openssl-1.1.0g/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625663012060 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/CONTRIBUTING0000644000000000000000000000505013176625655013713 0ustar rootrootHOW TO CONTRIBUTE PATCHES TO OpenSSL ------------------------------------ (Please visit https://www.openssl.org/community/getting-started.html for other ideas about how to contribute.) Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see the above link or https://mta.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general OpenSSL community you might want to discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first. Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good reason as to why that feature isn't implemented. To submit a patch, make a pull request on GitHub. If you think the patch could use feedback from the community, please start a thread on openssl-dev to discuss it. Having addressed the following items before the PR will help make the acceptance and review process faster: 1. Anything other than trivial contributions will require a contributor licensing agreement, giving us permission to use your code. See https://www.openssl.org/policies/cla.html for details. 2. All source files should start with the following text (with appropriate comment characters at the start of each line and the year(s) updated): Copyright 20xx-20yy The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 3. Patches should be as current as possible; expect to have to rebase often. We do not accept merge commits; You will be asked to remove them before a patch is considered acceptable. 4. Patches should follow our coding style (see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without warnings. Where gcc or clang is available you should use the --strict-warnings Configure option. OpenSSL compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features. Clean builds via Travis and AppVeyor are expected, and done whenever a PR is created or updated. 5. When at all possible, patches should include tests. These can either be added to an existing test, or completely new. Please see test/README for information on the test framework. 6. New features or changed functionality must include documentation. Please look at the "pod" files in doc/apps, doc/crypto and doc/ssl for examples of our style. openssl-1.1.0g/ms/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661012475 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/ms/segrenam.pl0000755000000000000000000000527013176625661014642 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html my $quiet = 1; unpack("L",pack("N",1))!=1 || die "only little-endian hosts are supported"; # first argument can specify custom suffix... $suffix=(@ARGV[0]=~/^\$/) ? shift(@ARGV) : "\$m"; ################################################################# # rename segments in COFF modules according to %map table below # %map=( ".text" => "fipstx$suffix", # ".text\$"=> "fipstx$suffix", # ".rdata" => "fipsrd$suffix", # ".data" => "fipsda$suffix" ); # ################################################################# # collect file list foreach (@ARGV) { if (/\*/) { push(@files,glob($_)); } else { push(@files,$_); } } use Fcntl; use Fcntl ":seek"; foreach (@files) { $file=$_; print "processing $file\n" unless $quiet; sysopen(FD,$file,O_RDWR|O_BINARY) || die "sysopen($file): $!"; # read IMAGE_DOS_HEADER sysread(FD,$mz,64)==64 || die "$file is too short"; @dos_header=unpack("a2C58I",$mz); if (@dos_header[0] eq "MZ") { $e_lfanew=pop(@dos_header); sysseek(FD,$e_lfanew,SEEK_SET) || die "$file is too short"; sysread(FD,$Magic,4)==4 || die "$file is too short"; unpack("I",$Magic)==0x4550 || die "$file is not COFF image"; } elsif ($file =~ /\.obj$/i) { # .obj files have no IMAGE_DOS_HEADER sysseek(FD,0,SEEK_SET) || die "unable to rewind $file"; } else { next; } # read IMAGE_FILE_HEADER sysread(FD,$coff,20)==20 || die "$file is too short"; ($Machine,$NumberOfSections,$TimeDateStamp, $PointerToSymbolTable,$NumberOfSysmbols, $SizeOfOptionalHeader,$Characteristics)=unpack("SSIIISS",$coff); # skip over IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER sysseek(FD,$SizeOfOptionalHeader,SEEK_CUR) || die "$file is too short"; # traverse IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER table for($i=0;$i<$NumberOfSections;$i++) { sysread(FD,$SectionHeader,40)==40 || die "$file is too short"; ($Name,@opaque)=unpack("Z8C*",$SectionHeader); if ($map{$Name}) { sysseek(FD,-40,SEEK_CUR) || die "unable to rewind $file"; syswrite(FD,pack("a8C*",$map{$Name},@opaque))==40 || die "syswrite failed: $!"; printf " %-8s -> %.8s\n",$Name,$map{$Name} unless $quiet; } } close(FD); } openssl-1.1.0g/ms/uplink-x86.pl0000755000000000000000000000205313176625661014762 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC, "${dir}.", "${dir}../crypto/perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; require "uplink-common.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"uplink-x86"); &external_label("OPENSSL_Uplink"); &public_label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable"); for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) { &function_begin_B("_\$lazy${i}"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable"))); &push ($i); &push ("eax"); &call (&label("OPENSSL_Uplink")); &pop ("eax"); &add ("esp",4); &jmp_ptr(&DWP(4*$i,"eax")); &function_end_B("_\$lazy${i}"); } &dataseg(); &align(4); &set_label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable"); &data_word($N); for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) { &data_word(&label("_\$lazy${i}")); } &asm_finish(); close OUTPUT; openssl-1.1.0g/ms/uplink.c0000644000000000000000000000777213176625661014160 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if (defined(_WIN64) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(UNICODE) # define UNICODE #endif #if defined(UNICODE) && !defined(_UNICODE) # define _UNICODE #endif #if defined(_UNICODE) && !defined(UNICODE) # define UNICODE #endif #include #include #include #include "uplink.h" void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *, ...); static TCHAR msg[128]; static void unimplemented(void) { OPENSSL_showfatal(sizeof(TCHAR) == sizeof(char) ? "%s\n" : "%S\n", msg); ExitProcess(1); } void OPENSSL_Uplink(volatile void **table, int index) { static HMODULE volatile apphandle = NULL; static void **volatile applinktable = NULL; int len; void (*func) (void) = unimplemented; HANDLE h; void **p; /* * Note that the below code is not MT-safe in respect to msg buffer, but * what's the worst thing that can happen? Error message might be * misleading or corrupted. As error condition is fatal and should never * be risen, I accept the risk... */ /* * One can argue that I should have used InterlockedExchangePointer or * something to update static variables and table[]. Well, store * instructions are as atomic as they can get and assigned values are * effectively constant... So that volatile qualifier should be * sufficient [it prohibits compiler to reorder memory access * instructions]. */ do { len = _sntprintf(msg, sizeof(msg) / sizeof(TCHAR), _T("OPENSSL_Uplink(%p,%02X): "), table, index); _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("unimplemented function")); if ((h = apphandle) == NULL) { if ((h = GetModuleHandle(NULL)) == NULL) { apphandle = (HMODULE) - 1; _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("no host application")); break; } apphandle = h; } if ((h = apphandle) == (HMODULE) - 1) /* revalidate */ break; if (applinktable == NULL) { void **(*applink) (); applink = (void **(*)())GetProcAddress(h, "OPENSSL_Applink"); if (applink == NULL) { apphandle = (HMODULE) - 1; _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("no OPENSSL_Applink")); break; } p = (*applink) (); if (p == NULL) { apphandle = (HMODULE) - 1; _tcscpy(msg + len, _T("no ApplinkTable")); break; } applinktable = p; } else p = applinktable; if (index > (int)p[0]) break; if (p[index]) func = p[index]; } while (0); table[index] = func; } #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86) # define LAZY(i) \ __declspec(naked) static void lazy##i (void) { \ _asm push i \ _asm push OFFSET OPENSSL_UplinkTable \ _asm call OPENSSL_Uplink \ _asm add esp,8 \ _asm jmp OPENSSL_UplinkTable+4*i } # if APPLINK_MAX>25 # error "Add more stubs..." # endif /* make some in advance... */ LAZY(1) LAZY(2) LAZY(3) LAZY(4) LAZY(5) LAZY(6) LAZY(7) LAZY(8) LAZY(9) LAZY(10) LAZY(11) LAZY(12) LAZY(13) LAZY(14) LAZY(15) LAZY(16) LAZY(17) LAZY(18) LAZY(19) LAZY(20) LAZY(21) LAZY(22) LAZY(23) LAZY(24) LAZY(25) void *OPENSSL_UplinkTable[] = { (void *)APPLINK_MAX, lazy1, lazy2, lazy3, lazy4, lazy5, lazy6, lazy7, lazy8, lazy9, lazy10, lazy11, lazy12, lazy13, lazy14, lazy15, lazy16, lazy17, lazy18, lazy19, lazy20, lazy21, lazy22, lazy23, lazy24, lazy25, }; #endif #ifdef SELFTEST main() { UP_fprintf(UP_stdout, "hello, world!\n"); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ms/cmp.pl0000755000000000000000000000225213176625661013615 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ($#ARGV == 1) || die "usage: cmp.pl \n"; open(IN0,"<$ARGV[0]") || die "unable to open $ARGV[0]\n"; open(IN1,"<$ARGV[1]") || die "unable to open $ARGV[1]\n"; binmode IN0; binmode IN1; $tot=0; $ret=1; for (;;) { $n1=sysread(IN0,$b1,4096); $n2=sysread(IN1,$b2,4096); last if ($n1 != $n2); last if ($b1 ne $b2); last if ($n1 < 0); if ($n1 == 0) { $ret=0; last; } $tot+=$n1; } close(IN0); close(IN1); if ($ret) { printf STDERR "$ARGV[0] and $ARGV[1] are different\n"; @a1=unpack("C*",$b1); @a2=unpack("C*",$b2); for ($i=0; $i<=$#a1; $i++) { if ($a1[$i] ne $a2[$i]) { printf "%02X %02X <<\n",$a1[$i],$a2[$i]; last; } } $nm=$tot+$n1; $tot+=$i+1; printf STDERR "diff at char $tot of $nm\n"; } exit($ret); openssl-1.1.0g/ms/tlhelp32.h0000644000000000000000000001046513176625661014311 0ustar rootroot/*- tlhelp32.h - Include file for Tool help functions. Written by Mumit Khan This file is part of a free library for the Win32 API. This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. */ #ifndef _TLHELP32_H # define _TLHELP32_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define HF32_DEFAULT 1 # define HF32_SHARED 2 # define LF32_FIXED 0x1 # define LF32_FREE 0x2 # define LF32_MOVEABLE 0x4 # define MAX_MODULE_NAME32 255 # define TH32CS_SNAPHEAPLIST 0x1 # define TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS 0x2 # define TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD 0x4 # define TH32CS_SNAPMODULE 0x8 # define TH32CS_SNAPALL (TH32CS_SNAPHEAPLIST|TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS|TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD|TH32CS_SNAPMODULE) # define TH32CS_INHERIT 0x80000000 typedef struct tagHEAPLIST32 { DWORD dwSize; DWORD th32ProcessID; DWORD th32HeapID; DWORD dwFlags; } HEAPLIST32, *PHEAPLIST32, *LPHEAPLIST32; typedef struct tagHEAPENTRY32 { DWORD dwSize; HANDLE hHandle; DWORD dwAddress; DWORD dwBlockSize; DWORD dwFlags; DWORD dwLockCount; DWORD dwResvd; DWORD th32ProcessID; DWORD th32HeapID; } HEAPENTRY32, *PHEAPENTRY32, *LPHEAPENTRY32; typedef struct tagPROCESSENTRY32W { DWORD dwSize; DWORD cntUsage; DWORD th32ProcessID; DWORD th32DefaultHeapID; DWORD th32ModuleID; DWORD cntThreads; DWORD th32ParentProcessID; LONG pcPriClassBase; DWORD dwFlags; WCHAR szExeFile[MAX_PATH]; } PROCESSENTRY32W, *PPROCESSENTRY32W, *LPPROCESSENTRY32W; typedef struct tagPROCESSENTRY32 { DWORD dwSize; DWORD cntUsage; DWORD th32ProcessID; DWORD th32DefaultHeapID; DWORD th32ModuleID; DWORD cntThreads; DWORD th32ParentProcessID; LONG pcPriClassBase; DWORD dwFlags; CHAR szExeFile[MAX_PATH]; } PROCESSENTRY32, *PPROCESSENTRY32, *LPPROCESSENTRY32; typedef struct tagTHREADENTRY32 { DWORD dwSize; DWORD cntUsage; DWORD th32ThreadID; DWORD th32OwnerProcessID; LONG tpBasePri; LONG tpDeltaPri; DWORD dwFlags; } THREADENTRY32, *PTHREADENTRY32, *LPTHREADENTRY32; typedef struct tagMODULEENTRY32W { DWORD dwSize; DWORD th32ModuleID; DWORD th32ProcessID; DWORD GlblcntUsage; DWORD ProccntUsage; BYTE *modBaseAddr; DWORD modBaseSize; HMODULE hModule; WCHAR szModule[MAX_MODULE_NAME32 + 1]; WCHAR szExePath[MAX_PATH]; } MODULEENTRY32W, *PMODULEENTRY32W, *LPMODULEENTRY32W; typedef struct tagMODULEENTRY32 { DWORD dwSize; DWORD th32ModuleID; DWORD th32ProcessID; DWORD GlblcntUsage; DWORD ProccntUsage; BYTE *modBaseAddr; DWORD modBaseSize; HMODULE hModule; char szModule[MAX_MODULE_NAME32 + 1]; char szExePath[MAX_PATH]; } MODULEENTRY32, *PMODULEENTRY32, *LPMODULEENTRY32; BOOL WINAPI Heap32First(LPHEAPENTRY32, DWORD, DWORD); BOOL WINAPI Heap32ListFirst(HANDLE, LPHEAPLIST32); BOOL WINAPI Heap32ListNext(HANDLE, LPHEAPLIST32); BOOL WINAPI Heap32Next(LPHEAPENTRY32); BOOL WINAPI Module32First(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32); BOOL WINAPI Module32FirstW(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32W); BOOL WINAPI Module32Next(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32); BOOL WINAPI Module32NextW(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32W); BOOL WINAPI Process32First(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32); BOOL WINAPI Process32FirstW(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32W); BOOL WINAPI Process32Next(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32); BOOL WINAPI Process32NextW(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32W); BOOL WINAPI Thread32First(HANDLE, LPTHREADENTRY32); BOOL WINAPI Thread32Next(HANDLE, LPTHREADENTRY32); BOOL WINAPI Toolhelp32ReadProcessMemory(DWORD, LPCVOID, LPVOID, DWORD, LPDWORD); HANDLE WINAPI CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(DWORD, DWORD); # ifdef UNICODE # define LPMODULEENTRY32 LPMODULEENTRY32W # define LPPROCESSENTRY32 LPPROCESSENTRY32W # define MODULEENTRY32 MODULEENTRY32W # define Module32First Module32FirstW # define Module32Next Module32NextW # define PMODULEENTRY32 PMODULEENTRY32W # define PPROCESSENTRY32 PPROCESSENTRY32W # define PROCESSENTRY32 PROCESSENTRY32W # define Process32First Process32FirstW # define Process32Next Process32NextW # endif /* UNICODE */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* _TLHELP32_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/ms/uplink-common.pl0000755000000000000000000000212513176625661015625 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # pull APPLINK_MAX value from applink.c... $applink_c=$0; $applink_c=~s|[^/\\]+$||g; $applink_c.="applink.c"; open(INPUT,$applink_c) || die "can't open $applink_c: $!"; @max=grep {/APPLINK_MAX\s+(\d+)/} ; close(INPUT); ($#max==0) or die "can't find APPLINK_MAX in $applink_c"; $max[0]=~/APPLINK_MAX\s+(\d+)/; $N=$1; # number of entries in OPENSSL_UplinkTable not including # OPENSSL_UplinkTable[0], which contains this value... 1; # Idea is to fill the OPENSSL_UplinkTable with pointers to stubs # which invoke 'void OPENSSL_Uplink (ULONG_PTR *table,int index)'; # and then dereference themselves. Latter shall result in endless # loop *unless* OPENSSL_Uplink does not replace 'table[index]' with # something else, e.g. as 'table[index]=unimplemented;'... openssl-1.1.0g/ms/applink.c0000644000000000000000000000666413176625661014313 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define APPLINK_STDIN 1 #define APPLINK_STDOUT 2 #define APPLINK_STDERR 3 #define APPLINK_FPRINTF 4 #define APPLINK_FGETS 5 #define APPLINK_FREAD 6 #define APPLINK_FWRITE 7 #define APPLINK_FSETMOD 8 #define APPLINK_FEOF 9 #define APPLINK_FCLOSE 10 /* should not be used */ #define APPLINK_FOPEN 11 /* solely for completeness */ #define APPLINK_FSEEK 12 #define APPLINK_FTELL 13 #define APPLINK_FFLUSH 14 #define APPLINK_FERROR 15 #define APPLINK_CLEARERR 16 #define APPLINK_FILENO 17 /* to be used with below */ #define APPLINK_OPEN 18 /* formally can't be used, as flags can vary */ #define APPLINK_READ 19 #define APPLINK_WRITE 20 #define APPLINK_LSEEK 21 #define APPLINK_CLOSE 22 #define APPLINK_MAX 22 /* always same as last macro */ #ifndef APPMACROS_ONLY # include # include # include static void *app_stdin(void) { return stdin; } static void *app_stdout(void) { return stdout; } static void *app_stderr(void) { return stderr; } static int app_feof(FILE *fp) { return feof(fp); } static int app_ferror(FILE *fp) { return ferror(fp); } static void app_clearerr(FILE *fp) { clearerr(fp); } static int app_fileno(FILE *fp) { return _fileno(fp); } static int app_fsetmod(FILE *fp, char mod) { return _setmode(_fileno(fp), mod == 'b' ? _O_BINARY : _O_TEXT); } #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif __declspec(dllexport) void ** # if defined(__BORLANDC__) /* * __stdcall appears to be the only way to get the name * decoration right with Borland C. Otherwise it works * purely incidentally, as we pass no parameters. */ __stdcall # else __cdecl # endif OPENSSL_Applink(void) { static int once = 1; static void *OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_MAX + 1] = { (void *)APPLINK_MAX }; if (once) { OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_STDIN] = app_stdin; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_STDOUT] = app_stdout; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_STDERR] = app_stderr; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FPRINTF] = fprintf; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FGETS] = fgets; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FREAD] = fread; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FWRITE] = fwrite; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FSETMOD] = app_fsetmod; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FEOF] = app_feof; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FCLOSE] = fclose; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FOPEN] = fopen; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FSEEK] = fseek; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FTELL] = ftell; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FFLUSH] = fflush; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FERROR] = app_ferror; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_CLEARERR] = app_clearerr; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_FILENO] = app_fileno; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_OPEN] = _open; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_READ] = _read; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_WRITE] = _write; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_LSEEK] = _lseek; OPENSSL_ApplinkTable[APPLINK_CLOSE] = _close; once = 0; } return OPENSSL_ApplinkTable; } #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ms/uplink-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000000276313176625661015303 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $output=pop; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"${dir}../crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl\" \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; push(@INC,"${dir}."); require "uplink-common.pl"; $prefix="_lazy"; print <<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_Uplink .globl OPENSSL_UplinkTable ___ for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) { print <<___; .type $prefix${i},\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 $prefix${i}: .byte 0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x28 # sub rsp,40 mov %rcx,48(%rsp) mov %rdx,56(%rsp) mov %r8,64(%rsp) mov %r9,72(%rsp) lea OPENSSL_UplinkTable(%rip),%rcx mov \$$i,%rdx call OPENSSL_Uplink mov 48(%rsp),%rcx mov 56(%rsp),%rdx mov 64(%rsp),%r8 mov 72(%rsp),%r9 lea OPENSSL_UplinkTable(%rip),%rax add \$40,%rsp jmp *8*$i(%rax) $prefix${i}_end: .size $prefix${i},.-$prefix${i} ___ } print <<___; .data OPENSSL_UplinkTable: .quad $N ___ for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) { print " .quad $prefix$i\n"; } print <<___; .section .pdata,"r" .align 4 ___ for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) { print <<___; .rva $prefix${i},$prefix${i}_end,${prefix}_unwind_info ___ } print <<___; .section .xdata,"r" .align 8 ${prefix}_unwind_info: .byte 0x01,0x04,0x01,0x00 .byte 0x04,0x42,0x00,0x00 ___ close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/ms/uplink.h0000644000000000000000000000426613176625661014160 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define APPMACROS_ONLY #include "applink.c" extern void *OPENSSL_UplinkTable[]; #define UP_stdin (*(void *(*)(void))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_STDIN])() #define UP_stdout (*(void *(*)(void))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_STDOUT])() #define UP_stderr (*(void *(*)(void))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_STDERR])() #define UP_fprintf (*(int (*)(void *,const char *,...))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FPRINTF]) #define UP_fgets (*(char *(*)(char *,int,void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FGETS]) #define UP_fread (*(size_t (*)(void *,size_t,size_t,void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FREAD]) #define UP_fwrite (*(size_t (*)(const void *,size_t,size_t,void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FWRITE]) #define UP_fsetmod (*(int (*)(void *,char))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FSETMOD]) #define UP_feof (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FEOF]) #define UP_fclose (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FCLOSE]) #define UP_fopen (*(void *(*)(const char *,const char *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FOPEN]) #define UP_fseek (*(int (*)(void *,long,int))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FSEEK]) #define UP_ftell (*(long (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FTELL]) #define UP_fflush (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FFLUSH]) #define UP_ferror (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FERROR]) #define UP_clearerr (*(void (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_CLEARERR]) #define UP_fileno (*(int (*)(void *))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_FILENO]) #define UP_open (*(int (*)(const char *,int,...))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_OPEN]) #define UP_read (*(ossl_ssize_t (*)(int,void *,size_t))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_READ]) #define UP_write (*(ossl_ssize_t (*)(int,const void *,size_t))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_WRITE]) #define UP_lseek (*(long (*)(int,long,int))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_LSEEK]) #define UP_close (*(int (*)(int))OPENSSL_UplinkTable[APPLINK_CLOSE]) openssl-1.1.0g/ms/uplink-ia64.pl0000755000000000000000000000260313176625661015101 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}."); require "uplink-common.pl"; local $V=8; # max number of args uplink functions may accept... my $loc0 = "r".(32+$V); print <<___; .text .global OPENSSL_Uplink# .type OPENSSL_Uplink#,\@function ___ for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) { print <<___; .proc lazy$i# lazy$i: .prologue { .mii; .save ar.pfs,$loc0 alloc loc0=ar.pfs,$V,3,2,0 .save b0,loc1 mov loc1=b0 addl loc2=\@ltoff(OPENSSL_UplinkTable#),gp };; .body { .mmi; ld8 out0=[loc2] mov out1=$i };; { .mib; add loc2=8*$i,out0 br.call.sptk.many b0=OPENSSL_Uplink# };; { .mmi; ld8 r31=[loc2];; ld8 r30=[r31],8 };; { .mii; ld8 gp=[r31] mov b6=r30 mov b0=loc1 };; { .mib; mov ar.pfs=loc0 br.many b6 };; .endp lazy$i# ___ } print <<___; .data .global OPENSSL_UplinkTable# OPENSSL_UplinkTable: data8 $N // amount of following entries ___ for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) { print " data8 \@fptr(lazy$i#)\n"; } print <<___; .size OPENSSL_UplinkTable,.-OPENSSL_UplinkTable# ___ close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/AUTHORS0000644000000000000000000000055213176625655013133 0ustar rootroot Andy Polyakov Ben Laurie Bodo Möller Emilia Käsper Eric Young Geoff Thorpe Holger Reif Kurt Roeckx Lutz Jänicke Mark J. Cox Matt Caswell Nils Larsch Paul C. Sutton Ralf S. Engelschall Rich Salz Richard Levitte Stephen Henson Steve Marquess Tim Hudson Ulf Möller Viktor Dukhovni openssl-1.1.0g/test/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662013036 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/sslapitest.c0000644000000000000000000010360313176625662015400 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssltestlib.h" #include "testutil.h" #include "e_os.h" static char *cert = NULL; static char *privkey = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static const unsigned char orespder[] = "Dummy OCSP Response"; static int ocsp_server_called = 0; static int ocsp_client_called = 0; static int cdummyarg = 1; static X509 *ocspcert = NULL; #endif #define NUM_EXTRA_CERTS 40 static int execute_test_large_message(const SSL_METHOD *smeth, const SSL_METHOD *cmeth, int read_ahead) { SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL; SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL; int testresult = 0; int i; BIO *certbio = BIO_new_file(cert, "r"); X509 *chaincert = NULL; int certlen; if (certbio == NULL) { printf("Can't load the certificate file\n"); goto end; } chaincert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certbio, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(certbio); certbio = NULL; if (chaincert == NULL) { printf("Unable to load certificate for chain\n"); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(smeth, cmeth, &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); goto end; } if(read_ahead) { /* * Test that read_ahead works correctly when dealing with large * records */ SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(cctx, 1); } /* * We assume the supplied certificate is big enough so that if we add * NUM_EXTRA_CERTS it will make the overall message large enough. The * default buffer size is requested to be 16k, but due to the way BUF_MEM * works, it ends up allocating a little over 21k (16 * 4/3). So, in this test * we need to have a message larger than that. */ certlen = i2d_X509(chaincert, NULL); OPENSSL_assert((certlen * NUM_EXTRA_CERTS) > ((SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH * 4) / 3)); for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXTRA_CERTS; i++) { if (!X509_up_ref(chaincert)) { printf("Unable to up ref cert\n"); goto end; } if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(sctx, chaincert)) { printf("Unable to add extra chain cert %d\n", i); X509_free(chaincert); goto end; } } if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n"); goto end; } /* * Calling SSL_clear() first is not required but this tests that SSL_clear() * doesn't leak (when using enable-crypto-mdebug). */ if (!SSL_clear(serverssl)) { printf("Unexpected failure from SSL_clear()\n"); goto end; } testresult = 1; end: X509_free(chaincert); SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); SSL_CTX_free(sctx); SSL_CTX_free(cctx); return testresult; } static int test_large_message_tls(void) { return execute_test_large_message(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), 0); } static int test_large_message_tls_read_ahead(void) { return execute_test_large_message(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), 1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS static int test_large_message_dtls(void) { /* * read_ahead is not relevant to DTLS because DTLS always acts as if * read_ahead is set. */ return execute_test_large_message(DTLS_server_method(), DTLS_client_method(), 0); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static int ocsp_server_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { int *argi = (int *)arg; unsigned char *orespdercopy = NULL; STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = NULL; OCSP_RESPID *id = NULL; if (*argi == 2) { /* In this test we are expecting exactly 1 OCSP_RESPID */ SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(s, &ids); if (ids == NULL || sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids) != 1) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(ids, 0); if (id == NULL || !OCSP_RESPID_match(id, ocspcert)) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } else if (*argi != 1) { return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } orespdercopy = OPENSSL_memdup(orespder, sizeof(orespder)); if (orespdercopy == NULL) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, orespdercopy, sizeof(orespder)); ocsp_server_called = 1; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int ocsp_client_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { int *argi = (int *)arg; const unsigned char *respderin; size_t len; if (*argi != 1 && *argi != 2) return 0; len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &respderin); if (memcmp(orespder, respderin, len) != 0) return 0; ocsp_client_called = 1; return 1; } static int test_tlsext_status_type(void) { SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL; SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL; int testresult = 0; STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = NULL; OCSP_RESPID *id = NULL; BIO *certbio = NULL; if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); return 0; } if (SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type(cctx) != -1) { printf("Unexpected initial value for " "SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type()\n"); goto end; } /* First just do various checks getting and setting tlsext_status_type */ clientssl = SSL_new(cctx); if (SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(clientssl) != -1) { printf("Unexpected initial value for SSL_get_tlsext_status_type()\n"); goto end; } if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(clientssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) { printf("Unexpected fail for SSL_set_tlsext_status_type()\n"); goto end; } if (SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(clientssl) != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { printf("Unexpected result for SSL_get_tlsext_status_type()\n"); goto end; } SSL_free(clientssl); clientssl = NULL; if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(cctx, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) { printf("Unexpected fail for SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type()\n"); goto end; } if (SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type(cctx) != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { printf("Unexpected result for SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type()\n"); goto end; } clientssl = SSL_new(cctx); if (SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(clientssl) != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { printf("Unexpected result for SSL_get_tlsext_status_type() (test 2)\n"); goto end; } SSL_free(clientssl); clientssl = NULL; /* * Now actually do a handshake and check OCSP information is exchanged and * the callbacks get called */ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(cctx, ocsp_client_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(cctx, &cdummyarg); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(sctx, ocsp_server_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(sctx, &cdummyarg); if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n"); goto end; } if (!ocsp_client_called || !ocsp_server_called) { printf("OCSP callbacks not called\n"); goto end; } SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); serverssl = NULL; clientssl = NULL; /* Try again but this time force the server side callback to fail */ ocsp_client_called = 0; ocsp_server_called = 0; cdummyarg = 0; if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); goto end; } /* This should fail because the callback will fail */ if (create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Unexpected success creating the connection\n"); goto end; } if (ocsp_client_called || ocsp_server_called) { printf("OCSP callbacks successfully called unexpectedly\n"); goto end; } SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); serverssl = NULL; clientssl = NULL; /* * This time we'll get the client to send an OCSP_RESPID that it will * accept. */ ocsp_client_called = 0; ocsp_server_called = 0; cdummyarg = 2; if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); goto end; } /* * We'll just use any old cert for this test - it doesn't have to be an OCSP * specific one. We'll use the server cert. */ certbio = BIO_new_file(cert, "r"); if (certbio == NULL) { printf("Can't load the certificate file\n"); goto end; } id = OCSP_RESPID_new(); ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); ocspcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certbio, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (id == NULL || ids == NULL || ocspcert == NULL || !OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(id, ocspcert) || !sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(ids, id)) { printf("Unable to set OCSP_RESPIDs\n"); goto end; } id = NULL; SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(clientssl, ids); /* Control has been transferred */ ids = NULL; BIO_free(certbio); certbio = NULL; if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n"); goto end; } if (!ocsp_client_called || !ocsp_server_called) { printf("OCSP callbacks not called\n"); goto end; } testresult = 1; end: SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); SSL_CTX_free(sctx); SSL_CTX_free(cctx); sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); OCSP_RESPID_free(id); BIO_free(certbio); X509_free(ocspcert); ocspcert = NULL; return testresult; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP */ typedef struct ssl_session_test_fixture { const char *test_case_name; int use_ext_cache; int use_int_cache; } SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE; static int new_called = 0, remove_called = 0; static SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE ssl_session_set_up(const char *const test_case_name) { SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; fixture.use_ext_cache = 1; fixture.use_int_cache = 1; new_called = remove_called = 0; return fixture; } static void ssl_session_tear_down(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { } static int new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { new_called++; return 1; } static void remove_session_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) { remove_called++; } static int execute_test_session(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE fix) { SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL; SSL *serverssl1 = NULL, *clientssl1 = NULL; SSL *serverssl2 = NULL, *clientssl2 = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 SSL *serverssl3 = NULL, *clientssl3 = NULL; #endif SSL_SESSION *sess1 = NULL, *sess2 = NULL; int testresult = 0; if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 /* Only allow TLS1.2 so we can force a connection failure later */ SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(cctx, TLS1_2_VERSION); #endif /* Set up session cache */ if (fix.use_ext_cache) { SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(cctx, new_session_cb); SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(cctx, remove_session_cb); } if (fix.use_int_cache) { /* Also covers instance where both are set */ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(cctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); } else { SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(cctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE); } if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl1, &clientssl1, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl1, clientssl1)) { printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n"); goto end; } sess1 = SSL_get1_session(clientssl1); if (sess1 == NULL) { printf("Unexpected NULL session\n"); goto end; } if (fix.use_int_cache && SSL_CTX_add_session(cctx, sess1)) { /* Should have failed because it should already be in the cache */ printf("Unexpected success adding session to cache\n"); goto end; } if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 1 || remove_called != 0)) { printf("Session not added to cache\n"); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl2, &clientssl2, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create second SSL objects\n"); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl2, clientssl2)) { printf("Unable to create second SSL connection\n"); goto end; } sess2 = SSL_get1_session(clientssl2); if (sess2 == NULL) { printf("Unexpected NULL session from clientssl2\n"); goto end; } if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 0)) { printf("Remove session callback unexpectedly called\n"); goto end; } /* * This should clear sess2 from the cache because it is a "bad" session. See * SSL_set_session() documentation. */ if (!SSL_set_session(clientssl2, sess1)) { printf("Unexpected failure setting session\n"); goto end; } if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 1)) { printf("Failed to call callback to remove session\n"); goto end; } if (SSL_get_session(clientssl2) != sess1) { printf("Unexpected session found\n"); goto end; } if (fix.use_int_cache) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_session(cctx, sess2)) { /* * Should have succeeded because it should not already be in the cache */ printf("Unexpected failure adding session to cache\n"); goto end; } if (!SSL_CTX_remove_session(cctx, sess2)) { printf("Unexpected failure removing session from cache\n"); goto end; } /* This is for the purposes of internal cache testing...ignore the * counter for external cache */ if (fix.use_ext_cache) remove_called--; } /* This shouldn't be in the cache so should fail */ if (SSL_CTX_remove_session(cctx, sess2)) { printf("Unexpected success removing session from cache\n"); goto end; } if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 2)) { printf("Failed to call callback to remove session #2\n"); goto end; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) /* Force a connection failure */ SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(sctx, TLS1_1_VERSION); if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl3, &clientssl3, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create third SSL objects\n"); goto end; } if (!SSL_set_session(clientssl3, sess1)) { printf("Unable to set session for third connection\n"); goto end; } /* This should fail because of the mismatched protocol versions */ if (create_ssl_connection(serverssl3, clientssl3)) { printf("Unable to create third SSL connection\n"); goto end; } /* We should have automatically removed the session from the cache */ if (fix.use_ext_cache && (new_called != 2 || remove_called != 3)) { printf("Failed to call callback to remove session #2\n"); goto end; } if (fix.use_int_cache && !SSL_CTX_add_session(cctx, sess2)) { /* * Should have succeeded because it should not already be in the cache */ printf("Unexpected failure adding session to cache #2\n"); goto end; } #endif testresult = 1; end: SSL_free(serverssl1); SSL_free(clientssl1); SSL_free(serverssl2); SSL_free(clientssl2); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 SSL_free(serverssl3); SSL_free(clientssl3); #endif SSL_SESSION_free(sess1); SSL_SESSION_free(sess2); /* * Check if we need to remove any sessions up-refed for the external cache */ if (new_called >= 1) SSL_SESSION_free(sess1); if (new_called >= 2) SSL_SESSION_free(sess2); SSL_CTX_free(sctx); SSL_CTX_free(cctx); return testresult; } static int test_session_with_only_int_cache(void) { SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_session_set_up); fixture.use_ext_cache = 0; EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_session, ssl_session_tear_down); } static int test_session_with_only_ext_cache(void) { SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_session_set_up); fixture.use_int_cache = 0; EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_session, ssl_session_tear_down); } static int test_session_with_both_cache(void) { SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_SESSION_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_session_set_up); EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_session, ssl_session_tear_down); } #define USE_NULL 0 #define USE_BIO_1 1 #define USE_BIO_2 2 #define TOTAL_SSL_SET_BIO_TESTS (3 * 3 * 3 * 3) static void setupbio(BIO **res, BIO *bio1, BIO *bio2, int type) { switch (type) { case USE_NULL: *res = NULL; break; case USE_BIO_1: *res = bio1; break; case USE_BIO_2: *res = bio2; break; } } static int test_ssl_set_bio(int idx) { SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()); BIO *bio1 = NULL; BIO *bio2 = NULL; BIO *irbio = NULL, *iwbio = NULL, *nrbio = NULL, *nwbio = NULL; SSL *ssl = NULL; int initrbio, initwbio, newrbio, newwbio; int testresult = 0; if (ctx == NULL) { printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n"); goto end; } ssl = SSL_new(ctx); if (ssl == NULL) { printf("Failed to allocate SSL object\n"); goto end; } initrbio = idx % 3; idx /= 3; initwbio = idx % 3; idx /= 3; newrbio = idx % 3; idx /= 3; newwbio = idx; OPENSSL_assert(newwbio <= 2); if (initrbio == USE_BIO_1 || initwbio == USE_BIO_1 || newrbio == USE_BIO_1 || newwbio == USE_BIO_1) { bio1 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (bio1 == NULL) { printf("Failed to allocate bio1\n"); goto end; } } if (initrbio == USE_BIO_2 || initwbio == USE_BIO_2 || newrbio == USE_BIO_2 || newwbio == USE_BIO_2) { bio2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (bio2 == NULL) { printf("Failed to allocate bio2\n"); goto end; } } setupbio(&irbio, bio1, bio2, initrbio); setupbio(&iwbio, bio1, bio2, initwbio); /* * We want to maintain our own refs to these BIO, so do an up ref for each * BIO that will have ownership transferred in the SSL_set_bio() call */ if (irbio != NULL) BIO_up_ref(irbio); if (iwbio != NULL && iwbio != irbio) BIO_up_ref(iwbio); SSL_set_bio(ssl, irbio, iwbio); setupbio(&nrbio, bio1, bio2, newrbio); setupbio(&nwbio, bio1, bio2, newwbio); /* * We will (maybe) transfer ownership again so do more up refs. * SSL_set_bio() has some really complicated ownership rules where BIOs have * already been set! */ if (nrbio != NULL && nrbio != irbio && (nwbio != iwbio || nrbio != nwbio)) BIO_up_ref(nrbio); if (nwbio != NULL && nwbio != nrbio && (nwbio != iwbio || (nwbio == iwbio && irbio == iwbio))) BIO_up_ref(nwbio); SSL_set_bio(ssl, nrbio, nwbio); testresult = 1; end: SSL_free(ssl); BIO_free(bio1); BIO_free(bio2); /* * This test is checking that the ref counting for SSL_set_bio is correct. * If we get here and we did too many frees then we will fail in the above * functions. If we haven't done enough then this will only be detected in * a crypto-mdebug build */ SSL_CTX_free(ctx); return testresult; } typedef struct ssl_bio_test_fixture { const char *test_case_name; int pop_ssl; enum { NO_BIO_CHANGE, CHANGE_RBIO, CHANGE_WBIO } change_bio; } SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE; static SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE ssl_bio_set_up(const char *const test_case_name) { SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; fixture.pop_ssl = 0; fixture.change_bio = NO_BIO_CHANGE; return fixture; } static void ssl_bio_tear_down(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { } static int execute_test_ssl_bio(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE fix) { BIO *sslbio = NULL, *membio1 = NULL, *membio2 = NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()); SSL *ssl = NULL; int testresult = 0; if (ctx == NULL) { printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n"); return 0; } ssl = SSL_new(ctx); if (ssl == NULL) { printf("Failed to allocate SSL object\n"); goto end; } sslbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); membio1 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (sslbio == NULL || membio1 == NULL) { printf("Malloc failure creating BIOs\n"); goto end; } BIO_set_ssl(sslbio, ssl, BIO_CLOSE); /* * If anything goes wrong here then we could leak memory, so this will * be caught in a crypto-mdebug build */ BIO_push(sslbio, membio1); /* Verify changing the rbio/wbio directly does not cause leaks */ if (fix.change_bio != NO_BIO_CHANGE) { membio2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (membio2 == NULL) { printf("Malloc failure creating membio2\n"); goto end; } if (fix.change_bio == CHANGE_RBIO) SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, membio2); else SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, membio2); } ssl = NULL; if (fix.pop_ssl) BIO_pop(sslbio); else BIO_pop(membio1); testresult = 1; end: BIO_free(membio1); BIO_free(sslbio); SSL_free(ssl); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); return testresult; } static int test_ssl_bio_pop_next_bio(void) { SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up); EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down); } static int test_ssl_bio_pop_ssl_bio(void) { SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up); fixture.pop_ssl = 1; EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down); } static int test_ssl_bio_change_rbio(void) { SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up); fixture.change_bio = CHANGE_RBIO; EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down); } static int test_ssl_bio_change_wbio(void) { SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE, ssl_bio_set_up); fixture.change_bio = CHANGE_WBIO; EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test_ssl_bio, ssl_bio_tear_down); } typedef struct { /* The list of sig algs */ const int *list; /* The length of the list */ size_t listlen; /* A sigalgs list in string format */ const char *liststr; /* Whether setting the list should succeed */ int valid; /* Whether creating a connection with the list should succeed */ int connsuccess; } sigalgs_list; static const int validlist1[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA}; static const int validlist2[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC}; static const int validlist3[] = {NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC}; static const int invalidlist1[] = {NID_undef, EVP_PKEY_RSA}; static const int invalidlist2[] = {NID_sha256, NID_undef}; static const int invalidlist3[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha256}; static const int invalidlist4[] = {NID_sha256}; static const sigalgs_list testsigalgs[] = { {validlist1, OSSL_NELEM(validlist1), NULL, 1, 1}, {validlist2, OSSL_NELEM(validlist2), NULL, 1, 1}, {validlist3, OSSL_NELEM(validlist3), NULL, 1, 0}, {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256", 1, 1}, {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 1}, {NULL, 0, "ECDSA+SHA512", 1, 0}, {invalidlist1, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist1), NULL, 0, 0}, {invalidlist2, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist2), NULL, 0, 0}, {invalidlist3, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist3), NULL, 0, 0}, {invalidlist4, OSSL_NELEM(invalidlist4), NULL, 0, 0}, {NULL, 0, "RSA", 0, 0}, {NULL, 0, "SHA256", 0, 0}, {NULL, 0, "RSA+SHA256:SHA256", 0, 0}, {NULL, 0, "Invalid", 0, 0}}; static int test_set_sigalgs(int idx) { SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL; SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL; int testresult = 0; const sigalgs_list *curr; int testctx; /* Should never happen */ if ((size_t)idx >= OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs) * 2) return 0; testctx = ((size_t)idx < OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs)); curr = testctx ? &testsigalgs[idx] : &testsigalgs[idx - OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs)]; if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); return 0; } if (testctx) { int ret; if (curr->list != NULL) ret = SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(cctx, curr->list, curr->listlen); else ret = SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx, curr->liststr); if (!ret) { if (curr->valid) printf("Unexpected failure setting sigalgs in SSL_CTX (%d)\n", idx); else testresult = 1; goto end; } if (!curr->valid) { printf("Unexpected success setting sigalgs in SSL_CTX (%d)\n", idx); goto end; } } if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); goto end; } if (!testctx) { int ret; if (curr->list != NULL) ret = SSL_set1_sigalgs(clientssl, curr->list, curr->listlen); else ret = SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(clientssl, curr->liststr); if (!ret) { if (curr->valid) printf("Unexpected failure setting sigalgs in SSL (%d)\n", idx); else testresult = 1; goto end; } if (!curr->valid) { printf("Unexpected success setting sigalgs in SSL (%d)\n", idx); goto end; } } if (curr->connsuccess != create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Unexpected return value creating SSL connection (%d)\n", idx); goto end; } testresult = 1; end: SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); SSL_CTX_free(sctx); SSL_CTX_free(cctx); return testresult; } static int clntaddcb = 0; static int clntparsecb = 0; static int srvaddcb = 0; static int srvparsecb = 0; static int snicb = 0; #define TEST_EXT_TYPE1 0xff00 static int add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg) { int *server = (int *)add_arg; unsigned char *data; if (SSL_is_server(s)) srvaddcb++; else clntaddcb++; if (*server != SSL_is_server(s) || (data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data))) == NULL) return -1; *data = 1; *out = data; *outlen = sizeof(char); return 1; } static void free_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *out, void *add_arg) { OPENSSL_free((unsigned char *)out); } static int parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg) { int *server = (int *)parse_arg; if (SSL_is_server(s)) srvparsecb++; else clntparsecb++; if (*server != SSL_is_server(s) || inlen != sizeof(char) || *in != 1) return -1; return 1; } static int sni_cb(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg) { SSL_CTX *ctx = (SSL_CTX *)arg; if (SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx) == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } snicb++; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } /* * Custom call back tests. * Test 0: callbacks in TLSv1.2 * Test 1: callbacks in TLSv1.2 with SNI */ static int test_custom_exts(int tst) { SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL, *sctx2 = NULL; SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL; int testresult = 0; static int server = 1; static int client = 0; SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; /* Reset callback counters */ clntaddcb = clntparsecb = srvaddcb = srvparsecb = 0; snicb = 0; if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); goto end; } if (tst == 1 && !create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), NULL, &sctx2, NULL, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair (2)\n"); goto end; } /* Create a client side custom extension */ if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(cctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb, &client, parse_cb, &client)) { printf("Unable to add client custom extension\n"); goto end; } /* Should not be able to add duplicates */ if (SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(cctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb, &client, parse_cb, &client)) { printf("Unexpected success adding duplicate extension\n"); goto end; } /* Create a server side custom extension */ if (!SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(sctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb, &server, parse_cb, &server)) { printf("Unable to add server custom extension\n"); goto end; } if (sctx2 != NULL && !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(sctx2, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb, &server, parse_cb, &server)) { printf("Unable to add server custom extension for SNI\n"); goto end; } /* Should not be able to add duplicates */ if (SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(sctx, TEST_EXT_TYPE1, add_cb, free_cb, &server, parse_cb, &server)) { printf("Unexpected success adding duplicate extension (2)\n"); goto end; } if (tst == 1) { /* Set up SNI */ if (!SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(sctx, sni_cb) || !SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(sctx, sctx2)) { printf("Cannot set SNI callbacks\n"); goto end; } } if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL) || !create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Cannot create SSL connection\n"); goto end; } if (clntaddcb != 1 || clntparsecb != 1 || srvaddcb != 1 || srvparsecb != 1 || (tst != 1 && snicb != 0) || (tst == 1 && snicb != 1)) { printf("Incorrect callback counts\n"); goto end; } sess = SSL_get1_session(clientssl); SSL_shutdown(clientssl); SSL_shutdown(serverssl); SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); serverssl = clientssl = NULL; if (tst == 1) { /* We don't bother with the resumption aspects for this test */ testresult = 1; goto end; } if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, NULL) || !SSL_set_session(clientssl, sess) || !create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Cannot create resumption connection\n"); goto end; } /* * For a resumed session we expect to add the ClientHello extension but we * should ignore it on the server side. */ if (clntaddcb != 2 || clntparsecb != 1 || srvaddcb != 1 || srvparsecb != 1) { printf("Incorrect resumption callback counts\n"); goto end; } testresult = 1; end: SSL_SESSION_free(sess); SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); SSL_CTX_free(sctx2); SSL_CTX_free(sctx); SSL_CTX_free(cctx); return testresult; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BIO *err = NULL; int testresult = 1; if (argc != 3) { printf("Invalid argument count\n"); return 1; } cert = argv[1]; privkey = argv[2]; err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); ADD_TEST(test_large_message_tls); ADD_TEST(test_large_message_tls_read_ahead); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS ADD_TEST(test_large_message_dtls); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP ADD_TEST(test_tlsext_status_type); #endif ADD_TEST(test_session_with_only_int_cache); ADD_TEST(test_session_with_only_ext_cache); ADD_TEST(test_session_with_both_cache); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_set_bio, TOTAL_SSL_SET_BIO_TESTS); ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_pop_next_bio); ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_pop_ssl_bio); ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_change_rbio); ADD_TEST(test_ssl_bio_change_wbio); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_set_sigalgs, OSSL_NELEM(testsigalgs) * 2); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_custom_exts, 2); testresult = run_tests(argv[0]); bio_s_mempacket_test_free(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0) testresult = 1; #endif BIO_free(err); if (!testresult) printf("PASS\n"); return testresult; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/testlib/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662014504 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/testlib/OpenSSL/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662015767 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm0000644000000000000000000006723213176625662017256 0ustar rootroot# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html package OpenSSL::Test; use strict; use warnings; use Test::More 0.96; use Exporter; use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT @EXPORT_OK %EXPORT_TAGS); $VERSION = "0.8"; @ISA = qw(Exporter); @EXPORT = (@Test::More::EXPORT, qw(setup indir app fuzz perlapp test perltest run)); @EXPORT_OK = (@Test::More::EXPORT_OK, qw(bldtop_dir bldtop_file srctop_dir srctop_file data_file pipe with cmdstr quotify)); =head1 NAME OpenSSL::Test - a private extension of Test::More =head1 SYNOPSIS use OpenSSL::Test; setup("my_test_name"); ok(run(app(["openssl", "version"])), "check for openssl presence"); indir "subdir" => sub { ok(run(test(["sometest", "arg1"], stdout => "foo.txt")), "run sometest with output to foo.txt"); }; =head1 DESCRIPTION This module is a private extension of L for testing OpenSSL. In addition to the Test::More functions, it also provides functions that easily find the diverse programs within a OpenSSL build tree, as well as some other useful functions. This module I on the environment variables C<$TOP> or C<$SRCTOP> and C<$BLDTOP>. Without one of the combinations it refuses to work. See L below. With each test recipe, a parallel data directory with (almost) the same name as the recipe is possible in the source directory tree. For example, for a recipe C<$SRCTOP/test/recipes/99-foo.t>, there could be a directory C<$SRCTOP/test/recipes/99-foo_data/>. =cut use File::Copy; use File::Spec::Functions qw/file_name_is_absolute curdir canonpath splitdir catdir catfile splitpath catpath devnull abs2rel rel2abs/; use File::Path 2.00 qw/rmtree mkpath/; use File::Basename; # The name of the test. This is set by setup() and is used in the other # functions to verify that setup() has been used. my $test_name = undef; # Directories we want to keep track of TOP, APPS, TEST and RESULTS are the # ones we're interested in, corresponding to the environment variables TOP # (mandatory), BIN_D, TEST_D, UTIL_D and RESULT_D. my %directories = (); # The environment variables that gave us the contents in %directories. These # get modified whenever we change directories, so that subprocesses can use # the values of those environment variables as well my @direnv = (); # A bool saying if we shall stop all testing if the current recipe has failing # tests or not. This is set by setup() if the environment variable STOPTEST # is defined with a non-empty value. my $end_with_bailout = 0; # A set of hooks that is affected by with() and may be used in diverse places. # All hooks are expected to be CODE references. my %hooks = ( # exit_checker is used by run() directly after completion of a command. # it receives the exit code from that command and is expected to return # 1 (for success) or 0 (for failure). This is the value that will be # returned by run(). # NOTE: When run() gets the option 'capture => 1', this hook is ignored. exit_checker => sub { return shift == 0 ? 1 : 0 }, ); # Debug flag, to be set manually when needed my $debug = 0; # Declare some utility functions that are defined at the end sub bldtop_file; sub bldtop_dir; sub srctop_file; sub srctop_dir; sub quotify; # Declare some private functions that are defined at the end sub __env; sub __cwd; sub __apps_file; sub __results_file; sub __fixup_cmd; sub __build_cmd; =head2 Main functions The following functions are exported by default when using C. =cut =over 4 =item B C is used for initial setup, and it is mandatory that it's used. If it's not used in a OpenSSL test recipe, the rest of the recipe will most likely refuse to run. C checks for environment variables (see L below), checks that C<$TOP/Configure> or C<$SRCTOP/Configure> exists, C into the results directory (defined by the C<$RESULT_D> environment variable if defined, otherwise C<$BLDTOP/test> or C<$TOP/test>, whichever is defined). =back =cut sub setup { my $old_test_name = $test_name; $test_name = shift; BAIL_OUT("setup() must receive a name") unless $test_name; warn "setup() detected test name change. Innocuous, so we continue...\n" if $old_test_name && $old_test_name ne $test_name; return if $old_test_name; BAIL_OUT("setup() needs \$TOP or \$SRCTOP and \$BLDTOP to be defined") unless $ENV{TOP} || ($ENV{SRCTOP} && $ENV{BLDTOP}); BAIL_OUT("setup() found both \$TOP and \$SRCTOP or \$BLDTOP...") if $ENV{TOP} && ($ENV{SRCTOP} || $ENV{BLDTOP}); __env(); BAIL_OUT("setup() expects the file Configure in the source top directory") unless -f srctop_file("Configure"); __cwd($directories{RESULTS}); } =over 4 =item B sub BLOCK, OPTS> C is used to run a part of the recipe in a different directory than the one C moved into, usually a subdirectory, given by SUBDIR. The part of the recipe that's run there is given by the codeblock BLOCK. C takes some additional options OPTS that affect the subdirectory: =over 4 =item B 0|1> When set to 1 (or any value that perl preceives as true), the subdirectory will be created if it doesn't already exist. This happens before BLOCK is executed. =item B 0|1> When set to 1 (or any value that perl preceives as true), the subdirectory will be cleaned out and removed. This happens both before and after BLOCK is executed. =back An example: indir "foo" => sub { ok(run(app(["openssl", "version"]), stdout => "foo.txt")); if (ok(open(RESULT, "foo.txt"), "reading foo.txt")) { my $line = ; close RESULT; is($line, qr/^OpenSSL 1\./, "check that we're using OpenSSL 1.x.x"); } }, create => 1, cleanup => 1; =back =cut sub indir { my $subdir = shift; my $codeblock = shift; my %opts = @_; my $reverse = __cwd($subdir,%opts); BAIL_OUT("FAILURE: indir, \"$subdir\" wasn't possible to move into") unless $reverse; $codeblock->(); __cwd($reverse); if ($opts{cleanup}) { rmtree($subdir, { safe => 0 }); } } =over 4 =item B =item B Both of these functions take a reference to a list that is a command and its arguments, and some additional options (described further on). C expects to find the given command (the first item in the given list reference) as an executable in C<$BIN_D> (if defined, otherwise C<$TOP/apps> or C<$BLDTOP/apps>). C expects to find the given command (the first item in the given list reference) as an executable in C<$TEST_D> (if defined, otherwise C<$TOP/test> or C<$BLDTOP/test>). Both return a CODEREF to be used by C, C or C. The options that both C and C can take are in the form of hash values: =over 4 =item B PATH> =item B PATH> =item B PATH> In all three cases, the corresponding standard input, output or error is redirected from (for stdin) or to (for the others) a file given by the string PATH, I, if the value is C, C or similar. =back =item B =item B Both these functions function the same way as B and B, except that they expect the command to be a perl script. Also, they support one more option: =over 4 =item B ARRAYref> The array reference is a set of arguments for perl rather than the script. Take care so that none of them can be seen as a script! Flags and their eventual arguments only! =back An example: ok(run(perlapp(["foo.pl", "arg1"], interpreter_args => [ "-I", srctop_dir("test") ]))); =back =cut sub app { my $cmd = shift; my %opts = @_; return sub { my $num = shift; return __build_cmd($num, \&__apps_file, $cmd, %opts); } } sub fuzz { my $cmd = shift; my %opts = @_; return sub { my $num = shift; return __build_cmd($num, \&__fuzz_file, $cmd, %opts); } } sub test { my $cmd = shift; my %opts = @_; return sub { my $num = shift; return __build_cmd($num, \&__test_file, $cmd, %opts); } } sub perlapp { my $cmd = shift; my %opts = @_; return sub { my $num = shift; return __build_cmd($num, \&__perlapps_file, $cmd, %opts); } } sub perltest { my $cmd = shift; my %opts = @_; return sub { my $num = shift; return __build_cmd($num, \&__perltest_file, $cmd, %opts); } } =over 4 =item B This CODEREF is expected to be the value return by C or C, anything else will most likely cause an error unless you know what you're doing. C executes the command returned by CODEREF and return either the resulting output (if the option C is set true) or a boolean indicating if the command succeeded or not. The options that C can take are in the form of hash values: =over 4 =item B 0|1> If true, the command will be executed with a perl backtick, and C will return the resulting output as an array of lines. If false or not given, the command will be executed with C, and C will return 1 if the command was successful or 0 if it wasn't. =back For further discussion on what is considered a successful command or not, see the function C further down. =back =cut sub run { my ($cmd, $display_cmd) = shift->(0); my %opts = @_; return () if !$cmd; my $prefix = ""; if ( $^O eq "VMS" ) { # VMS $prefix = "pipe "; } my @r = (); my $r = 0; my $e = 0; # In non-verbose, we want to shut up the command interpreter, in case # it has something to complain about. On VMS, it might complain both # on stdout and stderr my $save_STDOUT; my $save_STDERR; if ($ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} && !$ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) { open $save_STDOUT, '>&', \*STDOUT or die "Can't dup STDOUT: $!"; open $save_STDERR, '>&', \*STDERR or die "Can't dup STDERR: $!"; open STDOUT, ">", devnull(); open STDERR, ">", devnull(); } # The dance we do with $? is the same dance the Unix shells appear to # do. For example, a program that gets aborted (and therefore signals # SIGABRT = 6) will appear to exit with the code 134. We mimic this # to make it easier to compare with a manual run of the command. if ($opts{capture}) { @r = `$prefix$cmd`; $e = ($? & 0x7f) ? ($? & 0x7f)|0x80 : ($? >> 8); } else { system("$prefix$cmd"); $e = ($? & 0x7f) ? ($? & 0x7f)|0x80 : ($? >> 8); $r = $hooks{exit_checker}->($e); } if ($ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} && !$ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) { close STDOUT; close STDERR; open STDOUT, '>&', $save_STDOUT or die "Can't restore STDOUT: $!"; open STDERR, '>&', $save_STDERR or die "Can't restore STDERR: $!"; } print STDERR "$prefix$display_cmd => $e\n" if !$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}; # At this point, $? stops being interesting, and unfortunately, # there are Test::More versions that get picky if we leave it # non-zero. $? = 0; if ($opts{capture}) { return @r; } else { return $r; } } END { my $tb = Test::More->builder; my $failure = scalar(grep { $_ == 0; } $tb->summary); if ($failure && $end_with_bailout) { BAIL_OUT("Stoptest!"); } } =head2 Utility functions The following functions are exported on request when using C. # To only get the bldtop_file and srctop_file functions. use OpenSSL::Test qw/bldtop_file srctop_file/; # To only get the bldtop_file function in addition to the default ones. use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_file/; =cut # Utility functions, exported on request =over 4 =item B LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL build directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or C<$BLDTOP>). C returns the resulting directory as a string, adapted to the local operating system. =back =cut sub bldtop_dir { return __bldtop_dir(@_); # This caters for operating systems that have # a very distinct syntax for directories. } =over 4 =item B LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL build directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or C<$BLDTOP>) and FILENAME is the name of a file located in that directory path. C returns the resulting file path as a string, adapted to the local operating system. =back =cut sub bldtop_file { return __bldtop_file(@_); } =over 4 =item B LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL source directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or C<$SRCTOP>). C returns the resulting directory as a string, adapted to the local operating system. =back =cut sub srctop_dir { return __srctop_dir(@_); # This caters for operating systems that have # a very distinct syntax for directories. } =over 4 =item B LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the top of the OpenSSL source directory (as indicated by the environment variable C<$TOP> or C<$SRCTOP>) and FILENAME is the name of a file located in that directory path. C returns the resulting file path as a string, adapted to the local operating system. =back =cut sub srctop_file { return __srctop_file(@_); } =over 4 =item B LIST is a list of directories that make up a path from the data directory associated with the test (see L above) and FILENAME is the name of a file located in that directory path. C returns the resulting file path as a string, adapted to the local operating system. =back =cut sub data_file { return __data_file(@_); } =over 4 =item B LIST is a list of CODEREFs returned by C or C, from which C creates a new command composed of all the given commands put together in a pipe. C returns a new CODEREF in the same manner as C or C, to be passed to C for execution. =back =cut sub pipe { my @cmds = @_; return sub { my @cs = (); my @dcs = (); my @els = (); my $counter = 0; foreach (@cmds) { my ($c, $dc, @el) = $_->(++$counter); return () if !$c; push @cs, $c; push @dcs, $dc; push @els, @el; } return ( join(" | ", @cs), join(" | ", @dcs), @els ); }; } =over 4 =item B C will temporarly install hooks given by the HASHREF and then execute the given CODEREF. Hooks are usually expected to have a coderef as value. The currently available hoosk are: =over 4 =item B CODEREF> This hook is executed after C has performed its given command. The CODEREF receives the exit code as only argument and is expected to return 1 (if the exit code indicated success) or 0 (if the exit code indicated failure). =back =back =cut sub with { my $opts = shift; my %opts = %{$opts}; my $codeblock = shift; my %saved_hooks = (); foreach (keys %opts) { $saved_hooks{$_} = $hooks{$_} if exists($hooks{$_}); $hooks{$_} = $opts{$_}; } $codeblock->(); foreach (keys %saved_hooks) { $hooks{$_} = $saved_hooks{$_}; } } =over 4 =item B C takes a CODEREF from C or C and simply returns the command as a string. C takes some additiona options OPTS that affect the string returned: =over 4 =item B 0|1> When set to 0, the returned string will be with all decorations, such as a possible redirect of stderr to the null device. This is suitable if the string is to be used directly in a recipe. When set to 1, the returned string will be without extra decorations. This is suitable for display if that is desired (doesn't confuse people with all internal stuff), or if it's used to pass a command down to a subprocess. Default: 0 =back =back =cut sub cmdstr { my ($cmd, $display_cmd) = shift->(0); my %opts = @_; if ($opts{display}) { return $display_cmd; } else { return $cmd; } } =over 4 =item B LIST is a list of strings that are going to be used as arguments for a command, and makes sure to inject quotes and escapes as necessary depending on the content of each string. This can also be used to put quotes around the executable of a command. I =back =cut sub quotify { # Unix setup (default if nothing else is mentioned) my $arg_formatter = sub { $_ = shift; /\s|[\{\}\\\$\[\]\*\?\|\&:;<>]/ ? "'$_'" : $_ }; if ( $^O eq "VMS") { # VMS setup $arg_formatter = sub { $_ = shift; if (/\s|["[:upper:]]/) { s/"/""/g; '"'.$_.'"'; } else { $_; } }; } elsif ( $^O eq "MSWin32") { # MSWin setup $arg_formatter = sub { $_ = shift; if (/\s|["\|\&\*\;<>]/) { s/(["\\])/\\$1/g; '"'.$_.'"'; } else { $_; } }; } return map { $arg_formatter->($_) } @_; } ###################################################################### # private functions. These are never exported. =head1 ENVIRONMENT OpenSSL::Test depends on some environment variables. =over 4 =item B This environment variable is mandatory. C will check that it's defined and that it's a directory that contains the file C. If this isn't so, C will C. =item B If defined, its value should be the directory where the openssl application is located. Defaults to C<$TOP/apps> (adapted to the operating system). =item B If defined, its value should be the directory where the test applications are located. Defaults to C<$TOP/test> (adapted to the operating system). =item B If defined, it puts testing in a different mode, where a recipe with failures will result in a C at the end of its run. =back =cut sub __env { (my $recipe_datadir = basename($0)) =~ s/\.t$/_data/i; $directories{SRCTOP} = $ENV{SRCTOP} || $ENV{TOP}; $directories{BLDTOP} = $ENV{BLDTOP} || $ENV{TOP}; $directories{BLDAPPS} = $ENV{BIN_D} || __bldtop_dir("apps"); $directories{SRCAPPS} = __srctop_dir("apps"); $directories{BLDFUZZ} = __bldtop_dir("fuzz"); $directories{SRCFUZZ} = __srctop_dir("fuzz"); $directories{BLDTEST} = $ENV{TEST_D} || __bldtop_dir("test"); $directories{SRCTEST} = __srctop_dir("test"); $directories{SRCDATA} = __srctop_dir("test", "recipes", $recipe_datadir); $directories{RESULTS} = $ENV{RESULT_D} || $directories{BLDTEST}; push @direnv, "TOP" if $ENV{TOP}; push @direnv, "SRCTOP" if $ENV{SRCTOP}; push @direnv, "BLDTOP" if $ENV{BLDTOP}; push @direnv, "BIN_D" if $ENV{BIN_D}; push @direnv, "TEST_D" if $ENV{TEST_D}; push @direnv, "RESULT_D" if $ENV{RESULT_D}; $end_with_bailout = $ENV{STOPTEST} ? 1 : 0; }; sub __srctop_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; return catfile($directories{SRCTOP},@_,$f); } sub __srctop_dir { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); return catdir($directories{SRCTOP},@_); } sub __bldtop_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; return catfile($directories{BLDTOP},@_,$f); } sub __bldtop_dir { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); return catdir($directories{BLDTOP},@_); } sub __exeext { my $ext = ""; if ($^O eq "VMS" ) { # VMS $ext = ".exe"; } elsif ($^O eq "MSWin32") { # Windows $ext = ".exe"; } return $ENV{"EXE_EXT"} || $ext; } sub __test_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; my $out = catfile($directories{BLDTEST},@_,$f . __exeext()); $out = catfile($directories{SRCTEST},@_,$f) unless -x $out; return $out; } sub __perltest_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; my $out = catfile($directories{BLDTEST},@_,$f); $out = catfile($directories{SRCTEST},@_,$f) unless -f $out; return ($^X, $out); } sub __apps_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; my $out = catfile($directories{BLDAPPS},@_,$f . __exeext()); $out = catfile($directories{SRCAPPS},@_,$f) unless -x $out; return $out; } sub __fuzz_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; my $out = catfile($directories{BLDFUZZ},@_,$f . __exeext()); $out = catfile($directories{SRCFUZZ},@_,$f) unless -x $out; return $out; } sub __perlapps_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; my $out = catfile($directories{BLDAPPS},@_,$f); $out = catfile($directories{SRCAPPS},@_,$f) unless -f $out; return ($^X, $out); } sub __data_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; return catfile($directories{SRCDATA},@_,$f); } sub __results_file { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $f = pop; return catfile($directories{RESULTS},@_,$f); } sub __cwd { my $dir = catdir(shift); my %opts = @_; my $abscurdir = rel2abs(curdir()); my $absdir = rel2abs($dir); my $reverse = abs2rel($abscurdir, $absdir); # PARANOIA: if we're not moving anywhere, we do nothing more if ($abscurdir eq $absdir) { return $reverse; } # Do not support a move to a different volume for now. Maybe later. BAIL_OUT("FAILURE: \"$dir\" moves to a different volume, not supported") if $reverse eq $abscurdir; # If someone happened to give a directory that leads back to the current, # it's extremely silly to do anything more, so just simulate that we did # move. # In this case, we won't even clean it out, for safety's sake. return "." if $reverse eq ""; $dir = canonpath($dir); if ($opts{create}) { mkpath($dir); } # We are recalculating the directories we keep track of, but need to save # away the result for after having moved into the new directory. my %tmp_directories = (); my %tmp_ENV = (); # For each of these directory variables, figure out where they are relative # to the directory we want to move to if they aren't absolute (if they are, # they don't change!) my @dirtags = sort keys %directories; foreach (@dirtags) { if (!file_name_is_absolute($directories{$_})) { my $newpath = abs2rel(rel2abs($directories{$_}), rel2abs($dir)); $tmp_directories{$_} = $newpath; } } # Treat each environment variable that was used to get us the values in # %directories the same was as the paths in %directories, so any sub # process can use their values properly as well foreach (@direnv) { if (!file_name_is_absolute($ENV{$_})) { my $newpath = abs2rel(rel2abs($ENV{$_}), rel2abs($dir)); $tmp_ENV{$_} = $newpath; } } # Should we just bail out here as well? I'm unsure. return undef unless chdir($dir); if ($opts{cleanup}) { rmtree(".", { safe => 0, keep_root => 1 }); } # We put back new values carefully. Doing the obvious # %directories = ( %tmp_irectories ) # will clear out any value that happens to be an absolute path foreach (keys %tmp_directories) { $directories{$_} = $tmp_directories{$_}; } foreach (keys %tmp_ENV) { $ENV{$_} = $tmp_ENV{$_}; } if ($debug) { print STDERR "DEBUG: __cwd(), directories and files:\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{BLDTEST} = \"$directories{BLDTEST}\"\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{SRCTEST} = \"$directories{SRCTEST}\"\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{SRCDATA} = \"$directories{SRCDATA}\"\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{RESULTS} = \"$directories{RESULTS}\"\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{BLDAPPS} = \"$directories{BLDAPPS}\"\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{SRCAPPS} = \"$directories{SRCAPPS}\"\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{SRCTOP} = \"$directories{SRCTOP}\"\n"; print STDERR " \$directories{BLDTOP} = \"$directories{BLDTOP}\"\n"; print STDERR "\n"; print STDERR " current directory is \"",curdir(),"\"\n"; print STDERR " the way back is \"$reverse\"\n"; } return $reverse; } sub __fixup_cmd { my $prog = shift; my $exe_shell = shift; my $prefix = __bldtop_file("util", "shlib_wrap.sh")." "; if (defined($exe_shell)) { $prefix = "$exe_shell "; } elsif ($^O eq "VMS" ) { # VMS $prefix = ($prog =~ /^(?:[\$a-z0-9_]+:)?[<\[]/i ? "mcr " : "mcr []"); } elsif ($^O eq "MSWin32") { # Windows $prefix = ""; } # We test both with and without extension. The reason # is that we might be passed a complete file spec, with # extension. if ( ! -x $prog ) { my $prog = "$prog"; if ( ! -x $prog ) { $prog = undef; } } if (defined($prog)) { # Make sure to quotify the program file on platforms that may # have spaces or similar in their path name. # To our knowledge, VMS is the exception where quotifying should # never happen. ($prog) = quotify($prog) unless $^O eq "VMS"; return $prefix.$prog; } print STDERR "$prog not found\n"; return undef; } sub __build_cmd { BAIL_OUT("Must run setup() first") if (! $test_name); my $num = shift; my $path_builder = shift; # Make a copy to not destroy the caller's array my @cmdarray = ( @{$_[0]} ); shift; my %opts = @_; # We do a little dance, as $path_builder might return a list of # more than one. If so, only the first is to be considered a # program to fix up, the rest is part of the arguments. This # happens for perl scripts, where $path_builder will return # a list of two, $^X and the script name. # Also, if $path_builder returned more than one, we don't apply # the EXE_SHELL environment variable. my @prog = ($path_builder->(shift @cmdarray)); my $first = shift @prog; my $exe_shell = @prog ? undef : $ENV{EXE_SHELL}; my $cmd = __fixup_cmd($first, $exe_shell); if (@prog) { if ( ! -f $prog[0] ) { print STDERR "$prog[0] not found\n"; $cmd = undef; } } my @args = (@prog, @cmdarray); if (defined($opts{interpreter_args})) { unshift @args, @{$opts{interpreter_args}}; } return () if !$cmd; my $arg_str = ""; my $null = devnull(); $arg_str = " ".join(" ", quotify @args) if @args; my $fileornull = sub { $_[0] ? $_[0] : $null; }; my $stdin = ""; my $stdout = ""; my $stderr = ""; my $saved_stderr = undef; $stdin = " < ".$fileornull->($opts{stdin}) if exists($opts{stdin}); $stdout= " > ".$fileornull->($opts{stdout}) if exists($opts{stdout}); $stderr=" 2> ".$fileornull->($opts{stderr}) if exists($opts{stderr}); my $display_cmd = "$cmd$arg_str$stdin$stdout$stderr"; $stderr=" 2> ".$null unless $stderr || !$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}; $cmd .= "$arg_str$stdin$stdout$stderr"; if ($debug) { print STDERR "DEBUG[__build_cmd]: \$cmd = \"$cmd\"\n"; print STDERR "DEBUG[__build_cmd]: \$display_cmd = \"$display_cmd\"\n"; } return ($cmd, $display_cmd); } =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 AUTHORS Richard Levitte Elevitte@openssl.orgE with assitance and inspiration from Andy Polyakov Eappro@openssl.org. =cut 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662016706 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm0000644000000000000000000000365713176625662020510 0ustar rootroot# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html package OpenSSL::Test::Simple; use strict; use warnings; use Exporter; use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT @EXPORT_OK %EXPORT_TAGS); $VERSION = "0.2"; @ISA = qw(Exporter); @EXPORT = qw(simple_test); =head1 NAME OpenSSL::Test::Simple - a few very simple test functions =head1 SYNOPSIS use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("my_test_name", "destest", "des"); =head1 DESCRIPTION Sometimes, the functions in L are quite tedious for some repetitive tasks. This module provides functions to make life easier. You could call them hacks if you wish. =cut use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; =over 4 =item B Runs a test named NAME, running the program PROGRAM with no arguments, to test the algorithm ALGORITHM. A complete recipe looks like this: use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_bf", "bftest", "bf"); =back =cut # args: # name (used with setup()) # algorithm (used to check if it's at all supported) # name of binary (the program that does the actual test) sub simple_test { my ($name, $prgr, @algos) = @_; setup($name); if (scalar(disabled(@algos))) { if (scalar(@algos) == 1) { plan skip_all => $algos[0]." is not supported by this OpenSSL build"; } else { my $last = pop @algos; plan skip_all => join(", ", @algos)." and $last are not supported by this OpenSSL build"; } } plan tests => 1; ok(run(test([$prgr])), "running $prgr"); } =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 AUTHORS Richard Levitte Elevitte@openssl.orgE with inspiration from Rich Salz Ersalz@openssl.orgE. =cut 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Utils.pm0000644000000000000000000001214213176625662020344 0ustar rootroot# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html package OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use strict; use warnings; use Exporter; use vars qw($VERSION @ISA @EXPORT @EXPORT_OK %EXPORT_TAGS); $VERSION = "0.1"; @ISA = qw(Exporter); @EXPORT = qw(alldisabled anydisabled disabled config available_protocols have_IPv4 have_IPv6); =head1 NAME OpenSSL::Test::Utils - test utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; my @tls = available_protocols("tls"); my @dtls = available_protocols("dtls"); alldisabled("dh", "dsa"); anydisabled("dh", "dsa"); config("fips"); have_IPv4(); have_IPv6(); =head1 DESCRIPTION This module provides utility functions for the testing framework. =cut use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_file/; =over 4 =item B Returns a list of strings for all the available SSL/TLS versions if STRING is "tls", or for all the available DTLS versions if STRING is "dtls". Otherwise, it returns the empty list. The strings in the returned list can be used with B and B. =item B =item B In an array context returns an array with each element set to 1 if the corresponding feature is disabled and 0 otherwise. In a scalar context, alldisabled returns 1 if all of the features in ARRAY are disabled, while anydisabled returns 1 if any of them are disabled. =item B Returns an item from the %config hash in \$TOP/configdata.pm. =item B =item B Return true if IPv4 / IPv6 is possible to use on the current system. =back =cut our %available_protocols; our %disabled; our %config; my $configdata_loaded = 0; sub load_configdata { # We eval it so it doesn't run at compile time of this file. # The latter would have bldtop_file() complain that setup() hasn't # been run yet. my $configdata = bldtop_file("configdata.pm"); eval { require $configdata; %available_protocols = %configdata::available_protocols; %disabled = %configdata::disabled; %config = %configdata::config; }; $configdata_loaded = 1; } # args # list of 1s and 0s, coming from check_disabled() sub anyof { my $x = 0; foreach (@_) { $x += $_ } return $x > 0; } # args # list of 1s and 0s, coming from check_disabled() sub allof { my $x = 1; foreach (@_) { $x *= $_ } return $x > 0; } # args # list of strings, all of them should be names of features # that can be disabled. # returns a list of 1s (if the corresponding feature is disabled) # and 0s (if it isn't) sub check_disabled { return map { exists $disabled{lc $_} ? 1 : 0 } @_; } # Exported functions ################################################# # args: # list of features to check sub anydisabled { load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded; my @ret = check_disabled(@_); return @ret if wantarray; return anyof(@ret); } # args: # list of features to check sub alldisabled { load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded; my @ret = check_disabled(@_); return @ret if wantarray; return allof(@ret); } # !!! Kept for backward compatibility # args: # single string sub disabled { anydisabled(@_); } sub available_protocols { load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded; my $protocol_class = shift; if (exists $available_protocols{lc $protocol_class}) { return @{$available_protocols{lc $protocol_class}} } return (); } sub config { load_configdata() unless $configdata_loaded; return $config{$_[0]}; } # IPv4 / IPv6 checker my $have_IPv4 = -1; my $have_IPv6 = -1; my $IP_factory; sub check_IP { my $listenaddress = shift; eval { require IO::Socket::IP; my $s = IO::Socket::IP->new( LocalAddr => $listenaddress, LocalPort => 0, Listen=>1, ); $s or die "\n"; $s->close(); }; if ($@ eq "") { return 1; } eval { require IO::Socket::INET6; my $s = IO::Socket::INET6->new( LocalAddr => $listenaddress, LocalPort => 0, Listen=>1, ); $s or die "\n"; $s->close(); }; if ($@ eq "") { return 1; } eval { require IO::Socket::INET; my $s = IO::Socket::INET->new( LocalAddr => $listenaddress, LocalPort => 0, Listen=>1, ); $s or die "\n"; $s->close(); }; if ($@ eq "") { return 1; } return 0; } sub have_IPv4 { if ($have_IPv4 < 0) { $have_IPv4 = check_IP("127.0.0.1"); } return $have_IPv4; } sub have_IPv6 { if ($have_IPv6 < 0) { $have_IPv6 = check_IP("::1"); } return $have_IPv6; } =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 AUTHORS Stephen Henson Esteve@openssl.orgE and Richard Levitte Elevitte@openssl.orgE =cut 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/dtlstest.c0000644000000000000000000000754613176625661015063 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "ssltestlib.h" #include "testutil.h" static char *cert = NULL; static char *privkey = NULL; #define NUM_TESTS 2 #define DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN 12 static unsigned char certstatus[] = { SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, /* Content type */ 0xfe, 0xfd, /* Record version */ 0, 1, /* Epoch */ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x0f, /* Record sequence number */ 0, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN - 2, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, /* Cert Status handshake message type */ 0, 0, DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN, /* Message len */ 0, 5, /* Message sequence */ 0, 0, 0, /* Fragment offset */ 0, 0, DUMMY_CERT_STATUS_LEN - 2, /* Fragment len */ 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80 /* Dummy data */ }; #define RECORD_SEQUENCE 10 static int test_dtls_unprocessed(int testidx) { SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL; SSL *serverssl1 = NULL, *clientssl1 = NULL; BIO *c_to_s_fbio, *c_to_s_mempacket; int testresult = 0; printf("Starting Test %d\n", testidx); if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(DTLS_server_method(), DTLS_client_method(), &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); return 0; } if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx, "AES128-SHA")) { printf("Failed setting cipher list\n"); } c_to_s_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_tls_dump_filter()); if (c_to_s_fbio == NULL) { printf("Failed to create filter BIO\n"); goto end; } /* BIO is freed by create_ssl_connection on error */ if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl1, &clientssl1, NULL, c_to_s_fbio)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout); goto end; } if (testidx == 1) certstatus[RECORD_SEQUENCE] = 0xff; /* * Inject a dummy record from the next epoch. In test 0, this should never * get used because the message sequence number is too big. In test 1 we set * the record sequence number to be way off in the future. This should not * have an impact on the record replay protection because the record should * be dropped before it is marked as arrived */ c_to_s_mempacket = SSL_get_wbio(clientssl1); c_to_s_mempacket = BIO_next(c_to_s_mempacket); mempacket_test_inject(c_to_s_mempacket, (char *)certstatus, sizeof(certstatus), 1, INJECT_PACKET_IGNORE_REC_SEQ); if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl1, clientssl1)) { printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout); goto end; } testresult = 1; end: SSL_free(serverssl1); SSL_free(clientssl1); SSL_CTX_free(sctx); SSL_CTX_free(cctx); return testresult; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BIO *err = NULL; int testresult = 1; if (argc != 3) { printf("Invalid argument count\n"); return 1; } cert = argv[1]; privkey = argv[2]; err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dtls_unprocessed, NUM_TESTS); testresult = run_tests(argv[0]); bio_f_tls_dump_filter_free(); bio_s_mempacket_test_free(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0) testresult = 1; #endif BIO_free(err); if (!testresult) printf("PASS\n"); return testresult; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/testx509.pem0000644000000000000000000000102213176625662015141 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBWzCCAQYCARgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwODELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNV BAgTA1FMRDEbMBkGA1UEAxMSU1NMZWF5L3JzYSB0ZXN0IENBMB4XDTk1MDYxOTIz MzMxMloXDTk1MDcxNzIzMzMxMlowOjELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNVBAgTA1FM RDEdMBsGA1UEAxMUU1NMZWF5L3JzYSB0ZXN0IGNlcnQwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEF AANLADBIAkEAqtt6qS5GTxVxGZYWa0/4u+IwHf7p2LNZbcPBp9/OfIcYAXBQn8hO /Re1uwLKXdCjIoaGs4DLdG88rkzfyK5dPQIDAQABMAwGCCqGSIb3DQIFBQADQQAE Wc7EcF8po2/ZO6kNCwK/ICH6DobgLekA5lSLr5EvuioZniZp5lFzAw4+YzPQ7XKJ zl9HYIMxATFyqSiD9jsx -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/testutil.h0000644000000000000000000000750213176625662015070 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_TESTUTIL_H # define HEADER_TESTUTIL_H #include /*- * SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE and EXECUTE_TEST macros for test case functions. * * SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE will call set_up() to create a new TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE * object called "fixture". It will also allocate the "result" variable used * by EXECUTE_TEST. set_up() should take a const char* specifying the test * case name and return a TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE by value. * * EXECUTE_TEST will pass fixture to execute_func() by value, call * tear_down(), and return the result of execute_func(). execute_func() should * take a TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE by value and return 1 on success and 0 on * failure. * * Unit tests can define their own SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE and EXECUTE_TEST * variations like so: * * #define SETUP_FOOBAR_TEST_FIXTURE()\ * SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(FOOBAR_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up_foobar) * * #define EXECUTE_FOOBAR_TEST()\ * EXECUTE_TEST(execute_foobar, tear_down_foobar) * * Then test case functions can take the form: * * static int test_foobar_feature() * { * SETUP_FOOBAR_TEST_FIXTURE(); * [...set individual members of fixture...] * EXECUTE_FOOBAR_TEST(); * } */ # define SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE, set_up)\ TEST_FIXTURE_TYPE fixture = set_up(TEST_CASE_NAME); \ int result = 0 # define EXECUTE_TEST(execute_func, tear_down)\ result = execute_func(fixture);\ tear_down(fixture);\ return result /* * TEST_CASE_NAME is defined as the name of the test case function where * possible; otherwise we get by with the file name and line number. */ # if !defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || __STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L # if defined(_MSC_VER) # define TEST_CASE_NAME __FUNCTION__ # else # define testutil_stringify_helper(s) #s # define testutil_stringify(s) testutil_stringify_helper(s) # define TEST_CASE_NAME __FILE__ ":" testutil_stringify(__LINE__) # endif /* _MSC_VER */ # else # define TEST_CASE_NAME __func__ # endif /* __STDC_VERSION__ */ /* * In main(), call ADD_TEST to register each test case function, then call * run_tests() to execute all tests and report the results. The result * returned from run_tests() should be used as the return value for main(). */ # define ADD_TEST(test_function) add_test(#test_function, test_function) /* * Simple parameterized tests. Adds a test_function(idx) test for each * 0 <= idx < num. */ # define ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_function, num) \ add_all_tests(#test_function, test_function, num) void add_test(const char *test_case_name, int (*test_fn) ()); void add_all_tests(const char *test_case_name, int (*test_fn)(int idx), int num); int run_tests(const char *test_prog_name); /* * Test assumption verification helpers. */ /* * Returns 1 if |s1| and |s2| are both NULL or equal. * Otherwise, returns 0 and pretty-prints diagnostics using |desc|. */ int strings_equal(const char *desc, const char *s1, const char *s2); #endif /* HEADER_TESTUTIL_H */ /* * For "impossible" conditions such as malloc failures or bugs in test code, * where continuing the test would be meaningless. Note that OPENSSL_assert * is fatal, and is never compiled out. */ #define TEST_check(condition) \ do { \ if (!(condition)) { \ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); \ OPENSSL_assert(!#condition); \ } \ } while (0); openssl-1.1.0g/test/casttest.c0000644000000000000000000001101513176625661015031 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_CAST is defined */ #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAST int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No CAST support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # define FULL_TEST static unsigned char k[16] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A }; static unsigned char in[8] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }; static int k_len[3] = { 16, 10, 5 }; static unsigned char c[3][8] = { {0x23, 0x8B, 0x4F, 0xE5, 0x84, 0x7E, 0x44, 0xB2}, {0xEB, 0x6A, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x2C, 0x02, 0x27, 0x1B}, {0x7A, 0xC8, 0x16, 0xD1, 0x6E, 0x9B, 0x30, 0x2E}, }; static unsigned char out[80]; static unsigned char in_a[16] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A }; static unsigned char in_b[16] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A }; static unsigned char c_a[16] = { 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0xA2, 0x49, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0xA6, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0x6D, 0xCA, 0x92 }; static unsigned char c_b[16] = { 0xB2, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0xB0, 0x0C, 0x31, 0xAD, 0x71, 0x80, 0xAC, 0x05, 0xB8, 0xE8, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x6E }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { # ifdef FULL_TEST long l; CAST_KEY key_b; # endif int i, z, err = 0; CAST_KEY key; for (z = 0; z < 3; z++) { CAST_set_key(&key, k_len[z], k); CAST_ecb_encrypt(in, out, &key, CAST_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(out, &(c[z][0]), 8) != 0) { printf("ecb cast error encrypting for keysize %d\n", k_len[z] * 8); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", out[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", c[z][i]); err = 20; printf("\n"); } CAST_ecb_encrypt(out, out, &key, CAST_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(out, in, 8) != 0) { printf("ecb cast error decrypting for keysize %d\n", k_len[z] * 8); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", out[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", in[i]); printf("\n"); err = 3; } } if (err == 0) printf("ecb cast5 ok\n"); # ifdef FULL_TEST { unsigned char out_a[16], out_b[16]; static char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF"; printf("This test will take some time...."); fflush(stdout); memcpy(out_a, in_a, sizeof(in_a)); memcpy(out_b, in_b, sizeof(in_b)); i = 1; for (l = 0; l < 1000000L; l++) { CAST_set_key(&key_b, 16, out_b); CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_a[0]), &(out_a[0]), &key_b, CAST_ENCRYPT); CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_a[8]), &(out_a[8]), &key_b, CAST_ENCRYPT); CAST_set_key(&key, 16, out_a); CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_b[0]), &(out_b[0]), &key, CAST_ENCRYPT); CAST_ecb_encrypt(&(out_b[8]), &(out_b[8]), &key, CAST_ENCRYPT); if ((l & 0xffff) == 0xffff) { printf("%c", hex[i & 0x0f]); fflush(stdout); i++; } } if ((memcmp(out_a, c_a, sizeof(c_a)) != 0) || (memcmp(out_b, c_b, sizeof(c_b)) != 0)) { printf("\n"); printf("Error\n"); printf("A out ="); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) printf("%02X ", out_a[i]); printf("\nactual="); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) printf("%02X ", c_a[i]); printf("\n"); printf("B out ="); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) printf("%02X ", out_b[i]); printf("\nactual="); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) printf("%02X ", c_b[i]); printf("\n"); } else printf(" ok\n"); } # endif EXIT(err); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/handshake_helper.c0000644000000000000000000011224313176625661016471 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "handshake_helper.h" #include "testutil.h" HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new() { HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); TEST_check(ret != NULL); return ret; } void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result) { if (result == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated); OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated); OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated); OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated); OPENSSL_free(result); } /* * Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert * from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash * the result in ex_data. */ typedef struct handshake_ex_data_st { int alert_sent; int num_fatal_alerts_sent; int alert_received; int session_ticket_do_not_call; ssl_servername_t servername; } HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA; typedef struct ctx_data_st { unsigned char *npn_protocols; size_t npn_protocols_len; unsigned char *alpn_protocols; size_t alpn_protocols_len; } CTX_DATA; /* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */ static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data) { OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols); ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols); ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL; } static int ex_data_idx; static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret) { if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) { ex_data->alert_sent = ret; if (strcmp(SSL_alert_type_string(ret), "F") == 0 || strcmp(SSL_alert_desc_string(ret), "CN") == 0) ex_data->num_fatal_alerts_sent++; } else { ex_data->alert_received = ret; } } } /* Select the appropriate server CTX. * Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found. * If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch. * Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch. * An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK. */ static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore) { const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); if (servername == NULL) { ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) { SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg; SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx); /* * Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior * allows testing of cases where the options between two * contexts differ/conflict */ SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL); SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx)); ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) { ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } else if (ignore) { ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } else { /* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } } /* * (RFC 6066): * If the server understood the ClientHello extension but * does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two * actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level * unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake. * * This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both * configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result * correctly. */ static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1); } static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0); } static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val = 0xff; static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val = 0xfe; static int server_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { unsigned char *resp; resp = OPENSSL_malloc(1); if (resp == NULL) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; /* * For the purposes of testing we just send back a dummy OCSP response */ *resp = *(unsigned char *)arg; if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, resp, 1)) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int client_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { const unsigned char *resp; int len; len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &resp); if (len != 1 || *resp != dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val) return 0; return 1; } static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION); return 0; } static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { return 1; } static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) { return 0; } static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) { HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1; return 0; } /* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */ static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen) { size_t len, i, prefix; len = strlen(protos); /* Should never have reuse. */ TEST_check(*out == NULL); /* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */ *out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); TEST_check(*out != NULL); *outlen = len + 1; /* * foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o' * foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r' */ memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len); prefix = 0; i = prefix + 1; while (i <= len) { if ((*out)[i] == ',') { TEST_check(i - 1 - prefix > 0); (*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix; prefix = i; } i++; } TEST_check(len - prefix > 0); (*out)[prefix] = len - prefix; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it * also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's * protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first * protocol that it supports. */ static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); int ret; ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx_data->npn_protocols, ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); /* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */ TEST_check(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED || ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) { CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); *data = ctx_data->npn_protocols; *len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif /* * The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports * and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server * supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL * respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. */ static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); int ret; /* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */ unsigned char *tmp_out; /* * The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|. * The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer, * so we can return directly without storing a copy. */ ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen, ctx_data->alpn_protocols, ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen); *out = tmp_out; /* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */ return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } /* * Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly * in the server/client CONF. */ static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx, const SSL_TEST_CTX *test, const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data, CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data, CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data) { unsigned char *ticket_keys; size_t ticket_key_len; TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server_ctx, test->max_fragment_size) == 1); if (server2_ctx != NULL) { TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server2_ctx, test->max_fragment_size) == 1); } TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(client_ctx, test->max_fragment_size) == 1); switch (extra->client.verify_callback) { case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL: SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb, NULL); break; case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL: SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb, NULL); break; default: break; } /* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */ switch (extra->server.servername_callback) { case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH: SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx); break; case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH: SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx); break; default: break; } if (extra->server.cert_status != SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ctx, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(client_ctx, NULL); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, ((extra->server.cert_status == SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE) ? &dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val : &dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val)); } /* * The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the * session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second * session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked */ if (server2_ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx, do_not_call_session_ticket_cb); if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) { parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols, &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols, &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb, server_ctx_data); } if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) { parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols, &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols, &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb, server2_ctx_data); } if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) { parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols, &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols, &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb, client_ctx_data); } #endif if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) { parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols, &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols, &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len); SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data); } if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) { TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols, &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols, &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len); SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data); } if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) { unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL; size_t alpn_protos_len; parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols, &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len); /* Reversed return value convention... */ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos, alpn_protos_len) == 0); OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos); } /* * Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with * one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment. */ ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0); ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len); TEST_check(ticket_keys != NULL); TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys, ticket_key_len) == 1); OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys); /* The default log list includes EC keys, so CT can't work without EC. */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(client_ctx)); switch (extra->client.ct_validation) { case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE)); break; case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT)); break; case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE: break; } #endif } /* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */ static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client, const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra) { if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE) SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client, ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername)); } /* The status for each connection phase. */ typedef enum { PEER_SUCCESS, PEER_RETRY, PEER_ERROR } peer_status_t; /* An SSL object and associated read-write buffers. */ typedef struct peer_st { SSL *ssl; /* Buffer lengths are int to match the SSL read/write API. */ unsigned char *write_buf; int write_buf_len; unsigned char *read_buf; int read_buf_len; int bytes_to_write; int bytes_to_read; peer_status_t status; } PEER; static void create_peer(PEER *peer, SSL_CTX *ctx) { static const int peer_buffer_size = 64 * 1024; peer->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); TEST_check(peer->ssl != NULL); peer->write_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size); TEST_check(peer->write_buf != NULL); peer->read_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size); TEST_check(peer->read_buf != NULL); peer->write_buf_len = peer->read_buf_len = peer_buffer_size; } static void peer_free_data(PEER *peer) { SSL_free(peer->ssl); OPENSSL_free(peer->write_buf); OPENSSL_free(peer->read_buf); } /* * Note that we could do the handshake transparently under an SSL_write, * but separating the steps is more helpful for debugging test failures. */ static void do_handshake_step(PEER *peer) { int ret; TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); ret = SSL_do_handshake(peer->ssl); if (ret == 1) { peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; } else if (ret == 0) { peer->status = PEER_ERROR; } else { int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */ if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) peer->status = PEER_ERROR; } } /*- * Send/receive some application data. The read-write sequence is * Peer A: (R) W - first read will yield no data * Peer B: R W * ... * Peer A: R W * Peer B: R W * Peer A: R */ static void do_app_data_step(PEER *peer) { int ret = 1, write_bytes; TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); /* We read everything available... */ while (ret > 0 && peer->bytes_to_read) { ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, peer->read_buf, peer->read_buf_len); if (ret > 0) { TEST_check(ret <= peer->bytes_to_read); peer->bytes_to_read -= ret; } else if (ret == 0) { peer->status = PEER_ERROR; return; } else { int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { peer->status = PEER_ERROR; return; } /* Else continue with write. */ } } /* ... but we only write one write-buffer-full of data. */ write_bytes = peer->bytes_to_write < peer->write_buf_len ? peer->bytes_to_write : peer->write_buf_len; if (write_bytes) { ret = SSL_write(peer->ssl, peer->write_buf, write_bytes); if (ret > 0) { /* SSL_write will only succeed with a complete write. */ TEST_check(ret == write_bytes); peer->bytes_to_write -= ret; } else { /* * We should perhaps check for SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/WRITE here * but this doesn't yet occur with current app data sizes. */ peer->status = PEER_ERROR; return; } } /* * We could simply finish when there was nothing to read, and we have * nothing left to write. But keeping track of the expected number of bytes * to read gives us somewhat better guarantees that all data sent is in fact * received. */ if (!peer->bytes_to_write && !peer->bytes_to_read) { peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; } } static void do_reneg_setup_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer) { int ret; char buf; TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); TEST_check(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT); /* Check if we are the peer that is going to initiate */ if ((test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER && SSL_is_server(peer->ssl)) || (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT && !SSL_is_server(peer->ssl))) { /* * If we already asked for a renegotiation then fall through to the * SSL_read() below. */ if (!SSL_renegotiate_pending(peer->ssl)) { /* * If we are the client we will always attempt to resume the * session. The server may or may not resume dependant on the * setting of SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION */ if (SSL_is_server(peer->ssl)) { ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl); } else { if (test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers != NULL) { if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(peer->ssl, test_ctx->extra.client.reneg_ciphers)) { peer->status = PEER_ERROR; return; } ret = SSL_renegotiate(peer->ssl); } else { ret = SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(peer->ssl); } } if (!ret) { peer->status = PEER_ERROR; return; } do_handshake_step(peer); /* * If status is PEER_RETRY it means we're waiting on the peer to * continue the handshake. As far as setting up the renegotiation is * concerned that is a success. The next step will continue the * handshake to its conclusion. * * If status is PEER_SUCCESS then we are the server and we have * successfully sent the HelloRequest. We need to continue to wait * until the handshake arrives from the client. */ if (peer->status == PEER_RETRY) peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; else if (peer->status == PEER_SUCCESS) peer->status = PEER_RETRY; return; } } /* * The SSL object is still expecting app data, even though it's going to * get a handshake message. We try to read, and it should fail - after which * we should be in a handshake */ ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, &buf, sizeof(buf)); if (ret >= 0) { /* * We're not actually expecting data - we're expecting a reneg to * start */ peer->status = PEER_ERROR; return; } else { int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { peer->status = PEER_ERROR; return; } /* If we're no in init yet then we're not done with setup yet */ if (!SSL_in_init(peer->ssl)) return; } peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; } /* * RFC 5246 says: * * Note that as of TLS 1.1, * failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a * session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform * with widespread implementation practice. * * However, * (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions. * (b) We test lower versions, too. * So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we * can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage * for SSL_shutdown as a bonus. */ static void do_shutdown_step(PEER *peer) { int ret; TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); ret = SSL_shutdown(peer->ssl); if (ret == 1) { peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; } else if (ret < 0) { /* On 0, we retry. */ int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */ if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) peer->status = PEER_ERROR; } } typedef enum { HANDSHAKE, RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA, RENEG_SETUP, RENEG_HANDSHAKE, APPLICATION_DATA, SHUTDOWN, CONNECTION_DONE } connect_phase_t; static connect_phase_t next_phase(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, connect_phase_t phase) { switch (phase) { case HANDSHAKE: if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER || test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT) return RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA; return APPLICATION_DATA; case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA: return RENEG_SETUP; case RENEG_SETUP: return RENEG_HANDSHAKE; case RENEG_HANDSHAKE: return APPLICATION_DATA; case APPLICATION_DATA: return SHUTDOWN; case SHUTDOWN: return CONNECTION_DONE; default: TEST_check(0); /* Should never call next_phase when done. */ } } static void do_connect_step(const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, PEER *peer, connect_phase_t phase) { switch (phase) { case HANDSHAKE: do_handshake_step(peer); break; case RENEG_APPLICATION_DATA: do_app_data_step(peer); break; case RENEG_SETUP: do_reneg_setup_step(test_ctx, peer); break; case RENEG_HANDSHAKE: do_handshake_step(peer); break; case APPLICATION_DATA: do_app_data_step(peer); break; case SHUTDOWN: do_shutdown_step(peer); break; default: TEST_check(0); } } typedef enum { /* Both parties succeeded. */ HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS, /* Client errored. */ CLIENT_ERROR, /* Server errored. */ SERVER_ERROR, /* Peers are in inconsistent state. */ INTERNAL_ERROR, /* One or both peers not done. */ HANDSHAKE_RETRY } handshake_status_t; /* * Determine the handshake outcome. * last_status: the status of the peer to have acted last. * previous_status: the status of the peer that didn't act last. * client_spoke_last: 1 if the client went last. */ static handshake_status_t handshake_status(peer_status_t last_status, peer_status_t previous_status, int client_spoke_last) { switch (last_status) { case PEER_SUCCESS: switch (previous_status) { case PEER_SUCCESS: /* Both succeeded. */ return HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS; case PEER_RETRY: /* Let the first peer finish. */ return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; case PEER_ERROR: /* * Second peer succeeded despite the fact that the first peer * already errored. This shouldn't happen. */ return INTERNAL_ERROR; } case PEER_RETRY: if (previous_status == PEER_RETRY) { /* Neither peer is done. */ return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; } else { /* * Deadlock: second peer is waiting for more input while first * peer thinks they're done (no more input is coming). */ return INTERNAL_ERROR; } case PEER_ERROR: switch (previous_status) { case PEER_SUCCESS: /* * First peer succeeded but second peer errored. * TODO(emilia): we should be able to continue here (with some * application data?) to ensure the first peer receives the * alert / close_notify. * (No tests currently exercise this branch.) */ return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : SERVER_ERROR; case PEER_RETRY: /* We errored; let the peer finish. */ return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; case PEER_ERROR: /* Both peers errored. Return the one that errored first. */ return client_spoke_last ? SERVER_ERROR : CLIENT_ERROR; } } /* Control should never reach here. */ return INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */ static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { char *ret; if(len == 0) return NULL; /* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */ TEST_check(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len); ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len); TEST_check(ret != NULL); return ret; } /* * Note that |extra| points to the correct client/server configuration * within |test_ctx|. When configuring the handshake, general mode settings * are taken from |test_ctx|, and client/server-specific settings should be * taken from |extra|. * * The configuration code should never reach into |test_ctx->extra| or * |test_ctx->resume_extra| directly. * * (We could refactor test mode settings into a substructure. This would result * in cleaner argument passing but would complicate the test configuration * parsing.) */ static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal( SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx, const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, SSL_SESSION *session_in, SSL_SESSION **session_out) { PEER server, client; BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client; HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data; CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data; HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new(); int client_turn = 1, client_turn_count = 0; connect_phase_t phase = HANDSHAKE; handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY; const unsigned char* tick = NULL; size_t tick_len = 0; SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL; const unsigned char *proto = NULL; /* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */ unsigned int proto_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *tmp_key; memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data)); memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data)); memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data)); memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server)); memset(&client, 0, sizeof(client)); configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx, extra, &server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data); /* Setup SSL and buffers; additional configuration happens below. */ create_peer(&server, server_ctx); create_peer(&client, client_ctx); server.bytes_to_write = client.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size; client.bytes_to_write = server.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size; configure_handshake_ssl(server.ssl, client.ssl, extra); if (session_in != NULL) { /* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in)); TEST_check(SSL_set_session(client.ssl, session_in)); } memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data)); memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data)); ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); TEST_check(client_to_server != NULL); TEST_check(server_to_client != NULL); /* Non-blocking bio. */ BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1); BIO_set_nbio(server_to_client, 1); SSL_set_connect_state(client.ssl); SSL_set_accept_state(server.ssl); /* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */ SSL_set_bio(client.ssl, server_to_client, client_to_server); TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0); TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0); SSL_set_bio(server.ssl, client_to_server, server_to_client); ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_check(ex_data_idx >= 0); TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(server.ssl, ex_data_idx, &server_ex_data) == 1); TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(client.ssl, ex_data_idx, &client_ex_data) == 1); SSL_set_info_callback(server.ssl, &info_cb); SSL_set_info_callback(client.ssl, &info_cb); client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY; /* * Half-duplex handshake loop. * Client and server speak to each other synchronously in the same process. * We use non-blocking BIOs, so whenever one peer blocks for read, it * returns PEER_RETRY to indicate that it's the other peer's turn to write. * The handshake succeeds once both peers have succeeded. If one peer * errors out, we also let the other peer retry (and presumably fail). */ for(;;) { if (client_turn) { do_connect_step(test_ctx, &client, phase); status = handshake_status(client.status, server.status, 1 /* client went last */); } else { do_connect_step(test_ctx, &server, phase); status = handshake_status(server.status, client.status, 0 /* server went last */); } switch (status) { case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS: client_turn_count = 0; phase = next_phase(test_ctx, phase); if (phase == CONNECTION_DONE) { ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS; goto err; } else { client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY; /* * For now, client starts each phase. Since each phase is * started separately, we can later control this more * precisely, for example, to test client-initiated and * server-initiated shutdown. */ client_turn = 1; break; } case CLIENT_ERROR: ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL; goto err; case SERVER_ERROR: ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL; goto err; case INTERNAL_ERROR: ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; case HANDSHAKE_RETRY: if (client_turn_count++ >= 2000) { /* * At this point, there's been so many PEER_RETRY in a row * that it's likely both sides are stuck waiting for a read. * It's time to give up. */ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } /* Continue. */ client_turn ^= 1; break; } } err: ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent; ret->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent = server_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent; ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received; ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent; ret->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent = client_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent; ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received; ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server.ssl); ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client.ssl); ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername; if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client.ssl)) != NULL) SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len); if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0) ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO; else ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES; ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); #endif SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client.ssl); ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server.ssl); if (session_out != NULL) *session_out = SSL_get1_session(client.ssl); if (SSL_get_server_tmp_key(client.ssl, &tmp_key)) { int nid = EVP_PKEY_id(tmp_key); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (nid == EVP_PKEY_EC) { EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmp_key); nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); } #endif EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_key); ret->tmp_key_type = nid; } ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data); ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data); ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data); peer_free_data(&server); peer_free_data(&client); return ret; } HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx, const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result; SSL_SESSION *session = NULL; result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx, &test_ctx->extra, NULL, &session); if (test_ctx->handshake_mode != SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) goto end; if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) { result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED; goto end; } HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result); /* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */ result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx, test_ctx, &test_ctx->resume_extra, session, NULL); end: SSL_SESSION_free(session); return result; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/Sssdsa.cnf0000644000000000000000000000146513176625661014773 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # hacked by iang to do DSA certs - Server RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = ES countryName_value = ES organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = Tortilleras S.A. 0.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 0.commonName_value = Torti 1.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 1.commonName_value = Gordita openssl-1.1.0g/test/heartbeat_test.c0000644000000000000000000002701013176625661016177 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * Unit test for TLS heartbeats. * * Acts as a regression test against the Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160). * * Author: Mike Bland (mbland@acm.org, http://mike-bland.com/) * Date: 2014-04-12 * License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC By 4.0) * http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US * * OUTPUT * ------ * The program returns zero on success. It will print a message with a count * of the number of failed tests and return nonzero if any tests fail. * * It will print the contents of the request and response buffers for each * failing test. In a "fixed" version, all the tests should pass and there * should be no output. * * In a "bleeding" version, you'll see: * * test_dtls1_heartbleed failed: * expected payload len: 0 * received: 1024 * sent 26 characters * "HEARTBLEED " * received 1024 characters * "HEARTBLEED \xde\xad\xbe\xef..." * ** test_dtls1_heartbleed failed ** * * The contents of the returned buffer in the failing test will depend on the * contents of memory on your machine. * * MORE INFORMATION * ---------------- * http://mike-bland.com/2014/04/12/heartbleed.html * http://mike-bland.com/tags/heartbleed.html */ #define OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST #include "../ssl/ssl_locl.h" #include "testutil.h" #include #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) /* As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#section-4 */ # define MIN_PADDING_SIZE 16 /* Maximum number of payload characters to print as test output */ # define MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS 1024 typedef struct heartbeat_test_fixture { SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *s; const char *test_case_name; int (*process_heartbeat) (SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length); unsigned char *payload; int sent_payload_len; int expected_return_value; int return_payload_offset; int expected_payload_len; const char *expected_return_payload; } HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE; static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; int setup_ok = 1; memset(&fixture, 0, sizeof(fixture)); fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; fixture.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (!fixture.ctx) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL_CTX for test: %s\n", test_case_name); setup_ok = 0; goto fail; } fixture.s = SSL_new(fixture.ctx); if (!fixture.s) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL for test: %s\n", test_case_name); setup_ok = 0; goto fail; } if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(fixture.s)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to set up wbio buffer for test: %s\n", test_case_name); setup_ok = 0; goto fail; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(fixture.s)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to setup buffers for test: %s\n", test_case_name); setup_ok = 0; goto fail; } /* * Clear the memory for the return buffer, since this isn't automatically * zeroed in opt mode and will cause spurious test failures that will * change with each execution. */ memset(fixture.s->rlayer.wbuf.buf, 0, fixture.s->rlayer.wbuf.len); fail: if (!setup_ok) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } return fixture; } static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up_dtls(const char *const test_case_name) { HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up(test_case_name, DTLS_server_method()); fixture.process_heartbeat = dtls1_process_heartbeat; /* * As per dtls1_get_record(), skipping the following from the beginning * of the returned heartbeat message: type-1 byte; version-2 bytes; * sequence number-8 bytes; length-2 bytes And then skipping the 1-byte * type encoded by process_heartbeat for a total of 14 bytes, at which * point we can grab the length and the payload we seek. */ fixture.return_payload_offset = 14; return fixture; } /* Needed by ssl3_write_bytes() */ static int dummy_handshake(SSL *s) { return 1; } static void tear_down(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); SSL_free(fixture.s); SSL_CTX_free(fixture.ctx); } static void print_payload(const char *const prefix, const unsigned char *payload, const int n) { const int end = n < MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS ? n : MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; int i = 0; printf("%s %d character%s", prefix, n, n == 1 ? "" : "s"); if (end != n) printf(" (first %d shown)", end); printf("\n \""); for (; i != end; ++i) { const unsigned char c = payload[i]; if (isprint(c)) fputc(c, stdout); else printf("\\x%02x", c); } printf("\"\n"); } static int execute_heartbeat(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { int result = 0; SSL *s = fixture.s; unsigned char *payload = fixture.payload; unsigned char sent_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 1]; int return_value; unsigned const char *p; int actual_payload_len; s->rlayer.rrec.data = payload; s->rlayer.rrec.length = strlen((const char *)payload); *payload++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; s2n(fixture.sent_payload_len, payload); /* * Make a local copy of the request, since it gets overwritten at some * point */ memcpy(sent_buf, payload, sizeof(sent_buf)); return_value = fixture.process_heartbeat(s, s->rlayer.rrec.data, s->rlayer.rrec.length); if (return_value != fixture.expected_return_value) { printf("%s failed: expected return value %d, received %d\n", fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_value, return_value); result = 1; } /* * If there is any byte alignment, it will be stored in wbuf.offset. */ p = &(s->rlayer. wbuf.buf[fixture.return_payload_offset + s->rlayer.wbuf.offset]); actual_payload_len = 0; n2s(p, actual_payload_len); if (actual_payload_len != fixture.expected_payload_len) { printf("%s failed:\n expected payload len: %d\n received: %d\n", fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_payload_len, actual_payload_len); print_payload("sent", sent_buf, strlen((const char *)sent_buf)); print_payload("received", p, actual_payload_len); result = 1; } else { char *actual_payload = OPENSSL_strndup((const char *)p, actual_payload_len); if (strcmp(actual_payload, fixture.expected_return_payload) != 0) { printf ("%s failed:\n expected payload: \"%s\"\n received: \"%s\"\n", fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_payload, actual_payload); result = 1; } OPENSSL_free(actual_payload); } if (result != 0) { printf("** %s failed **\n--------\n", fixture.test_case_name); } return result; } static int honest_payload_size(unsigned char payload_buf[]) { /* Omit three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ return strlen((const char *)&payload_buf[3]) - MIN_PADDING_SIZE; } # define SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(type)\ SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up_##type) # define EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST()\ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_heartbeat, tear_down) static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding() { SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ unsigned char payload_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 4] = " Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding" " "; const int payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len; fixture.expected_return_value = 0; fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len; fixture.expected_return_payload = "Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding"; EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); } static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload() { int payload_buf_len; SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); /* * Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length, plus a * NUL at the end */ unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS]; memset(payload_buf, ' ', MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3); payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3] = '\0'; payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len; fixture.expected_return_value = 0; fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len; fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); } static int test_dtls1_heartbleed() { SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS] = " HEARTBLEED "; fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; fixture.expected_return_value = 0; fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); } static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload() { SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); /* * Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte short of type + payload length * + minimum padding */ unsigned char payload_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 4]; memset(payload_buf, ' ', MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 2); payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 2] = '\0'; fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; fixture.expected_return_value = 0; fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); } static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length() { SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); /* * Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte in excess of maximum allowed * heartbeat message length */ unsigned char payload_buf[SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 2]; memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf)); payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0'; fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; fixture.sent_payload_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); fixture.expected_return_value = 0; fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); } # undef EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST # undef SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int result = 0; ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_not_bleeding); ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload); ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed); ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload); ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length); result = run_tests(argv[0]); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return result; } #else /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { return EXIT_SUCCESS; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */ openssl-1.1.0g/test/test.cnf0000644000000000000000000000511513176625662014507 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section #################################################################### [ CA_default ] dir = ./demoCA # Where everything is kept certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept database = $dir/index.txt # database index file. new_certs_dir = $dir/new_certs # default place for new certs. certificate = $dir/CAcert.pem # The CA certificate serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL private_key = $dir/private/CAkey.pem# The private key RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # private random number file default_days = 365 # how long to certify for default_crl_days= 30 # how long before next CRL default_md = md5 # which md to use. # A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look # For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional # and supplied fields are just that :-) policy = policy_match # For the CA policy [ policy_match ] countryName = match stateOrProvinceName = match organizationName = match organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional # For the 'anything' policy # At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object' # types. [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = testkey.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = AU countryName_value = AU stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name) stateOrProvinceName_default = Queensland stateOrProvinceName_value = localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) localityName_value = Brisbane organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_default = organizationName_value = CryptSoft Pty Ltd organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) organizationalUnitName_default = organizationalUnitName_value = . commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) commonName_value = Eric Young emailAddress = Email Address emailAddress_value = eay@mincom.oz.au openssl-1.1.0g/test/p5_crpt2_test.c0000644000000000000000000001133613176625661015702 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #include #include #include #include typedef struct { const char *pass; int passlen; const char *salt; int saltlen; int iter; } testdata; static testdata test_cases[] = { {"password", 8, "salt", 4, 1}, {"password", 8, "salt", 4, 2}, {"password", 8, "salt", 4, 4096}, {"passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24, "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36, 4096}, {"pass\0word", 9, "sa\0lt", 5, 4096}, {NULL}, }; static const char *sha1_results[] = { "0c60c80f961f0e71f3a9b524af6012062fe037a6", "ea6c014dc72d6f8ccd1ed92ace1d41f0d8de8957", "4b007901b765489abead49d926f721d065a429c1", "3d2eec4fe41c849b80c8d83662c0e44a8b291a964cf2f07038", "56fa6aa75548099dcc37d7f03425e0c3", }; static const char *sha256_results[] = { "120fb6cffcf8b32c43e7225256c4f837a86548c92ccc35480805987cb70be17b", "ae4d0c95af6b46d32d0adff928f06dd02a303f8ef3c251dfd6e2d85a95474c43", "c5e478d59288c841aa530db6845c4c8d962893a001ce4e11a4963873aa98134a", "348c89dbcbd32b2f32d814b8116e84cf2b17347ebc1800181c4e2a1fb8dd53e1c63551" "8c7dac47e9", "89b69d0516f829893c696226650a8687", }; static const char *sha512_results[] = { "867f70cf1ade02cff3752599a3a53dc4af34c7a669815ae5d513554e1c8cf252c02d47" "0a285a0501bad999bfe943c08f050235d7d68b1da55e63f73b60a57fce", "e1d9c16aa681708a45f5c7c4e215ceb66e011a2e9f0040713f18aefdb866d53cf76cab" "2868a39b9f7840edce4fef5a82be67335c77a6068e04112754f27ccf4e", "d197b1b33db0143e018b12f3d1d1479e6cdebdcc97c5c0f87f6902e072f457b5143f30" "602641b3d55cd335988cb36b84376060ecd532e039b742a239434af2d5", "8c0511f4c6e597c6ac6315d8f0362e225f3c501495ba23b868c005174dc4ee71115b59" "f9e60cd9532fa33e0f75aefe30225c583a186cd82bd4daea9724a3d3b8", "9d9e9c4cd21fe4be24d5b8244c759665", }; static void hexdump(FILE *f, const char *title, const unsigned char *s, int l) { int i; fprintf(f, "%s", title); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { fprintf(f, "%02x", s[i]); } fprintf(f, "\n"); } static void convert(unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++, dst++, src += 2) { unsigned int n; sscanf((char *)src, "%2x", &n); *dst = (unsigned char)n; } *dst = 0; } static void test_p5_pbkdf2(int i, char *digestname, testdata *test, const char *hex) { const EVP_MD *digest; unsigned char *out; unsigned char *expected; int keylen, r; digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(digestname); if (digest == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "unknown digest %s\n", digestname); EXIT(5); } if ((strlen(hex) % 2) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "odd hex digest %s %i\n", digestname, i); EXIT(5); } keylen = strlen(hex) / 2; expected = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 1); out = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 1); if ((expected == NULL) || (out == NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "malloc() failed\n"); EXIT(5); } convert(expected, (const unsigned char *)hex, keylen); r = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(test->pass, test->passlen, (const unsigned char *)test->salt, test->saltlen, test->iter, digest, keylen, out); if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(%s) failure test %i\n", digestname, i); EXIT(3); } if (memcmp(expected, out, keylen) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Wrong result for PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(%s) test %i\n", digestname, i); hexdump(stderr, "expected: ", expected, keylen); hexdump(stderr, "result: ", out, keylen); EXIT(2); } OPENSSL_free(expected); OPENSSL_free(out); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i; testdata *test = test_cases; CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN, NULL); printf("PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() tests "); for (i = 0; test->pass != NULL; i++, test++) { test_p5_pbkdf2(i, "sha1", test, sha1_results[i]); test_p5_pbkdf2(i, "sha256", test, sha256_results[i]); test_p5_pbkdf2(i, "sha512", test, sha512_results[i]); printf("."); } printf(" done\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) return 1; # endif return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/ectest.c0000644000000000000000000015761513176625661014507 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include #ifdef FLAT_INC # include "e_os.h" #else # include "../e_os.h" #endif #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { puts("Elliptic curves are disabled."); return 0; } #else # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include # endif # include # include # include # include # include # include # if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_MIPS_) && (_MSC_VER/100==12) /* suppress "too big too optimize" warning */ # pragma warning(disable:4959) # endif # define ABORT do { \ fflush(stdout); \ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: ABORT\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); \ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); \ EXIT(1); \ } while (0) # define TIMING_BASE_PT 0 # define TIMING_RAND_PT 1 # define TIMING_SIMUL 2 /* test multiplication with group order, long and negative scalars */ static void group_order_tests(EC_GROUP *group) { BIGNUM *n1, *n2, *order; EC_POINT *P = EC_POINT_new(group); EC_POINT *Q = EC_POINT_new(group); EC_POINT *R = EC_POINT_new(group); EC_POINT *S = EC_POINT_new(group); BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); int i; n1 = BN_new(); n2 = BN_new(); order = BN_new(); fprintf(stdout, "verify group order ..."); fflush(stdout); if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, order, NULL, NULL, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(group, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, order, NULL, NULL, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); fprintf(stdout, "long/negative scalar tests "); for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) { const BIGNUM *scalars[6]; const EC_POINT *points[6]; fprintf(stdout, i == 1 ? "allowing precomputation ... " : "without precomputation ... "); if (!BN_set_word(n1, i)) ABORT; /* * If i == 1, P will be the predefined generator for which * EC_GROUP_precompute_mult has set up precomputation. */ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, P, n1, NULL, NULL, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_one(n1)) ABORT; /* n1 = 1 - order */ if (!BN_sub(n1, n1, order)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n1, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT; /* n2 = 1 + order */ if (!BN_add(n2, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT; /* n2 = (1 - order) * (1 + order) = 1 - order^2 */ if (!BN_mul(n2, n1, n2, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT; /* n2 = order^2 - 1 */ BN_set_negative(n2, 0); if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT; /* Add P to verify the result. */ if (!EC_POINT_add(group, Q, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; /* Exercise EC_POINTs_mul, including corner cases. */ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; scalars[0] = scalars[1] = BN_value_one(); points[0] = points[1] = P; if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, R, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, S, points[0], ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, R, S, ctx)) ABORT; scalars[0] = n1; points[0] = Q; /* => infinity */ scalars[1] = n2; points[1] = P; /* => -P */ scalars[2] = n1; points[2] = Q; /* => infinity */ scalars[3] = n2; points[3] = Q; /* => infinity */ scalars[4] = n1; points[4] = P; /* => P */ scalars[5] = n2; points[5] = Q; /* => infinity */ if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 6, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; } fprintf(stdout, "ok\n"); EC_POINT_free(P); EC_POINT_free(Q); EC_POINT_free(R); EC_POINT_free(S); BN_free(n1); BN_free(n2); BN_free(order); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } static void prime_field_tests(void) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *p, *a, *b; EC_GROUP *group; EC_GROUP *P_160 = NULL, *P_192 = NULL, *P_224 = NULL, *P_256 = NULL, *P_384 = NULL, *P_521 = NULL; EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R; BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *yplusone; unsigned char buf[100]; size_t i, len; int k; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) ABORT; p = BN_new(); a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); if (!p || !a || !b) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "17")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "1")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "1")) ABORT; group = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GFp_mont_method()); /* applications should use * EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp so * that the library gets to * choose the EC_METHOD */ if (!group) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; { EC_GROUP *tmp; tmp = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)); if (!tmp) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(tmp, group)) ABORT; EC_GROUP_free(group); group = tmp; } if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "Curve defined by Weierstrass equation\n y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b (mod 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, p); fprintf(stdout, ")\n a = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, a); fprintf(stdout, "\n b = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, b); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); P = EC_POINT_new(group); Q = EC_POINT_new(group); R = EC_POINT_new(group); if (!P || !Q || !R) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; buf[0] = 0; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, Q, buf, 1, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; x = BN_new(); y = BN_new(); z = BN_new(); yplusone = BN_new(); if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || yplusone == NULL) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "D")) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stderr, x); fprintf(stderr, ", y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stderr, y); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); ABORT; } fprintf(stdout, "A cyclic subgroup:\n"); k = 100; do { if (k-- == 0) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) fprintf(stdout, " point at infinity\n"); else { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, ", y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } if (!EC_POINT_copy(R, P)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; } while (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)); if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, Q, R, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, buf, sizeof buf, ctx); if (len == 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "Generator as octet string, compressed form:\n "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]); len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf, sizeof buf, ctx); if (len == 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, uncompressed form:\n "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]); len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof buf, ctx); if (len == 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, hybrid form:\n "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]); if (!EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, y, z, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nA representation of the inverse of that generator in\nJacobian projective coordinates:\n X = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, ", Y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, ", Z = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, z); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx)) ABORT; /* * Curve secp160r1 (Certicom Research SEC 2 Version 1.0, section 2.4.2, * 2000) -- not a NIST curve, but commonly used */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF")) ABORT; if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFC")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "1C97BEFC54BD7A8B65ACF89F81D4D4ADC565FA45")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "4A96B5688EF573284664698968C38BB913CBFC82")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, "23a628553168947d59dcc912042351377ac5fb32")) ABORT; if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. */ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "0100000000000000000001F4C8F927AED3CA752257")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nSEC2 curve secp160r1 -- Generator:\n x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "23a628553168947d59dcc912042351377ac5fb32")) ABORT; if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 160) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); group_order_tests(group); if ((P_160 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_160, group)) ABORT; /* Curve P-192 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")) ABORT; if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "64210519E59C80E70FA7E9AB72243049FEB8DEECC146B9B1")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "188DA80EB03090F67CBF20EB43A18800F4FF0AFD82FF1012")) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-192 -- Generator:\n x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "07192B95FFC8DA78631011ED6B24CDD573F977A11E794811")) ABORT; if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. */ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 192) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); group_order_tests(group); if ((P_192 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_192, group)) ABORT; /* Curve P-224 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ if (!BN_hex2bn (&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF000000000000000000000001")) ABORT; if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&b, "B4050A850C04B3ABF54132565044B0B7D7BFD8BA270B39432355FFB4")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&x, "B70E0CBD6BB4BF7F321390B94A03C1D356C21122343280D6115C1D21")) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-224 -- Generator:\n x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ if (!BN_hex2bn (&z, "BD376388B5F723FB4C22DFE6CD4375A05A07476444D5819985007E34")) ABORT; if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. */ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 224) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); group_order_tests(group); if ((P_224 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_224, group)) ABORT; /* Curve P-256 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ if (!BN_hex2bn (&p, "FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")) ABORT; if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&a, "FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&b, "5AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn (&x, "6B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C296")) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E" "84F3B9CAC2FC632551")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-256 -- Generator:\n x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ if (!BN_hex2bn (&z, "4FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5")) ABORT; if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. */ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 256) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); group_order_tests(group); if ((P_256 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_256, group)) ABORT; /* Curve P-384 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFF0000000000000000FFFFFFFF")) ABORT; if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFF0000000000000000FFFFFFFC")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "B3312FA7E23EE7E4988E056BE3F82D19181D9C6EFE8141" "120314088F5013875AC656398D8A2ED19D2A85C8EDD3EC2AEF")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "AA87CA22BE8B05378EB1C71EF320AD746E1D3B628BA79B" "9859F741E082542A385502F25DBF55296C3A545E3872760AB7")) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-384 -- Generator:\n x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "3617DE4A96262C6F5D9E98BF9292DC29F8F41DBD289A14" "7CE9DA3113B5F0B8C00A60B1CE1D7E819D7A431D7C90EA0E5F")) ABORT; if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. */ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 384) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); group_order_tests(group); if ((P_384 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_384, group)) ABORT; /* Curve P-521 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")) ABORT; if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "051953EB9618E1C9A1F929A21A0B68540EEA2DA725B99B" "315F3B8B489918EF109E156193951EC7E937B1652C0BD3BB1BF073573" "DF883D2C34F1EF451FD46B503F00")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "C6858E06B70404E9CD9E3ECB662395B4429C648139053F" "B521F828AF606B4D3DBAA14B5E77EFE75928FE1DC127A2FFA8DE3348B" "3C1856A429BF97E7E31C2E5BD66")) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5" "C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386409")) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-521 -- Generator:\n x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "11839296A789A3BC0045C8A5FB42C7D1BD998F54449579" "B446817AFBD17273E662C97EE72995EF42640C550B9013FAD0761353C" "7086A272C24088BE94769FD16650")) ABORT; if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. */ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 521) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); group_order_tests(group); if ((P_521 = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(P_521, group)) ABORT; /* more tests using the last curve */ /* Restore the point that got mangled in the (x, y + 1) test. */ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx)) ABORT; /* P = -2Q */ if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, R, Q, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, R)) ABORT; /* R = P + 2Q */ { const EC_POINT *points[4]; const BIGNUM *scalars[4]; BIGNUM *scalar3; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; points[0] = Q; points[1] = Q; points[2] = Q; points[3] = Q; if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, z, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(y, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (BN_is_odd(y)) ABORT; if (!BN_rshift1(y, y)) ABORT; scalars[0] = y; /* (group order + 1)/2, so y*Q + y*Q = Q */ scalars[1] = y; fprintf(stdout, "combined multiplication ..."); fflush(stdout); /* z is still the group order */ if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, R, z, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, R, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(y), 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, z, y)) ABORT; BN_set_negative(z, 1); scalars[0] = y; scalars[1] = z; /* z = -(order + y) */ if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!BN_pseudo_rand(x, BN_num_bits(y) - 1, 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, x, y)) ABORT; BN_set_negative(z, 1); scalars[0] = x; scalars[1] = y; scalars[2] = z; /* z = -(x+y) */ scalar3 = BN_new(); if (!scalar3) ABORT; BN_zero(scalar3); scalars[3] = scalar3; if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 4, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n"); BN_free(scalar3); } BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); EC_GROUP_free(group); EC_POINT_free(P); EC_POINT_free(Q); EC_POINT_free(R); BN_free(x); BN_free(y); BN_free(z); BN_free(yplusone); EC_GROUP_free(P_160); EC_GROUP_free(P_192); EC_GROUP_free(P_224); EC_GROUP_free(P_256); EC_GROUP_free(P_384); EC_GROUP_free(P_521); } /* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP # define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; \ /* \ * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \ * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \ */ \ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \ fprintf(stdout, "\n%s -- Generator:\n x = 0x", _name); \ BN_print_fp(stdout, x); \ fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); \ BN_print_fp(stdout, y); \ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); \ /* G_y value taken from the standard: */ \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _y)) ABORT; \ if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z)) ABORT; # else # define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; \ /* \ * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \ * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \ */ \ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \ fprintf(stdout, "\n%s -- Generator:\n x = 0x", _name); \ BN_print_fp(stdout, x); \ fprintf(stdout, "\n y = 0x"); \ BN_print_fp(stdout, y); \ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); # endif # define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, _p)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, _a)) ABORT; \ if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, _b)) ABORT; \ if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; \ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \ fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ..."); \ if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != _degree) ABORT; \ fprintf(stdout, " ok\n"); \ group_order_tests(group); \ if ((_variable = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group))) == NULL) ABORT; \ if (!EC_GROUP_copy(_variable, group)) ABORT; \ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M static void char2_field_tests(void) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *p, *a, *b; EC_GROUP *group; EC_GROUP *C2_K163 = NULL, *C2_K233 = NULL, *C2_K283 = NULL, *C2_K409 = NULL, *C2_K571 = NULL; EC_GROUP *C2_B163 = NULL, *C2_B233 = NULL, *C2_B283 = NULL, *C2_B409 = NULL, *C2_B571 = NULL; EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R; BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof, *yplusone; unsigned char buf[100]; size_t i, len; int k; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) ABORT; p = BN_new(); a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); if (p == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "13")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "3")) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "1")) ABORT; group = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GF2m_simple_method()); /* applications should use * EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m * so that the library gets * to choose the EC_METHOD */ if (!group) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; { EC_GROUP *tmp; tmp = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)); if (!tmp) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(tmp, group)) ABORT; EC_GROUP_free(group); group = tmp; } if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "Curve defined by Weierstrass equation\n y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b (mod 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, p); fprintf(stdout, ")\n a = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, a); fprintf(stdout, "\n b = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, b); fprintf(stdout, "\n(0x... means binary polynomial)\n"); P = EC_POINT_new(group); Q = EC_POINT_new(group); R = EC_POINT_new(group); if (!P || !Q || !R) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; buf[0] = 0; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, Q, buf, 1, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; x = BN_new(); y = BN_new(); z = BN_new(); cof = BN_new(); yplusone = BN_new(); if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || cof == NULL || yplusone == NULL) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "6")) ABORT; /* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT; # else if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, "8")) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; # endif if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) { /* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; # endif fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stderr, x); fprintf(stderr, ", y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stderr, y); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); ABORT; } fprintf(stdout, "A cyclic subgroup:\n"); k = 100; do { if (k-- == 0) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) fprintf(stdout, " point at infinity\n"); else { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " x = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, x); fprintf(stdout, ", y = 0x"); BN_print_fp(stdout, y); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } if (!EC_POINT_copy(R, P)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; } while (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)); if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, Q, R, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; /* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED, buf, sizeof buf, ctx); if (len == 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "Generator as octet string, compressed form:\n "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]); # endif len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf, sizeof buf, ctx); if (len == 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, uncompressed form:\n "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]); /* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q, POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID, buf, sizeof buf, ctx); if (len == 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, P, buf, len, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "\nGenerator as octet string, hybrid form:\n "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) fprintf(stdout, "%02X", buf[i]); # endif fprintf(stdout, "\n"); if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx)) ABORT; /* Curve K-163 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve K-163", "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000C9", "1", "1", "02FE13C0537BBC11ACAA07D793DE4E6D5E5C94EEE8", "0289070FB05D38FF58321F2E800536D538CCDAA3D9", 1, "04000000000000000000020108A2E0CC0D99F8A5EF", "2", 163, C2_K163); /* Curve B-163 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve B-163", "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000C9", "1", "020A601907B8C953CA1481EB10512F78744A3205FD", "03F0EBA16286A2D57EA0991168D4994637E8343E36", "00D51FBC6C71A0094FA2CDD545B11C5C0C797324F1", 1, "040000000000000000000292FE77E70C12A4234C33", "2", 163, C2_B163); /* Curve K-233 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve K-233", "020000000000000000000000000000000000000004000000000000000001", "0", "1", "017232BA853A7E731AF129F22FF4149563A419C26BF50A4C9D6EEFAD6126", "01DB537DECE819B7F70F555A67C427A8CD9BF18AEB9B56E0C11056FAE6A3", 0, "008000000000000000000000000000069D5BB915BCD46EFB1AD5F173ABDF", "4", 233, C2_K233); /* Curve B-233 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve B-233", "020000000000000000000000000000000000000004000000000000000001", "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", "0066647EDE6C332C7F8C0923BB58213B333B20E9CE4281FE115F7D8F90AD", "00FAC9DFCBAC8313BB2139F1BB755FEF65BC391F8B36F8F8EB7371FD558B", "01006A08A41903350678E58528BEBF8A0BEFF867A7CA36716F7E01F81052", 1, "01000000000000000000000000000013E974E72F8A6922031D2603CFE0D7", "2", 233, C2_B233); /* Curve K-283 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve K-283", "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010A1", "0", "1", "0503213F78CA44883F1A3B8162F188E553CD265F23C1567A16876913B0C2AC2458492836", "01CCDA380F1C9E318D90F95D07E5426FE87E45C0E8184698E45962364E34116177DD2259", 0, "01FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE9AE2ED07577265DFF7F94451E061E163C61", "4", 283, C2_K283); /* Curve B-283 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve B-283", "0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010A1", "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", "027B680AC8B8596DA5A4AF8A19A0303FCA97FD7645309FA2A581485AF6263E313B79A2F5", "05F939258DB7DD90E1934F8C70B0DFEC2EED25B8557EAC9C80E2E198F8CDBECD86B12053", "03676854FE24141CB98FE6D4B20D02B4516FF702350EDDB0826779C813F0DF45BE8112F4", 1, "03FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEF90399660FC938A90165B042A7CEFADB307", "2", 283, C2_B283); /* Curve K-409 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve K-409", "02000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008000000000000000000001", "0", "1", "0060F05F658F49C1AD3AB1890F7184210EFD0987E307C84C27ACCFB8F9F67CC2C460189EB5AAAA62EE222EB1B35540CFE9023746", "01E369050B7C4E42ACBA1DACBF04299C3460782F918EA427E6325165E9EA10E3DA5F6C42E9C55215AA9CA27A5863EC48D8E0286B", 1, "007FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE5F83B2D4EA20400EC4557D5ED3E3E7CA5B4B5C83B8E01E5FCF", "4", 409, C2_K409); /* Curve B-409 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve B-409", "02000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008000000000000000000001", "00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", "0021A5C2C8EE9FEB5C4B9A753B7B476B7FD6422EF1F3DD674761FA99D6AC27C8A9A197B272822F6CD57A55AA4F50AE317B13545F", "015D4860D088DDB3496B0C6064756260441CDE4AF1771D4DB01FFE5B34E59703DC255A868A1180515603AEAB60794E54BB7996A7", "0061B1CFAB6BE5F32BBFA78324ED106A7636B9C5A7BD198D0158AA4F5488D08F38514F1FDF4B4F40D2181B3681C364BA0273C706", 1, "010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001E2AAD6A612F33307BE5FA47C3C9E052F838164CD37D9A21173", "2", 409, C2_B409); /* Curve K-571 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve K-571", "80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000425", "0", "1", "026EB7A859923FBC82189631F8103FE4AC9CA2970012D5D46024804801841CA44370958493B205E647DA304DB4CEB08CBBD1BA39494776FB988B47174DCA88C7E2945283A01C8972", "0349DC807F4FBF374F4AEADE3BCA95314DD58CEC9F307A54FFC61EFC006D8A2C9D4979C0AC44AEA74FBEBBB9F772AEDCB620B01A7BA7AF1B320430C8591984F601CD4C143EF1C7A3", 0, "020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000131850E1F19A63E4B391A8DB917F4138B630D84BE5D639381E91DEB45CFE778F637C1001", "4", 571, C2_K571); /* Curve B-571 (FIPS PUB 186-2, App. 6) */ CHAR2_CURVE_TEST ("NIST curve B-571", "80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000425", "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", "02F40E7E2221F295DE297117B7F3D62F5C6A97FFCB8CEFF1CD6BA8CE4A9A18AD84FFABBD8EFA59332BE7AD6756A66E294AFD185A78FF12AA520E4DE739BACA0C7FFEFF7F2955727A", "0303001D34B856296C16C0D40D3CD7750A93D1D2955FA80AA5F40FC8DB7B2ABDBDE53950F4C0D293CDD711A35B67FB1499AE60038614F1394ABFA3B4C850D927E1E7769C8EEC2D19", "037BF27342DA639B6DCCFFFEB73D69D78C6C27A6009CBBCA1980F8533921E8A684423E43BAB08A576291AF8F461BB2A8B3531D2F0485C19B16E2F1516E23DD3C1A4827AF1B8AC15B", 1, "03FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE661CE18FF55987308059B186823851EC7DD9CA1161DE93D5174D66E8382E9BB2FE84E47", "2", 571, C2_B571); /* more tests using the last curve */ if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx)) ABORT; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx)) ABORT; /* P = -2Q */ if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_add(group, R, R, Q, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, R)) ABORT; /* R = P + 2Q */ { const EC_POINT *points[3]; const BIGNUM *scalars[3]; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT; points[0] = Q; points[1] = Q; points[2] = Q; if (!BN_add(y, z, BN_value_one())) ABORT; if (BN_is_odd(y)) ABORT; if (!BN_rshift1(y, y)) ABORT; scalars[0] = y; /* (group order + 1)/2, so y*Q + y*Q = Q */ scalars[1] = y; fprintf(stdout, "combined multiplication ..."); fflush(stdout); /* z is still the group order */ if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, R, z, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, P, R, ctx)) ABORT; if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, R, Q, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(y), 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, z, y)) ABORT; BN_set_negative(z, 1); scalars[0] = y; scalars[1] = z; /* z = -(order + y) */ if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 2, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!BN_pseudo_rand(x, BN_num_bits(y) - 1, 0, 0)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(z, x, y)) ABORT; BN_set_negative(z, 1); scalars[0] = x; scalars[1] = y; scalars[2] = z; /* z = -(x+y) */ if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 3, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n"); } BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); EC_GROUP_free(group); EC_POINT_free(P); EC_POINT_free(Q); EC_POINT_free(R); BN_free(x); BN_free(y); BN_free(z); BN_free(cof); BN_free(yplusone); EC_GROUP_free(C2_K163); EC_GROUP_free(C2_B163); EC_GROUP_free(C2_K233); EC_GROUP_free(C2_B233); EC_GROUP_free(C2_K283); EC_GROUP_free(C2_B283); EC_GROUP_free(C2_K409); EC_GROUP_free(C2_B409); EC_GROUP_free(C2_K571); EC_GROUP_free(C2_B571); } # endif static void internal_curve_test(void) { EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL; size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0; int ok = 1; crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0); curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len); if (curves == NULL) return; if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) { OPENSSL_free(curves); return; } fprintf(stdout, "testing internal curves: "); for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) { EC_GROUP *group = NULL; int nid = curves[n].nid; if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) { ok = 0; fprintf(stdout, "\nEC_GROUP_new_curve_name() failed with" " curve %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); /* try next curve */ continue; } if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) { ok = 0; fprintf(stdout, "\nEC_GROUP_check() failed with" " curve %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); EC_GROUP_free(group); /* try the next curve */ continue; } fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); EC_GROUP_free(group); } if (ok) fprintf(stdout, " ok\n\n"); else { fprintf(stdout, " failed\n\n"); ABORT; } /* Test all built-in curves and let the library choose the EC_METHOD */ for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) { EC_GROUP *group = NULL; int nid = curves[n].nid; /* * Skip for X25519 because low level operations such as EC_POINT_mul() * are not supported for this curve */ if (nid == NID_X25519) continue; fprintf(stdout, "%s:\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); fflush(stdout); if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) { ABORT; } group_order_tests(group); EC_GROUP_free(group); } OPENSSL_free(curves); return; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /* * nistp_test_params contains magic numbers for testing our optimized * implementations of several NIST curves with characteristic > 3. */ struct nistp_test_params { const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (); int degree; /* * Qx, Qy and D are taken from * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf * Otherwise, values are standard curve parameters from FIPS 180-3 */ const char *p, *a, *b, *Qx, *Qy, *Gx, *Gy, *order, *d; }; static const struct nistp_test_params nistp_tests_params[] = { { /* P-224 */ EC_GFp_nistp224_method, 224, /* p */ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF000000000000000000000001", /* a */ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE", /* b */ "B4050A850C04B3ABF54132565044B0B7D7BFD8BA270B39432355FFB4", /* Qx */ "E84FB0B8E7000CB657D7973CF6B42ED78B301674276DF744AF130B3E", /* Qy */ "4376675C6FC5612C21A0FF2D2A89D2987DF7A2BC52183B5982298555", /* Gx */ "B70E0CBD6BB4BF7F321390B94A03C1D356C21122343280D6115C1D21", /* Gy */ "BD376388B5F723FB4C22DFE6CD4375A05A07476444D5819985007E34", /* order */ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D", /* d */ "3F0C488E987C80BE0FEE521F8D90BE6034EC69AE11CA72AA777481E8", }, { /* P-256 */ EC_GFp_nistp256_method, 256, /* p */ "ffffffff00000001000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffff", /* a */ "ffffffff00000001000000000000000000000000fffffffffffffffffffffffc", /* b */ "5ac635d8aa3a93e7b3ebbd55769886bc651d06b0cc53b0f63bce3c3e27d2604b", /* Qx */ "b7e08afdfe94bad3f1dc8c734798ba1c62b3a0ad1e9ea2a38201cd0889bc7a19", /* Qy */ "3603f747959dbf7a4bb226e41928729063adc7ae43529e61b563bbc606cc5e09", /* Gx */ "6b17d1f2e12c4247f8bce6e563a440f277037d812deb33a0f4a13945d898c296", /* Gy */ "4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f5", /* order */ "ffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551", /* d */ "c477f9f65c22cce20657faa5b2d1d8122336f851a508a1ed04e479c34985bf96", }, { /* P-521 */ EC_GFp_nistp521_method, 521, /* p */ "1ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", /* a */ "1fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc", /* b */ "051953eb9618e1c9a1f929a21a0b68540eea2da725b99b315f3b8b489918ef109e156193951ec7e937b1652c0bd3bb1bf073573df883d2c34f1ef451fd46b503f00", /* Qx */ "0098e91eef9a68452822309c52fab453f5f117c1da8ed796b255e9ab8f6410cca16e59df403a6bdc6ca467a37056b1e54b3005d8ac030decfeb68df18b171885d5c4", /* Qy */ "0164350c321aecfc1cca1ba4364c9b15656150b4b78d6a48d7d28e7f31985ef17be8554376b72900712c4b83ad668327231526e313f5f092999a4632fd50d946bc2e", /* Gx */ "c6858e06b70404e9cd9e3ecb662395b4429c648139053fb521f828af606b4d3dbaa14b5e77efe75928fe1dc127a2ffa8de3348b3c1856a429bf97e7e31c2e5bd66", /* Gy */ "11839296a789a3bc0045c8a5fb42c7d1bd998f54449579b446817afbd17273e662c97ee72995ef42640c550b9013fad0761353c7086a272c24088be94769fd16650", /* order */ "1fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb71e91386409", /* d */ "0100085f47b8e1b8b11b7eb33028c0b2888e304bfc98501955b45bba1478dc184eeedf09b86a5f7c21994406072787205e69a63709fe35aa93ba333514b24f961722", }, }; static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order, *yplusone; EC_GROUP *NISTP; EC_POINT *G, *P, *Q, *Q_CHECK; fprintf(stdout, "\nNIST curve P-%d (optimised implementation):\n", test->degree); ctx = BN_CTX_new(); p = BN_new(); a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); x = BN_new(); y = BN_new(); m = BN_new(); n = BN_new(); order = BN_new(); yplusone = BN_new(); NISTP = EC_GROUP_new(test->meth()); if (!NISTP) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, test->p)) ABORT; if (1 != BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, test->a)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, test->b)) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(NISTP, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT; G = EC_POINT_new(NISTP); P = EC_POINT_new(NISTP); Q = EC_POINT_new(NISTP); Q_CHECK = EC_POINT_new(NISTP); if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Qx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Qy)) ABORT; if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. */ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Gx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Gy)) ABORT; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, G, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; if (!BN_hex2bn(&order, test->order)) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, G, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ... "); if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(NISTP) != test->degree) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "ok\n"); fprintf(stdout, "NIST test vectors ... "); if (!BN_hex2bn(&n, test->d)) ABORT; /* fixed point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, n, NULL, NULL, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; /* random point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, G, n, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; /* set generator to P = 2*G, where G is the standard generator */ if (!EC_POINT_dbl(NISTP, P, G, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, P, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* set the scalar to m=n/2, where n is the NIST test scalar */ if (!BN_rshift(m, n, 1)) ABORT; /* test the non-standard generator */ /* fixed point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; /* random point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, P, m, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; /* * We have not performed precomputation so have_precompute mult should be * false */ if (EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP)) ABORT; /* now repeat all tests with precomputation */ if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(NISTP, ctx)) ABORT; if (!EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP)) ABORT; /* fixed point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; /* random point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, P, m, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; /* reset generator */ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(NISTP, G, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT; /* fixed point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, n, NULL, NULL, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; /* random point multiplication */ EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, NULL, G, n, ctx); if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx)) ABORT; fprintf(stdout, "ok\n"); group_order_tests(NISTP); EC_GROUP_free(NISTP); EC_POINT_free(G); EC_POINT_free(P); EC_POINT_free(Q); EC_POINT_free(Q_CHECK); BN_free(n); BN_free(m); BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(x); BN_free(y); BN_free(order); BN_free(yplusone); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } static void nistp_tests() { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nistp_tests_params); i++) { nistp_single_test(&nistp_tests_params[i]); } } # endif static void parameter_test(void) { EC_GROUP *group, *group2; ECPARAMETERS *ecparameters; fprintf(stderr, "\ntesting ecparameters conversion ..."); group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp112r1); if (!group) ABORT; ecparameters = EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL); if (!ecparameters) ABORT; group2 = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(ecparameters); if (!group2) ABORT; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, group2, NULL)) ABORT; fprintf(stderr, " ok\n"); EC_GROUP_free(group); EC_GROUP_free(group2); ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparameters); } static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *p; p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */ prime_field_tests(); puts(""); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M char2_field_tests(); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 nistp_tests(); # endif /* test the internal curves */ internal_curve_test(); parameter_test(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/md4test.c0000644000000000000000000000402713176625661014570 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No MD4 support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include static char *test[] = { "", "a", "abc", "message digest", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890", NULL, }; static char *ret[] = { "31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0", "bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24", "a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d", "d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b", "d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9", "043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4", "e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536", }; static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, err = 0; char **P, **R; char *p; unsigned char md[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; P = test; R = ret; i = 1; while (*P != NULL) { if (!EVP_Digest(&(P[0][0]), strlen((char *)*P), md, NULL, EVP_md4(), NULL)) { printf("EVP Digest error.\n"); EXIT(1); } p = pt(md); if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) { printf("error calculating MD4 on '%s'\n", *P); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i); i++; R++; P++; } EXIT(err); } static char *pt(unsigned char *md) { int i; static char buf[80]; for (i = 0; i < MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); return (buf); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/cms-examples.pl0000644000000000000000000002130013176625661015764 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Perl script to run tests against S/MIME examples in RFC4134 # Assumes RFC is in current directory and called "rfc4134.txt" use MIME::Base64; my $badttest = 0; my $verbose = 1; my $cmscmd; my $exdir = "./"; my $exfile = "./rfc4134.txt"; if (-f "../apps/openssl") { $cmscmd = "../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl cms"; } elsif (-f "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe") { $cmscmd = "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe cms"; } elsif (-f "..\\out32\\openssl.exe") { $cmscmd = "..\\out32\\openssl.exe cms"; } my @test_list = ( [ "3.1.bin" => "dataout" ], [ "3.2.bin" => "encode, dataout" ], [ "4.1.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ], [ "4.2.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont, rsa" ], [ "4.3.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont_extern, dss" ], [ "4.4.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ], [ "4.5.bin" => "verifyder, cont, rsa" ], [ "4.6.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ], [ "4.7.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ], [ "4.8.eml" => "verifymime, dss" ], [ "4.9.eml" => "verifymime, dss" ], [ "4.10.bin" => "encode, verifyder, cont, dss" ], [ "4.11.bin" => "encode, certsout" ], [ "5.1.bin" => "encode, envelopeder, cont" ], [ "5.2.bin" => "encode, envelopeder, cont" ], [ "5.3.eml" => "envelopemime, cont" ], [ "6.0.bin" => "encode, digest, cont" ], [ "7.1.bin" => "encode, encrypted, cont" ], [ "7.2.bin" => "encode, encrypted, cont" ] ); # Extract examples from RFC4134 text. # Base64 decode all examples, certificates and # private keys are converted to PEM format. my ( $filename, $data ); my @cleanup = ( "cms.out", "cms.err", "tmp.der", "tmp.txt" ); $data = ""; open( IN, $exfile ) || die "Can't Open RFC examples file $exfile"; while () { next unless (/^\|/); s/^\|//; next if (/^\*/); if (/^>(.*)$/) { $filename = $1; next; } if (/^$filename"; binmode OUT; print OUT $data; close OUT; push @cleanup, $filename; } elsif ( $filename =~ /\.cer$/ ) { write_pem( $filename, "CERTIFICATE", $data ); } elsif ( $filename =~ /\.pri$/ ) { write_pem( $filename, "PRIVATE KEY", $data ); } $data = ""; $filename = ""; } else { $data .= $_; } } my $secretkey = "73:7c:79:1f:25:ea:d0:e0:46:29:25:43:52:f7:dc:62:91:e5:cb:26:91:7a:da:32"; foreach (@test_list) { my ( $file, $tlist ) = @$_; print "Example file $file:\n"; if ( $tlist =~ /encode/ ) { run_reencode_test( $exdir, $file ); } if ( $tlist =~ /certsout/ ) { run_certsout_test( $exdir, $file ); } if ( $tlist =~ /dataout/ ) { run_dataout_test( $exdir, $file ); } if ( $tlist =~ /verify/ ) { run_verify_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file ); } if ( $tlist =~ /digest/ ) { run_digest_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file ); } if ( $tlist =~ /encrypted/ ) { run_encrypted_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file, $secretkey ); } if ( $tlist =~ /envelope/ ) { run_envelope_test( $exdir, $tlist, $file ); } } foreach (@cleanup) { unlink $_; } if ($badtest) { print "\n$badtest TESTS FAILED!!\n"; } else { print "\n***All tests successful***\n"; } sub write_pem { my ( $filename, $str, $data ) = @_; $filename =~ s/\.[^.]*$/.pem/; push @cleanup, $filename; open OUT, ">$filename"; print OUT "-----BEGIN $str-----\n"; print OUT $data; print OUT "-----END $str-----\n"; close OUT; } sub run_reencode_test { my ( $cmsdir, $tfile ) = @_; unlink "tmp.der"; system( "$cmscmd -cmsout -inform DER -outform DER" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.der" ); if ($?) { print "\tReencode command FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } elsif ( !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/$tfile", "tmp.der" ) ) { print "\tReencode FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } else { print "\tReencode passed\n" if $verbose; } } sub run_certsout_test { my ( $cmsdir, $tfile ) = @_; unlink "tmp.der"; unlink "tmp.pem"; system( "$cmscmd -cmsout -inform DER -certsout tmp.pem" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.der" ); if ($?) { print "\tCertificate output command FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } else { print "\tCertificate output passed\n" if $verbose; } } sub run_dataout_test { my ( $cmsdir, $tfile ) = @_; unlink "tmp.txt"; system( "$cmscmd -data_out -inform DER" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt" ); if ($?) { print "\tDataout command FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } elsif ( !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) ) { print "\tDataout compare FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } else { print "\tDataout passed\n" if $verbose; } } sub run_verify_test { my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile ) = @_; unlink "tmp.txt"; $form = "DER" if $tlist =~ /verifyder/; $form = "SMIME" if $tlist =~ /verifymime/; $cafile = "$cmsdir/CarlDSSSelf.pem" if $tlist =~ /dss/; $cafile = "$cmsdir/CarlRSASelf.pem" if $tlist =~ /rsa/; $cmd = "$cmscmd -verify -inform $form" . " -CAfile $cafile" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt"; $cmd .= " -content $cmsdir/ExContent.bin" if $tlist =~ /cont_extern/; system("$cmd 2>cms.err 1>cms.out"); if ($?) { print "\tVerify command FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/ && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) ) { print "\tVerify content compare FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } else { print "\tVerify passed\n" if $verbose; } } sub run_envelope_test { my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile ) = @_; unlink "tmp.txt"; $form = "DER" if $tlist =~ /envelopeder/; $form = "SMIME" if $tlist =~ /envelopemime/; $cmd = "$cmscmd -decrypt -inform $form" . " -recip $cmsdir/BobRSASignByCarl.pem" . " -inkey $cmsdir/BobPrivRSAEncrypt.pem" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt"; system("$cmd 2>cms.err 1>cms.out"); if ($?) { print "\tDecrypt command FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/ && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) ) { print "\tDecrypt content compare FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } else { print "\tDecrypt passed\n" if $verbose; } } sub run_digest_test { my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile ) = @_; unlink "tmp.txt"; my $cmd = "$cmscmd -digest_verify -inform DER" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt"; system("$cmd 2>cms.err 1>cms.out"); if ($?) { print "\tDigest verify command FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/ && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) ) { print "\tDigest verify content compare FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } else { print "\tDigest verify passed\n" if $verbose; } } sub run_encrypted_test { my ( $cmsdir, $tlist, $tfile, $key ) = @_; unlink "tmp.txt"; system( "$cmscmd -EncryptedData_decrypt -inform DER" . " -secretkey $key" . " -in $cmsdir/$tfile -out tmp.txt" ); if ($?) { print "\tEncrypted Data command FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } elsif ( $tlist =~ /cont/ && !cmp_files( "$cmsdir/ExContent.bin", "tmp.txt" ) ) { print "\tEncrypted Data content compare FAILED!!\n"; $badtest++; } else { print "\tEncryptedData verify passed\n" if $verbose; } } sub cmp_files { my ( $f1, $f2 ) = @_; my ( $fp1, $fp2 ); my ( $rd1, $rd2 ); if ( !open( $fp1, "<$f1" ) ) { print STDERR "Can't Open file $f1\n"; return 0; } if ( !open( $fp2, "<$f2" ) ) { print STDERR "Can't Open file $f2\n"; return 0; } binmode $fp1; binmode $fp2; my $ret = 0; for ( ; ; ) { $n1 = sysread $fp1, $rd1, 4096; $n2 = sysread $fp2, $rd2, 4096; last if ( $n1 != $n2 ); last if ( $rd1 ne $rd2 ); if ( $n1 == 0 ) { $ret = 1; last; } } close $fp1; close $fp2; return $ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/md2test.c0000644000000000000000000000415213176625661014565 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No MD2 support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include # endif static char *test[] = { "", "a", "abc", "message digest", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890", NULL, }; static char *ret[] = { "8350e5a3e24c153df2275c9f80692773", "32ec01ec4a6dac72c0ab96fb34c0b5d1", "da853b0d3f88d99b30283a69e6ded6bb", "ab4f496bfb2a530b219ff33031fe06b0", "4e8ddff3650292ab5a4108c3aa47940b", "da33def2a42df13975352846c30338cd", "d5976f79d83d3a0dc9806c3c66f3efd8", }; static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, err = 0; char **P, **R; char *p; unsigned char md[MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; P = test; R = ret; i = 1; while (*P != NULL) { if (!EVP_Digest((unsigned char *)*P, strlen(*P), md, NULL, EVP_md2(), NULL)) { printf("EVP Digest error.\n"); EXIT(1); } p = pt(md); if (strcmp(p, *R) != 0) { printf("error calculating MD2 on '%s'\n", *P); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i); i++; R++; P++; } EXIT(err); return err; } static char *pt(unsigned char *md) { int i; static char buf[80]; for (i = 0; i < MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); return (buf); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/v3-cert2.pem0000644000000000000000000000165413176625662015114 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICiTCCAfKgAwIBAgIEMeZfHzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADB9MQswCQYDVQQGEwJD YTEPMA0GA1UEBxMGTmVwZWFuMR4wHAYDVQQLExVObyBMaWFiaWxpdHkgQWNjZXB0 ZWQxHzAdBgNVBAoTFkZvciBEZW1vIFB1cnBvc2VzIE9ubHkxHDAaBgNVBAMTE0Vu dHJ1c3QgRGVtbyBXZWIgQ0EwHhcNOTYwNzEyMTQyMDE1WhcNOTYxMDEyMTQyMDE1 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dsatest exptest rsa_test \ evp_test evp_extra_test igetest v3nametest v3ext \ crltest danetest heartbeat_test p5_crpt2_test bad_dtls_test \ constant_time_test verify_extra_test clienthellotest \ packettest asynctest secmemtest srptest memleaktest \ dtlsv1listentest ct_test threadstest afalgtest d2i_test \ ssl_test_ctx_test ssl_test x509aux cipherlist_test asynciotest \ bioprinttest sslapitest dtlstest sslcorrupttest bio_enc_test SOURCE[aborttest]=aborttest.c INCLUDE[aborttest]=../include DEPEND[aborttest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[sanitytest]=sanitytest.c INCLUDE[sanitytest]=../include DEPEND[sanitytest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[exdatatest]=exdatatest.c INCLUDE[exdatatest]=../include DEPEND[exdatatest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[bntest]=bntest.c INCLUDE[bntest]=.. ../crypto/include ../include DEPEND[bntest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[ectest]=ectest.c INCLUDE[ectest]=../include DEPEND[ectest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[ecdsatest]=ecdsatest.c INCLUDE[ecdsatest]=../include DEPEND[ecdsatest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[gmdifftest]=gmdifftest.c INCLUDE[gmdifftest]=../include DEPEND[gmdifftest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[pbelutest]=pbelutest.c INCLUDE[pbelutest]=../include DEPEND[pbelutest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[ideatest]=ideatest.c INCLUDE[ideatest]=../include DEPEND[ideatest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[md2test]=md2test.c INCLUDE[md2test]=../include DEPEND[md2test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[md4test]=md4test.c INCLUDE[md4test]=../include DEPEND[md4test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[md5test]=md5test.c INCLUDE[md5test]=../include DEPEND[md5test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[hmactest]=hmactest.c INCLUDE[hmactest]=../include DEPEND[hmactest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[wp_test]=wp_test.c INCLUDE[wp_test]=../include DEPEND[wp_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[rc2test]=rc2test.c INCLUDE[rc2test]=../include DEPEND[rc2test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[rc4test]=rc4test.c INCLUDE[rc4test]=../include DEPEND[rc4test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[rc5test]=rc5test.c INCLUDE[rc5test]=../include DEPEND[rc5test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[destest]=destest.c INCLUDE[destest]=../include DEPEND[destest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[sha1test]=sha1test.c INCLUDE[sha1test]=../include DEPEND[sha1test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[sha256t]=sha256t.c INCLUDE[sha256t]=../include DEPEND[sha256t]=../libcrypto SOURCE[sha512t]=sha512t.c INCLUDE[sha512t]=../include DEPEND[sha512t]=../libcrypto SOURCE[mdc2test]=mdc2test.c INCLUDE[mdc2test]=../include DEPEND[mdc2test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[rmdtest]=rmdtest.c INCLUDE[rmdtest]=../include DEPEND[rmdtest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[randtest]=randtest.c INCLUDE[randtest]=../include DEPEND[randtest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[dhtest]=dhtest.c INCLUDE[dhtest]=../include DEPEND[dhtest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[enginetest]=enginetest.c INCLUDE[enginetest]=../include DEPEND[enginetest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[casttest]=casttest.c INCLUDE[casttest]=../include DEPEND[casttest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[bftest]=bftest.c INCLUDE[bftest]=../include DEPEND[bftest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[ssltest_old]=ssltest_old.c INCLUDE[ssltest_old]=.. ../include DEPEND[ssltest_old]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[dsatest]=dsatest.c INCLUDE[dsatest]=../include DEPEND[dsatest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[exptest]=exptest.c INCLUDE[exptest]=../include DEPEND[exptest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[rsa_test]=rsa_test.c INCLUDE[rsa_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[rsa_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[evp_test]=evp_test.c INCLUDE[evp_test]=../include DEPEND[evp_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[evp_extra_test]=evp_extra_test.c INCLUDE[evp_extra_test]=../include DEPEND[evp_extra_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[igetest]=igetest.c INCLUDE[igetest]=.. ../include DEPEND[igetest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[v3nametest]=v3nametest.c INCLUDE[v3nametest]=../include DEPEND[v3nametest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[crltest]=crltest.c testutil.c INCLUDE[crltest]=../include DEPEND[crltest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[v3ext]=v3ext.c INCLUDE[v3ext]=../include DEPEND[v3ext]=../libcrypto SOURCE[danetest]=danetest.c INCLUDE[danetest]=../include DEPEND[danetest]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[heartbeat_test]=heartbeat_test.c testutil.c INCLUDE[heartbeat_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[heartbeat_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[p5_crpt2_test]=p5_crpt2_test.c INCLUDE[p5_crpt2_test]=../include DEPEND[p5_crpt2_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[constant_time_test]=constant_time_test.c INCLUDE[constant_time_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[constant_time_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[verify_extra_test]=verify_extra_test.c INCLUDE[verify_extra_test]=../include DEPEND[verify_extra_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[clienthellotest]=clienthellotest.c INCLUDE[clienthellotest]=../include DEPEND[clienthellotest]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[bad_dtls_test]=bad_dtls_test.c INCLUDE[bad_dtls_test]=../include DEPEND[bad_dtls_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[packettest]=packettest.c INCLUDE[packettest]=../include DEPEND[packettest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[asynctest]=asynctest.c INCLUDE[asynctest]=.. ../include DEPEND[asynctest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[secmemtest]=secmemtest.c INCLUDE[secmemtest]=../include DEPEND[secmemtest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[srptest]=srptest.c INCLUDE[srptest]=../include DEPEND[srptest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[memleaktest]=memleaktest.c INCLUDE[memleaktest]=../include DEPEND[memleaktest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[dtlsv1listentest]=dtlsv1listentest.c INCLUDE[dtlsv1listentest]=.. ../include DEPEND[dtlsv1listentest]=../libssl SOURCE[ct_test]=ct_test.c testutil.c INCLUDE[ct_test]=../crypto/include ../include DEPEND[ct_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[threadstest]=threadstest.c INCLUDE[threadstest]=.. ../include DEPEND[threadstest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[afalgtest]=afalgtest.c INCLUDE[afalgtest]=.. ../include DEPEND[afalgtest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[d2i_test]=d2i_test.c testutil.c INCLUDE[d2i_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[d2i_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[ssl_test_ctx_test]=ssl_test_ctx_test.c ssl_test_ctx.c testutil.c INCLUDE[ssl_test_ctx_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[ssl_test_ctx_test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[ssl_test]=ssl_test.c ssl_test_ctx.c testutil.c handshake_helper.c INCLUDE[ssl_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[ssl_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[cipherlist_test]=cipherlist_test.c testutil.c INCLUDE[cipherlist_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[cipherlist_test]=../libcrypto ../libssl INCLUDE[testutil.o]=.. INCLUDE[ssl_test_ctx.o]=../include INCLUDE[handshake_helper.o]=../include INCLUDE[ssltestlib.o]=.. ../include SOURCE[x509aux]=x509aux.c INCLUDE[x509aux]=../include DEPEND[x509aux]=../libcrypto SOURCE[asynciotest]=asynciotest.c ssltestlib.c INCLUDE[asynciotest]=../include DEPEND[asynciotest]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[bioprinttest]=bioprinttest.c INCLUDE[bioprinttest]=../include DEPEND[bioprinttest]=../libcrypto SOURCE[sslapitest]=sslapitest.c ssltestlib.c testutil.c INCLUDE[sslapitest]=../include .. DEPEND[sslapitest]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[dtlstest]=dtlstest.c ssltestlib.c testutil.c INCLUDE[dtlstest]=../include . DEPEND[dtlstest]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[sslcorrupttest]=sslcorrupttest.c ssltestlib.c testutil.c INCLUDE[sslcorrupttest]=../include . DEPEND[sslcorrupttest]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[bio_enc_test]=bio_enc_test.c INCLUDE[bio_enc_test]=../include DEPEND[bio_enc_test]=../libcrypto IF[{- !$disabled{shared} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=shlibloadtest SOURCE[shlibloadtest]=shlibloadtest.c INCLUDE[shlibloadtest]=../include ENDIF ENDIF {- use File::Spec::Functions; use File::Basename; use if $^O ne "VMS", 'File::Glob' => qw/glob/; my @nogo_headers = ( "asn1_mac.h", "__decc_include_prologue.h", "__decc_include_epilogue.h" ); my @headerfiles = glob catfile($sourcedir, updir(), "include", "openssl", "*.h"); foreach my $headerfile (@headerfiles) { my $name = basename($headerfile, ".h"); next if $disabled{$name}; next if grep { $_ eq lc("$name.h") } @nogo_headers; $OUT .= <<"_____"; PROGRAMS_NO_INST=buildtest_$name GENERATE[buildtest_$name.c]=generate_buildtest.pl $name SOURCE[buildtest_$name]=buildtest_$name.c INCLUDE[buildtest_$name]=../include DEPEND[buildtest_$name]=../libssl ../libcrypto _____ } -} openssl-1.1.0g/test/asynctest.c0000644000000000000000000002135113176625661015220 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef _WIN32 # include #endif #include #include #include #include static int ctr = 0; static ASYNC_JOB *currjob = NULL; static int only_pause(void *args) { ASYNC_pause_job(); return 1; } static int add_two(void *args) { ctr++; ASYNC_pause_job(); ctr++; return 2; } static int save_current(void *args) { currjob = ASYNC_get_current_job(); ASYNC_pause_job(); return 1; } #define MAGIC_WAIT_FD ((OSSL_ASYNC_FD)99) static int waitfd(void *args) { ASYNC_JOB *job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx; job = ASYNC_get_current_job(); if (job == NULL) return 0; waitctx = ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(job); if (waitctx == NULL) return 0; /* First case: no fd added or removed */ ASYNC_pause_job(); /* Second case: one fd added */ if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, waitctx, MAGIC_WAIT_FD, NULL, NULL)) return 0; ASYNC_pause_job(); /* Third case: all fd removed */ if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(waitctx, waitctx)) return 0; ASYNC_pause_job(); /* Last case: fd added and immediately removed */ if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, waitctx, MAGIC_WAIT_FD, NULL, NULL)) return 0; if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(waitctx, waitctx)) return 0; return 1; } static int blockpause(void *args) { ASYNC_block_pause(); ASYNC_pause_job(); ASYNC_unblock_pause(); ASYNC_pause_job(); return 1; } static int test_ASYNC_init_thread() { ASYNC_JOB *job1 = NULL, *job2 = NULL, *job3 = NULL; int funcret1, funcret2, funcret3; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL; if ( !ASYNC_init_thread(2, 0) || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL || ASYNC_start_job(&job1, waitctx, &funcret1, only_pause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || ASYNC_start_job(&job2, waitctx, &funcret2, only_pause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || ASYNC_start_job(&job3, waitctx, &funcret3, only_pause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_NO_JOBS || ASYNC_start_job(&job1, waitctx, &funcret1, only_pause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_FINISH || ASYNC_start_job(&job3, waitctx, &funcret3, only_pause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || ASYNC_start_job(&job2, waitctx, &funcret2, only_pause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_FINISH || ASYNC_start_job(&job3, waitctx, &funcret3, only_pause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_FINISH || funcret1 != 1 || funcret2 != 1 || funcret3 != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_init_thread() failed\n"); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 0; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 1; } static int test_ASYNC_start_job() { ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL; int funcret; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL; ctr = 0; if ( !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0) || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, add_two, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || ctr != 1 || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, add_two, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_FINISH || ctr != 2 || funcret != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_start_job() failed\n"); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 0; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 1; } static int test_ASYNC_get_current_job() { ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL; int funcret; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL; currjob = NULL; if ( !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0) || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, save_current, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || currjob != job || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, save_current, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_FINISH || funcret != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_get_current_job() failed\n"); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 0; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 1; } static int test_ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() { ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL; int funcret; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL; OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd = OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD, delfd = OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD; size_t numfds, numdelfds; if ( !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0) || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL /* On first run we're not expecting any wait fds */ || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds) || numfds != 0 || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL, &numdelfds) || numfds != 0 || numdelfds != 0 /* On second run we're expecting one added fd */ || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds) || numfds != 1 || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, &fd, &numfds) || fd != MAGIC_WAIT_FD || (fd = OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD, 0) /* Assign to something else */ || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL, &numdelfds) || numfds != 1 || numdelfds != 0 || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, &fd, &numfds, NULL, &numdelfds) || fd != MAGIC_WAIT_FD /* On third run we expect one deleted fd */ || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds) || numfds != 0 || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL, &numdelfds) || numfds != 0 || numdelfds != 1 || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, &delfd, &numdelfds) || delfd != MAGIC_WAIT_FD /* On last run we are not expecting any wait fd */ || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, waitfd, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_FINISH || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds) || numfds != 0 || !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(waitctx, NULL, &numfds, NULL, &numdelfds) || numfds != 0 || numdelfds != 0 || funcret != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_get_wait_fd() failed\n"); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 0; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 1; } static int test_ASYNC_block_pause() { ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL; int funcret; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx = NULL; if ( !ASYNC_init_thread(1, 0) || (waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new()) == NULL || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, blockpause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_PAUSE || ASYNC_start_job(&job, waitctx, &funcret, blockpause, NULL, 0) != ASYNC_FINISH || funcret != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "test_ASYNC_block_pause() failed\n"); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 0; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(waitctx); ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); return 1; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (!ASYNC_is_capable()) { fprintf(stderr, "OpenSSL build is not ASYNC capable - skipping async tests\n"); } else { CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); if ( !test_ASYNC_init_thread() || !test_ASYNC_start_job() || !test_ASYNC_get_current_job() || !test_ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() || !test_ASYNC_block_pause()) { return 1; } } printf("PASS\n"); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/danetest.c0000644000000000000000000003140213176625661015010 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif #include "../e_os.h" #define _UC(c) ((unsigned char)(c)) static const char *progname; /* * Forward declaration, of function that uses internal interfaces, from headers * included at the end of this module. */ static void store_ctx_dane_init(X509_STORE_CTX *, SSL *); static int saved_errno; static void save_errno(void) { saved_errno = errno; } static int restore_errno(void) { int ret = errno; errno = saved_errno; return ret; } static void test_usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s: danetest basedomain CAfile tlsafile\n", progname); } static void print_errors(void) { unsigned long err; char buffer[1024]; const char *file; const char *data; int line; int flags; while ((err = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) { ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d:%s\n", buffer, file, line, data); else fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d\n", buffer, file, line); } } static int verify_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int ret = -1; X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx; SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx); int store_ctx_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); if ((store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL) return -1; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, cert, chain)) goto end; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(store_ctx, store_ctx_idx, ssl)) goto end; X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(store_ctx, SSL_is_server(ssl) ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(store_ctx), SSL_get0_param(ssl)); store_ctx_dane_init(store_ctx, ssl); if (SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl)) X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(store_ctx, SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl)); ret = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx); SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx)); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx); end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx); return (ret); } static STACK_OF(X509) *load_chain(BIO *fp, int nelem) { int count; char *name = 0; char *header = 0; unsigned char *data = 0; long len; char *errtype = 0; /* if error: cert or pkey? */ STACK_OF(X509) *chain; typedef X509 *(*d2i_X509_t)(X509 **, const unsigned char **, long); if ((chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == 0) { perror("malloc"); exit(1); } for (count = 0; count < nelem && errtype == 0 && PEM_read_bio(fp, &name, &header, &data, &len); ++count) { const unsigned char *p = data; if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0 || strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0 || strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0) { d2i_X509_t d = strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) ? d2i_X509_AUX : d2i_X509; X509 *cert = d(0, &p, len); if (cert == 0 || (p - data) != len) errtype = "certificate"; else if (sk_X509_push(chain, cert) == 0) { perror("malloc"); goto err; } } else { fprintf(stderr, "unexpected chain file object: %s\n", name); goto err; } /* * If any of these were null, PEM_read() would have failed. */ OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(header); OPENSSL_free(data); } if (errtype) { fprintf(stderr, "error reading: malformed %s\n", errtype); goto err; } if (count == nelem) { ERR_clear_error(); return chain; } err: /* Some other PEM read error */ sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); print_errors(); return NULL; } static char *read_to_eol(BIO *f) { static char buf[1024]; int n; if (!BIO_gets(f, buf, sizeof(buf))) return NULL; n = strlen(buf); if (buf[n-1] != '\n') { if (n+1 == sizeof(buf)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: input too long\n", progname); } else { fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: EOF before newline\n", progname); } return NULL; } /* Trim trailing whitespace */ while (n > 0 && isspace(_UC(buf[n-1]))) buf[--n] = '\0'; return buf; } /* * Hex decoder that tolerates optional whitespace */ static ossl_ssize_t hexdecode(const char *in, void *result) { unsigned char **out = (unsigned char **)result; unsigned char *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in)/2); unsigned char *cp = ret; uint8_t byte; int nibble = 0; if (ret == NULL) return -1; for (byte = 0; *in; ++in) { int x; if (isspace(_UC(*in))) continue; x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*in); if (x < 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } byte |= (char)x; if ((nibble ^= 1) == 0) { *cp++ = byte; byte = 0; } else { byte <<= 4; } } if (nibble != 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } return cp - (*out = ret); } static ossl_ssize_t checked_uint8(const char *in, void *out) { uint8_t *result = (uint8_t *)out; const char *cp = in; char *endp; long v; int e; save_errno(); v = strtol(cp, &endp, 10); e = restore_errno(); if (((v == LONG_MIN || v == LONG_MAX) && e == ERANGE) || endp == cp || !isspace(_UC(*endp)) || v != (*(uint8_t *)result = (uint8_t) v)) { return -1; } for (cp = endp; isspace(_UC(*cp)); ++cp) continue; return cp - in; } struct tlsa_field { void *var; const char *name; ossl_ssize_t (*parser)(const char *, void *); }; static int tlsa_import_rr(SSL *ssl, const char *rrdata) { static uint8_t usage; static uint8_t selector; static uint8_t mtype; static unsigned char *data = NULL; static struct tlsa_field tlsa_fields[] = { { &usage, "usage", checked_uint8 }, { &selector, "selector", checked_uint8 }, { &mtype, "mtype", checked_uint8 }, { &data, "data", hexdecode }, { NULL, } }; int ret; struct tlsa_field *f; const char *cp = rrdata; ossl_ssize_t len = 0; for (f = tlsa_fields; f->var; ++f) { if ((len = f->parser(cp += len, f->var)) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: bad TLSA %s field in: %s\n", progname, f->name, rrdata); return 0; } } ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, usage, selector, mtype, data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); if (ret == 0) { print_errors(); fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: unusable TLSA rrdata: %s\n", progname, rrdata); return 0; } if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: error loading TLSA rrdata: %s\n", progname, rrdata); return 0; } return ret; } static int allws(const char *cp) { while (*cp) if (!isspace(_UC(*cp++))) return 0; return 1; } static int test_tlsafile(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *base_name, BIO *f, const char *path) { char *line; int testno = 0; int ret = 1; SSL *ssl; while (ret > 0 && (line = read_to_eol(f)) != NULL) { STACK_OF(X509) *chain; int ntlsa; int ncert; int noncheck; int want; int want_depth; int off; int i; int ok; int err; int mdpth; if (*line == '\0' || *line == '#') continue; ++testno; if (sscanf(line, "%d %d %d %d %d%n", &ntlsa, &ncert, &noncheck, &want, &want_depth, &off) != 5 || !allws(line + off)) { fprintf(stderr, "Expected tlsa count, cert count and result" " at test %d of %s\n", testno, path); return 0; } if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) return -1; SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); if (SSL_dane_enable(ssl, base_name) <= 0) { SSL_free(ssl); return -1; } if (noncheck) SSL_dane_set_flags(ssl, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS); for (i = 0; i < ntlsa; ++i) { if ((line = read_to_eol(f)) == NULL || !tlsa_import_rr(ssl, line)) { SSL_free(ssl); return 0; } } /* Don't report old news */ ERR_clear_error(); chain = load_chain(f, ncert); if (chain == NULL) { SSL_free(ssl); return -1; } ok = verify_chain(ssl, chain); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); /* * Peek under the hood, normally TLSA match data is hidden when * verification fails, we can obtain any suppressed data by setting the * verification result to X509_V_OK before looking. */ SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK); mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(ssl, NULL, NULL); /* Not needed any more, but lead by example and put the error back. */ SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, err); SSL_free(ssl); if (ok < 0) { ret = 0; fprintf(stderr, "verify_chain internal error in %s test %d\n", path, testno); print_errors(); continue; } if (err != want || (want == 0 && !ok)) { ret = 0; if (err != want) { if (want == X509_V_OK) fprintf(stderr, "Verification failure in %s test %d: %d: %s\n", path, testno, err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); else fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error in %s test %d: %d: wanted %d\n", path, testno, err, want); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Verification failure in %s test %d: ok=0\n", path, testno); } print_errors(); continue; } if (mdpth != want_depth) { ret = 0; fprintf(stderr, "Wrong match depth, in %s test %d: wanted %d, got: %d\n", path, testno, want_depth, mdpth); } fprintf(stderr, "%s: test %d successful\n", path, testno); } ERR_clear_error(); return ret; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BIO *f; BIO *bio_err; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; const char *basedomain; const char *CAfile; const char *tlsafile; const char *p; int ret = 1; progname = argv[0]; if (argc != 4) { test_usage(); EXIT(ret); } basedomain = argv[1]; CAfile = argv[2]; tlsafile = argv[3]; bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); f = BIO_new_file(tlsafile, "r"); if (f == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error opening tlsa record file: '%s': %s\n", progname, tlsafile, strerror(errno)); EXIT(ret); } ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) { print_errors(); goto end; } if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, NULL)) { print_errors(); goto end; } if ((SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(ctx, EVP_sha512(), 2, 1)) <= 0) { print_errors(); goto end; } if ((SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(ctx, EVP_sha256(), 1, 2)) <= 0) { print_errors(); goto end; } if (test_tlsafile(ctx, basedomain, f, tlsafile) <= 0) { print_errors(); goto end; } ret = 0; end: BIO_free(f); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0) ret = 1; #endif BIO_free(bio_err); EXIT(ret); } #include static void store_ctx_dane_init(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, SSL *ssl) { X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(store_ctx, SSL_get0_dane(ssl)); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/testrsapub.pem0000644000000000000000000000026613176625662015741 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAKrbeqkuRk8VcRmWFmtP+LviMB3+6diz WW3DwaffznyHGAFwUJ/ITv0XtbsCyl3QoyKGhrOAy3RvPK5M38iuXT0CAwEAAQ== -----END PUBLIC KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/pkcs7.pem0000644000000000000000000000724013176625661014572 0ustar rootroot MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCAMIACAQExADCABgkqhkiG9w0BBwEAAKCAMIIE+DCCBGGg AwIBAgIQaGSF/JpbS1C223+yrc+N1DANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBiMREwDwYDVQQH EwhJbnRlcm5ldDEXMBUGA1UEChMOVmVyaVNpZ24sIEluYy4xNDAyBgNVBAsTK1Zl cmlTaWduIENsYXNzIDEgQ0EgLSBJbmRpdmlkdWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIwHhcNOTYw ODEyMDAwMDAwWhcNOTYwODE3MjM1OTU5WjCCASAxETAPBgNVBAcTCEludGVybmV0 MRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjE0MDIGA1UECxMrVmVyaVNpZ24gQ2xh c3MgMSBDQSAtIEluZGl2aWR1YWwgU3Vic2NyaWJlcjE3MDUGA1UECxMuRGlnaXRh bCBJRCBDbGFzcyAxIC0gU01JTUUgVmVyaVNpZ24sIEluYy4gVEVTVDFGMEQGA1UE CxM9d3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L0NQUyBJbmNvcnAuIGJ5IFJl Zi4sTElBQi5MVEQoYyk5NjEZMBcGA1UEAxMQQWxleGFuZHJlIERlYWNvbjEgMB4G CSqGSIb3DQEJARYRYWxleEB2ZXJpc2lnbi5jb20wWzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANK ADBHAkAOy7xxCAIkOfuIA2LyRpxgKlDORl8htdXYhF5iBGUx1GYaK6KF+bK/CCI0 l4j2OfWGFBUrwGoWqxTNcWgTfMzRAgMBAAGjggIyMIICLjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMIIC HwYDVR0DBIICFjCCAhIwggIOMIICCgYLYIZIAYb4RQEHAQEwggH5FoIBp1RoaXMg Y2VydGlmaWNhdGUgaW5jb3Jwb3JhdGVzIGJ5IHJlZmVyZW5jZSwgYW5kIGl0cyB1 c2UgaXMgc3RyaWN0bHkgc3ViamVjdCB0bywgdGhlIFZlcmlTaWduIENlcnRpZmlj YXRpb24gUHJhY3RpY2UgU3RhdGVtZW50IChDUFMpLCBhdmFpbGFibGUgYXQ6IGh0 dHBzOi8vd3d3LnZlcmlzaWduLmNvbS9DUFM7IGJ5IEUtbWFpbCBhdCBDUFMtcmVx dWVzdHNAdmVyaXNpZ24uY29tOyBvciBieSBtYWlsIGF0IFZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMu LCAyNTkzIENvYXN0IEF2ZS4sIE1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcsIENBIDk0MDQzIFVTQSBU ZWwuICsxICg0MTUpIDk2MS04ODMwIENvcHlyaWdodCAoYykgMTk5NiBWZXJpU2ln biwgSW5jLiAgQWxsIFJpZ2h0cyBSZXNlcnZlZC4gQ0VSVEFJTiBXQVJSQU5USUVT IERJU0NMQUlNRUQgYW5kIExJQUJJTElUWSBMSU1JVEVELqAOBgxghkgBhvhFAQcB AQGhDgYMYIZIAYb4RQEHAQECMCwwKhYoaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29t L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvQ1BTIDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQAimWMGQwwwxk+b3KAL HlSWXtU7LWHe29CEG8XeVNTvrqs6SBqT7OoENOkGxpfdpVgZ3Qw2SKjxDvbvpfSF slsqcxWSgB/hWuaVuZCkvTw/dYGGOxkTJGxvDCfl1PZjX4dKbatslsi9Z9HpGWT7 ttItRwKqcBKgmCJvKi1pGWED0zCCAnkwggHioAMCAQICEDURpVKQb+fQKaRAGdQR /D4wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwXzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlT aWduLCBJbmMuMTcwNQYDVQQLEy5DbGFzcyAxIFB1YmxpYyBQcmltYXJ5IENlcnRp ZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MB4XDTk2MDYyNzAwMDAwMFoXDTk3MDYyNzIzNTk1 OVowYjERMA8GA1UEBxMISW50ZXJuZXQxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMu MTQwMgYDVQQLEytWZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAxIENBIC0gSW5kaXZpZHVhbCBTdWJz Y3JpYmVyMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC2FKbPTdAFDdjKI9Bv qrQpkmOOLPhvltcunXZLEbE2jVfJw/0cxrr+Hgi6M8qV6r7jW80GqLd5HUQq7XPy sVKDaBBwZJHXPmv5912dFEObbpdFmIFH0S3L3bty10w/cariQPJUObwW7s987Lrb P2wqsxaxhhKdrpM01bjV0Pc+qQIDAQABozMwMTAPBgNVHRMECDAGAQH/AgEBMAsG A1UdDwQEAwIBBjARBglghkgBhvhCAQEEBAMCAgQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQADgYEA KeXHoBmnbxRCgk0jM9e9mDppdxpsipIna/J8DOHEUuD4nONAr4+xOg73SBl026n7 Bk55A2wvAMGo7+kKTZ+rHaFDDcmq4O+rzFri2RIOeGAncj1IcGptAQhvXoIhFMG4 Jlzg1KlHZHqy7D3jex78zcSU7kKOu8f5tAX1jC3+sToAAKGAMIIBJzCBkTANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQIFADBiMREwDwYDVQQHEwhJbnRlcm5ldDEXMBUGA1UEChMOVmVyaVNp Z24sIEluYy4xNDAyBgNVBAsTK1ZlcmlTaWduIENsYXNzIDEgQ0EgLSBJbmRpdmlk dWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIXDTk2MDcwMTE3MzA0MFoXDTk3MDcwMTAwMDAwMFowDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQECBQADgYEAGLuQ6PX8A7AiqBEtWzYtl6lZNSDI0bR5YUo+D2Jzkw30 dxQnJSbKXEc6XYuzAW5HvrzATXu5c19WWPT4cRDwmjH71i9QcDysWwf/wE0qGTiW I3tQT0I5VGh7jIJD07nlBw3R4Xl8dH9kr85JsWinqDH5YKpIo9o8knY5n7+qjOow ggEkMIGOMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMF8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5W ZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjE3MDUGA1UECxMuQ2xhc3MgMSBQdWJsaWMgUHJpbWFyeSBD ZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eRcNOTYwNzE2MjMxMTI5WhcNOTYwODE1MDAw MDAwWjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQIFAAOBgQAXsLE4vnsY6sY67QrmWec7iaU2ehzxanEK /9wKHZNuhlNzk+qGZZw2evxfUe2OaRbYpl8zuZvhK9BHD3ad14OSe9/zx5hOPgP/ DQXt6R4R8Q/1JheBrolrgbavjvI2wKS8/Psp2prBrkF4T48+AKRmS8Zzh1guxgvP b+xSu/jH0gAAMYAAAAAAAAAAAA== openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssltest_old.c0000644000000000000000000031623513176625662015553 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ /* Or gethostname won't be declared properly on Linux and GNU platforms. */ #ifndef _BSD_SOURCE # define _BSD_SOURCE 1 #endif #ifndef _DEFAULT_SOURCE # define _DEFAULT_SOURCE 1 #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* * Or isascii won't be declared properly on VMS (at least with DECompHP C). */ # define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500 #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT # include #endif /* * Or gethostname won't be declared properly * on Compaq platforms (at least with DEC C). * Do not try to put it earlier, or IPv6 includes * get screwed... */ #define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED 1 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS # include #else # include OPENSSL_UNISTD #endif static SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL; static SSL_CTX *s_ctx2 = NULL; /* * There is really no standard for this, so let's assign something * only for this test */ #define COMP_ZLIB 1 static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg); #define APP_CALLBACK_STRING "Test Callback Argument" struct app_verify_arg { char *string; int app_verify; }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *get_dh512(void); static DH *get_dh1024(void); static DH *get_dh1024dsa(void); #endif static char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* SRP client */ /* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */ typedef struct srp_client_arg_st { char *srppassin; char *srplogin; } SRP_CLIENT_ARG; # define PWD_STRLEN 1024 static char *ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg; return OPENSSL_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin); } /* SRP server */ /* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */ typedef struct srp_server_arg_st { char *expected_user; char *pass; } SRP_SERVER_ARG; static int ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { SRP_SERVER_ARG *p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *)arg; if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s)); return SSL3_AL_FATAL; } if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s, p->expected_user, p->pass, "1024") < 0) { *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return SSL3_AL_FATAL; } return SSL_ERROR_NONE; } #endif static BIO *bio_err = NULL; static BIO *bio_stdout = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* Note that this code assumes that this is only a one element list: */ static const char NEXT_PROTO_STRING[] = "\x09testproto"; static int npn_client = 0; static int npn_server = 0; static int npn_server_reject = 0; static int cb_client_npn(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { /* * This callback only returns the protocol string, rather than a length * prefixed set. We assume that NEXT_PROTO_STRING is a one element list * and remove the first byte to chop off the length prefix. */ *out = (unsigned char *)NEXT_PROTO_STRING + 1; *outlen = sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 2; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int cb_server_npn(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) { *data = (const unsigned char *)NEXT_PROTO_STRING; *len = sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 1; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int cb_server_rejects_npn(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) { return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } static int verify_npn(SSL *client, SSL *server) { const unsigned char *client_s; unsigned client_len; const unsigned char *server_s; unsigned server_len; SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client, &client_s, &client_len); SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server, &server_s, &server_len); if (client_len) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Client NPN: "); BIO_write(bio_stdout, client_s, client_len); BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n"); } if (server_len) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Server NPN: "); BIO_write(bio_stdout, server_s, server_len); BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n"); } /* * If an NPN string was returned, it must be the protocol that we * expected to negotiate. */ if (client_len && (client_len != sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 2 || memcmp(client_s, NEXT_PROTO_STRING + 1, client_len))) return -1; if (server_len && (server_len != sizeof(NEXT_PROTO_STRING) - 2 || memcmp(server_s, NEXT_PROTO_STRING + 1, server_len))) return -1; if (!npn_client && client_len) return -1; if (!npn_server && server_len) return -1; if (npn_server_reject && server_len) return -1; if (npn_client && npn_server && (!client_len || !server_len)) return -1; return 0; } #endif static const char *alpn_client; static char *alpn_server; static char *alpn_server2; static const char *alpn_expected; static unsigned char *alpn_selected; static const char *server_min_proto; static const char *server_max_proto; static const char *client_min_proto; static const char *client_max_proto; static const char *should_negotiate; static const char *sn_client; static const char *sn_server1; static const char *sn_server2; static int sn_expect = 0; static const char *server_sess_out; static const char *server_sess_in; static const char *client_sess_out; static const char *client_sess_in; static SSL_SESSION *server_sess; static SSL_SESSION *client_sess; static int servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (sn_server2 == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername 2 is NULL\n"); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } if (servername) { if (s_ctx2 != NULL && sn_server2 != NULL && !strcasecmp(servername, sn_server2)) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Switching server context.\n"); SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, s_ctx2); } } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int verify_servername(SSL *client, SSL *server) { /* just need to see if sn_context is what we expect */ SSL_CTX* ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(server); if (sn_expect == 0) return 0; if (sn_expect == 1 && ctx == s_ctx) return 0; if (sn_expect == 2 && ctx == s_ctx2) return 0; BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: expected context %d\n", sn_expect); if (ctx == s_ctx2) BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is 2\n"); else if (ctx == s_ctx) BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is 1\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Servername: context is unknown\n"); return -1; } /*- * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. * in: a NUL terminated string like "abc,def,ghi" * * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure. */ static unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen, const char *in) { size_t len; unsigned char *out; size_t i, start = 0; len = strlen(in); if (len >= 65535) return NULL; out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1); if (!out) return NULL; for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || in[i] == ',') { if (i - start > 255) { OPENSSL_free(out); return NULL; } out[start] = i - start; start = i + 1; } else out[i + 1] = in[i]; } *outlen = len + 1; return out; } static int cb_server_alpn(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { unsigned char *protos; size_t protos_len; char* alpn_str = arg; protos = next_protos_parse(&protos_len, alpn_str); if (protos == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "failed to parser ALPN server protocol string: %s\n", alpn_str); abort(); } if (SSL_select_next_proto ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, protos, protos_len, in, inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) { OPENSSL_free(protos); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } /* * Make a copy of the selected protocol which will be freed in * verify_alpn. */ alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(*outlen); memcpy(alpn_selected, *out, *outlen); *out = alpn_selected; OPENSSL_free(protos); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int verify_alpn(SSL *client, SSL *server) { const unsigned char *client_proto, *server_proto; unsigned int client_proto_len = 0, server_proto_len = 0; SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client, &client_proto, &client_proto_len); SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server, &server_proto, &server_proto_len); OPENSSL_free(alpn_selected); alpn_selected = NULL; if (client_proto_len != server_proto_len) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN selected protocols differ!\n"); goto err; } if (client_proto != NULL && memcmp(client_proto, server_proto, client_proto_len) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN selected protocols differ!\n"); goto err; } if (client_proto_len > 0 && alpn_expected == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN unexpectedly negotiated\n"); goto err; } if (alpn_expected != NULL && (client_proto_len != strlen(alpn_expected) || memcmp(client_proto, alpn_expected, client_proto_len) != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN selected protocols not equal to expected protocol: %s\n", alpn_expected); goto err; } return 0; err: BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN results: client: '"); BIO_write(bio_stdout, client_proto, client_proto_len); BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "', server: '"); BIO_write(bio_stdout, server_proto, server_proto_len); BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "'\n"); BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ALPN configured: client: '%s', server: '", alpn_client); if (SSL_get_SSL_CTX(server) == s_ctx2) { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s'\n", alpn_server2); } else { BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s'\n", alpn_server); } return -1; } /* * WARNING : below extension types are *NOT* IETF assigned, and could * conflict if these types are reassigned and handled specially by OpenSSL * in the future */ #define TACK_EXT_TYPE 62208 #define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0 1000 #define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1 1001 #define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2 1002 #define CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3 1003 static const char custom_ext_cli_string[] = "abc"; static const char custom_ext_srv_string[] = "defg"; /* These set from cmdline */ static char *serverinfo_file = NULL; static int serverinfo_sct = 0; static int serverinfo_tack = 0; /* These set based on extension callbacks */ static int serverinfo_sct_seen = 0; static int serverinfo_tack_seen = 0; static int serverinfo_other_seen = 0; /* This set from cmdline */ static int custom_ext = 0; /* This set based on extension callbacks */ static int custom_ext_error = 0; static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) serverinfo_sct_seen++; else if (ext_type == TACK_EXT_TYPE) serverinfo_tack_seen++; else serverinfo_other_seen++; return 1; } static int verify_serverinfo() { if (serverinfo_sct != serverinfo_sct_seen) return -1; if (serverinfo_tack != serverinfo_tack_seen) return -1; if (serverinfo_other_seen) return -1; return 0; } /*- * Four test cases for custom extensions: * 0 - no ClientHello extension or ServerHello response * 1 - ClientHello with "abc", no response * 2 - ClientHello with "abc", empty response * 3 - ClientHello with "abc", "defg" response */ static int custom_ext_0_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0) custom_ext_error = 1; return 0; /* Don't send an extension */ } static int custom_ext_0_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { return 1; } static int custom_ext_1_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1) custom_ext_error = 1; *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_cli_string; *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_cli_string); return 1; /* Send "abc" */ } static int custom_ext_1_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { return 1; } static int custom_ext_2_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2) custom_ext_error = 1; *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_cli_string; *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_cli_string); return 1; /* Send "abc" */ } static int custom_ext_2_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2) custom_ext_error = 1; if (inlen != 0) custom_ext_error = 1; /* Should be empty response */ return 1; } static int custom_ext_3_cli_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3) custom_ext_error = 1; *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_cli_string; *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_cli_string); return 1; /* Send "abc" */ } static int custom_ext_3_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3) custom_ext_error = 1; if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_srv_string)) custom_ext_error = 1; if (memcmp(custom_ext_srv_string, in, inlen) != 0) custom_ext_error = 1; /* Check for "defg" */ return 1; } /* * custom_ext_0_cli_add_cb returns 0 - the server won't receive a callback * for this extension */ static int custom_ext_0_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { custom_ext_error = 1; return 1; } /* 'add' callbacks are only called if the 'parse' callback is called */ static int custom_ext_0_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { /* Error: should not have been called */ custom_ext_error = 1; return 0; /* Don't send an extension */ } static int custom_ext_1_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1) custom_ext_error = 1; /* Check for "abc" */ if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_cli_string)) custom_ext_error = 1; if (memcmp(in, custom_ext_cli_string, inlen) != 0) custom_ext_error = 1; return 1; } static int custom_ext_1_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { return 0; /* Don't send an extension */ } static int custom_ext_2_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2) custom_ext_error = 1; /* Check for "abc" */ if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_cli_string)) custom_ext_error = 1; if (memcmp(in, custom_ext_cli_string, inlen) != 0) custom_ext_error = 1; return 1; } static int custom_ext_2_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { *out = NULL; *outlen = 0; return 1; /* Send empty extension */ } static int custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (ext_type != CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3) custom_ext_error = 1; /* Check for "abc" */ if (inlen != strlen(custom_ext_cli_string)) custom_ext_error = 1; if (memcmp(in, custom_ext_cli_string, inlen) != 0) custom_ext_error = 1; return 1; } static int custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { *out = (const unsigned char *)custom_ext_srv_string; *outlen = strlen(custom_ext_srv_string); return 1; /* Send "defg" */ } static char *cipher = NULL; static int verbose = 0; static int debug = 0; static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; int doit_localhost(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, int family, long bytes, clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time); int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes, clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time); int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes); static void sv_usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssltest [args ...]\n"); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS fprintf(stderr, "-F - run test in FIPS mode\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " -server_auth - check server certificate\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -client_auth - do client authentication\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -v - more output\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -d - debug output\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -reuse - use session-id reuse\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -num - number of connections to perform\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -bytes - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH fprintf(stderr, " -dhe512 - use 512 bit key for DHE (to test failure)\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE (default, no-op)\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -dhe1024dsa - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -no_dhe - disable DHE\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC fprintf(stderr, " -no_ecdhe - disable ECDHE\nTODO(openssl-team): no_ecdhe was broken by auto ecdh. Make this work again.\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK fprintf(stderr, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP fprintf(stderr, " -srpuser user - SRP username to use\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 fprintf(stderr, " -tls1 - use TLSv1\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS fprintf(stderr, " -dtls - use DTLS\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 fprintf(stderr, " -dtls1 - use DTLSv1\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 fprintf(stderr, " -dtls12 - use DTLSv1.2\n"); #endif #endif fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -cert arg - Server certificate file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -key arg - Server key file (default: same as -cert)\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -c_cert arg - Client certificate file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -c_key arg - Client key file (default: same as -c_cert)\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -cipher arg - The cipher list\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -bio_pair - Use BIO pairs\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -ipv4 - Use IPv4 connection on localhost\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -ipv6 - Use IPv6 connection on localhost\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -f - Test even cases that can't work\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -time - measure processor time used by client and server\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -zlib - use zlib compression\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG fprintf(stderr, " -npn_client - have client side offer NPN\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -npn_server - have server side offer NPN\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -npn_server_reject - have server reject NPN\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " -serverinfo_file file - have server use this file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -serverinfo_sct - have client offer and expect SCT\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -serverinfo_tack - have client offer and expect TACK\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -custom_ext - try various custom extension callbacks\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_client - have client side offer ALPN\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server - have server side offer ALPN\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server1 - alias for -alpn_server\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_server2 - have server side context 2 offer ALPN\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -alpn_expected - the ALPN protocol that should be negotiated\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -server_min_proto - Minimum version the server should support\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -server_max_proto - Maximum version the server should support\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -client_min_proto - Minimum version the client should support\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -client_max_proto - Maximum version the client should support\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -should_negotiate - The version that should be negotiated, fail-client or fail-server\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT fprintf(stderr, " -noct - no certificate transparency\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -requestct - request certificate transparency\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -requirect - require certificate transparency\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " -sn_client - have client request this servername\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -sn_server1 - have server context 1 respond to this servername\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -sn_server2 - have server context 2 respond to this servername\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -sn_expect1 - expected server 1\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -sn_expect2 - expected server 2\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -server_sess_out - Save the server session to a file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -server_sess_in - Read the server session from a file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -client_sess_out - Save the client session to a file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -client_sess_in - Read the client session from a file\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -should_reuse - The expected state of reusing the session\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -no_ticket - do not issue TLS session ticket\n"); } static void print_key_details(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *key) { int keyid = EVP_PKEY_id(key); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (keyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) { EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key); int nid; const char *cname; nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); EC_KEY_free(ec); cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (!cname) cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_printf(out, "%d bits EC (%s)", EVP_PKEY_bits(key), cname); } else #endif { const char *algname; switch (keyid) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: algname = "RSA"; break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: algname = "DSA"; break; case EVP_PKEY_DH: algname = "DH"; break; default: algname = OBJ_nid2sn(keyid); break; } BIO_printf(out, "%d bits %s", EVP_PKEY_bits(key), algname); } } static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix) { const SSL_CIPHER *ciph; int mdnid; X509 *cert; EVP_PKEY *pkey; ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher(c_ssl); BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s%s, cipher %s %s", prefix, SSL_get_version(c_ssl), SSL_CIPHER_get_version(ciph), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(ciph)); cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(c_ssl); if (cert != NULL) { EVP_PKEY* pubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); if (pubkey != NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_stdout, ", "); print_key_details(bio_stdout, pubkey); } X509_free(cert); } if (SSL_get_server_tmp_key(c_ssl, &pkey)) { BIO_puts(bio_stdout, ", temp key: "); print_key_details(bio_stdout, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(c_ssl, &mdnid)) BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", digest=%s", OBJ_nid2sn(mdnid)); BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n"); } /* * protocol_from_string - converts a protocol version string to a number * * Returns -1 on failure or the version on success */ static int protocol_from_string(const char *value) { struct protocol_versions { const char *name; int version; }; static const struct protocol_versions versions[] = { {"ssl3", SSL3_VERSION}, {"tls1", TLS1_VERSION}, {"tls1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION}, {"tls1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION}, {"dtls1", DTLS1_VERSION}, {"dtls1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION}}; size_t i; size_t n = OSSL_NELEM(versions); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) if (strcmp(versions[i].name, value) == 0) return versions[i].version; return -1; } static SSL_SESSION *read_session(const char *filename) { SSL_SESSION *sess; BIO *f = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"); if (f == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", filename); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return NULL; } sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(f, NULL, 0, NULL); if (sess == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse session file %s\n", filename); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } BIO_free(f); return sess; } static int write_session(const char *filename, SSL_SESSION *sess) { BIO *f = BIO_new_file(filename, "w"); if (sess == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No session information\n"); return 0; } if (f == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", filename); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(f, sess); BIO_free(f); return 1; } /* * set_protocol_version - Sets protocol version minimum or maximum * * Returns 0 on failure and 1 on success */ static int set_protocol_version(const char *version, SSL *ssl, int setting) { if (version != NULL) { int ver = protocol_from_string(version); if (ver < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing: %s\n", version); return 0; } return SSL_ctrl(ssl, setting, ver, NULL); } return 1; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; int badop = 0; enum { BIO_MEM, BIO_PAIR, BIO_IPV4, BIO_IPV6 } bio_type = BIO_MEM; int force = 0; int dtls1 = 0, dtls12 = 0, dtls = 0, tls1 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1; int client_auth = 0; int server_auth = 0, i; struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg = { APP_CALLBACK_STRING, 0 }; char *p; SSL_CTX *c_ctx = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL; SSL *c_ssl, *s_ssl; int number = 1, reuse = 0; int should_reuse = -1; int no_ticket = 0; long bytes = 256L; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; int dhe512 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* client */ SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = { NULL, NULL }; /* server */ SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = { NULL, NULL }; #endif int no_dhe = 0; int no_psk = 0; int print_time = 0; clock_t s_time = 0, c_time = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int n, comp = 0; COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS int fips_mode = 0; #endif int no_protocol; int min_version = 0, max_version = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * Disable CT validation by default, because it will interfere with * anything using custom extension handlers to deal with SCT extensions. */ int ct_validation = 0; #endif SSL_CONF_CTX *s_cctx = NULL, *c_cctx = NULL, *s_cctx2 = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *conf_args = NULL; char *arg = NULL, *argn = NULL; verbose = 0; debug = 0; cipher = 0; bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); s_cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); s_cctx2 = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); c_cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); if (!s_cctx || !c_cctx || !s_cctx2) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(s_cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(s_cctx2, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE); if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(s_cctx, "-s_")) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(s_cctx2, "-s_")) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(c_cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE); if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(c_cctx, "-c_")) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv, "-F") == 0) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS fips_mode = 1; #else fprintf(stderr, "not compiled with FIPS support, so exiting without running.\n"); EXIT(0); #endif } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_auth") == 0) server_auth = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_auth") == 0) client_auth = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v") == 0) verbose = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-d") == 0) debug = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reuse") == 0) reuse = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe512") == 0) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dhe512 = 1; #else fprintf(stderr, "ignoring -dhe512, since I'm compiled without DH\n"); #endif } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024dsa") == 0) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dhe1024dsa = 1; #else fprintf(stderr, "ignoring -dhe1024dsa, since I'm compiled without DH\n"); #endif } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) no_dhe = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0) /* obsolete */; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; psk_key = *(++argv); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (strspn(psk_key, "abcdefABCDEF1234567890") != strlen(psk_key)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv); goto bad; } #else no_psk = 1; #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin = *(++argv); min_version = TLS1_VERSION; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin = *(++argv); min_version = TLS1_VERSION; } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) { tls1 = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) { ssl3 = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) { dtls1 = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls12") == 0) { dtls12 = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls") == 0) { dtls = 1; } else if (strncmp(*argv, "-num", 4) == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; number = atoi(*(++argv)); if (number == 0) number = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bytes") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; bytes = atol(*(++argv)); if (bytes == 0L) bytes = 1L; i = strlen(argv[0]); if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'k') bytes *= 1024L; if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'm') bytes *= 1024L * 1024L; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; cipher = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; CApath = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; CAfile = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bio_pair") == 0) { bio_type = BIO_PAIR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ipv4") == 0) { bio_type = BIO_IPV4; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ipv6") == 0) { bio_type = BIO_IPV6; } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-f") == 0) { force = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-time") == 0) { print_time = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noct") == 0) { ct_validation = 0; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ct") == 0) { ct_validation = 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP else if (strcmp(*argv, "-zlib") == 0) { comp = COMP_ZLIB; } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-app_verify") == 0) { app_verify_arg.app_verify = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (strcmp(*argv, "-npn_client") == 0) { npn_client = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-npn_server") == 0) { npn_server = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-npn_server_reject") == 0) { npn_server_reject = 1; } #endif else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo_sct") == 0) { serverinfo_sct = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo_tack") == 0) { serverinfo_tack = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverinfo_file") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; serverinfo_file = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-custom_ext") == 0) { custom_ext = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_client") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; alpn_client = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server") == 0 || strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server1") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; alpn_server = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_server2") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; alpn_server2 = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-alpn_expected") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; alpn_expected = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_min_proto") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; server_min_proto = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_max_proto") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; server_max_proto = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_min_proto") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; client_min_proto = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_max_proto") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; client_max_proto = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-should_negotiate") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; should_negotiate = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_client") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; sn_client = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_server1") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; sn_server1 = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_server2") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; sn_server2 = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_expect1") == 0) { sn_expect = 1; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sn_expect2") == 0) { sn_expect = 2; } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_sess_out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; server_sess_out = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_sess_in") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; server_sess_in = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_sess_out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; client_sess_out = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_sess_in") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; client_sess_in = *(++argv); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-should_reuse") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; should_reuse = !!atoi(*(++argv)); } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ticket") == 0) { no_ticket = 1; } else { int rv; arg = argv[0]; argn = argv[1]; /* Try to process command using SSL_CONF */ rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(c_cctx, &argc, &argv); /* If not processed try server */ if (rv == 0) rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(s_cctx, &argc, &argv); /* Recognised: store it for later use */ if (rv > 0) { if (rv == 1) argn = NULL; if (!conf_args) { conf_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!conf_args) goto end; } if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(conf_args, arg)) goto end; if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(conf_args, argn)) goto end; continue; } if (rv == -3) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing argument for %s\n", arg); else if (rv < 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command %s\n", arg); else if (rv == 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", arg); badop = 1; break; } argc--; argv++; } if (badop) { bad: sv_usage(); goto end; } if (ssl3 + tls1 + dtls + dtls1 + dtls12 > 1) { fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls, -dtls1 or -dtls12 should " "be requested.\n"); EXIT(1); } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if (ssl3) no_protocol = 1; else #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 if (tls1) no_protocol = 1; else #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1) if (dtls1) no_protocol = 1; else #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2) if (dtls12) no_protocol = 1; else #endif no_protocol = 0; /* * Testing was requested for a compiled-out protocol (e.g. SSLv3). * Ideally, we would error out, but the generic test wrapper can't know * when to expect failure. So we do nothing and return success. */ if (no_protocol) { fprintf(stderr, "Testing was requested for a disabled protocol. " "Skipping tests.\n"); ret = 0; goto end; } if (!ssl3 && !tls1 && !dtls && !dtls1 && !dtls12 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) { fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. Use -f to perform " "the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), " "or add one of -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls, -dtls1, -dtls12, -reuse\n" "to avoid protocol mismatch.\n"); EXIT(1); } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (fips_mode) { if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); EXIT(1); } else fprintf(stderr, "*** IN FIPS MODE ***\n"); } #endif if (print_time) { if (bio_type != BIO_PAIR) { fprintf(stderr, "Using BIO pair (-bio_pair)\n"); bio_type = BIO_PAIR; } if (number < 50 && !force) fprintf(stderr, "Warning: For accurate timings, use more connections (e.g. -num 1000)\n"); } /* if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (comp == COMP_ZLIB) cm = COMP_zlib(); if (cm != NULL) { if (COMP_get_type(cm) != NID_undef) { if (SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(comp, cm) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to add compression method\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Warning: %s compression not supported\n", comp == COMP_ZLIB ? "zlib" : "unknown"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } } ssl_comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(ssl_comp_methods); if (n) { int j; printf("Available compression methods:"); for (j = 0; j < n; j++) { SSL_COMP *c = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, j); printf(" %s:%d", SSL_COMP_get0_name(c), SSL_COMP_get_id(c)); } printf("\n"); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS meth = TLS_method(); if (ssl3) { min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; } else if (tls1) { min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (dtls || dtls1 || dtls12) meth = DTLS_method(); if (dtls1) { min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; } else if (dtls12) { min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; } #endif c_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); s_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); s_ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth); /* no SSL_CTX_dup! */ if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx2 == NULL)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* * Since we will use low security ciphersuites and keys for testing set * security level to zero by default. Tests can override this by adding * "@SECLEVEL=n" to the cipher string. */ SSL_CTX_set_security_level(c_ctx, 0); SSL_CTX_set_security_level(s_ctx, 0); SSL_CTX_set_security_level(s_ctx2, 0); if (no_ticket) { SSL_CTX_set_options(c_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); } if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(c_ctx, min_version) == 0) goto end; if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(c_ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(s_ctx, min_version) == 0) goto end; if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(s_ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (cipher != NULL) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx, cipher) || !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx, cipher) || !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx2, cipher)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (ct_validation && !SSL_CTX_enable_ct(c_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #endif /* Process SSL_CONF arguments */ SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(c_cctx, c_ctx); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(s_cctx, s_ctx); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(s_cctx2, s_ctx2); for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(conf_args); i += 2) { int rv; arg = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(conf_args, i); argn = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(conf_args, i + 1); rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(c_cctx, arg, argn); /* If not recognised use server context */ if (rv == -2) { rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(s_cctx2, arg, argn); if (rv > 0) rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(s_cctx, arg, argn); } if (rv <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error processing %s %s\n", arg, argn ? argn : ""); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(s_cctx) || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(c_cctx) || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(s_cctx2)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error finishing context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (!no_dhe) { if (dhe1024dsa) { dh = get_dh1024dsa(); } else if (dhe512) dh = get_dh512(); else dh = get_dh1024(); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh); SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx2, dh); DH_free(dh); } #else (void)no_dhe; #endif if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) || (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) || (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx2, CAfile, CApath)) || (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx2)) || (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) || (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx))) { /* fprintf(stderr,"SSL_load_verify_locations\n"); */ ERR_print_errors(bio_err); /* goto end; */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(s_ctx) || !SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(s_ctx2) || !SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(c_ctx)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } #endif if (client_auth) { printf("client authentication\n"); SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx2, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, app_verify_callback, &app_verify_arg); SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx2, app_verify_callback, &app_verify_arg); } if (server_auth) { printf("server authentication\n"); SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(c_ctx, app_verify_callback, &app_verify_arg); } { int session_id_context = 0; if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context, sizeof session_id_context) || !SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx2, (void *)&session_id_context, sizeof session_id_context)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } /* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */ if (psk_key != NULL) { /* * no_psk is used to avoid putting psk command to openssl tool */ if (no_psk) { /* * if PSK is not compiled in and psk key is given, do nothing and * exit successfully */ ret = 0; goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(c_ctx, psk_client_callback); SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx, psk_server_callback); SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx2, psk_server_callback); if (debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n"); if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx, "ctx server identity_hint") || !SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx2, "ctx server identity_hint")) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_client_arg.srplogin) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n"); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx, &srp_client_arg); SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb); /* * SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength); */ } if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx2, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg); SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx2, &srp_server_arg); SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb); SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx2, ssl_srp_server_param_cb); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (npn_client) { SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(c_ctx, cb_client_npn, NULL); } if (npn_server) { if (npn_server_reject) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't have both -npn_server and -npn_server_reject\n"); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_npn, NULL); SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx2, cb_server_npn, NULL); } if (npn_server_reject) { SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_rejects_npn, NULL); SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(s_ctx2, cb_server_rejects_npn, NULL); } #endif if (serverinfo_sct) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, NULL, NULL, NULL, serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error adding SCT extension\n"); goto end; } } if (serverinfo_tack) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, TACK_EXT_TYPE, NULL, NULL, NULL, serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error adding TACK extension\n"); goto end; } } if (serverinfo_file) if (!SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(s_ctx, serverinfo_file) || !SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(s_ctx2, serverinfo_file)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing serverinfo file\n"); goto end; } if (custom_ext) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0, custom_ext_0_cli_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_0_cli_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1, custom_ext_1_cli_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_1_cli_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2, custom_ext_2_cli_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_2_cli_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(c_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3, custom_ext_3_cli_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_3_cli_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0, custom_ext_0_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_0_srv_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_0, custom_ext_0_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_0_srv_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1, custom_ext_1_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_1_srv_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_1, custom_ext_1_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_1_srv_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2, custom_ext_2_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_2_srv_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_2, custom_ext_2_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_2_srv_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3, custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb, NULL) || !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(s_ctx2, CUSTOM_EXT_TYPE_3, custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, custom_ext_3_srv_parse_cb, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting custom extensions\n"); goto end; } } if (alpn_server) SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s_ctx, cb_server_alpn, alpn_server); if (alpn_server2) SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(s_ctx2, cb_server_alpn, alpn_server2); if (alpn_client) { size_t alpn_len; unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_client); if (alpn == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn_client argument\n"); goto end; } /* Returns 0 on success!! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(c_ctx, alpn, alpn_len)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting ALPN\n"); OPENSSL_free(alpn); goto end; } OPENSSL_free(alpn); } if (server_sess_in != NULL) { server_sess = read_session(server_sess_in); if (server_sess == NULL) goto end; } if (client_sess_in != NULL) { client_sess = read_session(client_sess_in); if (client_sess == NULL) goto end; } if (server_sess_out != NULL || server_sess_in != NULL) { char *keys; long size; /* Use a fixed key so that we can decrypt the ticket. */ size = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(s_ctx, NULL, 0); keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(size); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(s_ctx, keys, size); OPENSSL_free(keys); } if (sn_server1 != NULL || sn_server2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(s_ctx, servername_cb); c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx); s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx); if (sn_client) SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(c_ssl, sn_client); if (!set_protocol_version(server_min_proto, s_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION)) goto end; if (!set_protocol_version(server_max_proto, s_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION)) goto end; if (!set_protocol_version(client_min_proto, c_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION)) goto end; if (!set_protocol_version(client_max_proto, c_ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION)) goto end; if (server_sess) { if (SSL_CTX_add_session(s_ctx, server_sess) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't add server session\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Doing handshakes=%d bytes=%ld\n", number, bytes); for (i = 0; i < number; i++) { if (!reuse) { if (!SSL_set_session(c_ssl, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set session\n"); goto end; } } if (client_sess_in != NULL) { if (SSL_set_session(c_ssl, client_sess) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't set client session\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } switch (bio_type) { case BIO_MEM: ret = doit(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes); break; case BIO_PAIR: ret = doit_biopair(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes, &s_time, &c_time); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK case BIO_IPV4: ret = doit_localhost(s_ssl, c_ssl, BIO_FAMILY_IPV4, bytes, &s_time, &c_time); break; case BIO_IPV6: ret = doit_localhost(s_ssl, c_ssl, BIO_FAMILY_IPV6, bytes, &s_time, &c_time); break; #else case BIO_IPV4: case BIO_IPV6: ret = 1; goto err; #endif } if (ret) break; } if (should_negotiate && ret == 0 && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") != 0 && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") != 0) { int version = protocol_from_string(should_negotiate); if (version < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing: %s\n", should_negotiate); ret = 1; goto err; } if (SSL_version(c_ssl) != version) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected version negotiated. " "Expected: %s, got %s\n", should_negotiate, SSL_get_version(c_ssl)); ret = 1; goto err; } } if (should_reuse != -1) { if (SSL_session_reused(s_ssl) != should_reuse || SSL_session_reused(c_ssl) != should_reuse) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected session reuse state. " "Expected: %d, server: %d, client: %d\n", should_reuse, SSL_session_reused(s_ssl), SSL_session_reused(c_ssl)); ret = 1; goto err; } } if (server_sess_out != NULL) { if (write_session(server_sess_out, SSL_get_session(s_ssl)) == 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } } if (client_sess_out != NULL) { if (write_session(client_sess_out, SSL_get_session(c_ssl)) == 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } } if (!verbose) { print_details(c_ssl, ""); } if (print_time) { #ifdef CLOCKS_PER_SEC /* * "To determine the time in seconds, the value returned by the clock * function should be divided by the value of the macro * CLOCKS_PER_SEC." -- ISO/IEC 9899 */ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Approximate total server time: %6.2f s\n" "Approximate total client time: %6.2f s\n", (double)s_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC, (double)c_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC); #else BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Approximate total server time: %6.2f units\n" "Approximate total client time: %6.2f units\n", (double)s_time, (double)c_time); #endif } err: SSL_free(s_ssl); SSL_free(c_ssl); end: SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx); SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx2); SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(s_cctx); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(s_cctx2); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(c_cctx); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(conf_args); BIO_free(bio_stdout); SSL_SESSION_free(server_sess); SSL_SESSION_free(client_sess); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0) ret = 1; #endif BIO_free(bio_err); EXIT(ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int doit_localhost(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, int family, long count, clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time) { long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count; BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL; BIO *acpt = NULL, *server = NULL, *client = NULL; char addr_str[40]; int ret = 1; int err_in_client = 0; int err_in_server = 0; acpt = BIO_new_accept("0"); if (acpt == NULL) goto err; BIO_set_accept_ip_family(acpt, family); BIO_set_bind_mode(acpt, BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK | BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR); if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) goto err; BIO_snprintf(addr_str, sizeof(addr_str), ":%s", BIO_get_accept_port(acpt)); client = BIO_new_connect(addr_str); BIO_set_conn_ip_family(client, family); if (!client) goto err; if (BIO_set_nbio(client, 1) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_set_nbio(acpt, 1) <= 0) goto err; { int st_connect = 0, st_accept = 0; while(!st_connect || !st_accept) { if (!st_connect) { if (BIO_do_connect(client) <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(client)) goto err; } else { st_connect = 1; } } if (!st_accept) { if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(acpt)) goto err; } else { st_accept = 1; } } } } /* We're not interested in accepting further connects */ server = BIO_pop(acpt); BIO_free_all(acpt); acpt = NULL; s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if (!s_ssl_bio) goto err; c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if (!c_ssl_bio) goto err; SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl); SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client); (void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl); SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server); (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); do { /*- * c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO * * client: I/O for SSL library * * * server: I/O for SSL library * * s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO */ /* * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so we * don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE -- * we just try everything in each iteration */ { /* CLIENT */ char cbuf[1024 * 8]; int i, r; clock_t c_clock = clock(); memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf)); if (debug) if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl)) printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl)); if (cw_num > 0) { /* Write to server. */ if (cw_num > (long)sizeof cbuf) i = sizeof cbuf; else i = (int)cw_num; r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n"); err_in_client = 1; goto err; } /* * BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here. The * library expects us to call BIO_write with the same * arguments again, and that's what we will do in the * next iteration. */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("client wrote %d\n", r); cw_num -= r; } } if (cr_num > 0) { /* Read from server. */ r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf)); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n"); err_in_client = 1; goto err; } /* * Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored. */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("client read %d\n", r); cr_num -= r; } } /* * c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals), but * sampling over a large number of connections should result in * fairly accurate figures. We cannot guarantee a lot, however * -- if each connection lasts for exactly one clock tick, it * will be counted only for the client or only for the server or * even not at all. */ *c_time += (clock() - c_clock); } { /* SERVER */ char sbuf[1024 * 8]; int i, r; clock_t s_clock = clock(); memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf)); if (debug) if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl)) printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl)); if (sw_num > 0) { /* Write to client. */ if (sw_num > (long)sizeof sbuf) i = sizeof sbuf; else i = (int)sw_num; r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n"); err_in_server = 1; goto err; } /* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("server wrote %d\n", r); sw_num -= r; } } if (sr_num > 0) { /* Read from client. */ r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n"); err_in_server = 1; goto err; } /* blah, blah */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("server read %d\n", r); sr_num -= r; } } *s_time += (clock() - s_clock); } } while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0); if (verbose) print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via TCP connect: "); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (verify_npn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) { ret = 1; goto end; } # endif if (verify_serverinfo() < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Server info verify error\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } if (verify_alpn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } if (verify_servername(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } if (custom_ext_error) { fprintf(stderr, "Custom extension error\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG end: # endif ret = 0; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_free_all(acpt); BIO_free(server); BIO_free(client); BIO_free(s_ssl_bio); BIO_free(c_ssl_bio); if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") == 0) ret = (err_in_client != 0) ? 0 : 1; else if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") == 0) ret = (err_in_server != 0) ? 0 : 1; return ret; } #endif int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count, clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time) { long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count; BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL; BIO *server = NULL, *server_io = NULL, *client = NULL, *client_io = NULL; int ret = 1; int err_in_client = 0; int err_in_server = 0; size_t bufsiz = 256; /* small buffer for testing */ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&server, bufsiz, &server_io, bufsiz)) goto err; if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&client, bufsiz, &client_io, bufsiz)) goto err; s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if (!s_ssl_bio) goto err; c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if (!c_ssl_bio) goto err; SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl); SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client); (void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl); SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server); (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); do { /*- * c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO * * client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library * * client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be * relayed over some I/O facility, but in this * test program, we're the server, too: * * server_io: server's SSL communication * * server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library * * s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO * * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair": * client + client_io, server + server_io. * BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must * be handled by the same thread). * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.] * * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints: * * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil * other side's read attempt * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now * * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee; * it depends on the application which one you should use. */ /* * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so we * don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE -- * we just try everything in each iteration */ { /* CLIENT */ char cbuf[1024 * 8]; int i, r; clock_t c_clock = clock(); memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf)); if (debug) if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl)) printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl)); if (cw_num > 0) { /* Write to server. */ if (cw_num > (long)sizeof cbuf) i = sizeof cbuf; else i = (int)cw_num; r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n"); err_in_client = 1; goto err; } /* * BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here. The * library expects us to call BIO_write with the same * arguments again, and that's what we will do in the * next iteration. */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("client wrote %d\n", r); cw_num -= r; } } if (cr_num > 0) { /* Read from server. */ r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf)); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n"); err_in_client = 1; goto err; } /* * Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored. */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("client read %d\n", r); cr_num -= r; } } /* * c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals), but * sampling over a large number of connections should result in * fairly accurate figures. We cannot guarantee a lot, however * -- if each connection lasts for exactly one clock tick, it * will be counted only for the client or only for the server or * even not at all. */ *c_time += (clock() - c_clock); } { /* SERVER */ char sbuf[1024 * 8]; int i, r; clock_t s_clock = clock(); memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf)); if (debug) if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl)) printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl)); if (sw_num > 0) { /* Write to client. */ if (sw_num > (long)sizeof sbuf) i = sizeof sbuf; else i = (int)sw_num; r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n"); err_in_server = 1; goto err; } /* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("server wrote %d\n", r); sw_num -= r; } } if (sr_num > 0) { /* Read from client. */ r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); if (r < 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n"); err_in_server = 1; goto err; } /* blah, blah */ } else if (r == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("server read %d\n", r); sr_num -= r; } } *s_time += (clock() - s_clock); } { /* "I/O" BETWEEN CLIENT AND SERVER. */ size_t r1, r2; BIO *io1 = server_io, *io2 = client_io; /* * we use the non-copying interface for io1 and the standard * BIO_write/BIO_read interface for io2 */ static int prev_progress = 1; int progress = 0; /* io1 to io2 */ do { size_t num; int r; r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io1); r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(io2); num = r1; if (r2 < num) num = r2; if (num) { char *dataptr; if (INT_MAX < num) /* yeah, right */ num = INT_MAX; r = BIO_nread(io1, &dataptr, (int)num); assert(r > 0); assert(r <= (int)num); /* * possibly r < num (non-contiguous data) */ num = r; r = BIO_write(io2, dataptr, (int)num); if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_write could not write " "BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() bytes"); goto err; } progress = 1; if (debug) printf((io1 == client_io) ? "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" : "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num); } } while (r1 && r2); /* io2 to io1 */ { size_t num; int r; r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io2); r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(io1); /* * here we could use ..._get_write_guarantee instead of * ..._get_read_request, but by using the latter we test * restartability of the SSL implementation more thoroughly */ num = r1; if (r2 < num) num = r2; if (num) { char *dataptr; if (INT_MAX < num) num = INT_MAX; if (num > 1) --num; /* test restartability even more thoroughly */ r = BIO_nwrite0(io1, &dataptr); assert(r > 0); if (r < (int)num) num = r; r = BIO_read(io2, dataptr, (int)num); if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_read could not read " "BIO_ctrl_pending() bytes"); goto err; } progress = 1; r = BIO_nwrite(io1, &dataptr, (int)num); if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_nwrite() did not accept " "BIO_nwrite0() bytes"); goto err; } if (debug) printf((io2 == client_io) ? "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" : "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num); } } /* no loop, BIO_ctrl_get_read_request now * returns 0 anyway */ if (!progress && !prev_progress) if (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: got stuck\n"); fprintf(stderr, " ERROR.\n"); goto err; } prev_progress = progress; } } while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0); if (verbose) print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via BIO pair: "); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (verify_npn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) { ret = 1; goto end; } #endif if (verify_serverinfo() < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Server info verify error\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } if (verify_alpn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } if (verify_servername(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } if (custom_ext_error) { fprintf(stderr, "Custom extension error\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG end: #endif ret = 0; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_free(server); BIO_free(server_io); BIO_free(client); BIO_free(client_io); BIO_free(s_ssl_bio); BIO_free(c_ssl_bio); if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") == 0) ret = (err_in_client != 0) ? 0 : 1; else if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") == 0) ret = (err_in_server != 0) ? 0 : 1; return ret; } #define W_READ 1 #define W_WRITE 2 #define C_DONE 1 #define S_DONE 2 int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count) { char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL; long bufsiz; long cw_num = count, cr_num = count; long sw_num = count, sr_num = count; int ret = 1; BIO *c_to_s = NULL; BIO *s_to_c = NULL; BIO *c_bio = NULL; BIO *s_bio = NULL; int c_r, c_w, s_r, s_w; int i, j; int done = 0; int c_write, s_write; int do_server = 0, do_client = 0; int max_frag = 5 * 1024; int err_in_client = 0; int err_in_server = 0; bufsiz = count > 40 * 1024 ? 40 * 1024 : count; if ((cbuf = OPENSSL_zalloc(bufsiz)) == NULL) goto err; if ((sbuf = OPENSSL_zalloc(bufsiz)) == NULL) goto err; c_to_s = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); s_to_c = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl); SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, s_to_c, c_to_s); SSL_set_max_send_fragment(c_ssl, max_frag); BIO_set_ssl(c_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* * We've just given our ref to these BIOs to c_ssl. We need another one to * give to s_ssl */ if (!BIO_up_ref(c_to_s)) { /* c_to_s and s_to_c will get freed when we free c_ssl */ c_to_s = NULL; s_to_c = NULL; goto err; } if (!BIO_up_ref(s_to_c)) { /* s_to_c will get freed when we free c_ssl */ s_to_c = NULL; goto err; } SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl); SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, c_to_s, s_to_c); /* We've used up all our refs to these now */ c_to_s = NULL; s_to_c = NULL; SSL_set_max_send_fragment(s_ssl, max_frag); BIO_set_ssl(s_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); c_r = 0; s_r = 1; c_w = 1; s_w = 0; c_write = 1, s_write = 0; /* We can always do writes */ for (;;) { do_server = 0; do_client = 0; i = (int)BIO_pending(s_bio); if ((i && s_r) || s_w) do_server = 1; i = (int)BIO_pending(c_bio); if ((i && c_r) || c_w) do_client = 1; if (do_server && debug) { if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl)) printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl)); /*- else if (s_write) printf("server:SSL_write()\n"); else printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */ } if (do_client && debug) { if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl)) printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl)); /*- else if (c_write) printf("client:SSL_write()\n"); else printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */ } if (!do_client && !do_server) { fprintf(stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) { if (c_write) { j = (cw_num > bufsiz) ? (int)bufsiz : (int)cw_num; i = BIO_write(c_bio, cbuf, j); if (i < 0) { c_r = 0; c_w = 0; if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) { if (BIO_should_read(c_bio)) c_r = 1; if (BIO_should_write(c_bio)) c_w = 1; } else { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n"); err_in_client = 1; ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } } else if (i == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("client wrote %d\n", i); /* ok */ s_r = 1; c_write = 0; cw_num -= i; if (max_frag > 1029) SSL_set_max_send_fragment(c_ssl, max_frag -= 5); } } else { i = BIO_read(c_bio, cbuf, bufsiz); if (i < 0) { c_r = 0; c_w = 0; if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) { if (BIO_should_read(c_bio)) c_r = 1; if (BIO_should_write(c_bio)) c_w = 1; } else { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n"); err_in_client = 1; ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } } else if (i == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("client read %d\n", i); cr_num -= i; if (sw_num > 0) { s_write = 1; s_w = 1; } if (cr_num <= 0) { s_write = 1; s_w = 1; done = S_DONE | C_DONE; } } } } if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE)) { if (!s_write) { i = BIO_read(s_bio, sbuf, bufsiz); if (i < 0) { s_r = 0; s_w = 0; if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) { if (BIO_should_read(s_bio)) s_r = 1; if (BIO_should_write(s_bio)) s_w = 1; } else { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n"); err_in_server = 1; ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } } else if (i == 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_read\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("server read %d\n", i); sr_num -= i; if (cw_num > 0) { c_write = 1; c_w = 1; } if (sr_num <= 0) { s_write = 1; s_w = 1; c_write = 0; } } } else { j = (sw_num > bufsiz) ? (int)bufsiz : (int)sw_num; i = BIO_write(s_bio, sbuf, j); if (i < 0) { s_r = 0; s_w = 0; if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) { if (BIO_should_read(s_bio)) s_r = 1; if (BIO_should_write(s_bio)) s_w = 1; } else { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n"); err_in_server = 1; ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } } else if (i == 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_write\n"); goto err; } else { if (debug) printf("server wrote %d\n", i); sw_num -= i; s_write = 0; c_r = 1; if (sw_num <= 0) done |= S_DONE; if (max_frag > 1029) SSL_set_max_send_fragment(s_ssl, max_frag -= 5); } } } if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE)) break; } if (verbose) print_details(c_ssl, "DONE: "); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (verify_npn(c_ssl, s_ssl) < 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } #endif if (verify_serverinfo() < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Server info verify error\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } if (custom_ext_error) { fprintf(stderr, "Custom extension error\n"); ret = 1; goto err; } ret = 0; err: BIO_free(c_to_s); BIO_free(s_to_c); BIO_free_all(c_bio); BIO_free_all(s_bio); OPENSSL_free(cbuf); OPENSSL_free(sbuf); if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-client") == 0) ret = (err_in_client != 0) ? 0 : 1; else if (should_negotiate != NULL && strcmp(should_negotiate, "fail-server") == 0) ret = (err_in_server != 0) ? 0 : 1; return (ret); } static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { char *s, buf[256]; s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)), buf, sizeof buf); if (s != NULL) { if (ok) printf("depth=%d %s\n", X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), buf); else { fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d error=%d %s\n", X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), buf); } } if (ok == 0) { int i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); switch (i) { default: fprintf(stderr, "Error string: %s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: ok = 1; break; } } return (ok); } static int app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { int ok = 1; struct app_verify_arg *cb_arg = arg; if (cb_arg->app_verify) { char *s = NULL, buf[256]; X509 *c = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(ctx); printf("In app_verify_callback, allowing cert. "); printf("Arg is: %s\n", cb_arg->string); printf("Finished printing do we have a context? 0x%p a cert? 0x%p\n", (void *)ctx, (void *)c); if (c) s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(c), buf, 256); if (s != NULL) { printf("cert depth=%d %s\n", X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), buf); } return (1); } ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx); return (ok); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /*- * These DH parameters have been generated as follows: * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 512 * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 1024 * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout -dsaparam 1024 * (The third function has been renamed to avoid name conflicts.) */ static DH *get_dh512() { static unsigned char dh512_p[] = { 0xCB, 0xC8, 0xE1, 0x86, 0xD0, 0x1F, 0x94, 0x17, 0xA6, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xC6, 0x1F, 0x0D, 0xAC, 0xB6, 0x25, 0x3E, 0x06, 0x39, 0xCA, 0x72, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x6E, 0xDA, 0xC0, 0x61, 0xE6, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x25, 0xE8, 0x3B, 0xB9, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xB6, 0xB5, 0xFE, 0x99, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x33, 0xB8, 0xE1, 0xF1, 0x13, 0x4F, 0x59, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x21, 0x33, 0x02, 0xC5, 0xAE, 0x23, }; static unsigned char dh512_g[] = { 0x02, }; DH *dh; BIGNUM *p, *g; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL); if ((p == NULL) || (g == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dh); BN_free(p); BN_free(g); return (NULL); } return (dh); } static DH *get_dh1024() { static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = { 0xF8, 0x81, 0x89, 0x7D, 0x14, 0x24, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xBF, 0x3A, 0xE4, 0x90, 0xF4, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xB5, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x56, 0xA2, 0xEA, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xC0, 0xC0, 0xCE, 0x89, 0xE1, 0xFA, 0x63, 0x3F, 0xB0, 0x6B, 0x32, 0x66, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x7B, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xC2, 0xAE, 0x98, 0x89, 0x26, 0x17, 0xC2, 0x05, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0x08, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x17, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xC5, 0x07, 0x93, 0x03, 0xB1, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0xB8, 0x1C, 0x52, 0x47, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x4B, 0x32, 0x81, 0xAA, 0x7F, 0x00, 0xC8, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x11, 0x2D, 0x37, 0x34, 0x6C, 0xEA, 0x02, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xBB, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x33, 0x09, 0x15, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x23, 0x87, 0x07, 0x5E, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x6B, 0x7C, 0x5F, 0xEC, 0xA6, 0x24, 0xDC, 0x53, }; static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = { 0x02, }; DH *dh; BIGNUM *p, *g; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL); if ((p == NULL) || (g == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dh); BN_free(p); BN_free(g); return (NULL); } return (dh); } static DH *get_dh1024dsa() { static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = { 0xC8, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x08, 0x07, 0x89, 0x4D, 0x90, 0x53, 0xF3, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x21, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xA6, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x23, 0x9A, 0xC7, 0x87, 0x19, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x6F, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0xB8, 0x65, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x31, 0x83, 0x4A, 0xA7, 0x5F, 0x2F, 0x88, 0x38, 0xB6, 0x55, 0xCF, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xDA, 0xAC, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0x33, 0x84, 0x37, 0x5B, 0x82, 0x4A, 0x31, 0x5D, 0xE7, 0xBD, 0x52, 0x97, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xBF, 0x10, 0x9E, 0x37, 0xEA, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x28, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x09, 0x5C, 0x68, 0xC7, 0x45, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x70, 0xC9, 0x3A, 0xBB, 0xDF, 0xD4, 0x21, 0x0F, 0xC4, 0x6A, 0x3C, 0xF6, 0x61, 0xCF, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x13, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0xBC, 0xCF, 0xBC, 0x26, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0x0B, 0xBD, 0xAB, 0x5D, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x39, }; static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = { 0x3B, 0x40, 0x86, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6C, 0xDE, 0x67, 0x1C, 0xCC, 0x80, 0x05, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0xFE, 0xBD, 0x20, 0x27, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x24, 0xC9, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xE1, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x98, 0x27, 0x40, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x8C, 0x6A, 0xE9, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x3A, 0xD6, 0x86, 0x83, 0x5E, 0x72, 0x41, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0xB3, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xCE, 0x37, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x65, 0xD3, 0xE6, 0xA6, 0x00, 0xF5, 0x5A, 0x95, 0x43, 0x5E, 0x81, 0xCF, 0x60, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xFC, 0x36, 0xA7, 0x5D, 0x7A, 0x4C, 0x06, 0x91, 0x6E, 0xF6, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x36, 0xCB, 0x06, 0xEA, 0xF5, 0x3D, 0x95, 0x49, 0xCB, 0xA7, 0xDD, 0x81, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x09, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x22, 0x72, 0xA1, 0x7F, 0xC4, 0x70, 0x56, 0x70, 0xE8, 0x20, 0x10, 0x18, 0x8F, 0x2E, 0x60, 0x07, 0xE7, 0x68, 0x1A, 0x82, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xA2, }; DH *dh; BIGNUM *p, *g; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL); if ((p == NULL) || (g == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dh); BN_free(p); BN_free(g); return (NULL); } DH_set_length(dh, 160); return (dh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* convert the PSK key (psk_key) in ascii to binary (psk) */ static int psk_key2bn(const char *pskkey, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { int ret; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, pskkey); if (!ret) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n", pskkey); BN_free(bn); return 0; } if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n", max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn)); BN_free(bn); return 0; } ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk); BN_free(bn); return ret; } static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { int ret; unsigned int psk_len = 0; ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "Client_identity"); if (ret < 0) goto out_err; if (debug) fprintf(stderr, "client: created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity, ret); ret = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len); if (ret < 0) goto out_err; psk_len = ret; out_err: return psk_len; } static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { unsigned int psk_len = 0; if (strcmp(identity, "Client_identity") != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "server: PSK error: client identity not found\n"); return 0; } psk_len = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len); return psk_len; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/bad_dtls_test.c0000644000000000000000000005050013176625661016014 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Unit test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER session resume, as used by * AnyConnect VPN protocol. * * This is designed to exercise the code paths in * http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/blob/HEAD:/dtls.c * which have frequently been affected by regressions in DTLS1_BAD_VER * support. * * Note that unlike other SSL tests, we don't test against our own SSL * server method. Firstly because we don't have one; we *only* support * DTLS1_BAD_VER as a client. And secondly because even if that were * fixed up it's the wrong thing to test against — because if changes * are made in generic DTLS code which don't take DTLS1_BAD_VER into * account, there's plenty of scope for making those changes such that * they break *both* the client and the server in the same way. * * So we handle the server side manually. In a session resume there isn't * much to be done anyway. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../ssl/packet_locl.h" #include "../e_os.h" /* for OSSL_NELEM() */ /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER packets the MAC doesn't include the handshake header */ #define MAC_OFFSET (DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) static unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; static unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; /* These are all generated locally, sized purely according to our own whim */ static unsigned char session_id[32]; static unsigned char master_secret[48]; static unsigned char cookie[20]; /* We've hard-coded the cipher suite; we know it's 104 bytes */ static unsigned char key_block[104]; #define mac_key (key_block + 20) #define dec_key (key_block + 40) #define enc_key (key_block + 56) static EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_md; static int do_PRF(const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, unsigned char *out, int olen) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL); size_t outlen = olen; /* No error handling. If it all screws up, the test will fail anyway */ EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, EVP_md5_sha1()); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret)); EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, seed1_len); EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, seed2_len); EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, seed3_len); EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 1; } static SSL_SESSION *client_session(void) { static unsigned char session_asn1[] = { 0x30, 0x5F, /* SEQUENCE, length 0x5F */ 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, /* INTEGER, SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION */ 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, /* INTEGER, DTLS1_BAD_VER */ 0x04, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2F, /* OCTET_STRING, AES128-SHA */ 0x04, 0x20, /* OCTET_STRING, session id */ #define SS_SESSID_OFS 15 /* Session ID goes here */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30, /* OCTET_STRING, master secret */ #define SS_SECRET_OFS 49 /* Master secret goes here */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, }; const unsigned char *p = session_asn1; /* Copy the randomly-generated fields into the above ASN1 */ memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id)); memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SECRET_OFS, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret)); return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sizeof(session_asn1)); } /* Returns 1 for initial ClientHello, 2 for ClientHello with cookie */ static int validate_client_hello(BIO *wbio) { PACKET pkt, pkt2; long len; unsigned char *data; int cookie_found = 0; unsigned int u; len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data); if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len)) return 0; /* Check record header type */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) return 0; /* Version */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER) return 0; /* Skip the rest of the record header */ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3)) return 0; /* Check it's a ClientHello */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) return 0; /* Skip the rest of the handshake message header */ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) return 0; /* Check client version */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER) return 0; /* Store random */ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) return 0; /* Check session id length and content */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2) || !PACKET_equal(&pkt2, session_id, sizeof(session_id))) return 0; /* Check cookie */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2)) return 0; if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) { if (!PACKET_equal(&pkt2, cookie, sizeof(cookie))) return 0; cookie_found = 1; } /* Skip ciphers */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u)) return 0; /* Skip compression */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u)) return 0; /* Skip extensions */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u)) return 0; /* Now we are at the end */ if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) return 0; /* Update handshake MAC for second ClientHello (with cookie) */ if (cookie_found && !EVP_DigestUpdate(handshake_md, data + MAC_OFFSET, len - MAC_OFFSET)) printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n"); (void)BIO_reset(wbio); return 1 + cookie_found; } static int send_hello_verify(BIO *rbio) { static unsigned char hello_verify[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */ 0x00, 0x23, /* Length */ 0x03, /* Hello Verify */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Fragment length */ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */ 0x14, /* Cookie length */ #define HV_COOKIE_OFS 28 /* Cookie goes here */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, }; memcpy(hello_verify + HV_COOKIE_OFS, cookie, sizeof(cookie)); BIO_write(rbio, hello_verify, sizeof(hello_verify)); return 1; } static int send_server_hello(BIO *rbio) { static unsigned char server_hello[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# 1 */ 0x00, 0x52, /* Length */ 0x02, /* Server Hello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Length */ 0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Fragment length */ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */ #define SH_RANDOM_OFS 27 /* Server random goes here */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, /* Session ID length */ #define SH_SESSID_OFS 60 /* Session ID goes here */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2f, /* Cipher suite AES128-SHA */ 0x00, /* Compression null */ }; static unsigned char change_cipher_spec[] = { 0x14, /* Change Cipher Spec */ 0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* Seq# 2 */ 0x00, 0x03, /* Length */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, /* Message */ }; memcpy(server_hello + SH_RANDOM_OFS, server_random, sizeof(server_random)); memcpy(server_hello + SH_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id)); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(handshake_md, server_hello + MAC_OFFSET, sizeof(server_hello) - MAC_OFFSET)) printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n"); BIO_write(rbio, server_hello, sizeof(server_hello)); BIO_write(rbio, change_cipher_spec, sizeof(change_cipher_spec)); return 1; } /* Create header, HMAC, pad, encrypt and send a record */ static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, unsigned long seqnr, const void *msg, size_t len) { /* Note that the order of the record header fields on the wire, * and in the HMAC, is different. So we just keep them in separate * variables and handle them individually. */ static unsigned char epoch[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 }; static unsigned char seq[6] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; static unsigned char ver[2] = { 0x01, 0x00 }; /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */ unsigned char lenbytes[2]; HMAC_CTX *ctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_ctx; unsigned char iv[16]; unsigned char pad; unsigned char *enc; #ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG seq[0] = (seqnr >> 40) & 0xff; seq[1] = (seqnr >> 32) & 0xff; #endif seq[2] = (seqnr >> 24) & 0xff; seq[3] = (seqnr >> 16) & 0xff; seq[4] = (seqnr >> 8) & 0xff; seq[5] = seqnr & 0xff; pad = 15 - ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) % 16); enc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1 + pad); if (enc == NULL) return 0; /* Copy record to encryption buffer */ memcpy(enc, msg, len); /* Append HMAC to data */ ctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, mac_key, 20, EVP_sha1(), NULL); HMAC_Update(ctx, epoch, 2); HMAC_Update(ctx, seq, 6); HMAC_Update(ctx, &type, 1); HMAC_Update(ctx, ver, 2); /* Version */ lenbytes[0] = len >> 8; lenbytes[1] = len & 0xff; HMAC_Update(ctx, lenbytes, 2); /* Length */ HMAC_Update(ctx, enc, len); /* Finally the data itself */ HMAC_Final(ctx, enc + len, NULL); HMAC_CTX_free(ctx); /* Append padding bytes */ len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; do { enc[len++] = pad; } while (len % 16); /* Generate IV, and encrypt */ RAND_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv)); enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_CipherInit_ex(enc_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, enc_key, iv, 1); EVP_Cipher(enc_ctx, enc, enc, len); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(enc_ctx); /* Finally write header (from fragmented variables), IV and encrypted record */ BIO_write(rbio, &type, 1); BIO_write(rbio, ver, 2); BIO_write(rbio, epoch, 2); BIO_write(rbio, seq, 6); lenbytes[0] = (len + sizeof(iv)) >> 8; lenbytes[1] = (len + sizeof(iv)) & 0xff; BIO_write(rbio, lenbytes, 2); BIO_write(rbio, iv, sizeof(iv)); BIO_write(rbio, enc, len); OPENSSL_free(enc); return 1; } static int send_finished(SSL *s, BIO *rbio) { static unsigned char finished_msg[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH] = { 0x14, /* Finished */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Length */ 0x00, 0x03, /* Seq# 3 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Fragment length */ /* Finished MAC (12 bytes) */ }; unsigned char handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; /* Derive key material */ do_PRF(TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, key_block, sizeof(key_block)); /* Generate Finished MAC */ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(handshake_md, handshake_hash, NULL)) printf("EVP_DigestFinal_ex() failed\n"); do_PRF(TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, handshake_hash, EVP_MD_CTX_size(handshake_md), NULL, 0, finished_msg + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH); return send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 0, finished_msg, sizeof(finished_msg)); } static int validate_ccs(BIO *wbio) { PACKET pkt; long len; unsigned char *data; unsigned int u; len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data); if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len)) return 0; /* Check record header type */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) return 0; /* Version */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER) return 0; /* Skip the rest of the record header */ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3)) return 0; /* Check ChangeCipherSpec message */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CCS) return 0; /* A DTLS1_BAD_VER ChangeCipherSpec also contains the * handshake sequence number (which is 2 here) */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0002) return 0; /* Now check the Finished packet */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) return 0; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER) return 0; /* Check epoch is now 1 */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0001) return 0; /* That'll do for now. If OpenSSL accepted *our* Finished packet * then it's evidently remembered that DTLS1_BAD_VER doesn't * include the handshake header in the MAC. There's not a lot of * point in implementing decryption here, just to check that it * continues to get it right for one more packet. */ return 1; } #define NODROP(x) { x##UL, 0 } #define DROP(x) { x##UL, 1 } static struct { unsigned long seq; int drop; } tests[] = { NODROP(1), NODROP(3), NODROP(2), NODROP(0x1234), NODROP(0x1230), NODROP(0x1235), NODROP(0xffff), NODROP(0x10001), NODROP(0xfffe), NODROP(0x10000), DROP(0x10001), DROP(0xff), NODROP(0x100000), NODROP(0x800000), NODROP(0x7fffe1), NODROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000000), NODROP(0xfffffe), DROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000010), NODROP(0xfffffd), NODROP(0x1000011), DROP(0x12), NODROP(0x1000012), NODROP(0x1ffffff), NODROP(0x2000000), DROP(0x1ff00fe), NODROP(0x2000001), NODROP(0x20fffff), NODROP(0x2105500), DROP(0x20ffffe), NODROP(0x21054ff), NODROP(0x211ffff), DROP(0x2110000), NODROP(0x2120000) /* The last test should be NODROP, because a DROP wouldn't get tested. */ }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *con; BIO *rbio; BIO *wbio; BIO *err; time_t now = 0; int testresult = 0; int ret; int i; err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); RAND_bytes(session_id, sizeof(session_id)); RAND_bytes(master_secret, sizeof(master_secret)); RAND_bytes(cookie, sizeof(cookie)); RAND_bytes(server_random + 4, sizeof(server_random) - 4); now = time(NULL); memcpy(server_random, &now, sizeof(now)); sess = client_session(); if (sess == NULL) { printf("Failed to generate SSL_SESSION\n"); goto end; } handshake_md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (handshake_md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(handshake_md, EVP_md5_sha1(), NULL)) { printf("Failed to initialise handshake_md\n"); goto end; } ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method()); if (ctx == NULL) { printf("Failed to allocate SSL_CTX\n"); goto end_md; } if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) { printf("SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version() failed\n"); goto end_ctx; } if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) { printf("SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version() failed\n"); goto end_ctx; } if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "AES128-SHA")) { printf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() failed\n"); goto end_ctx; } con = SSL_new(ctx); if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) { printf("SSL_set_session() failed\n"); goto end_con; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); BIO_set_nbio(rbio, 1); BIO_set_nbio(wbio, 1); SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio); SSL_set_connect_state(con); /* Send initial ClientHello */ ret = SSL_do_handshake(con); if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { printf("Unexpected handshake result at initial call!\n"); goto end_con; } if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 1) { printf("Initial ClientHello failed validation\n"); goto end_con; } if (send_hello_verify(rbio) != 1) { printf("Failed to send HelloVerify\n"); goto end_con; } ret = SSL_do_handshake(con); if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { printf("Unexpected handshake result after HelloVerify!\n"); goto end_con; } if (validate_client_hello(wbio) != 2) { printf("Second ClientHello failed validation\n"); goto end_con; } if (send_server_hello(rbio) != 1) { printf("Failed to send ServerHello\n"); goto end_con; } ret = SSL_do_handshake(con); if (ret > 0 || SSL_get_error(con, ret) != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { printf("Unexpected handshake result after ServerHello!\n"); goto end_con; } if (send_finished(con, rbio) != 1) { printf("Failed to send Finished\n"); goto end_con; } ret = SSL_do_handshake(con); if (ret < 1) { printf("Handshake not successful after Finished!\n"); goto end_con; } if (validate_ccs(wbio) != 1) { printf("Failed to validate client CCS/Finished\n"); goto end_con; } /* While we're here and crafting packets by hand, we might as well do a bit of a stress test on the DTLS record replay handling. Not Cisco-DTLS specific but useful anyway for the general case. It's been broken before, and in fact was broken even for a basic 0, 2, 1 test case when this test was first added.... */ for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(tests); i++) { unsigned long recv_buf[2]; if (send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, tests[i].seq, &tests[i].seq, sizeof(unsigned long)) != 1) { printf("Failed to send data seq #0x%lx (%d)\n", tests[i].seq, i); goto end_con; } if (tests[i].drop) continue; ret = SSL_read(con, recv_buf, 2 * sizeof(unsigned long)); if (ret != sizeof(unsigned long)) { printf("SSL_read failed or wrong size on seq#0x%lx (%d)\n", tests[i].seq, i); goto end_con; } if (recv_buf[0] != tests[i].seq) { printf("Wrong data packet received (0x%lx not 0x%lx) at packet %d\n", recv_buf[0], tests[i].seq, i); goto end_con; } } if (tests[i-1].drop) { printf("Error: last test cannot be DROP()\n"); goto end_con; } testresult=1; end_con: SSL_free(con); end_ctx: SSL_CTX_free(ctx); end_md: EVP_MD_CTX_free(handshake_md); end: ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); if (!testresult) { printf("Cisco BadDTLS test: FAILED\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0) testresult = 0; #endif BIO_free(err); return testresult?0:1; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/generate_ssl_tests.pl0000644000000000000000000001053713176625661017275 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## SSL testcase generator use strict; use warnings; use File::Basename; use File::Spec::Functions; use OpenSSL::Test qw/srctop_dir srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; # This block needs to run before 'use lib srctop_dir' directives. BEGIN { OpenSSL::Test::setup("no_test_here"); } use lib srctop_dir("util"); # for with_fallback use lib srctop_dir("test", "ssl-tests"); # for ssltests_base use with_fallback qw(Text::Template); use vars qw/@ISA/; push (@ISA, qw/Text::Template/); use ssltests_base; sub print_templates { my $source = srctop_file("test", "ssl_test.tmpl"); my $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => $source); print "# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl\n\n"; my $num = scalar @ssltests::tests; # Add the implicit base configuration. foreach my $test (@ssltests::tests) { $test->{"server"} = { (%ssltests::base_server, %{$test->{"server"}}) }; if (defined $test->{"server2"}) { $test->{"server2"} = { (%ssltests::base_server, %{$test->{"server2"}}) }; } else { if ($test->{"server"}->{"extra"} && defined $test->{"server"}->{"extra"}->{"ServerNameCallback"}) { # Default is the same as server. $test->{"reuse_server2"} = 1; } # Do not emit an empty/duplicate "server2" section. $test->{"server2"} = { }; } if (defined $test->{"resume_server"}) { $test->{"resume_server"} = { (%ssltests::base_server, %{$test->{"resume_server"}}) }; } else { if (defined $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} && $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} eq "Resume") { # Default is the same as server. $test->{"reuse_resume_server"} = 1; } # Do not emit an empty/duplicate "resume-server" section. $test->{"resume_server"} = { }; } $test->{"client"} = { (%ssltests::base_client, %{$test->{"client"}}) }; if (defined $test->{"resume_client"}) { $test->{"resume_client"} = { (%ssltests::base_client, %{$test->{"resume_client"}}) }; } else { if (defined $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} && $test->{"test"}->{"HandshakeMode"} eq "Resume") { # Default is the same as client. $test->{"reuse_resume_client"} = 1; } # Do not emit an empty/duplicate "resume-client" section. $test->{"resume_client"} = { }; } } # ssl_test expects to find a # # num_tests = n # # directive in the file. It'll then look for configuration directives # for n tests, that each look like this: # # test-n = test-section # # [test-section] # (SSL modules for client and server configuration go here.) # # [test-n] # (Test configuration goes here.) print "num_tests = $num\n\n"; # The conf module locations must come before everything else, because # they look like # # test-n = test-section # # and you can't mix and match them with sections. my $idx = 0; foreach my $test (@ssltests::tests) { my $testname = "${idx}-" . $test->{'name'}; print "test-$idx = $testname\n"; $idx++; } $idx = 0; foreach my $test (@ssltests::tests) { my $testname = "${idx}-" . $test->{'name'}; my $text = $template->fill_in( HASH => [{ idx => $idx, testname => $testname } , $test], DELIMITERS => [ "{-", "-}" ]); print "# ===========================================================\n\n"; print "$text\n"; $idx++; } } # Shamelessly copied from Configure. sub read_config { my $fname = shift; open(INPUT, "< $fname") or die "Can't open input file '$fname'!\n"; local $/ = undef; my $content = ; close(INPUT); eval $content; warn $@ if $@; } my $input_file = shift; # Reads the tests into ssltests::tests. read_config($input_file); print_templates(); 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/testec-p256.pem0000644000000000000000000000034313176625662015522 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MHcCAQEEIDYEX2yQlhJXDIwBEwcfyAn2eICEKJxqsAPGChey1a2toAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUQDQgAEJXwAdITiPFcSUsaRI2nlzTNRn++q6F38XrH8m8sf28DQ+2Oob5SU zvgjVS0e70pIqH6bSXDgPc8mKtSs9Zi26Q== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/generate_buildtest.pl0000644000000000000000000000142013176625661017240 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; # First argument is name; my $name = shift @ARGV; my $name_uc = uc $name; # All other arguments are ignored for now print <<"_____"; /* * Generated with test/generate_buildtest.pl, to check that such a simple * program builds. */ #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_${name_uc} # include #endif int main() { return 0; } _____ openssl-1.1.0g/test/Sssrsa.cnf0000644000000000000000000000143613176625661015007 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # create RSA certs - Server RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_key = no [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = ES countryName_value = ES organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = Tortilleras S.A. 0.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 0.commonName_value = Torti 1.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 1.commonName_value = Gordita openssl-1.1.0g/test/igetest.c0000644000000000000000000004014313176625661014647 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #define TEST_SIZE 128 #define BIG_TEST_SIZE 10240 static void hexdump(FILE *f, const char *title, const unsigned char *s, int l) { int n = 0; fprintf(f, "%s", title); for (; n < l; ++n) { if ((n % 16) == 0) fprintf(f, "\n%04x", n); fprintf(f, " %02x", s[n]); } fprintf(f, "\n"); } #define MAX_VECTOR_SIZE 64 struct ige_test { const unsigned char key[16]; const unsigned char iv[32]; const unsigned char in[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE]; const unsigned char out[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE]; const size_t length; const int encrypt; }; static struct ige_test const ige_test_vectors[] = { {{0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f}, /* key */ {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f}, /* iv */ {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, /* in */ {0x1a, 0x85, 0x19, 0xa6, 0x55, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x52, 0xe9, 0xda, 0x8e, 0x43, 0xda, 0x4e, 0xf4, 0x45, 0x3c, 0xf4, 0x56, 0xb4, 0xca, 0x48, 0x8a, 0xa3, 0x83, 0xc7, 0x9c, 0x98, 0xb3, 0x47, 0x97, 0xcb}, /* out */ 32, AES_ENCRYPT}, /* test vector 0 */ {{0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65}, /* key */ {0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x49, 0x47, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4f, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x53, 0x53}, /* iv */ {0x4c, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x74, 0x27, 0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x67, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x72, 0x69, 0x67, 0x68, 0x74, 0x21, 0x0a}, /* in */ {0x99, 0x70, 0x64, 0x87, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0xe6, 0x13, 0xbc, 0x6d, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0xf2, 0x4b, 0x1c, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x48, 0xc8, 0xb9, 0xc3, 0x40, 0x3e, 0x34, 0x67, 0xa8, 0xca, 0xd8, 0x93, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x3b}, /* out */ 32, AES_DECRYPT}, /* test vector 1 */ }; struct bi_ige_test { const unsigned char key1[32]; const unsigned char key2[32]; const unsigned char iv[64]; const unsigned char in[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE]; const unsigned char out[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE]; const size_t keysize; const size_t length; const int encrypt; }; static struct bi_ige_test const bi_ige_test_vectors[] = { {{0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f}, /* key1 */ {0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f}, /* key2 */ {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f}, /* iv */ {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, /* in */ {0x14, 0x40, 0x6f, 0xae, 0xa2, 0x79, 0xf2, 0x56, 0x1f, 0x86, 0xeb, 0x3b, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x53, 0xdc, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x0c, 0x03, 0xde, 0x7c, 0xe5, 0x16, 0x6a, 0x9c, 0x20, 0x33, 0x9d, 0x33, 0xfe, 0x12}, /* out */ 16, 32, AES_ENCRYPT}, /* test vector 0 */ {{0x58, 0x0a, 0x06, 0xe9, 0x97, 0x07, 0x59, 0x5c, 0x9e, 0x19, 0xd2, 0xa7, 0xbb, 0x40, 0x2b, 0x7a, 0xc7, 0xd8, 0x11, 0x9e, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x35, 0x75, 0x64, 0x28, 0x0f, 0x23, 0xad, 0x74, 0xac, 0x37}, /* key1 */ {0xd1, 0x80, 0xa0, 0x31, 0x47, 0xa3, 0x11, 0x13, 0x86, 0x26, 0x9e, 0x6d, 0xff, 0xaf, 0x72, 0x74, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x35, 0x81, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0x3d, 0x21, 0x67, 0x7b, 0x58, 0xa8, 0x18, 0xf9, 0x72, 0xe4}, /* key2 */ {0x80, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x4c, 0xe6, 0x7b, 0x06, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x35, 0xd5, 0x7e, 0x71, 0xc1, 0x70, 0x70, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x00, 0x28, 0x0c, 0xbf, 0x6c, 0x42, 0x9b, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0x65, 0x11, 0x77, 0x7c, 0x67, 0xfe, 0x76, 0x0a, 0xf0, 0xd5, 0xc6, 0x6e, 0x6a, 0xe7, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0x7e, 0x9e, 0xf9, 0x20, 0x0e, 0x54, 0x6f, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x8d, 0x7e, 0xbd, 0x48, 0x79, 0x37, 0x99, 0xff, 0x27, 0x93, 0xa3}, /* iv */ {0xf1, 0x54, 0x3d, 0xca, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0xef, 0x1c, 0x4f, 0xa6, 0x43, 0xf6, 0xe6, 0x48, 0x57, 0xf0, 0xee, 0x15, 0x7f, 0xe3, 0xe7, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x2f, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7a, 0x17, 0x00, 0xab, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0xbe, 0x44, 0x09, 0x9c, 0xcd, 0xac, 0xa8, 0x52, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x7b, 0x75, 0xbc, 0xa4, 0x92, 0x5a, 0xab, 0x46, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0x35, 0x1c, 0x55, 0xa4, 0xb3, 0xa8, 0x40, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x0b}, /* in */ {0x42, 0xe5, 0x28, 0x30, 0x31, 0xc2, 0xa0, 0x23, 0x68, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x24, 0x59, 0x92, 0x79, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0x76, 0x53, 0xb1, 0xcf, 0x20, 0x86, 0x23, 0xe8, 0x72, 0x55, 0x99, 0x92, 0x0d, 0x16, 0x1c, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0xce, 0xcb, 0x51, 0xe2, 0x67, 0xfa, 0x10, 0xec, 0xcd, 0x3d, 0x67, 0xa5, 0xe6, 0xf7, 0x31, 0x26, 0xb0, 0x0d, 0x76, 0x5e, 0x28, 0xdc, 0x7f, 0x01, 0xc5, 0xa5, 0x4c}, /* out */ 32, 64, AES_ENCRYPT}, /* test vector 1 */ }; static int run_test_vectors(void) { unsigned int n; int errs = 0; for (n = 0; n < OSSL_NELEM(ige_test_vectors); ++n) { const struct ige_test *const v = &ige_test_vectors[n]; AES_KEY key; unsigned char buf[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE]; unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2]; assert(v->length <= MAX_VECTOR_SIZE); if (v->encrypt == AES_ENCRYPT) AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof v->key, &key); else AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key, 8 * sizeof v->key, &key); memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(v->in, buf, v->length, &key, iv, v->encrypt); if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) { printf("IGE test vector %d failed\n", n); hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof v->key); hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof v->iv); hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length); hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length); hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length); ++errs; } /* try with in == out */ memcpy(iv, v->iv, sizeof iv); memcpy(buf, v->in, v->length); AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf, v->length, &key, iv, v->encrypt); if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) { printf("IGE test vector %d failed (with in == out)\n", n); hexdump(stdout, "key", v->key, sizeof v->key); hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof v->iv); hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length); hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length); hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length); ++errs; } } for (n = 0; n < OSSL_NELEM(bi_ige_test_vectors); ++n) { const struct bi_ige_test *const v = &bi_ige_test_vectors[n]; AES_KEY key1; AES_KEY key2; unsigned char buf[MAX_VECTOR_SIZE]; assert(v->length <= MAX_VECTOR_SIZE); if (v->encrypt == AES_ENCRYPT) { AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key1, 8 * v->keysize, &key1); AES_set_encrypt_key(v->key2, 8 * v->keysize, &key2); } else { AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key1, 8 * v->keysize, &key1); AES_set_decrypt_key(v->key2, 8 * v->keysize, &key2); } AES_bi_ige_encrypt(v->in, buf, v->length, &key1, &key2, v->iv, v->encrypt); if (memcmp(v->out, buf, v->length)) { printf("Bidirectional IGE test vector %d failed\n", n); hexdump(stdout, "key 1", v->key1, sizeof v->key1); hexdump(stdout, "key 2", v->key2, sizeof v->key2); hexdump(stdout, "iv", v->iv, sizeof v->iv); hexdump(stdout, "in", v->in, v->length); hexdump(stdout, "expected", v->out, v->length); hexdump(stdout, "got", buf, v->length); ++errs; } } return errs; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned char rkey[16]; unsigned char rkey2[16]; AES_KEY key; AES_KEY key2; unsigned char plaintext[BIG_TEST_SIZE]; unsigned char ciphertext[BIG_TEST_SIZE]; unsigned char checktext[BIG_TEST_SIZE]; unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 4]; unsigned char saved_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 4]; int err = 0; unsigned int n; unsigned matches; assert(BIG_TEST_SIZE >= TEST_SIZE); RAND_bytes(rkey, sizeof rkey); RAND_bytes(plaintext, sizeof plaintext); RAND_bytes(iv, sizeof iv); memcpy(saved_iv, iv, sizeof saved_iv); /* Forward IGE only... */ /* Straight encrypt/decrypt */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) { printf("Encrypt+decrypt doesn't match\n"); hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE); hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE); ++err; } /* Now check encrypt chaining works */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext + TEST_SIZE / 2, ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) { printf("Chained encrypt+decrypt doesn't match\n"); hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE); hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE); ++err; } /* And check decrypt chaining */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext + TEST_SIZE / 2, ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext + TEST_SIZE / 2, checktext + TEST_SIZE / 2, TEST_SIZE / 2, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) { printf("Chained encrypt+chained decrypt doesn't match\n"); hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE); hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE); ++err; } /* make sure garble extends forwards only */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); /* corrupt halfway through */ ++ciphertext[sizeof ciphertext / 2]; AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); memcpy(iv, saved_iv, sizeof iv); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); matches = 0; for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n) if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n]) ++matches; if (matches > sizeof checktext / 2 + sizeof checktext / 100) { printf("More than 51%% matches after garbling\n"); ++err; } if (matches < sizeof checktext / 2) { printf("Garble extends backwards!\n"); ++err; } /* Bi-directional IGE */ /* * Note that we don't have to recover the IV, because chaining isn't */ /* possible with biIGE, so the IV is not updated. */ RAND_bytes(rkey2, sizeof rkey2); /* Straight encrypt/decrypt */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_bi_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, TEST_SIZE, &key, &key2, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_bi_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, TEST_SIZE, &key, &key2, iv, AES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(checktext, plaintext, TEST_SIZE)) { printf("Encrypt+decrypt doesn't match\n"); hexdump(stdout, "Plaintext", plaintext, TEST_SIZE); hexdump(stdout, "Checktext", checktext, TEST_SIZE); ++err; } /* make sure garble extends both ways */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); /* corrupt halfway through */ ++ciphertext[sizeof ciphertext / 2]; AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); matches = 0; for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n) if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n]) ++matches; if (matches > sizeof checktext / 100) { printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling\n"); ++err; } /* make sure garble extends both ways (2) */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); /* corrupt right at the end */ ++ciphertext[sizeof ciphertext - 1]; AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); matches = 0; for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n) if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n]) ++matches; if (matches > sizeof checktext / 100) { printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling (2)\n"); ++err; } /* make sure garble extends both ways (3) */ AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_encrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_ige_encrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, sizeof plaintext, &key, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); /* corrupt right at the start */ ++ciphertext[0]; AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey, 8 * sizeof rkey, &key); AES_set_decrypt_key(rkey2, 8 * sizeof rkey2, &key2); AES_ige_encrypt(ciphertext, checktext, sizeof checktext, &key, iv, AES_DECRYPT); matches = 0; for (n = 0; n < sizeof checktext; ++n) if (checktext[n] == plaintext[n]) ++matches; if (matches > sizeof checktext / 100) { printf("More than 1%% matches after bidirectional garbling (3)\n"); ++err; } err += run_test_vectors(); return err; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/clienthellotest.c0000644000000000000000000000763013176625661016411 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../ssl/packet_locl.h" #define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN 2 #define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS 1 /* * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version */ #define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG 0 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *con; BIO *rbio; BIO *wbio; BIO *err; long len; unsigned char *data; PACKET pkt, pkt2, pkt3; char *dummytick = "Hello World!"; unsigned int type; int testresult = 0; int currtest = 0; err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); /* * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets * produced when we try to connect */ for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) { testresult = 0; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()); con = SSL_new(ctx); rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio); SSL_set_connect_state(con); if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) { if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick))) goto end; } if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) { /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */ goto end; } len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data); if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len)) goto end; /* Skip the record header */ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) goto end; /* Skip the handshake message header */ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) goto end; /* Skip client version and random */ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto end; /* Skip session id */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2)) goto end; /* Skip ciphers */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2)) goto end; /* Skip compression */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2)) goto end; /* Extensions len */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2)) goto end; /* Loop through all extensions */ while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt2, &type) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt2, &pkt3)) goto end; if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) { if (PACKET_equal(&pkt3, dummytick, strlen(dummytick))) { /* Ticket data is as we expected */ testresult = 1; } else { printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n"); } break; } } } end: SSL_free(con); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); if (!testresult) { printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest); break; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0) testresult = 0; #endif BIO_free(err); return testresult?0:1; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/sha256t.c0000644000000000000000000001321013176625662014373 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include static const unsigned char app_b1[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad }; static const unsigned char app_b2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x24, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0x61, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xff, 0x21, 0x67, 0xf6, 0xec, 0xed, 0xd4, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xc1 }; static const unsigned char app_b3[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0xcd, 0xc7, 0x6e, 0x5c, 0x99, 0x14, 0xfb, 0x92, 0x81, 0xa1, 0xc7, 0xe2, 0x84, 0xd7, 0x3e, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x80, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x6d, 0x39, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0x11, 0x2c, 0xd0 }; static const unsigned char addenum_1[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x23, 0x09, 0x7d, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xd8, 0x22, 0x86, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x77, 0xbd, 0xa2, 0x55, 0xb3, 0x2a, 0xad, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0xbd, 0xa0, 0xb3, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xa7 }; static const unsigned char addenum_2[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x75, 0x38, 0x8b, 0x16, 0x51, 0x27, 0x76, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0xba, 0x5d, 0xa1, 0xfd, 0x89, 0x01, 0x50, 0xb0, 0xc6, 0x45, 0x5c, 0xb4, 0xf5, 0x8b, 0x19, 0x52, 0x52, 0x25, 0x25 }; static const unsigned char addenum_3[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0c, 0x91, 0xd8, 0xbb, 0xb4, 0xc1, 0xea, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8a, 0x4b, 0xf0, 0x3f, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x4e, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x67 }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int i; EVP_MD_CTX *evp; fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-256 "); if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, app_b1, sizeof(app_b1))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!EVP_Digest("abcdbcde" "cdefdefg" "efghfghi" "ghijhijk" "ijkljklm" "klmnlmno" "mnopnopq", 56, md, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, app_b2, sizeof(app_b2))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); evp = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (evp == NULL) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed. (malloc failure)\n"); return 1; } if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 288) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa", (1000000 - i) < 288 ? 1000000 - i : 288)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, app_b3, sizeof(app_b3))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n"); fflush(stdout); fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-224 "); if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha224(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, addenum_1, sizeof(addenum_1))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!EVP_Digest("abcdbcde" "cdefdefg" "efghfghi" "ghijhijk" "ijkljklm" "klmnlmno" "mnopnopq", 56, md, NULL, EVP_sha224(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, addenum_2, sizeof(addenum_2))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); EVP_MD_CTX_reset(evp); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha224(), NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 64) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa", (1000000 - i) < 64 ? 1000000 - i : 64)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL)) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp); if (memcmp(md, addenum_3, sizeof(addenum_3))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n"); fflush(stdout); return 0; err: fprintf(stderr, "Fatal EVP error!\n"); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/danetest.pem0000644000000000000000000000121413176625661015345 0ustar rootrootsubject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/serverinfo.pem0000644000000000000000000000134413176625662015725 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR CT----- ABIAZMevsj4TC5rgwjZNciLGwh15YXoIK9t5aypGJIG4QzyMowmwwDdqxudkUcGa DvuqlYL7psO5j4/BIHTe677CAZBBH3Ho2NOM5q1zub4AbfUMlKeufuQgeQ2Tj1oe LJLRzrwDnPs= -----END SERVERINFO FOR CT----- -----BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR TACK----- 8wABTwFMh1Dz+3W6zULWJKjav5TNaFEXL1h98YtCXeyZnORYg4mbKpxH5CMbjpgx To3amSqUPF4Ntjc/i9+poutxebYkbgAAAkMcxb8+RaM9YEywaJEGViKJJmpYG/gJ HgfGaefI9kKbXSDmP9ntg8dLvDzuyYw14ktM2850Q9WvBiltpekilZxVuT2bFtfs cmS++SAK9YOM8RrKhL1TLmrktoBEJZ6z5GTukYdQ8/t1us1C1iSo2r+UzWhRFy9Y ffGLQl3smZzkWIOJmyqcR+QjG46YMU6N2pkqlDxeDbY3P4vfqaLrcXm2JG4AAAGN xXQJPbdniI9rEydVXb1Cu1yT/t7FBEx6hLxuoypXjCI1wCGpXsd8zEnloR0Ank5h VO/874E/BZlItzSPpcmDKl5Def6BrAJTErQlE9npo52S05YWORxJw1+VYBdqQ09A x3wA -----END SERVERINFO FOR TACK----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/testreq2.pem0000644000000000000000000000056313176625662015316 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIHaMIGFAgEAMA4xDDAKBgNVBAMTA2NuNDBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgC QQCQsnkyUGDY2R3mYoeTprFJKgWuJ3f1jUjlIuW5+wfAUoeMt35c4vcFZ2mIBpEG DtzkNQN1kr2O9ldm9zYnYhyhAgMBAAGgEjAQBgorBgEEAYI3AgEOMQIwADANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAAb2szZgVIxg3vK6kYLjGSBISyuzcXJ6IvuPW6M+yzi1Qgoi gQhazHTJp91T8ItZEzUJGZSZl2e5iXlnffWB+/U= -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/shlibloadtest.c0000644000000000000000000001354113176625662016047 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include /* The test is only currently implemented for DSO_DLFCN and DSO_WIN32 */ #if defined(DSO_DLFCN) || defined(DSO_WIN32) #define SSL_CTX_NEW "SSL_CTX_new" #define SSL_CTX_FREE "SSL_CTX_free" #define TLS_METHOD "TLS_method" #define ERR_GET_ERROR "ERR_get_error" #define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM_FUNC "OpenSSL_version_num" typedef struct ssl_ctx_st SSL_CTX; typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD; typedef const SSL_METHOD * (*TLS_method_t)(void); typedef SSL_CTX * (*SSL_CTX_new_t)(const SSL_METHOD *meth); typedef void (*SSL_CTX_free_t)(SSL_CTX *); typedef unsigned long (*ERR_get_error_t)(void); typedef unsigned long (*OpenSSL_version_num_t)(void); static TLS_method_t TLS_method; static SSL_CTX_new_t SSL_CTX_new; static SSL_CTX_free_t SSL_CTX_free; static ERR_get_error_t ERR_get_error; static OpenSSL_version_num_t OpenSSL_version_num; #ifdef DSO_DLFCN # include typedef void * SHLIB; typedef void * SHLIB_SYM; # define SHLIB_INIT NULL static int shlib_load(const char *filename, SHLIB *lib) { *lib = dlopen(filename, RTLD_GLOBAL | RTLD_LAZY); if (*lib == NULL) return 0; return 1; } static int shlib_sym(SHLIB lib, const char *symname, SHLIB_SYM *sym) { *sym = dlsym(lib, symname); return *sym != NULL; } static int shlib_close(SHLIB lib) { if (dlclose(lib) != 0) return 0; return 1; } #elif defined(DSO_WIN32) # include typedef HINSTANCE SHLIB; typedef void * SHLIB_SYM; # define SHLIB_INIT 0 static int shlib_load(const char *filename, SHLIB *lib) { *lib = LoadLibraryA(filename); if (*lib == NULL) return 0; return 1; } static int shlib_sym(SHLIB lib, const char *symname, SHLIB_SYM *sym) { *sym = (SHLIB_SYM)GetProcAddress(lib, symname); return *sym != NULL; } static int shlib_close(SHLIB lib) { if (FreeLibrary(lib) == 0) return 0; return 1; } #endif # define CRYPTO_FIRST_OPT "-crypto_first" # define SSL_FIRST_OPT "-ssl_first" # define JUST_CRYPTO_OPT "-just_crypto" enum test_types_en { CRYPTO_FIRST, SSL_FIRST, JUST_CRYPTO }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { SHLIB ssllib = SHLIB_INIT, cryptolib = SHLIB_INIT; SSL_CTX *ctx; union { void (*func) (void); SHLIB_SYM sym; } tls_method_sym, ssl_ctx_new_sym, ssl_ctx_free_sym, err_get_error_sym, openssl_version_num_sym; enum test_types_en test_type; int i; if (argc != 4) { printf("Unexpected number of arguments\n"); return 1; } if (strcmp(argv[1], CRYPTO_FIRST_OPT) == 0) { test_type = CRYPTO_FIRST; } else if (strcmp(argv[1], SSL_FIRST_OPT) == 0) { test_type = SSL_FIRST; } else if (strcmp(argv[1], JUST_CRYPTO_OPT) == 0) { test_type = JUST_CRYPTO; } else { printf("Unrecognised argument\n"); return 1; } for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if ((i == 0 && (test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST || test_type == JUST_CRYPTO)) || (i == 1 && test_type == SSL_FIRST)) { if (!shlib_load(argv[2], &cryptolib)) { printf("Unable to load libcrypto\n"); return 1; } } if ((i == 0 && test_type == SSL_FIRST) || (i == 1 && test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST)) { if (!shlib_load(argv[3], &ssllib)) { printf("Unable to load libssl\n"); return 1; } } } if (test_type != JUST_CRYPTO) { if (!shlib_sym(ssllib, TLS_METHOD, &tls_method_sym.sym) || !shlib_sym(ssllib, SSL_CTX_NEW, &ssl_ctx_new_sym.sym) || !shlib_sym(ssllib, SSL_CTX_FREE, &ssl_ctx_free_sym.sym)) { printf("Unable to load ssl symbols\n"); return 1; } TLS_method = (TLS_method_t)tls_method_sym.func; SSL_CTX_new = (SSL_CTX_new_t)ssl_ctx_new_sym.func; SSL_CTX_free = (SSL_CTX_free_t)ssl_ctx_free_sym.func; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()); if (ctx == NULL) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX\n"); return 1; } SSL_CTX_free(ctx); } if (!shlib_sym(cryptolib, ERR_GET_ERROR, &err_get_error_sym.sym) || !shlib_sym(cryptolib, OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM_FUNC, &openssl_version_num_sym.sym)) { printf("Unable to load crypto symbols\n"); return 1; } ERR_get_error = (ERR_get_error_t)err_get_error_sym.func; OpenSSL_version_num = (OpenSSL_version_num_t)openssl_version_num_sym.func; if (ERR_get_error() != 0) { printf("Unexpected error in error queue\n"); return 1; } if (OpenSSL_version_num() != OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) { printf("Unexpected library version loaded\n"); return 1; } for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if ((i == 0 && test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST) || (i == 1 && test_type == SSL_FIRST)) { if (!shlib_close(ssllib)) { printf("Unable to close libssl\n"); return 1; } } if ((i == 0 && (test_type == SSL_FIRST || test_type == JUST_CRYPTO)) || (i == 1 && test_type == CRYPTO_FIRST)) { if (!shlib_close(cryptolib)) { printf("Unable to close libcrypto\n"); return 1; } } } printf("Success\n"); return 0; } #else int main(void) { printf("Test not implemented on this platform\n"); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/constant_time_test.c0000644000000000000000000002317313176625661017115 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_TRUE = (unsigned)(~0); static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_FALSE = 0; static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_TRUE_8 = 0xff; static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_FALSE_8 = 0; static int test_binary_op(unsigned int (*op) (unsigned int a, unsigned int b), const char *op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true) { unsigned c = op(a, b); if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du " "(TRUE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c); return 1; } else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du " "(FALSE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, c); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_binary_op_8(unsigned char (*op) (unsigned int a, unsigned int b), const char *op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true) { unsigned char c = op(a, b); if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u " "(TRUE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c); return 1; } else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u " "(FALSE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, c); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_is_zero(unsigned int a) { unsigned int c = constant_time_is_zero(a); if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): " "expected %du (TRUE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c); return 1; } else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): " "expected %du (FALSE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE, c); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_is_zero_8(unsigned int a) { unsigned char c = constant_time_is_zero_8(a); if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): " "expected %u (TRUE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c); return 1; } else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): " "expected %u (FALSE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, c); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_select(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { unsigned int selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b); if (selected != a) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du," "%du): expected %du(first value), got %du\n", CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected); return 1; } selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b); if (selected != b) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du," "%du): expected %du(second value), got %du\n", CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_select_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) { unsigned char selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, a, b); if (selected != a) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u," "%u): expected %u(first value), got %u\n", CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected); return 1; } selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, a, b); if (selected != b) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u," "%u): expected %u(second value), got %u\n", CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_select_int(int a, int b) { int selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b); if (selected != a) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d," "%d): expected %d(first value), got %d\n", CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected); return 1; } selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b); if (selected != b) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d," "%d): expected %d(second value), got %d\n", CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_eq_int(int a, int b) { unsigned int equal = constant_time_eq_int(a, b); if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): " "expected %du(TRUE), got %du\n", a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, equal); return 1; } else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): " "expected %du(FALSE), got %du\n", a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, equal); return 1; } return 0; } static int test_eq_int_8(int a, int b) { unsigned char equal = constant_time_eq_int_8(a, b); if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): " "expected %u(TRUE), got %u\n", a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, equal); return 1; } else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8) { fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): " "expected %u(FALSE), got %u\n", a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, equal); return 1; } return 0; } static unsigned int test_values[] = { 0, 1, 1024, 12345, 32000, UINT_MAX / 2 - 1, UINT_MAX / 2, UINT_MAX / 2 + 1, UINT_MAX - 1, UINT_MAX }; static unsigned char test_values_8[] = { 0, 1, 2, 20, 32, 127, 128, 129, 255 }; static int signed_test_values[] = { 0, 1, -1, 1024, -1024, 12345, -12345, 32000, -32000, INT_MAX, INT_MIN, INT_MAX - 1, INT_MIN + 1 }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { unsigned int a, b, i, j; int c, d; unsigned char e, f; int num_failed = 0, num_all = 0; fprintf(stdout, "Testing constant time operations...\n"); for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(test_values); ++i) { a = test_values[i]; num_failed += test_is_zero(a); num_failed += test_is_zero_8(a); num_all += 2; for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(test_values); ++j) { b = test_values[j]; num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt, "constant_time_lt", a, b, a < b); num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8, "constant_time_lt_8", a, b, a < b); num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt, "constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a); num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8, "constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a); num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge, "constant_time_ge", a, b, a >= b); num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8, "constant_time_ge_8", a, b, a >= b); num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge, "constant_time_ge", b, a, b >= a); num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8, "constant_time_ge_8", b, a, b >= a); num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq, "constant_time_eq", a, b, a == b); num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8, "constant_time_eq_8", a, b, a == b); num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq, "constant_time_eq", b, a, b == a); num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8, "constant_time_eq_8", b, a, b == a); num_failed += test_select(a, b); num_all += 13; } } for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(signed_test_values); ++i) { c = signed_test_values[i]; for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(signed_test_values); ++j) { d = signed_test_values[j]; num_failed += test_select_int(c, d); num_failed += test_eq_int(c, d); num_failed += test_eq_int_8(c, d); num_all += 3; } } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values_8); ++i) { e = test_values_8[i]; for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values_8); ++j) { f = test_values_8[j]; num_failed += test_select_8(e, f); num_all += 1; } } if (!num_failed) { fprintf(stdout, "success (ran %d tests)\n", num_all); return EXIT_SUCCESS; } else { fprintf(stdout, "%d of %d tests failed!\n", num_failed, num_all); return EXIT_FAILURE; } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/exdatatest.c0000644000000000000000000001432013176625661015347 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include static long saved_argl; static void *saved_argp; static int saved_idx; static int saved_idx2; /* * SIMPLE EX_DATA IMPLEMENTATION * Apps explicitly set/get ex_data as needed */ static void exnew(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx); OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl); OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp); OPENSSL_assert(ptr == NULL); } static int exdup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx); OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl); OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp); OPENSSL_assert(from_d != NULL); return 1; } static void exfree(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx); OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl); OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp); } /* * PRE-ALLOCATED EX_DATA IMPLEMENTATION * Extended data structure is allocated in exnew2/freed in exfree2 * Data is stored inside extended data structure */ typedef struct myobj_ex_data_st { char *hello; int new; int dup; } MYOBJ_EX_DATA; static void exnew2(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { int ret; MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data; OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx2); OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl); OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp); OPENSSL_assert(ptr == NULL); ex_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ex_data)); OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL); ret = CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, saved_idx2, ex_data); OPENSSL_assert(ret); ex_data->new = 1; } static int exdup2(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { MYOBJ_EX_DATA **update_ex_data = (MYOBJ_EX_DATA**)from_d; MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, saved_idx2); OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx2); OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl); OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp); OPENSSL_assert(from_d != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(*update_ex_data != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(ex_data->new); /* Copy hello over */ ex_data->hello = (*update_ex_data)->hello; /* indicate this is a dup */ ex_data->dup = 1; /* Keep my original ex_data */ *update_ex_data = ex_data; return 1; } static void exfree2(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, saved_idx2); int ret; OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL); OPENSSL_free(ex_data); OPENSSL_assert(idx == saved_idx2); OPENSSL_assert(argl == saved_argl); OPENSSL_assert(argp == saved_argp); ret = CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, saved_idx2, NULL); OPENSSL_assert(ret); } typedef struct myobj_st { CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; int id; int st; } MYOBJ; static MYOBJ *MYOBJ_new() { static int count = 0; MYOBJ *obj = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*obj)); obj->id = ++count; obj->st = CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, obj, &obj->ex_data); OPENSSL_assert(obj->st != 0); return obj; } static void MYOBJ_sethello(MYOBJ *obj, char *cp) { obj->st = CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx, cp); OPENSSL_assert(obj->st != 0); } static char *MYOBJ_gethello(MYOBJ *obj) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx); } static void MYOBJ_sethello2(MYOBJ *obj, char *cp) { MYOBJ_EX_DATA* ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx2); if (ex_data != NULL) ex_data->hello = cp; else obj->st = 0; } static char *MYOBJ_gethello2(MYOBJ *obj) { MYOBJ_EX_DATA* ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&obj->ex_data, saved_idx2); if (ex_data != NULL) return ex_data->hello; obj->st = 0; return NULL; } static void MYOBJ_free(MYOBJ *obj) { CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, obj, &obj->ex_data); OPENSSL_free(obj); } static MYOBJ *MYOBJ_dup(MYOBJ *in) { MYOBJ *obj = MYOBJ_new(); obj->st = CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, &obj->ex_data, &in->ex_data); OPENSSL_assert(obj->st != 0); return obj; } int main() { MYOBJ *t1, *t2, *t3; MYOBJ_EX_DATA *ex_data; const char *cp; char *p; p = OPENSSL_strdup("hello world"); saved_argl = 21; saved_argp = OPENSSL_malloc(1); saved_idx = CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, saved_argl, saved_argp, exnew, exdup, exfree); saved_idx2 = CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP, saved_argl, saved_argp, exnew2, exdup2, exfree2); t1 = MYOBJ_new(); t2 = MYOBJ_new(); OPENSSL_assert(t1->st && t2->st); ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&t1->ex_data, saved_idx2); OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL); ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&t2->ex_data, saved_idx2); OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL); MYOBJ_sethello(t1, p); cp = MYOBJ_gethello(t1); OPENSSL_assert(cp == p); cp = MYOBJ_gethello(t2); OPENSSL_assert(cp == NULL); MYOBJ_sethello2(t1, p); cp = MYOBJ_gethello2(t1); OPENSSL_assert(cp == p); OPENSSL_assert(t1->st); cp = MYOBJ_gethello2(t2); OPENSSL_assert(cp == NULL); OPENSSL_assert(t2->st); t3 = MYOBJ_dup(t1); ex_data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&t3->ex_data, saved_idx2); OPENSSL_assert(ex_data != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(ex_data->dup); cp = MYOBJ_gethello(t3); OPENSSL_assert(cp == p); cp = MYOBJ_gethello2(t3); OPENSSL_assert(cp == p); OPENSSL_assert(t3->st); MYOBJ_free(t1); MYOBJ_free(t2); MYOBJ_free(t3); OPENSSL_free(saved_argp); OPENSSL_free(p); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/verify_extra_test.c0000644000000000000000000000770613176625662016762 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; BIO *bio; X509 *x; bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"); if (bio == NULL) { return NULL; } certs = sk_X509_new_null(); if (certs == NULL) { BIO_free(bio); return NULL; } ERR_set_mark(); do { x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) { sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); BIO_free(bio); return NULL; } else if (x == NULL) { /* * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors * generated */ ERR_pop_to_mark(); } } while (x != NULL); BIO_free(bio); return certs; } /* * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery) * * Chain is as follows: * * rootCA (self-signed) * | * interCA * | * subinterCA subinterCA (self-signed) * | | * leaf ------------------ * | * bad * * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE * * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys * * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store * (roots.pem) * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem) * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem) * * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad * */ static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(const char *roots_f, const char *untrusted_f, const char *bad_f) { int ret = 0; int i; X509 *x = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL; store = X509_STORE_new(); if (store == NULL) goto err; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) goto err; if(!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, roots_f, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) goto err; untrusted = load_certs_from_file(untrusted_f); if ((bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r")) == NULL) goto err; if((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL) goto err; sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (sctx == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted)) goto err; i = X509_verify_cert(sctx); if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) { /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */ ret = 1; } err: X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx); X509_free(x); BIO_free(bio); sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free); X509_STORE_free(store); if (ret != 1) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return ret; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: verify_extra_test roots.pem untrusted.pem bad.pem\n"); return 1; } if (!test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(argv[1], argv[2], argv[3])) { fprintf(stderr, "Test alt chains cert forgery failed\n"); return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) return 1; #endif printf("PASS\n"); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/aborttest.c0000644000000000000000000000072013176625661015207 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { OPENSSL_die("Voluntary abort", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/randtest.c0000644000000000000000000000726713176625661015041 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" /* some FIPS 140-1 random number test */ /* some simple tests */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned char buf[2500]; int i, j, k, s, sign, nsign, err = 0; unsigned long n1; unsigned long n2[16]; unsigned long runs[2][34]; /* * double d; */ long d; i = RAND_bytes(buf, 2500); if (i <= 0) { printf("init failed, the rand method is not properly installed\n"); err++; goto err; } n1 = 0; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) n2[i] = 0; for (i = 0; i < 34; i++) runs[0][i] = runs[1][i] = 0; /* test 1 and 2 */ sign = 0; nsign = 0; for (i = 0; i < 2500; i++) { j = buf[i]; n2[j & 0x0f]++; n2[(j >> 4) & 0x0f]++; for (k = 0; k < 8; k++) { s = (j & 0x01); if (s == sign) nsign++; else { if (nsign > 34) nsign = 34; if (nsign != 0) { runs[sign][nsign - 1]++; if (nsign > 6) runs[sign][5]++; } sign = s; nsign = 1; } if (s) n1++; j >>= 1; } } if (nsign > 34) nsign = 34; if (nsign != 0) runs[sign][nsign - 1]++; /* test 1 */ if (!((9654 < n1) && (n1 < 10346))) { printf("test 1 failed, X=%lu\n", n1); err++; } printf("test 1 done\n"); /* test 2 */ d = 0; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) d += n2[i] * n2[i]; d = (d * 8) / 25 - 500000; if (!((103 < d) && (d < 5740))) { printf("test 2 failed, X=%ld.%02ld\n", d / 100L, d % 100L); err++; } printf("test 2 done\n"); /* test 3 */ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if (!((2267 < runs[i][0]) && (runs[i][0] < 2733))) { printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", i, 1, runs[i][0]); err++; } if (!((1079 < runs[i][1]) && (runs[i][1] < 1421))) { printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", i, 2, runs[i][1]); err++; } if (!((502 < runs[i][2]) && (runs[i][2] < 748))) { printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", i, 3, runs[i][2]); err++; } if (!((223 < runs[i][3]) && (runs[i][3] < 402))) { printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", i, 4, runs[i][3]); err++; } if (!((90 < runs[i][4]) && (runs[i][4] < 223))) { printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", i, 5, runs[i][4]); err++; } if (!((90 < runs[i][5]) && (runs[i][5] < 223))) { printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", i, 6, runs[i][5]); err++; } } printf("test 3 done\n"); /* test 4 */ if (runs[0][33] != 0) { printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", 0, 34, runs[0][33]); err++; } if (runs[1][33] != 0) { printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", 1, 34, runs[1][33]); err++; } printf("test 4 done\n"); err: err = ((err) ? 1 : 0); EXIT(err); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/v3-cert1.pem0000644000000000000000000000166013176625662015110 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICjTCCAfigAwIBAgIEMaYgRzALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx NjA0BgNVBAoTLU5hdGlvbmFsIEFlcm9uYXV0aWNzIGFuZCBTcGFjZSBBZG1pbmlz dHJhdGlvbjAmFxE5NjA1MjgxMzQ5MDUrMDgwMBcROTgwNTI4MTM0OTA1KzA4MDAw ZzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxNjA0BgNVBAoTLU5hdGlvbmFsIEFlcm9uYXV0aWNzIGFu ZCBTcGFjZSBBZG1pbmlzdHJhdGlvbjEgMAkGA1UEBRMCMTYwEwYDVQQDEwxTdGV2 ZSBTY2hvY2gwWDALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEDSQAwRgJBALrAwyYdgxmzNP/ts0Uyf6Bp miJYktU/w4NG67ULaN4B5CnEz7k57s9o3YY3LecETgQ5iQHmkwlYDTL2fTgVfw0C AQOjgaswgagwZAYDVR0ZAQH/BFowWDBWMFQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMTYwNAYDVQQK Ey1OYXRpb25hbCBBZXJvbmF1dGljcyBhbmQgU3BhY2UgQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRpb24x DTALBgNVBAMTBENSTDEwFwYDVR0BAQH/BA0wC4AJODMyOTcwODEwMBgGA1UdAgQR MA8ECTgzMjk3MDgyM4ACBSAwDQYDVR0KBAYwBAMCBkAwCwYJKoZIhvcNAQEEA4GB AH2y1VCEw/A4zaXzSYZJTTUi3uawbbFiS2yxHvgf28+8Js0OHXk1H1w2d6qOHH21 X82tZXd/0JtG0g1T9usFFBDvYK8O0ebgz/P5ELJnBL2+atObEuJy1ZZ0pBDWINR3 WkDNLCGiTkCKp0F5EWIrVDwh54NNevkCQRZita+z4IBO -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.c0000644000000000000000000002732113176625662016764 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Ideally, CONF should offer standard parsing methods and cover them * in tests. But since we have no CONF tests, we use a custom test for now. */ #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include "ssl_test_ctx.h" #include "testutil.h" #include #include #include #include static CONF *conf = NULL; typedef struct ssl_test_ctx_test_fixture { const char *test_case_name; const char *test_section; /* Expected parsed configuration. */ SSL_TEST_CTX *expected_ctx; } SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE; static int SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF_equal(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client, SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client2) { if (client->verify_callback != client2->verify_callback) { fprintf(stderr, "ClientVerifyCallback mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_verify_callback_name(client->verify_callback), ssl_verify_callback_name(client2->verify_callback)); return 0; } if (client->servername != client2->servername) { fprintf(stderr, "ServerName mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_servername_name(client->servername), ssl_servername_name(client2->servername)); return 0; } if (!strings_equal("Client NPNProtocols", client->npn_protocols, client2->npn_protocols)) return 0; if (!strings_equal("Client ALPNProtocols", client->alpn_protocols, client2->alpn_protocols)) return 0; if (client->ct_validation != client2->ct_validation) { fprintf(stderr, "CTValidation mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_ct_validation_name(client->ct_validation), ssl_ct_validation_name(client2->ct_validation)); return 0; } return 1; } static int SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF_equal(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server, SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server2) { if (server->servername_callback != server2->servername_callback) { fprintf(stderr, "ServerNameCallback mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_servername_callback_name(server->servername_callback), ssl_servername_callback_name(server2->servername_callback)); return 0; } if (!strings_equal("Server NPNProtocols", server->npn_protocols, server2->npn_protocols)) return 0; if (!strings_equal("Server ALPNProtocols", server->alpn_protocols, server2->alpn_protocols)) return 0; if (server->broken_session_ticket != server2->broken_session_ticket) { fprintf(stderr, "Broken session ticket mismatch: %d vs %d.\n", server->broken_session_ticket, server2->broken_session_ticket); return 0; } if (server->cert_status != server2->cert_status) { fprintf(stderr, "CertStatus mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_certstatus_name(server->cert_status), ssl_certstatus_name(server2->cert_status)); return 0; } return 1; } static int SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF_equal(SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra2) { return SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF_equal(&extra->client, &extra2->client) && SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF_equal(&extra->server, &extra2->server) && SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF_equal(&extra->server2, &extra2->server2); } /* Returns 1 if the contexts are equal, 0 otherwise. */ static int SSL_TEST_CTX_equal(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx, SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx2) { if (ctx->method != ctx2->method) { fprintf(stderr, "Method mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_test_method_name(ctx->method), ssl_test_method_name(ctx2->method)); return 0; } if (ctx->handshake_mode != ctx2->handshake_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "HandshakeMode mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_handshake_mode_name(ctx->handshake_mode), ssl_handshake_mode_name(ctx2->handshake_mode)); return 0; } if (ctx->app_data_size != ctx2->app_data_size) { fprintf(stderr, "ApplicationData mismatch: %d vs %d.\n", ctx->app_data_size, ctx2->app_data_size); return 0; } if (ctx->max_fragment_size != ctx2->max_fragment_size) { fprintf(stderr, "MaxFragmentSize mismatch: %d vs %d.\n", ctx->max_fragment_size, ctx2->max_fragment_size); return 0; } if (!SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF_equal(&ctx->extra, &ctx2->extra)) { fprintf(stderr, "Extra conf mismatch.\n"); return 0; } if (!SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF_equal(&ctx->resume_extra, &ctx2->resume_extra)) { fprintf(stderr, "Resume extra conf mismatch.\n"); return 0; } if (ctx->expected_result != ctx2->expected_result) { fprintf(stderr, "ExpectedResult mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_test_result_name(ctx->expected_result), ssl_test_result_name(ctx2->expected_result)); return 0; } if (ctx->expected_client_alert != ctx2->expected_client_alert) { fprintf(stderr, "ClientAlert mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_alert_name(ctx->expected_client_alert), ssl_alert_name(ctx2->expected_client_alert)); return 0; } if (ctx->expected_server_alert != ctx2->expected_server_alert) { fprintf(stderr, "ServerAlert mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_alert_name(ctx->expected_server_alert), ssl_alert_name(ctx2->expected_server_alert)); return 0; } if (ctx->expected_protocol != ctx2->expected_protocol) { fprintf(stderr, "ClientAlert mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_protocol_name(ctx->expected_protocol), ssl_protocol_name(ctx2->expected_protocol)); return 0; } if (ctx->expected_servername != ctx2->expected_servername) { fprintf(stderr, "ExpectedServerName mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_servername_name(ctx->expected_servername), ssl_servername_name(ctx2->expected_servername)); return 0; } if (ctx->session_ticket_expected != ctx2->session_ticket_expected) { fprintf(stderr, "SessionTicketExpected mismatch: %s vs %s.\n", ssl_session_ticket_name(ctx->session_ticket_expected), ssl_session_ticket_name(ctx2->session_ticket_expected)); return 0; } if (!strings_equal("ExpectedNPNProtocol", ctx->expected_npn_protocol, ctx2->expected_npn_protocol)) return 0; if (!strings_equal("ExpectedALPNProtocol", ctx->expected_alpn_protocol, ctx2->expected_alpn_protocol)) return 0; if (ctx->resumption_expected != ctx2->resumption_expected) { fprintf(stderr, "ResumptionExpected mismatch: %d vs %d.\n", ctx->resumption_expected, ctx2->resumption_expected); return 0; } return 1; } static SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name) { SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; fixture.expected_ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_new(); TEST_check(fixture.expected_ctx != NULL); return fixture; } static int execute_test(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { int success = 0; SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_create(conf, fixture.test_section); if (ctx == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse good configuration %s.\n", fixture.test_section); goto err; } if (!SSL_TEST_CTX_equal(ctx, fixture.expected_ctx)) goto err; success = 1; err: SSL_TEST_CTX_free(ctx); return success; } static int execute_failure_test(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_create(conf, fixture.test_section); if (ctx != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Parsing bad configuration %s succeeded.\n", fixture.test_section); SSL_TEST_CTX_free(ctx); return 0; } return 1; } static void tear_down(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { SSL_TEST_CTX_free(fixture.expected_ctx); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } #define SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE() \ SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up) #define EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST() \ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down) #define EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_FAILURE_TEST() \ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_failure_test, tear_down) static int test_empty_configuration() { SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.test_section = "ssltest_default"; fixture.expected_ctx->expected_result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS; EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST(); } static int test_good_configuration() { SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.test_section = "ssltest_good"; fixture.expected_ctx->method = SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS; fixture.expected_ctx->handshake_mode = SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME; fixture.expected_ctx->app_data_size = 1024; fixture.expected_ctx->max_fragment_size = 2048; fixture.expected_ctx->expected_result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL; fixture.expected_ctx->expected_client_alert = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; fixture.expected_ctx->expected_server_alert = 0; /* No alert. */ fixture.expected_ctx->expected_protocol = TLS1_1_VERSION; fixture.expected_ctx->expected_servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2; fixture.expected_ctx->session_ticket_expected = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES; fixture.expected_ctx->resumption_expected = 1; fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.verify_callback = SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL; fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2; fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.npn_protocols = OPENSSL_strdup("foo,bar"); TEST_check(fixture.expected_ctx->extra.client.npn_protocols != NULL); fixture.expected_ctx->extra.server.servername_callback = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH; fixture.expected_ctx->extra.server.broken_session_ticket = 1; fixture.expected_ctx->resume_extra.server2.alpn_protocols = OPENSSL_strdup("baz"); TEST_check( fixture.expected_ctx->resume_extra.server2.alpn_protocols != NULL); fixture.expected_ctx->resume_extra.client.ct_validation = SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT; EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST(); } static const char *bad_configurations[] = { "ssltest_unknown_option", "ssltest_wrong_section", "ssltest_unknown_expected_result", "ssltest_unknown_alert", "ssltest_unknown_protocol", "ssltest_unknown_verify_callback", "ssltest_unknown_servername", "ssltest_unknown_servername_callback", "ssltest_unknown_session_ticket_expected", "ssltest_unknown_method", "ssltest_unknown_handshake_mode", "ssltest_unknown_resumption_expected", "ssltest_unknown_ct_validation", }; static int test_bad_configuration(int idx) { SETUP_SSL_TEST_CTX_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.test_section = bad_configurations[idx]; EXECUTE_SSL_TEST_CTX_FAILURE_TEST(); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int result = 0; if (argc != 2) return 1; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); TEST_check(conf != NULL); /* argv[1] should point to test/ssl_test_ctx_test.conf */ TEST_check(NCONF_load(conf, argv[1], NULL) > 0); ADD_TEST(test_empty_configuration); ADD_TEST(test_good_configuration); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_bad_configuration, OSSL_NELEM(bad_configurations)); result = run_tests(argv[0]); NCONF_free(conf); return result; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/evp_test.c0000644000000000000000000016512513176625661015044 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/numbers.h" /* Remove spaces from beginning and end of a string */ static void remove_space(char **pval) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)*pval; while (isspace(*p)) p++; *pval = (char *)p; p = p + strlen(*pval) - 1; /* Remove trailing space */ while (isspace(*p)) *p-- = 0; } /* * Given a line of the form: * name = value # comment * extract name and value. NB: modifies passed buffer. */ static int parse_line(char **pkw, char **pval, char *linebuf) { char *p; p = linebuf + strlen(linebuf) - 1; if (*p != '\n') { fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: missing EOL\n"); exit(1); } /* Look for # */ p = strchr(linebuf, '#'); if (p) *p = '\0'; /* Look for = sign */ p = strchr(linebuf, '='); /* If no '=' exit */ if (!p) return 0; *p++ = '\0'; *pkw = linebuf; *pval = p; /* Remove spaces from keyword and value */ remove_space(pkw); remove_space(pval); return 1; } /* * Unescape some escape sequences in string literals. * Return the result in a newly allocated buffer. * Currently only supports '\n'. * If the input length is 0, returns a valid 1-byte buffer, but sets * the length to 0. */ static unsigned char* unescape(const char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *out_len) { unsigned char *ret, *p; size_t i; if (input_len == 0) { *out_len = 0; return OPENSSL_zalloc(1); } /* Escaping is non-expanding; over-allocate original size for simplicity. */ ret = p = OPENSSL_malloc(input_len); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) { if (input[i] == '\\') { if (i == input_len - 1 || input[i+1] != 'n') goto err; *p++ = '\n'; i++; } else { *p++ = input[i]; } } *out_len = p - ret; return ret; err: OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } /* For a hex string "value" convert to a binary allocated buffer */ static int test_bin(const char *value, unsigned char **buf, size_t *buflen) { long len; *buflen = 0; /* Check for empty value */ if (!*value) { /* * Don't return NULL for zero length buffer. * This is needed for some tests with empty keys: HMAC_Init_ex() expects * a non-NULL key buffer even if the key length is 0, in order to detect * key reset. */ *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1); if (!*buf) return 0; **buf = 0; *buflen = 0; return 1; } /* Check for NULL literal */ if (strcmp(value, "NULL") == 0) { *buf = NULL; *buflen = 0; return 1; } /* Check for string literal */ if (value[0] == '"') { size_t vlen; value++; vlen = strlen(value); if (value[vlen - 1] != '"') return 0; vlen--; *buf = unescape(value, vlen, buflen); if (*buf == NULL) return 0; return 1; } /* Otherwise assume as hex literal and convert it to binary buffer */ *buf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &len); if (!*buf) { fprintf(stderr, "Value=%s\n", value); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return -1; } /* Size of input buffer means we'll never overflow */ *buflen = len; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT /* Currently only used by scrypt tests */ /* Parse unsigned decimal 64 bit integer value */ static int test_uint64(const char *value, uint64_t *pr) { const char *p = value; if (!*p) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid empty integer value\n"); return -1; } *pr = 0; while (*p) { if (*pr > UINT64_MAX/10) { fprintf(stderr, "Integer string overflow value=%s\n", value); return -1; } *pr *= 10; if (*p < '0' || *p > '9') { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid integer string value=%s\n", value); return -1; } *pr += *p - '0'; p++; } return 1; } #endif /* Structure holding test information */ struct evp_test { /* file being read */ BIO *in; /* temp memory BIO for reading in keys */ BIO *key; /* List of public and private keys */ struct key_list *private; struct key_list *public; /* method for this test */ const struct evp_test_method *meth; /* current line being processed */ unsigned int line; /* start line of current test */ unsigned int start_line; /* Error string for test */ const char *err, *aux_err; /* Expected error value of test */ char *expected_err; /* Expected error function string */ char *func; /* Expected error reason string */ char *reason; /* Number of tests */ int ntests; /* Error count */ int errors; /* Number of tests skipped */ int nskip; /* If output mismatch expected and got value */ unsigned char *out_received; size_t out_received_len; unsigned char *out_expected; size_t out_expected_len; /* test specific data */ void *data; /* Current test should be skipped */ int skip; }; struct key_list { char *name; EVP_PKEY *key; struct key_list *next; }; /* Test method structure */ struct evp_test_method { /* Name of test as it appears in file */ const char *name; /* Initialise test for "alg" */ int (*init) (struct evp_test * t, const char *alg); /* Clean up method */ void (*cleanup) (struct evp_test * t); /* Test specific name value pair processing */ int (*parse) (struct evp_test * t, const char *name, const char *value); /* Run the test itself */ int (*run_test) (struct evp_test * t); }; static const struct evp_test_method digest_test_method, cipher_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method mac_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method psign_test_method, pverify_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method pdecrypt_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method pverify_recover_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method pderive_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method pbe_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method encode_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method kdf_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method keypair_test_method; static const struct evp_test_method *evp_test_list[] = { &digest_test_method, &cipher_test_method, &mac_test_method, &psign_test_method, &pverify_test_method, &pdecrypt_test_method, &pverify_recover_test_method, &pderive_test_method, &pbe_test_method, &encode_test_method, &kdf_test_method, &keypair_test_method, NULL }; static const struct evp_test_method *evp_find_test(const char *name) { const struct evp_test_method **tt; for (tt = evp_test_list; *tt; tt++) { if (strcmp(name, (*tt)->name) == 0) return *tt; } return NULL; } static void hex_print(const char *name, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { size_t i; fprintf(stderr, "%s ", name); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X", buf[i]); fputs("\n", stderr); } static void free_expected(struct evp_test *t) { OPENSSL_free(t->expected_err); t->expected_err = NULL; OPENSSL_free(t->func); t->func = NULL; OPENSSL_free(t->reason); t->reason = NULL; OPENSSL_free(t->out_expected); OPENSSL_free(t->out_received); t->out_expected = NULL; t->out_received = NULL; t->out_expected_len = 0; t->out_received_len = 0; /* Literals. */ t->err = NULL; } static void print_expected(struct evp_test *t) { if (t->out_expected == NULL && t->out_received == NULL) return; hex_print("Expected:", t->out_expected, t->out_expected_len); hex_print("Got: ", t->out_received, t->out_received_len); free_expected(t); } static int check_test_error(struct evp_test *t) { unsigned long err; const char *func; const char *reason; if (!t->err && !t->expected_err) return 1; if (t->err && !t->expected_err) { if (t->aux_err != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d(%s): unexpected error %s\n", t->start_line, t->aux_err, t->err); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: unexpected error %s\n", t->start_line, t->err); } print_expected(t); return 0; } if (!t->err && t->expected_err) { fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: succeeded expecting %s\n", t->start_line, t->expected_err); return 0; } if (strcmp(t->err, t->expected_err) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: expecting %s got %s\n", t->start_line, t->expected_err, t->err); return 0; } if (t->func == NULL && t->reason == NULL) return 1; if (t->func == NULL || t->reason == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: missing function or reason code\n", t->start_line); return 0; } err = ERR_peek_error(); if (err == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d, expected error \"%s:%s\" not set\n", t->start_line, t->func, t->reason); return 0; } func = ERR_func_error_string(err); reason = ERR_reason_error_string(err); if (func == NULL && reason == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: expected error \"%s:%s\", no strings available. Skipping...\n", t->start_line, t->func, t->reason); return 1; } if (strcmp(func, t->func) == 0 && strcmp(reason, t->reason) == 0) return 1; fprintf(stderr, "Test line %d: expected error \"%s:%s\", got \"%s:%s\"\n", t->start_line, t->func, t->reason, func, reason); return 0; } /* Setup a new test, run any existing test */ static int setup_test(struct evp_test *t, const struct evp_test_method *tmeth) { /* If we already have a test set up run it */ if (t->meth) { t->ntests++; if (t->skip) { t->nskip++; } else { /* run the test */ if (t->err == NULL && t->meth->run_test(t) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s test error line %d\n", t->meth->name, t->start_line); return 0; } if (!check_test_error(t)) { if (t->err) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); t->errors++; } } /* clean it up */ ERR_clear_error(); if (t->data != NULL) { t->meth->cleanup(t); OPENSSL_free(t->data); t->data = NULL; } OPENSSL_free(t->expected_err); t->expected_err = NULL; free_expected(t); } t->meth = tmeth; return 1; } static int find_key(EVP_PKEY **ppk, const char *name, struct key_list *lst) { for (; lst; lst = lst->next) { if (strcmp(lst->name, name) == 0) { if (ppk) *ppk = lst->key; return 1; } } return 0; } static void free_key_list(struct key_list *lst) { while (lst != NULL) { struct key_list *ltmp; EVP_PKEY_free(lst->key); OPENSSL_free(lst->name); ltmp = lst->next; OPENSSL_free(lst); lst = ltmp; } } static int check_unsupported() { long err = ERR_peek_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EVP && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * If EC support is enabled we should catch also EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP as an * hint to an unsupported algorithm/curve (e.g. if binary EC support is * disabled). */ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EC && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ return 0; } static int read_key(struct evp_test *t) { char tmpbuf[80]; if (t->key == NULL) t->key = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); else if (BIO_reset(t->key) <= 0) return 0; if (t->key == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating key memory BIO\n"); return 0; } /* Read to PEM end line and place content in memory BIO */ while (BIO_gets(t->in, tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf))) { t->line++; if (BIO_puts(t->key, tmpbuf) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error writing to key memory BIO\n"); return 0; } if (strncmp(tmpbuf, "-----END", 8) == 0) return 1; } fprintf(stderr, "Can't find key end\n"); return 0; } static int process_test(struct evp_test *t, char *buf, int verbose) { char *keyword = NULL, *value = NULL; int rv = 0, add_key = 0; struct key_list **lst = NULL, *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; const struct evp_test_method *tmeth = NULL; if (verbose) fputs(buf, stdout); if (!parse_line(&keyword, &value, buf)) return 1; if (strcmp(keyword, "PrivateKey") == 0) { if (!read_key(t)) return 0; pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(t->key, NULL, 0, NULL); if (pk == NULL && !check_unsupported()) { fprintf(stderr, "Error reading private key %s\n", value); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return 0; } lst = &t->private; add_key = 1; } if (strcmp(keyword, "PublicKey") == 0) { if (!read_key(t)) return 0; pk = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(t->key, NULL, 0, NULL); if (pk == NULL && !check_unsupported()) { fprintf(stderr, "Error reading public key %s\n", value); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return 0; } lst = &t->public; add_key = 1; } /* If we have a key add to list */ if (add_key) { if (find_key(NULL, value, *lst)) { fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate key %s\n", value); return 0; } key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*key)); if (!key) return 0; key->name = OPENSSL_strdup(value); key->key = pk; key->next = *lst; *lst = key; return 1; } /* See if keyword corresponds to a test start */ tmeth = evp_find_test(keyword); if (tmeth) { if (!setup_test(t, tmeth)) return 0; t->start_line = t->line; t->skip = 0; if (!tmeth->init(t, value)) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown %s: %s\n", keyword, value); return 0; } return 1; } else if (t->skip) { return 1; } else if (strcmp(keyword, "Result") == 0) { if (t->expected_err) { fprintf(stderr, "Line %d: multiple result lines\n", t->line); return 0; } t->expected_err = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (t->expected_err == NULL) return 0; } else if (strcmp(keyword, "Function") == 0) { if (t->func != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Line %d: multiple function lines\n", t->line); return 0; } t->func = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (t->func == NULL) return 0; } else if (strcmp(keyword, "Reason") == 0) { if (t->reason != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Line %d: multiple reason lines\n", t->line); return 0; } t->reason = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (t->reason == NULL) return 0; } else { /* Must be test specific line: try to parse it */ if (t->meth) rv = t->meth->parse(t, keyword, value); if (rv == 0) fprintf(stderr, "line %d: unexpected keyword %s\n", t->line, keyword); if (rv < 0) fprintf(stderr, "line %d: error processing keyword %s\n", t->line, keyword); if (rv <= 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_var_length_output(struct evp_test *t, const unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len, const unsigned char *received, size_t received_len) { if (expected_len == received_len && memcmp(expected, received, expected_len) == 0) { return 0; } /* The result printing code expects a non-NULL buffer. */ t->out_expected = OPENSSL_memdup(expected, expected_len ? expected_len : 1); t->out_expected_len = expected_len; t->out_received = OPENSSL_memdup(received, received_len ? received_len : 1); t->out_received_len = received_len; if (t->out_expected == NULL || t->out_received == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Memory allocation error!\n"); exit(1); } return 1; } static int check_output(struct evp_test *t, const unsigned char *expected, const unsigned char *received, size_t len) { return check_var_length_output(t, expected, len, received, len); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL; char buf[10240]; struct evp_test t; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: evp_test testfile.txt\n"); return 1; } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t)); t.start_line = -1; in = BIO_new_file(argv[1], "rb"); if (in == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't open %s for reading\n", argv[1]); return 1; } t.in = in; t.err = NULL; while (BIO_gets(in, buf, sizeof(buf))) { t.line++; if (!process_test(&t, buf, 0)) exit(1); } /* Run any final test we have */ if (!setup_test(&t, NULL)) exit(1); fprintf(stderr, "%d tests completed with %d errors, %d skipped\n", t.ntests, t.errors, t.nskip); free_key_list(t.public); free_key_list(t.private); BIO_free(t.key); BIO_free(in); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) return 1; #endif if (t.errors) return 1; return 0; } static void test_free(void *d) { OPENSSL_free(d); } /* Message digest tests */ struct digest_data { /* Digest this test is for */ const EVP_MD *digest; /* Input to digest */ unsigned char *input; size_t input_len; /* Repeat count for input */ size_t nrpt; /* Expected output */ unsigned char *output; size_t output_len; }; static int digest_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg) { const EVP_MD *digest; struct digest_data *mdat; digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(alg); if (!digest) { /* If alg has an OID assume disabled algorithm */ if (OBJ_sn2nid(alg) != NID_undef || OBJ_ln2nid(alg) != NID_undef) { t->skip = 1; return 1; } return 0; } mdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mdat)); mdat->digest = digest; mdat->input = NULL; mdat->output = NULL; mdat->nrpt = 1; t->data = mdat; return 1; } static void digest_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct digest_data *mdat = t->data; test_free(mdat->input); test_free(mdat->output); } static int digest_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct digest_data *mdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0) return test_bin(value, &mdata->input, &mdata->input_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0) return test_bin(value, &mdata->output, &mdata->output_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Count") == 0) { long nrpt = atoi(value); if (nrpt <= 0) return 0; mdata->nrpt = (size_t)nrpt; return 1; } return 0; } static int digest_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct digest_data *mdata = t->data; size_t i; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int md_len; mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!mctx) goto err; err = "DIGESTINIT_ERROR"; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, mdata->digest, NULL)) goto err; err = "DIGESTUPDATE_ERROR"; for (i = 0; i < mdata->nrpt; i++) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, mdata->input, mdata->input_len)) goto err; } err = "DIGESTFINAL_ERROR"; if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, md, &md_len)) goto err; err = "DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH"; if (md_len != mdata->output_len) goto err; err = "DIGEST_MISMATCH"; if (check_output(t, mdata->output, md, md_len)) goto err; err = NULL; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); t->err = err; return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method digest_test_method = { "Digest", digest_test_init, digest_test_cleanup, digest_test_parse, digest_test_run }; /* Cipher tests */ struct cipher_data { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; int enc; /* EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE or EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE if AEAD */ int aead; unsigned char *key; size_t key_len; unsigned char *iv; size_t iv_len; unsigned char *plaintext; size_t plaintext_len; unsigned char *ciphertext; size_t ciphertext_len; /* GCM, CCM only */ unsigned char *aad; size_t aad_len; unsigned char *tag; size_t tag_len; }; static int cipher_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg) { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data; cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(alg); if (!cipher) { /* If alg has an OID assume disabled algorithm */ if (OBJ_sn2nid(alg) != NID_undef || OBJ_ln2nid(alg) != NID_undef) { t->skip = 1; return 1; } return 0; } cdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*cdat)); cdat->cipher = cipher; cdat->enc = -1; cdat->key = NULL; cdat->iv = NULL; cdat->ciphertext = NULL; cdat->plaintext = NULL; cdat->aad = NULL; cdat->tag = NULL; t->data = cdat; if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) cdat->aead = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher); else if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) cdat->aead = -1; else cdat->aead = 0; return 1; } static void cipher_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data; test_free(cdat->key); test_free(cdat->iv); test_free(cdat->ciphertext); test_free(cdat->plaintext); test_free(cdat->aad); test_free(cdat->tag); } static int cipher_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "Key") == 0) return test_bin(value, &cdat->key, &cdat->key_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "IV") == 0) return test_bin(value, &cdat->iv, &cdat->iv_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Plaintext") == 0) return test_bin(value, &cdat->plaintext, &cdat->plaintext_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Ciphertext") == 0) return test_bin(value, &cdat->ciphertext, &cdat->ciphertext_len); if (cdat->aead) { if (strcmp(keyword, "AAD") == 0) return test_bin(value, &cdat->aad, &cdat->aad_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Tag") == 0) return test_bin(value, &cdat->tag, &cdat->tag_len); } if (strcmp(keyword, "Operation") == 0) { if (strcmp(value, "ENCRYPT") == 0) cdat->enc = 1; else if (strcmp(value, "DECRYPT") == 0) cdat->enc = 0; else return 0; return 1; } return 0; } static int cipher_test_enc(struct evp_test *t, int enc, size_t out_misalign, size_t inp_misalign, int frag) { struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data; unsigned char *in, *out, *tmp = NULL; size_t in_len, out_len, donelen = 0; int tmplen, chunklen, tmpflen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; const char *err; err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) goto err; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW); if (enc) { in = cdat->plaintext; in_len = cdat->plaintext_len; out = cdat->ciphertext; out_len = cdat->ciphertext_len; } else { in = cdat->ciphertext; in_len = cdat->ciphertext_len; out = cdat->plaintext; out_len = cdat->plaintext_len; } if (inp_misalign == (size_t)-1) { /* * Exercise in-place encryption */ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(out_misalign + in_len + 2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); if (!tmp) goto err; in = memcpy(tmp + out_misalign, in, in_len); } else { inp_misalign += 16 - ((out_misalign + in_len) & 15); /* * 'tmp' will store both output and copy of input. We make the copy * of input to specifically aligned part of 'tmp'. So we just * figured out how much padding would ensure the required alignment, * now we allocate extended buffer and finally copy the input just * past inp_misalign in expression below. Output will be written * past out_misalign... */ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(out_misalign + in_len + 2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + inp_misalign + in_len); if (!tmp) goto err; in = memcpy(tmp + out_misalign + in_len + 2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + inp_misalign, in, in_len); } err = "CIPHERINIT_ERROR"; if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cdat->cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc)) goto err; err = "INVALID_IV_LENGTH"; if (cdat->iv) { if (cdat->aead) { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, cdat->iv_len, 0)) goto err; } else if (cdat->iv_len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) goto err; } if (cdat->aead) { unsigned char *tag; /* * If encrypting or OCB just set tag length initially, otherwise * set tag length and value. */ if (enc || cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE) { err = "TAG_LENGTH_SET_ERROR"; tag = NULL; } else { err = "TAG_SET_ERROR"; tag = cdat->tag; } if (tag || cdat->aead != EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, cdat->tag_len, tag)) goto err; } } err = "INVALID_KEY_LENGTH"; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, cdat->key_len)) goto err; err = "KEY_SET_ERROR"; if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, cdat->key, cdat->iv, -1)) goto err; if (!enc && cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE) { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, cdat->tag_len, cdat->tag)) { err = "TAG_SET_ERROR"; goto err; } } if (cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &tmplen, NULL, out_len)) { err = "CCM_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH_SET_ERROR"; goto err; } } if (cdat->aad) { err = "AAD_SET_ERROR"; if (!frag) { if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen, cdat->aad, cdat->aad_len)) goto err; } else { /* * Supply the AAD in chunks less than the block size where possible */ if (cdat->aad_len > 0) { if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen, cdat->aad, 1)) goto err; donelen++; } if (cdat->aad_len > 2) { if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen, cdat->aad + donelen, cdat->aad_len - 2)) goto err; donelen += cdat->aad_len - 2; } if (cdat->aad_len > 1 && !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &chunklen, cdat->aad + donelen, 1)) goto err; } } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); err = "CIPHERUPDATE_ERROR"; tmplen = 0; if (!frag) { /* We supply the data all in one go */ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign, &tmplen, in, in_len)) goto err; } else { /* Supply the data in chunks less than the block size where possible */ if (in_len > 0) { if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign, &chunklen, in, 1)) goto err; tmplen += chunklen; in++; in_len--; } if (in_len > 1) { if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign + tmplen, &chunklen, in, in_len - 1)) goto err; tmplen += chunklen; in += in_len - 1; in_len = 1; } if (in_len > 0 ) { if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, tmp + out_misalign + tmplen, &chunklen, in, 1)) goto err; tmplen += chunklen; } } if (cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) tmpflen = 0; else { err = "CIPHERFINAL_ERROR"; if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, tmp + out_misalign + tmplen, &tmpflen)) goto err; } err = "LENGTH_MISMATCH"; if (out_len != (size_t)(tmplen + tmpflen)) goto err; err = "VALUE_MISMATCH"; if (check_output(t, out, tmp + out_misalign, out_len)) goto err; if (enc && cdat->aead) { unsigned char rtag[16]; if (cdat->tag_len > sizeof(rtag)) { err = "TAG_LENGTH_INTERNAL_ERROR"; goto err; } if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, cdat->tag_len, rtag)) { err = "TAG_RETRIEVE_ERROR"; goto err; } if (check_output(t, cdat->tag, rtag, cdat->tag_len)) { err = "TAG_VALUE_MISMATCH"; goto err; } } err = NULL; err: OPENSSL_free(tmp); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); t->err = err; return err ? 0 : 1; } static int cipher_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct cipher_data *cdat = t->data; int rv, frag = 0; size_t out_misalign, inp_misalign; if (!cdat->key) { t->err = "NO_KEY"; return 0; } if (!cdat->iv && EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cdat->cipher)) { /* IV is optional and usually omitted in wrap mode */ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cdat->cipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) { t->err = "NO_IV"; return 0; } } if (cdat->aead && !cdat->tag) { t->err = "NO_TAG"; return 0; } for (out_misalign = 0; out_misalign <= 1;) { static char aux_err[64]; t->aux_err = aux_err; for (inp_misalign = (size_t)-1; inp_misalign != 2; inp_misalign++) { if (inp_misalign == (size_t)-1) { /* kludge: inp_misalign == -1 means "exercise in-place" */ BIO_snprintf(aux_err, sizeof(aux_err), "%s in-place, %sfragmented", out_misalign ? "misaligned" : "aligned", frag ? "" : "not "); } else { BIO_snprintf(aux_err, sizeof(aux_err), "%s output and %s input, %sfragmented", out_misalign ? "misaligned" : "aligned", inp_misalign ? "misaligned" : "aligned", frag ? "" : "not "); } if (cdat->enc) { rv = cipher_test_enc(t, 1, out_misalign, inp_misalign, frag); /* Not fatal errors: return */ if (rv != 1) { if (rv < 0) return 0; return 1; } } if (cdat->enc != 1) { rv = cipher_test_enc(t, 0, out_misalign, inp_misalign, frag); /* Not fatal errors: return */ if (rv != 1) { if (rv < 0) return 0; return 1; } } } if (out_misalign == 1 && frag == 0) { /* * XTS, CCM and Wrap modes have special requirements about input * lengths so we don't fragment for those */ if (cdat->aead == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cdat->cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cdat->cipher) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) break; out_misalign = 0; frag++; } else { out_misalign++; } } t->aux_err = NULL; return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method cipher_test_method = { "Cipher", cipher_test_init, cipher_test_cleanup, cipher_test_parse, cipher_test_run }; struct mac_data { /* MAC type */ int type; /* Algorithm string for this MAC */ char *alg; /* MAC key */ unsigned char *key; size_t key_len; /* Input to MAC */ unsigned char *input; size_t input_len; /* Expected output */ unsigned char *output; size_t output_len; }; static int mac_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg) { int type; struct mac_data *mdat; if (strcmp(alg, "HMAC") == 0) { type = EVP_PKEY_HMAC; } else if (strcmp(alg, "CMAC") == 0) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC type = EVP_PKEY_CMAC; #else t->skip = 1; return 1; #endif } else return 0; mdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mdat)); mdat->type = type; mdat->alg = NULL; mdat->key = NULL; mdat->input = NULL; mdat->output = NULL; t->data = mdat; return 1; } static void mac_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct mac_data *mdat = t->data; test_free(mdat->alg); test_free(mdat->key); test_free(mdat->input); test_free(mdat->output); } static int mac_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct mac_data *mdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "Key") == 0) return test_bin(value, &mdata->key, &mdata->key_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Algorithm") == 0) { mdata->alg = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (!mdata->alg) return 0; return 1; } if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0) return test_bin(value, &mdata->input, &mdata->input_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0) return test_bin(value, &mdata->output, &mdata->output_len); return 0; } static int mac_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct mac_data *mdata = t->data; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL, *genctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *mac = NULL; size_t mac_len; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (mdata->alg != NULL && strstr(mdata->alg, "DES") != NULL) { /* Skip DES */ err = NULL; goto err; } #endif err = "MAC_PKEY_CTX_ERROR"; genctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(mdata->type, NULL); if (!genctx) goto err; err = "MAC_KEYGEN_INIT_ERROR"; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(genctx) <= 0) goto err; if (mdata->type == EVP_PKEY_CMAC) { err = "MAC_ALGORITHM_SET_ERROR"; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(genctx, "cipher", mdata->alg) <= 0) goto err; } err = "MAC_KEY_SET_ERROR"; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key(genctx, mdata->key, mdata->key_len) <= 0) goto err; err = "MAC_KEY_GENERATE_ERROR"; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(genctx, &key) <= 0) goto err; if (mdata->type == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) { err = "MAC_ALGORITHM_SET_ERROR"; md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdata->alg); if (!md) goto err; } mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!mctx) goto err; err = "DIGESTSIGNINIT_ERROR"; if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, key)) goto err; err = "DIGESTSIGNUPDATE_ERROR"; if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, mdata->input, mdata->input_len)) goto err; err = "DIGESTSIGNFINAL_LENGTH_ERROR"; if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &mac_len)) goto err; mac = OPENSSL_malloc(mac_len); if (!mac) { fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating mac buffer!\n"); exit(1); } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, mac, &mac_len)) goto err; err = "MAC_LENGTH_MISMATCH"; if (mac_len != mdata->output_len) goto err; err = "MAC_MISMATCH"; if (check_output(t, mdata->output, mac, mac_len)) goto err; err = NULL; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); OPENSSL_free(mac); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx); EVP_PKEY_free(key); t->err = err; return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method mac_test_method = { "MAC", mac_test_init, mac_test_cleanup, mac_test_parse, mac_test_run }; /* * Public key operations. These are all very similar and can share * a lot of common code. */ struct pkey_data { /* Context for this operation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; /* Key operation to perform */ int (*keyop) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); /* Input to MAC */ unsigned char *input; size_t input_len; /* Expected output */ unsigned char *output; size_t output_len; }; /* * Perform public key operation setup: lookup key, allocated ctx and call * the appropriate initialisation function */ static int pkey_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name, int use_public, int (*keyopinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*keyop) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) ) { struct pkey_data *kdata; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int rv = 0; if (use_public) rv = find_key(&pkey, name, t->public); if (!rv) rv = find_key(&pkey, name, t->private); if (!rv || pkey == NULL) { t->skip = 1; return 1; } kdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*kdata)); if (!kdata) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } kdata->ctx = NULL; kdata->input = NULL; kdata->output = NULL; kdata->keyop = keyop; t->data = kdata; kdata->ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (!kdata->ctx) return 0; if (keyopinit(kdata->ctx) <= 0) t->err = "KEYOP_INIT_ERROR"; return 1; } static void pkey_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data; OPENSSL_free(kdata->input); OPENSSL_free(kdata->output); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kdata->ctx); } static int pkey_test_ctrl(struct evp_test *t, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, const char *value) { int rv; char *p, *tmpval; tmpval = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (tmpval == NULL) return 0; p = strchr(tmpval, ':'); if (p != NULL) *p++ = 0; rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, tmpval, p); if (rv == -2) { t->err = "PKEY_CTRL_INVALID"; rv = 1; } else if (p != NULL && rv <= 0) { /* If p has an OID and lookup fails assume disabled algorithm */ int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_ln2nid(p); if ((nid != NID_undef) && EVP_get_digestbynid(nid) == NULL && EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid) == NULL) { t->skip = 1; rv = 1; } else { t->err = "PKEY_CTRL_ERROR"; rv = 1; } } OPENSSL_free(tmpval); return rv > 0; } static int pkey_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0) return test_bin(value, &kdata->input, &kdata->input_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0) return test_bin(value, &kdata->output, &kdata->output_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Ctrl") == 0) return pkey_test_ctrl(t, kdata->ctx, value); return 0; } static int pkey_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data; unsigned char *out = NULL; size_t out_len; const char *err = "KEYOP_LENGTH_ERROR"; if (kdata->keyop(kdata->ctx, NULL, &out_len, kdata->input, kdata->input_len) <= 0) goto err; out = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len); if (!out) { fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating output buffer!\n"); exit(1); } err = "KEYOP_ERROR"; if (kdata->keyop (kdata->ctx, out, &out_len, kdata->input, kdata->input_len) <= 0) goto err; err = "KEYOP_LENGTH_MISMATCH"; if (out_len != kdata->output_len) goto err; err = "KEYOP_MISMATCH"; if (check_output(t, kdata->output, out, out_len)) goto err; err = NULL; err: OPENSSL_free(out); t->err = err; return 1; } static int sign_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name) { return pkey_test_init(t, name, 0, EVP_PKEY_sign_init, EVP_PKEY_sign); } static const struct evp_test_method psign_test_method = { "Sign", sign_test_init, pkey_test_cleanup, pkey_test_parse, pkey_test_run }; static int verify_recover_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name) { return pkey_test_init(t, name, 1, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover); } static const struct evp_test_method pverify_recover_test_method = { "VerifyRecover", verify_recover_test_init, pkey_test_cleanup, pkey_test_parse, pkey_test_run }; static int decrypt_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name) { return pkey_test_init(t, name, 0, EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init, EVP_PKEY_decrypt); } static const struct evp_test_method pdecrypt_test_method = { "Decrypt", decrypt_test_init, pkey_test_cleanup, pkey_test_parse, pkey_test_run }; static int verify_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name) { return pkey_test_init(t, name, 1, EVP_PKEY_verify_init, 0); } static int verify_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data; if (EVP_PKEY_verify(kdata->ctx, kdata->output, kdata->output_len, kdata->input, kdata->input_len) <= 0) t->err = "VERIFY_ERROR"; return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method pverify_test_method = { "Verify", verify_test_init, pkey_test_cleanup, pkey_test_parse, verify_test_run }; static int pderive_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name) { return pkey_test_init(t, name, 0, EVP_PKEY_derive_init, 0); } static int pderive_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "PeerKey") == 0) { EVP_PKEY *peer; if (find_key(&peer, value, t->public) == 0) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kdata->ctx, peer) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (strcmp(keyword, "SharedSecret") == 0) return test_bin(value, &kdata->output, &kdata->output_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Ctrl") == 0) return pkey_test_ctrl(t, kdata->ctx, value); return 0; } static int pderive_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct pkey_data *kdata = t->data; unsigned char *out = NULL; size_t out_len; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; out_len = kdata->output_len; out = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len); if (!out) { fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating output buffer!\n"); exit(1); } err = "DERIVE_ERROR"; if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kdata->ctx, out, &out_len) <= 0) goto err; err = "SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH_MISMATCH"; if (out_len != kdata->output_len) goto err; err = "SHARED_SECRET_MISMATCH"; if (check_output(t, kdata->output, out, out_len)) goto err; err = NULL; err: OPENSSL_free(out); t->err = err; return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method pderive_test_method = { "Derive", pderive_test_init, pkey_test_cleanup, pderive_test_parse, pderive_test_run }; /* PBE tests */ #define PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT 1 #define PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2 2 #define PBE_TYPE_PKCS12 3 struct pbe_data { int pbe_type; /* scrypt parameters */ uint64_t N, r, p, maxmem; /* PKCS#12 parameters */ int id, iter; const EVP_MD *md; /* password */ unsigned char *pass; size_t pass_len; /* salt */ unsigned char *salt; size_t salt_len; /* Expected output */ unsigned char *key; size_t key_len; }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT static int scrypt_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "N") == 0) return test_uint64(value, &pdata->N); if (strcmp(keyword, "p") == 0) return test_uint64(value, &pdata->p); if (strcmp(keyword, "r") == 0) return test_uint64(value, &pdata->r); if (strcmp(keyword, "maxmem") == 0) return test_uint64(value, &pdata->maxmem); return 0; } #endif static int pbkdf2_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "iter") == 0) { pdata->iter = atoi(value); if (pdata->iter <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (strcmp(keyword, "MD") == 0) { pdata->md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value); if (pdata->md == NULL) return 0; return 1; } return 0; } static int pkcs12_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "id") == 0) { pdata->id = atoi(value); if (pdata->id <= 0) return 0; return 1; } return pbkdf2_test_parse(t, keyword, value); } static int pbe_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *alg) { struct pbe_data *pdat; int pbe_type = 0; if (strcmp(alg, "scrypt") == 0) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT pbe_type = PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT; #else t->skip = 1; return 1; #endif } else if (strcmp(alg, "pbkdf2") == 0) { pbe_type = PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2; } else if (strcmp(alg, "pkcs12") == 0) { pbe_type = PBE_TYPE_PKCS12; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown pbe algorithm %s\n", alg); } pdat = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pdat)); pdat->pbe_type = pbe_type; pdat->pass = NULL; pdat->salt = NULL; pdat->N = 0; pdat->r = 0; pdat->p = 0; pdat->maxmem = 0; pdat->id = 0; pdat->iter = 0; pdat->md = NULL; t->data = pdat; return 1; } static void pbe_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct pbe_data *pdat = t->data; test_free(pdat->pass); test_free(pdat->salt); test_free(pdat->key); } static int pbe_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "Password") == 0) return test_bin(value, &pdata->pass, &pdata->pass_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Salt") == 0) return test_bin(value, &pdata->salt, &pdata->salt_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Key") == 0) return test_bin(value, &pdata->key, &pdata->key_len); if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2) return pbkdf2_test_parse(t, keyword, value); else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PKCS12) return pkcs12_test_parse(t, keyword, value); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT) return scrypt_test_parse(t, keyword, value); #endif return 0; } static int pbe_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct pbe_data *pdata = t->data; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; unsigned char *key; key = OPENSSL_malloc(pdata->key_len); if (!key) goto err; if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PBKDF2) { err = "PBKDF2_ERROR"; if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC((char *)pdata->pass, pdata->pass_len, pdata->salt, pdata->salt_len, pdata->iter, pdata->md, pdata->key_len, key) == 0) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT } else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_SCRYPT) { err = "SCRYPT_ERROR"; if (EVP_PBE_scrypt((const char *)pdata->pass, pdata->pass_len, pdata->salt, pdata->salt_len, pdata->N, pdata->r, pdata->p, pdata->maxmem, key, pdata->key_len) == 0) goto err; #endif } else if (pdata->pbe_type == PBE_TYPE_PKCS12) { err = "PKCS12_ERROR"; if (PKCS12_key_gen_uni(pdata->pass, pdata->pass_len, pdata->salt, pdata->salt_len, pdata->id, pdata->iter, pdata->key_len, key, pdata->md) == 0) goto err; } err = "KEY_MISMATCH"; if (check_output(t, pdata->key, key, pdata->key_len)) goto err; err = NULL; err: OPENSSL_free(key); t->err = err; return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method pbe_test_method = { "PBE", pbe_test_init, pbe_test_cleanup, pbe_test_parse, pbe_test_run }; /* Base64 tests */ typedef enum { BASE64_CANONICAL_ENCODING = 0, BASE64_VALID_ENCODING = 1, BASE64_INVALID_ENCODING = 2 } base64_encoding_type; struct encode_data { /* Input to encoding */ unsigned char *input; size_t input_len; /* Expected output */ unsigned char *output; size_t output_len; base64_encoding_type encoding; }; static int encode_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *encoding) { struct encode_data *edata = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*edata)); if (strcmp(encoding, "canonical") == 0) { edata->encoding = BASE64_CANONICAL_ENCODING; } else if (strcmp(encoding, "valid") == 0) { edata->encoding = BASE64_VALID_ENCODING; } else if (strcmp(encoding, "invalid") == 0) { edata->encoding = BASE64_INVALID_ENCODING; t->expected_err = OPENSSL_strdup("DECODE_ERROR"); if (t->expected_err == NULL) return 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad encoding: %s. Should be one of " "{canonical, valid, invalid}\n", encoding); return 0; } t->data = edata; return 1; } static void encode_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct encode_data *edata = t->data; test_free(edata->input); test_free(edata->output); memset(edata, 0, sizeof(*edata)); } static int encode_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct encode_data *edata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "Input") == 0) return test_bin(value, &edata->input, &edata->input_len); if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0) return test_bin(value, &edata->output, &edata->output_len); return 0; } static int encode_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct encode_data *edata = t->data; unsigned char *encode_out = NULL, *decode_out = NULL; int output_len, chunk_len; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; EVP_ENCODE_CTX *decode_ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); if (decode_ctx == NULL) goto err; if (edata->encoding == BASE64_CANONICAL_ENCODING) { EVP_ENCODE_CTX *encode_ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); if (encode_ctx == NULL) goto err; encode_out = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(edata->input_len)); if (encode_out == NULL) goto err; EVP_EncodeInit(encode_ctx); EVP_EncodeUpdate(encode_ctx, encode_out, &chunk_len, edata->input, edata->input_len); output_len = chunk_len; EVP_EncodeFinal(encode_ctx, encode_out + chunk_len, &chunk_len); output_len += chunk_len; EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(encode_ctx); if (check_var_length_output(t, edata->output, edata->output_len, encode_out, output_len)) { err = "BAD_ENCODING"; goto err; } } decode_out = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_DECODE_LENGTH(edata->output_len)); if (decode_out == NULL) goto err; EVP_DecodeInit(decode_ctx); if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(decode_ctx, decode_out, &chunk_len, edata->output, edata->output_len) < 0) { err = "DECODE_ERROR"; goto err; } output_len = chunk_len; if (EVP_DecodeFinal(decode_ctx, decode_out + chunk_len, &chunk_len) != 1) { err = "DECODE_ERROR"; goto err; } output_len += chunk_len; if (edata->encoding != BASE64_INVALID_ENCODING && check_var_length_output(t, edata->input, edata->input_len, decode_out, output_len)) { err = "BAD_DECODING"; goto err; } err = NULL; err: t->err = err; OPENSSL_free(encode_out); OPENSSL_free(decode_out); EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(decode_ctx); return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method encode_test_method = { "Encoding", encode_test_init, encode_test_cleanup, encode_test_parse, encode_test_run, }; /* KDF operations */ struct kdf_data { /* Context for this operation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; /* Expected output */ unsigned char *output; size_t output_len; }; /* * Perform public key operation setup: lookup key, allocated ctx and call * the appropriate initialisation function */ static int kdf_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *name) { struct kdf_data *kdata; kdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*kdata)); if (kdata == NULL) return 0; kdata->ctx = NULL; kdata->output = NULL; t->data = kdata; kdata->ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(OBJ_sn2nid(name), NULL); if (kdata->ctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(kdata->ctx) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } static void kdf_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct kdf_data *kdata = t->data; OPENSSL_free(kdata->output); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kdata->ctx); } static int kdf_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { struct kdf_data *kdata = t->data; if (strcmp(keyword, "Output") == 0) return test_bin(value, &kdata->output, &kdata->output_len); if (strncmp(keyword, "Ctrl", 4) == 0) return pkey_test_ctrl(t, kdata->ctx, value); return 0; } static int kdf_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { struct kdf_data *kdata = t->data; unsigned char *out = NULL; size_t out_len = kdata->output_len; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; out = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len); if (!out) { fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating output buffer!\n"); exit(1); } err = "KDF_DERIVE_ERROR"; if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kdata->ctx, out, &out_len) <= 0) goto err; err = "KDF_LENGTH_MISMATCH"; if (out_len != kdata->output_len) goto err; err = "KDF_MISMATCH"; if (check_output(t, kdata->output, out, out_len)) goto err; err = NULL; err: OPENSSL_free(out); t->err = err; return 1; } static const struct evp_test_method kdf_test_method = { "KDF", kdf_test_init, kdf_test_cleanup, kdf_test_parse, kdf_test_run }; struct keypair_test_data { EVP_PKEY *privk; EVP_PKEY *pubk; }; static int keypair_test_init(struct evp_test *t, const char *pair) { int rv = 0; EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL, *pubk = NULL; char *pub, *priv = NULL; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; struct keypair_test_data *data; priv = OPENSSL_strdup(pair); if (priv == NULL) return 0; pub = strchr(priv, ':'); if ( pub == NULL ) { fprintf(stderr, "Wrong syntax \"%s\"\n", pair); goto end; } *pub++ = 0; /* split priv and pub strings */ if (find_key(&pk, priv, t->private) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find private key: %s\n", priv); err = "MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY"; goto end; } if (find_key(&pubk, pub, t->public) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find public key: %s\n", pub); err = "MISSING_PUBLIC_KEY"; goto end; } if (pk == NULL && pubk == NULL) { /* Both keys are listed but unsupported: skip this test */ t->skip = 1; rv = 1; goto end; } data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (data == NULL ) goto end; data->privk = pk; data->pubk = pubk; t->data = data; rv = 1; err = NULL; end: if (priv) OPENSSL_free(priv); t->err = err; return rv; } static void keypair_test_cleanup(struct evp_test *t) { struct keypair_test_data *data = t->data; t->data = NULL; if (data) test_free(data); return; } /* For test that do not accept any custom keyword: * return 0 if called */ static int void_test_parse(struct evp_test *t, const char *keyword, const char *value) { return 0; } static int keypair_test_run(struct evp_test *t) { int rv = 0; const struct keypair_test_data *pair = t->data; const char *err = "INTERNAL_ERROR"; if (pair == NULL) goto end; if (pair->privk == NULL || pair->pubk == NULL) { /* this can only happen if only one of the keys is not set * which means that one of them was unsupported while the * other isn't: hence a key type mismatch. */ err = "KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH"; rv = 1; goto end; } if ((rv = EVP_PKEY_cmp(pair->privk, pair->pubk)) != 1 ) { if ( 0 == rv ) { err = "KEYPAIR_MISMATCH"; } else if ( -1 == rv ) { err = "KEYPAIR_TYPE_MISMATCH"; } else if ( -2 == rv ) { err = "UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPARISON"; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error in key comparison\n"); rv = 0; goto end; } rv = 1; goto end; } rv = 1; err = NULL; end: t->err = err; return rv; } static const struct evp_test_method keypair_test_method = { "PrivPubKeyPair", keypair_test_init, keypair_test_cleanup, void_test_parse, keypair_test_run }; openssl-1.1.0g/test/testdsapub.pem0000644000000000000000000000121613176625662015717 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MIIBuDCCASwGByqGSM44BAEwggEfAoGBAP0qjYTPLaYp45XigmyPLxV6z0C/ps++ vnLqIVNWkZB7CPOwAdKXd4DHDKu8TRzHxxDg4OJ5VGdaJtkgSgXY1FQHDeX/qjzC jUFlOcXvC1mk2vpBwJBA0LcJpBnSXDas57AbGpml5eZi6t9x5GexkFKlCLDyRb4l OAJtEm1UBgXXAhUA35ewr++pwhCUPplXTnkuhXiq/SMCgYEAvnbHcLilpmRTrVlO IiBQo9cGlqdDhrueyN2JKPOCe2j6u95W4WRlApoPta2zxIumiMFq3uy6mv6oXWlZ WlHDE5eh907vZd0qbm7dyjuwuep/9ZUKbNf3+6eUCwZ8MbVHpGoDvUydAnmrnovA DOorbdl8a3m/VamGjfoVj8mctnYDgYUAAoGBAMyZoH2YF7/wO7CbGD6bGet3q+zx ksOp+6gz2+ae23Gajpd3u4JzbOxqjk4vrQaTrMPRRWXWJxC5WwLMalzwke75wi8g GT6+EUxFoLXlSmRQN+h4f+AbOHFQiiW9v3xrgUKPiYWPEz/bhYw5DC73vPfkHXxm V495KiSIx4fvfH1B -----END PUBLIC KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/CAssdh.cnf0000644000000000000000000000133013176625661014667 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # hacked by iang to do DH certs - CA RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = CU countryName_value = CU organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = La Junta de la Revolucion commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) commonName_value = Junta openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl_test_ctx_test.conf0000644000000000000000000000351013176625662017461 0ustar rootroot[ssltest_default] [ssltest_good] client = ssltest_good_client_extra server = ssltest_good_server_extra resume-server2 = ssltest_good_resume_server2_extra resume-client = ssltest_good_resume_client_extra Method = DTLS HandshakeMode = Resume ApplicationData = 1024 MaxFragmentSize = 2048 ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedClientAlert = UnknownCA ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = Yes ResumptionExpected = Yes [ssltest_good_client_extra] VerifyCallback = RejectAll ServerName = server2 NPNProtocols = foo,bar [ssltest_good_resume_client_extra] CTValidation = Strict [ssltest_good_server_extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch BrokenSessionTicket = Yes [ssltest_good_resume_server2_extra] ALPNProtocols = baz [ssltest_unknown_option] UnknownOption = Foo [ssltest_wrong_section] server = ssltest_wrong_section_server [ssltest_wrong_section_server] VerifyCallback = RejectAll [ssltest_unknown_expected_result] ExpectedResult = Foo [ssltest_unknown_alert] ExpectedServerAlert = Foo [ssltest_unknown_protocol] Protocol = Foo [ssltest_unknown_verify_callback] client = ssltest_unknown_verify_callback_client [ssltest_unknown_verify_callback_client] VerifyCallback = Foo [ssltest_unknown_servername] client = ssltest_unknown_servername_client [ssltest_unknown_servername_client] ServerName = Foo [ssltest_unknown_servername_callback] server = ssltest_unknown_servername_server [ssltest_unknown_servername_server] ServerNameCallback = Foo [ssltest_unknown_session_ticket_expected] SessionTicketExpected = Foo [ssltest_unknown_method] Method = TLS2 [ssltest_unknown_handshake_mode] HandshakeMode = Foo [ssltest_unknown_resumption_expected] ResumptionExpected = Foo [ssltest_unknown_ct_validation] client = ssltest_unknown_ct_validation_client [ssltest_unknown_ct_validation_client] CTCallback = Foo openssl-1.1.0g/test/P2ss.cnf0000644000000000000000000000211613176625661014354 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = keySS.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no default_md = sha256 [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = AU countryName_value = AU organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = Dodgy Brothers 0.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 0.commonName_value = Brother 1 1.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 1.commonName_value = Brother 2 2.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 2.commonName_value = Proxy 1 3.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 3.commonName_value = Proxy 2 [ v3_proxy ] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext [ proxy_ext ] language=id-ppl-anyLanguage pathlen=0 policy=text:BC openssl-1.1.0g/test/smcont.txt0000644000000000000000000000012313176625662015076 0ustar rootrootSomewhat longer test content for OpenSSL CMS utility to handle, and a bit longer...openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl_test_ctx.h0000644000000000000000000001445013176625662015731 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_TEST_CTX_H #define HEADER_SSL_TEST_CTX_H #include #include typedef enum { SSL_TEST_SUCCESS = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL, SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL, SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR, /* Couldn't test resumption/renegotiation: original handshake failed. */ SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED } ssl_test_result_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_VERIFY_NONE = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL, SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL } ssl_verify_callback_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1, SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2, SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_INVALID } ssl_servername_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH, SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH } ssl_servername_callback_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_IGNORE = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES, SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO, SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_BROKEN /* Special test */ } ssl_session_ticket_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_METHOD_TLS = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS } ssl_test_method_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME, SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER, SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT } ssl_handshake_mode_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE, SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT } ssl_ct_validation_t; typedef enum { SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE = 0, /* Default */ SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE, SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE } ssl_cert_status_t; /* * Server/client settings that aren't supported by the SSL CONF library, * such as callbacks. */ typedef struct { /* One of a number of predefined custom callbacks. */ ssl_verify_callback_t verify_callback; /* One of a number of predefined server names use by the client */ ssl_servername_t servername; /* Supported NPN and ALPN protocols. A comma-separated list. */ char *npn_protocols; char *alpn_protocols; ssl_ct_validation_t ct_validation; /* Ciphersuites to set on a renegotiation */ char *reneg_ciphers; } SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF; typedef struct { /* SNI callback (server-side). */ ssl_servername_callback_t servername_callback; /* Supported NPN and ALPN protocols. A comma-separated list. */ char *npn_protocols; char *alpn_protocols; /* Whether to set a broken session ticket callback. */ int broken_session_ticket; /* Should we send a CertStatus message? */ ssl_cert_status_t cert_status; } SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF; typedef struct { SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF client; SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF server; SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF server2; } SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF; typedef struct { /* * Global test configuration. Does not change between handshakes. */ /* Whether the server/client CTX should use DTLS or TLS. */ ssl_test_method_t method; /* Whether to test a resumed/renegotiated handshake. */ ssl_handshake_mode_t handshake_mode; /* * How much application data to exchange (default is 256 bytes). * Both peers will send |app_data_size| bytes interleaved. */ int app_data_size; /* Maximum send fragment size. */ int max_fragment_size; /* * Extra server/client configurations. Per-handshake. */ /* First handshake. */ SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF extra; /* Resumed handshake. */ SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF resume_extra; /* * Test expectations. These apply to the LAST handshake. */ /* Defaults to SUCCESS. */ ssl_test_result_t expected_result; /* Alerts. 0 if no expectation. */ /* See ssl.h for alert codes. */ /* Alert sent by the client / received by the server. */ int expected_client_alert; /* Alert sent by the server / received by the client. */ int expected_server_alert; /* Negotiated protocol version. 0 if no expectation. */ /* See ssl.h for protocol versions. */ int expected_protocol; /* * The expected SNI context to use. * We test server-side that the server switched to the expected context. * Set by the callback upon success, so if the callback wasn't called or * terminated with an alert, the servername will match with * SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE. * Note: in the event that the servername was accepted, the client should * also receive an empty SNI extension back but we have no way of probing * client-side via the API that this was the case. */ ssl_servername_t expected_servername; ssl_session_ticket_t session_ticket_expected; /* The expected NPN/ALPN protocol to negotiate. */ char *expected_npn_protocol; char *expected_alpn_protocol; /* Whether the second handshake is resumed or a full handshake (boolean). */ int resumption_expected; /* Expected temporary key type */ int expected_tmp_key_type; } SSL_TEST_CTX; const char *ssl_test_result_name(ssl_test_result_t result); const char *ssl_alert_name(int alert); const char *ssl_protocol_name(int protocol); const char *ssl_verify_callback_name(ssl_verify_callback_t verify_callback); const char *ssl_servername_name(ssl_servername_t server); const char *ssl_servername_callback_name(ssl_servername_callback_t servername_callback); const char *ssl_session_ticket_name(ssl_session_ticket_t server); const char *ssl_test_method_name(ssl_test_method_t method); const char *ssl_handshake_mode_name(ssl_handshake_mode_t mode); const char *ssl_ct_validation_name(ssl_ct_validation_t mode); const char *ssl_certstatus_name(ssl_cert_status_t cert_status); /* * Load the test case context from |conf|. * See test/README.ssltest.md for details on the conf file format. */ SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_create(const CONF *conf, const char *test_section); SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_new(void); void SSL_TEST_CTX_free(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx); #endif /* HEADER_SSL_TEST_CTX_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/test/hmactest.c0000644000000000000000000002247213176625661015020 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 # include # endif # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 static struct test_st { unsigned char key[16]; int key_len; unsigned char data[64]; int data_len; unsigned char *digest; } test[8] = { { "", 0, "More text test vectors to stuff up EBCDIC machines :-)", 54, (unsigned char *)"e9139d1e6ee064ef8cf514fc7dc83e86", }, { { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, }, 16, "Hi There", 8, (unsigned char *)"9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d", }, { "Jefe", 4, "what do ya want for nothing?", 28, (unsigned char *)"750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738", }, { { 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, }, 16, { 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd }, 50, (unsigned char *)"56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6", }, { "", 0, "My test data", 12, (unsigned char *)"61afdecb95429ef494d61fdee15990cabf0826fc" }, { "", 0, "My test data", 12, (unsigned char *)"2274b195d90ce8e03406f4b526a47e0787a88a65479938f1a5baa3ce0f079776" }, { "123456", 6, "My test data", 12, (unsigned char *)"bab53058ae861a7f191abe2d0145cbb123776a6369ee3f9d79ce455667e411dd" }, { "12345", 5, "My test data again", 18, (unsigned char *)"a12396ceddd2a85f4c656bc1e0aa50c78cffde3e" } }; # endif static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 int i; char *p; # endif int err = 0; HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx2 = NULL; unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int len; # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 printf("test skipped: MD5 disabled\n"); # else # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(test[0].data, test[0].data, test[0].data_len); ebcdic2ascii(test[1].data, test[1].data, test[1].data_len); ebcdic2ascii(test[2].key, test[2].key, test[2].key_len); ebcdic2ascii(test[2].data, test[2].data, test[2].data_len); # endif for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { p = pt(HMAC(EVP_md5(), test[i].key, test[i].key_len, test[i].data, test[i].data_len, NULL, NULL), MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[i].digest) != 0) { printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[i].digest); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i); } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_MD5 */ /* test4 */ ctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { printf("HMAC malloc failure (test 4)\n"); err++; goto end; } if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != NULL) { printf("Message digest not NULL for HMAC (test 4)\n"); err++; goto test5; } if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD and key (test 4)\n"); err++; goto test5; } if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n"); err++; goto test5; } if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty key (test 4)\n"); err++; goto test5; } if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n"); err++; goto test5; } printf("test 4 ok\n"); test5: /* Test 5 has empty key; test that single-shot accepts a NULL key. */ p = pt(HMAC(EVP_sha1(), NULL, 0, test[4].data, test[4].data_len, NULL, NULL), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) { printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest); err++; } HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx); if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != NULL) { printf("Message digest not NULL for HMAC (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, -1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with invalid key len(test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) { printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) { printf("Error finalising data (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } p = pt(buf, len); if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) { printf("Error calculating interim HMAC on test 5\n"); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest); err++; goto test6; } if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { printf("Should disallow changing MD without a new key (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[5].key, test[5].key_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != EVP_sha256()) { printf("Unexpected message digest for HMAC (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[5].data, test[5].data_len)) { printf("Error updating HMAC with data (sha256) (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) { printf("Error finalising data (sha256) (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } p = pt(buf, len); if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[5].digest) != 0) { printf("Error calculating 2nd interim HMAC on test 5\n"); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[5].digest); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[6].key, test[6].key_len, NULL, NULL)) { printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC with key (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[6].data, test[6].data_len)) { printf("Error updating HMAC with data (new key) (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) { printf("Error finalising data (new key) (test 5)\n"); err++; goto test6; } p = pt(buf, len); if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[6].digest) != 0) { printf("error calculating HMAC on test 5\n"); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[6].digest); err++; } else { printf("test 5 ok\n"); } test6: HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx); ctx2 = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (ctx2 == NULL) { printf("HMAC malloc failure (test 6)\n"); err++; goto end; } if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[7].key, test[7].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 6)\n"); err++; goto end; } if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[7].data, test[7].data_len)) { printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 6)\n"); err++; goto end; } if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(ctx2, ctx)) { printf("Failed to copy HMAC_CTX (test 6)\n"); err++; goto end; } if (!HMAC_Final(ctx2, buf, &len)) { printf("Error finalising data (test 6)\n"); err++; goto end; } p = pt(buf, len); if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[7].digest) != 0) { printf("Error calculating HMAC on test 6\n"); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[7].digest); err++; } else { printf("test 6 ok\n"); } end: HMAC_CTX_free(ctx2); HMAC_CTX_free(ctx); EXIT(err); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len) { unsigned int i; static char buf[80]; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); return (buf); } # endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/README.ssltest.md0000644000000000000000000002173613176625661016025 0ustar rootroot# SSL tests SSL testcases are configured in the `ssl-tests` directory. Each `ssl_*.conf.in` file contains a number of test configurations. These files are used to generate testcases in the OpenSSL CONF format. The precise test output can be dependent on the library configuration. The test harness generates the output files on the fly. However, for verification, we also include checked-in configuration outputs corresponding to the default configuration. These testcases live in `test/ssl-tests/*.conf` files. For more details, see `ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in` for an example. ## Configuring the test First, give your test a name. The names do not have to be unique. An example test input looks like this: ``` { name => "test-default", server => { "CipherString" => "DEFAULT" }, client => { "CipherString" => "DEFAULT" }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, } ``` The test section supports the following options ### Test mode * Method - the method to test. One of DTLS or TLS. * HandshakeMode - which handshake flavour to test: - Simple - plain handshake (default) - Resume - test resumption - RenegotiateServer - test server initiated renegotiation - RenegotiateClient - test client initiated renegotiation When HandshakeMode is Resume or Renegotiate, the original handshake is expected to succeed. All configured test expectations are verified against the second handshake. * ApplicationData - amount of application data bytes to send (integer, defaults to 256 bytes). Applies to both client and server. Application data is sent in 64kB chunks (but limited by MaxFragmentSize and available parallelization, see below). * MaxFragmentSize - maximum send fragment size (integer, defaults to 512 in tests - see `SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment` for documentation). Applies to both client and server. Lowering the fragment size will split handshake and application data up between more `SSL_write` calls, thus allowing to exercise different code paths. In particular, if the buffer size (64kB) is at least four times as large as the maximum fragment, interleaved multi-buffer crypto implementations may be used on some platforms. ### Test expectations * ExpectedResult - expected handshake outcome. One of - Success - handshake success - ServerFail - serverside handshake failure - ClientFail - clientside handshake failure - InternalError - some other error * ExpectedClientAlert, ExpectedServerAlert - expected alert. See `ssl_test_ctx.c` for known values. Note: the expected alert is currently matched against the _last_ received alert (i.e., a fatal alert or a `close_notify`). Warning alert expectations are not yet supported. (A warning alert will not be correctly matched, if followed by a `close_notify` or another alert.) * ExpectedProtocol - expected negotiated protocol. One of SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2. * SessionTicketExpected - whether or not a session ticket is expected - Ignore - do not check for a session ticket (default) - Yes - a session ticket is expected - No - a session ticket is not expected * ResumptionExpected - whether or not resumption is expected (Resume mode only) - Yes - resumed handshake - No - full handshake (default) * ExpectedNPNProtocol, ExpectedALPNProtocol - NPN and ALPN expectations. * ExpectedTmpKeyType - the expected algorithm or curve of server temp key ## Configuring the client and server The client and server configurations can be any valid `SSL_CTX` configurations. For details, see the manpages for `SSL_CONF_cmd`. Give your configurations as a dictionary of CONF commands, e.g. ``` server => { "CipherString" => "DEFAULT", "MinProtocol" => "TLSv1", } ``` The following sections may optionally be defined: * server2 - this section configures a secondary context that is selected via the ServerName test option. This context is used whenever a ServerNameCallback is specified. If the server2 section is not present, then the configuration matches server. * resume_server - this section configures the client to resume its session against a different server. This context is used whenever HandshakeMode is Resume. If the resume_server section is not present, then the configuration matches server. * resume_client - this section configures the client to resume its session with a different configuration. In practice this may occur when, for example, upgraded clients reuse sessions persisted on disk. This context is used whenever HandshakeMode is Resume. If the resume_client section is not present, then the configuration matches client. ### Configuring callbacks and additional options Additional handshake settings can be configured in the `extra` section of each client and server: ``` client => { "CipherString" => "DEFAULT", extra => { "ServerName" => "server2", } } ``` #### Supported client-side options * ClientVerifyCallback - the client's custom certificate verify callback. Used to test callback behaviour. One of - None - no custom callback (default) - AcceptAll - accepts all certificates. - RejectAll - rejects all certificates. * ServerName - the server the client should attempt to connect to. One of - None - do not use SNI (default) - server1 - the initial context - server2 - the secondary context - invalid - an unknown context * CTValidation - Certificate Transparency validation strategy. One of - None - no validation (default) - Permissive - SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE - Strict - SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT #### Supported server-side options * ServerNameCallback - the SNI switching callback to use - None - no callback (default) - IgnoreMismatch - continue the handshake on SNI mismatch - RejectMismatch - abort the handshake on SNI mismatch * BrokenSessionTicket - a special test case where the session ticket callback does not initialize crypto. - No (default) - Yes #### Mutually supported options * NPNProtocols, ALPNProtocols - NPN and ALPN settings. Server and client protocols can be specified as a comma-separated list, and a callback with the recommended behaviour will be installed automatically. ### Default server and client configurations The default server certificate and CA files are added to the configurations automatically. Server certificate verification is requested by default. You can override these options by redefining them: ``` client => { "VerifyCAFile" => "/path/to/custom/file" } ``` or by deleting them ``` client => { "VerifyCAFile" => undef } ``` ## Adding a test to the test harness 1. Add a new test configuration to `test/ssl-tests`, following the examples of existing `*.conf.in` files (for example, `01-simple.conf.in`). 2. Generate the generated `*.conf` test input file. You can do so by running `generate_ssl_tests.pl`: ``` $ ./config $ cd test $ TOP=.. perl -I testlib/ generate_ssl_tests.pl ssl-tests/my.conf.in \ > ssl-tests/my.conf ``` where `my.conf.in` is your test input file. For example, to generate the test cases in `ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in`, do ``` $ TOP=.. perl -I testlib/ generate_ssl_tests.pl ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in > ssl-tests/01-simple.conf ``` Alternatively (hackish but simple), you can comment out ``` unlink glob $tmp_file; ``` in `test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t` and run ``` $ make TESTS=test_ssl_new test ``` This will save the generated output in a `*.tmp` file in the build directory. 3. Update the number of tests planned in `test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t`. If the test suite has any skip conditions, update those too (see `test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t` for details). ## Running the tests with the test harness ``` HARNESS_VERBOSE=yes make TESTS=test_ssl_new test ``` ## Running a test manually These steps are only needed during development. End users should run `make test` or follow the instructions above to run the SSL test suite. To run an SSL test manually from the command line, the `TEST_CERTS_DIR` environment variable to point to the location of the certs. E.g., from the root OpenSSL directory, do ``` $ CTLOG_FILE=test/ct/log_list.conf TEST_CERTS_DIR=test/certs test/ssl_test \ test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf ``` or for shared builds ``` $ CTLOG_FILE=test/ct/log_list.conf TEST_CERTS_DIR=test/certs \ util/shlib_wrap.sh test/ssl_test test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf ``` Note that the test expectations sometimes depend on the Configure settings. For example, the negotiated protocol depends on the set of available (enabled) protocols: a build with `enable-ssl3` has different test expectations than a build with `no-ssl3`. The Perl test harness automatically generates expected outputs, so users who just run `make test` do not need any extra steps. However, when running a test manually, keep in mind that the repository version of the generated `test/ssl-tests/*.conf` correspond to expected outputs in with the default Configure options. To run `ssl_test` manually from the command line in a build with a different configuration, you may need to generate the right `*.conf` file from the `*.conf.in` input first. openssl-1.1.0g/test/testdsa.pem0000644000000000000000000000124013176625662015205 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBvQIBAAKBgQD9Ko2Ezy2mKeOV4oJsjy8Ves9Av6bPvr5y6iFTVpGQewjzsAHS l3eAxwyrvE0cx8cQ4ODieVRnWibZIEoF2NRUBw3l/6o8wo1BZTnF7wtZpNr6QcCQ QNC3CaQZ0lw2rOewGxqZpeXmYurfceRnsZBSpQiw8kW+JTgCbRJtVAYF1wIVAN+X sK/vqcIQlD6ZV055LoV4qv0jAoGBAL52x3C4paZkU61ZTiIgUKPXBpanQ4a7nsjd iSjzgnto+rveVuFkZQKaD7Wts8SLpojBat7supr+qF1pWVpRwxOXofdO72XdKm5u 3co7sLnqf/WVCmzX9/unlAsGfDG1R6RqA71MnQJ5q56LwAzqK23ZfGt5v1Wpho36 FY/JnLZ2AoGBAMyZoH2YF7/wO7CbGD6bGet3q+zxksOp+6gz2+ae23Gajpd3u4Jz bOxqjk4vrQaTrMPRRWXWJxC5WwLMalzwke75wi8gGT6+EUxFoLXlSmRQN+h4f+Ab OHFQiiW9v3xrgUKPiYWPEz/bhYw5DC73vPfkHXxmV495KiSIx4fvfH1BAhUAv3HU l7iXVdDF5BKF2B+Vd8w9+MI= -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/testp7.pem0000644000000000000000000000544613176625662015000 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PKCS7----- MIIIGAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIICTCCCAUCAQExADALBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGgggY8MIIE cjCCBBygAwIBAgIQeS+OJfWJUZAx6cX0eAiMjzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBiMREw DwYDVQQHEwhJbnRlcm5ldDEXMBUGA1UEChMOVmVyaVNpZ24sIEluYy4xNDAyBgNV BAsTK1ZlcmlTaWduIENsYXNzIDEgQ0EgLSBJbmRpdmlkdWFsIFN1YnNjcmliZXIw HhcNOTYwNzE5MDAwMDAwWhcNOTcwMzMwMjM1OTU5WjCB1TERMA8GA1UEBxMISW50 ZXJuZXQxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMTQwMgYDVQQLEytWZXJpU2ln biBDbGFzcyAxIENBIC0gSW5kaXZpZHVhbCBTdWJzY3JpYmVyMSgwJgYDVQQLEx9E aWdpdGFsIElEIENsYXNzIDEgLSBTTUlNRSBUZXN0MUcwRQYDVQQLEz53d3cudmVy aXNpZ24uY29tL3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvQ1BTLTEuMCBJbmMuIGJ5IFJlZi4sTElBQi5M VEQoYyk5NjBbMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0oAMEcCQA7LvHEIAiQ5+4gDYvJGnGAq UM5GXyG11diEXmIEZTHUZhorooX5sr8IIjSXiPY59YYUFSvAaharFM1xaBN8zNEC AwEAAaOCAjkwggI1MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwggImBgNVHQMEggIdMIICGTCCAhUwggIR BgtghkgBhvhFAQcBATCCAgAWggGrVGhpcyBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBpbmNvcnBvcmF0 ZXMgYnkgcmVmZXJlbmNlLCBhbmQgaXRzIHVzZSBpcyBzdHJpY3RseSBzdWJqZWN0 IHRvLCB0aGUgVmVyaVNpZ24gQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBQcmFjdGljZSBTdGF0ZW1l bnQgKENQUyksIGF2YWlsYWJsZSBhdDogaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29t L0NQUy0xLjA7IGJ5IEUtbWFpbCBhdCBDUFMtcmVxdWVzdHNAdmVyaXNpZ24uY29t OyBvciBieSBtYWlsIGF0IFZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuLCAyNTkzIENvYXN0IEF2ZS4s IE1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcsIENBIDk0MDQzIFVTQSBUZWwuICsxICg0MTUpIDk2MS04 ODMwIENvcHlyaWdodCAoYykgMTk5NiBWZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLiAgQWxsIFJpZ2h0 cyBSZXNlcnZlZC4gQ0VSVEFJTiBXQVJSQU5USUVTIERJU0NMQUlNRUQgYW5kIExJ QUJJTElUWSBMSU1JVEVELqAOBgxghkgBhvhFAQcBAQGhDgYMYIZIAYb4RQEHAQEC MC8wLRYraHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29tL3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvQ1BTLTEu AzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAMCYDuSb/eIlYSxY31nZZTaCZkCSfHjlacMofExr cF+A2yHoEuT+eCQkqM0pMNHXddUeoQ9RjV+VuMBNmm63DUYwggHCMIIBbKADAgEC AhB8CYTq1bkRFJBYOd67cp9JMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVT MRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjEWMBQGA1UECxMNVEVTVCBSb290IFBD QTAeFw05NjA3MTcwMDAwMDBaFw05NzA3MTcyMzU5NTlaMGIxETAPBgNVBAcTCElu dGVybmV0MRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjE0MDIGA1UECxMrVmVyaVNp Z24gQ2xhc3MgMSBDQSAtIEluZGl2aWR1YWwgU3Vic2NyaWJlcjBcMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQDsVzrNgnDhbAJZrWeLd9g1vMZJA2W67D33TTbga6yMt+ES TWEywhS6RNP+fzLGg7utinjH4tL60cXa0G27GDsLAgMBAAGjIjAgMAsGA1UdDwQE AwIBBjARBglghkgBhvhCAQEEBAMCAgQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQADQQAUp6bRwkaD 2d1MBs/mjUcgTI2fXVmW8tTm/Ud6OzUwpC3vYgybiOOA4f6mOC5dbyUHrLOsrihU 47ZQ0Jo1DUfboYIBrTCBwTBtMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVT MRcwFQYDVQQKEw5WZXJpU2lnbiwgSW5jLjEWMBQGA1UECxMNVEVTVCBSb290IFBD QRcNOTYwNzE3MTc0NDA5WhcNOTgwNzE3MDAwMDAwWjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQIFAANB AHitA0/xAukCjHzeh1AMT/l2oC68N+yFb+aJPHBBMxc6gG2MaKjBNwb5hcXUllMl ExONA3ju10f7owIq3s3wx10wgeYwgZEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwYjERMA8GA1UE BxMISW50ZXJuZXQxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMTQwMgYDVQQLEytW ZXJpU2lnbiBDbGFzcyAxIENBIC0gSW5kaXZpZHVhbCBTdWJzY3JpYmVyFw05NjA3 MTcxNzU5MjlaFw05NzA3MTgwMDAwMDBaMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAA0EAubVWYTsW sQmste9f+UgMw8BkjDlM25fwQLrCfmmnLxjewey10kSROypUaJLb+r4oRALc0fG9 XfZsaiiIgotQHjEA -----END PKCS7----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/pkcs7-1.pem0000644000000000000000000000152313176625661014726 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PKCS7----- MIICUAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIICQTCCAj0CAQExDjAMBggqhkiG9w0CAgUAMCgGCSqG SIb3DQEHAaAbBBlFdmVyeW9uZSBnZXRzIEZyaWRheSBvZmYuoIIBXjCCAVowggEE AgQUAAApMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMCwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMR0wGwYDVQQKExRF eGFtcGxlIE9yZ2FuaXphdGlvbjAeFw05MjA5MDkyMjE4MDZaFw05NDA5MDkyMjE4 MDVaMEIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMR0wGwYDVQQKExRFeGFtcGxlIE9yZ2FuaXphdGlv bjEUMBIGA1UEAxMLVGVzdCBVc2VyIDEwWzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANKADBHAkAK ZnkdxpiBaN56t3QZu3+wwAHGJxAnAHUUKULhmo2MUdBTs+N4Kh3l3Fr06+mUaBcB FKHf5nzcmpr1XWVWILurAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQADQQBFGqHhqncgSl/N 9XYGnQL3MsJvNnsNV4puZPOakR9Hld8JlDQFEaDR30ogsmp3TMrvdfxpLlTCoZN8 BxEmnZsWMYGbMIGYAgEBMDQwLDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxHTAbBgNVBAoTFEV4YW1w bGUgT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uAgQUAAApMAwGCCqGSIb3DQICBQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB BQAEQAX6aoEvx9+L9PJUJQngPoRuEbnGIL4gCe+0QO+8xmkhaZSsBPNBtX0FIC1C j7Kie1x339mxW/w9VZNTUDQQweHh -----END PKCS7----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/sha512t.c0000644000000000000000000001551613176625662014401 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include static const unsigned char app_c1[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0xdd, 0xaf, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xba, 0xcc, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xae, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, 0x12, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0x89, 0xa9, 0x7e, 0xa2, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x4b, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x9a, 0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x4f, 0xc1, 0xa8, 0x36, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x23, 0xa3, 0xfe, 0xeb, 0xbd, 0x45, 0x4d, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3c, 0xe8, 0x0e, 0x2a, 0x9a, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xa5, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x9f }; static const unsigned char app_c2[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x8e, 0x95, 0x9b, 0x75, 0xda, 0xe3, 0x13, 0xda, 0x8c, 0xf4, 0xf7, 0x28, 0x14, 0xfc, 0x14, 0x3f, 0x8f, 0x77, 0x79, 0xc6, 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0x72, 0x99, 0xae, 0xad, 0xb6, 0x88, 0x90, 0x18, 0x50, 0x1d, 0x28, 0x9e, 0x49, 0x00, 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x33, 0x1b, 0x99, 0xde, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x3a, 0xc7, 0xd3, 0x29, 0xee, 0xb6, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x54, 0x5e, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x5b, 0x87, 0x4b, 0xe9, 0x09 }; static const unsigned char app_c3[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0xe7, 0x18, 0x48, 0x3d, 0x0c, 0xe7, 0x69, 0x64, 0x4e, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xbc, 0x15, 0xb4, 0x63, 0x8e, 0x1f, 0x98, 0xb1, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x44, 0x28, 0x56, 0x32, 0xa8, 0x03, 0xaf, 0xa9, 0x73, 0xeb, 0xde, 0x0f, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x87, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0x0a, 0x4c, 0xb0, 0x43, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x77, 0xc3, 0x1b, 0xeb, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x2c, 0x49, 0xaa, 0x2e, 0x4e, 0xad, 0xb2, 0x17, 0xad, 0x8c, 0xc0, 0x9b }; static const unsigned char app_d1[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0xcb, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3f, 0x45, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x8b, 0xb5, 0xa0, 0x3d, 0x69, 0x9a, 0xc6, 0x50, 0x07, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x32, 0xab, 0x0e, 0xde, 0xd1, 0x63, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0x60, 0x5a, 0x43, 0xff, 0x5b, 0xed, 0x80, 0x86, 0x07, 0x2b, 0xa1, 0xe7, 0xcc, 0x23, 0x58, 0xba, 0xec, 0xa1, 0x34, 0xc8, 0x25, 0xa7 }; static const unsigned char app_d2[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x09, 0x33, 0x0c, 0x33, 0xf7, 0x11, 0x47, 0xe8, 0x3d, 0x19, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x1b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x11, 0x1b, 0x17, 0x3b, 0x3b, 0x05, 0xd2, 0x2f, 0xa0, 0x80, 0x86, 0xe3, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0x12, 0xfc, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x1a, 0x55, 0x7e, 0x2d, 0xb9, 0x66, 0xc3, 0xe9, 0xfa, 0x91, 0x74, 0x60, 0x39 }; static const unsigned char app_d3[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x18, 0x09, 0x71, 0x64, 0x74, 0xcb, 0x08, 0x6e, 0x83, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x4a, 0x1c, 0xed, 0x14, 0x9e, 0x9c, 0x00, 0xf2, 0x48, 0x52, 0x79, 0x72, 0xce, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x4c, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x07, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0xdc, 0x38, 0xec, 0xc4, 0xeb, 0xae, 0x97, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0x7f, 0x3d, 0x89, 0x85 }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned char md[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int i; EVP_MD_CTX *evp; fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-512 "); if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, app_c1, sizeof(app_c1))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!EVP_Digest("abcdefgh" "bcdefghi" "cdefghij" "defghijk" "efghijkl" "fghijklm" "ghijklmn" "hijklmno" "ijklmnop" "jklmnopq" "klmnopqr" "lmnopqrs" "mnopqrst" "nopqrstu", 112, md, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, app_c2, sizeof(app_c2))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); evp = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (evp == NULL) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed. (malloc failure)\n"); return 1; } if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha512(), NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 288) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa", (1000000 - i) < 288 ? 1000000 - i : 288)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL)) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_reset(evp); if (memcmp(md, app_c3, sizeof(app_c3))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n"); fflush(stdout); fprintf(stdout, "Testing SHA-384 "); if (!EVP_Digest("abc", 3, md, NULL, EVP_sha384(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, app_d1, sizeof(app_d1))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!EVP_Digest("abcdefgh" "bcdefghi" "cdefghij" "defghijk" "efghijkl" "fghijklm" "ghijklmn" "hijklmno" "ijklmnop" "jklmnopq" "klmnopqr" "lmnopqrs" "mnopqrst" "nopqrstu", 112, md, NULL, EVP_sha384(), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, app_d2, sizeof(app_d2))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(evp, EVP_sha384(), NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 64) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(evp, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa", (1000000 - i) < 64 ? 1000000 - i : 64)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(evp, md, NULL)) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp); if (memcmp(md, app_d3, sizeof(app_d3))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 3 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n"); fflush(stdout); return 0; err: fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nFatal EVP error!\n"); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661014653 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/bad_bio.der0000644000000000000000000000000713176625661016723 0ustar rootroot0„`openssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/bad_cert.der0000644000000000000000000000175713176625661017124 0ustar rootroot0‚Ö0‚¾ k¿QYÉ[0  *†H†÷  0I1 0 UUS10U  Google Inc1%0#UÎGoogle Internet Authority G20 151028185638Z 160126000000Z0i1 0 UUS10U California10UÐ0€0€@€0€ Mountain Vi'ew10U Google Inc10U mail.google.com0Y0*†HÎ=*†HÎ=­BÜ´‚gO30[øéË~NÕZNUpùžŒ¿{$Å7°L&@•óö¹¢›8ã€bkë„{Ïì¢ 2†"/ì]Ó½{h£‚k0‚g0U%0++0,Ur0#‚mail.google.com‚inbox.google.com0 U€0h+\0Z0++0†http://pki.google.com/GIAG2.crt0++0†http://clients1.google.com/ocsp0UÃ6抓l.+_Q[N× gP«Õ0 Uÿ00U#0€Jݼöhµvõ¶»bºZ/0!U 00  +Öy0g 00U)0'0% # !†http://pki.google.com/GIAG2.crl0  *†H†÷  ‚e8Ξ¡N§Y`L±þ¹ê'Pºçßáýn-/RiÂÉ3í%ì0§&uŸÝÃj4RNþnÿ(óZ}†ß²»†$ɉ–Ôs4prÛÁJ µj@ ¢¡ÀØ;yÚXÀÓ@ÙüŠèFJ說Õ1}xИ)|cÙ,ðõ‹è$æÁ¢À_é1õ –i‹¥„Cö±}.!•Én]™¼¨§M¶ˆ:ÕG® }D^9 0€00€0€€u —ÿ M-WžÄS<[p4ŽÐn?òœ…ºþ‘Mo¼FP’{eåi L™÷~ (^"n¼©ô:â e6µ5,pgF õ5GZ`r+Ñopenssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/int1.der0000644000000000000000000000000313176625661016213 0ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/int0.der0000644000000000000000000000000313176625661016212 0ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/bad-cms.der0000644000000000000000000000003013176625661016646 0ustar rootroot0 *†H†÷   010openssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-pad0.der0000644000000000000000000000000413176625661017501 0ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/intminus1.der0000644000000000000000000000000313176625661017267 0ustar rootrootÿopenssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/bad_generalname.der0000644000000000000000000000007413176625661020434 0ustar rootroot¥€0;¶!;)''ï÷!l¿(,:µ¿(*;©:§«½:“**;i)*w*ë)ã;U:'):ñ;l*!'Ò£openssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/bad-int-padminus1.der0000644000000000000000000000000413176625661020556 0ustar rootrootÿÿopenssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i-tests/high_tag.der0000644000000000000000000000000613176625661017115 0ustar rootroot‚openssl-1.1.0g/test/dhtest.c0000644000000000000000000006121613176625661014502 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No DH support\n"); return (0); } #else # include static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg); static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; static int run_rfc5114_tests(void); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BN_GENCB *_cb = NULL; DH *a = NULL; DH *b = NULL; DH *c = NULL; const BIGNUM *ap = NULL, *ag = NULL, *apub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; const BIGNUM *bpub_key = NULL; BIGNUM *bp = NULL, *bg = NULL, *cpriv_key = NULL; char buf[12] = {0}; unsigned char *abuf = NULL; unsigned char *bbuf = NULL; unsigned char *cbuf = NULL; int i, alen, blen, clen, aout, bout, cout; int ret = 1; BIO *out = NULL; CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) EXIT(1); BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); _cb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (_cb == NULL) goto err; BN_GENCB_set(_cb, &cb, out); if (((a = DH_new()) == NULL) || (!DH_generate_parameters_ex(a, 64, DH_GENERATOR_5, _cb))) goto err; if (!DH_check(a, &i)) goto err; if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) BIO_puts(out, "p value is not prime\n"); if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) BIO_puts(out, "p value is not a safe prime\n"); if (i & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR) BIO_puts(out, "unable to check the generator value\n"); if (i & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) BIO_puts(out, "the g value is not a generator\n"); DH_get0_pqg(a, &ap, NULL, &ag); BIO_puts(out, "\np ="); BN_print(out, ap); BIO_puts(out, "\ng ="); BN_print(out, ag); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); b = DH_new(); if (b == NULL) goto err; bp = BN_dup(ap); bg = BN_dup(ag); if ((bp == NULL) || (bg == NULL) || !DH_set0_pqg(b, bp, NULL, bg)) goto err; bp = bg = NULL; if (!DH_generate_key(a)) goto err; DH_get0_key(a, &apub_key, &priv_key); BIO_puts(out, "pri 1="); BN_print(out, priv_key); BIO_puts(out, "\npub 1="); BN_print(out, apub_key); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); if (!DH_generate_key(b)) goto err; DH_get0_key(b, &bpub_key, &priv_key); BIO_puts(out, "pri 2="); BN_print(out, priv_key); BIO_puts(out, "\npub 2="); BN_print(out, bpub_key); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); /* Also test with a private-key-only copy of |b|. */ if ((c = DHparams_dup(b)) == NULL || (cpriv_key = BN_dup(priv_key)) == NULL || !DH_set0_key(c, NULL, cpriv_key)) goto err; cpriv_key = NULL; alen = DH_size(a); abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(alen); if (abuf == NULL) goto err; aout = DH_compute_key(abuf, bpub_key, a); BIO_puts(out, "key1 ="); for (i = 0; i < aout; i++) { sprintf(buf, "%02X", abuf[i]); BIO_puts(out, buf); } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); blen = DH_size(b); bbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(blen); if (bbuf == NULL) goto err; bout = DH_compute_key(bbuf, apub_key, b); BIO_puts(out, "key2 ="); for (i = 0; i < bout; i++) { sprintf(buf, "%02X", bbuf[i]); BIO_puts(out, buf); } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); clen = DH_size(c); cbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(clen); if (cbuf == NULL) goto err; cout = DH_compute_key(cbuf, apub_key, c); BIO_puts(out, "key3 ="); for (i = 0; i < cout; i++) { sprintf(buf, "%02X", cbuf[i]); BIO_puts(out, buf); } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); if ((aout < 4) || (bout != aout) || (memcmp(abuf, bbuf, aout) != 0) || (cout != aout) || (memcmp(abuf, cbuf, aout) != 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error in DH routines\n"); ret = 1; } else ret = 0; if (!run_rfc5114_tests()) ret = 1; err: (void)BIO_flush(out); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); OPENSSL_free(abuf); OPENSSL_free(bbuf); OPENSSL_free(cbuf); DH_free(b); DH_free(a); DH_free(c); BN_free(bp); BN_free(bg); BN_free(cpriv_key); BN_GENCB_free(_cb); BIO_free(out); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) ret = 1; #endif EXIT(ret); } static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg) { char c = '*'; if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg), &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg)); return 1; } /* Test data from RFC 5114 */ static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_xA[] = { 0xB9, 0xA3, 0xB3, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xEF, 0xC1, 0xA2, 0x93, 0x04, 0x96, 0x50, 0x70, 0x86, 0xF8, 0x45, 0x5D, 0x48, 0x94, 0x3E }; static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_yA[] = { 0x2A, 0x85, 0x3B, 0x3D, 0x92, 0x19, 0x75, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x5B, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xD8, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x1D, 0xCC, 0x3E, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xD3, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x2B, 0x75, 0x21, 0x28, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0xBE, 0x0E, 0x76, 0xFF, 0x57, 0x27, 0xFA, 0x8A, 0xCC, 0xE2, 0x69, 0x56, 0xBA, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x26, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x28, 0xD8, 0x69, 0x3F, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x84, 0x1D, 0x84, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x00, 0x54, 0xEC, 0xE5, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0xB7, 0xA6, 0x1A, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xB3, 0xC6, 0x0D, 0x2E, 0x43, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x87, 0x27, 0xDA, 0x37, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCE, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x78, 0x75, 0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xEA, 0x8F, 0x9D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x5F, 0x75, 0xA5, 0xF3, 0xD1, 0xDF, 0x37, 0x01, 0x16, 0x5F, 0xC9, 0xE5, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x79, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x95, 0x40, 0xAE, 0x96, 0xD5, 0xD8, 0x8E, 0xD7, 0x76 }; static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_xB[] = { 0x93, 0x92, 0xC9, 0xF9, 0xEB, 0x6A, 0x7A, 0x6A, 0x90, 0x22, 0xF7, 0xD8, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x23, 0xC6, 0x83, 0x5B, 0xBD, 0xDA }; static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_yB[] = { 0x71, 0x7A, 0x6C, 0xB0, 0x53, 0x37, 0x1F, 0xF4, 0xA3, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x1E, 0x56, 0x63, 0xF8, 0x61, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0xAD, 0x34, 0xAE, 0x66, 0x57, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xF6, 0xC6, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0xDD, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x6C, 0x78, 0x33, 0xF6, 0xBC, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x09, 0x55, 0x82, 0xAD, 0x86, 0x8E, 0x44, 0x0E, 0x8D, 0x09, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0xEC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0xCF, 0xA0, 0x57, 0x77, 0x6C, 0xAA, 0xF9, 0x73, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0x9F, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0x74, 0x11, 0xF8, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x6A, 0x4E, 0xDB, 0x46, 0xCC, 0x2B, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x03, 0x09, 0x0E, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x26, 0x31, 0x1E, 0x53, 0xFD, 0x2C, 0x14, 0xB5, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x9A, 0x3D, 0xA1, 0xBE, 0x41, 0xBD, 0xCE, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x6F, 0x5C, 0xE0, 0x67, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0x33, 0xFE }; static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_Z[] = { 0x5C, 0x80, 0x4F, 0x45, 0x4D, 0x30, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x85, 0x27, 0x1F, 0x93, 0x52, 0x8C, 0x91, 0xDF, 0x6B, 0x48, 0xAB, 0x5F, 0x80, 0xB3, 0xB5, 0x9C, 0xAA, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x3E, 0x39, 0xF3, 0xCB, 0x61, 0x45, 0x25, 0xD9, 0x52, 0x1D, 0x2E, 0x64, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xB8, 0x07, 0xB8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x40, 0x06, 0x2F, 0x25, 0x7D, 0x7D, 0x6F, 0xBF, 0xE8, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xF0, 0x72, 0xE9, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0xAF, 0xDA, 0x94, 0x13, 0xEA, 0xFB, 0x2E, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x99, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x0C, 0xAC, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x7E, 0x9C, 0xFB, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE2, 0xB4, 0x20, 0x83, 0x5B, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x19, 0xFB, 0x0B, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0xD0, 0x9E, 0x34, 0x55, 0x25, 0x16, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x55, 0x41, 0x6F, 0x46, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xED, 0x31, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0x6E, 0x6D }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_xA[] = { 0x22, 0xE6, 0x26, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xFF, 0xD0, 0x67, 0x08, 0xA6, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x47, 0xF3, 0x61, 0xF7, 0x6D, 0x8F, 0x4F, 0x72, 0x1A, 0x05, 0x48, 0xE4, 0x83, 0x29, 0x4B, 0x0C }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_yA[] = { 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x45, 0x1B, 0xD8, 0x86, 0xE6, 0x99, 0xE6, 0x7B, 0x49, 0x4E, 0x28, 0x8B, 0xD7, 0xF8, 0xE0, 0xD3, 0x70, 0xBA, 0xDD, 0xA7, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xD2, 0xFD, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0x61, 0x45, 0xCC, 0x9F, 0x28, 0x04, 0x19, 0x97, 0x5E, 0xB8, 0x08, 0x87, 0x7C, 0x8A, 0x4C, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x0B, 0xD4, 0x8D, 0x4A, 0x54, 0x01, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0x87, 0x76, 0xBF, 0xEE, 0xE1, 0x34, 0xC0, 0x38, 0x31, 0xAC, 0x27, 0x3C, 0xD9, 0xD6, 0x35, 0xAB, 0x0C, 0xE0, 0x06, 0xA4, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x7E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0xFB, 0x87, 0x66, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xF3, 0x80, 0x78, 0xBC, 0x8E, 0xE8, 0x58, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xE2, 0x43, 0x96, 0x8C, 0xFC, 0x4F, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x45, 0x54, 0x17, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xBF, 0x2E, 0x86, 0x1B, 0x7B, 0xB4, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x1E, 0xA3, 0x87, 0xCB, 0xAA, 0x5C, 0xA6, 0x72, 0xAF, 0xCB, 0xE8, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0xD6, 0x2D, 0x4C, 0xE1, 0x5F, 0x17, 0xDD, 0x36, 0xF9, 0x1E, 0xD1, 0xEE, 0xDD, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x4A, 0x06, 0x45, 0x5C, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xD4, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEC, 0x36, 0x0E, 0x84, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0x26, 0xE2, 0x2C, 0x43, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xBF, 0x30, 0x9D, 0x56, 0x84, 0x97, 0x68, 0xB7, 0xF5, 0x2C, 0xFD, 0xF6, 0x55, 0xFD, 0x05, 0x3A, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x06, 0x97, 0x9E, 0x7E, 0x58, 0x06, 0xB1, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0xE5, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xA5, 0xBC, 0x56, 0x8E, 0xBB, 0x52, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x61, 0xD6, 0x8D, 0x25, 0x6F, 0x8F, 0xC9, 0x7C, 0x07, 0x4A, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x82, 0x7E, 0x2E, 0xBC, 0x8C, 0x61, 0x34, 0x55, 0x31, 0x15, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x71, 0x03, 0x92, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x6D, 0x85, 0xE5, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x68, 0x17, 0x8F, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0x7C, 0x2F, 0x5C, 0x71, 0x64, 0x8D, 0x6F }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_xB[] = { 0x4F, 0xF3, 0xBC, 0x96, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0x6A, 0x6D, 0x71, 0xD3, 0xB3, 0x63, 0x80, 0x0A, 0x7C, 0xDF, 0xEF, 0x6F, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x44, 0x17, 0xEA, 0x15, 0x35, 0x3B, 0x75, 0x90 }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_yB[] = { 0x4D, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x92, 0xA9, 0x76, 0x2A, 0x13, 0xF2, 0xF8, 0x38, 0x44, 0xAD, 0x3D, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x0E, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x3D, 0xB6, 0xC2, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x39, 0x61, 0x18, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x0B, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xEC, 0x41, 0x82, 0xD7, 0x60, 0xCD, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x95, 0x99, 0x97, 0x06, 0x22, 0xA1, 0x88, 0x1B, 0xBA, 0x2D, 0xC8, 0x22, 0x93, 0x9C, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x91, 0x2C, 0x66, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x54, 0x38, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x66, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x75, 0xE2, 0x4C, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0xD0, 0xC7, 0x28, 0x72, 0x36, 0x12, 0x95, 0x25, 0xEE, 0x15, 0xB5, 0xDD, 0x79, 0x98, 0xAA, 0x04, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x6C, 0xAC, 0xD7, 0x17, 0x20, 0x83, 0xA9, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x66, 0x4E, 0xAD, 0x2C, 0x47, 0x9E, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x06, 0x54, 0xCC, 0x19, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x77, 0x03, 0xCE, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xCD, 0x61, 0x26, 0xF5, 0xD6, 0x65, 0xEC, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x72, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x92, 0x01, 0x4B, 0x03, 0x7E, 0xB6, 0x21, 0xA2, 0xAC, 0x8E, 0x36, 0x5D, 0xE0, 0x71, 0xFF, 0xC1, 0x40, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x7A, 0x12, 0x91, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0xDE, 0x89, 0x47, 0x34, 0x37, 0xAB, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x74, 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x21, 0x5D, 0xD9, 0xC1, 0x21, 0x64, 0xA7, 0xE4, 0x05, 0x31, 0x18, 0xD1, 0x99, 0xBE, 0xC8, 0xEF, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x61, 0x17, 0x0C, 0x84, 0xC8, 0x7D, 0x10, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x67, 0x4A, 0x1F, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0xBA, 0x1D, 0x44, 0xDE, 0x48, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x68, 0xDC, 0x0C, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x76, 0x35, 0xA7, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xFB, 0x1E, 0x4B, 0xB7, 0xB8, 0x56, 0xF9, 0x68, 0x27, 0x73, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x41, 0x38, 0xE9, 0x15, 0xD9, 0xC3, 0x00, 0x2E, 0xBC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x20, 0x54, 0x6A, 0x7E, 0x20, 0x02, 0x14, 0x2B, 0x6C }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_224_Z[] = { 0x34, 0xD9, 0xBD, 0xDC, 0x1B, 0x42, 0x17, 0x6C, 0x31, 0x3F, 0xEA, 0x03, 0x4C, 0x21, 0x03, 0x4D, 0x07, 0x4A, 0x63, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xB3, 0x70, 0x3F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x45, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x6B, 0xDF, 0x75, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0x0A, 0x9D, 0xA5, 0x22, 0x9D, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x32, 0x28, 0x6C, 0xBC, 0x0F, 0x91, 0xDA, 0x4C, 0x3C, 0x85, 0x2F, 0xC0, 0x99, 0xC6, 0x79, 0x53, 0x1D, 0x94, 0xC7, 0x8A, 0xB0, 0x3D, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xB0, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xCA, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x21, 0xCF, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x33, 0x99, 0x40, 0x17, 0xD0, 0x20, 0x0A, 0xE2, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x6E, 0x2F, 0xF5, 0x14, 0x57, 0x79, 0x26, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x2B, 0x0F, 0xB4, 0x74, 0xA2, 0xD5, 0x6D, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0x69, 0xA7, 0x70, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xB1, 0x6B, 0x22, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x13, 0x53, 0x1E, 0xF5, 0x23, 0xD7, 0x12, 0x12, 0x07, 0x7B, 0x5A, 0x16, 0x9B, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xAD, 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x60, 0x82, 0x84, 0xC7, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x6D, 0x5A, 0x51, 0x83, 0xB8, 0x70, 0x66, 0xDE, 0x17, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0x71, 0xC9, 0xEB, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0x89, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x45, 0xEC, 0x06, 0x15, 0x93, 0xD4, 0x42, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0x1C, 0xB9, 0x94, 0x3A, 0x1D, 0x23, 0xA5, 0xEA, 0x3B, 0xCF, 0x21, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0x69, 0xC7, 0x28, 0xBE, 0x49, 0x0B, 0x2F, 0xC8, 0x8C, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x2D, 0xB6, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xE5, 0xD0, 0x3C, 0x17, 0xC4, 0x64, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xE2, 0x03, 0xE1, 0x3F, 0x95, 0x29, 0x95, 0xFB, 0x03, 0xC6, 0x9D, 0x3C, 0xC4, 0x7F, 0xCB, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x69, 0x98, 0xFF, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x6D, 0xE7, 0x3C, 0xF9, 0xF6, 0x38, 0x69 }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_xA[] = { 0x08, 0x81, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xDB, 0x87, 0x66, 0x0C, 0x6D, 0xC1, 0x3E, 0x61, 0x49, 0x38, 0xD5, 0xB9, 0xC8, 0xB2, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x58, 0x1C, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0x1B, 0x35, 0x45, 0x43, 0x97, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0x0E }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_yA[] = { 0x2E, 0x93, 0x80, 0xC8, 0x32, 0x3A, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x45, 0xBC, 0x49, 0x41, 0xDE, 0xB0, 0xEC, 0x37, 0x42, 0xC6, 0x2F, 0xE0, 0xEC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xDB, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x59, 0xBE, 0xE0, 0x24, 0x29, 0x11, 0xBF, 0xB9, 0x67, 0x23, 0x5C, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x5A, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xBE, 0x63, 0x0B, 0x92, 0xDC, 0x4B, 0xDE, 0x28, 0x47, 0xA9, 0xC6, 0x2C, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x27, 0x45, 0x42, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0x60, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0x0F, 0xE9, 0x15, 0x9F, 0xCC, 0xE7, 0x26, 0xCE, 0x7C, 0xD8, 0x52, 0x3D, 0x74, 0x50, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x40, 0xE4, 0x91, 0x91, 0x21, 0xEB, 0x5F, 0x01, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0xB0, 0xD3, 0xD6, 0x48, 0xA9, 0x3B, 0xFB, 0x75, 0x68, 0x9E, 0x82, 0x44, 0xAC, 0x13, 0x4A, 0xF5, 0x44, 0x71, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x42, 0x26, 0x68, 0x47, 0x80, 0xDD, 0xDC, 0xB4, 0x98, 0x59, 0x41, 0x06, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0x98, 0x56, 0x48, 0x7A, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0x02, 0x2A, 0x2E, 0x5E, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x97, 0xC1, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xEA, 0x02, 0x12, 0xAF, 0x04, 0xD9, 0xB4, 0xCE, 0xBC, 0x93, 0x7C, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x3E, 0x15, 0xA8, 0xA0, 0x34, 0x2E, 0x33, 0x76, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE3, 0xB8, 0xB9, 0xB8, 0x7F, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x3A, 0x15, 0xAF, 0x12, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x06, 0xDF, 0xC3, 0x4F, 0x29, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0xA7, 0x85, 0xBF, 0x66, 0x58, 0xAF, 0xF5, 0xE4, 0xB0, 0x93, 0x00, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xAF, 0x66, 0x5B, 0x3C, 0x2E, 0x11, 0x3A, 0x3A, 0x4E, 0x90, 0x52, 0x69, 0x34, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x14, 0x26, 0x68, 0x5F, 0x4E, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x86, 0x8A, 0x81, 0x26, 0xFF, 0x3F, 0x22, 0x79, 0xB5, 0x7C, 0xA6, 0x7E, 0x29 }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_xB[] = { 0x7D, 0x62, 0xA7, 0xE3, 0xEF, 0x36, 0xDE, 0x61, 0x7B, 0x13, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xB8, 0x2C, 0x78, 0x0D, 0x83, 0xA2, 0x3B, 0xD4, 0xEE, 0x67, 0x05, 0x64, 0x51, 0x21, 0xF3, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x46, 0xA5, 0x3D }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_yB[] = { 0x57, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x2B, 0x1B, 0x81, 0x74, 0x48, 0xBD, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x6C, 0x36, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x28, 0x9D, 0x39, 0x03, 0xA3, 0x0B, 0x98, 0x32, 0xC5, 0x74, 0x1F, 0xA2, 0x50, 0x36, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xC7, 0xF7, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0xBC, 0x1F, 0x13, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x8E, 0x03, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xFF, 0x8F, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x78, 0x44, 0x24, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE4, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0x6F, 0xD2, 0xFA, 0xB6, 0x41, 0x05, 0xCA, 0x30, 0xA6, 0x74, 0xE0, 0x7F, 0x78, 0x09, 0x85, 0x20, 0x88, 0x63, 0x2F, 0xC0, 0x49, 0x23, 0x37, 0x91, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0xDD, 0x08, 0x3A, 0x97, 0x8B, 0x88, 0x3E, 0xE6, 0x18, 0xBC, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x41, 0x5F, 0x2D, 0x95, 0xE6, 0x83, 0xCF, 0x14, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x5F, 0xBE, 0x10, 0xD3, 0xCE, 0x41, 0xC6, 0xC1, 0x20, 0xC7, 0x8A, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x08, 0xC6, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x0B, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x07, 0xBE, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0x29, 0x70, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x04, 0x39, 0x63, 0xE6, 0x6D, 0xDD, 0x32, 0x0D, 0x59, 0x9A, 0xD9, 0x93, 0x6C, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0x7C, 0x08, 0xB1, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5E, 0x98, 0x5C, 0xEB, 0xE1, 0x86, 0xF3, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x67, 0x7E, 0x80, 0x60, 0x73, 0x31, 0xEE, 0x17, 0xAF, 0x33, 0x80, 0xA7, 0x25, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x23, 0x17, 0xD7, 0xDD, 0x43, 0xF5, 0x9D, 0x7A, 0xF9, 0x56, 0x8A, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0x84, 0xD3, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x22, 0x44, 0xED, 0x12, 0x09, 0x88, 0x21, 0x93, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x29, 0x24, 0xC7, 0xCA, 0x90, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x97, 0x82, 0x3D, 0x7D, 0xEB, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0x8E, 0x4A, 0x45, 0xD4, 0x9F, 0x7F, 0x53, 0x75, 0x7E, 0x19, 0x13 }; static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_Z[] = { 0x86, 0xC7, 0x0B, 0xF8, 0xD0, 0xBB, 0x81, 0xBB, 0x01, 0x07, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x21, 0x9C, 0xB7, 0xD2, 0x72, 0x03, 0xDB, 0x2A, 0x19, 0xC8, 0x77, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0xF1, 0x9F, 0xD7, 0xD7, 0x7E, 0xF2, 0x25, 0x46, 0xA6, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xD5, 0x2D, 0xC8, 0x45, 0x53, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xC6, 0x03, 0x30, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xEA, 0x7C, 0x06, 0x72, 0xCA, 0xC1, 0x51, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x35, 0xC0, 0x47, 0xB9, 0xA5, 0x51, 0xB8, 0x8F, 0x39, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x14, 0xA0, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0x47, 0x74, 0xD4, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0xED, 0x5B, 0xC2, 0xF1, 0x1E, 0x52, 0xC8, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x95, 0x09, 0x85, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0xEC, 0xD8, 0xA8, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0xEF, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x8A, 0xC5, 0x85, 0x30, 0x97, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x83, 0x7F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0xF7, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBE, 0x01, 0xAF, 0x80, 0xA7, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0xEA, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xC0, 0x2D, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x87, 0x39, 0x93, 0x85, 0x87, 0x5D, 0x7E, 0x86, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x89, 0x38, 0xAC, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x09, 0x8E, 0x05, 0xBE, 0x4D, 0xCF, 0xB2, 0x40, 0x52, 0xB8, 0x3A, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x14, 0x78, 0x3F, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xDE, 0x7F, 0x53, 0xFA, 0xE9, 0x20, 0x84, 0x22, 0x40, 0x90, 0xE0, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x4D, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0xFD, 0x4B, 0x57, 0xD2, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x72, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xAA, 0x19, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x01, 0xF6, 0xF1, 0x7B, 0x4A, 0xA1, 0x0F, 0x42, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA7, 0x60, 0x80, 0xB4, 0xB9, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0xCE, 0xFE, 0xA1, 0x15, 0xB2, 0xCE, 0xB8, 0x78, 0x9B, 0xB8, 0xA3, 0xB0, 0xEA, 0x87, 0xFE, 0xBE, 0x63, 0xB6, 0xC8, 0xF8, 0x46, 0xEC, 0x6D, 0xB0, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x5D, 0x7C }; static const unsigned char dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y[] = { 0x45, 0x32, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x07, 0xE5, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xD6, 0x02, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x32, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x41, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xAD, 0xC6, 0x26, 0x85, 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x8C, 0x12, 0x4C, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x20, 0xC4, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xA4, 0x25, 0xB7, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xCC, 0x67, 0xBA, 0xEA, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0x24, 0x72, 0x60, 0xDA, 0x88, 0x18, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x35, 0x8B, 0x83, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0xFA, 0x48, 0x73, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x87, 0xFF, 0x6B, 0x66, 0x1F, 0xA8, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x01, 0xE5, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x52, 0xD0, 0xE9, 0xD8, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA5, 0x25, 0x95, 0x74, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x4E, 0xA7, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xE2, 0xD2, 0x9D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x70, 0x34, 0x44, 0x32, 0xC7, 0xB2, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xFE, 0x17, 0x2B, 0xD6, 0x1F, 0x8B, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x9A, 0x33, 0x66, 0x62, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x18, 0x3E, 0xA2, 0x5F, 0x00, 0x07, 0xD8, 0x9B, 0x22, 0xE4, 0xEC, 0x84, 0xD5, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x31, 0x23, 0xD8, 0x44, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x44, 0xCC, 0xC6, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xBE, 0x50, 0x9D, 0x4A, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x72, 0x4D, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xED, 0x33, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0x7F, 0x16, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xEB, 0xD2, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x01, 0x73, 0x84, 0x62, 0xB9, 0x29, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x32, 0x9E, 0x7A, 0x6A, 0xCF, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x62, 0x77, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x62, 0x72, 0x5A, 0x69, 0xA6, 0x5B, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x95, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0xC2, 0xDF, 0x72, 0x6D, 0xB1, 0x1E, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x93, 0x74, 0x89, 0x59 }; typedef struct { DH *(*get_param) (void); const unsigned char *xA; size_t xA_len; const unsigned char *yA; size_t yA_len; const unsigned char *xB; size_t xB_len; const unsigned char *yB; size_t yB_len; const unsigned char *Z; size_t Z_len; } rfc5114_td; # define make_rfc5114_td(pre) { \ DH_get_##pre, \ dhtest_##pre##_xA, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_xA), \ dhtest_##pre##_yA, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_yA), \ dhtest_##pre##_xB, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_xB), \ dhtest_##pre##_yB, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_yB), \ dhtest_##pre##_Z, sizeof(dhtest_##pre##_Z) \ } static const rfc5114_td rfctd[] = { make_rfc5114_td(1024_160), make_rfc5114_td(2048_224), make_rfc5114_td(2048_256) }; static int run_rfc5114_tests(void) { int i; DH *dhA = NULL; DH *dhB = NULL; unsigned char *Z1 = NULL; unsigned char *Z2 = NULL; const rfc5114_td *td = NULL; BIGNUM *bady = NULL, *priv_key = NULL, *pub_key = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key_tmp; for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(rfctd); i++) { td = rfctd + i; /* Set up DH structures setting key components */ dhA = td->get_param(); dhB = td->get_param(); if ((dhA == NULL) || (dhB == NULL)) goto bad_err; priv_key = BN_bin2bn(td->xA, td->xA_len, NULL); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(td->yA, td->yA_len, NULL); if (priv_key == NULL || pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(dhA, pub_key, priv_key)) goto bad_err; priv_key = BN_bin2bn(td->xB, td->xB_len, NULL); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(td->yB, td->yB_len, NULL); if (priv_key == NULL || pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(dhB, pub_key, priv_key)) goto bad_err; priv_key = pub_key = NULL; if ((td->Z_len != (size_t)DH_size(dhA)) || (td->Z_len != (size_t)DH_size(dhB))) goto err; Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA)); Z2 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhB)); if ((Z1 == NULL) || (Z2 == NULL)) goto bad_err; /* * Work out shared secrets using both sides and compare with expected * values. */ DH_get0_key(dhB, &pub_key_tmp, NULL); if (DH_compute_key(Z1, pub_key_tmp, dhA) == -1) goto bad_err; DH_get0_key(dhA, &pub_key_tmp, NULL); if (DH_compute_key(Z2, pub_key_tmp, dhB) == -1) goto bad_err; if (memcmp(Z1, td->Z, td->Z_len)) goto err; if (memcmp(Z2, td->Z, td->Z_len)) goto err; printf("RFC5114 parameter test %d OK\n", i + 1); DH_free(dhA); DH_free(dhB); OPENSSL_free(Z1); OPENSSL_free(Z2); dhA = NULL; dhB = NULL; Z1 = NULL; Z2 = NULL; } /* Now i == OSSL_NELEM(rfctd) */ /* RFC5114 uses unsafe primes, so now test an invalid y value */ dhA = DH_get_2048_224(); if (dhA == NULL) goto bad_err; Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA)); if (Z1 == NULL) goto bad_err; bady = BN_bin2bn(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y, sizeof(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y), NULL); if (bady == NULL) goto bad_err; if (!DH_generate_key(dhA)) goto bad_err; if (DH_compute_key(Z1, bady, dhA) != -1) { /* * DH_compute_key should fail with -1. If we get here we unexpectedly * allowed an invalid y value */ goto err; } /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */ ERR_clear_error(); printf("RFC5114 parameter test %d OK\n", i + 1); BN_free(bady); DH_free(dhA); OPENSSL_free(Z1); return 1; bad_err: BN_free(bady); DH_free(dhA); DH_free(dhB); BN_free(pub_key); BN_free(priv_key); OPENSSL_free(Z1); OPENSSL_free(Z2); fprintf(stderr, "Initialisation error RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return 0; err: BN_free(bady); DH_free(dhA); DH_free(dhB); OPENSSL_free(Z1); OPENSSL_free(Z2); fprintf(stderr, "Test failed RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/sha1test.c0000644000000000000000000000532713176625662014745 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #include #include #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include #endif static char test[][80] = { { "abc" }, { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" } }; static char *ret[] = { "a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d", "84983e441c3bd26ebaae4aa1f95129e5e54670f1", }; static char *bigret = "34aa973cd4c4daa4f61eeb2bdbad27316534016f"; static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { unsigned int i; int err = 0; char **R; static unsigned char buf[1000]; char *p, *r; EVP_MD_CTX *c; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; c = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); R = ret; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(test); i++) { # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(test[i], test[i], strlen(test[i])); # endif if (!EVP_Digest(test[i], strlen(test[i]), md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { printf("EVP_Digest() error\n"); err++; goto err; } p = pt(md); if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) { printf("error calculating SHA1 on '%s'\n", test[i]); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i + 1); R++; } memset(buf, 'a', 1000); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, 1000); #endif /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) { printf("EVP_DigestInit_ex() error\n"); err++; goto err; } for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, buf, 1000)) { printf("EVP_DigestUpdate() error\n"); err++; goto err; } } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, md, NULL)) { printf("EVP_DigestFinal() error\n"); err++; goto err; } p = pt(md); r = bigret; if (strcmp(p, r) != 0) { printf("error calculating SHA1 on 'a' * 1000\n"); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, r); err++; } else printf("test 3 ok\n"); err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(c); EXIT(err); return (0); } static char *pt(unsigned char *md) { int i; static char buf[80]; for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); return (buf); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/mdc2test.c0000644000000000000000000000501713176625661014731 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) # define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No MDC2 support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include # endif static unsigned char pad1[16] = { 0x42, 0xE5, 0x0C, 0xD2, 0x24, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0x76, 0x0B, 0xDD, 0x2B, 0xD4, 0x09, 0x28, 0x1A }; static unsigned char pad2[16] = { 0x2E, 0x46, 0x79, 0xB5, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x75, 0x35, 0xD8, 0x7A, 0xFE, 0xAB, 0x33, 0xBE, 0xE2 }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int ret = 1; unsigned char md[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int i; EVP_MD_CTX *c; static char text[] = "Now is the time for all "; # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(text, text, strlen(text)); # endif c = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (c == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, EVP_mdc2(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, (unsigned char *)text, strlen(text)) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md[0]), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, pad1, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) printf("%02X", md[i]); printf(" <- generated\n"); for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) printf("%02X", pad1[i]); printf(" <- correct\n"); goto err; } else { printf("pad1 - ok\n"); } if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, EVP_mdc2(), NULL)) goto err; /* FIXME: use a ctl function? */ ((MDC2_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(c))->pad_type = 2; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, (unsigned char *)text, strlen(text)) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md[0]), NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(md, pad2, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) printf("%02X", md[i]); printf(" <- generated\n"); for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) printf("%02X", pad2[i]); printf(" <- correct\n"); } else { printf("pad2 - ok\n"); ret = 0; } err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(c); EXIT(ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/rmdtest.c0000644000000000000000000000461313176625662014670 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No ripemd support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include # endif static char test[][100] = { { "" }, { "a" }, { "abc" }, { "message digest" }, { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } }; static char *ret[] = { "9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31", "0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe", "8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc", "5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36", "f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc", "12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b", "b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189", "9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb", }; static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { unsigned int i; int err = 0; char **R; char *p; unsigned char md[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH]; R = ret; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(test); i++) { # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(test[i], test[i], strlen(test[i])); # endif if (!EVP_Digest(test[i], strlen(test[i]), md, NULL, EVP_ripemd160(), NULL)) { printf("EVP Digest error.\n"); EXIT(1); } p = pt(md); if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) { printf("error calculating RIPEMD160 on '%s'\n", test[i]); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i + 1); R++; } EXIT(err); } static char *pt(unsigned char *md) { int i; static char buf[80]; for (i = 0; i < RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); return (buf); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl_test_ctx.c0000644000000000000000000005010613176625662015722 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include "ssl_test_ctx.h" #include "testutil.h" static const int default_app_data_size = 256; /* Default set to be as small as possible to exercise fragmentation. */ static const int default_max_fragment_size = 512; static int parse_boolean(const char *value, int *result) { if (strcasecmp(value, "Yes") == 0) { *result = 1; return 1; } else if (strcasecmp(value, "No") == 0) { *result = 0; return 1; } return 0; } #define IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(struct_type, name, field) \ static int parse_##name##_##field(struct_type *ctx, const char *value) \ { \ return parse_boolean(value, &ctx->field); \ } #define IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(struct_type, name, field) \ static int parse_##name##_##field(struct_type *ctx, const char *value) \ { \ OPENSSL_free(ctx->field); \ ctx->field = OPENSSL_strdup(value); \ TEST_check(ctx->field != NULL); \ return 1; \ } #define IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_INT_OPTION(struct_type, name, field) \ static int parse_##name##_##field(struct_type *ctx, const char *value) \ { \ ctx->field = atoi(value); \ return 1; \ } /* True enums and other test configuration values that map to an int. */ typedef struct { const char *name; int value; } test_enum; __owur static int parse_enum(const test_enum *enums, size_t num_enums, int *value, const char *name) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < num_enums; i++) { if (strcmp(enums[i].name, name) == 0) { *value = enums[i].value; return 1; } } return 0; } static const char *enum_name(const test_enum *enums, size_t num_enums, int value) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < num_enums; i++) { if (enums[i].value == value) { return enums[i].name; } } return "InvalidValue"; } /* ExpectedResult */ static const test_enum ssl_test_results[] = { {"Success", SSL_TEST_SUCCESS}, {"ServerFail", SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL}, {"ClientFail", SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL}, {"InternalError", SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR}, }; __owur static int parse_expected_result(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_test_results, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_results), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } test_ctx->expected_result = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_test_result_name(ssl_test_result_t result) { return enum_name(ssl_test_results, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_results), result); } /* ExpectedClientAlert / ExpectedServerAlert */ static const test_enum ssl_alerts[] = { {"UnknownCA", SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {"HandshakeFailure", SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, {"UnrecognizedName", SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME}, {"BadCertificate", SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {"NoApplicationProtocol", SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL}, }; __owur static int parse_alert(int *alert, const char *value) { return parse_enum(ssl_alerts, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_alerts), alert, value); } __owur static int parse_client_alert(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { return parse_alert(&test_ctx->expected_client_alert, value); } __owur static int parse_server_alert(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { return parse_alert(&test_ctx->expected_server_alert, value); } const char *ssl_alert_name(int alert) { return enum_name(ssl_alerts, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_alerts), alert); } /* ExpectedProtocol */ static const test_enum ssl_protocols[] = { {"TLSv1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION}, {"TLSv1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION}, {"TLSv1", TLS1_VERSION}, {"SSLv3", SSL3_VERSION}, {"DTLSv1", DTLS1_VERSION}, {"DTLSv1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION}, }; __owur static int parse_protocol(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { return parse_enum(ssl_protocols, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_protocols), &test_ctx->expected_protocol, value); } const char *ssl_protocol_name(int protocol) { return enum_name(ssl_protocols, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_protocols), protocol); } /* VerifyCallback */ static const test_enum ssl_verify_callbacks[] = { {"None", SSL_TEST_VERIFY_NONE}, {"AcceptAll", SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL}, {"RejectAll", SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL}, }; __owur static int parse_client_verify_callback(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client_conf, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_verify_callbacks, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_verify_callbacks), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } client_conf->verify_callback = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_verify_callback_name(ssl_verify_callback_t callback) { return enum_name(ssl_verify_callbacks, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_verify_callbacks), callback); } /* ServerName */ static const test_enum ssl_servername[] = { {"None", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE}, {"server1", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1}, {"server2", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2}, {"invalid", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_INVALID}, }; __owur static int parse_servername(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client_conf, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_servername, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } client_conf->servername = ret_value; return 1; } __owur static int parse_expected_servername(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_servername, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } test_ctx->expected_servername = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_servername_name(ssl_servername_t server) { return enum_name(ssl_servername, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername), server); } /* ServerNameCallback */ static const test_enum ssl_servername_callbacks[] = { {"None", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE}, {"IgnoreMismatch", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH}, {"RejectMismatch", SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH}, }; __owur static int parse_servername_callback(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server_conf, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_servername_callbacks, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername_callbacks), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } server_conf->servername_callback = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_servername_callback_name(ssl_servername_callback_t callback) { return enum_name(ssl_servername_callbacks, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_servername_callbacks), callback); } /* SessionTicketExpected */ static const test_enum ssl_session_ticket[] = { {"Ignore", SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_IGNORE}, {"Yes", SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES}, {"No", SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO}, }; __owur static int parse_session_ticket(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_session_ticket, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_session_ticket), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } test_ctx->session_ticket_expected = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_session_ticket_name(ssl_session_ticket_t server) { return enum_name(ssl_session_ticket, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_session_ticket), server); } /* Method */ static const test_enum ssl_test_methods[] = { {"TLS", SSL_TEST_METHOD_TLS}, {"DTLS", SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS}, }; __owur static int parse_test_method(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_test_methods, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_methods), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } test_ctx->method = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_test_method_name(ssl_test_method_t method) { return enum_name(ssl_test_methods, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_methods), method); } /* NPN and ALPN options */ IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, npn_protocols) IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF, server, npn_protocols) IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, expected_npn_protocol) IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, alpn_protocols) IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF, server, alpn_protocols) IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, expected_alpn_protocol) /* Handshake mode */ static const test_enum ssl_handshake_modes[] = { {"Simple", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE}, {"Resume", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME}, {"RenegotiateServer", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_SERVER}, {"RenegotiateClient", SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RENEG_CLIENT}, }; __owur static int parse_handshake_mode(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_handshake_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_handshake_modes), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } test_ctx->handshake_mode = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_handshake_mode_name(ssl_handshake_mode_t mode) { return enum_name(ssl_handshake_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_handshake_modes), mode); } /* Renegotiation Ciphersuites */ IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, reneg_ciphers) /* CT Validation */ static const test_enum ssl_ct_validation_modes[] = { {"None", SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE}, {"Permissive", SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE}, {"Strict", SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT}, }; __owur static int parse_ct_validation(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client_conf, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_ct_validation_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_ct_validation_modes), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } client_conf->ct_validation = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_ct_validation_name(ssl_ct_validation_t mode) { return enum_name(ssl_ct_validation_modes, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_ct_validation_modes), mode); } IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, resumption_expected) IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF, server, broken_session_ticket) /* CertStatus */ static const test_enum ssl_certstatus[] = { {"None", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE}, {"GoodResponse", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE}, {"BadResponse", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE} }; __owur static int parse_certstatus(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server_conf, const char *value) { int ret_value; if (!parse_enum(ssl_certstatus, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_certstatus), &ret_value, value)) { return 0; } server_conf->cert_status = ret_value; return 1; } const char *ssl_certstatus_name(ssl_cert_status_t cert_status) { return enum_name(ssl_certstatus, OSSL_NELEM(ssl_certstatus), cert_status); } /* ApplicationData */ IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_INT_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, app_data_size) /* MaxFragmentSize */ IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_INT_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, max_fragment_size) /* ExpectedTmpKeyType */ __owur static int parse_expected_tmp_key_type(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value) { int nid; if (value == NULL) return 0; nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_ln2nid(value); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (nid == NID_undef) nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value); #endif if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type = nid; return 1; } /* Known test options and their corresponding parse methods. */ /* Top-level options. */ typedef struct { const char *name; int (*parse)(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const char *value); } ssl_test_ctx_option; static const ssl_test_ctx_option ssl_test_ctx_options[] = { { "ExpectedResult", &parse_expected_result }, { "ExpectedClientAlert", &parse_client_alert }, { "ExpectedServerAlert", &parse_server_alert }, { "ExpectedProtocol", &parse_protocol }, { "ExpectedServerName", &parse_expected_servername }, { "SessionTicketExpected", &parse_session_ticket }, { "Method", &parse_test_method }, { "ExpectedNPNProtocol", &parse_test_expected_npn_protocol }, { "ExpectedALPNProtocol", &parse_test_expected_alpn_protocol }, { "HandshakeMode", &parse_handshake_mode }, { "ResumptionExpected", &parse_test_resumption_expected }, { "ApplicationData", &parse_test_app_data_size }, { "MaxFragmentSize", &parse_test_max_fragment_size }, { "ExpectedTmpKeyType", &parse_expected_tmp_key_type }, }; /* Nested client options. */ typedef struct { const char *name; int (*parse)(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *conf, const char *value); } ssl_test_client_option; static const ssl_test_client_option ssl_test_client_options[] = { { "VerifyCallback", &parse_client_verify_callback }, { "ServerName", &parse_servername }, { "NPNProtocols", &parse_client_npn_protocols }, { "ALPNProtocols", &parse_client_alpn_protocols }, { "CTValidation", &parse_ct_validation }, { "RenegotiateCiphers", &parse_client_reneg_ciphers}, }; /* Nested server options. */ typedef struct { const char *name; int (*parse)(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *conf, const char *value); } ssl_test_server_option; static const ssl_test_server_option ssl_test_server_options[] = { { "ServerNameCallback", &parse_servername_callback }, { "NPNProtocols", &parse_server_npn_protocols }, { "ALPNProtocols", &parse_server_alpn_protocols }, { "BrokenSessionTicket", &parse_server_broken_session_ticket }, { "CertStatus", &parse_certstatus }, }; /* * Since these methods are used to create tests, we use TEST_check liberally * for malloc failures and other internal errors. */ SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_new() { SSL_TEST_CTX *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); TEST_check(ret != NULL); ret->app_data_size = default_app_data_size; ret->max_fragment_size = default_max_fragment_size; return ret; } static void ssl_test_extra_conf_free_data(SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *conf) { OPENSSL_free(conf->client.npn_protocols); OPENSSL_free(conf->server.npn_protocols); OPENSSL_free(conf->server2.npn_protocols); OPENSSL_free(conf->client.alpn_protocols); OPENSSL_free(conf->server.alpn_protocols); OPENSSL_free(conf->server2.alpn_protocols); OPENSSL_free(conf->client.reneg_ciphers); } static void ssl_test_ctx_free_extra_data(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx) { ssl_test_extra_conf_free_data(&ctx->extra); ssl_test_extra_conf_free_data(&ctx->resume_extra); } void SSL_TEST_CTX_free(SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx) { ssl_test_ctx_free_extra_data(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx->expected_npn_protocol); OPENSSL_free(ctx->expected_alpn_protocol); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } static int parse_client_options(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF *client, const CONF *conf, const char *client_section) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk_conf; int i; size_t j; sk_conf = NCONF_get_section(conf, client_section); TEST_check(sk_conf != NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk_conf); i++) { int found = 0; const CONF_VALUE *option = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk_conf, i); for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_client_options); j++) { if (strcmp(option->name, ssl_test_client_options[j].name) == 0) { if (!ssl_test_client_options[j].parse(client, option->value)) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad value %s for option %s\n", option->value, option->name); return 0; } found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown test option: %s\n", option->name); return 0; } } return 1; } static int parse_server_options(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server, const CONF *conf, const char *server_section) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk_conf; int i; size_t j; sk_conf = NCONF_get_section(conf, server_section); TEST_check(sk_conf != NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk_conf); i++) { int found = 0; const CONF_VALUE *option = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk_conf, i); for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_server_options); j++) { if (strcmp(option->name, ssl_test_server_options[j].name) == 0) { if (!ssl_test_server_options[j].parse(server, option->value)) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad value %s for option %s\n", option->value, option->name); return 0; } found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown test option: %s\n", option->name); return 0; } } return 1; } SSL_TEST_CTX *SSL_TEST_CTX_create(const CONF *conf, const char *test_section) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk_conf; SSL_TEST_CTX *ctx; int i; size_t j; sk_conf = NCONF_get_section(conf, test_section); TEST_check(sk_conf != NULL); ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_new(); TEST_check(ctx != NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk_conf); i++) { int found = 0; const CONF_VALUE *option = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk_conf, i); /* Subsections */ if (strcmp(option->name, "client") == 0) { if (!parse_client_options(&ctx->extra.client, conf, option->value)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(option->name, "server") == 0) { if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->extra.server, conf, option->value)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(option->name, "server2") == 0) { if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->extra.server2, conf, option->value)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(option->name, "resume-client") == 0) { if (!parse_client_options(&ctx->resume_extra.client, conf, option->value)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(option->name, "resume-server") == 0) { if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->resume_extra.server, conf, option->value)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(option->name, "resume-server2") == 0) { if (!parse_server_options(&ctx->resume_extra.server2, conf, option->value)) goto err; } else { for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_test_ctx_options); j++) { if (strcmp(option->name, ssl_test_ctx_options[j].name) == 0) { if (!ssl_test_ctx_options[j].parse(ctx, option->value)) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad value %s for option %s\n", option->value, option->name); goto err; } found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown test option: %s\n", option->name); goto err; } } } goto done; err: SSL_TEST_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; done: return ctx; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/handshake_helper.h0000644000000000000000000000427013176625661016476 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H #define HEADER_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H #include "ssl_test_ctx.h" typedef struct handshake_result { ssl_test_result_t result; /* These alerts are in the 2-byte format returned by the info_callback. */ /* (Latest) alert sent by the client; 0 if no alert. */ int client_alert_sent; /* Number of fatal or close_notify alerts sent. */ int client_num_fatal_alerts_sent; /* (Latest) alert received by the server; 0 if no alert. */ int client_alert_received; /* (Latest) alert sent by the server; 0 if no alert. */ int server_alert_sent; /* Number of fatal or close_notify alerts sent. */ int server_num_fatal_alerts_sent; /* (Latest) alert received by the client; 0 if no alert. */ int server_alert_received; /* Negotiated protocol. On success, these should always match. */ int server_protocol; int client_protocol; /* Server connection */ ssl_servername_t servername; /* Session ticket status */ ssl_session_ticket_t session_ticket; /* Was this called on the second context? */ int session_ticket_do_not_call; char *client_npn_negotiated; char *server_npn_negotiated; char *client_alpn_negotiated; char *server_alpn_negotiated; /* Was the handshake resumed? */ int client_resumed; int server_resumed; /* Temporary key type */ int tmp_key_type; } HANDSHAKE_RESULT; HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new(void); void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result); /* Do a handshake and report some information about the result. */ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx, const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx); #endif /* HEADER_HANDSHAKE_HELPER_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/test/shibboleth.pfx0000644000000000000000000000472713176625662015712 0ustar rootroot0‚ Ó0‚  *†H†÷  ‚ €‚ |0‚ x0‚ *†H†÷  ‚ù‚õ0‚ñ0‚í *†H†÷   ‚þ0‚ú0 *†H†÷  0î«OþÒœ®µÐ‚Øeïæ`f;ʲ÷¸ÂS6þ%w,u¨vV؈z©˜øÛõ2{ýÁí3Q9x§{PÌ#Ö^zÒ͈€çh´²φ0^¸"*‘$‹ûl‚˜ ú©#ˆ «éwPž—…§Þب8OôFAé{¡°;]yù)^–`qâ“­) %k3º{ïÚš~²"M­¦É ©F?âÄH“YÄmNØX©”·ê½âr‹b›t£Ï4ISŸ½Ñ*§’ˆ#·ƒ­$¿§êƒz†cônÀ ¾y=Õÿ?”RŒ‹Ûl5OÊH[ Zc'P’¨zÛh©"Ò•ƒOTÍ0–{p›RaŒ›‰l7:ŽìYV –Üc /:\u€jì…Žc+õ£l)hqJH(l”^Š¶=êˆN{è‘yno‹^„xLÛB$ãjJkyhy¨Âüß—„úŒ¬[“šõvÙÄŸã ïJ8†¦¾Ÿ®¾ûŠpßMl¦Ó£|íßmë*NÀvûâÞNqf†Çq³ 'Óõ~Z‚Ò¥sÂœtóír‡²ÕÛÖCJÍUd¦Emtƒ³|AÚ.¬Œ¶¥ÛY퓸ÌÂpVˆ¹Û„€gúñ+ƒ}\÷p[™,ïå]ÅgjC‰À­Çó }ärr7Ζò³6'ƒ²-Wn9α•T¨aD6àÓköëŠ$q$ÉdòçkÏÈ‚ï4{SÄ⪉ä)e7@’Uj³à,F R_4z¢üwQßàÀh¶/0U0²c“¿§~pv/AéjxS?@ÄóÈ þi03^%ó£r2~§%º—Š6‰R½r’*È*÷þ©íàBˆcƒ‚¥n§†¹kÅìâ‘ù¹îJMãœcHÝ¿.jö­ßžÖ+†Ç d{Þ韋ÆvöÓ5½#ýŒoŠ°(áŸþÇÎ#G°Fò_ÿ–›œØ?ïÆr“Ŧ”Õ3FpÍîÞøg6”ÈU”ÉYJco7’~jØsÂнÙ¶ä¢mÖú¿¦Ý<;¨i~µœ©³µAÚ/šùAœÁ•Êpô¶u€óJ¿82åObWºqùL)¥"·¬ÏO¢ª„i„H~e)§o³ËÝO§8Ó³ß-ÇñȳŒ}=ÖšäÚ„IÄè@*ù.1Ã:"É n·?©{Q†ìdÔ 2±‡ºîÒ´°º†öÝ÷aÜÉhVóûÈÛóÌmŽxFû«ë žÃþanÕ—ŸÐ1}JZËr"r“Ÿåé¨Ub0ƒ†áí± ‹¿"üÆÝZÓYAÅâ›)y;Ä8»ínÄt¹§[¢RrÐV–OÚëvç”Ý"!‚ð±¢ÕzTkÇùi×)c~yë¬^(îê xigÁžÞnvû“_ÐdsÏ4Ù>ƒ à¾ôÞËß÷aaG-Ž ’b®›~¹XÙ¤s—태ê„F¬`~Bá¨Ê)L3¼Æ—™¿/>ÀxMÐô´ç¢Í%ã(#@?ä2[Ýít‹[q”Î<±¶A¸z,kçið‚îƥƩ(Ji7ά\G$#ݧ×MþO[ Z;ˆ€ÂHêtGmjñqt\¥Ú‚ÒËzLðಉm˜ BsFû V" Œ0>z!×Ðî¿óŠõÜÌB’3MQÒ¡e„äiÐ1Û0 *†H†÷  10W *†H†÷  1JH3f71af65-1687-444a-9f46-c8be194c3e8e0k +‚71^\Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.00‚h *†H†÷  ‚Y‚U0‚Q0‚M *†H†÷   ‚%0‚! *†H†÷   ‚‚ 0‚ 0‚ñ 6íö‡:¡§G5ónŒˆ0  *†H†÷ 010U anonymous0  160719220001Z21160625220001Z010U anonymous0‚"0  *†H†÷ ‚0‚ ‚¼¶°BL×\#¹ÎS”üèæÂÎõ'j¹H I×\L<Þm ôÁÌ€ýtÖÀÂô;ë+IƾnÅÉçRå^6Ÿ* !.åQGʉþ ¡-?zþˆâ9kS%!{O²Ž¾ì¦§3.Št?TO,…tTe6àñºã÷;Ï|¦wø^€—”s Ž_ܳÝItßÙ9Ir) ²=#Ô_•rð]YxŸyäméŸUd¸¤*¾×‹öiSï?y­V`çQ’ô´àzñã}ð=ÍI,:g“‹“:Žp\5åö&cKvwâ–&fš¹µ¯øڞ̾û£U0S0U%0  +‚7 0/U(0& $ +‚7  anonymous@windows-x0 U00  *†H†÷ ‚¸~â©?0º3ÀV÷ô‚ØÇáÓ¡Pltá‹bzzÔJÙ:Ò²)ÑaúæV¦îoɆ"×?µ]Kòa'.»ï)À>5â òÀδͼk;àpè´?zèx²ËD+¢ÊE*ed@æõÀØ(ŠI´µd7ºá““ؑΑû÷¢Ç~AŸ%F½È5œæ_ÿ½aÏr˜—ÿ=ü59®’=^Ø߸õš ŒáýVDq6·z‘È¡E®.Љ—iq,yÎû,£}C(*Ï›êêdøý5”ˆ`ýì0bxi¿Ÿfuæ”Í7hqð÷MÊÆι ()‰*µ‚kl\Îãû? ൵„ʘ10 *†H†÷  10;00+¥`ýöQÑ2¹®ªôÝÓçnˆ§”îl]¤KL+è¬" #include #include #include #include int main() { BIO *b; static const unsigned char key[16] = { 0 }; static unsigned char inp[1024] = { 0 }; unsigned char out[1024], ref[1024]; int i, lref, len; /* Fill buffer with non-zero data so that over steps can be detected */ if (RAND_bytes(inp, sizeof(inp)) <= 0) return -1; /* * Exercise CBC cipher */ /* reference output for single-chunk operation */ b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher()); if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), key, NULL, 0)) return -1; BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp))); lref = BIO_read(b, ref, sizeof(ref)); BIO_free_all(b); /* perform split operations and compare to reference */ for (i = 1; i < lref; i++) { b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher()); if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), key, NULL, 0)) return -1; BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp))); memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); out[i] = ~ref[i]; len = BIO_read(b, out, i); /* check for overstep */ if (out[i] != (unsigned char)~ref[i]) { fprintf(stderr, "CBC output overstep@%d\n", i); return 1; } len += BIO_read(b, out + len, sizeof(out) - len); BIO_free_all(b); if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) { fprintf(stderr, "CBC output mismatch@%d\n", i); return 2; } } /* perform small-chunk operations and compare to reference */ for (i = 1; i < lref / 2; i++) { int delta; b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher()); if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), key, NULL, 0)) return -1; BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp))); memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); for (len = 0; (delta = BIO_read(b, out + len, i)); ) { len += delta; } BIO_free_all(b); if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) { fprintf(stderr, "CBC output mismatch@%d\n", i); return 3; } } /* * Exercise CTR cipher */ /* reference output for single-chunk operation */ b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher()); if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), key, NULL, 0)) return -1; BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp))); lref = BIO_read(b, ref, sizeof(ref)); BIO_free_all(b); /* perform split operations and compare to reference */ for (i = 1; i < lref; i++) { b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher()); if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), key, NULL, 0)) return -1; BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp))); memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); out[i] = ~ref[i]; len = BIO_read(b, out, i); /* check for overstep */ if (out[i] != (unsigned char)~ref[i]) { fprintf(stderr, "CTR output overstep@%d\n", i); return 4; } len += BIO_read(b, out + len, sizeof(out) - len); BIO_free_all(b); if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) { fprintf(stderr, "CTR output mismatch@%d\n", i); return 5; } } /* perform small-chunk operations and compare to reference */ for (i = 1; i < lref / 2; i++) { int delta; b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher()); if (!BIO_set_cipher(b, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), key, NULL, 0)) return -1; BIO_push(b, BIO_new_mem_buf(inp, sizeof(inp))); memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); for (len = 0; (delta = BIO_read(b, out + len, i)); ) { len += delta; } BIO_free_all(b); if (len != lref || memcmp(out, ref, len)) { fprintf(stderr, "CTR output mismatch@%d\n", i); return 6; } } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/x509aux.c0000644000000000000000000001377513176625662014442 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" static const char *progname; static void test_usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s certfile\n", progname); } static void print_errors(void) { unsigned long err; char buffer[1024]; const char *file; const char *data; int line; int flags; while ((err = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) { ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d:%s\n", buffer, file, line, data); else fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d\n", buffer, file, line); } } static int test_certs(BIO *fp) { int count; char *name = 0; char *header = 0; unsigned char *data = 0; long len; typedef X509 *(*d2i_X509_t)(X509 **, const unsigned char **, long); typedef int (*i2d_X509_t)(X509 *, unsigned char **); int err = 0; for (count = 0; !err && PEM_read_bio(fp, &name, &header, &data, &len); ++count) { int trusted = strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0; d2i_X509_t d2i = trusted ? d2i_X509_AUX : d2i_X509; i2d_X509_t i2d = trusted ? i2d_X509_AUX : i2d_X509; X509 *cert = NULL; const unsigned char *p = data; unsigned char *buf = NULL; unsigned char *bufp; long enclen; if (!trusted && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) != 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "unexpected PEM object: %s\n", name); err = 1; goto next; } cert = d2i(NULL, &p, len); if (cert == NULL || (p - data) != len) { fprintf(stderr, "error parsing input %s\n", name); err = 1; goto next; } /* Test traditional 2-pass encoding into caller allocated buffer */ enclen = i2d(cert, NULL); if (len != enclen) { fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s != input length %ld\n", enclen, name, len); err = 1; goto next; } if ((buf = bufp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { perror("malloc"); err = 1; goto next; } enclen = i2d(cert, &bufp); if (len != enclen) { fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s != input length %ld\n", enclen, name, len); err = 1; goto next; } enclen = (long) (bufp - buf); if (enclen != len) { fprintf(stderr, "unexpected buffer position after encoding %s\n", name); err = 1; goto next; } if (memcmp(buf, data, len) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "encoded content of %s does not match input\n", name); err = 1; goto next; } OPENSSL_free(buf); buf = NULL; /* Test 1-pass encoding into library allocated buffer */ enclen = i2d(cert, &buf); if (len != enclen) { fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s != input length %ld\n", enclen, name, len); err = 1; goto next; } if (memcmp(buf, data, len) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "encoded content of %s does not match input\n", name); err = 1; goto next; } if (trusted) { /* Encode just the cert and compare with initial encoding */ OPENSSL_free(buf); buf = NULL; /* Test 1-pass encoding into library allocated buffer */ enclen = i2d(cert, &buf); if (enclen > len) { fprintf(stderr, "encoded length %ld of %s > input length %ld\n", enclen, name, len); err = 1; goto next; } if (memcmp(buf, data, enclen) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "encoded cert content does not match input\n"); err = 1; goto next; } } /* * If any of these were null, PEM_read() would have failed. */ next: X509_free(cert); OPENSSL_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(header); OPENSSL_free(data); } if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) { /* Reached end of PEM file */ if (count > 0) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } } /* Some other PEM read error */ print_errors(); return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BIO *bio_err; const char *p; int ret = 1; progname = argv[0]; if (argc < 2) { test_usage(); EXIT(ret); } bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { BIO *f = BIO_new_file(*argv, "r"); int ok; if (f == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error opening cert file: '%s': %s\n", progname, *argv, strerror(errno)); EXIT(ret); } ret = !(ok = test_certs(f)); BIO_free(f); if (!ok) { printf("%s ERROR\n", *argv); ret = 1; break; } printf("%s OK\n", *argv); argc--; argv++; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0) ret = 1; #endif BIO_free(bio_err); EXIT(ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/enginetest.c0000644000000000000000000002720213176625661015351 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No ENGINE support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include # include # include # include # include static void display_engine_list(void) { ENGINE *h; int loop; h = ENGINE_get_first(); loop = 0; printf("listing available engine types\n"); while (h) { printf("engine %i, id = \"%s\", name = \"%s\"\n", loop++, ENGINE_get_id(h), ENGINE_get_name(h)); h = ENGINE_get_next(h); } printf("end of list\n"); /* * ENGINE_get_first() increases the struct_ref counter, so we must call * ENGINE_free() to decrease it again */ ENGINE_free(h); } /* Test EVP_PKEY method */ static EVP_PKEY_METHOD *test_rsa = NULL; static int called_encrypt = 0; /* Test function to check operation has been redirected */ static int test_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { called_encrypt = 1; return 1; } static int test_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **pnids, int nid) { static const int rnid = EVP_PKEY_RSA; if (pmeth == NULL) { *pnids = &rnid; return 1; } if (nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { *pmeth = test_rsa; return 1; } *pmeth = NULL; return 0; } /* Return a test EVP_PKEY value */ static EVP_PKEY *get_test_pkey(void) { static unsigned char n[] = "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F" "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5" "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93" "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1" "\xF5"; static unsigned char e[] = "\x11"; RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (rsa == NULL || pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pk, rsa)) { RSA_free(rsa); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return NULL; } if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, BN_bin2bn(n, sizeof(n)-1, NULL), BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e)-1, NULL), NULL)) { EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return NULL; } return pk; } static int test_redirect(void) { const unsigned char pt[] = "Hello World\n"; unsigned char *tmp = NULL; size_t len; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int to_return = 0; printf("\nRedirection test\n"); if ((pkey = get_test_pkey()) == NULL) { printf("Get test key failed\n"); goto err; } len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { printf("Buffer alloc failed\n"); goto err; } if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL) { printf("Key context allocation failure\n"); goto err; } printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: no redirection\n"); /* Encrypt some data: should succeed but not be redirected */ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0 || called_encrypt) { printf("Test encryption failure\n"); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; /* Create a test ENGINE */ if ((e = ENGINE_new()) == NULL || !ENGINE_set_id(e, "Test redirect engine") || !ENGINE_set_name(e, "Test redirect engine")) { printf("Redirection engine setup failure\n"); goto err; } /* * Try to create a context for this engine and test key. * Try setting test key engine. Both should fail because the * engine has no public key methods. */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e) != NULL || EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(pkey, e) > 0) { printf("Unexpected redirection success\n"); goto err; } /* Setup an empty test EVP_PKEY_METHOD and set callback to return it */ if ((test_rsa = EVP_PKEY_meth_new(EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0)) == NULL) { printf("Test RSA algorithm setup failure\n"); goto err; } ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, test_pkey_meths); /* Getting a context for test ENGINE should now succeed */ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e)) == NULL) { printf("Redirected context allocation failed\n"); goto err; } /* Encrypt should fail because operation is not supported */ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) > 0) { printf("Encryption redirect unexpected success\n"); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; /* Add test encrypt operation to method */ EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt(test_rsa, 0, test_encrypt); printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: redirection via EVP_PKEY_CTX_new()\n"); if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e)) == NULL) { printf("Redirected context allocation failed\n"); goto err; } /* Encrypt some data: should succeed and be redirected */ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0 || !called_encrypt) { printf("Redirected key context encryption failed\n"); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; called_encrypt = 0; printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: check default operation not redirected\n"); /* Create context with default engine: should not be redirected */ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0 || called_encrypt) { printf("Unredirected key context encryption failed\n"); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; /* Set engine explicitly for test key */ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(pkey, e)) { printf("Key engine set failed\n"); goto err; } printf("EVP_PKEY_encrypt test: redirection via EVP_PKEY_set1_engine()\n"); /* Create context with default engine: should be redirected now */ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)) == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, tmp, &len, pt, sizeof(pt)) <= 0 || !called_encrypt) { printf("Key redirection failure\n"); goto err; } to_return = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ENGINE_free(e); OPENSSL_free(tmp); return to_return; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { ENGINE *block[512]; char buf[256]; const char *id, *name, *p; ENGINE *ptr; int loop; int to_return = 1; ENGINE *new_h1 = NULL; ENGINE *new_h2 = NULL; ENGINE *new_h3 = NULL; ENGINE *new_h4 = NULL; p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); memset(block, 0, sizeof(block)); if (((new_h1 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) || !ENGINE_set_id(new_h1, "test_id0") || !ENGINE_set_name(new_h1, "First test item") || ((new_h2 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) || !ENGINE_set_id(new_h2, "test_id1") || !ENGINE_set_name(new_h2, "Second test item") || ((new_h3 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) || !ENGINE_set_id(new_h3, "test_id2") || !ENGINE_set_name(new_h3, "Third test item") || ((new_h4 = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) || !ENGINE_set_id(new_h4, "test_id3") || !ENGINE_set_name(new_h4, "Fourth test item")) { printf("Couldn't set up test ENGINE structures\n"); goto end; } printf("\nenginetest beginning\n\n"); display_engine_list(); if (!ENGINE_add(new_h1)) { printf("Add failed!\n"); goto end; } display_engine_list(); ptr = ENGINE_get_first(); if (!ENGINE_remove(ptr)) { printf("Remove failed!\n"); goto end; } ENGINE_free(ptr); display_engine_list(); if (!ENGINE_add(new_h3) || !ENGINE_add(new_h2)) { printf("Add failed!\n"); goto end; } display_engine_list(); if (!ENGINE_remove(new_h2)) { printf("Remove failed!\n"); goto end; } display_engine_list(); if (!ENGINE_add(new_h4)) { printf("Add failed!\n"); goto end; } display_engine_list(); if (ENGINE_add(new_h3)) { printf("Add *should* have failed but didn't!\n"); goto end; } else printf("Add that should fail did.\n"); ERR_clear_error(); if (ENGINE_remove(new_h2)) { printf("Remove *should* have failed but didn't!\n"); goto end; } else printf("Remove that should fail did.\n"); ERR_clear_error(); if (!ENGINE_remove(new_h3)) { printf("Remove failed!\n"); goto end; } display_engine_list(); if (!ENGINE_remove(new_h4)) { printf("Remove failed!\n"); goto end; } display_engine_list(); /* * Depending on whether there's any hardware support compiled in, this * remove may be destined to fail. */ ptr = ENGINE_get_first(); if (ptr) if (!ENGINE_remove(ptr)) printf("Remove failed!i - probably no hardware " "support present.\n"); ENGINE_free(ptr); display_engine_list(); if (!ENGINE_add(new_h1) || !ENGINE_remove(new_h1)) { printf("Couldn't add and remove to an empty list!\n"); goto end; } else printf("Successfully added and removed to an empty list!\n"); printf("About to beef up the engine-type list\n"); for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++) { sprintf(buf, "id%i", loop); id = OPENSSL_strdup(buf); sprintf(buf, "Fake engine type %i", loop); name = OPENSSL_strdup(buf); if (((block[loop] = ENGINE_new()) == NULL) || !ENGINE_set_id(block[loop], id) || !ENGINE_set_name(block[loop], name)) { printf("Couldn't create block of ENGINE structures.\n" "I'll probably also core-dump now, damn.\n"); goto end; } } for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++) { if (!ENGINE_add(block[loop])) { printf("\nAdding stopped at %i, (%s,%s)\n", loop, ENGINE_get_id(block[loop]), ENGINE_get_name(block[loop])); goto cleanup_loop; } else printf("."); fflush(stdout); } cleanup_loop: printf("\nAbout to empty the engine-type list\n"); while ((ptr = ENGINE_get_first()) != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_remove(ptr)) { printf("\nRemove failed!\n"); goto end; } ENGINE_free(ptr); printf("."); fflush(stdout); } for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++) { OPENSSL_free((void *)ENGINE_get_id(block[loop])); OPENSSL_free((void *)ENGINE_get_name(block[loop])); } if (!test_redirect()) goto end; printf("\nTests completed happily\n"); to_return = 0; end: if (to_return) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ENGINE_free(new_h1); ENGINE_free(new_h2); ENGINE_free(new_h3); ENGINE_free(new_h4); for (loop = 0; loop < 512; loop++) ENGINE_free(block[loop]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) to_return = 1; #endif return to_return; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/sslcorrupttest.c0000644000000000000000000001611513176625662016326 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "ssltestlib.h" #include "testutil.h" static void copy_flags(BIO *bio) { int flags; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); flags = BIO_test_flags(next, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS); BIO_clear_flags(bio, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS); BIO_set_flags(bio, flags); } static int tls_corrupt_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl) { int ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl); copy_flags(bio); return ret; } static int tls_corrupt_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); char *copy; if (in[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { copy = BUF_memdup(in, inl); TEST_check(copy != NULL); /* corrupt last bit of application data */ copy[inl-1] ^= 1; ret = BIO_write(next, copy, inl); OPENSSL_free(copy); } else { ret = BIO_write(next, in, inl); } copy_flags(bio); return ret; } static long tls_corrupt_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); if (next == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static int tls_corrupt_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size) { /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */ return -1; } static int tls_corrupt_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str) { /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */ return -1; } static int tls_corrupt_new(BIO *bio) { BIO_set_init(bio, 1); return 1; } static int tls_corrupt_free(BIO *bio) { BIO_set_init(bio, 0); return 1; } #define BIO_TYPE_CUSTOM_FILTER (0x80 | BIO_TYPE_FILTER) static BIO_METHOD *method_tls_corrupt = NULL; /* Note: Not thread safe! */ static const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter(void) { if (method_tls_corrupt == NULL) { method_tls_corrupt = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_CUSTOM_FILTER, "TLS corrupt filter"); if ( method_tls_corrupt == NULL || !BIO_meth_set_write(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_write) || !BIO_meth_set_read(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_read) || !BIO_meth_set_puts(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_puts) || !BIO_meth_set_gets(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_gets) || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_ctrl) || !BIO_meth_set_create(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_new) || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(method_tls_corrupt, tls_corrupt_free)) return NULL; } return method_tls_corrupt; } static void bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter_free(void) { BIO_meth_free(method_tls_corrupt); } /* * The test is supposed to be executed with RSA key, customarily * with apps/server.pem used even in other tests. For this reason * |cipher_list| is initialized with RSA ciphers' names. This * naturally means that if test is to be re-purposed for other * type of key, then NID_auth_* filter below would need adjustment. */ static const char **cipher_list = NULL; static int setup_cipher_list() { SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; SSL *ssl = NULL; static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk_ciphers = NULL; int i, numciphers; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); TEST_check(ctx != NULL); ssl = SSL_new(ctx); TEST_check(ssl != NULL); sk_ciphers = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl); TEST_check(sk_ciphers != NULL); /* * The |cipher_list| will be filled only with names of RSA ciphers, * so that some of the allocated space will be wasted, but the loss * is deemed acceptable... */ cipher_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk_ciphers) * sizeof(cipher_list[0])); TEST_check(cipher_list != NULL); for (numciphers = 0, i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk_ciphers); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk_ciphers, i); if (SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(cipher) == NID_auth_rsa) cipher_list[numciphers++] = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); } TEST_check(numciphers != 0); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk_ciphers); SSL_free(ssl); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); return numciphers; } static char *cert = NULL; static char *privkey = NULL; static int test_ssl_corrupt(int testidx) { SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL; SSL *server = NULL, *client = NULL; BIO *c_to_s_fbio; int testresult = 0; static unsigned char junk[16000] = { 0 }; printf("Starting Test %d, %s\n", testidx, cipher_list[testidx]); if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)) { printf("Unable to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); return 0; } if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx, cipher_list[testidx])) { printf("Failed setting cipher list\n"); goto end; } c_to_s_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter()); if (c_to_s_fbio == NULL) { printf("Failed to create filter BIO\n"); goto end; } /* BIO is freed by create_ssl_connection on error */ if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &server, &client, NULL, c_to_s_fbio)) { printf("Unable to create SSL objects\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_connection(server, client)) { printf("Unable to create SSL connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout); goto end; } if (SSL_write(client, junk, sizeof(junk)) < 0) { printf("Unable to SSL_write\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout); goto end; } if (SSL_read(server, junk, sizeof(junk)) >= 0) { printf("Read should have failed with \"bad record mac\"\n"); goto end; } if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) != SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout); goto end; } testresult = 1; end: SSL_free(server); SSL_free(client); SSL_CTX_free(sctx); SSL_CTX_free(cctx); return testresult; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BIO *err = NULL; int testresult = 1; if (argc != 3) { printf("Invalid argument count\n"); return 1; } cert = argv[1]; privkey = argv[2]; err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_corrupt, setup_cipher_list()); testresult = run_tests(argv[0]); bio_f_tls_corrupt_filter_free(); OPENSSL_free(cipher_list); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err) <= 0) testresult = 1; #endif BIO_free(err); if (!testresult) printf("PASS\n"); return testresult; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/pkits-test.pl0000644000000000000000000007625213176625661015515 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Perl utility to run PKITS tests for RFC3280 compliance. my $ossl_path; if ( -f "../apps/openssl" ) { $ossl_path = "../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl"; } elsif ( -f "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe" ) { $ossl_path = "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe"; } elsif ( -f "..\\out32\\openssl.exe" ) { $ossl_path = "..\\out32\\openssl.exe"; } else { die "Can't find OpenSSL executable"; } my $pkitsdir = "pkits/smime"; my $pkitsta = "pkits/certs/TrustAnchorRootCertificate.crt"; die "Can't find PKITS test data" if !-d $pkitsdir; my $nist1 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.1"; my $nist2 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.2"; my $nist3 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.3"; my $nist4 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.4"; my $nist5 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.5"; my $nist6 = "2.16.840.1.101.3.2.1.48.6"; my $apolicy = "X509v3 Any Policy"; # This table contains the chapter headings of the accompanying PKITS # document. They provide useful informational output and their names # can be converted into the filename to test. my @testlists = ( [ "4.1", "Signature Verification" ], [ "4.1.1", "Valid Signatures Test1", 0 ], [ "4.1.2", "Invalid CA Signature Test2", 7 ], [ "4.1.3", "Invalid EE Signature Test3", 7 ], [ "4.1.4", "Valid DSA Signatures Test4", 0 ], [ "4.1.5", "Valid DSA Parameter Inheritance Test5", 0 ], [ "4.1.6", "Invalid DSA Signature Test6", 7 ], [ "4.2", "Validity Periods" ], [ "4.2.1", "Invalid CA notBefore Date Test1", 9 ], [ "4.2.2", "Invalid EE notBefore Date Test2", 9 ], [ "4.2.3", "Valid pre2000 UTC notBefore Date Test3", 0 ], [ "4.2.4", "Valid GeneralizedTime notBefore Date Test4", 0 ], [ "4.2.5", "Invalid CA notAfter Date Test5", 10 ], [ "4.2.6", "Invalid EE notAfter Date Test6", 10 ], [ "4.2.7", "Invalid pre2000 UTC EE notAfter Date Test7", 10 ], [ "4.2.8", "Valid GeneralizedTime notAfter Date Test8", 0 ], [ "4.3", "Verifying Name Chaining" ], [ "4.3.1", "Invalid Name Chaining EE Test1", 20 ], [ "4.3.2", "Invalid Name Chaining Order Test2", 20 ], [ "4.3.3", "Valid Name Chaining Whitespace Test3", 0 ], [ "4.3.4", "Valid Name Chaining Whitespace Test4", 0 ], [ "4.3.5", "Valid Name Chaining Capitalization Test5", 0 ], [ "4.3.6", "Valid Name Chaining UIDs Test6", 0 ], [ "4.3.7", "Valid RFC3280 Mandatory Attribute Types Test7", 0 ], [ "4.3.8", "Valid RFC3280 Optional Attribute Types Test8", 0 ], [ "4.3.9", "Valid UTF8String Encoded Names Test9", 0 ], [ "4.3.10", "Valid Rollover from PrintableString to UTF8String Test10", 0 ], [ "4.3.11", "Valid UTF8String Case Insensitive Match Test11", 0 ], [ "4.4", "Basic Certificate Revocation Tests" ], [ "4.4.1", "Missing CRL Test1", 3 ], [ "4.4.2", "Invalid Revoked CA Test2", 23 ], [ "4.4.3", "Invalid Revoked EE Test3", 23 ], [ "4.4.4", "Invalid Bad CRL Signature Test4", 8 ], [ "4.4.5", "Invalid Bad CRL Issuer Name Test5", 3 ], [ "4.4.6", "Invalid Wrong CRL Test6", 3 ], [ "4.4.7", "Valid Two CRLs Test7", 0 ], # The test document suggests these should return certificate revoked... # Subsquent discussion has concluded they should not due to unhandle # critical CRL extensions. [ "4.4.8", "Invalid Unknown CRL Entry Extension Test8", 36 ], [ "4.4.9", "Invalid Unknown CRL Extension Test9", 36 ], [ "4.4.10", "Invalid Unknown CRL Extension Test10", 36 ], [ "4.4.11", "Invalid Old CRL nextUpdate Test11", 12 ], [ "4.4.12", "Invalid pre2000 CRL nextUpdate Test12", 12 ], [ "4.4.13", "Valid GeneralizedTime CRL nextUpdate Test13", 0 ], [ "4.4.14", "Valid Negative Serial Number Test14", 0 ], [ "4.4.15", "Invalid Negative Serial Number Test15", 23 ], [ "4.4.16", "Valid Long Serial Number Test16", 0 ], [ "4.4.17", "Valid Long Serial Number Test17", 0 ], [ "4.4.18", "Invalid Long Serial Number Test18", 23 ], [ "4.4.19", "Valid Separate Certificate and CRL Keys Test19", 0 ], [ "4.4.20", "Invalid Separate Certificate and CRL Keys Test20", 23 ], # CRL path is revoked so get a CRL path validation error [ "4.4.21", "Invalid Separate Certificate and CRL Keys Test21", 54 ], [ "4.5", "Verifying Paths with Self-Issued Certificates" ], [ "4.5.1", "Valid Basic Self-Issued Old With New Test1", 0 ], [ "4.5.2", "Invalid Basic Self-Issued Old With New Test2", 23 ], [ "4.5.3", "Valid Basic Self-Issued New With Old Test3", 0 ], [ "4.5.4", "Valid Basic Self-Issued New With Old Test4", 0 ], [ "4.5.5", "Invalid Basic Self-Issued New With Old Test5", 23 ], [ "4.5.6", "Valid Basic Self-Issued CRL Signing Key Test6", 0 ], [ "4.5.7", "Invalid Basic Self-Issued CRL Signing Key Test7", 23 ], [ "4.5.8", "Invalid Basic Self-Issued CRL Signing Key Test8", 20 ], [ "4.6", "Verifying Basic Constraints" ], [ "4.6.1", "Invalid Missing basicConstraints Test1", 24 ], [ "4.6.2", "Invalid cA False Test2", 24 ], [ "4.6.3", "Invalid cA False Test3", 24 ], [ "4.6.4", "Valid basicConstraints Not Critical Test4", 0 ], [ "4.6.5", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test5", 25 ], [ "4.6.6", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test6", 25 ], [ "4.6.7", "Valid pathLenConstraint Test7", 0 ], [ "4.6.8", "Valid pathLenConstraint Test8", 0 ], [ "4.6.9", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test9", 25 ], [ "4.6.10", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test10", 25 ], [ "4.6.11", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test11", 25 ], [ "4.6.12", "Invalid pathLenConstraint Test12", 25 ], [ "4.6.13", "Valid pathLenConstraint Test13", 0 ], [ "4.6.14", "Valid pathLenConstraint Test14", 0 ], [ "4.6.15", "Valid Self-Issued pathLenConstraint Test15", 0 ], [ "4.6.16", "Invalid Self-Issued pathLenConstraint Test16", 25 ], [ "4.6.17", "Valid Self-Issued pathLenConstraint Test17", 0 ], [ "4.7", "Key Usage" ], [ "4.7.1", "Invalid keyUsage Critical keyCertSign False Test1", 20 ], [ "4.7.2", "Invalid keyUsage Not Critical keyCertSign False Test2", 20 ], [ "4.7.3", "Valid keyUsage Not Critical Test3", 0 ], [ "4.7.4", "Invalid keyUsage Critical cRLSign False Test4", 35 ], [ "4.7.5", "Invalid keyUsage Not Critical cRLSign False Test5", 35 ], # Certificate policy tests need special handling. They can have several # sub tests and we need to check the outputs are correct. [ "4.8", "Certificate Policies" ], [ "4.8.1.1", "All Certificates Same Policy Test1", "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy", "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0 ], [ "4.8.1.2", "All Certificates Same Policy Test1", "-policy $nist1 -explicit_policy", "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0 ], [ "4.8.1.3", "All Certificates Same Policy Test1", "-policy $nist2 -explicit_policy", "True", $nist1, "", 43 ], [ "4.8.1.4", "All Certificates Same Policy Test1", "-policy $nist1 -policy $nist2 -explicit_policy", "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0 ], [ "4.8.2.1", "All Certificates No Policies Test2", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "", "", 0 ], [ "4.8.2.2", "All Certificates No Policies Test2", "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.3.1", "Different Policies Test3", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "", "", 0 ], [ "4.8.3.2", "Different Policies Test3", "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.3.3", "Different Policies Test3", "-policy $nist1 -policy $nist2 -explicit_policy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.4", "Different Policies Test4", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.5", "Different Policies Test5", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.6.1", "Overlapping Policies Test6", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0 ], [ "4.8.6.2", "Overlapping Policies Test6", "-policy $nist1", "True", $nist1, $nist1, 0 ], [ "4.8.6.3", "Overlapping Policies Test6", "-policy $nist2", "True", $nist1, "", 43 ], [ "4.8.7", "Different Policies Test7", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.8", "Different Policies Test8", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.9", "Different Policies Test9", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.10.1", "All Certificates Same Policies Test10", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.10.2", "All Certificates Same Policies Test10", "-policy $nist2", "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist2", 0 ], [ "4.8.10.3", "All Certificates Same Policies Test10", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1:$nist2", 0 ], [ "4.8.11.1", "All Certificates AnyPolicy Test11", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$apolicy", "$apolicy", 0 ], [ "4.8.11.2", "All Certificates AnyPolicy Test11", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$apolicy", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.12", "Different Policies Test12", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.13.1", "All Certificates Same Policies Test13", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1:$nist2:$nist3", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.13.2", "All Certificates Same Policies Test13", "-policy $nist2", "True", "$nist1:$nist2:$nist3", "$nist2", 0 ], [ "4.8.13.3", "All Certificates Same Policies Test13", "-policy $nist3", "True", "$nist1:$nist2:$nist3", "$nist3", 0 ], [ "4.8.14.1", "AnyPolicy Test14", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.14.2", "AnyPolicy Test14", "-policy $nist2", "True", "$nist1", "", 43 ], [ "4.8.15", "User Notice Qualifier Test15", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.16", "User Notice Qualifier Test16", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.17", "User Notice Qualifier Test17", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.18.1", "User Notice Qualifier Test18", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.18.2", "User Notice Qualifier Test18", "-policy $nist2", "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist2", 0 ], [ "4.8.19", "User Notice Qualifier Test19", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.8.20", "CPS Pointer Qualifier Test20", "-policy anyPolicy -explicit_policy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.9", "Require Explicit Policy" ], [ "4.9.1", "Valid RequireExplicitPolicy Test1", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "", "", 0 ], [ "4.9.2", "Valid RequireExplicitPolicy Test2", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "", "", 0 ], [ "4.9.3", "Invalid RequireExplicitPolicy Test3", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.9.4", "Valid RequireExplicitPolicy Test4", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.9.5", "Invalid RequireExplicitPolicy Test5", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.9.6", "Valid Self-Issued requireExplicitPolicy Test6", "-policy anyPolicy", "False", "", "", 0 ], [ "4.9.7", "Invalid Self-Issued requireExplicitPolicy Test7", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.9.8", "Invalid Self-Issued requireExplicitPolicy Test8", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.10", "Policy Mappings" ], [ "4.10.1.1", "Valid Policy Mapping Test1", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.10.1.2", "Valid Policy Mapping Test1", "-policy $nist2", "True", "$nist1", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.1.3", "Valid Policy Mapping Test1", "-policy anyPolicy -inhibit_map", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.2.1", "Invalid Policy Mapping Test2", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.2.2", "Invalid Policy Mapping Test2", "-policy anyPolicy -inhibit_map", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.3.1", "Valid Policy Mapping Test3", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist2", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.3.2", "Valid Policy Mapping Test3", "-policy $nist2", "True", "$nist2", "$nist2", 0 ], [ "4.10.4", "Invalid Policy Mapping Test4", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.5.1", "Valid Policy Mapping Test5", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.10.5.2", "Valid Policy Mapping Test5", "-policy $nist6", "True", "$nist1", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.6.1", "Valid Policy Mapping Test6", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.10.6.2", "Valid Policy Mapping Test6", "-policy $nist6", "True", "$nist1", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.7", "Invalid Mapping From anyPolicy Test7", 42 ], [ "4.10.8", "Invalid Mapping To anyPolicy Test8", 42 ], [ "4.10.9", "Valid Policy Mapping Test9", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.10.10", "Invalid Policy Mapping Test10", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.10.11", "Valid Policy Mapping Test11", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], # TODO: check notice display [ "4.10.12.1", "Valid Policy Mapping Test12", "-policy $nist1", "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist1", 0 ], # TODO: check notice display [ "4.10.12.2", "Valid Policy Mapping Test12", "-policy $nist2", "True", "$nist1:$nist2", "$nist2", 0 ], [ "4.10.13", "Valid Policy Mapping Test13", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], # TODO: check notice display [ "4.10.14", "Valid Policy Mapping Test14", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.11", "Inhibit Policy Mapping" ], [ "4.11.1", "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test1", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.11.2", "Valid inhibitPolicyMapping Test2", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.11.3", "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test3", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.11.4", "Valid inhibitPolicyMapping Test4", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist2", "$nist2", 0 ], [ "4.11.5", "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test5", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.11.6", "Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping Test6", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.11.7", "Valid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test7", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.11.8", "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test8", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.11.9", "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test9", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.11.10", "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test10", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.11.11", "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitPolicyMapping Test11", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.12", "Inhibit Any Policy" ], [ "4.12.1", "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test1", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.12.2", "Valid inhibitAnyPolicy Test2", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.12.3.1", "inhibitAnyPolicy Test3", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "$nist1", "$nist1", 0 ], [ "4.12.3.2", "inhibitAnyPolicy Test3", "-policy anyPolicy -inhibit_any", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.12.4", "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test4", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.12.5", "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test5", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.12.6", "Invalid inhibitAnyPolicy Test6", "-policy anyPolicy", "True", "", "", 43 ], [ "4.12.7", "Valid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test7", 0 ], [ "4.12.8", "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test8", 43 ], [ "4.12.9", "Valid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test9", 0 ], [ "4.12.10", "Invalid Self-Issued inhibitAnyPolicy Test10", 43 ], [ "4.13", "Name Constraints" ], [ "4.13.1", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test1", 0 ], [ "4.13.2", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test2", 47 ], [ "4.13.3", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test3", 47 ], [ "4.13.4", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test4", 0 ], [ "4.13.5", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test5", 0 ], [ "4.13.6", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test6", 0 ], [ "4.13.7", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test7", 48 ], [ "4.13.8", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test8", 48 ], [ "4.13.9", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test9", 48 ], [ "4.13.10", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test10", 48 ], [ "4.13.11", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test11", 0 ], [ "4.13.12", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test12", 47 ], [ "4.13.13", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test13", 47 ], [ "4.13.14", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test14", 0 ], [ "4.13.15", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test15", 48 ], [ "4.13.16", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test16", 48 ], [ "4.13.17", "Invalid DN nameConstraints Test17", 48 ], [ "4.13.18", "Valid DN nameConstraints Test18", 0 ], [ "4.13.19", "Valid Self-Issued DN nameConstraints Test19", 0 ], [ "4.13.20", "Invalid Self-Issued DN nameConstraints Test20", 47 ], [ "4.13.21", "Valid RFC822 nameConstraints Test21", 0 ], [ "4.13.22", "Invalid RFC822 nameConstraints Test22", 47 ], [ "4.13.23", "Valid RFC822 nameConstraints Test23", 0 ], [ "4.13.24", "Invalid RFC822 nameConstraints Test24", 47 ], [ "4.13.25", "Valid RFC822 nameConstraints Test25", 0 ], [ "4.13.26", "Invalid RFC822 nameConstraints Test26", 48 ], [ "4.13.27", "Valid DN and RFC822 nameConstraints Test27", 0 ], [ "4.13.28", "Invalid DN and RFC822 nameConstraints Test28", 47 ], [ "4.13.29", "Invalid DN and RFC822 nameConstraints Test29", 47 ], [ "4.13.30", "Valid DNS nameConstraints Test30", 0 ], [ "4.13.31", "Invalid DNS nameConstraints Test31", 47 ], [ "4.13.32", "Valid DNS nameConstraints Test32", 0 ], [ "4.13.33", "Invalid DNS nameConstraints Test33", 48 ], [ "4.13.34", "Valid URI nameConstraints Test34", 0 ], [ "4.13.35", "Invalid URI nameConstraints Test35", 47 ], [ "4.13.36", "Valid URI nameConstraints Test36", 0 ], [ "4.13.37", "Invalid URI nameConstraints Test37", 48 ], [ "4.13.38", "Invalid DNS nameConstraints Test38", 47 ], [ "4.14", "Distribution Points" ], [ "4.14.1", "Valid distributionPoint Test1", 0 ], [ "4.14.2", "Invalid distributionPoint Test2", 23 ], [ "4.14.3", "Invalid distributionPoint Test3", 44 ], [ "4.14.4", "Valid distributionPoint Test4", 0 ], [ "4.14.5", "Valid distributionPoint Test5", 0 ], [ "4.14.6", "Invalid distributionPoint Test6", 23 ], [ "4.14.7", "Valid distributionPoint Test7", 0 ], [ "4.14.8", "Invalid distributionPoint Test8", 44 ], [ "4.14.9", "Invalid distributionPoint Test9", 44 ], [ "4.14.10", "Valid No issuingDistributionPoint Test10", 0 ], [ "4.14.11", "Invalid onlyContainsUserCerts CRL Test11", 44 ], [ "4.14.12", "Invalid onlyContainsCACerts CRL Test12", 44 ], [ "4.14.13", "Valid onlyContainsCACerts CRL Test13", 0 ], [ "4.14.14", "Invalid onlyContainsAttributeCerts Test14", 44 ], [ "4.14.15", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test15", 23 ], [ "4.14.16", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test16", 23 ], [ "4.14.17", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test17", 3 ], [ "4.14.18", "Valid onlySomeReasons Test18", 0 ], [ "4.14.19", "Valid onlySomeReasons Test19", 0 ], [ "4.14.20", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test20", 23 ], [ "4.14.21", "Invalid onlySomeReasons Test21", 23 ], [ "4.14.22", "Valid IDP with indirectCRL Test22", 0 ], [ "4.14.23", "Invalid IDP with indirectCRL Test23", 23 ], [ "4.14.24", "Valid IDP with indirectCRL Test24", 0 ], [ "4.14.25", "Valid IDP with indirectCRL Test25", 0 ], [ "4.14.26", "Invalid IDP with indirectCRL Test26", 44 ], [ "4.14.27", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test27", 3 ], [ "4.14.28", "Valid cRLIssuer Test28", 0 ], [ "4.14.29", "Valid cRLIssuer Test29", 0 ], # Although this test is valid it has a circular dependency. As a result # an attempt is made to reursively checks a CRL path and rejected due to # a CRL path validation error. PKITS notes suggest this test does not # need to be run due to this issue. [ "4.14.30", "Valid cRLIssuer Test30", 54 ], [ "4.14.31", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test31", 23 ], [ "4.14.32", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test32", 23 ], [ "4.14.33", "Valid cRLIssuer Test33", 0 ], [ "4.14.34", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test34", 23 ], [ "4.14.35", "Invalid cRLIssuer Test35", 44 ], [ "4.15", "Delta-CRLs" ], [ "4.15.1", "Invalid deltaCRLIndicator No Base Test1", 3 ], [ "4.15.2", "Valid delta-CRL Test2", 0 ], [ "4.15.3", "Invalid delta-CRL Test3", 23 ], [ "4.15.4", "Invalid delta-CRL Test4", 23 ], [ "4.15.5", "Valid delta-CRL Test5", 0 ], [ "4.15.6", "Invalid delta-CRL Test6", 23 ], [ "4.15.7", "Valid delta-CRL Test7", 0 ], [ "4.15.8", "Valid delta-CRL Test8", 0 ], [ "4.15.9", "Invalid delta-CRL Test9", 23 ], [ "4.15.10", "Invalid delta-CRL Test10", 12 ], [ "4.16", "Private Certificate Extensions" ], [ "4.16.1", "Valid Unknown Not Critical Certificate Extension Test1", 0 ], [ "4.16.2", "Invalid Unknown Critical Certificate Extension Test2", 34 ], ); my $verbose = 1; my $numtest = 0; my $numfail = 0; my $ossl = "ossl/apps/openssl"; my $ossl_cmd = "$ossl_path cms -verify -verify_retcode "; $ossl_cmd .= "-CAfile pkitsta.pem -crl_check_all -x509_strict "; # Check for expiry of trust anchor system "$ossl_path x509 -inform DER -in $pkitsta -checkend 0"; if ($? == 256) { print STDERR "WARNING: using older expired data\n"; $ossl_cmd .= "-attime 1291940972 "; } $ossl_cmd .= "-policy_check -extended_crl -use_deltas -out /dev/null 2>&1 "; system "$ossl_path x509 -inform DER -in $pkitsta -out pkitsta.pem"; die "Can't create trust anchor file" if $?; print "Running PKITS tests:\n" if $verbose; foreach (@testlists) { my $argnum = @$_; if ( $argnum == 2 ) { my ( $tnum, $title ) = @$_; print "$tnum $title\n" if $verbose; } elsif ( $argnum == 3 ) { my ( $tnum, $title, $exp_ret ) = @$_; my $filename = $title; $exp_ret += 32 if $exp_ret; $filename =~ tr/ -//d; $filename = "Signed${filename}.eml"; if ( !-f "$pkitsdir/$filename" ) { print "\"$filename\" not found\n"; } else { my $ret; my $test_fail = 0; my $errmsg = ""; my $cmd = $ossl_cmd; $cmd .= "-in $pkitsdir/$filename -policy anyPolicy"; my $cmdout = `$cmd`; $ret = $? >> 8; if ( $? & 0xff ) { $errmsg .= "Abnormal OpenSSL termination\n"; $test_fail = 1; } if ( $exp_ret != $ret ) { $errmsg .= "Return code:$ret, "; $errmsg .= "expected $exp_ret\n"; $test_fail = 1; } if ($test_fail) { print "$tnum $title : Failed!\n"; print "Filename: $pkitsdir/$filename\n"; print $errmsg; print "Command output:\n$cmdout\n"; $numfail++; } $numtest++; } } elsif ( $argnum == 7 ) { my ( $tnum, $title, $exargs, $exp_epol, $exp_aset, $exp_uset, $exp_ret ) = @$_; my $filename = $title; $exp_ret += 32 if $exp_ret; $filename =~ tr/ -//d; $filename = "Signed${filename}.eml"; if ( !-f "$pkitsdir/$filename" ) { print "\"$filename\" not found\n"; } else { my $ret; my $cmdout = ""; my $errmsg = ""; my $epol = ""; my $aset = ""; my $uset = ""; my $pol = -1; my $test_fail = 0; my $cmd = $ossl_cmd; $cmd .= "-in $pkitsdir/$filename $exargs -policy_print"; @oparr = `$cmd`; $ret = $? >> 8; if ( $? & 0xff ) { $errmsg .= "Abnormal OpenSSL termination\n"; $test_fail = 1; } foreach (@oparr) { my $test_failed = 0; $cmdout .= $_; if (/^Require explicit Policy: (.*)$/) { $epol = $1; } if (/^Authority Policies/) { if (/empty/) { $aset = ""; } else { $pol = 1; } } $test_fail = 1 if (/leak/i); if (/^User Policies/) { if (/empty/) { $uset = ""; } else { $pol = 2; } } if (/\s+Policy: (.*)$/) { if ( $pol == 1 ) { $aset .= ":" if $aset ne ""; $aset .= $1; } elsif ( $pol == 2 ) { $uset .= ":" if $uset ne ""; $uset .= $1; } } } if ( $epol ne $exp_epol ) { $errmsg .= "Explicit policy:$epol, "; $errmsg .= "expected $exp_epol\n"; $test_fail = 1; } if ( $aset ne $exp_aset ) { $errmsg .= "Authority policy set :$aset, "; $errmsg .= "expected $exp_aset\n"; $test_fail = 1; } if ( $uset ne $exp_uset ) { $errmsg .= "User policy set :$uset, "; $errmsg .= "expected $exp_uset\n"; $test_fail = 1; } if ( $exp_ret != $ret ) { print "Return code:$ret, expected $exp_ret\n"; $test_fail = 1; } if ($test_fail) { print "$tnum $title : Failed!\n"; print "Filename: $pkitsdir/$filename\n"; print "Command output:\n$cmdout\n"; $numfail++; } $numtest++; } } } if ($numfail) { print "$numfail tests failed out of $numtest\n"; } else { print "All Tests Successful.\n"; } unlink "pkitsta.pem"; openssl-1.1.0g/test/rsa_test.c0000644000000000000000000003125713176625662015036 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* test vectors from p1ovect1.txt */ #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No RSA support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # define SetKey \ RSA_set0_key(key, \ BN_bin2bn(n, sizeof(n)-1, NULL), \ BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e)-1, NULL), \ BN_bin2bn(d, sizeof(d)-1, NULL)); \ RSA_set0_factors(key, \ BN_bin2bn(p, sizeof(p)-1, NULL), \ BN_bin2bn(q, sizeof(q)-1, NULL)); \ RSA_set0_crt_params(key, \ BN_bin2bn(dmp1, sizeof(dmp1)-1, NULL), \ BN_bin2bn(dmq1, sizeof(dmq1)-1, NULL), \ BN_bin2bn(iqmp, sizeof(iqmp)-1, NULL)); \ memcpy(c, ctext_ex, sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1); \ return (sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1); static int key1(RSA *key, unsigned char *c) { static unsigned char n[] = "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F" "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5" "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93" "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1" "\xF5"; static unsigned char e[] = "\x11"; static unsigned char d[] = "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44" "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64" "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9" "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51"; static unsigned char p[] = "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5" "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12" "\x0D"; static unsigned char q[] = "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9" "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D" "\x89"; static unsigned char dmp1[] = "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF" "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05"; static unsigned char dmq1[] = "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99" "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D" "\x51"; static unsigned char iqmp[] = "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8" "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26"; static unsigned char ctext_ex[] = "\x1b\x8f\x05\xf9\xca\x1a\x79\x52\x6e\x53\xf3\xcc\x51\x4f\xdb\x89" "\x2b\xfb\x91\x93\x23\x1e\x78\xb9\x92\xe6\x8d\x50\xa4\x80\xcb\x52" "\x33\x89\x5c\x74\x95\x8d\x5d\x02\xab\x8c\x0f\xd0\x40\xeb\x58\x44" "\xb0\x05\xc3\x9e\xd8\x27\x4a\x9d\xbf\xa8\x06\x71\x40\x94\x39\xd2"; SetKey; } static int key2(RSA *key, unsigned char *c) { static unsigned char n[] = "\x00\xA3\x07\x9A\x90\xDF\x0D\xFD\x72\xAC\x09\x0C\xCC\x2A\x78\xB8" "\x74\x13\x13\x3E\x40\x75\x9C\x98\xFA\xF8\x20\x4F\x35\x8A\x0B\x26" "\x3C\x67\x70\xE7\x83\xA9\x3B\x69\x71\xB7\x37\x79\xD2\x71\x7B\xE8" "\x34\x77\xCF"; static unsigned char e[] = "\x3"; static unsigned char d[] = "\x6C\xAF\xBC\x60\x94\xB3\xFE\x4C\x72\xB0\xB3\x32\xC6\xFB\x25\xA2" "\xB7\x62\x29\x80\x4E\x68\x65\xFC\xA4\x5A\x74\xDF\x0F\x8F\xB8\x41" "\x3B\x52\xC0\xD0\xE5\x3D\x9B\x59\x0F\xF1\x9B\xE7\x9F\x49\xDD\x21" "\xE5\xEB"; static unsigned char p[] = "\x00\xCF\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92" "\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5\xCF\xCE\x91"; static unsigned char q[] = "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9" "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5F"; static unsigned char dmp1[] = "\x00\x8A\x15\x78\xAC\x5D\x13\xAF\x10\x2B\x22\xB9\x99\xCD\x74\x61" "\xF1\x5E\x6D\x22\xCC\x03\x23\xDF\xDF\x0B"; static unsigned char dmq1[] = "\x00\x86\x55\x21\x4A\xC5\x4D\x8D\x4E\xCD\x61\x77\xF1\xC7\x36\x90" "\xCE\x2A\x48\x2C\x8B\x05\x99\xCB\xE0\x3F"; static unsigned char iqmp[] = "\x00\x83\xEF\xEF\xB8\xA9\xA4\x0D\x1D\xB6\xED\x98\xAD\x84\xED\x13" "\x35\xDC\xC1\x08\xF3\x22\xD0\x57\xCF\x8D"; static unsigned char ctext_ex[] = "\x14\xbd\xdd\x28\xc9\x83\x35\x19\x23\x80\xe8\xe5\x49\xb1\x58\x2a" "\x8b\x40\xb4\x48\x6d\x03\xa6\xa5\x31\x1f\x1f\xd5\xf0\xa1\x80\xe4" "\x17\x53\x03\x29\xa9\x34\x90\x74\xb1\x52\x13\x54\x29\x08\x24\x52" "\x62\x51"; SetKey; } static int key3(RSA *key, unsigned char *c) { static unsigned char n[] = "\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71" "\xF7\x36\x8D\x07\xEE\xD4\x10\x43\xA4\x40\xD6\xB6\xF0\x74\x54\xF5" "\x1F\xB8\xDF\xBA\xAF\x03\x5C\x02\xAB\x61\xEA\x48\xCE\xEB\x6F\xCD" "\x48\x76\xED\x52\x0D\x60\xE1\xEC\x46\x19\x71\x9D\x8A\x5B\x8B\x80" "\x7F\xAF\xB8\xE0\xA3\xDF\xC7\x37\x72\x3E\xE6\xB4\xB7\xD9\x3A\x25" "\x84\xEE\x6A\x64\x9D\x06\x09\x53\x74\x88\x34\xB2\x45\x45\x98\x39" "\x4E\xE0\xAA\xB1\x2D\x7B\x61\xA5\x1F\x52\x7A\x9A\x41\xF6\xC1\x68" "\x7F\xE2\x53\x72\x98\xCA\x2A\x8F\x59\x46\xF8\xE5\xFD\x09\x1D\xBD" "\xCB"; static unsigned char e[] = "\x11"; static unsigned char d[] = "\x00\xA5\xDA\xFC\x53\x41\xFA\xF2\x89\xC4\xB9\x88\xDB\x30\xC1\xCD" "\xF8\x3F\x31\x25\x1E\x06\x68\xB4\x27\x84\x81\x38\x01\x57\x96\x41" "\xB2\x94\x10\xB3\xC7\x99\x8D\x6B\xC4\x65\x74\x5E\x5C\x39\x26\x69" "\xD6\x87\x0D\xA2\xC0\x82\xA9\x39\xE3\x7F\xDC\xB8\x2E\xC9\x3E\xDA" "\xC9\x7F\xF3\xAD\x59\x50\xAC\xCF\xBC\x11\x1C\x76\xF1\xA9\x52\x94" "\x44\xE5\x6A\xAF\x68\xC5\x6C\x09\x2C\xD3\x8D\xC3\xBE\xF5\xD2\x0A" "\x93\x99\x26\xED\x4F\x74\xA1\x3E\xDD\xFB\xE1\xA1\xCE\xCC\x48\x94" "\xAF\x94\x28\xC2\xB7\xB8\x88\x3F\xE4\x46\x3A\x4B\xC8\x5B\x1C\xB3" "\xC1"; static unsigned char p[] = "\x00\xEE\xCF\xAE\x81\xB1\xB9\xB3\xC9\x08\x81\x0B\x10\xA1\xB5\x60" "\x01\x99\xEB\x9F\x44\xAE\xF4\xFD\xA4\x93\xB8\x1A\x9E\x3D\x84\xF6" "\x32\x12\x4E\xF0\x23\x6E\x5D\x1E\x3B\x7E\x28\xFA\xE7\xAA\x04\x0A" "\x2D\x5B\x25\x21\x76\x45\x9D\x1F\x39\x75\x41\xBA\x2A\x58\xFB\x65" "\x99"; static unsigned char q[] = "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9" "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D" "\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5" "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x15" "\x03"; static unsigned char dmp1[] = "\x54\x49\x4C\xA6\x3E\xBA\x03\x37\xE4\xE2\x40\x23\xFC\xD6\x9A\x5A" "\xEB\x07\xDD\xDC\x01\x83\xA4\xD0\xAC\x9B\x54\xB0\x51\xF2\xB1\x3E" "\xD9\x49\x09\x75\xEA\xB7\x74\x14\xFF\x59\xC1\xF7\x69\x2E\x9A\x2E" "\x20\x2B\x38\xFC\x91\x0A\x47\x41\x74\xAD\xC9\x3C\x1F\x67\xC9\x81"; static unsigned char dmq1[] = "\x47\x1E\x02\x90\xFF\x0A\xF0\x75\x03\x51\xB7\xF8\x78\x86\x4C\xA9" "\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7" "\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D" "\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D"; static unsigned char iqmp[] = "\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23" "\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11" "\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E" "\x9E\x2E\x0F\x96\x56\xE6\x98\xEA\x36\x66\xED\xFB\x25\x79\x80\x39" "\xF7"; static unsigned char ctext_ex[] = "\xb8\x24\x6b\x56\xa6\xed\x58\x81\xae\xb5\x85\xd9\xa2\x5b\x2a\xd7" "\x90\xc4\x17\xe0\x80\x68\x1b\xf1\xac\x2b\xc3\xde\xb6\x9d\x8b\xce" "\xf0\xc4\x36\x6f\xec\x40\x0a\xf0\x52\xa7\x2e\x9b\x0e\xff\xb5\xb3" "\xf2\xf1\x92\xdb\xea\xca\x03\xc1\x27\x40\x05\x71\x13\xbf\x1f\x06" "\x69\xac\x22\xe9\xf3\xa7\x85\x2e\x3c\x15\xd9\x13\xca\xb0\xb8\x86" "\x3a\x95\xc9\x92\x94\xce\x86\x74\x21\x49\x54\x61\x03\x46\xf4\xd4" "\x74\xb2\x6f\x7c\x48\xb4\x2e\xe6\x8e\x1f\x57\x2a\x1f\xc4\x02\x6a" "\xc4\x56\xb4\xf5\x9f\x7b\x62\x1e\xa1\xb9\xd8\x8f\x64\x20\x2f\xb1"; SetKey; } static int pad_unknown(void) { unsigned long l; while ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0) if (ERR_GET_REASON(l) == RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE) return (1); return (0); } static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int err = 0; int v; RSA *key; unsigned char ptext[256]; unsigned char ctext[256]; static unsigned char ptext_ex[] = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a"; unsigned char ctext_ex[256]; int plen; int clen = 0; int num; int n; CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or OAEP may fail */ plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1; for (v = 0; v < 3; v++) { key = RSA_new(); switch (v) { case 0: clen = key1(key, ctext_ex); break; case 1: clen = key2(key, ctext_ex); break; case 2: clen = key3(key, ctext_ex); break; } num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (num != clen) { printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption failed!\n"); err = 1; goto oaep; } num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) { printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption failed!\n"); err = 1; } else printf("PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption/decryption ok\n"); oaep: ERR_clear_error(); num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); if (num == -1 && pad_unknown()) { printf("No OAEP support\n"); goto next; } if (num != clen) { printf("OAEP encryption failed!\n"); err = 1; goto next; } num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) { printf("OAEP decryption (encrypted data) failed!\n"); err = 1; } else if (memcmp(ctext, ctext_ex, num) == 0) printf("OAEP test vector %d passed!\n", v); /* * Different ciphertexts (rsa_oaep.c without -DPKCS_TESTVECT). Try * decrypting ctext_ex */ num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext_ex, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) { printf("OAEP decryption (test vector data) failed!\n"); err = 1; } else printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n"); /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */ for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) { ctext[n] ^= 1; num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); if (num > 0) { printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n"); err = 1; break; } ctext[n] ^= 1; } /* Test truncated ciphertexts, as well as negative length. */ for (n = -1; n < clen; ++n) { num = RSA_private_decrypt(n, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); if (num > 0) { printf("Truncated data decrypted!\n"); err = 1; break; } } next: RSA_free(key); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) err = 1; #endif return err; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/ecdsatest.c0000644000000000000000000003736713176625661015200 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include #include #include /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_EC is defined */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { puts("Elliptic curves are disabled."); return 0; } #else # include # include # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include # endif # include # include static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator " "think it has entropy"; /* declaration of the test functions */ int x9_62_tests(BIO *); int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r, const char *s); int test_builtin(BIO *); /* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */ int change_rand(void); int restore_rand(void); int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); static RAND_METHOD fake_rand; static const RAND_METHOD *old_rand; int change_rand(void) { /* save old rand method */ if ((old_rand = RAND_get_rand_method()) == NULL) return 0; fake_rand.seed = old_rand->seed; fake_rand.cleanup = old_rand->cleanup; fake_rand.add = old_rand->add; fake_rand.status = old_rand->status; /* use own random function */ fake_rand.bytes = fbytes; fake_rand.pseudorand = old_rand->bytes; /* set new RAND_METHOD */ if (!RAND_set_rand_method(&fake_rand)) return 0; return 1; } int restore_rand(void) { if (!RAND_set_rand_method(old_rand)) return 0; else return 1; } static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0; static const char *numbers[8] = { "651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659", "6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654", "8763001015071075675010661307616710783570106710677817767166" "71676178726717", "7000000175690566466555057817571571075705015757757057795755" "55657156756655", "1275552191113212300012030439187146164646146646466749494799", "1542725565216523985789236956265265265235675811949404040041", "1456427555219115346513212300075341203043918714616464614664" "64667494947990", "1712787255652165239672857892369562652652652356758119494040" "40041670216363" }; int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { int ret; BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; if (use_fake == 0) return old_rand->bytes(buf, num); use_fake = 0; if (fbytes_counter >= 8) return 0; tmp = BN_new(); if (!tmp) return 0; if (!BN_dec2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter])) { BN_free(tmp); return 0; } fbytes_counter++; if (num != BN_num_bytes(tmp) || !BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf)) ret = 0; else ret = 1; BN_free(tmp); return ret; } /* some tests from the X9.62 draft */ int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in) { int ret = 0; const char message[] = "abc"; unsigned char digest[20]; unsigned int dgst_len = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); EC_KEY *key = NULL; ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL; BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; if (md_ctx == NULL) goto x962_int_err; /* get the message digest */ if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, EVP_sha1()) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, (const void *)message, 3) || !EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, digest, &dgst_len)) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "testing %s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); /* create the key */ if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) goto x962_int_err; use_fake = 1; if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key)) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* create the signature */ use_fake = 1; /* Use ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */ if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp)) goto x962_int_err; signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, 20, kinv, rp, key); if (signature == NULL) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* compare the created signature with the expected signature */ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL || (s = BN_new()) == NULL) goto x962_int_err; if (!BN_dec2bn(&r, r_in) || !BN_dec2bn(&s, s_in)) goto x962_int_err; ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s); if (BN_cmp(sig_r, r) || BN_cmp(sig_s, s)) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* verify the signature */ if (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, signature, key) != 1) goto x962_int_err; BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); BIO_printf(out, " ok\n"); ret = 1; x962_int_err: if (!ret) BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); EC_KEY_free(key); ECDSA_SIG_free(signature); BN_free(r); BN_free(s); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); BN_clear_free(kinv); BN_clear_free(rp); return ret; } int x9_62_tests(BIO *out) { int ret = 0; BIO_printf(out, "some tests from X9.62:\n"); /* set own rand method */ if (!change_rand()) goto x962_err; if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_prime192v1, "3342403536405981729393488334694600415596881826869351677613", "5735822328888155254683894997897571951568553642892029982342")) goto x962_err; if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_prime239v1, "3086361431751678114926225473006680188549593787585317781474" "62058306432176", "3238135532097973577080787768312505059318910517550078427819" "78505179448783")) goto x962_err; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, "87194383164871543355722284926904419997237591535066528048", "308992691965804947361541664549085895292153777025772063598")) goto x962_err; if (!x9_62_test_internal(out, NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, "2159633321041961198501834003903461262881815148684178964245" "5876922391552", "1970303740007316867383349976549972270528498040721988191026" "49413465737174")) goto x962_err; # endif ret = 1; x962_err: if (!restore_rand()) ret = 0; return ret; } int test_builtin(BIO *out) { EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL; size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL; EC_GROUP *group; ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL, *modified_sig = NULL; unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; const unsigned char *sig_ptr; unsigned char *sig_ptr2; unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL; const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; BIGNUM *modified_r = NULL, *modified_s = NULL; BIGNUM *unmodified_r = NULL, *unmodified_s = NULL; unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len; int nid, ret = 0; /* fill digest values with some random data */ if (RAND_bytes(digest, 20) <= 0 || RAND_bytes(wrong_digest, 20) <= 0) { BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* * create and verify a ecdsa signature with every available curve (with ) */ BIO_printf(out, "\ntesting ECDSA_sign() and ECDSA_verify() " "with some internal curves:\n"); /* get a list of all internal curves */ crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0); curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len); if (curves == NULL) { BIO_printf(out, "malloc error\n"); goto builtin_err; } if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) { BIO_printf(out, "unable to get internal curves\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* now create and verify a signature for every curve */ for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) { unsigned char dirt, offset; nid = curves[n].nid; if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_X25519) continue; /* create new ecdsa key (== EC_KEY) */ if ((eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) goto builtin_err; group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (group == NULL) goto builtin_err; if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) goto builtin_err; EC_GROUP_free(group); degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); if (degree < 160) { /* drop the curve */ EC_KEY_free(eckey); eckey = NULL; continue; } BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); /* create key */ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* create second key */ if ((wrong_eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) goto builtin_err; group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (group == NULL) goto builtin_err; if (EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey, group) == 0) goto builtin_err; EC_GROUP_free(group); if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* check key */ if (!EC_KEY_check_key(eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* create signature */ sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey); if ((signature = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL) goto builtin_err; if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature, &sig_len, eckey)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* verify signature */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* verify signature with the wrong key */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, wrong_eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* wrong digest */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* wrong length */ if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1, eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); /* * Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't garble * the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and modify a byte in * one of the bignums directly. */ sig_ptr = signature; if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } ECDSA_SIG_get0(ecdsa_sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); /* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */ r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s); bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8; if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len)) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } buf_len = 2 * bn_len; if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(buf_len)) == NULL) goto builtin_err; BN_bn2bin(sig_r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len); BN_bn2bin(sig_s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len); /* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */ offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len; dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1; raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; /* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */ modified_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new(); if (modified_sig == NULL) goto builtin_err; if (((modified_r = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL) || ((modified_s = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL) || !ECDSA_SIG_set0(modified_sig, modified_r, modified_s)) { BN_free(modified_r); BN_free(modified_s); goto builtin_err; } sig_ptr2 = signature; sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(modified_sig, &sig_ptr2); if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } /* * Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */ raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt; if (((unmodified_r = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL) || ((unmodified_s = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, NULL)) == NULL) || !ECDSA_SIG_set0(modified_sig, unmodified_r, unmodified_s)) { BN_free(unmodified_r); BN_free(unmodified_s); goto builtin_err; } sig_ptr2 = signature; sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(modified_sig, &sig_ptr2); if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) { BIO_printf(out, " failed\n"); goto builtin_err; } BIO_printf(out, "."); (void)BIO_flush(out); BIO_printf(out, " ok\n"); /* cleanup */ /* clean bogus errors */ ERR_clear_error(); OPENSSL_free(signature); signature = NULL; EC_KEY_free(eckey); eckey = NULL; EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); wrong_eckey = NULL; ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); ecdsa_sig = NULL; ECDSA_SIG_free(modified_sig); modified_sig = NULL; OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); raw_buf = NULL; } ret = 1; builtin_err: EC_KEY_free(eckey); EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey); ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); ECDSA_SIG_free(modified_sig); OPENSSL_free(signature); OPENSSL_free(raw_buf); OPENSSL_free(curves); return ret; } int main(void) { int ret = 1; BIO *out; char *p; out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); /* initialize the prng */ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed)); /* the tests */ if (!x9_62_tests(out)) goto err; if (!test_builtin(out)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) BIO_printf(out, "\nECDSA test failed\n"); else BIO_printf(out, "\nECDSA test passed\n"); if (ret) ERR_print_errors(out); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out) <= 0) ret = 1; #endif BIO_free(out); return ret; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/gmdifftest.c0000644000000000000000000000460113176625661015336 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #define SECS_PER_DAY (24 * 60 * 60) /* * Time checking test code. Check times are identical for a wide range of * offsets. This should be run on a machine with 64 bit time_t or it will * trigger the very errors the routines fix. */ static int check_time(long offset) { struct tm tm1, tm2, o1; int off_day, off_sec; long toffset; time_t t1, t2; time(&t1); t2 = t1 + offset; OPENSSL_gmtime(&t2, &tm2); OPENSSL_gmtime(&t1, &tm1); o1 = tm1; OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(&tm1, 0, offset); if ((tm1.tm_year != tm2.tm_year) || (tm1.tm_mon != tm2.tm_mon) || (tm1.tm_mday != tm2.tm_mday) || (tm1.tm_hour != tm2.tm_hour) || (tm1.tm_min != tm2.tm_min) || (tm1.tm_sec != tm2.tm_sec)) { fprintf(stderr, "TIME ERROR!!\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Time1: %d/%d/%d, %d:%02d:%02d\n", tm2.tm_mday, tm2.tm_mon + 1, tm2.tm_year + 1900, tm2.tm_hour, tm2.tm_min, tm2.tm_sec); fprintf(stderr, "Time2: %d/%d/%d, %d:%02d:%02d\n", tm1.tm_mday, tm1.tm_mon + 1, tm1.tm_year + 1900, tm1.tm_hour, tm1.tm_min, tm1.tm_sec); return 0; } if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&off_day, &off_sec, &o1, &tm1)) return 0; toffset = (long)off_day *SECS_PER_DAY + off_sec; if (offset != toffset) { fprintf(stderr, "TIME OFFSET ERROR!!\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Expected %ld, Got %ld (%d:%d)\n", offset, toffset, off_day, off_sec); return 0; } return 1; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { long offset; int fails; if (sizeof(time_t) < 8) { fprintf(stderr, "Skipping; time_t is less than 64-bits\n"); return 0; } for (fails = 0, offset = 0; offset < 1000000; offset++) { if (!check_time(offset)) fails++; if (!check_time(-offset)) fails++; if (!check_time(offset * 1000)) fails++; if (!check_time(-offset * 1000)) fails++; } return fails ? 1 : 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/destest.c0000644000000000000000000007244513176625661014670 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # define OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # endif #else # include #endif #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No DES support\n"); return (0); } #else # include /* tisk tisk - the test keys don't all have odd parity :-( */ /* test data */ # define NUM_TESTS 34 static unsigned char key_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10}, {0x7C, 0xA1, 0x10, 0x45, 0x4A, 0x1A, 0x6E, 0x57}, {0x01, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xC1, 0x37, 0x6E}, {0x07, 0xA1, 0x13, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0x0B, 0x26, 0x86}, {0x38, 0x49, 0x67, 0x4C, 0x26, 0x02, 0x31, 0x9E}, {0x04, 0xB9, 0x15, 0xBA, 0x43, 0xFE, 0xB5, 0xB6}, {0x01, 0x13, 0xB9, 0x70, 0xFD, 0x34, 0xF2, 0xCE}, {0x01, 0x70, 0xF1, 0x75, 0x46, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xE6}, {0x43, 0x29, 0x7F, 0xAD, 0x38, 0xE3, 0x73, 0xFE}, {0x07, 0xA7, 0x13, 0x70, 0x45, 0xDA, 0x2A, 0x16}, {0x04, 0x68, 0x91, 0x04, 0xC2, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0x2F}, {0x37, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xB5, 0x16, 0xCB, 0x75, 0x46}, {0x1F, 0x08, 0x26, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0xC2, 0x46, 0x5E}, {0x58, 0x40, 0x23, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xBA, 0x61, 0x76}, {0x02, 0x58, 0x16, 0x16, 0x46, 0x29, 0xB0, 0x07}, {0x49, 0x79, 0x3E, 0xBC, 0x79, 0xB3, 0x25, 0x8F}, {0x4F, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x73, 0xA7}, {0x49, 0xE9, 0x5D, 0x6D, 0x4C, 0xA2, 0x29, 0xBF}, {0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0xDC, 0x40, 0x9B, 0x26, 0xD6}, {0x1C, 0x58, 0x7F, 0x1C, 0x13, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01}, {0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E}, {0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10} }; static unsigned char plain_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0xD0, 0x39, 0x77, 0x67, 0x42}, {0x5C, 0xD5, 0x4C, 0xA8, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x57, 0xDA}, {0x02, 0x48, 0xD4, 0x38, 0x06, 0xF6, 0x71, 0x72}, {0x51, 0x45, 0x4B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x44, 0x0A}, {0x42, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x30, 0x59, 0x57, 0x7F, 0xA2}, {0x05, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x08, 0x51, 0xCF, 0x14, 0x3A}, {0x07, 0x56, 0xD8, 0xE0, 0x77, 0x47, 0x61, 0xD2}, {0x76, 0x25, 0x14, 0xB8, 0x29, 0xBF, 0x48, 0x6A}, {0x3B, 0xDD, 0x11, 0x90, 0x49, 0x37, 0x28, 0x02}, {0x26, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x9A}, {0x16, 0x4D, 0x5E, 0x40, 0x4F, 0x27, 0x52, 0x32}, {0x6B, 0x05, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x75, 0x9F, 0x5C, 0xCA}, {0x00, 0x4B, 0xD6, 0xEF, 0x09, 0x17, 0x60, 0x62}, {0x48, 0x0D, 0x39, 0x00, 0x6E, 0xE7, 0x62, 0xF2}, {0x43, 0x75, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x69, 0x8F, 0x3C, 0xFA}, {0x07, 0x2D, 0x43, 0xA0, 0x77, 0x07, 0x52, 0x92}, {0x02, 0xFE, 0x55, 0x77, 0x81, 0x17, 0xF1, 0x2A}, {0x1D, 0x9D, 0x5C, 0x50, 0x18, 0xF7, 0x28, 0xC2}, {0x30, 0x55, 0x32, 0x28, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x29, 0x5A}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF} }; static unsigned char cipher_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = { {0x8C, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xE9, 0xC1, 0xB1, 0x23, 0xA7}, {0x73, 0x59, 0xB2, 0x16, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0xDC, 0x58}, {0x95, 0x8E, 0x6E, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x05, 0x55, 0x7B}, {0xF4, 0x03, 0x79, 0xAB, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xC5, 0x33}, {0x17, 0x66, 0x8D, 0xFC, 0x72, 0x92, 0x53, 0x2D}, {0x8A, 0x5A, 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x1A, 0xB8, 0xF2, 0xDD}, {0x8C, 0xA6, 0x4D, 0xE9, 0xC1, 0xB1, 0x23, 0xA7}, {0xED, 0x39, 0xD9, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x74, 0xBC, 0xC4}, {0x69, 0x0F, 0x5B, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0x26, 0x93, 0x9B}, {0x7A, 0x38, 0x9D, 0x10, 0x35, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0x71}, {0x86, 0x8E, 0xBB, 0x51, 0xCA, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x9A}, {0x71, 0x78, 0x87, 0x6E, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x9B, 0x2A}, {0xAF, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x42, 0x1F, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x95}, {0x86, 0xA5, 0x60, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xC6, 0xD8, 0x5B}, {0x0C, 0xD3, 0xDA, 0x02, 0x00, 0x21, 0xDC, 0x09}, {0xEA, 0x67, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0xDB, 0x2B, 0x7A}, {0xDF, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x81, 0x5C, 0xAF, 0x1A, 0x0F}, {0x5C, 0x51, 0x3C, 0x9C, 0x48, 0x86, 0xC0, 0x88}, {0x0A, 0x2A, 0xEE, 0xAE, 0x3F, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0x77}, {0xEF, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x5D, 0xFA, 0x57, 0x5A}, {0x88, 0xBF, 0x0D, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x0D, 0xEE, 0x56}, {0xA1, 0xF9, 0x91, 0x55, 0x41, 0x02, 0x0B, 0x56}, {0x6F, 0xBF, 0x1C, 0xAF, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0x05, 0x56}, {0x2F, 0x22, 0xE4, 0x9B, 0xAB, 0x7C, 0xA1, 0xAC}, {0x5A, 0x6B, 0x61, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0xCE, 0x4A}, {0x5F, 0x4C, 0x03, 0x8E, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0x2E, 0x41}, {0x63, 0xFA, 0xC0, 0xD0, 0x34, 0xD9, 0xF7, 0x93}, {0x61, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0x0C, 0xE8, 0xF0, 0x71, 0x00}, {0xDB, 0x95, 0x86, 0x05, 0xF8, 0xC8, 0xC6, 0x06}, {0xED, 0xBF, 0xD1, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x29, 0xCC, 0xC7}, {0x35, 0x55, 0x50, 0xB2, 0x15, 0x0E, 0x24, 0x51}, {0xCA, 0xAA, 0xAF, 0x4D, 0xEA, 0xF1, 0xDB, 0xAE}, {0xD5, 0xD4, 0x4F, 0xF7, 0x20, 0x68, 0x3D, 0x0D}, {0x2A, 0x2B, 0xB0, 0x08, 0xDF, 0x97, 0xC2, 0xF2} }; static unsigned char cipher_ecb2[NUM_TESTS - 1][8] = { {0x92, 0x95, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x73, 0x6E}, {0x19, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x6D, 0xF3, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0x16}, {0x2A, 0x4B, 0x4D, 0x24, 0x52, 0x43, 0x84, 0x27}, {0x35, 0x84, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x9D, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xB6}, {0x4A, 0x5B, 0x2F, 0x42, 0xAA, 0x77, 0x19, 0x25}, {0xA0, 0x6B, 0xA9, 0xB8, 0xCA, 0x5B, 0x17, 0x8A}, {0xAB, 0x9D, 0xB7, 0xFB, 0xED, 0x95, 0xF2, 0x74}, {0x3D, 0x25, 0x6C, 0x23, 0xA7, 0x25, 0x2F, 0xD6}, {0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAB, 0x4F, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xB7, 0x67}, {0x8F, 0x68, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0x1A, 0x10}, {0x82, 0x57, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0x50, 0x5E, 0x81, 0x85}, {0xA2, 0x0F, 0x0A, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x89, 0x7D, 0xFA}, {0xCD, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x3A, 0xDB, 0x0D, 0x7E, 0xF3}, {0xD2, 0xC2, 0xBE, 0x27, 0xE8, 0x1B, 0x68, 0xE3}, {0xE9, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x89, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x0A}, {0xA7, 0x18, 0xC3, 0x9F, 0xFA, 0x9F, 0xD7, 0x69}, {0x77, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xB1, 0xD2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0xB1}, {0x49, 0xAB, 0x92, 0x7F, 0xD0, 0x22, 0x00, 0xB7}, {0xCE, 0x1C, 0x6C, 0x7D, 0x85, 0xE3, 0x4A, 0x6F}, {0xBE, 0x91, 0xD6, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xE9, 0x87}, {0x70, 0x28, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x74, 0x1A}, {0xAA, 0x37, 0x80, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x22, 0x1D, 0xDE}, {0xA6, 0xC4, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x28, 0x93, 0xAC, 0xB3}, {0x22, 0x07, 0x81, 0x5A, 0xE4, 0xB7, 0x1A, 0xAD}, {0xDC, 0xCE, 0x05, 0xE7, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xF5, 0x84}, {0x26, 0x1D, 0x39, 0x2C, 0xB3, 0xBA, 0xA5, 0x85}, {0xB4, 0xF7, 0x0F, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x04, 0xF0, 0xDC}, {0x95, 0xBA, 0xA9, 0x4E, 0x87, 0x36, 0xF2, 0x89}, {0xD4, 0x07, 0x3A, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0x82, 0x0E}, {0xEF, 0x6F, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0x66, 0x1A, 0x7E, 0x89}, {0xC1, 0x97, 0xF5, 0x58, 0x74, 0x8A, 0x20, 0xE7}, {0x43, 0x34, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x86, 0xC8}, {0x08, 0xD7, 0xB4, 0xFB, 0x62, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x85} }; static unsigned char cbc_key[8] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef }; static unsigned char cbc2_key[8] = { 0xf1, 0xe0, 0xd3, 0xc2, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0x97, 0x86 }; static unsigned char cbc3_key[8] = { 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }; static unsigned char cbc_iv[8] = { 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }; /* * Changed the following text constant to binary so it will work on ebcdic * machines :-) */ /* static char cbc_data[40]="7654321 Now is the time for \0001"; */ static unsigned char cbc_data[40] = { 0x37, 0x36, 0x35, 0x34, 0x33, 0x32, 0x31, 0x20, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6D, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x20, 0x00, 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, }; static unsigned char cbc_ok[32] = { 0xcc, 0xd1, 0x73, 0xff, 0xab, 0x20, 0x39, 0xf4, 0xac, 0xd8, 0xae, 0xfd, 0xdf, 0xd8, 0xa1, 0xeb, 0x46, 0x8e, 0x91, 0x15, 0x78, 0x88, 0xba, 0x68, 0x1d, 0x26, 0x93, 0x97, 0xf7, 0xfe, 0x62, 0xb4 }; # ifdef SCREW_THE_PARITY # error "SCREW_THE_PARITY is not meant to be defined." # error "Original vectors are preserved for reference only." static unsigned char cbc2_key[8] = { 0xf0, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x87 }; static unsigned char xcbc_ok[32] = { 0x86, 0x74, 0x81, 0x0D, 0x61, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0x48, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x03, 0xE1, 0xB8, 0xBB, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0x64, 0x30, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x06, 0x65, 0x81, 0x76, 0x04, 0x1D, 0x77, 0x62, 0x17, 0xCA, 0x2B, 0xD2, }; # else static unsigned char xcbc_ok[32] = { 0x84, 0x6B, 0x29, 0x14, 0x85, 0x1E, 0x9A, 0x29, 0x54, 0x73, 0x2F, 0x8A, 0xA0, 0xA6, 0x11, 0xC1, 0x15, 0xCD, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0x95, 0x1B, 0x10, 0x53, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0x5E, 0x03, 0xB2, 0x1A, 0xA3, 0xC4, }; # endif static unsigned char cbc3_ok[32] = { 0x3F, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xAC, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x22, 0x13, 0x76, 0x3C, 0x1C, 0xBD, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x79, 0x96, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x1C, 0x67, 0x38, 0x12, 0xCF, 0xDE, 0x96, 0x75 }; static unsigned char pcbc_ok[32] = { 0xcc, 0xd1, 0x73, 0xff, 0xab, 0x20, 0x39, 0xf4, 0x6d, 0xec, 0xb4, 0x70, 0xa0, 0xe5, 0x6b, 0x15, 0xae, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x61, 0xed, 0x7d, 0x9c, 0x9f, 0xf7, 0x17, 0x46, 0x3b, 0x8a, 0xb3, 0xcc, 0x88 }; static unsigned char cfb_key[8] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef }; static unsigned char cfb_iv[8] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef }; static unsigned char cfb_buf1[40], cfb_buf2[40], cfb_tmp[8]; static unsigned char plain[24] = { 0x4e, 0x6f, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20 }; static unsigned char cfb_cipher8[24] = { 0xf3, 0x1f, 0xda, 0x07, 0x01, 0x14, 0x62, 0xee, 0x18, 0x7f, 0x43, 0xd8, 0x0a, 0x7c, 0xd9, 0xb5, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0x90, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0x9a, 0x87 }; static unsigned char cfb_cipher16[24] = { 0xF3, 0x09, 0x87, 0x87, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xF7, 0x3C, 0x36, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0x70, 0xD8, 0xD5, 0x34, 0x19, 0xD3, 0x86, 0xB2, 0x23, 0xB7, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0x1B }; static unsigned char cfb_cipher32[24] = { 0xF3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xA4, 0xDF, 0xA4, 0x9F, 0x33, 0xDC, 0x7B, 0xAD, 0x4C, 0xC8, 0x9F, 0x64, 0xE4, 0x53, 0xE5, 0xEC, 0x67, 0x20, 0xDA, 0xB6 }; static unsigned char cfb_cipher48[24] = { 0xF3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xC7, 0xF4, 0x30, 0xB5, 0x15, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0x85, 0x97, 0x5A, 0x13, 0x8C, 0x68, 0x60, 0xE2, 0x38, 0x34, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0x1F }; static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[24] = { 0xF3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xC7, 0xF4, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x83, 0x9B, 0x1A, 0x92, 0xF7, 0x84, 0x03, 0x46, 0x71, 0x33, 0x89, 0x8E, 0xA6, 0x22 }; static unsigned char ofb_key[8] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef }; static unsigned char ofb_iv[8] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef }; static unsigned char ofb_buf1[24], ofb_buf2[24], ofb_tmp[8]; static unsigned char ofb_cipher[24] = { 0xf3, 0x09, 0x62, 0x49, 0xc7, 0xf4, 0x6e, 0x51, 0x35, 0xf2, 0x4a, 0x24, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0x3d, 0x3f, 0x3d, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xe3, 0x25, 0x5a, 0xf8, 0xc3 }; static DES_LONG cbc_cksum_ret = 0xF7FE62B4L; static unsigned char cbc_cksum_data[8] = { 0x1D, 0x26, 0x93, 0x97, 0xf7, 0xfe, 0x62, 0xb4 }; static char *pt(unsigned char *p); static int cfb_test(int bits, unsigned char *cfb_cipher); static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher); static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int j, err = 0; unsigned int i; DES_cblock in, out, outin, iv3; DES_key_schedule ks, ks2, ks3; unsigned char cbc_in[40]; unsigned char cbc_out[40]; DES_LONG cs; unsigned char cret[8]; DES_LONG lqret[4]; int num; char *str; printf("Doing ecb\n"); for (i = 0; i < NUM_TESTS; i++) { DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i], &ks); memcpy(in, plain_data[i], 8); memset(out, 0, 8); memset(outin, 0, 8); DES_ecb_encrypt(&in, &out, &ks, DES_ENCRYPT); DES_ecb_encrypt(&out, &outin, &ks, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(out, cipher_data[i], 8) != 0) { printf("Encryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n", i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(in), pt(cipher_data[i]), pt(out)); err = 1; } if (memcmp(in, outin, 8) != 0) { printf("Decryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n", i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(out), pt(in), pt(outin)); err = 1; } } # ifndef LIBDES_LIT printf("Doing ede ecb\n"); for (i = 0; i < (NUM_TESTS - 2); i++) { DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i], &ks); DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i + 1], &ks2); DES_set_key_unchecked(&key_data[i + 2], &ks3); memcpy(in, plain_data[i], 8); memset(out, 0, 8); memset(outin, 0, 8); DES_ecb3_encrypt(&in,&out,&ks,&ks2,&ks,DES_ENCRYPT); DES_ecb3_encrypt(&out,&outin,&ks,&ks2,&ks,DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(out, cipher_ecb2[i], 8) != 0) { printf("Encryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n", i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(in), pt(cipher_ecb2[i]), pt(out)); err = 1; } if (memcmp(in, outin, 8) != 0) { printf("Decryption error %2d\nk=%s p=%s o=%s act=%s\n", i + 1, pt(key_data[i]), pt(out), pt(in), pt(outin)); err = 1; } } # endif printf("Doing cbc\n"); if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) { printf("Key error %d\n", j); err = 1; } memset(cbc_out, 0, 40); memset(cbc_in, 0, 40); memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv)); DES_ncbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &iv3, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_out, cbc_ok, 32) != 0) { printf("cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n"); err = 1; } memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv)); DES_ncbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &iv3, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data)) != 0) { printf("cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } # ifndef LIBDES_LIT printf("Doing desx cbc\n"); if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) { printf("Key error %d\n", j); err = 1; } memset(cbc_out, 0, 40); memset(cbc_in, 0, 40); memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv)); DES_xcbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &iv3, &cbc2_key, &cbc3_key, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_out, xcbc_ok, 32) != 0) { printf("des_xcbc_encrypt encrypt error\n"); err = 1; } memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv)); DES_xcbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &iv3, &cbc2_key, &cbc3_key, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1) != 0) { printf("des_xcbc_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } # endif printf("Doing ede cbc\n"); if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) { printf("Key error %d\n", j); err = 1; } if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc2_key, &ks2)) != 0) { printf("Key error %d\n", j); err = 1; } if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc3_key, &ks3)) != 0) { printf("Key error %d\n", j); err = 1; } memset(cbc_out, 0, 40); memset(cbc_in, 0, 40); i = strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1; /* i=((i+7)/8)*8; */ memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv)); DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, 16L, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, DES_ENCRYPT); DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(&(cbc_data[16]), &(cbc_out[16]), i - 16, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp (cbc_out, cbc3_ok, (unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1 + 7) / 8 * 8) != 0) { unsigned int n; printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (n = 0; n < i; ++n) printf(" %02x", cbc_out[n]); printf("\n"); for (n = 0; n < i; ++n) printf(" %02x", cbc3_ok[n]); printf("\n"); err = 1; } memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv)); DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, i, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1) != 0) { unsigned int n; printf("DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n"); for (n = 0; n < i; ++n) printf(" %02x", cbc_data[n]); printf("\n"); for (n = 0; n < i; ++n) printf(" %02x", cbc_in[n]); printf("\n"); err = 1; } # ifndef LIBDES_LIT printf("Doing pcbc\n"); if ((j = DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks)) != 0) { printf("Key error %d\n", j); err = 1; } memset(cbc_out, 0, 40); memset(cbc_in, 0, 40); DES_pcbc_encrypt(cbc_data, cbc_out, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &cbc_iv, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_out, pcbc_ok, 32) != 0) { printf("pcbc_encrypt encrypt error\n"); err = 1; } DES_pcbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &cbc_iv, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1) != 0) { printf("pcbc_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } printf("Doing "); printf("cfb8 "); err += cfb_test(8, cfb_cipher8); printf("cfb16 "); err += cfb_test(16, cfb_cipher16); printf("cfb32 "); err += cfb_test(32, cfb_cipher32); printf("cfb48 "); err += cfb_test(48, cfb_cipher48); printf("cfb64 "); err += cfb_test(64, cfb_cipher64); printf("cfb64() "); err += cfb64_test(cfb_cipher64); memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++) DES_cfb_encrypt(&(plain[i]), &(cfb_buf1[i]), 8, 1, &ks, &cfb_tmp, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cfb_cipher8, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { printf("cfb_encrypt small encrypt error\n"); err = 1; } memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++) DES_cfb_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[i]), &(cfb_buf2[i]), 8, 1, &ks, &cfb_tmp, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { printf("cfb_encrypt small decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } printf("ede_cfb64() "); err += ede_cfb64_test(cfb_cipher64); printf("done\n"); printf("Doing ofb\n"); DES_set_key_checked(&ofb_key, &ks); memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv)); DES_ofb_encrypt(plain, ofb_buf1, 64, sizeof(plain) / 8, &ks, &ofb_tmp); if (memcmp(ofb_cipher, ofb_buf1, sizeof(ofb_buf1)) != 0) { printf("ofb_encrypt encrypt error\n"); printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n", ofb_buf1[8 + 0], ofb_buf1[8 + 1], ofb_buf1[8 + 2], ofb_buf1[8 + 3], ofb_buf1[8 + 4], ofb_buf1[8 + 5], ofb_buf1[8 + 6], ofb_buf1[8 + 7]); printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n", ofb_buf1[8 + 0], ofb_cipher[8 + 1], ofb_cipher[8 + 2], ofb_cipher[8 + 3], ofb_buf1[8 + 4], ofb_cipher[8 + 5], ofb_cipher[8 + 6], ofb_cipher[8 + 7]); err = 1; } memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv)); DES_ofb_encrypt(ofb_buf1, ofb_buf2, 64, sizeof(ofb_buf1) / 8, &ks, &ofb_tmp); if (memcmp(plain, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf2)) != 0) { printf("ofb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n", ofb_buf2[8 + 0], ofb_buf2[8 + 1], ofb_buf2[8 + 2], ofb_buf2[8 + 3], ofb_buf2[8 + 4], ofb_buf2[8 + 5], ofb_buf2[8 + 6], ofb_buf2[8 + 7]); printf("%02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X %02X\n", plain[8 + 0], plain[8 + 1], plain[8 + 2], plain[8 + 3], plain[8 + 4], plain[8 + 5], plain[8 + 6], plain[8 + 7]); err = 1; } printf("Doing ofb64\n"); DES_set_key_checked(&ofb_key, &ks); memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv)); memset(ofb_buf1, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1)); memset(ofb_buf2, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1)); num = 0; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++) { DES_ofb64_encrypt(&(plain[i]), &(ofb_buf1[i]), 1, &ks, &ofb_tmp, &num); } if (memcmp(ofb_cipher, ofb_buf1, sizeof(ofb_buf1)) != 0) { printf("ofb64_encrypt encrypt error\n"); err = 1; } memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv)); num = 0; DES_ofb64_encrypt(ofb_buf1, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf1), &ks, &ofb_tmp, &num); if (memcmp(plain, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf2)) != 0) { printf("ofb64_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } printf("Doing ede_ofb64\n"); DES_set_key_checked(&ofb_key, &ks); memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv)); memset(ofb_buf1, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1)); memset(ofb_buf2, 0, sizeof(ofb_buf1)); num = 0; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(plain); i++) { DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(&(plain[i]), &(ofb_buf1[i]), 1, &ks, &ks, &ks, &ofb_tmp, &num); } if (memcmp(ofb_cipher, ofb_buf1, sizeof(ofb_buf1)) != 0) { printf("ede_ofb64_encrypt encrypt error\n"); err = 1; } memcpy(ofb_tmp, ofb_iv, sizeof(ofb_iv)); num = 0; DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(ofb_buf1, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf1), &ks, &ks, &ks, &ofb_tmp, &num); if (memcmp(plain, ofb_buf2, sizeof(ofb_buf2)) != 0) { printf("ede_ofb64_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } printf("Doing cbc_cksum\n"); DES_set_key_checked(&cbc_key, &ks); cs = DES_cbc_cksum(cbc_data, &cret, strlen((char *)cbc_data), &ks, &cbc_iv); if (cs != cbc_cksum_ret) { printf("bad return value (%08lX), should be %08lX\n", (unsigned long)cs, (unsigned long)cbc_cksum_ret); err = 1; } if (memcmp(cret, cbc_cksum_data, 8) != 0) { printf("bad cbc_cksum block returned\n"); err = 1; } printf("Doing quad_cksum\n"); cs = DES_quad_cksum(cbc_data, (DES_cblock *)lqret, (long)strlen((char *)cbc_data), 2, (DES_cblock *)cbc_iv); if (cs != 0x70d7a63aL) { printf("quad_cksum error, ret %08lx should be 70d7a63a\n", (unsigned long)cs); err = 1; } if (lqret[0] != 0x327eba8dL) { printf("quad_cksum error, out[0] %08lx is not %08lx\n", (unsigned long)lqret[0], 0x327eba8dUL); err = 1; } if (lqret[1] != 0x201a49ccL) { printf("quad_cksum error, out[1] %08lx is not %08lx\n", (unsigned long)lqret[1], 0x201a49ccUL); err = 1; } if (lqret[2] != 0x70d7a63aL) { printf("quad_cksum error, out[2] %08lx is not %08lx\n", (unsigned long)lqret[2], 0x70d7a63aUL); err = 1; } if (lqret[3] != 0x501c2c26L) { printf("quad_cksum error, out[3] %08lx is not %08lx\n", (unsigned long)lqret[3], 0x501c2c26UL); err = 1; } # endif printf("input word alignment test"); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { printf(" %d", i); DES_ncbc_encrypt(&(cbc_out[i]), cbc_in, strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &cbc_iv, DES_ENCRYPT); } printf("\noutput word alignment test"); for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { printf(" %d", i); DES_ncbc_encrypt(cbc_out, &(cbc_in[i]), strlen((char *)cbc_data) + 1, &ks, &cbc_iv, DES_ENCRYPT); } printf("\n"); printf("fast crypt test "); str = DES_crypt("testing", "ef"); if (strcmp("efGnQx2725bI2", str) != 0) { printf("fast crypt error, %s should be efGnQx2725bI2\n", str); err = 1; } str = DES_crypt("bca76;23", "yA"); if (strcmp("yA1Rp/1hZXIJk", str) != 0) { printf("fast crypt error, %s should be yA1Rp/1hZXIJk\n", str); err = 1; } str = DES_crypt("testing", "y\202"); if (str != NULL) { printf("salt error only usascii are accepted\n"); err = 1; } str = DES_crypt("testing", "\0A"); if (str != NULL) { printf("salt error cannot contain null terminator\n"); err = 1; } str = DES_crypt("testing", "A"); if (str != NULL) { printf("salt error must be at least 2\n"); err = 1; } printf("\n"); return (err); } static char *pt(unsigned char *p) { static char bufs[10][20]; static int bnum = 0; char *ret; int i; static char *f = "0123456789ABCDEF"; ret = &(bufs[bnum++][0]); bnum %= 10; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { ret[i * 2] = f[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; ret[i * 2 + 1] = f[p[i] & 0xf]; } ret[16] = '\0'; return (ret); } # ifndef LIBDES_LIT static int cfb_test(int bits, unsigned char *cfb_cipher) { DES_key_schedule ks; int i, err = 0; DES_set_key_checked(&cfb_key, &ks); memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); DES_cfb_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, bits, sizeof(plain), &ks, &cfb_tmp, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { err = 1; printf("cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); } memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); DES_cfb_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, bits, sizeof(plain), &ks, &cfb_tmp, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { err = 1; printf("cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); } return (err); } static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher) { DES_key_schedule ks; int err = 0, i, n; DES_set_key_checked(&cfb_key, &ks); memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); n = 0; DES_cfb64_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, 12, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_ENCRYPT); DES_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]), &(cfb_buf1[12]), sizeof(plain) - 12, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { err = 1; printf("cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); } memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); n = 0; DES_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, 17, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT); DES_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]), &(cfb_buf2[17]), sizeof(plain) - 17, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { err = 1; printf("cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf2[i]))); } return (err); } static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher) { DES_key_schedule ks; int err = 0, i, n; DES_set_key_checked(&cfb_key, &ks); memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); n = 0; DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, 12, &ks, &ks, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_ENCRYPT); DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]), &(cfb_buf1[12]), sizeof(plain) - 12, &ks, &ks, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { err = 1; printf("ede_cfb_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); } memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, sizeof(cfb_iv)); n = 0; DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, (long)17, &ks, &ks, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT); DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]), &(cfb_buf2[17]), sizeof(plain) - 17, &ks, &ks, &ks, &cfb_tmp, &n, DES_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, sizeof(plain)) != 0) { err = 1; printf("ede_cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf2[i]))); } return (err); } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/CAssdsa.cnf0000644000000000000000000000133113176625661015044 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # hacked by iang to do DSA certs - CA RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = ES countryName_value = ES organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = Hermanos Locos commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) commonName_value = Hermanos Locos CA openssl-1.1.0g/test/evptests.txt0000644000000000000000000267424013176625661015472 0ustar rootroot# # Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html #cipher:key:iv:plaintext:ciphertext:0/1(decrypt/encrypt) #aadcipher:key:iv:plaintext:ciphertext:aad:tag:0/1(decrypt/encrypt) #digest:::input:output # BLAKE2 tests, using same inputs as MD5 # There are no official BLAKE2 test vectors we can use since they all use a key # Which is currently unsupported by OpenSSL. They were generated using the # reference implementation. RFC7693 also mentions the 616263 / "abc" values. Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = Output = 69217a3079908094e11121d042354a7c1f55b6482ca1a51e1b250dfd1ed0eef9 Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 61 Output = 4a0d129873403037c2cd9b9048203687f6233fb6738956e0349bd4320fec3e90 Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 616263 Output = 508c5e8c327c14e2e1a72ba34eeb452f37458b209ed63a294d999b4c86675982 Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 6d65737361676520646967657374 Output = fa10ab775acf89b7d3c8a6e823d586f6b67bdbac4ce207fe145b7d3ac25cd28c Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a Output = bdf88eb1f86a0cdf0e840ba88fa118508369df186c7355b4b16cf79fa2710a12 Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839 Output = c75439ea17e1de6fa4510c335dc3d3f343e6f9e1ce2773e25b4174f1df8b119b Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930 Output = fdaedb290a0d5af9870864fec2e090200989dc9cd53a3c092129e8535e8b4f66 Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F Output = 1FA877DE67259D19863A2A34BCC6962A2B25FCBF5CBECD7EDE8F1FA36688A796 Digest = BLAKE2s256 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F8081 Output = C80ABEEBB669AD5DEEB5F5EC8EA6B7A05DDF7D31EC4C0A2EE20B0B98CAEC6746 Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = Output = 786a02f742015903c6c6fd852552d272912f4740e15847618a86e217f71f5419d25e1031afee585313896444934eb04b903a685b1448b755d56f701afe9be2ce Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 61 Output = 333fcb4ee1aa7c115355ec66ceac917c8bfd815bf7587d325aec1864edd24e34d5abe2c6b1b5ee3face62fed78dbef802f2a85cb91d455a8f5249d330853cb3c Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 616263 Output = ba80a53f981c4d0d6a2797b69f12f6e94c212f14685ac4b74b12bb6fdbffa2d17d87c5392aab792dc252d5de4533cc9518d38aa8dbf1925ab92386edd4009923 Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 6d65737361676520646967657374 Output = 3c26ce487b1c0f062363afa3c675ebdbf5f4ef9bdc022cfbef91e3111cdc283840d8331fc30a8a0906cff4bcdbcd230c61aaec60fdfad457ed96b709a382359a Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a Output = c68ede143e416eb7b4aaae0d8e48e55dd529eafed10b1df1a61416953a2b0a5666c761e7d412e6709e31ffe221b7a7a73908cb95a4d120b8b090a87d1fbedb4c Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839 Output = 99964802e5c25e703722905d3fb80046b6bca698ca9e2cc7e49b4fe1fa087c2edf0312dfbb275cf250a1e542fd5dc2edd313f9c491127c2e8c0c9b24168e2d50 Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930 Output = 686f41ec5afff6e87e1f076f542aa466466ff5fbde162c48481ba48a748d842799f5b30f5b67fc684771b33b994206d05cc310f31914edd7b97e41860d77d282 Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F Output = 2319E3789C47E2DAA5FE807F61BEC2A1A6537FA03F19FF32E87EECBFD64B7E0E8CCFF439AC333B040F19B0C4DDD11A61E24AC1FE0F10A039806C5DCC0DA3D115 Digest = BLAKE2b512 Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F8081 Output = DF0A9D0C212843A6A934E3902B2DD30D17FBA5F969D2030B12A546D8A6A45E80CF5635F071F0452E9C919275DA99BED51EB1173C1AF0518726B75B0EC3BAE2B5 # SHA(1) tests (from shatest.c) Digest = SHA1 Input = 616263 Output = a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d # MD5 tests (from md5test.c) Digest = MD5 Input = Output = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e Digest = MD5 Input = 61 Output = 0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661 Digest = MD5 Input = 616263 Output = 900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72 Digest = MD5 Input = 6d65737361676520646967657374 Output = f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0 Digest = MD5 Input = 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a Output = c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b Digest = MD5 Input = 4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839 Output = d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f Digest = MD5 Input = 3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930 Output = 57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a # MD4 tests from md4test.c Digest = MD4 Input = "" Output = 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 Digest = MD4 Input = "a" Output = bde52cb31de33e46245e05fbdbd6fb24 Digest = MD4 Input = "abc" Output = a448017aaf21d8525fc10ae87aa6729d Digest = MD4 Input = "message digest" Output = d9130a8164549fe818874806e1c7014b Digest = MD4 Input = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" Output = d79e1c308aa5bbcdeea8ed63df412da9 Digest = MD4 Input = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" Output = 043f8582f241db351ce627e153e7f0e4 Digest = MD4 Input = "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" Output = e33b4ddc9c38f2199c3e7b164fcc0536 # RIPEMD160 tests from rmdtest.c Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "" Output = 9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31 Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "a" Output = 0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "abc" Output = 8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "message digest" Output = 5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36 Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" Output = f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" Output = 12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" Output = b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189 Digest = RIPEMD160 Input = "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" Output = 9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb # whirlpool tests from wp_test.c Digest = whirlpool Input = "" Output = 19FA61D75522A4669B44E39C1D2E1726C530232130D407F89AFEE0964997F7A73E83BE698B288FEBCF88E3E03C4F0757EA8964E59B63D93708B138CC42A66EB3 Digest = whirlpool Input = "a" Output = 8ACA2602792AEC6F11A67206531FB7D7F0DFF59413145E6973C45001D0087B42D11BC645413AEFF63A42391A39145A591A92200D560195E53B478584FDAE231A Digest = whirlpool Input = "abc" Output = 4E2448A4C6F486BB16B6562C73B4020BF3043E3A731BCE721AE1B303D97E6D4C7181EEBDB6C57E277D0E34957114CBD6C797FC9D95D8B582D225292076D4EEF5 Digest = whirlpool Input = "message digest" Output = 378C84A4126E2DC6E56DCC7458377AAC838D00032230F53CE1F5700C0FFB4D3B8421557659EF55C106B4B52AC5A4AAA692ED920052838F3362E86DBD37A8903E Digest = whirlpool Input = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" Output = F1D754662636FFE92C82EBB9212A484A8D38631EAD4238F5442EE13B8054E41B08BF2A9251C30B6A0B8AAE86177AB4A6F68F673E7207865D5D9819A3DBA4EB3B Digest = whirlpool Input = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" Output = DC37E008CF9EE69BF11F00ED9ABA26901DD7C28CDEC066CC6AF42E40F82F3A1E08EBA26629129D8FB7CB57211B9281A65517CC879D7B962142C65F5A7AF01467 Digest = whirlpool Input = "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" Output = 466EF18BABB0154D25B9D38A6414F5C08784372BCCB204D6549C4AFADB6014294D5BD8DF2A6C44E538CD047B2681A51A2C60481E88C5A20B2C2A80CF3A9A083B Digest = whirlpool Input = "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijk" Output = 2A987EA40F917061F5D6F0A0E4644F488A7A5A52DEEE656207C562F988E95C6916BDC8031BC5BE1B7B947639FE050B56939BAAA0ADFF9AE6745B7B181C3BE3FD Digest = whirlpool Input = "aaaaaaaaaa" Count = 100000 Output = 0C99005BEB57EFF50A7CF005560DDF5D29057FD86B20BFD62DECA0F1CCEA4AF51FC15490EDDC47AF32BB2B66C34FF9AD8C6008AD677F77126953B226E4ED8B01 # DES EDE3 CFB1 # echo -n "Hello World" | # apps/openssl enc -des-ede3-cfb1 \ # -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 -iv 0001020304050607 | # xxd -ps -u Cipher = DES-EDE3-CFB1 Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 IV = 0001020304050607 Plaintext = "Hello World" Ciphertext = 3CF55D656E9C0664513358 Cipher = DES-EDE3-CFB1 Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 IV = 0001020304050607 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = "Hello World" Ciphertext = 3CF55D656E9C0664513358 # AES 128 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt) Cipher = AES-128-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = 69C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A # AES 192 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt) Cipher = AES-192-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = DDA97CA4864CDFE06EAF70A0EC0D7191 # AES 256 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt) Cipher = AES-256-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = 8EA2B7CA516745BFEAFC49904B496089 # AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt) #AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::00000000000000000000000000000000:C34C052CC0DA8D73451AFE5F03BE297F:1 # AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt) #AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::44416AC2D1F53C583303917E6BE9EBE0:00000000000000000000000000000000:0 # AES 192 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt) #AES-192-ECB:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::48E31E9E256718F29229319C19F15BA4:00000000000000000000000000000000:0 # AES 256 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt) #AES-256-ECB:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::058CCFFDBBCB382D1F6F56585D8A4ADE:00000000000000000000000000000000:0 # AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt) #AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:8A05FC5E095AF4848A08D328D3688E3D:1 # AES 192 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt) #AES-192-CBC:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:7BD966D53AD8C1BB85D2ADFAE87BB104:1 # AES 256 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt) #AES-256-CBC:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FE3C53653E2F45B56FCD88B2CC898FF0:1 # AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt) #AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FACA37E0B0C85373DF706E73F7C9AF86:00000000000000000000000000000000:0 # AES tests from NIST document SP800-38A # For all ECB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # AES-bits-ECB:key::plaintext:ciphertext:encdec # ECB-AES128.Encrypt and ECB-AES128.Decrypt Cipher = AES-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 3AD77BB40D7A3660A89ECAF32466EF97 Cipher = AES-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = F5D3D58503B9699DE785895A96FDBAAF Cipher = AES-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 43B1CD7F598ECE23881B00E3ED030688 Cipher = AES-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 7B0C785E27E8AD3F8223207104725DD4 # ECB-AES192.Encrypt and ECB-AES192.Decrypt Cipher = AES-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = BD334F1D6E45F25FF712A214571FA5CC Cipher = AES-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 974104846D0AD3AD7734ECB3ECEE4EEF Cipher = AES-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = EF7AFD2270E2E60ADCE0BA2FACE6444E Cipher = AES-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 9A4B41BA738D6C72FB16691603C18E0E # ECB-AES256.Encrypt and ECB-AES256.Decrypt Cipher = AES-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = F3EED1BDB5D2A03C064B5A7E3DB181F8 Cipher = AES-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 591CCB10D410ED26DC5BA74A31362870 Cipher = AES-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = B6ED21B99CA6F4F9F153E7B1BEAFED1D Cipher = AES-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 23304B7A39F9F3FF067D8D8F9E24ECC7 # For all CBC encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # AES-bits-CBC:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec # CBC-AES128.Encrypt and CBC-AES128.Decrypt Cipher = AES-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D Cipher = AES-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2 Cipher = AES-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2 Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516 Cipher = AES-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 3FF1CAA1681FAC09120ECA307586E1A7 # CBC-AES192.Encrypt and CBC-AES192.Decrypt Cipher = AES-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8 Cipher = AES-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8 Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A Cipher = AES-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0 Cipher = AES-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 08B0E27988598881D920A9E64F5615CD # CBC-AES256.Encrypt and CBC-AES256.Decrypt Cipher = AES-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6 Cipher = AES-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6 Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D Cipher = AES-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461 Cipher = AES-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = B2EB05E2C39BE9FCDA6C19078C6A9D1B # We don't support CFB{1,8}-AESxxx.{En,De}crypt # For all CFB128 encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec # CFB128-AES128.Encrypt Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6 # CFB128-AES128.Decrypt Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF Cipher = AES-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6 # CFB128-AES192.Encrypt Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174 Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9 Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF # CFB128-AES192.Decrypt Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174 Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9 Cipher = AES-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF # CFB128-AES256.Encrypt Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860 Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9 Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471 # CFB128-AES256.Decrypt Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860 Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9 Cipher = AES-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471 # For all OFB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/output':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec # OFB-AES128.Encrypt Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825 Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E # OFB-AES128.Decrypt Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825 Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC Cipher = AES-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E # OFB-AES192.Encrypt Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174 Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401 Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2 Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A # OFB-AES192.Decrypt Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174 Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401 Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2 Cipher = AES-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A # OFB-AES256.Encrypt Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860 Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408 Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484 # OFB-AES256.Decrypt Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860 Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408 Cipher = AES-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484 # AES Counter test vectors from RFC3686 Cipher = aes-128-ctr Key = AE6852F8121067CC4BF7A5765577F39E IV = 00000030000000000000000000000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367 Ciphertext = E4095D4FB7A7B3792D6175A3261311B8 Cipher = aes-128-ctr Key = 7E24067817FAE0D743D6CE1F32539163 IV = 006CB6DBC0543B59DA48D90B00000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = 5104A106168A72D9790D41EE8EDAD388EB2E1EFC46DA57C8FCE630DF9141BE28 Cipher = aes-128-ctr Key = 7691BE035E5020A8AC6E618529F9A0DC IV = 00E0017B27777F3F4A1786F000000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223 Ciphertext = C1CF48A89F2FFDD9CF4652E9EFDB72D74540A42BDE6D7836D59A5CEAAEF3105325B2072F Cipher = aes-192-ctr Key = 16AF5B145FC9F579C175F93E3BFB0EED863D06CCFDB78515 IV = 0000004836733C147D6D93CB00000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367 Ciphertext = 4B55384FE259C9C84E7935A003CBE928 Cipher = aes-192-ctr Key = 7C5CB2401B3DC33C19E7340819E0F69C678C3DB8E6F6A91A IV = 0096B03B020C6EADC2CB500D00000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = 453243FC609B23327EDFAAFA7131CD9F8490701C5AD4A79CFC1FE0FF42F4FB00 Cipher = aes-192-ctr Key = 02BF391EE8ECB159B959617B0965279BF59B60A786D3E0FE IV = 0007BDFD5CBD60278DCC091200000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223 Ciphertext = 96893FC55E5C722F540B7DD1DDF7E758D288BC95C69165884536C811662F2188ABEE0935 Cipher = aes-256-ctr Key = 776BEFF2851DB06F4C8A0542C8696F6C6A81AF1EEC96B4D37FC1D689E6C1C104 IV = 00000060DB5672C97AA8F0B200000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367 Ciphertext = 145AD01DBF824EC7560863DC71E3E0C0 Cipher = aes-256-ctr Key = F6D66D6BD52D59BB0796365879EFF886C66DD51A5B6A99744B50590C87A23884 IV = 00FAAC24C1585EF15A43D87500000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = F05E231B3894612C49EE000B804EB2A9B8306B508F839D6A5530831D9344AF1C Cipher = aes-256-ctr Key = FF7A617CE69148E4F1726E2F43581DE2AA62D9F805532EDFF1EED687FB54153D IV = 001CC5B751A51D70A1C1114800000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223 Ciphertext = EB6C52821D0BBBF7CE7594462ACA4FAAB407DF866569FD07F48CC0B583D6071F1EC0E6B8 # Self-generated vector to trigger false carry on big-endian platforms Cipher = aes-128-ctr Key = 7E24067817FAE0D743D6CE1F32539163 IV = 00000000000000007FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = A2D459477E6432BD74184B1B5370D2243CDC202BC43583B2A55D288CDBBD1E03 # DES ECB tests (from destest) Cipher = DES-ECB Key = 0000000000000000 Plaintext = 0000000000000000 Ciphertext = 8CA64DE9C1B123A7 Cipher = DES-ECB Key = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF Plaintext = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF Ciphertext = 7359B2163E4EDC58 Cipher = DES-ECB Key = 3000000000000000 Plaintext = 1000000000000001 Ciphertext = 958E6E627A05557B Cipher = DES-ECB Key = 1111111111111111 Plaintext = 1111111111111111 Ciphertext = F40379AB9E0EC533 Cipher = DES-ECB Key = 0123456789ABCDEF Plaintext = 1111111111111111 Ciphertext = 17668DFC7292532D Cipher = DES-ECB Key = 1111111111111111 Plaintext = 0123456789ABCDEF Ciphertext = 8A5AE1F81AB8F2DD Cipher = DES-ECB Key = FEDCBA9876543210 Plaintext = 0123456789ABCDEF Ciphertext = ED39D950FA74BCC4 # DESX-CBC tests (from destest) Cipher = DESX-CBC Key = 0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210 IV = fedcba9876543210 Plaintext = 37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000 Ciphertext = 846B2914851E9A2954732F8AA0A611C115CDC2D7951B1053A63C5E03B21AA3C4 # DES EDE3 CBC tests (from destest) Cipher = DES-EDE3-CBC Key = 0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210 IV = fedcba9876543210 Plaintext = 37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000 Ciphertext = 3FE301C962AC01D02213763C1CBD4CDC799657C064ECF5D41C673812CFDE9675 # RC4 tests (from rc4test) Cipher = RC4 Key = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef Plaintext = 0123456789abcdef Ciphertext = 75b7878099e0c596 Cipher = RC4 Key = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef Plaintext = 0000000000000000 Ciphertext = 7494c2e7104b0879 Cipher = RC4 Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 0000000000000000 Ciphertext = de188941a3375d3a Cipher = RC4 Key = ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345 Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd615a1162e1c7ba36b67858 Cipher = RC4 Key = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef Plaintext = 123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF012345678 Ciphertext = 66a0949f8af7d6891f7f832ba833c00c892ebe30143ce28740011ecf Cipher = RC4 Key = ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345 Plaintext = 00000000000000000000 Ciphertext = d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd61 # Camellia tests from RFC3713 # For all ECB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # CAMELLIA-bits-ECB:key::plaintext:ciphertext:encdec Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB Key = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 Plaintext = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 Ciphertext = 67673138549669730857065648eabe43 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB Key = 0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100011223344556677 Plaintext = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 Ciphertext = b4993401b3e996f84ee5cee7d79b09b9 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB Key = 0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff Plaintext = 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 Ciphertext = 9acc237dff16d76c20ef7c919e3a7509 # ECB-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = 77CF412067AF8270613529149919546F Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = B22F3C36B72D31329EEE8ADDC2906C68 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = 2EDF1F3418D53B88841FC8985FB1ECF2 # ECB-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt and ECB-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 432FC5DCD628115B7C388D770B270C96 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 0BE1F14023782A22E8384C5ABB7FAB2B Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = A0A1ABCD1893AB6FE0FE5B65DF5F8636 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-ECB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = E61925E0D5DFAA9BB29F815B3076E51A # ECB-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt and ECB-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CCCC6C4E138B45848514D48D0D3439D3 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 5713C62C14B2EC0F8393B6AFD6F5785A Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = B40ED2B60EB54D09D030CF511FEEF366 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-ECB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 909DBD95799096748CB27357E73E1D26 # ECB-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt and ECB-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = BEFD219B112FA00098919CD101C9CCFA Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = C91D3A8F1AEA08A9386CF4B66C0169EA Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = A623D711DC5F25A51BB8A80D56397D28 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-ECB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 7960109FB6DC42947FCFE59EA3C5EB6B # For all CBC encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # CAMELLIA-bits-CBC:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec # CBC-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt and CBC-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 1607CF494B36BBF00DAEB0B503C831AB Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 1607CF494B36BBF00DAEB0B503C831AB Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = A2F2CF671629EF7840C5A5DFB5074887 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = A2F2CF671629EF7840C5A5DFB5074887 Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 0F06165008CF8B8B5A63586362543E54 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CBC Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 36A84CDAFD5F9A85ADA0F0A993D6D577 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 74C64268CDB8B8FAF5B34E8AF3732980 # CBC-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt and CBC-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 2A4830AB5AC4A1A2405955FD2195CF93 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 2A4830AB5AC4A1A2405955FD2195CF93 Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 5D5A869BD14CE54264F892A6DD2EC3D5 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 5D5A869BD14CE54264F892A6DD2EC3D5 Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 37D359C3349836D884E310ADDF68C449 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CBC Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 37D359C3349836D884E310ADDF68C449 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 01FAAA930B4AB9916E9668E1428C6B08 # CBC-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt and CBC-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = E6CFA35FC02B134A4D2C0B6737AC3EDA Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = E6CFA35FC02B134A4D2C0B6737AC3EDA Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 36CBEB73BD504B4070B1B7DE2B21EB50 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 36CBEB73BD504B4070B1B7DE2B21EB50 Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = E31A6055297D96CA3330CDF1B1860A83 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CBC Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = E31A6055297D96CA3330CDF1B1860A83 Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 5D563F6D1CCCF236051C0C5C1C58F28F # We don't support CFB{1,8}-CAMELLIAxxx.{En,De}crypt # For all CFB128 encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # CAMELLIA-bits-CFB:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec # CFB128-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 742A25F0542340C7BAEF24CA8482BB09 # CFB128-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = A53D28BB82DF741103EA4F921A44880B Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 9C2157A664626D1DEF9EA420FDE69B96 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 742A25F0542340C7BAEF24CA8482BB09 # CFB128-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = D5B5378A3ABED55803F25565D8907B84 # CFB128-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 86F8491627906D780C7A6D46EA331F98 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 69511CCE594CF710CB98BB63D7221F01 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = D5B5378A3ABED55803F25565D8907B84 # CFB128-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 5953ADCE14DB8C7F39F1BD39F359BFFA # CFB128-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 89BEDB4CCDD864EA11BA4CBE849B5E2B Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 555FC3F34BDD2D54C62D9E3BF338C1C4 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 5953ADCE14DB8C7F39F1BD39F359BFFA # For all OFB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is # CAMELLIA-bits-OFB:key:IV/output':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec # OFB-CAMELLIA128.Encrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 25623DB569CA51E01482649977E28D84 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = C776634A60729DC657D12B9FCA801E98 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = D776379BE0E50825E681DA1A4C980E8E # OFB-CAMELLIA128.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = 14F7646187817EB586599146B82BD719 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = 50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 25623DB569CA51E01482649977E28D84 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = C776634A60729DC657D12B9FCA801E98 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-OFB Key = 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C IV = A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = D776379BE0E50825E681DA1A4C980E8E # OFB-CAMELLIA192.Encrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 8ECEB7D0350D72C7F78562AEBDF99339 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = BDD62DBBB9700846C53B507F544696F0 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = E28014E046B802F385C4C2E13EAD4A72 # OFB-CAMELLIA192.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = C832BB9780677DAA82D9B6860DCD565E Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 8ECEB7D0350D72C7F78562AEBDF99339 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = 52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = BDD62DBBB9700846C53B507F544696F0 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-OFB Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B IV = BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = E28014E046B802F385C4C2E13EAD4A72 # OFB-CAMELLIA256.Encrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 127AD97E8E3994E4820027D7BA109368 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 6BFF6265A6A6B7A535BC65A80B17214E Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 0A4A0404E26AA78A27CB271E8BF3CF20 # OFB-CAMELLIA256.Decrypt Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A Ciphertext = CF6107BB0CEA7D7FB1BD31F5E7B06C93 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51 Ciphertext = 127AD97E8E3994E4820027D7BA109368 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF Ciphertext = 6BFF6265A6A6B7A535BC65A80B17214E Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-OFB Key = 603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4 IV = 41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710 Ciphertext = 0A4A0404E26AA78A27CB271E8BF3CF20 # Camellia test vectors from RFC5528 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CTR Key = AE6852F8121067CC4BF7A5765577F39E IV = 00000030000000000000000000000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367 Ciphertext = D09DC29A8214619A20877C76DB1F0B3F Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CTR Key = 7E24067817FAE0D743D6CE1F32539163 IV = 006CB6DBC0543B59DA48D90B00000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = DBF3C78DC08396D4DA7C907765BBCB442B8E8E0F31F0DCA72C7417E35360E048 Cipher = CAMELLIA-128-CTR Key = 7691BE035E5020A8AC6E618529F9A0DC IV = 00E0017B27777F3F4A1786F000000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223 Ciphertext = B19D1FCDCB75EB882F849CE24D85CF739CE64B2B5C9D73F14F2D5D9DCE9889CDDF508696 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CTR Key = 16AF5B145FC9F579C175F93E3BFB0EED863D06CCFDB78515 IV = 0000004836733C147D6D93CB00000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367 Ciphertext = 2379399E8A8D2B2B16702FC78B9E9696 Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CTR Key = 7C5CB2401B3DC33C19E7340819E0F69C678C3DB8E6F6A91A IV = 0096B03B020C6EADC2CB500D00000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = 7DEF34F7A5D0E415674B7FFCAE67C75DD018B86FF23051E056392A99F35A4CED Cipher = CAMELLIA-192-CTR Key = 02BF391EE8ECB159B959617B0965279BF59B60A786D3E0FE IV = 0007BDFD5CBD60278DCC091200000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223 Ciphertext = 5710E556E1487A20B5AC0E73F19E4E7876F37FDC91B1EF4D4DADE8E666A64D0ED557AB57 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CTR Key = 776BEFF2851DB06F4C8A0542C8696F6C6A81AF1EEC96B4D37FC1D689E6C1C104 IV = 00000060DB5672C97AA8F0B200000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 53696E676C6520626C6F636B206D7367 Ciphertext = 3401F9C8247EFFCEBD6994714C1BBB11 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CTR Key = F6D66D6BD52D59BB0796365879EFF886C66DD51A5B6A99744B50590C87A23884 IV = 00FAAC24C1585EF15A43D87500000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = D6C30392246F7808A83C2B22A8839E45E51CD48A1CDF406EBC9CC2D3AB834108 Cipher = CAMELLIA-256-CTR Key = FF7A617CE69148E4F1726E2F43581DE2AA62D9F805532EDFF1EED687FB54153D IV = 001CC5B751A51D70A1C1114800000001 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20212223 Ciphertext = A4DA23FCE6A5FFAA6D64AE9A0652A42CD161A34B65F9679F75C01F101F71276F15EF0D8D # SEED test vectors from RFC4269 Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Ciphertext = 5EBAC6E0054E166819AFF1CC6D346CDB Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = C11F22F20140505084483597E4370F43 Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 4706480851E61BE85D74BFB3FD956185 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = 83A2F8A288641FB9A4E9A5CC2F131C7D Ciphertext = EE54D13EBCAE706D226BC3142CD40D4A Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 28DBC3BC49FFD87DCFA509B11D422BE7 Operation = DECRYPT Plaintext = B41E6BE2EBA84A148E2EED84593C5EC7 Ciphertext = 9B9B7BFCD1813CB95D0B3618F40F5122 Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Ciphertext = 5EBAC6E0054E166819AFF1CC6D346CDB Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = C11F22F20140505084483597E4370F43 Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 4706480851E61BE85D74BFB3FD956185 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = 83A2F8A288641FB9A4E9A5CC2F131C7D Ciphertext = EE54D13EBCAE706D226BC3142CD40D4A Cipher = SEED-ECB Key = 28DBC3BC49FFD87DCFA509B11D422BE7 Operation = ENCRYPT Plaintext = B41E6BE2EBA84A148E2EED84593C5EC7 Ciphertext = 9B9B7BFCD1813CB95D0B3618F40F5122 # AES CCM 256 bit key Cipher = aes-256-ccm Key = 1bde3251d41a8b5ea013c195ae128b218b3e0306376357077ef1c1c78548b92e IV = 5b8e40746f6b98e00f1d13ff41 AAD = c17a32514eb6103f3249e076d4c871dc97e04b286699e54491dc18f6d734d4c0 Tag = 2024931d73bca480c24a24ece6b6c2bf Plaintext = 53bd72a97089e312422bf72e242377b3c6ee3e2075389b999c4ef7f28bd2b80a Ciphertext = 9a5fcccdb4cf04e7293d2775cc76a488f042382d949b43b7d6bb2b9864786726 Cipher = aes-256-ccm Key = 1bde3251d41a8b5ea013c195ae128b218b3e0306376357077ef1c1c78548b92e IV = 5b8e40746f6b98e00f1d13ff41 AAD = c17a32514eb6103f3249e076d4c871dc97e04b286699e54491dc18f6d734d4c0 Tag = 2024931d73bca480c24a24ece6b6c2be Plaintext = 53bd72a97089e312422bf72e242377b3c6ee3e2075389b999c4ef7f28bd2b80a Ciphertext = 9a5fcccdb4cf04e7293d2775cc76a488f042382d949b43b7d6bb2b9864786726 Operation = DECRYPT Result = CIPHERUPDATE_ERROR # AES GCM test vectors from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-spec.pdf Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = 58e2fccefa7e3061367f1d57a4e7455a Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = ab6e47d42cec13bdf53a67b21257bddf Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78 Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 AAD = Tag = 4d5c2af327cd64a62cf35abd2ba6fab4 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255 Ciphertext = 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49ce3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa051ba30b396a0aac973d58e091473f5985 Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 5bc94fbc3221a5db94fae95ae7121a47 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49ce3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa051ba30b396a0aac973d58e091 Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = cafebabefacedbad AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 3612d2e79e3b0785561be14aaca2fccb Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 61353b4c2806934a777ff51fa22a4755699b2a714fcdc6f83766e5f97b6c742373806900e49f24b22b097544d4896b424989b5e1ebac0f07c23f4598 Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 619cc5aefffe0bfa462af43c1699d050 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 8ce24998625615b603a033aca13fb894be9112a5c3a211a8ba262a3cca7e2ca701e4a9a4fba43c90ccdcb281d48c7c6fd62875d2aca417034c34aee5 Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 619cc5aefffe0bfa462af43c1699d051 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 8ce24998625615b603a033aca13fb894be9112a5c3a211a8ba262a3cca7e2ca701e4a9a4fba43c90ccdcb281d48c7c6fd62875d2aca417034c34aee5 Operation = DECRYPT Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR Cipher = aes-192-gcm Key = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = cd33b28ac773f74ba00ed1f312572435 Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-192-gcm Key = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = 2ff58d80033927ab8ef4d4587514f0fb Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 98e7247c07f0fe411c267e4384b0f600 Cipher = aes-192-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 AAD = Tag = 9924a7c8587336bfb118024db8674a14 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255 Ciphertext = 3980ca0b3c00e841eb06fac4872a2757859e1ceaa6efd984628593b40ca1e19c7d773d00c144c525ac619d18c84a3f4718e2448b2fe324d9ccda2710acade256 Cipher = aes-192-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 2519498e80f1478f37ba55bd6d27618c Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 3980ca0b3c00e841eb06fac4872a2757859e1ceaa6efd984628593b40ca1e19c7d773d00c144c525ac619d18c84a3f4718e2448b2fe324d9ccda2710 Cipher = aes-192-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c IV = cafebabefacedbad AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 65dcc57fcf623a24094fcca40d3533f8 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 0f10f599ae14a154ed24b36e25324db8c566632ef2bbb34f8347280fc4507057fddc29df9a471f75c66541d4d4dad1c9e93a19a58e8b473fa0f062f7 Cipher = aes-192-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = dcf566ff291c25bbb8568fc3d376a6d9 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = d27e88681ce3243c4830165a8fdcf9ff1de9a1d8e6b447ef6ef7b79828666e4581e79012af34ddd9e2f037589b292db3e67c036745fa22e7e9b7373b Cipher = aes-192-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = dcf566ff291c25bbb8568fc3d376a6d8 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = d27e88681ce3243c4830165a8fdcf9ff1de9a1d8e6b447ef6ef7b79828666e4581e79012af34ddd9e2f037589b292db3e67c036745fa22e7e9b7373b Operation = DECRYPT Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR Cipher = aes-256-gcm Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = 530f8afbc74536b9a963b4f1c4cb738b Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-256-gcm Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = d0d1c8a799996bf0265b98b5d48ab919 Plaintext = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = cea7403d4d606b6e074ec5d3baf39d18 Cipher = aes-256-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 AAD = Tag = b094dac5d93471bdec1a502270e3cc6c Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255 Ciphertext = 522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662898015ad Cipher = aes-256-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = cafebabefacedbaddecaf888 AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 76fc6ece0f4e1768cddf8853bb2d551b Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662 Cipher = aes-256-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = cafebabefacedbad AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = 3a337dbf46a792c45e454913fe2ea8f2 Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = c3762df1ca787d32ae47c13bf19844cbaf1ae14d0b976afac52ff7d79bba9de0feb582d33934a4f0954cc2363bc73f7862ac430e64abe499f47c9b1f Cipher = aes-256-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = a44a8266ee1c8eb0c8b5d4cf5ae9f19a Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 5a8def2f0c9e53f1f75d7853659e2a20eeb2b22aafde6419a058ab4f6f746bf40fc0c3b780f244452da3ebf1c5d82cdea2418997200ef82e44ae7e3f Cipher = aes-256-gcm Key = feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308 IV = 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b AAD = feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2 Tag = a44a8266ee1c8eb0c8b5d4cf5ae9f19b Plaintext = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39 Ciphertext = 5a8def2f0c9e53f1f75d7853659e2a20eeb2b22aafde6419a058ab4f6f746bf40fc0c3b780f244452da3ebf1c5d82cdea2418997200ef82e44ae7e3f Operation = DECRYPT Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR # local add-ons, primarily streaming ghash tests # 128 bytes aad Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662898015ad Tag = 5fea793a2d6f974d37e68e0cb8ff9492 Plaintext = Ciphertext = # 48 bytes plaintext Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = 9dd0a376b08e40eb00c35f29f9ea61a4 Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0 # 80 bytes plaintext Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = 98885a3a22bd4742fe7b72172193b163 Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0c94da219118e297d7b7ebcbcc9c388f28ade7d85a8ee35616f7124a9d5270291 # 128 bytes plaintext Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = cac45f60e31efd3b5a43b98a22ce1aa1 Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0c94da219118e297d7b7ebcbcc9c388f28ade7d85a8ee35616f7124a9d527029195b84d1b96c690ff2f2de30bf2ec89e00253786e126504f0dab90c48a30321de3345e6b0461e7c9e6c6b7afedde83f40 # 192 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = 566f8ef683078bfdeeffa869d751a017 Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 56b3373ca9ef6e4a2b64fe1e9a17b61425f10d47a75a5fce13efc6bc784af24f4141bdd48cf7c770887afd573cca5418a9aeffcd7c5ceddfc6a78397b9a85b499da558257267caab2ad0b23ca476a53cb17fb41c4b8b475cb4f3f7165094c229c9e8c4dc0a2a5ff1903e501511221376a1cdb8364c5061a20cae74bc4acd76ceb0abc9fd3217ef9f8c90be402ddf6d8697f4f880dff15bfb7a6b28241ec8fe183c2d59e3f9dfff653c7126f0acb9e64211f42bae12af462b1070bef1ab5e3606 # 240 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = fd0c7011ff07f0071324bdfb2d0f3a29 Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 56b3373ca9ef6e4a2b64fe1e9a17b61425f10d47a75a5fce13efc6bc784af24f4141bdd48cf7c770887afd573cca5418a9aeffcd7c5ceddfc6a78397b9a85b499da558257267caab2ad0b23ca476a53cb17fb41c4b8b475cb4f3f7165094c229c9e8c4dc0a2a5ff1903e501511221376a1cdb8364c5061a20cae74bc4acd76ceb0abc9fd3217ef9f8c90be402ddf6d8697f4f880dff15bfb7a6b28241ec8fe183c2d59e3f9dfff653c7126f0acb9e64211f42bae12af462b1070bef1ab5e3606872ca10dee15b3249b1a1b958f23134c4bccb7d03200bce420a2f8eb66dcf3644d1423c1b5699003c13ecef4bf38a3b6 # 288 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 00000000000000000000000000000000 IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 AAD = Tag = 8b307f6b33286d0ab026a9ed3fe1e85f Plaintext = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 56b3373ca9ef6e4a2b64fe1e9a17b61425f10d47a75a5fce13efc6bc784af24f4141bdd48cf7c770887afd573cca5418a9aeffcd7c5ceddfc6a78397b9a85b499da558257267caab2ad0b23ca476a53cb17fb41c4b8b475cb4f3f7165094c229c9e8c4dc0a2a5ff1903e501511221376a1cdb8364c5061a20cae74bc4acd76ceb0abc9fd3217ef9f8c90be402ddf6d8697f4f880dff15bfb7a6b28241ec8fe183c2d59e3f9dfff653c7126f0acb9e64211f42bae12af462b1070bef1ab5e3606872ca10dee15b3249b1a1b958f23134c4bccb7d03200bce420a2f8eb66dcf3644d1423c1b5699003c13ecef4bf38a3b60eedc34033bac1902783dc6d89e2e774188a439c7ebcc0672dbda4ddcfb2794613b0be41315ef778708a70ee7d75165c # 80 bytes plaintext, submitted by Intel Cipher = aes-128-gcm Key = 843ffcf5d2b72694d19ed01d01249412 IV = dbcca32ebf9b804617c3aa9e AAD = 00000000000000000000000000000000101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f Tag = 3b629ccfbc1119b7319e1dce2cd6fd6d Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f Ciphertext = 6268c6fa2a80b2d137467f092f657ac04d89be2beaa623d61b5a868c8f03ff95d3dcee23ad2f1ab3a6c80eaf4b140eb05de3457f0fbc111a6b43d0763aa422a3013cf1dc37fe417d1fbfc449b75d4cc5 #AES OCB Test vectors Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = Tag = 197B9C3C441D3C83EAFB2BEF633B9182 Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 0001020304050607 Tag = 16DC76A46D47E1EAD537209E8A96D14E Plaintext = 0001020304050607 Ciphertext = 92B657130A74B85A Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 0001020304050607 Tag = 98B91552C8C009185044E30A6EB2FE21 Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = Tag = 971EFFCAE19AD4716F88E87B871FBEED Plaintext = 0001020304050607 Ciphertext = 92B657130A74B85A Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Tag = 776C9924D6723A1FC4524532AC3E5BEB Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Tag = 7DDB8E6CEA6814866212509619B19CC6 Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = Tag = 13CC8B747807121A4CBB3E4BD6B456AF Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Tag = 5FA94FC3F38820F1DC3F3D1FD4E55E1C Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122FCFCEE7A2A8D4D48 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Tag = 282026DA3068BC9FA118681D559F10F6 Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = Tag = 6EF2F52587FDA0ED97DC7EEDE241DF68 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122FCFCEE7A2A8D4D48 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Tag = B2A040DD3BD5164372D76D7BB6824240 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Tag = E1E072633BADE51A60E85951D9C42A1B Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = Tag = 4A3BAE824465CFDAF8C41FC50C7DF9D9 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 659C623211DEEA0DE30D2C381879F4C8 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB68C65778B058A635 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 7AEB7A69A1687DD082CA27B0D9A37096 Plaintext = Ciphertext = Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = Tag = 060C8467F4ABAB5E8B3C2067A2E115DC Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Ciphertext = BEA5E8798DBE7110031C144DA0B26122CEAAB9B05DF771A657149D53773463CB68C65778B058A635 #AES OCB Non standard test vectors - generated from reference implementation Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 1b6c44f34e3abb3cbf8976e7 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Ciphertext = 09a4fd29de949d9a9aa9924248422097ad4883b4713e6c214ff6567ada08a96766fc4e2ee3e3a5a1 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 1ad62009901f40cba7cd7156f94a7324 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Ciphertext = 5e2fa7367ffbdb3938845cfd415fcc71ec79634eb31451609d27505f5e2978f43c44213d8fa441ee Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = C203F98CE28F7DAD3F31C021 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F3031 Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C822D6 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 8346D7D47C5D893ED472F5AB Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F4041 Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F714FF Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 5822A9A70FDF55D29D2984A6 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F5051 Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB8294170634D Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 81772B6741ABB4ECA9D2DEB2 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F6061 Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB829417001E54E15A7576C4DF32366E0F439C7050FAA Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 3E52A01D068DE85456DB03B7 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071 Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB829417001E54E15A7576C4DF32366E0F439C7051CB4824B8114E9A720CBC1CE0185B156B486 Cipher = aes-128-ocb Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F IV = 000102030405060708090A0B AAD = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F2021222324252627 Tag = 3E52A01D068DE85456DB03B6 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071 Ciphertext = 09A4FD29DE949D9A9AA9924248422097AD4883B4713E6C214FF6567ADA08A967B2176C12F110DD441B7CAA3A509B13C86A023AFCEE998BEE42028D44507B15F77C528A1DE6406B519BCEE8FCB829417001E54E15A7576C4DF32366E0F439C7051CB4824B8114E9A720CBC1CE0185B156B486 Operation = DECRYPT Result = CIPHERFINAL_ERROR # AES XTS test vectors from IEEE Std 1619-2007 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Ciphertext = 917cf69ebd68b2ec9b9fe9a3eadda692cd43d2f59598ed858c02c2652fbf922e Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 1111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222 IV = 33333333330000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 Ciphertext = c454185e6a16936e39334038acef838bfb186fff7480adc4289382ecd6d394f0 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f022222222222222222222222222222222 IV = 33333333330000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 Ciphertext = af85336b597afc1a900b2eb21ec949d292df4c047e0b21532186a5971a227a89 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51a10c421110e6d81588ede82103a252d8a750e8768defffed9122810aaeb99f9172af82b604dc4b8e51bcb08235a6f4341332e4ca60482a4ba1a03b3e65008fc5da76b70bf1690db4eae29c5f1badd03c5ccf2a55d705ddcd86d449511ceb7ec30bf12b1fa35b913f9f747a8afd1b130e94bff94effd01a91735ca1726acd0b197c4e5b03393697e126826fb6bbde8ecc1e08298516e2c9ed03ff3c1b7860f6de76d4cecd94c8119855ef5297ca67e9f3e7ff72b1e99785ca0a7e7720c5b36dc6d72cac9574c8cbbc2f801e23e56fd344b07f22154beba0f08ce8891e643ed995c94d9a69c9f1b5f499027a78572aeebd74d20cc39881c213ee770b1010e4bea718846977ae119f7a023ab58cca0ad752afe656bb3c17256a9f6e9bf19fdd5a38fc82bbe872c5539edb609ef4f79c203ebb140f2e583cb2ad15b4aa5b655016a8449277dbd477ef2c8d6c017db738b18deb4a427d1923ce3ff262735779a418f20a282df920147beabe421ee5319d0568 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 01000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 02000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = fd000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = fe000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = ff000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 3260ae8dad1f4a32c5cafe3ab0eb95549d461a67ceb9e5aa2d3afb62dece0553193ba50c75be251e08d1d08f1088576c7efdfaaf3f459559571e12511753b07af073f35da06af0ce0bbf6b8f5ccc5cea500ec1b211bd51f63b606bf6528796ca12173ba39b8935ee44ccce646f90a45bf9ccc567f0ace13dc2d53ebeedc81f58b2e41179dddf0d5a5c42f5d8506c1a5d2f8f59f3ea873cbcd0eec19acbf325423bd3dcb8c2b1bf1d1eaed0eba7f0698e4314fbeb2f1566d1b9253008cbccf45a2b0d9c5c9c21474f4076e02be26050b99dee4fd68a4cf890e496e4fcae7b70f94ea5a9062da0daeba1993d2ccd1dd3c244b8428801495a58b216547e7e847c46d1d756377b6242d2e5fb83bf752b54e0df71e889f3a2bb0f4c10805bf3c590376e3c24e22ff57f7fa965577375325cea5d920db94b9c336b455f6e894c01866fe9fbb8c8d3f70a2957285f6dfb5dcd8cbf54782f8fe7766d4723819913ac773421e3a31095866bad22c86a6036b2518b2059b4229d18c8c2ccbdf906c6cc6e82464ee57bddb0bebcb1dc645325bfb3e665ef7251082c88ebb1cf203bd779fdd38675713c8daadd17e1cabee432b09787b6ddf3304e38b731b45df5df51b78fcfb3d32466028d0ba36555e7e11ab0ee0666061d1645d962444bc47a38188930a84b4d561395c73c087021927ca638b7afc8a8679ccb84c26555440ec7f10445cd Cipher = aes-256-xts Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592 IV = ff000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-256-xts Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592 IV = ffff0000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-256-xts Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592 IV = ffffff00000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-256-xts Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592 IV = ffffffff000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-256-xts Key = 27182818284590452353602874713526624977572470936999595749669676273141592653589793238462643383279502884197169399375105820974944592 IV = ffffffffff0000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0 IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 Ciphertext = 6c1625db4671522d3d7599601de7ca09ed Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0 IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011 Ciphertext = d069444b7a7e0cab09e24447d24deb1fedbf Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0 IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112 Ciphertext = e5df1351c0544ba1350b3363cd8ef4beedbf9d Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0bfbebdbcbbbab9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0 IV = 9a785634120000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213 Ciphertext = 9d84c813f719aa2c7be3f66171c7c5c2edbf9dac Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeefc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf IV = 21436587a90000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 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 Ciphertext = 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 # Exercise different lengths covering even ciphertext stealing cases Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f6061 Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5B079C6307EA0914559C6D2FB6384F8AADF94 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce84 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f7071 Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CEF4F253466EF4953ADC8FE2F5BC1FF57593FD Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad0265 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f8081 Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE842973C68248EDDFE26FB9B096659C8A5D6BB7 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f9091 Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD0265C4DD16E65A24575A709F174593F19FF85EA9 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51a10c421110e6d81588ede82103a252d8 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1 Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD02655EA92DC4C4E41A8952C651D33174BE519215FA160C664D4B07D757A034AB3B35A10C Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51a10c421110e6d81588ede82103a252d8a750e8768defffed9122810aaeb99f91 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1 Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD02655EA92DC4C4E41A8952C651D33174BE51A10C421110E6D81588EDE82103A252D82C6CBC24F9357BD1FB882AA4B2CC2E7FA750 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf Ciphertext = 27a7479befa1d476489f308cd4cfa6e2a96e4bbe3208ff25287dd3819616e89cc78cf7f5e543445f8333d8fa7f56000005279fa5d8b5e4ad40e736ddb4d35412328063fd2aab53e5ea1e0a9f332500a5df9487d07a5c92cc512c8866c7e860ce93fdf166a24912b422976146ae20ce846bb7dc9ba94a767aaef20c0d61ad02655ea92dc4c4e41a8952c651d33174be51a10c421110e6d81588ede82103a252d8a750e8768defffed9122810aaeb99f9172af82b604dc4b8e51bcb08235a6f434 Cipher = aes-128-xts Key = 2718281828459045235360287471352631415926535897932384626433832795 IV = 00000000000000000000000000000000 Plaintext = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1 Ciphertext = 27A7479BEFA1D476489F308CD4CFA6E2A96E4BBE3208FF25287DD3819616E89CC78CF7F5E543445F8333D8FA7F56000005279FA5D8B5E4AD40E736DDB4D35412328063FD2AAB53E5EA1E0A9F332500A5DF9487D07A5C92CC512C8866C7E860CE93FDF166A24912B422976146AE20CE846BB7DC9BA94A767AAEF20C0D61AD02655EA92DC4C4E41A8952C651D33174BE51A10C421110E6D81588EDE82103A252D8A750E8768DEFFFED9122810AAEB99F910409B03D164E727C31290FD4E039500872AF # AES wrap tests from RFC3394 Cipher = id-aes128-wrap Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = 1FA68B0A8112B447AEF34BD8FB5A7B829D3E862371D2CFE5 Cipher = id-aes192-wrap Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = 96778B25AE6CA435F92B5B97C050AED2468AB8A17AD84E5D Cipher = id-aes256-wrap Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF Ciphertext = 64E8C3F9CE0F5BA263E9777905818A2A93C8191E7D6E8AE7 Cipher = id-aes192-wrap Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607 Ciphertext = 031D33264E15D33268F24EC260743EDCE1C6C7DDEE725A936BA814915C6762D2 Cipher = id-aes256-wrap Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF0001020304050607 Ciphertext = A8F9BC1612C68B3FF6E6F4FBE30E71E4769C8B80A32CB8958CD5D17D6B254DA1 Cipher = id-aes256-wrap Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Ciphertext = 28C9F404C4B810F4CBCCB35CFB87F8263F5786E2D80ED326CBC7F0E71A99F43BFB988B9B7A02DD21 # Same as previous example but with invalid unwrap key: should be rejected # without returning any plaintext Cipher = id-aes256-wrap Operation = DECRYPT Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E00 Plaintext = 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F Ciphertext = 28C9F404C4B810F4CBCCB35CFB87F8263F5786E2D80ED326CBC7F0E71A99F43BFB988B9B7A02DD21 Result = CIPHERUPDATE_ERROR # AES wrap tests from RFC5649 Cipher = id-aes192-wrap-pad Key = 5840df6e29b02af1ab493b705bf16ea1ae8338f4dcc176a8 Plaintext = c37b7e6492584340bed12207808941155068f738 Ciphertext = 138bdeaa9b8fa7fc61f97742e72248ee5ae6ae5360d1ae6a5f54f373fa543b6a Cipher = id-aes192-wrap-pad Key = 5840df6e29b02af1ab493b705bf16ea1ae8338f4dcc176a8 Plaintext = 466f7250617369 Ciphertext = afbeb0f07dfbf5419200f2ccb50bb24f # HMAC tests from RFC2104 MAC = HMAC Algorithm = MD5 Key = 0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b Input = "Hi There" Output = 9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d MAC = HMAC Algorithm = MD5 Key = "Jefe" Input = "what do ya want for nothing?" Output = 750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738 MAC = HMAC Algorithm = MD5 Key = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Input = DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD Output = 56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6 # HMAC tests from NIST test data MAC = HMAC Algorithm = SHA1 Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen" Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F Output = 5FD596EE78D5553C8FF4E72D266DFD192366DA29 MAC = HMAC Algorithm = SHA1 Input = "Sample message for keylen #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "testutil.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* Used when declaring buffers to read text files into */ #define CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE 8096 static char *certs_dir = NULL; static char *ct_dir = NULL; typedef struct ct_test_fixture { const char *test_case_name; /* The current time in milliseconds */ uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms; /* The CT log store to use during tests */ CTLOG_STORE* ctlog_store; /* Set the following to test handling of SCTs in X509 certificates */ const char *certs_dir; char *certificate_file; char *issuer_file; /* Expected number of SCTs */ int expected_sct_count; /* Expected number of valid SCTS */ int expected_valid_sct_count; /* Set the following to test handling of SCTs in TLS format */ const unsigned char *tls_sct_list; size_t tls_sct_list_len; STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list; /* * A file to load the expected SCT text from. * This text will be compared to the actual text output during the test. * A maximum of |CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE| bytes will be read of this file. */ const char *sct_dir; const char *sct_text_file; /* Whether to test the validity of the SCT(s) */ int test_validity; } CT_TEST_FIXTURE; static CT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name) { CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; int setup_ok = 1; memset(&fixture, 0, sizeof(fixture)); fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; fixture.epoch_time_in_ms = 1473269626000; /* Sep 7 17:33:46 2016 GMT */ fixture.ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new(); if (fixture.ctlog_store == NULL) { setup_ok = 0; fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create a new CT log store\n"); goto end; } if (CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(fixture.ctlog_store) != 1) { setup_ok = 0; fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load CT log list\n"); goto end; } end: if (!setup_ok) { CTLOG_STORE_free(fixture.ctlog_store); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } return fixture; } static void tear_down(CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { CTLOG_STORE_free(fixture.ctlog_store); SCT_LIST_free(fixture.sct_list); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } static char *mk_file_path(const char *dir, const char *file) { char *full_file = NULL; size_t full_file_l = 0; const char *sep = ""; #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS sep = "/"; #endif full_file_l = strlen(dir) + strlen(sep) + strlen(file) + 1; full_file = OPENSSL_zalloc(full_file_l); if (full_file != NULL) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(full_file, dir, full_file_l); OPENSSL_strlcat(full_file, sep, full_file_l); OPENSSL_strlcat(full_file, file, full_file_l); } return full_file; } static X509 *load_pem_cert(const char *dir, const char *file) { X509 *cert = NULL; char *file_path = mk_file_path(dir, file); if (file_path != NULL) { BIO *cert_io = BIO_new_file(file_path, "r"); OPENSSL_free(file_path); if (cert_io != NULL) cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(cert_io, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(cert_io); } return cert; } static int read_text_file(const char *dir, const char *file, char *buffer, int buffer_length) { int result = -1; char *file_path = mk_file_path(dir, file); if (file_path != NULL) { BIO *file_io = BIO_new_file(file_path, "r"); OPENSSL_free(file_path); if (file_io != NULL) { result = BIO_read(file_io, buffer, buffer_length); BIO_free(file_io); } } return result; } static int compare_sct_list_printout(STACK_OF(SCT) *sct, const char *expected_output) { BIO *text_buffer = NULL; char *actual_output = NULL; int result = 1; text_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (text_buffer == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate buffer\n"); goto end; } SCT_LIST_print(sct, text_buffer, 0, "\n", NULL); /* Append null terminator because we're about to use the buffer contents * as a string. */ if (BIO_write(text_buffer, "\0", 1) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to append null terminator to SCT text\n"); goto end; } BIO_get_mem_data(text_buffer, &actual_output); result = strcmp(actual_output, expected_output); if (result != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Expected SCT printout:\n%s\nActual SCT printout:\n%s\n", expected_output, actual_output); } end: BIO_free(text_buffer); return result; } static int compare_extension_printout(X509_EXTENSION *extension, const char *expected_output) { BIO *text_buffer = NULL; char *actual_output = NULL; int result = 1; text_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (text_buffer == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate buffer\n"); goto end; } if (!X509V3_EXT_print(text_buffer, extension, X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to print extension\n"); goto end; } /* Append null terminator because we're about to use the buffer contents * as a string. */ if (BIO_write(text_buffer, "\0", 1) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to append null terminator to extension text\n"); goto end; } BIO_get_mem_data(text_buffer, &actual_output); result = strcmp(actual_output, expected_output); if (result != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Expected SCT printout:\n%s\nActual SCT printout:\n%s\n", expected_output, actual_output); } end: BIO_free(text_buffer); return result; } static int assert_validity(CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture, STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *policy_ctx) { int invalid_sct_count = 0; int valid_sct_count = 0; int i; if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, policy_ctx) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error verifying SCTs\n"); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(scts); ++i) { SCT *sct_i = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); switch (SCT_get_validation_status(sct_i)) { case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID: ++valid_sct_count; break; case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID: ++invalid_sct_count; break; default: /* Ignore other validation statuses. */ break; } } if (valid_sct_count != fixture.expected_valid_sct_count) { int unverified_sct_count = sk_SCT_num(scts) - invalid_sct_count - valid_sct_count; fprintf(stderr, "%d SCTs failed verification\n" "%d SCTs passed verification (%d expected)\n" "%d SCTs were unverified\n", invalid_sct_count, valid_sct_count, fixture.expected_valid_sct_count, unverified_sct_count); return 0; } return 1; } static int execute_cert_test(CT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { int success = 0; X509 *cert = NULL, *issuer = NULL; STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL; SCT *sct = NULL; char expected_sct_text[CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE]; int sct_text_len = 0; unsigned char *tls_sct_list = NULL; size_t tls_sct_list_len = 0; CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ct_policy_ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(); if (fixture.sct_text_file != NULL) { sct_text_len = read_text_file(fixture.sct_dir, fixture.sct_text_file, expected_sct_text, CT_TEST_MAX_FILE_SIZE - 1); if (sct_text_len < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Test data file not found: %s\n", fixture.sct_text_file); goto end; } expected_sct_text[sct_text_len] = '\0'; } CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE( ct_policy_ctx, fixture.ctlog_store); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(ct_policy_ctx, fixture.epoch_time_in_ms); if (fixture.certificate_file != NULL) { int sct_extension_index; X509_EXTENSION *sct_extension = NULL; cert = load_pem_cert(fixture.certs_dir, fixture.certificate_file); if (cert == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to load certificate: %s\n", fixture.certificate_file); goto end; } CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ct_policy_ctx, cert); if (fixture.issuer_file != NULL) { issuer = load_pem_cert(fixture.certs_dir, fixture.issuer_file); if (issuer == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Unable to load issuer certificate: %s\n", fixture.issuer_file); goto end; } CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ct_policy_ctx, issuer); } sct_extension_index = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, -1); sct_extension = X509_get_ext(cert, sct_extension_index); if (fixture.expected_sct_count > 0) { if (sct_extension == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SCT extension not found in: %s\n", fixture.certificate_file); goto end; } if (fixture.sct_text_file && compare_extension_printout(sct_extension, expected_sct_text)) { goto end; } if (fixture.test_validity) { int i; scts = X509V3_EXT_d2i(sct_extension); for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(scts); ++i) { SCT *sct_i = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); if (!SCT_set_source(sct_i, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting SCT source to X509v3 extension\n"); goto end; } } if (!assert_validity(fixture, scts, ct_policy_ctx)) goto end; } } else if (sct_extension != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Expected no SCTs, but found SCT extension in: %s\n", fixture.certificate_file); goto end; } } if (fixture.tls_sct_list != NULL) { const unsigned char *p = fixture.tls_sct_list; if (o2i_SCT_LIST(&scts, &p, fixture.tls_sct_list_len) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to decode SCTs from TLS format\n"); goto end; } if (fixture.test_validity && cert != NULL) { if (!assert_validity(fixture, scts, ct_policy_ctx)) goto end; } if (fixture.sct_text_file && compare_sct_list_printout(scts, expected_sct_text)) { goto end; } tls_sct_list_len = i2o_SCT_LIST(scts, &tls_sct_list); if (tls_sct_list_len != fixture.tls_sct_list_len || memcmp(fixture.tls_sct_list, tls_sct_list, tls_sct_list_len) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to encode SCTs into TLS format correctly\n"); goto end; } } success = 1; end: X509_free(cert); X509_free(issuer); SCT_LIST_free(scts); SCT_free(sct); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ct_policy_ctx); OPENSSL_free(tls_sct_list); return success; } #define SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE() SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CT_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up) #define EXECUTE_CT_TEST() EXECUTE_TEST(execute_cert_test, tear_down) static int test_no_scts_in_certificate() { SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir; fixture.certificate_file = "leaf.pem"; fixture.issuer_file = "subinterCA.pem"; fixture.expected_sct_count = 0; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } static int test_one_sct_in_certificate() { SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir; fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem"; fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"; fixture.expected_sct_count = 1; fixture.sct_dir = certs_dir; fixture.sct_text_file = "embeddedSCTs1.sct"; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } static int test_multiple_scts_in_certificate() { SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir; fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs3.pem"; fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem"; fixture.expected_sct_count = 3; fixture.sct_dir = certs_dir; fixture.sct_text_file = "embeddedSCTs3.sct"; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } static int test_verify_one_sct() { SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir; fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem"; fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"; fixture.expected_sct_count = fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 1; fixture.test_validity = 1; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } static int test_verify_multiple_scts() { SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir; fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs3.pem"; fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs3_issuer.pem"; fixture.expected_sct_count = fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 3; fixture.test_validity = 1; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } static int test_verify_fails_for_future_sct() { SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.epoch_time_in_ms = 1365094800000; /* Apr 4 17:00:00 2013 GMT */ fixture.certs_dir = certs_dir; fixture.certificate_file = "embeddedSCTs1.pem"; fixture.issuer_file = "embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"; fixture.expected_sct_count = 1; fixture.expected_valid_sct_count = 0; fixture.test_validity = 1; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } static int test_decode_tls_sct() { const unsigned char tls_sct_list[] = "\x00\x78" /* length of list */ "\x00\x76" "\x00" /* version */ /* log ID */ "\xDF\x1C\x2E\xC1\x15\x00\x94\x52\x47\xA9\x61\x68\x32\x5D\xDC\x5C\x79" "\x59\xE8\xF7\xC6\xD3\x88\xFC\x00\x2E\x0B\xBD\x3F\x74\xD7\x64" "\x00\x00\x01\x3D\xDB\x27\xDF\x93" /* timestamp */ "\x00\x00" /* extensions length */ "" /* extensions */ "\x04\x03" /* hash and signature algorithms */ "\x00\x47" /* signature length */ /* signature */ "\x30\x45\x02\x20\x48\x2F\x67\x51\xAF\x35\xDB\xA6\x54\x36\xBE\x1F\xD6" "\x64\x0F\x3D\xBF\x9A\x41\x42\x94\x95\x92\x45\x30\x28\x8F\xA3\xE5\xE2" "\x3E\x06\x02\x21\x00\xE4\xED\xC0\xDB\x3A\xC5\x72\xB1\xE2\xF5\xE8\xAB" "\x6A\x68\x06\x53\x98\x7D\xCF\x41\x02\x7D\xFE\xFF\xA1\x05\x51\x9D\x89" "\xED\xBF\x08"; SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.tls_sct_list = tls_sct_list; fixture.tls_sct_list_len = 0x7a; fixture.sct_dir = ct_dir; fixture.sct_text_file = "tls1.sct"; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } static int test_encode_tls_sct() { const char log_id[] = "3xwuwRUAlFJHqWFoMl3cXHlZ6PfG04j8AC4LvT9012Q="; const uint64_t timestamp = 1; const char extensions[] = ""; const char signature[] = "BAMARzBAMiBIL2dRrzXbplQ2vh/WZA89v5pBQpSVkkUwKI+j5" "eI+BgIhAOTtwNs6xXKx4vXoq2poBlOYfc9BAn3+/6EFUZ2J7b8I"; SCT *sct = NULL; SETUP_CT_TEST_FIXTURE(); fixture.sct_list = sk_SCT_new_null(); sct = SCT_new_from_base64(SCT_VERSION_V1, log_id, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509, timestamp, extensions, signature); if (sct == NULL) { tear_down(fixture); fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create SCT from base64-encoded test data\n"); return 0; } sk_SCT_push(fixture.sct_list, sct); fixture.sct_dir = ct_dir; fixture.sct_text_file = "tls1.sct"; EXECUTE_CT_TEST(); } /* * Tests that the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX default time is approximately now. * Allow +-10 minutes, as it may compensate for clock skew. */ static int test_default_ct_policy_eval_ctx_time_is_now() { int success = 0; CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ct_policy_ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(); const time_t default_time = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(ct_policy_ctx) / 1000; const time_t time_tolerance = 600; /* 10 minutes */ if (fabs(difftime(time(NULL), default_time)) > time_tolerance) { fprintf(stderr, "Default CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX time is not approximately now.\n"); goto end; } success = 1; end: CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ct_policy_ctx); return success; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int result = 0; char *tmp_env = NULL; tmp_env = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (tmp_env != NULL && strcmp(tmp_env, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); tmp_env = getenv("CT_DIR"); ct_dir = OPENSSL_strdup(tmp_env != NULL ? tmp_env : "ct"); tmp_env = getenv("CERTS_DIR"); certs_dir = OPENSSL_strdup(tmp_env != NULL ? tmp_env : "certs"); ADD_TEST(test_no_scts_in_certificate); ADD_TEST(test_one_sct_in_certificate); ADD_TEST(test_multiple_scts_in_certificate); ADD_TEST(test_verify_one_sct); ADD_TEST(test_verify_multiple_scts); ADD_TEST(test_verify_fails_for_future_sct); ADD_TEST(test_decode_tls_sct); ADD_TEST(test_encode_tls_sct); ADD_TEST(test_default_ct_policy_eval_ctx_time_is_now); result = run_tests(argv[0]); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); OPENSSL_free(ct_dir); OPENSSL_free(certs_dir); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) result = 1; #endif return result; } #else /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { return EXIT_SUCCESS; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */ openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662014777 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf0000644000000000000000000001672713176625662021363 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 9 test-0 = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume test-1 = 1-renegotiate-client-resume test-2 = 2-renegotiate-server-resume test-3 = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require test-4 = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once test-5 = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead test-6 = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead test-7 = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead test-8 = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead # =========================================================== [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume] ssl_conf = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl] server = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server client = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [1-renegotiate-client-resume] ssl_conf = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl [1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl] server = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-server client = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-client [1-renegotiate-client-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-renegotiate-client-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [2-renegotiate-server-resume] ssl_conf = 2-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl [2-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl] server = 2-renegotiate-server-resume-server client = 2-renegotiate-server-resume-client [2-renegotiate-server-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-renegotiate-server-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [3-renegotiate-client-auth-require] ssl_conf = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl [3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl] server = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server client = 3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client [3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Require [3-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [4-renegotiate-client-auth-once] ssl_conf = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl [4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl] server = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server client = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client [4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Once [4-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead] ssl_conf = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl [5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl] server = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server client = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client [5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra [5-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-SHA # =========================================================== [6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead] ssl_conf = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl [6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl] server = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server client = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client [6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra [6-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-GCM-SHA256 # =========================================================== [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead] ssl_conf = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl] server = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-SHA # =========================================================== [8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead] ssl_conf = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl [8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl] server = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server client = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client [8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra [8-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-GCM-SHA384 openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf0000644000000000000000000073456213176625662021432 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 361 test-0 = 0-version-negotiation test-1 = 1-version-negotiation test-2 = 2-version-negotiation test-3 = 3-version-negotiation test-4 = 4-version-negotiation test-5 = 5-version-negotiation test-6 = 6-version-negotiation test-7 = 7-version-negotiation test-8 = 8-version-negotiation test-9 = 9-version-negotiation test-10 = 10-version-negotiation test-11 = 11-version-negotiation test-12 = 12-version-negotiation test-13 = 13-version-negotiation test-14 = 14-version-negotiation test-15 = 15-version-negotiation test-16 = 16-version-negotiation test-17 = 17-version-negotiation test-18 = 18-version-negotiation test-19 = 19-version-negotiation test-20 = 20-version-negotiation test-21 = 21-version-negotiation test-22 = 22-version-negotiation test-23 = 23-version-negotiation test-24 = 24-version-negotiation test-25 = 25-version-negotiation test-26 = 26-version-negotiation test-27 = 27-version-negotiation test-28 = 28-version-negotiation test-29 = 29-version-negotiation test-30 = 30-version-negotiation test-31 = 31-version-negotiation test-32 = 32-version-negotiation test-33 = 33-version-negotiation test-34 = 34-version-negotiation test-35 = 35-version-negotiation test-36 = 36-version-negotiation test-37 = 37-version-negotiation test-38 = 38-version-negotiation test-39 = 39-version-negotiation test-40 = 40-version-negotiation test-41 = 41-version-negotiation test-42 = 42-version-negotiation test-43 = 43-version-negotiation test-44 = 44-version-negotiation test-45 = 45-version-negotiation test-46 = 46-version-negotiation test-47 = 47-version-negotiation test-48 = 48-version-negotiation test-49 = 49-version-negotiation test-50 = 50-version-negotiation test-51 = 51-version-negotiation test-52 = 52-version-negotiation test-53 = 53-version-negotiation test-54 = 54-version-negotiation test-55 = 55-version-negotiation test-56 = 56-version-negotiation test-57 = 57-version-negotiation test-58 = 58-version-negotiation test-59 = 59-version-negotiation test-60 = 60-version-negotiation test-61 = 61-version-negotiation test-62 = 62-version-negotiation test-63 = 63-version-negotiation test-64 = 64-version-negotiation test-65 = 65-version-negotiation test-66 = 66-version-negotiation test-67 = 67-version-negotiation test-68 = 68-version-negotiation test-69 = 69-version-negotiation test-70 = 70-version-negotiation test-71 = 71-version-negotiation test-72 = 72-version-negotiation test-73 = 73-version-negotiation test-74 = 74-version-negotiation test-75 = 75-version-negotiation test-76 = 76-version-negotiation test-77 = 77-version-negotiation test-78 = 78-version-negotiation test-79 = 79-version-negotiation test-80 = 80-version-negotiation test-81 = 81-version-negotiation test-82 = 82-version-negotiation test-83 = 83-version-negotiation test-84 = 84-version-negotiation test-85 = 85-version-negotiation test-86 = 86-version-negotiation test-87 = 87-version-negotiation test-88 = 88-version-negotiation test-89 = 89-version-negotiation test-90 = 90-version-negotiation test-91 = 91-version-negotiation test-92 = 92-version-negotiation test-93 = 93-version-negotiation test-94 = 94-version-negotiation test-95 = 95-version-negotiation test-96 = 96-version-negotiation test-97 = 97-version-negotiation test-98 = 98-version-negotiation test-99 = 99-version-negotiation test-100 = 100-version-negotiation test-101 = 101-version-negotiation test-102 = 102-version-negotiation test-103 = 103-version-negotiation test-104 = 104-version-negotiation test-105 = 105-version-negotiation test-106 = 106-version-negotiation test-107 = 107-version-negotiation test-108 = 108-version-negotiation test-109 = 109-version-negotiation test-110 = 110-version-negotiation test-111 = 111-version-negotiation test-112 = 112-version-negotiation test-113 = 113-version-negotiation test-114 = 114-version-negotiation test-115 = 115-version-negotiation test-116 = 116-version-negotiation test-117 = 117-version-negotiation test-118 = 118-version-negotiation test-119 = 119-version-negotiation test-120 = 120-version-negotiation test-121 = 121-version-negotiation test-122 = 122-version-negotiation test-123 = 123-version-negotiation test-124 = 124-version-negotiation test-125 = 125-version-negotiation test-126 = 126-version-negotiation test-127 = 127-version-negotiation test-128 = 128-version-negotiation test-129 = 129-version-negotiation test-130 = 130-version-negotiation test-131 = 131-version-negotiation test-132 = 132-version-negotiation test-133 = 133-version-negotiation test-134 = 134-version-negotiation test-135 = 135-version-negotiation test-136 = 136-version-negotiation test-137 = 137-version-negotiation test-138 = 138-version-negotiation test-139 = 139-version-negotiation test-140 = 140-version-negotiation test-141 = 141-version-negotiation test-142 = 142-version-negotiation test-143 = 143-version-negotiation test-144 = 144-version-negotiation test-145 = 145-version-negotiation test-146 = 146-version-negotiation test-147 = 147-version-negotiation test-148 = 148-version-negotiation test-149 = 149-version-negotiation test-150 = 150-version-negotiation test-151 = 151-version-negotiation test-152 = 152-version-negotiation test-153 = 153-version-negotiation test-154 = 154-version-negotiation test-155 = 155-version-negotiation test-156 = 156-version-negotiation test-157 = 157-version-negotiation test-158 = 158-version-negotiation test-159 = 159-version-negotiation test-160 = 160-version-negotiation test-161 = 161-version-negotiation test-162 = 162-version-negotiation test-163 = 163-version-negotiation test-164 = 164-version-negotiation test-165 = 165-version-negotiation test-166 = 166-version-negotiation test-167 = 167-version-negotiation test-168 = 168-version-negotiation test-169 = 169-version-negotiation test-170 = 170-version-negotiation test-171 = 171-version-negotiation test-172 = 172-version-negotiation test-173 = 173-version-negotiation test-174 = 174-version-negotiation test-175 = 175-version-negotiation test-176 = 176-version-negotiation test-177 = 177-version-negotiation test-178 = 178-version-negotiation test-179 = 179-version-negotiation test-180 = 180-version-negotiation test-181 = 181-version-negotiation test-182 = 182-version-negotiation test-183 = 183-version-negotiation test-184 = 184-version-negotiation test-185 = 185-version-negotiation test-186 = 186-version-negotiation test-187 = 187-version-negotiation test-188 = 188-version-negotiation test-189 = 189-version-negotiation test-190 = 190-version-negotiation test-191 = 191-version-negotiation test-192 = 192-version-negotiation test-193 = 193-version-negotiation test-194 = 194-version-negotiation test-195 = 195-version-negotiation test-196 = 196-version-negotiation test-197 = 197-version-negotiation test-198 = 198-version-negotiation test-199 = 199-version-negotiation test-200 = 200-version-negotiation test-201 = 201-version-negotiation test-202 = 202-version-negotiation test-203 = 203-version-negotiation test-204 = 204-version-negotiation test-205 = 205-version-negotiation test-206 = 206-version-negotiation test-207 = 207-version-negotiation test-208 = 208-version-negotiation test-209 = 209-version-negotiation test-210 = 210-version-negotiation test-211 = 211-version-negotiation test-212 = 212-version-negotiation test-213 = 213-version-negotiation test-214 = 214-version-negotiation test-215 = 215-version-negotiation test-216 = 216-version-negotiation test-217 = 217-version-negotiation test-218 = 218-version-negotiation test-219 = 219-version-negotiation test-220 = 220-version-negotiation test-221 = 221-version-negotiation test-222 = 222-version-negotiation test-223 = 223-version-negotiation test-224 = 224-version-negotiation test-225 = 225-version-negotiation test-226 = 226-version-negotiation test-227 = 227-version-negotiation test-228 = 228-version-negotiation test-229 = 229-version-negotiation test-230 = 230-version-negotiation test-231 = 231-version-negotiation test-232 = 232-version-negotiation test-233 = 233-version-negotiation test-234 = 234-version-negotiation test-235 = 235-version-negotiation test-236 = 236-version-negotiation test-237 = 237-version-negotiation test-238 = 238-version-negotiation test-239 = 239-version-negotiation test-240 = 240-version-negotiation test-241 = 241-version-negotiation test-242 = 242-version-negotiation test-243 = 243-version-negotiation test-244 = 244-version-negotiation test-245 = 245-version-negotiation test-246 = 246-version-negotiation test-247 = 247-version-negotiation test-248 = 248-version-negotiation test-249 = 249-version-negotiation test-250 = 250-version-negotiation test-251 = 251-version-negotiation test-252 = 252-version-negotiation test-253 = 253-version-negotiation test-254 = 254-version-negotiation test-255 = 255-version-negotiation test-256 = 256-version-negotiation test-257 = 257-version-negotiation test-258 = 258-version-negotiation test-259 = 259-version-negotiation test-260 = 260-version-negotiation test-261 = 261-version-negotiation test-262 = 262-version-negotiation test-263 = 263-version-negotiation test-264 = 264-version-negotiation test-265 = 265-version-negotiation test-266 = 266-version-negotiation test-267 = 267-version-negotiation test-268 = 268-version-negotiation test-269 = 269-version-negotiation test-270 = 270-version-negotiation test-271 = 271-version-negotiation test-272 = 272-version-negotiation test-273 = 273-version-negotiation test-274 = 274-version-negotiation test-275 = 275-version-negotiation test-276 = 276-version-negotiation test-277 = 277-version-negotiation test-278 = 278-version-negotiation test-279 = 279-version-negotiation test-280 = 280-version-negotiation test-281 = 281-version-negotiation test-282 = 282-version-negotiation test-283 = 283-version-negotiation test-284 = 284-version-negotiation test-285 = 285-version-negotiation test-286 = 286-version-negotiation test-287 = 287-version-negotiation test-288 = 288-version-negotiation test-289 = 289-version-negotiation test-290 = 290-version-negotiation test-291 = 291-version-negotiation test-292 = 292-version-negotiation test-293 = 293-version-negotiation test-294 = 294-version-negotiation test-295 = 295-version-negotiation test-296 = 296-version-negotiation test-297 = 297-version-negotiation test-298 = 298-version-negotiation test-299 = 299-version-negotiation test-300 = 300-version-negotiation test-301 = 301-version-negotiation test-302 = 302-version-negotiation test-303 = 303-version-negotiation test-304 = 304-version-negotiation test-305 = 305-version-negotiation test-306 = 306-version-negotiation test-307 = 307-version-negotiation test-308 = 308-version-negotiation test-309 = 309-version-negotiation test-310 = 310-version-negotiation test-311 = 311-version-negotiation test-312 = 312-version-negotiation test-313 = 313-version-negotiation test-314 = 314-version-negotiation test-315 = 315-version-negotiation test-316 = 316-version-negotiation test-317 = 317-version-negotiation test-318 = 318-version-negotiation test-319 = 319-version-negotiation test-320 = 320-version-negotiation test-321 = 321-version-negotiation test-322 = 322-version-negotiation test-323 = 323-version-negotiation test-324 = 324-version-negotiation test-325 = 325-version-negotiation test-326 = 326-version-negotiation test-327 = 327-version-negotiation test-328 = 328-version-negotiation test-329 = 329-version-negotiation test-330 = 330-version-negotiation test-331 = 331-version-negotiation test-332 = 332-version-negotiation test-333 = 333-version-negotiation test-334 = 334-version-negotiation test-335 = 335-version-negotiation test-336 = 336-version-negotiation test-337 = 337-version-negotiation test-338 = 338-version-negotiation test-339 = 339-version-negotiation test-340 = 340-version-negotiation test-341 = 341-version-negotiation test-342 = 342-version-negotiation test-343 = 343-version-negotiation test-344 = 344-version-negotiation test-345 = 345-version-negotiation test-346 = 346-version-negotiation test-347 = 347-version-negotiation test-348 = 348-version-negotiation test-349 = 349-version-negotiation test-350 = 350-version-negotiation test-351 = 351-version-negotiation test-352 = 352-version-negotiation test-353 = 353-version-negotiation test-354 = 354-version-negotiation test-355 = 355-version-negotiation test-356 = 356-version-negotiation test-357 = 357-version-negotiation test-358 = 358-version-negotiation test-359 = 359-version-negotiation test-360 = 360-version-negotiation # =========================================================== [0-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 0-version-negotiation-ssl [0-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 0-version-negotiation-server client = 0-version-negotiation-client [0-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [1-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 1-version-negotiation-ssl [1-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 1-version-negotiation-server client = 1-version-negotiation-client [1-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [2-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 2-version-negotiation-ssl [2-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 2-version-negotiation-server client = 2-version-negotiation-client [2-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [3-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 3-version-negotiation-ssl [3-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 3-version-negotiation-server client = 3-version-negotiation-client [3-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [4-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 4-version-negotiation-ssl [4-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 4-version-negotiation-server client = 4-version-negotiation-client [4-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [5-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 5-version-negotiation-ssl [5-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 5-version-negotiation-server client = 5-version-negotiation-client [5-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [6-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 6-version-negotiation-ssl [6-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 6-version-negotiation-server client = 6-version-negotiation-client [6-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [7-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 7-version-negotiation-ssl [7-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 7-version-negotiation-server client = 7-version-negotiation-client [7-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [8-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 8-version-negotiation-ssl [8-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 8-version-negotiation-server client = 8-version-negotiation-client [8-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [9-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 9-version-negotiation-ssl [9-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 9-version-negotiation-server client = 9-version-negotiation-client [9-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [10-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 10-version-negotiation-ssl [10-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 10-version-negotiation-server client = 10-version-negotiation-client [10-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [11-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 11-version-negotiation-ssl [11-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 11-version-negotiation-server client = 11-version-negotiation-client [11-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [12-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 12-version-negotiation-ssl [12-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 12-version-negotiation-server client = 12-version-negotiation-client [12-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [13-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 13-version-negotiation-ssl [13-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 13-version-negotiation-server client = 13-version-negotiation-client [13-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [14-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 14-version-negotiation-ssl [14-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 14-version-negotiation-server client = 14-version-negotiation-client [14-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [15-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 15-version-negotiation-ssl [15-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 15-version-negotiation-server client = 15-version-negotiation-client [15-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [16-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 16-version-negotiation-ssl [16-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 16-version-negotiation-server client = 16-version-negotiation-client [16-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-16] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [17-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 17-version-negotiation-ssl [17-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 17-version-negotiation-server client = 17-version-negotiation-client [17-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [17-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-17] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [18-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 18-version-negotiation-ssl [18-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 18-version-negotiation-server client = 18-version-negotiation-client [18-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [18-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-18] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [19-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 19-version-negotiation-ssl [19-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 19-version-negotiation-server client = 19-version-negotiation-client [19-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [19-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-19] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [20-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 20-version-negotiation-ssl [20-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 20-version-negotiation-server client = 20-version-negotiation-client [20-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [20-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-20] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [21-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 21-version-negotiation-ssl [21-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 21-version-negotiation-server client = 21-version-negotiation-client [21-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [21-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-21] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [22-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 22-version-negotiation-ssl [22-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 22-version-negotiation-server client = 22-version-negotiation-client [22-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [22-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-22] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [23-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 23-version-negotiation-ssl [23-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 23-version-negotiation-server client = 23-version-negotiation-client [23-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [23-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-23] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [24-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 24-version-negotiation-ssl [24-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 24-version-negotiation-server client = 24-version-negotiation-client [24-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [24-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-24] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [25-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 25-version-negotiation-ssl [25-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 25-version-negotiation-server client = 25-version-negotiation-client [25-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [25-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-25] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [26-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 26-version-negotiation-ssl [26-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 26-version-negotiation-server client = 26-version-negotiation-client [26-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [26-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-26] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [27-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 27-version-negotiation-ssl [27-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 27-version-negotiation-server client = 27-version-negotiation-client [27-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [27-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-27] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [28-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 28-version-negotiation-ssl [28-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 28-version-negotiation-server client = 28-version-negotiation-client [28-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [28-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-28] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [29-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 29-version-negotiation-ssl [29-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 29-version-negotiation-server client = 29-version-negotiation-client [29-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [29-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-29] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [30-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 30-version-negotiation-ssl [30-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 30-version-negotiation-server client = 30-version-negotiation-client [30-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [30-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-30] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [31-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 31-version-negotiation-ssl [31-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 31-version-negotiation-server client = 31-version-negotiation-client [31-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [31-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-31] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [32-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 32-version-negotiation-ssl [32-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 32-version-negotiation-server client = 32-version-negotiation-client [32-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [32-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-32] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [33-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 33-version-negotiation-ssl [33-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 33-version-negotiation-server client = 33-version-negotiation-client [33-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [33-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-33] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [34-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 34-version-negotiation-ssl [34-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 34-version-negotiation-server client = 34-version-negotiation-client [34-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [34-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-34] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [35-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 35-version-negotiation-ssl [35-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 35-version-negotiation-server client = 35-version-negotiation-client [35-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [35-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-35] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [36-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 36-version-negotiation-ssl [36-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 36-version-negotiation-server client = 36-version-negotiation-client [36-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [36-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-36] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [37-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 37-version-negotiation-ssl [37-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 37-version-negotiation-server client = 37-version-negotiation-client [37-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [37-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-37] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [38-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 38-version-negotiation-ssl [38-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 38-version-negotiation-server client = 38-version-negotiation-client [38-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [38-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-38] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [39-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 39-version-negotiation-ssl [39-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 39-version-negotiation-server client = 39-version-negotiation-client [39-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [39-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-39] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [40-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 40-version-negotiation-ssl [40-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 40-version-negotiation-server client = 40-version-negotiation-client [40-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [40-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-40] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [41-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 41-version-negotiation-ssl [41-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 41-version-negotiation-server client = 41-version-negotiation-client [41-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [41-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-41] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [42-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 42-version-negotiation-ssl [42-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 42-version-negotiation-server client = 42-version-negotiation-client [42-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [42-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-42] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [43-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 43-version-negotiation-ssl [43-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 43-version-negotiation-server client = 43-version-negotiation-client [43-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [43-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-43] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [44-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 44-version-negotiation-ssl [44-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 44-version-negotiation-server client = 44-version-negotiation-client [44-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [44-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-44] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [45-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 45-version-negotiation-ssl [45-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 45-version-negotiation-server client = 45-version-negotiation-client [45-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [45-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-45] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [46-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 46-version-negotiation-ssl [46-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 46-version-negotiation-server client = 46-version-negotiation-client [46-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [46-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-46] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [47-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 47-version-negotiation-ssl [47-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 47-version-negotiation-server client = 47-version-negotiation-client [47-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [47-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-47] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [48-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 48-version-negotiation-ssl [48-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 48-version-negotiation-server client = 48-version-negotiation-client [48-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [48-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-48] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [49-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 49-version-negotiation-ssl [49-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 49-version-negotiation-server client = 49-version-negotiation-client [49-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [49-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-49] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [50-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 50-version-negotiation-ssl [50-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 50-version-negotiation-server client = 50-version-negotiation-client [50-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [50-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-50] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [51-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 51-version-negotiation-ssl [51-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 51-version-negotiation-server client = 51-version-negotiation-client [51-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [51-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-51] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [52-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 52-version-negotiation-ssl [52-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 52-version-negotiation-server client = 52-version-negotiation-client [52-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [52-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-52] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [53-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 53-version-negotiation-ssl [53-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 53-version-negotiation-server client = 53-version-negotiation-client [53-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [53-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-53] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [54-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 54-version-negotiation-ssl [54-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 54-version-negotiation-server client = 54-version-negotiation-client [54-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [54-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-54] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [55-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 55-version-negotiation-ssl [55-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 55-version-negotiation-server client = 55-version-negotiation-client [55-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [55-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-55] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [56-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 56-version-negotiation-ssl [56-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 56-version-negotiation-server client = 56-version-negotiation-client [56-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [56-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-56] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [57-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 57-version-negotiation-ssl [57-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 57-version-negotiation-server client = 57-version-negotiation-client [57-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [57-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-57] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [58-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 58-version-negotiation-ssl [58-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 58-version-negotiation-server client = 58-version-negotiation-client [58-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [58-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-58] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [59-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 59-version-negotiation-ssl [59-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 59-version-negotiation-server client = 59-version-negotiation-client [59-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [59-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-59] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [60-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 60-version-negotiation-ssl [60-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 60-version-negotiation-server client = 60-version-negotiation-client [60-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [60-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-60] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [61-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 61-version-negotiation-ssl [61-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 61-version-negotiation-server client = 61-version-negotiation-client [61-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [61-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-61] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [62-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 62-version-negotiation-ssl [62-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 62-version-negotiation-server client = 62-version-negotiation-client [62-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [62-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-62] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [63-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 63-version-negotiation-ssl [63-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 63-version-negotiation-server client = 63-version-negotiation-client [63-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [63-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-63] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [64-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 64-version-negotiation-ssl [64-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 64-version-negotiation-server client = 64-version-negotiation-client [64-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [64-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-64] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [65-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 65-version-negotiation-ssl [65-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 65-version-negotiation-server client = 65-version-negotiation-client [65-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [65-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-65] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [66-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 66-version-negotiation-ssl [66-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 66-version-negotiation-server client = 66-version-negotiation-client [66-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [66-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-66] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [67-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 67-version-negotiation-ssl [67-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 67-version-negotiation-server client = 67-version-negotiation-client [67-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [67-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-67] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [68-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 68-version-negotiation-ssl [68-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 68-version-negotiation-server client = 68-version-negotiation-client [68-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [68-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-68] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [69-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 69-version-negotiation-ssl [69-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 69-version-negotiation-server client = 69-version-negotiation-client [69-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [69-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-69] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [70-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 70-version-negotiation-ssl [70-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 70-version-negotiation-server client = 70-version-negotiation-client [70-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [70-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-70] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [71-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 71-version-negotiation-ssl [71-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 71-version-negotiation-server client = 71-version-negotiation-client [71-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [71-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-71] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [72-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 72-version-negotiation-ssl [72-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 72-version-negotiation-server client = 72-version-negotiation-client [72-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [72-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-72] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [73-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 73-version-negotiation-ssl [73-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 73-version-negotiation-server client = 73-version-negotiation-client [73-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [73-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-73] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [74-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 74-version-negotiation-ssl [74-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 74-version-negotiation-server client = 74-version-negotiation-client [74-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [74-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-74] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [75-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 75-version-negotiation-ssl [75-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 75-version-negotiation-server client = 75-version-negotiation-client [75-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [75-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-75] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [76-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 76-version-negotiation-ssl [76-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 76-version-negotiation-server client = 76-version-negotiation-client [76-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [76-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-76] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [77-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 77-version-negotiation-ssl [77-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 77-version-negotiation-server client = 77-version-negotiation-client [77-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [77-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-77] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [78-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 78-version-negotiation-ssl [78-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 78-version-negotiation-server client = 78-version-negotiation-client [78-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [78-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-78] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [79-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 79-version-negotiation-ssl [79-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 79-version-negotiation-server client = 79-version-negotiation-client [79-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [79-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-79] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [80-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 80-version-negotiation-ssl [80-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 80-version-negotiation-server client = 80-version-negotiation-client [80-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [80-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-80] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [81-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 81-version-negotiation-ssl [81-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 81-version-negotiation-server client = 81-version-negotiation-client [81-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [81-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-81] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [82-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 82-version-negotiation-ssl [82-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 82-version-negotiation-server client = 82-version-negotiation-client [82-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [82-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-82] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [83-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 83-version-negotiation-ssl [83-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 83-version-negotiation-server client = 83-version-negotiation-client [83-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [83-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-83] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [84-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 84-version-negotiation-ssl [84-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 84-version-negotiation-server client = 84-version-negotiation-client [84-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [84-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-84] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [85-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 85-version-negotiation-ssl [85-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 85-version-negotiation-server client = 85-version-negotiation-client [85-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [85-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-85] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [86-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 86-version-negotiation-ssl [86-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 86-version-negotiation-server client = 86-version-negotiation-client [86-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [86-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-86] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [87-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 87-version-negotiation-ssl [87-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 87-version-negotiation-server client = 87-version-negotiation-client [87-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [87-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-87] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [88-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 88-version-negotiation-ssl [88-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 88-version-negotiation-server client = 88-version-negotiation-client [88-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [88-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-88] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [89-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 89-version-negotiation-ssl [89-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 89-version-negotiation-server client = 89-version-negotiation-client [89-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [89-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-89] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [90-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 90-version-negotiation-ssl [90-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 90-version-negotiation-server client = 90-version-negotiation-client [90-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [90-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-90] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [91-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 91-version-negotiation-ssl [91-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 91-version-negotiation-server client = 91-version-negotiation-client [91-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [91-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-91] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [92-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 92-version-negotiation-ssl [92-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 92-version-negotiation-server client = 92-version-negotiation-client [92-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [92-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-92] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [93-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 93-version-negotiation-ssl [93-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 93-version-negotiation-server client = 93-version-negotiation-client [93-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [93-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-93] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [94-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 94-version-negotiation-ssl [94-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 94-version-negotiation-server client = 94-version-negotiation-client [94-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [94-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-94] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [95-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 95-version-negotiation-ssl [95-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 95-version-negotiation-server client = 95-version-negotiation-client [95-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [95-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-95] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [96-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 96-version-negotiation-ssl [96-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 96-version-negotiation-server client = 96-version-negotiation-client [96-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [96-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-96] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [97-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 97-version-negotiation-ssl [97-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 97-version-negotiation-server client = 97-version-negotiation-client [97-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [97-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-97] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [98-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 98-version-negotiation-ssl [98-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 98-version-negotiation-server client = 98-version-negotiation-client [98-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [98-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-98] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [99-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 99-version-negotiation-ssl [99-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 99-version-negotiation-server client = 99-version-negotiation-client [99-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [99-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-99] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [100-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 100-version-negotiation-ssl [100-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 100-version-negotiation-server client = 100-version-negotiation-client [100-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [100-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-100] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [101-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 101-version-negotiation-ssl [101-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 101-version-negotiation-server client = 101-version-negotiation-client [101-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [101-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-101] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [102-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 102-version-negotiation-ssl [102-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 102-version-negotiation-server client = 102-version-negotiation-client [102-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [102-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-102] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [103-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 103-version-negotiation-ssl [103-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 103-version-negotiation-server client = 103-version-negotiation-client [103-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [103-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-103] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [104-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 104-version-negotiation-ssl [104-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 104-version-negotiation-server client = 104-version-negotiation-client [104-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [104-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-104] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [105-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 105-version-negotiation-ssl [105-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 105-version-negotiation-server client = 105-version-negotiation-client [105-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [105-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-105] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [106-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 106-version-negotiation-ssl [106-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 106-version-negotiation-server client = 106-version-negotiation-client [106-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [106-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-106] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [107-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 107-version-negotiation-ssl [107-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 107-version-negotiation-server client = 107-version-negotiation-client [107-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [107-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-107] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [108-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 108-version-negotiation-ssl [108-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 108-version-negotiation-server client = 108-version-negotiation-client [108-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [108-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-108] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [109-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 109-version-negotiation-ssl [109-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 109-version-negotiation-server client = 109-version-negotiation-client [109-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [109-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-109] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [110-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 110-version-negotiation-ssl [110-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 110-version-negotiation-server client = 110-version-negotiation-client [110-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [110-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-110] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [111-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 111-version-negotiation-ssl [111-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 111-version-negotiation-server client = 111-version-negotiation-client [111-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [111-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-111] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [112-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 112-version-negotiation-ssl [112-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 112-version-negotiation-server client = 112-version-negotiation-client [112-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [112-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-112] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [113-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 113-version-negotiation-ssl [113-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 113-version-negotiation-server client = 113-version-negotiation-client [113-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [113-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-113] ExpectedResult = InternalError # =========================================================== [114-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 114-version-negotiation-ssl [114-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 114-version-negotiation-server client = 114-version-negotiation-client [114-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [114-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-114] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [115-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 115-version-negotiation-ssl [115-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 115-version-negotiation-server client = 115-version-negotiation-client [115-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [115-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-115] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [116-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 116-version-negotiation-ssl [116-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 116-version-negotiation-server client = 116-version-negotiation-client [116-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [116-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-116] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [117-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 117-version-negotiation-ssl [117-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 117-version-negotiation-server client = 117-version-negotiation-client [117-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [117-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-117] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [118-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 118-version-negotiation-ssl [118-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 118-version-negotiation-server client = 118-version-negotiation-client [118-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [118-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-118] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [119-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 119-version-negotiation-ssl [119-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 119-version-negotiation-server client = 119-version-negotiation-client [119-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [119-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-119] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [120-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 120-version-negotiation-ssl [120-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 120-version-negotiation-server client = 120-version-negotiation-client [120-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [120-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-120] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [121-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 121-version-negotiation-ssl [121-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 121-version-negotiation-server client = 121-version-negotiation-client [121-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [121-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-121] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [122-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 122-version-negotiation-ssl [122-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 122-version-negotiation-server client = 122-version-negotiation-client [122-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [122-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-122] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [123-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 123-version-negotiation-ssl [123-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 123-version-negotiation-server client = 123-version-negotiation-client [123-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [123-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-123] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [124-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 124-version-negotiation-ssl [124-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 124-version-negotiation-server client = 124-version-negotiation-client [124-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [124-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-124] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [125-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 125-version-negotiation-ssl [125-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 125-version-negotiation-server client = 125-version-negotiation-client [125-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [125-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-125] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [126-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 126-version-negotiation-ssl [126-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 126-version-negotiation-server client = 126-version-negotiation-client [126-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [126-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-126] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [127-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 127-version-negotiation-ssl [127-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 127-version-negotiation-server client = 127-version-negotiation-client [127-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [127-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-127] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [128-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 128-version-negotiation-ssl [128-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 128-version-negotiation-server client = 128-version-negotiation-client [128-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [128-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-128] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [129-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 129-version-negotiation-ssl [129-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 129-version-negotiation-server client = 129-version-negotiation-client [129-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [129-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-129] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [130-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 130-version-negotiation-ssl [130-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 130-version-negotiation-server client = 130-version-negotiation-client [130-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [130-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-130] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [131-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 131-version-negotiation-ssl [131-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 131-version-negotiation-server client = 131-version-negotiation-client [131-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [131-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-131] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [132-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 132-version-negotiation-ssl [132-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 132-version-negotiation-server client = 132-version-negotiation-client [132-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [132-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-132] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [133-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 133-version-negotiation-ssl [133-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 133-version-negotiation-server client = 133-version-negotiation-client [133-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [133-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-133] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [134-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 134-version-negotiation-ssl [134-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 134-version-negotiation-server client = 134-version-negotiation-client [134-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [134-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-134] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [135-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 135-version-negotiation-ssl [135-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 135-version-negotiation-server client = 135-version-negotiation-client [135-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [135-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-135] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [136-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 136-version-negotiation-ssl [136-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 136-version-negotiation-server client = 136-version-negotiation-client [136-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [136-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-136] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [137-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 137-version-negotiation-ssl [137-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 137-version-negotiation-server client = 137-version-negotiation-client [137-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [137-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-137] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [138-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 138-version-negotiation-ssl [138-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 138-version-negotiation-server client = 138-version-negotiation-client [138-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [138-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-138] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [139-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 139-version-negotiation-ssl [139-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 139-version-negotiation-server client = 139-version-negotiation-client [139-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [139-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-139] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [140-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 140-version-negotiation-ssl [140-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 140-version-negotiation-server client = 140-version-negotiation-client [140-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [140-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-140] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [141-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 141-version-negotiation-ssl [141-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 141-version-negotiation-server client = 141-version-negotiation-client [141-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [141-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-141] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [142-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 142-version-negotiation-ssl [142-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 142-version-negotiation-server client = 142-version-negotiation-client [142-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [142-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-142] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [143-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 143-version-negotiation-ssl [143-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 143-version-negotiation-server client = 143-version-negotiation-client [143-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [143-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-143] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [144-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 144-version-negotiation-ssl [144-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 144-version-negotiation-server client = 144-version-negotiation-client [144-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [144-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-144] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [145-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 145-version-negotiation-ssl [145-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 145-version-negotiation-server client = 145-version-negotiation-client [145-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [145-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-145] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [146-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 146-version-negotiation-ssl [146-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 146-version-negotiation-server client = 146-version-negotiation-client [146-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [146-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-146] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [147-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 147-version-negotiation-ssl [147-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 147-version-negotiation-server client = 147-version-negotiation-client [147-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [147-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-147] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [148-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 148-version-negotiation-ssl [148-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 148-version-negotiation-server client = 148-version-negotiation-client [148-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [148-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-148] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [149-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 149-version-negotiation-ssl [149-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 149-version-negotiation-server client = 149-version-negotiation-client [149-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [149-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-149] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [150-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 150-version-negotiation-ssl [150-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 150-version-negotiation-server client = 150-version-negotiation-client [150-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [150-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-150] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [151-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 151-version-negotiation-ssl [151-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 151-version-negotiation-server client = 151-version-negotiation-client [151-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [151-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-151] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [152-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 152-version-negotiation-ssl [152-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 152-version-negotiation-server client = 152-version-negotiation-client [152-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [152-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-152] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [153-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 153-version-negotiation-ssl [153-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 153-version-negotiation-server client = 153-version-negotiation-client [153-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [153-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-153] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [154-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 154-version-negotiation-ssl [154-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 154-version-negotiation-server client = 154-version-negotiation-client [154-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [154-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-154] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [155-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 155-version-negotiation-ssl [155-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 155-version-negotiation-server client = 155-version-negotiation-client [155-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [155-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-155] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [156-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 156-version-negotiation-ssl [156-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 156-version-negotiation-server client = 156-version-negotiation-client [156-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [156-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-156] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [157-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 157-version-negotiation-ssl [157-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 157-version-negotiation-server client = 157-version-negotiation-client [157-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [157-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-157] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [158-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 158-version-negotiation-ssl [158-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 158-version-negotiation-server client = 158-version-negotiation-client [158-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [158-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-158] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [159-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 159-version-negotiation-ssl [159-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 159-version-negotiation-server client = 159-version-negotiation-client [159-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [159-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-159] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [160-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 160-version-negotiation-ssl [160-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 160-version-negotiation-server client = 160-version-negotiation-client [160-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [160-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-160] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [161-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 161-version-negotiation-ssl [161-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 161-version-negotiation-server client = 161-version-negotiation-client [161-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [161-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-161] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [162-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 162-version-negotiation-ssl [162-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 162-version-negotiation-server client = 162-version-negotiation-client [162-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [162-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-162] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [163-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 163-version-negotiation-ssl [163-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 163-version-negotiation-server client = 163-version-negotiation-client [163-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [163-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-163] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [164-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 164-version-negotiation-ssl [164-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 164-version-negotiation-server client = 164-version-negotiation-client [164-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [164-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-164] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [165-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 165-version-negotiation-ssl [165-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 165-version-negotiation-server client = 165-version-negotiation-client [165-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [165-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-165] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [166-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 166-version-negotiation-ssl [166-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 166-version-negotiation-server client = 166-version-negotiation-client [166-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [166-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-166] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [167-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 167-version-negotiation-ssl [167-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 167-version-negotiation-server client = 167-version-negotiation-client [167-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [167-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-167] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [168-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 168-version-negotiation-ssl [168-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 168-version-negotiation-server client = 168-version-negotiation-client [168-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [168-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-168] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [169-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 169-version-negotiation-ssl [169-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 169-version-negotiation-server client = 169-version-negotiation-client [169-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [169-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-169] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [170-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 170-version-negotiation-ssl [170-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 170-version-negotiation-server client = 170-version-negotiation-client [170-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [170-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-170] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [171-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 171-version-negotiation-ssl [171-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 171-version-negotiation-server client = 171-version-negotiation-client [171-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [171-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-171] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [172-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 172-version-negotiation-ssl [172-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 172-version-negotiation-server client = 172-version-negotiation-client [172-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [172-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-172] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [173-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 173-version-negotiation-ssl [173-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 173-version-negotiation-server client = 173-version-negotiation-client [173-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [173-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-173] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [174-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 174-version-negotiation-ssl [174-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 174-version-negotiation-server client = 174-version-negotiation-client [174-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [174-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-174] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [175-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 175-version-negotiation-ssl [175-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 175-version-negotiation-server client = 175-version-negotiation-client [175-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [175-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-175] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [176-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 176-version-negotiation-ssl [176-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 176-version-negotiation-server client = 176-version-negotiation-client [176-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [176-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-176] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [177-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 177-version-negotiation-ssl [177-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 177-version-negotiation-server client = 177-version-negotiation-client [177-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [177-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-177] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [178-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 178-version-negotiation-ssl [178-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 178-version-negotiation-server client = 178-version-negotiation-client [178-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [178-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-178] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [179-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 179-version-negotiation-ssl [179-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 179-version-negotiation-server client = 179-version-negotiation-client [179-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [179-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-179] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [180-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 180-version-negotiation-ssl [180-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 180-version-negotiation-server client = 180-version-negotiation-client [180-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [180-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-180] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [181-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 181-version-negotiation-ssl [181-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 181-version-negotiation-server client = 181-version-negotiation-client [181-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [181-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-181] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [182-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 182-version-negotiation-ssl [182-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 182-version-negotiation-server client = 182-version-negotiation-client [182-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [182-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-182] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [183-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 183-version-negotiation-ssl [183-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 183-version-negotiation-server client = 183-version-negotiation-client [183-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [183-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-183] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [184-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 184-version-negotiation-ssl [184-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 184-version-negotiation-server client = 184-version-negotiation-client [184-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [184-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-184] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [185-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 185-version-negotiation-ssl [185-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 185-version-negotiation-server client = 185-version-negotiation-client [185-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [185-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-185] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [186-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 186-version-negotiation-ssl [186-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 186-version-negotiation-server client = 186-version-negotiation-client [186-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [186-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-186] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [187-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 187-version-negotiation-ssl [187-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 187-version-negotiation-server client = 187-version-negotiation-client [187-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [187-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-187] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [188-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 188-version-negotiation-ssl [188-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 188-version-negotiation-server client = 188-version-negotiation-client [188-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [188-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-188] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [189-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 189-version-negotiation-ssl [189-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 189-version-negotiation-server client = 189-version-negotiation-client [189-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [189-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-189] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [190-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 190-version-negotiation-ssl [190-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 190-version-negotiation-server client = 190-version-negotiation-client [190-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [190-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-190] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [191-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 191-version-negotiation-ssl [191-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 191-version-negotiation-server client = 191-version-negotiation-client [191-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [191-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-191] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [192-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 192-version-negotiation-ssl [192-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 192-version-negotiation-server client = 192-version-negotiation-client [192-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [192-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-192] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [193-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 193-version-negotiation-ssl [193-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 193-version-negotiation-server client = 193-version-negotiation-client [193-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [193-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-193] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [194-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 194-version-negotiation-ssl [194-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 194-version-negotiation-server client = 194-version-negotiation-client [194-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [194-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-194] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [195-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 195-version-negotiation-ssl [195-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 195-version-negotiation-server client = 195-version-negotiation-client [195-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [195-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-195] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [196-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 196-version-negotiation-ssl [196-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 196-version-negotiation-server client = 196-version-negotiation-client [196-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [196-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-196] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [197-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 197-version-negotiation-ssl [197-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 197-version-negotiation-server client = 197-version-negotiation-client [197-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [197-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-197] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [198-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 198-version-negotiation-ssl [198-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 198-version-negotiation-server client = 198-version-negotiation-client [198-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [198-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-198] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [199-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 199-version-negotiation-ssl [199-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 199-version-negotiation-server client = 199-version-negotiation-client [199-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [199-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-199] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [200-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 200-version-negotiation-ssl [200-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 200-version-negotiation-server client = 200-version-negotiation-client [200-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [200-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-200] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [201-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 201-version-negotiation-ssl [201-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 201-version-negotiation-server client = 201-version-negotiation-client [201-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [201-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-201] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [202-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 202-version-negotiation-ssl [202-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 202-version-negotiation-server client = 202-version-negotiation-client [202-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [202-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-202] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [203-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 203-version-negotiation-ssl [203-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 203-version-negotiation-server client = 203-version-negotiation-client [203-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [203-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-203] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [204-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 204-version-negotiation-ssl [204-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 204-version-negotiation-server client = 204-version-negotiation-client [204-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [204-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-204] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [205-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 205-version-negotiation-ssl [205-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 205-version-negotiation-server client = 205-version-negotiation-client [205-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [205-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-205] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [206-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 206-version-negotiation-ssl [206-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 206-version-negotiation-server client = 206-version-negotiation-client [206-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [206-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-206] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [207-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 207-version-negotiation-ssl [207-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 207-version-negotiation-server client = 207-version-negotiation-client [207-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [207-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-207] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [208-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 208-version-negotiation-ssl [208-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 208-version-negotiation-server client = 208-version-negotiation-client [208-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [208-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-208] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [209-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 209-version-negotiation-ssl [209-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 209-version-negotiation-server client = 209-version-negotiation-client [209-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [209-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-209] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [210-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 210-version-negotiation-ssl [210-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 210-version-negotiation-server client = 210-version-negotiation-client [210-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [210-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-210] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [211-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 211-version-negotiation-ssl [211-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 211-version-negotiation-server client = 211-version-negotiation-client [211-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [211-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-211] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [212-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 212-version-negotiation-ssl [212-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 212-version-negotiation-server client = 212-version-negotiation-client [212-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [212-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-212] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [213-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 213-version-negotiation-ssl [213-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 213-version-negotiation-server client = 213-version-negotiation-client [213-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [213-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-213] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [214-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 214-version-negotiation-ssl [214-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 214-version-negotiation-server client = 214-version-negotiation-client [214-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [214-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-214] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [215-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 215-version-negotiation-ssl [215-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 215-version-negotiation-server client = 215-version-negotiation-client [215-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [215-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-215] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [216-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 216-version-negotiation-ssl [216-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 216-version-negotiation-server client = 216-version-negotiation-client [216-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [216-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-216] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [217-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 217-version-negotiation-ssl [217-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 217-version-negotiation-server client = 217-version-negotiation-client [217-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [217-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-217] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [218-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 218-version-negotiation-ssl [218-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 218-version-negotiation-server client = 218-version-negotiation-client [218-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [218-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-218] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [219-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 219-version-negotiation-ssl [219-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 219-version-negotiation-server client = 219-version-negotiation-client [219-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [219-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-219] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [220-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 220-version-negotiation-ssl [220-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 220-version-negotiation-server client = 220-version-negotiation-client [220-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [220-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-220] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [221-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 221-version-negotiation-ssl [221-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 221-version-negotiation-server client = 221-version-negotiation-client [221-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [221-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-221] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [222-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 222-version-negotiation-ssl [222-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 222-version-negotiation-server client = 222-version-negotiation-client [222-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [222-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-222] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [223-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 223-version-negotiation-ssl [223-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 223-version-negotiation-server client = 223-version-negotiation-client [223-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [223-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-223] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [224-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 224-version-negotiation-ssl [224-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 224-version-negotiation-server client = 224-version-negotiation-client [224-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [224-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-224] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [225-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 225-version-negotiation-ssl [225-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 225-version-negotiation-server client = 225-version-negotiation-client [225-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [225-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-225] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [226-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 226-version-negotiation-ssl [226-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 226-version-negotiation-server client = 226-version-negotiation-client [226-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [226-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-226] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [227-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 227-version-negotiation-ssl [227-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 227-version-negotiation-server client = 227-version-negotiation-client [227-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [227-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-227] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [228-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 228-version-negotiation-ssl [228-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 228-version-negotiation-server client = 228-version-negotiation-client [228-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [228-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-228] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [229-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 229-version-negotiation-ssl [229-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 229-version-negotiation-server client = 229-version-negotiation-client [229-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [229-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-229] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [230-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 230-version-negotiation-ssl [230-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 230-version-negotiation-server client = 230-version-negotiation-client [230-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [230-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-230] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [231-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 231-version-negotiation-ssl [231-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 231-version-negotiation-server client = 231-version-negotiation-client [231-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [231-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-231] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [232-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 232-version-negotiation-ssl [232-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 232-version-negotiation-server client = 232-version-negotiation-client [232-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [232-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-232] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [233-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 233-version-negotiation-ssl [233-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 233-version-negotiation-server client = 233-version-negotiation-client [233-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [233-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-233] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [234-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 234-version-negotiation-ssl [234-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 234-version-negotiation-server client = 234-version-negotiation-client [234-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [234-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-234] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [235-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 235-version-negotiation-ssl [235-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 235-version-negotiation-server client = 235-version-negotiation-client [235-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [235-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-235] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [236-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 236-version-negotiation-ssl [236-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 236-version-negotiation-server client = 236-version-negotiation-client [236-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [236-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-236] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [237-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 237-version-negotiation-ssl [237-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 237-version-negotiation-server client = 237-version-negotiation-client [237-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [237-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-237] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [238-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 238-version-negotiation-ssl [238-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 238-version-negotiation-server client = 238-version-negotiation-client [238-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [238-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-238] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [239-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 239-version-negotiation-ssl [239-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 239-version-negotiation-server client = 239-version-negotiation-client [239-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [239-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-239] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [240-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 240-version-negotiation-ssl [240-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 240-version-negotiation-server client = 240-version-negotiation-client [240-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [240-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-240] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [241-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 241-version-negotiation-ssl [241-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 241-version-negotiation-server client = 241-version-negotiation-client [241-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [241-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-241] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [242-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 242-version-negotiation-ssl [242-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 242-version-negotiation-server client = 242-version-negotiation-client [242-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [242-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-242] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [243-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 243-version-negotiation-ssl [243-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 243-version-negotiation-server client = 243-version-negotiation-client [243-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [243-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-243] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [244-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 244-version-negotiation-ssl [244-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 244-version-negotiation-server client = 244-version-negotiation-client [244-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [244-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-244] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [245-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 245-version-negotiation-ssl [245-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 245-version-negotiation-server client = 245-version-negotiation-client [245-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [245-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-245] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [246-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 246-version-negotiation-ssl [246-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 246-version-negotiation-server client = 246-version-negotiation-client [246-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [246-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-246] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [247-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 247-version-negotiation-ssl [247-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 247-version-negotiation-server client = 247-version-negotiation-client [247-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [247-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-247] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [248-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 248-version-negotiation-ssl [248-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 248-version-negotiation-server client = 248-version-negotiation-client [248-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [248-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-248] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [249-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 249-version-negotiation-ssl [249-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 249-version-negotiation-server client = 249-version-negotiation-client [249-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [249-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-249] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [250-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 250-version-negotiation-ssl [250-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 250-version-negotiation-server client = 250-version-negotiation-client [250-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [250-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-250] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [251-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 251-version-negotiation-ssl [251-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 251-version-negotiation-server client = 251-version-negotiation-client [251-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [251-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-251] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [252-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 252-version-negotiation-ssl [252-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 252-version-negotiation-server client = 252-version-negotiation-client [252-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [252-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-252] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [253-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 253-version-negotiation-ssl [253-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 253-version-negotiation-server client = 253-version-negotiation-client [253-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [253-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-253] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [254-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 254-version-negotiation-ssl [254-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 254-version-negotiation-server client = 254-version-negotiation-client [254-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [254-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-254] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [255-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 255-version-negotiation-ssl [255-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 255-version-negotiation-server client = 255-version-negotiation-client [255-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [255-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-255] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [256-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 256-version-negotiation-ssl [256-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 256-version-negotiation-server client = 256-version-negotiation-client [256-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [256-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-256] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [257-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 257-version-negotiation-ssl [257-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 257-version-negotiation-server client = 257-version-negotiation-client [257-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [257-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-257] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [258-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 258-version-negotiation-ssl [258-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 258-version-negotiation-server client = 258-version-negotiation-client [258-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [258-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-258] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [259-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 259-version-negotiation-ssl [259-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 259-version-negotiation-server client = 259-version-negotiation-client [259-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [259-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-259] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [260-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 260-version-negotiation-ssl [260-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 260-version-negotiation-server client = 260-version-negotiation-client [260-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [260-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-260] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [261-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 261-version-negotiation-ssl [261-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 261-version-negotiation-server client = 261-version-negotiation-client [261-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [261-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-261] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [262-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 262-version-negotiation-ssl [262-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 262-version-negotiation-server client = 262-version-negotiation-client [262-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [262-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-262] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [263-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 263-version-negotiation-ssl [263-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 263-version-negotiation-server client = 263-version-negotiation-client [263-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [263-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-263] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [264-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 264-version-negotiation-ssl [264-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 264-version-negotiation-server client = 264-version-negotiation-client [264-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [264-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-264] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [265-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 265-version-negotiation-ssl [265-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 265-version-negotiation-server client = 265-version-negotiation-client [265-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [265-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-265] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [266-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 266-version-negotiation-ssl [266-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 266-version-negotiation-server client = 266-version-negotiation-client [266-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [266-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-266] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [267-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 267-version-negotiation-ssl [267-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 267-version-negotiation-server client = 267-version-negotiation-client [267-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [267-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-267] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [268-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 268-version-negotiation-ssl [268-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 268-version-negotiation-server client = 268-version-negotiation-client [268-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [268-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-268] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [269-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 269-version-negotiation-ssl [269-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 269-version-negotiation-server client = 269-version-negotiation-client [269-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [269-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-269] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [270-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 270-version-negotiation-ssl [270-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 270-version-negotiation-server client = 270-version-negotiation-client [270-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [270-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-270] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [271-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 271-version-negotiation-ssl [271-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 271-version-negotiation-server client = 271-version-negotiation-client [271-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [271-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-271] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [272-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 272-version-negotiation-ssl [272-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 272-version-negotiation-server client = 272-version-negotiation-client [272-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [272-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-272] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [273-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 273-version-negotiation-ssl [273-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 273-version-negotiation-server client = 273-version-negotiation-client [273-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [273-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-273] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [274-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 274-version-negotiation-ssl [274-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 274-version-negotiation-server client = 274-version-negotiation-client [274-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [274-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-274] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [275-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 275-version-negotiation-ssl [275-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 275-version-negotiation-server client = 275-version-negotiation-client [275-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [275-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-275] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [276-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 276-version-negotiation-ssl [276-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 276-version-negotiation-server client = 276-version-negotiation-client [276-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [276-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-276] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [277-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 277-version-negotiation-ssl [277-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 277-version-negotiation-server client = 277-version-negotiation-client [277-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [277-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-277] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [278-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 278-version-negotiation-ssl [278-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 278-version-negotiation-server client = 278-version-negotiation-client [278-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [278-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-278] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [279-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 279-version-negotiation-ssl [279-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 279-version-negotiation-server client = 279-version-negotiation-client [279-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [279-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-279] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [280-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 280-version-negotiation-ssl [280-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 280-version-negotiation-server client = 280-version-negotiation-client [280-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [280-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-280] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [281-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 281-version-negotiation-ssl [281-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 281-version-negotiation-server client = 281-version-negotiation-client [281-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [281-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-281] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [282-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 282-version-negotiation-ssl [282-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 282-version-negotiation-server client = 282-version-negotiation-client [282-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [282-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-282] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [283-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 283-version-negotiation-ssl [283-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 283-version-negotiation-server client = 283-version-negotiation-client [283-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [283-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-283] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [284-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 284-version-negotiation-ssl [284-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 284-version-negotiation-server client = 284-version-negotiation-client [284-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [284-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-284] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [285-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 285-version-negotiation-ssl [285-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 285-version-negotiation-server client = 285-version-negotiation-client [285-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [285-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-285] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [286-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 286-version-negotiation-ssl [286-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 286-version-negotiation-server client = 286-version-negotiation-client [286-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [286-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-286] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [287-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 287-version-negotiation-ssl [287-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 287-version-negotiation-server client = 287-version-negotiation-client [287-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [287-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-287] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [288-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 288-version-negotiation-ssl [288-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 288-version-negotiation-server client = 288-version-negotiation-client [288-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [288-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-288] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [289-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 289-version-negotiation-ssl [289-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 289-version-negotiation-server client = 289-version-negotiation-client [289-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [289-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-289] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [290-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 290-version-negotiation-ssl [290-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 290-version-negotiation-server client = 290-version-negotiation-client [290-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [290-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-290] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [291-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 291-version-negotiation-ssl [291-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 291-version-negotiation-server client = 291-version-negotiation-client [291-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [291-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-291] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [292-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 292-version-negotiation-ssl [292-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 292-version-negotiation-server client = 292-version-negotiation-client [292-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [292-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-292] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [293-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 293-version-negotiation-ssl [293-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 293-version-negotiation-server client = 293-version-negotiation-client [293-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [293-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-293] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [294-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 294-version-negotiation-ssl [294-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 294-version-negotiation-server client = 294-version-negotiation-client [294-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [294-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-294] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [295-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 295-version-negotiation-ssl [295-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 295-version-negotiation-server client = 295-version-negotiation-client [295-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [295-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-295] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [296-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 296-version-negotiation-ssl [296-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 296-version-negotiation-server client = 296-version-negotiation-client [296-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [296-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-296] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [297-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 297-version-negotiation-ssl [297-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 297-version-negotiation-server client = 297-version-negotiation-client [297-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [297-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-297] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [298-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 298-version-negotiation-ssl [298-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 298-version-negotiation-server client = 298-version-negotiation-client [298-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [298-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-298] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [299-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 299-version-negotiation-ssl [299-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 299-version-negotiation-server client = 299-version-negotiation-client [299-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [299-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-299] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [300-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 300-version-negotiation-ssl [300-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 300-version-negotiation-server client = 300-version-negotiation-client [300-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [300-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-300] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [301-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 301-version-negotiation-ssl [301-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 301-version-negotiation-server client = 301-version-negotiation-client [301-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [301-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-301] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [302-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 302-version-negotiation-ssl [302-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 302-version-negotiation-server client = 302-version-negotiation-client [302-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [302-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-302] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [303-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 303-version-negotiation-ssl [303-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 303-version-negotiation-server client = 303-version-negotiation-client [303-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [303-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-303] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [304-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 304-version-negotiation-ssl [304-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 304-version-negotiation-server client = 304-version-negotiation-client [304-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [304-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-304] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [305-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 305-version-negotiation-ssl [305-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 305-version-negotiation-server client = 305-version-negotiation-client [305-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [305-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-305] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [306-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 306-version-negotiation-ssl [306-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 306-version-negotiation-server client = 306-version-negotiation-client [306-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [306-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-306] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [307-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 307-version-negotiation-ssl [307-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 307-version-negotiation-server client = 307-version-negotiation-client [307-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [307-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-307] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [308-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 308-version-negotiation-ssl [308-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 308-version-negotiation-server client = 308-version-negotiation-client [308-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [308-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-308] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [309-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 309-version-negotiation-ssl [309-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 309-version-negotiation-server client = 309-version-negotiation-client [309-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [309-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-309] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [310-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 310-version-negotiation-ssl [310-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 310-version-negotiation-server client = 310-version-negotiation-client [310-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [310-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-310] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [311-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 311-version-negotiation-ssl [311-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 311-version-negotiation-server client = 311-version-negotiation-client [311-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [311-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-311] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [312-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 312-version-negotiation-ssl [312-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 312-version-negotiation-server client = 312-version-negotiation-client [312-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [312-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-312] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [313-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 313-version-negotiation-ssl [313-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 313-version-negotiation-server client = 313-version-negotiation-client [313-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [313-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-313] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [314-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 314-version-negotiation-ssl [314-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 314-version-negotiation-server client = 314-version-negotiation-client [314-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [314-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-314] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [315-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 315-version-negotiation-ssl [315-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 315-version-negotiation-server client = 315-version-negotiation-client [315-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [315-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-315] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [316-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 316-version-negotiation-ssl [316-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 316-version-negotiation-server client = 316-version-negotiation-client [316-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [316-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-316] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [317-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 317-version-negotiation-ssl [317-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 317-version-negotiation-server client = 317-version-negotiation-client [317-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [317-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-317] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [318-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 318-version-negotiation-ssl [318-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 318-version-negotiation-server client = 318-version-negotiation-client [318-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [318-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-318] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [319-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 319-version-negotiation-ssl [319-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 319-version-negotiation-server client = 319-version-negotiation-client [319-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [319-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-319] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [320-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 320-version-negotiation-ssl [320-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 320-version-negotiation-server client = 320-version-negotiation-client [320-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [320-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-320] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [321-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 321-version-negotiation-ssl [321-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 321-version-negotiation-server client = 321-version-negotiation-client [321-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [321-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-321] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [322-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 322-version-negotiation-ssl [322-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 322-version-negotiation-server client = 322-version-negotiation-client [322-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [322-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-322] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [323-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 323-version-negotiation-ssl [323-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 323-version-negotiation-server client = 323-version-negotiation-client [323-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [323-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-323] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [324-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 324-version-negotiation-ssl [324-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 324-version-negotiation-server client = 324-version-negotiation-client [324-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [324-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-324] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [325-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 325-version-negotiation-ssl [325-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 325-version-negotiation-server client = 325-version-negotiation-client [325-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [325-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-325] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [326-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 326-version-negotiation-ssl [326-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 326-version-negotiation-server client = 326-version-negotiation-client [326-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [326-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-326] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [327-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 327-version-negotiation-ssl [327-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 327-version-negotiation-server client = 327-version-negotiation-client [327-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [327-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-327] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [328-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 328-version-negotiation-ssl [328-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 328-version-negotiation-server client = 328-version-negotiation-client [328-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [328-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-328] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [329-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 329-version-negotiation-ssl [329-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 329-version-negotiation-server client = 329-version-negotiation-client [329-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [329-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-329] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [330-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 330-version-negotiation-ssl [330-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 330-version-negotiation-server client = 330-version-negotiation-client [330-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [330-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-330] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [331-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 331-version-negotiation-ssl [331-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 331-version-negotiation-server client = 331-version-negotiation-client [331-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [331-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-331] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [332-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 332-version-negotiation-ssl [332-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 332-version-negotiation-server client = 332-version-negotiation-client [332-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [332-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-332] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [333-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 333-version-negotiation-ssl [333-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 333-version-negotiation-server client = 333-version-negotiation-client [333-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [333-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-333] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [334-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 334-version-negotiation-ssl [334-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 334-version-negotiation-server client = 334-version-negotiation-client [334-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [334-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-334] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [335-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 335-version-negotiation-ssl [335-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 335-version-negotiation-server client = 335-version-negotiation-client [335-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [335-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-335] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [336-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 336-version-negotiation-ssl [336-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 336-version-negotiation-server client = 336-version-negotiation-client [336-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [336-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-336] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [337-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 337-version-negotiation-ssl [337-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 337-version-negotiation-server client = 337-version-negotiation-client [337-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [337-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-337] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [338-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 338-version-negotiation-ssl [338-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 338-version-negotiation-server client = 338-version-negotiation-client [338-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [338-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-338] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [339-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 339-version-negotiation-ssl [339-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 339-version-negotiation-server client = 339-version-negotiation-client [339-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [339-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-339] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [340-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 340-version-negotiation-ssl [340-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 340-version-negotiation-server client = 340-version-negotiation-client [340-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [340-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-340] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [341-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 341-version-negotiation-ssl [341-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 341-version-negotiation-server client = 341-version-negotiation-client [341-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [341-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-341] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [342-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 342-version-negotiation-ssl [342-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 342-version-negotiation-server client = 342-version-negotiation-client [342-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [342-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-342] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [343-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 343-version-negotiation-ssl [343-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 343-version-negotiation-server client = 343-version-negotiation-client [343-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [343-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-343] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [344-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 344-version-negotiation-ssl [344-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 344-version-negotiation-server client = 344-version-negotiation-client [344-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [344-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-344] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [345-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 345-version-negotiation-ssl [345-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 345-version-negotiation-server client = 345-version-negotiation-client [345-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [345-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-345] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [346-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 346-version-negotiation-ssl [346-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 346-version-negotiation-server client = 346-version-negotiation-client [346-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [346-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-346] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [347-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 347-version-negotiation-ssl [347-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 347-version-negotiation-server client = 347-version-negotiation-client [347-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = SSLv3 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [347-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-347] ExpectedResult = ServerFail # =========================================================== [348-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 348-version-negotiation-ssl [348-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 348-version-negotiation-server client = 348-version-negotiation-client [348-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [348-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-348] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [349-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 349-version-negotiation-ssl [349-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 349-version-negotiation-server client = 349-version-negotiation-client [349-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [349-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-349] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [350-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 350-version-negotiation-ssl [350-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 350-version-negotiation-server client = 350-version-negotiation-client [350-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [350-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-350] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [351-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 351-version-negotiation-ssl [351-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 351-version-negotiation-server client = 351-version-negotiation-client [351-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = SSLv3 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [351-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-351] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [352-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 352-version-negotiation-ssl [352-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 352-version-negotiation-server client = 352-version-negotiation-client [352-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [352-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-352] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [353-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 353-version-negotiation-ssl [353-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 353-version-negotiation-server client = 353-version-negotiation-client [353-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [353-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-353] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [354-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 354-version-negotiation-ssl [354-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 354-version-negotiation-server client = 354-version-negotiation-client [354-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [354-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-354] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [355-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 355-version-negotiation-ssl [355-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 355-version-negotiation-server client = 355-version-negotiation-client [355-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [355-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-355] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [356-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 356-version-negotiation-ssl [356-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 356-version-negotiation-server client = 356-version-negotiation-client [356-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [356-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-356] ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [357-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 357-version-negotiation-ssl [357-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 357-version-negotiation-server client = 357-version-negotiation-client [357-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [357-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-357] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [358-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 358-version-negotiation-ssl [358-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 358-version-negotiation-server client = 358-version-negotiation-client [358-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [358-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-358] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [359-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 359-version-negotiation-ssl [359-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 359-version-negotiation-server client = 359-version-negotiation-client [359-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [359-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-359] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [360-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 360-version-negotiation-ssl [360-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 360-version-negotiation-server client = 360-version-negotiation-client [360-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [360-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-360] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf0000644000000000000000000005710413176625662016675 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 20 test-0 = 0-npn-simple test-1 = 1-npn-client-finds-match test-2 = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref test-3 = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch test-4 = 4-npn-no-server-support test-5 = 5-npn-no-client-support test-6 = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch test-7 = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch test-8 = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn test-9 = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn test-10 = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn test-11 = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn test-12 = 12-npn-simple-resumption test-13 = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption test-14 = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption test-15 = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption test-16 = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption test-17 = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption test-18 = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption test-19 = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption # =========================================================== [0-npn-simple] ssl_conf = 0-npn-simple-ssl [0-npn-simple-ssl] server = 0-npn-simple-server client = 0-npn-simple-client [0-npn-simple-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-npn-simple-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo server = 0-npn-simple-server-extra client = 0-npn-simple-client-extra [0-npn-simple-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo [0-npn-simple-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [1-npn-client-finds-match] ssl_conf = 1-npn-client-finds-match-ssl [1-npn-client-finds-match-ssl] server = 1-npn-client-finds-match-server client = 1-npn-client-finds-match-client [1-npn-client-finds-match-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-npn-client-finds-match-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar server = 1-npn-client-finds-match-server-extra client = 1-npn-client-finds-match-client-extra [1-npn-client-finds-match-server-extra] NPNProtocols = baz,bar [1-npn-client-finds-match-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [2-npn-client-honours-server-pref] ssl_conf = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-ssl [2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-ssl] server = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server client = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client [2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar server = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server-extra client = 2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client-extra [2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-server-extra] NPNProtocols = bar,foo [2-npn-client-honours-server-pref-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch] ssl_conf = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-ssl [3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-ssl] server = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server client = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client [3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo server = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server-extra client = 3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client-extra [3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-server-extra] NPNProtocols = baz [3-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [4-npn-no-server-support] ssl_conf = 4-npn-no-server-support-ssl [4-npn-no-server-support-ssl] server = 4-npn-no-server-support-server client = 4-npn-no-server-support-client [4-npn-no-server-support-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-npn-no-server-support-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] client = 4-npn-no-server-support-client-extra [4-npn-no-server-support-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [5-npn-no-client-support] ssl_conf = 5-npn-no-client-support-ssl [5-npn-no-client-support-ssl] server = 5-npn-no-client-support-server client = 5-npn-no-client-support-client [5-npn-no-client-support-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-npn-no-client-support-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] server = 5-npn-no-client-support-server-extra [5-npn-no-client-support-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch] ssl_conf = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl] server = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server client = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client server2 = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2 [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo ExpectedServerName = server1 server = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra server2 = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra client = 6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra] NPNProtocols = bar [6-npn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch] ssl_conf = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl] server = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server client = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client server2 = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2 [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra server2 = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra client = 7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra] NPNProtocols = bar [7-npn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn] ssl_conf = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-ssl [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-ssl] server = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server client = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client server2 = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2 [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server-extra server2 = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2-extra client = 8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client-extra [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-server2-extra] NPNProtocols = bar [8-npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn] ssl_conf = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-ssl [9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-ssl] server = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server client = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client server2 = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server2 [9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server-extra client = 9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client-extra [9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-server-extra] NPNProtocols = bar ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [9-npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [10-alpn-preferred-over-npn] ssl_conf = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-ssl [10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-ssl] server = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server client = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client [10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo server = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server-extra client = 10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client-extra [10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo NPNProtocols = bar [10-alpn-preferred-over-npn-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo NPNProtocols = bar # =========================================================== [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn] ssl_conf = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-ssl [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-ssl] server = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server client = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client server2 = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2 [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server-extra server2 = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2-extra client = 11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client-extra [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-server2-extra] NPNProtocols = bar [11-sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo NPNProtocols = bar ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [12-npn-simple-resumption] ssl_conf = 12-npn-simple-resumption-ssl [12-npn-simple-resumption-ssl] server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client resume-server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server resume-client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client [12-npn-simple-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-npn-simple-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 12-npn-simple-resumption-server-extra client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 12-npn-simple-resumption-client-extra [12-npn-simple-resumption-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo [12-npn-simple-resumption-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [13-npn-server-switch-resumption] ssl_conf = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-ssl [13-npn-server-switch-resumption-ssl] server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client resume-server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client [13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedNPNProtocol = baz HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra [13-npn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra] NPNProtocols = bar,foo [13-npn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra] NPNProtocols = baz,foo [13-npn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz # =========================================================== [14-npn-client-switch-resumption] ssl_conf = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-ssl [14-npn-client-switch-resumption-ssl] server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client resume-server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server resume-client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client [14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedNPNProtocol = bar HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra [14-npn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz [14-npn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,baz [14-npn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra] NPNProtocols = bar,baz # =========================================================== [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption] ssl_conf = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl] server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client resume-server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedNPNProtocol = foo HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra] NPNProtocols = bar [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra] NPNProtocols = baz [15-npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [16-npn-no-server-support-resumption] ssl_conf = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl [16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl] server = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client resume-server = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client [16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-16] HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra [16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo [16-npn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [17-npn-no-client-support-resumption] ssl_conf = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl [17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl] server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server client = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client resume-server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server resume-client = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client [17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-17] HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra client = 17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra [17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra] NPNProtocols = foo [17-npn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra] NPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption] ssl_conf = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-ssl [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-ssl] server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client resume-server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-18] ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server-extra client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client-extra [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-server-extra] NPNProtocols = bar [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-resume-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo NPNProtocols = baz [18-alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo NPNProtocols = bar,baz # =========================================================== [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption] ssl_conf = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-ssl [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-ssl] server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client resume-server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-19] ExpectedNPNProtocol = baz HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server-extra client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client-extra [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo NPNProtocols = bar [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-resume-server-extra] NPNProtocols = baz [19-npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo NPNProtocols = bar,baz openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000176713176625662020712 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test CertStatus messages use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "certstatus-good", server => { extra => { "CertStatus" => "GoodResponse", }, }, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "certstatus-bad", server => { extra => { "CertStatus" => "BadResponse", }, }, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail" } }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf0000644000000000000000000000336713176625662017366 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 3 test-0 = 0-default test-1 = 1-Server signature algorithms bug test-2 = 2-verify-cert # =========================================================== [0-default] ssl_conf = 0-default-ssl [0-default-ssl] server = 0-default-server client = 0-default-client [0-default-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-default-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [1-Server signature algorithms bug] ssl_conf = 1-Server signature algorithms bug-ssl [1-Server signature algorithms bug-ssl] server = 1-Server signature algorithms bug-server client = 1-Server signature algorithms bug-client [1-Server signature algorithms bug-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT ClientSignatureAlgorithms = ECDSA+SHA256 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-Server signature algorithms bug-client] CipherString = DEFAULT SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [2-verify-cert] ssl_conf = 2-verify-cert-ssl [2-verify-cert-ssl] server = 2-verify-cert-server client = 2-verify-cert-client [2-verify-cert-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-verify-cert-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedClientAlert = UnknownCA ExpectedResult = ClientFail openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf.in0000644000000000000000000001231513176625662021010 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test Renegotiation use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; our @tests = ( { name => "renegotiate-client-no-resume", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation" }, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-client-resume", server => {}, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-server-no-resume", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation" }, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-server-resume", server => {}, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-client-auth-require", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation", "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2", "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"), "VerifyMode" => "Require", }, client => { "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"), }, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-client-auth-once", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation", "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2", "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"), "VerifyMode" => "Once", }, client => { "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"), }, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } } ); our @tests_tls1_2 = ( { name => "renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation", "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-SHA" } }, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation", "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256" } }, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation", "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-SHA" } }, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-aead-to-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation", "MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.2" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-GCM-SHA384" } }, test => { "Method" => "TLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } } ); push @tests, @tests_tls1_2 unless disabled("tls1_2"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf.in0000644000000000000000000001743213176625662017442 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "alpn-simple", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "alpn-server-finds-match", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "baz,bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "alpn-server-honours-server-pref", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar,foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "alpn-alert-on-mismatch", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail", "ExpectedServerAlert" => "NoApplicationProtocol", }, }, { name => "alpn-no-server-support", server => { }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "alpn-no-client-support", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { }, test => { "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server1", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server1", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "alpn-with-sni-context-switch", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server2", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server2", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar", "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server2", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "alpn-simple-resumption", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "alpn-server-switch-resumption", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar,foo", }, }, resume_server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "baz,foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "baz", }, }, { name => "alpn-client-switch-resumption", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,baz", }, }, resume_client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar,baz", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, resume_server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail", "ExpectedServerAlert" => "NoApplicationProtocol", }, }, { name => "alpn-no-server-support-resumption", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, resume_server => { }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "alpn-no-client-support-resumption", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, resume_client => { }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/18-dtls-renegotiate.conf.in0000644000000000000000000001220213176625662021750 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test Renegotiation use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; our @tests = ( { name => "renegotiate-client-no-resume", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation" }, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-client-resume", server => {}, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, # Note: Unlike the TLS tests, we will never do resumption with server # initiated reneg. This is because an OpenSSL DTLS client will always do a full # handshake (i.e. it doesn't supply a session id) when it receives a # HelloRequest. This is different to the OpenSSL TLS implementation where an # OpenSSL client will always try an abbreviated handshake (i.e. it will supply # the session id). This goes all the way to commit 48ae85b6f when abbreviated # handshake support was first added. Neither behaviour is wrong, but the # discrepancy is strange. TODO: Should we harmonise the TLS and DTLS behaviour, # and if so, what to? { name => "renegotiate-server-resume", server => {}, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-client-auth-require", server => { "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"), "VerifyMode" => "Require", }, client => { "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"), }, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-client-auth-once", server => { "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"), "VerifyMode" => "Once", }, client => { "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"), }, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateServer", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } } ); our @tests_dtls1_2 = ( { name => "renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-SHA" } }, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256" } }, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-SHA" } }, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "renegotiate-aead-to-aead", server => { "Options" => "NoResumptionOnRenegotiation" }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-GCM-SHA256", extra => { "RenegotiateCiphers" => "AES256-GCM-SHA384" } }, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "HandshakeMode" => "RenegotiateClient", "ResumptionExpected" => "No", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, ); push @tests, @tests_dtls1_2 unless disabled("dtls1_2"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000077213176625662020704 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation upon resumption. use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; use protocol_version; our @tests = generate_resumption_tests("TLS"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000425113176625662021662 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## SSL test configurations package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha", server => { "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA", }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha", server => { }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA", "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha", server => { "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA", "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2", server => { "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA256", }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2", server => { }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA256", "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2", server => { "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, client => { "CipherString" => "AES128-SHA256", "Options" => "-EncryptThenMac", }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf.in0000644000000000000000000001016513176625662020776 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- ## SSL test configurations package ssltests; use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw(anydisabled); setup("no_test_here"); # We test version-flexible negotiation (undef) and each protocol version. my @protocols = (undef, "SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2"); my @is_disabled = (0); push @is_disabled, anydisabled("ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2"); our @tests = (); sub generate_tests() { foreach (0..$#protocols) { my $protocol = $protocols[$_]; my $protocol_name = $protocol || "flex"; my $caalert; if (!$is_disabled[$_]) { if ($protocol_name eq "SSLv3") { $caalert = "BadCertificate"; } else { $caalert = "UnknownCA"; } # Sanity-check simple handshake. push @tests, { name => "server-auth-${protocol_name}", server => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol }, client => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }; # Handshake with client cert requested but not required or received. push @tests, { name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-request", server => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol, "VerifyMode" => "Request" }, client => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }; # Handshake with client cert required but not present. push @tests, { name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-require-fail", server => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol, "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"), "VerifyMode" => "Require", }, client => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail", "ExpectedServerAlert" => "HandshakeFailure", }, }; # Successful handshake with client authentication. push @tests, { name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-require", server => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol, "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("root-cert.pem"), "VerifyMode" => "Request", }, client => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol, "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"), }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }; # Handshake with client authentication but without the root certificate. push @tests, { name => "client-auth-${protocol_name}-noroot", server => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol, "VerifyMode" => "Require", }, client => { "MinProtocol" => $protocol, "MaxProtocol" => $protocol, "Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"), }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail", "ExpectedServerAlert" => $caalert, }, }; } } } generate_tests(); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf0000644000000000000000000002527513176625662020740 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 16 test-0 = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data test-1 = 1-one-fragment-app-data test-2 = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data test-3 = 3-small-app-data test-4 = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size test-5 = 5-medium-app-data test-6 = 6-medium-plus-app-data test-7 = 7-large-app-data test-8 = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size test-9 = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size test-10 = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer test-11 = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer test-12 = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment test-13 = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment test-14 = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer test-15 = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer # =========================================================== [0-one-fragment-minus-app-data] ssl_conf = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-ssl [0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-ssl] server = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-server client = 0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-client [0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-one-fragment-minus-app-data-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ApplicationData = 511 # =========================================================== [1-one-fragment-app-data] ssl_conf = 1-one-fragment-app-data-ssl [1-one-fragment-app-data-ssl] server = 1-one-fragment-app-data-server client = 1-one-fragment-app-data-client [1-one-fragment-app-data-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-one-fragment-app-data-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ApplicationData = 512 # =========================================================== [2-one-fragment-plus-app-data] ssl_conf = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-ssl [2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-ssl] server = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-server client = 2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-client [2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-one-fragment-plus-app-data-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ApplicationData = 513 # =========================================================== [3-small-app-data] ssl_conf = 3-small-app-data-ssl [3-small-app-data-ssl] server = 3-small-app-data-server client = 3-small-app-data-client [3-small-app-data-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-small-app-data-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ApplicationData = 4097 # =========================================================== [4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size] ssl_conf = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl [4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl] server = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-server client = 4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-client [4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-small-app-data-large-fragment-size-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ApplicationData = 4097 MaxFragmentSize = 16384 # =========================================================== [5-medium-app-data] ssl_conf = 5-medium-app-data-ssl [5-medium-app-data-ssl] server = 5-medium-app-data-server client = 5-medium-app-data-client [5-medium-app-data-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-medium-app-data-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ApplicationData = 32775 # =========================================================== [6-medium-plus-app-data] ssl_conf = 6-medium-plus-app-data-ssl [6-medium-plus-app-data-ssl] server = 6-medium-plus-app-data-server client = 6-medium-plus-app-data-client [6-medium-plus-app-data-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-medium-plus-app-data-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ApplicationData = 131069 # =========================================================== [7-large-app-data] ssl_conf = 7-large-app-data-ssl [7-large-app-data-ssl] server = 7-large-app-data-server client = 7-large-app-data-client [7-large-app-data-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-large-app-data-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ApplicationData = 1048576 # =========================================================== [8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size] ssl_conf = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl [8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-ssl] server = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-server client = 8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-client [8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-large-app-data-large-fragment-size-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ApplicationData = 1048576 MaxFragmentSize = 16384 # =========================================================== [9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size] ssl_conf = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-ssl [9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-ssl] server = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-server client = 9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-client [9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-large-app-data-odd-fragment-size-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ApplicationData = 1048576 MaxFragmentSize = 5115 # =========================================================== [10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer] ssl_conf = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl [10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl] server = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server client = 10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client [10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ApplicationData = 1048576 MaxFragmentSize = 4096 # =========================================================== [11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer] ssl_conf = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl [11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl] server = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server client = 11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client [11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ApplicationData = 1048576 MaxFragmentSize = 4096 # =========================================================== [12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment] ssl_conf = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl [12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl] server = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server client = 12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client [12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ApplicationData = 1048579 MaxFragmentSize = 5115 # =========================================================== [13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment] ssl_conf = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl [13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-ssl] server = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server client = 13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client [13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ApplicationData = 1048573 MaxFragmentSize = 5125 # =========================================================== [14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer] ssl_conf = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl [14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-ssl] server = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server client = 14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client [14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ApplicationData = 4096 MaxFragmentSize = 4096 # =========================================================== [15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer] ssl_conf = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl [15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-ssl] server = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server client = 15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client [15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ApplicationData = 4096 MaxFragmentSize = 4096 openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/04-client_auth.conf0000644000000000000000000003674013176625662020400 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 20 test-0 = 0-server-auth-flex test-1 = 1-client-auth-flex-request test-2 = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail test-3 = 3-client-auth-flex-require test-4 = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot test-5 = 5-server-auth-TLSv1 test-6 = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request test-7 = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail test-8 = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require test-9 = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot test-10 = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1 test-11 = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request test-12 = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail test-13 = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require test-14 = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot test-15 = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2 test-16 = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request test-17 = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail test-18 = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require test-19 = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot # =========================================================== [0-server-auth-flex] ssl_conf = 0-server-auth-flex-ssl [0-server-auth-flex-ssl] server = 0-server-auth-flex-server client = 0-server-auth-flex-client [0-server-auth-flex-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-server-auth-flex-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [1-client-auth-flex-request] ssl_conf = 1-client-auth-flex-request-ssl [1-client-auth-flex-request-ssl] server = 1-client-auth-flex-request-server client = 1-client-auth-flex-request-client [1-client-auth-flex-request-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Request [1-client-auth-flex-request-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [2-client-auth-flex-require-fail] ssl_conf = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-ssl [2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-ssl] server = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-server client = 2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-client [2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Require [2-client-auth-flex-require-fail-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure # =========================================================== [3-client-auth-flex-require] ssl_conf = 3-client-auth-flex-require-ssl [3-client-auth-flex-require-ssl] server = 3-client-auth-flex-require-server client = 3-client-auth-flex-require-client [3-client-auth-flex-require-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Request [3-client-auth-flex-require-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [4-client-auth-flex-noroot] ssl_conf = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot-ssl [4-client-auth-flex-noroot-ssl] server = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot-server client = 4-client-auth-flex-noroot-client [4-client-auth-flex-noroot-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Require [4-client-auth-flex-noroot-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA # =========================================================== [5-server-auth-TLSv1] ssl_conf = 5-server-auth-TLSv1-ssl [5-server-auth-TLSv1-ssl] server = 5-server-auth-TLSv1-server client = 5-server-auth-TLSv1-client [5-server-auth-TLSv1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-server-auth-TLSv1-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [6-client-auth-TLSv1-request] ssl_conf = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-ssl [6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-ssl] server = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-server client = 6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-client [6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Request [6-client-auth-TLSv1-request-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail] ssl_conf = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-ssl [7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-ssl] server = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-server client = 7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-client [7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Require [7-client-auth-TLSv1-require-fail-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure # =========================================================== [8-client-auth-TLSv1-require] ssl_conf = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-ssl [8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-ssl] server = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-server client = 8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-client [8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Request [8-client-auth-TLSv1-require-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot] ssl_conf = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-ssl [9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-ssl] server = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-server client = 9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-client [9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Require [9-client-auth-TLSv1-noroot-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA # =========================================================== [10-server-auth-TLSv1.1] ssl_conf = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-ssl [10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-ssl] server = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-server client = 10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-client [10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-server-auth-TLSv1.1-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request] ssl_conf = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-ssl [11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-ssl] server = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-server client = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-client [11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Request [11-client-auth-TLSv1.1-request-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail] ssl_conf = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-ssl [12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-ssl] server = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-server client = 12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-client [12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Require [12-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-fail-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure # =========================================================== [13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require] ssl_conf = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-ssl [13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-ssl] server = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-server client = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-client [13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Request [13-client-auth-TLSv1.1-require-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot] ssl_conf = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-ssl [14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-ssl] server = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-server client = 14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-client [14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Require [14-client-auth-TLSv1.1-noroot-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA # =========================================================== [15-server-auth-TLSv1.2] ssl_conf = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-ssl [15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-ssl] server = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-server client = 15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-client [15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-server-auth-TLSv1.2-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request] ssl_conf = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-ssl [16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-ssl] server = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-server client = 16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-client [16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Request [16-client-auth-TLSv1.2-request-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-16] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail] ssl_conf = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-ssl [17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-ssl] server = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-server client = 17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-client [17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Require [17-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-fail-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-17] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = HandshakeFailure # =========================================================== [18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require] ssl_conf = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-ssl [18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-ssl] server = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-server client = 18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-client [18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Request [18-client-auth-TLSv1.2-require-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-18] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot] ssl_conf = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-ssl [19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-ssl] server = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-server client = 19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-client [19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyMode = Require [19-client-auth-TLSv1.2-noroot-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-19] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/15-certstatus.conf0000644000000000000000000000252513176625662020276 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 2 test-0 = 0-certstatus-good test-1 = 1-certstatus-bad # =========================================================== [0-certstatus-good] ssl_conf = 0-certstatus-good-ssl [0-certstatus-good-ssl] server = 0-certstatus-good-server client = 0-certstatus-good-client [0-certstatus-good-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-certstatus-good-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success Method = TLS server = 0-certstatus-good-server-extra [0-certstatus-good-server-extra] CertStatus = GoodResponse # =========================================================== [1-certstatus-bad] ssl_conf = 1-certstatus-bad-ssl [1-certstatus-bad-ssl] server = 1-certstatus-bad-server client = 1-certstatus-bad-client [1-certstatus-bad-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-certstatus-bad-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = ClientFail Method = TLS server = 1-certstatus-bad-server-extra [1-certstatus-bad-server-extra] CertStatus = BadResponse openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf0000644000000000000000000003353613176625662021332 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 16 test-0 = 0-resumption test-1 = 1-resumption test-2 = 2-resumption test-3 = 3-resumption test-4 = 4-resumption test-5 = 5-resumption test-6 = 6-resumption test-7 = 7-resumption test-8 = 8-resumption test-9 = 9-resumption test-10 = 10-resumption test-11 = 11-resumption test-12 = 12-resumption test-13 = 13-resumption test-14 = 14-resumption test-15 = 15-resumption # =========================================================== [0-resumption] ssl_conf = 0-resumption-ssl [0-resumption-ssl] server = 0-resumption-server client = 0-resumption-client resume-server = 0-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 0-resumption-client [0-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [1-resumption] ssl_conf = 1-resumption-ssl [1-resumption-ssl] server = 1-resumption-server client = 1-resumption-client resume-server = 1-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 1-resumption-client [1-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [2-resumption] ssl_conf = 2-resumption-ssl [2-resumption-ssl] server = 2-resumption-server client = 2-resumption-client resume-server = 2-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 2-resumption-client [2-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [3-resumption] ssl_conf = 3-resumption-ssl [3-resumption-ssl] server = 3-resumption-server client = 3-resumption-client resume-server = 3-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 3-resumption-client [3-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [4-resumption] ssl_conf = 4-resumption-ssl [4-resumption-ssl] server = 4-resumption-server client = 4-resumption-client resume-server = 4-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 4-resumption-client [4-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [5-resumption] ssl_conf = 5-resumption-ssl [5-resumption-ssl] server = 5-resumption-server client = 5-resumption-client resume-server = 5-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 5-resumption-client [5-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [6-resumption] ssl_conf = 6-resumption-ssl [6-resumption-ssl] server = 6-resumption-server client = 6-resumption-client resume-server = 6-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 6-resumption-client [6-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [7-resumption] ssl_conf = 7-resumption-ssl [7-resumption-ssl] server = 7-resumption-server client = 7-resumption-client resume-server = 7-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 7-resumption-client [7-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [8-resumption] ssl_conf = 8-resumption-ssl [8-resumption-ssl] server = 8-resumption-server client = 8-resumption-client resume-server = 8-resumption-server resume-client = 8-resumption-resume-client [8-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [8-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [9-resumption] ssl_conf = 9-resumption-ssl [9-resumption-ssl] server = 9-resumption-server client = 9-resumption-client resume-server = 9-resumption-server resume-client = 9-resumption-resume-client [9-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [9-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [10-resumption] ssl_conf = 10-resumption-ssl [10-resumption-ssl] server = 10-resumption-server client = 10-resumption-client resume-server = 10-resumption-server resume-client = 10-resumption-resume-client [10-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [10-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [11-resumption] ssl_conf = 11-resumption-ssl [11-resumption-ssl] server = 11-resumption-server client = 11-resumption-client resume-server = 11-resumption-server resume-client = 11-resumption-resume-client [11-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [11-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [12-resumption] ssl_conf = 12-resumption-ssl [12-resumption-ssl] server = 12-resumption-server client = 12-resumption-client resume-server = 12-resumption-server resume-client = 12-resumption-resume-client [12-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [12-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [13-resumption] ssl_conf = 13-resumption-ssl [13-resumption-ssl] server = 13-resumption-server client = 13-resumption-client resume-server = 13-resumption-server resume-client = 13-resumption-resume-client [13-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [13-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [14-resumption] ssl_conf = 14-resumption-ssl [14-resumption-ssl] server = 14-resumption-server client = 14-resumption-client resume-server = 14-resumption-server resume-client = 14-resumption-resume-client [14-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [14-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [15-resumption] ssl_conf = 15-resumption-ssl [15-resumption-ssl] server = 15-resumption-server client = 15-resumption-client resume-server = 15-resumption-server resume-client = 15-resumption-resume-client [15-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [15-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume Method = DTLS ResumptionExpected = Yes openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000544213176625662017273 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## SSL test configurations use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "SNI-switch-context", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, client => { extra => { "ServerName" => "server2", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, { name => "SNI-keep-context", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, client => { extra => { "ServerName" => "server1", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server1", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, { name => "SNI-no-server-support", server => { }, client => { extra => { "ServerName" => "server1", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, { name => "SNI-no-client-support", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, client => { }, test => { # We expect that the callback is still called # to let the application decide whether they tolerate # missing SNI (as our test callback does). "ExpectedServerName" => "server1", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, { name => "SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, client => { extra => { "ServerName" => "invalid", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server1", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, { name => "SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "RejectMismatch", }, }, client => { extra => { "ServerName" => "invalid", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail", "ExpectedServerAlert" => "UnrecognizedName" }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/13-fragmentation.conf.in0000644000000000000000000001105713176625662021336 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = ( # Default fragment size is 512. { name => "one-fragment-minus-app-data", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 511, } }, { name => "one-fragment-app-data", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 512, } }, { name => "one-fragment-plus-app-data", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 513, } }, { name => "small-app-data", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 4 * 1024 + 1, } }, { name => "small-app-data-large-fragment-size", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 4 * 1024 + 1, MaxFragmentSize => 16384, } }, { name => "medium-app-data", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 32 * 1024 + 7, } }, # Exceeds the 64kB write buffer size. { name => "medium-plus-app-data", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 128 * 1024 - 3, } }, { name => "large-app-data", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024, } }, { name => "large-app-data-large-fragment-size", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024, MaxFragmentSize => 16384, } }, { name => "large-app-data-odd-fragment-size", server => { }, client => { }, test => { ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024, MaxFragmentSize => 5 * 1024 - 5, } }, # When the buffer / fragment size ratio is sufficiently large, # multi-buffer code kicks in on some platforms for AES-SHA. The # exact minimum ratio depends on the platform, and is usually # around 4. Since the the test buffer is 64kB, a 4kB fragment is # easily sufficient. # # (We run this test on all platforms though it's only true multibuffer # on some of them.) { name => "large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer", server => { }, client => { CipherString => "AES128-SHA", }, test => { ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024, MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024, } }, { name => "large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer", server => { }, client => { CipherString => "AES128-SHA256", }, test => { ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024, MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024, } }, { name => "large-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer-odd-fragment", server => { }, client => { CipherString => "AES128-SHA", }, test => { ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024 + 3, MaxFragmentSize => 5 * 1024 - 5, } }, { name => "large-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer-odd-fragment", server => { }, client => { CipherString => "AES128-SHA256", }, test => { ApplicationData => 1024 * 1024 - 3, MaxFragmentSize => 5 * 1024 + 5, } }, # Test that multibuffer-capable code also handles small data correctly. # Here fragment size == app data size < buffer size, # so no multibuffering should happen. { name => "small-app-data-aes-sha1-multibuffer", server => { }, client => { CipherString => "AES128-SHA", }, test => { ApplicationData => 4 * 1024, MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024, } }, { name => "small-app-data-aes-sha2-multibuffer", server => { }, client => { CipherString => "AES128-SHA256", }, test => { ApplicationData => 4 * 1024, MaxFragmentSize => 4 * 1024, } }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000755413176625662021404 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## SSL test configurations package ssltests; our @tests = ( # Sanity-check that verification indeed succeeds without the # restrictive callback. { name => "verify-success", server => { }, client => { }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always fails. { name => "verify-custom-reject", server => { }, client => { extra => { "VerifyCallback" => "RejectAll", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail", "ExpectedClientAlert" => "HandshakeFailure", }, }, # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always succeeds. { name => "verify-custom-allow", server => { }, client => { extra => { "VerifyCallback" => "AcceptAll", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, # Sanity-check that verification indeed succeeds if peer verification # is not requested. { name => "noverify-success", server => { }, client => { "VerifyMode" => undef, "VerifyCAFile" => undef, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always fails. # The callback return has no impact on handshake success in this mode. { name => "noverify-ignore-custom-reject", server => { }, client => { "VerifyMode" => undef, "VerifyCAFile" => undef, extra => { "VerifyCallback" => "RejectAll", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always succeeds. # The callback return has no impact on handshake success in this mode. { name => "noverify-accept-custom-allow", server => { }, client => { "VerifyMode" => undef, "VerifyCAFile" => undef, extra => { "VerifyCallback" => "AcceptAll", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, # Sanity-check that verification indeed fails without the # permissive callback. { name => "verify-fail-no-root", server => { }, client => { # Don't set up the client root file. "VerifyCAFile" => undef, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail", "ExpectedClientAlert" => "UnknownCA", }, }, # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always succeeds. { name => "verify-custom-success-no-root", server => { }, client => { "VerifyCAFile" => undef, extra => { "VerifyCallback" => "AcceptAll", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, # Same test as above but with a custom callback that always fails. { name => "verify-custom-fail-no-root", server => { }, client => { "VerifyCAFile" => undef, extra => { "VerifyCallback" => "RejectAll", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail", "ExpectedClientAlert" => "HandshakeFailure", }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/05-sni.conf0000644000000000000000000001245213176625662016665 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 6 test-0 = 0-SNI-switch-context test-1 = 1-SNI-keep-context test-2 = 2-SNI-no-server-support test-3 = 3-SNI-no-client-support test-4 = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch test-5 = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch # =========================================================== [0-SNI-switch-context] ssl_conf = 0-SNI-switch-context-ssl [0-SNI-switch-context-ssl] server = 0-SNI-switch-context-server client = 0-SNI-switch-context-client server2 = 0-SNI-switch-context-server [0-SNI-switch-context-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-SNI-switch-context-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 0-SNI-switch-context-server-extra server2 = 0-SNI-switch-context-server-extra client = 0-SNI-switch-context-client-extra [0-SNI-switch-context-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [0-SNI-switch-context-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [1-SNI-keep-context] ssl_conf = 1-SNI-keep-context-ssl [1-SNI-keep-context-ssl] server = 1-SNI-keep-context-server client = 1-SNI-keep-context-client server2 = 1-SNI-keep-context-server [1-SNI-keep-context-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-SNI-keep-context-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 server = 1-SNI-keep-context-server-extra server2 = 1-SNI-keep-context-server-extra client = 1-SNI-keep-context-client-extra [1-SNI-keep-context-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [1-SNI-keep-context-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [2-SNI-no-server-support] ssl_conf = 2-SNI-no-server-support-ssl [2-SNI-no-server-support-ssl] server = 2-SNI-no-server-support-server client = 2-SNI-no-server-support-client [2-SNI-no-server-support-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-SNI-no-server-support-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = Success client = 2-SNI-no-server-support-client-extra [2-SNI-no-server-support-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [3-SNI-no-client-support] ssl_conf = 3-SNI-no-client-support-ssl [3-SNI-no-client-support-ssl] server = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server client = 3-SNI-no-client-support-client server2 = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server [3-SNI-no-client-support-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-SNI-no-client-support-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 server = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server-extra server2 = 3-SNI-no-client-support-server-extra [3-SNI-no-client-support-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch # =========================================================== [4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch] ssl_conf = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-ssl [4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-ssl] server = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server client = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client server2 = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server [4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 server = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server-extra server2 = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server-extra client = 4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client-extra [4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [4-SNI-bad-sni-ignore-mismatch-client-extra] ServerName = invalid # =========================================================== [5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch] ssl_conf = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-ssl [5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-ssl] server = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server client = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client server2 = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server [5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = UnrecognizedName server = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server-extra server2 = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server-extra client = 5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client-extra [5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = RejectMismatch [5-SNI-bad-sni-reject-mismatch-client-extra] ServerName = invalid openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.conf0000644000000000000000000001353013176625662020766 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 9 test-0 = 0-verify-success test-1 = 1-verify-custom-reject test-2 = 2-verify-custom-allow test-3 = 3-noverify-success test-4 = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject test-5 = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow test-6 = 6-verify-fail-no-root test-7 = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root test-8 = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root # =========================================================== [0-verify-success] ssl_conf = 0-verify-success-ssl [0-verify-success-ssl] server = 0-verify-success-server client = 0-verify-success-client [0-verify-success-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-verify-success-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [1-verify-custom-reject] ssl_conf = 1-verify-custom-reject-ssl [1-verify-custom-reject-ssl] server = 1-verify-custom-reject-server client = 1-verify-custom-reject-client [1-verify-custom-reject-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-verify-custom-reject-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedClientAlert = HandshakeFailure ExpectedResult = ClientFail client = 1-verify-custom-reject-client-extra [1-verify-custom-reject-client-extra] VerifyCallback = RejectAll # =========================================================== [2-verify-custom-allow] ssl_conf = 2-verify-custom-allow-ssl [2-verify-custom-allow-ssl] server = 2-verify-custom-allow-server client = 2-verify-custom-allow-client [2-verify-custom-allow-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-verify-custom-allow-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = Success client = 2-verify-custom-allow-client-extra [2-verify-custom-allow-client-extra] VerifyCallback = AcceptAll # =========================================================== [3-noverify-success] ssl_conf = 3-noverify-success-ssl [3-noverify-success-ssl] server = 3-noverify-success-server client = 3-noverify-success-client [3-noverify-success-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-noverify-success-client] CipherString = DEFAULT [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject] ssl_conf = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-ssl [4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-ssl] server = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-server client = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client [4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client] CipherString = DEFAULT [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success client = 4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client-extra [4-noverify-ignore-custom-reject-client-extra] VerifyCallback = RejectAll # =========================================================== [5-noverify-accept-custom-allow] ssl_conf = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-ssl [5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-ssl] server = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-server client = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client [5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client] CipherString = DEFAULT [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success client = 5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client-extra [5-noverify-accept-custom-allow-client-extra] VerifyCallback = AcceptAll # =========================================================== [6-verify-fail-no-root] ssl_conf = 6-verify-fail-no-root-ssl [6-verify-fail-no-root-ssl] server = 6-verify-fail-no-root-server client = 6-verify-fail-no-root-client [6-verify-fail-no-root-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-verify-fail-no-root-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedClientAlert = UnknownCA ExpectedResult = ClientFail # =========================================================== [7-verify-custom-success-no-root] ssl_conf = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-ssl [7-verify-custom-success-no-root-ssl] server = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-server client = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client [7-verify-custom-success-no-root-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = Success client = 7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client-extra [7-verify-custom-success-no-root-client-extra] VerifyCallback = AcceptAll # =========================================================== [8-verify-custom-fail-no-root] ssl_conf = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-ssl [8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-ssl] server = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-server client = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client [8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedClientAlert = HandshakeFailure ExpectedResult = ClientFail client = 8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client-extra [8-verify-custom-fail-no-root-client-extra] VerifyCallback = RejectAll openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000517413176625662020557 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = (); sub generate_tests() { foreach my $c ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") { foreach my $s1 ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") { foreach my $s2 ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") { foreach my $n ("server1", "server2") { my $result = expected_result($c, $s1, $s2, $n); push @tests, { "name" => "sni-session-ticket", "client" => { "Options" => $c, "extra" => { "ServerName" => $n, }, }, "server" => { "Options" => $s1, "extra" => { # We don't test mismatch here. "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, "server2" => { "Options" => $s2, }, "test" => { "ExpectedServerName" => $n, "ExpectedResult" => "Success", "SessionTicketExpected" => $result, } }; } } } } } # If the client has session tickets disabled, then No support # If the server initial_ctx has session tickets disabled, then No support # If SNI is in use, then if the "switched-to" context has session tickets disabled, # then No support sub expected_result { my ($c, $s1, $s2, $n) = @_; return "No" if $c eq "-SessionTicket"; return "No" if $s1 eq "-SessionTicket"; return "No" if ($s2 eq "-SessionTicket" && $n eq "server2"); return "Yes"; } # Add a "Broken" case. push @tests, { "name" => "sni-session-ticket", "client" => { "Options" => "SessionTicket", "extra" => { "ServerName" => "server1", } }, "server" => { "Options" => "SessionTicket", "extra" => { "BrokenSessionTicket" => "Yes", }, }, "server2" => { "Options" => "SessionTicket", }, "test" => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", "SessionTicketExpected" => "No", } }; generate_tests(); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/10-resumption.conf0000644000000000000000000007522213176625662020301 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 36 test-0 = 0-resumption test-1 = 1-resumption test-2 = 2-resumption test-3 = 3-resumption test-4 = 4-resumption test-5 = 5-resumption test-6 = 6-resumption test-7 = 7-resumption test-8 = 8-resumption test-9 = 9-resumption test-10 = 10-resumption test-11 = 11-resumption test-12 = 12-resumption test-13 = 13-resumption test-14 = 14-resumption test-15 = 15-resumption test-16 = 16-resumption test-17 = 17-resumption test-18 = 18-resumption test-19 = 19-resumption test-20 = 20-resumption test-21 = 21-resumption test-22 = 22-resumption test-23 = 23-resumption test-24 = 24-resumption test-25 = 25-resumption test-26 = 26-resumption test-27 = 27-resumption test-28 = 28-resumption test-29 = 29-resumption test-30 = 30-resumption test-31 = 31-resumption test-32 = 32-resumption test-33 = 33-resumption test-34 = 34-resumption test-35 = 35-resumption # =========================================================== [0-resumption] ssl_conf = 0-resumption-ssl [0-resumption-ssl] server = 0-resumption-server client = 0-resumption-client resume-server = 0-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 0-resumption-client [0-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [1-resumption] ssl_conf = 1-resumption-ssl [1-resumption-ssl] server = 1-resumption-server client = 1-resumption-client resume-server = 1-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 1-resumption-client [1-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [2-resumption] ssl_conf = 2-resumption-ssl [2-resumption-ssl] server = 2-resumption-server client = 2-resumption-client resume-server = 2-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 2-resumption-client [2-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [3-resumption] ssl_conf = 3-resumption-ssl [3-resumption-ssl] server = 3-resumption-server client = 3-resumption-client resume-server = 3-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 3-resumption-client [3-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [4-resumption] ssl_conf = 4-resumption-ssl [4-resumption-ssl] server = 4-resumption-server client = 4-resumption-client resume-server = 4-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 4-resumption-client [4-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [5-resumption] ssl_conf = 5-resumption-ssl [5-resumption-ssl] server = 5-resumption-server client = 5-resumption-client resume-server = 5-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 5-resumption-client [5-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [6-resumption] ssl_conf = 6-resumption-ssl [6-resumption-ssl] server = 6-resumption-server client = 6-resumption-client resume-server = 6-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 6-resumption-client [6-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [7-resumption] ssl_conf = 7-resumption-ssl [7-resumption-ssl] server = 7-resumption-server client = 7-resumption-client resume-server = 7-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 7-resumption-client [7-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [8-resumption] ssl_conf = 8-resumption-ssl [8-resumption-ssl] server = 8-resumption-server client = 8-resumption-client resume-server = 8-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 8-resumption-client [8-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [9-resumption] ssl_conf = 9-resumption-ssl [9-resumption-ssl] server = 9-resumption-server client = 9-resumption-client resume-server = 9-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 9-resumption-client [9-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [10-resumption] ssl_conf = 10-resumption-ssl [10-resumption-ssl] server = 10-resumption-server client = 10-resumption-client resume-server = 10-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 10-resumption-client [10-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [11-resumption] ssl_conf = 11-resumption-ssl [11-resumption-ssl] server = 11-resumption-server client = 11-resumption-client resume-server = 11-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 11-resumption-client [11-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [12-resumption] ssl_conf = 12-resumption-ssl [12-resumption-ssl] server = 12-resumption-server client = 12-resumption-client resume-server = 12-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 12-resumption-client [12-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [13-resumption] ssl_conf = 13-resumption-ssl [13-resumption-ssl] server = 13-resumption-server client = 13-resumption-client resume-server = 13-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 13-resumption-client [13-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [14-resumption] ssl_conf = 14-resumption-ssl [14-resumption-ssl] server = 14-resumption-server client = 14-resumption-client resume-server = 14-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 14-resumption-client [14-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [15-resumption] ssl_conf = 15-resumption-ssl [15-resumption-ssl] server = 15-resumption-server client = 15-resumption-client resume-server = 15-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 15-resumption-client [15-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [16-resumption] ssl_conf = 16-resumption-ssl [16-resumption-ssl] server = 16-resumption-server client = 16-resumption-client resume-server = 16-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 16-resumption-client [16-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-16] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [17-resumption] ssl_conf = 17-resumption-ssl [17-resumption-ssl] server = 17-resumption-server client = 17-resumption-client resume-server = 17-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 17-resumption-client [17-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [17-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [17-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-17] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [18-resumption] ssl_conf = 18-resumption-ssl [18-resumption-ssl] server = 18-resumption-server client = 18-resumption-client resume-server = 18-resumption-server resume-client = 18-resumption-resume-client [18-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [18-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [18-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-18] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [19-resumption] ssl_conf = 19-resumption-ssl [19-resumption-ssl] server = 19-resumption-server client = 19-resumption-client resume-server = 19-resumption-server resume-client = 19-resumption-resume-client [19-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [19-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [19-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-19] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [20-resumption] ssl_conf = 20-resumption-ssl [20-resumption-ssl] server = 20-resumption-server client = 20-resumption-client resume-server = 20-resumption-server resume-client = 20-resumption-resume-client [20-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [20-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [20-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-20] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [21-resumption] ssl_conf = 21-resumption-ssl [21-resumption-ssl] server = 21-resumption-server client = 21-resumption-client resume-server = 21-resumption-server resume-client = 21-resumption-resume-client [21-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [21-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [21-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-21] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [22-resumption] ssl_conf = 22-resumption-ssl [22-resumption-ssl] server = 22-resumption-server client = 22-resumption-client resume-server = 22-resumption-server resume-client = 22-resumption-resume-client [22-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [22-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [22-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-22] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [23-resumption] ssl_conf = 23-resumption-ssl [23-resumption-ssl] server = 23-resumption-server client = 23-resumption-client resume-server = 23-resumption-server resume-client = 23-resumption-resume-client [23-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [23-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 MinProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [23-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-23] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [24-resumption] ssl_conf = 24-resumption-ssl [24-resumption-ssl] server = 24-resumption-server client = 24-resumption-client resume-server = 24-resumption-server resume-client = 24-resumption-resume-client [24-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [24-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [24-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-24] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [25-resumption] ssl_conf = 25-resumption-ssl [25-resumption-ssl] server = 25-resumption-server client = 25-resumption-client resume-server = 25-resumption-server resume-client = 25-resumption-resume-client [25-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [25-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [25-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-25] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [26-resumption] ssl_conf = 26-resumption-ssl [26-resumption-ssl] server = 26-resumption-server client = 26-resumption-client resume-server = 26-resumption-server resume-client = 26-resumption-resume-client [26-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [26-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [26-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-26] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [27-resumption] ssl_conf = 27-resumption-ssl [27-resumption-ssl] server = 27-resumption-server client = 27-resumption-client resume-server = 27-resumption-server resume-client = 27-resumption-resume-client [27-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [27-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [27-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-27] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [28-resumption] ssl_conf = 28-resumption-ssl [28-resumption-ssl] server = 28-resumption-server client = 28-resumption-client resume-server = 28-resumption-server resume-client = 28-resumption-resume-client [28-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [28-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [28-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-28] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [29-resumption] ssl_conf = 29-resumption-ssl [29-resumption-ssl] server = 29-resumption-server client = 29-resumption-client resume-server = 29-resumption-server resume-client = 29-resumption-resume-client [29-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [29-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 MinProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [29-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-29] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [30-resumption] ssl_conf = 30-resumption-ssl [30-resumption-ssl] server = 30-resumption-server client = 30-resumption-client resume-server = 30-resumption-server resume-client = 30-resumption-resume-client [30-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [30-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [30-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-30] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [31-resumption] ssl_conf = 31-resumption-ssl [31-resumption-ssl] server = 31-resumption-server client = 31-resumption-client resume-server = 31-resumption-server resume-client = 31-resumption-resume-client [31-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [31-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [31-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-31] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [32-resumption] ssl_conf = 32-resumption-ssl [32-resumption-ssl] server = 32-resumption-server client = 32-resumption-client resume-server = 32-resumption-server resume-client = 32-resumption-resume-client [32-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [32-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [32-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-32] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [33-resumption] ssl_conf = 33-resumption-ssl [33-resumption-ssl] server = 33-resumption-server client = 33-resumption-client resume-server = 33-resumption-server resume-client = 33-resumption-resume-client [33-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [33-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [33-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-33] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.1 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [34-resumption] ssl_conf = 34-resumption-ssl [34-resumption-ssl] server = 34-resumption-server client = 34-resumption-client resume-server = 34-resumption-server resume-client = 34-resumption-resume-client [34-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [34-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [34-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-34] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [35-resumption] ssl_conf = 35-resumption-ssl [35-resumption-ssl] server = 35-resumption-server client = 35-resumption-client resume-server = 35-resumption-server resume-client = 35-resumption-resume-client [35-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [35-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [35-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-35] ExpectedProtocol = TLSv1.2 HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/19-mac-then-encrypt.conf0000644000000000000000000001064613176625662021262 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 6 test-0 = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha test-1 = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha test-2 = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha test-3 = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2 test-4 = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2 test-5 = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2 # =========================================================== [0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha] ssl_conf = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-ssl [0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-ssl] server = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-server client = 0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-client [0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -EncryptThenMac PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha] ssl_conf = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-ssl [1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-ssl] server = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-server client = 1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-client [1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA Options = -EncryptThenMac VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha] ssl_conf = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-ssl [2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-ssl] server = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-server client = 2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-client [2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -EncryptThenMac PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA Options = -EncryptThenMac VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2] ssl_conf = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-ssl [3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-ssl] server = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-server client = 3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-client [3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -EncryptThenMac PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-disable-encrypt-then-mac-server-sha2-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2] ssl_conf = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-ssl [4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-ssl] server = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-server client = 4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-client [4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-disable-encrypt-then-mac-client-sha2-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA256 Options = -EncryptThenMac VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success # =========================================================== [5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2] ssl_conf = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-ssl [5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-ssl] server = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-server client = 5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-client [5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -EncryptThenMac PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-disable-encrypt-then-mac-both-sha2-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA256 Options = -EncryptThenMac VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/11-dtls_resumption.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000077313176625662021734 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation upon resumption. use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; use protocol_version; our @tests = generate_resumption_tests("DTLS"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf0000644000000000000000000012504413176625662022370 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 64 test-0 = 0-version-negotiation test-1 = 1-version-negotiation test-2 = 2-version-negotiation test-3 = 3-version-negotiation test-4 = 4-version-negotiation test-5 = 5-version-negotiation test-6 = 6-version-negotiation test-7 = 7-version-negotiation test-8 = 8-version-negotiation test-9 = 9-version-negotiation test-10 = 10-version-negotiation test-11 = 11-version-negotiation test-12 = 12-version-negotiation test-13 = 13-version-negotiation test-14 = 14-version-negotiation test-15 = 15-version-negotiation test-16 = 16-version-negotiation test-17 = 17-version-negotiation test-18 = 18-version-negotiation test-19 = 19-version-negotiation test-20 = 20-version-negotiation test-21 = 21-version-negotiation test-22 = 22-version-negotiation test-23 = 23-version-negotiation test-24 = 24-version-negotiation test-25 = 25-version-negotiation test-26 = 26-version-negotiation test-27 = 27-version-negotiation test-28 = 28-version-negotiation test-29 = 29-version-negotiation test-30 = 30-version-negotiation test-31 = 31-version-negotiation test-32 = 32-version-negotiation test-33 = 33-version-negotiation test-34 = 34-version-negotiation test-35 = 35-version-negotiation test-36 = 36-version-negotiation test-37 = 37-version-negotiation test-38 = 38-version-negotiation test-39 = 39-version-negotiation test-40 = 40-version-negotiation test-41 = 41-version-negotiation test-42 = 42-version-negotiation test-43 = 43-version-negotiation test-44 = 44-version-negotiation test-45 = 45-version-negotiation test-46 = 46-version-negotiation test-47 = 47-version-negotiation test-48 = 48-version-negotiation test-49 = 49-version-negotiation test-50 = 50-version-negotiation test-51 = 51-version-negotiation test-52 = 52-version-negotiation test-53 = 53-version-negotiation test-54 = 54-version-negotiation test-55 = 55-version-negotiation test-56 = 56-version-negotiation test-57 = 57-version-negotiation test-58 = 58-version-negotiation test-59 = 59-version-negotiation test-60 = 60-version-negotiation test-61 = 61-version-negotiation test-62 = 62-version-negotiation test-63 = 63-version-negotiation # =========================================================== [0-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 0-version-negotiation-ssl [0-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 0-version-negotiation-server client = 0-version-negotiation-client [0-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [1-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 1-version-negotiation-ssl [1-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 1-version-negotiation-server client = 1-version-negotiation-client [1-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [2-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 2-version-negotiation-ssl [2-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 2-version-negotiation-server client = 2-version-negotiation-client [2-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [3-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 3-version-negotiation-ssl [3-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 3-version-negotiation-server client = 3-version-negotiation-client [3-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [4-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 4-version-negotiation-ssl [4-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 4-version-negotiation-server client = 4-version-negotiation-client [4-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [5-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 5-version-negotiation-ssl [5-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 5-version-negotiation-server client = 5-version-negotiation-client [5-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [6-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 6-version-negotiation-ssl [6-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 6-version-negotiation-server client = 6-version-negotiation-client [6-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedResult = ServerFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [7-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 7-version-negotiation-ssl [7-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 7-version-negotiation-server client = 7-version-negotiation-client [7-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = ServerFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [8-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 8-version-negotiation-ssl [8-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 8-version-negotiation-server client = 8-version-negotiation-client [8-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [9-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 9-version-negotiation-ssl [9-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 9-version-negotiation-server client = 9-version-negotiation-client [9-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [10-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 10-version-negotiation-ssl [10-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 10-version-negotiation-server client = 10-version-negotiation-client [10-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [11-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 11-version-negotiation-ssl [11-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 11-version-negotiation-server client = 11-version-negotiation-client [11-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [12-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 12-version-negotiation-ssl [12-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 12-version-negotiation-server client = 12-version-negotiation-client [12-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [13-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 13-version-negotiation-ssl [13-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 13-version-negotiation-server client = 13-version-negotiation-client [13-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [14-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 14-version-negotiation-ssl [14-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 14-version-negotiation-server client = 14-version-negotiation-client [14-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [15-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 15-version-negotiation-ssl [15-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 15-version-negotiation-server client = 15-version-negotiation-client [15-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [16-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 16-version-negotiation-ssl [16-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 16-version-negotiation-server client = 16-version-negotiation-client [16-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-16] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [17-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 17-version-negotiation-ssl [17-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 17-version-negotiation-server client = 17-version-negotiation-client [17-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [17-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-17] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [18-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 18-version-negotiation-ssl [18-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 18-version-negotiation-server client = 18-version-negotiation-client [18-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [18-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-18] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [19-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 19-version-negotiation-ssl [19-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 19-version-negotiation-server client = 19-version-negotiation-client [19-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [19-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-19] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [20-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 20-version-negotiation-ssl [20-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 20-version-negotiation-server client = 20-version-negotiation-client [20-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [20-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-20] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [21-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 21-version-negotiation-ssl [21-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 21-version-negotiation-server client = 21-version-negotiation-client [21-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [21-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-21] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [22-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 22-version-negotiation-ssl [22-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 22-version-negotiation-server client = 22-version-negotiation-client [22-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [22-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-22] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [23-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 23-version-negotiation-ssl [23-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 23-version-negotiation-server client = 23-version-negotiation-client [23-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [23-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-23] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [24-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 24-version-negotiation-ssl [24-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 24-version-negotiation-server client = 24-version-negotiation-client [24-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [24-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-24] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [25-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 25-version-negotiation-ssl [25-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 25-version-negotiation-server client = 25-version-negotiation-client [25-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [25-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-25] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [26-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 26-version-negotiation-ssl [26-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 26-version-negotiation-server client = 26-version-negotiation-client [26-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [26-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-26] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [27-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 27-version-negotiation-ssl [27-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 27-version-negotiation-server client = 27-version-negotiation-client [27-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [27-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-27] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [28-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 28-version-negotiation-ssl [28-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 28-version-negotiation-server client = 28-version-negotiation-client [28-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [28-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-28] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [29-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 29-version-negotiation-ssl [29-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 29-version-negotiation-server client = 29-version-negotiation-client [29-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [29-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-29] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [30-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 30-version-negotiation-ssl [30-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 30-version-negotiation-server client = 30-version-negotiation-client [30-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [30-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-30] ExpectedResult = ServerFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [31-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 31-version-negotiation-ssl [31-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 31-version-negotiation-server client = 31-version-negotiation-client [31-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [31-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-31] ExpectedResult = ServerFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [32-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 32-version-negotiation-ssl [32-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 32-version-negotiation-server client = 32-version-negotiation-client [32-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [32-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-32] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [33-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 33-version-negotiation-ssl [33-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 33-version-negotiation-server client = 33-version-negotiation-client [33-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [33-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-33] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [34-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 34-version-negotiation-ssl [34-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 34-version-negotiation-server client = 34-version-negotiation-client [34-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [34-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-34] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [35-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 35-version-negotiation-ssl [35-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 35-version-negotiation-server client = 35-version-negotiation-client [35-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [35-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-35] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [36-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 36-version-negotiation-ssl [36-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 36-version-negotiation-server client = 36-version-negotiation-client [36-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [36-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-36] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [37-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 37-version-negotiation-ssl [37-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 37-version-negotiation-server client = 37-version-negotiation-client [37-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [37-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-37] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [38-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 38-version-negotiation-ssl [38-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 38-version-negotiation-server client = 38-version-negotiation-client [38-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [38-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-38] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [39-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 39-version-negotiation-ssl [39-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 39-version-negotiation-server client = 39-version-negotiation-client [39-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [39-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-39] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [40-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 40-version-negotiation-ssl [40-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 40-version-negotiation-server client = 40-version-negotiation-client [40-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [40-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-40] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [41-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 41-version-negotiation-ssl [41-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 41-version-negotiation-server client = 41-version-negotiation-client [41-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [41-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-41] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [42-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 42-version-negotiation-ssl [42-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 42-version-negotiation-server client = 42-version-negotiation-client [42-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [42-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-42] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [43-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 43-version-negotiation-ssl [43-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 43-version-negotiation-server client = 43-version-negotiation-client [43-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [43-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-43] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [44-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 44-version-negotiation-ssl [44-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 44-version-negotiation-server client = 44-version-negotiation-client [44-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [44-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-44] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [45-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 45-version-negotiation-ssl [45-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 45-version-negotiation-server client = 45-version-negotiation-client [45-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [45-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-45] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [46-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 46-version-negotiation-ssl [46-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 46-version-negotiation-server client = 46-version-negotiation-client [46-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [46-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-46] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [47-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 47-version-negotiation-ssl [47-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 47-version-negotiation-server client = 47-version-negotiation-client [47-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [47-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-47] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [48-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 48-version-negotiation-ssl [48-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 48-version-negotiation-server client = 48-version-negotiation-client [48-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [48-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-48] ExpectedResult = ClientFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [49-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 49-version-negotiation-ssl [49-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 49-version-negotiation-server client = 49-version-negotiation-client [49-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [49-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-49] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [50-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 50-version-negotiation-ssl [50-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 50-version-negotiation-server client = 50-version-negotiation-client [50-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [50-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-50] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [51-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 51-version-negotiation-ssl [51-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 51-version-negotiation-server client = 51-version-negotiation-client [51-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [51-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-51] ExpectedResult = ClientFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [52-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 52-version-negotiation-ssl [52-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 52-version-negotiation-server client = 52-version-negotiation-client [52-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [52-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-52] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [53-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 53-version-negotiation-ssl [53-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 53-version-negotiation-server client = 53-version-negotiation-client [53-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [53-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-53] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [54-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 54-version-negotiation-ssl [54-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 54-version-negotiation-server client = 54-version-negotiation-client [54-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [54-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-54] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [55-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 55-version-negotiation-ssl [55-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 55-version-negotiation-server client = 55-version-negotiation-client [55-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [55-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-55] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [56-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 56-version-negotiation-ssl [56-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 56-version-negotiation-server client = 56-version-negotiation-client [56-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [56-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-56] ExpectedResult = ClientFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [57-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 57-version-negotiation-ssl [57-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 57-version-negotiation-server client = 57-version-negotiation-client [57-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [57-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-57] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [58-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 58-version-negotiation-ssl [58-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 58-version-negotiation-server client = 58-version-negotiation-client [58-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [58-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-58] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [59-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 59-version-negotiation-ssl [59-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 59-version-negotiation-server client = 59-version-negotiation-client [59-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [59-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-59] ExpectedResult = ClientFail Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [60-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 60-version-negotiation-ssl [60-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 60-version-negotiation-server client = 60-version-negotiation-client [60-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [60-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-60] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [61-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 61-version-negotiation-ssl [61-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 61-version-negotiation-server client = 61-version-negotiation-client [61-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [61-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-61] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [62-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 62-version-negotiation-ssl [62-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 62-version-negotiation-server client = 62-version-negotiation-client [62-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = DTLSv1.2 MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [62-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-62] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS # =========================================================== [63-version-negotiation] ssl_conf = 63-version-negotiation-ssl [63-version-negotiation-ssl] server = 63-version-negotiation-server client = 63-version-negotiation-client [63-version-negotiation-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [63-version-negotiation-client] CipherString = DEFAULT MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-63] ExpectedProtocol = DTLSv1.2 ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf0000644000000000000000000004344213176625662017406 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 29 test-0 = 0-curve-sect163k1 test-1 = 1-curve-sect163r1 test-2 = 2-curve-sect163r2 test-3 = 3-curve-sect193r1 test-4 = 4-curve-sect193r2 test-5 = 5-curve-sect233k1 test-6 = 6-curve-sect233r1 test-7 = 7-curve-sect239k1 test-8 = 8-curve-sect283k1 test-9 = 9-curve-sect283r1 test-10 = 10-curve-sect409k1 test-11 = 11-curve-sect409r1 test-12 = 12-curve-sect571k1 test-13 = 13-curve-sect571r1 test-14 = 14-curve-secp160k1 test-15 = 15-curve-secp160r1 test-16 = 16-curve-secp160r2 test-17 = 17-curve-secp192k1 test-18 = 18-curve-prime192v1 test-19 = 19-curve-secp224k1 test-20 = 20-curve-secp224r1 test-21 = 21-curve-secp256k1 test-22 = 22-curve-prime256v1 test-23 = 23-curve-secp384r1 test-24 = 24-curve-secp521r1 test-25 = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1 test-26 = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1 test-27 = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1 test-28 = 28-curve-X25519 # =========================================================== [0-curve-sect163k1] ssl_conf = 0-curve-sect163k1-ssl [0-curve-sect163k1-ssl] server = 0-curve-sect163k1-server client = 0-curve-sect163k1-client [0-curve-sect163k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect163k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-curve-sect163k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect163k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect163k1 # =========================================================== [1-curve-sect163r1] ssl_conf = 1-curve-sect163r1-ssl [1-curve-sect163r1-ssl] server = 1-curve-sect163r1-server client = 1-curve-sect163r1-client [1-curve-sect163r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect163r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-curve-sect163r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect163r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect163r1 # =========================================================== [2-curve-sect163r2] ssl_conf = 2-curve-sect163r2-ssl [2-curve-sect163r2-ssl] server = 2-curve-sect163r2-server client = 2-curve-sect163r2-client [2-curve-sect163r2-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect163r2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-curve-sect163r2-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect163r2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect163r2 # =========================================================== [3-curve-sect193r1] ssl_conf = 3-curve-sect193r1-ssl [3-curve-sect193r1-ssl] server = 3-curve-sect193r1-server client = 3-curve-sect193r1-client [3-curve-sect193r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect193r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-curve-sect193r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect193r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect193r1 # =========================================================== [4-curve-sect193r2] ssl_conf = 4-curve-sect193r2-ssl [4-curve-sect193r2-ssl] server = 4-curve-sect193r2-server client = 4-curve-sect193r2-client [4-curve-sect193r2-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect193r2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-curve-sect193r2-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect193r2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect193r2 # =========================================================== [5-curve-sect233k1] ssl_conf = 5-curve-sect233k1-ssl [5-curve-sect233k1-ssl] server = 5-curve-sect233k1-server client = 5-curve-sect233k1-client [5-curve-sect233k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect233k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-curve-sect233k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect233k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect233k1 # =========================================================== [6-curve-sect233r1] ssl_conf = 6-curve-sect233r1-ssl [6-curve-sect233r1-ssl] server = 6-curve-sect233r1-server client = 6-curve-sect233r1-client [6-curve-sect233r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect233r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-curve-sect233r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect233r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect233r1 # =========================================================== [7-curve-sect239k1] ssl_conf = 7-curve-sect239k1-ssl [7-curve-sect239k1-ssl] server = 7-curve-sect239k1-server client = 7-curve-sect239k1-client [7-curve-sect239k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect239k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-curve-sect239k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect239k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect239k1 # =========================================================== [8-curve-sect283k1] ssl_conf = 8-curve-sect283k1-ssl [8-curve-sect283k1-ssl] server = 8-curve-sect283k1-server client = 8-curve-sect283k1-client [8-curve-sect283k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect283k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-curve-sect283k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect283k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect283k1 # =========================================================== [9-curve-sect283r1] ssl_conf = 9-curve-sect283r1-ssl [9-curve-sect283r1-ssl] server = 9-curve-sect283r1-server client = 9-curve-sect283r1-client [9-curve-sect283r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect283r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-curve-sect283r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect283r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect283r1 # =========================================================== [10-curve-sect409k1] ssl_conf = 10-curve-sect409k1-ssl [10-curve-sect409k1-ssl] server = 10-curve-sect409k1-server client = 10-curve-sect409k1-client [10-curve-sect409k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect409k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-curve-sect409k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect409k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect409k1 # =========================================================== [11-curve-sect409r1] ssl_conf = 11-curve-sect409r1-ssl [11-curve-sect409r1-ssl] server = 11-curve-sect409r1-server client = 11-curve-sect409r1-client [11-curve-sect409r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect409r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-curve-sect409r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect409r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect409r1 # =========================================================== [12-curve-sect571k1] ssl_conf = 12-curve-sect571k1-ssl [12-curve-sect571k1-ssl] server = 12-curve-sect571k1-server client = 12-curve-sect571k1-client [12-curve-sect571k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect571k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-curve-sect571k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect571k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect571k1 # =========================================================== [13-curve-sect571r1] ssl_conf = 13-curve-sect571r1-ssl [13-curve-sect571r1-ssl] server = 13-curve-sect571r1-server client = 13-curve-sect571r1-client [13-curve-sect571r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = sect571r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-curve-sect571r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = sect571r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = sect571r1 # =========================================================== [14-curve-secp160k1] ssl_conf = 14-curve-secp160k1-ssl [14-curve-secp160k1-ssl] server = 14-curve-secp160k1-server client = 14-curve-secp160k1-client [14-curve-secp160k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp160k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-curve-secp160k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp160k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp160k1 # =========================================================== [15-curve-secp160r1] ssl_conf = 15-curve-secp160r1-ssl [15-curve-secp160r1-ssl] server = 15-curve-secp160r1-server client = 15-curve-secp160r1-client [15-curve-secp160r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp160r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-curve-secp160r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp160r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp160r1 # =========================================================== [16-curve-secp160r2] ssl_conf = 16-curve-secp160r2-ssl [16-curve-secp160r2-ssl] server = 16-curve-secp160r2-server client = 16-curve-secp160r2-client [16-curve-secp160r2-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp160r2 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-curve-secp160r2-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp160r2 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-16] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp160r2 # =========================================================== [17-curve-secp192k1] ssl_conf = 17-curve-secp192k1-ssl [17-curve-secp192k1-ssl] server = 17-curve-secp192k1-server client = 17-curve-secp192k1-client [17-curve-secp192k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp192k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [17-curve-secp192k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp192k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-17] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp192k1 # =========================================================== [18-curve-prime192v1] ssl_conf = 18-curve-prime192v1-ssl [18-curve-prime192v1-ssl] server = 18-curve-prime192v1-server client = 18-curve-prime192v1-client [18-curve-prime192v1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = prime192v1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [18-curve-prime192v1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = prime192v1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-18] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = prime192v1 # =========================================================== [19-curve-secp224k1] ssl_conf = 19-curve-secp224k1-ssl [19-curve-secp224k1-ssl] server = 19-curve-secp224k1-server client = 19-curve-secp224k1-client [19-curve-secp224k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp224k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [19-curve-secp224k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp224k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-19] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp224k1 # =========================================================== [20-curve-secp224r1] ssl_conf = 20-curve-secp224r1-ssl [20-curve-secp224r1-ssl] server = 20-curve-secp224r1-server client = 20-curve-secp224r1-client [20-curve-secp224r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp224r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [20-curve-secp224r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp224r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-20] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp224r1 # =========================================================== [21-curve-secp256k1] ssl_conf = 21-curve-secp256k1-ssl [21-curve-secp256k1-ssl] server = 21-curve-secp256k1-server client = 21-curve-secp256k1-client [21-curve-secp256k1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp256k1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [21-curve-secp256k1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp256k1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-21] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp256k1 # =========================================================== [22-curve-prime256v1] ssl_conf = 22-curve-prime256v1-ssl [22-curve-prime256v1-ssl] server = 22-curve-prime256v1-server client = 22-curve-prime256v1-client [22-curve-prime256v1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = prime256v1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [22-curve-prime256v1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = prime256v1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-22] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = prime256v1 # =========================================================== [23-curve-secp384r1] ssl_conf = 23-curve-secp384r1-ssl [23-curve-secp384r1-ssl] server = 23-curve-secp384r1-server client = 23-curve-secp384r1-client [23-curve-secp384r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp384r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [23-curve-secp384r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp384r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-23] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp384r1 # =========================================================== [24-curve-secp521r1] ssl_conf = 24-curve-secp521r1-ssl [24-curve-secp521r1-ssl] server = 24-curve-secp521r1-server client = 24-curve-secp521r1-client [24-curve-secp521r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = secp521r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [24-curve-secp521r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = secp521r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-24] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = secp521r1 # =========================================================== [25-curve-brainpoolP256r1] ssl_conf = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-ssl [25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-ssl] server = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-server client = 25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-client [25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = brainpoolP256r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [25-curve-brainpoolP256r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = brainpoolP256r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-25] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = brainpoolP256r1 # =========================================================== [26-curve-brainpoolP384r1] ssl_conf = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-ssl [26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-ssl] server = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-server client = 26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-client [26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = brainpoolP384r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [26-curve-brainpoolP384r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = brainpoolP384r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-26] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = brainpoolP384r1 # =========================================================== [27-curve-brainpoolP512r1] ssl_conf = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-ssl [27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-ssl] server = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-server client = 27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-client [27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = brainpoolP512r1 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [27-curve-brainpoolP512r1-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = brainpoolP512r1 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-27] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = brainpoolP512r1 # =========================================================== [28-curve-X25519] ssl_conf = 28-curve-X25519-ssl [28-curve-X25519-ssl] server = 28-curve-X25519-server client = 28-curve-X25519-client [28-curve-X25519-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Curves = X25519 PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [28-curve-X25519-client] CipherString = ECDHE Curves = X25519 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-28] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedTmpKeyType = X25519 openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000631013176625662017101 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "ct-permissive-without-scts", server => { }, client => { extra => { "CTValidation" => "Permissive", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "ct-permissive-with-scts", server => { "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"), }, client => { "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"), extra => { "CTValidation" => "Permissive", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "ct-strict-without-scts", server => { }, client => { extra => { "CTValidation" => "Strict", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail", "ExpectedClientAlert" => "HandshakeFailure", }, }, { name => "ct-strict-with-scts", server => { "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"), }, client => { "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"), extra => { "CTValidation" => "Strict", }, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "ct-permissive-resumption", server => { "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"), }, client => { "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"), extra => { "CTValidation" => "Permissive", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, { name => "ct-strict-resumption", server => { "Certificate" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1-key.pem"), }, client => { "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem"), extra => { "CTValidation" => "Strict", }, }, # SCTs are not present during resumption, so the resumption # should succeed. resume_client => { extra => { "CTValidation" => "Strict", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedResult" => "Success", }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/protocol_version.pm0000644000000000000000000002052113176625662020743 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation package ssltests; use strict; use warnings; use List::Util qw/max min/; use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw/anydisabled alldisabled/; setup("no_test_here"); my @tls_protocols = ("SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2"); # undef stands for "no limit". my @min_tls_protocols = (undef, "SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2"); my @max_tls_protocols = ("SSLv3", "TLSv1", "TLSv1.1", "TLSv1.2", undef); my @is_tls_disabled = anydisabled("ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2"); my $min_tls_enabled; my $max_tls_enabled; # Protocol configuration works in cascades, i.e., # $no_tls1_1 disables TLSv1.1 and below. # # $min_enabled and $max_enabled will be correct if there is at least one # protocol enabled. foreach my $i (0..$#tls_protocols) { if (!$is_tls_disabled[$i]) { $min_tls_enabled = $i; last; } } foreach my $i (0..$#tls_protocols) { if (!$is_tls_disabled[$i]) { $max_tls_enabled = $i; } } my @dtls_protocols = ("DTLSv1", "DTLSv1.2"); # undef stands for "no limit". my @min_dtls_protocols = (undef, "DTLSv1", "DTLSv1.2"); my @max_dtls_protocols = ("DTLSv1", "DTLSv1.2", undef); my @is_dtls_disabled = anydisabled("dtls1", "dtls1_2"); my $min_dtls_enabled; my $max_dtls_enabled; # $min_enabled and $max_enabled will be correct if there is at least one # protocol enabled. foreach my $i (0..$#dtls_protocols) { if (!$is_dtls_disabled[$i]) { $min_dtls_enabled = $i; last; } } foreach my $i (0..$#dtls_protocols) { if (!$is_dtls_disabled[$i]) { $max_dtls_enabled = $i; } } sub no_tests { my ($dtls) = @_; return $dtls ? alldisabled("dtls1", "dtls1_2") : alldisabled("ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2"); } sub generate_version_tests { my ($method) = @_; my $dtls = $method eq "DTLS"; # Don't write the redundant "Method = TLS" into the configuration. undef $method if !$dtls; my @protocols = $dtls ? @dtls_protocols : @tls_protocols; my @min_protocols = $dtls ? @min_dtls_protocols : @min_tls_protocols; my @max_protocols = $dtls ? @max_dtls_protocols : @max_tls_protocols; my $min_enabled = $dtls ? $min_dtls_enabled : $min_tls_enabled; my $max_enabled = $dtls ? $max_dtls_enabled : $max_tls_enabled; if (no_tests($dtls)) { return; } my @tests = (); foreach my $c_min (0..$#min_protocols) { my $c_max_min = $c_min == 0 ? 0 : $c_min - 1; foreach my $c_max ($c_max_min..$#max_protocols) { foreach my $s_min (0..$#min_protocols) { my $s_max_min = $s_min == 0 ? 0 : $s_min - 1; foreach my $s_max ($s_max_min..$#max_protocols) { my ($result, $protocol) = expected_result($c_min, $c_max, $s_min, $s_max, $min_enabled, $max_enabled, \@protocols); push @tests, { "name" => "version-negotiation", "client" => { "MinProtocol" => $min_protocols[$c_min], "MaxProtocol" => $max_protocols[$c_max], }, "server" => { "MinProtocol" => $min_protocols[$s_min], "MaxProtocol" => $max_protocols[$s_max], }, "test" => { "ExpectedResult" => $result, "ExpectedProtocol" => $protocol, "Method" => $method, } }; } } } } return @tests; } sub generate_resumption_tests { my ($method) = @_; my $dtls = $method eq "DTLS"; # Don't write the redundant "Method = TLS" into the configuration. undef $method if !$dtls; my @protocols = $dtls ? @dtls_protocols : @tls_protocols; my $min_enabled = $dtls ? $min_dtls_enabled : $min_tls_enabled; if (no_tests($dtls)) { return; } my @server_tests = (); my @client_tests = (); # Obtain the first session against a fixed-version server/client. foreach my $original_protocol($min_enabled..$#protocols) { # Upgrade or downgrade the server/client max version support and test # that it upgrades, downgrades or resumes the session as well. foreach my $resume_protocol($min_enabled..$#protocols) { my $resumption_expected; # We should only resume on exact version match. if ($original_protocol eq $resume_protocol) { $resumption_expected = "Yes"; } else { $resumption_expected = "No"; } foreach my $ticket ("SessionTicket", "-SessionTicket") { # Client is flexible, server upgrades/downgrades. push @server_tests, { "name" => "resumption", "client" => { }, "server" => { "MinProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol], "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol], "Options" => $ticket, }, "resume_server" => { "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol], }, "test" => { "ExpectedProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol], "Method" => $method, "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => $resumption_expected, } }; # Server is flexible, client upgrades/downgrades. push @client_tests, { "name" => "resumption", "client" => { "MinProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol], "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$original_protocol], }, "server" => { "Options" => $ticket, }, "resume_client" => { "MaxProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol], }, "test" => { "ExpectedProtocol" => $protocols[$resume_protocol], "Method" => $method, "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => $resumption_expected, } }; } } } return (@server_tests, @client_tests); } sub expected_result { my ($c_min, $c_max, $s_min, $s_max, $min_enabled, $max_enabled, $protocols) = @_; # Adjust for "undef" (no limit). $c_min = $c_min == 0 ? 0 : $c_min - 1; $c_max = $c_max == scalar @$protocols ? $c_max - 1 : $c_max; $s_min = $s_min == 0 ? 0 : $s_min - 1; $s_max = $s_max == scalar @$protocols ? $s_max - 1 : $s_max; # We now have at least one protocol enabled, so $min_enabled and # $max_enabled are well-defined. $c_min = max $c_min, $min_enabled; $s_min = max $s_min, $min_enabled; $c_max = min $c_max, $max_enabled; $s_max = min $s_max, $max_enabled; if ($c_min > $c_max) { # Client should fail to even send a hello. # This results in an internal error since the server will be # waiting for input that never arrives. return ("InternalError", undef); } elsif ($s_min > $s_max) { # Server has no protocols, should always fail. return ("ServerFail", undef); } elsif ($s_min > $c_max) { # Server doesn't support the client range. return ("ServerFail", undef); } elsif ($c_min > $s_max) { # Server will try with a version that is lower than the lowest # supported client version. return ("ClientFail", undef); } else { # Server and client ranges overlap. my $max_common = $s_max < $c_max ? $s_max : $c_max; return ("Success", $protocols->[$max_common]); } } 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/17-renegotiate.conf0000644000000000000000000002062713176625662020410 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 10 test-0 = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume test-1 = 1-renegotiate-client-resume test-2 = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume test-3 = 3-renegotiate-server-resume test-4 = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require test-5 = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once test-6 = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead test-7 = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead test-8 = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead test-9 = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead # =========================================================== [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume] ssl_conf = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-ssl] server = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server client = 0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-renegotiate-client-no-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [1-renegotiate-client-resume] ssl_conf = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl [1-renegotiate-client-resume-ssl] server = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-server client = 1-renegotiate-client-resume-client [1-renegotiate-client-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-renegotiate-client-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [2-renegotiate-server-no-resume] ssl_conf = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-ssl [2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-ssl] server = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-server client = 2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-client [2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-renegotiate-server-no-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [3-renegotiate-server-resume] ssl_conf = 3-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl [3-renegotiate-server-resume-ssl] server = 3-renegotiate-server-resume-server client = 3-renegotiate-server-resume-client [3-renegotiate-server-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-renegotiate-server-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = Yes # =========================================================== [4-renegotiate-client-auth-require] ssl_conf = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl [4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-ssl] server = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server client = 4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client [4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Require [4-renegotiate-client-auth-require-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [5-renegotiate-client-auth-once] ssl_conf = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl [5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-ssl] server = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server client = 5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client [5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/root-cert.pem VerifyMode = Once [5-renegotiate-client-auth-once-client] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-client-chain.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/ee-key.pem VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateServer Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No # =========================================================== [6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead] ssl_conf = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl [6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-ssl] server = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server client = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client [6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra [6-renegotiate-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-SHA # =========================================================== [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead] ssl_conf = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-ssl] server = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra [7-renegotiate-non-aead-to-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES128-GCM-SHA256 # =========================================================== [8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead] ssl_conf = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl [8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-ssl] server = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server client = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client [8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-SHA VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra [8-renegotiate-non-aead-to-non-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-SHA # =========================================================== [9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead] ssl_conf = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl [9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-ssl] server = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server client = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client [9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT MaxProtocol = TLSv1.2 Options = NoResumptionOnRenegotiation PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client] CipherString = AES128-GCM-SHA256 VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = RenegotiateClient Method = TLS ResumptionExpected = No client = 9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra [9-renegotiate-aead-to-aead-client-extra] RenegotiateCiphers = AES256-GCM-SHA384 openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/12-ct.conf0000644000000000000000000001175713176625662016507 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 6 test-0 = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts test-1 = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts test-2 = 2-ct-strict-without-scts test-3 = 3-ct-strict-with-scts test-4 = 4-ct-permissive-resumption test-5 = 5-ct-strict-resumption # =========================================================== [0-ct-permissive-without-scts] ssl_conf = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-ssl [0-ct-permissive-without-scts-ssl] server = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-server client = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client [0-ct-permissive-without-scts-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success client = 0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client-extra [0-ct-permissive-without-scts-client-extra] CTValidation = Permissive # =========================================================== [1-ct-permissive-with-scts] ssl_conf = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-ssl [1-ct-permissive-with-scts-ssl] server = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-server client = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client [1-ct-permissive-with-scts-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem [1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success client = 1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client-extra [1-ct-permissive-with-scts-client-extra] CTValidation = Permissive # =========================================================== [2-ct-strict-without-scts] ssl_conf = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-ssl [2-ct-strict-without-scts-ssl] server = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-server client = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-client [2-ct-strict-without-scts-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-ct-strict-without-scts-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedClientAlert = HandshakeFailure ExpectedResult = ClientFail client = 2-ct-strict-without-scts-client-extra [2-ct-strict-without-scts-client-extra] CTValidation = Strict # =========================================================== [3-ct-strict-with-scts] ssl_conf = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-ssl [3-ct-strict-with-scts-ssl] server = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-server client = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-client [3-ct-strict-with-scts-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem [3-ct-strict-with-scts-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success client = 3-ct-strict-with-scts-client-extra [3-ct-strict-with-scts-client-extra] CTValidation = Strict # =========================================================== [4-ct-permissive-resumption] ssl_conf = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-ssl [4-ct-permissive-resumption-ssl] server = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-server client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client resume-server = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-server resume-client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client [4-ct-permissive-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem [4-ct-permissive-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 4-ct-permissive-resumption-client-extra [4-ct-permissive-resumption-client-extra] CTValidation = Permissive # =========================================================== [5-ct-strict-resumption] ssl_conf = 5-ct-strict-resumption-ssl [5-ct-strict-resumption-ssl] server = 5-ct-strict-resumption-server client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-client resume-server = 5-ct-strict-resumption-server resume-client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client [5-ct-strict-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem [5-ct-strict-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem VerifyMode = Peer [5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client-extra [5-ct-strict-resumption-client-extra] CTValidation = Strict [5-ct-strict-resumption-resume-client-extra] CTValidation = Strict openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/06-sni-ticket.conf0000644000000000000000000004514313176625662020152 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 17 test-0 = 0-sni-session-ticket test-1 = 1-sni-session-ticket test-2 = 2-sni-session-ticket test-3 = 3-sni-session-ticket test-4 = 4-sni-session-ticket test-5 = 5-sni-session-ticket test-6 = 6-sni-session-ticket test-7 = 7-sni-session-ticket test-8 = 8-sni-session-ticket test-9 = 9-sni-session-ticket test-10 = 10-sni-session-ticket test-11 = 11-sni-session-ticket test-12 = 12-sni-session-ticket test-13 = 13-sni-session-ticket test-14 = 14-sni-session-ticket test-15 = 15-sni-session-ticket test-16 = 16-sni-session-ticket # =========================================================== [0-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 0-sni-session-ticket-ssl [0-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 0-sni-session-ticket-server client = 0-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 0-sni-session-ticket-server2 [0-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success SessionTicketExpected = No server = 0-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 0-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [0-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] BrokenSessionTicket = Yes [0-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [1-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 1-sni-session-ticket-ssl [1-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 1-sni-session-ticket-server client = 1-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 1-sni-session-ticket-server2 [1-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = Yes server = 1-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 1-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [1-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [1-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [2-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 2-sni-session-ticket-ssl [2-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 2-sni-session-ticket-server client = 2-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 2-sni-session-ticket-server2 [2-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = Yes server = 2-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 2-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [2-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [2-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [3-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 3-sni-session-ticket-ssl [3-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 3-sni-session-ticket-server client = 3-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 3-sni-session-ticket-server2 [3-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = Yes server = 3-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 3-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [3-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [3-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [4-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 4-sni-session-ticket-ssl [4-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 4-sni-session-ticket-server client = 4-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 4-sni-session-ticket-server2 [4-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 4-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 4-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [4-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [4-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [5-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 5-sni-session-ticket-ssl [5-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 5-sni-session-ticket-server client = 5-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 5-sni-session-ticket-server2 [5-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 5-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 5-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [5-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [5-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [6-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 6-sni-session-ticket-ssl [6-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 6-sni-session-ticket-server client = 6-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 6-sni-session-ticket-server2 [6-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 6-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 6-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [6-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [6-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [7-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 7-sni-session-ticket-ssl [7-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 7-sni-session-ticket-server client = 7-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 7-sni-session-ticket-server2 [7-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 7-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 7-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [7-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [7-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [8-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 8-sni-session-ticket-ssl [8-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 8-sni-session-ticket-server client = 8-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 8-sni-session-ticket-server2 [8-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 8-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 8-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [8-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [8-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [9-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 9-sni-session-ticket-ssl [9-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 9-sni-session-ticket-server client = 9-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 9-sni-session-ticket-server2 [9-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 9-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 9-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [9-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [9-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [10-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 10-sni-session-ticket-ssl [10-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 10-sni-session-ticket-server client = 10-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 10-sni-session-ticket-server2 [10-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 10-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 10-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [10-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [10-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [11-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 11-sni-session-ticket-ssl [11-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 11-sni-session-ticket-server client = 11-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 11-sni-session-ticket-server2 [11-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 11-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 11-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [11-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [11-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [12-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 12-sni-session-ticket-ssl [12-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 12-sni-session-ticket-server client = 12-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 12-sni-session-ticket-server2 [12-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 12-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 12-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [12-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [12-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [13-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 13-sni-session-ticket-ssl [13-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 13-sni-session-ticket-server client = 13-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 13-sni-session-ticket-server2 [13-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 13-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 13-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [13-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [13-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [14-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 14-sni-session-ticket-ssl [14-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 14-sni-session-ticket-server client = 14-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 14-sni-session-ticket-server2 [14-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 14-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 14-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [14-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [14-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [15-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 15-sni-session-ticket-ssl [15-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 15-sni-session-ticket-server client = 15-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 15-sni-session-ticket-server2 [15-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server1 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 15-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 15-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [15-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [15-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [16-sni-session-ticket] ssl_conf = 16-sni-session-ticket-ssl [16-sni-session-ticket-ssl] server = 16-sni-session-ticket-server client = 16-sni-session-ticket-client server2 = 16-sni-session-ticket-server2 [16-sni-session-ticket-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-sni-session-ticket-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [16-sni-session-ticket-client] CipherString = DEFAULT Options = -SessionTicket VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-16] ExpectedResult = Success ExpectedServerName = server2 SessionTicketExpected = No server = 16-sni-session-ticket-server-extra client = 16-sni-session-ticket-client-extra [16-sni-session-ticket-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [16-sni-session-ticket-client-extra] ServerName = server2 openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/02-protocol-version.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000075213176625662022022 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test TLS version negotiation package ssltests; use strict; use warnings; use protocol_version; our @tests = generate_version_tests("TLS"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf0000644000000000000000000000252713176625662021245 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 2 test-0 = 0-certstatus-good test-1 = 1-certstatus-bad # =========================================================== [0-certstatus-good] ssl_conf = 0-certstatus-good-ssl [0-certstatus-good-ssl] server = 0-certstatus-good-server client = 0-certstatus-good-client [0-certstatus-good-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-certstatus-good-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedResult = Success Method = DTLS server = 0-certstatus-good-server-extra [0-certstatus-good-server-extra] CertStatus = GoodResponse # =========================================================== [1-certstatus-bad] ssl_conf = 1-certstatus-bad-ssl [1-certstatus-bad-ssl] server = 1-certstatus-bad-server client = 1-certstatus-bad-client [1-certstatus-bad-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-certstatus-bad-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedResult = ClientFail Method = DTLS server = 1-certstatus-bad-server-extra [1-certstatus-bad-server-extra] CertStatus = BadResponse openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/ssltests_base.pm0000644000000000000000000000145413176625662020217 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## SSL test configurations package ssltests; sub test_pem { my ($file) = @_; my $dir_sep = $^O ne "VMS" ? "/" : ""; return "\${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}" . $dir_sep . $file, } our %base_server = ( "Certificate" => test_pem("servercert.pem"), "PrivateKey" => test_pem("serverkey.pem"), "CipherString" => "DEFAULT", ); our %base_client = ( "VerifyCAFile" => test_pem("rootcert.pem"), "VerifyMode" => "Peer", "CipherString" => "DEFAULT", ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/07-dtls-protocol-version.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000075413176625662022775 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test DTLS version negotiation package ssltests; use strict; use warnings; use protocol_version; our @tests = generate_version_tests("DTLS"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/09-alpn.conf0000644000000000000000000004425413176625662017037 0ustar rootroot# Generated with generate_ssl_tests.pl num_tests = 16 test-0 = 0-alpn-simple test-1 = 1-alpn-server-finds-match test-2 = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref test-3 = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch test-4 = 4-alpn-no-server-support test-5 = 5-alpn-no-client-support test-6 = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch test-7 = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch test-8 = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn test-9 = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn test-10 = 10-alpn-simple-resumption test-11 = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption test-12 = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption test-13 = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption test-14 = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption test-15 = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption # =========================================================== [0-alpn-simple] ssl_conf = 0-alpn-simple-ssl [0-alpn-simple-ssl] server = 0-alpn-simple-server client = 0-alpn-simple-client [0-alpn-simple-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [0-alpn-simple-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-0] ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo server = 0-alpn-simple-server-extra client = 0-alpn-simple-client-extra [0-alpn-simple-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo [0-alpn-simple-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [1-alpn-server-finds-match] ssl_conf = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-ssl [1-alpn-server-finds-match-ssl] server = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-server client = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-client [1-alpn-server-finds-match-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [1-alpn-server-finds-match-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-1] ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar server = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-server-extra client = 1-alpn-server-finds-match-client-extra [1-alpn-server-finds-match-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = baz,bar [1-alpn-server-finds-match-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref] ssl_conf = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-ssl [2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-ssl] server = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server client = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client [2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-2] ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar server = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server-extra client = 2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client-extra [2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar,foo [2-alpn-server-honours-server-pref-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch] ssl_conf = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-ssl [3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-ssl] server = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server client = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client [3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-3] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = NoApplicationProtocol server = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server-extra client = 3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client-extra [3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = baz [3-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [4-alpn-no-server-support] ssl_conf = 4-alpn-no-server-support-ssl [4-alpn-no-server-support-ssl] server = 4-alpn-no-server-support-server client = 4-alpn-no-server-support-client [4-alpn-no-server-support-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [4-alpn-no-server-support-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-4] client = 4-alpn-no-server-support-client-extra [4-alpn-no-server-support-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [5-alpn-no-client-support] ssl_conf = 5-alpn-no-client-support-ssl [5-alpn-no-client-support-ssl] server = 5-alpn-no-client-support-server client = 5-alpn-no-client-support-client [5-alpn-no-client-support-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [5-alpn-no-client-support-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-5] server = 5-alpn-no-client-support-server-extra [5-alpn-no-client-support-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch] ssl_conf = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-ssl] server = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server client = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client server2 = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2 [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-6] ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo ExpectedServerName = server1 server = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra server2 = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra client = 6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-server2-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar [6-alpn-with-sni-no-context-switch-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server1 # =========================================================== [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch] ssl_conf = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-ssl] server = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server client = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client server2 = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2 [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-7] ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra server2 = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra client = 7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-server2-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar [7-alpn-with-sni-context-switch-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn] ssl_conf = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-ssl [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-ssl] server = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server client = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client server2 = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2 [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-8] ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server-extra server2 = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2-extra client = 8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client-extra [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server-extra] ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-server2-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar [8-alpn-selected-sni-server-supports-alpn-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn] ssl_conf = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-ssl [9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-ssl] server = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server client = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client server2 = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server2 [9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server2] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-9] ExpectedServerName = server2 server = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server-extra client = 9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client-extra [9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar ServerNameCallback = IgnoreMismatch [9-alpn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-alpn-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar ServerName = server2 # =========================================================== [10-alpn-simple-resumption] ssl_conf = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-ssl [10-alpn-simple-resumption-ssl] server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client resume-server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server resume-client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client [10-alpn-simple-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [10-alpn-simple-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-10] ExpectedALPNProtocol = foo HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-server-extra client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 10-alpn-simple-resumption-client-extra [10-alpn-simple-resumption-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo [10-alpn-simple-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption] ssl_conf = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-ssl [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-ssl] server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client resume-server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-11] ExpectedALPNProtocol = baz HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar,foo [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-resume-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = baz,foo [11-alpn-server-switch-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz # =========================================================== [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption] ssl_conf = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-ssl [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-ssl] server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client resume-server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server resume-client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-12] ExpectedALPNProtocol = bar HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar,baz [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,baz [12-alpn-client-switch-resumption-resume-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar,baz # =========================================================== [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption] ssl_conf = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-ssl] server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client resume-server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-13] ExpectedResult = ServerFail ExpectedServerAlert = NoApplicationProtocol HandshakeMode = Resume server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = bar [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-resume-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = baz [13-alpn-alert-on-mismatch-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo,bar # =========================================================== [14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption] ssl_conf = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl [14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-ssl] server = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client resume-server = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server resume-client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client [14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-resume-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-14] HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra resume-client = 14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra [14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo [14-alpn-no-server-support-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo # =========================================================== [15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption] ssl_conf = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl [15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-ssl] server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server client = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client resume-server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server resume-client = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client [15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server] Certificate = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/servercert.pem CipherString = DEFAULT PrivateKey = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/serverkey.pem [15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-resume-client] CipherString = DEFAULT VerifyCAFile = ${ENV::TEST_CERTS_DIR}/rootcert.pem VerifyMode = Peer [test-15] HandshakeMode = Resume ResumptionExpected = Yes server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra resume-server = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra client = 15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra [15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-server-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo [15-alpn-no-client-support-resumption-client-extra] ALPNProtocols = foo openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/14-curves.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000222313176625662020003 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- ## SSL test configurations package ssltests; use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw(anydisabled); my @curves = ("sect163k1", "sect163r1", "sect163r2", "sect193r1", "sect193r2", "sect233k1", "sect233r1", "sect239k1", "sect283k1", "sect283r1", "sect409k1", "sect409r1", "sect571k1", "sect571r1", "secp160k1", "secp160r1", "secp160r2", "secp192k1", "prime192v1", "secp224k1", "secp224r1", "secp256k1", "prime256v1", "secp384r1", "secp521r1", "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP512r1", "X25519"); our @tests = (); sub generate_tests() { foreach (0..$#curves) { my $curve = $curves[$_]; push @tests, { name => "curve-${curve}", server => { "Curves" => $curve }, client => { "CipherString" => "ECDHE", "Curves" => $curve }, test => { "ExpectedTmpKeyType" => $curve, "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }; } } generate_tests(); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/08-npn.conf.in0000644000000000000000000002425313176625662017301 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test version negotiation use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "npn-simple", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "npn-client-finds-match", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "baz,bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "npn-client-honours-server-pref", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar,foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "npn-no-server-support", server => { }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "npn-no-client-support", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { }, test => { "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "npn-with-sni-no-context-switch", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server1", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server1", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "npn-with-sni-context-switch", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server2", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "npn-selected-sni-server-supports-npn", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server2", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "npn-selected-sni-server-does-not-support-npn", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar", "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", }, }, server2 => { }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", "ServerName" => "server2", }, }, test => { "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "alpn-preferred-over-npn", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "sni-npn-preferred-over-alpn", server => { extra => { "ServerNameCallback" => "IgnoreMismatch", "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, server2 => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, client => { extra => { "ServerName" => "server2", "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, test => { "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef, "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar", "ExpectedServerName" => "server2", }, }, { name => "npn-simple-resumption", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "npn-server-switch-resumption", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar,foo", }, }, resume_server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "baz,foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "baz", }, }, { name => "npn-client-switch-resumption", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar,baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,baz", }, }, resume_client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar,baz", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "bar", }, }, { name => "npn-client-first-pref-on-mismatch-resumption", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, resume_server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo,bar", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "foo", }, }, { name => "npn-no-server-support-resumption", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, resume_server => { }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "npn-no-client-support-resumption", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, client => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "foo", }, }, resume_client => { }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "alpn-preferred-over-npn-resumption", server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, resume_server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "NPNProtocols" => "baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "NPNProtocols" => "bar,baz", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => "foo", "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => undef, }, }, { name => "npn-used-if-alpn-not-supported-resumption", server => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "NPNProtocols" => "bar", }, }, resume_server => { extra => { "NPNProtocols" => "baz", }, }, client => { extra => { "ALPNProtocols" => "foo", "NPNProtocols" => "bar,baz", }, }, test => { "HandshakeMode" => "Resume", "ResumptionExpected" => "Yes", "ExpectedALPNProtocol" => undef, "ExpectedNPNProtocol" => "baz", }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/01-simple.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000221713176625662017764 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## SSL test configurations package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "default", server => { }, client => { }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, { name => "Server signature algorithms bug", # Should have no effect as we aren't doing client auth server => { "ClientSignatureAlgorithms" => "ECDSA+SHA256" }, client => { "SignatureAlgorithms" => "RSA+SHA256" }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "Success" }, }, { name => "verify-cert", server => { }, client => { # Don't set up the client root file. "VerifyCAFile" => undef, }, test => { "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail", "ExpectedClientAlert" => "UnknownCA", }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/16-certstatus.conf0000644000000000000000000000000013176625662020261 0ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl-tests/16-dtls-certstatus.conf.in0000644000000000000000000000177613176625662021657 0ustar rootroot# -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Test DTLS CertStatus messages use strict; use warnings; package ssltests; our @tests = ( { name => "certstatus-good", server => { extra => { "CertStatus" => "GoodResponse", }, }, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "ExpectedResult" => "Success" } }, { name => "certstatus-bad", server => { extra => { "CertStatus" => "BadResponse", }, }, client => {}, test => { "Method" => "DTLS", "ExpectedResult" => "ClientFail" } }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/test/crltest.c0000644000000000000000000003514113176625661014665 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "../e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "testutil.h" #define PARAM_TIME 1474934400 /* Sep 27th, 2016 */ static const char *kCRLTestRoot[] = { "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n", "MIIDbzCCAlegAwIBAgIJAODri7v0dDUFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAME4xCzAJBgNV\n", "BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQHDA1Nb3VudGFpbiBW\n", "aWV3MRIwEAYDVQQKDAlCb3JpbmdTU0wwHhcNMTYwOTI2MTUwNjI2WhcNMjYwOTI0\n", "MTUwNjI2WjBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQG\n", "A1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJQm9yaW5nU1NMMIIBIjANBgkq\n", "hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3B\n", "S/dUBpbrzd1aeFzNlI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+\n", "5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWp\n", "uRqO6rctN9qUoMlTIAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n\n", "8H922qmvPNA9idmX9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbL\n", "P2o9orxGx7aCtnnBZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABo1Aw\n", "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUWPt3N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUWPt3\n", "N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n", "AQEAORu6M0MOwXy+3VEBwNilfTxyqDfruQsc1jA4PT8Oe8zora1WxE1JB4q2FJOz\n", "EAuM3H/NXvEnBuN+ITvKZAJUfm4NKX97qmjMJwLKWe1gVv+VQTr63aR7mgWJReQN\n", "XdMztlVeZs2dppV6uEg3ia1X0G7LARxGpA9ETbMyCpb39XxlYuTClcbA5ftDN99B\n", "3Xg9KNdd++Ew22O3HWRDvdDpTO/JkzQfzi3sYwUtzMEonENhczJhGf7bQMmvL/w5\n", "24Wxj4Z7KzzWIHsNqE/RIs6RV3fcW61j/mRgW2XyoWnMVeBzvcJr9NXp4VQYmFPw\n", "amd8GKMZQvP0ufGnUn7D7uartA==\n", "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n", NULL }; static const char *kCRLTestLeaf[] = { "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n", "MIIDkDCCAnigAwIBAgICEAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\n", "EzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDU1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcxEjAQ\n", "BgNVBAoMCUJvcmluZ1NTTDAeFw0xNjA5MjYxNTA4MzFaFw0xNzA5MjYxNTA4MzFa\n", "MEsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlC\n", "b3JpbmdTU0wxEzARBgNVBAMMCmJvcmluZy5zc2wwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA\n", "A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc5v1S1M0W+QWM+raWfO0LH8uvqEwuJQgODqMaGnSlWUx9\n", "8iQcnWfjyPja3lWg9K62hSOFDuSyEkysKHDxijz5R93CfLcfnVXjWQDJe7EJTTDP\n", "ozEvxN6RjAeYv7CF000euYr3QT5iyBjg76+bon1p0jHZBJeNPP1KqGYgyxp+hzpx\n", "e0gZmTlGAXd8JQK4v8kpdYwD6PPifFL/jpmQpqOtQmH/6zcLjY4ojmqpEdBqIKIX\n", "+saA29hMq0+NK3K+wgg31RU+cVWxu3tLOIiesETkeDgArjWRS1Vkzbi4v9SJxtNu\n", "OZuAxWiynRJw3JwH/OFHYZIvQqz68ZBoj96cepjPAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQC\n", "MAAwLAYJYIZIAYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRl\n", "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTGn0OVVh/aoYt0bvEKG+PIERqnDzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRY+3c3\n", "lxn8JG+5tuuSp8GcCqGr3jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAd2nM8gCQN2Dc8QJw\n", "XSZXyuI3DBGGCHcay/3iXu0JvTC3EiQo8J6Djv7WLI0N5KH8mkm40u89fJAB2lLZ\n", "ShuHVtcC182bOKnePgwp9CNwQ21p0rDEu/P3X46ZvFgdxx82E9xLa0tBB8PiPDWh\n", "lV16jbaKTgX5AZqjnsyjR5o9/mbZVupZJXx5Syq+XA8qiJfstSYJs4KyKK9UOjql\n", "ICkJVKpi2ahDBqX4MOH4SLfzVk8pqSpviS6yaA1RXqjpkxiN45WWaXDldVHMSkhC\n", "5CNXsXi4b1nAntu89crwSLA3rEwzCWeYj+BX7e1T9rr3oJdwOU/2KQtW1js1yQUG\n", "tjJMFw==\n", "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n", NULL }; static const char *kBasicCRL[] = { "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n", "MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n", "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n", "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV\n", "HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LN\n", "ZEAc+a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWo\n", "eOkq0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4os\n", "dsAReBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vv\n", "diyu0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho\n", "/vBbhl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw==\n", "-----END X509 CRL-----\n", NULL }; static const char *kRevokedCRL[] = { "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n", "MIIBvjCBpwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n", "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n", "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyNDRaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEyNDRaMBUwEwICEAAX\n", "DTE2MDkyNjE1MTIyNlqgDjAMMAoGA1UdFAQDAgECMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB\n", "AQCUGaM4DcWzlQKrcZvI8TMeR8BpsvQeo5BoI/XZu2a8h//PyRyMwYeaOM+3zl0d\n", "sjgCT8b3C1FPgT+P2Lkowv7rJ+FHJRNQkogr+RuqCSPTq65ha4WKlRGWkMFybzVH\n", "NloxC+aU3lgp/NlX9yUtfqYmJek1CDrOOGPrAEAwj1l/BUeYKNGqfBWYJQtPJu+5\n", "OaSvIYGpETCZJscUWODmLEb/O3DM438vLvxonwGqXqS0KX37+CHpUlyhnSovxXxp\n", "Pz4aF+L7OtczxL0GYtD2fR9B7TDMqsNmHXgQrixvvOY7MUdLGbd4RfJL3yA53hyO\n", "xzfKY2TzxLiOmctG0hXFkH5J\n", "-----END X509 CRL-----\n", NULL }; static const char *kBadIssuerCRL[] = { "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n", "MIIBwjCBqwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n", "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzEWMBQGA1UECgwN\n", "Tm90IEJvcmluZ1NTTBcNMTYwOTI2MTUxMjQ0WhcNMTYxMDI2MTUxMjQ0WjAVMBMC\n", "AhAAFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyMjZaoA4wDDAKBgNVHRQEAwIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF\n", "AAOCAQEAlBmjOA3Fs5UCq3GbyPEzHkfAabL0HqOQaCP12btmvIf/z8kcjMGHmjjP\n", "t85dHbI4Ak/G9wtRT4E/j9i5KML+6yfhRyUTUJKIK/kbqgkj06uuYWuFipURlpDB\n", "cm81RzZaMQvmlN5YKfzZV/clLX6mJiXpNQg6zjhj6wBAMI9ZfwVHmCjRqnwVmCUL\n", "TybvuTmkryGBqREwmSbHFFjg5ixG/ztwzON/Ly78aJ8Bql6ktCl9+/gh6VJcoZ0q\n", "L8V8aT8+Ghfi+zrXM8S9BmLQ9n0fQe0wzKrDZh14EK4sb7zmOzFHSxm3eEXyS98g\n", "Od4cjsc3ymNk88S4jpnLRtIVxZB+SQ==\n", "-----END X509 CRL-----\n", NULL }; /* * This is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution point * extension. */ static const char *kKnownCriticalCRL[] = { "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n", "MIIBujCBowIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n", "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n", "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCEwHzAKBgNV\n", "HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAA+3\n", "i+5e5Ub8sccfgOBs6WVJFI9c8gvJjrJ8/dYfFIAuCyeocs7DFXn1n13CRZ+URR/Q\n", "mVWgU28+xeusuSPYFpd9cyYTcVyNUGNTI3lwgcE/yVjPaOmzSZKdPakApRxtpKKQ\n", "NN/56aQz3bnT/ZSHQNciRB8U6jiD9V30t0w+FDTpGaG+7bzzUH3UVF9xf9Ctp60A\n", "3mfLe0scas7owSt4AEFuj2SPvcE7yvdOXbu+IEv21cEJUVExJAbhvIweHXh6yRW+\n", "7VVeiNzdIjkZjyTmAzoXGha4+wbxXyBRbfH+XWcO/H+8nwyG8Gktdu2QB9S9nnIp\n", "o/1TpfOMSGhMyMoyPrk=\n", "-----END X509 CRL-----\n", NULL }; /* * kUnknownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with an unknown critical extension. */ static const char *kUnknownCriticalCRL[] = { "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n", "MIIBvDCBpQIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n", "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n", "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCMwITAKBgNV\n", "HRQEAwIBATATBgwqhkiG9xIEAYS3CQABAf8EADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA\n", "GvBP0xqL509InMj/3493YVRV+ldTpBv5uTD6jewzf5XdaxEQ/VjTNe5zKnxbpAib\n", "Kf7cwX0PMSkZjx7k7kKdDlEucwVvDoqC+O9aJcqVmM6GDyNb9xENxd0XCXja6MZC\n", "yVgP4AwLauB2vSiEprYJyI1APph3iAEeDm60lTXX/wBM/tupQDDujKh2GPyvBRfJ\n", "+wEDwGg3ICwvu4gO4zeC5qnFR+bpL9t5tOMAQnVZ0NWv+k7mkd2LbHdD44dxrfXC\n", "nhtfERx99SDmC/jtUAJrGhtCO8acr7exCeYcduN7KKCm91OeCJKK6OzWst0Og1DB\n", "kwzzU2rL3G65CrZ7H0SZsQ==\n", "-----END X509 CRL-----\n", NULL }; /* * kUnknownCriticalCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution * point extension followed by an unknown critical extension */ static const char *kUnknownCriticalCRL2[] = { "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n", "MIIBzzCBuAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n", "CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ\n", "Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoDYwNDAKBgNV\n", "HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wEwYMKoZIhvcSBAGEtwkAAQH/BAAw\n", "DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBACTcpQC8jXL12JN5YzOcQ64ubQIe0XxRAd30p7qB\n", "BTXGpgqBjrjxRfLms7EBYodEXB2oXMsDq3km0vT1MfYdsDD05S+SQ9CDsq/pUfaC\n", "E2WNI5p8WircRnroYvbN2vkjlRbMd1+yNITohXYXCJwjEOAWOx3XIM10bwPYBv4R\n", "rDobuLHoMgL3yHgMHmAkP7YpkBucNqeBV8cCdeAZLuhXFWi6yfr3r/X18yWbC/r2\n", "2xXdkrSqXLFo7ToyP8YKTgiXpya4x6m53biEYwa2ULlas0igL6DK7wjYZX95Uy7H\n", "GKljn9weIYiMPV/BzGymwfv2EW0preLwtyJNJPaxbdin6Jc=\n", "-----END X509 CRL-----\n", NULL }; /* * Glue an array of strings together. Return a BIO and put the string * into |*out| so we can free it. */ static BIO *glue(const char **pem, char **out) { char *dest; int i; size_t s = 0; /* Glue the strings together. */ for (i = 0; pem[i] != NULL; ++i) s += strlen(pem[i]); dest = *out = OPENSSL_malloc(s + 1); if (dest == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; pem[i] != NULL; ++i) dest += strlen(strcpy(dest, pem[i])); return BIO_new_mem_buf(*out, s); } /* * Create a CRL from an array of strings. */ static X509_CRL *CRL_from_strings(const char **pem) { char *p; BIO *b = glue(pem, &p); X509_CRL *crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); OPENSSL_free(p); BIO_free(b); return crl; } /* * Create an X509 from an array of strings. */ static X509 *X509_from_strings(const char **pem) { char *p; BIO *b = glue(pem, &p); X509 *x = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); OPENSSL_free(p); BIO_free(b); return x; } /* * Verify |leaf| certificate (chained up to |root|). |crls| if * not NULL, is a list of CRLs to include in the verification. It is * also free'd before returning, which is kinda yucky but convenient. * Returns a value from X509_V_ERR_xxx or X509_V_OK. */ static int verify(X509 *leaf, X509 *root, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, unsigned long flags) { X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new(); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); STACK_OF(X509) *roots = sk_X509_new_null(); int status = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; if (ctx == NULL || store == NULL || param == NULL || roots == NULL) goto err; /* Create a stack; upref the cert because we free it below. */ X509_up_ref(root); if (!sk_X509_push(roots, root)) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL)) goto err; X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, roots); X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, PARAM_TIME); if (X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(param) != PARAM_TIME) { fprintf(stderr, "set_time/get_time mismatch.\n"); goto err; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, 16); if (flags) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, flags); X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(ctx, param); ERR_clear_error(); status = X509_verify_cert(ctx) == 1 ? X509_V_OK : X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); err: sk_X509_pop_free(roots, X509_free); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); X509_STORE_free(store); return status; } /* * Create a stack of CRL's. Upref each one because we call pop_free on * the stack and need to keep the CRL's around until the test exits. * Yes this crashes on malloc failure; it forces us to debug. */ static STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *make_CRL_stack(X509_CRL *x1, X509_CRL *x2) { STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x1); X509_CRL_up_ref(x1); if (x2 != NULL) { sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x2); X509_CRL_up_ref(x2); } return sk; } static int test_crl() { X509 *root = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestRoot); X509 *leaf = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestLeaf); X509_CRL *basic_crl = CRL_from_strings(kBasicCRL); X509_CRL *revoked_crl = CRL_from_strings(kRevokedCRL); X509_CRL *bad_issuer_crl = CRL_from_strings(kBadIssuerCRL); X509_CRL *known_critical_crl = CRL_from_strings(kKnownCriticalCRL); X509_CRL *unknown_critical_crl = CRL_from_strings(kUnknownCriticalCRL); X509_CRL *unknown_critical_crl2 = CRL_from_strings(kUnknownCriticalCRL2); int status = 0; if (root == NULL || leaf == NULL || basic_crl == NULL || revoked_crl == NULL || bad_issuer_crl == NULL || known_critical_crl == NULL || unknown_critical_crl == NULL || unknown_critical_crl2 == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse certificates and CRLs.\n"); goto err; } if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(basic_crl, NULL), X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_OK) { fprintf(stderr, "Cert with CRL didn't verify.\n"); goto err; } if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(basic_crl, revoked_crl), X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED) { fprintf(stderr, "Revoked CRL wasn't checked.\n"); goto err; } if (verify(leaf, root, NULL, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) { fprintf(stderr, "CRLs were not required.\n"); goto err; } if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(bad_issuer_crl, NULL), X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad CRL issuer was unnoticed.\n"); goto err; } if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(known_critical_crl, NULL), X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_OK) { fprintf(stderr, "CRL with known critical extension was rejected.\n"); goto err; } if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(unknown_critical_crl, NULL), X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION) { fprintf(stderr, "CRL with unknown critical extension was accepted.\n"); goto err; } if (verify(leaf, root, make_CRL_stack(unknown_critical_crl2, NULL), X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) != X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION) { fprintf(stderr, "CRL with unknown critical extension (2) was accepted.\n"); goto err; } status = 1; err: X509_free(root); X509_free(leaf); X509_CRL_free(basic_crl); X509_CRL_free(revoked_crl); X509_CRL_free(bad_issuer_crl); X509_CRL_free(known_critical_crl); X509_CRL_free(unknown_critical_crl); X509_CRL_free(unknown_critical_crl2); return status; } int main() { ADD_TEST(test_crl); return run_tests("crltest"); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/asynciotest.c0000644000000000000000000002533513176625661015556 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include #include #include #include #include "../ssl/packet_locl.h" #include "ssltestlib.h" /* Should we fragment records or not? 0 = no, !0 = yes*/ static int fragment = 0; static int async_new(BIO *bi); static int async_free(BIO *a); static int async_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl); static int async_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl); static long async_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static int async_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size); static int async_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str); /* Choose a sufficiently large type likely to be unused for this custom BIO */ # define BIO_TYPE_ASYNC_FILTER (0x80 | BIO_TYPE_FILTER) static BIO_METHOD *methods_async = NULL; struct async_ctrs { unsigned int rctr; unsigned int wctr; }; static const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_async_filter() { if (methods_async == NULL) { methods_async = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_ASYNC_FILTER, "Async filter"); if ( methods_async == NULL || !BIO_meth_set_write(methods_async, async_write) || !BIO_meth_set_read(methods_async, async_read) || !BIO_meth_set_puts(methods_async, async_puts) || !BIO_meth_set_gets(methods_async, async_gets) || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(methods_async, async_ctrl) || !BIO_meth_set_create(methods_async, async_new) || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(methods_async, async_free)) return NULL; } return methods_async; } static int async_new(BIO *bio) { struct async_ctrs *ctrs; ctrs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(struct async_ctrs)); if (ctrs == NULL) return 0; BIO_set_data(bio, ctrs); BIO_set_init(bio, 1); return 1; } static int async_free(BIO *bio) { struct async_ctrs *ctrs; if (bio == NULL) return 0; ctrs = BIO_get_data(bio); OPENSSL_free(ctrs); BIO_set_data(bio, NULL); BIO_set_init(bio, 0); return 1; } static int async_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl) { struct async_ctrs *ctrs; int ret = -1; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); if (outl <= 0) return 0; if (next == NULL) return 0; ctrs = BIO_get_data(bio); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); if (ctrs->rctr > 0) { ret = BIO_read(next, out, 1); if (ret <= 0 && BIO_should_read(next)) BIO_set_retry_read(bio); ctrs->rctr = 0; } else { ctrs->rctr++; BIO_set_retry_read(bio); } return ret; } #define MIN_RECORD_LEN 6 #define CONTENTTYPEPOS 0 #define VERSIONHIPOS 1 #define VERSIONLOPOS 2 #define DATAPOS 5 static int async_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) { struct async_ctrs *ctrs; int ret = -1; size_t written = 0; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); if (inl <= 0) return 0; if (next == NULL) return 0; ctrs = BIO_get_data(bio); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); if (ctrs->wctr > 0) { ctrs->wctr = 0; if (fragment) { PACKET pkt; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (const unsigned char *)in, inl)) abort(); while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) { PACKET payload; unsigned int contenttype, versionhi, versionlo, data; if ( !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &contenttype) || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versionhi) || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versionlo) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &payload)) abort(); /* Pretend we wrote out the record header */ written += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; while (PACKET_get_1(&payload, &data)) { /* Create a new one byte long record for each byte in the * record in the input buffer */ char smallrec[MIN_RECORD_LEN] = { 0, /* Content type */ 0, /* Version hi */ 0, /* Version lo */ 0, /* Length hi */ 1, /* Length lo */ 0 /* Data */ }; smallrec[CONTENTTYPEPOS] = contenttype; smallrec[VERSIONHIPOS] = versionhi; smallrec[VERSIONLOPOS] = versionlo; smallrec[DATAPOS] = data; ret = BIO_write(next, smallrec, MIN_RECORD_LEN); if (ret <= 0) abort(); written++; } /* * We can't fragment anything after the CCS, otherwise we * get a bad record MAC */ if (contenttype == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { fragment = 0; break; } } } /* Write any data we have left after fragmenting */ ret = 0; if ((int)written < inl) { ret = BIO_write(next, in + written , inl - written); } if (ret <= 0 && BIO_should_write(next)) BIO_set_retry_write(bio); else ret += written; } else { ctrs->wctr++; BIO_set_retry_write(bio); } return ret; } static long async_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); if (next == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static int async_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size) { /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */ return -1; } static int async_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str) { return async_write(bio, str, strlen(str)); } #define MAX_ATTEMPTS 100 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { SSL_CTX *serverctx = NULL, *clientctx = NULL; SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL; BIO *s_to_c_fbio = NULL, *c_to_s_fbio = NULL; int test, err = 1, ret; size_t i, j; const char testdata[] = "Test data"; char buf[sizeof(testdata)]; CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); if (argc != 3) { printf("Invalid argument count\n"); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), &serverctx, &clientctx, argv[1], argv[2])) { printf("Failed to create SSL_CTX pair\n"); goto end; } /* * We do 2 test runs. The first time around we just do a normal handshake * with lots of async io going on. The second time around we also break up * all records so that the content is only one byte length (up until the * CCS) */ for (test = 1; test < 3; test++) { if (test == 2) fragment = 1; s_to_c_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_async_filter()); c_to_s_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_async_filter()); if (s_to_c_fbio == NULL || c_to_s_fbio == NULL) { printf("Failed to create filter BIOs\n"); BIO_free(s_to_c_fbio); BIO_free(c_to_s_fbio); goto end; } /* BIOs get freed on error */ if (!create_ssl_objects(serverctx, clientctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, s_to_c_fbio, c_to_s_fbio)) { printf("Test %d failed: Create SSL objects failed\n", test); goto end; } if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl)) { printf("Test %d failed: Create SSL connection failed\n", test); goto end; } /* * Send and receive some test data. Do the whole thing twice to ensure * we hit at least one async event in both reading and writing */ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { int len; /* * Write some test data. It should never take more than 2 attempts * (the first one might be a retryable fail). */ for (ret = -1, i = 0, len = 0; len != sizeof(testdata) && i < 2; i++) { ret = SSL_write(clientssl, testdata + len, sizeof(testdata) - len); if (ret > 0) { len += ret; } else { int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(clientssl, ret); if (ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL || ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SSL) { printf("Test %d failed: Failed to write app data\n", test); err = -1; goto end; } } } if (len != sizeof(testdata)) { err = -1; printf("Test %d failed: Failed to write all app data\n", test); goto end; } /* * Now read the test data. It may take more attemps here because * it could fail once for each byte read, including all overhead * bytes from the record header/padding etc. */ for (ret = -1, i = 0, len = 0; len != sizeof(testdata) && i < MAX_ATTEMPTS; i++) { ret = SSL_read(serverssl, buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len); if (ret > 0) { len += ret; } else { int ssl_error = SSL_get_error(serverssl, ret); if (ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL || ssl_error == SSL_ERROR_SSL) { printf("Test %d failed: Failed to read app data\n", test); err = -1; goto end; } } } if (len != sizeof(testdata) || memcmp(buf, testdata, sizeof(testdata)) != 0) { err = -1; printf("Test %d failed: Unexpected app data received\n", test); goto end; } } /* Also frees the BIOs */ SSL_free(clientssl); SSL_free(serverssl); clientssl = serverssl = NULL; } printf("Test success\n"); err = 0; end: if (err) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); SSL_free(clientssl); SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_CTX_free(clientctx); SSL_CTX_free(serverctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr); # endif return err; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/testsid.pem0000644000000000000000000000452013176625662015221 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN SSL SESSION PARAMETERS----- MIIGpAIBAQICAwMEAsAwBCABkpk0q01VEnPtcNWLtYg1xZJLreP0C1r4wPOakiLu 8AQwi0opOLa+Omt26PqbLUcmI1H7F/n7qRy6TaL9Lxf2/ZBUDgRG3aSuSejO+gki F2U9oQYCBFR6XVaiBAICASyjggVjMIIFXzCCBEegAwIBAgIQNdDRF5hINFi7kAeK 0fP5FjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBBMQswCQYDVQQGEwJGUjESMBAGA1UEChMJR0FO REkgU0FTMR4wHAYDVQQDExVHYW5kaSBTdGFuZGFyZCBTU0wgQ0EwHhcNMTMxMjMx MDAwMDAwWhcNMTQxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjBYMSEwHwYDVQQLExhEb21haW4gQ29udHJv bCBWYWxpZGF0ZWQxGzAZBgNVBAsTEkdhbmRpIFN0YW5kYXJkIFNTTDEWMBQGA1UE AxMNZGIuZGViaWFuLm9yZzCCAaIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggGPADCCAYoCggGB AN/7DlZZKR5SELzF7rdn6LWxuebpVyFu1eXltzxi+Mig9cR0ZZD3hp0JcUresABO zE66AuhGtcFus/J/88CGM2r39u3n5ac5O/4Ypp57997YJRV725dL4oX75Vpc4p8j EI/LyIFteZN22ziv9zW7qCKKahnq1tuqDkV+84BEARpVdIaaWmn/KqsEgxeNKomy OLvn96IVCTAF78rudPmJHfSCl++NFmg0yu7DPyuXf8YJfA6j8/kFueanK2B1y/ww 8MSbL3iAdgLwVtRJkwRYyKn8p5+ybwzX9L36GWgYs9OXUn8x494T5GjbGQVxUNt7 qJnRtiUwYVoiOARrv1EI0Cq4ANXVaLDckc5y0a2PY3c4NWVlKGYbdxdQC1n6nH93 mWDIr6vu7JX3CqDDr8FBlNVVtiBiv0q/eiVb9dzBzOntt3hA6GOJFAuwDDf7g7nq Gq8qqcr7EIyVB8ytQ5XMgtLCpmJkLzIdRYfdsQMa7cAbl0THAwwXigcotFA0aYIP BQIDAQABo4IBujCCAbYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUtqj/oqgv0KbNS7Fo8+dQEDGneSEw HQYDVR0OBBYEFDJGWXznCu/+qyFLCmUI4cmXy1DCMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAM BgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjBgBgNV HSAEWTBXMEsGCysGAQQBsjEBAgIaMDwwOgYIKwYBBQUHAgEWLmh0dHA6Ly93d3cu Z2FuZGkubmV0L2NvbnRyYWN0cy9mci9zc2wvY3BzL3BkZi8wCAYGZ4EMAQIBMDwG A1UdHwQ1MDMwMaAvoC2GK2h0dHA6Ly9jcmwuZ2FuZGkubmV0L0dhbmRpU3RhbmRh cmRTU0xDQS5jcmwwagYIKwYBBQUHAQEEXjBcMDcGCCsGAQUFBzAChitodHRwOi8v Y3J0LmdhbmRpLm5ldC9HYW5kaVN0YW5kYXJkU1NMQ0EuY3J0MCEGCCsGAQUFBzAB hhVodHRwOi8vb2NzcC5nYW5kaS5uZXQwKwYDVR0RBCQwIoINZGIuZGViaWFuLm9y Z4IRd3d3LmRiLmRlYmlhbi5vcmcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAK+ix7EQNPgU qDx46gAPifcm6b2FvXq+gtlB9h6UaDDO7fxDzmoU5V4WtdBM5uvIfOmpeNuCxPaj 18cUlj9PPjL3eK43UCVu6w5hN3p2/2BPvFjQRhtBcIcEWsMal1DCtS/vCBkQt1lS gd4/xiMfK4cQYtwRu47gB0HuM2lecYHA42EC5hqupY/2tHo54AdyU46TxgUQcm0e icLtYuTjIYQWdUgM92heDw8caey5GKL2/TmYM2iWy/csFLm4tJAwPMtvy1KWdJQE iqYIuI9Lb4/xOyjSwVNLIJmbEzE6Sds9sjxqEcU4CconTVJazvHZtnBRV8GiRYKa d/xgQ6J+/Z2kAgQAqQQCAgEsqoHDBIHAPGxCacLRMYb3hbL3lRqQIfH3xoufIwKn zOAIyjxH7GPZpI87/e93AF1uw6eyy+aWJM6G/71E8Ln1iQtZjrGkGQCjEcIrUhEk Bgg93A28zly2zu2aBwi2yT4bUcyHxE3P3Q4R8xkQxrdWSMfCjCy9HKUViOENKET6 avKXF7lDT1iG/x8RtTHtFGYX4YcFVhdEqcqnZ7tw5sqkHG2D0gLzO2SETF9KPHCq zAHQtw5r4Dgl+a+BGLczh6as4yIH+xH+ -----END SSL SESSION PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/v3ext.c0000644000000000000000000000170513176625662014256 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include int main(int ac, char **av) { X509 *x = NULL; BIO *b = NULL; long pathlen; int ret = 1; if (ac != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage error\n"); goto end; } b = BIO_new_file(av[1], "r"); if (b == NULL) goto end; x = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (x == NULL) goto end; pathlen = X509_get_pathlen(x); if (pathlen == 6) ret = 0; end: ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); BIO_free(b); X509_free(x); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/P1ss.cnf0000644000000000000000000000175013176625661014356 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = keySS.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no default_md = sha256 [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = AU countryName_value = AU organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = Dodgy Brothers 0.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 0.commonName_value = Brother 1 1.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 1.commonName_value = Brother 2 2.commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) 2.commonName_value = Proxy 1 [ v3_proxy ] basicConstraints=CA:FALSE subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB openssl-1.1.0g/test/README0000644000000000000000000000552213176625661013721 0ustar rootrootHow to add recipes ================== For any test that you want to perform, you write a script located in test/recipes/, named {nn}-test_{name}.t, where {nn} is a two digit number and {name} is a unique name of your choice. Please note that if a test involves a new testing executable, you will need to do some additions in test/Makefile. More on this later. Naming conventions ================= A test executable is named test/{name}test.c A test recipe is named test/recipes/{nn}-test_{name}.t, where {nn} is a two digit number and {name} is a unique name of your choice. The number {nn} is (somewhat loosely) grouped as follows: 00-04 sanity, internal and essential API tests 05-09 individual symmetric cipher algorithms 10-14 math (bignum) 15-19 individual asymmetric cipher algorithms 20-24 openssl commands (some otherwise not tested) 25-29 certificate forms, generation and verification 30-35 engine and evp 60-79 APIs 70 PACKET layer 80-89 "larger" protocols (CA, CMS, OCSP, SSL, TSA) 90-99 misc A recipe that just runs a test executable ========================================= A script that just runs a program looks like this: #! /usr/bin/perl use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_{name}", "{name}test", "{name}"); {name} is the unique name you have chosen for your test. The second argument to `simple_test' is the test executable, and `simple_test' expects it to be located in test/ For documentation on OpenSSL::Test::Simple, do `perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm'. A recipe that runs a more complex test ====================================== For more complex tests, you will need to read up on Test::More and OpenSSL::Test. Test::More is normally preinstalled, do `man Test::More' for documentation. For OpenSSL::Test, do `perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm'. A script to start from could be this: #! /usr/bin/perl use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test; setup("test_{name}"); plan tests => 2; # The number of tests being performed ok(test1, "test1"); ok(test2, "test1"); sub test1 { # test feature 1 } sub test2 { # test feature 2 } Changes to test/Makefile ======================== Whenever a new test involves a new test executable you need to do the following (at all times, replace {NAME} and {name} with the name of your test): * among the variables for test executables at the beginning, add a line like this: {NAME}TEST= {name}test * add `$({NAME}TEST)$(EXE_EXT)' to the assignment of EXE: * add `$({NAME}TEST).o' to the assignment of OBJ: * add `$({NAME}TEST).c' to the assignment of SRC: * add the following lines for building the executable: $({NAME}TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $({NAME}TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) @target=$({NAME}TEST); $(BUILD_CMD) openssl-1.1.0g/test/rc2test.c0000644000000000000000000000556513176625661014602 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This has been a quickly hacked 'ideatest.c'. When I add tests for other * RC2 modes, more of the code will be uncommented. */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No RC2 support\n"); return (0); } #else # include static unsigned char RC2key[4][16] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F}, }; static unsigned char RC2plain[4][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, }; static unsigned char RC2cipher[4][8] = { {0x1C, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x83, 0x8D, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xB7}, {0x21, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x78, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0xC0, 0x74}, {0x13, 0xDB, 0x35, 0x17, 0xD3, 0x21, 0x86, 0x9E}, {0x50, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x62, 0xBD, 0x75, 0x7F, 0x31}, }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, n, err = 0; RC2_KEY key; unsigned char buf[8], buf2[8]; for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) { RC2_set_key(&key, 16, &(RC2key[n][0]), 0 /* or 1024 */ ); RC2_ecb_encrypt(&(RC2plain[n][0]), buf, &key, RC2_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(&(RC2cipher[n][0]), buf, 8) != 0) { printf("ecb rc2 error encrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", buf[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", RC2cipher[n][i]); err = 20; printf("\n"); } RC2_ecb_encrypt(buf, buf2, &key, RC2_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(&(RC2plain[n][0]), buf2, 8) != 0) { printf("ecb RC2 error decrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", buf[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", RC2plain[n][i]); printf("\n"); err = 3; } } if (err == 0) printf("ecb RC2 ok\n"); EXIT(err); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl_test.tmpl0000644000000000000000000001051013176625662015571 0ustar rootroot[{-$testname-}] ssl_conf = {-$testname-}-ssl [{-$testname-}-ssl] server = {-$testname-}-server client = {-$testname-}-client{- # The following sections are optional. $OUT = ""; if (%server2) { $OUT .= "\nserver2 = $testname-server2"; } elsif ($reuse_server2) { $OUT .= "\nserver2 = $testname-server"; } if (%resume_server) { $OUT .= "\nresume-server = $testname-resume-server"; } elsif ($reuse_resume_server) { $OUT .= "\nresume-server = $testname-server"; } if (%resume_client) { $OUT .= "\nresume-client = $testname-resume-client"; } elsif ($reuse_resume_client) { $OUT .= "\nresume-client = $testname-client"; } -} [{-$testname-}-server] {- foreach my $key (sort keys %server) { # Emitted in the test section. next if ($key eq "extra"); $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server{$key}\n} if defined $server{$key}; } if (%server2) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-server2]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %server2) { next if ($key eq "extra"); $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server2{$key}\n} if defined $server2{$key}; } } if (%resume_server) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-server]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %resume_server) { next if ($key eq "extra"); $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_server{$key}\n} if defined $resume_server{$key}; } } -} [{-$testname-}-client] {- foreach my $key (sort keys %client) { next if ($key eq "extra"); $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$client{$key}\n} if defined $client{$key}; } if (%resume_client) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-client]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %resume_client) { next if ($key eq "extra"); $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_client{$key}\n} if defined $resume_client{$key}; } } -} [test-{-$idx-}] {- foreach my $key (sort keys %test) { $OUT .= qq{$key} ." = " . qq{$test{$key}\n} if defined $test{$key}; } # The extra server/client configuration sections. if ($server{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "server = $testname-server-extra\n"; } if (%server2 && $server2{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "server2 = $testname-server2-extra\n"; } elsif ($reuse_server2 && $server{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "server2 = $testname-server-extra\n"; } if (%resume_server && $resume_server{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "resume-server = $testname-resume-server-extra\n"; } elsif ($reuse_resume_server && $server{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "resume-server = $testname-server-extra\n"; } if ($client{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "client = $testname-client-extra\n"; } if (%resume_client && $resume_client{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "resume-client = $testname-resume-client-extra\n"; } elsif ($reuse_resume_client && $client{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "resume-client = $testname-client-extra\n"; } if ($server{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-server-extra]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %{$server{"extra"}}) { $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server{"extra"}{$key}\n} if defined $server{"extra"}{$key}; } } if (%server2 && $server2{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-server2-extra]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %{$server2{"extra"}}) { $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$server2{"extra"}{$key}\n} if defined $server2{"extra"}{$key}; } } if (%resume_server && $resume_server{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-server-extra]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %{$resume_server{"extra"}}) { $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_server{"extra"}{$key}\n} if defined $resume_server{"extra"}{$key}; } } if ($client{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-client-extra]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %{$client{"extra"}}) { $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$client{"extra"}{$key}\n} if defined $client{"extra"}{$key}; } } if (%resume_client && $resume_client{"extra"}) { $OUT .= "\n[$testname-resume-client-extra]\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %{$resume_client{"extra"}}) { $OUT .= qq{$key} . " = " . qq{$resume_client{"extra"}{$key}\n} if defined $resume_client{"extra"}{$key}; } } -} openssl-1.1.0g/test/methtest.c0000644000000000000000000000315213176625661015037 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "meth.h" #include int main(argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { METHOD_CTX *top, *tmp1, *tmp2; top = METH_new(x509_lookup()); /* get a top level context */ if (top == NULL) goto err; tmp1 = METH_new(x509_by_file()); if (top == NULL) goto err; METH_arg(tmp1, METH_TYPE_FILE, "cafile1"); METH_arg(tmp1, METH_TYPE_FILE, "cafile2"); METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp1); tmp2 = METH_new(x509_by_dir()); METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/home/eay/.CAcerts"); METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/home/eay/SSLeay/certs"); METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/usr/local/ssl/certs"); METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp2); /*- tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir); METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts"); METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp); tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary); METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem"); METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp); */ METH_init(top); METH_control(tmp1, METH_CONTROL_DUMP, stdout); METH_control(tmp2, METH_CONTROL_DUMP, stdout); EXIT(0); err: ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); EXIT(1); return (0); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/run_tests.pl0000644000000000000000000000650013176625662015422 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; # Recognise VERBOSE and V which is common on other projects. BEGIN { $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE} = "yes" if $ENV{VERBOSE} || $ENV{V}; } use File::Spec::Functions qw/catdir catfile curdir abs2rel rel2abs/; use File::Basename; use if $^O ne "VMS", 'File::Glob' => qw/glob/; use Module::Load::Conditional qw(can_load); my $TAP_Harness = can_load(modules => { 'TAP::Harness' => undef }) ? 'TAP::Harness' : 'OpenSSL::TAP::Harness'; my $srctop = $ENV{SRCTOP} || $ENV{TOP}; my $bldtop = $ENV{BLDTOP} || $ENV{TOP}; my $recipesdir = catdir($srctop, "test", "recipes"); my $testlib = catdir($srctop, "test", "testlib"); my $utillib = catdir($srctop, "util"); my %tapargs = ( verbosity => $ENV{VERBOSE} || $ENV{V} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE} ? 1 : 0, lib => [ $testlib, $utillib ], switches => '-w', merge => 1 ); my @tests = ( "alltests" ); if (@ARGV) { @tests = @ARGV; } my $list_mode = scalar(grep /^list$/, @tests) != 0; if (grep /^(alltests|list)$/, @tests) { @tests = grep { basename($_) =~ /^[0-9][0-9]-[^\.]*\.t$/ } glob(catfile($recipesdir,"*.t")); } else { my @t = (); foreach (@tests) { push @t, grep { basename($_) =~ /^[0-9][0-9]-[^\.]*\.t$/ } glob(catfile($recipesdir,"*-$_.t")); } @tests = @t; } if ($list_mode) { @tests = map { $_ = basename($_); $_ =~ s/^[0-9][0-9]-//; $_ =~ s/\.t$//; $_ } @tests; print join("\n", @tests), "\n"; } else { @tests = map { abs2rel($_, rel2abs(curdir())); } @tests; my $harness = $TAP_Harness->new(\%tapargs); my $ret = $harness->runtests(sort @tests); # $ret->has_errors may be any number, not just 0 or 1. On VMS, numbers # from 2 and on are used as is as VMS statuses, which has severity encoded # in the lower 3 bits. 0 and 1, on the other hand, generate SUCCESS and # FAILURE, so for currect reporting on all platforms, we make sure the only # exit codes are 0 and 1. Double-bang is the trick to do so. exit !!$ret->has_errors if (ref($ret) eq "TAP::Parser::Aggregator"); # If this isn't a TAP::Parser::Aggregator, it's the pre-TAP test harness, # which simply dies at the end if any test failed, so we don't need to # bother with any exit code in that case. } # Fake TAP::Harness in case it's not loaded use Test::Harness; package OpenSSL::TAP::Harness; sub new { my $class = shift; my %args = %{ shift() }; return bless { %args }, $class; } sub runtests { my $self = shift; my @switches = (); if ($self->{switches}) { push @switches, $self->{switches}; } if ($self->{lib}) { foreach (@{$self->{lib}}) { my $l = $_; # It seems that $switches is getting interpreted with 'eval' or # something like that, and that we need to take care of backslashes # or they will disappear along the way. $l =~ s|\\|\\\\|g if $^O eq "MSWin32"; push @switches, "-I$l"; } } $Test::Harness::switches = join(' ', @switches); Test::Harness::runtests(@_); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/bioprinttest.c0000644000000000000000000002277613176625661015745 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include static int justprint = 0; static char *fpexpected[][5] = { /* 0 */ { "0.0000e+00", "0.0000", "0", "0.0000E+00", "0" }, /* 1 */ { "6.7000e-01", "0.6700", "0.67", "6.7000E-01", "0.67" }, /* 2 */ { "6.6667e-01", "0.6667", "0.6667", "6.6667E-01", "0.6667" }, /* 3 */ { "6.6667e-04", "0.0007", "0.0006667", "6.6667E-04", "0.0006667" }, /* 4 */ { "6.6667e-05", "0.0001", "6.667e-05", "6.6667E-05", "6.667E-05" }, /* 5 */ { "6.6667e+00", "6.6667", "6.667", "6.6667E+00", "6.667" }, /* 6 */ { "6.6667e+01", "66.6667", "66.67", "6.6667E+01", "66.67" }, /* 7 */ { "6.6667e+02", "666.6667", "666.7", "6.6667E+02", "666.7" }, /* 8 */ { "6.6667e+03", "6666.6667", "6667", "6.6667E+03", "6667" }, /* 9 */ { "6.6667e+04", "66666.6667", "6.667e+04", "6.6667E+04", "6.667E+04" }, /* 10 */ { "0.00000e+00", "0.00000", "0", "0.00000E+00", "0" }, /* 11 */ { "6.70000e-01", "0.67000", "0.67", "6.70000E-01", "0.67" }, /* 12 */ { "6.66667e-01", "0.66667", "0.66667", "6.66667E-01", "0.66667" }, /* 13 */ { "6.66667e-04", "0.00067", "0.00066667", "6.66667E-04", "0.00066667" }, /* 14 */ { "6.66667e-05", "0.00007", "6.6667e-05", "6.66667E-05", "6.6667E-05" }, /* 15 */ { "6.66667e+00", "6.66667", "6.6667", "6.66667E+00", "6.6667" }, /* 16 */ { "6.66667e+01", "66.66667", "66.667", "6.66667E+01", "66.667" }, /* 17 */ { "6.66667e+02", "666.66667", "666.67", "6.66667E+02", "666.67" }, /* 18 */ { "6.66667e+03", "6666.66667", "6666.7", "6.66667E+03", "6666.7" }, /* 19 */ { "6.66667e+04", "66666.66667", "66667", "6.66667E+04", "66667" }, /* 20 */ { " 0.0000e+00", " 0.0000", " 0", " 0.0000E+00", " 0" }, /* 21 */ { " 6.7000e-01", " 0.6700", " 0.67", " 6.7000E-01", " 0.67" }, /* 22 */ { " 6.6667e-01", " 0.6667", " 0.6667", " 6.6667E-01", " 0.6667" }, /* 23 */ { " 6.6667e-04", " 0.0007", " 0.0006667", " 6.6667E-04", " 0.0006667" }, /* 24 */ { " 6.6667e-05", " 0.0001", " 6.667e-05", " 6.6667E-05", " 6.667E-05" }, /* 25 */ { " 6.6667e+00", " 6.6667", " 6.667", " 6.6667E+00", " 6.667" }, /* 26 */ { " 6.6667e+01", " 66.6667", " 66.67", " 6.6667E+01", " 66.67" }, /* 27 */ { " 6.6667e+02", " 666.6667", " 666.7", " 6.6667E+02", " 666.7" }, /* 28 */ { " 6.6667e+03", " 6666.6667", " 6667", " 6.6667E+03", " 6667" }, /* 29 */ { " 6.6667e+04", " 66666.6667", " 6.667e+04", " 6.6667E+04", " 6.667E+04" }, /* 30 */ { " 0.00000e+00", " 0.00000", " 0", " 0.00000E+00", " 0" }, /* 31 */ { " 6.70000e-01", " 0.67000", " 0.67", " 6.70000E-01", " 0.67" }, /* 32 */ { " 6.66667e-01", " 0.66667", " 0.66667", " 6.66667E-01", " 0.66667" }, /* 33 */ { " 6.66667e-04", " 0.00067", " 0.00066667", " 6.66667E-04", " 0.00066667" }, /* 34 */ { " 6.66667e-05", " 0.00007", " 6.6667e-05", " 6.66667E-05", " 6.6667E-05" }, /* 35 */ { " 6.66667e+00", " 6.66667", " 6.6667", " 6.66667E+00", " 6.6667" }, /* 36 */ { " 6.66667e+01", " 66.66667", " 66.667", " 6.66667E+01", " 66.667" }, /* 37 */ { " 6.66667e+02", " 666.66667", " 666.67", " 6.66667E+02", " 666.67" }, /* 38 */ { " 6.66667e+03", " 6666.66667", " 6666.7", " 6.66667E+03", " 6666.7" }, /* 39 */ { " 6.66667e+04", " 66666.66667", " 66667", " 6.66667E+04", " 66667" }, /* 40 */ { "0e+00", "0", "0", "0E+00", "0" }, /* 41 */ { "7e-01", "1", "0.7", "7E-01", "0.7" }, /* 42 */ { "7e-01", "1", "0.7", "7E-01", "0.7" }, /* 43 */ { "7e-04", "0", "0.0007", "7E-04", "0.0007" }, /* 44 */ { "7e-05", "0", "7e-05", "7E-05", "7E-05" }, /* 45 */ { "7e+00", "7", "7", "7E+00", "7" }, /* 46 */ { "7e+01", "67", "7e+01", "7E+01", "7E+01" }, /* 47 */ { "7e+02", "667", "7e+02", "7E+02", "7E+02" }, /* 48 */ { "7e+03", "6667", "7e+03", "7E+03", "7E+03" }, /* 49 */ { "7e+04", "66667", "7e+04", "7E+04", "7E+04" }, /* 50 */ { "0.000000e+00", "0.000000", "0", "0.000000E+00", "0" }, /* 51 */ { "6.700000e-01", "0.670000", "0.67", "6.700000E-01", "0.67" }, /* 52 */ { "6.666667e-01", "0.666667", "0.666667", "6.666667E-01", "0.666667" }, /* 53 */ { "6.666667e-04", "0.000667", "0.000666667", "6.666667E-04", "0.000666667" }, /* 54 */ { "6.666667e-05", "0.000067", "6.66667e-05", "6.666667E-05", "6.66667E-05" }, /* 55 */ { "6.666667e+00", "6.666667", "6.66667", "6.666667E+00", "6.66667" }, /* 56 */ { "6.666667e+01", "66.666667", "66.6667", "6.666667E+01", "66.6667" }, /* 57 */ { "6.666667e+02", "666.666667", "666.667", "6.666667E+02", "666.667" }, /* 58 */ { "6.666667e+03", "6666.666667", "6666.67", "6.666667E+03", "6666.67" }, /* 59 */ { "6.666667e+04", "66666.666667", "66666.7", "6.666667E+04", "66666.7" }, /* 60 */ { "0.0000e+00", "000.0000", "00000000", "0.0000E+00", "00000000" }, /* 61 */ { "6.7000e-01", "000.6700", "00000.67", "6.7000E-01", "00000.67" }, /* 62 */ { "6.6667e-01", "000.6667", "000.6667", "6.6667E-01", "000.6667" }, /* 63 */ { "6.6667e-04", "000.0007", "0.0006667", "6.6667E-04", "0.0006667" }, /* 64 */ { "6.6667e-05", "000.0001", "6.667e-05", "6.6667E-05", "6.667E-05" }, /* 65 */ { "6.6667e+00", "006.6667", "0006.667", "6.6667E+00", "0006.667" }, /* 66 */ { "6.6667e+01", "066.6667", "00066.67", "6.6667E+01", "00066.67" }, /* 67 */ { "6.6667e+02", "666.6667", "000666.7", "6.6667E+02", "000666.7" }, /* 68 */ { "6.6667e+03", "6666.6667", "00006667", "6.6667E+03", "00006667" }, /* 69 */ { "6.6667e+04", "66666.6667", "6.667e+04", "6.6667E+04", "6.667E+04" }, }; static void dofptest(int test, double val, char *width, int prec, int *fail) { char format[80], result[80]; int i; for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { char *fspec = NULL; switch (i) { case 0: fspec = "e"; break; case 1: fspec = "f"; break; case 2: fspec = "g"; break; case 3: fspec = "E"; break; case 4: fspec = "G"; break; } if (prec >= 0) BIO_snprintf(format, sizeof(format), "%%%s.%d%s", width, prec, fspec); else BIO_snprintf(format, sizeof(format), "%%%s%s", width, fspec); BIO_snprintf(result, sizeof(result), format, val); if (justprint) { if (i == 0) { printf(" /* %3d */ { \"%s\"", test, result); } else { printf(", \"%s\"", result); } } else { if (strcmp(fpexpected[test][i], result) != 0) { printf("Test %d(%d) failed. Expected \"%s\". Got \"%s\". " "Format \"%s\"\n", test, i, fpexpected[test][i], result, format); *fail = 1; } } } if (justprint) { printf(" },\n"); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int test = 0; int i; int fail = 0; int prec = -1; char *width = ""; const double frac = 2.0/3.0; char buf[80]; if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "-expected") == 0) { justprint = 1; } CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); /* Tests for floating point format specifiers */ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { switch (i) { case 0: prec = 4; width = ""; break; case 1: prec = 5; width = ""; break; case 2: prec = 4; width = "12"; break; case 3: prec = 5; width = "12"; break; case 4: prec = 0; width = ""; break; case 5: prec = -1; width = ""; break; case 6: prec = 4; width = "08"; break; } dofptest(test++, 0.0, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, 0.67, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, frac, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, frac / 1000, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, frac / 10000, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, 6.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, 66.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, 666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, 6666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail); dofptest(test++, 66666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail); } /* Test excessively big number. Should fail */ if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%f\n", 2 * (double)ULONG_MAX) != -1) { printf("Test %d failed. Unexpected success return from " "BIO_snprintf()\n", test); fail = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) return 1; # endif if (!justprint) { if (fail) { printf("FAIL\n"); return 1; } printf ("PASS\n"); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/srptest.c0000644000000000000000000002105513176625662014711 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No SRP support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include # include static void showbn(const char *name, const BIGNUM *bn) { fputs(name, stdout); fputs(" = ", stdout); BN_print_fp(stdout, bn); putc('\n', stdout); } # define RANDOM_SIZE 32 /* use 256 bits on each side */ static int run_srp(const char *username, const char *client_pass, const char *server_pass) { int ret = -1; BIGNUM *s = NULL; BIGNUM *v = NULL; BIGNUM *a = NULL; BIGNUM *b = NULL; BIGNUM *u = NULL; BIGNUM *x = NULL; BIGNUM *Apub = NULL; BIGNUM *Bpub = NULL; BIGNUM *Kclient = NULL; BIGNUM *Kserver = NULL; unsigned char rand_tmp[RANDOM_SIZE]; /* use builtin 1024-bit params */ const SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN("1024"); if (GN == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get SRP parameters\n"); return -1; } /* Set up server's password entry */ if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(username, server_pass, &s, &v, GN->N, GN->g)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create SRP verifier\n"); return -1; } showbn("N", GN->N); showbn("g", GN->g); showbn("Salt", s); showbn("Verifier", v); /* Server random */ RAND_bytes(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp)); b = BN_bin2bn(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp), NULL); /* TODO - check b != 0 */ showbn("b", b); /* Server's first message */ Bpub = SRP_Calc_B(b, GN->N, GN->g, v); showbn("B", Bpub); if (!SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(Bpub, GN->N)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid B\n"); return -1; } /* Client random */ RAND_bytes(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp)); a = BN_bin2bn(rand_tmp, sizeof(rand_tmp), NULL); /* TODO - check a != 0 */ showbn("a", a); /* Client's response */ Apub = SRP_Calc_A(a, GN->N, GN->g); showbn("A", Apub); if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(Apub, GN->N)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid A\n"); return -1; } /* Both sides calculate u */ u = SRP_Calc_u(Apub, Bpub, GN->N); /* Client's key */ x = SRP_Calc_x(s, username, client_pass); Kclient = SRP_Calc_client_key(GN->N, Bpub, GN->g, x, a, u); showbn("Client's key", Kclient); /* Server's key */ Kserver = SRP_Calc_server_key(Apub, v, u, b, GN->N); showbn("Server's key", Kserver); if (BN_cmp(Kclient, Kserver) == 0) { ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Keys mismatch\n"); ret = 1; } BN_clear_free(Kclient); BN_clear_free(Kserver); BN_clear_free(x); BN_free(u); BN_free(Apub); BN_clear_free(a); BN_free(Bpub); BN_clear_free(b); BN_free(s); BN_clear_free(v); return ret; } static int check_bn(const char *name, const BIGNUM *bn, const char *hexbn) { BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; int rv; if (BN_hex2bn(&tmp, hexbn) == 0) return 0; rv = BN_cmp(bn, tmp); if (rv == 0) { printf("%s = ", name); BN_print_fp(stdout, bn); printf("\n"); BN_free(tmp); return 1; } printf("Unexpected %s value\n", name); printf("Expecting: "); BN_print_fp(stdout, tmp); printf("\nReceived: "); BN_print_fp(stdout, bn); printf("\n"); BN_free(tmp); return 0; } /* SRP test vectors from RFC5054 */ static int run_srp_kat(void) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *s = NULL; BIGNUM *v = NULL; BIGNUM *a = NULL; BIGNUM *b = NULL; BIGNUM *u = NULL; BIGNUM *x = NULL; BIGNUM *Apub = NULL; BIGNUM *Bpub = NULL; BIGNUM *Kclient = NULL; BIGNUM *Kserver = NULL; /* use builtin 1024-bit params */ const SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN("1024"); if (GN == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get SRP parameters\n"); goto err; } BN_hex2bn(&s, "BEB25379D1A8581EB5A727673A2441EE"); /* Set up server's password entry */ if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN("alice", "password123", &s, &v, GN->N, GN->g)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create SRP verifier\n"); goto err; } if (!check_bn("v", v, "7E273DE8696FFC4F4E337D05B4B375BEB0DDE1569E8FA00A9886D812" "9BADA1F1822223CA1A605B530E379BA4729FDC59F105B4787E5186F5" "C671085A1447B52A48CF1970B4FB6F8400BBF4CEBFBB168152E08AB5" "EA53D15C1AFF87B2B9DA6E04E058AD51CC72BFC9033B564E26480D78" "E955A5E29E7AB245DB2BE315E2099AFB")) goto err; /* Server random */ BN_hex2bn(&b, "E487CB59D31AC550471E81F00F6928E01DDA08E974A004F49E61F5D1" "05284D20"); /* Server's first message */ Bpub = SRP_Calc_B(b, GN->N, GN->g, v); if (!SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(Bpub, GN->N)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid B\n"); goto err; } if (!check_bn("B", Bpub, "BD0C61512C692C0CB6D041FA01BB152D4916A1E77AF46AE105393011" "BAF38964DC46A0670DD125B95A981652236F99D9B681CBF87837EC99" "6C6DA04453728610D0C6DDB58B318885D7D82C7F8DEB75CE7BD4FBAA" "37089E6F9C6059F388838E7A00030B331EB76840910440B1B27AAEAE" "EB4012B7D7665238A8E3FB004B117B58")) goto err; /* Client random */ BN_hex2bn(&a, "60975527035CF2AD1989806F0407210BC81EDC04E2762A56AFD529DD" "DA2D4393"); /* Client's response */ Apub = SRP_Calc_A(a, GN->N, GN->g); if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(Apub, GN->N)) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid A\n"); return -1; } if (!check_bn("A", Apub, "61D5E490F6F1B79547B0704C436F523DD0E560F0C64115BB72557EC4" "4352E8903211C04692272D8B2D1A5358A2CF1B6E0BFCF99F921530EC" "8E39356179EAE45E42BA92AEACED825171E1E8B9AF6D9C03E1327F44" "BE087EF06530E69F66615261EEF54073CA11CF5858F0EDFDFE15EFEA" "B349EF5D76988A3672FAC47B0769447B")) goto err; /* Both sides calculate u */ u = SRP_Calc_u(Apub, Bpub, GN->N); if (!check_bn("u", u, "CE38B9593487DA98554ED47D70A7AE5F462EF019")) goto err; /* Client's key */ x = SRP_Calc_x(s, "alice", "password123"); Kclient = SRP_Calc_client_key(GN->N, Bpub, GN->g, x, a, u); if (!check_bn("Client's key", Kclient, "B0DC82BABCF30674AE450C0287745E7990A3381F63B387AAF271A10D" "233861E359B48220F7C4693C9AE12B0A6F67809F0876E2D013800D6C" "41BB59B6D5979B5C00A172B4A2A5903A0BDCAF8A709585EB2AFAFA8F" "3499B200210DCC1F10EB33943CD67FC88A2F39A4BE5BEC4EC0A3212D" "C346D7E474B29EDE8A469FFECA686E5A")) goto err; /* Server's key */ Kserver = SRP_Calc_server_key(Apub, v, u, b, GN->N); if (!check_bn("Server's key", Kserver, "B0DC82BABCF30674AE450C0287745E7990A3381F63B387AAF271A10D" "233861E359B48220F7C4693C9AE12B0A6F67809F0876E2D013800D6C" "41BB59B6D5979B5C00A172B4A2A5903A0BDCAF8A709585EB2AFAFA8F" "3499B200210DCC1F10EB33943CD67FC88A2F39A4BE5BEC4EC0A3212D" "C346D7E474B29EDE8A469FFECA686E5A")) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_clear_free(Kclient); BN_clear_free(Kserver); BN_clear_free(x); BN_free(u); BN_free(Apub); BN_clear_free(a); BN_free(Bpub); BN_clear_free(b); BN_free(s); BN_clear_free(v); return ret; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *bio_err; bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); /* "Negative" test, expect a mismatch */ if (run_srp("alice", "password1", "password2") == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Mismatched SRP run failed\n"); return 1; } /* "Positive" test, should pass */ if (run_srp("alice", "password", "password") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Plain SRP run failed\n"); return 1; } /* KAT from RFC5054: should pass */ if (run_srp_kat() != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SRP KAT failed\n"); return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0) return 1; #endif BIO_free(bio_err); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/evp_extra_test.c0000644000000000000000000004043313176625661016241 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * kExampleRSAKeyDER is an RSA private key in ASN.1, DER format. Of course, you * should never use this key anywhere but in an example. */ static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyDER[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0x59, 0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xd3, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34, 0x75, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x97, 0x8a, 0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8, 0x50, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0xec, 0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83, 0x58, 0x76, 0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48, 0x1a, 0xd8, 0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a, 0x6d, 0xc7, 0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5, 0x32, 0x85, 0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x5f, 0xee, 0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8, 0x66, 0x85, 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa4, 0x0a, 0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x15, 0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0x83, 0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78, 0x80, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71, 0x99, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60, 0x1f, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3, 0x40, 0x41, 0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18, 0xc6, 0xd9, 0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0xef, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x46, 0x87, 0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xdf, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63, 0x55, 0xf5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05, 0xcd, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16, 0xb3, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x9b, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xfa, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe8, 0xba, 0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7, 0xe7, 0xfe, 0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99, 0x75, 0xe7, 0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40, 0x5a, 0x34, 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x84, 0x27, 0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea, 0x52, 0x2c, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e, 0x49, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9, 0xd1, 0x8a, 0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae, 0x17, 0x17, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d, 0x08, 0xf1, 0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf, }; static const unsigned char kMsg[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }; static const unsigned char kSignature[] = { 0xa5, 0xf0, 0x8a, 0x47, 0x5d, 0x3c, 0xb3, 0xcc, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8c, 0xae, 0x4c, 0x14, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x36, 0xde, 0xf4, 0x3e, 0x3d, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x60, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x91, 0x28, 0xda, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0x04, 0x96, 0x7e, 0x63, 0x13, 0x90, 0xce, 0xb9, 0xb4, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xfd, 0x09, 0x3d, 0xc7, 0x67, 0x78, 0x54, 0x04, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x62, 0x6e, 0x24, 0x67, 0xb4, 0x40, 0xfc, 0x57, 0x62, 0xc6, 0xf1, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x97, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xa8, 0xae, 0x44, 0x46, 0x5e, 0xab, 0x67, 0x17, 0x53, 0x19, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xc8, 0x16, 0x3e, 0x86, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x2f, 0xfc, 0x23, 0x48, 0xd9, 0x0b, 0x13, 0xdd, 0x7b, 0x5a, 0x25, 0x79, 0xef, 0xa5, 0x7b, 0x04, 0xed, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x18, 0x55, 0xe4, 0x0a, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x79, 0x5d, 0xd7, 0x55, 0xa7, 0xab, 0x45, 0x02, 0x97, 0x60, 0x42, }; /* * kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8 is kExampleRSAKeyDER encoded in a PKCS #8 * PrivateKeyInfo. */ static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x76, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82, 0x02, 0x60, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0x59, 0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xd3, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34, 0x75, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x97, 0x8a, 0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8, 0x50, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0xec, 0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83, 0x58, 0x76, 0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48, 0x1a, 0xd8, 0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a, 0x6d, 0xc7, 0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5, 0x32, 0x85, 0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x5f, 0xee, 0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8, 0x66, 0x85, 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa4, 0x0a, 0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x15, 0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0x83, 0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78, 0x80, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71, 0x99, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60, 0x1f, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3, 0x40, 0x41, 0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18, 0xc6, 0xd9, 0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0xef, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x46, 0x87, 0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xdf, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63, 0x55, 0xf5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05, 0xcd, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16, 0xb3, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x9b, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xfa, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe8, 0xba, 0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7, 0xe7, 0xfe, 0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99, 0x75, 0xe7, 0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40, 0x5a, 0x34, 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x84, 0x27, 0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea, 0x52, 0x2c, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e, 0x49, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9, 0xd1, 0x8a, 0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae, 0x17, 0x17, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d, 0x08, 0xf1, 0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf, }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * kExampleECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey * structure. */ static const unsigned char kExampleECKeyDER[] = { 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x08, 0x72, 0x7a, 0xd4, 0xa0, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0xdd, 0x59, 0xc9, 0x4d, 0x89, 0x68, 0x77, 0x08, 0xb5, 0x6f, 0xc9, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x77, 0x0e, 0xe8, 0xd1, 0xc9, 0xce, 0x0a, 0x8b, 0xb4, 0x6a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0x69, 0xe2, 0xbf, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x97, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x94, 0x8a, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x97, 0x6b, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x46, 0xfb, 0xdd, 0xa9, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x9d, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x5a, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xa8, 0x0a, 0x18, 0xf9, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xa3, 0x1e, 0x56, 0xe2, 0x7c, 0x83, 0x48, 0xdb, 0x16, 0x1a, 0x1c, 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0xf1, 0x94, 0x2d, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0x72, 0x22, 0xc1, }; /* * kExampleBadECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey * structure. The private key is equal to the order and will fail to import */ static const unsigned char kExampleBadECKeyDER[] = { 0x30, 0x66, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x04, 0x4C, 0x30, 0x4A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x03, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51 }; #endif static EVP_PKEY *load_example_rsa_key(void) { EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; const unsigned char *derp = kExampleRSAKeyDER; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; RSA *rsa = NULL; if (!d2i_RSAPrivateKey(&rsa, &derp, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER))) { return NULL; } pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa)) { goto out; } ret = pkey; pkey = NULL; out: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); RSA_free(rsa); return ret; } static int test_EVP_DigestSignInit(void) { int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; unsigned char *sig = NULL; size_t sig_len = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, *md_ctx_verify; md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); md_ctx_verify = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL || md_ctx_verify == NULL) goto out; pkey = load_example_rsa_key(); if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) || !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg))) { goto out; } /* Determine the size of the signature. */ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len)) { goto out; } /* Sanity check for testing. */ if (sig_len != (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { fprintf(stderr, "sig_len mismatch\n"); goto out; } sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len); if (sig == NULL || !EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sig, &sig_len)) { goto out; } /* Ensure that the signature round-trips. */ if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx_verify, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) || !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx_verify, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg)) || !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx_verify, sig, sig_len)) { goto out; } ret = 1; out: if (!ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx_verify); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); OPENSSL_free(sig); return ret; } static int test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit(void) { int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); pkey = load_example_rsa_key(); if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) || !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg)) || !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, kSignature, sizeof(kSignature))) { goto out; } ret = 1; out: if (!ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return ret; } static int test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, int expected_id) { int ret = 0; const unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; p = input; pkey = d2i_AutoPrivateKey(NULL, &p, input_len); if (pkey == NULL || p != input + input_len) { fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey failed\n"); goto done; } if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != expected_id) { fprintf(stderr, "Did not decode expected type\n"); goto done; } ret = 1; done: if (!ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* Tests loading a bad key in PKCS8 format */ static int test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY(void) { int ret = 0; const unsigned char *derp = kExampleBadECKeyDER; PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &derp, sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER)); if (!p8inf || derp != kExampleBadECKeyDER + sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse key\n"); goto done; } pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); if (pkey) { fprintf(stderr, "Imported invalid EC key\n"); goto done; } ret = 1; done: PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return ret; } #endif int main(void) { CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); if (!test_EVP_DigestSignInit()) { fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n"); return 1; } if (!test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit()) { fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestVerifyInit failed\n"); return 1; } if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER), EVP_PKEY_RSA)) { fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER) failed\n"); return 1; } if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey (kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8), EVP_PKEY_RSA)) { fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8) failed\n"); return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleECKeyDER), EVP_PKEY_EC)) { fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER) failed\n"); return 1; } if (!test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY()) { fprintf(stderr, "test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY failed\n"); return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) return 1; #endif printf("PASS\n"); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/pbelutest.c0000644000000000000000000000250213176625661015207 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* * Password based encryption (PBE) table ordering test. * Attempt to look up all supported algorithms. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { size_t i; int rv = 0; int pbe_type, pbe_nid; int last_type = -1, last_nid = -1; for (i = 0; EVP_PBE_get(&pbe_type, &pbe_nid, i) != 0; i++) { if (EVP_PBE_find(pbe_type, pbe_nid, NULL, NULL, 0) == 0) { rv = 1; break; } } if (rv == 0) return 0; /* Error: print out whole table */ for (i = 0; EVP_PBE_get(&pbe_type, &pbe_nid, i) != 0; i++) { if (pbe_type > last_type) rv = 0; else if (pbe_type < last_type || pbe_nid < last_nid) rv = 1; else rv = 0; fprintf(stderr, "PBE type=%d %d (%s): %s\n", pbe_type, pbe_nid, OBJ_nid2sn(pbe_nid), rv ? "ERROR" : "OK"); last_type = pbe_type; last_nid = pbe_nid; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/rc4test.c0000644000000000000000000001322213176625661014571 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No RC4 support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include static unsigned char keys[7][30] = { {8, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}, {8, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}, {8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {4, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45}, {8, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}, {4, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23, 0x45}, }; static unsigned char data_len[7] = { 8, 8, 8, 20, 28, 10 }; static unsigned char data[7][30] = { {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0xff}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff}, {0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0xff}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff}, {0}, }; static unsigned char output[7][30] = { {0x75, 0xb7, 0x87, 0x80, 0x99, 0xe0, 0xc5, 0x96, 0x00}, {0x74, 0x94, 0xc2, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x4b, 0x08, 0x79, 0x00}, {0xde, 0x18, 0x89, 0x41, 0xa3, 0x37, 0x5d, 0x3a, 0x00}, {0xd6, 0xa1, 0x41, 0xa7, 0xec, 0x3c, 0x38, 0xdf, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x5a, 0x11, 0x62, 0xe1, 0xc7, 0xba, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x78, 0x58, 0x00}, {0x66, 0xa0, 0x94, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xf7, 0xd6, 0x89, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0x83, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0x33, 0xc0, 0x0c, 0x89, 0x2e, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x14, 0x3c, 0xe2, 0x87, 0x40, 0x01, 0x1e, 0xcf, 0x00}, {0xd6, 0xa1, 0x41, 0xa7, 0xec, 0x3c, 0x38, 0xdf, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x00}, {0}, }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, err = 0; int j; unsigned char *p; RC4_KEY key; unsigned char obuf[512]; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { RC4_set_key(&key, keys[i][0], &(keys[i][1])); memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf)); RC4(&key, data_len[i], &(data[i][0]), obuf); if (memcmp(obuf, output[i], data_len[i] + 1) != 0) { printf("error calculating RC4\n"); printf("output:"); for (j = 0; j < data_len[i] + 1; j++) printf(" %02x", obuf[j]); printf("\n"); printf("expect:"); p = &(output[i][0]); for (j = 0; j < data_len[i] + 1; j++) printf(" %02x", *(p++)); printf("\n"); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i); } printf("test end processing "); for (i = 0; i < data_len[3]; i++) { RC4_set_key(&key, keys[3][0], &(keys[3][1])); memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf)); RC4(&key, i, &(data[3][0]), obuf); if ((memcmp(obuf, output[3], i) != 0) || (obuf[i] != 0)) { printf("error in RC4 length processing\n"); printf("output:"); for (j = 0; j < i + 1; j++) printf(" %02x", obuf[j]); printf("\n"); printf("expect:"); p = &(output[3][0]); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) printf(" %02x", *(p++)); printf(" 00\n"); err++; } else { printf("."); fflush(stdout); } } printf("done\n"); printf("test multi-call "); for (i = 0; i < data_len[3]; i++) { RC4_set_key(&key, keys[3][0], &(keys[3][1])); memset(obuf, 0, sizeof(obuf)); RC4(&key, i, &(data[3][0]), obuf); RC4(&key, data_len[3] - i, &(data[3][i]), &(obuf[i])); if (memcmp(obuf, output[3], data_len[3] + 1) != 0) { printf("error in RC4 multi-call processing\n"); printf("output:"); for (j = 0; j < data_len[3] + 1; j++) printf(" %02x", obuf[j]); printf("\n"); printf("expect:"); p = &(output[3][0]); for (j = 0; j < data_len[3] + 1; j++) printf(" %02x", *(p++)); err++; } else { printf("."); fflush(stdout); } } printf("done\n"); printf("bulk test "); { unsigned char buf[513]; SHA_CTX c; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; static unsigned char expected[] = { 0xa4, 0x7b, 0xcc, 0x00, 0x3d, 0xd0, 0xbd, 0xe1, 0xac, 0x5f, 0x12, 0x1e, 0x45, 0xbc, 0xfb, 0x1a, 0xa1, 0xf2, 0x7f, 0xc5 }; RC4_set_key(&key, keys[0][0], &(keys[3][1])); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); SHA1_Init(&c); for (i = 0; i < 2571; i++) { RC4(&key, sizeof(buf), buf, buf); SHA1_Update(&c, buf, sizeof(buf)); } SHA1_Final(md, &c); if (memcmp(md, expected, sizeof(md))) { printf("error in RC4 bulk test\n"); printf("output:"); for (j = 0; j < (int)sizeof(md); j++) printf(" %02x", md[j]); printf("\n"); printf("expect:"); for (j = 0; j < (int)sizeof(md); j++) printf(" %02x", expected[j]); printf("\n"); err++; } else printf("ok\n"); } EXIT(err); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/md5test.c0000644000000000000000000000403013176625661014563 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No MD5 support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # include static char *test[] = { "", "a", "abc", "message digest", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890", NULL, }; static char *ret[] = { "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e", "0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661", "900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72", "f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0", "c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b", "d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f", "57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a", }; static char *pt(unsigned char *md); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, err = 0; char **P, **R; char *p; unsigned char md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; P = test; R = ret; i = 1; while (*P != NULL) { if (!EVP_Digest(&(P[0][0]), strlen((char *)*P), md, NULL, EVP_md5(), NULL)) { printf("EVP Digest error.\n"); EXIT(1); } p = pt(md); if (strcmp(p, (char *)*R) != 0) { printf("error calculating MD5 on '%s'\n", *P); printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, *R); err++; } else printf("test %d ok\n", i); i++; R++; P++; } EXIT(err); } static char *pt(unsigned char *md) { int i; static char buf[80]; for (i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); return (buf); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/testcrl.pem0000644000000000000000000000165213176625662015225 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN X509 CRL----- MIICjTCCAfowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwXzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNVBAoT F1JTQSBEYXRhIFNlY3VyaXR5LCBJbmMuMS4wLAYDVQQLEyVTZWN1cmUgU2VydmVy IENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5Fw05NTA1MDIwMjEyMjZaFw05NTA2MDEw MDAxNDlaMIIBaDAWAgUCQQAABBcNOTUwMjAxMTcyNDI2WjAWAgUCQQAACRcNOTUw MjEwMDIxNjM5WjAWAgUCQQAADxcNOTUwMjI0MDAxMjQ5WjAWAgUCQQAADBcNOTUw MjI1MDA0NjQ0WjAWAgUCQQAAGxcNOTUwMzEzMTg0MDQ5WjAWAgUCQQAAFhcNOTUw MzE1MTkxNjU0WjAWAgUCQQAAGhcNOTUwMzE1MTk0MDQxWjAWAgUCQQAAHxcNOTUw MzI0MTk0NDMzWjAWAgUCcgAABRcNOTUwMzI5MjAwNzExWjAWAgUCcgAAERcNOTUw MzMwMDIzNDI2WjAWAgUCQQAAIBcNOTUwNDA3MDExMzIxWjAWAgUCcgAAHhcNOTUw NDA4MDAwMjU5WjAWAgUCcgAAQRcNOTUwNDI4MTcxNzI0WjAWAgUCcgAAOBcNOTUw NDI4MTcyNzIxWjAWAgUCcgAATBcNOTUwNTAyMDIxMjI2WjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQIF AAN+AHqOEJXSDejYy0UwxxrH/9+N2z5xu/if0J6qQmK92W0hW158wpJg+ovV3+wQ wvIEPRL2rocL0tKfAsVq1IawSJzSNgxG0lrcla3MrJBnZ4GaZDu4FutZh72MR3Gt JaAL3iTJHJD55kK2D/VoyY1djlsPuNh6AEgdVwFAyp0v -----END X509 CRL----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/sanitytest.c0000644000000000000000000000404213176625662015411 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #define TEST(e) \ do { \ if (!(e)) { \ fprintf(stderr, "Failed " #e "\n"); \ failures++; \ } \ } while (0) enum smallchoices { sa, sb, sc }; enum medchoices { ma, mb, mc, md, me, mf, mg, mh, mi, mj, mk, ml }; enum largechoices { a01, b01, c01, d01, e01, f01, g01, h01, i01, j01, a02, b02, c02, d02, e02, f02, g02, h02, i02, j02, a03, b03, c03, d03, e03, f03, g03, h03, i03, j03, a04, b04, c04, d04, e04, f04, g04, h04, i04, j04, a05, b05, c05, d05, e05, f05, g05, h05, i05, j05, a06, b06, c06, d06, e06, f06, g06, h06, i06, j06, a07, b07, c07, d07, e07, f07, g07, h07, i07, j07, a08, b08, c08, d08, e08, f08, g08, h08, i08, j08, a09, b09, c09, d09, e09, f09, g09, h09, i09, j09, a10, b10, c10, d10, e10, f10, g10, h10, i10, j10, xxx }; int main() { char *p; char bytes[sizeof(p)]; int failures = 0; /* Is NULL equivalent to all-bytes-zero? */ p = NULL; memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes); TEST(memcmp(&p, bytes, sizeof(bytes)) == 0); /* Enum size */ TEST(sizeof(enum smallchoices) == sizeof(int)); TEST(sizeof(enum medchoices) == sizeof(int)); TEST(sizeof(enum largechoices) == sizeof(int)); /* Basic two's complement checks. */ TEST(~(-1) == 0); TEST(~(-1L) == 0L); /* Check that values with sign bit 1 and value bits 0 are valid */ TEST(-(INT_MIN + 1) == INT_MAX); TEST(-(LONG_MIN + 1) == LONG_MAX); /* Check that unsigned-to-signed conversions preserve bit patterns */ TEST((int)((unsigned int)INT_MAX + 1) == INT_MIN); TEST((long)((unsigned long)LONG_MAX + 1) == LONG_MIN); return failures; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/afalgtest.c0000644000000000000000000000715213176625661015160 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG # include # define K_MAJ 4 # define K_MIN1 1 # define K_MIN2 0 # if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2) /* * If we get here then it looks like there is a mismatch between the linux * headers and the actual kernel version, so we have tried to compile with * afalg support, but then skipped it in e_afalg.c. As far as this test is * concerned we behave as if we had been configured without support */ # define OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG #include #include #include #include /* Use a buffer size which is not aligned to block size */ #define BUFFER_SIZE (8 * 1024) - 13 static int test_afalg_aes_128_cbc(ENGINE *e) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc(); unsigned char key[] = "\x5F\x4D\xCC\x3B\x5A\xA7\x65\xD6\ \x1D\x83\x27\xDE\xB8\x82\xCF\x99"; unsigned char iv[] = "\x2B\x95\x99\x0A\x91\x51\x37\x4A\ \xBD\x8F\xF8\xC5\xA7\xA0\xFE\x08"; unsigned char in[BUFFER_SIZE]; unsigned char ebuf[BUFFER_SIZE + 32]; unsigned char dbuf[BUFFER_SIZE + 32]; int encl, encf, decl, decf; unsigned int status = 0; ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed to allocate ctx\n", __func__); return 0; } RAND_bytes(in, BUFFER_SIZE); if ( !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, e, key, iv, 1) || !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, ebuf, &encl, in, BUFFER_SIZE) || !EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, ebuf+encl, &encf)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed encryption\n", __func__); goto end; } encl += encf; if ( !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx) || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, e, key, iv, 0) || !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, dbuf, &decl, ebuf, encl) || !EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, dbuf+decl, &decf)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed decryption\n", __func__); goto end; } decl += decf; if ( decl != BUFFER_SIZE || memcmp(dbuf, in, BUFFER_SIZE)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s() failed Dec(Enc(P)) != P\n", __func__); goto end; } status = 1; end: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return status; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e; CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG, NULL); # endif e = ENGINE_by_id("afalg"); if (e == NULL) { /* * A failure to load is probably a platform environment problem so we * don't treat this as an OpenSSL test failure, i.e. we return 0 */ fprintf(stderr, "AFALG Test: Failed to load AFALG Engine - skipping test\n"); return 0; } if (test_afalg_aes_128_cbc(e) == 0) { ENGINE_free(e); return 1; } ENGINE_free(e); printf("PASS\n"); return 0; } #else /* OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { fprintf(stderr, "AFALG not supported - skipping AFALG tests\n"); printf("PASS\n"); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssltestlib.h0000644000000000000000000000250013176625662015374 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_SSLTESTLIB_H # define HEADER_SSLTESTLIB_H # include int create_ssl_ctx_pair(const SSL_METHOD *sm, const SSL_METHOD *cm, SSL_CTX **sctx, SSL_CTX **cctx, char *certfile, char *privkeyfile); int create_ssl_objects(SSL_CTX *serverctx, SSL_CTX *clientctx, SSL **sssl, SSL **cssl, BIO *s_to_c_fbio, BIO *c_to_s_fbio); int create_ssl_connection(SSL *serverssl, SSL *clientssl); /* Note: Not thread safe! */ const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_tls_dump_filter(void); void bio_f_tls_dump_filter_free(void); const BIO_METHOD *bio_s_mempacket_test(void); void bio_s_mempacket_test_free(void); /* Packet types - value 0 is reserved */ #define INJECT_PACKET 1 #define INJECT_PACKET_IGNORE_REC_SEQ 2 int mempacket_test_inject(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl, int pktnum, int type); typedef struct mempacket_st MEMPACKET; DEFINE_STACK_OF(MEMPACKET) #endif /* HEADER_SSLTESTLIB_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/test/dsatest.c0000644000000000000000000001224213176625661014651 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No DSA support\n"); return (0); } #else # include static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg); /* * seed, out_p, out_q, out_g are taken from the updated Appendix 5 to FIPS * PUB 186 and also appear in Appendix 5 to FIPS PIB 186-1 */ static unsigned char seed[20] = { 0xd5, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x4b, 0x60, 0xef, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0xb6, 0x21, 0x1b, 0x40, 0x62, 0xba, 0x32, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x42, 0x7d, 0xd3, }; static unsigned char out_p[] = { 0x8d, 0xf2, 0xa4, 0x94, 0x49, 0x22, 0x76, 0xaa, 0x3d, 0x25, 0x75, 0x9b, 0xb0, 0x68, 0x69, 0xcb, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xd8, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x8d, 0x0c, 0xf7, 0xcb, 0xb8, 0x32, 0x4f, 0x0d, 0x78, 0x82, 0xe5, 0xd0, 0x76, 0x2f, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x21, 0x0e, 0xaf, 0xc2, 0xe9, 0xad, 0xac, 0x32, 0xab, 0x7a, 0xac, 0x49, 0x69, 0x3d, 0xfb, 0xf8, 0x37, 0x24, 0xc2, 0xec, 0x07, 0x36, 0xee, 0x31, 0xc8, 0x02, 0x91, }; static unsigned char out_q[] = { 0xc7, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x7e, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x99, 0x3b, 0x4f, 0x2d, 0xed, 0x30, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xda, 0xce, 0x91, 0x5f, }; static unsigned char out_g[] = { 0x62, 0x6d, 0x02, 0x78, 0x39, 0xea, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x41, 0x31, 0x63, 0xa5, 0x5b, 0x4c, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x29, 0x9d, 0x55, 0x22, 0x95, 0x6c, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x3b, 0xff, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x99, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xcb, 0x9d, 0xe5, 0xfa, 0x24, 0xba, 0xbf, 0x58, 0xe5, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x21, 0x92, 0x5c, 0x9c, 0xc4, 0x2e, 0x9f, 0x6f, 0x46, 0x4b, 0x08, 0x8c, 0xc5, 0x72, 0xaf, 0x53, 0xe6, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x02, }; static const unsigned char str1[] = "12345678901234567890"; static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; static BIO *bio_err = NULL; int main(int argc, char **argv) { BN_GENCB *cb; DSA *dsa = NULL; int counter, ret = 0, i, j; unsigned char buf[256]; unsigned long h; unsigned char sig[256]; unsigned int siglen; const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL; if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); BIO_printf(bio_err, "test generation of DSA parameters\n"); cb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (!cb) goto end; BN_GENCB_set(cb, dsa_cb, bio_err); if (((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) || !DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsa, 512, seed, 20, &counter, &h, cb)) goto end; BIO_printf(bio_err, "seed\n"); for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 4) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%02X%02X%02X%02X ", seed[i], seed[i + 1], seed[i + 2], seed[i + 3]); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "\ncounter=%d h=%ld\n", counter, h); DSA_print(bio_err, dsa, 0); if (counter != 105) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "counter should be 105\n"); goto end; } if (h != 2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "h should be 2\n"); goto end; } DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); i = BN_bn2bin(q, buf); j = sizeof(out_q); if ((i != j) || (memcmp(buf, out_q, i) != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "q value is wrong\n"); goto end; } i = BN_bn2bin(p, buf); j = sizeof(out_p); if ((i != j) || (memcmp(buf, out_p, i) != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "p value is wrong\n"); goto end; } i = BN_bn2bin(g, buf); j = sizeof(out_g); if ((i != j) || (memcmp(buf, out_g, i) != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "g value is wrong\n"); goto end; } DSA_generate_key(dsa); DSA_sign(0, str1, 20, sig, &siglen, dsa); if (DSA_verify(0, str1, 20, sig, siglen, dsa) == 1) ret = 1; end: if (!ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); DSA_free(dsa); BN_GENCB_free(cb); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0) ret = 0; #endif BIO_free(bio_err); bio_err = NULL; EXIT(!ret); } static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg) { char c = '*'; static int ok = 0, num = 0; if (p == 0) { c = '.'; num++; }; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) { c = '*'; ok++; } if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg), &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg)); if (!ok && (p == 0) && (num > 1)) { BIO_printf(BN_GENCB_get_arg(arg), "error in dsatest\n"); return 0; } return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssltestlib.c0000644000000000000000000004655313176625662015407 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "e_os.h" #include "ssltestlib.h" static int tls_dump_new(BIO *bi); static int tls_dump_free(BIO *a); static int tls_dump_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl); static int tls_dump_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl); static long tls_dump_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static int tls_dump_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size); static int tls_dump_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str); /* Choose a sufficiently large type likely to be unused for this custom BIO */ # define BIO_TYPE_TLS_DUMP_FILTER (0x80 | BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_MEMPACKET_TEST 0x81 static BIO_METHOD *method_tls_dump = NULL; static BIO_METHOD *method_mempacket_test = NULL; /* Note: Not thread safe! */ const BIO_METHOD *bio_f_tls_dump_filter(void) { if (method_tls_dump == NULL) { method_tls_dump = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_TLS_DUMP_FILTER, "TLS dump filter"); if ( method_tls_dump == NULL || !BIO_meth_set_write(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_write) || !BIO_meth_set_read(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_read) || !BIO_meth_set_puts(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_puts) || !BIO_meth_set_gets(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_gets) || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_ctrl) || !BIO_meth_set_create(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_new) || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(method_tls_dump, tls_dump_free)) return NULL; } return method_tls_dump; } void bio_f_tls_dump_filter_free(void) { BIO_meth_free(method_tls_dump); } static int tls_dump_new(BIO *bio) { BIO_set_init(bio, 1); return 1; } static int tls_dump_free(BIO *bio) { BIO_set_init(bio, 0); return 1; } static void copy_flags(BIO *bio) { int flags; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); flags = BIO_test_flags(next, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS); BIO_clear_flags(bio, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY | BIO_FLAGS_RWS); BIO_set_flags(bio, flags); } #define RECORD_CONTENT_TYPE 0 #define RECORD_VERSION_HI 1 #define RECORD_VERSION_LO 2 #define RECORD_EPOCH_HI 3 #define RECORD_EPOCH_LO 4 #define RECORD_SEQUENCE_START 5 #define RECORD_SEQUENCE_END 10 #define RECORD_LEN_HI 11 #define RECORD_LEN_LO 12 #define MSG_TYPE 0 #define MSG_LEN_HI 1 #define MSG_LEN_MID 2 #define MSG_LEN_LO 3 #define MSG_SEQ_HI 4 #define MSG_SEQ_LO 5 #define MSG_FRAG_OFF_HI 6 #define MSG_FRAG_OFF_MID 7 #define MSG_FRAG_OFF_LO 8 #define MSG_FRAG_LEN_HI 9 #define MSG_FRAG_LEN_MID 10 #define MSG_FRAG_LEN_LO 11 static void dump_data(const char *data, int len) { int rem, i, content, reclen, msglen, fragoff, fraglen, epoch; unsigned char *rec; printf("---- START OF PACKET ----\n"); rem = len; rec = (unsigned char *)data; while (rem > 0) { if (rem != len) printf("*\n"); printf("*---- START OF RECORD ----\n"); if (rem < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { printf("*---- RECORD TRUNCATED ----\n"); break; } content = rec[RECORD_CONTENT_TYPE]; printf("** Record Content-type: %d\n", content); printf("** Record Version: %02x%02x\n", rec[RECORD_VERSION_HI], rec[RECORD_VERSION_LO]); epoch = (rec[RECORD_EPOCH_HI] << 8) | rec[RECORD_EPOCH_LO]; printf("** Record Epoch: %d\n", epoch); printf("** Record Sequence: "); for (i = RECORD_SEQUENCE_START; i <= RECORD_SEQUENCE_END; i++) printf("%02x", rec[i]); reclen = (rec[RECORD_LEN_HI] << 8) | rec[RECORD_LEN_LO]; printf("\n** Record Length: %d\n", reclen); /* Now look at message */ rec += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; rem -= DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (content == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { printf("**---- START OF HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT ----\n"); if (epoch > 0) { printf("**---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT ENCRYPTED ----\n"); } else if (rem < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH || reclen < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { printf("**---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT TRUNCATED ----\n"); } else { printf("*** Message Type: %d\n", rec[MSG_TYPE]); msglen = (rec[MSG_LEN_HI] << 16) | (rec[MSG_LEN_MID] << 8) | rec[MSG_LEN_LO]; printf("*** Message Length: %d\n", msglen); printf("*** Message sequence: %d\n", (rec[MSG_SEQ_HI] << 8) | rec[MSG_SEQ_LO]); fragoff = (rec[MSG_FRAG_OFF_HI] << 16) | (rec[MSG_FRAG_OFF_MID] << 8) | rec[MSG_FRAG_OFF_LO]; printf("*** Message Fragment offset: %d\n", fragoff); fraglen = (rec[MSG_FRAG_LEN_HI] << 16) | (rec[MSG_FRAG_LEN_MID] << 8) | rec[MSG_FRAG_LEN_LO]; printf("*** Message Fragment len: %d\n", fraglen); if (fragoff + fraglen > msglen) printf("***---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT INVALID ----\n"); else if(reclen < fraglen) printf("**---- HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT TRUNCATED ----\n"); else printf("**---- END OF HANDSHAKE MESSAGE FRAGMENT ----\n"); } } if (rem < reclen) { printf("*---- RECORD TRUNCATED ----\n"); rem = 0; } else { rec += reclen; rem -= reclen; printf("*---- END OF RECORD ----\n"); } } printf("---- END OF PACKET ----\n\n"); fflush(stdout); } static int tls_dump_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl) { int ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl); copy_flags(bio); if (ret > 0) { dump_data(out, ret); } return ret; } static int tls_dump_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); ret = BIO_write(next, in, inl); copy_flags(bio); return ret; } static long tls_dump_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(bio); if (next == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static int tls_dump_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size) { /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */ return -1; } static int tls_dump_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str) { return tls_dump_write(bio, str, strlen(str)); } struct mempacket_st { unsigned char *data; int len; unsigned int num; unsigned int type; }; static void mempacket_free(MEMPACKET *pkt) { if (pkt->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(pkt->data); OPENSSL_free(pkt); } typedef struct mempacket_test_ctx_st { STACK_OF(MEMPACKET) *pkts; unsigned int epoch; unsigned int currrec; unsigned int currpkt; unsigned int lastpkt; unsigned int noinject; } MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX; static int mempacket_test_new(BIO *bi); static int mempacket_test_free(BIO *a); static int mempacket_test_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl); static int mempacket_test_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl); static long mempacket_test_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static int mempacket_test_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size); static int mempacket_test_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str); const BIO_METHOD *bio_s_mempacket_test(void) { if (method_mempacket_test == NULL) { method_mempacket_test = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_MEMPACKET_TEST, "Mem Packet Test"); if ( method_mempacket_test == NULL || !BIO_meth_set_write(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_write) || !BIO_meth_set_read(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_read) || !BIO_meth_set_puts(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_puts) || !BIO_meth_set_gets(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_gets) || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_ctrl) || !BIO_meth_set_create(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_new) || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(method_mempacket_test, mempacket_test_free)) return NULL; } return method_mempacket_test; } void bio_s_mempacket_test_free(void) { BIO_meth_free(method_mempacket_test); } static int mempacket_test_new(BIO *bio) { MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; ctx->pkts = sk_MEMPACKET_new_null(); if (ctx->pkts == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return 0; } BIO_set_init(bio, 1); BIO_set_data(bio, ctx); return 1; } static int mempacket_test_free(BIO *bio) { MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio); sk_MEMPACKET_pop_free(ctx->pkts, mempacket_free); OPENSSL_free(ctx); BIO_set_data(bio, NULL); BIO_set_init(bio, 0); return 1; } /* Record Header values */ #define EPOCH_HI 4 #define EPOCH_LO 5 #define RECORD_SEQUENCE 10 #define RECORD_LEN_HI 11 #define RECORD_LEN_LO 12 #define STANDARD_PACKET 0 static int mempacket_test_read(BIO *bio, char *out, int outl) { MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio); MEMPACKET *thispkt; unsigned char *rec; int rem; unsigned int seq, offset, len, epoch; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); thispkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, 0); if (thispkt == NULL || thispkt->num != ctx->currpkt) { /* Probably run out of data */ BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return -1; } (void)sk_MEMPACKET_shift(ctx->pkts); ctx->currpkt++; if (outl > thispkt->len) outl = thispkt->len; if (thispkt->type != INJECT_PACKET_IGNORE_REC_SEQ) { /* * Overwrite the record sequence number. We strictly number them in * the order received. Since we are actually a reliable transport * we know that there won't be any re-ordering. We overwrite to deal * with any packets that have been injected */ rem = thispkt->len; rec = thispkt->data; while (rem > 0) { if (rem < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { return -1; } epoch = (rec[EPOCH_HI] << 8) | rec[EPOCH_LO]; if (epoch != ctx->epoch) { ctx->epoch = epoch; ctx->currrec = 0; } seq = ctx->currrec; offset = 0; do { rec[RECORD_SEQUENCE - offset] = seq & 0xFF; seq >>= 8; offset++; } while (seq > 0); ctx->currrec++; len = ((rec[RECORD_LEN_HI] << 8) | rec[RECORD_LEN_LO]) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; rec += len; rem -= len; } } memcpy(out, thispkt->data, outl); mempacket_free(thispkt); return outl; } int mempacket_test_inject(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl, int pktnum, int type) { MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio); MEMPACKET *thispkt, *looppkt, *nextpkt; int i; if (ctx == NULL) return -1; /* We only allow injection before we've started writing any data */ if (pktnum >= 0) { if (ctx->noinject) return -1; } else { ctx->noinject = 1; } thispkt = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(MEMPACKET)); if (thispkt == NULL) return -1; thispkt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(inl); if (thispkt->data == NULL) { mempacket_free(thispkt); return -1; } memcpy(thispkt->data, in, inl); thispkt->len = inl; thispkt->num = (pktnum >= 0) ? (unsigned int)pktnum : ctx->lastpkt; thispkt->type = type; for(i = 0; (looppkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, i)) != NULL; i++) { /* Check if we found the right place to insert this packet */ if (looppkt->num > thispkt->num) { if (sk_MEMPACKET_insert(ctx->pkts, thispkt, i) == 0) { mempacket_free(thispkt); return -1; } /* If we're doing up front injection then we're done */ if (pktnum >= 0) return inl; /* * We need to do some accounting on lastpkt. We increment it first, * but it might now equal the value of injected packets, so we need * to skip over those */ ctx->lastpkt++; do { i++; nextpkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, i); if (nextpkt != NULL && nextpkt->num == ctx->lastpkt) ctx->lastpkt++; else return inl; } while(1); } else if(looppkt->num == thispkt->num) { if (!ctx->noinject) { /* We injected two packets with the same packet number! */ return -1; } ctx->lastpkt++; thispkt->num++; } } /* * We didn't find any packets with a packet number equal to or greater than * this one, so we just add it onto the end */ if (!sk_MEMPACKET_push(ctx->pkts, thispkt)) { mempacket_free(thispkt); return -1; } if (pktnum < 0) ctx->lastpkt++; return inl; } static int mempacket_test_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) { return mempacket_test_inject(bio, in, inl, -1, STANDARD_PACKET); } static long mempacket_test_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; MEMPACKET_TEST_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(bio); MEMPACKET *thispkt; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_EOF: ret = (long)(sk_MEMPACKET_num(ctx->pkts) == 0); break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = BIO_get_shutdown(bio); break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: BIO_set_shutdown(bio, (int)num); break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0L; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: thispkt = sk_MEMPACKET_value(ctx->pkts, 0); if (thispkt == NULL) ret = 0; else ret = thispkt->len; break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_RESET: case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: case BIO_CTRL_POP: default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static int mempacket_test_gets(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size) { /* We don't support this - not needed anyway */ return -1; } static int mempacket_test_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str) { return mempacket_test_write(bio, str, strlen(str)); } int create_ssl_ctx_pair(const SSL_METHOD *sm, const SSL_METHOD *cm, SSL_CTX **sctx, SSL_CTX **cctx, char *certfile, char *privkeyfile) { SSL_CTX *serverctx = NULL; SSL_CTX *clientctx = NULL; serverctx = SSL_CTX_new(sm); if (cctx != NULL) clientctx = SSL_CTX_new(cm); if (serverctx == NULL || (cctx != NULL && clientctx == NULL)) { printf("Failed to create SSL_CTX\n"); goto err; } if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(serverctx, certfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { printf("Failed to load server certificate\n"); goto err; } if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(serverctx, privkeyfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { printf("Failed to load server private key\n"); } if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(serverctx) <= 0) { printf("Failed to check private key\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(serverctx, 1); #endif *sctx = serverctx; if (cctx != NULL) *cctx = clientctx; return 1; err: SSL_CTX_free(serverctx); SSL_CTX_free(clientctx); return 0; } #define MAXLOOPS 100000 /* * NOTE: Transfers control of the BIOs - this function will free them on error */ int create_ssl_objects(SSL_CTX *serverctx, SSL_CTX *clientctx, SSL **sssl, SSL **cssl, BIO *s_to_c_fbio, BIO *c_to_s_fbio) { SSL *serverssl, *clientssl; BIO *s_to_c_bio = NULL, *c_to_s_bio = NULL; if (*sssl == NULL) serverssl = SSL_new(serverctx); else serverssl = *sssl; if (*cssl == NULL) clientssl = SSL_new(clientctx); else clientssl = *cssl; if (serverssl == NULL || clientssl == NULL) { printf("Failed to create SSL object\n"); goto error; } if (SSL_is_dtls(clientssl)) { s_to_c_bio = BIO_new(bio_s_mempacket_test()); c_to_s_bio = BIO_new(bio_s_mempacket_test()); } else { s_to_c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); c_to_s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); } if (s_to_c_bio == NULL || c_to_s_bio == NULL) { printf("Failed to create mem BIOs\n"); goto error; } if (s_to_c_fbio != NULL) s_to_c_bio = BIO_push(s_to_c_fbio, s_to_c_bio); if (c_to_s_fbio != NULL) c_to_s_bio = BIO_push(c_to_s_fbio, c_to_s_bio); if (s_to_c_bio == NULL || c_to_s_bio == NULL) { printf("Failed to create chained BIOs\n"); goto error; } /* Set Non-blocking IO behaviour */ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(s_to_c_bio, -1); BIO_set_mem_eof_return(c_to_s_bio, -1); /* Up ref these as we are passing them to two SSL objects */ BIO_up_ref(s_to_c_bio); BIO_up_ref(c_to_s_bio); SSL_set_bio(serverssl, c_to_s_bio, s_to_c_bio); SSL_set_bio(clientssl, s_to_c_bio, c_to_s_bio); /* BIOs will now be freed when SSL objects are freed */ s_to_c_bio = c_to_s_bio = NULL; s_to_c_fbio = c_to_s_fbio = NULL; *sssl = serverssl; *cssl = clientssl; return 1; error: SSL_free(serverssl); SSL_free(clientssl); BIO_free(s_to_c_bio); BIO_free(c_to_s_bio); BIO_free(s_to_c_fbio); BIO_free(c_to_s_fbio); return 0; } int create_ssl_connection(SSL *serverssl, SSL *clientssl) { int retc = -1, rets = -1, err, abortctr = 0; int clienterr = 0, servererr = 0; do { err = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; while (!clienterr && retc <= 0 && err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { retc = SSL_connect(clientssl); if (retc <= 0) err = SSL_get_error(clientssl, retc); } if (!clienterr && retc <= 0 && err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { printf("SSL_connect() failed %d, %d\n", retc, err); clienterr = 1; } err = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; while (!servererr && rets <= 0 && err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { rets = SSL_accept(serverssl); if (rets <= 0) err = SSL_get_error(serverssl, rets); } if (!servererr && rets <= 0 && err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { printf("SSL_accept() failed %d, %d\n", retc, err); servererr = 1; } if (clienterr && servererr) return 0; if (++abortctr == MAXLOOPS) { printf("No progress made\n"); return 0; } } while (retc <=0 || rets <= 0); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/CAtsa.cnf0000644000000000000000000001153713176625661014527 0ustar rootroot # # This config is used by the Time Stamp Authority tests. # RANDFILE = ./.rnd # Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info: oid_section = new_oids TSDNSECT = ts_cert_dn INDEX = 1 [ new_oids ] # Policies used by the TSA tests. tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1 tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6 tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7 #---------------------------------------------------------------------- [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section [ CA_default ] dir = ./demoCA certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept database = $dir/index.txt # database index file. new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts # default place for new certs. certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA certificate serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # private random number file default_days = 365 # how long to certify for default_md = sha256 # which md to use. preserve = no # keep passed DN ordering policy = policy_match # For the CA policy [ policy_match ] countryName = supplied stateOrProvinceName = supplied organizationName = supplied organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional #---------------------------------------------------------------------- [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_md = sha1 distinguished_name = $ENV::TSDNSECT encrypt_rsa_key = no prompt = no # attributes = req_attributes x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert string_mask = nombstr [ ts_ca_dn ] countryName = HU stateOrProvinceName = Budapest localityName = Budapest organizationName = Gov-CA Ltd. commonName = ca1 [ ts_cert_dn ] countryName = HU stateOrProvinceName = Budapest localityName = Buda organizationName = Hun-TSA Ltd. commonName = tsa$ENV::INDEX [ tsa_cert ] # TSA server cert is not a CA cert. basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # The following key usage flags are needed for TSA server certificates. keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always [ non_tsa_cert ] # This is not a CA cert and not a TSA cert, either (timeStamping usage missing) basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # The following key usage flags are needed for TSA server certificates. keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature # timeStamping is not supported by this certificate # extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always [ v3_req ] # Extensions to add to a certificate request basicConstraints = CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always basicConstraints = critical,CA:true keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign #---------------------------------------------------------------------- [ tsa ] default_tsa = tsa_config1 # the default TSA section [ tsa_config1 ] # These are used by the TSA reply generation only. dir = . # TSA root directory serial = $dir/tsa_serial # The current serial number (mandatory) signer_cert = $dir/tsa_cert1.pem # The TSA signing certificate # (optional) certs = $dir/tsaca.pem # Certificate chain to include in reply # (optional) signer_key = $dir/tsa_key1.pem # The TSA private key (optional) signer_digest = sha256 # Signing digest to use. (Optional) default_policy = tsa_policy1 # Policy if request did not specify it # (optional) other_policies = tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3 # acceptable policies (optional) digests = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 # Acceptable message digests (mandatory) accuracy = secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100 # (optional) ordering = yes # Is ordering defined for timestamps? # (optional, default: no) tsa_name = yes # Must the TSA name be included in the reply? # (optional, default: no) ess_cert_id_chain = yes # Must the ESS cert id chain be included? # (optional, default: no) [ tsa_config2 ] # This configuration uses a certificate which doesn't have timeStamping usage. # These are used by the TSA reply generation only. dir = . # TSA root directory serial = $dir/tsa_serial # The current serial number (mandatory) signer_cert = $dir/tsa_cert2.pem # The TSA signing certificate # (optional) certs = $dir/demoCA/cacert.pem# Certificate chain to include in reply # (optional) signer_key = $dir/tsa_key2.pem # The TSA private key (optional) signer_digest = sha256 # Signing digest to use. (Optional) default_policy = tsa_policy1 # Policy if request did not specify it # (optional) other_policies = tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3 # acceptable policies (optional) digests = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 # Acceptable message digests (mandatory) openssl-1.1.0g/test/danetest.in0000644000000000000000000025713013176625661015204 0ustar rootroot# Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # Blank and comment lines ignored. # # The first line in each block takes the form: # # # # It is followed by lines of the form: # # # # and finally, by certificates. # Test chain matching TLSA records # -- # subject= CN = example.com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subject= CN = Issuer CA # 2 0 0 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 # 2 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD # 2 0 2 6BC0C0F2500320A49392910965263A3EBDD594173D3E36CCE38A003D2EC3FAFBC315EDB776CD3139637DF494FB60359601542A4F821BF0542F926E6270C9762C # 2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200047D4BAE18B49F5DC69D0A3C85C66A3E2119DE92CFAD081FAD55C12D510EC97B6C00E13695A8D9713548FE60DF15573390433E2A1BD92DB4B7AA016EC6185DC5AF # 2 1 1 65A457617072DA3E7F1152471EB3D406526530097D0A9AA34EB47C990A1FCDA3 # 2 1 2 1F484106F765B6F1AC483CC509CDAD36486A83D1BA115F562516F407C1109303658408B455824DA0785A252B205DBEECB1AFB5DB869E8AAC242091B63F258F05 # -- # subject= CN = Root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enumber: # << 'EOF' perl -pe 'BEGIN {$t = 0; $/="\n\n"} if (s/\A\s*# \d+\s*?\n//sm) {printf "# %d\n", ++$t}' ## -- Anonymous and "never valid" leaf certificate DANE-EE(3) tests # 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 1 588FD5F414E3327EAFE3169DC040AE161247D1296BF38304AB9CF464850A1365 subject= issuer= notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68 A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1 yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y= -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 2 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 05C66146D7909EAE2379825F6D0F5284146B79598DA12E403DC29C33147CF33E subject= issuer= notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68 A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1 yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y= -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 3 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 2 42BEE929852C8063A0D619B53D0DD35703BBAD2FC25F2055F737C7A14DDFEA544491F8C00F50FA083BD0AD1B5C98529994FF811BBA5E5170CC6EE9F3ED5563E1 subject= issuer= notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68 A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1 yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y= -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 4 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 2 D91A3E5DC34879CD77AD1E989F56FA78FACADF05EF8D445EDF5652BD58EE392C87C02F84C0119D62309041F2D5128A73399DF25D1F47BCD497357EAF1A1009A3 subject= issuer= notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68 A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1 yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y= -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 5 1 1 1 65 -1 3 0 1 588FD5F414E3327EAFE3169DC040AE161247D1296BF38304AB9CF464850A1366 subject= issuer= notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68 A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1 yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y= -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 6 1 1 1 65 -1 3 1 1 05C66146D7909EAE2379825F6D0F5284146B79598DA12E403DC29C33147CF33F subject= issuer= notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68 A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1 yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y= -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 7 1 1 1 65 -1 3 0 2 42BEE929852C8063A0D619B53D0DD35703BBAD2FC25F2055F737C7A14DDFEA544491F8C00F50FA083BD0AD1B5C98529994FF811BBA5E5170CC6EE9F3ED5563E2 subject= issuer= notBefore=Dec 14 00:10:34 2015 GMT notAfter=Dec 13 00:10:34 2015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIHsMIGToAMCAQICAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwADAeFw0xNTEyMTQwMDEwMzRaFw0x NTEyMTMwMDEwMzRaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATFpP+gCO68 A2m5dHmflHnLRzYFRPr8AsQgT7PfMeiKGk8YyFgx6T+YXFsjEJRUG0MWtcscnAyV CIb+EUPzn2EJMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIGrnt6hw3yEIHpqYlgIKr4VgmEh1 yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y= -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 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31 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 2 361029F20A3B59DAFAAF05D41811EFC1A9439B972BC6B9D7F13BC5469570E49ACAE0CB0C877C75D58346590EA950AC7A39AED6E8AA8004EA7F5DE3AB9462047E subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 32 1 3 0 0 2 0 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- ## -- PKIX-?? chain failures -- # 33 # Missing intermediate CA 1 1 0 20 0 1 0 1 BEDC04764CECAE80AEE454D332758F50847DCA424216466E4012E0DEAE1F2E5F subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 34 # Missing PKIX intermediate, provided via DNS 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 3111668338043DE264D0256A702248696C9484B6221A42740F920187B4C61838 0 0 0 308201683082010DA003020102020102300A06082A8648CE3D04030230123110300E06035504030C07526F6F742043413020170D3135313231333233323030395A180F33303135303431353233323030395A30143112301006035504030C094973737565722043413059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200047D4BAE18B49F5DC69D0A3C85C66A3E2119DE92CFAD081FAD55C12D510EC97B6C00E13695A8D9713548FE60DF15573390433E2A1BD92DB4B7AA016EC6185DC5AFA350304E301D0603551D0E041604147AB75A3CD295CA5DF7C5150916E18FF5CC376A15301F0603551D23041830168014E4BD405F052A820DDF9883F93D7D3F90AAEC723F300C0603551D13040530030101FF300A06082A8648CE3D0403020349003046022100831DCD882DA8785D50E41020898C0248879DDDF72D701D1DC1DE6BE08155B43E022100B84B2FB519C4CD3CBC791603D4488F7707597DB7980D9C173E7FDD0ECD7CA308 subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 35 # Wrong leaf digest 1 3 0 65 -1 1 0 2 F756CCD61F3CA50D017653911701CA0052AF0B29E273DD263DD23643D86D4369D03686BD1369EF54BB2DC2DAE3CE4F05AF39D54648F94D54AA86B259AEAD9924 subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 36 # Wrong intermediate digest 1 2 0 65 -1 0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBE subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 37 # Wrong root digest 1 2 0 65 -1 0 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3D subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- ## -- Mixed usage cases # 38 # DANE-EE(3) beats DANE-TA(2) 1 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 CB861AF6DDED185EE04472A9092052CCC735120C34785E72C996C94B122EBA6F329BE630B1B4C6E2756E7A75392C21E253C6AEACC31FD45FF4595DED375FAF62 2 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 39 # DANE-TA(2) depth 1 beats DANE-TA(2) depth 2 1 3 0 0 1 2 1 2 1F484106F765B6F1AC483CC509CDAD36486A83D1BA115F562516F407C1109303658408B455824DA0785A252B205DBEECB1AFB5DB869E8AAC242091B63F258F05 2 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 40 # DANE-TA(2) depth 2 beats PKIX-TA(0) depth 1 1 3 0 0 2 2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C 0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 41 # DANE-TA(2) depth 2 beats PKIX-EE depth 0 1 3 0 0 2 2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C 0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Root CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9 1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3 bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 42 # DANE-TA(2) Full(0) root "from DNS": 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 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 subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 43 # DANE-TA(2) Full(0) intermediate "from DNS": 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 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 subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 44 # DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) intermediate "from DNS": 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200047D4BAE18B49F5DC69D0A3C85C66A3E2119DE92CFAD081FAD55C12D510EC97B6C00E13695A8D9713548FE60DF15573390433E2A1BD92DB4B7AA016EC6185DC5AF subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 45 # DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) root "from DNS": 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004D1DA578FD18FB86456B0D91B5656BDD68D4DDBD250E337571127C75E0560F41D0AF91BFAF8805F80C28C026A14D4FE8C30A9673B9EC0C05A84AA810D1341B76C subject= /CN=example.com issuer= /CN=Issuer CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:23:52 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:23:52 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBlDCCATugAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJc3N1ZXIg Q0EwIBcNMTUxMjEzMjMyMzUyWhgPMzAxNTA0MTUyMzIzNTJaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMM C2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEZkmV9HveNee0 3kiyWOnooHreu9uGOz0G9IGhlGyD2p9Wz/TZOJuFXS82SxWFsMc0/PomMCaWT/Wk MIs/yHm9uKN6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFFsgykF9kIjHpMAXy2wMHHObsH2KMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFHq3WjzSlcpd98UVCRbhj/XMN2oVMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID RwAwRAIfIckDKlyKk4ctP0rvMhqVdN2VbUO9k8NplExy1pAoWAIhAMizKQ16835X GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= /CN=Issuer CA issuer= /CN=Root CA notBefore=Dec 13 23:20:09 2015 GMT notAfter=Apr 15 23:20:09 3015 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMjAwOVoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMyMDA5WjAUMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlJ c3N1ZXIgQ0EwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR9S64YtJ9dxp0KPIXG aj4hGd6Sz60IH61VwS1RDsl7bADhNpWo2XE1SP5g3xVXM5BDPiob2S20t6oBbsYY XcWvo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUerdaPNKVyl33xRUJFuGP9cw3ahUwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAU5L1AXwUqgg3fmIP5PX0/kKrscj8wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1 GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 46 # Mismatched name "example.org", should still succeed given a # DANE-EE(3) match. 1 3 1 0 0 3 1 1 ee1477190203f5d8b4767f4451b89e7367cdec7f6965a4988227983562ac8270 subject= CN = example.org issuer= CN = CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:47 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:47 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBkDCCATWgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAOMQwwCgYDVQQDDANDQTIwIBcN MTYwMjA2MjIzOTQ3WhgPMjExNjAyMDcyMjM5NDdaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMMC2V4YW1w bGUub3JnMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE/YCEn0pxClPTvpjioxU4 ajopRa4j/6XTqxy9zqn1AcMCiVWp6j22B6RpLmKEHoRHQxFzebd2juTXIDq81CID z6N6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOrSA+2YKXa5KR6k0687CZuhai5OMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYB BQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIh AKSsLwlidPiSrgda6XWihov4D4KHu6ZX3ZAAZ2uiBAefAiEArCq5WiO3Zeunl0Ct PyDiaL1QKbJ7lnqPQCS1o8xn+RI= -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:13 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:13 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb +/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo 7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = Root CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:38:48 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:38:48 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1 42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 47 # Mismatched name "example.org", should fail despite a DANE-TA(2) # match for the intermediate CA. 1 3 0 62 1 2 1 1 946af0956378efaba7ee1bbedc17af110ea8de19c079a98e77398724a3708a1f subject= CN = example.org issuer= CN = CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:47 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:47 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBkDCCATWgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAOMQwwCgYDVQQDDANDQTIwIBcN MTYwMjA2MjIzOTQ3WhgPMjExNjAyMDcyMjM5NDdaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMMC2V4YW1w bGUub3JnMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE/YCEn0pxClPTvpjioxU4 ajopRa4j/6XTqxy9zqn1AcMCiVWp6j22B6RpLmKEHoRHQxFzebd2juTXIDq81CID z6N6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOrSA+2YKXa5KR6k0687CZuhai5OMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYB BQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIh AKSsLwlidPiSrgda6XWihov4D4KHu6ZX3ZAAZ2uiBAefAiEArCq5WiO3Zeunl0Ct PyDiaL1QKbJ7lnqPQCS1o8xn+RI= -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:13 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:13 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb +/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo 7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = Root CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:38:48 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:38:48 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1 42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 48 # Mismatched name "example.org", should fail despite a DANE-TA(2) # match for the root CA. 1 3 0 62 2 2 1 1 34474f2fbc39da44dfbd11215bdafadf9507406c04de1f65dbd2a1bc4f2165cc subject= CN = example.org issuer= CN = CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:47 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:47 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBkDCCATWgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAOMQwwCgYDVQQDDANDQTIwIBcN MTYwMjA2MjIzOTQ3WhgPMjExNjAyMDcyMjM5NDdaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMMC2V4YW1w bGUub3JnMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE/YCEn0pxClPTvpjioxU4 ajopRa4j/6XTqxy9zqn1AcMCiVWp6j22B6RpLmKEHoRHQxFzebd2juTXIDq81CID z6N6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOrSA+2YKXa5KR6k0687CZuhai5OMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYB BQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIh AKSsLwlidPiSrgda6XWihov4D4KHu6ZX3ZAAZ2uiBAefAiEArCq5WiO3Zeunl0Ct PyDiaL1QKbJ7lnqPQCS1o8xn+RI= -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:13 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:13 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb +/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo 7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = Root CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:38:48 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:38:48 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1 42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- # 49 # Mismatched name "example.org", should fail when name checks # are not disabled for DANE-EE(3). 1 3 0 62 0 3 1 1 ee1477190203f5d8b4767f4451b89e7367cdec7f6965a4988227983562ac8270 subject= CN = example.org issuer= CN = CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:47 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:47 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBkDCCATWgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAOMQwwCgYDVQQDDANDQTIwIBcN MTYwMjA2MjIzOTQ3WhgPMjExNjAyMDcyMjM5NDdaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMMC2V4YW1w bGUub3JnMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE/YCEn0pxClPTvpjioxU4 ajopRa4j/6XTqxy9zqn1AcMCiVWp6j22B6RpLmKEHoRHQxFzebd2juTXIDq81CID z6N6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOrSA+2YKXa5KR6k0687CZuhai5OMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYB BQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIh AKSsLwlidPiSrgda6XWihov4D4KHu6ZX3ZAAZ2uiBAefAiEArCq5WiO3Zeunl0Ct PyDiaL1QKbJ7lnqPQCS1o8xn+RI= -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:13 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:13 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb +/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo 7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= CN = Root CA2 issuer= CN = Root CA2 notBefore=Feb 6 22:38:48 2016 GMT notAfter=Feb 7 22:38:48 2116 GMT -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1 42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/ideatest.c0000644000000000000000000001215213176625661015004 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No IDEA support\n"); return (0); } #else # include static const unsigned char k[16] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x08 }; static const unsigned char in[8] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x03 }; static const unsigned char c[8] = { 0x11, 0xFB, 0xED, 0x2B, 0x01, 0x98, 0x6D, 0xE5 }; static unsigned char out[80]; static const char text[] = "Hello to all people out there"; static const unsigned char cfb_key[16] = { 0xe1, 0xf0, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0x87, 0x96, 0x69, 0x78, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x0f, 0x1e, }; static const unsigned char cfb_iv[80] = { 0x34, 0x12, 0x78, 0x56, 0xab, 0x90, 0xef, 0xcd }; static unsigned char cfb_buf1[40], cfb_buf2[40], cfb_tmp[8]; # define CFB_TEST_SIZE 24 static const unsigned char plain[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = { 0x4e, 0x6f, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20 }; static const unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = { 0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A, 0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45 /*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38, 0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9, 0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/ }; static int cfb64_test(const unsigned char *cfb_cipher); static char *pt(unsigned char *p); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, err = 0; IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE key, dkey; unsigned char iv[8]; IDEA_set_encrypt_key(k, &key); IDEA_ecb_encrypt(in, out, &key); if (memcmp(out, c, 8) != 0) { printf("ecb idea error encrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", out[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", c[i]); err = 20; printf("\n"); } IDEA_set_decrypt_key(&key, &dkey); IDEA_ecb_encrypt(c, out, &dkey); if (memcmp(out, in, 8) != 0) { printf("ecb idea error decrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", out[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", in[i]); printf("\n"); err = 3; } if (err == 0) printf("ecb idea ok\n"); memcpy(iv, k, 8); IDEA_cbc_encrypt((unsigned char *)text, out, strlen(text) + 1, &key, iv, 1); memcpy(iv, k, 8); IDEA_cbc_encrypt(out, out, 8, &dkey, iv, 0); IDEA_cbc_encrypt(&(out[8]), &(out[8]), strlen(text) + 1 - 8, &dkey, iv, 0); if (memcmp(text, out, strlen(text) + 1) != 0) { printf("cbc idea bad\n"); err = 4; } else printf("cbc idea ok\n"); printf("cfb64 idea "); if (cfb64_test(cfb_cipher64)) { printf("bad\n"); err = 5; } else printf("ok\n"); EXIT(err); } static int cfb64_test(const unsigned char *cfb_cipher) { IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE eks, dks; int err = 0, i, n; IDEA_set_encrypt_key(cfb_key, &eks); IDEA_set_decrypt_key(&eks, &dks); memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, 8); n = 0; IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(plain, cfb_buf1, (long)12, &eks, cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_ENCRYPT); IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(&(plain[12]), &(cfb_buf1[12]), (long)CFB_TEST_SIZE - 12, &eks, cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cfb_cipher, cfb_buf1, CFB_TEST_SIZE) != 0) { err = 1; printf("IDEA_cfb64_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < CFB_TEST_SIZE; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf1[i]))); } memcpy(cfb_tmp, cfb_iv, 8); n = 0; IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1, cfb_buf2, (long)13, &eks, cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_DECRYPT); IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[13]), &(cfb_buf2[13]), (long)CFB_TEST_SIZE - 13, &eks, cfb_tmp, &n, IDEA_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(plain, cfb_buf2, CFB_TEST_SIZE) != 0) { err = 1; printf("IDEA_cfb_encrypt decrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 8) printf("%s\n", pt(&(cfb_buf2[i]))); } return (err); } static char *pt(unsigned char *p) { static char bufs[10][20]; static int bnum = 0; char *ret; int i; static char *f = "0123456789ABCDEF"; ret = &(bufs[bnum++][0]); bnum %= 10; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { ret[i * 2] = f[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; ret[i * 2 + 1] = f[p[i] & 0xf]; } ret[16] = '\0'; return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/wp_test.c0000644000000000000000000002032413176625662014670 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL) int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No Whirlpool support\n"); return (0); } #else /* ISO/IEC 10118-3 test vector set */ static const unsigned char iso_test_1[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x19, 0xFA, 0x61, 0xD7, 0x55, 0x22, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x9B, 0x44, 0xE3, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x2E, 0x17, 0x26, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x23, 0x21, 0x30, 0xD4, 0x07, 0xF8, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0x96, 0x49, 0x97, 0xF7, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xBE, 0x69, 0x8B, 0x28, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0xCF, 0x88, 0xE3, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x57, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x64, 0xE5, 0x9B, 0x63, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x08, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xCC, 0x42, 0xA6, 0x6E, 0xB3 }; static const unsigned char iso_test_2[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x8A, 0xCA, 0x26, 0x02, 0x79, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0x6F, 0x11, 0xA6, 0x72, 0x06, 0x53, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xF0, 0xDF, 0xF5, 0x94, 0x13, 0x14, 0x5E, 0x69, 0x73, 0xC4, 0x50, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x08, 0x7B, 0x42, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0xC6, 0x45, 0x41, 0x3A, 0xEF, 0xF6, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x39, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x14, 0x5A, 0x59, 0x1A, 0x92, 0x20, 0x0D, 0x56, 0x01, 0x95, 0xE5, 0x3B, 0x47, 0x85, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xAE, 0x23, 0x1A }; static const unsigned char iso_test_3[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x4E, 0x24, 0x48, 0xA4, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x86, 0xBB, 0x16, 0xB6, 0x56, 0x2C, 0x73, 0xB4, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xF3, 0x04, 0x3E, 0x3A, 0x73, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x72, 0x1A, 0xE1, 0xB3, 0x03, 0xD9, 0x7E, 0x6D, 0x4C, 0x71, 0x81, 0xEE, 0xBD, 0xB6, 0xC5, 0x7E, 0x27, 0x7D, 0x0E, 0x34, 0x95, 0x71, 0x14, 0xCB, 0xD6, 0xC7, 0x97, 0xFC, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xD8, 0xB5, 0x82, 0xD2, 0x25, 0x29, 0x20, 0x76, 0xD4, 0xEE, 0xF5 }; static const unsigned char iso_test_4[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x37, 0x8C, 0x84, 0xA4, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x2D, 0xC6, 0xE5, 0x6D, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x58, 0x37, 0x7A, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x00, 0x03, 0x22, 0x30, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0xF5, 0x70, 0x0C, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x4D, 0x3B, 0x84, 0x21, 0x55, 0x76, 0x59, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xC1, 0x06, 0xB4, 0xB5, 0x2A, 0xC5, 0xA4, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x92, 0xED, 0x92, 0x00, 0x52, 0x83, 0x8F, 0x33, 0x62, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xBD, 0x37, 0xA8, 0x90, 0x3E }; static const unsigned char iso_test_5[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x54, 0x66, 0x26, 0x36, 0xFF, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x82, 0xEB, 0xB9, 0x21, 0x2A, 0x48, 0x4A, 0x8D, 0x38, 0x63, 0x1E, 0xAD, 0x42, 0x38, 0xF5, 0x44, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0x3B, 0x80, 0x54, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x08, 0xBF, 0x2A, 0x92, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x0B, 0x6A, 0x0B, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x17, 0x7A, 0xB4, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0x8F, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x07, 0x86, 0x5D, 0x5D, 0x98, 0x19, 0xA3, 0xDB, 0xA4, 0xEB, 0x3B }; static const unsigned char iso_test_6[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0xDC, 0x37, 0xE0, 0x08, 0xCF, 0x9E, 0xE6, 0x9B, 0xF1, 0x1F, 0x00, 0xED, 0x9A, 0xBA, 0x26, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xD7, 0xC2, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xC0, 0x66, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0x2E, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0x3A, 0x1E, 0x08, 0xEB, 0xA2, 0x66, 0x29, 0x12, 0x9D, 0x8F, 0xB7, 0xCB, 0x57, 0x21, 0x1B, 0x92, 0x81, 0xA6, 0x55, 0x17, 0xCC, 0x87, 0x9D, 0x7B, 0x96, 0x21, 0x42, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0xF0, 0x14, 0x67 }; static const unsigned char iso_test_7[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x46, 0x6E, 0xF1, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x4D, 0x25, 0xB9, 0xD3, 0x8A, 0x64, 0x14, 0xF5, 0xC0, 0x87, 0x84, 0x37, 0x2B, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x04, 0xD6, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xDB, 0x60, 0x14, 0x29, 0x4D, 0x5B, 0xD8, 0xDF, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x44, 0xE5, 0x38, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x7B, 0x26, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x1A, 0x2C, 0x60, 0x48, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC5, 0xA2, 0x0B, 0x2C, 0x2A, 0x80, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0x9A, 0x08, 0x3B }; static const unsigned char iso_test_8[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x2A, 0x98, 0x7E, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x91, 0x70, 0x61, 0xF5, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xA0, 0xE4, 0x64, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x8A, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x52, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x65, 0x62, 0x07, 0xC5, 0x62, 0xF9, 0x88, 0xE9, 0x5C, 0x69, 0x16, 0xBD, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x1B, 0xC5, 0xBE, 0x1B, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x76, 0x39, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x0B, 0x56, 0x93, 0x9B, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xAD, 0xFF, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0x74, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x18, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0xFD }; static const unsigned char iso_test_9[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH] = { 0x0C, 0x99, 0x00, 0x5B, 0xEB, 0x57, 0xEF, 0xF5, 0x0A, 0x7C, 0xF0, 0x05, 0x56, 0x0D, 0xDF, 0x5D, 0x29, 0x05, 0x7F, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x20, 0xBF, 0xD6, 0x2D, 0xEC, 0xA0, 0xF1, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x54, 0x90, 0xED, 0xDC, 0x47, 0xAF, 0x32, 0xBB, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xC3, 0x4F, 0xF9, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0x60, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x77, 0x12, 0x69, 0x53, 0xB2, 0x26, 0xE4, 0xED, 0x8B, 0x01 }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { unsigned char md[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int i; WHIRLPOOL_CTX ctx; fprintf(stdout, "Testing Whirlpool "); WHIRLPOOL("", 0, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_1, sizeof(iso_test_1))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 1 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL("a", 1, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_2, sizeof(iso_test_2))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 2 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL("abc", 3, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_3, sizeof(iso_test_3))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 3 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL("message digest", 14, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_4, sizeof(iso_test_4))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 4 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", 26, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_5, sizeof(iso_test_5))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 5 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" "0123456789", 62, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_6, sizeof(iso_test_6))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 6 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL("1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890" "1234567890", 80, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_7, sizeof(iso_test_7))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 7 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL("abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijk", 32, md); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_8, sizeof(iso_test_8))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 8 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); WHIRLPOOL_Init(&ctx); for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i += 288) WHIRLPOOL_Update(&ctx, "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa" "aaaaaaaa", (1000000 - i) < 288 ? 1000000 - i : 288); WHIRLPOOL_Final(md, &ctx); if (memcmp(md, iso_test_9, sizeof(iso_test_9))) { fflush(stdout); fprintf(stderr, "\nTEST 9 of 9 failed.\n"); return 1; } else fprintf(stdout, "."); fflush(stdout); fprintf(stdout, " passed.\n"); fflush(stdout); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/packettest.c0000644000000000000000000003565013176625661015361 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "../ssl/packet_locl.h" #define BUF_LEN 255 static int test_PACKET_remaining(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 1) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_remaining() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_end(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN || PACKET_end(&pkt) != buf + BUF_LEN || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 1) || PACKET_end(&pkt) != buf + BUF_LEN || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1) || PACKET_end(&pkt) != buf + BUF_LEN) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_end() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_1(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned int i; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i) || i != 0x02 || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 2) || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i) || i != 0xfe || PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_1() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_4(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned long i; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_get_4(&pkt, &i) || i != 0x08060402UL || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8) || !PACKET_get_4(&pkt, &i) || i != 0xfefcfaf8UL || PACKET_get_4(&pkt, &i)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_4() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_net_2(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned int i; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i) || i != 0x0204 || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 4) || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i) || i != 0xfcfe || PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_net_2() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_net_3(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned long i; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &i) || i != 0x020406UL || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 6) || !PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &i) || i != 0xfafcfeUL || PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &i)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_net_3() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_net_4(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned long i; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &i) || i != 0x02040608UL || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8) || !PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &i) || i != 0xf8fafcfeUL || PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &i)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_net_4() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_sub_packet(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { PACKET pkt, subpkt; unsigned long i; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &subpkt, 4) || !PACKET_get_net_4(&subpkt, &i) || i != 0x02040608UL || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &subpkt, 4) || !PACKET_get_net_4(&subpkt, &i) || i != 0xf8fafcfeUL || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) || PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &subpkt, 4)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_sub_packet() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_bytes(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { const unsigned char *bytes; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &bytes, 4) || bytes[0] != 2 || bytes[1] != 4 || bytes[2] != 6 || bytes[3] != 8 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN -4 || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &bytes, 4) || bytes[0] != 0xf8 || bytes[1] != 0xfa || bytes[2] != 0xfc || bytes[3] != 0xfe || PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_bytes() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_copy_bytes(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned char bytes[4]; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, bytes, 4) || bytes[0] != 2 || bytes[1] != 4 || bytes[2] != 6 || bytes[3] != 8 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN - 4 || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 8) || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, bytes, 4) || bytes[0] != 0xf8 || bytes[1] != 0xfa || bytes[2] != 0xfc || bytes[3] != 0xfe || PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_copy_bytes() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_copy_all(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned char tmp[BUF_LEN]; PACKET pkt; size_t len; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_copy_all(&pkt, tmp, BUF_LEN, &len) || len != BUF_LEN || memcmp(buf, tmp, BUF_LEN) != 0 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN || PACKET_copy_all(&pkt, tmp, BUF_LEN - 1, &len)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_copy_bytes() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_memdup(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { unsigned char *data = NULL; size_t len; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_memdup(&pkt, &data, &len) || len != BUF_LEN || memcmp(data, PACKET_data(&pkt), len) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 10) || !PACKET_memdup(&pkt, &data, &len) || len != BUF_LEN - 10 || memcmp(data, PACKET_data(&pkt), len)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_memdup() failed\n"); OPENSSL_free(data); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(data); return 1; } static int test_PACKET_strndup() { char buf[10], buf2[10]; char *data = NULL; PACKET pkt; memset(buf, 'x', 10); memset(buf2, 'y', 10); buf2[5] = '\0'; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf, 10) || !PACKET_strndup(&pkt, &data) || strlen(data) != 10 || strncmp(data, buf, 10) || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf2, 10) || !PACKET_strndup(&pkt, &data) || strlen(data) != 5 || strcmp(data, buf2)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_strndup failed\n"); OPENSSL_free(data); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(data); return 1; } static int test_PACKET_contains_zero_byte() { char buf[10], buf2[10]; PACKET pkt; memset(buf, 'x', 10); memset(buf2, 'y', 10); buf2[5] = '\0'; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf, 10) || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&pkt) || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, (unsigned char*)buf2, 10) || !PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&pkt)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_contains_zero_byte failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_forward(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { const unsigned char *byte; PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &byte, 1) || byte[0] != 4 || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, BUF_LEN - 3) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &byte, 1) || byte[0] != 0xfe) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_forward() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_buf_init() { unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]; PACKET pkt; /* Also tests PACKET_remaining() */ if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 4) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 4 || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN || PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_buf_init() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_null_init() { PACKET pkt; PACKET_null_init(&pkt); if ( PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0 || PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_null_init() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_equal(unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]) { PACKET pkt; if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 4) || !PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, 4) || PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf + 1, 4) || !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN - 1) || PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN + 1) || PACKET_equal(&pkt, buf, 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_equal() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1() { unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]; const size_t len = 16; unsigned int i; PACKET pkt, short_pkt, subpkt; buf[0] = len; for (i = 1; i < BUF_LEN; i++) { buf[i] = (i * 2) & 0xff; } if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_buf_init(&short_pkt, buf, len) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &i) || i != 0x0204 || PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&short_pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&short_pkt) != len) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2() { unsigned char buf[1024]; const size_t len = 516; /* 0x0204 */ unsigned int i; PACKET pkt, short_pkt, subpkt; for (i = 1; i <= 1024; i++) { buf[i-1] = (i * 2) & 0xff; } if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 1024) || !PACKET_buf_init(&short_pkt, buf, len) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &i) || i != 0x0608 || PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&short_pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&short_pkt) != len) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3() { unsigned char buf[1024]; const size_t len = 516; /* 0x000204 */ unsigned int i; PACKET pkt, short_pkt, subpkt; for (i = 0; i < 1024; i++) { buf[i] = (i * 2) & 0xff; } if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 1024) || !PACKET_buf_init(&short_pkt, buf, len) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &i) || i != 0x0608 || PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&short_pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&short_pkt) != len) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1() { unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]; const size_t len = 16; unsigned int i; PACKET pkt, exact_pkt, subpkt; buf[0] = len; for (i = 1; i < BUF_LEN; i++) { buf[i] = (i * 2) & 0xff; } if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, BUF_LEN) || !PACKET_buf_init(&exact_pkt, buf, len + 1) || PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != BUF_LEN || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&exact_pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&exact_pkt) != 0 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2() { unsigned char buf[1024]; const size_t len = 516; /* 0x0204 */ unsigned int i; PACKET pkt, exact_pkt, subpkt; for (i = 1; i <= 1024; i++) { buf[i-1] = (i * 2) & 0xff; } if ( !PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, 1024) || !PACKET_buf_init(&exact_pkt, buf, len + 2) || PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 1024 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&exact_pkt, &subpkt) || PACKET_remaining(&exact_pkt) != 0 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != len) { fprintf(stderr, "test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned char buf[BUF_LEN]; unsigned int i; for (i=1; i<=BUF_LEN; i++) { buf[i-1] = (i * 2) & 0xff; } i = 0; if ( !test_PACKET_buf_init() || !test_PACKET_null_init() || !test_PACKET_remaining(buf) || !test_PACKET_end(buf) || !test_PACKET_equal(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_1(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_4(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_net_2(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_net_3(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_net_4(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_sub_packet(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_bytes(buf) || !test_PACKET_copy_bytes(buf) || !test_PACKET_copy_all(buf) || !test_PACKET_memdup(buf) || !test_PACKET_strndup() || !test_PACKET_contains_zero_byte() || !test_PACKET_forward(buf) || !test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1() || !test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2() || !test_PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3() || !test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1() || !test_PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2()) { return 1; } printf("PASS\n"); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/testrsa.pem0000644000000000000000000000076113176625662015232 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBPAIBAAJBAKrbeqkuRk8VcRmWFmtP+LviMB3+6dizWW3DwaffznyHGAFwUJ/I Tv0XtbsCyl3QoyKGhrOAy3RvPK5M38iuXT0CAwEAAQJAZ3cnzaHXM/bxGaR5CR1R rD1qFBAVfoQFiOH9uPJgMaoAuoQEisPHVcZDKcOv4wEg6/TInAIXBnEigtqvRzuy oQIhAPcgZzUq3yVooAaoov8UbXPxqHlwo6GBMqnv20xzkf6ZAiEAsP4BnIaQTM8S mvcpHZwQJdmdHHkGKAs37Dfxi67HbkUCIQCeZGliHXFa071Fp06ZeWlR2ADonTZz rJBhdTe0v5pCeQIhAIZfkiGgGBX4cIuuckzEm43g9WMUjxP/0GlK39vIyihxAiEA mymehFRT0MvqW5xAKAx7Pgkt8HVKwVhc2LwGKHE0DZM= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662015266 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem0000644000000000000000000000547713176625662017200 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIICZQIBADCCAjkGByqGSM44BAEwggIsAoIBAQCQfLlNdehPnTrGIMhw4rk0uua6 k1nCG3zcyfXli17BdB2k0HBPaTA3a3ZHfOt1Awy0Uu0wZ3gdPr9z0I64hnJXIGou zIanZ7nYRImHtX5JMFbXeyxo1Owd2Zs3oEk9nQUoUsMxvmYC/ghPL5Zx1pPxcHCO wzWxoG4yZMjimXOc1/W7zvK/4/g/Cz9fItD3zdcydfgM/hK0/CeYQ21xfhqf4mjK v9plnCcWgToGI+7H8VK80MFbkO2QKRz3vP1/TjK6PRm9sEeB5b10+SvGv2j2w+CC 0fXL4s6n7PtBlm/bww8xL1/Az8kwejUcII1Dc8uNwwISwGbwaGBvl7IHpm21AiEA rodZi+nCKZdTL8IgCjX3n0DuhPRkVQPjz/B6VweLW9MCggEAfimkUNwnsGFp7mKM zJKhHoQkMB1qJzyIHjDzQ/J1xjfoF6i27afw1/WKboND5eseZhlhA2TO5ZJB6nGx DOE9lVQxYVml++cQj6foHh1TVJAgGl4mWuveW/Rz+NEhpK4zVeEsfMrbkBypPByy xzF1Z49t568xdIo+e8jLI8FjEdXOIUg4ehB3NY6SL8r4oJ49j/sJWfHcDoWH/LK9 ZaBF8NpflJe3F40S8RDvM8j2HC+y2Q4QyKk1DXGiH+7yQLGWzr3M73kC3UBnnH0h Hxb7ISDCT7dCw/lH1nCbVFBOM0ASI26SSsFSXQrvD2kryRcTZ0KkyyhhoPODWpU+ TQMsxQQjAiEArJr6p2zTbhRppQurHGTdmdYHqrDdZH4MCsD9tQCw1xY= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIFkDCCBHigAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzFaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzFaMEUx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR4wHAYDVQQDDBVU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBEU0EgIzMwggNGMIICOQYHKoZIzjgEATCCAiwCggEBAJB8 uU116E+dOsYgyHDiuTS65rqTWcIbfNzJ9eWLXsF0HaTQcE9pMDdrdkd863UDDLRS 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2uhATzJaKH7vu63k3DjftbSBVh+32YXwtHc+BGjs8S2aDtCW3FtDA7Z6J8BIxaNg MF4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMJxatDE FCEFGl4uoiQQ1050Ju9RMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMmRUwpjexZbi71E8HaIqSTm5bZs MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQBGZD1JnMep39KMOhD0iBTmyjhtcnRemckvRask pS/CqPwo+M+lPNdxpLU2w9b0QhPnj0yAS/BS1yBjsLGY4DP156k4Q3QOhwsrTmrK YOxg0w7DOpkv5g11YLJpHsjSOwg5uIMoefL8mjQK6XOFOmQXHJrUtGulu+fs6FlM khGJcW4xYVPK0x/mHvTT8tQaTTkgTdVHObHF5Dyx/F9NMpB3RFguQPk2kT4lJc4i Up8T9mLzaxz6xc4wwh8h70Zw81lkGYhX+LRk3sfd/REq9x4QXQNP9t9qU1CgrBzv 4orzt9cda4r+rleSg2XjWnXzMydE6DuwPVPZlqnLbSYUy660 -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem0000644000000000000000000000561113176625662017203 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQDcYC4tS2Uvn1Z2 iDgtfkJA5tAqgbN6X4yK02RtVH5xekV9+6+eTt/9S+iFAzAnwqR/UB1R67ETrsWq V8u9xLg5fHIwIkmu9/6P31UU9cghO7J1lcrhHvooHaFpcXepPWQacpuBq2VvcKRD lDfVmdM5z6eS3dSZPTOMMP/xk4nhZB8mcw27qiccPieS0PZ9EZB63T1gmwaK1Rd5 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QGO2E2NtolL3umesa+2TJ/8Whw46Iu2llSjtVDm9NGiPk5eA7xPPf1iEi9kCgYAb 0EmVE91wJoaarLtGS7LDkpgrFacEWbPnAbfzW62UENIX2Y1OBm5pH/Vfi7J+vHWS 8E9e0eIRCL2vY2hgQy/oa67H151SkZnvQ/IP6Ar8Xvd1bDSK8HQ6tMQqKm63Y9g0 KDjHCP4znOsSMnk8h/bZ3HcAtvbeWwftBR/LBnYNQQKBgA1leIXLLHRoX0VtS/7e y7Xmn7gepj+gDbSuCs5wGtgw0RB/1z/S3QoS2TCbZzKPBo20+ivoRP7gcuFhduFR hT8V87esr/QzLVpjLedQDW8Xb7GiO3BsU/gVC9VcngenbL7JObl3NgvdreIYo6+n yrLyf+8hjm6H6zkjqiOkHAl+ -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDbDCCAlSgAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzBaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzBaMEUx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR4wHAYDVQQDDBVU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBSU0EgIzIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEK AoIBAQDcYC4tS2Uvn1Z2iDgtfkJA5tAqgbN6X4yK02RtVH5xekV9+6+eTt/9S+iF AzAnwqR/UB1R67ETrsWqV8u9xLg5fHIwIkmu9/6P31UU9cghO7J1lcrhHvooHaFp cXepPWQacpuBq2VvcKRDlDfVmdM5z6eS3dSZPTOMMP/xk4nhZB8mcw27qiccPieS 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86knQsM6uFiMSzY9nkJGZOlH3w4NHLE78pk75xR1sg1MEZr4x/t+a/ea9Y4AXklE DCcaHtpMGeAx3ZAqSKec+zQOOA73JWP1/gYHGdYyTQpQtwRTsh0Gi5mOOdpoJ0vp O83xYbFCZ+ZZKX1RWOjJe2OQBRtw739q1nRga1VMLAT/LFSQsSE3IOp8hiWbjnit 1SE6q3II2a/aHZH/x4OzszfmtQfmerty3eQSq3bgajfxCsccnRjSbLeNiazRSKNg MF4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFNHQYTOO xaZ/N68OpxqjHKuatw6sMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMmRUwpjexZbi71E8HaIqSTm5bZs MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQAAiLociMMXcLkO/uKjAjCIQMrsghrOrxn4ZGBx d/mCTeqPxhcrX2UorwxVCKI2+Dmz5dTC2xKprtvkiIadJamJmxYYzeF1pgRriFN3 MkmMMkTbe/ekSvSeMtHQ2nHDCAJIaA/k9akWfA0+26Ec25/JKMrl3LttllsJMK1z Xj7TcQpAIWORKWSNxY/ezM34+9ABHDZB2waubFqS+irlZsn38aZRuUI0K67fuuIt 17vMUBqQpe2hfNAjpZ8dIpEdAGjQ6izV2uwP1lXbiaK9U4dvUqmwyCIPniX7Hpaf 0VnX0mEViXMT6vWZTjLBUv0oKmO7xBkWHIaaX6oyF32pK5AO -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem0000644000000000000000000000547713176625662017177 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIICZAIBADCCAjkGByqGSM44BAEwggIsAoIBAQCQfLlNdehPnTrGIMhw4rk0uua6 k1nCG3zcyfXli17BdB2k0HBPaTA3a3ZHfOt1Awy0Uu0wZ3gdPr9z0I64hnJXIGou zIanZ7nYRImHtX5JMFbXeyxo1Owd2Zs3oEk9nQUoUsMxvmYC/ghPL5Zx1pPxcHCO wzWxoG4yZMjimXOc1/W7zvK/4/g/Cz9fItD3zdcydfgM/hK0/CeYQ21xfhqf4mjK v9plnCcWgToGI+7H8VK80MFbkO2QKRz3vP1/TjK6PRm9sEeB5b10+SvGv2j2w+CC 0fXL4s6n7PtBlm/bww8xL1/Az8kwejUcII1Dc8uNwwISwGbwaGBvl7IHpm21AiEA rodZi+nCKZdTL8IgCjX3n0DuhPRkVQPjz/B6VweLW9MCggEAfimkUNwnsGFp7mKM zJKhHoQkMB1qJzyIHjDzQ/J1xjfoF6i27afw1/WKboND5eseZhlhA2TO5ZJB6nGx DOE9lVQxYVml++cQj6foHh1TVJAgGl4mWuveW/Rz+NEhpK4zVeEsfMrbkBypPByy xzF1Z49t568xdIo+e8jLI8FjEdXOIUg4ehB3NY6SL8r4oJ49j/sJWfHcDoWH/LK9 ZaBF8NpflJe3F40S8RDvM8j2HC+y2Q4QyKk1DXGiH+7yQLGWzr3M73kC3UBnnH0h Hxb7ISDCT7dCw/lH1nCbVFBOM0ASI26SSsFSXQrvD2kryRcTZ0KkyyhhoPODWpU+ TQMsxQQiAiAdCUJ5n2Q9hIynN8BMpnRcdfH696BKejGx+2Mr2kfnnA== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIFkDCCBHigAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzFaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzFaMEUx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR4wHAYDVQQDDBVU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBEU0EgIzIwggNGMIICOQYHKoZIzjgEATCCAiwCggEBAJB8 uU116E+dOsYgyHDiuTS65rqTWcIbfNzJ9eWLXsF0HaTQcE9pMDdrdkd863UDDLRS 7TBneB0+v3PQjriGclcgai7MhqdnudhEiYe1fkkwVtd7LGjU7B3ZmzegST2dBShS wzG+ZgL+CE8vlnHWk/FwcI7DNbGgbjJkyOKZc5zX9bvO8r/j+D8LP18i0PfN1zJ1 +Az+ErT8J5hDbXF+Gp/iaMq/2mWcJxaBOgYj7sfxUrzQwVuQ7ZApHPe8/X9OMro9 Gb2wR4HlvXT5K8a/aPbD4ILR9cvizqfs+0GWb9vDDzEvX8DPyTB6NRwgjUNzy43D AhLAZvBoYG+XsgembbUCIQCuh1mL6cIpl1MvwiAKNfefQO6E9GRVA+PP8HpXB4tb 0wKCAQB+KaRQ3CewYWnuYozMkqEehCQwHWonPIgeMPND8nXGN+gXqLbtp/DX9Ypu g0Pl6x5mGWEDZM7lkkHqcbEM4T2VVDFhWaX75xCPp+geHVNUkCAaXiZa695b9HP4 0SGkrjNV4Sx8ytuQHKk8HLLHMXVnj23nrzF0ij57yMsjwWMR1c4hSDh6EHc1jpIv yvignj2P+wlZ8dwOhYf8sr1loEXw2l+Ul7cXjRLxEO8zyPYcL7LZDhDIqTUNcaIf 7vJAsZbOvczveQLdQGecfSEfFvshIMJPt0LD+UfWcJtUUE4zQBIjbpJKwVJdCu8P aSvJFxNnQqTLKGGg84NalT5NAyzFA4IBBQACggEAItQlFu0t7Mw1HHROuuwKLS+E h2WNNZP96MLQTygOVlqgaJY+1mJLzvl/51LLH6YezX0t89Z2Dm/3SOJEdNrdbIEt tbu5rzymXxFhc8uaIYZFhST38oQwJOjM8wFitAQESe6/9HZjkexMqSqx/r5aEKTa LBinqA1BJRI72So1/1dv8P99FavPADdj8V7fAccReKEQKnfnwA7mrnD+OlIqFKFn 3wCGk8Sw7tSJ9g6jgCI+zFwrKn2w+w+iot/Ogxl9yMAtKmAd689IAZr5GPPvV2y0 KOogCiUYgSTSawZhr+rjyFavfI5dBWzMq4tKx/zAi6MJ+6hGJjJ8jHoT9JAPmaNg MF4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFGaxw04k qpufeGZC+TTBq8oMnXyrMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMmRUwpjexZbi71E8HaIqSTm5bZs MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQCk2Xob1ICsdHYx/YsBzY6E1eEwcI4RZbZ3hEXp VA72/Mbz60gjv1OwE5Ay4j+xG7IpTio6y2A9ZNepGpzidYcsL/Lx9Sv1LlN0Ukzb uk6Czd2sZJp+PFMTTrgCd5rXKnZs/0D84Vci611vGMA1hnUnbAnBBmgLXe9pDNRV 6mhmCLLjJ4GOr5Wxt/hhknr7V2e1VMx3Q47GZhc0o/gExfhxXA8+gicM0nEYNakD 2A1F0qDhQGakjuofANHhjdUDqKJ1sxurAy80fqb0ddzJt2el89iXKN+aXx/zEX96 GI5ON7z/bkVwIi549lUOpWb2Mved61NBzCLKVP7HSuEIsC/I -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smdh.pem0000644000000000000000000000364513176625662016734 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBSgIBADCCASsGByqGSM4+AgEwggEeAoGBANQMSgwEcnEZ31kZxa9Ef8qOK/AJ 9dMlsXMWVYnf/QevGdN/0Aei/j9a8QHG+CvvTm0DOEKhN9QUtABKsYZag865CA7B mSdHjQuFqILtzA25sDJ+3+jk9vbss+56ETRll/wasJVLGbmmHNkBMvc1fC1d/sGF cEn4zJnQvvFaeMgDAoGAaQD9ZvL8FYsJuNxN6qp5VfnfRqYvyi2PWSqtRKPGGC+V thYg49PRjwPOcXzvOsdEOQ7iH9jTiSvnUdwSSEwYTZkSBuQXAgOMJAWOpoXyaRvh atziBDoBnWS+/kX5RBhxvS0+em9yfRqAQleuGG+R1mEDihyJc8dWQQPT+O1l4oUC FQCJlKsQZ0VBrWPGcUCNa54ZW6TH9QQWAhRR2NMZrQSfWthXDO8Lj5WZ34zQrA== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID/zCCAuegAwIBAgIJANv1TSKgememMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA4MDIxNDQ5MjlaFw0yMzA2MTExNDQ5MjlaMEQx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBESCAjMTCCAbYwggErBgcqhkjOPgIBMIIBHgKBgQDUDEoM BHJxGd9ZGcWvRH/KjivwCfXTJbFzFlWJ3/0HrxnTf9AHov4/WvEBxvgr705tAzhC oTfUFLQASrGGWoPOuQgOwZknR40LhaiC7cwNubAyft/o5Pb27LPuehE0ZZf8GrCV Sxm5phzZATL3NXwtXf7BhXBJ+MyZ0L7xWnjIAwKBgGkA/Wby/BWLCbjcTeqqeVX5 30amL8otj1kqrUSjxhgvlbYWIOPT0Y8DznF87zrHRDkO4h/Y04kr51HcEkhMGE2Z EgbkFwIDjCQFjqaF8mkb4Wrc4gQ6AZ1kvv5F+UQYcb0tPnpvcn0agEJXrhhvkdZh A4ociXPHVkED0/jtZeKFAhUAiZSrEGdFQa1jxnFAjWueGVukx/UDgYQAAoGAL1ve cgI2awBeJH8ULBhSQpdL224VUDxFPiXzt8Vu5VLnxPv0pfA5En+8VByTuV7u6RSw 3/78NuTyr/sTyN8YlB1AuXHdTJynA1ICte1xgD4j2ijlq+dv8goOAFt9xkvXx7LD umJ/cCignXETcNGfMi8+0s0bpMZyoHRdce8DQ26jYDBeMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAw DgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgXgMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQLWk1ffSXH8p3Bqrdjgi/6jzLnwDAf BgNVHSMEGDAWgBTffl6IBSQzCN0igQKXzJq3sTMnMDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOC AQEAWvJj79MW1/Wq3RIANgAhonsI1jufYqxTH+1M0RU0ZXHulgem77Le2Ls1bizi 0SbvfpTiiFGkbKonKtO2wvfqwwuptSg3omMI5IjAGxYbyv2KBzIpp1O1LTDk9RbD 48JMMF01gByi2+NLUQ1MYF+5RqyoRqcyp5x2+Om1GeIM4Q/GRuI4p4dybWy8iC+d LeXQfR7HXfh+tAum+WzjfLJwbnWbHmPhTbKB01U4lBp6+r8BGHAtNdPjEHqap4/z vVZVXti9ThZ20EhM+VFU3y2wyapeQjhQvw/A2YRES0Ik7BSj3hHfWH/CTbLVQnhu Uj6tw18ExOYxqoEGixNLPA5qsQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smdsap.pem0000644000000000000000000000070713176625662017264 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS----- MIIBHwKBgQDFJfsIPOIawMO5biw+AoYUhNVxReBOLQosU3Qv4B8krac0BNr3OjSG Lh1wZxHqhlAE0QmasTaKojuk20nNWeFnczSz6vDl0IVJEhS8VYor5kt9gLqtGcoA gsf4gRDIutJyQDaNn3IVY89uXUVIoexvQeLQDBCgQPC5O8rJdqBwtwIVAK2Jjt+d qk07eQUE59koYUEKyNorAoGBAI4IEpusf8G14kCHmRtnHXM2tG5EWJDmW6Qtwjqv Wp1GKUx5WFy1tVWR9nl5rL0Di+kNdENo+SkKj7h3uDulGOI6T0mQYbV2h1IK+FMO GnOqvZ8eNTE2n4PGTo5puZ63LBm+QYrQsrNiUY4vakLFQ2rEK/SLwdsDFK4ZSJCB Qw5z -----END DSA PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/mksmime-certs.sh0000644000000000000000000000720613176625662020407 0ustar rootroot#!/bin/sh # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Utility to recreate S/MIME certificates OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl OPENSSL_CONF=./ca.cnf export OPENSSL_CONF # Root CA: create certificate directly CN="Test S/MIME RSA Root" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -x509 -nodes \ -keyout smroot.pem -out smroot.pem -newkey rsa:2048 -days 3650 # EE RSA certificates: create request first CN="Test S/MIME EE RSA #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smrsa1.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048 # Sign request: end entity extensions $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smrsa1.pem CN="Test S/MIME EE RSA #2" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smrsa2.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048 $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smrsa2.pem CN="Test S/MIME EE RSA #3" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smrsa3.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048 $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smrsa3.pem # Create DSA parameters $OPENSSL dsaparam -out dsap.pem 2048 CN="Test S/MIME EE DSA #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smdsa1.pem -out req.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdsa1.pem CN="Test S/MIME EE DSA #2" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smdsa2.pem -out req.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdsa2.pem CN="Test S/MIME EE DSA #3" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smdsa3.pem -out req.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdsa3.pem # Create EC parameters $OPENSSL ecparam -out ecp.pem -name P-256 $OPENSSL ecparam -out ecp2.pem -name K-283 CN="Test S/MIME EE EC #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smec1.pem -out req.pem -newkey ec:ecp.pem $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smec1.pem CN="Test S/MIME EE EC #2" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smec2.pem -out req.pem -newkey ec:ecp2.pem $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smec2.pem CN="Test S/MIME EE EC #3" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smec3.pem -out req.pem -newkey ec:ecp.pem $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smec3.pem # Create X9.42 DH parameters. $OPENSSL genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_type:2 \ -out dhp.pem # Generate X9.42 DH key. $OPENSSL genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out smdh.pem $OPENSSL pkey -pubout -in smdh.pem -out dhpub.pem # Generate dummy request. CN="Test S/MIME EE DH #1" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout smtmp.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:2048 # Sign request but force public key to DH $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA smroot.pem -days 3600 \ -force_pubkey dhpub.pem \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial >>smdh.pem # Remove temp files. rm -f req.pem ecp.pem ecp2.pem dsap.pem dhp.pem dhpub.pem smtmp.pem smroot.srl openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smec2.pem0000644000000000000000000000231713176625662017005 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGPAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAQBHgwdgIBAQQjhHaq507MOBznelrLG/pl brnnJi/iEJUUp+Pm3PEiteXqckmhTANKAAQF2zs6vobmoT+M+P2+9LZ7asvFBNi7 uCzLYF/8j1Scn/spczoC9vNzVhNw+Lg7dnjNL4EDIyYZLl7E0v69luzbvy+q44/8 6bQ= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICpTCCAY2gAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBHMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzFaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzFaMEQx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBFQyAjMjBeMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAQA0oABAXbOzq+ huahP4z4/b70tntqy8UE2Lu4LMtgX/yPVJyf+ylzOgL283NWE3D4uDt2eM0vgQMj JhkuXsTS/r2W7Nu/L6rjj/zptKNgMF4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8E BAMCBeAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFGf+QSQlkN20PsNN7x+jmQIJBDcXMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FMmRUwpjexZbi71E8HaIqSTm5bZsMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQBaBBryl2Ez ftBrGENXMKQP3bBEw4n9ely6HvYQi9IC7HyK0ktz7B2FcJ4z96q38JN3cLxV0DhK xT/72pFmQwZVJngvRaol0k1B+bdmM03llxCw/uNNZejixDjHUI9gEfbigehd7QY0 uYDu4k4O35/z/XPQ6O5Kzw+J2vdzU8GXlMBbWeZWAmEfLGbk3Ux0ouITnSz0ty5P rkHTo0uprlFcZAsrsNY5v5iuomYT7ZXAR3sqGZL1zPOKBnyfXeNFUfnKsZW7Fnlq IlYBQIjqR1HGxxgCSy66f1oplhxSch4PUpk5tqrs6LeOqc2+xROy1T5YrB3yjVs0 4ZdCllHZkhop -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smec1.pem0000644000000000000000000000227613176625662017010 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgXzBRX9Z5Ib4LAVAS DMlYvkj0SmLmYvWULe2LfyXRmpWhRANCAAS+SIj2FY2DouPRuNDp9WVpsqef58tV 3gIwV0EOV/xyYTzZhufZi/aBcXugWR1x758x4nHus2uEuEFi3Mr3K3+x -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICoDCCAYigAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzFaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzFaMEQx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBFQyAjMTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABL5I iPYVjYOi49G40On1ZWmyp5/ny1XeAjBXQQ5X/HJhPNmG59mL9oFxe6BZHXHvnzHi ce6za4S4QWLcyvcrf7GjYDBeMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgXg MB0GA1UdDgQWBBR/ybxC2DI+Jydhx1FMgPbMTmLzRzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTJkVMK Y3sWW4u9RPB2iKkk5uW2bDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAdk9si83JjtgHHHGy WcgWDfM0jzlWBsgFNQ9DwAuB7gJd/LG+5Ocajg5XdA5FXAdKkfwI6be3PdcVs3Bt 7f/fdKfBxfr9/SvFHnK7PVAX2x1wwS4HglX1lfoyq1boSvsiJOnAX3jsqXJ9TJiV FlgRVnhnrw6zz3Xs/9ZDMTENUrqDHPNsDkKEi+9SqIsqDXpMCrGHP4ic+S8Rov1y S+0XioMxVyXDp6XcL4PQ/NgHbw5/+UcS0me0atZ6pW68C0vi6xeU5vxojyuZxMI1 DXXwMhOXWaKff7KNhXDUN0g58iWlnyaCz4XQwFsbbFs88TQ1+e/aj3bbwTxUeyN7 qtcHJA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/ca.cnf0000644000000000000000000000316013176625662016341 0ustar rootroot# # OpenSSL example configuration file for automated certificate creation. # # This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME or CN # is undefined. HOME = . RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd CN = "Not Defined" default_ca = ca #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = privkey.pem # Don't prompt for fields: use those in section directly prompt = no distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert string_mask = utf8only # req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = UK organizationName = OpenSSL Group # Take CN from environment so it can come from a script. commonName = $ENV::CN [ usr_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity # certificate basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid [ dh_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity # DH certificate basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE keyUsage=critical, keyAgreement # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA # PKIX recommendation. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always basicConstraints = critical,CA:true keyUsage = critical, cRLSign, keyCertSign openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem0000644000000000000000000000561113176625662017204 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQCyK+BTAOJKJjji OhY60NeZjzGGZxEBfCm62n0mwkzusW/V/e63uwj6uOVCFoVBz5doMf3M6QIS2jL3 Aw6Qs5+vcuLA0gHrqIwjYQz1UZ5ETLKLKbQw6YOIVfsFSTxytUVpfcByrubWiLKX 63theG1/IVokDK/9/k52Kyt+wcCjuRb7AJQFj2OLDRuWm/gavozkK103gQ+dUq4H XamZMtTq1EhQOfc0IUeCOEL6xz4jzlHHfzLdkvb7Enhav2sXDfOmZp/DYf9IqS7l vFkkINPVbYFBTexaPZlFwmpGRjkmoyH/w+Jlcpzs+w6p1diWRpaSn62bbkRN49j6 L2dVb+DfAgMBAAECggEAciwDl6zdVT6g/PbT/+SMA+7qgYHSN+1koEQaJpgjzGEP lUUfj8TewCtzXaIoyj9IepBuXryBg6snNXpT/w3bqgYon/7zFBvxkUpDj4A5tvKf BuY2fZFlpBvUu1Ju1eKrFCptBBBoA9mc+BUB/ze4ktrAdJFcxZoMlVScjqGB3GdR OHw2x9BdWGCJBhiu9VHhAAb/LVWi6xgDumYSWZwN2yovg+7J91t5bsENeBRHycK+ i5dNFh1umIK9N0SH6bpHPnLHrCRchrQ6ZRRxL4ZBKA9jFRDeI7OOsJuCvhGyJ1se snsLjr/Ahg00aiHCcC1SPQ6pmXAVBCG7hf4AX82V4QKBgQDaFDE+Fcpv84mFo4s9 wn4CZ8ymoNIaf5zPl/gpH7MGots4NT5+Ns+6zzJQ6TEpDjTPx+vDaabP7QGXwVZn 8NAHYvCQK37b+u9HrOt256YYRDOmnJFSbsJdmqzMEzpTNmQ8GuI37cZCS9CmSMv+ ab/plcwuv0cJRSC83NN2AFyu1QKBgQDRJzKIBQlpprF9rA0D5ZjLVW4OH18A0Mmm oanw7qVutBaM4taFN4M851WnNIROyYIlkk2fNgW57Y4M8LER4zLrjU5HY4lB0BMX LQWDbyz4Y7L4lVnnEKfQxWFt9avNZwiCxCxEKy/n/icmVCzc91j9uwKcupdzrN6E yzPd1s5y4wKBgQCkJvzmAdsOp9/Fg1RFWcgmIWHvrzBXl+U+ceLveZf1j9K5nYJ7 2OBGer4iH1XM1I+2M4No5XcWHg3L4FEdDixY0wXHT6Y/CcThS+015Kqmq3fBmyrc RNjzQoF9X5/QkSmkAIx1kvpgXtcgw70htRIrToGSUpKzDKDW6NYXhbA+PQKBgDJK KH5IJ8E9kYPUMLT1Kc4KVpISvPcnPLVSPdhuqVx69MkfadFSTb4BKbkwiXegQCjk isFzbeEM25EE9q6EYKP+sAm+RyyJ6W0zKBY4TynSXyAiWSGUAaXTL+AOqCaVVZiL rtEdSUGQ/LzclIT0/HLV2oTw4KWxtTdc3LXEhpNdAoGBAM3LckiHENqtoeK2gVNw IPeEuruEqoN4n+XltbEEv6Ymhxrs6T6HSKsEsLhqsUiIvIzH43KMm45SNYTn5eZh yzYMXLmervN7c1jJe2Y2MYv6hE+Ypj1xGW4w7s8WNKmVzLv97beisD9AZrS7sXfF RvOAi5wVkYylDxV4238MAZIq -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDbDCCAlSgAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBCMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzBaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzBaMEUx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR4wHAYDVQQDDBVU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBSU0EgIzMwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEK AoIBAQCyK+BTAOJKJjjiOhY60NeZjzGGZxEBfCm62n0mwkzusW/V/e63uwj6uOVC FoVBz5doMf3M6QIS2jL3Aw6Qs5+vcuLA0gHrqIwjYQz1UZ5ETLKLKbQw6YOIVfsF STxytUVpfcByrubWiLKX63theG1/IVokDK/9/k52Kyt+wcCjuRb7AJQFj2OLDRuW m/gavozkK103gQ+dUq4HXamZMtTq1EhQOfc0IUeCOEL6xz4jzlHHfzLdkvb7Enha v2sXDfOmZp/DYf9IqS7lvFkkINPVbYFBTexaPZlFwmpGRjkmoyH/w+Jlcpzs+w6p 1diWRpaSn62bbkRN49j6L2dVb+DfAgMBAAGjYDBeMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYD VR0PAQH/BAQDAgXgMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQ6CkW5sa6HrBsWvuPOvMjyL5AnsDAfBgNV HSMEGDAWgBTJkVMKY3sWW4u9RPB2iKkk5uW2bDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEA JhcrD7AKafVzlncA3cZ6epAruj1xwcfiE+EbuAaeWEGjoSltmevcjgoIxvijRVcp sCbNmHJZ/siQlqzWjjf3yoERvLDqngJZZpQeocMIbLRQf4wgLAuiBcvT52wTE+sa VexeETDy5J1OW3wE4A3rkdBp6hLaymlijFNnd5z/bP6w3AcIMWm45yPm0skM8RVr O3UstEFYD/iy+p+Y/YZDoxYQSW5Vl+NkpGmc5bzet8gQz4JeXtH3z5zUGoDM4XK7 tXP3yUi2eecCbyjh/wgaQiVdylr1Kv3mxXcTl+cFO22asDkh0R/y72nTCu5fSILY CscFo2Z2pYROGtZDmYqhRw== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem0000644000000000000000000000561113176625662017202 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKYwggSiAgEAAoIBAQDXr9uzB/20QXKC xhkfNnJvl2xl1hzdOcrQmAqo+AAAcA/D49ImuJDVQRaK2bcj54XB26i1kXuOrxID 3/etUb8yudfx8OAVwh8G0xVA4zhr8uXW85W2tBr4v0Lt+W6lSd6Hmfrk4GmE9LTU /vzl9HUPW6SZShN1G0nY6oeUXvLi0vasEUKv3a51T6JFYg4c7qt5RCk/w8kwrQ0D orQwCdkOPEIiC4b+nPStF12SVm5bx8rbYzioxuY/PdSebvt0APeqgRxSpCxqYnHs CoNeHzSrGXcP0COzFeUOz2tdrhmH09JLbGZs4nbojPxMkjpJSv3/ekDG2CHYxXSH XxpJstxZAgMBAAECggEASY4xsJaTEPwY3zxLqPdag2/yibBBW7ivz/9p80HQTlXp KnbxXj8nNXLjCytAZ8A3P2t316PrrTdLP4ML5lGwkM4MNPhek00GY79syhozTa0i cPHVJt+5Kwee/aVI9JmCiGAczh0yHyOM3+6ttIZvvXMVaSl4BUHvJ0ikQBc5YdzL s6VM2gCOR6K6n+39QHDI/T7WwO9FFSNnpWFOCHwAWtyBMlleVj+xeZX8OZ/aT+35 27yjsGNBftWKku29VDineiQC+o+fZGJs6w4JZHoBSP8TfxP8fRCFVNA281G78Xak cEnKXwZ54bpoSa3ThKl+56J6NHkkfRGb8Rgt/ipJYQKBgQD5DKb82mLw85iReqsT 8bkp408nPOBGz7KYnQsZqAVNGfehM02+dcN5z+w0jOj6GMPLPg5whlEo/O+rt9ze j6c2+8/+B4Bt5oqCKoOCIndH68jl65+oUxFkcHYxa3zYKGC9Uvb+x2BtBmYgvDRG ew6I2Q3Zyd2ThZhJygUZpsjsbQKBgQDdtNiGTkgWOm+WuqBI1LT5cQfoPfgI7/da ZA+37NBUQRe0cM7ddEcNqx7E3uUa1JJOoOYv65VyGI33Ul+evI8h5WE5bupcCEFk LolzbMc4YQUlsySY9eUXM8jQtfVtaWhuQaABt97l+9oADkrhA+YNdEu2yiz3T6W+ msI5AnvkHQKBgDEjuPMdF/aY6dqSjJzjzfgg3KZOUaZHJuML4XvPdjRPUlfhKo7Q 55/qUZ3Qy8tFBaTderXjGrJurc+A+LiFOaYUq2ZhDosguOWUA9yydjyfnkUXZ6or sbvSoM+BeOGhnezdKNT+e90nLRF6cQoTD7war6vwM6L+8hxlGvqDuRNFAoGAD4K8 d0D4yB1Uez4ZQp8m/iCLRhM3zCBFtNw1QU/fD1Xye5w8zL96zRkAsRNLAgKHLdsR 355iuTXAkOIBcJCOjveGQsdgvAmT0Zdz5FBi663V91o+IDlryqDD1t40CnCKbtRG hng/ruVczg4x7OYh7SUKuwIP/UlkNh6LogNreX0CgYBQF9troLex6X94VTi1V5hu iCwzDT6AJj63cS3VRO2ait3ZiLdpKdSNNW2WrlZs8FZr/mVutGEcWho8BugGMWST 1iZkYwly9Xfjnpd0I00ZIlr2/B3+ZsK8w5cOW5Lpb7frol6+BkDnBjbNZI5kQndn zQpuMJliRlrq/5JkIbH6SA== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDbDCCAlSgAwIBAgIJANk5lu6mSyBAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MzBaFw0yMzA1MjYxNzI4MzBaMEUx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR4wHAYDVQQDDBVU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBSU0EgIzEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEK AoIBAQDXr9uzB/20QXKCxhkfNnJvl2xl1hzdOcrQmAqo+AAAcA/D49ImuJDVQRaK 2bcj54XB26i1kXuOrxID3/etUb8yudfx8OAVwh8G0xVA4zhr8uXW85W2tBr4v0Lt +W6lSd6Hmfrk4GmE9LTU/vzl9HUPW6SZShN1G0nY6oeUXvLi0vasEUKv3a51T6JF Yg4c7qt5RCk/w8kwrQ0DorQwCdkOPEIiC4b+nPStF12SVm5bx8rbYzioxuY/PdSe bvt0APeqgRxSpCxqYnHsCoNeHzSrGXcP0COzFeUOz2tdrhmH09JLbGZs4nbojPxM kjpJSv3/ekDG2CHYxXSHXxpJstxZAgMBAAGjYDBeMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYD VR0PAQH/BAQDAgXgMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTmjc+lrTQuYx/VBOBGjMvufajvhDAfBgNV HSMEGDAWgBTJkVMKY3sWW4u9RPB2iKkk5uW2bDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEA dr2IRXcFtlF16kKWs1VTaFIHHNQrfSVHBkhKblPX3f/0s/i3eXgwKUu7Hnb6T3/o E8L+e4ioQNhahTLt9ruJNHWA/QDwOfkqM3tshCs2xOD1Cpy7Bd3Dn0YBrHKyNXRK WelGp+HetSXJGW4IZJP7iES7Um0DGktLabhZbe25EnthRDBjNnaAmcofHECWESZp lEHczGZfS9tRbzOCofxvgLbF64H7wYSyjAe6R8aain0VRbIusiD4tCHX/lOMh9xT GNBW8zTL+tV9H1unjPMORLnT0YQ3oAyEND0jCu0ACA1qGl+rzxhF6bQcTUNEbRMu 9Hjq6s316fk4Ne0EUF3PbA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smroot.pem0000644000000000000000000000561113176625662017317 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQCyyQXED5HyVWwq nXyzmY317yMUJrIfsKvREG2C691dJNHgNg+oq5sjt/fzkyS84AvdOiicAsao4cYL DulthaLpbC7msEBhvwAil0FNb5g3ERupe1KuTdUV1UuD/i6S2VoaNXUBBn1rD9Wc BBc0lnx/4Wt92eQTI6925pt7ZHPQw2Olp7TQDElyi5qPxCem4uT0g3zbZsWqmmsI MXbu+K3dEprzqA1ucKXbxUmZNkMwVs2XCmlLxrRUj8C3/zENtH17HWCznhR/IVcV kgIuklkeiDsEhbWvUQumVXR7oPh/CPZAbjGqq5mVueHSHrp7brBVZKHZvoUka28Q LWitq1W5AgMBAAECggEASkRnOMKfBeOmQy2Yl6K57eeg0sYgSDnDpd0FINWJ5x9c b58FcjOXBodtYKlHIY6QXx3BsM0WaSEge4d+QBi7S+u8r+eXVwNYswXSArDQsk9R Bl5MQkvisGciL3pvLmFLpIeASyS/BLJXMbAhU58PqK+jT2wr6idwxBuXivJ3ichu ISdT1s2aMmnD86ulCD2DruZ4g0mmk5ffV+Cdj+WWkyvEaJW2GRYov2qdaqwSOxV4 Yve9qStvEIWAf2cISQjbnw2Ww6Z5ebrqlOz9etkmwIly6DTbrIneBnoqJlFFWGlF ghuzc5RE2w1GbcKSOt0qXH44MTf/j0r86dlu7UIxgQKBgQDq0pEaiZuXHi9OQAOp PsDEIznCU1bcTDJewANHag5DPEnMKLltTNyLaBRulMypI+CrDbou0nDr29VOzfXx mNvi/c7RttOBOx7kXKvu0JUFKe2oIWRsg0KsyMX7UFMVaHFgrW+8DhQc7HK7URiw nitOnA7YwIHRF9BMmcWcLFEYBQKBgQDC6LPbXV8COKO0YCfGXPnE7EZGD/p0Q92Z 8CoSefphEScSdO1IpxFXG7fOZ4x2GQb9q7D3IvaeKAqNjUjkuyxdB30lIWDBwSWw fFgsa2SZwD5P60G/ar50YJr6LiF333aUMDVmC9swFfZERAEmGUz2NTrPWQdIx/lu PyDtUR75JQKBgHaoCCJ8vl5SJl1IA5GV4Bo8IoeLTSzsY9d09zMy6BoZcMD1Ix2T 5S2cXhayoegl9PT6bsYSGHVWFCdJ86ktMI826TcXRzDaCvYhzc9THroJQcnfdbtP aHWezkv7fsAmkoPjn75K7ubeo+r7Q5qbkg6a1PW58N8TRXIvkackzaVxAoGBALAq qh3U+AHG9dgbrPeyo6KkuCOtX39ks8/mbfCDRZYkbb9V5f5r2tVz3R93IlK/7jyr yWimtmde46Lrl33922w+T5OW5qBZllo9GWkUrDn3s5qClcuQjJIdmxYTSfbSCJiK NkmE39lHkG5FVRB9f71tgTlWS6ox7TYDYxx83NTtAoGAUJPAkGt4yGAN4Pdebv53 bSEpAAULBHntiqDEOu3lVColHuZIucml/gbTpQDruE4ww4wE7dOhY8Q4wEBVYbRI vHkSiWpJUvZCuKG8Foh5pm9hU0qb+rbQV7NhLJ02qn1AMGO3F/WKrHPPY8/b9YhQ KfvPCYimQwBjVrEnSntLPR0= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDbjCCAlagAwIBAgIJAMc+8VKBJ/S9MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xMzA3MTcxNzI4MjlaFw0yMzA3MTUxNzI4MjlaMEQx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoC ggEBALLJBcQPkfJVbCqdfLOZjfXvIxQmsh+wq9EQbYLr3V0k0eA2D6irmyO39/OT JLzgC906KJwCxqjhxgsO6W2FoulsLuawQGG/ACKXQU1vmDcRG6l7Uq5N1RXVS4P+ LpLZWho1dQEGfWsP1ZwEFzSWfH/ha33Z5BMjr3bmm3tkc9DDY6WntNAMSXKLmo/E J6bi5PSDfNtmxaqaawgxdu74rd0SmvOoDW5wpdvFSZk2QzBWzZcKaUvGtFSPwLf/ MQ20fXsdYLOeFH8hVxWSAi6SWR6IOwSFta9RC6ZVdHug+H8I9kBuMaqrmZW54dIe untusFVkodm+hSRrbxAtaK2rVbkCAwEAAaNjMGEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMmRUwpjexZb i71E8HaIqSTm5bZsMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMmRUwpjexZbi71E8HaIqSTm5bZsMA8G A1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IB AQAwpIVWQey2u/XoQSMSu0jd0EZvU+lhLaFrDy/AHQeG3yX1+SAOM6f6w+efPvyb Op1NPI9UkMPb4PCg9YC7jgYokBkvAcI7J4FcuDKMVhyCD3cljp0ouuKruvEf4FBl zyQ9pLqA97TuG8g1hLTl8G90NzTRcmKpmhs18BmCxiqHcTfoIpb3QvPkDX8R7LVt 9BUGgPY+8ELCgw868TuHh/Cnc67gBtRjBp0sCYVzGZmKsO5f1XdHrAZKYN5mEp0C 7/OqcDoFqORTquLeycg1At/9GqhDEgxNrqA+YEsPbLGAfsNuXUsXs2ubpGsOZxKt Emsny2ah6fU2z7PztrUy/A80 -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/smime-certs/smec3.pem0000644000000000000000000000227613176625662017012 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQga03Rl+2K38wgwVyJ zSy+knGorGWZBGG5p//ke0WUSbqhRANCAARH8uHBHkuOfuyXgJj7V3lNqUEPiQNo xG8ntGjVmKRHfywdUoQJ1PgfbkCEsBk334rRFmja1r+MYyqn/A9ARiGB -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICoDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAPaEOllWs/pjMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMEQxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRUZXN0IFMv TUlNRSBSU0EgUm9vdDAeFw0xNzA4MTAxNTQyMDhaFw0yNzA2MTkxNTQyMDhaMEQx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRU ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBFRSBFQyAjMzBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEfy 4cEeS45+7JeAmPtXeU2pQQ+JA2jEbye0aNWYpEd/LB1ShAnU+B9uQISwGTffitEW aNrWv4xjKqf8D0BGIYGjYDBeMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgXg MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQLR+H9CmAY/KDyXWdVUM9FP766WzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBT3YQTy KJTdSIrnOcPj3pm5oVNtazANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAmMRuf8Iz5fr9f0GA HaNiOM5S7AIfZ6W7zzdeF63EF1j9HqP1DJsUW4y5b9azWmpp62kKuNaM4CGPUVvm diLKJVlrDcc+6lW9oROpnBsskhjqFMTjTANPQSAKZeKiG2W3U8Q103VQpuYvE4Nj OU9JT+5e4RZS7wxYk/IsvnyF/DkoF1FTMHo9/3Wiw4V4KRhpJIPnqojWNcfipmhM UDpbw0Oyj5fE7x6wvaoOUr8GNJE5NudtV/5QDh9REkjyKUdVYsuUrWwKqn3NT8EI OLl8wx3RqA8htRg/W+SoESx87rvW1saPGvfypBp4cl18B1IzTlC+FMbHFJvZqQn8 Ci1l4Q== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/Uss.cnf0000644000000000000000000000177213176625661014306 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # RANDFILE = ./.rnd CN2 = Brother 2 #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = keySS.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no default_md = sha256 prompt = no [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = AU organizationName = Dodgy Brothers 0.commonName = Brother 1 1.commonName = $ENV::CN2 [ v3_ee ] subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always basicConstraints = CA:false keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment [ v3_ee_dsa ] subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always basicConstraints = CA:false keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature [ v3_ee_ec ] subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always basicConstraints = CA:false keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyAgreement openssl-1.1.0g/test/CAss.cnf0000644000000000000000000000430313176625661014356 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = keySS.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_rsa_key = no default_md = sha1 [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = AU countryName_value = AU organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = Dodgy Brothers commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) commonName_value = Dodgy CA #################################################################### [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section #################################################################### [ CA_default ] dir = ./demoCA # Where everything is kept certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept database = $dir/index.txt # database index file. #unique_subject = no # Set to 'no' to allow creation of # several certificates with same subject. new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts # default place for new certs. certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA certificate serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # private random number file x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the cert name_opt = ca_default # Subject Name options cert_opt = ca_default # Certificate field options default_days = 365 # how long to certify for default_crl_days= 30 # how long before next CRL default_md = md5 # which md to use. preserve = no # keep passed DN ordering policy = policy_anything [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional [ v3_ca ] subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always basicConstraints = critical,CA:true,pathlen:1 keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign issuerAltName=issuer:copy openssl-1.1.0g/test/dtlsv1listentest.c0000644000000000000000000003305713176625661016545 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif #include "e_os.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* Just a ClientHello without a cookie */ static const unsigned char clienthello_nocookie[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x3A, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00, /* Session id len */ 0x00, /* Cookie len */ 0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */ 0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */ 0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */ 0x01, /* Compression methods len */ 0x00, /* Null compression */ 0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */ }; /* First fragment of a ClientHello without a cookie */ static const unsigned char clienthello_nocookie_frag[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x30, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x24, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00, /* Session id len */ 0x00 /* Cookie len */ }; /* First fragment of a ClientHello which is too short */ static const unsigned char clienthello_nocookie_short[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x2F, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x23, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00 /* Session id len */ }; /* Second fragment of a ClientHello */ static const unsigned char clienthello_2ndfrag[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x38, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x2E, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x2C, /* Fragment length */ /* Version skipped - sent in first fragment */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00, /* Session id len */ 0x00, /* Cookie len */ 0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */ 0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */ 0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */ 0x01, /* Compression methods len */ 0x00, /* Null compression */ 0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */ }; /* A ClientHello with a good cookie */ static const unsigned char clienthello_cookie[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x4E, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00, /* Session id len */ 0x14, /* Cookie len */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, /* Cookie */ 0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */ 0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */ 0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */ 0x01, /* Compression methods len */ 0x00, /* Null compression */ 0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */ }; /* A fragmented ClientHello with a good cookie */ static const unsigned char clienthello_cookie_frag[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x44, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x38, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00, /* Session id len */ 0x14, /* Cookie len */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 /* Cookie */ }; /* A ClientHello with a bad cookie */ static const unsigned char clienthello_badcookie[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x4E, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00, /* Session id len */ 0x14, /* Cookie len */ 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, /* Cookie */ 0x00, 0x04, /* Ciphersuites len */ 0x00, 0x2f, /* AES128-SHA */ 0x00, 0xff, /* Empty reneg info SCSV */ 0x01, /* Compression methods len */ 0x00, /* Null compression */ 0x00, 0x00 /* Extensions len */ }; /* A fragmented ClientHello with the fragment boundary mid cookie */ static const unsigned char clienthello_cookie_short[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x43, /* Record Length */ 0x01, /* ClientHello */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x42, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x37, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFD, /* DTLSv1.2 */ 0xCA, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, /* Random */ 0x00, /* Session id len */ 0x14, /* Cookie len */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12 /* Cookie */ }; /* Bad record - too short */ static const unsigned char record_short[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 /* Record sequence number */ }; static const unsigned char verify[] = { 0x16, /* Handshake */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Record sequence number */ 0x00, 0x23, /* Record Length */ 0x03, /* HelloVerifyRequest */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Message length */ 0x00, 0x00, /* Message sequence */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Fragment length */ 0xFE, 0xFF, /* DTLSv1.0 */ 0x14, /* Cookie len */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 005, 0x06, 007, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 /* Cookie */ }; static struct { const unsigned char *in; unsigned int inlen; /* * GOOD == positive return value from DTLSv1_listen, no output yet * VERIFY == 0 return value, HelloVerifyRequest sent * DROP == 0 return value, no output */ enum {GOOD, VERIFY, DROP} outtype; } testpackets[9] = { { clienthello_nocookie, sizeof(clienthello_nocookie), VERIFY }, { clienthello_nocookie_frag, sizeof(clienthello_nocookie_frag), VERIFY }, { clienthello_nocookie_short, sizeof(clienthello_nocookie_short), DROP }, { clienthello_2ndfrag, sizeof(clienthello_2ndfrag), DROP }, { clienthello_cookie, sizeof(clienthello_cookie), GOOD }, { clienthello_cookie_frag, sizeof(clienthello_cookie_frag), GOOD }, { clienthello_badcookie, sizeof(clienthello_badcookie), VERIFY }, { clienthello_cookie_short, sizeof(clienthello_cookie_short), DROP }, { record_short, sizeof(record_short), DROP } }; # define COOKIE_LEN 20 static int cookie_gen(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len) { unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < COOKIE_LEN; i++, cookie++) { *cookie = i; } *cookie_len = COOKIE_LEN; return 1; } static int cookie_verify(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len) { unsigned int i; if (cookie_len != COOKIE_LEN) return 0; for (i = 0; i < COOKIE_LEN; i++, cookie++) { if (*cookie != i) return 0; } return 1; } #endif int main(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; SSL *ssl = NULL; BIO *outbio = NULL; BIO *inbio = NULL; BIO_ADDR *peer = BIO_ADDR_new(); char *data; long datalen; int ret, success = 0; long i; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method()); if (ctx == NULL || peer == NULL) goto err; SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, cookie_gen); SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, cookie_verify); /* Create an SSL object for the connection */ ssl = SSL_new(ctx); if (ssl == NULL) goto err; outbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (outbio == NULL) goto err; SSL_set0_wbio(ssl, outbio); success = 1; for (i = 0; i < (long)OSSL_NELEM(testpackets) && success; i++) { inbio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *)testpackets[i].in, testpackets[i].inlen); if (inbio == NULL) { success = 0; goto err; } /* Set Non-blocking IO behaviour */ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(inbio, -1); SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, inbio); /* Process the incoming packet */ ret = DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer); if (ret < 0) { success = 0; goto err; } datalen = BIO_get_mem_data(outbio, &data); if (testpackets[i].outtype == VERIFY) { if (ret == 0) { if (datalen != sizeof(verify) || (memcmp(data, verify, sizeof(verify)) != 0)) { printf("Test %ld failure: incorrect HelloVerifyRequest\n", i); success = 0; } else { printf("Test %ld success\n", i); } } else { printf ("Test %ld failure: should not have succeeded\n", i); success = 0; } } else if (datalen == 0) { if ((ret == 0 && testpackets[i].outtype == DROP) || (ret == 1 && testpackets[i].outtype == GOOD)) { printf("Test %ld success\n", i); } else { printf("Test %ld failure: wrong return value\n", i); success = 0; } } else { printf("Test %ld failure: Unexpected data output\n", i); success = 0; } (void)BIO_reset(outbio); inbio = NULL; /* Frees up inbio */ SSL_set0_rbio(ssl, NULL); } err: if (!success) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); /* Also frees up outbio */ SSL_free(ssl); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); BIO_free(inbio); OPENSSL_free(peer); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr); # endif return success ? 0 : 1; #else printf("DTLSv1_listen() is not supported by this build - skipping\n"); return 0; #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662014470 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t0000644000000000000000000000137713176625662017177 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_pkcs7"); plan tests => 3; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); subtest 'pkcs7 conversions -- pkcs7' => sub { tconversion("p7", srctop_file("test", "testp7.pem"), "pkcs7"); }; subtest 'pkcs7 conversions -- pkcs7d' => sub { tconversion("p7d", srctop_file("test", "pkcs7-1.pem"), "pkcs7"); }; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslsessiontick.t0000644000000000000000000002137213176625662021225 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; use File::Temp qw(tempfile); my $test_name = "test_sslsessiontick"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; sub checkmessages($$$$$$); sub clearclient(); sub clearall(); my $chellotickext = 0; my $shellotickext = 0; my $fullhand = 0; my $ticketseen = 0; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( undef, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); #Test 1: By default with no existing session we should get a session ticket #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen # NewSessionTicket message seen; Full handshake $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 10; checkmessages(1, "Default session ticket test", 1, 1, 1, 1); #Test 2: If the server does not accept tickets we should get a normal handshake #with no session tickets #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension not seen # NewSessionTicket message not seen; Full handshake clearall(); $proxy->serverflags("-no_ticket"); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(2, "No server support session ticket test", 1, 0, 0, 1); #Test 3: If the client does not accept tickets we should get a normal handshake #with no session tickets #Expected result: ClientHello extension not seen; ServerHello extension not seen # NewSessionTicket message not seen; Full handshake clearall(); $proxy->clientflags("-no_ticket"); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(3, "No client support session ticket test", 0, 0, 0, 1); #Test 4: Test session resumption with session ticket #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension not seen # NewSessionTicket message not seen; Abbreviated handshake clearall(); (undef, my $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); $proxy->clientstart(); checkmessages(4, "Session resumption session ticket test", 1, 0, 0, 0); unlink $session; #Test 5: Test session resumption with ticket capable client without a ticket #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen # NewSessionTicket message seen; Abbreviated handshake clearall(); (undef, $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session." -no_ticket"); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); $proxy->clientstart(); checkmessages(5, "Session resumption with ticket capable client without a " ."ticket", 1, 1, 1, 0); unlink $session; #Test 6: Client accepts empty ticket. #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen; # NewSessionTicket message seen; Full handshake. clearall(); $proxy->filter(\&ticket_filter); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(6, "Empty ticket test", 1, 1, 1, 1); #Test 7-8: Client keeps existing ticket on empty ticket. clearall(); (undef, $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(3); $proxy->filter(undef); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session." -sess_out ".$session); $proxy->filter(\&inject_empty_ticket_filter); $proxy->clientstart(); #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen; # NewSessionTicket message seen; Abbreviated handshake. checkmessages(7, "Empty ticket resumption test", 1, 1, 1, 0); clearclient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); $proxy->filter(undef); $proxy->clientstart(); #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension not seen; # NewSessionTicket message not seen; Abbreviated handshake. checkmessages(8, "Empty ticket resumption test", 1, 0, 0, 0); unlink $session; #Test 9: Bad server sends the ServerHello extension but does not send a #NewSessionTicket #Expected result: Connection failure clearall(); $proxy->serverflags("-no_ticket"); $proxy->filter(\&inject_ticket_extension_filter); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "Server sends ticket extension but no ticket test"); #Test10: Bad server does not send the ServerHello extension but does send a #NewSessionTicket #Expected result: Connection failure clearall(); $proxy->serverflags("-no_ticket"); $proxy->filter(\&inject_empty_ticket_filter); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "No server ticket extension but ticket sent test"); sub ticket_filter { my $proxy = shift; foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { $message->ticket(""); $message->repack(); } } } sub inject_empty_ticket_filter { my $proxy = shift; foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { # Only inject the message first time we're called. return; } } my @new_message_list = (); foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { push @new_message_list, $message; if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) { $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SESSION_TICKET, ""); $message->repack(); # Tack NewSessionTicket onto the ServerHello record. # This only works if the ServerHello is exactly one record. my $record = ${$message->records}[0]; my $offset = $message->startoffset + $message->encoded_length; my $newsessionticket = TLSProxy::NewSessionTicket->new( 1, "", [$record], $offset, []); $newsessionticket->repack(); push @new_message_list, $newsessionticket; } } $proxy->message_list([@new_message_list]); } sub inject_ticket_extension_filter { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the initial ServerHello if ($proxy->flight != 1) { return; } foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) { #Add the session ticket extension to the ServerHello even though #we are not going to send a NewSessionTicket message $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SESSION_TICKET, ""); $message->repack(); } } } sub checkmessages($$$$$$) { my ($testno, $testname, $testch, $testsh, $testtickseen, $testhand) = @_; subtest $testname => sub { foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO || $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) { #Get the extensions data my %extensions = %{$message->extension_data}; if (defined $extensions{TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SESSION_TICKET}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { $chellotickext = 1; } else { $shellotickext = 1; } } } elsif ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { #Must be doing a full handshake $fullhand = 1; } elsif ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { $ticketseen = 1; } } plan tests => 5; ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Handshake"); ok(($testch && $chellotickext) || (!$testch && !$chellotickext), "ClientHello extension Session Ticket check"); ok(($testsh && $shellotickext) || (!$testsh && !$shellotickext), "ServerHello extension Session Ticket check"); ok(($testtickseen && $ticketseen) || (!$testtickseen && !$ticketseen), "Session Ticket message presence check"); ok(($testhand && $fullhand) || (!$testhand && !$fullhand), "Session Ticket full handshake check"); } } sub clearclient() { $chellotickext = 0; $shellotickext = 0; $fullhand = 0; $ticketseen = 0; $proxy->clearClient(); } sub clearall() { clearclient(); $proxy->clear(); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_fuzz.t0000644000000000000000000000213713176625662017143 0ustar rootroot#!/usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use if $^O ne "VMS", 'File::Glob' => qw/glob/; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_fuzz"); my @fuzzers = ('asn1', 'asn1parse', 'bignum', 'bndiv', 'conf', 'crl', 'server', 'x509'); if (!disabled("cms")) { push @fuzzers, 'cms'; } if (!disabled("ct")) { push @fuzzers, 'ct'; } plan tests => scalar @fuzzers; foreach my $f (@fuzzers) { subtest "Fuzzing $f" => sub { my @files = glob(srctop_file('fuzz', 'corpora', $f, '*')); push @files, glob(srctop_file('fuzz', 'corpora', "$f-*", '*')); plan skip_all => "No corpora for $f-test" unless @files; plan tests => scalar @files; foreach (@files) { ok(run(fuzz(["$f-test", $_]))); } } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t0000644000000000000000000000105213176625662016724 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_evp"); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["evp_test", srctop_file("test", "evptests.txt")])), "running evp_test evptests.txt"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_md2.t0000644000000000000000000000063613176625662016625 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_md2", "md2test", "md2"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_hmac.t0000644000000000000000000000063113176625662017046 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_hmac", "hmactest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_mdc2.t0000644000000000000000000000064113176625662016764 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_mdc2", "mdc2test", "mdc2"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t0000644000000000000000000001117313176625662017616 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Basename; use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; use if $^O ne "VMS", 'File::Glob' => qw/glob/; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw/disabled alldisabled available_protocols/; setup("test_ssl_new"); $ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs"); $ENV{CTLOG_FILE} = srctop_file("test", "ct", "log_list.conf"); my @conf_srcs = glob(srctop_file("test", "ssl-tests", "*.conf.in")); map { s/;.*// } @conf_srcs if $^O eq "VMS"; my @conf_files = map { basename($_, ".in") } @conf_srcs; map { s/\^// } @conf_files if $^O eq "VMS"; # We hard-code the number of tests to double-check that the globbing above # finds all files as expected. plan tests => 19; # = scalar @conf_srcs # Some test results depend on the configuration of enabled protocols. We only # verify generated sources in the default configuration. my $is_default_tls = (disabled("ssl3") && !disabled("tls1") && !disabled("tls1_1") && !disabled("tls1_2")); my $is_default_dtls = (!disabled("dtls1") && !disabled("dtls1_2")); my $no_tls = alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); my $no_dtls = alldisabled(available_protocols("dtls")); my $no_npn = disabled("nextprotoneg"); my $no_ct = disabled("ct"); my $no_ec = disabled("ec"); my $no_ec2m = disabled("ec2m"); my $no_ocsp = disabled("ocsp"); # Add your test here if the test conf.in generates test cases and/or # expectations dynamically based on the OpenSSL compile-time config. my %conf_dependent_tests = ( "02-protocol-version.conf" => !$is_default_tls, "04-client_auth.conf" => !$is_default_tls, "07-dtls-protocol-version.conf" => !$is_default_dtls, "10-resumption.conf" => !$is_default_tls, "11-dtls_resumption.conf" => !$is_default_dtls, "17-renegotiate.conf" => disabled("tls1_2"), "18-dtls-renegotiate.conf" => disabled("dtls1_2"), ); # Add your test here if it should be skipped for some compile-time # configurations. Default is $no_tls but some tests have different skip # conditions. my %skip = ( "07-dtls-protocol-version.conf" => $no_dtls, "08-npn.conf" => $no_tls || $no_npn, "10-resumption.conf" => disabled("tls1_1") || disabled("tls1_2"), "11-dtls_resumption.conf" => disabled("dtls1") || disabled("dtls1_2"), "12-ct.conf" => $no_tls || $no_ct || $no_ec, # We could run some of these tests without TLS 1.2 if we had a per-test # disable instruction but that's a bizarre configuration not worth # special-casing for. # We should review this once we have TLS 1.3. "13-fragmentation.conf" => disabled("tls1_2"), "14-curves.conf" => disabled("tls1_2") || $no_ec || $no_ec2m, "15-certstatus.conf" => $no_tls || $no_ocsp, "16-dtls-certstatus.conf" => $no_dtls || $no_ocsp, "18-dtls-renegotiate.conf" => $no_dtls, "19-mac-then-encrypt.conf" => disabled("tls1_2"), ); foreach my $conf (@conf_files) { subtest "Test configuration $conf" => sub { test_conf($conf, $conf_dependent_tests{$conf} || $^O eq "VMS" ? 0 : 1, defined($skip{$conf}) ? $skip{$conf} : $no_tls); } } sub test_conf { plan tests => 3; my ($conf, $check_source, $skip) = @_; my $conf_file = srctop_file("test", "ssl-tests", $conf); my $tmp_file = "${conf}.$$.tmp"; my $run_test = 1; SKIP: { # "Test" 1. Generate the source. my $input_file = $conf_file . ".in"; skip 'failure', 2 unless ok(run(perltest(["generate_ssl_tests.pl", $input_file], interpreter_args => [ "-I", srctop_dir("test", "testlib")], stdout => $tmp_file)), "Getting output from generate_ssl_tests.pl."); SKIP: { # Test 2. Compare against existing output in test/ssl_tests.conf. skip "Skipping generated source test for $conf", 1 if !$check_source; $run_test = is(cmp_text($tmp_file, $conf_file), 0, "Comparing generated sources."); } # Test 3. Run the test. skip "No tests available; skipping tests", 1 if $skip; skip "Stale sources; skipping tests", 1 if !$run_test; ok(run(test(["ssl_test", $tmp_file])), "running ssl_test $conf"); } unlink glob $tmp_file; } sub cmp_text { return compare_text(@_, sub { $_[0] =~ s/\R//g; $_[1] =~ s/\R//g; return $_[0] ne $_[1]; }); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_v3name.t0000644000000000000000000000063513176625662017337 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_v3name", "v3nametest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_sha512.t0000644000000000000000000000064113176625662017142 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_sha512", "sha512t", "sha"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/25-test_sid.t0000644000000000000000000000117613176625662016724 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_sid"); plan tests => 2; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); subtest 'sid conversions' => sub { tconversion("sid", srctop_file("test","testsid.pem"), "sess_id"); }; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t0000644000000000000000000001023113176625661021317 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # -*- mode: Perl -*- # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use File::Spec::Functions qw(devnull); use OpenSSL::Test qw(:DEFAULT srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file); use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_symbol_presence"); plan skip_all => "Only useful when building shared libraries" if disabled("shared"); my @libnames = ("crypto", "ssl"); my $testcount = scalar @libnames; plan tests => $testcount * 2; note "NOTE: developer test! It's possible that it won't run on your\n", "platform, and that's perfectly fine. This is mainly for developers\n", "on Unix to check that our shared libraries are consistent with the\n", "ordinals (util/*.num in the source tree), something that should be\n", "good enough a check for the other platforms as well.\n"; foreach my $libname (@libnames) { SKIP: { my $shlibpath = bldtop_file("lib" . $libname . ".so"); *OSTDERR = *STDERR; *OSTDOUT = *STDOUT; open STDERR, ">", devnull(); open STDOUT, ">", devnull(); my @nm_lines = map { s|\R$||; $_ } `nm -Pg $shlibpath 2> /dev/null`; close STDERR; close STDOUT; *STDERR = *OSTDERR; *STDOUT = *OSTDOUT; skip "Can't run 'nm -Pg $shlibpath' => $?... ignoring", 2 unless $? == 0; my $bldtop = bldtop_dir(); my @def_lines; indir $bldtop => sub { my $mkdefpath = srctop_file("util", "mkdef.pl"); @def_lines = map { s|\R$||; $_ } `$^X $mkdefpath $libname linux 2> /dev/null`; ok($? == 0, "running 'cd $bldtop; $^X $mkdefpath $libname linux' => $?"); }, create => 0, cleanup => 0; note "Number of lines in \@nm_lines before massaging: ", scalar @nm_lines; note "Number of lines in \@def_lines before massaging: ", scalar @def_lines; # Massage the nm output to only contain defined symbols @nm_lines = sort map { s| .*||; $_ } grep(m|.* [BCDST] .*|, @nm_lines); # Massage the mkdef.pl output to only contain global symbols # The output we got is in Unix .map format, which has a global # and a local section. We're only interested in the global # section. my $in_global = 0; @def_lines = sort map { s|;||; s|\s+||g; $_ } grep { $in_global = 1 if m|global:|; $in_global = 0 if m|local:|; $in_global = 0 if m|\}|; $in_global && m|;|; } @def_lines; note "Number of lines in \@nm_lines after massaging: ", scalar @nm_lines; note "Number of lines in \@def_lines after massaging: ", scalar @def_lines; # Maintain lists of symbols that are missing in the shared library, # or that are extra. my @missing = (); my @extra = (); while (scalar @nm_lines || scalar @def_lines) { my $nm_first = $nm_lines[0]; my $def_first = $def_lines[0]; if (!defined($nm_first)) { push @missing, shift @def_lines; } elsif (!defined($def_first)) { push @extra, shift @nm_lines; } elsif ($nm_first gt $def_first) { push @missing, shift @def_lines; } elsif ($nm_first lt $def_first) { push @extra, shift @nm_lines; } else { shift @def_lines; shift @nm_lines; } } if (scalar @missing) { note "The following symbols are missing in lib$libname.so:"; foreach (@missing) { note " $_"; } } if (scalar @extra) { note "The following symbols are extra in lib$libname.so:"; foreach (@extra) { note " $_"; } } ok(scalar @missing == 0, "check that there are no missing symbols in lib$libname.so"); } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t0000644000000000000000000000133513176625662017437 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_sslapi"); plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build" if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls")); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["sslapitest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running sslapitest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/03-test_ui.t0000644000000000000000000000163613176625661016556 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test; setup("test_ui"); plan tests => 1; note <<"EOF"; The best way to test the UI interface is currently by using an openssl command that uses password_callback. The only one that does this is 'genrsa'. Since password_callback uses a UI method derived from UI_OpenSSL(), it ensures that one gets tested well enough as well. EOF my $outfile = "rsa_$$.pem"; ok(run(app(["openssl", "genrsa", "-passout", "pass:password", "-aes128", "-out", $outfile])), "Checking that genrsa with a password works properly"); unlink $outfile; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_bio_enc.t0000644000000000000000000000065313176625662017544 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_bio_enc", "bio_enc_test", "bio_enc"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/30-test_engine.t0000644000000000000000000000074313176625662017405 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test; setup("test_engine"); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["enginetest"])), "running enginetest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_shlibload.t0000644000000000000000000000236613176625662020112 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; #Load configdata.pm BEGIN { setup("test_shlibload"); } use lib bldtop_dir('.'); use configdata; plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a shared build" if disabled("shared"); plan tests => 3; my $libcrypto_idx = $unified_info{rename}->{libcrypto} // "libcrypto"; my $libssl_idx = $unified_info{rename}->{libssl} // "libssl"; my $libcrypto = $unified_info{sharednames}->{$libcrypto_idx}.$target{shared_extension_simple}; my $libssl = $unified_info{sharednames}->{$libssl_idx}.$target{shared_extension_simple}; ok(run(test(["shlibloadtest", "-crypto_first", $libcrypto, $libssl])), "running shlibloadtest -crypto_first"); ok(run(test(["shlibloadtest", "-ssl_first", $libcrypto, $libssl])), "running shlibloadtest -ssl_first"); ok(run(test(["shlibloadtest", "-just_crypto", $libcrypto, $libssl])), "running shlibloadtest -just_crypto"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/15-test_ecdsa.t0000644000000000000000000000064113176625662017217 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_ecdsa", "ecdsatest", "ec"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_tlsextms.t0000644000000000000000000001556113176625662020033 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; use File::Temp qw(tempfile); my $test_name = "test_tlsextms"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; sub checkmessages($$$$$); sub setrmextms($$); sub clearall(); my $crmextms = 0; my $srmextms = 0; my $cextms = 0; my $sextms = 0; my $fullhand = 0; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( \&extms_filter, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); #Test 1: By default server and client should send extended master secret # extension. #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen # Full handshake setrmextms(0, 0); $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 9; checkmessages(1, "Default extended master secret test", 1, 1, 1); #Test 2: If client omits extended master secret extension, server should too. #Expected result: ClientHello extension not seen; ServerHello extension not seen # Full handshake clearall(); setrmextms(1, 0); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(2, "No client extension extended master secret test", 0, 0, 1); # Test 3: same as 1 but with session tickets disabled. # Expected result: same as test 1. clearall(); $proxy->clientflags("-no_ticket"); setrmextms(0, 0); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(3, "No ticket extended master secret test", 1, 1, 1); # Test 4: same as 2 but with session tickets disabled. # Expected result: same as test 2. clearall(); $proxy->clientflags("-no_ticket"); setrmextms(1, 0); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(2, "No ticket, no client extension extended master secret test", 0, 0, 1); #Test 5: Session resumption extended master secret test # #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen # Abbreviated handshake clearall(); setrmextms(0, 0); (undef, my $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); $proxy->clientstart(); checkmessages(5, "Session resumption extended master secret test", 1, 1, 0); unlink $session; #Test 6: Session resumption extended master secret test original session # omits extension. Server must not resume session. #Expected result: ClientHello extension seen; ServerHello extension seen # Full handshake clearall(); setrmextms(1, 0); (undef, $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); setrmextms(0, 0); $proxy->clientstart(); checkmessages(6, "Session resumption extended master secret test", 1, 1, 1); unlink $session; #Test 7: Session resumption extended master secret test resumed session # omits client extension. Server must abort connection. #Expected result: aborted connection. clearall(); setrmextms(0, 0); (undef, $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); setrmextms(1, 0); $proxy->clientstart(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Client inconsistent session resumption"); unlink $session; #Test 8: Session resumption extended master secret test resumed session # omits server extension. Client must abort connection. #Expected result: aborted connection. clearall(); setrmextms(0, 0); (undef, $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); setrmextms(0, 1); $proxy->clientstart(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Server inconsistent session resumption 1"); unlink $session; #Test 9: Session resumption extended master secret test initial session # omits server extension. Client must abort connection. #Expected result: aborted connection. clearall(); setrmextms(0, 1); (undef, $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start(); $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); setrmextms(0, 0); $proxy->clientstart(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Server inconsistent session resumption 2"); unlink $session; sub extms_filter { my $proxy = shift; foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($crmextms && $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET); $message->repack(); } if ($srmextms && $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) { $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET); $message->repack(); } } } sub checkmessages($$$$$) { my ($testno, $testname, $testcextms, $testsextms, $testhand) = @_; subtest $testname => sub { foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO || $message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) { #Get the extensions data my %extensions = %{$message->extension_data}; if (defined $extensions{TLSProxy::Message::EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { $cextms = 1; } else { $sextms = 1; } } } elsif ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { #Must be doing a full handshake $fullhand = 1; } } plan tests => 4; ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Handshake"); ok($testcextms == $cextms, "ClientHello extension extended master secret check"); ok($testsextms == $sextms, "ServerHello extension extended master secret check"); ok($testhand == $fullhand, "Extended master secret full handshake check"); } } sub setrmextms($$) { ($crmextms, $srmextms) = @_; } sub clearall() { $cextms = 0; $sextms = 0; $fullhand = 0; $proxy->clear(); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_dane.t0000644000000000000000000000143313176625662017051 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_dane"); plan skip_all => "test_dane uses ec which is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("ec"); plan tests => 1; # The number of tests being performed ok(run(test(["danetest", "example.com", srctop_file("test", "danetest.pem"), srctop_file("test", "danetest.in")])), "dane tests"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_asyncio.t0000644000000000000000000000134513176625662017610 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_asyncio"); plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build" if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls")); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["asynciotest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running asynciotest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_cipherlist.t0000644000000000000000000000142513176625662020311 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/perl # # Copyright 2016-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils qw(alldisabled available_protocols); setup("test_cipherlist"); my $no_anytls = alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); # If we have no protocols, then we also have no supported ciphers. plan skip_all => "No SSL/TLS protocol is supported by this OpenSSL build." if $no_anytls; simple_test("test_cipherlist", "cipherlist_test", "cipherlist"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_idea.t0000644000000000000000000000064113176625662017041 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_idea", "ideatest", "idea"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625662017522 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1025line.pem0000644000000000000000000000325513176625661022423 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs 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B0G A1U EBw wWV G9v bWF ueW NoY XJh Y3R lcn N2a Wxs ZTF IME YGA 1UE Cgw /VG hlI EJl bmV 2b2 xlb nQg U29 jaW V0e SBv ZiB Mb3 F1Y WNp b3V zIG FuZ CBQ bGV vbm Fzd Glj IFB lcm lwa HJh c2l zMT 0wO wYD VQQ LDD RFb mRv cnN lbW Vud CBv ZiB Wb3 Vja HNh ZmU nZC BFd mlk ZW5 0aW Fye SBD ZXJ 0aW ZpY 2F0 aW9 uMR UwE wYD VQQ DDA xjZ XJ0 LmV 4YW 1wb GUw Hhc NMT cwM jIz MjA yNT M2W hcN MTc wMz I1M jAy NTM 2Wj CCA SYx YzB hBg NVB AgM WlR oZS BHc mVh dCB TdG F0Z SBv ZiB Mb2 5nL Vdp bmR lZC BDZ XJ0 aWZ pY2 F0Z SBG aWV sZC BOY W1l cyB XaG VyZ WJ5 IHR vIE luY 3Jl YXN lIH RoZ SBP dXR wdX QgU 2l6 ZTE fMB 0GA 1UE Bww WVG 9vb WFu eWN oYX JhY 3Rl cnN 2aW xsZ TFI MEY GA1 UEC gw/ VGh lIE Jlb mV2 b2x lbn QgU 29j aWV 0eS BvZ iBM b3F 1YW Npb 3Vz IGF uZC BQb GVv bmF zdG ljI FBl cml waH Jhc 2lz MT0 wOw YDV QQL DDR Fbm Rvc nNl bWV udC BvZ iBW b3V jaH NhZ mUn ZCB Fdm lkZ W50 aWF yeS BDZ XJ0 aWZ pY2 F0a W9u MRU wEw YDV QQD DAx jZX J0L mV4 YW1 wbG Uwg gEi MA0 GCS qGS Ib3 DQE BAQ UAA 4IB DwA wgg EKA oIB AQC 7MO Irq H+Z IJi Zdr oKM rel KMS vvR Kg2 MEg j/s x9T aHH qrK ys4 AiL 4Rq /yb QEi gFC 6G8 mpZ WbB rU+ vN2 SLr 1Zs Pft CHI Y12 LF5 60W LYT YNq DgF 5Bd CZC rjJ 2hh N+X wML 2tg YdW ioV /Ee y8S JSq Usk f03 Mpc wnL bVf Sph wmo wqN fiE FFq PBC f7E 8IV arG Wct bMp vlM bAM 5ow hMe v/C cmq qt8 1NF kb1 WVe jvN 5v/ JKv 243 /Xe df4 I7Z Jv7 zKe swo P9p iFz WHX Cd9 SIV zWq F77 u/c rHu fIh oEa 7Nk ZhS C2a osQ F61 9iK nfk 0nq WaL DJ1 82C CXk HER oQC 7q9 X2I GLD LoA 0XA gMB AAE wDQ YJK oZI hvc NAQ ELB QAD ggE BAK btL x+Y lCG RCB mYn 3df YF+ BIv K/b /e0 DKN hDK hb4 s9J ywl J4q nAB 48t gPx 0q+ ZB+ EdM YRq Cwy vXJ xEd Z7P sCd UeU 6xI 2yb khS dUU fQb Yem 3aY RG+ yuk Gza zyS QJs 8lG qxB lRM Fl/ FGC g+o SQ/ I32 eGf 8mi cDs kj2 zkA JtC kUP HX3 0Yr WMf OwW 1r2 xYr 2mB NXb NWX JhW /sI g5u 8aa 9fc ALe uQc MXk bsb VoP mC5 aLd iVZ rvU FoJ 8DP g0a YYw j64 RwU 0B5 HW/ 7jK hQ2 5Fg KVA zLG rgY x1D ivk M7U QGd WYn U8I AA8 S89 gRj Gk2 hnk eag Was 3dx qTT pgJ Dhp rgW zyK a9h II= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-misalignedpad.pem0000644000000000000000000000244113176625662023574 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K 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 -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-shortandlongline.pem0000644000000000000000000000327413176625661024537 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs ZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0G A1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2 b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlw aHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlk ZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcN MTcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSBH cmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1l cyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwW VG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQg U29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lz 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1024line.pem0000644000000000000000000000242013176625662022226 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U 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2 Q l I a / S m N z X E Y k N 3 g o D z H S F K B a u B 0 o 5 q F c 1 b 1 x 7 d X P C F L 0 a t G 5 U x o R r / E p 7 t i a b 4 D Z m Y E n O G k L 2 d V N 8 j A 0 4 F + H Q G B e P 6 n D O S K h X R j b U O D U p D p D v j + F J f 7 7 R v 0 p 4 8 l 9 i p 8 i / b q u w u k X l M e d 3 O 4 d 6 r n E w k g g d y S S 5 i t i S h w a V L P f + i c I / Y d 4 v c P X D P U H T k j 1 X m o Z 4 f 1 m U F 1 7 O t C o h s J T 7 O 4 o M B B M B w q C k C 7 e n r L a A L i 9 j i K y m 4 7 g 2 b Z H 0 5 x J P p W X S / k S E k w t / j I + a + o 4 C u D P l y 3 X h I c Y R t s a W B J W i a m 1 O T 7 s G Q + z k j T G A a 6 N f w b R 8 S c Q C 8 M z D f V n k J 3 V n X j T 3 4 5 b z + F 7 H T A v e Q 8 a 7 K G x N n t P h E 0 K V j p l 3 6 9 K q 2 T M L y e x Q A R J a p a b B f / S T 9 z W P 7 w x z W f r E b X 3 O E Z C u R D V k w W f 1 8 B H / E h 6 L q n q g 5 Q M 4 G u X 7 0 8 N i F p i w Q t 9 p / D A u Q d h B r P 6 7 B x L 6 4 C b I 7 C g W 4 L v 3 z 3 q n K f F V 9 z Y 5 / m x C E R n 9 m P O i g 2 r 8 W v v X t 7 c h 6 n h z B P f C w q 0 B o P q L K U F g D p e X s N d J 9 s W 5 I V 3 y i / 3 B h 9 8 Z B Y X z j 8 g / 7 X M o 6 v 9 9 8 f c t + E i H P s c u q e Y U a o J Z 6 + Z j 7 W 4 5 n G A 9 D G s n E m Z 0 W u x 2 t T j 7 0 m D o H / / 2 1 T i R A x 6 y p P P + I q 2 Y D z q h 7 V X c / g s s O n / v U 1 A j 1 9 g z L + M R n 1 Z 5 5 S M r A 7 n O 9 0 m O g O y E P + u G r X y a h f Z G P b m p g I x + M T b t f v R t Z B s G 3 E c X y W 9 N n H J f k 4 O 8 x N 3 h Y P W X a B I o 1 5 q B 3 j Y b x 1 o k t b c Q P o 0 h z a N v + P J 5 w t T 4 7 J L N c b M e M S n w K M 8 M B 4 C X l M 4 3 R U t K w s 6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/beermug.pem0000644000000000000000000000240713176625661021655 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXQIBAAKBgQC+qeXl4ZUfQZFmcGAPwdt7Mza4NQ6mJHehc4V/hVYc6eepvL/5 uyyflzuhVy5ufctdi92FlXcIct5nNPdqK0PPdWH5Uzw0t/OjI5y/SJh8ur20krqw 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-longline.pem0000644000000000000000000000327413176625661022774 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs ZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0G A1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2 b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlw aHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlk ZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcN MTcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSBH cmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1l cyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwW VG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQg U29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lz MT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWFy 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KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaB Io15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws 6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-threecolumn.pem0000644000000000000000000000321513176625662023320 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBD WX0 Qfa rl+ QNs HgC Uud Lyb 6Dk C4z yaD U/v UqW yHX 0m+ 8W2 bbm T5T exl L3h sM5 Ugz 7Ks Gqy jeO uK9 QT5 LOM 4Vy K6B gmh qpQ aJ1 MgC WA/ gbB PTg Bp2 jfp 3oS 0WC 5D6 GMw csd qoe IpD /wc e3k 0H2 Gfu 6+r INB mbI Ttn 4DT f3P kOc DIw dDc eN2 qkZ anl oFV riS 3kA BUI h1e hYI XQi bLR FY5 rXd Qnh Y2C ZNr QFI Mwl 64h K5P 5hQ bcy JKG DHA YzX V7o upd Xy5 F9o yEd 6eA 5ix +n1 jKF RB7 PmA pZm uiQ jzf ExV KmB PGx RzO GT0 qR5 vLy lQh eiS C77 nke raw Uyj A2Q lIa /Sm NzX EYk N3g oDz HSF KBa uB0 o5q Fc1 b1x 7dX PCF L0a tG5 Uxo Rr/ Ep7 tia b4D ZmY EnO GkL 2dV N8j A04 F+H QGB eP6 nDO SKh XRj bUO DUp DpD vj+ FJf 77R v0p 48l 9ip 8i/ bqu wuk XlM ed3 O4d 6rn Ewk ggd ySS 5it iSh waV LPf +ic I/Y d4v cPX DPU HTk j1X moZ 4f1 mUF 17O tCo hsJ T7O 4oM BBM Bwq CkC 7en rLa ALi 9ji Kym 47g 2bZ H05 xJP pWX S/k SEk wt/ jI+ a+o 4Cu DPl y3X hIc YRt saW BJW iam 1OT 7sG Q+z kjT GAa 6Nf wbR 8Sc QC8 MzD fVn kJ3 VnX jT3 45b z+F 7HT Ave Q8a 7KG xNn tPh E0K Vjp l36 9Kq 2TM Lye xQA RJa pab Bf/ ST9 zWP 7wx zWf rEb X3O EZC uRD Vkw Wf1 8BH /Eh 6Lq nqg 5QM 4Gu X70 8Ni Fpi wQt 9p/ DAu Qdh BrP 67B xL6 4Cb I7C gW4 Lv3 z3q nKf FV9 zY5 /mx CER n9m POi g2r 8Wv vXt 7ch 6nh zBP fCw q0B oPq LKU FgD peX sNd J9s W5I V3y i/3 Bh9 8ZB YXz j8g /7X Mo6 v99 8fc t+E iHP scu qeY Uao JZ6 +Zj 7W4 5nG A9D Gsn EmZ 0Wu x2t Tj7 0mD oH/ /21 TiR Ax6 ypP P+I q2Y Dzq h7V Xc/ gss On/ vU1 Aj1 9gz L+M Rn1 Z55 SMr A7n O90 mOg OyE P+u GrX yah fZG Pbm pgI x+M Tbt fvR tZB sG3 EcX yW9 NnH Jfk 4O8 xN3 hYP WXa BIo 15q B3j Ybx 1ok tbc QPo 0hz aNv +PJ 5wt T47 JLN cbM eMS nwK M8M B4C XlM 43R UtK ws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-257line.pem0000644000000000000000000000243413176625662022162 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG 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SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+FJf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-earlypad.pem0000644000000000000000000000330013176625661022754 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs ====ZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0G A1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2 b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlw aHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlk ZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcN MTcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSBH cmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1l cyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwW VG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQg U29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lz MT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWFy eSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqG SIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC7MOIrqH+ZIJiZdroKMrelKMSvvRKg2MEg j/sx9TaHHqrKys4AiL4Rq/ybQEigFC6G8mpZWbBrU+vN2SLr1ZsPftCHIY12LF56 0WLYTYNqDgF5BdCZCrjJ2hhN+XwML2tgYdWioV/Eey8SJSqUskf03MpcwnLbVfSp hwmowqNfiEFFqPBCf7E8IVarGWctbMpvlMbAM5owhMev/Ccmqqt81NFkb1WVejvN 5v/JKv243/Xedf4I7ZJv7zKeswoP9piFzWHXCd9SIVzWqF77u/crHufIhoEa7NkZ hSC2aosQF619iKnfk0nqWaLDJ182CCXkHERoQC7q9X2IGLDLoA0XAgMBAAEwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKbtLx+YlCGRCBmYn3dfYF+BIvK/b/e0DKNhDKhb4s9J ywlJ4qnAB48tgPx0q+ZB+EdMYRqCwyvXJxEdZ7PsCdUeU6xI2ybkhSdUUfQbYem3 aYRG+yukGzazySQJs8lGqxBlRMFl/FGCg+oSQ/I32eGf8micDskj2zkAJtCkUPHX 30YrWMfOwW1r2xYr2mBNXbNWXJhW/sIg5u8aa9fcALeuQcMXkbsbVoPmC5aLdiVZ rvUFoJ8DPg0aYYwj64RwU0B5HW/7jKhQ25FgKVAzLGrgYx1DivkM7UQGdWYnU8IA A8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-trailingwhitespace.pem0000644000000000000000000000266713176625662024673 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-misalignedpad.pem0000644000000000000000000000327513176625661023767 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs ZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0G A1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2 b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlw aHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlk ZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcN MTcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSBH cmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1l cyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwW VG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQg U29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lz MT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWFy eSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqG SIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC7MOIrqH+ZIJiZdroKMrelKMSvvRKg2MEg j/sx9TaHHqrKys4AiL4Rq/ybQEigFC6G8mpZWbBrU+vN2SLr1ZsPftCHIY12LF56 0WLYTYNqDgF5BdCZCrjJ2hhN+XwML2tgYdWioV/Eey8SJSqUskf03MpcwnLbVfSp hwmowqNfiEFFqPBCf7E8IVarGWctbMpvlMbAM5owhMev/Ccmqqt81NFkb1WVejvN 5v/JKv243/Xedf4I7ZJv7zKeswoP9piFzWHXCd9SIVzWqF77u/crHufIhoEa7NkZ hSC2aosQF619iKnfk0nqWaLDJ182CCXkHERoQC7q9X2IGLDLoA0XAgMBAAEwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKbtLx+YlCGRCBmYn3dfYF+BIvK/b/e0DKNhDKhb4s9J ywlJ4qnAB48tgPx0q+ZB+EdMYRqCwyvXJxEdZ7PsCdUeU6xI2ybkhSdUUfQbYem3 aYRG+yukGzazySQJs8lGqxBlRMFl/FGCg+oSQ/I32eGf8micDskj2zkAJtCkUPHX 30YrWMfOwW1r2xYr2mBNXbNWXJhW/sIg5u8aa9fcALeuQcMXkbsbVoPmC5aLdiVZ rvUFoJ8DPg0aYYwj64RwU0B5HW/7jKhQ25FgKVAzLGrgYx1DivkM7UQGdWYnU8IA A8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/NOTES0000644000000000000000000000024113176625661020331 0ustar rootrootThe cert-*.pem and dsa-*.pem files are generated as manipulation of the ASCII text of cert.pem and dsa.pem, respectively -- they should decode to the same data. openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-blankline.pem0000644000000000000000000000327513176625661023125 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs ZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0G A1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2 b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlw 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KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKbtLx+YlCGRCBmYn3dfYF+BIvK/b/e0DKNhDKhb4s9J ywlJ4qnAB48tgPx0q+ZB+EdMYRqCwyvXJxEdZ7PsCdUeU6xI2ybkhSdUUfQbYem3 aYRG+yukGzazySQJs8lGqxBlRMFl/FGCg+oSQ/I32eGf8micDskj2zkAJtCkUPHX 30YrWMfOwW1r2xYr2mBNXbNWXJhW/sIg5u8aa9fcALeuQcMXkbsbVoPmC5aLdiVZ rvUFoJ8DPg0aYYwj64RwU0B5HW/7jKhQ25FgKVAzLGrgYx1DivkM7UQGdWYnU8IA A8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-257line.pem0000644000000000000000000000327113176625661022347 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwa HJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZ W50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcNM TcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSBHc mVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1lc yBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwWV G9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQgU 29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lzM T0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWFye SBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGS Ib3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC7MOIrqH+ZIJiZdroKMrelKMSvvRKg2MEgj /sx9TaHHqrKys4AiL4Rq/ybQEigFC6G8mpZWbBrU+vN2SLr1ZsPftCHIY12LF560 WLYTYNqDgF5BdCZCrjJ2hhN+XwML2tgYdWioV/Eey8SJSqUskf03MpcwnLbVfSph wmowqNfiEFFqPBCf7E8IVarGWctbMpvlMbAM5owhMev/Ccmqqt81NFkb1WVejvN5 v/JKv243/Xedf4I7ZJv7zKeswoP9piFzWHXCd9SIVzWqF77u/crHufIhoEa7NkZh SC2aosQF619iKnfk0nqWaLDJ182CCXkHERoQC7q9X2IGLDLoA0XAgMBAAEwDQYJK oZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKbtLx+YlCGRCBmYn3dfYF+BIvK/b/e0DKNhDKhb4s9Jy wlJ4qnAB48tgPx0q+ZB+EdMYRqCwyvXJxEdZ7PsCdUeU6xI2ybkhSdUUfQbYem3a YRG+yukGzazySQJs8lGqxBlRMFl/FGCg+oSQ/I32eGf8micDskj2zkAJtCkUPHX3 0YrWMfOwW1r2xYr2mBNXbNWXJhW/sIg5u8aa9fcALeuQcMXkbsbVoPmC5aLdiVZr vUFoJ8DPg0aYYwj64RwU0B5HW/7jKhQ25FgKVAzLGrgYx1DivkM7UQGdWYnU8IAA 8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-comment.pem0000644000000000000000000000254113176625662022436 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 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rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bqu wukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxz WfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-shortandlongline.pem0000644000000000000000000000243713176625662024352 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90mO gOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-oneline.pem0000644000000000000000000000241613176625662022426 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5Ugz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GMwcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7oupdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQheiSC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+FJf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTGAa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369Kq2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYXzj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mDoH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90mOgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBIo15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1023line.pem0000644000000000000000000000242113176625662022226 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U 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 Io15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws 6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-extrapad.pem0000644000000000000000000000244413176625662022606 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 ==== -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-onelineheader.pem0000644000000000000000000000243713176625662023602 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-corruptedheader.pem0000644000000000000000000000243713176625662024160 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCARPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-trailingwhitespace.pem0000644000000000000000000000362413176625662025053 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVs ZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0G A1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2 b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlw aHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlk ZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcN MTcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSBH cmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1l cyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwW VG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQg U29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2lz MT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWFy eSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqG SIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC7MOIrqH+ZIJiZdroKMrelKMSvvRKg2MEg j/sx9TaHHqrKys4AiL4Rq/ybQEigFC6G8mpZWbBrU+vN2SLr1ZsPftCHIY12LF56 0WLYTYNqDgF5BdCZCrjJ2hhN+XwML2tgYdWioV/Eey8SJSqUskf03MpcwnLbVfSp hwmowqNfiEFFqPBCf7E8IVarGWctbMpvlMbAM5owhMev/Ccmqqt81NFkb1WVejvN 5v/JKv243/Xedf4I7ZJv7zKeswoP9piFzWHXCd9SIVzWqF77u/crHufIhoEa7NkZ hSC2aosQF619iKnfk0nqWaLDJ182CCXkHERoQC7q9X2IGLDLoA0XAgMBAAEwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKbtLx+YlCGRCBmYn3dfYF+BIvK/b/e0DKNhDKhb4s9J ywlJ4qnAB48tgPx0q+ZB+EdMYRqCwyvXJxEdZ7PsCdUeU6xI2ybkhSdUUfQbYem3 aYRG+yukGzazySQJs8lGqxBlRMFl/FGCg+oSQ/I32eGf8micDskj2zkAJtCkUPHX 30YrWMfOwW1r2xYr2mBNXbNWXJhW/sIg5u8aa9fcALeuQcMXkbsbVoPmC5aLdiVZ rvUFoJ8DPg0aYYwj64RwU0B5HW/7jKhQ25FgKVAzLGrgYx1DivkM7UQGdWYnU8IA A8S89gRjGk2hnkeagWas3dxqTTpgJDhprgWzyKa9hII= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/wellknown0000644000000000000000000000001213176625662021456 0ustar rootrootwellknown openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-255line.pem0000644000000000000000000000243513176625662022161 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTGAa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369Kq2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCER n9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBY Xzj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70m DoH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90 mOgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaB Io15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws 6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-1025line.pem0000644000000000000000000000242013176625662022227 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U 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 15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-onecolumn.pem0000644000000000000000000000641613176625661023165 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- M I I E z D C C A 7 Q C C Q C g x k R o x + Y l j j A N B g k q h k i G 9 w 0 B A Q s F A D C C A S Y x Y z B h B g N V B A g M W l R o Z S B H c m V h d C B T d G F 0 Z S B v Z i B M b 2 5 n L V d p b m R l Z C B D Z X J 0 a W Z p Y 2 F 0 Z S B G a W V s Z C B O Y W 1 l c y B X a G V y Z W J 5 I H R v I E l u Y 3 J l Y X N l I H R o Z S B P d X R w d X Q g U 2 l 6 Z T E f M B 0 G A 1 U E B w w W V G 9 v b W F u e W N o Y X J h Y 3 R l c n N 2 a W x s Z T F I M E Y G A 1 U E C g w / V G h l I E J l b m V 2 b 2 x l b n Q g U 2 9 j a W V 0 e S B v Z i B M b 3 F 1 Y W N p b 3 V z I G F u Z C B Q b G V v b m F z d G l j I F B l c m l w a H J h c 2 l z M T 0 w O w Y D V Q Q L D D R F b m R v c n N l b W V u d C B v Z i B W b 3 V j a H N h Z m U n Z C B F d m l k Z W 5 0 a W F y e S B D Z X J 0 a W Z p Y 2 F 0 a W 9 u M R U w E w Y D V Q Q D D A x j Z X J 0 L m V 4 Y W 1 w b G U w H h c N M T c w M j I z M j A y N T M 2 W h c N M T c w M z I 1 M j A y N T M 2 W j C C A S Y x Y z B h B g N V B A g M W l R o Z S B H c m V h d C B T d G F 0 Z S B v Z i B M b 2 5 n L V d p b m R l Z C B D Z X J 0 a W Z p Y 2 F 0 Z S B G a W V s Z C B O Y W 1 l c y B X a G V y Z W J 5 I H R v I E l u Y 3 J l Y X N l I H R o Z S B P d X R w d X Q g U 2 l 6 Z T E f M B 0 G A 1 U E B w w W V G 9 v b W F u e W N o Y X J h Y 3 R l c n N 2 a W x s Z T F I M E Y G A 1 U E C g w / V G h l I E J l b m V 2 b 2 x l b n Q g U 2 9 j a W V 0 e S B v Z i B M b 3 F 1 Y W N p b 3 V z I G F u Z C B Q b G V v b m F z d G l j I F B l c m l w a H J h c 2 l z M T 0 w O w Y D V Q Q L D D R F b m R v c n N l b W V u d C B v Z i B W b 3 V j a H N h Z m U n Z C B F d m l k Z W 5 0 a W F y e S B D Z X J 0 a W Z p Y 2 F 0 a W 9 u M R U w E w Y D V Q Q D D A x j Z X J 0 L m V 4 Y W 1 w b G U w g g E i M A 0 G C S q G S I b 3 D Q E B A Q U A A 4 I B D w A w g g E K A o I B A Q C 7 M O I r q H + Z I J i Z d r o K M r e l K M S v v R K g 2 M E g j / s x 9 T a H H q r K y s 4 A i L 4 R q / y b Q E i g F C 6 G 8 m p Z W b B r U + v N 2 S L r 1 Z s P f t C H I Y 1 2 L F 5 6 0 W L Y T Y N q D g F 5 B d C Z C r j J 2 h h N + X w M L 2 t g Y d W i o V / E e y 8 S J S q U s k f 0 3 M p c w n L b V f S p h w m o w q N f i E F F q P B C f 7 E 8 I V a r G W c t b M p v l M b A M 5 o w h M e v / C c m q q t 8 1 N F k b 1 W V e j v N 5 v / J K v 2 4 3 / X e d f 4 I 7 Z J v 7 z K e s w o P 9 p i F z W H X C d 9 S I V z W q F 7 7 u / c r H u f I h o E a 7 N k Z h S C 2 a o s Q F 6 1 9 i K n f k 0 n q W a L D J 1 8 2 C C X k H E R o Q C 7 q 9 X 2 I G L D L o A 0 X A g M B A A E w D Q Y J K o Z I h v c N A Q E L B Q A D g g E B A K b t L x + Y l C G R C B m Y n 3 d f Y F + B I v K / b / e 0 D K N h D K h b 4 s 9 J y w l J 4 q n A B 4 8 t g P x 0 q + Z B + E d M Y R q C w y v X J x E d Z 7 P s C d U e U 6 x I 2 y b k h S d U U f Q b Y e m 3 a Y R G + y u k G z a z y S Q J s 8 l G q x B l R M F l / F G C g + o S Q / I 3 2 e G f 8 m i c D s k j 2 z k A J t C k U P H X 3 0 Y r W M f O w W 1 r 2 x Y r 2 m B N X b N W X J h W / s I g 5 u 8 a a 9 f c A L e u Q c M X k b s b V o P m C 5 a L d i V Z r v U F o J 8 D P g 0 a Y Y w j 6 4 R w U 0 B 5 H W / 7 j K h Q 2 5 F g K V A z L G r g Y x 1 D i v k M 7 U Q G d W Y n U 8 I A A 8 S 8 9 g R j G k 2 h n k e a g W a s 3 d x q T T p g J D h p r g W z y K a 9 h I I = -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-1023line.pem0000644000000000000000000000325513176625661022421 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM 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PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-longline.pem0000644000000000000000000000243713176625662022607 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBIo 15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsa-leadingwhitespace.pem0000644000000000000000000000266513176625662024463 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-255line.pem0000644000000000000000000000327113176625661022345 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEzDCCA7QCCQCgxkRox+YljjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgM WlRoZSBHcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBwwWVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQgU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcml waHJhc2lzMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdml kZW50aWFyeSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxjZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUwHhc NMTcwMjIzMjAyNTM2WhcNMTcwMzI1MjAyNTM2WjCCASYxYzBhBgNVBAgMWlRoZSB HcmVhdCBTdGF0ZSBvZiBMb25nLVdpbmRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBGaWVsZCBOYW1 lcyBXaGVyZWJ5IHRvIEluY3JlYXNlIHRoZSBPdXRwdXQgU2l6ZTEfMB0GA1UEBww WVG9vbWFueWNoYXJhY3RlcnN2aWxsZTFIMEYGA1UECgw/VGhlIEJlbmV2b2xlbnQ gU29jaWV0eSBvZiBMb3F1YWNpb3VzIGFuZCBQbGVvbmFzdGljIFBlcmlwaHJhc2l zMT0wOwYDVQQLDDRFbmRvcnNlbWVudCBvZiBWb3VjaHNhZmUnZCBFdmlkZW50aWF 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PRIVATE KEY----- Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,A2A7FA3E5E454B59C8777564E7AF3CD6 EBDWX0Qfarl+QNsHgCUudLyb6DkC4zyaDU/vUqWyHX0m+8W2bbmT5TexlL3hsM5U gz7KsGqyjeOuK9QT5LOM4VyK6BgmhqpQaJ1MgCWA/gbBPTgBp2jfp3oS0WC5D6GM wcsdqoeIpD/wce3k0H2Gfu6+rINBmbITtn4DTf3PkOcDIwdDceN2qkZanloFVriS 3kABUIh1ehYIXQibLRFY5rXdQnhY2CZNrQFIMwl64hK5P5hQbcyJKGDHAYzXV7ou pdXy5F9oyEd6eA5ix+n1jKFRB7PmApZmuiQjzfExVKmBPGxRzOGT0qR5vLylQhei SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/csr.pem0000644000000000000000000000236113176625662021016 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIDbTCCAlUCAQAwggEmMWMwYQYDVQQIDFpUaGUgR3JlYXQgU3RhdGUgb2YgTG9u Zy1XaW5kZWQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgRmllbGQgTmFtZXMgV2hlcmVieSB0byBJbmNy ZWFzZSB0aGUgT3V0cHV0IFNpemUxHzAdBgNVBAcMFlRvb21hbnljaGFyYWN0ZXJz dmlsbGUxSDBGBgNVBAoMP1RoZSBCZW5ldm9sZW50IFNvY2lldHkgb2YgTG9xdWFj aW91cyBhbmQgUGxlb25hc3RpYyBQZXJpcGhyYXNpczE9MDsGA1UECww0RW5kb3Jz ZW1lbnQgb2YgVm91Y2hzYWZlJ2QgRXZpZGVudGlhcnkgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbjEV MBMGA1UEAwwMY2VydC5leGFtcGxlMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIB CgKCAQEAuzDiK6h/mSCYmXa6CjK3pSjEr70SoNjBII/7MfU2hx6qysrOAIi+Eav8 m0BIoBQuhvJqWVmwa1Przdki69WbD37QhyGNdixeetFi2E2Dag4BeQXQmQq4ydoY Tfl8DC9rYGHVoqFfxHsvEiUqlLJH9NzKXMJy21X0qYcJqMKjX4hBRajwQn+xPCFW qxlnLWzKb5TGwDOaMITHr/wnJqqrfNTRZG9VlXo7zeb/ySr9uN/13nX+CO2Sb+8y nrMKD/aYhc1h1wnfUiFc1qhe+7v3Kx7nyIaBGuzZGYUgtmqLEBetfYip35NJ6lmi wydfNggl5BxEaEAu6vV9iBiwy6ANFwIDAQABoAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEB 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SC77nkerawUyjA2QlIa/SmNzXEYkN3goDzHSFKBauB0o5qFc1b1x7dXPCFL0atG5 UxoRr/Ep7tiab4DZmYEnOGkL2dVN8jA04F+HQGBeP6nDOSKhXRjbUODUpDpDvj+F Jf77Rv0p48l9ip8i/bquwukXlMed3O4d6rnEwkggdySS5itiShwaVLPf+icI/Yd4 vcPXDPUHTkj1XmoZ4f1mUF17OtCohsJT7O4oMBBMBwqCkC7enrLaALi9jiKym47g 2bZH05xJPpWXS/kSEkwt/jI+a+o4CuDPly3XhIcYRtsaWBJWiam1OT7sGQ+zkjTG Aa6NfwbR8ScQC8MzDfVnkJ3VnXjT345bz+F7HTAveQ8a7KGxNntPhE0KVjpl369K q2TMLyexQARJapabBf/ST9zWP7wxzWfrEbX3OEZCuRDVkwWf18BH/Eh6Lqnqg5QM 4GuX708NiFpiwQt9p/DAuQdhBrP67BxL64CbI7CgW4Lv3z3qnKfFV9zY5/mxCERn 9mPOig2r8WvvXt7ch6nhzBPfCwq0BoPqLKUFgDpeXsNdJ9sW5IV3yi/3Bh98ZBYX zj8g/7XMo6v998fct+EiHPscuqeYUaoJZ6+Zj7W45nGA9DGsnEmZ0Wux2tTj70mD oH//21TiRAx6ypPP+Iq2YDzqh7VXc/gssOn/vU1Aj19gzL+MRn1Z55SMrA7nO90m OgOyEP+uGrXyahfZGPbmpgIx+MTbtfvRtZBsG3EcXyW9NnHJfk4O8xN3hYPWXaBI o15qB3jYbx1oktbcQPo0hzaNv+PJ5wtT47JLNcbMeMSnwKM8MB4CXlM43RUtKws6 -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/dsaparam.pem0000644000000000000000000000146413176625662022022 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS----- MIICLAKCAQEArjV9Th2W4p8AlmBabk0HjaV8vPmt15/V6e6mM1Hee3LSdapxd/Fj +7bsWroNcqIaHGS45YkJbclvC3/Szp/vh1q2Zy/v7utZ9V7/qCiEnls3CRGAfAhc 1eFIS9Jo+z+fK2tsDUgbGoDC6xEbN3nWjItyPmelBQ5Bip41ULTSQCdr/eBka1s4 QpS1Sdrvbng3zTCJw0VQe5yM5xyYcHFdeV/v6JSFUz7voyzOGqt91l4UzVFUiZ13 5Pgi8DUQdQVxUU+MTFwNLCy+bDTuEoKHAxkGEqiq9A08ScxwWtgy7jJQhXDoGP10 gFMyV+5Qya7rrrYiMhZrjFna7h0z30yiPQIhAK0tbhew8+vHuO6VePIX9TMBZ7ze k//uQOh/8ZNtS4cTAoIBAGZv2mOljtJM1UUtdl1fzUq0GkI1hjpvqfonq94DITYK BynJL21JqPfG9JLXc8HYdg5hpwtulrjIyzg1EiB5pQgoNVy8UhavUroPw7FjEicL dKRHQ9YwuJwuQBTNmX/ojjewqT9U6WYiYUz4SQNXFDIdNz3ikviOoGpmY/Cwbgcr Pb/QhGqqHzB3ZeX89exVznPbvqeNOp967U+vooBMMJ4oSWVA8ANFVpmikxucRt69 qKtfkD+3P9RvjVow4dRjOmp8jyT82RQoCeSEThdDVrjUS6IpRdMT8MJ2mwGggG6T Y16HJCAq/7ufqJlsp5oAuX3aZsnAcnIiDxrMI9m3Xxs= -----END DSA PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/bc.pl0000644000000000000000000000605613176625662015420 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use Math::BigInt; sub calc { @_ = __adder(@_); if (scalar @_ != 1) { return "NaN"; } return shift; } sub __canonhex { my ($sign, $hex) = (shift =~ /^([+\-]?)(.*)$/); $hex = "0x".$hex if $hex !~ /^0x/; return $sign.$hex; } sub __adder { @_ = __multiplier(@_); while (scalar @_ > 1 && $_[1] =~ /^[\+\-]$/) { my $operand1 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift)); my $operator = shift; @_ = __multiplier(@_); my $operand2 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift)); if ($operator eq "+") { $operand1->badd($operand2); } elsif ($operator eq "-") { $operand1->bsub($operand2); } else { die "SOMETHING WENT AWFULLY WRONG"; } unshift @_, $operand1->as_hex(); } return @_; } sub __multiplier { @_ = __power(@_); while (scalar @_ > 1 && $_[1] =~ /^[\*\/%]$/) { my $operand1 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift)); my $operator = shift; @_ = __power(@_); my $operand2 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift)); if ($operator eq "*") { $operand1->bmul($operand2); } elsif ($operator eq "/") { # Math::BigInt->bdiv() is documented to do floored division, # i.e. 1 / -4 = -1, while bc and OpenSSL BN_div do truncated # division, i.e. 1 / -4 = 0. We need to make the operation # work like OpenSSL's BN_div to be able to verify. my $neg = ($operand1->is_neg() ? !$operand2->is_neg() : $operand2->is_neg()); $operand1->babs(); $operand2->babs(); $operand1->bdiv($operand2); if ($neg) { $operand1->bneg(); } } elsif ($operator eq "%") { # Here's a bit of a quirk... # With OpenSSL's BN, as well as bc, the result of -10 % 3 is -1 # while Math::BigInt, the result is 2. # The latter is mathematically more correct, but... my $o1isneg = $operand1->is_neg(); $operand1->babs(); # Math::BigInt does something different with a negative modulus, # while OpenSSL's BN and bc treat it like a positive number... $operand2->babs(); $operand1->bmod($operand2); if ($o1isneg) { $operand1->bneg(); } } else { die "SOMETHING WENT AWFULLY WRONG"; } unshift @_, $operand1->as_hex(); } return @_; } sub __power { @_ = __paren(@_); while (scalar @_ > 1 && $_[1] eq "^") { my $operand1 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift)); shift; @_ = __paren(@_); my $operand2 = Math::BigInt->from_hex(__canonhex(shift)); $operand1->bpow($operand2); unshift @_, $operand1->as_hex(); } return @_; } # returns array ( $result, @remaining ) sub __paren { if (scalar @_ > 0 && $_[0] eq "(") { shift; my @result = __adder(@_); if (scalar @_ == 0 || $_[0] ne ")") { return ("NaN"); } shift; return @result; } return @_; } 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslrecords.t0000644000000000000000000002603013176625662020324 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; my $test_name = "test_sslrecords"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled" if disabled("tls1_2"); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( \&add_empty_recs_filter, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); #Test 1: Injecting out of context empty records should fail my $content_type = TLSProxy::Record::RT_APPLICATION_DATA; my $inject_recs_num = 1; $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; my $num_tests = 10; if (!disabled("tls1_1")) { $num_tests++; } plan tests => $num_tests; ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Out of context empty records test"); #Test 2: Injecting in context empty records should succeed $proxy->clear(); $content_type = TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE; $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "In context empty records test"); #Test 3: Injecting too many in context empty records should fail $proxy->clear(); #We allow 32 consecutive in context empty records $inject_recs_num = 33; $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Too many in context empty records test"); #Test 4: Injecting a fragmented fatal alert should fail. We actually expect no # alerts to be sent from either side because *we* injected the fatal # alert, i.e. this will look like a disorderly close $proxy->clear(); $proxy->filter(\&add_frag_alert_filter); $proxy->start(); ok(!TLSProxy::Message->end(), "Fragmented alert records test"); #Run some SSLv2 ClientHello tests use constant { TLSV1_2_IN_SSLV2 => 0, SSLV2_IN_SSLV2 => 1, FRAGMENTED_IN_TLSV1_2 => 2, FRAGMENTED_IN_SSLV2 => 3, ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2 => 4 }; #Test 5: Inject an SSLv2 style record format for a TLSv1.2 ClientHello my $sslv2testtype = TLSV1_2_IN_SSLV2; $proxy->clear(); $proxy->filter(\&add_sslv2_filter); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "TLSv1.2 in SSLv2 ClientHello test"); #Test 6: Inject an SSLv2 style record format for an SSLv2 ClientHello. We don't # support this so it should fail. We actually treat it as an unknown # protocol so we don't even send an alert in this case. $sslv2testtype = SSLV2_IN_SSLV2; $proxy->clear(); $proxy->start(); ok(!TLSProxy::Message->end(), "SSLv2 in SSLv2 ClientHello test"); #Test 7: Sanity check ClientHello fragmentation. This isn't really an SSLv2 test # at all, but it gives us confidence that Test 8 fails for the right # reasons $sslv2testtype = FRAGMENTED_IN_TLSV1_2; $proxy->clear(); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Fragmented ClientHello in TLSv1.2 test"); #Test 8: Fragment a TLSv1.2 ClientHello across a TLS1.2 record; an SSLv2 # record; and another TLS1.2 record. This isn't allowed so should fail $sslv2testtype = FRAGMENTED_IN_SSLV2; $proxy->clear(); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Fragmented ClientHello in TLSv1.2/SSLv2 test"); #Test 9: Send a TLS warning alert before an SSLv2 ClientHello. This should # fail because an SSLv2 ClientHello must be the first record. $sslv2testtype = ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2; $proxy->clear(); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Alert before SSLv2 ClientHello test"); #Unrecognised record type tests #Test 10: Sending an unrecognised record type in TLS1.2 should fail $proxy->clear(); $proxy->filter(\&add_unknown_record_type); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Unrecognised record type in TLS1.2"); #Test 11: Sending an unrecognised record type in TLS1.1 should fail if (!disabled("tls1_1")) { $proxy->clear(); $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_1"); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Unrecognised record type in TLS1.1"); } sub add_empty_recs_filter { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello if ($proxy->flight != 0) { return; } for (my $i = 0; $i < $inject_recs_num; $i++) { my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, $content_type, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, "", "" ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; } } sub add_frag_alert_filter { my $proxy = shift; my $byte; # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello if ($proxy->flight != 0) { return; } # Add a zero length fragment first #my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( # 0, # TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT, # TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, # 0, # 0, # 0, # "", # "" #); #push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; # Now add the alert level (Fatal) as a separate record $byte = pack('C', TLSProxy::Message::AL_LEVEL_FATAL); my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, 1, 0, 1, 1, $byte, $byte ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; # And finally the description (Unexpected message) in a third record $byte = pack('C', TLSProxy::Message::AL_DESC_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, 1, 0, 1, 1, $byte, $byte ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; } sub add_sslv2_filter { my $proxy = shift; my $clienthello; my $record; # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello if ($proxy->flight != 0) { return; } # Ditch the real ClientHello - we're going to replace it with our own shift @{$proxy->record_list}; if ($sslv2testtype == ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2) { my $alert = pack('CC', TLSProxy::Message::AL_LEVEL_FATAL, TLSProxy::Message::AL_DESC_NO_RENEGOTIATION); my $alertlen = length $alert; $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, TLSProxy::Record::RT_ALERT, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, $alertlen, 0, $alertlen, $alertlen, $alert, $alert ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; } if ($sslv2testtype == ALERT_BEFORE_SSLV2 || $sslv2testtype == TLSV1_2_IN_SSLV2 || $sslv2testtype == SSLV2_IN_SSLV2) { # This is an SSLv2 format ClientHello $clienthello = pack "C44", 0x01, # ClientHello 0x03, 0x03, #TLSv1.2 0x00, 0x03, # Ciphersuites len 0x00, 0x00, # Session id len 0x00, 0x20, # Challenge len 0x00, 0x00, 0x2f, #AES128-SHA 0x01, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6; # Challenge if ($sslv2testtype == SSLV2_IN_SSLV2) { # Set the version to "real" SSLv2 vec($clienthello, 1, 8) = 0x00; vec($clienthello, 2, 8) = 0x02; } my $chlen = length $clienthello; $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, $chlen, 1, #SSLv2 $chlen, $chlen, $clienthello, $clienthello ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; } else { # For this test we're using a real TLS ClientHello $clienthello = pack "C49", 0x01, # ClientHello 0x00, 0x00, 0x2D, # Message length 0x03, 0x03, # TLSv1.2 0x01, 0x18, 0x9F, 0x76, 0xEC, 0x57, 0xCE, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0x79, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xAC, 0x6E, 0xD1, 0x58, 0x35, 0x03, 0x97, 0x16, 0x10, 0x82, 0x56, 0xD8, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x8A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0xF6, # Random 0x00, # Session id len 0x00, 0x04, # Ciphersuites len 0x00, 0x2f, # AES128-SHA 0x00, 0xff, # Empty reneg info SCSV 0x01, # Compression methods len 0x00, # Null compression 0x00, 0x00; # Extensions len # Split this into 3: A TLS record; a SSLv2 record and a TLS record. # We deliberately split the second record prior to the Challenge/Random # and set the first byte of the random to 1. This makes the second SSLv2 # record look like an SSLv2 ClientHello my $frag1 = substr $clienthello, 0, 6; my $frag2 = substr $clienthello, 6, 32; my $frag3 = substr $clienthello, 38; my $fraglen = length $frag1; $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, $fraglen, 0, $fraglen, $fraglen, $frag1, $frag1 ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; $fraglen = length $frag2; my $recvers; if ($sslv2testtype == FRAGMENTED_IN_SSLV2) { $recvers = 1; } else { $recvers = 0; } $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, $fraglen, $recvers, $fraglen, $fraglen, $frag2, $frag2 ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; $fraglen = length $frag3; $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 0, TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, $fraglen, 0, $fraglen, $fraglen, $frag3, $frag3 ); push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; } } sub add_unknown_record_type { my $proxy = shift; # We'll change a record after the initial version neg has taken place if ($proxy->flight != 2) { return; } my $lastrec = ${$proxy->record_list}[-1]; my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( 2, TLSProxy::Record::RT_UNKNOWN, $lastrec->version(), 1, 0, 1, 1, "X", "X" ); unshift @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t0000644000000000000000000005112013176625662017577 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use POSIX; use File::Basename; use File::Copy; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT with bldtop_file srctop_file cmdstr/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_ssl"); $ENV{CTLOG_FILE} = srctop_file("test", "ct", "log_list.conf"); my ($no_rsa, $no_dsa, $no_dh, $no_ec, $no_srp, $no_psk, $no_ssl3, $no_tls1, $no_tls1_1, $no_tls1_2, $no_dtls, $no_dtls1, $no_dtls1_2, $no_ct) = anydisabled qw/rsa dsa dh ec srp psk ssl3 tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2 dtls dtls1 dtls1_2 ct/; my $no_anytls = alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); my $no_anydtls = alldisabled(available_protocols("dtls")); plan skip_all => "No SSL/TLS/DTLS protocol is support by this OpenSSL build" if $no_anytls && $no_anydtls; my $digest = "-sha1"; my @reqcmd = ("openssl", "req"); my @x509cmd = ("openssl", "x509", $digest); my @verifycmd = ("openssl", "verify"); my @gendsacmd = ("openssl", "gendsa"); my $dummycnf = srctop_file("apps", "openssl.cnf"); my $CAkey = "keyCA.ss"; my $CAcert="certCA.ss"; my $CAserial="certCA.srl"; my $CAreq="reqCA.ss"; my $CAconf=srctop_file("test","CAss.cnf"); my $CAreq2="req2CA.ss"; # temp my $Uconf=srctop_file("test","Uss.cnf"); my $Ukey="keyU.ss"; my $Ureq="reqU.ss"; my $Ucert="certU.ss"; my $Dkey="keyD.ss"; my $Dreq="reqD.ss"; my $Dcert="certD.ss"; my $Ekey="keyE.ss"; my $Ereq="reqE.ss"; my $Ecert="certE.ss"; my $P1conf=srctop_file("test","P1ss.cnf"); my $P1key="keyP1.ss"; my $P1req="reqP1.ss"; my $P1cert="certP1.ss"; my $P1intermediate="tmp_intP1.ss"; my $P2conf=srctop_file("test","P2ss.cnf"); my $P2key="keyP2.ss"; my $P2req="reqP2.ss"; my $P2cert="certP2.ss"; my $P2intermediate="tmp_intP2.ss"; my $server_sess="server.ss"; my $client_sess="client.ss"; # ssltest_old.c is deprecated in favour of the new framework in ssl_test.c # If you're adding tests here, you probably want to convert them to the # new format in ssl_test.c and add recipes to 80-test_ssl_new.t instead. plan tests => 1 # For testss +6 # For the first testssl ; subtest 'test_ss' => sub { if (testss()) { open OUT, ">", "intP1.ss"; copy($CAcert, \*OUT); copy($Ucert, \*OUT); close OUT; open OUT, ">", "intP2.ss"; copy($CAcert, \*OUT); copy($Ucert, \*OUT); copy($P1cert, \*OUT); close OUT; } }; note('test_ssl -- key U'); testssl("keyU.ss", $Ucert, $CAcert); # ----------- # subtest functions sub testss { open RND, ">>", ".rnd"; print RND "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; close RND; my @req_dsa = ("-newkey", "dsa:".srctop_file("apps", "dsa1024.pem")); my $dsaparams = srctop_file("apps", "dsa1024.pem"); my @req_new; if ($no_rsa) { @req_new = @req_dsa; } else { @req_new = ("-new"); } plan tests => 17; SKIP: { skip 'failure', 16 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $CAconf, "-out", $CAreq, "-keyout", $CAkey, @req_new])), 'make cert request'); skip 'failure', 15 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $CAreq, "-days", "30", "-req", "-out", $CAcert, "-signkey", $CAkey, "-extfile", $CAconf, "-extensions", "v3_ca"], stdout => "err.ss")), 'convert request into self-signed cert'); skip 'failure', 14 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-in", $CAcert, "-x509toreq", "-signkey", $CAkey, "-out", $CAreq2], stdout => "err.ss")), 'convert cert into a cert request'); skip 'failure', 13 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $dummycnf, "-verify", "-in", $CAreq, "-noout"])), 'verify request 1'); skip 'failure', 12 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $dummycnf, "-verify", "-in", $CAreq2, "-noout"])), 'verify request 2'); skip 'failure', 11 unless ok(run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $CAcert])), 'verify signature'); skip 'failure', 10 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $Uconf, "-out", $Ureq, "-keyout", $Ukey, @req_new], stdout => "err.ss")), 'make a user cert request'); skip 'failure', 9 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $Ureq, "-days", "30", "-req", "-out", $Ucert, "-CA", $CAcert, "-CAkey", $CAkey, "-CAserial", $CAserial, "-extfile", $Uconf, "-extensions", "v3_ee"], stdout => "err.ss")) && run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $Ucert])), 'sign user cert request'); skip 'failure', 8 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate", "-noout", "-in", $Ucert])), 'Certificate details'); skip 'failure', 7 unless subtest 'DSA certificate creation' => sub { plan skip_all => "skipping DSA certificate creation" if $no_dsa; plan tests => 5; SKIP: { $ENV{CN2} = "DSA Certificate"; skip 'failure', 4 unless ok(run(app([@gendsacmd, "-out", $Dkey, $dsaparams], stdout => "err.ss")), "make a DSA key"); skip 'failure', 3 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-new", "-config", $Uconf, "-out", $Dreq, "-key", $Dkey], stdout => "err.ss")), "make a DSA user cert request"); skip 'failure', 2 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $Dreq, "-days", "30", "-req", "-out", $Dcert, "-CA", $CAcert, "-CAkey", $CAkey, "-CAserial", $CAserial, "-extfile", $Uconf, "-extensions", "v3_ee_dsa"], stdout => "err.ss")), "sign DSA user cert request"); skip 'failure', 1 unless ok(run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $Dcert])), "verify DSA user cert"); skip 'failure', 0 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate", "-noout", "-in", $Dcert])), "DSA Certificate details"); } }; skip 'failure', 6 unless subtest 'ECDSA/ECDH certificate creation' => sub { plan skip_all => "skipping ECDSA/ECDH certificate creation" if $no_ec; plan tests => 5; SKIP: { $ENV{CN2} = "ECDSA Certificate"; skip 'failure', 4 unless ok(run(app(["openssl", "ecparam", "-name", "P-256", "-out", "ecp.ss"])), "make EC parameters"); skip 'failure', 3 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $Uconf, "-out", $Ereq, "-keyout", $Ekey, "-newkey", "ec:ecp.ss"], stdout => "err.ss")), "make a ECDSA/ECDH user cert request"); skip 'failure', 2 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $Ereq, "-days", "30", "-req", "-out", $Ecert, "-CA", $CAcert, "-CAkey", $CAkey, "-CAserial", $CAserial, "-extfile", $Uconf, "-extensions", "v3_ee_ec"], stdout => "err.ss")), "sign ECDSA/ECDH user cert request"); skip 'failure', 1 unless ok(run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, $Ecert])), "verify ECDSA/ECDH user cert"); skip 'failure', 0 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate", "-noout", "-in", $Ecert])), "ECDSA Certificate details"); } }; skip 'failure', 5 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $P1conf, "-out", $P1req, "-keyout", $P1key, @req_new], stdout => "err.ss")), 'make a proxy cert request'); skip 'failure', 4 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $P1req, "-days", "30", "-req", "-out", $P1cert, "-CA", $Ucert, "-CAkey", $Ukey, "-extfile", $P1conf, "-extensions", "v3_proxy"], stdout => "err.ss")), 'sign proxy with user cert'); copy($Ucert, $P1intermediate); run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, "-untrusted", $P1intermediate, $P1cert])); ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate", "-noout", "-in", $P1cert])), 'Certificate details'); skip 'failure', 2 unless ok(run(app([@reqcmd, "-config", $P2conf, "-out", $P2req, "-keyout", $P2key, @req_new], stdout => "err.ss")), 'make another proxy cert request'); skip 'failure', 1 unless ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-CAcreateserial", "-in", $P2req, "-days", "30", "-req", "-out", $P2cert, "-CA", $P1cert, "-CAkey", $P1key, "-extfile", $P2conf, "-extensions", "v3_proxy"], stdout => "err.ss")), 'sign second proxy cert request with the first proxy cert'); open OUT, ">", $P2intermediate; copy($Ucert, \*OUT); copy($P1cert, \*OUT); close OUT; run(app([@verifycmd, "-CAfile", $CAcert, "-untrusted", $P2intermediate, $P2cert])); ok(run(app([@x509cmd, "-subject", "-issuer", "-startdate", "-enddate", "-noout", "-in", $P2cert])), 'Certificate details'); } } sub testssl { my ($key, $cert, $CAtmp) = @_; my @CA = $CAtmp ? ("-CAfile", $CAtmp) : ("-CApath", bldtop_dir("certs")); my @ssltest = ("ssltest_old", "-s_key", $key, "-s_cert", $cert, "-c_key", $key, "-c_cert", $cert); my $serverinfo = srctop_file("test","serverinfo.pem"); my $dsa_cert = 0; if (grep /DSA Public Key/, run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-in", $cert, "-text", "-noout"]), capture => 1)) { $dsa_cert = 1; } # plan tests => 11; subtest 'standard SSL tests' => sub { ###################################################################### plan tests => 21; SKIP: { skip "SSLv3 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4 if disabled("ssl3"); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3"])), 'test sslv3 via BIO pair'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3", "-server_auth", @CA])), 'test sslv3 with server authentication via BIO pair'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-ssl3", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test sslv3 with both server and client authentication via BIO pair'); } SKIP: { skip "Neither SSLv3 nor any TLS version are supported by this OpenSSL build", 1 if $no_anytls; ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair"])), 'test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair'); } SKIP: { skip "DTLSv1 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4 if disabled("dtls1"); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1"])), 'test dtlsv1'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1", "-server_auth", @CA])), 'test dtlsv1 with server authentication'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test dtlsv1 with client authentication'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls1", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test dtlsv1 with both server and client authentication'); } SKIP: { skip "DTLSv1.2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 4 if disabled("dtls1_2"); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12"])), 'test dtlsv1.2'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12", "-server_auth", @CA])), 'test dtlsv1.2 with server authentication'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test dtlsv1.2 with client authentication'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-dtls12", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test dtlsv1.2 with both server and client authentication'); } SKIP: { skip "Neither SSLv3 nor any TLS version are supported by this OpenSSL build", 8 if $no_anytls; SKIP: { skip "skipping test of sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE test", 1 if $dsa_cert; ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-no_dhe", "-no_ecdhe"])), 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair'); } ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-dhe1024dsa", "-v"])), 'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", @CA])), 'test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", @CA])), 'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", "-app_verify", @CA])), 'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify'); SKIP: { skip "No IPv4 available on this machine", 1 unless !disabled("sock") && have_IPv4(); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-ipv4"])), 'test TLS via IPv4'); } SKIP: { skip "No IPv6 available on this machine", 1 unless !disabled("sock") && have_IPv6(); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-ipv6"])), 'test TLS via IPv6'); } } }; subtest "Testing ciphersuites" => sub { my @exkeys = (); my $ciphers = "-EXP:-PSK:-SRP:-kDH:-kECDHe"; if ($no_dh) { note "skipping DHE tests\n"; $ciphers .= ":-kDHE"; } if ($no_dsa) { note "skipping DSA tests\n"; $ciphers .= ":-aDSA"; } else { push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certD.ss", "-s_key", "keyD.ss"; } if ($no_ec) { note "skipping EC tests\n"; $ciphers .= ":!aECDSA:!kECDH"; } else { push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certE.ss", "-s_key", "keyE.ss"; } my @protocols = (); # We only use the flags that ssltest_old understands push @protocols, "-tls1_2" unless $no_tls1_2; push @protocols, "-tls1" unless $no_tls1; push @protocols, "-ssl3" unless $no_ssl3; my $protocolciphersuitecount = 0; my %ciphersuites = (); foreach my $protocol (@protocols) { $ciphersuites{$protocol} = [ map { s|\R||; split(/:/, $_) } run(app(["openssl", "ciphers", "-s", $protocol, "ALL:$ciphers"]), capture => 1) ]; $protocolciphersuitecount += scalar @{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}; } plan skip_all => "None of the ciphersuites to test are available in this OpenSSL build" if $protocolciphersuitecount + scalar(keys %ciphersuites) == 0; # The count of protocols is because in addition to the ciphersuits # we got above, we're running a weak DH test for each protocol plan tests => $protocolciphersuitecount + scalar(keys %ciphersuites); foreach my $protocol (sort keys %ciphersuites) { note "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol"; # ssltest_old doesn't know -tls1_2, but that's fine, since that's # the default choice if TLSv1.2 enabled my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_2" ? "" : $protocol; foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) { if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) { note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher"; ok(1); } else { ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher", $cipher, $flag])), "Testing $cipher"); } } is(run(test([@ssltest, "-s_cipher", "EDH", "-c_cipher", 'EDH:@SECLEVEL=1', "-dhe512", $protocol eq "SSLv3" ? ("-ssl3") : ()])), 0, "testing connection with weak DH, expecting failure"); } }; subtest 'RSA/(EC)DHE/PSK tests' => sub { ###################################################################### plan tests => 5; SKIP: { skip "TLSv1.0 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 5 if $no_tls1; SKIP: { skip "skipping anonymous DH tests", 1 if ($no_dh); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-v", "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "ADH", "-dhe1024dsa", "-num", "10", "-f", "-time"])), 'test tlsv1 with 1024bit anonymous DH, multiple handshakes'); } SKIP: { skip "skipping RSA tests", 2 if $no_rsa; ok(run(test(["ssltest_old", "-v", "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-s_cert", srctop_file("apps","server2.pem"), "-no_dhe", "-no_ecdhe", "-num", "10", "-f", "-time"])), 'test tlsv1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes'); skip "skipping RSA+DHE tests", 1 if $no_dh; ok(run(test(["ssltest_old", "-v", "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-s_cert", srctop_file("apps","server2.pem"), "-dhe1024dsa", "-num", "10", "-f", "-time"])), 'test tlsv1 with 1024bit RSA, 1024bit DHE, multiple handshakes'); } SKIP: { skip "skipping PSK tests", 2 if ($no_psk); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-tls1", "-cipher", "PSK", "-psk", "abc123"])), 'test tls1 with PSK'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "PSK", "-psk", "abc123"])), 'test tls1 with PSK via BIO pair'); } } }; subtest 'Custom Extension tests' => sub { ###################################################################### plan tests => 1; SKIP: { skip "TLSv1.0 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1 if $no_tls1; ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-custom_ext"])), 'test tls1 with custom extensions'); } }; subtest 'Serverinfo tests' => sub { ###################################################################### plan tests => 5; SKIP: { skip "TLSv1.0 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 5 if $no_tls1; note('echo test tls1 with serverinfo'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo]))); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_sct"]))); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_tack"]))); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_sct", "-serverinfo_tack"]))); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-custom_ext", "-serverinfo_file", $serverinfo, "-serverinfo_sct", "-serverinfo_tack"]))); } }; subtest 'SRP tests' => sub { plan tests => 4; SKIP: { skip "skipping SRP tests", 4 if $no_srp || alldisabled(grep !/^ssl3/, available_protocols("tls")); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-tls1", "-cipher", "SRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])), 'test tls1 with SRP'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "SRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])), 'test tls1 with SRP via BIO pair'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-tls1", "-cipher", "aSRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])), 'test tls1 with SRP auth'); ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-tls1", "-cipher", "aSRP", "-srpuser", "test", "-srppass", "abc123"])), 'test tls1 with SRP auth via BIO pair'); } }; } unlink $CAkey; unlink $CAcert; unlink $CAserial; unlink $CAreq; unlink $CAreq2; unlink $Ukey; unlink $Ureq; unlink $Ucert; unlink basename($Ucert, '.ss').'.srl'; unlink $Dkey; unlink $Dreq; unlink $Dcert; unlink $Ekey; unlink $Ereq; unlink $Ecert; unlink $P1key; unlink $P1req; unlink $P1cert; unlink basename($P1cert, '.ss').'.srl'; unlink $P1intermediate; unlink "intP1.ss"; unlink $P2key; unlink $P2req; unlink $P2cert; unlink $P2intermediate; unlink "intP2.ss"; unlink "ecp.ss"; unlink "err.ss"; unlink $server_sess; unlink $client_sess; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_wp.t0000644000000000000000000000064313176625662016567 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_wp", "wp_test", "whirlpool"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_rc4.t0000644000000000000000000000063513176625662016632 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_rc4", "rc4test", "rc4"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/01-test_abort.t0000644000000000000000000000073613176625661017246 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test; setup("test_abort"); plan tests => 1; is(run(test(["aborttest"])), 0, "Testing that abort is caught correctly"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/25-test_req.t0000644000000000000000000000407513176625662016735 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_req"); plan tests => 4; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); open RND, ">>", ".rnd"; print RND "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; close RND; subtest "generating certificate requests" => sub { my @req_new; if (disabled("rsa")) { @req_new = ("-newkey", "dsa:".srctop_file("apps", "dsa512.pem")); } else { @req_new = ("-new"); note("There should be a 2 sequences of .'s and some +'s."); note("There should not be more that at most 80 per line"); } plan tests => 2; ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"), @req_new, "-out", "testreq.pem"])), "Generating request"); ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"), "-verify", "-in", "testreq.pem", "-noout"])), "Verifying signature on request"); }; my @openssl_args = ("req", "-config", srctop_file("apps", "openssl.cnf")); run_conversion('req conversions', "testreq.pem"); run_conversion('req conversions -- testreq2', srctop_file("test", "testreq2.pem")); unlink "testkey.pem", "testreq.pem"; sub run_conversion { my $title = shift; my $reqfile = shift; subtest $title => sub { run(app(["openssl", @openssl_args, "-in", $reqfile, "-inform", "p", "-noout", "-text"], stderr => "req-check.err", stdout => undef)); open DATA, "req-check.err"; SKIP: { plan skip_all => "skipping req conversion test for $reqfile" if grep /Unknown Public Key/, map { s/\R//; } ; tconversion("req", $reqfile, @openssl_args); } close DATA; unlink "req-check.err"; done_testing(); }; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/30-test_evp_extra.t0000644000000000000000000000075613176625662020141 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test; setup("test_evp_extra"); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["evp_extra_test"])), "running evp_extra_test"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_clienthello.t0000644000000000000000000000120513176625662020440 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_clienthello"); plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build" if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls")); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["clienthellotest"])), "running clienthellotest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_p5_crpt2.t0000644000000000000000000000064213176625662017602 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_p5_crpt2", "p5_crpt2_test"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t0000644000000000000000000000166413176625662017373 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_x509aux"); plan skip_all => "test_dane uses ec which is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("ec"); plan tests => 1; # The number of tests being performed ok(run(test(["x509aux", srctop_file("test", "certs", "roots.pem"), srctop_file("test", "certs", "root+anyEKU.pem"), srctop_file("test", "certs", "root-anyEKU.pem"), srctop_file("test", "certs", "root-cert.pem")] )), "x509aux tests"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t0000644000000000000000000000420213176625662017242 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use Encode; setup("test_pkcs12"); plan skip_all => "The PKCS12 command line utility is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("des"); my $pass = "σÏνθημα γνώÏισμα"; my $savedcp; if (eval { require Win32::API; 1; }) { # Trouble is that Win32 perl uses CreateProcessA, which # makes it problematic to pass non-ASCII arguments, from perl[!] # that is. This is because CreateProcessA is just a wrapper for # CreateProcessW and will call MultiByteToWideChar and use # system default locale. Since we attempt Greek pass-phrase # conversion can be done only with Greek locale. Win32::API->Import("kernel32","UINT GetSystemDefaultLCID()"); if (GetSystemDefaultLCID() != 0x408) { plan skip_all => "Non-Greek system locale"; } else { # Ensure correct code page so that VERBOSE output is right. Win32::API->Import("kernel32","UINT GetConsoleOutputCP()"); Win32::API->Import("kernel32","BOOL SetConsoleOutputCP(UINT cp)"); $savedcp = GetConsoleOutputCP(); SetConsoleOutputCP(1253); $pass = Encode::encode("cp1253",Encode::decode("utf-8",$pass)); } } else { # Running MinGW tests transparenly under Wine apparently requires # UTF-8 locale... foreach(`locale -a`) { s/\R$//; if ($_ =~ m/^C\.UTF\-?8/i) { $ENV{LC_ALL} = $_; last; } } } $ENV{OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8}=1; plan tests => 1; # just see that we can read shibboleth.pfx protected with $pass ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-noout", "-password", "pass:$pass", "-in", srctop_file("test", "shibboleth.pfx")])), "test_pkcs12"); SetConsoleOutputCP($savedcp) if (defined($savedcp)); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_ige.t0000644000000000000000000000062713176625662016713 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_ige", "igetest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/15-test_dh.t0000644000000000000000000000063313176625662016534 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_dh", "dhtest", "dh"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_heartbeat.t0000644000000000000000000000066213176625662020105 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_heartbeat", "heartbeat_test", "heartbeats"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_md5.t0000644000000000000000000000063613176625662016630 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_md5", "md5test", "md5"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/25-test_crl.t0000644000000000000000000000252513176625662016724 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_crl"); plan tests => 5; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); subtest 'crl conversions' => sub { tconversion("crl", srctop_file("test","testcrl.pem")); }; ok(run(test(['crltest']))); ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl crl -noout -fingerprint -in}, srctop_file('test', 'testcrl.pem')], 'SHA1 Fingerprint=BA:F4:1B:AD:7A:9B:2F:09:16:BC:60:A7:0E:CE:79:2E:36:00:E7:B2')); ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl crl -noout -fingerprint -sha256 -in}, srctop_file('test', 'testcrl.pem')], 'SHA256 Fingerprint=B3:A9:FD:A7:2E:8C:3D:DF:D0:F1:C3:1A:96:60:B5:FD:B0:99:7C:7F:0E:E4:34:F5:DB:87:62:36:BC:F1:BC:1B')); sub compare1stline { my ($cmdarray, $str) = @_; my @lines = run(app($cmdarray), capture => 1); return 1 if $lines[0] =~ m|^\Q${str}\E\R$|; note "Got ", $lines[0]; note "Expected ", $str; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/20-test_enc.t0000644000000000000000000000364513176625662016710 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/; use File::Copy; use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; use File::Basename; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_enc"); # We do it this way, because setup() may have moved us around, # so the directory portion of $0 might not be correct any more. # However, the name hasn't changed. my $testsrc = srctop_file("test","recipes",basename($0)); my $test = catfile(".", "p"); my $cmd = "openssl"; my @ciphers = map { s/^\s+//; s/\s+$//; split /\s+/ } run(app([$cmd, "list", "-cipher-commands"]), capture => 1); plan tests => 1 + (scalar @ciphers)*2; my $init = ok(copy($testsrc,$test)); if (!$init) { diag("Trying to copy $testsrc to $test : $!"); } SKIP: { skip "Not initialized, skipping...", 11 unless $init; foreach my $c (@ciphers) { my %variant = ("$c" => [], "$c base64" => [ "-a" ]); foreach my $t (sort keys %variant) { my $cipherfile = "$test.$c.cipher"; my $clearfile = "$test.$c.clear"; my @e = ( "$c", "-bufsize", "113", @{$variant{$t}}, "-e", "-k", "test" ); my @d = ( "$c", "-bufsize", "157", @{$variant{$t}}, "-d", "-k", "test" ); if ($c eq "cat") { $cipherfile = "$test.cipher"; $clearfile = "$test.clear"; @e = ( "enc", @{$variant{$t}}, "-e" ); @d = ( "enc", @{$variant{$t}}, "-d" ); } ok(run(app([$cmd, @e, "-in", $test, "-out", $cipherfile])) && run(app([$cmd, @d, "-in", $cipherfile, "-out", $clearfile])) && compare_text($test,$clearfile) == 0, $t); unlink $cipherfile, $clearfile; } } } unlink $test; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t0000644000000000000000000000120313176625662020643 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_verify_extra"); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["verify_extra_test", srctop_file("test", "certs", "roots.pem"), srctop_file("test", "certs", "untrusted.pem"), srctop_file("test", "certs", "bad.pem")]))); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/20-test_passwd.t0000644000000000000000000000270313176625662017436 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_passwd"); plan tests => disabled("des") ? 4 : 6; ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd password}], '^.{13}\R$'), 'crypt password with random salt') if !disabled("des"); ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -1 password}], '^\$1\$.{8}\$.{22}\R$'), 'BSD style MD5 password with random salt'); ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -apr1 password}], '^\$apr1\$.{8}\$.{22}\R$'), 'Apache style MD5 password with random salt'); ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -salt xx password}], '^xxj31ZMTZzkVA\R$'), 'crypt password with salt xx') if !disabled("des"); ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -salt xxxxxxxx -1 password}], '^\$1\$xxxxxxxx\$UYCIxa628\.9qXjpQCjM4a\.\R$'), 'BSD style MD5 password with salt xxxxxxxx'); ok(compare1stline([qw{openssl passwd -salt xxxxxxxx -apr1 password}], '^\$apr1\$xxxxxxxx\$dxHfLAsjHkDRmG83UXe8K0\R$'), 'Apache style MD5 password with salt xxxxxxxx'); sub compare1stline { my ($cmdarray, $regexp) = @_; my @lines = run(app($cmdarray), capture => 1); return $lines[0] =~ m|$regexp|; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_sha1.t0000644000000000000000000000064013176625662016772 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_sha1", "sha1test", "sha"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t0000644000000000000000000000125613176625662017212 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; my $test_name = "test_afalg"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "$test_name not supported for this build" if disabled("afalgeng"); plan tests => 1; $ENV{OPENSSL_ENGINES} = bldtop_dir("engines/afalg"); ok(run(test(["afalgtest"])), "running afalgtest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/15-test_dsa.t0000644000000000000000000000221413176625662016705 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_dsa"); plan tests => 6; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); ok(run(test(["dsatest"])), "running dsatest"); ok(run(test(["dsatest", "-app2_1"])), "running dsatest -app2_1"); SKIP: { skip "Skipping dsa conversion test", 3 if disabled("dsa"); subtest 'dsa conversions -- private key' => sub { tconversion("dsa", srctop_file("test","testdsa.pem")); }; subtest 'dsa conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub { tconversion("dsa", srctop_file("test","testdsa.pem"), "pkey"); }; subtest 'dsa conversions -- public key' => sub { tconversion("msb", srctop_file("test","testdsapub.pem"), "dsa", "-pubin", "-pubout"); }; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_tsa.t0000644000000000000000000001644613176625662016743 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use POSIX; use File::Spec::Functions qw/splitdir curdir catfile/; use File::Compare; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_tsa"); plan skip_all => "TS is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("ts"); # All these are modified inside indir further down. They need to exist # here, however, to be available in all subroutines. my $openssl_conf; my $testtsa; my $CAtsa; my @RUN; sub create_tsa_cert { my $INDEX = shift; my $EXT = shift; my $r = 1; $ENV{TSDNSECT} = "ts_cert_dn"; ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", $openssl_conf, "-new", "-out", "tsa_req${INDEX}.pem", "-keyout", "tsa_key${INDEX}.pem"]))); note "using extension $EXT"; ok(run(app(["openssl", "x509", "-req", "-in", "tsa_req${INDEX}.pem", "-out", "tsa_cert${INDEX}.pem", "-CA", "tsaca.pem", "-CAkey", "tsacakey.pem", "-CAcreateserial", "-extfile", $openssl_conf, "-extensions", $EXT]))); } sub create_time_stamp_response { my $queryfile = shift; my $outputfile = shift; my $datafile = shift; ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-section", "$datafile", "-queryfile", "$queryfile", "-out", "$outputfile"]))); } sub verify_time_stamp_response { my $queryfile = shift; my $inputfile = shift; my $datafile = shift; ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-queryfile", "$queryfile", "-in", "$inputfile", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem", "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"]))); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-data", "$datafile", "-in", "$inputfile", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem", "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"]))); } sub verify_time_stamp_response_fail { my $queryfile = shift; my $inputfile = shift; ok(!run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-queryfile", "$queryfile", "-in", "$inputfile", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem", "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"]))); } # main functions plan tests => 20; note "setting up TSA test directory"; indir "tsa" => sub { $openssl_conf = srctop_file("test", "CAtsa.cnf"); $testtsa = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_tsa.t"); $CAtsa = srctop_file("test", "CAtsa.cnf"); @RUN = ("openssl", "ts", "-config", $openssl_conf); # ../apps/CA.pl needs these $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = "-config $openssl_conf"; $ENV{OPENSSL} = cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1); SKIP: { $ENV{TSDNSECT} = "ts_ca_dn"; skip "failed", 19 unless ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", $openssl_conf, "-new", "-x509", "-nodes", "-out", "tsaca.pem", "-keyout", "tsacakey.pem"])), 'creating a new CA for the TSA tests'); skip "failed", 18 unless subtest 'creating tsa_cert1.pem TSA server cert' => sub { create_tsa_cert("1", "tsa_cert") }; skip "failed", 17 unless subtest 'creating tsa_cert2.pem non-TSA server cert' => sub { create_tsa_cert("2", "non_tsa_cert") }; skip "failed", 16 unless ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-data", $testtsa, "-tspolicy", "tsa_policy1", "-cert", "-out", "req1.tsq"])), 'creating req1.req time stamp request for file testtsa'); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-in", "req1.tsq", "-text"])), 'printing req1.req'); subtest 'generating valid response for req1.req' => sub { create_time_stamp_response("req1.tsq", "resp1.tsr", "tsa_config1") }; ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp1.tsr", "-text"])), 'printing response'); subtest 'verifying valid response' => sub { verify_time_stamp_response("req1.tsq", "resp1.tsr", $testtsa) }; skip "failed", 11 unless subtest 'verifying valid token' => sub { ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp1.tsr", "-out", "resp1.tsr.token", "-token_out"]))); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-queryfile", "req1.tsq", "-in", "resp1.tsr.token", "-token_in", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem", "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"]))); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-verify", "-data", $testtsa, "-in", "resp1.tsr.token", "-token_in", "-CAfile", "tsaca.pem", "-untrusted", "tsa_cert1.pem"]))); }; skip "failed", 10 unless ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-data", $testtsa, "-tspolicy", "tsa_policy2", "-no_nonce", "-out", "req2.tsq"])), 'creating req2.req time stamp request for file testtsa'); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-in", "req2.tsq", "-text"])), 'printing req2.req'); skip "failed", 8 unless subtest 'generating valid response for req2.req' => sub { create_time_stamp_response("req2.tsq", "resp2.tsr", "tsa_config1") }; skip "failed", 7 unless subtest 'checking -token_in and -token_out options with -reply' => sub { my $RESPONSE2="resp2.tsr.copy.tsr"; my $TOKEN_DER="resp2.tsr.token.der"; ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp2.tsr", "-out", "$TOKEN_DER", "-token_out"]))); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "$TOKEN_DER", "-token_in", "-out", "$RESPONSE2"]))); is(compare($RESPONSE2, "resp2.tsr"), 0); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp2.tsr", "-text", "-token_out"]))); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "$TOKEN_DER", "-token_in", "-text", "-token_out"]))); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-queryfile", "req2.tsq", "-text", "-token_out"]))); }; ok(run(app([@RUN, "-reply", "-in", "resp2.tsr", "-text"])), 'printing response'); subtest 'verifying valid response' => sub { verify_time_stamp_response("req2.tsq", "resp2.tsr", $testtsa) }; subtest 'verifying response against wrong request, it should fail' => sub { verify_time_stamp_response_fail("req1.tsq", "resp2.tsr") }; subtest 'verifying response against wrong request, it should fail' => sub { verify_time_stamp_response_fail("req2.tsq", "resp1.tsr") }; skip "failure", 2 unless ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-data", $CAtsa, "-no_nonce", "-out", "req3.tsq"])), "creating req3.req time stamp request for file CAtsa.cnf"); ok(run(app([@RUN, "-query", "-in", "req3.tsq", "-text"])), 'printing req3.req'); subtest 'verifying response against wrong request, it should fail' => sub { verify_time_stamp_response_fail("req3.tsq", "resp1.tsr") }; } }, create => 1, cleanup => 1 openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_rc2.t0000644000000000000000000000063513176625662016630 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_rc2", "rc2test", "rc2"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_sslcorrupt.t0000644000000000000000000000131613176625662020362 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_sslcorrupt"); plan skip_all => "No TLS protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["sslcorrupttest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running sslcorrupttest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_cast.t0000644000000000000000000000064113176625662017071 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_cast", "casttest", "cast"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_async.t0000644000000000000000000000064413176625662017263 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_async", "asynctest", "async"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_ct.t0000644000000000000000000000120213176625662016542 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file srctop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; setup("test_ct"); $ENV{CTLOG_FILE} = srctop_file("test", "ct", "log_list.conf"); $ENV{CT_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "ct"); $ENV{CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs"); simple_test("test_ct", "ct_test", "ct", "ec"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t0000644000000000000000000000064113176625662017063 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_rand", "randtest", "rand"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_ca.t0000644000000000000000000000322113176625662016522 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use POSIX; use File::Path 2.00 qw/rmtree/; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file/; setup("test_ca"); $ENV{OPENSSL} = cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1); my $std_openssl_cnf = srctop_file("apps", $^O eq "VMS" ? "openssl-vms.cnf" : "openssl.cnf"); rmtree("demoCA", { safe => 0 }); plan tests => 4; SKIP: { $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = '-config "'.srctop_file("test", "CAss.cnf").'"'; skip "failed creating CA structure", 3 if !ok(run(perlapp(["CA.pl","-newca"], stdin => undef)), 'creating CA structure'); $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = '-config "'.srctop_file("test", "Uss.cnf").'"'; skip "failed creating new certificate request", 2 if !ok(run(perlapp(["CA.pl","-newreq"])), 'creating certificate request'); $ENV{OPENSSL_CONFIG} = '-config "'.$std_openssl_cnf.'"'; skip "failed to sign certificate request", 1 if !is(yes(cmdstr(perlapp(["CA.pl", "-sign"]))), 0, 'signing certificate request'); ok(run(perlapp(["CA.pl", "-verify", "newcert.pem"])), 'verifying new certificate'); } rmtree("demoCA", { safe => 0 }); unlink "newcert.pem", "newreq.pem", "newkey.pem"; sub yes { my $cntr = 10; open(PIPE, "|-", join(" ",@_)); local $SIG{PIPE} = "IGNORE"; 1 while $cntr-- > 0 && print PIPE "y\n"; close PIPE; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/10-test_bn.t0000644000000000000000000000321313176625662016530 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use Math::BigInt; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_bn"); plan tests => 3; require_ok(srctop_file("test","recipes","bc.pl")); my $testresults = "tmp.bntest"; my $init = ok(run(test(["bntest"], stdout => $testresults)), 'initialize'); SKIP: { skip "Initializing failed, skipping", 1 if !$init; subtest 'Checking the bn results' => sub { my @lines = (); if (open DATA, $testresults) { @lines = ; close DATA; } map { s/\R//; } @lines; # chomp(@lines); plan tests => scalar grep(/^print /, @lines); my $l = ""; while (scalar @lines) { $l = shift @lines; last if $l =~ /^print /; } while (1) { $l =~ s/^print "//; $l =~ s/\\n"//; my $t = $l; my @operations = (); $l = undef; while (scalar @lines) { $l = shift @lines; last if $l =~ /^print /; push @operations, $l; $l = undef; } ok(check_operations(@operations), "verify $t"); last unless $l; } }; } unlink $testresults; sub check_operations { my $failcount = 0; foreach my $line (@_) { my $result = calc(split /\s+/, $line); if ($result ne "0" && $result ne "0x0") { $failcount++; print STDERR "Failed! $line => $result\n"; } } return $failcount == 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslmessages.t0000644000000000000000000001211713176625662020473 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use File::Temp qw(tempfile); use TLSProxy::Proxy; my $test_name = "test_tls13messages"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; use constant { DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE => 1, OCSP_HANDSHAKE => 2, RESUME_HANDSHAKE => 4, CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE => 8, RENEG_HANDSHAKE => 16, ALL_HANDSHAKES => 31 }; my @handmessages = ( [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO, ALL_HANDSHAKES], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO, ALL_HANDSHAKES], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, OCSP_HANDSHAKE], #ServerKeyExchange handshakes not currently supported by TLSProxy [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE, CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, ALL_HANDSHAKES], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ALL_HANDSHAKES & ~RESUME_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, ALL_HANDSHAKES], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [TLSProxy::Message::MT_FINISHED, RENEG_HANDSHAKE], [0, 0] ); my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( undef, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); sub checkmessages($$); #Test 1: Check we get all the right messages for a default handshake (undef, my $session) = tempfile(); $proxy->serverconnects(2); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_out ".$session); $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 5; checkmessages(DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE, "Default handshake test"); #Test 2: Resumption handshake $proxy->clearClient(); $proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session); $proxy->clientstart(); checkmessages(RESUME_HANDSHAKE, "Resumption handshake test"); unlink $session; #Test 3: A client auth handshake $proxy->clear(); $proxy->clientflags("-cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")); $proxy->serverflags("-Verify 5"); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE, "Client auth handshake test"); #Test 4: A handshake with a renegotiation $proxy->clear(); $proxy->reneg(1); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(RENEG_HANDSHAKE, "Rengotiation handshake test"); #Test 5: A handshake with a renegotiation and client auth $proxy->clear(); $proxy->clientflags("-cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")); $proxy->serverflags("-Verify 5"); $proxy->reneg(1); $proxy->start(); checkmessages(RENEG_HANDSHAKE | CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE, "Renogitation and client auth handshake test"); sub checkmessages($$) { my ($handtype, $testname) = @_; subtest $testname => sub { my $loop = 0; my $numtests; #First count the number of tests for ($numtests = 0; $handmessages[$loop][1] != 0; $loop++) { $numtests++ if (($handmessages[$loop][1] & $handtype) != 0); } plan tests => $numtests; my $nextmess = 0; my $message = undef; for ($loop = 0; $handmessages[$loop][1] != 0; $loop++) { next if (($handmessages[$loop][1] & $handtype) == 0); if (scalar @{$proxy->message_list} > $nextmess) { $message = ${$proxy->message_list}[$nextmess]; $nextmess++; } else { $message = undef; } if (!defined $message) { fail("Message type check. Got nothing, expected " .$handmessages[$loop][0]); } else { ok($message->mt == $handmessages[$loop][0], "Message type check. Got ".$message->mt .", expected ".$handmessages[$loop][0]); } } } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/15-test_genrsa.t0000644000000000000000000000173113176625662017420 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_genrsa"); plan tests => 5; is(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genrsa', '-3', '-out', 'genrsatest.pem', '8'])), 0, "genrsa -3 8"); ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genrsa', '-3', '-out', 'genrsatest.pem', '16'])), "genrsa -3 16"); ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-in', 'genrsatest.pem', '-noout'])), "rsa -check"); ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genrsa', '-f4', '-out', 'genrsatest.pem', '16'])), "genrsa -f4 16"); ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-in', 'genrsatest.pem', '-noout'])), "rsa -check"); unlink 'genrsatest.pem'; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/25-test_x509.t0000644000000000000000000000173613176625662016654 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_x509"); plan tests => 5; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); subtest 'x509 -- x.509 v1 certificate' => sub { tconversion("x509", srctop_file("test","testx509.pem")); }; subtest 'x509 -- first x.509 v3 certificate' => sub { tconversion("x509", srctop_file("test","v3-cert1.pem")); }; subtest 'x509 -- second x.509 v3 certificate' => sub { tconversion("x509", srctop_file("test","v3-cert2.pem")); }; subtest 'x509 -- pathlen' => sub { ok(run(test(["v3ext", srctop_file("test/certs", "pathlen.pem")]))); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_dtlsv1listen.t0000644000000000000000000000065713176625662020605 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_dtlsv1listen", "dtlsv1listentest", "dh"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_gmdiff.t0000644000000000000000000000063513176625662017402 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_gmdiff", "gmdifftest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/40-test_rehash.t0000644000000000000000000000620113176625662017406 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec::Functions; use File::Copy; use File::Basename; use if $^O ne "VMS", 'File::Glob' => qw/glob/; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_rehash"); #If "openssl rehash -help" fails it's most likely because we're on a platform #that doesn't support the rehash command (e.g. Windows) plan skip_all => "test_rehash is not available on this platform" unless run(app(["openssl", "rehash", "-help"])); plan tests => 5; indir "rehash.$$" => sub { prepare(); ok(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])), 'Testing normal rehash operations'); }, create => 1, cleanup => 1; indir "rehash.$$" => sub { prepare(sub { chmod 400, $_ foreach (@_); }); ok(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])), 'Testing rehash operations on readonly files'); }, create => 1, cleanup => 1; indir "rehash.$$" => sub { ok(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])), 'Testing rehash operations on empty directory'); }, create => 1, cleanup => 1; indir "rehash.$$" => sub { prepare(); chmod 0500, curdir(); SKIP: { if (!ok(!open(FOO, ">unwritable.txt"), "Testing that we aren't running as a privileged user, such as root")) { close FOO; skip "It's pointless to run the next test as root", 1; } isnt(run(app(["openssl", "rehash", curdir()])), 1, 'Testing rehash operations on readonly directory'); } chmod 0700, curdir(); # make it writable again, so cleanup works }, create => 1, cleanup => 1; sub prepare { my @pemsourcefiles = sort glob(srctop_file('test', "*.pem")); my @destfiles = (); die "There are no source files\n" if scalar @pemsourcefiles == 0; my $cnt = 0; foreach (@pemsourcefiles) { my $basename = basename($_, ".pem"); my $writing = 0; open PEM, $_ or die "Can't read $_: $!\n"; while (my $line = ) { if ($line =~ m{^-----BEGIN (?:CERTIFICATE|X509 CRL)-----}) { die "New start in a PEM blob?\n" if $writing; $cnt++; my $destfile = catfile(curdir(), $basename . sprintf("-%02d", $cnt) . ".pem"); push @destfiles, $destfile; open OUT, '>', $destfile or die "Can't write $destfile\n"; $writing = 1; } print OUT $line if $writing; if ($line =~ m|^-----END |) { close OUT if $writing; $writing = 0; } } die "No end marker in $basename\n" if $writing; } die "No test PEM files produced\n" if $cnt == 0; foreach (@_) { die "Internal error, argument is not CODE" unless (ref($_) eq 'CODE'); $_->(@destfiles); } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t0000644000000000000000000004237413176625662017456 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec::Functions qw/canonpath/; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_verify"); sub verify { my ($cert, $purpose, $trusted, $untrusted, @opts) = @_; my @args = qw(openssl verify -auth_level 1 -purpose); my @path = qw(test certs); push(@args, "$purpose", @opts); for (@$trusted) { push(@args, "-trusted", srctop_file(@path, "$_.pem")) } for (@$untrusted) { push(@args, "-untrusted", srctop_file(@path, "$_.pem")) } push(@args, srctop_file(@path, "$cert.pem")); run(app([@args])); } plan tests => 127; # Canonical success ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]), "accept compat trust"); # Root CA variants ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-nonca)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail trusted non-ca root"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(nroot+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail server trust non-ca root"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(nroot+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wildcard trust non-ca root"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert2)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wrong root key"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-name2)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wrong root DN"); # Explicit trust/purpose combinations # ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server trust"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server trust with server purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server trust with client purpose"); # Wildcard trust ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept wildcard trust"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept wildcard trust with server purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept wildcard trust with client purpose"); # Inapplicable mistrust ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept client mistrust"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept client mistrust with server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client mistrust with client purpose"); # Inapplicable trust ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client trust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client trust with server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client trust with client purpose"); # Server mistrust ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail rejected EKU"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail server mistrust with server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail server mistrust with client purpose"); # Wildcard mistrust ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wildcard mistrust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sroot-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wildcard mistrust with server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(croot-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wildcard mistrust with client purpose"); # Check that trusted-first is on by setting up paths to different roots # depending on whether the intermediate is the trusted or untrusted one. # ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-serverAuth root-cert2 ca-root2)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept trusted-first path"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2+serverAuth ca-root2)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept trusted-first path with server trust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2-serverAuth ca-root2)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail trusted-first path with server mistrust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2+clientAuth ca-root2)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail trusted-first path with client trust"); # CA variants ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-nonca)]), "fail non-CA untrusted intermediate"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-nonbc)]), "fail non-CA untrusted intermediate"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-nonca)], []), "fail non-CA trust-store intermediate"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-nonbc)], []), "fail non-CA trust-store intermediate"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert nca+serverAuth)], []), "fail non-CA server trust intermediate"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert nca+anyEKU)], []), "fail non-CA wildcard trust intermediate"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert2)]), "fail wrong intermediate CA key"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-name2)]), "fail wrong intermediate CA DN"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-root2)]), "fail wrong intermediate CA issuer"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [], [qw(ca-cert)], "-partial_chain"), "fail untrusted partial chain"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept trusted partial chain"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept partial chain with server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(cca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"), "fail partial chain with client purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept server trust partial chain"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(cca+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept server trust client purpose partial chain"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept client mistrust partial chain"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+anyEKU)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept wildcard trust partial chain"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [], [qw(ca+serverAuth)], "-partial_chain"), "fail untrusted partial issuer with ignored server trust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "fail server mistrust partial chain"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "fail client trust partial chain"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-anyEKU)], [], "-partial_chain"), "fail wildcard mistrust partial chain"); # We now test auxiliary trust even for intermediate trusted certs without # -partial_chain. Note that "-trusted_first" is now always on and cannot # be disabled. ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server trust"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept wildcard trust"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server trust and purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept wildcard trust and server purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept client mistrust and server purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept server trust and client purpose"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept wildcard trust and client purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wildcard mistrust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail server mistrust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client trust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client trust and server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client trust and client purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail server mistrust and client purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client mistrust and client purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail server mistrust and server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert sca-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wildcard mistrust and server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert cca-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wildcard mistrust and client purpose"); # EE variants ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "accept client chain"); ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail server leaf purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail client leaf purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert2", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wrong intermediate CA key"); ok(!verify("ee-name2", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail wrong intermediate CA DN"); ok(!verify("ee-expired", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), "fail expired leaf"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept last-resort direct leaf match"); ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-client)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept last-resort direct leaf match"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-client)], [], "-partial_chain"), "fail last-resort direct leaf non-match"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept direct match with server trust"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "fail direct match with server mistrust"); ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee+clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept direct match with client trust"); ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "reject direct match with client mistrust"); # Proxy certificates ok(!verify("pc1-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ee-client ca-cert)]), "fail to accept proxy cert without -allow_proxy_certs"); ok(verify("pc1-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"), "accept proxy cert 1"); ok(verify("pc2-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"), "accept proxy cert 2"); ok(!verify("bad-pc3-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"), "fail proxy cert with incorrect subject"); ok(!verify("bad-pc4-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"), "fail proxy cert with incorrect pathlen"); ok(verify("pc5-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"), "accept proxy cert missing proxy policy"); ok(!verify("pc6-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(pc1-cert ee-client ca-cert)], "-allow_proxy_certs"), "failed proxy cert where last CN was added as a multivalue RDN component"); # Security level tests ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"), "accept RSA 2048 chain at auth level 2"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "3"), "reject RSA 2048 root at auth level 3"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-768"], ["ca-cert-768i"], "-auth_level", "0"), "accept RSA 768 root at auth level 0"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-768"], ["ca-cert-768i"]), "reject RSA 768 root at auth level 1"); ok(verify("ee-cert-768i", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-768"], "-auth_level", "0"), "accept RSA 768 intermediate at auth level 0"); ok(!verify("ee-cert-768i", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-768"]), "reject RSA 768 intermediate at auth level 1"); ok(verify("ee-cert-768", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0"), "accept RSA 768 leaf at auth level 0"); ok(!verify("ee-cert-768", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]), "reject RSA 768 leaf at auth level 1"); # ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-md5"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"), "accept md5 self-signed TA at auth level 2"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["ca-cert-md5-any"], [], "-auth_level", "2"), "accept md5 intermediate TA at auth level 2"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-md5"], "-auth_level", "0"), "accept md5 intermediate at auth level 0"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-md5"]), "reject md5 intermediate at auth level 1"); ok(verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0"), "accept md5 leaf at auth level 0"); ok(!verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]), "reject md5 leaf at auth level 1"); # Depth tests, note the depth limit bounds the number of CA certificates # between the trust-anchor and the leaf, so, for example, with a root->ca->leaf # chain, depth = 1 is sufficient, but depth == 0 is not. # ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-verify_depth", "2"), "accept chain with verify_depth 2"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-verify_depth", "1"), "accept chain with verify_depth 1"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-verify_depth", "0"), "accept chain with verify_depth 0"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["ca-cert-md5-any"], [], "-verify_depth", "0"), "accept md5 intermediate TA with verify_depth 0"); # Name Constraints tests. ok(verify("alt1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ), "Name Constraints everything permitted"); ok(verify("alt2-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca2-cert"], ), "Name Constraints nothing excluded"); ok(verify("alt3-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ), "Name Constraints nested test all permitted"); ok(!verify("badalt1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ), "Name Constraints hostname not permitted"); ok(!verify("badalt2-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca2-cert"], ), "Name Constraints hostname excluded"); ok(!verify("badalt3-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ), "Name Constraints email address not permitted"); ok(!verify("badalt4-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ), "Name Constraints subject email address not permitted"); ok(!verify("badalt5-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ), "Name Constraints IP address not permitted"); ok(!verify("badalt6-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ), "Name Constraints CN hostname not permitted"); ok(!verify("badalt7-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ), "Name Constraints CN BMPSTRING hostname not permitted"); ok(!verify("badalt8-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ), "Name constaints nested DNS name not permitted 1"); ok(!verify("badalt9-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ), "Name constaints nested DNS name not permitted 2"); ok(!verify("badalt10-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ), "Name constaints nested DNS name excluded"); ok(!verify("many-names1", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), "Too many names and constraints to check (1)"); ok(!verify("many-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), "Too many names and constraints to check (2)"); ok(!verify("many-names3", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), "Too many names and constraints to check (3)"); ok(verify("some-names1", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), "Not too many names and constraints to check (1)"); ok(verify("some-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), "Not too many names and constraints to check (2)"); ok(verify("some-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), "Not too many names and constraints to check (3)"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/tconversion.pl0000644000000000000000000000550313176625662017401 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; use File::Copy; use lib 'testlib'; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT/; my %conversionforms = ( # Default conversion forms. Other series may be added with # specific test types as key. "*" => [ "d", "p" ], "msb" => [ "d", "p", "msblob" ], ); sub tconversion { my $testtype = shift; my $t = shift; my @conversionforms = defined($conversionforms{$testtype}) ? @{$conversionforms{$testtype}} : @{$conversionforms{"*"}}; my @openssl_args = @_; if (!@openssl_args) { @openssl_args = ($testtype); } my $n = scalar @conversionforms; my $totaltests = 1 # for initializing + $n # initial conversions from p to all forms (A) + $n*$n # conversion from result of A to all forms (B) + 1 # comparing original test file to p form of A + $n*($n-1); # comparing first conversion to each fom in A with B $totaltests-- if ($testtype eq "p7d"); # no comparison of original test file plan tests => $totaltests; my @cmd = ("openssl", @openssl_args); my $init; if (scalar @openssl_args > 0 && $openssl_args[0] eq "pkey") { $init = ok(run(app([@cmd, "-in", $t, "-out", "$testtype-fff.p"])), 'initializing'); } else { $init = ok(copy($t, "$testtype-fff.p"), 'initializing'); } if (!$init) { diag("Trying to copy $t to $testtype-fff.p : $!"); } SKIP: { skip "Not initialized, skipping...", 22 unless $init; foreach my $to (@conversionforms) { ok(run(app([@cmd, "-in", "$testtype-fff.p", "-inform", "p", "-out", "$testtype-f.$to", "-outform", $to])), "p -> $to"); } foreach my $to (@conversionforms) { foreach my $from (@conversionforms) { ok(run(app([@cmd, "-in", "$testtype-f.$from", "-inform", $from, "-out", "$testtype-ff.$from$to", "-outform", $to])), "$from -> $to"); } } if ($testtype ne "p7d") { is(cmp_text("$testtype-fff.p", "$testtype-f.p"), 0, 'comparing orig to p'); } foreach my $to (@conversionforms) { next if $to eq "d"; foreach my $from (@conversionforms) { is(cmp_text("$testtype-f.$to", "$testtype-ff.$from$to"), 0, "comparing $to to $from$to"); } } } unlink glob "$testtype-f.*"; unlink glob "$testtype-ff.*"; unlink glob "$testtype-fff.*"; } sub cmp_text { return compare_text(@_, sub { $_[0] =~ s/\R//g; $_[1] =~ s/\R//g; return $_[0] ne $_[1]; }); } 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/15-test_rsapss.t0000644000000000000000000000454213176625662017457 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT with srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_rsapss"); plan tests => 5; #using test/testrsa.pem which happens to be a 512 bit RSA ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sign', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha1', '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2', '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', '-out', 'testrsapss.sig', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])), "openssl dgst -sign"); with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 1; } }, sub { ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sign', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha512', '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2', '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])), "openssl dgst -sign, expect to fail gracefully"); ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sign', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha512', '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:2147483647', '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha1', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])), "openssl dgst -sign, expect to fail gracefully"); ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-prverify', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha512', '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2', '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', '-signature', 'testrsapss.sig', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])), "openssl dgst -prverify, expect to fail gracefully"); }); ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-prverify', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-sha1', '-sigopt', 'rsa_padding_mode:pss', '-sigopt', 'rsa_pss_saltlen:-2', '-sigopt', 'rsa_mgf1_md:sha512', '-signature', 'testrsapss.sig', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem')])), "openssl dgst -prverify"); unlink 'testrsapss.sig'; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t0000644000000000000000000000704413176625661016722 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ====================================================================== use strict; use warnings; use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; use File::Basename; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file data_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_pem_reading"); my $testsrc = srctop_file("test", "recipes", basename($0)); my $cmd = "openssl"; # map input PEM file to 1 if it should be accepted; 0 when should be rejected my %cert_expected = ( "cert-1023line.pem" => 1, "cert-1024line.pem" => 1, "cert-1025line.pem" => 1, "cert-255line.pem" => 1, "cert-256line.pem" => 1, "cert-257line.pem" => 1, "cert-blankline.pem" => 0, "cert-comment.pem" => 0, "cert-earlypad.pem" => 0, "cert-extrapad.pem" => 0, "cert-infixwhitespace.pem" => 1, "cert-junk.pem" => 0, "cert-leadingwhitespace.pem" => 1, "cert-longline.pem" => 1, "cert-misalignedpad.pem" => 0, "cert-onecolumn.pem" => 1, "cert-oneline.pem" => 1, "cert-shortandlongline.pem" => 1, "cert-shortline.pem" => 1, "cert-threecolumn.pem" => 1, "cert-trailingwhitespace.pem" => 1, "cert.pem" => 1 ); my %dsa_expected = ( "dsa-1023line.pem" => 0, "dsa-1024line.pem" => 0, "dsa-1025line.pem" => 0, "dsa-255line.pem" => 0, "dsa-256line.pem" => 0, "dsa-257line.pem" => 0, "dsa-blankline.pem" => 0, "dsa-comment.pem" => 0, "dsa-corruptedheader.pem" => 0, "dsa-corruptiv.pem" => 0, "dsa-earlypad.pem" => 0, "dsa-extrapad.pem" => 0, "dsa-infixwhitespace.pem" => 0, "dsa-junk.pem" => 0, "dsa-leadingwhitespace.pem" => 0, "dsa-longline.pem" => 0, "dsa-misalignedpad.pem" => 0, "dsa-onecolumn.pem" => 0, "dsa-oneline.pem" => 0, "dsa-onelineheader.pem" => 0, "dsa-shortandlongline.pem" => 0, "dsa-shortline.pem" => 0, "dsa-threecolumn.pem" => 0, "dsa-trailingwhitespace.pem" => 1, "dsa.pem" => 1 ); plan tests => scalar keys(%cert_expected) + scalar keys(%dsa_expected) + 1; foreach my $input (keys %cert_expected) { my @common = ($cmd, "x509", "-text", "-noout", "-inform", "PEM", "-in"); my @data = run(app([@common, data_file($input)], stderr => undef), capture => 1); my @match = grep /The Great State of Long-Winded Certificate Field Names Whereby to Increase the Output Size/, @data; is((scalar @match > 0 ? 1 : 0), $cert_expected{$input}); } SKIP: { skip "DSA support disabled, skipping...", (scalar keys %dsa_expected) unless !disabled("dsa"); foreach my $input (keys %dsa_expected) { my @common = ($cmd, "pkey", "-inform", "PEM", "-passin", "file:" . data_file("wellknown"), "-noout", "-text", "-in"); my @data = run(app([@common, data_file($input)], stderr => undef), capture => 1); my @match = grep /68:42:02:16:63:54:16:eb:06:5c:ab:06:72:3b:78:/, @data; is((scalar @match > 0 ? 1 : 0), $dsa_expected{$input}); } } SKIP: { skip "RSA support disabled, skipping...", 1 unless !disabled("rsa"); my @common = ($cmd, "pkey", "-inform", "PEM", "-noout", "-text", "-in"); my @data = run(app([@common, data_file("beermug.pem")], stderr => undef), capture => 1); my @match = grep /00:a0:3a:21:14:5d:cd:b6:d5:a0:3e:49:23:c1:3a:/, @data; ok(scalar @match > 0 ? 1 : 0); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_dtls.t0000644000000000000000000000130313176625662017104 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_dtls"); plan skip_all => "No DTLS protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build" if alldisabled(available_protocols("dtls")); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["dtlstest", srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem")])), "running dtlstest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_bad_dtls.t0000644000000000000000000000110213176625662017706 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_bad_dtls"); plan skip_all => "DTLSv1 is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("dtls1"); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["bad_dtls_test"])), "running bad_dtls_test"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_rc5.t0000644000000000000000000000063613176625662016634 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_rc5", "rc5test", "rc5"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_constant_time.t0000644000000000000000000000065413176625662021016 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_constant_time", "constant_time_test"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_ocsp.t0000644000000000000000000002021213176625662017102 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use POSIX; use File::Spec::Functions qw/devnull catfile/; use File::Copy; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT with pipe srctop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_ocsp"); plan skip_all => "OCSP is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("ocsp"); my $ocspdir=srctop_dir("test", "ocsp-tests"); # 17 December 2012 so we don't get certificate expiry errors. my @check_time=("-attime", "1355875200"); sub test_ocsp { my $title = shift; my $inputfile = shift; my $CAfile = shift; my $untrusted = shift; if ($untrusted eq "") { $untrusted = $CAfile; } my $expected_exit = shift; run(app(["openssl", "base64", "-d", "-in", catfile($ocspdir,$inputfile), "-out", "ocsp-resp-fff.dat"])); with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == $expected_exit; } }, sub { ok(run(app(["openssl", "ocsp", "-respin", "ocsp-resp-fff.dat", "-partial_chain", @check_time, "-CAfile", catfile($ocspdir, $CAfile), "-verify_other", catfile($ocspdir, $untrusted), "-no-CApath"])), $title); }); unlink "ocsp-resp-fff.dat"; } plan tests => 10; subtest "=== VALID OCSP RESPONSES ===" => sub { plan tests => 7; test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; 3-level CA hierarchy", "ND1.ors", "ND1_Cross_Root.pem", "ND1_Issuer_ICA-Cross.pem", 0); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); }; subtest "=== INVALID SIGNATURE on the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub { plan tests => 6; test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "ISOP_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "ISOP_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "ISOP_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "ISOP_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "ISOP_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "ISOP_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== WRONG RESPONDERID in the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub { plan tests => 6; test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "WRID_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "WRID_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "WRID_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "WRID_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "WRID_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "WRID_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== WRONG ISSUERNAMEHASH in the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub { plan tests => 6; test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "WINH_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "WINH_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "WINH_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "WINH_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "WINH_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "WINH_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== WRONG ISSUERKEYHASH in the OCSP RESPONSE ===" => sub { plan tests => 6; test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "WIKH_ND1.ors", "ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "WIKH_ND2.ors", "ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "WIKH_ND3.ors", "ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "WIKH_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "WIKH_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "WIKH_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== WRONG KEY in the DELEGATED OCSP SIGNING CERTIFICATE ===" => sub { plan tests => 3; test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "WKDOSC_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "WKDOSC_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "WKDOSC_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== INVALID SIGNATURE on the DELEGATED OCSP SIGNING CERTIFICATE ===" => sub { plan tests => 3; test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "ISDOSC_D1.ors", "D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "ISDOSC_D2.ors", "D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "ISDOSC_D3.ors", "D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== WRONG SUBJECT NAME in the ISSUER CERTIFICATE ===" => sub { plan tests => 6; test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "ND1.ors", "WSNIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "ND2.ors", "WSNIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "ND3.ors", "WSNIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "D1.ors", "WSNIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "D2.ors", "WSNIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "D3.ors", "WSNIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== WRONG KEY in the ISSUER CERTIFICATE ===" => sub { plan tests => 6; test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "ND1.ors", "WKIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "ND2.ors", "WKIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "ND3.ors", "WKIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "D1.ors", "WKIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "D2.ors", "WKIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "D3.ors", "WKIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 1); }; subtest "=== INVALID SIGNATURE on the ISSUER CERTIFICATE ===" => sub { plan tests => 6; # Expect success, because we're explicitly trusting the issuer certificate. test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "ND1.ors", "ISIC_ND1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "ND2.ors", "ISIC_ND2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("NON-DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "ND3.ors", "ISIC_ND3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Intermediate CA -> EE", "D1.ors", "ISIC_D1_Issuer_ICA.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> Intermediate CA", "D2.ors", "ISIC_D2_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); test_ocsp("DELEGATED; Root CA -> EE", "D3.ors", "ISIC_D3_Issuer_Root.pem", "", 0); }; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslvertol.t0000644000000000000000000000417213176625662020201 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; my $test_name = "test_sslextension"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( \&vers_tolerance_filter, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); #Test 1: Asking for TLS1.3 should pass my $client_version = TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_3; $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 2; ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Version tolerance test, TLS 1.3"); #Test 2: Testing something below SSLv3 should fail $client_version = TLSProxy::Record::VERS_SSL_3_0 - 1; $proxy->clear(); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Version tolerance test, SSL < 3.0"); sub vers_tolerance_filter { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello if ($proxy->flight != 0) { return; } foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { #Set the client version #Anything above the max supported version (TLS1.2) should succeed #Anything below SSLv3 should fail $message->client_version($client_version); $message->repack(); } } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslextension.t0000644000000000000000000000643613176625662020707 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; my $test_name = "test_sslextension"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( \&extension_filter, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); # Test 1: Sending a zero length extension block should pass $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 3; ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Zero extension length test"); sub extension_filter { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello if ($proxy->flight != 0) { return; } foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { # Remove all extensions and set the extension len to zero $message->extension_data({}); $message->extensions_len(0); # Extensions have been removed so make sure we don't try to use them $message->process_extensions(); $message->repack(); } } } # Test 2-3: Sending a duplicate extension should fail. sub inject_duplicate_extension { my ($proxy, $message_type) = @_; foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == $message_type) { my %extensions = %{$message->extension_data}; # Add a duplicate (unknown) extension. $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION, ""); $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION, ""); $message->repack(); } } } sub inject_duplicate_extension_clienthello { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello if ($proxy->flight != 0) { return; } inject_duplicate_extension($proxy, TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO); } sub inject_duplicate_extension_serverhello { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the initial ServerHello if ($proxy->flight != 1) { return; } inject_duplicate_extension($proxy, TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO); } $proxy->clear(); $proxy->filter(\&inject_duplicate_extension_clienthello); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Duplicate ClientHello extension"); $proxy->clear(); $proxy->filter(\&inject_duplicate_extension_serverhello); $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Duplicate ServerHello extension"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/30-test_pbelu.t0000644000000000000000000000063313176625662017245 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_pbelu", "pbelutest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_srp.t0000644000000000000000000000063613176625662016753 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_srp", "srptest", "srp"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_bioprint.t0000644000000000000000000000063413176625662017773 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_bioprint", "bioprinttest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/25-test_d2i.t0000644000000000000000000000657613176625662016634 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_d2i"); plan tests => 14; ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "X509", "decode", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad_cert.der')])), "Running d2i_test bad_cert.der"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "GENERAL_NAME", "decode", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad_generalname.der')])), "Running d2i_test bad_generalname.der"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "BIO", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad_bio.der')])), "Running d2i_test bad_bio.der"); # This test checks CVE-2016-2108. The data consists of an tag 258 and # two zero content octets. This is parsed as an ASN1_ANY type. If the # type is incorrectly interpreted as an ASN.1 INTEGER the two zero content # octets will be reject as invalid padding and this test will fail. # If the type is correctly interpreted it will by treated as an ASN1_STRING # type and the content octets copied verbatim. ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','high_tag.der')])), "Running d2i_test high_tag.der"); # Above test data but interpreted as ASN.1 INTEGER: this will be rejected # because the tag is invalid. ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "decode", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','high_tag.der')])), "Running d2i_test high_tag.der INTEGER"); # Parse valid 0, 1 and -1 ASN.1 INTEGER as INTEGER or ANY. ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "OK", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int0.der')])), "Running d2i_test int0.der INTEGER"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "OK", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int1.der')])), "Running d2i_test int1.der INTEGER"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "OK", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','intminus1.der')])), "Running d2i_test intminus1.der INTEGER"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int0.der')])), "Running d2i_test int0.der ANY"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','int1.der')])), "Running d2i_test int1.der ANY"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_ANY", "OK", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','intminus1.der')])), "Running d2i_test intminus1.der ANY"); # Integers with illegal additional padding. ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "decode", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad-int-pad0.der')])), "Running d2i_test bad-int-pad0.der INTEGER"); ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "ASN1_INTEGER", "decode", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad-int-padminus1.der')])), "Running d2i_test bad-int-padminus1.der INTEGER"); SKIP: { skip "No CMS support in this configuration", 1 if disabled("cms"); # Invalid CMS structure with decode error in CHOICE value. # Test for CVE-2016-7053 ok(run(test(["d2i_test", "CMS_ContentInfo", "decode", srctop_file('test','d2i-tests','bad-cms.der')])), "Running d2i_test bad-cms.der CMS ContentInfo"); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslcbcpadding.t0000644000000000000000000000662613176625662020752 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; my $test_name = "test_sslcbcpadding"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLSv1.2 enabled" if disabled("tls1_2"); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( \&add_maximal_padding_filter, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); # TODO: We could test all 256 values, but then the log file gets too large for # CI. See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1440. my @test_offsets = (0, 128, 254, 255); # Test that maximally-padded records are accepted. my $bad_padding_offset = -1; $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 1 + scalar(@test_offsets); ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Maximally-padded record test"); # Test that invalid padding is rejected. foreach my $offset (@test_offsets) { $proxy->clear(); $bad_padding_offset = $offset; $proxy->start(); ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Invalid padding byte $bad_padding_offset"); } sub add_maximal_padding_filter { my $proxy = shift; if ($proxy->flight == 0) { # Disable Encrypt-then-MAC. foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt != TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { next; } $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC); $message->process_extensions(); $message->repack(); } } if ($proxy->flight == 3) { # Insert a maximally-padded record. Assume a block size of 16 (AES) and # a MAC length of 20 (SHA-1). my $block_size = 16; my $mac_len = 20; # Size the plaintext so that 256 is a valid padding. my $plaintext_len = $block_size - ($mac_len % $block_size); my $plaintext = "A" x $plaintext_len; my $data = "B" x $block_size; # Explicit IV. $data .= $plaintext; $data .= TLSProxy::Proxy::fill_known_data($mac_len); # MAC. # Add padding. for (my $i = 0; $i < 256; $i++) { if ($i == $bad_padding_offset) { $data .= "\xfe"; } else { $data .= "\xff"; } } my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new( $proxy->flight, TLSProxy::Record::RT_APPLICATION_DATA, TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_2, length($data), 0, length($data), $plaintext_len, $data, $plaintext, ); # Send the record immediately after the server Finished. push @{$proxy->record_list}, $record; } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t0000644000000000000000000000207713176625662016534 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_ec"); plan tests => 5; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); ok(run(test(["ectest"])), "running ectest"); SKIP: { skip "Skipping ec conversion test", 3 if disabled("ec"); subtest 'ec conversions -- private key' => sub { tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem")); }; subtest 'ec conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub { tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem"), "pkey"); }; subtest 'ec conversions -- public key' => sub { tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testecpub-p256.pem"), "ec", "-pubin", "-pubout"); }; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/10-test_exp.t0000644000000000000000000000062713176625662016733 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_exp", "exptest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/03-test_exdata.t0000644000000000000000000000063013176625661017400 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_exdata", "exdatatest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_sha256.t0000644000000000000000000000064113176625662017147 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_sha256", "sha256t", "sha"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t0000644000000000000000000004455513176625662016740 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use POSIX; use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/; use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_cms"); plan skip_all => "CMS is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("cms"); my $smdir = srctop_dir("test", "smime-certs"); my $smcont = srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt"); my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib) = disabled qw/des dh dsa ec ec2m rc2 zlib/; plan tests => 4; my @smime_pkcs7_tests = ( [ "signed content DER format, RSA key", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach", "-certfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed detached content DER format, RSA key", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt", "-content", $smcont ] ], [ "signed content test streaming BER format, RSA", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach", "-stream", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content DER format, DSA key", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt", "-content", $smcont ] ], [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing)", [ "-resign", "-inform", "DER", "-in", "test.cms", "-outform", "DER", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test2.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test2.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt", "-content", $smcont ] ], [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach", "-stream", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"), "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-noattr", "-nodetach", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"), "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content S/MIME format, RSA key SHA1", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-md", "sha1", "-certfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-nodetach", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"), "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"), "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients, 3rd used", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients, key only used", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-inkey", catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], ); my @smime_cms_tests = ( [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach", "-keyid", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"), "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa2.pem"), "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content MIME format, RSA key, signed receipt request", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-nodetach", "-receipt_request_to", "test\@openssl.org", "-receipt_request_all", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed receipt MIME format, RSA key", [ "-sign_receipt", "-in", "test.cms", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), "-out", "test2.cms" ], [ "-verify_receipt", "test2.cms", "-in", "test.cms", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem") ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, 3 recipients, keyid", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-keyid", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smrsa3.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming PEM format, KEK", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-aes128", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-secretkeyid", "C0FEE0" ], [ "-decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt", "-inform", "PEM", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-secretkeyid", "C0FEE0" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming PEM format, KEK, key only", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-aes128", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-secretkeyid", "C0FEE0" ], [ "-decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt", "-inform", "PEM", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F" ] ], [ "data content test streaming PEM format", [ "-data_create", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-data_out", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, 128 bit RC2 key", [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-rc2", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, 40 bit RC2 key", [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-rc2", "-secretkey", "0001020304", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-secretkey", "0001020304", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key", [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-des3", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, 128 bit AES key", [ "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-aes128", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-EncryptedData_decrypt", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], ); my @smime_cms_comp_tests = ( [ "compressed content test streaming PEM format", [ "-compress", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach", "-stream", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-uncompress", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ] ); my @smime_cms_param_tests = ( [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, RSA keys, PSS signature", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:pss", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, RSA keys, PSS signature, no attributes", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach", "-noattr", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:pss", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, RSA keys, PSS signature, SHA384 MGF1", [ "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach", "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:pss", "-keyopt", "rsa_mgf1_md:sha384", "-out", "test.cms" ], [ "-verify", "-in", "test.cms", "-inform", "PEM", "-CAfile", catfile($smdir, "smroot.pem"), "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, OAEP default parameters", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:oaep" ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, OAEP SHA256", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-keyopt", "rsa_padding_mode:oaep", "-keyopt", "rsa_oaep_md:sha256" ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smrsa1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, ECDH", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, DES, ECDH, 2 recipients, key only used", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"), catfile($smdir, "smec3.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-inkey", catfile($smdir, "smec3.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, DES, key identifier", [ "-encrypt", "-keyid", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem") ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, AES128, SHA256 KDF", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"), "-aes128", "-keyopt", "ecdh_kdf_md:sha256" ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec1.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, K-283, cofactor DH", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec2.pem"), "-aes128", "-keyopt", "ecdh_kdf_md:sha256", "-keyopt", "ecdh_cofactor_mode:1" ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smec2.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ], [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, X9.42 DH", [ "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-stream", "-out", "test.cms", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"), "-aes128" ], [ "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"), "-in", "test.cms", "-out", "smtst.txt" ] ] ); subtest "CMS => PKCS#7 compatibility tests\n" => sub { plan tests => scalar @smime_pkcs7_tests; foreach (@smime_pkcs7_tests) { SKIP: { my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]); skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason; ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}])) && run(app(["openssl", "smime", @{$$_[2]}])) && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0, $$_[0]); } } }; subtest "CMS <= PKCS#7 compatibility tests\n" => sub { plan tests => scalar @smime_pkcs7_tests; foreach (@smime_pkcs7_tests) { SKIP: { my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]); skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason; ok(run(app(["openssl", "smime", @{$$_[1]}])) && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}])) && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0, $$_[0]); } } }; subtest "CMS <=> CMS consistency tests\n" => sub { plan tests => (scalar @smime_pkcs7_tests) + (scalar @smime_cms_tests); foreach (@smime_pkcs7_tests) { SKIP: { my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]); skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason; ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}])) && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}])) && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0, $$_[0]); } } foreach (@smime_cms_tests) { SKIP: { my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]); skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason; ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}])) && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}])) && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0, $$_[0]); } } }; subtest "CMS <=> CMS consistency tests, modified key parameters\n" => sub { plan tests => (scalar @smime_cms_param_tests) + (scalar @smime_cms_comp_tests); foreach (@smime_cms_param_tests) { SKIP: { my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]); skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason; ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}])) && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}])) && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0, $$_[0]); } } SKIP: { skip("Zlib not supported: compression tests skipped", scalar @smime_cms_comp_tests) if $no_zlib; foreach (@smime_cms_comp_tests) { SKIP: { my $skip_reason = check_availability($$_[0]); skip $skip_reason, 1 if $skip_reason; ok(run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[1]}])) && run(app(["openssl", "cms", @{$$_[2]}])) && compare_text($smcont, "smtst.txt") == 0, $$_[0]); } } } }; unlink "test.cms"; unlink "test2.cms"; unlink "smtst.txt"; sub check_availability { my $tnam = shift; return "$tnam: skipped, EC disabled\n" if ($no_ec && $tnam =~ /ECDH/); return "$tnam: skipped, ECDH disabled\n" if ($no_ec && $tnam =~ /ECDH/); return "$tnam: skipped, EC2M disabled\n" if ($no_ec2m && $tnam =~ /K-283/); return "$tnam: skipped, DH disabled\n" if ($no_dh && $tnam =~ /X9\.42/); return "$tnam: skipped, RC2 disabled\n" if ($no_rc2 && $tnam =~ /RC2/); return "$tnam: skipped, DES disabled\n" if ($no_des && $tnam =~ /DES/); return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n" if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/); return ""; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_threads.t0000644000000000000000000000063713176625662017602 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_threads", "threadstest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_des.t0000644000000000000000000000063613176625662016716 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_des", "destest", "des"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_memleak.t0000644000000000000000000000101213176625662017547 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test; setup("test_memleak"); plan tests => 2; ok(run(test(["memleaktest"])), "running leak test"); ok(run(test(["memleaktest", "freeit"])), "running no leak test"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/90-test_secmem.t0000644000000000000000000000063513176625662017417 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_secmem", "secmemtest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_md4.t0000644000000000000000000000063613176625662016627 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_md4", "md4test", "md4"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/60-test_x509_store.t0000644000000000000000000000344313176625662020064 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Copy; use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT canonpath/; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_x509_store"); #If "openssl rehash -help" fails it's most likely because we're on a platform #that doesn't support the rehash command (e.g. Windows) plan skip_all => "test_rehash is not available on this platform" unless run(app(["openssl", "rehash", "-help"])); # We use 'openssl verify' for these tests, as it contains everything # we need to conduct these tests. The tests here are a subset of the # ones found in 25-test_verify.t sub verify { my ($cert, $purpose, $trustedpath, $untrusted, @opts) = @_; my @args = qw(openssl verify -auth_level 1 -purpose); my @path = qw(test certs); push(@args, "$purpose", @opts); push(@args, "-CApath", $trustedpath); for (@$untrusted) { push(@args, "-untrusted", srctop_file(@path, "$_.pem")) } push(@args, srctop_file(@path, "$cert.pem")); run(app([@args])); } plan tests => 3; indir "60-test_x509_store" => sub { for (("root-cert")) { copy(srctop_file("test", "certs", "$_.pem"), curdir()); } ok(run(app([qw(openssl rehash), curdir()])), "Rehashing"); # Canonical success ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", curdir(), ["ca-cert"], "-show_chain"), "verify ee-cert"); # Failure because root cert not present in CApath ok(!verify("ca-root2", "any", curdir(), [], "-show_chain")); }, create => 1, cleanup => 1; openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_test_ctx.t0000644000000000000000000000113113176625662020653 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_ssl_test_ctx"); plan tests => 1; ok(run(test(["ssl_test_ctx_test", srctop_file("test", "ssl_test_ctx_test.conf")])), "running ssl_test_ctx_test ssl_test_ctx_test.conf"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/01-test_sanity.t0000644000000000000000000000063513176625661017444 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_sanity", "sanitytest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslskewith0p.t0000644000000000000000000000363013176625662020602 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; my $test_name = "test_sslskewith0p"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "dh is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("dh"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( \&ske_0_p_filter, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); #We must use an anon DHE cipher for this test $proxy->cipherc('ADH-AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0'); $proxy->ciphers('ADH-AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0'); $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 1; ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "ServerKeyExchange with 0 p"); sub ske_0_p_filter { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the SKE - always in flight 1 if ($proxy->flight != 1) { return; } foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { #Set p to a value of 0 $message->p(pack('C', 0)); $message->repack(); } } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_sslcertstatus.t0000644000000000000000000000415313176625662021066 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; use TLSProxy::Proxy; my $test_name = "test_sslcertstatus"; setup($test_name); plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O" if $^O =~ /^(VMS|MSWin32)$/; plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled" if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled" if disabled("sock"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the ocsp feature enabled" if disabled("ocsp"); plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled" if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls")); $ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000'; my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new( \&certstatus_filter, cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1), srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"), (!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE}) ); #Test 1: Sending a status_request extension in both ClientHello and #ServerHello but then omitting the CertificateStatus message is valid $proxy->clientflags("-status"); $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; plan tests => 1; ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Missing CertificateStatus message"); sub certstatus_filter { my $proxy = shift; # We're only interested in the initial ServerHello if ($proxy->flight != 1) { return; } foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) { if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_HELLO) { #Add the status_request to the ServerHello even though we are not #going to send a CertificateStatus message $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, ""); $message->repack(); } } } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/15-test_rsa.t0000644000000000000000000000243513176625662016730 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; use File::Spec; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; setup("test_rsa"); plan tests => 6; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); ok(run(test(["rsa_test"])), "running rsatest"); ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'rsa', '-check', '-in', srctop_file('test', 'testrsa.pem'), '-noout'])), "rsa -check"); SKIP: { skip "Skipping rsa conversion test", 3 if disabled("rsa"); subtest 'rsa conversions -- private key' => sub { tconversion("rsa", srctop_file("test","testrsa.pem")); }; subtest 'rsa conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub { tconversion("rsa", srctop_file("test","testrsa.pem"), "pkey"); }; } SKIP: { skip "Skipping msblob conversion test", 1 if disabled("rsa") || disabled("dsa"); subtest 'rsa conversions -- public key' => sub { tconversion("msb", srctop_file("test","testrsapub.pem"), "rsa", "-pubin", "-pubout"); }; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_rmd.t0000644000000000000000000000063613176625662016725 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_rmd", "rmdtest", "rmd"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/70-test_packet.t0000644000000000000000000000063513176625662017413 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_packet", "packettest"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/02-test_ordinals.t0000644000000000000000000000323013176625661017743 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; setup("test_ordinals"); plan tests => 2; ok(testordinals(srctop_file("util", "libcrypto.num")), "Test libcrypto.num"); ok(testordinals(srctop_file("util", "libssl.num")), "Test libssl.num"); sub testordinals { my $filename = shift; my $cnt = 0; my $ret = 1; my $qualifier = ""; my $newqual; my $lastfunc = ""; open(my $fh, '<', $filename); while (my $line = <$fh>) { my @tokens = split(/(?:\s+|\s*:\s*)/, $line); #Check the line looks sane if ($#tokens < 5 || $#tokens > 6) { print STDERR "Invalid line:\n$line\n"; $ret = 0; last; } if ($tokens[3] eq "NOEXIST") { #Ignore this line next; } #Some ordinals can be repeated, e.g. if one is VMS and another is !VMS $newqual = $tokens[4]; $newqual =~ s/!//g; if ($cnt > $tokens[1] || ($cnt == $tokens[1] && ($qualifier ne $newqual || $qualifier eq ""))) { print STDERR "Invalid ordinal detected: ".$tokens[1]."\n"; $ret = 0; last; } $cnt = $tokens[1]; $qualifier = $newqual; $lastfunc = $tokens[0]; } close($fh); return $ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/recipes/05-test_bf.t0000644000000000000000000000063313176625662016527 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; simple_test("test_bf", "bftest", "bf"); openssl-1.1.0g/test/cipherlist_test.c0000644000000000000000000001272613176625661016416 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include "testutil.h" typedef struct cipherlist_test_fixture { const char *test_case_name; SSL_CTX *server; SSL_CTX *client; } CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE; static CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name) { CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; fixture.server = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); fixture.client = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); OPENSSL_assert(fixture.client != NULL && fixture.server != NULL); return fixture; } /* * All ciphers in the DEFAULT cipherlist meet the default security level. * However, default supported ciphers exclude SRP and PSK ciphersuites * for which no callbacks have been set up. * * Supported ciphers also exclude TLSv1.2 ciphers if TLSv1.2 is disabled, * and individual disabled algorithms. However, NO_RSA, NO_AES and NO_SHA * are currently broken and should be considered mission impossible in libssl. */ static const uint32_t default_ciphers_in_order[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, # endif # if !defined OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !defined OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, # endif # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, # endif #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, #endif TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, }; static int test_default_cipherlist(SSL_CTX *ctx) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; SSL *ssl; int i, ret = 0, num_expected_ciphers, num_ciphers; uint32_t expected_cipher_id, cipher_id; ssl = SSL_new(ctx); OPENSSL_assert(ssl != NULL); ciphers = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl); OPENSSL_assert(ciphers != NULL); num_expected_ciphers = OSSL_NELEM(default_ciphers_in_order); num_ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); if (num_ciphers != num_expected_ciphers) { fprintf(stderr, "Expected %d supported ciphers, got %d.\n", num_expected_ciphers, num_ciphers); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < num_ciphers; i++) { expected_cipher_id = default_ciphers_in_order[i]; cipher_id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i)); if (cipher_id != expected_cipher_id) { fprintf(stderr, "Wrong cipher at position %d: expected %x, " "got %x\n", i, expected_cipher_id, cipher_id); goto err; } } ret = 1; err: sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); SSL_free(ssl); return ret; } static int execute_test(CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { return test_default_cipherlist(fixture.server) && test_default_cipherlist(fixture.client); } static void tear_down(CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { SSL_CTX_free(fixture.server); SSL_CTX_free(fixture.client); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } #define SETUP_CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE() \ SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up) #define EXECUTE_CIPHERLIST_TEST() \ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down) static int test_default_cipherlist_implicit() { SETUP_CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE(); EXECUTE_CIPHERLIST_TEST(); } static int test_default_cipherlist_explicit() { SETUP_CIPHERLIST_TEST_FIXTURE(); OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(fixture.server, "DEFAULT")); OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(fixture.client, "DEFAULT")); EXECUTE_CIPHERLIST_TEST(); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int result = 0; ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_implicit); ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_explicit); result = run_tests(argv[0]); return result; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/bftest.c0000644000000000000000000004204613176625661014476 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This has been a quickly hacked 'ideatest.c'. When I add tests for other * RC2 modes, more of the code will be uncommented. */ #include #include #include #include /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_BF is defined */ #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BF int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No BF support\n"); return (0); } #else # include # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include # endif static char bf_key[2][30] = { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", "Who is John Galt?" }; /* big endian */ static BF_LONG bf_plain[2][2] = { {0x424c4f57L, 0x46495348L}, {0xfedcba98L, 0x76543210L} }; static BF_LONG bf_cipher[2][2] = { {0x324ed0feL, 0xf413a203L}, {0xcc91732bL, 0x8022f684L} }; /************/ /* Lets use the DES test vectors :-) */ # define NUM_TESTS 34 static unsigned char ecb_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10}, {0x7C, 0xA1, 0x10, 0x45, 0x4A, 0x1A, 0x6E, 0x57}, {0x01, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xC1, 0x37, 0x6E}, {0x07, 0xA1, 0x13, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0x0B, 0x26, 0x86}, {0x38, 0x49, 0x67, 0x4C, 0x26, 0x02, 0x31, 0x9E}, {0x04, 0xB9, 0x15, 0xBA, 0x43, 0xFE, 0xB5, 0xB6}, {0x01, 0x13, 0xB9, 0x70, 0xFD, 0x34, 0xF2, 0xCE}, {0x01, 0x70, 0xF1, 0x75, 0x46, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xE6}, {0x43, 0x29, 0x7F, 0xAD, 0x38, 0xE3, 0x73, 0xFE}, {0x07, 0xA7, 0x13, 0x70, 0x45, 0xDA, 0x2A, 0x16}, {0x04, 0x68, 0x91, 0x04, 0xC2, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0x2F}, {0x37, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xB5, 0x16, 0xCB, 0x75, 0x46}, {0x1F, 0x08, 0x26, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0xC2, 0x46, 0x5E}, {0x58, 0x40, 0x23, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xBA, 0x61, 0x76}, {0x02, 0x58, 0x16, 0x16, 0x46, 0x29, 0xB0, 0x07}, {0x49, 0x79, 0x3E, 0xBC, 0x79, 0xB3, 0x25, 0x8F}, {0x4F, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x73, 0xA7}, {0x49, 0xE9, 0x5D, 0x6D, 0x4C, 0xA2, 0x29, 0xBF}, {0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0xDC, 0x40, 0x9B, 0x26, 0xD6}, {0x1C, 0x58, 0x7F, 0x1C, 0x13, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01}, {0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E}, {0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10} }; static unsigned char plain_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0xA1, 0xD6, 0xD0, 0x39, 0x77, 0x67, 0x42}, {0x5C, 0xD5, 0x4C, 0xA8, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x57, 0xDA}, {0x02, 0x48, 0xD4, 0x38, 0x06, 0xF6, 0x71, 0x72}, {0x51, 0x45, 0x4B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x44, 0x0A}, {0x42, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x30, 0x59, 0x57, 0x7F, 0xA2}, {0x05, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x08, 0x51, 0xCF, 0x14, 0x3A}, {0x07, 0x56, 0xD8, 0xE0, 0x77, 0x47, 0x61, 0xD2}, {0x76, 0x25, 0x14, 0xB8, 0x29, 0xBF, 0x48, 0x6A}, {0x3B, 0xDD, 0x11, 0x90, 0x49, 0x37, 0x28, 0x02}, {0x26, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x9A}, {0x16, 0x4D, 0x5E, 0x40, 0x4F, 0x27, 0x52, 0x32}, {0x6B, 0x05, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x75, 0x9F, 0x5C, 0xCA}, {0x00, 0x4B, 0xD6, 0xEF, 0x09, 0x17, 0x60, 0x62}, {0x48, 0x0D, 0x39, 0x00, 0x6E, 0xE7, 0x62, 0xF2}, {0x43, 0x75, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x69, 0x8F, 0x3C, 0xFA}, {0x07, 0x2D, 0x43, 0xA0, 0x77, 0x07, 0x52, 0x92}, {0x02, 0xFE, 0x55, 0x77, 0x81, 0x17, 0xF1, 0x2A}, {0x1D, 0x9D, 0x5C, 0x50, 0x18, 0xF7, 0x28, 0xC2}, {0x30, 0x55, 0x32, 0x28, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x29, 0x5A}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF} }; static unsigned char cipher_data[NUM_TESTS][8] = { {0x4E, 0xF9, 0x97, 0x45, 0x61, 0x98, 0xDD, 0x78}, {0x51, 0x86, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0x8A}, {0x7D, 0x85, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x30, 0x63, 0xF2}, {0x24, 0x66, 0xDD, 0x87, 0x8B, 0x96, 0x3C, 0x9D}, {0x61, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x80, 0x22, 0x81, 0xB0, 0x96}, {0x7D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0xAF, 0xDA, 0x1E, 0xC7}, {0x4E, 0xF9, 0x97, 0x45, 0x61, 0x98, 0xDD, 0x78}, {0x0A, 0xCE, 0xAB, 0x0F, 0xC6, 0xA0, 0xA2, 0x8D}, {0x59, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x45, 0xEB, 0x05, 0x28, 0x2B}, {0xB1, 0xB8, 0xCC, 0x0B, 0x25, 0x0F, 0x09, 0xA0}, {0x17, 0x30, 0xE5, 0x77, 0x8B, 0xEA, 0x1D, 0xA4}, {0xA2, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x56, 0xCF, 0x26, 0x51, 0xEB}, {0x35, 0x38, 0x82, 0xB1, 0x09, 0xCE, 0x8F, 0x1A}, {0x48, 0xF4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x4C, 0x37, 0x99, 0x18}, {0x43, 0x21, 0x93, 0xB7, 0x89, 0x51, 0xFC, 0x98}, {0x13, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x54, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0x1A, 0xE5}, {0x2E, 0xED, 0xDA, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xD3, 0x9C, 0x79}, {0xD8, 0x87, 0xE0, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x2D, 0xA6, 0xE3}, {0x5F, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x4F, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x39, 0x69}, {0x4A, 0x05, 0x7A, 0x3B, 0x24, 0xD3, 0x97, 0x7B}, {0x45, 0x20, 0x31, 0xC1, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x8E}, {0x75, 0x55, 0xAE, 0x39, 0xF5, 0x9B, 0x87, 0xBD}, {0x53, 0xC5, 0x5F, 0x9C, 0xB4, 0x9F, 0xC0, 0x19}, {0x7A, 0x8E, 0x7B, 0xFA, 0x93, 0x7E, 0x89, 0xA3}, {0xCF, 0x9C, 0x5D, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x86, 0xAD, 0xB5}, {0xD1, 0xAB, 0xB2, 0x90, 0x65, 0x8B, 0xC7, 0x78}, {0x55, 0xCB, 0x37, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF2, 0x01}, {0xFA, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x48, 0x47, 0xB2, 0x68, 0xB2}, {0xA7, 0x90, 0x79, 0x51, 0x08, 0xEA, 0x3C, 0xAE}, {0xC3, 0x9E, 0x07, 0x2D, 0x9F, 0xAC, 0x63, 0x1D}, {0x01, 0x49, 0x33, 0xE0, 0xCD, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xE4}, {0xF2, 0x1E, 0x9A, 0x77, 0xB7, 0x1C, 0x49, 0xBC}, {0x24, 0x59, 0x46, 0x88, 0x57, 0x54, 0x36, 0x9A}, {0x6B, 0x5C, 0x5A, 0x9C, 0x5D, 0x9E, 0x0A, 0x5A}, }; static unsigned char cbc_key[16] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x87 }; static unsigned char cbc_iv[8] = { 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }; static char cbc_data[40] = "7654321 Now is the time for "; static unsigned char cbc_ok[32] = { 0x6B, 0x77, 0xB4, 0xD6, 0x30, 0x06, 0xDE, 0xE6, 0x05, 0xB1, 0x56, 0xE2, 0x74, 0x03, 0x97, 0x93, 0x58, 0xDE, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0x15, 0x46, 0x16, 0xD9, 0x59, 0xF1, 0x65, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0xFF, 0x92, 0xCC }; static unsigned char cfb64_ok[] = { 0xE7, 0x32, 0x14, 0xA2, 0x82, 0x21, 0x39, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x04, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x72, 0x00, 0x51, 0x9D, 0x57, 0xA6, 0xC3 }; static unsigned char ofb64_ok[] = { 0xE7, 0x32, 0x14, 0xA2, 0x82, 0x21, 0x39, 0xCA, 0x62, 0xB3, 0x43, 0xCC, 0x5B, 0x65, 0x58, 0x73, 0x10, 0xDD, 0x90, 0x8D, 0x0C, 0x24, 0x1B, 0x22, 0x63, 0xC2, 0xCF, 0x80, 0xDA }; # define KEY_TEST_NUM 25 static unsigned char key_test[KEY_TEST_NUM] = { 0xf0, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x87, 0x78, 0x69, 0x5a, 0x4b, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88 }; static unsigned char key_data[8] = { 0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }; static unsigned char key_out[KEY_TEST_NUM][8] = { {0xF9, 0xAD, 0x59, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x00, 0x5E}, {0xE9, 0x1D, 0x21, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xD6}, {0xE9, 0xC2, 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x1B, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF3}, {0xBE, 0x1E, 0x63, 0x94, 0x08, 0x64, 0x0F, 0x05}, {0xB3, 0x9E, 0x44, 0x48, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x6E}, {0x94, 0x57, 0xAA, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x92, 0x8C, 0x0D}, {0x8B, 0xB7, 0x70, 0x32, 0xF9, 0x60, 0x62, 0x9D}, {0xE8, 0x7A, 0x24, 0x4E, 0x2C, 0xC8, 0x5E, 0x82}, {0x15, 0x75, 0x0E, 0x7A, 0x4F, 0x4E, 0xC5, 0x77}, {0x12, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x0B, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE0}, {0x3A, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x9A, 0xFF, 0xC5, 0x37, 0xF6}, {0x94, 0x09, 0xDA, 0x87, 0xA9, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0xF2}, {0x88, 0x4F, 0x80, 0x62, 0x50, 0x60, 0xB8, 0xB4}, {0x1F, 0x85, 0x03, 0x1C, 0x19, 0xE1, 0x19, 0x68}, {0x79, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x3A, 0x71, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x4F}, {0x93, 0x14, 0x28, 0x87, 0xEE, 0x3B, 0xE1, 0x5C}, {0x03, 0x42, 0x9E, 0x83, 0x8C, 0xE2, 0xD1, 0x4B}, {0xA4, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x27, 0x46, 0x9F, 0xF6, 0x7B}, {0xAF, 0xD5, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xC1, 0xBC, 0x96, 0xA8}, {0x10, 0x85, 0x1C, 0x0E, 0x38, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x9F}, {0xE6, 0xF5, 0x1E, 0xD7, 0x9B, 0x9D, 0xB2, 0x1F}, {0x64, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0x4A, 0xFD, 0x36, 0xB4, 0x6F}, {0x80, 0xC7, 0xD7, 0xD4, 0x5A, 0x54, 0x79, 0xAD}, {0x05, 0x04, 0x4B, 0x62, 0xFA, 0x52, 0xD0, 0x80}, }; static int test(void); static int print_test_data(void); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int ret; if (argc > 1) ret = print_test_data(); else ret = test(); EXIT(ret); } static int print_test_data(void) { unsigned int i, j; printf("ecb test data\n"); printf("key bytes\t\tclear bytes\t\tcipher bytes\n"); for (i = 0; i < NUM_TESTS; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) printf("%02X", ecb_data[i][j]); printf("\t"); for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) printf("%02X", plain_data[i][j]); printf("\t"); for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) printf("%02X", cipher_data[i][j]); printf("\n"); } printf("set_key test data\n"); printf("data[8]= "); for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) printf("%02X", key_data[j]); printf("\n"); for (i = 0; i < KEY_TEST_NUM - 1; i++) { printf("c="); for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) printf("%02X", key_out[i][j]); printf(" k[%2u]=", i + 1); for (j = 0; j < i + 1; j++) printf("%02X", key_test[j]); printf("\n"); } printf("\nchaining mode test data\n"); printf("key[16] = "); for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) printf("%02X", cbc_key[j]); printf("\niv[8] = "); for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) printf("%02X", cbc_iv[j]); printf("\ndata[%d] = '%s'", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1, cbc_data); printf("\ndata[%d] = ", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1); for (j = 0; j < strlen(cbc_data) + 1; j++) printf("%02X", cbc_data[j]); printf("\n"); printf("cbc cipher text\n"); printf("cipher[%d]= ", 32); for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) printf("%02X", cbc_ok[j]); printf("\n"); printf("cfb64 cipher text\n"); printf("cipher[%d]= ", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1); for (j = 0; j < strlen(cbc_data) + 1; j++) printf("%02X", cfb64_ok[j]); printf("\n"); printf("ofb64 cipher text\n"); printf("cipher[%d]= ", (int)strlen(cbc_data) + 1); for (j = 0; j < strlen(cbc_data) + 1; j++) printf("%02X", ofb64_ok[j]); printf("\n"); return (0); } static int test(void) { unsigned char cbc_in[40], cbc_out[40], iv[8]; int i, n, err = 0; BF_KEY key; BF_LONG data[2]; unsigned char out[8]; BF_LONG len; # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(cbc_data, cbc_data, strlen(cbc_data)); # endif printf("testing blowfish in raw ecb mode\n"); for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(bf_key[n], bf_key[n], strlen(bf_key[n])); # endif BF_set_key(&key, strlen(bf_key[n]), (unsigned char *)bf_key[n]); data[0] = bf_plain[n][0]; data[1] = bf_plain[n][1]; BF_encrypt(data, &key); if (memcmp(&(bf_cipher[n][0]), &(data[0]), 8) != 0) { printf("BF_encrypt error encrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)data[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)bf_cipher[n][i]); err = 1; printf("\n"); } BF_decrypt(&(data[0]), &key); if (memcmp(&(bf_plain[n][0]), &(data[0]), 8) != 0) { printf("BF_encrypt error decrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)data[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) printf("%08lX ", (unsigned long)bf_plain[n][i]); printf("\n"); err = 1; } } printf("testing blowfish in ecb mode\n"); for (n = 0; n < NUM_TESTS; n++) { BF_set_key(&key, 8, ecb_data[n]); BF_ecb_encrypt(&(plain_data[n][0]), out, &key, BF_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(&(cipher_data[n][0]), out, 8) != 0) { printf("BF_ecb_encrypt blowfish error encrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", out[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", cipher_data[n][i]); err = 1; printf("\n"); } BF_ecb_encrypt(out, out, &key, BF_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(&(plain_data[n][0]), out, 8) != 0) { printf("BF_ecb_encrypt error decrypting\n"); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", out[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", plain_data[n][i]); printf("\n"); err = 1; } } printf("testing blowfish set_key\n"); for (n = 1; n < KEY_TEST_NUM; n++) { BF_set_key(&key, n, key_test); BF_ecb_encrypt(key_data, out, &key, BF_ENCRYPT); /* mips-sgi-irix6.5-gcc vv -mabi=64 bug workaround */ if (memcmp(out, &(key_out[i = n - 1][0]), 8) != 0) { printf("blowfish setkey error\n"); err = 1; } } printf("testing blowfish in cbc mode\n"); len = strlen(cbc_data) + 1; BF_set_key(&key, 16, cbc_key); memset(cbc_in, 0, sizeof(cbc_in)); memset(cbc_out, 0, sizeof(cbc_out)); memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, sizeof iv); BF_cbc_encrypt((unsigned char *)cbc_data, cbc_out, len, &key, iv, BF_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_out, cbc_ok, 32) != 0) { err = 1; printf("BF_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) printf("0x%02X,", cbc_out[i]); } memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8); BF_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, len, &key, iv, BF_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, strlen(cbc_data) + 1) != 0) { printf("BF_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } printf("testing blowfish in cfb64 mode\n"); BF_set_key(&key, 16, cbc_key); memset(cbc_in, 0, 40); memset(cbc_out, 0, 40); memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8); n = 0; BF_cfb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)cbc_data, cbc_out, (long)13, &key, iv, &n, BF_ENCRYPT); BF_cfb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)&(cbc_data[13]), &(cbc_out[13]), len - 13, &key, iv, &n, BF_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_out, cfb64_ok, (int)len) != 0) { err = 1; printf("BF_cfb64_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) printf("0x%02X,", cbc_out[i]); } n = 0; memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8); BF_cfb64_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, 17, &key, iv, &n, BF_DECRYPT); BF_cfb64_encrypt(&(cbc_out[17]), &(cbc_in[17]), len - 17, &key, iv, &n, BF_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, (int)len) != 0) { printf("BF_cfb64_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } printf("testing blowfish in ofb64\n"); BF_set_key(&key, 16, cbc_key); memset(cbc_in, 0, 40); memset(cbc_out, 0, 40); memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8); n = 0; BF_ofb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)cbc_data, cbc_out, (long)13, &key, iv, &n); BF_ofb64_encrypt((unsigned char *)&(cbc_data[13]), &(cbc_out[13]), len - 13, &key, iv, &n); if (memcmp(cbc_out, ofb64_ok, (int)len) != 0) { err = 1; printf("BF_ofb64_encrypt encrypt error\n"); for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) printf("0x%02X,", cbc_out[i]); } n = 0; memcpy(iv, cbc_iv, 8); BF_ofb64_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, 17, &key, iv, &n); BF_ofb64_encrypt(&(cbc_out[17]), &(cbc_in[17]), len - 17, &key, iv, &n); if (memcmp(cbc_in, cbc_data, (int)len) != 0) { printf("BF_ofb64_encrypt decrypt error\n"); err = 1; } return (err); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/bntest.c0000644000000000000000000014575713176625661014523 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the Eric Young open source * license provided above. * * The binary polynomial arithmetic software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #include /* * In bn_lcl.h, bn_expand() is defined as a static ossl_inline function. * This is fine in itself, it will end up as an unused static function in * the worst case. However, it referenses bn_expand2(), which is a private * function in libcrypto and therefore unavailable on some systems. This * may result in a linker error because of unresolved symbols. * * To avoid this, we define a dummy variant of bn_expand2() here, and to * avoid possible clashes with libcrypto, we rename it first, using a macro. */ #define bn_expand2 dummy_bn_expand2 BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words); BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words) { return NULL; } #include "../crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h" static const int num0 = 100; /* number of tests */ static const int num1 = 50; /* additional tests for some functions */ static const int num2 = 5; /* number of tests for slow functions */ int test_add(BIO *bp); int test_sub(BIO *bp); int test_lshift1(BIO *bp); int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_); int test_rshift1(BIO *bp); int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_div_word(BIO *bp); int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mul(BIO *bp); int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp); int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp); int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_small_prime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx); int test_bn2dec(BIO *bp); int rand_neg(void); static int results = 0; static unsigned char lst[] = "\xC6\x4F\x43\x04\x2A\xEA\xCA\x6E\x58\x36\x80\x5B\xE8\xC9" "\x9B\x04\x5D\x48\x36\xC2\xFD\x16\xC9\x64\xF0"; static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; static void message(BIO *out, char *m) { fprintf(stderr, "test %s\n", m); BIO_puts(out, "print \"test "); BIO_puts(out, m); BIO_puts(out, "\\n\"\n"); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIO *out; char *outfile = NULL; CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); results = 0; RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */ argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv, "-results") == 0) results = 1; else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) break; outfile = *(++argv); } argc--; argv++; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) EXIT(1); out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) EXIT(1); if (outfile == NULL) { BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); } else { if (!BIO_write_filename(out, outfile)) { perror(outfile); EXIT(1); } } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS { BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()); out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out); } #endif if (!results) BIO_puts(out, "obase=16\nibase=16\n"); message(out, "BN_add"); if (!test_add(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_sub"); if (!test_sub(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_lshift1"); if (!test_lshift1(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_lshift (fixed)"); if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, BN_bin2bn(lst, sizeof(lst) - 1, NULL))) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_lshift"); if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, NULL)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_rshift1"); if (!test_rshift1(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_rshift"); if (!test_rshift(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_sqr"); if (!test_sqr(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_mul"); if (!test_mul(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_div"); if (!test_div(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_div_word"); if (!test_div_word(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_div_recp"); if (!test_div_recp(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_mod"); if (!test_mod(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_mod_mul"); if (!test_mod_mul(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_mont"); if (!test_mont(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_mod_exp"); if (!test_mod_exp(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"); if (!test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out, ctx)) goto err; if (!test_mod_exp_mont5(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_exp"); if (!test_exp(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_kronecker"); if (!test_kron(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_mod_sqrt"); if (!test_sqrt(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "Small prime generation"); if (!test_small_prime(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_bn2dec"); if (!test_bn2dec(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M message(out, "BN_GF2m_add"); if (!test_gf2m_add(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod"); if (!test_gf2m_mod(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_mul"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_mul(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqr(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_inv"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_inv(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_div"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_div(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_exp"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_exp(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(out, ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); #endif BN_CTX_free(ctx); BIO_free(out); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) EXIT(1); #endif EXIT(0); err: BIO_puts(out, "1\n"); /* make sure the Perl script fed by bc * notices the failure, see test_bn in * test/Makefile.ssl */ (void)BIO_flush(out); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BIO_free(out); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); EXIT(1); } int test_add(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(b, 450 + i, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); BN_add(c, a, b); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " + "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } a->neg = !a->neg; b->neg = !b->neg; BN_add(c, c, b); BN_add(c, c, a); if (!BN_is_zero(c)) { fprintf(stderr, "Add test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); return (1); } int test_sub(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) { if (i < num1) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); BN_copy(b, a); if (BN_set_bit(a, i) == 0) return (0); BN_add_word(b, i); } else { BN_bntest_rand(b, 400 + i - num1, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); } BN_sub(c, a, b); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_add(c, c, b); BN_sub(c, c, a); if (!BN_is_zero(c)) { fprintf(stderr, "Subtract test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); return (1); } int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_one(a); BN_zero(b); if (BN_div(d, c, a, b, ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n"); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) { if (i < num1) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 400, 0, 0); BN_copy(b, a); BN_lshift(a, a, i); BN_add_word(a, i); } else BN_bntest_rand(b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); BN_div(d, c, a, b, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " / "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, d); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mul(e, d, b, ctx); BN_add(d, e, c); BN_sub(d, d, a); if (!BN_is_zero(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Division test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); } static void print_word(BIO *bp, BN_ULONG w) { int i = sizeof(w) * 8; char *fmt = NULL; unsigned char byte; do { i -= 8; byte = (unsigned char)(w >> i); if (fmt == NULL) fmt = byte ? "%X" : NULL; else fmt = "%02X"; if (fmt != NULL) BIO_printf(bp, fmt, byte); } while (i); /* If we haven't printed anything, at least print a zero! */ if (fmt == NULL) BIO_printf(bp, "0"); } int test_div_word(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b; BN_ULONG r, rmod, s; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { do { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, -1, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0); } while (BN_is_zero(b)); s = b->d[0]; BN_copy(b, a); rmod = BN_mod_word(b, s); r = BN_div_word(b, s); if (rmod != r) { fprintf(stderr, "Mod (word) test failed!\n"); return 0; } if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " / "); print_word(bp, s); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); print_word(bp, s); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } print_word(bp, r); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mul_word(b, s); BN_add_word(b, r); BN_sub(b, a, b); if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Division (word) test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); return (1); } int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; BN_RECP_CTX *recp; int i; recp = BN_RECP_CTX_new(); a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) { if (i < num1) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 400, 0, 0); BN_copy(b, a); BN_lshift(a, a, i); BN_add_word(a, i); } else BN_bntest_rand(b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); BN_RECP_CTX_set(recp, b, ctx); BN_div_recp(d, c, a, recp, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " / "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, d); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mul(e, d, b, ctx); BN_add(d, e, c); BN_sub(d, d, a); if (!BN_is_zero(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Reciprocal division test failed!\n"); fprintf(stderr, "a="); BN_print_fp(stderr, a); fprintf(stderr, "\nb="); BN_print_fp(stderr, b); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); BN_RECP_CTX_free(recp); return (1); } int test_mul(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i; BN_CTX *ctx; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) EXIT(1); a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) { if (i <= num1) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 100, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 100, 0, 0); } else BN_bntest_rand(b, i - num1, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); BN_mul(c, a, b, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_div(d, e, c, a, ctx); BN_sub(d, d, b); if (!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "Multiplication test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return (1); } int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *c, *d, *e; int i, ret = 0; a = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL) { goto err; } for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 40 + i * 10, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); BN_sqr(c, a, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * "); BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_div(d, e, c, a, ctx); BN_sub(d, d, a); if (!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed!\n"); goto err; } } /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */ BN_hex2bn(&a, "80000000000000008000000000000001" "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000"); BN_sqr(c, a, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * "); BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx); if (BN_cmp(c, d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce " "different results!\n"); goto err; } /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */ BN_hex2bn(&a, "80000000000000000000000080000001" "FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000"); BN_sqr(c, a, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * "); BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx); if (BN_cmp(c, d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce " "different results!\n"); goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return ret; } int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *A, *B; BIGNUM *n; int i; BN_MONT_CTX *mont; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); A = BN_new(); B = BN_new(); n = BN_new(); mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (mont == NULL) return 0; BN_zero(n); if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n"); return 0; } BN_set_word(n, 16); if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n"); return 0; } BN_bntest_rand(a, 100, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 100, 0, 0); for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { int bits = (200 * (i + 1)) / num2; if (bits == 0) continue; BN_bntest_rand(n, bits, 0, 1); BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx); BN_nnmod(a, a, n, ctx); BN_nnmod(b, b, n, ctx); BN_to_montgomery(A, a, mont, ctx); BN_to_montgomery(B, b, mont, ctx); BN_mod_mul_montgomery(c, A, B, mont, ctx); BN_from_montgomery(A, c, mont, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, &mont->N); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, A); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mod_mul(d, a, b, n, ctx); BN_sub(d, d, A); if (!BN_is_zero(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Montgomery multiplication test failed!\n"); return 0; } } /* Regression test for carry bug in mulx4x_mont */ BN_hex2bn(&a, "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878" "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878" "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878" "7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878"); BN_hex2bn(&b, "095D72C08C097BA488C5E439C655A192EAFB6380073D8C2664668EDDB4060744" "E16E57FB4EDB9AE10A0CEFCDC28A894F689A128379DB279D48A2E20849D68593" "9B7803BCF46CEBF5C533FB0DD35B080593DE5472E3FE5DB951B8BFF9B4CB8F03" "9CC638A5EE8CDD703719F8000E6A9F63BEED5F2FCD52FF293EA05A251BB4AB81"); BN_hex2bn(&n, "D78AF684E71DB0C39CFF4E64FB9DB567132CB9C50CC98009FEB820B26F2DED9B" "91B9B5E2B83AE0AE4EB4E0523CA726BFBE969B89FD754F674CE99118C3F2D1C5" "D81FDC7C54E02B60262B241D53C040E99E45826ECA37A804668E690E1AFC1CA4" "2C9A15D84D4954425F0B7642FC0BD9D7B24E2618D2DCC9B729D944BADACFDDAF"); BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, n, ctx); BN_mod_mul_montgomery(c, a, b, mont, ctx); BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, b, a, mont, ctx); if (BN_cmp(c, d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Montgomery multiplication test failed:" " a*b != b*a.\n"); return 0; } BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(A); BN_free(B); BN_free(n); return (1); } int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(b, 450 + i * 10, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); BN_mod(c, a, b, ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_div(d, e, a, b, ctx); BN_sub(e, e, c); if (!BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modulo test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); } int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i, j; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_one(a); BN_one(b); BN_zero(c); if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n"); return 0; } for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 475 + i * 10, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 425 + i * 11, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); if (!BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) { unsigned long l; while ((l = ERR_get_error())) fprintf(stderr, "ERROR:%s\n", ERR_error_string(l, NULL)); EXIT(1); } if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, c); if ((a->neg ^ b->neg) && !BN_is_zero(e)) { /* * If (a*b) % c is negative, c must be added in order * to obtain the normalized remainder (new with * OpenSSL 0.9.7, previous versions of BN_mod_mul * could generate negative results) */ BIO_puts(bp, " + "); BN_print(bp, c); } BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, e); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mul(d, a, b, ctx); BN_sub(d, d, e); BN_div(a, b, d, c, ctx); if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modulo multiply test failed!\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return 0; } } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); } int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_one(a); BN_one(b); BN_zero(c); if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n"); return 0; } BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0); if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) return (0); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " ^ "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, d); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx); BN_sub(e, e, d); BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx); if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } } /* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */ BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505"); BN_hex2bn(&b, "02"); BN_hex2bn(&c, "4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141" "4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141" "4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000" "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"); BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx); BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx); if (BN_cmp(d, e)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n"); return 0; } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); } int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_one(a); BN_one(b); BN_zero(c); if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus " "succeeded\n"); return 0; } BN_set_word(c, 16); if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus " "succeeded\n"); return 0; } BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0); if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) return (00); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " ^ "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, d); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx); BN_sub(e, e, d); BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx); if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); } /* * Test constant-time modular exponentiation with 1024-bit inputs, which on * x86_64 cause a different code branch to be taken. */ int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *p, *m, *d, *e; BN_MONT_CTX *mont; a = BN_new(); p = BN_new(); m = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); BN_bntest_rand(m, 1024, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ /* Zero exponent */ BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0); BN_zero(p); if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL)) return 0; if (!BN_is_one(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } /* Zero input */ BN_bntest_rand(p, 1024, 0, 0); BN_zero(a); if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL)) return 0; if (!BN_is_zero(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } /* * Craft an input whose Montgomery representation is 1, i.e., shorter * than the modulus m, in order to test the const time precomputation * scattering/gathering. */ BN_one(a); BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx); if (!BN_from_montgomery(e, a, mont, ctx)) return 0; if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL)) return 0; if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx)) return 0; if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } /* Finally, some regular test vectors. */ BN_bntest_rand(e, 1024, 0, 0); if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL)) return 0; if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx)) return 0; if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_free(a); BN_free(p); BN_free(m); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); } int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *e, *one; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); one = BN_new(); BN_one(one); for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0); if (BN_exp(d, a, b, ctx) <= 0) return (0); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " ^ "); BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, d); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_one(e); for (; !BN_is_zero(b); BN_sub(b, b, one)) BN_mul(e, e, a, ctx); BN_sub(e, e, d); if (!BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "Exponentiation test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); BN_free(one); return (1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; int i, ret = 0; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_rand(a, 512, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY); BN_copy(b, BN_value_one()); a->neg = rand_neg(); b->neg = rand_neg(); BN_GF2m_add(c, a, b); /* Test that two added values have the correct parity. */ if ((BN_is_odd(a) && BN_is_odd(c)) || (!BN_is_odd(a) && !BN_is_odd(c))) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (a) failed!\n"); goto err; } BN_GF2m_add(c, c, c); /* Test that c + c = 0. */ if (!BN_is_zero(c)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (b) failed!\n"); goto err; } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e; int i, j, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]); BN_GF2m_add(d, a, c); BN_GF2m_mod(e, d, b[j]); /* Test that a + (a mod p) mod p == 0. */ if (!BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modulo test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f, *g, *h; int i, j, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); f = BN_new(); g = BN_new(); h = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(d, 1024, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, a, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_add(f, a, d); BN_GF2m_mod_mul(g, f, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_mod_mul(h, d, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_add(f, e, g); BN_GF2m_add(f, f, h); /* Test that (a+d)*c = a*c + d*c. */ if (!BN_is_zero(f)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular multiplication test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); BN_free(f); BN_free(g); BN_free(h); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d; int i, j, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(c, a, b[j], ctx); BN_copy(d, a); BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, d, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d); /* Test that a*a = a^2. */ if (!BN_is_zero(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular squaring test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d; int i, j, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { BN_GF2m_mod_inv(c, a, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, c, b[j], ctx); /* Test that ((1/a)*a) = 1. */ if (!BN_is_one(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular inversion test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f; int i, j, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); f = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { BN_GF2m_mod_div(d, a, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, d, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_mod_div(f, a, e, b[j], ctx); /* Test that ((a/c)*c)/a = 1. */ if (!BN_is_one(f)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular division test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); BN_free(f); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f; int i, j, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); f = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0); BN_bntest_rand(d, 512, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { BN_GF2m_mod_exp(e, a, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, d, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, e, f, b[j], ctx); BN_add(f, c, d); BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, f, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_add(f, e, f); /* Test that a^(c+d)=a^c*a^d. */ if (!BN_is_zero(f)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular exponentiation test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); BN_free(f); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f; int i, j, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); f = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]); BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(d, a, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(e, d, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_add(f, c, e); /* Test that d^2 = a, where d = sqrt(a). */ if (!BN_is_zero(f)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular square root test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); BN_free(f); return ret; } int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e; int i, j, s = 0, t, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { t = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(c, a, b[j], ctx); if (t) { s++; BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(d, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d); BN_GF2m_mod(e, a, b[j]); BN_GF2m_add(e, e, d); /* * Test that solution of quadratic c satisfies c^2 + c = a. */ if (!BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic test failed!\n"); goto err; } } } } if (s == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "All %i tests of GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic resulted in no roots;\n", num0); fprintf(stderr, "this is very unlikely and probably indicates an error.\n"); goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return ret; } #endif static int genprime_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg) { char c = '*'; if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; putc(c, stderr); fflush(stderr); return 1; } int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_GENCB cb; BIGNUM *a, *b, *r, *t; int i; int legendre, kronecker; int ret = 0; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); r = BN_new(); t = BN_new(); if (a == NULL || b == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL) goto err; BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL); /* * We test BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) just for b odd (Jacobi symbol). In * this case we know that if b is prime, then BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) is * congruent to $a^{(b-1)/2}$, modulo $b$ (Legendre symbol). So we * generate a random prime b and compare these values for a number of * random a's. (That is, we run the Solovay-Strassen primality test to * confirm that b is prime, except that we don't want to test whether b * is prime but whether BN_kronecker works.) */ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(b, 512, 0, NULL, NULL, &cb)) goto err; b->neg = rand_neg(); putc('\n', stderr); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0)) goto err; a->neg = rand_neg(); /* t := (|b|-1)/2 (note that b is odd) */ if (!BN_copy(t, b)) goto err; t->neg = 0; if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(t, t)) goto err; /* r := a^t mod b */ b->neg = 0; if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, t, b, ctx)) goto err; b->neg = 1; if (BN_is_word(r, 1)) legendre = 1; else if (BN_is_zero(r)) legendre = 0; else { if (!BN_add_word(r, 1)) goto err; if (0 != BN_ucmp(r, b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Legendre symbol computation failed\n"); goto err; } legendre = -1; } kronecker = BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx); if (kronecker < -1) goto err; /* we actually need BN_kronecker(a, |b|) */ if (a->neg && b->neg) kronecker = -kronecker; if (legendre != kronecker) { fprintf(stderr, "legendre != kronecker; a = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, a); fprintf(stderr, ", b = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, b); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); goto err; } putc('.', stderr); fflush(stderr); } putc('\n', stderr); fflush(stderr); ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(r); BN_free(t); return ret; } int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_GENCB cb; BIGNUM *a, *p, *r; int i, j; int ret = 0; a = BN_new(); p = BN_new(); r = BN_new(); if (a == NULL || p == NULL || r == NULL) goto err; BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (i < 8) { unsigned primes[8] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 }; if (!BN_set_word(p, primes[i])) goto err; } else { if (!BN_set_word(a, 32)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(r, 2 * i + 1)) goto err; if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(p, 256, 0, a, r, &cb)) goto err; putc('\n', stderr); } p->neg = rand_neg(); for (j = 0; j < num2; j++) { /* * construct 'a' such that it is a square modulo p, but in * general not a proper square and not reduced modulo p */ if (!BN_bntest_rand(r, 256, 0, 3)) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 256, 0, 3)) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqr(a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(a, a, r, ctx)) goto err; if (rand_neg()) if (!BN_sub(a, a, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqrt(r, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(a, r) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_sqrt failed: a = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, a); fprintf(stderr, ", r = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, r); fprintf(stderr, ", p = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, p); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); goto err; } putc('.', stderr); fflush(stderr); } putc('\n', stderr); fflush(stderr); } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(p); BN_free(r); return ret; } int test_small_prime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { static const int bits = 10; int ret = 0; BIGNUM *r; r = BN_new(); if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(r, bits, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; if (BN_num_bits(r) != bits) { BIO_printf(bp, "Expected %d bit prime, got %d bit number\n", bits, BN_num_bits(r)); goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_clear_free(r); return ret; } int test_bn2dec(BIO *bp) { static const char *bn2dec_tests[] = { "0", "1", "-1", "100", "-100", "123456789012345678901234567890", "-123456789012345678901234567890", "123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890", "-123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890", }; int ret = 0; size_t i; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; char *dec = NULL; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(bn2dec_tests); i++) { if (!BN_dec2bn(&bn, bn2dec_tests[i])) goto err; dec = BN_bn2dec(bn); if (dec == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_bn2dec failed on %s.\n", bn2dec_tests[i]); goto err; } if (strcmp(dec, bn2dec_tests[i]) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_bn2dec gave %s, wanted %s.\n", dec, bn2dec_tests[i]); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(dec); dec = NULL; } ret = 1; err: BN_free(bn); OPENSSL_free(dec); return ret; } int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d; int i; b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); BN_one(c); if (a_) a = a_; else { a = BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); } for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_lshift(b, a, i + 1); BN_add(c, c, c); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * "); BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_mul(d, a, c, ctx); BN_sub(d, d, b); if (!BN_is_zero(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Left shift test failed!\n"); fprintf(stderr, "a="); BN_print_fp(stderr, a); fprintf(stderr, "\nb="); BN_print_fp(stderr, b); fprintf(stderr, "\nc="); BN_print_fp(stderr, c); fprintf(stderr, "\nd="); BN_print_fp(stderr, d); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); return (1); } int test_lshift1(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_lshift1(b, a); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " * 2"); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_add(c, a, a); BN_sub(a, b, c); if (!BN_is_zero(a)) { fprintf(stderr, "Left shift one test failed!\n"); return 0; } BN_copy(a, b); } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); return (1); } int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_one(c); BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_rshift(b, a, i + 1); BN_add(c, c, c); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " / "); BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_div(d, e, a, c, ctx); BN_sub(d, d, b); if (!BN_is_zero(d)) { fprintf(stderr, "Right shift test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return (1); } int test_rshift1(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; int i; a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0); a->neg = rand_neg(); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_rshift1(b, a); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " / 2"); BIO_puts(bp, " - "); } BN_print(bp, b); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } BN_sub(c, a, b); BN_sub(c, c, b); if (!BN_is_zero(c) && !BN_abs_is_word(c, 1)) { fprintf(stderr, "Right shift one test failed!\n"); return 0; } BN_copy(a, b); } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); return (1); } int rand_neg(void) { static unsigned int neg = 0; static int sign[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1 }; return (sign[(neg++) % 8]); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/memleaktest.c0000644000000000000000000000216613176625661015521 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG char *p; char *lost; int noleak; p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); lost = OPENSSL_malloc(3); if (lost == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_malloc failed\n"); return 1; } if (argv[1] && strcmp(argv[1], "freeit") == 0) { OPENSSL_free(lost); lost = NULL; } noleak = CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr); /* If -1 return value something bad happened */ if (noleak == -1) return 1; return ((lost != NULL) ^ (noleak == 0)); #else return 0; #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/test/ct/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661013443 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/ct/tls1.sct0000644000000000000000000000110413176625661015035 0ustar rootrootSigned Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 (0x0) Log ID : DF:1C:2E:C1:15:00:94:52:47:A9:61:68:32:5D:DC:5C: 79:59:E8:F7:C6:D3:88:FC:00:2E:0B:BD:3F:74:D7:64 Timestamp : Apr 5 17:04:16.275 2013 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:20:48:2F:67:51:AF:35:DB:A6:54:36:BE:1F: D6:64:0F:3D:BF:9A:41:42:94:95:92:45:30:28:8F:A3: E5:E2:3E:06:02:21:00:E4:ED:C0:DB:3A:C5:72:B1:E2: F5:E8:AB:6A:68:06:53:98:7D:CF:41:02:7D:FE:FF:A1: 05:51:9D:89:ED:BF:08openssl-1.1.0g/test/ct/log_list.conf0000644000000000000000000000370313176625661016131 0ustar rootrootenabled_logs=test,pilot,aviator,rocketeer,digicert,certly,izempe,symantec,venafi [test] description = https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/tree/99218b6445906a81f219d84e9c6d2683e13e4e58/test/testdata key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEmXg8sUUzwBYaWrRb+V0IopzQ6o3UyEJ04r5ZrRXGdpYM8K+hB0pXrGRLI0eeWz+3skXrS0IO83AhA3GpRL6s6w== [pilot] description = Google Pilot Log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEfahLEimAoz2t01p3uMziiLOl/fHTDM0YDOhBRuiBARsV4UvxG2LdNgoIGLrtCzWE0J5APC2em4JlvR8EEEFMoA== [aviator] description = Google Aviator log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE1/TMabLkDpCjiupacAlP7xNi0I1JYP8bQFAHDG1xhtolSY1l4QgNRzRrvSe8liE+NPWHdjGxfx3JhTsN9x8/6Q== [rocketeer] description = Google Rocketeer log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEIFsYyDzBi7MxCAC/oJBXK7dHjG+1aLCOkHjpoHPqTyghLpzA9BYbqvnV16mAw04vUjyYASVGJCUoI3ctBcJAeg== [digicert] description = DigiCert Log Server key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEAkbFvhu7gkAW6MHSrBlpE1n4+HCFRkC5OLAjgqhkTH+/uzSfSl8ois8ZxAD2NgaTZe1M9akhYlrYkes4JECs6A== [certly] description = Certly.IO log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAECyPLhWKYYUgEc+tUXfPQB4wtGS2MNvXrjwFCCnyYJifBtd2Sk7Cu+Js9DNhMTh35FftHaHu6ZrclnNBKwmbbSA== [izempe] description = Izempe log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJ2Q5DC3cUBj4IQCiDu0s6j51up+TZAkAEcQRF6tczw90rLWXkJMAW7jr9yc92bIKgV8vDXU4lDeZHvYHduDuvg== [symantec] description = Symantec log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEluqsHEYMG1XcDfy1lCdGV0JwOmkY4r87xNuroPS2bMBTP01CEDPwWJePa75y9CrsHEKqAy8afig1dpkIPSEUhg== [venafi] description = Venafi log key = MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAolpIHxdSlTXLo1s6H1OCdpSj/4DyHDc8wLG9wVmLqy1lk9fz4ATVmm+/1iN2Nk8jmctUKK2MFUtlWXZBSpym97M7frGlSaQXUWyA3CqQUEuIJOmlEjKTBEiQAvpfDjCHjlV2Be4qTM6jamkJbiWtgnYPhJL6ONaGTiSPm7Byy57iaz/hbckldSOIoRhYBiMzeNoA0DiRZ9KmfSeXZ1rB8y8X5urSW+iBzf2SaOfzBvDpcoTuAaWx2DPazoOl28fP1hZ+kHUYvxbcMjttjauCFx+JII0dmuZNIwjfeG/GBb9frpSX219k1O4Wi6OEbHEr8at/XQ0y7gTikOxBn/s5wQIDAQAB openssl-1.1.0g/test/testecpub-p256.pem0000644000000000000000000000026213176625662016231 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJXwAdITiPFcSUsaRI2nlzTNRn++q 6F38XrH8m8sf28DQ+2Oob5SUzvgjVS0e70pIqH6bSXDgPc8mKtSs9Zi26Q== -----END PUBLIC KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/rc5test.c0000644000000000000000000002430713176625661014600 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This has been a quickly hacked 'ideatest.c'. When I add tests for other * RC5 modes, more of the code will be uncommented. */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("No RC5 support\n"); return (0); } #else # include static unsigned char RC5key[5][16] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x91, 0x5f, 0x46, 0x19, 0xbe, 0x41, 0xb2, 0x51, 0x63, 0x55, 0xa5, 0x01, 0x10, 0xa9, 0xce, 0x91}, {0x78, 0x33, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x5a, 0xeb, 0x0f, 0x2f, 0xd7, 0xb1, 0x69, 0xbb, 0x8d, 0xc1, 0x67, 0x87}, {0xdc, 0x49, 0xdb, 0x13, 0x75, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x4f, 0x64, 0x85, 0xb4, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0x2b, 0xaf}, {0x52, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x49, 0xd4, 0x1b, 0xa0, 0x15, 0x24, 0x97, 0x57, 0x4d, 0x7f, 0x15, 0x31, 0x25}, }; static unsigned char RC5plain[5][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x21, 0xA5, 0xDB, 0xEE, 0x15, 0x4B, 0x8F, 0x6D}, {0xF7, 0xC0, 0x13, 0xAC, 0x5B, 0x2B, 0x89, 0x52}, {0x2F, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x69, 0xFC, 0x92}, {0x65, 0xC1, 0x78, 0xB2, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x97, 0xCC}, }; static unsigned char RC5cipher[5][8] = { {0x21, 0xA5, 0xDB, 0xEE, 0x15, 0x4B, 0x8F, 0x6D}, {0xF7, 0xC0, 0x13, 0xAC, 0x5B, 0x2B, 0x89, 0x52}, {0x2F, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x69, 0xFC, 0x92}, {0x65, 0xC1, 0x78, 0xB2, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x97, 0xCC}, {0xEB, 0x44, 0xE4, 0x15, 0xDA, 0x31, 0x98, 0x24}, }; # define RC5_CBC_NUM 27 static unsigned char rc5_cbc_cipher[RC5_CBC_NUM][8] = { {0x7a, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x79, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1e}, {0x79, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x78, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1e}, {0x7a, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x79, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1f}, {0x7a, 0x7b, 0xba, 0x4d, 0x79, 0x11, 0x1d, 0x1f}, {0x8b, 0x9d, 0xed, 0x91, 0xce, 0x77, 0x94, 0xa6}, {0x2f, 0x75, 0x9f, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x86, 0xa3, 0x78}, {0xdc, 0xa2, 0x69, 0x4b, 0xf4, 0x0e, 0x07, 0x88}, {0xdc, 0xa2, 0x69, 0x4b, 0xf4, 0x0e, 0x07, 0x88}, {0xdc, 0xfe, 0x09, 0x85, 0x77, 0xec, 0xa5, 0xff}, {0x96, 0x46, 0xfb, 0x77, 0x63, 0x8f, 0x9c, 0xa8}, {0xb2, 0xb3, 0x20, 0x9d, 0xb6, 0x59, 0x4d, 0xa4}, {0x54, 0x5f, 0x7f, 0x32, 0xa5, 0xfc, 0x38, 0x36}, {0x82, 0x85, 0xe7, 0xc1, 0xb5, 0xbc, 0x74, 0x02}, {0xfc, 0x58, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x09, 0x34}, {0xcf, 0x27, 0x0e, 0xf9, 0x71, 0x7f, 0xf7, 0xc4}, {0xe4, 0x93, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x4d, 0x6e, 0x8c}, {0x5c, 0x4c, 0x04, 0x1e, 0x0f, 0x21, 0x7a, 0xc3}, {0x92, 0x1f, 0x12, 0x48, 0x53, 0x73, 0xb4, 0xf7}, {0x5b, 0xa0, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xbe, 0x7f, 0x5f, 0xad}, {0xc5, 0x33, 0x77, 0x1c, 0xd0, 0x11, 0x0e, 0x63}, {0x29, 0x4d, 0xdb, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x27, 0x8d, 0x60}, {0xda, 0xd6, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0xf7, 0xe8}, {0x97, 0xe0, 0x78, 0x78, 0x37, 0xed, 0x31, 0x7f}, {0x78, 0x75, 0xdb, 0xf6, 0x73, 0x8c, 0x64, 0x78}, {0x8f, 0x34, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x96, 0x95}, {0x7c, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0xdf, 0x34, 0xf9, 0x48, 0x11}, {0x7f, 0xd1, 0xa0, 0x23, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0xa2, 0x17}, }; static unsigned char rc5_cbc_key[RC5_CBC_NUM][17] = { {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x11}, {1, 0x00}, {4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {1, 0x00}, {4, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}, {4, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}, {4, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}, {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {8, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {16, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {16, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {16, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05}, {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05}, {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05}, {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05}, {5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05}, }; static unsigned char rc5_cbc_plain[RC5_CBC_NUM][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x01}, }; static int rc5_cbc_rounds[RC5_CBC_NUM] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 8, 8, 12, 16, 8, 12, 16, 12, 8, 12, 16, 8, 12, 16, 12, 8, 8, 8, 8, }; static unsigned char rc5_cbc_iv[RC5_CBC_NUM][8] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x78, 0x75, 0xdb, 0xf6, 0x73, 0x8c, 0x64, 0x78}, {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0x7c, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0xdf, 0x34, 0xf9, 0x48, 0x11}, }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, n, err = 0; RC5_32_KEY key; unsigned char buf[8], buf2[8], ivb[8]; for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) { RC5_32_set_key(&key, 16, &(RC5key[n][0]), 12); RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(&(RC5plain[n][0]), buf, &key, RC5_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(&(RC5cipher[n][0]), buf, 8) != 0) { printf("ecb RC5 error encrypting (%d)\n", n + 1); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", buf[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", RC5cipher[n][i]); err = 20; printf("\n"); } RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(buf, buf2, &key, RC5_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(&(RC5plain[n][0]), buf2, 8) != 0) { printf("ecb RC5 error decrypting (%d)\n", n + 1); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", buf2[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", RC5plain[n][i]); printf("\n"); err = 3; } } if (err == 0) printf("ecb RC5 ok\n"); for (n = 0; n < RC5_CBC_NUM; n++) { i = rc5_cbc_rounds[n]; if (i < 8) continue; RC5_32_set_key(&key, rc5_cbc_key[n][0], &(rc5_cbc_key[n][1]), i); memcpy(ivb, &(rc5_cbc_iv[n][0]), 8); RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(&(rc5_cbc_plain[n][0]), buf, 8, &key, &(ivb[0]), RC5_ENCRYPT); if (memcmp(&(rc5_cbc_cipher[n][0]), buf, 8) != 0) { printf("cbc RC5 error encrypting (%d)\n", n + 1); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", buf[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", rc5_cbc_cipher[n][i]); err = 30; printf("\n"); } memcpy(ivb, &(rc5_cbc_iv[n][0]), 8); RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf2, 8, &key, &(ivb[0]), RC5_DECRYPT); if (memcmp(&(rc5_cbc_plain[n][0]), buf2, 8) != 0) { printf("cbc RC5 error decrypting (%d)\n", n + 1); printf("got :"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", buf2[i]); printf("\n"); printf("expected:"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%02X ", rc5_cbc_plain[n][i]); printf("\n"); err = 3; } } if (err == 0) printf("cbc RC5 ok\n"); EXIT(err); return (err); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/test/secmemtest.c0000644000000000000000000001222413176625662015354 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #define perror_line() perror_line1(__LINE__) #define perror_line1(l) perror_line2(l) #define perror_line2(l) perror("failed " #l) int main(int argc, char **argv) { #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) char *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL; s = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20); /* s = non-secure 20 */ if (s == NULL) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (CRYPTO_secure_allocated(s)) { perror_line(); return 1; } r = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20); /* r = non-secure 20, s = non-secure 20 */ if (r == NULL) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(4096, 32)) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (CRYPTO_secure_allocated(r)) { perror_line(); return 1; } p = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20); /* r = non-secure 20, p = secure 20, s = non-secure 20 */ if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(p)) { perror_line(); return 1; } /* 20 secure -> 32-byte minimum allocaton unit */ if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 32) { perror_line(); return 1; } q = OPENSSL_malloc(20); /* r = non-secure 20, p = secure 20, q = non-secure 20, s = non-secure 20 */ if (CRYPTO_secure_allocated(q)) { perror_line(); return 1; } OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(s, 20); s = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(20); /* r = non-secure 20, p = secure 20, q = non-secure 20, s = secure 20 */ if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(s)) { perror_line(); return 1; } /* 2 * 20 secure -> 64 bytes allocated */ if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 64) { perror_line(); return 1; } OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(p, 20); /* 20 secure -> 32 bytes allocated */ if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 32) { perror_line(); return 1; } OPENSSL_free(q); /* should not complete, as secure memory is still allocated */ if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized()) { perror_line(); return 1; } OPENSSL_secure_free(s); /* secure memory should now be 0, so done should complete */ if (CRYPTO_secure_used() != 0) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized()) { perror_line(); return 1; } fprintf(stderr, "Possible infinite loop: allocate more than available\n"); if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(32768, 16)) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (OPENSSL_secure_malloc((size_t)-1) != NULL) { perror_line(); return 1; } if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) { perror_line(); return 1; } /* * If init fails, then initialized should be false, if not, this * could cause an infinite loop secure_malloc, but we don't test it */ if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(16, 16) && CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized()) { CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done(); perror_line(); return 1; } /*- * There was also a possible infinite loop when the number of * elements was 1<<31, as |int i| was set to that, which is a * negative number. However, it requires minimum input values: * * CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init((size_t)1<<34, (size_t)1<<4); * * Which really only works on 64-bit systems, since it took 16 GB * secure memory arena to trigger the problem. It naturally takes * corresponding amount of available virtual and physical memory * for test to be feasible/representative. Since we can't assume * that every system is equipped with that much memory, the test * remains disabled. If the reader of this comment really wants * to make sure that infinite loop is fixed, they can enable the * code below. */ # if 0 /*- * On Linux and BSD this test has a chance to complete in minimal * time and with minimum side effects, because mlock is likely to * fail because of RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, which is customarily [much] * smaller than 16GB. In other words Linux and BSD users can be * limited by virtual space alone... */ if (sizeof(size_t) > 4) { fprintf(stderr, "Possible infinite loop: 1<<31 limit\n"); if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init((size_t)1<<34, (size_t)1<<4) == 0) { perror_line(); } else if (!CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done()) { perror_line(); return 1; } } # endif /* this can complete - it was not really secure */ OPENSSL_secure_free(r); #else /* Should fail. */ if (CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(4096, 32)) { perror_line(); return 1; } #endif return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661014155 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/badalt8-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016765 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQCnlPu+irAiJq5p 1oRI57hEyFFVT20enklmXPXIntlgXzU8kn1d8RFMIlCjDcE1FtV5cTIjia8wxy4X B3lwqrL+A/nJ8RXTVBumoAIqEgr3Q2P18zZA6JgTzUWa9DM/qPtAVi3QToniS6m+ PQPxnY2uLSRcMZ7n6FuAs+Rm+eHS+8kKTsARDaKo7g2l7i4egPHcZc2jYlvoEo1/ 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CERTIFICATE----- MIIDfjCCAmagAwIBAgIJAKRNsDKacUqNMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFoxCzAJBgNV BAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKExhJbnRlcm5ldCBX aWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQxEzARBgNVBAMTCnN1YmludGVyQ0EwHhcNMTUwNzAyMTMx OTQ5WhcNMzUwNzAyMTMxOTQ5WjBUMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKU29t ZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UEChMYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMQ0wCwYD VQQDEwRsZWFmMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv0Qo9WC/ BKA70LtQJdwVGSXqr9dut3cQmiFzTb/SaWldjOT1sRNDFxSzdTJjU/8cIDEZvaTI wRxP/dtVQLjc+4jzrUwz93NuZYlsEWUEUg4Lrnfs0Nz50yHk4rJhVxWjb8Ii/wRB ViWHFExP7CwTkXiTclC1bCqTuWkjxF3thTfTsttRyY7qNkz2JpNx0guD8v4otQoY jA5AEZvK4IXLwOwxol5xBTMvIrvvff2kkh+c7OC2QVbUTow/oppjqIKCx2maNHCt LFTJELf3fwtRJLJsy4fKGP0/6kpZc8Sp88WK4B4FauF9IV1CmoAJUC1vJxhagHIK fVtFjUWs8GPobQIDAQABo00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQcHcT+8SVG IRlN9YTuM9rlz7UZfzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTpZ30QdMGarrhMPwk+HHAV3R8aTzAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAGjmSkF8is+v0/RLcnSRiCXENz+yNi4pFCAt6dOtT 6Gtpqa1tY5It9lVppfWb26JrygMIzOr/fB0r1Q7FtZ/7Ft3P6IXVdk3GDO0QsORD 2dRAejhYpc5c7joHxAw9oRfKrEqE+ihVPUTcfcIuBaalvuhkpQRmKP71ws5DVzOw QhnMd0TtIrbKHaNQ4kNsmSY5fQolwB0LtNfTus7OEFdcZWhOXrWImKXN9jewPKdV mSG34NfXOnA6qx0eQg06z+TkdrptH6j1Va2vS1/bL+h1GxjpTHlvTGaZYxaloIjw y/EzY5jygRoABnR3eBm15CYZwwKL9izIq1H3OhymEi/Ycg== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/embeddedSCTs3.sct0000644000000000000000000000331313176625661017241 0ustar rootrootSigned Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 (0x0) Log ID : 68:F6:98:F8:1F:64:82:BE:3A:8C:EE:B9:28:1D:4C:FC: 71:51:5D:67:93:D4:44:D1:0A:67:AC:BB:4F:4F:FB:C4 Timestamp : Dec 1 13:31:25.961 2015 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:44:02:20:58:2D:0A:BE:78:41:8A:E7:89:A9:5E:66: 21:C5:6A:16:79:DF:33:85:8A:D3:F3:1D:71:AF:75:30: FB:CC:4E:45:02:20:41:9C:89:B8:80:19:87:46:6C:1C: 3A:95:0B:BE:F4:98:75:D4:CA:49:97:FD:25:2E:E3:78: B5:36:30:20:26:4D Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 (0x0) Log ID : 56:14:06:9A:2F:D7:C2:EC:D3:F5:E1:BD:44:B2:3E:C7: 46:76:B9:BC:99:11:5C:C0:EF:94:98:55:D6:89:D0:DD Timestamp : Dec 1 13:31:25.352 2015 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:20:79:68:E9:70:38:5A:63:F3:A6:B1:97:0E: 7E:D0:C5:71:1B:76:06:CB:09:63:48:1E:E1:20:F3:A7: EF:2A:4E:74:02:21:00:8E:B7:BB:ED:85:5D:85:1B:54: 5E:3C:C5:EC:F2:13:9C:09:D1:0A:01:C2:59:5F:7C:31: 19:A1:9D:E1:17:C7:1F Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 (0x0) Log ID : A4:B9:09:90:B4:18:58:14:87:BB:13:A2:CC:67:70:0A: 3C:35:98:04:F9:1B:DF:B8:E3:77:CD:0E:C8:0D:DC:10 Timestamp : Dec 1 13:31:25.980 2015 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:20:2B:06:42:0F:D9:71:BD:21:42:A5:F9:C5: 55:83:D2:9D:E5:A1:8D:B6:3D:A6:73:89:42:32:9C:91: 0F:3B:6A:74:02:21:00:86:EE:10:F9:10:E6:7B:17:65: D9:2D:37:53:4A:3B:F0:AE:03:E4:21:76:37:EF:AF:B4: 44:2E:2B:F5:5C:C6:91openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/alt1-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000242613176625661016460 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDlTCCAn2gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0 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Dd6Kg+Ka02nD5QBXSAk/xz0FmgezzGGCLjg85/Sfe9Y7tNhQXh3HuGXuJizYccdQ Fh1IAFYW3DZoDKS7dDTCltvDEma/2IE684+CRJiA6PH9rYfJ1CCUfAMpyA85CxKT P68GDKI++WoUgM8LDfxS0KOL7A9cqcpM2L27hjyEgnqIBPHFfm9fxztBotuCTl5L vRlTFVjv65nn -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/cca-anyEKU.pem0000644000000000000000000000215313176625661016541 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDATCCAemgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNlMGMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wEwYD VR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAB6mihrap7ByLl3w P/0XsqMvOkxCxoWTeI0cEwbxSpUXfMTE24oIQJiqIyHO6qeSRgSywk/DTU0uJWOB Idr6dPI6wPrS4jvFqcgoFH1OPjAJCpl5CuCJEH8gB3LJ4dNfj+O7shT0XeI+R1vw gp+fJ8v6jX4y8Nk/Bcy748dC1HZhMWHxQblzjRu8Xmd6lDiMskoWE2JAwgRK7b3M dCpuTCHMTsdCspwBUvQ4gNYNP5IURE+09DBtEBQicN/1RHyRZOw7YGs5ZOdc5mRe O5E+WHE1xiJ0QwUu2co55PFlukidWXx7LE02foNaNm+rw4OUTrzsqmmgkp1qqAab ap/RSXgwCKAGBgRVHSUA -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem0000644000000000000000000000240513176625661017343 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIJAJTed6XmFiu/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFoxCzAJBgNV BAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBX aWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQxEzARBgNVBAMMCnN1YmludGVyQ0EwHhcNMTUwNzAyMTMy MTU4WhcNMzUwNzAyMTMyMTU4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29t ZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMRMwEQYD VQQDDApzdWJpbnRlckNBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA /zQjvhbU7RWDsRaEkVUBZWR/PqZ49GoE9p3OyRN4pkt1c1yb2ARVkYZP5e9gHb04 wPVz2+FYy+2mNkl+uAZbcK5w5fWO3WJIEn57he4MkWu3ew1nJeSv3na8gyOoCheG 64kWVbA2YL92mR7QoSCo4SP7RmykLrwj6TlDxqgH6DxKSD/CpdCHE3DKAzAiri3G Vc90OJAszYHlje4/maVIOayGROVET3xa5cbtRJl8IBgmqhMywtz4hhY/XZTvdEn2 90aL857Hk7JjogA7mLKi07yKzknMxHV+k6JX7xJEttkcNQRFHONWZG1T4mRY1Drh 6VbJGb+0GNIldNLQqigkfwIDAQABo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQW BBTpZ30QdMGarrhMPwk+HHAV3R8aTzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTpZ30QdMGarrhMPwk+ HHAV3R8aTzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAF8UAMtV1DClUWRw1h+THdAhjeo8S 9BOp6QphtlYuc9o+tQri5m+WqbyUZKIBEtumNhFb7QI1e4hO64y1kKbSs2AjWcJ2 QxAyGiMM3wl2UfxPohDtgNhm0GFgQ1tUTeSnW3kAom9NqI7U/2lPpLh4rrFYTepR wy0FV3NpRuHPtJE0VfqYnwWiTRdCJ7w1XzknKOUSHP/hRbyJVlwQp3VEQ9SIOYU6 C+QEVGIgQiST6MRlCvoNP43guaRtrMuBZJaHKy/hLPvkdRpXHoUeKQFDuH77sZsF sBv3EHNKoBvpSpSJndZN6UcH7Z1yn41Y6AnO4u492jiRAjQpP9+Nf/x1eg== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/alt1-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016307 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKYwggSiAgEAAoIBAQCwL9V/EvLlKZ40 2t27+5tYyW21+2wvcO5OE38YlOVy/5txITf/xFASUqGpsurxQuqMv+owPF5qbZVa 2Eqd2ShXY3WYfgsmGSnK7+CUXhdpX0SCDZ+nehIHAKGxkzcHXL+u8bjbTItJngL5 ioC4zmvyIQhzQvpfLzQycf2vu5sR/sjcTy+pQv5CTI2uqGmJ3ce+FiaTwttiyf3A qcbKSirKD2GI5NAV/Ub2yjvLOG/Olo8857YbfjaUOCy4fV8D2aINdahhOFCK7FfF wGMSazBkDWXevXJwjs/L5zlQrMxTmuKlb13gBq9IhZWQF20CXr6Yol2lxzBLfAta h8aXFvA3AgMBAAECggEAa073DcqQvhq3DSIw4wm/+DfW5nwXzF1QB6XAR0yI453j IuhEnzcGPeKuLBmZFxDWoptRG8fpCZFs4kPSTomxFGizewlp6O5ykfPAKR2VzMwF geCiWPL0f+dWlD1Byu4moXsASDE6tL/UuAAvnl+7R2HvL6SfsdGiTQc4qAvvyukM szks+MePHSlXmL5Eld7HfKgpvxY1SbYOQU0aPXAQAnLaOT931q+tgZMG6nBWN+pu w5bgKCA26BMAAaUAdIIDEa9fjzkpXjElCT4qhJYVKQn9Pb7aSc4jihSpCknqbb9c 55nW5PWMZJyCbCOUG/SVTblXV+NmhdtwrgUbHImXIQKBgQDcb/7vp+rq06uNx3b4 AjTZdzCVbHM8gp7b1GkGD0SncrzX6RxPSzNn7d4AUKY065bwa89A+TRwV8DSo7G8 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MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNDIyMjkwNVoYDzIxMTYwMTE1MjIyOTA1WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv5oV1s3N us7SINg7omu5AxueEgK97mh5PU3hgZpliSFaESmL2qLGeP609oXs/68XDXVW4utU LCOjLh0np+5Xy3i3GRDXgBZ72QDe23WqqQqqaBlQVVm1WxG+amRtZJEWdSIsiFBt k+8dBElHh2WQDhDOWqHGHQarQgJPxGB97MRhMSlbTwK1T5KAWOlqi5mJW5L6vNrQ 7Tra/YceH70fU0fJYOXhBxM92NwD1bbVd9GPYFSqrdrVj19bvo63XsxZduex5QHr RkWqT5w5mgAHaEgCqWrS/64q9TR9UEwrB8kiZZg3k9/im+zBwEULTZu0r8oMEkpj bTlXLmt8EMBqxwIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUcH8uroNoWZgEIyrN6z4XzSTd AUkwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUcH8uroNoWZgEIyrN6z4XzSTdAUkwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAuiLq2lhcOJHrwUP0txbHk2vy6rmGTPxqmcCo CUQFZ3KrvUQM+rtRqqQ0+LzU4wSTFogBz9KSMfT03gPegY3b/7L2TOaMmUFRzTdd c9PNT0lP8V3pNQrxp0IjKir791QkGe2Ux45iMKf/SXpeTWASp4zeMiD6/LXFzzaK BfNS5IrIWRDev41lFasDzudK5/kmVaMvDOFyW51KkKkqb64VS4UA81JIEzClvz+3 Vp3k1AXup5+XnTvhqu2nRhrLpJR5w8OXQpcn6qjKlVc2BXtb3xwci1/ibHlZy3CZ 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rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDgjCCAmqgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5UZXN0 IE5DIHN1YiBDQTAgFw0xNjA3MDkxNDQ4MTFaGA8yMTE2MDcxMDE0NDgxMVowUDEi MCAGA1UECgwZQmFkIE5DIFRlc3QgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgODEVMBMGA1UEAwwMd3d3 Lmdvb2QuY29tMRMwEQYDVQQDDApKb2UgQmxvZ2dzMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEF AAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAp5T7voqwIiauadaESOe4RMhRVU9tHp5JZlz1yJ7ZYF81 PJJ9XfERTCJQow3BNRbVeXEyI4mvMMcuFwd5cKqy/gP5yfEV01QbpqACKhIK90Nj 9fM2QOiYE81FmvQzP6j7QFYt0E6J4kupvj0D8Z2Nri0kXDGe5+hbgLPkZvnh0vvJ Ck7AEQ2iqO4Npe4uHoDx3GXNo2Jb6BKNf+nMsJPLo7sqUuZA0/mFDVPNRvKfiq6b ObFUdbY/qPVPHk9VBWZuO9etk35G2yTSQ9KiGRNgcoWQAozAyLRx0yECHZEbrZ5J JFuPXO/r7saqNuV7L8UpR0Z0SpyXKs7suLGBpYnO/wIDAQABo4GbMIGYMB0GA1Ud DgQWBBRkrc1ZEOlR+93o/6EPrgFeM37AsjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTwU4mH3VYZwBnm IFVvC/wUFdejsjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMEsGA1UdEQREMEKCD3d3dy5vay5nb29kLmNv bYIMd3d3Lmdvb2QubmV0gQ1nb29kQGdvb2Qub3JngQxhbnlAZ29vZC5jb22HBMCo AAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAJ/gHSUGV0LahCqlFzhi4iP5JTleZlhsqOQd 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CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/badalt3-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016760 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQCiqb6LYFYj1uPe IVuzuDL1bfV8+xlrws67I+9yVDiHslYdA7ygv41gYKEmKSbL2SvAOnfjgDEb8RYf LhF3LQUvXyON0LkjkZseXVFLNokDBXoNVeP1QjWfznPxHpgGN/xF7OQpkX3FVByC IVUOpiXBbq5FtsuLhquHK0yAsY1gJYP8QFHUbCnE5vrpK8lOv4MZEc9rS6ZrSKn6 9+s3nGx9QheboiDVTWqynxDQn2W5ZyTyKQX0IRnKg2zLJ6Dg2ec8OUh5nvzzUdns AJ/pN2Yc3ri53OPodTkmrRha31N48TA7st35XepAk4vZnSq7cml+85xs8Az/OZDS HH1EV5sDAgMBAAECggEAUIndN2NGo04l2vkHT4/XY1/DWdN1/b4h39TmHOSIbN+m 9YzBG5JcbKjLgXqEpA/uMqqAa9sv9ZbEDkIgEbLvy0m+79u1n1/bvwgTVTs2UZGn oeyyBuB2bp6pF2y/duzHctPdEJvh+w8vYlsgozUuonyruwbL91SBn1aX9Wx0BHMk rReJHuLxnGGgUVJzmNqKaGKBpuBaLhpytcIuwkNErDHUfzyxDcpu8IPo70jCafrE hlrbs9o8vKcnWF3XZ2LVPdrF0MQeXfvOPc0txiAOU4DQ91gsoZsVsYJCXY4Qw+4S ajpxidF6nQDtRtB/aTq+OCMzCVGog6V8Mg7VbA8u4QKBgQDQSHDEBgvPfoA/6Sxp uzFV7T0Vgl58oV35EqPFl81cBUSwTElx8ueP4kK00964j47Qe/N5TQOzvH+rxlGQ 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MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg Fw0xNjAxMTUwODE5NTBaGA8yMTE2MDExNjA4MTk1MFowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT 5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1 U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5 ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjfTB7MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTnm+IqrYpsOst2UeWOB5gi l+FzojAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0ETPx1+Je91OeICIQT4YGvx/JXjAJBgNVHRMEAjAA MBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMCMBkGA1UdEQQSMBCCDnNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxl MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQB+x23yjviJ9/n0G65xjntoPCLpsZtqId+WvN/9 sXGqRZyAnBWPFpWrf9qXdxXZpTw7KRfywnEVsUQP12XKCc9JH4tG4l/wCDaHi9qO pLstQskcXk40gWaU83ojjchdtDFBaxR5KxC83SR669Rw9mn66bWz/6zpK9VYohVh A5/3RqteQaeQETFbZdlb6e7jAjiGp6DmAiH/WLrVvMY8k0z81TD0+UjJqI9097mF 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6Xrhgw26oAUmxWkvzzXsgwxAZFJMpM5Rg3rwrNDzWQKBgQDnR9FIh24gOK6g9dOx i/LVKFZ1V1/HVXTXiBjPHwecNkBXLLlgE46fxSHd1mt1yoHnyp3qOXbCIsqnk0S9 KyMN0y7YG0P6QHxdrnhhr2zsZaVBEoLXmBn7vp6M50xt/Je4qvOGwkPTrU2Uftil qMIexti5oO/tOksmWw0Bm0R0WwKBgQDGsthSr9y1zpACJnu9rdMkwqZoxn8n7CPN y2L66WSpCopBKighfvn9ymOkV07TdcY9PEo/Yb5G3jT23trY2GOd6EYTSa0S8yDt lslXTzZJGAK+RiMf5zHBwIS800XSBqXCjL+yJ3w0sQd9uRcQr8XjIJLZfbT10sRg 1jQBMK1WdwKBgQDJdsXXaCGF79ouW/ULs9zT0U9+552HBenB1cvGoEEA0kE5rrvL 9T1H73CQzTbOZJjEULs+TNAmTCg70Q0Pu4PNhyhHF3kfhQzQjipO7YD0a5aIGJfh NZ1srZ9vHgx1wpJnSoLX4GE1AsGRmO0fYOG37X7cNFTLUPwlbSrnO1lmAQKBgHdR kJve5X/7wfi4mVgnGQMbLIkAof0cTcfYGeEo5HyqSqmlIiIzOPYRYlKe50QOlnPR T5jOHlA6Qb35x5uuHewGPoZ4mMknXR+vi8q1U5kDJSqTvaX71KJP9KXbjTL5MPMq SDc4hNqzcBcsXdB0bTXeKrEWTuPLpIeuOd55F64zAoGBAMooy318nDZ0c2Qek3/N +SN+cG5tLH7HjbI9C4XBYVbxXHIvg/nSzFRxBbC2ZFetJ27xvweM1J/Clk7d1Lvq PM7fcVgcc+ccHNM7KX77k0/J+FJF1uNsj9Rgg2TFveLKbtHfmaZd31k1HIYhSS5E a0BZeU4ZpKQJxpf8YbXbPi2Z -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ca-cert-md5.pem0000644000000000000000000000206213176625661016661 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC7DCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDMyMDA2MjcyN1oYDzIxMTYwMzIxMDYyNzI3WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQEEBQADggEBACTmLO0KOkXFNjj6hXozC9GzQYMXdCfNmgMuetk8xdVm TqkF/qIGK2FBWn91IH0/9ydZbL83EKjPjqjwqzXqExJ0Un+fy7XbYMKtjGJ21egJ x97jzKey5phEwRD/4fJ+PCml9eE/SNzBV0xKSDq4qQYvSJ3GF6KCATVlr0bDzQJZ 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DF:1C:2E:C1:15:00:94:52:47:A9:61:68:32:5D:DC:5C: 79:59:E8:F7:C6:D3:88:FC:00:2E:0B:BD:3F:74:D7:64 Timestamp : Apr 5 17:04:16.275 2013 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:20:48:2F:67:51:AF:35:DB:A6:54:36:BE:1F: D6:64:0F:3D:BF:9A:41:42:94:95:92:45:30:28:8F:A3: E5:E2:3E:06:02:21:00:E4:ED:C0:DB:3A:C5:72:B1:E2: F5:E8:AB:6A:68:06:53:98:7D:CF:41:02:7D:FE:FF:A1: 05:51:9D:89:ED:BF:08openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/some-names2.pem0000644000000000000000000002055513176625661017015 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIYgzCCF2ugAwIBAgIBBjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDEwJDQTAg Fw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMHdDAu dGVzdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALoL2oQZEgFBdXwu Pb29W75T63JfNJKKdYi6YrmKM+EKbcMue/hFrLGQXB6a2eQZFn+j3hmexeQF9T8i Wxh2S6rzAr1Yj+qXeDBaMf4oBEiEhBxIsaIlws3qQa4baeVEEoxw+A+ISrYHTIFc V/i0bcIFt5p7v7wbu686a/w0vIqPfad5amdQJMvmjZXDI+jGMvFPmBRHr2/1dJUW PaKsJluwR514pJv74urIyEt+dFPM2/5kc2HiLNkeuS1Hbky+dPlDIGrfaHHsCNnb 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rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQC/mhXWzc26ztIg 2Duia7kDG54SAr3uaHk9TeGBmmWJIVoRKYvaosZ4/rT2hez/rxcNdVbi61QsI6Mu HSen7lfLeLcZENeAFnvZAN7bdaqpCqpoGVBVWbVbEb5qZG1kkRZ1IiyIUG2T7x0E SUeHZZAOEM5aocYdBqtCAk/EYH3sxGExKVtPArVPkoBY6WqLmYlbkvq82tDtOtr9 hx4fvR9TR8lg5eEHEz3Y3APVttV30Y9gVKqt2tWPX1u+jrdezFl257HlAetGRapP nDmaAAdoSAKpatL/rir1NH1QTCsHySJlmDeT3+Kb7MHARQtNm7SvygwSSmNtOVcu a3wQwGrHAgMBAAECggEBAL4rWle8JuCuHGNbGz1nO9d41tg7fnYdnZAaN6OiMfr8 bl+wY84aV3GKJOS2InfYOcIy340UU5QHvxOq/kwwRVV/uAOZ8rqAFmZY9djOnhdv rZjq3xAHnPgJ0XvZt7XkR2z1AUw+v7Pf1WYGsYcSZ/t99MKB5Je0odA/aRqZRwLy YflbsnAJtxdJ6fsiVCSJcU76V8sxfiCimw6ppLMEp3zCjveQ5Lv0eVoL2zNYeh+l GiSwqTqaR+WJekkDiXRd9KYI19drf7OkTII1DtOd6bgvKX3zv2lNiere4J4k7cAP rW6fBFgtSq2oklTpWUlXRH7XQAgDtDvldXdlKaj96dkCgYEA8KPSu5ywg8pjCofE nLtJTfVyD2g9tgNLj9dI3kuSniZU51kOtk5rZZwL0S8piGczL908aV9DIWdXWsND 5hlXquKUTSjxPYEzZvaN+tvf9e0AcY/D/UaK0mKPjEbh7vg6pS77aZZz2EL2inOs 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0WQqBVB/b4Rw21Kf9fMVMtXvOxIsQcdz2583s6Lojr63H4P11fF60EEVmEW2cXs7 MviuHdt+cQKBgQCpgS0ufwbgYpjlu2mQG8fkrpRLTeCw1YGMkREXXVxEY4s/QXCS F1Zl+l5QiAdTeaGAR/BcfZatyp17iTCUqSiiWEjtFrmQMFHGEmqavwStlAqPY9AB niPeOu3EFkLbiESs6V+mPlvxJq1+6UlqRNNYDZvEERH05gUwjxEc5fsnqQKBgQCo Q2cqJ8GIeVyIDreZ/hVR15G/8cdxysr1o2MLQGpKRb0mQx9HLfr4wWirUfzz3P7M ykJgIUwdgdW9rQRLJNztfJf5CSZVZuhwPAYaV0pjMI2nWg7iLAXICh2caI7ZLnKx hzJv3OvPTtcipUdhFXg5M4RXVfv4U3QtFRYeIChX0QKBgQDDQ7mGmWkuR++svxXG A5ITe+7RBRO8kVhXEGYQbIiuk4fM2ZXWnw/MwMVX3cZRfL2DPVmRa5Xcgs9OLwQD hoGqX9LBAkyB1p+ZBqNJaHa86awXR01gWNPW7/GJTp4Q7V4KkGvjIbWVWH/7TpMe d6YkymUz7h0qMN/M5nsB5Xg4jg== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/pc5-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016135 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQCvDPn1fctKUE8+ aHf036mHkIEsWn0iNFl2K/qAOMqjqOvslj+zxhRqwj29v1Prb4ZYvjRrJ2GQdh7G Xju4cP6wQKKHGOurJhYczcfqwAfi+21KBn4gmM3i4GESuIC6GuXWqw24oMZYBi5H 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LfF7zRuNQ2FFvgboAUveLWjTYhgp0W4onds/gT/MoF7+lmhak5dunc6AVXdciBoY W3vUHK6BVWW5minMPax2NZDN5KZiTSHvZd1/RCG+7x8tSbQthgtN58Z94QKBgHbH aZ/hFgo1xRESaqFKN2TbJ4dBe6CKYlU/Pyip7TKvlSPjJXxZGUI+RpQbj7uMC6iG rWVNex/gUhwA7eCVm76iSZpSeGhK5Hvn0AY5ShakC9rtVzEomb/enkTKJi0FNxkT 1HY0/4pta3u+1P9+jsPHVkXpPpAcqlpbDUCwVky5AoGAJgwr1pxM7RDQon8Mpjxm XTJ36Vl+6dq/5yPBcKylQ49e5XrugS2trV1aSZKsiVuLGK9N8ND2N8OazxfpXbee q6b8GAqWWz4ewe30FKo0ipL1SfsJUTv8lPKIGo8oNk4vsUvv/bLJHpr6+g2d8lCw A0i6wzzrXUiXlynYm+VCKhs= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/root-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000207213176625661016577 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN 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CuipVdk9yi4eROoQAxWvVBDz+7Q9CF7j1PkDMYB+QwiXwNfGplOMAWv6nQUNJPs5 dIn/eeha7QWrqG/45A== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/sroot+serverAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000216713176625661020160 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDBjCCAe6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo2UwYzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAknUQhKHR 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aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo2UwYzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAknUQhKHR lI3BOPTuD+DMabjdfZ6Sb5ICpIOcvYFnlZV0lkyK3TuOw+iSlUUzHT3MlMos1w2a mYPb1BpACTpB1vOcRZPaoSZqiOJrKzes+oUZG7R75lz+TK4Y1lQlWObsnUlFUDzr c3P3mbCALr9RPee+Mqd10E/57jjIF0sb3Cq74l7MEzD/3JWKhxEtTmChG+Q29bzW foaDqVaePdyk4M+TMQMioGqXYqu/4bzCnZyls1J5FfwBCtPGJ1/3wxLwk+Pavu9w TSagWsC90QGRYH0EauS1KqlJ6dR6Tyf6G5HHmDPufzHT0ouL5Db6C59XSMWud6RG E3ODKNXOOP3jsDAMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMC -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/badalt6-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016763 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQDKz8F/ndKz0vuv BymjTUjtrWSQsnsuisR+oW8CIliNBi8yqqeNrtoa2s+e2GBC7gxDlK9IOqGo4Ulu 9jY5On6RysrFWLpK97I7EP9cg63alH+NRFEwczRzErHtYx54yiBjcovcCVeTtdnd 7/P4T8hIGy6QjdW68lzwnN/I9x11NWoipIKvAOGXz0L/WaPPWZ0GJFlBqEX//O3+ 6sweSUX4ivAC9txou3rwDA8kJx5Ge9trQ9dPPG/jpL96f1DLE9H2SkVff1KLTPmb jUwiYj161lsKLxGkbdmPWRjt1pP4+5UUhioo1Y0WrTd5ELwB1eKTtWsOlRsdLOa8 1L6m8ngXAgMBAAECggEBAJNMHK8BAvzTqTPPsfAGu4bTvgxRdKGy609FFAiqxUF3 UmQsCZEfgwyqCszFPfSeS43xuPRukObE6L6MV4ls8GwWqvp1nKfCClJX3/9jK6tq 2tDQ416a7Wb+FvfgW0tDEg7oLKfcqRyAoQFNuxWHbGDiTQlz2dzzFYkzhlzBDUYH /pu9qkNFGfYMFwsBUd8pp8zMnv552CCIgalBBFr1hy9q47HBaJPaF2/CjZJmsqkp rVMBH7+j0y1DW3JO5rSKcRdz+mgEd9m/yQIazvBPJKxeGza8JfLBuACYFLIoO1S+ b8s/zmQPHeZwTxSsM64M1uYi4dmJy0viozLlWsjrE1ECgYEA/GxGG/lB1mL+Hzmc kXzWmA2nLPxZXGxMBOYH/n8l4OyDmKi2Bmly7kS0kLdY6gYTVBWFCRcvPxf+UJu9 x4NcKDkjXVXSg7Muux3Bh1JoRCOKB2Hk3pqdDe55GcT5bSikkd5PYCNobcnqzSK1 HzKveDdukraZxIPFpVs1VM9/gxMCgYEAza+BJUAEWoq925a1RKlMwdXW1ONBhFqU fXon15fgycHkiYIBGbGE65Oyz8BwE6jNAT+SwKlNCc6jPAkXvEUpczEi5Rcox8Ec hNoXBHcBxHEhtfV2VKX5I9JFAadmvnfS5St7HjRLzE2Y6xym1+fKfnAlSLpdb3W2 eRqVBi3F020CgYEA6K/yrQTHwRX+BdC42JCIzSAA1IJG6eDW7skR43NX+pBr+sTD DwQTszrYbHLnXst888zmluutXO8EO1Bl0E3yHQ4W4IolhcweLtUOOm0nunA8Y/PE 48MJNfd34N5nw01s7x5Mc2YQdOxmKvVsmzbA9AO9RTdYZgPGpVh/wA+LDssCgYBh F2+G/ekQNF3awhFfD+vDtAVtCLlsmLVvZbJY+sCJfJU8s7mBP2LXMSk/GD/Ph+b9 p9zGRSSwdHJpbIFfxeYDEja+nWgKowWrUKd83BBhgmW/Vtc8rfwlBKS+Wx8M2dMb iqLbZyRAlICSuzumvyu+84EmC5L/gjlYgUvHVuQDIQKBgHH7q3hrKI5mQ0BR9h75 4yP98c+Duz8IsQllIG0gzCiiOYIVTl3uzTCa/E9Sa+jG+kFsCeUDchmC6LmHdF/Z ZHfECcQT4B37xMMwvjwNW7E6/FyRx3XC762Fd5vlz3fBuVKburfh1JpfpcO85Wvo R1UfsJugW9Yetsqd9WB6q3ln -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ncca1-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000230413176625661016577 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDWTCCAkGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDcwOTE0NDgxMVoYDzIxMTYwNzEwMTQ0ODExWjAXMRUwEwYDVQQD DAxUZXN0IE5DIENBIDEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDC XjL5JEImsGFW5whlXCfDTeqjZAVb+rSXAhZQ25bP9YvhsbmPVYe8A61zwGStl2rF mChzN9/+LA40/lh0mjCV82mfNp1XLRPhE9sPGXwfLgJGCy/d6pp/8yGuFmkWPus9 bhxlOk7ADw4e3R3kVdwn9I3O3mIrI+I45ywZpzrbs/NGFiqhRxXbZTAKyI4INxgB VZfkoxqesnjD1j36fq7qEVas6gVm27YA9b+31ofFLM7WN811LQELwTdWiF0/xXiO XawU1QnkrNPxCSPWyeaM4tN50ZPRQA/ArV4I7szKhKskRzGwFgdaxorYn8c+2gTq fedLPvNw1WPryAumidqTAgMBAAGjgbIwga8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFAjRm/nm1WRwoPFr Gp7tUtrd9VBDMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMA8GA1Ud EwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wXAYDVR0eBFUwU6BRMA6CDHd3dy5nb29kLm9yZzAKgghnb29k LmNvbTAPgQ1nb29kQGdvb2Qub3JnMAqBCGdvb2QuY29tMAqHCH8AAAH/////MAqH CMCoAAD//wAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQDRpRo9txGcsPsfBInz2ctvl37p a7DcrFTSLltADj+7/80OwYBtdmxiU9OfuETxdq5XbkghlmBGrDswtGHhcoDnSugm 2n3Ov0YOQHYgStGYEsmXahjZ49Xlh8gzt9NBfzJIm6blBpJo845Z0cbzd1LdCgt/ ck83nGnLvhIEZ3nFrT2K9vWQ3UkrFMfR3gCZpu/2X3+5UgK9IpGU+crDcGUcpdoz YaJka2w7rjw0mvQX8JtVBRt4xGRRAXXL2YA421nIzX7tKLHngYp6V9zu7QE2G5zS RewAXU3TERFQi4bF+N9mmwj8z9CYClRH56uFboGGBEGSulsbF5C4DB0p7dbl -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/root-cert-md5.pem0000644000000000000000000000207213176625661017262 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDMyMDA2MjcyN1oYDzIxMTYwMzIxMDYyNzI3WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOCAQEAwSTZo97psLqiNmgvCC/Z51F3S9bFKPjGK4dc Kqh8pMJsb8DnfGlPnsYXq/0oPcBThTRGZDqTeZa0ms8G+g4GS21TPF7lmvVJUJhz GRLJxX7TYB8xriSJ15DwZgGmEGPfzmoIq27nwrO4TRAi0TCLdw01XZwiq2V7anl+ jrIpJPDuaT3oBqnGTMZ5IoaQq2TX8PS/ZW6icJiRmXLMp/HUycKpDUshiuARR5Mi UOzX8IHwn76Zj6z1R8xW9j1WcEycFYevTMaRuS6hnYagiSaAytIQU8hgMR4AWodM 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rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDATCCAemgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNlMGMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wEwYD VR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAB6mihrap7ByLl3w P/0XsqMvOkxCxoWTeI0cEwbxSpUXfMTE24oIQJiqIyHO6qeSRgSywk/DTU0uJWOB Idr6dPI6wPrS4jvFqcgoFH1OPjAJCpl5CuCJEH8gB3LJ4dNfj+O7shT0XeI+R1vw gp+fJ8v6jX4y8Nk/Bcy748dC1HZhMWHxQblzjRu8Xmd6lDiMskoWE2JAwgRK7b3M 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CERTIFICATE----- MIIDfDCCAmSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2 ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTEQMA4GA1UEAwwHcHJveHkgMTAgFw0xNjA2MTgxOTU0NDFaGA8y MTE2MDYxOTE5NTQ0MVowPTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUxEDAOBgNV BAMMB3Byb3h5IDExEDAOBgNVBAMMB3Byb3h5IDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDgpvzv40QOQxRy6qhowyMfSRwn8TSUX/tt9U92ij/HDurM aT+89lLd6oOCohmXomg4t18Fik3yUyoKOi2Jo/ATV5ZYvhKOQzf4d7zTno3SsTSB s1i9aNVnwVd9QZA/Y1lHtEUETIr94neET6bvaV9DHrtmVaEC6rXxbLmm6dLEcqEh +XnjoAi6PL/+U+RSQm6ekLEWwhwePUCr2QvGotjpUzDJngHCtxrVj6ZK8DPlgXpo 2CWC2l6uwlakxkMQkCQQICywMKsmyMVPWFbalUezRDl7S/J9ybZYK61aq8mrBYzn tCaD3HwtjKmkAZ3tKcDfPidqwVtUAioBSzB6ztc/AgMBAAGjgZYwgZMwHQYDVR0O BBYEFPg3PONgEnnZVF3tRrg4aY4hBGVhMEEGA1UdIwQ6MDiAFNOib4aG0AVcbb7p bh224iVD3Jx8oR2kGzAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZYIBAjAJBgNV HRMEAjAAMCQGCCsGAQUFBwEOAQH/BBUwEwIBADAOBggrBgEFBQcVAAQCQUIwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAJvmPj0eIOQEZSFrvbMEz5dp0udK+TIMKBmgPfCVrSPu g5wArKY5CqFzrrvXb8FWHuAuP9KsXaqU+oqaTrRlGDs0sl6LWkvamz9FLDbYS2+d 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IM9ox88wYKWynanPbra4n0zhepooKt+naeY2HLR8UgwT6sTi0Yfld9mjytA8/DP6 AcqtIDDf60vNI00sgxjgZqofVayA9KShzIPzjBec4zI1sg5YzoSNyH28VXFstEpi 8CVtmRYQHhc2gDI9MGge4sHRYwaIFkegzpwcEUnp6tTVe9ZvHawgsXF/rCGfH4M6 uNO0D+9Md1bdW7382yOtWbkyibsugqnfBYCUH6hAhDlfYzpba2Smb0roc6Crq7HR 5HpEYY6qEir9wFMkD5MZsWrNRGRuzd5am82J+aaHz/4wDKAKBggrBgEFBQcDAQ== -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/pc1-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016131 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQCeF5hc7UW6KtJ/ 26YrZTeG5Pu7FrPd9W58Wq/xpll8sg2priHgomhwFG+EtBqxP/qfGQADwCBpynm+ bxngsRX94+puCbdpDCRV19vZNfrrdH57PbUmujQfCAPuWnGye7TWbtilqkgJf88y fI+0Y2qmGWpvl3PcijZVbNxEan1FKkB5v1E25+UCDU4Y4nfyJ1jtqSA6RJeixCUE 363iLanJL4Ph781u/GUhICeqj6oKdPzEmnzT9Udt8APpS2pfIjhfcw4w8A+pFXf0 HsezGdcodiZqzs39mdmS8cmMk77xJ8BIOlT484Jg/bB9PfBfEB2LXO3jz/HyrRWQ VHgyF2ONAgMBAAECggEBAJtfoTUjVPYlBAD5RRU9QxdmkSlMpLYucsnw7x7WWPi+ 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+IEy2NMVWRoJTaVwN2UzpKfyDRIzs6DWTs8fJARNDWO+lp04skToFRPdY5L6RJhP dl0yHofPTNUz2lLmMOhTOw4= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/croot+clientAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000216713176625661020110 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDBjCCAe6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo2UwYzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAi/mR+SIa 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MIIDhDCCAmygAwIBAgIJAJkv2OGshkmUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFcxCzAJBgNV BAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKExhJbnRlcm5ldCBX aWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQxEDAOBgNVBAMTB2ludGVyQ0EwHhcNMTUwNzAyMTMxODIz WhcNMzUwNzAyMTMxODIzWjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKU29tZS1T dGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UEChMYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMRMwEQYDVQQD EwpzdWJpbnRlckNBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA/zQj vhbU7RWDsRaEkVUBZWR/PqZ49GoE9p3OyRN4pkt1c1yb2ARVkYZP5e9gHb04wPVz 2+FYy+2mNkl+uAZbcK5w5fWO3WJIEn57he4MkWu3ew1nJeSv3na8gyOoCheG64kW VbA2YL92mR7QoSCo4SP7RmykLrwj6TlDxqgH6DxKSD/CpdCHE3DKAzAiri3GVc90 OJAszYHlje4/maVIOayGROVET3xa5cbtRJl8IBgmqhMywtz4hhY/XZTvdEn290aL 857Hk7JjogA7mLKi07yKzknMxHV+k6JX7xJEttkcNQRFHONWZG1T4mRY1Drh6VbJ Gb+0GNIldNLQqigkfwIDAQABo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTp Z30QdMGarrhMPwk+HHAV3R8aTzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQY+tYjuY9dXRN9Po+okcfZ YcAXLjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgVUsOf9rdHlQDw4clP8GMY7QahfXbvd8 8o++P18KeInQXH6+sCg0axZXzhOmKwn+Ina3EsOP7xk4aKIYwJ4A1xBuT7fKxquQ 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CERTIFICATE----- MIIDhzCCAm+gAwIBAgIJAJTed6XmFiu/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFoxCzAJBgNV BAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBX aWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQxEzARBgNVBAMMCnN1YmludGVyQ0EwHhcNMTUwNzAyMTMy MTU4WhcNMzUwNzAyMTMyMTU4WjBaMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29t ZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMRMwEQYD VQQDDApzdWJpbnRlckNBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA /zQjvhbU7RWDsRaEkVUBZWR/PqZ49GoE9p3OyRN4pkt1c1yb2ARVkYZP5e9gHb04 wPVz2+FYy+2mNkl+uAZbcK5w5fWO3WJIEn57he4MkWu3ew1nJeSv3na8gyOoCheG 64kWVbA2YL92mR7QoSCo4SP7RmykLrwj6TlDxqgH6DxKSD/CpdCHE3DKAzAiri3G Vc90OJAszYHlje4/maVIOayGROVET3xa5cbtRJl8IBgmqhMywtz4hhY/XZTvdEn2 90aL857Hk7JjogA7mLKi07yKzknMxHV+k6JX7xJEttkcNQRFHONWZG1T4mRY1Drh 6VbJGb+0GNIldNLQqigkfwIDAQABo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQW BBTpZ30QdMGarrhMPwk+HHAV3R8aTzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTpZ30QdMGarrhMPwk+ HHAV3R8aTzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAF8UAMtV1DClUWRw1h+THdAhjeo8S 9BOp6QphtlYuc9o+tQri5m+WqbyUZKIBEtumNhFb7QI1e4hO64y1kKbSs2AjWcJ2 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bh224iVD3Jx8oR2kGzAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZYIBAjAJBgNV HRMEAjAAMCAGCCsGAQUFBwEOAQH/BBEwDwIBADAKBggrBgEFBQcVADANBgkqhkiG 9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAl93p1Pcw3hBbTTnm9oa9cOUvPBkUwLJmSJ1Il3HQQuLz5H+H OiF3ePaa7wmGmMTwHEYtOvIhGO5c6zilVRint03BaXRizZcqdjDiHUgVcr11pzX5 F4ihFOF91c6DmUorRrtkjglLb/gAMdUE0eT/wukiMjJWgcw+O2EVxGjpAgRVNw/v byYx4TPmvnnigqfMY9lVFKJy0g5Ovw6Nb2ff8ndSEZsCDB8XdNg2u07zYu1dM/vF wpjsA/omrfXP3opH1ustvMQm9BPkySLRzNbIYHHRJX3Hkhn+EYzMmxv3cH0EEtn6 taj7Gfsp7TfLpfSgP/Y88EsKhQAWsdFt2tT3FQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/mkcert.sh0000755000000000000000000001542613176625661016011 0ustar rootroot#! /bin/bash # # Copyright (c) 2016 Viktor Dukhovni . # All rights reserved. # # Contributed to the OpenSSL project under the terms of the OpenSSL license # included with the version of the OpenSSL software that includes this module. # 100 years should be enough for now # if [ -z "$DAYS" ]; then DAYS=36525 fi if [ -z "$OPENSSL_SIGALG" ]; then OPENSSL_SIGALG=sha256 fi if [ -z "$REQMASK" ]; then REQMASK=utf8only fi stderr_onerror() { ( err=$("$@" >&3 2>&1) || { printf "%s\n" "$err" >&2 exit 1 } ) 3>&1 } key() { local key=$1; shift local alg=rsa if [ -n "$OPENSSL_KEYALG" ]; then alg=$OPENSSL_KEYALG fi local bits=2048 if [ -n "$OPENSSL_KEYBITS" ]; then bits=$OPENSSL_KEYBITS fi if [ ! -f "${key}.pem" ]; then args=(-algorithm "$alg") case $alg in rsa) args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:$bits );; ec) args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:$bits") args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve);; *) printf "Unsupported key algorithm: %s\n" "$alg" >&2; return 1;; esac stderr_onerror \ openssl genpkey "${args[@]}" -out "${key}.pem" fi } # Usage: $0 req keyname dn1 dn2 ... req() { local key=$1; shift key "$key" local errs stderr_onerror \ openssl req -new -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -key "${key}.pem" \ -config <(printf "string_mask=%s\n[req]\n%s\n%s\n[dn]\n" \ "$REQMASK" "prompt = no" "distinguished_name = dn" for dn in "$@"; do echo "$dn"; done) } req_nocn() { local key=$1; shift key "$key" stderr_onerror \ openssl req -new -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -subj / -key "${key}.pem" \ -config <(printf "[req]\n%s\n[dn]\nCN_default =\n" \ "distinguished_name = dn") } cert() { local cert=$1; shift local exts=$1; shift stderr_onerror \ openssl x509 -req -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -out "${cert}.pem" \ -extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts") "$@" } genroot() { local cn=$1; shift local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift local skid="subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" local akid="authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid" "basicConstraints = critical,CA:true") for eku in "$@" do exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$eku") done csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1 echo "$csr" | cert "$cert" "$exts" -signkey "${key}.pem" -set_serial 1 -days "${DAYS}" } genca() { local cn=$1; shift local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift local cakey=$1; shift local cacert=$1; shift local skid="subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" local akid="authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid" "basicConstraints = critical,CA:true") for eku in "$@" do exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$eku") done if [ -n "$NC" ]; then exts=$(printf "%s\nnameConstraints = %s\n" "$exts" "$NC") fi csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1 echo "$csr" | cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \ -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" } gen_nonbc_ca() { local cn=$1; shift local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift local cakey=$1; shift local cacert=$1; shift local skid="subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" local akid="authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid") exts=$(printf "%s\nkeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "keyCertSign, cRLSign") for eku in "$@" do exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$eku") done csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1 echo "$csr" | cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \ -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" } # Usage: $0 genpc keyname certname eekeyname eecertname pcext1 pcext2 ... # # Note: takes csr on stdin, so must be used with $0 req like this: # # $0 req keyname dn | $0 genpc keyname certname eekeyname eecertname pcext ... genpc() { local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift local cakey=$1; shift local ca=$1; shift exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n" \ "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \ "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid, issuer:always" \ "basicConstraints = CA:false" \ "proxyCertInfo = critical, @pcexts"; echo "[pcexts]"; for x in "$@"; do echo $x; done) cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \ -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" } # Usage: $0 genalt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt1 alt2 ... # # Note: takes csr on stdin, so must be used with $0 req like this: # # $0 req keyname dn | $0 genalt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt ... geneealt() { local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift local cakey=$1; shift local ca=$1; shift exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n" \ "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \ "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" \ "basicConstraints = CA:false" \ "subjectAltName = @alts"; echo "[alts]"; for x in "$@"; do echo $x; done) cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \ -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" } genee() { local OPTIND=1 local purpose=serverAuth while getopts p: o do case $o in p) purpose="$OPTARG";; *) echo "Usage: $0 genee [-p EKU] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2 return 1;; esac done shift $((OPTIND - 1)) local cn=$1; shift local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift local cakey=$1; shift local ca=$1; shift exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n[alts]\n%s\n" \ "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \ "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid, issuer" \ "basicConstraints = CA:false" \ "extendedKeyUsage = $purpose" \ "subjectAltName = @alts" "DNS=${cn}") csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1 echo "$csr" | cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${ca}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \ -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" "$@" } genss() { local cn=$1; shift local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n[alts]\n%s\n" \ "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" \ "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid, issuer" \ "basicConstraints = CA:false" \ "extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth" \ "subjectAltName = @alts" "DNS=${cn}") csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1 echo "$csr" | cert "$cert" "$exts" -signkey "${key}.pem" \ -set_serial 1 -days "${DAYS}" "$@" } gennocn() { local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift csr=$(req_nocn "$key") || return 1 echo "$csr" | cert "$cert" "" -signkey "${key}.pem" -set_serial 1 -days -1 "$@" } "$@" openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/servercert.pem0000644000000000000000000000217713176625661017053 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDJTCCAg2gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNDIyMjk0NloYDzIxMTYwMTE1MjIyOTQ2WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQD DA5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEB ANVdYGrf/GHuSKqMEUhDpW22Ul2qmEmxYZI1sfw6BCUMbXn/tNXJ6VwcO+Crs7h9 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CERTIFICATE----- MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyB6dJAD5 wbStQf4HE0EhldtDShNVQ/jhDu6s2Ka30FdP4ml1+c2Py7ODUSjSCegXaBIOXCA+ R0zaBAJ3ZeqXx3UrE9PiXaHRGZcoPtX4mK9IOHhIdxwPUa6ceSOJn4cHY+p0cFLp /5bnUErp4IqbL1bMd4v8fFxJ0ZDGJahfLiurnYUyalaNCHK+hK2+RaeRgPlsXfiU /vwhhjFhdhixbPm8l+S+2xNySV1JAAzrUvEDdNZ0iBvuVcS2mlhSKTht5Zeg+0C6 7kYYqxM9CVZCwcV/aSUImwjeFsNMJsl/nFyEacu6vXz0rjvLwPzTAeVYZy592Gwv akWOtiDdap7WJQIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUnM5mQjCrHAgmX3MZbd8Pp65Y Uh4wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUnM5mQjCrHAgmX3MZbd8Pp65YUh4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEADkH6+rUX2QD5TMBn8x4PR9mTQsxhD2k8K2bv NpbsWX0ta2pDPhiBpIbrTrTmw656MMRkwMLYIAX7BFhyjO9gO0nVXfU1SSTDsso+ qu/K1t2US/rLeJQn8gYiTw6AqmvxHOndLaZQrYef4rUzsYnahNzxcoS1FMVxoJFM o+1Wo0BFBlASv5Az0iFfjd1Uy3+AHB41+2vczNIWSki3mg4hzus2PSS4AA9IYeh+ zU/HJMddnVedLKNstTAfR85ftACtsP6JhBqCBqC4mCVsN2ZlgucETbsOMyWYB4+y 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0VyVhggsBa6+dbZlp9ldqGYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFK+8ha7+TK7hjZcjiMilsWALuk7Y MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAXBgNVHSAEEDAOMAwGCmCGSAFlAwIBMAEwEgYDVR0T AQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBBjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAMJCr70MBeik9uEqE4f27 dR2O/kNaoqIOtzn+Y4PIzJGRspeGRjhkl4E+wafiPgHeyYCWIlO/R2E4BmI/ZNeD xQCHbIVzPDHeSI7DD6F9N/atZ/b3L3J4VnfU8gFdNq1wsGqf1hxHcvdpLXLTU0LX 2j+th4jY/ogHv4kz3SHT7un1ktxQk2Rhb1u4PSBbQ6lI9oP4Jnda0jtakb1ZqhdZ 8N/sJvsfEQuqxss/jp+j70dmIGH/bDJfxU1oG0xdyi1xP2qjqdrWHI/mEVlygfXi oxJ8JTfEcEHVsTffYR9fDUn0NylqCLdqFaDwLKqWl+C2inODNMpNusqleDAViw6B CA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ee-cert-md5.pem0000644000000000000000000000216713176625661016675 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg Fw0xNjAzMjAwNjI3MjdaGA8yMTE2MDMyMTA2MjcyN1owGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT 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CERTIFICATE----- MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyB6dJAD5 wbStQf4HE0EhldtDShNVQ/jhDu6s2Ka30FdP4ml1+c2Py7ODUSjSCegXaBIOXCA+ R0zaBAJ3ZeqXx3UrE9PiXaHRGZcoPtX4mK9IOHhIdxwPUa6ceSOJn4cHY+p0cFLp /5bnUErp4IqbL1bMd4v8fFxJ0ZDGJahfLiurnYUyalaNCHK+hK2+RaeRgPlsXfiU /vwhhjFhdhixbPm8l+S+2xNySV1JAAzrUvEDdNZ0iBvuVcS2mlhSKTht5Zeg+0C6 7kYYqxM9CVZCwcV/aSUImwjeFsNMJsl/nFyEacu6vXz0rjvLwPzTAeVYZy592Gwv akWOtiDdap7WJQIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUnM5mQjCrHAgmX3MZbd8Pp65Y Uh4wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUnM5mQjCrHAgmX3MZbd8Pp65YUh4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEADkH6+rUX2QD5TMBn8x4PR9mTQsxhD2k8K2bv NpbsWX0ta2pDPhiBpIbrTrTmw656MMRkwMLYIAX7BFhyjO9gO0nVXfU1SSTDsso+ qu/K1t2US/rLeJQn8gYiTw6AqmvxHOndLaZQrYef4rUzsYnahNzxcoS1FMVxoJFM o+1Wo0BFBlASv5Az0iFfjd1Uy3+AHB41+2vczNIWSki3mg4hzus2PSS4AA9IYeh+ zU/HJMddnVedLKNstTAfR85ftACtsP6JhBqCBqC4mCVsN2ZlgucETbsOMyWYB4+y 9b6JIYDA1wxNVBXwN+D4MyALxjmjwcTsL6pXgoVc0JEJWVqQ1zAMMAoGCCsGAQUF BwMB -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ca-cert2.pem0000644000000000000000000000206213176625661016260 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC7DCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAOsBxQ3RD9TDABcU Uddp+r5s2pLcA/IUN8MnH2PoemxgfJUKfWm+t0VR2mFqyiSeym1V1TkDnuhzui1Y ftOuiN1qVs0s6xBcU0+S9vWzYIu5SFTkOgB5APYamCLfbDw3xFTQvRs55UfR+yof T/sN6Enq6AhptqnJ/eYVX9EuLTDwV55Kptb4gv9JQs6v01aEHzJ9KGlK2zKpS9Am E67xNkwPeXwbzDdqXgr2a+aSrZjtHUfOsV5gZwH8XPAY0kFmrwhHIJsYZInsZhFo nil/9pMB8gHFU2EHq3LXbs4GUouQoIf+m3OmgeHCI+t7nAfQgU94FJzq+r6p4WxQ KI7cotkCAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFAFonW/5R1NkYk6W28NxJdMyTlCtMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAJIyn7fl5QppxeRmCLhj18Ic+Nft5LMCvaOkv9HNctL+ f1Qe2RgtdrMbHpYykXYrOI4KDt4LhLLInGjXNgV+lp8tSi/ok26wNIpwjf68bfP+ nWNHi2Lt0Eeo9Wpq2VqdsHct98VvBXyuLysbThEJVbrLRsgvBWxdEzbf5RnwdWd5 ZTDQyHgP1/gabl+AyvDFne101IyEA3i90NBhQ8NmSNn4ShTTrerbZSiWhy4eQEzo PeWfUVERV28/0D4XIt/fFuF3M/0RbEgKq2wlDMCT8+W/hWmcZsdyt4xSyiGyjh9Y ldYmdyOrlfOGVzkZ63GTOAC68SNVCXJg3cOmfEczkRw= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/leaf.key0000644000000000000000000000321713176625661015601 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAv0Qo9WC/BKA70LtQJdwVGSXqr9dut3cQmiFzTb/SaWldjOT1 sRNDFxSzdTJjU/8cIDEZvaTIwRxP/dtVQLjc+4jzrUwz93NuZYlsEWUEUg4Lrnfs 0Nz50yHk4rJhVxWjb8Ii/wRBViWHFExP7CwTkXiTclC1bCqTuWkjxF3thTfTsttR yY7qNkz2JpNx0guD8v4otQoYjA5AEZvK4IXLwOwxol5xBTMvIrvvff2kkh+c7OC2 QVbUTow/oppjqIKCx2maNHCtLFTJELf3fwtRJLJsy4fKGP0/6kpZc8Sp88WK4B4F auF9IV1CmoAJUC1vJxhagHIKfVtFjUWs8GPobQIDAQABAoIBAB1fCiskQDElqgnT uesWcOb7u55lJstlrVb97Ab0fgtR8tvADTq0Colw1F4a7sXnVxpab+l/dJSzFFWX aPAXc1ftH/5sxU4qm7lb8Qx6xr8TCRgxslwgkvypJ8zoN6p32DFBTr56mM3x1Vx4 m41Y92hPa9USL8n8f9LpImT1R5Q9ShI/RUCowPyzhC6OGkFSBJu72nyA3WK0znXn q5TNsTRdJLOug7eoJJvhOPfy3neNQV0f2jQ+2wDKCYvn6i4j9FSLgYC/vorqofEd vFBHxl374117F6DXdBChyD4CD5vsplB0zcExRUCT5+iBqf5uc8CbLHeyNk6vSaf5 BljHWsECgYEA93QnlKsVycgCQqHt2q8EIZ5p7ksGYRVfBEzgetsNdpxvSwrLyLQE L5AKG3upndOofCeJnLuQF1j954FjCs5Y+8Sy2H1D1EPrHSBp4ig2F5aOxT3vYROd v+/mF4ZUzlIlv3jNDz5IoLaxm9vhXTtLLUtQyTueGDmqwlht0Kr3/gcCgYEAxd86 Q23jT4DmJqUl+g0lWdc2dgej0jwFfJ2BEw/Q55vHjqj96oAX5QQZFOUhZU8Otd/D lLzlsFn0pOaSW/RB4l5Kv8ab+ZpxfAV6Gq47nlfzmEGGx4wcoL0xkHufiXg0sqaG UtEMSKFhxPQZhWojUimK/+YIF69molxA6G9miOsCgYEA8mICSytxwh55qE74rtXz 1AJZfKJcc0f9tDahQ3XBsEb29Kh0h/lciEIsxFLTB9dFF6easb0/HL98pQElxHXu z14SWOAKSqbka7lOPcppgZ1l52oNSiduw4z28mAQPbBVbUGkiqPVfCa3vhUYoLvt nUZCsXoGF3CVBJydpGFzXI0CgYEAtt3Jg72PoM8YZEimI0R462F4xHXlEYtE6tjJ C+vG/fU65P4Kw+ijrJQv9d6YEX+RscXdg51bjLJl5OvuAStopCLOZBPR3Ei+bobF RNkW4gyYZHLSc6JqZqbSopuNYkeENEKvyuPFvW3f5FxPJbxkbi9UdZCKlBEXAh/O IMGregcCgYBC8bS7zk6KNDy8q2uC/m/g6LRMxpb8G4jsrcLoyuJs3zDckBjQuLJQ IOMXcQBWN1h+DKekF2ecr3fJAJyEv4pU4Ct2r/ZTYFMdJTyAbjw0mqOjUR4nsdOh t/vCbt0QW3HXYTcVdCnFqBtelKnI12KoC0jAO9EAJGZ6kE/NwG6dQg== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/setup.sh0000755000000000000000000003544613176625661015670 0ustar rootroot#! /bin/sh # Primary root: root-cert # root cert variants: CA:false, key2, DN2 # trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth -clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU # ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-cert ./mkcert.sh genss "Root CA" root-key root-nonca ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key2 root-cert2 ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root Cert 2" root-key root-name2 # openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out root+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out root-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out root+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject clientAuth -out root-clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out root-anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out root+anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert2.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out root2+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert2.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out root2-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-cert2.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out root2+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-nonca.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out nroot+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in root-nonca.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out nroot+anyEKU.pem # Root CA security level variants: # MD5 self-signature OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \ ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-cert-md5 # 768-bit key OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \ ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key-768 root-cert-768 # primary client-EKU root: croot-cert # trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU # ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key croot-cert clientAuth # openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out croot+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out croot-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out croot+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject clientAuth -out croot-clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out croot-anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in croot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out croot+anyEKU.pem # primary server-EKU root: sroot-cert # trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU # ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key sroot-cert serverAuth # openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out sroot+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out sroot-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out sroot+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject clientAuth -out sroot-clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sroot-anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in sroot-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sroot+anyEKU.pem # Primary intermediate ca: ca-cert # ca variants: CA:false, key2, DN2, issuer2, expired # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth, -anyEKU, +anyEKU # ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert root-key root-cert ./mkcert.sh genee "CA" ca-key ca-nonca root-key root-cert ./mkcert.sh gen_nonbc_ca "CA" ca-key ca-nonbc root-key root-cert ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key2 ca-cert2 root-key root-cert ./mkcert.sh genca "CA2" ca-key ca-name2 root-key root-cert ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-root2 root-key2 root-cert2 DAYS=-1 ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-expired root-key root-cert # openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out ca+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out ca-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out ca+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject clientAuth -out ca-clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out ca-anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in ca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out ca+anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in ca-nonca.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out nca+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ca-nonca.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out nca+anyEKU.pem # Intermediate CA security variants: # MD5 issuer signature, OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \ ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert-md5 root-key root-cert openssl x509 -in ca-cert-md5.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out ca-cert-md5-any.pem # Issuer has 768-bit key ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert-768i root-key-768 root-cert-768 # CA has 768-bit key OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \ ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-768 ca-cert-768 root-key root-cert # client intermediate ca: cca-cert # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth # ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key cca-cert root-key root-cert clientAuth # openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out cca+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out cca-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out cca+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out cca-clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out cca-anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out cca+anyEKU.pem # server intermediate ca: sca-cert # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth, -anyEKU, +anyEKU # ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key sca-cert root-key root-cert serverAuth # openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out sca+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out sca-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out sca+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject clientAuth -out sca-clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sca-anyEKU.pem openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sca+anyEKU.pem # Primary leaf cert: ee-cert # ee variants: expired, issuer-key2, issuer-name2 # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth # purpose variants: client # ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert ca-key ca-cert ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-expired ca-key ca-cert -days -1 ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert2 ca-key2 ca-cert2 ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-name2 ca-key ca-name2 ./mkcert.sh genee -p clientAuth server.example ee-key ee-client ca-key ca-cert # openssl x509 -in ee-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out ee+serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ee-cert.pem -trustout \ -addreject serverAuth -out ee-serverAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ee-client.pem -trustout \ -addtrust clientAuth -out ee+clientAuth.pem openssl x509 -in ee-client.pem -trustout \ -addreject clientAuth -out ee-clientAuth.pem # Leaf cert security level variants # MD5 issuer signature OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \ ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert-md5 ca-key ca-cert # 768-bit issuer key ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert-768i ca-key-768 ca-cert-768 # 768-bit leaf key OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \ ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-768 ee-cert-768 ca-key ca-cert # Proxy certificates, off of ee-client # Start with some good ones ./mkcert.sh req pc1-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" | \ ./mkcert.sh genpc pc1-key pc1-cert ee-key ee-client \ "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 1" "policy = text:AB" ./mkcert.sh req pc2-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.CN = proxy 2" | \ ./mkcert.sh genpc pc2-key pc2-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \ "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0" "policy = text:AB" # And now a couple of bad ones # pc3: incorrect CN ./mkcert.sh req bad-pc3-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 3" | \ ./mkcert.sh genpc bad-pc3-key bad-pc3-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \ "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0" "policy = text:AB" # pc4: incorrect pathlen ./mkcert.sh req bad-pc4-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.CN = proxy 4" | \ ./mkcert.sh genpc bad-pc4-key bad-pc4-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \ "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 1" "policy = text:AB" # pc5: no policy ./mkcert.sh req pc5-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.CN = proxy 5" | \ ./mkcert.sh genpc pc5-key pc5-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \ "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0" # pc6: incorrect CN (made into a component of a multivalue RDN) ./mkcert.sh req bad-pc6-key "0.CN = server.example" "1.CN = proxy 1" "2.+CN = proxy 6" | \ ./mkcert.sh genpc bad-pc6-key bad-pc6-cert pc1-key pc1-cert \ "language = id-ppl-anyLanguage" "pathlen = 0" "policy = text:AB" # Name constraints test certificates. # NC CA1 only permits the host www.good.org and *.good.com email address # good@good.org and *@good.com and IP addresses 127.0.0.1 and # 192.168.0.0/16 NC="permitted;DNS:www.good.org, permitted;DNS:good.com," NC="$NC permitted;email:good@good.org, permitted;email:good.com," NC="$NC permitted;IP:127.0.0.1/255.255.255.255, permitted;IP:192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0" NC=$NC ./mkcert.sh genca "Test NC CA 1" ncca1-key ncca1-cert root-key root-cert # NC CA2 allows anything apart from hosts www.bad.org and *.bad.com # and email addresses bad@bad.org and *@bad.com NC="excluded;DNS:www.bad.org, excluded;DNS:bad.com," NC="$NC excluded;email:bad@bad.org, excluded;email:bad.com, " NC="$NC excluded;IP:10.0.0.0/255.0.0.0" NC=$NC ./mkcert.sh genca "Test NC CA 2" ncca2-key ncca2-cert root-key root-cert # Name constraints subordinate CA. Adds www.good.net (which should be # disallowed because parent CA doesn't permit it) adds ok.good.com # (which should be allowed because parent allows *.good.com # and now excludes bad.ok.good.com (allowed in permitted subtrees # but explicitly excluded). NC="permitted;DNS:www.good.net, permitted;DNS:ok.good.com, " NC="$NC excluded;DNS:bad.ok.good.com" NC=$NC ./mkcert.sh genca "Test NC sub CA" ncca3-key ncca3-cert \ ncca1-key ncca1-cert # all subjectAltNames allowed by CA1. ./mkcert.sh req alt1-key "O = Good NC Test Certificate 1" \ "1.CN=www.good.org" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" "3.CN=any.good.com" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt alt1-key alt1-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1" # no subjectAltNames excluded by CA2. ./mkcert.sh req alt2-key "O = Good NC Test Certificate 2" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt alt2-key alt2-cert ncca2-key ncca2-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.anything.org" "DNS.2 = any.other.com" \ "email.1 = other@bad.org" "email.2 = any@something.com" # hostname other.good.org which is not allowed by CA1. ./mkcert.sh req badalt1-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 1" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt1-key badalt1-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \ "DNS.1 = other.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" # any.bad.com is excluded by CA2. ./mkcert.sh req badalt2-key 'O = Bad NC Test Certificate 2' | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt2-key badalt2-cert ncca2-key ncca2-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.bad.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" # other@good.org not permitted by CA1 ./mkcert.sh req badalt3-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 3" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt3-key badalt1-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \ "email.1 = other@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" # all subject alt names OK but subject email address not allowed by CA1. ./mkcert.sh req badalt4-key 'O = Bad NC Test Certificate 4' \ "emailAddress = any@other.com" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt4-key badalt4-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" # IP address not allowed by CA1 ./mkcert.sh req badalt5-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 5" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt5-key badalt5-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.2" # all subject alt names OK but subject CN not allowed by CA1. ./mkcert.sh req badalt6-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 6" \ "1.CN=other.good.org" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" "3.CN=any.good.com" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt6-key badalt6-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1" # all subject alt names OK but subject CN not allowed by CA1, BMPSTRING REQMASK=MASK:0x800 ./mkcert.sh req badalt7-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 7" \ "1.CN=other.good.org" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" "3.CN=any.good.com" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt7-key badalt7-cert ncca1-key ncca1-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.org" "DNS.2 = any.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1" # all subjectAltNames allowed by chain ./mkcert.sh req alt3-key "O = Good NC Test Certificate 3" \ "1.CN=www.ok.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt alt3-key alt3-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.ok.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1" # www.good.net allowed by parent CA but not parent of parent ./mkcert.sh req badalt8-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 8" \ "1.CN=www.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt8-key badalt8-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.ok.good.com" "DNS.2 = www.good.net" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1" # other.good.com not allowed by parent CA but allowed by parent of parent ./mkcert.sh req badalt9-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 9" \ "1.CN=www.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt9-key badalt9-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.good.com" "DNS.2 = other.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1" # www.bad.net excluded by parent CA. ./mkcert.sh req badalt10-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 10" \ "1.CN=www.ok.good.com" "2.CN=Joe Bloggs" | \ ./mkcert.sh geneealt badalt10-key badalt10-cert ncca3-key ncca3-cert \ "DNS.1 = www.ok.good.com" "DNS.2 = bad.ok.good.com" \ "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \ "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1" openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/bad-pc3-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325413176625661016663 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQDfkPXhtGaOG5MR dMZ6mSI+OVj13SjQEMO741bjZmZM7/WwJwNx4/ozwy5w3hbcvEom2qe6WCKThzpB +hufIgsElrLL6YHu/eExxfMqSkuUnlYye8JLriqs54i47bvtLn+h/vZdMnsIrS/W GmGCDfVGC3u21h3tTmcVd/jC8vUueXdgoFVCq4elMidmM0ar5+tNAJRcG9ZSeuuG iVbYCiGaYY+7PkyyYy1UiWyrhBPNvdQ3xcakygpWOXSQ19INYTLcAM6GMSnEBK6F 55zZyvuq3Ob60+okaSYWAo+7D0/BrzVfCWlzmWeFyJVR3Ps3nLxteahs+Fl7D7a9 DbgPbY2HAgMBAAECggEASAMzkG5BkojDSJ4qyJbG9vAV/awtV0fvJHhIJpt3XFT2 +LS4YVkj4MSAEw8WoidsYzOPT3DQQmEOnO3pM8sNbX71PMWMeuUAQr4WY4rm6YpP DZfbr/D8AhHacmbxX6bYqd+sj7yQ8OyIOhjpS7EfTl6ojO5PWX8lqT6pvHHyE/Ol 1ZH2MG4GaX10IfrF7bw88XozmFfsw6eVX6t3cBK3PNapxj+RNEwcYBAgtXBNVVAJ mSMkgSZ8/kTggRr3ntKvXCiOrm8Iud6Bwqp+aXB8+etT9p6gWDs0J4MCfkWvva+1 WuZDgryiVnIdqwalrLMg2IfwJhjtlqZjj0R1Oe2isQKBgQD/JSlg+/ZYAmm/BzzV C3mII94Vw0lvX6qpeKMXvcwVcWRSwJMnMPMxnxebyEZopn0t25CRu0+N+sHNUZKg JVw5wL9nA7815JGTfVV9znN8leSYdhvWh6amrKT+Ku+1vXTBONFAR85eilzYUtff jKGVDhBuZ7a5YIT6+DOLoPbMdQKBgQDgULasEUxNTeVSq6qzM/1tvSR4Z9W2JIFr nDxC/RyPq5LN+3Pg5JiA3FFION6C2Rb+rb2RBlpSxuO4Jv+gPWnqZfuXZiTusiDd dnyFsAoGPnb2SIm3OAO2N3w/7ttmRCsWnm0mkFLkd4XJG/mtDcHrit1SZTEWima2 wKf2RJEiiwKBgQCH5+aTp4K/vIFRZOyNWvBgiSJ6GyzZq26/mOfe9JVp8p2KytNX c+aGzwSHUXXXtp9FNwhZ6BlnOmPTFxlwPpZSmQ4bNE68yUSV+JP6UGcJvNooL/mC G320mI/GZ16KQyGW7snfYKBXkYIFJJOim0lSmUw9Uvds5THQcTcbsCDmJQKBgQDE F2sJUnncXkspkO5BiCJ0a1NVepgFiTYmJ0c63F+6bKeCL94l7FAw3eikdSp3QmXq r2E3RVFyaXGqi1UN9IIBqbNdr6p7i/ZVA35ps/Gfcb23IMRbCbmc8jZJAXqElPUB 6e7LNoFwPdgTbcQ+9vbd/N/rZpCZ/tU5z4NFMr2ZbwKBgQCPN9KsqsRRK2v+j0wt ArKrWHK5w1Cj5rRbedOn8659edTB5tqrFtZh4YJB842oe4s2XYXtk+Kq9HBRh4Em CkO/JSH7lgVXT1zsf0ZYojaZWLhVTNHa3PO6R0FtyC0h7MtHV9aquPNCeiQDkwbT RBV8wc0Stpj+QEShPIS9gEQVNA== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/root2+clientAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000213313176625661020020 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyB6dJAD5 wbStQf4HE0EhldtDShNVQ/jhDu6s2Ka30FdP4ml1+c2Py7ODUSjSCegXaBIOXCA+ R0zaBAJ3ZeqXx3UrE9PiXaHRGZcoPtX4mK9IOHhIdxwPUa6ceSOJn4cHY+p0cFLp /5bnUErp4IqbL1bMd4v8fFxJ0ZDGJahfLiurnYUyalaNCHK+hK2+RaeRgPlsXfiU /vwhhjFhdhixbPm8l+S+2xNySV1JAAzrUvEDdNZ0iBvuVcS2mlhSKTht5Zeg+0C6 7kYYqxM9CVZCwcV/aSUImwjeFsNMJsl/nFyEacu6vXz0rjvLwPzTAeVYZy592Gwv akWOtiDdap7WJQIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUnM5mQjCrHAgmX3MZbd8Pp65Y Uh4wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUnM5mQjCrHAgmX3MZbd8Pp65YUh4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEADkH6+rUX2QD5TMBn8x4PR9mTQsxhD2k8K2bv NpbsWX0ta2pDPhiBpIbrTrTmw656MMRkwMLYIAX7BFhyjO9gO0nVXfU1SSTDsso+ qu/K1t2US/rLeJQn8gYiTw6AqmvxHOndLaZQrYef4rUzsYnahNzxcoS1FMVxoJFM o+1Wo0BFBlASv5Az0iFfjd1Uy3+AHB41+2vczNIWSki3mg4hzus2PSS4AA9IYeh+ zU/HJMddnVedLKNstTAfR85ftACtsP6JhBqCBqC4mCVsN2ZlgucETbsOMyWYB4+y 9b6JIYDA1wxNVBXwN+D4MyALxjmjwcTsL6pXgoVc0JEJWVqQ1zAMMAoGCCsGAQUF BwMC -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ee-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000216713176625661016212 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg Fw0xNjAxMTUwODE5NDlaGA8yMTE2MDExNjA4MTk0OVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT 5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1 U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5 ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjfTB7MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTnm+IqrYpsOst2UeWOB5gi l+FzojAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0ETPx1+Je91OeICIQT4YGvx/JXjAJBgNVHRMEAjAA MBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMBkGA1UdEQQSMBCCDnNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxl MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBBtDxPYULl5b7VFC7/U0NgV8vTJk4zpPnUMMQ4 QF2AWDFAek8oLKrz18KQ8M/DEhDxgkaoeXEMLT6BJUEVNYuFEYHEDGarl0nMDRXL xOgAExfz3Tf/pjsLaha5aWH7NyCSKWC+lYkIOJ/Kb/m/6QsDJoXsEC8AhrPfqJhz UzsCoxIlaDWqawH4+S8bdeX0tvs2VtJk/WOJHxMqXra6kgI4fAgyvr2kIZHinQ3y cgX40uAC38bwpE95kJ7FhSfQlE1Rt7sOspUj098Dd0RNDn2uKyOTxEqIELHfw4AX O3XAzt8qDyho8nEd/xiQ6qgsQnvXa+hSRJw42g3/czVskxRx -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/alt3-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016311 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDRevE8uG9fLyuH 6laiTCG8I/5i5xflgOpb68xBNu/ZrSi5+oxwI11iQifFPom9t3UX+ytxd6iXEBd7 BGaWN1YG5gTGXupkNQOCn82t5Fpvg9rzcvAU4fHrLtz/U7A/Peu/alGmdv/OUcpB Zp1fDXSZwIBREPjWbgXkHJNmGnGYmMozQn1hJ0rL5juujPfVV88w/ZJKRFF6Xthm y38xNYj/u/bBRhhR2AL5k5oSmAxSBCaimOem52AZRbUBU1hqow3vIq1fLxSflaF0 e9w16vyf5PVL8MrcA7bCTHkbIzutVKWwQ1fkIqWXhgunF7Uc8Tw7Mc9AQF0HlkJe xeMWr3O/AgMBAAECggEBAJFEuNZq8JEJnR58G+gg86QNMfRUXfYCGIP2WYdAGcTS mFOgtJNvcusZBYt7evndp44h2FavrHJV7nKY8qtpZHcUPGt0lwc23GBRgcj9etmq jsQVCPjyV1nI/ejymF7DCiGMEWNnUq45ehEwoCGyqxGUtWeCZY4Obndqea1s2SoA SIwrP74kSP+cjcOb+KEg5jF5aT0Mzo9ipQuuoxLzjXJhtQuyDYOulq4g/jalMewk GLgRgbzrEDK8/DMVu35rNJ+CHWHowo+1G4lLY4DhajPMXMqb0dgR1JlFF5qyBoTN CJXq4mpuf4ApEd61MTCm0FoqSm/AprSAIISCqapytQECgYEA/ND+C9ZnOOtTxgqI nuq2r1yGFlNnbovcfiU3vrceUvmN+ne1tBtXSTNB4H95AUuoBeVAeYApBKxc0c9K 5Pnwp5NdPbana2cfuorzJrIHM09RP/obDP8VTnNJeO7wd+00Cx5ZnV5g8UcicebH hbjfsc/lkd8G8YCIx+DBigzjIO8CgYEA1B4/JjCOuzM7Ag3y+XIIl3Ud4n15uog1 5tDD1y3xWzZbL7fh0APf4mT8cTTU0ms4i9Rnpraw8ds9EfhMDXxJBs+LO6Ivw5RY RxWoAB1YTPU+T8EuTzZzIp/jrWTgsvLkjNq25W/lbZLO1n8ofFMgAAbWsN0J40ZN 70Sib/JAOjECgYBSiJvXG3h5QYIIzhmJ39Ah8Y+orDPBCBHEcLwBG+Dfb67lDL2Z /a8CK6Se+J51SNCilBP3VlqNtwNaT1UA6YOiAV7YLc/8JR9bk88LW+Uz3/oDa8/2 7zNyd/qNa1u/mwV5d8ADuvLk8bcR/ig2xILqlpc4htnKb463ye0E924SqwKBgHKL OtKmmgzg51Z+rdyiBZ20MsUhuOBPubvAtGC4gIMe4TLte1VXIkkg+2kufFZ8a/am ZqqSMQ8JsvrHOFp36P9yh99V/7D/pIQOX8BgGFTGgjWTPiysXJQv/0SdGvHHVD/z w5w2RpBbHLKbzAMG6FrbVof/dN10E5XHXGhTSvehAoGAHA6WgpPFp7iJBoC13NrZ q3DKluiytegvljyDW5hOlRGqdWp7551EGYLnWtc4bSHboIf89Iz4mW/hyYr7frzE A3Ksob4NIUCGMFJGSyTuK7eyhAxlVZbzqepZ+YftfTvW3iVXkxXx6kEgdzwPrNMx DXwfc6G23PX5tUayTZqKC+g= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem0000644000000000000000000000151713176625661016524 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICRDCCASygAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDMyMDA2MjcyN1oYDzIxMTYwMzIxMDYyNzI3WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTB8MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA2sAMGgCYQC3wNLc1A9gAjz1H94ozPrLOhE2 R8c6RQjkUIALCOuw8xbZV+AEDSqP11Bw8MVzvmpksR9s1idJhLOugwMNTHfTXJjV DWoQh9ofR51J5sOph4yDhQBXRmiuvqMDj+a81UkCAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYE FKrzei/LKJop6yShiJupKskW0ZQcMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslT nE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAFr4hjVtLuZz gxLILAOREEtanckfnapUrhTLukog9Q8uzqMUE+YDEhkcP4YAVjcab6HaXrbcxXsn zn+v+GPszD9G3doGbUjuwEEAHz+k/9sjsn8QAGw/XslYhd5dktaRRCqaTNiWT+Ks xKntAsgXcgWNIpvGikzTB/W7IrjIV8/S1JjLABtoY88tFUX81Ohr3bFFsRc9EHVS MtGnEwfoBOSlCUjaTWBNHHi1HstK9sG2SNT/nhN1HATk/aiCiQRKr/bm6ezPC2If 6mRidaNiQN8+vzvtn86BqtRJOEi8jj5CBax6IqwfE+lDZIwT7H9C9Cu8Yp4mTM0x wwzRDnFVisM= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/cca+anyEKU.pem0000644000000000000000000000215313176625661016537 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDATCCAemgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNlMGMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wEwYD VR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAB6mihrap7ByLl3w P/0XsqMvOkxCxoWTeI0cEwbxSpUXfMTE24oIQJiqIyHO6qeSRgSywk/DTU0uJWOB Idr6dPI6wPrS4jvFqcgoFH1OPjAJCpl5CuCJEH8gB3LJ4dNfj+O7shT0XeI+R1vw gp+fJ8v6jX4y8Nk/Bcy748dC1HZhMWHxQblzjRu8Xmd6lDiMskoWE2JAwgRK7b3M dCpuTCHMTsdCspwBUvQ4gNYNP5IURE+09DBtEBQicN/1RHyRZOw7YGs5ZOdc5mRe 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/root-key2.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016513 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDIHp0kAPnBtK1B /gcTQSGV20NKE1VD+OEO7qzYprfQV0/iaXX5zY/Ls4NRKNIJ6BdoEg5cID5HTNoE Andl6pfHdSsT0+JdodEZlyg+1fiYr0g4eEh3HA9Rrpx5I4mfhwdj6nRwUun/ludQ SungipsvVsx3i/x8XEnRkMYlqF8uK6udhTJqVo0Icr6Erb5Fp5GA+Wxd+JT+/CGG MWF2GLFs+byX5L7bE3JJXUkADOtS8QN01nSIG+5VxLaaWFIpOG3ll6D7QLruRhir Ez0JVkLBxX9pJQibCN4Ww0wmyX+cXIRpy7q9fPSuO8vA/NMB5VhnLn3YbC9qRY62 IN1qntYlAgMBAAECggEAJgHieHcS+F43VcRIVbjWBx8orYX0eL9pByv/efpYCOK8 UlUTSglnmRmUBDMLiUQiReq//XFGQsZu1boeMSYYA5LWRqLEaGIWU5To2N5Mo7sO rWLy6GRU6H+QSlWcisbbeXeK+9ZTiO6BKjfAKZxJkvkaRk44+umQP5QOfhJ3WU4t 0wkwYOfm8uOEg48yZTgjUVzhIORHAq5RHH/5goLrNwO2bIqOHOqzSrXGQJJ+oDaL JykccyVAElUGd5JaSpm5z0a43C4A5q770ppiByGxJv1L3ID1hkik1ZpWfMtwPH1Y FIAINqlhVoeAEwOCpL9axZ5OCGQrgWLNV4LfJyG4NQKBgQDyHGDyp+ZpMJRxCtDt 8QWtthuoOfwmXOR81ZJGD3GA8rEGcG1zH4F+B4Z76/Kwb/uabH9FPURS+kcDpsuM 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/croot+serverAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000216713176625661020140 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDBjCCAe6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo2UwYzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAi/mR+SIa bs1egGRRSAzqu4KkrOG1vGVQNj0XfHn1WeAdmwEAjNi+llErpkMyY08Cjb/3fiQc 6H9CA36utf/Ym84OQOY64m4C1Kikxw8EHudoPNvSWQAFEpCk5gs6rCJEnj9QolL3 32IvZQ1m+GcrjGg976PccEaM7S362kTj+kcAswmS8iJmDAJ2b+ghHTFrFQS4GAw7 XOcqQbinx9ntGn135VsJLOXKveYvQSD7sHKCd4RFrFTSEwWmtBL96vRXmTV5wTAr tpkKKKw5N9CiHnbhNyVrSRiLCzVDTpYQDaBJhb7XOsHi+/HOzmbK6LHe0Lt1nP+k 4PR8O0S5WC0PlzAMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMB -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/sroot-clientAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000216713176625661020132 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDBjCCAe6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo2UwYzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 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9UxISqFOG6sLdZIKA88Q+M2HE/MdzwiJby/bSUXhn5aluZqjR60nGPqAb2S/r98C MQDasGzUTXqEYOPsAL4irzKMMiMdqbj6dNHsmo1GIYKx8PuN193i/cNd5XDv78Gm imECMQC10IvewbKtVl9f2540ye9JYE18pvsPVI0pxtt++DGqsTkoqGH7JasktmN/ +ogLBTECMBf9/xKTpXtcfeTod/OqMOt8nKmmcyrXIijJE/K7vnDzNUXshuVeXc6x W2CXdzFkQQIweyLLA6etAJGsmCRwIgnfp1ubmVdfPou68byHSnzAf4/GxBriSd5b EQcYwjE7SDI7 -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/bad-pc3-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000233513176625661017027 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDajCCAlKgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2 ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTEQMA4GA1UEAwwHcHJveHkgMTAgFw0xNjA2MTgxOTU0NDZaGA8y MTE2MDYxOTE5NTQ0NlowKzEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUxEDAOBgNV BAMMB3Byb3h5IDMwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDfkPXh tGaOG5MRdMZ6mSI+OVj13SjQEMO741bjZmZM7/WwJwNx4/ozwy5w3hbcvEom2qe6 WCKThzpB+hufIgsElrLL6YHu/eExxfMqSkuUnlYye8JLriqs54i47bvtLn+h/vZd MnsIrS/WGmGCDfVGC3u21h3tTmcVd/jC8vUueXdgoFVCq4elMidmM0ar5+tNAJRc G9ZSeuuGiVbYCiGaYY+7PkyyYy1UiWyrhBPNvdQ3xcakygpWOXSQ19INYTLcAM6G MSnEBK6F55zZyvuq3Ob60+okaSYWAo+7D0/BrzVfCWlzmWeFyJVR3Ps3nLxteahs +Fl7D7a9DbgPbY2HAgMBAAGjgZYwgZMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFH18o4bnybHle31aYNRi QZSGJ96XMEEGA1UdIwQ6MDiAFNOib4aG0AVcbb7pbh224iVD3Jx8oR2kGzAZMRcw FQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZYIBAjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMCQGCCsGAQUFBwEO AQH/BBUwEwIBADAOBggrBgEFBQcVAAQCQUIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAGKD jTgyuFlwNRgrw0g4IZMmbEWcgW4r1v2yMRyAXhZuVyc8lkUZoe14eM4kqwJ5ayti peN+ETpRk6AS4eaCEBnn4tE/S8TD4KRovio1EWy5TvjPE6M9jPonF5IfNKgGuR3o 7gN0KKJpzf9jj5JEJPV/d5AKw9fMdSZseea7bZ6JV8kKCW+9WCSMFnwR7POPWSQa ZNJy1PN6GlvHykdK4QwZT3jHaQMVY/uIC1BXrN3sC3l79jnL5tTeK8JLvZAqjfy5 +5pNH71k8zqVR2z0fC4oiv8TNsDn2g07wCCcQmzg8JHsP5p/hyUg51RqrQJhAbaf eUmD8lyBBdfcia2UqJM= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem0000644000000000000000000000162413176625661016531 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICeDCCAWCgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg 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MIIDVjCCAj6gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0 IE5DIENBIDIwIBcNMTYwNzA5MTQ0ODExWhgPMjExNjA3MTAxNDQ4MTFaMCUxIzAh BgNVBAoMGkdvb2QgTkMgVGVzdCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSAyMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAw+bG1zr36IgcElBxX1vFcfq1NhdwjzUWlYt88oVr Zbn2cKzOZWTA2ft8slJf5b5AgWWuJ1Ph1EdX9evBvUE3qVUPDpJQ7UNBMvScqL8J pCjWBcRK9WWguV6MTqF8dJnadup7qfN0i6IWquA4yDEcJDQR4j0BjoAEsQgkASYi maYN5W7PW5swj7AR4K0W5Cwy+KF4+UXKkHPCmYUlbBa6lXZRp3uwU/gXT0fmLz3W O8eT1PdoPnbRVFIKPhZrHcNAORti4xr4Cn8IEhTaqxIQnCjSCjhksoOuoojhW0qR s9t1lTDxyBX5Uz6smanEyCQ6TQFOdMj4m8ULNYTSZbGYcwIDAQABo4GcMIGZMB0G A1UdDgQWBBT4YmD7D7JsE8BJzNs/5cIpbtZxhjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBS6A5+dBiSk V+Zz+vU6Cfm6hcyp+jAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMEwGA1UdEQRFMEOCEHd3dy5hbnl0aGlu Zy5vcmeCDWFueS5vdGhlci5jb22BDW90aGVyQGJhZC5vcmeBEWFueUBzb21ldGhp bmcuY29tMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBaH8qg41pSXo2ViEsZWVyUmB7QwVVW bWeR191XTQPfPNEDFmUzzeBllMUedF4HyD36v7Flpo/LdPdXQnZQ/eyKalztFHgm uePN5DNdS5xn9aqiKNF5pkO9WDhhYuwLRM50JeiyvKk2NvNx9oDFUQ7G6jEJu/r9 rd+8PCUa0SK1dDPJ9dpGrfsAYwk8kST5/JfyDMrocsijOu3v1uGTttMQ0h0A6w6g EW8p77dVS/a2S3wJo9EiFHhnrAN493cwSXgBZUhKoKOri2u6XKV2D3g8N6bp22Ut S5wx0pC8o3wW5upPsDAnEUt9kJJgVkS0FfCEHhHZ8iQyuwX15Yft2Qsj -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/rootCA.key0000644000000000000000000000321713176625661016061 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwPFrd4isNd/7c1MvkoAvdBYyTfUQIG9sOo7R3GvhLj7DBA+/ m8TJEtHkC0WX5QbNZjrh4OIr36LE7HvTPTyK/150oKunA2oWW16SxH5beYpp1LyD Xq5CknSlK+cAwanc1bFTBw9z946tFD4lnuUe5syRzZUMgEQgw/0Xz5E9YxAcFFv7 w6jBiLJ3/5zb/GpERET3hewILNTfgaN5yf4em5MWU7eXq75PGqXi+kYF5A2cKqTM uR4hoGzEq1mwQDm7+Yit/d+NtAuvfkHgITzIM0VJhC+TBu79T+1P87yb3vwlXlXV ddTFezpANQafxIS0bJMMrzdar7ZBTSYjHLgCswIDAQABAoIBAC1EdwJEfqLlOgmE qtSkXn3N919y76Wsfqf+eh5M8Tf4YajCSSIyuTpBJE/AtDJ3thkWF4i7h6+gcLNL GfR0D+h6MMLBgx259iTZu3V+b9fEMbBHykqcd+IEm/wA5pyJTdaVE/XEGmEqiFEH g6wT9XwQ4uRo49X0JfvVlZCNcumapYfPY+BwPQloydm/cLtgUtc1RKUCG7i27aHM VaUm+NdYZIwwCQs0Aof/h7PkEWvHq0idaxY9qkLbbZHb1Np/IkmvqCo/PSS1whDj 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/many-names2.pem0000644000000000000000000003753313176625661017022 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIunDCCLYSgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDEwJDQTAg Fw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMHdDAu dGVzdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALoL2oQZEgFBdXwu Pb29W75T63JfNJKKdYi6YrmKM+EKbcMue/hFrLGQXB6a2eQZFn+j3hmexeQF9T8i Wxh2S6rzAr1Yj+qXeDBaMf4oBEiEhBxIsaIlws3qQa4baeVEEoxw+A+ISrYHTIFc V/i0bcIFt5p7v7wbu686a/w0vIqPfad5amdQJMvmjZXDI+jGMvFPmBRHr2/1dJUW PaKsJluwR514pJv74urIyEt+dFPM2/5kc2HiLNkeuS1Hbky+dPlDIGrfaHHsCNnb /GjvQ6YfvDXRrYPCxWMk0x3FMSaDK9T0zoJ5hE9fViR+D6xcJO2RNUCUENS+Iipj 3kIrLbkCAwEAAaOCK/4wgiv6MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggr BgEFBQcDATAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMIIrwwYDVR0RBIIrujCCK7aCB3QwLnRlc3SC B3QxLnRlc3SCB3QyLnRlc3SCB3QzLnRlc3SCB3Q0LnRlc3SCB3Q1LnRlc3SCB3Q2 LnRlc3SCB3Q3LnRlc3SCB3Q4LnRlc3SCB3Q5LnRlc3SCCHQxMC50ZXN0ggh0MTEu dGVzdIIIdDEyLnRlc3SCCHQxMy50ZXN0ggh0MTQudGVzdIIIdDE1LnRlc3SCCHQx 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-----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/sca-serverAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000216313176625661017556 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDATCCAemgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNlMGMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wEwYD VR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAB4hlnzu/V80J5+R rT57HXi0ufIjXLTC4zEghc/xL3V5vKst2dDPTKJ6SqG6PWSlVg1nJJbjekR3kH+G 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M8EUamsOymmG0bzDwjzIJRdpAoGAOUoVtmy3ehZG0WVc5ocqitu+BfdWnViln0O1 sX9xC3F4Rm4ymGJLA5ntg1bwNMoCytdodun6h5+O4YcXfIseQJFib7KxP/Bf0qcW aOzCnx36y5MQUMAD8H+1SU9TnjQhs9N8eBUE/kQu3BT99e8KllgJCEPoUNIP/s8s 5LtFg6ECgYEAgLwJoJ3hBwr0LmUi3kpFYdbZ+tAKIvKQH3xYMnQulOqtlXJFy0bu ZcIAwsigRUqdCC2JuyAUw52HCtVVlpQjNs4BnUzaKooLOCm3w3i6X27mnHE0200S zqC0rcB0xNz/IltGc7IP+T8UK5xX38uhJ/vUW75OvAjqheJSBwR9h5c= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/nroot+anyEKU.pem0000644000000000000000000000221313176625661017147 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDFzCCAf+gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g 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WH7TrojdalbNLOsQXFNPkvb1s2CLuUhU5DoAeQD2Gpgi32w8N8RU0L0bOeVH0fsq H0/7DehJ6ugIabapyf3mFV/RLi0w8FeeSqbW+IL/SULOr9NWhB8yfShpStsyqUvQ JhOu8TZMD3l8G8w3al4K9mvmkq2Y7R1HzrFeYGcB/FzwGNJBZq8IRyCbGGSJ7GYR aJ4pf/aTAfIBxVNhB6ty127OBlKLkKCH/ptzpoHhwiPre5wH0IFPeBSc6vq+qeFs UCiO3KLZAgMBAAECggEAWrrGLz1llUjrwf1QU5BRBC/WexiCVXXEyY1TKylYCnt9 3bS9EpRVAWhGnZGzFUxQ7sFSnr5tHWWAnX0rCeK6aHFjrbcH0bszVudwfQ+R2J/h 8xRh6EjPPDSsQ9pqWR1WqUAloltJz96bz3ljUZPe+Jq+lnDp2sdnROs/oOzo+Zkz ZkesMwX+aR9prRhnT60A0UeQXZyDJFrWMCVnaeO3JUI5RvjZ3xdEgi5jj4AiNUvH x1k/CApynTvJN4LTFncc6qfnyNH/BU0521WKOcTVCI7tWioRIhiX369xR9qqgRfL woifc3UjW1f66eMRTsIeh+smcoG4WkHvmpknVDG74QKBgQD7lOtCRMZr9gKIEWNy pwm1sMS91zuJnaVLEHjIc6Glc9TqDlZOGp5KcAgXA8Tm7TblQXJ+QlGjX6RBdRD6 XTHbQcyCJ/5rUU+2a6BBga++moBp2ugLSjc/YSTpzVTRC9+Lw1dZ5czrn3exozQj 1/jxdOUVToOomwhpGHoXxVqv3QKBgQDvIlUbvHxrwE8EmBWYjhYZeOTREmzhWNCo 6p7zibZPvKyfZxzXSonJ+T1k/pxNlkMg3SuhZozOCdhQtQupauRlrQ4Hzw3Vc6gr Dv5Qew/UwxB02zWjG2PhAfDV1KQgZAwC1g1TCWwqQcV52g5p0kdUgKaPte1P336l YvwmTduNLQKBgQDutNsQEr+OWmsGfjE07Sb6XRIf6qOULJ9UfPmNgKGkoiYoOphL HViJ2ojihXIDhppqplGjWPurHylz7kbAt0KB/om0CYyOeSVAOhhhb1K4cFJdnhZD +BQ5r8vdhzTt8O0X6K3uH2vzOWjRhMAJLngHalmegNPNW+R8C3x1J42nhQKBgF9s q9mtlVjKHL4Qkk2WJWt0uppTZ+9kqZ8+QL+eLIoVGC1j0DZ5IBLgyocKswSi+Zab q1V0vqtZcmCCXmz0or+QFxE2pqaOyISmLwWeleqpDGAVOYok2+5l/9zURcpHIiPf luGT2P3j0RGW2jmQF7a4v76JMnG1FayZm1UNrJbhAoGAGM8s9YbDW2+DaTbbSQbg IBmT+8MLjVczRUmv5Yi8y4z/aEGjsM7032LjFRiR1PUTeAnkKLnII5rdbEo96UDb OMv8SAH3G4lhfS+lq2TSy+XjlAAIOkiI9xW6Xo/KakIOepDzORzY74ayrxqjiyQv uchNPF6GhCMnLZC9AxZs4Fg= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1_issuer.pem0000644000000000000000000000201613176625661020620 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC0DCCAjmgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJHQjEk MCIGA1UEChMbQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgVHJhbnNwYXJlbmN5IENBMQ4wDAYDVQQIEwVX YWxlczEQMA4GA1UEBxMHRXJ3IFdlbjAeFw0xMjA2MDEwMDAwMDBaFw0yMjA2MDEw MDAwMDBaMFUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMSQwIgYDVQQKExtDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBUcmFu 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fF0nLoRb/6iCd0VnJlliTKky/p8aaG4+VooQPTxwpat6zir4G1N2dWwYbMTDpVfh 836wHNPmmFvCUSKZcoLAEmMVRrNU9gBXkS64FfoP0FCoWeHb9NSlQY5YFb0BO8C/ 6AZlMGCt1HDPEK+gE/Uwayk7Yo3npSb+ZgnwZpA0ip0lPJ0Uf5cZ5Q/RBP0H+nxi KLKzBpY01IJ67/7R1Ioc27JiUpBGmKQzjg48POSMOECFolv0dH33O6aXJaXtw9Kq m8y3rPQqNPehWzbRq75txC/sayQZXNUrteVz -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ncca3-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000225013176625661016601 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDQzCCAiugAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0 IE5DIENBIDEwIBcNMTYwNzA5MTQ0ODExWhgPMjExNjA3MTAxNDQ4MTFaMBkxFzAV BgNVBAMMDlRlc3QgTkMgc3ViIENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIB CgKCAQEAu6gOQAcNel3NCbWCctR4Y4BqRNPbo6W3HpFyY+204kGimdNZvE2zkpfs HR6PB7AHUvq+44+NN/l1J//JkT/9rFVoGDbb/L354US/iBJ3zjBSqeeXvofSmsvf 6+x6g9W7bFLETJ0mH+vjPQ2f3dS4O4Lc7W3HsldR/WUkesQb3+FsxBph6/84vylM oSsScd/2HFD7lrt+Fk1DGqkMI10tl6PozREAxSJgSFLUtr2P15a7wyi4m5LBM4+L YKMr/vuj7wFtH2BEwh2iRbJ2wYxxjKV42Hg+6l5XlahVr2rTpK6aP9R8spg+Og/P A+d2shD3+q6OkglEyq9rRGa2mRZrwwIDAQABo4GVMIGSMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTwU4mH 3VYZwBnmIFVvC/wUFdejsjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQI0Zv55tVkcKDxaxqe7VLa3fVQ QzAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MD8GA1UdHgQ4MDagHzAOggx3d3cuZ29vZC5uZXQw DYILb2suZ29vZC5jb22hEzARgg9iYWQub2suZ29vZC5jb20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQADggEBAMIXGpXdI4jpDzPkqJIoDtAC4KQlC8fm8nW/fEgfHiOZgGHsCkjcvpFU 4yQ/ito9qlV4d4SoWLQijc5eJmTvWQKvHfZNCM9nKWQCY/QDMMePT2UO8RLHjkI3 V2ARfrFv9NEQ8gd7u0dvsGivacE0vlIS480saVVnda54gOHh5RVe1/mr3EUqnQJr RTothfmTcCH104SUBUB92gD9Cgh3NpvRS/sZI1pv3diUyw1QF9qszWfk1NPDan4g hX6VBeHQ4n6PbZLhdbUawE1tVyoN7Q7siz/ybNH0Uj68k87q+HOIx99Qtihw6xoj UhL2ht4Pmyhy3ACeEI2BTZESEzG/WBI= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ee+clientAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000223413176625661017346 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg Fw0xNjAxMTUwODE5NTBaGA8yMTE2MDExNjA4MTk1MFowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT 5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1 U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5 ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjfTB7MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTnm+IqrYpsOst2UeWOB5gi l+FzojAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0ETPx1+Je91OeICIQT4YGvx/JXjAJBgNVHRMEAjAA MBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMCMBkGA1UdEQQSMBCCDnNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxl MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQB+x23yjviJ9/n0G65xjntoPCLpsZtqId+WvN/9 sXGqRZyAnBWPFpWrf9qXdxXZpTw7KRfywnEVsUQP12XKCc9JH4tG4l/wCDaHi9qO pLstQskcXk40gWaU83ojjchdtDFBaxR5KxC83SR669Rw9mn66bWz/6zpK9VYohVh A5/3RqteQaeQETFbZdlb6e7jAjiGp6DmAiH/WLrVvMY8k0z81TD0+UjJqI9097mF VtNX0l+46/tR4zvyA4yYqxK+L8M57SjfwxvwUpDxxVVnRsf3kHhudeAc+UDWzqws n5P71o+AfbkYzhHsSFIZyYUnGv+JApFpcGEMEiHL2iBhCRdxMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUH AwI= -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/root+clientAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000213313176625661017736 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAyRRJx27WYOogPXZpPfAMt8ptapr/ugLWGLlw bzKySoyLpoV2/YNAvTAGB90iFq6x/ujjrK41/ES0p3v38/Qfuxo24gcZgc/oYLV2 UqR+uGCx68p2OWLYctBsARtYWOEgPhHFb9aVxcOQKyZHtivDX0wLGX+nqZoHX9IY mc0sbpRBRMzxRsChbzD5re9kZ5NrgkjA6DJ7jYh2GitOM6oIU3Dd9+pk3bCEkFUg Ry9qN/k+AyeqH1Qcb5LU+MTmlw8bmyzmMOBZgdegtO4HshcBMO054KSB3WSfBPDO bEhZ0vm/lw63TGi88yIMtlkmcU2g0RKpeQI96G6QeqHyKF3p8DAMMAoGCCsGAQUF BwMC -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/root-key-768.pem0000644000000000000000000000131513176625661016753 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIB5AIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAc4wggHKAgEAAmEAue2pKTZhWeE1qUCK QDa25I68dQpVImWqMqbOVQ8j6BAXIFbG3JB3B6kjzu2XwRbWKfYiI543j1b461U6 UGIzHCqL8FwGW1NttKuVGmhIo4fpXvMhe9+yqPBawOLftXXFAgMBAAECYH1FP4Bg /16Lepg6v+tb8gY0lY1WFN5EGVRfRw3QUaT9kldboEjjnQ8wSswVEPYr56IHZ8mH Or8LtJVrB3fjriq5vNOt7lRscuV7IcVtOyVWu5+MoJmO67Q2vRJXLWTdAQIxANtp AiqObXo8vyT+EDcOEW104PfKNVh/4fhyrDwAk/yTcxkv4dcnuTykeLPvkXq4cQIx ANjvQa+9LubMy3N1uXIbWWsiEBi4BdNK+xuppJ2puckaiQU42Mfmw/Nj4LMEJLfc lQIwCYcv3uU8f9hvfI3D6oAj5Zrzwg737hXvnDhunlRwGMHWd7uKlStWcfm6fCXl LW0hAjEAneK0egVEp3IR+PyLdcL194UZFgSJKNj/nYiAaMdokjcf1o8jJ4qKvw/I MEIpvy9pAjAzaFHKRugCN01V2dgXYYGL8+zkcwG4ehDXH1XEs4v8r3WtHBPPKED6 AemfAQJLvh8= -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ee-cert2.pem0000644000000000000000000000216713176625661016274 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg Fw0xNjAxMTUwODE5NDlaGA8yMTE2MDExNjA4MTk0OVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT 5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1 U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5 ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjfTB7MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTnm+IqrYpsOst2UeWOB5gi l+FzojAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQBaJ1v+UdTZGJOltvDcSXTMk5QrTAJBgNVHRMEAjAA MBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMBMBkGA1UdEQQSMBCCDnNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxl MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQC8XKL6Bh01xQv+3BTk4Kqu95/TEecZdBPsxU4r mCT829HsTw54Od7ID64Kzxi52RtJKPDnd3GB1tDAChEYI+U0g3582JiZCXPwxkC0 y2YEhsXgatfOj0h5eT47FdmH7YeY4S6PxNo7Ek3ma5523M6dqcbP71fLvFptu5DZ dP9+I9hxeojAeumKONzVK4ADWthqgMgVKqjV34lqNNcWDEXgOUjJwT1HXnlwnCMk PtdnDSvzHEQFt25RZwkiOjimC97FZAPmsyYmLHc4q6s81ms5M4S9dackCA6TDRvv sOzivaeM07/94iKBINFpoHpJmD9Z5zE+vH2weMVjhSQnFsGc -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/serverkey.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016677 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKgwggSkAgEAAoIBAQDVXWBq3/xh7kiq jBFIQ6VttlJdqphJsWGSNbH8OgQlDG15/7TVyelcHDvgq7O4faPebb3g3ddavxRH EUJepoLQYcF/3RNG5gmFBw7y1PwaZNIKrSCrIGuW8K3MxBlTVdwBHaSz74q0SVNd igUc8dzhRL/F1+J3GVdclwt17ohDcQ/KbMG0slCnd0ZsWA8Rv/F2JFquOUK3UWcp 4dBVMG8X5JHqrfgowkNvomSp+52YkmJIPusNT4JKiv8/cu6Wta6hwZi6732QdW3/ WlKeq/XAftCHQ9uFBwcPfTh6/dHT7mUd0+o5aoc37krT4A1u9XCswr3xbvOSlV6p 8KFllZONAgMBAAECggEADLTt7A+A2Vg2jamf0dztejY0e42QWjstI2b9PZc67fXq 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rDTjZK5S8Mi9dzVSsNlJi7PJphiEK2R1+nFYRwcBAoGBANWoIG85jpXAOnq/Kcgx Rl3YivR0Ke6r1tFlP58rT7X3EkiboXyQl5vLIFCAwUte6RGrLl1dy3Qyh80B9ySL Jx6vj42CK7vgv6A96TuVYhnXTnEI6ZvwAQ2VGaw4BizhjALs/kdSE/og9aSCs3ws KQypwAFz0tbHxaNag/bSAN0J -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ca-key-768.pem0000644000000000000000000000131513176625661016353 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIB5QIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAc8wggHLAgEAAmEAt8DS3NQPYAI89R/e KMz6yzoRNkfHOkUI5FCACwjrsPMW2VfgBA0qj9dQcPDFc75qZLEfbNYnSYSzroMD DUx301yY1Q1qEIfaH0edSebDqYeMg4UAV0Zorr6jA4/mvNVJAgMBAAECYQCJAsu3 QJ9eNQ0CsQpTXdO6aMegs5CHkCX7J1Lx52rl+7uTv4QXQUH1EtS2AbEYhmdGzMFN ZlBrg1vDsW/yn02NZzvT6xT/kvzFhQVw1i8B0YyB8wPao3f2ZxPkAfeoAAECMQDa 6VkNYlHgPOlTtwU1WYUirFczpipQsuk/lIf7B3+rVRUHoAE4nbeIRJgkKZaJEAEC MQDW4pYsyN79HEqFpOFlfsrERw3y4hLRXGeHxbfJFdAe7SUfNj28ZI2EPFE0DJhX RUkCMA39M2+jhM/rlI2A+Jg8LEHW+YuXZsTZagZiG35zMDlmqn1eQDW5/mx61a4Z 6kDAAQIwIlbZWtTK1bX0rsC3iEmny4/zSbIZAb37iXXuNcM3nAmXmhJH8Vg8STp+ W4v7uE6JAjEAwiB9wCVwG4UhvKNQ4Wd2mfJiKZQNF4rL4ID0g+Wk6kX67c7u2hfH sSaluw9nM91s -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/cca-clientAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000216313176625661017506 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDATCCAemgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNlMGMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wEwYD VR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAB6mihrap7ByLl3w P/0XsqMvOkxCxoWTeI0cEwbxSpUXfMTE24oIQJiqIyHO6qeSRgSywk/DTU0uJWOB Idr6dPI6wPrS4jvFqcgoFH1OPjAJCpl5CuCJEH8gB3LJ4dNfj+O7shT0XeI+R1vw gp+fJ8v6jX4y8Nk/Bcy748dC1HZhMWHxQblzjRu8Xmd6lDiMskoWE2JAwgRK7b3M dCpuTCHMTsdCspwBUvQ4gNYNP5IURE+09DBtEBQicN/1RHyRZOw7YGs5ZOdc5mRe O5E+WHE1xiJ0QwUu2co55PFlukidWXx7LE02foNaNm+rw4OUTrzsqmmgkp1qqAab ap/RSXgwDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAg== -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/cca+serverAuth.pem0000644000000000000000000000216313176625661017534 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDATCCAemgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNlMGMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wEwYD VR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAB6mihrap7ByLl3w P/0XsqMvOkxCxoWTeI0cEwbxSpUXfMTE24oIQJiqIyHO6qeSRgSywk/DTU0uJWOB Idr6dPI6wPrS4jvFqcgoFH1OPjAJCpl5CuCJEH8gB3LJ4dNfj+O7shT0XeI+R1vw gp+fJ8v6jX4y8Nk/Bcy748dC1HZhMWHxQblzjRu8Xmd6lDiMskoWE2JAwgRK7b3M dCpuTCHMTsdCspwBUvQ4gNYNP5IURE+09DBtEBQicN/1RHyRZOw7YGs5ZOdc5mRe O5E+WHE1xiJ0QwUu2co55PFlukidWXx7LE02foNaNm+rw4OUTrzsqmmgkp1qqAab ap/RSXgwDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAQ== -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/badalt7-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000255313176625661017136 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID1DCCArygAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAXMRUwEwYDVQQDDAxUZXN0 IE5DIENBIDEwIBcNMTYwNzA5MTQ0ODExWhgPMjExNjA3MTAxNDQ4MTFaMIGmMTsw OQYDVQQKHjIAQgBhAGQAIABOAEMAIABUAGUAcwB0ACAAQwBlAHIAdABpAGYAaQBj AGEAdABlACAANzElMCMGA1UEAx4cAG8AdABoAGUAcgAuAGcAbwBvAGQALgBvAHIA ZzEdMBsGA1UEAx4UAEoAbwBlACAAQgBsAG8AZwBnAHMxITAfBgNVBAMeGABhAG4A eQAuAGcAbwBvAGQALgBjAG8AbTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoC ggEBANStByWr70u2A49OO+LYu0ivQP+uBu2n3E6RoEYf+op/+JF3clwfMQCGqiSg QxOJMHkcu4gJDudRLCSXqHPnR0hOd+mQ5wQQJmLj8A99ImcD2oN5R3V5I4bSlXP9 GCq2pFDnwXuEcJ3d2Dt1HYO4jA4Ol/RBT3NIqmwSnQzXv98mjYFpy6AuAIaYGmbh 1DLWxsTPI2NjNafJYS85NrQDLkTpq48nCmQCJ+ly6Zzu7WuJiDKD1Rxs7ZwgNtLi Zhp41TeFHxCbfSFKe9u4rnUmImKxwgc9KuzOLpLAzD9avWpPGHtkCsLFsiw/EJYf UdeCXc7tz9WhXZzOk/ffLOcrorMCAwEAAaOBmDCBlTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUwYsR1XfZ 2cPcAR7i5i9obalnJcIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUCNGb+ebVZHCg8Wsanu1S2t31UEMw CQYDVR0TBAIwADBIBgNVHREEQTA/ggx3d3cuZ29vZC5vcmeCDGFueS5nb29kLmNv bYENZ29vZEBnb29kLm9yZ4EMYW55QGdvb2QuY29thwTAqAABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB CwUAA4IBAQAN/klfzMLi2acp5KdH9UZR4XCk3cZBOuMuI0vU+wrU/ETgY6rFhAwY gSZsO6vX0mt/G6QfOmY5+kW4FY5XavGhhNVY2x5ATZKvQCf+orIsUHOBxVTjH6az uEnxGDRTbjXSkBTCTSoOqdJNeOmEwiaHEVy/atumUW2B2KP5FeBGdud/94c4Q9/O WBJ0EICGF6hYTDra63lAjxyARTvocVakIE8zytT1SbU4yO05mYPyNdXxiXikepFE phPQWNSLx4EPBIorGCFj7MPDmFCH/+EjDjGz3SNUvqsak6MstzK94KVriQyIHKex IL5WuKFm0XSGKTX8SzyMGErMGeriveL2 -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/embeddedSCTs1-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000156713176625661020026 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICWwIBAAKBgQC+75jnwmh3rjhfdTJaDB0ym+3xj6r015a/BH634c4VyVui+A7k WL19uG+KSyUhkaeb1wDDjpwDibRc1NyaEgqyHgy0HNDnKAWkEM2cW9tdSSdyba8X EPYBhzd+olsaHjnu0LiBGdwVTcaPfajjDK8VijPmyVCfSgWwFAn/Xdh+tQIDAQAB AoGAK/daG0vt6Fkqy/hdrtSJSKUVRoGRmS2nnba4Qzlwzh1+x2kdbMFuaOu2a37g PvmeQclheKZ3EG1+Jb4yShwLcBCV6pkRJhOKuhvqGnjngr6uBH4gMCjpZVj7GDMf flYHhdJCs3Cz/TY0wKN3o1Fldil2DHR/AEOc1nImeSp5/EUCQQDjKS3W957kYtTU X5BeRjvg03Ug8tJq6IFuhTFvUJ+XQ5bAc0DmxAbQVKqRS7Wje59zTknVvS+MFdeQ pz4dGuV7AkEA1y0X2yarIls+0A/S1uwkvwRTIkfS+QwFJ1zVya8sApRdKAcidIzA b70hkKLilU9+LrXg5iZdFp8l752qJiw9jwJAXjItN/7mfH4fExGto+or2kbVQxxt 9LcFNPc2UJp2ExuL37HrL8YJrUnukOF8KJaSwBWuuFsC5GwKP4maUCdfEQJAUwBR 83c3DEmmMRvpeH4erpA8gTyzZN3+HvDwhpvLnjMcvBQEdnDUykVqbSBnxrCjO+Fs n1qtDczWFVf8Cj2GgQJAQ14Awx32Cn9sF+3M+sEVtlAf6CqiEbkYeYdSCbsplMmZ 1UoaxiwXY3z+B7epsRnnPR3KaceAlAxw2/zQJMFNOQ== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/croot-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000212713176625661016743 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDBjCCAe6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo2UwYzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB 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EDFLN1syhzOpdfjXW9TAeHwCqM/UrjSo0HtD1Tcqfh8/HHWSoHdfvegapCLKIELl OkOxia9EHXUSL51JdbruWtLYHTmiKDtDAO2e9EjGkQKBgHOEZ0u07bCyz+EZHTQb sWt1U2LztJ/cNSNqgVc4NTTna0KisjXBTbtIQeArI42GHXNBazE+KbApnHQy8f7M DJIl2/70CRTfosDdSE6DnQk672BhJ4fr6Ln/VyvcATlcv34UYiGsDY3LCf0UTdjd GsR6pGtD+3qErri9pbdxDvRC -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/bad-pc4-cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000236513176625661017033 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDfDCCAmSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5zZXJ2 ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTEQMA4GA1UEAwwHcHJveHkgMTAgFw0xNjA2MTgxOTU0NTBaGA8y MTE2MDYxOTE5NTQ1MFowPTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUxEDAOBgNV BAMMB3Byb3h5IDExEDAOBgNVBAMMB3Byb3h5IDQwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC2xxl2G3u38wzrx5uWgKiZ557ZIbLQECZgwmMbGzdrNqbD veVgTEdkIxRk0py1QUqqukhTk9OpkUrYiSUpkAMkc3yRtpCp2KZeuN6OwyeAm8Jf KUHeEvvM+GNZw/AoahgRJ5Cd9OykI4Uv3y0BzwZGXCrKDWr0Bpwcg6aQ/0+dFtd0 ElBKq2v2hHpKn4P7ZM0mpvPSEwJ5nPUDY6iuRZNVrihmuZ4UZtKsz7EFbXfqaiLz 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/croot-anyEKU.pem0000644000000000000000000000216313176625661017142 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIDBjCCAe6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDEyOTA0NDc0NloYDzIxMTYwMTMwMDQ0NzQ2WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8 oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN wCtVERc6NEIcaQ06GLDtFZRexv2eh8Yc55QaksBfBcFzQ+UD3gmRySTO2I6Lfi7g MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo2UwYzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3 o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB /zATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAi/mR+SIa bs1egGRRSAzqu4KkrOG1vGVQNj0XfHn1WeAdmwEAjNi+llErpkMyY08Cjb/3fiQc 6H9CA36utf/Ym84OQOY64m4C1Kikxw8EHudoPNvSWQAFEpCk5gs6rCJEnj9QolL3 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ncca-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325013176625661016352 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQCa5ZI7OT5fv4Gi tT2jicNz2OGT5BqPNq/rJEWkkWWfEvkjgDPfBCIcXDINaRHnwUpgUvFp0BqFRhEg mKgHBSEoSIzIlxP8uv6XGKhCiDbrycJSiyqvmveJoBCReP2Pj0dch2ioP6Fswf/z Yipg/u+kmXzK+NEJlDr0olk5A3gXise1TElgsuaZt4gXTa402JvmGIebex2fWJzY LGTWHWYdCprl898rPY1IA0pFhVBw5iIVLCug0VuAqjv743n00aBhjRqfm7P4xmH/ XT4+xEXtYWzG3RN0TG/76Y3V8VGQEHh8Pt8Wn7nZB5/buW/ftfYlPlQLaClddRZA LyMkiKM/AgMBAAECggEAfZqBDKMrkArDvUPIes9gfZU1vm3ul4kZ98wO6Ra519dT zVTNOx+n5WVhdPxpd4uGmztG5a3Jg57AjrUbM64WKAtElffkTkD352AoOOMp3eNa PwL4lzNLXP890CjTO9FMZZyr4hrO9FkQCrTkdojjnI6V4iUHpQPdFrh7Lz8/553v sfbXW0o6jRtnN8jslLs7LQY+n0QQeLuvwrJGJRdQSfubtjTOYzlE/WZJmitJMi2X 0qnoVK5B91bo3NcdFxstSgv36RL5Txsas8PfXWrFzPxqgjPjlpw1xMrF5bT3rK72 oPB+/HunqIJc0OHHs2mi38Jea0yBCaJHzniAp2INcQKBgQDLjP5STKvu+SSZGpBp T3m+i6hbmo1HzYZBSi9jJiyGB8G50G5rbGJ0c/BgjfkhfRhmJ5Ym4NVVgxQgrMHe 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MIIEogIBAAKCAQEAwTqNko5vQiQ5BQohPJ3sySrjT6JedjsKtt1OZ8ndR2C1asUi HgpVO8QDHKID88Qklx6UCieeKAwIY0VzqWzTyZWTwdqTU9t8arHHJu7IcFlmWsAL fwTmARWJmpY+K8fGnQx1Kxfi6nQJ8Whq4bcAqJ2HXzG69Wjs3Ki70ScNbQ9RUwXJ n/FeNrsphKAv5K22zBqjWAQdYMg6vtKZAXCET8jw6OkPVnUb/QvyoBEijWt0+HBh 7wLkSUvMj/7fc88+xtvGqZPyG2Py4DdWW1stpgiZ3TTohEk84t1u5L3qQaRQmVE6 y5RMImyVY8hegC4zc6aGZDFRv8MR+gk6prcuUwIDAQABAoIBAEkz4YZwJ34rMt7R 452PRrE/ajY1EQxBeeGlHZr8QrRT0ubMIAy5ZWjq7TLfvhePaz1E/FiMgcIyLMtO +G5rKCDqZbu/DqlqMUxKZWQ+efj2JWyj7LcGKAypGCRUXuE/IeNFYO4ecnzX0Rx/ rl4scjdu1mYd9PIb+f/ufJjT7qYtykmwlb0MbEJ25yjTC4iHzacvFLJgdXrPp8b9 ZGlVBKyuk9ZrZDC8/a4QrKt7Hp2SqqO4WqaTgM1G+cQFYuVBmj74bQhJHMmQ+Opr 5KXwBKEHMtJkq1GPVZ34W90V82d+8MJAxymuPomwRXKl1dKgnvny+0eobXkiBDcF XCBCmIECgYEA8c/fE7Sa1vLZriw0Meq+TxU5hru4YM6OmQ+idc6diCp2U9lW+KJr YrIRTZFcmhEGmRjAEZrdK0oFY7h5RhsZ+gTftmNZuL8WJCK9+y2DE9dB++md3oVC PK0d4SmQKsivOTTeiK/VYFGoLc8t8Ud/anu2Q1kFdC+7cH/TrRseV4MCgYEAzJDw MTil055rYlrAAH8ePEuONomu2MoZRRCX/tWuVvz+eIzA35mryW3OR45l5qNluQoZ 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TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- MIIC7DCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjANMQswCQYDVQQD DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W l9rFQtsvaWSRywjXVlp5fxuEQelNnXcJEKhsKTNExsBUZebo4/J1BWpklWzA9P0l YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9 CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBADnZ9uXGAdwfNC3xuERIlBwgLROeBRGgcfHWdXZB/tWk IM9ox88wYKWynanPbra4n0zhepooKt+naeY2HLR8UgwT6sTi0Yfld9mjytA8/DP6 AcqtIDDf60vNI00sgxjgZqofVayA9KShzIPzjBec4zI1sg5YzoSNyH28VXFstEpi 8CVtmRYQHhc2gDI9MGge4sHRYwaIFkegzpwcEUnp6tTVe9ZvHawgsXF/rCGfH4M6 uNO0D+9Md1bdW7382yOtWbkyibsugqnfBYCUH6hAhDlfYzpba2Smb0roc6Crq7HR 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openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/ca-expired.pem0000644000000000000000000000205613176625661016704 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC6jCCAdKgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 IENBMB4XDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoXDTE2MDExNDA4MTk0OVowDTELMAkGA1UEAwwC Q0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCWnaQ9AEscX8bL3Y/S MbKIFczEhixc4mmLhPSno1PfkeO/UYn78HwQDTutrDVidfV///RuVI8FppIjs59Z OdA5GLAQQN5ic4pOsI7f3OfJQSJUhIAIKbw1PIbfMN7dtCT/fmKlwHroKhY/1pfa xULbL2lkkcsI11ZaeX8bhEHpTZ13CRCobCkzRMbAVGXm6OPydQVqZJVswPT9JWFu SDbwwAMHBdZ85RH9GOhKLdNyDDcoNjExOIXocY3YAknIvBmJxYqxP6I16qqQHGRo e69naloGVA9Q4fm09r461M4/Hkx9xncyPqJY7dvddNiSFGqo98s0WJGofBSxfQiz TbFHAgMBAAGjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBS0ETPx1+Je91OeICIQT4YGvx/JXjAfBgNV HSMEGDAWgBSO9SWvHptrhD18gJrJU5xNcvejUjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqG SIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAW1MwF8Rfcgj6zHutqzzt7RQB5GT1b/vJNzgUyGTRK9kch HOw7rM9WpfP1cMEjhLwGJEZkHPb0DA8rZ4uFERuoZky04/vTum0GgLXmlnSTaAk5 ImJyJn9aFR+sbD6QyfkSmQk9yS48AHom62IfA9yVwQStq3HvI038oVEb2IO5TE+L 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-----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/certs/badalt10-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000325413176625661017042 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQDNu92PoDZIXgPC H3f87JomwNCpnrhChmbC77+FZR1wAaDrWJYu8JH8mT3sR4FFHTXuk7vXXu52Awsf 4lqEna3Cpfv+QQYhXC2O9gbqpAxdr5gvrp/M+MpB2vnaidimi+4/Li7IkjwjpPfr TPm7wmL+KNcDwbKA5j4OdMr16UVUe+PO3DdvYeAZ2QtQTF7sFMxHsaWAsu4thkEy OA60PqDdTrCFGx0vakMa38frxk2KXmTpEdjG+jrTxBwhqQrMTQg84TwJpR+o2sU9 pApIbgFpKpIRy07oGt5Jl7h9qzgTqavU0YQtpD4qXLjnCHZ4XsaL3Dg1SdF9Ka5E tz9dCt33AgMBAAECggEBAJzXPb+C2h8tXRwetXCiR5qHoAvPrpU4tRqjf5SIU3rS IwWIEWZTjFfP039Pu+Mes8Df63HzM0PQaiiyfWNgedlMhOF+XNgN18WHFhrHWY4K kbC4Jacze63c7GGIeRvuzYBpCs1pfmOGHmLJ2hEjzigIpnJ8tkLCREjtDNWQMoSG V5LznbgZ9S/2KjyvTW5ff6m4GQH3BShPPkFDICgQTulwdZT/Y8SDKx5+qX2RAtjY RguaaNSKQnOHroF+FPNPMUsK5gLZLWIdIECTi6YHaba1BThKzeKFKtQ0lWI5ebxg R4kzEPFJmEHbNplxUHSkY4ZIsWK9m09Sn72IrmVY6fECgYEA9e4+w2x/YLtnfwYT tVj+kR5MRTn6t+gOR7o6lsWGvkFqwSi0syfN8D6u3KeoYORUUY7ISCFJgIag5Y5V Hp8T23O4rRcWuoAmolxNyvYiUYsVdflDbAZFKMSvrAv3XlRRf0vJYXym32k8KAhx 1qo1zTl7THWM/skv/SF+VMItnO0CgYEA1ihKz8LbtPcbsOaivJX7cXVf1AuRty6F lKX8QIGg0ppq/EFkZDWg7+OCVneO53bFVDDqKoiM4Dq9+aA6Dgx4fjFof8rUaCet H/isEkjcvEmG2a71PU/moamDuZDu8yRodUl4zyjqthQgc2n6ryV/ZIU8vNZmjpIr EhITW8/mbfMCgYEA7UMjpDA5l55VlDPNscihGGpNlQABxYmItWSSf8EjZMwB7UaT RsChKyWeV90cUhYWzvRcf1I18lxwP+eYcUlxw+eaBMvgrp9SJpO8rZHWvCrd0opf pIlMEa/n96k3xva8BX6dU4MKD0IculajVUGzVEIflT1XgLuio6i7k5Qeo2UCgYA3 I8SvXbKIE5/Tmm6IM+27tsbnp9rq2VWXgm1Chp3L2+pz7LpWeuBnI6LpdHsc6Z3B IZ8JOINdMIK9hR2thFR52WrYjHbIIn8W3kYfpxb+e8f2wG9wS+RL94NtAf4kKFmk 6TfrztMv8lqwnLbo5bS5QvzyehmJ1+SzEGhfmVXxNQKBgQCULij+SMWsFC/gPJHh BCnx12Dx9t5+qE4vrjtNumCCnj9i0nRPludbWapRfHyfe0WlhpnnHo2OTFcl3qna wBln8Km2CWNsX/QeosZBPr5KAakfD+l8LieK350t7yE1LEboYCZkBNCG2gJXIyTs o5DsYNoxX/IWq2EbB6qQ3Cys6w== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/test/ssl_test.c0000644000000000000000000003004113176625662015040 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "handshake_helper.h" #include "ssl_test_ctx.h" #include "testutil.h" static CONF *conf = NULL; /* Currently the section names are of the form test-, e.g. test-15. */ #define MAX_TESTCASE_NAME_LENGTH 100 typedef struct ssl_test_ctx_test_fixture { const char *test_case_name; char test_app[MAX_TESTCASE_NAME_LENGTH]; } SSL_TEST_FIXTURE; static SSL_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name) { SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; return fixture; } static const char *print_alert(int alert) { return alert ? SSL_alert_desc_string_long(alert) : "no alert"; } static int check_result(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { if (result->result != test_ctx->expected_result) { fprintf(stderr, "ExpectedResult mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n", ssl_test_result_name(test_ctx->expected_result), ssl_test_result_name(result->result)); return 0; } return 1; } static int check_alerts(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { if (result->client_alert_sent != result->client_alert_received) { fprintf(stderr, "Client sent alert %s but server received %s\n.", print_alert(result->client_alert_sent), print_alert(result->client_alert_received)); /* * We can't bail here because the peer doesn't always get far enough * to process a received alert. Specifically, in protocol version * negotiation tests, we have the following scenario. * Client supports TLS v1.2 only; Server supports TLS v1.1. * Client proposes TLS v1.2; server responds with 1.1; * Client now sends a protocol alert, using TLS v1.2 in the header. * The server, however, rejects the alert because of version mismatch * in the record layer; therefore, the server appears to never * receive the alert. */ /* return 0; */ } if (result->server_alert_sent != result->server_alert_received) { fprintf(stderr, "Server sent alert %s but client received %s\n.", print_alert(result->server_alert_sent), print_alert(result->server_alert_received)); /* return 0; */ } /* Tolerate an alert if one wasn't explicitly specified in the test. */ if (test_ctx->expected_client_alert /* * The info callback alert value is computed as * (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1] * where the low byte is the alert code and the high byte is other stuff. */ && (result->client_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->expected_client_alert) { fprintf(stderr, "ClientAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n", print_alert(test_ctx->expected_client_alert), print_alert(result->client_alert_sent)); return 0; } if (test_ctx->expected_server_alert && (result->server_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->expected_server_alert) { fprintf(stderr, "ServerAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n", print_alert(test_ctx->expected_server_alert), print_alert(result->server_alert_sent)); return 0; } if (result->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent > 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d fatal alerts.\n", result->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent); return 0; } if (result->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent > 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Server sent %d alerts.\n", result->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent); return 0; } return 1; } static int check_protocol(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { if (result->client_protocol != result->server_protocol) { fprintf(stderr, "Client has protocol %s but server has %s\n.", ssl_protocol_name(result->client_protocol), ssl_protocol_name(result->server_protocol)); return 0; } if (test_ctx->expected_protocol) { if (result->client_protocol != test_ctx->expected_protocol) { fprintf(stderr, "Protocol mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n", ssl_protocol_name(test_ctx->expected_protocol), ssl_protocol_name(result->client_protocol)); return 0; } } return 1; } static int check_servername(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { if (result->servername != test_ctx->expected_servername) { fprintf(stderr, "Client ServerName mismatch, expected %s, got %s\n.", ssl_servername_name(test_ctx->expected_servername), ssl_servername_name(result->servername)); return 0; } return 1; } static int check_session_ticket(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { if (test_ctx->session_ticket_expected == SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_IGNORE) return 1; if (result->session_ticket != test_ctx->session_ticket_expected) { fprintf(stderr, "Client SessionTicketExpected mismatch, expected %s, got %s\n.", ssl_session_ticket_name(test_ctx->session_ticket_expected), ssl_session_ticket_name(result->session_ticket)); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG static int check_npn(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { int ret = 1; ret &= strings_equal("NPN Negotiated (client vs server)", result->client_npn_negotiated, result->server_npn_negotiated); ret &= strings_equal("ExpectedNPNProtocol", test_ctx->expected_npn_protocol, result->client_npn_negotiated); return ret; } #endif static int check_alpn(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { int ret = 1; ret &= strings_equal("ALPN Negotiated (client vs server)", result->client_alpn_negotiated, result->server_alpn_negotiated); ret &= strings_equal("ExpectedALPNProtocol", test_ctx->expected_alpn_protocol, result->client_alpn_negotiated); return ret; } static int check_resumption(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { if (result->client_resumed != result->server_resumed) { fprintf(stderr, "Resumption mismatch (client vs server): %d vs %d\n", result->client_resumed, result->server_resumed); return 0; } if (result->client_resumed != test_ctx->resumption_expected) { fprintf(stderr, "ResumptionExpected mismatch: %d vs %d\n", test_ctx->resumption_expected, result->client_resumed); return 0; } return 1; } static int check_tmp_key(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { if (test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type == 0 || test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type == result->tmp_key_type) return 1; fprintf(stderr, "Tmp key type mismatch, %s vs %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(test_ctx->expected_tmp_key_type), OBJ_nid2ln(result->tmp_key_type)); return 0; } /* * This could be further simplified by constructing an expected * HANDSHAKE_RESULT, and implementing comparison methods for * its fields. */ static int check_test(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) { int ret = 1; ret &= check_result(result, test_ctx); ret &= check_alerts(result, test_ctx); if (result->result == SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) { ret &= check_protocol(result, test_ctx); ret &= check_servername(result, test_ctx); ret &= check_session_ticket(result, test_ctx); ret &= (result->session_ticket_do_not_call == 0); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ret &= check_npn(result, test_ctx); #endif ret &= check_alpn(result, test_ctx); ret &= check_resumption(result, test_ctx); ret &= check_tmp_key(result, test_ctx); } return ret; } static int execute_test(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { int ret = 0; SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL, *server2_ctx = NULL, *client_ctx = NULL, *resume_server_ctx = NULL, *resume_client_ctx = NULL; SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx = NULL; HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result = NULL; test_ctx = SSL_TEST_CTX_create(conf, fixture.test_app); if (test_ctx == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (test_ctx->method == SSL_TEST_METHOD_DTLS) { server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method()); if (test_ctx->extra.server.servername_callback != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE) { server2_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method()); TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); } client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method()); if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) { resume_server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_server_method()); resume_client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method()); TEST_check(resume_server_ctx != NULL); TEST_check(resume_client_ctx != NULL); } } #endif if (test_ctx->method == SSL_TEST_METHOD_TLS) { server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); /* SNI on resumption isn't supported/tested yet. */ if (test_ctx->extra.server.servername_callback != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_CB_NONE) { server2_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); } client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME) { resume_server_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); resume_client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); TEST_check(resume_server_ctx != NULL); TEST_check(resume_client_ctx != NULL); } } TEST_check(server_ctx != NULL); TEST_check(client_ctx != NULL); TEST_check(CONF_modules_load(conf, fixture.test_app, 0) > 0); if (!SSL_CTX_config(server_ctx, "server") || !SSL_CTX_config(client_ctx, "client")) { goto err; } if (server2_ctx != NULL && !SSL_CTX_config(server2_ctx, "server2")) goto err; if (resume_server_ctx != NULL && !SSL_CTX_config(resume_server_ctx, "resume-server")) goto err; if (resume_client_ctx != NULL && !SSL_CTX_config(resume_client_ctx, "resume-client")) goto err; result = do_handshake(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, resume_server_ctx, resume_client_ctx, test_ctx); ret = check_test(result, test_ctx); err: CONF_modules_unload(0); SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx); SSL_CTX_free(server2_ctx); SSL_CTX_free(client_ctx); SSL_CTX_free(resume_server_ctx); SSL_CTX_free(resume_client_ctx); SSL_TEST_CTX_free(test_ctx); if (ret != 1) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result); return ret; } static void tear_down(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { } #define SETUP_SSL_TEST_FIXTURE() \ SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(SSL_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up) #define EXECUTE_SSL_TEST() \ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down) static int test_handshake(int idx) { SETUP_SSL_TEST_FIXTURE(); BIO_snprintf(fixture.test_app, sizeof(fixture.test_app), "test-%d", idx); EXECUTE_SSL_TEST(); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int result = 0; long num_tests; if (argc != 2) return 1; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); TEST_check(conf != NULL); /* argv[1] should point to the test conf file */ TEST_check(NCONF_load(conf, argv[1], NULL) > 0); TEST_check(NCONF_get_number_e(conf, NULL, "num_tests", &num_tests)); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_handshake, (int)(num_tests)); result = run_tests(argv[0]); return result; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/r160test.c0000644000000000000000000000051613176625661014573 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ openssl-1.1.0g/test/threadstest.c0000644000000000000000000001150113176625662015532 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if defined(_WIN32) # include #endif #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) || defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) typedef unsigned int thread_t; static int run_thread(thread_t *t, void (*f)(void)) { f(); return 1; } static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread) { return 1; } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) typedef HANDLE thread_t; static DWORD WINAPI thread_run(LPVOID arg) { void (*f)(void); *(void **) (&f) = arg; f(); return 0; } static int run_thread(thread_t *t, void (*f)(void)) { *t = CreateThread(NULL, 0, thread_run, *(void **) &f, 0, NULL); return *t != NULL; } static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread) { return WaitForSingleObject(thread, INFINITE) == 0; } #else typedef pthread_t thread_t; static void *thread_run(void *arg) { void (*f)(void); *(void **) (&f) = arg; f(); return NULL; } static int run_thread(thread_t *t, void (*f)(void)) { return pthread_create(t, NULL, thread_run, *(void **) &f) == 0; } static int wait_for_thread(thread_t thread) { return pthread_join(thread, NULL) == 0; } #endif static int test_lock(void) { CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(lock)) { fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock() failed\n"); return 0; } if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock)) { fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock() failed\n"); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(lock); return 1; } static CRYPTO_ONCE once_run = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static unsigned once_run_count = 0; static void once_do_run(void) { once_run_count++; } static void once_run_thread_cb(void) { CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&once_run, once_do_run); } static int test_once(void) { thread_t thread; if (!run_thread(&thread, once_run_thread_cb) || !wait_for_thread(thread)) { fprintf(stderr, "run_thread() failed\n"); return 0; } if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&once_run, once_do_run)) { fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() failed\n"); return 0; } if (once_run_count != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "once run %u times\n", once_run_count); return 0; } return 1; } static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL thread_local_key; static unsigned destructor_run_count = 0; static int thread_local_thread_cb_ok = 0; static void thread_local_destructor(void *arg) { unsigned *count; if (arg == NULL) return; count = arg; (*count)++; } static void thread_local_thread_cb(void) { void *ptr; ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key); if (ptr != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "ptr not NULL\n"); return; } if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&thread_local_key, &destructor_run_count)) { fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local() failed\n"); return; } ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key); if (ptr != &destructor_run_count) { fprintf(stderr, "invalid ptr\n"); return; } thread_local_thread_cb_ok = 1; } static int test_thread_local(void) { thread_t thread; void *ptr = NULL; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&thread_local_key, thread_local_destructor)) { fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local() failed\n"); return 0; } ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key); if (ptr != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "ptr not NULL\n"); return 0; } if (!run_thread(&thread, thread_local_thread_cb) || !wait_for_thread(thread)) { fprintf(stderr, "run_thread() failed\n"); return 0; } if (thread_local_thread_cb_ok != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "thread-local thread callback failed\n"); return 0; } #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) ptr = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&thread_local_key); if (ptr != NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "ptr not NULL\n"); return 0; } # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) if (destructor_run_count != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "thread-local destructor run %u times\n", destructor_run_count); return 0; } # endif #endif if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&thread_local_key)) { fprintf(stderr, "CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local() failed\n"); return 0; } return 1; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (!test_lock()) return 1; if (!test_once()) return 1; if (!test_thread_local()) return 1; printf("PASS\n"); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/testutil.c0000644000000000000000000000575513176625662015073 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "testutil.h" #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" /* * Declares the structures needed to register each test case function. */ typedef struct test_info { const char *test_case_name; int (*test_fn) (); int (*param_test_fn)(int idx); int num; } TEST_INFO; static TEST_INFO all_tests[1024]; static int num_tests = 0; /* * A parameterised tests runs a loop of test cases. * |num_test_cases| counts the total number of test cases * across all tests. */ static int num_test_cases = 0; void add_test(const char *test_case_name, int (*test_fn) ()) { assert(num_tests != OSSL_NELEM(all_tests)); all_tests[num_tests].test_case_name = test_case_name; all_tests[num_tests].test_fn = test_fn; all_tests[num_tests].num = -1; ++num_test_cases; ++num_tests; } void add_all_tests(const char *test_case_name, int(*test_fn)(int idx), int num) { assert(num_tests != OSSL_NELEM(all_tests)); all_tests[num_tests].test_case_name = test_case_name; all_tests[num_tests].param_test_fn = test_fn; all_tests[num_tests].num = num; ++num_tests; num_test_cases += num; } int run_tests(const char *test_prog_name) { int num_failed = 0; int i, j; printf("%s: %d test case%s\n", test_prog_name, num_test_cases, num_test_cases == 1 ? "" : "s"); for (i = 0; i != num_tests; ++i) { if (all_tests[i].num == -1) { if (!all_tests[i].test_fn()) { printf("** %s failed **\n--------\n", all_tests[i].test_case_name); ++num_failed; } } else { for (j = 0; j < all_tests[i].num; j++) { if (!all_tests[i].param_test_fn(j)) { printf("** %s failed test %d\n--------\n", all_tests[i].test_case_name, j); ++num_failed; } } } } if (num_failed != 0) { printf("%s: %d test%s failed (out of %d)\n", test_prog_name, num_failed, num_failed != 1 ? "s" : "", num_test_cases); return EXIT_FAILURE; } printf(" All tests passed.\n"); return EXIT_SUCCESS; } static const char *print_string_maybe_null(const char *s) { return s == NULL ? "(NULL)" : s; } int strings_equal(const char *desc, const char *s1, const char *s2) { if (s1 == NULL && s2 == NULL) return 1; if (s1 == NULL || s2 == NULL || strcmp(s1, s2) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s mismatch: %s vs %s\n", desc, print_string_maybe_null(s1), print_string_maybe_null(s2)); return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/exptest.c0000644000000000000000000001536413176625661014706 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #define NUM_BITS (BN_BITS2 * 4) static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; /* * Test that r == 0 in test_exp_mod_zero(). Returns one on success, * returns zero and prints debug output otherwise. */ static int a_is_zero_mod_one(const char *method, const BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a) { if (!BN_is_zero(r)) { fprintf(stderr, "%s failed:\n", method); fprintf(stderr, "a ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n"); fprintf(stderr, "a = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, a); fprintf(stderr, "\nr = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, r); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); return 0; } return 1; } /* * test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success. */ static int test_exp_mod_zero() { BIGNUM *a = NULL, *p = NULL, *m = NULL; BIGNUM *r = NULL; BN_ULONG one_word = 1; BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); int ret = 1, failed = 0; m = BN_new(); if (!m) goto err; BN_one(m); a = BN_new(); if (!a) goto err; BN_one(a); p = BN_new(); if (!p) goto err; BN_zero(p); r = BN_new(); if (!r) goto err; if (!BN_rand(a, 1024, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx)) goto err; if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp", r, a)) failed = 1; if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx)) goto err; if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_recp", r, a)) failed = 1; if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(r, a, p, m, ctx)) goto err; if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_simple", r, a)) failed = 1; if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL)) goto err; if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont", r, a)) failed = 1; if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL)) { goto err; } if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime", r, a)) failed = 1; /* * A different codepath exists for single word multiplication * in non-constant-time only. */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, one_word, p, m, ctx, NULL)) goto err; if (!BN_is_zero(r)) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_word failed:\n"); fprintf(stderr, "1 ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n"); fprintf(stderr, "r = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, r); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); return 0; } ret = failed; err: BN_free(r); BN_free(a); BN_free(p); BN_free(m); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIO *out = NULL; int i, ret; unsigned char c; BIGNUM *r_mont, *r_mont_const, *r_recp, *r_simple, *a, *b, *m; RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_rand may fail, and we * don't even check its return * value (which we should) */ ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) EXIT(1); r_mont = BN_new(); r_mont_const = BN_new(); r_recp = BN_new(); r_simple = BN_new(); a = BN_new(); b = BN_new(); m = BN_new(); if ((r_mont == NULL) || (r_recp == NULL) || (a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) goto err; out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) EXIT(1); BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); for (i = 0; i < 200; i++) { RAND_bytes(&c, 1); c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2; BN_rand(a, NUM_BITS + c, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY); RAND_bytes(&c, 1); c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2; BN_rand(b, NUM_BITS + c, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY); RAND_bytes(&c, 1); c = (c % BN_BITS) - BN_BITS2; BN_rand(m, NUM_BITS + c, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD); BN_mod(a, a, m, ctx); BN_mod(b, b, m, ctx); ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r_mont, a, b, m, ctx, NULL); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_mont() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r_recp, a, b, m, ctx); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_recp() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r_simple, a, b, m, ctx); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_simple() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r_mont_const, a, b, m, ctx, NULL); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont) == 0 && BN_cmp(r_simple, r_recp) == 0 && BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont_const) == 0) { printf("."); fflush(stdout); } else { if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont) != 0) printf("\nsimple and mont results differ\n"); if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont_const) != 0) printf("\nsimple and mont const time results differ\n"); if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_recp) != 0) printf("\nsimple and recp results differ\n"); printf("a (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(a)); BN_print(out, a); printf("\nb (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(b)); BN_print(out, b); printf("\nm (%3d) = ", BN_num_bits(m)); BN_print(out, m); printf("\nsimple ="); BN_print(out, r_simple); printf("\nrecp ="); BN_print(out, r_recp); printf("\nmont ="); BN_print(out, r_mont); printf("\nmont_ct ="); BN_print(out, r_mont_const); printf("\n"); EXIT(1); } } BN_free(r_mont); BN_free(r_mont_const); BN_free(r_recp); BN_free(r_simple); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(m); BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (test_exp_mod_zero() != 0) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out) <= 0) goto err; #endif BIO_free(out); printf("\n"); printf("done\n"); EXIT(0); err: ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } openssl-1.1.0g/test/d2i_test.c0000644000000000000000000001235113176625661014720 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Regression tests for ASN.1 parsing bugs. */ #include #include #include "testutil.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS # include #endif #include "e_os.h" static const ASN1_ITEM *item_type; static const char *test_file; typedef enum { ASN1_UNKNOWN, ASN1_OK, ASN1_BIO, ASN1_DECODE, ASN1_ENCODE, ASN1_COMPARE } expected_error_t; typedef struct { const char *str; expected_error_t code; } error_enum; static expected_error_t expected_error = ASN1_UNKNOWN; typedef struct d2i_test_fixture { const char *test_case_name; } D2I_TEST_FIXTURE; static D2I_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name) { D2I_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; return fixture; } static int execute_test(D2I_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { BIO *bio = NULL; ASN1_VALUE *value = NULL; int ret = 0; unsigned char buf[2048]; const unsigned char *buf_ptr = buf; unsigned char *der = NULL; int derlen; int len; if ((bio = BIO_new_file(test_file, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (expected_error == ASN1_BIO) { value = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(item_type, bio, NULL); if (value == NULL) ret = 1; goto err; } /* * Unless we are testing it we don't use ASN1_item_d2i_bio because it * performs sanity checks on the input and can reject it before the * decoder is called. */ len = BIO_read(bio, buf, sizeof buf); if (len < 0) goto err; value = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &buf_ptr, len, item_type); if (value == NULL) { if (expected_error == ASN1_DECODE) ret = 1; goto err; } derlen = ASN1_item_i2d(value, &der, item_type); if (der == NULL || derlen < 0) { if (expected_error == ASN1_ENCODE) ret = 1; goto err; } if (derlen != len || memcmp(der, buf, derlen) != 0) { if (expected_error == ASN1_COMPARE) ret = 1; goto err; } if (expected_error == ASN1_OK) ret = 1; err: /* Don't indicate success for memory allocation errors */ if (ret == 1 && ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE) ret = 0; BIO_free(bio); OPENSSL_free(der); ASN1_item_free(value, item_type); return ret; } static void tear_down(D2I_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } #define SETUP_D2I_TEST_FIXTURE() \ SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(D2I_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up) #define EXECUTE_D2I_TEST() \ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_test, tear_down) static int test_bad_asn1() { SETUP_D2I_TEST_FIXTURE(); EXECUTE_D2I_TEST(); } /* * Usage: d2i_test , e.g. * d2i_test generalname bad_generalname.der */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { int result = 0; const char *test_type_name; const char *expected_error_string; const char *p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); size_t i; static ASN1_ITEM_EXP *items[] = { ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ANY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509), ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS ASN1_ITEM_ref(CMS_ContentInfo) #endif }; static error_enum expected_errors[] = { {"OK", ASN1_OK}, {"BIO", ASN1_BIO}, {"decode", ASN1_DECODE}, {"encode", ASN1_ENCODE}, {"compare", ASN1_COMPARE} }; if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: d2i_test item_name expected_error file.der\n"); return 1; } test_type_name = argv[1]; expected_error_string = argv[2]; test_file = argv[3]; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(items); i++) { const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(items[i]); if (strcmp(test_type_name, it->sname) == 0) { item_type = it; break; } } if (item_type == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown type %s\n", test_type_name); fprintf(stderr, "Supported types:\n"); for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(items); i++) { const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(items[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\t%s\n", it->sname); } return 1; } for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(expected_errors); i++) { if (strcmp(expected_errors[i].str, expected_error_string) == 0) { expected_error = expected_errors[i].code; break; } } if (expected_error == ASN1_UNKNOWN) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown expected error %s\n", expected_error_string); return 1; } ADD_TEST(test_bad_asn1); result = run_tests(argv[0]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr) <= 0) result = 1; #endif return result; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/v3nametest.c0000644000000000000000000002634513176625662015305 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #include static const char *const names[] = { "a", "b", ".", "*", "@", ".a", "a.", ".b", "b.", ".*", "*.", "*@", "@*", "a@", "@a", "b@", "..", "-example.com", "example-.com", "@@", "**", "*.com", "*com", "*.*.com", "*com", "com*", "*example.com", "*@example.com", "test@*.example.com", "example.com", "www.example.com", "test.www.example.com", "*.example.com", "*.www.example.com", "test.*.example.com", "www.*.com", ".www.example.com", "*www.example.com", "example.net", "xn--rger-koa.example.com", "*.xn--rger-koa.example.com", "www.xn--rger-koa.example.com", "*.good--example.com", "www.good--example.com", "*.xn--bar.com", "xn--foo.xn--bar.com", "a.example.com", "b.example.com", "postmaster@example.com", "Postmaster@example.com", "postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM", NULL }; static const char *const exceptions[] = { "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [a.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [b.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [www.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*.example.com] matches [xn--rger-koa.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [test.www.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]", "set CN: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]", "set CN: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]", "set CN: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]", "set CN: host-no-wildcards: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set CN: host-no-wildcards: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set emailAddress: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]", "set emailAddress: email: [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]", "set emailAddress: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@example.com]", "set emailAddress: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM]", "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [www.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [a.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [b.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.example.com] matches [xn--rger-koa.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [test.www.example.com]", "set dnsName: host-no-wildcards: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set dnsName: host-no-wildcards: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]", "set dnsName: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]", "set rfc822Name: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]", "set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@example.com]", "set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM]", "set rfc822Name: email: [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]", NULL }; static int is_exception(const char *msg) { const char *const *p; for (p = exceptions; *p; ++p) if (strcmp(msg, *p) == 0) return 1; return 0; } static int set_cn(X509 *crt, ...) { int ret = 0; X509_NAME *n = NULL; va_list ap; va_start(ap, crt); n = X509_NAME_new(); if (n == NULL) goto out; while (1) { int nid; const char *name; nid = va_arg(ap, int); if (nid == 0) break; name = va_arg(ap, const char *); if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)name, -1, -1, 1)) goto out; } if (!X509_set_subject_name(crt, n)) goto out; ret = 1; out: X509_NAME_free(n); va_end(ap); return ret; } /*- int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); */ static int set_altname(X509 *crt, ...) { int ret = 0; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL; ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5 = NULL; va_list ap; va_start(ap, crt); gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null(); if (gens == NULL) goto out; while (1) { int type; const char *name; type = va_arg(ap, int); if (type == 0) break; name = va_arg(ap, const char *); gen = GENERAL_NAME_new(); if (gen == NULL) goto out; ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new(); if (ia5 == NULL) goto out; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(ia5, name, -1)) goto out; switch (type) { case GEN_EMAIL: case GEN_DNS: GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(gen, type, ia5); ia5 = NULL; break; default: abort(); } sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen); gen = NULL; } if (!X509_add1_ext_i2d(crt, NID_subject_alt_name, gens, 0, 0)) goto out; ret = 1; out: ASN1_IA5STRING_free(ia5); GENERAL_NAME_free(gen); GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); va_end(ap); return ret; } static int set_cn1(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, name, 0); } static int set_cn_and_email(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, name, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "dummy@example.com", 0); } static int set_cn2(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, "dummy value", NID_commonName, name, 0); } static int set_cn3(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_commonName, name, NID_commonName, "dummy value", 0); } static int set_email1(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name, 0); } static int set_email2(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "dummy@example.com", NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name, 0); } static int set_email3(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "dummy@example.com", 0); } static int set_email_and_cn(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_cn(crt, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, name, NID_commonName, "www.example.org", 0); } static int set_altname_dns(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_altname(crt, GEN_DNS, name, 0); } static int set_altname_email(X509 *crt, const char *name) { return set_altname(crt, GEN_EMAIL, name, 0); } struct set_name_fn { int (*fn) (X509 *, const char *); const char *name; int host; int email; }; static const struct set_name_fn name_fns[] = { {set_cn1, "set CN", 1, 0}, {set_cn2, "set CN", 1, 0}, {set_cn3, "set CN", 1, 0}, {set_cn_and_email, "set CN", 1, 0}, {set_email1, "set emailAddress", 0, 1}, {set_email2, "set emailAddress", 0, 1}, {set_email3, "set emailAddress", 0, 1}, {set_email_and_cn, "set emailAddress", 0, 1}, {set_altname_dns, "set dnsName", 1, 0}, {set_altname_email, "set rfc822Name", 0, 1}, {NULL, NULL, 0} }; static X509 *make_cert() { X509 *ret = NULL; X509 *crt = NULL; X509_NAME *issuer = NULL; crt = X509_new(); if (crt == NULL) goto out; if (!X509_set_version(crt, 3)) goto out; ret = crt; crt = NULL; out: X509_NAME_free(issuer); return ret; } static int errors; static void check_message(const struct set_name_fn *fn, const char *op, const char *nameincert, int match, const char *name) { char msg[1024]; if (match < 0) return; BIO_snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s: %s: [%s] %s [%s]", fn->name, op, nameincert, match ? "matches" : "does not match", name); if (is_exception(msg)) return; puts(msg); ++errors; } static void run_cert(X509 *crt, const char *nameincert, const struct set_name_fn *fn) { const char *const *pname = names; while (*pname) { int samename = strcasecmp(nameincert, *pname) == 0; size_t namelen = strlen(*pname); char *name = malloc(namelen); int match, ret; memcpy(name, *pname, namelen); ret = X509_check_host(crt, name, namelen, 0, NULL); match = -1; if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "internal error in X509_check_host"); ++errors; } else if (fn->host) { if (ret == 1 && !samename) match = 1; if (ret == 0 && samename) match = 0; } else if (ret == 1) match = 1; check_message(fn, "host", nameincert, match, *pname); ret = X509_check_host(crt, name, namelen, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS, NULL); match = -1; if (ret < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "internal error in X509_check_host"); ++errors; } else if (fn->host) { if (ret == 1 && !samename) match = 1; if (ret == 0 && samename) match = 0; } else if (ret == 1) match = 1; check_message(fn, "host-no-wildcards", nameincert, match, *pname); ret = X509_check_email(crt, name, namelen, 0); match = -1; if (fn->email) { if (ret && !samename) match = 1; if (!ret && samename && strchr(nameincert, '@') != NULL) match = 0; } else if (ret) match = 1; check_message(fn, "email", nameincert, match, *pname); ++pname; free(name); } } int main(void) { const struct set_name_fn *pfn = name_fns; while (pfn->name) { const char *const *pname = names; while (*pname) { X509 *crt = make_cert(); if (crt == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "make_cert failed\n"); return 1; } if (!pfn->fn(crt, *pname)) { fprintf(stderr, "X509 name setting failed\n"); return 1; } run_cert(crt, *pname, pfn); X509_free(crt); ++pname; } ++pfn; } return errors > 0 ? 1 : 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/test/CAssrsa.cnf0000644000000000000000000000130413176625661015062 0ustar rootroot# # SSLeay example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # create RSA certs - CA RANDFILE = ./.rnd #################################################################### [ req ] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name encrypt_key = no [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = ES countryName_value = ES organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) organizationName_value = Hermanos Locos commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) commonName_value = Hermanos Locos CA openssl-1.1.0g/.travis-create-release.sh0000644000000000000000000000040213176625655016656 0ustar rootroot#! /bin/sh # $1 is expected to be $TRAVIS_OS_NAME ./Configure dist if [ "$1" == osx ]; then make NAME='_srcdist' TARFILE='_srcdist.tar' \ TAR_COMMAND='$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf -' tar else make TARFILE='_srcdist.tar' NAME='_srcdist' dist fi openssl-1.1.0g/build.info0000644000000000000000000000435213176625656014042 0ustar rootrootLIBS=libcrypto libssl ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto ORDINALS[libssl]=ssl INCLUDE[libcrypto]=. crypto/include include INCLUDE[libssl]=. include DEPEND[libssl]=libcrypto # Empty DEPEND "indices" means the dependencies are expected to be built # unconditionally before anything else. DEPEND[]=include/openssl/opensslconf.h crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h \ crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h DEPEND[include/openssl/opensslconf.h]=configdata.pm GENERATE[include/openssl/opensslconf.h]=include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in DEPEND[crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h]=configdata.pm GENERATE[crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h]=crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in DEPEND[crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h]=configdata.pm GENERATE[crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h]=crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^Cygwin/ -}] SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=cygcrypto-{- $config{shlib_major}.".".$config{shlib_minor} -} SHARED_NAME[libssl]=cygssl-{- $config{shlib_major}.".".$config{shlib_minor} -} ELSIF[{- $config{target} =~ /^mingw/ -}] SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=libcrypto-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $config{target} eq "mingw64" ? "-x64" : "" -} SHARED_NAME[libssl]=libssl-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $config{target} eq "mingw64" ? "-x64" : "" -} ELSIF[{- $config{target} =~ /^VC-/ -}] SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=libcrypto-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $target{multilib} -} SHARED_NAME[libssl]=libssl-{- $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} -}{- $target{multilib} -} ENDIF # VMS has a cultural standard where all libraries are prefixed. # For OpenSSL, the choice is 'ossl$' (this prefix was claimed in a # conversation with VSI, Tuesday January 26 2016) # Also, it seems it's usual to have the pointer size the libraries # were built for as part of the name. IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^vms/ -}] RENAME[libcrypto]=ossl$libcrypto{- $target{pointer_size} -} RENAME[libssl]=ossl$libssl{- $target{pointer_size} -} SHARED_NAME[libcrypto]=ossl$libcrypto{- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -}_shr{- $target{pointer_size} -} SHARED_NAME[libssl]=ossl$libssl{- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -}_shr{- $target{pointer_size} -} ENDIF openssl-1.1.0g/.travis-apt-pin.preferences0000644000000000000000000000040013176625655017232 0ustar rootrootPackage: clang-3.9 Pin: release o=Ubuntu Pin-Priority: -1 Package: libclang-common-3.9-dev Pin: release o=Ubuntu Pin-Priority: -1 Package: libclang1-3.9 Pin: release o=Ubuntu Pin-Priority: -1 Package: libllvm3.9v4 Pin: release o=Ubuntu Pin-Priority: -1 openssl-1.1.0g/.gitattributes0000644000000000000000000000006213176625655014752 0ustar rootroot*.der binary /fuzz/corpora/** binary *.pfx binary openssl-1.1.0g/NOTES.DJGPP0000644000000000000000000000405713176625655013545 0ustar rootroot INSTALLATION ON THE DOS PLATFORM WITH DJGPP ------------------------------------------- OpenSSL has been ported to DJGPP, a Unix look-alike 32-bit run-time environment for 16-bit DOS, but only with long filename support. If you wish to compile on native DOS with 8+3 filenames, you will have to tweak the installation yourself, including renaming files with illegal or duplicate names. You should have a full DJGPP environment installed, including the latest versions of DJGPP, GCC, BINUTILS, BASH, etc. This package requires that PERL and the PERL module Text::Template also be installed (see NOTES.PERL). All of these can be obtained from the usual DJGPP mirror sites or directly at "http://www.delorie.com/pub/djgpp". For help on which files to download, see the DJGPP "ZIP PICKER" page at "http://www.delorie.com/djgpp/zip-picker.html". You also need to have the WATT-32 networking package installed before you try to compile OpenSSL. This can be obtained from "http://www.watt-32.net/". The Makefile assumes that the WATT-32 code is in the directory specified by the environment variable WATT_ROOT. If you have watt-32 in directory "watt32" under your main DJGPP directory, specify WATT_ROOT="/dev/env/DJDIR/watt32". To compile OpenSSL, start your BASH shell, then configure for DJGPP by running "./Configure" with appropriate arguments: ./Configure no-threads --prefix=/dev/env/DJDIR DJGPP And finally fire up "make". You may run out of DPMI selectors when running in a DOS box under Windows. If so, just close the BASH shell, go back to Windows, and restart BASH. Then run "make" again. RUN-TIME CAVEAT LECTOR -------------- Quoting FAQ: "Cryptographic software needs a source of unpredictable data to work correctly. Many open source operating systems provide a "randomness device" (/dev/urandom or /dev/random) that serves this purpose." As of version 0.9.7f DJGPP port checks upon /dev/urandom$ for a 3rd party "randomness" DOS driver. One such driver, NOISE.SYS, can be obtained from "http://www.rahul.net/dkaufman/index.html". openssl-1.1.0g/config0000755000000000000000000006655013176625656013271 0ustar rootroot#!/bin/sh # Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # OpenSSL config: determine the operating system and run ./Configure # Derived from minarch and GuessOS from Apache. # # Do "config -h" for usage information. SUFFIX="" DRYRUN="false" VERBOSE="false" EXE="" THERE=`dirname $0` # pick up any command line args to config for i do case "$i" in -d*) options=$options" --debug";; -t*) DRYRUN="true" VERBOSE="true";; -v*) VERBOSE="true";; -h*) DRYRUN="true"; cat </dev/null` || MACHINE="unknown" [ "$RELEASE" ] || RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || RELEASE="unknown" [ "$SYSTEM" ] || SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || SYSTEM="unknown" [ "$BUILD" ] || VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || VERSION="unknown" # Now test for ISC and SCO, since it is has a braindamaged uname. # # We need to work around FreeBSD 1.1.5.1 ( XREL=`uname -X 2>/dev/null | grep "^Release" | awk '{print $3}'` if [ "x$XREL" != "x" ]; then if [ -f /etc/kconfig ]; then case "$XREL" in 4.0|4.1) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-isc4"; exit 0 ;; esac else case "$XREL" in 3.2v4.2) echo "whatever-whatever-sco3"; exit 0 ;; 3.2v5.0*) echo "whatever-whatever-sco5"; exit 0 ;; 4.2MP) case "x${VERSION}" in x2.0*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware20"; exit 0 ;; x2.1*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware21"; exit 0 ;; x2*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware2"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; 4.2) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware1"; exit 0 ;; 5*) case "x${VERSION}" in # We hardcode i586 in place of ${MACHINE} for the # following reason. The catch is that even though Pentium # is minimum requirement for platforms in question, # ${MACHINE} gets always assigned to i386. Now, problem # with i386 is that it makes ./config pass 386 to # ./Configure, which in turn makes make generate # inefficient SHA-1 (for this moment) code. x[678]*) echo "i586-sco-unixware7"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; esac fi fi # Now we simply scan though... In most cases, the SYSTEM info is enough # case "${SYSTEM}:${RELEASE}:${VERSION}:${MACHINE}" in A/UX:*) echo "m68k-apple-aux3"; exit 0 ;; AIX:[3-9]:4:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0 ;; AIX:*:[5-9]:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0 ;; AIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix3"; exit 0 ;; HI-UX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-hi-hiux"; exit 0 ;; HP-UX:*) HPUXVER=`echo ${RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` case "$HPUXVER" in 1[0-9].*) # HPUX 10 and 11 targets are unified echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux1x"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; IRIX:6.*) echo "mips3-sgi-irix"; exit 0 ;; IRIX64:*) echo "mips4-sgi-irix64"; exit 0 ;; Linux:[2-9].*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux2"; exit 0 ;; Linux:1.*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux1"; exit 0 ;; GNU*) echo "hurd-x86"; exit 0; ;; LynxOS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-lynx-lynxos"; exit 0 ;; BSD/OS:4.*) # BSD/OS always says 386 echo "i486-whatever-bsdi4"; exit 0 ;; BSD/386:*:*:*486*|BSD/OS:*:*:*:*486*) case `/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model` in Pentium*) echo "i586-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "i386-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; esac; ;; BSD/386:*|BSD/OS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; FreeBSD:*:*:*386*) VERS=`echo ${RELEASE} | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` MACH=`sysctl -n hw.model` ARCH='whatever' case ${MACH} in *386* ) MACH="i386" ;; *486* ) MACH="i486" ;; Pentium\ II*) MACH="i686" ;; Pentium* ) MACH="i586" ;; * ) MACH="$MACHINE" ;; esac case ${MACH} in i[0-9]86 ) ARCH="pc" ;; esac echo "${MACH}-${ARCH}-freebsd${VERS}"; exit 0 ;; FreeBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-freebsd"; exit 0 ;; Haiku:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-haiku"; exit 0 ;; NetBSD:*:*:*386*) echo "`(/usr/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model || /sbin/sysctl -n hw.model) | sed 's,.*\(.\)86-class.*,i\186,'`-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0 ;; NetBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0 ;; OpenBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-openbsd"; exit 0 ;; OpenUNIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-OpenUNIX${VERSION}"; exit 0 ;; OSF1:*:*:*alpha*) OSFMAJOR=`echo ${RELEASE}| sed -e 's/^V\([0-9]*\)\..*$/\1/'` case "$OSFMAJOR" in 4|5) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-tru64"; exit 0 ;; 1|2|3) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; QNX:*) case "$RELEASE" in 4*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx4" ;; 6*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx6" ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-qnx" ;; esac exit 0 ;; Paragon*:*:*:*) echo "i860-intel-osf1"; exit 0 ;; Rhapsody:*) echo "ppc-apple-rhapsody"; exit 0 ;; Darwin:*) case "$MACHINE" in Power*) echo "ppc-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; x86_64) echo "x86_64-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; *) echo "i686-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; esac exit 0 ;; SunOS:5.*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-solaris2"; exit 0 ;; SunOS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-sun-sunos4"; exit 0 ;; UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; VOS:*:*:i786) echo "i386-stratus-vos"; exit 0 ;; VOS:*:*:*) echo "hppa1.1-stratus-vos"; exit 0 ;; *:4*:R4*:m88k) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; *:4.0:3.0:3[34]?? | *:4.0:3.0:3[34]??,*) echo "i486-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; ULTRIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-ultrix"; exit 0 ;; POSIX-BC*) echo "${MACHINE}-siemens-sysv4"; exit 0 # Here, $MACHINE == "BS2000" ;; machten:*) echo "${MACHINE}-tenon-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0; ;; library:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; ConvexOS:*:11.0:*) echo "${MACHINE}-v11-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0; ;; # The following combinations are supported # MINGW64* on x86_64 => mingw64 # MINGW32* on x86_64 => mingw # MINGW32* on i?86 => mingw # # MINGW64* on i?86 isn't expected to work... MINGW64*:*:*:x86_64) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw64"; exit 0; ;; MINGW*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw"; exit 0; ;; CYGWIN*) echo "${MACHINE}-pc-cygwin"; exit 0 ;; vxworks*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-vxworks"; exit 0; ;; esac # # Ugg. These are all we can determine by what we know about # the output of uname. Be more creative: # # Do the Apollo stuff first. Here, we just simply assume # that the existence of the /usr/apollo directory is proof # enough if [ -d /usr/apollo ]; then echo "whatever-apollo-whatever" exit 0 fi # Now NeXT ISNEXT=`hostinfo 2>/dev/null` case "$ISNEXT" in *'NeXT Mach 3.3'*) echo "whatever-next-nextstep3.3"; exit 0 ;; *NeXT*) echo "whatever-next-nextstep"; exit 0 ;; esac # At this point we gone through all the one's # we know of: Punt echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-${SYSTEM}" exit 0 ) 2>/dev/null | ( # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # this is where the translation occurs into SSLeay terms # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Only set CC if not supplied already if [ -z "$CROSS_COMPILE$CC" ]; then GCCVER=`sh -c "gcc -dumpversion" 2>/dev/null` if [ "$GCCVER" != "" ]; then # then strip off whatever prefix egcs prepends the number with... # Hopefully, this will work for any future prefixes as well. GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | LC_ALL=C sed 's/^[a-zA-Z]*\-//'` # Since gcc 3.1 gcc --version behaviour has changed. gcc -dumpversion # does give us what we want though, so we use that. We just just the # major and minor version numbers. # peak single digit before and after first dot, e.g. 2.95.1 gives 29 GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | sed 's/\([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'` CC=gcc else CC=cc fi fi GCCVER=${GCCVER:-0} if [ "$SYSTEM" = "HP-UX" ];then # By default gcc is a ILP32 compiler (with long long == 64). GCC_BITS="32" if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then # PA64 support only came in with gcc 3.0.x. # We check if the preprocessor symbol __LP64__ is defined... if echo "__LP64__" | gcc -v -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null; then : # __LP64__ has slipped through, it therefore is not defined else GCC_BITS="64" fi fi fi if [ "$SYSTEM" = "SunOS" ]; then if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then # 64-bit ABI isn't officially supported in gcc 3.0, but it appears # to be working, at the very least 'make test' passes... if gcc -v -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 | grep __arch64__ > /dev/null; then GCC_ARCH="-m64" else GCC_ARCH="-m32" fi fi # check for WorkShop C, expected output is "cc: blah-blah C x.x" CCVER=`(cc -V 2>&1) 2>/dev/null | \ egrep -e '^cc: .* C [0-9]\.[0-9]' | \ sed 's/.* C \([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'` CCVER=${CCVER:-0} if [ $MACHINE != i86pc -a $CCVER -gt 40 ]; then CC=cc # overrides gcc!!! if [ $CCVER -eq 50 ]; then echo "WARNING! Detected WorkShop C 5.0. Do make sure you have" echo " patch #107357-01 or later applied." sleep 5 fi fi fi if [ "${SYSTEM}" = "AIX" ]; then # favor vendor cc over gcc (cc) 2>&1 | grep -iv "not found" > /dev/null && CC=cc fi CCVER=${CCVER:-0} # read the output of the embedded GuessOS read GUESSOS echo Operating system: $GUESSOS # now map the output into SSLeay terms ... really should hack into the # script above so we end up with values in vars but that would take # more time that I want to waste at the moment case "$GUESSOS" in uClinux*64*) OUT=uClinux-dist64 ;; uClinux*) OUT=uClinux-dist ;; mips3-sgi-irix) #CPU=`(hinv -t cpu) 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^CPU:[^R]*R\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'` #CPU=${CPU:-0} #if [ $CPU -ge 5000 ]; then # options="$options -mips4" #else # options="$options -mips3" #fi OUT="irix-mips3-$CC" ;; mips4-sgi-irix64) echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure irix64-mips4-$CC' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi #CPU=`(hinv -t cpu) 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^CPU:[^R]*R\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'` #CPU=${CPU:-0} #if [ $CPU -ge 5000 ]; then # options="$options -mips4" #else # options="$options -mips3" #fi OUT="irix-mips3-$CC" ;; ppc-apple-rhapsody) OUT="rhapsody-ppc-cc" ;; ppc-apple-darwin*) ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.64bitops) 2>/dev/null` if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure darwin64-ppc-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="darwin64-ppc-cc" else OUT="darwin-ppc-cc" fi ;; i?86-apple-darwin*) ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.x86_64) 2>/dev/null` if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke 'KERNEL_BITS=64 $THERE/config $options'." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." # The stty technique used elsewhere doesn't work on # MacOS. At least, right now on this Mac. sleep 5 fi fi if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc" else OUT="darwin-i386-cc" fi ;; x86_64-apple-darwin*) if [ -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 32-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke 'KERNEL_BITS=32 $THERE/config $options'." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." # The stty technique used elsewhere doesn't work on # MacOS. At least, right now on this Mac. sleep 5 fi fi if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "32" ]; then OUT="darwin-i386-cc" else OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc" fi ;; armv6+7-*-iphoneos) options="$options -arch%20armv6 -arch%20armv7" OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;; *-*-iphoneos) options="$options -arch%20${MACHINE}" OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;; arm64-*-iphoneos|*-*-ios64) OUT="ios64-cross" ;; alpha-*-linux2) ISA=`awk '/cpu model/{print$4;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` case ${ISA:-generic} in *[678]) OUT="linux-alpha+bwx-$CC" ;; *) OUT="linux-alpha-$CC" ;; esac if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then case ${ISA:-generic} in EV5|EV45) options="$options -mcpu=ev5";; EV56|PCA56) options="$options -mcpu=ev56";; *) options="$options -mcpu=ev6";; esac fi ;; ppc64-*-linux2) if [ -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure linux-ppc64' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="linux-ppc64" else OUT="linux-ppc" (echo "__LP64__" | gcc -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null) || options="$options -m32" fi ;; ppc64le-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc64le" ;; ppc-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc" ;; mips64*-*-linux2) echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure linux64-mips64' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi OUT="linux-mips64" ;; mips*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-mips32" ;; ppc60x-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppc60x" ;; ppcgen-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppcgen" ;; pentium-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-pentium" ;; simlinux-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-simlinux" ;; mips-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-mips";; ia64-*-linux?) OUT="linux-ia64" ;; sparc64-*-linux2) echo "WARNING! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI" echo " and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure linux64-sparcv9' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;; sparc-*-linux2) KARCH=`awk '/^type/{print$3;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` case ${KARCH:-sun4} in sun4u*) OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;; sun4m) OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;; sun4d) OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;; *) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; esac ;; parisc*-*-linux2) # 64-bit builds under parisc64 linux are not supported and # compiler is expected to generate 32-bit objects... CPUARCH=`awk '/cpu family/{print substr($5,1,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` CPUSCHEDULE=`awk '/^cpu.[ ]*: PA/{print substr($3,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` # ??TODO ?? Model transformations # 0. CPU Architecture for the 1.1 processor has letter suffixes. We strip that off # assuming no further arch. identification will ever be used by GCC. # 1. I'm most concerned about whether is a 7300LC is closer to a 7100 versus a 7100LC. # 2. The variant 64-bit processors cause concern should GCC support explicit schedulers # for these chips in the future. # PA7300LC -> 7100LC (1.1) # PA8200 -> 8000 (2.0) # PA8500 -> 8000 (2.0) # PA8600 -> 8000 (2.0) CPUSCHEDULE=`echo $CPUSCHEDULE|sed -e 's/7300LC/7100LC/' -e 's/8.00/8000/'` # Finish Model transformations options="$options -DB_ENDIAN -mschedule=$CPUSCHEDULE -march=$CPUARCH" OUT="linux-generic32" ;; armv[1-3]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32" ;; armv[7-9]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4"; options="$options -march=armv7-a" ;; arm*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4" ;; aarch64-*-linux2) OUT="linux-aarch64" ;; sh*b-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; sh*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DL_ENDIAN" ;; m68k*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; s390-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; s390x-*-linux2) # To be uncommented when glibc bug is fixed, see Configure... #if egrep -e '^features.* highgprs' /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null ; then # echo "WARNING! If you wish to build \"highgprs\" 32-bit library, then you" # echo " have to invoke './Configure linux32-s390x' *manually*." # if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t -1 ]; then # echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." # (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 # fi #fi OUT="linux64-s390x" ;; x86_64-*-linux?) if $CC -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 | grep -q ILP32 > /dev/null; then OUT="linux-x32" else OUT="linux-x86_64" fi ;; *86-*-linux2) # On machines where the compiler understands -m32, prefer a # config target that uses it if $CC -m32 -E -x c /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then OUT="linux-x86" else OUT="linux-elf" fi ;; *86-*-linux1) OUT="linux-aout" ;; *-*-linux?) OUT="linux-generic32" ;; sun4[uv]*-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv9-$CC" ISA64=`(isainfo) 2>/dev/null | grep sparcv9` if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "" ]; then if [ "$CC" = "cc" -a $CCVER -ge 50 ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris64-sparcv9-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi elif [ "$CC" = "gcc" -a "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m64" ]; then # $GCC_ARCH denotes default ABI chosen by compiler driver # (first one found on the $PATH). I assume that user # expects certain consistency with the rest of his builds # and therefore switch over to 64-bit. OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-gcc" echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 32-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi elif [ "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m32" ]; then echo "NOTICE! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI" echo " and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris64-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi fi if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-$CC" fi ;; sun4m-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;; sun4d-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;; sun4*-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv7-$CC" ;; *86*-*-solaris2) ISA64=`(isainfo) 2>/dev/null | grep amd64` if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a ${KERNEL_BITS:-64} -eq 64 ]; then OUT="solaris64-x86_64-$CC" else OUT="solaris-x86-$CC" if [ `uname -r | sed -e 's/5\.//'` -lt 10 ]; then options="$options no-sse2" fi fi ;; *-*-sunos4) OUT="sunos-$CC" ;; *86*-*-bsdi4) OUT="BSD-x86-elf"; options="$options no-sse2 -ldl" ;; alpha*-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic64"; options="$options -DL_ENDIAN" ;; powerpc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic64"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;; sparc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-sparc64" ;; ia64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-ia64" ;; amd64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-x86_64" ;; *86*-*-*bsd*) # mimic ld behaviour when it's looking for libc... if [ -L /usr/lib/libc.so ]; then # [Free|Net]BSD libc=/usr/lib/libc.so else # OpenBSD # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null` fi case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in *ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;; *) OUT="BSD-x86"; options="$options no-sse2" ;; esac ;; *-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic32" ;; x86_64-*-haiku) OUT="haiku-x86_64" ;; *-*-haiku) OUT="haiku-x86" ;; *-*-osf) OUT="osf1-alpha-cc" ;; *-*-tru64) OUT="tru64-alpha-cc" ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are7) if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then OUT="unixware-7-gcc" ; options="$options no-sse2" else OUT="unixware-7" ; options="$options no-sse2 -D__i386__" fi ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are20*) OUT="unixware-2.0"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are21*) OUT="unixware-2.1"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;; *-*-vos) options="$options no-threads no-shared no-asm no-dso" EXE=".pm" OUT="vos-$CC" ;; BS2000-siemens-sysv4) OUT="BS2000-OSD" ;; *-hpux1*) if [ $CC = "gcc" -a $GCC_BITS = "64" ]; then OUT="hpux64-parisc2-gcc" fi [ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITS) 2>/dev/null` KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32} CPU_VERSION=`(getconf CPU_VERSION) 2>/dev/null` CPU_VERSION=${CPU_VERSION:-0} # See for further info on CPU_VERSION. if [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 768 ]; then # IA-64 CPU if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then OUT="hpux64-ia64-cc" else OUT="hpux-ia64-cc" fi elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 532 ]; then # PA-RISC 2.x CPU OUT=${OUT:-"hpux-parisc2-${CC}"} if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure hpux64-parisc2-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi # PA-RISC 2.0 is no longer supported as separate 32-bit # target. This is compensated for by run-time detection # in most critical assembly modules and taking advantage # of 2.0 architecture in PA-RISC 1.1 build. OUT="hpux-parisc1_1-${CC}" elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 528 ]; then # PA-RISC 1.1+ CPU OUT="hpux-parisc1_1-${CC}" elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 523 ]; then # PA-RISC 1.0 CPU OUT="hpux-parisc-${CC}" else # Motorola(?) CPU OUT="hpux-$CC" fi options="$options -D_REENTRANT" ;; *-hpux) OUT="hpux-parisc-$CC" ;; *-aix) [ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITMODE) 2>/dev/null` KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32} OBJECT_MODE=${OBJECT_MODE:-32} if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then OUT="aix-gcc" if [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' OUT="aix64-gcc" fi elif [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' OUT="aix64-cc" else OUT="aix-cc" if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit kit, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure aix64-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have ~5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi fi if (lsattr -E -O -l `lsdev -c processor|awk '{print$1;exit}'` | grep -i powerpc) >/dev/null 2>&1; then : # this applies even to Power3 and later, as they return PowerPC_POWER[345] else options="$options no-asm" fi ;; # these are all covered by the catchall below i[3456]86-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-x86" ;; *-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-${MACHINE}" ;; x86pc-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6-i386" ;; *-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6" ;; x86-*-android|i?86-*-android) OUT="android-x86" ;; armv[7-9]*-*-android) OUT="android-armeabi"; options="$options -march=armv7-a" ;; arm*-*-android) OUT="android-armeabi" ;; *) OUT=`echo $GUESSOS | awk -F- '{print $3}'`;; esac # NB: This atalla support has been superseded by the ENGINE support # That contains its own header and definitions anyway. Support can # be enabled or disabled on any supported platform without external # headers, eg. by adding the "hw-atalla" switch to ./config or # perl Configure # # See whether we can compile Atalla support #if [ -f /usr/include/atasi.h ] #then # options="$options -DATALLA" #fi if [ -n "$CONFIG_OPTIONS" ]; then options="$options $CONFIG_OPTIONS" fi if expr "$options" : '.*no\-asm' > /dev/null; then :; else sh -c "$CROSS_COMPILE${CC:-gcc} -Wa,--help -c -o /tmp/null.$$.o -x assembler /dev/null && rm /tmp/null.$$.o" 2>&1 | \ grep \\--noexecstack >/dev/null && \ options="$options -Wa,--noexecstack" fi # gcc < 2.8 does not support -march=ultrasparc if [ "$OUT" = solaris-sparcv9-gcc -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ] then echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'solaris-sparcv8-gcc'." echo " Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later." sleep 5 OUT=solaris-sparcv8-gcc fi if [ "$OUT" = "linux-sparcv9" -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ] then echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'linux-sparcv8'." echo " Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later." sleep 5 OUT=linux-sparcv8 fi case "$GUESSOS" in i386-*) options="$options 386" ;; esac for i in aes bf camellia cast des dh dsa ec hmac idea md2 md5 mdc2 rc2 rc4 rc5 ripemd rsa seed sha do if [ ! -d $THERE/crypto/$i ] then options="$options no-$i" fi done if [ -z "$OUT" ]; then OUT="$CC" fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do if [ -f "$i/perl5$EXE" ] ; then PERL="$i/perl5$EXE" break; fi; done fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do if [ -f "$i/perl$EXE" ] ; then if "$i/perl$EXE" -e 'exit($]<5.0)'; then PERL="$i/perl$EXE" break; fi; fi; done fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then echo "You need Perl 5." exit 1 fi # run Configure to check to see if we need to specify the # compiler for the platform ... in which case we add it on # the end ... otherwise we leave it off $PERL $THERE/Configure LIST | grep "$OUT-$CC" > /dev/null if [ $? = "0" ]; then OUT="$OUT-$CC" fi OUT="$OUT" $PERL $THERE/Configure LIST | grep "$OUT" > /dev/null if [ $? = "0" ]; then echo Configuring for $OUT if [ "$VERBOSE" = "true" ]; then echo $PERL $THERE/Configure $OUT $options fi if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" ]; then $PERL $THERE/Configure $OUT $options fi else echo "This system ($OUT) is not supported. See file INSTALL for details." fi ) openssl-1.1.0g/NOTES.PERL0000644000000000000000000001074413176625655013443 0ustar rootroot TOC === - Notes on Perl - Notes on Perl on Windows - Notes on Perl modules we use - Notes on installing a perl module Notes on Perl ------------- For our scripts, we rely quite a bit on Perl, and increasingly on some core Perl modules. These Perl modules are part of the Perl source, so if you build Perl on your own, you should be set. However, if you install Perl as binary packages, the outcome might differ, and you may have to check that you do get the core modules installed properly. We do not claim to know them all, but experience has told us the following: - on Linux distributions based on Debian, the package 'perl' will install the core Perl modules as well, so you will be fine. - on Linux distributions based on RPMs, you will need to install 'perl-core' rather than just 'perl'. You MUST have at least Perl version 5.10.0 installed. This minimum requirement is due to our use of regexp backslash sequence \R among other features that didn't exist in core Perl before that version. Notes on Perl on Windows ------------------------ There are a number of build targets that can be viewed as "Windows". Indeed, there are VC-* configs targeting VisualStudio C, as well as MinGW and Cygwin. The key recommendation is to use "matching" Perl, one that matches build environment. For example, if you will build on Cygwin be sure to use the Cygwin package manager to install Perl. For MSYS builds use the MSYS provided Perl. For VC-* builds we recommend ActiveState Perl, available from http://www.activestate.com/ActivePerl. Notes on Perl on VMS -------------------- You will need to install Perl separately. One way to do so is to download the source from http://perl.org/, unpacking it, reading README.vms and follow the instructions. Another way is to download a .PCSI file from http://www.vmsperl.com/ and install it using the POLYCENTER install tool. Notes on Perl modules we use ---------------------------- We make increasing use of Perl modules, and do our best to limit ourselves to core Perl modules to keep the requirements down. There are just a few exceptions: Test::More We require the minimum version to be 0.96, which appeared in Perl 5.13.4, because that version was the first to have all the features we're using. This module is required for testing only! If you don't plan on running the tests, you don't need to bother with this one. Text::Template This module is not part of the core Perl modules. As a matter of fact, the core Perl modules do not include any templating module to date. This module is absolutely needed, configuration depends on it. To avoid unnecessary initial hurdles, we have bundled a copy of the following modules in our source. They will work as fallbacks if these modules aren't already installed on the system. Text::Template Notes on installing a perl module --------------------------------- There are a number of ways to install a perl module. In all descriptions below, Text::Template will server as an example. 1. for Linux users, the easiest is to install with the use of your favorite package manager. Usually, all you need to do is search for the module name and to install the package that comes up. On Debian based Linux distributions, it would go like this: $ apt-cache search Text::Template ... libtext-template-perl - perl module to process text templates $ sudo apt-get install libtext-template-perl Perl modules in Debian based distributions use package names like the name of the module in question, with "lib" prepended and "-perl" appended. 2. Install using CPAN. This is very easy, but usually requires root access: $ cpan -i Text::Template Note that this runs all the tests that the module to be installed comes with. This is usually a smooth operation, but there are platforms where a failure is indicated even though the actual tests were successful. Should that happen, you can force an installation regardless (that should be safe since you've already seen the tests succeed!): $ cpan -f -i Text::Template Note: on VMS, you must quote any argument that contains upper case characters, so the lines above would be: $ cpan -i "Text::Template" and: $ cpan -f -i "Text::Template" openssl-1.1.0g/README.ENGINE0000644000000000000000000003732713176625656013722 0ustar rootroot ENGINE ====== With OpenSSL 0.9.6, a new component was added to support alternative cryptography implementations, most commonly for interfacing with external crypto devices (eg. accelerator cards). This component is called ENGINE, and its presence in OpenSSL 0.9.6 (and subsequent bug-fix releases) caused a little confusion as 0.9.6** releases were rolled in two versions, a "standard" and an "engine" version. In development for 0.9.7, the ENGINE code has been merged into the main branch and will be present in the standard releases from 0.9.7 forwards. There are currently built-in ENGINE implementations for the following crypto devices: o Cryptodev o Microsoft CryptoAPI o VIA Padlock o nCipher CHIL In addition, dynamic binding to external ENGINE implementations is now provided by a special ENGINE called "dynamic". See the "DYNAMIC ENGINE" section below for details. At this stage, a number of things are still needed and are being worked on: 1 Integration of EVP support. 2 Configuration support. 3 Documentation! 1 With respect to EVP, this relates to support for ciphers and digests in the ENGINE model so that alternative implementations of existing algorithms/modes (or previously unimplemented ones) can be provided by ENGINE implementations. 2 Configuration support currently exists in the ENGINE API itself, in the form of "control commands". These allow an application to expose to the user/admin the set of commands and parameter types a given ENGINE implementation supports, and for an application to directly feed string based input to those ENGINEs, in the form of name-value pairs. This is an extensible way for ENGINEs to define their own "configuration" mechanisms that are specific to a given ENGINE (eg. for a particular hardware device) but that should be consistent across *all* OpenSSL-based applications when they use that ENGINE. Work is in progress (or at least in planning) for supporting these control commands from the CONF (or NCONF) code so that applications using OpenSSL's existing configuration file format can have ENGINE settings specified in much the same way. Presently however, applications must use the ENGINE API itself to provide such functionality. To see first hand the types of commands available with the various compiled-in ENGINEs (see further down for dynamic ENGINEs), use the "engine" openssl utility with full verbosity, ie; openssl engine -vvvv 3 Documentation? Volunteers welcome! The source code is reasonably well self-documenting, but some summaries and usage instructions are needed - moreover, they are needed in the same POD format the existing OpenSSL documentation is provided in. Any complete or incomplete contributions would help make this happen. STABILITY & BUG-REPORTS ======================= What already exists is fairly stable as far as it has been tested, but the test base has been a bit small most of the time. For the most part, the vendors of the devices these ENGINEs support have contributed to the development and/or testing of the implementations, and *usually* (with no guarantees) have experience in using the ENGINE support to drive their devices from common OpenSSL-based applications. Bugs and/or inexplicable behaviour in using a specific ENGINE implementation should be sent to the author of that implementation (if it is mentioned in the corresponding C file), and in the case of implementations for commercial hardware devices, also through whatever vendor support channels are available. If none of this is possible, or the problem seems to be something about the ENGINE API itself (ie. not necessarily specific to a particular ENGINE implementation) then you should mail complete details to the relevant OpenSSL mailing list. For a definition of "complete details", refer to the OpenSSL "README" file. As for which list to send it to; openssl-users: if you are *using* the ENGINE abstraction, either in an pre-compiled application or in your own application code. openssl-dev: if you are discussing problems with OpenSSL source code. USAGE ===== The default "openssl" ENGINE is always chosen when performing crypto operations unless you specify otherwise. You must actively tell the openssl utility commands to use anything else through a new command line switch called "-engine". Also, if you want to use the ENGINE support in your own code to do something similar, you must likewise explicitly select the ENGINE implementation you want. Depending on the type of hardware, system, and configuration, "settings" may need to be applied to an ENGINE for it to function as expected/hoped. The recommended way of doing this is for the application to support ENGINE "control commands" so that each ENGINE implementation can provide whatever configuration primitives it might require and the application can allow the user/admin (and thus the hardware vendor's support desk also) to provide any such input directly to the ENGINE implementation. This way, applications do not need to know anything specific to any device, they only need to provide the means to carry such user/admin input through to the ENGINE in question. Ie. this connects *you* (and your helpdesk) to the specific ENGINE implementation (and device), and allows application authors to not get buried in hassle supporting arbitrary devices they know (and care) nothing about. A new "openssl" utility, "openssl engine", has been added in that allows for testing and examination of ENGINE implementations. Basic usage instructions are available by specifying the "-?" command line switch. DYNAMIC ENGINES =============== The new "dynamic" ENGINE provides a low-overhead way to support ENGINE implementations that aren't pre-compiled and linked into OpenSSL-based applications. This could be because existing compiled-in implementations have known problems and you wish to use a newer version with an existing application. It could equally be because the application (or OpenSSL library) you are using simply doesn't have support for the ENGINE you wish to use, and the ENGINE provider (eg. hardware vendor) is providing you with a self-contained implementation in the form of a shared-library. The other use-case for "dynamic" is with applications that wish to maintain the smallest foot-print possible and so do not link in various ENGINE implementations from OpenSSL, but instead leaves you to provide them, if you want them, in the form of "dynamic"-loadable shared-libraries. It should be possible for hardware vendors to provide their own shared-libraries to support arbitrary hardware to work with applications based on OpenSSL 0.9.7 or later. If you're using an application based on 0.9.7 (or later) and the support you desire is only announced for versions later than the one you need, ask the vendor to backport their ENGINE to the version you need. How does "dynamic" work? ------------------------ The dynamic ENGINE has a special flag in its implementation such that every time application code asks for the 'dynamic' ENGINE, it in fact gets its own copy of it. As such, multi-threaded code (or code that multiplexes multiple uses of 'dynamic' in a single application in any way at all) does not get confused by 'dynamic' being used to do many independent things. Other ENGINEs typically don't do this so there is only ever 1 ENGINE structure of its type (and reference counts are used to keep order). The dynamic ENGINE itself provides absolutely no cryptographic functionality, and any attempt to "initialise" the ENGINE automatically fails. All it does provide are a few "control commands" that can be used to control how it will load an external ENGINE implementation from a shared-library. To see these control commands, use the command-line; openssl engine -vvvv dynamic The "SO_PATH" control command should be used to identify the shared-library that contains the ENGINE implementation, and "NO_VCHECK" might possibly be useful if there is a minor version conflict and you (or a vendor helpdesk) is convinced you can safely ignore it. "ID" is probably only needed if a shared-library implements multiple ENGINEs, but if you know the engine id you expect to be using, it doesn't hurt to specify it (and this provides a sanity check if nothing else). "LIST_ADD" is only required if you actually wish the loaded ENGINE to be discoverable by application code later on using the ENGINE's "id". For most applications, this isn't necessary - but some application authors may have nifty reasons for using it. The "LOAD" command is the only one that takes no parameters and is the command that uses the settings from any previous commands to actually *load* the shared-library ENGINE implementation. If this command succeeds, the (copy of the) 'dynamic' ENGINE will magically morph into the ENGINE that has been loaded from the shared-library. As such, any control commands supported by the loaded ENGINE could then be executed as per normal. Eg. if ENGINE "foo" is implemented in the shared-library "libfoo.so" and it supports some special control command "CMD_FOO", the following code would load and use it (NB: obviously this code has no error checking); ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", "/lib/libfoo.so", 0); ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "ID", "foo", 0); ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0); ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "CMD_FOO", "some input data", 0); For testing, the "openssl engine" utility can be useful for this sort of thing. For example the above code excerpt would achieve much the same result as; openssl engine dynamic \ -pre SO_PATH:/lib/libfoo.so \ -pre ID:foo \ -pre LOAD \ -pre "CMD_FOO:some input data" Or to simply see the list of commands supported by the "foo" ENGINE; openssl engine -vvvv dynamic \ -pre SO_PATH:/lib/libfoo.so \ -pre ID:foo \ -pre LOAD Applications that support the ENGINE API and more specifically, the "control commands" mechanism, will provide some way for you to pass such commands through to ENGINEs. As such, you would select "dynamic" as the ENGINE to use, and the parameters/commands you pass would control the *actual* ENGINE used. Each command is actually a name-value pair and the value can sometimes be omitted (eg. the "LOAD" command). Whilst the syntax demonstrated in "openssl engine" uses a colon to separate the command name from the value, applications may provide their own syntax for making that separation (eg. a win32 registry key-value pair may be used by some applications). The reason for the "-pre" syntax in the "openssl engine" utility is that some commands might be issued to an ENGINE *after* it has been initialised for use. Eg. if an ENGINE implementation requires a smart-card to be inserted during initialisation (or a PIN to be typed, or whatever), there may be a control command you can issue afterwards to "forget" the smart-card so that additional initialisation is no longer possible. In applications such as web-servers, where potentially volatile code may run on the same host system, this may provide some arguable security value. In such a case, the command would be passed to the ENGINE after it has been initialised for use, and so the "-post" switch would be used instead. Applications may provide a different syntax for supporting this distinction, and some may simply not provide it at all ("-pre" is almost always what you're after, in reality). How do I build a "dynamic" ENGINE? ---------------------------------- This question is trickier - currently OpenSSL bundles various ENGINE implementations that are statically built in, and any application that calls the "ENGINE_load_builtin_engines()" function will automatically have all such ENGINEs available (and occupying memory). Applications that don't call that function have no ENGINEs available like that and would have to use "dynamic" to load any such ENGINE - but on the other hand such applications would only have the memory footprint of any ENGINEs explicitly loaded using user/admin provided control commands. The main advantage of not statically linking ENGINEs and only using "dynamic" for hardware support is that any installation using no "external" ENGINE suffers no unnecessary memory footprint from unused ENGINEs. Likewise, installations that do require an ENGINE incur the overheads from only *that* ENGINE once it has been loaded. Sounds good? Maybe, but currently building an ENGINE implementation as a shared-library that can be loaded by "dynamic" isn't automated in OpenSSL's build process. It can be done manually quite easily however. Such a shared-library can either be built with any OpenSSL code it needs statically linked in, or it can link dynamically against OpenSSL if OpenSSL itself is built as a shared library. The instructions are the same in each case, but in the former (statically linked any dependencies on OpenSSL) you must ensure OpenSSL is built with position-independent code ("PIC"). The default OpenSSL compilation may already specify the relevant flags to do this, but you should consult with your compiler documentation if you are in any doubt. This example will show building the "atalla" ENGINE in the crypto/engine/ directory as a shared-library for use via the "dynamic" ENGINE. 1) "cd" to the crypto/engine/ directory of a pre-compiled OpenSSL source tree. 2) Recompile at least one source file so you can see all the compiler flags (and syntax) being used to build normally. Eg; touch hw_atalla.c ; make will rebuild "hw_atalla.o" using all such flags. 3) Manually enter the same compilation line to compile the "hw_atalla.c" file but with the following two changes; (a) add "-DENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT" to the command line switches, (b) change the output file from "hw_atalla.o" to something new, eg. "tmp_atalla.o" 4) Link "tmp_atalla.o" into a shared-library using the top-level OpenSSL libraries to resolve any dependencies. The syntax for doing this depends heavily on your system/compiler and is a nightmare known well to anyone who has worked with shared-library portability before. 'gcc' on Linux, for example, would use the following syntax; gcc -shared -o dyn_atalla.so tmp_atalla.o -L../.. -lcrypto 5) Test your shared library using "openssl engine" as explained in the previous section. Eg. from the top-level directory, you might try; apps/openssl engine -vvvv dynamic \ -pre SO_PATH:./crypto/engine/dyn_atalla.so -pre LOAD If the shared-library loads successfully, you will see both "-pre" commands marked as "SUCCESS" and the list of control commands displayed (because of "-vvvv") will be the control commands for the *atalla* ENGINE (ie. *not* the 'dynamic' ENGINE). You can also add the "-t" switch to the utility if you want it to try and initialise the atalla ENGINE for use to test any possible hardware/driver issues. PROBLEMS ======== It seems like the ENGINE part doesn't work too well with CryptoSwift on Win32. A quick test done right before the release showed that trying "openssl speed -engine cswift" generated errors. If the DSO gets enabled, an attempt is made to write at memory address 0x00000002. openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656012527 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/VMS/openssl_shutdown.com.in0000644000000000000000000000256513176625656017262 0ustar rootroot$ ! OpenSSL shutdown script $ ! $ ! This script deassigns the logical names used by the installation $ ! of OpenSSL. It can do so at any level, defined by P1. $ ! $ ! P1 Qualifier(s) for DEASSIGN. $ ! Default: /PROCESS $ ! $ ! P2 If the value is "NOALIASES", no alias logical names are $ ! deassigned. $ $ status = %x10000001 ! Generic success $ $ ! In case there's a problem $ ON CONTROL_Y THEN GOTO bailout $ ON ERROR THEN GOTO bailout $ $ ! Find the architecture $ IF F$GETSYI("CPU") .LT. 128 $ THEN $ arch := VAX $ ELSE $ arch := F$EDIT(F$GETSYI("ARCH_NAME"),"UPCASE") $ IF arch .EQS. "" THEN GOTO unknown_arch $ ENDIF $ $ ! Abbrevs $ DEAS := DEASSIGN /NOLOG 'P1' $ sv := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -} $ pz := {- $config{pointer_size} -} $ $ DEAS OSSL$DATAROOT $ DEAS OSSL$INSTROOT $ DEAS OSSL$INCLUDE $ DEAS OSSL$LIB $ DEAS OSSL$SHARE $ DEAS OSSL$ENGINES'sv' $ DEAS OSSL$EXE $ DEAS OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'pz' $ DEAS OSSL$LIBSSL'pz' ${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ DEAS OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz' $ DEAS OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz' ${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ DEAS OPENSSL $ $ IF P2 .NES. "NOALIASES" $ THEN $ DEAS OSSL$ENGINES ${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ DEAS OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR'pz' $ DEAS OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR'pz' ${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ ENDIF $ $ EXIT 'status' openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/test-includes.com0000644000000000000000000000136013176625656016012 0ustar rootroot$! Quick script to check how well including individual header files works $! on VMS, even when the VMS macro isn't defined. $ $ sav_def = f$env("DEFAULT") $ here = f$parse("A.;0",f$ENV("PROCEDURE")) - "A.;0" $ set default 'here' $ set default [-.include.openssl] $ define openssl 'f$env("DEFAULT")' $ set default [--] $ $ loop: $ f = f$search("openssl:*.h") $ if f .eqs. "" then goto loop_end $ write sys$output "Checking ",f $ open/write foo foo.c $ write foo "#undef VMS" $ write foo "#include " $ write foo "#include " $ write foo "main()" $ write foo "{printf(""foo\n"");}" $ close foo $ cc/STANDARD=ANSI89/NOLIST/PREFIX=ALL foo.c $ delete foo.c; $ goto loop $ loop_end: $ set default 'save_def' $ exit openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/openssl_utils.com.in0000644000000000000000000000050713176625656016541 0ustar rootroot$ ! OpenSSL utilities $ ! $ $ v := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", split(/\./, $config{version}) -} $ $ OPENSSL'v' :== $OSSL$EXE:OPENSSL'v' $ OPENSSL :== $OSSL$EXE:OPENSSL'v' $ $ IF F$TYPE(PERL) .EQS. "STRING" $ THEN $ C_REHASH :== 'PERL' OSSL$EXE:c_rehash.pl $ ELSE $ WRITE SYS$ERROR "NOTE: no perl => no C_REHASH" $ ENDIF openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/openssl_startup.com.in0000644000000000000000000001066313176625656017107 0ustar rootroot$ ! OpenSSL startup script $ ! $ ! This script defines the logical names used by the installation $ ! of OpenSSL. It can provide those logical names at any level, $ ! defined by P1. $ ! $ ! The logical names created are: $ ! $ ! OSSL$INSTROOT Installation root $ ! OSSL$DATAROOT Data root (common directory $ ! for certs etc) $ ! OSSL$INCLUDE Include directory root $ ! OSSL$LIB Where the static library files $ ! are located $ ! OSSL$SHARE Where the shareable image files $ ! are located $ ! OSSL$EXE Where the executables are located $ ! OSSL$ENGINESnnn Where the shareable images are located $ ! OSSL$LIBCRYPTO The static crypto library $ ! OSSL$LIBSSL The static ssl library $ ! OSSL$LIBCRYPTOnnn_SHR The shareable crypto image $ ! OSSL$LIBSSLnnn_SHR The shareable ssl image $ ! OPENSSL is OSSL$INCLUDE:[OPENSSL] $ ! $ ! In all these, nnn is the OpenSSL version number. This allows $ ! several OpenSSL versions to be installed simultaneously, which $ ! matters for applications that are linked to the shareable images $ ! or that depend on engines. $ ! $ ! In addition, unless P2 is "NOALIASES", these logical names are $ ! created: $ ! $ ! OSSL$ENGINES Alias for OSSL$ENGINESnnn $ ! OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR Alias for OSSL$LIBCRYPTOnnn_SHR $ ! OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR Alias for OSSL$LIBSSLnnn_SHR $ ! $ ! P1 Qualifier(s) for DEFINE. "/SYSTEM" would be typical when $ ! calling this script from SYS$STARTUP:SYSTARTUP_VMS.COM, $ ! while "/PROCESS" would be typical for a personal install. $ ! Default: /PROCESS $ ! $ ! P2 If the value is "NOALIASES", no alias logical names are $ ! created. $ $ status = %x10000001 ! Generic success $ $ ! In case there's a problem $ ON CONTROL_Y THEN GOTO bailout $ ON ERROR THEN GOTO bailout $ $ ! Find the architecture $ IF F$GETSYI("CPU") .LT. 128 $ THEN $ arch := VAX $ ELSE $ arch = F$EDIT(F$GETSYI("ARCH_NAME"),"UPCASE") $ IF arch .EQS. "" THEN GOTO unknown_arch $ ENDIF $ $ ! Generated information $ INSTALLTOP := {- $config{INSTALLTOP} -} $ OPENSSLDIR := {- $config{OPENSSLDIR} -} $ $ ! Make sure that INSTALLTOP and OPENSSLDIR become something one $ ! can build concealed logical names on $ INSTALLTOP_ = F$PARSE("A.;",INSTALLTOP,,,"NO_CONCEAL") - - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "." $ OPENSSLDIR_ = F$PARSE("A.;",OPENSSLDIR,,,"NO_CONCEAL") - - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "." $ $ DEFINE /TRANSLATION=CONCEALED /NOLOG WRK_INSTALLTOP 'INSTALLTOP_'] $ DEFINE /TRANSLATION=CONCEALED /NOLOG WRK_OPENSSLDIR 'OPENSSLDIR_'] $ $ ! Check that things are in place, and specifically, the stuff $ ! belonging to this architecture $ IF F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[000000]INCLUDE.DIR;1") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[000000]LIB.DIR;1") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[000000]EXE.DIR;1") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[LIB]''arch'.DIR;1") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_INSTALLTOP:[EXE]''arch'.DIR;1") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("WRK_OPENSSLDIR:[000000]openssl.cnf") .EQS. "" $ THEN $ WRITE SYS$ERROR "''INSTALLTOP' doesn't look like an OpenSSL installation for ''arch'" $ status = %x00018292 ! RMS$_FNF, file not found $ GOTO bailout $ ENDIF $ $ ! Abbrevs $ DEFT := DEFINE /TRANSLATION=CONCEALED /NOLOG 'P1' $ DEF := DEFINE /NOLOG 'P1' $ sv := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor} -} $ pz := {- $config{pointer_size} -} $ $ DEFT OSSL$DATAROOT 'OPENSSLDIR_'] $ DEFT OSSL$INSTROOT 'INSTALLTOP_'] $ DEFT OSSL$INCLUDE 'INSTALLTOP_'INCLUDE.] $ DEF OSSL$LIB OSSL$INSTROOT:[LIB.'arch'] $ DEF OSSL$SHARE OSSL$INSTROOT:[LIB.'arch'] $ DEF OSSL$ENGINES'sv''pz' OSSL$INSTROOT:[ENGINES'sv''pz'.'arch'] $ DEF OSSL$EXE OSSL$INSTROOT:[EXE.'arch'],- OSSL$INSTROOT:[EXE] $ DEF OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'pz' OSSL$LIB:OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'pz'.OLB $ DEF OSSL$LIBSSL'pz' OSSL$LIB:OSSL$LIBSSL'pz'.OLB ${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ DEF OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz' OSSL$SHARE:OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz'.EXE $ DEF OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz' OSSL$SHARE:OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz'.EXE ${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ DEF OPENSSL OSSL$INCLUDE:[OPENSSL] $ $ IF P2 .NES. "NOALIASES" $ THEN $ DEF OSSL$ENGINES'pz' OSSL$ENGINES'sv''pz' ${- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ DEF OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR'pz' OSSL$LIBCRYPTO'sv'_SHR'pz' $ DEF OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR'pz' OSSL$LIBSSL'sv'_SHR'pz' ${- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -} $ ENDIF $ $ bailout: $ DEASSIGN WRK_INSTALLTOP $ DEASSIGN WRK_OPENSSLDIR $ $ EXIT 'status' openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl0000644000000000000000000000264413176625656015172 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use warnings; my @directory_vars = ( "dir", "certs", "crl_dir", "new_certs_dir" ); my @file_vars = ( "database", "certificate", "serial", "crlnumber", "crl", "private_key", "RANDFILE" ); while() { s|\R$||; foreach my $d (@directory_vars) { if (/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*)\.\/([^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) { $_ = "$1sys\\\$disk:\[.$2$3"; } elsif (/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*)(\w[^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) { $_ = "$1sys\\\$disk:\[.$2$3"; } s/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*\$\w+)\/([^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/$1.$2\]$3/; while(/^(\s*\#?\s*${d}\s*=\s*(\$\w+\.|sys\\\$disk:\[\.)[\w\.]+)\/([^\]]*)\](.*)$/) { $_ = "$1.$3]$4"; } } foreach my $f (@file_vars) { s/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*)\.\/(.*)$/$1sys\\\$disk:\[\/$2/; while(/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*(\$\w+|sys\\\$disk:\[)[^\/]*)\/(\w+\/[^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) { $_ = "$1.$3$4"; } if (/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*(\$\w+|sys\\\$disk:\[)[^\/]*)\/(\w+)([\s\#].*)$/) { $_ = "$1]$3.$4"; } elsif (/^(\s*\#?\s*${f}\s*=\s*(\$\w+|sys\\\$disk:\[)[^\/]*)\/([^\s\#]*)([\s\#].*)$/) { $_ = "$1]$3$4"; } } print $_,"\n"; } openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/engine.opt0000644000000000000000000000011313176625656014513 0ustar rootrootCASE_SENSITIVE=YES SYMBOL_VECTOR=(bind_engine=PROCEDURE,v_check=PROCEDURE) openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/openssl_ivp.com.in0000644000000000000000000000351113176625656016175 0ustar rootroot$ ! OpenSSL Internal Verification Procedure $ ! $ ! This script checks the consistency of a OpenSSL installation $ ! It had better be spawned, as it creates process logicals $ $ ! Generated information $ INSTALLTOP := {- $config{INSTALLTOP} -} $ OPENSSLDIR := {- $config{OPENSSLDIR} -} $ $ ! Make sure that INSTALLTOP and OPENSSLDIR become something one $ ! can use to call the startup procedure $ INSTALLTOP_ = F$PARSE("A.;",INSTALLTOP,,,"NO_CONCEAL") - - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "." $ OPENSSLDIR_ = F$PARSE("A.;",OPENSSLDIR,,,"NO_CONCEAL") - - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + "." $ $ v := {- sprintf "%02d%02d", split(/\./, $config{version}) -} $ pz := {- $config{pointer_size} -} $ $ @'INSTALLTOP_'SYS$STARTUP]openssl_startup'v' $ @'INSTALLTOP_'SYS$STARTUP]openssl_utils'v' $ $ IF F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBCRYPTO''pz'") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBSSL''pz'") .EQS. "" {- output_off() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}- .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR''pz'") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR''pz'") .EQS. "" {- output_on() if $config{no_shared}; "" -}- .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$INCLUDE:[OPENSSL]crypto.h") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("OPENSSL:crypto.h") .EQS. "" - .OR. F$SEARCH("OSSL$EXE:OPENSSL''v'.EXE") .EQS. "" $ THEN $ WRITE SYS$ERROR "Installation inconsistent" $ EXIT %x00018292 ! RMS$_FNF, file not found $ ENDIF $ $ ON ERROR THEN GOTO error $ $ ! If something else is wrong with the installation, we're likely $ ! to get an image activation error here $ openssl version -a $ $ ! FUTURE ENHANCEMENT: Verify that engines are where they should be. $ ! openssl engine -c -t checker $ $ WRITE SYS$ERROR "OpenSSL IVP passed" $ EXIT %x10000001 $ $ error: $ save_status = $STATUS $ WRITE SYS$ERROR "OpenSSL IVP failed" $ EXIT 'save_status' openssl-1.1.0g/VMS/translatesyms.pl0000644000000000000000000000364213176625656016002 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # This script will translate any SYMBOL_VECTOR item that has a translation # in CXX$DEMANGLER_DB. The latter is generated by and CC/DECC command that # uses the qualifier /REPOSITORY with the build directory as value. When # /NAMES=SHORTENED has been used, this file will hold the translations from # the original symbols to the shortened variants. # # CXX$DEMAGLER_DB. is an ISAM file, but with the magic of RMS, it can be # read as a text file, with each record as one line. # # The lines will have the following syntax for any symbol found that's longer # than 31 characters: # # LONG_symbol_34567890123{cksum}$LONG_symbol_34567890123_more_than_31_chars # # $ is present at the end of the shortened symbol name, and is preceded by a # 7 character checksum. The $ makes it easy to separate the shortened name # from the original one. use strict; use warnings; usage() if scalar @ARGV < 1; my %translations = (); open DEMANGLER_DATA, $ARGV[0] or die "Couldn't open $ARGV[0]: $!\n"; while() { s|\R$||; (my $translated, my $original) = split /\$/; $translations{$original} = $translated.'$'; } close DEMANGLER_DATA; $| = 1; # Autoflush while() { s@ ((?:[A-Za-z0-9_]+)\/)?([A-Za-z0-9_]+)=(PROCEDURE|DATA) @ if (defined($translations{$2})) { my $trans = $translations{$2}; my $trans_uc = uc $trans; if (defined($1) && $trans ne $trans_uc) { "$trans_uc/$trans=$3" } else { "$trans=$3" } } else { $& } @gxe; print $_; } openssl-1.1.0g/.gitignore0000644000000000000000000000525013176625655014053 0ustar rootroot# Ignore editor artefacts /.dir-locals.el # Top level excludes /Makefile.orig /MINFO /TABLE /*.a /*.pc /rehash.time /inc.* /makefile.* /out.* /tmp.* /configdata.pm # *all* Makefiles Makefile # ... except in demos !/demos/*/Makefile # Links under apps /apps/CA.pl /apps/tsget /apps/tsget.pl /apps/md4.c # Auto generated headers /crypto/buildinf.h /apps/progs.h /crypto/include/internal/*_conf.h /openssl/include/opensslconf.h /util/domd # Executables /apps/openssl /test/sha256t /test/sha512t /test/gost2814789t /test/ssltest_old /test/*test /test/fips_aesavs /test/fips_desmovs /test/fips_dhvs /test/fips_drbgvs /test/fips_dssvs /test/fips_ecdhvs /test/fips_ecdsavs /test/fips_rngvs /test/fips_test_suite /test/ssltest_old /test/x509aux /test/v3ext # Certain files that get created by tests on the fly /test/test-runs /test/buildtest_* # Fuzz stuff. # Anything without an extension is an executable on Unix, so we keep files # with extensions. And we keep the corpora subddir versioned as well. # Anything more generic with extensions that should be ignored will be taken # care of by general ignores for those extensions (*.o, *.obj, *.exe, ...) /fuzz/* !/fuzz/README* !/fuzz/corpora !/fuzz/*.* # Misc auto generated files /include/openssl/opensslconf.h /tools/c_rehash /tools/c_rehash.pl /util/shlib_wrap.sh /tags /TAGS /crypto.map /ssl.map # Windows (legacy) /tmp32 /tmp32.dbg /tmp32dll /tmp32dll.dbg /out32 /out32.dbg /out32dll /out32dll.dbg /inc32 /MINFO /ms/.rnd /ms/bcb.mak /ms/libeay32.def /ms/nt.mak /ms/ntdll.mak /ms/ssleay32.def /ms/version32.rc # Files created on other branches that are not held in git, and are not # needed on this branch /include/openssl/asn1_mac.h /include/openssl/des_old.h /include/openssl/fips.h /include/openssl/fips_rand.h /include/openssl/krb5_asn.h /include/openssl/kssl.h /include/openssl/pq_compat.h /include/openssl/ssl23.h /include/openssl/tmdiff.h /include/openssl/ui_compat.h /test/fips_aesavs.c /test/fips_desmovs.c /test/fips_dsatest.c /test/fips_dssvs.c /test/fips_hmactest.c /test/fips_randtest.c /test/fips_rngvs.c /test/fips_rsagtest.c /test/fips_rsastest.c /test/fips_rsavtest.c /test/fips_shatest.c /test/fips_test_suite.c /test/shatest.c ##### Generic patterns # Auto generated assembly language source files *.s !/crypto/*/asm/*.s /crypto/arm*.S /crypto/*/*.S *.asm !/crypto/*/asm/*.asm # Object files *.o *.obj # editor artefacts *.swp .#* \#*# *~ # Certificate symbolic links *.0 # All kinds of executables *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dylib.* *.dll *.dll.* *.exe *.pyc *.exp *.lib *.pdb *.ilk *.def *.rc *.res # Misc generated stuff Makefile.save /crypto/**/lib /engines/**/lib /ssl/**/lib *.bak cscope.* *.d pod2htmd.tmp # Windows manifest files *.manifest openssl-1.1.0g/external/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661013700 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661014642 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/transfer/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661016466 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/transfer/Text/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661017412 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/transfer/Text/Template.pm0000644000000000000000000000147713176625661021534 0ustar rootroot# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Quick transfer to the downloaded Text::Template BEGIN { use File::Spec::Functions; use File::Basename; use lib catdir(dirname(__FILE__), "..", "..", "Text-Template-1.46", "lib"); # Some unpackers on VMS convert periods in directory names to underscores use lib catdir(dirname(__FILE__), "..", "..", "Text-Template-1_46", "lib"); use Text::Template; shift @INC; # Takes away the effect of use lib shift @INC; # Takes away the effect of use lib } 1; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661017725 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.yml0000644000000000000000000000065513176625661021204 0ustar rootroot--- abstract: unknown author: - unknown build_requires: ExtUtils::MakeMaker: 0 configure_requires: ExtUtils::MakeMaker: 0 dynamic_config: 1 generated_by: 'ExtUtils::MakeMaker version 6.62, CPAN::Meta::Converter version 2.120630' license: unknown meta-spec: url: http://module-build.sourceforge.net/META-spec-v1.4.html version: 1.4 name: Text-Template no_index: directory: - t - inc requires: {} version: 1.46 openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661020170 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/14-broken.t0000644000000000000000000000442113176625661022060 0ustar rootroot#!perl # test apparatus for Text::Template module use Text::Template; print "1..5\n"; $n=1; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; # (1) basic error delivery { my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => '{1/0}', )->fill_in(); if ($r eq q{Program fragment delivered error ``Illegal division by zero at template line 1.''}) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n# $r\n"; } $n++; } # (2) BROKEN sub called in ->new? { my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => '{1/0}', BROKEN => sub {'---'}, )->fill_in(); if ($r eq q{---}) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n# $r\n"; } $n++; } # (3) BROKEN sub called in ->fill_in? { my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => '{1/0}', )->fill_in(BROKEN => sub {'---'}); if ($r eq q{---}) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n# $r\n"; } $n++; } # (4) BROKEN sub passed correct args when called in ->new? { my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => '{1/0}', BROKEN => sub { my %a = @_; qq{$a{lineno},$a{error},$a{text}} }, )->fill_in(); if ($r eq qq{1,Illegal division by zero at template line 1.\n,1/0}) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n# $r\n"; } $n++; } # (5) BROKEN sub passed correct args when called in ->fill_in? { my $r = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => '{1/0}', )->fill_in(BROKEN => sub { my %a = @_; qq{$a{lineno},$a{error},$a{text}} }); if ($r eq qq{1,Illegal division by zero at template line 1.\n,1/0}) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n# $r\n"; } $n++; } openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/10-delimiters.t0000644000000000000000000000575313176625661022746 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # Tests for user-specified delimiter functions # These tests first appeared in version 1.20. use Text::Template; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..18\n"; $n = 1; # (1) Try a simple delimiter: <<..>> # First with the delimiters specified at object creation time $V = $V = 119; $template = q{The value of $V is <<$V>>.}; $result = q{The value of $V is 119.}; $template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => $template, DELIMITERS => ['<<', '>>'] ) or die "Couldn't construct template object: $Text::Template::ERROR; aborting"; $text = $template1->fill_in(); print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (2) Now with delimiter choice deferred until fill-in time. $template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => $template); $text = $template1->fill_in(DELIMITERS => ['<<', '>>']); print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (3) Now we'll try using regex metacharacters # First with the delimiters specified at object creation time $template = q{The value of $V is [$V].}; $template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => $template, DELIMITERS => ['[', ']'] ) or die "Couldn't construct template object: $Text::Template::ERROR; aborting"; $text = $template1->fill_in(); print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (4) Now with delimiter choice deferred until fill-in time. $template1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => $template); $text = $template1->fill_in(DELIMITERS => ['[', ']']); print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (5-18) Make sure \ is working properly # (That is to say, it is ignored.) # These tests are similar to those in 01-basic.t. my @tests = ('{""}' => '', # (5) # Backslashes don't matter '{"}"}' => undef, '{"\\}"}' => undef, # One backslash '{"\\\\}"}' => undef, # Two backslashes '{"\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Three backslashes '{"\\\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Four backslashes (10) '{"\\\\\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Five backslashes # Backslashes are always passed directly to Perl '{"x20"}' => 'x20', '{"\\x20"}' => ' ', # One backslash '{"\\\\x20"}' => '\\x20', # Two backslashes '{"\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\ ', # Three backslashes (15) '{"\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\x20', # Four backslashes '{"\\\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\ ', # Five backslashes '{"\\x20\\}"}' => undef, # (18) ); my $i; for ($i=0; $i<@tests; $i+=2) { my $tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tests[$i], DELIMITERS => ['{', '}'], ); my $text = $tmpl->fill_in; my $result = $tests[$i+1]; my $ok = (! defined $text && ! defined $result || $text eq $result); unless ($ok) { print STDERR "($n) expected .$result., got .$text.\n"; } print +($ok ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; } exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/12-preprocess.t0000644000000000000000000000265313176625661022770 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # Tests for PREPROCESSOR features # These tests first appeared in version 1.25. use Text::Template::Preprocess; die "This is the test program for Text::Template::Preprocess version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::Preprocess::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::Preprocess::VERSION == 1.46; $TMPFILE = "tt$$"; print "1..8\n"; my $n = 1; my $py = sub { tr/x/y/ }; my $pz = sub { tr/x/z/ }; my $t = 'xxx The value of $x is {$x}'; my $outx = 'xxx The value of $x is 119'; my $outy = 'yyy The value of $y is 23'; my $outz = 'zzz The value of $z is 5'; open TF, "> $TMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting"; print TF $t; close TF; @result = ($outx, $outy, $outz, $outz); for my $trial (1, 0) { for my $test (0 .. 3) { my $tmpl; if ($trial == 0) { $tmpl = new Text::Template::Preprocess (TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $t) or die; } else { open TF, "< $TMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting"; $tmpl = new Text::Template::Preprocess (TYPE => 'FILEHANDLE', SOURCE => \*TF) or die; } $tmpl->preprocessor($py) if ($test & 1) == 1; my @args = ((($test & 2) == 2) ? (PREPROCESSOR => $pz) : ()); my $o = $tmpl->fill_in(@args, HASH => {x => 119, 'y' => 23, z => 5}); # print STDERR "$o/$result[$test]\n"; print +(($o eq $result[$test]) ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; } } unlink $TMPFILE; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/09-error.t0000644000000000000000000000237313176625661021741 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module # still incomplete. use Text::Template; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..5\n"; $n = 1; # (1-2) Missing source eval { Text::Template->new(); }; unless ($@ =~ /^\QUsage: Text::Template::new(TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ...)/) { print STDERR $@; print "not "; } print "ok $n\n"; $n++; eval { Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE'); }; if ($@ =~ /^\QUsage: Text::Template::new(TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ...)/) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print STDERR $@; print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (3) Invalid type eval { Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'wlunch', SOURCE => 'fish food'); }; if ($@ =~ /^\QIllegal value `WLUNCH' for TYPE parameter/) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print STDERR $@; print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (4-5) File does not exist my $o = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => 'this file does not exist'); print $o ? "not ok $n\n" : "ok $n\n"; $n++; print defined($Text::Template::ERROR) && $Text::Template::ERROR =~ /^Couldn't open file/ ? "ok $n\n" : "not ok $n\n"; $n++; exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/06-ofh.t0000644000000000000000000000150313176625661021353 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module # still incomplete. use Text::Template; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..2\n"; $n=1; $template = new Text::Template TYPE => STRING, SOURCE => q{My process ID is {$$}}; $of = "t$$"; END { unlink $of } open O, "> $of" or die; $text = $template->fill_in(OUTPUT => \*O); # (1) No $text should have been constructed. Return value should be true. print +($text eq '1' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; close O or die; open I, "< $of" or die; { local $/; $t = } close I; # (2) The text should have been printed to the file print +($t eq "My process ID is $$" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/08-exported.t0000644000000000000000000000435313176625661022441 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module # still incomplete. use Text::Template 'fill_in_file', 'fill_in_string'; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..6\n"; $n=1; $Q::n = $Q::n = 119; # (1) Test fill_in_string $out = fill_in_string('The value of $n is {$n}.', PACKAGE => 'Q' ); print +($out eq 'The value of $n is 119.' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (2) Test fill_in_file $TEMPFILE = "tt$$"; open F, "> $TEMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting"; print F 'The value of $n is {$n}.', "\n"; close F or die "Couldn't write test file: $!; aborting"; $R::n = $R::n = 8128; $out = fill_in_file($TEMPFILE, PACKAGE => 'R'); print +($out eq "The value of \$n is 8128.\n" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (3) Jonathan Roy reported this bug: open F, "> $TEMPFILE" or die "Couldn't open test file: $!; aborting"; print F "With a message here? [% \$var %]\n"; close F or die "Couldn't close test file: $!; aborting"; $out = fill_in_file($TEMPFILE, DELIMITERS => ['[%', '%]'], HASH => { "var" => \"It is good!" }); print +($out eq "With a message here? It is good!\n" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (4) It probably occurs in fill_this_in also: $out = Text::Template->fill_this_in("With a message here? [% \$var %]\n", DELIMITERS => ['[%', '%]'], HASH => { "var" => \"It is good!" }); print +($out eq "With a message here? It is good!\n" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (5) This test failed in 1.25. It was supplied by Donald L. Greer Jr. # Note that it's different from (1) in that there's no explicit # package=> argument. use vars qw($string $foo $r); $string='Hello {$foo}'; $foo="Don"; $r = fill_in_string($string); print (($r eq 'Hello Don' ? '' : 'not '), 'ok ', $n++, "\n"); # (6) This test failed in 1.25. It's a variation on (5) package Q2; use Text::Template 'fill_in_string'; use vars qw($string $foo $r); $string='Hello {$foo}'; $foo="Don"; $r = fill_in_string($string); print (($r eq 'Hello Don' ? '' : 'not '), 'ok ', $main::n++, "\n"); package main; END { $TEMPFILE && unlink $TEMPFILE } exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/03-out.t0000644000000000000000000000230513176625661021404 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module # still incomplete. # use Text::Template; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46 You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..1\n"; $n=1; $template = q{ This line should have a 3: {1+2} This line should have several numbers: { $t = ''; foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $t .= $n . ' ' } $t } }; $templateOUT = q{ This line should have a 3: { $OUT = 1+2 } This line should have several numbers: { foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $OUT .= $n . ' ' } } }; # Build templates from string $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template) or die; $templateOUT = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $templateOUT) or die; # Fill in templates $text = $template->fill_in() or die; $textOUT = $templateOUT->fill_in() or die; # (1) They should be the same print +($text eq $textOUT ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # Missing: Test this feature in Safe compartments; # it's a totally different code path. # Decision: Put that into safe.t, because that file should # be skipped when Safe.pm is unavailable. exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/02-hash.t0000644000000000000000000000621713176625661021525 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module # still incomplete. use Text::Template; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..12\n"; $n=1; $template = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> {$v}'; $v = 'oops (main)'; $Q::v = 'oops (Q)'; $vars = { 'v' => \'good' }; # (1) Build template from string $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template); print +($template ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (2) Fill in template in anonymous package $result2 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good'; $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars); print +($text eq $result2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (3) Did we clobber the main variable? print +($v eq 'oops (main)' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (4) Fill in same template again $result4 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good'; $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars); print +($text eq $result4 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (5) Now with a package $result5 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good'; $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars, PACKAGE => 'Q'); print +($text eq $result5 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (6) We expect to have clobbered the Q variable. print +($Q::v eq 'good' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (7) Now let's try it without a package $result7 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good'; $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $vars); print +($text eq $result7 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (8-11) Now what does it do when we pass a hash with undefined values? # Roy says it does something bad. (Added for 1.20.) my $WARNINGS = 0; { local $SIG{__WARN__} = sub {$WARNINGS++}; local $^W = 1; # Make sure this is on for this test $template8 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> {defined $v ? "bad" : "good"}'; $result8 = 'We will put value of $v (which is "good") here -> good'; my $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template8); my $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => {'v' => undef}); # (8) Did we generate a warning? print +($WARNINGS == 0 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (9) Was the output correct? print +($text eq $result8 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (10-11) Let's try that again, with a twist this time $WARNINGS = 0; $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => [{'v' => 17}, {'v' => undef}]); # (10) Did we generate a warning? print +($WARNINGS == 0 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (11) Was the output correct? if ($] < 5.005) { print "ok $n # skipped -- not supported before 5.005\n"; } else { print +($text eq $result8 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; } $n++; } # (12) Now we'll test the multiple-hash option (Added for 1.20.) $text = Text::Template::fill_in_string(q{$v: {$v}. @v: [{"@v"}].}, HASH => [{'v' => 17}, {'v' => ['a', 'b', 'c']}, {'v' => \23}, ]); $result = q{$v: 23. @v: [a b c].}; print +($text eq $result ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/05-safe2.t0000644000000000000000000000536113176625661021604 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module # still incomplete. use Text::Template; BEGIN { eval "use Safe"; if ($@) { print "1..0\n"; exit 0; } } die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..12\n"; $n = 1; $c = new Safe or die; # Test handling of packages and importing. $c->reval('$P = "safe root"'); $P = $P = 'main'; $Q::P = $Q::P = 'Q'; # How to effectively test the gensymming? $t = new Text::Template TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => 'package is {$P}' or die; # (1) Default behavior: Inherit from calling package, `main' in this case. $text = $t->fill_in(); print +($text eq 'package is main' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (2) When a package is specified, we should use that package instead. $text = $t->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'Q'); print +($text eq 'package is Q' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (3) When no package is specified in safe mode, we should use the # default safe root. $text = $t->fill_in(SAFE => $c); print +($text eq 'package is safe root' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (4) When a package is specified in safe mode, we should use the # default safe root, after aliasing to the specified package $text = $t->fill_in(SAFE => $c, PACKAGE => Q); print +($text eq 'package is Q' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # Now let's see if hash vars are installed properly into safe templates $t = new Text::Template TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => 'hash is {$H}' or die; # (5) First in default mode $text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good5'} ); print +($text eq 'hash is good5' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (6) Now in packages $text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good6'}, PACKAGE => 'Q' ); print +($text eq 'hash is good6' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (7) Now in the default root of the safe compartment $text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good7'}, SAFE => $c ); print +($text eq 'hash is good7' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (8) Now in the default root after aliasing to a package that # got the hash stuffed in $text = $t->fill_in(HASH => {H => 'good8'}, SAFE => $c, PACKAGE => 'Q2' ); print +($text eq 'hash is good8' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # Now let's make sure that none of the packages leaked on each other. # (9) This var should NOT have been installed into the main package print +(defined $H ? 'not ' : ''), "ok $n\n"; $H=$H; $n++; # (10) good6 was overwritten in test 7, so there's nothing to test for here. print "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (11) this value overwrote the one from test 6. print +($Q::H eq 'good7' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $Q::H = $Q::H; $n++; # (12) print +($Q2::H eq 'good8' ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $Q2::H = $Q2::H; $n++; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/04-safe.t0000644000000000000000000001063413176625661021520 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module # still incomplete. use Text::Template; BEGIN { eval "use Safe"; if ($@) { print "1..0\n"; exit 0; } } die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..16\n"; if ($^O eq 'MacOS') { $BADOP = qq{}; $FAILURE = q{}; } else { $BADOP = qq{kill 0}; $FAILURE = q{Program fragment at line 1 delivered error ``kill trapped by operation mask''}; } $n=1; $v = $v = 119; $c = new Safe or die; $goodtemplate = q{This should succeed: { $v }}; $goodoutput = q{This should succeed: 119}; $template1 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $goodtemplate) or die; $template2 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $goodtemplate) or die; $text1 = $template1->fill_in(); $text2 = $template1->fill_in(SAFE => $c); $ERR2 = $@; $text3 = $template2->fill_in(SAFE => $c); $ERR3 = $@; # (1)(2)(3) None of these should have failed. print +(defined $text1 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; print +(defined $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; print +(defined $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (4) Safe and non-safe fills of different template objects with the # same template text should yield the same result. # print +($text1 eq $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; # (4) voided this test: it's not true, because the unsafe fill # uses package main, while the safe fill uses the secret safe package. # We could alias the secret safe package to be identical to main, # but that wouldn't be safe. If you want the aliasing, you have to # request it explicitly with `PACKAGE'. print "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (5) Safe and non-safe fills of the same template object # should yield the same result. # (5) voided this test for the same reason as #4. # print +($text1 eq $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (6) Make sure the output was actually correct print +($text1 eq $goodoutput ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; $badtemplate = qq{This should fail: { $BADOP; 'NOFAIL' }}; $badnosafeoutput = q{This should fail: NOFAIL}; $badsafeoutput = q{This should fail: Program fragment delivered error ``kill trapped by operation mask at template line 1.''}; $template1 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $badtemplate) or die; $template2 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $badtemplate) or die; $text1 = $template1->fill_in(); $text2 = $template1->fill_in(SAFE => $c); $ERR2 = $@; $text3 = $template2->fill_in(SAFE => $c); $ERR3 = $@; $text4 = $template1->fill_in(); # (7)(8)(9)(10) None of these should have failed. print +(defined $text1 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; print +(defined $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; print +(defined $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; print +(defined $text4 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (11) text1 and text4 should be the same (using safe in between # didn't change anything.) print +($text1 eq $text4 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (12) text2 and text3 should be the same (same template text in different # objects print +($text2 eq $text3 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (13) text1 should yield badnosafeoutput print +($text1 eq $badnosafeoutput ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (14) text2 should yield badsafeoutput $text2 =~ s/'kill'/kill/; # 5.8.1 added quote marks around the op name print "# expected: <$badsafeoutput>\n# got : <$text2>\n"; print +($text2 eq $badsafeoutput ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; $template = q{{$x=1}{$x+1}}; $template1 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template) or die; $template2 = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template) or die; $text1 = $template1->fill_in(); $text2 = $template1->fill_in(SAFE => new Safe); # (15) Do effects persist in safe compartments? print +($text1 eq $text2 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (16) Try the BROKEN routine in safe compartments sub my_broken { my %a = @_; $a{error} =~ s/ at.*//s; "OK! text:$a{text} error:$a{error} lineno:$a{lineno} arg:$a{arg}" ; } $templateB = new Text::Template (TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => '{die}') or die; $text1 = $templateB->fill_in(BROKEN => \&my_broken, BROKEN_ARG => 'barg', SAFE => new Safe, ); $result1 = qq{OK! text:die error:Died lineno:1 arg:barg}; print +($text1 eq $result1 ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/13-taint.t0000644000000000000000000000571713176625661021727 0ustar rootroot#!perl -T # Tests for taint-mode features use lib 'blib/lib'; use Text::Template; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; my $r = int(rand(10000)); my $file = "tt$r"; # makes its arguments tainted sub taint { for (@_) { $_ .= substr($0,0,0); # LOD } } print "1..21\n"; my $n =1; print "ok ", $n++, "\n"; my $template = 'The value of $n is {$n}.'; open T, "> $file" or die "Couldn't write temporary file $file: $!"; print T $template, "\n"; close T or die "Couldn't finish temporary file $file: $!"; sub should_fail { my $obj = Text::Template->new(@_); eval {$obj->fill_in()}; if ($@) { print "ok $n # $@\n"; } else { print "not ok $n # (didn't fail)\n"; } $n++; } sub should_work { my $obj = Text::Template->new(@_); eval {$obj->fill_in()}; if ($@) { print "not ok $n # $@\n"; } else { print "ok $n\n"; } $n++; } sub should_be_tainted { if (Text::Template::_is_clean($_[0])) { print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; return; } print "ok $n\n"; $n++; return; } sub should_be_clean { unless (Text::Template::_is_clean($_[0])) { print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; return; } print "ok $n\n"; $n++; return; } # Tainted filename should die with and without UNTAINT option # untainted filename should die without UNTAINT option # filehandle should die without UNTAINT option # string and array with tainted data should die either way # (2)-(7) my $tfile = $file; taint($tfile); should_be_tainted($tfile); should_be_clean($file); should_fail TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $tfile; should_fail TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $tfile, UNTAINT => 1; should_fail TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $file; should_work TYPE => 'file', SOURCE => $file, UNTAINT => 1; # (8-9) open H, "< $file" or die "Couldn't open $file for reading: $!; aborting"; should_fail TYPE => 'filehandle', SOURCE => \*H; close H; open H, "< $file" or die "Couldn't open $file for reading: $!; aborting"; should_work TYPE => 'filehandle', SOURCE => \*H, UNTAINT => 1; close H; # (10-15) my $ttemplate = $template; taint($ttemplate); should_be_tainted($ttemplate); should_be_clean($template); should_fail TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $ttemplate; should_fail TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $ttemplate, UNTAINT => 1; should_work TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $template; should_work TYPE => 'string', SOURCE => $template, UNTAINT => 1; # (16-19) my $array = [ $template ]; my $tarray = [ $ttemplate ]; should_fail TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $tarray; should_fail TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $tarray, UNTAINT => 1; should_work TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $array; should_work TYPE => 'array', SOURCE => $array, UNTAINT => 1; # (20-21) Test _unconditionally_untaint utility function Text::Template::_unconditionally_untaint($ttemplate); should_be_clean($ttemplate); Text::Template::_unconditionally_untaint($tfile); should_be_clean($tfile); END { unlink $file } openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/07-safe3.t0000644000000000000000000000416713176625661021612 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # test apparatus for Text::Template module use Text::Template; BEGIN { eval "use Safe"; if ($@) { print "1..0\n"; exit 0; } } die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46. You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..3\n"; $n=1; # Test the OUT feature with safe compartments $template = q{ This line should have a 3: {1+2} This line should have several numbers: { $t = ''; foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $t .= $n . ' ' } $t } }; $templateOUT = q{ This line should have a 3: { $OUT = 1+2 } This line should have several numbers: { foreach $n (1 .. 20) { $OUT .= $n . ' ' } } }; $c = new Safe; # Build templates from string $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $template, SAFE => $c) or die; $templateOUT = new Text::Template ('type' => 'STRING', 'source' => $templateOUT, SAFE => $c) or die; # Fill in templates $text = $template->fill_in() or die; $textOUT = $templateOUT->fill_in() or die; # (1) They should be the same print +($text eq $textOUT ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (2-3) "Joel Appelbaum" <000701c0ac2c$aed1d6e0$0201a8c0@prime> # "Contrary to the documentation the $OUT variable is not always # undefined at the start of each program fragment. The $OUT variable # is never undefined after it is used once if you are using the SAFE # option. The result is that every fragment after the fragment that # $OUT was used in is replaced by the old $OUT value instead of the # result of the fragment. This holds true even after the # Text::Template object goes out of scope and a new one is created!" # # Also reported by Daini Xie. { my $template = q{{$OUT = 'x'}y{$OUT .= 'z'}}; my $expected = "xyz"; my $s = Safe->new; my $o = Text::Template->new(type => 'string', source => $template, ); for (1..2) { my $r = $o->fill_in(SAFE => $s); if ($r ne $expected) { print "not ok $n # <$r>\n"; } else { print "ok $n\n"; } $n++; } } exit; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/01-basic.t0000644000000000000000000001403413176625661021656 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # Tests of basic, essential functionality # use Text::Template; $X::v = $Y::v = 0; # Suppress `var used only once' print "1..31\n"; $n=1; $template_1 = < {\$v} We will evaluate 1+1 here -> {1 + 1} EOM # (1) Construct temporary template file for testing # file operations $TEMPFILE = "tt$$"; open(TMP, "> $TEMPFILE") or print "not ok $n\n" && &abort("Couldn\'t write tempfile $TEMPFILE: $!"); print TMP $template_1; close TMP; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (2) Build template from file $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'FILE', 'source' => $TEMPFILE); if (defined($template)) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n"; } $n++; # (3) Fill in template from file $X::v = "abc"; $resultX = < abc We will evaluate 1+1 here -> 2 EOM $Y::v = "ABC"; $resultY = < ABC We will evaluate 1+1 here -> 2 EOM $text = $template->fill_in('package' => X); if ($text eq $resultX) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (4) Fill in same template again $text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y); if ($text eq $resultY) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (5) Simple test of `fill_this_in' $text = Text::Template->fill_this_in( $template_1, 'package' => X); if ($text eq $resultX) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (6) test creation of template from filehandle if (open (TMPL, "< $TEMPFILE")) { $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'FILEHANDLE', 'source' => *TMPL); if (defined($template)) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n"; } $n++; # (7) test filling in of template from filehandle $text = $template->fill_in('package' => X); if ($text eq $resultX) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (8) test second fill_in on same template object $text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y); if ($text eq $resultY) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; close TMPL; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; } # (9) test creation of template from array $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'ARRAY', 'source' => [ 'We will put value of $v (which is "abc") here -> {$v}', "\n", 'We will evaluate 1+1 here -> {1+1}', "\n", ]); if (defined($template)) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n"; } $n++; # (10) test filling in of template from array $text = $template->fill_in('package' => X); if ($text eq $resultX) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (11) test second fill_in on same array template object $text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y); if ($text eq $resultY) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; print STDERR "$resultX\n---\n$text"; unless (!defined($text)) { print STDERR "ERROR: $Text::Template::ERROR\n"}; } $n++; # (12) Make sure \ is working properly # Test added for version 1.11 my $tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => 'B{"\\}"}C{"\\{"}D', ); # This should fail if the \ are not interpreted properly. my $text = $tmpl->fill_in(); print +($text eq "B}C{D" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (13) Make sure \ is working properly # Test added for version 1.11 $tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => qq{A{"\t"}B}, ); # Symptom of old problem: ALL \ were special in templates, so # The lexer would return (A, PROGTEXT("t"), B), and the # result text would be AtB instead of A(tab)B. $text = $tmpl->fill_in(); print +($text eq "A\tB" ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; # (14-27) Make sure \ is working properly # Test added for version 1.11 # This is a sort of general test. my @tests = ('{""}' => '', # (14) '{"}"}' => undef, # (15) '{"\\}"}' => '}', # One backslash '{"\\\\}"}' => undef, # Two backslashes '{"\\\\\\}"}' => '}', # Three backslashes '{"\\\\\\\\}"}' => undef, # Four backslashes '{"\\\\\\\\\\}"}' => '\}', # Five backslashes (20) '{"x20"}' => 'x20', '{"\\x20"}' => ' ', # One backslash '{"\\\\x20"}' => '\\x20', # Two backslashes '{"\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\ ', # Three backslashes '{"\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\x20', # Four backslashes (25) '{"\\\\\\\\\\x20"}' => '\\\\ ', # Five backslashes '{"\\x20\\}"}' => ' }', # (27) ); my $i; for ($i=0; $i<@tests; $i+=2) { my $tmpl = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tests[$i], ); my $text = $tmpl->fill_in; my $result = $tests[$i+1]; my $ok = (! defined $text && ! defined $result || $text eq $result); unless ($ok) { print STDERR "($n) expected .$result., got .$text.\n"; } print +($ok ? '' : 'not '), "ok $n\n"; $n++; } # (28-30) I discovered that you can't pass a glob ref as your filehandle. # MJD 20010827 # (28) test creation of template from filehandle if (open (TMPL, "< $TEMPFILE")) { $template = new Text::Template ('type' => 'FILEHANDLE', 'source' => \*TMPL); if (defined($template)) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n $Text::Template::ERROR\n"; } $n++; # (29) test filling in of template from filehandle $text = $template->fill_in('package' => X); if ($text eq $resultX) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; # (30) test second fill_in on same template object $text = $template->fill_in('package' => Y); if ($text eq $resultY) { print "ok $n\n"; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; } $n++; close TMPL; } else { print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; print "not ok $n\n"; $n++; } # (31) Test _scrubpkg for leakiness $Text::Template::GEN0::test = 1; Text::Template::_scrubpkg('Text::Template::GEN0'); if ($Text::Template::GEN0::test) { print "not ok $n\n"; } else { print "ok $n\n"; } $n++; END {unlink $TEMPFILE;} exit; sub abort { unlink $TEMPFILE; die $_[0]; } openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/11-prepend.t0000644000000000000000000000466313176625661022242 0ustar rootroot#!perl # # Tests for PREPEND features # These tests first appeared in version 1.22. use Text::Template; die "This is the test program for Text::Template version 1.46 You are using version $Text::Template::VERSION instead. That does not make sense.\n Aborting" unless $Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46; print "1..9\n"; my $n = 1; @Emptyclass1::ISA = 'Text::Template'; @Emptyclass2::ISA = 'Text::Template'; my $tin = q{The value of $foo is: {$foo}}; Text::Template->always_prepend(q{$foo = "global"}); $tmpl1 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tin, ); $tmpl2 = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tin, PREPEND => q{$foo = "template"}, ); $tmpl1->compile; $tmpl2->compile; $t1 = $tmpl1->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T1'); $t2 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T2'); $t3 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PREPEND => q{$foo = "fillin"}, PACKAGE => 'T3'); ($t1 eq 'The value of $foo is: global') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; ($t2 eq 'The value of $foo is: template') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; ($t3 eq 'The value of $foo is: fillin') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; Emptyclass1->always_prepend(q{$foo = 'Emptyclass global';}); $tmpl1 = Emptyclass1->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tin, ); $tmpl2 = Emptyclass1->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tin, PREPEND => q{$foo = "template"}, ); $tmpl1->compile; $tmpl2->compile; $t1 = $tmpl1->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T4'); $t2 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T5'); $t3 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PREPEND => q{$foo = "fillin"}, PACKAGE => 'T6'); ($t1 eq 'The value of $foo is: Emptyclass global') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; ($t2 eq 'The value of $foo is: template') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; ($t3 eq 'The value of $foo is: fillin') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; $tmpl1 = Emptyclass2->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tin, ); $tmpl2 = Emptyclass2->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $tin, PREPEND => q{$foo = "template"}, ); $tmpl1->compile; $tmpl2->compile; $t1 = $tmpl1->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T4'); $t2 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'T5'); $t3 = $tmpl2->fill_in(PREPEND => q{$foo = "fillin"}, PACKAGE => 'T6'); ($t1 eq 'The value of $foo is: global') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; ($t2 eq 'The value of $foo is: template') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; ($t3 eq 'The value of $foo is: fillin') or print "not "; print "ok $n\n"; $n++; openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/t/00-version.t0000644000000000000000000000022513176625661022256 0ustar rootroot#!perl use Text::Template; print "1..1\n"; if ($Text::Template::VERSION == 1.46) { print "ok 1\n"; } else { print "not ok 1\n"; } openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Artistic0000644000000000000000000001373713176625661021445 0ustar rootroot The "Artistic License" Preamble The intent of this document is to state the conditions under which a Package may be copied, such that the Copyright Holder maintains some semblance of artistic control over the development of the package, while giving the users of the package the right to use and distribute the Package in a more-or-less customary fashion, plus the right to make reasonable modifications. 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The End openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/META.json0000644000000000000000000000142713176625661021352 0ustar rootroot{ "abstract" : "unknown", "author" : [ "unknown" ], "dynamic_config" : 1, "generated_by" : "ExtUtils::MakeMaker version 6.62, CPAN::Meta::Converter version 2.120630", "license" : [ "unknown" ], "meta-spec" : { "url" : "http://search.cpan.org/perldoc?CPAN::Meta::Spec", "version" : "2" }, "name" : "Text-Template", "no_index" : { "directory" : [ "t", "inc" ] }, "prereqs" : { "build" : { "requires" : { "ExtUtils::MakeMaker" : "0" } }, "configure" : { "requires" : { "ExtUtils::MakeMaker" : "0" } }, "runtime" : { "requires" : {} } }, "release_status" : "stable", "version" : "1.46" } openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/Makefile.PL0000644000000000000000000000033113176625661021674 0ustar rootrootuse ExtUtils::MakeMaker; WriteMakefile( NAME => 'Text::Template', VERSION_FROM => 'lib/Text/Template.pm', # 'linkext' => {LINKTYPE => ''}, 'dist' => {COMPRESS => 'gzip', SUFFIX => 'gz'}, ); openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/README0000644000000000000000000002666513176625661020624 0ustar rootroot Text::Template v1.46 This is a library for generating form letters, building HTML pages, or filling in templates generally. A `template' is a piece of text that has little Perl programs embedded in it here and there. When you `fill in' a template, you evaluate the little programs and replace them with their values. Here's an example of a template: Dear {$title} {$lastname}, It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your {$monthname[$last_paid_month]} payment. Please remit ${sprintf("%.2f", $amount)} immediately, or your patellae may be needlessly endangered. Love, Mark "{nickname(rand 20)}" Dominus The result of filling in this template is a string, which might look something like this: Dear Mr. Gates, It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your February payment. Please remit $392.12 immediately, or your patellae may be needlessly endangered. Love, Mark "Vizopteryx" Dominus You can store a template in a file outside your program. People can modify the template without modifying the program. You can separate the formatting details from the main code, and put the formatting parts of the program into the template. That prevents code bloat and encourages functional separation. You can fill in the template in a `Safe' compartment. This means that if you don't trust the person who wrote the code in the template, you won't have to worry that they are tampering with your program when you execute it. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Text::Template was originally released some time in late 1995 or early 1996. After three years of study and investigation, I rewrote it from scratch in January 1999. The new version, 1.0, was much faster, delivered better functionality and was almost 100% backward-compatible with the previous beta versions. I have added a number of useful features and conveniences since the 1.0 release, while still retaining backward compatibility. With one merely cosmetic change, the current version of Text::Template passes the test suite that the old beta versions passed. Questions or comments should be addressed to mjd-perl-template+@plover.com. This address goes directly to me, and not to anyone else; it is not a mailing list address. To receive occasional announcements of new versions of T::T, send an empty note to mjd-perl-template-request@plover.com. This mailing list is not for discussion; it is for announcements only. Therefore, there is no address for sending messages to the list. You can get the most recent version of Text::Template, news, comments, and other collateral information from . ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.46 since v1.44: Thanks to Rik Signes, there is a new Text::Template->append_text_to_output method, which Text::Template always uses whenever it wants to emit output. You can subclass this to get control over the output, for example for postprocessing. A spurious warning is no longer emitted when the TYPE parameter to ->new is omitted. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.44 since v1.43: This is a maintentance release. There are no feature changes. _scrubpkg, which was responsible for eptying out temporary packages after the module had done with them, wasn't always working; the result was memory-leaks in long-running applications. This should be fixed now, and there is a test in the test suite for it. Minor changes to the test suite to prevent spurious errors. Minor documentation changes. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.43 since v1.42: The ->new method now fails immediately and sets $Text::Template::ERROR if the file that is named by a filename argument does not exist or cannot be opened for some other reason. Formerly, the constructor would succeed and the ->fill_in call would fail. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.42 since v1.41: This is a maintentance release. There are no feature changes. Fixed a bug relating to use of UNTAINT under perl 5.005_03 and possibly other versions. Taint-related tests are now more comprehensive. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.41 since v1.40: This is a maintentance release. There are no feature changes. Tests now work correctly on Windows systems and possibly on other non-unix systems. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.40 since v1.31: New UNTAINT option tells the module that it is safe to 'eval' code even though it has come from a file or filehandle. Code added to prevent memory leaks when filling many templates. Thanks to Itamar Almeida de Carvalho. Bug fix: $OUT was not correctly initialized when used in conjunction with SAFE. You may now use a glob ref when passing a filehandle to the ->new funcion. Formerly, a glob was reuqired. New subclass: Text::Template::Preprocess. Just like Text::Template, but you may supply a PREPROCESS option in the constructor or the fill_in call; this is a function which receives each code fragment prior to evaluation, and which may modify and return the fragment; the modified fragment is what is evaluated. Error messages passed to BROKEN subroutines will now report the correct line number of the template at which the error occurred: Illegal division by zero at template line 37. If the template comes from a file, the filename will be reported as well: Illegal division by zero at catalog.tmpl line 37. INCOMPATIBLE CHANGE: The format of the default error message has changed. It used to look like: Program fragment at line 30 delivered error ``Illegal division by zero'' It now looks like: Program fragment delivered error ``Illegal division by zero at catalog.tmpl line 37'' Note that the default message used to report the line number at which the program fragment began; it now reports the line number at which the error actually occurred. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.31 since v1.23: Just bug fixes---fill_in_string was failing. Thanks to Donald L. Greer Jr. for the test case. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.23 since v1.22: Small bug fix: DELIMITER and other arguments were being ignored in calls to fill_in_file and fill_this_in. (Thanks to Jonathan Roy for reporting this.) ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.22 since v1.20: You can now specify that certain Perl statements be prepended to the beginning of every program fragment in a template, either per template, or for all templates, or for the duration of only one call to fill_in. This is useful, for example, if you want to enable `strict' checks in your templates but you don't want to manually add `use strict' to the front of every program fragment everywhere. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.20 since v1.12: You can now specify that the program fragment delimiters are strings other than { and }. This has three interesting effects: First, it changes the delimiter strings. Second, it disables the special meaning of \, so you have to be really, really sure that the delimiters will not appear in your templates. And third, because of the simplifications introduced by the elimination of \ processing, template parsing is 20-25% faster. See the manual section on `Alternative Delimiters'. Fixed bug having to do with undefined values in HASH options. In particular, Text::Template no longer generates a warning if you try to give a variable an undefined value. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.12 since v1.11: I forgot to say that Text::Template ISA Exporter, so the exported functions never got exported. Duhhh! Template TYPEs are now case-insensitive. The `new' method now diagnoses attempts to use an invalid TYPE. More tests for these things. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.11 since v1.10: Fixed a bug in the way backslashes were processed. The 1.10 behavior was incompatible with the beta versions and was also inconvenient. (`\n' in templates was replaced with `n' before it was given to Perl for evaluation.) The new behavior is also incompatible with the beta versions, but it is only a little bit incompatible, and it is probbaly better. Documentation for the new behavior, and tests for the bug. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.10 since v1.03: New OUTPUT option delivers template results directly to a filehandle instead of making them into a string. Saves space and time. PACKAGE and HASH now work intelligently with SAFE. Fragments may now output data directly to the template, rather than having to arrange to return it as a return value at the end. This means that where you used to have to write this: { my $blist = ''; foreach $i (@items) { $blist .= qq{ * $i\n}; } $blist; } You can now write this instead, because $OUT is special. { foreach $i (@items) { $OUT.= " * $i\n"; } } (`A spoonful of sugar makes the medicine go down.') Fixed some small bugs. Worked around a bug in Perl that does the wrong thing with $x = when $x contains a glob. More documentation. Errors fixed. Lots more tests. ---------------------------------------------------------------- What's new in v1.03 since v1.0: Code added to support HASH option to fill_in. (Incl. `_gensym' function.) Documentation for HASH. New test file for HASH. Note about failure of lexical variables to propagate into templates. Why does this surprise people? Bug fix: program fragments are evaluated in an environment with `no strict' by default. Otherwise, you get a lot of `Global symbol "$v" requires explicit package name' failures. Why didn't the test program pick this up? Because the only variable the test program ever used was `$a', which is exempt. Duhhhhh. Fixed the test program. Various minor documentation fixes. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Improvements of 1.0 over the old 0.1beta: New features: At least twice as fast Better support for filling out the same template more than once Now supports evaluation of program fragments in Safe compartments. (Thanks, Jonathan!) Better argument syntax More convenience functions The parser is much better and simpler. Once a template is parsed, the parsed version is stored so that it needn't be parsed again. BROKEN function behavior is rationalized. You can now pass an arbitrary argument to your BROKEN function, or return a value from it to the main program. Documentation overhauled. openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661020473 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661021417 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template.pm0000644000000000000000000017120213176625661023533 0ustar rootroot# -*- perl -*- # Text::Template.pm # # Fill in `templates' # # Copyright 2013 M. J. Dominus. # You may copy and distribute this program under the # same terms as Perl iteself. # If in doubt, write to mjd-perl-template+@plover.com for a license. # # Version 1.46 package Text::Template; require 5.004; use Exporter; @ISA = qw(Exporter); @EXPORT_OK = qw(fill_in_file fill_in_string TTerror); use vars '$ERROR'; use strict; $Text::Template::VERSION = '1.46'; my %GLOBAL_PREPEND = ('Text::Template' => ''); sub Version { $Text::Template::VERSION; } sub _param { my $kk; my ($k, %h) = @_; for $kk ($k, "\u$k", "\U$k", "-$k", "-\u$k", "-\U$k") { return $h{$kk} if exists $h{$kk}; } return; } sub always_prepend { my $pack = shift; my $old = $GLOBAL_PREPEND{$pack}; $GLOBAL_PREPEND{$pack} = shift; $old; } { my %LEGAL_TYPE; BEGIN { %LEGAL_TYPE = map {$_=>1} qw(FILE FILEHANDLE STRING ARRAY); } sub new { my $pack = shift; my %a = @_; my $stype = uc(_param('type', %a) || "FILE"); my $source = _param('source', %a); my $untaint = _param('untaint', %a); my $prepend = _param('prepend', %a); my $alt_delim = _param('delimiters', %a); my $broken = _param('broken', %a); unless (defined $source) { require Carp; Carp::croak("Usage: $ {pack}::new(TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ...)"); } unless ($LEGAL_TYPE{$stype}) { require Carp; Carp::croak("Illegal value `$stype' for TYPE parameter"); } my $self = {TYPE => $stype, PREPEND => $prepend, UNTAINT => $untaint, BROKEN => $broken, (defined $alt_delim ? (DELIM => $alt_delim) : ()), }; # Under 5.005_03, if any of $stype, $prepend, $untaint, or $broken # are tainted, all the others become tainted too as a result of # sharing the expression with them. We install $source separately # to prevent it from acquiring a spurious taint. $self->{SOURCE} = $source; bless $self => $pack; return unless $self->_acquire_data; $self; } } # Convert template objects of various types to type STRING, # in which the template data is embedded in the object itself. sub _acquire_data { my ($self) = @_; my $type = $self->{TYPE}; if ($type eq 'STRING') { # nothing necessary } elsif ($type eq 'FILE') { my $data = _load_text($self->{SOURCE}); unless (defined $data) { # _load_text already set $ERROR return undef; } if ($self->{UNTAINT} && _is_clean($self->{SOURCE})) { _unconditionally_untaint($data); } $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING'; $self->{FILENAME} = $self->{SOURCE}; $self->{SOURCE} = $data; } elsif ($type eq 'ARRAY') { $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING'; $self->{SOURCE} = join '', @{$self->{SOURCE}}; } elsif ($type eq 'FILEHANDLE') { $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING'; local $/; my $fh = $self->{SOURCE}; my $data = <$fh>; # Extra assignment avoids bug in Solaris perl5.00[45]. if ($self->{UNTAINT}) { _unconditionally_untaint($data); } $self->{SOURCE} = $data; } else { # This should have been caught long ago, so it represents a # drastic `can't-happen' sort of failure my $pack = ref $self; die "Can only acquire data for $pack objects of subtype STRING, but this is $type; aborting"; } $self->{DATA_ACQUIRED} = 1; } sub source { my ($self) = @_; $self->_acquire_data unless $self->{DATA_ACQUIRED}; return $self->{SOURCE}; } sub set_source_data { my ($self, $newdata) = @_; $self->{SOURCE} = $newdata; $self->{DATA_ACQUIRED} = 1; $self->{TYPE} = 'STRING'; 1; } sub compile { my $self = shift; return 1 if $self->{TYPE} eq 'PREPARSED'; return undef unless $self->_acquire_data; unless ($self->{TYPE} eq 'STRING') { my $pack = ref $self; # This should have been caught long ago, so it represents a # drastic `can't-happen' sort of failure die "Can only compile $pack objects of subtype STRING, but this is $self->{TYPE}; aborting"; } my @tokens; my $delim_pats = shift() || $self->{DELIM}; my ($t_open, $t_close) = ('{', '}'); my $DELIM; # Regex matches a delimiter if $delim_pats if (defined $delim_pats) { ($t_open, $t_close) = @$delim_pats; $DELIM = "(?:(?:\Q$t_open\E)|(?:\Q$t_close\E))"; @tokens = split /($DELIM|\n)/, $self->{SOURCE}; } else { @tokens = split /(\\\\(?=\\*[{}])|\\[{}]|[{}\n])/, $self->{SOURCE}; } my $state = 'TEXT'; my $depth = 0; my $lineno = 1; my @content; my $cur_item = ''; my $prog_start; while (@tokens) { my $t = shift @tokens; next if $t eq ''; if ($t eq $t_open) { # Brace or other opening delimiter if ($depth == 0) { push @content, [$state, $cur_item, $lineno] if $cur_item ne ''; $cur_item = ''; $state = 'PROG'; $prog_start = $lineno; } else { $cur_item .= $t; } $depth++; } elsif ($t eq $t_close) { # Brace or other closing delimiter $depth--; if ($depth < 0) { $ERROR = "Unmatched close brace at line $lineno"; return undef; } elsif ($depth == 0) { push @content, [$state, $cur_item, $prog_start] if $cur_item ne ''; $state = 'TEXT'; $cur_item = ''; } else { $cur_item .= $t; } } elsif (!$delim_pats && $t eq '\\\\') { # precedes \\\..\\\{ or \\\..\\\} $cur_item .= '\\'; } elsif (!$delim_pats && $t =~ /^\\([{}])$/) { # Escaped (literal) brace? $cur_item .= $1; } elsif ($t eq "\n") { # Newline $lineno++; $cur_item .= $t; } else { # Anything else $cur_item .= $t; } } if ($state eq 'PROG') { $ERROR = "End of data inside program text that began at line $prog_start"; return undef; } elsif ($state eq 'TEXT') { push @content, [$state, $cur_item, $lineno] if $cur_item ne ''; } else { die "Can't happen error #1"; } $self->{TYPE} = 'PREPARSED'; $self->{SOURCE} = \@content; 1; } sub prepend_text { my ($self) = @_; my $t = $self->{PREPEND}; unless (defined $t) { $t = $GLOBAL_PREPEND{ref $self}; unless (defined $t) { $t = $GLOBAL_PREPEND{'Text::Template'}; } } $self->{PREPEND} = $_[1] if $#_ >= 1; return $t; } sub fill_in { my $fi_self = shift; my %fi_a = @_; unless ($fi_self->{TYPE} eq 'PREPARSED') { my $delims = _param('delimiters', %fi_a); my @delim_arg = (defined $delims ? ($delims) : ()); $fi_self->compile(@delim_arg) or return undef; } my $fi_varhash = _param('hash', %fi_a); my $fi_package = _param('package', %fi_a) ; my $fi_broken = _param('broken', %fi_a) || $fi_self->{BROKEN} || \&_default_broken; my $fi_broken_arg = _param('broken_arg', %fi_a) || []; my $fi_safe = _param('safe', %fi_a); my $fi_ofh = _param('output', %fi_a); my $fi_eval_package; my $fi_scrub_package = 0; my $fi_filename = _param('filename') || $fi_self->{FILENAME} || 'template'; my $fi_prepend = _param('prepend', %fi_a); unless (defined $fi_prepend) { $fi_prepend = $fi_self->prepend_text; } if (defined $fi_safe) { $fi_eval_package = 'main'; } elsif (defined $fi_package) { $fi_eval_package = $fi_package; } elsif (defined $fi_varhash) { $fi_eval_package = _gensym(); $fi_scrub_package = 1; } else { $fi_eval_package = caller; } my $fi_install_package; if (defined $fi_varhash) { if (defined $fi_package) { $fi_install_package = $fi_package; } elsif (defined $fi_safe) { $fi_install_package = $fi_safe->root; } else { $fi_install_package = $fi_eval_package; # The gensymmed one } _install_hash($fi_varhash => $fi_install_package); } if (defined $fi_package && defined $fi_safe) { no strict 'refs'; # Big fat magic here: Fix it so that the user-specified package # is the default one available in the safe compartment. *{$fi_safe->root . '::'} = \%{$fi_package . '::'}; # LOD } my $fi_r = ''; my $fi_item; foreach $fi_item (@{$fi_self->{SOURCE}}) { my ($fi_type, $fi_text, $fi_lineno) = @$fi_item; if ($fi_type eq 'TEXT') { $fi_self->append_text_to_output( text => $fi_text, handle => $fi_ofh, out => \$fi_r, type => $fi_type, ); } elsif ($fi_type eq 'PROG') { no strict; my $fi_lcomment = "#line $fi_lineno $fi_filename"; my $fi_progtext = "package $fi_eval_package; $fi_prepend;\n$fi_lcomment\n$fi_text;"; my $fi_res; my $fi_eval_err = ''; if ($fi_safe) { $fi_safe->reval(q{undef $OUT}); $fi_res = $fi_safe->reval($fi_progtext); $fi_eval_err = $@; my $OUT = $fi_safe->reval('$OUT'); $fi_res = $OUT if defined $OUT; } else { my $OUT; $fi_res = eval $fi_progtext; $fi_eval_err = $@; $fi_res = $OUT if defined $OUT; } # If the value of the filled-in text really was undef, # change it to an explicit empty string to avoid undefined # value warnings later. $fi_res = '' unless defined $fi_res; if ($fi_eval_err) { $fi_res = $fi_broken->(text => $fi_text, error => $fi_eval_err, lineno => $fi_lineno, arg => $fi_broken_arg, ); if (defined $fi_res) { $fi_self->append_text_to_output( text => $fi_res, handle => $fi_ofh, out => \$fi_r, type => $fi_type, ); } else { return $fi_res; # Undefined means abort processing } } else { $fi_self->append_text_to_output( text => $fi_res, handle => $fi_ofh, out => \$fi_r, type => $fi_type, ); } } else { die "Can't happen error #2"; } } _scrubpkg($fi_eval_package) if $fi_scrub_package; defined $fi_ofh ? 1 : $fi_r; } sub append_text_to_output { my ($self, %arg) = @_; if (defined $arg{handle}) { print { $arg{handle} } $arg{text}; } else { ${ $arg{out} } .= $arg{text}; } return; } sub fill_this_in { my $pack = shift; my $text = shift; my $templ = $pack->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => $text, @_) or return undef; $templ->compile or return undef; my $result = $templ->fill_in(@_); $result; } sub fill_in_string { my $string = shift; my $package = _param('package', @_); push @_, 'package' => scalar(caller) unless defined $package; Text::Template->fill_this_in($string, @_); } sub fill_in_file { my $fn = shift; my $templ = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => $fn, @_) or return undef; $templ->compile or return undef; my $text = $templ->fill_in(@_); $text; } sub _default_broken { my %a = @_; my $prog_text = $a{text}; my $err = $a{error}; my $lineno = $a{lineno}; chomp $err; # $err =~ s/\s+at .*//s; "Program fragment delivered error ``$err''"; } sub _load_text { my $fn = shift; local *F; unless (open F, $fn) { $ERROR = "Couldn't open file $fn: $!"; return undef; } local $/; ; } sub _is_clean { my $z; eval { ($z = join('', @_)), eval '#' . substr($z,0,0); 1 } # LOD } sub _unconditionally_untaint { for (@_) { ($_) = /(.*)/s; } } { my $seqno = 0; sub _gensym { __PACKAGE__ . '::GEN' . $seqno++; } sub _scrubpkg { my $s = shift; $s =~ s/^Text::Template:://; no strict 'refs'; my $hash = $Text::Template::{$s."::"}; foreach my $key (keys %$hash) { undef $hash->{$key}; } } } # Given a hashful of variables (or a list of such hashes) # install the variables into the specified package, # overwriting whatever variables were there before. sub _install_hash { my $hashlist = shift; my $dest = shift; if (UNIVERSAL::isa($hashlist, 'HASH')) { $hashlist = [$hashlist]; } my $hash; foreach $hash (@$hashlist) { my $name; foreach $name (keys %$hash) { my $val = $hash->{$name}; no strict 'refs'; local *SYM = *{"$ {dest}::$name"}; if (! defined $val) { delete ${"$ {dest}::"}{$name}; } elsif (ref $val) { *SYM = $val; } else { *SYM = \$val; } } } } sub TTerror { $ERROR } 1; =head1 NAME Text::Template - Expand template text with embedded Perl =head1 VERSION This file documents C version B<1.46> =head1 SYNOPSIS use Text::Template; $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => 'filename.tmpl'); $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'ARRAY', SOURCE => [ ... ] ); $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILEHANDLE', SOURCE => $fh ); $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => '...' ); $template = Text::Template->new(PREPEND => q{use strict;}, ...); # Use a different template file syntax: $template = Text::Template->new(DELIMITERS => [$open, $close], ...); $recipient = 'King'; $text = $template->fill_in(); # Replaces `{$recipient}' with `King' print $text; $T::recipient = 'Josh'; $text = $template->fill_in(PACKAGE => T); # Pass many variables explicitly $hash = { recipient => 'Abed-Nego', friends => [ 'me', 'you' ], enemies => { loathsome => 'Bill Gates', fearsome => 'Larry Ellison' }, }; $text = $template->fill_in(HASH => $hash, ...); # $recipient is Abed-Nego, # @friends is ( 'me', 'you' ), # %enemies is ( loathsome => ..., fearsome => ... ) # Call &callback in case of programming errors in template $text = $template->fill_in(BROKEN => \&callback, BROKEN_ARG => $ref, ...); # Evaluate program fragments in Safe compartment with restricted permissions $text = $template->fill_in(SAFE => $compartment, ...); # Print result text instead of returning it $success = $template->fill_in(OUTPUT => \*FILEHANDLE, ...); # Parse template with different template file syntax: $text = $template->fill_in(DELIMITERS => [$open, $close], ...); # Note that this is *faster* than using the default delimiters # Prepend specified perl code to each fragment before evaluating: $text = $template->fill_in(PREPEND => q{use strict 'vars';}, ...); use Text::Template 'fill_in_string'; $text = fill_in_string( < 'T', ...); Dear {$recipient}, Pay me at once. Love, G.V. EOM use Text::Template 'fill_in_file'; $text = fill_in_file($filename, ...); # All templates will always have `use strict vars' attached to all fragments Text::Template->always_prepend(q{use strict 'vars';}); =head1 DESCRIPTION This is a library for generating form letters, building HTML pages, or filling in templates generally. A `template' is a piece of text that has little Perl programs embedded in it here and there. When you `fill in' a template, you evaluate the little programs and replace them with their values. You can store a template in a file outside your program. People can modify the template without modifying the program. You can separate the formatting details from the main code, and put the formatting parts of the program into the template. That prevents code bloat and encourages functional separation. =head2 Example Here's an example of a template, which we'll suppose is stored in the file C: Dear {$title} {$lastname}, It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your {$monthname[$last_paid_month]} payment. Please remit ${sprintf("%.2f", $amount)} immediately, or your patellae may be needlessly endangered. Love, Mark "Vizopteryx" Dominus The result of filling in this template is a string, which might look something like this: Dear Mr. Gates, It has come to our attention that you are delinquent in your February payment. Please remit $392.12 immediately, or your patellae may be needlessly endangered. Love, Mark "Vizopteryx" Dominus Here is a complete program that transforms the example template into the example result, and prints it out: use Text::Template; my $template = Text::Template->new(SOURCE => 'formletter.tmpl') or die "Couldn't construct template: $Text::Template::ERROR"; my @monthname = qw(January February March April May June July August September October November December); my %vars = (title => 'Mr.', firstname => 'Bill', lastname => 'Gates', last_paid_month => 1, # February amount => 392.12, monthname => \@monthname, ); my $result = $template->fill_in(HASH => \%vars); if (defined $result) { print $result } else { die "Couldn't fill in template: $Text::Template::ERROR" } =head2 Philosophy When people make a template module like this one, they almost always start by inventing a special syntax for substitutions. For example, they build it so that a string like C<%%VAR%%> is replaced with the value of C<$VAR>. Then they realize the need extra formatting, so they put in some special syntax for formatting. Then they need a loop, so they invent a loop syntax. Pretty soon they have a new little template language. This approach has two problems: First, their little language is crippled. If you need to do something the author hasn't thought of, you lose. Second: Who wants to learn another language? You already know Perl, so why not use it? C templates are programmed in I. You embed Perl code in your template, with C<{> at the beginning and C<}> at the end. If you want a variable interpolated, you write it the way you would in Perl. If you need to make a loop, you can use any of the Perl loop constructions. All the Perl built-in functions are available. =head1 Details =head2 Template Parsing The C module scans the template source. An open brace C<{> begins a program fragment, which continues until the matching close brace C<}>. When the template is filled in, the program fragments are evaluated, and each one is replaced with the resulting value to yield the text that is returned. A backslash C<\> in front of a brace (or another backslash that is in front of a brace) escapes its special meaning. The result of filling out this template: \{ The sum of 1 and 2 is {1+2} \} is { The sum of 1 and 2 is 3 } If you have an unmatched brace, C will return a failure code and a warning about where the problem is. Backslashes that do not precede a brace are passed through unchanged. If you have a template like this: { "String that ends in a newline.\n" } The backslash inside the string is passed through to Perl unchanged, so the C<\n> really does turn into a newline. See the note at the end for details about the way backslashes work. Backslash processing is I done when you specify alternative delimiters with the C option. (See L<"Alternative Delimiters">, below.) Each program fragment should be a sequence of Perl statements, which are evaluated the usual way. The result of the last statement executed will be evaluted in scalar context; the result of this statement is a string, which is interpolated into the template in place of the program fragment itself. The fragments are evaluated in order, and side effects from earlier fragments will persist into later fragments: {$x = @things; ''}The Lord High Chamberlain has gotten {$x} things for me this year. { $diff = $x - 17; $more = 'more' if ($diff == 0) { $diff = 'no'; } elsif ($diff < 0) { $more = 'fewer'; } ''; } That is {$diff} {$more} than he gave me last year. The value of C<$x> set in the first line will persist into the next fragment that begins on the third line, and the values of C<$diff> and C<$more> set in the second fragment will persist and be interpolated into the last line. The output will look something like this: The Lord High Chamberlain has gotten 42 things for me this year. That is 25 more than he gave me last year. That is all the syntax there is. =head2 The C<$OUT> variable There is one special trick you can play in a template. Here is the motivation for it: Suppose you are going to pass an array, C<@items>, into the template, and you want the template to generate a bulleted list with a header, like this: Here is a list of the things I have got for you since 1907: * Ivory * Apes * Peacocks * ... One way to do it is with a template like this: Here is a list of the things I have got for you since 1907: { my $blist = ''; foreach $i (@items) { $blist .= qq{ * $i\n}; } $blist; } Here we construct the list in a variable called C<$blist>, which we return at the end. This is a little cumbersome. There is a shortcut. Inside of templates, there is a special variable called C<$OUT>. Anything you append to this variable will appear in the output of the template. Also, if you use C<$OUT> in a program fragment, the normal behavior, of replacing the fragment with its return value, is disabled; instead the fragment is replaced with the value of C<$OUT>. This means that you can write the template above like this: Here is a list of the things I have got for you since 1907: { foreach $i (@items) { $OUT .= " * $i\n"; } } C<$OUT> is reinitialized to the empty string at the start of each program fragment. It is private to C, so you can't use a variable named C<$OUT> in your template without invoking the special behavior. =head2 General Remarks All C functions return C on failure, and set the variable C<$Text::Template::ERROR> to contain an explanation of what went wrong. For example, if you try to create a template from a file that does not exist, C<$Text::Template::ERROR> will contain something like: Couldn't open file xyz.tmpl: No such file or directory =head2 C $template = new Text::Template ( TYPE => ..., SOURCE => ... ); This creates and returns a new template object. C returns C and sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR> if it can't create the template object. C says where the template source code will come from. C says what kind of object the source is. The most common type of source is a file: new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => $filename ); This reads the template from the specified file. The filename is opened with the Perl C command, so it can be a pipe or anything else that makes sense with C. The C can also be C, in which case the C should be a string: new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'STRING', SOURCE => "This is the actual template!" ); The C can be C, in which case the source should be a reference to an array of strings. The concatenation of these strings is the template: new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'ARRAY', SOURCE => [ "This is ", "the actual", " template!", ] ); The C can be FILEHANDLE, in which case the source should be an open filehandle (such as you got from the C or C packages, or a glob, or a reference to a glob). In this case C will read the text from the filehandle up to end-of-file, and that text is the template: # Read template source code from STDIN: new Text::Template ( TYPE => 'FILEHANDLE', SOURCE => \*STDIN ); If you omit the C attribute, it's taken to be C. C is required. If you omit it, the program will abort. The words C and C can be spelled any of the following ways: TYPE SOURCE Type Source type source -TYPE -SOURCE -Type -Source -type -source Pick a style you like and stick with it. =over 4 =item C You may also add a C option. If this option is present, its value should be a reference to an array of two strings. The first string is the string that signals the beginning of each program fragment, and the second string is the string that signals the end of each program fragment. See L<"Alternative Delimiters">, below. =item C If your program is running in taint mode, you may have problems if your templates are stored in files. Data read from files is considered 'untrustworthy', and taint mode will not allow you to evaluate the Perl code in the file. (It is afraid that a malicious person might have tampered with the file.) In some environments, however, local files are trustworthy. You can tell C that a certain file is trustworthy by supplying C 1> in the call to C. This will tell C to disable taint checks on template code that has come from a file, as long as the filename itself is considered trustworthy. It will also disable taint checks on template code that comes from a filehandle. When used with C 'string'> or C 'array'>, it has no effect. See L for more complete information about tainting. Thanks to Steve Palincsar, Gerard Vreeswijk, and Dr. Christoph Baehr for help with this feature. =item C This option is passed along to the C call unless it is overridden in the arguments to C. See L feature and using C in templates> below. =item C This option is passed along to the C call unless it is overridden in the arguments to C. See L> below. =back =head2 C $template->compile() Loads all the template text from the template's source, parses and compiles it. If successful, returns true; otherwise returns false and sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR>. If the template is already compiled, it returns true and does nothing. You don't usually need to invoke this function, because C (see below) compiles the template if it isn't compiled already. If there is an argument to this function, it must be a reference to an array containing alternative delimiter strings. See C<"Alternative Delimiters">, below. =head2 C $template->fill_in(OPTIONS); Fills in a template. Returns the resulting text if successful. Otherwise, returns C and sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR>. The I are a hash, or a list of key-value pairs. You can write the key names in any of the six usual styles as above; this means that where this manual says C (for example) you can actually use any of PACKAGE Package package -PACKAGE -Package -package Pick a style you like and stick with it. The all-lowercase versions may yield spurious warnings about Ambiguous use of package => resolved to "package" so you might like to avoid them and use the capitalized versions. At present, there are eight legal options: C, C, C, C, C, C, and C. =over 4 =item C C specifies the name of a package in which the program fragments should be evaluated. The default is to use the package from which C was called. For example, consider this template: The value of the variable x is {$x}. If you use C<$template-Efill_in(PACKAGE =E 'R')> , then the C<$x> in the template is actually replaced with the value of C<$R::x>. If you omit the C option, C<$x> will be replaced with the value of the C<$x> variable in the package that actually called C. You should almost always use C. If you don't, and your template makes changes to variables, those changes will be propagated back into the main program. Evaluating the template in a private package helps prevent this. The template can still modify variables in your program if it wants to, but it will have to do so explicitly. See the section at the end on `Security'. Here's an example of using C: Your Royal Highness, Enclosed please find a list of things I have gotten for you since 1907: { foreach $item (@items) { $item_no++; $OUT .= " $item_no. \u$item\n"; } } Signed, Lord High Chamberlain We want to pass in an array which will be assigned to the array C<@items>. Here's how to do that: @items = ('ivory', 'apes', 'peacocks', ); $template->fill_in(); This is not very safe. The reason this isn't as safe is that if you had a variable named C<$item_no> in scope in your program at the point you called C, its value would be clobbered by the act of filling out the template. The problem is the same as if you had written a subroutine that used those variables in the same way that the template does. (C<$OUT> is special in templates and is always safe.) One solution to this is to make the C<$item_no> variable private to the template by declaring it with C. If the template does this, you are safe. But if you use the C option, you will probably be safe even if the template does I declare its variables with C: @Q::items = ('ivory', 'apes', 'peacocks', ); $template->fill_in(PACKAGE => 'Q'); In this case the template will clobber the variable C<$Q::item_no>, which is not related to the one your program was using. Templates cannot affect variables in the main program that are declared with C, unless you give the template references to those variables. =item C You may not want to put the template variables into a package. Packages can be hard to manage: You can't copy them, for example. C provides an alternative. The value for C should be a reference to a hash that maps variable names to values. For example, $template->fill_in(HASH => { recipient => "The King", items => ['gold', 'frankincense', 'myrrh'], object => \$self, }); will fill out the template and use C<"The King"> as the value of C<$recipient> and the list of items as the value of C<@items>. Note that we pass an array reference, but inside the template it appears as an array. In general, anything other than a simple string or number should be passed by reference. We also want to pass an object, which is in C<$self>; note that we pass a reference to the object, C<\$self> instead. Since we've passed a reference to a scalar, inside the template the object appears as C<$object>. The full details of how it works are a little involved, so you might want to skip to the next section. Suppose the key in the hash is I and the value is I. =over 4 =item * If the I is C, then any variables named C<$key>, C<@key>, C<%key>, etc., are undefined. =item * If the I is a string or a number, then C<$key> is set to that value in the template. =item * For anything else, you must pass a reference. If the I is a reference to an array, then C<@key> is set to that array. If the I is a reference to a hash, then C<%key> is set to that hash. Similarly if I is any other kind of reference. This means that var => "foo" and var => \"foo" have almost exactly the same effect. (The difference is that in the former case, the value is copied, and in the latter case it is aliased.) =item * In particular, if you want the template to get an object or any kind, you must pass a reference to it: $template->fill_in(HASH => { database_handle => \$dbh, ... }); If you do this, the template will have a variable C<$database_handle> which is the database handle object. If you leave out the C<\>, the template will have a hash C<%database_handle>, which exposes the internal structure of the database handle object; you don't want that. =back Normally, the way this works is by allocating a private package, loading all the variables into the package, and then filling out the template as if you had specified that package. A new package is allocated each time. However, if you I use the C option, C loads the variables into the package you specified, and they stay there after the call returns. Subsequent calls to C that use the same package will pick up the values you loaded in. If the argument of C is a reference to an array instead of a reference to a hash, then the array should contain a list of hashes whose contents are loaded into the template package one after the other. You can use this feature if you want to combine several sets of variables. For example, one set of variables might be the defaults for a fill-in form, and the second set might be the user inputs, which override the defaults when they are present: $template->fill_in(HASH => [\%defaults, \%user_input]); You can also use this to set two variables with the same name: $template->fill_in(HASH => [{ v => "The King" }, { v => [1,2,3] }, ] ); This sets C<$v> to C<"The King"> and C<@v> to C<(1,2,3)>. =item C If any of the program fragments fails to compile or aborts for any reason, and you have set the C option to a function reference, C will invoke the function. This function is called the I function>. The C function will tell C what to do next. If the C function returns C, C will immediately abort processing the template and return the text that it has accumulated so far. If your function does this, it should set a flag that you can examine after C returns so that you can tell whether there was a premature return or not. If the C function returns any other value, that value will be interpolated into the template as if that value had been the return value of the program fragment to begin with. For example, if the C function returns an error string, the error string will be interpolated into the output of the template in place of the program fragment that cased the error. If you don't specify a C function, C supplies a default one that returns something like Program fragment delivered error ``Illegal division by 0 at template line 37'' (Note that the format of this message has changed slightly since version 1.31.) The return value of the C function is interpolated into the template at the place the error occurred, so that this template: (3+4)*5 = { 3+4)*5 } yields this result: (3+4)*5 = Program fragment delivered error ``syntax error at template line 1'' If you specify a value for the C attribute, it should be a reference to a function that C can call instead of the default function. C will pass a hash to the C function. The hash will have at least these three members: =over 4 =item C The source code of the program fragment that failed =item C The text of the error message (C<$@>) generated by eval. The text has been modified to omit the trailing newline and to include the name of the template file (if there was one). The line number counts from the beginning of the template, not from the beginning of the failed program fragment. =item C The line number of the template at which the program fragment began. =back There may also be an C member. See C, below =item C If you supply the C option to C, the value of the option is passed to the C function whenever it is called. The default C function ignores the C, but you can write a custom C function that uses the C to get more information about what went wrong. The C function could also use the C as a reference to store an error message or some other information that it wants to communicate back to the caller. For example: $error = ''; sub my_broken { my %args = @_; my $err_ref = $args{arg}; ... $$err_ref = "Some error message"; return undef; } $template->fill_in(BROKEN => \&my_broken, BROKEN_ARG => \$error, ); if ($error) { die "It didn't work: $error"; } If one of the program fragments in the template fails, it will call the C function, C, and pass it the C, which is a reference to C<$error>. C can store an error message into C<$error> this way. Then the function that called C can see if C has left an error message for it to find, and proceed accordingly. =item C If you give C a C option, its value should be a safe compartment object from the C package. All evaluation of program fragments will be performed in this compartment. See L for full details about such compartments and how to restrict the operations that can be performed in them. If you use the C option with C, the package you specify will be placed into the safe compartment and evaluation will take place in that package as usual. If not, C operation is a little different from the default. Usually, if you don't specify a package, evaluation of program fragments occurs in the package from which the template was invoked. But in C mode the evaluation occurs inside the safe compartment and cannot affect the calling package. Normally, if you use C without C, the hash variables are imported into a private, one-use-only package. But if you use C and C together without C, the hash variables will just be loaded into the root namespace of the C compartment. =item C If your template is going to generate a lot of text that you are just going to print out again anyway, you can save memory by having C print out the text as it is generated instead of making it into a big string and returning the string. If you supply the C option to C, the value should be a filehandle. The generated text will be printed to this filehandle as it is constructed. For example: $template->fill_in(OUTPUT => \*STDOUT, ...); fills in the C<$template> as usual, but the results are immediately printed to STDOUT. This may result in the output appearing more quickly than it would have otherwise. If you use C, the return value from C is still true on success and false on failure, but the complete text is not returned to the caller. =item C You can have some Perl code prepended automatically to the beginning of every program fragment. See L feature and using C in templates> below. =item C If this option is present, its value should be a reference to a list of two strings. The first string is the string that signals the beginning of each program fragment, and the second string is the string that signals the end of each program fragment. See L<"Alternative Delimiters">, below. If you specify C in the call to C, they override any delimiters you set when you created the template object with C. =back =head1 Convenience Functions =head2 C The basic way to fill in a template is to create a template object and then call C on it. This is useful if you want to fill in the same template more than once. In some programs, this can be cumbersome. C accepts a string, which contains the template, and a list of options, which are passed to C as above. It constructs the template object for you, fills it in as specified, and returns the results. It returns C and sets C<$Text::Template::ERROR> if it couldn't generate any results. An example: $Q::name = 'Donald'; $Q::amount = 141.61; $Q::part = 'hyoid bone'; $text = Text::Template->fill_this_in( <<'EOM', PACKAGE => Q); Dear {$name}, You owe me \\${sprintf('%.2f', $amount)}. Pay or I will break your {$part}. Love, Grand Vizopteryx of Irkutsk. EOM Notice how we included the template in-line in the program by using a `here document' with the CE> notation. C is a deprecated feature. It is only here for backwards compatibility, and may be removed in some far-future version in C. You should use C instead. It is described in the next section. =head2 C It is stupid that C is a class method. It should have been just an imported function, so that you could omit the C> in the example above. But I made the mistake four years ago and it is too late to change it. C is exactly like C except that it is not a method and you can omit the C> and just say print fill_in_string(<<'EOM', ...); Dear {$name}, ... EOM To use C, you need to say use Text::Template 'fill_in_string'; at the top of your program. You should probably use C instead of C. =head2 C If you import C, you can say $text = fill_in_file(filename, ...); The C<...> are passed to C as above. The filename is the name of the file that contains the template you want to fill in. It returns the result text. or C, as usual. If you are going to fill in the same file more than once in the same program you should use the longer C / C sequence instead. It will be a lot faster because it only has to read and parse the file once. =head2 Including files into templates People always ask for this. ``Why don't you have an include function?'' they want to know. The short answer is this is Perl, and Perl already has an include function. If you want it, you can just put {qx{cat filename}} into your template. VoilE. If you don't want to use C, you can write a little four-line function that opens a file and dumps out its contents, and call it from the template. I wrote one for you. In the template, you can say {Text::Template::_load_text(filename)} If that is too verbose, here is a trick. Suppose the template package that you are going to be mentioning in the C call is package C. Then in the main program, write *Q::include = \&Text::Template::_load_text; This imports the C<_load_text> function into package C with the name C. From then on, any template that you fill in with package C can say {include(filename)} to insert the text from the named file at that point. If you are using the C option instead, just put C \&Text::Template::_load_text> into the hash instead of importing it explicitly. Suppose you don't want to insert a plain text file, but rather you want to include one template within another? Just use C in the template itself: {Text::Template::fill_in_file(filename)} You can do the same importing trick if this is too much to type. =head1 Miscellaneous =head2 C variables People are frequently surprised when this doesn't work: my $recipient = 'The King'; my $text = fill_in_file('formletter.tmpl'); The text C doesn't get into the form letter. Why not? Because C<$recipient> is a C variable, and the whole point of C variables is that they're private and inaccessible except in the scope in which they're declared. The template is not part of that scope, so the template can't see C<$recipient>. If that's not the behavior you want, don't use C. C means a private variable, and in this case you don't want the variable to be private. Put the variables into package variables in some other package, and use the C option to C: $Q::recipient = $recipient; my $text = fill_in_file('formletter.tmpl', PACKAGE => 'Q'); or pass the names and values in a hash with the C option: my $text = fill_in_file('formletter.tmpl', HASH => { recipient => $recipient }); =head2 Security Matters All variables are evaluated in the package you specify with the C option of C. if you use this option, and if your templates don't do anything egregiously stupid, you won't have to worry that evaluation of the little programs will creep out into the rest of your program and wreck something. Nevertheless, there's really no way (except with C) to protect against a template that says { $Important::Secret::Security::Enable = 0; # Disable security checks in this program } or { $/ = "ho ho ho"; # Sabotage future uses of . # $/ is always a global variable } or even { system("rm -rf /") } so B go filling in templates unless you're sure you know what's in them. If you're worried, or you can't trust the person who wrote the template, use the C option. A final warning: program fragments run a small risk of accidentally clobbering local variables in the C function itself. These variables all have names that begin with C<$fi_>, so if you stay away from those names you'll be safe. (Of course, if you're a real wizard you can tamper with them deliberately for exciting effects; this is actually how C<$OUT> works.) I can fix this, but it will make the package slower to do it, so I would prefer not to. If you are worried about this, send me mail and I will show you what to do about it. =head2 Alternative Delimiters Lorenzo Valdettaro pointed out that if you are using C to generate TeX output, the choice of braces as the program fragment delimiters makes you suffer suffer suffer. Starting in version 1.20, you can change the choice of delimiters to something other than curly braces. In either the C call or the C call, you can specify an alternative set of delimiters with the C option. For example, if you would like code fragments to be delimited by C<[@--> and C<--@]> instead of C<{> and C<}>, use ... DELIMITERS => [ '[@--', '--@]' ], ... Note that these delimiters are I, not regexes. (I tried for regexes, but it complicates the lexical analysis too much.) Note also that C disables the special meaning of the backslash, so if you want to include the delimiters in the literal text of your template file, you are out of luck---it is up to you to choose delimiters that do not conflict with what you are doing. The delimiter strings may still appear inside of program fragments as long as they nest properly. This means that if for some reason you absolutely must have a program fragment that mentions one of the delimiters, like this: [@-- print "Oh no, a delimiter: --@]\n" --@] you may be able to make it work by doing this instead: [@-- # Fake matching delimiter in a comment: [@-- print "Oh no, a delimiter: --@]\n" --@] It may be safer to choose delimiters that begin with a newline character. Because the parsing of templates is simplified by the absence of backslash escapes, using alternative C may speed up the parsing process by 20-25%. This shows that my original choice of C<{> and C<}> was very bad. =head2 C feature and using C in templates Suppose you would like to use C in your templates to detect undeclared variables and the like. But each code fragment is a separate lexical scope, so you have to turn on C at the top of each and every code fragment: { use strict; use vars '$foo'; $foo = 14; ... } ... { # we forgot to put `use strict' here my $result = $boo + 12; # $boo is misspelled and should be $foo # No error is raised on `$boo' } Because we didn't put C at the top of the second fragment, it was only active in the first fragment, and we didn't get any C checking in the second fragment. Then we mispelled C<$foo> and the error wasn't caught. C version 1.22 and higher has a new feature to make this easier. You can specify that any text at all be automatically added to the beginning of each program fragment. When you make a call to C, you can specify a PREPEND => 'some perl statements here' option; the statements will be prepended to each program fragment for that one call only. Suppose that the C call included a PREPEND => 'use strict;' option, and that the template looked like this: { use vars '$foo'; $foo = 14; ... } ... { my $result = $boo + 12; # $boo is misspelled and should be $foo ... } The code in the second fragment would fail, because C<$boo> has not been declared. C was implied, even though you did not write it explicitly, because the C option added it for you automatically. There are two other ways to do this. At the time you create the template object with C, you can also supply a C option, in which case the statements will be prepended each time you fill in that template. If the C call has its own C option, this overrides the one specified at the time you created the template. Finally, you can make the class method call Text::Template->always_prepend('perl statements'); If you do this, then call calls to C for I template will attach the perl statements to the beginning of each program fragment, except where overridden by C options to C or C. =head2 Prepending in Derived Classes This section is technical, and you should skip it on the first few readings. Normally there are three places that prepended text could come from. It could come from the C option in the C call, from the C option in the C call that created the template object, or from the argument of the C call. C looks for these three things in order and takes the first one that it finds. In a subclass of C, this last possibility is ambiguous. Suppose C is a subclass of C. Should Text::Template->always_prepend(...); affect objects in class C? The answer is that you can have it either way. The C value for C is normally stored in a hash variable named C<%GLOBAL_PREPEND> under the key C. When C looks to see what text to prepend, it first looks in the template object itself, and if not, it looks in C<$GLOBAL_PREPEND{I}> where I is the class to which the template object belongs. If it doesn't find any value, it looks in C<$GLOBAL_PREPEND{'Text::Template'}>. This means that objects in class C I be affected by Text::Template->always_prepend(...); I there is also a call to Derived->always_prepend(...); So when you're designing your derived class, you can arrange to have your objects ignore C calls by simply putting Calways_prepend('')> at the top of your module. Of course, there is also a final escape hatch: Templates support a C that is used to look up the appropriate text to be prepended at C time. Your derived class can override this method to get an arbitrary effect. =head2 JavaScript Jennifer D. St Clair asks: > Most of my pages contain JavaScript and Stylesheets. > How do I change the template identifier? Jennifer is worried about the braces in the JavaScript being taken as the delimiters of the Perl program fragments. Of course, disaster will ensue when perl tries to evaluate these as if they were Perl programs. The best choice is to find some unambiguous delimiter strings that you can use in your template instead of curly braces, and then use the C option. However, if you can't do this for some reason, there are two easy workarounds: 1. You can put C<\> in front of C<{>, C<}>, or C<\> to remove its special meaning. So, for example, instead of if (br== "n3") { // etc. } you can put if (br== "n3") \{ // etc. \} and it'll come out of the template engine the way you want. But here is another method that is probably better. To see how it works, first consider what happens if you put this into a template: { 'foo' } Since it's in braces, it gets evaluated, and obviously, this is going to turn into foo So now here's the trick: In Perl, C is the same as C<'...'>. So if we wrote {q{foo}} it would turn into foo So for your JavaScript, just write {q{if (br== "n3") { // etc. }} } and it'll come out as if (br== "n3") { // etc. } which is what you want. =head2 Shut Up! People sometimes try to put an initialization section at the top of their templates, like this: { ... $var = 17; } Then they complain because there is a C<17> at the top of the output that they didn't want to have there. Remember that a program fragment is replaced with its own return value, and that in Perl the return value of a code block is the value of the last expression that was evaluated, which in this case is 17. If it didn't do that, you wouldn't be able to write C<{$recipient}> and have the recipient filled in. To prevent the 17 from appearing in the output is very simple: { ... $var = 17; ''; } Now the last expression evaluated yields the empty string, which is invisible. If you don't like the way this looks, use { ... $var = 17; ($SILENTLY); } instead. Presumably, C<$SILENTLY> has no value, so nothing will be interpolated. This is what is known as a `trick'. =head2 Compatibility Every effort has been made to make this module compatible with older versions. The only known exceptions follow: The output format of the default C subroutine has changed twice, most recently between versions 1.31 and 1.40. Starting in version 1.10, the C<$OUT> variable is arrogated for a special meaning. If you had templates before version 1.10 that happened to use a variable named C<$OUT>, you will have to change them to use some other variable or all sorts of strangeness will result. Between versions 0.1b and 1.00 the behavior of the \ metacharacter changed. In 0.1b, \\ was special everywhere, and the template processor always replaced it with a single backslash before passing the code to Perl for evaluation. The rule now is more complicated but probably more convenient. See the section on backslash processing, below, for a full discussion. =head2 Backslash Processing In C beta versions, the backslash was special whenever it appeared before a brace or another backslash. That meant that while C<{"\n"}> did indeed generate a newline, C<{"\\"}> did not generate a backslash, because the code passed to Perl for evaluation was C<"\"> which is a syntax error. If you wanted a backslash, you would have had to write C<{"\\\\"}>. In C versions 1.00 through 1.10, there was a bug: Backslash was special everywhere. In these versions, C<{"\n"}> generated the letter C. The bug has been corrected in version 1.11, but I did not go back to exactly the old rule, because I did not like the idea of having to write C<{"\\\\"}> to get one backslash. The rule is now more complicated to remember, but probably easier to use. The rule is now: Backslashes are always passed to Perl unchanged I they occur as part of a sequence like C<\\\\\\{> or C<\\\\\\}>. In these contexts, they are special; C<\\> is replaced with C<\>, and C<\{> and C<\}> signal a literal brace. Examples: \{ foo \} is I evaluated, because the C<\> before the braces signals that they should be taken literally. The result in the output looks like this: { foo } This is a syntax error: { "foo}" } because C thinks that the code ends at the first C<}>, and then gets upset when it sees the second one. To make this work correctly, use { "foo\}" } This passes C<"foo}"> to Perl for evaluation. Note there's no C<\> in the evaluated code. If you really want a C<\> in the evaluated code, use { "foo\\\}" } This passes C<"foo\}"> to Perl for evaluation. Starting with C version 1.20, backslash processing is disabled if you use the C option to specify alternative delimiter strings. =head2 A short note about C<$Text::Template::ERROR> In the past some people have fretted about `violating the package boundary' by examining a variable inside the C package. Don't feel this way. C<$Text::Template::ERROR> is part of the published, official interface to this package. It is perfectly OK to inspect this variable. The interface is not going to change. If it really, really bothers you, you can import a function called C that returns the current value of the C<$ERROR> variable. So you can say: use Text::Template 'TTerror'; my $template = new Text::Template (SOURCE => $filename); unless ($template) { my $err = TTerror; die "Couldn't make template: $err; aborting"; } I don't see what benefit this has over just doing this: use Text::Template; my $template = new Text::Template (SOURCE => $filename) or die "Couldn't make template: $Text::Template::ERROR; aborting"; But if it makes you happy to do it that way, go ahead. =head2 Sticky Widgets in Template Files The C module provides functions for `sticky widgets', which are form input controls that retain their values from one page to the next. Sometimes people want to know how to include these widgets into their template output. It's totally straightforward. Just call the C functions from inside the template: { $q->checkbox_group(NAME => 'toppings', LINEBREAK => true, COLUMNS => 3, VALUES => \@toppings, ); } =head2 Automatic preprocessing of program fragments It may be useful to preprocess the program fragments before they are evaluated. See C for more details. =head2 Automatic postprocessing of template hunks It may be useful to process hunks of output before they are appended to the result text. For this, subclass and replace the C method. It is passed a list of pairs with these entries: handle - a filehandle to which to print the desired output out - a ref to a string to which to append, to use if handle is not given text - the text that will be appended type - where the text came from: TEXT for literal text, PROG for code =head2 Author Mark Jason Dominus, Plover Systems Please send questions and other remarks about this software to C You can join a very low-volume (E10 messages per year) mailing list for announcements about this package. Send an empty note to C to join. For updates, visit C. =head2 Support? This software is version 1.46. It may have bugs. Suggestions and bug reports are always welcome. Send them to C. (That is my address, not the address of the mailing list. The mailing list address is a secret.) =head1 LICENSE Text::Template version 1.46 Copyright 2013 Mark Jason Dominus This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. You may also can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Perl Artistic License. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. =head1 THANKS Many thanks to the following people for offering support, encouragement, advice, bug reports, and all the other good stuff. David H. Adler / Joel Appelbaum / Klaus Arnhold / AntEnio AragEo / Kevin Atteson / Chris.Brezil / Mike Brodhead / Tom Brown / Dr. Frank Bucolo / Tim Bunce / Juan E. Camacho / Itamar Almeida de Carvalho / Joseph Cheek / Gene Damon / San Deng / Bob Dougherty / Marek Grac / Dan Franklin / gary at dls.net / Todd A. Green / Donald L. Greer Jr. / Michelangelo Grigni / Zac Hansen / Tom Henry / Jarko Hietaniemi / Matt X. Hunter / Robert M. Ioffe / Daniel LaLiberte / Reuven M. Lerner / Trip Lilley / Yannis Livassof / Val Luck / Kevin Madsen / David Marshall / James Mastros / Joel Meulenberg / Jason Moore / Sergey Myasnikov / Chris Nandor / Bek Oberin / Steve Palincsar / Ron Pero / Hans Persson / Sean Roehnelt / Jonathan Roy / Shabbir J. Safdar / Jennifer D. St Clair / Uwe Schneider / Randal L. Schwartz / Michael G Schwern / Yonat Sharon / Brian C. Shensky / Niklas Skoglund / Tom Snee / Fred Steinberg / Hans Stoop / Michael J. Suzio / Dennis Taylor / James H. Thompson / Shad Todd / Lieven Tomme / Lorenzo Valdettaro / Larry Virden / Andy Wardley / Archie Warnock / Chris Wesley / Matt Womer / Andrew G Wood / Daini Xie / Michaely Yeung Special thanks to: =over 2 =item Jonathan Roy for telling me how to do the C support (I spent two years worrying about it, and then Jonathan pointed out that it was trivial.) =item Ranjit Bhatnagar for demanding less verbose fragments like they have in ASP, for helping me figure out the Right Thing, and, especially, for talking me out of adding any new syntax. These discussions resulted in the C<$OUT> feature. =back =head2 Bugs and Caveats C variables in C are still susceptible to being clobbered by template evaluation. They all begin with C, so avoid those names in your templates. The line number information will be wrong if the template's lines are not terminated by C<"\n">. You should let me know if this is a problem. If you do, I will fix it. The C<$OUT> variable has a special meaning in templates, so you cannot use it as if it were a regular variable. There are not quite enough tests in the test suite. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661023172 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/lib/Text/Template/Preprocess.pm0000644000000000000000000001030313176625661025652 0ustar rootroot package Text::Template::Preprocess; use Text::Template; @ISA = qw(Text::Template); $Text::Template::Preprocess::VERSION = 1.46; sub fill_in { my $self = shift; my (%args) = @_; my $pp = $args{PREPROCESSOR} || $self->{PREPROCESSOR} ; if ($pp) { local $_ = $self->source(); # print "# fill_in: before <$_>\n"; &$pp; # print "# fill_in: after <$_>\n"; $self->set_source_data($_); } $self->SUPER::fill_in(@_); } sub preprocessor { my ($self, $pp) = @_; my $old_pp = $self->{PREPROCESSOR}; $self->{PREPROCESSOR} = $pp if @_ > 1; # OK to pass $pp=undef $old_pp; } 1; =head1 NAME Text::Template::Preprocess - Expand template text with embedded Perl =head1 VERSION This file documents C version B<1.46> =head1 SYNOPSIS use Text::Template::Preprocess; my $t = Text::Template::Preprocess->new(...); # identical to Text::Template # Fill in template, but preprocess each code fragment with pp(). my $result = $t->fill_in(..., PREPROCESSOR => \&pp); my $old_pp = $t->preprocessor(\&new_pp); =head1 DESCRIPTION C provides a new C option to C. If the C option is supplied, it must be a reference to a preprocessor subroutine. When filling out a template, C will use this subroutine to preprocess the program fragment prior to evaluating the code. The preprocessor subroutine will be called repeatedly, once for each program fragment. The program fragment will be in C<$_>. The subroutine should modify the contents of C<$_> and return. C will then execute contents of C<$_> and insert the result into the appropriate part of the template. C objects also support a utility method, C, which sets a new preprocessor for the object. This preprocessor is used for all subsequent calls to C except where overridden by an explicit C option. C returns the previous default preprocessor function, or undefined if there wasn't one. When invoked with no arguments, C returns the object's current default preprocessor function without changing it. In all other respects, C is identical to C. =head1 WHY? One possible purpose: If your files contain a lot of JavaScript, like this: Plain text here... { perl code } { more perl code } More plain text... You don't want C to confuse the curly braces in the JavaScript program with executable Perl code. One strategy: sub quote_scripts { s()(q{$1})gsi; } Then use C \"e_scripts>. This will transform =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 AUTHOR Mark Jason Dominus, Plover Systems Please send questions and other remarks about this software to C You can join a very low-volume (E10 messages per year) mailing list for announcements about this package. Send an empty note to C to join. For updates, visit C. =head1 LICENSE Text::Template::Preprocess version 1.46 Copyright 2013 Mark Jason Dominus This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. You may also can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the Perl Artistic License. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/INSTALL0000644000000000000000000000111013176625661020747 0ustar rootroot To install: perl Makefile.PL to construct the Makefile, then make test to test the package. If it fails any tests, please send me the output of `make test' and `perl -V'. I'll tell you whether it is safe to go ahead, or I'll provide a fix. If it passes the tests, use make install to install it. Detailed documentation is at the bottom of the lib/Text/Template.pm file. You may be able to view it with the following command: perldoc Text::Template Or: perldoc lib/Text/Template.pm If you have problems, send me mail: mjd-perl-template+@plover.com openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/COPYING0000644000000000000000000004317313176625661020770 0ustar rootroot GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 2, June 1991 Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. Preamble The licenses for most software are designed to take away your freedom to share and change it. By contrast, the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free software--to make sure the software is free for all its users. This General Public License applies to most of the Free Software Foundation's software and to any other program whose authors commit to using it. (Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by the GNU Library General Public License instead.) You can apply it to your programs, too. When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things. To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it. For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they know their rights. We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and (2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the software. Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain that everyone understands that there is no warranty for this free software. If the software is modified by someone else and passed on, we want its recipients to know that what they have is not the original, so that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the original authors' reputations. Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software patents. We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free program will individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the program proprietary. To prevent this, we have made it clear that any patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all. The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and modification follow. GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION 0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains a notice placed by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed under the terms of this General Public License. The "Program", below, refers to any such program or work, and a "work based on the Program" means either the Program or any derivative work under copyright law: that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it, either verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into another language. (Hereinafter, translation is included without limitation in the term "modification".) Each licensee is addressed as "you". Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not covered by this License; they are outside its scope. The act of running the Program is not restricted, and the output from the Program is covered only if its contents constitute a work based on the Program (independent of having been made by running the Program). Whether that is true depends on what the Program does. 1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any warranty; and give any other recipients of the Program a copy of this License along with the Program. You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy, and you may at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee. 2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy and distribute such modifications or work under the terms of Section 1 above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions: a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices stating that you changed the files and the date of any change. b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License. c) If the modified program normally reads commands interactively when run, you must cause it, when started running for such interactive use in the most ordinary way, to print or display an announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide a warranty) and that users may redistribute the program under these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of this License. (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but does not normally print such an announcement, your work based on the Program is not required to print an announcement.) These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole. If identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program, and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those sections when you distribute them as separate works. But when you distribute the same sections as part of a whole which is a work based on the Program, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote it. Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to exercise the right to control the distribution of derivative or collective works based on the Program. In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under the scope of this License. 3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it, under Section 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following: a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable source code, which must be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or, b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your cost of physically performing source distribution, a complete machine-readable copy of the corresponding source code, to be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or, c) Accompany it with the information you received as to the offer to distribute corresponding source code. (This alternative is allowed only for noncommercial distribution and only if you received the program in object code or executable form with such an offer, in accord with Subsection b above.) The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for making modifications to it. For an executable work, complete source code means all the source code for all modules it contains, plus any associated interface definition files, plus the scripts used to control compilation and installation of the executable. However, as a special exception, the source code distributed need not include anything that is normally distributed (in either source or binary form) with the major components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the operating system on which the executable runs, unless that component itself accompanies the executable. If distribution of executable or object code is made by offering access to copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent access to copy the source code from the same place counts as distribution of the source code, even though third parties are not compelled to copy the source along with the object code. 4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License. However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under this License will not have their licenses terminated so long as such parties remain in full compliance. 5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not signed it. However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or distribute the Program or its derivative works. These actions are prohibited by law if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and all its terms and conditions for copying, distributing or modifying the Program or works based on it. 6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from the original licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to these terms and conditions. You may not impose any further restrictions on the recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein. You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to this License. 7. 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If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the original copyright holder who places the Program under this License may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among countries not thus excluded. In such case, this License incorporates the limitation as if written in the body of this License. 9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of the General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to address new problems or concerns. Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program specifies a version number of this License which applies to it and "any later version", you have the option of following the terms and conditions either of that version or of any later version published by the Free Software Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version number of this License, you may choose any version ever published by the Free Software Foundation. 10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to the author to ask for permission. For software which is copyrighted by the Free Software Foundation, write to the Free Software Foundation; we sometimes make exceptions for this. Our decision will be guided by the two goals of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software and of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally. NO WARRANTY 11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION. 12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS Appendix: How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms. To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively convey the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found. Copyright (C) 19yy This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode: Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) 19yy name of author Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions; type `show c' for details. The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate parts of the General Public License. Of course, the commands you use may be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program. You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary. Here is a sample; alter the names: Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker. , 1 April 1989 Ty Coon, President of Vice This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Library General Public License instead of this License. openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Text-Template-1.46/MANIFEST0000644000000000000000000000073413176625661021062 0ustar rootrootMANIFEST COPYING Artistic Makefile.PL INSTALL README lib/Text/Template.pm lib/Text/Template/Preprocess.pm t/00-version.t t/01-basic.t t/02-hash.t t/03-out.t t/04-safe.t t/05-safe2.t t/06-ofh.t t/07-safe3.t t/08-exported.t t/09-error.t t/10-delimiters.t t/11-prepend.t t/12-preprocess.t t/13-taint.t t/14-broken.t META.yml Module meta-data (added by MakeMaker) META.json Module JSON meta-data (added by MakeMaker) openssl-1.1.0g/external/perl/Downloaded.txt0000644000000000000000000000061513176625661017465 0ustar rootrootIntro ----- If we find a useful Perl module that isn't one of the core Perl modules, we may choose to bundle it with the OpenSSL source. Here, we simply list those modules and where we downloaded them from. Downloaded and bundled Perl modules ----------------------------------- Text::Template 1.46 was downloaded from http://search.cpan.org/CPAN/authors/id/M/MJ/MJD/Text-Template-1.46.tar.gz openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625655015053 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/windows-checker.pm0000644000000000000000000000115613176625655020510 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/perl use Config; # Check that the perl implementation file modules generate paths that # we expect for the platform use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT rel2abs); if (rel2abs('.') !~ m|\\|) { die < { cc => "purify gcc", cflags => "-g -Wall", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", ex_libs => add(" ","-lsocket -lnsl"), }, "debug" => { cc => "gcc", cflags => "-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -ggdb -g2 -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, "debug-erbridge" => { inherit_from => [ "x86_64_asm" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine("$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add(" ","-ldl"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "elf", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "linux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-m64", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "64", }, "debug-linux-pentium" => { inherit_from => [ "x86_elf_asm" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine("-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add(" ","-ldl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", }, "debug-linux-ppro" => { inherit_from => [ "x86_elf_asm" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine("-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add(" ","-ldl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", }, "debug-linux-ia32-aes" => { cc => "gcc", cflags => combine("-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add(" ","-ldl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", cpuid_asm_src => "x86cpuid.s", bn_asm_src => "bn-586.s co-586.s x86-mont.s", des_asm_src => "des-586.s crypt586.s", aes_asm_src => "aes_x86core.s aes_cbc.s aesni-x86.s", bf_asm_src => "bf-586.s", md5_asm_src => "md5-586.s", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-586.s sha256-586.s sha512-586.s", cast_asm_src => "cast-586.s", rc4_asm_src => "rc4-586.s", rmd160_asm_src => "rmd-586.s", rc5_asm_src => "rc5-586.s", wp_asm_src => "wp_block.s wp-mmx.s", modes_asm_src => "ghash-x86.s", padlock_asm_src => "e_padlock-x86.s", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "elf", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "linux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "dist" => { cc => "cc", cflags => "-O", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, "debug-test-64-clang" => { inherit_from => [ "x86_64_asm" ], cc => "clang", cflags => combine("$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -Wno-error=extended-offsetof -Wno-error=language-extension-token -Wno-error=unused-const-variable -Wstrict-overflow -Qunused-arguments -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe", threads("${BSDthreads}")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "elf", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "bsd-gcc-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "darwin64-debug-test-64-clang" => { inherit_from => [ "x86_64_asm" ], cc => "clang", cflags => combine("-arch x86_64 -DL_ENDIAN $gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -Wno-error=extended-offsetof -Wno-error=language-extension-token -Wno-error=unused-const-variable -Wstrict-overflow -Qunused-arguments -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe", threads("${BSDthreads}")), sys_id => "MACOSX", bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "macosx", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "darwin-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC -fno-common", shared_ldflag => "-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib", shared_extension => ".\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl0000644000000000000000000011740513176625655020457 0ustar rootroot## ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## ## {- join("\n## ", @autowarntext) -} {- our $objext = $target{obj_extension} || ".o"; our $depext = $target{dep_extension} || ".d"; our $exeext = $target{exe_extension} || ""; our $libext = $target{lib_extension} || ".a"; our $shlibext = $target{shared_extension} || ".so"; our $shlibextsimple = $target{shared_extension_simple} || ".so"; our $shlibextimport = $target{shared_import_extension} || ""; our $dsoext = $target{dso_extension} || ".so"; sub windowsdll { $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/ } our $sover = $config{target} =~ /^mingw/ ? $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor} : $config{shlib_major}.".".$config{shlib_minor}; # shlib and shlib_simple both take a static library name and figure # out what the shlib name should be. # # When OpenSSL is configured "no-shared", these functions will just # return empty lists, making them suitable to join(). # # With Windows DLL producers, shlib($libname) will return the shared # library name (which usually is different from the static library # name) with the default shared extension appended to it, while # shlib_simple($libname) will return the static library name with # the shared extension followed by ".a" appended to it. The former # result is used as the runtime shared library while the latter is # used as the DLL import library. # # On all Unix systems, shlib($libname) will return the library name # with the default shared extension, while shlib_simple($libname) # will return the name from shlib($libname) with any SO version number # removed. On some systems, they may therefore return the exact same # string. sub shlib { return () if $disabled{shared}; my $lib = shift; return $unified_info{sharednames}->{$lib} . $shlibext; } sub shlib_simple { return () if $disabled{shared}; my $lib = shift; if (windowsdll()) { return $lib . $shlibextimport; } return $lib . $shlibextsimple; } # dso is a complement to shlib / shlib_simple that returns the # given libname with the simple shared extension (possible SO version # removed). This differs from shlib_simple() by being unconditional. sub dso { my $engine = shift; return $engine . $dsoext; } # This makes sure things get built in the order they need # to. You're welcome. sub dependmagic { my $target = shift; return "$target: build_generated\n\t\$(MAKE) depend && \$(MAKE) _$target\n_$target"; } ''; -} PLATFORM={- $config{target} -} OPTIONS={- $config{options} -} CONFIGURE_ARGS=({- join(", ",quotify_l(@{$config{perlargv}})) -}) SRCDIR={- $config{sourcedir} -} BLDDIR={- $config{builddir} -} VERSION={- $config{version} -} MAJOR={- $config{major} -} MINOR={- $config{minor} -} SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER={- $config{shlib_version_number} -} SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY={- $config{shlib_version_history} -} SHLIB_MAJOR={- $config{shlib_major} -} SHLIB_MINOR={- $config{shlib_minor} -} SHLIB_TARGET={- $target{shared_target} -} LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} SHLIB_INFO={- join(" ", map { "\"".shlib($_).";".shlib_simple($_)."\"" } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -} PROGRAMS={- join(" ", map { $_.$exeext } @{$unified_info{programs}}) -} SCRIPTS={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{scripts}}) -} {- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} DEPS={- join(" ", map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|$depext|; $x; } grep { $unified_info{sources}->{$_}->[0] =~ /\.c$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}}); -} {- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} GENERATED_MANDATORY={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{depends}->{""}} ) -} GENERATED={- join(" ", ( map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.S$|\.s|; $x } grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} } map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} } grep { /\.o$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}} ), ( grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}} )) -} INSTALL_LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} INSTALL_SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} INSTALL_SHLIB_INFO={- join(" ", map { "\"".shlib($_).";".shlib_simple($_)."\"" } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} INSTALL_ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -} INSTALL_PROGRAMS={- join(" ", map { $_.$exeext } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -} {- output_off() if $disabled{apps}; "" -} BIN_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)/tools/c_rehash MISC_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)/apps/CA.pl $(BLDDIR)/apps/tsget {- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -} APPS_OPENSSL={- use File::Spec::Functions; catfile("apps","openssl") -} # DESTDIR is for package builders so that they can configure for, say, # /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/. # Normally it is left empty. DESTDIR= # Do not edit these manually. Use Configure with --prefix or --openssldir # to change this! Short explanation in the top comment in Configure INSTALLTOP={- # $prefix is used in the OPENSSLDIR perl snippet # our $prefix = $config{prefix} || "/usr/local"; $prefix -} OPENSSLDIR={- # # The logic here is that if no --openssldir was given, # OPENSSLDIR will get the value from $prefix plus "/ssl". # If --openssldir was given and the value is an absolute # path, OPENSSLDIR will get its value without change. # If the value from --openssldir is a relative path, # OPENSSLDIR will get $prefix with the --openssldir # value appended as a subdirectory. # use File::Spec::Functions; our $openssldir = $config{openssldir} ? (file_name_is_absolute($config{openssldir}) ? $config{openssldir} : catdir($prefix, $config{openssldir})) : catdir($prefix, "ssl"); $openssldir -} LIBDIR={- # # if $prefix/lib$target{multilib} is not an existing # directory, then assume that it's not searched by linker # automatically, in which case adding $target{multilib} suffix # causes more grief than we're ready to tolerate, so don't... our $multilib = -d "$prefix/lib$target{multilib}" ? $target{multilib} : ""; our $libdir = $config{libdir} || "lib$multilib"; $libdir -} ENGINESDIR={- use File::Spec::Functions; catdir($prefix,$libdir,"engines-$sover") -} # Convenience variable for those who want to set the rpath in shared # libraries and applications LIBRPATH=$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man DOCDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/doc/$(BASENAME) HTMLDIR=$(DOCDIR)/html # MANSUFFIX is for the benefit of anyone who may want to have a suffix # appended after the manpage file section number. "ssl" is popular, # resulting in files such as config.5ssl rather than config.5. MANSUFFIX= HTMLSUFFIX=html CROSS_COMPILE= {- $config{cross_compile_prefix} -} CC= $(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{cc} -} CFLAGS={- our $cflags2 = join(" ",(map { "-D".$_} @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}}),"-DOPENSSLDIR=\"\\\"\$(OPENSSLDIR)\\\"\"","-DENGINESDIR=\"\\\"\$(ENGINESDIR)\\\"\"") -} {- $target{cflags} -} {- $config{cflags} -} CFLAGS_Q={- $cflags2 =~ s|([\\"])|\\$1|g; $cflags2 -} {- $config{cflags} -} LDFLAGS= {- $target{lflags} -} PLIB_LDFLAGS= {- $target{plib_lflags} -} EX_LIBS= {- $target{ex_libs} -} {- $config{ex_libs} -} LIB_CFLAGS={- $target{shared_cflag} || "" -} LIB_LDFLAGS={- $target{shared_ldflag}." ".$config{shared_ldflag} -} DSO_CFLAGS={- $target{shared_cflag} || "" -} DSO_LDFLAGS=$(LIB_LDFLAGS) BIN_CFLAGS={- $target{bin_cflags} -} PERL={- $config{perl} -} ARFLAGS= {- $target{arflags} -} AR=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{ar} || "ar" -} $(ARFLAGS) r RANLIB= {- $target{ranlib} -} NM= $(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{nm} || "nm" -} RCFLAGS={- $target{shared_rcflag} -} RC= $(CROSS_COMPILE){- $target{rc} || "windres" -} RM= rm -f RMDIR= rmdir TAR= {- $target{tar} || "tar" -} TARFLAGS= {- $target{tarflags} -} MAKEDEPEND={- $config{makedepprog} -} BASENAME= openssl NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION) TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar # We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in # order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture # dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC # gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus # and pass it down to assembler. AS=$(CC) -c ASFLAG=$(CFLAGS) PERLASM_SCHEME= {- $target{perlasm_scheme} -} # For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support # the 80386. PROCESSOR= {- $config{processor} -} # We want error [and other] messages in English. Trouble is that make(1) # doesn't pass macros down as environment variables unless there already # was corresponding variable originally set. In other words we can only # reassign environment variables, but not set new ones, not in portable # manner that is. That's why we reassign several, just to be sure... LC_ALL=C LC_MESSAGES=C LANG=C # The main targets ################################################### {- dependmagic('all'); -}: build_libs_nodep build_engines_nodep build_programs_nodep link-utils {- dependmagic('build_libs'); -}: build_libs_nodep {- dependmagic('build_engines'); -}: build_engines_nodep {- dependmagic('build_programs'); -}: build_programs_nodep build_generated: $(GENERATED_MANDATORY) build_libs_nodep: libcrypto.pc libssl.pc openssl.pc build_engines_nodep: $(ENGINES) build_programs_nodep: $(PROGRAMS) $(SCRIPTS) # Kept around for backward compatibility build_apps build_tests: build_programs test: tests {- dependmagic('tests'); -}: build_programs_nodep build_engines_nodep link-utils @ : {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -} ( cd test; \ mkdir -p test-runs; \ SRCTOP=../$(SRCDIR) \ BLDTOP=../$(BLDDIR) \ RESULT_D=test-runs \ PERL="$(PERL)" \ EXE_EXT={- $exeext -} \ OPENSSL_ENGINES=`cd ../$(BLDDIR)/engines; pwd` \ OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on \ $(PERL) ../$(SRCDIR)/test/run_tests.pl $(TESTS) ) @ : {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -} @echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options" @ : {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -} list-tests: @ : {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -} @SRCTOP="$(SRCDIR)" \ $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/test/run_tests.pl list @ : {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -} @echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options" @ : {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -} install: install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs uninstall: uninstall_docs uninstall_sw libclean: @set -e; for s in $(SHLIB_INFO); do \ s1=`echo "$$s" | cut -f1 -d";"`; \ s2=`echo "$$s" | cut -f2 -d";"`; \ echo $(RM) $$s1; \ $(RM) $$s1; \ if [ "$$s1" != "$$s2" ]; then \ echo $(RM) $$s2; \ $(RM) $$s2; \ fi; \ done $(RM) $(LIBS) $(RM) *.map clean: libclean $(RM) $(PROGRAMS) $(TESTPROGS) $(ENGINES) $(SCRIPTS) $(RM) $(GENERATED) -$(RM) `find . -name '*{- $depext -}' -a \! -path "./.git/*"` -$(RM) `find . -name '*{- $objext -}' -a \! -path "./.git/*"` $(RM) core $(RM) tags TAGS doc-nits $(RM) test/.rnd $(RM) openssl.pc libcrypto.pc libssl.pc -$(RM) `find . -type l -a \! -path "./.git/*"` $(RM) $(TARFILE) distclean: clean $(RM) configdata.pm $(RM) Makefile # We check if any depfile is newer than Makefile and decide to # concatenate only if that is true. depend: @: {- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} @if egrep "^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE" Makefile >/dev/null && [ -z "`find $(DEPS) -newer Makefile 2>/dev/null; exit 0`" ]; then :; else \ ( $(PERL) -pe 'exit 0 if /^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE.*/' < Makefile; \ echo '# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.'; \ echo; \ for f in $(DEPS); do \ if [ -f $$f ]; then cat $$f; fi; \ done ) > Makefile.new; \ if cmp Makefile.new Makefile >/dev/null 2>&1; then \ rm -f Makefile.new; \ else \ mv -f Makefile.new Makefile; \ fi; \ fi @: {- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} # Install helper targets ############################################# install_sw: all install_dev install_engines install_runtime uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_engines uninstall_dev install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs $(RM) -r -v $(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR) install_ssldirs: @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc @set -e; for x in dummy $(MISC_SCRIPTS); do \ if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$x`; \ echo "install $$x -> $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn"; \ cp $$x $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn.new; \ chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$fn; \ done @echo "install $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf -> $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.dist" @cp $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new @chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new @mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.dist @if ! [ -f "$(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf" ]; then \ echo "install $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf -> $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf"; \ cp $(SRCDIR)/apps/openssl.cnf $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf; \ chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf; \ fi install_dev: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1) @echo "*** Installing development files" @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl @ : {- output_off() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -} @echo "install $(SRCDIR)/ms/applink.c -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c" @cp $(SRCDIR)/ms/applink.c $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c @chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c @ : {- output_on() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -} @set -e; for i in $(SRCDIR)/include/openssl/*.h \ $(BLDDIR)/include/openssl/*.h; do \ fn=`basename $$i`; \ echo "install $$i -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn"; \ cp $$i $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn; \ chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn; \ done @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) @set -e; for l in $(INSTALL_LIBS); do \ fn=`basename $$l`; \ echo "install $$l -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn"; \ cp $$l $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \ $(RANLIB) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \ chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn; \ done @ : {- output_off() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} @set -e; for s in $(INSTALL_SHLIB_INFO); do \ s1=`echo "$$s" | cut -f1 -d";"`; \ s2=`echo "$$s" | cut -f2 -d";"`; \ fn1=`basename $$s1`; \ fn2=`basename $$s2`; \ : {- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \ echo "install $$s1 -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1"; \ cp $$s1 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1.new; \ chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1; \ if [ "$$fn1" != "$$fn2" ]; then \ echo "link $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2 -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1"; \ ln -sf $$fn1 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \ fi; \ : {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -}{- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \ echo "install $$s2 -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2"; \ cp $$s2 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2.new; \ chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \ : {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \ done @ : {- output_on() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig @echo "install libcrypto.pc -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc" @cp libcrypto.pc $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig @chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc @echo "install libssl.pc -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc" @cp libssl.pc $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig @chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc @echo "install openssl.pc -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc" @cp openssl.pc $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig @chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc uninstall_dev: @echo "*** Uninstalling development files" @ : {- output_off() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -} @echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c" @$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/applink.c @ : {- output_on() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -} @set -e; for i in $(SRCDIR)/include/openssl/*.h \ $(BLDDIR)/include/openssl/*.h; do \ fn=`basename $$i`; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$fn; \ done -$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl -$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/include @set -e; for l in $(INSTALL_LIBS); do \ fn=`basename $$l`; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn; \ done @ : {- output_off() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} @set -e; for s in $(INSTALL_SHLIB_INFO); do \ s1=`echo "$$s" | cut -f1 -d";"`; \ s2=`echo "$$s" | cut -f2 -d";"`; \ fn1=`basename $$s1`; \ fn2=`basename $$s2`; \ : {- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn1; \ if [ "$$fn1" != "$$fn2" ]; then \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \ fi; \ : {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -}{- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn2; \ : {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \ done @ : {- output_on() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc -$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig -$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) install_engines: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1) @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/ @echo "*** Installing engines" @set -e; for e in dummy $(INSTALL_ENGINES); do \ if [ "$$e" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$e`; \ echo "install $$e -> $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn"; \ cp $$e $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn.new; \ chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn; \ done uninstall_engines: @echo "*** Uninstalling engines" @set -e; for e in dummy $(INSTALL_ENGINES); do \ if [ "$$e" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$e`; \ if [ "$$fn" = '{- dso("ossltest") -}' ]; then \ continue; \ fi; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR)/$$fn; \ done -$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR) install_runtime: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1) @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin @ : {- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -} @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) @ : {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -} @echo "*** Installing runtime files" @set -e; for s in dummy $(INSTALL_SHLIBS); do \ if [ "$$s" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$s`; \ : {- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -}; \ echo "install $$s -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \ cp $$s $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \ chmod 644 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \ : {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -}{- output_off() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \ echo "install $$s -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn"; \ cp $$s $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \ chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$fn; \ : {- output_on() if windowsdll(); "" -}; \ done @set -e; for x in dummy $(INSTALL_PROGRAMS); do \ if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$x`; \ echo "install $$x -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \ cp $$x $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \ chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \ done @set -e; for x in dummy $(BIN_SCRIPTS); do \ if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$x`; \ echo "install $$x -> $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \ cp $$x $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \ chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new; \ mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn.new \ $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \ done uninstall_runtime: @echo "*** Uninstalling runtime files" @set -e; for x in dummy $(INSTALL_PROGRAMS); \ do \ if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$x`; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \ done; @set -e; for x in dummy $(BIN_SCRIPTS); \ do \ if [ "$$x" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$x`; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \ done @ : {- output_off() unless windowsdll(); "" -} @set -e; for s in dummy $(INSTALL_SHLIBS); do \ if [ "$$s" = "dummy" ]; then continue; fi; \ fn=`basename $$s`; \ echo "$(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn"; \ $(RM) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$fn; \ done @ : {- output_on() unless windowsdll(); "" -} -$(RMDIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin install_man_docs: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1) @echo "*** Installing manpages" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \ --destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR) --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX) uninstall_man_docs: @echo "*** Uninstalling manpages" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \ --destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR) --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX) \ --remove install_html_docs: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1) @echo "*** Installing HTML manpages" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \ --destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR) --type=html uninstall_html_docs: @echo "*** Uninstalling manpages" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \ --destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR) --type=html --remove # Developer targets (note: these are only available on Unix) ######### update: generate errors ordinals generate: generate_apps generate_crypto_bn generate_crypto_objects \ generate_crypto_conf generate_crypto_asn1 doc-nits: (cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) util/find-doc-nits -n ) >doc-nits if [ -s doc-nits ] ; then cat doc-nits; rm doc-nits ; exit 1; fi # Test coverage is a good idea for the future #coverage: $(PROGRAMS) $(TESTPROGRAMS) # ... lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRCS) generate_apps: ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl \ < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf ) generate_crypto_bn: ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl > crypto/bn/bn_prime.h ) generate_crypto_objects: ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl \ crypto/objects/objects.txt \ crypto/objects/obj_mac.num \ include/openssl/obj_mac.h ) ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl \ include/openssl/obj_mac.h \ crypto/objects/obj_dat.h ) ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl \ crypto/objects/obj_mac.num \ crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt \ > crypto/objects/obj_xref.h ) generate_crypto_conf: ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/conf/keysets.pl \ > crypto/conf/conf_def.h ) generate_crypto_asn1: ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) crypto/asn1/charmap.pl \ > crypto/asn1/charmap.h ) errors: ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c ) ( cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write ) ( cd $(SRCDIR)/engines; \ for e in *.ec; do \ $(PERL) ../util/mkerr.pl -conf $$e \ -nostatic -staticloader -write *.c; \ done ) ordinals: ( b=`pwd`; cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) -I$$b util/mkdef.pl crypto update ) ( b=`pwd`; cd $(SRCDIR); $(PERL) -I$$b util/mkdef.pl ssl update ) test_ordinals: ( cd test; \ SRCTOP=../$(SRCDIR) \ BLDTOP=../$(BLDDIR) \ $(PERL) ../$(SRCDIR)/test/run_tests.pl test_ordinals ) tags TAGS: FORCE rm -f TAGS tags -ctags -R . -etags `find . -name '*.[ch]' -o -name '*.pm'` # Release targets (note: only available on Unix) ##################### # If your tar command doesn't support --owner and --group, make sure to # use one that does, for example GNU tar TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --owner 0 --group 0 -cvf - PREPARE_CMD=: tar: set -e; \ TMPDIR=/var/tmp/openssl-copy.$$$$; \ DISTDIR=$(NAME); \ mkdir -p $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR; \ (cd $(SRCDIR); \ git ls-tree -r --name-only --full-tree HEAD \ | grep -v '^fuzz/corpora' \ | while read F; do \ mkdir -p $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR/`dirname $$F`; \ cp $$F $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR/$$F; \ done); \ (cd $$TMPDIR/$$DISTDIR; \ $(PREPARE_CMD); \ find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755; \ find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r; \ find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x); \ (cd $$TMPDIR; $(TAR_COMMAND) $$DISTDIR) \ | (cd $(SRCDIR); gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz); \ rm -rf $$TMPDIR cd $(SRCDIR); ls -l $(TARFILE).gz dist: @$(MAKE) PREPARE_CMD='$(PERL) ./Configure dist' tar # Helper targets ##################################################### link-utils: $(BLDDIR)/util/opensslwrap.sh $(BLDDIR)/util/opensslwrap.sh: configdata.pm @if [ "$(SRCDIR)" != "$(BLDDIR)" ]; then \ mkdir -p "$(BLDDIR)/util"; \ ln -sf "../$(SRCDIR)/util/opensslwrap.sh" "$(BLDDIR)/util"; \ fi FORCE: # Building targets ################################################### libcrypto.pc libssl.pc openssl.pc: configdata.pm $(LIBS) {- join(" ",map { shlib_simple($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} libcrypto.pc: @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo 'enginesdir=$${libdir}/engines-{- $sover -}'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \ echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir}' ) > libcrypto.pc libssl.pc: @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libssl'; \ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires.private: libcrypto'; \ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl'; \ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir}' ) > libssl.pc openssl.pc: @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires: libssl libcrypto' ) > openssl.pc configdata.pm: $(SRCDIR)/Configure $(SRCDIR)/config {- join(" ", @{$config{build_file_templates}}, @{$config{build_infos}}, @{$config{conf_files}}) -} @echo "Detected changed: $?" @echo "Reconfiguring..." $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/Configure reconf @echo "**************************************************" @echo "*** ***" @echo "*** Please run the same make command again ***" @echo "*** ***" @echo "**************************************************" @false {- use File::Basename; use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/; # Helper function to figure out dependencies on libraries # It takes a list of library names and outputs a list of dependencies sub compute_lib_depends { if ($disabled{shared}) { return map { $_.$libext } @_; } # Depending on shared libraries: # On Windows POSIX layers, we depend on {libname}.dll.a # On Unix platforms, we depend on {shlibname}.so return map { shlib_simple($_) } @_; } sub generatesrc { my %args = @_; my $generator = join(" ", @{$args{generator}}); my $generator_incs = join("", map { " -I".$_ } @{$args{generator_incs}}); my $incs = join("", map { " -I".$_ } @{$args{incs}}); my $deps = join(" ", @{$args{generator_deps}}, @{$args{deps}}); if ($args{src} !~ /\.[sS]$/) { if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ m|^.*\.in$|) { my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "dofile.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); return <<"EOF"; $args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps \$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\ "-o$target{build_file}" $generator > \$@ EOF } else { return <<"EOF"; $args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps \$(PERL)$generator_incs $generator > \$@ EOF } } else { if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.pl$/) { $generator = 'CC="$(CC)" $(PERL)'.$generator_incs.' '.$generator; } elsif ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.m4$/) { $generator = 'm4 -B 8192'.$generator_incs.' '.$generator.' >' } elsif ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.S$/) { $generator = undef; } else { die "Generator type for $args{src} unknown: $generator\n"; } if (defined($generator)) { # If the target is named foo.S in build.info, we want to # end up generating foo.s in two steps. if ($args{src} =~ /\.S$/) { (my $target = $args{src}) =~ s|\.S$|.s|; return <<"EOF"; $target: $args{generator}->[0] $deps ( trap "rm -f \$@.*" INT 0; \\ $generator \$@.S; \\ \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) -E \$@.S | \\ \$(PERL) -ne '/^#(line)?\\s*[0-9]+/ or print' > \$@.i && \\ mv -f \$@.i \$@ ) EOF } # Otherwise.... return <<"EOF"; $args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps $generator \$@ EOF } return <<"EOF"; $args{src}: $args{generator}->[0] $deps \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) -E \$< | \\ \$(PERL) -ne '/^#(line)?\\s*[0-9]+/ or print' > \$@ EOF } } # Should one wonder about the end of the Perl snippet, it's because this # second regexp eats up line endings as well, if the removed path is the # last in the line. We may therefore need to put back a line ending. sub src2obj { my %args = @_; my $obj = $args{obj}; my @srcs = map { if ($unified_info{generate}->{$_}) { (my $x = $_) =~ s/\.S$/.s/; $x } else { $_ } } ( @{$args{srcs}} ); my $srcs = join(" ", @srcs); my $deps = join(" ", @srcs, @{$args{deps}}); my $incs = join("", map { " -I".$_ } @{$args{incs}}); unless ($disabled{zlib}) { if ($withargs{zlib_include}) { $incs .= " -I".$withargs{zlib_include}; } } my $ecflags = { lib => '$(LIB_CFLAGS)', dso => '$(DSO_CFLAGS)', bin => '$(BIN_CFLAGS)' } -> {$args{intent}}; my $makedepprog = $config{makedepprog}; my $recipe = <<"EOF"; $obj$objext: $deps EOF if (!$disabled{makedepend} && $makedepprog !~ /\/makedepend/) { $recipe .= <<"EOF"; \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -MMD -MF $obj$depext.tmp -MT \$\@ -c -o \$\@ $srcs \@touch $obj$depext.tmp \@if cmp $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext > /dev/null 2> /dev/null; then \\ rm -f $obj$depext.tmp; \\ else \\ mv $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext; \\ fi EOF } else { $recipe .= <<"EOF"; \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c -o \$\@ $srcs EOF if (!$disabled{makedepend} && $makedepprog =~ /\/makedepend/) { $recipe .= <<"EOF"; -\$(MAKEDEPEND) -f- -o"|\$\@" -- $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -- $srcs \\ >$obj$depext.tmp 2>/dev/null -\$(PERL) -i -pe 's/^.*\\|//; s/ \\/(\\\\.|[^ ])*//; \$\$_ = undef if (/: *\$\$/ || /^(#.*| *)\$\$/); \$\$_.="\\n" unless !defined(\$\$_) or /\\R\$\$/g;' $obj$depext.tmp \@if cmp $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext > /dev/null 2> /dev/null; then \\ rm -f $obj$depext.tmp; \\ else \\ mv $obj$depext.tmp $obj$depext; \\ fi EOF } } return $recipe; } # On Unix, we build shlibs from static libs, so we're ignoring the # object file array. We *know* this routine is only called when we've # configure 'shared'. sub libobj2shlib { my %args = @_; my $lib = $args{lib}; my $shlib = $args{shlib}; my $libd = dirname($lib); my $libn = basename($lib); (my $libname = $libn) =~ s/^lib//; my $linklibs = join("", map { my $d = dirname($_); my $f = basename($_); (my $l = $f) =~ s/^lib//; " -L$d -l$l" } @{$args{deps}}); my $deps = join(" ",compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); my $shlib_target = $target{shared_target}; my $ordinalsfile = defined($args{ordinals}) ? $args{ordinals}->[1] : ""; my $target = shlib_simple($lib); my $target_full = shlib($lib); return <<"EOF" # With a build on a Windows POSIX layer (Cygwin or Mingw), we know for a fact # that two files get produced, {shlibname}.dll and {libname}.dll.a. # With all other Unix platforms, we often build a shared library with the # SO version built into the file name and a symlink without the SO version # It's not necessary to have both as targets. The choice falls on the # simplest, {libname}$shlibextimport for Windows POSIX layers and # {libname}$shlibextsimple for the Unix platforms. $target: $lib$libext $deps $ordinalsfile \$(MAKE) -f \$(SRCDIR)/Makefile.shared -e \\ PLATFORM=\$(PLATFORM) \\ PERL="\$(PERL)" SRCDIR='\$(SRCDIR)' DSTDIR="$libd" \\ INSTALLTOP='\$(INSTALLTOP)' LIBDIR='\$(LIBDIR)' \\ LIBDEPS='\$(PLIB_LDFLAGS) '"$linklibs"' \$(EX_LIBS)' \\ LIBNAME=$libname SHLIBVERSION=\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR) \\ STLIBNAME=$lib$libext \\ SHLIBNAME=$target SHLIBNAME_FULL=$target_full \\ CC='\$(CC)' CFLAGS='\$(CFLAGS) \$(LIB_CFLAGS)' \\ LDFLAGS='\$(LDFLAGS)' SHARED_LDFLAGS='\$(LIB_LDFLAGS)' \\ RC='\$(RC)' SHARED_RCFLAGS='\$(RCFLAGS)' \\ link_shlib.$shlib_target EOF . (windowsdll() ? <<"EOF" : ""); rm -f apps/$shlib$shlibext rm -f test/$shlib$shlibext cp -p $shlib$shlibext apps/ cp -p $shlib$shlibext test/ EOF } sub obj2dso { my %args = @_; my $dso = $args{lib}; my $dsod = dirname($dso); my $dson = basename($dso); my $shlibdeps = join("", map { my $d = dirname($_); my $f = basename($_); (my $l = $f) =~ s/^lib//; " -L$d -l$l" } @{$args{deps}}); my $deps = join(" ",compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); my $shlib_target = $target{shared_target}; my $objs = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); my $target = dso($dso); return <<"EOF"; $target: $objs $deps \$(MAKE) -f \$(SRCDIR)/Makefile.shared -e \\ PLATFORM=\$(PLATFORM) \\ PERL="\$(PERL)" SRCDIR='\$(SRCDIR)' DSTDIR="$dsod" \\ LIBDEPS='\$(PLIB_LDFLAGS) '"$shlibdeps"' \$(EX_LIBS)' \\ SHLIBNAME_FULL=$target LDFLAGS='\$(LDFLAGS)' \\ CC='\$(CC)' CFLAGS='\$(CFLAGS) \$(DSO_CFLAGS)' \\ SHARED_LDFLAGS='\$(DSO_LDFLAGS)' \\ LIBEXTRAS="$objs" \\ link_dso.$shlib_target EOF } sub obj2lib { my %args = @_; my $lib = $args{lib}; my $objs = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); return <<"EOF"; $lib$libext: $objs \$(AR) \$\@ \$\? \$(RANLIB) \$\@ || echo Never mind. EOF } sub obj2bin { my %args = @_; my $bin = $args{bin}; my $bind = dirname($bin); my $binn = basename($bin); my $objs = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); my $deps = join(" ",compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); my $linklibs = join("", map { my $d = dirname($_); my $f = basename($_); $d = "." if $d eq $f; (my $l = $f) =~ s/^lib//; " -L$d -l$l" } @{$args{deps}}); my $shlib_target = $disabled{shared} ? "" : $target{shared_target}; return <<"EOF"; $bin$exeext: $objs $deps \$(RM) $bin$exeext \$(MAKE) -f \$(SRCDIR)/Makefile.shared -e \\ PERL="\$(PERL)" SRCDIR=\$(SRCDIR) \\ APPNAME=$bin$exeext OBJECTS="$objs" \\ LIBDEPS='\$(PLIB_LDFLAGS) '"$linklibs"' \$(EX_LIBS)' \\ CC='\$(CC)' CFLAGS='\$(CFLAGS) \$(BIN_CFLAGS)' \\ LDFLAGS='\$(LDFLAGS)' \\ link_app.$shlib_target EOF } sub in2script { my %args = @_; my $script = $args{script}; my $sources = join(" ", @{$args{sources}}); my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "dofile.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); return <<"EOF"; $script: $sources \$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\ "-o$target{build_file}" $sources > "$script" chmod a+x $script EOF } sub generatedir { my %args = @_; my $dir = $args{dir}; my @deps = map { s|\.o$|$objext|; $_ } @{$args{deps}}; my @actions = (); my %extinfo = ( dso => $dsoext, lib => $libext, bin => $exeext ); foreach my $type (("dso", "lib", "bin", "script")) { next unless defined($unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}); # For lib object files, we could update the library. However, it # was decided that it's enough to build the directory local object # files, so we don't need to add any actions, and the dependencies # are already taken care of. if ($type ne "lib") { foreach my $prod (@{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}}) { if (dirname($prod) eq $dir) { push @deps, $prod.$extinfo{$type}; } else { push @actions, "\t@ : No support to produce $type ".join(", ", @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}}); } } } } my $deps = join(" ", @deps); my $actions = join("\n", "", @actions); return <<"EOF"; $args{dir} $args{dir}/: $deps$actions EOF } "" # Important! This becomes part of the template result. -} openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl0000644000000000000000000005615613176625655021233 0ustar rootroot## ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## ## {- join("\n## ", @autowarntext) -} {- our $objext = $target{obj_extension} || ".obj"; our $depext = $target{dep_extension} || ".d"; our $exeext = $target{exe_extension} || ".exe"; our $libext = $target{lib_extension} || ".lib"; our $shlibext = $target{shared_extension} || ".dll"; our $shlibextimport = $target{shared_import_extension} || ".lib"; our $dsoext = $target{dso_extension} || ".dll"; our $sover = $config{shlib_major}."_".$config{shlib_minor}; my $win_installenv = $target{build_scheme}->[2] eq "VC-W32" ? "ProgramFiles(x86)" : "ProgramW6432"; my $win_commonenv = $target{build_scheme}->[2] eq "VC-W32" ? "CommonProgramFiles(x86)" : "CommonProgramW6432"; our $win_installroot = defined($ENV{$win_installenv}) ? $win_installenv : 'ProgramFiles'; our $win_commonroot = defined($ENV{$win_commonenv}) ? $win_commonenv : 'CommonProgramFiles'; # expand variables early $win_installroot = $ENV{$win_installroot}; $win_commonroot = $ENV{$win_commonroot}; sub shlib { return () if $disabled{shared}; my $lib = shift; return $unified_info{sharednames}->{$lib} . $shlibext; } sub shlib_import { return () if $disabled{shared}; my $lib = shift; return $lib . $shlibextimport; } sub dso { my $dso = shift; return $dso . $dsoext; } # This makes sure things get built in the order they need # to. You're welcome. sub dependmagic { my $target = shift; return "$target: build_generated\n\t\$(MAKE) depend && \$(MAKE) _$target\n_$target"; } ''; -} PLATFORM={- $config{target} -} SRCDIR={- $config{sourcedir} -} BLDDIR={- $config{builddir} -} VERSION={- $config{version} -} MAJOR={- $config{major} -} MINOR={- $config{minor} -} SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER={- $config{shlib_version_number} -} LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} SHLIBPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $shlibext = ".pdb"; shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -} ENGINEPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $dsoext = ".pdb"; dso($_) } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -} PROGRAMS={- our @PROGRAMS = map { $_.$exeext } @{$unified_info{programs}}; join(" ", @PROGRAMS) -} PROGRAMPDBS={- join(" ", map { $_.".pdb" } @{$unified_info{programs}}) -} SCRIPTS={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{scripts}}) -} {- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} DEPS={- join(" ", map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|$depext|; $x; } grep { $unified_info{sources}->{$_}->[0] =~ /\.c$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}}); -} {- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} GENERATED_MANDATORY={- join(" ", @{$unified_info{depends}->{""}} ) -} GENERATED={- join(" ", ( map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.[sS]$|\.asm|; $x } grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} } map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} } grep { /\.o$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}} ), ( grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}} )) -} INSTALL_LIBS={- join(" ", map { $_.$libext } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} INSTALL_SHLIBS={- join(" ", map { shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} INSTALL_SHLIBPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $shlibext = ".pdb"; shlib($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} INSTALL_ENGINES={- join(" ", map { dso($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -} INSTALL_ENGINEPDBS={- join(" ", map { local $dsoext = ".pdb"; dso($_) } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -} INSTALL_PROGRAMS={- join(" ", map { $_.$exeext } grep { !m|^test\\| } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -} INSTALL_PROGRAMPDBS={- join(" ", map { $_.".pdb" } grep { !m|^test\\| } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -} {- output_off() if $disabled{apps}; "" -} BIN_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)\tools\c_rehash.pl MISC_SCRIPTS=$(BLDDIR)\apps\CA.pl $(BLDDIR)\apps\tsget.pl {- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -} APPS_OPENSSL={- use File::Spec::Functions; catfile("apps","openssl") -} # Do not edit these manually. Use Configure with --prefix or --openssldir # to change this! Short explanation in the top comment in Configure INSTALLTOP_dev={- # $prefix is used in the OPENSSLDIR perl snippet # use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT splitpath); our $prefix = canonpath($config{prefix} || "$win_installroot\\OpenSSL"); our ($prefix_dev, $prefix_dir, $prefix_file) = splitpath($prefix, 1); $prefix_dev -} INSTALLTOP_dir={- canonpath($prefix_dir) -} OPENSSLDIR_dev={- # # The logic here is that if no --openssldir was given, # OPENSSLDIR will get the value from $prefix plus "/ssl". # If --openssldir was given and the value is an absolute # path, OPENSSLDIR will get its value without change. # If the value from --openssldir is a relative path, # OPENSSLDIR will get $prefix with the --openssldir # value appended as a subdirectory. # use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT splitpath); our $openssldir = $config{openssldir} ? (file_name_is_absolute($config{openssldir}) ? canonpath($config{openssldir}) : catdir($prefix, $config{openssldir})) : canonpath("$win_commonroot\\SSL"); our ($openssldir_dev, $openssldir_dir, $openssldir_file) = splitpath($openssldir, 1); $openssldir_dev -} OPENSSLDIR_dir={- canonpath($openssldir_dir) -} LIBDIR={- our $libdir = $config{libdir} || "lib"; $libdir -} ENGINESDIR_dev={- use File::Spec::Functions qw(:DEFAULT splitpath); our $enginesdir = catdir($prefix,$libdir,"engines-$sover"); our ($enginesdir_dev, $enginesdir_dir, $enginesdir_file) = splitpath($enginesdir, 1); $enginesdir_dev -} ENGINESDIR_dir={- canonpath($enginesdir_dir) -} !IF "$(DESTDIR)" != "" INSTALLTOP=$(DESTDIR)$(INSTALLTOP_dir) OPENSSLDIR=$(DESTDIR)$(OPENSSLDIR_dir) ENGINESDIR=$(DESTDIR)$(ENGINESDIR_dir) !ELSE INSTALLTOP=$(INSTALLTOP_dev)$(INSTALLTOP_dir) OPENSSLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR_dev)$(OPENSSLDIR_dir) ENGINESDIR=$(ENGINESDIR_dev)$(ENGINESDIR_dir) !ENDIF CC={- $target{cc} -} CFLAGS={- join(" ",(map { "-D".$_} @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}})) -} {- join(" ", quotify_l("-DENGINESDIR=\"$enginesdir\"", "-DOPENSSLDIR=\"$openssldir\"")) -} {- $target{cflags} -} {- $config{cflags} -} COUTFLAG={- $target{coutflag} || "/Fo" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY) RC={- $target{rc} || "rc" -} RCOUTFLAG={- $target{rcoutflag} || "/fo" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY) LD={- $target{ld} || "link" -} LDFLAGS={- $target{lflags} -} LDOUTFLAG={- $target{loutflag} || "/out:" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY) EX_LIBS={- $target{ex_libs} -} LIB_CFLAGS={- join(" ", $target{lib_cflags}, $target{shared_cflag}) || "" -} LIB_LDFLAGS={- $target{shared_ldflag} || "" -} DSO_CFLAGS={- join(" ", $target{dso_cflags}, $target{shared_cflag}) || "" -} DSO_LDFLAGS={- join(" ", $target{dso_lflags}, $target{shared_ldflag}) || "" -} BIN_CFLAGS={- $target{bin_cflags} -} BIN_LDFLAGS={- $target{bin_lflags} -} PERL={- $config{perl} -} AR={- $target{ar} -} ARFLAGS= {- $target{arflags} -} AROUTFLAG={- $target{aroutflag} || "/out:" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY) MT={- $target{mt} -} MTFLAGS= {- $target{mtflags} -} MTINFLAG={- $target{mtinflag} || "-manifest " -}$(OSSL_EMPTY) MTOUTFLAG={- $target{mtoutflag} || "-outputresource:" -}$(OSSL_EMPTY) AS={- $target{as} -} ASFLAGS={- $target{asflags} -} ASOUTFLAG={- $target{asoutflag} -}$(OSSL_EMPTY) PERLASM_SCHEME= {- $target{perlasm_scheme} -} PROCESSOR= {- $config{processor} -} # The main targets ################################################### {- dependmagic('all'); -}: build_libs_nodep build_engines_nodep build_programs_nodep {- dependmagic('build_libs'); -}: build_libs_nodep {- dependmagic('build_engines'); -}: build_engines_nodep {- dependmagic('build_programs'); -}: build_programs_nodep build_generated: $(GENERATED_MANDATORY) build_libs_nodep: $(LIBS) {- join(" ",map { shlib_import($_) } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} build_engines_nodep: $(ENGINES) build_programs_nodep: $(PROGRAMS) $(SCRIPTS) # Kept around for backward compatibility build_apps build_tests: build_programs test: tests {- dependmagic('tests'); -}: build_programs_nodep build_engines_nodep @rem {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -} -mkdir $(BLDDIR)\test\test-runs set SRCTOP=$(SRCDIR) set BLDTOP=$(BLDDIR) set RESULT_D=$(BLDDIR)\test\test-runs set PERL=$(PERL) set OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\test\run_tests.pl" $(TESTS) @rem {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -} @echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options" @rem {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -} list-tests: @rem {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -} @set SRCTOP=$(SRCDIR) @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\test\run_tests.pl" list @rem {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -} @echo "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options" @rem {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -} install: install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs uninstall: uninstall_docs uninstall_sw libclean: "$(PERL)" -e "map { m/(.*)\.dll$$/; unlink glob """$$1.*"""; } @ARGV" $(SHLIBS) "$(PERL)" -e "map { m/(.*)\.dll$$/; unlink glob """apps/$$1.*"""; } @ARGV" $(SHLIBS) "$(PERL)" -e "map { m/(.*)\.dll$$/; unlink glob """test/$$1.*"""; } @ARGV" $(SHLIBS) -del /Q /F $(LIBS) -del /Q ossl_static.pdb clean: libclean {- join("\n\t", map { "-del /Q /F $_" } @PROGRAMS) -} -del /Q /F $(ENGINES) -del /Q /F $(SCRIPTS) -del /Q /F $(GENERATED) -del /Q /S /F *.d -del /Q /S /F *.obj -del /Q /S /F *.pdb -del /Q /S /F *.exp -del /Q /S /F engines\*.ilk -del /Q /S /F engines\*.lib -del /Q /S /F apps\*.lib -del /Q /S /F engines\*.manifest -del /Q /S /F apps\*.manifest -del /Q /S /F test\*.manifest distclean: clean -del /Q /F configdata.pm -del /Q /F makefile depend: # Install helper targets ############################################# install_sw: all install_dev install_engines install_runtime uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_engines uninstall_dev install_docs: install_html_docs uninstall_docs: uninstall_html_docs install_ssldirs: @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(OPENSSLDIR)\certs" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(OPENSSLDIR)\private" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(OPENSSLDIR)\misc" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\apps\openssl.cnf" \ "$(OPENSSLDIR)\openssl.cnf.dist" @IF NOT EXIST "$(OPENSSLDIR)\openssl.cnf" \ "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\apps\openssl.cnf" \ "$(OPENSSLDIR)\openssl.cnf" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(MISC_SCRIPTS) \ "$(OPENSSLDIR)\misc" install_dev: @if "$(INSTALLTOP)"=="" ( echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty & exit 1 ) @echo *** Installing development files @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl" @rem {- output_off() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -} @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\ms\applink.c" \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl" @rem {- output_on() unless grep { $_ eq "OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK" } @{$target{defines}}; "" -} @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" "$(SRCDIR)\include\openssl\*.h" \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(BLDDIR)\include\openssl\*.h \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\include\openssl" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(INSTALLTOP)\$(LIBDIR)" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_LIBS) \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\$(LIBDIR)" @if "$(SHLIBS)"=="" \ "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" ossl_static.pdb \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\$(LIBDIR)" uninstall_dev: install_engines: @if "$(INSTALLTOP)"=="" ( echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty & exit 1 ) @echo *** Installing engines @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(ENGINESDIR)" @if not "$(ENGINES)"=="" \ "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_ENGINES) "$(ENGINESDIR)" @if not "$(ENGINES)"=="" \ "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_ENGINEPDBS) "$(ENGINESDIR)" uninstall_engines: install_runtime: @if "$(INSTALLTOP)"=="" ( echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty & exit 1 ) @echo *** Installing runtime files @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\mkdir-p.pl" "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin" @if not "$(SHLIBS)"=="" \ "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_SHLIBS) "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin" @if not "$(SHLIBS)"=="" \ "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_SHLIBPDBS) \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_PROGRAMS) \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(INSTALL_PROGRAMPDBS) \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin" @"$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\copy.pl" $(BIN_SCRIPTS) \ "$(INSTALLTOP)\bin" uninstall_runtime: install_html_docs: "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\util\process_docs.pl" \ "--destdir=$(INSTALLTOP)\html" --type=html uninstall_html_docs: # Building targets ################################################### configdata.pm: "$(SRCDIR)\Configure" {- join(" ", map { '"'.$_.'"' } @{$config{build_file_templates}}, @{$config{build_infos}}, @{$config{conf_files}}) -} @echo "Detected changed: $?" @echo "Reconfiguring..." "$(PERL)" "$(SRCDIR)\Configure" reconf @echo "**************************************************" @echo "*** ***" @echo "*** Please run the same make command again ***" @echo "*** ***" @echo "**************************************************" @exit 1 {- use File::Basename; use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/; # Helper function to figure out dependencies on libraries # It takes a list of library names and outputs a list of dependencies sub compute_lib_depends { if ($disabled{shared}) { return map { $_.$libext } @_; } return map { shlib_import($_) } @_; } sub generatesrc { my %args = @_; (my $target = $args{src}) =~ s/\.[sS]$/.asm/; my $generator = '"'.join('" "', @{$args{generator}}).'"'; my $generator_incs = join("", map { " -I \"$_\"" } @{$args{generator_incs}}); my $incs = join("", map { " /I \"$_\"" } @{$args{incs}}); my $deps = @{$args{deps}} ? '"'.join('" "', @{$args{generator_deps}}, @{$args{deps}}).'"' : ''; if ($target !~ /\.asm$/) { if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ m|^.*\.in$|) { my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "dofile.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); return <<"EOF"; $target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps "\$(PERL)" "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\ "-o$target{build_file}" $generator > \$@ EOF } else { return <<"EOF"; $target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps "\$(PERL)"$generator_incs $generator > \$@ EOF } } else { if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.pl$/) { $generator = '"$(PERL)"'.$generator_incs.' '.$generator; } elsif ($args{generator}->[0] =~ /\.S$/) { $generator = undef; } else { die "Generator type for $src unknown: $generator\n"; } if (defined($generator)) { # If the target is named foo.S in build.info, we want to # end up generating foo.s in two steps. if ($args{src} =~ /\.S$/) { return <<"EOF"; $target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps set ASM=\$(AS) $generator \$@.S \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) /EP /C \$@.S > \$@.i && move /Y \$@.i \$@ del /Q \$@.S EOF } # Otherwise.... return <<"EOF"; $target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps set ASM=\$(AS) $generator \$@ EOF } return <<"EOF"; $target: "$args{generator}->[0]" $deps \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) /EP /C "$args{generator}->[0]" > \$@.i && move /Y \$@.i \$@ EOF } } sub src2obj { my %args = @_; my $obj = $args{obj}; my @srcs = map { (my $x = $_) =~ s/\.s$/.asm/; $x } ( @{$args{srcs}} ); my $srcs = '"'.join('" "', @srcs).'"'; my $deps = '"'.join('" "', @srcs, @{$args{deps}}).'"'; my $incs = join("", map { ' /I "'.$_.'"' } @{$args{incs}}); unless ($disabled{zlib}) { if ($withargs{zlib_include}) { $incs .= ' /I "'.$withargs{zlib_include}.'"'; } } my $ecflags = { lib => '$(LIB_CFLAGS)', dso => '$(DSO_CFLAGS)', bin => '$(BIN_CFLAGS)' } -> {$args{intent}}; my $makedepprog = $config{makedepprog}; if ($srcs[0] =~ /\.asm$/) { return <<"EOF"; $obj$objext: $deps \$(AS) \$(ASFLAGS) \$(ASOUTFLAG)\$\@ $srcs EOF } return <<"EOF" if (!$disabled{makedepend}); $obj$depext: $deps \$(CC) \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags$inc /Zs /showIncludes $srcs 2>&1 | \\ "\$(PERL)" -n << > $obj$depext chomp; s/^Note: including file: *//; \$\$collect{\$\$_} = 1; END { print '$obj$objext: ',join(" ", sort keys \%collect),"\\n" } << $obj$objext: $obj$depext \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c \$(COUTFLAG)\$\@ @<< $srcs << EOF return <<"EOF" if ($disabled{makedepend}); $obj$objext: $deps \$(CC) $incs \$(CFLAGS) $ecflags -c \$(COUTFLAG)\$\@ $srcs EOF } # On Unix, we build shlibs from static libs, so we're ignoring the # object file array. We *know* this routine is only called when we've # configure 'shared'. sub libobj2shlib { my %args = @_; my $lib = $args{lib}; my $shlib = $args{shlib}; (my $mkdef_key = $lib) =~ s/^lib//i; my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); my $linklibs = join("", map { "\n$_" } compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); my $deps = join(" ", (map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}), compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); my $ordinalsfile = defined($args{ordinals}) ? $args{ordinals}->[1] : ""; my $mkdef_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "mkdef.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); my $mkrc_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "mkrc.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); my $target = shlib_import($lib); return <<"EOF" $target: $deps "$ordinalsfile" "$mkdef_pl" "\$(PERL)" "$mkdef_pl" "$mkdef_key" 32 > $shlib.def "\$(PERL)" -i.tmp -pe "s|^LIBRARY\\s+${mkdef_key}32|LIBRARY $shlib|;" $shlib.def DEL $shlib.def.tmp "\$(PERL)" "$mkrc_pl" $shlib$shlibext > $shlib.rc \$(RC) \$(RCOUTFLAG)$shlib.res $shlib.rc IF EXIST $shlib$shlibext.manifest DEL /F /Q $shlib$shlibext.manifest \$(LD) \$(LDFLAGS) \$(LIB_LDFLAGS) \\ /implib:\$@ \$(LDOUTFLAG)$shlib$shlibext /def:$shlib.def @<< || (DEL /Q \$(\@B).* $shlib.* && EXIT 1) $objs $shlib.res$linklibs \$(EX_LIBS) << IF EXIST $shlib$shlibext.manifest \\ \$(MT) \$(MTFLAGS) \$(MTINFLAG)$shlib$shlibext.manifest \$(MTOUTFLAG)$shlib$shlibext IF EXIST apps\\$shlib$shlibext DEL /Q /F apps\\$shlib$shlibext IF EXIST test\\$shlib$shlibext DEL /Q /F test\\$shlib$shlibext COPY $shlib$shlibext apps COPY $shlib$shlibext test EOF } sub obj2dso { my %args = @_; my $dso = $args{lib}; my $dso_n = basename($dso); my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); my $linklibs = join("", map { "\n$_" } compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); my $deps = join(" ", (map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}), compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); return <<"EOF"; $dso$dsoext: $deps IF EXIST $dso$dsoext.manifest DEL /F /Q $dso$dsoext.manifest \$(LD) \$(LDFLAGS) \$(DSO_LDFLAGS) \$(LDOUTFLAG)$dso$dsoext /def:<< @<< LIBRARY $dso_n EXPORTS bind_engine @1 v_check @2 << $objs$linklibs \$(EX_LIBS) << IF EXIST $dso$dsoext.manifest \\ \$(MT) \$(MTFLAGS) \$(MTINFLAG)$dso$dsoext.manifest \$(MTOUTFLAG)$dso$dsoext EOF } sub obj2lib { # Because static libs and import libs are both named the same in native # Windows, we can't have both. We skip the static lib in that case, # as the shared libs are what we use anyway. return "" unless $disabled{"shared"}; my %args = @_; my $lib = $args{lib}; my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); my $deps = join(" ", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); return <<"EOF"; $lib$libext: $deps \$(AR) \$(ARFLAGS) \$(AROUTFLAG)$lib$libext @<< \$** << EOF } sub obj2bin { my %args = @_; my $bin = $args{bin}; my $objs = join("\n", map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}); my $linklibs = join("", map { "\n$_" } compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); my $deps = join(" ", (map { $_.$objext } @{$args{objs}}), compute_lib_depends(@{$args{deps}})); return <<"EOF"; $bin$exeext: $deps IF EXIST $bin$exeext.manifest DEL /F /Q $bin$exeext.manifest \$(LD) \$(LDFLAGS) \$(BIN_LDFLAGS) \$(LDOUTFLAG)$bin$exeext @<< $objs setargv.obj$linklibs \$(EX_LIBS) << IF EXIST $bin$exeext.manifest \\ \$(MT) \$(MTFLAGS) \$(MTINFLAG)$bin$exeext.manifest \$(MTOUTFLAG)$bin$exeext EOF } sub in2script { my %args = @_; my $script = $args{script}; my $sources = '"'.join('" "', @{$args{sources}}).'"'; my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "dofile.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); return <<"EOF"; $script: $sources "\$(PERL)" "-I\$(BLDDIR)" -Mconfigdata "$dofile" \\ "-o$target{build_file}" $sources > "$script" EOF } sub generatedir { my %args = @_; my $dir = $args{dir}; my @deps = map { s|\.o$|$objext|; $_ } @{$args{deps}}; my @actions = (); my %extinfo = ( dso => $dsoext, lib => $libext, bin => $exeext ); foreach my $type (("dso", "lib", "bin", "script")) { next unless defined($unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}); # For lib object files, we could update the library. However, # LIB on Windows doesn't work that way, so we won't create any # actions for it, and the dependencies are already taken care of. if ($type ne "lib") { foreach my $prod (@{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}}) { if (dirname($prod) eq $dir) { push @deps, $prod.$extinfo{$type}; } else { push @actions, "\t@rem No support to produce $type ".join(", ", @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{products}->{$type}}); } } } } my $deps = join(" ", @deps); my $actions = join("\n", "", @actions); return <<"EOF"; $args{dir} $args{dir}\\ : $deps$actions EOF } "" # Important! This becomes part of the template result. -} openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/50-djgpp.conf0000644000000000000000000000105213176625655017246 0ustar rootroot# We can't make any commitment to support the DJGPP platform, # and rely entirely on the OpenSSL community to help is fine # tune and test. %targets = ( "DJGPP" => { inherit_from => [ asm("x86_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => "-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall", sys_id => "MSDOS", ex_libs => add("-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", perlasm_scheme => "a.out", }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/00-base-templates.conf0000644000000000000000000002237613176625655021057 0ustar rootroot# -*- Mode: perl -*- %targets=( DEFAULTS => { template => 1, cflags => "", defines => [], thread_scheme => "(unknown)", # Assume we don't know thread_defines => [], apps_aux_src => "", cpuid_asm_src => "mem_clr.c", uplink_aux_src => "", bn_asm_src => "bn_asm.c", ec_asm_src => "", des_asm_src => "des_enc.c fcrypt_b.c", aes_asm_src => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c", bf_asm_src => "bf_enc.c", md5_asm_src => "", cast_asm_src => "c_enc.c", rc4_asm_src => "rc4_enc.c rc4_skey.c", rmd160_asm_src => "", rc5_asm_src => "rc5_enc.c", wp_asm_src => "wp_block.c", cmll_asm_src => "camellia.c cmll_misc.c cmll_cbc.c", modes_asm_src => "", padlock_asm_src => "", chacha_asm_src => "chacha_enc.c", poly1305_asm_src => "", unistd => "", shared_target => "", shared_cflag => "", shared_defines => [], shared_ldflag => "", shared_rcflag => "", shared_extension => "", build_scheme => [ "unified", "unix" ], build_file => "Makefile", }, BASE_common => { template => 1, defines => sub { my @defs = (); push @defs, "ZLIB" unless $disabled{zlib}; push @defs, "ZLIB_SHARED" unless $disabled{"zlib-dynamic"}; return [ @defs ]; }, }, BASE_unix => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_common" ], template => 1, ex_libs => sub { unless ($disabled{zlib}) { if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) { if (defined($withargs{zlib_lib})) { return "-L".$withargs{zlib_lib}." -lz"; } else { return "-lz"; } } } return (); }, build_scheme => [ "unified", "unix" ], build_file => "Makefile", }, BASE_Windows => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_common" ], template => 1, ex_libs => sub { unless ($disabled{zlib}) { if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) { return $withargs{zlib_lib} // "ZLIB1"; } } return (); }, ld => "link", lflags => "/nologo", loutflag => "/out:", ar => "lib", arflags => "/nologo", aroutflag => "/out:", rc => "rc", rcoutflag => "/fo", mt => "mt", mtflags => "-nologo", mtinflag => "-manifest ", mtoutflag => "-outputresource:", build_file => "makefile", build_scheme => [ "unified", "windows" ], }, BASE_VMS => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_common" ], template => 1, build_file => "descrip.mms", build_scheme => [ "unified", "VMS" ], }, uplink_common => { template => 1, apps_aux_src => add("../ms/applink.c"), uplink_aux_src => add("../ms/uplink.c"), defines => add("OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK"), }, x86_uplink => { inherit_from => [ "uplink_common" ], template => 1, uplink_aux_src => add("uplink-x86.s"), }, x86_64_uplink => { inherit_from => [ "uplink_common" ], template => 1, uplink_aux_src => add("uplink-x86_64.s"), }, ia64_uplink => { inherit_from => [ "uplink_common" ], template => 1, uplink_aux_src => add("uplink-ia64.s"), }, x86_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "x86cpuid.s", bn_asm_src => "bn-586.s co-586.s x86-mont.s x86-gf2m.s", ec_asm_src => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-x86.s", des_asm_src => "des-586.s crypt586.s", aes_asm_src => "aes-586.s vpaes-x86.s aesni-x86.s", bf_asm_src => "bf-586.s", md5_asm_src => "md5-586.s", cast_asm_src => "cast-586.s", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-586.s sha256-586.s sha512-586.s", rc4_asm_src => "rc4-586.s", rmd160_asm_src => "rmd-586.s", rc5_asm_src => "rc5-586.s", wp_asm_src => "wp_block.c wp-mmx.s", cmll_asm_src => "cmll-x86.s", modes_asm_src => "ghash-x86.s", padlock_asm_src => "e_padlock-x86.s", chacha_asm_src => "chacha-x86.s", poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-x86.s", }, x86_elf_asm => { template => 1, inherit_from => [ "x86_asm" ], perlasm_scheme => "elf" }, x86_64_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "x86_64cpuid.s", bn_asm_src => "asm/x86_64-gcc.c x86_64-mont.s x86_64-mont5.s x86_64-gf2m.s rsaz_exp.c rsaz-x86_64.s rsaz-avx2.s", ec_asm_src => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s", aes_asm_src => "aes-x86_64.s vpaes-x86_64.s bsaes-x86_64.s aesni-x86_64.s aesni-sha1-x86_64.s aesni-sha256-x86_64.s aesni-mb-x86_64.s", md5_asm_src => "md5-x86_64.s", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-x86_64.s sha256-x86_64.s sha512-x86_64.s sha1-mb-x86_64.s sha256-mb-x86_64.s", rc4_asm_src => "rc4-x86_64.s rc4-md5-x86_64.s", wp_asm_src => "wp-x86_64.s", cmll_asm_src => "cmll-x86_64.s cmll_misc.c", modes_asm_src => "ghash-x86_64.s aesni-gcm-x86_64.s", padlock_asm_src => "e_padlock-x86_64.s", chacha_asm_src => "chacha-x86_64.s", poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-x86_64.s", }, ia64_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "ia64cpuid.s", bn_asm_src => "bn-ia64.s ia64-mont.s", aes_asm_src => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-ia64.s", md5_asm_src => "md5-ia64.s", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-ia64.s sha256-ia64.s sha512-ia64.s", rc4_asm_src => "rc4-ia64.s rc4_skey.c", modes_asm_src => "ghash-ia64.s", perlasm_scheme => "void" }, sparcv9_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "sparcv9cap.c sparccpuid.S", bn_asm_src => "asm/sparcv8plus.S sparcv9-mont.S sparcv9a-mont.S vis3-mont.S sparct4-mont.S sparcv9-gf2m.S", ec_asm_src => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.S", des_asm_src => "des_enc-sparc.S fcrypt_b.c dest4-sparcv9.S", aes_asm_src => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-sparcv9.S aest4-sparcv9.S aesfx-sparcv9.S", md5_asm_src => "md5-sparcv9.S", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-sparcv9.S sha256-sparcv9.S sha512-sparcv9.S", cmll_asm_src => "camellia.c cmll_misc.c cmll_cbc.c cmllt4-sparcv9.S", modes_asm_src => "ghash-sparcv9.S", poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-sparcv9.S", perlasm_scheme => "void" }, sparcv8_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "", bn_asm_src => "asm/sparcv8.S", des_asm_src => "des_enc-sparc.S fcrypt_b.c", perlasm_scheme => "void" }, alpha_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "alphacpuid.s", bn_asm_src => "bn_asm.c alpha-mont.S", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-alpha.S", modes_asm_src => "ghash-alpha.S", perlasm_scheme => "void" }, mips32_asm => { template => 1, bn_asm_src => "bn-mips.s mips-mont.s", aes_asm_src => "aes_cbc.c aes-mips.S", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-mips.S sha256-mips.S", }, mips64_asm => { inherit_from => [ "mips32_asm" ], template => 1, sha1_asm_src => add("sha512-mips.S"), poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-mips.S", }, s390x_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "s390xcap.c s390xcpuid.S", bn_asm_src => "asm/s390x.S s390x-mont.S s390x-gf2m.s", aes_asm_src => "aes-s390x.S aes-ctr.fake aes-xts.fake", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-s390x.S sha256-s390x.S sha512-s390x.S", rc4_asm_src => "rc4-s390x.s", modes_asm_src => "ghash-s390x.S", chacha_asm_src => "chacha-s390x.S", poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-s390x.S", }, armv4_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "armcap.c armv4cpuid.S", bn_asm_src => "bn_asm.c armv4-mont.S armv4-gf2m.S", ec_asm_src => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-armv4.S", aes_asm_src => "aes_cbc.c aes-armv4.S bsaes-armv7.S aesv8-armx.S", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-armv4-large.S sha256-armv4.S sha512-armv4.S", modes_asm_src => "ghash-armv4.S ghashv8-armx.S", chacha_asm_src => "chacha-armv4.S", poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-armv4.S", perlasm_scheme => "void" }, aarch64_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "armcap.c arm64cpuid.S", ec_asm_src => "ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-armv8.S", bn_asm_src => "bn_asm.c armv8-mont.S", aes_asm_src => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aesv8-armx.S vpaes-armv8.S", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-armv8.S sha256-armv8.S sha512-armv8.S", modes_asm_src => "ghashv8-armx.S", chacha_asm_src => "chacha-armv8.S", poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-armv8.S", }, parisc11_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "pariscid.s", bn_asm_src => "bn_asm.c parisc-mont.s", aes_asm_src => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-parisc.s", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-parisc.s sha256-parisc.s sha512-parisc.s", rc4_asm_src => "rc4-parisc.s", modes_asm_src => "ghash-parisc.s", perlasm_scheme => "32" }, parisc20_64_asm => { template => 1, inherit_from => [ "parisc11_asm" ], perlasm_scheme => "64", }, ppc64_asm => { template => 1, cpuid_asm_src => "ppccpuid.s ppccap.c", bn_asm_src => "bn-ppc.s ppc-mont.s ppc64-mont.s", aes_asm_src => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c aes-ppc.s vpaes-ppc.s aesp8-ppc.s", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-ppc.s sha256-ppc.s sha512-ppc.s sha256p8-ppc.s sha512p8-ppc.s", modes_asm_src => "ghashp8-ppc.s", chacha_asm_src => "chacha-ppc.s", poly1305_asm_src=> "poly1305-ppc.s poly1305-ppcfp.s", }, ppc32_asm => { inherit_from => [ "ppc64_asm" ], template => 1 }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/README0000644000000000000000000007473413176625655015752 0ustar rootrootIntro ===== This directory contains a few sets of files that are used for configuration in diverse ways: *.conf Target platform configurations, please read 'Configurations of OpenSSL target platforms' for more information. *.tmpl Build file templates, please read 'Build-file programming with the "unified" build system' as well as 'Build info files' for more information. *.pm Helper scripts / modules for the main `Configure` script. See 'Configure helper scripts for more information. Configurations of OpenSSL target platforms ========================================== Target configurations are a collection of facts that we know about different platforms and their capabilities. We organise them in a hash table, where each entry represent a specific target. In each table entry, the following keys are significant: inherit_from => Other targets to inherit values from. Explained further below. [1] template => Set to 1 if this isn't really a platform target. Instead, this target is a template upon which other targets can be built. Explained further below. [1] sys_id => System identity for systems where that is difficult to determine automatically. cc => The compiler command, usually one of "cc", "gcc" or "clang". This command is normally also used to link object files and libraries into the final program. cflags => Flags that are used at all times when compiling. defines => As an alternative, macro definitions may be present here instead of in `cflags'. If given here, they MUST be as an array of the string such as "MACRO=value", or just "MACRO" for definitions without value. shared_cflag => Extra compilation flags used when compiling for shared libraries, typically something like "-fPIC". (linking is a complex thing, see [3] below) ld => Linker command, usually not defined (meaning the compiler command is used instead). (NOTE: this is here for future use, it's not implemented yet) lflags => Flags that are used when linking apps. shared_ldflag => Flags that are used when linking shared or dynamic libraries. plib_lflags => Extra linking flags to appear just before the libraries on the command line. ex_libs => Extra libraries that are needed when linking. ar => The library archive command, the default is "ar". (NOTE: this is here for future use, it's not implemented yet) arflags => Flags to be used with the library archive command. ranlib => The library archive indexing command, the default is 'ranlib' it it exists. unistd => An alternative header to the typical ''. This is very rarely needed. shared_extension => File name extension used for shared libraries. obj_extension => File name extension used for object files. On unix, this defaults to ".o" (NOTE: this is here for future use, it's not implemented yet) exe_extension => File name extension used for executable files. On unix, this defaults to "" (NOTE: this is here for future use, it's not implemented yet) thread_scheme => The type of threads is used on the configured platform. Currently known values are "(unknown)", "pthreads", "uithreads" (a.k.a solaris threads) and "winthreads". Except for "(unknown)", the actual value is currently ignored but may be used in the future. See further notes below [2]. dso_scheme => The type of dynamic shared objects to build for. This mostly comes into play with engines, but can be used for other purposes as well. Valid values are "DLFCN" (dlopen() et al), "DLFCN_NO_H" (for systems that use dlopen() et al but do not have fcntl.h), "DL" (shl_load() et al), "WIN32" and "VMS". perlasm_scheme => The perlasm method used to created the assembler files used when compiling with assembler implementations. shared_target => The shared library building method used. This is a target found in Makefile.shared. build_scheme => The scheme used to build up a Makefile. In its simplest form, the value is a string with the name of the build scheme. The value may also take the form of a list of strings, if the build_scheme is to have some options. In this case, the first string in the list is the name of the build scheme. Currently recognised build scheme is "unified". For the "unified" build scheme, this item *must* be an array with the first being the word "unified" and the second being a word to identify the platform family. multilib => On systems that support having multiple implementations of a library (typically a 32-bit and a 64-bit variant), this is used to have the different variants in different directories. bn_ops => Building options (was just bignum options in the earlier history of this option, hence the name). This is a string of words that describe algorithms' implementation parameters that are optimal for the designated target platform, such as the type of integers used to build up the bignum, different ways to implement certain ciphers and so on. To fully comprehend the meaning, the best is to read the affected source. The valid words are: THIRTY_TWO_BIT bignum limbs are 32 bits, this is default if no option is specified, it works on any supported system [unless "wider" limb size is implied in assembly code]; BN_LLONG bignum limbs are 32 bits, but 64-bit 'unsigned long long' is used internally in calculations; SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG bignum limbs are 64 bits and sizeof(long) is 8; SIXTY_FOUR_BIT bignums limbs are 64 bits, but execution environment is ILP32; RC4_CHAR RC4 key schedule is made up of 'unsigned char's; RC4_INT RC4 key schedule is made up of 'unsigned int's; EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN for shared libraries, export vars as accessor functions. apps_extra_src => Extra source to build apps/openssl, as needed by the target. cpuid_asm_src => assembler implementation of cpuid code as well as OPENSSL_cleanse(). Default to mem_clr.c bn_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core bignum functions. Defaults to bn_asm.c ec_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core EC functions. des_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core DES encryption functions. Defaults to 'des_enc.c fcrypt_b.c' aes_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core AES functions. Defaults to 'aes_core.c aes_cbc.c' bf_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core BlowFish functions. Defaults to 'bf_enc.c' md5_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core MD5 functions. sha1_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core SHA1, functions, and also possibly SHA256 and SHA512 ones. cast_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core CAST functions. Defaults to 'c_enc.c' rc4_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core RC4 functions. Defaults to 'rc4_enc.c rc4_skey.c' rmd160_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core RMD160 functions. rc5_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core RC5 functions. Defaults to 'rc5_enc.c' wp_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core WHIRLPOOL functions. cmll_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core CAMELLIA functions. Defaults to 'camellia.c cmll_misc.c cmll_cbc.c' modes_asm_src => Assembler implementation of cipher modes, currently the functions gcm_gmult_4bit and gcm_ghash_4bit. padlock_asm_src => Assembler implementation of core parts of the padlock engine. This is mandatory on any platform where the padlock engine might actually be built. [1] as part of the target configuration, one can have a key called 'inherit_from' that indicate what other configurations to inherit data from. These are resolved recursively. Inheritance works as a set of default values that can be overridden by corresponding key values in the inheriting configuration. Note 1: any configuration table can be used as a template. Note 2: pure templates have the attribute 'template => 1' and cannot be used as build targets. If several configurations are given in the 'inherit_from' array, the values of same attribute are concatenated with space separation. With this, it's possible to have several smaller templates for different configuration aspects that can be combined into a complete configuration. instead of a scalar value or an array, a value can be a code block of the form 'sub { /* your code here */ }'. This code block will be called with the list of inherited values for that key as arguments. In fact, the concatenation of strings is really done by using 'sub { join(" ",@_) }' on the list of inherited values. An example: "foo" => { template => 1, haha => "ha ha", hoho => "ho", ignored => "This should not appear in the end result", }, "bar" => { template => 1, haha => "ah", hoho => "haho", hehe => "hehe" }, "laughter" => { inherit_from => [ "foo", "bar" ], hehe => sub { join(" ",(@_,"!!!")) }, ignored => "", } The entry for "laughter" will become as follows after processing: "laughter" => { haha => "ha ha ah", hoho => "ho haho", hehe => "hehe !!!", ignored => "" } [2] OpenSSL is built with threading capabilities unless the user specifies 'no-threads'. The value of the key 'thread_scheme' may be "(unknown)", in which case the user MUST give some compilation flags to Configure. [3] OpenSSL has three types of things to link from object files or static libraries: - shared libraries; that would be libcrypto and libssl. - shared objects (sometimes called dynamic libraries); that would be the engines. - applications; those are apps/openssl and all the test apps. Very roughly speaking, linking is done like this (words in braces represent the configuration settings documented at the beginning of this file): shared libraries: {ld} $(CFLAGS) {shared_ldflag} -shared -o libfoo.so \ -Wl,--whole-archive libfoo.a -Wl,--no-whole-archive \ {plib_lflags} -lcrypto {ex_libs} shared objects: {ld} $(CFLAGS) {shared_ldflag} -shared -o libeng.so \ blah1.o blah2.o {plib_lflags} -lcrypto {ex_libs} applications: {ld} $(CFLAGS) {lflags} -o app \ app1.o utils.o {plib_lflags} -lssl -lcrypto {ex_libs} Historically, the target configurations came in form of a string with values separated by colons. This use is deprecated. The string form looked like this: "target" => "{cc}:{cflags}:{unistd}:{thread_cflag}:{sys_id}:{lflags}:{bn_ops}:{cpuid_obj}:{bn_obj}:{ec_obj}:{des_obj}:{aes_obj}:{bf_obj}:{md5_obj}:{sha1_obj}:{cast_obj}:{rc4_obj}:{rmd160_obj}:{rc5_obj}:{wp_obj}:{cmll_obj}:{modes_obj}:{padlock_obj}:{perlasm_scheme}:{dso_scheme}:{shared_target}:{shared_cflag}:{shared_ldflag}:{shared_extension}:{ranlib}:{arflags}:{multilib}" Build info files ================ The build.info files that are spread over the source tree contain the minimum information needed to build and distribute OpenSSL. It uses a simple and yet fairly powerful language to determine what needs to be built, from what sources, and other relationships between files. For every build.info file, all file references are relative to the directory of the build.info file for source files, and the corresponding build directory for built files if the build tree differs from the source tree. When processed, every line is processed with the perl module Text::Template, using the delimiters "{-" and "-}". The hashes %config and %target are passed to the perl fragments, along with $sourcedir and $builddir, which are the locations of the source directory for the current build.info file and the corresponding build directory, all relative to the top of the build tree. To begin with, things to be built are declared by setting specific variables: PROGRAMS=foo bar LIBS=libsomething ENGINES=libeng SCRIPTS=myhack EXTRA=file1 file2 Note that the files mentioned for PROGRAMS, LIBS and ENGINES *must* be without extensions. The build file templates will figure them out. For each thing to be built, it is then possible to say what sources they are built from: PROGRAMS=foo bar SOURCE[foo]=foo.c common.c SOURCE[bar]=bar.c extra.c common.c It's also possible to tell some other dependencies: DEPEND[foo]=libsomething DEPEND[libbar]=libsomethingelse (it could be argued that 'libsomething' and 'libsomethingelse' are source as well. However, the files given through SOURCE are expected to be located in the source tree while files given through DEPEND are expected to be located in the build tree) For some libraries, we maintain files with public symbols and their slot in a transfer vector (important on some platforms). It can be declared like this: ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto The value is not the name of the file in question, but rather the argument to util/mkdef.pl that indicates which file to use. One some platforms, shared libraries come with a name that's different from their static counterpart. That's declared as follows: SHARED_NAME[libfoo]=cygfoo-{- $config{shlibver} -} The example is from Cygwin, which has a required naming convention. Sometimes, it makes sense to rename an output file, for example a library: RENAME[libfoo]=libbar That lines has "libfoo" get renamed to "libbar". While it makes no sense at all to just have a rename like that (why not just use "libbar" everywhere?), it does make sense when it can be used conditionally. See a little further below for an example. In some cases, it's desirable to include some source files in the shared form of a library only: SHARED_SOURCE[libfoo]=dllmain.c For any file to be built, it's also possible to tell what extra include paths the build of their source files should use: INCLUDE[foo]=include In some cases, one might want to generate some source files from others, that's done as follows: GENERATE[foo.s]=asm/something.pl $(CFLAGS) GENERATE[bar.s]=asm/bar.S The value of each GENERATE line is a command line or part of it. Configure places no rules on the command line, except the the first item muct be the generator file. It is, however, entirely up to the build file template to define exactly how those command lines should be handled, how the output is captured and so on. Sometimes, the generator file itself depends on other files, for example if it is a perl script that depends on other perl modules. This can be expressed using DEPEND like this: DEPEND[asm/something.pl]=../perlasm/Foo.pm There may also be cases where the exact file isn't easily specified, but an inclusion directory still needs to be specified. INCLUDE can be used in that case: INCLUDE[asm/something.pl]=../perlasm NOTE: GENERATE lines are limited to one command only per GENERATE. As a last resort, it's possible to have raw build file lines, between BEGINRAW and ENDRAW lines as follows: BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)] haha.h: {- $builddir -}/Makefile echo "/* haha */" > haha.h ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)] The word within square brackets is the build_file configuration item or the build_file configuration item followed by the second word in the build_scheme configuration item for the configured target within parenthesis as shown above. For example, with the following relevant configuration items: build_file => "build.ninja" build_scheme => [ "unified", "unix" ] ... these lines will be considered: BEGINRAW[build.ninja] build haha.h: echo "/* haha */" > haha.h ENDRAW[build.ninja] BEGINRAW[build.ninja(unix)] build hoho.h: echo "/* hoho */" > hoho.h ENDRAW[build.ninja(unix)] Should it be needed because the recipes within a RAW section might clash with those generated by Configure, it's possible to tell it not to generate them with the use of OVERRIDES, for example: SOURCE[libfoo]=foo.c bar.c OVERRIDES=bar.o BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)] bar.o: bar.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -DSPECIAL -c -o $@ $< ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)] See the documentation further up for more information on configuration items. Finally, you can have some simple conditional use of the build.info information, looking like this: IF[1] something ELSIF[2] something other ELSE something else ENDIF The expression in square brackets is interpreted as a string in perl, and will be seen as true if perl thinks it is, otherwise false. For example, the above would have "something" used, since 1 is true. Together with the use of Text::Template, this can be used as conditions based on something in the passed variables, for example: IF[{- $disabled{shared} -}] LIBS=libcrypto SOURCE[libcrypto]=... ELSE LIBS=libfoo SOURCE[libfoo]=... ENDIF or: # VMS has a cultural standard where all libraries are prefixed. # For OpenSSL, the choice is 'ossl_' IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^vms/ -}] RENAME[libcrypto]=ossl_libcrypto RENAME[libssl]=ossl_libssl ENDIF Build-file programming with the "unified" build system ====================================================== "Build files" are called "Makefile" on Unix-like operating systems, "descrip.mms" for MMS on VMS, "makefile" for nmake on Windows, etc. To use the "unified" build system, the target configuration needs to set the three items 'build_scheme', 'build_file' and 'build_command'. In the rest of this section, we will assume that 'build_scheme' is set to "unified" (see the configurations documentation above for the details). For any name given by 'build_file', the "unified" system expects a template file in Configurations/ named like the build file, with ".tmpl" appended, or in case of possible ambiguity, a combination of the second 'build_scheme' list item and the 'build_file' name. For example, if 'build_file' is set to "Makefile", the template could be Configurations/Makefile.tmpl or Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl. In case both Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl and Configurations/Makefile.tmpl are present, the former takes precedence. The build-file template is processed with the perl module Text::Template, using "{-" and "-}" as delimiters that enclose the perl code fragments that generate configuration-dependent content. Those perl fragments have access to all the hash variables from configdata.pem. The build-file template is expected to define at least the following perl functions in a perl code fragment enclosed with "{-" and "-}". They are all expected to return a string with the lines they produce. generatesrc - function that produces build file lines to generate a source file from some input. It's called like this: generatesrc(src => "PATH/TO/tobegenerated", generator => [ "generatingfile", ... ] generator_incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ] generator_deps => [ "dep1", ... ] generator => [ "generatingfile", ... ] incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ], deps => [ "dep1", ... ], intent => one of "libs", "dso", "bin" ); 'src' has the name of the file to be generated. 'generator' is the command or part of command to generate the file, of which the first item is expected to be the file to generate from. generatesrc() is expected to analyse and figure out exactly how to apply that file and how to capture the result. 'generator_incs' and 'generator_deps' are include directories and files that the generator file itself depends on. 'incs' and 'deps' are include directories and files that are used if $(CC) is used as an intermediary step when generating the end product (the file indicated by 'src'). 'intent' indicates what the generated file is going to be used for. src2obj - function that produces build file lines to build an object file from source files and associated data. It's called like this: src2obj(obj => "PATH/TO/objectfile", srcs => [ "PATH/TO/sourcefile", ... ], deps => [ "dep1", ... ], incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ] intent => one of "lib", "dso", "bin" ); 'obj' has the intended object file *without* extension, src2obj() is expected to add that. 'srcs' has the list of source files to build the object file, with the first item being the source file that directly corresponds to the object file. 'deps' is a list of explicit dependencies. 'incs' is a list of include file directories. Finally, 'intent' indicates what this object file is going to be used for. obj2lib - function that produces build file lines to build a static library file ("libfoo.a" in Unix terms) from object files. called like this: obj2lib(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ]); 'lib' has the intended library file name *without* extension, obj2lib is expected to add that. 'objs' has the list of object files (also *without* extension) to build this library. libobj2shlib - function that produces build file lines to build a shareable object library file ("libfoo.so" in Unix terms) from the corresponding static library file or object files. called like this: libobj2shlib(shlib => "PATH/TO/shlibfile", lib => "PATH/TO/libfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ], deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile", ... ], ordinals => [ "word", "/PATH/TO/ordfile" ]); 'lib' has the intended library file name *without* extension, libobj2shlib is expected to add that. 'shlib' has the corresponding shared library name *without* extension. 'deps' has the list of other libraries (also *without* extension) this library needs to be linked with. 'objs' has the list of object files (also *without* extension) to build this library. 'ordinals' MAY be present, and when it is, its value is an array where the word is "crypto" or "ssl" and the file is one of the ordinal files util/libeay.num or util/ssleay.num in the source directory. This function has a choice; it can use the corresponding static library as input to make the shared library, or the list of object files. obj2dso - function that produces build file lines to build a dynamic shared object file from object files. called like this: obj2dso(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ], deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile", ... ]); This is almost the same as libobj2shlib, but the intent is to build a shareable library that can be loaded in runtime (a "plugin"...). The differences are subtle, one of the most visible ones is that the resulting shareable library is produced from object files only. obj2bin - function that produces build file lines to build an executable file from object files. called like this: obj2bin(bin => "PATH/TO/binfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ], deps => [ "PATH/TO/libfile", ... ]); 'bin' has the intended executable file name *without* extension, obj2bin is expected to add that. 'objs' has the list of object files (also *without* extension) to build this library. 'deps' has the list of library files (also *without* extension) that the programs needs to be linked with. in2script - function that produces build file lines to build a script file from some input. called like this: in2script(script => "PATH/TO/scriptfile", sources => [ "PATH/TO/infile", ... ]); 'script' has the intended script file name. 'sources' has the list of source files to build the resulting script from. In all cases, file file paths are relative to the build tree top, and the build file actions run with the build tree top as current working directory. Make sure to end the section with these functions with a string that you thing is appropriate for the resulting build file. If nothing else, end it like this: ""; # Make sure no lingering values end up in the Makefile -} Configure helper scripts ======================== Configure uses helper scripts in this directory: Checker scripts --------------- These scripts are per platform family, to check the integrity of the tools used for configuration and building. The checker script used is either {build_platform}-{build_file}-checker.pm or {build_platform}-checker.pm, where {build_platform} is the second 'build_scheme' list element from the configuration target data, and {build_file} is 'build_file' from the same target data. If the check succeeds, the script is expected to end with a non-zero expression. If the check fails, the script can end with a zero, or with a `die`. openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/10-main.conf0000644000000000000000000025070213176625655017072 0ustar rootroot## -*- mode: perl; -*- ## Standard openssl configuration targets. # Helper functions for the Windows configs my $vc_win64a_info = {}; sub vc_win64a_info { unless (%$vc_win64a_info) { if (`nasm -v 2>NUL` =~ /NASM version ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $1 >= 2.0) { $vc_win64a_info = { as => "nasm", asflags => "-f win64 -DNEAR -Ox -g", asoutflag => "-o" }; } elsif ($disabled{asm}) { $vc_win64a_info = { as => "ml64", asflags => "/c /Cp /Cx /Zi", asoutflag => "/Fo" }; } else { $die->("NASM not found - please read INSTALL and NOTES.WIN for further details\n"); $vc_win64a_info = { as => "{unknown}", asflags => "", asoutflag => "" }; } } return $vc_win64a_info; } my $vc_win32_info = {}; sub vc_win32_info { unless (%$vc_win32_info) { my $ver=`nasm -v 2>NUL`; my $vew=`nasmw -v 2>NUL`; if ($ver ne "" || $vew ne "") { $vc_win32_info = { as => $ver ge $vew ? "nasm" : "nasmw", asflags => "-f win32", asoutflag => "-o", perlasm_scheme => "win32n" }; } elsif ($disabled{asm}) { $vc_win32_info = { as => "ml", asflags => "/nologo /Cp /coff /c /Cx /Zi", asoutflag => "/Fo", perlasm_scheme => "win32" }; } else { $die->("NASM not found - please read INSTALL and NOTES.WIN for further details\n"); $vc_win32_info = { as => "{unknown}", asflags => "", asoutflag => "", perlasm_scheme => "win32" }; } } return $vc_win32_info; } my $vc_wince_info = {}; sub vc_wince_info { unless (%$vc_wince_info) { # sanity check $die->('%OSVERSION% is not defined') if (!defined($ENV{'OSVERSION'})); $die->('%PLATFORM% is not defined') if (!defined($ENV{'PLATFORM'})); $die->('%TARGETCPU% is not defined') if (!defined($ENV{'TARGETCPU'})); # # Idea behind this is to mimic flags set by eVC++ IDE... # my $wcevers = $ENV{'OSVERSION'}; # WCENNN my $wcevernum; my $wceverdotnum; if ($wcevers =~ /^WCE([1-9])([0-9]{2})$/) { $wcevernum = "$1$2"; $wceverdotnum = "$1.$2"; } else { $die->('%OSVERSION% value is insane'); $wcevernum = "{unknown}"; $wceverdotnum = "{unknown}"; } my $wcecdefs = "-D_WIN32_WCE=$wcevernum -DUNDER_CE=$wcevernum"; # -D_WIN32_WCE=NNN my $wcelflag = "/subsystem:windowsce,$wceverdotnum"; # ...,N.NN my $wceplatf = $ENV{'PLATFORM'}; $wceplatf =~ tr/a-z0-9 /A-Z0-9_/; $wcecdefs .= " -DWCE_PLATFORM_$wceplatf"; my $wcetgt = $ENV{'TARGETCPU'}; # just shorter name... SWITCH: for($wcetgt) { /^X86/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -Dx86 -D_X86_ -D_i386_ -Di_386_"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:X86"; last; }; /^ARMV4[IT]/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt"; $wcecdefs.=" -DTHUMB -D_THUMB_" if($wcetgt=~/T$/); $wcecdefs.=" -QRarch4T -QRinterwork-return"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:THUMB"; last; }; /^ARM/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:ARM"; last; }; /^MIPSIV/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt"; $wcecdefs.=" -D_MIPS64 -QMmips4 -QMn32"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPSFPU"; last; }; /^MIPS16/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt"; $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPSII -QMmips16"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS16"; last; }; /^MIPSII/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt"; $wcecdefs.=" -QMmips2"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS"; last; }; /^R4[0-9]{3}/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS"; last; }; /^SH[0-9]/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_${wcetgt}_ -DSHx"; $wcecdefs.=" -Qsh4" if ($wcetgt =~ /^SH4/); $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt"; last; }; { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_${wcetgt}_"; $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt"; last; }; } $vc_wince_info = { cflags => $wcecdefs, lflags => $wcelflag }; } return $vc_wince_info; } # Helper functions for the VMS configs my $vms_info = {}; sub vms_info { unless (%$vms_info) { my $pointer_size = shift; my $pointer_size_str = $pointer_size == 0 ? "" : "$pointer_size"; $vms_info->{disable_warns} = [ ]; $vms_info->{pointer_size} = $pointer_size_str; if ($pointer_size == 64) { `PIPE CC /NOCROSS_REFERENCE /NOLIST /NOOBJECT /WARNINGS = DISABLE = ( MAYLOSEDATA3, EMPTYFILE ) NL: 2> NL:`; if ($? == 0) { push @{$vms_info->{disable_warns}}, "MAYLOSEDATA3"; } } unless ($disabled{zlib}) { my $default_zlib = 'GNV$LIBZSHR' . $pointer_size_str; if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"})) { $vms_info->{zlib} = $withargs{zlib_lib} || "$default_zlib/SHARE"; } else { $vms_info->{def_zlib} = $withargs{zlib_lib} || $default_zlib; # In case the --with-zlib-lib value contains something like # /SHARE or /LIB or so at the end, remove it. $vms_info->{def_zlib} =~ s|/.*$||g; } } } return $vms_info; } %targets = ( #### Basic configs that should work on any 32-bit box "gcc" => { cc => "gcc", cflags => picker(debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), thread_scheme => "(unknown)", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", }, "cc" => { cc => "cc", cflags => "-O", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, #### VOS Configurations "vos-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => picker(default => "-Wall -DOPENSSL_SYS_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), thread_scheme => "(unknown)", sys_id => "VOS", lflags => "-Wl,-map", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", shared_extension => ".so", }, #### Solaris configurations "solaris-common" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], template => 1, cflags => "-DFILIO_H", ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl -ldl"), dso_scheme => "dlfcn", thread_scheme => "pthreads", shared_target => "solaris-shared", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, #### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups "solaris-x86-gcc" => { # NB. GNU C has to be configured to use GNU assembler, and not # /usr/ccs/bin/as. Failure to comply will result in compile # failures [at least] in 32-bit build. # [Above statement is in direct contradition with one below. # Latter is kept, because it's formally inappropriate to # modify compile flags in letter release.] # -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have # to do it here because whenever GNU C instantiates an assembler # template it surrounds it with #APP #NO_APP comment pair which # (at least Solaris 7_x86) /usr/ccs/bin/as fails to assemble # with "Illegal mnemonic" error message. inherit_from => [ "solaris-common", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => add_before(picker(default => "-Wall -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer"), threads("-pthread")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-shared -static-libgcc", }, "solaris64-x86_64-gcc" => { # -shared -static-libgcc might appear controversial, but modules # taken from static libgcc do not have relocations and linking # them into our shared objects doesn't have any negative side # effects. On the contrary, doing so makes it possible to use # gcc shared build with Sun C. Given that gcc generates faster # code [thanks to inline assembler], I would actually recommend # to consider using gcc shared build even with vendor compiler:-) # inherit_from => [ "solaris-common", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => add_before(picker(default => "-m64 -Wall -DL_ENDIAN", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-pthread")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", perlasm_scheme => "elf", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-m64 -shared -static-libgcc", multilib => "/64", }, #### Solaris x86 with Sun C setups # There used to be solaris-x86-cc target, but it was removed, # primarily because vendor assembler can't assemble our modules # with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even # available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays # standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged # option, which we can firmly point at... # # On related note, solaris64-x86_64-cc target won't compile code # paths utilizing AVX and post-Haswell instruction extensions. # Consider switching to solaris64-x86_64-gcc even here... # "solaris64-x86_64-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-common", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => add_before(picker(default => "-xarch=generic64 -xstrconst -Xa -DL_ENDIAN", debug => "-g", release => "-xO5 -xdepend -xbuiltin"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), thread_scheme => "pthreads", lflags => add("-xarch=generic64",threads("-mt")), ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", perlasm_scheme => "elf", shared_cflag => "-KPIC", shared_ldflag => "-xarch=generic64 -G -dy -z text", multilib => "/64", }, #### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups "solaris-sparcv7-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-common" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => add_before(picker(default => "-Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-pthread")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-shared", }, "solaris-sparcv8-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-sparcv7-gcc", asm("sparcv8_asm") ], cflags => add_before("-mcpu=v8"), }, "solaris-sparcv9-gcc" => { # -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes # -mcpu=ultrasparc inherit_from => [ "solaris-sparcv7-gcc", asm("sparcv9_asm") ], cflags => add_before("-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc"), }, "solaris64-sparcv9-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-sparcv9-gcc" ], cflags => sub { my $f=join(" ",@_); $f =~ s/\-m32/-m64/; $f; }, bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", shared_ldflag => "-m64 -shared", multilib => "/64", }, #### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups # SC4.0 doesn't pass 'make test', upgrade to SC5.0 or SC4.2. # SC4.2 is ok, better than gcc even on bn as long as you tell it -xarch=v8 # SC5.0 note: Compiler common patch 107357-01 or later is required! "solaris-sparcv7-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-common" ], cc => "cc", cflags => add_before(picker(default => "-xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W", debug => "-g", release => "-xO5 -xdepend"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), lflags => add(threads("-mt")), ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", shared_cflag => "-KPIC", shared_ldflag => "-G -dy -z text", }, #### "solaris-sparcv8-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-sparcv7-cc", asm("sparcv8_asm") ], cflags => add_before("-xarch=v8"), }, "solaris-sparcv9-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-sparcv7-cc", asm("sparcv9_asm") ], cflags => add_before("-xarch=v8plus"), }, "solaris64-sparcv9-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "solaris-sparcv7-cc", asm("sparcv9_asm") ], cflags => add_before("-xarch=v9"), lflags => add_before("-xarch=v9"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", shared_ldflag => "-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text", multilib => "/64", }, #### IRIX 6.x configs # Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported. "irix-mips3-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-mabi=n32 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O3"), threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")), ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "n32", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "irix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-mabi=n32", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "32", }, "irix-mips3-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-n32 -mips3 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O2"), threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")), ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "n32", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "irix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-n32", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "32", }, # N64 ABI builds. "irix64-mips4-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-mabi=64 -mips4 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O3"), threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")), ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "64", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "irix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-mabi=64", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "64", }, "irix64-mips4-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips64_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-64 -mips4 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O2"), threads("-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE")), ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "RC4_CHAR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "64", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "irix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-64", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "64", }, #### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs. # Special notes: # - Originally we were optimizing at +O4 level. It should be noted # that the only difference between +O3 and +O4 is global inter- # procedural analysis. As it has to be performed during the link # stage the compiler leaves behind certain pseudo-code in lib*.a # which might be release or even patch level specific. Generating # the machine code for and analyzing the *whole* program appears # to be *extremely* memory demanding while the performance gain is # actually questionable. The situation is intensified by the default # HP-UX data set size limit (infamous 'maxdsiz' tunable) of 64MB # which is way too low for +O4. In other words, doesn't +O3 make # more sense? # - Keep in mind that the HP compiler by default generates code # suitable for execution on the host you're currently compiling at. # If the toolkit is meant to be used on various PA-RISC processors # consider './Configure hpux-parisc-[g]cc +DAportable'. # - -DMD32_XARRAY triggers workaround for compiler bug we ran into in # 32-bit message digests. (For the moment of this writing) HP C # doesn't seem to "digest" too many local variables (they make "him" # chew forever:-). For more details look-up MD32_XARRAY comment in # crypto/sha/sha_lcl.h. # - originally there were 32-bit hpux-parisc2-* targets. They were # scrapped, because a) they were not interchangeable with other 32-bit # targets; b) performance-critical 32-bit assembly modules implement # even PA-RISC 2.0-specific code paths, which are chosen at run-time, # thus adequate performance is provided even with PA-RISC 1.1 build. # "hpux-parisc-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-pthread")), ex_libs => add("-Wl,+s -ldld"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dl", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "hpux-parisc1_1-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "hpux-parisc-gcc", asm("parisc11_asm") ], multilib => "/pa1.1", }, "hpux64-parisc2-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("parisc20_64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add("-ldl"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fpic", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "/pa20_64", }, # More attempts at unified 10.X and 11.X targets for HP C compiler. # # Chris Ruemmler # Kevin Steves "hpux-parisc-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "+Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY", debug => "+O0 +d -g", release => "+O3"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add("-Wl,+s -ldld",threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dl", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "+Z", shared_ldflag => "-b", shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "hpux-parisc1_1-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "hpux-parisc-cc", asm("parisc11_asm") ], cflags => add_before("+DA1.1"), multilib => "/pa1.1", }, "hpux64-parisc2-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("parisc20_64_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "+DD64 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY", debug => "+O0 +d -g", release => "+O3"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add("-ldl",threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "+Z", shared_ldflag => "+DD64 -b", shared_extension => ".sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "/pa20_64", }, # HP/UX IA-64 targets "hpux-ia64-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-Ae +DD32 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN", debug => "+O0 +d -g", release => "+O2"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add("-ldl",threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "+Z", shared_ldflag => "+DD32 -b", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "/hpux32", }, # Frank Geurts has patiently assisted # with debugging of the following config. "hpux64-ia64-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-Ae +DD64 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN", debug => "+O0 +d -g", release => "+O3"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add("-ldl", threads("-lpthread")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "+Z", shared_ldflag => "+DD64 -b", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "/hpux64", }, # GCC builds... "hpux-ia64-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-pthread")), ex_libs => add("-ldl"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fpic", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "/hpux32", }, "hpux64-ia64-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ia64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-mlp64 -DB_ENDIAN", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-pthread")), ex_libs => add("-ldl"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "hpux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fpic", shared_ldflag => "-mlp64 -shared", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", multilib => "/hpux64", }, #### HP MPE/iX http://jazz.external.hp.com/src/openssl/ "MPE/iX-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => "-D_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3 -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_SOCKET_SOURCE -I/SYSLOG/PUB", sys_id => "MPE", ex_libs => add("-L/SYSLOG/PUB -lsyslog -lsocket -lcurses"), thread_scheme => "(unknown)", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", }, #### DEC Alpha Tru64 targets. Tru64 is marketing name for OSF/1 version 4 #### and forward. In reality 'uname -s' still returns "OSF1". Originally #### there were even osf1-* configs targeting prior versions provided, #### but not anymore... "tru64-alpha-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("alpha_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine("-std=c9x -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=500 -D_OSF_SOURCE -O3", threads("-pthread")), ex_libs => "-lrt", # for mlock(2) bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "alpha-osf1-shared", shared_extension => ".so", }, "tru64-alpha-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("alpha_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine("-std1 -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=500 -D_OSF_SOURCE -tune host -fast -readonly_strings", threads("-pthread")), ex_libs => "-lrt", # for mlock(2) bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "alpha-osf1-shared", shared_ldflag => "-msym", shared_extension => ".so", }, #### #### Variety of LINUX:-) #### # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate... "linux-generic32" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-Wall", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-pthread")), ex_libs => add("-ldl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "linux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC -DOPENSSL_USE_NODELETE", shared_ldflag => "-Wl,-znodelete", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "linux-generic64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32" ], bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", }, "linux-ppc" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("ppc32_asm") ], perlasm_scheme => "linux32", }, "linux-ppc64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("ppc64_asm") ], cflags => add("-m64 -DB_ENDIAN"), perlasm_scheme => "linux64", shared_ldflag => add("-m64"), multilib => "64", }, "linux-ppc64le" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("ppc64_asm") ], cflags => add("-m64 -DL_ENDIAN"), perlasm_scheme => "linux64le", shared_ldflag => add("-m64"), }, "linux-armv4" => { ################################################################ # Note that -march is not among compiler options in linux-armv4 # target description. Not specifying one is intentional to give # you choice to: # # a) rely on your compiler default by not specifying one; # b) specify your target platform explicitly for optimal # performance, e.g. -march=armv6 or -march=armv7-a; # c) build "universal" binary that targets *range* of platforms # by specifying minimum and maximum supported architecture; # # As for c) option. It actually makes no sense to specify # maximum to be less than ARMv7, because it's the least # requirement for run-time switch between platform-specific # code paths. And without run-time switch performance would be # equivalent to one for minimum. Secondly, there are some # natural limitations that you'd have to accept and respect. # Most notably you can *not* build "universal" binary for # big-endian platform. This is because ARMv7 processor always # picks instructions in little-endian order. Another similar # limitation is that -mthumb can't "cross" -march=armv6t2 # boundary, because that's where it became Thumb-2. Well, this # limitation is a bit artificial, because it's not really # impossible, but it's deemed too tricky to support. And of # course you have to be sure that your binutils are actually # up to the task of handling maximum target platform. With all # this in mind here is an example of how to configure # "universal" build: # # ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8 # inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("armv4_asm") ], perlasm_scheme => "linux32", }, "linux-aarch64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("aarch64_asm") ], perlasm_scheme => "linux64", }, "linux-arm64ilp32" => { # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32 inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("aarch64_asm") ], cflags => add("-mabi=ilp32"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "linux64", shared_ldflag => add("-mabi=ilp32"), }, "linux-mips32" => { # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly # support, if no -march was specified at command line. inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("mips32_asm") ], cflags => add("-mabi=32 -DBN_DIV3W"), perlasm_scheme => "o32", shared_ldflag => add("-mabi=32"), }, # mips32 and mips64 below refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture # specifications, MIPS32 and MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness. "linux-mips64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("mips64_asm") ], cflags => add("-mabi=n32 -DBN_DIV3W"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "n32", shared_ldflag => add("-mabi=n32"), multilib => "32", }, "linux64-mips64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("mips64_asm") ], cflags => add("-mabi=64 -DBN_DIV3W"), perlasm_scheme => "64", shared_ldflag => add("-mabi=64"), multilib => "64", }, #### IA-32 targets... #### These two targets are a bit aged and are to be used on older Linux #### machines where gcc doesn't understand -m32 and -m64 "linux-elf" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cflags => add(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN", release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", }, "linux-aout" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => add(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -Wall", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", perlasm_scheme => "a.out", }, #### X86 / X86_64 targets "linux-x86" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("x86_asm") ], cflags => add(picker(default => "-m32 -DL_ENDIAN", release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", perlasm_scheme => "elf", shared_ldflag => add("-m32"), }, "linux-x86-clang" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-x86" ], cc => "clang", cxx => "clang++", cflags => add("-Wextra -Qunused-arguments"), }, "linux-x86_64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cflags => add("-m64 -DL_ENDIAN"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", perlasm_scheme => "elf", shared_ldflag => add("-m64"), multilib => "64", }, "linux-x86_64-clang" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-x86_64" ], cc => "clang", cflags => add("-Wextra -Qunused-arguments"), }, "linux-x32" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cflags => add("-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT", perlasm_scheme => "elf32", shared_ldflag => add("-mx32"), multilib => "x32", }, "linux-ia64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("ia64_asm") ], bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", }, "linux64-s390x" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("s390x_asm") ], cflags => add("-m64 -DB_ENDIAN"), perlasm_scheme => "64", shared_ldflag => add("-m64"), multilib => "64", }, "linux32-s390x" => { #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux # 2.6.32, see /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most # significant bits of general purpose registers not only # upon 32-bit process context switch, but even on # asynchronous signal delivery to such process. This makes # it possible to deploy 64-bit instructions even in legacy # application context and achieve better [or should we say # adequate] performance. The build is binary compatible with # linux-generic32, and the idea is to be able to install the # resulting libcrypto.so alongside generic one, e.g. as # /lib/highgprs/libcrypto.so.x.y, for ldconfig and run-time # linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it doesn't work just # yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc # sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1... # inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("s390x_asm") ], cflags => add("-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN"), bn_asm_src => sub { my $r=join(" ",@_); $r=~s|asm/s390x\.S|bn_asm.c|; $r; }, perlasm_scheme => "31", shared_ldflag => add("-m31"), multilib => "/highgprs", }, #### SPARC Linux setups # Ray Miller has # patiently assisted with debugging of following two configs. "linux-sparcv8" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("sparcv8_asm") ], cflags => add("-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W"), }, "linux-sparcv9" => { # it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, # but -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what. inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("sparcv9_asm") ], cflags => add("-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -Wa,-Av8plus -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W"), shared_ldflag => add("-m32"), }, "linux64-sparcv9" => { # GCC 3.1 is a requirement inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("sparcv9_asm") ], cflags => add("-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", shared_ldflag => add("-m64"), multilib => "64", }, "linux-alpha-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("alpha_asm") ], cflags => add("-DL_ENDIAN"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", }, "linux-c64xplus" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], # TI_CGT_C6000_7.3.x is a requirement cc => "cl6x", cflags => combine("--linux -ea=.s -eo=.o -mv6400+ -o2 -ox -ms -pden -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", cpuid_asm_src => "c64xpluscpuid.s", bn_asm_src => "asm/bn-c64xplus.asm c64xplus-gf2m.s", aes_asm_src => "aes-c64xplus.s aes_cbc.c aes-ctr.fake", sha1_asm_src => "sha1-c64xplus.s sha256-c64xplus.s sha512-c64xplus.s", rc4_asm_src => "rc4-c64xplus.s", modes_asm_src => "ghash-c64xplus.s", chacha_asm_src => "chacha-c64xplus.s", poly1305_asm_src => "poly1305-c64xplus.s", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "void", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "linux-shared", shared_cflag => "--pic", shared_ldflag => add("-z --sysv --shared"), shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ranlib => "true", }, #### Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs. # # It takes pair of prior-set environment variables to make it work: # # CROSS_SYSROOT=/some/where/android-ndk-/platforms/android-/arch- # CROSS_COMPILE= # # As well as PATH adjusted to cover ${CROSS_COMPILE}gcc and company. # For example to compile for ICS and ARM with NDK 10d, you'd: # # ANDROID_NDK=/some/where/android-ndk-10d # CROSS_SYSROOT=$ANDROID_NDK/platforms/android-14/arch-arm # CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-adroideabi- # PATH=$ANDROID_NDK/toolchains/arm-linux-androideabi-4.8/prebuild/linux-x86_64/bin # "android" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32" ], # Special note about unconditional -fPIC and -pie. The underlying # reason is that Lollipop refuses to run non-PIE. But what about # older systems and NDKs? -fPIC was never problem, so the only # concern is -pie. Older toolchains, e.g. r4, appear to handle it # and binaries turn mostly functional. "Mostly" means that oldest # Androids, such as Froyo, fail to handle executable, but newer # systems are perfectly capable of executing binaries targeting # Froyo. Keep in mind that in the nutshell Android builds are # about JNI, i.e. shared libraries, not applications. cflags => add(picker(default => "-mandroid -fPIC --sysroot=\$(CROSS_SYSROOT) -Wa,--noexecstack")), bin_cflags => "-pie", }, "android-x86" => { inherit_from => [ "android", asm("x86_asm") ], cflags => add(picker(release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", perlasm_scheme => "android", }, ################################################################ # Contemporary Android applications can provide multiple JNI # providers in .apk, targeting multiple architectures. Among # them there is "place" for two ARM flavours: generic eabi and # armv7-a/hard-float. However, it should be noted that OpenSSL's # ability to engage NEON is not constrained by ABI choice, nor # is your ability to call OpenSSL from your application code # compiled with floating-point ABI other than default 'soft'. # [Latter thanks to __attribute__((pcs("aapcs"))) declaration.] # This means that choice of ARM libraries you provide in .apk # is driven by application needs. For example if application # itself benefits from NEON or is floating-point intensive, then # it might be appropriate to provide both libraries. Otherwise # just generic eabi would do. But in latter case it would be # appropriate to # # ./Configure android-armeabi -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8 # # in order to build "universal" binary and allow OpenSSL take # advantage of NEON when it's available. # "android-armeabi" => { inherit_from => [ "android", asm("armv4_asm") ], }, "android-mips" => { inherit_from => [ "android", asm("mips32_asm") ], perlasm_scheme => "o32", }, "android64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64" ], cflags => add(picker(default => "-mandroid -fPIC --sysroot=\$(CROSS_SYSROOT) -Wa,--noexecstack")), bin_cflags => "-pie", }, "android64-aarch64" => { inherit_from => [ "android64", asm("aarch64_asm") ], perlasm_scheme => "linux64", }, #### *BSD "BSD-generic32" => { # As for thread cflag. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of # flags, which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies # to them all, but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is # as -D_POSIX_THREAD -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x # expands it as -lc_r, which has to be accompanied by explicit # -D_THREAD_SAFE and sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x # expands it as -lc_r, which seems to be sufficient? inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-Wall", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O3"), threads("-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "bsd-gcc-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "BSD-generic64" => { inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic32" ], bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", }, "BSD-x86" => { inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic32", asm("x86_asm") ], cflags => add(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN", release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", shared_target => "bsd-shared", perlasm_scheme => "a.out", }, "BSD-x86-elf" => { inherit_from => [ "BSD-x86" ], perlasm_scheme => "elf", }, "BSD-sparcv8" => { inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic32", asm("sparcv8_asm") ], cflags => add("-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN"), }, "BSD-sparc64" => { # -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it # simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3, # triggered by RIPEMD160 code. inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic64", asm("sparcv9_asm") ], cflags => add("-DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_REG_T=int"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", }, "BSD-ia64" => { inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic64", asm("ia64_asm") ], cflags => add_before("-DL_ENDIAN"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", }, "BSD-x86_64" => { inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic64", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cflags => add_before("-DL_ENDIAN"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", perlasm_scheme => "elf", }, "bsdi-elf-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => "-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -Wall", ex_libs => add("-ldl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "bsd-gcc-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "nextstep" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => "-O -Wall", unistd => "", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, "nextstep3.3" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => "-O3 -Wall", unistd => "", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, # QNX "qnx4" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => "-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, "QNX6" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "gcc", ex_libs => add("-lsocket"), dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "bsd-gcc-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "QNX6-i386" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => "-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall", ex_libs => add("-lsocket"), dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "bsd-gcc-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, #### SCO/Caldera targets. # # Originally we had like unixware-*, unixware-*-pentium, unixware-*-p6, etc. # Now we only have blended unixware-* as it's the only one used by ./config. # If you want to optimize for particular microarchitecture, bypass ./config # and './Configure unixware-7 -Kpentium_pro' or whatever appropriate. # Note that not all targets include assembler support. Mostly because of # lack of motivation to support out-of-date platforms with out-of-date # compiler drivers and assemblers. Tim Rice has # patiently assisted to debug most of it. # # UnixWare 2.0x fails destest with -O. "unixware-2.0" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine("-DFILIO_H -DNO_STRINGS_H", threads("-Kthread")), ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx"), thread_scheme => "uithreads", }, "unixware-2.1" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine("-O -DFILIO_H", threads("-Kthread")), ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx"), thread_scheme => "uithreads", }, "unixware-7" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine("-O -DFILIO_H -Kalloca", threads("-Kthread")), ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl"), thread_scheme => "uithreads", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", perlasm_scheme => "elf-1", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "svr5-shared", shared_cflag => "-Kpic", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "unixware-7-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine("-DL_ENDIAN -DFILIO_H -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "elf-1", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "gnu-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, # SCO 5 - Ben Laurie says the -O breaks the SCO cc. "sco5-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => "-belf", ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl"), thread_scheme => "(unknown)", perlasm_scheme => "elf-1", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "svr3-shared", shared_cflag => "-Kpic", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "sco5-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer", ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", perlasm_scheme => "elf-1", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "svr3-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, #### IBM's AIX. # Below targets assume AIX >=5. Caveat lector. If you are accustomed # to control compilation "bitness" by setting $OBJECT_MODE environment # variable, then you should know that in OpenSSL case it's considered # only in ./config. Once configured, build procedure remains "deaf" to # current value of $OBJECT_MODE. "aix-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc32_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-DB_ENDIAN", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O"), threads("-pthread")), sys_id => "AIX", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "aix32", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "aix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-shared -static-libgcc -Wl,-G", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", arflags => "-X32", }, "aix64-gcc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-maix64 -DB_ENDIAN", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O"), threads("-pthread")), sys_id => "AIX", bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "aix64", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "aix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-maix64 -shared -static-libgcc -Wl,-G", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", arflags => "-X64", }, "aix-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc32_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-q32 -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O"), threads("-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE")), sys_id => "AIX", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", ex_libs => threads("-lpthreads"), perlasm_scheme => "aix32", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "aix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-q32 -G", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", arflags => "-X 32", }, "aix64-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("ppc64_asm") ], cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-q64 -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst", debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O"), threads("-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE")), sys_id => "AIX", bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", ex_libs => threads("-lpthreads"), perlasm_scheme => "aix64", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "aix-shared", shared_ldflag => "-q64 -G", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", arflags => "-X 64", }, # SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe "BS2000-OSD" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "c89", cflags => "-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC", ex_libs => add("-lsocket -lnsl"), bn_ops => "THIRTY_TWO_BIT RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, # OS/390 Unix an EBCDIC-based Unix system on IBM mainframe # You need to compile using the c89.sh wrapper in the tools directory, because the # IBM compiler does not like the -L switch after any object modules. # "OS390-Unix" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "c89.sh", cflags => "-O -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC -DNO_SYS_PARAM_H -D_ALL_SOURCE", bn_ops => "THIRTY_TWO_BIT RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "(unknown)", }, #### Visual C targets # # Win64 targets, WIN64I denotes IA-64 and WIN64A - AMD64 # # Note about -wd4090, disable warning C4090. This warning returns false # positives in some situations. Disabling it altogether masks both # legitimate and false cases, but as we compile on multiple platforms, # we rely on other compilers to catch legitimate cases. # # Also note that we force threads no matter what. Configuring "no-threads" # is ignored. "VC-common" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_Windows" ], template => 1, cc => "cl", cflags => "-W3 -wd4090 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE", defines => add(sub { my @defs = (); unless ($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"}) { my $zlib = $withargs{zlib_lib} // "ZLIB1"; push @defs, quotify("perl", 'LIBZ="' . $zlib . '"'); } return [ @defs ]; }), coutflag => "/Fo", lib_cflags => add("/Zi /Fdossl_static"), dso_cflags => "/Zi /Fddso", bin_cflags => "/Zi /Fdapp", lflags => add("/debug"), shared_ldflag => "/dll", shared_target => "win-shared", # meaningless except it gives Configure a hint thread_scheme => "winthreads", dso_scheme => "win32", apps_aux_src => add("win32_init.c"), }, "VC-noCE-common" => { inherit_from => [ "VC-common" ], template => 1, cflags => add(picker(default => "-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE", debug => sub { ($disabled{shared} ? "" : "/MDd") ." /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG"; }, release => sub { ($disabled{shared} ? "" : "/MD") ." /O2"; })), lib_cflags => add(sub { $disabled{shared} ? "/MT /Zl" : () }), # Following might/should appears controversial, i.e. defining # /MDd without evaluating $disabled{shared}. It works in # non-shared build because static library is compiled with /Zl # and bares no reference to specific RTL. And it works in # shared build because multiple /MDd options are not prohibited. # But why /MDd in static build? Well, basically this is just a # reference point, which allows to catch eventual errors that # would prevent those who want to wrap OpenSSL into own .DLL. # Why not /MD in release build then? Well, some are likely to # prefer [non-debug] openssl.exe to be free from Micorosoft RTL # redistributable. bin_cflags => add(picker(debug => "/MDd", release => sub { $disabled{shared} ? "/MT" : () }, )), bin_lflags => add("/subsystem:console /opt:ref"), ex_libs => add(sub { my @ex_libs = (); push @ex_libs, 'ws2_32.lib' unless $disabled{sock}; push @ex_libs, 'gdi32.lib advapi32.lib crypt32.lib user32.lib'; return join(" ", @ex_libs); }), }, "VC-WIN64-common" => { inherit_from => [ "VC-noCE-common" ], template => 1, ex_libs => add(sub { my @ex_libs = (); push @ex_libs, 'bufferoverflowu.lib' if (`cl 2>&1` =~ /14\.00\.4[0-9]{4}\./); return join(" ", @_, @ex_libs); }), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN", build_scheme => add("VC-W64", { separator => undef }), }, "VC-WIN64I" => { inherit_from => [ "VC-WIN64-common", asm("ia64_asm"), sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "ia64_uplink" } ], as => "ias", asflags => "-d debug", asoutflag => "-o", sys_id => "WIN64I", bn_asm_src => sub { return undef unless @_; my $r=join(" ",@_); $r=~s|bn-ia64.s|bn_asm.c|; $r; }, perlasm_scheme => "ias", multilib => "-ia64", }, "VC-WIN64A" => { inherit_from => [ "VC-WIN64-common", asm("x86_64_asm"), sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "x86_64_uplink" } ], as => sub { vc_win64a_info()->{as} }, asflags => sub { vc_win64a_info()->{asflags} }, asoutflag => sub { vc_win64a_info()->{asoutflag} }, sys_id => "WIN64A", bn_asm_src => sub { return undef unless @_; my $r=join(" ",@_); $r=~s|asm/x86_64-gcc|bn_asm|; $r; }, perlasm_scheme => "auto", multilib => "-x64", }, "VC-WIN32" => { # x86 Win32 target defaults to ANSI API, if you want UNICODE, # configure with 'perl Configure VC-WIN32 -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE' inherit_from => [ "VC-noCE-common", asm("x86_asm"), sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "uplink_common" } ], as => sub { vc_win32_info()->{as} }, asflags => sub { vc_win32_info()->{asflags} }, asoutflag => sub { vc_win32_info()->{asoutflag} }, ex_libs => add(sub { my @ex_libs = (); # WIN32 UNICODE build gets linked with unicows.lib for # backward compatibility with Win9x. push @ex_libs, 'unicows.lib' if (grep { $_ eq "UNICODE" } @user_defines); return join(" ", @ex_libs, @_); }), sys_id => "WIN32", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN", perlasm_scheme => sub { vc_win32_info()->{perlasm_scheme} }, build_scheme => add("VC-W32", { separator => undef }), }, "VC-CE" => { inherit_from => [ "VC-common" ], as => "ml", asflags => "/nologo /Cp /coff /c /Cx /Zi", asoutflag => "/Fo", cc => "cl", cflags => picker(default => combine('/W3 /WX /GF /Gy /nologo -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -DOPENSSL_SYS_WINCE -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -DNO_CHMOD -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT', sub { vc_wince_info()->{cflags}; }, sub { defined($ENV{'WCECOMPAT'}) ? '-I$(WCECOMPAT)/include' : (); }, sub { defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}) ? '-I$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/../../include' : (); }, sub { `cl 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=14 ? ($disabled{shared} ? " /MT" : " /MD") : " /MC"; }), debug => "/Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG", release => "/O1i"), lflags => combine("/nologo /opt:ref", sub { vc_wince_info()->{lflags}; }, sub { defined($ENV{PORTSDK_LIBPATH}) ? "/entry:mainCRTstartup" : (); }), sys_id => "WINCE", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN", ex_libs => add(sub { my @ex_libs = (); push @ex_libs, 'ws2.lib' unless $disabled{sock}; push @ex_libs, 'crypt32.lib'; if (defined($ENV{WCECOMPAT})) { my $x = '$(WCECOMPAT)/lib'; if (-f "$x/$ENV{TARGETCPU}/wcecompatex.lib") { $x .= '/$(TARGETCPU)/wcecompatex.lib'; } else { $x .= '/wcecompatex.lib'; } push @ex_libs, $x; } push @ex_libs, '$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/portlib.lib' if (defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'})); push @ex_libs, ' /nodefaultlib coredll.lib corelibc.lib' if ($ENV{'TARGETCPU'} eq "X86"); return @ex_libs; }), build_scheme => add("VC-WCE", { separator => undef }), }, #### MinGW "mingw" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_asm"), sub { $disabled{shared} ? () : "x86_uplink" } ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -m32 -Wall", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer"), threads("-D_MT")), sys_id => "MINGW32", ex_libs => add("-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN", thread_scheme => "winthreads", perlasm_scheme => "coff", dso_scheme => "win32", shared_target => "mingw-shared", shared_cflag => add("-D_WINDLL"), shared_ldflag => "-static-libgcc", shared_rcflag => "--target=pe-i386", shared_extension => ".dll", multilib => "", apps_aux_src => add("win32_init.c"), }, "mingw64" => { # As for OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK. Applink makes it possible to use # .dll compiled with one compiler with application compiled with # another compiler. It's possible to engage Applink support in # mingw64 build, but it's not done, because till mingw64 # supports structured exception handling, one can't seriously # consider its binaries for using with non-mingw64 run-time # environment. And as mingw64 is always consistent with itself, # Applink is never engaged and can as well be omitted. inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -m64 -Wall", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O3"), threads("-D_MT")), sys_id => "MINGW64", ex_libs => add("-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN", thread_scheme => "winthreads", perlasm_scheme => "mingw64", dso_scheme => "win32", shared_target => "mingw-shared", shared_cflag => add("-D_WINDLL"), shared_ldflag => "-static-libgcc", shared_rcflag => "--target=pe-x86-64", shared_extension => ".dll", multilib => "64", apps_aux_src => add("win32_init.c"), }, #### UEFI "UEFI" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => "-DL_ENDIAN -O", sys_id => "UEFI", }, #### UWIN "UWIN" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "cc", cflags => "-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -O -Wall", sys_id => "UWIN", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", dso_scheme => "win32", }, #### Cygwin "Cygwin-x86" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => picker(default => "-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -Wall", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer"), sys_id => "CYGWIN", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthread", perlasm_scheme => "coff", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "cygwin-shared", shared_cflag => "-D_WINDLL", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".dll", }, "Cygwin-x86_64" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => picker(default => "-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -Wall", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O3"), sys_id => "CYGWIN", bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthread", perlasm_scheme => "mingw64", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "cygwin-shared", shared_cflag => "-D_WINDLL", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".dll", }, # Backward compatibility for those using this target "Cygwin" => { inherit_from => [ "Cygwin-x86" ] }, # In case someone constructs the Cygwin target name themself "Cygwin-i386" => { inherit_from => [ "Cygwin-x86" ] }, "Cygwin-i486" => { inherit_from => [ "Cygwin-x86" ] }, "Cygwin-i586" => { inherit_from => [ "Cygwin-x86" ] }, "Cygwin-i686" => { inherit_from => [ "Cygwin-x86" ] }, ##### MacOS X (a.k.a. Darwin) setup "darwin-common" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], template => 1, cc => "cc", cflags => combine(picker(default => "", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O3"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), sys_id => "MACOSX", plib_lflags => "-Wl,-search_paths_first", bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "osx32", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", ranlib => "ranlib -c", shared_target => "darwin-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-dynamiclib", shared_extension => ".\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib", }, # Option "freeze" such as -std=gnu9x can't negatively interfere # with future defaults for below two targets, because MacOS X # for PPC has no future, it was discontinued by vendor in 2009. "darwin-ppc-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "darwin-common", asm("ppc32_asm") ], cflags => add("-arch ppc -std=gnu9x -DB_ENDIAN -Wa,-force_cpusubtype_ALL"), perlasm_scheme => "osx32", shared_ldflag => "-arch ppc -dynamiclib", }, "darwin64-ppc-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "darwin-common", asm("ppc64_asm") ], cflags => add("-arch ppc64 -std=gnu9x -DB_ENDIAN"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "osx64", shared_ldflag => "-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib", }, "darwin-i386-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "darwin-common", asm("x86_asm") ], cflags => add(picker(default => "-arch i386 -DL_ENDIAN", release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_INT", perlasm_scheme => "macosx", shared_ldflag => "-arch i386 -dynamiclib", }, "darwin64-x86_64-cc" => { inherit_from => [ "darwin-common", asm("x86_64_asm") ], cflags => add("-arch x86_64 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", perlasm_scheme => "macosx", shared_ldflag => "-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib", }, #### iPhoneOS/iOS # # It takes three prior-set environment variables to make it work: # # CROSS_COMPILE=/where/toolchain/is/usr/bin/ [note ending slash] # CROSS_TOP=/where/SDKs/are # CROSS_SDK=iPhoneOSx.y.sdk # # Exact paths vary with Xcode releases, but for couple of last ones # they would look like this: # # CROSS_COMPILE=`xcode-select --print-path`/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/bin/ # CROSS_TOP=`xcode-select --print-path`/Platforms/iPhoneOS.platform/Developer # CROSS_SDK=iPhoneOS.sdk # "iphoneos-cross" => { inherit_from => [ "darwin-common" ], cflags => add("-isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fno-common"), sys_id => "iOS", }, "ios-cross" => { inherit_from => [ "darwin-common", asm("armv4_asm") ], # It should be possible to go below iOS 6 and even add -arch armv6, # thus targeting iPhone pre-3GS, but it's assumed to be irrelevant # at this point. cflags => add("-arch armv7 -mios-version-min=6.0.0 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fno-common"), sys_id => "iOS", perlasm_scheme => "ios32", }, "ios64-cross" => { inherit_from => [ "darwin-common", asm("aarch64_asm") ], cflags => add("-arch arm64 -mios-version-min=7.0.0 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fno-common"), sys_id => "iOS", bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "ios64", }, ##### GNU Hurd "hurd-x86" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], inherit_from => [ asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cc => "gcc", cflags => combine("-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall", threads("-pthread")), ex_libs => add("-ldl"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "linux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, ##### VxWorks for various targets "vxworks-ppc60x" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "ccppc", cflags => "-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -mhard-float -mstrict-align -fno-implicit-fp -DPPC32_fp60x -O2 -fstrength-reduce -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip", sys_id => "VXWORKS", ex_libs => add("-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/common"), }, "vxworks-ppcgen" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "ccppc", cflags => "-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -msoft-float -mstrict-align -O1 -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip", sys_id => "VXWORKS", ex_libs => add("-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/sfcommon"), }, "vxworks-ppc405" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "ccppc", cflags => "-g -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC405 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h", sys_id => "VXWORKS", lflags => "-r", }, "vxworks-ppc750" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "ccppc", cflags => "-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h \$(DEBUG_FLAG)", sys_id => "VXWORKS", lflags => "-r", }, "vxworks-ppc750-debug" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "ccppc", cflags => "-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG -g", sys_id => "VXWORKS", lflags => "-r", }, "vxworks-ppc860" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "ccppc", cflags => "-nostdinc -msoft-float -DCPU=PPC860 -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h", sys_id => "VXWORKS", lflags => "-r", }, "vxworks-simlinux" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "ccpentium", cflags => "-B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DL_ENDIAN -DCPU=SIMLINUX -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK", sys_id => "VXWORKS", lflags => "-r", ranlib => "ranlibpentium", }, "vxworks-mips" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("mips32_asm") ], cc => "ccmips", cflags => combine("-mrtp -mips2 -O -G 0 -B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DCPU=MIPS32 -msoft-float -mno-branch-likely -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), sys_id => "VXWORKS", ex_libs => add("-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/mips/MIPSI32/sfcommon"), thread_scheme => "pthreads", perlasm_scheme => "o32", ranlib => "ranlibmips", }, #### uClinux "uClinux-dist" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "$ENV{'CC'}", cflags => combine("\$(CFLAGS)", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), plib_lflags => "\$(LDFLAGS)", ex_libs => add("\$(LDLIBS)"), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}", shared_target => "linux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ranlib => "$ENV{'RANLIB'}", }, "uClinux-dist64" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ], cc => "$ENV{'CC'}", cflags => combine("\$(CFLAGS)", threads("-D_REENTRANT")), plib_lflags => "\$(LDFLAGS)", ex_libs => add("\$(LDLIBS)"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}", shared_target => "linux-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ranlib => "$ENV{'RANLIB'}", }, ##### VMS "vms-generic" => { inherit_from => [ "BASE_VMS" ], template => 1, cc => "CC/DECC", cflags => picker(default => "/STANDARD=(ISOC94,RELAXED)/NOLIST/PREFIX=ALL", debug => "/NOOPTIMIZE/DEBUG", release => "/OPTIMIZE/NODEBUG"), defines => add("OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE"), lflags => picker(default => "/MAP", debug => "/DEBUG/TRACEBACK", release => "/NODEBUG/NOTRACEBACK"), lib_cflags => add("/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)/EXTERN_MODEL=STRICT_REFDEF"), dso_cflags => add("/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)"), shared_target => "vms-shared", dso_scheme => "vms", thread_scheme => "pthreads", apps_aux_src => "vms_decc_init.c vms_term_sock.c", }, "vms-alpha" => { inherit_from => [ "vms-generic" ], cflags => add(sub { my @warnings = @{vms_info(0)->{disable_warns}}; @warnings ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); }), defines => add(sub { return vms_info(0)->{def_zlib} ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(0)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : (); }), ex_libs => add(sub { return vms_info(0)->{zlib} || (); }), pointer_size => sub { return vms_info(0)->{pointer_size} }, #as => "???", #debug_aflags => "/NOOPTIMIZE/DEBUG", #release_aflags => "/OPTIMIZE/NODEBUG", bn_opts => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_INT", }, "vms-alpha-p32" => { inherit_from => [ "vms-generic" ], cflags => add("/POINTER_SIZE=32", sub { my @warnings = @{vms_info(32)->{disable_warns}}; @warnings ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); } ), defines => add(sub { return vms_info(32)->{def_zlib} ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(32)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : (); }), ex_libs => add(sub { return vms_info(32)->{zlib} || (); }), pointer_size => sub { return vms_info(32)->{pointer_size} }, }, "vms-alpha-p64" => { inherit_from => [ "vms-generic" ], cflags => add("/POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV", sub { my @warnings = @{vms_info(64)->{disable_warns}}; @warnings ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); } ), defines => add(sub { return vms_info(64)->{def_zlib} ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(64)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : (); }), ex_libs => add(sub { return vms_info(64)->{zlib} || (); }), pointer_size => sub { return vms_info(64)->{pointer_size} }, }, "vms-ia64" => { inherit_from => [ "vms-generic" ], cflags => add(sub { my @warnings = @{vms_info(0)->{disable_warns}}; @warnings ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); }), defines => add(sub { return vms_info(0)->{def_zlib} ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(0)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : (); }), ex_libs => add(sub { return vms_info(0)->{zlib} || (); }), pointer_size => sub { return vms_info(0)->{pointer_size} }, #as => "I4S", #debug_aflags => "/NOOPTIMIZE/DEBUG", #release_aflags => "/OPTIMIZE/NODEBUG", bn_opts => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_INT", }, "vms-ia64-p32" => { inherit_from => [ "vms-generic" ], cflags => add("/POINTER_SIZE=32", sub { my @warnings = @{vms_info(32)->{disable_warns}}; @warnings ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); } ), defines => add(sub { return vms_info(32)->{def_zlib} ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(32)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : (); }), ex_libs => add(sub { return vms_info(32)->{zlib} || (); }), pointer_size => sub { return vms_info(32)->{pointer_size} }, }, "vms-ia64-p64" => { inherit_from => [ "vms-generic" ], cflags => add("/POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV", sub { my @warnings = @{vms_info(64)->{disable_warns}}; @warnings ? "/WARNINGS=DISABLE=(".join(",",@warnings).")" : (); } ), defines => add(sub { return vms_info(64)->{def_zlib} ? "LIBZ=\"\"\"".vms_info(64)->{def_zlib}."\"\"\"" : (); }), ex_libs => add(sub { return vms_info(64)->{zlib} || (); }), pointer_size => sub { return vms_info(64)->{pointer_size} }, }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/common.tmpl0000644000000000000000000002130013176625655017235 0ustar rootroot{- # -*- Mode: perl -*- use File::Basename; # A cache of objects for which a recipe has already been generated my %cache; # resolvedepends and reducedepends work in tandem to make sure # there are no duplicate dependencies and that they are in the # right order. This is especially used to sort the list of # libraries that a build depends on. sub resolvedepends { my $thing = shift; my @listsofar = @_; # to check if we're looping my @list = @{$unified_info{depends}->{$thing}}; my @newlist = (); if (scalar @list) { foreach my $item (@list) { # It's time to break off when the dependency list starts looping next if grep { $_ eq $item } @listsofar; push @newlist, $item, resolvedepends($item, @listsofar, $item); } } @newlist; } sub reducedepends { my @list = @_; my @newlist = (); while (@list) { my $item = shift @list; push @newlist, $item unless grep { $item eq $_ } @list; } @newlist; } # dogenerate is responsible for producing all the recipes that build # generated source files. It recurses in case a dependency is also a # generated source file. sub dogenerate { my $src = shift; return "" if $cache{$src}; my $obj = shift; my $bin = shift; my %opts = @_; if ($unified_info{generate}->{$src}) { die "$src is generated by Configure, should not appear in build file\n" if ref $unified_info{generate}->{$src} eq ""; my $script = $unified_info{generate}->{$src}->[0]; $OUT .= generatesrc(src => $src, generator => $unified_info{generate}->{$src}, generator_incs => $unified_info{includes}->{$script}, generator_deps => $unified_info{depends}->{$script}, deps => $unified_info{depends}->{$src}, incs => [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$bin}}, @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}} ], %opts); foreach (@{$unified_info{depends}->{$src}}) { dogenerate($_, $obj, $bin, %opts); } } $cache{$src} = 1; } # doobj is responsible for producing all the recipes that build # object files as well as dependency files. sub doobj { my $obj = shift; return "" if $cache{$obj}; (my $obj_no_o = $obj) =~ s|\.o$||; my $bin = shift; my %opts = @_; if (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$obj}}) { $OUT .= src2obj(obj => $obj_no_o, srcs => $unified_info{sources}->{$obj}, deps => $unified_info{depends}->{$obj}, incs => [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$bin}}, @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}} ], %opts); foreach ((@{$unified_info{sources}->{$obj}}, @{$unified_info{depends}->{$obj}})) { dogenerate($_, $obj, $bin, %opts); } } $cache{$obj} = 1; } # dolib is responsible for building libraries. It will call # libobj2shlib is shared libraries are produced, and obj2lib in all # cases. It also makes sure all object files for the library are # built. sub dolib { my $lib = shift; return "" if $cache{$lib}; unless ($disabled{shared}) { my %ordinals = $unified_info{ordinals}->{$lib} ? (ordinals => $unified_info{ordinals}->{$lib}) : (); $OUT .= libobj2shlib(shlib => $unified_info{sharednames}->{$lib}, lib => $lib, objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x } (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}}, @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}}) ], deps => [ reducedepends(resolvedepends($lib)) ], %ordinals); foreach (@{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}}) { doobj($_, $lib, intent => "lib"); } } $OUT .= obj2lib(lib => $lib, objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x } @{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}} ]); foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}}) { doobj($_, $lib, intent => "lib"); } $cache{$lib} = 1; } # doengine is responsible for building engines. It will call # obj2dso, and also makes sure all object files for the library # are built. sub doengine { my $lib = shift; return "" if $cache{$lib}; $OUT .= obj2dso(lib => $lib, objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x } (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}}, @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}}) ], deps => [ resolvedepends($lib) ]); foreach ((@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}}, @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}})) { doobj($_, $lib, intent => "dso"); } $cache{$lib} = 1; } # dobin is responsible for building programs. It will call obj2bin, # and also makes sure all object files for the library are built. sub dobin { my $bin = shift; return "" if $cache{$bin}; my $deps = [ reducedepends(resolvedepends($bin)) ]; $OUT .= obj2bin(bin => $bin, objs => [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$||; $x } @{$unified_info{sources}->{$bin}} ], deps => $deps); foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$bin}}) { doobj($_, $bin, intent => "bin"); } $cache{$bin} = 1; } # dobin is responsible for building scripts from templates. It will # call in2script. sub doscript { my $script = shift; return "" if $cache{$script}; $OUT .= in2script(script => $script, sources => $unified_info{sources}->{$script}); $cache{$script} = 1; } sub dodir { my $dir = shift; return "" if !exists(&generatedir) or $cache{$dir}; $OUT .= generatedir(dir => $dir, deps => $unified_info{dirinfo}->{$dir}->{deps}, %{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$_}->{products}}); $cache{$dir} = 1; } # Start with populating the cache with all the overrides %cache = map { $_ => 1 } @{$unified_info{overrides}}; # For convenience collect information regarding directories where # files are generated, those generated files and the end product # they end up in where applicable. Then, add build rules for those # directories if (exists &generatedir) { my %loopinfo = ( "dso" => [ @{$unified_info{engines}} ], "lib" => [ @{$unified_info{libraries}} ], "bin" => [ @{$unified_info{programs}} ], "script" => [ @{$unified_info{scripts}} ] ); foreach my $type (keys %loopinfo) { foreach my $product (@{$loopinfo{$type}}) { my %dirs = (); my $pd = dirname($product); # We already have a "test" target, and the current directory # is just silly to make a target for $dirs{$pd} = 1 unless $pd eq "test" || $pd eq "."; foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$product}}) { my $d = dirname($_); # We don't want to create targets for source directories # when building out of source next if ($config{sourcedir} ne $config{builddir} && $d =~ m|^\Q$config{sourcedir}\E|); # We already have a "test" target, and the current directory # is just silly to make a target for next if $d eq "test" || $d eq "."; $dirs{$d} = 1; push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$d}->{deps}}, $_ if $d ne $pd; } foreach (keys %dirs) { push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$_}->{products}->{$type}}, $product; } } } } # Build mandatory generated headers foreach (@{$unified_info{depends}->{""}}) { dogenerate($_); } # Build all known libraries, engines, programs and scripts. # Everything else will be handled as a consequence. foreach (@{$unified_info{libraries}}) { dolib($_); } foreach (@{$unified_info{engines}}) { doengine($_); } foreach (@{$unified_info{programs}}) { dobin($_); } foreach (@{$unified_info{scripts}}) { doscript($_); } foreach (sort keys %{$unified_info{dirinfo}}) { dodir($_); } # Finally, should there be any applicable BEGINRAW/ENDRAW sections, # they are added here. $OUT .= $_."\n" foreach @{$unified_info{rawlines}}; -} openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/README.design0000644000000000000000000006226113176625655017212 0ustar rootrootDesign document for the unified scheme data =========================================== How are things connected? ------------------------- The unified scheme takes all its data from the build.info files seen throughout the source tree. These files hold the minimum information needed to build end product files from diverse sources. See the section on build.info files below. From the information in build.info files, Configure builds up an information database as a hash table called %unified_info, which is stored in configdata.pm, found at the top of the build tree (which may or may not be the same as the source tree). Configurations/common.tmpl uses the data from %unified_info to generate the rules for building end product files as well as intermediary files with the help of a few functions found in the build-file templates. See the section on build-file templates further down for more information. build.info files ---------------- As mentioned earlier, build.info files are meant to hold the minimum information needed to build output files, and therefore only (with a few possible exceptions [1]) have information about end products (such as scripts, library files and programs) and source files (such as C files, C header files, assembler files, etc). Intermediate files such as object files are rarely directly referred to in build.info files (and when they are, it's always with the file name extension .o), they are inferred by Configure. By the same rule of minimalism, end product file name extensions (such as .so, .a, .exe, etc) are never mentioned in build.info. Their file name extensions will be inferred by the build-file templates, adapted for the platform they are meant for (see sections on %unified_info and build-file templates further down). The variables PROGRAMS, LIBS, ENGINES and SCRIPTS are used to declare end products. There are variants for them with '_NO_INST' as suffix (PROGRAM_NO_INST etc) to specify end products that shouldn't get installed. The variables SOURCE, DEPEND, INCLUDE and ORDINALS are indexed by a produced file, and their values are the source used to produce that particular produced file, extra dependencies, include directories needed, and ordinal files (explained further below. All their values in all the build.info throughout the source tree are collected together and form a set of programs, libraries, engines and scripts to be produced, source files, dependencies, etc etc etc. Let's have a pretend example, a very limited contraption of OpenSSL, composed of the program 'apps/openssl', the libraries 'libssl' and 'libcrypto', an engine 'engines/ossltest' and their sources and dependencies. # build.info LIBS=libcrypto libssl ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto ORDINALS[libssl]=ssl INCLUDE[libcrypto]=include INCLUDE[libssl]=include DEPEND[libssl]=libcrypto This is the top directory build.info file, and it tells us that two libraries are to be built, there are some ordinals to be used to declare what symbols in those libraries are seen as public, the include directory 'include/' shall be used throughout when building anything that will end up in each library, and that the library 'libssl' depend on the library 'libcrypto' to function properly. # apps/build.info PROGRAMS=openssl SOURCE[openssl]=openssl.c INCLUDE[openssl]=.. ../include DEPEND[openssl]=../libssl This is the build.info file in 'apps/', one may notice that all file paths mentioned are relative to the directory the build.info file is located in. This one tells us that there's a program to be built called 'apps/openssl' (the file name extension will depend on the platform and is therefore not mentioned in the build.info file). It's built from one source file, 'apps/openssl.c', and building it requires the use of '.' and 'include' include directories (both are declared from the point of view of the 'apps/' directory), and that the program depends on the library 'libssl' to function properly. # crypto/build.info LIBS=../libcrypto SOURCE[../libcrypto]=aes.c evp.c cversion.c DEPEND[cversion.o]=buildinf.h GENERATE[buildinf.h]=../util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)" DEPEND[buildinf.h]=../Makefile DEPEND[../util/mkbuildinf.pl]=../util/Foo.pm This is the build.info file in 'crypto', and it tells us a little more about what's needed to produce 'libcrypto'. LIBS is used again to declare that 'libcrypto' is to be produced. This declaration is really unnecessary as it's already mentioned in the top build.info file, but can make the info file easier to understand. This is to show that duplicate information isn't an issue. This build.info file informs us that 'libcrypto' is built from a few source files, 'crypto/aes.c', 'crypto/evp.c' and 'crypto/cversion.c'. It also shows us that building the object file inferred from 'crypto/cversion.c' depends on 'crypto/buildinf.h'. Finally, it also shows the possibility to declare how some files are generated using some script, in this case a perl script, and how such scripts can be declared to depend on other files, in this case a perl module. Two things are worth an extra note: 'DEPEND[cversion.o]' mentions an object file. DEPEND indexes is the only location where it's valid to mention them Lines in 'BEGINRAW'..'ENDRAW' sections must always mention files as seen from the top directory, no exception. # ssl/build.info LIBS=../libssl SOURCE[../libssl]=tls.c This is the build.info file in 'ssl/', and it tells us that the library 'libssl' is built from the source file 'ssl/tls.c'. # engines/build.info ENGINES=dasync SOURCE[dasync]=e_dasync.c DEPEND[dasync]=../libcrypto INCLUDE[dasync]=../include ENGINES_NO_INST=ossltest SOURCE[ossltest]=e_ossltest.c DEPEND[ossltest]=../libcrypto INCLUDE[ossltest]=../include This is the build.info file in 'engines/', telling us that two engines called 'engines/dasync' and 'engines/ossltest' shall be built, that dasync's source is 'engines/e_dasync.c' and ossltest's source is 'engines/e_ossltest.c' and that the include directory 'include/' may be used when building anything that will be part of these engines. Also, both engines depend on the library 'libcrypto' to function properly. Finally, only dasync is being installed, as ossltest is only for internal testing. When Configure digests these build.info files, the accumulated information comes down to this: LIBS=libcrypto libssl ORDINALS[libcrypto]=crypto SOURCE[libcrypto]=crypto/aes.c crypto/evp.c crypto/cversion.c DEPEND[crypto/cversion.o]=crypto/buildinf.h INCLUDE[libcrypto]=include ORDINALS[libssl]=ssl SOURCE[libssl]=ssl/tls.c INCLUDE[libssl]=include DEPEND[libssl]=libcrypto PROGRAMS=apps/openssl SOURCE[apps/openssl]=apps/openssl.c INCLUDE[apps/openssl]=. include DEPEND[apps/openssl]=libssl ENGINES=engines/dasync SOURCE[engines/dasync]=engines/e_dasync.c DEPEND[engines/dasync]=libcrypto INCLUDE[engines/dasync]=include ENGINES_NO_INST=engines/ossltest SOURCE[engines/ossltest]=engines/e_ossltest.c DEPEND[engines/ossltest]=libcrypto INCLUDE[engines/ossltest]=include GENERATE[crypto/buildinf.h]=util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)" DEPEND[crypto/buildinf.h]=Makefile DEPEND[util/mkbuildinf.pl]=util/Foo.pm A few notes worth mentioning: LIBS may be used to declare routine libraries only. PROGRAMS may be used to declare programs only. ENGINES may be used to declare engines only. The indexes for SOURCE and ORDINALS must only be end product files, such as libraries, programs or engines. The values of SOURCE variables must only be source files (possibly generated) INCLUDE and DEPEND shows a relationship between different files (usually produced files) or between files and directories, such as a program depending on a library, or between an object file and some extra source file. When Configure processes the build.info files, it will take it as truth without question, and will therefore perform very few checks. If the build tree is separate from the source tree, it will assume that all built files and up in the build directory and that all source files are to be found in the source tree, if they can be found there. Configure will assume that source files that can't be found in the source tree (such as 'crypto/bildinf.h' in the example above) are generated and will be found in the build tree. The %unified_info database -------------------------- The information in all the build.info get digested by Configure and collected into the %unified_info database, divided into the following indexes: depends => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'dependency' ... ] pairs. These are directly inferred from the DEPEND variables in build.info files. engines => a list of engines. These are directly inferred from the ENGINES variable in build.info files. generate => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'generator' ... ] pairs. These are directly inferred from the GENERATE variables in build.info files. includes => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'include' ... ] pairs. These are directly inferred from the INCLUDE variables in build.info files. install => a hash table containing 'type' => [ 'file' ... ] pairs. The types are 'programs', 'libraries', 'engines' and 'scripts', and the array of files list the files of that type that should be installed. libraries => a list of libraries. These are directly inferred from the LIBS variable in build.info files. ordinals => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'word', 'ordfile' ] pairs. 'file' and 'word' are directly inferred from the ORDINALS variables in build.info files, while the file 'ofile' comes from internal knowledge in Configure. programs => a list of programs. These are directly inferred from the PROGRAMS variable in build.info files. rawlines => a list of build-file lines. These are a direct copy of the BEGINRAW..ENDRAW lines in build.info files. Note: only the BEGINRAW..ENDRAW section for the current platform are copied, the rest are ignored. scripts => a list of scripts. There are directly inferred from the SCRIPTS variable in build.info files. sources => a hash table containing 'file' => [ 'sourcefile' ... ] pairs. These are indirectly inferred from the SOURCE variables in build.info files. Object files are mentioned in this hash table, with source files from SOURCE variables, and AS source files for programs and libraries. shared_sources => a hash table just like 'sources', but only as source files (object files) for building shared libraries. As an example, here is how the build.info files example from the section above would be digested into a %unified_info table: our %unified_info = ( "depends" => { "apps/openssl" => [ "libssl", ], "crypto/buildinf.h" => [ "Makefile", ], "crypto/cversion.o" => [ "crypto/buildinf.h", ], "engines/ossltest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "libssl" => [ "libcrypto", ], "util/mkbuildinf.pl" => [ "util/Foo.pm", ], }, "engines" => [ "engines/dasync", "engines/ossltest", ], "generate" => { "crypto/buildinf.h" => [ "util/mkbuildinf.pl", "\"\$(CC)", "\$(CFLAGS)\"", "\"$(PLATFORM)\"", ], }, "includes" => { "apps/openssl" => [ ".", "include", ], "engines/ossltest" => [ "include" ], "libcrypto" => [ "include", ], "libssl" => [ "include", ], "util/mkbuildinf.pl" => [ "util", ], } "install" => { "engines" => [ "engines/dasync", ], "libraries" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "programs" => [ "apps/openssl", ], }, "libraries" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "ordinals" => { "libcrypto" => [ "crypto", "util/libcrypto.num", ], "libssl" => [ "ssl", "util/libssl.num", ], }, "programs" => [ "apps/openssl", ], "rawlines" => [ ], "sources" => { "apps/openssl" => [ "apps/openssl.o", ], "apps/openssl.o" => [ "apps/openssl.c", ], "crypto/aes.o" => [ "crypto/aes.c", ], "crypto/cversion.o" => [ "crypto/cversion.c", ], "crypto/evp.o" => [ "crypto/evp.c", ], "engines/e_ossltest.o" => [ "engines/e_ossltest.c", ], "engines/ossltest" => [ "engines/e_ossltest.o", ], "libcrypto" => [ "crypto/aes.c", "crypto/cversion.c", "crypto/evp.c", ], "libssl" => [ "ssl/tls.c", ], "ssl/tls.o" => [ "ssl/tls.c", ], }, ); As can be seen, everything in %unified_info is fairly simple suggest of information. Still, it tells us that to build all programs, we must build 'apps/openssl', and to build the latter, we will need to build all its sources ('apps/openssl.o' in this case) and all the other things it depends on (such as 'libssl'). All those dependencies need to be built as well, using the same logic, so to build 'libssl', we need to build 'ssl/tls.o' as well as 'libcrypto', and to build the latter... Build-file templates -------------------- Build-file templates are essentially build-files (such as Makefile on Unix) with perl code fragments mixed in. Those perl code fragment will generate all the configuration dependent data, including all the rules needed to build end product files and intermediary files alike. At a minimum, there must be a perl code fragment that defines a set of functions that are used to generates specific build-file rules, to build static libraries from object files, to build shared libraries from static libraries, to programs from object files and libraries, etc. generatesrc - function that produces build file lines to generate a source file from some input. It's called like this: generatesrc(src => "PATH/TO/tobegenerated", generator => [ "generatingfile", ... ] generator_incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ] generator_deps => [ "dep1", ... ] incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ], deps => [ "dep1", ... ], intent => one of "libs", "dso", "bin" ); 'src' has the name of the file to be generated. 'generator' is the command or part of command to generate the file, of which the first item is expected to be the file to generate from. generatesrc() is expected to analyse and figure out exactly how to apply that file and how to capture the result. 'generator_incs' and 'generator_deps' are include directories and files that the generator file itself depends on. 'incs' and 'deps' are include directories and files that are used if $(CC) is used as an intermediary step when generating the end product (the file indicated by 'src'). 'intent' indicates what the generated file is going to be used for. src2obj - function that produces build file lines to build an object file from source files and associated data. It's called like this: src2obj(obj => "PATH/TO/objectfile", srcs => [ "PATH/TO/sourcefile", ... ], deps => [ "dep1", ... ], incs => [ "INCL/PATH", ... ] intent => one of "lib", "dso", "bin" ); 'obj' has the intended object file *without* extension, src2obj() is expected to add that. 'srcs' has the list of source files to build the object file, with the first item being the source file that directly corresponds to the object file. 'deps' is a list of explicit dependencies. 'incs' is a list of include file directories. Finally, 'intent' indicates what this object file is going to be used for. obj2lib - function that produces build file lines to build a static library file ("libfoo.a" in Unix terms) from object files. called like this: obj2lib(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ]); 'lib' has the intended library file name *without* extension, obj2lib is expected to add that. 'objs' has the list of object files (also *without* extension) to build this library. libobj2shlib - function that produces build file lines to build a shareable object library file ("libfoo.so" in Unix terms) from the corresponding static library file or object files. called like this: libobj2shlib(shlib => "PATH/TO/shlibfile", lib => "PATH/TO/libfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ], deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile", ... ], ordinals => [ "word", "/PATH/TO/ordfile" ]); 'lib' has the intended library file name *without* extension, libobj2shlib is expected to add that. 'shlib' has the corresponding shared library name *without* extension. 'deps' has the list of other libraries (also *without* extension) this library needs to be linked with. 'objs' has the list of object files (also *without* extension) to build this library. 'ordinals' MAY be present, and when it is, its value is an array where the word is "crypto" or "ssl" and the file is one of the ordinal files util/libcrypto.num or util/libssl.num in the source directory. This function has a choice; it can use the corresponding static library as input to make the shared library, or the list of object files. obj2dynlib - function that produces build file lines to build a dynamically loadable library file ("libfoo.so" on Unix) from object files. called like this: obj2dynlib(lib => "PATH/TO/libfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ], deps => [ "PATH/TO/otherlibfile", ... ]); This is almost the same as libobj2shlib, but the intent is to build a shareable library that can be loaded in runtime (a "plugin"...). The differences are subtle, one of the most visible ones is that the resulting shareable library is produced from object files only. obj2bin - function that produces build file lines to build an executable file from object files. called like this: obj2bin(bin => "PATH/TO/binfile", objs => [ "PATH/TO/objectfile", ... ], deps => [ "PATH/TO/libfile", ... ]); 'bin' has the intended executable file name *without* extension, obj2bin is expected to add that. 'objs' has the list of object files (also *without* extension) to build this library. 'deps' has the list of library files (also *without* extension) that the programs needs to be linked with. in2script - function that produces build file lines to build a script file from some input. called like this: in2script(script => "PATH/TO/scriptfile", sources => [ "PATH/TO/infile", ... ]); 'script' has the intended script file name. 'sources' has the list of source files to build the resulting script from. Along with the build-file templates is the driving engine Configurations/common.tmpl, which looks through all the information in %unified_info and generates all the rulesets to build libraries, programs and all intermediate files, using the rule generating functions defined in the build-file template. As an example with the smaller build.info set we've seen as an example, producing the rules to build 'libcrypto' would result in the following calls: # Note: libobj2shlib will only be called if shared libraries are # to be produced. # Note 2: libobj2shlib gets both the name of the static library # and the names of all the object files that go into it. It's up # to the implementation to decide which to use as input. # Note 3: common.tmpl peals off the ".o" extension from all object # files, as the platform at hand may have a different one. libobj2shlib(shlib => "libcrypto", lib => "libcrypto", objs => [ "crypto/aes", "crypto/evp", "crypto/cversion" ], deps => [ ] ordinals => [ "crypto", "util/libcrypto.num" ]); obj2lib(lib => "libcrypto" objs => [ "crypto/aes", "crypto/evp", "crypto/cversion" ]); src2obj(obj => "crypto/aes" srcs => [ "crypto/aes.c" ], deps => [ ], incs => [ "include" ], intent => "lib"); src2obj(obj => "crypto/evp" srcs => [ "crypto/evp.c" ], deps => [ ], incs => [ "include" ], intent => "lib"); src2obj(obj => "crypto/cversion" srcs => [ "crypto/cversion.c" ], deps => [ "crypto/buildinf.h" ], incs => [ "include" ], intent => "lib"); generatesrc(src => "crypto/buildinf.h", generator => [ "util/mkbuildinf.pl", "\"$(CC)", "$(CFLAGS)\"", "\"$(PLATFORM)\"" ], generator_incs => [ "util" ], generator_deps => [ "util/Foo.pm" ], incs => [ ], deps => [ ], intent => "lib"); The returned strings from all those calls are then concatenated together and written to the resulting build-file. openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/50-haiku.conf0000644000000000000000000000223313176625655017245 0ustar rootroot%targets = ( "haiku-common" => { template => 1, cc => "cc", cflags => add_before(picker(default => "-DL_ENDIAN -Wall -include \$(SRCDIR)/os-dep/haiku.h", debug => "-g -O0", release => "-O2"), threads("-D_REENTRANT")), sys_id => "HAIKU", ex_libs => "-lnetwork", perlasm_scheme => "elf", thread_scheme => "pthreads", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", shared_target => "gnu-shared", shared_cflag => "-fPIC", shared_ldflag => "-shared", shared_extension => ".so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", }, "haiku-x86" => { inherit_from => [ "haiku-common", asm("x86_elf_asm") ], cflags => add(picker(release => "-fomit-frame-pointer")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG", }, "haiku-x86_64" => { inherit_from => [ "haiku-common" ], cflags => add("-m64"), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/50-masm.conf0000644000000000000000000000130713176625655017102 0ustar rootroot# We can't make commitment to supporting Microsoft assembler, # because it would mean supporting all masm versions. This in # in turn is because masm is not really an interchangeable option, # while users tend to have reasons to stick with specific Visual # Studio versions. It's usually lesser hassle to make it work # with latest assembler, but tweaking for older versions had # proven to be daunting task. This is experimental target, for # production builds stick with [up-to-date version of] nasm. %targets = ( "VC-WIN64A-masm" => { inherit_from => [ "VC-WIN64A" ], as => "ml64", asflags => "/c /Cp /Cx /Zi", asoutflag => "/Fo", }, ); openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/INTERNALS.Configure0000644000000000000000000001731313176625655020262 0ustar rootrootConfigure Internals =================== [ note: this file uses markdown for formatting ] Intro ----- This is a collection of notes that are hopefully of interest to those who decide to dive into Configure and what it does. This is a living document and anyone is encouraged to add to it and submit changes. There's no claim for this document to be complete at any time, but it will hopefully reach such a point in time. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Parsing build.info files, processing conditions ----------------------------------------------- Processing conditions in build.info files is done with the help of a condition stack that tell if a build.info should be processed or if it should just be skipped over. The possible states of the stack top are expressed in the following comment from Configure: # The top item of this stack has the following values # -2 positive already run and we found ELSE (following ELSIF should fail) # -1 positive already run (skip until ENDIF) # 0 negatives so far (if we're at a condition, check it) # 1 last was positive (don't skip lines until next ELSE, ELSIF or ENDIF) # 2 positive ELSE (following ELSIF should fail) Ground rule is that non-condition lines are skipped over if the stack top is > 0. Condition lines (IF, ELSIF, ELSE and ENDIF statements) need to be processed either way to keep track of the skip stack states, so they are a little more intricate. Instead of trying to describe in words, here are some example of what the skip stack should look like after each line is processed: Example 1: | IF[1] | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | IF[1] | 1 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ELSIF[1] | 1 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSE | 1 -2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ELSIF[1] | -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | IF[1] | -1 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[1] | -1 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSE | -1 -2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | | | Example 2: | IF[0] | 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | IF[1] | 0 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[1] | 0 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSE | 0 -2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[1] | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | IF[1] | 1 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ELSIF[1] | 1 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSE | 1 -2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ENDIF | | | Example 3: | IF[0] | 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | IF[0] | 0 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[1] | 0 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSE | 0 -2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[1] | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | IF[0] | 1 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[1] | 1 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ELSE | 1 -2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ENDIF | | | Example 4: | IF[0] | 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | IF[0] | 0 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[0] | 0 -1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSE | 0 -2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ENDIF | 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[1] | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | IF[0] | 1 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSIF[0] | 1 0 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is skipped over | | ELSE | 1 2 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ENDIF | 1 | | | ... whatever ... | | this line is processed | | ENDIF | | | openssl-1.1.0g/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl0000644000000000000000000010510213176625655020174 0ustar rootroot## descrip.mms to build OpenSSL on OpenVMS ## ## {- join("\n## ", @autowarntext) -} {- use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/; # Our prefix, claimed when speaking with the VSI folks Tuesday # January 26th 2016 our $osslprefix = 'OSSL$'; (our $osslprefix_q = $osslprefix) =~ s/\$/\\\$/; our $sover = sprintf "%02d%02d", $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor}; our $osslver = sprintf "%02d%02d", split(/\./, $config{version}); our $sourcedir = $config{sourcedir}; our $builddir = $config{builddir}; sub sourcefile { catfile($sourcedir, @_); } sub buildfile { catfile($builddir, @_); } sub sourcedir { catdir($sourcedir, @_); } sub builddir { catdir($builddir, @_); } sub tree { (my $x = shift) =~ s|\]$|...]|; $x } sub move { my $f = catdir(@_); my $b = abs2rel(rel2abs("."),rel2abs($f)); $sourcedir = catdir($b,$sourcedir) if !file_name_is_absolute($sourcedir); $builddir = catdir($b,$builddir) if !file_name_is_absolute($builddir); ""; } # Because we need to make two computations of these data, # we store them in arrays for reuse our @shlibs = map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{libraries}}; our @install_shlibs = map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}; our @generated = ( ( map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.S$|\.s|; $x } grep { defined $unified_info{generate}->{$_} } map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} } grep { /\.o$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}} ), ( grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}} ) ); # This is a horrible hack, but is needed because recursive inclusion of files # in different directories does not work well with HP C. my $sd = sourcedir("crypto", "async", "arch"); foreach (grep /\[\.crypto\.async\.arch\].*\.o$/, keys %{$unified_info{sources}}) { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|.OBJ|; $unified_info{before}->{$x} = qq(arch_include = F\$PARSE("$sd","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" define arch 'arch_include'); $unified_info{after}->{$x} = qq(deassign arch); } my $sd1 = sourcedir("ssl","record"); my $sd2 = sourcedir("ssl","statem"); $unified_info{before}->{"[.test]heartbeat_test.OBJ"} = $unified_info{before}->{"[.test]ssltest_old.OBJ"} = qq(record_include = F\$PARSE("$sd1","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" define record 'record_include' statem_include = F\$PARSE("$sd2","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" define statem 'statem_include'); $unified_info{after}->{"[.test]heartbeat_test.OBJ"} = $unified_info{after}->{"[.test]ssltest.OBJ"} = qq(deassign statem deassign record); foreach (grep /^\[\.ssl\.(?:record|statem)\].*\.o$/, keys %{$unified_info{sources}}) { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|.OBJ|; $unified_info{before}->{$x} = qq(record_include = F\$PARSE("$sd1","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" define record 'record_include' statem_include = F\$PARSE("$sd2","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" define statem 'statem_include'); $unified_info{after}->{$x} = qq(deassign statem deassign record); } # This makes sure things get built in the order they need # to. You're welcome. sub dependmagic { my $target = shift; return "$target : build_generated\n\t\pipe \$(MMS) \$(MMSQUALIFIERS) depend && \$(MMS) \$(MMSQUALIFIERS) _$target\n_$target"; } #use Data::Dumper; #print STDERR "DEBUG: before:\n", Dumper($unified_info{before}); #print STDERR "DEBUG: after:\n", Dumper($unified_info{after}); ""; -} PLATFORM={- $config{target} -} OPTIONS={- $config{options} -} CONFIGURE_ARGS=({- join(", ",quotify_l(@{$config{perlargv}})) -}) SRCDIR={- $config{sourcedir} -} BLDDIR={- $config{builddir} -} # Allow both V and VERBOSE to indicate verbosity. This only applies # to testing. VERBOSE=$(V) VERSION={- $config{version} -} MAJOR={- $config{major} -} MINOR={- $config{minor} -} SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER={- $config{shlib_version_number} -} SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY={- $config{shlib_version_history} -} SHLIB_MAJOR={- $config{shlib_major} -} SHLIB_MINOR={- $config{shlib_minor} -} SHLIB_TARGET={- $target{shared_target} -} EXE_EXT=.EXE LIB_EXT=.OLB SHLIB_EXT=.EXE OBJ_EXT=.OBJ DEP_EXT=.D LIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".OLB" } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) -} SHLIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @shlibs) -} ENGINES={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{engines}}) -} PROGRAMS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{programs}}) -} SCRIPTS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @{$unified_info{scripts}}) -} {- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} DEPS={- our @deps = map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.o$|\$(DEP_EXT)|; $x; } grep { $unified_info{sources}->{$_}->[0] =~ /\.c$/ } keys %{$unified_info{sources}}; join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @deps); -} {- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} GENERATED_MANDATORY={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @{$unified_info{depends}->{""}} ) -} GENERATED={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_ } @generated) -} INSTALL_LIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".OLB" } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} INSTALL_SHLIBS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @install_shlibs) -} INSTALL_ENGINES={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -} INSTALL_PROGRAMS={- join(", ", map { "-\n\t".$_.".EXE" } @{$unified_info{install}->{programs}}) -} {- output_off() if $disabled{apps}; "" -} BIN_SCRIPTS=[.tools]c_rehash.pl MISC_SCRIPTS=[.apps]CA.pl, [.apps]tsget.pl {- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -} APPS_OPENSSL={- use File::Spec::Functions; catfile("apps","openssl") -} # DESTDIR is for package builders so that they can configure for, say, # SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL] and yet have everything installed in STAGING:[USER]. # In that case, configure with --prefix=SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL] and then run # MMS with /MACROS=(DESTDIR=STAGING:[USER]). The result will end up in # STAGING:[USER.OPENSSL]. # Normally it is left empty. DESTDIR= # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --prefix=DIR to change this! INSTALLTOP={- our $installtop = catdir($config{prefix}) || "SYS\$COMMON:[OPENSSL]"; $installtop -} SYSTARTUP={- catdir($installtop, '[.SYS$STARTUP]'); -} # This is the standard central area to store certificates, private keys... OPENSSLDIR={- catdir($config{openssldir}) or $config{prefix} ? catdir($config{prefix},"COMMON") : "SYS\$COMMON:[OPENSSL-COMMON]" -} # The same, but for C OPENSSLDIR_C={- $osslprefix -}DATAROOT:[000000] # Where installed engines reside, for C ENGINESDIR_C={- $osslprefix -}ENGINES{- $sover.$target{pointer_size} -}: CC= {- $target{cc} -} CFLAGS= /DEFINE=({- join(",", @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}},"OPENSSLDIR=\"\"\"\$(OPENSSLDIR_C)\"\"\"","ENGINESDIR=\"\"\"\$(ENGINESDIR_C)\"\"\"") -}) {- $target{cflags} -} {- $config{cflags} -} CFLAGS_Q=$(CFLAGS) DEPFLAG= /DEFINE=({- join(",", @{$config{depdefines}}) -}) LDFLAGS= {- $target{lflags} -} EX_LIBS= {- $target{ex_libs} ? ",".$target{ex_libs} : "" -}{- $config{ex_libs} ? ",".$config{ex_libs} : "" -} LIB_CFLAGS={- $target{lib_cflags} || "" -} DSO_CFLAGS={- $target{dso_cflags} || "" -} BIN_CFLAGS={- $target{bin_cflags} || "" -} PERL={- $config{perl} -} # We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in # order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture # dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC # gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus # and pass it down to assembler. AS={- $target{as} -} ASFLAG={- $target{asflags} -} # .FIRST and .LAST are special targets with MMS and MMK. # The defines in there are for C. includes that look like # this: # # #include # #include "internal/bar.h" # # will use the logical names to find the files. Expecting # DECompHP C to find files in subdirectories of whatever was # given with /INCLUDE is a fantasy, unfortunately. NODEBUG=@ .FIRST : $(NODEBUG) openssl_inc1 = F$PARSE("[.include.openssl]","A.;",,,"syntax_only") - "A.;" $(NODEBUG) openssl_inc2 = F$PARSE("{- catdir($config{sourcedir},"[.include.openssl]") -}","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" $(NODEBUG) internal_inc1 = F$PARSE("[.crypto.include.internal]","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" $(NODEBUG) internal_inc2 = F$PARSE("{- catdir($config{sourcedir},"[.include.internal]") -}","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" $(NODEBUG) internal_inc3 = F$PARSE("{- catdir($config{sourcedir},"[.crypto.include.internal]") -}","A.;",,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" $(NODEBUG) DEFINE openssl 'openssl_inc1','openssl_inc2' $(NODEBUG) DEFINE internal 'internal_inc1','internal_inc2','internal_inc3' $(NODEBUG) staging_dir = "$(DESTDIR)" $(NODEBUG) staging_instdir = "" $(NODEBUG) staging_datadir = "" $(NODEBUG) IF staging_dir .NES. "" THEN - staging_instdir = F$PARSE("A.;",staging_dir,"[]",,"SYNTAX_ONLY") $(NODEBUG) IF staging_instdir - "]A.;" .NES. staging_instdir THEN - staging_instdir = staging_instdir - "]A.;" + ".OPENSSL-INSTALL]" $(NODEBUG) IF staging_instdir - "A.;" .NES. staging_instdir THEN - staging_instdir = staging_instdir - "A.;" + "[OPENSSL-INSTALL]" $(NODEBUG) IF staging_dir .NES. "" THEN - staging_datadir = F$PARSE("A.;",staging_dir,"[]",,"SYNTAX_ONLY") $(NODEBUG) IF staging_datadir - "]A.;" .NES. staging_datadir THEN - staging_datadir = staging_datadir - "]A.;" + ".OPENSSL-COMMON]" $(NODEBUG) IF staging_datadir - "A.;" .NES. staging_datadir THEN - staging_datadir = staging_datadir - "A.;" + "[OPENSSL-COMMON]" $(NODEBUG) ! $(NODEBUG) ! Installation logical names $(NODEBUG) ! $(NODEBUG) installtop = F$PARSE(staging_instdir,"$(INSTALLTOP)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + ".]" $(NODEBUG) datatop = F$PARSE(staging_datadir,"$(OPENSSLDIR)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + ".]" $(NODEBUG) DEFINE ossl_installroot 'installtop' $(NODEBUG) DEFINE ossl_dataroot 'datatop' $(NODEBUG) ! $(NODEBUG) ! Figure out the architecture $(NODEBUG) ! $(NODEBUG) arch = f$edit( f$getsyi( "arch_name"), "upcase") $(NODEBUG) ! $(NODEBUG) ! Set up logical names for the libraries, so LINK and $(NODEBUG) ! running programs can use them. $(NODEBUG) ! $(NODEBUG) {- join("\n\t\$(NODEBUG) ", map { "DEFINE ".uc($_)." 'F\$ENV(\"DEFAULT\")'".uc($_)."\$(SHLIB_EXT)" } map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) || "!" -} .LAST : $(NODEBUG) {- join("\n\t\$(NODEBUG) ", map { "DEASSIGN ".uc($_) } map { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} || () } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) || "!" -} $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN ossl_dataroot $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN ossl_installroot $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN internal $(NODEBUG) DEASSIGN openssl .DEFAULT : @ ! MMS cannot handle no actions... # The main targets ################################################### {- dependmagic('all'); -} : build_libs_nodep, build_engines_nodep, build_programs_nodep {- dependmagic('build_libs'); -} : build_libs_nodep {- dependmagic('build_engines'); -} : build_engines_nodep {- dependmagic('build_programs'); -} : build_programs_nodep build_generated : $(GENERATED_MANDATORY) build_libs_nodep : $(LIBS), $(SHLIBS) build_engines_nodep : $(ENGINES) build_programs_nodep : $(PROGRAMS), $(SCRIPTS) # Kept around for backward compatibility build_apps build_tests : build_programs test : tests {- dependmagic('tests'); -} : build_programs_nodep, build_engines_nodep @ ! {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -} SET DEFAULT [.test]{- move("test") -} CREATE/DIR [.test-runs] DEFINE SRCTOP {- sourcedir() -} DEFINE BLDTOP {- builddir() -} DEFINE RESULT_D {- builddir(qw(test test-runs)) -} DEFINE OPENSSL_ENGINES {- builddir("engines") -} DEFINE OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY "on" IF "$(VERBOSE)" .NES. "" THEN DEFINE VERBOSE "$(VERBOSE)" $(PERL) {- sourcefile("test", "run_tests.pl") -} $(TESTS) DEASSIGN OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY DEASSIGN OPENSSL_ENGINES DEASSIGN BLDTOP DEASSIGN SRCTOP SET DEFAULT [-]{- move("..") -} @ ! {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -} @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options" @ ! {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -} list-tests : @ ! {- output_off() if $disabled{tests}; "" -} @ DEFINE SRCTOP {- sourcedir() -} @ $(PERL) {- sourcefile("test", "run_tests.pl") -} list @ DEASSIGN SRCTOP @ ! {- if ($disabled{tests}) { output_on(); } else { output_off(); } "" -} @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options" @ ! {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -} install : install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "######################################################################" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" @ IF "$(DESTDIR)" .EQS. "" THEN - PIPE ( WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Installation complete" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_startup{- $osslver -} to set up logical names" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "then run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_utils{- $osslver -} to define commands" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ) @ IF "$(DESTDIR)" .NES. "" THEN - PIPE ( WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Staging installation complete" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Finish or package in such a way that the contents of the directory tree" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT staging_instdir ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "ends up in $(INSTALLTOP)," ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "and that the contents of the contents of the directory tree" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT staging_datadir ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "ends up in $(OPENSSLDIR)" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "When in its final destination," ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_startup{- $osslver -} to set up logical names" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "then run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_utils{- $osslver -} to define commands" ; - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ) check_install : spawn/nolog @ossl_installroot:[SYSTEST]openssl_ivp{- $osslver -}.com uninstall : uninstall_docs uninstall_sw # Because VMS wants the generation number (or *) to delete files, we can't # use $(LIBS), $(PROGRAMS), $(GENERATED) and $(ENGINES)directly. libclean : {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.OLB;*" } @{$unified_info{libraries}}) || "@ !" -} {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.EXE;*,$_.MAP;*,$_.OPT;*" } @shlibs) || "@ !" -} clean : libclean {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.EXE;*,$_.OPT;*" } @{$unified_info{programs}}) || "@ !" -} {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_.EXE;*,$_.OPT;*" } @{$unified_info{engines}}) || "@ !" -} {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_;*" } @{$unified_info{scripts}}) || "@ !" -} {- join("\n\t", map { "- DELETE $_;*" } @generated) || "@ !" -} - DELETE [...]*.MAP;* - DELETE [...]*.D;* - DELETE [...]*.OBJ;*,*.LIS;* - DELETE []CXX$DEMANGLER_DB.;* - DELETE [.VMS]openssl_startup.com;* - DELETE [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com;* - DELETE []vmsconfig.pm;* distclean : clean - DELETE configdata.pm;* - DELETE descrip.mms;* depend : descrip.mms descrip.mms : FORCE @ ! {- output_off() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} @ $(PERL) -pe "if (/^# DO NOT DELETE.*/) { exit(0); }" - < descrip.mms > descrip.mms-new @ OPEN/APPEND DESCRIP descrip.mms-new @ WRITE DESCRIP "# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it." {- join("\n\t", map { "\@ IF F\$SEARCH(\"$_\") .NES. \"\" THEN TYPE $_ /OUTPUT=DESCRIP:" } @deps); -} @ CLOSE DESCRIP @ PIPE ( $(PERL) -e "use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; my $x = compare_text(""descrip.mms"",""descrip.mms-new""); exit(0x10000000 + ($x == 0));" || - RENAME descrip.mms-new descrip.mms ) @ IF F$SEARCH("descrip.mms-new") .NES. "" THEN DELETE descrip.mms-new;* -@ SPAWN/OUTPUT=NLA0: PURGE/NOLOG descrip.mms @ ! {- output_on() if $disabled{makedepend}; "" -} # Install helper targets ############################################# install_sw : all install_shared _install_dev_ns - install_engines _install_runtime_ns - install_startup install_ivp uninstall_sw : uninstall_shared _uninstall_dev_ns - uninstall_engines _uninstall_runtime_ns - uninstall_startup uninstall_ivp install_docs : install_html_docs uninstall_docs : uninstall_html_docs install_ssldirs : check_INSTALLTOP - CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G:RE,W:RE) OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000] IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]CERTS.DIR;1") .EQS. "" THEN - CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G:RE,W:RE) OSSL_DATAROOT:[CERTS] IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]PRIVATE.DIR;1") .EQS. "" THEN - CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G,W) OSSL_DATAROOT:[PRIVATE] IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]MISC.DIR;1") .EQS. "" THEN - CREATE/DIR/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWE,G,W) OSSL_DATAROOT:[MISC] COPY/PROT=W:RE $(MISC_SCRIPTS) OSSL_DATAROOT:[MISC] @ ! Install configuration file COPY/PROT=W:R {- sourcefile("apps", "openssl-vms.cnf") -} - ossl_dataroot:[000000]openssl.cnf-dist IF F$SEARCH("OSSL_DATAROOT:[000000]openssl.cnf") .EQS. "" THEN - COPY/PROT=W:R {- sourcefile("apps", "openssl-vms.cnf") -} - ossl_dataroot:[000000]openssl.cnf install_shared : check_INSTALLTOP @ {- output_off() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} ! @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** Installing shareable images" @ ! Install shared (runtime) libraries - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch'] {- join("\n ", map { "COPY/PROT=W:R $_.EXE ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch']" } @install_shlibs) -} @ {- output_on() if $disabled{shared}; "" -} ! _install_dev_ns : check_INSTALLTOP @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** Installing development files" @ ! Install header files - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[include.openssl] COPY/PROT=W:R openssl:*.h ossl_installroot:[include.openssl] @ ! Install static (development) libraries - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch'] {- join("\n ", map { "COPY/PROT=W:R $_.OLB ossl_installroot:[LIB.'arch']" } @{$unified_info{install}->{libraries}}) -} install_dev : install_shared _install_dev_ns _install_runtime_ns : check_INSTALLTOP @ ! Install the main program - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[EXE.'arch'] COPY/PROT=W:RE [.APPS]openssl.EXE - ossl_installroot:[EXE.'arch']openssl{- $osslver -}.EXE @ ! Install scripts COPY/PROT=W:RE $(BIN_SCRIPTS) ossl_installroot:[EXE] @ ! {- output_on() if $disabled{apps}; "" -} install_runtime : install_shared _install_runtime_ns install_engines : check_INSTALLTOP @ {- output_off() unless scalar @{$unified_info{engines}}; "" -} ! @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** Installing engines" - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[ENGINES{- $sover.$target{pointer_size} -}.'arch'] {- join("\n ", map { "COPY/PROT=W:RE $_.EXE ossl_installroot:[ENGINES$sover$target{pointer_size}.'arch']" } @{$unified_info{install}->{engines}}) -} @ {- output_on() unless scalar @{$unified_info{engines}}; "" -} ! install_startup : [.VMS]openssl_startup.com [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com - [.VMS]openssl_utils.com, check_INSTALLTOP - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP] COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_startup.com - ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP]openssl_startup{- $osslver -}.com COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com - ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP]openssl_shutdown{- $osslver -}.com COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_utils.com - ossl_installroot:[SYS$STARTUP]openssl_utils{- $osslver -}.com install_ivp : [.VMS]openssl_ivp.com check_INSTALLTOP - CREATE/DIR ossl_installroot:[SYSTEST] COPY/PROT=W:RE [.VMS]openssl_ivp.com - ossl_installroot:[SYSTEST]openssl_ivp{- $osslver -}.com [.VMS]openssl_startup.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_startup.com.in") -} - CREATE/DIR [.VMS] $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} - {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_startup.com.in") -} - > [.VMS]openssl_startup.com [.VMS]openssl_utils.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_utils.com.in") -} - CREATE/DIR [.VMS] $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} - {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_utils.com.in") -} - > [.VMS]openssl_utils.com [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_shutdown.com.in") -} - CREATE/DIR [.VMS] $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} - {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_shutdown.com.in") -} - > [.VMS]openssl_shutdown.com [.VMS]openssl_ivp.com : vmsconfig.pm {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_ivp.com.in") -} - CREATE/DIR [.VMS] $(PERL) "-I." "-Mvmsconfig" {- sourcefile("util", "dofile.pl") -} - {- sourcefile("VMS", "openssl_ivp.com.in") -} - > [.VMS]openssl_ivp.com vmsconfig.pm : configdata.pm OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ CONFIG []vmsconfig.pm WRITE CONFIG "package vmsconfig;" WRITE CONFIG "use strict; use warnings;" WRITE CONFIG "use Exporter;" WRITE CONFIG "our @ISA = qw(Exporter);" WRITE CONFIG "our @EXPORT = qw(%config %target %withargs %unified_info %disabled);" WRITE CONFIG "our %config = (" WRITE CONFIG " target => '","{- $config{target} -}","'," WRITE CONFIG " version => '","{- $config{version} -}","'," WRITE CONFIG " shlib_major => '","{- $config{shlib_major} -}","'," WRITE CONFIG " shlib_minor => '","{- $config{shlib_minor} -}","'," WRITE CONFIG " no_shared => '","{- $disabled{shared} -}","'," WRITE CONFIG " INSTALLTOP => '$(INSTALLTOP)'," WRITE CONFIG " OPENSSLDIR => '$(OPENSSLDIR)'," WRITE CONFIG " pointer_size => '","{- $target{pointer_size} -}","'," WRITE CONFIG ");" WRITE CONFIG "our %target = ();" WRITE CONFIG "our %disabled = ();" WRITE CONFIG "our %withargs = ();" WRITE CONFIG "our %unified_info = ();" WRITE CONFIG "1;" CLOSE CONFIG install_html_docs : check_INSTALLTOP sourcedir = F$PARSE("{- $sourcedir -}A.;","[]") - "]A.;" + ".DOC]" $(PERL) {- sourcefile("util", "process_docs.pl") -} - --sourcedir='sourcedir' --destdir=ossl_installroot:[HTML] - --type=html check_INSTALLTOP : @ IF "$(INSTALLTOP)" .EQS. "" THEN - WRITE SYS$ERROR "INSTALLTOP should not be empty" @ IF "$(INSTALLTOP)" .EQS. "" THEN - EXIT %x10000002 # Helper targets ##################################################### # Developer targets ################################################## debug_logicals : SH LOGICAL/PROC openssl,internal,ossl_installroot,ossl_dataroot # Building targets ################################################### configdata.pm : $(SRCDIR)Configure $(SRCDIR)config.com {- join(" ", @{$config{build_file_templates}}, @{$config{build_infos}}, @{$config{conf_files}}) -} @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Reconfiguring..." perl $(SRCDIR)Configure reconf @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*************************************************" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** ***" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** Please run the same mms command again ***" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*** ***" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "*************************************************" @ PIPE ( EXIT %X10000000 ) {- use File::Basename; use File::Spec::Functions qw/abs2rel rel2abs catfile catdir/; sub generatesrc { my %args = @_; my $generator = join(" ", @{$args{generator}}); my $generator_incs = join("", map { ' "-I'.$_.'"' } @{$args{generator_incs}}); my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @{$args{generator_deps}}, @{$args{deps}}); if ($args{src} !~ /\.[sS]$/) { if ($args{generator}->[0] =~ m|^.*\.in$|) { my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "dofile.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); return <<"EOF"; $args{src} : $args{generator}->[0] $deps \$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" "-Mconfigdata" $dofile \\ "-o$target{build_file}" $generator > \$@ EOF } else { return <<"EOF"; $args{src} : $args{generator}->[0] $deps \$(PERL)$generator_incs $generator > \$@ EOF } } else { die "No method to generate assembler source present.\n"; } } sub src2obj { my %args = @_; my $obj = $args{obj}; my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @{$args{srcs}}, @{$args{deps}}); # Because VMS C isn't very good at combining a /INCLUDE path with # #includes having a relative directory (like '#include "../foo.h"), # the best choice is to move to the first source file's intended # directory before compiling, and make sure to write the object file # in the correct position (important when the object tree is other # than the source tree). my $forward = dirname($args{srcs}->[0]); my $backward = abs2rel(rel2abs("."), rel2abs($forward)); my $objd = abs2rel(rel2abs(dirname($obj)), rel2abs($forward)); my $objn = basename($obj); my $srcs = join(", ", map { abs2rel(rel2abs($_), rel2abs($forward)) } @{$args{srcs}}); my $ecflags = { lib => '$(LIB_CFLAGS)', dso => '$(DSO_CFLAGS)', bin => '$(BIN_CFLAGS)' } -> {$args{intent}}; my $incs_on = "\@ !"; my $incs_off = "\@ !"; my $incs = ""; my @incs = (); push @incs, @{$args{incs}} if @{$args{incs}}; unless ($disabled{zlib}) { # GNV$ZLIB_INCLUDE is the standard logical name for later zlib # incarnations. push @incs, ($withargs{zlib_include} || 'GNV$ZLIB_INCLUDE:'); } if (@incs) { $incs_on = "DEFINE tmp_includes " .join(",-\n\t\t\t", map { file_name_is_absolute($_) ? $_ : catdir($backward,$_) } @incs); $incs_off = "DEASSIGN tmp_includes"; $incs = " /INCLUDE=(tmp_includes:)"; } my $before = $unified_info{before}->{$obj.".OBJ"} || "\@ !"; my $after = $unified_info{after}->{$obj.".OBJ"} || "\@ !"; my $depbuild = $disabled{makedepend} ? "" : " /MMS=(FILE=${objd}${objn}.tmp-D,TARGET=$obj.OBJ)"; return <<"EOF"; $obj.OBJ : $deps ${before} SET DEFAULT $forward $incs_on \$(CC) \$(CFLAGS)${ecflags}${incs}${depbuild} /OBJECT=${objd}${objn}.OBJ /REPOSITORY=$backward $srcs $incs_off SET DEFAULT $backward ${after} \@ PIPE ( \$(PERL) -e "use File::Compare qw/compare_text/; my \$x = compare_text(""$obj.D"",""$obj.tmp-D""); exit(0x10000000 + (\$x == 0));" || - RENAME $obj.tmp-D $obj.d ) \@ IF F\$SEARCH("$obj.tmp-D") .NES. "" THEN DELETE $obj.tmp-D;* - PURGE $obj.OBJ EOF } sub libobj2shlib { my %args = @_; my $lib = $args{lib}; my $shlib = $args{shlib}; my $libd = dirname($lib); my $libn = basename($lib); (my $mkdef_key = $libn) =~ s/^${osslprefix_q}lib([^0-9]*)\d*/$1/i; my @deps = map { $disabled{shared} ? $_.".OLB" : $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}.".EXE"; } @{$args{deps}}; my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @deps); my $shlib_target = $disabled{shared} ? "" : $target{shared_target}; my $ordinalsfile = defined($args{ordinals}) ? $args{ordinals}->[1] : ""; my $engine_opt = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "VMS", "engine.opt")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); my $mkdef_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "mkdef.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); my $translatesyms_pl = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "VMS", "translatesyms.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); # The "[]" hack is because in .OPT files, each line inherits the # previous line's file spec as default, so if no directory spec # is present in the current line and the previous line has one that # doesn't apply, you're in for a surprise. my $write_opt = join("\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_; $x =~ s|(\.EXE)|$1/SHARE|; $x =~ s|(\.OLB)|$1/LIB|; "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x\"" } @deps) || "\@ !"; return <<"EOF"; $shlib.EXE : $lib.OLB $deps $ordinalsfile \$(PERL) $mkdef_pl "$mkdef_key" "VMS" > $shlib.SYMVEC-tmp \$(PERL) $translatesyms_pl \$(BLDDIR)CXX\$DEMANGLER_DB. < $shlib.SYMVEC-tmp > $shlib.SYMVEC DELETE $shlib.SYMVEC-tmp;* OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ OPT_FILE $shlib.OPT WRITE OPT_FILE "IDENTIFICATION=""V$config{version}""" TYPE $shlib.SYMVEC /OUTPUT=OPT_FILE: WRITE OPT_FILE "$lib.OLB/LIBRARY" $write_opt CLOSE OPT_FILE LINK /MAP=$shlib.MAP /FULL/SHARE=$shlib.EXE $shlib.OPT/OPT \$(EX_LIBS) DELETE $shlib.SYMVEC;* PURGE $shlib.EXE,$shlib.OPT,$shlib.MAP EOF } sub obj2dso { my %args = @_; my $lib = $args{lib}; my $libd = dirname($lib); my $libn = basename($lib); (my $libn_nolib = $libn) =~ s/^lib//; my @objs = map { "$_.OBJ" } @{$args{objs}}; my @deps = map { $disabled{shared} ? $_.".OLB" : $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}.".EXE"; } @{$args{deps}}; my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @objs, @deps); my $shlib_target = $disabled{shared} ? "" : $target{shared_target}; my $engine_opt = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "VMS", "engine.opt")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); # The "[]" hack is because in .OPT files, each line inherits the # previous line's file spec as default, so if no directory spec # is present in the current line and the previous line has one that # doesn't apply, you're in for a surprise. my $write_opt1 = join(",-\"\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_; "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x" } @objs). "\""; my $write_opt2 = join("\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_; $x =~ s|(\.EXE)|$1/SHARE|; $x =~ s|(\.OLB)|$1/LIB|; "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x\"" } @deps) || "\@ !"; return <<"EOF"; $lib.EXE : $deps OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ OPT_FILE $lib.OPT TYPE $engine_opt /OUTPUT=OPT_FILE: $write_opt1 $write_opt2 CLOSE OPT_FILE LINK /MAP=$lib.MAP /FULL/SHARE=$lib.EXE $lib.OPT/OPT \$(EX_LIBS) - PURGE $lib.EXE,$lib.OPT,$lib.MAP EOF } sub obj2lib { my %args = @_; my $lib = $args{lib}; my $objs = join(", -\n\t\t", map { $_.".OBJ" } (@{$args{objs}})); my $fill_lib = join("\n\t", (map { "LIBRARY/REPLACE $lib.OLB $_.OBJ" } @{$args{objs}})); return <<"EOF"; $lib.OLB : $objs LIBRARY/CREATE/OBJECT $lib.OLB $fill_lib - PURGE $lib.OLB EOF } sub obj2bin { my %args = @_; my $bin = $args{bin}; my $bind = dirname($bin); my $binn = basename($bin); my @objs = map { "$_.OBJ" } @{$args{objs}}; my @deps = map { $disabled{shared} ? $_.".OLB" : $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}.".EXE"; } @{$args{deps}}; my $deps = join(", -\n\t\t", @objs, @deps); # The "[]" hack is because in .OPT files, each line inherits the # previous line's file spec as default, so if no directory spec # is present in the current line and the previous line has one that # doesn't apply, you're in for a surprise. my $write_opt1 = join(",-\"\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_; "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x" } @objs). "\""; my $write_opt2 = join("\n\t", map { my $x = $_ =~ /\[/ ? $_ : "[]".$_; $x =~ s|(\.EXE)|$1/SHARE|; $x =~ s|(\.OLB)|$1/LIB|; "WRITE OPT_FILE \"$x\"" } @deps) || "\@ !"; return <<"EOF"; $bin.EXE : $deps OPEN/WRITE/SHARE=READ OPT_FILE $bin.OPT $write_opt1 $write_opt2 CLOSE OPT_FILE LINK/EXEC=$bin.EXE \$(LDFLAGS) $bin.OPT/OPT \$(EX_LIBS) - PURGE $bin.EXE,$bin.OPT EOF } sub in2script { my %args = @_; my $script = $args{script}; return "" if grep { $_ eq $script } @{$args{sources}}; # No overwrite! my $sources = join(" ", @{$args{sources}}); my $dofile = abs2rel(rel2abs(catfile($config{sourcedir}, "util", "dofile.pl")), rel2abs($config{builddir})); return <<"EOF"; $script : $sources \$(PERL) "-I\$(BLDDIR)" "-Mconfigdata" $dofile - "-o$target{build_file}" $sources > $script SET FILE/PROT=(S:RWED,O:RWED,G:RE,W:RE) $script PURGE $script EOF } "" # Important! This becomes part of the template result. -} openssl-1.1.0g/Makefile.shared0000644000000000000000000004374013176625655014776 0ustar rootroot# # Helper makefile to link shared libraries in a portable way. # This is much simpler than libtool, and hopefully not too error-prone. # # The following variables need to be set on the command line to build # properly # CC contains the current compiler. This one MUST be defined CC=cc CFLAGS=$(CFLAG) # LDFLAGS contains flags to be used when temporary object files (when building # shared libraries) are created, or when an application is linked. # SHARED_LDFLAGS contains flags to be used when the shared library is created. LDFLAGS=$(LDFLAG) SHARED_LDFLAGS=$(SHARED_LDFLAG) RC=windres # SHARED_RCFLAGS are flags used with windres, i.e. when build for Cygwin # or Mingw. SHARED_RCFLAGS=$(SHARED_RCFLAG) NM=nm # LIBNAME contains just the name of the library, without prefix ("lib" # on Unix, "cyg" for certain forms under Cygwin...) or suffix (.a, .so, # .dll, ...). This one MUST have a value when using this makefile to # build shared libraries. # For example, to build libfoo.so, you need to do the following: #LIBNAME=foo LIBNAME= # STLIBNAME contains the path of the static library to build the shared # library from, for example: #STLIBNAME=libfoo.a STLIBNAME= # On most Unix platforms, SHLIBNAME contains the path of the short name of # the shared library to build, for example #SHLIBNAME=libfoo.so # On Windows POSIX layers (cygwin and mingw), SHLIBNAME contains the import # library name for the shared library to be built, for example: #SHLIBNAME=libfoo.dll.a # SHLIBNAME_FULL contains the path of the full name of the shared library to # build, for example: #SHLIBNAME_FULL=libfoo.so.1.2 # When building DSOs, SHLIBNAME_FULL contains path of the full DSO name, for # example: #SHLIBNAME_FULL=dir/dso.so SHLIBNAME_FULL= # SHLIBVERSION contains the current version of the shared library (not to # be confused with the project version) #SHLIBVERSION=1.2 SHLIBVERSION= # NOTE: to build shared libraries, LIBNAME, STLIBNAME, SHLIBNAME and # SHLIBNAME_FULL MUST have values when using this makefile, and in some # cases, SHLIBVERSION as well. To build DSOs, SHLIBNAME_FULL MUST have # a value, the rest can be left alone. # APPNAME contains just the name of the application, without suffix ("" # on Unix, ".exe" on Windows, ...). This one MUST have a value when using # this makefile to build applications. # For example, to build foo, you need to do the following: #APPNAME=foo APPNAME= # SRCDIR is the top directory of the source tree. SRCDIR=. # OBJECTS contains all the object files to link together into the application. # This must contain at least one object file. #OBJECTS=foo.o OBJECTS= # LIBEXTRAS contains extra modules to link together with the library. # For example, if a second library, say libbar.a needs to be linked into # libfoo.so, you need to do the following: #LIBEXTRAS=libbar.a # Note that this MUST be used when using the link_dso targets, to hold the # names of all object files that go into the target shared object. LIBEXTRAS= # LIBDEPS contains all the flags necessary to cover all necessary # dependencies to other libraries. LIBDEPS= #------------------------------------------------------------------------------ # The rest is private to this makefile. SET_X=: #SET_X=set -x top: echo "Trying to use this makefile interactively? Don't." LINK_APP= \ ( $(SET_X); \ LIBDEPS="$${LIBDEPS:-$(LIBDEPS)}"; \ LDCMD="$${LDCMD:-$(CC)}"; LDFLAGS="$${LDFLAGS:-$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)}"; \ LIBPATH=`for x in $$LIBDEPS; do echo $$x; done | sed -e 's/^ *-L//;t' -e d | uniq`; \ LIBPATH=`echo $$LIBPATH | sed -e 's/ /:/g'`; \ echo LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \ $${LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS} -o $${APPNAME:=$(APPNAME)} $(OBJECTS) $${LIBDEPS}; \ LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \ $${LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS} -o $${APPNAME:=$(APPNAME)} $(OBJECTS) $${LIBDEPS} ) LINK_SO= \ ( $(SET_X); \ LIBDEPS="$${LIBDEPS:-$(LIBDEPS)}"; \ SHAREDCMD="$${SHAREDCMD:-$(CC)}"; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$${SHAREDFLAGS:-$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS)}"; \ LIBPATH=`for x in $$LIBDEPS; do echo $$x; done | sed -e 's/^ *-L//;t' -e d | uniq`; \ LIBPATH=`echo $$LIBPATH | sed -e 's/ /:/g'`; \ echo LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \ $${SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS} \ -o $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) \ $$ALLSYMSFLAGS $$SHOBJECTS $$NOALLSYMSFLAGS $$LIBDEPS; \ LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LIBPATH:$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH \ $${SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS} \ -o $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) \ $$ALLSYMSFLAGS $$SHOBJECTS $$NOALLSYMSFLAGS $$LIBDEPS \ ) && $(SYMLINK_SO) SYMLINK_SO= \ if [ -n "$$INHIBIT_SYMLINKS" ]; then :; else \ if [ -n "$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)" -a -n "$(SHLIBNAME)" -a \ "$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)" != "$(SHLIBNAME)" ]; then \ ( $(SET_X); \ rm -f $(SHLIBNAME); \ ln -s $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) $(SHLIBNAME) ); \ fi; \ fi LINK_SO_SHLIB= SHOBJECTS="$(STLIBNAME) $(LIBEXTRAS)"; $(LINK_SO) LINK_SO_DSO= INHIBIT_SYMLINKS=yes; SHOBJECTS="$(LIBEXTRAS)"; $(LINK_SO) LINK_SO_SHLIB_VIA_O= \ SHOBJECTS=$(STLIBNAME).o; \ ALL=$$ALLSYMSFLAGS; ALLSYMSFLAGS=; NOALLSYMSFLAGS=; \ ( echo ld $(LDFLAGS) -r -o $$SHOBJECTS $$ALL $(STLIBNAME) $(LIBEXTRAS); \ ld $(LDFLAGS) -r -o $$SHOBJECTS $$ALL $(STLIBNAME) $(LIBEXTRAS) ); \ $(LINK_SO) && ( echo rm -f $$SHOBJECTS; rm -f $$SHOBJECTS ) LINK_SO_SHLIB_UNPACKED= \ UNPACKDIR=link_tmp.$$$$; rm -rf $$UNPACKDIR; mkdir $$UNPACKDIR; \ (cd $$UNPACKDIR; ar x ../$(STLIBNAME)) && \ ([ -z "$(LIBEXTRAS)" ] || cp $(LIBEXTRAS) $$UNPACKDIR) && \ SHOBJECTS=$$UNPACKDIR/*.o; \ $(LINK_SO) && rm -rf $$UNPACKDIR DETECT_GNU_LD=($(CC) -Wl,-V /dev/null 2>&1 | grep '^GNU ld' )>/dev/null DO_GNU_SO_COMMON=\ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-soname=$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)" DO_GNU_DSO=\ $(DO_GNU_SO_COMMON) DO_GNU_SO=\ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \ $(DO_GNU_SO_COMMON) DO_GNU_APP=LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)" #This is rather special. It's a special target with which one can link #applications without bothering with any features that have anything to #do with shared libraries, for example when linking against static #libraries. It's mostly here to avoid a lot of conditionals everywhere #else... link_app.: $(LINK_APP) link_dso.gnu: @ $(DO_GNU_DSO); $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.gnu: @ $(DO_GNU_SO); $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) link_app.gnu: @ $(DO_GNU_APP); $(LINK_APP) link_shlib.linux-shared: @$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdef.pl $(LIBNAME) linux >$(LIBNAME).map; \ $(DO_GNU_SO); \ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive,--version-script=$(LIBNAME).map'; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) link_dso.bsd: @if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_DSO); else \ LIBDEPS=" "; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -nostdlib"; \ fi; $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.bsd: @if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_SO); else \ LIBDEPS=" "; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS="-Wl,-Bforcearchive"; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -nostdlib"; \ fi; $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) link_app.bsd: @if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_APP); else \ LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \ fi; $(LINK_APP) # For Darwin AKA Mac OS/X (dyld) # Originally link_dso.darwin produced .so, because it was hard-coded # in dso_dlfcn module. At later point dso_dlfcn switched to .dylib # extension in order to allow for run-time linking with vendor- # supplied shared libraries such as libz, so that link_dso.darwin had # to be harmonized with it. This caused minor controversy, because # it was believed that dlopen can't be used to dynamically load # .dylib-s, only so called bundle modules (ones linked with -bundle # flag). The belief seems to be originating from pre-10.4 release, # where dlfcn functionality was emulated by dlcompat add-on. In # 10.4 dlopen was rewritten as native part of dyld and is documented # to be capable of loading both dynamic libraries and bundles. In # order to provide compatibility with pre-10.4 dlopen, modules are # linked with -bundle flag, which makes .dylib extension misleading. # It works, because dlopen is [and always was] extension-agnostic. # Alternative to this heuristic approach is to develop specific # MacOS X dso module relying on whichever "native" dyld interface. link_dso.darwin: @ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) `echo $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) | sed s/dynamiclib/bundle/`"; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.darwin: @ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-all_load'; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -current_version $(SHLIBVERSION) -compatibility_version $(SHLIBVERSION) -install_name $(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) link_app.darwin: # is there run-path on darwin? $(LINK_APP) link_dso.cygwin: @ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ base=-Wl,--enable-auto-image-base; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.cygwin: @ INHIBIT_SYMLINKS=yes; \ echo "$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) |" \ "$(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o"; \ $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) | \ $(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,--enable-auto-image-base -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,$(SHLIBNAME) rc.o"; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) || exit 1; \ rm rc.o link_app.cygwin: $(LINK_APP) # link_dso.mingw-shared and link_app.mingw-shared are mapped to the # corresponding cygwin targets, as they do the exact same thing. link_shlib.mingw: @ INHIBIT_SYMLINKS=yes; \ base=; [ $(LIBNAME) = "crypto" -a -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] && base=-Wl,--image-base,0x63000000; \ $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdef.pl 32 $(LIBNAME) \ | sed -e 's|^\(LIBRARY *\)$(LIBNAME)32|\1$(SHLIBNAME_FULL)|' \ > $(LIBNAME).def; \ echo "$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) |" \ "$(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o"; \ $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkrc.pl $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) | \ $(RC) $(SHARED_RCFLAGS) -o rc.o; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,$(SHLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME).def rc.o"; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) || exit 1; \ rm $(LIBNAME).def rc.o link_dso.alpha-osf1: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_DSO); \ else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-B,symbolic"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.alpha-osf1: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_SO); \ else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-all'; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-none'; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-B,symbolic -set_version $(SHLIBVERSION)"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) link_app.alpha-osf1: @if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_APP); \ else \ LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_APP) link_dso.solaris: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_DSO); \ else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.solaris: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_SO); \ else \ $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/mkdef.pl $(LIBNAME) linux >$(LIBNAME).map; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS="-Wl,-z,allextract,-M,$(LIBNAME).map"; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS="-Wl,-z,defaultextract"; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) link_app.solaris: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_APP); \ else \ LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_APP) # OpenServer 5 native compilers used link_dso.svr3: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_DSO); \ else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -G -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.svr3: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_SO); \ else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -G -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB_UNPACKED) link_app.svr3: @$(DETECT_GNU_LD) && $(DO_GNU_APP); \ $(LINK_APP) # UnixWare 7 and OpenUNIX 8 native compilers used link_dso.svr5: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_DSO); \ else \ SHARE_FLAG='-G'; \ ($(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep gcc) > /dev/null && SHARE_FLAG='-shared'; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $${SHARE_FLAG} -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.svr5: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_SO); \ else \ SHARE_FLAG='-G'; \ ($(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep gcc) > /dev/null && SHARE_FLAG='-shared'; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $${SHARE_FLAG} -h $(SHLIBNAME_FULL)"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB_UNPACKED) link_app.svr5: @$(DETECT_GNU_LD) && $(DO_GNU_APP); \ $(LINK_APP) link_dso.irix: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_DSO); \ else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=""; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-soname,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),-B,symbolic"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) link_shlib.irix: @ if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then \ $(DO_GNU_SO); \ else \ MINUSWL=""; \ ($(CC) -v 2>&1 | grep gcc) > /dev/null && MINUSWL="-Wl,"; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSWL}-all"; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS="$${MINUSWL}-none"; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared -Wl,-soname,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),-B,symbolic"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) link_app.irix: @LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)"; \ $(LINK_APP) # 32-bit PA-RISC HP-UX embeds the -L pathname of libs we link with, so # we compensate for it with +cdp ../: and +cdp ./:. Yes, these rewrite # rules imply that we can only link one level down in catalog structure, # but that's what takes place for the moment of this writing. +cdp option # was introduced in HP-UX 11.x and applies in 32-bit PA-RISC link # editor context only [it's simply ignored in other cases, which are all # ELFs by the way]. # link_dso.hpux: @if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_DSO); else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ expr $(PLATFORM) : 'hpux64' > /dev/null && ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,+forceload'; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-B,symbolic,+vnocompatwarnings,-z,+s,+h,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),+cdp,../:,+cdp,./:"; \ fi; \ rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) || :; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO) && chmod a=rx $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) link_shlib.hpux: @if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_SO); else \ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,-Fl'; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ expr $(PLATFORM) : 'hpux64' > /dev/null && ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,+forceload'; \ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-B,symbolic,+vnocompatwarnings,-z,+s,+h,$(SHLIBNAME_FULL),+cdp,../:,+cdp,./:"; \ fi; \ rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) || :; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB) && chmod a=rx $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) link_app.hpux: @if $(DETECT_GNU_LD); then $(DO_GNU_APP); else \ LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,+s,+cdp,../:,+cdp,./:"; \ fi; \ $(LINK_APP) link_dso.aix: @OBJECT_MODE=`expr "x$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)" : 'x\-[a-z]*\(64\)'` || :; \ OBJECT_MODE=$${OBJECT_MODE:-32}; export OBJECT_MODE; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS='$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-bexpall,-bnolibpath,-bM:SRE'; \ rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) 2>&1 > /dev/null ; \ $(LINK_SO_DSO); link_shlib.aix: @ OBJECT_MODE=`expr "x$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)" : 'x\-[a-z]*\(64\)'` || : ; \ OBJECT_MODE=$${OBJECT_MODE:-32}; export OBJECT_MODE; \ ALLSYMSFLAGS='-bnogc'; \ NOALLSYMSFLAGS=''; \ SHAREDFLAGS='$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -Wl,-bexpall,-bnolibpath,-bM:SRE'; \ rm -f $(SHLIBNAME_FULL) 2>&1 > /dev/null ; \ $(LINK_SO_SHLIB_VIA_O) link_app.aix: LDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) -Wl,-bsvr4 $(LDFLAGS)"; \ $(LINK_APP) # Targets to build symbolic links when needed symlink.gnu symlink.solaris symlink.svr3 symlink.svr5 symlink.irix \ symlink.aix: @ $(SYMLINK_SO) symlink.darwin: @ $(SYMLINK_SO) symlink.hpux: @ $(SYMLINK_SO) # The following lines means those specific architectures do no symlinks symlink.cygwin symlink.alpha-osf1 symlink.tru64 symlink.tru64-rpath: # Compatibility targets link_dso.bsd-gcc-shared link_dso.linux-shared link_dso.gnu-shared: link_dso.gnu link_shlib.bsd-gcc-shared: link_shlib.linux-shared link_shlib.gnu-shared: link_shlib.gnu link_app.bsd-gcc-shared link_app.linux-shared link_app.gnu-shared: link_app.gnu symlink.bsd-gcc-shared symlink.bsd-shared symlink.linux-shared symlink.gnu-shared: symlink.gnu link_dso.bsd-shared: link_dso.bsd link_shlib.bsd-shared: link_shlib.bsd link_app.bsd-shared: link_app.bsd link_dso.darwin-shared: link_dso.darwin link_shlib.darwin-shared: link_shlib.darwin link_app.darwin-shared: link_app.darwin symlink.darwin-shared: symlink.darwin link_dso.cygwin-shared: link_dso.cygwin link_shlib.cygwin-shared: link_shlib.cygwin link_app.cygwin-shared: link_app.cygwin symlink.cygwin-shared: symlink.cygwin link_dso.mingw-shared: link_dso.cygwin link_shlib.mingw-shared: link_shlib.mingw link_app.mingw-shared: link_app.cygwin symlink.mingw-shared: symlink.cygwin link_dso.alpha-osf1-shared: link_dso.alpha-osf1 link_shlib.alpha-osf1-shared: link_shlib.alpha-osf1 link_app.alpha-osf1-shared: link_app.alpha-osf1 symlink.alpha-osf1-shared: symlink.alpha-osf1 link_dso.tru64-shared: link_dso.tru64 link_shlib.tru64-shared: link_shlib.tru64 link_app.tru64-shared: link_app.tru64 symlink.tru64-shared: symlink.tru64 link_dso.tru64-shared-rpath: link_dso.tru64-rpath link_shlib.tru64-shared-rpath: link_shlib.tru64-rpath link_app.tru64-shared-rpath: link_app.tru64-rpath symlink.tru64-shared-rpath: symlink.tru64-rpath link_dso.solaris-shared: link_dso.solaris link_shlib.solaris-shared: link_shlib.solaris link_app.solaris-shared: link_app.solaris symlink.solaris-shared: symlink.solaris link_dso.svr3-shared: link_dso.svr3 link_shlib.svr3-shared: link_shlib.svr3 link_app.svr3-shared: link_app.svr3 symlink.svr3-shared: symlink.svr3 link_dso.svr5-shared: link_dso.svr5 link_shlib.svr5-shared: link_shlib.svr5 link_app.svr5-shared: link_app.svr5 symlink.svr5-shared: symlink.svr5 link_dso.irix-shared: link_dso.irix link_shlib.irix-shared: link_shlib.irix link_app.irix-shared: link_app.irix symlink.irix-shared: symlink.irix link_dso.hpux-shared: link_dso.hpux link_shlib.hpux-shared: link_shlib.hpux link_app.hpux-shared: link_app.hpux symlink.hpux-shared: symlink.hpux link_dso.aix-shared: link_dso.aix link_shlib.aix-shared: link_shlib.aix link_app.aix-shared: link_app.aix symlink.aix-shared: symlink.aix openssl-1.1.0g/NOTES.WIN0000644000000000000000000001236013176625656013333 0ustar rootroot NOTES FOR THE WINDOWS PLATFORMS =============================== Requirement details for native (Visual C++) builds -------------------------------------------------- In addition to the requirements and instructions listed in INSTALL, this are required as well: - You need Perl. We recommend ActiveState Perl, available from https://www.activestate.com/ActivePerl. Another viable alternative appears to be Strawberry Perl, http://strawberryperl.com. You also need the perl module Text::Template, available on CPAN. Please read NOTES.PERL for more information. - You need a C compiler. OpenSSL has been tested to build with these: * Visual C++ - Netwide Assembler, a.k.a. NASM, available from http://www.nasm.us, is required if you intend to utilize assembler modules. Note that NASM is the only supported assembler. The Microsoft provided assembler is NOT supported. Visual C++ (native Windows) --------------------------- Installation directories The default installation directories are derived from environment variables. For VC-WIN32, the following defaults are use: PREFIX: %ProgramFiles(86)%\OpenSSL OPENSSLDIR: %CommonProgramFiles(86)%\SSL For VC-WIN64, the following defaults are use: PREFIX: %ProgramW6432%\OpenSSL OPENSSLDIR: %CommonProgramW6432%\SSL Should those environment variables not exist (on a pure Win32 installation for examples), these fallbacks are used: PREFIX: %ProgramFiles%\OpenSSL OPENSSLDIR: %CommonProgramFiles%\SSL ALSO NOTE that those directories are usually write protected, even if your account is in the Administrators group. To work around that, start the command prompt by right-clicking on it and choosing "Run as Administrator" before running 'nmake install'. The other solution is, of course, to choose a different set of directories by using --prefix and --openssldir when configuring. GNU C (Cygwin) -------------- Cygwin implements a Posix/Unix runtime system (cygwin1.dll) on top of the Windows subsystem and provides a bash shell and GNU tools environment. Consequently, a make of OpenSSL with Cygwin is virtually identical to the Unix procedure. To build OpenSSL using Cygwin, you need to: * Install Cygwin (see https://cygwin.com/) * Install Cygwin Perl and ensure it is in the path. Recall that as least 5.10.0 is required. * Run the Cygwin bash shell Apart from that, follow the Unix instructions in INSTALL. NOTE: "make test" and normal file operations may fail in directories mounted as text (i.e. mount -t c:\somewhere /home) due to Cygwin stripping of carriage returns. To avoid this ensure that a binary mount is used, e.g. mount -b c:\somewhere /home. It is also possible to create "conventional" Windows binaries that use the Microsoft C runtime system (msvcrt.dll or crtdll.dll) using MinGW development add-on for Cygwin. MinGW is supported even as a standalone setup as described in the following section. In the context you should recognize that binaries targeting Cygwin itself are not interchangeable with "conventional" Windows binaries you generate with/for MinGW. GNU C (MinGW/MSYS) ------------------ * Compiler and shell environment installation: MinGW and MSYS are available from http://www.mingw.org/, both are required. Run the installers and do whatever magic they say it takes to start MSYS bash shell with GNU tools and matching Perl on its PATH. "Matching Perl" refers to chosen "shell environment", i.e. if built under MSYS, then Perl compiled for MSYS must be used. Alternatively, one can use MSYS2 from https://msys2.github.io/, which includes MingW (32-bit and 64-bit). * It is also possible to cross-compile it on Linux by configuring with './Configure --cross-compile-prefix=i386-mingw32- mingw ...'. Other possible cross compile prefixes include x86_64-w64-mingw32- and i686-w64-mingw32-. Linking your application ------------------------ This section applies to non-Cygwin builds. If you link with static OpenSSL libraries then you're expected to additionally link your application with WS2_32.LIB, GDI32.LIB, ADVAPI32.LIB, CRYPT32.LIB and USER32.LIB. Those developing non-interactive service applications might feel concerned about linking with GDI32.LIB and USER32.LIB, as they are justly associated with interactive desktop, which is not available to service processes. The toolkit is designed to detect in which context it's currently executed, GUI, console app or service, and act accordingly, namely whether or not to actually make GUI calls. Additionally those who wish to /DELAYLOAD:GDI32.DLL and /DELAYLOAD:USER32.DLL and actually keep them off service process should consider implementing and exporting from .exe image in question own _OPENSSL_isservice not relying on USER32.DLL. E.g., on Windows Vista and later you could: __declspec(dllexport) __cdecl BOOL _OPENSSL_isservice(void) { DWORD sess; if (ProcessIdToSessionId(GetCurrentProcessId(),&sess)) return sess==0; return FALSE; } If you link with OpenSSL .DLLs, then you're expected to include into your application code small "shim" snippet, which provides glue between OpenSSL BIO layer and your compiler run-time. See the OPENSSL_Applink manual page for further details. openssl-1.1.0g/NOTES.VMS0000644000000000000000000000526213176625656013346 0ustar rootroot NOTES FOR THE OPENVMS PLATFORM ============================== Requirement details ------------------- In addition to the requirements and instructions listed in INSTALL, this are required as well: * At least ODS-5 disk organization for source and build. Installation can be done on any existing disk organization. About ANSI C compiler --------------------- An ANSI C compiled is needed among other things. This means that VAX C is not and will not be supported. We have only tested with DEC C (a.k.a HP VMS C / VSI C) and require version 7.1 or later. Compiling with a different ANSI C compiler may require some work. Please avoid using C RTL feature logical names DECC$* when building and testing OpenSSL. Most of all, they can be disruptive when running the tests, as they affect the Perl interpreter. About ODS-5 directory names and Perl ------------------------------------ It seems that the perl function canonpath() in the File::Spec module doesn't treat file specifications where the last directory name contains periods very well. Unfortunately, some versions of VMS tar will keep the periods in the OpenSSL source directory instead of converting them to underscore, thereby leaving your source in something like [.openssl-1^.1^.0]. This will lead to issues when configuring and building OpenSSL. We have no replacement for Perl's canonpath(), so the best workaround for now is to rename the OpenSSL source directory, as follows (please adjust for the actual source directory name you have): $ rename openssl-1^.1^.0.DIR openssl-1_1_0.DIR About MMS and DCL ----------------- MMS has certain limitations when it comes to line length, and DCL has certain limitations when it comes to total command length. We do what we can to mitigate, but there is the possibility that it's not enough. Should you run into issues, a very simple solution is to set yourself up a few logical names for the directory trees you're going to use. Checking the distribution ------------------------- There have been reports of places where the distribution didn't quite get through, for example if you've copied the tree from a NFS-mounted Unix mount point. The easiest way to check if everything got through as it should is to check for one of the following files: [.crypto]opensslconf^.h.in The best way to get a correct distribution is to download the gzipped tar file from ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/, use GZIP -d to uncompress it and VMSTAR to unpack the resulting tar file. Gzip and VMSTAR are available here: http://antinode.info/dec/index.html#Software Should you need it, you can find UnZip for VMS here: http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html openssl-1.1.0g/config.com0000644000000000000000000000471313176625656014034 0ustar rootroot$ ! OpenSSL config: determine the architecture and run Configure $ ! Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. $ ! $ ! Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use $ ! this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a $ ! copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at $ ! https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $ ! $ ! Very simple for the moment, it will take the following arguments: $ ! $ ! -32 or 32 sets /POINTER_SIZE=32 $ ! -64 or 64 sets /POINTER_SIZE=64 $ ! -d sets debugging $ ! -h prints a usage and exits $ ! -t test mode, doesn't run Configure $ $ arch = f$edit( f$getsyi( "arch_name"), "lowercase") $ pointer_size = "" $ dryrun = 0 $ verbose = 0 $ here = F$PARSE("A.;",F$ENVIRONMENT("PROCEDURE"),,,"SYNTAX_ONLY") - "A.;" $ $ collected_args = "" $ P_index = 0 $ LOOP1: $ P_index = P_index + 1 $ IF P_index .GT. 8 THEN GOTO ENDLOOP1 $ P = F$EDIT(P1,"TRIM,LOWERCASE") $ IF P .EQS. "-h" $ THEN $ dryrun = 1 $ P = "" $ TYPE SYS$INPUT $ DECK Usage: @config [options] -32 or 32 Build with 32-bit pointer size. -64 or 64 Build with 64-bit pointer size. -d Build with debugging. -t Test mode, do not run the Configure perl script. -v Verbose mode, show the exact Configure call that is being made. -h This help. Any other text will be passed to the Configure perl script. See INSTALL for instructions. $ EOD $ ENDIF $ IF P .EQS. "-t" $ THEN $ dryrun = 1 $ verbose = 1 $ P = "" $ ENDIF $ IF P .EQS. "-v" $ THEN $ verbose = 1 $ P = "" $ ENDIF $ IF P .EQS. "-32" .OR. P .EQS. "32" $ THEN $ pointer_size = "-P32" $ P = "" $ ENDIF $ IF P .EQS. "-64" .OR. P .EQS. "64" $ THEN $ pointer_size = "-P64" $ P = "" $ ENDIF $ IF P .EQS. "-d" $ THEN $ collected_args = collected_args + " --debug" $ P = "" $ ENDIF $ IF P .NES. "" THEN - collected_args = collected_args + " " + P1 $ P1 = P2 $ P2 = P3 $ P3 = P4 $ P4 = P5 $ P5 = P6 $ P6 = P7 $ P7 = P8 $ P8 = "" $ GOTO LOOP1 $ ENDLOOP1: $ $ target = "vms-''arch'''pointer_size'" $ IF verbose THEN - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "PERL ''here'Configure ""''target'""''collected_args'" $ IF .not. dryrun THEN - PERL 'here'Configure "''target'" 'debug' 'collected_args' $ EXIT $STATUS openssl-1.1.0g/LICENSE0000644000000000000000000001376013176625655013075 0ustar rootroot LICENSE ISSUES ============== The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a double license, i.e. both the conditions of the OpenSSL License and the original SSLeay license apply to the toolkit. See below for the actual license texts. OpenSSL License --------------- /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2017 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ Original SSLeay License ----------------------- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660013375 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/armcap.c0000644000000000000000000001227113176625656015014 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "arm_arch.h" unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__<7 void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { } unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void) { return 0; } #else static sigset_t all_masked; static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp; static void ill_handler(int sig) { siglongjmp(ill_jmp, sig); } /* * Following subroutines could have been inlined, but it's not all * ARM compilers support inline assembler... */ void _armv7_neon_probe(void); void _armv8_aes_probe(void); void _armv8_sha1_probe(void); void _armv8_sha256_probe(void); void _armv8_pmull_probe(void); unsigned long _armv7_tick(void); unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void) { if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK) return _armv7_tick(); else return 0; } # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) __attribute__ ((constructor)); # endif /* * Use a weak reference to getauxval() so we can use it if it is available but * don't break the build if it is not. */ # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) extern unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long type) __attribute__ ((weak)); # else static unsigned long (*getauxval) (unsigned long) = NULL; # endif /* * ARM puts the feature bits for Crypto Extensions in AT_HWCAP2, whereas * AArch64 used AT_HWCAP. */ # if defined(__arm__) || defined (__arm) # define HWCAP 16 /* AT_HWCAP */ # define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 12) # define HWCAP_CE 26 /* AT_HWCAP2 */ # define HWCAP_CE_AES (1 << 0) # define HWCAP_CE_PMULL (1 << 1) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA1 (1 << 2) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA256 (1 << 3) # elif defined(__aarch64__) # define HWCAP 16 /* AT_HWCAP */ # define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 1) # define HWCAP_CE HWCAP # define HWCAP_CE_AES (1 << 3) # define HWCAP_CE_PMULL (1 << 4) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA1 (1 << 5) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA256 (1 << 6) # endif void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { char *e; struct sigaction ill_oact, ill_act; sigset_t oset; static int trigger = 0; if (trigger) return; trigger = 1; if ((e = getenv("OPENSSL_armcap"))) { OPENSSL_armcap_P = (unsigned int)strtoul(e, NULL, 0); return; } # if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(__aarch64__) /* * Capability probing by catching SIGILL appears to be problematic * on iOS. But since Apple universe is "monocultural", it's actually * possible to simply set pre-defined processor capability mask. */ if (1) { OPENSSL_armcap_P = ARMV7_NEON; return; } /* * One could do same even for __aarch64__ iOS builds. It's not done * exclusively for reasons of keeping code unified across platforms. * Unified code works because it never triggers SIGILL on Apple * devices... */ # endif sigfillset(&all_masked); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGTRAP); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGFPE); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGBUS); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGSEGV); OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0; memset(&ill_act, 0, sizeof(ill_act)); ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler; ill_act.sa_mask = all_masked; sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset); sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &ill_oact); if (getauxval != NULL) { if (getauxval(HWCAP) & HWCAP_NEON) { unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP_CE); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_AES) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_PMULL) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA1) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA256) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256; } } else if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv7_neon_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON; if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_pmull_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL | ARMV8_AES; } else if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_aes_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES; } if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_sha1_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1; } if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_sha256_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256; } } if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv7_tick(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_TICK; } sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_oact, NULL); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/s390xcap.c0000644000000000000000000000247313176625657015127 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include unsigned long long OPENSSL_s390xcap_P[10]; static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp; static void ill_handler(int sig) { siglongjmp(ill_jmp, sig); } unsigned long OPENSSL_s390x_facilities(void); void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { sigset_t oset; struct sigaction ill_act, oact; if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P[0]) return; OPENSSL_s390xcap_P[0] = 1UL << (8 * sizeof(unsigned long) - 1); memset(&ill_act, 0, sizeof(ill_act)); ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler; sigfillset(&ill_act.sa_mask); sigdelset(&ill_act.sa_mask, SIGILL); sigdelset(&ill_act.sa_mask, SIGTRAP); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset); sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &oact); /* protection against missing store-facility-list-extended */ if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) OPENSSL_s390x_facilities(); sigaction(SIGILL, &oact, NULL); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014102 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_ext.c0000644000000000000000000001064413176625660015640 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(const X509_CRL *x) { return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->crl.extensions)); } int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->crl.extensions, nid, lastpos)); } int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->crl.extensions, obj, lastpos)); } int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->crl.extensions, crit, lastpos)); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(const X509_CRL *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_get_ext(x->crl.extensions, loc)); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->crl.extensions, loc)); } void *X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(x->crl.extensions, nid, crit, idx); } int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->crl.extensions, nid, value, crit, flags); } int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->crl.extensions), ex, loc) != NULL); } int X509_get_ext_count(const X509 *x) { return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->cert_info.extensions)); } int X509_get_ext_by_NID(const X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->cert_info.extensions, nid, lastpos)); } int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->cert_info.extensions, obj, lastpos)); } int X509_get_ext_by_critical(const X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical (x->cert_info.extensions, crit, lastpos)); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(const X509 *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_get_ext(x->cert_info.extensions, loc)); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->cert_info.extensions, loc)); } int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->cert_info.extensions), ex, loc) != NULL); } void *X509_get_ext_d2i(const X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(x->cert_info.extensions, nid, crit, idx); } int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->cert_info.extensions, nid, value, crit, flags); } int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(const X509_REVOKED *x) { return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->extensions)); } int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->extensions, nid, lastpos)); } int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_REVOKED *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->extensions, obj, lastpos)); } int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_REVOKED *x, int crit, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->extensions, crit, lastpos)); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(const X509_REVOKED *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_get_ext(x->extensions, loc)); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->extensions, loc)); } int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->extensions), ex, loc) != NULL); } void *X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(x->extensions, nid, crit, idx); } int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->extensions, nid, value, crit, flags); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509type.c0000644000000000000000000000345713176625660015666 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include int X509_certificate_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { const EVP_PKEY *pk; int ret = 0, i; if (x == NULL) return (0); if (pkey == NULL) pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); else pk = pkey; if (pk == NULL) return (0); switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: ret = EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN; /* if (!sign only extension) */ ret |= EVP_PKT_ENC; break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: ret = EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN; break; case EVP_PKEY_EC: ret = EVP_PK_EC | EVP_PKT_SIGN | EVP_PKT_EXCH; break; case EVP_PKEY_DH: ret = EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH; break; case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: ret = EVP_PKT_EXCH | EVP_PKT_SIGN; break; default: break; } i = X509_get_signature_nid(x); if (i && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(i, NULL, &i)) { switch (i) { case NID_rsaEncryption: case NID_rsa: ret |= EVP_PKS_RSA; break; case NID_dsa: case NID_dsa_2: ret |= EVP_PKS_DSA; break; case NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey: ret |= EVP_PKS_EC; break; default: break; } } return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_v3.c0000644000000000000000000001334613176625660015372 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "x509_lcl.h" int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x) { if (x == NULL) return (0); return (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x)); } int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int lastpos) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (obj == NULL) return (-2); return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos)); } int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { int n; X509_EXTENSION *ex; if (sk == NULL) return (-1); lastpos++; if (lastpos < 0) lastpos = 0; n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk); for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) { ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(sk, lastpos); if (OBJ_cmp(ex->object, obj) == 0) return (lastpos); } return (-1); } int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, int crit, int lastpos) { int n; X509_EXTENSION *ex; if (sk == NULL) return (-1); lastpos++; if (lastpos < 0) lastpos = 0; n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk); for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) { ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(sk, lastpos); if (((ex->critical > 0) && crit) || ((ex->critical <= 0) && !crit)) return (lastpos); } return (-1); } X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc) { if (x == NULL || sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0) return NULL; else return sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(x, loc); } X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc) { X509_EXTENSION *ret; if (x == NULL || sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0) return (NULL); ret = sk_X509_EXTENSION_delete(x, loc); return (ret); } STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { X509_EXTENSION *new_ex = NULL; int n; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk = NULL; if (x == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err2; } if (*x == NULL) { if ((sk = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; } else sk = *x; n = sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(sk); if (loc > n) loc = n; else if (loc < 0) loc = n; if ((new_ex = X509_EXTENSION_dup(ex)) == NULL) goto err2; if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_insert(sk, new_ex, loc)) goto err; if (*x == NULL) *x = sk; return (sk); err: X509err(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: X509_EXTENSION_free(new_ex); sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(sk); return (NULL); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_EXTENSION *ret; obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (obj == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } ret = X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(ex, obj, crit, data); if (ret == NULL) ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); return (ret); } X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data) { X509_EXTENSION *ret; if ((ex == NULL) || (*ex == NULL)) { if ((ret = X509_EXTENSION_new()) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } } else ret = *ex; if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_object(ret, obj)) goto err; if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(ret, crit)) goto err; if (!X509_EXTENSION_set_data(ret, data)) goto err; if ((ex != NULL) && (*ex == NULL)) *ex = ret; return (ret); err: if ((ex == NULL) || (ret != *ex)) X509_EXTENSION_free(ret); return (NULL); } int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { if ((ex == NULL) || (obj == NULL)) return (0); ASN1_OBJECT_free(ex->object); ex->object = OBJ_dup(obj); return ex->object != NULL; } int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit) { if (ex == NULL) return (0); ex->critical = (crit) ? 0xFF : -1; return (1); } int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data) { int i; if (ex == NULL) return (0); i = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&ex->value, data->data, data->length); if (!i) return (0); return (1); } ASN1_OBJECT *X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex) { if (ex == NULL) return (NULL); return (ex->object); } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex) { if (ex == NULL) return (NULL); return &ex->value; } int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(const X509_EXTENSION *ex) { if (ex == NULL) return (0); if (ex->critical > 0) return 1; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/build.info0000644000000000000000000000074113176625660016060 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ x509_def.c x509_d2.c x509_r2x.c x509_cmp.c \ x509_obj.c x509_req.c x509spki.c x509_vfy.c \ x509_set.c x509cset.c x509rset.c x509_err.c \ x509name.c x509_v3.c x509_ext.c x509_att.c \ x509type.c x509_lu.c x_all.c x509_txt.c \ x509_trs.c by_file.c by_dir.c x509_vpm.c \ x_crl.c t_crl.c x_req.c t_req.c x_x509.c t_x509.c \ x_pubkey.c x_x509a.c x_attrib.c x_exten.c x_name.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509cset.c0000644000000000000000000001003513176625660015631 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version) { if (x == NULL) return (0); if (x->crl.version == NULL) { if ((x->crl.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) return (0); } return (ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->crl.version, version)); } int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name) { if (x == NULL) return (0); return (X509_NAME_set(&x->crl.issuer, name)); } int X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm) { if (x == NULL) return 0; return x509_set1_time(&x->crl.lastUpdate, tm); } int X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm) { if (x == NULL) return 0; return x509_set1_time(&x->crl.nextUpdate, tm); } int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *c) { int i; X509_REVOKED *r; /* * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order */ sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(c->crl.revoked); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(c->crl.revoked); i++) { r = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(c->crl.revoked, i); r->sequence = i; } c->crl.enc.modified = 1; return 1; } int X509_CRL_up_ref(X509_CRL *crl) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&crl->references, 1, &i, crl->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_CRL", crl); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } long X509_CRL_get_version(const X509_CRL *crl) { return ASN1_INTEGER_get(crl->crl.version); } const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->crl.lastUpdate; } const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->crl.nextUpdate; } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->crl.lastUpdate; } ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->crl.nextUpdate; } #endif X509_NAME *X509_CRL_get_issuer(const X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->crl.issuer; } const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_CRL_get0_extensions(const X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->crl.extensions; } STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->crl.revoked; } void X509_CRL_get0_signature(const X509_CRL *crl, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg) { if (psig != NULL) *psig = &crl->signature; if (palg != NULL) *palg = &crl->sig_alg; } int X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(const X509_CRL *crl) { return OBJ_obj2nid(crl->sig_alg.algorithm); } const ASN1_TIME *X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(const X509_REVOKED *x) { return x->revocationDate; } int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_TIME *tm) { ASN1_TIME *in; if (x == NULL) return (0); in = x->revocationDate; if (in != tm) { in = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm); if (in != NULL) { ASN1_TIME_free(x->revocationDate); x->revocationDate = in; } } return (in != NULL); } const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(const X509_REVOKED *x) { return &x->serialNumber; } int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { ASN1_INTEGER *in; if (x == NULL) return (0); in = &x->serialNumber; if (in != serial) return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial); return 1; } const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(const X509_REVOKED *r) { return r->extensions; } int i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(X509_CRL *crl, unsigned char **pp) { crl->crl.enc.modified = 1; return i2d_X509_CRL_INFO(&crl->crl, pp); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_att.c0000644000000000000000000002274013176625660015630 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "x509_lcl.h" int X509at_get_attr_count(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x) { return sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x); } int X509at_get_attr_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int nid, int lastpos) { const ASN1_OBJECT *obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (obj == NULL) return (-2); return (X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos)); } int X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { int n; X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex; if (sk == NULL) return (-1); lastpos++; if (lastpos < 0) lastpos = 0; n = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); for (; lastpos < n; lastpos++) { ex = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(sk, lastpos); if (OBJ_cmp(ex->object, obj) == 0) return (lastpos); } return (-1); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_get_attr(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc) { if (x == NULL || sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0) return NULL; else return sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(x, loc); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_delete_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret; if (x == NULL || sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(x) <= loc || loc < 0) return (NULL); ret = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_delete(x, loc); return (ret); } STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *new_attr = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk = NULL; if (x == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err2; } if (*x == NULL) { if ((sk = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; } else sk = *x; if ((new_attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(attr)) == NULL) goto err2; if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(sk, new_attr)) goto err; if (*x == NULL) *x = sk; return (sk); err: X509err(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(new_attr); sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(sk); return (NULL); } STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret; attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, type, bytes, len); if (!attr) return 0; ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr); X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr); return ret; } STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret; attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(NULL, nid, type, bytes, len); if (!attr) return 0; ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr); X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr); return ret; } STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *ret; attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(NULL, attrname, type, bytes, len); if (!attr) return 0; ret = X509at_add1_attr(x, attr); X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr); return ret; } void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type) { int i; X509_ATTRIBUTE *at; i = X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, lastpos); if (i == -1) return NULL; if ((lastpos <= -2) && (X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(x, obj, i) != -1)) return NULL; at = X509at_get_attr(x, i); if (lastpos <= -3 && (X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(at) != 1)) return NULL; return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(at, 0, type, NULL); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, int nid, int atrtype, const void *data, int len) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret; obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (obj == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(attr, obj, atrtype, data, len); if (ret == NULL) ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); return (ret); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int atrtype, const void *data, int len) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret; if ((attr == NULL) || (*attr == NULL)) { if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } } else ret = *attr; if (!X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(ret, obj)) goto err; if (!X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(ret, atrtype, data, len)) goto err; if ((attr != NULL) && (*attr == NULL)) *attr = ret; return (ret); err: if ((attr == NULL) || (ret != *attr)) X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(ret); return (NULL); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, const char *atrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_ATTRIBUTE *nattr; obj = OBJ_txt2obj(atrname, 0); if (obj == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME); ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", atrname); return (NULL); } nattr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(attr, obj, type, bytes, len); ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); return nattr; } int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { if ((attr == NULL) || (obj == NULL)) return (0); ASN1_OBJECT_free(attr->object); attr->object = OBJ_dup(obj); return attr->object != NULL; } int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype, const void *data, int len) { ASN1_TYPE *ttmp = NULL; ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL; int atype = 0; if (!attr) return 0; if (attrtype & MBSTRING_FLAG) { stmp = ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(NULL, data, len, attrtype, OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object)); if (!stmp) { X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return 0; } atype = stmp->type; } else if (len != -1) { if ((stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(attrtype)) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, data, len)) goto err; atype = attrtype; } /* * This is a bit naughty because the attribute should really have at * least one value but some types use and zero length SET and require * this. */ if (attrtype == 0) { ASN1_STRING_free(stmp); return 1; } if ((ttmp = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((len == -1) && !(attrtype & MBSTRING_FLAG)) { if (!ASN1_TYPE_set1(ttmp, attrtype, data)) goto err; } else { ASN1_TYPE_set(ttmp, atype, stmp); stmp = NULL; } if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(attr->set, ttmp)) goto err; return 1; err: X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_TYPE_free(ttmp); ASN1_STRING_free(stmp); return 0; } int X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(const X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr) { if (attr == NULL) return 0; return sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->set); } ASN1_OBJECT *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr) { if (attr == NULL) return (NULL); return (attr->object); } void *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx, int atrtype, void *data) { ASN1_TYPE *ttmp; ttmp = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, idx); if (!ttmp) return NULL; if (atrtype != ASN1_TYPE_get(ttmp)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA, X509_R_WRONG_TYPE); return NULL; } return ttmp->value.ptr; } ASN1_TYPE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx) { if (attr == NULL) return NULL; return sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->set, idx); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_x509.c0000644000000000000000000001434713176625660015313 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME), ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY), ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1), ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF) /* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */ extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache); static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval; switch (operation) { case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST: ret->ex_flags = 0; ret->ex_pathlen = -1; ret->ex_pcpathlen = -1; ret->skid = NULL; ret->akid = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL; ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL; #endif ret->aux = NULL; ret->crldp = NULL; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data)) return 0; break; case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST: CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data); X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid); AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid); CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp); policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache); GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname); NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free); ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid); #endif break; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = { ASN1_EMBED(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF), ASN1_EMBED(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_EMBED(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509) int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx)); } /* * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a * reliable source such as local storage. */ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { const unsigned char *q; X509 *ret; int freeret = 0; /* Save start position */ q = *pp; if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) freeret = 1; ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length); /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */ if (ret == NULL) return NULL; /* update length */ length -= q - *pp; if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) goto err; *pp = q; return ret; err: if (freeret) { X509_free(ret); if (a) *a = NULL; } return NULL; } /* * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer * length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the * error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions. * Here we avoid compounding the problem. */ static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) { int length, tmplen; unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL; OPENSSL_assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL); /* * This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509() * not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check * both just in case. */ length = i2d_X509(a, pp); if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) return length; tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp); if (tmplen < 0) { if (start != NULL) *pp = start; return tmplen; } length += tmplen; return length; } /* * Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer * length if pp == NULL. * * When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since * we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do * the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the * allocated buffer. */ int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) { int length; unsigned char *tmp; /* Buffer provided by caller */ if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL) return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp); /* Obtain the combined length */ if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0) return length; /* Allocate requisite combined storage */ *pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length); if (tmp == NULL) return -1; /* Push error onto error stack? */ /* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */ length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp); if (length <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(*pp); *pp = NULL; } return length; } int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp) { x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1; return i2d_X509_CINF(&x->cert_info, pp); } void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x) { if (psig) *psig = &x->signature; if (palg) *palg = &x->sig_alg; } int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x) { return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c0000644000000000000000000005316013176625660015460 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include "x509_lcl.h" X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method) { X509_LOOKUP *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; ret->method = method; if ((method->new_item != NULL) && !method->new_item(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; if ((ctx->method != NULL) && (ctx->method->free != NULL)) (*ctx->method->free) (ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE *s) { return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock); } int X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE *s) { return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); } int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx) { if (ctx->method == NULL) return 0; if (ctx->method->init != NULL) return ctx->method->init(ctx); else return 1; } int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx) { if (ctx->method == NULL) return 0; if (ctx->method->shutdown != NULL) return ctx->method->shutdown(ctx); else return 1; } int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, char **ret) { if (ctx->method == NULL) return -1; if (ctx->method->ctrl != NULL) return ctx->method->ctrl(ctx, cmd, argc, argl, ret); else return 1; } int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_subject == NULL)) return 0; if (ctx->skip) return 0; return ctx->method->get_by_subject(ctx, type, name, ret); } int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial == NULL)) return 0; return ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial(ctx, type, name, serial, ret); } int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint == NULL)) return 0; return ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint(ctx, type, bytes, len, ret); } int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret) { if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_alias == NULL)) return 0; return ctx->method->get_by_alias(ctx, type, str, len, ret); } static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT *const *a, const X509_OBJECT *const *b) { int ret; ret = ((*a)->type - (*b)->type); if (ret) return ret; switch ((*a)->type) { case X509_LU_X509: ret = X509_subject_name_cmp((*a)->data.x509, (*b)->data.x509); break; case X509_LU_CRL: ret = X509_CRL_cmp((*a)->data.crl, (*b)->data.crl); break; default: /* abort(); */ return 0; } return ret; } X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void) { X509_STORE *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp)) == NULL) goto err; ret->cache = 1; if ((ret->get_cert_methods = sk_X509_LOOKUP_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) goto err; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) goto err; ret->references = 1; return ret; err: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ret->param); sk_X509_OBJECT_free(ret->objs); sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(ret->get_cert_methods); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *vfy) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk; X509_LOOKUP *lu; if (vfy == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&vfy->references, -1, &i, vfy->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_STORE", vfy); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); sk = vfy->get_cert_methods; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) { lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i); X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(lu); X509_LOOKUP_free(lu); } sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(sk); sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(vfy->objs, X509_OBJECT_free); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, vfy, &vfy->ex_data); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vfy->param); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(vfy->lock); OPENSSL_free(vfy); } int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE *vfy) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&vfy->references, 1, &i, vfy->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509_STORE", a); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk; X509_LOOKUP *lu; sk = v->get_cert_methods; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) { lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i); if (m == lu->method) { return lu; } } /* a new one */ lu = X509_LOOKUP_new(m); if (lu == NULL) return NULL; else { lu->store_ctx = v; if (sk_X509_LOOKUP_push(v->get_cert_methods, lu)) return lu; else { X509_LOOKUP_free(lu); return NULL; } } } X509_OBJECT *X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name) { X509_OBJECT *ret = X509_OBJECT_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(vs, type, name, ret)) { X509_OBJECT_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret) { X509_STORE *ctx = vs->ctx; X509_LOOKUP *lu; X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp; int i, j; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); if (tmp == NULL || type == X509_LU_CRL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(ctx->get_cert_methods); i++) { lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(ctx->get_cert_methods, i); j = X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(lu, type, name, &stmp); if (j) { tmp = &stmp; break; } } if (tmp == NULL) return 0; } ret->type = tmp->type; ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr; X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(ret); return 1; } int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_OBJECT *obj; int ret = 1, added = 1; if (x == NULL) return 0; obj = X509_OBJECT_new(); if (obj == NULL) return 0; obj->type = X509_LU_X509; obj->data.x509 = x; X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); ret = 0; } else { added = sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj); ret = added != 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); if (!ret) /* obj not pushed */ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); if (!added) /* on push failure */ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x) { X509_OBJECT *obj; int ret = 1, added = 1; if (x == NULL) return 0; obj = X509_OBJECT_new(); if (obj == NULL) return 0; obj->type = X509_LU_CRL; obj->data.crl = x; X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); ret = 0; } else { added = sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj); ret = added != 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); if (!ret) /* obj not pushed */ X509_OBJECT_free(obj); if (!added) /* on push failure */ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } int X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a) { switch (a->type) { default: break; case X509_LU_X509: return X509_up_ref(a->data.x509); case X509_LU_CRL: return X509_CRL_up_ref(a->data.crl); } return 1; } X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(const X509_OBJECT *a) { if (a == NULL || a->type != X509_LU_X509) return NULL; return a->data.x509; } X509_CRL *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(X509_OBJECT *a) { if (a == NULL || a->type != X509_LU_CRL) return NULL; return a->data.crl; } X509_LOOKUP_TYPE X509_OBJECT_get_type(const X509_OBJECT *a) { return a->type; } X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_new() { X509_OBJECT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->type = X509_LU_NONE; return ret; } void X509_OBJECT_free(X509_OBJECT *a) { if (a == NULL) return; switch (a->type) { default: break; case X509_LU_X509: X509_free(a->data.x509); break; case X509_LU_CRL: X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl); break; } OPENSSL_free(a); } static int x509_object_idx_cnt(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, int *pnmatch) { X509_OBJECT stmp; X509 x509_s; X509_CRL crl_s; int idx; stmp.type = type; switch (type) { case X509_LU_X509: stmp.data.x509 = &x509_s; x509_s.cert_info.subject = name; break; case X509_LU_CRL: stmp.data.crl = &crl_s; crl_s.crl.issuer = name; break; default: /* abort(); */ return -1; } idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, &stmp); if (idx >= 0 && pnmatch) { int tidx; const X509_OBJECT *tobj, *pstmp; *pnmatch = 1; pstmp = &stmp; for (tidx = idx + 1; tidx < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); tidx++) { tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx); if (x509_object_cmp(&tobj, &pstmp)) break; (*pnmatch)++; } } return idx; } int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name) { return x509_object_idx_cnt(h, type, name, NULL); } X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name) { int idx; idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(h, type, name); if (idx == -1) return NULL; return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx); } STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *v) { return v->objs; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { int i, idx, cnt; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; X509 *x; X509_OBJECT *obj; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock); idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt); if (idx < 0) { /* * Nothing found in cache: do lookup to possibly add new objects to * cache */ X509_OBJECT *xobj = X509_OBJECT_new(); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); if (xobj == NULL) return NULL; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, nm, xobj)) { X509_OBJECT_free(xobj); return NULL; } X509_OBJECT_free(xobj); CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock); idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt); if (idx < 0) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); return NULL; } } sk = sk_X509_new_null(); for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) { obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx); x = obj->data.x509; X509_up_ref(x); if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return NULL; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); return sk; } STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { int i, idx, cnt; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); X509_CRL *x; X509_OBJECT *obj, *xobj = X509_OBJECT_new(); /* Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache */ if (sk == NULL || xobj == NULL || !X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, xobj)) { X509_OBJECT_free(xobj); sk_X509_CRL_free(sk); return NULL; } X509_OBJECT_free(xobj); CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock); idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt); if (idx < 0) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); sk_X509_CRL_free(sk); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) { obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx); x = obj->data.crl; X509_CRL_up_ref(x); if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); X509_CRL_free(x); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(sk, X509_CRL_free); return NULL; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); return sk; } X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_OBJECT *x) { int idx, i; X509_OBJECT *obj; idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, x); if (idx == -1) return NULL; if ((x->type != X509_LU_X509) && (x->type != X509_LU_CRL)) return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx); for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i++) { obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i); if (x509_object_cmp ((const X509_OBJECT **)&obj, (const X509_OBJECT **)&x)) return NULL; if (x->type == X509_LU_X509) { if (!X509_cmp(obj->data.x509, x->data.x509)) return obj; } else if (x->type == X509_LU_CRL) { if (!X509_CRL_match(obj->data.crl, x->data.crl)) return obj; } else return obj; } return NULL; } /*- * Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations * of the API this can only retrieve a single certificate matching * a given subject name. However it will fill the cache with all * matching certificates, so we can examine the cache for all * matches. * * Return values are: * 1 lookup successful. * 0 certificate not found. * -1 some other error. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_NAME *xn; X509_OBJECT *obj = X509_OBJECT_new(), *pobj = NULL; int i, ok, idx, ret; if (obj == NULL) return -1; *issuer = NULL; xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x); ok = X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, xn, obj); if (ok != 1) { X509_OBJECT_free(obj); return 0; } /* If certificate matches all OK */ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, obj->data.x509)) { if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, obj->data.x509, -1)) { *issuer = obj->data.x509; X509_up_ref(*issuer); X509_OBJECT_free(obj); return 1; } } X509_OBJECT_free(obj); /* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */ ret = 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->ctx->lock); idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, xn); if (idx != -1) { /* should be true as we've had at least one * match */ /* Look through all matching certs for suitable issuer */ for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(ctx->ctx->objs); i++) { pobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, i); /* See if we've run past the matches */ if (pobj->type != X509_LU_X509) break; if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, X509_get_subject_name(pobj->data.x509))) break; if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, pobj->data.x509)) { *issuer = pobj->data.x509; ret = 1; /* * If times check, exit with match, * otherwise keep looking. Leave last * match in issuer so we return nearest * match if no certificate time is OK. */ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, *issuer, -1)) break; } } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->ctx->lock); if (*issuer) X509_up_ref(*issuer); return ret; } int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); } int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); return 1; } int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose); } int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust); } int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->param; } void X509_STORE_set_verify(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) { ctx->verify = verify; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_get_verify(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->verify; } void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->verify_cb; } void X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn get_issuer) { ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->get_issuer; } void X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued) { ctx->check_issued = check_issued; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->check_issued; } void X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn check_revocation) { ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->check_revocation; } void X509_STORE_set_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl) { ctx->get_crl = get_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->get_crl; } void X509_STORE_set_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl) { ctx->check_crl = check_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->check_crl; } void X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn cert_crl) { ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->cert_crl; } void X509_STORE_set_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn check_policy) { ctx->check_policy = check_policy; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_get_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->check_policy; } void X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn lookup_certs) { ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_certs; } void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls) { ctx->lookup_crls = lookup_crls; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_crls; } void X509_STORE_set_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn ctx_cleanup) { ctx->cleanup = ctx_cleanup; } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_get_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx) { return ctx->cleanup; } int X509_STORE_set_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx, void *data) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); } void *X509_STORE_get_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); } X509_STORE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->ctx; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_x509a.c0000644000000000000000000001043313176625660015444 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" /* * X509_CERT_AUX routines. These are used to encode additional user * modifiable data about a certificate. This data is appended to the X509 * encoding when the *_X509_AUX routines are used. This means that the * "traditional" X509 routines will simply ignore the extra data. */ static X509_CERT_AUX *aux_get(X509 *x); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_CERT_AUX) = { ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, trust, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, reject, ASN1_OBJECT, 0), ASN1_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, alias, ASN1_UTF8STRING), ASN1_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, keyid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CERT_AUX, other, X509_ALGOR, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_CERT_AUX) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CERT_AUX) int X509_trusted(const X509 *x) { return x->aux ? 1 : 0; } static X509_CERT_AUX *aux_get(X509 *x) { if (x == NULL) return NULL; if (x->aux == NULL && (x->aux = X509_CERT_AUX_new()) == NULL) return NULL; return x->aux; } int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *name, int len) { X509_CERT_AUX *aux; if (!name) { if (!x || !x->aux || !x->aux->alias) return 1; ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(x->aux->alias); x->aux->alias = NULL; return 1; } if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL) return 0; if (aux->alias == NULL && (aux->alias = ASN1_UTF8STRING_new()) == NULL) return 0; return ASN1_STRING_set(aux->alias, name, len); } int X509_keyid_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *id, int len) { X509_CERT_AUX *aux; if (!id) { if (!x || !x->aux || !x->aux->keyid) return 1; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->aux->keyid); x->aux->keyid = NULL; return 1; } if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL) return 0; if (aux->keyid == NULL && (aux->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) return 0; return ASN1_STRING_set(aux->keyid, id, len); } unsigned char *X509_alias_get0(X509 *x, int *len) { if (!x->aux || !x->aux->alias) return NULL; if (len) *len = x->aux->alias->length; return x->aux->alias->data; } unsigned char *X509_keyid_get0(X509 *x, int *len) { if (!x->aux || !x->aux->keyid) return NULL; if (len) *len = x->aux->keyid->length; return x->aux->keyid->data; } int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { X509_CERT_AUX *aux; ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp = NULL; if (obj) { objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj); if (!objtmp) return 0; } if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL) goto err; if (aux->trust == NULL && (aux->trust = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if (!objtmp || sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->trust, objtmp)) return 1; err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp); return 0; } int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { X509_CERT_AUX *aux; ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp; if ((objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL) return 0; if ((aux = aux_get(x)) == NULL) goto err; if (aux->reject == NULL && (aux->reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; return sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->reject, objtmp); err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp); return 0; } void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x) { if (x->aux) { sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(x->aux->trust, ASN1_OBJECT_free); x->aux->trust = NULL; } } void X509_reject_clear(X509 *x) { if (x->aux) { sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(x->aux->reject, ASN1_OBJECT_free); x->aux->reject = NULL; } } STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_trust_objects(X509 *x) { if (x->aux != NULL) return x->aux->trust; return NULL; } STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_reject_objects(X509 *x) { if (x->aux != NULL) return x->aux->reject; return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_req.c0000644000000000000000000001710213176625660015623 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include #include X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { X509_REQ *ret; X509_REQ_INFO *ri; int i; EVP_PKEY *pktmp; ret = X509_REQ_new(); if (ret == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ri = &ret->req_info; ri->version->length = 1; ri->version->data = OPENSSL_malloc(1); if (ri->version->data == NULL) goto err; ri->version->data[0] = 0; /* version == 0 */ if (!X509_REQ_set_subject_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x))) goto err; pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pktmp == NULL) goto err; i = X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp); if (!i) goto err; if (pkey != NULL) { if (!X509_REQ_sign(ret, pkey, md)) goto err; } return (ret); err: X509_REQ_free(ret); return (NULL); } EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req) { if (req == NULL) return (NULL); return (X509_PUBKEY_get(req->req_info.pubkey)); } EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(X509_REQ *req) { if (req == NULL) return NULL; return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(req->req_info.pubkey)); } X509_PUBKEY *X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(X509_REQ *req) { return req->req_info.pubkey; } int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *k) { EVP_PKEY *xk = NULL; int ok = 0; xk = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(x); switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k)) { case 1: ok = 1; break; case 0: X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); break; case -1: X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); break; case -2: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (EVP_PKEY_id(k) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); break; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (EVP_PKEY_id(k) == EVP_PKEY_DH) { /* No idea */ X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY); break; } #endif X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); } EVP_PKEY_free(xk); return (ok); } /* * It seems several organisations had the same idea of including a list of * extensions in a certificate request. There are at least two OIDs that are * used and there may be more: so the list is configurable. */ static int ext_nid_list[] = { NID_ext_req, NID_ms_ext_req, NID_undef }; static int *ext_nids = ext_nid_list; int X509_REQ_extension_nid(int req_nid) { int i, nid; for (i = 0;; i++) { nid = ext_nids[i]; if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; else if (req_nid == nid) return 1; } } int *X509_REQ_get_extension_nids(void) { return ext_nids; } void X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids) { ext_nids = nids; } STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr; ASN1_TYPE *ext = NULL; int idx, *pnid; const unsigned char *p; if ((req == NULL) || !ext_nids) return (NULL); for (pnid = ext_nids; *pnid != NID_undef; pnid++) { idx = X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(req, *pnid, -1); if (idx == -1) continue; attr = X509_REQ_get_attr(req, idx); ext = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 0); break; } if (!ext || (ext->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) return NULL; p = ext->value.sequence->data; return (STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *) ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, ext->value.sequence->length, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS)); } /* * Add a STACK_OF extensions to a certificate request: allow alternative OIDs * in case we want to create a non standard one. */ int X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts, int nid) { int extlen; int rv = 0; unsigned char *ext = NULL; /* Generate encoding of extensions */ extlen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)exts, &ext, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_EXTENSIONS)); if (extlen <= 0) return 0; rv = X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, ext, extlen); OPENSSL_free(ext); return rv; } /* This is the normal usage: use the "official" OID */ int X509_REQ_add_extensions(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts) { return X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(req, exts, NID_ext_req); } /* Request attribute functions */ int X509_REQ_get_attr_count(const X509_REQ *req) { return X509at_get_attr_count(req->req_info.attributes); } int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(const X509_REQ *req, int nid, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(req->req_info.attributes, nid, lastpos); } int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(req->req_info.attributes, obj, lastpos); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_get_attr(const X509_REQ *req, int loc) { return X509at_get_attr(req->req_info.attributes, loc); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_delete_attr(X509_REQ *req, int loc) { return X509at_delete_attr(req->req_info.attributes, loc); } int X509_REQ_add1_attr(X509_REQ *req, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr) { if (X509at_add1_attr(&req->req_info.attributes, attr)) return 1; return 0; } int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ(X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&req->req_info.attributes, obj, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(X509_REQ *req, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&req->req_info.attributes, nid, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(X509_REQ *req, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&req->req_info.attributes, attrname, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } long X509_REQ_get_version(const X509_REQ *req) { return ASN1_INTEGER_get(req->req_info.version); } X509_NAME *X509_REQ_get_subject_name(const X509_REQ *req) { return req->req_info.subject; } void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg) { if (psig != NULL) *psig = req->signature; if (palg != NULL) *palg = &req->sig_alg; } int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req) { return OBJ_obj2nid(req->sig_alg.algorithm); } int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp) { req->req_info.enc.modified = 1; return i2d_X509_REQ_INFO(&req->req_info, pp); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_def.c0000644000000000000000000000164013176625660015572 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include const char *X509_get_default_private_dir(void) { return (X509_PRIVATE_DIR); } const char *X509_get_default_cert_area(void) { return (X509_CERT_AREA); } const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void) { return (X509_CERT_DIR); } const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(void) { return (X509_CERT_FILE); } const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void) { return (X509_CERT_DIR_EVP); } const char *X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void) { return (X509_CERT_FILE_EVP); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_name.c0000644000000000000000000003703113176625660015521 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "x509_lcl.h" /* * Maximum length of X509_NAME: much larger than anything we should * ever see in practice. */ #define X509_NAME_MAX (1024 * 1024) static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass); static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a); static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a); static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in); static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * intname, unsigned char **in); static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, int indent, const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_NAME_ENTRY) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, object, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, value, ASN1_PRINTABLE) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME_ENTRY) /* * For the "Name" type we need a SEQUENCE OF { SET OF X509_NAME_ENTRY } so * declare two template wrappers for this */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_ENTRIES) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, RDNS, X509_NAME_ENTRY) static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRIES) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_INTERNAL) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Name, X509_NAME_ENTRIES) static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_INTERNAL) /* * Normally that's where it would end: we'd have two nested STACK structures * representing the ASN1. Unfortunately X509_NAME uses a completely different * form and caches encodings so we have to process the internal form and * convert to the external form. */ static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_name_ff = { NULL, x509_name_ex_new, x509_name_ex_free, 0, /* Default clear behaviour is OK */ x509_name_ex_d2i, x509_name_ex_i2d, x509_name_ex_print }; IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509_NAME, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_name_ff) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME) static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { X509_NAME *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) goto memerr; if ((ret->entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null()) == NULL) goto memerr; if ((ret->bytes = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) goto memerr; ret->modified = 1; *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret; return 1; memerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (ret) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ret->entries); OPENSSL_free(ret); } return 0; } static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { X509_NAME *a; if (!pval || !*pval) return; a = (X509_NAME *)*pval; BUF_MEM_free(a->bytes); sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(a->entries, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc); OPENSSL_free(a); *pval = NULL; } static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); } static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(ne, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); } static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { const unsigned char *p = *in, *q; union { STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s; ASN1_VALUE *a; } intname = { NULL }; union { X509_NAME *x; ASN1_VALUE *a; } nm = { NULL }; int i, j, ret; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries; X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; if (len > X509_NAME_MAX) len = X509_NAME_MAX; q = p; /* Get internal representation of Name */ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&intname.a, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (ret <= 0) return ret; if (*val) x509_name_ex_free(val, NULL); if (!x509_name_ex_new(&nm.a, NULL)) goto err; /* We've decoded it: now cache encoding */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(nm.x->bytes, p - q)) goto err; memcpy(nm.x->bytes->data, q, p - q); /* Convert internal representation to X509_NAME structure */ for (i = 0; i < sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(intname.s); i++) { entries = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(intname.s, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(entries); j++) { entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(entries, j); entry->set = i; if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(nm.x->entries, entry)) goto err; sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(entries, j, NULL); } } ret = x509_name_canon(nm.x); if (!ret) goto err; sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); nm.x->modified = 0; *val = nm.a; *in = p; return ret; err: if (nm.x != NULL) X509_NAME_free(nm.x); sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free); ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass) { int ret; X509_NAME *a = (X509_NAME *)*val; if (a->modified) { ret = x509_name_encode(a); if (ret < 0) return ret; ret = x509_name_canon(a); if (ret < 0) return ret; } ret = a->bytes->length; if (out != NULL) { memcpy(*out, a->bytes->data, ret); *out += ret; } return ret; } static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a) { union { STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s; ASN1_VALUE *a; } intname = { NULL }; int len; unsigned char *p; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; int i, set = -1; intname.s = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!intname.s) goto memerr; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) { entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i); if (entry->set != set) { entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!entries) goto memerr; if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname.s, entries)) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries); goto memerr; } set = entry->set; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, entry)) goto memerr; } len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1); if (!BUF_MEM_grow(a->bytes, len)) goto memerr; p = (unsigned char *)a->bytes->data; ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a, &p, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1); sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); a->modified = 0; return len; memerr: sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, int indent, const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, (const X509_NAME *)*pval, indent, pctx->nm_flags) <= 0) return 0; return 2; } /* * This function generates the canonical encoding of the Name structure. In * it all strings are converted to UTF8, leading, trailing and multiple * spaces collapsed, converted to lower case and the leading SEQUENCE header * removed. In future we could also normalize the UTF8 too. By doing this * comparison of Name structures can be rapidly performed by just using * memcmp() of the canonical encoding. By omitting the leading SEQUENCE name * constraints of type dirName can also be checked with a simple memcmp(). */ static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a) { unsigned char *p; STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *intname = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry, *tmpentry = NULL; int i, set = -1, ret = 0, len; OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc); a->canon_enc = NULL; /* Special case: empty X509_NAME => null encoding */ if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries) == 0) { a->canon_enclen = 0; return 1; } intname = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!intname) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) { entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i); if (entry->set != set) { entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!entries) goto err; if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname, entries)) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries); goto err; } set = entry->set; } tmpentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new(); if (tmpentry == NULL) goto err; tmpentry->object = OBJ_dup(entry->object); if (tmpentry->object == NULL) goto err; if (!asn1_string_canon(tmpentry->value, entry->value)) goto err; if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, tmpentry)) goto err; tmpentry = NULL; } /* Finally generate encoding */ len = i2d_name_canon(intname, NULL); if (len < 0) goto err; a->canon_enclen = len; p = OPENSSL_malloc(a->canon_enclen); if (p == NULL) goto err; a->canon_enc = p; i2d_name_canon(intname, &p); ret = 1; err: X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free); return ret; } /* Bitmap of all the types of string that will be canonicalized. */ #define ASN1_MASK_CANON \ (B_ASN1_UTF8STRING | B_ASN1_BMPSTRING | B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING \ | B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING | B_ASN1_T61STRING | B_ASN1_IA5STRING \ | B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in) { unsigned char *to, *from; int len, i; /* If type not in bitmask just copy string across */ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(in->type) & ASN1_MASK_CANON)) { if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(out, in)) return 0; return 1; } out->type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING; out->length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&out->data, in); if (out->length == -1) return 0; to = out->data; from = to; len = out->length; /* * Convert string in place to canonical form. Ultimately we may need to * handle a wider range of characters but for now ignore anything with * MSB set and rely on the isspace() and tolower() functions. */ /* Ignore leading spaces */ while ((len > 0) && !(*from & 0x80) && isspace(*from)) { from++; len--; } to = from + len; /* Ignore trailing spaces */ while ((len > 0) && !(to[-1] & 0x80) && isspace(to[-1])) { to--; len--; } to = out->data; i = 0; while (i < len) { /* If MSB set just copy across */ if (*from & 0x80) { *to++ = *from++; i++; } /* Collapse multiple spaces */ else if (isspace(*from)) { /* Copy one space across */ *to++ = ' '; /* * Ignore subsequent spaces. Note: don't need to check len here * because we know the last character is a non-space so we can't * overflow. */ do { from++; i++; } while (!(*from & 0x80) && isspace(*from)); } else { *to++ = tolower(*from); from++; i++; } } out->length = to - out->data; return 1; } static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * _intname, unsigned char **in) { int i, len, ltmp; ASN1_VALUE *v; STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *intname = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)_intname; len = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(intname); i++) { v = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(intname, i); ltmp = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&v, in, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_ENTRIES), -1, -1); if (ltmp < 0) return ltmp; len += ltmp; } return len; } int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name) { if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(name)) == NULL) return 0; X509_NAME_free(*xn); *xn = name; return 1; } int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase) { char *s, *c, *b; int l, i; l = 80 - 2 - obase; b = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0); if (!b) return 0; if (!*b) { OPENSSL_free(b); return 1; } s = b + 1; /* skip the first slash */ c = s; for (;;) { #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if (((*s == '/') && ((s[1] >= 'A') && (s[1] <= 'Z') && ((s[2] == '=') || ((s[2] >= 'A') && (s[2] <= 'Z') && (s[3] == '=')) ))) || (*s == '\0')) #else if (((*s == '/') && (isupper(s[1]) && ((s[2] == '=') || (isupper(s[2]) && (s[3] == '=')) ))) || (*s == '\0')) #endif { i = s - c; if (BIO_write(bp, c, i) != i) goto err; c = s + 1; /* skip following slash */ if (*s != '\0') { if (BIO_write(bp, ", ", 2) != 2) goto err; } l--; } if (*s == '\0') break; s++; l--; } OPENSSL_free(b); return 1; err: X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); OPENSSL_free(b); return 0; } int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder, size_t *pderlen) { /* Make sure encoding is valid */ if (i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) <= 0) return 0; if (pder != NULL) *pder = (unsigned char *)nm->bytes->data; if (pderlen != NULL) *pderlen = nm->bytes->length; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c0000644000000000000000000002210013176625660016067 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include struct X509_pubkey_st { X509_ALGOR *algor; ASN1_BIT_STRING *public_key; EVP_PKEY *pkey; }; static int x509_pubkey_decode(EVP_PKEY **pk, X509_PUBKEY *key); /* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */ static int pubkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) { X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval; EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey); } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) { /* Attempt to decode public key and cache in pubkey structure. */ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval; EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey); /* * Opportunistically decode the key but remove any non fatal errors * from the queue. Subsequent explicit attempts to decode/use the key * will return an appropriate error. */ ERR_set_mark(); if (x509_pubkey_decode(&pubkey->pkey, pubkey) == -1) return 0; ERR_pop_to_mark(); } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(X509_PUBKEY, pubkey_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, algor, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, public_key, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(X509_PUBKEY, X509_PUBKEY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY) int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { X509_PUBKEY *pk = NULL; if (x == NULL) return (0); if ((pk = X509_PUBKEY_new()) == NULL) goto error; if (pkey->ameth) { if (pkey->ameth->pub_encode) { if (!pkey->ameth->pub_encode(pk, pkey)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR); goto error; } } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto error; } } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); goto error; } X509_PUBKEY_free(*x); *x = pk; pk->pkey = pkey; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey); return 1; error: X509_PUBKEY_free(pk); return 0; } /* * Attempt to decode a public key. * Returns 1 on success, 0 for a decode failure and -1 for a fatal * error e.g. malloc failure. */ static int x509_pubkey_decode(EVP_PKEY **ppkey, X509_PUBKEY *key) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, OBJ_obj2nid(key->algor->algorithm))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); goto error; } if (pkey->ameth->pub_decode) { /* * Treat any failure of pub_decode as a decode error. In * future we could have different return codes for decode * errors and fatal errors such as malloc failure. */ if (!pkey->ameth->pub_decode(pkey, key)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR); goto error; } } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto error; } *ppkey = pkey; return 1; error: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key) { EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->public_key == NULL) return NULL; if (key->pkey != NULL) return key->pkey; /* * When the key ASN.1 is initially parsed an attempt is made to * decode the public key and cache the EVP_PKEY structure. If this * operation fails the cached value will be NULL. Parsing continues * to allow parsing of unknown key types or unsupported forms. * We repeat the decode operation so the appropriate errors are left * in the queue. */ x509_pubkey_decode(&ret, key); /* If decode doesn't fail something bad happened */ if (ret != NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(ret); } return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key) { EVP_PKEY *ret = X509_PUBKEY_get0(key); if (ret != NULL) EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret); return ret; } /* * Now two pseudo ASN1 routines that take an EVP_PKEY structure and encode or * decode as X509_PUBKEY */ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { X509_PUBKEY *xpk; EVP_PKEY *pktmp; const unsigned char *q; q = *pp; xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length); if (!xpk) return NULL; pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk); X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk); if (!pktmp) return NULL; *pp = q; if (a) { EVP_PKEY_free(*a); *a = pktmp; } return pktmp; } int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp) { X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL; int ret; if (!a) return 0; if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&xpk, a)) return 0; ret = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, pp); X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk); return ret; } /* * The following are equivalents but which return RSA and DSA keys */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; RSA *key; const unsigned char *q; q = *pp; pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length); if (!pkey) return NULL; key = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (!key) return NULL; *pp = q; if (a) { RSA_free(*a); *a = key; } return key; } int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; int ret; if (!a) return 0; pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pktmp == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pktmp, a); ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; DSA *key; const unsigned char *q; q = *pp; pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length); if (!pkey) return NULL; key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (!key) return NULL; *pp = q; if (a) { DSA_free(*a); *a = key; } return key; } int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a, unsigned char **pp) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; int ret; if (!a) return 0; pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pktmp == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pktmp, a); ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; EC_KEY *key; const unsigned char *q; q = *pp; pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length); if (!pkey) return (NULL); key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (!key) return (NULL); *pp = q; if (a) { EC_KEY_free(*a); *a = key; } return (key); } int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; int ret; if (!a) return (0); if ((pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pktmp, a); ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); return (ret); } #endif int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval, unsigned char *penc, int penclen) { if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pub->algor, aobj, ptype, pval)) return 0; if (penc) { OPENSSL_free(pub->public_key->data); pub->public_key->data = penc; pub->public_key->length = penclen; /* Set number of unused bits to zero */ pub->public_key->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); pub->public_key->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; } return 1; } int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg, const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen, X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub) { if (ppkalg) *ppkalg = pub->algor->algorithm; if (pk) { *pk = pub->public_key->data; *ppklen = pub->public_key->length; } if (pa) *pa = pub->algor; return 1; } ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { if (x == NULL) return NULL; return x->cert_info.key->public_key; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c0000644000000000000000000004236313176625660015645 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "x509_lcl.h" /* X509_VERIFY_PARAM functions */ #define SET_HOST 0 #define ADD_HOST 1 static char *str_copy(const char *s) { return OPENSSL_strdup(s); } static void str_free(char *s) { OPENSSL_free(s); } static int int_x509_param_set_hosts(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, int mode, const char *name, size_t namelen) { char *copy; /* * Refuse names with embedded NUL bytes, except perhaps as final byte. * XXX: Do we need to push an error onto the error stack? */ if (namelen == 0 || name == NULL) namelen = name ? strlen(name) : 0; else if (name && memchr(name, '\0', namelen > 1 ? namelen - 1 : namelen)) return 0; if (namelen > 0 && name[namelen - 1] == '\0') --namelen; if (mode == SET_HOST) { sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(vpm->hosts, str_free); vpm->hosts = NULL; } if (name == NULL || namelen == 0) return 1; copy = OPENSSL_strndup(name, namelen); if (copy == NULL) return 0; if (vpm->hosts == NULL && (vpm->hosts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(copy); return 0; } if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(vpm->hosts, copy)) { OPENSSL_free(copy); if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts) == 0) { sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(vpm->hosts); vpm->hosts = NULL; } return 0; } return 1; } static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { if (!param) return; param->name = NULL; param->purpose = 0; param->trust = X509_TRUST_DEFAULT; /* * param->inh_flags = X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT; */ param->inh_flags = 0; param->flags = 0; param->depth = -1; param->auth_level = -1; /* -1 means unset, 0 is explicit */ sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free); param->policies = NULL; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(param->hosts, str_free); param->hosts = NULL; OPENSSL_free(param->peername); param->peername = NULL; OPENSSL_free(param->email); param->email = NULL; param->emaillen = 0; OPENSSL_free(param->ip); param->ip = NULL; param->iplen = 0; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; param = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*param)); if (param == NULL) return NULL; x509_verify_param_zero(param); return param; } void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { if (!param) return; x509_verify_param_zero(param); OPENSSL_free(param); } /*- * This function determines how parameters are "inherited" from one structure * to another. There are several different ways this can happen. * * 1. If a child structure needs to have its values initialized from a parent * they are simply copied across. For example SSL_CTX copied to SSL. * 2. If the structure should take on values only if they are currently unset. * For example the values in an SSL structure will take appropriate value * for SSL servers or clients but only if the application has not set new * ones. * * The "inh_flags" field determines how this function behaves. * * Normally any values which are set in the default are not copied from the * destination and verify flags are ORed together. * * If X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT is set then anything set in the source is copied * to the destination. Effectively the values in "to" become default values * which will be used only if nothing new is set in "from". * * If X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE is set then all value are copied across whether * they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though. * * If X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS is set then the flags value is copied instead * of ORed. * * If X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED is set then no values are copied. * * If X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE is set then the current inh_flags setting is zeroed * after the next call. */ /* Macro to test if a field should be copied from src to dest */ #define test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \ (to_overwrite || \ ((src->field != def) && (to_default || (dest->field == def)))) /* Macro to test and copy a field if necessary */ #define x509_verify_param_copy(field, def) \ if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(field, def)) \ dest->field = src->field int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *dest, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *src) { unsigned long inh_flags; int to_default, to_overwrite; if (!src) return 1; inh_flags = dest->inh_flags | src->inh_flags; if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE) dest->inh_flags = 0; if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED) return 1; if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT) to_default = 1; else to_default = 0; if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE) to_overwrite = 1; else to_overwrite = 0; x509_verify_param_copy(purpose, 0); x509_verify_param_copy(trust, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT); x509_verify_param_copy(depth, -1); x509_verify_param_copy(auth_level, -1); /* If overwrite or check time not set, copy across */ if (to_overwrite || !(dest->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)) { dest->check_time = src->check_time; dest->flags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME; /* Don't need to copy flag: that is done below */ } if (inh_flags & X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS) dest->flags = 0; dest->flags |= src->flags; if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(policies, NULL)) { if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(dest, src->policies)) return 0; } /* Copy the host flags if and only if we're copying the host list */ if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(hosts, NULL)) { sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(dest->hosts, str_free); dest->hosts = NULL; if (src->hosts) { dest->hosts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_deep_copy(src->hosts, str_copy, str_free); if (dest->hosts == NULL) return 0; dest->hostflags = src->hostflags; } } if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(email, NULL)) { if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(dest, src->email, src->emaillen)) return 0; } if (test_x509_verify_param_copy(ip, NULL)) { if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(dest, src->ip, src->iplen)) return 0; } return 1; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from) { unsigned long save_flags = to->inh_flags; int ret; to->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT; ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(to, from); to->inh_flags = save_flags; return ret; } static int int_x509_param_set1(char **pdest, size_t *pdestlen, const char *src, size_t srclen) { void *tmp; if (src) { if (srclen == 0) srclen = strlen(src); tmp = OPENSSL_memdup(src, srclen); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; } else { tmp = NULL; srclen = 0; } OPENSSL_free(*pdest); *pdest = tmp; if (pdestlen != NULL) *pdestlen = srclen; return 1; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name) { OPENSSL_free(param->name); param->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (param->name) return 1; return 0; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags) { param->flags |= flags; if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_MASK) param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK; return 1; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags) { param->flags &= ~flags; return 1; } unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return param->flags; } uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return param->inh_flags; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, uint32_t flags) { param->inh_flags = flags; return 1; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose) { return X509_PURPOSE_set(¶m->purpose, purpose); } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust) { return X509_TRUST_set(¶m->trust, trust); } void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth) { param->depth = depth; } void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level) { param->auth_level = auth_level; } time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return param->check_time; } void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t) { param->check_time = t; param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, ASN1_OBJECT *policy) { if (!param->policies) { param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null(); if (!param->policies) return 0; } if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, policy)) return 0; return 1; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies) { int i; ASN1_OBJECT *oid, *doid; if (!param) return 0; sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free); if (!policies) { param->policies = NULL; return 1; } param->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null(); if (!param->policies) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policies); i++) { oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policies, i); doid = OBJ_dup(oid); if (!doid) return 0; if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(param->policies, doid)) { ASN1_OBJECT_free(doid); return 0; } } param->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK; return 1; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name, size_t namelen) { return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param, SET_HOST, name, namelen); } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name, size_t namelen) { return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param, ADD_HOST, name, namelen); } void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned int flags) { param->hostflags = flags; } char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return param->peername; } /* * Move peername from one param structure to another, freeing any name present * at the target. If the source is a NULL parameter structure, free and zero * the target peername. */ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from) { char *peername = (from != NULL) ? from->peername : NULL; if (to->peername != peername) { OPENSSL_free(to->peername); to->peername = peername; } if (from) from->peername = NULL; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *email, size_t emaillen) { return int_x509_param_set1(¶m->email, ¶m->emaillen, email, emaillen); } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen) { if (iplen != 0 && iplen != 4 && iplen != 16) return 0; return int_x509_param_set1((char **)¶m->ip, ¶m->iplen, (char *)ip, iplen); } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc) { unsigned char ipout[16]; size_t iplen; iplen = (size_t)a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc); if (iplen == 0) return 0; return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, ipout, iplen); } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return param->depth; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return param->auth_level; } const char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { return param->name; } #define vpm_empty_id NULL, 0U, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 /* * Default verify parameters: these are used for various applications and can * be overridden by the user specified table. NB: the 'name' field *must* be * in alphabetical order because it will be searched using OBJ_search. */ static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = { { "default", /* X509 default parameters */ 0, /* Check time */ 0, /* internal flags */ X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST, /* flags */ 0, /* purpose */ 0, /* trust */ 100, /* depth */ -1, /* auth_level */ NULL, /* policies */ vpm_empty_id}, { "pkcs7", /* S/MIME sign parameters */ 0, /* Check time */ 0, /* internal flags */ 0, /* flags */ X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, /* purpose */ X509_TRUST_EMAIL, /* trust */ -1, /* depth */ -1, /* auth_level */ NULL, /* policies */ vpm_empty_id}, { "smime_sign", /* S/MIME sign parameters */ 0, /* Check time */ 0, /* internal flags */ 0, /* flags */ X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, /* purpose */ X509_TRUST_EMAIL, /* trust */ -1, /* depth */ -1, /* auth_level */ NULL, /* policies */ vpm_empty_id}, { "ssl_client", /* SSL/TLS client parameters */ 0, /* Check time */ 0, /* internal flags */ 0, /* flags */ X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, /* purpose */ X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, /* trust */ -1, /* depth */ -1, /* auth_level */ NULL, /* policies */ vpm_empty_id}, { "ssl_server", /* SSL/TLS server parameters */ 0, /* Check time */ 0, /* internal flags */ 0, /* flags */ X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, /* purpose */ X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, /* trust */ -1, /* depth */ -1, /* auth_level */ NULL, /* policies */ vpm_empty_id} }; static STACK_OF(X509_VERIFY_PARAM) *param_table = NULL; static int table_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *a, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *b) { return strcmp(a->name, b->name); } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, X509_VERIFY_PARAM, table); IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(X509_VERIFY_PARAM, X509_VERIFY_PARAM, table); static int param_cmp(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *const *a, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *const *b) { return strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name); } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { int idx; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *ptmp; if (param_table == NULL) { param_table = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(param_cmp); if (param_table == NULL) return 0; } else { idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, param); if (idx != -1) { ptmp = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ptmp); (void)sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_delete(param_table, idx); } } if (!sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_push(param_table, param)) return 0; return 1; } int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(void) { int num = OSSL_NELEM(default_table); if (param_table) num += sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_num(param_table); return num; } const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(int id) { int num = OSSL_NELEM(default_table); if (id < num) return default_table + id; return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, id - num); } const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(const char *name) { int idx; X509_VERIFY_PARAM pm; pm.name = (char *)name; if (param_table) { idx = sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_find(param_table, &pm); if (idx != -1) return sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_value(param_table, idx); } return OBJ_bsearch_table(&pm, default_table, OSSL_NELEM(default_table)); } void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup(void) { sk_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_pop_free(param_table, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free); param_table = NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c0000644000000000000000000000345013176625660015550 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { X509 *ret = NULL; X509_CINF *xi = NULL; X509_NAME *xn; EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL; if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* duplicate the request */ xi = &ret->cert_info; if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(r->req_info.attributes) != 0) { if ((xi->version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(xi->version, 2)) goto err; /*- xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done ri->attributes=NULL; */ } xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r); if (X509_set_subject_name(ret, xn) == 0) goto err; if (X509_set_issuer_name(ret, xn) == 0) goto err; if (X509_gmtime_adj(xi->validity.notBefore, 0) == NULL) goto err; if (X509_gmtime_adj(xi->validity.notAfter, (long)60 * 60 * 24 * days) == NULL) goto err; pubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(r); if (pubkey == NULL || !X509_set_pubkey(ret, pubkey)) goto err; if (!X509_sign(ret, pkey, EVP_md5())) goto err; return ret; err: X509_free(ret); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/t_req.c0000644000000000000000000001455113176625660015366 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = X509_REQ_print(b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int X509_REQ_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x, unsigned long nmflags, unsigned long cflag) { long l; int i; EVP_PKEY *pkey; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; char mlch = ' '; int nmindent = 0; if ((nmflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) { mlch = '\n'; nmindent = 12; } if (nmflags == X509_FLAG_COMPAT) nmindent = 16; if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER)) { if (BIO_write(bp, "Certificate Request:\n", 21) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, " Data:\n", 10) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)) { l = X509_REQ_get_version(x); if (l >= 0 && l <= 2) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: Unknown (%ld)\n", "", l) <= 0) goto err; } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT)) { if (BIO_printf(bp, " Subject:%c", mlch) <= 0) goto err; if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x), nmindent, nmflags) < 0) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY)) { X509_PUBKEY *xpkey; ASN1_OBJECT *koid; if (BIO_write(bp, " Subject Public Key Info:\n", 33) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sPublic Key Algorithm: ", "") <= 0) goto err; xpkey = X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(x); X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&koid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpkey); if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, koid) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; pkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bp, "%12sUnable to load Public Key\n", ""); ERR_print_errors(bp); } else { EVP_PKEY_print_public(bp, pkey, 16, NULL); } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES)) { /* may not be */ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sAttributes:\n", "") <= 0) goto err; if (X509_REQ_get_attr_count(x) == 0) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sa0:00\n", "") <= 0) goto err; } else { for (i = 0; i < X509_REQ_get_attr_count(x); i++) { ASN1_TYPE *at; X509_ATTRIBUTE *a; ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *aobj; int j, type = 0, count = 1, ii = 0; a = X509_REQ_get_attr(x, i); aobj = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(a); if (X509_REQ_extension_nid(OBJ_obj2nid(aobj))) continue; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12s", "") <= 0) goto err; if ((j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, aobj)) > 0) { ii = 0; count = X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(a); get_next: at = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(a, ii); type = at->type; bs = at->value.asn1_string; } for (j = 25 - j; j > 0; j--) if (BIO_write(bp, " ", 1) != 1) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, ":") <= 0) goto err; if ((type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) || (type == V_ASN1_T61STRING) || (type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) || (type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) { if (BIO_write(bp, (char *)bs->data, bs->length) != bs->length) goto err; BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } else { BIO_puts(bp, "unable to print attribute\n"); } if (++ii < count) goto get_next; } } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS)) { exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x); if (exts) { BIO_printf(bp, "%8sRequested Extensions:\n", ""); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_EXTENSION *ex; int critical; ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12s", "") <= 0) goto err; obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj); critical = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex); if (BIO_printf(bp, ": %s\n", critical ? "critical" : "") <= 0) goto err; if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, cflag, 16)) { BIO_printf(bp, "%16s", ""); ASN1_STRING_print(bp, X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex)); } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP)) { const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg; const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig; X509_REQ_get0_signature(x, &sig, &sig_alg); if (!X509_signature_print(bp, sig_alg, sig)) goto err; } return (1); err: X509err(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x) { return X509_REQ_print_ex(bp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/by_dir.c0000644000000000000000000002576413176625660015534 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include #endif #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "x509_lcl.h" struct lookup_dir_hashes_st { unsigned long hash; int suffix; }; struct lookup_dir_entry_st { char *dir; int dir_type; STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) *hashes; }; typedef struct lookup_dir_st { BUF_MEM *buffer; STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY) *dirs; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; } BY_DIR; static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, char **ret); static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu); static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu); static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type); static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret); static X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_dir_lookup = { "Load certs from files in a directory", new_dir, /* new */ free_dir, /* free */ NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* shutdown */ dir_ctrl, /* ctrl */ get_cert_by_subject, /* get_by_subject */ NULL, /* get_by_issuer_serial */ NULL, /* get_by_fingerprint */ NULL, /* get_by_alias */ }; X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void) { return (&x509_dir_lookup); } static int dir_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, char **retp) { int ret = 0; BY_DIR *ld; char *dir = NULL; ld = (BY_DIR *)ctx->method_data; switch (cmd) { case X509_L_ADD_DIR: if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) { dir = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_dir_env()); if (dir) ret = add_cert_dir(ld, dir, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); else ret = add_cert_dir(ld, X509_get_default_cert_dir(), X509_FILETYPE_PEM); if (!ret) { X509err(X509_F_DIR_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR); } } else ret = add_cert_dir(ld, argp, (int)argl); break; } return (ret); } static int new_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu) { BY_DIR *a; if ((a = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a))) == NULL) return 0; if ((a->buffer = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(a); return 0; } a->dirs = NULL; a->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (a->lock == NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(a->buffer); OPENSSL_free(a); return 0; } lu->method_data = (char *)a; return 1; } static void by_dir_hash_free(BY_DIR_HASH *hash) { OPENSSL_free(hash); } static int by_dir_hash_cmp(const BY_DIR_HASH *const *a, const BY_DIR_HASH *const *b) { if ((*a)->hash > (*b)->hash) return 1; if ((*a)->hash < (*b)->hash) return -1; return 0; } static void by_dir_entry_free(BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent) { OPENSSL_free(ent->dir); sk_BY_DIR_HASH_pop_free(ent->hashes, by_dir_hash_free); OPENSSL_free(ent); } static void free_dir(X509_LOOKUP *lu) { BY_DIR *a; a = (BY_DIR *)lu->method_data; sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_pop_free(a->dirs, by_dir_entry_free); BUF_MEM_free(a->buffer); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock); OPENSSL_free(a); } static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type) { const char *s, *p; if (dir == NULL || !*dir) { X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY); return 0; } s = dir; p = s; do { if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0')) { BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent; int j; size_t len; const char *ss = s; s = p + 1; len = p - ss; if (len == 0) continue; for (j = 0; j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); j++) { ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, j); if (strlen(ent->dir) == len && strncmp(ent->dir, ss, len) == 0) break; } if (j < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs)) continue; if (ctx->dirs == NULL) { ctx->dirs = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!ctx->dirs) { X509err(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } ent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ent)); if (ent == NULL) return 0; ent->dir_type = type; ent->hashes = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_new(by_dir_hash_cmp); ent->dir = OPENSSL_strndup(ss, len); if (ent->dir == NULL || ent->hashes == NULL) { by_dir_entry_free(ent); return 0; } if (!sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_push(ctx->dirs, ent)) { by_dir_entry_free(ent); return 0; } } } while (*p++ != '\0'); return 1; } static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret) { BY_DIR *ctx; union { X509 st_x509; X509_CRL crl; } data; int ok = 0; int i, j, k; unsigned long h; BUF_MEM *b = NULL; X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp; const char *postfix = ""; if (name == NULL) return (0); stmp.type = type; if (type == X509_LU_X509) { data.st_x509.cert_info.subject = name; stmp.data.x509 = &data.st_x509; postfix = ""; } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) { data.crl.crl.issuer = name; stmp.data.crl = &data.crl; postfix = "r"; } else { X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE); goto finish; } if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto finish; } ctx = (BY_DIR *)xl->method_data; h = X509_NAME_hash(name); for (i = 0; i < sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_num(ctx->dirs); i++) { BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent; int idx; BY_DIR_HASH htmp, *hent; ent = sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_value(ctx->dirs, i); j = strlen(ent->dir) + 1 + 8 + 6 + 1 + 1; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, j)) { X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto finish; } if (type == X509_LU_CRL && ent->hashes) { htmp.hash = h; CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ctx->lock); idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp); if (idx >= 0) { hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx); k = hent->suffix; } else { hent = NULL; k = 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); } else { k = 0; hent = NULL; } for (;;) { char c = '/'; #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS c = ent->dir[strlen(ent->dir) - 1]; if (c != ':' && c != '>' && c != ']') { /* * If no separator is present, we assume the directory * specifier is a logical name, and add a colon. We really * should use better VMS routines for merging things like * this, but this will do for now... -- Richard Levitte */ c = ':'; } else { c = '\0'; } #endif if (c == '\0') { /* * This is special. When c == '\0', no directory separator * should be added. */ BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max, "%s%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, h, postfix, k); } else { BIO_snprintf(b->data, b->max, "%s%c%08lx.%s%d", ent->dir, c, h, postfix, k); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # ifdef _WIN32 # define stat _stat # endif { struct stat st; if (stat(b->data, &st) < 0) break; } #endif /* found one. */ if (type == X509_LU_X509) { if ((X509_load_cert_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0) break; } else if (type == X509_LU_CRL) { if ((X509_load_crl_file(xl, b->data, ent->dir_type)) == 0) break; } /* else case will caught higher up */ k++; } /* * we have added it to the cache so now pull it out again */ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); j = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(xl->store_ctx->objs, &stmp); if (j != -1) tmp = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(xl->store_ctx->objs, j); else tmp = NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); /* If a CRL, update the last file suffix added for this */ if (type == X509_LU_CRL) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); /* * Look for entry again in case another thread added an entry * first. */ if (!hent) { htmp.hash = h; idx = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &htmp); if (idx >= 0) hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx); } if (!hent) { hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*hent)); if (hent == NULL) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ok = 0; goto finish; } hent->hash = h; hent->suffix = k; if (!sk_BY_DIR_HASH_push(ent->hashes, hent)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); OPENSSL_free(hent); ok = 0; goto finish; } } else if (hent->suffix < k) { hent->suffix = k; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); } if (tmp != NULL) { ok = 1; ret->type = tmp->type; memcpy(&ret->data, &tmp->data, sizeof(ret->data)); /* * If we were going to up the reference count, we would need to * do it on a perl 'type' basis */ /*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/ goto finish; } } finish: BUF_MEM_free(b); return (ok); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c0000644000000000000000000002135013176625660015644 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b); static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p); static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags); static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags); static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags); static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags); static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust; /* * WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without * any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index * into the table */ static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = { {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL}, {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth, NULL}, {X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth, NULL}, {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect, NULL}, {X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign, NULL}, {X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign, NULL}, {X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP, NULL}, {X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL} }; #define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard) static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL; static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b) { return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust; } int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *, int) { int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int); oldtrust = default_trust; default_trust = trust; return oldtrust; } int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags) { X509_TRUST *pt; int idx; /* We get this as a default value */ if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT); idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id); if (idx == -1) return default_trust(id, x, flags); pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx); return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags); } int X509_TRUST_get_count(void) { if (!trtable) return X509_TRUST_COUNT; return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT; } X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx) { if (idx < 0) return NULL; if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx; return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT); } int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id) { X509_TRUST tmp; int idx; if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX)) return id - X509_TRUST_MIN; tmp.trust = id; if (!trtable) return -1; idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp); if (idx == -1) return -1; return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT; } int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust) { if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST); return 0; } *t = trust; return 1; } int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int), const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2) { int idx; X509_TRUST *trtmp; /* * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC; /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME; /* Get existing entry if any */ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id); /* Need a new entry */ if (idx == -1) { if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC; } else trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx); /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME) OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name); /* dup supplied name */ if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC; /* Set all other flags */ trtmp->flags |= flags; trtmp->trust = id; trtmp->check_trust = ck; trtmp->arg1 = arg1; trtmp->arg2 = arg2; /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ if (idx == -1) { if (trtable == NULL && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err;; } if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } return 1; err: if (idx == -1) { OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name); OPENSSL_free(trtmp); } return 0; } static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p) { if (!p) return; if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) { if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME) OPENSSL_free(p->name); OPENSSL_free(p); } } void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void) { sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free); trtable = NULL; } int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp) { return xp->flags; } char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp) { return xp->name; } int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp) { return xp->trust; } static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags) { /* * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the * certificate is self-signed. */ flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU; return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags); } static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags) { /* * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not * rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat" * trust in self-signed certificates apply. */ flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU); return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags); } static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; else return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags) { X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux; int i; if (ax && ax->reject) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i); int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj); if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage && (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU))) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; } } if (ax && ax->trust) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i); int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj); if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage && (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU))) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } /* * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match. * * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects. * * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable * from lack of EKU constraints. * * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an * explicit reject. */ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; } if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0) return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat. */ return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509spki.c0000644000000000000000000000426413176625660015650 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include int NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if ((x == NULL) || (x->spkac == NULL)) return (0); return (X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->spkac->pubkey), pkey)); } EVP_PKEY *NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x) { if ((x == NULL) || (x->spkac == NULL)) return (NULL); return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->spkac->pubkey)); } /* Load a Netscape SPKI from a base64 encoded string */ NETSCAPE_SPKI *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(const char *str, int len) { unsigned char *spki_der; const unsigned char *p; int spki_len; NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki; if (len <= 0) len = strlen(str); if ((spki_der = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } spki_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(spki_der, (const unsigned char *)str, len); if (spki_len < 0) { X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(spki_der); return NULL; } p = spki_der; spki = d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI(NULL, &p, spki_len); OPENSSL_free(spki_der); return spki; } /* Generate a base64 encoded string from an SPKI */ char *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki) { unsigned char *der_spki, *p; char *b64_str; int der_len; der_len = i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI(spki, NULL); der_spki = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len); b64_str = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len * 2); if (der_spki == NULL || b64_str == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(der_spki); OPENSSL_free(b64_str); return NULL; } p = der_spki; i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI(spki, &p); EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)b64_str, der_spki, der_len); OPENSSL_free(der_spki); return b64_str; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c0000644000000000000000000003061013176625660015612 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int i; const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; ai = &a->cert_info; bi = &b->cert_info; i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); if (i) return (i); return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) { unsigned long ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned char md[16]; char *f; if (ctx == NULL) goto err; f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) goto err; OPENSSL_free(f); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) goto err; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (ret); } #endif int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer)); } int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject)); } int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer)); } int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); } X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info.issuer); } unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer)); } #endif X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { return (a->cert_info.subject); } ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; } const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) { return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; } unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject)); } #endif /* * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. */ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { int rv; /* ensure hash is valid */ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (rv) return rv; /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) return -1; if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len) return 1; return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len); } return rv; } int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { int ret; /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); if (ret < 0) return -2; } ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; if (ret) return ret; return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); } unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) return 0; ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 /* * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, * this is reasonably efficient. */ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char md[16]; if (md_ctx == NULL) return ret; /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return (ret); } #endif /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { int i; X509 x, *x509 = NULL; if (!sk) return NULL; x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; x.cert_info.issuer = name; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) return (x509); } return (NULL); } X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { X509 *x509; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) return (x509); } return (NULL); } EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) { if (x == NULL) return NULL; return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); } EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) { if (x == NULL) return NULL; return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); } int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) { const EVP_PKEY *xk; int ret; xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (xk) ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); else ret = -2; switch (ret) { case 1: break; case 0: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); break; case -1: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); break; case -2: X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); } if (ret > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) { const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; int curve_nid; if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); if (!grp) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ /* * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. */ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; } else return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; return X509_V_OK; } int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { int rv, i, sign_nid; EVP_PKEY *pk; unsigned long tflags = flags; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ if (x == NULL) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); i = 1; } else i = 0; pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); /* * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm. */ if (chain == NULL) return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; /* Correct error depth */ i = 0; goto end; } /* Check EE key only */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Correct error depth */ i = 0; goto end; } for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; goto end; } pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); if (rv != X509_V_OK) goto end; } /* Final check: root CA signature */ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); end: if (rv != X509_V_OK) { /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) i--; /* * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error. */ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; if (perror_depth) *perror_depth = i; } return rv; } int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) { int sign_nid; if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) return X509_V_OK; sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); } #else int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) { return 0; } int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) { return 0; } #endif /* * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of * each X509 structure. */ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *ret; int i; ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); X509_up_ref(x); } return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c0000644000000000000000000001176413176625660015616 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" /* * Limit to ensure we don't overflow: much greater than * anything encountered in practice. */ #define NAME_ONELINE_MAX (1024 * 1024) char *X509_NAME_oneline(const X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len) { const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; int i; int n, lold, l, l1, l2, num, j, type; const char *s; char *p; unsigned char *q; BUF_MEM *b = NULL; static const char hex[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; int gs_doit[4]; char tmp_buf[80]; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC unsigned char ebcdic_buf[1024]; #endif if (buf == NULL) { if ((b = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, 200)) goto err; b->data[0] = '\0'; len = 200; } else if (len == 0) { return NULL; } if (a == NULL) { if (b) { buf = b->data; OPENSSL_free(b); } strncpy(buf, "NO X509_NAME", len); buf[len - 1] = '\0'; return buf; } len--; /* space for '\0' */ l = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) { ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i); n = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object); if ((n == NID_undef) || ((s = OBJ_nid2sn(n)) == NULL)) { i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), ne->object); s = tmp_buf; } l1 = strlen(s); type = ne->value->type; num = ne->value->length; if (num > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG); goto end; } q = ne->value->data; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING || type == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING || type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING || type == V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING || type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) { if (num > (int)sizeof(ebcdic_buf)) num = sizeof(ebcdic_buf); ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, num); q = ebcdic_buf; } #endif if ((type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING) && ((num % 4) == 0)) { gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 0; for (j = 0; j < num; j++) if (q[j] != 0) gs_doit[j & 3] = 1; if (gs_doit[0] | gs_doit[1] | gs_doit[2]) gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 1; else { gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = 0; gs_doit[3] = 1; } } else gs_doit[0] = gs_doit[1] = gs_doit[2] = gs_doit[3] = 1; for (l2 = j = 0; j < num; j++) { if (!gs_doit[j & 3]) continue; l2++; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if ((q[j] < ' ') || (q[j] > '~')) l2 += 3; #else if ((os_toascii[q[j]] < os_toascii[' ']) || (os_toascii[q[j]] > os_toascii['~'])) l2 += 3; #endif } lold = l; l += 1 + l1 + 1 + l2; if (l > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG); goto end; } if (b != NULL) { if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, l + 1)) goto err; p = &(b->data[lold]); } else if (l > len) { break; } else p = &(buf[lold]); *(p++) = '/'; memcpy(p, s, (unsigned int)l1); p += l1; *(p++) = '='; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* q was assigned above already. */ q = ne->value->data; #endif for (j = 0; j < num; j++) { if (!gs_doit[j & 3]) continue; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC n = q[j]; if ((n < ' ') || (n > '~')) { *(p++) = '\\'; *(p++) = 'x'; *(p++) = hex[(n >> 4) & 0x0f]; *(p++) = hex[n & 0x0f]; } else *(p++) = n; #else n = os_toascii[q[j]]; if ((n < os_toascii[' ']) || (n > os_toascii['~'])) { *(p++) = '\\'; *(p++) = 'x'; *(p++) = hex[(n >> 4) & 0x0f]; *(p++) = hex[n & 0x0f]; } else *(p++) = q[j]; #endif } *p = '\0'; } if (b != NULL) { p = b->data; OPENSSL_free(b); } else p = buf; if (i == 0) *p = '\0'; return (p); err: X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); end: BUF_MEM_free(b); return (NULL); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/by_file.c0000644000000000000000000001440113176625660015657 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "x509_lcl.h" static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, char **ret); static X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_file_lookup = { "Load file into cache", NULL, /* new */ NULL, /* free */ NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* shutdown */ by_file_ctrl, /* ctrl */ NULL, /* get_by_subject */ NULL, /* get_by_issuer_serial */ NULL, /* get_by_fingerprint */ NULL, /* get_by_alias */ }; X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void) { return (&x509_file_lookup); } static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, char **ret) { int ok = 0; const char *file; switch (cmd) { case X509_L_FILE_LOAD: if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) { file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env()); if (file) ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); else ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file (ctx, X509_get_default_cert_file(), X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); if (!ok) { X509err(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL, X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS); } } else { if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, argp, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); else ok = (X509_load_cert_file(ctx, argp, (int)argl) != 0); } break; } return (ok); } int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) { int ret = 0; BIO *in = NULL; int i, count = 0; X509 *x = NULL; if (file == NULL) return (1); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto err; } if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) { for (;;) { x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, ""); if (x == NULL) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) { ERR_clear_error(); break; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); goto err; } } i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; count++; X509_free(x); x = NULL; } ret = count; } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) { x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL); if (x == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } i = X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; ret = i; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE); goto err; } err: X509_free(x); BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) { int ret = 0; BIO *in = NULL; int i, count = 0; X509_CRL *x = NULL; if (file == NULL) return (1); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if ((in == NULL) || (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto err; } if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) { for (;;) { x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, ""); if (x == NULL) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) { ERR_clear_error(); break; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); goto err; } } i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; count++; X509_CRL_free(x); x = NULL; } ret = count; } else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1) { x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL); if (x == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } i = X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, x); if (!i) goto err; ret = i; } else { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE, X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE); goto err; } err: X509_CRL_free(x); BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) { STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf; X509_INFO *itmp; BIO *in; int i, count = 0; if (type != X509_FILETYPE_PEM) return X509_load_cert_file(ctx, file, type); in = BIO_new_file(file, "r"); if (!in) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); return 0; } inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, ""); BIO_free(in); if (!inf) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); i++) { itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i); if (itmp->x509) { X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->x509); count++; } if (itmp->crl) { X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->crl); count++; } } sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free); return count; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_req.c0000644000000000000000000000445213176625660015371 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" /*- * X509_REQ_INFO is handled in an unusual way to get round * invalid encodings. Some broken certificate requests don't * encode the attributes field if it is empty. This is in * violation of PKCS#10 but we need to tolerate it. We do * this by making the attributes field OPTIONAL then using * the callback to initialise it to an empty STACK. * * This means that the field will be correctly encoded unless * we NULL out the field. * * As a result we no longer need the req_kludge field because * the information is now contained in the attributes field: * 1. If it is NULL then it's the invalid omission. * 2. If it is empty it is the correct encoding. * 3. If it is not empty then some attributes are present. * */ static int rinf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { X509_REQ_INFO *rinf = (X509_REQ_INFO *)*pval; if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) { rinf->attributes = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null(); if (!rinf->attributes) return 0; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, enc, rinf_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, subject, X509_NAME), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, pubkey, X509_PUBKEY), /* This isn't really OPTIONAL but it gets round invalid * encodings */ ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(X509_REQ_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, X509_REQ_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO) ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_REQ, 0) = { ASN1_EMBED(X509_REQ, req_info, X509_REQ_INFO), ASN1_EMBED(X509_REQ, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_REQ, X509_REQ) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REQ) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_d2.c0000644000000000000000000000315013176625660015337 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include int X509_STORE_set_default_paths(X509_STORE *ctx) { X509_LOOKUP *lookup; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) return (0); X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) return (0); X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); /* clear any errors */ ERR_clear_error(); return (1); } int X509_STORE_load_locations(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file, const char *path) { X509_LOOKUP *lookup; if (file != NULL) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) return (0); if (X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, file, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) return (0); } if (path != NULL) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) return (0); if (X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, path, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) return (0); } if ((path == NULL) && (file == NULL)) return (0); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_err.c0000644000000000000000000001521313176625660015625 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR), "add_cert_dir"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN), "build_chain"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL), "by_file_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS), "check_name_constraints"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY), "check_policy"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DANE_I2D), "dane_i2d"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DIR_CTRL), "dir_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT), "get_cert_by_subject"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE), "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE), "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR), "X509at_add1_attr"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT), "X509v3_add_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID), "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ), "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT), "X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA), "X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA), "X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "X509_check_private_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF), "X509_CRL_diff"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP), "X509_CRL_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID), "X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ), "X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS), "X509_get_pubkey_parameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE), "X509_load_cert_crl_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE), "X509_load_cert_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE), "X509_load_crl_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY), "X509_NAME_add_entry"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID), "X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT), "X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT), "X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE), "X509_NAME_oneline"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT), "X509_NAME_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW), "X509_OBJECT_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP), "X509_print_ex_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE), "x509_pubkey_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0), "X509_PUBKEY_get0"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET), "X509_PUBKEY_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "X509_REQ_check_private_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX), "X509_REQ_print_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP), "X509_REQ_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509), "X509_REQ_to_X509"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT), "X509_STORE_add_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL), "X509_STORE_add_crl"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER), "X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT), "X509_STORE_CTX_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW), "X509_STORE_CTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT), "X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ), "X509_to_X509_REQ"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD), "X509_TRUST_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET), "X509_TRUST_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT), "X509_verify_cert"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH), "akid mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR), "bad selector"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE), "bad x509 filetype"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR), "base64 decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY), "cant check dh key"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE), "cert already in hash table"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA), "crl already delta"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE), "crl verify failure"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH), "idp mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY), "invalid directory"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME), "invalid field name"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_INVALID_TRUST), "invalid trust"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH), "issuer mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH), "key type mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH), "key values mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR), "loading cert dir"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS), "loading defaults"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED), "method not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG), "name too long"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER), "newer crl not newer"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY), "no cert set for us to verify"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER), "no crl number"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR), "public key decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR), "public key encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY), "should retry"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN), "unable to find parameters in chain"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY), "unable to get certs public key"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE), "unknown key type"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID), "unknown nid"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID), "unknown purpose id"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID), "unknown trust id"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM), "unsupported algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE), "wrong lookup type"}, {ERR_REASON(X509_R_WRONG_TYPE), "wrong type"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_X509_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(X509_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, X509_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, X509_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_set.c0000644000000000000000000000676113176625660015640 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version) { if (x == NULL) return (0); if (version == 0) { ASN1_INTEGER_free(x->cert_info.version); x->cert_info.version = NULL; return (1); } if (x->cert_info.version == NULL) { if ((x->cert_info.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) return (0); } return (ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->cert_info.version, version)); } int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { ASN1_INTEGER *in; if (x == NULL) return 0; in = &x->cert_info.serialNumber; if (in != serial) return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial); return 1; } int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name) { if (x == NULL) return (0); return (X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.issuer, name)); } int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name) { if (x == NULL) return (0); return (X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.subject, name)); } int x509_set1_time(ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm) { ASN1_TIME *in; in = *ptm; if (in != tm) { in = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm); if (in != NULL) { ASN1_TIME_free(*ptm); *ptm = in; } } return (in != NULL); } int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm) { if (x == NULL) return 0; return x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.validity.notBefore, tm); } int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm) { if (x == NULL) return 0; return x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.validity.notAfter, tm); } int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (x == NULL) return (0); return (X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->cert_info.key), pkey)); } int X509_up_ref(X509 *x) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&x->references, 1, &i, x->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509", x); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } long X509_get_version(const X509 *x) { return ASN1_INTEGER_get(x->cert_info.version); } const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x) { return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore; } const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x) { return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter; } ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x) { return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore; } ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x) { return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter; } int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x) { return EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm)); } X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x) { return x->cert_info.key; } const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x) { return x->cert_info.extensions; } void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid) { if (piuid != NULL) *piuid = x->cert_info.issuerUID; if (psuid != NULL) *psuid = x->cert_info.subjectUID; } const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x) { return &x->cert_info.signature; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/t_crl.c0000644000000000000000000000526513176625660015361 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int X509_CRL_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = X509_CRL_print(b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int X509_CRL_print(BIO *out, X509_CRL *x) { STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *rev; X509_REVOKED *r; const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg; const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig; long l; int i; char *p; BIO_printf(out, "Certificate Revocation List (CRL):\n"); l = X509_CRL_get_version(x); if (l >= 0 && l <= 1) BIO_printf(out, "%8sVersion %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l); else BIO_printf(out, "%8sVersion unknown (%ld)\n", "", l); X509_CRL_get0_signature(x, &sig, &sig_alg); X509_signature_print(out, sig_alg, NULL); p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x), NULL, 0); BIO_printf(out, "%8sIssuer: %s\n", "", p); OPENSSL_free(p); BIO_printf(out, "%8sLast Update: ", ""); ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(x)); BIO_printf(out, "\n%8sNext Update: ", ""); if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x)) ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x)); else BIO_printf(out, "NONE"); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); X509V3_extensions_print(out, "CRL extensions", X509_CRL_get0_extensions(x), 0, 8); rev = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(x); if (sk_X509_REVOKED_num(rev) > 0) BIO_printf(out, "Revoked Certificates:\n"); else BIO_printf(out, "No Revoked Certificates.\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(rev); i++) { r = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(rev, i); BIO_printf(out, " Serial Number: "); i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(r)); BIO_printf(out, "\n Revocation Date: "); ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(r)); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); X509V3_extensions_print(out, "CRL entry extensions", X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(r), 0, 8); } X509_signature_print(out, sig_alg, sig); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000001320613176625660015614 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This structure holds all parameters associated with a verify operation by * including an X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure in related structures the * parameters used can be customized */ struct X509_VERIFY_PARAM_st { char *name; time_t check_time; /* Time to use */ uint32_t inh_flags; /* Inheritance flags */ unsigned long flags; /* Various verify flags */ int purpose; /* purpose to check untrusted certificates */ int trust; /* trust setting to check */ int depth; /* Verify depth */ int auth_level; /* Security level for chain verification */ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies; /* Permissible policies */ /* Peer identity details */ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *hosts; /* Set of acceptable names */ unsigned int hostflags; /* Flags to control matching features */ char *peername; /* Matching hostname in peer certificate */ char *email; /* If not NULL email address to match */ size_t emaillen; unsigned char *ip; /* If not NULL IP address to match */ size_t iplen; /* Length of IP address */ }; /* No error callback if depth < 0 */ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth); /* a sequence of these are used */ struct x509_attributes_st { ASN1_OBJECT *object; STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *set; }; struct X509_extension_st { ASN1_OBJECT *object; ASN1_BOOLEAN critical; ASN1_OCTET_STRING value; }; /* * Method to handle CRL access. In general a CRL could be very large (several * Mb) and can consume large amounts of resources if stored in memory by * multiple processes. This method allows general CRL operations to be * redirected to more efficient callbacks: for example a CRL entry database. */ #define X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC 1 struct x509_crl_method_st { int flags; int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl); int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl); int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer); int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk); }; struct x509_lookup_method_st { const char *name; int (*new_item) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); void (*free) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); int (*init) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); int (*shutdown) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); int (*ctrl) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, char **ret); int (*get_by_subject) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret); int (*get_by_issuer_serial) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_OBJECT *ret); int (*get_by_fingerprint) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret); int (*get_by_alias) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret); }; /* This is the functions plus an instance of the local variables. */ struct x509_lookup_st { int init; /* have we been started */ int skip; /* don't use us. */ X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method; /* the functions */ char *method_data; /* method data */ X509_STORE *store_ctx; /* who owns us */ }; /* * This is used to hold everything. It is used for all certificate * validation. Once we have a certificate chain, the 'verify' function is * then called to actually check the cert chain. */ struct x509_store_st { /* The following is a cache of trusted certs */ int cache; /* if true, stash any hits */ STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs; /* Cache of all objects */ /* These are external lookup methods */ STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *get_cert_methods; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; /* Callbacks for various operations */ /* called to verify a certificate */ int (*verify) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* error callback */ int (*verify_cb) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* get issuers cert from ctx */ int (*get_issuer) (X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); /* check issued */ int (*check_issued) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); /* Check revocation status of chain */ int (*check_revocation) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* retrieve CRL */ int (*get_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x); /* Check CRL validity */ int (*check_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl); /* Check certificate against CRL */ int (*cert_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); /* Check policy status of the chain */ int (*check_policy) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); STACK_OF(X509) *(*lookup_certs) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*lookup_crls) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); int (*cleanup) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; int references; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; typedef struct lookup_dir_hashes_st BY_DIR_HASH; typedef struct lookup_dir_entry_st BY_DIR_ENTRY; DEFINE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) DEFINE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_ENTRY) typedef STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY; DEFINE_STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509rset.c0000644000000000000000000000210613176625660015650 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x, long version) { if (x == NULL) return (0); x->req_info.enc.modified = 1; return (ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->req_info.version, version)); } int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *x, X509_NAME *name) { if (x == NULL) return (0); x->req_info.enc.modified = 1; return (X509_NAME_set(&x->req_info.subject, name)); } int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (x == NULL) return (0); x->req_info.enc.modified = 1; return (X509_PUBKEY_set(&x->req_info.pubkey, pkey)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c0000644000000000000000000001730313176625660015656 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n) { switch ((int)n) { case X509_V_OK: return ("ok"); case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: return ("unspecified certificate verification error"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: return ("unable to get issuer certificate"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: return ("unable to get certificate CRL"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: return ("unable to decrypt certificate's signature"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: return ("unable to decrypt CRL's signature"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: return ("unable to decode issuer public key"); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: return ("certificate signature failure"); case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: return ("CRL signature failure"); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: return ("certificate is not yet valid"); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: return ("certificate has expired"); case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: return ("CRL is not yet valid"); case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: return ("CRL has expired"); case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: return ("format error in certificate's notBefore field"); case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: return ("format error in certificate's notAfter field"); case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: return ("format error in CRL's lastUpdate field"); case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: return ("format error in CRL's nextUpdate field"); case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: return ("out of memory"); case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: return ("self signed certificate"); case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: return ("self signed certificate in certificate chain"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: return ("unable to get local issuer certificate"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: return ("unable to verify the first certificate"); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: return ("certificate chain too long"); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: return ("certificate revoked"); case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: return ("invalid CA certificate"); case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: return ("path length constraint exceeded"); case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: return ("unsupported certificate purpose"); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: return ("certificate not trusted"); case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: return ("certificate rejected"); case X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: return ("subject issuer mismatch"); case X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: return ("authority and subject key identifier mismatch"); case X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: return ("authority and issuer serial number mismatch"); case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN: return ("key usage does not include certificate signing"); case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: return ("unable to get CRL issuer certificate"); case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: return ("unhandled critical extension"); case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN: return ("key usage does not include CRL signing"); case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION: return ("unhandled critical CRL extension"); case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA: return ("invalid non-CA certificate (has CA markings)"); case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: return ("proxy path length constraint exceeded"); case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE: return ("key usage does not include digital signature"); case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED: return ("proxy certificates not allowed, please set the appropriate flag"); case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION: return ("invalid or inconsistent certificate extension"); case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION: return ("invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension"); case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: return ("no explicit policy"); case X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE: return ("Different CRL scope"); case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE: return ("Unsupported extension feature"); case X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE: return ("RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources"); case X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: return ("permitted subtree violation"); case X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: return ("excluded subtree violation"); case X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: return ("name constraints minimum and maximum not supported"); case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: return ("application verification failure"); case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: return ("unsupported name constraint type"); case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: return ("unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax"); case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: return ("unsupported or invalid name syntax"); case X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR: return ("CRL path validation error"); case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP: return ("Path Loop"); case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION: return ("Suite B: certificate version invalid"); case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM: return ("Suite B: invalid public key algorithm"); case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE: return ("Suite B: invalid ECC curve"); case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM: return ("Suite B: invalid signature algorithm"); case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED: return ("Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS"); case X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256: return ("Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256"); case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: return ("Hostname mismatch"); case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: return ("Email address mismatch"); case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: return ("IP address mismatch"); case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: return ("No matching DANE TLSA records"); case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: return ("EE certificate key too weak"); case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: return ("CA certificate key too weak"); case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: return ("CA signature digest algorithm too weak"); case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: return ("Invalid certificate verification context"); case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: return ("Issuer certificate lookup error"); case X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS: return ("Certificate Transparency required, but no valid SCTs found"); case X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION: return ("proxy subject name violation"); default: /* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */ return ("unknown certificate verification error"); } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_crl.c0000644000000000000000000003333313176625660015362 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include "x509_lcl.h" static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a, const X509_REVOKED *const *b); static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = { ASN1_EMBED(X509_REVOKED,serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,revocationDate, ASN1_TIME), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED,extensions, X509_EXTENSION) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED) static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r); static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer); static X509_CRL_METHOD int_crl_meth = { 0, 0, 0, def_crl_lookup, def_crl_verify }; static const X509_CRL_METHOD *default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth; /* * The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. Since we cache * the original encoding the signature won't be affected by reordering of the * revoked field. */ static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval; if (!a || !a->revoked) return 1; switch (operation) { /* * Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that would * affect the output of X509_CRL_print(). */ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked, X509_REVOKED_cmp); break; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = { ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME), ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO) /* * Set CRL entry issuer according to CRL certificate issuer extension. Check * for unhandled critical CRL entry extensions. */ static int crl_set_issuers(X509_CRL *crl) { int i, j; GENERAL_NAMES *gens, *gtmp; STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked; revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl); gens = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++) { X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason; X509_EXTENSION *ext; gtmp = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_certificate_issuer, &j, NULL); if (!gtmp && (j != -1)) { crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; return 1; } if (gtmp) { gens = gtmp; if (!crl->issuers) { crl->issuers = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null(); if (!crl->issuers) return 0; } if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(crl->issuers, gtmp)) return 0; } rev->issuer = gens; reason = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason, &j, NULL); if (!reason && (j != -1)) { crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; return 1; } if (reason) { rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason); ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason); } else rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE; /* Check for critical CRL entry extensions */ exts = rev->extensions; for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); j++) { ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, j); if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)) == NID_certificate_issuer) continue; crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; break; } } } return 1; } /* * The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions * and hash of the whole CRL. */ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; X509_EXTENSION *ext; int idx; switch (operation) { case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST: crl->idp = NULL; crl->akid = NULL; crl->flags = 0; crl->idp_flags = 0; crl->idp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; crl->meth = default_crl_method; crl->meth_data = NULL; crl->issuers = NULL; crl->crl_number = NULL; crl->base_crl_number = NULL; break; case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha1(), crl->sha1_hash, NULL); crl->idp = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_issuing_distribution_point, NULL, NULL); if (crl->idp) setup_idp(crl, crl->idp); crl->akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); crl->crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_crl_number, NULL, NULL); crl->base_crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_delta_crl, NULL, NULL); /* Delta CRLs must have CRL number */ if (crl->base_crl_number && !crl->crl_number) crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; /* * See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and indicate * this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so anything else * critical sets the flag. This code accesses the X509_CRL structure * directly: applications shouldn't do this. */ exts = crl->crl.extensions; for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) { int nid; ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx); nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)); if (nid == NID_freshest_crl) crl->flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) { /* We handle IDP and deltas */ if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point) || (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier) || (nid == NID_delta_crl)) continue; crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; break; } } if (!crl_set_issuers(crl)) return 0; if (crl->meth->crl_init) { if (crl->meth->crl_init(crl) == 0) return 0; } crl->flags |= EXFLAG_SET; break; case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST: if (crl->meth->crl_free) { if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl)) return 0; } AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid); ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp); ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number); ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number); sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free); break; } return 1; } /* Convert IDP into a more convenient form */ static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp) { int idp_only = 0; /* Set various flags according to IDP */ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT; if (idp->onlyuser > 0) { idp_only++; crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER; } if (idp->onlyCA > 0) { idp_only++; crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA; } if (idp->onlyattr > 0) { idp_only++; crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR; } if (idp_only > 1) crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID; if (idp->indirectCRL > 0) crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT; if (idp->onlysomereasons) { crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS; if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 0) crl->idp_reasons = idp->onlysomereasons->data[0]; if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 1) crl->idp_reasons |= (idp->onlysomereasons->data[1] << 8); crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; } DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)); } ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = { ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO), ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_EMBED(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REVOKED) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL) static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a, const X509_REVOKED *const *b) { return (ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)&(*a)->serialNumber, (ASN1_STRING *)&(*b)->serialNumber)); } int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev) { X509_CRL_INFO *inf; inf = &crl->crl; if (inf->revoked == NULL) inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp); if (inf->revoked == NULL || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } inf->enc.modified = 1; return 1; } int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r) { if (crl->meth->crl_verify) return crl->meth->crl_verify(crl, r); return 0; } int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { if (crl->meth->crl_lookup) return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL); return 0; } int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x) { if (crl->meth->crl_lookup) return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, X509_get_serialNumber(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)); return 0; } static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r) { return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), &crl->sig_alg, &crl->signature, &crl->crl, r)); } static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm, X509_REVOKED *rev) { int i; if (!rev->issuer) { if (!nm) return 1; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) return 1; return 0; } if (!nm) nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(rev->issuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(rev->issuer, i); if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gen->d.directoryName)) return 1; } return 0; } static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer) { X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev; int idx; rtmp.serialNumber = *serial; /* * Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. Do this * under a lock to avoid race condition. */ if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl.revoked)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(crl->lock); sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl.revoked); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(crl->lock); } idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl.revoked, &rtmp); if (idx < 0) return 0; /* Need to look for matching name */ for (; idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl.revoked); idx++) { rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl.revoked, idx); if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&rev->serialNumber, serial)) return 0; if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev)) { if (ret) *ret = rev; if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) return 2; return 1; } } return 0; } void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth) { if (meth == NULL) default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth; else default_crl_method = meth; } X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl), int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl), int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer), int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk)) { X509_CRL_METHOD *m; m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*m)); if (m == NULL) return NULL; m->crl_init = crl_init; m->crl_free = crl_free; m->crl_lookup = crl_lookup; m->crl_verify = crl_verify; m->flags = X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC; return m; } void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m) { if (m == NULL || !(m->flags & X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC)) return; OPENSSL_free(m); } void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat) { crl->meth_data = dat; } void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl) { return crl->meth_data; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/t_x509.c0000644000000000000000000002563513176625660015311 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int X509_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x) { return X509_print_ex_fp(fp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT); } int X509_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag, unsigned long cflag) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = X509_print_ex(b, x, nmflag, cflag); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int X509_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x) { return X509_print_ex(bp, x, XN_FLAG_COMPAT, X509_FLAG_COMPAT); } int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags, unsigned long cflag) { long l; int ret = 0, i; char *m = NULL, mlch = ' '; int nmindent = 0; ASN1_INTEGER *bs; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const char *neg; if ((nmflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) { mlch = '\n'; nmindent = 12; } if (nmflags == X509_FLAG_COMPAT) nmindent = 16; if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER)) { if (BIO_write(bp, "Certificate:\n", 13) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, " Data:\n", 10) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)) { l = X509_get_version(x); if (l >= 0 && l <= 2) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: %ld (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, (unsigned long)l) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: Unknown (%ld)\n", "", l) <= 0) goto err; } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL)) { if (BIO_write(bp, " Serial Number:", 22) <= 0) goto err; bs = X509_get_serialNumber(x); if (bs->length <= (int)sizeof(long)) { ERR_set_mark(); l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs); ERR_pop_to_mark(); } else { l = -1; } if (l != -1) { unsigned long ul; if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { ul = 0 - (unsigned long)l; neg = "-"; } else { ul = l; neg = ""; } if (BIO_printf(bp, " %s%lu (%s0x%lx)\n", neg, ul, neg, ul) <= 0) goto err; } else { neg = (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) ? " (Negative)" : ""; if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n%12s%s", "", neg) <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%c", bs->data[i], ((i + 1 == bs->length) ? '\n' : ':')) <= 0) goto err; } } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME)) { const X509_ALGOR *tsig_alg = X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(x); if (X509_signature_print(bp, tsig_alg, NULL) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER)) { if (BIO_printf(bp, " Issuer:%c", mlch) <= 0) goto err; if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, X509_get_issuer_name(x), nmindent, nmflags) < 0) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY)) { if (BIO_write(bp, " Validity\n", 17) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, " Not Before: ", 24) <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get0_notBefore(x))) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Not After : ", 25) <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get0_notAfter(x))) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT)) { if (BIO_printf(bp, " Subject:%c", mlch) <= 0) goto err; if (X509_NAME_print_ex (bp, X509_get_subject_name(x), nmindent, nmflags) < 0) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY)) { X509_PUBKEY *xpkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x); ASN1_OBJECT *xpoid; X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&xpoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpkey); if (BIO_write(bp, " Subject Public Key Info:\n", 33) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sPublic Key Algorithm: ", "") <= 0) goto err; if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, xpoid) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bp, "%12sUnable to load Public Key\n", ""); ERR_print_errors(bp); } else { EVP_PKEY_print_public(bp, pkey, 16, NULL); } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_IDS)) { const ASN1_BIT_STRING *iuid, *suid; X509_get0_uids(x, &iuid, &suid); if (iuid != NULL) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sIssuer Unique ID: ", "") <= 0) goto err; if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, iuid, 12)) goto err; } if (suid != NULL) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sSubject Unique ID: ", "") <= 0) goto err; if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, suid, 12)) goto err; } } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS)) X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "X509v3 extensions", X509_get0_extensions(x), cflag, 8); if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP)) { const X509_ALGOR *sig_alg; const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig; X509_get0_signature(&sig, &sig_alg, x); if (X509_signature_print(bp, sig_alg, sig) <= 0) goto err; } if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_AUX)) { if (!X509_aux_print(bp, x, 0)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(m); return (ret); } int X509_ocspid_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x) { unsigned char *der = NULL; unsigned char *dertmp; int derlen; int i; unsigned char SHA1md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; ASN1_BIT_STRING *keybstr; X509_NAME *subj; /* * display the hash of the subject as it would appear in OCSP requests */ if (BIO_printf(bp, " Subject OCSP hash: ") <= 0) goto err; subj = X509_get_subject_name(x); derlen = i2d_X509_NAME(subj, NULL); if ((der = dertmp = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen)) == NULL) goto err; i2d_X509_NAME(subj, &dertmp); if (!EVP_Digest(der, derlen, SHA1md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", SHA1md[i]) <= 0) goto err; } OPENSSL_free(der); der = NULL; /* * display the hash of the public key as it would appear in OCSP requests */ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Public key OCSP hash: ") <= 0) goto err; keybstr = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(x); if (keybstr == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_Digest(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(keybstr), ASN1_STRING_length(keybstr), SHA1md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", SHA1md[i]) <= 0) goto err; } BIO_printf(bp, "\n"); return (1); err: OPENSSL_free(der); return (0); } int X509_signature_dump(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent) { const unsigned char *s; int i, n; n = sig->length; s = sig->data; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if ((i % 18) == 0) { if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) return 0; if (BIO_indent(bp, indent, indent) <= 0) return 0; } if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", s[i], ((i + 1) == n) ? "" : ":") <= 0) return 0; } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1) return 0; return 1; } int X509_signature_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig) { int sig_nid; if (BIO_puts(bp, " Signature Algorithm: ") <= 0) return 0; if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, sigalg->algorithm) <= 0) return 0; sig_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm); if (sig_nid != NID_undef) { int pkey_nid, dig_nid; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &dig_nid, &pkey_nid)) { ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(NULL, pkey_nid); if (ameth && ameth->sig_print) return ameth->sig_print(bp, sigalg, sig, 9, 0); } } if (sig) return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, 9); else if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent) { char oidstr[80], first; STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust, *reject; const unsigned char *alias, *keyid; int keyidlen; int i; if (X509_trusted(x) == 0) return 1; trust = X509_get0_trust_objects(x); reject = X509_get0_reject_objects(x); if (trust) { first = 1; BIO_printf(out, "%*sTrusted Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, ""); for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(trust); i++) { if (!first) BIO_puts(out, ", "); else first = 0; OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof oidstr, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(trust, i), 0); BIO_puts(out, oidstr); } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } else BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Trusted Uses.\n", indent, ""); if (reject) { first = 1; BIO_printf(out, "%*sRejected Uses:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, ""); for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(reject); i++) { if (!first) BIO_puts(out, ", "); else first = 0; OBJ_obj2txt(oidstr, sizeof oidstr, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(reject, i), 0); BIO_puts(out, oidstr); } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } else BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, ""); alias = X509_alias_get0(x, NULL); if (alias) BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %s\n", indent, "", alias); keyid = X509_keyid_get0(x, &keyidlen); if (keyid) { BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, ""); for (i = 0; i < keyidlen; i++) BIO_printf(out, "%s%02X", i ? ":" : "", keyid[i]); BIO_write(out, "\n", 1); } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509name.c0000644000000000000000000002366313176625660015626 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf, int len) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (obj == NULL) return (-1); return (X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(name, obj, buf, len)); } int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf, int len) { int i; const ASN1_STRING *data; i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, -1); if (i < 0) return (-1); data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i)); i = (data->length > (len - 1)) ? (len - 1) : data->length; if (buf == NULL) return (data->length); memcpy(buf, data->data, i); buf[i] = '\0'; return (i); } int X509_NAME_entry_count(const X509_NAME *name) { if (name == NULL) return (0); return (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries)); } int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (obj == NULL) return (-2); return (X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, lastpos)); } /* NOTE: you should be passing -1, not 0 as lastpos */ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { int n; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk; if (name == NULL) return (-1); if (lastpos < 0) lastpos = -1; sk = name->entries; n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk); for (lastpos++; lastpos < n; lastpos++) { ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, lastpos); if (OBJ_cmp(ne->object, obj) == 0) return (lastpos); } return (-1); } X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(const X509_NAME *name, int loc) { if (name == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries) <= loc || loc < 0) return (NULL); else return (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(name->entries, loc)); } X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *ret; int i, n, set_prev, set_next; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk; if (name == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(name->entries) <= loc || loc < 0) return (NULL); sk = name->entries; ret = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_delete(sk, loc); n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk); name->modified = 1; if (loc == n) return (ret); /* else we need to fixup the set field */ if (loc != 0) set_prev = (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1))->set; else set_prev = ret->set - 1; set_next = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set; /*- * set_prev is the previous set * set is the current set * set_next is the following * prev 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * set 1 1 2 2 * next 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 * so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then * re-number down by 1 */ if (set_prev + 1 < set_next) for (i = loc; i < n; i++) sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set--; return (ret); } int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; int ret; ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, type, bytes, len); if (!ne) return 0; ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set); X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); return ret; } int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; int ret; ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(NULL, nid, type, bytes, len); if (!ne) return 0; ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set); X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); return ret; } int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; int ret; ne = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(NULL, field, type, bytes, len); if (!ne) return 0; ret = X509_NAME_add_entry(name, ne, loc, set); X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); return ret; } /* * if set is -1, append to previous set, 0 'a new one', and 1, prepend to the * guy we are about to stomp on. */ int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc, int set) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *new_name = NULL; int n, i, inc; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *sk; if (name == NULL) return (0); sk = name->entries; n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk); if (loc > n) loc = n; else if (loc < 0) loc = n; name->modified = 1; if (set == -1) { if (loc == 0) { set = 0; inc = 1; } else { set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1)->set; inc = 0; } } else { /* if (set >= 0) */ if (loc >= n) { if (loc != 0) set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc - 1)->set + 1; else set = 0; } else set = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set; inc = (set == 0) ? 1 : 0; } /* * X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup is ASN1 generated code, that can't be easily * const'ified; harmless cast as dup() don't modify its input. */ if ((new_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup((X509_NAME_ENTRY *)ne)) == NULL) goto err; new_name->set = set; if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_insert(sk, new_name, loc)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (inc) { n = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(sk); for (i = loc + 1; i < n; i++) sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i - 1)->set += 1; } return (1); err: X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(new_name); return (0); } X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_NAME_ENTRY *nentry; obj = OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0); if (obj == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME); ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", field); return (NULL); } nentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(ne, obj, type, bytes, len); ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); return nentry; } X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_NAME_ENTRY *nentry; obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (obj == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID, X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } nentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(ne, obj, type, bytes, len); ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); return nentry; } X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *ret; if ((ne == NULL) || (*ne == NULL)) { if ((ret = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); } else ret = *ne; if (!X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(ret, obj)) goto err; if (!X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(ret, type, bytes, len)) goto err; if ((ne != NULL) && (*ne == NULL)) *ne = ret; return (ret); err: if ((ne == NULL) || (ret != *ne)) X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ret); return (NULL); } int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { if ((ne == NULL) || (obj == NULL)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } ASN1_OBJECT_free(ne->object); ne->object = OBJ_dup(obj); return ((ne->object == NULL) ? 0 : 1); } int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { int i; if ((ne == NULL) || ((bytes == NULL) && (len != 0))) return (0); if ((type > 0) && (type & MBSTRING_FLAG)) return ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(&ne->value, bytes, len, type, OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object)) ? 1 : 0; if (len < 0) len = strlen((const char *)bytes); i = ASN1_STRING_set(ne->value, bytes, len); if (!i) return (0); if (type != V_ASN1_UNDEF) { if (type == V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE) ne->value->type = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(bytes, len); else ne->value->type = type; } return (1); } ASN1_OBJECT *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne) { if (ne == NULL) return (NULL); return (ne->object); } ASN1_STRING *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne) { if (ne == NULL) return (NULL); return (ne->value); } int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne) { return ne->set; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c0000644000000000000000000031245313176625660015647 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "x509_lcl.h" /* CRL score values */ /* No unhandled critical extensions */ #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* CRL times valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons); static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; } /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) { /* * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are * parse errors, rather than memory pressure! */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) return 1; else return 0; } /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; X509 *xtmp = NULL; int i; /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); if (certs == NULL) return NULL; /* Look for exact match */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) break; } if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) X509_up_ref(xtmp); else xtmp = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); return xtmp; } /*- * Inform the verify callback of an error. * If B is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at * B. * If B is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave * unchanged (presumably set by the caller). * * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. */ static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) { ctx->error_depth = depth; ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); if (err != X509_V_OK) ctx->error = err; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } /*- * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error * number. * * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. */ static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) return 1; for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); /* * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only * check the security of issuer keys. */ if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0) return 0; /* * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. */ if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int err; int ok; /* * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, * instantiate chain public key parameters. */ if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) return ok; err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, ctx->param->flags); if (err != X509_V_OK) { if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0) return ok; } /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0) return ok; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) return ok; if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) return ok; #endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); return ok; } int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int ret; if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { /* * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We * cannot do another one. */ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } /* * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that * the first entry is in place */ if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; } X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); ctx->num_untrusted = 1; /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL)) return 0; if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) ret = dane_verify(ctx); else ret = verify_chain(ctx); /* * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). */ if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return ret; } /* * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) */ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) { int i; X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) { rv = issuer; if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1)) break; } } return rv; } /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) { int ret; if (x == issuer) return cert_self_signed(x); ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); if (ret == X509_V_OK) { int i; X509 *ch; /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; break; } } } return (ret == X509_V_OK); } /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); if (*issuer) { X509_up_ref(*issuer); return 1; } else return 0; } static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; X509 *x; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { if (sk == NULL) sk = sk_X509_new_null(); if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) { sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return NULL; } X509_up_ref(x); } } return sk; } /* * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. */ static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, int must_be_ca) { int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust * settings trump the purpose constraints. * * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in * ctx->param->purpose! * * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value * via the X509_PURPOSE API. * * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is * also set. */ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); switch (tr_ok) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: return 1; case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: break; default: switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { case 1: return 1; case 0: break; default: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) return 1; } break; } return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); } /* * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied * purpose */ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; X509 *x; int proxy_path_length = 0; int purpose; int allow_proxy_certs; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); /*- * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. */ must_be_ca = -1; /* CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) { allow_proxy_certs = 0; purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; } else { allow_proxy_certs = ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); purpose = ctx->param->purpose; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { int ret; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)) return 0; } if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED)) return 0; } ret = X509_check_ca(x); switch (must_be_ca) { case -1: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; case 0: if (ret != 0) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; } else ret = 1; break; default: /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ if ((ret == 0) || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1))) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; } if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK)) return 0; /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) return 0; /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) return 0; } /* Increment path length if not self issued */ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) plen++; /* * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { /* * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. * * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, * increment proxy_path_length. */ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) return 0; } proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; } proxy_path_length++; must_be_ca = 0; } else must_be_ca = 1; } return 1; } static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i; /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); int j; /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) continue; /* * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry * added. * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; int last_object_nid = 0; int err = X509_V_OK; int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ if (last_object_loc < 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as * there is in issuer. */ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a * multivalued RDN */ if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)) == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1))) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly */ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); if (tmpsubject == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); last_object_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; } X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); proxy_name_done: if (err != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err)) return 0; } /* * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them * to be obeyed. */ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; if (nc) { int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0) rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); switch (rv) { case X509_V_OK: break; case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: return 0; default: if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv)) return 0; break; } } } } return 1; } static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) { return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); } static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { int i; int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); char *name; if (vpm->peername != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); vpm->peername = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) return 1; } return n == 0; } static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; X509 *x = ctx->cert; if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) { int i; X509 *x = NULL; X509 *mx; SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); int trust; /* * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. */ if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: return trust; } } /* * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. */ for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) goto trusted; if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) goto rejected; } /* * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, * the chain is PKIX trusted. */ if (num_untrusted < num) { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) goto trusted; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { /* * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf * for a direct trust store match. */ i = 0; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); if (!mx) return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. */ trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { X509_free(mx); goto rejected; } /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); X509_free(x); ctx->num_untrusted = 0; goto trusted; } /* * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. */ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; rejected: if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED)) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; trusted: if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; if (dane->pdpth < 0) dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ if (dane->mdpth >= 0) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) return 1; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; else { /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ if (ctx->parent) return 1; last = 0; } for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { ctx->error_depth = i; ok = check_cert(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; } return 1; } static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; int ok = 0; int cnum = ctx->error_depth; X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) return 1; while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ if (ctx->get_crl) ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); else ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); /* * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ if (!ok) { ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); goto done; } ctx->current_crl = crl; ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); if (!ok) goto done; if (dcrl) { ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); if (!ok) goto done; ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); if (!ok) goto done; } else ok = 1; /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ if (ok != 2) { ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); if (!ok) goto done; } X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); crl = NULL; dcrl = NULL; /* * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration, * so exit loop. */ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); goto done; } } done: X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); ctx->current_crl = NULL; return ok; } /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (notify) ctx->current_crl = crl; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) return 1; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) return 0; } if (i > 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) return 0; } if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) return 0; } /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) return 0; } } if (notify) ctx->current_crl = NULL; return 1; } static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); reasons = *preasons; crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) continue; /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { int day, sec; if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) continue; /* * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| * and |sec|. */ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) continue; } best_crl = crl; best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; best_score = crl_score; best_reasons = reasons; } if (best_crl) { X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); *pcrl = best_crl; *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; *pscore = best_score; *preasons = best_reasons; X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); *pdcrl = NULL; get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); } if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) return 1; return 0; } /* * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. */ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; int i; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) return 0; exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); } else exta = NULL; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) return 0; extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); } else extb = NULL; if (!exta && !extb) return 1; if (!exta || !extb) return 0; if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) return 0; return 1; } /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) { /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ if (!delta->base_crl_number) return 0; /* Base must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number) return 0; /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) return 0; /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) return 0; if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) return 0; /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 0; /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or * retrieve a chain of deltas... */ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *delta; int i; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) return; if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); *dcrl = delta; return; } } *dcrl = NULL; } /* * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. */ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int crl_score = 0; unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) return 0; /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) return 0; } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; } /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ else if (crl->base_crl_number) return 0; /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) return 0; } else crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; /* Check expiry */ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) return 0; /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; } *preasons = tmp_reasons; return crl_score; } static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) { X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); int cidx = ctx->error_depth; int i; if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) cidx++; crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) return; /* * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of * untrusted certificates. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pissuer = crl_issuer; *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; return; } } } /* * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. */ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; int ret; /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) return 0; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) return -1; crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; /* Copy verify params across */ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); crl_ctx.parent = ctx; crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* Verify CRL issuer */ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); if (ret <= 0) goto err; /* Check chain is acceptable */ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); return ret; } /* * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the * RFC5280 version */ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) { X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) return 1; return 0; } /*- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. */ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) { X509_NAME *nm = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; int i, j; if (!a || !b) return 1; if (a->type == 1) { if (!a->dpname) return 0; /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) return 1; else return 0; } /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ nm = a->dpname; gens = b->name.fullname; } else if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ gens = a->name.fullname; nm = b->dpname; } /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ if (nm) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) return 1; } } return 0; } static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) { int i; X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ if (!dp->CRLissuer) return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons) { int i; if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) return 0; } else { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) return 0; } *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; return 1; } } } if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) return 1; return 0; } /* * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try * to find a delta CRL too */ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509 *issuer = NULL; int crl_score = 0; unsigned int reasons; X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); reasons = ctx->current_reasons; ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); if (ok) goto done; /* Lookup CRLs from store */ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ if (!skcrl && crl) goto done; get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); done: /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ if (crl) { ctx->current_issuer = issuer; ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; ctx->current_reasons = reasons; *pcrl = crl; *pdcrl = dcrl; return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRL validity */ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) { X509 *issuer = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; int cnum = ctx->error_depth; int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ if (ctx->current_issuer) issuer = ctx->current_issuer; /* * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next * certificate in chain. */ else if (cnum < chnum) issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); else { issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) return 0; } if (issuer == NULL) return 1; /* * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done */ if (!crl->base_crl_number) { /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) return 0; if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) && check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) return 0; if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) return 0; } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) && !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) return 0; /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); if (!ikey && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) return 0; if (ikey) { int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) return 0; /* Verify CRL signature */ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) return 0; } return 1; } /* Check certificate against CRL */ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { X509_REVOKED *rev; /* * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can * change the meaning of CRL entries. */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) return 0; /* * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure * reason is not removeFromCRL. */ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) return 2; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (ctx->parent) return 1; /* * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the * X509_policy_check() call. */ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { int i; /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) continue; if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) return 0; } return 1; } if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; /* * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. */ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } /*- * Check certificate validity times. * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return * the validation status. * * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) return 1; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime); if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) return 0; if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD)) return 0; if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID)) return 0; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime); if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) return 0; if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD)) return 0; if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED)) return 0; return 1; } static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); X509 *xs; /* * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as * NULL, since all we have is a bare key. */ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { xs = xi; xi = NULL; goto check_cert; } if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) xs = xi; else { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { xs = xi; goto check_cert; } if (n <= 0) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); n--; ctx->error_depth = n; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } /* * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). */ while (n >= 0) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject). */ if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) return 0; } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) return 0; } } check_cert: /* Calls verify callback as needed */ if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) return 0; /* * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) * is retained. */ ctx->current_issuer = xi; ctx->current_cert = xs; ctx->error_depth = n; if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) return 0; if (--n >= 0) { xi = xs; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } } return 1; } int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) { return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); } int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) { char *str; ASN1_TIME atm; long offset; char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; int i, j, remaining; p = buff1; remaining = ctm->length; str = (char *)ctm->data; /* * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) return 0; memcpy(p, str, 10); p += 10; str += 10; remaining -= 10; } else { /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) return 0; memcpy(p, str, 12); p += 12; str += 12; remaining -= 12; } if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { *(p++) = '0'; *(p++) = '0'; } else { /* SS (seconds) */ if (remaining < 2) return 0; *(p++) = *(str++); *(p++) = *(str++); remaining -= 2; /* * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. * Can we just kill them altogether? */ if (remaining && *str == '.') { str++; remaining--; for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') break; } } } *(p++) = 'Z'; *(p++) = '\0'; /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ if (!remaining) return 0; if (*str == 'Z') { if (remaining != 1) return 0; offset = 0; } else { /* (+-)HHMM */ if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) return 0; /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ if (remaining != 5) return 0; if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') return 0; offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); if (*str == '-') offset = -offset; } atm.type = ctm->type; atm.flags = 0; atm.length = sizeof(buff2); atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) return 0; if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); if (i < 50) i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); if (j < 50) j += 100; if (i < j) return -1; if (i > j) return 1; } i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ return -1; else return i; } ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) { return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { time_t t; if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; else time(&t); if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; int i, j; if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) break; } if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); return 0; } /* first, populate the other certs */ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); } if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); return 1; } /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL; int i; STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; /* CRLs can't be delta already */ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); return NULL; } /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); return NULL; } /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); return NULL; } if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); return NULL; } /* CRLs must verify */ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Create new CRL */ crl = X509_CRL_new(); if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) goto memerr; /* Set issuer name */ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) goto memerr; /* * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL * number to correct value too. */ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext; ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) goto memerr; } /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); /* * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. */ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); if (!rvtmp) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); goto memerr; } } } /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) goto memerr; return crl; memerr: X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509_CRL_free(crl); return NULL; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); } void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error_depth; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { ctx->error_depth = depth; } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_cert; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->current_cert = x; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->chain; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx->chain) return NULL; return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_issuer; } X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->parent; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->cert = x; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) { ctx->crls = sk; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) { /* * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). */ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) { /* * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. */ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); } /* * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL * client/server. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, int purpose, int trust) { int idx; /* If purpose not set use default */ if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ if (purpose) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); /* * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? */ if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); } /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; } if (trust) { idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); return 0; } } if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; return 1; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) { X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } return ctx; } void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int ret = 1; ctx->ctx = store; ctx->cert = x509; ctx->untrusted = chain; ctx->crls = NULL; ctx->num_untrusted = 0; ctx->other_ctx = NULL; ctx->valid = 0; ctx->chain = NULL; ctx->error = 0; ctx->explicit_policy = 0; ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; ctx->tree = NULL; ctx->parent = NULL; ctx->dane = NULL; ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ if (store) ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; else ctx->cleanup = 0; if (store && store->check_issued) ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; else ctx->check_issued = check_issued; if (store && store->get_issuer) ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; else ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; if (store && store->verify_cb) ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; else ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; if (store && store->verify) ctx->verify = store->verify; else ctx->verify = internal_verify; if (store && store->check_revocation) ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; else ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; if (store && store->get_crl) ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; else ctx->get_crl = NULL; if (store && store->check_crl) ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; else ctx->check_crl = check_crl; if (store && store->cert_crl) ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; else ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; if (store && store->check_policy) ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy; else ctx->check_policy = check_policy; if (store && store->lookup_certs) ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; else ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; if (store && store->lookup_crls) ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; else ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (ctx->param == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ if (store) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); else ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; if (ret) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the * purpose if this still yields the default value. */ if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (xp != NULL) ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); } if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &ctx->ex_data)) return 1; X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: /* * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. */ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return 0; } /* * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. */ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->other_ctx = sk; ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { /* * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the * pointers below after they're freed! */ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { ctx->cleanup(ctx); ctx->cleanup = NULL; } if (ctx->param != NULL) { if (ctx->parent == NULL) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = NULL; } X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); ctx->tree = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = NULL; CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->untrusted; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->untrusted = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_cb; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) { ctx->verify = verify; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->get_issuer; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_issued; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_revocation; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->get_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_policy; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_certs; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_crls; } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cleanup; } X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->tree; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->explicit_policy; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->num_untrusted; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) { const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); if (!param) return 0; return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) { ctx->dane = dane; } static unsigned char *dane_i2d( X509 *cert, uint8_t selector, unsigned int *i2dlen) { unsigned char *buf = NULL; int len; /* * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. */ switch (selector) { case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); break; case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); break; default: X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); return NULL; } if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; return buf; } #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; unsigned int i2dlen = 0; unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; unsigned int cmplen = 0; int i; int recnum; int matched = 0; danetls_record *t = NULL; uint32_t mask; mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; /* * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; /* * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. */ if (dane->mdpth >= 0) mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; /*- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 * * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). * * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. * * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" * or multiple "3 0 1" records. * * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. */ recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) continue; if (t->usage != usage) { usage = t->usage; /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ mtype = DANETLS_NONE; ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; } if (t->selector != selector) { selector = t->selector; /* Update per-selector state */ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); if (i2dbuf == NULL) return -1; /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ mtype = DANETLS_NONE; ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { /*- * Digest agility: * * * * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals * other than "Full". */ if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) continue; } /* * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. */ if (t->mtype != mtype) { const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; cmpbuf = i2dbuf; cmplen = i2dlen; if (md != NULL) { cmpbuf = mdbuf; if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { matched = -1; break; } } } /* * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a * full chain. */ if (cmplen == t->dlen && memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) matched = 1; if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { dane->mdpth = depth; dane->mtlsa = t; OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = cert; X509_up_ref(cert); } break; } } /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); return matched; } static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int matched = 0; X509 *cert; if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). */ cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; if (matched > 0) { ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; danetls_record *t; int num = ctx->num_untrusted; X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); int i; for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) continue; /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; dane->mdpth = num - 1; dane->mtlsa = t; /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) { /* * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */ X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; dane->mtlsa = NULL; dane->mdpth = -1; dane->pdpth = -1; } static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); if (err == X509_V_OK) return 1; return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err); } static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *cert = ctx->cert; SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int matched; int done; dane_reset(dane); /*- * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor. * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done * if: * + matched < 0, internal error. * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. */ matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); if (done) X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); if (matched > 0) { /* Callback invoked as needed */ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) return 0; /* Callback invoked as needed */ if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && !check_id(ctx)) return 0; /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = cert; return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); } if (matched < 0) { ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = cert; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; } if (done) { /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) return 0; return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); } /* * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. */ return verify_chain(ctx); } /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */ static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; int ok; ctx->chain = NULL; ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); ctx->chain = saved_chain; return ok; } static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); int ss = cert_self_signed(cert); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; unsigned int search; int may_trusted = 0; int may_alternate = 0; int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; int alt_untrusted = 0; int depth; int ok = 0; int i; /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num); #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ /* * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain * if no luck with untrusted first. */ search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) search |= S_DOTRUSTED; else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) may_alternate = 1; may_trusted = 1; } /* * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. */ if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for * this to change. ] */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) { if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) { if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) { sk_X509_free(sktmp); X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } } } /* * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound * might be reasonable. */ if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2) ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2; /* * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. */ depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; while (search != 0) { X509 *x; X509 *xtmp = NULL; /* * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. * * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain * would be a-priori too long. */ if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { /* * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or * ctx->num_untrusted. * * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". */ i = alt_untrusted; } x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1); ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) { trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; search = 0; continue; } if (ok > 0) { /* * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note * that despite the current trust-store match we might still * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! * * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted * certificate among the ones from the trust store. */ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0); search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; for (; num > i; --num) X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); ctx->num_untrusted = num; if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { dane->mdpth = -1; X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; } if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) dane->pdpth = -1; } /* * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. */ if (ss == 0) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; search = 0; continue; } ss = cert_self_signed(x); } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { /* * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. */ if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) { /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ X509_free(xtmp); ok = 0; } else { X509_free(x); ctx->num_untrusted = --num; (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp); } } /* * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. * * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. */ if (ok) { OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num); search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: search = 0; continue; } if (ss == 0) continue; } } /* * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, * and trying to extend the shorted chain. */ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) continue; /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || ctx->num_untrusted < 2) break; /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ search |= S_DOALTERNATE; alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; ss = 0; } } /* * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates */ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted); x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1); /* * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. */ xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); if (xtmp == NULL) { search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; if (may_trusted) search |= S_DOTRUSTED; continue; } /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; search = 0; continue; } X509_up_ref(x = xtmp); ++ctx->num_untrusted; ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp); /* * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */ switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: search = 0; continue; } } } sk_X509_free(sktmp); /* * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. */ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (num <= depth) { if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) trust = check_trust(ctx, num); } switch (trust) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: return 1; case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: /* Callback already issued */ return 0; case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: default: num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (num > depth) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0)) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT); if (ss) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); if (ctx->num_untrusted < num) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT); return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); } } static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); /* * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of * ``ctx``. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); int level = ctx->param->auth_level; /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ if (pkey == NULL) return 0; if (level <= 0) return 1; if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; } /* * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether * self-signed or otherwise). * * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert); int mdnid = NID_undef; int secbits = -1; int level = ctx->param->auth_level; if (level <= 0) return 1; if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) { const EVP_MD *md; /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */ if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL) secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4; } return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_all.c0000644000000000000000000003331213176625660015347 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include #include #include int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r) { if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(&a->sig_alg, &a->cert_info.signature)) return 0; return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &a->sig_alg, &a->signature, &a->cert_info, r)); } int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r) { return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO), &a->sig_alg, a->signature, &a->req_info, r)); } int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r) { return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC), &a->sig_algor, a->signature, a->spkac, r)); } int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1; return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &x->cert_info.signature, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->cert_info, pkey, md)); } int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1; return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), &x->cert_info.signature, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->cert_info, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int X509_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509 **pcert) { return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx, (ASN1_VALUE **)pcert, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)); } #endif int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO), &x->sig_alg, NULL, x->signature, &x->req_info, pkey, md)); } int X509_REQ_sign_ctx(X509_REQ *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO), &x->sig_alg, NULL, x->signature, &x->req_info, ctx); } int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { x->crl.enc.modified = 1; return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), &x->crl.sig_alg, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->crl, pkey, md)); } int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { x->crl.enc.modified = 1; return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), &x->crl.sig_alg, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature, &x->crl, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int X509_CRL_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509_CRL **pcrl) { return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx, (ASN1_VALUE **)pcrl, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL)); } #endif int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { return (ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC), &x->sig_algor, NULL, x->signature, x->spkac, pkey, md)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x509) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509); } int i2d_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x509) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509); } #endif X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x509) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509); } int i2d_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 *x509) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **crl) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl); } int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *crl) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl); } #endif X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **crl) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl); } int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *crl) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **p7) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7); } int i2d_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *p7) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7); } #endif PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **p7) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7); } int i2d_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *p7) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **req) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req); } int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *req) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req); } #endif X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **req) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req); } int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa); } int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_d2i_fp((void *(*)(void)) RSA_new, (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, fp, (void **)rsa); } int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa); } int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_i2d_fp((I2D_OF(void))i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, fp, rsa); } # endif RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa); } int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(RSA, RSA_new, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, bp, rsa); } int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa); } int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(RSA, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, bp, rsa); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, fp, dsa); } int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(DSA, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, fp, dsa); } DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, fp, dsa); } int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(DSA, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, fp, dsa); } # endif DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, bp, dsa); } int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, bp, dsa); } DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA, DSA_new, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, bp, dsa); } int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(DSA, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, bp, dsa); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, fp, eckey); } int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, fp, eckey); } EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_ECPrivateKey, fp, eckey); } int i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY, i2d_ECPrivateKey, fp, eckey); } # endif EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, bp, eckey); } int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *ecdsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, bp, ecdsa); } EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new, d2i_ECPrivateKey, bp, eckey); } int i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY, i2d_ECPrivateKey, bp, eckey); } #endif int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { ASN1_BIT_STRING *key; key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(data); if (!key) return 0; return EVP_Digest(key->data, key->length, md, len, type, NULL); } int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0) { /* Asking for SHA1 and we already computed it. */ if (len != NULL) *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash); memcpy(md, data->sha1_hash, sizeof(data->sha1_hash)); return 1; } return (ASN1_item_digest (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), type, (char *)data, md, len)); } int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0) { /* Asking for SHA1; always computed in CRL d2i. */ if (len != NULL) *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash); memcpy(md, data->sha1_hash, sizeof(data->sha1_hash)); return 1; } return (ASN1_item_digest (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), type, (char *)data, md, len)); } int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return (ASN1_item_digest (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), type, (char *)data, md, len)); } int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return (ASN1_item_digest (ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME), type, (char *)data, md, len)); } int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return (ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL), type, (char *)data, md, len)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG **p8) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(X509_SIG, X509_SIG_new, d2i_X509_SIG, fp, p8); } int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG *p8) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG, fp, p8); } #endif X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG **p8) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(X509_SIG, X509_SIG_new, d2i_X509_SIG, bp, p8); } int i2d_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG *p8) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG, bp, p8); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, fp, p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, fp, p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *key) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; int ret; p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key); if (!p8inf) return 0; ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(fp, p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return ret; } int i2d_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PrivateKey, fp, pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_AutoPrivateKey, fp, a); } int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, fp, pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_PUBKEY, fp, a); } #endif PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, bp, p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, bp, p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *key) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; int ret; p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key); if (!p8inf) return 0; ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bp, p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return ret; } int i2d_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PrivateKey, bp, pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_AutoPrivateKey, bp, a); } int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, bp, pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new, d2i_PUBKEY, bp, a); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_exten.c0000644000000000000000000000202013176625660015712 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "x509_lcl.h" ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_EXTENSION) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_EXTENSION, object, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(X509_EXTENSION, critical, ASN1_BOOLEAN), ASN1_EMBED(X509_EXTENSION, value, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_EXTENSION) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_EXTENSIONS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Extension, X509_EXTENSION) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_EXTENSIONS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_EXTENSION) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c0000644000000000000000000000265713176625660016074 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "x509_lcl.h" /*- * X509_ATTRIBUTE: this has the following form: * * typedef struct x509_attributes_st * { * ASN1_OBJECT *object; * STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *set; * } X509_ATTRIBUTE; * */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_ATTRIBUTE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_ATTRIBUTE, object, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE, set, ASN1_ANY) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_ATTRIBUTE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ATTRIBUTE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_ATTRIBUTE) X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret = NULL; ASN1_TYPE *val = NULL; if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->object = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if ((val = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(ret->set, val)) goto err; ASN1_TYPE_set(val, atrtype, value); return (ret); err: X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(ret); ASN1_TYPE_free(val); return (NULL); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014152 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/build.info0000644000000000000000000000435413176625656016134 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ aes_misc.c aes_ecb.c aes_cfb.c aes_ofb.c \ aes_ige.c aes_wrap.c {- $target{aes_asm_src} -} GENERATE[aes-ia64.s]=asm/aes-ia64.S GENERATE[aes-586.s]=asm/aes-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[aes-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[vpaes-x86.s]=asm/vpaes-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[vpaes-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[aesni-x86.s]=asm/aesni-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[aesni-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[aes-x86_64.s]=asm/aes-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[vpaes-x86_64.s]=asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[bsaes-x86_64.s]=asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aesni-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aesni-sha1-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aesni-sha256-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aesni-mb-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aes-sparcv9.S]=asm/aes-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[aes-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[aest4-sparcv9.S]=asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[aest4-sparcv9.o]=.. DEPEND[aest4-sparcv9.S]=../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl GENERATE[aesfx-sparcv9.S]=asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[aesfx-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[aes-ppc.s]=asm/aes-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[vpaes-ppc.s]=asm/vpaes-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aesp8-ppc.s]=asm/aesp8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aes-parisc.s]=asm/aes-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aes-mips.S]=asm/aes-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aesv8-armx.S]=asm/aesv8-armx.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[aesv8-armx.o]=.. GENERATE[vpaes-armv8.S]=asm/vpaes-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aes-armv4.S]=asm/aes-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[aes-armv4.o]=.. GENERATE[bsaes-armv7.S]=asm/bsaes-armv7.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[bsaes-armv7.o]=.. BEGINRAW[Makefile] ##### AES assembler implementations # GNU make "catch all" {- $builddir -}/aes-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/aes-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ {- $builddir -}/bsaes-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/bsaes-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ENDRAW[Makefile] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c0000644000000000000000000000125613176625656015720 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include void AES_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num) { CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000246313176625656016111 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_AES_LOCL_H # define HEADER_AES_LOCL_H # include # include # include # include # if defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) # define SWAP(x) (_lrotl(x, 8) & 0x00ff00ff | _lrotr(x, 8) & 0xff00ff00) # define GETU32(p) SWAP(*((u32 *)(p))) # define PUTU32(ct, st) { *((u32 *)(ct)) = SWAP((st)); } # else # define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3])) # define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } # endif # ifdef AES_LONG typedef unsigned long u32; # else typedef unsigned int u32; # endif typedef unsigned short u16; typedef unsigned char u8; # define MAXKC (256/32) # define MAXKB (256/8) # define MAXNR 14 /* This controls loop-unrolling in aes_core.c */ # undef FULL_UNROLL #endif /* !HEADER_AES_LOCL_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_core.c0000644000000000000000000017257713176625656016121 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.c * * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* Note: rewritten a little bit to provide error control and an OpenSSL- compatible API */ #include #include #include #include #include "aes_locl.h" #ifndef AES_ASM /*- Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; Td4[x] = Si[x].[01]; */ static const u32 Te0[256] = { 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU, 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U, 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU, 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU, 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U, 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU, 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU, 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU, 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU, 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU, 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U, 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU, 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU, 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U, 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU, 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU, 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU, 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU, 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU, 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U, 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU, 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU, 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU, 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU, 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U, 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U, 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U, 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U, 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU, 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U, 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U, 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU, 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU, 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U, 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U, 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U, 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU, 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U, 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU, 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U, 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU, 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U, 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U, 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU, 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U, 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U, 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U, 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U, 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U, 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U, 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U, 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U, 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU, 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U, 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U, 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U, 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U, 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U, 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U, 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU, 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U, 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U, 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U, 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU, }; static const u32 Te1[256] = { 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU, 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U, 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU, 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U, 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU, 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U, 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU, 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U, 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U, 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU, 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U, 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U, 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U, 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU, 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U, 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U, 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU, 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U, 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U, 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U, 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU, 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU, 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U, 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU, 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU, 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U, 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU, 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U, 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU, 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U, 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U, 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U, 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU, 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U, 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU, 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U, 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU, 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U, 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U, 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU, 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU, 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU, 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U, 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U, 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU, 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U, 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU, 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U, 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU, 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U, 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU, 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU, 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U, 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU, 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U, 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU, 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U, 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U, 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U, 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU, 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU, 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U, 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU, 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U, }; static const u32 Te2[256] = { 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU, 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U, 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU, 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U, 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU, 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U, 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU, 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U, 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U, 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU, 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U, 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U, 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U, 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU, 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U, 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U, 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU, 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U, 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U, 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U, 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU, 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU, 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U, 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU, 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU, 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U, 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU, 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U, 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU, 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U, 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U, 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U, 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU, 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U, 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU, 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U, 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU, 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U, 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U, 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU, 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU, 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU, 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U, 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U, 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU, 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U, 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU, 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U, 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU, 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U, 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU, 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU, 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U, 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU, 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U, 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU, 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U, 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U, 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U, 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU, 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU, 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U, 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU, 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U, }; static const u32 Te3[256] = { 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U, 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U, 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U, 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU, 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU, 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU, 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U, 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU, 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU, 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U, 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U, 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU, 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU, 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU, 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU, 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU, 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U, 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU, 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU, 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U, 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U, 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U, 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U, 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U, 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU, 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U, 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU, 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU, 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U, 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U, 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U, 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU, 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U, 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU, 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU, 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U, 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U, 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU, 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U, 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU, 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U, 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U, 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U, 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U, 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU, 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U, 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU, 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U, 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU, 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U, 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU, 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU, 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU, 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU, 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U, 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U, 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U, 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U, 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U, 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U, 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU, 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U, 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU, 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU, }; static const u32 Td0[256] = { 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U, 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U, 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U, 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU, 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U, 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U, 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU, 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U, 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU, 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U, 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U, 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U, 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U, 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU, 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U, 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU, 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U, 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU, 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U, 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U, 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U, 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU, 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U, 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU, 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U, 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU, 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U, 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU, 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU, 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U, 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU, 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U, 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU, 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U, 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U, 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U, 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU, 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U, 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U, 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU, 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U, 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U, 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U, 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U, 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U, 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU, 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U, 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U, 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U, 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U, 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U, 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU, 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU, 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU, 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU, 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U, 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U, 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU, 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU, 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U, 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU, 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U, 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U, 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U, }; static const u32 Td1[256] = { 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU, 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U, 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU, 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U, 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U, 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U, 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U, 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U, 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U, 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU, 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU, 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU, 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U, 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU, 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U, 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U, 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U, 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU, 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU, 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U, 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU, 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U, 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU, 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU, 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U, 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U, 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U, 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU, 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U, 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU, 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U, 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U, 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U, 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU, 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U, 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U, 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U, 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U, 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U, 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U, 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU, 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU, 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U, 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU, 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U, 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU, 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU, 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U, 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU, 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U, 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U, 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U, 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U, 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U, 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U, 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U, 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU, 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U, 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U, 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU, 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U, 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U, 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U, 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U, }; static const u32 Td2[256] = { 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U, 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U, 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U, 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U, 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU, 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U, 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U, 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U, 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U, 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU, 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U, 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U, 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU, 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U, 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U, 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U, 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U, 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U, 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U, 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU, 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U, 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U, 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U, 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U, 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U, 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU, 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU, 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U, 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU, 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U, 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU, 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU, 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU, 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU, 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U, 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U, 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U, 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U, 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U, 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U, 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U, 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU, 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU, 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U, 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U, 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU, 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU, 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U, 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U, 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U, 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U, 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U, 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U, 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U, 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU, 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U, 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U, 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U, 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U, 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U, 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U, 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU, 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U, 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U, }; static const u32 Td3[256] = { 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU, 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU, 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U, 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U, 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU, 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU, 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U, 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU, 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U, 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU, 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U, 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U, 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U, 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U, 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U, 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU, 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU, 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U, 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U, 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU, 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU, 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U, 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U, 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U, 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U, 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU, 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U, 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U, 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU, 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU, 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U, 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U, 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U, 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU, 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U, 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U, 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U, 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U, 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U, 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U, 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U, 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU, 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U, 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U, 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU, 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU, 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U, 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU, 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U, 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U, 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U, 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U, 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U, 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U, 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU, 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU, 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU, 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU, 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U, 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U, 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U, 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU, 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U, 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U, }; static const u8 Td4[256] = { 0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U, 0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU, 0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U, 0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU, 0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU, 0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU, 0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U, 0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U, 0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U, 0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U, 0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU, 0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U, 0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU, 0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U, 0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U, 0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU, 0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU, 0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U, 0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U, 0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU, 0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U, 0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU, 0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U, 0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U, 0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U, 0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU, 0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU, 0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U, 0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U, 0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U, 0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU, }; static const u32 rcon[] = { 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ }; /** * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. */ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key) { u32 *rk; int i = 0; u32 temp; if (!userKey || !key) return -1; if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) return -2; rk = key->rd_key; if (bits == 128) key->rounds = 10; else if (bits == 192) key->rounds = 12; else key->rounds = 14; rk[0] = GETU32(userKey ); rk[1] = GETU32(userKey + 4); rk[2] = GETU32(userKey + 8); rk[3] = GETU32(userKey + 12); if (bits == 128) { while (1) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; if (++i == 10) { return 0; } rk += 4; } } rk[4] = GETU32(userKey + 16); rk[5] = GETU32(userKey + 20); if (bits == 192) { while (1) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; if (++i == 8) { return 0; } rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; rk += 6; } } rk[6] = GETU32(userKey + 24); rk[7] = GETU32(userKey + 28); if (bits == 256) { while (1) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; if (++i == 7) { return 0; } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; rk += 8; } } return 0; } /** * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. */ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key) { u32 *rk; int i, j, status; u32 temp; /* first, start with an encryption schedule */ status = AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key); if (status < 0) return status; rk = key->rd_key; /* invert the order of the round keys: */ for (i = 0, j = 4*(key->rounds); i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; } /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ for (i = 1; i < (key->rounds); i++) { rk += 4; rk[0] = Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[1] = Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[2] = Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[3] = Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; } return 0; } /* * Encrypt a single block * in and out can overlap */ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key) { const u32 *rk; u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ assert(in && out && key); rk = key->rd_key; /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(in ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(in + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(in + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; /* round 2: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; /* round 4: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; /* round 6: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; /* round 8: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (key->rounds > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (key->rounds > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += key->rounds << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = key->rounds >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = (Te2[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(out , s0); s1 = (Te2[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(out + 4, s1); s2 = (Te2[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(out + 8, s2); s3 = (Te2[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(out + 12, s3); } /* * Decrypt a single block * in and out can overlap */ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key) { const u32 *rk; u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ assert(in && out && key); rk = key->rd_key; /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(in ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(in + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(in + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; /* round 2: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; /* round 4: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; /* round 6: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; /* round 8: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (key->rounds > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (key->rounds > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += key->rounds << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = key->rounds >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(out , s0); s1 = ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(out + 4, s1); s2 = ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(out + 8, s2); s3 = ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(out + 12, s3); } #else /* AES_ASM */ static const u8 Te4[256] = { 0x63U, 0x7cU, 0x77U, 0x7bU, 0xf2U, 0x6bU, 0x6fU, 0xc5U, 0x30U, 0x01U, 0x67U, 0x2bU, 0xfeU, 0xd7U, 0xabU, 0x76U, 0xcaU, 0x82U, 0xc9U, 0x7dU, 0xfaU, 0x59U, 0x47U, 0xf0U, 0xadU, 0xd4U, 0xa2U, 0xafU, 0x9cU, 0xa4U, 0x72U, 0xc0U, 0xb7U, 0xfdU, 0x93U, 0x26U, 0x36U, 0x3fU, 0xf7U, 0xccU, 0x34U, 0xa5U, 0xe5U, 0xf1U, 0x71U, 0xd8U, 0x31U, 0x15U, 0x04U, 0xc7U, 0x23U, 0xc3U, 0x18U, 0x96U, 0x05U, 0x9aU, 0x07U, 0x12U, 0x80U, 0xe2U, 0xebU, 0x27U, 0xb2U, 0x75U, 0x09U, 0x83U, 0x2cU, 0x1aU, 0x1bU, 0x6eU, 0x5aU, 0xa0U, 0x52U, 0x3bU, 0xd6U, 0xb3U, 0x29U, 0xe3U, 0x2fU, 0x84U, 0x53U, 0xd1U, 0x00U, 0xedU, 0x20U, 0xfcU, 0xb1U, 0x5bU, 0x6aU, 0xcbU, 0xbeU, 0x39U, 0x4aU, 0x4cU, 0x58U, 0xcfU, 0xd0U, 0xefU, 0xaaU, 0xfbU, 0x43U, 0x4dU, 0x33U, 0x85U, 0x45U, 0xf9U, 0x02U, 0x7fU, 0x50U, 0x3cU, 0x9fU, 0xa8U, 0x51U, 0xa3U, 0x40U, 0x8fU, 0x92U, 0x9dU, 0x38U, 0xf5U, 0xbcU, 0xb6U, 0xdaU, 0x21U, 0x10U, 0xffU, 0xf3U, 0xd2U, 0xcdU, 0x0cU, 0x13U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x97U, 0x44U, 0x17U, 0xc4U, 0xa7U, 0x7eU, 0x3dU, 0x64U, 0x5dU, 0x19U, 0x73U, 0x60U, 0x81U, 0x4fU, 0xdcU, 0x22U, 0x2aU, 0x90U, 0x88U, 0x46U, 0xeeU, 0xb8U, 0x14U, 0xdeU, 0x5eU, 0x0bU, 0xdbU, 0xe0U, 0x32U, 0x3aU, 0x0aU, 0x49U, 0x06U, 0x24U, 0x5cU, 0xc2U, 0xd3U, 0xacU, 0x62U, 0x91U, 0x95U, 0xe4U, 0x79U, 0xe7U, 0xc8U, 0x37U, 0x6dU, 0x8dU, 0xd5U, 0x4eU, 0xa9U, 0x6cU, 0x56U, 0xf4U, 0xeaU, 0x65U, 0x7aU, 0xaeU, 0x08U, 0xbaU, 0x78U, 0x25U, 0x2eU, 0x1cU, 0xa6U, 0xb4U, 0xc6U, 0xe8U, 0xddU, 0x74U, 0x1fU, 0x4bU, 0xbdU, 0x8bU, 0x8aU, 0x70U, 0x3eU, 0xb5U, 0x66U, 0x48U, 0x03U, 0xf6U, 0x0eU, 0x61U, 0x35U, 0x57U, 0xb9U, 0x86U, 0xc1U, 0x1dU, 0x9eU, 0xe1U, 0xf8U, 0x98U, 0x11U, 0x69U, 0xd9U, 0x8eU, 0x94U, 0x9bU, 0x1eU, 0x87U, 0xe9U, 0xceU, 0x55U, 0x28U, 0xdfU, 0x8cU, 0xa1U, 0x89U, 0x0dU, 0xbfU, 0xe6U, 0x42U, 0x68U, 0x41U, 0x99U, 0x2dU, 0x0fU, 0xb0U, 0x54U, 0xbbU, 0x16U }; static const u32 rcon[] = { 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ }; /** * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. */ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key) { u32 *rk; int i = 0; u32 temp; if (!userKey || !key) return -1; if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) return -2; rk = key->rd_key; if (bits == 128) key->rounds = 10; else if (bits == 192) key->rounds = 12; else key->rounds = 14; rk[0] = GETU32(userKey ); rk[1] = GETU32(userKey + 4); rk[2] = GETU32(userKey + 8); rk[3] = GETU32(userKey + 12); if (bits == 128) { while (1) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; if (++i == 10) { return 0; } rk += 4; } } rk[4] = GETU32(userKey + 16); rk[5] = GETU32(userKey + 20); if (bits == 192) { while (1) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; if (++i == 8) { return 0; } rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; rk += 6; } } rk[6] = GETU32(userKey + 24); rk[7] = GETU32(userKey + 28); if (bits == 256) { while (1) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; if (++i == 7) { return 0; } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff]); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; rk += 8; } } return 0; } /** * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. */ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key) { u32 *rk; int i, j, status; u32 temp; /* first, start with an encryption schedule */ status = AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key); if (status < 0) return status; rk = key->rd_key; /* invert the order of the round keys: */ for (i = 0, j = 4*(key->rounds); i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; } /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ for (i = 1; i < (key->rounds); i++) { rk += 4; for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m; tp1 = rk[j]; m = tp1 & 0x80808080; tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp2 & 0x80808080; tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp4 & 0x80808080; tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1; tpb = tp9 ^ tp2; tpd = tp9 ^ tp4; tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2; #if defined(ROTATE) rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^ ROTATE(tp9,24) ^ ROTATE(tpb,8); #else rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ (tp9 >> 8) ^ (tp9 << 24) ^ (tpb >> 24) ^ (tpb << 8); #endif } } return 0; } #endif /* AES_ASM */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014732 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl0000644000000000000000000014656113176625656017022 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # AES for MIPS # October 2010 # # Code uses 1K[+256B] S-box and on single-issue core [such as R5000] # spends ~68 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key. This is ~16% # faster than gcc-generated code, which is not very impressive. But # recall that compressed S-box requires extra processing, namely # additional rotations. Rotations are implemented with lwl/lwr pairs, # which is normally used for loading unaligned data. Another cool # thing about this module is its endian neutrality, which means that # it processes data without ever changing byte order... # September 2012 # # Add MIPS32R2 (~10% less instructions) and SmartMIPS ASE (further # ~25% less instructions) code. Note that there is no run-time switch, # instead, code path is chosen upon pre-process time, pass -mips32r2 # or/and -msmartmips. ###################################################################### # There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most # widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if # one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral # manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout: # ($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23)); ($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31)); # # The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate # interoperability: # # - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp; # - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting # old code]; # - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary; # # For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs: # # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); # ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); # ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); # ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); # ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); # $flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64 if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $PTR_LA="dla"; $PTR_ADD="dadd"; # incidentally works even on n32 $PTR_SUB="dsub"; # incidentally works even on n32 $PTR_INS="dins"; $REG_S="sd"; $REG_L="ld"; $PTR_SLL="dsll"; # incidentally works even on n32 $SZREG=8; } else { $PTR_LA="la"; $PTR_ADD="add"; $PTR_SUB="sub"; $PTR_INS="ins"; $REG_S="sw"; $REG_L="lw"; $PTR_SLL="sll"; $SZREG=4; } $pf = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $t0 : $t2; # # # ###################################################################### $big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC}); for (@ARGV) { $output=$_ if (/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/); } open STDOUT,">$output"; if (!defined($big_endian)) { $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1); } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; my ($MSB,$LSB)=(0,3); # automatically converted to little-endian $code.=<<___; .text #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER # include #endif #if defined(__mips_smartmips) && !defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) #define _MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2 #endif #if !defined(__mips_eabi) && (!defined(__vxworks) || defined(__pic__)) .option pic2 #endif .set noat ___ {{{ my $FRAMESIZE=16*$SZREG; my $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc0fff008" : "0xc0ff0000"; my ($inp,$out,$key,$Tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3)=($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7); my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4,$t5,$t6,$t7,$t8,$t9,$t10,$t11) = map("\$$_",(12..23)); my ($key0,$cnt)=($gp,$fp); # instuction ordering is "stolen" from output from MIPSpro assembler # invoked with -mips3 -O3 arguments... $code.=<<___; .align 5 .ent _mips_AES_encrypt _mips_AES_encrypt: .frame $sp,0,$ra .set reorder lw $t0,0($key) lw $t1,4($key) lw $t2,8($key) lw $t3,12($key) lw $cnt,240($key) $PTR_ADD $key0,$key,16 xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 sub $cnt,1 #if defined(__mips_smartmips) ext $i0,$s1,16,8 .Loop_enc: ext $i1,$s2,16,8 ext $i2,$s3,16,8 ext $i3,$s0,16,8 lwxs $t0,$i0($Tbl) # Te1[s1>>16] ext $i0,$s2,8,8 lwxs $t1,$i1($Tbl) # Te1[s2>>16] ext $i1,$s3,8,8 lwxs $t2,$i2($Tbl) # Te1[s3>>16] ext $i2,$s0,8,8 lwxs $t3,$i3($Tbl) # Te1[s0>>16] ext $i3,$s1,8,8 lwxs $t4,$i0($Tbl) # Te2[s2>>8] ext $i0,$s3,0,8 lwxs $t5,$i1($Tbl) # Te2[s3>>8] ext $i1,$s0,0,8 lwxs $t6,$i2($Tbl) # Te2[s0>>8] ext $i2,$s1,0,8 lwxs $t7,$i3($Tbl) # Te2[s1>>8] ext $i3,$s2,0,8 lwxs $t8,$i0($Tbl) # Te3[s3] ext $i0,$s0,24,8 lwxs $t9,$i1($Tbl) # Te3[s0] ext $i1,$s1,24,8 lwxs $t10,$i2($Tbl) # Te3[s1] ext $i2,$s2,24,8 lwxs $t11,$i3($Tbl) # Te3[s2] ext $i3,$s3,24,8 rotr $t0,$t0,8 rotr $t1,$t1,8 rotr $t2,$t2,8 rotr $t3,$t3,8 rotr $t4,$t4,16 rotr $t5,$t5,16 rotr $t6,$t6,16 rotr $t7,$t7,16 xor $t0,$t4 lwxs $t4,$i0($Tbl) # Te0[s0>>24] xor $t1,$t5 lwxs $t5,$i1($Tbl) # Te0[s1>>24] xor $t2,$t6 lwxs $t6,$i2($Tbl) # Te0[s2>>24] xor $t3,$t7 lwxs $t7,$i3($Tbl) # Te0[s3>>24] rotr $t8,$t8,24 lw $s0,0($key0) rotr $t9,$t9,24 lw $s1,4($key0) rotr $t10,$t10,24 lw $s2,8($key0) rotr $t11,$t11,24 lw $s3,12($key0) xor $t0,$t8 xor $t1,$t9 xor $t2,$t10 xor $t3,$t11 xor $t0,$t4 xor $t1,$t5 xor $t2,$t6 xor $t3,$t7 sub $cnt,1 $PTR_ADD $key0,16 xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 .set noreorder bnez $cnt,.Loop_enc ext $i0,$s1,16,8 _xtr $i0,$s1,16-2 #else _xtr $i0,$s1,16-2 .Loop_enc: _xtr $i1,$s2,16-2 _xtr $i2,$s3,16-2 _xtr $i3,$s0,16-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) lw $t0,0($i0) # Te1[s1>>16] _xtr $i0,$s2,8-2 lw $t1,0($i1) # Te1[s2>>16] _xtr $i1,$s3,8-2 lw $t2,0($i2) # Te1[s3>>16] _xtr $i2,$s0,8-2 lw $t3,0($i3) # Te1[s0>>16] _xtr $i3,$s1,8-2 #else lwl $t0,3($i0) # Te1[s1>>16] lwl $t1,3($i1) # Te1[s2>>16] lwl $t2,3($i2) # Te1[s3>>16] lwl $t3,3($i3) # Te1[s0>>16] lwr $t0,2($i0) # Te1[s1>>16] _xtr $i0,$s2,8-2 lwr $t1,2($i1) # Te1[s2>>16] _xtr $i1,$s3,8-2 lwr $t2,2($i2) # Te1[s3>>16] _xtr $i2,$s0,8-2 lwr $t3,2($i3) # Te1[s0>>16] _xtr $i3,$s1,8-2 #endif and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) rotr $t0,$t0,8 rotr $t1,$t1,8 rotr $t2,$t2,8 rotr $t3,$t3,8 # if defined(_MIPSEL) lw $t4,0($i0) # Te2[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s3,0-2 lw $t5,0($i1) # Te2[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s0,0-2 lw $t6,0($i2) # Te2[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s1,0-2 lw $t7,0($i3) # Te2[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s2,0-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lw $t8,0($i0) # Te3[s3] $PTR_INS $i0,$s0,2,8 lw $t9,0($i1) # Te3[s0] $PTR_INS $i1,$s1,2,8 lw $t10,0($i2) # Te3[s1] $PTR_INS $i2,$s2,2,8 lw $t11,0($i3) # Te3[s2] $PTR_INS $i3,$s3,2,8 # else lw $t4,0($i0) # Te2[s2>>8] $PTR_INS $i0,$s3,2,8 lw $t5,0($i1) # Te2[s3>>8] $PTR_INS $i1,$s0,2,8 lw $t6,0($i2) # Te2[s0>>8] $PTR_INS $i2,$s1,2,8 lw $t7,0($i3) # Te2[s1>>8] $PTR_INS $i3,$s2,2,8 lw $t8,0($i0) # Te3[s3] _xtr $i0,$s0,24-2 lw $t9,0($i1) # Te3[s0] _xtr $i1,$s1,24-2 lw $t10,0($i2) # Te3[s1] _xtr $i2,$s2,24-2 lw $t11,0($i3) # Te3[s2] _xtr $i3,$s3,24-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl # endif rotr $t4,$t4,16 rotr $t5,$t5,16 rotr $t6,$t6,16 rotr $t7,$t7,16 rotr $t8,$t8,24 rotr $t9,$t9,24 rotr $t10,$t10,24 rotr $t11,$t11,24 #else lwl $t4,2($i0) # Te2[s2>>8] lwl $t5,2($i1) # Te2[s3>>8] lwl $t6,2($i2) # Te2[s0>>8] lwl $t7,2($i3) # Te2[s1>>8] lwr $t4,1($i0) # Te2[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s3,0-2 lwr $t5,1($i1) # Te2[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s0,0-2 lwr $t6,1($i2) # Te2[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s1,0-2 lwr $t7,1($i3) # Te2[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s2,0-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lwl $t8,1($i0) # Te3[s3] lwl $t9,1($i1) # Te3[s0] lwl $t10,1($i2) # Te3[s1] lwl $t11,1($i3) # Te3[s2] lwr $t8,0($i0) # Te3[s3] _xtr $i0,$s0,24-2 lwr $t9,0($i1) # Te3[s0] _xtr $i1,$s1,24-2 lwr $t10,0($i2) # Te3[s1] _xtr $i2,$s2,24-2 lwr $t11,0($i3) # Te3[s2] _xtr $i3,$s3,24-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #endif xor $t0,$t4 lw $t4,0($i0) # Te0[s0>>24] xor $t1,$t5 lw $t5,0($i1) # Te0[s1>>24] xor $t2,$t6 lw $t6,0($i2) # Te0[s2>>24] xor $t3,$t7 lw $t7,0($i3) # Te0[s3>>24] xor $t0,$t8 lw $s0,0($key0) xor $t1,$t9 lw $s1,4($key0) xor $t2,$t10 lw $s2,8($key0) xor $t3,$t11 lw $s3,12($key0) xor $t0,$t4 xor $t1,$t5 xor $t2,$t6 xor $t3,$t7 sub $cnt,1 $PTR_ADD $key0,16 xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 .set noreorder bnez $cnt,.Loop_enc _xtr $i0,$s1,16-2 #endif .set reorder _xtr $i1,$s2,16-2 _xtr $i2,$s3,16-2 _xtr $i3,$s0,16-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $t0,2($i0) # Te4[s1>>16] _xtr $i0,$s2,8-2 lbu $t1,2($i1) # Te4[s2>>16] _xtr $i1,$s3,8-2 lbu $t2,2($i2) # Te4[s3>>16] _xtr $i2,$s0,8-2 lbu $t3,2($i3) # Te4[s0>>16] _xtr $i3,$s1,8-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) # if defined(_MIPSEL) lbu $t4,2($i0) # Te4[s2>>8] $PTR_INS $i0,$s0,2,8 lbu $t5,2($i1) # Te4[s3>>8] $PTR_INS $i1,$s1,2,8 lbu $t6,2($i2) # Te4[s0>>8] $PTR_INS $i2,$s2,2,8 lbu $t7,2($i3) # Te4[s1>>8] $PTR_INS $i3,$s3,2,8 lbu $t8,2($i0) # Te4[s0>>24] _xtr $i0,$s3,0-2 lbu $t9,2($i1) # Te4[s1>>24] _xtr $i1,$s0,0-2 lbu $t10,2($i2) # Te4[s2>>24] _xtr $i2,$s1,0-2 lbu $t11,2($i3) # Te4[s3>>24] _xtr $i3,$s2,0-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl # else lbu $t4,2($i0) # Te4[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s0,24-2 lbu $t5,2($i1) # Te4[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s1,24-2 lbu $t6,2($i2) # Te4[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s2,24-2 lbu $t7,2($i3) # Te4[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s3,24-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $t8,2($i0) # Te4[s0>>24] $PTR_INS $i0,$s3,2,8 lbu $t9,2($i1) # Te4[s1>>24] $PTR_INS $i1,$s0,2,8 lbu $t10,2($i2) # Te4[s2>>24] $PTR_INS $i2,$s1,2,8 lbu $t11,2($i3) # Te4[s3>>24] $PTR_INS $i3,$s2,2,8 # endif _ins $t0,16 _ins $t1,16 _ins $t2,16 _ins $t3,16 _ins2 $t0,$t4,8 lbu $t4,2($i0) # Te4[s3] _ins2 $t1,$t5,8 lbu $t5,2($i1) # Te4[s0] _ins2 $t2,$t6,8 lbu $t6,2($i2) # Te4[s1] _ins2 $t3,$t7,8 lbu $t7,2($i3) # Te4[s2] _ins2 $t0,$t8,24 lw $s0,0($key0) _ins2 $t1,$t9,24 lw $s1,4($key0) _ins2 $t2,$t10,24 lw $s2,8($key0) _ins2 $t3,$t11,24 lw $s3,12($key0) _ins2 $t0,$t4,0 _ins2 $t1,$t5,0 _ins2 $t2,$t6,0 _ins2 $t3,$t7,0 #else lbu $t4,2($i0) # Te4[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s0,24-2 lbu $t5,2($i1) # Te4[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s1,24-2 lbu $t6,2($i2) # Te4[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s2,24-2 lbu $t7,2($i3) # Te4[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s3,24-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $t8,2($i0) # Te4[s0>>24] _xtr $i0,$s3,0-2 lbu $t9,2($i1) # Te4[s1>>24] _xtr $i1,$s0,0-2 lbu $t10,2($i2) # Te4[s2>>24] _xtr $i2,$s1,0-2 lbu $t11,2($i3) # Te4[s3>>24] _xtr $i3,$s2,0-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl _ins $t0,16 _ins $t1,16 _ins $t2,16 _ins $t3,16 _ins $t4,8 _ins $t5,8 _ins $t6,8 _ins $t7,8 xor $t0,$t4 lbu $t4,2($i0) # Te4[s3] xor $t1,$t5 lbu $t5,2($i1) # Te4[s0] xor $t2,$t6 lbu $t6,2($i2) # Te4[s1] xor $t3,$t7 lbu $t7,2($i3) # Te4[s2] _ins $t8,24 lw $s0,0($key0) _ins $t9,24 lw $s1,4($key0) _ins $t10,24 lw $s2,8($key0) _ins $t11,24 lw $s3,12($key0) xor $t0,$t8 xor $t1,$t9 xor $t2,$t10 xor $t3,$t11 _ins $t4,0 _ins $t5,0 _ins $t6,0 _ins $t7,0 xor $t0,$t4 xor $t1,$t5 xor $t2,$t6 xor $t3,$t7 #endif xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 jr $ra .end _mips_AES_encrypt .align 5 .globl AES_encrypt .ent AES_encrypt AES_encrypt: .frame $sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra .mask $SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i); # o32 PIC-ification .cpload $pf ___ $code.=<<___; $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE $REG_S $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi prologue $REG_S \$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S \$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S \$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S \$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i); # non-o32 PIC-ification .cplocal $Tbl .cpsetup $pf,$zero,AES_encrypt ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $PTR_LA $Tbl,AES_Te # PIC-ified 'load address' lwl $s0,0+$MSB($inp) lwl $s1,4+$MSB($inp) lwl $s2,8+$MSB($inp) lwl $s3,12+$MSB($inp) lwr $s0,0+$LSB($inp) lwr $s1,4+$LSB($inp) lwr $s2,8+$LSB($inp) lwr $s3,12+$LSB($inp) bal _mips_AES_encrypt swr $s0,0+$LSB($out) swr $s1,4+$LSB($out) swr $s2,8+$LSB($out) swr $s3,12+$LSB($out) swl $s0,0+$MSB($out) swl $s1,4+$MSB($out) swl $s2,8+$MSB($out) swl $s3,12+$MSB($out) .set noreorder $REG_L $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L \$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L \$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L \$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L \$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE .end AES_encrypt ___ $code.=<<___; .align 5 .ent _mips_AES_decrypt _mips_AES_decrypt: .frame $sp,0,$ra .set reorder lw $t0,0($key) lw $t1,4($key) lw $t2,8($key) lw $t3,12($key) lw $cnt,240($key) $PTR_ADD $key0,$key,16 xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 sub $cnt,1 #if defined(__mips_smartmips) ext $i0,$s3,16,8 .Loop_dec: ext $i1,$s0,16,8 ext $i2,$s1,16,8 ext $i3,$s2,16,8 lwxs $t0,$i0($Tbl) # Td1[s3>>16] ext $i0,$s2,8,8 lwxs $t1,$i1($Tbl) # Td1[s0>>16] ext $i1,$s3,8,8 lwxs $t2,$i2($Tbl) # Td1[s1>>16] ext $i2,$s0,8,8 lwxs $t3,$i3($Tbl) # Td1[s2>>16] ext $i3,$s1,8,8 lwxs $t4,$i0($Tbl) # Td2[s2>>8] ext $i0,$s1,0,8 lwxs $t5,$i1($Tbl) # Td2[s3>>8] ext $i1,$s2,0,8 lwxs $t6,$i2($Tbl) # Td2[s0>>8] ext $i2,$s3,0,8 lwxs $t7,$i3($Tbl) # Td2[s1>>8] ext $i3,$s0,0,8 lwxs $t8,$i0($Tbl) # Td3[s1] ext $i0,$s0,24,8 lwxs $t9,$i1($Tbl) # Td3[s2] ext $i1,$s1,24,8 lwxs $t10,$i2($Tbl) # Td3[s3] ext $i2,$s2,24,8 lwxs $t11,$i3($Tbl) # Td3[s0] ext $i3,$s3,24,8 rotr $t0,$t0,8 rotr $t1,$t1,8 rotr $t2,$t2,8 rotr $t3,$t3,8 rotr $t4,$t4,16 rotr $t5,$t5,16 rotr $t6,$t6,16 rotr $t7,$t7,16 xor $t0,$t4 lwxs $t4,$i0($Tbl) # Td0[s0>>24] xor $t1,$t5 lwxs $t5,$i1($Tbl) # Td0[s1>>24] xor $t2,$t6 lwxs $t6,$i2($Tbl) # Td0[s2>>24] xor $t3,$t7 lwxs $t7,$i3($Tbl) # Td0[s3>>24] rotr $t8,$t8,24 lw $s0,0($key0) rotr $t9,$t9,24 lw $s1,4($key0) rotr $t10,$t10,24 lw $s2,8($key0) rotr $t11,$t11,24 lw $s3,12($key0) xor $t0,$t8 xor $t1,$t9 xor $t2,$t10 xor $t3,$t11 xor $t0,$t4 xor $t1,$t5 xor $t2,$t6 xor $t3,$t7 sub $cnt,1 $PTR_ADD $key0,16 xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 .set noreorder bnez $cnt,.Loop_dec ext $i0,$s3,16,8 _xtr $i0,$s3,16-2 #else _xtr $i0,$s3,16-2 .Loop_dec: _xtr $i1,$s0,16-2 _xtr $i2,$s1,16-2 _xtr $i3,$s2,16-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) lw $t0,0($i0) # Td1[s3>>16] _xtr $i0,$s2,8-2 lw $t1,0($i1) # Td1[s0>>16] _xtr $i1,$s3,8-2 lw $t2,0($i2) # Td1[s1>>16] _xtr $i2,$s0,8-2 lw $t3,0($i3) # Td1[s2>>16] _xtr $i3,$s1,8-2 #else lwl $t0,3($i0) # Td1[s3>>16] lwl $t1,3($i1) # Td1[s0>>16] lwl $t2,3($i2) # Td1[s1>>16] lwl $t3,3($i3) # Td1[s2>>16] lwr $t0,2($i0) # Td1[s3>>16] _xtr $i0,$s2,8-2 lwr $t1,2($i1) # Td1[s0>>16] _xtr $i1,$s3,8-2 lwr $t2,2($i2) # Td1[s1>>16] _xtr $i2,$s0,8-2 lwr $t3,2($i3) # Td1[s2>>16] _xtr $i3,$s1,8-2 #endif and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) rotr $t0,$t0,8 rotr $t1,$t1,8 rotr $t2,$t2,8 rotr $t3,$t3,8 # if defined(_MIPSEL) lw $t4,0($i0) # Td2[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s1,0-2 lw $t5,0($i1) # Td2[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s2,0-2 lw $t6,0($i2) # Td2[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s3,0-2 lw $t7,0($i3) # Td2[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s0,0-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lw $t8,0($i0) # Td3[s1] $PTR_INS $i0,$s0,2,8 lw $t9,0($i1) # Td3[s2] $PTR_INS $i1,$s1,2,8 lw $t10,0($i2) # Td3[s3] $PTR_INS $i2,$s2,2,8 lw $t11,0($i3) # Td3[s0] $PTR_INS $i3,$s3,2,8 #else lw $t4,0($i0) # Td2[s2>>8] $PTR_INS $i0,$s1,2,8 lw $t5,0($i1) # Td2[s3>>8] $PTR_INS $i1,$s2,2,8 lw $t6,0($i2) # Td2[s0>>8] $PTR_INS $i2,$s3,2,8 lw $t7,0($i3) # Td2[s1>>8] $PTR_INS $i3,$s0,2,8 lw $t8,0($i0) # Td3[s1] _xtr $i0,$s0,24-2 lw $t9,0($i1) # Td3[s2] _xtr $i1,$s1,24-2 lw $t10,0($i2) # Td3[s3] _xtr $i2,$s2,24-2 lw $t11,0($i3) # Td3[s0] _xtr $i3,$s3,24-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #endif rotr $t4,$t4,16 rotr $t5,$t5,16 rotr $t6,$t6,16 rotr $t7,$t7,16 rotr $t8,$t8,24 rotr $t9,$t9,24 rotr $t10,$t10,24 rotr $t11,$t11,24 #else lwl $t4,2($i0) # Td2[s2>>8] lwl $t5,2($i1) # Td2[s3>>8] lwl $t6,2($i2) # Td2[s0>>8] lwl $t7,2($i3) # Td2[s1>>8] lwr $t4,1($i0) # Td2[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s1,0-2 lwr $t5,1($i1) # Td2[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s2,0-2 lwr $t6,1($i2) # Td2[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s3,0-2 lwr $t7,1($i3) # Td2[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s0,0-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lwl $t8,1($i0) # Td3[s1] lwl $t9,1($i1) # Td3[s2] lwl $t10,1($i2) # Td3[s3] lwl $t11,1($i3) # Td3[s0] lwr $t8,0($i0) # Td3[s1] _xtr $i0,$s0,24-2 lwr $t9,0($i1) # Td3[s2] _xtr $i1,$s1,24-2 lwr $t10,0($i2) # Td3[s3] _xtr $i2,$s2,24-2 lwr $t11,0($i3) # Td3[s0] _xtr $i3,$s3,24-2 and $i0,0x3fc and $i1,0x3fc and $i2,0x3fc and $i3,0x3fc $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #endif xor $t0,$t4 lw $t4,0($i0) # Td0[s0>>24] xor $t1,$t5 lw $t5,0($i1) # Td0[s1>>24] xor $t2,$t6 lw $t6,0($i2) # Td0[s2>>24] xor $t3,$t7 lw $t7,0($i3) # Td0[s3>>24] xor $t0,$t8 lw $s0,0($key0) xor $t1,$t9 lw $s1,4($key0) xor $t2,$t10 lw $s2,8($key0) xor $t3,$t11 lw $s3,12($key0) xor $t0,$t4 xor $t1,$t5 xor $t2,$t6 xor $t3,$t7 sub $cnt,1 $PTR_ADD $key0,16 xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 .set noreorder bnez $cnt,.Loop_dec _xtr $i0,$s3,16-2 #endif .set reorder lw $t4,1024($Tbl) # prefetch Td4 _xtr $i0,$s3,16 lw $t5,1024+32($Tbl) _xtr $i1,$s0,16 lw $t6,1024+64($Tbl) _xtr $i2,$s1,16 lw $t7,1024+96($Tbl) _xtr $i3,$s2,16 lw $t8,1024+128($Tbl) and $i0,0xff lw $t9,1024+160($Tbl) and $i1,0xff lw $t10,1024+192($Tbl) and $i2,0xff lw $t11,1024+224($Tbl) and $i3,0xff $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $t0,1024($i0) # Td4[s3>>16] _xtr $i0,$s2,8 lbu $t1,1024($i1) # Td4[s0>>16] _xtr $i1,$s3,8 lbu $t2,1024($i2) # Td4[s1>>16] _xtr $i2,$s0,8 lbu $t3,1024($i3) # Td4[s2>>16] _xtr $i3,$s1,8 and $i0,0xff and $i1,0xff and $i2,0xff and $i3,0xff $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) # if defined(_MIPSEL) lbu $t4,1024($i0) # Td4[s2>>8] $PTR_INS $i0,$s0,0,8 lbu $t5,1024($i1) # Td4[s3>>8] $PTR_INS $i1,$s1,0,8 lbu $t6,1024($i2) # Td4[s0>>8] $PTR_INS $i2,$s2,0,8 lbu $t7,1024($i3) # Td4[s1>>8] $PTR_INS $i3,$s3,0,8 lbu $t8,1024($i0) # Td4[s0>>24] _xtr $i0,$s1,0 lbu $t9,1024($i1) # Td4[s1>>24] _xtr $i1,$s2,0 lbu $t10,1024($i2) # Td4[s2>>24] _xtr $i2,$s3,0 lbu $t11,1024($i3) # Td4[s3>>24] _xtr $i3,$s0,0 $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl # else lbu $t4,1024($i0) # Td4[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s0,24 lbu $t5,1024($i1) # Td4[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s1,24 lbu $t6,1024($i2) # Td4[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s2,24 lbu $t7,1024($i3) # Td4[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s3,24 $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $t8,1024($i0) # Td4[s0>>24] $PTR_INS $i0,$s1,0,8 lbu $t9,1024($i1) # Td4[s1>>24] $PTR_INS $i1,$s2,0,8 lbu $t10,1024($i2) # Td4[s2>>24] $PTR_INS $i2,$s3,0,8 lbu $t11,1024($i3) # Td4[s3>>24] $PTR_INS $i3,$s0,0,8 # endif _ins $t0,16 _ins $t1,16 _ins $t2,16 _ins $t3,16 _ins2 $t0,$t4,8 lbu $t4,1024($i0) # Td4[s1] _ins2 $t1,$t5,8 lbu $t5,1024($i1) # Td4[s2] _ins2 $t2,$t6,8 lbu $t6,1024($i2) # Td4[s3] _ins2 $t3,$t7,8 lbu $t7,1024($i3) # Td4[s0] _ins2 $t0,$t8,24 lw $s0,0($key0) _ins2 $t1,$t9,24 lw $s1,4($key0) _ins2 $t2,$t10,24 lw $s2,8($key0) _ins2 $t3,$t11,24 lw $s3,12($key0) _ins2 $t0,$t4,0 _ins2 $t1,$t5,0 _ins2 $t2,$t6,0 _ins2 $t3,$t7,0 #else lbu $t4,1024($i0) # Td4[s2>>8] _xtr $i0,$s0,24 lbu $t5,1024($i1) # Td4[s3>>8] _xtr $i1,$s1,24 lbu $t6,1024($i2) # Td4[s0>>8] _xtr $i2,$s2,24 lbu $t7,1024($i3) # Td4[s1>>8] _xtr $i3,$s3,24 $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $t8,1024($i0) # Td4[s0>>24] _xtr $i0,$s1,0 lbu $t9,1024($i1) # Td4[s1>>24] _xtr $i1,$s2,0 lbu $t10,1024($i2) # Td4[s2>>24] _xtr $i2,$s3,0 lbu $t11,1024($i3) # Td4[s3>>24] _xtr $i3,$s0,0 $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl _ins $t0,16 _ins $t1,16 _ins $t2,16 _ins $t3,16 _ins $t4,8 _ins $t5,8 _ins $t6,8 _ins $t7,8 xor $t0,$t4 lbu $t4,1024($i0) # Td4[s1] xor $t1,$t5 lbu $t5,1024($i1) # Td4[s2] xor $t2,$t6 lbu $t6,1024($i2) # Td4[s3] xor $t3,$t7 lbu $t7,1024($i3) # Td4[s0] _ins $t8,24 lw $s0,0($key0) _ins $t9,24 lw $s1,4($key0) _ins $t10,24 lw $s2,8($key0) _ins $t11,24 lw $s3,12($key0) xor $t0,$t8 xor $t1,$t9 xor $t2,$t10 xor $t3,$t11 _ins $t4,0 _ins $t5,0 _ins $t6,0 _ins $t7,0 xor $t0,$t4 xor $t1,$t5 xor $t2,$t6 xor $t3,$t7 #endif xor $s0,$t0 xor $s1,$t1 xor $s2,$t2 xor $s3,$t3 jr $ra .end _mips_AES_decrypt .align 5 .globl AES_decrypt .ent AES_decrypt AES_decrypt: .frame $sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra .mask $SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i); # o32 PIC-ification .cpload $pf ___ $code.=<<___; $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE $REG_S $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi prologue $REG_S \$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S \$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S \$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S \$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i); # non-o32 PIC-ification .cplocal $Tbl .cpsetup $pf,$zero,AES_decrypt ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $PTR_LA $Tbl,AES_Td # PIC-ified 'load address' lwl $s0,0+$MSB($inp) lwl $s1,4+$MSB($inp) lwl $s2,8+$MSB($inp) lwl $s3,12+$MSB($inp) lwr $s0,0+$LSB($inp) lwr $s1,4+$LSB($inp) lwr $s2,8+$LSB($inp) lwr $s3,12+$LSB($inp) bal _mips_AES_decrypt swr $s0,0+$LSB($out) swr $s1,4+$LSB($out) swr $s2,8+$LSB($out) swr $s3,12+$LSB($out) swl $s0,0+$MSB($out) swl $s1,4+$MSB($out) swl $s2,8+$MSB($out) swl $s3,12+$MSB($out) .set noreorder $REG_L $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L \$15,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L \$14,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L \$13,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L \$12,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE .end AES_decrypt ___ }}} {{{ my $FRAMESIZE=8*$SZREG; my $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc000f008" : "0xc0000000"; my ($inp,$bits,$key,$Tbl)=($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3); my ($rk0,$rk1,$rk2,$rk3,$rk4,$rk5,$rk6,$rk7)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2); my ($rcon,$cnt)=($gp,$fp); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .ent _mips_AES_set_encrypt_key _mips_AES_set_encrypt_key: .frame $sp,0,$ra .set noreorder beqz $inp,.Lekey_done li $t0,-1 beqz $key,.Lekey_done $PTR_ADD $rcon,$Tbl,256 .set reorder lwl $rk0,0+$MSB($inp) # load 128 bits lwl $rk1,4+$MSB($inp) lwl $rk2,8+$MSB($inp) lwl $rk3,12+$MSB($inp) li $at,128 lwr $rk0,0+$LSB($inp) lwr $rk1,4+$LSB($inp) lwr $rk2,8+$LSB($inp) lwr $rk3,12+$LSB($inp) .set noreorder beq $bits,$at,.L128bits li $cnt,10 .set reorder lwl $rk4,16+$MSB($inp) # load 192 bits lwl $rk5,20+$MSB($inp) li $at,192 lwr $rk4,16+$LSB($inp) lwr $rk5,20+$LSB($inp) .set noreorder beq $bits,$at,.L192bits li $cnt,8 .set reorder lwl $rk6,24+$MSB($inp) # load 256 bits lwl $rk7,28+$MSB($inp) li $at,256 lwr $rk6,24+$LSB($inp) lwr $rk7,28+$LSB($inp) .set noreorder beq $bits,$at,.L256bits li $cnt,7 b .Lekey_done li $t0,-2 .align 4 .L128bits: .set reorder srl $i0,$rk3,16 srl $i1,$rk3,8 and $i0,0xff and $i1,0xff and $i2,$rk3,0xff srl $i3,$rk3,24 $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $i0,0($i0) lbu $i1,0($i1) lbu $i2,0($i2) lbu $i3,0($i3) sw $rk0,0($key) sw $rk1,4($key) sw $rk2,8($key) sw $rk3,12($key) sub $cnt,1 $PTR_ADD $key,16 _bias $i0,24 _bias $i1,16 _bias $i2,8 _bias $i3,0 xor $rk0,$i0 lw $i0,0($rcon) xor $rk0,$i1 xor $rk0,$i2 xor $rk0,$i3 xor $rk0,$i0 xor $rk1,$rk0 xor $rk2,$rk1 xor $rk3,$rk2 .set noreorder bnez $cnt,.L128bits $PTR_ADD $rcon,4 sw $rk0,0($key) sw $rk1,4($key) sw $rk2,8($key) li $cnt,10 sw $rk3,12($key) li $t0,0 sw $cnt,80($key) b .Lekey_done $PTR_SUB $key,10*16 .align 4 .L192bits: .set reorder srl $i0,$rk5,16 srl $i1,$rk5,8 and $i0,0xff and $i1,0xff and $i2,$rk5,0xff srl $i3,$rk5,24 $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $i0,0($i0) lbu $i1,0($i1) lbu $i2,0($i2) lbu $i3,0($i3) sw $rk0,0($key) sw $rk1,4($key) sw $rk2,8($key) sw $rk3,12($key) sw $rk4,16($key) sw $rk5,20($key) sub $cnt,1 $PTR_ADD $key,24 _bias $i0,24 _bias $i1,16 _bias $i2,8 _bias $i3,0 xor $rk0,$i0 lw $i0,0($rcon) xor $rk0,$i1 xor $rk0,$i2 xor $rk0,$i3 xor $rk0,$i0 xor $rk1,$rk0 xor $rk2,$rk1 xor $rk3,$rk2 xor $rk4,$rk3 xor $rk5,$rk4 .set noreorder bnez $cnt,.L192bits $PTR_ADD $rcon,4 sw $rk0,0($key) sw $rk1,4($key) sw $rk2,8($key) li $cnt,12 sw $rk3,12($key) li $t0,0 sw $cnt,48($key) b .Lekey_done $PTR_SUB $key,12*16 .align 4 .L256bits: .set reorder srl $i0,$rk7,16 srl $i1,$rk7,8 and $i0,0xff and $i1,0xff and $i2,$rk7,0xff srl $i3,$rk7,24 $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $i0,0($i0) lbu $i1,0($i1) lbu $i2,0($i2) lbu $i3,0($i3) sw $rk0,0($key) sw $rk1,4($key) sw $rk2,8($key) sw $rk3,12($key) sw $rk4,16($key) sw $rk5,20($key) sw $rk6,24($key) sw $rk7,28($key) sub $cnt,1 _bias $i0,24 _bias $i1,16 _bias $i2,8 _bias $i3,0 xor $rk0,$i0 lw $i0,0($rcon) xor $rk0,$i1 xor $rk0,$i2 xor $rk0,$i3 xor $rk0,$i0 xor $rk1,$rk0 xor $rk2,$rk1 xor $rk3,$rk2 beqz $cnt,.L256bits_done srl $i0,$rk3,24 srl $i1,$rk3,16 srl $i2,$rk3,8 and $i3,$rk3,0xff and $i1,0xff and $i2,0xff $PTR_ADD $i0,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i1,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i2,$Tbl $PTR_ADD $i3,$Tbl lbu $i0,0($i0) lbu $i1,0($i1) lbu $i2,0($i2) lbu $i3,0($i3) sll $i0,24 sll $i1,16 sll $i2,8 xor $rk4,$i0 xor $rk4,$i1 xor $rk4,$i2 xor $rk4,$i3 xor $rk5,$rk4 xor $rk6,$rk5 xor $rk7,$rk6 $PTR_ADD $key,32 .set noreorder b .L256bits $PTR_ADD $rcon,4 .L256bits_done: sw $rk0,32($key) sw $rk1,36($key) sw $rk2,40($key) li $cnt,14 sw $rk3,44($key) li $t0,0 sw $cnt,48($key) $PTR_SUB $key,12*16 .Lekey_done: jr $ra nop .end _mips_AES_set_encrypt_key .globl AES_set_encrypt_key .ent AES_set_encrypt_key AES_set_encrypt_key: .frame $sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra .mask $SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i); # o32 PIC-ification .cpload $pf ___ $code.=<<___; $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE $REG_S $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi prologue $REG_S $s3,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i); # non-o32 PIC-ification .cplocal $Tbl .cpsetup $pf,$zero,AES_set_encrypt_key ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $PTR_LA $Tbl,AES_Te4 # PIC-ified 'load address' bal _mips_AES_set_encrypt_key .set noreorder move $a0,$t0 $REG_L $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE .end AES_set_encrypt_key ___ my ($head,$tail)=($inp,$bits); my ($tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8,$tp9,$tpb,$tpd,$tpe)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); my ($m,$x80808080,$x7f7f7f7f,$x1b1b1b1b)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .globl AES_set_decrypt_key .ent AES_set_decrypt_key AES_set_decrypt_key: .frame $sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra .mask $SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i); # o32 PIC-ification .cpload $pf ___ $code.=<<___; $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE $REG_S $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi prologue $REG_S $s3,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i); # non-o32 PIC-ification .cplocal $Tbl .cpsetup $pf,$zero,AES_set_decrypt_key ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $PTR_LA $Tbl,AES_Te4 # PIC-ified 'load address' bal _mips_AES_set_encrypt_key bltz $t0,.Ldkey_done sll $at,$cnt,4 $PTR_ADD $head,$key,0 $PTR_ADD $tail,$key,$at .align 4 .Lswap: lw $rk0,0($head) lw $rk1,4($head) lw $rk2,8($head) lw $rk3,12($head) lw $rk4,0($tail) lw $rk5,4($tail) lw $rk6,8($tail) lw $rk7,12($tail) sw $rk0,0($tail) sw $rk1,4($tail) sw $rk2,8($tail) sw $rk3,12($tail) $PTR_ADD $head,16 $PTR_SUB $tail,16 sw $rk4,-16($head) sw $rk5,-12($head) sw $rk6,-8($head) sw $rk7,-4($head) bne $head,$tail,.Lswap lw $tp1,16($key) # modulo-scheduled lui $x80808080,0x8080 sub $cnt,1 or $x80808080,0x8080 sll $cnt,2 $PTR_ADD $key,16 lui $x1b1b1b1b,0x1b1b nor $x7f7f7f7f,$zero,$x80808080 or $x1b1b1b1b,0x1b1b .align 4 .Lmix: and $m,$tp1,$x80808080 and $tp2,$tp1,$x7f7f7f7f srl $tp4,$m,7 addu $tp2,$tp2 # tp2<<1 subu $m,$tp4 and $m,$x1b1b1b1b xor $tp2,$m and $m,$tp2,$x80808080 and $tp4,$tp2,$x7f7f7f7f srl $tp8,$m,7 addu $tp4,$tp4 # tp4<<1 subu $m,$tp8 and $m,$x1b1b1b1b xor $tp4,$m and $m,$tp4,$x80808080 and $tp8,$tp4,$x7f7f7f7f srl $tp9,$m,7 addu $tp8,$tp8 # tp8<<1 subu $m,$tp9 and $m,$x1b1b1b1b xor $tp8,$m xor $tp9,$tp8,$tp1 xor $tpe,$tp8,$tp4 xor $tpb,$tp9,$tp2 xor $tpd,$tp9,$tp4 #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) rotr $tp1,$tpd,16 xor $tpe,$tp2 rotr $tp2,$tp9,8 xor $tpe,$tp1 rotr $tp4,$tpb,24 xor $tpe,$tp2 lw $tp1,4($key) # modulo-scheduled xor $tpe,$tp4 #else _ror $tp1,$tpd,16 xor $tpe,$tp2 _ror $tp2,$tpd,-16 xor $tpe,$tp1 _ror $tp1,$tp9,8 xor $tpe,$tp2 _ror $tp2,$tp9,-24 xor $tpe,$tp1 _ror $tp1,$tpb,24 xor $tpe,$tp2 _ror $tp2,$tpb,-8 xor $tpe,$tp1 lw $tp1,4($key) # modulo-scheduled xor $tpe,$tp2 #endif sub $cnt,1 sw $tpe,0($key) $PTR_ADD $key,4 bnez $cnt,.Lmix li $t0,0 .Ldkey_done: .set noreorder move $a0,$t0 $REG_L $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE .end AES_set_decrypt_key ___ }}} ###################################################################### # Tables are kept in endian-neutral manner $code.=<<___; .rdata .align 10 AES_Te: .byte 0xc6,0x63,0x63,0xa5, 0xf8,0x7c,0x7c,0x84 # Te0 .byte 0xee,0x77,0x77,0x99, 0xf6,0x7b,0x7b,0x8d .byte 0xff,0xf2,0xf2,0x0d, 0xd6,0x6b,0x6b,0xbd .byte 0xde,0x6f,0x6f,0xb1, 0x91,0xc5,0xc5,0x54 .byte 0x60,0x30,0x30,0x50, 0x02,0x01,0x01,0x03 .byte 0xce,0x67,0x67,0xa9, 0x56,0x2b,0x2b,0x7d .byte 0xe7,0xfe,0xfe,0x19, 0xb5,0xd7,0xd7,0x62 .byte 0x4d,0xab,0xab,0xe6, 0xec,0x76,0x76,0x9a .byte 0x8f,0xca,0xca,0x45, 0x1f,0x82,0x82,0x9d .byte 0x89,0xc9,0xc9,0x40, 0xfa,0x7d,0x7d,0x87 .byte 0xef,0xfa,0xfa,0x15, 0xb2,0x59,0x59,0xeb .byte 0x8e,0x47,0x47,0xc9, 0xfb,0xf0,0xf0,0x0b .byte 0x41,0xad,0xad,0xec, 0xb3,0xd4,0xd4,0x67 .byte 0x5f,0xa2,0xa2,0xfd, 0x45,0xaf,0xaf,0xea .byte 0x23,0x9c,0x9c,0xbf, 0x53,0xa4,0xa4,0xf7 .byte 0xe4,0x72,0x72,0x96, 0x9b,0xc0,0xc0,0x5b .byte 0x75,0xb7,0xb7,0xc2, 0xe1,0xfd,0xfd,0x1c .byte 0x3d,0x93,0x93,0xae, 0x4c,0x26,0x26,0x6a .byte 0x6c,0x36,0x36,0x5a, 0x7e,0x3f,0x3f,0x41 .byte 0xf5,0xf7,0xf7,0x02, 0x83,0xcc,0xcc,0x4f .byte 0x68,0x34,0x34,0x5c, 0x51,0xa5,0xa5,0xf4 .byte 0xd1,0xe5,0xe5,0x34, 0xf9,0xf1,0xf1,0x08 .byte 0xe2,0x71,0x71,0x93, 0xab,0xd8,0xd8,0x73 .byte 0x62,0x31,0x31,0x53, 0x2a,0x15,0x15,0x3f .byte 0x08,0x04,0x04,0x0c, 0x95,0xc7,0xc7,0x52 .byte 0x46,0x23,0x23,0x65, 0x9d,0xc3,0xc3,0x5e .byte 0x30,0x18,0x18,0x28, 0x37,0x96,0x96,0xa1 .byte 0x0a,0x05,0x05,0x0f, 0x2f,0x9a,0x9a,0xb5 .byte 0x0e,0x07,0x07,0x09, 0x24,0x12,0x12,0x36 .byte 0x1b,0x80,0x80,0x9b, 0xdf,0xe2,0xe2,0x3d .byte 0xcd,0xeb,0xeb,0x26, 0x4e,0x27,0x27,0x69 .byte 0x7f,0xb2,0xb2,0xcd, 0xea,0x75,0x75,0x9f .byte 0x12,0x09,0x09,0x1b, 0x1d,0x83,0x83,0x9e .byte 0x58,0x2c,0x2c,0x74, 0x34,0x1a,0x1a,0x2e .byte 0x36,0x1b,0x1b,0x2d, 0xdc,0x6e,0x6e,0xb2 .byte 0xb4,0x5a,0x5a,0xee, 0x5b,0xa0,0xa0,0xfb .byte 0xa4,0x52,0x52,0xf6, 0x76,0x3b,0x3b,0x4d .byte 0xb7,0xd6,0xd6,0x61, 0x7d,0xb3,0xb3,0xce .byte 0x52,0x29,0x29,0x7b, 0xdd,0xe3,0xe3,0x3e .byte 0x5e,0x2f,0x2f,0x71, 0x13,0x84,0x84,0x97 .byte 0xa6,0x53,0x53,0xf5, 0xb9,0xd1,0xd1,0x68 .byte 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0xc1,0xed,0xed,0x2c .byte 0x40,0x20,0x20,0x60, 0xe3,0xfc,0xfc,0x1f .byte 0x79,0xb1,0xb1,0xc8, 0xb6,0x5b,0x5b,0xed .byte 0xd4,0x6a,0x6a,0xbe, 0x8d,0xcb,0xcb,0x46 .byte 0x67,0xbe,0xbe,0xd9, 0x72,0x39,0x39,0x4b .byte 0x94,0x4a,0x4a,0xde, 0x98,0x4c,0x4c,0xd4 .byte 0xb0,0x58,0x58,0xe8, 0x85,0xcf,0xcf,0x4a .byte 0xbb,0xd0,0xd0,0x6b, 0xc5,0xef,0xef,0x2a .byte 0x4f,0xaa,0xaa,0xe5, 0xed,0xfb,0xfb,0x16 .byte 0x86,0x43,0x43,0xc5, 0x9a,0x4d,0x4d,0xd7 .byte 0x66,0x33,0x33,0x55, 0x11,0x85,0x85,0x94 .byte 0x8a,0x45,0x45,0xcf, 0xe9,0xf9,0xf9,0x10 .byte 0x04,0x02,0x02,0x06, 0xfe,0x7f,0x7f,0x81 .byte 0xa0,0x50,0x50,0xf0, 0x78,0x3c,0x3c,0x44 .byte 0x25,0x9f,0x9f,0xba, 0x4b,0xa8,0xa8,0xe3 .byte 0xa2,0x51,0x51,0xf3, 0x5d,0xa3,0xa3,0xfe .byte 0x80,0x40,0x40,0xc0, 0x05,0x8f,0x8f,0x8a .byte 0x3f,0x92,0x92,0xad, 0x21,0x9d,0x9d,0xbc .byte 0x70,0x38,0x38,0x48, 0xf1,0xf5,0xf5,0x04 .byte 0x63,0xbc,0xbc,0xdf, 0x77,0xb6,0xb6,0xc1 .byte 0xaf,0xda,0xda,0x75, 0x42,0x21,0x21,0x63 .byte 0x20,0x10,0x10,0x30, 0xe5,0xff,0xff,0x1a .byte 0xfd,0xf3,0xf3,0x0e, 0xbf,0xd2,0xd2,0x6d .byte 0x81,0xcd,0xcd,0x4c, 0x18,0x0c,0x0c,0x14 .byte 0x26,0x13,0x13,0x35, 0xc3,0xec,0xec,0x2f .byte 0xbe,0x5f,0x5f,0xe1, 0x35,0x97,0x97,0xa2 .byte 0x88,0x44,0x44,0xcc, 0x2e,0x17,0x17,0x39 .byte 0x93,0xc4,0xc4,0x57, 0x55,0xa7,0xa7,0xf2 .byte 0xfc,0x7e,0x7e,0x82, 0x7a,0x3d,0x3d,0x47 .byte 0xc8,0x64,0x64,0xac, 0xba,0x5d,0x5d,0xe7 .byte 0x32,0x19,0x19,0x2b, 0xe6,0x73,0x73,0x95 .byte 0xc0,0x60,0x60,0xa0, 0x19,0x81,0x81,0x98 .byte 0x9e,0x4f,0x4f,0xd1, 0xa3,0xdc,0xdc,0x7f .byte 0x44,0x22,0x22,0x66, 0x54,0x2a,0x2a,0x7e .byte 0x3b,0x90,0x90,0xab, 0x0b,0x88,0x88,0x83 .byte 0x8c,0x46,0x46,0xca, 0xc7,0xee,0xee,0x29 .byte 0x6b,0xb8,0xb8,0xd3, 0x28,0x14,0x14,0x3c .byte 0xa7,0xde,0xde,0x79, 0xbc,0x5e,0x5e,0xe2 .byte 0x16,0x0b,0x0b,0x1d, 0xad,0xdb,0xdb,0x76 .byte 0xdb,0xe0,0xe0,0x3b, 0x64,0x32,0x32,0x56 .byte 0x74,0x3a,0x3a,0x4e, 0x14,0x0a,0x0a,0x1e .byte 0x92,0x49,0x49,0xdb, 0x0c,0x06,0x06,0x0a .byte 0x48,0x24,0x24,0x6c, 0xb8,0x5c,0x5c,0xe4 .byte 0x9f,0xc2,0xc2,0x5d, 0xbd,0xd3,0xd3,0x6e .byte 0x43,0xac,0xac,0xef, 0xc4,0x62,0x62,0xa6 .byte 0x39,0x91,0x91,0xa8, 0x31,0x95,0x95,0xa4 .byte 0xd3,0xe4,0xe4,0x37, 0xf2,0x79,0x79,0x8b .byte 0xd5,0xe7,0xe7,0x32, 0x8b,0xc8,0xc8,0x43 .byte 0x6e,0x37,0x37,0x59, 0xda,0x6d,0x6d,0xb7 .byte 0x01,0x8d,0x8d,0x8c, 0xb1,0xd5,0xd5,0x64 .byte 0x9c,0x4e,0x4e,0xd2, 0x49,0xa9,0xa9,0xe0 .byte 0xd8,0x6c,0x6c,0xb4, 0xac,0x56,0x56,0xfa .byte 0xf3,0xf4,0xf4,0x07, 0xcf,0xea,0xea,0x25 .byte 0xca,0x65,0x65,0xaf, 0xf4,0x7a,0x7a,0x8e .byte 0x47,0xae,0xae,0xe9, 0x10,0x08,0x08,0x18 .byte 0x6f,0xba,0xba,0xd5, 0xf0,0x78,0x78,0x88 .byte 0x4a,0x25,0x25,0x6f, 0x5c,0x2e,0x2e,0x72 .byte 0x38,0x1c,0x1c,0x24, 0x57,0xa6,0xa6,0xf1 .byte 0x73,0xb4,0xb4,0xc7, 0x97,0xc6,0xc6,0x51 .byte 0xcb,0xe8,0xe8,0x23, 0xa1,0xdd,0xdd,0x7c .byte 0xe8,0x74,0x74,0x9c, 0x3e,0x1f,0x1f,0x21 .byte 0x96,0x4b,0x4b,0xdd, 0x61,0xbd,0xbd,0xdc .byte 0x0d,0x8b,0x8b,0x86, 0x0f,0x8a,0x8a,0x85 .byte 0xe0,0x70,0x70,0x90, 0x7c,0x3e,0x3e,0x42 .byte 0x71,0xb5,0xb5,0xc4, 0xcc,0x66,0x66,0xaa .byte 0x90,0x48,0x48,0xd8, 0x06,0x03,0x03,0x05 .byte 0xf7,0xf6,0xf6,0x01, 0x1c,0x0e,0x0e,0x12 .byte 0xc2,0x61,0x61,0xa3, 0x6a,0x35,0x35,0x5f .byte 0xae,0x57,0x57,0xf9, 0x69,0xb9,0xb9,0xd0 .byte 0x17,0x86,0x86,0x91, 0x99,0xc1,0xc1,0x58 .byte 0x3a,0x1d,0x1d,0x27, 0x27,0x9e,0x9e,0xb9 .byte 0xd9,0xe1,0xe1,0x38, 0xeb,0xf8,0xf8,0x13 .byte 0x2b,0x98,0x98,0xb3, 0x22,0x11,0x11,0x33 .byte 0xd2,0x69,0x69,0xbb, 0xa9,0xd9,0xd9,0x70 .byte 0x07,0x8e,0x8e,0x89, 0x33,0x94,0x94,0xa7 .byte 0x2d,0x9b,0x9b,0xb6, 0x3c,0x1e,0x1e,0x22 .byte 0x15,0x87,0x87,0x92, 0xc9,0xe9,0xe9,0x20 .byte 0x87,0xce,0xce,0x49, 0xaa,0x55,0x55,0xff .byte 0x50,0x28,0x28,0x78, 0xa5,0xdf,0xdf,0x7a .byte 0x03,0x8c,0x8c,0x8f, 0x59,0xa1,0xa1,0xf8 .byte 0x09,0x89,0x89,0x80, 0x1a,0x0d,0x0d,0x17 .byte 0x65,0xbf,0xbf,0xda, 0xd7,0xe6,0xe6,0x31 .byte 0x84,0x42,0x42,0xc6, 0xd0,0x68,0x68,0xb8 .byte 0x82,0x41,0x41,0xc3, 0x29,0x99,0x99,0xb0 .byte 0x5a,0x2d,0x2d,0x77, 0x1e,0x0f,0x0f,0x11 .byte 0x7b,0xb0,0xb0,0xcb, 0xa8,0x54,0x54,0xfc .byte 0x6d,0xbb,0xbb,0xd6, 0x2c,0x16,0x16,0x3a AES_Td: .byte 0x51,0xf4,0xa7,0x50, 0x7e,0x41,0x65,0x53 # Td0 .byte 0x1a,0x17,0xa4,0xc3, 0x3a,0x27,0x5e,0x96 .byte 0x3b,0xab,0x6b,0xcb, 0x1f,0x9d,0x45,0xf1 .byte 0xac,0xfa,0x58,0xab, 0x4b,0xe3,0x03,0x93 .byte 0x20,0x30,0xfa,0x55, 0xad,0x76,0x6d,0xf6 .byte 0x88,0xcc,0x76,0x91, 0xf5,0x02,0x4c,0x25 .byte 0x4f,0xe5,0xd7,0xfc, 0xc5,0x2a,0xcb,0xd7 .byte 0x26,0x35,0x44,0x80, 0xb5,0x62,0xa3,0x8f .byte 0xde,0xb1,0x5a,0x49, 0x25,0xba,0x1b,0x67 .byte 0x45,0xea,0x0e,0x98, 0x5d,0xfe,0xc0,0xe1 .byte 0xc3,0x2f,0x75,0x02, 0x81,0x4c,0xf0,0x12 .byte 0x8d,0x46,0x97,0xa3, 0x6b,0xd3,0xf9,0xc6 .byte 0x03,0x8f,0x5f,0xe7, 0x15,0x92,0x9c,0x95 .byte 0xbf,0x6d,0x7a,0xeb, 0x95,0x52,0x59,0xda .byte 0xd4,0xbe,0x83,0x2d, 0x58,0x74,0x21,0xd3 .byte 0x49,0xe0,0x69,0x29, 0x8e,0xc9,0xc8,0x44 .byte 0x75,0xc2,0x89,0x6a, 0xf4,0x8e,0x79,0x78 .byte 0x99,0x58,0x3e,0x6b, 0x27,0xb9,0x71,0xdd .byte 0xbe,0xe1,0x4f,0xb6, 0xf0,0x88,0xad,0x17 .byte 0xc9,0x20,0xac,0x66, 0x7d,0xce,0x3a,0xb4 .byte 0x63,0xdf,0x4a,0x18, 0xe5,0x1a,0x31,0x82 .byte 0x97,0x51,0x33,0x60, 0x62,0x53,0x7f,0x45 .byte 0xb1,0x64,0x77,0xe0, 0xbb,0x6b,0xae,0x84 .byte 0xfe,0x81,0xa0,0x1c, 0xf9,0x08,0x2b,0x94 .byte 0x70,0x48,0x68,0x58, 0x8f,0x45,0xfd,0x19 .byte 0x94,0xde,0x6c,0x87, 0x52,0x7b,0xf8,0xb7 .byte 0xab,0x73,0xd3,0x23, 0x72,0x4b,0x02,0xe2 .byte 0xe3,0x1f,0x8f,0x57, 0x66,0x55,0xab,0x2a .byte 0xb2,0xeb,0x28,0x07, 0x2f,0xb5,0xc2,0x03 .byte 0x86,0xc5,0x7b,0x9a, 0xd3,0x37,0x08,0xa5 .byte 0x30,0x28,0x87,0xf2, 0x23,0xbf,0xa5,0xb2 .byte 0x02,0x03,0x6a,0xba, 0xed,0x16,0x82,0x5c .byte 0x8a,0xcf,0x1c,0x2b, 0xa7,0x79,0xb4,0x92 .byte 0xf3,0x07,0xf2,0xf0, 0x4e,0x69,0xe2,0xa1 .byte 0x65,0xda,0xf4,0xcd, 0x06,0x05,0xbe,0xd5 .byte 0xd1,0x34,0x62,0x1f, 0xc4,0xa6,0xfe,0x8a .byte 0x34,0x2e,0x53,0x9d, 0xa2,0xf3,0x55,0xa0 .byte 0x05,0x8a,0xe1,0x32, 0xa4,0xf6,0xeb,0x75 .byte 0x0b,0x83,0xec,0x39, 0x40,0x60,0xef,0xaa .byte 0x5e,0x71,0x9f,0x06, 0xbd,0x6e,0x10,0x51 .byte 0x3e,0x21,0x8a,0xf9, 0x96,0xdd,0x06,0x3d .byte 0xdd,0x3e,0x05,0xae, 0x4d,0xe6,0xbd,0x46 .byte 0x91,0x54,0x8d,0xb5, 0x71,0xc4,0x5d,0x05 .byte 0x04,0x06,0xd4,0x6f, 0x60,0x50,0x15,0xff .byte 0x19,0x98,0xfb,0x24, 0xd6,0xbd,0xe9,0x97 .byte 0x89,0x40,0x43,0xcc, 0x67,0xd9,0x9e,0x77 .byte 0xb0,0xe8,0x42,0xbd, 0x07,0x89,0x8b,0x88 .byte 0xe7,0x19,0x5b,0x38, 0x79,0xc8,0xee,0xdb .byte 0xa1,0x7c,0x0a,0x47, 0x7c,0x42,0x0f,0xe9 .byte 0xf8,0x84,0x1e,0xc9, 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x09,0x80,0x86,0x83, 0x32,0x2b,0xed,0x48 .byte 0x1e,0x11,0x70,0xac, 0x6c,0x5a,0x72,0x4e .byte 0xfd,0x0e,0xff,0xfb, 0x0f,0x85,0x38,0x56 .byte 0x3d,0xae,0xd5,0x1e, 0x36,0x2d,0x39,0x27 .byte 0x0a,0x0f,0xd9,0x64, 0x68,0x5c,0xa6,0x21 .byte 0x9b,0x5b,0x54,0xd1, 0x24,0x36,0x2e,0x3a .byte 0x0c,0x0a,0x67,0xb1, 0x93,0x57,0xe7,0x0f .byte 0xb4,0xee,0x96,0xd2, 0x1b,0x9b,0x91,0x9e .byte 0x80,0xc0,0xc5,0x4f, 0x61,0xdc,0x20,0xa2 .byte 0x5a,0x77,0x4b,0x69, 0x1c,0x12,0x1a,0x16 .byte 0xe2,0x93,0xba,0x0a, 0xc0,0xa0,0x2a,0xe5 .byte 0x3c,0x22,0xe0,0x43, 0x12,0x1b,0x17,0x1d .byte 0x0e,0x09,0x0d,0x0b, 0xf2,0x8b,0xc7,0xad .byte 0x2d,0xb6,0xa8,0xb9, 0x14,0x1e,0xa9,0xc8 .byte 0x57,0xf1,0x19,0x85, 0xaf,0x75,0x07,0x4c .byte 0xee,0x99,0xdd,0xbb, 0xa3,0x7f,0x60,0xfd .byte 0xf7,0x01,0x26,0x9f, 0x5c,0x72,0xf5,0xbc .byte 0x44,0x66,0x3b,0xc5, 0x5b,0xfb,0x7e,0x34 .byte 0x8b,0x43,0x29,0x76, 0xcb,0x23,0xc6,0xdc .byte 0xb6,0xed,0xfc,0x68, 0xb8,0xe4,0xf1,0x63 .byte 0xd7,0x31,0xdc,0xca, 0x42,0x63,0x85,0x10 .byte 0x13,0x97,0x22,0x40, 0x84,0xc6,0x11,0x20 .byte 0x85,0x4a,0x24,0x7d, 0xd2,0xbb,0x3d,0xf8 .byte 0xae,0xf9,0x32,0x11, 0xc7,0x29,0xa1,0x6d .byte 0x1d,0x9e,0x2f,0x4b, 0xdc,0xb2,0x30,0xf3 .byte 0x0d,0x86,0x52,0xec, 0x77,0xc1,0xe3,0xd0 .byte 0x2b,0xb3,0x16,0x6c, 0xa9,0x70,0xb9,0x99 .byte 0x11,0x94,0x48,0xfa, 0x47,0xe9,0x64,0x22 .byte 0xa8,0xfc,0x8c,0xc4, 0xa0,0xf0,0x3f,0x1a .byte 0x56,0x7d,0x2c,0xd8, 0x22,0x33,0x90,0xef .byte 0x87,0x49,0x4e,0xc7, 0xd9,0x38,0xd1,0xc1 .byte 0x8c,0xca,0xa2,0xfe, 0x98,0xd4,0x0b,0x36 .byte 0xa6,0xf5,0x81,0xcf, 0xa5,0x7a,0xde,0x28 .byte 0xda,0xb7,0x8e,0x26, 0x3f,0xad,0xbf,0xa4 .byte 0x2c,0x3a,0x9d,0xe4, 0x50,0x78,0x92,0x0d .byte 0x6a,0x5f,0xcc,0x9b, 0x54,0x7e,0x46,0x62 .byte 0xf6,0x8d,0x13,0xc2, 0x90,0xd8,0xb8,0xe8 .byte 0x2e,0x39,0xf7,0x5e, 0x82,0xc3,0xaf,0xf5 .byte 0x9f,0x5d,0x80,0xbe, 0x69,0xd0,0x93,0x7c .byte 0x6f,0xd5,0x2d,0xa9, 0xcf,0x25,0x12,0xb3 .byte 0xc8,0xac,0x99,0x3b, 0x10,0x18,0x7d,0xa7 .byte 0xe8,0x9c,0x63,0x6e, 0xdb,0x3b,0xbb,0x7b .byte 0xcd,0x26,0x78,0x09, 0x6e,0x59,0x18,0xf4 .byte 0xec,0x9a,0xb7,0x01, 0x83,0x4f,0x9a,0xa8 .byte 0xe6,0x95,0x6e,0x65, 0xaa,0xff,0xe6,0x7e .byte 0x21,0xbc,0xcf,0x08, 0xef,0x15,0xe8,0xe6 .byte 0xba,0xe7,0x9b,0xd9, 0x4a,0x6f,0x36,0xce .byte 0xea,0x9f,0x09,0xd4, 0x29,0xb0,0x7c,0xd6 .byte 0x31,0xa4,0xb2,0xaf, 0x2a,0x3f,0x23,0x31 .byte 0xc6,0xa5,0x94,0x30, 0x35,0xa2,0x66,0xc0 .byte 0x74,0x4e,0xbc,0x37, 0xfc,0x82,0xca,0xa6 .byte 0xe0,0x90,0xd0,0xb0, 0x33,0xa7,0xd8,0x15 .byte 0xf1,0x04,0x98,0x4a, 0x41,0xec,0xda,0xf7 .byte 0x7f,0xcd,0x50,0x0e, 0x17,0x91,0xf6,0x2f .byte 0x76,0x4d,0xd6,0x8d, 0x43,0xef,0xb0,0x4d .byte 0xcc,0xaa,0x4d,0x54, 0xe4,0x96,0x04,0xdf .byte 0x9e,0xd1,0xb5,0xe3, 0x4c,0x6a,0x88,0x1b .byte 0xc1,0x2c,0x1f,0xb8, 0x46,0x65,0x51,0x7f .byte 0x9d,0x5e,0xea,0x04, 0x01,0x8c,0x35,0x5d .byte 0xfa,0x87,0x74,0x73, 0xfb,0x0b,0x41,0x2e .byte 0xb3,0x67,0x1d,0x5a, 0x92,0xdb,0xd2,0x52 .byte 0xe9,0x10,0x56,0x33, 0x6d,0xd6,0x47,0x13 .byte 0x9a,0xd7,0x61,0x8c, 0x37,0xa1,0x0c,0x7a .byte 0x59,0xf8,0x14,0x8e, 0xeb,0x13,0x3c,0x89 .byte 0xce,0xa9,0x27,0xee, 0xb7,0x61,0xc9,0x35 .byte 0xe1,0x1c,0xe5,0xed, 0x7a,0x47,0xb1,0x3c .byte 0x9c,0xd2,0xdf,0x59, 0x55,0xf2,0x73,0x3f .byte 0x18,0x14,0xce,0x79, 0x73,0xc7,0x37,0xbf .byte 0x53,0xf7,0xcd,0xea, 0x5f,0xfd,0xaa,0x5b .byte 0xdf,0x3d,0x6f,0x14, 0x78,0x44,0xdb,0x86 .byte 0xca,0xaf,0xf3,0x81, 0xb9,0x68,0xc4,0x3e .byte 0x38,0x24,0x34,0x2c, 0xc2,0xa3,0x40,0x5f .byte 0x16,0x1d,0xc3,0x72, 0xbc,0xe2,0x25,0x0c .byte 0x28,0x3c,0x49,0x8b, 0xff,0x0d,0x95,0x41 .byte 0x39,0xa8,0x01,0x71, 0x08,0x0c,0xb3,0xde .byte 0xd8,0xb4,0xe4,0x9c, 0x64,0x56,0xc1,0x90 .byte 0x7b,0xcb,0x84,0x61, 0xd5,0x32,0xb6,0x70 .byte 0x48,0x6c,0x5c,0x74, 0xd0,0xb8,0x57,0x42 .byte 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 # Td4 .byte 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb .byte 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 .byte 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb .byte 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d .byte 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e .byte 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 .byte 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 .byte 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 .byte 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 .byte 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda .byte 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 .byte 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a .byte 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 .byte 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 .byte 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b .byte 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea .byte 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 .byte 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 .byte 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e .byte 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 .byte 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b .byte 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 .byte 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 .byte 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 .byte 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f .byte 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d .byte 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef .byte 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 .byte 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 .byte 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 .byte 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d AES_Te4: .byte 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 # Te4 .byte 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 .byte 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 .byte 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 .byte 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc .byte 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 .byte 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a .byte 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 .byte 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 .byte 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 .byte 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b .byte 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf .byte 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 .byte 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 .byte 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 .byte 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 .byte 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 .byte 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 .byte 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 .byte 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb .byte 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c .byte 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 .byte 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 .byte 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 .byte 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 .byte 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a .byte 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e .byte 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e .byte 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 .byte 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf .byte 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 .byte 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 .byte 0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00 # rcon .byte 0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x1B,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x36,0x00,0x00,0x00 ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; # made-up _instructions, _xtr, _ins, _ror and _bias, cope # with byte order dependencies... if (/^\s+_/) { s/(_[a-z]+\s+)(\$[0-9]+),([^,]+)(#.*)*$/$1$2,$2,$3/; s/_xtr\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+(\-2)*)/ sprintf("srl\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ? eval($3) : eval("24-$3"))/e or s/_ins\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/ sprintf("sll\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ? eval($3) : eval("24-$3"))/e or s/_ins2\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/ sprintf("ins\t$1,$2,%d,8",$big_endian ? eval($3) : eval("24-$3"))/e or s/_ror\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)/ sprintf("srl\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ? eval($3) : eval("$3*-1"))/e or s/_bias\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/ sprintf("sll\t$1,$2,%d",$big_endian ? eval($3) : eval("($3-16)&31"))/e; s/srl\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),\-([0-9]+)/ sprintf("sll\t$1,$2,$3")/e or s/srl\s+(\$[0-9]+),(\$[0-9]+),0/ sprintf("and\t$1,$2,0xff")/e or s/(sll\s+\$[0-9]+,\$[0-9]+,0)/#$1/; } # convert lwl/lwr and swr/swl to little-endian order if (!$big_endian && /^\s+[sl]w[lr]\s+/) { s/([sl]wl.*)([0-9]+)\((\$[0-9]+)\)/ sprintf("$1%d($3)",eval("$2-$2%4+($2%4-1)&3"))/e or s/([sl]wr.*)([0-9]+)\((\$[0-9]+)\)/ sprintf("$1%d($3)",eval("$2-$2%4+($2%4+1)&3"))/e; } if (!$big_endian) { s/(rotr\s+\$[0-9]+,\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/sprintf("$1,%d",32-$2)/e; s/(ext\s+\$[0-9]+,\$[0-9]+),([0-9]+),8/sprintf("$1,%d,8",24-$2)/e; } print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl0000644000000000000000000012340713176625656017174 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ###################################################################### ## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation. ## version 0.1 ## ## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009 ## Public domain. ## ## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and ## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/. # CBC encrypt/decrypt performance in cycles per byte processed with # 128-bit key. # # aes-ppc.pl this # PPC74x0/G4e 35.5/52.1/(23.8) 11.9(*)/15.4 # PPC970/G5 37.9/55.0/(28.5) 22.2/28.5 # POWER6 42.7/54.3/(28.2) 63.0/92.8(**) # POWER7 32.3/42.9/(18.4) 18.5/23.3 # # (*) This is ~10% worse than reported in paper. The reason is # twofold. This module doesn't make any assumption about # key schedule (or data for that matter) alignment and handles # it in-line. Secondly it, being transliterated from # vpaes-x86_64.pl, relies on "nested inversion" better suited # for Intel CPUs. # (**) Inadequate POWER6 performance is due to astronomic AltiVec # latency, 9 cycles per simple logical operation. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T =8; $LRSAVE =2*$SIZE_T; $STU ="stdu"; $POP ="ld"; $PUSH ="std"; $UCMP ="cmpld"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T =4; $LRSAVE =$SIZE_T; $STU ="stwu"; $POP ="lwz"; $PUSH ="stw"; $UCMP ="cmplw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $sp="r1"; $FRAME=6*$SIZE_T+13*16; # 13*16 is for v20-v31 offload $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $code.=<<___; .machine "any" .text .align 7 # totally strategic alignment _vpaes_consts: Lk_mc_forward: # mc_forward .long 0x01020300, 0x05060704, 0x090a0b08, 0x0d0e0f0c ?inv .long 0x05060704, 0x090a0b08, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x01020300 ?inv .long 0x090a0b08, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x01020300, 0x05060704 ?inv .long 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x01020300, 0x05060704, 0x090a0b08 ?inv Lk_mc_backward: # mc_backward .long 0x03000102, 0x07040506, 0x0b08090a, 0x0f0c0d0e ?inv .long 0x0f0c0d0e, 0x03000102, 0x07040506, 0x0b08090a ?inv .long 0x0b08090a, 0x0f0c0d0e, 0x03000102, 0x07040506 ?inv .long 0x07040506, 0x0b08090a, 0x0f0c0d0e, 0x03000102 ?inv Lk_sr: # sr .long 0x00010203, 0x04050607, 0x08090a0b, 0x0c0d0e0f ?inv .long 0x00050a0f, 0x04090e03, 0x080d0207, 0x0c01060b ?inv .long 0x0009020b, 0x040d060f, 0x08010a03, 0x0c050e07 ?inv .long 0x000d0a07, 0x04010e0b, 0x0805020f, 0x0c090603 ?inv ## ## "Hot" constants ## Lk_inv: # inv, inva .long 0xf001080d, 0x0f06050e, 0x020c0b0a, 0x09030704 ?rev .long 0xf0070b0f, 0x060a0401, 0x09080502, 0x0c0e0d03 ?rev Lk_ipt: # input transform (lo, hi) .long 0x00702a5a, 0x98e8b2c2, 0x08782252, 0x90e0baca ?rev .long 0x004d7c31, 0x7d30014c, 0x81ccfdb0, 0xfcb180cd ?rev Lk_sbo: # sbou, sbot .long 0x00c7bd6f, 0x176dd2d0, 0x78a802c5, 0x7abfaa15 ?rev .long 0x006abb5f, 0xa574e4cf, 0xfa352b41, 0xd1901e8e ?rev Lk_sb1: # sb1u, sb1t .long 0x0023e2fa, 0x15d41836, 0xefd92e0d, 0xc1ccf73b ?rev .long 0x003e50cb, 0x8fe19bb1, 0x44f52a14, 0x6e7adfa5 ?rev Lk_sb2: # sb2u, sb2t .long 0x0029e10a, 0x4088eb69, 0x4a2382ab, 0xc863a1c2 ?rev .long 0x0024710b, 0xc6937ae2, 0xcd2f98bc, 0x55e9b75e ?rev ## ## Decryption stuff ## Lk_dipt: # decryption input transform .long 0x005f540b, 0x045b500f, 0x1a454e11, 0x1e414a15 ?rev .long 0x00650560, 0xe683e386, 0x94f191f4, 0x72177712 ?rev Lk_dsbo: # decryption sbox final output .long 0x0040f97e, 0x53ea8713, 0x2d3e94d4, 0xb96daac7 ?rev .long 0x001d4493, 0x0f56d712, 0x9c8ec5d8, 0x59814bca ?rev Lk_dsb9: # decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t .long 0x00d6869a, 0x53031c85, 0xc94c994f, 0x501fd5ca ?rev .long 0x0049d7ec, 0x89173bc0, 0x65a5fbb2, 0x9e2c5e72 ?rev Lk_dsbd: # decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t .long 0x00a2b1e6, 0xdfcc577d, 0x39442a88, 0x139b6ef5 ?rev .long 0x00cbc624, 0xf7fae23c, 0xd3efde15, 0x0d183129 ?rev Lk_dsbb: # decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t .long 0x0042b496, 0x926422d0, 0x04d4f2b0, 0xf6462660 ?rev .long 0x006759cd, 0xa69894c1, 0x6baa5532, 0x3e0cfff3 ?rev Lk_dsbe: # decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t .long 0x00d0d426, 0x9692f246, 0xb0f6b464, 0x04604222 ?rev .long 0x00c1aaff, 0xcda6550c, 0x323e5998, 0x6bf36794 ?rev ## ## Key schedule constants ## Lk_dksd: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*D .long 0x0047e4a3, 0x5d1ab9fe, 0xf9be1d5a, 0xa4e34007 ?rev .long 0x008336b5, 0xf477c241, 0x1e9d28ab, 0xea69dc5f ?rev Lk_dksb: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*B .long 0x00d55085, 0x1fca4f9a, 0x994cc91c, 0x8653d603 ?rev .long 0x004afcb6, 0xa7ed5b11, 0xc882347e, 0x6f2593d9 ?rev Lk_dkse: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63 .long 0x00d6c91f, 0xca1c03d5, 0x86504f99, 0x4c9a8553 ?rev .long 0xe87bdc4f, 0x059631a2, 0x8714b320, 0x6af95ecd ?rev Lk_dks9: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*9 .long 0x00a7d97e, 0xc86f11b6, 0xfc5b2582, 0x3493ed4a ?rev .long 0x00331427, 0x62517645, 0xcefddae9, 0xac9fb88b ?rev Lk_rcon: # rcon .long 0xb6ee9daf, 0xb991831f, 0x817d7c4d, 0x08982a70 ?asis Lk_s63: .long 0x5b5b5b5b, 0x5b5b5b5b, 0x5b5b5b5b, 0x5b5b5b5b ?asis Lk_opt: # output transform .long 0x0060b6d6, 0x29499fff, 0x0868bede, 0x214197f7 ?rev .long 0x00ecbc50, 0x51bded01, 0xe00c5cb0, 0xb15d0de1 ?rev Lk_deskew: # deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew" .long 0x00e3a447, 0x40a3e407, 0x1af9be5d, 0x5ab9fe1d ?rev .long 0x0069ea83, 0xdcb5365f, 0x771e9df4, 0xabc24128 ?rev .align 5 Lconsts: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr r12 #vvvvv "distance between . and _vpaes_consts addi r12,r12,-0x308 mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .asciz "Vector Permutation AES for AltiVec, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)" .align 6 ___ my ($inptail,$inpperm,$outhead,$outperm,$outmask,$keyperm) = map("v$_",(26..31)); { my ($inp,$out,$key) = map("r$_",(3..5)); my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$sbou,$sbot) = map("v$_",(10..15)); my ($sb1u,$sb1t,$sb2u,$sb2t) = map("v$_",(16..19)); my ($sb9u,$sb9t,$sbdu,$sbdt,$sbbu,$sbbt,$sbeu,$sbet)=map("v$_",(16..23)); $code.=<<___; ## ## _aes_preheat ## ## Fills register %r10 -> .aes_consts (so you can -fPIC) ## and %xmm9-%xmm15 as specified below. ## .align 4 _vpaes_encrypt_preheat: mflr r8 bl Lconsts mtlr r8 li r11, 0xc0 # Lk_inv li r10, 0xd0 li r9, 0xe0 # Lk_ipt li r8, 0xf0 vxor v7, v7, v7 # 0x00..00 vspltisb v8,4 # 0x04..04 vspltisb v9,0x0f # 0x0f..0f lvx $invlo, r12, r11 li r11, 0x100 lvx $invhi, r12, r10 li r10, 0x110 lvx $iptlo, r12, r9 li r9, 0x120 lvx $ipthi, r12, r8 li r8, 0x130 lvx $sbou, r12, r11 li r11, 0x140 lvx $sbot, r12, r10 li r10, 0x150 lvx $sb1u, r12, r9 lvx $sb1t, r12, r8 lvx $sb2u, r12, r11 lvx $sb2t, r12, r10 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ## ## _aes_encrypt_core ## ## AES-encrypt %xmm0. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm0 = input ## %xmm9-%xmm15 as in _vpaes_preheat ## (%rdx) = scheduled keys ## ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm6, %r9, %r10, %r11, %rax ## ## .align 5 _vpaes_encrypt_core: lwz r8, 240($key) # pull rounds li r9, 16 lvx v5, 0, $key # vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm5 # round0 key li r11, 0x10 lvx v6, r9, $key addi r9, r9, 16 ?vperm v5, v5, v6, $keyperm # align round key addi r10, r11, 0x40 vsrb v1, v0, v8 # vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 vperm v0, $iptlo, $iptlo, v0 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm1 vperm v1, $ipthi, $ipthi, v1 # vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm2 vxor v0, v0, v5 # vpxor %xmm5, %xmm1, %xmm0 vxor v0, v0, v1 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 mtctr r8 b Lenc_entry .align 4 Lenc_loop: # middle of middle round vperm v4, $sb1t, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u lvx v1, r12, r11 # vmovdqa -0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_mc_forward[] addi r11, r11, 16 vperm v0, $sb1u, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t vxor v4, v4, v5 # vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k andi. r11, r11, 0x30 # and \$0x30, %r11 # ... mod 4 vperm v5, $sb2t, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm15, %xmm5 # 4 = sb2u vxor v0, v0, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = A vperm v2, $sb2u, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm14, %xmm2 # 2 = sb2t lvx v4, r12, r10 # vmovdqa (%r11,%r10), %xmm4 # .Lk_mc_backward[] addi r10, r11, 0x40 vperm v3, v0, v7, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm3 # 0 = B vxor v2, v2, v5 # vpxor %xmm5, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = 2A vperm v0, v0, v7, v4 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 3 = D vxor v3, v3, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 0 = 2A+B vperm v4, v3, v7, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm4 # 0 = 2B+C vxor v0, v0, v3 # vpxor %xmm3, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 3 = 2A+B+D vxor v0, v0, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D Lenc_entry: # top of round vsrb v1, v0, v8 # vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i vperm v5, $invhi, $invhi, v0 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm5 # 2 = a/k vxor v0, v0, v1 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j vperm v3, $invlo, $invlo, v1 # vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i vperm v4, $invlo, $invlo, v0 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j vand v0, v0, v9 vxor v3, v3, v5 # vpxor %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k vxor v4, v4, v5 # vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k vperm v2, $invlo, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak vmr v5, v6 lvx v6, r9, $key # vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm5 vperm v3, $invlo, v7, v4 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak addi r9, r9, 16 vxor v2, v2, v0 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = io ?vperm v5, v5, v6, $keyperm # align round key vxor v3, v3, v1 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = jo bdnz Lenc_loop # middle of last round addi r10, r11, 0x80 # vmovdqa -0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou .Lk_sbo # vmovdqa -0x50(%r10), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot .Lk_sbo+16 vperm v4, $sbou, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou lvx v1, r12, r10 # vmovdqa 0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_sr[] vperm v0, $sbot, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t vxor v4, v4, v5 # vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k vxor v0, v0, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = A vperm v0, v0, v7, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .globl .vpaes_encrypt .align 5 .vpaes_encrypt: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mflr r6 mfspr r7, 256 # save vrsave stvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp stw r7,`$FRAME-4`($sp) # save vrsave li r0, -1 $PUSH r6,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) mtspr 256, r0 # preserve all AltiVec registers bl _vpaes_encrypt_preheat ?lvsl $inpperm, 0, $inp # prepare for unaligned access lvx v0, 0, $inp addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo ?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out ?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key # prepare for unaligned access lvx $inptail, 0, $inp # redundant in aligned case ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm bl _vpaes_encrypt_core andi. r8, $out, 15 li r9, 16 beq Lenc_out_aligned vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left mtctr r9 Lenc_out_unaligned: stvebx v0, 0, $out addi $out, $out, 1 bdnz Lenc_out_unaligned b Lenc_done .align 4 Lenc_out_aligned: stvx v0, 0, $out Lenc_done: li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mtlr r6 mtspr 256, r7 # restore vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .vpaes_encrypt,.-.vpaes_encrypt .align 4 _vpaes_decrypt_preheat: mflr r8 bl Lconsts mtlr r8 li r11, 0xc0 # Lk_inv li r10, 0xd0 li r9, 0x160 # Ldipt li r8, 0x170 vxor v7, v7, v7 # 0x00..00 vspltisb v8,4 # 0x04..04 vspltisb v9,0x0f # 0x0f..0f lvx $invlo, r12, r11 li r11, 0x180 lvx $invhi, r12, r10 li r10, 0x190 lvx $iptlo, r12, r9 li r9, 0x1a0 lvx $ipthi, r12, r8 li r8, 0x1b0 lvx $sbou, r12, r11 li r11, 0x1c0 lvx $sbot, r12, r10 li r10, 0x1d0 lvx $sb9u, r12, r9 li r9, 0x1e0 lvx $sb9t, r12, r8 li r8, 0x1f0 lvx $sbdu, r12, r11 li r11, 0x200 lvx $sbdt, r12, r10 li r10, 0x210 lvx $sbbu, r12, r9 lvx $sbbt, r12, r8 lvx $sbeu, r12, r11 lvx $sbet, r12, r10 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ## ## Decryption core ## ## Same API as encryption core. ## .align 4 _vpaes_decrypt_core: lwz r8, 240($key) # pull rounds li r9, 16 lvx v5, 0, $key # vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm4 # round0 key li r11, 0x30 lvx v6, r9, $key addi r9, r9, 16 ?vperm v5, v5, v6, $keyperm # align round key vsrb v1, v0, v8 # vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 vperm v0, $iptlo, $iptlo, v0 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 vperm v1, $ipthi, $ipthi, v1 # vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm0 vxor v0, v0, v5 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 vxor v0, v0, v1 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 mtctr r8 b Ldec_entry .align 4 Ldec_loop: # # Inverse mix columns # lvx v0, r12, r11 # v5 and v0 are flipped # vmovdqa -0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sb9u # vmovdqa -0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sb9t vperm v4, $sb9u, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb9u subi r11, r11, 16 vperm v1, $sb9t, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sb9t andi. r11, r11, 0x30 vxor v5, v5, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # vmovdqa 0x00(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbdu vxor v5, v5, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch # vmovdqa 0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbdt vperm v4, $sbdu, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbdu vperm v5, v5, v7, v0 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch vperm v1, $sbdt, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbdt vxor v5, v5, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch # vmovdqa 0x20(%r10), %xmm4 # 4 : sbbu vxor v5, v5, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch # vmovdqa 0x30(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbbt vperm v4, $sbbu, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbbu vperm v5, v5, v7, v0 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch vperm v1, $sbbt, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbbt vxor v5, v5, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch # vmovdqa 0x40(%r10), %xmm4 # 4 : sbeu vxor v5, v5, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch # vmovdqa 0x50(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbet vperm v4, $sbeu, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbeu vperm v5, v5, v7, v0 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch vperm v1, $sbet, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbet vxor v0, v5, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch vxor v0, v0, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch Ldec_entry: # top of round vsrb v1, v0, v8 # vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i vperm v2, $invhi, $invhi, v0 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k vxor v0, v0, v1 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j vperm v3, $invlo, $invlo, v1 # vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i vperm v4, $invlo, $invlo, v0 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j vand v0, v0, v9 vxor v3, v3, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k vxor v4, v4, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k vperm v2, $invlo, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak vmr v5, v6 lvx v6, r9, $key # vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm0 vperm v3, $invlo, v7, v4 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak addi r9, r9, 16 vxor v2, v2, v0 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = io ?vperm v5, v5, v6, $keyperm # align round key vxor v3, v3, v1 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = jo bdnz Ldec_loop # middle of last round addi r10, r11, 0x80 # vmovdqa 0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou vperm v4, $sbou, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou # vmovdqa 0x70(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbot lvx v2, r12, r10 # vmovdqa -0x160(%r11), %xmm2 # .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160 vperm v1, $sbot, v7, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sb1t vxor v4, v4, v5 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k vxor v0, v1, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = A vperm v0, v0, v7, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .globl .vpaes_decrypt .align 5 .vpaes_decrypt: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mflr r6 mfspr r7, 256 # save vrsave stvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp stw r7,`$FRAME-4`($sp) # save vrsave li r0, -1 $PUSH r6,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) mtspr 256, r0 # preserve all AltiVec registers bl _vpaes_decrypt_preheat ?lvsl $inpperm, 0, $inp # prepare for unaligned access lvx v0, 0, $inp addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo ?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out ?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key lvx $inptail, 0, $inp # redundant in aligned case ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm bl _vpaes_decrypt_core andi. r8, $out, 15 li r9, 16 beq Ldec_out_aligned vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left mtctr r9 Ldec_out_unaligned: stvebx v0, 0, $out addi $out, $out, 1 bdnz Ldec_out_unaligned b Ldec_done .align 4 Ldec_out_aligned: stvx v0, 0, $out Ldec_done: li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mtlr r6 mtspr 256, r7 # restore vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .vpaes_decrypt,.-.vpaes_decrypt .globl .vpaes_cbc_encrypt .align 5 .vpaes_cbc_encrypt: ${UCMP}i r5,16 bltlr- $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+2*$SIZE_T)`($sp) mflr r0 li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mfspr r12, 256 stvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp stw r12,`$FRAME-4`($sp) # save vrsave $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*0`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*1`($sp) li r9, -16 $PUSH r0, `$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2+$LRSAVE`($sp) and r30, r5, r9 # copy length&-16 andi. r9, $out, 15 # is $out aligned? mr r5, r6 # copy pointer to key mr r31, r7 # copy pointer to iv li r6, -1 mcrf cr1, cr0 # put aside $out alignment flag mr r7, r12 # copy vrsave mtspr 256, r6 # preserve all AltiVec registers lvx v24, 0, r31 # load [potentially unaligned] iv li r9, 15 ?lvsl $inpperm, 0, r31 lvx v25, r9, r31 ?vperm v24, v24, v25, $inpperm cmpwi r8, 0 # test direction neg r8, $inp # prepare for unaligned access vxor v7, v7, v7 ?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key ?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out ?lvsr $inpperm, 0, r8 # -$inp vnor $outmask, v7, v7 # 0xff..ff lvx $inptail, 0, $inp ?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo beq Lcbc_decrypt bl _vpaes_encrypt_preheat li r0, 16 beq cr1, Lcbc_enc_loop # $out is aligned vmr v0, $inptail lvx $inptail, 0, $inp addi $inp, $inp, 16 ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv bl _vpaes_encrypt_core andi. r8, $out, 15 vmr v24, v0 # put aside iv sub r9, $out, r8 vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left Lcbc_enc_head: stvebx $outhead, r8, r9 cmpwi r8, 15 addi r8, r8, 1 bne Lcbc_enc_head sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16 addi $out, $out, 16 beq Lcbc_unaligned_done Lcbc_enc_loop: vmr v0, $inptail lvx $inptail, 0, $inp addi $inp, $inp, 16 ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv bl _vpaes_encrypt_core vmr v24, v0 # put aside iv sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16 vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left vsel v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask vmr $outhead, v0 stvx v1, 0, $out addi $out, $out, 16 bne Lcbc_enc_loop b Lcbc_done .align 5 Lcbc_decrypt: bl _vpaes_decrypt_preheat li r0, 16 beq cr1, Lcbc_dec_loop # $out is aligned vmr v0, $inptail lvx $inptail, 0, $inp addi $inp, $inp, 16 ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm vmr v25, v0 # put aside input bl _vpaes_decrypt_core andi. r8, $out, 15 vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv vmr v24, v25 sub r9, $out, r8 vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left Lcbc_dec_head: stvebx $outhead, r8, r9 cmpwi r8, 15 addi r8, r8, 1 bne Lcbc_dec_head sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16 addi $out, $out, 16 beq Lcbc_unaligned_done Lcbc_dec_loop: vmr v0, $inptail lvx $inptail, 0, $inp addi $inp, $inp, 16 ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm vmr v25, v0 # put aside input bl _vpaes_decrypt_core vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv vmr v24, v25 sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16 vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left vsel v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask vmr $outhead, v0 stvx v1, 0, $out addi $out, $out, 16 bne Lcbc_dec_loop Lcbc_done: beq cr1, Lcbc_write_iv # $out is aligned Lcbc_unaligned_done: andi. r8, $out, 15 sub $out, $out, r8 li r9, 0 Lcbc_tail: stvebx $outhead, r9, $out addi r9, r9, 1 cmpw r9, r8 bne Lcbc_tail Lcbc_write_iv: neg r8, r31 # write [potentially unaligned] iv li r10, 4 ?lvsl $outperm, 0, r8 li r11, 8 li r12, 12 vperm v24, v24, v24, $outperm # rotate right/left stvewx v24, 0, r31 # ivp is at least 32-bit aligned stvewx v24, r10, r31 stvewx v24, r11, r31 stvewx v24, r12, r31 mtspr 256, r7 # restore vrsave li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` lvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp Lcbc_abort: $POP r0, `$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2+$LRSAVE`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*0`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*1`($sp) mtlr r0 addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2` blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,2,6,0 .long 0 .size .vpaes_cbc_encrypt,.-.vpaes_cbc_encrypt ___ } { my ($inp,$bits,$out)=map("r$_",(3..5)); my $dir="cr1"; my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$rcon) = map("v$_",(10..13,24)); $code.=<<___; ######################################################## ## ## ## AES key schedule ## ## ## ######################################################## .align 4 _vpaes_key_preheat: mflr r8 bl Lconsts mtlr r8 li r11, 0xc0 # Lk_inv li r10, 0xd0 li r9, 0xe0 # L_ipt li r8, 0xf0 vspltisb v8,4 # 0x04..04 vxor v9,v9,v9 # 0x00..00 lvx $invlo, r12, r11 # Lk_inv li r11, 0x120 lvx $invhi, r12, r10 li r10, 0x130 lvx $iptlo, r12, r9 # Lk_ipt li r9, 0x220 lvx $ipthi, r12, r8 li r8, 0x230 lvx v14, r12, r11 # Lk_sb1 li r11, 0x240 lvx v15, r12, r10 li r10, 0x250 lvx v16, r12, r9 # Lk_dksd li r9, 0x260 lvx v17, r12, r8 li r8, 0x270 lvx v18, r12, r11 # Lk_dksb li r11, 0x280 lvx v19, r12, r10 li r10, 0x290 lvx v20, r12, r9 # Lk_dkse li r9, 0x2a0 lvx v21, r12, r8 li r8, 0x2b0 lvx v22, r12, r11 # Lk_dks9 lvx v23, r12, r10 lvx v24, r12, r9 # Lk_rcon lvx v25, 0, r12 # Lk_mc_forward[0] lvx v26, r12, r8 # Lks63 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_core: mflr r7 bl _vpaes_key_preheat # load the tables #lvx v0, 0, $inp # vmovdqu (%rdi), %xmm0 # load key (unaligned) neg r8, $inp # prepare for unaligned access lvx v0, 0, $inp addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not typo ?lvsr $inpperm, 0, r8 # -$inp lvx v6, 0, $inp # v6 serves as inptail addi $inp, $inp, 8 ?vperm v0, v0, v6, $inpperm # input transform vmr v3, v0 # vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm3 bl _vpaes_schedule_transform vmr v7, v0 # vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm7 bne $dir, Lschedule_am_decrypting # encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform li r8, 0x30 # mov \$0x30,%r8d li r9, 4 li r10, 8 li r11, 12 ?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out # prepare for unaligned access vnor $outmask, v9, v9 # 0xff..ff ?vperm $outmask, v9, $outmask, $outperm #stvx v0, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left stvewx $outhead, 0, $out # some are superfluous stvewx $outhead, r9, $out stvewx $outhead, r10, $out addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10 stvewx $outhead, r11, $out b Lschedule_go Lschedule_am_decrypting: srwi r8, $bits, 1 # shr \$1,%r8d andi. r8, r8, 32 # and \$32,%r8d xori r8, r8, 32 # xor \$32,%r8d # nbits==192?0:32 addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10 # decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows lvx v1, r8, r10 # vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1 li r9, 4 li r10, 8 li r11, 12 vperm v4, v3, v3, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 neg r0, $out # prepare for unaligned access ?lvsl $outperm, 0, r0 vnor $outmask, v9, v9 # 0xff..ff ?vperm $outmask, $outmask, v9, $outperm #stvx v4, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm3, (%rdx) vperm $outhead, v4, v4, $outperm # rotate right/left stvewx $outhead, 0, $out # some are superfluous stvewx $outhead, r9, $out stvewx $outhead, r10, $out addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10 stvewx $outhead, r11, $out addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not typo xori r8, r8, 0x30 # xor \$0x30, %r8 Lschedule_go: cmplwi $bits, 192 # cmp \$192, %esi bgt Lschedule_256 beq Lschedule_192 # 128: fall though ## ## .schedule_128 ## ## 128-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## This schedule is really simple, because all its parts ## are accomplished by the subroutines. ## Lschedule_128: li r0, 10 # mov \$10, %esi mtctr r0 Loop_schedule_128: bl _vpaes_schedule_round bdz Lschedule_mangle_last # dec %esi bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle # write output b Loop_schedule_128 ## ## .aes_schedule_192 ## ## 192-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit ## schedule, but with more smearing. The long, high side is ## stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in ## the high bits of %xmm6. ## ## This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each ## round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys. ## Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round ## keys. ## .align 4 Lschedule_192: li r0, 4 # mov \$4, %esi lvx v0, 0, $inp ?vperm v0, v6, v0, $inpperm ?vsldoi v0, v3, v0, 8 # vmovdqu 8(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (very unaligned) bl _vpaes_schedule_transform # input transform ?vsldoi v6, v0, v9, 8 ?vsldoi v6, v9, v6, 8 # clobber "low" side with zeros mtctr r0 Loop_schedule_192: bl _vpaes_schedule_round ?vsldoi v0, v6, v0, 8 # vpalignr \$8,%xmm6,%xmm0,%xmm0 bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle # save key n bl _vpaes_schedule_192_smear bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle # save key n+1 bl _vpaes_schedule_round bdz Lschedule_mangle_last # dec %esi bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle # save key n+2 bl _vpaes_schedule_192_smear b Loop_schedule_192 ## ## .aes_schedule_256 ## ## 256-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit ## schedule, but with an additional "low side" in ## %xmm6. The low side's rounds are the same as the ## high side's, except no rcon and no rotation. ## .align 4 Lschedule_256: li r0, 7 # mov \$7, %esi addi $inp, $inp, 8 lvx v0, 0, $inp # vmovdqu 16(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (unaligned) ?vperm v0, v6, v0, $inpperm bl _vpaes_schedule_transform # input transform mtctr r0 Loop_schedule_256: bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle # output low result vmr v6, v0 # vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm6 # save cur_lo in xmm6 # high round bl _vpaes_schedule_round bdz Lschedule_mangle_last # dec %esi bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle # low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6 ?vspltw v0, v0, 3 # vpshufd \$0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 vmr v5, v7 # vmovdqa %xmm7, %xmm5 vmr v7, v6 # vmovdqa %xmm6, %xmm7 bl _vpaes_schedule_low_round vmr v7, v5 # vmovdqa %xmm5, %xmm7 b Loop_schedule_256 ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle_last ## ## Mangler for last round of key schedule ## Mangles %xmm0 ## when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63 ## when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0) ## ## Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits ## .align 4 Lschedule_mangle_last: # schedule last round key from xmm0 li r11, 0x2e0 # lea .Lk_deskew(%rip),%r11 li r9, 0x2f0 bne $dir, Lschedule_mangle_last_dec # encrypting lvx v1, r8, r10 # vmovdqa (%r8,%r10),%xmm1 li r11, 0x2c0 # lea .Lk_opt(%rip), %r11 # prepare to output transform li r9, 0x2d0 # prepare to output transform vperm v0, v0, v0, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # output permute lvx $iptlo, r11, r12 # reload $ipt lvx $ipthi, r9, r12 addi $out, $out, 16 # add \$16, %rdx vxor v0, v0, v26 # vpxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm0 bl _vpaes_schedule_transform # output transform #stvx v0, r0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left li r10, 4 vsel v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask li r11, 8 stvx v2, 0, $out li r12, 12 stvewx v0, 0, $out # some (or all) are redundant stvewx v0, r10, $out stvewx v0, r11, $out stvewx v0, r12, $out b Lschedule_mangle_done .align 4 Lschedule_mangle_last_dec: lvx $iptlo, r11, r12 # reload $ipt lvx $ipthi, r9, r12 addi $out, $out, -16 # add \$-16, %rdx vxor v0, v0, v26 # vpxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm0 bl _vpaes_schedule_transform # output transform #stvx v0, r0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key addi r9, $out, -15 # -15 is not typo vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left li r10, 4 vsel v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask li r11, 8 stvx v2, 0, $out li r12, 12 stvewx v0, 0, r9 # some (or all) are redundant stvewx v0, r10, r9 stvewx v0, r11, r9 stvewx v0, r12, r9 Lschedule_mangle_done: mtlr r7 # cleanup vxor v0, v0, v0 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm0, %xmm0 vxor v1, v1, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm1, %xmm1 vxor v2, v2, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm2, %xmm2 vxor v3, v3, v3 # vpxor %xmm3, %xmm3, %xmm3 vxor v4, v4, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm4, %xmm4 vxor v5, v5, v5 # vpxor %xmm5, %xmm5, %xmm5 vxor v6, v6, v6 # vpxor %xmm6, %xmm6, %xmm6 vxor v7, v7, v7 # vpxor %xmm7, %xmm7, %xmm7 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ## ## .aes_schedule_192_smear ## ## Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm7: high side, b a x y ## %xmm6: low side, d c 0 0 ## %xmm13: 0 ## ## Outputs: ## %xmm6: b+c+d b+c 0 0 ## %xmm0: b+c+d b+c b a ## .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_192_smear: ?vspltw v0, v7, 3 ?vsldoi v1, v9, v6, 12 # vpshufd \$0x80, %xmm6, %xmm1 # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0 ?vsldoi v0, v7, v0, 8 # vpshufd \$0xFE, %xmm7, %xmm0 # b a _ _ -> b b b a vxor v6, v6, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm6, %xmm6 # -> c+d c 0 0 vxor v6, v6, v0 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm6, %xmm6 # -> b+c+d b+c b a vmr v0, v6 ?vsldoi v6, v6, v9, 8 ?vsldoi v6, v9, v6, 8 # clobber low side with zeros blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ## ## .aes_schedule_round ## ## Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7 ## ## Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0 ## then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of ## %xmm7. ## ## Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for ## next rcon. ## ## Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the ## second low, result into third, result into highest. ## ## Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0. ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r11. ## .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_round: # extract rcon from xmm8 #vxor v4, v4, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm4, %xmm4 ?vsldoi v1, $rcon, v9, 15 # vpalignr \$15, %xmm8, %xmm4, %xmm1 ?vsldoi $rcon, $rcon, $rcon, 15 # vpalignr \$15, %xmm8, %xmm8, %xmm8 vxor v7, v7, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm7, %xmm7 # rotate ?vspltw v0, v0, 3 # vpshufd \$0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 ?vsldoi v0, v0, v0, 1 # vpalignr \$1, %xmm0, %xmm0, %xmm0 # fall through... # low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon. _vpaes_schedule_low_round: # smear xmm7 ?vsldoi v1, v9, v7, 12 # vpslldq \$4, %xmm7, %xmm1 vxor v7, v7, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm7, %xmm7 vspltisb v1, 0x0f # 0x0f..0f ?vsldoi v4, v9, v7, 8 # vpslldq \$8, %xmm7, %xmm4 # subbytes vand v1, v1, v0 # vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 # 0 = k vsrb v0, v0, v8 # vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i vxor v7, v7, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm7, %xmm7 vperm v2, $invhi, v9, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k vxor v1, v1, v0 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j vperm v3, $invlo, v9, v0 # vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i vxor v3, v3, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k vperm v4, $invlo, v9, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j vxor v7, v7, v26 # vpxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm7, %xmm7 vperm v3, $invlo, v9, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 2 = 1/iak vxor v4, v4, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k vperm v2, $invlo, v9, v4 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 3 = 1/jak vxor v3, v3, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 2 = io vxor v2, v2, v0 # vpxor %xmm0, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 3 = jo vperm v4, v15, v9, v3 # vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou vperm v1, v14, v9, v2 # vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm12, %xmm1 # 0 = sb1t vxor v1, v1, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbox output # add in smeared stuff vxor v0, v1, v7 # vpxor %xmm7, %xmm1, %xmm0 vxor v7, v1, v7 # vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm7 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ## ## .aes_schedule_transform ## ## Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%r11) ## ## Requires that %xmm9 = 0x0F0F... as in preheat ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm2 ## .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_transform: #vand v1, v0, v9 # vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 vsrb v2, v0, v8 # vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # vmovdqa (%r11), %xmm2 # lo vperm v0, $iptlo, $iptlo, v0 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 # vmovdqa 16(%r11), %xmm1 # hi vperm v2, $ipthi, $ipthi, v2 # vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm0 vxor v0, v0, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle ## ## Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version ## to our version. ## ## On encrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1 ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## On decrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9 ## deskew ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## ## Writes out to (%rdx), and increments or decrements it ## Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %r8 ## Preserves xmm0 ## Clobbers xmm1-xmm5 ## .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_mangle: #vmr v4, v0 # vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm4 # save xmm0 for later # vmovdqa .Lk_mc_forward(%rip),%xmm5 bne $dir, Lschedule_mangle_dec # encrypting vxor v4, v0, v26 # vpxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm4 addi $out, $out, 16 # add \$16, %rdx vperm v4, v4, v4, v25 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 vperm v1, v4, v4, v25 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm1 vperm v3, v1, v1, v25 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm1, %xmm3 vxor v4, v4, v1 # vpxor %xmm1, %xmm4, %xmm4 lvx v1, r8, r10 # vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1 vxor v3, v3, v4 # vpxor %xmm4, %xmm3, %xmm3 vperm v3, v3, v3, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 addi r8, r8, -16 # add \$-16, %r8 andi. r8, r8, 0x30 # and \$0x30, %r8 #stvx v3, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm3, (%rdx) vperm v1, v3, v3, $outperm # rotate right/left vsel v2, $outhead, v1, $outmask vmr $outhead, v1 stvx v2, 0, $out blr .align 4 Lschedule_mangle_dec: # inverse mix columns # lea .Lk_dksd(%rip),%r11 vsrb v1, v0, v8 # vpsrlb \$4, %xmm4, %xmm1 # 1 = hi #and v4, v0, v9 # vpand %xmm9, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = lo # vmovdqa 0x00(%r11), %xmm2 vperm v2, v16, v16, v0 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 # vmovdqa 0x10(%r11), %xmm3 vperm v3, v17, v17, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 vxor v3, v3, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 vperm v3, v3, v9, v25 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 # vmovdqa 0x20(%r11), %xmm2 vperm v2, v18, v18, v0 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 vxor v2, v2, v3 # vpxor %xmm3, %xmm2, %xmm2 # vmovdqa 0x30(%r11), %xmm3 vperm v3, v19, v19, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 vxor v3, v3, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 vperm v3, v3, v9, v25 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 # vmovdqa 0x40(%r11), %xmm2 vperm v2, v20, v20, v0 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 vxor v2, v2, v3 # vpxor %xmm3, %xmm2, %xmm2 # vmovdqa 0x50(%r11), %xmm3 vperm v3, v21, v21, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 vxor v3, v3, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # vmovdqa 0x60(%r11), %xmm2 vperm v2, v22, v22, v0 # vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 vperm v3, v3, v9, v25 # vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 # vmovdqa 0x70(%r11), %xmm4 vperm v4, v23, v23, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm4, %xmm4 lvx v1, r8, r10 # vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1 vxor v2, v2, v3 # vpxor %xmm3, %xmm2, %xmm2 vxor v3, v4, v2 # vpxor %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm3 addi $out, $out, -16 # add \$-16, %rdx vperm v3, v3, v3, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 addi r8, r8, -16 # add \$-16, %r8 andi. r8, r8, 0x30 # and \$0x30, %r8 #stvx v3, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm3, (%rdx) vperm v1, v3, v3, $outperm # rotate right/left vsel v2, $outhead, v1, $outmask vmr $outhead, v1 stvx v2, 0, $out blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .globl .vpaes_set_encrypt_key .align 5 .vpaes_set_encrypt_key: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mflr r0 mfspr r6, 256 # save vrsave stvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp stw r6,`$FRAME-4`($sp) # save vrsave li r7, -1 $PUSH r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) mtspr 256, r7 # preserve all AltiVec registers srwi r9, $bits, 5 # shr \$5,%eax addi r9, r9, 6 # add \$5,%eax stw r9, 240($out) # mov %eax,240(%rdx) # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; cmplw $dir, $bits, $bits # set encrypt direction li r8, 0x30 # mov \$0x30,%r8d bl _vpaes_schedule_core $POP r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mtspr 256, r6 # restore vrsave mtlr r0 xor r3, r3, r3 lvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .vpaes_set_encrypt_key,.-.vpaes_set_encrypt_key .globl .vpaes_set_decrypt_key .align 4 .vpaes_set_decrypt_key: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mflr r0 mfspr r6, 256 # save vrsave stvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp stw r6,`$FRAME-4`($sp) # save vrsave li r7, -1 $PUSH r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) mtspr 256, r7 # preserve all AltiVec registers srwi r9, $bits, 5 # shr \$5,%eax addi r9, r9, 6 # add \$5,%eax stw r9, 240($out) # mov %eax,240(%rdx) # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; slwi r9, r9, 4 # shl \$4,%eax add $out, $out, r9 # lea (%rdx,%rax),%rdx cmplwi $dir, $bits, 0 # set decrypt direction srwi r8, $bits, 1 # shr \$1,%r8d andi. r8, r8, 32 # and \$32,%r8d xori r8, r8, 32 # xor \$32,%r8d # nbits==192?0:32 bl _vpaes_schedule_core $POP r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mtspr 256, r6 # restore vrsave mtlr r0 xor r3, r3, r3 lvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .vpaes_set_decrypt_key,.-.vpaes_set_decrypt_key ___ } my $consts=1; foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; # constants table endian-specific conversion if ($consts && m/\.long\s+(.+)\s+(\?[a-z]*)$/o) { my $conv=$2; my @bytes=(); # convert to endian-agnostic format foreach (split(/,\s+/,$1)) { my $l = /^0/?oct:int; push @bytes,($l>>24)&0xff,($l>>16)&0xff,($l>>8)&0xff,$l&0xff; } # little-endian conversion if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) { SWITCH: for($conv) { /\?inv/ && do { @bytes=map($_^0xf,@bytes); last; }; /\?rev/ && do { @bytes=reverse(@bytes); last; }; } } #emit print ".byte\t",join(',',map (sprintf("0x%02x",$_),@bytes)),"\n"; next; } $consts=0 if (m/Lconsts:/o); # end of table # instructions prefixed with '?' are endian-specific and need # to be adjusted accordingly... if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) { # little-endian s/\?lvsr/lvsl/o or s/\?lvsl/lvsr/o or s/\?(vperm\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+)/$1$3$2$4/o or s/\?(vsldoi\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*(v[0-9]+,\s*)([0-9]+)/$1$3$2 16-$4/o or s/\?(vspltw\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*([0-9])/$1$2 3-$3/o; } else { # big-endian s/\?([a-z]+)/$1/o; } print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000006677613176625656020010 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # March 2016 # # Initial support for Fujitsu SPARC64 X/X+ comprises minimally # required key setup and single-block procedures. # # April 2016 # # Add "teaser" CBC and CTR mode-specific subroutines. "Teaser" means # that parallelizeable nature of CBC decrypt and CTR is not utilized # yet. CBC encrypt on the other hand is as good as it can possibly # get processing one byte in 4.1 cycles with 128-bit key on SPARC64 X. # This is ~6x faster than pure software implementation... # # July 2016 # # Switch from faligndata to fshiftorx, which allows to omit alignaddr # instructions and improve single-block and short-input performance # with misaligned data. $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; { my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$tmp,$mask) = map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #define LOCALS (STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME) .text .globl aes_fx_encrypt .align 32 aes_fx_encrypt: and $inp, 7, $tmp ! is input aligned? andn $inp, 7, $inp ldd [$key + 0], %f6 ! round[0] ldd [$key + 8], %f8 mov %o7, %g1 ld [$key + 240], $rounds 1: call .+8 add %o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7 sll $tmp, 3, $tmp ldd [$inp + 0], %f0 ! load input brz,pt $tmp, .Lenc_inp_aligned ldd [$inp + 8], %f2 ldd [%o7 + $tmp], %f14 ! shift left params ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, %f14, %f0 fshiftorx %f2, %f4, %f14, %f2 .Lenc_inp_aligned: ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fxor %f0, %f6, %f0 ! ^=round[0] fxor %f2, %f8, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 add $key, 32, $key sub $rounds, 4, $rounds .Loop_enc: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ldd [$key + 24], %f12 add $key, 32, $key fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$key + 0], %f6 ldd [$key + 8], %f8 brnz,a $rounds, .Loop_enc sub $rounds, 2, $rounds andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned? andn $out, 7, $out mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $tmp, $mask add %o7, 64, %o7 sll $tmp, 3, $tmp fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [%o7 + $tmp], %f14 ! shift right params fmovd %f0, %f4 faesenclx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesenclx %f4, %f8, %f2 bnz,pn %icc, .Lenc_out_unaligned mov %g1, %o7 std %f0, [$out + 0] retl std %f2, [$out + 8] .align 16 .Lenc_out_unaligned: add $out, 16, $inp orn %g0, $mask, $tmp fshiftorx %f0, %f0, %f14, %f4 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, %f14, %f6 fshiftorx %f2, %f2, %f14, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] stda %f8, [$inp + $tmp]0xc0 ! partial store retl nop .type aes_fx_encrypt,#function .size aes_fx_encrypt,.-aes_fx_encrypt .globl aes_fx_decrypt .align 32 aes_fx_decrypt: and $inp, 7, $tmp ! is input aligned? andn $inp, 7, $inp ldd [$key + 0], %f6 ! round[0] ldd [$key + 8], %f8 mov %o7, %g1 ld [$key + 240], $rounds 1: call .+8 add %o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7 sll $tmp, 3, $tmp ldd [$inp + 0], %f0 ! load input brz,pt $tmp, .Ldec_inp_aligned ldd [$inp + 8], %f2 ldd [%o7 + $tmp], %f14 ! shift left params ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, %f14, %f0 fshiftorx %f2, %f4, %f14, %f2 .Ldec_inp_aligned: ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fxor %f0, %f6, %f0 ! ^=round[0] fxor %f2, %f8, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 add $key, 32, $key sub $rounds, 4, $rounds .Loop_dec: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ldd [$key + 24], %f12 add $key, 32, $key fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$key + 0], %f6 ldd [$key + 8], %f8 brnz,a $rounds, .Loop_dec sub $rounds, 2, $rounds andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned? andn $out, 7, $out mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $tmp, $mask add %o7, 64, %o7 sll $tmp, 3, $tmp fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [%o7 + $tmp], %f14 ! shift right params fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdeclx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdeclx %f4, %f8, %f2 bnz,pn %icc, .Ldec_out_unaligned mov %g1, %o7 std %f0, [$out + 0] retl std %f2, [$out + 8] .align 16 .Ldec_out_unaligned: add $out, 16, $inp orn %g0, $mask, $tmp fshiftorx %f0, %f0, %f14, %f4 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, %f14, %f6 fshiftorx %f2, %f2, %f14, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] stda %f8, [$inp + $tmp]0xc0 ! partial store retl nop .type aes_fx_decrypt,#function .size aes_fx_decrypt,.-aes_fx_decrypt ___ } { my ($inp,$bits,$out,$tmp,$inc) = map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl aes_fx_set_decrypt_key .align 32 aes_fx_set_decrypt_key: b .Lset_encrypt_key mov -1, $inc retl nop .type aes_fx_set_decrypt_key,#function .size aes_fx_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_fx_set_decrypt_key .globl aes_fx_set_encrypt_key .align 32 aes_fx_set_encrypt_key: mov 1, $inc nop .Lset_encrypt_key: and $inp, 7, $tmp andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $tmp, 3, $tmp mov %o7, %g1 1: call .+8 add %o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7 ldd [%o7 + $tmp], %f10 ! shift left params mov %g1, %o7 cmp $bits, 192 ldd [$inp + 0], %f0 bl,pt %icc, .L128 ldd [$inp + 8], %f2 be,pt %icc, .L192 ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 brz,pt $tmp, .L256aligned ldd [$inp + 24], %f6 ldd [$inp + 32], %f8 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, %f10, %f0 fshiftorx %f2, %f4, %f10, %f2 fshiftorx %f4, %f6, %f10, %f4 fshiftorx %f6, %f8, %f10, %f6 .L256aligned: mov 14, $bits and $inc, `14*16`, $tmp st $bits, [$out + 240] ! store rounds add $out, $tmp, $out ! start or end of key schedule sllx $inc, 4, $inc ! 16 or -16 ___ for ($i=0; $i<6; $i++) { $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + 0] faeskeyx %f6, `0x10+$i`, %f0 std %f2, [$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out faeskeyx %f0, 0x00, %f2 std %f4, [$out + 0] faeskeyx %f2, 0x01, %f4 std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out faeskeyx %f4, 0x00, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + 0] faeskeyx %f6, `0x10+$i`, %f0 std %f2, [$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out faeskeyx %f0, 0x00, %f2 std %f4,[$out + 0] std %f6,[$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out std %f0,[$out + 0] std %f2,[$out + 8] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 ! return 0 .align 16 .L192: brz,pt $tmp, .L192aligned nop ldd [$inp + 24], %f6 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, %f10, %f0 fshiftorx %f2, %f4, %f10, %f2 fshiftorx %f4, %f6, %f10, %f4 .L192aligned: mov 12, $bits and $inc, `12*16`, $tmp st $bits, [$out + 240] ! store rounds add $out, $tmp, $out ! start or end of key schedule sllx $inc, 4, $inc ! 16 or -16 ___ for ($i=0; $i<8; $i+=2) { $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + 0] faeskeyx %f4, `0x10+$i`, %f0 std %f2, [$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out faeskeyx %f0, 0x00, %f2 std %f4, [$out + 0] faeskeyx %f2, 0x00, %f4 std %f0, [$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out faeskeyx %f4, `0x10+$i+1`, %f0 std %f2, [$out + 0] faeskeyx %f0, 0x00, %f2 std %f4, [$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<6); faeskeyx %f2, 0x00, %f4 ___ } $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 ! return 0 .align 16 .L128: brz,pt $tmp, .L128aligned nop ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, %f10, %f0 fshiftorx %f2, %f4, %f10, %f2 .L128aligned: mov 10, $bits and $inc, `10*16`, $tmp st $bits, [$out + 240] ! store rounds add $out, $tmp, $out ! start or end of key schedule sllx $inc, 4, $inc ! 16 or -16 ___ for ($i=0; $i<10; $i++) { $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + 0] faeskeyx %f2, `0x10+$i`, %f0 std %f2, [$out + 8] add $out, $inc, $out faeskeyx %f0, 0x00, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 ! return 0 .type aes_fx_set_encrypt_key,#function .size aes_fx_set_encrypt_key,.-aes_fx_set_encrypt_key ___ } { my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$dir) = map("%i$_",(0..5)); my ($rounds,$inner,$end,$inc,$ialign,$oalign,$mask) = map("%l$_",(0..7)); my ($iv0,$iv1,$r0hi,$r0lo,$rlhi,$rllo,$in0,$in1,$intail,$outhead,$fshift) = map("%f$_",grep { !($_ & 1) } (16 .. 62)); my ($ileft,$iright) = ($ialign,$oalign); $code.=<<___; .globl aes_fx_cbc_encrypt .align 32 aes_fx_cbc_encrypt: save %sp, -STACK_FRAME-16, %sp srln $len, 4, $len and $inp, 7, $ialign andn $inp, 7, $inp brz,pn $len, .Lcbc_no_data sll $ialign, 3, $ileft 1: call .+8 add %o7, .Linp_align-1b, %o7 ld [$key + 240], $rounds and $out, 7, $oalign ld [$ivp + 0], %f0 ! load ivec andn $out, 7, $out ld [$ivp + 4], %f1 sll $oalign, 3, $mask ld [$ivp + 8], %f2 ld [$ivp + 12], %f3 sll $rounds, 4, $rounds add $rounds, $key, $end ldd [$key + 0], $r0hi ! round[0] ldd [$key + 8], $r0lo add $inp, 16, $inp sub $len, 1, $len ldd [$end + 0], $rlhi ! round[last] ldd [$end + 8], $rllo mov 16, $inc movrz $len, 0, $inc ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 ldd [%o7 + $ileft], $fshift ! shift left params add %o7, 64, %o7 ldd [$inp - 16], $in0 ! load input ldd [$inp - 8], $in1 ldda [$inp]0x82, $intail ! non-faulting load brz $dir, .Lcbc_decrypt add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 fxor $r0hi, %f0, %f0 ! ivec^=round[0] fxor $r0lo, %f2, %f2 fshiftorx $in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0 fshiftorx $in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1 nop .Loop_cbc_enc: fxor $in0, %f0, %f0 ! inp^ivec^round[0] fxor $in1, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 add $key, 32, $end sub $rounds, 16*6, $inner .Lcbc_enc: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ldd [$end + 24], %f12 add $end, 32, $end fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$end + 0], %f6 ldd [$end + 8], %f8 brnz,a $inner, .Lcbc_enc sub $inner, 16*2, $inner fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ! round[last-1] ldd [$end + 24], %f12 movrz $len, 0, $inc fmovd $intail, $in0 ldd [$inp - 8], $in1 ! load next input block ldda [$inp]0x82, $intail ! non-faulting load add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 fshiftorx $in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0 fshiftorx $in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fxor $r0hi, $in0, $in0 ! inp^=round[0] fxor $r0lo, $in1, $in1 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesenclx %f2, $rlhi, %f0 faesenclx %f4, $rllo, %f2 brnz,pn $oalign, .Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out nop std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brnz,a $len, .Loop_cbc_enc sub $len, 1, $len st %f0, [$ivp + 0] ! output ivec st %f1, [$ivp + 4] st %f2, [$ivp + 8] st %f3, [$ivp + 12] .Lcbc_no_data: ret restore .align 32 .Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out: ldd [%o7 + $mask], $fshift ! shift right params mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $oalign, $mask sub %g0, $ileft, $iright fshiftorx %f0, %f0, $fshift, %f6 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8 stda %f6, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store orn %g0, $mask, $mask std %f8, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brz $len, .Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out_done sub $len, 1, $len b .Loop_cbc_enc_unaligned_out nop .align 32 .Loop_cbc_enc_unaligned_out: fmovd %f2, $outhead fxor $in0, %f0, %f0 ! inp^ivec^round[0] fxor $in1, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 48], %f10 ! round[3] ldd [$key + 56], %f12 ldx [$inp - 16], %o0 ldx [$inp - 8], %o1 brz $ileft, .Lcbc_enc_aligned_inp movrz $len, 0, $inc ldx [$inp], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 .Lcbc_enc_aligned_inp: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$key + 64], %f6 ! round[4] ldd [$key + 72], %f8 add $key, 64, $end sub $rounds, 16*8, $inner stx %o0, [%sp + LOCALS + 0] stx %o1, [%sp + LOCALS + 8] add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 nop .Lcbc_enc_unaligned: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ldd [$end + 24], %f12 add $end, 32, $end fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$end + 0], %f6 ldd [$end + 8], %f8 brnz,a $inner, .Lcbc_enc_unaligned sub $inner, 16*2, $inner fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ! round[last-1] ldd [$end + 24], %f12 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [%sp + LOCALS + 0], $in0 ldd [%sp + LOCALS + 8], $in1 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fxor $r0hi, $in0, $in0 ! inp^=round[0] fxor $r0lo, $in1, $in1 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesenclx %f2, $rlhi, %f0 faesenclx %f4, $rllo, %f2 fshiftorx $outhead, %f0, $fshift, %f6 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8 std %f6, [$out + 0] std %f8, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brnz,a $len, .Loop_cbc_enc_unaligned_out sub $len, 1, $len .Lcbc_enc_unaligned_out_done: fshiftorx %f2, %f2, $fshift, %f8 stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store st %f0, [$ivp + 0] ! output ivec st %f1, [$ivp + 4] st %f2, [$ivp + 8] st %f3, [$ivp + 12] ret restore .align 32 .Lcbc_decrypt: fshiftorx $in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0 fshiftorx $in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1 fmovd %f0, $iv0 fmovd %f2, $iv1 .Loop_cbc_dec: fxor $in0, $r0hi, %f0 ! inp^round[0] fxor $in1, $r0lo, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 add $key, 32, $end sub $rounds, 16*6, $inner .Lcbc_dec: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ldd [$end + 24], %f12 add $end, 32, $end fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$end + 0], %f6 ldd [$end + 8], %f8 brnz,a $inner, .Lcbc_dec sub $inner, 16*2, $inner fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ! round[last-1] ldd [$end + 24], %f12 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f8, %f2 fxor $iv0, $rlhi, %f6 ! ivec^round[last] fxor $iv1, $rllo, %f8 fmovd $in0, $iv0 fmovd $in1, $iv1 movrz $len, 0, $inc fmovd $intail, $in0 ldd [$inp - 8], $in1 ! load next input block ldda [$inp]0x82, $intail ! non-faulting load add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fshiftorx $in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0 fshiftorx $in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdeclx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdeclx %f4, %f8, %f2 brnz,pn $oalign, .Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out nop std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brnz,a $len, .Loop_cbc_dec sub $len, 1, $len st $iv0, [$ivp + 0] ! output ivec st $iv0#lo, [$ivp + 4] st $iv1, [$ivp + 8] st $iv1#lo, [$ivp + 12] ret restore .align 32 .Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out: ldd [%o7 + $mask], $fshift ! shift right params mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $oalign, $mask sub %g0, $ileft, $iright fshiftorx %f0, %f0, $fshift, %f6 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8 stda %f6, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store orn %g0, $mask, $mask std %f8, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brz $len, .Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out_done sub $len, 1, $len b .Loop_cbc_dec_unaligned_out nop .align 32 .Loop_cbc_dec_unaligned_out: fmovd %f2, $outhead fxor $in0, $r0hi, %f0 ! inp^round[0] fxor $in1, $r0lo, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 48], %f10 ! round[3] ldd [$key + 56], %f12 ldx [$inp - 16], %o0 ldx [$inp - 8], %o1 brz $ileft, .Lcbc_dec_aligned_inp movrz $len, 0, $inc ldx [$inp], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 .Lcbc_dec_aligned_inp: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$key + 64], %f6 ! round[4] ldd [$key + 72], %f8 add $key, 64, $end sub $rounds, 16*8, $inner stx %o0, [%sp + LOCALS + 0] stx %o1, [%sp + LOCALS + 8] add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 nop .Lcbc_dec_unaligned: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ldd [$end + 24], %f12 add $end, 32, $end fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$end + 0], %f6 ldd [$end + 8], %f8 brnz,a $inner, .Lcbc_dec_unaligned sub $inner, 16*2, $inner fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ! round[last-1] ldd [$end + 24], %f12 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f8, %f2 fxor $iv0, $rlhi, %f6 ! ivec^round[last] fxor $iv1, $rllo, %f8 fmovd $in0, $iv0 fmovd $in1, $iv1 ldd [%sp + LOCALS + 0], $in0 ldd [%sp + LOCALS + 8], $in1 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdecx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesdecx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesdeclx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesdeclx %f4, %f8, %f2 fshiftorx $outhead, %f0, $fshift, %f6 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8 std %f6, [$out + 0] std %f8, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brnz,a $len, .Loop_cbc_dec_unaligned_out sub $len, 1, $len .Lcbc_dec_unaligned_out_done: fshiftorx %f2, %f2, $fshift, %f8 stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store st $iv0, [$ivp + 0] ! output ivec st $iv0#lo, [$ivp + 4] st $iv1, [$ivp + 8] st $iv1#lo, [$ivp + 12] ret restore .type aes_fx_cbc_encrypt,#function .size aes_fx_cbc_encrypt,.-aes_fx_cbc_encrypt ___ } { my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp) = map("%i$_",(0..5)); my ($rounds,$inner,$end,$inc,$ialign,$oalign,$mask) = map("%l$_",(0..7)); my ($ctr0,$ctr1,$r0hi,$r0lo,$rlhi,$rllo,$in0,$in1,$intail,$outhead,$fshift) = map("%f$_",grep { !($_ & 1) } (16 .. 62)); my ($ileft,$iright) = ($ialign, $oalign); my $one = "%f14"; $code.=<<___; .globl aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .align 32 aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks: save %sp, -STACK_FRAME-16, %sp srln $len, 0, $len and $inp, 7, $ialign andn $inp, 7, $inp brz,pn $len, .Lctr32_no_data sll $ialign, 3, $ileft .Lpic: call .+8 add %o7, .Linp_align - .Lpic, %o7 ld [$key + 240], $rounds and $out, 7, $oalign ld [$ivp + 0], $ctr0 ! load counter andn $out, 7, $out ld [$ivp + 4], $ctr0#lo sll $oalign, 3, $mask ld [$ivp + 8], $ctr1 ld [$ivp + 12], $ctr1#lo ldd [%o7 + 128], $one sll $rounds, 4, $rounds add $rounds, $key, $end ldd [$key + 0], $r0hi ! round[0] ldd [$key + 8], $r0lo add $inp, 16, $inp sub $len, 1, $len ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 mov 16, $inc movrz $len, 0, $inc ldd [$end + 0], $rlhi ! round[last] ldd [$end + 8], $rllo ldd [%o7 + $ileft], $fshift ! shiftleft params add %o7, 64, %o7 ldd [$inp - 16], $in0 ! load input ldd [$inp - 8], $in1 ldda [$inp]0x82, $intail ! non-faulting load add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 fshiftorx $in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0 fshiftorx $in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1 .Loop_ctr32: fxor $ctr0, $r0hi, %f0 ! counter^round[0] fxor $ctr1, $r0lo, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 add $key, 32, $end sub $rounds, 16*6, $inner .Lctr32_enc: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ldd [$end + 24], %f12 add $end, 32, $end fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$end + 0], %f6 ldd [$end + 8], %f8 brnz,a $inner, .Lctr32_enc sub $inner, 16*2, $inner fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ! round[last-1] ldd [$end + 24], %f12 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 fxor $in0, $rlhi, %f6 ! inp^round[last] fxor $in1, $rllo, %f8 movrz $len, 0, $inc fmovd $intail, $in0 ldd [$inp - 8], $in1 ! load next input block ldda [$inp]0x82, $intail ! non-faulting load add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fshiftorx $in0, $in1, $fshift, $in0 fshiftorx $in1, $intail, $fshift, $in1 fpadd32 $ctr1, $one, $ctr1 ! increment counter fmovd %f0, %f4 faesenclx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesenclx %f4, %f8, %f2 brnz,pn $oalign, .Lctr32_unaligned_out nop std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brnz,a $len, .Loop_ctr32 sub $len, 1, $len .Lctr32_no_data: ret restore .align 32 .Lctr32_unaligned_out: ldd [%o7 + $mask], $fshift ! shift right params mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $oalign, $mask sub %g0, $ileft, $iright fshiftorx %f0, %f0, $fshift, %f6 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8 stda %f6, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store orn %g0, $mask, $mask std %f8, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brz $len, .Lctr32_unaligned_out_done sub $len, 1, $len b .Loop_ctr32_unaligned_out nop .align 32 .Loop_ctr32_unaligned_out: fmovd %f2, $outhead fxor $ctr0, $r0hi, %f0 ! counter^round[0] fxor $ctr1, $r0lo, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f6 ! round[2] ldd [$key + 40], %f8 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 48], %f10 ! round[3] ldd [$key + 56], %f12 ldx [$inp - 16], %o0 ldx [$inp - 8], %o1 brz $ileft, .Lctr32_aligned_inp movrz $len, 0, $inc ldx [$inp], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 .Lctr32_aligned_inp: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$key + 64], %f6 ! round[4] ldd [$key + 72], %f8 add $key, 64, $end sub $rounds, 16*8, $inner stx %o0, [%sp + LOCALS + 0] stx %o1, [%sp + LOCALS + 8] add $inp, $inc, $inp ! inp+=16 nop .Lctr32_enc_unaligned: fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ldd [$end + 24], %f12 add $end, 32, $end fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 ldd [$end + 0], %f6 ldd [$end + 8], %f8 brnz,a $inner, .Lctr32_enc_unaligned sub $inner, 16*2, $inner fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$end + 16], %f10 ! round[last-1] ldd [$end + 24], %f12 fpadd32 $ctr1, $one, $ctr1 ! increment counter fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f8, %f2 fxor $in0, $rlhi, %f6 ! inp^round[last] fxor $in1, $rllo, %f8 ldd [%sp + LOCALS + 0], $in0 ldd [%sp + LOCALS + 8], $in1 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesencx %f2, %f10, %f0 faesencx %f4, %f12, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f10 ! round[1] ldd [$key + 24], %f12 fmovd %f0, %f4 faesenclx %f2, %f6, %f0 faesenclx %f4, %f8, %f2 fshiftorx $outhead, %f0, $fshift, %f6 fshiftorx %f0, %f2, $fshift, %f8 std %f6, [$out + 0] std %f8, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out brnz,a $len, .Loop_ctr32_unaligned_out sub $len, 1, $len .Lctr32_unaligned_out_done: fshiftorx %f2, %f2, $fshift, %f8 stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store ret restore .type aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,#function .size aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .align 32 .Linp_align: ! fshiftorx parameters for left shift toward %rs1 .byte 0, 0, 64, 0, 0, 64, 0, -64 .byte 0, 0, 56, 8, 0, 56, 8, -56 .byte 0, 0, 48, 16, 0, 48, 16, -48 .byte 0, 0, 40, 24, 0, 40, 24, -40 .byte 0, 0, 32, 32, 0, 32, 32, -32 .byte 0, 0, 24, 40, 0, 24, 40, -24 .byte 0, 0, 16, 48, 0, 16, 48, -16 .byte 0, 0, 8, 56, 0, 8, 56, -8 .Lout_align: ! fshiftorx parameters for right shift toward %rs2 .byte 0, 0, 0, 64, 0, 0, 64, 0 .byte 0, 0, 8, 56, 0, 8, 56, -8 .byte 0, 0, 16, 48, 0, 16, 48, -16 .byte 0, 0, 24, 40, 0, 24, 40, -24 .byte 0, 0, 32, 32, 0, 32, 32, -32 .byte 0, 0, 40, 24, 0, 40, 24, -40 .byte 0, 0, 48, 16, 0, 48, 16, -48 .byte 0, 0, 56, 8, 0, 56, 8, -56 .Lone: .word 0, 1 .asciz "AES for Fujitsu SPARC64 X, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ } # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "faligndata" => 0x048, "bshuffle" => 0x04c, "fpadd32" => 0x052, "fxor" => 0x06c, "fsrc2" => 0x078 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unvis3 { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "alignaddr" => 0x018, "bmask" => 0x019, "alignaddrl" => 0x01a ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unfx { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %aesopf = ( "faesencx" => 0x90, "faesdecx" => 0x91, "faesenclx" => 0x92, "faesdeclx" => 0x93, "faeskeyx" => 0x94 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) { $rs2 = ($rs2 =~ /%f([0-6]*[02468])/) ? (($1|$1>>5)&31) : $rs2; $rs2 = oct($rs2) if ($rs2 =~ /^0/); foreach ($rs1,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unfx3src { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %aesopf = ( "fshiftorx" => 0x0b ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd"; if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|$rd<<25|0x37<<19|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/%f([0-9]+)#lo/sprintf "%%f%d",$1+1/ge; s/\b(faes[^x]{3,4}x)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unfx($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge or s/\b([f][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unfx3src($1,$2,$3,$4,$5) /ge or s/\b([fb][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unvis($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge or s/\b(alignaddr[l]*)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000022256213176625656017007 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # Version 2.1. # # aes-*-cbc benchmarks are improved by >70% [compared to gcc 3.3.2 on # Opteron 240 CPU] plus all the bells-n-whistles from 32-bit version # [you'll notice a lot of resemblance], such as compressed S-boxes # in little-endian byte order, prefetch of these tables in CBC mode, # as well as avoiding L1 cache aliasing between stack frame and key # schedule and already mentioned tables, compressed Td4... # # Performance in number of cycles per processed byte for 128-bit key: # # ECB encrypt ECB decrypt CBC large chunk # AMD64 33 43 13.0 # EM64T 38 56 18.6(*) # Core 2 30 42 14.5(*) # Atom 65 86 32.1(*) # # (*) with hyper-threading off $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; $verticalspin=1; # unlike 32-bit version $verticalspin performs # ~15% better on both AMD and Intel cores $speed_limit=512; # see aes-586.pl for details $code=".text\n"; $s0="%eax"; $s1="%ebx"; $s2="%ecx"; $s3="%edx"; $acc0="%esi"; $mask80="%rsi"; $acc1="%edi"; $maskfe="%rdi"; $acc2="%ebp"; $mask1b="%rbp"; $inp="%r8"; $out="%r9"; $t0="%r10d"; $t1="%r11d"; $t2="%r12d"; $rnds="%r13d"; $sbox="%r14"; $key="%r15"; sub hi() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1h/; $r; } sub lo() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/; $r =~ s/%[er]([sd]i)/%\1l/; $r =~ s/%(r[0-9]+)[d]?/%\1b/; $r; } sub LO() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%r([a-z]+)/%e\1/; $r =~ s/%r([0-9]+)/%r\1d/; $r; } sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf".long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; } } sub data_word() { my $i; my $last=pop(@_); $code.=".long\t"; while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"0x%08x,",$i; } $code.=sprintf"0x%08x\n",$last; } sub data_byte() { my $i; my $last=pop(@_); $code.=".byte\t"; while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"0x%02x,",$i&0xff; } $code.=sprintf"0x%02x\n",$last&0xff; } sub encvert() { my $t3="%r8d"; # zaps $inp! $code.=<<___; # favor 3-way issue Opteron pipeline... movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc2 mov 0($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 mov 0($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 mov 0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc2 xor 3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 xor 3($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 mov 0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 shr \$16,$s2 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc2 xor 3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t2 shr \$16,$s3 xor 3($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 shr \$16,$s1 lea 16($key),$key shr \$16,$s0 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc2 xor 2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 xor 2($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 xor 2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc2 xor 1($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 xor 1($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 xor 2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 mov 12($key),$s3 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc1 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc2 mov 0($key),$s0 xor 1($sbox,$acc1,8),$t2 xor 1($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 mov 4($key),$s1 mov 8($key),$s2 xor $t0,$s0 xor $t1,$s1 xor $t2,$s2 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } sub enclastvert() { my $t3="%r8d"; # zaps $inp! $code.=<<___; movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc2 movzb 2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 movzb 2($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 movzb 2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc1 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc2 movzb 2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t3 mov 0($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1 #$t0 mov 0($sbox,$acc2,8),$acc2 #$t1 and \$0x0000ff00,$acc1 and \$0x0000ff00,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0 xor $acc2,$t1 shr \$16,$s2 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1 shr \$16,$s3 mov 0($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0 #$t2 mov 0($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1 #$t3 and \$0x0000ff00,$acc0 and \$0x0000ff00,$acc1 shr \$16,$s1 xor $acc0,$t2 xor $acc1,$t3 shr \$16,$s0 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc2 mov 0($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0 #$t0 mov 0($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1 #$t1 mov 0($sbox,$acc2,8),$acc2 #$t2 and \$0x00ff0000,$acc0 and \$0x00ff0000,$acc1 and \$0x00ff0000,$acc2 xor $acc0,$t0 xor $acc1,$t1 xor $acc2,$t2 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc1 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc2 mov 0($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0 #$t3 mov 2($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1 #$t0 mov 2($sbox,$acc2,8),$acc2 #$t1 and \$0x00ff0000,$acc0 and \$0xff000000,$acc1 and \$0xff000000,$acc2 xor $acc0,$t3 xor $acc1,$t0 xor $acc2,$t1 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1 mov 16+12($key),$s3 mov 2($sbox,$acc0,8),$acc0 #$t2 mov 2($sbox,$acc1,8),$acc1 #$t3 mov 16+0($key),$s0 and \$0xff000000,$acc0 and \$0xff000000,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t2 xor $acc1,$t3 mov 16+4($key),$s1 mov 16+8($key),$s2 xor $t0,$s0 xor $t1,$s1 xor $t2,$s2 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } sub encstep() { my ($i,@s) = @_; my $tmp0=$acc0; my $tmp1=$acc1; my $tmp2=$acc2; my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i]; if ($i==3) { $tmp0=$s[1]; $tmp1=$s[2]; $tmp2=$s[3]; } $code.=" movzb ".&lo($s[0]).",$out\n"; $code.=" mov $s[2],$tmp1\n" if ($i!=3); $code.=" lea 16($key),$key\n" if ($i==0); $code.=" movzb ".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n"; $code.=" mov 0($sbox,$out,8),$out\n"; $code.=" shr \$16,$tmp1\n"; $code.=" mov $s[3],$tmp2\n" if ($i!=3); $code.=" xor 3($sbox,$tmp0,8),$out\n"; $code.=" movzb ".&lo($tmp1).",$tmp1\n"; $code.=" shr \$24,$tmp2\n"; $code.=" xor 4*$i($key),$out\n"; $code.=" xor 2($sbox,$tmp1,8),$out\n"; $code.=" xor 1($sbox,$tmp2,8),$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t0,$s[1]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $t1,$s[2]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $t2,$s[3]\n" if ($i==3); $code.="\n"; } sub enclast() { my ($i,@s)=@_; my $tmp0=$acc0; my $tmp1=$acc1; my $tmp2=$acc2; my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i]; if ($i==3) { $tmp0=$s[1]; $tmp1=$s[2]; $tmp2=$s[3]; } $code.=" movzb ".&lo($s[0]).",$out\n"; $code.=" mov $s[2],$tmp1\n" if ($i!=3); $code.=" mov 2($sbox,$out,8),$out\n"; $code.=" shr \$16,$tmp1\n"; $code.=" mov $s[3],$tmp2\n" if ($i!=3); $code.=" and \$0x000000ff,$out\n"; $code.=" movzb ".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n"; $code.=" movzb ".&lo($tmp1).",$tmp1\n"; $code.=" shr \$24,$tmp2\n"; $code.=" mov 0($sbox,$tmp0,8),$tmp0\n"; $code.=" mov 0($sbox,$tmp1,8),$tmp1\n"; $code.=" mov 2($sbox,$tmp2,8),$tmp2\n"; $code.=" and \$0x0000ff00,$tmp0\n"; $code.=" and \$0x00ff0000,$tmp1\n"; $code.=" and \$0xff000000,$tmp2\n"; $code.=" xor $tmp0,$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t0,$s[1]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" xor $tmp1,$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t1,$s[2]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" xor $tmp2,$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t2,$s[3]\n" if ($i==3); $code.="\n"; } $code.=<<___; .type _x86_64_AES_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _x86_64_AES_encrypt: xor 0($key),$s0 # xor with key xor 4($key),$s1 xor 8($key),$s2 xor 12($key),$s3 mov 240($key),$rnds # load key->rounds sub \$1,$rnds jmp .Lenc_loop .align 16 .Lenc_loop: ___ if ($verticalspin) { &encvert(); } else { &encstep(0,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &encstep(1,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &encstep(2,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &encstep(3,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); } $code.=<<___; sub \$1,$rnds jnz .Lenc_loop ___ if ($verticalspin) { &enclastvert(); } else { &enclast(0,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &enclast(1,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &enclast(2,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &enclast(3,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); $code.=<<___; xor 16+0($key),$s0 # xor with key xor 16+4($key),$s1 xor 16+8($key),$s2 xor 16+12($key),$s3 ___ } $code.=<<___; .byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret .size _x86_64_AES_encrypt,.-_x86_64_AES_encrypt ___ # it's possible to implement this by shifting tN by 8, filling least # significant byte with byte load and finally bswap-ing at the end, # but such partial register load kills Core 2... sub enccompactvert() { my ($t3,$t4,$t5)=("%r8d","%r9d","%r13d"); $code.=<<___; movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t0 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$t1 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$t2 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t3 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1 shr \$16,$s2 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc2 movzb ($sbox,$t0,1),$t0 movzb ($sbox,$t1,1),$t1 movzb ($sbox,$t2,1),$t2 movzb ($sbox,$t3,1),$t3 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4 #$t0 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc0 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5 #$t1 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc1 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t2 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t3 shl \$8,$t4 shr \$16,$s3 shl \$8,$t5 xor $t4,$t0 shr \$16,$s0 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t4 shr \$16,$s1 xor $t5,$t1 shl \$8,$acc2 movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t5 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0 xor $acc2,$t2 shl \$8,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc2 shl \$16,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t3 movzb ($sbox,$t4,1),$t4 #$t1 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb ($sbox,$t5,1),$t5 #$t2 xor $acc1,$t0 shr \$8,$s2 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1 shl \$16,$t4 shr \$8,$s1 shl \$16,$t5 xor $t4,$t1 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t3 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t0 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t1 movzb ($sbox,$s2,1),$s3 #$t3 movzb ($sbox,$s1,1),$s2 #$t2 shl \$16,$acc2 xor $t5,$t2 shl \$24,$acc0 xor $acc2,$t3 shl \$24,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t0 shl \$24,$s3 xor $acc1,$t1 shl \$24,$s2 mov $t0,$s0 mov $t1,$s1 xor $t2,$s2 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } sub enctransform_ref() { my $sn = shift; my ($acc,$r2,$tmp)=("%r8d","%r9d","%r13d"); $code.=<<___; mov $sn,$acc and \$0x80808080,$acc mov $acc,$tmp shr \$7,$tmp lea ($sn,$sn),$r2 sub $tmp,$acc and \$0xfefefefe,$r2 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc mov $sn,$tmp xor $acc,$r2 xor $r2,$sn rol \$24,$sn xor $r2,$sn ror \$16,$tmp xor $tmp,$sn ror \$8,$tmp xor $tmp,$sn ___ } # unlike decrypt case it does not pay off to parallelize enctransform sub enctransform() { my ($t3,$r20,$r21)=($acc2,"%r8d","%r9d"); $code.=<<___; mov \$0x80808080,$t0 mov \$0x80808080,$t1 and $s0,$t0 and $s1,$t1 mov $t0,$acc0 mov $t1,$acc1 shr \$7,$t0 lea ($s0,$s0),$r20 shr \$7,$t1 lea ($s1,$s1),$r21 sub $t0,$acc0 sub $t1,$acc1 and \$0xfefefefe,$r20 and \$0xfefefefe,$r21 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc0 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc1 mov $s0,$t0 mov $s1,$t1 xor $acc0,$r20 xor $acc1,$r21 xor $r20,$s0 xor $r21,$s1 mov \$0x80808080,$t2 rol \$24,$s0 mov \$0x80808080,$t3 rol \$24,$s1 and $s2,$t2 and $s3,$t3 xor $r20,$s0 xor $r21,$s1 mov $t2,$acc0 ror \$16,$t0 mov $t3,$acc1 ror \$16,$t1 lea ($s2,$s2),$r20 shr \$7,$t2 xor $t0,$s0 shr \$7,$t3 xor $t1,$s1 ror \$8,$t0 lea ($s3,$s3),$r21 ror \$8,$t1 sub $t2,$acc0 sub $t3,$acc1 xor $t0,$s0 xor $t1,$s1 and \$0xfefefefe,$r20 and \$0xfefefefe,$r21 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc0 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc1 mov $s2,$t2 mov $s3,$t3 xor $acc0,$r20 xor $acc1,$r21 ror \$16,$t2 xor $r20,$s2 ror \$16,$t3 xor $r21,$s3 rol \$24,$s2 mov 0($sbox),$acc0 # prefetch Te4 rol \$24,$s3 xor $r20,$s2 mov 64($sbox),$acc1 xor $r21,$s3 mov 128($sbox),$r20 xor $t2,$s2 ror \$8,$t2 xor $t3,$s3 ror \$8,$t3 xor $t2,$s2 mov 192($sbox),$r21 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } $code.=<<___; .type _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact: lea 128($sbox),$inp # size optimization mov 0-128($inp),$acc1 # prefetch Te4 mov 32-128($inp),$acc2 mov 64-128($inp),$t0 mov 96-128($inp),$t1 mov 128-128($inp),$acc1 mov 160-128($inp),$acc2 mov 192-128($inp),$t0 mov 224-128($inp),$t1 jmp .Lenc_loop_compact .align 16 .Lenc_loop_compact: xor 0($key),$s0 # xor with key xor 4($key),$s1 xor 8($key),$s2 xor 12($key),$s3 lea 16($key),$key ___ &enccompactvert(); $code.=<<___; cmp 16(%rsp),$key je .Lenc_compact_done ___ &enctransform(); $code.=<<___; jmp .Lenc_loop_compact .align 16 .Lenc_compact_done: xor 0($key),$s0 xor 4($key),$s1 xor 8($key),$s2 xor 12($key),$s3 .byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret .size _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact,.-_x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact ___ # void AES_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); $code.=<<___; .globl AES_encrypt .type AES_encrypt,\@function,3 .align 16 .globl asm_AES_encrypt .hidden asm_AES_encrypt asm_AES_encrypt: AES_encrypt: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 # allocate frame "above" key schedule mov %rsp,%r10 lea -63(%rdx),%rcx # %rdx is key argument and \$-64,%rsp sub %rsp,%rcx neg %rcx and \$0x3c0,%rcx sub %rcx,%rsp sub \$32,%rsp mov %rsi,16(%rsp) # save out mov %r10,24(%rsp) # save real stack pointer .Lenc_prologue: mov %rdx,$key mov 240($key),$rnds # load rounds mov 0(%rdi),$s0 # load input vector mov 4(%rdi),$s1 mov 8(%rdi),$s2 mov 12(%rdi),$s3 shl \$4,$rnds lea ($key,$rnds),%rbp mov $key,(%rsp) # key schedule mov %rbp,8(%rsp) # end of key schedule # pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule lea .LAES_Te+2048(%rip),$sbox lea 768(%rsp),%rbp sub $sbox,%rbp and \$0x300,%rbp lea ($sbox,%rbp),$sbox call _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact mov 16(%rsp),$out # restore out mov 24(%rsp),%rsi # restore saved stack pointer mov $s0,0($out) # write output vector mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lenc_epilogue: ret .size AES_encrypt,.-AES_encrypt ___ #------------------------------------------------------------------# sub decvert() { my $t3="%r8d"; # zaps $inp! $code.=<<___; # favor 3-way issue Opteron pipeline... movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc2 mov 0($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 mov 0($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 mov 0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc2 xor 3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 xor 3($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 mov 0($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0 shr \$16,$s0 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc2 xor 3($sbox,$acc0,8),$t2 shr \$16,$s3 xor 3($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 shr \$16,$s1 lea 16($key),$key shr \$16,$s2 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc2 xor 2($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 xor 2($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 xor 2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t2 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc2 xor 1($sbox,$acc0,8),$t0 xor 1($sbox,$acc1,8),$t1 xor 2($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 mov 12($key),$s3 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc2 xor 1($sbox,$acc0,8),$t2 mov 0($key),$s0 xor 1($sbox,$acc2,8),$t3 xor $t0,$s0 mov 4($key),$s1 mov 8($key),$s2 xor $t2,$s2 xor $t1,$s1 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } sub declastvert() { my $t3="%r8d"; # zaps $inp! $code.=<<___; lea 2048($sbox),$sbox # size optimization movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc2 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t0 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$t1 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$t2 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc1 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc2 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t3 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t1 shl \$8,$acc1 shl \$8,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0 xor $acc2,$t1 shr \$16,$s3 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1 shr \$16,$s0 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t2 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t3 shl \$8,$acc0 shl \$8,$acc1 shr \$16,$s1 xor $acc0,$t2 xor $acc1,$t3 shr \$16,$s2 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$acc1 movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$acc2 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t0 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t1 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t2 shl \$16,$acc0 shl \$16,$acc1 shl \$16,$acc2 xor $acc0,$t0 xor $acc1,$t1 xor $acc2,$t2 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc1 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc2 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t3 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t1 shl \$16,$acc0 shl \$24,$acc1 shl \$24,$acc2 xor $acc0,$t3 xor $acc1,$t0 xor $acc2,$t1 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1 mov 16+12($key),$s3 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t2 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t3 mov 16+0($key),$s0 shl \$24,$acc0 shl \$24,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t2 xor $acc1,$t3 mov 16+4($key),$s1 mov 16+8($key),$s2 lea -2048($sbox),$sbox xor $t0,$s0 xor $t1,$s1 xor $t2,$s2 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } sub decstep() { my ($i,@s) = @_; my $tmp0=$acc0; my $tmp1=$acc1; my $tmp2=$acc2; my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i]; $code.=" mov $s[0],$out\n" if ($i!=3); $tmp1=$s[2] if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $s[2],$tmp1\n" if ($i!=3); $code.=" and \$0xFF,$out\n"; $code.=" mov 0($sbox,$out,8),$out\n"; $code.=" shr \$16,$tmp1\n"; $tmp2=$s[3] if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $s[3],$tmp2\n" if ($i!=3); $tmp0=$s[1] if ($i==3); $code.=" movzb ".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n"; $code.=" and \$0xFF,$tmp1\n"; $code.=" shr \$24,$tmp2\n"; $code.=" xor 3($sbox,$tmp0,8),$out\n"; $code.=" xor 2($sbox,$tmp1,8),$out\n"; $code.=" xor 1($sbox,$tmp2,8),$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t2,$s[1]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $t1,$s[2]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $t0,$s[3]\n" if ($i==3); $code.="\n"; } sub declast() { my ($i,@s)=@_; my $tmp0=$acc0; my $tmp1=$acc1; my $tmp2=$acc2; my $out=($t0,$t1,$t2,$s[0])[$i]; $code.=" mov $s[0],$out\n" if ($i!=3); $tmp1=$s[2] if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $s[2],$tmp1\n" if ($i!=3); $code.=" and \$0xFF,$out\n"; $code.=" movzb 2048($sbox,$out,1),$out\n"; $code.=" shr \$16,$tmp1\n"; $tmp2=$s[3] if ($i==3); $code.=" mov $s[3],$tmp2\n" if ($i!=3); $tmp0=$s[1] if ($i==3); $code.=" movzb ".&hi($s[1]).",$tmp0\n"; $code.=" and \$0xFF,$tmp1\n"; $code.=" shr \$24,$tmp2\n"; $code.=" movzb 2048($sbox,$tmp0,1),$tmp0\n"; $code.=" movzb 2048($sbox,$tmp1,1),$tmp1\n"; $code.=" movzb 2048($sbox,$tmp2,1),$tmp2\n"; $code.=" shl \$8,$tmp0\n"; $code.=" shl \$16,$tmp1\n"; $code.=" shl \$24,$tmp2\n"; $code.=" xor $tmp0,$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t2,$s[1]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" xor $tmp1,$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t1,$s[2]\n" if ($i==3); $code.=" xor $tmp2,$out\n"; $code.=" mov $t0,$s[3]\n" if ($i==3); $code.="\n"; } $code.=<<___; .type _x86_64_AES_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _x86_64_AES_decrypt: xor 0($key),$s0 # xor with key xor 4($key),$s1 xor 8($key),$s2 xor 12($key),$s3 mov 240($key),$rnds # load key->rounds sub \$1,$rnds jmp .Ldec_loop .align 16 .Ldec_loop: ___ if ($verticalspin) { &decvert(); } else { &decstep(0,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &decstep(1,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &decstep(2,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &decstep(3,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); $code.=<<___; lea 16($key),$key xor 0($key),$s0 # xor with key xor 4($key),$s1 xor 8($key),$s2 xor 12($key),$s3 ___ } $code.=<<___; sub \$1,$rnds jnz .Ldec_loop ___ if ($verticalspin) { &declastvert(); } else { &declast(0,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &declast(1,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &declast(2,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &declast(3,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); $code.=<<___; xor 16+0($key),$s0 # xor with key xor 16+4($key),$s1 xor 16+8($key),$s2 xor 16+12($key),$s3 ___ } $code.=<<___; .byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret .size _x86_64_AES_decrypt,.-_x86_64_AES_decrypt ___ sub deccompactvert() { my ($t3,$t4,$t5)=("%r8d","%r9d","%r13d"); $code.=<<___; movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t0 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$t1 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$t2 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t3 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0 movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1 shr \$16,$s3 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc2 movzb ($sbox,$t0,1),$t0 movzb ($sbox,$t1,1),$t1 movzb ($sbox,$t2,1),$t2 movzb ($sbox,$t3,1),$t3 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4 #$t0 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc0 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5 #$t1 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t2 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t3 shr \$16,$s2 shl \$8,$t5 shl \$8,$t4 movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc1 shr \$16,$s0 xor $t4,$t0 shr \$16,$s1 movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t4 shl \$8,$acc2 xor $t5,$t1 shl \$8,$acc0 movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t5 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0 xor $acc2,$t2 movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc2 shl \$16,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t3 movzb ($sbox,$t4,1),$t4 #$t1 movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t3 xor $acc1,$t0 movzb ($sbox,$t5,1),$t5 #$t2 movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1 shl \$16,$acc2 shl \$16,$t4 shl \$16,$t5 xor $acc2,$t3 movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc2 xor $t4,$t1 shr \$8,$s0 xor $t5,$t2 movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t0 movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$s1 #$t1 movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$s2 #$t2 movzb ($sbox,$s0,1),$s3 #$t3 mov $t0,$s0 shl \$24,$acc0 shl \$24,$s1 shl \$24,$s2 xor $acc0,$s0 shl \$24,$s3 xor $t1,$s1 xor $t2,$s2 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } # parallelized version! input is pair of 64-bit values: %rax=s1.s0 # and %rcx=s3.s2, output is four 32-bit values in %eax=s0, %ebx=s1, # %ecx=s2 and %edx=s3. sub dectransform() { my ($tp10,$tp20,$tp40,$tp80,$acc0)=("%rax","%r8", "%r9", "%r10","%rbx"); my ($tp18,$tp28,$tp48,$tp88,$acc8)=("%rcx","%r11","%r12","%r13","%rdx"); my $prefetch = shift; $code.=<<___; mov $mask80,$tp40 mov $mask80,$tp48 and $tp10,$tp40 and $tp18,$tp48 mov $tp40,$acc0 mov $tp48,$acc8 shr \$7,$tp40 lea ($tp10,$tp10),$tp20 shr \$7,$tp48 lea ($tp18,$tp18),$tp28 sub $tp40,$acc0 sub $tp48,$acc8 and $maskfe,$tp20 and $maskfe,$tp28 and $mask1b,$acc0 and $mask1b,$acc8 xor $acc0,$tp20 xor $acc8,$tp28 mov $mask80,$tp80 mov $mask80,$tp88 and $tp20,$tp80 and $tp28,$tp88 mov $tp80,$acc0 mov $tp88,$acc8 shr \$7,$tp80 lea ($tp20,$tp20),$tp40 shr \$7,$tp88 lea ($tp28,$tp28),$tp48 sub $tp80,$acc0 sub $tp88,$acc8 and $maskfe,$tp40 and $maskfe,$tp48 and $mask1b,$acc0 and $mask1b,$acc8 xor $acc0,$tp40 xor $acc8,$tp48 mov $mask80,$tp80 mov $mask80,$tp88 and $tp40,$tp80 and $tp48,$tp88 mov $tp80,$acc0 mov $tp88,$acc8 shr \$7,$tp80 xor $tp10,$tp20 # tp2^=tp1 shr \$7,$tp88 xor $tp18,$tp28 # tp2^=tp1 sub $tp80,$acc0 sub $tp88,$acc8 lea ($tp40,$tp40),$tp80 lea ($tp48,$tp48),$tp88 xor $tp10,$tp40 # tp4^=tp1 xor $tp18,$tp48 # tp4^=tp1 and $maskfe,$tp80 and $maskfe,$tp88 and $mask1b,$acc0 and $mask1b,$acc8 xor $acc0,$tp80 xor $acc8,$tp88 xor $tp80,$tp10 # tp1^=tp8 xor $tp88,$tp18 # tp1^=tp8 xor $tp80,$tp20 # tp2^tp1^=tp8 xor $tp88,$tp28 # tp2^tp1^=tp8 mov $tp10,$acc0 mov $tp18,$acc8 xor $tp80,$tp40 # tp4^tp1^=tp8 shr \$32,$acc0 xor $tp88,$tp48 # tp4^tp1^=tp8 shr \$32,$acc8 xor $tp20,$tp80 # tp8^=tp8^tp2^tp1=tp2^tp1 rol \$8,`&LO("$tp10")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8) xor $tp28,$tp88 # tp8^=tp8^tp2^tp1=tp2^tp1 rol \$8,`&LO("$tp18")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8) xor $tp40,$tp80 # tp2^tp1^=tp8^tp4^tp1=tp8^tp4^tp2 rol \$8,`&LO("$acc0")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8) xor $tp48,$tp88 # tp2^tp1^=tp8^tp4^tp1=tp8^tp4^tp2 rol \$8,`&LO("$acc8")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8) xor `&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$tp10")` shr \$32,$tp80 xor `&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$tp18")` shr \$32,$tp88 xor `&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$acc0")` xor `&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$acc8")` mov $tp20,$tp80 rol \$24,`&LO("$tp20")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24) mov $tp28,$tp88 rol \$24,`&LO("$tp28")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24) shr \$32,$tp80 xor `&LO("$tp20")`,`&LO("$tp10")` shr \$32,$tp88 xor `&LO("$tp28")`,`&LO("$tp18")` rol \$24,`&LO("$tp80")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24) mov $tp40,$tp20 rol \$24,`&LO("$tp88")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24) mov $tp48,$tp28 shr \$32,$tp20 xor `&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$acc0")` shr \$32,$tp28 xor `&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$acc8")` `"mov 0($sbox),$mask80" if ($prefetch)` rol \$16,`&LO("$tp40")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16) `"mov 64($sbox),$maskfe" if ($prefetch)` rol \$16,`&LO("$tp48")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16) `"mov 128($sbox),$mask1b" if ($prefetch)` rol \$16,`&LO("$tp20")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16) `"mov 192($sbox),$tp80" if ($prefetch)` xor `&LO("$tp40")`,`&LO("$tp10")` rol \$16,`&LO("$tp28")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16) xor `&LO("$tp48")`,`&LO("$tp18")` `"mov 256($sbox),$tp88" if ($prefetch)` xor `&LO("$tp20")`,`&LO("$acc0")` xor `&LO("$tp28")`,`&LO("$acc8")` ___ } $code.=<<___; .type _x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact: lea 128($sbox),$inp # size optimization mov 0-128($inp),$acc1 # prefetch Td4 mov 32-128($inp),$acc2 mov 64-128($inp),$t0 mov 96-128($inp),$t1 mov 128-128($inp),$acc1 mov 160-128($inp),$acc2 mov 192-128($inp),$t0 mov 224-128($inp),$t1 jmp .Ldec_loop_compact .align 16 .Ldec_loop_compact: xor 0($key),$s0 # xor with key xor 4($key),$s1 xor 8($key),$s2 xor 12($key),$s3 lea 16($key),$key ___ &deccompactvert(); $code.=<<___; cmp 16(%rsp),$key je .Ldec_compact_done mov 256+0($sbox),$mask80 shl \$32,%rbx shl \$32,%rdx mov 256+8($sbox),$maskfe or %rbx,%rax or %rdx,%rcx mov 256+16($sbox),$mask1b ___ &dectransform(1); $code.=<<___; jmp .Ldec_loop_compact .align 16 .Ldec_compact_done: xor 0($key),$s0 xor 4($key),$s1 xor 8($key),$s2 xor 12($key),$s3 .byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret .size _x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact,.-_x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact ___ # void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); $code.=<<___; .globl AES_decrypt .type AES_decrypt,\@function,3 .align 16 .globl asm_AES_decrypt .hidden asm_AES_decrypt asm_AES_decrypt: AES_decrypt: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 # allocate frame "above" key schedule mov %rsp,%r10 lea -63(%rdx),%rcx # %rdx is key argument and \$-64,%rsp sub %rsp,%rcx neg %rcx and \$0x3c0,%rcx sub %rcx,%rsp sub \$32,%rsp mov %rsi,16(%rsp) # save out mov %r10,24(%rsp) # save real stack pointer .Ldec_prologue: mov %rdx,$key mov 240($key),$rnds # load rounds mov 0(%rdi),$s0 # load input vector mov 4(%rdi),$s1 mov 8(%rdi),$s2 mov 12(%rdi),$s3 shl \$4,$rnds lea ($key,$rnds),%rbp mov $key,(%rsp) # key schedule mov %rbp,8(%rsp) # end of key schedule # pick Td4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule lea .LAES_Td+2048(%rip),$sbox lea 768(%rsp),%rbp sub $sbox,%rbp and \$0x300,%rbp lea ($sbox,%rbp),$sbox shr \$3,%rbp # recall "magic" constants! add %rbp,$sbox call _x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact mov 16(%rsp),$out # restore out mov 24(%rsp),%rsi # restore saved stack pointer mov $s0,0($out) # write output vector mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Ldec_epilogue: ret .size AES_decrypt,.-AES_decrypt ___ #------------------------------------------------------------------# sub enckey() { $code.=<<___; movz %dl,%esi # rk[i]>>0 movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx movz %dh,%esi # rk[i]>>8 shl \$24,%ebx xor %ebx,%eax movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx shr \$16,%edx movz %dl,%esi # rk[i]>>16 xor %ebx,%eax movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx movz %dh,%esi # rk[i]>>24 shl \$8,%ebx xor %ebx,%eax movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx shl \$16,%ebx xor %ebx,%eax xor 1024-128(%rbp,%rcx,4),%eax # rcon ___ } # int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, # AES_KEY *key) $code.=<<___; .globl AES_set_encrypt_key .type AES_set_encrypt_key,\@function,3 .align 16 AES_set_encrypt_key: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 # redundant, but allows to share push %r13 # exception handler... push %r14 push %r15 sub \$8,%rsp .Lenc_key_prologue: call _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key mov 40(%rsp),%rbp mov 48(%rsp),%rbx add \$56,%rsp .Lenc_key_epilogue: ret .size AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key .type _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key: mov %esi,%ecx # %ecx=bits mov %rdi,%rsi # %rsi=userKey mov %rdx,%rdi # %rdi=key test \$-1,%rsi jz .Lbadpointer test \$-1,%rdi jz .Lbadpointer lea .LAES_Te(%rip),%rbp lea 2048+128(%rbp),%rbp # prefetch Te4 mov 0-128(%rbp),%eax mov 32-128(%rbp),%ebx mov 64-128(%rbp),%r8d mov 96-128(%rbp),%edx mov 128-128(%rbp),%eax mov 160-128(%rbp),%ebx mov 192-128(%rbp),%r8d mov 224-128(%rbp),%edx cmp \$128,%ecx je .L10rounds cmp \$192,%ecx je .L12rounds cmp \$256,%ecx je .L14rounds mov \$-2,%rax # invalid number of bits jmp .Lexit .L10rounds: mov 0(%rsi),%rax # copy first 4 dwords mov 8(%rsi),%rdx mov %rax,0(%rdi) mov %rdx,8(%rdi) shr \$32,%rdx xor %ecx,%ecx jmp .L10shortcut .align 4 .L10loop: mov 0(%rdi),%eax # rk[0] mov 12(%rdi),%edx # rk[3] .L10shortcut: ___ &enckey (); $code.=<<___; mov %eax,16(%rdi) # rk[4] xor 4(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,20(%rdi) # rk[5] xor 8(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,24(%rdi) # rk[6] xor 12(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,28(%rdi) # rk[7] add \$1,%ecx lea 16(%rdi),%rdi cmp \$10,%ecx jl .L10loop movl \$10,80(%rdi) # setup number of rounds xor %rax,%rax jmp .Lexit .L12rounds: mov 0(%rsi),%rax # copy first 6 dwords mov 8(%rsi),%rbx mov 16(%rsi),%rdx mov %rax,0(%rdi) mov %rbx,8(%rdi) mov %rdx,16(%rdi) shr \$32,%rdx xor %ecx,%ecx jmp .L12shortcut .align 4 .L12loop: mov 0(%rdi),%eax # rk[0] mov 20(%rdi),%edx # rk[5] .L12shortcut: ___ &enckey (); $code.=<<___; mov %eax,24(%rdi) # rk[6] xor 4(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,28(%rdi) # rk[7] xor 8(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,32(%rdi) # rk[8] xor 12(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,36(%rdi) # rk[9] cmp \$7,%ecx je .L12break add \$1,%ecx xor 16(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,40(%rdi) # rk[10] xor 20(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,44(%rdi) # rk[11] lea 24(%rdi),%rdi jmp .L12loop .L12break: movl \$12,72(%rdi) # setup number of rounds xor %rax,%rax jmp .Lexit .L14rounds: mov 0(%rsi),%rax # copy first 8 dwords mov 8(%rsi),%rbx mov 16(%rsi),%rcx mov 24(%rsi),%rdx mov %rax,0(%rdi) mov %rbx,8(%rdi) mov %rcx,16(%rdi) mov %rdx,24(%rdi) shr \$32,%rdx xor %ecx,%ecx jmp .L14shortcut .align 4 .L14loop: mov 0(%rdi),%eax # rk[0] mov 28(%rdi),%edx # rk[4] .L14shortcut: ___ &enckey (); $code.=<<___; mov %eax,32(%rdi) # rk[8] xor 4(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,36(%rdi) # rk[9] xor 8(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,40(%rdi) # rk[10] xor 12(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,44(%rdi) # rk[11] cmp \$6,%ecx je .L14break add \$1,%ecx mov %eax,%edx mov 16(%rdi),%eax # rk[4] movz %dl,%esi # rk[11]>>0 movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx movz %dh,%esi # rk[11]>>8 xor %ebx,%eax movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx shr \$16,%edx shl \$8,%ebx movz %dl,%esi # rk[11]>>16 xor %ebx,%eax movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx movz %dh,%esi # rk[11]>>24 shl \$16,%ebx xor %ebx,%eax movzb -128(%rbp,%rsi),%ebx shl \$24,%ebx xor %ebx,%eax mov %eax,48(%rdi) # rk[12] xor 20(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,52(%rdi) # rk[13] xor 24(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,56(%rdi) # rk[14] xor 28(%rdi),%eax mov %eax,60(%rdi) # rk[15] lea 32(%rdi),%rdi jmp .L14loop .L14break: movl \$14,48(%rdi) # setup number of rounds xor %rax,%rax jmp .Lexit .Lbadpointer: mov \$-1,%rax .Lexit: .byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret .size _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,.-_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key ___ sub deckey_ref() { my ($i,$ptr,$te,$td) = @_; my ($tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8,$acc)=("%eax","%ebx","%edi","%edx","%r8d"); $code.=<<___; mov $i($ptr),$tp1 mov $tp1,$acc and \$0x80808080,$acc mov $acc,$tp4 shr \$7,$tp4 lea 0($tp1,$tp1),$tp2 sub $tp4,$acc and \$0xfefefefe,$tp2 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc xor $tp2,$acc mov $acc,$tp2 and \$0x80808080,$acc mov $acc,$tp8 shr \$7,$tp8 lea 0($tp2,$tp2),$tp4 sub $tp8,$acc and \$0xfefefefe,$tp4 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc xor $tp1,$tp2 # tp2^tp1 xor $tp4,$acc mov $acc,$tp4 and \$0x80808080,$acc mov $acc,$tp8 shr \$7,$tp8 sub $tp8,$acc lea 0($tp4,$tp4),$tp8 xor $tp1,$tp4 # tp4^tp1 and \$0xfefefefe,$tp8 and \$0x1b1b1b1b,$acc xor $acc,$tp8 xor $tp8,$tp1 # tp1^tp8 rol \$8,$tp1 # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8) xor $tp8,$tp2 # tp2^tp1^tp8 xor $tp8,$tp4 # tp4^tp1^tp8 xor $tp2,$tp8 xor $tp4,$tp8 # tp8^(tp8^tp4^tp1)^(tp8^tp2^tp1)=tp8^tp4^tp2 xor $tp8,$tp1 rol \$24,$tp2 # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24) xor $tp2,$tp1 rol \$16,$tp4 # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16) xor $tp4,$tp1 mov $tp1,$i($ptr) ___ } # int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, # AES_KEY *key) $code.=<<___; .globl AES_set_decrypt_key .type AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function,3 .align 16 AES_set_decrypt_key: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 push %rdx # save key schedule .Ldec_key_prologue: call _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key mov (%rsp),%r8 # restore key schedule cmp \$0,%eax jne .Labort mov 240(%r8),%r14d # pull number of rounds xor %rdi,%rdi lea (%rdi,%r14d,4),%rcx mov %r8,%rsi lea (%r8,%rcx,4),%rdi # pointer to last chunk .align 4 .Linvert: mov 0(%rsi),%rax mov 8(%rsi),%rbx mov 0(%rdi),%rcx mov 8(%rdi),%rdx mov %rax,0(%rdi) mov %rbx,8(%rdi) mov %rcx,0(%rsi) mov %rdx,8(%rsi) lea 16(%rsi),%rsi lea -16(%rdi),%rdi cmp %rsi,%rdi jne .Linvert lea .LAES_Te+2048+1024(%rip),%rax # rcon mov 40(%rax),$mask80 mov 48(%rax),$maskfe mov 56(%rax),$mask1b mov %r8,$key sub \$1,%r14d .align 4 .Lpermute: lea 16($key),$key mov 0($key),%rax mov 8($key),%rcx ___ &dectransform (); $code.=<<___; mov %eax,0($key) mov %ebx,4($key) mov %ecx,8($key) mov %edx,12($key) sub \$1,%r14d jnz .Lpermute xor %rax,%rax .Labort: mov 8(%rsp),%r15 mov 16(%rsp),%r14 mov 24(%rsp),%r13 mov 32(%rsp),%r12 mov 40(%rsp),%rbp mov 48(%rsp),%rbx add \$56,%rsp .Ldec_key_epilogue: ret .size AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key ___ # void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); { # stack frame layout # -8(%rsp) return address my $keyp="0(%rsp)"; # one to pass as $key my $keyend="8(%rsp)"; # &(keyp->rd_key[4*keyp->rounds]) my $_rsp="16(%rsp)"; # saved %rsp my $_inp="24(%rsp)"; # copy of 1st parameter, inp my $_out="32(%rsp)"; # copy of 2nd parameter, out my $_len="40(%rsp)"; # copy of 3rd parameter, length my $_key="48(%rsp)"; # copy of 4th parameter, key my $_ivp="56(%rsp)"; # copy of 5th parameter, ivp my $ivec="64(%rsp)"; # ivec[16] my $aes_key="80(%rsp)"; # copy of aes_key my $mark="80+240(%rsp)"; # copy of aes_key->rounds $code.=<<___; .globl AES_cbc_encrypt .type AES_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6 .align 16 .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl asm_AES_cbc_encrypt .hidden asm_AES_cbc_encrypt asm_AES_cbc_encrypt: AES_cbc_encrypt: cmp \$0,%rdx # check length je .Lcbc_epilogue pushfq push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lcbc_prologue: cld mov %r9d,%r9d # clear upper half of enc lea .LAES_Te(%rip),$sbox cmp \$0,%r9 jne .Lcbc_picked_te lea .LAES_Td(%rip),$sbox .Lcbc_picked_te: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r10d cmp \$$speed_limit,%rdx jb .Lcbc_slow_prologue test \$15,%rdx jnz .Lcbc_slow_prologue bt \$28,%r10d jc .Lcbc_slow_prologue # allocate aligned stack frame... lea -88-248(%rsp),$key and \$-64,$key # ... and make sure it doesn't alias with AES_T[ed] modulo 4096 mov $sbox,%r10 lea 2304($sbox),%r11 mov $key,%r12 and \$0xFFF,%r10 # s = $sbox&0xfff and \$0xFFF,%r11 # e = ($sbox+2048)&0xfff and \$0xFFF,%r12 # p = %rsp&0xfff cmp %r11,%r12 # if (p=>e) %rsp =- (p-e); jb .Lcbc_te_break_out sub %r11,%r12 sub %r12,$key jmp .Lcbc_te_ok .Lcbc_te_break_out: # else %rsp -= (p-s)&0xfff + framesz sub %r10,%r12 and \$0xFFF,%r12 add \$320,%r12 sub %r12,$key .align 4 .Lcbc_te_ok: xchg %rsp,$key #add \$8,%rsp # reserve for return address! mov $key,$_rsp # save %rsp .Lcbc_fast_body: mov %rdi,$_inp # save copy of inp mov %rsi,$_out # save copy of out mov %rdx,$_len # save copy of len mov %rcx,$_key # save copy of key mov %r8,$_ivp # save copy of ivp movl \$0,$mark # copy of aes_key->rounds = 0; mov %r8,%rbp # rearrange input arguments mov %r9,%rbx mov %rsi,$out mov %rdi,$inp mov %rcx,$key mov 240($key),%eax # key->rounds # do we copy key schedule to stack? mov $key,%r10 sub $sbox,%r10 and \$0xfff,%r10 cmp \$2304,%r10 jb .Lcbc_do_ecopy cmp \$4096-248,%r10 jb .Lcbc_skip_ecopy .align 4 .Lcbc_do_ecopy: mov $key,%rsi lea $aes_key,%rdi lea $aes_key,$key mov \$240/8,%ecx .long 0x90A548F3 # rep movsq mov %eax,(%rdi) # copy aes_key->rounds .Lcbc_skip_ecopy: mov $key,$keyp # save key pointer mov \$18,%ecx .align 4 .Lcbc_prefetch_te: mov 0($sbox),%r10 mov 32($sbox),%r11 mov 64($sbox),%r12 mov 96($sbox),%r13 lea 128($sbox),$sbox sub \$1,%ecx jnz .Lcbc_prefetch_te lea -2304($sbox),$sbox cmp \$0,%rbx je .LFAST_DECRYPT #----------------------------- ENCRYPT -----------------------------# mov 0(%rbp),$s0 # load iv mov 4(%rbp),$s1 mov 8(%rbp),$s2 mov 12(%rbp),$s3 .align 4 .Lcbc_fast_enc_loop: xor 0($inp),$s0 xor 4($inp),$s1 xor 8($inp),$s2 xor 12($inp),$s3 mov $keyp,$key # restore key mov $inp,$_inp # if ($verticalspin) save inp call _x86_64_AES_encrypt mov $_inp,$inp # if ($verticalspin) restore inp mov $_len,%r10 mov $s0,0($out) mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) lea 16($inp),$inp lea 16($out),$out sub \$16,%r10 test \$-16,%r10 mov %r10,$_len jnz .Lcbc_fast_enc_loop mov $_ivp,%rbp # restore ivp mov $s0,0(%rbp) # save ivec mov $s1,4(%rbp) mov $s2,8(%rbp) mov $s3,12(%rbp) jmp .Lcbc_fast_cleanup #----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------# .align 16 .LFAST_DECRYPT: cmp $inp,$out je .Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place mov %rbp,$ivec .align 4 .Lcbc_fast_dec_loop: mov 0($inp),$s0 # read input mov 4($inp),$s1 mov 8($inp),$s2 mov 12($inp),$s3 mov $keyp,$key # restore key mov $inp,$_inp # if ($verticalspin) save inp call _x86_64_AES_decrypt mov $ivec,%rbp # load ivp mov $_inp,$inp # if ($verticalspin) restore inp mov $_len,%r10 # load len xor 0(%rbp),$s0 # xor iv xor 4(%rbp),$s1 xor 8(%rbp),$s2 xor 12(%rbp),$s3 mov $inp,%rbp # current input, next iv sub \$16,%r10 mov %r10,$_len # update len mov %rbp,$ivec # update ivp mov $s0,0($out) # write output mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) lea 16($inp),$inp lea 16($out),$out jnz .Lcbc_fast_dec_loop mov $_ivp,%r12 # load user ivp mov 0(%rbp),%r10 # load iv mov 8(%rbp),%r11 mov %r10,0(%r12) # copy back to user mov %r11,8(%r12) jmp .Lcbc_fast_cleanup .align 16 .Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place: mov 0(%rbp),%r10 # copy iv to stack mov 8(%rbp),%r11 mov %r10,0+$ivec mov %r11,8+$ivec .align 4 .Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_loop: mov 0($inp),$s0 # load input mov 4($inp),$s1 mov 8($inp),$s2 mov 12($inp),$s3 mov $keyp,$key # restore key mov $inp,$_inp # if ($verticalspin) save inp call _x86_64_AES_decrypt mov $_inp,$inp # if ($verticalspin) restore inp mov $_len,%r10 xor 0+$ivec,$s0 xor 4+$ivec,$s1 xor 8+$ivec,$s2 xor 12+$ivec,$s3 mov 0($inp),%r11 # load input mov 8($inp),%r12 sub \$16,%r10 jz .Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_done mov %r11,0+$ivec # copy input to iv mov %r12,8+$ivec mov $s0,0($out) # save output [zaps input] mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) lea 16($inp),$inp lea 16($out),$out mov %r10,$_len jmp .Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_loop .Lcbc_fast_dec_in_place_done: mov $_ivp,%rdi mov %r11,0(%rdi) # copy iv back to user mov %r12,8(%rdi) mov $s0,0($out) # save output [zaps input] mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) .align 4 .Lcbc_fast_cleanup: cmpl \$0,$mark # was the key schedule copied? lea $aes_key,%rdi je .Lcbc_exit mov \$240/8,%ecx xor %rax,%rax .long 0x90AB48F3 # rep stosq jmp .Lcbc_exit #--------------------------- SLOW ROUTINE ---------------------------# .align 16 .Lcbc_slow_prologue: # allocate aligned stack frame... lea -88(%rsp),%rbp and \$-64,%rbp # ... just "above" key schedule lea -88-63(%rcx),%r10 sub %rbp,%r10 neg %r10 and \$0x3c0,%r10 sub %r10,%rbp xchg %rsp,%rbp #add \$8,%rsp # reserve for return address! mov %rbp,$_rsp # save %rsp .Lcbc_slow_body: #mov %rdi,$_inp # save copy of inp #mov %rsi,$_out # save copy of out #mov %rdx,$_len # save copy of len #mov %rcx,$_key # save copy of key mov %r8,$_ivp # save copy of ivp mov %r8,%rbp # rearrange input arguments mov %r9,%rbx mov %rsi,$out mov %rdi,$inp mov %rcx,$key mov %rdx,%r10 mov 240($key),%eax mov $key,$keyp # save key pointer shl \$4,%eax lea ($key,%rax),%rax mov %rax,$keyend # pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key scdedule lea 2048($sbox),$sbox lea 768-8(%rsp),%rax sub $sbox,%rax and \$0x300,%rax lea ($sbox,%rax),$sbox cmp \$0,%rbx je .LSLOW_DECRYPT #--------------------------- SLOW ENCRYPT ---------------------------# test \$-16,%r10 # check upon length mov 0(%rbp),$s0 # load iv mov 4(%rbp),$s1 mov 8(%rbp),$s2 mov 12(%rbp),$s3 jz .Lcbc_slow_enc_tail # short input... .align 4 .Lcbc_slow_enc_loop: xor 0($inp),$s0 xor 4($inp),$s1 xor 8($inp),$s2 xor 12($inp),$s3 mov $keyp,$key # restore key mov $inp,$_inp # save inp mov $out,$_out # save out mov %r10,$_len # save len call _x86_64_AES_encrypt_compact mov $_inp,$inp # restore inp mov $_out,$out # restore out mov $_len,%r10 # restore len mov $s0,0($out) mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) lea 16($inp),$inp lea 16($out),$out sub \$16,%r10 test \$-16,%r10 jnz .Lcbc_slow_enc_loop test \$15,%r10 jnz .Lcbc_slow_enc_tail mov $_ivp,%rbp # restore ivp mov $s0,0(%rbp) # save ivec mov $s1,4(%rbp) mov $s2,8(%rbp) mov $s3,12(%rbp) jmp .Lcbc_exit .align 4 .Lcbc_slow_enc_tail: mov %rax,%r11 mov %rcx,%r12 mov %r10,%rcx mov $inp,%rsi mov $out,%rdi .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb mov \$16,%rcx # zero tail sub %r10,%rcx xor %rax,%rax .long 0x9066AAF3 # rep stosb mov $out,$inp # this is not a mistake! mov \$16,%r10 # len=16 mov %r11,%rax mov %r12,%rcx jmp .Lcbc_slow_enc_loop # one more spin... #--------------------------- SLOW DECRYPT ---------------------------# .align 16 .LSLOW_DECRYPT: shr \$3,%rax add %rax,$sbox # recall "magic" constants! mov 0(%rbp),%r11 # copy iv to stack mov 8(%rbp),%r12 mov %r11,0+$ivec mov %r12,8+$ivec .align 4 .Lcbc_slow_dec_loop: mov 0($inp),$s0 # load input mov 4($inp),$s1 mov 8($inp),$s2 mov 12($inp),$s3 mov $keyp,$key # restore key mov $inp,$_inp # save inp mov $out,$_out # save out mov %r10,$_len # save len call _x86_64_AES_decrypt_compact mov $_inp,$inp # restore inp mov $_out,$out # restore out mov $_len,%r10 xor 0+$ivec,$s0 xor 4+$ivec,$s1 xor 8+$ivec,$s2 xor 12+$ivec,$s3 mov 0($inp),%r11 # load input mov 8($inp),%r12 sub \$16,%r10 jc .Lcbc_slow_dec_partial jz .Lcbc_slow_dec_done mov %r11,0+$ivec # copy input to iv mov %r12,8+$ivec mov $s0,0($out) # save output [can zap input] mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) lea 16($inp),$inp lea 16($out),$out jmp .Lcbc_slow_dec_loop .Lcbc_slow_dec_done: mov $_ivp,%rdi mov %r11,0(%rdi) # copy iv back to user mov %r12,8(%rdi) mov $s0,0($out) # save output [can zap input] mov $s1,4($out) mov $s2,8($out) mov $s3,12($out) jmp .Lcbc_exit .align 4 .Lcbc_slow_dec_partial: mov $_ivp,%rdi mov %r11,0(%rdi) # copy iv back to user mov %r12,8(%rdi) mov $s0,0+$ivec # save output to stack mov $s1,4+$ivec mov $s2,8+$ivec mov $s3,12+$ivec mov $out,%rdi lea $ivec,%rsi lea 16(%r10),%rcx .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb jmp .Lcbc_exit .align 16 .Lcbc_exit: mov $_rsp,%rsi mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lcbc_popfq: popfq .Lcbc_epilogue: ret .size AES_cbc_encrypt,.-AES_cbc_encrypt ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .LAES_Te: ___ &_data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6); &_data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591); &_data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56); &_data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec); &_data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa); &_data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb); &_data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45); &_data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b); &_data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c); &_data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83); &_data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9); &_data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a); &_data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d); &_data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f); &_data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df); &_data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea); &_data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34); &_data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b); &_data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d); &_data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413); &_data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1); &_data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6); &_data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972); &_data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85); &_data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed); &_data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511); &_data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe); &_data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b); &_data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05); &_data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1); &_data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142); &_data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf); &_data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3); &_data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e); &_data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a); &_data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6); &_data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3); &_data_word(0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54, 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b); &_data_word(0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428); &_data_word(0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad); &_data_word(0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264, 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14); &_data_word(0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8); &_data_word(0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4); &_data_word(0xa8919139, 0xa4959531, 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2); &_data_word(0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda); &_data_word(0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949); &_data_word(0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac, 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf); &_data_word(0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810); &_data_word(0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c); &_data_word(0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657, 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697); &_data_word(0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e); &_data_word(0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f); &_data_word(0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c, 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc); &_data_word(0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c); &_data_word(0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969); &_data_word(0x91868617, 0x58c1c199, 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27); &_data_word(0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122); &_data_word(0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433); &_data_word(0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c, 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9); &_data_word(0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5); &_data_word(0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a); &_data_word(0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7, 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0); &_data_word(0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e); &_data_word(0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c); #Te4 # four copies of Te4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); #rcon: $code.=<<___; .long 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008 .long 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080 .long 0x0000001b, 0x00000036, 0x80808080, 0x80808080 .long 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b ___ $code.=<<___; .align 64 .LAES_Td: ___ &_data_word(0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a); &_data_word(0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f, 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b); &_data_word(0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5); &_data_word(0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5); &_data_word(0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25, 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d); &_data_word(0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b); &_data_word(0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295); &_data_word(0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458, 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e); &_data_word(0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927); &_data_word(0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d); &_data_word(0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5, 0x60335197, 0x457f5362); &_data_word(0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9); &_data_word(0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52); &_data_word(0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72, 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566); &_data_word(0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3); &_data_word(0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed); &_data_word(0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7, 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e); &_data_word(0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4); &_data_word(0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4); &_data_word(0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040, 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd); &_data_word(0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d); &_data_word(0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060); &_data_word(0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6, 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967); &_data_word(0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879); &_data_word(0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000); &_data_word(0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32, 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c); &_data_word(0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36); &_data_word(0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624); &_data_word(0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793, 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b); &_data_word(0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c); &_data_word(0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12); &_data_word(0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2, 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14); &_data_word(0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3); &_data_word(0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b); &_data_word(0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb, 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8); &_data_word(0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684); &_data_word(0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7); &_data_word(0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc, 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177); &_data_word(0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947); &_data_word(0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322); &_data_word(0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9, 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498); &_data_word(0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f); &_data_word(0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54); &_data_word(0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890, 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382); &_data_word(0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf); &_data_word(0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb); &_data_word(0x097826cd, 0xf418596e, 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83); &_data_word(0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef); &_data_word(0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029); &_data_word(0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a, 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235); &_data_word(0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733); &_data_word(0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117); &_data_word(0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43, 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4); &_data_word(0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546); &_data_word(0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb); &_data_word(0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92, 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d); &_data_word(0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb); &_data_word(0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a); &_data_word(0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255, 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773); &_data_word(0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478); &_data_word(0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2); &_data_word(0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc, 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff); &_data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664); &_data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0); #Td4: # four copies of Td4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); $code.=<<___; .long 0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe .long 0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0 ___ &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); $code.=<<___; .long 0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe .long 0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0 ___ &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); $code.=<<___; .long 0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe .long 0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0 ___ &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); $code.=<<___; .long 0x80808080, 0x80808080, 0xfefefefe, 0xfefefefe .long 0x1b1b1b1b, 0x1b1b1b1b, 0, 0 .asciz "AES for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type block_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 block_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_block_prologue mov 24(%rax),%rax # pull saved real stack pointer lea 48(%rax),%rax # adjust... mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_block_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi jmp .Lcommon_seh_exit .size block_se_handler,.-block_se_handler .type key_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 key_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_key_prologue lea 56(%rax),%rax mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_key_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi jmp .Lcommon_seh_exit .size key_se_handler,.-key_se_handler .type cbc_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 cbc_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lcbc_prologue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_prologue jb .Lin_cbc_prologue lea .Lcbc_fast_body(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_fast_body jb .Lin_cbc_frame_setup lea .Lcbc_slow_prologue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_slow_prologue jb .Lin_cbc_body lea .Lcbc_slow_body(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_slow_body jb .Lin_cbc_frame_setup .Lin_cbc_body: mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp lea .Lcbc_epilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lcbc_epilogue jae .Lin_cbc_prologue lea 8(%rax),%rax lea .Lcbc_popfq(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lcbc_popfq jae .Lin_cbc_prologue mov `16-8`(%rax),%rax # biased $_rsp lea 56(%rax),%rax .Lin_cbc_frame_setup: mov -16(%rax),%rbx mov -24(%rax),%rbp mov -32(%rax),%r12 mov -40(%rax),%r13 mov -48(%rax),%r14 mov -56(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_cbc_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi .Lcommon_seh_exit: mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$`1232/8`,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_AES_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_AES_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_AES_encrypt .rva .LSEH_begin_AES_decrypt .rva .LSEH_end_AES_decrypt .rva .LSEH_info_AES_decrypt .rva .LSEH_begin_AES_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_end_AES_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_info_AES_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_begin_AES_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_end_AES_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_info_AES_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_begin_AES_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_AES_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_AES_cbc_encrypt .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_AES_encrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva block_se_handler .rva .Lenc_prologue,.Lenc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_AES_decrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva block_se_handler .rva .Ldec_prologue,.Ldec_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_AES_set_encrypt_key: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva key_se_handler .rva .Lenc_key_prologue,.Lenc_key_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_AES_set_decrypt_key: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva key_se_handler .rva .Ldec_key_prologue,.Ldec_key_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_AES_cbc_encrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva cbc_se_handler ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl0000644000000000000000000006667613176625656017055 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ###################################################################### ## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation. ## version 0.1 ## ## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009 ## Public domain. ## ## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and ## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/. ###################################################################### # September 2011. # # Port vpaes-x86_64.pl as 32-bit "almost" drop-in replacement for # aes-586.pl. "Almost" refers to the fact that AES_cbc_encrypt # doesn't handle partial vectors (doesn't have to if called from # EVP only). "Drop-in" implies that this module doesn't share key # schedule structure with the original nor does it make assumption # about its alignment... # # Performance summary. aes-586.pl column lists large-block CBC # encrypt/decrypt/with-hyper-threading-off(*) results in cycles per # byte processed with 128-bit key, and vpaes-x86.pl column - [also # large-block CBC] encrypt/decrypt. # # aes-586.pl vpaes-x86.pl # # Core 2(**) 28.1/41.4/18.3 21.9/25.2(***) # Nehalem 27.9/40.4/18.1 10.2/11.9 # Atom 70.7/92.1/60.1 61.1/75.4(***) # Silvermont 45.4/62.9/24.1 49.2/61.1(***) # # (*) "Hyper-threading" in the context refers rather to cache shared # among multiple cores, than to specifically Intel HTT. As vast # majority of contemporary cores share cache, slower code path # is common place. In other words "with-hyper-threading-off" # results are presented mostly for reference purposes. # # (**) "Core 2" refers to initial 65nm design, a.k.a. Conroe. # # (***) Less impressive improvement on Core 2 and Atom is due to slow # pshufb, yet it's respectable +28%/64% improvement on Core 2 # and +15% on Atom (as implied, over "hyper-threading-safe" # code path). # # $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open OUT,">$output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"vpaes-x86.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $PREFIX="vpaes"; my ($round, $base, $magic, $key, $const, $inp, $out)= ("eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx","ebp", "esi","edi"); &static_label("_vpaes_consts"); &static_label("_vpaes_schedule_low_round"); &set_label("_vpaes_consts",64); $k_inv=-0x30; # inv, inva &data_word(0x0D080180,0x0E05060F,0x0A0B0C02,0x04070309); &data_word(0x0F0B0780,0x01040A06,0x02050809,0x030D0E0C); $k_s0F=-0x10; # s0F &data_word(0x0F0F0F0F,0x0F0F0F0F,0x0F0F0F0F,0x0F0F0F0F); $k_ipt=0x00; # input transform (lo, hi) &data_word(0x5A2A7000,0xC2B2E898,0x52227808,0xCABAE090); &data_word(0x317C4D00,0x4C01307D,0xB0FDCC81,0xCD80B1FC); $k_sb1=0x20; # sb1u, sb1t &data_word(0xCB503E00,0xB19BE18F,0x142AF544,0xA5DF7A6E); &data_word(0xFAE22300,0x3618D415,0x0D2ED9EF,0x3BF7CCC1); $k_sb2=0x40; # sb2u, sb2t &data_word(0x0B712400,0xE27A93C6,0xBC982FCD,0x5EB7E955); &data_word(0x0AE12900,0x69EB8840,0xAB82234A,0xC2A163C8); $k_sbo=0x60; # sbou, sbot &data_word(0x6FBDC700,0xD0D26D17,0xC502A878,0x15AABF7A); &data_word(0x5FBB6A00,0xCFE474A5,0x412B35FA,0x8E1E90D1); $k_mc_forward=0x80; # mc_forward &data_word(0x00030201,0x04070605,0x080B0A09,0x0C0F0E0D); &data_word(0x04070605,0x080B0A09,0x0C0F0E0D,0x00030201); &data_word(0x080B0A09,0x0C0F0E0D,0x00030201,0x04070605); &data_word(0x0C0F0E0D,0x00030201,0x04070605,0x080B0A09); $k_mc_backward=0xc0; # mc_backward &data_word(0x02010003,0x06050407,0x0A09080B,0x0E0D0C0F); &data_word(0x0E0D0C0F,0x02010003,0x06050407,0x0A09080B); &data_word(0x0A09080B,0x0E0D0C0F,0x02010003,0x06050407); &data_word(0x06050407,0x0A09080B,0x0E0D0C0F,0x02010003); $k_sr=0x100; # sr &data_word(0x03020100,0x07060504,0x0B0A0908,0x0F0E0D0C); &data_word(0x0F0A0500,0x030E0904,0x07020D08,0x0B06010C); &data_word(0x0B020900,0x0F060D04,0x030A0108,0x070E050C); &data_word(0x070A0D00,0x0B0E0104,0x0F020508,0x0306090C); $k_rcon=0x140; # rcon &data_word(0xAF9DEEB6,0x1F8391B9,0x4D7C7D81,0x702A9808); $k_s63=0x150; # s63: all equal to 0x63 transformed &data_word(0x5B5B5B5B,0x5B5B5B5B,0x5B5B5B5B,0x5B5B5B5B); $k_opt=0x160; # output transform &data_word(0xD6B66000,0xFF9F4929,0xDEBE6808,0xF7974121); &data_word(0x50BCEC00,0x01EDBD51,0xB05C0CE0,0xE10D5DB1); $k_deskew=0x180; # deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew" &data_word(0x47A4E300,0x07E4A340,0x5DBEF91A,0x1DFEB95A); &data_word(0x83EA6900,0x5F36B5DC,0xF49D1E77,0x2841C2AB); ## ## Decryption stuff ## Key schedule constants ## $k_dksd=0x1a0; # decryption key schedule: invskew x*D &data_word(0xA3E44700,0xFEB91A5D,0x5A1DBEF9,0x0740E3A4); &data_word(0xB5368300,0x41C277F4,0xAB289D1E,0x5FDC69EA); $k_dksb=0x1c0; # decryption key schedule: invskew x*B &data_word(0x8550D500,0x9A4FCA1F,0x1CC94C99,0x03D65386); &data_word(0xB6FC4A00,0x115BEDA7,0x7E3482C8,0xD993256F); $k_dkse=0x1e0; # decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63 &data_word(0x1FC9D600,0xD5031CCA,0x994F5086,0x53859A4C); &data_word(0x4FDC7BE8,0xA2319605,0x20B31487,0xCD5EF96A); $k_dks9=0x200; # decryption key schedule: invskew x*9 &data_word(0x7ED9A700,0xB6116FC8,0x82255BFC,0x4AED9334); &data_word(0x27143300,0x45765162,0xE9DAFDCE,0x8BB89FAC); ## ## Decryption stuff ## Round function constants ## $k_dipt=0x220; # decryption input transform &data_word(0x0B545F00,0x0F505B04,0x114E451A,0x154A411E); &data_word(0x60056500,0x86E383E6,0xF491F194,0x12771772); $k_dsb9=0x240; # decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t &data_word(0x9A86D600,0x851C0353,0x4F994CC9,0xCAD51F50); &data_word(0xECD74900,0xC03B1789,0xB2FBA565,0x725E2C9E); $k_dsbd=0x260; # decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t &data_word(0xE6B1A200,0x7D57CCDF,0x882A4439,0xF56E9B13); &data_word(0x24C6CB00,0x3CE2FAF7,0x15DEEFD3,0x2931180D); $k_dsbb=0x280; # decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t &data_word(0x96B44200,0xD0226492,0xB0F2D404,0x602646F6); &data_word(0xCD596700,0xC19498A6,0x3255AA6B,0xF3FF0C3E); $k_dsbe=0x2a0; # decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t &data_word(0x26D4D000,0x46F29296,0x64B4F6B0,0x22426004); &data_word(0xFFAAC100,0x0C55A6CD,0x98593E32,0x9467F36B); $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output &data_word(0x7EF94000,0x1387EA53,0xD4943E2D,0xC7AA6DB9); &data_word(0x93441D00,0x12D7560F,0xD8C58E9C,0xCA4B8159); &asciz ("Vector Permutation AES for x86/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"); &align (64); &function_begin_B("_vpaes_preheat"); &add ($const,&DWP(0,"esp")); &movdqa ("xmm7",&QWP($k_inv,$const)); &movdqa ("xmm6",&QWP($k_s0F,$const)); &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_preheat"); ## ## _aes_encrypt_core ## ## AES-encrypt %xmm0. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm0 = input ## %xmm6-%xmm7 as in _vpaes_preheat ## (%edx) = scheduled keys ## ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm5, %eax, %ebx, %ecx, %edx ## ## &function_begin_B("_vpaes_encrypt_core"); &mov ($magic,16); &mov ($round,&DWP(240,$key)); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6") &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_ipt,$const)); &pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); &pand ("xmm0","xmm6"); &movdqu ("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key)); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm0"); &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP($k_ipt+16,$const)); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm5"); &psrld ("xmm1",4); &add ($key,16); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); &lea ($base,&DWP($k_mc_backward,$const)); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &jmp (&label("enc_entry")); &set_label("enc_loop",16); # middle of middle round &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP($k_sb1,$const)); # 4 : sb1u &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP($k_sb1+16,$const));# 0 : sb1t &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sb1u &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sb1t &pxor ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 = sb1u + k &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_sb2,$const)); # 4 : sb2u &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = A &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(-0x40,$base,$magic));# .Lk_mc_forward[] &pshufb ("xmm5","xmm2"); # 4 = sb2u &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_sb2+16,$const));# 2 : sb2t &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0,$base,$magic)); # .Lk_mc_backward[] &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = sb2t &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0"); # 3 = A &pxor ("xmm2","xmm5"); # 2 = 2A &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = B &add ($key,16); # next key &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); # 0 = 2A+B &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm4"); # 3 = D &add ($magic,16); # next mc &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0"); # 3 = 2A+B+D &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = 2B+C &and ($magic,0x30); # ... mod 4 &sub ($round,1); # nr-- &pxor ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D &set_label("enc_entry"); # top of round &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6"); # 1 : i &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k &pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); # 1 = i<<4 &psrld ("xmm1",4); # 1 = i &pand ("xmm0","xmm6"); # 0 = k &pshufb ("xmm5","xmm0"); # 2 = a/k &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/i &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = j &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = 1/i &movdqa ("xmm4","xmm7"); # 4 : 1/j &pxor ("xmm3","xmm5"); # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = 1/j &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm7"); # 2 : 1/iak &pxor ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = 1/iak &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/jak &pxor ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = io &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm4"); # 3 = 1/jak &movdqu ("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key)); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = jo &jnz (&label("enc_loop")); # middle of last round &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP($k_sbo,$const)); # 3 : sbou .Lk_sbo &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP($k_sbo+16,$const));# 3 : sbot .Lk_sbo+16 &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbou &pxor ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 = sb1u + k &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sb1t &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x40,$base,$magic));# .Lk_sr[] &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = A &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_encrypt_core"); ## ## Decryption core ## ## Same API as encryption core. ## &function_begin_B("_vpaes_decrypt_core"); &lea ($base,&DWP($k_dsbd,$const)); &mov ($round,&DWP(240,$key)); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_dipt-$k_dsbd,$base)); &pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); &mov ($magic,$round); &psrld ("xmm1",4) &movdqu ("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key)); &shl ($magic,4); &pand ("xmm0","xmm6"); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm0"); &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP($k_dipt-$k_dsbd+16,$base)); &xor ($magic,0x30); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); &and ($magic,0x30); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm5"); &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_mc_forward+48,$const)); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &add ($key,16); &lea ($magic,&DWP($k_sr-$k_dsbd,$base,$magic)); &jmp (&label("dec_entry")); &set_label("dec_loop",16); ## ## Inverse mix columns ## &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(-0x20,$base)); # 4 : sb9u &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(-0x10,$base)); # 0 : sb9t &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sb9u &pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sb9t &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0,$base)); # 4 : sbdu &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,$base)); # 0 : sbdt &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbdu &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); # MC ch &pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sbdt &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 4 = ch &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,$base)); # 4 : sbbu &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x30,$base)); # 0 : sbbt &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbbu &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); # MC ch &pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sbbt &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 4 = ch &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x40,$base)); # 4 : sbeu &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,$base)); # 0 : sbet &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbeu &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); # MC ch &pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sbet &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 4 = ch &add ($key,16); # next round key &palignr("xmm5","xmm5",12); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch &sub ($round,1); # nr-- &set_label("dec_entry"); # top of round &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6"); # 1 : i &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k &pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); # 1 = i<<4 &pand ("xmm0","xmm6"); # 0 = k &psrld ("xmm1",4); # 1 = i &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = a/k &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/i &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = j &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = 1/i &movdqa ("xmm4","xmm7"); # 4 : 1/j &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = 1/j &pxor ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm7"); # 2 : 1/iak &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = 1/iak &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/jak &pxor ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = io &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm4"); # 3 = 1/jak &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = jo &jnz (&label("dec_loop")); # middle of last round &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x60,$base)); # 3 : sbou &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbou &pxor ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = sb1u + k &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x70,$base)); # 0 : sbot &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0,$magic)); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sb1t &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = A &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm2"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_decrypt_core"); ######################################################## ## ## ## AES key schedule ## ## ## ######################################################## &function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_core"); &add ($const,&DWP(0,"esp")); &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp)); # load key (unaligned) &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_rcon,$const)); # load rcon # input transform &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0"); &lea ($base,&DWP($k_ipt,$const)); &movdqa (&QWP(4,"esp"),"xmm2"); # xmm8 &call ("_vpaes_schedule_transform"); &movdqa ("xmm7","xmm0"); &test ($out,$out); &jnz (&label("schedule_am_decrypting")); # encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &jmp (&label("schedule_go")); &set_label("schedule_am_decrypting"); # decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP($k_sr,$const,$magic)); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm3"); &xor ($magic,0x30); &set_label("schedule_go"); &cmp ($round,192); &ja (&label("schedule_256")); &je (&label("schedule_192")); # 128: fall though ## ## .schedule_128 ## ## 128-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## This schedule is really simple, because all its parts ## are accomplished by the subroutines. ## &set_label("schedule_128"); &mov ($round,10); &set_label("loop_schedule_128"); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_round"); &dec ($round); &jz (&label("schedule_mangle_last")); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); # write output &jmp (&label("loop_schedule_128")); ## ## .aes_schedule_192 ## ## 192-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit ## schedule, but with more smearing. The long, high side is ## stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in ## the high bits of %xmm6. ## ## This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each ## round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys. ## Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round ## keys. ## &set_label("schedule_192",16); &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(8,$inp)); # load key part 2 (very unaligned) &call ("_vpaes_schedule_transform"); # input transform &movdqa ("xmm6","xmm0"); # save short part &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); # clear 4 &movhlps("xmm6","xmm4"); # clobber low side with zeros &mov ($round,4); &set_label("loop_schedule_192"); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_round"); &palignr("xmm0","xmm6",8); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); # save key n &call ("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear"); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); # save key n+1 &call ("_vpaes_schedule_round"); &dec ($round); &jz (&label("schedule_mangle_last")); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); # save key n+2 &call ("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear"); &jmp (&label("loop_schedule_192")); ## ## .aes_schedule_256 ## ## 256-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit ## schedule, but with an additional "low side" in ## %xmm6. The low side's rounds are the same as the ## high side's, except no rcon and no rotation. ## &set_label("schedule_256",16); &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(16,$inp)); # load key part 2 (unaligned) &call ("_vpaes_schedule_transform"); # input transform &mov ($round,7); &set_label("loop_schedule_256"); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); # output low result &movdqa ("xmm6","xmm0"); # save cur_lo in xmm6 # high round &call ("_vpaes_schedule_round"); &dec ($round); &jz (&label("schedule_mangle_last")); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); # low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6 &pshufd ("xmm0","xmm0",0xFF); &movdqa (&QWP(20,"esp"),"xmm7"); &movdqa ("xmm7","xmm6"); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_low_round"); &movdqa ("xmm7",&QWP(20,"esp")); &jmp (&label("loop_schedule_256")); ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle_last ## ## Mangler for last round of key schedule ## Mangles %xmm0 ## when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63 ## when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0) ## ## Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits ## &set_label("schedule_mangle_last",16); # schedule last round key from xmm0 &lea ($base,&DWP($k_deskew,$const)); &test ($out,$out); &jnz (&label("schedule_mangle_last_dec")); # encrypting &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP($k_sr,$const,$magic)); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); # output permute &lea ($base,&DWP($k_opt,$const)); # prepare to output transform &add ($key,32); &set_label("schedule_mangle_last_dec"); &add ($key,-16); &pxor ("xmm0",&QWP($k_s63,$const)); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_transform"); # output transform &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); # save last key # cleanup &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_core"); ## ## .aes_schedule_192_smear ## ## Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm7: high side, b a x y ## %xmm6: low side, d c 0 0 ## %xmm13: 0 ## ## Outputs: ## %xmm6: b+c+d b+c 0 0 ## %xmm0: b+c+d b+c b a ## &function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear"); &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm6",0x80); # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0 &pshufd ("xmm0","xmm7",0xFE); # b a _ _ -> b b b a &pxor ("xmm6","xmm1"); # -> c+d c 0 0 &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm0"); # -> b+c+d b+c b a &movdqa ("xmm0","xmm6"); &movhlps("xmm6","xmm1"); # clobber low side with zeros &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear"); ## ## .aes_schedule_round ## ## Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7 ## ## Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0 ## then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of ## %xmm7. ## ## Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for ## next rcon. ## ## Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the ## second low, result into third, result into highest. ## ## Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0. ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm5. ## &function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_round"); # extract rcon from xmm8 &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(8,"esp")); # xmm8 &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &palignr("xmm1","xmm2",15); &palignr("xmm2","xmm2",15); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm1"); # rotate &pshufd ("xmm0","xmm0",0xFF); &palignr("xmm0","xmm0",1); # fall through... &movdqa (&QWP(8,"esp"),"xmm2"); # xmm8 # low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon. &set_label("_vpaes_schedule_low_round"); # smear xmm7 &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm7"); &pslldq ("xmm7",4); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm1"); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm7"); &pslldq ("xmm7",8); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm7",&QWP($k_s63,$const)); # subbyte &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP($k_s0F,$const)); &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_inv,$const)); # 4 : 1/j &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm4"); &pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); &psrld ("xmm1",4); # 1 = i &pand ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = k &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = a/k &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = j &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm5"); # 3 : 1/i &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = 1/i &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k &movdqa ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 : 1/j &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = 1/j &pxor ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm5"); # 2 : 1/iak &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = 1/iak &pxor ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = io &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm5"); # 3 : 1/jak &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm4"); # 3 = 1/jak &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = jo &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP($k_sb1,$const)); # 4 : sbou &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbou &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP($k_sb1+16,$const));# 0 : sbot &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sb1t &pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = sbox output # add in smeared stuff &pxor ("xmm0","xmm7"); &movdqa ("xmm7","xmm0"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_round"); ## ## .aes_schedule_transform ## ## Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%ebx) ## ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm1, %xmm2 ## &function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_transform"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_s0F,$const)); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2"); &pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); &psrld ("xmm1",4); &pand ("xmm0","xmm2"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0,$base)); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm0"); &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(16,$base)); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_transform"); ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle ## ## Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version ## to our version. ## ## On encrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1 ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## On decrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9 ## deskew ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## ## Writes out to (%edx), and increments or decrements it ## Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %ecx ## Preserves xmm0 ## Clobbers xmm1-xmm5 ## &function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); &movdqa ("xmm4","xmm0"); # save xmm0 for later &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_mc_forward,$const)); &test ($out,$out); &jnz (&label("schedule_mangle_dec")); # encrypting &add ($key,16); &pxor ("xmm4",&QWP($k_s63,$const)); &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm5"); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm4"); &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm5"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm4"); &pshufb ("xmm4","xmm5"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm4"); &jmp (&label("schedule_mangle_both")); &set_label("schedule_mangle_dec",16); # inverse mix columns &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_s0F,$const)); &lea ($inp,&DWP($k_dksd,$const)); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2"); &pandn ("xmm1","xmm4"); &psrld ("xmm1",4); # 1 = hi &pand ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = lo &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm4"); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm5"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm5"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x50,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm5"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x70,$inp)); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &add ($key,-16); &set_label("schedule_mangle_both"); &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP($k_sr,$const,$magic)); &pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); &add ($magic,-16); &and ($magic,0x30); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm3"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_mangle"); # # Interface to OpenSSL # &function_begin("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # inp &lea ($base,&DWP(-56,"esp")); &mov ($round,&wparam(1)); # bits &and ($base,-16); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # key &xchg ($base,"esp"); # alloca &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$base); &mov ($base,$round); &shr ($base,5); &add ($base,5); &mov (&DWP(240,$key),$base); # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; &mov ($magic,0x30); &mov ($out,0); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point"))); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_core"); &set_label("pic_point"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp")); &xor ("eax","eax"); &function_end("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key"); &function_begin("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # inp &lea ($base,&DWP(-56,"esp")); &mov ($round,&wparam(1)); # bits &and ($base,-16); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # key &xchg ($base,"esp"); # alloca &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$base); &mov ($base,$round); &shr ($base,5); &add ($base,5); &mov (&DWP(240,$key),$base); # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; &shl ($base,4); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key,$base)); &mov ($out,1); &mov ($magic,$round); &shr ($magic,1); &and ($magic,32); &xor ($magic,32); # nbist==192?0:32; &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point"))); &call ("_vpaes_schedule_core"); &set_label("pic_point"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp")); &xor ("eax","eax"); &function_end("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key"); &function_begin("${PREFIX}_encrypt"); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point"))); &call ("_vpaes_preheat"); &set_label("pic_point"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # inp &lea ($base,&DWP(-56,"esp")); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); # out &and ($base,-16); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # key &xchg ($base,"esp"); # alloca &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$base); &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp)); &call ("_vpaes_encrypt_core"); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$out),"xmm0"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp")); &function_end("${PREFIX}_encrypt"); &function_begin("${PREFIX}_decrypt"); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point"))); &call ("_vpaes_preheat"); &set_label("pic_point"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # inp &lea ($base,&DWP(-56,"esp")); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); # out &and ($base,-16); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # key &xchg ($base,"esp"); # alloca &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$base); &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp)); &call ("_vpaes_decrypt_core"); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$out),"xmm0"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp")); &function_end("${PREFIX}_decrypt"); &function_begin("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # inp &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); # out &mov ($round,&wparam(2)); # len &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key &sub ($round,16); &jc (&label("cbc_abort")); &lea ($base,&DWP(-56,"esp")); &mov ($const,&wparam(4)); # ivp &and ($base,-16); &mov ($magic,&wparam(5)); # enc &xchg ($base,"esp"); # alloca &movdqu ("xmm1",&QWP(0,$const)); # load IV &sub ($out,$inp); &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$base); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$out); # save out &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$key) # save key &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$const); # save ivp &mov ($out,$round); # $out works as $len &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("_vpaes_consts")."+0x30-".&label("pic_point"))); &call ("_vpaes_preheat"); &set_label("pic_point"); &cmp ($magic,0); &je (&label("cbc_dec_loop")); &jmp (&label("cbc_enc_loop")); &set_label("cbc_enc_loop",16); &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # inp^=iv &call ("_vpaes_encrypt_core"); &mov ($base,&DWP(0,"esp")); # restore out &mov ($key,&DWP(4,"esp")); # restore key &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm0"); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$base,$inp),"xmm0"); # write output &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); &sub ($out,16); &jnc (&label("cbc_enc_loop")); &jmp (&label("cbc_done")); &set_label("cbc_dec_loop",16); &movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &movdqa (&QWP(16,"esp"),"xmm1"); # save IV &movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm0"); # save future IV &call ("_vpaes_decrypt_core"); &mov ($base,&DWP(0,"esp")); # restore out &mov ($key,&DWP(4,"esp")); # restore key &pxor ("xmm0",&QWP(16,"esp")); # out^=iv &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(32,"esp")); # load next IV &movdqu (&QWP(0,$base,$inp),"xmm0"); # write output &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); &sub ($out,16); &jnc (&label("cbc_dec_loop")); &set_label("cbc_done"); &mov ($base,&DWP(8,"esp")); # restore ivp &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp")); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$base),"xmm1"); # write IV &set_label("cbc_abort"); &function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl0000755000000000000000000005315413176625656017275 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements support for ARMv8 AES instructions. The # module is endian-agnostic in sense that it supports both big- and # little-endian cases. As does it support both 32- and 64-bit modes # of operation. Latter is achieved by limiting amount of utilized # registers to 16, which implies additional NEON load and integer # instructions. This has no effect on mighty Apple A7, where results # are literally equal to the theoretical estimates based on AES # instruction latencies and issue rates. On Cortex-A53, an in-order # execution core, this costs up to 10-15%, which is partially # compensated by implementing dedicated code path for 128-bit # CBC encrypt case. On Cortex-A57 parallelizable mode performance # seems to be limited by sheer amount of NEON instructions... # # Performance in cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key: # # CBC enc CBC dec CTR # Apple A7 2.39 1.20 1.20 # Cortex-A53 1.32 1.29 1.46 # Cortex-A57(*) 1.95 0.85 0.93 # Denver 1.96 0.86 0.80 # Mongoose 1.33 1.20 1.20 # # (*) original 3.64/1.34/1.32 results were for r0p0 revision # and are still same even for updated module; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; $prefix="aes_v8"; $code=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .text ___ $code.=".arch armv8-a+crypto\n" if ($flavour =~ /64/); $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); .arch armv7-a // don't confuse not-so-latest binutils with argv8 :-) .fpu neon .code 32 #undef __thumb2__ ___ # Assembler mnemonics are an eclectic mix of 32- and 64-bit syntax, # NEON is mostly 32-bit mnemonics, integer - mostly 64. Goal is to # maintain both 32- and 64-bit codes within single module and # transliterate common code to either flavour with regex vodoo. # {{{ my ($inp,$bits,$out,$ptr,$rounds)=("x0","w1","x2","x3","w12"); my ($zero,$rcon,$mask,$in0,$in1,$tmp,$key)= $flavour=~/64/? map("q$_",(0..6)) : map("q$_",(0..3,8..10)); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .Lrcon: .long 0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01 .long 0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d // rotate-n-splat .long 0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b .globl ${prefix}_set_encrypt_key .type ${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,%function .align 5 ${prefix}_set_encrypt_key: .Lenc_key: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ___ $code.=<<___; mov $ptr,#-1 cmp $inp,#0 b.eq .Lenc_key_abort cmp $out,#0 b.eq .Lenc_key_abort mov $ptr,#-2 cmp $bits,#128 b.lt .Lenc_key_abort cmp $bits,#256 b.gt .Lenc_key_abort tst $bits,#0x3f b.ne .Lenc_key_abort adr $ptr,.Lrcon cmp $bits,#192 veor $zero,$zero,$zero vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16 mov $bits,#8 // reuse $bits vld1.32 {$rcon,$mask},[$ptr],#32 b.lt .Loop128 b.eq .L192 b .L256 .align 4 .Loop128: vtbl.8 $key,{$in0},$mask vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12 vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16 aese $key,$zero subs $bits,$bits,#1 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $key,$key,$rcon veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1 veor $in0,$in0,$key b.ne .Loop128 vld1.32 {$rcon},[$ptr] vtbl.8 $key,{$in0},$mask vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12 vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16 aese $key,$zero veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $key,$key,$rcon veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1 veor $in0,$in0,$key vtbl.8 $key,{$in0},$mask vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12 vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16 aese $key,$zero veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $key,$key,$rcon veor $in0,$in0,$tmp veor $in0,$in0,$key vst1.32 {$in0},[$out] add $out,$out,#0x50 mov $rounds,#10 b .Ldone .align 4 .L192: vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#8 vmov.i8 $key,#8 // borrow $key vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16 vsub.i8 $mask,$mask,$key // adjust the mask .Loop192: vtbl.8 $key,{$in1},$mask vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12 vst1.32 {$in1},[$out],#8 aese $key,$zero subs $bits,$bits,#1 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vdup.32 $tmp,${in0}[3] veor $tmp,$tmp,$in1 veor $key,$key,$rcon vext.8 $in1,$zero,$in1,#12 vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1 veor $in1,$in1,$tmp veor $in0,$in0,$key veor $in1,$in1,$key vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16 b.ne .Loop192 mov $rounds,#12 add $out,$out,#0x20 b .Ldone .align 4 .L256: vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp] mov $bits,#7 mov $rounds,#14 vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16 .Loop256: vtbl.8 $key,{$in1},$mask vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12 vst1.32 {$in1},[$out],#16 aese $key,$zero subs $bits,$bits,#1 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $key,$key,$rcon veor $in0,$in0,$tmp vshl.u8 $rcon,$rcon,#1 veor $in0,$in0,$key vst1.32 {$in0},[$out],#16 b.eq .Ldone vdup.32 $key,${in0}[3] // just splat vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in1,#12 aese $key,$zero veor $in1,$in1,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in1,$in1,$tmp vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$tmp,#12 veor $in1,$in1,$tmp veor $in1,$in1,$key b .Loop256 .Ldone: str $rounds,[$out] mov $ptr,#0 .Lenc_key_abort: mov x0,$ptr // return value `"ldr x29,[sp],#16" if ($flavour =~ /64/)` ret .size ${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,.-${prefix}_set_encrypt_key .globl ${prefix}_set_decrypt_key .type ${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,%function .align 5 ${prefix}_set_decrypt_key: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); stmdb sp!,{r4,lr} ___ $code.=<<___; bl .Lenc_key cmp x0,#0 b.ne .Ldec_key_abort sub $out,$out,#240 // restore original $out mov x4,#-16 add $inp,$out,x12,lsl#4 // end of key schedule vld1.32 {v0.16b},[$out] vld1.32 {v1.16b},[$inp] vst1.32 {v0.16b},[$inp],x4 vst1.32 {v1.16b},[$out],#16 .Loop_imc: vld1.32 {v0.16b},[$out] vld1.32 {v1.16b},[$inp] aesimc v0.16b,v0.16b aesimc v1.16b,v1.16b vst1.32 {v0.16b},[$inp],x4 vst1.32 {v1.16b},[$out],#16 cmp $inp,$out b.hi .Loop_imc vld1.32 {v0.16b},[$out] aesimc v0.16b,v0.16b vst1.32 {v0.16b},[$inp] eor x0,x0,x0 // return value .Ldec_key_abort: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); ldmia sp!,{r4,pc} ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret ___ $code.=<<___; .size ${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,.-${prefix}_set_decrypt_key ___ }}} {{{ sub gen_block () { my $dir = shift; my ($e,$mc) = $dir eq "en" ? ("e","mc") : ("d","imc"); my ($inp,$out,$key)=map("x$_",(0..2)); my $rounds="w3"; my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout)=map("q$_",(0..3)); $code.=<<___; .globl ${prefix}_${dir}crypt .type ${prefix}_${dir}crypt,%function .align 5 ${prefix}_${dir}crypt: ldr $rounds,[$key,#240] vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16 vld1.8 {$inout},[$inp] sub $rounds,$rounds,#2 vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16 .Loop_${dir}c: aes$e $inout,$rndkey0 aes$mc $inout,$inout vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16 subs $rounds,$rounds,#2 aes$e $inout,$rndkey1 aes$mc $inout,$inout vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16 b.gt .Loop_${dir}c aes$e $inout,$rndkey0 aes$mc $inout,$inout vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key] aes$e $inout,$rndkey1 veor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 vst1.8 {$inout},[$out] ret .size ${prefix}_${dir}crypt,.-${prefix}_${dir}crypt ___ } &gen_block("en"); &gen_block("de"); }}} {{{ my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..4)); my $enc="w5"; my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step,$step1)=($enc,"w6","x7","x8","x12"); my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7)); my ($dat,$tmp,$rndzero_n_last)=($dat0,$tmp0,$tmp1); my ($key4,$key5,$key6,$key7)=("x6","x12","x14",$key); ### q8-q15 preloaded key schedule $code.=<<___; .globl ${prefix}_cbc_encrypt .type ${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,%function .align 5 ${prefix}_cbc_encrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); mov ip,sp stmdb sp!,{r4-r8,lr} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so ldmia ip,{r4-r5} @ load remaining args ___ $code.=<<___; subs $len,$len,#16 mov $step,#16 b.lo .Lcbc_abort cclr $step,eq cmp $enc,#0 // en- or decrypting? ldr $rounds,[$key,#240] and $len,$len,#-16 vld1.8 {$ivec},[$ivp] vld1.8 {$dat},[$inp],$step vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key] // load key schedule... sub $rounds,$rounds,#6 add $key_,$key,x5,lsl#4 // pointer to last 7 round keys sub $rounds,$rounds,#2 vld1.32 {q10-q11},[$key_],#32 vld1.32 {q12-q13},[$key_],#32 vld1.32 {q14-q15},[$key_],#32 vld1.32 {$rndlast},[$key_] add $key_,$key,#32 mov $cnt,$rounds b.eq .Lcbc_dec cmp $rounds,#2 veor $dat,$dat,$ivec veor $rndzero_n_last,q8,$rndlast b.eq .Lcbc_enc128 vld1.32 {$in0-$in1},[$key_] add $key_,$key,#16 add $key4,$key,#16*4 add $key5,$key,#16*5 aese $dat,q8 aesmc $dat,$dat add $key6,$key,#16*6 add $key7,$key,#16*7 b .Lenter_cbc_enc .align 4 .Loop_cbc_enc: aese $dat,q8 aesmc $dat,$dat vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16 .Lenter_cbc_enc: aese $dat,q9 aesmc $dat,$dat aese $dat,$in0 aesmc $dat,$dat vld1.32 {q8},[$key4] cmp $rounds,#4 aese $dat,$in1 aesmc $dat,$dat vld1.32 {q9},[$key5] b.eq .Lcbc_enc192 aese $dat,q8 aesmc $dat,$dat vld1.32 {q8},[$key6] aese $dat,q9 aesmc $dat,$dat vld1.32 {q9},[$key7] nop .Lcbc_enc192: aese $dat,q8 aesmc $dat,$dat subs $len,$len,#16 aese $dat,q9 aesmc $dat,$dat cclr $step,eq aese $dat,q10 aesmc $dat,$dat aese $dat,q11 aesmc $dat,$dat vld1.8 {q8},[$inp],$step aese $dat,q12 aesmc $dat,$dat veor q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last aese $dat,q13 aesmc $dat,$dat vld1.32 {q9},[$key_] // re-pre-load rndkey[1] aese $dat,q14 aesmc $dat,$dat aese $dat,q15 veor $ivec,$dat,$rndlast b.hs .Loop_cbc_enc vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16 b .Lcbc_done .align 5 .Lcbc_enc128: vld1.32 {$in0-$in1},[$key_] aese $dat,q8 aesmc $dat,$dat b .Lenter_cbc_enc128 .Loop_cbc_enc128: aese $dat,q8 aesmc $dat,$dat vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16 .Lenter_cbc_enc128: aese $dat,q9 aesmc $dat,$dat subs $len,$len,#16 aese $dat,$in0 aesmc $dat,$dat cclr $step,eq aese $dat,$in1 aesmc $dat,$dat aese $dat,q10 aesmc $dat,$dat aese $dat,q11 aesmc $dat,$dat vld1.8 {q8},[$inp],$step aese $dat,q12 aesmc $dat,$dat aese $dat,q13 aesmc $dat,$dat aese $dat,q14 aesmc $dat,$dat veor q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last aese $dat,q15 veor $ivec,$dat,$rndlast b.hs .Loop_cbc_enc128 vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16 b .Lcbc_done ___ { my ($dat2,$in2,$tmp2)=map("q$_",(10,11,9)); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .Lcbc_dec: vld1.8 {$dat2},[$inp],#16 subs $len,$len,#32 // bias add $cnt,$rounds,#2 vorr $in1,$dat,$dat vorr $dat1,$dat,$dat vorr $in2,$dat2,$dat2 b.lo .Lcbc_dec_tail vorr $dat1,$dat2,$dat2 vld1.8 {$dat2},[$inp],#16 vorr $in0,$dat,$dat vorr $in1,$dat1,$dat1 vorr $in2,$dat2,$dat2 .Loop3x_cbc_dec: aesd $dat0,q8 aesimc $dat0,$dat0 aesd $dat1,q8 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q8 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 subs $cnt,$cnt,#2 aesd $dat0,q9 aesimc $dat0,$dat0 aesd $dat1,q9 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q9 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 b.gt .Loop3x_cbc_dec aesd $dat0,q8 aesimc $dat0,$dat0 aesd $dat1,q8 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q8 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 veor $tmp0,$ivec,$rndlast subs $len,$len,#0x30 veor $tmp1,$in0,$rndlast mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point aesd $dat0,q9 aesimc $dat0,$dat0 aesd $dat1,q9 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q9 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that // at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2 // are loaded with last "words" vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2 mov $key_,$key aesd $dat0,q12 aesimc $dat0,$dat0 aesd $dat1,q12 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q12 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16 aesd $dat0,q13 aesimc $dat0,$dat0 aesd $dat1,q13 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q13 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16 aesd $dat0,q14 aesimc $dat0,$dat0 aesd $dat1,q14 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q14 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16 aesd $dat0,q15 aesd $dat1,q15 aesd $dat2,q15 vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0] add $cnt,$rounds,#2 veor $tmp0,$tmp0,$dat0 veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1 veor $dat2,$dat2,$tmp2 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1] vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16 vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0 vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16 vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1 vst1.8 {$dat2},[$out],#16 vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2 b.hs .Loop3x_cbc_dec cmn $len,#0x30 b.eq .Lcbc_done nop .Lcbc_dec_tail: aesd $dat1,q8 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q8 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 subs $cnt,$cnt,#2 aesd $dat1,q9 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q9 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 b.gt .Lcbc_dec_tail aesd $dat1,q8 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q8 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 aesd $dat1,q9 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q9 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 aesd $dat1,q12 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q12 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 cmn $len,#0x20 aesd $dat1,q13 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q13 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 veor $tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast aesd $dat1,q14 aesimc $dat1,$dat1 aesd $dat2,q14 aesimc $dat2,$dat2 veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast aesd $dat1,q15 aesd $dat2,q15 b.eq .Lcbc_dec_one veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1 veor $tmp2,$tmp2,$dat2 vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2 vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16 vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16 b .Lcbc_done .Lcbc_dec_one: veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat2 vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2 vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16 .Lcbc_done: vst1.8 {$ivec},[$ivp] .Lcbc_abort: ___ } $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r8,pc} ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret ___ $code.=<<___; .size ${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,.-${prefix}_cbc_encrypt ___ }}} {{{ my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..4)); my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_)=("w5","w6","x7"); my ($ctr,$tctr0,$tctr1,$tctr2)=map("w$_",(8..10,12)); my $step="x12"; # aliases with $tctr2 my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7)); my ($dat2,$in2,$tmp2)=map("q$_",(10,11,9)); my ($dat,$tmp)=($dat0,$tmp0); ### q8-q15 preloaded key schedule $code.=<<___; .globl ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .type ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function .align 5 ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); mov ip,sp stmdb sp!,{r4-r10,lr} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so ldr r4, [ip] @ load remaining arg ___ $code.=<<___; ldr $rounds,[$key,#240] ldr $ctr, [$ivp, #12] vld1.32 {$dat0},[$ivp] vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key] // load key schedule... sub $rounds,$rounds,#4 mov $step,#16 cmp $len,#2 add $key_,$key,x5,lsl#4 // pointer to last 5 round keys sub $rounds,$rounds,#2 vld1.32 {q12-q13},[$key_],#32 vld1.32 {q14-q15},[$key_],#32 vld1.32 {$rndlast},[$key_] add $key_,$key,#32 mov $cnt,$rounds cclr $step,lo #ifndef __ARMEB__ rev $ctr, $ctr #endif vorr $dat1,$dat0,$dat0 add $tctr1, $ctr, #1 vorr $dat2,$dat0,$dat0 add $ctr, $ctr, #2 vorr $ivec,$dat0,$dat0 rev $tctr1, $tctr1 vmov.32 ${dat1}[3],$tctr1 b.ls .Lctr32_tail rev $tctr2, $ctr sub $len,$len,#3 // bias vmov.32 ${dat2}[3],$tctr2 b .Loop3x_ctr32 .align 4 .Loop3x_ctr32: aese $dat0,q8 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q8 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 aese $dat2,q8 aesmc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 subs $cnt,$cnt,#2 aese $dat0,q9 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q9 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 aese $dat2,q9 aesmc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 b.gt .Loop3x_ctr32 aese $dat0,q8 aesmc $tmp0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q8 aesmc $tmp1,$dat1 vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16 vorr $dat0,$ivec,$ivec aese $dat2,q8 aesmc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16 vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec aese $tmp0,q9 aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0 aese $tmp1,q9 aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1 vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16 mov $key_,$key aese $dat2,q9 aesmc $tmp2,$dat2 vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec add $tctr0,$ctr,#1 aese $tmp0,q12 aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0 aese $tmp1,q12 aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1 veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast add $tctr1,$ctr,#2 aese $tmp2,q12 aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2 veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast add $ctr,$ctr,#3 aese $tmp0,q13 aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0 aese $tmp1,q13 aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1 veor $in2,$in2,$rndlast rev $tctr0,$tctr0 aese $tmp2,q13 aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2 vmov.32 ${dat0}[3], $tctr0 rev $tctr1,$tctr1 aese $tmp0,q14 aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0 aese $tmp1,q14 aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1 vmov.32 ${dat1}[3], $tctr1 rev $tctr2,$ctr aese $tmp2,q14 aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2 vmov.32 ${dat2}[3], $tctr2 subs $len,$len,#3 aese $tmp0,q15 aese $tmp1,q15 aese $tmp2,q15 veor $in0,$in0,$tmp0 vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0] vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16 veor $in1,$in1,$tmp1 mov $cnt,$rounds vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16 veor $in2,$in2,$tmp2 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1] vst1.8 {$in2},[$out],#16 b.hs .Loop3x_ctr32 adds $len,$len,#3 b.eq .Lctr32_done cmp $len,#1 mov $step,#16 cclr $step,eq .Lctr32_tail: aese $dat0,q8 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q8 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 subs $cnt,$cnt,#2 aese $dat0,q9 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q9 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 b.gt .Lctr32_tail aese $dat0,q8 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q8 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 aese $dat0,q9 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q9 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],$step aese $dat0,q12 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q12 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp] aese $dat0,q13 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q13 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast aese $dat0,q14 aesmc $dat0,$dat0 aese $dat1,q14 aesmc $dat1,$dat1 veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast aese $dat0,q15 aese $dat1,q15 cmp $len,#1 veor $in0,$in0,$dat0 veor $in1,$in1,$dat1 vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16 b.eq .Lctr32_done vst1.8 {$in1},[$out] .Lctr32_done: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,pc} ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret ___ $code.=<<___; .size ${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks ___ }}} $code.=<<___; #endif ___ ######################################## if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code my %opcode = ( "aesd" => 0x4e285800, "aese" => 0x4e284800, "aesimc"=> 0x4e287800, "aesmc" => 0x4e286800 ); local *unaes = sub { my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_; $arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)/o && sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s", $opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5), $mnemonic,$arg; }; foreach(split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo; s/\bq([0-9]+)\b/"v".($1<8?$1:$1+8).".16b"/geo; # old->new registers s/@\s/\/\//o; # old->new style commentary #s/[v]?(aes\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unaes($1,$2)/geo or s/cclr\s+([wx])([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/csel $1$2,$1zr,$1$2,$3/o or s/mov\.([a-z]+)\s+([wx][0-9]+),\s*([wx][0-9]+)/csel $2,$3,$2,$1/o or s/vmov\.i8/movi/o or # fix up legacy mnemonics s/vext\.8/ext/o or s/vrev32\.8/rev32/o or s/vtst\.8/cmtst/o or s/vshr/ushr/o or s/^(\s+)v/$1/o or # strip off v prefix s/\bbx\s+lr\b/ret/o; # fix up remainig legacy suffixes s/\.[ui]?8//o; m/\],#8/o and s/\.16b/\.8b/go; s/\.[ui]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go; s/\.[ui]?64//o and s/\.16b/\.2d/go; s/\.[42]([sd])\[([0-3])\]/\.$1\[$2\]/o; print $_,"\n"; } } else { ######## 32-bit code my %opcode = ( "aesd" => 0xf3b00340, "aese" => 0xf3b00300, "aesimc"=> 0xf3b003c0, "aesmc" => 0xf3b00380 ); local *unaes = sub { my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_; if ($arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)/o) { my $word = $opcode{$mnemonic}|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19) |(($2&7)<<1) |(($2&8)<<2); # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian. # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older # assemblers don't implement it:-( sprintf ".byte\t0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x\t@ %s %s", $word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff, ($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff, $mnemonic,$arg; } }; sub unvtbl { my $arg=shift; $arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*\{q([0-9]+)\},\s*q([0-9]+)/o && sprintf "vtbl.8 d%d,{q%d},d%d\n\t". "vtbl.8 d%d,{q%d},d%d", 2*$1,$2,2*$3, 2*$1+1,$2,2*$3+1; } sub unvdup32 { my $arg=shift; $arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\]/o && sprintf "vdup.32 q%d,d%d[%d]",$1,2*$2+($3>>1),$3&1; } sub unvmov32 { my $arg=shift; $arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\],(.*)/o && sprintf "vmov.32 d%d[%d],%s",2*$1+($2>>1),$2&1,$3; } foreach(split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo; s/\b[wx]([0-9]+)\b/r$1/go; # new->old registers s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go; # new->old registers s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary # fix up remainig new-style suffixes s/\{q([0-9]+)\},\s*\[(.+)\],#8/sprintf "{d%d},[$2]!",2*$1/eo or s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o; s/[v]?(aes\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unaes($1,$2)/geo or s/cclr\s+([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/mov$2 $1,#0/o or s/vtbl\.8\s+(.*)/unvtbl($1)/geo or s/vdup\.32\s+(.*)/unvdup32($1)/geo or s/vmov\.32\s+(.*)/unvmov32($1)/geo or s/^(\s+)b\./$1b/o or s/^(\s+)mov\./$1mov/o or s/^(\s+)ret/$1bx\tlr/o; print $_,"\n"; } } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ia64.S0000644000000000000000000012122613176625656016373 0ustar rootroot// Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. // // Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use // this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy // in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at // https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html // // ==================================================================== // Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL // project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary // forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license. // ==================================================================== // // What's wrong with compiler generated code? Compiler never uses // variable 'shr' which is pairable with 'extr'/'dep' instructions. // Then it uses 'zxt' which is an I-type, but can be replaced with // 'and' which in turn can be assigned to M-port [there're double as // much M-ports as there're I-ports on Itanium 2]. By sacrificing few // registers for small constants (255, 24 and 16) to be used with // 'shr' and 'and' instructions I can achieve better ILP, Instruction // Level Parallelism, and performance. This code outperforms GCC 3.3 // generated code by over factor of 2 (two), GCC 3.4 - by 70% and // HP C - by 40%. Measured best-case scenario, i.e. aligned // big-endian input, ECB timing on Itanium 2 is (18 + 13*rounds) // ticks per block, or 9.25 CPU cycles per byte for 128 bit key. // Version 1.2 mitigates the hazard of cache-timing attacks by // a) compressing S-boxes from 8KB to 2KB+256B, b) scheduling // references to S-boxes for L2 cache latency, c) prefetching T[ed]4 // prior last round. As result performance dropped to (26 + 15*rounds) // ticks per block or 11 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key. // This is ~16% deterioration. For reference Itanium 2 L1 cache has // 64 bytes line size and L2 - 128 bytes... .ident "aes-ia64.S, version 1.2" .ident "IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov " .explicit .text rk0=r8; rk1=r9; pfssave=r2; lcsave=r10; prsave=r3; maskff=r11; twenty4=r14; sixteen=r15; te00=r16; te11=r17; te22=r18; te33=r19; te01=r20; te12=r21; te23=r22; te30=r23; te02=r24; te13=r25; te20=r26; te31=r27; te03=r28; te10=r29; te21=r30; te32=r31; // these are rotating... t0=r32; s0=r33; t1=r34; s1=r35; t2=r36; s2=r37; t3=r38; s3=r39; te0=r40; te1=r41; te2=r42; te3=r43; #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) # define ADDP addp4 #else # define ADDP add #endif // Offsets from Te0 #define TE0 0 #define TE2 2 #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) || defined(B_ENDIAN) #define TE1 3 #define TE3 1 #else #define TE1 1 #define TE3 3 #endif // This implies that AES_KEY comprises 32-bit key schedule elements // even on LP64 platforms. #ifndef KSZ # define KSZ 4 # define LDKEY ld4 #endif .proc _ia64_AES_encrypt# // Input: rk0-rk1 // te0 // te3 as AES_KEY->rounds!!! // s0-s3 // maskff,twenty4,sixteen // Output: r16,r20,r24,r28 as s0-s3 // Clobber: r16-r31,rk0-rk1,r32-r43 .align 32 _ia64_AES_encrypt: .prologue .altrp b6 .body { .mmi; alloc r16=ar.pfs,12,0,0,8 LDKEY t0=[rk0],2*KSZ mov pr.rot=1<<16 } { .mmi; LDKEY t1=[rk1],2*KSZ add te1=TE1,te0 add te3=-3,te3 };; { .mib; LDKEY t2=[rk0],2*KSZ mov ar.ec=2 } { .mib; LDKEY t3=[rk1],2*KSZ add te2=TE2,te0 brp.loop.imp .Le_top,.Le_end-16 };; { .mmi; xor s0=s0,t0 xor s1=s1,t1 mov ar.lc=te3 } { .mmi; xor s2=s2,t2 xor s3=s3,t3 add te3=TE3,te0 };; .align 32 .Le_top: { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t0=[rk0],2*KSZ // 0/0:rk[0] (p0) and te33=s3,maskff // 0/0:s3&0xff (p0) extr.u te22=s2,8,8 } // 0/0:s2>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t1=[rk1],2*KSZ // 0/1:rk[1] (p0) and te30=s0,maskff // 0/1:s0&0xff (p0) shr.u te00=s0,twenty4 };; // 0/0:s0>>24 { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t2=[rk0],2*KSZ // 1/2:rk[2] (p0) shladd te33=te33,3,te3 // 1/0:te0+s0>>24 (p0) extr.u te23=s3,8,8 } // 1/1:s3>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t3=[rk1],2*KSZ // 1/3:rk[3] (p0) shladd te30=te30,3,te3 // 1/1:te3+s0 (p0) shr.u te01=s1,twenty4 };; // 1/1:s1>>24 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te33=[te33] // 2/0:te3[s3&0xff] (p0) shladd te22=te22,3,te2 // 2/0:te2+s2>>8&0xff (p0) extr.u te20=s0,8,8 } // 2/2:s0>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te30=[te30] // 2/1:te3[s0] (p0) shladd te23=te23,3,te2 // 2/1:te2+s3>>8 (p0) shr.u te02=s2,twenty4 };; // 2/2:s2>>24 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te22=[te22] // 3/0:te2[s2>>8] (p0) shladd te20=te20,3,te2 // 3/2:te2+s0>>8 (p0) extr.u te21=s1,8,8 } // 3/3:s1>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te23=[te23] // 3/1:te2[s3>>8] (p0) shladd te00=te00,3,te0 // 3/0:te0+s0>>24 (p0) shr.u te03=s3,twenty4 };; // 3/3:s3>>24 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te20=[te20] // 4/2:te2[s0>>8] (p0) shladd te21=te21,3,te2 // 4/3:te3+s2 (p0) extr.u te11=s1,16,8 } // 4/0:s1>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te00=[te00] // 4/0:te0[s0>>24] (p0) shladd te01=te01,3,te0 // 4/1:te0+s1>>24 (p0) shr.u te13=s3,sixteen };; // 4/2:s3>>16 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te21=[te21] // 5/3:te2[s1>>8] (p0) shladd te11=te11,3,te1 // 5/0:te1+s1>>16 (p0) extr.u te12=s2,16,8 } // 5/1:s2>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te01=[te01] // 5/1:te0[s1>>24] (p0) shladd te02=te02,3,te0 // 5/2:te0+s2>>24 (p0) and te31=s1,maskff };; // 5/2:s1&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te11=[te11] // 6/0:te1[s1>>16] (p0) shladd te12=te12,3,te1 // 6/1:te1+s2>>16 (p0) extr.u te10=s0,16,8 } // 6/3:s0>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te02=[te02] // 6/2:te0[s2>>24] (p0) shladd te03=te03,3,te0 // 6/3:te1+s0>>16 (p0) and te32=s2,maskff };; // 6/3:s2&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te12=[te12] // 7/1:te1[s2>>16] (p0) shladd te31=te31,3,te3 // 7/2:te3+s1&0xff (p0) and te13=te13,maskff} // 7/2:s3>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te03=[te03] // 7/3:te0[s3>>24] (p0) shladd te32=te32,3,te3 // 7/3:te3+s2 (p0) xor t0=t0,te33 };; // 7/0: { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te31=[te31] // 8/2:te3[s1] (p0) shladd te13=te13,3,te1 // 8/2:te1+s3>>16 (p0) xor t0=t0,te22 } // 8/0: { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te32=[te32] // 8/3:te3[s2] (p0) shladd te10=te10,3,te1 // 8/3:te1+s0>>16 (p0) xor t1=t1,te30 };; // 8/1: { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te13=[te13] // 9/2:te1[s3>>16] (p0) ld4 te10=[te10] // 9/3:te1[s0>>16] (p0) xor t0=t0,te00 };; // 9/0: !L2 scheduling { .mmi; (p0) xor t1=t1,te23 // 10[9]/1: (p0) xor t2=t2,te20 // 10[9]/2: (p0) xor t3=t3,te21 };; // 10[9]/3: { .mmi; (p0) xor t0=t0,te11 // 11[10]/0:done! (p0) xor t1=t1,te01 // 11[10]/1: (p0) xor t2=t2,te02 };; // 11[10]/2: !L2 scheduling { .mmi; (p0) xor t3=t3,te03 // 12[10]/3: (p16) cmp.eq p0,p17=r0,r0 };; // 12[10]/clear (p17) { .mmi; (p0) xor t1=t1,te12 // 13[11]/1:done! (p0) xor t2=t2,te31 // 13[11]/2: (p0) xor t3=t3,te32 } // 13[11]/3: { .mmi; (p17) add te0=2048,te0 // 13[11]/ (p17) add te1=2048+64-TE1,te1};; // 13[11]/ { .mib; (p0) xor t2=t2,te13 // 14[12]/2:done! (p17) add te2=2048+128-TE2,te2} // 14[12]/ { .mib; (p0) xor t3=t3,te10 // 14[12]/3:done! (p17) add te3=2048+192-TE3,te3 // 14[12]/ br.ctop.sptk .Le_top };; .Le_end: { .mmi; ld8 te12=[te0] // prefetch Te4 ld8 te31=[te1] } { .mmi; ld8 te10=[te2] ld8 te32=[te3] } { .mmi; LDKEY t0=[rk0],2*KSZ // 0/0:rk[0] and te33=s3,maskff // 0/0:s3&0xff extr.u te22=s2,8,8 } // 0/0:s2>>8&0xff { .mmi; LDKEY t1=[rk1],2*KSZ // 0/1:rk[1] and te30=s0,maskff // 0/1:s0&0xff shr.u te00=s0,twenty4 };; // 0/0:s0>>24 { .mmi; LDKEY t2=[rk0],2*KSZ // 1/2:rk[2] add te33=te33,te0 // 1/0:te0+s0>>24 extr.u te23=s3,8,8 } // 1/1:s3>>8&0xff { .mmi; LDKEY t3=[rk1],2*KSZ // 1/3:rk[3] add te30=te30,te0 // 1/1:te0+s0 shr.u te01=s1,twenty4 };; // 1/1:s1>>24 { .mmi; ld1 te33=[te33] // 2/0:te0[s3&0xff] add te22=te22,te0 // 2/0:te0+s2>>8&0xff extr.u te20=s0,8,8 } // 2/2:s0>>8&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te30=[te30] // 2/1:te0[s0] add te23=te23,te0 // 2/1:te0+s3>>8 shr.u te02=s2,twenty4 };; // 2/2:s2>>24 { .mmi; ld1 te22=[te22] // 3/0:te0[s2>>8] add te20=te20,te0 // 3/2:te0+s0>>8 extr.u te21=s1,8,8 } // 3/3:s1>>8&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te23=[te23] // 3/1:te0[s3>>8] add te00=te00,te0 // 3/0:te0+s0>>24 shr.u te03=s3,twenty4 };; // 3/3:s3>>24 { .mmi; ld1 te20=[te20] // 4/2:te0[s0>>8] add te21=te21,te0 // 4/3:te0+s2 extr.u te11=s1,16,8 } // 4/0:s1>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te00=[te00] // 4/0:te0[s0>>24] add te01=te01,te0 // 4/1:te0+s1>>24 shr.u te13=s3,sixteen };; // 4/2:s3>>16 { .mmi; ld1 te21=[te21] // 5/3:te0[s1>>8] add te11=te11,te0 // 5/0:te0+s1>>16 extr.u te12=s2,16,8 } // 5/1:s2>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te01=[te01] // 5/1:te0[s1>>24] add te02=te02,te0 // 5/2:te0+s2>>24 and te31=s1,maskff };; // 5/2:s1&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te11=[te11] // 6/0:te0[s1>>16] add te12=te12,te0 // 6/1:te0+s2>>16 extr.u te10=s0,16,8 } // 6/3:s0>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te02=[te02] // 6/2:te0[s2>>24] add te03=te03,te0 // 6/3:te0+s0>>16 and te32=s2,maskff };; // 6/3:s2&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te12=[te12] // 7/1:te0[s2>>16] add te31=te31,te0 // 7/2:te0+s1&0xff dep te33=te22,te33,8,8} // 7/0: { .mmi; ld1 te03=[te03] // 7/3:te0[s3>>24] add te32=te32,te0 // 7/3:te0+s2 and te13=te13,maskff};; // 7/2:s3>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te31=[te31] // 8/2:te0[s1] add te13=te13,te0 // 8/2:te0+s3>>16 dep te30=te23,te30,8,8} // 8/1: { .mmi; ld1 te32=[te32] // 8/3:te0[s2] add te10=te10,te0 // 8/3:te0+s0>>16 shl te00=te00,twenty4};; // 8/0: { .mii; ld1 te13=[te13] // 9/2:te0[s3>>16] dep te33=te11,te33,16,8 // 9/0: shl te01=te01,twenty4};; // 9/1: { .mii; ld1 te10=[te10] // 10/3:te0[s0>>16] dep te31=te20,te31,8,8 // 10/2: shl te02=te02,twenty4};; // 10/2: { .mii; xor t0=t0,te33 // 11/0: dep te32=te21,te32,8,8 // 11/3: shl te12=te12,sixteen};; // 11/1: { .mii; xor r16=t0,te00 // 12/0:done! dep te31=te13,te31,16,8 // 12/2: shl te03=te03,twenty4};; // 12/3: { .mmi; xor t1=t1,te01 // 13/1: xor t2=t2,te02 // 13/2: dep te32=te10,te32,16,8};; // 13/3: { .mmi; xor t1=t1,te30 // 14/1: xor r24=t2,te31 // 14/2:done! xor t3=t3,te32 };; // 14/3: { .mib; xor r20=t1,te12 // 15/1:done! xor r28=t3,te03 // 15/3:done! br.ret.sptk b6 };; .endp _ia64_AES_encrypt# // void AES_encrypt (const void *in,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); .global AES_encrypt# .proc AES_encrypt# .align 32 AES_encrypt: .prologue .save ar.pfs,pfssave { .mmi; alloc pfssave=ar.pfs,3,1,12,0 and out0=3,in0 mov r3=ip } { .mmi; ADDP in0=0,in0 mov loc0=psr.um ADDP out11=KSZ*60,in2 };; // &AES_KEY->rounds { .mmi; ld4 out11=[out11] // AES_KEY->rounds add out8=(AES_Te#-AES_encrypt#),r3 // Te0 .save pr,prsave mov prsave=pr } { .mmi; rum 1<<3 // clear um.ac .save ar.lc,lcsave mov lcsave=ar.lc };; .body #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) // HPUX is big-endian, cut 15+15 cycles... { .mib; cmp.ne p6,p0=out0,r0 add out0=4,in0 (p6) br.dpnt.many .Le_i_unaligned };; { .mmi; ld4 out1=[in0],8 // s0 and out9=3,in1 mov twenty4=24 } { .mmi; ld4 out3=[out0],8 // s1 ADDP rk0=0,in2 mov sixteen=16 };; { .mmi; ld4 out5=[in0] // s2 cmp.ne p6,p0=out9,r0 mov maskff=0xff } { .mmb; ld4 out7=[out0] // s3 ADDP rk1=KSZ,in2 br.call.sptk.many b6=_ia64_AES_encrypt };; { .mib; ADDP in0=4,in1 ADDP in1=0,in1 (p6) br.spnt .Le_o_unaligned };; { .mii; mov psr.um=loc0 mov ar.pfs=pfssave mov ar.lc=lcsave };; { .mmi; st4 [in1]=r16,8 // s0 st4 [in0]=r20,8 // s1 mov pr=prsave,0x1ffff };; { .mmb; st4 [in1]=r24 // s2 st4 [in0]=r28 // s3 br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; #endif .align 32 .Le_i_unaligned: { .mmi; add out0=1,in0 add out2=2,in0 add out4=3,in0 };; { .mmi; ld1 r16=[in0],4 ld1 r17=[out0],4 }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r18=[out2],4 ld1 out1=[out4],4 };; // s0 { .mmi; ld1 r20=[in0],4 ld1 r21=[out0],4 }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r22=[out2],4 ld1 out3=[out4],4 };; // s1 { .mmi; ld1 r24=[in0],4 ld1 r25=[out0],4 }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r26=[out2],4 ld1 out5=[out4],4 };; // s2 { .mmi; ld1 r28=[in0] ld1 r29=[out0] }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r30=[out2] ld1 out7=[out4] };; // s3 { .mii; dep out1=r16,out1,24,8 //;; dep out3=r20,out3,24,8 }//;; { .mii; ADDP rk0=0,in2 dep out5=r24,out5,24,8 //;; dep out7=r28,out7,24,8 };; { .mii; ADDP rk1=KSZ,in2 dep out1=r17,out1,16,8 //;; dep out3=r21,out3,16,8 }//;; { .mii; mov twenty4=24 dep out5=r25,out5,16,8 //;; dep out7=r29,out7,16,8 };; { .mii; mov sixteen=16 dep out1=r18,out1,8,8 //;; dep out3=r22,out3,8,8 }//;; { .mii; mov maskff=0xff dep out5=r26,out5,8,8 //;; dep out7=r30,out7,8,8 };; { .mib; br.call.sptk.many b6=_ia64_AES_encrypt };; .Le_o_unaligned: { .mii; ADDP out0=0,in1 extr.u r17=r16,8,8 // s0 shr.u r19=r16,twenty4 }//;; { .mii; ADDP out1=1,in1 extr.u r18=r16,16,8 shr.u r23=r20,twenty4 }//;; // s1 { .mii; ADDP out2=2,in1 extr.u r21=r20,8,8 shr.u r22=r20,sixteen }//;; { .mii; ADDP out3=3,in1 extr.u r25=r24,8,8 // s2 shr.u r27=r24,twenty4 };; { .mii; st1 [out3]=r16,4 extr.u r26=r24,16,8 shr.u r31=r28,twenty4 }//;; // s3 { .mii; st1 [out2]=r17,4 extr.u r29=r28,8,8 shr.u r30=r28,sixteen }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r18,4 st1 [out0]=r19,4 };; { .mmi; st1 [out3]=r20,4 st1 [out2]=r21,4 }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r22,4 st1 [out0]=r23,4 };; { .mmi; st1 [out3]=r24,4 st1 [out2]=r25,4 mov pr=prsave,0x1ffff }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r26,4 st1 [out0]=r27,4 mov ar.pfs=pfssave };; { .mmi; st1 [out3]=r28 st1 [out2]=r29 mov ar.lc=lcsave }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r30 st1 [out0]=r31 } { .mfb; mov psr.um=loc0 // restore user mask br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp AES_encrypt# // *AES_decrypt are autogenerated by the following script: #if 0 #!/usr/bin/env perl print "// *AES_decrypt are autogenerated by the following script:\n#if 0\n"; open(PROG,'<'.$0); while() { print; } close(PROG); print "#endif\n"; while(<>) { $process=1 if (/\.proc\s+_ia64_AES_encrypt/); next if (!$process); #s/te00=s0/td00=s0/; s/te00/td00/g; s/te11=s1/td13=s3/; s/te11/td13/g; #s/te22=s2/td22=s2/; s/te22/td22/g; s/te33=s3/td31=s1/; s/te33/td31/g; #s/te01=s1/td01=s1/; s/te01/td01/g; s/te12=s2/td10=s0/; s/te12/td10/g; #s/te23=s3/td23=s3/; s/te23/td23/g; s/te30=s0/td32=s2/; s/te30/td32/g; #s/te02=s2/td02=s2/; s/te02/td02/g; s/te13=s3/td11=s1/; s/te13/td11/g; #s/te20=s0/td20=s0/; s/te20/td20/g; s/te31=s1/td33=s3/; s/te31/td33/g; #s/te03=s3/td03=s3/; s/te03/td03/g; s/te10=s0/td12=s2/; s/te10/td12/g; #s/te21=s1/td21=s1/; s/te21/td21/g; s/te32=s2/td30=s0/; s/te32/td30/g; s/td/te/g; s/AES_encrypt/AES_decrypt/g; s/\.Le_/.Ld_/g; s/AES_Te#/AES_Td#/g; print; exit if (/\.endp\s+AES_decrypt/); } #endif .proc _ia64_AES_decrypt# // Input: rk0-rk1 // te0 // te3 as AES_KEY->rounds!!! // s0-s3 // maskff,twenty4,sixteen // Output: r16,r20,r24,r28 as s0-s3 // Clobber: r16-r31,rk0-rk1,r32-r43 .align 32 _ia64_AES_decrypt: .prologue .altrp b6 .body { .mmi; alloc r16=ar.pfs,12,0,0,8 LDKEY t0=[rk0],2*KSZ mov pr.rot=1<<16 } { .mmi; LDKEY t1=[rk1],2*KSZ add te1=TE1,te0 add te3=-3,te3 };; { .mib; LDKEY t2=[rk0],2*KSZ mov ar.ec=2 } { .mib; LDKEY t3=[rk1],2*KSZ add te2=TE2,te0 brp.loop.imp .Ld_top,.Ld_end-16 };; { .mmi; xor s0=s0,t0 xor s1=s1,t1 mov ar.lc=te3 } { .mmi; xor s2=s2,t2 xor s3=s3,t3 add te3=TE3,te0 };; .align 32 .Ld_top: { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t0=[rk0],2*KSZ // 0/0:rk[0] (p0) and te31=s1,maskff // 0/0:s3&0xff (p0) extr.u te22=s2,8,8 } // 0/0:s2>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t1=[rk1],2*KSZ // 0/1:rk[1] (p0) and te32=s2,maskff // 0/1:s0&0xff (p0) shr.u te00=s0,twenty4 };; // 0/0:s0>>24 { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t2=[rk0],2*KSZ // 1/2:rk[2] (p0) shladd te31=te31,3,te3 // 1/0:te0+s0>>24 (p0) extr.u te23=s3,8,8 } // 1/1:s3>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) LDKEY t3=[rk1],2*KSZ // 1/3:rk[3] (p0) shladd te32=te32,3,te3 // 1/1:te3+s0 (p0) shr.u te01=s1,twenty4 };; // 1/1:s1>>24 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te31=[te31] // 2/0:te3[s3&0xff] (p0) shladd te22=te22,3,te2 // 2/0:te2+s2>>8&0xff (p0) extr.u te20=s0,8,8 } // 2/2:s0>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te32=[te32] // 2/1:te3[s0] (p0) shladd te23=te23,3,te2 // 2/1:te2+s3>>8 (p0) shr.u te02=s2,twenty4 };; // 2/2:s2>>24 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te22=[te22] // 3/0:te2[s2>>8] (p0) shladd te20=te20,3,te2 // 3/2:te2+s0>>8 (p0) extr.u te21=s1,8,8 } // 3/3:s1>>8&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te23=[te23] // 3/1:te2[s3>>8] (p0) shladd te00=te00,3,te0 // 3/0:te0+s0>>24 (p0) shr.u te03=s3,twenty4 };; // 3/3:s3>>24 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te20=[te20] // 4/2:te2[s0>>8] (p0) shladd te21=te21,3,te2 // 4/3:te3+s2 (p0) extr.u te13=s3,16,8 } // 4/0:s1>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te00=[te00] // 4/0:te0[s0>>24] (p0) shladd te01=te01,3,te0 // 4/1:te0+s1>>24 (p0) shr.u te11=s1,sixteen };; // 4/2:s3>>16 { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te21=[te21] // 5/3:te2[s1>>8] (p0) shladd te13=te13,3,te1 // 5/0:te1+s1>>16 (p0) extr.u te10=s0,16,8 } // 5/1:s2>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te01=[te01] // 5/1:te0[s1>>24] (p0) shladd te02=te02,3,te0 // 5/2:te0+s2>>24 (p0) and te33=s3,maskff };; // 5/2:s1&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te13=[te13] // 6/0:te1[s1>>16] (p0) shladd te10=te10,3,te1 // 6/1:te1+s2>>16 (p0) extr.u te12=s2,16,8 } // 6/3:s0>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te02=[te02] // 6/2:te0[s2>>24] (p0) shladd te03=te03,3,te0 // 6/3:te1+s0>>16 (p0) and te30=s0,maskff };; // 6/3:s2&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te10=[te10] // 7/1:te1[s2>>16] (p0) shladd te33=te33,3,te3 // 7/2:te3+s1&0xff (p0) and te11=te11,maskff} // 7/2:s3>>16&0xff { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te03=[te03] // 7/3:te0[s3>>24] (p0) shladd te30=te30,3,te3 // 7/3:te3+s2 (p0) xor t0=t0,te31 };; // 7/0: { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te33=[te33] // 8/2:te3[s1] (p0) shladd te11=te11,3,te1 // 8/2:te1+s3>>16 (p0) xor t0=t0,te22 } // 8/0: { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te30=[te30] // 8/3:te3[s2] (p0) shladd te12=te12,3,te1 // 8/3:te1+s0>>16 (p0) xor t1=t1,te32 };; // 8/1: { .mmi; (p0) ld4 te11=[te11] // 9/2:te1[s3>>16] (p0) ld4 te12=[te12] // 9/3:te1[s0>>16] (p0) xor t0=t0,te00 };; // 9/0: !L2 scheduling { .mmi; (p0) xor t1=t1,te23 // 10[9]/1: (p0) xor t2=t2,te20 // 10[9]/2: (p0) xor t3=t3,te21 };; // 10[9]/3: { .mmi; (p0) xor t0=t0,te13 // 11[10]/0:done! (p0) xor t1=t1,te01 // 11[10]/1: (p0) xor t2=t2,te02 };; // 11[10]/2: !L2 scheduling { .mmi; (p0) xor t3=t3,te03 // 12[10]/3: (p16) cmp.eq p0,p17=r0,r0 };; // 12[10]/clear (p17) { .mmi; (p0) xor t1=t1,te10 // 13[11]/1:done! (p0) xor t2=t2,te33 // 13[11]/2: (p0) xor t3=t3,te30 } // 13[11]/3: { .mmi; (p17) add te0=2048,te0 // 13[11]/ (p17) add te1=2048+64-TE1,te1};; // 13[11]/ { .mib; (p0) xor t2=t2,te11 // 14[12]/2:done! (p17) add te2=2048+128-TE2,te2} // 14[12]/ { .mib; (p0) xor t3=t3,te12 // 14[12]/3:done! (p17) add te3=2048+192-TE3,te3 // 14[12]/ br.ctop.sptk .Ld_top };; .Ld_end: { .mmi; ld8 te10=[te0] // prefetch Td4 ld8 te33=[te1] } { .mmi; ld8 te12=[te2] ld8 te30=[te3] } { .mmi; LDKEY t0=[rk0],2*KSZ // 0/0:rk[0] and te31=s1,maskff // 0/0:s3&0xff extr.u te22=s2,8,8 } // 0/0:s2>>8&0xff { .mmi; LDKEY t1=[rk1],2*KSZ // 0/1:rk[1] and te32=s2,maskff // 0/1:s0&0xff shr.u te00=s0,twenty4 };; // 0/0:s0>>24 { .mmi; LDKEY t2=[rk0],2*KSZ // 1/2:rk[2] add te31=te31,te0 // 1/0:te0+s0>>24 extr.u te23=s3,8,8 } // 1/1:s3>>8&0xff { .mmi; LDKEY t3=[rk1],2*KSZ // 1/3:rk[3] add te32=te32,te0 // 1/1:te0+s0 shr.u te01=s1,twenty4 };; // 1/1:s1>>24 { .mmi; ld1 te31=[te31] // 2/0:te0[s3&0xff] add te22=te22,te0 // 2/0:te0+s2>>8&0xff extr.u te20=s0,8,8 } // 2/2:s0>>8&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te32=[te32] // 2/1:te0[s0] add te23=te23,te0 // 2/1:te0+s3>>8 shr.u te02=s2,twenty4 };; // 2/2:s2>>24 { .mmi; ld1 te22=[te22] // 3/0:te0[s2>>8] add te20=te20,te0 // 3/2:te0+s0>>8 extr.u te21=s1,8,8 } // 3/3:s1>>8&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te23=[te23] // 3/1:te0[s3>>8] add te00=te00,te0 // 3/0:te0+s0>>24 shr.u te03=s3,twenty4 };; // 3/3:s3>>24 { .mmi; ld1 te20=[te20] // 4/2:te0[s0>>8] add te21=te21,te0 // 4/3:te0+s2 extr.u te13=s3,16,8 } // 4/0:s1>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te00=[te00] // 4/0:te0[s0>>24] add te01=te01,te0 // 4/1:te0+s1>>24 shr.u te11=s1,sixteen };; // 4/2:s3>>16 { .mmi; ld1 te21=[te21] // 5/3:te0[s1>>8] add te13=te13,te0 // 5/0:te0+s1>>16 extr.u te10=s0,16,8 } // 5/1:s2>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te01=[te01] // 5/1:te0[s1>>24] add te02=te02,te0 // 5/2:te0+s2>>24 and te33=s3,maskff };; // 5/2:s1&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te13=[te13] // 6/0:te0[s1>>16] add te10=te10,te0 // 6/1:te0+s2>>16 extr.u te12=s2,16,8 } // 6/3:s0>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te02=[te02] // 6/2:te0[s2>>24] add te03=te03,te0 // 6/3:te0+s0>>16 and te30=s0,maskff };; // 6/3:s2&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te10=[te10] // 7/1:te0[s2>>16] add te33=te33,te0 // 7/2:te0+s1&0xff dep te31=te22,te31,8,8} // 7/0: { .mmi; ld1 te03=[te03] // 7/3:te0[s3>>24] add te30=te30,te0 // 7/3:te0+s2 and te11=te11,maskff};; // 7/2:s3>>16&0xff { .mmi; ld1 te33=[te33] // 8/2:te0[s1] add te11=te11,te0 // 8/2:te0+s3>>16 dep te32=te23,te32,8,8} // 8/1: { .mmi; ld1 te30=[te30] // 8/3:te0[s2] add te12=te12,te0 // 8/3:te0+s0>>16 shl te00=te00,twenty4};; // 8/0: { .mii; ld1 te11=[te11] // 9/2:te0[s3>>16] dep te31=te13,te31,16,8 // 9/0: shl te01=te01,twenty4};; // 9/1: { .mii; ld1 te12=[te12] // 10/3:te0[s0>>16] dep te33=te20,te33,8,8 // 10/2: shl te02=te02,twenty4};; // 10/2: { .mii; xor t0=t0,te31 // 11/0: dep te30=te21,te30,8,8 // 11/3: shl te10=te10,sixteen};; // 11/1: { .mii; xor r16=t0,te00 // 12/0:done! dep te33=te11,te33,16,8 // 12/2: shl te03=te03,twenty4};; // 12/3: { .mmi; xor t1=t1,te01 // 13/1: xor t2=t2,te02 // 13/2: dep te30=te12,te30,16,8};; // 13/3: { .mmi; xor t1=t1,te32 // 14/1: xor r24=t2,te33 // 14/2:done! xor t3=t3,te30 };; // 14/3: { .mib; xor r20=t1,te10 // 15/1:done! xor r28=t3,te03 // 15/3:done! br.ret.sptk b6 };; .endp _ia64_AES_decrypt# // void AES_decrypt (const void *in,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); .global AES_decrypt# .proc AES_decrypt# .align 32 AES_decrypt: .prologue .save ar.pfs,pfssave { .mmi; alloc pfssave=ar.pfs,3,1,12,0 and out0=3,in0 mov r3=ip } { .mmi; ADDP in0=0,in0 mov loc0=psr.um ADDP out11=KSZ*60,in2 };; // &AES_KEY->rounds { .mmi; ld4 out11=[out11] // AES_KEY->rounds add out8=(AES_Td#-AES_decrypt#),r3 // Te0 .save pr,prsave mov prsave=pr } { .mmi; rum 1<<3 // clear um.ac .save ar.lc,lcsave mov lcsave=ar.lc };; .body #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) // HPUX is big-endian, cut 15+15 cycles... { .mib; cmp.ne p6,p0=out0,r0 add out0=4,in0 (p6) br.dpnt.many .Ld_i_unaligned };; { .mmi; ld4 out1=[in0],8 // s0 and out9=3,in1 mov twenty4=24 } { .mmi; ld4 out3=[out0],8 // s1 ADDP rk0=0,in2 mov sixteen=16 };; { .mmi; ld4 out5=[in0] // s2 cmp.ne p6,p0=out9,r0 mov maskff=0xff } { .mmb; ld4 out7=[out0] // s3 ADDP rk1=KSZ,in2 br.call.sptk.many b6=_ia64_AES_decrypt };; { .mib; ADDP in0=4,in1 ADDP in1=0,in1 (p6) br.spnt .Ld_o_unaligned };; { .mii; mov psr.um=loc0 mov ar.pfs=pfssave mov ar.lc=lcsave };; { .mmi; st4 [in1]=r16,8 // s0 st4 [in0]=r20,8 // s1 mov pr=prsave,0x1ffff };; { .mmb; st4 [in1]=r24 // s2 st4 [in0]=r28 // s3 br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; #endif .align 32 .Ld_i_unaligned: { .mmi; add out0=1,in0 add out2=2,in0 add out4=3,in0 };; { .mmi; ld1 r16=[in0],4 ld1 r17=[out0],4 }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r18=[out2],4 ld1 out1=[out4],4 };; // s0 { .mmi; ld1 r20=[in0],4 ld1 r21=[out0],4 }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r22=[out2],4 ld1 out3=[out4],4 };; // s1 { .mmi; ld1 r24=[in0],4 ld1 r25=[out0],4 }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r26=[out2],4 ld1 out5=[out4],4 };; // s2 { .mmi; ld1 r28=[in0] ld1 r29=[out0] }//;; { .mmi; ld1 r30=[out2] ld1 out7=[out4] };; // s3 { .mii; dep out1=r16,out1,24,8 //;; dep out3=r20,out3,24,8 }//;; { .mii; ADDP rk0=0,in2 dep out5=r24,out5,24,8 //;; dep out7=r28,out7,24,8 };; { .mii; ADDP rk1=KSZ,in2 dep out1=r17,out1,16,8 //;; dep out3=r21,out3,16,8 }//;; { .mii; mov twenty4=24 dep out5=r25,out5,16,8 //;; dep out7=r29,out7,16,8 };; { .mii; mov sixteen=16 dep out1=r18,out1,8,8 //;; dep out3=r22,out3,8,8 }//;; { .mii; mov maskff=0xff dep out5=r26,out5,8,8 //;; dep out7=r30,out7,8,8 };; { .mib; br.call.sptk.many b6=_ia64_AES_decrypt };; .Ld_o_unaligned: { .mii; ADDP out0=0,in1 extr.u r17=r16,8,8 // s0 shr.u r19=r16,twenty4 }//;; { .mii; ADDP out1=1,in1 extr.u r18=r16,16,8 shr.u r23=r20,twenty4 }//;; // s1 { .mii; ADDP out2=2,in1 extr.u r21=r20,8,8 shr.u r22=r20,sixteen }//;; { .mii; ADDP out3=3,in1 extr.u r25=r24,8,8 // s2 shr.u r27=r24,twenty4 };; { .mii; st1 [out3]=r16,4 extr.u r26=r24,16,8 shr.u r31=r28,twenty4 }//;; // s3 { .mii; st1 [out2]=r17,4 extr.u r29=r28,8,8 shr.u r30=r28,sixteen }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r18,4 st1 [out0]=r19,4 };; { .mmi; st1 [out3]=r20,4 st1 [out2]=r21,4 }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r22,4 st1 [out0]=r23,4 };; { .mmi; st1 [out3]=r24,4 st1 [out2]=r25,4 mov pr=prsave,0x1ffff }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r26,4 st1 [out0]=r27,4 mov ar.pfs=pfssave };; { .mmi; st1 [out3]=r28 st1 [out2]=r29 mov ar.lc=lcsave }//;; { .mmi; st1 [out1]=r30 st1 [out0]=r31 } { .mfb; mov psr.um=loc0 // restore user mask br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp AES_decrypt# // leave it in .text segment... .align 64 .global AES_Te# .type AES_Te#,@object AES_Te: data4 0xc66363a5,0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84,0xf87c7c84 data4 0xee777799,0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d,0xf67b7b8d data4 0xfff2f20d,0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd,0xd66b6bbd data4 0xde6f6fb1,0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554,0x91c5c554 data4 0x60303050,0x60303050, 0x02010103,0x02010103 data4 0xce6767a9,0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d,0x562b2b7d data4 0xe7fefe19,0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762,0xb5d7d762 data4 0x4dababe6,0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a,0xec76769a data4 0x8fcaca45,0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d,0x1f82829d data4 0x89c9c940,0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87,0xfa7d7d87 data4 0xeffafa15,0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb,0xb25959eb data4 0x8e4747c9,0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b,0xfbf0f00b data4 0x41adadec,0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467,0xb3d4d467 data4 0x5fa2a2fd,0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea,0x45afafea data4 0x239c9cbf,0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7,0x53a4a4f7 data4 0xe4727296,0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b,0x9bc0c05b data4 0x75b7b7c2,0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c,0xe1fdfd1c data4 0x3d9393ae,0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a,0x4c26266a data4 0x6c36365a,0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41,0x7e3f3f41 data4 0xf5f7f702,0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f,0x83cccc4f data4 0x6834345c,0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4,0x51a5a5f4 data4 0xd1e5e534,0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108,0xf9f1f108 data4 0xe2717193,0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873,0xabd8d873 data4 0x62313153,0x62313153, 0x2a15153f,0x2a15153f data4 0x0804040c,0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752,0x95c7c752 data4 0x46232365,0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e,0x9dc3c35e data4 0x30181828,0x30181828, 0x379696a1,0x379696a1 data4 0x0a05050f,0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5,0x2f9a9ab5 data4 0x0e070709,0x0e070709, 0x24121236,0x24121236 data4 0x1b80809b,0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d,0xdfe2e23d data4 0xcdebeb26,0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769,0x4e272769 data4 0x7fb2b2cd,0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f,0xea75759f data4 0x1209091b,0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e,0x1d83839e data4 0x582c2c74,0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e,0x341a1a2e data4 0x361b1b2d,0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2,0xdc6e6eb2 data4 0xb45a5aee,0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb,0x5ba0a0fb data4 0xa45252f6,0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d,0x763b3b4d data4 0xb7d6d661,0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce,0x7db3b3ce data4 0x5229297b,0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e,0xdde3e33e data4 0x5e2f2f71,0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497,0x13848497 data4 0xa65353f5,0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168,0xb9d1d168 data4 0x00000000,0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c,0xc1eded2c data4 0x40202060,0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f,0xe3fcfc1f data4 0x79b1b1c8,0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed,0xb65b5bed data4 0xd46a6abe,0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46,0x8dcbcb46 data4 0x67bebed9,0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b,0x7239394b data4 0x944a4ade,0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4,0x984c4cd4 data4 0xb05858e8,0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a,0x85cfcf4a data4 0xbbd0d06b,0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a,0xc5efef2a data4 0x4faaaae5,0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16,0xedfbfb16 data4 0x864343c5,0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7,0x9a4d4dd7 data4 0x66333355,0x66333355, 0x11858594,0x11858594 data4 0x8a4545cf,0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910,0xe9f9f910 data4 0x04020206,0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81,0xfe7f7f81 data4 0xa05050f0,0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44,0x783c3c44 data4 0x259f9fba,0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3,0x4ba8a8e3 data4 0xa25151f3,0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe,0x5da3a3fe data4 0x804040c0,0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a,0x058f8f8a data4 0x3f9292ad,0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc,0x219d9dbc data4 0x70383848,0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504,0xf1f5f504 data4 0x63bcbcdf,0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1,0x77b6b6c1 data4 0xafdada75,0xafdada75, 0x42212163,0x42212163 data4 0x20101030,0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a,0xe5ffff1a data4 0xfdf3f30e,0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d,0xbfd2d26d data4 0x81cdcd4c,0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14,0x180c0c14 data4 0x26131335,0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f,0xc3ecec2f data4 0xbe5f5fe1,0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2,0x359797a2 data4 0x884444cc,0x884444cc, 0x2e171739,0x2e171739 data4 0x93c4c457,0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2,0x55a7a7f2 data4 0xfc7e7e82,0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47,0x7a3d3d47 data4 0xc86464ac,0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7,0xba5d5de7 data4 0x3219192b,0x3219192b, 0xe6737395,0xe6737395 data4 0xc06060a0,0xc06060a0, 0x19818198,0x19818198 data4 0x9e4f4fd1,0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f,0xa3dcdc7f data4 0x44222266,0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e,0x542a2a7e data4 0x3b9090ab,0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883,0x0b888883 data4 0x8c4646ca,0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29,0xc7eeee29 data4 0x6bb8b8d3,0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c,0x2814143c data4 0xa7dede79,0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2,0xbc5e5ee2 data4 0x160b0b1d,0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76,0xaddbdb76 data4 0xdbe0e03b,0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256,0x64323256 data4 0x743a3a4e,0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e,0x140a0a1e data4 0x924949db,0x924949db, 0x0c06060a,0x0c06060a data4 0x4824246c,0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4,0xb85c5ce4 data4 0x9fc2c25d,0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e,0xbdd3d36e data4 0x43acacef,0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6,0xc46262a6 data4 0x399191a8,0x399191a8, 0x319595a4,0x319595a4 data4 0xd3e4e437,0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b,0xf279798b data4 0xd5e7e732,0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843,0x8bc8c843 data4 0x6e373759,0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7,0xda6d6db7 data4 0x018d8d8c,0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564,0xb1d5d564 data4 0x9c4e4ed2,0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0,0x49a9a9e0 data4 0xd86c6cb4,0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa,0xac5656fa data4 0xf3f4f407,0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25,0xcfeaea25 data4 0xca6565af,0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e,0xf47a7a8e data4 0x47aeaee9,0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818,0x10080818 data4 0x6fbabad5,0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888,0xf0787888 data4 0x4a25256f,0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72,0x5c2e2e72 data4 0x381c1c24,0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1,0x57a6a6f1 data4 0x73b4b4c7,0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651,0x97c6c651 data4 0xcbe8e823,0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c,0xa1dddd7c data4 0xe874749c,0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21,0x3e1f1f21 data4 0x964b4bdd,0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc,0x61bdbddc data4 0x0d8b8b86,0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85,0x0f8a8a85 data4 0xe0707090,0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42,0x7c3e3e42 data4 0x71b5b5c4,0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa,0xcc6666aa data4 0x904848d8,0x904848d8, 0x06030305,0x06030305 data4 0xf7f6f601,0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12,0x1c0e0e12 data4 0xc26161a3,0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f,0x6a35355f data4 0xae5757f9,0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0,0x69b9b9d0 data4 0x17868691,0x17868691, 0x99c1c158,0x99c1c158 data4 0x3a1d1d27,0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9,0x279e9eb9 data4 0xd9e1e138,0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813,0xebf8f813 data4 0x2b9898b3,0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133,0x22111133 data4 0xd26969bb,0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970,0xa9d9d970 data4 0x078e8e89,0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7,0x339494a7 data4 0x2d9b9bb6,0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22,0x3c1e1e22 data4 0x15878792,0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920,0xc9e9e920 data4 0x87cece49,0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff,0xaa5555ff data4 0x50282878,0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a,0xa5dfdf7a data4 0x038c8c8f,0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8,0x59a1a1f8 data4 0x09898980,0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17,0x1a0d0d17 data4 0x65bfbfda,0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631,0xd7e6e631 data4 0x844242c6,0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8,0xd06868b8 data4 0x824141c3,0x824141c3, 0x299999b0,0x299999b0 data4 0x5a2d2d77,0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11,0x1e0f0f11 data4 0x7bb0b0cb,0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc,0xa85454fc data4 0x6dbbbbd6,0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a,0x2c16163a // Te4: data1 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 data1 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 data1 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 data1 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 data1 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc data1 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 data1 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a data1 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 data1 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 data1 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 data1 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b data1 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf data1 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 data1 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 data1 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 data1 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 data1 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 data1 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 data1 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 data1 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb data1 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c data1 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 data1 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 data1 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 data1 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 data1 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a data1 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e data1 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e data1 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 data1 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf data1 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 data1 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 .size AES_Te#,2048+256 // HP-UX assembler fails to ".-AES_Te#" .align 64 .global AES_Td# .type AES_Td#,@object AES_Td: data4 0x51f4a750,0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553,0x7e416553 data4 0x1a17a4c3,0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96,0x3a275e96 data4 0x3bab6bcb,0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1,0x1f9d45f1 data4 0xacfa58ab,0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393,0x4be30393 data4 0x2030fa55,0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6,0xad766df6 data4 0x88cc7691,0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25,0xf5024c25 data4 0x4fe5d7fc,0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7,0xc52acbd7 data4 0x26354480,0x26354480, 0xb562a38f,0xb562a38f data4 0xdeb15a49,0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67,0x25ba1b67 data4 0x45ea0e98,0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1,0x5dfec0e1 data4 0xc32f7502,0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012,0x814cf012 data4 0x8d4697a3,0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6,0x6bd3f9c6 data4 0x038f5fe7,0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95,0x15929c95 data4 0xbf6d7aeb,0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da,0x955259da data4 0xd4be832d,0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3,0x587421d3 data4 0x49e06929,0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844,0x8ec9c844 data4 0x75c2896a,0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978,0xf48e7978 data4 0x99583e6b,0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd,0x27b971dd data4 0xbee14fb6,0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17,0xf088ad17 data4 0xc920ac66,0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4,0x7dce3ab4 data4 0x63df4a18,0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182,0xe51a3182 data4 0x97513360,0x97513360, 0x62537f45,0x62537f45 data4 0xb16477e0,0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84,0xbb6bae84 data4 0xfe81a01c,0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94,0xf9082b94 data4 0x70486858,0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19,0x8f45fd19 data4 0x94de6c87,0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7,0x527bf8b7 data4 0xab73d323,0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2,0x724b02e2 data4 0xe31f8f57,0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a,0x6655ab2a data4 0xb2eb2807,0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203,0x2fb5c203 data4 0x86c57b9a,0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5,0xd33708a5 data4 0x302887f2,0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2,0x23bfa5b2 data4 0x02036aba,0x02036aba, 0xed16825c,0xed16825c data4 0x8acf1c2b,0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492,0xa779b492 data4 0xf307f2f0,0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1,0x4e69e2a1 data4 0x65daf4cd,0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5,0x0605bed5 data4 0xd134621f,0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a,0xc4a6fe8a data4 0x342e539d,0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0,0xa2f355a0 data4 0x058ae132,0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75,0xa4f6eb75 data4 0x0b83ec39,0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa,0x4060efaa data4 0x5e719f06,0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051,0xbd6e1051 data4 0x3e218af9,0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d,0x96dd063d data4 0xdd3e05ae,0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46,0x4de6bd46 data4 0x91548db5,0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05,0x71c45d05 data4 0x0406d46f,0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff,0x605015ff data4 0x1998fb24,0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997,0xd6bde997 data4 0x894043cc,0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77,0x67d99e77 data4 0xb0e842bd,0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88,0x07898b88 data4 0xe7195b38,0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb,0x79c8eedb data4 0xa17c0a47,0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9,0x7c420fe9 data4 0xf8841ec9,0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000,0x00000000 data4 0x09808683,0x09808683, 0x322bed48,0x322bed48 data4 0x1e1170ac,0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e,0x6c5a724e data4 0xfd0efffb,0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856,0x0f853856 data4 0x3daed51e,0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927,0x362d3927 data4 0x0a0fd964,0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621,0x685ca621 data4 0x9b5b54d1,0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a,0x24362e3a data4 0x0c0a67b1,0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f,0x9357e70f data4 0xb4ee96d2,0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e,0x1b9b919e data4 0x80c0c54f,0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2,0x61dc20a2 data4 0x5a774b69,0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16,0x1c121a16 data4 0xe293ba0a,0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5,0xc0a02ae5 data4 0x3c22e043,0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d,0x121b171d data4 0x0e090d0b,0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad,0xf28bc7ad data4 0x2db6a8b9,0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8,0x141ea9c8 data4 0x57f11985,0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c,0xaf75074c data4 0xee99ddbb,0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd,0xa37f60fd data4 0xf701269f,0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc,0x5c72f5bc data4 0x44663bc5,0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34,0x5bfb7e34 data4 0x8b432976,0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc,0xcb23c6dc data4 0xb6edfc68,0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163,0xb8e4f163 data4 0xd731dcca,0xd731dcca, 0x42638510,0x42638510 data4 0x13972240,0x13972240, 0x84c61120,0x84c61120 data4 0x854a247d,0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8,0xd2bb3df8 data4 0xaef93211,0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d,0xc729a16d data4 0x1d9e2f4b,0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3,0xdcb230f3 data4 0x0d8652ec,0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0,0x77c1e3d0 data4 0x2bb3166c,0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999,0xa970b999 data4 0x119448fa,0x119448fa, 0x47e96422,0x47e96422 data4 0xa8fc8cc4,0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a,0xa0f03f1a data4 0x567d2cd8,0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef,0x223390ef data4 0x87494ec7,0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1,0xd938d1c1 data4 0x8ccaa2fe,0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36,0x98d40b36 data4 0xa6f581cf,0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28,0xa57ade28 data4 0xdab78e26,0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4,0x3fadbfa4 data4 0x2c3a9de4,0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d,0x5078920d data4 0x6a5fcc9b,0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662,0x547e4662 data4 0xf68d13c2,0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8,0x90d8b8e8 data4 0x2e39f75e,0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5,0x82c3aff5 data4 0x9f5d80be,0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c,0x69d0937c data4 0x6fd52da9,0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3,0xcf2512b3 data4 0xc8ac993b,0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7,0x10187da7 data4 0xe89c636e,0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b,0xdb3bbb7b data4 0xcd267809,0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4,0x6e5918f4 data4 0xec9ab701,0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8,0x834f9aa8 data4 0xe6956e65,0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e,0xaaffe67e data4 0x21bccf08,0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6,0xef15e8e6 data4 0xbae79bd9,0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce,0x4a6f36ce data4 0xea9f09d4,0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6,0x29b07cd6 data4 0x31a4b2af,0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331,0x2a3f2331 data4 0xc6a59430,0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0,0x35a266c0 data4 0x744ebc37,0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6,0xfc82caa6 data4 0xe090d0b0,0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815,0x33a7d815 data4 0xf104984a,0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7,0x41ecdaf7 data4 0x7fcd500e,0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f,0x1791f62f data4 0x764dd68d,0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d,0x43efb04d data4 0xccaa4d54,0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df,0xe49604df data4 0x9ed1b5e3,0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b,0x4c6a881b data4 0xc12c1fb8,0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f,0x4665517f data4 0x9d5eea04,0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d,0x018c355d data4 0xfa877473,0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e,0xfb0b412e data4 0xb3671d5a,0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252,0x92dbd252 data4 0xe9105633,0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713,0x6dd64713 data4 0x9ad7618c,0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a,0x37a10c7a data4 0x59f8148e,0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89,0xeb133c89 data4 0xcea927ee,0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935,0xb761c935 data4 0xe11ce5ed,0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c,0x7a47b13c data4 0x9cd2df59,0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f,0x55f2733f data4 0x1814ce79,0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf,0x73c737bf data4 0x53f7cdea,0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b,0x5ffdaa5b data4 0xdf3d6f14,0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86,0x7844db86 data4 0xcaaff381,0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e,0xb968c43e data4 0x3824342c,0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f,0xc2a3405f data4 0x161dc372,0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c,0xbce2250c data4 0x283c498b,0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541,0xff0d9541 data4 0x39a80171,0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de,0x080cb3de data4 0xd8b4e49c,0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190,0x6456c190 data4 0x7bcb8461,0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670,0xd532b670 data4 0x486c5c74,0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742,0xd0b85742 // Td4: data1 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 data1 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb data1 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 data1 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb data1 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d data1 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e data1 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 data1 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 data1 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 data1 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 data1 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda data1 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 data1 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a data1 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 data1 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 data1 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b data1 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea data1 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 data1 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 data1 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e data1 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 data1 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b data1 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 data1 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 data1 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 data1 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f data1 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d data1 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef data1 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 data1 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 data1 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 data1 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d .size AES_Td#,2048+256 // HP-UX assembler fails to ".-AES_Td#" openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl0000644000000000000000000012633513176625656017537 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # [Endian-neutral] AES for C64x+. # # Even though SPLOOPs are scheduled for 13 cycles, and thus expected # performance is ~8.5 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key, # measured performance turned to be ~10 cycles per byte. Discrepancy # must be caused by limitations of L1D memory banking(*), see SPRU871 # TI publication for further details. If any consolation it's still # ~20% faster than TI's linear assembly module anyway... Compared to # aes_core.c compiled with cl6x 6.0 with -mv6400+ -o2 options this # code is 3.75x faster and almost 3x smaller (tables included). # # (*) This means that there might be subtle correlation between data # and timing and one can wonder if it can be ... attacked:-( # On the other hand this also means that *if* one chooses to # implement *4* T-tables variant [instead of 1 T-table as in # this implementation, or in addition to], then one ought to # *interleave* them. Even though it complicates addressing, # references to interleaved tables would be guaranteed not to # clash. I reckon that it should be possible to break 8 cycles # per byte "barrier," i.e. improve by ~20%, naturally at the # cost of 8x increased pressure on L1D. 8x because you'd have # to interleave both Te and Td tables... while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; ($TEA,$TEB)=("A5","B5"); ($KPA,$KPB)=("A3","B1"); @K=("A6","B6","A7","B7"); @s=("A8","B8","A9","B9"); @Te0=@Td0=("A16","B16","A17","B17"); @Te1=@Td1=("A18","B18","A19","B19"); @Te2=@Td2=("A20","B20","A21","B21"); @Te3=@Td3=("A22","B22","A23","B23"); $code=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .nocmp .asg AES_encrypt,_AES_encrypt .asg AES_decrypt,_AES_decrypt .asg AES_set_encrypt_key,_AES_set_encrypt_key .asg AES_set_decrypt_key,_AES_set_decrypt_key .asg AES_ctr32_encrypt,_AES_ctr32_encrypt .endif .asg B3,RA .asg A4,INP .asg B4,OUT .asg A6,KEY .asg A4,RET .asg B15,SP .eval 24,EXT0 .eval 16,EXT1 .eval 8,EXT2 .eval 0,EXT3 .eval 8,TBL1 .eval 16,TBL2 .eval 24,TBL3 .if .BIG_ENDIAN .eval 24-EXT0,EXT0 .eval 24-EXT1,EXT1 .eval 24-EXT2,EXT2 .eval 24-EXT3,EXT3 .eval 32-TBL1,TBL1 .eval 32-TBL2,TBL2 .eval 32-TBL3,TBL3 .endif .global _AES_encrypt _AES_encrypt: .asmfunc MVK 1,B2 __encrypt: .if __TI_EABI__ [B2] LDNDW *INP++,A9:A8 ; load input || MVKL \$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te,__encrypt),$TEA || ADDKPC __encrypt,B0 [B2] LDNDW *INP++,B9:B8 || MVKH \$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te,__encrypt),$TEA || ADD 0,KEY,$KPA || ADD 4,KEY,$KPB .else [B2] LDNDW *INP++,A9:A8 ; load input || MVKL (AES_Te-__encrypt),$TEA || ADDKPC __encrypt,B0 [B2] LDNDW *INP++,B9:B8 || MVKH (AES_Te-__encrypt),$TEA || ADD 0,KEY,$KPA || ADD 4,KEY,$KPB .endif LDW *$KPA++[2],$Te0[0] ; zero round key || LDW *$KPB++[2],$Te0[1] || MVK 60,A0 || ADD B0,$TEA,$TEA ; AES_Te LDW *KEY[A0],B0 ; rounds || MVK 1024,A0 ; sizeof(AES_Te) LDW *$KPA++[2],$Te0[2] || LDW *$KPB++[2],$Te0[3] || MV $TEA,$TEB NOP .if .BIG_ENDIAN MV A9,$s[0] || MV A8,$s[1] || MV B9,$s[2] || MV B8,$s[3] .else MV A8,$s[0] || MV A9,$s[1] || MV B8,$s[2] || MV B9,$s[3] .endif XOR $Te0[0],$s[0],$s[0] || XOR $Te0[1],$s[1],$s[1] || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[0] ; 1st round key || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[1] SUB B0,2,B0 SPLOOPD 13 || MVC B0,ILC || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[2] || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[3] ;;==================================================================== EXTU $s[1],EXT1,24,$Te1[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT3,24,$Te3[0] LDW *${TEB}[$Te1[1]],$Te1[1] ; Te1[s1>>8], t0 || LDW *${TEA}[$Te3[0]],$Te3[0] ; Te3[s0>>24], t1 || XOR $s[2],$Te0[2],$s[2] ; modulo-scheduled || XOR $s[3],$Te0[3],$s[3] ; modulo-scheduled || EXTU $s[1],EXT3,24,$Te3[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT1,24,$Te1[0] LDW *${TEB}[$Te3[1]],$Te3[1] ; Te3[s1>>24], t2 || LDW *${TEA}[$Te1[0]],$Te1[0] ; Te1[s0>>8], t3 || EXTU $s[2],EXT2,24,$Te2[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT2,24,$Te2[3] LDW *${TEA}[$Te2[2]],$Te2[2] ; Te2[s2>>16], t0 || LDW *${TEB}[$Te2[3]],$Te2[3] ; Te2[s3>>16], t1 || EXTU $s[3],EXT3,24,$Te3[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT1,24,$Te1[2] LDW *${TEB}[$Te3[3]],$Te3[3] ; Te3[s3>>24], t0 || LDW *${TEA}[$Te1[2]],$Te1[2] ; Te1[s2>>8], t1 || EXTU $s[0],EXT2,24,$Te2[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT2,24,$Te2[1] LDW *${TEA}[$Te2[0]],$Te2[0] ; Te2[s0>>16], t2 || LDW *${TEB}[$Te2[1]],$Te2[1] ; Te2[s1>>16], t3 || EXTU $s[3],EXT1,24,$Te1[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT3,24,$Te3[2] LDW *${TEB}[$Te1[3]],$Te1[3] ; Te1[s3>>8], t2 || LDW *${TEA}[$Te3[2]],$Te3[2] ; Te3[s2>>24], t3 || ROTL $Te1[1],TBL1,$Te3[0] ; t0 || ROTL $Te3[0],TBL3,$Te1[1] ; t1 || EXTU $s[0],EXT0,24,$Te0[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT0,24,$Te0[1] LDW *${TEA}[$Te0[0]],$Te0[0] ; Te0[s0], t0 || LDW *${TEB}[$Te0[1]],$Te0[1] ; Te0[s1], t1 || ROTL $Te3[1],TBL3,$Te1[0] ; t2 || ROTL $Te1[0],TBL1,$Te3[1] ; t3 || EXTU $s[2],EXT0,24,$Te0[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT0,24,$Te0[3] LDW *${TEA}[$Te0[2]],$Te0[2] ; Te0[s2], t2 || LDW *${TEB}[$Te0[3]],$Te0[3] ; Te0[s3], t3 || ROTL $Te2[2],TBL2,$Te2[2] ; t0 || ROTL $Te2[3],TBL2,$Te2[3] ; t1 || XOR $K[0],$Te3[0],$s[0] || XOR $K[1],$Te1[1],$s[1] ROTL $Te3[3],TBL3,$Te1[2] ; t0 || ROTL $Te1[2],TBL1,$Te3[3] ; t1 || XOR $K[2],$Te1[0],$s[2] || XOR $K[3],$Te3[1],$s[3] || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[0] ; next round key || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[1] ROTL $Te2[0],TBL2,$Te2[0] ; t2 || ROTL $Te2[1],TBL2,$Te2[1] ; t3 || XOR $s[0],$Te2[2],$s[0] || XOR $s[1],$Te2[3],$s[1] || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[2] || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[3] ROTL $Te1[3],TBL1,$Te3[2] ; t2 || ROTL $Te3[2],TBL3,$Te1[3] ; t3 || XOR $s[0],$Te1[2],$s[0] || XOR $s[1],$Te3[3],$s[1] XOR $s[2],$Te2[0],$s[2] || XOR $s[3],$Te2[1],$s[3] || XOR $s[0],$Te0[0],$s[0] || XOR $s[1],$Te0[1],$s[1] SPKERNEL || XOR.L $s[2],$Te3[2],$s[2] || XOR.L $s[3],$Te1[3],$s[3] ;;==================================================================== ADD.D ${TEA},A0,${TEA} ; point to Te4 || ADD.D ${TEB},A0,${TEB} || EXTU $s[1],EXT1,24,$Te1[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT3,24,$Te3[0] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te1[1]],$Te1[1] ; Te1[s1>>8], t0 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Te3[0]],$Te3[0] ; Te3[s0>>24], t1 || XOR $s[2],$Te0[2],$s[2] ; modulo-scheduled || XOR $s[3],$Te0[3],$s[3] ; modulo-scheduled || EXTU $s[0],EXT0,24,$Te0[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT0,24,$Te0[1] LDBU *${TEA}[$Te0[0]],$Te0[0] ; Te0[s0], t0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te0[1]],$Te0[1] ; Te0[s1], t1 || EXTU $s[3],EXT3,24,$Te3[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT1,24,$Te1[2] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te3[3]],$Te3[3] ; Te3[s3>>24], t0 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Te1[2]],$Te1[2] ; Te1[s2>>8], t1 || EXTU $s[2],EXT2,24,$Te2[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT2,24,$Te2[3] LDBU *${TEA}[$Te2[2]],$Te2[2] ; Te2[s2>>16], t0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te2[3]],$Te2[3] ; Te2[s3>>16], t1 || EXTU $s[1],EXT3,24,$Te3[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT1,24,$Te1[0] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te3[1]],$Te3[1] ; Te3[s1>>24], t2 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Te1[0]],$Te1[0] ; Te1[s0>>8], t3 || EXTU $s[3],EXT1,24,$Te1[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT3,24,$Te3[2] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te1[3]],$Te1[3] ; Te1[s3>>8], t2 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Te3[2]],$Te3[2] ; Te3[s2>>24], t3 || EXTU $s[2],EXT0,24,$Te0[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT0,24,$Te0[3] LDBU *${TEA}[$Te0[2]],$Te0[2] ; Te0[s2], t2 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te0[3]],$Te0[3] ; Te0[s3], t3 || EXTU $s[0],EXT2,24,$Te2[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT2,24,$Te2[1] LDBU *${TEA}[$Te2[0]],$Te2[0] ; Te2[s0>>16], t2 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te2[1]],$Te2[1] ; Te2[s1>>16], t3 .if .BIG_ENDIAN PACK2 $Te0[0],$Te1[1],$Te0[0] || PACK2 $Te0[1],$Te1[2],$Te0[1] PACK2 $Te2[2],$Te3[3],$Te2[2] || PACK2 $Te2[3],$Te3[0],$Te2[3] PACKL4 $Te0[0],$Te2[2],$Te0[0] || PACKL4 $Te0[1],$Te2[3],$Te0[1] XOR $K[0],$Te0[0],$Te0[0] ; s[0] || XOR $K[1],$Te0[1],$Te0[1] ; s[1] PACK2 $Te0[2],$Te1[3],$Te0[2] || PACK2 $Te0[3],$Te1[0],$Te0[3] PACK2 $Te2[0],$Te3[1],$Te2[0] || PACK2 $Te2[1],$Te3[2],$Te2[1] || BNOP RA PACKL4 $Te0[2],$Te2[0],$Te0[2] || PACKL4 $Te0[3],$Te2[1],$Te0[3] XOR $K[2],$Te0[2],$Te0[2] ; s[2] || XOR $K[3],$Te0[3],$Te0[3] ; s[3] MV $Te0[0],A9 || MV $Te0[1],A8 MV $Te0[2],B9 || MV $Te0[3],B8 || [B2] STNDW A9:A8,*OUT++ [B2] STNDW B9:B8,*OUT++ .else PACK2 $Te1[1],$Te0[0],$Te1[1] || PACK2 $Te1[2],$Te0[1],$Te1[2] PACK2 $Te3[3],$Te2[2],$Te3[3] || PACK2 $Te3[0],$Te2[3],$Te3[0] PACKL4 $Te3[3],$Te1[1],$Te1[1] || PACKL4 $Te3[0],$Te1[2],$Te1[2] XOR $K[0],$Te1[1],$Te1[1] ; s[0] || XOR $K[1],$Te1[2],$Te1[2] ; s[1] PACK2 $Te1[3],$Te0[2],$Te1[3] || PACK2 $Te1[0],$Te0[3],$Te1[0] PACK2 $Te3[1],$Te2[0],$Te3[1] || PACK2 $Te3[2],$Te2[1],$Te3[2] || BNOP RA PACKL4 $Te3[1],$Te1[3],$Te1[3] || PACKL4 $Te3[2],$Te1[0],$Te1[0] XOR $K[2],$Te1[3],$Te1[3] ; s[2] || XOR $K[3],$Te1[0],$Te1[0] ; s[3] MV $Te1[1],A8 || MV $Te1[2],A9 MV $Te1[3],B8 || MV $Te1[0],B9 || [B2] STNDW A9:A8,*OUT++ [B2] STNDW B9:B8,*OUT++ .endif .endasmfunc .global _AES_decrypt _AES_decrypt: .asmfunc MVK 1,B2 __decrypt: .if __TI_EABI__ [B2] LDNDW *INP++,A9:A8 ; load input || MVKL \$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Td,__decrypt),$TEA || ADDKPC __decrypt,B0 [B2] LDNDW *INP++,B9:B8 || MVKH \$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Td,__decrypt),$TEA || ADD 0,KEY,$KPA || ADD 4,KEY,$KPB .else [B2] LDNDW *INP++,A9:A8 ; load input || MVKL (AES_Td-__decrypt),$TEA || ADDKPC __decrypt,B0 [B2] LDNDW *INP++,B9:B8 || MVKH (AES_Td-__decrypt),$TEA || ADD 0,KEY,$KPA || ADD 4,KEY,$KPB .endif LDW *$KPA++[2],$Td0[0] ; zero round key || LDW *$KPB++[2],$Td0[1] || MVK 60,A0 || ADD B0,$TEA,$TEA ; AES_Td LDW *KEY[A0],B0 ; rounds || MVK 1024,A0 ; sizeof(AES_Td) LDW *$KPA++[2],$Td0[2] || LDW *$KPB++[2],$Td0[3] || MV $TEA,$TEB NOP .if .BIG_ENDIAN MV A9,$s[0] || MV A8,$s[1] || MV B9,$s[2] || MV B8,$s[3] .else MV A8,$s[0] || MV A9,$s[1] || MV B8,$s[2] || MV B9,$s[3] .endif XOR $Td0[0],$s[0],$s[0] || XOR $Td0[1],$s[1],$s[1] || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[0] ; 1st round key || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[1] SUB B0,2,B0 SPLOOPD 13 || MVC B0,ILC || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[2] || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[3] ;;==================================================================== EXTU $s[1],EXT3,24,$Td3[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT1,24,$Td1[0] LDW *${TEB}[$Td3[1]],$Td3[1] ; Td3[s1>>24], t0 || LDW *${TEA}[$Td1[0]],$Td1[0] ; Td1[s0>>8], t1 || XOR $s[2],$Td0[2],$s[2] ; modulo-scheduled || XOR $s[3],$Td0[3],$s[3] ; modulo-scheduled || EXTU $s[1],EXT1,24,$Td1[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT3,24,$Td3[0] LDW *${TEB}[$Td1[1]],$Td1[1] ; Td1[s1>>8], t2 || LDW *${TEA}[$Td3[0]],$Td3[0] ; Td3[s0>>24], t3 || EXTU $s[2],EXT2,24,$Td2[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT2,24,$Td2[3] LDW *${TEA}[$Td2[2]],$Td2[2] ; Td2[s2>>16], t0 || LDW *${TEB}[$Td2[3]],$Td2[3] ; Td2[s3>>16], t1 || EXTU $s[3],EXT1,24,$Td1[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT3,24,$Td3[2] LDW *${TEB}[$Td1[3]],$Td1[3] ; Td1[s3>>8], t0 || LDW *${TEA}[$Td3[2]],$Td3[2] ; Td3[s2>>24], t1 || EXTU $s[0],EXT2,24,$Td2[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT2,24,$Td2[1] LDW *${TEA}[$Td2[0]],$Td2[0] ; Td2[s0>>16], t2 || LDW *${TEB}[$Td2[1]],$Td2[1] ; Td2[s1>>16], t3 || EXTU $s[3],EXT3,24,$Td3[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT1,24,$Td1[2] LDW *${TEB}[$Td3[3]],$Td3[3] ; Td3[s3>>24], t2 || LDW *${TEA}[$Td1[2]],$Td1[2] ; Td1[s2>>8], t3 || ROTL $Td3[1],TBL3,$Td1[0] ; t0 || ROTL $Td1[0],TBL1,$Td3[1] ; t1 || EXTU $s[0],EXT0,24,$Td0[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT0,24,$Td0[1] LDW *${TEA}[$Td0[0]],$Td0[0] ; Td0[s0], t0 || LDW *${TEB}[$Td0[1]],$Td0[1] ; Td0[s1], t1 || ROTL $Td1[1],TBL1,$Td3[0] ; t2 || ROTL $Td3[0],TBL3,$Td1[1] ; t3 || EXTU $s[2],EXT0,24,$Td0[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT0,24,$Td0[3] LDW *${TEA}[$Td0[2]],$Td0[2] ; Td0[s2], t2 || LDW *${TEB}[$Td0[3]],$Td0[3] ; Td0[s3], t3 || ROTL $Td2[2],TBL2,$Td2[2] ; t0 || ROTL $Td2[3],TBL2,$Td2[3] ; t1 || XOR $K[0],$Td1[0],$s[0] || XOR $K[1],$Td3[1],$s[1] ROTL $Td1[3],TBL1,$Td3[2] ; t0 || ROTL $Td3[2],TBL3,$Td1[3] ; t1 || XOR $K[2],$Td3[0],$s[2] || XOR $K[3],$Td1[1],$s[3] || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[0] ; next round key || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[1] ROTL $Td2[0],TBL2,$Td2[0] ; t2 || ROTL $Td2[1],TBL2,$Td2[1] ; t3 || XOR $s[0],$Td2[2],$s[0] || XOR $s[1],$Td2[3],$s[1] || LDW *$KPA++[2],$K[2] || LDW *$KPB++[2],$K[3] ROTL $Td3[3],TBL3,$Td1[2] ; t2 || ROTL $Td1[2],TBL1,$Td3[3] ; t3 || XOR $s[0],$Td3[2],$s[0] || XOR $s[1],$Td1[3],$s[1] XOR $s[2],$Td2[0],$s[2] || XOR $s[3],$Td2[1],$s[3] || XOR $s[0],$Td0[0],$s[0] || XOR $s[1],$Td0[1],$s[1] SPKERNEL || XOR.L $s[2],$Td1[2],$s[2] || XOR.L $s[3],$Td3[3],$s[3] ;;==================================================================== ADD.D ${TEA},A0,${TEA} ; point to Td4 || ADD.D ${TEB},A0,${TEB} || EXTU $s[1],EXT3,24,$Td3[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT1,24,$Td1[0] LDBU *${TEB}[$Td3[1]],$Td3[1] ; Td3[s1>>24], t0 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Td1[0]],$Td1[0] ; Td1[s0>>8], t1 || XOR $s[2],$Td0[2],$s[2] ; modulo-scheduled || XOR $s[3],$Td0[3],$s[3] ; modulo-scheduled || EXTU $s[0],EXT0,24,$Td0[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT0,24,$Td0[1] LDBU *${TEA}[$Td0[0]],$Td0[0] ; Td0[s0], t0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Td0[1]],$Td0[1] ; Td0[s1], t1 || EXTU $s[2],EXT2,24,$Td2[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT2,24,$Td2[3] LDBU *${TEA}[$Td2[2]],$Td2[2] ; Td2[s2>>16], t0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Td2[3]],$Td2[3] ; Td2[s3>>16], t1 || EXTU $s[3],EXT1,24,$Td1[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT3,24,$Td3[2] LDBU *${TEB}[$Td1[3]],$Td1[3] ; Td1[s3>>8], t0 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Td3[2]],$Td3[2] ; Td3[s2>>24], t1 || EXTU $s[1],EXT1,24,$Td1[1] || EXTU $s[0],EXT3,24,$Td3[0] LDBU *${TEB}[$Td1[1]],$Td1[1] ; Td1[s1>>8], t2 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Td3[0]],$Td3[0] ; Td3[s0>>24], t3 || EXTU $s[0],EXT2,24,$Td2[0] || EXTU $s[1],EXT2,24,$Td2[1] LDBU *${TEA}[$Td2[0]],$Td2[0] ; Td2[s0>>16], t2 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Td2[1]],$Td2[1] ; Td2[s1>>16], t3 || EXTU $s[3],EXT3,24,$Td3[3] || EXTU $s[2],EXT1,24,$Td1[2] LDBU *${TEB}[$Td3[3]],$Td3[3] ; Td3[s3>>24], t2 || LDBU *${TEA}[$Td1[2]],$Td1[2] ; Td1[s2>>8], t3 || EXTU $s[2],EXT0,24,$Td0[2] || EXTU $s[3],EXT0,24,$Td0[3] LDBU *${TEA}[$Td0[2]],$Td0[2] ; Td0[s2], t2 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Td0[3]],$Td0[3] ; Td0[s3], t3 .if .BIG_ENDIAN PACK2 $Td0[0],$Td1[3],$Td0[0] || PACK2 $Td0[1],$Td1[0],$Td0[1] PACK2 $Td2[2],$Td3[1],$Td2[2] || PACK2 $Td2[3],$Td3[2],$Td2[3] PACKL4 $Td0[0],$Td2[2],$Td0[0] || PACKL4 $Td0[1],$Td2[3],$Td0[1] XOR $K[0],$Td0[0],$Td0[0] ; s[0] || XOR $K[1],$Td0[1],$Td0[1] ; s[1] PACK2 $Td0[2],$Td1[1],$Td0[2] || PACK2 $Td0[3],$Td1[2],$Td0[3] PACK2 $Td2[0],$Td3[3],$Td2[0] || PACK2 $Td2[1],$Td3[0],$Td2[1] || BNOP RA PACKL4 $Td0[2],$Td2[0],$Td0[2] || PACKL4 $Td0[3],$Td2[1],$Td0[3] XOR $K[2],$Td0[2],$Td0[2] ; s[2] || XOR $K[3],$Td0[3],$Td0[3] ; s[3] MV $Td0[0],A9 || MV $Td0[1],A8 MV $Td0[2],B9 || MV $Td0[3],B8 || [B2] STNDW A9:A8,*OUT++ [B2] STNDW B9:B8,*OUT++ .else PACK2 $Td1[3],$Td0[0],$Td1[3] || PACK2 $Td1[0],$Td0[1],$Td1[0] PACK2 $Td3[1],$Td2[2],$Td3[1] || PACK2 $Td3[2],$Td2[3],$Td3[2] PACKL4 $Td3[1],$Td1[3],$Td1[3] || PACKL4 $Td3[2],$Td1[0],$Td1[0] XOR $K[0],$Td1[3],$Td1[3] ; s[0] || XOR $K[1],$Td1[0],$Td1[0] ; s[1] PACK2 $Td1[1],$Td0[2],$Td1[1] || PACK2 $Td1[2],$Td0[3],$Td1[2] PACK2 $Td3[3],$Td2[0],$Td3[3] || PACK2 $Td3[0],$Td2[1],$Td3[0] || BNOP RA PACKL4 $Td3[3],$Td1[1],$Td1[1] || PACKL4 $Td3[0],$Td1[2],$Td1[2] XOR $K[2],$Td1[1],$Td1[1] ; s[2] || XOR $K[3],$Td1[2],$Td1[2] ; s[3] MV $Td1[3],A8 || MV $Td1[0],A9 MV $Td1[1],B8 || MV $Td1[2],B9 || [B2] STNDW A9:A8,*OUT++ [B2] STNDW B9:B8,*OUT++ .endif .endasmfunc ___ { my @K=(@K,@s); # extended key my @Te4=map("B$_",(16..19)); my @Kx9=@Te0; # used in AES_set_decrypt_key my @KxB=@Te1; my @KxD=@Te2; my @KxE=@Te3; $code.=<<___; .asg OUT,BITS .global _AES_set_encrypt_key _AES_set_encrypt_key: __set_encrypt_key: .asmfunc MV INP,A0 || SHRU BITS,5,BITS ; 128-192-256 -> 4-6-8 || MV KEY,A1 [!A0] B RA ||[!A0] MVK -1,RET ||[!A0] MVK 1,A1 ; only one B RA [!A1] B RA ||[!A1] MVK -1,RET ||[!A1] MVK 0,A0 || MVK 0,B0 || MVK 0,A1 [A0] LDNDW *INP++,A9:A8 || [A0] CMPEQ 4,BITS,B0 || [A0] CMPLT 3,BITS,A1 [B0] B key128? || [A1] LDNDW *INP++,B9:B8 || [A0] CMPEQ 6,BITS,B0 || [A0] CMPLT 5,BITS,A1 [B0] B key192? || [A1] LDNDW *INP++,B17:B16 || [A0] CMPEQ 8,BITS,B0 || [A0] CMPLT 7,BITS,A1 [B0] B key256? || [A1] LDNDW *INP++,B19:B18 .if __TI_EABI__ [A0] ADD 0,KEY,$KPA || [A0] ADD 4,KEY,$KPB || [A0] MVKL \$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te4,__set_encrypt_key),$TEA || [A0] ADDKPC __set_encrypt_key,B6 [A0] MVKH \$PCR_OFFSET(AES_Te4,__set_encrypt_key),$TEA [A0] ADD B6,$TEA,$TEA ; AES_Te4 .else [A0] ADD 0,KEY,$KPA || [A0] ADD 4,KEY,$KPB || [A0] MVKL (AES_Te4-__set_encrypt_key),$TEA || [A0] ADDKPC __set_encrypt_key,B6 [A0] MVKH (AES_Te4-__set_encrypt_key),$TEA [A0] ADD B6,$TEA,$TEA ; AES_Te4 .endif NOP NOP BNOP RA,5 || MVK -2,RET ; unknown bit length || MVK 0,B0 ; redundant ;;==================================================================== ;;==================================================================== key128?: .if .BIG_ENDIAN MV A9,$K[0] || MV A8,$K[1] || MV B9,$Te4[2] || MV B8,$K[3] .else MV A8,$K[0] || MV A9,$K[1] || MV B8,$Te4[2] || MV B9,$K[3] .endif MVK 256,A0 || MVK 9,B0 SPLOOPD 14 || MVC B0,ILC || MV $TEA,$TEB || ADD $TEA,A0,A30 ; rcon ;;==================================================================== LDW *A30++[1],A31 ; rcon[i] || MV $Te4[2],$K[2] || EXTU $K[3],EXT1,24,$Te4[0] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0] || MV $K[3],A0 || EXTU $K[3],EXT2,24,$Te4[1] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1] || EXTU A0,EXT3,24,A0 || EXTU $K[3],EXT0,24,$Te4[3] .if .BIG_ENDIAN LDBU *${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3] || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0 .else LDBU *${TEA}[A0],A0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3] .endif STW $K[0],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[1],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[2],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[3],*$KPB++[2] XOR A31,$K[0],$K[0] ; ^=rcon[i] .if .BIG_ENDIAN PACK2 $Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1] PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] PACKL4 $Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3] .else PACK2 $Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1] PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] PACKL4 $Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3] .endif XOR $Te4[3],$K[0],$Te4[0] ; K[0] XOR $Te4[0],$K[1],$K[1] ; K[1] MV $Te4[0],$K[0] || XOR $K[1],$K[2],$Te4[2] ; K[2] XOR $Te4[2],$K[3],$K[3] ; K[3] SPKERNEL ;;==================================================================== BNOP RA MV $Te4[2],$K[2] || STW $K[0],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[1],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[2],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[3],*$KPB++[2] MVK 10,B0 ; rounds STW B0,*++${KPB}[15] MVK 0,RET ;;==================================================================== ;;==================================================================== key192?: .if .BIG_ENDIAN MV A9,$K[0] || MV A8,$K[1] || MV B9,$K[2] || MV B8,$K[3] MV B17,$Te4[2] || MV B16,$K[5] .else MV A8,$K[0] || MV A9,$K[1] || MV B8,$K[2] || MV B9,$K[3] MV B16,$Te4[2] || MV B17,$K[5] .endif MVK 256,A0 || MVK 6,B0 MV $TEA,$TEB || ADD $TEA,A0,A30 ; rcon ;;==================================================================== loop192?: LDW *A30++[1],A31 ; rcon[i] || MV $Te4[2],$K[4] || EXTU $K[5],EXT1,24,$Te4[0] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0] || MV $K[5],A0 || EXTU $K[5],EXT2,24,$Te4[1] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1] || EXTU A0,EXT3,24,A0 || EXTU $K[5],EXT0,24,$Te4[3] .if .BIG_ENDIAN LDBU *${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3] || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0 .else LDBU *${TEA}[A0],A0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3] .endif STW $K[0],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[1],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[2],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[3],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[4],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[5],*$KPB++[2] XOR A31,$K[0],$K[0] ; ^=rcon[i] .if .BIG_ENDIAN PACK2 $Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1] || PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] PACKL4 $Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3] .else PACK2 $Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1] || PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] PACKL4 $Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3] .endif BDEC loop192?,B0 || XOR $Te4[3],$K[0],$Te4[0] ; K[0] XOR $Te4[0],$K[1],$K[1] ; K[1] MV $Te4[0],$K[0] || XOR $K[1],$K[2],$Te4[2] ; K[2] XOR $Te4[2],$K[3],$K[3] ; K[3] MV $Te4[2],$K[2] || XOR $K[3],$K[4],$Te4[2] ; K[4] XOR $Te4[2],$K[5],$K[5] ; K[5] ;;==================================================================== BNOP RA STW $K[0],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[1],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[2],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[3],*$KPB++[2] MVK 12,B0 ; rounds STW B0,*++${KPB}[7] MVK 0,RET ;;==================================================================== ;;==================================================================== key256?: .if .BIG_ENDIAN MV A9,$K[0] || MV A8,$K[1] || MV B9,$K[2] || MV B8,$K[3] MV B17,$K[4] || MV B16,$K[5] || MV B19,$Te4[2] || MV B18,$K[7] .else MV A8,$K[0] || MV A9,$K[1] || MV B8,$K[2] || MV B9,$K[3] MV B16,$K[4] || MV B17,$K[5] || MV B18,$Te4[2] || MV B19,$K[7] .endif MVK 256,A0 || MVK 6,B0 MV $TEA,$TEB || ADD $TEA,A0,A30 ; rcon ;;==================================================================== loop256?: LDW *A30++[1],A31 ; rcon[i] || MV $Te4[2],$K[6] || EXTU $K[7],EXT1,24,$Te4[0] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0] || MV $K[7],A0 || EXTU $K[7],EXT2,24,$Te4[1] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1] || EXTU A0,EXT3,24,A0 || EXTU $K[7],EXT0,24,$Te4[3] .if .BIG_ENDIAN LDBU *${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3] || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0 .else LDBU *${TEA}[A0],A0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3] .endif STW $K[0],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[1],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[2],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[3],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[4],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[5],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[6],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[7],*$KPB++[2] || XOR A31,$K[0],$K[0] ; ^=rcon[i] .if .BIG_ENDIAN PACK2 $Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1] || PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] PACKL4 $Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3] ||[!B0] B done256? .else PACK2 $Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1] || PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] PACKL4 $Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3] ||[!B0] B done256? .endif XOR $Te4[3],$K[0],$Te4[0] ; K[0] XOR $Te4[0],$K[1],$K[1] ; K[1] MV $Te4[0],$K[0] || XOR $K[1],$K[2],$Te4[2] ; K[2] XOR $Te4[2],$K[3],$K[3] ; K[3] MV $Te4[2],$K[2] || [B0] EXTU $K[3],EXT0,24,$Te4[0] || [B0] SUB B0,1,B0 LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[0]],$Te4[0] || MV $K[3],A0 || EXTU $K[3],EXT1,24,$Te4[1] LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[1]],$Te4[1] || EXTU A0,EXT2,24,A0 || EXTU $K[3],EXT3,24,$Te4[3] .if .BIG_ENDIAN LDBU *${TEA}[A0],$Te4[3] || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],A0 NOP 3 PACK2 $Te4[0],$Te4[1],$Te4[1] PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] || B loop256? PACKL4 $Te4[1],$Te4[3],$Te4[3] .else LDBU *${TEA}[A0],A0 || LDBU *${TEB}[$Te4[3]],$Te4[3] NOP 3 PACK2 $Te4[1],$Te4[0],$Te4[1] PACK2 $Te4[3],A0,$Te4[3] || B loop256? PACKL4 $Te4[3],$Te4[1],$Te4[3] .endif XOR $Te4[3],$K[4],$Te4[0] ; K[4] XOR $Te4[0],$K[5],$K[5] ; K[5] MV $Te4[0],$K[4] || XOR $K[5],$K[6],$Te4[2] ; K[6] XOR $Te4[2],$K[7],$K[7] ; K[7] ;;==================================================================== done256?: BNOP RA STW $K[0],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[1],*$KPB++[2] STW $K[2],*$KPA++[2] || STW $K[3],*$KPB++[2] MVK 14,B0 ; rounds STW B0,*--${KPB}[1] MVK 0,RET .endasmfunc .global _AES_set_decrypt_key _AES_set_decrypt_key: .asmfunc B __set_encrypt_key ; guarantee local call MV KEY,B30 ; B30 is not modified MV RA, B31 ; B31 is not modified ADDKPC ret?,RA,2 ret?: ; B0 holds rounds or zero [!B0] BNOP B31 ; return if zero [B0] SHL B0,4,A0 ; offset to last round key [B0] SHRU B0,1,B1 [B0] SUB B1,1,B1 [B0] MVK 0x0000001B,B3 ; AES polynomial [B0] MVKH 0x07000000,B3 SPLOOPD 9 ; flip round keys || MVC B1,ILC || MV B30,$KPA || ADD B30,A0,$KPB || MVK 16,A0 ; sizeof(round key) ;;==================================================================== LDW *${KPA}[0],A16 || LDW *${KPB}[0],B16 LDW *${KPA}[1],A17 || LDW *${KPB}[1],B17 LDW *${KPA}[2],A18 || LDW *${KPB}[2],B18 LDW *${KPA}[3],A19 || ADD $KPA,A0,$KPA || LDW *${KPB}[3],B19 || SUB $KPB,A0,$KPB NOP STW B16,*${KPA}[-4] || STW A16,*${KPB}[4] STW B17,*${KPA}[-3] || STW A17,*${KPB}[5] STW B18,*${KPA}[-2] || STW A18,*${KPB}[6] STW B19,*${KPA}[-1] || STW A19,*${KPB}[7] SPKERNEL ;;==================================================================== SUB B0,1,B0 ; skip last round || ADD B30,A0,$KPA ; skip first round || ADD B30,A0,$KPB || MVC GFPGFR,B30 ; save GFPGFR LDW *${KPA}[0],$K[0] || LDW *${KPB}[1],$K[1] || MVC B3,GFPGFR LDW *${KPA}[2],$K[2] || LDW *${KPB}[3],$K[3] MVK 0x00000909,A24 || MVK 0x00000B0B,B24 MVKH 0x09090000,A24 || MVKH 0x0B0B0000,B24 MVC B0,ILC || SUB B0,1,B0 GMPY4 $K[0],A24,$Kx9[0] ; ·0x09 || GMPY4 $K[1],A24,$Kx9[1] || MVK 0x00000D0D,A25 || MVK 0x00000E0E,B25 GMPY4 $K[2],A24,$Kx9[2] || GMPY4 $K[3],A24,$Kx9[3] || MVKH 0x0D0D0000,A25 || MVKH 0x0E0E0000,B25 GMPY4 $K[0],B24,$KxB[0] ; ·0x0B || GMPY4 $K[1],B24,$KxB[1] GMPY4 $K[2],B24,$KxB[2] || GMPY4 $K[3],B24,$KxB[3] SPLOOP 11 ; InvMixColumns ;;==================================================================== GMPY4 $K[0],A25,$KxD[0] ; ·0x0D || GMPY4 $K[1],A25,$KxD[1] || SWAP2 $Kx9[0],$Kx9[0] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 $Kx9[1],$Kx9[1] || MV $K[0],$s[0] ; this or DINT || MV $K[1],$s[1] || [B0] LDW *${KPA}[4],$K[0] || [B0] LDW *${KPB}[5],$K[1] GMPY4 $K[2],A25,$KxD[2] || GMPY4 $K[3],A25,$KxD[3] || SWAP2 $Kx9[2],$Kx9[2] || SWAP2 $Kx9[3],$Kx9[3] || MV $K[2],$s[2] || MV $K[3],$s[3] || [B0] LDW *${KPA}[6],$K[2] || [B0] LDW *${KPB}[7],$K[3] GMPY4 $s[0],B25,$KxE[0] ; ·0x0E || GMPY4 $s[1],B25,$KxE[1] || XOR $Kx9[0],$KxB[0],$KxB[0] || XOR $Kx9[1],$KxB[1],$KxB[1] GMPY4 $s[2],B25,$KxE[2] || GMPY4 $s[3],B25,$KxE[3] || XOR $Kx9[2],$KxB[2],$KxB[2] || XOR $Kx9[3],$KxB[3],$KxB[3] ROTL $KxB[0],TBL3,$KxB[0] || ROTL $KxB[1],TBL3,$KxB[1] || SWAP2 $KxD[0],$KxD[0] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 $KxD[1],$KxD[1] ROTL $KxB[2],TBL3,$KxB[2] || ROTL $KxB[3],TBL3,$KxB[3] || SWAP2 $KxD[2],$KxD[2] || SWAP2 $KxD[3],$KxD[3] XOR $KxE[0],$KxD[0],$KxE[0] || XOR $KxE[1],$KxD[1],$KxE[1] || [B0] GMPY4 $K[0],A24,$Kx9[0] ; ·0x09 || [B0] GMPY4 $K[1],A24,$Kx9[1] || ADDAW $KPA,4,$KPA XOR $KxE[2],$KxD[2],$KxE[2] || XOR $KxE[3],$KxD[3],$KxE[3] || [B0] GMPY4 $K[2],A24,$Kx9[2] || [B0] GMPY4 $K[3],A24,$Kx9[3] || ADDAW $KPB,4,$KPB XOR $KxB[0],$KxE[0],$KxE[0] || XOR $KxB[1],$KxE[1],$KxE[1] || [B0] GMPY4 $K[0],B24,$KxB[0] ; ·0x0B || [B0] GMPY4 $K[1],B24,$KxB[1] XOR $KxB[2],$KxE[2],$KxE[2] || XOR $KxB[3],$KxE[3],$KxE[3] || [B0] GMPY4 $K[2],B24,$KxB[2] || [B0] GMPY4 $K[3],B24,$KxB[3] || STW $KxE[0],*${KPA}[-4] || STW $KxE[1],*${KPB}[-3] STW $KxE[2],*${KPA}[-2] || STW $KxE[3],*${KPB}[-1] || [B0] SUB B0,1,B0 SPKERNEL ;;==================================================================== BNOP B31,3 MVC B30,GFPGFR ; restore GFPGFR(*) MVK 0,RET .endasmfunc ___ # (*) Even though ABI doesn't specify GFPGFR as non-volatile, there # are code samples out there that *assume* its default value. } { my ($inp,$out,$blocks,$key,$ivp)=("A4","B4","A6","B6","A8"); $code.=<<___; .global _AES_ctr32_encrypt _AES_ctr32_encrypt: .asmfunc LDNDW *${ivp}[0],A31:A30 ; load counter value || MV $blocks,A2 ; reassign $blocks || DMV RA,$key,B27:B26 ; reassign RA and $key LDNDW *${ivp}[1],B31:B30 || MVK 0,B2 ; don't let __encrypt load input || MVK 0,A1 ; and postpone writing output .if .BIG_ENDIAN NOP .else NOP 4 SWAP2 B31,B31 ; keep least significant 32 bits SWAP4 B31,B31 ; in host byte order .endif ctr32_loop?: [A2] BNOP __encrypt || [A1] XOR A29,A9,A9 ; input^Ek(counter) || [A1] XOR A28,A8,A8 || [A2] LDNDW *INP++,A29:A28 ; load input [!A2] BNOP B27 ; return || [A1] XOR B29,B9,B9 || [A1] XOR B28,B8,B8 || [A2] LDNDW *INP++,B29:B28 .if .BIG_ENDIAN [A1] STNDW A9:A8,*OUT++ ; save output || [A2] DMV A31,A30,A9:A8 ; pass counter value to __encrypt [A1] STNDW B9:B8,*OUT++ || [A2] DMV B31,B30,B9:B8 || [A2] ADD B30,1,B30 ; counter++ .else [A1] STNDW A9:A8,*OUT++ ; save output || [A2] DMV A31,A30,A9:A8 || [A2] SWAP2 B31,B0 || [A2] ADD B31,1,B31 ; counter++ [A1] STNDW B9:B8,*OUT++ || [A2] MV B30,B8 || [A2] SWAP4 B0,B9 .endif [A2] ADDKPC ctr32_loop?,RA ; return to ctr32_loop? || [A2] MV B26,KEY ; pass $key || [A2] SUB A2,1,A2 ; $blocks-- ||[!A1] MVK 1,A1 NOP NOP .endasmfunc ___ } # Tables are kept in endian-neutral manner $code.=<<___; .if __TI_EABI__ .sect ".text:aes_asm.const" .else .sect ".const:aes_asm" .endif .align 128 AES_Te: .byte 0xc6,0x63,0x63,0xa5, 0xf8,0x7c,0x7c,0x84 .byte 0xee,0x77,0x77,0x99, 0xf6,0x7b,0x7b,0x8d .byte 0xff,0xf2,0xf2,0x0d, 0xd6,0x6b,0x6b,0xbd .byte 0xde,0x6f,0x6f,0xb1, 0x91,0xc5,0xc5,0x54 .byte 0x60,0x30,0x30,0x50, 0x02,0x01,0x01,0x03 .byte 0xce,0x67,0x67,0xa9, 0x56,0x2b,0x2b,0x7d .byte 0xe7,0xfe,0xfe,0x19, 0xb5,0xd7,0xd7,0x62 .byte 0x4d,0xab,0xab,0xe6, 0xec,0x76,0x76,0x9a .byte 0x8f,0xca,0xca,0x45, 0x1f,0x82,0x82,0x9d .byte 0x89,0xc9,0xc9,0x40, 0xfa,0x7d,0x7d,0x87 .byte 0xef,0xfa,0xfa,0x15, 0xb2,0x59,0x59,0xeb .byte 0x8e,0x47,0x47,0xc9, 0xfb,0xf0,0xf0,0x0b .byte 0x41,0xad,0xad,0xec, 0xb3,0xd4,0xd4,0x67 .byte 0x5f,0xa2,0xa2,0xfd, 0x45,0xaf,0xaf,0xea .byte 0x23,0x9c,0x9c,0xbf, 0x53,0xa4,0xa4,0xf7 .byte 0xe4,0x72,0x72,0x96, 0x9b,0xc0,0xc0,0x5b .byte 0x75,0xb7,0xb7,0xc2, 0xe1,0xfd,0xfd,0x1c .byte 0x3d,0x93,0x93,0xae, 0x4c,0x26,0x26,0x6a .byte 0x6c,0x36,0x36,0x5a, 0x7e,0x3f,0x3f,0x41 .byte 0xf5,0xf7,0xf7,0x02, 0x83,0xcc,0xcc,0x4f .byte 0x68,0x34,0x34,0x5c, 0x51,0xa5,0xa5,0xf4 .byte 0xd1,0xe5,0xe5,0x34, 0xf9,0xf1,0xf1,0x08 .byte 0xe2,0x71,0x71,0x93, 0xab,0xd8,0xd8,0x73 .byte 0x62,0x31,0x31,0x53, 0x2a,0x15,0x15,0x3f .byte 0x08,0x04,0x04,0x0c, 0x95,0xc7,0xc7,0x52 .byte 0x46,0x23,0x23,0x65, 0x9d,0xc3,0xc3,0x5e .byte 0x30,0x18,0x18,0x28, 0x37,0x96,0x96,0xa1 .byte 0x0a,0x05,0x05,0x0f, 0x2f,0x9a,0x9a,0xb5 .byte 0x0e,0x07,0x07,0x09, 0x24,0x12,0x12,0x36 .byte 0x1b,0x80,0x80,0x9b, 0xdf,0xe2,0xe2,0x3d .byte 0xcd,0xeb,0xeb,0x26, 0x4e,0x27,0x27,0x69 .byte 0x7f,0xb2,0xb2,0xcd, 0xea,0x75,0x75,0x9f .byte 0x12,0x09,0x09,0x1b, 0x1d,0x83,0x83,0x9e .byte 0x58,0x2c,0x2c,0x74, 0x34,0x1a,0x1a,0x2e .byte 0x36,0x1b,0x1b,0x2d, 0xdc,0x6e,0x6e,0xb2 .byte 0xb4,0x5a,0x5a,0xee, 0x5b,0xa0,0xa0,0xfb .byte 0xa4,0x52,0x52,0xf6, 0x76,0x3b,0x3b,0x4d .byte 0xb7,0xd6,0xd6,0x61, 0x7d,0xb3,0xb3,0xce .byte 0x52,0x29,0x29,0x7b, 0xdd,0xe3,0xe3,0x3e .byte 0x5e,0x2f,0x2f,0x71, 0x13,0x84,0x84,0x97 .byte 0xa6,0x53,0x53,0xf5, 0xb9,0xd1,0xd1,0x68 .byte 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0xc1,0xed,0xed,0x2c .byte 0x40,0x20,0x20,0x60, 0xe3,0xfc,0xfc,0x1f .byte 0x79,0xb1,0xb1,0xc8, 0xb6,0x5b,0x5b,0xed .byte 0xd4,0x6a,0x6a,0xbe, 0x8d,0xcb,0xcb,0x46 .byte 0x67,0xbe,0xbe,0xd9, 0x72,0x39,0x39,0x4b .byte 0x94,0x4a,0x4a,0xde, 0x98,0x4c,0x4c,0xd4 .byte 0xb0,0x58,0x58,0xe8, 0x85,0xcf,0xcf,0x4a .byte 0xbb,0xd0,0xd0,0x6b, 0xc5,0xef,0xef,0x2a .byte 0x4f,0xaa,0xaa,0xe5, 0xed,0xfb,0xfb,0x16 .byte 0x86,0x43,0x43,0xc5, 0x9a,0x4d,0x4d,0xd7 .byte 0x66,0x33,0x33,0x55, 0x11,0x85,0x85,0x94 .byte 0x8a,0x45,0x45,0xcf, 0xe9,0xf9,0xf9,0x10 .byte 0x04,0x02,0x02,0x06, 0xfe,0x7f,0x7f,0x81 .byte 0xa0,0x50,0x50,0xf0, 0x78,0x3c,0x3c,0x44 .byte 0x25,0x9f,0x9f,0xba, 0x4b,0xa8,0xa8,0xe3 .byte 0xa2,0x51,0x51,0xf3, 0x5d,0xa3,0xa3,0xfe .byte 0x80,0x40,0x40,0xc0, 0x05,0x8f,0x8f,0x8a .byte 0x3f,0x92,0x92,0xad, 0x21,0x9d,0x9d,0xbc .byte 0x70,0x38,0x38,0x48, 0xf1,0xf5,0xf5,0x04 .byte 0x63,0xbc,0xbc,0xdf, 0x77,0xb6,0xb6,0xc1 .byte 0xaf,0xda,0xda,0x75, 0x42,0x21,0x21,0x63 .byte 0x20,0x10,0x10,0x30, 0xe5,0xff,0xff,0x1a .byte 0xfd,0xf3,0xf3,0x0e, 0xbf,0xd2,0xd2,0x6d .byte 0x81,0xcd,0xcd,0x4c, 0x18,0x0c,0x0c,0x14 .byte 0x26,0x13,0x13,0x35, 0xc3,0xec,0xec,0x2f .byte 0xbe,0x5f,0x5f,0xe1, 0x35,0x97,0x97,0xa2 .byte 0x88,0x44,0x44,0xcc, 0x2e,0x17,0x17,0x39 .byte 0x93,0xc4,0xc4,0x57, 0x55,0xa7,0xa7,0xf2 .byte 0xfc,0x7e,0x7e,0x82, 0x7a,0x3d,0x3d,0x47 .byte 0xc8,0x64,0x64,0xac, 0xba,0x5d,0x5d,0xe7 .byte 0x32,0x19,0x19,0x2b, 0xe6,0x73,0x73,0x95 .byte 0xc0,0x60,0x60,0xa0, 0x19,0x81,0x81,0x98 .byte 0x9e,0x4f,0x4f,0xd1, 0xa3,0xdc,0xdc,0x7f .byte 0x44,0x22,0x22,0x66, 0x54,0x2a,0x2a,0x7e .byte 0x3b,0x90,0x90,0xab, 0x0b,0x88,0x88,0x83 .byte 0x8c,0x46,0x46,0xca, 0xc7,0xee,0xee,0x29 .byte 0x6b,0xb8,0xb8,0xd3, 0x28,0x14,0x14,0x3c .byte 0xa7,0xde,0xde,0x79, 0xbc,0x5e,0x5e,0xe2 .byte 0x16,0x0b,0x0b,0x1d, 0xad,0xdb,0xdb,0x76 .byte 0xdb,0xe0,0xe0,0x3b, 0x64,0x32,0x32,0x56 .byte 0x74,0x3a,0x3a,0x4e, 0x14,0x0a,0x0a,0x1e .byte 0x92,0x49,0x49,0xdb, 0x0c,0x06,0x06,0x0a .byte 0x48,0x24,0x24,0x6c, 0xb8,0x5c,0x5c,0xe4 .byte 0x9f,0xc2,0xc2,0x5d, 0xbd,0xd3,0xd3,0x6e .byte 0x43,0xac,0xac,0xef, 0xc4,0x62,0x62,0xa6 .byte 0x39,0x91,0x91,0xa8, 0x31,0x95,0x95,0xa4 .byte 0xd3,0xe4,0xe4,0x37, 0xf2,0x79,0x79,0x8b .byte 0xd5,0xe7,0xe7,0x32, 0x8b,0xc8,0xc8,0x43 .byte 0x6e,0x37,0x37,0x59, 0xda,0x6d,0x6d,0xb7 .byte 0x01,0x8d,0x8d,0x8c, 0xb1,0xd5,0xd5,0x64 .byte 0x9c,0x4e,0x4e,0xd2, 0x49,0xa9,0xa9,0xe0 .byte 0xd8,0x6c,0x6c,0xb4, 0xac,0x56,0x56,0xfa .byte 0xf3,0xf4,0xf4,0x07, 0xcf,0xea,0xea,0x25 .byte 0xca,0x65,0x65,0xaf, 0xf4,0x7a,0x7a,0x8e .byte 0x47,0xae,0xae,0xe9, 0x10,0x08,0x08,0x18 .byte 0x6f,0xba,0xba,0xd5, 0xf0,0x78,0x78,0x88 .byte 0x4a,0x25,0x25,0x6f, 0x5c,0x2e,0x2e,0x72 .byte 0x38,0x1c,0x1c,0x24, 0x57,0xa6,0xa6,0xf1 .byte 0x73,0xb4,0xb4,0xc7, 0x97,0xc6,0xc6,0x51 .byte 0xcb,0xe8,0xe8,0x23, 0xa1,0xdd,0xdd,0x7c .byte 0xe8,0x74,0x74,0x9c, 0x3e,0x1f,0x1f,0x21 .byte 0x96,0x4b,0x4b,0xdd, 0x61,0xbd,0xbd,0xdc .byte 0x0d,0x8b,0x8b,0x86, 0x0f,0x8a,0x8a,0x85 .byte 0xe0,0x70,0x70,0x90, 0x7c,0x3e,0x3e,0x42 .byte 0x71,0xb5,0xb5,0xc4, 0xcc,0x66,0x66,0xaa .byte 0x90,0x48,0x48,0xd8, 0x06,0x03,0x03,0x05 .byte 0xf7,0xf6,0xf6,0x01, 0x1c,0x0e,0x0e,0x12 .byte 0xc2,0x61,0x61,0xa3, 0x6a,0x35,0x35,0x5f .byte 0xae,0x57,0x57,0xf9, 0x69,0xb9,0xb9,0xd0 .byte 0x17,0x86,0x86,0x91, 0x99,0xc1,0xc1,0x58 .byte 0x3a,0x1d,0x1d,0x27, 0x27,0x9e,0x9e,0xb9 .byte 0xd9,0xe1,0xe1,0x38, 0xeb,0xf8,0xf8,0x13 .byte 0x2b,0x98,0x98,0xb3, 0x22,0x11,0x11,0x33 .byte 0xd2,0x69,0x69,0xbb, 0xa9,0xd9,0xd9,0x70 .byte 0x07,0x8e,0x8e,0x89, 0x33,0x94,0x94,0xa7 .byte 0x2d,0x9b,0x9b,0xb6, 0x3c,0x1e,0x1e,0x22 .byte 0x15,0x87,0x87,0x92, 0xc9,0xe9,0xe9,0x20 .byte 0x87,0xce,0xce,0x49, 0xaa,0x55,0x55,0xff .byte 0x50,0x28,0x28,0x78, 0xa5,0xdf,0xdf,0x7a .byte 0x03,0x8c,0x8c,0x8f, 0x59,0xa1,0xa1,0xf8 .byte 0x09,0x89,0x89,0x80, 0x1a,0x0d,0x0d,0x17 .byte 0x65,0xbf,0xbf,0xda, 0xd7,0xe6,0xe6,0x31 .byte 0x84,0x42,0x42,0xc6, 0xd0,0x68,0x68,0xb8 .byte 0x82,0x41,0x41,0xc3, 0x29,0x99,0x99,0xb0 .byte 0x5a,0x2d,0x2d,0x77, 0x1e,0x0f,0x0f,0x11 .byte 0x7b,0xb0,0xb0,0xcb, 0xa8,0x54,0x54,0xfc .byte 0x6d,0xbb,0xbb,0xd6, 0x2c,0x16,0x16,0x3a AES_Te4: .byte 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 .byte 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 .byte 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 .byte 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 .byte 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc .byte 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 .byte 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a .byte 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 .byte 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 .byte 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 .byte 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b .byte 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf .byte 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 .byte 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 .byte 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 .byte 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 .byte 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 .byte 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 .byte 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 .byte 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb .byte 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c .byte 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 .byte 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 .byte 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 .byte 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 .byte 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a .byte 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e .byte 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e .byte 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 .byte 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf .byte 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 .byte 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 rcon: .byte 0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x80,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x1B,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x36,0x00,0x00,0x00 .align 128 AES_Td: .byte 0x51,0xf4,0xa7,0x50, 0x7e,0x41,0x65,0x53 .byte 0x1a,0x17,0xa4,0xc3, 0x3a,0x27,0x5e,0x96 .byte 0x3b,0xab,0x6b,0xcb, 0x1f,0x9d,0x45,0xf1 .byte 0xac,0xfa,0x58,0xab, 0x4b,0xe3,0x03,0x93 .byte 0x20,0x30,0xfa,0x55, 0xad,0x76,0x6d,0xf6 .byte 0x88,0xcc,0x76,0x91, 0xf5,0x02,0x4c,0x25 .byte 0x4f,0xe5,0xd7,0xfc, 0xc5,0x2a,0xcb,0xd7 .byte 0x26,0x35,0x44,0x80, 0xb5,0x62,0xa3,0x8f .byte 0xde,0xb1,0x5a,0x49, 0x25,0xba,0x1b,0x67 .byte 0x45,0xea,0x0e,0x98, 0x5d,0xfe,0xc0,0xe1 .byte 0xc3,0x2f,0x75,0x02, 0x81,0x4c,0xf0,0x12 .byte 0x8d,0x46,0x97,0xa3, 0x6b,0xd3,0xf9,0xc6 .byte 0x03,0x8f,0x5f,0xe7, 0x15,0x92,0x9c,0x95 .byte 0xbf,0x6d,0x7a,0xeb, 0x95,0x52,0x59,0xda .byte 0xd4,0xbe,0x83,0x2d, 0x58,0x74,0x21,0xd3 .byte 0x49,0xe0,0x69,0x29, 0x8e,0xc9,0xc8,0x44 .byte 0x75,0xc2,0x89,0x6a, 0xf4,0x8e,0x79,0x78 .byte 0x99,0x58,0x3e,0x6b, 0x27,0xb9,0x71,0xdd .byte 0xbe,0xe1,0x4f,0xb6, 0xf0,0x88,0xad,0x17 .byte 0xc9,0x20,0xac,0x66, 0x7d,0xce,0x3a,0xb4 .byte 0x63,0xdf,0x4a,0x18, 0xe5,0x1a,0x31,0x82 .byte 0x97,0x51,0x33,0x60, 0x62,0x53,0x7f,0x45 .byte 0xb1,0x64,0x77,0xe0, 0xbb,0x6b,0xae,0x84 .byte 0xfe,0x81,0xa0,0x1c, 0xf9,0x08,0x2b,0x94 .byte 0x70,0x48,0x68,0x58, 0x8f,0x45,0xfd,0x19 .byte 0x94,0xde,0x6c,0x87, 0x52,0x7b,0xf8,0xb7 .byte 0xab,0x73,0xd3,0x23, 0x72,0x4b,0x02,0xe2 .byte 0xe3,0x1f,0x8f,0x57, 0x66,0x55,0xab,0x2a .byte 0xb2,0xeb,0x28,0x07, 0x2f,0xb5,0xc2,0x03 .byte 0x86,0xc5,0x7b,0x9a, 0xd3,0x37,0x08,0xa5 .byte 0x30,0x28,0x87,0xf2, 0x23,0xbf,0xa5,0xb2 .byte 0x02,0x03,0x6a,0xba, 0xed,0x16,0x82,0x5c .byte 0x8a,0xcf,0x1c,0x2b, 0xa7,0x79,0xb4,0x92 .byte 0xf3,0x07,0xf2,0xf0, 0x4e,0x69,0xe2,0xa1 .byte 0x65,0xda,0xf4,0xcd, 0x06,0x05,0xbe,0xd5 .byte 0xd1,0x34,0x62,0x1f, 0xc4,0xa6,0xfe,0x8a .byte 0x34,0x2e,0x53,0x9d, 0xa2,0xf3,0x55,0xa0 .byte 0x05,0x8a,0xe1,0x32, 0xa4,0xf6,0xeb,0x75 .byte 0x0b,0x83,0xec,0x39, 0x40,0x60,0xef,0xaa .byte 0x5e,0x71,0x9f,0x06, 0xbd,0x6e,0x10,0x51 .byte 0x3e,0x21,0x8a,0xf9, 0x96,0xdd,0x06,0x3d .byte 0xdd,0x3e,0x05,0xae, 0x4d,0xe6,0xbd,0x46 .byte 0x91,0x54,0x8d,0xb5, 0x71,0xc4,0x5d,0x05 .byte 0x04,0x06,0xd4,0x6f, 0x60,0x50,0x15,0xff .byte 0x19,0x98,0xfb,0x24, 0xd6,0xbd,0xe9,0x97 .byte 0x89,0x40,0x43,0xcc, 0x67,0xd9,0x9e,0x77 .byte 0xb0,0xe8,0x42,0xbd, 0x07,0x89,0x8b,0x88 .byte 0xe7,0x19,0x5b,0x38, 0x79,0xc8,0xee,0xdb .byte 0xa1,0x7c,0x0a,0x47, 0x7c,0x42,0x0f,0xe9 .byte 0xf8,0x84,0x1e,0xc9, 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 .byte 0x09,0x80,0x86,0x83, 0x32,0x2b,0xed,0x48 .byte 0x1e,0x11,0x70,0xac, 0x6c,0x5a,0x72,0x4e .byte 0xfd,0x0e,0xff,0xfb, 0x0f,0x85,0x38,0x56 .byte 0x3d,0xae,0xd5,0x1e, 0x36,0x2d,0x39,0x27 .byte 0x0a,0x0f,0xd9,0x64, 0x68,0x5c,0xa6,0x21 .byte 0x9b,0x5b,0x54,0xd1, 0x24,0x36,0x2e,0x3a .byte 0x0c,0x0a,0x67,0xb1, 0x93,0x57,0xe7,0x0f .byte 0xb4,0xee,0x96,0xd2, 0x1b,0x9b,0x91,0x9e .byte 0x80,0xc0,0xc5,0x4f, 0x61,0xdc,0x20,0xa2 .byte 0x5a,0x77,0x4b,0x69, 0x1c,0x12,0x1a,0x16 .byte 0xe2,0x93,0xba,0x0a, 0xc0,0xa0,0x2a,0xe5 .byte 0x3c,0x22,0xe0,0x43, 0x12,0x1b,0x17,0x1d .byte 0x0e,0x09,0x0d,0x0b, 0xf2,0x8b,0xc7,0xad .byte 0x2d,0xb6,0xa8,0xb9, 0x14,0x1e,0xa9,0xc8 .byte 0x57,0xf1,0x19,0x85, 0xaf,0x75,0x07,0x4c .byte 0xee,0x99,0xdd,0xbb, 0xa3,0x7f,0x60,0xfd .byte 0xf7,0x01,0x26,0x9f, 0x5c,0x72,0xf5,0xbc .byte 0x44,0x66,0x3b,0xc5, 0x5b,0xfb,0x7e,0x34 .byte 0x8b,0x43,0x29,0x76, 0xcb,0x23,0xc6,0xdc .byte 0xb6,0xed,0xfc,0x68, 0xb8,0xe4,0xf1,0x63 .byte 0xd7,0x31,0xdc,0xca, 0x42,0x63,0x85,0x10 .byte 0x13,0x97,0x22,0x40, 0x84,0xc6,0x11,0x20 .byte 0x85,0x4a,0x24,0x7d, 0xd2,0xbb,0x3d,0xf8 .byte 0xae,0xf9,0x32,0x11, 0xc7,0x29,0xa1,0x6d .byte 0x1d,0x9e,0x2f,0x4b, 0xdc,0xb2,0x30,0xf3 .byte 0x0d,0x86,0x52,0xec, 0x77,0xc1,0xe3,0xd0 .byte 0x2b,0xb3,0x16,0x6c, 0xa9,0x70,0xb9,0x99 .byte 0x11,0x94,0x48,0xfa, 0x47,0xe9,0x64,0x22 .byte 0xa8,0xfc,0x8c,0xc4, 0xa0,0xf0,0x3f,0x1a .byte 0x56,0x7d,0x2c,0xd8, 0x22,0x33,0x90,0xef .byte 0x87,0x49,0x4e,0xc7, 0xd9,0x38,0xd1,0xc1 .byte 0x8c,0xca,0xa2,0xfe, 0x98,0xd4,0x0b,0x36 .byte 0xa6,0xf5,0x81,0xcf, 0xa5,0x7a,0xde,0x28 .byte 0xda,0xb7,0x8e,0x26, 0x3f,0xad,0xbf,0xa4 .byte 0x2c,0x3a,0x9d,0xe4, 0x50,0x78,0x92,0x0d .byte 0x6a,0x5f,0xcc,0x9b, 0x54,0x7e,0x46,0x62 .byte 0xf6,0x8d,0x13,0xc2, 0x90,0xd8,0xb8,0xe8 .byte 0x2e,0x39,0xf7,0x5e, 0x82,0xc3,0xaf,0xf5 .byte 0x9f,0x5d,0x80,0xbe, 0x69,0xd0,0x93,0x7c .byte 0x6f,0xd5,0x2d,0xa9, 0xcf,0x25,0x12,0xb3 .byte 0xc8,0xac,0x99,0x3b, 0x10,0x18,0x7d,0xa7 .byte 0xe8,0x9c,0x63,0x6e, 0xdb,0x3b,0xbb,0x7b .byte 0xcd,0x26,0x78,0x09, 0x6e,0x59,0x18,0xf4 .byte 0xec,0x9a,0xb7,0x01, 0x83,0x4f,0x9a,0xa8 .byte 0xe6,0x95,0x6e,0x65, 0xaa,0xff,0xe6,0x7e .byte 0x21,0xbc,0xcf,0x08, 0xef,0x15,0xe8,0xe6 .byte 0xba,0xe7,0x9b,0xd9, 0x4a,0x6f,0x36,0xce .byte 0xea,0x9f,0x09,0xd4, 0x29,0xb0,0x7c,0xd6 .byte 0x31,0xa4,0xb2,0xaf, 0x2a,0x3f,0x23,0x31 .byte 0xc6,0xa5,0x94,0x30, 0x35,0xa2,0x66,0xc0 .byte 0x74,0x4e,0xbc,0x37, 0xfc,0x82,0xca,0xa6 .byte 0xe0,0x90,0xd0,0xb0, 0x33,0xa7,0xd8,0x15 .byte 0xf1,0x04,0x98,0x4a, 0x41,0xec,0xda,0xf7 .byte 0x7f,0xcd,0x50,0x0e, 0x17,0x91,0xf6,0x2f .byte 0x76,0x4d,0xd6,0x8d, 0x43,0xef,0xb0,0x4d .byte 0xcc,0xaa,0x4d,0x54, 0xe4,0x96,0x04,0xdf .byte 0x9e,0xd1,0xb5,0xe3, 0x4c,0x6a,0x88,0x1b .byte 0xc1,0x2c,0x1f,0xb8, 0x46,0x65,0x51,0x7f .byte 0x9d,0x5e,0xea,0x04, 0x01,0x8c,0x35,0x5d .byte 0xfa,0x87,0x74,0x73, 0xfb,0x0b,0x41,0x2e .byte 0xb3,0x67,0x1d,0x5a, 0x92,0xdb,0xd2,0x52 .byte 0xe9,0x10,0x56,0x33, 0x6d,0xd6,0x47,0x13 .byte 0x9a,0xd7,0x61,0x8c, 0x37,0xa1,0x0c,0x7a .byte 0x59,0xf8,0x14,0x8e, 0xeb,0x13,0x3c,0x89 .byte 0xce,0xa9,0x27,0xee, 0xb7,0x61,0xc9,0x35 .byte 0xe1,0x1c,0xe5,0xed, 0x7a,0x47,0xb1,0x3c .byte 0x9c,0xd2,0xdf,0x59, 0x55,0xf2,0x73,0x3f .byte 0x18,0x14,0xce,0x79, 0x73,0xc7,0x37,0xbf .byte 0x53,0xf7,0xcd,0xea, 0x5f,0xfd,0xaa,0x5b .byte 0xdf,0x3d,0x6f,0x14, 0x78,0x44,0xdb,0x86 .byte 0xca,0xaf,0xf3,0x81, 0xb9,0x68,0xc4,0x3e .byte 0x38,0x24,0x34,0x2c, 0xc2,0xa3,0x40,0x5f .byte 0x16,0x1d,0xc3,0x72, 0xbc,0xe2,0x25,0x0c .byte 0x28,0x3c,0x49,0x8b, 0xff,0x0d,0x95,0x41 .byte 0x39,0xa8,0x01,0x71, 0x08,0x0c,0xb3,0xde .byte 0xd8,0xb4,0xe4,0x9c, 0x64,0x56,0xc1,0x90 .byte 0x7b,0xcb,0x84,0x61, 0xd5,0x32,0xb6,0x70 .byte 0x48,0x6c,0x5c,0x74, 0xd0,0xb8,0x57,0x42 AES_Td4: .byte 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 .byte 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb .byte 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 .byte 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb .byte 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d .byte 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e .byte 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 .byte 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 .byte 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 .byte 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 .byte 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda .byte 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 .byte 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a .byte 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 .byte 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 .byte 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b .byte 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea .byte 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 .byte 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 .byte 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e .byte 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 .byte 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b .byte 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 .byte 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 .byte 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 .byte 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f .byte 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d .byte 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef .byte 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 .byte 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 .byte 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 .byte 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d .cstring "AES for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl0000644000000000000000000007074213176625656017330 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # AES for PA-RISC. # # June 2009. # # The module is mechanical transliteration of aes-sparcv9.pl, but with # a twist: S-boxes are compressed even further down to 1K+256B. On # PA-7100LC performance is ~40% better than gcc 3.2 generated code and # is about 33 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key. Newer CPUs # perform at 16 cycles per byte. It's not faster than code generated # by vendor compiler, but recall that it has compressed S-boxes, which # requires extra processing. # # Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $FRAME_MARKER =80; $SAVED_RP =16; $PUSH ="std"; $PUSHMA ="std,ma"; $POP ="ldd"; $POPMB ="ldd,mb"; } else { $LEVEL ="1.0"; $SIZE_T =4; $FRAME_MARKER =48; $SAVED_RP =20; $PUSH ="stw"; $PUSHMA ="stwm"; $POP ="ldw"; $POPMB ="ldwm"; } $FRAME=16*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 16 saved regs + frame marker # [+ argument transfer] $inp="%r26"; # arg0 $out="%r25"; # arg1 $key="%r24"; # arg2 ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3) = ("%r1","%r2","%r3","%r4"); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = ("%r5","%r6","%r7","%r8"); ($acc0, $acc1, $acc2, $acc3, $acc4, $acc5, $acc6, $acc7, $acc8, $acc9,$acc10,$acc11,$acc12,$acc13,$acc14,$acc15) = ("%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16", "%r17","%r18","%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23","%r26"); $tbl="%r28"; $rounds="%r29"; $code=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .EXPORT AES_encrypt,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR .ALIGN 64 AES_encrypt .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp) blr %r0,$tbl ldi 3,$t0 L\$enc_pic andcm $tbl,$t0,$tbl ldo L\$AES_Te-L\$enc_pic($tbl),$tbl and $inp,$t0,$t0 sub $inp,$t0,$inp ldw 0($inp),$s0 ldw 4($inp),$s1 ldw 8($inp),$s2 comib,= 0,$t0,L\$enc_inp_aligned ldw 12($inp),$s3 sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0 subi 32,$t0,$t0 mtctl $t0,%cr11 ldw 16($inp),$t1 vshd $s0,$s1,$s0 vshd $s1,$s2,$s1 vshd $s2,$s3,$s2 vshd $s3,$t1,$s3 L\$enc_inp_aligned bl _parisc_AES_encrypt,%r31 nop extru,<> $out,31,2,%r0 b L\$enc_out_aligned nop _srm $s0,24,$acc0 _srm $s0,16,$acc1 stb $acc0,0($out) _srm $s0,8,$acc2 stb $acc1,1($out) _srm $s1,24,$acc4 stb $acc2,2($out) _srm $s1,16,$acc5 stb $s0,3($out) _srm $s1,8,$acc6 stb $acc4,4($out) _srm $s2,24,$acc0 stb $acc5,5($out) _srm $s2,16,$acc1 stb $acc6,6($out) _srm $s2,8,$acc2 stb $s1,7($out) _srm $s3,24,$acc4 stb $acc0,8($out) _srm $s3,16,$acc5 stb $acc1,9($out) _srm $s3,8,$acc6 stb $acc2,10($out) stb $s2,11($out) stb $acc4,12($out) stb $acc5,13($out) stb $acc6,14($out) b L\$enc_done stb $s3,15($out) L\$enc_out_aligned stw $s0,0($out) stw $s1,4($out) stw $s2,8($out) stw $s3,12($out) L\$enc_done $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11 $POP `-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12 $POP `-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13 $POP `-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14 $POP `-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15 $POP `-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16 $POP `-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17 $POP `-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18 bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .ALIGN 16 _parisc_AES_encrypt .PROC .CALLINFO MILLICODE .ENTRY ldw 240($key),$rounds ldw 0($key),$t0 ldw 4($key),$t1 ldw 8($key),$t2 _srm $rounds,1,$rounds xor $t0,$s0,$s0 ldw 12($key),$t3 _srm $s0,24,$acc0 xor $t1,$s1,$s1 ldw 16($key),$t0 _srm $s1,16,$acc1 xor $t2,$s2,$s2 ldw 20($key),$t1 xor $t3,$s3,$s3 ldw 24($key),$t2 ldw 28($key),$t3 L\$enc_loop _srm $s2,8,$acc2 ldwx,s $acc0($tbl),$acc0 _srm $s3,0,$acc3 ldwx,s $acc1($tbl),$acc1 _srm $s1,24,$acc4 ldwx,s $acc2($tbl),$acc2 _srm $s2,16,$acc5 ldwx,s $acc3($tbl),$acc3 _srm $s3,8,$acc6 ldwx,s $acc4($tbl),$acc4 _srm $s0,0,$acc7 ldwx,s $acc5($tbl),$acc5 _srm $s2,24,$acc8 ldwx,s $acc6($tbl),$acc6 _srm $s3,16,$acc9 ldwx,s $acc7($tbl),$acc7 _srm $s0,8,$acc10 ldwx,s $acc8($tbl),$acc8 _srm $s1,0,$acc11 ldwx,s $acc9($tbl),$acc9 _srm $s3,24,$acc12 ldwx,s $acc10($tbl),$acc10 _srm $s0,16,$acc13 ldwx,s $acc11($tbl),$acc11 _srm $s1,8,$acc14 ldwx,s $acc12($tbl),$acc12 _srm $s2,0,$acc15 ldwx,s $acc13($tbl),$acc13 ldwx,s $acc14($tbl),$acc14 ldwx,s $acc15($tbl),$acc15 addib,= -1,$rounds,L\$enc_last ldo 32($key),$key _ror $acc1,8,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ldw 0($key),$s0 _ror $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ldw 4($key),$s1 _ror $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ldw 8($key),$s2 _ror $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ldw 12($key),$s3 _ror $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 _srm $t0,24,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 _srm $t1,16,$acc1 xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 _srm $t2,8,$acc2 ldwx,s $acc0($tbl),$acc0 _srm $t3,0,$acc3 ldwx,s $acc1($tbl),$acc1 _srm $t1,24,$acc4 ldwx,s $acc2($tbl),$acc2 _srm $t2,16,$acc5 ldwx,s $acc3($tbl),$acc3 _srm $t3,8,$acc6 ldwx,s $acc4($tbl),$acc4 _srm $t0,0,$acc7 ldwx,s $acc5($tbl),$acc5 _srm $t2,24,$acc8 ldwx,s $acc6($tbl),$acc6 _srm $t3,16,$acc9 ldwx,s $acc7($tbl),$acc7 _srm $t0,8,$acc10 ldwx,s $acc8($tbl),$acc8 _srm $t1,0,$acc11 ldwx,s $acc9($tbl),$acc9 _srm $t3,24,$acc12 ldwx,s $acc10($tbl),$acc10 _srm $t0,16,$acc13 ldwx,s $acc11($tbl),$acc11 _srm $t1,8,$acc14 ldwx,s $acc12($tbl),$acc12 _srm $t2,0,$acc15 ldwx,s $acc13($tbl),$acc13 _ror $acc1,8,$acc1 ldwx,s $acc14($tbl),$acc14 _ror $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc0,$s0,$s0 ldwx,s $acc15($tbl),$acc15 _ror $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc1,$s0,$s0 ldw 16($key),$t0 _ror $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc2,$s0,$s0 ldw 20($key),$t1 _ror $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 ldw 24($key),$t2 _ror $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc4,$s1,$s1 ldw 28($key),$t3 _ror $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc5,$s1,$s1 ldw 1024+0($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 _ror $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc6,$s1,$s1 ldw 1024+32($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 _ror $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 ldw 1024+64($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 _ror $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc8,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+96($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 _ror $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc9,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+128($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 _ror $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc10,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+160($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 _srm $s0,24,$acc0 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+192($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$s3,$s3 ldw 1024+224($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch te4 _srm $s1,16,$acc1 xor $acc14,$s3,$s3 b L\$enc_loop xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 .ALIGN 16 L\$enc_last ldo 1024($tbl),$rounds _ror $acc1,8,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ldw 0($key),$s0 _ror $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ldw 4($key),$s1 _ror $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ldw 8($key),$s2 _ror $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ldw 12($key),$s3 _ror $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 _srm $t0,24,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 _srm $t1,16,$acc1 xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 _srm $t2,8,$acc2 ldbx $acc0($rounds),$acc0 _srm $t1,24,$acc4 ldbx $acc1($rounds),$acc1 _srm $t2,16,$acc5 _srm $t3,0,$acc3 ldbx $acc2($rounds),$acc2 ldbx $acc3($rounds),$acc3 _srm $t3,8,$acc6 ldbx $acc4($rounds),$acc4 _srm $t2,24,$acc8 ldbx $acc5($rounds),$acc5 _srm $t3,16,$acc9 _srm $t0,0,$acc7 ldbx $acc6($rounds),$acc6 ldbx $acc7($rounds),$acc7 _srm $t0,8,$acc10 ldbx $acc8($rounds),$acc8 _srm $t3,24,$acc12 ldbx $acc9($rounds),$acc9 _srm $t0,16,$acc13 _srm $t1,0,$acc11 ldbx $acc10($rounds),$acc10 _srm $t1,8,$acc14 ldbx $acc11($rounds),$acc11 ldbx $acc12($rounds),$acc12 ldbx $acc13($rounds),$acc13 _srm $t2,0,$acc15 ldbx $acc14($rounds),$acc14 dep $acc0,7,8,$acc3 ldbx $acc15($rounds),$acc15 dep $acc4,7,8,$acc7 dep $acc1,15,8,$acc3 dep $acc5,15,8,$acc7 dep $acc2,23,8,$acc3 dep $acc6,23,8,$acc7 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 dep $acc8,7,8,$acc11 dep $acc12,7,8,$acc15 dep $acc9,15,8,$acc11 dep $acc13,15,8,$acc15 dep $acc10,23,8,$acc11 dep $acc14,23,8,$acc15 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 bv (%r31) .EXIT xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 .PROCEND .ALIGN 64 L\$AES_Te .WORD 0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d .WORD 0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554 .WORD 0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d .WORD 0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a .WORD 0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87 .WORD 0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b .WORD 0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea .WORD 0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b .WORD 0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a .WORD 0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f .WORD 0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108 .WORD 0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f .WORD 0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e .WORD 0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5 .WORD 0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d .WORD 0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f .WORD 0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e .WORD 0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb .WORD 0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce .WORD 0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497 .WORD 0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c .WORD 0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed .WORD 0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b .WORD 0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a .WORD 0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16 .WORD 0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594 .WORD 0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81 .WORD 0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3 .WORD 0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a .WORD 0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504 .WORD 0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163 .WORD 0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d .WORD 0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f .WORD 0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739 .WORD 0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47 .WORD 0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395 .WORD 0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f .WORD 0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883 .WORD 0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c .WORD 0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76 .WORD 0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e .WORD 0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4 .WORD 0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6 .WORD 0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b .WORD 0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7 .WORD 0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0 .WORD 0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25 .WORD 0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818 .WORD 0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72 .WORD 0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651 .WORD 0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21 .WORD 0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85 .WORD 0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa .WORD 0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12 .WORD 0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0 .WORD 0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9 .WORD 0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133 .WORD 0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7 .WORD 0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920 .WORD 0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a .WORD 0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17 .WORD 0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8 .WORD 0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11 .WORD 0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a .BYTE 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 .BYTE 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 .BYTE 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 .BYTE 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 .BYTE 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc .BYTE 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 .BYTE 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a .BYTE 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 .BYTE 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 .BYTE 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 .BYTE 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b .BYTE 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf .BYTE 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 .BYTE 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 .BYTE 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 .BYTE 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 .BYTE 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 .BYTE 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 .BYTE 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 .BYTE 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb .BYTE 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c .BYTE 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 .BYTE 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 .BYTE 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 .BYTE 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 .BYTE 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a .BYTE 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e .BYTE 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e .BYTE 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 .BYTE 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf .BYTE 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 .BYTE 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 ___ $code.=<<___; .EXPORT AES_decrypt,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR .ALIGN 16 AES_decrypt .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp) blr %r0,$tbl ldi 3,$t0 L\$dec_pic andcm $tbl,$t0,$tbl ldo L\$AES_Td-L\$dec_pic($tbl),$tbl and $inp,$t0,$t0 sub $inp,$t0,$inp ldw 0($inp),$s0 ldw 4($inp),$s1 ldw 8($inp),$s2 comib,= 0,$t0,L\$dec_inp_aligned ldw 12($inp),$s3 sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0 subi 32,$t0,$t0 mtctl $t0,%cr11 ldw 16($inp),$t1 vshd $s0,$s1,$s0 vshd $s1,$s2,$s1 vshd $s2,$s3,$s2 vshd $s3,$t1,$s3 L\$dec_inp_aligned bl _parisc_AES_decrypt,%r31 nop extru,<> $out,31,2,%r0 b L\$dec_out_aligned nop _srm $s0,24,$acc0 _srm $s0,16,$acc1 stb $acc0,0($out) _srm $s0,8,$acc2 stb $acc1,1($out) _srm $s1,24,$acc4 stb $acc2,2($out) _srm $s1,16,$acc5 stb $s0,3($out) _srm $s1,8,$acc6 stb $acc4,4($out) _srm $s2,24,$acc0 stb $acc5,5($out) _srm $s2,16,$acc1 stb $acc6,6($out) _srm $s2,8,$acc2 stb $s1,7($out) _srm $s3,24,$acc4 stb $acc0,8($out) _srm $s3,16,$acc5 stb $acc1,9($out) _srm $s3,8,$acc6 stb $acc2,10($out) stb $s2,11($out) stb $acc4,12($out) stb $acc5,13($out) stb $acc6,14($out) b L\$dec_done stb $s3,15($out) L\$dec_out_aligned stw $s0,0($out) stw $s1,4($out) stw $s2,8($out) stw $s3,12($out) L\$dec_done $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11 $POP `-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12 $POP `-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13 $POP `-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14 $POP `-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15 $POP `-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16 $POP `-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17 $POP `-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18 bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .ALIGN 16 _parisc_AES_decrypt .PROC .CALLINFO MILLICODE .ENTRY ldw 240($key),$rounds ldw 0($key),$t0 ldw 4($key),$t1 ldw 8($key),$t2 ldw 12($key),$t3 _srm $rounds,1,$rounds xor $t0,$s0,$s0 ldw 16($key),$t0 xor $t1,$s1,$s1 ldw 20($key),$t1 _srm $s0,24,$acc0 xor $t2,$s2,$s2 ldw 24($key),$t2 xor $t3,$s3,$s3 ldw 28($key),$t3 _srm $s3,16,$acc1 L\$dec_loop _srm $s2,8,$acc2 ldwx,s $acc0($tbl),$acc0 _srm $s1,0,$acc3 ldwx,s $acc1($tbl),$acc1 _srm $s1,24,$acc4 ldwx,s $acc2($tbl),$acc2 _srm $s0,16,$acc5 ldwx,s $acc3($tbl),$acc3 _srm $s3,8,$acc6 ldwx,s $acc4($tbl),$acc4 _srm $s2,0,$acc7 ldwx,s $acc5($tbl),$acc5 _srm $s2,24,$acc8 ldwx,s $acc6($tbl),$acc6 _srm $s1,16,$acc9 ldwx,s $acc7($tbl),$acc7 _srm $s0,8,$acc10 ldwx,s $acc8($tbl),$acc8 _srm $s3,0,$acc11 ldwx,s $acc9($tbl),$acc9 _srm $s3,24,$acc12 ldwx,s $acc10($tbl),$acc10 _srm $s2,16,$acc13 ldwx,s $acc11($tbl),$acc11 _srm $s1,8,$acc14 ldwx,s $acc12($tbl),$acc12 _srm $s0,0,$acc15 ldwx,s $acc13($tbl),$acc13 ldwx,s $acc14($tbl),$acc14 ldwx,s $acc15($tbl),$acc15 addib,= -1,$rounds,L\$dec_last ldo 32($key),$key _ror $acc1,8,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ldw 0($key),$s0 _ror $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ldw 4($key),$s1 _ror $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ldw 8($key),$s2 _ror $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ldw 12($key),$s3 _ror $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 _srm $t0,24,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 _srm $t3,16,$acc1 _srm $t2,8,$acc2 ldwx,s $acc0($tbl),$acc0 _srm $t1,0,$acc3 ldwx,s $acc1($tbl),$acc1 _srm $t1,24,$acc4 ldwx,s $acc2($tbl),$acc2 _srm $t0,16,$acc5 ldwx,s $acc3($tbl),$acc3 _srm $t3,8,$acc6 ldwx,s $acc4($tbl),$acc4 _srm $t2,0,$acc7 ldwx,s $acc5($tbl),$acc5 _srm $t2,24,$acc8 ldwx,s $acc6($tbl),$acc6 _srm $t1,16,$acc9 ldwx,s $acc7($tbl),$acc7 _srm $t0,8,$acc10 ldwx,s $acc8($tbl),$acc8 _srm $t3,0,$acc11 ldwx,s $acc9($tbl),$acc9 _srm $t3,24,$acc12 ldwx,s $acc10($tbl),$acc10 _srm $t2,16,$acc13 ldwx,s $acc11($tbl),$acc11 _srm $t1,8,$acc14 ldwx,s $acc12($tbl),$acc12 _srm $t0,0,$acc15 ldwx,s $acc13($tbl),$acc13 _ror $acc1,8,$acc1 ldwx,s $acc14($tbl),$acc14 _ror $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc0,$s0,$s0 ldwx,s $acc15($tbl),$acc15 _ror $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc1,$s0,$s0 ldw 16($key),$t0 _ror $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc2,$s0,$s0 ldw 20($key),$t1 _ror $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 ldw 24($key),$t2 _ror $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc4,$s1,$s1 ldw 28($key),$t3 _ror $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc5,$s1,$s1 ldw 1024+0($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 _ror $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc6,$s1,$s1 ldw 1024+32($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 _ror $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 ldw 1024+64($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 _ror $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc8,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+96($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 _ror $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc9,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+128($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 _ror $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc10,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+160($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 _srm $s0,24,$acc0 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 ldw 1024+192($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$s3,$s3 ldw 1024+224($tbl),%r0 ; prefetch td4 xor $acc14,$s3,$s3 xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 b L\$dec_loop _srm $s3,16,$acc1 .ALIGN 16 L\$dec_last ldo 1024($tbl),$rounds _ror $acc1,8,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ldw 0($key),$s0 _ror $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ldw 4($key),$s1 _ror $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ldw 8($key),$s2 _ror $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ldw 12($key),$s3 _ror $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 _ror $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 _ror $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 _srm $t0,24,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 _srm $t3,16,$acc1 _srm $t2,8,$acc2 ldbx $acc0($rounds),$acc0 _srm $t1,24,$acc4 ldbx $acc1($rounds),$acc1 _srm $t0,16,$acc5 _srm $t1,0,$acc3 ldbx $acc2($rounds),$acc2 ldbx $acc3($rounds),$acc3 _srm $t3,8,$acc6 ldbx $acc4($rounds),$acc4 _srm $t2,24,$acc8 ldbx $acc5($rounds),$acc5 _srm $t1,16,$acc9 _srm $t2,0,$acc7 ldbx $acc6($rounds),$acc6 ldbx $acc7($rounds),$acc7 _srm $t0,8,$acc10 ldbx $acc8($rounds),$acc8 _srm $t3,24,$acc12 ldbx $acc9($rounds),$acc9 _srm $t2,16,$acc13 _srm $t3,0,$acc11 ldbx $acc10($rounds),$acc10 _srm $t1,8,$acc14 ldbx $acc11($rounds),$acc11 ldbx $acc12($rounds),$acc12 ldbx $acc13($rounds),$acc13 _srm $t0,0,$acc15 ldbx $acc14($rounds),$acc14 dep $acc0,7,8,$acc3 ldbx $acc15($rounds),$acc15 dep $acc4,7,8,$acc7 dep $acc1,15,8,$acc3 dep $acc5,15,8,$acc7 dep $acc2,23,8,$acc3 dep $acc6,23,8,$acc7 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 dep $acc8,7,8,$acc11 dep $acc12,7,8,$acc15 dep $acc9,15,8,$acc11 dep $acc13,15,8,$acc15 dep $acc10,23,8,$acc11 dep $acc14,23,8,$acc15 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 bv (%r31) .EXIT xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 .PROCEND .ALIGN 64 L\$AES_Td .WORD 0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96 .WORD 0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393 .WORD 0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25 .WORD 0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f .WORD 0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1 .WORD 0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6 .WORD 0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da .WORD 0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844 .WORD 0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd .WORD 0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4 .WORD 0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45 .WORD 0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94 .WORD 0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7 .WORD 0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a .WORD 0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5 .WORD 0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c .WORD 0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1 .WORD 0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a .WORD 0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75 .WORD 0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051 .WORD 0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46 .WORD 0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff .WORD 0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77 .WORD 0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb .WORD 0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000 .WORD 0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e .WORD 0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927 .WORD 0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a .WORD 0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e .WORD 0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16 .WORD 0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d .WORD 0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8 .WORD 0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd .WORD 0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34 .WORD 0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163 .WORD 0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120 .WORD 0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d .WORD 0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0 .WORD 0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422 .WORD 0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef .WORD 0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36 .WORD 0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4 .WORD 0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662 .WORD 0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5 .WORD 0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3 .WORD 0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b .WORD 0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8 .WORD 0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6 .WORD 0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6 .WORD 0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0 .WORD 0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815 .WORD 0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f .WORD 0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df .WORD 0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f .WORD 0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e .WORD 0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713 .WORD 0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89 .WORD 0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c .WORD 0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf .WORD 0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86 .WORD 0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f .WORD 0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541 .WORD 0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190 .WORD 0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742 .BYTE 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 .BYTE 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb .BYTE 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 .BYTE 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb .BYTE 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d .BYTE 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e .BYTE 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 .BYTE 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 .BYTE 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 .BYTE 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 .BYTE 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda .BYTE 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 .BYTE 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a .BYTE 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 .BYTE 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 .BYTE 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b .BYTE 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea .BYTE 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 .BYTE 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 .BYTE 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e .BYTE 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 .BYTE 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b .BYTE 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 .BYTE 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 .BYTE 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 .BYTE 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f .BYTE 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d .BYTE 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef .BYTE 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 .BYTE 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 .BYTE 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 .BYTE 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d .STRINGZ "AES for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; # translate made up instructons: _ror, _srm s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/shd$1$2,$2,/ or s/_srm(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/ $SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,8,",$1,31-$2) : sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,8,",$1,63-$2)/e; s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4); s/\bbv\b(.*\(%r2\))/bve$1/ if ($SIZE_T==8); print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000007436013176625656017353 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ###################################################################### ## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation. ## version 0.1 ## ## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009 ## Public domain. ## ## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and ## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/. ###################################################################### # September 2011. # # Interface to OpenSSL as "almost" drop-in replacement for # aes-x86_64.pl. "Almost" refers to the fact that AES_cbc_encrypt # doesn't handle partial vectors (doesn't have to if called from # EVP only). "Drop-in" implies that this module doesn't share key # schedule structure with the original nor does it make assumption # about its alignment... # # Performance summary. aes-x86_64.pl column lists large-block CBC # encrypt/decrypt/with-hyper-threading-off(*) results in cycles per # byte processed with 128-bit key, and vpaes-x86_64.pl column - # [also large-block CBC] encrypt/decrypt. # # aes-x86_64.pl vpaes-x86_64.pl # # Core 2(**) 29.6/41.1/14.3 21.9/25.2(***) # Nehalem 29.6/40.3/14.6 10.0/11.8 # Atom 57.3/74.2/32.1 60.9/77.2(***) # Silvermont 52.7/64.0/19.5 48.8/60.8(***) # Goldmont 38.9/49.0/17.8 10.6/12.6 # # (*) "Hyper-threading" in the context refers rather to cache shared # among multiple cores, than to specifically Intel HTT. As vast # majority of contemporary cores share cache, slower code path # is common place. In other words "with-hyper-threading-off" # results are presented mostly for reference purposes. # # (**) "Core 2" refers to initial 65nm design, a.k.a. Conroe. # # (***) Less impressive improvement on Core 2 and Atom is due to slow # pshufb, yet it's respectable +36%/62% improvement on Core 2 # (as implied, over "hyper-threading-safe" code path). # # $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; $PREFIX="vpaes"; $code.=<<___; .text ## ## _aes_encrypt_core ## ## AES-encrypt %xmm0. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm0 = input ## %xmm9-%xmm15 as in _vpaes_preheat ## (%rdx) = scheduled keys ## ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm5, %r9, %r10, %r11, %rax ## Preserves %xmm6 - %xmm8 so you get some local vectors ## ## .type _vpaes_encrypt_core,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_encrypt_core: mov %rdx, %r9 mov \$16, %r11 mov 240(%rdx),%eax movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 movdqa .Lk_ipt(%rip), %xmm2 # iptlo pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 movdqu (%r9), %xmm5 # round0 key psrld \$4, %xmm1 pand %xmm9, %xmm0 pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 movdqa .Lk_ipt+16(%rip), %xmm0 # ipthi pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 pxor %xmm5, %xmm2 add \$16, %r9 pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 lea .Lk_mc_backward(%rip),%r10 jmp .Lenc_entry .align 16 .Lenc_loop: # middle of middle round movdqa %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 : sb1u movdqa %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 : sb1t pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t pxor %xmm5, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k movdqa %xmm15, %xmm5 # 4 : sb2u pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A movdqa -0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_mc_forward[] pshufb %xmm2, %xmm5 # 4 = sb2u movdqa (%r11,%r10), %xmm4 # .Lk_mc_backward[] movdqa %xmm14, %xmm2 # 2 : sb2t pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = sb2t movdqa %xmm0, %xmm3 # 3 = A pxor %xmm5, %xmm2 # 2 = 2A pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = B add \$16, %r9 # next key pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+B pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = D add \$16, %r11 # next mc pxor %xmm0, %xmm3 # 3 = 2A+B+D pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = 2B+C and \$0x30, %r11 # ... mod 4 sub \$1,%rax # nr-- pxor %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D .Lenc_entry: # top of round movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 # 1 : i movdqa %xmm11, %xmm5 # 2 : a/k pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 # 1 = i<<4 psrld \$4, %xmm1 # 1 = i pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k pshufb %xmm0, %xmm5 # 2 = a/k movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j pxor %xmm5, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak pxor %xmm5, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak movdqu (%r9), %xmm5 pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo jnz .Lenc_loop # middle of last round movdqa -0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou .Lk_sbo movdqa -0x50(%r10), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot .Lk_sbo+16 pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou pxor %xmm5, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t movdqa 0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_sr[] pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 ret .size _vpaes_encrypt_core,.-_vpaes_encrypt_core ## ## Decryption core ## ## Same API as encryption core. ## .type _vpaes_decrypt_core,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_decrypt_core: mov %rdx, %r9 # load key mov 240(%rdx),%eax movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 movdqa .Lk_dipt(%rip), %xmm2 # iptlo pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 mov %rax, %r11 psrld \$4, %xmm1 movdqu (%r9), %xmm5 # round0 key shl \$4, %r11 pand %xmm9, %xmm0 pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 movdqa .Lk_dipt+16(%rip), %xmm0 # ipthi xor \$0x30, %r11 lea .Lk_dsbd(%rip),%r10 pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 and \$0x30, %r11 pxor %xmm5, %xmm2 movdqa .Lk_mc_forward+48(%rip), %xmm5 pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 add \$16, %r9 add %r10, %r11 jmp .Ldec_entry .align 16 .Ldec_loop: ## ## Inverse mix columns ## movdqa -0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sb9u movdqa -0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sb9t pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb9u pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sb9t pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 movdqa 0x00(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbdu pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch movdqa 0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbdt pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbdu pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sbdt pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 4 = ch movdqa 0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbbu pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch movdqa 0x30(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbbt pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbbu pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sbbt pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 4 = ch movdqa 0x40(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbeu pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch movdqa 0x50(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbet pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbeu pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sbet pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 4 = ch add \$16, %r9 # next round key palignr \$12, %xmm5, %xmm5 pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch sub \$1,%rax # nr-- .Ldec_entry: # top of round movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 # 1 : i pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 # 1 = i<<4 movdqa %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 : a/k psrld \$4, %xmm1 # 1 = i pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j pxor %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak movdqu (%r9), %xmm0 pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo jnz .Ldec_loop # middle of last round movdqa 0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou pxor %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k movdqa 0x70(%r10), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot movdqa -0x160(%r11), %xmm2 # .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160 pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A pshufb %xmm2, %xmm0 ret .size _vpaes_decrypt_core,.-_vpaes_decrypt_core ######################################################## ## ## ## AES key schedule ## ## ## ######################################################## .type _vpaes_schedule_core,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_schedule_core: # rdi = key # rsi = size in bits # rdx = buffer # rcx = direction. 0=encrypt, 1=decrypt call _vpaes_preheat # load the tables movdqa .Lk_rcon(%rip), %xmm8 # load rcon movdqu (%rdi), %xmm0 # load key (unaligned) # input transform movdqa %xmm0, %xmm3 lea .Lk_ipt(%rip), %r11 call _vpaes_schedule_transform movdqa %xmm0, %xmm7 lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10 test %rcx, %rcx jnz .Lschedule_am_decrypting # encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform movdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) jmp .Lschedule_go .Lschedule_am_decrypting: # decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows movdqa (%r8,%r10),%xmm1 pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqu %xmm3, (%rdx) xor \$0x30, %r8 .Lschedule_go: cmp \$192, %esi ja .Lschedule_256 je .Lschedule_192 # 128: fall though ## ## .schedule_128 ## ## 128-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## This schedule is really simple, because all its parts ## are accomplished by the subroutines. ## .Lschedule_128: mov \$10, %esi .Loop_schedule_128: call _vpaes_schedule_round dec %rsi jz .Lschedule_mangle_last call _vpaes_schedule_mangle # write output jmp .Loop_schedule_128 ## ## .aes_schedule_192 ## ## 192-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit ## schedule, but with more smearing. The long, high side is ## stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in ## the high bits of %xmm6. ## ## This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each ## round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys. ## Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round ## keys. ## .align 16 .Lschedule_192: movdqu 8(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (very unaligned) call _vpaes_schedule_transform # input transform movdqa %xmm0, %xmm6 # save short part pxor %xmm4, %xmm4 # clear 4 movhlps %xmm4, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros mov \$4, %esi .Loop_schedule_192: call _vpaes_schedule_round palignr \$8,%xmm6,%xmm0 call _vpaes_schedule_mangle # save key n call _vpaes_schedule_192_smear call _vpaes_schedule_mangle # save key n+1 call _vpaes_schedule_round dec %rsi jz .Lschedule_mangle_last call _vpaes_schedule_mangle # save key n+2 call _vpaes_schedule_192_smear jmp .Loop_schedule_192 ## ## .aes_schedule_256 ## ## 256-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit ## schedule, but with an additional "low side" in ## %xmm6. The low side's rounds are the same as the ## high side's, except no rcon and no rotation. ## .align 16 .Lschedule_256: movdqu 16(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (unaligned) call _vpaes_schedule_transform # input transform mov \$7, %esi .Loop_schedule_256: call _vpaes_schedule_mangle # output low result movdqa %xmm0, %xmm6 # save cur_lo in xmm6 # high round call _vpaes_schedule_round dec %rsi jz .Lschedule_mangle_last call _vpaes_schedule_mangle # low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6 pshufd \$0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm7, %xmm5 movdqa %xmm6, %xmm7 call _vpaes_schedule_low_round movdqa %xmm5, %xmm7 jmp .Loop_schedule_256 ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle_last ## ## Mangler for last round of key schedule ## Mangles %xmm0 ## when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63 ## when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0) ## ## Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits ## .align 16 .Lschedule_mangle_last: # schedule last round key from xmm0 lea .Lk_deskew(%rip),%r11 # prepare to deskew test %rcx, %rcx jnz .Lschedule_mangle_last_dec # encrypting movdqa (%r8,%r10),%xmm1 pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 # output permute lea .Lk_opt(%rip), %r11 # prepare to output transform add \$32, %rdx .Lschedule_mangle_last_dec: add \$-16, %rdx pxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm0 call _vpaes_schedule_transform # output transform movdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key # cleanup pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 pxor %xmm1, %xmm1 pxor %xmm2, %xmm2 pxor %xmm3, %xmm3 pxor %xmm4, %xmm4 pxor %xmm5, %xmm5 pxor %xmm6, %xmm6 pxor %xmm7, %xmm7 ret .size _vpaes_schedule_core,.-_vpaes_schedule_core ## ## .aes_schedule_192_smear ## ## Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm7: high side, b a x y ## %xmm6: low side, d c 0 0 ## %xmm13: 0 ## ## Outputs: ## %xmm6: b+c+d b+c 0 0 ## %xmm0: b+c+d b+c b a ## .type _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_schedule_192_smear: pshufd \$0x80, %xmm6, %xmm1 # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0 pshufd \$0xFE, %xmm7, %xmm0 # b a _ _ -> b b b a pxor %xmm1, %xmm6 # -> c+d c 0 0 pxor %xmm1, %xmm1 pxor %xmm0, %xmm6 # -> b+c+d b+c b a movdqa %xmm6, %xmm0 movhlps %xmm1, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros ret .size _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,.-_vpaes_schedule_192_smear ## ## .aes_schedule_round ## ## Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7 ## ## Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0 ## then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of ## %xmm7. ## ## Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for ## next rcon. ## ## Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the ## second low, result into third, result into highest. ## ## Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0. ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r11. ## .type _vpaes_schedule_round,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_schedule_round: # extract rcon from xmm8 pxor %xmm1, %xmm1 palignr \$15, %xmm8, %xmm1 palignr \$15, %xmm8, %xmm8 pxor %xmm1, %xmm7 # rotate pshufd \$0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 palignr \$1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # fall through... # low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon. _vpaes_schedule_low_round: # smear xmm7 movdqa %xmm7, %xmm1 pslldq \$4, %xmm7 pxor %xmm1, %xmm7 movdqa %xmm7, %xmm1 pslldq \$8, %xmm7 pxor %xmm1, %xmm7 pxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm7 # subbytes movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 psrld \$4, %xmm1 # 1 = i pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k movdqa %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 : a/k pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j pxor %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo movdqa %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 : sbou pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou movdqa %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 : sbot pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = sbox output # add in smeared stuff pxor %xmm7, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm0, %xmm7 ret .size _vpaes_schedule_round,.-_vpaes_schedule_round ## ## .aes_schedule_transform ## ## Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%r11) ## ## Requires that %xmm9 = 0x0F0F... as in preheat ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm1, %xmm2 ## .type _vpaes_schedule_transform,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_schedule_transform: movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 psrld \$4, %xmm1 pand %xmm9, %xmm0 movdqa (%r11), %xmm2 # lo pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 movdqa 16(%r11), %xmm0 # hi pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 ret .size _vpaes_schedule_transform,.-_vpaes_schedule_transform ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle ## ## Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version ## to our version. ## ## On encrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1 ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## On decrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9 ## deskew ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## ## Writes out to (%rdx), and increments or decrements it ## Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %r8 ## Preserves xmm0 ## Clobbers xmm1-xmm5 ## .type _vpaes_schedule_mangle,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_schedule_mangle: movdqa %xmm0, %xmm4 # save xmm0 for later movdqa .Lk_mc_forward(%rip),%xmm5 test %rcx, %rcx jnz .Lschedule_mangle_dec # encrypting add \$16, %rdx pxor .Lk_s63(%rip),%xmm4 pshufb %xmm5, %xmm4 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 pshufb %xmm5, %xmm4 pxor %xmm4, %xmm3 pshufb %xmm5, %xmm4 pxor %xmm4, %xmm3 jmp .Lschedule_mangle_both .align 16 .Lschedule_mangle_dec: # inverse mix columns lea .Lk_dksd(%rip),%r11 movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 pandn %xmm4, %xmm1 psrld \$4, %xmm1 # 1 = hi pand %xmm9, %xmm4 # 4 = lo movdqa 0x00(%r11), %xmm2 pshufb %xmm4, %xmm2 movdqa 0x10(%r11), %xmm3 pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 pshufb %xmm5, %xmm3 movdqa 0x20(%r11), %xmm2 pshufb %xmm4, %xmm2 pxor %xmm3, %xmm2 movdqa 0x30(%r11), %xmm3 pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 pshufb %xmm5, %xmm3 movdqa 0x40(%r11), %xmm2 pshufb %xmm4, %xmm2 pxor %xmm3, %xmm2 movdqa 0x50(%r11), %xmm3 pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 pshufb %xmm5, %xmm3 movdqa 0x60(%r11), %xmm2 pshufb %xmm4, %xmm2 pxor %xmm3, %xmm2 movdqa 0x70(%r11), %xmm3 pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 add \$-16, %rdx .Lschedule_mangle_both: movdqa (%r8,%r10),%xmm1 pshufb %xmm1,%xmm3 add \$-16, %r8 and \$0x30, %r8 movdqu %xmm3, (%rdx) ret .size _vpaes_schedule_mangle,.-_vpaes_schedule_mangle # # Interface to OpenSSL # .globl ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .type ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,\@function,3 .align 16 ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0xa0(%rsp) .Lenc_key_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %esi,%eax shr \$5,%eax add \$5,%eax mov %eax,240(%rdx) # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; mov \$0,%ecx mov \$0x30,%r8d call _vpaes_schedule_core ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 0xb8(%rsp),%rsp .Lenc_key_epilogue: ___ $code.=<<___; xor %eax,%eax ret .size ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .globl ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key .type ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,\@function,3 .align 16 ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0xa0(%rsp) .Ldec_key_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %esi,%eax shr \$5,%eax add \$5,%eax mov %eax,240(%rdx) # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; shl \$4,%eax lea 16(%rdx,%rax),%rdx mov \$1,%ecx mov %esi,%r8d shr \$1,%r8d and \$32,%r8d xor \$32,%r8d # nbits==192?0:32 call _vpaes_schedule_core ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 0xb8(%rsp),%rsp .Ldec_key_epilogue: ___ $code.=<<___; xor %eax,%eax ret .size ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key .globl ${PREFIX}_encrypt .type ${PREFIX}_encrypt,\@function,3 .align 16 ${PREFIX}_encrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0xa0(%rsp) .Lenc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0 call _vpaes_preheat call _vpaes_encrypt_core movdqu %xmm0,(%rsi) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 0xb8(%rsp),%rsp .Lenc_epilogue: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt .globl ${PREFIX}_decrypt .type ${PREFIX}_decrypt,\@function,3 .align 16 ${PREFIX}_decrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0xa0(%rsp) .Ldec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; movdqu (%rdi),%xmm0 call _vpaes_preheat call _vpaes_decrypt_core movdqu %xmm0,(%rsi) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 0xb8(%rsp),%rsp .Ldec_epilogue: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ${PREFIX}_decrypt,.-${PREFIX}_decrypt ___ { my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$enc)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9"); # void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); $code.=<<___; .globl ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt .type ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6 .align 16 ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt: xchg $key,$len ___ ($len,$key)=($key,$len); $code.=<<___; sub \$16,$len jc .Lcbc_abort ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0xa0(%rsp) .Lcbc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; movdqu ($ivp),%xmm6 # load IV sub $inp,$out call _vpaes_preheat cmp \$0,${enc}d je .Lcbc_dec_loop jmp .Lcbc_enc_loop .align 16 .Lcbc_enc_loop: movdqu ($inp),%xmm0 pxor %xmm6,%xmm0 call _vpaes_encrypt_core movdqa %xmm0,%xmm6 movdqu %xmm0,($out,$inp) lea 16($inp),$inp sub \$16,$len jnc .Lcbc_enc_loop jmp .Lcbc_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_loop: movdqu ($inp),%xmm0 movdqa %xmm0,%xmm7 call _vpaes_decrypt_core pxor %xmm6,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm7,%xmm6 movdqu %xmm0,($out,$inp) lea 16($inp),$inp sub \$16,$len jnc .Lcbc_dec_loop .Lcbc_done: movdqu %xmm6,($ivp) # save IV ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 0xb8(%rsp),%rsp .Lcbc_epilogue: ___ $code.=<<___; .Lcbc_abort: ret .size ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt ___ } $code.=<<___; ## ## _aes_preheat ## ## Fills register %r10 -> .aes_consts (so you can -fPIC) ## and %xmm9-%xmm15 as specified below. ## .type _vpaes_preheat,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _vpaes_preheat: lea .Lk_s0F(%rip), %r10 movdqa -0x20(%r10), %xmm10 # .Lk_inv movdqa -0x10(%r10), %xmm11 # .Lk_inv+16 movdqa 0x00(%r10), %xmm9 # .Lk_s0F movdqa 0x30(%r10), %xmm13 # .Lk_sb1 movdqa 0x40(%r10), %xmm12 # .Lk_sb1+16 movdqa 0x50(%r10), %xmm15 # .Lk_sb2 movdqa 0x60(%r10), %xmm14 # .Lk_sb2+16 ret .size _vpaes_preheat,.-_vpaes_preheat ######################################################## ## ## ## Constants ## ## ## ######################################################## .type _vpaes_consts,\@object .align 64 _vpaes_consts: .Lk_inv: # inv, inva .quad 0x0E05060F0D080180, 0x040703090A0B0C02 .quad 0x01040A060F0B0780, 0x030D0E0C02050809 .Lk_s0F: # s0F .quad 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F, 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F .Lk_ipt: # input transform (lo, hi) .quad 0xC2B2E8985A2A7000, 0xCABAE09052227808 .quad 0x4C01307D317C4D00, 0xCD80B1FCB0FDCC81 .Lk_sb1: # sb1u, sb1t .quad 0xB19BE18FCB503E00, 0xA5DF7A6E142AF544 .quad 0x3618D415FAE22300, 0x3BF7CCC10D2ED9EF .Lk_sb2: # sb2u, sb2t .quad 0xE27A93C60B712400, 0x5EB7E955BC982FCD .quad 0x69EB88400AE12900, 0xC2A163C8AB82234A .Lk_sbo: # sbou, sbot .quad 0xD0D26D176FBDC700, 0x15AABF7AC502A878 .quad 0xCFE474A55FBB6A00, 0x8E1E90D1412B35FA .Lk_mc_forward: # mc_forward .quad 0x0407060500030201, 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09 .quad 0x080B0A0904070605, 0x000302010C0F0E0D .quad 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09, 0x0407060500030201 .quad 0x000302010C0F0E0D, 0x080B0A0904070605 .Lk_mc_backward:# mc_backward .quad 0x0605040702010003, 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B .quad 0x020100030E0D0C0F, 0x0A09080B06050407 .quad 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B, 0x0605040702010003 .quad 0x0A09080B06050407, 0x020100030E0D0C0F .Lk_sr: # sr .quad 0x0706050403020100, 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A0908 .quad 0x030E09040F0A0500, 0x0B06010C07020D08 .quad 0x0F060D040B020900, 0x070E050C030A0108 .quad 0x0B0E0104070A0D00, 0x0306090C0F020508 .Lk_rcon: # rcon .quad 0x1F8391B9AF9DEEB6, 0x702A98084D7C7D81 .Lk_s63: # s63: all equal to 0x63 transformed .quad 0x5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5B, 0x5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5B .Lk_opt: # output transform .quad 0xFF9F4929D6B66000, 0xF7974121DEBE6808 .quad 0x01EDBD5150BCEC00, 0xE10D5DB1B05C0CE0 .Lk_deskew: # deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew" .quad 0x07E4A34047A4E300, 0x1DFEB95A5DBEF91A .quad 0x5F36B5DC83EA6900, 0x2841C2ABF49D1E77 ## ## Decryption stuff ## Key schedule constants ## .Lk_dksd: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*D .quad 0xFEB91A5DA3E44700, 0x0740E3A45A1DBEF9 .quad 0x41C277F4B5368300, 0x5FDC69EAAB289D1E .Lk_dksb: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*B .quad 0x9A4FCA1F8550D500, 0x03D653861CC94C99 .quad 0x115BEDA7B6FC4A00, 0xD993256F7E3482C8 .Lk_dkse: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63 .quad 0xD5031CCA1FC9D600, 0x53859A4C994F5086 .quad 0xA23196054FDC7BE8, 0xCD5EF96A20B31487 .Lk_dks9: # decryption key schedule: invskew x*9 .quad 0xB6116FC87ED9A700, 0x4AED933482255BFC .quad 0x4576516227143300, 0x8BB89FACE9DAFDCE ## ## Decryption stuff ## Round function constants ## .Lk_dipt: # decryption input transform .quad 0x0F505B040B545F00, 0x154A411E114E451A .quad 0x86E383E660056500, 0x12771772F491F194 .Lk_dsb9: # decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t .quad 0x851C03539A86D600, 0xCAD51F504F994CC9 .quad 0xC03B1789ECD74900, 0x725E2C9EB2FBA565 .Lk_dsbd: # decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t .quad 0x7D57CCDFE6B1A200, 0xF56E9B13882A4439 .quad 0x3CE2FAF724C6CB00, 0x2931180D15DEEFD3 .Lk_dsbb: # decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t .quad 0xD022649296B44200, 0x602646F6B0F2D404 .quad 0xC19498A6CD596700, 0xF3FF0C3E3255AA6B .Lk_dsbe: # decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t .quad 0x46F2929626D4D000, 0x2242600464B4F6B0 .quad 0x0C55A6CDFFAAC100, 0x9467F36B98593E32 .Lk_dsbo: # decryption sbox final output .quad 0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D .quad 0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C .asciz "Vector Permutation AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)" .align 64 .size _vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts ___ if ($win64) { # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue lea 16(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq lea 0xb8(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$`1232/8`,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_encrypt .rva .LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_decrypt .rva .LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_decrypt .rva .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_decrypt .rva .LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lenc_key_body,.Lenc_key_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Ldec_key_body,.Ldec_key_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_encrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lenc_body,.Lenc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_decrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Ldec_body,.Ldec_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lcbc_body,.Lcbc_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000005531613176625656017706 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by David S. Miller and Andy Polyakov # . The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD # license. October 2012. All rights reserved. # ==================================================================== ###################################################################### # AES for SPARC T4. # # AES round instructions complete in 3 cycles and can be issued every # cycle. It means that round calculations should take 4*rounds cycles, # because any given round instruction depends on result of *both* # previous instructions: # # |0 |1 |2 |3 |4 # |01|01|01| # |23|23|23| # |01|01|... # |23|... # # Provided that fxor [with IV] takes 3 cycles to complete, critical # path length for CBC encrypt would be 3+4*rounds, or in other words # it should process one byte in at least (3+4*rounds)/16 cycles. This # estimate doesn't account for "collateral" instructions, such as # fetching input from memory, xor-ing it with zero-round key and # storing the result. Yet, *measured* performance [for data aligned # at 64-bit boundary!] deviates from this equation by less than 0.5%: # # 128-bit key 192- 256- # CBC encrypt 2.70/2.90(*) 3.20/3.40 3.70/3.90 # (*) numbers after slash are for # misaligned data. # # Out-of-order execution logic managed to fully overlap "collateral" # instructions with those on critical path. Amazing! # # As with Intel AES-NI, question is if it's possible to improve # performance of parallelizeable modes by interleaving round # instructions. Provided round instruction latency and throughput # optimal interleave factor is 2. But can we expect 2x performance # improvement? Well, as round instructions can be issued one per # cycle, they don't saturate the 2-way issue pipeline and therefore # there is room for "collateral" calculations... Yet, 2x speed-up # over CBC encrypt remains unattaintable: # # 128-bit key 192- 256- # CBC decrypt 1.64/2.11 1.89/2.37 2.23/2.61 # CTR 1.64/2.08(*) 1.89/2.33 2.23/2.61 # (*) numbers after slash are for # misaligned data. # # Estimates based on amount of instructions under assumption that # round instructions are not pairable with any other instruction # suggest that latter is the actual case and pipeline runs # underutilized. It should be noted that T4 out-of-order execution # logic is so capable that performance gain from 2x interleave is # not even impressive, ~7-13% over non-interleaved code, largest # for 256-bit keys. # To anchor to something else, software implementation processes # one byte in 29 cycles with 128-bit key on same processor. Intel # Sandy Bridge encrypts byte in 5.07 cycles in CBC mode and decrypts # in 0.93, naturally with AES-NI. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "sparcv9_modes.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $::evp=1; # if $evp is set to 0, script generates module with # AES_[en|de]crypt, AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key and AES_cbc_encrypt entry # points. These however are not fully compatible with openssl/aes.h, # because they expect AES_KEY to be aligned at 64-bit boundary. When # used through EVP, alignment is arranged at EVP layer. Second thing # that is arranged by EVP is at least 32-bit alignment of IV. ###################################################################### # single-round subroutines # { my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$tmp,$mask)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .text .globl aes_t4_encrypt .align 32 aes_t4_encrypt: andcc $inp, 7, %g1 ! is input aligned? andn $inp, 7, $inp ldx [$key + 0], %g4 ldx [$key + 8], %g5 ldx [$inp + 0], %o4 bz,pt %icc, 1f ldx [$inp + 8], %o5 ldx [$inp + 16], $inp sll %g1, 3, %g1 sub %g0, %g1, %o3 sllx %o4, %g1, %o4 sllx %o5, %g1, %g1 srlx %o5, %o3, %o5 srlx $inp, %o3, %o3 or %o5, %o4, %o4 or %o3, %g1, %o5 1: ld [$key + 240], $rounds ldd [$key + 16], %f12 ldd [$key + 24], %f14 xor %g4, %o4, %o4 xor %g5, %o5, %o5 movxtod %o4, %f0 movxtod %o5, %f2 srl $rounds, 1, $rounds ldd [$key + 32], %f16 sub $rounds, 1, $rounds ldd [$key + 40], %f18 add $key, 48, $key .Lenc: aes_eround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 0], %f12 ldd [$key + 8], %f14 sub $rounds,1,$rounds aes_eround01 %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 brnz,pt $rounds, .Lenc add $key, 32, $key andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned? aes_eround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01_l %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23_l %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2 bnz,pn %icc, 2f nop std %f0, [$out + 0] retl std %f2, [$out + 8] 2: alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $tmp, $mask faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $mask, $mask retl stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store .type aes_t4_encrypt,#function .size aes_t4_encrypt,.-aes_t4_encrypt .globl aes_t4_decrypt .align 32 aes_t4_decrypt: andcc $inp, 7, %g1 ! is input aligned? andn $inp, 7, $inp ldx [$key + 0], %g4 ldx [$key + 8], %g5 ldx [$inp + 0], %o4 bz,pt %icc, 1f ldx [$inp + 8], %o5 ldx [$inp + 16], $inp sll %g1, 3, %g1 sub %g0, %g1, %o3 sllx %o4, %g1, %o4 sllx %o5, %g1, %g1 srlx %o5, %o3, %o5 srlx $inp, %o3, %o3 or %o5, %o4, %o4 or %o3, %g1, %o5 1: ld [$key + 240], $rounds ldd [$key + 16], %f12 ldd [$key + 24], %f14 xor %g4, %o4, %o4 xor %g5, %o5, %o5 movxtod %o4, %f0 movxtod %o5, %f2 srl $rounds, 1, $rounds ldd [$key + 32], %f16 sub $rounds, 1, $rounds ldd [$key + 40], %f18 add $key, 48, $key .Ldec: aes_dround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 0], %f12 ldd [$key + 8], %f14 sub $rounds,1,$rounds aes_dround01 %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 brnz,pt $rounds, .Ldec add $key, 32, $key andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned? aes_dround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01_l %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23_l %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2 bnz,pn %icc, 2f nop std %f0, [$out + 0] retl std %f2, [$out + 8] 2: alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $tmp, $mask faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $mask, $mask retl stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store .type aes_t4_decrypt,#function .size aes_t4_decrypt,.-aes_t4_decrypt ___ } ###################################################################### # key setup subroutines # { my ($inp,$bits,$out,$tmp)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl aes_t4_set_encrypt_key .align 32 aes_t4_set_encrypt_key: .Lset_encrypt_key: and $inp, 7, $tmp alignaddr $inp, %g0, $inp cmp $bits, 192 ldd [$inp + 0], %f0 bl,pt %icc,.L128 ldd [$inp + 8], %f2 be,pt %icc,.L192 ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 brz,pt $tmp, .L256aligned ldd [$inp + 24], %f6 ldd [$inp + 32], %f8 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4 faligndata %f6, %f8, %f6 .L256aligned: ___ for ($i=0; $i<6; $i++) { $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + `32*$i+0`] aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f6, $i, %f0 std %f2, [$out + `32*$i+8`] aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2 std %f4, [$out + `32*$i+16`] aes_kexpand0 %f4, %f2, %f4 std %f6, [$out + `32*$i+24`] aes_kexpand2 %f6, %f4, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + `32*$i+0`] aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f6, $i, %f0 std %f2, [$out + `32*$i+8`] aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2 std %f4, [$out + `32*$i+16`] std %f6, [$out + `32*$i+24`] std %f0, [$out + `32*$i+32`] std %f2, [$out + `32*$i+40`] mov 14, $tmp st $tmp, [$out + 240] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 .align 16 .L192: brz,pt $tmp, .L192aligned nop ldd [$inp + 24], %f6 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4 .L192aligned: ___ for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + `24*$i+0`] aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f4, $i, %f0 std %f2, [$out + `24*$i+8`] aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2 std %f4, [$out + `24*$i+16`] aes_kexpand2 %f4, %f2, %f4 ___ } $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + `24*$i+0`] aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f4, $i, %f0 std %f2, [$out + `24*$i+8`] aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2 std %f4, [$out + `24*$i+16`] std %f0, [$out + `24*$i+24`] std %f2, [$out + `24*$i+32`] mov 12, $tmp st $tmp, [$out + 240] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 .align 16 .L128: brz,pt $tmp, .L128aligned nop ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 .L128aligned: ___ for ($i=0; $i<10; $i++) { $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + `16*$i+0`] aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f2, $i, %f0 std %f2, [$out + `16*$i+8`] aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; std %f0, [$out + `16*$i+0`] std %f2, [$out + `16*$i+8`] mov 10, $tmp st $tmp, [$out + 240] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 .type aes_t4_set_encrypt_key,#function .size aes_t4_set_encrypt_key,.-aes_t4_set_encrypt_key .globl aes_t4_set_decrypt_key .align 32 aes_t4_set_decrypt_key: mov %o7, %o5 call .Lset_encrypt_key nop mov %o5, %o7 sll $tmp, 4, $inp ! $tmp is number of rounds add $tmp, 2, $tmp add $out, $inp, $inp ! $inp=$out+16*rounds srl $tmp, 2, $tmp ! $tmp=(rounds+2)/4 .Lkey_flip: ldd [$out + 0], %f0 ldd [$out + 8], %f2 ldd [$out + 16], %f4 ldd [$out + 24], %f6 ldd [$inp + 0], %f8 ldd [$inp + 8], %f10 ldd [$inp - 16], %f12 ldd [$inp - 8], %f14 sub $tmp, 1, $tmp std %f0, [$inp + 0] std %f2, [$inp + 8] std %f4, [$inp - 16] std %f6, [$inp - 8] std %f8, [$out + 0] std %f10, [$out + 8] std %f12, [$out + 16] std %f14, [$out + 24] add $out, 32, $out brnz $tmp, .Lkey_flip sub $inp, 32, $inp retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 .type aes_t4_set_decrypt_key,#function .size aes_t4_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_t4_set_decrypt_key ___ } {{{ my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); my ($ileft,$iright,$ooff,$omask,$ivoff)=map("%l$_",(1..7)); $code.=<<___; .align 32 _aes128_encrypt_1x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01_l %f52, %f4, %f2, %f0 retl aes_eround23_l %f54, %f4, %f2, %f2 .type _aes128_encrypt_1x,#function .size _aes128_encrypt_1x,.-_aes128_encrypt_1x .align 32 _aes128_encrypt_2x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f48, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f50, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_eround01_l %f52, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23_l %f54, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01_l %f52, %f10, %f6, %f4 retl aes_eround23_l %f54, %f10, %f6, %f6 .type _aes128_encrypt_2x,#function .size _aes128_encrypt_2x,.-_aes128_encrypt_2x .align 32 _aes128_loadkey: ldx [$key + 0], %g4 ldx [$key + 8], %g5 ___ for ($i=2; $i<22;$i++) { # load key schedule $code.=<<___; ldd [$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i` ___ } $code.=<<___; retl nop .type _aes128_loadkey,#function .size _aes128_loadkey,.-_aes128_loadkey _aes128_load_enckey=_aes128_loadkey _aes128_load_deckey=_aes128_loadkey ___ &alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",128); if ($::evp) { &alg_ctr32_implement("aes",128); &alg_xts_implement("aes",128,"en"); &alg_xts_implement("aes",128,"de"); } &alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",128); $code.=<<___; .align 32 _aes128_decrypt_1x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01_l %f52, %f4, %f2, %f0 retl aes_dround23_l %f54, %f4, %f2, %f2 .type _aes128_decrypt_1x,#function .size _aes128_decrypt_1x,.-_aes128_decrypt_1x .align 32 _aes128_decrypt_2x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_dround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f48, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_dround23 %f50, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_dround01_l %f52, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23_l %f54, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01_l %f52, %f10, %f6, %f4 retl aes_dround23_l %f54, %f10, %f6, %f6 .type _aes128_decrypt_2x,#function .size _aes128_decrypt_2x,.-_aes128_decrypt_2x ___ $code.=<<___; .align 32 _aes192_encrypt_1x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01_l %f60, %f4, %f2, %f0 retl aes_eround23_l %f62, %f4, %f2, %f2 .type _aes192_encrypt_1x,#function .size _aes192_encrypt_1x,.-_aes192_encrypt_1x .align 32 _aes192_encrypt_2x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f56, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f58, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_eround01_l %f60, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23_l %f62, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01_l %f60, %f10, %f6, %f4 retl aes_eround23_l %f62, %f10, %f6, %f6 .type _aes192_encrypt_2x,#function .size _aes192_encrypt_2x,.-_aes192_encrypt_2x .align 32 _aes256_encrypt_1x: aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 208], %f16 ldd [$key + 216], %f18 aes_eround01 %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 224], %f20 ldd [$key + 232], %f22 ___ for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 aes_eround01_l %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23_l %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f20 retl ldd [$key + 40], %f22 .type _aes256_encrypt_1x,#function .size _aes256_encrypt_1x,.-_aes256_encrypt_1x .align 32 _aes256_encrypt_2x: aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 208], %f16 ldd [$key + 216], %f18 aes_eround01 %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_eround23 %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 224], %f20 ldd [$key + 232], %f22 ___ for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 aes_eround01_l %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_eround23_l %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01_l %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_eround23_l %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 32], %f20 retl ldd [$key + 40], %f22 .type _aes256_encrypt_2x,#function .size _aes256_encrypt_2x,.-_aes256_encrypt_2x .align 32 _aes192_loadkey: ldx [$key + 0], %g4 ldx [$key + 8], %g5 ___ for ($i=2; $i<26;$i++) { # load key schedule $code.=<<___; ldd [$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i` ___ } $code.=<<___; retl nop .type _aes192_loadkey,#function .size _aes192_loadkey,.-_aes192_loadkey _aes256_loadkey=_aes192_loadkey _aes192_load_enckey=_aes192_loadkey _aes192_load_deckey=_aes192_loadkey _aes256_load_enckey=_aes192_loadkey _aes256_load_deckey=_aes192_loadkey ___ &alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",256); &alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",192); if ($::evp) { &alg_ctr32_implement("aes",256); &alg_xts_implement("aes",256,"en"); &alg_xts_implement("aes",256,"de"); &alg_ctr32_implement("aes",192); } &alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",192); &alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",256); $code.=<<___; .align 32 _aes256_decrypt_1x: aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 208], %f16 ldd [$key + 216], %f18 aes_dround01 %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 224], %f20 ldd [$key + 232], %f22 ___ for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 aes_dround01_l %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23_l %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f20 retl ldd [$key + 40], %f22 .type _aes256_decrypt_1x,#function .size _aes256_decrypt_1x,.-_aes256_decrypt_1x .align 32 _aes256_decrypt_2x: aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_dround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 208], %f16 ldd [$key + 216], %f18 aes_dround01 %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_dround23 %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 224], %f20 ldd [$key + 232], %f22 ___ for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_dround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 aes_dround01_l %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23_l %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01_l %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_dround23_l %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 32], %f20 retl ldd [$key + 40], %f22 .type _aes256_decrypt_2x,#function .size _aes256_decrypt_2x,.-_aes256_decrypt_2x .align 32 _aes192_decrypt_1x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f4 aes_dround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01_l %f60, %f4, %f2, %f0 retl aes_dround23_l %f62, %f4, %f2, %f2 .type _aes192_decrypt_1x,#function .size _aes192_decrypt_1x,.-_aes192_decrypt_1x .align 32 _aes192_decrypt_2x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) { $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4 aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; aes_dround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f8 aes_dround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01 %f56, %f4, %f6, %f10 aes_dround23 %f58, %f4, %f6, %f6 aes_dround01_l %f60, %f8, %f2, %f0 aes_dround23_l %f62, %f8, %f2, %f2 aes_dround01_l %f60, %f10, %f6, %f4 retl aes_dround23_l %f62, %f10, %f6, %f6 .type _aes192_decrypt_2x,#function .size _aes192_decrypt_2x,.-_aes192_decrypt_2x ___ }}} if (!$::evp) { $code.=<<___; .global AES_encrypt AES_encrypt=aes_t4_encrypt .global AES_decrypt AES_decrypt=aes_t4_decrypt .global AES_set_encrypt_key .align 32 AES_set_encrypt_key: andcc %o2, 7, %g0 ! check alignment bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -1, %o0 brz,a,pn %o0, 1f mov -1, %o0 brz,a,pn %o2, 1f mov -1, %o0 andncc %o1, 0x1c0, %g0 bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -2, %o0 cmp %o1, 128 bl,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -2, %o0 b aes_t4_set_encrypt_key nop 1: retl nop .type AES_set_encrypt_key,#function .size AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key .global AES_set_decrypt_key .align 32 AES_set_decrypt_key: andcc %o2, 7, %g0 ! check alignment bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -1, %o0 brz,a,pn %o0, 1f mov -1, %o0 brz,a,pn %o2, 1f mov -1, %o0 andncc %o1, 0x1c0, %g0 bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -2, %o0 cmp %o1, 128 bl,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -2, %o0 b aes_t4_set_decrypt_key nop 1: retl nop .type AES_set_decrypt_key,#function .size AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key ___ my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl AES_cbc_encrypt .align 32 AES_cbc_encrypt: ld [$key + 240], %g1 nop brz $enc, .Lcbc_decrypt cmp %g1, 12 bl,pt %icc, aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt nop be,pn %icc, aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt nop ba aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt nop .Lcbc_decrypt: bl,pt %icc, aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt nop be,pn %icc, aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt nop ba aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt nop .type AES_cbc_encrypt,#function .size AES_cbc_encrypt,.-AES_cbc_encrypt ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "AES for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov" .align 4 ___ &emit_assembler(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl0000644000000000000000000030724113176625656017020 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In # OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as # drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl [see below for # details]. # # Performance. # # To start with see corresponding paragraph in aesni-x86_64.pl... # Instead of filling table similar to one found there I've chosen to # summarize *comparison* results for raw ECB, CTR and CBC benchmarks. # The simplified table below represents 32-bit performance relative # to 64-bit one in every given point. Ratios vary for different # encryption modes, therefore interval values. # # 16-byte 64-byte 256-byte 1-KB 8-KB # 53-67% 67-84% 91-94% 95-98% 97-99.5% # # Lower ratios for smaller block sizes are perfectly understandable, # because function call overhead is higher in 32-bit mode. Largest # 8-KB block performance is virtually same: 32-bit code is less than # 1% slower for ECB, CBC and CCM, and ~3% slower otherwise. # January 2011 # # See aesni-x86_64.pl for details. Unlike x86_64 version this module # interleaves at most 6 aes[enc|dec] instructions, because there are # not enough registers for 8x interleave [which should be optimal for # Sandy Bridge]. Actually, performance results for 6x interleave # factor presented in aesni-x86_64.pl (except for CTR) are for this # module. # April 2011 # # Add aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt. Westmere spends 1.50 cycles processing # one byte out of 8KB with 128-bit key, Sandy Bridge - 1.09. # November 2015 # # Add aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt. ###################################################################### # Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with # 128-bit key (less is better). # # CBC en-/decrypt CTR XTS ECB OCB # Westmere 3.77/1.37 1.37 1.52 1.27 # * Bridge 5.07/0.98 0.99 1.09 0.91 1.10 # Haswell 4.44/0.80 0.97 1.03 0.72 0.76 # Silvermont 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46 4.03 # Bulldozer 5.80/0.98 1.05 1.24 0.93 1.23 $PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script # generates drop-in replacement for # crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl:-) $inline=1; # inline _aesni_[en|de]crypt $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open OUT,">$output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &static_label("key_const"); if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=\&movups; } else { $movekey=\&movups; } $len="eax"; $rounds="ecx"; $key="edx"; $inp="esi"; $out="edi"; $rounds_="ebx"; # backup copy for $rounds $key_="ebp"; # backup copy for $key $rndkey0="xmm0"; $rndkey1="xmm1"; $inout0="xmm2"; $inout1="xmm3"; $inout2="xmm4"; $inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5"; $inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6"; $inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7"; # AESNI extension sub aeskeygenassist { my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm); } } sub aescommon { my($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2);} } sub aesimc { aescommon(0xdb,@_); } sub aesenc { aescommon(0xdc,@_); } sub aesenclast { aescommon(0xdd,@_); } sub aesdec { aescommon(0xde,@_); } sub aesdeclast { aescommon(0xdf,@_); } # Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1 { my $sn; sub aesni_inline_generate1 { my ($p,$inout,$ivec)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout)); $sn++; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key)); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key)); &xorps ($ivec,$rndkey0) if (defined($ivec)); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key)); &xorps ($inout,$ivec) if (defined($ivec)); &xorps ($inout,$rndkey0) if (!defined($ivec)); &set_label("${p}1_loop_$sn"); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; &dec ($rounds); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key)); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &jnz (&label("${p}1_loop_$sn")); eval"&aes${p}last ($inout,$rndkey1)"; }} sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop { my ($p,$inout)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout)); &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1"); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key)); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$key)); &xorps ($inout,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$key)); &lea ($key,&DWP(0x30,$key)); &cmp ($rounds,11); &jb (&label("${p}128")); &lea ($key,&DWP(0x20,$key)); &je (&label("${p}192")); &lea ($key,&DWP(0x20,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x40,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x30,$key)); &set_label("${p}192"); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x20,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x10,$key)); &set_label("${p}128"); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x60,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x70,$key)); eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout,$rndkey0)"; &ret(); &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1"); } # void $PREFIX_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); &aesni_generate1("enc") if (!$inline); &function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax")); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &mov ("eax",&wparam(1)); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1); &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout0,$inout0); &ret (); &function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt"); # void $PREFIX_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); &aesni_generate1("dec") if(!$inline); &function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax")); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &mov ("eax",&wparam(1)); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1); &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout0,$inout0); &ret (); &function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt"); # _aesni_[en|de]cryptN are private interfaces, N denotes interleave # factor. Why 3x subroutine were originally used in loops? Even though # aes[enc|dec] latency was originally 6, it could be scheduled only # every *2nd* cycle. Thus 3x interleave was the one providing optimal # utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as # of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3]. # This is why it originally made no sense to implement 2x subroutine. # But times change and it became appropriate to spend extra 192 bytes # on 2x subroutine on Atom Silvermont account. For processors that # can schedule aes[enc|dec] every cycle optimal interleave factor # equals to corresponding instructions latency. 8x is optimal for # * Bridge, but it's unfeasible to accommodate such implementation # in XMM registers addreassable in 32-bit mode and therefore maximum # of 6x is used instead... sub aesni_generate2 { my $p=shift; &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt2"); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key)); &shl ($rounds,4); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key)); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &neg ($rounds); &add ($rounds,16); &set_label("${p}2_loop"); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds)); &add ($rounds,32); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &jnz (&label("${p}2_loop")); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; &ret(); &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt2"); } sub aesni_generate3 { my $p=shift; &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3"); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key)); &shl ($rounds,4); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key)); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &neg ($rounds); &add ($rounds,16); &set_label("${p}3_loop"); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds)); &add ($rounds,32); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &jnz (&label("${p}3_loop")); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)"; &ret(); &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3"); } # 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance, # most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one # should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement would be <20%, # so it's not worth it... sub aesni_generate4 { my $p=shift; &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4"); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key)); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key)); &shl ($rounds,4); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key)); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &neg ($rounds); &data_byte (0x0f,0x1f,0x40,0x00); &add ($rounds,16); &set_label("${p}4_loop"); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)"; &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds)); &add ($rounds,32); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &jnz (&label("${p}4_loop")); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout3,$rndkey0)"; &ret(); &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4"); } sub aesni_generate6 { my $p=shift; &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6"); &static_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key)); &shl ($rounds,4); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); # pxor does better here &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &neg ($rounds); eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)"; &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds)); &add ($rounds,16); &jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner")); &set_label("${p}6_loop",16); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)"; &set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner"); eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)"; &set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds)); &add ($rounds,32); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey0)"; &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &jnz (&label("${p}6_loop")); eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout3,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout4,$rndkey0)"; eval"&aes${p}last ($inout5,$rndkey0)"; &ret(); &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6"); } &aesni_generate2("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate2("dec"); &aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate3("dec"); &aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate4("dec"); &aesni_generate6("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate6("dec"); if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { ###################################################################### # void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # int enc); &function_begin("aesni_ecb_encrypt"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4)); &and ($len,-16); &jz (&label("ecb_ret")); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &test ($rounds_,$rounds_); &jz (&label("ecb_decrypt")); &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds &cmp ($len,0x60); &jb (&label("ecb_enc_tail")); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp)); &sub ($len,0x60); &jmp (&label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter")); &set_label("ecb_enc_loop6",16); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp)); &set_label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter"); &call ("_aesni_encrypt6"); &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &sub ($len,0x60); &jnc (&label("ecb_enc_loop6")); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out)); &add ($len,0x60); &jz (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_enc_tail"); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &cmp ($len,0x20); &jb (&label("ecb_enc_one")); &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &je (&label("ecb_enc_two")); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &cmp ($len,0x40); &jb (&label("ecb_enc_three")); &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &je (&label("ecb_enc_four")); &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &xorps ($inout5,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_encrypt6"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_enc_one",16); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_enc_two",16); &call ("_aesni_encrypt2"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_enc_three",16); &call ("_aesni_encrypt3"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_enc_four",16); &call ("_aesni_encrypt4"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); ###################################################################### &set_label("ecb_decrypt",16); &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds &cmp ($len,0x60); &jb (&label("ecb_dec_tail")); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp)); &sub ($len,0x60); &jmp (&label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter")); &set_label("ecb_dec_loop6",16); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp)); &set_label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter"); &call ("_aesni_decrypt6"); &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &sub ($len,0x60); &jnc (&label("ecb_dec_loop6")); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out)); &add ($len,0x60); &jz (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_dec_tail"); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &cmp ($len,0x20); &jb (&label("ecb_dec_one")); &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &je (&label("ecb_dec_two")); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &cmp ($len,0x40); &jb (&label("ecb_dec_three")); &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &je (&label("ecb_dec_four")); &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &xorps ($inout5,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_decrypt6"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_dec_one",16); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_dec_two",16); &call ("_aesni_decrypt2"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_dec_three",16); &call ("_aesni_decrypt3"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &jmp (&label("ecb_ret")); &set_label("ecb_dec_four",16); &call ("_aesni_decrypt4"); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &set_label("ecb_ret"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt"); ###################################################################### # void aesni_ccm64_[en|de]crypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out, # size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, # const char *ivec,char *cmac); # # Handles only complete blocks, operates on 64-bit counter and # does not update *ivec! Nor does it finalize CMAC value # (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details) # { my $cmac=$inout1; &function_begin("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4)); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5)); &mov ($key_,"esp"); &sub ("esp",60); &and ("esp",-16); # align stack &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_); &movdqu ($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec &movdqu ($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load cmac &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b); &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203); # compose counter increment vector on stack &mov ($rounds_,1); &xor ($key_,$key_); &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_); &shl ($rounds,4); &mov ($rounds_,16); &lea ($key_,&DWP(0,$key)); &movdqa ($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp")); &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &sub ($rounds_,$rounds); &pshufb ($ivec,$inout3); &set_label("ccm64_enc_outer"); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_)); &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_)); &xorps ($rndkey0,$in0); &xorps ($cmac,$rndkey0); # cmac^=inp &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_)); &set_label("ccm64_enc2_loop"); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds)); &add ($rounds,32); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0); &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &jnz (&label("ccm64_enc2_loop")); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1); &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp")); &dec ($len); &aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0); &aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); &xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp^=E(ivec) &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output &pshufb ($inout0,$inout3); &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out)); &jnz (&label("ccm64_enc_outer")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp")); &mov ($out,&wparam(5)); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &function_end("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks"); &function_begin("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4)); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5)); &mov ($key_,"esp"); &sub ("esp",60); &and ("esp",-16); # align stack &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_); &movdqu ($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec &movdqu ($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load cmac &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b); &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203); # compose counter increment vector on stack &mov ($rounds_,1); &xor ($key_,$key_); &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_); &movdqa ($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp")); # bswap mask &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec); &mov ($key_,$key); &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); &pshufb ($ivec,$inout3); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &shl ($rounds_,4); &mov ($rounds,16); &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp")); &lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp)); &sub ($rounds,$rounds_); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_,$rounds_)); &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); &jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer")); &set_label("ccm64_dec_outer",16); &xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp ^= E(ivec) &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out)); &pshufb ($inout0,$inout3); &sub ($len,1); &jz (&label("ccm64_dec_break")); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_)); &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_)); &xorps ($in0,$rndkey0); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); &xorps ($cmac,$in0); # cmac^=out &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_)); &set_label("ccm64_dec2_loop"); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds)); &add ($rounds,32); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0); &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &jnz (&label("ccm64_dec2_loop")); &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp")); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1); &aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0); &aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0); &lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp)); &jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer")); &set_label("ccm64_dec_break",16); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_)); &mov ($key,$key_); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$cmac,$in0); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1",$cmac); } &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp")); &mov ($out,&wparam(5)); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &function_end("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks"); } ###################################################################### # void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out, # size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, # const char *ivec); # # Handles only complete blocks, operates on 32-bit counter and # does not update *ivec! (see crypto/modes/ctr128.c for details) # # stack layout: # 0 pshufb mask # 16 vector addend: 0,6,6,6 # 32 counter-less ivec # 48 1st triplet of counter vector # 64 2nd triplet of counter vector # 80 saved %esp &function_begin("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4)); &mov ($key_,"esp"); &sub ("esp",88); &and ("esp",-16); # align stack &mov (&DWP(80,"esp"),$key_); &cmp ($len,1); &je (&label("ctr32_one_shortcut")); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b); &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203); # compose counter increment vector on stack &mov ($rounds,6); &xor ($key_,$key_); &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$rounds); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$rounds); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_); &pextrd ($rounds_,$inout5,3); # pull 32-bit counter &pinsrd ($inout5,$key_,3); # wipe 32-bit counter &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key->rounds # compose 2 vectors of 3x32-bit counters &bswap ($rounds_); &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1); &movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte-swap mask &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$rounds_,0); &lea ($key_,&DWP(3,$rounds_)); &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$key_,0); &inc ($rounds_); &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$rounds_,1); &inc ($key_); &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$key_,1); &inc ($rounds_); &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$rounds_,2); &inc ($key_); &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$key_,2); &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 1st triplet &pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0,$key)); # key[0] &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 2nd triplet &pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap &pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey0,3<<6); # place counter to upper dword &pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey0,2<<6); &cmp ($len,6); &jb (&label("ctr32_tail")); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); # counter-less ivec^key[0] &shl ($rounds,4); &mov ($rounds_,16); &movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),$inout5); # save counter-less ivec^key[0] &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key &sub ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup twisted $rounds &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &sub ($len,6); &jmp (&label("ctr32_loop6")); &set_label("ctr32_loop6",16); # inlining _aesni_encrypt6's prologue gives ~6% improvement... &pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey0,1<<6); &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull counter-less ivec &pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey1,3<<6); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # merge counter-less ivec &pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey1,2<<6); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &pshufd ($inout5,$rndkey1,1<<6); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_)); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_)); &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1); &call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter")); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey1); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey0); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16,"esp")); # load increment &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1); &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(64,"esp")); # load 2nd triplet &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &paddd ($rndkey1,$rndkey0); # 2nd triplet increment &paddd ($rndkey0,&QWP(48,"esp")); # 1st triplet increment &movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte swap mask &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &xorps ($inout3,$inout1); &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp)); &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 1st triplet &pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap &xorps ($inout4,$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &xorps ($inout5,$inout1); &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 2nd triplet &pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey0,3<<6); &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out)); &pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey0,2<<6); &sub ($len,6); &jnc (&label("ctr32_loop6")); &add ($len,6); &jz (&label("ctr32_ret")); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$key_)); &mov ($key,$key_); &pxor ($inout5,&QWP(32,"esp")); # restore count-less ivec &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_)); # restore $rounds &set_label("ctr32_tail"); &por ($inout0,$inout5); &cmp ($len,2); &jb (&label("ctr32_one")); &pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey0,1<<6); &por ($inout1,$inout5); &je (&label("ctr32_two")); &pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey1,3<<6); &por ($inout2,$inout5); &cmp ($len,4); &jb (&label("ctr32_three")); &pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey1,2<<6); &por ($inout3,$inout5); &je (&label("ctr32_four")); &por ($inout4,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_encrypt6"); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey1); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey0); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey1); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret")); &set_label("ctr32_one_shortcut",16); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &set_label("ctr32_one"); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &xorps ($in0,$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret")); &set_label("ctr32_two",16); &call ("_aesni_encrypt2"); &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret")); &set_label("ctr32_three",16); &call ("_aesni_encrypt3"); &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); &movups ($inout5,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret")); &set_label("ctr32_four",16); &call ("_aesni_encrypt4"); &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups ($inout5,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &xorps ($inout1,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &set_label("ctr32_ret"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(80,"esp")); &function_end("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks"); ###################################################################### # void aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len, # const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2 # const unsigned char iv[16]); # { my ($tweak,$twtmp,$twres,$twmask)=($rndkey1,$rndkey0,$inout0,$inout1); &function_begin("aesni_xts_encrypt"); &mov ($key,&wparam(4)); # key2 &mov ($inp,&wparam(5)); # clear-text tweak &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key2->rounds &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key1 &mov ($key_,"esp"); &sub ("esp",16*7+8); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key1->rounds &and ("esp",-16); # align stack &mov (&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87); # compose the magic constant &mov (&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0); &mov (&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1); &mov (&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0); &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save original $len &mov (&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_); # save original %esp &movdqa ($tweak,$inout0); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87 &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &and ($len,-16); &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds &sub ($len,16*6); &jc (&label("xts_enc_short")); &shl ($rounds,4); &mov ($rounds_,16); &sub ($rounds_,$rounds); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &jmp (&label("xts_enc_loop6")); &set_label("xts_enc_loop6",16); for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); } &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13); &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_)); &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &pxor ($inout5,$tweak); # inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0] &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0] &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp)); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_)); &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_)); &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1); &call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter")); &movdqa ($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # last tweak &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &xorps ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3); &xorps ($inout5,$tweak); &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &movups (&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*6,$out)); &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87 &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &sub ($len,16*6); &jnc (&label("xts_enc_loop6")); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_)); # restore $rounds &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); &set_label("xts_enc_short"); &add ($len,16*6); &jz (&label("xts_enc_done6x")); &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak &cmp ($len,0x20); &jb (&label("xts_enc_one")); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &je (&label("xts_enc_two")); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &cmp ($len,0x40); &jb (&label("xts_enc_three")); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4); &je (&label("xts_enc_four")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5); &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($inout0,1); &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pxor ($inout5,$tweak); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp)); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak &pxor ($inout4,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_encrypt6"); &movaps ($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # last tweak &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &xorps ($inout4,$tweak); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3); &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*5,$out)); &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done")); &set_label("xts_enc_one",16); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &lea ($out,&DWP(16*1,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout3); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done")); &set_label("xts_enc_two",16); &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &call ("_aesni_encrypt2"); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*2,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done")); &set_label("xts_enc_three",16); &movaps ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside last tweak &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_encrypt3"); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*3,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout5); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done")); &set_label("xts_enc_four",16); &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak &movups ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp)); &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &xorps ($inout3,$inout4); &call ("_aesni_encrypt4"); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &xorps ($inout3,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done")); &set_label("xts_enc_done6x",16); # $tweak is pre-calculated &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len &and ($len,15); &jz (&label("xts_enc_ret")); &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak); &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16 &jmp (&label("xts_enc_steal")); &set_label("xts_enc_done",16); &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &and ($len,15); &jz (&label("xts_enc_ret")); &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16 &pshufd ($inout3,$twtmp,0x13); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($inout3,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # isolate carry and residue &pxor ($inout3,$tweak); &set_label("xts_enc_steal"); &movz ($rounds,&BP(0,$inp)); &movz ($key,&BP(-16,$out)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp)); &mov (&BP(-16,$out),&LB($rounds)); &mov (&BP(0,$out),&LB($key)); &lea ($out,&DWP(1,$out)); &sub ($len,1); &jnz (&label("xts_enc_steal")); &sub ($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # rewind $out &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &movups ($inout0,&QWP(-16,$out)); # load input &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &movups (&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0); # write output &set_label("xts_enc_ret"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp &function_end("aesni_xts_encrypt"); &function_begin("aesni_xts_decrypt"); &mov ($key,&wparam(4)); # key2 &mov ($inp,&wparam(5)); # clear-text tweak &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key2->rounds &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key1 &mov ($key_,"esp"); &sub ("esp",16*7+8); &and ("esp",-16); # align stack &xor ($rounds_,$rounds_); # if(len%16) len-=16; &test ($len,15); &setnz (&LB($rounds_)); &shl ($rounds_,4); &sub ($len,$rounds_); &mov (&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87); # compose the magic constant &mov (&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0); &mov (&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1); &mov (&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0); &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save original $len &mov (&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_); # save original %esp &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key1->rounds &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds &movdqa ($tweak,$inout0); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87 &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &and ($len,-16); &sub ($len,16*6); &jc (&label("xts_dec_short")); &shl ($rounds,4); &mov ($rounds_,16); &sub ($rounds_,$rounds); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); &jmp (&label("xts_dec_loop6")); &set_label("xts_dec_loop6",16); for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); } &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13); &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_)); &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &pxor ($inout5,$tweak); # inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0] &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0] &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp)); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_)); &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_)); &aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout4,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout5,$rndkey1); &call (&label("_aesni_decrypt6_enter")); &movdqa ($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # last tweak &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &xorps ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3); &xorps ($inout5,$tweak); &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &movups (&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*6,$out)); &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87 &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &sub ($len,16*6); &jnc (&label("xts_dec_loop6")); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_)); # restore $rounds &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); &set_label("xts_dec_short"); &add ($len,16*6); &jz (&label("xts_dec_done6x")); &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak &cmp ($len,0x20); &jb (&label("xts_dec_one")); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &je (&label("xts_dec_two")); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &cmp ($len,0x40); &jb (&label("xts_dec_three")); &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4); &je (&label("xts_dec_four")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5); &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($inout0,1); &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pxor ($inout5,$tweak); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp)); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak &pxor ($inout4,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_decrypt6"); &movaps ($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # last tweak &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &xorps ($inout4,$tweak); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3); &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*5,$out)); &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done")); &set_label("xts_dec_one",16); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &lea ($out,&DWP(16*1,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout3); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done")); &set_label("xts_dec_two",16); &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &call ("_aesni_decrypt2"); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*2,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done")); &set_label("xts_dec_three",16); &movaps ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside last tweak &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_decrypt3"); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*3,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout5); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done")); &set_label("xts_dec_four",16); &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak &movups ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp)); &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &xorps ($inout3,$inout4); &call ("_aesni_decrypt4"); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output &xorps ($inout3,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2); &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out)); &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done")); &set_label("xts_dec_done6x",16); # $tweak is pre-calculated &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len &and ($len,15); &jz (&label("xts_dec_ret")); &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16 &jmp (&label("xts_dec_only_one_more")); &set_label("xts_dec_done",16); &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &and ($len,15); &jz (&label("xts_dec_ret")); &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16 &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13); &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp); &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits &pxor ($tweak,$twres); &set_label("xts_dec_only_one_more"); &pshufd ($inout3,$twtmp,0x13); &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1); &pand ($inout3,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue &pxor ($inout3,$tweak); &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output &set_label("xts_dec_steal"); &movz ($rounds,&BP(16,$inp)); &movz ($key,&BP(0,$out)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp)); &mov (&BP(0,$out),&LB($rounds)); &mov (&BP(16,$out),&LB($key)); &lea ($out,&DWP(1,$out)); &sub ($len,1); &jnz (&label("xts_dec_steal")); &sub ($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # rewind $out &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$out)); # load input &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # input^=tweak if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # output^=tweak &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output &set_label("xts_dec_ret"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp &function_end("aesni_xts_decrypt"); } ###################################################################### # void aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t blocks, # const AES_KEY *key, unsigned int start_block_num, # unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16], # unsigned char checksum[16]); # { # offsets within stack frame my $checksum = 16*6; my ($key_off,$rounds_off,$out_off,$end_off,$esp_off)=map(16*7+4*$_,(0..4)); # reassigned registers my ($l_,$block,$i1,$i3,$i5) = ($rounds_,$key_,$rounds,$len,$out); # $l_, $blocks, $inp, $key are permanently allocated in registers; # remaining non-volatile ones are offloaded to stack, which even # stay invariant after written to stack. &function_begin("aesni_ocb_encrypt"); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5)); # &offset_i &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(7)); # &checksum &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); &movdqu ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load offset_i &mov ($block,&wparam(4)); # start_block_num &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load checksum &mov ($l_,&wparam(6)); # L_ &mov ($rounds,"esp"); &sub ("esp",$esp_off+4); # alloca &and ("esp",-16); # align stack &sub ($out,$inp); &shl ($len,4); &lea ($len,&DWP(-16*6,$inp,$len)); # end of input - 16*6 &mov (&DWP($out_off,"esp"),$out); &mov (&DWP($end_off,"esp"),$len); &mov (&DWP($esp_off,"esp"),$rounds); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &test ($block,1); &jnz (&label("odd")); &bsf ($i3,$block); &add ($block,1); &shl ($i3,4); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &mov ($i3,$key); # put aside key &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &pxor ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($inout4,$rndkey1); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey1,$inout4); # pass the checksum &movups (&QWP(-16,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$i3)); &mov ($key,$i3); # restore key &mov ($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp")); &set_label("odd"); &shl ($rounds,4); &mov ($out,16); &sub ($out,$rounds); # twisted rounds &mov (&DWP($key_off,"esp"),$key); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); # end of key schedule &mov (&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"),$out); &cmp ($inp,$len); &ja (&label("short")); &jmp (&label("grandloop")); &set_label("grandloop",32); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &lea ($i3,&DWP(3,$block)); &lea ($i5,&DWP(5,$block)); &add ($block,6); &bsf ($i1,$i1); &bsf ($i3,$i3); &bsf ($i5,$i5); &shl ($i1,4); &shl ($i3,4); &shl ($i5,4); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp")); &movdqa ($inout2,$inout0); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &movdqa ($inout4,$inout0); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i5)); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout1,$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout2,$inout1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1); &pxor ($inout3,$inout2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2); &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout5); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds)); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(16*5,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp)); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ roundkey[0] &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout3); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout4); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout5); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &pxor ($inout5,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &mov ($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"); &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # pass last offset_i &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum &movdqu (&QWP(-16*6,$out,$inp),$inout0);# store output &movdqu (&QWP(-16*5,$out,$inp),$inout1); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*4,$out,$inp),$inout2); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5); &cmp ($inp,$len); # done yet? &jb (&label("grandloop")); &set_label("short"); &add ($len,16*6); &sub ($len,$inp); &jz (&label("done")); &cmp ($len,16*2); &jb (&label("one")); &je (&label("two")); &cmp ($len,16*4); &jb (&label("three")); &je (&label("four")); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &lea ($i3,&DWP(3,$block)); &bsf ($i1,$i1); &bsf ($i3,$i3); &shl ($i1,4); &shl ($i3,4); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp")); &movdqa ($inout2,$inout0); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &movdqa ($inout4,$inout0); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout1,$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout2,$inout1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1); &pxor ($inout3,$inout2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2); &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds)); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &pxor ($inout5,$inout5); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ roundkey[0] &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout3); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout4); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1); &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"); &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # pass last offset_i &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum &movdqu (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &movdqu (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &movdqu (&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2); &movdqu (&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3); &movdqu (&QWP(16*4,$out,$inp),$inout4); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("one",16); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_)); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &pxor ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($inout4,$rndkey1); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); } else { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey1,$inout4); # pass the checksum &movups (&QWP(0,$out,$inp),$inout0); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("two",16); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &bsf ($i1,$i1); &shl ($i1,4); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &pxor ($inout0,$inout4); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$inout5); &movdqa ($inout3,$rndkey1) &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_encrypt2"); &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # ^ offset_i &xorps ($inout1,$inout5); &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey1,$inout3); # pass the checksum &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("three",16); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &bsf ($i1,$i1); &shl ($i1,4); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &movdqa ($inout5,$inout3); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &pxor ($inout0,$inout3); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$inout4); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &pxor ($inout2,$inout5); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_encrypt3"); &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # ^ offset_i &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("four",16); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &lea ($i3,&DWP(3,$block)); &bsf ($i1,$i1); &bsf ($i3,$i3); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &shl ($i1,4); &shl ($i3,4); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &movdqa ($inout4,$inout2); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &pxor ($inout3,$inout2); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout2); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout3); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &pxor ($inout2,$inout4); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout3); &pxor ($inout3,$inout5); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1) &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_encrypt4"); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &xorps ($inout3,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2); &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3); &set_label("done"); &mov ($key,&DWP($esp_off,"esp")); &pxor ($inout0,$inout0); # clear register bank &pxor ($inout1,$inout1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0); # clear stack &pxor ($inout2,$inout2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout3,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout4,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout5,$inout5); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$inout0); &lea ("esp",&DWP(0,$key)); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5)); # &offset_i &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(7)); # &checksum &movdqu (&QWP(0,$rounds),$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$rounds_),$rndkey1); &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1); &function_end("aesni_ocb_encrypt"); &function_begin("aesni_ocb_decrypt"); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5)); # &offset_i &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(7)); # &checksum &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); &movdqu ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load offset_i &mov ($block,&wparam(4)); # start_block_num &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load checksum &mov ($l_,&wparam(6)); # L_ &mov ($rounds,"esp"); &sub ("esp",$esp_off+4); # alloca &and ("esp",-16); # align stack &sub ($out,$inp); &shl ($len,4); &lea ($len,&DWP(-16*6,$inp,$len)); # end of input - 16*6 &mov (&DWP($out_off,"esp"),$out); &mov (&DWP($end_off,"esp"),$len); &mov (&DWP($esp_off,"esp"),$rounds); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &test ($block,1); &jnz (&label("odd")); &bsf ($i3,$block); &add ($block,1); &shl ($i3,4); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &mov ($i3,$key); # put aside key &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($inout4,$rndkey1); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movaps ($rndkey1,$inout4); # pass the checksum &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &xorps ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &movups (&QWP(-16,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$i3)); &mov ($key,$i3); # restore key &mov ($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp")); &set_label("odd"); &shl ($rounds,4); &mov ($out,16); &sub ($out,$rounds); # twisted rounds &mov (&DWP($key_off,"esp"),$key); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds)); # end of key schedule &mov (&DWP($rounds_off,"esp"),$out); &cmp ($inp,$len); &ja (&label("short")); &jmp (&label("grandloop")); &set_label("grandloop",32); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &lea ($i3,&DWP(3,$block)); &lea ($i5,&DWP(5,$block)); &add ($block,6); &bsf ($i1,$i1); &bsf ($i3,$i3); &bsf ($i5,$i5); &shl ($i1,4); &shl ($i3,4); &shl ($i5,4); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp")); &movdqa ($inout2,$inout0); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &movdqa ($inout4,$inout0); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i5)); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout1,$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout2,$inout1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1); &pxor ($inout3,$inout2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2); &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout5); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds)); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(16*5,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp)); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ roundkey[0] &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &pxor ($inout5,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout4,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout5,$rndkey1); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &mov ($len,&DWP($end_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_decrypt6_enter"); &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # pass last offset_i &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp")); &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &movdqu (&QWP(-16*6,$out,$inp),$inout0);# store output &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*5,$out,$inp),$inout1); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*4,$out,$inp),$inout2); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout3); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout4); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*2,$out,$inp),$inout4); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout5); &movdqu (&QWP(-16*1,$out,$inp),$inout5); &cmp ($inp,$len); # done yet? &jb (&label("grandloop")); &set_label("short"); &add ($len,16*6); &sub ($len,$inp); &jz (&label("done")); &cmp ($len,16*2); &jb (&label("one")); &je (&label("two")); &cmp ($len,16*4); &jb (&label("three")); &je (&label("four")); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &lea ($i3,&DWP(3,$block)); &bsf ($i1,$i1); &bsf ($i3,$i3); &shl ($i1,4); &shl ($i3,4); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP($rounds_off,"esp")); &movdqa ($inout2,$inout0); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &movdqa ($inout4,$inout0); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout1,$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout2,$inout1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout1); &pxor ($inout3,$inout2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout2); &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout3); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout4); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-48,$key,$rounds)); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp)); &pxor ($inout5,$inout5); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # ^ roundkey[0] &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-32,$key,$rounds)); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds)); &aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout4,$rndkey1); &aesdec ($inout5,$rndkey1); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_decrypt6_enter"); &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # pass last offset_i &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp")); &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &movdqu (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &movdqu (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &movdqu (&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout3); &movdqu (&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout4); &movdqu (&QWP(16*4,$out,$inp),$inout4); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("one",16); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_)); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movdqa ($inout4,$rndkey1); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$inout5); # ^ offset_i &movaps ($rndkey1,$inout4); # pass the checksum &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &xorps ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &movups (&QWP(0,$out,$inp),$inout0); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("two",16); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &bsf ($i1,$i1); &shl ($i1,4); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &movdqa ($inout3,$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &pxor ($inout0,$inout4); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,$inout5); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_decrypt2"); &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # ^ offset_i &xorps ($inout1,$inout5); &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &xorps ($inout3,$inout0); # checksum &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &xorps ($inout3,$inout1); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &movaps ($rndkey1,$inout3); # pass the checksum &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("three",16); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &bsf ($i1,$i1); &shl ($i1,4); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &movdqa ($inout5,$inout3); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &pxor ($inout0,$inout3); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,$inout4); &pxor ($inout2,$inout5); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_decrypt3"); &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # ^ offset_i &xorps ($inout1,$inout4); &xorps ($inout2,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("four",16); &lea ($i1,&DWP(1,$block)); &lea ($i3,&DWP(3,$block)); &bsf ($i1,$i1); &bsf ($i3,$i3); &mov ($key,&DWP($key_off,"esp")); # restore key &shl ($i1,4); &shl ($i3,4); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0,$l_)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0,$l_,$i1)); &movdqa ($inout4,$inout2); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$l_,$i3)); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0); # ^ last offset_i &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input &pxor ($inout3,$inout2); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &pxor ($inout4,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout2); &pxor ($inout5,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout3); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &movdqa (&QWP($checksum,"esp"),$rndkey1); &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &pxor ($inout2,$inout4); &pxor ($inout3,$inout5); &mov ($out,&DWP($out_off,"esp")); &call ("_aesni_decrypt4"); &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP($checksum,"esp"));# pass the checksum &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # ^ offset_i &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &xorps ($inout2,$inout4); &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out,$inp),$inout0); # store output &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout0); # checksum &xorps ($inout3,$inout5); &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out,$inp),$inout1); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout1); &movdqa ($rndkey0,$inout5); # pass last offset_i &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out,$inp),$inout2); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout2); &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out,$inp),$inout3); &pxor ($rndkey1,$inout3); &set_label("done"); &mov ($key,&DWP($esp_off,"esp")); &pxor ($inout0,$inout0); # clear register bank &pxor ($inout1,$inout1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout0); # clear stack &pxor ($inout2,$inout2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout3,$inout3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout4,$inout4); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($inout5,$inout5); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$inout0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$inout0); &lea ("esp",&DWP(0,$key)); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5)); # &offset_i &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(7)); # &checksum &movdqu (&QWP(0,$rounds),$rndkey0); &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$rounds_),$rndkey1); &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1); &function_end("aesni_ocb_decrypt"); } } ###################################################################### # void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); &function_begin("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); &mov ($rounds_,"esp"); &mov ($out,&wparam(1)); &sub ($rounds_,24); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &and ($rounds_,-16); &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); &mov ($key_,&wparam(4)); &test ($len,$len); &jz (&label("cbc_abort")); &cmp (&wparam(5),0); &xchg ($rounds_,"esp"); # alloca &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0,$key_)); # load IV &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_); # save original %esp &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds &je (&label("cbc_decrypt")); &movaps ($inout0,$ivec); &cmp ($len,16); &jb (&label("cbc_enc_tail")); &sub ($len,16); &jmp (&label("cbc_enc_loop")); &set_label("cbc_enc_loop",16); &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0,$inp)); # input actually &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$inout0,$ivec); } else { &xorps($inout0,$ivec); &call("_aesni_encrypt1"); } &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # store output &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out)); &sub ($len,16); &jnc (&label("cbc_enc_loop")); &add ($len,16); &jnz (&label("cbc_enc_tail")); &movaps ($ivec,$inout0); &pxor ($inout0,$inout0); &jmp (&label("cbc_ret")); &set_label("cbc_enc_tail"); &mov ("ecx",$len); # zaps $rounds &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb &mov ("ecx",16); # zero tail &sub ("ecx",$len); &xor ("eax","eax"); # zaps $len &data_word(0xAAF3F689); # rep stosb &lea ($out,&DWP(-16,$out)); # rewind $out by 1 block &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &mov ($inp,$out); # $inp and $out are the same &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &jmp (&label("cbc_enc_loop")); ###################################################################### &set_label("cbc_decrypt",16); &cmp ($len,0x50); &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_tail")); &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec); # save IV &sub ($len,0x50); &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter")); &set_label("cbc_dec_loop6",16); &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save IV &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout5); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out)); &set_label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter"); &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); &call ("_aesni_decrypt6"); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # ^=IV &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey1); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey0); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey1); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); # IV &xorps ($inout5,$rndkey1); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp)); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x50,$out)); &sub ($len,0x60); &ja (&label("cbc_dec_loop6")); &movaps ($inout0,$inout5); &movaps ($ivec,$rndkey0); &add ($len,0x50); &jle (&label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected")); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out)); &set_label("cbc_dec_tail"); &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movaps ($in0,$inout0); &cmp ($len,0x10); &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_one")); &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movaps ($in1,$inout1); &cmp ($len,0x20); &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_two")); &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &cmp ($len,0x30); &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_three")); &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &cmp ($len,0x40); &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_four")); &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec); # save IV &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); &xorps ($inout5,$inout5); &call ("_aesni_decrypt6"); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp)); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # ^= IV &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey1); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey0); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey1); &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); # IV &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$inout1); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &pxor ($inout2,$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3); &pxor ($inout3,$inout3); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x40,$out)); &movaps ($inout0,$inout4); &pxor ($inout4,$inout4); &sub ($len,0x50); &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected")); &set_label("cbc_dec_one",16); if ($inline) { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); } else { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); } &xorps ($inout0,$ivec); &movaps ($ivec,$in0); &sub ($len,0x10); &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected")); &set_label("cbc_dec_two",16); &call ("_aesni_decrypt2"); &xorps ($inout0,$ivec); &xorps ($inout1,$in0); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movaps ($inout0,$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$inout1); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out)); &movaps ($ivec,$in1); &sub ($len,0x20); &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected")); &set_label("cbc_dec_three",16); &call ("_aesni_decrypt3"); &xorps ($inout0,$ivec); &xorps ($inout1,$in0); &xorps ($inout2,$in1); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &movaps ($inout0,$inout2); &pxor ($inout2,$inout2); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$inout1); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x20,$out)); &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &sub ($len,0x30); &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected")); &set_label("cbc_dec_four",16); &call ("_aesni_decrypt4"); &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &xorps ($inout0,$ivec); &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &xorps ($inout1,$in0); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1); &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1); &pxor ($inout1,$inout1); &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2); &pxor ($inout2,$inout2); &lea ($out,&DWP(0x30,$out)); &movaps ($inout0,$inout3); &pxor ($inout3,$inout3); &sub ($len,0x40); &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected")); &set_label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected",16); &pxor ($inout1,$inout1); &pxor ($inout2,$inout2); &pxor ($inout3,$inout3); &pxor ($inout4,$inout4); &set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"); &and ($len,15); &jnz (&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial")); &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); &jmp (&label("cbc_ret")); &set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial",16); &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0); &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); &mov ("ecx",16); &mov ($inp,"esp"); &sub ("ecx",$len); &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0); &set_label("cbc_ret"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"esp")); # pull original %esp &mov ($key_,&wparam(4)); &pxor ($inout0,$inout0); &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1); &movups (&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec); # output IV &pxor ($ivec,$ivec); &set_label("cbc_abort"); &function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt"); ###################################################################### # Mechanical port from aesni-x86_64.pl. # # _aesni_set_encrypt_key is private interface, # input: # "eax" const unsigned char *userKey # $rounds int bits # $key AES_KEY *key # output: # "eax" return code # $round rounds &function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key"); &push ("ebp"); &push ("ebx"); &test ("eax","eax"); &jz (&label("bad_pointer")); &test ($key,$key); &jz (&label("bad_pointer")); &call (&label("pic")); &set_label("pic"); &blindpop("ebx"); &lea ("ebx",&DWP(&label("key_const")."-".&label("pic"),"ebx")); &picmeup("ebp","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","ebx",&label("key_const")); &movups ("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax")); # pull first 128 bits of *userKey &xorps ("xmm4","xmm4"); # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0 &mov ("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp")); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &and ("ebp",1<<28|1<<11); # AVX and XOP bits &cmp ($rounds,256); &je (&label("14rounds")); &cmp ($rounds,192); &je (&label("12rounds")); &cmp ($rounds,128); &jne (&label("bad_keybits")); &set_label("10rounds",16); &cmp ("ebp",1<<28); &je (&label("10rounds_alt")); &mov ($rounds,9); &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0 &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 1 &call (&label("key_128_cold")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x2); # round 2 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04); # round 3 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08); # round 4 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10); # round 5 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20); # round 6 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x40); # round 7 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x80); # round 8 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x1b); # round 9 &call (&label("key_128")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x36); # round 10 &call (&label("key_128")); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &mov (&DWP(80,$key),$rounds); &jmp (&label("good_key")); &set_label("key_128",16); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &set_label("key_128_cold"); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000); &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4"); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100); &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4"); &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111); # critical path &xorps ("xmm0","xmm1"); &ret(); &set_label("10rounds_alt",16); &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx")); &mov ($rounds,8); &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx")); &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0"); &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); &set_label("loop_key128"); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); &aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4"); &pslld ("xmm4",1); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0"); &dec ($rounds); &jnz (&label("loop_key128")); &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x30,"ebx")); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); &aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4"); &pslld ("xmm4",1); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0"); &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); &aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4"); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); &pslldq ("xmm2",4); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm0"); &mov ($rounds,9); &mov (&DWP(96,$key),$rounds); &jmp (&label("good_key")); &set_label("12rounds",16); &movq ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining 1/3 of *userKey &cmp ("ebp",1<<28); &je (&label("12rounds_alt")); &mov ($rounds,11); &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0 &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 1,2 &call (&label("key_192a_cold")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02); # round 2,3 &call (&label("key_192b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04); # round 4,5 &call (&label("key_192a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08); # round 5,6 &call (&label("key_192b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10); # round 7,8 &call (&label("key_192a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20); # round 8,9 &call (&label("key_192b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40); # round 10,11 &call (&label("key_192a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x80); # round 11,12 &call (&label("key_192b")); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &mov (&DWP(48,$key),$rounds); &jmp (&label("good_key")); &set_label("key_192a",16); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &set_label("key_192a_cold",16); &movaps ("xmm5","xmm2"); &set_label("key_192b_warm"); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2"); &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4"); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100); &pslldq ("xmm3",4); &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4"); &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm1",0b01010101); # critical path &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm0",0b11111111); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &ret(); &set_label("key_192b",16); &movaps ("xmm3","xmm0"); &shufps ("xmm5","xmm0",0b01000100); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm5"); &shufps ("xmm3","xmm2",0b01001110); &$movekey (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm3"); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key)); &jmp (&label("key_192b_warm")); &set_label("12rounds_alt",16); &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x10,"ebx")); &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx")); &mov ($rounds,8); &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); &set_label("loop_key192"); &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2"); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2"); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5"); &aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4"); &pslld ("xmm4",1); &lea ($key,&DWP(24,$key)); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0"); &pslldq ("xmm0",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0"); &pslldq ("xmm0",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0"); &pslldq ("xmm0",4); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm3"); &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm0",0xff); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pslldq ("xmm1",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3"); &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); &dec ($rounds); &jnz (&label("loop_key192")); &mov ($rounds,11); &mov (&DWP(32,$key),$rounds); &jmp (&label("good_key")); &set_label("14rounds",16); &movups ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining half of *userKey &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &cmp ("ebp",1<<28); &je (&label("14rounds_alt")); &mov ($rounds,13); &$movekey (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0 &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2"); # round 1 &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 2 &call (&label("key_256a_cold")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 3 &call (&label("key_256b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02); # round 4 &call (&label("key_256a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x02); # round 5 &call (&label("key_256b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04); # round 6 &call (&label("key_256a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04); # round 7 &call (&label("key_256b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08); # round 8 &call (&label("key_256a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08); # round 9 &call (&label("key_256b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10); # round 10 &call (&label("key_256a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10); # round 11 &call (&label("key_256b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20); # round 12 &call (&label("key_256a")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20); # round 13 &call (&label("key_256b")); &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40); # round 14 &call (&label("key_256a")); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds); &xor ("eax","eax"); &jmp (&label("good_key")); &set_label("key_256a",16); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2"); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &set_label("key_256a_cold"); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000); &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4"); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100); &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4"); &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111); # critical path &xorps ("xmm0","xmm1"); &ret(); &set_label("key_256b",16); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm2",0b00010000); &xorps ("xmm2","xmm4"); &shufps ("xmm4","xmm2",0b10001100); &xorps ("xmm2","xmm4"); &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b10101010); # critical path &xorps ("xmm2","xmm1"); &ret(); &set_label("14rounds_alt",16); &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx")); &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx")); &mov ($rounds,7); &movdqu (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0"); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2"); &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2"); &set_label("loop_key256"); &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5"); &aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4"); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0"); &pslldq ("xmm0",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0"); &pslldq ("xmm0",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0"); &pslldq ("xmm0",4); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm3"); &pslld ("xmm4",1); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &dec ($rounds); &jz (&label("done_key256")); &pshufd ("xmm2","xmm0",0xff); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm3"); &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pslldq ("xmm1",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pslldq ("xmm1",4); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); &pslldq ("xmm1",4); &pxor ("xmm1","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm1"); &movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm2"); &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key)); &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2"); &jmp (&label("loop_key256")); &set_label("done_key256"); &mov ($rounds,13); &mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds); &set_label("good_key"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &pop ("ebx"); &pop ("ebp"); &ret (); &set_label("bad_pointer",4); &mov ("eax",-1); &pop ("ebx"); &pop ("ebp"); &ret (); &set_label("bad_keybits",4); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); &mov ("eax",-2); &pop ("ebx"); &pop ("ebp"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key"); # int $PREFIX_set_encrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, # AES_KEY *key) &function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(1)); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &call ("_aesni_set_encrypt_key"); &ret (); &function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key"); # int $PREFIX_set_decrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, # AES_KEY *key) &function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); &mov ($rounds,&wparam(1)); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &call ("_aesni_set_encrypt_key"); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &shl ($rounds,4); # rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key &test ("eax","eax"); &jnz (&label("dec_key_ret")); &lea ("eax",&DWP(16,$key,$rounds)); # end of key schedule &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # just swap &$movekey ("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax")); &$movekey (&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0"); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm1"); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax")); &set_label("dec_key_inverse"); &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # swap and inverse &$movekey ("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax")); &aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0"); &aesimc ("xmm1","xmm1"); &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax")); &$movekey (&QWP(16,"eax"),"xmm0"); &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm1"); &cmp ("eax",$key); &ja (&label("dec_key_inverse")); &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # inverse middle &aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0"); &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &xor ("eax","eax"); # return success &set_label("dec_key_ret"); &ret (); &function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key"); &set_label("key_const",64); &data_word(0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d); &data_word(0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605); &data_word(1,1,1,1); &data_word(0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b); &asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl0000755000000000000000000026612713176625656017110 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements support for AES instructions as per PowerISA # specification version 2.07, first implemented by POWER8 processor. # The module is endian-agnostic in sense that it supports both big- # and little-endian cases. Data alignment in parallelizable modes is # handled with VSX loads and stores, which implies MSR.VSX flag being # set. It should also be noted that ISA specification doesn't prohibit # alignment exceptions for these instructions on page boundaries. # Initially alignment was handled in pure AltiVec/VMX way [when data # is aligned programmatically, which in turn guarantees exception- # free execution], but it turned to hamper performance when vcipher # instructions are interleaved. It's reckoned that eventual # misalignment penalties at page boundaries are in average lower # than additional overhead in pure AltiVec approach. # # May 2016 # # Add XTS subroutine, 9x on little- and 12x improvement on big-endian # systems were measured. # ###################################################################### # Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with # 128-bit key (less is better). # # CBC en-/decrypt CTR XTS # POWER8[le] 3.96/0.72 0.74 1.1 # POWER8[be] 3.75/0.65 0.66 1.0 $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T =8; $LRSAVE =2*$SIZE_T; $STU ="stdu"; $POP ="ld"; $PUSH ="std"; $UCMP ="cmpld"; $SHL ="sldi"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T =4; $LRSAVE =$SIZE_T; $STU ="stwu"; $POP ="lwz"; $PUSH ="stw"; $UCMP ="cmplw"; $SHL ="slwi"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $FRAME=8*$SIZE_T; $prefix="aes_p8"; $sp="r1"; $vrsave="r12"; ######################################################################### {{{ # Key setup procedures # my ($inp,$bits,$out,$ptr,$cnt,$rounds)=map("r$_",(3..8)); my ($zero,$in0,$in1,$key,$rcon,$mask,$tmp)=map("v$_",(0..6)); my ($stage,$outperm,$outmask,$outhead,$outtail)=map("v$_",(7..11)); $code.=<<___; .machine "any" .text .align 7 rcon: .long 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x01000000 ?rev .long 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000, 0x1b000000 ?rev .long 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c, 0x0d0e0f0c ?rev .long 0,0,0,0 ?asis Lconsts: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr $ptr #vvvvv "distance between . and rcon addi $ptr,$ptr,-0x48 mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .asciz "AES for PowerISA 2.07, CRYPTOGAMS by " .globl .${prefix}_set_encrypt_key .align 5 .${prefix}_set_encrypt_key: Lset_encrypt_key: mflr r11 $PUSH r11,$LRSAVE($sp) li $ptr,-1 ${UCMP}i $inp,0 beq- Lenc_key_abort # if ($inp==0) return -1; ${UCMP}i $out,0 beq- Lenc_key_abort # if ($out==0) return -1; li $ptr,-2 cmpwi $bits,128 blt- Lenc_key_abort cmpwi $bits,256 bgt- Lenc_key_abort andi. r0,$bits,0x3f bne- Lenc_key_abort lis r0,0xfff0 mfspr $vrsave,256 mtspr 256,r0 bl Lconsts mtlr r11 neg r9,$inp lvx $in0,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo lvsr $key,0,r9 # borrow $key li r8,0x20 cmpwi $bits,192 lvx $in1,0,$inp le?vspltisb $mask,0x0f # borrow $mask lvx $rcon,0,$ptr le?vxor $key,$key,$mask # adjust for byte swap lvx $mask,r8,$ptr addi $ptr,$ptr,0x10 vperm $in0,$in0,$in1,$key # align [and byte swap in LE] li $cnt,8 vxor $zero,$zero,$zero mtctr $cnt ?lvsr $outperm,0,$out vspltisb $outmask,-1 lvx $outhead,0,$out ?vperm $outmask,$zero,$outmask,$outperm blt Loop128 addi $inp,$inp,8 beq L192 addi $inp,$inp,8 b L256 .align 4 Loop128: vperm $key,$in0,$in0,$mask # rotate-n-splat vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$in0,12 # >>32 vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail vcipherlast $key,$key,$rcon stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vadduwm $rcon,$rcon,$rcon vxor $in0,$in0,$key bdnz Loop128 lvx $rcon,0,$ptr # last two round keys vperm $key,$in0,$in0,$mask # rotate-n-splat vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$in0,12 # >>32 vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail vcipherlast $key,$key,$rcon stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vadduwm $rcon,$rcon,$rcon vxor $in0,$in0,$key vperm $key,$in0,$in0,$mask # rotate-n-splat vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$in0,12 # >>32 vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail vcipherlast $key,$key,$rcon stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vxor $in0,$in0,$key vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail stvx $stage,0,$out addi $inp,$out,15 # 15 is not typo addi $out,$out,0x50 li $rounds,10 b Ldone .align 4 L192: lvx $tmp,0,$inp li $cnt,4 vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vperm $in1,$in1,$tmp,$key # align [and byte swap in LE] vspltisb $key,8 # borrow $key mtctr $cnt vsububm $mask,$mask,$key # adjust the mask Loop192: vperm $key,$in1,$in1,$mask # roate-n-splat vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$in0,12 # >>32 vcipherlast $key,$key,$rcon vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $stage,$zero,$in1,8 vspltw $tmp,$in0,3 vxor $tmp,$tmp,$in1 vsldoi $in1,$zero,$in1,12 # >>32 vadduwm $rcon,$rcon,$rcon vxor $in1,$in1,$tmp vxor $in0,$in0,$key vxor $in1,$in1,$key vsldoi $stage,$stage,$in0,8 vperm $key,$in1,$in1,$mask # rotate-n-splat vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$in0,12 # >>32 vperm $outtail,$stage,$stage,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail vcipherlast $key,$key,$rcon stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vsldoi $stage,$in0,$in1,8 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vperm $outtail,$stage,$stage,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vspltw $tmp,$in0,3 vxor $tmp,$tmp,$in1 vsldoi $in1,$zero,$in1,12 # >>32 vadduwm $rcon,$rcon,$rcon vxor $in1,$in1,$tmp vxor $in0,$in0,$key vxor $in1,$in1,$key vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail stvx $stage,0,$out addi $inp,$out,15 # 15 is not typo addi $out,$out,16 bdnz Loop192 li $rounds,12 addi $out,$out,0x20 b Ldone .align 4 L256: lvx $tmp,0,$inp li $cnt,7 li $rounds,14 vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vperm $in1,$in1,$tmp,$key # align [and byte swap in LE] mtctr $cnt Loop256: vperm $key,$in1,$in1,$mask # rotate-n-splat vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$in0,12 # >>32 vperm $outtail,$in1,$in1,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail vcipherlast $key,$key,$rcon stvx $stage,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in0,$in0,$tmp vadduwm $rcon,$rcon,$rcon vxor $in0,$in0,$key vperm $outtail,$in0,$in0,$outperm # rotate vsel $stage,$outhead,$outtail,$outmask vmr $outhead,$outtail stvx $stage,0,$out addi $inp,$out,15 # 15 is not typo addi $out,$out,16 bdz Ldone vspltw $key,$in0,3 # just splat vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$in1,12 # >>32 vsbox $key,$key vxor $in1,$in1,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in1,$in1,$tmp vsldoi $tmp,$zero,$tmp,12 # >>32 vxor $in1,$in1,$tmp vxor $in1,$in1,$key b Loop256 .align 4 Ldone: lvx $in1,0,$inp # redundant in aligned case vsel $in1,$outhead,$in1,$outmask stvx $in1,0,$inp li $ptr,0 mtspr 256,$vrsave stw $rounds,0($out) Lenc_key_abort: mr r3,$ptr blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,1,0,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .${prefix}_set_encrypt_key,.-.${prefix}_set_encrypt_key .globl .${prefix}_set_decrypt_key .align 5 .${prefix}_set_decrypt_key: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r10 $PUSH r10,$FRAME+$LRSAVE($sp) bl Lset_encrypt_key mtlr r10 cmpwi r3,0 bne- Ldec_key_abort slwi $cnt,$rounds,4 subi $inp,$out,240 # first round key srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 add $out,$inp,$cnt # last round key mtctr $rounds Ldeckey: lwz r0, 0($inp) lwz r6, 4($inp) lwz r7, 8($inp) lwz r8, 12($inp) addi $inp,$inp,16 lwz r9, 0($out) lwz r10,4($out) lwz r11,8($out) lwz r12,12($out) stw r0, 0($out) stw r6, 4($out) stw r7, 8($out) stw r8, 12($out) subi $out,$out,16 stw r9, -16($inp) stw r10,-12($inp) stw r11,-8($inp) stw r12,-4($inp) bdnz Ldeckey xor r3,r3,r3 # return value Ldec_key_abort: addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .${prefix}_set_decrypt_key,.-.${prefix}_set_decrypt_key ___ }}} ######################################################################### {{{ # Single block en- and decrypt procedures # sub gen_block () { my $dir = shift; my $n = $dir eq "de" ? "n" : ""; my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$idx)=map("r$_",(3..7)); $code.=<<___; .globl .${prefix}_${dir}crypt .align 5 .${prefix}_${dir}crypt: lwz $rounds,240($key) lis r0,0xfc00 mfspr $vrsave,256 li $idx,15 # 15 is not typo mtspr 256,r0 lvx v0,0,$inp neg r11,$out lvx v1,$idx,$inp lvsl v2,0,$inp # inpperm le?vspltisb v4,0x0f ?lvsl v3,0,r11 # outperm le?vxor v2,v2,v4 li $idx,16 vperm v0,v0,v1,v2 # align [and byte swap in LE] lvx v1,0,$key ?lvsl v5,0,$key # keyperm srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 lvx v2,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 subi $rounds,$rounds,1 ?vperm v1,v1,v2,v5 # align round key vxor v0,v0,v1 lvx v1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 mtctr $rounds Loop_${dir}c: ?vperm v2,v2,v1,v5 v${n}cipher v0,v0,v2 lvx v2,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm v1,v1,v2,v5 v${n}cipher v0,v0,v1 lvx v1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Loop_${dir}c ?vperm v2,v2,v1,v5 v${n}cipher v0,v0,v2 lvx v2,$idx,$key ?vperm v1,v1,v2,v5 v${n}cipherlast v0,v0,v1 vspltisb v2,-1 vxor v1,v1,v1 li $idx,15 # 15 is not typo ?vperm v2,v1,v2,v3 # outmask le?vxor v3,v3,v4 lvx v1,0,$out # outhead vperm v0,v0,v0,v3 # rotate [and byte swap in LE] vsel v1,v1,v0,v2 lvx v4,$idx,$out stvx v1,0,$out vsel v0,v0,v4,v2 stvx v0,$idx,$out mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .${prefix}_${dir}crypt,.-.${prefix}_${dir}crypt ___ } &gen_block("en"); &gen_block("de"); }}} ######################################################################### {{{ # CBC en- and decrypt procedures # my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$enc,$rounds,$idx)=map("r$_",(3..10)); my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout,$tmp)= map("v$_",(0..3)); my ($ivec,$inptail,$inpperm,$outhead,$outperm,$outmask,$keyperm)= map("v$_",(4..10)); $code.=<<___; .globl .${prefix}_cbc_encrypt .align 5 .${prefix}_cbc_encrypt: ${UCMP}i $len,16 bltlr- cmpwi $enc,0 # test direction lis r0,0xffe0 mfspr $vrsave,256 mtspr 256,r0 li $idx,15 vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey0 le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f lvx $ivec,0,$ivp # load [unaligned] iv lvsl $inpperm,0,$ivp lvx $inptail,$idx,$ivp le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp vperm $ivec,$ivec,$inptail,$inpperm neg r11,$inp ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key # prepare for unaligned key lwz $rounds,240($key) lvsr $inpperm,0,r11 # prepare for unaligned load lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp ?lvsr $outperm,0,$out # prepare for unaligned store vspltisb $outmask,-1 lvx $outhead,0,$out ?vperm $outmask,$rndkey0,$outmask,$outperm le?vxor $outperm,$outperm,$tmp srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 li $idx,16 subi $rounds,$rounds,1 beq Lcbc_dec Lcbc_enc: vmr $inout,$inptail lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 mtctr $rounds subi $len,$len,16 # len-=16 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 vxor $inout,$inout,$ivec Loop_cbc_enc: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Loop_cbc_enc ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key li $idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipherlast $ivec,$inout,$rndkey0 ${UCMP}i $len,16 vperm $tmp,$ivec,$ivec,$outperm vsel $inout,$outhead,$tmp,$outmask vmr $outhead,$tmp stvx $inout,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 bge Lcbc_enc b Lcbc_done .align 4 Lcbc_dec: ${UCMP}i $len,128 bge _aesp8_cbc_decrypt8x vmr $tmp,$inptail lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 mtctr $rounds subi $len,$len,16 # len-=16 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key vperm $tmp,$tmp,$inptail,$inpperm lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $inout,$tmp,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 Loop_cbc_dec: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Loop_cbc_dec ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key li $idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vncipherlast $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 ${UCMP}i $len,16 vxor $inout,$inout,$ivec vmr $ivec,$tmp vperm $tmp,$inout,$inout,$outperm vsel $inout,$outhead,$tmp,$outmask vmr $outhead,$tmp stvx $inout,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 bge Lcbc_dec Lcbc_done: addi $out,$out,-1 lvx $inout,0,$out # redundant in aligned case vsel $inout,$outhead,$inout,$outmask stvx $inout,0,$out neg $enc,$ivp # write [unaligned] iv li $idx,15 # 15 is not typo vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey0 vspltisb $outmask,-1 le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f ?lvsl $outperm,0,$enc ?vperm $outmask,$rndkey0,$outmask,$outperm le?vxor $outperm,$outperm,$tmp lvx $outhead,0,$ivp vperm $ivec,$ivec,$ivec,$outperm vsel $inout,$outhead,$ivec,$outmask lvx $inptail,$idx,$ivp stvx $inout,0,$ivp vsel $inout,$ivec,$inptail,$outmask stvx $inout,$idx,$ivp mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,6,0 .long 0 ___ ######################################################################### {{ # Optimized CBC decrypt procedure # my $key_="r11"; my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,8,26..31)); $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/); my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5, $in6, $in7 )=map("v$_",(0..3,10..13)); my ($out0,$out1,$out2,$out3,$out4,$out5,$out6,$out7)=map("v$_",(14..21)); my $rndkey0="v23"; # v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys # v26-v31 last 6 round keys my ($tmp,$keyperm)=($in3,$in4); # aliases with "caller", redundant assignment $code.=<<___; .align 5 _aesp8_cbc_decrypt8x: $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp) li r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15` li r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31` stvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp li r0,-1 stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp) # save vrsave li $x10,0x10 $PUSH r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x20,0x20 $PUSH r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x30,0x30 $PUSH r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x40,0x40 $PUSH r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x50,0x50 $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x60,0x60 $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x70,0x70 mtspr 256,r0 subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total subi $len,$len,128 # bias lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key # load key schedule lvx v30,$x10,$key addi $key,$key,0x20 lvx v31,$x00,$key ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 mtctr $rounds Load_cbc_dec_key: ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v30,$x10,$key addi $key,$key,0x20 stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[1] ?vperm v25,v31,v30,$keyperm lvx v31,$x00,$key stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[2] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 bdnz Load_cbc_dec_key lvx v26,$x10,$key ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v27,$x20,$key stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[3] ?vperm v25,v31,v26,$keyperm lvx v28,$x30,$key stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[4] addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ ?vperm v26,v26,v27,$keyperm lvx v29,$x40,$key ?vperm v27,v27,v28,$keyperm lvx v30,$x50,$key ?vperm v28,v28,v29,$keyperm lvx v31,$x60,$key ?vperm v29,v29,v30,$keyperm lvx $out0,$x70,$key # borrow $out0 ?vperm v30,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # pre-load round[1] ?vperm v31,v31,$out0,$keyperm lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # pre-load round[2] #lvx $inptail,0,$inp # "caller" already did this #addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo subi $inp,$inp,15 # undo "caller" le?li $idx,8 lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load first 8 "words" le?lvsl $inpperm,0,$idx le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp # transform for lvx_u/stvx_u lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm vxor $out0,$in0,$rndkey0 lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm vxor $out1,$in1,$rndkey0 lvx_u $in6,$x60,$inp le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm vxor $out2,$in2,$rndkey0 lvx_u $in7,$x70,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x80 le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm vxor $out3,$in3,$rndkey0 le?vperm $in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm vxor $out4,$in4,$rndkey0 le?vperm $in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm vxor $out5,$in5,$rndkey0 vxor $out6,$in6,$rndkey0 vxor $out7,$in7,$rndkey0 mtctr $rounds b Loop_cbc_dec8x .align 5 Loop_cbc_dec8x: vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 vncipher $out5,$out5,v24 vncipher $out6,$out6,v24 vncipher $out7,$out7,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 vncipher $out5,$out5,v25 vncipher $out6,$out6,v25 vncipher $out7,$out7,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Loop_cbc_dec8x subic $len,$len,128 # $len-=128 vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 vncipher $out5,$out5,v24 vncipher $out6,$out6,v24 vncipher $out7,$out7,v24 subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 vncipher $out5,$out5,v25 vncipher $out6,$out6,v25 vncipher $out7,$out7,v25 and r0,r0,$len vncipher $out0,$out0,v26 vncipher $out1,$out1,v26 vncipher $out2,$out2,v26 vncipher $out3,$out3,v26 vncipher $out4,$out4,v26 vncipher $out5,$out5,v26 vncipher $out6,$out6,v26 vncipher $out7,$out7,v26 add $inp,$inp,r0 # $inp is adjusted in such # way that at exit from the # loop inX-in7 are loaded # with last "words" vncipher $out0,$out0,v27 vncipher $out1,$out1,v27 vncipher $out2,$out2,v27 vncipher $out3,$out3,v27 vncipher $out4,$out4,v27 vncipher $out5,$out5,v27 vncipher $out6,$out6,v27 vncipher $out7,$out7,v27 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28 vncipher $out1,$out1,v28 vncipher $out2,$out2,v28 vncipher $out3,$out3,v28 vncipher $out4,$out4,v28 vncipher $out5,$out5,v28 vncipher $out6,$out6,v28 vncipher $out7,$out7,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vncipher $out0,$out0,v29 vncipher $out1,$out1,v29 vncipher $out2,$out2,v29 vncipher $out3,$out3,v29 vncipher $out4,$out4,v29 vncipher $out5,$out5,v29 vncipher $out6,$out6,v29 vncipher $out7,$out7,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vncipher $out0,$out0,v30 vxor $ivec,$ivec,v31 # xor with last round key vncipher $out1,$out1,v30 vxor $in0,$in0,v31 vncipher $out2,$out2,v30 vxor $in1,$in1,v31 vncipher $out3,$out3,v30 vxor $in2,$in2,v31 vncipher $out4,$out4,v30 vxor $in3,$in3,v31 vncipher $out5,$out5,v30 vxor $in4,$in4,v31 vncipher $out6,$out6,v30 vxor $in5,$in5,v31 vncipher $out7,$out7,v30 vxor $in6,$in6,v31 vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$ivec vncipherlast $out1,$out1,$in0 lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load next input block vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$in1 lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$in2 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in3 le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in4 le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp vncipherlast $out6,$out6,$in5 le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$in6 le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm lvx_u $in6,$x60,$inp vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm lvx_u $in7,$x70,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x80 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out le?vperm $in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm vxor $out0,$in0,$rndkey0 le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm vxor $out1,$in1,$rndkey0 le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out vxor $out2,$in2,$rndkey0 le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out vxor $out3,$in3,$rndkey0 le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out vxor $out4,$in4,$rndkey0 le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out vxor $out5,$in5,$rndkey0 le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x60,$out vxor $out6,$in6,$rndkey0 stvx_u $out7,$x70,$out addi $out,$out,0x80 vxor $out7,$in7,$rndkey0 mtctr $rounds beq Loop_cbc_dec8x # did $len-=128 borrow? addic. $len,$len,128 beq Lcbc_dec8x_done nop nop Loop_cbc_dec8x_tail: # up to 7 "words" tail... vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 vncipher $out5,$out5,v24 vncipher $out6,$out6,v24 vncipher $out7,$out7,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 vncipher $out5,$out5,v25 vncipher $out6,$out6,v25 vncipher $out7,$out7,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Loop_cbc_dec8x_tail vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 vncipher $out5,$out5,v24 vncipher $out6,$out6,v24 vncipher $out7,$out7,v24 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 vncipher $out5,$out5,v25 vncipher $out6,$out6,v25 vncipher $out7,$out7,v25 vncipher $out1,$out1,v26 vncipher $out2,$out2,v26 vncipher $out3,$out3,v26 vncipher $out4,$out4,v26 vncipher $out5,$out5,v26 vncipher $out6,$out6,v26 vncipher $out7,$out7,v26 vncipher $out1,$out1,v27 vncipher $out2,$out2,v27 vncipher $out3,$out3,v27 vncipher $out4,$out4,v27 vncipher $out5,$out5,v27 vncipher $out6,$out6,v27 vncipher $out7,$out7,v27 vncipher $out1,$out1,v28 vncipher $out2,$out2,v28 vncipher $out3,$out3,v28 vncipher $out4,$out4,v28 vncipher $out5,$out5,v28 vncipher $out6,$out6,v28 vncipher $out7,$out7,v28 vncipher $out1,$out1,v29 vncipher $out2,$out2,v29 vncipher $out3,$out3,v29 vncipher $out4,$out4,v29 vncipher $out5,$out5,v29 vncipher $out6,$out6,v29 vncipher $out7,$out7,v29 vncipher $out1,$out1,v30 vxor $ivec,$ivec,v31 # last round key vncipher $out2,$out2,v30 vxor $in1,$in1,v31 vncipher $out3,$out3,v30 vxor $in2,$in2,v31 vncipher $out4,$out4,v30 vxor $in3,$in3,v31 vncipher $out5,$out5,v30 vxor $in4,$in4,v31 vncipher $out6,$out6,v30 vxor $in5,$in5,v31 vncipher $out7,$out7,v30 vxor $in6,$in6,v31 cmplwi $len,32 # switch($len) blt Lcbc_dec8x_one nop beq Lcbc_dec8x_two cmplwi $len,64 blt Lcbc_dec8x_three nop beq Lcbc_dec8x_four cmplwi $len,96 blt Lcbc_dec8x_five nop beq Lcbc_dec8x_six Lcbc_dec8x_seven: vncipherlast $out1,$out1,$ivec vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$in1 vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$in2 vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in3 vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in4 vncipherlast $out6,$out6,$in5 vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$in6 vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x00,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x10,$out le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x20,$out le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x30,$out le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x40,$out le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x50,$out stvx_u $out7,$x60,$out addi $out,$out,0x70 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lcbc_dec8x_six: vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$ivec vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$in2 vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in3 vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in4 vncipherlast $out6,$out6,$in5 vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$in6 vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x00,$out le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x10,$out le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x20,$out le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x30,$out le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x40,$out stvx_u $out7,$x50,$out addi $out,$out,0x60 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lcbc_dec8x_five: vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$ivec vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in3 vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in4 vncipherlast $out6,$out6,$in5 vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$in6 vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x00,$out le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x10,$out le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x20,$out le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x30,$out stvx_u $out7,$x40,$out addi $out,$out,0x50 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lcbc_dec8x_four: vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$ivec vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in4 vncipherlast $out6,$out6,$in5 vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$in6 vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x00,$out le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x10,$out le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x20,$out stvx_u $out7,$x30,$out addi $out,$out,0x40 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lcbc_dec8x_three: vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$ivec vncipherlast $out6,$out6,$in5 vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$in6 vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x00,$out le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x10,$out stvx_u $out7,$x20,$out addi $out,$out,0x30 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lcbc_dec8x_two: vncipherlast $out6,$out6,$ivec vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$in6 vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x00,$out stvx_u $out7,$x10,$out addi $out,$out,0x20 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lcbc_dec8x_one: vncipherlast $out7,$out7,$ivec vmr $ivec,$in7 le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out7,0,$out addi $out,$out,0x10 Lcbc_dec8x_done: le?vperm $ivec,$ivec,$ivec,$inpperm stvx_u $ivec,0,$ivp # write [unaligned] iv li r10,`$FRAME+15` li r11,`$FRAME+31` stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp # wipe copies of round keys addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 mtspr 256,$vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp $POP r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T` blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0 .long 0 .size .${prefix}_cbc_encrypt,.-.${prefix}_cbc_encrypt ___ }} }}} ######################################################################### {{{ # CTR procedure[s] # my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$x10,$rounds,$idx)=map("r$_",(3..10)); my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout,$tmp)= map("v$_",(0..3)); my ($ivec,$inptail,$inpperm,$outhead,$outperm,$outmask,$keyperm,$one)= map("v$_",(4..11)); my $dat=$tmp; $code.=<<___; .globl .${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .align 5 .${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks: ${UCMP}i $len,1 bltlr- lis r0,0xfff0 mfspr $vrsave,256 mtspr 256,r0 li $idx,15 vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey0 le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f lvx $ivec,0,$ivp # load [unaligned] iv lvsl $inpperm,0,$ivp lvx $inptail,$idx,$ivp vspltisb $one,1 le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp vperm $ivec,$ivec,$inptail,$inpperm vsldoi $one,$rndkey0,$one,1 neg r11,$inp ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key # prepare for unaligned key lwz $rounds,240($key) lvsr $inpperm,0,r11 # prepare for unaligned load lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 li $idx,16 subi $rounds,$rounds,1 ${UCMP}i $len,8 bge _aesp8_ctr32_encrypt8x ?lvsr $outperm,0,$out # prepare for unaligned store vspltisb $outmask,-1 lvx $outhead,0,$out ?vperm $outmask,$rndkey0,$outmask,$outperm le?vxor $outperm,$outperm,$tmp lvx $rndkey0,0,$key mtctr $rounds lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $inout,$ivec,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 b Loop_ctr32_enc .align 5 Loop_ctr32_enc: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Loop_ctr32_enc vadduwm $ivec,$ivec,$one vmr $dat,$inptail lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 subic. $len,$len,1 # blocks-- ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key vperm $dat,$dat,$inptail,$inpperm li $idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm lvx $rndkey0,0,$key vxor $dat,$dat,$rndkey1 # last round key vcipherlast $inout,$inout,$dat lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 vperm $inout,$inout,$inout,$outperm vsel $dat,$outhead,$inout,$outmask mtctr $rounds ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vmr $outhead,$inout vxor $inout,$ivec,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key addi $idx,$idx,16 stvx $dat,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 bne Loop_ctr32_enc addi $out,$out,-1 lvx $inout,0,$out # redundant in aligned case vsel $inout,$outhead,$inout,$outmask stvx $inout,0,$out mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,6,0 .long 0 ___ ######################################################################### {{ # Optimized CTR procedure # my $key_="r11"; my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,8,26..31)); $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/); my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5, $in6, $in7 )=map("v$_",(0..3,10,12..14)); my ($out0,$out1,$out2,$out3,$out4,$out5,$out6,$out7)=map("v$_",(15..22)); my $rndkey0="v23"; # v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys # v26-v31 last 6 round keys my ($tmp,$keyperm)=($in3,$in4); # aliases with "caller", redundant assignment my ($two,$three,$four)=($outhead,$outperm,$outmask); $code.=<<___; .align 5 _aesp8_ctr32_encrypt8x: $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp) li r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15` li r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31` stvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp li r0,-1 stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp) # save vrsave li $x10,0x10 $PUSH r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x20,0x20 $PUSH r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x30,0x30 $PUSH r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x40,0x40 $PUSH r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x50,0x50 $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x60,0x60 $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x70,0x70 mtspr 256,r0 subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key # load key schedule lvx v30,$x10,$key addi $key,$key,0x20 lvx v31,$x00,$key ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 mtctr $rounds Load_ctr32_enc_key: ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v30,$x10,$key addi $key,$key,0x20 stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[1] ?vperm v25,v31,v30,$keyperm lvx v31,$x00,$key stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[2] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 bdnz Load_ctr32_enc_key lvx v26,$x10,$key ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v27,$x20,$key stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[3] ?vperm v25,v31,v26,$keyperm lvx v28,$x30,$key stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[4] addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ ?vperm v26,v26,v27,$keyperm lvx v29,$x40,$key ?vperm v27,v27,v28,$keyperm lvx v30,$x50,$key ?vperm v28,v28,v29,$keyperm lvx v31,$x60,$key ?vperm v29,v29,v30,$keyperm lvx $out0,$x70,$key # borrow $out0 ?vperm v30,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # pre-load round[1] ?vperm v31,v31,$out0,$keyperm lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # pre-load round[2] vadduwm $two,$one,$one subi $inp,$inp,15 # undo "caller" $SHL $len,$len,4 vadduwm $out1,$ivec,$one # counter values ... vadduwm $out2,$ivec,$two vxor $out0,$ivec,$rndkey0 # ... xored with rndkey[0] le?li $idx,8 vadduwm $out3,$out1,$two vxor $out1,$out1,$rndkey0 le?lvsl $inpperm,0,$idx vadduwm $out4,$out2,$two vxor $out2,$out2,$rndkey0 le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f vadduwm $out5,$out3,$two vxor $out3,$out3,$rndkey0 le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp # transform for lvx_u/stvx_u vadduwm $out6,$out4,$two vxor $out4,$out4,$rndkey0 vadduwm $out7,$out5,$two vxor $out5,$out5,$rndkey0 vadduwm $ivec,$out6,$two # next counter value vxor $out6,$out6,$rndkey0 vxor $out7,$out7,$rndkey0 mtctr $rounds b Loop_ctr32_enc8x .align 5 Loop_ctr32_enc8x: vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 vcipher $out1,$out1,v24 vcipher $out2,$out2,v24 vcipher $out3,$out3,v24 vcipher $out4,$out4,v24 vcipher $out5,$out5,v24 vcipher $out6,$out6,v24 vcipher $out7,$out7,v24 Loop_ctr32_enc8x_middle: lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 vcipher $out1,$out1,v25 vcipher $out2,$out2,v25 vcipher $out3,$out3,v25 vcipher $out4,$out4,v25 vcipher $out5,$out5,v25 vcipher $out6,$out6,v25 vcipher $out7,$out7,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Loop_ctr32_enc8x subic r11,$len,256 # $len-256, borrow $key_ vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 vcipher $out1,$out1,v24 vcipher $out2,$out2,v24 vcipher $out3,$out3,v24 vcipher $out4,$out4,v24 vcipher $out5,$out5,v24 vcipher $out6,$out6,v24 vcipher $out7,$out7,v24 subfe r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 vcipher $out1,$out1,v25 vcipher $out2,$out2,v25 vcipher $out3,$out3,v25 vcipher $out4,$out4,v25 vcipher $out5,$out5,v25 vcipher $out6,$out6,v25 vcipher $out7,$out7,v25 and r0,r0,r11 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vcipher $out0,$out0,v26 vcipher $out1,$out1,v26 vcipher $out2,$out2,v26 vcipher $out3,$out3,v26 vcipher $out4,$out4,v26 vcipher $out5,$out5,v26 vcipher $out6,$out6,v26 vcipher $out7,$out7,v26 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] subic $len,$len,129 # $len-=129 vcipher $out0,$out0,v27 addi $len,$len,1 # $len-=128 really vcipher $out1,$out1,v27 vcipher $out2,$out2,v27 vcipher $out3,$out3,v27 vcipher $out4,$out4,v27 vcipher $out5,$out5,v27 vcipher $out6,$out6,v27 vcipher $out7,$out7,v27 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vcipher $out0,$out0,v28 lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load input vcipher $out1,$out1,v28 lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp vcipher $out2,$out2,v28 lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp vcipher $out3,$out3,v28 lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp vcipher $out4,$out4,v28 lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp vcipher $out5,$out5,v28 lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp vcipher $out6,$out6,v28 lvx_u $in6,$x60,$inp vcipher $out7,$out7,v28 lvx_u $in7,$x70,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x80 vcipher $out0,$out0,v29 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm vcipher $out1,$out1,v29 le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm vcipher $out2,$out2,v29 le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm vcipher $out3,$out3,v29 le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm vcipher $out4,$out4,v29 le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm vcipher $out5,$out5,v29 le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm vcipher $out6,$out6,v29 le?vperm $in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm vcipher $out7,$out7,v29 le?vperm $in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm add $inp,$inp,r0 # $inp is adjusted in such # way that at exit from the # loop inX-in7 are loaded # with last "words" subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 vcipher $out0,$out0,v30 vxor $in0,$in0,v31 # xor with last round key vcipher $out1,$out1,v30 vxor $in1,$in1,v31 vcipher $out2,$out2,v30 vxor $in2,$in2,v31 vcipher $out3,$out3,v30 vxor $in3,$in3,v31 vcipher $out4,$out4,v30 vxor $in4,$in4,v31 vcipher $out5,$out5,v30 vxor $in5,$in5,v31 vcipher $out6,$out6,v30 vxor $in6,$in6,v31 vcipher $out7,$out7,v30 vxor $in7,$in7,v31 bne Lctr32_enc8x_break # did $len-129 borrow? vcipherlast $in0,$out0,$in0 vcipherlast $in1,$out1,$in1 vadduwm $out1,$ivec,$one # counter values ... vcipherlast $in2,$out2,$in2 vadduwm $out2,$ivec,$two vxor $out0,$ivec,$rndkey0 # ... xored with rndkey[0] vcipherlast $in3,$out3,$in3 vadduwm $out3,$out1,$two vxor $out1,$out1,$rndkey0 vcipherlast $in4,$out4,$in4 vadduwm $out4,$out2,$two vxor $out2,$out2,$rndkey0 vcipherlast $in5,$out5,$in5 vadduwm $out5,$out3,$two vxor $out3,$out3,$rndkey0 vcipherlast $in6,$out6,$in6 vadduwm $out6,$out4,$two vxor $out4,$out4,$rndkey0 vcipherlast $in7,$out7,$in7 vadduwm $out7,$out5,$two vxor $out5,$out5,$rndkey0 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm vadduwm $ivec,$out6,$two # next counter value vxor $out6,$out6,$rndkey0 le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$inpperm vxor $out7,$out7,$rndkey0 mtctr $rounds vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 stvx_u $in0,$x00,$out le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$inpperm vcipher $out1,$out1,v24 stvx_u $in1,$x10,$out le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$inpperm vcipher $out2,$out2,v24 stvx_u $in2,$x20,$out le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$inpperm vcipher $out3,$out3,v24 stvx_u $in3,$x30,$out le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$inpperm vcipher $out4,$out4,v24 stvx_u $in4,$x40,$out le?vperm $in6,$in6,$in6,$inpperm vcipher $out5,$out5,v24 stvx_u $in5,$x50,$out le?vperm $in7,$in7,$in7,$inpperm vcipher $out6,$out6,v24 stvx_u $in6,$x60,$out vcipher $out7,$out7,v24 stvx_u $in7,$x70,$out addi $out,$out,0x80 b Loop_ctr32_enc8x_middle .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_break: cmpwi $len,-0x60 blt Lctr32_enc8x_one nop beq Lctr32_enc8x_two cmpwi $len,-0x40 blt Lctr32_enc8x_three nop beq Lctr32_enc8x_four cmpwi $len,-0x20 blt Lctr32_enc8x_five nop beq Lctr32_enc8x_six cmpwi $len,0x00 blt Lctr32_enc8x_seven Lctr32_enc8x_eight: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in0 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1 vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2 vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3 vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4 vcipherlast $out5,$out5,$in5 vcipherlast $out6,$out6,$in6 vcipherlast $out7,$out7,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out le?vperm $out7,$out7,$out7,$inpperm stvx_u $out6,$x60,$out stvx_u $out7,$x70,$out addi $out,$out,0x80 b Lctr32_enc8x_done .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_seven: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in1 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in2 vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in3 vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in4 vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in5 vcipherlast $out5,$out5,$in6 vcipherlast $out6,$out6,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out le?vperm $out6,$out6,$out6,$inpperm stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out stvx_u $out6,$x60,$out addi $out,$out,0x70 b Lctr32_enc8x_done .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_six: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in2 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in3 vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in4 vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in5 vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in6 vcipherlast $out5,$out5,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$inpperm stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out addi $out,$out,0x60 b Lctr32_enc8x_done .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_five: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in3 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in4 vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in5 vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in6 vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$inpperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out addi $out,$out,0x50 b Lctr32_enc8x_done .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_four: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in4 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in5 vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in6 vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$inpperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out addi $out,$out,0x40 b Lctr32_enc8x_done .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_three: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in5 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in6 vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$inpperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out addi $out,$out,0x30 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_two: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in6 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out addi $out,$out,0x20 b Lcbc_dec8x_done .align 5 Lctr32_enc8x_one: vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in7 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$inpperm stvx_u $out0,0,$out addi $out,$out,0x10 Lctr32_enc8x_done: li r10,`$FRAME+15` li r11,`$FRAME+31` stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp # wipe copies of round keys addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $inpperm,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $inpperm,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 mtspr 256,$vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp $POP r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T` blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0 .long 0 .size .${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-.${prefix}_ctr32_encrypt_blocks ___ }} }}} ######################################################################### {{{ # XTS procedures # # int aes_p8_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len, # # const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, # # [const] unsigned char iv[16]); # # If $key2 is NULL, then a "tweak chaining" mode is engaged, in which # # input tweak value is assumed to be encrypted already, and last tweak # # value, one suitable for consecutive call on same chunk of data, is # # written back to original buffer. In addition, in "tweak chaining" # # mode only complete input blocks are processed. # my ($inp,$out,$len,$key1,$key2,$ivp,$rounds,$idx) = map("r$_",(3..10)); my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout) = map("v$_",(0..2)); my ($output,$inptail,$inpperm,$leperm,$keyperm) = map("v$_",(3..7)); my ($tweak,$seven,$eighty7,$tmp,$tweak1) = map("v$_",(8..12)); my $taillen = $key2; ($inp,$idx) = ($idx,$inp); # reassign $code.=<<___; .globl .${prefix}_xts_encrypt .align 5 .${prefix}_xts_encrypt: mr $inp,r3 # reassign li r3,-1 ${UCMP}i $len,16 bltlr- lis r0,0xfff0 mfspr r12,256 # save vrsave li r11,0 mtspr 256,r0 vspltisb $seven,0x07 # 0x070707..07 le?lvsl $leperm,r11,r11 le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f le?vxor $leperm,$leperm,$seven li $idx,15 lvx $tweak,0,$ivp # load [unaligned] iv lvsl $inpperm,0,$ivp lvx $inptail,$idx,$ivp le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp vperm $tweak,$tweak,$inptail,$inpperm neg r11,$inp lvsr $inpperm,0,r11 # prepare for unaligned load lvx $inout,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp ${UCMP}i $key2,0 # key2==NULL? beq Lxts_enc_no_key2 ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key2 # prepare for unaligned key lwz $rounds,240($key2) srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 subi $rounds,$rounds,1 li $idx,16 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key2 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 mtctr $rounds Ltweak_xts_enc: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Ltweak_xts_enc ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipherlast $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0 li $ivp,0 # don't chain the tweak b Lxts_enc Lxts_enc_no_key2: li $idx,-16 and $len,$len,$idx # in "tweak chaining" # mode only complete # blocks are processed Lxts_enc: lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key1 # prepare for unaligned key lwz $rounds,240($key1) srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 subi $rounds,$rounds,1 li $idx,16 vslb $eighty7,$seven,$seven # 0x808080..80 vor $eighty7,$eighty7,$seven # 0x878787..87 vspltisb $tmp,1 # 0x010101..01 vsldoi $eighty7,$eighty7,$tmp,15 # 0x870101..01 ${UCMP}i $len,96 bge _aesp8_xts_encrypt6x andi. $taillen,$len,15 subic r0,$len,32 subi $taillen,$taillen,16 subfe r0,r0,r0 and r0,r0,$taillen add $inp,$inp,r0 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 mtctr $rounds b Loop_xts_enc .align 5 Loop_xts_enc: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Loop_xts_enc ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 li $idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak vcipherlast $output,$inout,$rndkey0 le?vperm $tmp,$output,$output,$leperm be?nop le?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out be?stvx_u $output,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 subic. $len,$len,16 beq Lxts_enc_done vmr $inout,$inptail lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 subic r0,$len,32 subfe r0,r0,r0 and r0,r0,$taillen add $inp,$inp,r0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak vxor $output,$output,$rndkey0 # just in case $len<16 vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 mtctr $rounds ${UCMP}i $len,16 bge Loop_xts_enc vxor $output,$output,$tweak lvsr $inpperm,0,$len # $inpperm is no longer needed vxor $inptail,$inptail,$inptail # $inptail is no longer needed vspltisb $tmp,-1 vperm $inptail,$inptail,$tmp,$inpperm vsel $inout,$inout,$output,$inptail subi r11,$out,17 subi $out,$out,16 mtctr $len li $len,16 Loop_xts_enc_steal: lbzu r0,1(r11) stb r0,16(r11) bdnz Loop_xts_enc_steal mtctr $rounds b Loop_xts_enc # one more time... Lxts_enc_done: ${UCMP}i $ivp,0 beq Lxts_enc_ret vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp Lxts_enc_ret: mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave li r3,0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0 .long 0 .size .${prefix}_xts_encrypt,.-.${prefix}_xts_encrypt .globl .${prefix}_xts_decrypt .align 5 .${prefix}_xts_decrypt: mr $inp,r3 # reassign li r3,-1 ${UCMP}i $len,16 bltlr- lis r0,0xfff8 mfspr r12,256 # save vrsave li r11,0 mtspr 256,r0 andi. r0,$len,15 neg r0,r0 andi. r0,r0,16 sub $len,$len,r0 vspltisb $seven,0x07 # 0x070707..07 le?lvsl $leperm,r11,r11 le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f le?vxor $leperm,$leperm,$seven li $idx,15 lvx $tweak,0,$ivp # load [unaligned] iv lvsl $inpperm,0,$ivp lvx $inptail,$idx,$ivp le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp vperm $tweak,$tweak,$inptail,$inpperm neg r11,$inp lvsr $inpperm,0,r11 # prepare for unaligned load lvx $inout,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp ${UCMP}i $key2,0 # key2==NULL? beq Lxts_dec_no_key2 ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key2 # prepare for unaligned key lwz $rounds,240($key2) srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 subi $rounds,$rounds,1 li $idx,16 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key2 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 mtctr $rounds Ltweak_xts_dec: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2 addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Ltweak_xts_dec ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vcipherlast $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0 li $ivp,0 # don't chain the tweak b Lxts_dec Lxts_dec_no_key2: neg $idx,$len andi. $idx,$idx,15 add $len,$len,$idx # in "tweak chaining" # mode only complete # blocks are processed Lxts_dec: lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key1 # prepare for unaligned key lwz $rounds,240($key1) srwi $rounds,$rounds,1 subi $rounds,$rounds,1 li $idx,16 vslb $eighty7,$seven,$seven # 0x808080..80 vor $eighty7,$eighty7,$seven # 0x878787..87 vspltisb $tmp,1 # 0x010101..01 vsldoi $eighty7,$eighty7,$tmp,15 # 0x870101..01 ${UCMP}i $len,96 bge _aesp8_xts_decrypt6x lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 mtctr $rounds ${UCMP}i $len,16 blt Ltail_xts_dec be?b Loop_xts_dec .align 5 Loop_xts_dec: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Loop_xts_dec ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 li $idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak vncipherlast $output,$inout,$rndkey0 le?vperm $tmp,$output,$output,$leperm be?nop le?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out be?stvx_u $output,0,$out addi $out,$out,16 subic. $len,$len,16 beq Lxts_dec_done vmr $inout,$inptail lvx $inptail,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 mtctr $rounds ${UCMP}i $len,16 bge Loop_xts_dec Ltail_xts_dec: vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak1,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $tweak1,$tweak1,$tmp subi $inp,$inp,16 add $inp,$inp,$len vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak # :-( vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak1 # :-) Loop_xts_dec_short: ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 bdnz Loop_xts_dec_short ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 li $idx,16 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak1 vncipherlast $output,$inout,$rndkey0 le?vperm $tmp,$output,$output,$leperm be?nop le?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out be?stvx_u $output,0,$out vmr $inout,$inptail lvx $inptail,0,$inp #addi $inp,$inp,16 lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1 lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm lvsr $inpperm,0,$len # $inpperm is no longer needed vxor $inptail,$inptail,$inptail # $inptail is no longer needed vspltisb $tmp,-1 vperm $inptail,$inptail,$tmp,$inpperm vsel $inout,$inout,$output,$inptail vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0 lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1 addi $idx,$idx,16 subi r11,$out,1 mtctr $len li $len,16 Loop_xts_dec_steal: lbzu r0,1(r11) stb r0,16(r11) bdnz Loop_xts_dec_steal mtctr $rounds b Loop_xts_dec # one more time... Lxts_dec_done: ${UCMP}i $ivp,0 beq Lxts_dec_ret vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp Lxts_dec_ret: mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave li r3,0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0 .long 0 .size .${prefix}_xts_decrypt,.-.${prefix}_xts_decrypt ___ ######################################################################### {{ # Optimized XTS procedures # my $key_=$key2; my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,3,26..31)); $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/); my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5 )=map("v$_",(0..5)); my ($out0, $out1, $out2, $out3, $out4, $out5)=map("v$_",(7,12..16)); my ($twk0, $twk1, $twk2, $twk3, $twk4, $twk5)=map("v$_",(17..22)); my $rndkey0="v23"; # v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys # v26-v31 last 6 round keys my ($keyperm)=($out0); # aliases with "caller", redundant assignment my $taillen=$x70; $code.=<<___; .align 5 _aesp8_xts_encrypt6x: $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp) mflr r11 li r7,`$FRAME+8*16+15` li r3,`$FRAME+8*16+31` $PUSH r11,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp) stvx v20,r7,$sp # ABI says so addi r7,r7,32 stvx v21,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v22,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v23,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v24,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v25,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v26,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v27,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v28,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v29,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v30,r7,$sp stvx v31,r3,$sp li r0,-1 stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp) # save vrsave li $x10,0x10 $PUSH r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x20,0x20 $PUSH r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x30,0x30 $PUSH r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x40,0x40 $PUSH r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x50,0x50 $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x60,0x60 $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x70,0x70 mtspr 256,r0 subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key1 # load key schedule lvx v30,$x10,$key1 addi $key1,$key1,0x20 lvx v31,$x00,$key1 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 mtctr $rounds Load_xts_enc_key: ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v30,$x10,$key1 addi $key1,$key1,0x20 stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[1] ?vperm v25,v31,v30,$keyperm lvx v31,$x00,$key1 stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[2] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 bdnz Load_xts_enc_key lvx v26,$x10,$key1 ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v27,$x20,$key1 stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[3] ?vperm v25,v31,v26,$keyperm lvx v28,$x30,$key1 stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[4] addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ ?vperm v26,v26,v27,$keyperm lvx v29,$x40,$key1 ?vperm v27,v27,v28,$keyperm lvx v30,$x50,$key1 ?vperm v28,v28,v29,$keyperm lvx v31,$x60,$key1 ?vperm v29,v29,v30,$keyperm lvx $twk5,$x70,$key1 # borrow $twk5 ?vperm v30,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # pre-load round[1] ?vperm v31,v31,$twk5,$keyperm lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # pre-load round[2] vperm $in0,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm subi $inp,$inp,31 # undo "caller" vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp andi. $taillen,$len,15 vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp sub $len,$len,$taillen vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp subi $len,$len,0x60 vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x60 vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vxor v31,v31,$rndkey0 mtctr $rounds b Loop_xts_enc6x .align 5 Loop_xts_enc6x: vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 vcipher $out1,$out1,v24 vcipher $out2,$out2,v24 vcipher $out3,$out3,v24 vcipher $out4,$out4,v24 vcipher $out5,$out5,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 vcipher $out1,$out1,v25 vcipher $out2,$out2,v25 vcipher $out3,$out3,v25 vcipher $out4,$out4,v25 vcipher $out5,$out5,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Loop_xts_enc6x subic $len,$len,96 # $len-=96 vxor $in0,$twk0,v31 # xor with last round key vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 vcipher $out1,$out1,v24 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0 vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vcipher $out2,$out2,v24 vcipher $out3,$out3,v24 vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vcipher $out4,$out4,v24 vcipher $out5,$out5,v24 subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 vcipher $out1,$out1,v25 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vcipher $out2,$out2,v25 vcipher $out3,$out3,v25 vxor $in1,$twk1,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0 vcipher $out4,$out4,v25 vcipher $out5,$out5,v25 and r0,r0,$len vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vcipher $out0,$out0,v26 vcipher $out1,$out1,v26 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vcipher $out2,$out2,v26 vcipher $out3,$out3,v26 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vcipher $out4,$out4,v26 vcipher $out5,$out5,v26 add $inp,$inp,r0 # $inp is adjusted in such # way that at exit from the # loop inX-in5 are loaded # with last "words" vxor $in2,$twk2,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0 vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vcipher $out0,$out0,v27 vcipher $out1,$out1,v27 vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vcipher $out2,$out2,v27 vcipher $out3,$out3,v27 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vcipher $out4,$out4,v27 vcipher $out5,$out5,v27 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vcipher $out0,$out0,v28 vcipher $out1,$out1,v28 vxor $in3,$twk3,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0 vcipher $out2,$out2,v28 vcipher $out3,$out3,v28 vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vcipher $out4,$out4,v28 vcipher $out5,$out5,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vcipher $out0,$out0,v29 vcipher $out1,$out1,v29 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vcipher $out2,$out2,v29 vcipher $out3,$out3,v29 vxor $in4,$twk4,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0 vcipher $out4,$out4,v29 vcipher $out5,$out5,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vcipher $out0,$out0,v30 vcipher $out1,$out1,v30 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vcipher $out2,$out2,v30 vcipher $out3,$out3,v30 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vcipher $out4,$out4,v30 vcipher $out5,$out5,v30 vxor $in5,$twk5,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0 vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in0 lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load next input block vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1 lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3 le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4 le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vcipherlast $tmp,$out5,$in5 # last block might be needed # in stealing mode le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x60 le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0 le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1 le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2 le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3 le?vperm $out5,$tmp,$tmp,$leperm stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4 le?stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out be?stvx_u $tmp, $x50,$out vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5 addi $out,$out,0x60 mtctr $rounds beq Loop_xts_enc6x # did $len-=96 borrow? addic. $len,$len,0x60 beq Lxts_enc6x_zero cmpwi $len,0x20 blt Lxts_enc6x_one nop beq Lxts_enc6x_two cmpwi $len,0x40 blt Lxts_enc6x_three nop beq Lxts_enc6x_four Lxts_enc6x_five: vxor $out0,$in1,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in2,$twk1 vxor $out2,$in3,$twk2 vxor $out3,$in4,$twk3 vxor $out4,$in5,$twk4 bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk5 # unused tweak le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out vxor $tmp,$out4,$twk5 # last block prep for stealing le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out addi $out,$out,0x50 bne Lxts_enc6x_steal b Lxts_enc6x_done .align 4 Lxts_enc6x_four: vxor $out0,$in2,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in3,$twk1 vxor $out2,$in4,$twk2 vxor $out3,$in5,$twk3 vxor $out4,$out4,$out4 bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk4 # unused tweak le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out vxor $tmp,$out3,$twk4 # last block prep for stealing le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out addi $out,$out,0x40 bne Lxts_enc6x_steal b Lxts_enc6x_done .align 4 Lxts_enc6x_three: vxor $out0,$in3,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in4,$twk1 vxor $out2,$in5,$twk2 vxor $out3,$out3,$out3 vxor $out4,$out4,$out4 bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk3 # unused tweak le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output vxor $tmp,$out2,$twk3 # last block prep for stealing le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out addi $out,$out,0x30 bne Lxts_enc6x_steal b Lxts_enc6x_done .align 4 Lxts_enc6x_two: vxor $out0,$in4,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in5,$twk1 vxor $out2,$out2,$out2 vxor $out3,$out3,$out3 vxor $out4,$out4,$out4 bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk2 # unused tweak vxor $tmp,$out1,$twk2 # last block prep for stealing le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out addi $out,$out,0x20 bne Lxts_enc6x_steal b Lxts_enc6x_done .align 4 Lxts_enc6x_one: vxor $out0,$in5,$twk0 nop Loop_xts_enc1x: vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Loop_xts_enc1x add $inp,$inp,$taillen cmpwi $taillen,0 vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 subi $inp,$inp,16 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 lvsr $inpperm,0,$taillen vcipher $out0,$out0,v26 lvx_u $in0,0,$inp vcipher $out0,$out0,v27 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vcipher $out0,$out0,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vcipher $out0,$out0,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm vcipher $out0,$out0,v30 vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0 vmr $twk0,$twk1 # unused tweak vxor $tmp,$out0,$twk1 # last block prep for stealing le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output addi $out,$out,0x10 bne Lxts_enc6x_steal b Lxts_enc6x_done .align 4 Lxts_enc6x_zero: cmpwi $taillen,0 beq Lxts_enc6x_done add $inp,$inp,$taillen subi $inp,$inp,16 lvx_u $in0,0,$inp lvsr $inpperm,0,$taillen # $in5 is no more le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm vxor $tmp,$tmp,$twk0 Lxts_enc6x_steal: vxor $in0,$in0,$twk0 vxor $out0,$out0,$out0 vspltisb $out1,-1 vperm $out0,$out0,$out1,$inpperm vsel $out0,$in0,$tmp,$out0 # $tmp is last block, remember? subi r30,$out,17 subi $out,$out,16 mtctr $taillen Loop_xts_enc6x_steal: lbzu r0,1(r30) stb r0,16(r30) bdnz Loop_xts_enc6x_steal li $taillen,0 mtctr $rounds b Loop_xts_enc1x # one more time... .align 4 Lxts_enc6x_done: ${UCMP}i $ivp,0 beq Lxts_enc6x_ret vxor $tweak,$twk0,$rndkey0 le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp Lxts_enc6x_ret: mtlr r11 li r10,`$FRAME+15` li r11,`$FRAME+31` stvx $seven,r10,$sp # wipe copies of round keys addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $seven,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $seven,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $seven,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 mtspr 256,$vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp $POP r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T` blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,6,6,0 .long 0 .align 5 _aesp8_xts_enc5x: vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 vcipher $out1,$out1,v24 vcipher $out2,$out2,v24 vcipher $out3,$out3,v24 vcipher $out4,$out4,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 vcipher $out1,$out1,v25 vcipher $out2,$out2,v25 vcipher $out3,$out3,v25 vcipher $out4,$out4,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz _aesp8_xts_enc5x add $inp,$inp,$taillen cmpwi $taillen,0 vcipher $out0,$out0,v24 vcipher $out1,$out1,v24 vcipher $out2,$out2,v24 vcipher $out3,$out3,v24 vcipher $out4,$out4,v24 subi $inp,$inp,16 vcipher $out0,$out0,v25 vcipher $out1,$out1,v25 vcipher $out2,$out2,v25 vcipher $out3,$out3,v25 vcipher $out4,$out4,v25 vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31 vcipher $out0,$out0,v26 lvsr $inpperm,0,$taillen # $in5 is no more vcipher $out1,$out1,v26 vcipher $out2,$out2,v26 vcipher $out3,$out3,v26 vcipher $out4,$out4,v26 vxor $in1,$twk1,v31 vcipher $out0,$out0,v27 lvx_u $in0,0,$inp vcipher $out1,$out1,v27 vcipher $out2,$out2,v27 vcipher $out3,$out3,v27 vcipher $out4,$out4,v27 vxor $in2,$twk2,v31 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vcipher $out0,$out0,v28 vcipher $out1,$out1,v28 vcipher $out2,$out2,v28 vcipher $out3,$out3,v28 vcipher $out4,$out4,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vxor $in3,$twk3,v31 vcipher $out0,$out0,v29 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm vcipher $out1,$out1,v29 vcipher $out2,$out2,v29 vcipher $out3,$out3,v29 vcipher $out4,$out4,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vxor $in4,$twk4,v31 vcipher $out0,$out0,v30 vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm vcipher $out1,$out1,v30 vcipher $out2,$out2,v30 vcipher $out3,$out3,v30 vcipher $out4,$out4,v30 vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0 vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1 vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2 vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3 vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .align 5 _aesp8_xts_decrypt6x: $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp) mflr r11 li r7,`$FRAME+8*16+15` li r3,`$FRAME+8*16+31` $PUSH r11,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp) stvx v20,r7,$sp # ABI says so addi r7,r7,32 stvx v21,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v22,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v23,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v24,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v25,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v26,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v27,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v28,r7,$sp addi r7,r7,32 stvx v29,r3,$sp addi r3,r3,32 stvx v30,r7,$sp stvx v31,r3,$sp li r0,-1 stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp) # save vrsave li $x10,0x10 $PUSH r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x20,0x20 $PUSH r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x30,0x30 $PUSH r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x40,0x40 $PUSH r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x50,0x50 $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x60,0x60 $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x70,0x70 mtspr 256,r0 subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key1 # load key schedule lvx v30,$x10,$key1 addi $key1,$key1,0x20 lvx v31,$x00,$key1 ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 mtctr $rounds Load_xts_dec_key: ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v30,$x10,$key1 addi $key1,$key1,0x20 stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[1] ?vperm v25,v31,v30,$keyperm lvx v31,$x00,$key1 stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[2] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 bdnz Load_xts_dec_key lvx v26,$x10,$key1 ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v27,$x20,$key1 stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[3] ?vperm v25,v31,v26,$keyperm lvx v28,$x30,$key1 stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[4] addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ ?vperm v26,v26,v27,$keyperm lvx v29,$x40,$key1 ?vperm v27,v27,v28,$keyperm lvx v30,$x50,$key1 ?vperm v28,v28,v29,$keyperm lvx v31,$x60,$key1 ?vperm v29,v29,v30,$keyperm lvx $twk5,$x70,$key1 # borrow $twk5 ?vperm v30,v30,v31,$keyperm lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # pre-load round[1] ?vperm v31,v31,$twk5,$keyperm lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # pre-load round[2] vperm $in0,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm subi $inp,$inp,31 # undo "caller" vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp andi. $taillen,$len,15 vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp sub $len,$len,$taillen vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp subi $len,$len,0x60 vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x60 vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vxor v31,v31,$rndkey0 mtctr $rounds b Loop_xts_dec6x .align 5 Loop_xts_dec6x: vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 vncipher $out5,$out5,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 vncipher $out5,$out5,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Loop_xts_dec6x subic $len,$len,96 # $len-=96 vxor $in0,$twk0,v31 # xor with last round key vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0 vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 vncipher $out5,$out5,v24 subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vxor $in1,$twk1,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 vncipher $out5,$out5,v25 and r0,r0,$len vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vncipher $out0,$out0,v26 vncipher $out1,$out1,v26 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vncipher $out2,$out2,v26 vncipher $out3,$out3,v26 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vncipher $out4,$out4,v26 vncipher $out5,$out5,v26 add $inp,$inp,r0 # $inp is adjusted in such # way that at exit from the # loop inX-in5 are loaded # with last "words" vxor $in2,$twk2,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0 vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vncipher $out0,$out0,v27 vncipher $out1,$out1,v27 vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vncipher $out2,$out2,v27 vncipher $out3,$out3,v27 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vncipher $out4,$out4,v27 vncipher $out5,$out5,v27 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vncipher $out0,$out0,v28 vncipher $out1,$out1,v28 vxor $in3,$twk3,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0 vncipher $out2,$out2,v28 vncipher $out3,$out3,v28 vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vncipher $out4,$out4,v28 vncipher $out5,$out5,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vncipher $out0,$out0,v29 vncipher $out1,$out1,v29 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vncipher $out2,$out2,v29 vncipher $out3,$out3,v29 vxor $in4,$twk4,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0 vncipher $out4,$out4,v29 vncipher $out5,$out5,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vncipher $out0,$out0,v30 vncipher $out1,$out1,v30 vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vncipher $out2,$out2,v30 vncipher $out3,$out3,v30 vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vncipher $out4,$out4,v30 vncipher $out5,$out5,v30 vxor $in5,$twk5,v31 vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0 vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$in0 lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load next input block vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15 vncipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1 lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7 vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3 le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4 le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in5 le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x60 le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0 le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1 le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2 le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3 le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$leperm stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4 stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5 addi $out,$out,0x60 mtctr $rounds beq Loop_xts_dec6x # did $len-=96 borrow? addic. $len,$len,0x60 beq Lxts_dec6x_zero cmpwi $len,0x20 blt Lxts_dec6x_one nop beq Lxts_dec6x_two cmpwi $len,0x40 blt Lxts_dec6x_three nop beq Lxts_dec6x_four Lxts_dec6x_five: vxor $out0,$in1,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in2,$twk1 vxor $out2,$in3,$twk2 vxor $out3,$in4,$twk3 vxor $out4,$in5,$twk4 bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk5 # unused tweak vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0 le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output vxor $out0,$in0,$twk1 le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out addi $out,$out,0x50 bne Lxts_dec6x_steal b Lxts_dec6x_done .align 4 Lxts_dec6x_four: vxor $out0,$in2,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in3,$twk1 vxor $out2,$in4,$twk2 vxor $out3,$in5,$twk3 vxor $out4,$out4,$out4 bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk4 # unused tweak vmr $twk1,$twk5 le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output vxor $out0,$in0,$twk5 le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out addi $out,$out,0x40 bne Lxts_dec6x_steal b Lxts_dec6x_done .align 4 Lxts_dec6x_three: vxor $out0,$in3,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in4,$twk1 vxor $out2,$in5,$twk2 vxor $out3,$out3,$out3 vxor $out4,$out4,$out4 bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk3 # unused tweak vmr $twk1,$twk4 le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output vxor $out0,$in0,$twk4 le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out addi $out,$out,0x30 bne Lxts_dec6x_steal b Lxts_dec6x_done .align 4 Lxts_dec6x_two: vxor $out0,$in4,$twk0 vxor $out1,$in5,$twk1 vxor $out2,$out2,$out2 vxor $out3,$out3,$out3 vxor $out4,$out4,$out4 bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm vmr $twk0,$twk2 # unused tweak vmr $twk1,$twk3 le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output vxor $out0,$in0,$twk3 stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out addi $out,$out,0x20 bne Lxts_dec6x_steal b Lxts_dec6x_done .align 4 Lxts_dec6x_one: vxor $out0,$in5,$twk0 nop Loop_xts_dec1x: vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Loop_xts_dec1x subi r0,$taillen,1 vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 andi. r0,r0,16 cmpwi $taillen,0 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 sub $inp,$inp,r0 vncipher $out0,$out0,v26 lvx_u $in0,0,$inp vncipher $out0,$out0,v27 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vncipher $out0,$out0,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm vncipher $out0,$out0,v30 mtctr $rounds vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0 vmr $twk0,$twk1 # unused tweak vmr $twk1,$twk2 le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output addi $out,$out,0x10 vxor $out0,$in0,$twk2 bne Lxts_dec6x_steal b Lxts_dec6x_done .align 4 Lxts_dec6x_zero: cmpwi $taillen,0 beq Lxts_dec6x_done lvx_u $in0,0,$inp le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm vxor $out0,$in0,$twk1 Lxts_dec6x_steal: vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz Lxts_dec6x_steal add $inp,$inp,$taillen vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 cmpwi $taillen,0 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 lvx_u $in0,0,$inp vncipher $out0,$out0,v26 lvsr $inpperm,0,$taillen # $in5 is no more vncipher $out0,$out0,v27 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vncipher $out0,$out0,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vxor $twk1,$twk1,v31 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm vncipher $out0,$out0,v30 vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm vncipherlast $tmp,$out0,$twk1 le?vperm $out0,$tmp,$tmp,$leperm le?stvx_u $out0,0,$out be?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out vxor $out0,$out0,$out0 vspltisb $out1,-1 vperm $out0,$out0,$out1,$inpperm vsel $out0,$in0,$tmp,$out0 vxor $out0,$out0,$twk0 subi r30,$out,1 mtctr $taillen Loop_xts_dec6x_steal: lbzu r0,1(r30) stb r0,16(r30) bdnz Loop_xts_dec6x_steal li $taillen,0 mtctr $rounds b Loop_xts_dec1x # one more time... .align 4 Lxts_dec6x_done: ${UCMP}i $ivp,0 beq Lxts_dec6x_ret vxor $tweak,$twk0,$rndkey0 le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp Lxts_dec6x_ret: mtlr r11 li r10,`$FRAME+15` li r11,`$FRAME+31` stvx $seven,r10,$sp # wipe copies of round keys addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $seven,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $seven,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx $seven,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx $seven,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 mtspr 256,$vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp $POP r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T` blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,6,6,0 .long 0 .align 5 _aesp8_xts_dec5x: vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3] addi $key_,$key_,0x20 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4] bdnz _aesp8_xts_dec5x subi r0,$taillen,1 vncipher $out0,$out0,v24 vncipher $out1,$out1,v24 vncipher $out2,$out2,v24 vncipher $out3,$out3,v24 vncipher $out4,$out4,v24 andi. r0,r0,16 cmpwi $taillen,0 vncipher $out0,$out0,v25 vncipher $out1,$out1,v25 vncipher $out2,$out2,v25 vncipher $out3,$out3,v25 vncipher $out4,$out4,v25 vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31 sub $inp,$inp,r0 vncipher $out0,$out0,v26 vncipher $out1,$out1,v26 vncipher $out2,$out2,v26 vncipher $out3,$out3,v26 vncipher $out4,$out4,v26 vxor $in1,$twk1,v31 vncipher $out0,$out0,v27 lvx_u $in0,0,$inp vncipher $out1,$out1,v27 vncipher $out2,$out2,v27 vncipher $out3,$out3,v27 vncipher $out4,$out4,v27 vxor $in2,$twk2,v31 addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28 vncipher $out1,$out1,v28 vncipher $out2,$out2,v28 vncipher $out3,$out3,v28 vncipher $out4,$out4,v28 lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1] vxor $in3,$twk3,v31 vncipher $out0,$out0,v29 le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm vncipher $out1,$out1,v29 vncipher $out2,$out2,v29 vncipher $out3,$out3,v29 vncipher $out4,$out4,v29 lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2] vxor $in4,$twk4,v31 vncipher $out0,$out0,v30 vncipher $out1,$out1,v30 vncipher $out2,$out2,v30 vncipher $out3,$out3,v30 vncipher $out4,$out4,v30 vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0 vncipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1 vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2 vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3 vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4 mtctr $rounds blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ___ }} }}} my $consts=1; foreach(split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo; # constants table endian-specific conversion if ($consts && m/\.(long|byte)\s+(.+)\s+(\?[a-z]*)$/o) { my $conv=$3; my @bytes=(); # convert to endian-agnostic format if ($1 eq "long") { foreach (split(/,\s*/,$2)) { my $l = /^0/?oct:int; push @bytes,($l>>24)&0xff,($l>>16)&0xff,($l>>8)&0xff,$l&0xff; } } else { @bytes = map(/^0/?oct:int,split(/,\s*/,$2)); } # little-endian conversion if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) { SWITCH: for($conv) { /\?inv/ && do { @bytes=map($_^0xf,@bytes); last; }; /\?rev/ && do { @bytes=reverse(@bytes); last; }; } } #emit print ".byte\t",join(',',map (sprintf("0x%02x",$_),@bytes)),"\n"; next; } $consts=0 if (m/Lconsts:/o); # end of table # instructions prefixed with '?' are endian-specific and need # to be adjusted accordingly... if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) { # little-endian s/le\?//o or s/be\?/#be#/o or s/\?lvsr/lvsl/o or s/\?lvsl/lvsr/o or s/\?(vperm\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+)/$1$3$2$4/o or s/\?(vsldoi\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*(v[0-9]+,\s*)([0-9]+)/$1$3$2 16-$4/o or s/\?(vspltw\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*([0-9])/$1$2 3-$3/o; } else { # big-endian s/le\?/#le#/o or s/be\?//o or s/\?([a-z]+)/$1/o; } print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl0000644000000000000000000011604113176625656016622 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # Needs more work: key setup, CBC routine... # # ppc_AES_[en|de]crypt perform at 18 cycles per byte processed with # 128-bit key, which is ~40% better than 64-bit code generated by gcc # 4.0. But these are not the ones currently used! Their "compact" # counterparts are, for security reason. ppc_AES_encrypt_compact runs # at 1/2 of ppc_AES_encrypt speed, while ppc_AES_decrypt_compact - # at 1/3 of ppc_AES_decrypt. # February 2010 # # Rescheduling instructions to favour Power6 pipeline gave 10% # performance improvement on the platform in question (and marginal # improvement even on others). It should be noted that Power6 fails # to process byte in 18 cycles, only in 23, because it fails to issue # 4 load instructions in two cycles, only in 3. As result non-compact # block subroutines are 25% slower than one would expect. Compact # functions scale better, because they have pure computational part, # which scales perfectly with clock frequency. To be specific # ppc_AES_encrypt_compact operates at 42 cycles per byte, while # ppc_AES_decrypt_compact - at 55 (in 64-bit build). $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T =8; $LRSAVE =2*$SIZE_T; $STU ="stdu"; $POP ="ld"; $PUSH ="std"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T =4; $LRSAVE =$SIZE_T; $STU ="stwu"; $POP ="lwz"; $PUSH ="stw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $FRAME=32*$SIZE_T; sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"\t.long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; } } $sp="r1"; $toc="r2"; $inp="r3"; $out="r4"; $key="r5"; $Tbl0="r3"; $Tbl1="r6"; $Tbl2="r7"; $Tbl3=$out; # stay away from "r2"; $out is offloaded to stack $s0="r8"; $s1="r9"; $s2="r10"; $s3="r11"; $t0="r12"; $t1="r0"; # stay away from "r13"; $t2="r14"; $t3="r15"; $acc00="r16"; $acc01="r17"; $acc02="r18"; $acc03="r19"; $acc04="r20"; $acc05="r21"; $acc06="r22"; $acc07="r23"; $acc08="r24"; $acc09="r25"; $acc10="r26"; $acc11="r27"; $acc12="r28"; $acc13="r29"; $acc14="r30"; $acc15="r31"; $mask80=$Tbl2; $mask1b=$Tbl3; $code.=<<___; .machine "any" .text .align 7 LAES_Te: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr $Tbl0 ; vvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry addi $Tbl0,$Tbl0,`128-8` mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .space `64-9*4` LAES_Td: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr $Tbl0 ; vvvvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry addi $Tbl0,$Tbl0,`128-64-8+2048+256` mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .space `128-64-9*4` ___ &_data_word( 0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d, 0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554, 0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d, 0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a, 0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87, 0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b, 0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea, 0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b, 0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a, 0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f, 0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108, 0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f, 0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e, 0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5, 0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d, 0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f, 0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e, 0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb, 0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce, 0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497, 0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c, 0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed, 0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b, 0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a, 0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16, 0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594, 0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81, 0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3, 0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a, 0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504, 0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163, 0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d, 0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f, 0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739, 0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47, 0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395, 0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f, 0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883, 0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c, 0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76, 0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e, 0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4, 0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6, 0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b, 0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7, 0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0, 0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25, 0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818, 0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72, 0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651, 0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21, 0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85, 0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa, 0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12, 0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0, 0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9, 0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133, 0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7, 0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920, 0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a, 0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17, 0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8, 0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11, 0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a); $code.=<<___; .byte 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 .byte 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 .byte 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 .byte 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 .byte 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc .byte 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 .byte 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a .byte 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 .byte 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 .byte 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 .byte 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b .byte 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf .byte 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 .byte 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 .byte 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 .byte 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 .byte 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 .byte 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 .byte 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 .byte 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb .byte 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c .byte 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 .byte 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 .byte 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 .byte 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 .byte 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a .byte 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e .byte 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e .byte 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 .byte 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf .byte 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 .byte 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 ___ &_data_word( 0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96, 0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393, 0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25, 0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f, 0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1, 0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6, 0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da, 0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844, 0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd, 0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4, 0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45, 0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94, 0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7, 0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a, 0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5, 0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c, 0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1, 0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a, 0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75, 0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051, 0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46, 0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff, 0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77, 0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb, 0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000, 0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e, 0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927, 0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a, 0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e, 0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16, 0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d, 0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8, 0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd, 0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34, 0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163, 0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120, 0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d, 0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0, 0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422, 0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef, 0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36, 0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4, 0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662, 0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5, 0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3, 0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b, 0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8, 0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6, 0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6, 0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0, 0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815, 0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f, 0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df, 0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f, 0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e, 0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713, 0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89, 0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c, 0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf, 0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86, 0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f, 0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541, 0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190, 0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742); $code.=<<___; .byte 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 .byte 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb .byte 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 .byte 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb .byte 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d .byte 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e .byte 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 .byte 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 .byte 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 .byte 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 .byte 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda .byte 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 .byte 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a .byte 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 .byte 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 .byte 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b .byte 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea .byte 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 .byte 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 .byte 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e .byte 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 .byte 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b .byte 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 .byte 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 .byte 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 .byte 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f .byte 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d .byte 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef .byte 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 .byte 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 .byte 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 .byte 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d .globl .AES_encrypt .align 7 .AES_encrypt: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp) $PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $PUSH r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $PUSH r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $PUSH r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $PUSH r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $PUSH r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $PUSH r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $PUSH r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $PUSH r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $PUSH r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) andi. $t0,$inp,3 andi. $t1,$out,3 or. $t0,$t0,$t1 bne Lenc_unaligned Lenc_unaligned_ok: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $s0,0($inp) lwz $s1,4($inp) lwz $s2,8($inp) lwz $s3,12($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $t0,0($inp) lwz $t1,4($inp) lwz $t2,8($inp) lwz $t3,12($inp) rotlwi $s0,$t0,8 rotlwi $s1,$t1,8 rotlwi $s2,$t2,8 rotlwi $s3,$t3,8 rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,0,7 rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,0,7 rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,0,7 rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,0,7 rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,16,23 rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,16,23 rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,16,23 rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,16,23 ___ $code.=<<___; bl LAES_Te bl Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact $POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); rotlwi $t0,$s0,8 rotlwi $t1,$s1,8 rotlwi $t2,$s2,8 rotlwi $t3,$s3,8 rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,0,7 rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,0,7 rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,0,7 rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,0,7 rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,16,23 rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,16,23 rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,16,23 rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,16,23 stw $t0,0($out) stw $t1,4($out) stw $t2,8($out) stw $t3,12($out) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); stw $s0,0($out) stw $s1,4($out) stw $s2,8($out) stw $s3,12($out) ___ $code.=<<___; b Lenc_done Lenc_unaligned: subfic $t0,$inp,4096 subfic $t1,$out,4096 andi. $t0,$t0,4096-16 beq Lenc_xpage andi. $t1,$t1,4096-16 bne Lenc_unaligned_ok Lenc_xpage: lbz $acc00,0($inp) lbz $acc01,1($inp) lbz $acc02,2($inp) lbz $s0,3($inp) lbz $acc04,4($inp) lbz $acc05,5($inp) lbz $acc06,6($inp) lbz $s1,7($inp) lbz $acc08,8($inp) lbz $acc09,9($inp) lbz $acc10,10($inp) insrwi $s0,$acc00,8,0 lbz $s2,11($inp) insrwi $s1,$acc04,8,0 lbz $acc12,12($inp) insrwi $s0,$acc01,8,8 lbz $acc13,13($inp) insrwi $s1,$acc05,8,8 lbz $acc14,14($inp) insrwi $s0,$acc02,8,16 lbz $s3,15($inp) insrwi $s1,$acc06,8,16 insrwi $s2,$acc08,8,0 insrwi $s3,$acc12,8,0 insrwi $s2,$acc09,8,8 insrwi $s3,$acc13,8,8 insrwi $s2,$acc10,8,16 insrwi $s3,$acc14,8,16 bl LAES_Te bl Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact $POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp) extrwi $acc00,$s0,8,0 extrwi $acc01,$s0,8,8 stb $acc00,0($out) extrwi $acc02,$s0,8,16 stb $acc01,1($out) stb $acc02,2($out) extrwi $acc04,$s1,8,0 stb $s0,3($out) extrwi $acc05,$s1,8,8 stb $acc04,4($out) extrwi $acc06,$s1,8,16 stb $acc05,5($out) stb $acc06,6($out) extrwi $acc08,$s2,8,0 stb $s1,7($out) extrwi $acc09,$s2,8,8 stb $acc08,8($out) extrwi $acc10,$s2,8,16 stb $acc09,9($out) stb $acc10,10($out) extrwi $acc12,$s3,8,0 stb $s2,11($out) extrwi $acc13,$s3,8,8 stb $acc12,12($out) extrwi $acc14,$s3,8,16 stb $acc13,13($out) stb $acc14,14($out) stb $s3,15($out) Lenc_done: $POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) $POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $POP r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $POP r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $POP r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $POP r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $POP r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $POP r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $POP r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $POP r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $POP r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $POP r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) mtlr r0 addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0 .long 0 .align 5 Lppc_AES_encrypt: lwz $acc00,240($key) addi $Tbl1,$Tbl0,3 lwz $t0,0($key) addi $Tbl2,$Tbl0,2 lwz $t1,4($key) addi $Tbl3,$Tbl0,1 lwz $t2,8($key) addi $acc00,$acc00,-1 lwz $t3,12($key) addi $key,$key,16 xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 mtctr $acc00 .align 4 Lenc_loop: rlwinm $acc00,$s0,`32-24+3`,21,28 rlwinm $acc01,$s1,`32-24+3`,21,28 rlwinm $acc02,$s2,`32-24+3`,21,28 rlwinm $acc03,$s3,`32-24+3`,21,28 lwz $t0,0($key) rlwinm $acc04,$s1,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwz $t1,4($key) rlwinm $acc05,$s2,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwz $t2,8($key) rlwinm $acc06,$s3,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwz $t3,12($key) rlwinm $acc07,$s0,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc00,$Tbl0,$acc00 rlwinm $acc08,$s2,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc01,$Tbl0,$acc01 rlwinm $acc09,$s3,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc02,$Tbl0,$acc02 rlwinm $acc10,$s0,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc03,$Tbl0,$acc03 rlwinm $acc11,$s1,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04 rlwinm $acc12,$s3,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05 rlwinm $acc13,$s0,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06 rlwinm $acc14,$s1,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07 rlwinm $acc15,$s2,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08 xor $t0,$t0,$acc00 lwzx $acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09 xor $t1,$t1,$acc01 lwzx $acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10 xor $t2,$t2,$acc02 lwzx $acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11 xor $t3,$t3,$acc03 lwzx $acc12,$Tbl3,$acc12 xor $t0,$t0,$acc04 lwzx $acc13,$Tbl3,$acc13 xor $t1,$t1,$acc05 lwzx $acc14,$Tbl3,$acc14 xor $t2,$t2,$acc06 lwzx $acc15,$Tbl3,$acc15 xor $t3,$t3,$acc07 xor $t0,$t0,$acc08 xor $t1,$t1,$acc09 xor $t2,$t2,$acc10 xor $t3,$t3,$acc11 xor $s0,$t0,$acc12 xor $s1,$t1,$acc13 xor $s2,$t2,$acc14 xor $s3,$t3,$acc15 addi $key,$key,16 bdnz Lenc_loop addi $Tbl2,$Tbl0,2048 nop lwz $t0,0($key) rlwinm $acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $t1,4($key) rlwinm $acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $t2,8($key) rlwinm $acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $t3,12($key) rlwinm $acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $acc08,`2048+0`($Tbl0) ! prefetch Te4 rlwinm $acc04,$s1,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc09,`2048+32`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc05,$s2,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc10,`2048+64`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc06,$s3,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc11,`2048+96`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc07,$s0,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc12,`2048+128`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31 lwz $acc13,`2048+160`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31 lwz $acc14,`2048+192`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31 lwz $acc15,`2048+224`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc00,$Tbl2,$acc00 rlwinm $acc12,$s3,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc01,$Tbl2,$acc01 rlwinm $acc13,$s0,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc02,$Tbl2,$acc02 rlwinm $acc14,$s1,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc03,$Tbl2,$acc03 rlwinm $acc15,$s2,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc04,$Tbl2,$acc04 rlwinm $s0,$acc00,24,0,7 lbzx $acc05,$Tbl2,$acc05 rlwinm $s1,$acc01,24,0,7 lbzx $acc06,$Tbl2,$acc06 rlwinm $s2,$acc02,24,0,7 lbzx $acc07,$Tbl2,$acc07 rlwinm $s3,$acc03,24,0,7 lbzx $acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08 rlwimi $s0,$acc04,16,8,15 lbzx $acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09 rlwimi $s1,$acc05,16,8,15 lbzx $acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10 rlwimi $s2,$acc06,16,8,15 lbzx $acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11 rlwimi $s3,$acc07,16,8,15 lbzx $acc12,$Tbl2,$acc12 rlwimi $s0,$acc08,8,16,23 lbzx $acc13,$Tbl2,$acc13 rlwimi $s1,$acc09,8,16,23 lbzx $acc14,$Tbl2,$acc14 rlwimi $s2,$acc10,8,16,23 lbzx $acc15,$Tbl2,$acc15 rlwimi $s3,$acc11,8,16,23 or $s0,$s0,$acc12 or $s1,$s1,$acc13 or $s2,$s2,$acc14 or $s3,$s3,$acc15 xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .align 4 Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact: lwz $acc00,240($key) addi $Tbl1,$Tbl0,2048 lwz $t0,0($key) lis $mask80,0x8080 lwz $t1,4($key) lis $mask1b,0x1b1b lwz $t2,8($key) ori $mask80,$mask80,0x8080 lwz $t3,12($key) ori $mask1b,$mask1b,0x1b1b addi $key,$key,16 mtctr $acc00 .align 4 Lenc_compact_loop: xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 rlwinm $acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 rlwinm $acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 rlwinm $acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31 rlwinm $acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31 rlwinm $acc04,$s1,`32-16`,24,31 rlwinm $acc05,$s2,`32-16`,24,31 rlwinm $acc06,$s3,`32-16`,24,31 rlwinm $acc07,$s0,`32-16`,24,31 lbzx $acc00,$Tbl1,$acc00 rlwinm $acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc01,$Tbl1,$acc01 rlwinm $acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc02,$Tbl1,$acc02 rlwinm $acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc03,$Tbl1,$acc03 rlwinm $acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04 rlwinm $acc12,$s3,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05 rlwinm $acc13,$s0,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06 rlwinm $acc14,$s1,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07 rlwinm $acc15,$s2,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc08,$Tbl1,$acc08 rlwinm $s0,$acc00,24,0,7 lbzx $acc09,$Tbl1,$acc09 rlwinm $s1,$acc01,24,0,7 lbzx $acc10,$Tbl1,$acc10 rlwinm $s2,$acc02,24,0,7 lbzx $acc11,$Tbl1,$acc11 rlwinm $s3,$acc03,24,0,7 lbzx $acc12,$Tbl1,$acc12 rlwimi $s0,$acc04,16,8,15 lbzx $acc13,$Tbl1,$acc13 rlwimi $s1,$acc05,16,8,15 lbzx $acc14,$Tbl1,$acc14 rlwimi $s2,$acc06,16,8,15 lbzx $acc15,$Tbl1,$acc15 rlwimi $s3,$acc07,16,8,15 rlwimi $s0,$acc08,8,16,23 rlwimi $s1,$acc09,8,16,23 rlwimi $s2,$acc10,8,16,23 rlwimi $s3,$acc11,8,16,23 lwz $t0,0($key) or $s0,$s0,$acc12 lwz $t1,4($key) or $s1,$s1,$acc13 lwz $t2,8($key) or $s2,$s2,$acc14 lwz $t3,12($key) or $s3,$s3,$acc15 addi $key,$key,16 bdz Lenc_compact_done and $acc00,$s0,$mask80 # r1=r0&0x80808080 and $acc01,$s1,$mask80 and $acc02,$s2,$mask80 and $acc03,$s3,$mask80 srwi $acc04,$acc00,7 # r1>>7 andc $acc08,$s0,$mask80 # r0&0x7f7f7f7f srwi $acc05,$acc01,7 andc $acc09,$s1,$mask80 srwi $acc06,$acc02,7 andc $acc10,$s2,$mask80 srwi $acc07,$acc03,7 andc $acc11,$s3,$mask80 sub $acc00,$acc00,$acc04 # r1-(r1>>7) sub $acc01,$acc01,$acc05 sub $acc02,$acc02,$acc06 sub $acc03,$acc03,$acc07 add $acc08,$acc08,$acc08 # (r0&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1 add $acc09,$acc09,$acc09 add $acc10,$acc10,$acc10 add $acc11,$acc11,$acc11 and $acc00,$acc00,$mask1b # (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b and $acc01,$acc01,$mask1b and $acc02,$acc02,$mask1b and $acc03,$acc03,$mask1b xor $acc00,$acc00,$acc08 # r2 xor $acc01,$acc01,$acc09 rotlwi $acc12,$s0,16 # ROTATE(r0,16) xor $acc02,$acc02,$acc10 rotlwi $acc13,$s1,16 xor $acc03,$acc03,$acc11 rotlwi $acc14,$s2,16 xor $s0,$s0,$acc00 # r0^r2 rotlwi $acc15,$s3,16 xor $s1,$s1,$acc01 rotrwi $s0,$s0,24 # ROTATE(r2^r0,24) xor $s2,$s2,$acc02 rotrwi $s1,$s1,24 xor $s3,$s3,$acc03 rotrwi $s2,$s2,24 xor $s0,$s0,$acc00 # ROTATE(r2^r0,24)^r2 rotrwi $s3,$s3,24 xor $s1,$s1,$acc01 xor $s2,$s2,$acc02 xor $s3,$s3,$acc03 rotlwi $acc08,$acc12,8 # ROTATE(r0,24) xor $s0,$s0,$acc12 # rotlwi $acc09,$acc13,8 xor $s1,$s1,$acc13 rotlwi $acc10,$acc14,8 xor $s2,$s2,$acc14 rotlwi $acc11,$acc15,8 xor $s3,$s3,$acc15 xor $s0,$s0,$acc08 # xor $s1,$s1,$acc09 xor $s2,$s2,$acc10 xor $s3,$s3,$acc11 b Lenc_compact_loop .align 4 Lenc_compact_done: xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .AES_encrypt,.-.AES_encrypt .globl .AES_decrypt .align 7 .AES_decrypt: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp) $PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $PUSH r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $PUSH r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $PUSH r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $PUSH r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $PUSH r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $PUSH r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $PUSH r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $PUSH r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $PUSH r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) andi. $t0,$inp,3 andi. $t1,$out,3 or. $t0,$t0,$t1 bne Ldec_unaligned Ldec_unaligned_ok: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $s0,0($inp) lwz $s1,4($inp) lwz $s2,8($inp) lwz $s3,12($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $t0,0($inp) lwz $t1,4($inp) lwz $t2,8($inp) lwz $t3,12($inp) rotlwi $s0,$t0,8 rotlwi $s1,$t1,8 rotlwi $s2,$t2,8 rotlwi $s3,$t3,8 rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,0,7 rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,0,7 rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,0,7 rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,0,7 rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,16,23 rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,16,23 rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,16,23 rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,16,23 ___ $code.=<<___; bl LAES_Td bl Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact $POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); rotlwi $t0,$s0,8 rotlwi $t1,$s1,8 rotlwi $t2,$s2,8 rotlwi $t3,$s3,8 rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,0,7 rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,0,7 rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,0,7 rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,0,7 rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,16,23 rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,16,23 rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,16,23 rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,16,23 stw $t0,0($out) stw $t1,4($out) stw $t2,8($out) stw $t3,12($out) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); stw $s0,0($out) stw $s1,4($out) stw $s2,8($out) stw $s3,12($out) ___ $code.=<<___; b Ldec_done Ldec_unaligned: subfic $t0,$inp,4096 subfic $t1,$out,4096 andi. $t0,$t0,4096-16 beq Ldec_xpage andi. $t1,$t1,4096-16 bne Ldec_unaligned_ok Ldec_xpage: lbz $acc00,0($inp) lbz $acc01,1($inp) lbz $acc02,2($inp) lbz $s0,3($inp) lbz $acc04,4($inp) lbz $acc05,5($inp) lbz $acc06,6($inp) lbz $s1,7($inp) lbz $acc08,8($inp) lbz $acc09,9($inp) lbz $acc10,10($inp) insrwi $s0,$acc00,8,0 lbz $s2,11($inp) insrwi $s1,$acc04,8,0 lbz $acc12,12($inp) insrwi $s0,$acc01,8,8 lbz $acc13,13($inp) insrwi $s1,$acc05,8,8 lbz $acc14,14($inp) insrwi $s0,$acc02,8,16 lbz $s3,15($inp) insrwi $s1,$acc06,8,16 insrwi $s2,$acc08,8,0 insrwi $s3,$acc12,8,0 insrwi $s2,$acc09,8,8 insrwi $s3,$acc13,8,8 insrwi $s2,$acc10,8,16 insrwi $s3,$acc14,8,16 bl LAES_Td bl Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact $POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp) extrwi $acc00,$s0,8,0 extrwi $acc01,$s0,8,8 stb $acc00,0($out) extrwi $acc02,$s0,8,16 stb $acc01,1($out) stb $acc02,2($out) extrwi $acc04,$s1,8,0 stb $s0,3($out) extrwi $acc05,$s1,8,8 stb $acc04,4($out) extrwi $acc06,$s1,8,16 stb $acc05,5($out) stb $acc06,6($out) extrwi $acc08,$s2,8,0 stb $s1,7($out) extrwi $acc09,$s2,8,8 stb $acc08,8($out) extrwi $acc10,$s2,8,16 stb $acc09,9($out) stb $acc10,10($out) extrwi $acc12,$s3,8,0 stb $s2,11($out) extrwi $acc13,$s3,8,8 stb $acc12,12($out) extrwi $acc14,$s3,8,16 stb $acc13,13($out) stb $acc14,14($out) stb $s3,15($out) Ldec_done: $POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) $POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $POP r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $POP r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $POP r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $POP r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $POP r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $POP r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $POP r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $POP r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $POP r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $POP r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) mtlr r0 addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0 .long 0 .align 5 Lppc_AES_decrypt: lwz $acc00,240($key) addi $Tbl1,$Tbl0,3 lwz $t0,0($key) addi $Tbl2,$Tbl0,2 lwz $t1,4($key) addi $Tbl3,$Tbl0,1 lwz $t2,8($key) addi $acc00,$acc00,-1 lwz $t3,12($key) addi $key,$key,16 xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 mtctr $acc00 .align 4 Ldec_loop: rlwinm $acc00,$s0,`32-24+3`,21,28 rlwinm $acc01,$s1,`32-24+3`,21,28 rlwinm $acc02,$s2,`32-24+3`,21,28 rlwinm $acc03,$s3,`32-24+3`,21,28 lwz $t0,0($key) rlwinm $acc04,$s3,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwz $t1,4($key) rlwinm $acc05,$s0,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwz $t2,8($key) rlwinm $acc06,$s1,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwz $t3,12($key) rlwinm $acc07,$s2,`32-16+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc00,$Tbl0,$acc00 rlwinm $acc08,$s2,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc01,$Tbl0,$acc01 rlwinm $acc09,$s3,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc02,$Tbl0,$acc02 rlwinm $acc10,$s0,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc03,$Tbl0,$acc03 rlwinm $acc11,$s1,`32-8+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04 rlwinm $acc12,$s1,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05 rlwinm $acc13,$s2,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06 rlwinm $acc14,$s3,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07 rlwinm $acc15,$s0,`0+3`,21,28 lwzx $acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08 xor $t0,$t0,$acc00 lwzx $acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09 xor $t1,$t1,$acc01 lwzx $acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10 xor $t2,$t2,$acc02 lwzx $acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11 xor $t3,$t3,$acc03 lwzx $acc12,$Tbl3,$acc12 xor $t0,$t0,$acc04 lwzx $acc13,$Tbl3,$acc13 xor $t1,$t1,$acc05 lwzx $acc14,$Tbl3,$acc14 xor $t2,$t2,$acc06 lwzx $acc15,$Tbl3,$acc15 xor $t3,$t3,$acc07 xor $t0,$t0,$acc08 xor $t1,$t1,$acc09 xor $t2,$t2,$acc10 xor $t3,$t3,$acc11 xor $s0,$t0,$acc12 xor $s1,$t1,$acc13 xor $s2,$t2,$acc14 xor $s3,$t3,$acc15 addi $key,$key,16 bdnz Ldec_loop addi $Tbl2,$Tbl0,2048 nop lwz $t0,0($key) rlwinm $acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $t1,4($key) rlwinm $acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $t2,8($key) rlwinm $acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $t3,12($key) rlwinm $acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31 lwz $acc08,`2048+0`($Tbl0) ! prefetch Td4 rlwinm $acc04,$s3,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc09,`2048+32`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc05,$s0,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc10,`2048+64`($Tbl0) lbzx $acc00,$Tbl2,$acc00 lwz $acc11,`2048+96`($Tbl0) lbzx $acc01,$Tbl2,$acc01 lwz $acc12,`2048+128`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc06,$s1,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc13,`2048+160`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc07,$s2,`32-16`,24,31 lwz $acc14,`2048+192`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31 lwz $acc15,`2048+224`($Tbl0) rlwinm $acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc02,$Tbl2,$acc02 rlwinm $acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc03,$Tbl2,$acc03 rlwinm $acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc04,$Tbl2,$acc04 rlwinm $acc12,$s1,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc05,$Tbl2,$acc05 rlwinm $acc13,$s2,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc06,$Tbl2,$acc06 rlwinm $acc14,$s3,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc07,$Tbl2,$acc07 rlwinm $acc15,$s0,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc08,$Tbl2,$acc08 rlwinm $s0,$acc00,24,0,7 lbzx $acc09,$Tbl2,$acc09 rlwinm $s1,$acc01,24,0,7 lbzx $acc10,$Tbl2,$acc10 rlwinm $s2,$acc02,24,0,7 lbzx $acc11,$Tbl2,$acc11 rlwinm $s3,$acc03,24,0,7 lbzx $acc12,$Tbl2,$acc12 rlwimi $s0,$acc04,16,8,15 lbzx $acc13,$Tbl2,$acc13 rlwimi $s1,$acc05,16,8,15 lbzx $acc14,$Tbl2,$acc14 rlwimi $s2,$acc06,16,8,15 lbzx $acc15,$Tbl2,$acc15 rlwimi $s3,$acc07,16,8,15 rlwimi $s0,$acc08,8,16,23 rlwimi $s1,$acc09,8,16,23 rlwimi $s2,$acc10,8,16,23 rlwimi $s3,$acc11,8,16,23 or $s0,$s0,$acc12 or $s1,$s1,$acc13 or $s2,$s2,$acc14 or $s3,$s3,$acc15 xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .align 4 Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact: lwz $acc00,240($key) addi $Tbl1,$Tbl0,2048 lwz $t0,0($key) lis $mask80,0x8080 lwz $t1,4($key) lis $mask1b,0x1b1b lwz $t2,8($key) ori $mask80,$mask80,0x8080 lwz $t3,12($key) ori $mask1b,$mask1b,0x1b1b addi $key,$key,16 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); insrdi $mask80,$mask80,32,0 insrdi $mask1b,$mask1b,32,0 ___ $code.=<<___; mtctr $acc00 .align 4 Ldec_compact_loop: xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 rlwinm $acc00,$s0,`32-24`,24,31 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 rlwinm $acc01,$s1,`32-24`,24,31 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 rlwinm $acc02,$s2,`32-24`,24,31 rlwinm $acc03,$s3,`32-24`,24,31 rlwinm $acc04,$s3,`32-16`,24,31 rlwinm $acc05,$s0,`32-16`,24,31 rlwinm $acc06,$s1,`32-16`,24,31 rlwinm $acc07,$s2,`32-16`,24,31 lbzx $acc00,$Tbl1,$acc00 rlwinm $acc08,$s2,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc01,$Tbl1,$acc01 rlwinm $acc09,$s3,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc02,$Tbl1,$acc02 rlwinm $acc10,$s0,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc03,$Tbl1,$acc03 rlwinm $acc11,$s1,`32-8`,24,31 lbzx $acc04,$Tbl1,$acc04 rlwinm $acc12,$s1,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc05,$Tbl1,$acc05 rlwinm $acc13,$s2,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc06,$Tbl1,$acc06 rlwinm $acc14,$s3,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc07,$Tbl1,$acc07 rlwinm $acc15,$s0,`0`,24,31 lbzx $acc08,$Tbl1,$acc08 rlwinm $s0,$acc00,24,0,7 lbzx $acc09,$Tbl1,$acc09 rlwinm $s1,$acc01,24,0,7 lbzx $acc10,$Tbl1,$acc10 rlwinm $s2,$acc02,24,0,7 lbzx $acc11,$Tbl1,$acc11 rlwinm $s3,$acc03,24,0,7 lbzx $acc12,$Tbl1,$acc12 rlwimi $s0,$acc04,16,8,15 lbzx $acc13,$Tbl1,$acc13 rlwimi $s1,$acc05,16,8,15 lbzx $acc14,$Tbl1,$acc14 rlwimi $s2,$acc06,16,8,15 lbzx $acc15,$Tbl1,$acc15 rlwimi $s3,$acc07,16,8,15 rlwimi $s0,$acc08,8,16,23 rlwimi $s1,$acc09,8,16,23 rlwimi $s2,$acc10,8,16,23 rlwimi $s3,$acc11,8,16,23 lwz $t0,0($key) or $s0,$s0,$acc12 lwz $t1,4($key) or $s1,$s1,$acc13 lwz $t2,8($key) or $s2,$s2,$acc14 lwz $t3,12($key) or $s3,$s3,$acc15 addi $key,$key,16 bdz Ldec_compact_done ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); # vectorized permutation improves decrypt performance by 10% insrdi $s0,$s1,32,0 insrdi $s2,$s3,32,0 and $acc00,$s0,$mask80 # r1=r0&0x80808080 and $acc02,$s2,$mask80 srdi $acc04,$acc00,7 # r1>>7 srdi $acc06,$acc02,7 andc $acc08,$s0,$mask80 # r0&0x7f7f7f7f andc $acc10,$s2,$mask80 sub $acc00,$acc00,$acc04 # r1-(r1>>7) sub $acc02,$acc02,$acc06 add $acc08,$acc08,$acc08 # (r0&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1 add $acc10,$acc10,$acc10 and $acc00,$acc00,$mask1b # (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b and $acc02,$acc02,$mask1b xor $acc00,$acc00,$acc08 # r2 xor $acc02,$acc02,$acc10 and $acc04,$acc00,$mask80 # r1=r2&0x80808080 and $acc06,$acc02,$mask80 srdi $acc08,$acc04,7 # r1>>7 srdi $acc10,$acc06,7 andc $acc12,$acc00,$mask80 # r2&0x7f7f7f7f andc $acc14,$acc02,$mask80 sub $acc04,$acc04,$acc08 # r1-(r1>>7) sub $acc06,$acc06,$acc10 add $acc12,$acc12,$acc12 # (r2&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1 add $acc14,$acc14,$acc14 and $acc04,$acc04,$mask1b # (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b and $acc06,$acc06,$mask1b xor $acc04,$acc04,$acc12 # r4 xor $acc06,$acc06,$acc14 and $acc08,$acc04,$mask80 # r1=r4&0x80808080 and $acc10,$acc06,$mask80 srdi $acc12,$acc08,7 # r1>>7 srdi $acc14,$acc10,7 sub $acc08,$acc08,$acc12 # r1-(r1>>7) sub $acc10,$acc10,$acc14 andc $acc12,$acc04,$mask80 # r4&0x7f7f7f7f andc $acc14,$acc06,$mask80 add $acc12,$acc12,$acc12 # (r4&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1 add $acc14,$acc14,$acc14 and $acc08,$acc08,$mask1b # (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b and $acc10,$acc10,$mask1b xor $acc08,$acc08,$acc12 # r8 xor $acc10,$acc10,$acc14 xor $acc00,$acc00,$s0 # r2^r0 xor $acc02,$acc02,$s2 xor $acc04,$acc04,$s0 # r4^r0 xor $acc06,$acc06,$s2 extrdi $acc01,$acc00,32,0 extrdi $acc03,$acc02,32,0 extrdi $acc05,$acc04,32,0 extrdi $acc07,$acc06,32,0 extrdi $acc09,$acc08,32,0 extrdi $acc11,$acc10,32,0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); and $acc00,$s0,$mask80 # r1=r0&0x80808080 and $acc01,$s1,$mask80 and $acc02,$s2,$mask80 and $acc03,$s3,$mask80 srwi $acc04,$acc00,7 # r1>>7 andc $acc08,$s0,$mask80 # r0&0x7f7f7f7f srwi $acc05,$acc01,7 andc $acc09,$s1,$mask80 srwi $acc06,$acc02,7 andc $acc10,$s2,$mask80 srwi $acc07,$acc03,7 andc $acc11,$s3,$mask80 sub $acc00,$acc00,$acc04 # r1-(r1>>7) sub $acc01,$acc01,$acc05 sub $acc02,$acc02,$acc06 sub $acc03,$acc03,$acc07 add $acc08,$acc08,$acc08 # (r0&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1 add $acc09,$acc09,$acc09 add $acc10,$acc10,$acc10 add $acc11,$acc11,$acc11 and $acc00,$acc00,$mask1b # (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b and $acc01,$acc01,$mask1b and $acc02,$acc02,$mask1b and $acc03,$acc03,$mask1b xor $acc00,$acc00,$acc08 # r2 xor $acc01,$acc01,$acc09 xor $acc02,$acc02,$acc10 xor $acc03,$acc03,$acc11 and $acc04,$acc00,$mask80 # r1=r2&0x80808080 and $acc05,$acc01,$mask80 and $acc06,$acc02,$mask80 and $acc07,$acc03,$mask80 srwi $acc08,$acc04,7 # r1>>7 andc $acc12,$acc00,$mask80 # r2&0x7f7f7f7f srwi $acc09,$acc05,7 andc $acc13,$acc01,$mask80 srwi $acc10,$acc06,7 andc $acc14,$acc02,$mask80 srwi $acc11,$acc07,7 andc $acc15,$acc03,$mask80 sub $acc04,$acc04,$acc08 # r1-(r1>>7) sub $acc05,$acc05,$acc09 sub $acc06,$acc06,$acc10 sub $acc07,$acc07,$acc11 add $acc12,$acc12,$acc12 # (r2&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1 add $acc13,$acc13,$acc13 add $acc14,$acc14,$acc14 add $acc15,$acc15,$acc15 and $acc04,$acc04,$mask1b # (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b and $acc05,$acc05,$mask1b and $acc06,$acc06,$mask1b and $acc07,$acc07,$mask1b xor $acc04,$acc04,$acc12 # r4 xor $acc05,$acc05,$acc13 xor $acc06,$acc06,$acc14 xor $acc07,$acc07,$acc15 and $acc08,$acc04,$mask80 # r1=r4&0x80808080 and $acc09,$acc05,$mask80 srwi $acc12,$acc08,7 # r1>>7 and $acc10,$acc06,$mask80 srwi $acc13,$acc09,7 and $acc11,$acc07,$mask80 srwi $acc14,$acc10,7 sub $acc08,$acc08,$acc12 # r1-(r1>>7) srwi $acc15,$acc11,7 sub $acc09,$acc09,$acc13 sub $acc10,$acc10,$acc14 sub $acc11,$acc11,$acc15 andc $acc12,$acc04,$mask80 # r4&0x7f7f7f7f andc $acc13,$acc05,$mask80 andc $acc14,$acc06,$mask80 andc $acc15,$acc07,$mask80 add $acc12,$acc12,$acc12 # (r4&0x7f7f7f7f)<<1 add $acc13,$acc13,$acc13 add $acc14,$acc14,$acc14 add $acc15,$acc15,$acc15 and $acc08,$acc08,$mask1b # (r1-(r1>>7))&0x1b1b1b1b and $acc09,$acc09,$mask1b and $acc10,$acc10,$mask1b and $acc11,$acc11,$mask1b xor $acc08,$acc08,$acc12 # r8 xor $acc09,$acc09,$acc13 xor $acc10,$acc10,$acc14 xor $acc11,$acc11,$acc15 xor $acc00,$acc00,$s0 # r2^r0 xor $acc01,$acc01,$s1 xor $acc02,$acc02,$s2 xor $acc03,$acc03,$s3 xor $acc04,$acc04,$s0 # r4^r0 xor $acc05,$acc05,$s1 xor $acc06,$acc06,$s2 xor $acc07,$acc07,$s3 ___ $code.=<<___; rotrwi $s0,$s0,8 # = ROTATE(r0,8) rotrwi $s1,$s1,8 xor $s0,$s0,$acc00 # ^= r2^r0 rotrwi $s2,$s2,8 xor $s1,$s1,$acc01 rotrwi $s3,$s3,8 xor $s2,$s2,$acc02 xor $s3,$s3,$acc03 xor $acc00,$acc00,$acc08 xor $acc01,$acc01,$acc09 xor $acc02,$acc02,$acc10 xor $acc03,$acc03,$acc11 xor $s0,$s0,$acc04 # ^= r4^r0 rotrwi $acc00,$acc00,24 xor $s1,$s1,$acc05 rotrwi $acc01,$acc01,24 xor $s2,$s2,$acc06 rotrwi $acc02,$acc02,24 xor $s3,$s3,$acc07 rotrwi $acc03,$acc03,24 xor $acc04,$acc04,$acc08 xor $acc05,$acc05,$acc09 xor $acc06,$acc06,$acc10 xor $acc07,$acc07,$acc11 xor $s0,$s0,$acc08 # ^= r8 [^((r4^r0)^(r2^r0)=r4^r2)] rotrwi $acc04,$acc04,16 xor $s1,$s1,$acc09 rotrwi $acc05,$acc05,16 xor $s2,$s2,$acc10 rotrwi $acc06,$acc06,16 xor $s3,$s3,$acc11 rotrwi $acc07,$acc07,16 xor $s0,$s0,$acc00 # ^= ROTATE(r8^r2^r0,24) rotrwi $acc08,$acc08,8 xor $s1,$s1,$acc01 rotrwi $acc09,$acc09,8 xor $s2,$s2,$acc02 rotrwi $acc10,$acc10,8 xor $s3,$s3,$acc03 rotrwi $acc11,$acc11,8 xor $s0,$s0,$acc04 # ^= ROTATE(r8^r4^r0,16) xor $s1,$s1,$acc05 xor $s2,$s2,$acc06 xor $s3,$s3,$acc07 xor $s0,$s0,$acc08 # ^= ROTATE(r8,8) xor $s1,$s1,$acc09 xor $s2,$s2,$acc10 xor $s3,$s3,$acc11 b Ldec_compact_loop .align 4 Ldec_compact_done: xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 xor $s2,$s2,$t2 xor $s3,$s3,$t3 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .AES_decrypt,.-.AES_decrypt .asciz "AES for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 7 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl0000755000000000000000000007313413176625656017437 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary # forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license. # ==================================================================== # # Version 1.1 # # The major reason for undertaken effort was to mitigate the hazard of # cache-timing attack. This is [currently and initially!] addressed in # two ways. 1. S-boxes are compressed from 5KB to 2KB+256B size each. # 2. References to them are scheduled for L2 cache latency, meaning # that the tables don't have to reside in L1 cache. Once again, this # is an initial draft and one should expect more countermeasures to # be implemented... # # Version 1.1 prefetches T[ed]4 in order to mitigate attack on last # round. # # Even though performance was not the primary goal [on the contrary, # extra shifts "induced" by compressed S-box and longer loop epilogue # "induced" by scheduling for L2 have negative effect on performance], # the code turned out to run in ~23 cycles per processed byte en-/ # decrypted with 128-bit key. This is pretty good result for code # with mentioned qualities and UltraSPARC core. Compared to Sun C # generated code my encrypt procedure runs just few percents faster, # while decrypt one - whole 50% faster [yes, Sun C failed to generate # optimal decrypt procedure]. Compared to GNU C generated code both # procedures are more than 60% faster:-) $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $frame="STACK_FRAME"; $bias="STACK_BIAS"; $locals=16; $acc0="%l0"; $acc1="%o0"; $acc2="%o1"; $acc3="%o2"; $acc4="%l1"; $acc5="%o3"; $acc6="%o4"; $acc7="%o5"; $acc8="%l2"; $acc9="%o7"; $acc10="%g1"; $acc11="%g2"; $acc12="%l3"; $acc13="%g3"; $acc14="%g4"; $acc15="%g5"; $t0="%l4"; $t1="%l5"; $t2="%l6"; $t3="%l7"; $s0="%i0"; $s1="%i1"; $s2="%i2"; $s3="%i3"; $tbl="%i4"; $key="%i5"; $rounds="%i7"; # aliases with return address, which is off-loaded to stack sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf"\t.long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; } } $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .align 256 AES_Te: ___ &_data_word( 0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d, 0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554, 0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d, 0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a, 0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87, 0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b, 0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea, 0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b, 0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a, 0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f, 0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108, 0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f, 0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e, 0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5, 0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d, 0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f, 0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e, 0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb, 0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce, 0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497, 0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c, 0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed, 0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b, 0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a, 0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16, 0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594, 0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81, 0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3, 0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a, 0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504, 0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163, 0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d, 0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f, 0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739, 0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47, 0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395, 0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f, 0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883, 0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c, 0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76, 0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e, 0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4, 0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6, 0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b, 0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7, 0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0, 0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25, 0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818, 0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72, 0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651, 0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21, 0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85, 0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa, 0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12, 0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0, 0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9, 0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133, 0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7, 0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920, 0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a, 0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17, 0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8, 0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11, 0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a); $code.=<<___; .byte 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 .byte 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 .byte 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 .byte 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 .byte 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc .byte 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 .byte 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a .byte 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 .byte 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 .byte 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 .byte 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b .byte 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf .byte 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 .byte 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 .byte 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 .byte 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 .byte 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 .byte 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 .byte 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 .byte 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb .byte 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c .byte 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 .byte 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 .byte 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 .byte 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 .byte 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a .byte 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e .byte 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e .byte 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 .byte 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf .byte 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 .byte 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 .type AES_Te,#object .size AES_Te,(.-AES_Te) .align 64 .skip 16 _sparcv9_AES_encrypt: save %sp,-$frame-$locals,%sp stx %i7,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] ! off-load return address ld [$key+240],$rounds ld [$key+0],$t0 ld [$key+4],$t1 ! ld [$key+8],$t2 srl $rounds,1,$rounds xor $t0,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+12],$t3 srl $s0,21,$acc0 xor $t1,$s1,$s1 ld [$key+16],$t0 srl $s1,13,$acc1 ! xor $t2,$s2,$s2 ld [$key+20],$t1 xor $t3,$s3,$s3 ld [$key+24],$t2 and $acc0,2040,$acc0 ld [$key+28],$t3 nop .Lenc_loop: srl $s2,5,$acc2 ! and $acc1,2040,$acc1 ldx [$tbl+$acc0],$acc0 sll $s3,3,$acc3 and $acc2,2040,$acc2 ldx [$tbl+$acc1],$acc1 srl $s1,21,$acc4 and $acc3,2040,$acc3 ldx [$tbl+$acc2],$acc2 ! srl $s2,13,$acc5 and $acc4,2040,$acc4 ldx [$tbl+$acc3],$acc3 srl $s3,5,$acc6 and $acc5,2040,$acc5 ldx [$tbl+$acc4],$acc4 fmovs %f0,%f0 sll $s0,3,$acc7 ! and $acc6,2040,$acc6 ldx [$tbl+$acc5],$acc5 srl $s2,21,$acc8 and $acc7,2040,$acc7 ldx [$tbl+$acc6],$acc6 srl $s3,13,$acc9 and $acc8,2040,$acc8 ldx [$tbl+$acc7],$acc7 ! srl $s0,5,$acc10 and $acc9,2040,$acc9 ldx [$tbl+$acc8],$acc8 sll $s1,3,$acc11 and $acc10,2040,$acc10 ldx [$tbl+$acc9],$acc9 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $s3,21,$acc12 ! and $acc11,2040,$acc11 ldx [$tbl+$acc10],$acc10 srl $s0,13,$acc13 and $acc12,2040,$acc12 ldx [$tbl+$acc11],$acc11 srl $s1,5,$acc14 and $acc13,2040,$acc13 ldx [$tbl+$acc12],$acc12 ! sll $s2,3,$acc15 and $acc14,2040,$acc14 ldx [$tbl+$acc13],$acc13 and $acc15,2040,$acc15 add $key,32,$key ldx [$tbl+$acc14],$acc14 fmovs %f0,%f0 subcc $rounds,1,$rounds ! ldx [$tbl+$acc15],$acc15 bz,a,pn %icc,.Lenc_last add $tbl,2048,$rounds srlx $acc1,8,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+0],$s0 fmovs %f0,%f0 srlx $acc2,16,$acc2 ! xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+4],$s1 srlx $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+8],$s2 srlx $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+12],$s3 ! srlx $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 fmovs %f0,%f0 srlx $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc10,16,$acc10 ! xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc15,24,$acc15 ! xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 srl $t0,21,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 srl $t1,13,$acc1 xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 and $acc0,2040,$acc0 ! srl $t2,5,$acc2 and $acc1,2040,$acc1 ldx [$tbl+$acc0],$acc0 sll $t3,3,$acc3 and $acc2,2040,$acc2 ldx [$tbl+$acc1],$acc1 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t1,21,$acc4 ! and $acc3,2040,$acc3 ldx [$tbl+$acc2],$acc2 srl $t2,13,$acc5 and $acc4,2040,$acc4 ldx [$tbl+$acc3],$acc3 srl $t3,5,$acc6 and $acc5,2040,$acc5 ldx [$tbl+$acc4],$acc4 ! sll $t0,3,$acc7 and $acc6,2040,$acc6 ldx [$tbl+$acc5],$acc5 srl $t2,21,$acc8 and $acc7,2040,$acc7 ldx [$tbl+$acc6],$acc6 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t3,13,$acc9 ! and $acc8,2040,$acc8 ldx [$tbl+$acc7],$acc7 srl $t0,5,$acc10 and $acc9,2040,$acc9 ldx [$tbl+$acc8],$acc8 sll $t1,3,$acc11 and $acc10,2040,$acc10 ldx [$tbl+$acc9],$acc9 ! srl $t3,21,$acc12 and $acc11,2040,$acc11 ldx [$tbl+$acc10],$acc10 srl $t0,13,$acc13 and $acc12,2040,$acc12 ldx [$tbl+$acc11],$acc11 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t1,5,$acc14 ! and $acc13,2040,$acc13 ldx [$tbl+$acc12],$acc12 sll $t2,3,$acc15 and $acc14,2040,$acc14 ldx [$tbl+$acc13],$acc13 srlx $acc1,8,$acc1 and $acc15,2040,$acc15 ldx [$tbl+$acc14],$acc14 ! srlx $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc0,$s0,$s0 ldx [$tbl+$acc15],$acc15 srlx $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc1,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+16],$t0 fmovs %f0,%f0 srlx $acc5,8,$acc5 ! xor $acc2,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+20],$t1 srlx $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+24],$t2 srlx $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc4,$s1,$s1 ld [$key+28],$t3 ! srlx $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc5,$s1,$s1 ldx [$tbl+2048+0],%g0 ! prefetch te4 srlx $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc6,$s1,$s1 ldx [$tbl+2048+32],%g0 ! prefetch te4 srlx $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 ldx [$tbl+2048+64],%g0 ! prefetch te4 srlx $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc8,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+96],%g0 ! prefetch te4 srlx $acc14,16,$acc14 ! xor $acc9,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+128],%g0 ! prefetch te4 srlx $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc10,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+160],%g0 ! prefetch te4 srl $s0,21,$acc0 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+192],%g0 ! prefetch te4 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$s3,$s3 ldx [$tbl+2048+224],%g0 ! prefetch te4 srl $s1,13,$acc1 ! xor $acc14,$s3,$s3 xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 ba .Lenc_loop and $acc0,2040,$acc0 .align 32 .Lenc_last: srlx $acc1,8,$acc1 ! xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+0],$s0 srlx $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+4],$s1 srlx $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+8],$s2 ! srlx $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+12],$s3 srlx $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc9,8,$acc9 ! xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc14,16,$acc14 ! xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 srl $t0,24,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 srl $t1,16,$acc1 ! xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 srl $t2,8,$acc2 and $acc1,255,$acc1 ldub [$rounds+$acc0],$acc0 srl $t1,24,$acc4 and $acc2,255,$acc2 ldub [$rounds+$acc1],$acc1 srl $t2,16,$acc5 ! and $t3,255,$acc3 ldub [$rounds+$acc2],$acc2 ldub [$rounds+$acc3],$acc3 srl $t3,8,$acc6 and $acc5,255,$acc5 ldub [$rounds+$acc4],$acc4 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t2,24,$acc8 ! and $acc6,255,$acc6 ldub [$rounds+$acc5],$acc5 srl $t3,16,$acc9 and $t0,255,$acc7 ldub [$rounds+$acc6],$acc6 ldub [$rounds+$acc7],$acc7 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t0,8,$acc10 ! and $acc9,255,$acc9 ldub [$rounds+$acc8],$acc8 srl $t3,24,$acc12 and $acc10,255,$acc10 ldub [$rounds+$acc9],$acc9 srl $t0,16,$acc13 and $t1,255,$acc11 ldub [$rounds+$acc10],$acc10 ! srl $t1,8,$acc14 and $acc13,255,$acc13 ldub [$rounds+$acc11],$acc11 ldub [$rounds+$acc12],$acc12 and $acc14,255,$acc14 ldub [$rounds+$acc13],$acc13 and $t2,255,$acc15 ldub [$rounds+$acc14],$acc14 ! sll $acc0,24,$acc0 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 ldub [$rounds+$acc15],$acc15 sll $acc1,16,$acc1 xor $acc0,$s0,$s0 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%i7 ! restore return address fmovs %f0,%f0 sll $acc2,8,$acc2 ! xor $acc1,$s0,$s0 sll $acc4,24,$acc4 xor $acc2,$s0,$s0 sll $acc5,16,$acc5 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 sll $acc6,8,$acc6 xor $acc4,$s1,$s1 sll $acc8,24,$acc8 ! xor $acc5,$s1,$s1 sll $acc9,16,$acc9 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 sll $acc10,8,$acc10 xor $acc6,$s1,$s1 sll $acc12,24,$acc12 xor $acc8,$s2,$s2 sll $acc13,16,$acc13 ! xor $acc9,$s2,$s2 sll $acc14,8,$acc14 xor $acc10,$s2,$s2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$s3,$s3 xor $acc14,$s3,$s3 xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 ret restore .type _sparcv9_AES_encrypt,#function .size _sparcv9_AES_encrypt,(.-_sparcv9_AES_encrypt) .align 32 .globl AES_encrypt AES_encrypt: or %o0,%o1,%g1 andcc %g1,3,%g0 bnz,pn %xcc,.Lunaligned_enc save %sp,-$frame,%sp ld [%i0+0],%o0 ld [%i0+4],%o1 ld [%i0+8],%o2 ld [%i0+12],%o3 1: call .+8 add %o7,AES_Te-1b,%o4 call _sparcv9_AES_encrypt mov %i2,%o5 st %o0,[%i1+0] st %o1,[%i1+4] st %o2,[%i1+8] st %o3,[%i1+12] ret restore .align 32 .Lunaligned_enc: ldub [%i0+0],%l0 ldub [%i0+1],%l1 ldub [%i0+2],%l2 sll %l0,24,%l0 ldub [%i0+3],%l3 sll %l1,16,%l1 ldub [%i0+4],%l4 sll %l2,8,%l2 or %l1,%l0,%l0 ldub [%i0+5],%l5 sll %l4,24,%l4 or %l3,%l2,%l2 ldub [%i0+6],%l6 sll %l5,16,%l5 or %l0,%l2,%o0 ldub [%i0+7],%l7 sll %l6,8,%l6 or %l5,%l4,%l4 ldub [%i0+8],%l0 or %l7,%l6,%l6 ldub [%i0+9],%l1 or %l4,%l6,%o1 ldub [%i0+10],%l2 sll %l0,24,%l0 ldub [%i0+11],%l3 sll %l1,16,%l1 ldub [%i0+12],%l4 sll %l2,8,%l2 or %l1,%l0,%l0 ldub [%i0+13],%l5 sll %l4,24,%l4 or %l3,%l2,%l2 ldub [%i0+14],%l6 sll %l5,16,%l5 or %l0,%l2,%o2 ldub [%i0+15],%l7 sll %l6,8,%l6 or %l5,%l4,%l4 or %l7,%l6,%l6 or %l4,%l6,%o3 1: call .+8 add %o7,AES_Te-1b,%o4 call _sparcv9_AES_encrypt mov %i2,%o5 srl %o0,24,%l0 srl %o0,16,%l1 stb %l0,[%i1+0] srl %o0,8,%l2 stb %l1,[%i1+1] stb %l2,[%i1+2] srl %o1,24,%l4 stb %o0,[%i1+3] srl %o1,16,%l5 stb %l4,[%i1+4] srl %o1,8,%l6 stb %l5,[%i1+5] stb %l6,[%i1+6] srl %o2,24,%l0 stb %o1,[%i1+7] srl %o2,16,%l1 stb %l0,[%i1+8] srl %o2,8,%l2 stb %l1,[%i1+9] stb %l2,[%i1+10] srl %o3,24,%l4 stb %o2,[%i1+11] srl %o3,16,%l5 stb %l4,[%i1+12] srl %o3,8,%l6 stb %l5,[%i1+13] stb %l6,[%i1+14] stb %o3,[%i1+15] ret restore .type AES_encrypt,#function .size AES_encrypt,(.-AES_encrypt) ___ $code.=<<___; .align 256 AES_Td: ___ &_data_word( 0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96, 0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393, 0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25, 0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f, 0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1, 0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6, 0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da, 0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844, 0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd, 0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4, 0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45, 0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94, 0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7, 0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a, 0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5, 0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c, 0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1, 0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a, 0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75, 0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051, 0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46, 0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff, 0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77, 0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb, 0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000, 0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e, 0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927, 0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a, 0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e, 0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16, 0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d, 0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8, 0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd, 0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34, 0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163, 0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120, 0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d, 0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0, 0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422, 0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef, 0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36, 0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4, 0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662, 0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5, 0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3, 0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b, 0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8, 0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6, 0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6, 0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0, 0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815, 0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f, 0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df, 0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f, 0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e, 0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713, 0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89, 0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c, 0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf, 0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86, 0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f, 0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541, 0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190, 0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742); $code.=<<___; .byte 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 .byte 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb .byte 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 .byte 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb .byte 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d .byte 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e .byte 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 .byte 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 .byte 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 .byte 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 .byte 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda .byte 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 .byte 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a .byte 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 .byte 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 .byte 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b .byte 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea .byte 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 .byte 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 .byte 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e .byte 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 .byte 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b .byte 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 .byte 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 .byte 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 .byte 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f .byte 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d .byte 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef .byte 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 .byte 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 .byte 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 .byte 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d .type AES_Td,#object .size AES_Td,(.-AES_Td) .align 64 .skip 16 _sparcv9_AES_decrypt: save %sp,-$frame-$locals,%sp stx %i7,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] ! off-load return address ld [$key+240],$rounds ld [$key+0],$t0 ld [$key+4],$t1 ! ld [$key+8],$t2 ld [$key+12],$t3 srl $rounds,1,$rounds xor $t0,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+16],$t0 xor $t1,$s1,$s1 ld [$key+20],$t1 srl $s0,21,$acc0 ! xor $t2,$s2,$s2 ld [$key+24],$t2 xor $t3,$s3,$s3 and $acc0,2040,$acc0 ld [$key+28],$t3 srl $s3,13,$acc1 nop .Ldec_loop: srl $s2,5,$acc2 ! and $acc1,2040,$acc1 ldx [$tbl+$acc0],$acc0 sll $s1,3,$acc3 and $acc2,2040,$acc2 ldx [$tbl+$acc1],$acc1 srl $s1,21,$acc4 and $acc3,2040,$acc3 ldx [$tbl+$acc2],$acc2 ! srl $s0,13,$acc5 and $acc4,2040,$acc4 ldx [$tbl+$acc3],$acc3 srl $s3,5,$acc6 and $acc5,2040,$acc5 ldx [$tbl+$acc4],$acc4 fmovs %f0,%f0 sll $s2,3,$acc7 ! and $acc6,2040,$acc6 ldx [$tbl+$acc5],$acc5 srl $s2,21,$acc8 and $acc7,2040,$acc7 ldx [$tbl+$acc6],$acc6 srl $s1,13,$acc9 and $acc8,2040,$acc8 ldx [$tbl+$acc7],$acc7 ! srl $s0,5,$acc10 and $acc9,2040,$acc9 ldx [$tbl+$acc8],$acc8 sll $s3,3,$acc11 and $acc10,2040,$acc10 ldx [$tbl+$acc9],$acc9 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $s3,21,$acc12 ! and $acc11,2040,$acc11 ldx [$tbl+$acc10],$acc10 srl $s2,13,$acc13 and $acc12,2040,$acc12 ldx [$tbl+$acc11],$acc11 srl $s1,5,$acc14 and $acc13,2040,$acc13 ldx [$tbl+$acc12],$acc12 ! sll $s0,3,$acc15 and $acc14,2040,$acc14 ldx [$tbl+$acc13],$acc13 and $acc15,2040,$acc15 add $key,32,$key ldx [$tbl+$acc14],$acc14 fmovs %f0,%f0 subcc $rounds,1,$rounds ! ldx [$tbl+$acc15],$acc15 bz,a,pn %icc,.Ldec_last add $tbl,2048,$rounds srlx $acc1,8,$acc1 xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+0],$s0 fmovs %f0,%f0 srlx $acc2,16,$acc2 ! xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+4],$s1 srlx $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+8],$s2 srlx $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+12],$s3 ! srlx $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 fmovs %f0,%f0 srlx $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc10,16,$acc10 ! xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc14,16,$acc14 xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc15,24,$acc15 ! xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 srl $t0,21,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 srl $t3,13,$acc1 and $acc0,2040,$acc0 ! srl $t2,5,$acc2 and $acc1,2040,$acc1 ldx [$tbl+$acc0],$acc0 sll $t1,3,$acc3 and $acc2,2040,$acc2 ldx [$tbl+$acc1],$acc1 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t1,21,$acc4 ! and $acc3,2040,$acc3 ldx [$tbl+$acc2],$acc2 srl $t0,13,$acc5 and $acc4,2040,$acc4 ldx [$tbl+$acc3],$acc3 srl $t3,5,$acc6 and $acc5,2040,$acc5 ldx [$tbl+$acc4],$acc4 ! sll $t2,3,$acc7 and $acc6,2040,$acc6 ldx [$tbl+$acc5],$acc5 srl $t2,21,$acc8 and $acc7,2040,$acc7 ldx [$tbl+$acc6],$acc6 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t1,13,$acc9 ! and $acc8,2040,$acc8 ldx [$tbl+$acc7],$acc7 srl $t0,5,$acc10 and $acc9,2040,$acc9 ldx [$tbl+$acc8],$acc8 sll $t3,3,$acc11 and $acc10,2040,$acc10 ldx [$tbl+$acc9],$acc9 ! srl $t3,21,$acc12 and $acc11,2040,$acc11 ldx [$tbl+$acc10],$acc10 srl $t2,13,$acc13 and $acc12,2040,$acc12 ldx [$tbl+$acc11],$acc11 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t1,5,$acc14 ! and $acc13,2040,$acc13 ldx [$tbl+$acc12],$acc12 sll $t0,3,$acc15 and $acc14,2040,$acc14 ldx [$tbl+$acc13],$acc13 srlx $acc1,8,$acc1 and $acc15,2040,$acc15 ldx [$tbl+$acc14],$acc14 ! srlx $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc0,$s0,$s0 ldx [$tbl+$acc15],$acc15 srlx $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc1,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+16],$t0 fmovs %f0,%f0 srlx $acc5,8,$acc5 ! xor $acc2,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+20],$t1 srlx $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 ld [$key+24],$t2 srlx $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc4,$s1,$s1 ld [$key+28],$t3 ! srlx $acc9,8,$acc9 xor $acc5,$s1,$s1 ldx [$tbl+2048+0],%g0 ! prefetch td4 srlx $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc6,$s1,$s1 ldx [$tbl+2048+32],%g0 ! prefetch td4 srlx $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 ldx [$tbl+2048+64],%g0 ! prefetch td4 srlx $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc8,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+96],%g0 ! prefetch td4 srlx $acc14,16,$acc14 ! xor $acc9,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+128],%g0 ! prefetch td4 srlx $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc10,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+160],%g0 ! prefetch td4 srl $s0,21,$acc0 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 ldx [$tbl+2048+192],%g0 ! prefetch td4 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$s3,$s3 ldx [$tbl+2048+224],%g0 ! prefetch td4 and $acc0,2040,$acc0 ! xor $acc14,$s3,$s3 xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 ba .Ldec_loop srl $s3,13,$acc1 .align 32 .Ldec_last: srlx $acc1,8,$acc1 ! xor $acc0,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+0],$s0 srlx $acc2,16,$acc2 xor $acc1,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+4],$s1 srlx $acc3,24,$acc3 xor $acc2,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+8],$s2 ! srlx $acc5,8,$acc5 xor $acc3,$t0,$t0 ld [$key+12],$s3 srlx $acc6,16,$acc6 xor $acc4,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc7,24,$acc7 xor $acc5,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc9,8,$acc9 ! xor $acc6,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc10,16,$acc10 xor $acc7,$t1,$t1 srlx $acc11,24,$acc11 xor $acc8,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc13,8,$acc13 xor $acc9,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc14,16,$acc14 ! xor $acc10,$t2,$t2 srlx $acc15,24,$acc15 xor $acc11,$t2,$t2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$t3,$t3 srl $t0,24,$acc0 xor $acc14,$t3,$t3 xor $acc15,$t3,$t3 ! srl $t3,16,$acc1 srl $t2,8,$acc2 and $acc1,255,$acc1 ldub [$rounds+$acc0],$acc0 srl $t1,24,$acc4 and $acc2,255,$acc2 ldub [$rounds+$acc1],$acc1 srl $t0,16,$acc5 ! and $t1,255,$acc3 ldub [$rounds+$acc2],$acc2 ldub [$rounds+$acc3],$acc3 srl $t3,8,$acc6 and $acc5,255,$acc5 ldub [$rounds+$acc4],$acc4 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t2,24,$acc8 ! and $acc6,255,$acc6 ldub [$rounds+$acc5],$acc5 srl $t1,16,$acc9 and $t2,255,$acc7 ldub [$rounds+$acc6],$acc6 ldub [$rounds+$acc7],$acc7 fmovs %f0,%f0 srl $t0,8,$acc10 ! and $acc9,255,$acc9 ldub [$rounds+$acc8],$acc8 srl $t3,24,$acc12 and $acc10,255,$acc10 ldub [$rounds+$acc9],$acc9 srl $t2,16,$acc13 and $t3,255,$acc11 ldub [$rounds+$acc10],$acc10 ! srl $t1,8,$acc14 and $acc13,255,$acc13 ldub [$rounds+$acc11],$acc11 ldub [$rounds+$acc12],$acc12 and $acc14,255,$acc14 ldub [$rounds+$acc13],$acc13 and $t0,255,$acc15 ldub [$rounds+$acc14],$acc14 ! sll $acc0,24,$acc0 xor $acc3,$s0,$s0 ldub [$rounds+$acc15],$acc15 sll $acc1,16,$acc1 xor $acc0,$s0,$s0 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%i7 ! restore return address fmovs %f0,%f0 sll $acc2,8,$acc2 ! xor $acc1,$s0,$s0 sll $acc4,24,$acc4 xor $acc2,$s0,$s0 sll $acc5,16,$acc5 xor $acc7,$s1,$s1 sll $acc6,8,$acc6 xor $acc4,$s1,$s1 sll $acc8,24,$acc8 ! xor $acc5,$s1,$s1 sll $acc9,16,$acc9 xor $acc11,$s2,$s2 sll $acc10,8,$acc10 xor $acc6,$s1,$s1 sll $acc12,24,$acc12 xor $acc8,$s2,$s2 sll $acc13,16,$acc13 ! xor $acc9,$s2,$s2 sll $acc14,8,$acc14 xor $acc10,$s2,$s2 xor $acc12,$acc14,$acc14 xor $acc13,$s3,$s3 xor $acc14,$s3,$s3 xor $acc15,$s3,$s3 ret restore .type _sparcv9_AES_decrypt,#function .size _sparcv9_AES_decrypt,(.-_sparcv9_AES_decrypt) .align 32 .globl AES_decrypt AES_decrypt: or %o0,%o1,%g1 andcc %g1,3,%g0 bnz,pn %xcc,.Lunaligned_dec save %sp,-$frame,%sp ld [%i0+0],%o0 ld [%i0+4],%o1 ld [%i0+8],%o2 ld [%i0+12],%o3 1: call .+8 add %o7,AES_Td-1b,%o4 call _sparcv9_AES_decrypt mov %i2,%o5 st %o0,[%i1+0] st %o1,[%i1+4] st %o2,[%i1+8] st %o3,[%i1+12] ret restore .align 32 .Lunaligned_dec: ldub [%i0+0],%l0 ldub [%i0+1],%l1 ldub [%i0+2],%l2 sll %l0,24,%l0 ldub [%i0+3],%l3 sll %l1,16,%l1 ldub [%i0+4],%l4 sll %l2,8,%l2 or %l1,%l0,%l0 ldub [%i0+5],%l5 sll %l4,24,%l4 or %l3,%l2,%l2 ldub [%i0+6],%l6 sll %l5,16,%l5 or %l0,%l2,%o0 ldub [%i0+7],%l7 sll %l6,8,%l6 or %l5,%l4,%l4 ldub [%i0+8],%l0 or %l7,%l6,%l6 ldub [%i0+9],%l1 or %l4,%l6,%o1 ldub [%i0+10],%l2 sll %l0,24,%l0 ldub [%i0+11],%l3 sll %l1,16,%l1 ldub [%i0+12],%l4 sll %l2,8,%l2 or %l1,%l0,%l0 ldub [%i0+13],%l5 sll %l4,24,%l4 or %l3,%l2,%l2 ldub [%i0+14],%l6 sll %l5,16,%l5 or %l0,%l2,%o2 ldub [%i0+15],%l7 sll %l6,8,%l6 or %l5,%l4,%l4 or %l7,%l6,%l6 or %l4,%l6,%o3 1: call .+8 add %o7,AES_Td-1b,%o4 call _sparcv9_AES_decrypt mov %i2,%o5 srl %o0,24,%l0 srl %o0,16,%l1 stb %l0,[%i1+0] srl %o0,8,%l2 stb %l1,[%i1+1] stb %l2,[%i1+2] srl %o1,24,%l4 stb %o0,[%i1+3] srl %o1,16,%l5 stb %l4,[%i1+4] srl %o1,8,%l6 stb %l5,[%i1+5] stb %l6,[%i1+6] srl %o2,24,%l0 stb %o1,[%i1+7] srl %o2,16,%l1 stb %l0,[%i1+8] srl %o2,8,%l2 stb %l1,[%i1+9] stb %l2,[%i1+10] srl %o3,24,%l4 stb %o2,[%i1+11] srl %o3,16,%l5 stb %l4,[%i1+12] srl %o3,8,%l6 stb %l5,[%i1+13] stb %l6,[%i1+14] stb %o3,[%i1+15] ret restore .type AES_decrypt,#function .size AES_decrypt,(.-AES_decrypt) ___ # fmovs instructions substituting for FP nops were originally added # to meet specific instruction alignment requirements to maximize ILP. # As UltraSPARC T1, a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU, FP nops can have # undesired effect, so just omit them and sacrifice some portion of # percent in performance... $code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gm; print $code; close STDOUT; # ensure flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl0000755000000000000000000031307713176625656016375 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # Version 4.3. # # You might fail to appreciate this module performance from the first # try. If compared to "vanilla" linux-ia32-icc target, i.e. considered # to be *the* best Intel C compiler without -KPIC, performance appears # to be virtually identical... But try to re-configure with shared # library support... Aha! Intel compiler "suddenly" lags behind by 30% # [on P4, more on others]:-) And if compared to position-independent # code generated by GNU C, this code performs *more* than *twice* as # fast! Yes, all this buzz about PIC means that unlike other hand- # coded implementations, this one was explicitly designed to be safe # to use even in shared library context... This also means that this # code isn't necessarily absolutely fastest "ever," because in order # to achieve position independence an extra register has to be # off-loaded to stack, which affects the benchmark result. # # Special note about instruction choice. Do you recall RC4_INT code # performing poorly on P4? It might be the time to figure out why. # RC4_INT code implies effective address calculations in base+offset*4 # form. Trouble is that it seems that offset scaling turned to be # critical path... At least eliminating scaling resulted in 2.8x RC4 # performance improvement [as you might recall]. As AES code is hungry # for scaling too, I [try to] avoid the latter by favoring off-by-2 # shifts and masking the result with 0xFF<<2 instead of "boring" 0xFF. # # As was shown by Dean Gaudet , the above note turned # void. Performance improvement with off-by-2 shifts was observed on # intermediate implementation, which was spilling yet another register # to stack... Final offset*4 code below runs just a tad faster on P4, # but exhibits up to 10% improvement on other cores. # # Second version is "monolithic" replacement for aes_core.c, which in # addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key. # This made it possible to implement little-endian variant of the # algorithm without modifying the base C code. Motivating factor for # the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32 # register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher # Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15% # better performance on most recent µ-archs... # # Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in # up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was # observed on P4 core, where "overall" imrovement coefficient, i.e. if # compared to PIC generated by GCC and in CBC mode, was observed to be # as large as 4x:-) CBC performance is virtually identical to ECB now # and on some platforms even better, e.g. 17.6 "small" cycles/byte on # Opteron, because certain function prologues and epilogues are # effectively taken out of the loop... # # Version 3.2 implements compressed tables and prefetch of these tables # in CBC[!] mode. Former means that 3/4 of table references are now # misaligned, which unfortunately has negative impact on elder IA-32 # implementations, Pentium suffered 30% penalty, PIII - 10%. # # Version 3.3 avoids L1 cache aliasing between stack frame and # S-boxes, and 3.4 - L1 cache aliasing even between key schedule. The # latter is achieved by copying the key schedule to controlled place in # stack. This unfortunately has rather strong impact on small block CBC # performance, ~2x deterioration on 16-byte block if compared to 3.3. # # Version 3.5 checks if there is L1 cache aliasing between user-supplied # key schedule and S-boxes and abstains from copying the former if # there is no. This allows end-user to consciously retain small block # performance by aligning key schedule in specific manner. # # Version 3.6 compresses Td4 to 256 bytes and prefetches it in ECB. # # Current ECB performance numbers for 128-bit key in CPU cycles per # processed byte [measure commonly used by AES benchmarkers] are: # # small footprint fully unrolled # P4 24 22 # AMD K8 20 19 # PIII 25 23 # Pentium 81 78 # # Version 3.7 reimplements outer rounds as "compact." Meaning that # first and last rounds reference compact 256 bytes S-box. This means # that first round consumes a lot more CPU cycles and that encrypt # and decrypt performance becomes asymmetric. Encrypt performance # drops by 10-12%, while decrypt - by 20-25%:-( 256 bytes S-box is # aggressively pre-fetched. # # Version 4.0 effectively rolls back to 3.6 and instead implements # additional set of functions, _[x86|sse]_AES_[en|de]crypt_compact, # which use exclusively 256 byte S-box. These functions are to be # called in modes not concealing plain text, such as ECB, or when # we're asked to process smaller amount of data [or unconditionally # on hyper-threading CPU]. Currently it's called unconditionally from # AES_[en|de]crypt, which affects all modes, but CBC. CBC routine # still needs to be modified to switch between slower and faster # mode when appropriate... But in either case benchmark landscape # changes dramatically and below numbers are CPU cycles per processed # byte for 128-bit key. # # ECB encrypt ECB decrypt CBC large chunk # P4 52[54] 83[95] 23 # AMD K8 46[41] 66[70] 18 # PIII 41[50] 60[77] 24 # Core 2 31[36] 45[64] 18.5 # Atom 76[100] 96[138] 60 # Pentium 115 150 77 # # Version 4.1 switches to compact S-box even in key schedule setup. # # Version 4.2 prefetches compact S-box in every SSE round or in other # words every cache-line is *guaranteed* to be accessed within ~50 # cycles window. Why just SSE? Because it's needed on hyper-threading # CPU! Which is also why it's prefetched with 64 byte stride. Best # part is that it has no negative effect on performance:-) # # Version 4.3 implements switch between compact and non-compact block # functions in AES_cbc_encrypt depending on how much data was asked # to be processed in one stroke. # ###################################################################### # Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when # attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects # timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when # malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES, # instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data. # # As far as synchronous attacks go the root to the AES timing # vulnerability is twofold. Firstly, of 256 S-box elements at most 160 # are referred to in single 128-bit block operation. Well, in C # implementation with 4 distinct tables it's actually as little as 40 # references per 256 elements table, but anyway... Secondly, even # though S-box elements are clustered into smaller amount of cache- # lines, smaller than 160 and even 40, it turned out that for certain # plain-text pattern[s] or simply put chosen plain-text and given key # few cache-lines remain unaccessed during block operation. Now, if # attacker can figure out this access pattern, he can deduct the key # [or at least part of it]. The natural way to mitigate this kind of # attacks is to minimize the amount of cache-lines in S-box and/or # prefetch them to ensure that every one is accessed for more uniform # timing. But note that *if* plain-text was concealed in such way that # input to block function is distributed *uniformly*, then attack # wouldn't apply. Now note that some encryption modes, most notably # CBC, do mask the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output # is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that # would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of # candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key # combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised # AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk # of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of # 512 bytes is chosen to provide same [diminishigly low] probability # for cache-line to remain untouched in large chunk operation with # large S-box as for single block operation with compact S-box and # surely needs more careful consideration... # # As for asynchronous attacks. There are two flavours: attacker code # being interleaved with AES on hyper-threading CPU at *instruction* # level, and two processes time sharing single core. As for latter. # Two vectors. 1. Given that attacker process has higher priority, # yield execution to process performing AES just before timer fires # off the scheduler, immediately regain control of CPU and analyze the # cache state. For this attack to be efficient attacker would have to # effectively slow down the operation by several *orders* of magnitute, # by ratio of time slice to duration of handful of AES rounds, which # unlikely to remain unnoticed. Not to mention that this also means # that he would spend correspondigly more time to collect enough # statistical data to mount the attack. It's probably appropriate to # say that if adeversary reckons that this attack is beneficial and # risks to be noticed, you probably have larger problems having him # mere opportunity. In other words suggested code design expects you # to preclude/mitigate this attack by overall system security design. # 2. Attacker manages to make his code interrupt driven. In order for # this kind of attack to be feasible, interrupt rate has to be high # enough, again comparable to duration of handful of AES rounds. But # is there interrupt source of such rate? Hardly, not even 1Gbps NIC # generates interrupts at such raging rate... # # And now back to the former, hyper-threading CPU or more specifically # Intel P4. Recall that asynchronous attack implies that malicious # code instruments itself. And naturally instrumentation granularity # has be noticeably lower than duration of codepath accessing S-box. # Given that all cache-lines are accessed during that time that is. # Current implementation accesses *all* cache-lines within ~50 cycles # window, which is actually *less* than RDTSC latency on Intel P4! $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open OUT,">$output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"aes-586.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); &static_label("AES_Te"); &static_label("AES_Td"); $s0="eax"; $s1="ebx"; $s2="ecx"; $s3="edx"; $key="edi"; $acc="esi"; $tbl="ebp"; # stack frame layout in _[x86|sse]_AES_* routines, frame is allocated # by caller $__ra=&DWP(0,"esp"); # return address $__s0=&DWP(4,"esp"); # s0 backing store $__s1=&DWP(8,"esp"); # s1 backing store $__s2=&DWP(12,"esp"); # s2 backing store $__s3=&DWP(16,"esp"); # s3 backing store $__key=&DWP(20,"esp"); # pointer to key schedule $__end=&DWP(24,"esp"); # pointer to end of key schedule $__tbl=&DWP(28,"esp"); # %ebp backing store # stack frame layout in AES_[en|crypt] routines, which differs from # above by 4 and overlaps by %ebp backing store $_tbl=&DWP(24,"esp"); $_esp=&DWP(28,"esp"); sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } } $speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are # processed with compact routine in CBC mode $small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on # recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller! # I favor compact code to minimize cache # contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back # in real-life applications... $vertical_spin=0; # shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of # its proof-of-concept status... # Note that there is no decvert(), as well as last encryption round is # performed with "horizontal" shifts. This is because this "vertical" # implementation [one which groups shifts on a given $s[i] to form a # "column," unlike "horizontal" one, which groups shifts on different # $s[i] to form a "row"] is work in progress. It was observed to run # few percents faster on Intel cores, but not AMD. On AMD K8 core it's # whole 12% slower:-( So we face a trade-off... Shall it be resolved # some day? Till then the code is considered experimental and by # default remains dormant... sub encvert() { my ($te,@s) = @_; my ($v0,$v1) = ($acc,$key); &mov ($v0,$s[3]); # copy s3 &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$s[2]); # save s2 &mov ($v1,$s[0]); # copy s0 &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s[1]); # save s1 &movz ($s[2],&HB($s[0])); &and ($s[0],0xFF); &mov ($s[0],&DWP(0,$te,$s[0],8)); # s0>>0 &shr ($v1,16); &mov ($s[3],&DWP(3,$te,$s[2],8)); # s0>>8 &movz ($s[1],&HB($v1)); &and ($v1,0xFF); &mov ($s[2],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s0>>16 &mov ($v1,$v0); &mov ($s[1],&DWP(1,$te,$s[1],8)); # s0>>24 &and ($v0,0xFF); &xor ($s[3],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>0 &movz ($v0,&HB($v1)); &shr ($v1,16); &xor ($s[2],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>8 &movz ($v0,&HB($v1)); &and ($v1,0xFF); &xor ($s[1],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s3>>16 &mov ($v1,&DWP(4,"esp")); # restore s2 &xor ($s[0],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>24 &mov ($v0,$v1); &and ($v1,0xFF); &xor ($s[2],&DWP(0,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>0 &movz ($v1,&HB($v0)); &shr ($v0,16); &xor ($s[1],&DWP(3,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>8 &movz ($v1,&HB($v0)); &and ($v0,0xFF); &xor ($s[0],&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # s2>>16 &mov ($v0,&DWP(8,"esp")); # restore s1 &xor ($s[3],&DWP(1,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>24 &mov ($v1,$v0); &and ($v0,0xFF); &xor ($s[1],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>0 &movz ($v0,&HB($v1)); &shr ($v1,16); &xor ($s[0],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>8 &movz ($v0,&HB($v1)); &and ($v1,0xFF); &xor ($s[3],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s1>>16 &mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v1 as key &xor ($s[2],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>24 } # Another experimental routine, which features "horizontal spin," but # eliminates one reference to stack. Strangely enough runs slower... sub enchoriz() { my ($v0,$v1) = ($key,$acc); &movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 3, 2, 1, 0* &rotr ($s2,8); # 8,11,10, 9 &mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 0 &movz ($v0,&HB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5*, 4 &rotr ($s3,16); # 13,12,15,14 &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 5 &movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # 8,11,10*, 9 &rotr ($s0,16); # 1, 0, 3, 2 &xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 10 &movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12,15*,14 &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 15, t[0] collected &mov ($__s0,$v1); # t[0] saved &movz ($v0,&LB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5, 4* &shr ($s1,16); # -, -, 7, 6 &mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 4 &movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12,15,14* &xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 14 &movz ($v0,&HB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3*, 2 &and ($s3,0xffff0000); # 13,12, -, - &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 3 &movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # 8,11,10, 9* &or ($s3,$s1); # 13,12, 7, 6 &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 9, t[1] collected &mov ($s1,$v1); # s[1]=t[1] &movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3, 2* &shr ($s2,16); # -, -, 8,11 &mov ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 2 &movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12, 7*, 6 &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 7 &movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # -, -, 8*,11 &xor ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 8 &mov ($v0,$s3); &shr ($v0,24); # 13 &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 13, t[2] collected &movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # -, -, 8,11* &shr ($s0,24); # 1* &mov ($s2,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 11 &xor ($s2,&DWP(3,$te,$s0,8)); # 1 &mov ($s0,$__s0); # s[0]=t[0] &movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12, 7, 6* &shr ($s3,16); # , ,13,12 &xor ($s2,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 6 &mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v0 as key &and ($s3,0xff); # , ,13,12* &mov ($s3,&DWP(0,$te,$s3,8)); # 12 &xor ($s3,$s2); # s[2]=t[3] collected &mov ($s2,$v1); # s[2]=t[2] } # More experimental code... SSE one... Even though this one eliminates # *all* references to stack, it's not faster... sub sse_encbody() { &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0 &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 0 &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2 &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1 &mov ("edx",&DWP(3,$tbl,"edx",8)); # 1 &shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4 &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 10 &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8 &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11 &xor ("edx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 11 &shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14 &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 5 &movq ("mm3",QWP(16,$key)); &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 15 &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4 &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 4 &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2 &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 14 &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8 &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 3 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 3 &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 9 &movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2 &mov ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 2 &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6 &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 8 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 8 &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12 &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 7 &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &movz ("eax",&LB("eax")); # 6 &xor ("edx",&DWP(2,$tbl,"eax",8)); # 6 &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0 &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 13 &xor ("ecx",&DWP(24,$key)); # t[2] &movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected &movz ("ebx",&LB("ebx")); # 12 &xor ("edx",&DWP(0,$tbl,"ebx",8)); # 12 &shr ("ecx",16); &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0 &mov ("ebx",&DWP(28,$key)); # t[3] &xor ("ebx","edx"); &movd ("mm5","ebx"); # t[3] collected &and ("ebx",0xffff0000); &or ("ebx","ecx"); &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected } ###################################################################### # "Compact" block function ###################################################################### sub enccompact() { my $Fn = \&mov; while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; } my ($i,$te,@s)=@_; my $tmp = $key; my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc; # $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to # void restoration of some values from stack, so that after # 4xenccompact with extra argument $key value is left there... if ($i==3) { &$Fn ($key,$__key); }##%edx else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); } &and ($out,0xFF); if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1] if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2] &movz ($out,&BP(-128,$te,$out,1)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1])); &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,8); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]); &shr ($tmp,16); } if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2] &and ($tmp,0xFF); &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,16); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2] else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); &shr ($tmp,24); } &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,24); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); } if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); } &comment(); } sub enctransform() { my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); my $i = shift; my $tmp = $tbl; my $r2 = $key ; &and ($tmp,$s[$i]); &lea ($r2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i])); &mov ($acc,$tmp); &shr ($tmp,7); &and ($r2,0xfefefefe); &sub ($acc,$tmp); &mov ($tmp,$s[$i]); &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b); &rotr ($tmp,16); &xor ($acc,$r2); # r2 &mov ($r2,$s[$i]); &xor ($s[$i],$acc); # r0 ^ r2 &rotr ($r2,16+8); &xor ($acc,$tmp); &rotl ($s[$i],24); &xor ($acc,$r2); &mov ($tmp,0x80808080) if ($i!=1); &xor ($s[$i],$acc); # ROTATE(r2^r0,24) ^ r2 } &function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact"); # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me! &mov ($__key,$key); # save key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc)); &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8)); &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule # prefetch Te4 &mov ($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl)); &mov ($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl)); &mov ($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl)); &mov ($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl)); &set_label("loop",16); &enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,1); &enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0,1); &enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1,1); &enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2,1); &mov ($tbl,0x80808080); &enctransform(2); &enctransform(3); &enctransform(0); &enctransform(1); &mov ($key,$__key); &mov ($tbl,$__tbl); &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &cmp ($key,$__end); &mov ($__key,$key); &jb (&label("loop")); &enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); &xor ($s0,&DWP(16,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(20,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(24,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(28,$key)); &ret (); &function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact"); ###################################################################### # "Compact" SSE block function. ###################################################################### # # Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure # x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same. # Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer # µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50% # better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code # eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/ # minimizes the pressure on the memory bus. # # MMX register layout lsb # +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ # | mm4 | mm0 | # +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ # | s3 | s2 | s1 | s0 | # +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ # |15|14|13|12|11|10| 9| 8| 7| 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1| 0| # +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ # # Indexes translate as s[N/4]>>(8*(N%4)), e.g. 5 means s1>>8. # In this terms encryption and decryption "compact" permutation # matrices can be depicted as following: # # encryption lsb # decryption lsb # +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+ # | t0 || 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 | # | t0 || 7 | 10 | 13 | 0 | # +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+ # | t1 || 3 | 14 | 9 | 4 | # | t1 || 11 | 14 | 1 | 4 | # +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+ # | t2 || 7 | 2 | 13 | 8 | # | t2 || 15 | 2 | 5 | 8 | # +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+ # | t3 || 11 | 6 | 1 | 12 | # | t3 || 3 | 6 | 9 | 12 | # +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+ # ###################################################################### # Why not xmm registers? Short answer. It was actually tested and # was not any faster, but *contrary*, most notably on Intel CPUs. # Longer answer. Main advantage of using mm registers is that movd # latency is lower, especially on Intel P4. While arithmetic # instructions are twice as many, they can be scheduled every cycle # and not every second one when they are operating on xmm register, # so that "arithmetic throughput" remains virtually the same. And # finally the code can be executed even on elder SSE-only CPUs:-) sub sse_enccompact() { &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0 &pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x0d); # 15,14,11,10 &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0 &movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 15,14,11,10 &mov ($__key,$key); &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0 &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1 &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2 &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0 &movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 10 &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1 &shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4 &shl ("edx",8); # 1 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 10 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 11 &shl ($acc,16); # 10 &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 10 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 11 &movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 5 &shl ($acc,24); # 11 &shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14 &or ("edx",$acc); # 11 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 5 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 15 &shl ($acc,8); # 5 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 5 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 15 &movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 4 &shl ($acc,24); # 15 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 15 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 4 &movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 14 &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2 &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 14 &movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 3 &shl ("ecx",16); # 14 &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 14 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 3 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 9 &shl ($acc,24); # 3 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 3 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 9 &movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 8 &shl ($acc,8); # 9 &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 9 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 8 &movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 2 &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6 &movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 2 &movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 7 &shl ("ecx",16); # 2 &and ("eax",0xff); # 6 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 2 &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 7 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 13 &shl ($acc,24); # 7 &and ("ebx",0xff); # 12 &movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 6 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 7 &shl ("eax",16); # 6 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 13 &or ("edx","eax"); # 6 &shl ($acc,8); # 13 &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 12 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 13 &or ("edx","ebx"); # 12 &mov ($key,$__key); &movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected &movd ("mm5","edx"); # t[3] collected &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected } if (!$x86only) { &function_begin_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact"); &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); # 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8 # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me! &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc)); &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8)); &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule &mov ($s0,0x1b1b1b1b); # magic constant &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0); # prefetch Te4 &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl)); &set_label("loop",16); &sse_enccompact(); &add ($key,16); &cmp ($key,$__end); &ja (&label("out")); &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp")); &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7"); &movq ("mm1","mm0"); &movq ("mm5","mm4"); # r0 &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm0"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm4"); &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2"); &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0xb1);# ROTATE(r0,16) &paddb ("mm0","mm0"); &paddb ("mm4","mm4"); &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # = r2 &pshufw ("mm3","mm2",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm7","mm6",0xb1);# r0 &pxor ("mm1","mm0"); &pxor ("mm5","mm4"); # r0^r2 &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= ROTATE(r0,16) &movq ("mm2","mm3"); &movq ("mm6","mm7"); &pslld ("mm3",8); &pslld ("mm7",8); &psrld ("mm2",24); &psrld ("mm6",24); &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= r0<<8 &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= r0>>24 &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5"); &movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$key)); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8,$key)); &psrld ("mm1",8); &psrld ("mm5",8); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl)); &pslld ("mm3",24); &pslld ("mm7",24); &mov ($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl)); &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= (r2^r0)<<8 &mov ($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl)); &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= (r2^r0)>>24 &mov ($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl)); &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("out",16); &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); &ret (); &function_end_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact"); } ###################################################################### # Vanilla block function. ###################################################################### sub encstep() { my ($i,$te,@s) = @_; my $tmp = $key; my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc; # lines marked with #%e?x[i] denote "reordered" instructions... if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); &and ($out,0xFF); } if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1] if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2] &mov ($out,&DWP(0,$te,$out,8)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1])); &xor ($out,&DWP(3,$te,$tmp,8)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]); &shr ($tmp,16); } if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2] &and ($tmp,0xFF); &xor ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2] else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); &shr ($tmp,24) } &xor ($out,&DWP(1,$te,$tmp,8)); if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); } if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); } &comment(); } sub enclast() { my ($i,$te,@s)=@_; my $tmp = $key; my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc; if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); } &and ($out,0xFF); if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1] if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2] &mov ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$out,8)); &and ($out,0x000000ff); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1])); &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8)); &and ($tmp,0x0000ff00); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]); &shr ($tmp,16); } if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2] &and ($tmp,0xFF); &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8)); &and ($tmp,0x00ff0000); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2] else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); &shr ($tmp,24); } &mov ($tmp,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8)); &and ($tmp,0xff000000); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); } if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); } } &function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt"); if ($vertical_spin) { # I need high parts of volatile registers to be accessible... &exch ($s1="edi",$key="ebx"); &mov ($s2="esi",$acc="ecx"); } # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me! &mov ($__key,$key); # save key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds if ($small_footprint) { &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc)); &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8)); &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule &set_label("loop",16); if ($vertical_spin) { &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); } else { &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); } &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &cmp ($key,$__end); &mov ($__key,$key); &jb (&label("loop")); } else { &cmp ($acc,10); &jle (&label("10rounds")); &cmp ($acc,12); &jle (&label("12rounds")); &set_label("14rounds",4); for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) { if ($vertical_spin) { &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); } else { &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); } &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key)); } &add ($key,32); &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key &set_label("12rounds",4); for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) { if ($vertical_spin) { &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); } else { &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); } &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key)); } &add ($key,32); &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key &set_label("10rounds",4); for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) { if ($vertical_spin) { &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); } else { &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); } &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key)); } } if ($vertical_spin) { # "reincarnate" some registers for "horizontal" spin... &mov ($s1="ebx",$key="edi"); &mov ($s2="ecx",$acc="esi"); } &enclast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &enclast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &enclast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &enclast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); &add ($key,$small_footprint?16:160); &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &ret (); &set_label("AES_Te",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment! &_data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6); &_data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591); &_data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56); &_data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec); &_data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa); &_data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb); &_data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45); &_data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b); &_data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c); &_data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83); &_data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9); &_data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a); &_data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d); &_data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f); &_data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df); &_data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea); &_data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34); &_data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b); &_data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d); &_data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413); &_data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1); &_data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6); &_data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972); &_data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85); &_data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed); &_data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511); &_data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe); &_data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b); &_data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05); &_data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1); &_data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142); &_data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf); &_data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3); &_data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e); &_data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a); &_data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6); &_data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3); &_data_word(0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54, 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b); &_data_word(0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428); &_data_word(0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad); &_data_word(0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264, 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14); &_data_word(0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8); &_data_word(0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4); &_data_word(0xa8919139, 0xa4959531, 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2); &_data_word(0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda); &_data_word(0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949); &_data_word(0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac, 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf); &_data_word(0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810); &_data_word(0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c); &_data_word(0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657, 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697); &_data_word(0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e); &_data_word(0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f); &_data_word(0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c, 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc); &_data_word(0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c); &_data_word(0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969); &_data_word(0x91868617, 0x58c1c199, 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27); &_data_word(0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122); &_data_word(0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433); &_data_word(0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c, 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9); &_data_word(0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5); &_data_word(0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a); &_data_word(0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7, 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0); &_data_word(0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e); &_data_word(0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c); #Te4 # four copies of Te4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5); &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76); &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0); &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0); &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc); &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15); &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a); &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75); &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0); &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84); &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b); &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf); &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85); &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8); &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5); &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2); &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17); &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73); &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88); &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb); &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c); &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79); &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08); &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6); &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a); &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e); &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e); &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94); &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf); &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68); &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16); #rcon: &data_word(0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008); &data_word(0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080); &data_word(0x0000001b, 0x00000036, 0x00000000, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000); &function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt"); # void AES_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); &function_begin("AES_encrypt"); &mov ($acc,&wparam(0)); # load inp &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key &mov ($s0,"esp"); &sub ("esp",36); &and ("esp",-64); # align to cache-line # place stack frame just "above" the key schedule &lea ($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key)); &sub ($s1,"esp"); &neg ($s1); &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ("esp",$s1); &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for caller's return address &mov ($_esp,$s0); # save stack pointer &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tbl); &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if (!$x86only); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl)); # pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule &lea ($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp")); &sub ($s1,$tbl); &and ($s1,0x300); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1)); if (!$x86only) { &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),25); # check for SSE bit &jnc (&label("x86")); &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc)); &call ("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # write output data &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4"); &emms (); &function_end_A(); } &set_label("x86",16); &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # load input data &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output data &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &function_end("AES_encrypt"); #--------------------------------------------------------------------# ###################################################################### # "Compact" block function ###################################################################### sub deccompact() { my $Fn = \&mov; while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; } my ($i,$td,@s)=@_; my $tmp = $key; my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc; # $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to # void restoration of some values from stack, so that after # 4xdeccompact with extra argument $key, $s0 and $s1 values # are left there... if($i==3) { &$Fn ($key,$__key); } else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); } &and ($out,0xFF); &movz ($out,&BP(-128,$td,$out,1)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; } &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1])); &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,8); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); } else { mov ($tmp,$s[2]); } &shr ($tmp,16); &and ($tmp,0xFF); &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,16); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &$Fn ($s[2],$__s1); } else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); } &shr ($tmp,24); &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,24); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); } if ($i==3) { &$Fn ($s[3],$__s0); } } # must be called with 2,3,0,1 as argument sequence!!! sub dectransform() { my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); my $i = shift; my $tmp = $key; my $tp2 = @s[($i+2)%4]; $tp2 = @s[2] if ($i==1); my $tp4 = @s[($i+3)%4]; $tp4 = @s[3] if ($i==1); my $tp8 = $tbl; &mov ($tmp,0x80808080); &and ($tmp,$s[$i]); &mov ($acc,$tmp); &shr ($tmp,7); &lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i])); &sub ($acc,$tmp); &and ($tp2,0xfefefefe); &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b); &xor ($tp2,$acc); &mov ($tmp,0x80808080); &and ($tmp,$tp2); &mov ($acc,$tmp); &shr ($tmp,7); &lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2)); &sub ($acc,$tmp); &and ($tp4,0xfefefefe); &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b); &xor ($tp2,$s[$i]); # tp2^tp1 &xor ($tp4,$acc); &mov ($tmp,0x80808080); &and ($tmp,$tp4); &mov ($acc,$tmp); &shr ($tmp,7); &lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4)); &sub ($acc,$tmp); &and ($tp8,0xfefefefe); &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b); &xor ($tp4,$s[$i]); # tp4^tp1 &rotl ($s[$i],8); # = ROTATE(tp1,8) &xor ($tp8,$acc); &xor ($s[$i],$tp2); &xor ($tp2,$tp8); &xor ($s[$i],$tp4); &xor ($tp4,$tp8); &rotl ($tp2,24); &xor ($s[$i],$tp8); # ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1) &rotl ($tp4,16); &xor ($s[$i],$tp2); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24) &rotl ($tp8,8); &xor ($s[$i],$tp4); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16) &mov ($s[0],$__s0) if($i==2); #prefetch $s0 &mov ($s[1],$__s1) if($i==3); #prefetch $s1 &mov ($s[2],$__s2) if($i==1); &xor ($s[$i],$tp8); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,8) &mov ($s[3],$__s3) if($i==1); &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$s[$i]) if($i>=2); } &function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact"); # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me! &mov ($__key,$key); # save key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc)); &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8)); &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule # prefetch Td4 &mov ($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl)); &mov ($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl)); &mov ($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl)); &mov ($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl)); &set_label("loop",16); &deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1,1); &deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2,1); &deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3,1); &deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0,1); &dectransform(2); &dectransform(3); &dectransform(0); &dectransform(1); &mov ($key,$__key); &mov ($tbl,$__tbl); &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &cmp ($key,$__end); &mov ($__key,$key); &jb (&label("loop")); &deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); &xor ($s0,&DWP(16,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(20,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(24,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(28,$key)); &ret (); &function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact"); ###################################################################### # "Compact" SSE block function. ###################################################################### sub sse_deccompact() { &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x0c); # 7, 6, 1, 0 &pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x09); # 13,12,11,10 &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 7, 6, 1, 0 &movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 13,12,11,10 &mov ($__key,$key); &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0 &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1 &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x06); # 3, 2, 5, 4 &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0 &movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 10 &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1 &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6 &shl ("edx",8); # 1 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 10 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 11 &shl ($acc,16); # 10 &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x03); # 9, 8,15,14 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 10 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 11 &movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 7 &shl ($acc,24); # 11 &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12 &or ("edx",$acc); # 11 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 7 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 13 &shl ($acc,24); # 7 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 7 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 13 &movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 6 &shl ($acc,8); # 13 &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 3, 2, 5, 4 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 13 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 6 &movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 12 &shl ($acc,16); # 6 &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 9, 8,15,14 &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 12 &movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 4 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 12 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 4 &movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 14 &or ("edx",$acc); # 4 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 14 &movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 5 &shl ($acc,16); # 14 &shr ("eax",16); # 3, 2 &or ("edx",$acc); # 14 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 5 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 15 &shr ("ebx",16); # 9, 8 &shl ($acc,8); # 5 &movd ("mm1","edx"); # t[1] collected &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 15 &movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 9 &shl ("edx",24); # 15 &and ("ebx",0xff); # 8 &or ("edx",$acc); # 15 &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 9 &movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 2 &shl ($acc,8); # 9 &movz ("eax",&HB("eax")); # 3 &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 8 &or ("ecx",$acc); # 9 &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 2 &or ("edx","ebx"); # 8 &shl ($acc,16); # 2 &movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 3 &or ("edx",$acc); # 2 &shl ("eax",24); # 3 &or ("ecx","eax"); # 3 &mov ($key,$__key); &movd ("mm4","edx"); # t[2] collected &movd ("mm5","ecx"); # t[3] collected &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected } if (!$x86only) { &function_begin_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact"); &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); # 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8 # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me! &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc)); &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8)); &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule &mov ($s0,0x1b1b1b1b); # magic constant &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0); # prefetch Td4 &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl)); &set_label("loop",16); &sse_deccompact(); &add ($key,16); &cmp ($key,$__end); &ja (&label("out")); # ROTATE(x^y,N) == ROTATE(x,N)^ROTATE(y,N) &movq ("mm3","mm0"); &movq ("mm7","mm4"); &movq ("mm2","mm0",1); &movq ("mm6","mm4",1); &movq ("mm1","mm0"); &movq ("mm5","mm4"); &pshufw ("mm0","mm0",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm4","mm4",0xb1);# = ROTATE(tp0,16) &pslld ("mm2",8); &pslld ("mm6",8); &psrld ("mm3",8); &psrld ("mm7",8); &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp0<<8 &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp0>>8 &pslld ("mm2",16); &pslld ("mm6",16); &psrld ("mm3",16); &psrld ("mm7",16); &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp0<<24 &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp0>>24 &movq ("mm3",&QWP(8,"esp")); &pxor ("mm2","mm2"); &pxor ("mm6","mm6"); &pcmpgtb("mm2","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm6","mm5"); &pand ("mm2","mm3"); &pand ("mm6","mm3"); &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5"); &pxor ("mm1","mm2"); &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # tp2 &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5"); &movq ("mm2","mm1"); &movq ("mm6","mm5"); &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp2 &pslld ("mm3",24); &pslld ("mm7",24); &psrld ("mm2",8); &psrld ("mm6",8); &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp2<<24 &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp2>>8 &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp")); &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7"); &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5"); &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2"); &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5"); &pxor ("mm1","mm3"); &pxor ("mm5","mm7"); # tp4 &pshufw ("mm3","mm1",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm7","mm5",0xb1); &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp4 &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= ROTATE(tp4,16) &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7"); &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5"); &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2"); &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5"); &pxor ("mm1","mm3"); &pxor ("mm5","mm7"); # tp8 &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8 &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5"); &pshufw ("mm2","mm1",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm6","mm5",0xb1); &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,16) &pslld ("mm1",8); &pslld ("mm5",8); &psrld ("mm3",8); &psrld ("mm7",8); &movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$key)); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8,$key)); &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8<<8 &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp8>>8 &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl)); &pslld ("mm1",16); &pslld ("mm5",16); &mov ($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl)); &psrld ("mm3",16); &psrld ("mm7",16); &mov ($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl)); &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8<<24 &mov ($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl)); &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp8>>24 &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("out",16); &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); &ret (); &function_end_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact"); } ###################################################################### # Vanilla block function. ###################################################################### sub decstep() { my ($i,$td,@s) = @_; my $tmp = $key; my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc; # no instructions are reordered, as performance appears # optimal... or rather that all attempts to reorder didn't # result in better performance [which by the way is not a # bit lower than ecryption]. if($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); } else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); } &and ($out,0xFF); &mov ($out,&DWP(0,$td,$out,8)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; } &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1])); &xor ($out,&DWP(3,$td,$tmp,8)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); } else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]); } &shr ($tmp,16); &and ($tmp,0xFF); &xor ($out,&DWP(2,$td,$tmp,8)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); } else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); } &shr ($tmp,24); &xor ($out,&DWP(1,$td,$tmp,8)); if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); } if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$__s0); } &comment(); } sub declast() { my ($i,$td,@s)=@_; my $tmp = $key; my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc; if($i==0) { &lea ($td,&DWP(2048+128,$td)); &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0-128,$td)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$td)); &mov ($tmp,&DWP(64-128,$td)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$td)); &mov ($tmp,&DWP(128-128,$td)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$td)); &mov ($tmp,&DWP(192-128,$td)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$td)); &lea ($td,&DWP(-128,$td)); } if($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); } else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); } &and ($out,0xFF); &movz ($out,&BP(0,$td,$out,1)); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; } &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1])); &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,8); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); } else { mov ($tmp,$s[2]); } &shr ($tmp,16); &and ($tmp,0xFF); &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,16); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); } else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); } &shr ($tmp,24); &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1)); &shl ($tmp,24); &xor ($out,$tmp); if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); } if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$__s0); &lea ($td,&DWP(-2048,$td)); } } &function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt"); # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me! &mov ($__key,$key); # save key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds if ($small_footprint) { &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc)); &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8)); &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule &set_label("loop",16); &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &cmp ($key,$__end); &mov ($__key,$key); &jb (&label("loop")); } else { &cmp ($acc,10); &jle (&label("10rounds")); &cmp ($acc,12); &jle (&label("12rounds")); &set_label("14rounds",4); for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) { &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key)); } &add ($key,32); &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key &set_label("12rounds",4); for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) { &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key)); } &add ($key,32); &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key &set_label("10rounds",4); for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) { &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key)); } } &declast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1); &declast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2); &declast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3); &declast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0); &add ($key,$small_footprint?16:160); &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &ret (); &set_label("AES_Td",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment! &_data_word(0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a); &_data_word(0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f, 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b); &_data_word(0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5); &_data_word(0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5); &_data_word(0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25, 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d); &_data_word(0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b); &_data_word(0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295); &_data_word(0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458, 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e); &_data_word(0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927); &_data_word(0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d); &_data_word(0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5, 0x60335197, 0x457f5362); &_data_word(0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9); &_data_word(0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52); &_data_word(0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72, 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566); &_data_word(0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3); &_data_word(0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed); &_data_word(0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7, 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e); &_data_word(0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4); &_data_word(0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4); &_data_word(0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040, 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd); &_data_word(0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d); &_data_word(0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060); &_data_word(0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6, 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967); &_data_word(0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879); &_data_word(0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000); &_data_word(0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32, 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c); &_data_word(0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36); &_data_word(0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624); &_data_word(0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793, 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b); &_data_word(0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c); &_data_word(0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12); &_data_word(0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2, 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14); &_data_word(0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3); &_data_word(0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b); &_data_word(0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb, 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8); &_data_word(0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684); &_data_word(0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7); &_data_word(0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc, 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177); &_data_word(0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947); &_data_word(0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322); &_data_word(0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9, 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498); &_data_word(0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f); &_data_word(0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54); &_data_word(0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890, 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382); &_data_word(0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf); &_data_word(0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb); &_data_word(0x097826cd, 0xf418596e, 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83); &_data_word(0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef); &_data_word(0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029); &_data_word(0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a, 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235); &_data_word(0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733); &_data_word(0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117); &_data_word(0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43, 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4); &_data_word(0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546); &_data_word(0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb); &_data_word(0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92, 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d); &_data_word(0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb); &_data_word(0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a); &_data_word(0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255, 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773); &_data_word(0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478); &_data_word(0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2); &_data_word(0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc, 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff); &_data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664); &_data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0); #Td4: # four copies of Td4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38); &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb); &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87); &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb); &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d); &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e); &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2); &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25); &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16); &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92); &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda); &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84); &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a); &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06); &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02); &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b); &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea); &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73); &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85); &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e); &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89); &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b); &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20); &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4); &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31); &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f); &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d); &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef); &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0); &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61); &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26); &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d); &function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt"); # void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); &function_begin("AES_decrypt"); &mov ($acc,&wparam(0)); # load inp &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key &mov ($s0,"esp"); &sub ("esp",36); &and ("esp",-64); # align to cache-line # place stack frame just "above" the key schedule &lea ($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key)); &sub ($s1,"esp"); &neg ($s1); &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ("esp",$s1); &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for caller's return address &mov ($_esp,$s0); # save stack pointer &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tbl); &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl)); # pick Td4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule &lea ($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp")); &sub ($s1,$tbl); &and ($s1,0x300); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1)); if (!$x86only) { &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),25); # check for SSE bit &jnc (&label("x86")); &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc)); &call ("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # write output data &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4"); &emms (); &function_end_A(); } &set_label("x86",16); &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # load input data &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output data &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &function_end("AES_decrypt"); # void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); { # stack frame layout # -4(%esp) # return address 0(%esp) # 0(%esp) # s0 backing store 4(%esp) # 4(%esp) # s1 backing store 8(%esp) # 8(%esp) # s2 backing store 12(%esp) # 12(%esp) # s3 backing store 16(%esp) # 16(%esp) # key backup 20(%esp) # 20(%esp) # end of key schedule 24(%esp) # 24(%esp) # %ebp backup 28(%esp) # 28(%esp) # %esp backup my $_inp=&DWP(32,"esp"); # copy of wparam(0) my $_out=&DWP(36,"esp"); # copy of wparam(1) my $_len=&DWP(40,"esp"); # copy of wparam(2) my $_key=&DWP(44,"esp"); # copy of wparam(3) my $_ivp=&DWP(48,"esp"); # copy of wparam(4) my $_tmp=&DWP(52,"esp"); # volatile variable # my $ivec=&DWP(60,"esp"); # ivec[16] my $aes_key=&DWP(76,"esp"); # copy of aes_key my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp"); # copy of aes_key->rounds &function_begin("AES_cbc_encrypt"); &mov ($s2 eq "ecx"? $s2 : "",&wparam(2)); # load len &cmp ($s2,0); &je (&label("drop_out")); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tbl); &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only); &cmp (&wparam(5),0); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl)); &jne (&label("picked_te")); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("AES_Te"),$tbl)); &set_label("picked_te"); # one can argue if this is required &pushf (); &cld (); &cmp ($s2,$speed_limit); &jb (&label("slow_way")); &test ($s2,15); &jnz (&label("slow_way")); if (!$x86only) { &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),28); # check for hyper-threading bit &jc (&label("slow_way")); } # pre-allocate aligned stack frame... &lea ($acc,&DWP(-80-244,"esp")); &and ($acc,-64); # ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $tbl modulo 4096 &mov ($s0,$tbl); &lea ($s1,&DWP(2048+256,$tbl)); &mov ($s3,$acc); &and ($s0,0xfff); # s = %ebp&0xfff &and ($s1,0xfff); # e = (%ebp+2048+256)&0xfff &and ($s3,0xfff); # p = %esp&0xfff &cmp ($s3,$s1); # if (p>=e) %esp =- (p-e); &jb (&label("tbl_break_out")); &sub ($s3,$s1); &sub ($acc,$s3); &jmp (&label("tbl_ok")); &set_label("tbl_break_out",4); # else %esp -= (p-s)&0xfff + framesz; &sub ($s3,$s0); &and ($s3,0xfff); &add ($s3,384); &sub ($acc,$s3); &set_label("tbl_ok",4); &lea ($s3,&wparam(0)); # obtain pointer to parameter block &exch ("esp",$acc); # allocate stack frame &add ("esp",4); # reserve for return address! &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); # save %ebp &mov ($_esp,$acc); # save %esp &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s3)); # load inp &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$s3)); # load out #&mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$s3)); # load len &mov ($key,&DWP(12,$s3)); # load key &mov ($acc,&DWP(16,$s3)); # load ivp &mov ($s3,&DWP(20,$s3)); # load enc flag &mov ($_inp,$s0); # save copy of inp &mov ($_out,$s1); # save copy of out &mov ($_len,$s2); # save copy of len &mov ($_key,$key); # save copy of key &mov ($_ivp,$acc); # save copy of ivp &mov ($mark,0); # copy of aes_key->rounds = 0; # do we copy key schedule to stack? &mov ($s1 eq "ebx" ? $s1 : "",$key); &mov ($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",244/4); &sub ($s1,$tbl); &mov ("esi",$key); &and ($s1,0xfff); &lea ("edi",$aes_key); &cmp ($s1,2048+256); &jb (&label("do_copy")); &cmp ($s1,4096-244); &jb (&label("skip_copy")); &set_label("do_copy",4); &mov ($_key,"edi"); &data_word(0xA5F3F689); # rep movsd &set_label("skip_copy"); &mov ($key,16); &set_label("prefetch_tbl",4); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$tbl)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(32,$tbl)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(64,$tbl)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(96,$tbl)); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(128,$tbl)); &sub ($key,1); &jnz (&label("prefetch_tbl")); &sub ($tbl,2048); &mov ($acc,$_inp); &mov ($key,$_ivp); &cmp ($s3,0); &je (&label("fast_decrypt")); #----------------------------- ENCRYPT -----------------------------# &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &set_label("fast_enc_loop",16); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt"); &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp &mov ($key,$_out); # load out &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # save output data &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jnz (&label("fast_enc_loop")); &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); # restore last 2 dwords &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save ivec &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &cmp ($mark,0); # was the key schedule copied? &mov ("edi",$_key); &je (&label("skip_ezero")); # zero copy of key schedule &mov ("ecx",240/4); &xor ("eax","eax"); &align (4); &data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd &set_label("skip_ezero"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &set_label("drop_out"); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed #----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------# &set_label("fast_decrypt",16); &cmp ($acc,$_out); &je (&label("fast_dec_in_place")); # in-place processing... &mov ($_tmp,$key); &align (4); &set_label("fast_dec_loop",16); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt"); &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load ivp &mov ($acc,$_len); # load len &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($key,$_out); # load out &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # write output &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &mov ($_tmp,$acc); # save ivp &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out &mov ($_out,$key); # save out &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jnz (&label("fast_dec_loop")); &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load temp ivp &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load user ivp &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # copy back to user &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &jmp (&label("fast_dec_out")); &set_label("fast_dec_in_place",16); &set_label("fast_dec_in_place_loop"); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &lea ($key,$ivec); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy to temp &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt"); &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp &mov ($acc,$_out); # load out &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance out &mov ($_out,$acc); # save out &lea ($acc,$ivec); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read temp &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy iv &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jnz (&label("fast_dec_in_place_loop")); &set_label("fast_dec_out",4); &cmp ($mark,0); # was the key schedule copied? &mov ("edi",$_key); &je (&label("skip_dzero")); # zero copy of key schedule &mov ("ecx",240/4); &xor ("eax","eax"); &align (4); &data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd &set_label("skip_dzero"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed #--------------------------- SLOW ROUTINE ---------------------------# &set_label("slow_way",16); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s0)) if (!$x86only);# load OPENSSL_ia32cap &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # load key # pre-allocate aligned stack frame... &lea ($acc,&DWP(-80,"esp")); &and ($acc,-64); # ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $key modulo 1024 &lea ($s1,&DWP(-80-63,$key)); &sub ($s1,$acc); &neg ($s1); &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ($acc,$s1); # pick S-box copy which can't overlap with stack frame or $key &lea ($s1,&DWP(768,$acc)); &sub ($s1,$tbl); &and ($s1,0x300); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1)); &lea ($s3,&wparam(0)); # pointer to parameter block &exch ("esp",$acc); &add ("esp",4); # reserve for return address! &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); # save %ebp &mov ($_esp,$acc); # save %esp &mov ($_tmp,$s0); # save OPENSSL_ia32cap &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s3)); # load inp &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$s3)); # load out #&mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$s3)); # load len #&mov ($key,&DWP(12,$s3)); # load key &mov ($acc,&DWP(16,$s3)); # load ivp &mov ($s3,&DWP(20,$s3)); # load enc flag &mov ($_inp,$s0); # save copy of inp &mov ($_out,$s1); # save copy of out &mov ($_len,$s2); # save copy of len &mov ($_key,$key); # save copy of key &mov ($_ivp,$acc); # save copy of ivp &mov ($key,$acc); &mov ($acc,$s0); &cmp ($s3,0); &je (&label("slow_decrypt")); #--------------------------- SLOW ENCRYPT ---------------------------# &cmp ($s2,16); &mov ($s3,$s1); &jb (&label("slow_enc_tail")); if (!$x86only) { &bt ($_tmp,25); # check for SSE bit &jnc (&label("slow_enc_x86")); &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # load iv &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); &set_label("slow_enc_loop_sse",16); &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($key,$_key); &call ("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact"); &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp &mov ($key,$_out); # load out &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"mm0"); # save output data &movq (&QWP(8,$key),"mm4"); &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len &cmp ($s2,16); &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jae (&label("slow_enc_loop_sse")); &test ($s2,15); &jnz (&label("slow_enc_tail")); &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # save ivec &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4"); &emms (); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed } &set_label("slow_enc_x86",16); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &set_label("slow_enc_loop_x86",4); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact"); &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp &mov ($key,$_out); # load out &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # save output data &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len &cmp ($s2,16); &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jae (&label("slow_enc_loop_x86")); &test ($s2,15); &jnz (&label("slow_enc_tail")); &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); # restore last dwords &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save ivec &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed &set_label("slow_enc_tail",16); &emms () if (!$x86only); &mov ($key eq "edi"? $key:"",$s3); # load out to edi &mov ($s1,16); &sub ($s1,$s2); &cmp ($key,$acc eq "esi"? $acc:""); # compare with inp &je (&label("enc_in_place")); &align (4); &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy input &jmp (&label("enc_skip_in_place")); &set_label("enc_in_place"); &lea ($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2)); &set_label("enc_skip_in_place"); &mov ($s2,$s1); &xor ($s0,$s0); &align (4); &data_word(0xAAF3F689); # rep stosb # zero tail &mov ($key,$_ivp); # restore ivp &mov ($acc,$s3); # output as input &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &mov ($_len,16); # len=16 &jmp (&label("slow_enc_loop_x86")); # one more spin... #--------------------------- SLOW DECRYPT ---------------------------# &set_label("slow_decrypt",16); if (!$x86only) { &bt ($_tmp,25); # check for SSE bit &jnc (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86")); &set_label("slow_dec_loop_sse",4); &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); # read input &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($key,$_key); &call ("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact"); &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp &lea ($s0,$ivec); &mov ($s1,$_out); # load out &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp &movq ("mm1",&QWP(0,$acc)); # re-read input &movq ("mm5",&QWP(8,$acc)); &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # xor iv &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"mm1"); # copy input to iv &movq (&QWP(8,$key),"mm5"); &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len &jc (&label("slow_dec_partial_sse")); &movq (&QWP(0,$s1),"mm0"); # write output &movq (&QWP(8,$s1),"mm4"); &lea ($s1,&DWP(16,$s1)); # advance out &mov ($_out,$s1); # save out &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jnz (&label("slow_dec_loop_sse")); &emms (); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed &set_label("slow_dec_partial_sse",16); &movq (&QWP(0,$s0),"mm0"); # save output to temp &movq (&QWP(8,$s0),"mm4"); &emms (); &add ($s2 eq "ecx" ? "ecx":"",16); &mov ("edi",$s1); # out &mov ("esi",$s0); # temp &align (4); &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy partial output &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed } &set_label("slow_dec_loop_x86",16); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &lea ($key,$ivec); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy to temp &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact"); &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp &mov ($acc,$_len); # load len &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &sub ($acc,16); &jc (&label("slow_dec_partial_x86")); &mov ($_len,$acc); # save len &mov ($acc,$_out); # load out &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance out &mov ($_out,$acc); # save out &lea ($acc,$ivec); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read temp &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy it to iv &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp &jnz (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86")); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed &set_label("slow_dec_partial_x86",16); &lea ($acc,$ivec); &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save output to temp &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3); &mov ($acc,$_inp); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # re-read input &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc)); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy it to iv &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ("ecx",$_len); &mov ("edi",$_out); &lea ("esi",$ivec); &align (4); &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy partial output &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end("AES_cbc_encrypt"); } #------------------------------------------------------------------# sub enckey() { &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[i]>>0 &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[i]>>8 &shl ("ebx",24); &xor ("eax","ebx"); &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &shr ("edx",16); &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[i]>>16 &xor ("eax","ebx"); &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[i]>>24 &shl ("ebx",8); &xor ("eax","ebx"); &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &shl ("ebx",16); &xor ("eax","ebx"); &xor ("eax",&DWP(1024-128,$tbl,"ecx",4)); # rcon } &function_begin("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # user supplied key &mov ("edi",&wparam(3)); # private key schedule &test ("esi",-1); &jz (&label("badpointer")); &test ("edi",-1); &jz (&label("badpointer")); &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tbl); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl)); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl)); # prefetch Te4 &mov ("eax",&DWP(0-128,$tbl)); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(32-128,$tbl)); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(64-128,$tbl)); &mov ("edx",&DWP(96-128,$tbl)); &mov ("eax",&DWP(128-128,$tbl)); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(160-128,$tbl)); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(192-128,$tbl)); &mov ("edx",&DWP(224-128,$tbl)); &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # number of bits in key &cmp ("ecx",128); &je (&label("10rounds")); &cmp ("ecx",192); &je (&label("12rounds")); &cmp ("ecx",256); &je (&label("14rounds")); &mov ("eax",-2); # invalid number of bits &jmp (&label("exit")); &set_label("10rounds"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 4 dwords &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx"); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &jmp (&label("10shortcut")); &align (4); &set_label("10loop"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0] &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); # rk[3] &set_label("10shortcut"); &enckey (); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[4] &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[5] &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[6] &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[7] &inc ("ecx"); &add ("edi",16); &cmp ("ecx",10); &jl (&label("10loop")); &mov (&DWP(80,"edi"),10); # setup number of rounds &xor ("eax","eax"); &jmp (&label("exit")); &set_label("12rounds"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 6 dwords &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx"); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"edx"); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &jmp (&label("12shortcut")); &align (4); &set_label("12loop"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0] &mov ("edx",&DWP(20,"edi")); # rk[5] &set_label("12shortcut"); &enckey (); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[6] &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[7] &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[8] &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[9] &cmp ("ecx",7); &je (&label("12break")); &inc ("ecx"); &xor ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[10] &xor ("eax",&DWP(20,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[11] &add ("edi",24); &jmp (&label("12loop")); &set_label("12break"); &mov (&DWP(72,"edi"),12); # setup number of rounds &xor ("eax","eax"); &jmp (&label("exit")); &set_label("14rounds"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 8 dwords &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx"); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &jmp (&label("14shortcut")); &align (4); &set_label("14loop"); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"edi")); # rk[7] &set_label("14shortcut"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0] &enckey (); &mov (&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[8] &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[9] &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[10] &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[11] &cmp ("ecx",6); &je (&label("14break")); &inc ("ecx"); &mov ("edx","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); # rk[4] &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[11]>>0 &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[11]>>8 &xor ("eax","ebx"); &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &shr ("edx",16); &shl ("ebx",8); &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[11]>>16 &xor ("eax","ebx"); &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[11]>>24 &shl ("ebx",16); &xor ("eax","ebx"); &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1)); &shl ("ebx",24); &xor ("eax","ebx"); &mov (&DWP(48,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[12] &xor ("eax",&DWP(20,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(52,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[13] &xor ("eax",&DWP(24,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(56,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[14] &xor ("eax",&DWP(28,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(60,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[15] &add ("edi",32); &jmp (&label("14loop")); &set_label("14break"); &mov (&DWP(48,"edi"),14); # setup number of rounds &xor ("eax","eax"); &jmp (&label("exit")); &set_label("badpointer"); &mov ("eax",-1); &set_label("exit"); &function_end("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key"); # int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, # AES_KEY *key) &function_begin_B("AES_set_encrypt_key"); &call ("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key"); &ret (); &function_end_B("AES_set_encrypt_key"); sub deckey() { my ($i,$key,$tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8) = @_; my $tmp = $tbl; &mov ($tmp,0x80808080); &and ($tmp,$tp1); &lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$tp1,$tp1)); &mov ($acc,$tmp); &shr ($tmp,7); &sub ($acc,$tmp); &and ($tp2,0xfefefefe); &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b); &xor ($tp2,$acc); &mov ($tmp,0x80808080); &and ($tmp,$tp2); &lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2)); &mov ($acc,$tmp); &shr ($tmp,7); &sub ($acc,$tmp); &and ($tp4,0xfefefefe); &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b); &xor ($tp2,$tp1); # tp2^tp1 &xor ($tp4,$acc); &mov ($tmp,0x80808080); &and ($tmp,$tp4); &lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4)); &mov ($acc,$tmp); &shr ($tmp,7); &xor ($tp4,$tp1); # tp4^tp1 &sub ($acc,$tmp); &and ($tp8,0xfefefefe); &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b); &rotl ($tp1,8); # = ROTATE(tp1,8) &xor ($tp8,$acc); &mov ($tmp,&DWP(4*($i+1),$key)); # modulo-scheduled load &xor ($tp1,$tp2); &xor ($tp2,$tp8); &xor ($tp1,$tp4); &rotl ($tp2,24); &xor ($tp4,$tp8); &xor ($tp1,$tp8); # ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1) &rotl ($tp4,16); &xor ($tp1,$tp2); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24) &rotl ($tp8,8); &xor ($tp1,$tp4); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16) &mov ($tp2,$tmp); &xor ($tp1,$tp8); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,8) &mov (&DWP(4*$i,$key),$tp1); } # int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, # AES_KEY *key) &function_begin_B("AES_set_decrypt_key"); &call ("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key"); &cmp ("eax",0); &je (&label("proceed")); &ret (); &set_label("proceed"); &push ("ebp"); &push ("ebx"); &push ("esi"); &push ("edi"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(2)); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(240,"esi")); # pull number of rounds &lea ("ecx",&DWP(0,"","ecx",4)); &lea ("edi",&DWP(0,"esi","ecx",4)); # pointer to last chunk &set_label("invert",4); # invert order of chunks &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"edx"); &add ("esi",16); &sub ("edi",16); &cmp ("esi","edi"); &jne (&label("invert")); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # pull number of rounds &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc)); &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8)); &mov (&wparam(2),$acc); &mov ($s0,&DWP(16,$key)); # modulo-scheduled load &set_label("permute",4); # permute the key schedule &add ($key,16); &deckey (0,$key,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3); &deckey (1,$key,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0); &deckey (2,$key,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1); &deckey (3,$key,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2); &cmp ($key,&wparam(2)); &jb (&label("permute")); &xor ("eax","eax"); # return success &function_end("AES_set_decrypt_key"); &asciz("AES for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000015002513176625656020157 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # June 2011 # # This is AESNI-CBC+SHA1 "stitch" implementation. The idea, as spelled # in http://download.intel.com/design/intarch/papers/323686.pdf, is # that since AESNI-CBC encrypt exhibit *very* low instruction-level # parallelism, interleaving it with another algorithm would allow to # utilize processor resources better and achieve better performance. # SHA1 instruction sequences(*) are taken from sha1-x86_64.pl and # AESNI code is weaved into it. Below are performance numbers in # cycles per processed byte, less is better, for standalone AESNI-CBC # encrypt, sum of the latter and standalone SHA1, and "stitched" # subroutine: # # AES-128-CBC +SHA1 stitch gain # Westmere 3.77[+5.3] 9.07 6.55 +38% # Sandy Bridge 5.05[+5.0(6.1)] 10.06(11.15) 5.98(7.05) +68%(+58%) # Ivy Bridge 5.05[+4.6] 9.65 5.54 +74% # Haswell 4.43[+3.6(4.2)] 8.00(8.58) 4.55(5.21) +75%(+65%) # Skylake 2.63[+3.5(4.1)] 6.17(6.69) 4.23(4.44) +46%(+51%) # Bulldozer 5.77[+6.0] 11.72 6.37 +84% # Ryzen(**) 2.71[+1.93] 4.64 2.74 +69% # Goldmont(**) 3.82[+1.70] 5.52 4.20 +31% # # AES-192-CBC # Westmere 4.51 9.81 6.80 +44% # Sandy Bridge 6.05 11.06(12.15) 6.11(7.19) +81%(+69%) # Ivy Bridge 6.05 10.65 6.07 +75% # Haswell 5.29 8.86(9.44) 5.32(5.32) +67%(+77%) # Bulldozer 6.89 12.84 6.96 +84% # # AES-256-CBC # Westmere 5.25 10.55 7.21 +46% # Sandy Bridge 7.05 12.06(13.15) 7.12(7.72) +69%(+70%) # Ivy Bridge 7.05 11.65 7.12 +64% # Haswell 6.19 9.76(10.34) 6.21(6.25) +57%(+65%) # Skylake 3.62 7.16(7.68) 4.56(4.76) +57%(+61%) # Bulldozer 8.00 13.95 8.25 +69% # Ryzen(**) 3.71 5.64 3.72 +52% # Goldmont(**) 5.35 7.05 5.76 +22% # # (*) There are two code paths: SSSE3 and AVX. See sha1-568.pl for # background information. Above numbers in parentheses are SSSE3 # results collected on AVX-capable CPU, i.e. apply on OSes that # don't support AVX. # (**) SHAEXT results. # # Needless to mention that it makes no sense to implement "stitched" # *decrypt* subroutine. Because *both* AESNI-CBC decrypt and SHA1 # fully utilize parallelism, so stitching would not give any gain # anyway. Well, there might be some, e.g. because of better cache # locality... For reference, here are performance results for # standalone AESNI-CBC decrypt: # # AES-128-CBC AES-192-CBC AES-256-CBC # Westmere 1.25 1.50 1.75 # Sandy Bridge 0.74 0.91 1.09 # Ivy Bridge 0.74 0.90 1.11 # Haswell 0.63 0.76 0.88 # Bulldozer 0.70 0.85 0.99 # And indeed: # # AES-256-CBC +SHA1 stitch gain # Westmere 1.75 7.20 6.68 +7.8% # Sandy Bridge 1.09 6.09(7.22) 5.82(6.95) +4.6%(+3.9%) # Ivy Bridge 1.11 5.70 5.45 +4.6% # Haswell 0.88 4.45(5.00) 4.39(4.69) +1.4%(*)(+6.6%) # Bulldozer 0.99 6.95 5.95 +17%(**) # # (*) Tiny improvement coefficient on Haswell is because we compare # AVX1 stitch to sum with AVX2 SHA1. # (**) Execution is fully dominated by integer code sequence and # SIMD still hardly shows [in single-process benchmark;-] $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; $avx=1 if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $1>=2.19); $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $1>=2.09); $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=10); $avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); $shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 $stitched_decrypt=0; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; # void aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(const void *inp, # void *out, # size_t length, # const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *iv, # SHA_CTX *ctx, # const void *in0); $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl aesni_cbc_sha1_enc .type aesni_cbc_sha1_enc,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 aesni_cbc_sha1_enc: # caller should check for SSSE3 and AES-NI bits mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r10d mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r11 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); bt \$61,%r11 # check SHA bit jc aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); and \$`1<<28`,%r11d # mask AVX bit and \$`1<<30`,%r10d # mask "Intel CPU" bit or %r11d,%r10d cmp \$`1<<28|1<<30`,%r10d je aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx ___ $code.=<<___; jmp aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3 ret .size aesni_cbc_sha1_enc,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc ___ my ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10"); my $Xi=4; my @X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); my @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10)); my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%ebp"); # size optimization my @T=("%esi","%edi"); my $j=0; my $jj=0; my $r=0; my $sn=0; my $rx=0; my $K_XX_XX="%r11"; my ($rndkey0,$iv,$in)=map("%xmm$_",(11..13)); # for enc my @rndkey=("%xmm14","%xmm15"); # for enc my ($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3)=map("%xmm$_",(12..15)); # for dec if (1) { # reassign for Atom Silvermont # The goal is to minimize amount of instructions with more than # 3 prefix bytes. Or in more practical terms to keep AES-NI *and* # SSSE3 instructions to upper half of the register bank. @X=map("%xmm$_",(8..11,4..7)); @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(12,13,3)); ($iv,$in,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(2,14,15)); @rndkey=("%xmm0","%xmm1"); } sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; my $arg = pop; $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n"; } my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) }; $code.=<<___; .type aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument #shr \$6,$len # debugging artefact #jz .Lepilogue_ssse3 # debugging artefact push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea `-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp #mov $in0,$inp # debugging artefact #lea 64(%rsp),$ctx # debugging artefact ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,96+0(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,96+16(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,96+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,96+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,96+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,96+80(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,96+96(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,96+112(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,96+128(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,96+144(%rsp) .Lprologue_ssse3: ___ $code.=<<___; mov $in0,%r12 # reassign arguments mov $out,%r13 mov $len,%r14 lea 112($key),%r15 # size optimization movdqu ($ivp),$iv # load IV mov $ivp,88(%rsp) # save $ivp ___ ($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15)); # reassign arguments my $rounds="${ivp}d"; $code.=<<___; shl \$6,$len sub $in0,$out mov 240-112($key),$rounds add $inp,$len # end of input lea K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX mov 0($ctx),$A # load context mov 4($ctx),$B mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov $B,@T[0] # magic seed mov 16($ctx),$E mov $C,@T[1] xor $D,@T[1] and @T[1],@T[0] movdqa 64($K_XX_XX),@Tx[2] # pbswap mask movdqa 0($K_XX_XX),@Tx[1] # K_00_19 movdqu 0($inp),@X[-4&7] # load input to %xmm[0-3] movdqu 16($inp),@X[-3&7] movdqu 32($inp),@X[-2&7] movdqu 48($inp),@X[-1&7] pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-4&7] # byte swap pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-3&7] pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-2&7] add \$64,$inp paddd @Tx[1],@X[-4&7] # add K_00_19 pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-1&7] paddd @Tx[1],@X[-3&7] paddd @Tx[1],@X[-2&7] movdqa @X[-4&7],0(%rsp) # X[]+K xfer to IALU psubd @Tx[1],@X[-4&7] # restore X[] movdqa @X[-3&7],16(%rsp) psubd @Tx[1],@X[-3&7] movdqa @X[-2&7],32(%rsp) psubd @Tx[1],@X[-2&7] movups -112($key),$rndkey0 # $key[0] movups 16-112($key),$rndkey[0] # forward reference jmp .Loop_ssse3 ___ my $aesenc=sub { use integer; my ($n,$k)=($r/10,$r%10); if ($k==0) { $code.=<<___; movups `16*$n`($in0),$in # load input xorps $rndkey0,$in ___ $code.=<<___ if ($n); movups $iv,`16*($n-1)`($out,$in0) # write output ___ $code.=<<___; xorps $in,$iv movups `32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv ___ } elsif ($k==9) { $sn++; $code.=<<___; cmp \$11,$rounds jb .Laesenclast$sn movups `32+16*($k+0)-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv movups `32+16*($k+1)-112`($key),$rndkey[0] aesenc $rndkey[1],$iv je .Laesenclast$sn movups `32+16*($k+2)-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv movups `32+16*($k+3)-112`($key),$rndkey[0] aesenc $rndkey[1],$iv .Laesenclast$sn: aesenclast $rndkey[0],$iv movups 16-112($key),$rndkey[1] # forward reference ___ } else { $code.=<<___; movups `32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv ___ } $r++; unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey)); }; sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pshufd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee); # was &movdqa (@X[0],@X[-3&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]); &paddd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &punpcklqdq(@X[0],@X[-3&7]); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]", was &palignr(@X[0],@X[-4&7],8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); &psrldq (@Tx[0],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pxor (@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[2],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslldq (@Tx[2],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &paddd (@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@Tx[0],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[1],@Tx[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@Tx[2],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &por (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld (@Tx[1],2); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[2],eval(16*(($Xi)/5))."($K_XX_XX)"); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[1]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2 &pshufd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee) if ($Xi==7); # was &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]) in Xupdate_ssse3_32_79 foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] push(@Tx,shift(@Tx)); } sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 44 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)) if ($Xi==8); &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)) if ($Xi==8); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[1] =~ /_ror/); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/); &punpcklqdq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]); # compose "X[-6]", was &palignr(@Tx[0],@X[-2&7],8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &pxor (@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); if ($Xi%5) { &movdqa (@Tx[2],@Tx[1]);# "perpetuate" K_XX_XX... } else { # ... or load next one &movdqa (@Tx[2],eval(16*($Xi/5))."($K_XX_XX)"); } eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &paddd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/); &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 &pslld (@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@Tx[0],30); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);# rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &por (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[1] =~ /_rol/); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); &pshufd(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee) if ($Xi<19); # was &movdqa (@Tx[1],@X[0]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] push(@Tx,shift(@Tx)); } sub Xuplast_ssse3_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &cmp ($inp,$len); &je (shift); unshift(@Tx,pop(@Tx)); &movdqa (@Tx[2],"64($K_XX_XX)"); # pbswap mask &movdqa (@Tx[1],"0($K_XX_XX)"); # K_00_19 &movdqu (@X[-4&7],"0($inp)"); # load input &movdqu (@X[-3&7],"16($inp)"); &movdqu (@X[-2&7],"32($inp)"); &movdqu (@X[-1&7],"48($inp)"); &pshufb (@X[-4&7],@Tx[2]); # byte swap &add ($inp,64); $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7],@Tx[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@X[($Xi-4)&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psubd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } my @body_00_19 = ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&$_ror ($b,$j?7:2);', # $b>>>2 '&xor (@T[0],$d);', '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b for next round '&add ($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)");',# X[]+K xfer '&xor ($b,$c);', # $c^$d for next round '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&and (@T[1],$b);', # ($b&($c^$d)) for next round '&xor ($b,$c);', # restore $b '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); sub body_00_19 () { # ((c^d)&b)^d # on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b return &body_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++; use integer; my ($k,$n); my @r=@body_00_19; $n = scalar(@r); $k = (($jj+1)*12/20)*20*$n/12; # 12 aesencs per these 20 rounds @r[$k%$n].='&$aesenc();' if ($jj==$k/$n); $jj++; return @r; } my @body_20_39 = ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)");',# X[]+K xfer '&xor (@T[0],$d) if($j==19);'. '&xor (@T[0],$c) if($j> 19);', # ($b^$d^$c) '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b for next round '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j< 79);', # $b^$d for next round '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2 '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); sub body_20_39 () { # b^d^c # on entry @T[0]=b^d return &body_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++; use integer; my ($k,$n); my @r=@body_20_39; $n = scalar(@r); $k = (($jj+1)*8/20)*20*$n/8; # 8 aesencs per these 20 rounds @r[$k%$n].='&$aesenc();' if ($jj==$k/$n && $rx!=20); $jj++; return @r; } my @body_40_59 = ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)");',# X[]+K xfer '&and (@T[0],$c) if ($j>=40);', # (b^c)&(c^d) '&xor ($c,$d) if ($j>=40);', # restore $c '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2 '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b for next round '&xor (@T[0],$c);', '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j==59);'. '&xor (@T[1],$b) if ($j< 59);', # b^c for next round '&xor ($b,$c) if ($j< 59);', # c^d for next round '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); sub body_40_59 () { # ((b^c)&(c^d))^c # on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d) $rx++; use integer; my ($k,$n); my @r=@body_40_59; $n = scalar(@r); $k=(($jj+1)*12/20)*20*$n/12; # 12 aesencs per these 20 rounds @r[$k%$n].='&$aesenc();' if ($jj==$k/$n && $rx!=40); $jj++; return @r; } $code.=<<___; .align 32 .Loop_ssse3: ___ &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39,".Ldone_ssse3"); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; $saved_r=$r; @saved_rndkey=@rndkey; &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; movups $iv,48($out,$in0) # write output lea 64($in0),$in0 add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C add 12($ctx),$D mov $A,0($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov @T[0],4($ctx) mov @T[0],$B # magic seed mov $C,8($ctx) mov $C,@T[1] mov $D,12($ctx) xor $D,@T[1] mov $E,16($ctx) and @T[1],@T[0] jmp .Loop_ssse3 .Ldone_ssse3: ___ $jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; $r=$saved_r; @rndkey=@saved_rndkey; &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; movups $iv,48($out,$in0) # write output mov 88(%rsp),$ivp # restore $ivp add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C mov $A,0($ctx) add 12($ctx),$D mov @T[0],4($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov $C,8($ctx) mov $D,12($ctx) mov $E,16($ctx) movups $iv,($ivp) # write IV ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 96+0(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 96+16(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 96+32(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 96+48(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 96+64(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 96+80(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 96+96(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 96+112(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 96+128(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 96+144(%rsp),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; lea `104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi mov 0(%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_ssse3: ret .size aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3 ___ if ($stitched_decrypt) {{{ # reset ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10"); $j=$jj=$r=$rx=0; $Xi=4; # reassign for Atom Silvermont (see above) ($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(0..4)); @X=map("%xmm$_",(8..13,6,7)); @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(14,15,5)); my @aes256_dec = ( '&movdqu($inout0,"0x00($in0)");', '&movdqu($inout1,"0x10($in0)"); &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0);', '&movdqu($inout2,"0x20($in0)"); &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);', '&movdqu($inout3,"0x30($in0)"); &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);', '&pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movups ($rndkey0,"16-112($key)");', '&movaps("64(%rsp)",@X[2]);', # save IV, originally @X[3] undef,undef ); for ($i=0;$i<13;$i++) { push (@aes256_dec,( '&aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey0);', '&aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey0);', '&aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey0);', '&aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movups($rndkey0,"'.(16*($i+2)-112).'($key)");' )); push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef)) if (($i>=3 && $i<=5) || $i>=11); push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef)) if ($i==5); } push(@aes256_dec,( '&aesdeclast ($inout0,$rndkey0); &movups (@X[0],"0x00($in0)");', '&aesdeclast ($inout1,$rndkey0); &movups (@X[1],"0x10($in0)");', '&aesdeclast ($inout2,$rndkey0); &movups (@X[2],"0x20($in0)");', '&aesdeclast ($inout3,$rndkey0); &movups (@X[3],"0x30($in0)");', '&xorps ($inout0,"64(%rsp)"); &movdqu ($rndkey0,"-112($key)");', '&xorps ($inout1,@X[0]); &movups ("0x00($out,$in0)",$inout0);', '&xorps ($inout2,@X[1]); &movups ("0x10($out,$in0)",$inout1);', '&xorps ($inout3,@X[2]); &movups ("0x20($out,$in0)",$inout2);', '&movups ("0x30($out,$in0)",$inout3);' )); sub body_00_19_dec () { # ((c^d)&b)^d # on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b return &body_20_39_dec() if ($rx==19); my @r=@body_00_19; unshift (@r,@aes256_dec[$rx]) if (@aes256_dec[$rx]); $rx++; return @r; } sub body_20_39_dec () { # b^d^c # on entry @T[0]=b^d return &body_40_59_dec() if ($rx==39); my @r=@body_20_39; unshift (@r,@aes256_dec[$rx]) if (@aes256_dec[$rx]); $rx++; return @r; } sub body_40_59_dec () { # ((b^c)&(c^d))^c # on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d) my @r=@body_40_59; unshift (@r,@aes256_dec[$rx]) if (@aes256_dec[$rx]); $rx++; return @r; } $code.=<<___; .globl aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec .type aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec: # caller should check for SSSE3 and AES-NI bits mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r10d mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r11d ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); and \$`1<<28`,%r11d # mask AVX bit and \$`1<<30`,%r10d # mask "Intel CPU" bit or %r11d,%r10d cmp \$`1<<28|1<<30`,%r10d je aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx ___ $code.=<<___; jmp aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3 ret .size aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec,.-aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec .type aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea `-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,96+0(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,96+16(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,96+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,96+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,96+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,96+80(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,96+96(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,96+112(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,96+128(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,96+144(%rsp) .Lprologue_dec_ssse3: ___ $code.=<<___; mov $in0,%r12 # reassign arguments mov $out,%r13 mov $len,%r14 lea 112($key),%r15 # size optimization movdqu ($ivp),@X[3] # load IV #mov $ivp,88(%rsp) # save $ivp ___ ($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15)); # reassign arguments $code.=<<___; shl \$6,$len sub $in0,$out add $inp,$len # end of input lea K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX mov 0($ctx),$A # load context mov 4($ctx),$B mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov $B,@T[0] # magic seed mov 16($ctx),$E mov $C,@T[1] xor $D,@T[1] and @T[1],@T[0] movdqa 64($K_XX_XX),@Tx[2] # pbswap mask movdqa 0($K_XX_XX),@Tx[1] # K_00_19 movdqu 0($inp),@X[-4&7] # load input to %xmm[0-3] movdqu 16($inp),@X[-3&7] movdqu 32($inp),@X[-2&7] movdqu 48($inp),@X[-1&7] pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-4&7] # byte swap add \$64,$inp pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-3&7] pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-2&7] pshufb @Tx[2],@X[-1&7] paddd @Tx[1],@X[-4&7] # add K_00_19 paddd @Tx[1],@X[-3&7] paddd @Tx[1],@X[-2&7] movdqa @X[-4&7],0(%rsp) # X[]+K xfer to IALU psubd @Tx[1],@X[-4&7] # restore X[] movdqa @X[-3&7],16(%rsp) psubd @Tx[1],@X[-3&7] movdqa @X[-2&7],32(%rsp) psubd @Tx[1],@X[-2&7] movdqu -112($key),$rndkey0 # $key[0] jmp .Loop_dec_ssse3 .align 32 .Loop_dec_ssse3: ___ &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39_dec,".Ldone_dec_ssse3"); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; $saved_rx=$rx; &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec); eval(@aes256_dec[-1]); # last store $code.=<<___; lea 64($in0),$in0 add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C add 12($ctx),$D mov $A,0($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov @T[0],4($ctx) mov @T[0],$B # magic seed mov $C,8($ctx) mov $C,@T[1] mov $D,12($ctx) xor $D,@T[1] mov $E,16($ctx) and @T[1],@T[0] jmp .Loop_dec_ssse3 .Ldone_dec_ssse3: ___ $jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; $rx=$saved_rx; &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39_dec); eval(@aes256_dec[-1]); # last store $code.=<<___; add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C mov $A,0($ctx) add 12($ctx),$D mov @T[0],4($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov $C,8($ctx) mov $D,12($ctx) mov $E,16($ctx) movups @X[3],($ivp) # write IV ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 96+0(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 96+16(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 96+32(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 96+48(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 96+64(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 96+80(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 96+96(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 96+112(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 96+128(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 96+144(%rsp),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; lea `104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi mov 0(%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_dec_ssse3: ret .size aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3,.-aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3 ___ }}} $j=$jj=$r=$rx=0; if ($avx) { my ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10"); my $Xi=4; my @X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); my @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10)); my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%ebp"); # size optimization my @T=("%esi","%edi"); my ($rndkey0,$iv,$in)=map("%xmm$_",(11..13)); my @rndkey=("%xmm14","%xmm15"); my ($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3)=map("%xmm$_",(12..15)); # for dec my $Kx=@Tx[2]; my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0],@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; $code.=<<___; .type aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument #shr \$6,$len # debugging artefact #jz .Lepilogue_avx # debugging artefact push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea `-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp #mov $in0,$inp # debugging artefact #lea 64(%rsp),$ctx # debugging artefact ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,96+0(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,96+16(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,96+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,96+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,96+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,96+80(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,96+96(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,96+112(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,96+128(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,96+144(%rsp) .Lprologue_avx: ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroall mov $in0,%r12 # reassign arguments mov $out,%r13 mov $len,%r14 lea 112($key),%r15 # size optimization vmovdqu ($ivp),$iv # load IV mov $ivp,88(%rsp) # save $ivp ___ ($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15)); # reassign arguments my $rounds="${ivp}d"; $code.=<<___; shl \$6,$len sub $in0,$out mov 240-112($key),$rounds add $inp,$len # end of input lea K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX mov 0($ctx),$A # load context mov 4($ctx),$B mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov $B,@T[0] # magic seed mov 16($ctx),$E mov $C,@T[1] xor $D,@T[1] and @T[1],@T[0] vmovdqa 64($K_XX_XX),@X[2] # pbswap mask vmovdqa 0($K_XX_XX),$Kx # K_00_19 vmovdqu 0($inp),@X[-4&7] # load input to %xmm[0-3] vmovdqu 16($inp),@X[-3&7] vmovdqu 32($inp),@X[-2&7] vmovdqu 48($inp),@X[-1&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7] # byte swap add \$64,$inp vpshufb @X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7] vpaddd $Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0] # add K_00_19 vpaddd $Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1] vpaddd $Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2] vmovdqa @X[0],0(%rsp) # X[]+K xfer to IALU vmovdqa @X[1],16(%rsp) vmovdqa @X[2],32(%rsp) vmovups -112($key),$rndkey[1] # $key[0] vmovups 16-112($key),$rndkey[0] # forward reference jmp .Loop_avx ___ my $aesenc=sub { use integer; my ($n,$k)=($r/10,$r%10); if ($k==0) { $code.=<<___; vmovdqu `16*$n`($in0),$in # load input vpxor $rndkey[1],$in,$in ___ $code.=<<___ if ($n); vmovups $iv,`16*($n-1)`($out,$in0) # write output ___ $code.=<<___; vpxor $in,$iv,$iv vaesenc $rndkey[0],$iv,$iv vmovups `32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1] ___ } elsif ($k==9) { $sn++; $code.=<<___; cmp \$11,$rounds jb .Lvaesenclast$sn vaesenc $rndkey[0],$iv,$iv vmovups `32+16*($k+0)-112`($key),$rndkey[1] vaesenc $rndkey[1],$iv,$iv vmovups `32+16*($k+1)-112`($key),$rndkey[0] je .Lvaesenclast$sn vaesenc $rndkey[0],$iv,$iv vmovups `32+16*($k+2)-112`($key),$rndkey[1] vaesenc $rndkey[1],$iv,$iv vmovups `32+16*($k+3)-112`($key),$rndkey[0] .Lvaesenclast$sn: vaesenclast $rndkey[0],$iv,$iv vmovups -112($key),$rndkey[0] vmovups 16-112($key),$rndkey[1] # forward reference ___ } else { $code.=<<___; vaesenc $rndkey[0],$iv,$iv vmovups `32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1] ___ } $r++; unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey)); }; sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@X[0],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslldq(@Tx[1],@X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@Tx[1],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@Tx[1],@Tx[1],2); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa ($Kx,eval(16*(($Xi)/5))."($K_XX_XX)") if ($Xi%5==0); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_avx_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 48 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vpalignr(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]" &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] !~ /&ro[rl]/); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]); &vmovdqa ($Kx,eval(16*($Xi/5))."($K_XX_XX)") if ($Xi%5==0); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@X[0],30); &vmovdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@X[0],@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xuplast_avx_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &cmp ($inp,$len); &je (shift); &vmovdqa(@Tx[1],"64($K_XX_XX)"); # pbswap mask &vmovdqa($Kx,"0($K_XX_XX)"); # K_00_19 &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],"0($inp)"); # load input &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],"16($inp)"); &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],"32($inp)"); &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],"48($inp)"); &vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@Tx[1]); # byte swap &add ($inp,64); $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpshufb(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7],@Tx[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@Tx[0],@X[($Xi-4)&7],$Kx); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa(eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@Tx[0]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } $code.=<<___; .align 32 .Loop_avx: ___ &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39,".Ldone_avx"); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; $saved_r=$r; @saved_rndkey=@rndkey; &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; vmovups $iv,48($out,$in0) # write output lea 64($in0),$in0 add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C add 12($ctx),$D mov $A,0($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov @T[0],4($ctx) mov @T[0],$B # magic seed mov $C,8($ctx) mov $C,@T[1] mov $D,12($ctx) xor $D,@T[1] mov $E,16($ctx) and @T[1],@T[0] jmp .Loop_avx .Ldone_avx: ___ $jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; $r=$saved_r; @rndkey=@saved_rndkey; &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; vmovups $iv,48($out,$in0) # write output mov 88(%rsp),$ivp # restore $ivp add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C mov $A,0($ctx) add 12($ctx),$D mov @T[0],4($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov $C,8($ctx) mov $D,12($ctx) mov $E,16($ctx) vmovups $iv,($ivp) # write IV vzeroall ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 96+0(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 96+16(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 96+32(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 96+48(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 96+64(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 96+80(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 96+96(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 96+112(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 96+128(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 96+144(%rsp),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; lea `104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi mov 0(%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx: ret .size aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx ___ if ($stitched_decrypt) {{{ # reset ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10"); $j=$jj=$r=$rx=0; $Xi=4; @aes256_dec = ( '&vpxor ($inout0,$rndkey0,"0x00($in0)");', '&vpxor ($inout1,$rndkey0,"0x10($in0)");', '&vpxor ($inout2,$rndkey0,"0x20($in0)");', '&vpxor ($inout3,$rndkey0,"0x30($in0)");', '&vmovups($rndkey0,"16-112($key)");', '&vmovups("64(%rsp)",@X[2]);', # save IV, originally @X[3] undef,undef ); for ($i=0;$i<13;$i++) { push (@aes256_dec,( '&vaesdec ($inout0,$inout0,$rndkey0);', '&vaesdec ($inout1,$inout1,$rndkey0);', '&vaesdec ($inout2,$inout2,$rndkey0);', '&vaesdec ($inout3,$inout3,$rndkey0); &vmovups($rndkey0,"'.(16*($i+2)-112).'($key)");' )); push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef)) if (($i>=3 && $i<=5) || $i>=11); push (@aes256_dec,(undef,undef)) if ($i==5); } push(@aes256_dec,( '&vaesdeclast ($inout0,$inout0,$rndkey0); &vmovups(@X[0],"0x00($in0)");', '&vaesdeclast ($inout1,$inout1,$rndkey0); &vmovups(@X[1],"0x10($in0)");', '&vaesdeclast ($inout2,$inout2,$rndkey0); &vmovups(@X[2],"0x20($in0)");', '&vaesdeclast ($inout3,$inout3,$rndkey0); &vmovups(@X[3],"0x30($in0)");', '&vxorps ($inout0,$inout0,"64(%rsp)"); &vmovdqu($rndkey0,"-112($key)");', '&vxorps ($inout1,$inout1,@X[0]); &vmovups("0x00($out,$in0)",$inout0);', '&vxorps ($inout2,$inout2,@X[1]); &vmovups("0x10($out,$in0)",$inout1);', '&vxorps ($inout3,$inout3,@X[2]); &vmovups("0x20($out,$in0)",$inout2);', '&vmovups ("0x30($out,$in0)",$inout3);' )); $code.=<<___; .type aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea `-104-($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,96+0(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,96+16(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,96+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,96+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,96+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,96+80(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,96+96(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,96+112(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,96+128(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,96+144(%rsp) .Lprologue_dec_avx: ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroall mov $in0,%r12 # reassign arguments mov $out,%r13 mov $len,%r14 lea 112($key),%r15 # size optimization vmovdqu ($ivp),@X[3] # load IV ___ ($in0,$out,$len,$key)=map("%r$_",(12..15)); # reassign arguments $code.=<<___; shl \$6,$len sub $in0,$out add $inp,$len # end of input lea K_XX_XX(%rip),$K_XX_XX mov 0($ctx),$A # load context mov 4($ctx),$B mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov $B,@T[0] # magic seed mov 16($ctx),$E mov $C,@T[1] xor $D,@T[1] and @T[1],@T[0] vmovdqa 64($K_XX_XX),@X[2] # pbswap mask vmovdqa 0($K_XX_XX),$Kx # K_00_19 vmovdqu 0($inp),@X[-4&7] # load input to %xmm[0-3] vmovdqu 16($inp),@X[-3&7] vmovdqu 32($inp),@X[-2&7] vmovdqu 48($inp),@X[-1&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7] # byte swap add \$64,$inp vpshufb @X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7] vpaddd $Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0] # add K_00_19 vpaddd $Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1] vpaddd $Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2] vmovdqa @X[0],0(%rsp) # X[]+K xfer to IALU vmovdqa @X[1],16(%rsp) vmovdqa @X[2],32(%rsp) vmovups -112($key),$rndkey0 # $key[0] jmp .Loop_dec_avx .align 32 .Loop_dec_avx: ___ &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59_dec); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39_dec,".Ldone_dec_avx"); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; $saved_rx=$rx; &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39_dec); eval(@aes256_dec[-1]); # last store $code.=<<___; lea 64($in0),$in0 add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C add 12($ctx),$D mov $A,0($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov @T[0],4($ctx) mov @T[0],$B # magic seed mov $C,8($ctx) mov $C,@T[1] mov $D,12($ctx) xor $D,@T[1] mov $E,16($ctx) and @T[1],@T[0] jmp .Loop_dec_avx .Ldone_dec_avx: ___ $jj=$j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; $rx=$saved_rx; &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39_dec); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39_dec); eval(@aes256_dec[-1]); # last store $code.=<<___; add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C mov $A,0($ctx) add 12($ctx),$D mov @T[0],4($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov $C,8($ctx) mov $D,12($ctx) mov $E,16($ctx) vmovups @X[3],($ivp) # write IV vzeroall ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 96+0(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 96+16(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 96+32(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 96+48(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 96+64(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 96+80(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 96+96(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 96+112(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 96+128(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 96+144(%rsp),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; lea `104+($win64?10*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsi mov 0(%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_dec_avx: ret .size aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx,.-aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_avx ___ }}} } $code.=<<___; .align 64 K_XX_XX: .long 0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999 # K_00_19 .long 0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1 # K_20_39 .long 0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc # K_40_59 .long 0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6 # K_60_79 .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f # pbswap mask .byte 0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0 .asciz "AESNI-CBC+SHA1 stitch for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 ___ if ($shaext) {{{ ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10"); $rounds="%r11d"; ($iv,$in,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(2,14,15)); @rndkey=("%xmm0","%xmm1"); $r=0; my ($BSWAP,$ABCD,$E,$E_,$ABCD_SAVE,$E_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(7..12)); my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(3..6)); $code.=<<___; .type aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea `-8-10*16`(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,-8-10*16(%rax) movaps %xmm7,-8-9*16(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-8-8*16(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-8-7*16(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-8-6*16(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-8-5*16(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-8-4*16(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-8-3*16(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-8-2*16(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-8-1*16(%rax) .Lprologue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; movdqu ($ctx),$ABCD movd 16($ctx),$E movdqa K_XX_XX+0x50(%rip),$BSWAP # byte-n-word swap mov 240($key),$rounds sub $in0,$out movups ($key),$rndkey0 # $key[0] movups ($ivp),$iv # load IV movups 16($key),$rndkey[0] # forward reference lea 112($key),$key # size optimization pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD # flip word order pshufd \$0b00011011,$E,$E # flip word order jmp .Loop_shaext .align 16 .Loop_shaext: ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; movdqu ($inp),@MSG[0] movdqa $E,$E_SAVE # offload $E pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[0] movdqu 0x10($inp),@MSG[1] movdqa $ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE # offload $ABCD ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[1] paddd @MSG[0],$E movdqu 0x20($inp),@MSG[2] lea 0x40($inp),$inp pxor $E_SAVE,@MSG[0] # black magic ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; pxor $E_SAVE,@MSG[0] # black magic movdqa $ABCD,$E_ pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[2] sha1rnds4 \$0,$E,$ABCD # 0-3 sha1nexte @MSG[1],$E_ ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha1msg1 @MSG[1],@MSG[0] movdqu -0x10($inp),@MSG[3] movdqa $ABCD,$E pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[3] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha1rnds4 \$0,$E_,$ABCD # 4-7 sha1nexte @MSG[2],$E pxor @MSG[2],@MSG[0] sha1msg1 @MSG[2],@MSG[1] ___ &$aesenc(); for($i=2;$i<20-4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; movdqa $ABCD,$E_ sha1rnds4 \$`int($i/5)`,$E,$ABCD # 8-11 sha1nexte @MSG[3],$E_ ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha1msg2 @MSG[3],@MSG[0] pxor @MSG[3],@MSG[1] sha1msg1 @MSG[3],@MSG[2] ___ ($E,$E_)=($E_,$E); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); &$aesenc(); } $code.=<<___; movdqa $ABCD,$E_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E,$ABCD # 64-67 sha1nexte @MSG[3],$E_ sha1msg2 @MSG[3],@MSG[0] pxor @MSG[3],@MSG[1] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; movdqa $ABCD,$E sha1rnds4 \$3,$E_,$ABCD # 68-71 sha1nexte @MSG[0],$E sha1msg2 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; movdqa $E_SAVE,@MSG[0] movdqa $ABCD,$E_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E,$ABCD # 72-75 sha1nexte @MSG[1],$E_ ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; movdqa $ABCD,$E sha1rnds4 \$3,$E_,$ABCD # 76-79 sha1nexte $MSG[0],$E ___ while($r<40) { &$aesenc(); } # remaining aesenc's $code.=<<___; dec $len paddd $ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD movups $iv,48($out,$in0) # write output lea 64($in0),$in0 jnz .Loop_shaext pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD pshufd \$0b00011011,$E,$E movups $iv,($ivp) # write IV movdqu $ABCD,($ctx) movd $E,16($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -8-10*16(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -8-9*16(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -8-8*16(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -8-7*16(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -8-6*16(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -8-5*16(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -8-4*16(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -8-3*16(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -8-2*16(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -8-1*16(%rax),%xmm15 mov %rax,%rsp .Lepilogue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext ___ }}} # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type ssse3_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ssse3_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); lea aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx jb .Lseh_no_shaext lea (%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq lea 168(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail .Lseh_no_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; lea 96(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq lea `104+10*16`(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer mov 0(%rax),%r15 mov 8(%rax),%r14 mov 16(%rax),%r13 mov 24(%rax),%r12 mov 32(%rax),%rbp mov 40(%rax),%rbx lea 48(%rax),%rax mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size ssse3_handler,.-ssse3_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3 .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3 .rva .LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx .rva .LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext .rva .LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ssse3_handler .rva .Lprologue_ssse3,.Lepilogue_ssse3 # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ssse3_handler .rva .Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); .LSEH_info_aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ssse3_handler .rva .Lprologue_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext # HandlerData[] ___ } #################################################################### sub rex { local *opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src)=@_; my $rex=0; $rex|=0x04 if($dst>=8); $rex|=0x01 if($src>=8); unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40 if($rex); } sub sha1rnds4 { if (@_[0] =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc); rex(\@opcode,$3,$2); push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$1; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return "sha1rnds4\t".@_[0]; } } sub sha1op38 { my $instr = shift; my %opcodelet = ( "sha1nexte" => 0xc8, "sha1msg1" => 0xc9, "sha1msg2" => 0xca ); if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38); rex(\@opcode,$2,$1); push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr}; push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return $instr."\t".@_[0]; } } sub aesni { my $line=shift; my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38); if ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my %opcodelet = ( "aesenc" => 0xdc, "aesenclast" => 0xdd, "aesdec" => 0xde, "aesdeclast" => 0xdf ); return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1})); rex(\@opcode,$3,$2); push @opcode,$opcodelet{$1},0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M unshift @opcode,0x66; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } return $line; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\b(sha1rnds4)\s+(.*)/sha1rnds4($2)/geo or s/\b(sha1[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha1op38($1,$2)/geo or s/\b(aes.*%xmm[0-9]+).*$/aesni($1)/geo; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl0000644000000000000000000017443713176625656017436 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # # Specific modes and adaptation for Linux kernel by Ard Biesheuvel # . Permission to use under GPL terms is # granted. # ==================================================================== # Bit-sliced AES for ARM NEON # # February 2012. # # This implementation is direct adaptation of bsaes-x86_64 module for # ARM NEON. Except that this module is endian-neutral [in sense that # it can be compiled for either endianness] by courtesy of vld1.8's # neutrality. Initial version doesn't implement interface to OpenSSL, # only low-level primitives and unsupported entry points, just enough # to collect performance results, which for Cortex-A8 core are: # # encrypt 19.5 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key # decrypt 22.1 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key # key conv. 440 cycles per 128-bit key/0.18 of 8x block # # Snapdragon S4 encrypts byte in 17.6 cycles and decrypts in 19.7, # which is [much] worse than anticipated (for further details see # http://www.openssl.org/~appro/Snapdragon-S4.html). # # Cortex-A15 manages in 14.2/16.1 cycles [when integer-only code # manages in 20.0 cycles]. # # When comparing to x86_64 results keep in mind that NEON unit is # [mostly] single-issue and thus can't [fully] benefit from # instruction-level parallelism. And when comparing to aes-armv4 # results keep in mind key schedule conversion overhead (see # bsaes-x86_64.pl for further details)... # # # April-August 2013 # # Add CBC, CTR and XTS subroutines, adapt for kernel use. # # $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } my ($inp,$out,$len,$key)=("r0","r1","r2","r3"); my @XMM=map("q$_",(0..15)); { my ($key,$rounds,$const)=("r4","r5","r6"); sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; } sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; } sub Sbox { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b0, b1, b4, b6, b3, b7, b2, b5] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..11]; my @s=@_[12..15]; &InBasisChange (@b); &Inv_GF256 (@b[6,5,0,3,7,1,4,2],@t,@s); &OutBasisChange (@b[7,1,4,2,6,5,0,3]); } sub InBasisChange { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b6, b5, b0, b3, b7, b1, b4, b2] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; $code.=<<___; veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[1] veor @b[5], @b[5], @b[6] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[0] veor @b[6], @b[6], @b[2] veor @b[5], @b[5], @b[0] veor @b[6], @b[6], @b[3] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[7] veor @b[7], @b[7], @b[5] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[4] veor @b[4], @b[4], @b[5] veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[7] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[1] veor @b[1], @b[1], @b[5] ___ } sub OutBasisChange { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b6, b1, b2, b4, b7, b0, b3, b5] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; $code.=<<___; veor @b[0], @b[0], @b[6] veor @b[1], @b[1], @b[4] veor @b[4], @b[4], @b[6] veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[0] veor @b[6], @b[6], @b[1] veor @b[1], @b[1], @b[5] veor @b[5], @b[5], @b[3] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[7] veor @b[7], @b[7], @b[5] veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[5] veor @b[4], @b[4], @b[7] ___ } sub InvSbox { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b0, b1, b6, b4, b2, b7, b3, b5] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..11]; my @s=@_[12..15]; &InvInBasisChange (@b); &Inv_GF256 (@b[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4],@t,@s); &InvOutBasisChange (@b[3,7,0,4,5,1,2,6]); } sub InvInBasisChange { # OutBasisChange in reverse (with twist) my @b=@_[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4]; $code.=<<___ veor @b[1], @b[1], @b[7] veor @b[4], @b[4], @b[7] veor @b[7], @b[7], @b[5] veor @b[1], @b[1], @b[3] veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[5] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[7] veor @b[6], @b[6], @b[1] veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[0] veor @b[5], @b[5], @b[3] veor @b[4], @b[4], @b[6] veor @b[0], @b[0], @b[6] veor @b[1], @b[1], @b[4] ___ } sub InvOutBasisChange { # InBasisChange in reverse my @b=@_[2,5,7,3,6,1,0,4]; $code.=<<___; veor @b[1], @b[1], @b[5] veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[7] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[1] veor @b[4], @b[4], @b[5] veor @b[7], @b[7], @b[5] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[4] veor @b[5], @b[5], @b[0] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[7] veor @b[6], @b[6], @b[2] veor @b[2], @b[2], @b[1] veor @b[6], @b[6], @b[3] veor @b[3], @b[3], @b[0] veor @b[5], @b[5], @b[6] ___ } sub Mul_GF4 { #;************************************************************* #;* Mul_GF4: Input x0-x1,y0-y1 Output x0-x1 Temp t0 (8) * #;************************************************************* my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0,$t1)=@_; $code.=<<___; veor $t0, $y0, $y1 vand $t0, $t0, $x0 veor $x0, $x0, $x1 vand $t1, $x1, $y0 vand $x0, $x0, $y1 veor $x1, $t1, $t0 veor $x0, $x0, $t1 ___ } sub Mul_GF4_N { # not used, see next subroutine # multiply and scale by N my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0)=@_; $code.=<<___; veor $t0, $y0, $y1 vand $t0, $t0, $x0 veor $x0, $x0, $x1 vand $x1, $x1, $y0 vand $x0, $x0, $y1 veor $x1, $x1, $x0 veor $x0, $x0, $t0 ___ } sub Mul_GF4_N_GF4 { # interleaved Mul_GF4_N and Mul_GF4 my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0, $x2,$x3,$y2,$y3,$t1)=@_; $code.=<<___; veor $t0, $y0, $y1 veor $t1, $y2, $y3 vand $t0, $t0, $x0 vand $t1, $t1, $x2 veor $x0, $x0, $x1 veor $x2, $x2, $x3 vand $x1, $x1, $y0 vand $x3, $x3, $y2 vand $x0, $x0, $y1 vand $x2, $x2, $y3 veor $x1, $x1, $x0 veor $x2, $x2, $x3 veor $x0, $x0, $t0 veor $x3, $x3, $t1 ___ } sub Mul_GF16_2 { my @x=@_[0..7]; my @y=@_[8..11]; my @t=@_[12..15]; $code.=<<___; veor @t[0], @x[0], @x[2] veor @t[1], @x[1], @x[3] ___ &Mul_GF4 (@x[0], @x[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[2..3]); $code.=<<___; veor @y[0], @y[0], @y[2] veor @y[1], @y[1], @y[3] ___ Mul_GF4_N_GF4 (@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3], @x[2], @x[3], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]); $code.=<<___; veor @x[0], @x[0], @t[0] veor @x[2], @x[2], @t[0] veor @x[1], @x[1], @t[1] veor @x[3], @x[3], @t[1] veor @t[0], @x[4], @x[6] veor @t[1], @x[5], @x[7] ___ &Mul_GF4_N_GF4 (@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3], @x[6], @x[7], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]); $code.=<<___; veor @y[0], @y[0], @y[2] veor @y[1], @y[1], @y[3] ___ &Mul_GF4 (@x[4], @x[5], @y[0], @y[1], @t[2..3]); $code.=<<___; veor @x[4], @x[4], @t[0] veor @x[6], @x[6], @t[0] veor @x[5], @x[5], @t[1] veor @x[7], @x[7], @t[1] ___ } sub Inv_GF256 { #;******************************************************************** #;* Inv_GF256: Input x0-x7 Output x0-x7 Temp t0-t3,s0-s3 (144) * #;******************************************************************** my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..11]; my @s=@_[12..15]; # direct optimizations from hardware $code.=<<___; veor @t[3], @x[4], @x[6] veor @t[2], @x[5], @x[7] veor @t[1], @x[1], @x[3] veor @s[1], @x[7], @x[6] vmov @t[0], @t[2] veor @s[0], @x[0], @x[2] vorr @t[2], @t[2], @t[1] veor @s[3], @t[3], @t[0] vand @s[2], @t[3], @s[0] vorr @t[3], @t[3], @s[0] veor @s[0], @s[0], @t[1] vand @t[0], @t[0], @t[1] veor @t[1], @x[3], @x[2] vand @s[3], @s[3], @s[0] vand @s[1], @s[1], @t[1] veor @t[1], @x[4], @x[5] veor @s[0], @x[1], @x[0] veor @t[3], @t[3], @s[1] veor @t[2], @t[2], @s[1] vand @s[1], @t[1], @s[0] vorr @t[1], @t[1], @s[0] veor @t[3], @t[3], @s[3] veor @t[0], @t[0], @s[1] veor @t[2], @t[2], @s[2] veor @t[1], @t[1], @s[3] veor @t[0], @t[0], @s[2] vand @s[0], @x[7], @x[3] veor @t[1], @t[1], @s[2] vand @s[1], @x[6], @x[2] vand @s[2], @x[5], @x[1] vorr @s[3], @x[4], @x[0] veor @t[3], @t[3], @s[0] veor @t[1], @t[1], @s[2] veor @t[0], @t[0], @s[3] veor @t[2], @t[2], @s[1] @ Inv_GF16 \t0, \t1, \t2, \t3, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3 @ new smaller inversion vand @s[2], @t[3], @t[1] vmov @s[0], @t[0] veor @s[1], @t[2], @s[2] veor @s[3], @t[0], @s[2] veor @s[2], @t[0], @s[2] @ @s[2]=@s[3] vbsl @s[1], @t[1], @t[0] vbsl @s[3], @t[3], @t[2] veor @t[3], @t[3], @t[2] vbsl @s[0], @s[1], @s[2] vbsl @t[0], @s[2], @s[1] vand @s[2], @s[0], @s[3] veor @t[1], @t[1], @t[0] veor @s[2], @s[2], @t[3] ___ # output in s3, s2, s1, t1 # Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \t2, \t3, \t0, \t1, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3 # Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \s3, \s2, \s1, \t1, \s0, \t0, \t2, \t3 &Mul_GF16_2(@x,@s[3,2,1],@t[1],@s[0],@t[0,2,3]); ### output msb > [x3,x2,x1,x0,x7,x6,x5,x4] < lsb } # AES linear components sub ShiftRows { my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..11]; my $mask=pop; $code.=<<___; vldmia $key!, {@t[0]-@t[3]} veor @t[0], @t[0], @x[0] veor @t[1], @t[1], @x[1] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[0])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[0])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dhi($mask)` vldmia $key!, {@t[0]} veor @t[2], @t[2], @x[2] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[1])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[1])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dhi($mask)` vldmia $key!, {@t[1]} veor @t[3], @t[3], @x[3] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[2])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[2])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dhi($mask)` vldmia $key!, {@t[2]} vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[3])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[3])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dhi($mask)` vldmia $key!, {@t[3]} veor @t[0], @t[0], @x[4] veor @t[1], @t[1], @x[5] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[4])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[4])`, {@t[0]}, `&Dhi($mask)` veor @t[2], @t[2], @x[6] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[5])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[5])`, {@t[1]}, `&Dhi($mask)` veor @t[3], @t[3], @x[7] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[6])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[6])`, {@t[2]}, `&Dhi($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@x[7])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dlo($mask)` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@x[7])`, {@t[3]}, `&Dhi($mask)` ___ } sub MixColumns { # modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last] my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; my $inv=@_[16]; # optional $code.=<<___; vext.8 @t[0], @x[0], @x[0], #12 @ x0 <<< 32 vext.8 @t[1], @x[1], @x[1], #12 veor @x[0], @x[0], @t[0] @ x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32) vext.8 @t[2], @x[2], @x[2], #12 veor @x[1], @x[1], @t[1] vext.8 @t[3], @x[3], @x[3], #12 veor @x[2], @x[2], @t[2] vext.8 @t[4], @x[4], @x[4], #12 veor @x[3], @x[3], @t[3] vext.8 @t[5], @x[5], @x[5], #12 veor @x[4], @x[4], @t[4] vext.8 @t[6], @x[6], @x[6], #12 veor @x[5], @x[5], @t[5] vext.8 @t[7], @x[7], @x[7], #12 veor @x[6], @x[6], @t[6] veor @t[1], @t[1], @x[0] veor @x[7], @x[7], @t[7] vext.8 @x[0], @x[0], @x[0], #8 @ (x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32)) <<< 64) veor @t[2], @t[2], @x[1] veor @t[0], @t[0], @x[7] veor @t[1], @t[1], @x[7] vext.8 @x[1], @x[1], @x[1], #8 veor @t[5], @t[5], @x[4] veor @x[0], @x[0], @t[0] veor @t[6], @t[6], @x[5] veor @x[1], @x[1], @t[1] vext.8 @t[0], @x[4], @x[4], #8 veor @t[4], @t[4], @x[3] vext.8 @t[1], @x[5], @x[5], #8 veor @t[7], @t[7], @x[6] vext.8 @x[4], @x[3], @x[3], #8 veor @t[3], @t[3], @x[2] vext.8 @x[5], @x[7], @x[7], #8 veor @t[4], @t[4], @x[7] vext.8 @x[3], @x[6], @x[6], #8 veor @t[3], @t[3], @x[7] vext.8 @x[6], @x[2], @x[2], #8 veor @x[7], @t[1], @t[5] ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$inv); veor @x[2], @t[0], @t[4] veor @x[4], @x[4], @t[3] veor @x[5], @x[5], @t[7] veor @x[3], @x[3], @t[6] @ vmov @x[2], @t[0] veor @x[6], @x[6], @t[2] @ vmov @x[7], @t[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($inv); veor @t[3], @t[3], @x[4] veor @x[5], @x[5], @t[7] veor @x[2], @x[3], @t[6] veor @x[3], @t[0], @t[4] veor @x[4], @x[6], @t[2] vmov @x[6], @t[3] @ vmov @x[7], @t[1] ___ } sub InvMixColumns_orig { my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; $code.=<<___; @ multiplication by 0x0e vext.8 @t[7], @x[7], @x[7], #12 vmov @t[2], @x[2] veor @x[2], @x[2], @x[5] @ 2 5 veor @x[7], @x[7], @x[5] @ 7 5 vext.8 @t[0], @x[0], @x[0], #12 vmov @t[5], @x[5] veor @x[5], @x[5], @x[0] @ 5 0 [1] veor @x[0], @x[0], @x[1] @ 0 1 vext.8 @t[1], @x[1], @x[1], #12 veor @x[1], @x[1], @x[2] @ 1 25 veor @x[0], @x[0], @x[6] @ 01 6 [2] vext.8 @t[3], @x[3], @x[3], #12 veor @x[1], @x[1], @x[3] @ 125 3 [4] veor @x[2], @x[2], @x[0] @ 25 016 [3] veor @x[3], @x[3], @x[7] @ 3 75 veor @x[7], @x[7], @x[6] @ 75 6 [0] vext.8 @t[6], @x[6], @x[6], #12 vmov @t[4], @x[4] veor @x[6], @x[6], @x[4] @ 6 4 veor @x[4], @x[4], @x[3] @ 4 375 [6] veor @x[3], @x[3], @x[7] @ 375 756=36 veor @x[6], @x[6], @t[5] @ 64 5 [7] veor @x[3], @x[3], @t[2] @ 36 2 vext.8 @t[5], @t[5], @t[5], #12 veor @x[3], @x[3], @t[4] @ 362 4 [5] ___ my @y = @x[7,5,0,2,1,3,4,6]; $code.=<<___; @ multiplication by 0x0b veor @y[1], @y[1], @y[0] veor @y[0], @y[0], @t[0] vext.8 @t[2], @t[2], @t[2], #12 veor @y[1], @y[1], @t[1] veor @y[0], @y[0], @t[5] vext.8 @t[4], @t[4], @t[4], #12 veor @y[1], @y[1], @t[6] veor @y[0], @y[0], @t[7] veor @t[7], @t[7], @t[6] @ clobber t[7] veor @y[3], @y[3], @t[0] veor @y[1], @y[1], @y[0] vext.8 @t[0], @t[0], @t[0], #12 veor @y[2], @y[2], @t[1] veor @y[4], @y[4], @t[1] vext.8 @t[1], @t[1], @t[1], #12 veor @y[2], @y[2], @t[2] veor @y[3], @y[3], @t[2] veor @y[5], @y[5], @t[2] veor @y[2], @y[2], @t[7] vext.8 @t[2], @t[2], @t[2], #12 veor @y[3], @y[3], @t[3] veor @y[6], @y[6], @t[3] veor @y[4], @y[4], @t[3] veor @y[7], @y[7], @t[4] vext.8 @t[3], @t[3], @t[3], #12 veor @y[5], @y[5], @t[4] veor @y[7], @y[7], @t[7] veor @t[7], @t[7], @t[5] @ clobber t[7] even more veor @y[3], @y[3], @t[5] veor @y[4], @y[4], @t[4] veor @y[5], @y[5], @t[7] vext.8 @t[4], @t[4], @t[4], #12 veor @y[6], @y[6], @t[7] veor @y[4], @y[4], @t[7] veor @t[7], @t[7], @t[5] vext.8 @t[5], @t[5], @t[5], #12 @ multiplication by 0x0d veor @y[4], @y[4], @y[7] veor @t[7], @t[7], @t[6] @ restore t[7] veor @y[7], @y[7], @t[4] vext.8 @t[6], @t[6], @t[6], #12 veor @y[2], @y[2], @t[0] veor @y[7], @y[7], @t[5] vext.8 @t[7], @t[7], @t[7], #12 veor @y[2], @y[2], @t[2] veor @y[3], @y[3], @y[1] veor @y[1], @y[1], @t[1] veor @y[0], @y[0], @t[0] veor @y[3], @y[3], @t[0] veor @y[1], @y[1], @t[5] veor @y[0], @y[0], @t[5] vext.8 @t[0], @t[0], @t[0], #12 veor @y[1], @y[1], @t[7] veor @y[0], @y[0], @t[6] veor @y[3], @y[3], @y[1] veor @y[4], @y[4], @t[1] vext.8 @t[1], @t[1], @t[1], #12 veor @y[7], @y[7], @t[7] veor @y[4], @y[4], @t[2] veor @y[5], @y[5], @t[2] veor @y[2], @y[2], @t[6] veor @t[6], @t[6], @t[3] @ clobber t[6] vext.8 @t[2], @t[2], @t[2], #12 veor @y[4], @y[4], @y[7] veor @y[3], @y[3], @t[6] veor @y[6], @y[6], @t[6] veor @y[5], @y[5], @t[5] vext.8 @t[5], @t[5], @t[5], #12 veor @y[6], @y[6], @t[4] vext.8 @t[4], @t[4], @t[4], #12 veor @y[5], @y[5], @t[6] veor @y[6], @y[6], @t[7] vext.8 @t[7], @t[7], @t[7], #12 veor @t[6], @t[6], @t[3] @ restore t[6] vext.8 @t[3], @t[3], @t[3], #12 @ multiplication by 0x09 veor @y[4], @y[4], @y[1] veor @t[1], @t[1], @y[1] @ t[1]=y[1] veor @t[0], @t[0], @t[5] @ clobber t[0] vext.8 @t[6], @t[6], @t[6], #12 veor @t[1], @t[1], @t[5] veor @y[3], @y[3], @t[0] veor @t[0], @t[0], @y[0] @ t[0]=y[0] veor @t[1], @t[1], @t[6] veor @t[6], @t[6], @t[7] @ clobber t[6] veor @y[4], @y[4], @t[1] veor @y[7], @y[7], @t[4] veor @y[6], @y[6], @t[3] veor @y[5], @y[5], @t[2] veor @t[4], @t[4], @y[4] @ t[4]=y[4] veor @t[3], @t[3], @y[3] @ t[3]=y[3] veor @t[5], @t[5], @y[5] @ t[5]=y[5] veor @t[2], @t[2], @y[2] @ t[2]=y[2] veor @t[3], @t[3], @t[7] veor @XMM[5], @t[5], @t[6] veor @XMM[6], @t[6], @y[6] @ t[6]=y[6] veor @XMM[2], @t[2], @t[6] veor @XMM[7], @t[7], @y[7] @ t[7]=y[7] vmov @XMM[0], @t[0] vmov @XMM[1], @t[1] @ vmov @XMM[2], @t[2] vmov @XMM[3], @t[3] vmov @XMM[4], @t[4] @ vmov @XMM[5], @t[5] @ vmov @XMM[6], @t[6] @ vmov @XMM[7], @t[7] ___ } sub InvMixColumns { my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; # Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to # # | 0e 0b 0d 09 | | 02 03 01 01 | | 05 00 04 00 | # | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 | # | 0d 09 0e 0b | | 01 01 02 03 | | 04 00 05 00 | # | 0b 0d 09 0e | | 03 01 01 02 | | 00 04 00 05 | $code.=<<___; @ multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00 vext.8 @t[0], @x[0], @x[0], #8 vext.8 @t[6], @x[6], @x[6], #8 vext.8 @t[7], @x[7], @x[7], #8 veor @t[0], @t[0], @x[0] vext.8 @t[1], @x[1], @x[1], #8 veor @t[6], @t[6], @x[6] vext.8 @t[2], @x[2], @x[2], #8 veor @t[7], @t[7], @x[7] vext.8 @t[3], @x[3], @x[3], #8 veor @t[1], @t[1], @x[1] vext.8 @t[4], @x[4], @x[4], #8 veor @t[2], @t[2], @x[2] vext.8 @t[5], @x[5], @x[5], #8 veor @t[3], @t[3], @x[3] veor @t[4], @t[4], @x[4] veor @t[5], @t[5], @x[5] veor @x[0], @x[0], @t[6] veor @x[1], @x[1], @t[6] veor @x[2], @x[2], @t[0] veor @x[4], @x[4], @t[2] veor @x[3], @x[3], @t[1] veor @x[1], @x[1], @t[7] veor @x[2], @x[2], @t[7] veor @x[4], @x[4], @t[6] veor @x[5], @x[5], @t[3] veor @x[3], @x[3], @t[6] veor @x[6], @x[6], @t[4] veor @x[4], @x[4], @t[7] veor @x[5], @x[5], @t[7] veor @x[7], @x[7], @t[5] ___ &MixColumns (@x,@t,1); # flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6 } sub swapmove { my ($a,$b,$n,$mask,$t)=@_; $code.=<<___; vshr.u64 $t, $b, #$n veor $t, $t, $a vand $t, $t, $mask veor $a, $a, $t vshl.u64 $t, $t, #$n veor $b, $b, $t ___ } sub swapmove2x { my ($a0,$b0,$a1,$b1,$n,$mask,$t0,$t1)=@_; $code.=<<___; vshr.u64 $t0, $b0, #$n vshr.u64 $t1, $b1, #$n veor $t0, $t0, $a0 veor $t1, $t1, $a1 vand $t0, $t0, $mask vand $t1, $t1, $mask veor $a0, $a0, $t0 vshl.u64 $t0, $t0, #$n veor $a1, $a1, $t1 vshl.u64 $t1, $t1, #$n veor $b0, $b0, $t0 veor $b1, $b1, $t1 ___ } sub bitslice { my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..11]; $code.=<<___; vmov.i8 $t0,#0x55 @ compose .LBS0 vmov.i8 $t1,#0x33 @ compose .LBS1 ___ &swapmove2x(@x[0,1,2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); $code.=<<___; vmov.i8 $t0,#0x0f @ compose .LBS2 ___ &swapmove2x(@x[0,2,1,3],2,$t1,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[0,4,1,5],4,$t0,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[2,6,3,7],4,$t0,$t2,$t3); } $code.=<<___; #ifndef __KERNEL__ # include "arm_arch.h" # define VFP_ABI_PUSH vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} # define VFP_ABI_POP vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} # define VFP_ABI_FRAME 0x40 #else # define VFP_ABI_PUSH # define VFP_ABI_POP # define VFP_ABI_FRAME 0 # define BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY # define XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK # define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ # define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ 7 #endif #ifdef __thumb__ # define adrl adr #endif #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .text .syntax unified @ ARMv7-capable assembler is expected to handle this #if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__) .thumb #else .code 32 # undef __thumb2__ #endif .type _bsaes_decrypt8,%function .align 4 _bsaes_decrypt8: adr $const,_bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $key!, {@XMM[9]} @ round 0 key #ifdef __APPLE__ adr $const,.LM0ISR #else add $const,$const,#.LM0ISR-_bsaes_decrypt8 #endif vldmia $const!, {@XMM[8]} @ .LM0ISR veor @XMM[10], @XMM[0], @XMM[9] @ xor with round0 key veor @XMM[11], @XMM[1], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[13], @XMM[3], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[14], @XMM[4], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[15], @XMM[5], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[10], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` ___ &bitslice (@XMM[0..7, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; sub $rounds,$rounds,#1 b .Ldec_sbox .align 4 .Ldec_loop: ___ &ShiftRows (@XMM[0..7, 8..12]); $code.=".Ldec_sbox:\n"; &InvSbox (@XMM[0..7, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 bcc .Ldec_done ___ &InvMixColumns (@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; vldmia $const, {@XMM[12]} @ .LISR ite eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM addeq $const,$const,#0x10 bne .Ldec_loop vldmia $const, {@XMM[12]} @ .LISRM0 b .Ldec_loop .align 4 .Ldec_done: ___ &bitslice (@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; vldmia $key, {@XMM[8]} @ last round key veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] bx lr .size _bsaes_decrypt8,.-_bsaes_decrypt8 .type _bsaes_const,%object .align 6 _bsaes_const: .LM0ISR: @ InvShiftRows constants .quad 0x0a0e0206070b0f03, 0x0004080c0d010509 .LISR: .quad 0x0504070602010003, 0x0f0e0d0c080b0a09 .LISRM0: .quad 0x01040b0e0205080f, 0x0306090c00070a0d .LM0SR: @ ShiftRows constants .quad 0x0a0e02060f03070b, 0x0004080c05090d01 .LSR: .quad 0x0504070600030201, 0x0f0e0d0c0a09080b .LSRM0: .quad 0x0304090e00050a0f, 0x01060b0c0207080d .LM0: .quad 0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d .LREVM0SR: .quad 0x090d01050c000408, 0x03070b0f060a0e02 .asciz "Bit-sliced AES for NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 6 .size _bsaes_const,.-_bsaes_const .type _bsaes_encrypt8,%function .align 4 _bsaes_encrypt8: adr $const,_bsaes_encrypt8 vldmia $key!, {@XMM[9]} @ round 0 key #ifdef __APPLE__ adr $const,.LM0SR #else sub $const,$const,#_bsaes_encrypt8-.LM0SR #endif vldmia $const!, {@XMM[8]} @ .LM0SR _bsaes_encrypt8_alt: veor @XMM[10], @XMM[0], @XMM[9] @ xor with round0 key veor @XMM[11], @XMM[1], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[0])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[1])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[13], @XMM[3], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[2])`, {@XMM[12]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[14], @XMM[4], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[3])`, {@XMM[13]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[15], @XMM[5], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[4])`, {@XMM[14]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[10], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[5])`, {@XMM[15]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[9] vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[6])`, {@XMM[10]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dlo(@XMM[8])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[7])`, {@XMM[11]}, `&Dhi(@XMM[8])` _bsaes_encrypt8_bitslice: ___ &bitslice (@XMM[0..7, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; sub $rounds,$rounds,#1 b .Lenc_sbox .align 4 .Lenc_loop: ___ &ShiftRows (@XMM[0..7, 8..12]); $code.=".Lenc_sbox:\n"; &Sbox (@XMM[0..7, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 bcc .Lenc_done ___ &MixColumns (@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; vldmia $const, {@XMM[12]} @ .LSR ite eq @ Thumb2 thing, samity check in ARM addeq $const,$const,#0x10 bne .Lenc_loop vldmia $const, {@XMM[12]} @ .LSRM0 b .Lenc_loop .align 4 .Lenc_done: ___ # output in lsb > [t0, t1, t4, t6, t3, t7, t2, t5] < msb &bitslice (@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; vldmia $key, {@XMM[8]} @ last round key veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] bx lr .size _bsaes_encrypt8,.-_bsaes_encrypt8 ___ } { my ($out,$inp,$rounds,$const)=("r12","r4","r5","r6"); sub bitslice_key { my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]); my ($bs0,$bs1,$bs2,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..12]; &swapmove (@x[0,1],1,$bs0,$t2,$t3); $code.=<<___; @ &swapmove(@x[2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); vmov @x[2], @x[0] vmov @x[3], @x[1] ___ #&swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x (@x[0,2,1,3],2,$bs1,$t2,$t3); $code.=<<___; @ &swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3); vmov @x[4], @x[0] vmov @x[6], @x[2] vmov @x[5], @x[1] vmov @x[7], @x[3] ___ &swapmove2x (@x[0,4,1,5],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x (@x[2,6,3,7],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3); } $code.=<<___; .type _bsaes_key_convert,%function .align 4 _bsaes_key_convert: adr $const,_bsaes_key_convert vld1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$inp]! @ load round 0 key #ifdef __APPLE__ adr $const,.LM0 #else sub $const,$const,#_bsaes_key_convert-.LM0 #endif vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! @ load round 1 key vmov.i8 @XMM[8], #0x01 @ bit masks vmov.i8 @XMM[9], #0x02 vmov.i8 @XMM[10], #0x04 vmov.i8 @XMM[11], #0x08 vmov.i8 @XMM[12], #0x10 vmov.i8 @XMM[13], #0x20 vldmia $const, {@XMM[14]} @ .LM0 #ifdef __ARMEL__ vrev32.8 @XMM[7], @XMM[7] vrev32.8 @XMM[15], @XMM[15] #endif sub $rounds,$rounds,#1 vstmia $out!, {@XMM[7]} @ save round 0 key b .Lkey_loop .align 4 .Lkey_loop: vtbl.8 `&Dlo(@XMM[7])`,{@XMM[15]},`&Dlo(@XMM[14])` vtbl.8 `&Dhi(@XMM[7])`,{@XMM[15]},`&Dhi(@XMM[14])` vmov.i8 @XMM[6], #0x40 vmov.i8 @XMM[15], #0x80 vtst.8 @XMM[0], @XMM[7], @XMM[8] vtst.8 @XMM[1], @XMM[7], @XMM[9] vtst.8 @XMM[2], @XMM[7], @XMM[10] vtst.8 @XMM[3], @XMM[7], @XMM[11] vtst.8 @XMM[4], @XMM[7], @XMM[12] vtst.8 @XMM[5], @XMM[7], @XMM[13] vtst.8 @XMM[6], @XMM[7], @XMM[6] vtst.8 @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15] vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! @ load next round key vmvn @XMM[0], @XMM[0] @ "pnot" vmvn @XMM[1], @XMM[1] vmvn @XMM[5], @XMM[5] vmvn @XMM[6], @XMM[6] #ifdef __ARMEL__ vrev32.8 @XMM[15], @XMM[15] #endif subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 vstmia $out!,{@XMM[0]-@XMM[7]} @ write bit-sliced round key bne .Lkey_loop vmov.i8 @XMM[7],#0x63 @ compose .L63 @ don't save last round key bx lr .size _bsaes_key_convert,.-_bsaes_key_convert ___ } if (0) { # following four functions are unsupported interface # used for benchmarking... $code.=<<___; .globl bsaes_enc_key_convert .type bsaes_enc_key_convert,%function .align 4 bsaes_enc_key_convert: stmdb sp!,{r4-r6,lr} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so ldr r5,[$inp,#240] @ pass rounds mov r4,$inp @ pass key mov r12,$out @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert veor @XMM[7],@XMM[7],@XMM[15] @ fix up last round key vstmia r12, {@XMM[7]} @ save last round key vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r6,pc} .size bsaes_enc_key_convert,.-bsaes_enc_key_convert .globl bsaes_encrypt_128 .type bsaes_encrypt_128,%function .align 4 bsaes_encrypt_128: stmdb sp!,{r4-r6,lr} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so .Lenc128_loop: vld1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$inp]! @ load input vld1.8 {@XMM[2]-@XMM[3]}, [$inp]! mov r4,$key @ pass the key vld1.8 {@XMM[4]-@XMM[5]}, [$inp]! mov r5,#10 @ pass rounds vld1.8 {@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]! bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[3]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! subs $len,$len,#0x80 vst1.8 {@XMM[5]}, [$out]! bhi .Lenc128_loop vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r6,pc} .size bsaes_encrypt_128,.-bsaes_encrypt_128 .globl bsaes_dec_key_convert .type bsaes_dec_key_convert,%function .align 4 bsaes_dec_key_convert: stmdb sp!,{r4-r6,lr} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so ldr r5,[$inp,#240] @ pass rounds mov r4,$inp @ pass key mov r12,$out @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert vldmia $out, {@XMM[6]} vstmia r12, {@XMM[15]} @ save last round key veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6] @ fix up round 0 key vstmia $out, {@XMM[7]} vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r6,pc} .size bsaes_dec_key_convert,.-bsaes_dec_key_convert .globl bsaes_decrypt_128 .type bsaes_decrypt_128,%function .align 4 bsaes_decrypt_128: stmdb sp!,{r4-r6,lr} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so .Ldec128_loop: vld1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$inp]! @ load input vld1.8 {@XMM[2]-@XMM[3]}, [$inp]! mov r4,$key @ pass the key vld1.8 {@XMM[4]-@XMM[5]}, [$inp]! mov r5,#10 @ pass rounds vld1.8 {@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]! bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[3]}, [$out]! subs $len,$len,#0x80 vst1.8 {@XMM[5]}, [$out]! bhi .Ldec128_loop vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r6,pc} .size bsaes_decrypt_128,.-bsaes_decrypt_128 ___ } { my ($inp,$out,$len,$key, $ivp,$fp,$rounds)=map("r$_",(0..3,8..10)); my ($keysched)=("sp"); $code.=<<___; .extern AES_cbc_encrypt .extern AES_decrypt .global bsaes_cbc_encrypt .type bsaes_cbc_encrypt,%function .align 5 bsaes_cbc_encrypt: #ifndef __KERNEL__ cmp $len, #128 #ifndef __thumb__ blo AES_cbc_encrypt #else bhs 1f b AES_cbc_encrypt 1: #endif #endif @ it is up to the caller to make sure we are called with enc == 0 mov ip, sp stmdb sp!, {r4-r10, lr} VFP_ABI_PUSH ldr $ivp, [ip] @ IV is 1st arg on the stack mov $len, $len, lsr#4 @ len in 16 byte blocks sub sp, #0x10 @ scratch space to carry over the IV mov $fp, sp @ save sp ldr $rounds, [$key, #240] @ get # of rounds #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY @ allocate the key schedule on the stack sub r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7 @ 128 bytes per inner round key add r12, #`128-32` @ sifze of bit-slices key schedule @ populate the key schedule mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds mov sp, r12 @ sp is $keysched bl _bsaes_key_convert vldmia $keysched, {@XMM[6]} vstmia r12, {@XMM[15]} @ save last round key veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6] @ fix up round 0 key vstmia $keysched, {@XMM[7]} #else ldr r12, [$key, #244] eors r12, #1 beq 0f @ populate the key schedule str r12, [$key, #244] mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds add r12, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert add r4, $key, #248 vldmia r4, {@XMM[6]} vstmia r12, {@XMM[15]} @ save last round key veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6] @ fix up round 0 key vstmia r4, {@XMM[7]} .align 2 0: #endif vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$ivp] @ load IV b .Lcbc_dec_loop .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_loop: subs $len, $len, #0x8 bmi .Lcbc_dec_loop_finish vld1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$inp]! @ load input vld1.8 {@XMM[2]-@XMM[3]}, [$inp]! #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY mov r4, $keysched @ pass the key #else add r4, $key, #248 #endif vld1.8 {@XMM[4]-@XMM[5]}, [$inp]! mov r5, $rounds vld1.8 {@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp] sub $inp, $inp, #0x60 vstmia $fp, {@XMM[15]} @ put aside IV bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $fp, {@XMM[14]} @ reload IV vld1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14] @ ^= IV vld1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vld1.8 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11] vld1.8 {@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[13] vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[14] vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[3]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[5]}, [$out]! b .Lcbc_dec_loop .Lcbc_dec_loop_finish: adds $len, $len, #8 beq .Lcbc_dec_done vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$inp]! @ load input cmp $len, #2 blo .Lcbc_dec_one vld1.8 {@XMM[1]}, [$inp]! #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY mov r4, $keysched @ pass the key #else add r4, $key, #248 #endif mov r5, $rounds vstmia $fp, {@XMM[15]} @ put aside IV beq .Lcbc_dec_two vld1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$inp]! cmp $len, #4 blo .Lcbc_dec_three vld1.8 {@XMM[3]}, [$inp]! beq .Lcbc_dec_four vld1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$inp]! cmp $len, #6 blo .Lcbc_dec_five vld1.8 {@XMM[5]}, [$inp]! beq .Lcbc_dec_six vld1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$inp]! sub $inp, $inp, #0x70 bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $fp, {@XMM[14]} @ reload IV vld1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14] @ ^= IV vld1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vld1.8 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11] vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[13] vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[3]}, [$out]! b .Lcbc_dec_done .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_six: sub $inp, $inp, #0x60 bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $fp,{@XMM[14]} @ reload IV vld1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14] @ ^= IV vld1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vld1.8 {@XMM[12]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11] vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$out]! b .Lcbc_dec_done .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_five: sub $inp, $inp, #0x50 bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $fp, {@XMM[14]} @ reload IV vld1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14] @ ^= IV vld1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[11] vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! b .Lcbc_dec_done .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_four: sub $inp, $inp, #0x40 bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $fp, {@XMM[14]} @ reload IV vld1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14] @ ^= IV vld1.8 {@XMM[10]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! b .Lcbc_dec_done .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_three: sub $inp, $inp, #0x30 bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $fp, {@XMM[14]} @ reload IV vld1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14] @ ^= IV vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[9] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! b .Lcbc_dec_done .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_two: sub $inp, $inp, #0x20 bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vldmia $fp, {@XMM[14]} @ reload IV vld1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[14] @ ^= IV vld1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! @ reload input veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[8] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output b .Lcbc_dec_done .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_one: sub $inp, $inp, #0x10 mov $rounds, $out @ save original out pointer mov $out, $fp @ use the iv scratch space as out buffer mov r2, $key vmov @XMM[4],@XMM[15] @ just in case ensure that IV vmov @XMM[5],@XMM[0] @ and input are preserved bl AES_decrypt vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$fp] @ load result veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[4] @ ^= IV vmov @XMM[15], @XMM[5] @ @XMM[5] holds input vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$rounds] @ write output .Lcbc_dec_done: #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY vmov.i32 q0, #0 vmov.i32 q1, #0 .Lcbc_dec_bzero: @ wipe key schedule [if any] vstmia $keysched!, {q0-q1} cmp $keysched, $fp bne .Lcbc_dec_bzero #endif mov sp, $fp add sp, #0x10 @ add sp,$fp,#0x10 is no good for thumb vst1.8 {@XMM[15]}, [$ivp] @ return IV VFP_ABI_POP ldmia sp!, {r4-r10, pc} .size bsaes_cbc_encrypt,.-bsaes_cbc_encrypt ___ } { my ($inp,$out,$len,$key, $ctr,$fp,$rounds)=(map("r$_",(0..3,8..10))); my $const = "r6"; # shared with _bsaes_encrypt8_alt my $keysched = "sp"; $code.=<<___; .extern AES_encrypt .global bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .type bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,%function .align 5 bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks: cmp $len, #8 @ use plain AES for blo .Lctr_enc_short @ small sizes mov ip, sp stmdb sp!, {r4-r10, lr} VFP_ABI_PUSH ldr $ctr, [ip] @ ctr is 1st arg on the stack sub sp, sp, #0x10 @ scratch space to carry over the ctr mov $fp, sp @ save sp ldr $rounds, [$key, #240] @ get # of rounds #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY @ allocate the key schedule on the stack sub r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7 @ 128 bytes per inner round key add r12, #`128-32` @ size of bit-sliced key schedule @ populate the key schedule mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds mov sp, r12 @ sp is $keysched bl _bsaes_key_convert veor @XMM[7],@XMM[7],@XMM[15] @ fix up last round key vstmia r12, {@XMM[7]} @ save last round key vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$ctr] @ load counter #ifdef __APPLE__ mov $ctr, #:lower16:(.LREVM0SR-.LM0) add $ctr, $const, $ctr #else add $ctr, $const, #.LREVM0SR-.LM0 @ borrow $ctr #endif vldmia $keysched, {@XMM[4]} @ load round0 key #else ldr r12, [$key, #244] eors r12, #1 beq 0f @ populate the key schedule str r12, [$key, #244] mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds add r12, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert veor @XMM[7],@XMM[7],@XMM[15] @ fix up last round key vstmia r12, {@XMM[7]} @ save last round key .align 2 0: add r12, $key, #248 vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$ctr] @ load counter adrl $ctr, .LREVM0SR @ borrow $ctr vldmia r12, {@XMM[4]} @ load round0 key sub sp, #0x10 @ place for adjusted round0 key #endif vmov.i32 @XMM[8],#1 @ compose 1<<96 veor @XMM[9],@XMM[9],@XMM[9] vrev32.8 @XMM[0],@XMM[0] vext.8 @XMM[8],@XMM[9],@XMM[8],#4 vrev32.8 @XMM[4],@XMM[4] vadd.u32 @XMM[9],@XMM[8],@XMM[8] @ compose 2<<96 vstmia $keysched, {@XMM[4]} @ save adjusted round0 key b .Lctr_enc_loop .align 4 .Lctr_enc_loop: vadd.u32 @XMM[10], @XMM[8], @XMM[9] @ compose 3<<96 vadd.u32 @XMM[1], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] @ +1 vadd.u32 @XMM[2], @XMM[0], @XMM[9] @ +2 vadd.u32 @XMM[3], @XMM[0], @XMM[10] @ +3 vadd.u32 @XMM[4], @XMM[1], @XMM[10] vadd.u32 @XMM[5], @XMM[2], @XMM[10] vadd.u32 @XMM[6], @XMM[3], @XMM[10] vadd.u32 @XMM[7], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vadd.u32 @XMM[10], @XMM[5], @XMM[10] @ next counter @ Borrow prologue from _bsaes_encrypt8 to use the opportunity @ to flip byte order in 32-bit counter vldmia $keysched, {@XMM[9]} @ load round0 key #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, $keysched, #0x10 @ pass next round key #else add r4, $key, #`248+16` #endif vldmia $ctr, {@XMM[8]} @ .LREVM0SR mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds vstmia $fp, {@XMM[10]} @ save next counter #ifdef __APPLE__ mov $const, #:lower16:(.LREVM0SR-.LSR) sub $const, $ctr, $const #else sub $const, $ctr, #.LREVM0SR-.LSR @ pass constants #endif bl _bsaes_encrypt8_alt subs $len, $len, #8 blo .Lctr_enc_loop_done vld1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! @ load input vld1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[9] vld1.8 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[4], @XMM[10] veor @XMM[6], @XMM[11] vld1.8 {@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[3], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! @ write output veor @XMM[7], @XMM[13] veor @XMM[2], @XMM[14] vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[5], @XMM[15] vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! vmov.i32 @XMM[8], #1 @ compose 1<<96 vst1.8 {@XMM[3]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[9], @XMM[9] vst1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$out]! vext.8 @XMM[8], @XMM[9], @XMM[8], #4 vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! vadd.u32 @XMM[9],@XMM[8],@XMM[8] @ compose 2<<96 vst1.8 {@XMM[5]}, [$out]! vldmia $fp, {@XMM[0]} @ load counter bne .Lctr_enc_loop b .Lctr_enc_done .align 4 .Lctr_enc_loop_done: add $len, $len, #8 vld1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [$inp]! @ load input veor @XMM[0], @XMM[8] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$out]! @ write output cmp $len, #2 blo .Lctr_enc_done vld1.8 {@XMM[9]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[9] vst1.8 {@XMM[1]}, [$out]! beq .Lctr_enc_done vld1.8 {@XMM[10]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[4]}, [$out]! cmp $len, #4 blo .Lctr_enc_done vld1.8 {@XMM[11]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[6], @XMM[11] vst1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$out]! beq .Lctr_enc_done vld1.8 {@XMM[12]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[3], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[3]}, [$out]! cmp $len, #6 blo .Lctr_enc_done vld1.8 {@XMM[13]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[7], @XMM[13] vst1.8 {@XMM[7]}, [$out]! beq .Lctr_enc_done vld1.8 {@XMM[14]}, [$inp] veor @XMM[2], @XMM[14] vst1.8 {@XMM[2]}, [$out]! .Lctr_enc_done: vmov.i32 q0, #0 vmov.i32 q1, #0 #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY .Lctr_enc_bzero: @ wipe key schedule [if any] vstmia $keysched!, {q0-q1} cmp $keysched, $fp bne .Lctr_enc_bzero #else vstmia $keysched, {q0-q1} #endif mov sp, $fp add sp, #0x10 @ add sp,$fp,#0x10 is no good for thumb VFP_ABI_POP ldmia sp!, {r4-r10, pc} @ return .align 4 .Lctr_enc_short: ldr ip, [sp] @ ctr pointer is passed on stack stmdb sp!, {r4-r8, lr} mov r4, $inp @ copy arguments mov r5, $out mov r6, $len mov r7, $key ldr r8, [ip, #12] @ load counter LSW vld1.8 {@XMM[1]}, [ip] @ load whole counter value #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev r8, r8 #endif sub sp, sp, #0x10 vst1.8 {@XMM[1]}, [sp] @ copy counter value sub sp, sp, #0x10 .Lctr_enc_short_loop: add r0, sp, #0x10 @ input counter value mov r1, sp @ output on the stack mov r2, r7 @ key bl AES_encrypt vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [r4]! @ load input vld1.8 {@XMM[1]}, [sp] @ load encrypted counter add r8, r8, #1 #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev r0, r8 str r0, [sp, #0x1c] @ next counter value #else str r8, [sp, #0x1c] @ next counter value #endif veor @XMM[0],@XMM[0],@XMM[1] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [r5]! @ store output subs r6, r6, #1 bne .Lctr_enc_short_loop vmov.i32 q0, #0 vmov.i32 q1, #0 vstmia sp!, {q0-q1} ldmia sp!, {r4-r8, pc} .size bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks ___ } { ###################################################################### # void bsaes_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len, # const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, # const unsigned char iv[16]); # my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$rounds,$magic,$fp)=(map("r$_",(7..10,1..3))); my $const="r6"; # returned by _bsaes_key_convert my $twmask=@XMM[5]; my @T=@XMM[6..7]; $code.=<<___; .globl bsaes_xts_encrypt .type bsaes_xts_encrypt,%function .align 4 bsaes_xts_encrypt: mov ip, sp stmdb sp!, {r4-r10, lr} @ 0x20 VFP_ABI_PUSH mov r6, sp @ future $fp mov $inp, r0 mov $out, r1 mov $len, r2 mov $key, r3 sub r0, sp, #0x10 @ 0x10 bic r0, #0xf @ align at 16 bytes mov sp, r0 #ifdef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK ldr r0, [ip] @ pointer to input tweak #else @ generate initial tweak ldr r0, [ip, #4] @ iv[] mov r1, sp ldr r2, [ip, #0] @ key2 bl AES_encrypt mov r0,sp @ pointer to initial tweak #endif ldr $rounds, [$key, #240] @ get # of rounds mov $fp, r6 #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY @ allocate the key schedule on the stack sub r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7 @ 128 bytes per inner round key @ add r12, #`128-32` @ size of bit-sliced key schedule sub r12, #`32+16` @ place for tweak[9] @ populate the key schedule mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds mov sp, r12 add r12, #0x90 @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15] @ fix up last round key vstmia r12, {@XMM[7]} @ save last round key #else ldr r12, [$key, #244] eors r12, #1 beq 0f str r12, [$key, #244] mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds add r12, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15] @ fix up last round key vstmia r12, {@XMM[7]} .align 2 0: sub sp, #0x90 @ place for tweak[9] #endif vld1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [r0] @ initial tweak adr $magic, .Lxts_magic subs $len, #0x80 blo .Lxts_enc_short b .Lxts_enc_loop .align 4 .Lxts_enc_loop: vldmia $magic, {$twmask} @ load XTS magic vshr.s64 @T[0], @XMM[8], #63 mov r0, sp vand @T[0], @T[0], $twmask ___ for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) { $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1] vst1.64 {@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]! vswp `&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")` vshr.s64 @T[1], @XMM[$i], #63 veor @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0] vand @T[1], @T[1], $twmask ___ @T=reverse(@T); $code.=<<___ if ($i>=10); vld1.8 {@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]! ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=11); veor @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3] ___ } $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @XMM[8], @XMM[15], @XMM[15] vst1.64 {@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]! vswp `&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")` veor @XMM[8], @XMM[8], @T[0] vst1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak vld1.8 {@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15] mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11] vld1.64 {@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13] veor @XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[14] vst1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[13], @XMM[5], @XMM[15] vst1.8 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak subs $len, #0x80 bpl .Lxts_enc_loop .Lxts_enc_short: adds $len, #0x70 bmi .Lxts_enc_done vldmia $magic, {$twmask} @ load XTS magic vshr.s64 @T[0], @XMM[8], #63 mov r0, sp vand @T[0], @T[0], $twmask ___ for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) { $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1] vst1.64 {@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]! vswp `&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")` vshr.s64 @T[1], @XMM[$i], #63 veor @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0] vand @T[1], @T[1], $twmask ___ @T=reverse(@T); $code.=<<___ if ($i>=10); vld1.8 {@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]! subs $len, #0x10 bmi .Lxts_enc_`$i-9` ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=11); veor @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3] ___ } $code.=<<___; sub $len, #0x10 vst1.64 {@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak vld1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11] vld1.64 {@XMM[14]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13] veor @XMM[12], @XMM[2], @XMM[14] vst1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[12]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_enc_done .align 4 .Lxts_enc_6: veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11] veor @XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13] vst1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_enc_done @ put this in range for both ARM and Thumb mode adr instructions .align 5 .Lxts_magic: .quad 1, 0x87 .align 5 .Lxts_enc_5: veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11] veor @XMM[10], @XMM[3], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[10]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_enc_done .align 4 .Lxts_enc_4: veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[6], @XMM[11] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_enc_done .align 4 .Lxts_enc_3: veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[4], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_enc_done .align 4 .Lxts_enc_2: veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_encrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_enc_done .align 4 .Lxts_enc_1: mov r0, sp veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] mov r1, sp vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] mov r2, $key mov r4, $fp @ preserve fp bl AES_encrypt vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$out]! mov $fp, r4 vmov @XMM[8], @XMM[9] @ next round tweak .Lxts_enc_done: #ifndef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK adds $len, #0x10 beq .Lxts_enc_ret sub r6, $out, #0x10 .Lxts_enc_steal: ldrb r0, [$inp], #1 ldrb r1, [$out, #-0x10] strb r0, [$out, #-0x10] strb r1, [$out], #1 subs $len, #1 bhi .Lxts_enc_steal vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [r6] mov r0, sp veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] mov r1, sp vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] mov r2, $key mov r4, $fp @ preserve fp bl AES_encrypt vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [r6] mov $fp, r4 #endif .Lxts_enc_ret: bic r0, $fp, #0xf vmov.i32 q0, #0 vmov.i32 q1, #0 #ifdef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK ldr r1, [$fp, #0x20+VFP_ABI_FRAME] @ chain tweak #endif .Lxts_enc_bzero: @ wipe key schedule [if any] vstmia sp!, {q0-q1} cmp sp, r0 bne .Lxts_enc_bzero mov sp, $fp #ifdef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK vst1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [r1] #endif VFP_ABI_POP ldmia sp!, {r4-r10, pc} @ return .size bsaes_xts_encrypt,.-bsaes_xts_encrypt .globl bsaes_xts_decrypt .type bsaes_xts_decrypt,%function .align 4 bsaes_xts_decrypt: mov ip, sp stmdb sp!, {r4-r10, lr} @ 0x20 VFP_ABI_PUSH mov r6, sp @ future $fp mov $inp, r0 mov $out, r1 mov $len, r2 mov $key, r3 sub r0, sp, #0x10 @ 0x10 bic r0, #0xf @ align at 16 bytes mov sp, r0 #ifdef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK ldr r0, [ip] @ pointer to input tweak #else @ generate initial tweak ldr r0, [ip, #4] @ iv[] mov r1, sp ldr r2, [ip, #0] @ key2 bl AES_encrypt mov r0, sp @ pointer to initial tweak #endif ldr $rounds, [$key, #240] @ get # of rounds mov $fp, r6 #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY @ allocate the key schedule on the stack sub r12, sp, $rounds, lsl#7 @ 128 bytes per inner round key @ add r12, #`128-32` @ size of bit-sliced key schedule sub r12, #`32+16` @ place for tweak[9] @ populate the key schedule mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds mov sp, r12 add r12, #0x90 @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert add r4, sp, #0x90 vldmia r4, {@XMM[6]} vstmia r12, {@XMM[15]} @ save last round key veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6] @ fix up round 0 key vstmia r4, {@XMM[7]} #else ldr r12, [$key, #244] eors r12, #1 beq 0f str r12, [$key, #244] mov r4, $key @ pass key mov r5, $rounds @ pass # of rounds add r12, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule bl _bsaes_key_convert add r4, $key, #248 vldmia r4, {@XMM[6]} vstmia r12, {@XMM[15]} @ save last round key veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[6] @ fix up round 0 key vstmia r4, {@XMM[7]} .align 2 0: sub sp, #0x90 @ place for tweak[9] #endif vld1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [r0] @ initial tweak adr $magic, .Lxts_magic #ifndef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK tst $len, #0xf @ if not multiple of 16 it ne @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM subne $len, #0x10 @ subtract another 16 bytes #endif subs $len, #0x80 blo .Lxts_dec_short b .Lxts_dec_loop .align 4 .Lxts_dec_loop: vldmia $magic, {$twmask} @ load XTS magic vshr.s64 @T[0], @XMM[8], #63 mov r0, sp vand @T[0], @T[0], $twmask ___ for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) { $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1] vst1.64 {@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]! vswp `&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")` vshr.s64 @T[1], @XMM[$i], #63 veor @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0] vand @T[1], @T[1], $twmask ___ @T=reverse(@T); $code.=<<___ if ($i>=10); vld1.8 {@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]! ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=11); veor @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3] ___ } $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @XMM[8], @XMM[15], @XMM[15] vst1.64 {@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]! vswp `&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")` veor @XMM[8], @XMM[8], @T[0] vst1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak vld1.8 {@XMM[6]-@XMM[7]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds veor @XMM[7], @XMM[7], @XMM[15] mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11] vld1.64 {@XMM[14]-@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13] veor @XMM[12], @XMM[3], @XMM[14] vst1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[13], @XMM[5], @XMM[15] vst1.8 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak subs $len, #0x80 bpl .Lxts_dec_loop .Lxts_dec_short: adds $len, #0x70 bmi .Lxts_dec_done vldmia $magic, {$twmask} @ load XTS magic vshr.s64 @T[0], @XMM[8], #63 mov r0, sp vand @T[0], @T[0], $twmask ___ for($i=9;$i<16;$i++) { $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i-1], @XMM[$i-1] vst1.64 {@XMM[$i-1]}, [r0,:128]! vswp `&Dhi("@T[0]")`,`&Dlo("@T[0]")` vshr.s64 @T[1], @XMM[$i], #63 veor @XMM[$i], @XMM[$i], @T[0] vand @T[1], @T[1], $twmask ___ @T=reverse(@T); $code.=<<___ if ($i>=10); vld1.8 {@XMM[$i-10]}, [$inp]! subs $len, #0x10 bmi .Lxts_dec_`$i-9` ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=11); veor @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-11], @XMM[$i-3] ___ } $code.=<<___; sub $len, #0x10 vst1.64 {@XMM[15]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak vld1.8 {@XMM[6]}, [$inp]! veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[6], @XMM[6], @XMM[14] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11] vld1.64 {@XMM[14]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13] veor @XMM[12], @XMM[3], @XMM[14] vst1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[12]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_dec_done .align 4 .Lxts_dec_6: vst1.64 {@XMM[14]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[5], @XMM[5], @XMM[13] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]-@XMM[13]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11] veor @XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[11], @XMM[7], @XMM[13] vst1.8 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_dec_done .align 4 .Lxts_dec_5: veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[4], @XMM[4], @XMM[12] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] vld1.64 {@XMM[12]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11] veor @XMM[10], @XMM[2], @XMM[12] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[10]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_dec_done .align 4 .Lxts_dec_4: veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[3], @XMM[3], @XMM[11] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[ 8]-@XMM[ 9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]-@XMM[11]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! veor @XMM[9], @XMM[4], @XMM[11] vst1.8 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_dec_done .align 4 .Lxts_dec_3: veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[2], @XMM[2], @XMM[10] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]! vld1.64 {@XMM[10]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] veor @XMM[8], @XMM[6], @XMM[10] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! vst1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_dec_done .align 4 .Lxts_dec_2: veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] #ifndef BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY add r4, sp, #0x90 @ pass key schedule #else add r4, $key, #248 @ pass key schedule #endif veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[9] mov r5, $rounds @ pass rounds mov r0, sp bl _bsaes_decrypt8 vld1.64 {@XMM[8]-@XMM[9]}, [r0,:128]! veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[ 8] veor @XMM[1], @XMM[1], @XMM[ 9] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]-@XMM[1]}, [$out]! vld1.64 {@XMM[8]}, [r0,:128] @ next round tweak b .Lxts_dec_done .align 4 .Lxts_dec_1: mov r0, sp veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] mov r1, sp vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] mov r5, $magic @ preserve magic mov r2, $key mov r4, $fp @ preserve fp bl AES_decrypt vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$out]! mov $fp, r4 mov $magic, r5 vmov @XMM[8], @XMM[9] @ next round tweak .Lxts_dec_done: #ifndef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK adds $len, #0x10 beq .Lxts_dec_ret @ calculate one round of extra tweak for the stolen ciphertext vldmia $magic, {$twmask} vshr.s64 @XMM[6], @XMM[8], #63 vand @XMM[6], @XMM[6], $twmask vadd.u64 @XMM[9], @XMM[8], @XMM[8] vswp `&Dhi("@XMM[6]")`,`&Dlo("@XMM[6]")` veor @XMM[9], @XMM[9], @XMM[6] @ perform the final decryption with the last tweak value vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$inp]! mov r0, sp veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[9] mov r1, sp vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] mov r2, $key mov r4, $fp @ preserve fp bl AES_decrypt vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[9] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [$out] mov r6, $out .Lxts_dec_steal: ldrb r1, [$out] ldrb r0, [$inp], #1 strb r1, [$out, #0x10] strb r0, [$out], #1 subs $len, #1 bhi .Lxts_dec_steal vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [r6] mov r0, sp veor @XMM[0], @XMM[8] mov r1, sp vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] mov r2, $key bl AES_decrypt vld1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [sp,:128] veor @XMM[0], @XMM[0], @XMM[8] vst1.8 {@XMM[0]}, [r6] mov $fp, r4 #endif .Lxts_dec_ret: bic r0, $fp, #0xf vmov.i32 q0, #0 vmov.i32 q1, #0 #ifdef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK ldr r1, [$fp, #0x20+VFP_ABI_FRAME] @ chain tweak #endif .Lxts_dec_bzero: @ wipe key schedule [if any] vstmia sp!, {q0-q1} cmp sp, r0 bne .Lxts_dec_bzero mov sp, $fp #ifdef XTS_CHAIN_TWEAK vst1.8 {@XMM[8]}, [r1] #endif VFP_ABI_POP ldmia sp!, {r4-r10, pc} @ return .size bsaes_xts_decrypt,.-bsaes_xts_decrypt ___ } $code.=<<___; #endif ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; open SELF,$0; while() { next if (/^#!/); last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/); print; } close SELF; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl0000755000000000000000000012610013176625656017443 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ###################################################################### ## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation. ## version 0.1 ## ## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009 ## Public domain. ## ## For details see http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ and ## http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/. ## ###################################################################### # ARMv8 NEON adaptation by # # Reason for undertaken effort is that there is at least one popular # SoC based on Cortex-A53 that doesn't have crypto extensions. # # CBC enc ECB enc/dec(*) [bit-sliced enc/dec] # Cortex-A53 21.5 18.1/20.6 [17.5/19.8 ] # Cortex-A57 36.0(**) 20.4/24.9(**) [14.4/16.6 ] # X-Gene 45.9(**) 45.8/57.7(**) [33.1/37.6(**) ] # Denver(***) 16.6(**) 15.1/17.8(**) [8.80/9.93 ] # Apple A7(***) 22.7(**) 10.9/14.3 [8.45/10.0 ] # Mongoose(***) 26.3(**) 21.0/25.0(**) [13.3/16.8 ] # # (*) ECB denotes approximate result for parallelizeable modes # such as CBC decrypt, CTR, etc.; # (**) these results are worse than scalar compiler-generated # code, but it's constant-time and therefore preferred; # (***) presented for reference/comparison purposes; $flavour = shift; while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; $code.=<<___; .text .type _vpaes_consts,%object .align 7 // totally strategic alignment _vpaes_consts: .Lk_mc_forward: // mc_forward .quad 0x0407060500030201, 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09 .quad 0x080B0A0904070605, 0x000302010C0F0E0D .quad 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09, 0x0407060500030201 .quad 0x000302010C0F0E0D, 0x080B0A0904070605 .Lk_mc_backward:// mc_backward .quad 0x0605040702010003, 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B .quad 0x020100030E0D0C0F, 0x0A09080B06050407 .quad 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B, 0x0605040702010003 .quad 0x0A09080B06050407, 0x020100030E0D0C0F .Lk_sr: // sr .quad 0x0706050403020100, 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A0908 .quad 0x030E09040F0A0500, 0x0B06010C07020D08 .quad 0x0F060D040B020900, 0x070E050C030A0108 .quad 0x0B0E0104070A0D00, 0x0306090C0F020508 // // "Hot" constants // .Lk_inv: // inv, inva .quad 0x0E05060F0D080180, 0x040703090A0B0C02 .quad 0x01040A060F0B0780, 0x030D0E0C02050809 .Lk_ipt: // input transform (lo, hi) .quad 0xC2B2E8985A2A7000, 0xCABAE09052227808 .quad 0x4C01307D317C4D00, 0xCD80B1FCB0FDCC81 .Lk_sbo: // sbou, sbot .quad 0xD0D26D176FBDC700, 0x15AABF7AC502A878 .quad 0xCFE474A55FBB6A00, 0x8E1E90D1412B35FA .Lk_sb1: // sb1u, sb1t .quad 0x3618D415FAE22300, 0x3BF7CCC10D2ED9EF .quad 0xB19BE18FCB503E00, 0xA5DF7A6E142AF544 .Lk_sb2: // sb2u, sb2t .quad 0x69EB88400AE12900, 0xC2A163C8AB82234A .quad 0xE27A93C60B712400, 0x5EB7E955BC982FCD // // Decryption stuff // .Lk_dipt: // decryption input transform .quad 0x0F505B040B545F00, 0x154A411E114E451A .quad 0x86E383E660056500, 0x12771772F491F194 .Lk_dsbo: // decryption sbox final output .quad 0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D .quad 0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C .Lk_dsb9: // decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t .quad 0x851C03539A86D600, 0xCAD51F504F994CC9 .quad 0xC03B1789ECD74900, 0x725E2C9EB2FBA565 .Lk_dsbd: // decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t .quad 0x7D57CCDFE6B1A200, 0xF56E9B13882A4439 .quad 0x3CE2FAF724C6CB00, 0x2931180D15DEEFD3 .Lk_dsbb: // decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t .quad 0xD022649296B44200, 0x602646F6B0F2D404 .quad 0xC19498A6CD596700, 0xF3FF0C3E3255AA6B .Lk_dsbe: // decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t .quad 0x46F2929626D4D000, 0x2242600464B4F6B0 .quad 0x0C55A6CDFFAAC100, 0x9467F36B98593E32 // // Key schedule constants // .Lk_dksd: // decryption key schedule: invskew x*D .quad 0xFEB91A5DA3E44700, 0x0740E3A45A1DBEF9 .quad 0x41C277F4B5368300, 0x5FDC69EAAB289D1E .Lk_dksb: // decryption key schedule: invskew x*B .quad 0x9A4FCA1F8550D500, 0x03D653861CC94C99 .quad 0x115BEDA7B6FC4A00, 0xD993256F7E3482C8 .Lk_dkse: // decryption key schedule: invskew x*E + 0x63 .quad 0xD5031CCA1FC9D600, 0x53859A4C994F5086 .quad 0xA23196054FDC7BE8, 0xCD5EF96A20B31487 .Lk_dks9: // decryption key schedule: invskew x*9 .quad 0xB6116FC87ED9A700, 0x4AED933482255BFC .quad 0x4576516227143300, 0x8BB89FACE9DAFDCE .Lk_rcon: // rcon .quad 0x1F8391B9AF9DEEB6, 0x702A98084D7C7D81 .Lk_opt: // output transform .quad 0xFF9F4929D6B66000, 0xF7974121DEBE6808 .quad 0x01EDBD5150BCEC00, 0xE10D5DB1B05C0CE0 .Lk_deskew: // deskew tables: inverts the sbox's "skew" .quad 0x07E4A34047A4E300, 0x1DFEB95A5DBEF91A .quad 0x5F36B5DC83EA6900, 0x2841C2ABF49D1E77 .asciz "Vector Permutaion AES for ARMv8, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)" .size _vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts .align 6 ___ { my ($inp,$out,$key) = map("x$_",(0..2)); my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$sbou,$sbot) = map("v$_.16b",(18..23)); my ($sb1u,$sb1t,$sb2u,$sb2t) = map("v$_.16b",(24..27)); my ($sb9u,$sb9t,$sbdu,$sbdt,$sbbu,$sbbt,$sbeu,$sbet)=map("v$_.16b",(24..31)); $code.=<<___; ## ## _aes_preheat ## ## Fills register %r10 -> .aes_consts (so you can -fPIC) ## and %xmm9-%xmm15 as specified below. ## .type _vpaes_encrypt_preheat,%function .align 4 _vpaes_encrypt_preheat: adr x10, .Lk_inv movi v17.16b, #0x0f ld1 {v18.2d-v19.2d}, [x10],#32 // .Lk_inv ld1 {v20.2d-v23.2d}, [x10],#64 // .Lk_ipt, .Lk_sbo ld1 {v24.2d-v27.2d}, [x10] // .Lk_sb1, .Lk_sb2 ret .size _vpaes_encrypt_preheat,.-_vpaes_encrypt_preheat ## ## _aes_encrypt_core ## ## AES-encrypt %xmm0. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm0 = input ## %xmm9-%xmm15 as in _vpaes_preheat ## (%rdx) = scheduled keys ## ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm5, %r9, %r10, %r11, %rax ## Preserves %xmm6 - %xmm8 so you get some local vectors ## ## .type _vpaes_encrypt_core,%function .align 4 _vpaes_encrypt_core: mov x9, $key ldr w8, [$key,#240] // pull rounds adr x11, .Lk_mc_forward+16 // vmovdqa .Lk_ipt(%rip), %xmm2 # iptlo ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9], #16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm5 # round0 key and v1.16b, v7.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 ushr v0.16b, v7.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 tbl v1.16b, {$iptlo}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm1 // vmovdqa .Lk_ipt+16(%rip), %xmm3 # ipthi tbl v2.16b, {$ipthi}, v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm2 eor v0.16b, v1.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm1, %xmm0 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 b .Lenc_entry .align 4 .Lenc_loop: // middle of middle round add x10, x11, #0x40 tbl v4.16b, {$sb1t}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u ld1 {v1.2d}, [x11], #16 // vmovdqa -0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_mc_forward[] tbl v0.16b, {$sb1u}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k tbl v5.16b, {$sb2t}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm15, %xmm5 # 4 = sb2u eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = A tbl v2.16b, {$sb2u}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm14, %xmm2 # 2 = sb2t ld1 {v4.2d}, [x10] // vmovdqa (%r11,%r10), %xmm4 # .Lk_mc_backward[] tbl v3.16b, {v0.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm3 # 0 = B eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v5.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = 2A tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 3 = D eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 0 = 2A+B tbl v4.16b, {v3.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm4 # 0 = 2B+C eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v3.16b // vpxor %xmm3, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 3 = 2A+B+D and x11, x11, #~(1<<6) // and \$0x30, %r11 # ... mod 4 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D sub w8, w8, #1 // nr-- .Lenc_entry: // top of round and v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm0, %xmm9, %xmm1 # 0 = k ushr v0.16b, v0.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i tbl v5.16b, {$invhi}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm5 # 2 = a/k eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j tbl v3.16b, {$invlo}, v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i tbl v4.16b, {$invlo}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v5.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v5.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k tbl v2.16b, {$invlo}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak tbl v3.16b, {$invlo}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = io eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = jo ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9],#16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm5 cbnz w8, .Lenc_loop // middle of last round add x10, x11, #0x80 // vmovdqa -0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou .Lk_sbo // vmovdqa -0x50(%r10), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot .Lk_sbo+16 tbl v4.16b, {$sbou}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou ld1 {v1.2d}, [x10] // vmovdqa 0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_sr[] tbl v0.16b, {$sbot}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = A tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 ret .size _vpaes_encrypt_core,.-_vpaes_encrypt_core .globl vpaes_encrypt .type vpaes_encrypt,%function .align 4 vpaes_encrypt: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ld1 {v7.16b}, [$inp] bl _vpaes_encrypt_preheat bl _vpaes_encrypt_core st1 {v0.16b}, [$out] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size vpaes_encrypt,.-vpaes_encrypt .type _vpaes_encrypt_2x,%function .align 4 _vpaes_encrypt_2x: mov x9, $key ldr w8, [$key,#240] // pull rounds adr x11, .Lk_mc_forward+16 // vmovdqa .Lk_ipt(%rip), %xmm2 # iptlo ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9], #16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm5 # round0 key and v1.16b, v14.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 ushr v0.16b, v14.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 and v9.16b, v15.16b, v17.16b ushr v8.16b, v15.16b, #4 tbl v1.16b, {$iptlo}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm1 tbl v9.16b, {$iptlo}, v9.16b // vmovdqa .Lk_ipt+16(%rip), %xmm3 # ipthi tbl v2.16b, {$ipthi}, v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm2 tbl v10.16b, {$ipthi}, v8.16b eor v0.16b, v1.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm1, %xmm0 eor v8.16b, v9.16b, v16.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b b .Lenc_2x_entry .align 4 .Lenc_2x_loop: // middle of middle round add x10, x11, #0x40 tbl v4.16b, {$sb1t}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u tbl v12.16b, {$sb1t}, v10.16b ld1 {v1.2d}, [x11], #16 // vmovdqa -0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_mc_forward[] tbl v0.16b, {$sb1u}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t tbl v8.16b, {$sb1u}, v11.16b eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k eor v12.16b, v12.16b, v16.16b tbl v5.16b, {$sb2t}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm15, %xmm5 # 4 = sb2u tbl v13.16b, {$sb2t}, v10.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = A eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v12.16b tbl v2.16b, {$sb2u}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm14, %xmm2 # 2 = sb2t tbl v10.16b, {$sb2u}, v11.16b ld1 {v4.2d}, [x10] // vmovdqa (%r11,%r10), %xmm4 # .Lk_mc_backward[] tbl v3.16b, {v0.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm3 # 0 = B tbl v11.16b, {v8.16b}, v1.16b eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v5.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = 2A eor v10.16b, v10.16b, v13.16b tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 3 = D tbl v8.16b, {v8.16b}, v4.16b eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 0 = 2A+B eor v11.16b, v11.16b, v10.16b tbl v4.16b, {v3.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm4 # 0 = 2B+C tbl v12.16b, {v11.16b},v1.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v3.16b // vpxor %xmm3, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 3 = 2A+B+D eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v11.16b and x11, x11, #~(1<<6) // and \$0x30, %r11 # ... mod 4 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v12.16b sub w8, w8, #1 // nr-- .Lenc_2x_entry: // top of round and v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm0, %xmm9, %xmm1 # 0 = k ushr v0.16b, v0.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i and v9.16b, v8.16b, v17.16b ushr v8.16b, v8.16b, #4 tbl v5.16b, {$invhi},v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm5 # 2 = a/k tbl v13.16b, {$invhi},v9.16b eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j eor v9.16b, v9.16b, v8.16b tbl v3.16b, {$invlo},v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i tbl v11.16b, {$invlo},v8.16b tbl v4.16b, {$invlo},v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j tbl v12.16b, {$invlo},v9.16b eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v5.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k eor v11.16b, v11.16b, v13.16b eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v5.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k eor v12.16b, v12.16b, v13.16b tbl v2.16b, {$invlo},v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak tbl v10.16b, {$invlo},v11.16b tbl v3.16b, {$invlo},v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak tbl v11.16b, {$invlo},v12.16b eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = io eor v10.16b, v10.16b, v9.16b eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = jo eor v11.16b, v11.16b, v8.16b ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9],#16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm5 cbnz w8, .Lenc_2x_loop // middle of last round add x10, x11, #0x80 // vmovdqa -0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou .Lk_sbo // vmovdqa -0x50(%r10), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot .Lk_sbo+16 tbl v4.16b, {$sbou}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou tbl v12.16b, {$sbou}, v10.16b ld1 {v1.2d}, [x10] // vmovdqa 0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_sr[] tbl v0.16b, {$sbot}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t tbl v8.16b, {$sbot}, v11.16b eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k eor v12.16b, v12.16b, v16.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = A eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v12.16b tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b},v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 tbl v1.16b, {v8.16b},v1.16b ret .size _vpaes_encrypt_2x,.-_vpaes_encrypt_2x .type _vpaes_decrypt_preheat,%function .align 4 _vpaes_decrypt_preheat: adr x10, .Lk_inv movi v17.16b, #0x0f adr x11, .Lk_dipt ld1 {v18.2d-v19.2d}, [x10],#32 // .Lk_inv ld1 {v20.2d-v23.2d}, [x11],#64 // .Lk_dipt, .Lk_dsbo ld1 {v24.2d-v27.2d}, [x11],#64 // .Lk_dsb9, .Lk_dsbd ld1 {v28.2d-v31.2d}, [x11] // .Lk_dsbb, .Lk_dsbe ret .size _vpaes_decrypt_preheat,.-_vpaes_decrypt_preheat ## ## Decryption core ## ## Same API as encryption core. ## .type _vpaes_decrypt_core,%function .align 4 _vpaes_decrypt_core: mov x9, $key ldr w8, [$key,#240] // pull rounds // vmovdqa .Lk_dipt(%rip), %xmm2 # iptlo lsl x11, x8, #4 // mov %rax, %r11; shl \$4, %r11 eor x11, x11, #0x30 // xor \$0x30, %r11 adr x10, .Lk_sr and x11, x11, #0x30 // and \$0x30, %r11 add x11, x11, x10 adr x10, .Lk_mc_forward+48 ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9],#16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm4 # round0 key and v1.16b, v7.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 ushr v0.16b, v7.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 tbl v2.16b, {$iptlo}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 ld1 {v5.2d}, [x10] // vmovdqa .Lk_mc_forward+48(%rip), %xmm5 // vmovdqa .Lk_dipt+16(%rip), %xmm1 # ipthi tbl v0.16b, {$ipthi}, v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm0 eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 b .Ldec_entry .align 4 .Ldec_loop: // // Inverse mix columns // // vmovdqa -0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sb9u // vmovdqa -0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sb9t tbl v4.16b, {$sb9u}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb9u tbl v1.16b, {$sb9t}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sb9t eor v0.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 // vmovdqa 0x00(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbdu eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch // vmovdqa 0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbdt tbl v4.16b, {$sbdu}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbdu tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v5.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch tbl v1.16b, {$sbdt}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbdt eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch // vmovdqa 0x20(%r10), %xmm4 # 4 : sbbu eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch // vmovdqa 0x30(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbbt tbl v4.16b, {$sbbu}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbbu tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v5.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch tbl v1.16b, {$sbbt}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbbt eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch // vmovdqa 0x40(%r10), %xmm4 # 4 : sbeu eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch // vmovdqa 0x50(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbet tbl v4.16b, {$sbeu}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbeu tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v5.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch tbl v1.16b, {$sbet}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbet eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch ext v5.16b, v5.16b, v5.16b, #12 // vpalignr \$12, %xmm5, %xmm5, %xmm5 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch sub w8, w8, #1 // sub \$1,%rax # nr-- .Ldec_entry: // top of round and v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 # 0 = k ushr v0.16b, v0.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i tbl v2.16b, {$invhi}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j tbl v3.16b, {$invlo}, v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i tbl v4.16b, {$invlo}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k tbl v2.16b, {$invlo}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak tbl v3.16b, {$invlo}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = io eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = jo ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9],#16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm0 cbnz w8, .Ldec_loop // middle of last round // vmovdqa 0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou tbl v4.16b, {$sbou}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou // vmovdqa 0x70(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbot ld1 {v2.2d}, [x11] // vmovdqa -0x160(%r11), %xmm2 # .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160 tbl v1.16b, {$sbot}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sb1t eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k eor v0.16b, v1.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = A tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 ret .size _vpaes_decrypt_core,.-_vpaes_decrypt_core .globl vpaes_decrypt .type vpaes_decrypt,%function .align 4 vpaes_decrypt: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ld1 {v7.16b}, [$inp] bl _vpaes_decrypt_preheat bl _vpaes_decrypt_core st1 {v0.16b}, [$out] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size vpaes_decrypt,.-vpaes_decrypt // v14-v15 input, v0-v1 output .type _vpaes_decrypt_2x,%function .align 4 _vpaes_decrypt_2x: mov x9, $key ldr w8, [$key,#240] // pull rounds // vmovdqa .Lk_dipt(%rip), %xmm2 # iptlo lsl x11, x8, #4 // mov %rax, %r11; shl \$4, %r11 eor x11, x11, #0x30 // xor \$0x30, %r11 adr x10, .Lk_sr and x11, x11, #0x30 // and \$0x30, %r11 add x11, x11, x10 adr x10, .Lk_mc_forward+48 ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9],#16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm4 # round0 key and v1.16b, v14.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 ushr v0.16b, v14.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 and v9.16b, v15.16b, v17.16b ushr v8.16b, v15.16b, #4 tbl v2.16b, {$iptlo},v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 tbl v10.16b, {$iptlo},v9.16b ld1 {v5.2d}, [x10] // vmovdqa .Lk_mc_forward+48(%rip), %xmm5 // vmovdqa .Lk_dipt+16(%rip), %xmm1 # ipthi tbl v0.16b, {$ipthi},v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm0 tbl v8.16b, {$ipthi},v8.16b eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 eor v10.16b, v10.16b, v16.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v10.16b b .Ldec_2x_entry .align 4 .Ldec_2x_loop: // // Inverse mix columns // // vmovdqa -0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sb9u // vmovdqa -0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sb9t tbl v4.16b, {$sb9u}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb9u tbl v12.16b, {$sb9u}, v10.16b tbl v1.16b, {$sb9t}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sb9t tbl v9.16b, {$sb9t}, v11.16b eor v0.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 eor v8.16b, v12.16b, v16.16b // vmovdqa 0x00(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbdu eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v9.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch // vmovdqa 0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbdt tbl v4.16b, {$sbdu}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbdu tbl v12.16b, {$sbdu}, v10.16b tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b},v5.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch tbl v8.16b, {v8.16b},v5.16b tbl v1.16b, {$sbdt}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbdt tbl v9.16b, {$sbdt}, v11.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v12.16b // vmovdqa 0x20(%r10), %xmm4 # 4 : sbbu eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v9.16b // vmovdqa 0x30(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbbt tbl v4.16b, {$sbbu}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbbu tbl v12.16b, {$sbbu}, v10.16b tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b},v5.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch tbl v8.16b, {v8.16b},v5.16b tbl v1.16b, {$sbbt}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbbt tbl v9.16b, {$sbbt}, v11.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v12.16b // vmovdqa 0x40(%r10), %xmm4 # 4 : sbeu eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v9.16b // vmovdqa 0x50(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbet tbl v4.16b, {$sbeu}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbeu tbl v12.16b, {$sbeu}, v10.16b tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b},v5.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm0, %xmm0 # MC ch tbl v8.16b, {v8.16b},v5.16b tbl v1.16b, {$sbet}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbet tbl v9.16b, {$sbet}, v11.16b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 4 = ch eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v12.16b ext v5.16b, v5.16b, v5.16b, #12 // vpalignr \$12, %xmm5, %xmm5, %xmm5 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 0 = ch eor v8.16b, v8.16b, v9.16b sub w8, w8, #1 // sub \$1,%rax # nr-- .Ldec_2x_entry: // top of round and v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 # 0 = k ushr v0.16b, v0.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i and v9.16b, v8.16b, v17.16b ushr v8.16b, v8.16b, #4 tbl v2.16b, {$invhi},v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k tbl v10.16b, {$invhi},v9.16b eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j eor v9.16b, v9.16b, v8.16b tbl v3.16b, {$invlo},v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i tbl v11.16b, {$invlo},v8.16b tbl v4.16b, {$invlo},v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j tbl v12.16b, {$invlo},v9.16b eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k eor v11.16b, v11.16b, v10.16b eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k eor v12.16b, v12.16b, v10.16b tbl v2.16b, {$invlo},v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak tbl v10.16b, {$invlo},v11.16b tbl v3.16b, {$invlo},v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak tbl v11.16b, {$invlo},v12.16b eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 2 = io eor v10.16b, v10.16b, v9.16b eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = jo eor v11.16b, v11.16b, v8.16b ld1 {v16.2d}, [x9],#16 // vmovdqu (%r9), %xmm0 cbnz w8, .Ldec_2x_loop // middle of last round // vmovdqa 0x60(%r10), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou tbl v4.16b, {$sbou}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou tbl v12.16b, {$sbou}, v10.16b // vmovdqa 0x70(%r10), %xmm1 # 0 : sbot tbl v1.16b, {$sbot}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sb1t tbl v9.16b, {$sbot}, v11.16b ld1 {v2.2d}, [x11] // vmovdqa -0x160(%r11), %xmm2 # .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160 eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v16.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k eor v12.16b, v12.16b, v16.16b eor v0.16b, v1.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = A eor v8.16b, v9.16b, v12.16b tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b},v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 tbl v1.16b, {v8.16b},v2.16b ret .size _vpaes_decrypt_2x,.-_vpaes_decrypt_2x ___ } { my ($inp,$bits,$out,$dir)=("x0","w1","x2","w3"); my ($invlo,$invhi,$iptlo,$ipthi,$rcon) = map("v$_.16b",(18..21,8)); $code.=<<___; ######################################################## ## ## ## AES key schedule ## ## ## ######################################################## .type _vpaes_key_preheat,%function .align 4 _vpaes_key_preheat: adr x10, .Lk_inv movi v16.16b, #0x5b // .Lk_s63 adr x11, .Lk_sb1 movi v17.16b, #0x0f // .Lk_s0F ld1 {v18.2d-v21.2d}, [x10] // .Lk_inv, .Lk_ipt adr x10, .Lk_dksd ld1 {v22.2d-v23.2d}, [x11] // .Lk_sb1 adr x11, .Lk_mc_forward ld1 {v24.2d-v27.2d}, [x10],#64 // .Lk_dksd, .Lk_dksb ld1 {v28.2d-v31.2d}, [x10],#64 // .Lk_dkse, .Lk_dks9 ld1 {v8.2d}, [x10] // .Lk_rcon ld1 {v9.2d}, [x11] // .Lk_mc_forward[0] ret .size _vpaes_key_preheat,.-_vpaes_key_preheat .type _vpaes_schedule_core,%function .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_core: stp x29, x30, [sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 bl _vpaes_key_preheat // load the tables ld1 {v0.16b}, [$inp],#16 // vmovdqu (%rdi), %xmm0 # load key (unaligned) // input transform mov v3.16b, v0.16b // vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm3 bl _vpaes_schedule_transform mov v7.16b, v0.16b // vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm7 adr x10, .Lk_sr // lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10 add x8, x8, x10 cbnz $dir, .Lschedule_am_decrypting // encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform st1 {v0.2d}, [$out] // vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) b .Lschedule_go .Lschedule_am_decrypting: // decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows ld1 {v1.2d}, [x8] // vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1 tbl v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 st1 {v3.2d}, [$out] // vmovdqu %xmm3, (%rdx) eor x8, x8, #0x30 // xor \$0x30, %r8 .Lschedule_go: cmp $bits, #192 // cmp \$192, %esi b.hi .Lschedule_256 b.eq .Lschedule_192 // 128: fall though ## ## .schedule_128 ## ## 128-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## This schedule is really simple, because all its parts ## are accomplished by the subroutines. ## .Lschedule_128: mov $inp, #10 // mov \$10, %esi .Loop_schedule_128: sub $inp, $inp, #1 // dec %esi bl _vpaes_schedule_round cbz $inp, .Lschedule_mangle_last bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle // write output b .Loop_schedule_128 ## ## .aes_schedule_192 ## ## 192-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit ## schedule, but with more smearing. The long, high side is ## stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in ## the high bits of %xmm6. ## ## This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each ## round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys. ## Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round ## keys. ## .align 4 .Lschedule_192: sub $inp, $inp, #8 ld1 {v0.16b}, [$inp] // vmovdqu 8(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (very unaligned) bl _vpaes_schedule_transform // input transform mov v6.16b, v0.16b // vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm6 # save short part eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm4, %xmm4 # clear 4 ins v6.d[0], v4.d[0] // vmovhlps %xmm4, %xmm6, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros mov $inp, #4 // mov \$4, %esi .Loop_schedule_192: sub $inp, $inp, #1 // dec %esi bl _vpaes_schedule_round ext v0.16b, v6.16b, v0.16b, #8 // vpalignr \$8,%xmm6,%xmm0,%xmm0 bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle // save key n bl _vpaes_schedule_192_smear bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle // save key n+1 bl _vpaes_schedule_round cbz $inp, .Lschedule_mangle_last bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle // save key n+2 bl _vpaes_schedule_192_smear b .Loop_schedule_192 ## ## .aes_schedule_256 ## ## 256-bit specific part of key schedule. ## ## The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit ## schedule, but with an additional "low side" in ## %xmm6. The low side's rounds are the same as the ## high side's, except no rcon and no rotation. ## .align 4 .Lschedule_256: ld1 {v0.16b}, [$inp] // vmovdqu 16(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (unaligned) bl _vpaes_schedule_transform // input transform mov $inp, #7 // mov \$7, %esi .Loop_schedule_256: sub $inp, $inp, #1 // dec %esi bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle // output low result mov v6.16b, v0.16b // vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm6 # save cur_lo in xmm6 // high round bl _vpaes_schedule_round cbz $inp, .Lschedule_mangle_last bl _vpaes_schedule_mangle // low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6 dup v0.4s, v0.s[3] // vpshufd \$0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 movi v4.16b, #0 mov v5.16b, v7.16b // vmovdqa %xmm7, %xmm5 mov v7.16b, v6.16b // vmovdqa %xmm6, %xmm7 bl _vpaes_schedule_low_round mov v7.16b, v5.16b // vmovdqa %xmm5, %xmm7 b .Loop_schedule_256 ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle_last ## ## Mangler for last round of key schedule ## Mangles %xmm0 ## when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63 ## when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0) ## ## Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits ## .align 4 .Lschedule_mangle_last: // schedule last round key from xmm0 adr x11, .Lk_deskew // lea .Lk_deskew(%rip),%r11 # prepare to deskew cbnz $dir, .Lschedule_mangle_last_dec // encrypting ld1 {v1.2d}, [x8] // vmovdqa (%r8,%r10),%xmm1 adr x11, .Lk_opt // lea .Lk_opt(%rip), %r11 # prepare to output transform add $out, $out, #32 // add \$32, %rdx tbl v0.16b, {v0.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm0 # output permute .Lschedule_mangle_last_dec: ld1 {v20.2d-v21.2d}, [x11] // reload constants sub $out, $out, #16 // add \$-16, %rdx eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v16.16b // vpxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm0 bl _vpaes_schedule_transform // output transform st1 {v0.2d}, [$out] // vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key // cleanup eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm0, %xmm0 eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm1, %xmm1 eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm2, %xmm2 eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v3.16b // vpxor %xmm3, %xmm3, %xmm3 eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm4, %xmm4 eor v5.16b, v5.16b, v5.16b // vpxor %xmm5, %xmm5, %xmm5 eor v6.16b, v6.16b, v6.16b // vpxor %xmm6, %xmm6, %xmm6 eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v7.16b // vpxor %xmm7, %xmm7, %xmm7 ldp x29, x30, [sp],#16 ret .size _vpaes_schedule_core,.-_vpaes_schedule_core ## ## .aes_schedule_192_smear ## ## Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule. ## ## Inputs: ## %xmm7: high side, b a x y ## %xmm6: low side, d c 0 0 ## %xmm13: 0 ## ## Outputs: ## %xmm6: b+c+d b+c 0 0 ## %xmm0: b+c+d b+c b a ## .type _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,%function .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_192_smear: movi v1.16b, #0 dup v0.4s, v7.s[3] ins v1.s[3], v6.s[2] // vpshufd \$0x80, %xmm6, %xmm1 # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0 ins v0.s[0], v7.s[2] // vpshufd \$0xFE, %xmm7, %xmm0 # b a _ _ -> b b b a eor v6.16b, v6.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm6, %xmm6 # -> c+d c 0 0 eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm1, %xmm1 eor v6.16b, v6.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm6, %xmm6 # -> b+c+d b+c b a mov v0.16b, v6.16b // vmovdqa %xmm6, %xmm0 ins v6.d[0], v1.d[0] // vmovhlps %xmm1, %xmm6, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros ret .size _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,.-_vpaes_schedule_192_smear ## ## .aes_schedule_round ## ## Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7 ## ## Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0 ## then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of ## %xmm7. ## ## Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for ## next rcon. ## ## Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the ## second low, result into third, result into highest. ## ## Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0. ## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r11. ## .type _vpaes_schedule_round,%function .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_round: // extract rcon from xmm8 movi v4.16b, #0 // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm4, %xmm4 ext v1.16b, $rcon, v4.16b, #15 // vpalignr \$15, %xmm8, %xmm4, %xmm1 ext $rcon, $rcon, $rcon, #15 // vpalignr \$15, %xmm8, %xmm8, %xmm8 eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm7, %xmm7 // rotate dup v0.4s, v0.s[3] // vpshufd \$0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 ext v0.16b, v0.16b, v0.16b, #1 // vpalignr \$1, %xmm0, %xmm0, %xmm0 // fall through... // low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon. _vpaes_schedule_low_round: // smear xmm7 ext v1.16b, v4.16b, v7.16b, #12 // vpslldq \$4, %xmm7, %xmm1 eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm7, %xmm7 ext v4.16b, v4.16b, v7.16b, #8 // vpslldq \$8, %xmm7, %xmm4 // subbytes and v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 # 0 = k ushr v0.16b, v0.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 # 1 = i eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm7, %xmm7 tbl v2.16b, {$invhi}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = j tbl v3.16b, {$invlo}, v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k tbl v4.16b, {$invlo}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v16.16b // vpxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm7, %xmm7 tbl v3.16b, {$invlo}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm10, %xmm3 # 2 = 1/iak eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k tbl v2.16b, {$invlo}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm10, %xmm2 # 3 = 1/jak eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 # 2 = io eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v0.16b // vpxor %xmm0, %xmm2, %xmm2 # 3 = jo tbl v4.16b, {v23.16b}, v3.16b // vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou tbl v1.16b, {v22.16b}, v2.16b // vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm12, %xmm1 # 0 = sb1t eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm1, %xmm1 # 0 = sbox output // add in smeared stuff eor v0.16b, v1.16b, v7.16b // vpxor %xmm7, %xmm1, %xmm0 eor v7.16b, v1.16b, v7.16b // vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm7 ret .size _vpaes_schedule_round,.-_vpaes_schedule_round ## ## .aes_schedule_transform ## ## Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%r11) ## ## Requires that %xmm9 = 0x0F0F... as in preheat ## Output in %xmm0 ## Clobbers %xmm1, %xmm2 ## .type _vpaes_schedule_transform,%function .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_transform: and v1.16b, v0.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm0, %xmm1 ushr v0.16b, v0.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm0, %xmm0 // vmovdqa (%r11), %xmm2 # lo tbl v2.16b, {$iptlo}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm2, %xmm2 // vmovdqa 16(%r11), %xmm1 # hi tbl v0.16b, {$ipthi}, v0.16b // vpshufb %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm0 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm0 ret .size _vpaes_schedule_transform,.-_vpaes_schedule_transform ## ## .aes_schedule_mangle ## ## Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version ## to our version. ## ## On encrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1 ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## On decrypt, ## xor with 0x63 ## multiply by "inverse mixcolumns" circulant E,B,D,9 ## deskew ## apply shiftrows transform ## ## ## Writes out to (%rdx), and increments or decrements it ## Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %r8 ## Preserves xmm0 ## Clobbers xmm1-xmm5 ## .type _vpaes_schedule_mangle,%function .align 4 _vpaes_schedule_mangle: mov v4.16b, v0.16b // vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm4 # save xmm0 for later // vmovdqa .Lk_mc_forward(%rip),%xmm5 cbnz $dir, .Lschedule_mangle_dec // encrypting eor v4.16b, v0.16b, v16.16b // vpxor .Lk_s63(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm4 add $out, $out, #16 // add \$16, %rdx tbl v4.16b, {v4.16b}, v9.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm4 tbl v1.16b, {v4.16b}, v9.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm4, %xmm1 tbl v3.16b, {v1.16b}, v9.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm1, %xmm3 eor v4.16b, v4.16b, v1.16b // vpxor %xmm1, %xmm4, %xmm4 ld1 {v1.2d}, [x8] // vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1 eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v4.16b // vpxor %xmm4, %xmm3, %xmm3 b .Lschedule_mangle_both .align 4 .Lschedule_mangle_dec: // inverse mix columns // lea .Lk_dksd(%rip),%r11 ushr v1.16b, v4.16b, #4 // vpsrlb \$4, %xmm4, %xmm1 # 1 = hi and v4.16b, v4.16b, v17.16b // vpand %xmm9, %xmm4, %xmm4 # 4 = lo // vmovdqa 0x00(%r11), %xmm2 tbl v2.16b, {v24.16b}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 // vmovdqa 0x10(%r11), %xmm3 tbl v3.16b, {v25.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 tbl v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v9.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 // vmovdqa 0x20(%r11), %xmm2 tbl v2.16b, {v26.16b}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v3.16b // vpxor %xmm3, %xmm2, %xmm2 // vmovdqa 0x30(%r11), %xmm3 tbl v3.16b, {v27.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 tbl v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v9.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 // vmovdqa 0x40(%r11), %xmm2 tbl v2.16b, {v28.16b}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v3.16b // vpxor %xmm3, %xmm2, %xmm2 // vmovdqa 0x50(%r11), %xmm3 tbl v3.16b, {v29.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 eor v3.16b, v3.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3 // vmovdqa 0x60(%r11), %xmm2 tbl v2.16b, {v30.16b}, v4.16b // vpshufb %xmm4, %xmm2, %xmm2 tbl v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v9.16b // vpshufb %xmm5, %xmm3, %xmm3 // vmovdqa 0x70(%r11), %xmm4 tbl v4.16b, {v31.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm4, %xmm4 ld1 {v1.2d}, [x8] // vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1 eor v2.16b, v2.16b, v3.16b // vpxor %xmm3, %xmm2, %xmm2 eor v3.16b, v4.16b, v2.16b // vpxor %xmm2, %xmm4, %xmm3 sub $out, $out, #16 // add \$-16, %rdx .Lschedule_mangle_both: tbl v3.16b, {v3.16b}, v1.16b // vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3 add x8, x8, #64-16 // add \$-16, %r8 and x8, x8, #~(1<<6) // and \$0x30, %r8 st1 {v3.2d}, [$out] // vmovdqu %xmm3, (%rdx) ret .size _vpaes_schedule_mangle,.-_vpaes_schedule_mangle .globl vpaes_set_encrypt_key .type vpaes_set_encrypt_key,%function .align 4 vpaes_set_encrypt_key: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so lsr w9, $bits, #5 // shr \$5,%eax add w9, w9, #5 // \$5,%eax str w9, [$out,#240] // mov %eax,240(%rdx) # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; mov $dir, #0 // mov \$0,%ecx mov x8, #0x30 // mov \$0x30,%r8d bl _vpaes_schedule_core eor x0, x0, x0 ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16 ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size vpaes_set_encrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_encrypt_key .globl vpaes_set_decrypt_key .type vpaes_set_decrypt_key,%function .align 4 vpaes_set_decrypt_key: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so lsr w9, $bits, #5 // shr \$5,%eax add w9, w9, #5 // \$5,%eax str w9, [$out,#240] // mov %eax,240(%rdx) # AES_KEY->rounds = nbits/32+5; lsl w9, w9, #4 // shl \$4,%eax add $out, $out, #16 // lea 16(%rdx,%rax),%rdx add $out, $out, x9 mov $dir, #1 // mov \$1,%ecx lsr w8, $bits, #1 // shr \$1,%r8d and x8, x8, #32 // and \$32,%r8d eor x8, x8, #32 // xor \$32,%r8d # nbits==192?0:32 bl _vpaes_schedule_core ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16 ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size vpaes_set_decrypt_key,.-vpaes_set_decrypt_key ___ } { my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$dir) = map("x$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl vpaes_cbc_encrypt .type vpaes_cbc_encrypt,%function .align 4 vpaes_cbc_encrypt: cbz $len, .Lcbc_abort cmp w5, #0 // check direction b.eq vpaes_cbc_decrypt stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 mov x17, $len // reassign mov x2, $key // reassign ld1 {v0.16b}, [$ivec] // load ivec bl _vpaes_encrypt_preheat b .Lcbc_enc_loop .align 4 .Lcbc_enc_loop: ld1 {v7.16b}, [$inp],#16 // load input eor v7.16b, v7.16b, v0.16b // xor with ivec bl _vpaes_encrypt_core st1 {v0.16b}, [$out],#16 // save output subs x17, x17, #16 b.hi .Lcbc_enc_loop st1 {v0.16b}, [$ivec] // write ivec ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 .Lcbc_abort: ret .size vpaes_cbc_encrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_encrypt .type vpaes_cbc_decrypt,%function .align 4 vpaes_cbc_decrypt: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so stp d10,d11,[sp,#-16]! stp d12,d13,[sp,#-16]! stp d14,d15,[sp,#-16]! mov x17, $len // reassign mov x2, $key // reassign ld1 {v6.16b}, [$ivec] // load ivec bl _vpaes_decrypt_preheat tst x17, #16 b.eq .Lcbc_dec_loop2x ld1 {v7.16b}, [$inp], #16 // load input bl _vpaes_decrypt_core eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v6.16b // xor with ivec orr v6.16b, v7.16b, v7.16b // next ivec value st1 {v0.16b}, [$out], #16 subs x17, x17, #16 b.ls .Lcbc_dec_done .align 4 .Lcbc_dec_loop2x: ld1 {v14.16b,v15.16b}, [$inp], #32 bl _vpaes_decrypt_2x eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v6.16b // xor with ivec eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v14.16b orr v6.16b, v15.16b, v15.16b st1 {v0.16b,v1.16b}, [$out], #32 subs x17, x17, #32 b.hi .Lcbc_dec_loop2x .Lcbc_dec_done: st1 {v6.16b}, [$ivec] ldp d14,d15,[sp],#16 ldp d12,d13,[sp],#16 ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16 ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16 ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size vpaes_cbc_decrypt,.-vpaes_cbc_decrypt ___ if (1) { $code.=<<___; .globl vpaes_ecb_encrypt .type vpaes_ecb_encrypt,%function .align 4 vpaes_ecb_encrypt: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so stp d10,d11,[sp,#-16]! stp d12,d13,[sp,#-16]! stp d14,d15,[sp,#-16]! mov x17, $len mov x2, $key bl _vpaes_encrypt_preheat tst x17, #16 b.eq .Lecb_enc_loop ld1 {v7.16b}, [$inp],#16 bl _vpaes_encrypt_core st1 {v0.16b}, [$out],#16 subs x17, x17, #16 b.ls .Lecb_enc_done .align 4 .Lecb_enc_loop: ld1 {v14.16b,v15.16b}, [$inp], #32 bl _vpaes_encrypt_2x st1 {v0.16b,v1.16b}, [$out], #32 subs x17, x17, #32 b.hi .Lecb_enc_loop .Lecb_enc_done: ldp d14,d15,[sp],#16 ldp d12,d13,[sp],#16 ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16 ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16 ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size vpaes_ecb_encrypt,.-vpaes_ecb_encrypt .globl vpaes_ecb_decrypt .type vpaes_ecb_decrypt,%function .align 4 vpaes_ecb_decrypt: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 stp d8,d9,[sp,#-16]! // ABI spec says so stp d10,d11,[sp,#-16]! stp d12,d13,[sp,#-16]! stp d14,d15,[sp,#-16]! mov x17, $len mov x2, $key bl _vpaes_decrypt_preheat tst x17, #16 b.eq .Lecb_dec_loop ld1 {v7.16b}, [$inp],#16 bl _vpaes_encrypt_core st1 {v0.16b}, [$out],#16 subs x17, x17, #16 b.ls .Lecb_dec_done .align 4 .Lecb_dec_loop: ld1 {v14.16b,v15.16b}, [$inp], #32 bl _vpaes_decrypt_2x st1 {v0.16b,v1.16b}, [$out], #32 subs x17, x17, #32 b.hi .Lecb_dec_loop .Lecb_dec_done: ldp d14,d15,[sp],#16 ldp d12,d13,[sp],#16 ldp d10,d11,[sp],#16 ldp d8,d9,[sp],#16 ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size vpaes_ecb_decrypt,.-vpaes_ecb_decrypt ___ } } print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000021732313176625656017330 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ################################################################### ### AES-128 [originally in CTR mode] ### ### bitsliced implementation for Intel Core 2 processors ### ### requires support of SSE extensions up to SSSE3 ### ### Author: Emilia Käsper and Peter Schwabe ### ### Date: 2009-03-19 ### ### Public domain ### ### ### ### See http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~ekasper/#software for ### ### further information. ### ################################################################### # # September 2011. # # Started as transliteration to "perlasm" the original code has # undergone following changes: # # - code was made position-independent; # - rounds were folded into a loop resulting in >5x size reduction # from 12.5KB to 2.2KB; # - above was possibile thanks to mixcolumns() modification that # allowed to feed its output back to aesenc[last], this was # achieved at cost of two additional inter-registers moves; # - some instruction reordering and interleaving; # - this module doesn't implement key setup subroutine, instead it # relies on conversion of "conventional" key schedule as returned # by AES_set_encrypt_key (see discussion below); # - first and last round keys are treated differently, which allowed # to skip one shiftrows(), reduce bit-sliced key schedule and # speed-up conversion by 22%; # - support for 192- and 256-bit keys was added; # # Resulting performance in CPU cycles spent to encrypt one byte out # of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is: # # Emilia's this(*) difference # # Core 2 9.30 8.69 +7% # Nehalem(**) 7.63 6.88 +11% # Atom 17.1 16.4 +4% # Silvermont - 12.9 # Goldmont - 8.85 # # (*) Comparison is not completely fair, because "this" is ECB, # i.e. no extra processing such as counter values calculation # and xor-ing input as in Emilia's CTR implementation is # performed. However, the CTR calculations stand for not more # than 1% of total time, so comparison is *rather* fair. # # (**) Results were collected on Westmere, which is considered to # be equivalent to Nehalem for this code. # # As for key schedule conversion subroutine. Interface to OpenSSL # relies on per-invocation on-the-fly conversion. This naturally # has impact on performance, especially for short inputs. Conversion # time in CPU cycles and its ratio to CPU cycles spent in 8x block # function is: # # conversion conversion/8x block # Core 2 240 0.22 # Nehalem 180 0.20 # Atom 430 0.20 # # The ratio values mean that 128-byte blocks will be processed # 16-18% slower, 256-byte blocks - 9-10%, 384-byte blocks - 6-7%, # etc. Then keep in mind that input sizes not divisible by 128 are # *effectively* slower, especially shortest ones, e.g. consecutive # 144-byte blocks are processed 44% slower than one would expect, # 272 - 29%, 400 - 22%, etc. Yet, despite all these "shortcomings" # it's still faster than ["hyper-threading-safe" code path in] # aes-x86_64.pl on all lengths above 64 bytes... # # October 2011. # # Add decryption procedure. Performance in CPU cycles spent to decrypt # one byte out of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is: # # Core 2 9.98 # Nehalem 7.80 # Atom 17.9 # Silvermont 14.0 # Goldmont 10.2 # # November 2011. # # Add bsaes_xts_[en|de]crypt. Less-than-80-bytes-block performance is # suboptimal, but XTS is meant to be used with larger blocks... # # $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); my @XMM=map("%xmm$_",(15,0..14)); # best on Atom, +10% over (0..15) my $ecb=0; # suppress unreferenced ECB subroutines, spare some space... { my ($key,$rounds,$const)=("%rax","%r10d","%r11"); sub Sbox { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b0, b1, b4, b6, b3, b7, b2, b5] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..11]; my @s=@_[12..15]; &InBasisChange (@b); &Inv_GF256 (@b[6,5,0,3,7,1,4,2],@t,@s); &OutBasisChange (@b[7,1,4,2,6,5,0,3]); } sub InBasisChange { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b6, b5, b0, b3, b7, b1, b4, b2] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; $code.=<<___; pxor @b[6], @b[5] pxor @b[1], @b[2] pxor @b[0], @b[3] pxor @b[2], @b[6] pxor @b[0], @b[5] pxor @b[3], @b[6] pxor @b[7], @b[3] pxor @b[5], @b[7] pxor @b[4], @b[3] pxor @b[5], @b[4] pxor @b[1], @b[3] pxor @b[7], @b[2] pxor @b[5], @b[1] ___ } sub OutBasisChange { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b6, b1, b2, b4, b7, b0, b3, b5] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; $code.=<<___; pxor @b[6], @b[0] pxor @b[4], @b[1] pxor @b[0], @b[2] pxor @b[6], @b[4] pxor @b[1], @b[6] pxor @b[5], @b[1] pxor @b[3], @b[5] pxor @b[7], @b[3] pxor @b[5], @b[7] pxor @b[5], @b[2] pxor @b[7], @b[4] ___ } sub InvSbox { # input in lsb > [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] < msb # output in lsb > [b0, b1, b6, b4, b2, b7, b3, b5] < msb my @b=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..11]; my @s=@_[12..15]; &InvInBasisChange (@b); &Inv_GF256 (@b[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4],@t,@s); &InvOutBasisChange (@b[3,7,0,4,5,1,2,6]); } sub InvInBasisChange { # OutBasisChange in reverse my @b=@_[5,1,2,6,3,7,0,4]; $code.=<<___ pxor @b[7], @b[4] pxor @b[5], @b[7] pxor @b[5], @b[2] pxor @b[7], @b[3] pxor @b[3], @b[5] pxor @b[5], @b[1] pxor @b[1], @b[6] pxor @b[0], @b[2] pxor @b[6], @b[4] pxor @b[6], @b[0] pxor @b[4], @b[1] ___ } sub InvOutBasisChange { # InBasisChange in reverse my @b=@_[2,5,7,3,6,1,0,4]; $code.=<<___; pxor @b[5], @b[1] pxor @b[7], @b[2] pxor @b[1], @b[3] pxor @b[5], @b[4] pxor @b[5], @b[7] pxor @b[4], @b[3] pxor @b[0], @b[5] pxor @b[7], @b[3] pxor @b[2], @b[6] pxor @b[1], @b[2] pxor @b[3], @b[6] pxor @b[0], @b[3] pxor @b[6], @b[5] ___ } sub Mul_GF4 { #;************************************************************* #;* Mul_GF4: Input x0-x1,y0-y1 Output x0-x1 Temp t0 (8) * #;************************************************************* my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0)=@_; $code.=<<___; movdqa $y0, $t0 pxor $y1, $t0 pand $x0, $t0 pxor $x1, $x0 pand $y0, $x1 pand $y1, $x0 pxor $x1, $x0 pxor $t0, $x1 ___ } sub Mul_GF4_N { # not used, see next subroutine # multiply and scale by N my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0)=@_; $code.=<<___; movdqa $y0, $t0 pxor $y1, $t0 pand $x0, $t0 pxor $x1, $x0 pand $y0, $x1 pand $y1, $x0 pxor $x0, $x1 pxor $t0, $x0 ___ } sub Mul_GF4_N_GF4 { # interleaved Mul_GF4_N and Mul_GF4 my ($x0,$x1,$y0,$y1,$t0, $x2,$x3,$y2,$y3,$t1)=@_; $code.=<<___; movdqa $y0, $t0 movdqa $y2, $t1 pxor $y1, $t0 pxor $y3, $t1 pand $x0, $t0 pand $x2, $t1 pxor $x1, $x0 pxor $x3, $x2 pand $y0, $x1 pand $y2, $x3 pand $y1, $x0 pand $y3, $x2 pxor $x0, $x1 pxor $x3, $x2 pxor $t0, $x0 pxor $t1, $x3 ___ } sub Mul_GF16_2 { my @x=@_[0..7]; my @y=@_[8..11]; my @t=@_[12..15]; $code.=<<___; movdqa @x[0], @t[0] movdqa @x[1], @t[1] ___ &Mul_GF4 (@x[0], @x[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[2]); $code.=<<___; pxor @x[2], @t[0] pxor @x[3], @t[1] pxor @y[2], @y[0] pxor @y[3], @y[1] ___ Mul_GF4_N_GF4 (@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3], @x[2], @x[3], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]); $code.=<<___; pxor @t[0], @x[0] pxor @t[0], @x[2] pxor @t[1], @x[1] pxor @t[1], @x[3] movdqa @x[4], @t[0] movdqa @x[5], @t[1] pxor @x[6], @t[0] pxor @x[7], @t[1] ___ &Mul_GF4_N_GF4 (@t[0], @t[1], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3], @x[6], @x[7], @y[2], @y[3], @t[2]); $code.=<<___; pxor @y[2], @y[0] pxor @y[3], @y[1] ___ &Mul_GF4 (@x[4], @x[5], @y[0], @y[1], @t[3]); $code.=<<___; pxor @t[0], @x[4] pxor @t[0], @x[6] pxor @t[1], @x[5] pxor @t[1], @x[7] ___ } sub Inv_GF256 { #;******************************************************************** #;* Inv_GF256: Input x0-x7 Output x0-x7 Temp t0-t3,s0-s3 (144) * #;******************************************************************** my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..11]; my @s=@_[12..15]; # direct optimizations from hardware $code.=<<___; movdqa @x[4], @t[3] movdqa @x[5], @t[2] movdqa @x[1], @t[1] movdqa @x[7], @s[1] movdqa @x[0], @s[0] pxor @x[6], @t[3] pxor @x[7], @t[2] pxor @x[3], @t[1] movdqa @t[3], @s[2] pxor @x[6], @s[1] movdqa @t[2], @t[0] pxor @x[2], @s[0] movdqa @t[3], @s[3] por @t[1], @t[2] por @s[0], @t[3] pxor @t[0], @s[3] pand @s[0], @s[2] pxor @t[1], @s[0] pand @t[1], @t[0] pand @s[0], @s[3] movdqa @x[3], @s[0] pxor @x[2], @s[0] pand @s[0], @s[1] pxor @s[1], @t[3] pxor @s[1], @t[2] movdqa @x[4], @s[1] movdqa @x[1], @s[0] pxor @x[5], @s[1] pxor @x[0], @s[0] movdqa @s[1], @t[1] pand @s[0], @s[1] por @s[0], @t[1] pxor @s[1], @t[0] pxor @s[3], @t[3] pxor @s[2], @t[2] pxor @s[3], @t[1] movdqa @x[7], @s[0] pxor @s[2], @t[0] movdqa @x[6], @s[1] pxor @s[2], @t[1] movdqa @x[5], @s[2] pand @x[3], @s[0] movdqa @x[4], @s[3] pand @x[2], @s[1] pand @x[1], @s[2] por @x[0], @s[3] pxor @s[0], @t[3] pxor @s[1], @t[2] pxor @s[2], @t[1] pxor @s[3], @t[0] #Inv_GF16 \t0, \t1, \t2, \t3, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3 # new smaller inversion movdqa @t[3], @s[0] pand @t[1], @t[3] pxor @t[2], @s[0] movdqa @t[0], @s[2] movdqa @s[0], @s[3] pxor @t[3], @s[2] pand @s[2], @s[3] movdqa @t[1], @s[1] pxor @t[2], @s[3] pxor @t[0], @s[1] pxor @t[2], @t[3] pand @t[3], @s[1] movdqa @s[2], @t[2] pxor @t[0], @s[1] pxor @s[1], @t[2] pxor @s[1], @t[1] pand @t[0], @t[2] pxor @t[2], @s[2] pxor @t[2], @t[1] pand @s[3], @s[2] pxor @s[0], @s[2] ___ # output in s3, s2, s1, t1 # Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \t2, \t3, \t0, \t1, \s0, \s1, \s2, \s3 # Mul_GF16_2 \x0, \x1, \x2, \x3, \x4, \x5, \x6, \x7, \s3, \s2, \s1, \t1, \s0, \t0, \t2, \t3 &Mul_GF16_2(@x,@s[3,2,1],@t[1],@s[0],@t[0,2,3]); ### output msb > [x3,x2,x1,x0,x7,x6,x5,x4] < lsb } # AES linear components sub ShiftRows { my @x=@_[0..7]; my $mask=pop; $code.=<<___; pxor 0x00($key),@x[0] pxor 0x10($key),@x[1] pxor 0x20($key),@x[2] pxor 0x30($key),@x[3] pshufb $mask,@x[0] pshufb $mask,@x[1] pxor 0x40($key),@x[4] pxor 0x50($key),@x[5] pshufb $mask,@x[2] pshufb $mask,@x[3] pxor 0x60($key),@x[6] pxor 0x70($key),@x[7] pshufb $mask,@x[4] pshufb $mask,@x[5] pshufb $mask,@x[6] pshufb $mask,@x[7] lea 0x80($key),$key ___ } sub MixColumns { # modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last] my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; my $inv=@_[16]; # optional $code.=<<___; pshufd \$0x93, @x[0], @t[0] # x0 <<< 32 pshufd \$0x93, @x[1], @t[1] pxor @t[0], @x[0] # x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32) pshufd \$0x93, @x[2], @t[2] pxor @t[1], @x[1] pshufd \$0x93, @x[3], @t[3] pxor @t[2], @x[2] pshufd \$0x93, @x[4], @t[4] pxor @t[3], @x[3] pshufd \$0x93, @x[5], @t[5] pxor @t[4], @x[4] pshufd \$0x93, @x[6], @t[6] pxor @t[5], @x[5] pshufd \$0x93, @x[7], @t[7] pxor @t[6], @x[6] pxor @t[7], @x[7] pxor @x[0], @t[1] pxor @x[7], @t[0] pxor @x[7], @t[1] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[0], @x[0] # (x0 ^ (x0 <<< 32)) <<< 64) pxor @x[1], @t[2] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[1], @x[1] pxor @x[4], @t[5] pxor @t[0], @x[0] pxor @x[5], @t[6] pxor @t[1], @x[1] pxor @x[3], @t[4] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[4], @t[0] pxor @x[6], @t[7] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[5], @t[1] pxor @x[2], @t[3] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[3], @x[4] pxor @x[7], @t[3] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[7], @x[5] pxor @x[7], @t[4] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[6], @x[3] pxor @t[4], @t[0] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @x[6] pxor @t[5], @t[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$inv); pxor @t[3], @x[4] pxor @t[7], @x[5] pxor @t[6], @x[3] movdqa @t[0], @x[2] pxor @t[2], @x[6] movdqa @t[1], @x[7] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($inv); pxor @x[4], @t[3] pxor @t[7], @x[5] pxor @x[3], @t[6] movdqa @t[0], @x[3] pxor @t[2], @x[6] movdqa @t[6], @x[2] movdqa @t[1], @x[7] movdqa @x[6], @x[4] movdqa @t[3], @x[6] ___ } sub InvMixColumns_orig { my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; $code.=<<___; # multiplication by 0x0e pshufd \$0x93, @x[7], @t[7] movdqa @x[2], @t[2] pxor @x[5], @x[7] # 7 5 pxor @x[5], @x[2] # 2 5 pshufd \$0x93, @x[0], @t[0] movdqa @x[5], @t[5] pxor @x[0], @x[5] # 5 0 [1] pxor @x[1], @x[0] # 0 1 pshufd \$0x93, @x[1], @t[1] pxor @x[2], @x[1] # 1 25 pxor @x[6], @x[0] # 01 6 [2] pxor @x[3], @x[1] # 125 3 [4] pshufd \$0x93, @x[3], @t[3] pxor @x[0], @x[2] # 25 016 [3] pxor @x[7], @x[3] # 3 75 pxor @x[6], @x[7] # 75 6 [0] pshufd \$0x93, @x[6], @t[6] movdqa @x[4], @t[4] pxor @x[4], @x[6] # 6 4 pxor @x[3], @x[4] # 4 375 [6] pxor @x[7], @x[3] # 375 756=36 pxor @t[5], @x[6] # 64 5 [7] pxor @t[2], @x[3] # 36 2 pxor @t[4], @x[3] # 362 4 [5] pshufd \$0x93, @t[5], @t[5] ___ my @y = @x[7,5,0,2,1,3,4,6]; $code.=<<___; # multiplication by 0x0b pxor @y[0], @y[1] pxor @t[0], @y[0] pxor @t[1], @y[1] pshufd \$0x93, @t[2], @t[2] pxor @t[5], @y[0] pxor @t[6], @y[1] pxor @t[7], @y[0] pshufd \$0x93, @t[4], @t[4] pxor @t[6], @t[7] # clobber t[7] pxor @y[0], @y[1] pxor @t[0], @y[3] pshufd \$0x93, @t[0], @t[0] pxor @t[1], @y[2] pxor @t[1], @y[4] pxor @t[2], @y[2] pshufd \$0x93, @t[1], @t[1] pxor @t[2], @y[3] pxor @t[2], @y[5] pxor @t[7], @y[2] pshufd \$0x93, @t[2], @t[2] pxor @t[3], @y[3] pxor @t[3], @y[6] pxor @t[3], @y[4] pshufd \$0x93, @t[3], @t[3] pxor @t[4], @y[7] pxor @t[4], @y[5] pxor @t[7], @y[7] pxor @t[5], @y[3] pxor @t[4], @y[4] pxor @t[5], @t[7] # clobber t[7] even more pxor @t[7], @y[5] pshufd \$0x93, @t[4], @t[4] pxor @t[7], @y[6] pxor @t[7], @y[4] pxor @t[5], @t[7] pshufd \$0x93, @t[5], @t[5] pxor @t[6], @t[7] # restore t[7] # multiplication by 0x0d pxor @y[7], @y[4] pxor @t[4], @y[7] pshufd \$0x93, @t[6], @t[6] pxor @t[0], @y[2] pxor @t[5], @y[7] pxor @t[2], @y[2] pshufd \$0x93, @t[7], @t[7] pxor @y[1], @y[3] pxor @t[1], @y[1] pxor @t[0], @y[0] pxor @t[0], @y[3] pxor @t[5], @y[1] pxor @t[5], @y[0] pxor @t[7], @y[1] pshufd \$0x93, @t[0], @t[0] pxor @t[6], @y[0] pxor @y[1], @y[3] pxor @t[1], @y[4] pshufd \$0x93, @t[1], @t[1] pxor @t[7], @y[7] pxor @t[2], @y[4] pxor @t[2], @y[5] pshufd \$0x93, @t[2], @t[2] pxor @t[6], @y[2] pxor @t[3], @t[6] # clobber t[6] pxor @y[7], @y[4] pxor @t[6], @y[3] pxor @t[6], @y[6] pxor @t[5], @y[5] pxor @t[4], @y[6] pshufd \$0x93, @t[4], @t[4] pxor @t[6], @y[5] pxor @t[7], @y[6] pxor @t[3], @t[6] # restore t[6] pshufd \$0x93, @t[5], @t[5] pshufd \$0x93, @t[6], @t[6] pshufd \$0x93, @t[7], @t[7] pshufd \$0x93, @t[3], @t[3] # multiplication by 0x09 pxor @y[1], @y[4] pxor @y[1], @t[1] # t[1]=y[1] pxor @t[5], @t[0] # clobber t[0] pxor @t[5], @t[1] pxor @t[0], @y[3] pxor @y[0], @t[0] # t[0]=y[0] pxor @t[6], @t[1] pxor @t[7], @t[6] # clobber t[6] pxor @t[1], @y[4] pxor @t[4], @y[7] pxor @y[4], @t[4] # t[4]=y[4] pxor @t[3], @y[6] pxor @y[3], @t[3] # t[3]=y[3] pxor @t[2], @y[5] pxor @y[2], @t[2] # t[2]=y[2] pxor @t[7], @t[3] pxor @y[5], @t[5] # t[5]=y[5] pxor @t[6], @t[2] pxor @t[6], @t[5] pxor @y[6], @t[6] # t[6]=y[6] pxor @y[7], @t[7] # t[7]=y[7] movdqa @t[0],@XMM[0] movdqa @t[1],@XMM[1] movdqa @t[2],@XMM[2] movdqa @t[3],@XMM[3] movdqa @t[4],@XMM[4] movdqa @t[5],@XMM[5] movdqa @t[6],@XMM[6] movdqa @t[7],@XMM[7] ___ } sub InvMixColumns { my @x=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; # Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to # # | 0e 0b 0d 09 | | 02 03 01 01 | | 05 00 04 00 | # | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 | # | 0d 09 0e 0b | | 01 01 02 03 | | 04 00 05 00 | # | 0b 0d 09 0e | | 03 01 01 02 | | 00 04 00 05 | $code.=<<___; # multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00 pshufd \$0x4E, @x[0], @t[0] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[6], @t[6] pxor @x[0], @t[0] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[7], @t[7] pxor @x[6], @t[6] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[1], @t[1] pxor @x[7], @t[7] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @t[2] pxor @x[1], @t[1] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[3], @t[3] pxor @x[2], @t[2] pxor @t[6], @x[0] pxor @t[6], @x[1] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[4], @t[4] pxor @x[3], @t[3] pxor @t[0], @x[2] pxor @t[1], @x[3] pshufd \$0x4E, @x[5], @t[5] pxor @x[4], @t[4] pxor @t[7], @x[1] pxor @t[2], @x[4] pxor @x[5], @t[5] pxor @t[7], @x[2] pxor @t[6], @x[3] pxor @t[6], @x[4] pxor @t[3], @x[5] pxor @t[4], @x[6] pxor @t[7], @x[4] pxor @t[7], @x[5] pxor @t[5], @x[7] ___ &MixColumns (@x,@t,1); # flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6 } sub aesenc { # not used my @b=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; $code.=<<___; movdqa 0x30($const),@t[0] # .LSR ___ &ShiftRows (@b,@t[0]); &Sbox (@b,@t); &MixColumns (@b[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5],@t); } sub aesenclast { # not used my @b=@_[0..7]; my @t=@_[8..15]; $code.=<<___; movdqa 0x40($const),@t[0] # .LSRM0 ___ &ShiftRows (@b,@t[0]); &Sbox (@b,@t); $code.=<<___ pxor 0x00($key),@b[0] pxor 0x10($key),@b[1] pxor 0x20($key),@b[4] pxor 0x30($key),@b[6] pxor 0x40($key),@b[3] pxor 0x50($key),@b[7] pxor 0x60($key),@b[2] pxor 0x70($key),@b[5] ___ } sub swapmove { my ($a,$b,$n,$mask,$t)=@_; $code.=<<___; movdqa $b,$t psrlq \$$n,$b pxor $a,$b pand $mask,$b pxor $b,$a psllq \$$n,$b pxor $t,$b ___ } sub swapmove2x { my ($a0,$b0,$a1,$b1,$n,$mask,$t0,$t1)=@_; $code.=<<___; movdqa $b0,$t0 psrlq \$$n,$b0 movdqa $b1,$t1 psrlq \$$n,$b1 pxor $a0,$b0 pxor $a1,$b1 pand $mask,$b0 pand $mask,$b1 pxor $b0,$a0 psllq \$$n,$b0 pxor $b1,$a1 psllq \$$n,$b1 pxor $t0,$b0 pxor $t1,$b1 ___ } sub bitslice { my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..11]; $code.=<<___; movdqa 0x00($const),$t0 # .LBS0 movdqa 0x10($const),$t1 # .LBS1 ___ &swapmove2x(@x[0,1,2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); $code.=<<___; movdqa 0x20($const),$t0 # .LBS2 ___ &swapmove2x(@x[0,2,1,3],2,$t1,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[0,4,1,5],4,$t0,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x(@x[2,6,3,7],4,$t0,$t2,$t3); } $code.=<<___; .text .extern asm_AES_encrypt .extern asm_AES_decrypt .type _bsaes_encrypt8,\@abi-omnipotent .align 64 _bsaes_encrypt8: lea .LBS0(%rip), $const # constants table movdqa ($key), @XMM[9] # round 0 key lea 0x10($key), $key movdqa 0x50($const), @XMM[8] # .LM0SR pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[0] # xor with round0 key pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[1] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[2] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[3] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[0] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[1] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[4] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[5] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[2] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[3] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[7] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[4] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[5] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[6] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[7] _bsaes_encrypt8_bitslice: ___ &bitslice (@XMM[0..7, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; dec $rounds jmp .Lenc_sbox .align 16 .Lenc_loop: ___ &ShiftRows (@XMM[0..7, 8]); $code.=".Lenc_sbox:\n"; &Sbox (@XMM[0..7, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; dec $rounds jl .Lenc_done ___ &MixColumns (@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; movdqa 0x30($const), @XMM[8] # .LSR jnz .Lenc_loop movdqa 0x40($const), @XMM[8] # .LSRM0 jmp .Lenc_loop .align 16 .Lenc_done: ___ # output in lsb > [t0, t1, t4, t6, t3, t7, t2, t5] < msb &bitslice (@XMM[0,1,4,6,3,7,2,5, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; movdqa ($key), @XMM[8] # last round key pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[4] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[6] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[3] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[7] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[2] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[5] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[0] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] ret .size _bsaes_encrypt8,.-_bsaes_encrypt8 .type _bsaes_decrypt8,\@abi-omnipotent .align 64 _bsaes_decrypt8: lea .LBS0(%rip), $const # constants table movdqa ($key), @XMM[9] # round 0 key lea 0x10($key), $key movdqa -0x30($const), @XMM[8] # .LM0ISR pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[0] # xor with round0 key pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[1] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[2] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[3] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[0] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[1] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[4] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[5] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[2] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[3] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[7] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[4] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[5] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[6] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[7] ___ &bitslice (@XMM[0..7, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; dec $rounds jmp .Ldec_sbox .align 16 .Ldec_loop: ___ &ShiftRows (@XMM[0..7, 8]); $code.=".Ldec_sbox:\n"; &InvSbox (@XMM[0..7, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; dec $rounds jl .Ldec_done ___ &InvMixColumns (@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..15]); $code.=<<___; movdqa -0x10($const), @XMM[8] # .LISR jnz .Ldec_loop movdqa -0x20($const), @XMM[8] # .LISRM0 jmp .Ldec_loop .align 16 .Ldec_done: ___ &bitslice (@XMM[0,1,6,4,2,7,3,5, 8..11]); $code.=<<___; movdqa ($key), @XMM[8] # last round key pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[6] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[4] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[2] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[7] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[3] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[5] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[0] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] ret .size _bsaes_decrypt8,.-_bsaes_decrypt8 ___ } { my ($out,$inp,$rounds,$const)=("%rax","%rcx","%r10d","%r11"); sub bitslice_key { my @x=reverse(@_[0..7]); my ($bs0,$bs1,$bs2,$t2,$t3)=@_[8..12]; &swapmove (@x[0,1],1,$bs0,$t2,$t3); $code.=<<___; #&swapmove(@x[2,3],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); movdqa @x[0], @x[2] movdqa @x[1], @x[3] ___ #&swapmove2x(@x[4,5,6,7],1,$t0,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x (@x[0,2,1,3],2,$bs1,$t2,$t3); $code.=<<___; #&swapmove2x(@x[4,6,5,7],2,$t1,$t2,$t3); movdqa @x[0], @x[4] movdqa @x[2], @x[6] movdqa @x[1], @x[5] movdqa @x[3], @x[7] ___ &swapmove2x (@x[0,4,1,5],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3); &swapmove2x (@x[2,6,3,7],4,$bs2,$t2,$t3); } $code.=<<___; .type _bsaes_key_convert,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _bsaes_key_convert: lea .Lmasks(%rip), $const movdqu ($inp), %xmm7 # load round 0 key lea 0x10($inp), $inp movdqa 0x00($const), %xmm0 # 0x01... movdqa 0x10($const), %xmm1 # 0x02... movdqa 0x20($const), %xmm2 # 0x04... movdqa 0x30($const), %xmm3 # 0x08... movdqa 0x40($const), %xmm4 # .LM0 pcmpeqd %xmm5, %xmm5 # .LNOT movdqu ($inp), %xmm6 # load round 1 key movdqa %xmm7, ($out) # save round 0 key lea 0x10($out), $out dec $rounds jmp .Lkey_loop .align 16 .Lkey_loop: pshufb %xmm4, %xmm6 # .LM0 movdqa %xmm0, %xmm8 movdqa %xmm1, %xmm9 pand %xmm6, %xmm8 pand %xmm6, %xmm9 movdqa %xmm2, %xmm10 pcmpeqb %xmm0, %xmm8 psllq \$4, %xmm0 # 0x10... movdqa %xmm3, %xmm11 pcmpeqb %xmm1, %xmm9 psllq \$4, %xmm1 # 0x20... pand %xmm6, %xmm10 pand %xmm6, %xmm11 movdqa %xmm0, %xmm12 pcmpeqb %xmm2, %xmm10 psllq \$4, %xmm2 # 0x40... movdqa %xmm1, %xmm13 pcmpeqb %xmm3, %xmm11 psllq \$4, %xmm3 # 0x80... movdqa %xmm2, %xmm14 movdqa %xmm3, %xmm15 pxor %xmm5, %xmm8 # "pnot" pxor %xmm5, %xmm9 pand %xmm6, %xmm12 pand %xmm6, %xmm13 movdqa %xmm8, 0x00($out) # write bit-sliced round key pcmpeqb %xmm0, %xmm12 psrlq \$4, %xmm0 # 0x01... movdqa %xmm9, 0x10($out) pcmpeqb %xmm1, %xmm13 psrlq \$4, %xmm1 # 0x02... lea 0x10($inp), $inp pand %xmm6, %xmm14 pand %xmm6, %xmm15 movdqa %xmm10, 0x20($out) pcmpeqb %xmm2, %xmm14 psrlq \$4, %xmm2 # 0x04... movdqa %xmm11, 0x30($out) pcmpeqb %xmm3, %xmm15 psrlq \$4, %xmm3 # 0x08... movdqu ($inp), %xmm6 # load next round key pxor %xmm5, %xmm13 # "pnot" pxor %xmm5, %xmm14 movdqa %xmm12, 0x40($out) movdqa %xmm13, 0x50($out) movdqa %xmm14, 0x60($out) movdqa %xmm15, 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out dec $rounds jnz .Lkey_loop movdqa 0x50($const), %xmm7 # .L63 #movdqa %xmm6, ($out) # don't save last round key ret .size _bsaes_key_convert,.-_bsaes_key_convert ___ } if (0 && !$win64) { # following four functions are unsupported interface # used for benchmarking... $code.=<<___; .globl bsaes_enc_key_convert .type bsaes_enc_key_convert,\@function,2 .align 16 bsaes_enc_key_convert: mov 240($inp),%r10d # pass rounds mov $inp,%rcx # pass key mov $out,%rax # pass key schedule call _bsaes_key_convert pxor %xmm6,%xmm7 # fix up last round key movdqa %xmm7,(%rax) # save last round key ret .size bsaes_enc_key_convert,.-bsaes_enc_key_convert .globl bsaes_encrypt_128 .type bsaes_encrypt_128,\@function,4 .align 16 bsaes_encrypt_128: .Lenc128_loop: movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[7] mov $key, %rax # pass the $key lea 0x80($inp), $inp mov \$10,%r10d call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x60($out) movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out sub \$0x80,$len ja .Lenc128_loop ret .size bsaes_encrypt_128,.-bsaes_encrypt_128 .globl bsaes_dec_key_convert .type bsaes_dec_key_convert,\@function,2 .align 16 bsaes_dec_key_convert: mov 240($inp),%r10d # pass rounds mov $inp,%rcx # pass key mov $out,%rax # pass key schedule call _bsaes_key_convert pxor ($out),%xmm7 # fix up round 0 key movdqa %xmm6,(%rax) # save last round key movdqa %xmm7,($out) ret .size bsaes_dec_key_convert,.-bsaes_dec_key_convert .globl bsaes_decrypt_128 .type bsaes_decrypt_128,\@function,4 .align 16 bsaes_decrypt_128: .Ldec128_loop: movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[7] mov $key, %rax # pass the $key lea 0x80($inp), $inp mov \$10,%r10d call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x60($out) movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out sub \$0x80,$len ja .Ldec128_loop ret .size bsaes_decrypt_128,.-bsaes_decrypt_128 ___ } { ###################################################################### # # OpenSSL interface # my ($arg1,$arg2,$arg3,$arg4,$arg5,$arg6)=$win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8","%r9","%r10","%r11d") : ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9d"); my ($inp,$out,$len,$key)=("%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15"); if ($ecb) { $code.=<<___; .globl bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks .type bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks: mov %rsp, %rax .Lecb_enc_prologue: push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea -0x48(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa0(%rsp), %rsp movaps %xmm6, 0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm7, 0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm8, 0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm9, 0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm10, 0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm11, 0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp) movaps %xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp) movaps %xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp) movaps %xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp) .Lecb_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rbp # backup %rsp mov 240($arg4),%eax # rounds mov $arg1,$inp # backup arguments mov $arg2,$out mov $arg3,$len mov $arg4,$key cmp \$8,$arg3 jb .Lecb_enc_short mov %eax,%ebx # backup rounds shl \$7,%rax # 128 bytes per inner round key sub \$`128-32`,%rax # size of bit-sliced key schedule sub %rax,%rsp mov %rsp,%rax # pass key schedule mov $key,%rcx # pass key mov %ebx,%r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_key_convert pxor %xmm6,%xmm7 # fix up last round key movdqa %xmm7,(%rax) # save last round key sub \$8,$len .Lecb_enc_loop: movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] mov %ebx,%r10d # pass rounds movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[7] lea 0x80($inp), $inp call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x60($out) movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out sub \$8,$len jnc .Lecb_enc_loop add \$8,$len jz .Lecb_enc_done movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule mov %ebx,%r10d # pass rounds cmp \$2,$len jb .Lecb_enc_one movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] je .Lecb_enc_two movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] cmp \$4,$len jb .Lecb_enc_three movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] je .Lecb_enc_four movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] cmp \$6,$len jb .Lecb_enc_five movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] je .Lecb_enc_six movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x60($out) jmp .Lecb_enc_done .align 16 .Lecb_enc_six: call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) jmp .Lecb_enc_done .align 16 .Lecb_enc_five: call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) jmp .Lecb_enc_done .align 16 .Lecb_enc_four: call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) jmp .Lecb_enc_done .align 16 .Lecb_enc_three: call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) jmp .Lecb_enc_done .align 16 .Lecb_enc_two: call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) jmp .Lecb_enc_done .align 16 .Lecb_enc_one: call _bsaes_encrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output jmp .Lecb_enc_done .align 16 .Lecb_enc_short: lea ($inp), $arg1 lea ($out), $arg2 lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_encrypt lea 16($inp), $inp lea 16($out), $out dec $len jnz .Lecb_enc_short .Lecb_enc_done: lea (%rsp),%rax pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 .Lecb_enc_bzero: # wipe key schedule [if any] movdqa %xmm0, 0x00(%rax) movdqa %xmm0, 0x10(%rax) lea 0x20(%rax), %rax cmp %rax, %rbp jb .Lecb_enc_bzero lea (%rbp),%rsp # restore %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x40(%rbp), %xmm6 movaps 0x50(%rbp), %xmm7 movaps 0x60(%rbp), %xmm8 movaps 0x70(%rbp), %xmm9 movaps 0x80(%rbp), %xmm10 movaps 0x90(%rbp), %xmm11 movaps 0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12 movaps 0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13 movaps 0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14 movaps 0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15 lea 0xa0(%rbp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; mov 0x48(%rsp), %r15 mov 0x50(%rsp), %r14 mov 0x58(%rsp), %r13 mov 0x60(%rsp), %r12 mov 0x68(%rsp), %rbx mov 0x70(%rsp), %rax lea 0x78(%rsp), %rsp mov %rax, %rbp .Lecb_enc_epilogue: ret .size bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ecb_encrypt_blocks .globl bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks .type bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks: mov %rsp, %rax .Lecb_dec_prologue: push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea -0x48(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa0(%rsp), %rsp movaps %xmm6, 0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm7, 0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm8, 0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm9, 0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm10, 0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm11, 0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp) movaps %xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp) movaps %xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp) movaps %xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp) .Lecb_dec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rbp # backup %rsp mov 240($arg4),%eax # rounds mov $arg1,$inp # backup arguments mov $arg2,$out mov $arg3,$len mov $arg4,$key cmp \$8,$arg3 jb .Lecb_dec_short mov %eax,%ebx # backup rounds shl \$7,%rax # 128 bytes per inner round key sub \$`128-32`,%rax # size of bit-sliced key schedule sub %rax,%rsp mov %rsp,%rax # pass key schedule mov $key,%rcx # pass key mov %ebx,%r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_key_convert pxor (%rsp),%xmm7 # fix up 0 round key movdqa %xmm6,(%rax) # save last round key movdqa %xmm7,(%rsp) sub \$8,$len .Lecb_dec_loop: movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] mov %ebx,%r10d # pass rounds movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[7] lea 0x80($inp), $inp call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x60($out) movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out sub \$8,$len jnc .Lecb_dec_loop add \$8,$len jz .Lecb_dec_done movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule mov %ebx,%r10d # pass rounds cmp \$2,$len jb .Lecb_dec_one movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] je .Lecb_dec_two movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] cmp \$4,$len jb .Lecb_dec_three movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] je .Lecb_dec_four movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] cmp \$6,$len jb .Lecb_dec_five movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] je .Lecb_dec_six movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x60($out) jmp .Lecb_dec_done .align 16 .Lecb_dec_six: call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) jmp .Lecb_dec_done .align 16 .Lecb_dec_five: call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) jmp .Lecb_dec_done .align 16 .Lecb_dec_four: call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) jmp .Lecb_dec_done .align 16 .Lecb_dec_three: call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) jmp .Lecb_dec_done .align 16 .Lecb_dec_two: call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) jmp .Lecb_dec_done .align 16 .Lecb_dec_one: call _bsaes_decrypt8 movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output jmp .Lecb_dec_done .align 16 .Lecb_dec_short: lea ($inp), $arg1 lea ($out), $arg2 lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_decrypt lea 16($inp), $inp lea 16($out), $out dec $len jnz .Lecb_dec_short .Lecb_dec_done: lea (%rsp),%rax pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 .Lecb_dec_bzero: # wipe key schedule [if any] movdqa %xmm0, 0x00(%rax) movdqa %xmm0, 0x10(%rax) lea 0x20(%rax), %rax cmp %rax, %rbp jb .Lecb_dec_bzero lea (%rbp),%rsp # restore %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x40(%rbp), %xmm6 movaps 0x50(%rbp), %xmm7 movaps 0x60(%rbp), %xmm8 movaps 0x70(%rbp), %xmm9 movaps 0x80(%rbp), %xmm10 movaps 0x90(%rbp), %xmm11 movaps 0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12 movaps 0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13 movaps 0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14 movaps 0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15 lea 0xa0(%rbp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; mov 0x48(%rsp), %r15 mov 0x50(%rsp), %r14 mov 0x58(%rsp), %r13 mov 0x60(%rsp), %r12 mov 0x68(%rsp), %rbx mov 0x70(%rsp), %rax lea 0x78(%rsp), %rsp mov %rax, %rbp .Lecb_dec_epilogue: ret .size bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ecb_decrypt_blocks ___ } $code.=<<___; .extern asm_AES_cbc_encrypt .globl bsaes_cbc_encrypt .type bsaes_cbc_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bsaes_cbc_encrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); mov 48(%rsp),$arg6 # pull direction flag ___ $code.=<<___; cmp \$0,$arg6 jne asm_AES_cbc_encrypt cmp \$128,$arg3 jb asm_AES_cbc_encrypt mov %rsp, %rax .Lcbc_dec_prologue: push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea -0x48(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); mov 0xa0(%rsp),$arg5 # pull ivp lea -0xa0(%rsp), %rsp movaps %xmm6, 0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm7, 0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm8, 0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm9, 0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm10, 0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm11, 0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp) movaps %xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp) movaps %xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp) movaps %xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp) .Lcbc_dec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp, %rbp # backup %rsp mov 240($arg4), %eax # rounds mov $arg1, $inp # backup arguments mov $arg2, $out mov $arg3, $len mov $arg4, $key mov $arg5, %rbx shr \$4, $len # bytes to blocks mov %eax, %edx # rounds shl \$7, %rax # 128 bytes per inner round key sub \$`128-32`, %rax # size of bit-sliced key schedule sub %rax, %rsp mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule mov $key, %rcx # pass key mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_key_convert pxor (%rsp),%xmm7 # fix up 0 round key movdqa %xmm6,(%rax) # save last round key movdqa %xmm7,(%rsp) movdqu (%rbx), @XMM[15] # load IV sub \$8,$len .Lcbc_dec_loop: movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] mov %edx,%r10d # pass rounds movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[7] movdqa @XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp) # put aside IV call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= IV movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # re-load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[10] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[11] pxor @XMM[10], @XMM[4] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[12] pxor @XMM[11], @XMM[2] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[13] pxor @XMM[12], @XMM[7] movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[14] pxor @XMM[13], @XMM[3] movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[15] # IV pxor @XMM[14], @XMM[5] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output lea 0x80($inp), $inp movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x60($out) movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out sub \$8,$len jnc .Lcbc_dec_loop add \$8,$len jz .Lcbc_dec_done movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[0] # load input mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds cmp \$2,$len jb .Lcbc_dec_one movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[1] je .Lcbc_dec_two movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[2] cmp \$4,$len jb .Lcbc_dec_three movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[3] je .Lcbc_dec_four movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[4] cmp \$6,$len jb .Lcbc_dec_five movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[5] je .Lcbc_dec_six movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[6] movdqa @XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp) # put aside IV call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= IV movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # re-load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[10] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[11] pxor @XMM[10], @XMM[4] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[12] pxor @XMM[11], @XMM[2] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[13] pxor @XMM[12], @XMM[7] movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[15] # IV pxor @XMM[13], @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x60($out) jmp .Lcbc_dec_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_six: movdqa @XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp) # put aside IV call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= IV movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # re-load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[10] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[11] pxor @XMM[10], @XMM[4] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[12] pxor @XMM[11], @XMM[2] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[15] # IV pxor @XMM[12], @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) jmp .Lcbc_dec_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_five: movdqa @XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp) # put aside IV call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= IV movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # re-load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[10] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[11] pxor @XMM[10], @XMM[4] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[15] # IV pxor @XMM[11], @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) jmp .Lcbc_dec_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_four: movdqa @XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp) # put aside IV call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= IV movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # re-load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[10] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[15] # IV pxor @XMM[10], @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) jmp .Lcbc_dec_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_three: movdqa @XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp) # put aside IV call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= IV movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # re-load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[15] # IV pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) jmp .Lcbc_dec_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_two: movdqa @XMM[15], 0x20(%rbp) # put aside IV call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= IV movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # re-load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[15] # IV pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) jmp .Lcbc_dec_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_one: lea ($inp), $arg1 lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 # buffer output lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_decrypt # doesn't touch %xmm pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[15] # ^= IV movdqu @XMM[15], ($out) # write output movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[15] # IV .Lcbc_dec_done: movdqu @XMM[15], (%rbx) # return IV lea (%rsp), %rax pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 .Lcbc_dec_bzero: # wipe key schedule [if any] movdqa %xmm0, 0x00(%rax) movdqa %xmm0, 0x10(%rax) lea 0x20(%rax), %rax cmp %rax, %rbp ja .Lcbc_dec_bzero lea (%rbp),%rsp # restore %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x40(%rbp), %xmm6 movaps 0x50(%rbp), %xmm7 movaps 0x60(%rbp), %xmm8 movaps 0x70(%rbp), %xmm9 movaps 0x80(%rbp), %xmm10 movaps 0x90(%rbp), %xmm11 movaps 0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12 movaps 0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13 movaps 0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14 movaps 0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15 lea 0xa0(%rbp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; mov 0x48(%rsp), %r15 mov 0x50(%rsp), %r14 mov 0x58(%rsp), %r13 mov 0x60(%rsp), %r12 mov 0x68(%rsp), %rbx mov 0x70(%rsp), %rax lea 0x78(%rsp), %rsp mov %rax, %rbp .Lcbc_dec_epilogue: ret .size bsaes_cbc_encrypt,.-bsaes_cbc_encrypt .globl bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .type bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks: mov %rsp, %rax .Lctr_enc_prologue: push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea -0x48(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); mov 0xa0(%rsp),$arg5 # pull ivp lea -0xa0(%rsp), %rsp movaps %xmm6, 0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm7, 0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm8, 0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm9, 0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm10, 0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm11, 0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp) movaps %xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp) movaps %xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp) movaps %xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp) .Lctr_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp, %rbp # backup %rsp movdqu ($arg5), %xmm0 # load counter mov 240($arg4), %eax # rounds mov $arg1, $inp # backup arguments mov $arg2, $out mov $arg3, $len mov $arg4, $key movdqa %xmm0, 0x20(%rbp) # copy counter cmp \$8, $arg3 jb .Lctr_enc_short mov %eax, %ebx # rounds shl \$7, %rax # 128 bytes per inner round key sub \$`128-32`, %rax # size of bit-sliced key schedule sub %rax, %rsp mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule mov $key, %rcx # pass key mov %ebx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_key_convert pxor %xmm6,%xmm7 # fix up last round key movdqa %xmm7,(%rax) # save last round key movdqa (%rsp), @XMM[9] # load round0 key lea .LADD1(%rip), %r11 movdqa 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # counter copy movdqa -0x20(%r11), @XMM[8] # .LSWPUP pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[9] # byte swap upper part pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[0] movdqa @XMM[9], (%rsp) # save adjusted round0 key jmp .Lctr_enc_loop .align 16 .Lctr_enc_loop: movdqa @XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp) # save counter movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[1] # prepare 8 counter values movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[2] paddd 0x00(%r11), @XMM[1] # .LADD1 movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[3] paddd 0x10(%r11), @XMM[2] # .LADD2 movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[4] paddd 0x20(%r11), @XMM[3] # .LADD3 movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[5] paddd 0x30(%r11), @XMM[4] # .LADD4 movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[6] paddd 0x40(%r11), @XMM[5] # .LADD5 movdqa @XMM[0], @XMM[7] paddd 0x50(%r11), @XMM[6] # .LADD6 paddd 0x60(%r11), @XMM[7] # .LADD7 # Borrow prologue from _bsaes_encrypt8 to use the opportunity # to flip byte order in 32-bit counter movdqa (%rsp), @XMM[9] # round 0 key lea 0x10(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule movdqa -0x10(%r11), @XMM[8] # .LSWPUPM0SR pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[0] # xor with round0 key pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[1] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[2] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[3] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[0] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[1] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[4] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[5] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[2] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[3] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[6] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[7] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[4] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[5] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[6] pshufb @XMM[8], @XMM[7] lea .LBS0(%rip), %r11 # constants table mov %ebx,%r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8_bitslice sub \$8,$len jc .Lctr_enc_loop_done movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # load input movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[10] movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[11] movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[12] movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[13] movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[14] movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[15] lea 0x80($inp),$inp pxor @XMM[0], @XMM[8] movdqa 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # load counter pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[8], 0x00($out) # write output pxor @XMM[10], @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor @XMM[11], @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) pxor @XMM[12], @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) pxor @XMM[13], @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) pxor @XMM[14], @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) pxor @XMM[15], @XMM[5] movdqu @XMM[2], 0x60($out) lea .LADD1(%rip), %r11 movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out paddd 0x70(%r11), @XMM[0] # .LADD8 jnz .Lctr_enc_loop jmp .Lctr_enc_done .align 16 .Lctr_enc_loop_done: add \$8, $len movdqu 0x00($inp), @XMM[8] # load input pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[0] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output cmp \$2,$len jb .Lctr_enc_done movdqu 0x10($inp), @XMM[9] pxor @XMM[9], @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) je .Lctr_enc_done movdqu 0x20($inp), @XMM[10] pxor @XMM[10], @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) cmp \$4,$len jb .Lctr_enc_done movdqu 0x30($inp), @XMM[11] pxor @XMM[11], @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) je .Lctr_enc_done movdqu 0x40($inp), @XMM[12] pxor @XMM[12], @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) cmp \$6,$len jb .Lctr_enc_done movdqu 0x50($inp), @XMM[13] pxor @XMM[13], @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) je .Lctr_enc_done movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[14] pxor @XMM[14], @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[2], 0x60($out) jmp .Lctr_enc_done .align 16 .Lctr_enc_short: lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg1 lea 0x30(%rbp), $arg2 lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_encrypt movdqu ($inp), @XMM[1] lea 16($inp), $inp mov 0x2c(%rbp), %eax # load 32-bit counter bswap %eax pxor 0x30(%rbp), @XMM[1] inc %eax # increment movdqu @XMM[1], ($out) bswap %eax lea 16($out), $out mov %eax, 0x2c(%rsp) # save 32-bit counter dec $len jnz .Lctr_enc_short .Lctr_enc_done: lea (%rsp), %rax pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 .Lctr_enc_bzero: # wipe key schedule [if any] movdqa %xmm0, 0x00(%rax) movdqa %xmm0, 0x10(%rax) lea 0x20(%rax), %rax cmp %rax, %rbp ja .Lctr_enc_bzero lea (%rbp),%rsp # restore %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x40(%rbp), %xmm6 movaps 0x50(%rbp), %xmm7 movaps 0x60(%rbp), %xmm8 movaps 0x70(%rbp), %xmm9 movaps 0x80(%rbp), %xmm10 movaps 0x90(%rbp), %xmm11 movaps 0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12 movaps 0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13 movaps 0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14 movaps 0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15 lea 0xa0(%rbp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; mov 0x48(%rsp), %r15 mov 0x50(%rsp), %r14 mov 0x58(%rsp), %r13 mov 0x60(%rsp), %r12 mov 0x68(%rsp), %rbx mov 0x70(%rsp), %rax lea 0x78(%rsp), %rsp mov %rax, %rbp .Lctr_enc_epilogue: ret .size bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks ___ ###################################################################### # void bsaes_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len, # const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, # const unsigned char iv[16]); # my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=@XMM[13..15]; $arg6=~s/d$//; $code.=<<___; .globl bsaes_xts_encrypt .type bsaes_xts_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bsaes_xts_encrypt: mov %rsp, %rax .Lxts_enc_prologue: push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea -0x48(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); mov 0xa0(%rsp),$arg5 # pull key2 mov 0xa8(%rsp),$arg6 # pull ivp lea -0xa0(%rsp), %rsp movaps %xmm6, 0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm7, 0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm8, 0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm9, 0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm10, 0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm11, 0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp) movaps %xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp) movaps %xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp) movaps %xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp) .Lxts_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp, %rbp # backup %rsp mov $arg1, $inp # backup arguments mov $arg2, $out mov $arg3, $len mov $arg4, $key lea ($arg6), $arg1 lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 lea ($arg5), $arg3 call asm_AES_encrypt # generate initial tweak mov 240($key), %eax # rounds mov $len, %rbx # backup $len mov %eax, %edx # rounds shl \$7, %rax # 128 bytes per inner round key sub \$`128-32`, %rax # size of bit-sliced key schedule sub %rax, %rsp mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule mov $key, %rcx # pass key mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_key_convert pxor %xmm6, %xmm7 # fix up last round key movdqa %xmm7, (%rax) # save last round key and \$-16, $len sub \$0x80, %rsp # place for tweak[8] movdqa 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7] # initial tweak pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa .Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits sub \$0x80, $len jc .Lxts_enc_short jmp .Lxts_enc_loop .align 16 .Lxts_enc_loop: ___ for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) { $code.=<<___; pshufd \$0x13, $twtmp, $twres pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa @XMM[7], @XMM[$i] movdqa @XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i] paddq @XMM[7], @XMM[7] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask, $twres # isolate carry and residue pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits pxor $twres, @XMM[7] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1); movdqu `0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2); pxor @XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[] ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6] pxor @XMM[8+5], @XMM[5] movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[8+7] lea 0x80($inp), $inp movdqa @XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp) pxor @XMM[8+6], @XMM[6] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule pxor @XMM[8+7], @XMM[7] mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) pxor 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) pxor 0x60(%rsp), @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) pxor 0x70(%rsp), @XMM[5] movdqu @XMM[2], 0x60($out) movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out movdqa 0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7] # prepare next iteration tweak pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa .Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp pshufd \$0x13, $twtmp, $twres pxor $twtmp, $twtmp paddq @XMM[7], @XMM[7] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask, $twres # isolate carry and residue pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits pxor $twres, @XMM[7] sub \$0x80,$len jnc .Lxts_enc_loop .Lxts_enc_short: add \$0x80, $len jz .Lxts_enc_done ___ for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) { $code.=<<___; pshufd \$0x13, $twtmp, $twres pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa @XMM[7], @XMM[$i] movdqa @XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i] paddq @XMM[7], @XMM[7] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask, $twres # isolate carry and residue pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits pxor $twres, @XMM[7] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1); movdqu `0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1] cmp \$`0x10*$i`,$len je .Lxts_enc_$i ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2); pxor @XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[] ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6] pxor @XMM[8+5], @XMM[5] movdqa @XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp) lea 0x70($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+6], @XMM[6] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) pxor 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) pxor 0x60(%rsp), @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x60($out) lea 0x70($out), $out movdqa 0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_6: pxor @XMM[8+4], @XMM[4] lea 0x60($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+5], @XMM[5] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) pxor 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) lea 0x60($out), $out movdqa 0x60(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_5: pxor @XMM[8+3], @XMM[3] lea 0x50($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+4], @XMM[4] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x40($out) lea 0x50($out), $out movdqa 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_4: pxor @XMM[8+2], @XMM[2] lea 0x40($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+3], @XMM[3] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x30($out) lea 0x40($out), $out movdqa 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_3: pxor @XMM[8+1], @XMM[1] lea 0x30($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+2], @XMM[2] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x20($out) lea 0x30($out), $out movdqa 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_2: pxor @XMM[8+0], @XMM[0] lea 0x20($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+1], @XMM[1] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_encrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) lea 0x20($out), $out movdqa 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_1: pxor @XMM[0], @XMM[8] lea 0x10($inp), $inp movdqa @XMM[8], 0x20(%rbp) lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg1 lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_encrypt # doesn't touch %xmm pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] #pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[0] #lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule #mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds #call _bsaes_encrypt8 #pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output lea 0x10($out), $out movdqa 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak .Lxts_enc_done: and \$15, %ebx jz .Lxts_enc_ret mov $out, %rdx .Lxts_enc_steal: movzb ($inp), %eax movzb -16(%rdx), %ecx lea 1($inp), $inp mov %al, -16(%rdx) mov %cl, 0(%rdx) lea 1(%rdx), %rdx sub \$1,%ebx jnz .Lxts_enc_steal movdqu -16($out), @XMM[0] lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg1 pxor @XMM[7], @XMM[0] lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 movdqa @XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp) lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_encrypt # doesn't touch %xmm pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[7], -16($out) .Lxts_enc_ret: lea (%rsp), %rax pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 .Lxts_enc_bzero: # wipe key schedule [if any] movdqa %xmm0, 0x00(%rax) movdqa %xmm0, 0x10(%rax) lea 0x20(%rax), %rax cmp %rax, %rbp ja .Lxts_enc_bzero lea (%rbp),%rsp # restore %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x40(%rbp), %xmm6 movaps 0x50(%rbp), %xmm7 movaps 0x60(%rbp), %xmm8 movaps 0x70(%rbp), %xmm9 movaps 0x80(%rbp), %xmm10 movaps 0x90(%rbp), %xmm11 movaps 0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12 movaps 0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13 movaps 0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14 movaps 0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15 lea 0xa0(%rbp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; mov 0x48(%rsp), %r15 mov 0x50(%rsp), %r14 mov 0x58(%rsp), %r13 mov 0x60(%rsp), %r12 mov 0x68(%rsp), %rbx mov 0x70(%rsp), %rax lea 0x78(%rsp), %rsp mov %rax, %rbp .Lxts_enc_epilogue: ret .size bsaes_xts_encrypt,.-bsaes_xts_encrypt .globl bsaes_xts_decrypt .type bsaes_xts_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bsaes_xts_decrypt: mov %rsp, %rax .Lxts_dec_prologue: push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 lea -0x48(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); mov 0xa0(%rsp),$arg5 # pull key2 mov 0xa8(%rsp),$arg6 # pull ivp lea -0xa0(%rsp), %rsp movaps %xmm6, 0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm7, 0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm8, 0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm9, 0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm10, 0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm11, 0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm12, 0xa0(%rsp) movaps %xmm13, 0xb0(%rsp) movaps %xmm14, 0xc0(%rsp) movaps %xmm15, 0xd0(%rsp) .Lxts_dec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp, %rbp # backup %rsp mov $arg1, $inp # backup arguments mov $arg2, $out mov $arg3, $len mov $arg4, $key lea ($arg6), $arg1 lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 lea ($arg5), $arg3 call asm_AES_encrypt # generate initial tweak mov 240($key), %eax # rounds mov $len, %rbx # backup $len mov %eax, %edx # rounds shl \$7, %rax # 128 bytes per inner round key sub \$`128-32`, %rax # size of bit-sliced key schedule sub %rax, %rsp mov %rsp, %rax # pass key schedule mov $key, %rcx # pass key mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_key_convert pxor (%rsp), %xmm7 # fix up round 0 key movdqa %xmm6, (%rax) # save last round key movdqa %xmm7, (%rsp) xor %eax, %eax # if ($len%16) len-=16; and \$-16, $len test \$15, %ebx setnz %al shl \$4, %rax sub %rax, $len sub \$0x80, %rsp # place for tweak[8] movdqa 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7] # initial tweak pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa .Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits sub \$0x80, $len jc .Lxts_dec_short jmp .Lxts_dec_loop .align 16 .Lxts_dec_loop: ___ for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) { $code.=<<___; pshufd \$0x13, $twtmp, $twres pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa @XMM[7], @XMM[$i] movdqa @XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i] paddq @XMM[7], @XMM[7] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask, $twres # isolate carry and residue pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits pxor $twres, @XMM[7] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1); movdqu `0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2); pxor @XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[] ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6] pxor @XMM[8+5], @XMM[5] movdqu 0x70($inp), @XMM[8+7] lea 0x80($inp), $inp movdqa @XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp) pxor @XMM[8+6], @XMM[6] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule pxor @XMM[8+7], @XMM[7] mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) pxor 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) pxor 0x60(%rsp), @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) pxor 0x70(%rsp), @XMM[5] movdqu @XMM[3], 0x60($out) movdqu @XMM[5], 0x70($out) lea 0x80($out), $out movdqa 0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7] # prepare next iteration tweak pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa .Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp pshufd \$0x13, $twtmp, $twres pxor $twtmp, $twtmp paddq @XMM[7], @XMM[7] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask, $twres # isolate carry and residue pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits pxor $twres, @XMM[7] sub \$0x80,$len jnc .Lxts_dec_loop .Lxts_dec_short: add \$0x80, $len jz .Lxts_dec_done ___ for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) { $code.=<<___; pshufd \$0x13, $twtmp, $twres pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa @XMM[7], @XMM[$i] movdqa @XMM[7], `0x10*$i`(%rsp)# save tweak[$i] paddq @XMM[7], @XMM[7] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask, $twres # isolate carry and residue pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp # broadcast upper bits pxor $twres, @XMM[7] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=1); movdqu `0x10*($i-1)`($inp), @XMM[8+$i-1] cmp \$`0x10*$i`,$len je .Lxts_dec_$i ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=2); pxor @XMM[8+$i-2], @XMM[$i-2]# input[] ^ tweak[] ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqu 0x60($inp), @XMM[8+6] pxor @XMM[8+5], @XMM[5] movdqa @XMM[7], 0x70(%rsp) lea 0x70($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+6], @XMM[6] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) pxor 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) pxor 0x60(%rsp), @XMM[3] movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) movdqu @XMM[3], 0x60($out) lea 0x70($out), $out movdqa 0x70(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_6: pxor @XMM[8+4], @XMM[4] lea 0x60($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+5], @XMM[5] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) pxor 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) movdqu @XMM[7], 0x50($out) lea 0x60($out), $out movdqa 0x60(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_5: pxor @XMM[8+3], @XMM[3] lea 0x50($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+4], @XMM[4] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) pxor 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[2] movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) movdqu @XMM[2], 0x40($out) lea 0x50($out), $out movdqa 0x50(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_4: pxor @XMM[8+2], @XMM[2] lea 0x40($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+3], @XMM[3] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) pxor 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[4] movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) movdqu @XMM[4], 0x30($out) lea 0x40($out), $out movdqa 0x40(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_3: pxor @XMM[8+1], @XMM[1] lea 0x30($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+2], @XMM[2] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output pxor 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) movdqu @XMM[6], 0x20($out) lea 0x30($out), $out movdqa 0x30(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_2: pxor @XMM[8+0], @XMM[0] lea 0x20($inp), $inp pxor @XMM[8+1], @XMM[1] lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds call _bsaes_decrypt8 pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] pxor 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[1] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output movdqu @XMM[1], 0x10($out) lea 0x20($out), $out movdqa 0x20(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_1: pxor @XMM[0], @XMM[8] lea 0x10($inp), $inp movdqa @XMM[8], 0x20(%rbp) lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg1 lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_decrypt # doesn't touch %xmm pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] #pxor @XMM[8], @XMM[0] #lea 0x80(%rsp), %rax # pass key schedule #mov %edx, %r10d # pass rounds #call _bsaes_decrypt8 #pxor 0x00(%rsp), @XMM[0] # ^= tweak[] movdqu @XMM[0], 0x00($out) # write output lea 0x10($out), $out movdqa 0x10(%rsp), @XMM[7] # next iteration tweak .Lxts_dec_done: and \$15, %ebx jz .Lxts_dec_ret pxor $twtmp, $twtmp movdqa .Lxts_magic(%rip), $twmask pcmpgtd @XMM[7], $twtmp pshufd \$0x13, $twtmp, $twres movdqa @XMM[7], @XMM[6] paddq @XMM[7], @XMM[7] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask, $twres # isolate carry and residue movdqu ($inp), @XMM[0] pxor $twres, @XMM[7] lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg1 pxor @XMM[7], @XMM[0] lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 movdqa @XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp) lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_decrypt # doesn't touch %xmm pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[7] mov $out, %rdx movdqu @XMM[7], ($out) .Lxts_dec_steal: movzb 16($inp), %eax movzb (%rdx), %ecx lea 1($inp), $inp mov %al, (%rdx) mov %cl, 16(%rdx) lea 1(%rdx), %rdx sub \$1,%ebx jnz .Lxts_dec_steal movdqu ($out), @XMM[0] lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg1 pxor @XMM[6], @XMM[0] lea 0x20(%rbp), $arg2 movdqa @XMM[0], 0x20(%rbp) lea ($key), $arg3 call asm_AES_decrypt # doesn't touch %xmm pxor 0x20(%rbp), @XMM[6] movdqu @XMM[6], ($out) .Lxts_dec_ret: lea (%rsp), %rax pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 .Lxts_dec_bzero: # wipe key schedule [if any] movdqa %xmm0, 0x00(%rax) movdqa %xmm0, 0x10(%rax) lea 0x20(%rax), %rax cmp %rax, %rbp ja .Lxts_dec_bzero lea (%rbp),%rsp # restore %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x40(%rbp), %xmm6 movaps 0x50(%rbp), %xmm7 movaps 0x60(%rbp), %xmm8 movaps 0x70(%rbp), %xmm9 movaps 0x80(%rbp), %xmm10 movaps 0x90(%rbp), %xmm11 movaps 0xa0(%rbp), %xmm12 movaps 0xb0(%rbp), %xmm13 movaps 0xc0(%rbp), %xmm14 movaps 0xd0(%rbp), %xmm15 lea 0xa0(%rbp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; mov 0x48(%rsp), %r15 mov 0x50(%rsp), %r14 mov 0x58(%rsp), %r13 mov 0x60(%rsp), %r12 mov 0x68(%rsp), %rbx mov 0x70(%rsp), %rax lea 0x78(%rsp), %rsp mov %rax, %rbp .Lxts_dec_epilogue: ret .size bsaes_xts_decrypt,.-bsaes_xts_decrypt ___ } $code.=<<___; .type _bsaes_const,\@object .align 64 _bsaes_const: .LM0ISR: # InvShiftRows constants .quad 0x0a0e0206070b0f03, 0x0004080c0d010509 .LISRM0: .quad 0x01040b0e0205080f, 0x0306090c00070a0d .LISR: .quad 0x0504070602010003, 0x0f0e0d0c080b0a09 .LBS0: # bit-slice constants .quad 0x5555555555555555, 0x5555555555555555 .LBS1: .quad 0x3333333333333333, 0x3333333333333333 .LBS2: .quad 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f, 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f .LSR: # shiftrows constants .quad 0x0504070600030201, 0x0f0e0d0c0a09080b .LSRM0: .quad 0x0304090e00050a0f, 0x01060b0c0207080d .LM0SR: .quad 0x0a0e02060f03070b, 0x0004080c05090d01 .LSWPUP: # byte-swap upper dword .quad 0x0706050403020100, 0x0c0d0e0f0b0a0908 .LSWPUPM0SR: .quad 0x0a0d02060c03070b, 0x0004080f05090e01 .LADD1: # counter increment constants .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000100000000 .LADD2: .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000200000000 .LADD3: .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000300000000 .LADD4: .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000400000000 .LADD5: .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000500000000 .LADD6: .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000600000000 .LADD7: .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000700000000 .LADD8: .quad 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000800000000 .Lxts_magic: .long 0x87,0,1,0 .Lmasks: .quad 0x0101010101010101, 0x0101010101010101 .quad 0x0202020202020202, 0x0202020202020202 .quad 0x0404040404040404, 0x0404040404040404 .quad 0x0808080808080808, 0x0808080808080808 .LM0: .quad 0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d .L63: .quad 0x6363636363636363, 0x6363636363636363 .asciz "Bit-sliced AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Emilia Käsper, Peter Schwabe, Andy Polyakov" .align 64 .size _bsaes_const,.-_bsaes_const ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue mov 160($context),%rax # pull context->Rbp lea 0x40(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq lea 0xa0(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer mov 0x70(%rax),%rbp mov 0x68(%rax),%rbx mov 0x60(%rax),%r12 mov 0x58(%rax),%r13 mov 0x50(%rax),%r14 mov 0x48(%rax),%r15 lea 0x78(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_prologue: mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$`1232/8`,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($ecb); .rva .Lecb_enc_prologue .rva .Lecb_enc_epilogue .rva .Lecb_enc_info .rva .Lecb_dec_prologue .rva .Lecb_dec_epilogue .rva .Lecb_dec_info ___ $code.=<<___; .rva .Lcbc_dec_prologue .rva .Lcbc_dec_epilogue .rva .Lcbc_dec_info .rva .Lctr_enc_prologue .rva .Lctr_enc_epilogue .rva .Lctr_enc_info .rva .Lxts_enc_prologue .rva .Lxts_enc_epilogue .rva .Lxts_enc_info .rva .Lxts_dec_prologue .rva .Lxts_dec_epilogue .rva .Lxts_dec_info .section .xdata .align 8 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($ecb); .Lecb_enc_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lecb_enc_body,.Lecb_enc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .Lecb_dec_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lecb_dec_body,.Lecb_dec_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___; .Lcbc_dec_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lcbc_dec_body,.Lcbc_dec_epilogue # HandlerData[] .Lctr_enc_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lctr_enc_body,.Lctr_enc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .Lxts_enc_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lxts_enc_body,.Lxts_enc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .Lxts_dec_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lxts_dec_body,.Lxts_dec_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000010671513176625656017730 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # Multi-buffer AES-NI procedures process several independent buffers # in parallel by interleaving independent instructions. # # Cycles per byte for interleave factor 4: # # asymptotic measured # --------------------------- # Westmere 5.00/4=1.25 5.13/4=1.28 # Atom 15.0/4=3.75 ?15.7/4=3.93 # Sandy Bridge 5.06/4=1.27 5.18/4=1.29 # Ivy Bridge 5.06/4=1.27 5.14/4=1.29 # Haswell 4.44/4=1.11 4.44/4=1.11 # Bulldozer 5.75/4=1.44 5.76/4=1.44 # # Cycles per byte for interleave factor 8 (not implemented for # pre-AVX processors, where higher interleave factor incidentally # doesn't result in improvement): # # asymptotic measured # --------------------------- # Sandy Bridge 5.06/8=0.64 7.10/8=0.89(*) # Ivy Bridge 5.06/8=0.64 7.14/8=0.89(*) # Haswell 5.00/8=0.63 5.00/8=0.63 # Bulldozer 5.75/8=0.72 5.77/8=0.72 # # (*) Sandy/Ivy Bridge are known to handle high interleave factors # suboptimally; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; $avx=0; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; # void aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt ( # struct { void *inp,*out; int blocks; double iv[2]; } inp[8]; # const AES_KEY *key, # int num); /* 1 or 2 */ # $inp="%rdi"; # 1st arg $key="%rsi"; # 2nd arg $num="%edx"; @inptr=map("%r$_",(8..11)); @outptr=map("%r$_",(12..15)); ($rndkey0,$rndkey1)=("%xmm0","%xmm1"); @out=map("%xmm$_",(2..5)); @inp=map("%xmm$_",(6..9)); ($counters,$mask,$zero)=map("%xmm$_",(10..12)); ($rounds,$one,$sink,$offset)=("%eax","%ecx","%rbp","%rbx"); $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt .type aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt,\@function,3 .align 32 aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); cmp \$2,$num jb .Lenc_non_avx mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%ecx test \$`1<<28`,%ecx # AVX bit jnz _avx_cbc_enc_shortcut jmp .Lenc_non_avx .align 16 .Lenc_non_avx: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) # not used, saved to share se_handler movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; # stack layout # # +0 output sink # +16 input sink [original %rsp and $num] # +32 counters sub \$48,%rsp and \$-64,%rsp mov %rax,16(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lenc4x_body: movdqu ($key),$zero # 0-round key lea 0x78($key),$key # size optimization lea 40*2($inp),$inp .Lenc4x_loop_grande: mov $num,24(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `40*$i+16-40*2`($inp),$one # borrow $one for number of blocks mov `40*$i+0-40*2`($inp),@inptr[$i] cmp $num,$one mov `40*$i+8-40*2`($inp),@outptr[$i] cmovg $one,$num # find maximum test $one,$one movdqu `40*$i+24-40*2`($inp),@out[$i] # load IV mov $one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp) # initialize counters cmovle %rsp,@inptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Lenc4x_done movups 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 pxor $zero,@out[0] movups 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 pxor $zero,@out[1] mov 0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds pxor $zero,@out[2] movdqu (@inptr[0]),@inp[0] # load inputs pxor $zero,@out[3] movdqu (@inptr[1]),@inp[1] pxor @inp[0],@out[0] movdqu (@inptr[2]),@inp[2] pxor @inp[1],@out[1] movdqu (@inptr[3]),@inp[3] pxor @inp[2],@out[2] pxor @inp[3],@out[3] movdqa 32(%rsp),$counters # load counters xor $offset,$offset jmp .Loop_enc4x .align 32 .Loop_enc4x: add \$16,$offset lea 16(%rsp),$sink # sink pointer mov \$1,$one # constant of 1 sub $offset,$sink aesenc $rndkey1,@out[0] prefetcht0 31(@inptr[0],$offset) # prefetch input prefetcht0 31(@inptr[1],$offset) aesenc $rndkey1,@out[1] prefetcht0 31(@inptr[2],$offset) prefetcht0 31(@inptr[2],$offset) aesenc $rndkey1,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0x30-0x78($key),$rndkey1 ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { my $rndkey = ($i&1) ? $rndkey1 : $rndkey0; $code.=<<___; cmp `32+4*$i`(%rsp),$one aesenc $rndkey,@out[0] aesenc $rndkey,@out[1] aesenc $rndkey,@out[2] cmovge $sink,@inptr[$i] # cancel input cmovg $sink,@outptr[$i] # sink output aesenc $rndkey,@out[3] movups `0x40+16*$i-0x78`($key),$rndkey ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqa $counters,$mask aesenc $rndkey0,@out[0] prefetcht0 15(@outptr[0],$offset) # prefetch output prefetcht0 15(@outptr[1],$offset) aesenc $rndkey0,@out[1] prefetcht0 15(@outptr[2],$offset) prefetcht0 15(@outptr[3],$offset) aesenc $rndkey0,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0x80-0x78($key),$rndkey0 pxor $zero,$zero aesenc $rndkey1,@out[0] pcmpgtd $zero,$mask movdqu -0x78($key),$zero # reload 0-round key aesenc $rndkey1,@out[1] paddd $mask,$counters # decrement counters movdqa $counters,32(%rsp) # update counters aesenc $rndkey1,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0x90-0x78($key),$rndkey1 cmp \$11,$rounds aesenc $rndkey0,@out[0] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[1] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0xa0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 jb .Lenc4x_tail aesenc $rndkey1,@out[0] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[1] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 aesenc $rndkey0,@out[0] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[1] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 je .Lenc4x_tail aesenc $rndkey1,@out[0] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[1] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 aesenc $rndkey0,@out[0] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[1] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 jmp .Lenc4x_tail .align 32 .Lenc4x_tail: aesenc $rndkey1,@out[0] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[1] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[2] aesenc $rndkey1,@out[3] movdqu (@inptr[0],$offset),@inp[0] movdqu 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 aesenclast $rndkey0,@out[0] movdqu (@inptr[1],$offset),@inp[1] pxor $zero,@inp[0] aesenclast $rndkey0,@out[1] movdqu (@inptr[2],$offset),@inp[2] pxor $zero,@inp[1] aesenclast $rndkey0,@out[2] movdqu (@inptr[3],$offset),@inp[3] pxor $zero,@inp[2] aesenclast $rndkey0,@out[3] movdqu 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 pxor $zero,@inp[3] movups @out[0],-16(@outptr[0],$offset) pxor @inp[0],@out[0] movups @out[1],-16(@outptr[1],$offset) pxor @inp[1],@out[1] movups @out[2],-16(@outptr[2],$offset) pxor @inp[2],@out[2] movups @out[3],-16(@outptr[3],$offset) pxor @inp[3],@out[3] dec $num jnz .Loop_enc4x mov 16(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp mov 24(%rsp),$num #pxor @inp[0],@out[0] #pxor @inp[1],@out[1] #movdqu @out[0],`40*0+24-40*2`($inp) # output iv FIX ME! #pxor @inp[2],@out[2] #movdqu @out[1],`40*1+24-40*2`($inp) #pxor @inp[3],@out[3] #movdqu @out[2],`40*2+24-40*2`($inp) # won't fix, let caller #movdqu @out[3],`40*3+24-40*2`($inp) # figure this out... lea `40*4`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Lenc4x_loop_grande .Lenc4x_done: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 #movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 #movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 #movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lenc4x_epilogue: ret .size aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt,.-aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt .globl aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt .type aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt,\@function,3 .align 32 aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); cmp \$2,$num jb .Ldec_non_avx mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%ecx test \$`1<<28`,%ecx # AVX bit jnz _avx_cbc_dec_shortcut jmp .Ldec_non_avx .align 16 .Ldec_non_avx: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) # not used, saved to share se_handler movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; # stack layout # # +0 output sink # +16 input sink [original %rsp and $num] # +32 counters sub \$48,%rsp and \$-64,%rsp mov %rax,16(%rsp) # original %rsp .Ldec4x_body: movdqu ($key),$zero # 0-round key lea 0x78($key),$key # size optimization lea 40*2($inp),$inp .Ldec4x_loop_grande: mov $num,24(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `40*$i+16-40*2`($inp),$one # borrow $one for number of blocks mov `40*$i+0-40*2`($inp),@inptr[$i] cmp $num,$one mov `40*$i+8-40*2`($inp),@outptr[$i] cmovg $one,$num # find maximum test $one,$one movdqu `40*$i+24-40*2`($inp),@inp[$i] # load IV mov $one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp) # initialize counters cmovle %rsp,@inptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldec4x_done movups 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 movups 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 mov 0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds movdqu (@inptr[0]),@out[0] # load inputs movdqu (@inptr[1]),@out[1] pxor $zero,@out[0] movdqu (@inptr[2]),@out[2] pxor $zero,@out[1] movdqu (@inptr[3]),@out[3] pxor $zero,@out[2] pxor $zero,@out[3] movdqa 32(%rsp),$counters # load counters xor $offset,$offset jmp .Loop_dec4x .align 32 .Loop_dec4x: add \$16,$offset lea 16(%rsp),$sink # sink pointer mov \$1,$one # constant of 1 sub $offset,$sink aesdec $rndkey1,@out[0] prefetcht0 31(@inptr[0],$offset) # prefetch input prefetcht0 31(@inptr[1],$offset) aesdec $rndkey1,@out[1] prefetcht0 31(@inptr[2],$offset) prefetcht0 31(@inptr[3],$offset) aesdec $rndkey1,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0x30-0x78($key),$rndkey1 ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { my $rndkey = ($i&1) ? $rndkey1 : $rndkey0; $code.=<<___; cmp `32+4*$i`(%rsp),$one aesdec $rndkey,@out[0] aesdec $rndkey,@out[1] aesdec $rndkey,@out[2] cmovge $sink,@inptr[$i] # cancel input cmovg $sink,@outptr[$i] # sink output aesdec $rndkey,@out[3] movups `0x40+16*$i-0x78`($key),$rndkey ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqa $counters,$mask aesdec $rndkey0,@out[0] prefetcht0 15(@outptr[0],$offset) # prefetch output prefetcht0 15(@outptr[1],$offset) aesdec $rndkey0,@out[1] prefetcht0 15(@outptr[2],$offset) prefetcht0 15(@outptr[3],$offset) aesdec $rndkey0,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0x80-0x78($key),$rndkey0 pxor $zero,$zero aesdec $rndkey1,@out[0] pcmpgtd $zero,$mask movdqu -0x78($key),$zero # reload 0-round key aesdec $rndkey1,@out[1] paddd $mask,$counters # decrement counters movdqa $counters,32(%rsp) # update counters aesdec $rndkey1,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0x90-0x78($key),$rndkey1 cmp \$11,$rounds aesdec $rndkey0,@out[0] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[1] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0xa0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 jb .Ldec4x_tail aesdec $rndkey1,@out[0] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[1] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 aesdec $rndkey0,@out[0] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[1] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 je .Ldec4x_tail aesdec $rndkey1,@out[0] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[1] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[3] movups 0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 aesdec $rndkey0,@out[0] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[1] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[2] aesdec $rndkey0,@out[3] movups 0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 jmp .Ldec4x_tail .align 32 .Ldec4x_tail: aesdec $rndkey1,@out[0] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[1] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[2] pxor $rndkey0,@inp[0] pxor $rndkey0,@inp[1] aesdec $rndkey1,@out[3] movdqu 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 pxor $rndkey0,@inp[2] pxor $rndkey0,@inp[3] movdqu 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 aesdeclast @inp[0],@out[0] aesdeclast @inp[1],@out[1] movdqu -16(@inptr[0],$offset),@inp[0] # load next IV movdqu -16(@inptr[1],$offset),@inp[1] aesdeclast @inp[2],@out[2] aesdeclast @inp[3],@out[3] movdqu -16(@inptr[2],$offset),@inp[2] movdqu -16(@inptr[3],$offset),@inp[3] movups @out[0],-16(@outptr[0],$offset) movdqu (@inptr[0],$offset),@out[0] movups @out[1],-16(@outptr[1],$offset) movdqu (@inptr[1],$offset),@out[1] pxor $zero,@out[0] movups @out[2],-16(@outptr[2],$offset) movdqu (@inptr[2],$offset),@out[2] pxor $zero,@out[1] movups @out[3],-16(@outptr[3],$offset) movdqu (@inptr[3],$offset),@out[3] pxor $zero,@out[2] pxor $zero,@out[3] dec $num jnz .Loop_dec4x mov 16(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp mov 24(%rsp),$num lea `40*4`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Ldec4x_loop_grande .Ldec4x_done: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 #movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 #movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 #movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Ldec4x_epilogue: ret .size aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt,.-aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt ___ if ($avx) {{{ my @ptr=map("%r$_",(8..15)); my $offload=$sink; my @out=map("%xmm$_",(2..9)); my @inp=map("%xmm$_",(10..13)); my ($counters,$zero)=("%xmm14","%xmm15"); $code.=<<___; .type aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx,\@function,3 .align 32 aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx: _avx_cbc_enc_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; # stack layout # # +0 output sink # +16 input sink [original %rsp and $num] # +32 counters # +64 distances between inputs and outputs # +128 off-load area for @inp[0..3] sub \$192,%rsp and \$-128,%rsp mov %rax,16(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lenc8x_body: vzeroupper vmovdqu ($key),$zero # 0-round key lea 0x78($key),$key # size optimization lea 40*4($inp),$inp shr \$1,$num .Lenc8x_loop_grande: #mov $num,24(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { my $temp = $i ? $offload : $offset; $code.=<<___; mov `40*$i+16-40*4`($inp),$one # borrow $one for number of blocks mov `40*$i+0-40*4`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer cmp $num,$one mov `40*$i+8-40*4`($inp),$temp # output pointer cmovg $one,$num # find maximum test $one,$one vmovdqu `40*$i+24-40*4`($inp),@out[$i] # load IV mov $one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp) # initialize counters cmovle %rsp,@ptr[$i] # cancel input sub @ptr[$i],$temp # distance between input and output mov $temp,`64+8*$i`(%rsp) # initialize distances ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Lenc8x_done vmovups 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vmovups 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 mov 0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds vpxor (@ptr[0]),$zero,@inp[0] # load inputs and xor with 0-round lea 128(%rsp),$offload # offload area vpxor (@ptr[1]),$zero,@inp[1] vpxor (@ptr[2]),$zero,@inp[2] vpxor (@ptr[3]),$zero,@inp[3] vpxor @inp[0],@out[0],@out[0] vpxor (@ptr[4]),$zero,@inp[0] vpxor @inp[1],@out[1],@out[1] vpxor (@ptr[5]),$zero,@inp[1] vpxor @inp[2],@out[2],@out[2] vpxor (@ptr[6]),$zero,@inp[2] vpxor @inp[3],@out[3],@out[3] vpxor (@ptr[7]),$zero,@inp[3] vpxor @inp[0],@out[4],@out[4] mov \$1,$one # constant of 1 vpxor @inp[1],@out[5],@out[5] vpxor @inp[2],@out[6],@out[6] vpxor @inp[3],@out[7],@out[7] jmp .Loop_enc8x .align 32 .Loop_enc8x: ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { my $rndkey=($i&1)?$rndkey0:$rndkey1; $code.=<<___; vaesenc $rndkey,@out[0],@out[0] cmp 32+4*$i(%rsp),$one ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i); mov 64+8*$i(%rsp),$offset ___ $code.=<<___; vaesenc $rndkey,@out[1],@out[1] prefetcht0 31(@ptr[$i]) # prefetch input vaesenc $rndkey,@out[2],@out[2] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>1); prefetcht0 15(@ptr[$i-2]) # prefetch output ___ $code.=<<___; vaesenc $rndkey,@out[3],@out[3] lea (@ptr[$i],$offset),$offset cmovge %rsp,@ptr[$i] # cancel input vaesenc $rndkey,@out[4],@out[4] cmovg %rsp,$offset # sink output vaesenc $rndkey,@out[5],@out[5] sub @ptr[$i],$offset vaesenc $rndkey,@out[6],@out[6] vpxor 16(@ptr[$i]),$zero,@inp[$i%4] # load input and xor with 0-round mov $offset,64+8*$i(%rsp) vaesenc $rndkey,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups `16*(3+$i)-0x78`($key),$rndkey lea 16(@ptr[$i],$offset),@ptr[$i] # switch to output ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<4) vmovdqu @inp[$i%4],`16*$i`($offload) # off-load ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 32(%rsp),$counters prefetcht0 15(@ptr[$i-2]) # prefetch output prefetcht0 15(@ptr[$i-1]) cmp \$11,$rounds jb .Lenc8x_tail vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 je .Lenc8x_tail vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6] vaesenc $rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 .Lenc8x_tail: vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0] vpxor $zero,$zero,$zero vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2] vpcmpgtd $zero,$counters,$zero vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4] vpaddd $counters,$zero,$zero # decrement counters vmovdqu 48(%rsp),$counters vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5] mov 64(%rsp),$offset # pre-load 1st offset vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6] vaesenc $rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0] vmovdqa $zero,32(%rsp) # update counters vpxor $zero,$zero,$zero vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1] vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2] vpcmpgtd $zero,$counters,$zero vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3] vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4] vpaddd $zero,$counters,$counters # decrement counters vmovdqu -0x78($key),$zero # 0-round vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5] vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6] vmovdqa $counters,48(%rsp) # update counters vaesenclast $rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 vmovups @out[0],-16(@ptr[0]) # write output sub $offset,@ptr[0] # switch to input vpxor 0x00($offload),@out[0],@out[0] vmovups @out[1],-16(@ptr[1]) sub `64+1*8`(%rsp),@ptr[1] vpxor 0x10($offload),@out[1],@out[1] vmovups @out[2],-16(@ptr[2]) sub `64+2*8`(%rsp),@ptr[2] vpxor 0x20($offload),@out[2],@out[2] vmovups @out[3],-16(@ptr[3]) sub `64+3*8`(%rsp),@ptr[3] vpxor 0x30($offload),@out[3],@out[3] vmovups @out[4],-16(@ptr[4]) sub `64+4*8`(%rsp),@ptr[4] vpxor @inp[0],@out[4],@out[4] vmovups @out[5],-16(@ptr[5]) sub `64+5*8`(%rsp),@ptr[5] vpxor @inp[1],@out[5],@out[5] vmovups @out[6],-16(@ptr[6]) sub `64+6*8`(%rsp),@ptr[6] vpxor @inp[2],@out[6],@out[6] vmovups @out[7],-16(@ptr[7]) sub `64+7*8`(%rsp),@ptr[7] vpxor @inp[3],@out[7],@out[7] dec $num jnz .Loop_enc8x mov 16(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp #mov 24(%rsp),$num #lea `40*8`($inp),$inp #dec $num #jnz .Lenc8x_loop_grande .Lenc8x_done: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lenc8x_epilogue: ret .size aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx,.-aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx .type aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx,\@function,3 .align 32 aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx: _avx_cbc_dec_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; # stack layout # # +0 output sink # +16 input sink [original %rsp and $num] # +32 counters # +64 distances between inputs and outputs # +128 off-load area for @inp[0..3] # +192 IV/input offload sub \$256,%rsp and \$-256,%rsp sub \$192,%rsp mov %rax,16(%rsp) # original %rsp .Ldec8x_body: vzeroupper vmovdqu ($key),$zero # 0-round key lea 0x78($key),$key # size optimization lea 40*4($inp),$inp shr \$1,$num .Ldec8x_loop_grande: #mov $num,24(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { my $temp = $i ? $offload : $offset; $code.=<<___; mov `40*$i+16-40*4`($inp),$one # borrow $one for number of blocks mov `40*$i+0-40*4`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer cmp $num,$one mov `40*$i+8-40*4`($inp),$temp # output pointer cmovg $one,$num # find maximum test $one,$one vmovdqu `40*$i+24-40*4`($inp),@out[$i] # load IV mov $one,`32+4*$i`(%rsp) # initialize counters cmovle %rsp,@ptr[$i] # cancel input sub @ptr[$i],$temp # distance between input and output mov $temp,`64+8*$i`(%rsp) # initialize distances vmovdqu @out[$i],`192+16*$i`(%rsp) # offload IV ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldec8x_done vmovups 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vmovups 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 mov 0xf0-0x78($key),$rounds lea 192+128(%rsp),$offload # offload area vmovdqu (@ptr[0]),@out[0] # load inputs vmovdqu (@ptr[1]),@out[1] vmovdqu (@ptr[2]),@out[2] vmovdqu (@ptr[3]),@out[3] vmovdqu (@ptr[4]),@out[4] vmovdqu (@ptr[5]),@out[5] vmovdqu (@ptr[6]),@out[6] vmovdqu (@ptr[7]),@out[7] vmovdqu @out[0],0x00($offload) # offload inputs vpxor $zero,@out[0],@out[0] # xor inputs with 0-round vmovdqu @out[1],0x10($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[1],@out[1] vmovdqu @out[2],0x20($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[2],@out[2] vmovdqu @out[3],0x30($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[3],@out[3] vmovdqu @out[4],0x40($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[4],@out[4] vmovdqu @out[5],0x50($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[5],@out[5] vmovdqu @out[6],0x60($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[6],@out[6] vmovdqu @out[7],0x70($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[7],@out[7] xor \$0x80,$offload mov \$1,$one # constant of 1 jmp .Loop_dec8x .align 32 .Loop_dec8x: ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { my $rndkey=($i&1)?$rndkey0:$rndkey1; $code.=<<___; vaesdec $rndkey,@out[0],@out[0] cmp 32+4*$i(%rsp),$one ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i); mov 64+8*$i(%rsp),$offset ___ $code.=<<___; vaesdec $rndkey,@out[1],@out[1] prefetcht0 31(@ptr[$i]) # prefetch input vaesdec $rndkey,@out[2],@out[2] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>1); prefetcht0 15(@ptr[$i-2]) # prefetch output ___ $code.=<<___; vaesdec $rndkey,@out[3],@out[3] lea (@ptr[$i],$offset),$offset cmovge %rsp,@ptr[$i] # cancel input vaesdec $rndkey,@out[4],@out[4] cmovg %rsp,$offset # sink output vaesdec $rndkey,@out[5],@out[5] sub @ptr[$i],$offset vaesdec $rndkey,@out[6],@out[6] vmovdqu 16(@ptr[$i]),@inp[$i%4] # load input mov $offset,64+8*$i(%rsp) vaesdec $rndkey,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups `16*(3+$i)-0x78`($key),$rndkey lea 16(@ptr[$i],$offset),@ptr[$i] # switch to output ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<4); vmovdqu @inp[$i%4],`128+16*$i`(%rsp) # off-load ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 32(%rsp),$counters prefetcht0 15(@ptr[$i-2]) # prefetch output prefetcht0 15(@ptr[$i-1]) cmp \$11,$rounds jb .Ldec8x_tail vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xb0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xc0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 je .Ldec8x_tail vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xd0-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6] vaesdec $rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0xe0-0x78($key),$rndkey0 .Ldec8x_tail: vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[0],@out[0] vpxor $zero,$zero,$zero vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[1],@out[1] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[2],@out[2] vpcmpgtd $zero,$counters,$zero vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[3],@out[3] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[4],@out[4] vpaddd $counters,$zero,$zero # decrement counters vmovdqu 48(%rsp),$counters vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[5],@out[5] mov 64(%rsp),$offset # pre-load 1st offset vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[6],@out[6] vaesdec $rndkey1,@out[7],@out[7] vmovups 0x10-0x78($key),$rndkey1 vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[0],@out[0] vmovdqa $zero,32(%rsp) # update counters vpxor $zero,$zero,$zero vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[1],@out[1] vpxor 0x00($offload),@out[0],@out[0] # xor with IV vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[2],@out[2] vpxor 0x10($offload),@out[1],@out[1] vpcmpgtd $zero,$counters,$zero vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[3],@out[3] vpxor 0x20($offload),@out[2],@out[2] vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[4],@out[4] vpxor 0x30($offload),@out[3],@out[3] vpaddd $zero,$counters,$counters # decrement counters vmovdqu -0x78($key),$zero # 0-round vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[5],@out[5] vpxor 0x40($offload),@out[4],@out[4] vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[6],@out[6] vpxor 0x50($offload),@out[5],@out[5] vmovdqa $counters,48(%rsp) # update counters vaesdeclast $rndkey0,@out[7],@out[7] vpxor 0x60($offload),@out[6],@out[6] vmovups 0x20-0x78($key),$rndkey0 vmovups @out[0],-16(@ptr[0]) # write output sub $offset,@ptr[0] # switch to input vmovdqu 128+0(%rsp),@out[0] vpxor 0x70($offload),@out[7],@out[7] vmovups @out[1],-16(@ptr[1]) sub `64+1*8`(%rsp),@ptr[1] vmovdqu @out[0],0x00($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[0],@out[0] vmovdqu 128+16(%rsp),@out[1] vmovups @out[2],-16(@ptr[2]) sub `64+2*8`(%rsp),@ptr[2] vmovdqu @out[1],0x10($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[1],@out[1] vmovdqu 128+32(%rsp),@out[2] vmovups @out[3],-16(@ptr[3]) sub `64+3*8`(%rsp),@ptr[3] vmovdqu @out[2],0x20($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[2],@out[2] vmovdqu 128+48(%rsp),@out[3] vmovups @out[4],-16(@ptr[4]) sub `64+4*8`(%rsp),@ptr[4] vmovdqu @out[3],0x30($offload) vpxor $zero,@out[3],@out[3] vmovdqu @inp[0],0x40($offload) vpxor @inp[0],$zero,@out[4] vmovups @out[5],-16(@ptr[5]) sub `64+5*8`(%rsp),@ptr[5] vmovdqu @inp[1],0x50($offload) vpxor @inp[1],$zero,@out[5] vmovups @out[6],-16(@ptr[6]) sub `64+6*8`(%rsp),@ptr[6] vmovdqu @inp[2],0x60($offload) vpxor @inp[2],$zero,@out[6] vmovups @out[7],-16(@ptr[7]) sub `64+7*8`(%rsp),@ptr[7] vmovdqu @inp[3],0x70($offload) vpxor @inp[3],$zero,@out[7] xor \$128,$offload dec $num jnz .Loop_dec8x mov 16(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp #mov 24(%rsp),$num #lea `40*8`($inp),$inp #dec $num #jnz .Ldec8x_loop_grande .Ldec8x_done: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Ldec8x_epilogue: ret .size aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx,.-aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx ___ }}} if ($win64) { # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lprologue jb .Lin_prologue mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lin_prologue mov 16(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore cotnext->R15 lea -56-10*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt .rva .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx .rva .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx .rva .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lenc4x_body,.Lenc4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Ldec4x_body,.Ldec4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lenc8x_body,.Lenc8x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_aesni_multi_cbc_decrypt_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Ldec8x_body,.Ldec8x_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ } #################################################################### sub rex { local *opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src)=@_; my $rex=0; $rex|=0x04 if($dst>=8); $rex|=0x01 if($src>=8); push @opcode,$rex|0x40 if($rex); } sub aesni { my $line=shift; my @opcode=(0x66); if ($line=~/(aeskeygenassist)\s+\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { rex(\@opcode,$4,$3); push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf; push @opcode,0xc0|($3&7)|(($4&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$2; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my %opcodelet = ( "aesimc" => 0xdb, "aesenc" => 0xdc, "aesenclast" => 0xdd, "aesdec" => 0xde, "aesdeclast" => 0xdf ); return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1})); rex(\@opcode,$3,$2); push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1}; push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+([0x1-9a-fA-F]*)\(%rsp\),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my %opcodelet = ( "aesenc" => 0xdc, "aesenclast" => 0xdd, "aesdec" => 0xde, "aesdeclast" => 0xdf ); return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1})); my $off = $2; push @opcode,0x44 if ($3>=8); push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1}; push @opcode,0x44|(($3&7)<<3),0x24; # ModR/M push @opcode,($off=~/^0/?oct($off):$off)&0xff; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } return $line; } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; $code =~ s/\b(aes.*%xmm[0-9]+).*$/aesni($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl0000644000000000000000000010150413176625656017067 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # AES for ARMv4 # January 2007. # # Code uses single 1K S-box and is >2 times faster than code generated # by gcc-3.4.1. This is thanks to unique feature of ARMv4 ISA, which # allows to merge logical or arithmetic operation with shift or rotate # in one instruction and emit combined result every cycle. The module # is endian-neutral. The performance is ~42 cycles/byte for 128-bit # key [on single-issue Xscale PXA250 core]. # May 2007. # # AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key is added. # July 2010. # # Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 12% improvement on # Cortex A8 core and ~25 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key. # February 2011. # # Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 16% # improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~21.5 cycles per byte. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $s0="r0"; $s1="r1"; $s2="r2"; $s3="r3"; $t1="r4"; $t2="r5"; $t3="r6"; $i1="r7"; $i2="r8"; $i3="r9"; $tbl="r10"; $key="r11"; $rounds="r12"; $code=<<___; #ifndef __KERNEL__ # include "arm_arch.h" #else # define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ #endif .text #if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #undef __thumb2__ #endif .type AES_Te,%object .align 5 AES_Te: .word 0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d .word 0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554 .word 0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d .word 0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a .word 0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87 .word 0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b .word 0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea .word 0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b .word 0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a .word 0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f .word 0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108 .word 0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f .word 0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e .word 0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5 .word 0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d .word 0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f .word 0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e .word 0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb .word 0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce .word 0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497 .word 0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c .word 0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed .word 0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b .word 0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a .word 0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16 .word 0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594 .word 0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81 .word 0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3 .word 0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a .word 0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504 .word 0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163 .word 0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d .word 0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f .word 0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739 .word 0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47 .word 0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395 .word 0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f .word 0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883 .word 0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c .word 0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76 .word 0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e .word 0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4 .word 0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6 .word 0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b .word 0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7 .word 0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0 .word 0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25 .word 0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818 .word 0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72 .word 0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651 .word 0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21 .word 0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85 .word 0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa .word 0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12 .word 0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0 .word 0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9 .word 0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133 .word 0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7 .word 0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920 .word 0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a .word 0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17 .word 0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8 .word 0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11 .word 0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a @ Te4[256] .byte 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 .byte 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 .byte 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 .byte 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 .byte 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc .byte 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 .byte 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a .byte 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 .byte 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 .byte 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 .byte 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b .byte 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf .byte 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 .byte 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 .byte 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 .byte 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 .byte 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 .byte 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 .byte 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 .byte 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb .byte 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c .byte 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 .byte 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 .byte 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 .byte 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 .byte 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a .byte 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e .byte 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e .byte 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 .byte 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf .byte 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 .byte 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 @ rcon[] .word 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000 .word 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000 .word 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 .size AES_Te,.-AES_Te @ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, @ const AES_KEY *key) { .global AES_encrypt .type AES_encrypt,%function .align 5 AES_encrypt: #ifndef __thumb2__ sub r3,pc,#8 @ AES_encrypt #else adr r3,AES_encrypt #endif stmdb sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr} #ifdef __APPLE__ adr $tbl,AES_Te #else sub $tbl,r3,#AES_encrypt-AES_Te @ Te #endif mov $rounds,r0 @ inp mov $key,r2 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb $s0,[$rounds,#3] @ load input data in endian-neutral ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#2] @ manner... ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#1] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#0] orr $s0,$s0,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s1,[$rounds,#7] orr $s0,$s0,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#6] orr $s0,$s0,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#5] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#4] orr $s1,$s1,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s2,[$rounds,#11] orr $s1,$s1,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#10] orr $s1,$s1,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#9] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#8] orr $s2,$s2,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s3,[$rounds,#15] orr $s2,$s2,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#14] orr $s2,$s2,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#13] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#12] orr $s3,$s3,$t1,lsl#8 orr $s3,$s3,$t2,lsl#16 orr $s3,$s3,$t3,lsl#24 #else ldr $s0,[$rounds,#0] ldr $s1,[$rounds,#4] ldr $s2,[$rounds,#8] ldr $s3,[$rounds,#12] #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $s0,$s0 rev $s1,$s1 rev $s2,$s2 rev $s3,$s3 #endif #endif bl _armv4_AES_encrypt ldr $rounds,[sp],#4 @ pop out #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $s0,$s0 rev $s1,$s1 rev $s2,$s2 rev $s3,$s3 #endif str $s0,[$rounds,#0] str $s1,[$rounds,#4] str $s2,[$rounds,#8] str $s3,[$rounds,#12] #else mov $t1,$s0,lsr#24 @ write output in endian-neutral mov $t2,$s0,lsr#16 @ manner... mov $t3,$s0,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#0] strb $t2,[$rounds,#1] mov $t1,$s1,lsr#24 strb $t3,[$rounds,#2] mov $t2,$s1,lsr#16 strb $s0,[$rounds,#3] mov $t3,$s1,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#4] strb $t2,[$rounds,#5] mov $t1,$s2,lsr#24 strb $t3,[$rounds,#6] mov $t2,$s2,lsr#16 strb $s1,[$rounds,#7] mov $t3,$s2,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#8] strb $t2,[$rounds,#9] mov $t1,$s3,lsr#24 strb $t3,[$rounds,#10] mov $t2,$s3,lsr#16 strb $s2,[$rounds,#11] mov $t3,$s3,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#12] strb $t2,[$rounds,#13] strb $t3,[$rounds,#14] strb $s3,[$rounds,#15] #endif #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size AES_encrypt,.-AES_encrypt .type _armv4_AES_encrypt,%function .align 2 _armv4_AES_encrypt: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr ldmia $key!,{$t1-$i1} eor $s0,$s0,$t1 ldr $rounds,[$key,#240-16] eor $s1,$s1,$t2 eor $s2,$s2,$t3 eor $s3,$s3,$i1 sub $rounds,$rounds,#1 mov lr,#255 and $i1,lr,$s0 and $i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8 and $i3,lr,$s0,lsr#16 mov $s0,$s0,lsr#24 .Lenc_loop: ldr $t1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te3[s0>>0] and $i1,lr,$s1,lsr#16 @ i0 ldr $t2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te2[s0>>8] and $i2,lr,$s1 ldr $t3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te1[s0>>16] and $i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8 ldr $s0,[$tbl,$s0,lsl#2] @ Te0[s0>>24] mov $s1,$s1,lsr#24 ldr $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te1[s1>>16] ldr $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te3[s1>>0] ldr $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te2[s1>>8] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,ror#8 ldr $s1,[$tbl,$s1,lsl#2] @ Te0[s1>>24] and $i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8 @ i0 eor $t2,$t2,$i2,ror#8 and $i2,lr,$s2,lsr#16 @ i1 eor $t3,$t3,$i3,ror#8 and $i3,lr,$s2 ldr $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te2[s2>>8] eor $s1,$s1,$t1,ror#24 ldr $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te1[s2>>16] mov $s2,$s2,lsr#24 ldr $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te3[s2>>0] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,ror#16 ldr $s2,[$tbl,$s2,lsl#2] @ Te0[s2>>24] and $i1,lr,$s3 @ i0 eor $s1,$s1,$i2,ror#8 and $i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8 @ i1 eor $t3,$t3,$i3,ror#16 and $i3,lr,$s3,lsr#16 @ i2 ldr $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te3[s3>>0] eor $s2,$s2,$t2,ror#16 ldr $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te2[s3>>8] mov $s3,$s3,lsr#24 ldr $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te1[s3>>16] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,ror#24 ldr $i1,[$key],#16 eor $s1,$s1,$i2,ror#16 ldr $s3,[$tbl,$s3,lsl#2] @ Te0[s3>>24] eor $s2,$s2,$i3,ror#8 ldr $t1,[$key,#-12] eor $s3,$s3,$t3,ror#8 ldr $t2,[$key,#-8] eor $s0,$s0,$i1 ldr $t3,[$key,#-4] and $i1,lr,$s0 eor $s1,$s1,$t1 and $i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8 eor $s2,$s2,$t2 and $i3,lr,$s0,lsr#16 eor $s3,$s3,$t3 mov $s0,$s0,lsr#24 subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 bne .Lenc_loop add $tbl,$tbl,#2 ldrb $t1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te4[s0>>0] and $i1,lr,$s1,lsr#16 @ i0 ldrb $t2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te4[s0>>8] and $i2,lr,$s1 ldrb $t3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te4[s0>>16] and $i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8 ldrb $s0,[$tbl,$s0,lsl#2] @ Te4[s0>>24] mov $s1,$s1,lsr#24 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te4[s1>>16] ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te4[s1>>0] ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te4[s1>>8] eor $s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#8 ldrb $s1,[$tbl,$s1,lsl#2] @ Te4[s1>>24] and $i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8 @ i0 eor $t2,$i2,$t2,lsl#8 and $i2,lr,$s2,lsr#16 @ i1 eor $t3,$i3,$t3,lsl#8 and $i3,lr,$s2 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te4[s2>>8] eor $s1,$t1,$s1,lsl#24 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te4[s2>>16] mov $s2,$s2,lsr#24 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te4[s2>>0] eor $s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#8 ldrb $s2,[$tbl,$s2,lsl#2] @ Te4[s2>>24] and $i1,lr,$s3 @ i0 eor $s1,$s1,$i2,lsl#16 and $i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8 @ i1 eor $t3,$i3,$t3,lsl#8 and $i3,lr,$s3,lsr#16 @ i2 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Te4[s3>>0] eor $s2,$t2,$s2,lsl#24 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Te4[s3>>8] mov $s3,$s3,lsr#24 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Te4[s3>>16] eor $s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#8 ldr $i1,[$key,#0] ldrb $s3,[$tbl,$s3,lsl#2] @ Te4[s3>>24] eor $s1,$s1,$i2,lsl#8 ldr $t1,[$key,#4] eor $s2,$s2,$i3,lsl#16 ldr $t2,[$key,#8] eor $s3,$t3,$s3,lsl#24 ldr $t3,[$key,#12] eor $s0,$s0,$i1 eor $s1,$s1,$t1 eor $s2,$s2,$t2 eor $s3,$s3,$t3 sub $tbl,$tbl,#2 ldr pc,[sp],#4 @ pop and return .size _armv4_AES_encrypt,.-_armv4_AES_encrypt .global AES_set_encrypt_key .type AES_set_encrypt_key,%function .align 5 AES_set_encrypt_key: _armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key: #ifndef __thumb2__ sub r3,pc,#8 @ AES_set_encrypt_key #else adr r3,AES_set_encrypt_key #endif teq r0,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif moveq r0,#-1 beq .Labrt teq r2,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif moveq r0,#-1 beq .Labrt teq r1,#128 beq .Lok teq r1,#192 beq .Lok teq r1,#256 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt ne @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif movne r0,#-1 bne .Labrt .Lok: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} mov $rounds,r0 @ inp mov lr,r1 @ bits mov $key,r2 @ key #ifdef __APPLE__ adr $tbl,AES_Te+1024 @ Te4 #else sub $tbl,r3,#_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024 @ Te4 #endif #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb $s0,[$rounds,#3] @ load input data in endian-neutral ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#2] @ manner... ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#1] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#0] orr $s0,$s0,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s1,[$rounds,#7] orr $s0,$s0,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#6] orr $s0,$s0,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#5] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#4] orr $s1,$s1,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s2,[$rounds,#11] orr $s1,$s1,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#10] orr $s1,$s1,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#9] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#8] orr $s2,$s2,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s3,[$rounds,#15] orr $s2,$s2,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#14] orr $s2,$s2,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#13] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#12] orr $s3,$s3,$t1,lsl#8 str $s0,[$key],#16 orr $s3,$s3,$t2,lsl#16 str $s1,[$key,#-12] orr $s3,$s3,$t3,lsl#24 str $s2,[$key,#-8] str $s3,[$key,#-4] #else ldr $s0,[$rounds,#0] ldr $s1,[$rounds,#4] ldr $s2,[$rounds,#8] ldr $s3,[$rounds,#12] #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $s0,$s0 rev $s1,$s1 rev $s2,$s2 rev $s3,$s3 #endif str $s0,[$key],#16 str $s1,[$key,#-12] str $s2,[$key,#-8] str $s3,[$key,#-4] #endif teq lr,#128 bne .Lnot128 mov $rounds,#10 str $rounds,[$key,#240-16] add $t3,$tbl,#256 @ rcon mov lr,#255 .L128_loop: and $t2,lr,$s3,lsr#24 and $i1,lr,$s3,lsr#16 ldrb $t2,[$tbl,$t2] and $i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] and $i3,lr,$s3 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] orr $t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#24 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] orr $t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16 ldr $t1,[$t3],#4 @ rcon[i++] orr $t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#8 eor $t2,$t2,$t1 eor $s0,$s0,$t2 @ rk[4]=rk[0]^... eor $s1,$s1,$s0 @ rk[5]=rk[1]^rk[4] str $s0,[$key],#16 eor $s2,$s2,$s1 @ rk[6]=rk[2]^rk[5] str $s1,[$key,#-12] eor $s3,$s3,$s2 @ rk[7]=rk[3]^rk[6] str $s2,[$key,#-8] subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 str $s3,[$key,#-4] bne .L128_loop sub r2,$key,#176 b .Ldone .Lnot128: #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb $i2,[$rounds,#19] ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#18] ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#17] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#16] orr $i2,$i2,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $i3,[$rounds,#23] orr $i2,$i2,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#22] orr $i2,$i2,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#21] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#20] orr $i3,$i3,$t1,lsl#8 orr $i3,$i3,$t2,lsl#16 str $i2,[$key],#8 orr $i3,$i3,$t3,lsl#24 str $i3,[$key,#-4] #else ldr $i2,[$rounds,#16] ldr $i3,[$rounds,#20] #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $i2,$i2 rev $i3,$i3 #endif str $i2,[$key],#8 str $i3,[$key,#-4] #endif teq lr,#192 bne .Lnot192 mov $rounds,#12 str $rounds,[$key,#240-24] add $t3,$tbl,#256 @ rcon mov lr,#255 mov $rounds,#8 .L192_loop: and $t2,lr,$i3,lsr#24 and $i1,lr,$i3,lsr#16 ldrb $t2,[$tbl,$t2] and $i2,lr,$i3,lsr#8 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] and $i3,lr,$i3 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] orr $t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#24 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] orr $t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16 ldr $t1,[$t3],#4 @ rcon[i++] orr $t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#8 eor $i3,$t2,$t1 eor $s0,$s0,$i3 @ rk[6]=rk[0]^... eor $s1,$s1,$s0 @ rk[7]=rk[1]^rk[6] str $s0,[$key],#24 eor $s2,$s2,$s1 @ rk[8]=rk[2]^rk[7] str $s1,[$key,#-20] eor $s3,$s3,$s2 @ rk[9]=rk[3]^rk[8] str $s2,[$key,#-16] subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 str $s3,[$key,#-12] #ifdef __thumb2__ itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif subeq r2,$key,#216 beq .Ldone ldr $i1,[$key,#-32] ldr $i2,[$key,#-28] eor $i1,$i1,$s3 @ rk[10]=rk[4]^rk[9] eor $i3,$i2,$i1 @ rk[11]=rk[5]^rk[10] str $i1,[$key,#-8] str $i3,[$key,#-4] b .L192_loop .Lnot192: #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb $i2,[$rounds,#27] ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#26] ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#25] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#24] orr $i2,$i2,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $i3,[$rounds,#31] orr $i2,$i2,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#30] orr $i2,$i2,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#29] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#28] orr $i3,$i3,$t1,lsl#8 orr $i3,$i3,$t2,lsl#16 str $i2,[$key],#8 orr $i3,$i3,$t3,lsl#24 str $i3,[$key,#-4] #else ldr $i2,[$rounds,#24] ldr $i3,[$rounds,#28] #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $i2,$i2 rev $i3,$i3 #endif str $i2,[$key],#8 str $i3,[$key,#-4] #endif mov $rounds,#14 str $rounds,[$key,#240-32] add $t3,$tbl,#256 @ rcon mov lr,#255 mov $rounds,#7 .L256_loop: and $t2,lr,$i3,lsr#24 and $i1,lr,$i3,lsr#16 ldrb $t2,[$tbl,$t2] and $i2,lr,$i3,lsr#8 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] and $i3,lr,$i3 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] orr $t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#24 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] orr $t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16 ldr $t1,[$t3],#4 @ rcon[i++] orr $t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#8 eor $i3,$t2,$t1 eor $s0,$s0,$i3 @ rk[8]=rk[0]^... eor $s1,$s1,$s0 @ rk[9]=rk[1]^rk[8] str $s0,[$key],#32 eor $s2,$s2,$s1 @ rk[10]=rk[2]^rk[9] str $s1,[$key,#-28] eor $s3,$s3,$s2 @ rk[11]=rk[3]^rk[10] str $s2,[$key,#-24] subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 str $s3,[$key,#-20] #ifdef __thumb2__ itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif subeq r2,$key,#256 beq .Ldone and $t2,lr,$s3 and $i1,lr,$s3,lsr#8 ldrb $t2,[$tbl,$t2] and $i2,lr,$s3,lsr#16 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] and $i3,lr,$s3,lsr#24 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] orr $t2,$t2,$i1,lsl#8 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] orr $t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#16 ldr $t1,[$key,#-48] orr $t2,$t2,$i3,lsl#24 ldr $i1,[$key,#-44] ldr $i2,[$key,#-40] eor $t1,$t1,$t2 @ rk[12]=rk[4]^... ldr $i3,[$key,#-36] eor $i1,$i1,$t1 @ rk[13]=rk[5]^rk[12] str $t1,[$key,#-16] eor $i2,$i2,$i1 @ rk[14]=rk[6]^rk[13] str $i1,[$key,#-12] eor $i3,$i3,$i2 @ rk[15]=rk[7]^rk[14] str $i2,[$key,#-8] str $i3,[$key,#-4] b .L256_loop .align 2 .Ldone: mov r0,#0 ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} .Labrt: #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ret @ bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key .global AES_set_decrypt_key .type AES_set_decrypt_key,%function .align 5 AES_set_decrypt_key: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr bl _armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key teq r0,#0 ldr lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr bne .Labrt mov r0,r2 @ AES_set_encrypt_key preserves r2, mov r1,r2 @ which is AES_KEY *key b _armv4_AES_set_enc2dec_key .size AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key @ void AES_set_enc2dec_key(const AES_KEY *inp,AES_KEY *out) .global AES_set_enc2dec_key .type AES_set_enc2dec_key,%function .align 5 AES_set_enc2dec_key: _armv4_AES_set_enc2dec_key: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} ldr $rounds,[r0,#240] mov $i1,r0 @ input add $i2,r0,$rounds,lsl#4 mov $key,r1 @ output add $tbl,r1,$rounds,lsl#4 str $rounds,[r1,#240] .Linv: ldr $s0,[$i1],#16 ldr $s1,[$i1,#-12] ldr $s2,[$i1,#-8] ldr $s3,[$i1,#-4] ldr $t1,[$i2],#-16 ldr $t2,[$i2,#16+4] ldr $t3,[$i2,#16+8] ldr $i3,[$i2,#16+12] str $s0,[$tbl],#-16 str $s1,[$tbl,#16+4] str $s2,[$tbl,#16+8] str $s3,[$tbl,#16+12] str $t1,[$key],#16 str $t2,[$key,#-12] str $t3,[$key,#-8] str $i3,[$key,#-4] teq $i1,$i2 bne .Linv ldr $s0,[$i1] ldr $s1,[$i1,#4] ldr $s2,[$i1,#8] ldr $s3,[$i1,#12] str $s0,[$key] str $s1,[$key,#4] str $s2,[$key,#8] str $s3,[$key,#12] sub $key,$key,$rounds,lsl#3 ___ $mask80=$i1; $mask1b=$i2; $mask7f=$i3; $code.=<<___; ldr $s0,[$key,#16]! @ prefetch tp1 mov $mask80,#0x80 mov $mask1b,#0x1b orr $mask80,$mask80,#0x8000 orr $mask1b,$mask1b,#0x1b00 orr $mask80,$mask80,$mask80,lsl#16 orr $mask1b,$mask1b,$mask1b,lsl#16 sub $rounds,$rounds,#1 mvn $mask7f,$mask80 mov $rounds,$rounds,lsl#2 @ (rounds-1)*4 .Lmix: and $t1,$s0,$mask80 and $s1,$s0,$mask7f sub $t1,$t1,$t1,lsr#7 and $t1,$t1,$mask1b eor $s1,$t1,$s1,lsl#1 @ tp2 and $t1,$s1,$mask80 and $s2,$s1,$mask7f sub $t1,$t1,$t1,lsr#7 and $t1,$t1,$mask1b eor $s2,$t1,$s2,lsl#1 @ tp4 and $t1,$s2,$mask80 and $s3,$s2,$mask7f sub $t1,$t1,$t1,lsr#7 and $t1,$t1,$mask1b eor $s3,$t1,$s3,lsl#1 @ tp8 eor $t1,$s1,$s2 eor $t2,$s0,$s3 @ tp9 eor $t1,$t1,$s3 @ tpe eor $t1,$t1,$s1,ror#24 eor $t1,$t1,$t2,ror#24 @ ^= ROTATE(tpb=tp9^tp2,8) eor $t1,$t1,$s2,ror#16 eor $t1,$t1,$t2,ror#16 @ ^= ROTATE(tpd=tp9^tp4,16) eor $t1,$t1,$t2,ror#8 @ ^= ROTATE(tp9,24) ldr $s0,[$key,#4] @ prefetch tp1 str $t1,[$key],#4 subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 bne .Lmix mov r0,#0 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size AES_set_enc2dec_key,.-AES_set_enc2dec_key .type AES_Td,%object .align 5 AES_Td: .word 0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96 .word 0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393 .word 0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25 .word 0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f .word 0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1 .word 0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6 .word 0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da .word 0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844 .word 0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd .word 0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4 .word 0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45 .word 0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94 .word 0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7 .word 0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a .word 0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5 .word 0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c .word 0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1 .word 0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a .word 0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75 .word 0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051 .word 0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46 .word 0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff .word 0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77 .word 0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb .word 0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000 .word 0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e .word 0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927 .word 0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a .word 0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e .word 0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16 .word 0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d .word 0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8 .word 0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd .word 0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34 .word 0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163 .word 0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120 .word 0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d .word 0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0 .word 0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422 .word 0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef .word 0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36 .word 0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4 .word 0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662 .word 0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5 .word 0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3 .word 0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b .word 0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8 .word 0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6 .word 0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6 .word 0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0 .word 0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815 .word 0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f .word 0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df .word 0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f .word 0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e .word 0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713 .word 0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89 .word 0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c .word 0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf .word 0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86 .word 0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f .word 0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541 .word 0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190 .word 0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742 @ Td4[256] .byte 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 .byte 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb .byte 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 .byte 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb .byte 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d .byte 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e .byte 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 .byte 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 .byte 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 .byte 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 .byte 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda .byte 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 .byte 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a .byte 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 .byte 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 .byte 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b .byte 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea .byte 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 .byte 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 .byte 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e .byte 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 .byte 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b .byte 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 .byte 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 .byte 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 .byte 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f .byte 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d .byte 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef .byte 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 .byte 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 .byte 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 .byte 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d .size AES_Td,.-AES_Td @ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, @ const AES_KEY *key) { .global AES_decrypt .type AES_decrypt,%function .align 5 AES_decrypt: #ifndef __thumb2__ sub r3,pc,#8 @ AES_decrypt #else adr r3,AES_decrypt #endif stmdb sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr} #ifdef __APPLE__ adr $tbl,AES_Td #else sub $tbl,r3,#AES_decrypt-AES_Td @ Td #endif mov $rounds,r0 @ inp mov $key,r2 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb $s0,[$rounds,#3] @ load input data in endian-neutral ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#2] @ manner... ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#1] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#0] orr $s0,$s0,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s1,[$rounds,#7] orr $s0,$s0,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#6] orr $s0,$s0,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#5] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#4] orr $s1,$s1,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s2,[$rounds,#11] orr $s1,$s1,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#10] orr $s1,$s1,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#9] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#8] orr $s2,$s2,$t1,lsl#8 ldrb $s3,[$rounds,#15] orr $s2,$s2,$t2,lsl#16 ldrb $t1,[$rounds,#14] orr $s2,$s2,$t3,lsl#24 ldrb $t2,[$rounds,#13] ldrb $t3,[$rounds,#12] orr $s3,$s3,$t1,lsl#8 orr $s3,$s3,$t2,lsl#16 orr $s3,$s3,$t3,lsl#24 #else ldr $s0,[$rounds,#0] ldr $s1,[$rounds,#4] ldr $s2,[$rounds,#8] ldr $s3,[$rounds,#12] #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $s0,$s0 rev $s1,$s1 rev $s2,$s2 rev $s3,$s3 #endif #endif bl _armv4_AES_decrypt ldr $rounds,[sp],#4 @ pop out #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $s0,$s0 rev $s1,$s1 rev $s2,$s2 rev $s3,$s3 #endif str $s0,[$rounds,#0] str $s1,[$rounds,#4] str $s2,[$rounds,#8] str $s3,[$rounds,#12] #else mov $t1,$s0,lsr#24 @ write output in endian-neutral mov $t2,$s0,lsr#16 @ manner... mov $t3,$s0,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#0] strb $t2,[$rounds,#1] mov $t1,$s1,lsr#24 strb $t3,[$rounds,#2] mov $t2,$s1,lsr#16 strb $s0,[$rounds,#3] mov $t3,$s1,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#4] strb $t2,[$rounds,#5] mov $t1,$s2,lsr#24 strb $t3,[$rounds,#6] mov $t2,$s2,lsr#16 strb $s1,[$rounds,#7] mov $t3,$s2,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#8] strb $t2,[$rounds,#9] mov $t1,$s3,lsr#24 strb $t3,[$rounds,#10] mov $t2,$s3,lsr#16 strb $s2,[$rounds,#11] mov $t3,$s3,lsr#8 strb $t1,[$rounds,#12] strb $t2,[$rounds,#13] strb $t3,[$rounds,#14] strb $s3,[$rounds,#15] #endif #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size AES_decrypt,.-AES_decrypt .type _armv4_AES_decrypt,%function .align 2 _armv4_AES_decrypt: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr ldmia $key!,{$t1-$i1} eor $s0,$s0,$t1 ldr $rounds,[$key,#240-16] eor $s1,$s1,$t2 eor $s2,$s2,$t3 eor $s3,$s3,$i1 sub $rounds,$rounds,#1 mov lr,#255 and $i1,lr,$s0,lsr#16 and $i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8 and $i3,lr,$s0 mov $s0,$s0,lsr#24 .Ldec_loop: ldr $t1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Td1[s0>>16] and $i1,lr,$s1 @ i0 ldr $t2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Td2[s0>>8] and $i2,lr,$s1,lsr#16 ldr $t3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Td3[s0>>0] and $i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8 ldr $s0,[$tbl,$s0,lsl#2] @ Td0[s0>>24] mov $s1,$s1,lsr#24 ldr $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Td3[s1>>0] ldr $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Td1[s1>>16] ldr $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Td2[s1>>8] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,ror#24 ldr $s1,[$tbl,$s1,lsl#2] @ Td0[s1>>24] and $i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8 @ i0 eor $t2,$i2,$t2,ror#8 and $i2,lr,$s2 @ i1 eor $t3,$i3,$t3,ror#8 and $i3,lr,$s2,lsr#16 ldr $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Td2[s2>>8] eor $s1,$s1,$t1,ror#8 ldr $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Td3[s2>>0] mov $s2,$s2,lsr#24 ldr $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Td1[s2>>16] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,ror#16 ldr $s2,[$tbl,$s2,lsl#2] @ Td0[s2>>24] and $i1,lr,$s3,lsr#16 @ i0 eor $s1,$s1,$i2,ror#24 and $i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8 @ i1 eor $t3,$i3,$t3,ror#8 and $i3,lr,$s3 @ i2 ldr $i1,[$tbl,$i1,lsl#2] @ Td1[s3>>16] eor $s2,$s2,$t2,ror#8 ldr $i2,[$tbl,$i2,lsl#2] @ Td2[s3>>8] mov $s3,$s3,lsr#24 ldr $i3,[$tbl,$i3,lsl#2] @ Td3[s3>>0] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,ror#8 ldr $i1,[$key],#16 eor $s1,$s1,$i2,ror#16 ldr $s3,[$tbl,$s3,lsl#2] @ Td0[s3>>24] eor $s2,$s2,$i3,ror#24 ldr $t1,[$key,#-12] eor $s0,$s0,$i1 ldr $t2,[$key,#-8] eor $s3,$s3,$t3,ror#8 ldr $t3,[$key,#-4] and $i1,lr,$s0,lsr#16 eor $s1,$s1,$t1 and $i2,lr,$s0,lsr#8 eor $s2,$s2,$t2 and $i3,lr,$s0 eor $s3,$s3,$t3 mov $s0,$s0,lsr#24 subs $rounds,$rounds,#1 bne .Ldec_loop add $tbl,$tbl,#1024 ldr $t2,[$tbl,#0] @ prefetch Td4 ldr $t3,[$tbl,#32] ldr $t1,[$tbl,#64] ldr $t2,[$tbl,#96] ldr $t3,[$tbl,#128] ldr $t1,[$tbl,#160] ldr $t2,[$tbl,#192] ldr $t3,[$tbl,#224] ldrb $s0,[$tbl,$s0] @ Td4[s0>>24] ldrb $t1,[$tbl,$i1] @ Td4[s0>>16] and $i1,lr,$s1 @ i0 ldrb $t2,[$tbl,$i2] @ Td4[s0>>8] and $i2,lr,$s1,lsr#16 ldrb $t3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s0>>0] and $i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8 add $s1,$tbl,$s1,lsr#24 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] @ Td4[s1>>0] ldrb $s1,[$s1] @ Td4[s1>>24] ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] @ Td4[s1>>16] eor $s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#24 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s1>>8] eor $s1,$t1,$s1,lsl#8 and $i1,lr,$s2,lsr#8 @ i0 eor $t2,$t2,$i2,lsl#8 and $i2,lr,$s2 @ i1 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] @ Td4[s2>>8] eor $t3,$t3,$i3,lsl#8 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] @ Td4[s2>>0] and $i3,lr,$s2,lsr#16 add $s2,$tbl,$s2,lsr#24 ldrb $s2,[$s2] @ Td4[s2>>24] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,lsl#8 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s2>>16] eor $s1,$i2,$s1,lsl#16 and $i1,lr,$s3,lsr#16 @ i0 eor $s2,$t2,$s2,lsl#16 and $i2,lr,$s3,lsr#8 @ i1 ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] @ Td4[s3>>16] eor $t3,$t3,$i3,lsl#16 ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] @ Td4[s3>>8] and $i3,lr,$s3 @ i2 add $s3,$tbl,$s3,lsr#24 ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s3>>0] ldrb $s3,[$s3] @ Td4[s3>>24] eor $s0,$s0,$i1,lsl#16 ldr $i1,[$key,#0] eor $s1,$s1,$i2,lsl#8 ldr $t1,[$key,#4] eor $s2,$i3,$s2,lsl#8 ldr $t2,[$key,#8] eor $s3,$t3,$s3,lsl#24 ldr $t3,[$key,#12] eor $s0,$s0,$i1 eor $s1,$s1,$t1 eor $s2,$s2,$t2 eor $s3,$s3,$t3 sub $tbl,$tbl,#1024 ldr pc,[sp],#4 @ pop and return .size _armv4_AES_decrypt,.-_armv4_AES_decrypt .asciz "AES for ARMv4, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ $code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 $code =~ s/\bret\b/bx\tlr/gm; open SELF,$0; while() { next if (/^#!/); last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/); print; } close SELF; print $code; close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl0000644000000000000000000014765613176625656016746 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # AES for s390x. # April 2007. # # Software performance improvement over gcc-generated code is ~70% and # in absolute terms is ~73 cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key. # You're likely to exclaim "why so slow?" Keep in mind that z-CPUs are # *strictly* in-order execution and issued instruction [in this case # load value from memory is critical] has to complete before execution # flow proceeds. S-boxes are compressed to 2KB[+256B]. # # As for hardware acceleration support. It's basically a "teaser," as # it can and should be improved in several ways. Most notably support # for CBC is not utilized, nor multiple blocks are ever processed. # Then software key schedule can be postponed till hardware support # detection... Performance improvement over assembler is reportedly # ~2.5x, but can reach >8x [naturally on larger chunks] if proper # support is implemented. # May 2007. # # Implement AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key. Key schedule setup is avoided # for 128-bit keys, if hardware support is detected. # Januray 2009. # # Add support for hardware AES192/256 and reschedule instructions to # minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard and to favour # dual-issue z10 pipeline. This gave ~25% improvement on z10 and # almost 50% on z9. The gain is smaller on z10, because being dual- # issue z10 makes it improssible to eliminate the interlock condition: # critial path is not long enough. Yet it spends ~24 cycles per byte # processed with 128-bit key. # # Unlike previous version hardware support detection takes place only # at the moment of key schedule setup, which is denoted in key->rounds. # This is done, because deferred key setup can't be made MT-safe, not # for keys longer than 128 bits. # # Add AES_cbc_encrypt, which gives incredible performance improvement, # it was measured to be ~6.6x. It's less than previously mentioned 8x, # because software implementation was optimized. # May 2010. # # Add AES_ctr32_encrypt. If hardware-assisted, it provides up to 4.3x # performance improvement over "generic" counter mode routine relying # on single-block, also hardware-assisted, AES_encrypt. "Up to" refers # to the fact that exact throughput value depends on current stack # frame alignment within 4KB page. In worst case you get ~75% of the # maximum, but *on average* it would be as much as ~98%. Meaning that # worst case is unlike, it's like hitting ravine on plateau. # November 2010. # # Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" # feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit # instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy # application context. The feature is not specific to any particular # processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code # remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform # 2x better than code generated by gcc 4.3. # December 2010. # # Add support for z196 "cipher message with counter" instruction. # Note however that it's disengaged, because it was measured to # perform ~12% worse than vanilla km-based code... # February 2011. # # Add AES_xts_[en|de]crypt. This includes support for z196 km-xts-aes # instructions, which deliver ~70% improvement at 8KB block size over # vanilla km-based code, 37% - at most like 512-bytes block size. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $softonly=0; # allow hardware support $t0="%r0"; $mask="%r0"; $t1="%r1"; $t2="%r2"; $inp="%r2"; $t3="%r3"; $out="%r3"; $bits="%r3"; $key="%r4"; $i1="%r5"; $i2="%r6"; $i3="%r7"; $s0="%r8"; $s1="%r9"; $s2="%r10"; $s3="%r11"; $tbl="%r12"; $rounds="%r13"; $ra="%r14"; $sp="%r15"; $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8; sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { $code.=sprintf".long\t0x%08x,0x%08x\n",$i,$i; } } $code=<<___; .text .type AES_Te,\@object .align 256 AES_Te: ___ &_data_word( 0xc66363a5, 0xf87c7c84, 0xee777799, 0xf67b7b8d, 0xfff2f20d, 0xd66b6bbd, 0xde6f6fb1, 0x91c5c554, 0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xce6767a9, 0x562b2b7d, 0xe7fefe19, 0xb5d7d762, 0x4dababe6, 0xec76769a, 0x8fcaca45, 0x1f82829d, 0x89c9c940, 0xfa7d7d87, 0xeffafa15, 0xb25959eb, 0x8e4747c9, 0xfbf0f00b, 0x41adadec, 0xb3d4d467, 0x5fa2a2fd, 0x45afafea, 0x239c9cbf, 0x53a4a4f7, 0xe4727296, 0x9bc0c05b, 0x75b7b7c2, 0xe1fdfd1c, 0x3d9393ae, 0x4c26266a, 0x6c36365a, 0x7e3f3f41, 0xf5f7f702, 0x83cccc4f, 0x6834345c, 0x51a5a5f4, 0xd1e5e534, 0xf9f1f108, 0xe2717193, 0xabd8d873, 0x62313153, 0x2a15153f, 0x0804040c, 0x95c7c752, 0x46232365, 0x9dc3c35e, 0x30181828, 0x379696a1, 0x0a05050f, 0x2f9a9ab5, 0x0e070709, 0x24121236, 0x1b80809b, 0xdfe2e23d, 0xcdebeb26, 0x4e272769, 0x7fb2b2cd, 0xea75759f, 0x1209091b, 0x1d83839e, 0x582c2c74, 0x341a1a2e, 0x361b1b2d, 0xdc6e6eb2, 0xb45a5aee, 0x5ba0a0fb, 0xa45252f6, 0x763b3b4d, 0xb7d6d661, 0x7db3b3ce, 0x5229297b, 0xdde3e33e, 0x5e2f2f71, 0x13848497, 0xa65353f5, 0xb9d1d168, 0x00000000, 0xc1eded2c, 0x40202060, 0xe3fcfc1f, 0x79b1b1c8, 0xb65b5bed, 0xd46a6abe, 0x8dcbcb46, 0x67bebed9, 0x7239394b, 0x944a4ade, 0x984c4cd4, 0xb05858e8, 0x85cfcf4a, 0xbbd0d06b, 0xc5efef2a, 0x4faaaae5, 0xedfbfb16, 0x864343c5, 0x9a4d4dd7, 0x66333355, 0x11858594, 0x8a4545cf, 0xe9f9f910, 0x04020206, 0xfe7f7f81, 0xa05050f0, 0x783c3c44, 0x259f9fba, 0x4ba8a8e3, 0xa25151f3, 0x5da3a3fe, 0x804040c0, 0x058f8f8a, 0x3f9292ad, 0x219d9dbc, 0x70383848, 0xf1f5f504, 0x63bcbcdf, 0x77b6b6c1, 0xafdada75, 0x42212163, 0x20101030, 0xe5ffff1a, 0xfdf3f30e, 0xbfd2d26d, 0x81cdcd4c, 0x180c0c14, 0x26131335, 0xc3ecec2f, 0xbe5f5fe1, 0x359797a2, 0x884444cc, 0x2e171739, 0x93c4c457, 0x55a7a7f2, 0xfc7e7e82, 0x7a3d3d47, 0xc86464ac, 0xba5d5de7, 0x3219192b, 0xe6737395, 0xc06060a0, 0x19818198, 0x9e4f4fd1, 0xa3dcdc7f, 0x44222266, 0x542a2a7e, 0x3b9090ab, 0x0b888883, 0x8c4646ca, 0xc7eeee29, 0x6bb8b8d3, 0x2814143c, 0xa7dede79, 0xbc5e5ee2, 0x160b0b1d, 0xaddbdb76, 0xdbe0e03b, 0x64323256, 0x743a3a4e, 0x140a0a1e, 0x924949db, 0x0c06060a, 0x4824246c, 0xb85c5ce4, 0x9fc2c25d, 0xbdd3d36e, 0x43acacef, 0xc46262a6, 0x399191a8, 0x319595a4, 0xd3e4e437, 0xf279798b, 0xd5e7e732, 0x8bc8c843, 0x6e373759, 0xda6d6db7, 0x018d8d8c, 0xb1d5d564, 0x9c4e4ed2, 0x49a9a9e0, 0xd86c6cb4, 0xac5656fa, 0xf3f4f407, 0xcfeaea25, 0xca6565af, 0xf47a7a8e, 0x47aeaee9, 0x10080818, 0x6fbabad5, 0xf0787888, 0x4a25256f, 0x5c2e2e72, 0x381c1c24, 0x57a6a6f1, 0x73b4b4c7, 0x97c6c651, 0xcbe8e823, 0xa1dddd7c, 0xe874749c, 0x3e1f1f21, 0x964b4bdd, 0x61bdbddc, 0x0d8b8b86, 0x0f8a8a85, 0xe0707090, 0x7c3e3e42, 0x71b5b5c4, 0xcc6666aa, 0x904848d8, 0x06030305, 0xf7f6f601, 0x1c0e0e12, 0xc26161a3, 0x6a35355f, 0xae5757f9, 0x69b9b9d0, 0x17868691, 0x99c1c158, 0x3a1d1d27, 0x279e9eb9, 0xd9e1e138, 0xebf8f813, 0x2b9898b3, 0x22111133, 0xd26969bb, 0xa9d9d970, 0x078e8e89, 0x339494a7, 0x2d9b9bb6, 0x3c1e1e22, 0x15878792, 0xc9e9e920, 0x87cece49, 0xaa5555ff, 0x50282878, 0xa5dfdf7a, 0x038c8c8f, 0x59a1a1f8, 0x09898980, 0x1a0d0d17, 0x65bfbfda, 0xd7e6e631, 0x844242c6, 0xd06868b8, 0x824141c3, 0x299999b0, 0x5a2d2d77, 0x1e0f0f11, 0x7bb0b0cb, 0xa85454fc, 0x6dbbbbd6, 0x2c16163a); $code.=<<___; # Te4[256] .byte 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5 .byte 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76 .byte 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0 .byte 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0 .byte 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc .byte 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15 .byte 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a .byte 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75 .byte 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0 .byte 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84 .byte 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b .byte 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf .byte 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85 .byte 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8 .byte 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5 .byte 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2 .byte 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17 .byte 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73 .byte 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88 .byte 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb .byte 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c .byte 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79 .byte 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9 .byte 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08 .byte 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6 .byte 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a .byte 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e .byte 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e .byte 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94 .byte 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf .byte 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68 .byte 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16 # rcon[] .long 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000 .long 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000 .long 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 .align 256 .size AES_Te,.-AES_Te # void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, # const AES_KEY *key) { .globl AES_encrypt .type AES_encrypt,\@function AES_encrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); l %r0,240($key) lhi %r1,16 clr %r0,%r1 jl .Lesoft la %r1,0($key) #la %r2,0($inp) la %r4,0($out) lghi %r3,16 # single block length .long 0xb92e0042 # km %r4,%r2 brc 1,.-4 # can this happen? br %r14 .align 64 .Lesoft: ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r3,$ra,3*$SIZE_T($sp) llgf $s0,0($inp) llgf $s1,4($inp) llgf $s2,8($inp) llgf $s3,12($inp) larl $tbl,AES_Te bras $ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt l${g} $out,3*$SIZE_T($sp) st $s0,0($out) st $s1,4($out) st $s2,8($out) st $s3,12($out) lm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .size AES_encrypt,.-AES_encrypt .type _s390x_AES_encrypt,\@function .align 16 _s390x_AES_encrypt: st${g} $ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,0($key) x $s1,4($key) x $s2,8($key) x $s3,12($key) l $rounds,240($key) llill $mask,`0xff<<3` aghi $rounds,-1 j .Lenc_loop .align 16 .Lenc_loop: sllg $t1,$s0,`0+3` srlg $t2,$s0,`8-3` srlg $t3,$s0,`16-3` srl $s0,`24-3` nr $s0,$mask ngr $t1,$mask nr $t2,$mask nr $t3,$mask srlg $i1,$s1,`16-3` # i0 sllg $i2,$s1,`0+3` srlg $i3,$s1,`8-3` srl $s1,`24-3` nr $i1,$mask nr $s1,$mask ngr $i2,$mask nr $i3,$mask l $s0,0($s0,$tbl) # Te0[s0>>24] l $t1,1($t1,$tbl) # Te3[s0>>0] l $t2,2($t2,$tbl) # Te2[s0>>8] l $t3,3($t3,$tbl) # Te1[s0>>16] x $s0,3($i1,$tbl) # Te1[s1>>16] l $s1,0($s1,$tbl) # Te0[s1>>24] x $t2,1($i2,$tbl) # Te3[s1>>0] x $t3,2($i3,$tbl) # Te2[s1>>8] srlg $i1,$s2,`8-3` # i0 srlg $i2,$s2,`16-3` # i1 nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask sllg $i3,$s2,`0+3` srl $s2,`24-3` nr $s2,$mask ngr $i3,$mask xr $s1,$t1 srlg $ra,$s3,`8-3` # i1 sllg $t1,$s3,`0+3` # i0 nr $ra,$mask la $key,16($key) ngr $t1,$mask x $s0,2($i1,$tbl) # Te2[s2>>8] x $s1,3($i2,$tbl) # Te1[s2>>16] l $s2,0($s2,$tbl) # Te0[s2>>24] x $t3,1($i3,$tbl) # Te3[s2>>0] srlg $i3,$s3,`16-3` # i2 xr $s2,$t2 srl $s3,`24-3` nr $i3,$mask nr $s3,$mask x $s0,0($key) x $s1,4($key) x $s2,8($key) x $t3,12($key) x $s0,1($t1,$tbl) # Te3[s3>>0] x $s1,2($ra,$tbl) # Te2[s3>>8] x $s2,3($i3,$tbl) # Te1[s3>>16] l $s3,0($s3,$tbl) # Te0[s3>>24] xr $s3,$t3 brct $rounds,.Lenc_loop .align 16 sllg $t1,$s0,`0+3` srlg $t2,$s0,`8-3` ngr $t1,$mask srlg $t3,$s0,`16-3` srl $s0,`24-3` nr $s0,$mask nr $t2,$mask nr $t3,$mask srlg $i1,$s1,`16-3` # i0 sllg $i2,$s1,`0+3` ngr $i2,$mask srlg $i3,$s1,`8-3` srl $s1,`24-3` nr $i1,$mask nr $s1,$mask nr $i3,$mask llgc $s0,2($s0,$tbl) # Te4[s0>>24] llgc $t1,2($t1,$tbl) # Te4[s0>>0] sll $s0,24 llgc $t2,2($t2,$tbl) # Te4[s0>>8] llgc $t3,2($t3,$tbl) # Te4[s0>>16] sll $t2,8 sll $t3,16 llgc $i1,2($i1,$tbl) # Te4[s1>>16] llgc $s1,2($s1,$tbl) # Te4[s1>>24] llgc $i2,2($i2,$tbl) # Te4[s1>>0] llgc $i3,2($i3,$tbl) # Te4[s1>>8] sll $i1,16 sll $s1,24 sll $i3,8 or $s0,$i1 or $s1,$t1 or $t2,$i2 or $t3,$i3 srlg $i1,$s2,`8-3` # i0 srlg $i2,$s2,`16-3` # i1 nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask sllg $i3,$s2,`0+3` srl $s2,`24-3` ngr $i3,$mask nr $s2,$mask sllg $t1,$s3,`0+3` # i0 srlg $ra,$s3,`8-3` # i1 ngr $t1,$mask llgc $i1,2($i1,$tbl) # Te4[s2>>8] llgc $i2,2($i2,$tbl) # Te4[s2>>16] sll $i1,8 llgc $s2,2($s2,$tbl) # Te4[s2>>24] llgc $i3,2($i3,$tbl) # Te4[s2>>0] sll $i2,16 nr $ra,$mask sll $s2,24 or $s0,$i1 or $s1,$i2 or $s2,$t2 or $t3,$i3 srlg $i3,$s3,`16-3` # i2 srl $s3,`24-3` nr $i3,$mask nr $s3,$mask l $t0,16($key) l $t2,20($key) llgc $i1,2($t1,$tbl) # Te4[s3>>0] llgc $i2,2($ra,$tbl) # Te4[s3>>8] llgc $i3,2($i3,$tbl) # Te4[s3>>16] llgc $s3,2($s3,$tbl) # Te4[s3>>24] sll $i2,8 sll $i3,16 sll $s3,24 or $s0,$i1 or $s1,$i2 or $s2,$i3 or $s3,$t3 l${g} $ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp) xr $s0,$t0 xr $s1,$t2 x $s2,24($key) x $s3,28($key) br $ra .size _s390x_AES_encrypt,.-_s390x_AES_encrypt ___ $code.=<<___; .type AES_Td,\@object .align 256 AES_Td: ___ &_data_word( 0x51f4a750, 0x7e416553, 0x1a17a4c3, 0x3a275e96, 0x3bab6bcb, 0x1f9d45f1, 0xacfa58ab, 0x4be30393, 0x2030fa55, 0xad766df6, 0x88cc7691, 0xf5024c25, 0x4fe5d7fc, 0xc52acbd7, 0x26354480, 0xb562a38f, 0xdeb15a49, 0x25ba1b67, 0x45ea0e98, 0x5dfec0e1, 0xc32f7502, 0x814cf012, 0x8d4697a3, 0x6bd3f9c6, 0x038f5fe7, 0x15929c95, 0xbf6d7aeb, 0x955259da, 0xd4be832d, 0x587421d3, 0x49e06929, 0x8ec9c844, 0x75c2896a, 0xf48e7978, 0x99583e6b, 0x27b971dd, 0xbee14fb6, 0xf088ad17, 0xc920ac66, 0x7dce3ab4, 0x63df4a18, 0xe51a3182, 0x97513360, 0x62537f45, 0xb16477e0, 0xbb6bae84, 0xfe81a01c, 0xf9082b94, 0x70486858, 0x8f45fd19, 0x94de6c87, 0x527bf8b7, 0xab73d323, 0x724b02e2, 0xe31f8f57, 0x6655ab2a, 0xb2eb2807, 0x2fb5c203, 0x86c57b9a, 0xd33708a5, 0x302887f2, 0x23bfa5b2, 0x02036aba, 0xed16825c, 0x8acf1c2b, 0xa779b492, 0xf307f2f0, 0x4e69e2a1, 0x65daf4cd, 0x0605bed5, 0xd134621f, 0xc4a6fe8a, 0x342e539d, 0xa2f355a0, 0x058ae132, 0xa4f6eb75, 0x0b83ec39, 0x4060efaa, 0x5e719f06, 0xbd6e1051, 0x3e218af9, 0x96dd063d, 0xdd3e05ae, 0x4de6bd46, 0x91548db5, 0x71c45d05, 0x0406d46f, 0x605015ff, 0x1998fb24, 0xd6bde997, 0x894043cc, 0x67d99e77, 0xb0e842bd, 0x07898b88, 0xe7195b38, 0x79c8eedb, 0xa17c0a47, 0x7c420fe9, 0xf8841ec9, 0x00000000, 0x09808683, 0x322bed48, 0x1e1170ac, 0x6c5a724e, 0xfd0efffb, 0x0f853856, 0x3daed51e, 0x362d3927, 0x0a0fd964, 0x685ca621, 0x9b5b54d1, 0x24362e3a, 0x0c0a67b1, 0x9357e70f, 0xb4ee96d2, 0x1b9b919e, 0x80c0c54f, 0x61dc20a2, 0x5a774b69, 0x1c121a16, 0xe293ba0a, 0xc0a02ae5, 0x3c22e043, 0x121b171d, 0x0e090d0b, 0xf28bc7ad, 0x2db6a8b9, 0x141ea9c8, 0x57f11985, 0xaf75074c, 0xee99ddbb, 0xa37f60fd, 0xf701269f, 0x5c72f5bc, 0x44663bc5, 0x5bfb7e34, 0x8b432976, 0xcb23c6dc, 0xb6edfc68, 0xb8e4f163, 0xd731dcca, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84c61120, 0x854a247d, 0xd2bb3df8, 0xaef93211, 0xc729a16d, 0x1d9e2f4b, 0xdcb230f3, 0x0d8652ec, 0x77c1e3d0, 0x2bb3166c, 0xa970b999, 0x119448fa, 0x47e96422, 0xa8fc8cc4, 0xa0f03f1a, 0x567d2cd8, 0x223390ef, 0x87494ec7, 0xd938d1c1, 0x8ccaa2fe, 0x98d40b36, 0xa6f581cf, 0xa57ade28, 0xdab78e26, 0x3fadbfa4, 0x2c3a9de4, 0x5078920d, 0x6a5fcc9b, 0x547e4662, 0xf68d13c2, 0x90d8b8e8, 0x2e39f75e, 0x82c3aff5, 0x9f5d80be, 0x69d0937c, 0x6fd52da9, 0xcf2512b3, 0xc8ac993b, 0x10187da7, 0xe89c636e, 0xdb3bbb7b, 0xcd267809, 0x6e5918f4, 0xec9ab701, 0x834f9aa8, 0xe6956e65, 0xaaffe67e, 0x21bccf08, 0xef15e8e6, 0xbae79bd9, 0x4a6f36ce, 0xea9f09d4, 0x29b07cd6, 0x31a4b2af, 0x2a3f2331, 0xc6a59430, 0x35a266c0, 0x744ebc37, 0xfc82caa6, 0xe090d0b0, 0x33a7d815, 0xf104984a, 0x41ecdaf7, 0x7fcd500e, 0x1791f62f, 0x764dd68d, 0x43efb04d, 0xccaa4d54, 0xe49604df, 0x9ed1b5e3, 0x4c6a881b, 0xc12c1fb8, 0x4665517f, 0x9d5eea04, 0x018c355d, 0xfa877473, 0xfb0b412e, 0xb3671d5a, 0x92dbd252, 0xe9105633, 0x6dd64713, 0x9ad7618c, 0x37a10c7a, 0x59f8148e, 0xeb133c89, 0xcea927ee, 0xb761c935, 0xe11ce5ed, 0x7a47b13c, 0x9cd2df59, 0x55f2733f, 0x1814ce79, 0x73c737bf, 0x53f7cdea, 0x5ffdaa5b, 0xdf3d6f14, 0x7844db86, 0xcaaff381, 0xb968c43e, 0x3824342c, 0xc2a3405f, 0x161dc372, 0xbce2250c, 0x283c498b, 0xff0d9541, 0x39a80171, 0x080cb3de, 0xd8b4e49c, 0x6456c190, 0x7bcb8461, 0xd532b670, 0x486c5c74, 0xd0b85742); $code.=<<___; # Td4[256] .byte 0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38 .byte 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb .byte 0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87 .byte 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb .byte 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d .byte 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e .byte 0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2 .byte 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25 .byte 0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16 .byte 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92 .byte 0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda .byte 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84 .byte 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a .byte 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06 .byte 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02 .byte 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b .byte 0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea .byte 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73 .byte 0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85 .byte 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e .byte 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89 .byte 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b .byte 0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20 .byte 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4 .byte 0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31 .byte 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f .byte 0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d .byte 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef .byte 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0 .byte 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61 .byte 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26 .byte 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d .size AES_Td,.-AES_Td # void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, # const AES_KEY *key) { .globl AES_decrypt .type AES_decrypt,\@function AES_decrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); l %r0,240($key) lhi %r1,16 clr %r0,%r1 jl .Ldsoft la %r1,0($key) #la %r2,0($inp) la %r4,0($out) lghi %r3,16 # single block length .long 0xb92e0042 # km %r4,%r2 brc 1,.-4 # can this happen? br %r14 .align 64 .Ldsoft: ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r3,$ra,3*$SIZE_T($sp) llgf $s0,0($inp) llgf $s1,4($inp) llgf $s2,8($inp) llgf $s3,12($inp) larl $tbl,AES_Td bras $ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt l${g} $out,3*$SIZE_T($sp) st $s0,0($out) st $s1,4($out) st $s2,8($out) st $s3,12($out) lm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .size AES_decrypt,.-AES_decrypt .type _s390x_AES_decrypt,\@function .align 16 _s390x_AES_decrypt: st${g} $ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,0($key) x $s1,4($key) x $s2,8($key) x $s3,12($key) l $rounds,240($key) llill $mask,`0xff<<3` aghi $rounds,-1 j .Ldec_loop .align 16 .Ldec_loop: srlg $t1,$s0,`16-3` srlg $t2,$s0,`8-3` sllg $t3,$s0,`0+3` srl $s0,`24-3` nr $s0,$mask nr $t1,$mask nr $t2,$mask ngr $t3,$mask sllg $i1,$s1,`0+3` # i0 srlg $i2,$s1,`16-3` srlg $i3,$s1,`8-3` srl $s1,`24-3` ngr $i1,$mask nr $s1,$mask nr $i2,$mask nr $i3,$mask l $s0,0($s0,$tbl) # Td0[s0>>24] l $t1,3($t1,$tbl) # Td1[s0>>16] l $t2,2($t2,$tbl) # Td2[s0>>8] l $t3,1($t3,$tbl) # Td3[s0>>0] x $s0,1($i1,$tbl) # Td3[s1>>0] l $s1,0($s1,$tbl) # Td0[s1>>24] x $t2,3($i2,$tbl) # Td1[s1>>16] x $t3,2($i3,$tbl) # Td2[s1>>8] srlg $i1,$s2,`8-3` # i0 sllg $i2,$s2,`0+3` # i1 srlg $i3,$s2,`16-3` srl $s2,`24-3` nr $i1,$mask ngr $i2,$mask nr $s2,$mask nr $i3,$mask xr $s1,$t1 srlg $ra,$s3,`8-3` # i1 srlg $t1,$s3,`16-3` # i0 nr $ra,$mask la $key,16($key) nr $t1,$mask x $s0,2($i1,$tbl) # Td2[s2>>8] x $s1,1($i2,$tbl) # Td3[s2>>0] l $s2,0($s2,$tbl) # Td0[s2>>24] x $t3,3($i3,$tbl) # Td1[s2>>16] sllg $i3,$s3,`0+3` # i2 srl $s3,`24-3` ngr $i3,$mask nr $s3,$mask xr $s2,$t2 x $s0,0($key) x $s1,4($key) x $s2,8($key) x $t3,12($key) x $s0,3($t1,$tbl) # Td1[s3>>16] x $s1,2($ra,$tbl) # Td2[s3>>8] x $s2,1($i3,$tbl) # Td3[s3>>0] l $s3,0($s3,$tbl) # Td0[s3>>24] xr $s3,$t3 brct $rounds,.Ldec_loop .align 16 l $t1,`2048+0`($tbl) # prefetch Td4 l $t2,`2048+64`($tbl) l $t3,`2048+128`($tbl) l $i1,`2048+192`($tbl) llill $mask,0xff srlg $i3,$s0,24 # i0 srlg $t1,$s0,16 srlg $t2,$s0,8 nr $s0,$mask # i3 nr $t1,$mask srlg $i1,$s1,24 nr $t2,$mask srlg $i2,$s1,16 srlg $ra,$s1,8 nr $s1,$mask # i0 nr $i2,$mask nr $ra,$mask llgc $i3,2048($i3,$tbl) # Td4[s0>>24] llgc $t1,2048($t1,$tbl) # Td4[s0>>16] llgc $t2,2048($t2,$tbl) # Td4[s0>>8] sll $t1,16 llgc $t3,2048($s0,$tbl) # Td4[s0>>0] sllg $s0,$i3,24 sll $t2,8 llgc $s1,2048($s1,$tbl) # Td4[s1>>0] llgc $i1,2048($i1,$tbl) # Td4[s1>>24] llgc $i2,2048($i2,$tbl) # Td4[s1>>16] sll $i1,24 llgc $i3,2048($ra,$tbl) # Td4[s1>>8] sll $i2,16 sll $i3,8 or $s0,$s1 or $t1,$i1 or $t2,$i2 or $t3,$i3 srlg $i1,$s2,8 # i0 srlg $i2,$s2,24 srlg $i3,$s2,16 nr $s2,$mask # i1 nr $i1,$mask nr $i3,$mask llgc $i1,2048($i1,$tbl) # Td4[s2>>8] llgc $s1,2048($s2,$tbl) # Td4[s2>>0] llgc $i2,2048($i2,$tbl) # Td4[s2>>24] llgc $i3,2048($i3,$tbl) # Td4[s2>>16] sll $i1,8 sll $i2,24 or $s0,$i1 sll $i3,16 or $t2,$i2 or $t3,$i3 srlg $i1,$s3,16 # i0 srlg $i2,$s3,8 # i1 srlg $i3,$s3,24 nr $s3,$mask # i2 nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask l${g} $ra,15*$SIZE_T($sp) or $s1,$t1 l $t0,16($key) l $t1,20($key) llgc $i1,2048($i1,$tbl) # Td4[s3>>16] llgc $i2,2048($i2,$tbl) # Td4[s3>>8] sll $i1,16 llgc $s2,2048($s3,$tbl) # Td4[s3>>0] llgc $s3,2048($i3,$tbl) # Td4[s3>>24] sll $i2,8 sll $s3,24 or $s0,$i1 or $s1,$i2 or $s2,$t2 or $s3,$t3 xr $s0,$t0 xr $s1,$t1 x $s2,24($key) x $s3,28($key) br $ra .size _s390x_AES_decrypt,.-_s390x_AES_decrypt ___ $code.=<<___; # void AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, int bits, # AES_KEY *key) { .globl AES_set_encrypt_key .type AES_set_encrypt_key,\@function .align 16 AES_set_encrypt_key: _s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key: lghi $t0,0 cl${g}r $inp,$t0 je .Lminus1 cl${g}r $key,$t0 je .Lminus1 lghi $t0,128 clr $bits,$t0 je .Lproceed lghi $t0,192 clr $bits,$t0 je .Lproceed lghi $t0,256 clr $bits,$t0 je .Lproceed lghi %r2,-2 br %r14 .align 16 .Lproceed: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); # convert bits to km(c) code, [128,192,256]->[18,19,20] lhi %r5,-128 lhi %r0,18 ar %r5,$bits srl %r5,6 ar %r5,%r0 larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P llihh %r0,0x8000 srlg %r0,%r0,0(%r5) ng %r0,32(%r1) # check availability of both km... ng %r0,48(%r1) # ...and kmc support for given key length jz .Lekey_internal lmg %r0,%r1,0($inp) # just copy 128 bits... stmg %r0,%r1,0($key) lhi %r0,192 cr $bits,%r0 jl 1f lg %r1,16($inp) stg %r1,16($key) je 1f lg %r1,24($inp) stg %r1,24($key) 1: st $bits,236($key) # save bits [for debugging purposes] lgr $t0,%r5 st %r5,240($key) # save km(c) code lghi %r2,0 br %r14 ___ $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lekey_internal: stm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp) # all non-volatile regs and $key larl $tbl,AES_Te+2048 llgf $s0,0($inp) llgf $s1,4($inp) llgf $s2,8($inp) llgf $s3,12($inp) st $s0,0($key) st $s1,4($key) st $s2,8($key) st $s3,12($key) lghi $t0,128 cr $bits,$t0 jne .Lnot128 llill $mask,0xff lghi $t3,0 # i=0 lghi $rounds,10 st $rounds,240($key) llgfr $t2,$s3 # temp=rk[3] srlg $i1,$s3,8 srlg $i2,$s3,16 srlg $i3,$s3,24 nr $t2,$mask nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask .align 16 .L128_loop: la $t2,0($t2,$tbl) la $i1,0($i1,$tbl) la $i2,0($i2,$tbl) la $i3,0($i3,$tbl) icm $t2,2,0($t2) # Te4[rk[3]>>0]<<8 icm $t2,4,0($i1) # Te4[rk[3]>>8]<<16 icm $t2,8,0($i2) # Te4[rk[3]>>16]<<24 icm $t2,1,0($i3) # Te4[rk[3]>>24] x $t2,256($t3,$tbl) # rcon[i] xr $s0,$t2 # rk[4]=rk[0]^... xr $s1,$s0 # rk[5]=rk[1]^rk[4] xr $s2,$s1 # rk[6]=rk[2]^rk[5] xr $s3,$s2 # rk[7]=rk[3]^rk[6] llgfr $t2,$s3 # temp=rk[3] srlg $i1,$s3,8 srlg $i2,$s3,16 nr $t2,$mask nr $i1,$mask srlg $i3,$s3,24 nr $i2,$mask st $s0,16($key) st $s1,20($key) st $s2,24($key) st $s3,28($key) la $key,16($key) # key+=4 la $t3,4($t3) # i++ brct $rounds,.L128_loop lghi $t0,10 lghi %r2,0 lm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 .Lnot128: llgf $t0,16($inp) llgf $t1,20($inp) st $t0,16($key) st $t1,20($key) lghi $t0,192 cr $bits,$t0 jne .Lnot192 llill $mask,0xff lghi $t3,0 # i=0 lghi $rounds,12 st $rounds,240($key) lghi $rounds,8 srlg $i1,$t1,8 srlg $i2,$t1,16 srlg $i3,$t1,24 nr $t1,$mask nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask .align 16 .L192_loop: la $t1,0($t1,$tbl) la $i1,0($i1,$tbl) la $i2,0($i2,$tbl) la $i3,0($i3,$tbl) icm $t1,2,0($t1) # Te4[rk[5]>>0]<<8 icm $t1,4,0($i1) # Te4[rk[5]>>8]<<16 icm $t1,8,0($i2) # Te4[rk[5]>>16]<<24 icm $t1,1,0($i3) # Te4[rk[5]>>24] x $t1,256($t3,$tbl) # rcon[i] xr $s0,$t1 # rk[6]=rk[0]^... xr $s1,$s0 # rk[7]=rk[1]^rk[6] xr $s2,$s1 # rk[8]=rk[2]^rk[7] xr $s3,$s2 # rk[9]=rk[3]^rk[8] st $s0,24($key) st $s1,28($key) st $s2,32($key) st $s3,36($key) brct $rounds,.L192_continue lghi $t0,12 lghi %r2,0 lm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 .L192_continue: lgr $t1,$s3 x $t1,16($key) # rk[10]=rk[4]^rk[9] st $t1,40($key) x $t1,20($key) # rk[11]=rk[5]^rk[10] st $t1,44($key) srlg $i1,$t1,8 srlg $i2,$t1,16 srlg $i3,$t1,24 nr $t1,$mask nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask la $key,24($key) # key+=6 la $t3,4($t3) # i++ j .L192_loop .align 16 .Lnot192: llgf $t0,24($inp) llgf $t1,28($inp) st $t0,24($key) st $t1,28($key) llill $mask,0xff lghi $t3,0 # i=0 lghi $rounds,14 st $rounds,240($key) lghi $rounds,7 srlg $i1,$t1,8 srlg $i2,$t1,16 srlg $i3,$t1,24 nr $t1,$mask nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask .align 16 .L256_loop: la $t1,0($t1,$tbl) la $i1,0($i1,$tbl) la $i2,0($i2,$tbl) la $i3,0($i3,$tbl) icm $t1,2,0($t1) # Te4[rk[7]>>0]<<8 icm $t1,4,0($i1) # Te4[rk[7]>>8]<<16 icm $t1,8,0($i2) # Te4[rk[7]>>16]<<24 icm $t1,1,0($i3) # Te4[rk[7]>>24] x $t1,256($t3,$tbl) # rcon[i] xr $s0,$t1 # rk[8]=rk[0]^... xr $s1,$s0 # rk[9]=rk[1]^rk[8] xr $s2,$s1 # rk[10]=rk[2]^rk[9] xr $s3,$s2 # rk[11]=rk[3]^rk[10] st $s0,32($key) st $s1,36($key) st $s2,40($key) st $s3,44($key) brct $rounds,.L256_continue lghi $t0,14 lghi %r2,0 lm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 .L256_continue: lgr $t1,$s3 # temp=rk[11] srlg $i1,$s3,8 srlg $i2,$s3,16 srlg $i3,$s3,24 nr $t1,$mask nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask la $t1,0($t1,$tbl) la $i1,0($i1,$tbl) la $i2,0($i2,$tbl) la $i3,0($i3,$tbl) llgc $t1,0($t1) # Te4[rk[11]>>0] icm $t1,2,0($i1) # Te4[rk[11]>>8]<<8 icm $t1,4,0($i2) # Te4[rk[11]>>16]<<16 icm $t1,8,0($i3) # Te4[rk[11]>>24]<<24 x $t1,16($key) # rk[12]=rk[4]^... st $t1,48($key) x $t1,20($key) # rk[13]=rk[5]^rk[12] st $t1,52($key) x $t1,24($key) # rk[14]=rk[6]^rk[13] st $t1,56($key) x $t1,28($key) # rk[15]=rk[7]^rk[14] st $t1,60($key) srlg $i1,$t1,8 srlg $i2,$t1,16 srlg $i3,$t1,24 nr $t1,$mask nr $i1,$mask nr $i2,$mask la $key,32($key) # key+=8 la $t3,4($t3) # i++ j .L256_loop .Lminus1: lghi %r2,-1 br $ra .size AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key # void AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *in, int bits, # AES_KEY *key) { .globl AES_set_decrypt_key .type AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function .align 16 AES_set_decrypt_key: #st${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp) # I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to st${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp) # save non-volatile registers and $key! bras $ra,_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key #l${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp) l${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp) ltgr %r2,%r2 bnzr $ra ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); #l $t0,240($key) lhi $t1,16 cr $t0,$t1 jl .Lgo oill $t0,0x80 # set "decrypt" bit st $t0,240($key) br $ra ___ $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lgo: lgr $rounds,$t0 #llgf $rounds,240($key) la $i1,0($key) sllg $i2,$rounds,4 la $i2,0($i2,$key) srl $rounds,1 lghi $t1,-16 .align 16 .Linv: lmg $s0,$s1,0($i1) lmg $s2,$s3,0($i2) stmg $s0,$s1,0($i2) stmg $s2,$s3,0($i1) la $i1,16($i1) la $i2,0($t1,$i2) brct $rounds,.Linv ___ $mask80=$i1; $mask1b=$i2; $maskfe=$i3; $code.=<<___; llgf $rounds,240($key) aghi $rounds,-1 sll $rounds,2 # (rounds-1)*4 llilh $mask80,0x8080 llilh $mask1b,0x1b1b llilh $maskfe,0xfefe oill $mask80,0x8080 oill $mask1b,0x1b1b oill $maskfe,0xfefe .align 16 .Lmix: l $s0,16($key) # tp1 lr $s1,$s0 ngr $s1,$mask80 srlg $t1,$s1,7 slr $s1,$t1 nr $s1,$mask1b sllg $t1,$s0,1 nr $t1,$maskfe xr $s1,$t1 # tp2 lr $s2,$s1 ngr $s2,$mask80 srlg $t1,$s2,7 slr $s2,$t1 nr $s2,$mask1b sllg $t1,$s1,1 nr $t1,$maskfe xr $s2,$t1 # tp4 lr $s3,$s2 ngr $s3,$mask80 srlg $t1,$s3,7 slr $s3,$t1 nr $s3,$mask1b sllg $t1,$s2,1 nr $t1,$maskfe xr $s3,$t1 # tp8 xr $s1,$s0 # tp2^tp1 xr $s2,$s0 # tp4^tp1 rll $s0,$s0,24 # = ROTATE(tp1,8) xr $s2,$s3 # ^=tp8 xr $s0,$s1 # ^=tp2^tp1 xr $s1,$s3 # tp2^tp1^tp8 xr $s0,$s2 # ^=tp4^tp1^tp8 rll $s1,$s1,8 rll $s2,$s2,16 xr $s0,$s1 # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24) rll $s3,$s3,24 xr $s0,$s2 # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16) xr $s0,$s3 # ^= ROTATE(tp8,8) st $s0,16($key) la $key,4($key) brct $rounds,.Lmix lm${g} %r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)# as was saved by AES_set_encrypt_key! lghi %r2,0 br $ra .size AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key ___ ######################################################################## # void AES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivec, const int enc) { my $inp="%r2"; my $out="%r4"; # length and out are swapped my $len="%r3"; my $key="%r5"; my $ivp="%r6"; $code.=<<___; .globl AES_cbc_encrypt .type AES_cbc_encrypt,\@function .align 16 AES_cbc_encrypt: xgr %r3,%r4 # flip %r3 and %r4, out and len xgr %r4,%r3 xgr %r3,%r4 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); lhi %r0,16 cl %r0,240($key) jh .Lcbc_software lg %r0,0($ivp) # copy ivec lg %r1,8($ivp) stmg %r0,%r1,16($sp) lmg %r0,%r1,0($key) # copy key, cover 256 bit stmg %r0,%r1,32($sp) lmg %r0,%r1,16($key) stmg %r0,%r1,48($sp) l %r0,240($key) # load kmc code lghi $key,15 # res=len%16, len-=res; ngr $key,$len sl${g}r $len,$key la %r1,16($sp) # parameter block - ivec || key jz .Lkmc_truncated .long 0xb92f0042 # kmc %r4,%r2 brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" ltr $key,$key jnz .Lkmc_truncated .Lkmc_done: lmg %r0,%r1,16($sp) # copy ivec to caller stg %r0,0($ivp) stg %r1,8($ivp) br $ra .align 16 .Lkmc_truncated: ahi $key,-1 # it's the way it's encoded in mvc tmll %r0,0x80 jnz .Lkmc_truncated_dec lghi %r1,0 stg %r1,16*$SIZE_T($sp) stg %r1,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp) bras %r1,1f mvc 16*$SIZE_T(1,$sp),0($inp) 1: ex $key,0(%r1) la %r1,16($sp) # restore parameter block la $inp,16*$SIZE_T($sp) lghi $len,16 .long 0xb92f0042 # kmc %r4,%r2 j .Lkmc_done .align 16 .Lkmc_truncated_dec: st${g} $out,4*$SIZE_T($sp) la $out,16*$SIZE_T($sp) lghi $len,16 .long 0xb92f0042 # kmc %r4,%r2 l${g} $out,4*$SIZE_T($sp) bras %r1,2f mvc 0(1,$out),16*$SIZE_T($sp) 2: ex $key,0(%r1) j .Lkmc_done .align 16 .Lcbc_software: ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} $key,$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp) lhi %r0,0 cl %r0,`$stdframe+$SIZE_T-4`($sp) je .Lcbc_decrypt larl $tbl,AES_Te llgf $s0,0($ivp) llgf $s1,4($ivp) llgf $s2,8($ivp) llgf $s3,12($ivp) lghi $t0,16 sl${g}r $len,$t0 brc 4,.Lcbc_enc_tail # if borrow .Lcbc_enc_loop: stm${g} $inp,$out,2*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,0($inp) x $s1,4($inp) x $s2,8($inp) x $s3,12($inp) lgr %r4,$key bras $ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt lm${g} $inp,$key,2*$SIZE_T($sp) st $s0,0($out) st $s1,4($out) st $s2,8($out) st $s3,12($out) la $inp,16($inp) la $out,16($out) lghi $t0,16 lt${g}r $len,$len jz .Lcbc_enc_done sl${g}r $len,$t0 brc 4,.Lcbc_enc_tail # if borrow j .Lcbc_enc_loop .align 16 .Lcbc_enc_done: l${g} $ivp,6*$SIZE_T($sp) st $s0,0($ivp) st $s1,4($ivp) st $s2,8($ivp) st $s3,12($ivp) lm${g} %r7,$ra,7*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 .Lcbc_enc_tail: aghi $len,15 lghi $t0,0 stg $t0,16*$SIZE_T($sp) stg $t0,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp) bras $t1,3f mvc 16*$SIZE_T(1,$sp),0($inp) 3: ex $len,0($t1) lghi $len,0 la $inp,16*$SIZE_T($sp) j .Lcbc_enc_loop .align 16 .Lcbc_decrypt: larl $tbl,AES_Td lg $t0,0($ivp) lg $t1,8($ivp) stmg $t0,$t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp) .Lcbc_dec_loop: stm${g} $inp,$out,2*$SIZE_T($sp) llgf $s0,0($inp) llgf $s1,4($inp) llgf $s2,8($inp) llgf $s3,12($inp) lgr %r4,$key bras $ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt lm${g} $inp,$key,2*$SIZE_T($sp) sllg $s0,$s0,32 sllg $s2,$s2,32 lr $s0,$s1 lr $s2,$s3 lg $t0,0($inp) lg $t1,8($inp) xg $s0,16*$SIZE_T($sp) xg $s2,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp) lghi $s1,16 sl${g}r $len,$s1 brc 4,.Lcbc_dec_tail # if borrow brc 2,.Lcbc_dec_done # if zero stg $s0,0($out) stg $s2,8($out) stmg $t0,$t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp) la $inp,16($inp) la $out,16($out) j .Lcbc_dec_loop .Lcbc_dec_done: stg $s0,0($out) stg $s2,8($out) .Lcbc_dec_exit: lm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) stmg $t0,$t1,0($ivp) br $ra .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_tail: aghi $len,15 stg $s0,16*$SIZE_T($sp) stg $s2,16*$SIZE_T+8($sp) bras $s1,4f mvc 0(1,$out),16*$SIZE_T($sp) 4: ex $len,0($s1) j .Lcbc_dec_exit .size AES_cbc_encrypt,.-AES_cbc_encrypt ___ } ######################################################################## # void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, # size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, # const unsigned char *ivec) { my $inp="%r2"; my $out="%r4"; # blocks and out are swapped my $len="%r3"; my $key="%r5"; my $iv0="%r5"; my $ivp="%r6"; my $fp ="%r7"; $code.=<<___; .globl AES_ctr32_encrypt .type AES_ctr32_encrypt,\@function .align 16 AES_ctr32_encrypt: xgr %r3,%r4 # flip %r3 and %r4, $out and $len xgr %r4,%r3 xgr %r3,%r4 llgfr $len,$len # safe in ctr32 subroutine even in 64-bit case ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); l %r0,240($key) lhi %r1,16 clr %r0,%r1 jl .Lctr32_software stm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp) slgr $out,$inp la %r1,0($key) # %r1 is permanent copy of $key lg $iv0,0($ivp) # load ivec lg $ivp,8($ivp) # prepare and allocate stack frame at the top of 4K page # with 1K reserved for eventual signal handling lghi $s0,-1024-256-16# guarantee at least 256-bytes buffer lghi $s1,-4096 algr $s0,$sp lgr $fp,$sp ngr $s0,$s1 # align at page boundary slgr $fp,$s0 # total buffer size lgr $s2,$sp lghi $s1,1024+16 # sl[g]fi is extended-immediate facility slgr $fp,$s1 # deduct reservation to get usable buffer size # buffer size is at lest 256 and at most 3072+256-16 la $sp,1024($s0) # alloca srlg $fp,$fp,4 # convert bytes to blocks, minimum 16 st${g} $s2,0($sp) # back-chain st${g} $fp,$SIZE_T($sp) slgr $len,$fp brc 1,.Lctr32_hw_switch # not zero, no borrow algr $fp,$len # input is shorter than allocated buffer lghi $len,0 st${g} $fp,$SIZE_T($sp) .Lctr32_hw_switch: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly && 0);# kmctr code was measured to be ~12% slower llgfr $s0,%r0 lgr $s1,%r1 larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P llihh %r0,0x8000 # check if kmctr supports the function code srlg %r0,%r0,0($s0) ng %r0,64(%r1) # check kmctr capability vector lgr %r0,$s0 lgr %r1,$s1 jz .Lctr32_km_loop ####### kmctr code algr $out,$inp # restore $out lgr $s1,$len # $s1 undertakes $len j .Lctr32_kmctr_loop .align 16 .Lctr32_kmctr_loop: la $s2,16($sp) lgr $s3,$fp .Lctr32_kmctr_prepare: stg $iv0,0($s2) stg $ivp,8($s2) la $s2,16($s2) ahi $ivp,1 # 32-bit increment, preserves upper half brct $s3,.Lctr32_kmctr_prepare #la $inp,0($inp) # inp sllg $len,$fp,4 # len #la $out,0($out) # out la $s2,16($sp) # iv .long 0xb92da042 # kmctr $out,$s2,$inp brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" slgr $s1,$fp brc 1,.Lctr32_kmctr_loop # not zero, no borrow algr $fp,$s1 lghi $s1,0 brc 4+1,.Lctr32_kmctr_loop # not zero l${g} $sp,0($sp) lm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); .Lctr32_km_loop: la $s2,16($sp) lgr $s3,$fp .Lctr32_km_prepare: stg $iv0,0($s2) stg $ivp,8($s2) la $s2,16($s2) ahi $ivp,1 # 32-bit increment, preserves upper half brct $s3,.Lctr32_km_prepare la $s0,16($sp) # inp sllg $s1,$fp,4 # len la $s2,16($sp) # out .long 0xb92e00a8 # km %r10,%r8 brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" la $s2,16($sp) lgr $s3,$fp slgr $s2,$inp .Lctr32_km_xor: lg $s0,0($inp) lg $s1,8($inp) xg $s0,0($s2,$inp) xg $s1,8($s2,$inp) stg $s0,0($out,$inp) stg $s1,8($out,$inp) la $inp,16($inp) brct $s3,.Lctr32_km_xor slgr $len,$fp brc 1,.Lctr32_km_loop # not zero, no borrow algr $fp,$len lghi $len,0 brc 4+1,.Lctr32_km_loop # not zero l${g} $s0,0($sp) l${g} $s1,$SIZE_T($sp) la $s2,16($sp) .Lctr32_km_zap: stg $s0,0($s2) stg $s0,8($s2) la $s2,16($s2) brct $s1,.Lctr32_km_zap la $sp,0($s0) lm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 .Lctr32_software: ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} $key,$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp) sl${g}r $inp,$out larl $tbl,AES_Te llgf $t1,12($ivp) .Lctr32_loop: stm${g} $inp,$out,2*$SIZE_T($sp) llgf $s0,0($ivp) llgf $s1,4($ivp) llgf $s2,8($ivp) lgr $s3,$t1 st $t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp) lgr %r4,$key bras $ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt lm${g} $inp,$ivp,2*$SIZE_T($sp) llgf $t1,16*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,0($inp,$out) x $s1,4($inp,$out) x $s2,8($inp,$out) x $s3,12($inp,$out) stm $s0,$s3,0($out) la $out,16($out) ahi $t1,1 # 32-bit increment brct $len,.Lctr32_loop lm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .size AES_ctr32_encrypt,.-AES_ctr32_encrypt ___ } ######################################################################## # void AES_xts_encrypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len, # const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, # const unsigned char iv[16]); # { my $inp="%r2"; my $out="%r4"; # len and out are swapped my $len="%r3"; my $key1="%r5"; # $i1 my $key2="%r6"; # $i2 my $fp="%r7"; # $i3 my $tweak=16*$SIZE_T+16; # or $stdframe-16, bottom of the frame... $code.=<<___; .type _s390x_xts_km,\@function .align 16 _s390x_xts_km: ___ $code.=<<___ if(1); llgfr $s0,%r0 # put aside the function code lghi $s1,0x7f nr $s1,%r0 larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P llihh %r0,0x8000 srlg %r0,%r0,32($s1) # check for 32+function code ng %r0,32(%r1) # check km capability vector lgr %r0,$s0 # restore the function code la %r1,0($key1) # restore $key1 jz .Lxts_km_vanilla lmg $i2,$i3,$tweak($sp) # put aside the tweak value algr $out,$inp oill %r0,32 # switch to xts function code aghi $s1,-18 # sllg $s1,$s1,3 # (function code - 18)*8, 0 or 16 la %r1,$tweak-16($sp) slgr %r1,$s1 # parameter block position lmg $s0,$s3,0($key1) # load 256 bits of key material, stmg $s0,$s3,0(%r1) # and copy it to parameter block. # yes, it contains junk and overlaps # with the tweak in 128-bit case. # it's done to avoid conditional # branch. stmg $i2,$i3,$tweak($sp) # "re-seat" the tweak value .long 0xb92e0042 # km %r4,%r2 brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" lrvg $s0,$tweak+0($sp) # load the last tweak lrvg $s1,$tweak+8($sp) stmg %r0,%r3,$tweak-32($sp) # wipe copy of the key nill %r0,0xffdf # switch back to original function code la %r1,0($key1) # restore pointer to $key1 slgr $out,$inp llgc $len,2*$SIZE_T-1($sp) nill $len,0x0f # $len%=16 br $ra .align 16 .Lxts_km_vanilla: ___ $code.=<<___; # prepare and allocate stack frame at the top of 4K page # with 1K reserved for eventual signal handling lghi $s0,-1024-256-16# guarantee at least 256-bytes buffer lghi $s1,-4096 algr $s0,$sp lgr $fp,$sp ngr $s0,$s1 # align at page boundary slgr $fp,$s0 # total buffer size lgr $s2,$sp lghi $s1,1024+16 # sl[g]fi is extended-immediate facility slgr $fp,$s1 # deduct reservation to get usable buffer size # buffer size is at lest 256 and at most 3072+256-16 la $sp,1024($s0) # alloca nill $fp,0xfff0 # round to 16*n st${g} $s2,0($sp) # back-chain nill $len,0xfff0 # redundant st${g} $fp,$SIZE_T($sp) slgr $len,$fp brc 1,.Lxts_km_go # not zero, no borrow algr $fp,$len # input is shorter than allocated buffer lghi $len,0 st${g} $fp,$SIZE_T($sp) .Lxts_km_go: lrvg $s0,$tweak+0($s2) # load the tweak value in little-endian lrvg $s1,$tweak+8($s2) la $s2,16($sp) # vector of ascending tweak values slgr $s2,$inp srlg $s3,$fp,4 j .Lxts_km_start .Lxts_km_loop: la $s2,16($sp) slgr $s2,$inp srlg $s3,$fp,4 .Lxts_km_prepare: lghi $i1,0x87 srag $i2,$s1,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr $i1,$i2 # rem algr $s0,$s0 alcgr $s1,$s1 xgr $s0,$i1 .Lxts_km_start: lrvgr $i1,$s0 # flip byte order lrvgr $i2,$s1 stg $i1,0($s2,$inp) stg $i2,8($s2,$inp) xg $i1,0($inp) xg $i2,8($inp) stg $i1,0($out,$inp) stg $i2,8($out,$inp) la $inp,16($inp) brct $s3,.Lxts_km_prepare slgr $inp,$fp # rewind $inp la $s2,0($out,$inp) lgr $s3,$fp .long 0xb92e00aa # km $s2,$s2 brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" la $s2,16($sp) slgr $s2,$inp srlg $s3,$fp,4 .Lxts_km_xor: lg $i1,0($out,$inp) lg $i2,8($out,$inp) xg $i1,0($s2,$inp) xg $i2,8($s2,$inp) stg $i1,0($out,$inp) stg $i2,8($out,$inp) la $inp,16($inp) brct $s3,.Lxts_km_xor slgr $len,$fp brc 1,.Lxts_km_loop # not zero, no borrow algr $fp,$len lghi $len,0 brc 4+1,.Lxts_km_loop # not zero l${g} $i1,0($sp) # back-chain llgf $fp,`2*$SIZE_T-4`($sp) # bytes used la $i2,16($sp) srlg $fp,$fp,4 .Lxts_km_zap: stg $i1,0($i2) stg $i1,8($i2) la $i2,16($i2) brct $fp,.Lxts_km_zap la $sp,0($i1) llgc $len,2*$SIZE_T-1($i1) nill $len,0x0f # $len%=16 bzr $ra # generate one more tweak... lghi $i1,0x87 srag $i2,$s1,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr $i1,$i2 # rem algr $s0,$s0 alcgr $s1,$s1 xgr $s0,$i1 ltr $len,$len # clear zero flag br $ra .size _s390x_xts_km,.-_s390x_xts_km .globl AES_xts_encrypt .type AES_xts_encrypt,\@function .align 16 AES_xts_encrypt: xgr %r3,%r4 # flip %r3 and %r4, $out and $len xgr %r4,%r3 xgr %r3,%r4 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); llgfr $len,$len ___ $code.=<<___; st${g} $len,1*$SIZE_T($sp) # save copy of $len srag $len,$len,4 # formally wrong, because it expands # sign byte, but who can afford asking # to process more than 2^63-1 bytes? # I use it, because it sets condition # code... bcr 8,$ra # abort if zero (i.e. less than 16) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); llgf %r0,240($key2) lhi %r1,16 clr %r0,%r1 jl .Lxts_enc_software st${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp) stm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp) sllg $len,$len,4 # $len&=~15 slgr $out,$inp # generate the tweak value l${g} $s3,$stdframe($sp) # pointer to iv la $s2,$tweak($sp) lmg $s0,$s1,0($s3) lghi $s3,16 stmg $s0,$s1,0($s2) la %r1,0($key2) # $key2 is not needed anymore .long 0xb92e00aa # km $s2,$s2, generate the tweak brc 1,.-4 # can this happen? l %r0,240($key1) la %r1,0($key1) # $key1 is not needed anymore bras $ra,_s390x_xts_km jz .Lxts_enc_km_done aghi $inp,-16 # take one step back la $i3,0($out,$inp) # put aside real $out .Lxts_enc_km_steal: llgc $i1,16($inp) llgc $i2,0($out,$inp) stc $i1,0($out,$inp) stc $i2,16($out,$inp) la $inp,1($inp) brct $len,.Lxts_enc_km_steal la $s2,0($i3) lghi $s3,16 lrvgr $i1,$s0 # flip byte order lrvgr $i2,$s1 xg $i1,0($s2) xg $i2,8($s2) stg $i1,0($s2) stg $i2,8($s2) .long 0xb92e00aa # km $s2,$s2 brc 1,.-4 # can this happen? lrvgr $i1,$s0 # flip byte order lrvgr $i2,$s1 xg $i1,0($i3) xg $i2,8($i3) stg $i1,0($i3) stg $i2,8($i3) .Lxts_enc_km_done: stg $sp,$tweak+0($sp) # wipe tweak stg $sp,$tweak+8($sp) l${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp) lm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 .Lxts_enc_software: ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) slgr $out,$inp l${g} $s3,$stdframe($sp) # ivp llgf $s0,0($s3) # load iv llgf $s1,4($s3) llgf $s2,8($s3) llgf $s3,12($s3) stm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp) la $key,0($key2) larl $tbl,AES_Te bras $ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt # generate the tweak lm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp) stm $s0,$s3,$tweak($sp) # save the tweak j .Lxts_enc_enter .align 16 .Lxts_enc_loop: lrvg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # load the tweak in little-endian lrvg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) lghi %r1,0x87 srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr %r1,%r0 # rem algr $s1,$s1 alcgr $s3,$s3 xgr $s1,%r1 lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order lrvgr $s3,$s3 srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits stg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # save the tweak llgfr $s1,$s1 srlg $s2,$s3,32 stg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) llgfr $s3,$s3 la $inp,16($inp) # $inp+=16 .Lxts_enc_enter: x $s0,0($inp) # ^=*($inp) x $s1,4($inp) x $s2,8($inp) x $s3,12($inp) stm${g} %r2,%r3,2*$SIZE_T($sp) # only two registers are changing la $key,0($key1) bras $ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt lm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,$tweak+0($sp) # ^=tweak x $s1,$tweak+4($sp) x $s2,$tweak+8($sp) x $s3,$tweak+12($sp) st $s0,0($out,$inp) st $s1,4($out,$inp) st $s2,8($out,$inp) st $s3,12($out,$inp) brct${g} $len,.Lxts_enc_loop llgc $len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp) nill $len,0x0f # $len%16 jz .Lxts_enc_done la $i3,0($inp,$out) # put aside real $out .Lxts_enc_steal: llgc %r0,16($inp) llgc %r1,0($out,$inp) stc %r0,0($out,$inp) stc %r1,16($out,$inp) la $inp,1($inp) brct $len,.Lxts_enc_steal la $out,0($i3) # restore real $out # generate last tweak... lrvg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # load the tweak in little-endian lrvg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) lghi %r1,0x87 srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr %r1,%r0 # rem algr $s1,$s1 alcgr $s3,$s3 xgr $s1,%r1 lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order lrvgr $s3,$s3 srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits stg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # save the tweak llgfr $s1,$s1 srlg $s2,$s3,32 stg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) llgfr $s3,$s3 x $s0,0($out) # ^=*(inp)|stolen cipther-text x $s1,4($out) x $s2,8($out) x $s3,12($out) st${g} $out,4*$SIZE_T($sp) la $key,0($key1) bras $ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt l${g} $out,4*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,`$tweak+0`($sp) # ^=tweak x $s1,`$tweak+4`($sp) x $s2,`$tweak+8`($sp) x $s3,`$tweak+12`($sp) st $s0,0($out) st $s1,4($out) st $s2,8($out) st $s3,12($out) .Lxts_enc_done: stg $sp,$tweak+0($sp) # wipe tweak stg $sp,$twesk+8($sp) lm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .size AES_xts_encrypt,.-AES_xts_encrypt ___ # void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len, # const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, # const unsigned char iv[16]); # $code.=<<___; .globl AES_xts_decrypt .type AES_xts_decrypt,\@function .align 16 AES_xts_decrypt: xgr %r3,%r4 # flip %r3 and %r4, $out and $len xgr %r4,%r3 xgr %r3,%r4 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); llgfr $len,$len ___ $code.=<<___; st${g} $len,1*$SIZE_T($sp) # save copy of $len aghi $len,-16 bcr 4,$ra # abort if less than zero. formally # wrong, because $len is unsigned, # but who can afford asking to # process more than 2^63-1 bytes? tmll $len,0x0f jnz .Lxts_dec_proceed aghi $len,16 .Lxts_dec_proceed: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly); llgf %r0,240($key2) lhi %r1,16 clr %r0,%r1 jl .Lxts_dec_software st${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp) stm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp) nill $len,0xfff0 # $len&=~15 slgr $out,$inp # generate the tweak value l${g} $s3,$stdframe($sp) # pointer to iv la $s2,$tweak($sp) lmg $s0,$s1,0($s3) lghi $s3,16 stmg $s0,$s1,0($s2) la %r1,0($key2) # $key2 is not needed past this point .long 0xb92e00aa # km $s2,$s2, generate the tweak brc 1,.-4 # can this happen? l %r0,240($key1) la %r1,0($key1) # $key1 is not needed anymore ltgr $len,$len jz .Lxts_dec_km_short bras $ra,_s390x_xts_km jz .Lxts_dec_km_done lrvgr $s2,$s0 # make copy in reverse byte order lrvgr $s3,$s1 j .Lxts_dec_km_2ndtweak .Lxts_dec_km_short: llgc $len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp) nill $len,0x0f # $len%=16 lrvg $s0,$tweak+0($sp) # load the tweak lrvg $s1,$tweak+8($sp) lrvgr $s2,$s0 # make copy in reverse byte order lrvgr $s3,$s1 .Lxts_dec_km_2ndtweak: lghi $i1,0x87 srag $i2,$s1,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr $i1,$i2 # rem algr $s0,$s0 alcgr $s1,$s1 xgr $s0,$i1 lrvgr $i1,$s0 # flip byte order lrvgr $i2,$s1 xg $i1,0($inp) xg $i2,8($inp) stg $i1,0($out,$inp) stg $i2,8($out,$inp) la $i2,0($out,$inp) lghi $i3,16 .long 0xb92e0066 # km $i2,$i2 brc 1,.-4 # can this happen? lrvgr $i1,$s0 lrvgr $i2,$s1 xg $i1,0($out,$inp) xg $i2,8($out,$inp) stg $i1,0($out,$inp) stg $i2,8($out,$inp) la $i3,0($out,$inp) # put aside real $out .Lxts_dec_km_steal: llgc $i1,16($inp) llgc $i2,0($out,$inp) stc $i1,0($out,$inp) stc $i2,16($out,$inp) la $inp,1($inp) brct $len,.Lxts_dec_km_steal lgr $s0,$s2 lgr $s1,$s3 xg $s0,0($i3) xg $s1,8($i3) stg $s0,0($i3) stg $s1,8($i3) la $s0,0($i3) lghi $s1,16 .long 0xb92e0088 # km $s0,$s0 brc 1,.-4 # can this happen? xg $s2,0($i3) xg $s3,8($i3) stg $s2,0($i3) stg $s3,8($i3) .Lxts_dec_km_done: stg $sp,$tweak+0($sp) # wipe tweak stg $sp,$tweak+8($sp) l${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp) lm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .align 16 .Lxts_dec_software: ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) srlg $len,$len,4 slgr $out,$inp l${g} $s3,$stdframe($sp) # ivp llgf $s0,0($s3) # load iv llgf $s1,4($s3) llgf $s2,8($s3) llgf $s3,12($s3) stm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp) la $key,0($key2) larl $tbl,AES_Te bras $ra,_s390x_AES_encrypt # generate the tweak lm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp) larl $tbl,AES_Td lt${g}r $len,$len stm $s0,$s3,$tweak($sp) # save the tweak jz .Lxts_dec_short j .Lxts_dec_enter .align 16 .Lxts_dec_loop: lrvg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # load the tweak in little-endian lrvg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) lghi %r1,0x87 srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr %r1,%r0 # rem algr $s1,$s1 alcgr $s3,$s3 xgr $s1,%r1 lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order lrvgr $s3,$s3 srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits stg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # save the tweak llgfr $s1,$s1 srlg $s2,$s3,32 stg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) llgfr $s3,$s3 .Lxts_dec_enter: x $s0,0($inp) # tweak^=*(inp) x $s1,4($inp) x $s2,8($inp) x $s3,12($inp) stm${g} %r2,%r3,2*$SIZE_T($sp) # only two registers are changing la $key,0($key1) bras $ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt lm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,$tweak+0($sp) # ^=tweak x $s1,$tweak+4($sp) x $s2,$tweak+8($sp) x $s3,$tweak+12($sp) st $s0,0($out,$inp) st $s1,4($out,$inp) st $s2,8($out,$inp) st $s3,12($out,$inp) la $inp,16($inp) brct${g} $len,.Lxts_dec_loop llgc $len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp) nill $len,0x0f # $len%16 jz .Lxts_dec_done # generate pair of tweaks... lrvg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # load the tweak in little-endian lrvg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) lghi %r1,0x87 srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr %r1,%r0 # rem algr $s1,$s1 alcgr $s3,$s3 xgr $s1,%r1 lrvgr $i2,$s1 # flip byte order lrvgr $i3,$s3 stmg $i2,$i3,$tweak($sp) # save the 1st tweak j .Lxts_dec_2ndtweak .align 16 .Lxts_dec_short: llgc $len,`2*$SIZE_T-1`($sp) nill $len,0x0f # $len%16 lrvg $s1,$tweak+0($sp) # load the tweak in little-endian lrvg $s3,$tweak+8($sp) .Lxts_dec_2ndtweak: lghi %r1,0x87 srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit ngr %r1,%r0 # rem algr $s1,$s1 alcgr $s3,$s3 xgr $s1,%r1 lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order lrvgr $s3,$s3 srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits stg $s1,$tweak-16+0($sp) # save the 2nd tweak llgfr $s1,$s1 srlg $s2,$s3,32 stg $s3,$tweak-16+8($sp) llgfr $s3,$s3 x $s0,0($inp) # tweak_the_2nd^=*(inp) x $s1,4($inp) x $s2,8($inp) x $s3,12($inp) stm${g} %r2,%r3,2*$SIZE_T($sp) la $key,0($key1) bras $ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt lm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,$tweak-16+0($sp) # ^=tweak_the_2nd x $s1,$tweak-16+4($sp) x $s2,$tweak-16+8($sp) x $s3,$tweak-16+12($sp) st $s0,0($out,$inp) st $s1,4($out,$inp) st $s2,8($out,$inp) st $s3,12($out,$inp) la $i3,0($out,$inp) # put aside real $out .Lxts_dec_steal: llgc %r0,16($inp) llgc %r1,0($out,$inp) stc %r0,0($out,$inp) stc %r1,16($out,$inp) la $inp,1($inp) brct $len,.Lxts_dec_steal la $out,0($i3) # restore real $out lm $s0,$s3,$tweak($sp) # load the 1st tweak x $s0,0($out) # tweak^=*(inp)|stolen cipher-text x $s1,4($out) x $s2,8($out) x $s3,12($out) st${g} $out,4*$SIZE_T($sp) la $key,0($key1) bras $ra,_s390x_AES_decrypt l${g} $out,4*$SIZE_T($sp) x $s0,$tweak+0($sp) # ^=tweak x $s1,$tweak+4($sp) x $s2,$tweak+8($sp) x $s3,$tweak+12($sp) st $s0,0($out) st $s1,4($out) st $s2,8($out) st $s3,12($out) stg $sp,$tweak-16+0($sp) # wipe 2nd tweak stg $sp,$tweak-16+8($sp) .Lxts_dec_done: stg $sp,$tweak+0($sp) # wipe tweak stg $sp,$twesk+8($sp) lm${g} %r6,$ra,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $ra .size AES_xts_decrypt,.-AES_xts_decrypt ___ } $code.=<<___; .string "AES for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; # force flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000037154313176625656017337 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In # OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as # drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl [see below for # details]. # # Performance. # # Given aes(enc|dec) instructions' latency asymptotic performance for # non-parallelizable modes such as CBC encrypt is 3.75 cycles per byte # processed with 128-bit key. And given their throughput asymptotic # performance for parallelizable modes is 1.25 cycles per byte. Being # asymptotic limit it's not something you commonly achieve in reality, # but how close does one get? Below are results collected for # different modes and block sized. Pairs of numbers are for en-/ # decryption. # # 16-byte 64-byte 256-byte 1-KB 8-KB # ECB 4.25/4.25 1.38/1.38 1.28/1.28 1.26/1.26 1.26/1.26 # CTR 5.42/5.42 1.92/1.92 1.44/1.44 1.28/1.28 1.26/1.26 # CBC 4.38/4.43 4.15/1.43 4.07/1.32 4.07/1.29 4.06/1.28 # CCM 5.66/9.42 4.42/5.41 4.16/4.40 4.09/4.15 4.06/4.07 # OFB 5.42/5.42 4.64/4.64 4.44/4.44 4.39/4.39 4.38/4.38 # CFB 5.73/5.85 5.56/5.62 5.48/5.56 5.47/5.55 5.47/5.55 # # ECB, CTR, CBC and CCM results are free from EVP overhead. This means # that otherwise used 'openssl speed -evp aes-128-??? -engine aesni # [-decrypt]' will exhibit 10-15% worse results for smaller blocks. # The results were collected with specially crafted speed.c benchmark # in order to compare them with results reported in "Intel Advanced # Encryption Standard (AES) New Instruction Set" White Paper Revision # 3.0 dated May 2010. All above results are consistently better. This # module also provides better performance for block sizes smaller than # 128 bytes in points *not* represented in the above table. # # Looking at the results for 8-KB buffer. # # CFB and OFB results are far from the limit, because implementation # uses "generic" CRYPTO_[c|o]fb128_encrypt interfaces relying on # single-block aesni_encrypt, which is not the most optimal way to go. # CBC encrypt result is unexpectedly high and there is no documented # explanation for it. Seemingly there is a small penalty for feeding # the result back to AES unit the way it's done in CBC mode. There is # nothing one can do and the result appears optimal. CCM result is # identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without # saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly # interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over # "straghtforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed # disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical # limit. # # Looking at how results vary with buffer size. # # Curves are practically saturated at 1-KB buffer size. In most cases # "256-byte" performance is >95%, and "64-byte" is ~90% of "8-KB" one. # CTR curve doesn't follow this pattern and is "slowest" changing one # with "256-byte" result being 87% of "8-KB." This is because overhead # in CTR mode is most computationally intensive. Small-block CCM # decrypt is slower than encrypt, because first CTR and last CBC-MAC # iterations can't be interleaved. # # Results for 192- and 256-bit keys. # # EVP-free results were observed to scale perfectly with number of # rounds for larger block sizes, i.e. 192-bit result being 10/12 times # lower and 256-bit one - 10/14. Well, in CBC encrypt case differences # are a tad smaller, because the above mentioned penalty biases all # results by same constant value. In similar way function call # overhead affects small-block performance, as well as OFB and CFB # results. Differences are not large, most common coefficients are # 10/11.7 and 10/13.4 (as opposite to 10/12.0 and 10/14.0), but one # observe even 10/11.2 and 10/12.4 (CTR, OFB, CFB)... # January 2011 # # While Westmere processor features 6 cycles latency for aes[enc|dec] # instructions, which can be scheduled every second cycle, Sandy # Bridge spends 8 cycles per instruction, but it can schedule them # every cycle. This means that code targeting Westmere would perform # suboptimally on Sandy Bridge. Therefore this update. # # In addition, non-parallelizable CBC encrypt (as well as CCM) is # optimized. Relative improvement might appear modest, 8% on Westmere, # but in absolute terms it's 3.77 cycles per byte encrypted with # 128-bit key on Westmere, and 5.07 - on Sandy Bridge. These numbers # should be compared to asymptotic limits of 3.75 for Westmere and # 5.00 for Sandy Bridge. Actually, the fact that they get this close # to asymptotic limits is quite amazing. Indeed, the limit is # calculated as latency times number of rounds, 10 for 128-bit key, # and divided by 16, the number of bytes in block, or in other words # it accounts *solely* for aesenc instructions. But there are extra # instructions, and numbers so close to the asymptotic limits mean # that it's as if it takes as little as *one* additional cycle to # execute all of them. How is it possible? It is possible thanks to # out-of-order execution logic, which manages to overlap post- # processing of previous block, things like saving the output, with # actual encryption of current block, as well as pre-processing of # current block, things like fetching input and xor-ing it with # 0-round element of the key schedule, with actual encryption of # previous block. Keep this in mind... # # For parallelizable modes, such as ECB, CBC decrypt, CTR, higher # performance is achieved by interleaving instructions working on # independent blocks. In which case asymptotic limit for such modes # can be obtained by dividing above mentioned numbers by AES # instructions' interleave factor. Westmere can execute at most 3 # instructions at a time, meaning that optimal interleave factor is 3, # and that's where the "magic" number of 1.25 come from. "Optimal # interleave factor" means that increase of interleave factor does # not improve performance. The formula has proven to reflect reality # pretty well on Westmere... Sandy Bridge on the other hand can # execute up to 8 AES instructions at a time, so how does varying # interleave factor affect the performance? Here is table for ECB # (numbers are cycles per byte processed with 128-bit key): # # instruction interleave factor 3x 6x 8x # theoretical asymptotic limit 1.67 0.83 0.625 # measured performance for 8KB block 1.05 0.86 0.84 # # "as if" interleave factor 4.7x 5.8x 6.0x # # Further data for other parallelizable modes: # # CBC decrypt 1.16 0.93 0.74 # CTR 1.14 0.91 0.74 # # Well, given 3x column it's probably inappropriate to call the limit # asymptotic, if it can be surpassed, isn't it? What happens there? # Rewind to CBC paragraph for the answer. Yes, out-of-order execution # magic is responsible for this. Processor overlaps not only the # additional instructions with AES ones, but even AES instuctions # processing adjacent triplets of independent blocks. In the 6x case # additional instructions still claim disproportionally small amount # of additional cycles, but in 8x case number of instructions must be # a tad too high for out-of-order logic to cope with, and AES unit # remains underutilized... As you can see 8x interleave is hardly # justifiable, so there no need to feel bad that 32-bit aesni-x86.pl # utilizies 6x interleave because of limited register bank capacity. # # Higher interleave factors do have negative impact on Westmere # performance. While for ECB mode it's negligible ~1.5%, other # parallelizables perform ~5% worse, which is outweighed by ~25% # improvement on Sandy Bridge. To balance regression on Westmere # CTR mode was implemented with 6x aesenc interleave factor. # April 2011 # # Add aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt. Westmere spends 1.25 cycles processing # one byte out of 8KB with 128-bit key, Sandy Bridge - 0.90. Just like # in CTR mode AES instruction interleave factor was chosen to be 6x. # November 2015 # # Add aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt. AES instruction interleave factor was # chosen to be 6x. ###################################################################### # Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with # 128-bit key (less is better). # # CBC en-/decrypt CTR XTS ECB OCB # Westmere 3.77/1.25 1.25 1.25 1.26 # * Bridge 5.07/0.74 0.75 0.90 0.85 0.98 # Haswell 4.44/0.63 0.63 0.73 0.63 0.70 # Skylake 2.62/0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 # Silvermont 5.75/3.54 3.56 4.12 3.87(*) 4.11 # Goldmont 3.82/1.26 1.26 1.29 1.29 1.50 # Bulldozer 5.77/0.70 0.72 0.90 0.70 0.95 # # (*) Atom Silvermont ECB result is suboptimal because of penalties # incurred by operations on %xmm8-15. As ECB is not considered # critical, nothing was done to mitigate the problem. $PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script # generates drop-in replacement for # crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl:-) $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; $movkey = $PREFIX eq "aesni" ? "movups" : "movups"; @_4args=$win64? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") : # Win64 order ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); # Unix order $code=".text\n"; $code.=".extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P\n"; $rounds="%eax"; # input to and changed by aesni_[en|de]cryptN !!! # this is natural Unix argument order for public $PREFIX_[ecb|cbc]_encrypt ... $inp="%rdi"; $out="%rsi"; $len="%rdx"; $key="%rcx"; # input to and changed by aesni_[en|de]cryptN !!! $ivp="%r8"; # cbc, ctr, ... $rnds_="%r10d"; # backup copy for $rounds $key_="%r11"; # backup copy for $key # %xmm register layout $rndkey0="%xmm0"; $rndkey1="%xmm1"; $inout0="%xmm2"; $inout1="%xmm3"; $inout2="%xmm4"; $inout3="%xmm5"; $inout4="%xmm6"; $inout5="%xmm7"; $inout6="%xmm8"; $inout7="%xmm9"; $in2="%xmm6"; $in1="%xmm7"; # used in CBC decrypt, CTR, ... $in0="%xmm8"; $iv="%xmm9"; # Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1. # # Why folded loop? Because aes[enc|dec] is slow enough to accommodate # cycles which take care of loop variables... { my $sn; sub aesni_generate1 { my ($p,$key,$rounds,$inout,$ivec)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout)); ++$sn; $code.=<<___; $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 $movkey 16($key),$rndkey1 ___ $code.=<<___ if (defined($ivec)); xorps $rndkey0,$ivec lea 32($key),$key xorps $ivec,$inout ___ $code.=<<___ if (!defined($ivec)); lea 32($key),$key xorps $rndkey0,$inout ___ $code.=<<___; .Loop_${p}1_$sn: aes${p} $rndkey1,$inout dec $rounds $movkey ($key),$rndkey1 lea 16($key),$key jnz .Loop_${p}1_$sn # loop body is 16 bytes aes${p}last $rndkey1,$inout ___ }} # void $PREFIX_[en|de]crypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key); # { my ($inp,$out,$key) = @_4args; $code.=<<___; .globl ${PREFIX}_encrypt .type ${PREFIX}_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ${PREFIX}_encrypt: movups ($inp),$inout0 # load input mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 movups $inout0,($out) # output pxor $inout0,$inout0 ret .size ${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt .globl ${PREFIX}_decrypt .type ${PREFIX}_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ${PREFIX}_decrypt: movups ($inp),$inout0 # load input mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds ___ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 movups $inout0,($out) # output pxor $inout0,$inout0 ret .size ${PREFIX}_decrypt, .-${PREFIX}_decrypt ___ } # _aesni_[en|de]cryptN are private interfaces, N denotes interleave # factor. Why 3x subroutine were originally used in loops? Even though # aes[enc|dec] latency was originally 6, it could be scheduled only # every *2nd* cycle. Thus 3x interleave was the one providing optimal # utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as # of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3]. # This is why it originally made no sense to implement 2x subroutine. # But times change and it became appropriate to spend extra 192 bytes # on 2x subroutine on Atom Silvermont account. For processors that # can schedule aes[enc|dec] every cycle optimal interleave factor # equals to corresponding instructions latency. 8x is optimal for # * Bridge and "super-optimal" for other Intel CPUs... sub aesni_generate2 { my $dir=shift; # As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not* # preserved. $inout[0-1] is cipher/clear text... $code.=<<___; .type _aesni_${dir}rypt2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _aesni_${dir}rypt2: $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 shl \$4,$rounds $movkey 16($key),$rndkey1 xorps $rndkey0,$inout0 xorps $rndkey0,$inout1 $movkey 32($key),$rndkey0 lea 32($key,$rounds),$key neg %rax # $rounds add \$16,%rax .L${dir}_loop2: aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout1 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .L${dir}_loop2 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout1 ret .size _aesni_${dir}rypt2,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt2 ___ } sub aesni_generate3 { my $dir=shift; # As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not* # preserved. $inout[0-2] is cipher/clear text... $code.=<<___; .type _aesni_${dir}rypt3,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _aesni_${dir}rypt3: $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 shl \$4,$rounds $movkey 16($key),$rndkey1 xorps $rndkey0,$inout0 xorps $rndkey0,$inout1 xorps $rndkey0,$inout2 $movkey 32($key),$rndkey0 lea 32($key,$rounds),$key neg %rax # $rounds add \$16,%rax .L${dir}_loop3: aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout2 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .L${dir}_loop3 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout2 ret .size _aesni_${dir}rypt3,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt3 ___ } # 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance, # most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one # should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement would be <20%, # so it's not worth it... sub aesni_generate4 { my $dir=shift; # As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not* # preserved. $inout[0-3] is cipher/clear text... $code.=<<___; .type _aesni_${dir}rypt4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _aesni_${dir}rypt4: $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 shl \$4,$rounds $movkey 16($key),$rndkey1 xorps $rndkey0,$inout0 xorps $rndkey0,$inout1 xorps $rndkey0,$inout2 xorps $rndkey0,$inout3 $movkey 32($key),$rndkey0 lea 32($key,$rounds),$key neg %rax # $rounds .byte 0x0f,0x1f,0x00 add \$16,%rax .L${dir}_loop4: aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout3 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .L${dir}_loop4 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout2 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout3 ret .size _aesni_${dir}rypt4,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt4 ___ } sub aesni_generate6 { my $dir=shift; # As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not* # preserved. $inout[0-5] is cipher/clear text... $code.=<<___; .type _aesni_${dir}rypt6,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _aesni_${dir}rypt6: $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 shl \$4,$rounds $movkey 16($key),$rndkey1 xorps $rndkey0,$inout0 pxor $rndkey0,$inout1 pxor $rndkey0,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 lea 32($key,$rounds),$key neg %rax # $rounds aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 pxor $rndkey0,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0,$inout4 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 pxor $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey0 add \$16,%rax jmp .L${dir}_loop6_enter .align 16 .L${dir}_loop6: aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 .L${dir}_loop6_enter: aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout3 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout4 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .L${dir}_loop6 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout5 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout2 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout3 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout4 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout5 ret .size _aesni_${dir}rypt6,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt6 ___ } sub aesni_generate8 { my $dir=shift; # As already mentioned it takes in $key and $rounds, which are *not* # preserved. $inout[0-7] is cipher/clear text... $code.=<<___; .type _aesni_${dir}rypt8,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _aesni_${dir}rypt8: $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 shl \$4,$rounds $movkey 16($key),$rndkey1 xorps $rndkey0,$inout0 xorps $rndkey0,$inout1 pxor $rndkey0,$inout2 pxor $rndkey0,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0,$inout4 lea 32($key,$rounds),$key neg %rax # $rounds aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 pxor $rndkey0,$inout5 pxor $rndkey0,$inout6 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 pxor $rndkey0,$inout7 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey0 add \$16,%rax jmp .L${dir}_loop8_inner .align 16 .L${dir}_loop8: aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 .L${dir}_loop8_inner: aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout5 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout6 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout7 .L${dir}_loop8_enter: $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout3 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout4 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout5 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout6 aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout7 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .L${dir}_loop8 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout5 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout6 aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout7 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout0 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout1 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout2 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout3 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout4 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout5 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout6 aes${dir}last $rndkey0,$inout7 ret .size _aesni_${dir}rypt8,.-_aesni_${dir}rypt8 ___ } &aesni_generate2("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate2("dec"); &aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate3("dec"); &aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate4("dec"); &aesni_generate6("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate6("dec"); &aesni_generate8("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); &aesni_generate8("dec"); if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { ######################################################################## # void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # int enc); $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_ecb_encrypt .type aesni_ecb_encrypt,\@function,5 .align 16 aesni_ecb_encrypt: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) # offload $inout4..7 movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) .Lecb_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; and \$-16,$len # if ($len<16) jz .Lecb_ret # return mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 mov $key,$key_ # backup $key mov $rounds,$rnds_ # backup $rounds test %r8d,%r8d # 5th argument jz .Lecb_decrypt #--------------------------- ECB ENCRYPT ------------------------------# cmp \$0x80,$len # if ($len<8*16) jb .Lecb_enc_tail # short input movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1 movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2 movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3 movdqu 0x40($inp),$inout4 movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5 movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6 movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16 sub \$0x80,$len # $len-=8*16 (can be zero) jmp .Lecb_enc_loop8_enter .align 16 .Lecb_enc_loop8: movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks mov $key_,$key # restore $key movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds movups $inout1,0x10($out) movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) movdqu 0x40($inp),$inout4 movups $inout5,0x50($out) movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5 movups $inout6,0x60($out) movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6 movups $inout7,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16 movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16 .Lecb_enc_loop8_enter: call _aesni_encrypt8 sub \$0x80,$len jnc .Lecb_enc_loop8 # loop if $len-=8*16 didn't borrow movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks mov $key_,$key # restore $key movups $inout1,0x10($out) mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds movups $inout2,0x20($out) movups $inout3,0x30($out) movups $inout4,0x40($out) movups $inout5,0x50($out) movups $inout6,0x60($out) movups $inout7,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16 add \$0x80,$len # restore real remaining $len jz .Lecb_ret # done if ($len==0) .Lecb_enc_tail: # $len is less than 8*16 movups ($inp),$inout0 cmp \$0x20,$len jb .Lecb_enc_one movups 0x10($inp),$inout1 je .Lecb_enc_two movups 0x20($inp),$inout2 cmp \$0x40,$len jb .Lecb_enc_three movups 0x30($inp),$inout3 je .Lecb_enc_four movups 0x40($inp),$inout4 cmp \$0x60,$len jb .Lecb_enc_five movups 0x50($inp),$inout5 je .Lecb_enc_six movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6 xorps $inout7,$inout7 call _aesni_encrypt8 movups $inout0,($out) # store 7 output blocks movups $inout1,0x10($out) movups $inout2,0x20($out) movups $inout3,0x30($out) movups $inout4,0x40($out) movups $inout5,0x50($out) movups $inout6,0x60($out) jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_enc_one: ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_enc_two: call _aesni_encrypt2 movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks movups $inout1,0x10($out) jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_enc_three: call _aesni_encrypt3 movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks movups $inout1,0x10($out) movups $inout2,0x20($out) jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_enc_four: call _aesni_encrypt4 movups $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks movups $inout1,0x10($out) movups $inout2,0x20($out) movups $inout3,0x30($out) jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_enc_five: xorps $inout5,$inout5 call _aesni_encrypt6 movups $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks movups $inout1,0x10($out) movups $inout2,0x20($out) movups $inout3,0x30($out) movups $inout4,0x40($out) jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_enc_six: call _aesni_encrypt6 movups $inout0,($out) # store 6 output blocks movups $inout1,0x10($out) movups $inout2,0x20($out) movups $inout3,0x30($out) movups $inout4,0x40($out) movups $inout5,0x50($out) jmp .Lecb_ret #--------------------------- ECB DECRYPT ------------------------------# .align 16 .Lecb_decrypt: cmp \$0x80,$len # if ($len<8*16) jb .Lecb_dec_tail # short input movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1 movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2 movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3 movdqu 0x40($inp),$inout4 movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5 movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6 movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16 sub \$0x80,$len # $len-=8*16 (can be zero) jmp .Lecb_dec_loop8_enter .align 16 .Lecb_dec_loop8: movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks mov $key_,$key # restore $key movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds movups $inout1,0x10($out) movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) movdqu 0x40($inp),$inout4 movups $inout5,0x50($out) movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5 movups $inout6,0x60($out) movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6 movups $inout7,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16 movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16 .Lecb_dec_loop8_enter: call _aesni_decrypt8 $movkey ($key_),$rndkey0 sub \$0x80,$len jnc .Lecb_dec_loop8 # loop if $len-=8*16 didn't borrow movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank mov $key_,$key # restore $key movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds movups $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) pxor $inout4,$inout4 movups $inout5,0x50($out) pxor $inout5,$inout5 movups $inout6,0x60($out) pxor $inout6,$inout6 movups $inout7,0x70($out) pxor $inout7,$inout7 lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16 add \$0x80,$len # restore real remaining $len jz .Lecb_ret # done if ($len==0) .Lecb_dec_tail: movups ($inp),$inout0 cmp \$0x20,$len jb .Lecb_dec_one movups 0x10($inp),$inout1 je .Lecb_dec_two movups 0x20($inp),$inout2 cmp \$0x40,$len jb .Lecb_dec_three movups 0x30($inp),$inout3 je .Lecb_dec_four movups 0x40($inp),$inout4 cmp \$0x60,$len jb .Lecb_dec_five movups 0x50($inp),$inout5 je .Lecb_dec_six movups 0x60($inp),$inout6 $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 xorps $inout7,$inout7 call _aesni_decrypt8 movups $inout0,($out) # store 7 output blocks pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) pxor $inout4,$inout4 movups $inout5,0x50($out) pxor $inout5,$inout5 movups $inout6,0x60($out) pxor $inout6,$inout6 pxor $inout7,$inout7 jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_dec_one: ___ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_dec_two: call _aesni_decrypt2 movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_dec_three: call _aesni_decrypt3 movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_dec_four: call _aesni_decrypt4 movups $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_dec_five: xorps $inout5,$inout5 call _aesni_decrypt6 movups $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) pxor $inout4,$inout4 pxor $inout5,$inout5 jmp .Lecb_ret .align 16 .Lecb_dec_six: call _aesni_decrypt6 movups $inout0,($out) # store 6 output blocks pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) pxor $inout4,$inout4 movups $inout5,0x50($out) pxor $inout5,$inout5 .Lecb_ret: xorps $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # %xmm0 pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,(%rsp) # clear stack movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) lea 0x58(%rsp),%rsp .Lecb_enc_ret: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size aesni_ecb_encrypt,.-aesni_ecb_encrypt ___ { ###################################################################### # void aesni_ccm64_[en|de]crypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out, # size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, # const char *ivec,char *cmac); # # Handles only complete blocks, operates on 64-bit counter and # does not update *ivec! Nor does it finalize CMAC value # (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details) # { my $cmac="%r9"; # 6th argument my $increment="%xmm9"; my $iv="%xmm6"; my $bswap_mask="%xmm7"; $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks .type aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks,\@function,6 .align 16 aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) # $iv movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) # $bswap_mask movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) # $in0 movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) # $increment .Lccm64_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds movdqu ($ivp),$iv movdqa .Lincrement64(%rip),$increment movdqa .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$bswap_mask shl \$4,$rounds mov \$16,$rnds_ lea 0($key),$key_ movdqu ($cmac),$inout1 movdqa $iv,$inout0 lea 32($key,$rounds),$key # end of key schedule pshufb $bswap_mask,$iv sub %rax,%r10 # twisted $rounds jmp .Lccm64_enc_outer .align 16 .Lccm64_enc_outer: $movkey ($key_),$rndkey0 mov %r10,%rax movups ($inp),$in0 # load inp xorps $rndkey0,$inout0 # counter $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 xorps $in0,$rndkey0 xorps $rndkey0,$inout1 # cmac^=inp $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 .Lccm64_enc2_loop: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Lccm64_enc2_loop aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 paddq $increment,$iv dec $len # $len-- ($len is in blocks) aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout1 lea 16($inp),$inp xorps $inout0,$in0 # inp ^= E(iv) movdqa $iv,$inout0 movups $in0,($out) # save output pshufb $bswap_mask,$inout0 lea 16($out),$out # $out+=16 jnz .Lccm64_enc_outer # loop if ($len!=0) pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 pxor $inout0,$inout0 movups $inout1,($cmac) # store resulting mac pxor $inout1,$inout1 pxor $in0,$in0 pxor $iv,$iv ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,(%rsp) # clear stack movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) lea 0x58(%rsp),%rsp .Lccm64_enc_ret: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks ___ ###################################################################### $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks .type aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks,\@function,6 .align 16 aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) # $iv movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) # $bswap_mask movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) # $in8 movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) # $increment .Lccm64_dec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds movups ($ivp),$iv movdqu ($cmac),$inout1 movdqa .Lincrement64(%rip),$increment movdqa .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$bswap_mask movaps $iv,$inout0 mov $rounds,$rnds_ mov $key,$key_ pshufb $bswap_mask,$iv ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; shl \$4,$rnds_ mov \$16,$rounds movups ($inp),$in0 # load inp paddq $increment,$iv lea 16($inp),$inp # $inp+=16 sub %r10,%rax # twisted $rounds lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key # end of key schedule mov %rax,%r10 jmp .Lccm64_dec_outer .align 16 .Lccm64_dec_outer: xorps $inout0,$in0 # inp ^= E(iv) movdqa $iv,$inout0 movups $in0,($out) # save output lea 16($out),$out # $out+=16 pshufb $bswap_mask,$inout0 sub \$1,$len # $len-- ($len is in blocks) jz .Lccm64_dec_break # if ($len==0) break $movkey ($key_),$rndkey0 mov %r10,%rax $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 xorps $rndkey0,$in0 xorps $rndkey0,$inout0 xorps $in0,$inout1 # cmac^=out $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 jmp .Lccm64_dec2_loop .align 16 .Lccm64_dec2_loop: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Lccm64_dec2_loop movups ($inp),$in0 # load input paddq $increment,$iv aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout1 lea 16($inp),$inp # $inp+=16 jmp .Lccm64_dec_outer .align 16 .Lccm64_dec_break: #xorps $in0,$inout1 # cmac^=out mov 240($key_),$rounds ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key_,$rounds,$inout1,$in0); $code.=<<___; pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 pxor $inout0,$inout0 movups $inout1,($cmac) # store resulting mac pxor $inout1,$inout1 pxor $in0,$in0 pxor $iv,$iv ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,(%rsp) # clear stack movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) lea 0x58(%rsp),%rsp .Lccm64_dec_ret: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks ___ } ###################################################################### # void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out, # size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, # const char *ivec); # # Handles only complete blocks, operates on 32-bit counter and # does not update *ivec! (see crypto/modes/ctr128.c for details) # # Overhaul based on suggestions from Shay Gueron and Vlad Krasnov, # http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3021&user=guest&pass=guest. # Keywords are full unroll and modulo-schedule counter calculations # with zero-round key xor. { my ($in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$in4,$in5)=map("%xmm$_",(10..15)); my ($key0,$ctr)=("${key_}d","${ivp}d"); my $frame_size = 0x80 + ($win64?160:0); $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .type aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,\@function,5 .align 16 aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks: cmp \$1,$len jne .Lctr32_bulk # handle single block without allocating stack frame, # useful when handling edges movups ($ivp),$inout0 movups ($inp),$inout1 mov 240($key),%edx # key->rounds ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,"%edx"); $code.=<<___; pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 xorps $inout1,$inout0 pxor $inout1,$inout1 movups $inout0,($out) xorps $inout0,$inout0 jmp .Lctr32_epilogue .align 16 .Lctr32_bulk: lea (%rsp),%rax push %rbp sub \$$frame_size,%rsp and \$-16,%rsp # Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax) # offload everything movaps %xmm7,-0x98(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-0x88(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x28(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x18(%rax) .Lctr32_body: ___ $code.=<<___; lea -8(%rax),%rbp # 8 16-byte words on top of stack are counter values # xor-ed with zero-round key movdqu ($ivp),$inout0 movdqu ($key),$rndkey0 mov 12($ivp),$ctr # counter LSB pxor $rndkey0,$inout0 mov 12($key),$key0 # 0-round key LSB movdqa $inout0,0x00(%rsp) # populate counter block bswap $ctr movdqa $inout0,$inout1 movdqa $inout0,$inout2 movdqa $inout0,$inout3 movdqa $inout0,0x40(%rsp) movdqa $inout0,0x50(%rsp) movdqa $inout0,0x60(%rsp) mov %rdx,%r10 # about to borrow %rdx movdqa $inout0,0x70(%rsp) lea 1($ctr),%rax lea 2($ctr),%rdx bswap %eax bswap %edx xor $key0,%eax xor $key0,%edx pinsrd \$3,%eax,$inout1 lea 3($ctr),%rax movdqa $inout1,0x10(%rsp) pinsrd \$3,%edx,$inout2 bswap %eax mov %r10,%rdx # restore %rdx lea 4($ctr),%r10 movdqa $inout2,0x20(%rsp) xor $key0,%eax bswap %r10d pinsrd \$3,%eax,$inout3 xor $key0,%r10d movdqa $inout3,0x30(%rsp) lea 5($ctr),%r9 mov %r10d,0x40+12(%rsp) bswap %r9d lea 6($ctr),%r10 mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds xor $key0,%r9d bswap %r10d mov %r9d,0x50+12(%rsp) xor $key0,%r10d lea 7($ctr),%r9 mov %r10d,0x60+12(%rsp) bswap %r9d mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r10d xor $key0,%r9d and \$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r10d # isolate XSAVE+MOVBE mov %r9d,0x70+12(%rsp) $movkey 0x10($key),$rndkey1 movdqa 0x40(%rsp),$inout4 movdqa 0x50(%rsp),$inout5 cmp \$8,$len # $len is in blocks jb .Lctr32_tail # short input if ($len<8) sub \$6,$len # $len is biased by -6 cmp \$`1<<22`,%r10d # check for MOVBE without XSAVE je .Lctr32_6x # [which denotes Atom Silvermont] lea 0x80($key),$key # size optimization sub \$2,$len # $len is biased by -8 jmp .Lctr32_loop8 .align 16 .Lctr32_6x: shl \$4,$rounds mov \$48,$rnds_ bswap $key0 lea 32($key,$rounds),$key # end of key schedule sub %rax,%r10 # twisted $rounds jmp .Lctr32_loop6 .align 16 .Lctr32_loop6: add \$6,$ctr # next counter value $movkey -48($key,$rnds_),$rndkey0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 mov $ctr,%eax xor $key0,%eax aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 movbe %eax,`0x00+12`(%rsp) # store next counter value lea 1($ctr),%eax aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 xor $key0,%eax movbe %eax,`0x10+12`(%rsp) aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 lea 2($ctr),%eax xor $key0,%eax aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 movbe %eax,`0x20+12`(%rsp) lea 3($ctr),%eax aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey -32($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1 xor $key0,%eax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 movbe %eax,`0x30+12`(%rsp) lea 4($ctr),%eax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 xor $key0,%eax movbe %eax,`0x40+12`(%rsp) aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 lea 5($ctr),%eax xor $key0,%eax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 movbe %eax,`0x50+12`(%rsp) mov %r10,%rax # mov $rnds_,$rounds aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey0 call .Lenc_loop6 movdqu ($inp),$inout6 # load 6 input blocks movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout7 movdqu 0x20($inp),$in0 movdqu 0x30($inp),$in1 movdqu 0x40($inp),$in2 movdqu 0x50($inp),$in3 lea 0x60($inp),$inp # $inp+=6*16 $movkey -64($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1 pxor $inout0,$inout6 # inp^=E(ctr) movaps 0x00(%rsp),$inout0 # load next counter [xor-ed with 0 round] pxor $inout1,$inout7 movaps 0x10(%rsp),$inout1 pxor $inout2,$in0 movaps 0x20(%rsp),$inout2 pxor $inout3,$in1 movaps 0x30(%rsp),$inout3 pxor $inout4,$in2 movaps 0x40(%rsp),$inout4 pxor $inout5,$in3 movaps 0x50(%rsp),$inout5 movdqu $inout6,($out) # store 6 output blocks movdqu $inout7,0x10($out) movdqu $in0,0x20($out) movdqu $in1,0x30($out) movdqu $in2,0x40($out) movdqu $in3,0x50($out) lea 0x60($out),$out # $out+=6*16 sub \$6,$len jnc .Lctr32_loop6 # loop if $len-=6 didn't borrow add \$6,$len # restore real remaining $len jz .Lctr32_done # done if ($len==0) lea -48($rnds_),$rounds lea -80($key,$rnds_),$key # restore $key neg $rounds shr \$4,$rounds # restore $rounds jmp .Lctr32_tail .align 32 .Lctr32_loop8: add \$8,$ctr # next counter value movdqa 0x60(%rsp),$inout6 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 mov $ctr,%r9d movdqa 0x70(%rsp),$inout7 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 bswap %r9d $movkey 0x20-0x80($key),$rndkey0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 xor $key0,%r9d nop aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 mov %r9d,0x00+12(%rsp) # store next counter value lea 1($ctr),%r9 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout6 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout7 $movkey 0x30-0x80($key),$rndkey1 ___ for($i=2;$i<8;$i++) { my $rndkeyx = ($i&1)?$rndkey1:$rndkey0; $code.=<<___; bswap %r9d aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout0 aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout1 xor $key0,%r9d .byte 0x66,0x90 aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout2 aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout3 mov %r9d,`0x10*($i-1)`+12(%rsp) lea $i($ctr),%r9 aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout4 aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout5 aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout6 aesenc $rndkeyx,$inout7 $movkey `0x20+0x10*$i`-0x80($key),$rndkeyx ___ } $code.=<<___; bswap %r9d aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 xor $key0,%r9d movdqu 0x00($inp),$in0 # start loading input aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 mov %r9d,0x70+12(%rsp) cmp \$11,$rounds aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout6 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout7 $movkey 0xa0-0x80($key),$rndkey0 jb .Lctr32_enc_done aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout6 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout7 $movkey 0xb0-0x80($key),$rndkey1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout6 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout7 $movkey 0xc0-0x80($key),$rndkey0 je .Lctr32_enc_done aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout6 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout7 $movkey 0xd0-0x80($key),$rndkey1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout6 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout7 $movkey 0xe0-0x80($key),$rndkey0 jmp .Lctr32_enc_done .align 16 .Lctr32_enc_done: movdqu 0x10($inp),$in1 pxor $rndkey0,$in0 # input^=round[last] movdqu 0x20($inp),$in2 pxor $rndkey0,$in1 movdqu 0x30($inp),$in3 pxor $rndkey0,$in2 movdqu 0x40($inp),$in4 pxor $rndkey0,$in3 movdqu 0x50($inp),$in5 pxor $rndkey0,$in4 pxor $rndkey0,$in5 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout6 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout7 movdqu 0x60($inp),$rndkey1 # borrow $rndkey1 for inp[6] lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16 aesenclast $in0,$inout0 # $inN is inp[N]^round[last] pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey1 # borrowed $rndkey movdqu 0x70-0x80($inp),$in0 aesenclast $in1,$inout1 pxor $rndkey0,$in0 movdqa 0x00(%rsp),$in1 # load next counter block aesenclast $in2,$inout2 aesenclast $in3,$inout3 movdqa 0x10(%rsp),$in2 movdqa 0x20(%rsp),$in3 aesenclast $in4,$inout4 aesenclast $in5,$inout5 movdqa 0x30(%rsp),$in4 movdqa 0x40(%rsp),$in5 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout6 movdqa 0x50(%rsp),$rndkey0 $movkey 0x10-0x80($key),$rndkey1#real 1st-round key aesenclast $in0,$inout7 movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks movdqa $in1,$inout0 movups $inout1,0x10($out) movdqa $in2,$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) movdqa $in3,$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) movdqa $in4,$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) movdqa $in5,$inout4 movups $inout5,0x50($out) movdqa $rndkey0,$inout5 movups $inout6,0x60($out) movups $inout7,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16 sub \$8,$len jnc .Lctr32_loop8 # loop if $len-=8 didn't borrow add \$8,$len # restore real remainig $len jz .Lctr32_done # done if ($len==0) lea -0x80($key),$key .Lctr32_tail: # note that at this point $inout0..5 are populated with # counter values xor-ed with 0-round key lea 16($key),$key cmp \$4,$len jb .Lctr32_loop3 je .Lctr32_loop4 # if ($len>4) compute 7 E(counter) shl \$4,$rounds movdqa 0x60(%rsp),$inout6 pxor $inout7,$inout7 $movkey 16($key),$rndkey0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 lea 32-16($key,$rounds),$key# prepare for .Lenc_loop8_enter neg %rax aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 add \$16,%rax # prepare for .Lenc_loop8_enter movups ($inp),$in0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 movups 0x10($inp),$in1 # pre-load input movups 0x20($inp),$in2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout6 call .Lenc_loop8_enter movdqu 0x30($inp),$in3 pxor $in0,$inout0 movdqu 0x40($inp),$in0 pxor $in1,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) # store output pxor $in2,$inout2 movdqu $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $in3,$inout3 movdqu $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $in0,$inout4 movdqu $inout3,0x30($out) movdqu $inout4,0x40($out) cmp \$6,$len jb .Lctr32_done # $len was 5, stop store movups 0x50($inp),$in1 xorps $in1,$inout5 movups $inout5,0x50($out) je .Lctr32_done # $len was 6, stop store movups 0x60($inp),$in2 xorps $in2,$inout6 movups $inout6,0x60($out) jmp .Lctr32_done # $len was 7, stop store .align 32 .Lctr32_loop4: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 lea 16($key),$key dec $rounds aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey ($key),$rndkey1 jnz .Lctr32_loop4 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout1 movups ($inp),$in0 # load input movups 0x10($inp),$in1 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout3 movups 0x20($inp),$in2 movups 0x30($inp),$in3 xorps $in0,$inout0 movups $inout0,($out) # store output xorps $in1,$inout1 movups $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $in2,$inout2 movdqu $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $in3,$inout3 movdqu $inout3,0x30($out) jmp .Lctr32_done # $len was 4, stop store .align 32 .Lctr32_loop3: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 lea 16($key),$key dec $rounds aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 $movkey ($key),$rndkey1 jnz .Lctr32_loop3 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout2 movups ($inp),$in0 # load input xorps $in0,$inout0 movups $inout0,($out) # store output cmp \$2,$len jb .Lctr32_done # $len was 1, stop store movups 0x10($inp),$in1 xorps $in1,$inout1 movups $inout1,0x10($out) je .Lctr32_done # $len was 2, stop store movups 0x20($inp),$in2 xorps $in2,$inout2 movups $inout2,0x20($out) # $len was 3, stop store .Lctr32_done: xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear regiser bank xor $key0,$key0 pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); pxor %xmm6,%xmm6 pxor %xmm7,%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack pxor %xmm8,%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) pxor %xmm9,%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) pxor %xmm10,%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) pxor %xmm11,%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) pxor %xmm12,%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) pxor %xmm13,%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) pxor %xmm14,%xmm14 movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp) pxor %xmm15,%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp) # clear stack movaps -0x90(%rbp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,-0x90(%rbp) movaps -0x80(%rbp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,-0x80(%rbp) movaps -0x70(%rbp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,-0x70(%rbp) movaps -0x60(%rbp),%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,-0x60(%rbp) movaps -0x50(%rbp),%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,-0x50(%rbp) movaps -0x40(%rbp),%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,-0x40(%rbp) movaps -0x30(%rbp),%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,-0x30(%rbp) movaps -0x20(%rbp),%xmm14 movaps %xmm0,-0x20(%rbp) movaps -0x10(%rbp),%xmm15 movaps %xmm0,-0x10(%rbp) movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%rbp),%rsp pop %rbp .Lctr32_epilogue: ret .size aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks ___ } ###################################################################### # void aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len, # const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2 # const unsigned char iv[16]); # { my @tweak=map("%xmm$_",(10..15)); my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=("%xmm8","%xmm9",@tweak[4]); my ($key2,$ivp,$len_)=("%r8","%r9","%r9"); my $frame_size = 0x70 + ($win64?160:0); $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_xts_encrypt .type aesni_xts_encrypt,\@function,6 .align 16 aesni_xts_encrypt: lea (%rsp),%rax push %rbp sub \$$frame_size,%rsp and \$-16,%rsp # Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax) # offload everything movaps %xmm7,-0x98(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-0x88(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x28(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x18(%rax) .Lxts_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; lea -8(%rax),%rbp movups ($ivp),$inout0 # load clear-text tweak mov 240(%r8),$rounds # key2->rounds mov 240($key),$rnds_ # key1->rounds ___ # generate the tweak &aesni_generate1("enc",$key2,$rounds,$inout0); $code.=<<___; $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 # zero round key mov $key,$key_ # backup $key mov $rnds_,$rounds # backup $rounds shl \$4,$rnds_ mov $len,$len_ # backup $len and \$-16,$len $movkey 16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1 # last round key movdqa .Lxts_magic(%rip),$twmask movdqa $inout0,@tweak[5] pshufd \$0x5f,$inout0,$twres pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey1 ___ # alternative tweak calculation algorithm is based on suggestions # by Shay Gueron. psrad doesn't conflict with AES-NI instructions # and should help in the future... for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; movdqa $twres,$twtmp paddd $twres,$twres movdqa @tweak[5],@tweak[$i] psrad \$31,$twtmp # broadcast upper bits paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twtmp pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[$i] pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqa @tweak[5],@tweak[4] psrad \$31,$twres paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twres pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[4] pxor $twres,@tweak[5] movaps $rndkey1,0x60(%rsp) # save round[0]^round[last] sub \$16*6,$len jc .Lxts_enc_short # if $len-=6*16 borrowed mov \$16+96,$rounds lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key # end of key schedule sub %r10,%rax # twisted $rounds $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 mov %rax,%r10 # backup twisted $rounds lea .Lxts_magic(%rip),%r8 jmp .Lxts_enc_grandloop .align 32 .Lxts_enc_grandloop: movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 # load input movdqa $rndkey0,$twmask movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1 pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 # input^=tweak^round[0] movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2 pxor @tweak[1],$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 movdqu `16*3`($inp),$inout3 pxor @tweak[2],$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 movdqu `16*4`($inp),$inout4 pxor @tweak[3],$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 movdqu `16*5`($inp),$inout5 pxor @tweak[5],$twmask # round[0]^=tweak[5] movdqa 0x60(%rsp),$twres # load round[0]^round[last] pxor @tweak[4],$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 lea `16*6`($inp),$inp pxor $twmask,$inout5 pxor $twres,@tweak[0] # calclulate tweaks^round[last] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 pxor $twres,@tweak[1] movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp) # put aside tweaks^round[last] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 pxor $twres,@tweak[2] aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 pxor $twres,@tweak[3] movdqa @tweak[1],`16*1`(%rsp) aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 pxor $twres,@tweak[4] movdqa @tweak[2],`16*2`(%rsp) aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 pxor $twres,$twmask movdqa @tweak[4],`16*4`(%rsp) aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 movdqa $twmask,`16*5`(%rsp) pshufd \$0x5f,@tweak[5],$twres jmp .Lxts_enc_loop6 .align 32 .Lxts_enc_loop6: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey -64($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -80($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Lxts_enc_loop6 movdqa (%r8),$twmask # start calculating next tweak movdqa $twres,$twtmp paddd $twres,$twres aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] psrad \$31,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 pand $twmask,$twtmp $movkey ($key_),@tweak[0] # load round[0] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] movaps @tweak[0],@tweak[1] # copy round[0] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey -64($key),$rndkey1 movdqa $twres,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 paddd $twres,$twres pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[0] aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 psrad \$31,$twtmp paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 pand $twmask,$twtmp movaps @tweak[1],@tweak[2] aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] movdqa $twres,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -48($key),$rndkey0 paddd $twres,$twres aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[1] psrad \$31,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 movdqa @tweak[3],`16*3`(%rsp) pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 movaps @tweak[2],@tweak[3] movdqa $twres,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey -32($key),$rndkey1 paddd $twres,$twres aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[2] psrad \$31,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twtmp aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] movaps @tweak[3],@tweak[4] aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 movdqa $twres,$rndkey0 paddd $twres,$twres aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[3] psrad \$31,$rndkey0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$rndkey0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[5] $movkey ($key_),$rndkey0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[4] aesenclast `16*0`(%rsp),$inout0 psrad \$31,$twres paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] aesenclast `16*1`(%rsp),$inout1 aesenclast `16*2`(%rsp),$inout2 pand $twmask,$twres mov %r10,%rax # restore $rounds aesenclast `16*3`(%rsp),$inout3 aesenclast `16*4`(%rsp),$inout4 aesenclast `16*5`(%rsp),$inout5 pxor $twres,@tweak[5] lea `16*6`($out),$out # $out+=6*16 movups $inout0,`-16*6`($out) # store 6 output blocks movups $inout1,`-16*5`($out) movups $inout2,`-16*4`($out) movups $inout3,`-16*3`($out) movups $inout4,`-16*2`($out) movups $inout5,`-16*1`($out) sub \$16*6,$len jnc .Lxts_enc_grandloop # loop if $len-=6*16 didn't borrow mov \$16+96,$rounds sub $rnds_,$rounds mov $key_,$key # restore $key shr \$4,$rounds # restore original value .Lxts_enc_short: # at the point @tweak[0..5] are populated with tweak values mov $rounds,$rnds_ # backup $rounds pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[0] add \$16*6,$len # restore real remaining $len jz .Lxts_enc_done # done if ($len==0) pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[1] cmp \$0x20,$len jb .Lxts_enc_one # $len is 1*16 pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[2] je .Lxts_enc_two # $len is 2*16 pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[3] cmp \$0x40,$len jb .Lxts_enc_three # $len is 3*16 pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[4] je .Lxts_enc_four # $len is 4*16 movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # $len is 5*16 movdqu 16*1($inp),$inout1 movdqu 16*2($inp),$inout2 pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqu 16*3($inp),$inout3 pxor @tweak[1],$inout1 movdqu 16*4($inp),$inout4 lea 16*5($inp),$inp # $inp+=5*16 pxor @tweak[2],$inout2 pxor @tweak[3],$inout3 pxor @tweak[4],$inout4 pxor $inout5,$inout5 call _aesni_encrypt6 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[5],@tweak[0] xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks xorps @tweak[3],$inout3 movdqu $inout1,16*1($out) xorps @tweak[4],$inout4 movdqu $inout2,16*2($out) movdqu $inout3,16*3($out) movdqu $inout4,16*4($out) lea 16*5($out),$out # $out+=5*16 jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_one: movups ($inp),$inout0 lea 16*1($inp),$inp # inp+=1*16 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[1],@tweak[0] movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block lea 16*1($out),$out # $out+=1*16 jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_two: movups ($inp),$inout0 movups 16($inp),$inout1 lea 32($inp),$inp # $inp+=2*16 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 call _aesni_encrypt2 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[2],@tweak[0] xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks movups $inout1,16*1($out) lea 16*2($out),$out # $out+=2*16 jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_three: movups ($inp),$inout0 movups 16*1($inp),$inout1 movups 16*2($inp),$inout2 lea 16*3($inp),$inp # $inp+=3*16 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 call _aesni_encrypt3 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[3],@tweak[0] xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks movups $inout1,16*1($out) movups $inout2,16*2($out) lea 16*3($out),$out # $out+=3*16 jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_four: movups ($inp),$inout0 movups 16*1($inp),$inout1 movups 16*2($inp),$inout2 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movups 16*3($inp),$inout3 lea 16*4($inp),$inp # $inp+=4*16 xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 xorps @tweak[3],$inout3 call _aesni_encrypt4 pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[4],@tweak[0] pxor @tweak[1],$inout1 pxor @tweak[2],$inout2 movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks pxor @tweak[3],$inout3 movdqu $inout1,16*1($out) movdqu $inout2,16*2($out) movdqu $inout3,16*3($out) lea 16*4($out),$out # $out+=4*16 jmp .Lxts_enc_done .align 16 .Lxts_enc_done: and \$15,$len_ # see if $len%16 is 0 jz .Lxts_enc_ret mov $len_,$len .Lxts_enc_steal: movzb ($inp),%eax # borrow $rounds ... movzb -16($out),%ecx # ... and $key lea 1($inp),$inp mov %al,-16($out) mov %cl,0($out) lea 1($out),$out sub \$1,$len jnz .Lxts_enc_steal sub $len_,$out # rewind $out mov $key_,$key # restore $key mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds movups -16($out),$inout0 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movups $inout0,-16($out) .Lxts_enc_ret: xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear register bank pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); pxor %xmm6,%xmm6 pxor %xmm7,%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack pxor %xmm8,%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) pxor %xmm9,%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) pxor %xmm10,%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) pxor %xmm11,%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) pxor %xmm12,%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) pxor %xmm13,%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) pxor %xmm14,%xmm14 pxor %xmm15,%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp) # clear stack movaps -0x90(%rbp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,-0x90(%rbp) movaps -0x80(%rbp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,-0x80(%rbp) movaps -0x70(%rbp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,-0x70(%rbp) movaps -0x60(%rbp),%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,-0x60(%rbp) movaps -0x50(%rbp),%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,-0x50(%rbp) movaps -0x40(%rbp),%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,-0x40(%rbp) movaps -0x30(%rbp),%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,-0x30(%rbp) movaps -0x20(%rbp),%xmm14 movaps %xmm0,-0x20(%rbp) movaps -0x10(%rbp),%xmm15 movaps %xmm0,-0x10(%rbp) movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%rbp),%rsp pop %rbp .Lxts_enc_epilogue: ret .size aesni_xts_encrypt,.-aesni_xts_encrypt ___ $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_xts_decrypt .type aesni_xts_decrypt,\@function,6 .align 16 aesni_xts_decrypt: lea (%rsp),%rax push %rbp sub \$$frame_size,%rsp and \$-16,%rsp # Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax) # offload everything movaps %xmm7,-0x98(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-0x88(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x28(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x18(%rax) .Lxts_dec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; lea -8(%rax),%rbp movups ($ivp),$inout0 # load clear-text tweak mov 240($key2),$rounds # key2->rounds mov 240($key),$rnds_ # key1->rounds ___ # generate the tweak &aesni_generate1("enc",$key2,$rounds,$inout0); $code.=<<___; xor %eax,%eax # if ($len%16) len-=16; test \$15,$len setnz %al shl \$4,%rax sub %rax,$len $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 # zero round key mov $key,$key_ # backup $key mov $rnds_,$rounds # backup $rounds shl \$4,$rnds_ mov $len,$len_ # backup $len and \$-16,$len $movkey 16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1 # last round key movdqa .Lxts_magic(%rip),$twmask movdqa $inout0,@tweak[5] pshufd \$0x5f,$inout0,$twres pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey1 ___ for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; movdqa $twres,$twtmp paddd $twres,$twres movdqa @tweak[5],@tweak[$i] psrad \$31,$twtmp # broadcast upper bits paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twtmp pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[$i] pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqa @tweak[5],@tweak[4] psrad \$31,$twres paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twres pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[4] pxor $twres,@tweak[5] movaps $rndkey1,0x60(%rsp) # save round[0]^round[last] sub \$16*6,$len jc .Lxts_dec_short # if $len-=6*16 borrowed mov \$16+96,$rounds lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key # end of key schedule sub %r10,%rax # twisted $rounds $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 mov %rax,%r10 # backup twisted $rounds lea .Lxts_magic(%rip),%r8 jmp .Lxts_dec_grandloop .align 32 .Lxts_dec_grandloop: movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 # load input movdqa $rndkey0,$twmask movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1 pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 # intput^=tweak^round[0] movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2 pxor @tweak[1],$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 movdqu `16*3`($inp),$inout3 pxor @tweak[2],$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 movdqu `16*4`($inp),$inout4 pxor @tweak[3],$inout3 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 movdqu `16*5`($inp),$inout5 pxor @tweak[5],$twmask # round[0]^=tweak[5] movdqa 0x60(%rsp),$twres # load round[0]^round[last] pxor @tweak[4],$inout4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 lea `16*6`($inp),$inp pxor $twmask,$inout5 pxor $twres,@tweak[0] # calclulate tweaks^round[last] aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 pxor $twres,@tweak[1] movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp) # put aside tweaks^last round key aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 pxor $twres,@tweak[2] aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 pxor $twres,@tweak[3] movdqa @tweak[1],`16*1`(%rsp) aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 pxor $twres,@tweak[4] movdqa @tweak[2],`16*2`(%rsp) aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 pxor $twres,$twmask movdqa @tweak[4],`16*4`(%rsp) aesdec $rndkey0,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 movdqa $twmask,`16*5`(%rsp) pshufd \$0x5f,@tweak[5],$twres jmp .Lxts_dec_loop6 .align 32 .Lxts_dec_loop6: aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey -64($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -80($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Lxts_dec_loop6 movdqa (%r8),$twmask # start calculating next tweak movdqa $twres,$twtmp paddd $twres,$twres aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] psrad \$31,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 pand $twmask,$twtmp $movkey ($key_),@tweak[0] # load round[0] aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] movaps @tweak[0],@tweak[1] # copy round[0] aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey -64($key),$rndkey1 movdqa $twres,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 paddd $twres,$twres pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[0] aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 psrad \$31,$twtmp paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 pand $twmask,$twtmp movaps @tweak[1],@tweak[2] aesdec $rndkey0,$inout4 pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] movdqa $twres,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -48($key),$rndkey0 paddd $twres,$twres aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[1] psrad \$31,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 movdqa @tweak[3],`16*3`(%rsp) pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 movaps @tweak[2],@tweak[3] movdqa $twres,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey -32($key),$rndkey1 paddd $twres,$twres aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[2] psrad \$31,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$twtmp aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout4 pxor $twtmp,@tweak[5] movaps @tweak[3],@tweak[4] aesdec $rndkey0,$inout5 movdqa $twres,$rndkey0 paddd $twres,$twres aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[3] psrad \$31,$rndkey0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] pand $twmask,$rndkey0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[5] $movkey ($key_),$rndkey0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[4] aesdeclast `16*0`(%rsp),$inout0 psrad \$31,$twres paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] aesdeclast `16*1`(%rsp),$inout1 aesdeclast `16*2`(%rsp),$inout2 pand $twmask,$twres mov %r10,%rax # restore $rounds aesdeclast `16*3`(%rsp),$inout3 aesdeclast `16*4`(%rsp),$inout4 aesdeclast `16*5`(%rsp),$inout5 pxor $twres,@tweak[5] lea `16*6`($out),$out # $out+=6*16 movups $inout0,`-16*6`($out) # store 6 output blocks movups $inout1,`-16*5`($out) movups $inout2,`-16*4`($out) movups $inout3,`-16*3`($out) movups $inout4,`-16*2`($out) movups $inout5,`-16*1`($out) sub \$16*6,$len jnc .Lxts_dec_grandloop # loop if $len-=6*16 didn't borrow mov \$16+96,$rounds sub $rnds_,$rounds mov $key_,$key # restore $key shr \$4,$rounds # restore original value .Lxts_dec_short: # at the point @tweak[0..5] are populated with tweak values mov $rounds,$rnds_ # backup $rounds pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[0] pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[1] add \$16*6,$len # restore real remaining $len jz .Lxts_dec_done # done if ($len==0) pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[2] cmp \$0x20,$len jb .Lxts_dec_one # $len is 1*16 pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[3] je .Lxts_dec_two # $len is 2*16 pxor $rndkey0,@tweak[4] cmp \$0x40,$len jb .Lxts_dec_three # $len is 3*16 je .Lxts_dec_four # $len is 4*16 movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # $len is 5*16 movdqu 16*1($inp),$inout1 movdqu 16*2($inp),$inout2 pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqu 16*3($inp),$inout3 pxor @tweak[1],$inout1 movdqu 16*4($inp),$inout4 lea 16*5($inp),$inp # $inp+=5*16 pxor @tweak[2],$inout2 pxor @tweak[3],$inout3 pxor @tweak[4],$inout4 call _aesni_decrypt6 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks xorps @tweak[3],$inout3 movdqu $inout1,16*1($out) xorps @tweak[4],$inout4 movdqu $inout2,16*2($out) pxor $twtmp,$twtmp movdqu $inout3,16*3($out) pcmpgtd @tweak[5],$twtmp movdqu $inout4,16*4($out) lea 16*5($out),$out # $out+=5*16 pshufd \$0x13,$twtmp,@tweak[1] # $twres and \$15,$len_ jz .Lxts_dec_ret movdqa @tweak[5],@tweak[0] paddq @tweak[5],@tweak[5] # psllq 1,$tweak pand $twmask,@tweak[1] # isolate carry and residue pxor @tweak[5],@tweak[1] jmp .Lxts_dec_done2 .align 16 .Lxts_dec_one: movups ($inp),$inout0 lea 16*1($inp),$inp # $inp+=1*16 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 ___ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[1],@tweak[0] movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block movdqa @tweak[2],@tweak[1] lea 16*1($out),$out # $out+=1*16 jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_two: movups ($inp),$inout0 movups 16($inp),$inout1 lea 32($inp),$inp # $inp+=2*16 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 call _aesni_decrypt2 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[2],@tweak[0] xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 movdqa @tweak[3],@tweak[1] movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks movups $inout1,16*1($out) lea 16*2($out),$out # $out+=2*16 jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_three: movups ($inp),$inout0 movups 16*1($inp),$inout1 movups 16*2($inp),$inout2 lea 16*3($inp),$inp # $inp+=3*16 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 call _aesni_decrypt3 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[3],@tweak[0] xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 movdqa @tweak[4],@tweak[1] xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks movups $inout1,16*1($out) movups $inout2,16*2($out) lea 16*3($out),$out # $out+=3*16 jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_four: movups ($inp),$inout0 movups 16*1($inp),$inout1 movups 16*2($inp),$inout2 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movups 16*3($inp),$inout3 lea 16*4($inp),$inp # $inp+=4*16 xorps @tweak[1],$inout1 xorps @tweak[2],$inout2 xorps @tweak[3],$inout3 call _aesni_decrypt4 pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 movdqa @tweak[4],@tweak[0] pxor @tweak[1],$inout1 movdqa @tweak[5],@tweak[1] pxor @tweak[2],$inout2 movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks pxor @tweak[3],$inout3 movdqu $inout1,16*1($out) movdqu $inout2,16*2($out) movdqu $inout3,16*3($out) lea 16*4($out),$out # $out+=4*16 jmp .Lxts_dec_done .align 16 .Lxts_dec_done: and \$15,$len_ # see if $len%16 is 0 jz .Lxts_dec_ret .Lxts_dec_done2: mov $len_,$len mov $key_,$key # restore $key mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds movups ($inp),$inout0 xorps @tweak[1],$inout0 ___ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; xorps @tweak[1],$inout0 movups $inout0,($out) .Lxts_dec_steal: movzb 16($inp),%eax # borrow $rounds ... movzb ($out),%ecx # ... and $key lea 1($inp),$inp mov %al,($out) mov %cl,16($out) lea 1($out),$out sub \$1,$len jnz .Lxts_dec_steal sub $len_,$out # rewind $out mov $key_,$key # restore $key mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds movups ($out),$inout0 xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 ___ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; xorps @tweak[0],$inout0 movups $inout0,($out) .Lxts_dec_ret: xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear register bank pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); pxor %xmm6,%xmm6 pxor %xmm7,%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack pxor %xmm8,%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) pxor %xmm9,%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) pxor %xmm10,%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) pxor %xmm11,%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) pxor %xmm12,%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) pxor %xmm13,%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) pxor %xmm14,%xmm14 pxor %xmm15,%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp) # clear stack movaps -0x90(%rbp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,-0x90(%rbp) movaps -0x80(%rbp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,-0x80(%rbp) movaps -0x70(%rbp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,-0x70(%rbp) movaps -0x60(%rbp),%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,-0x60(%rbp) movaps -0x50(%rbp),%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,-0x50(%rbp) movaps -0x40(%rbp),%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,-0x40(%rbp) movaps -0x30(%rbp),%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,-0x30(%rbp) movaps -0x20(%rbp),%xmm14 movaps %xmm0,-0x20(%rbp) movaps -0x10(%rbp),%xmm15 movaps %xmm0,-0x10(%rbp) movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%rbp),%rsp pop %rbp .Lxts_dec_epilogue: ret .size aesni_xts_decrypt,.-aesni_xts_decrypt ___ } ###################################################################### # void aesni_ocb_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t blocks, # const AES_KEY *key, unsigned int start_block_num, # unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16], # unsigned char checksum[16]); # { my @offset=map("%xmm$_",(10..15)); my ($checksum,$rndkey0l)=("%xmm8","%xmm9"); my ($block_num,$offset_p)=("%r8","%r9"); # 5th and 6th arguments my ($L_p,$checksum_p) = ("%rbx","%rbp"); my ($i1,$i3,$i5) = ("%r12","%r13","%r14"); my $seventh_arg = $win64 ? 56 : 8; my $blocks = $len; $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_ocb_encrypt .type aesni_ocb_encrypt,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni_ocb_encrypt: lea (%rsp),%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa0(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,0x00(%rsp) # offload everything movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0x90(%rsp) .Locb_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov $seventh_arg(%rax),$L_p # 7th argument mov $seventh_arg+8(%rax),$checksum_p# 8th argument mov 240($key),$rnds_ mov $key,$key_ shl \$4,$rnds_ $movkey ($key),$rndkey0l # round[0] $movkey 16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1 # round[last] movdqu ($offset_p),@offset[5] # load last offset_i pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey0l # round[0] ^ round[last] pxor $rndkey1,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[last] mov \$16+32,$rounds lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 # round[1] sub %r10,%rax # twisted $rounds mov %rax,%r10 # backup twisted $rounds movdqu ($L_p),@offset[0] # L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks movdqu ($checksum_p),$checksum # load checksum test \$1,$block_num # is first block number odd? jnz .Locb_enc_odd bsf $block_num,$i1 add \$1,$block_num shl \$4,$i1 movdqu ($L_p,$i1),$inout5 # borrow movdqu ($inp),$inout0 lea 16($inp),$inp call __ocb_encrypt1 movdqa $inout5,@offset[5] movups $inout0,($out) lea 16($out),$out sub \$1,$blocks jz .Locb_enc_done .Locb_enc_odd: lea 1($block_num),$i1 # even-numbered blocks lea 3($block_num),$i3 lea 5($block_num),$i5 lea 6($block_num),$block_num bsf $i1,$i1 # ntz(block) bsf $i3,$i3 bsf $i5,$i5 shl \$4,$i1 # ntz(block) -> table offset shl \$4,$i3 shl \$4,$i5 sub \$6,$blocks jc .Locb_enc_short jmp .Locb_enc_grandloop .align 32 .Locb_enc_grandloop: movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 # load input movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1 movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2 movdqu `16*3`($inp),$inout3 movdqu `16*4`($inp),$inout4 movdqu `16*5`($inp),$inout5 lea `16*6`($inp),$inp call __ocb_encrypt6 movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) # store output movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) movups $inout3,`16*3`($out) movups $inout4,`16*4`($out) movups $inout5,`16*5`($out) lea `16*6`($out),$out sub \$6,$blocks jnc .Locb_enc_grandloop .Locb_enc_short: add \$6,$blocks jz .Locb_enc_done movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 cmp \$2,$blocks jb .Locb_enc_one movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1 je .Locb_enc_two movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2 cmp \$4,$blocks jb .Locb_enc_three movdqu `16*3`($inp),$inout3 je .Locb_enc_four movdqu `16*4`($inp),$inout4 pxor $inout5,$inout5 call __ocb_encrypt6 movdqa @offset[4],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) movups $inout3,`16*3`($out) movups $inout4,`16*4`($out) jmp .Locb_enc_done .align 16 .Locb_enc_one: movdqa @offset[0],$inout5 # borrow call __ocb_encrypt1 movdqa $inout5,@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) jmp .Locb_enc_done .align 16 .Locb_enc_two: pxor $inout2,$inout2 pxor $inout3,$inout3 call __ocb_encrypt4 movdqa @offset[1],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) jmp .Locb_enc_done .align 16 .Locb_enc_three: pxor $inout3,$inout3 call __ocb_encrypt4 movdqa @offset[2],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) jmp .Locb_enc_done .align 16 .Locb_enc_four: call __ocb_encrypt4 movdqa @offset[3],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) movups $inout3,`16*3`($out) .Locb_enc_done: pxor $rndkey0,@offset[5] # "remove" round[last] movdqu $checksum,($checksum_p) # store checksum movdqu @offset[5],($offset_p) # store last offset_i xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear register bank pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); pxor %xmm6,%xmm6 pxor %xmm7,%xmm7 pxor %xmm8,%xmm8 pxor %xmm9,%xmm9 pxor %xmm10,%xmm10 pxor %xmm11,%xmm11 pxor %xmm12,%xmm12 pxor %xmm13,%xmm13 pxor %xmm14,%xmm14 pxor %xmm15,%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x00(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp) movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps %xmm0,0x80(%rsp) movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15 movaps %xmm0,0x90(%rsp) lea 0xa0+0x28(%rsp),%rax .Locb_enc_pop: lea 0xa0(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___; pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx .Locb_enc_epilogue: ret .size aesni_ocb_encrypt,.-aesni_ocb_encrypt .type __ocb_encrypt6,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ocb_encrypt6: pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0] movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1] movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2] movdqu ($L_p,$i3),@offset[3] movdqa @offset[0],@offset[4] pxor @offset[5],@offset[0] movdqu ($L_p,$i5),@offset[5] pxor @offset[0],@offset[1] pxor $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum pxor @offset[0],$inout0 # input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i pxor @offset[1],@offset[2] pxor $inout1,$checksum pxor @offset[1],$inout1 pxor @offset[2],@offset[3] pxor $inout2,$checksum pxor @offset[2],$inout2 pxor @offset[3],@offset[4] pxor $inout3,$checksum pxor @offset[3],$inout3 pxor @offset[4],@offset[5] pxor $inout4,$checksum pxor @offset[4],$inout4 pxor $inout5,$checksum pxor @offset[5],$inout5 $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 lea 1($block_num),$i1 # even-numbered blocks lea 3($block_num),$i3 lea 5($block_num),$i5 add \$6,$block_num pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[0] # offset_i ^ round[last] bsf $i1,$i1 # ntz(block) bsf $i3,$i3 bsf $i5,$i5 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[1] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[2] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[3] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[4] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 shl \$4,$i1 # ntz(block) -> table offset shl \$4,$i3 jmp .Locb_enc_loop6 .align 32 .Locb_enc_loop6: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Locb_enc_loop6 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 shl \$4,$i5 aesenclast @offset[0],$inout0 movdqu ($L_p),@offset[0] # L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks mov %r10,%rax # restore twisted rounds aesenclast @offset[1],$inout1 aesenclast @offset[2],$inout2 aesenclast @offset[3],$inout3 aesenclast @offset[4],$inout4 aesenclast @offset[5],$inout5 ret .size __ocb_encrypt6,.-__ocb_encrypt6 .type __ocb_encrypt4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ocb_encrypt4: pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0] movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1] movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2] movdqu ($L_p,$i3),@offset[3] pxor @offset[5],@offset[0] pxor @offset[0],@offset[1] pxor $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum pxor @offset[0],$inout0 # input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i pxor @offset[1],@offset[2] pxor $inout1,$checksum pxor @offset[1],$inout1 pxor @offset[2],@offset[3] pxor $inout2,$checksum pxor @offset[2],$inout2 pxor $inout3,$checksum pxor @offset[3],$inout3 $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[0] # offset_i ^ round[last] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[1] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[2] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[3] aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 jmp .Locb_enc_loop4 .align 32 .Locb_enc_loop4: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Locb_enc_loop4 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 mov %r10,%rax # restore twisted rounds aesenclast @offset[0],$inout0 aesenclast @offset[1],$inout1 aesenclast @offset[2],$inout2 aesenclast @offset[3],$inout3 ret .size __ocb_encrypt4,.-__ocb_encrypt4 .type __ocb_encrypt1,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ocb_encrypt1: pxor @offset[5],$inout5 # offset_i pxor $rndkey0l,$inout5 # offset_i ^ round[0] pxor $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum pxor $inout5,$inout0 # input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 pxor $rndkey0l,$inout5 # offset_i ^ round[last] aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 jmp .Locb_enc_loop1 .align 32 .Locb_enc_loop1: aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesenc $rndkey0,$inout0 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Locb_enc_loop1 aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 # redundant in tail mov %r10,%rax # restore twisted rounds aesenclast $inout5,$inout0 ret .size __ocb_encrypt1,.-__ocb_encrypt1 .globl aesni_ocb_decrypt .type aesni_ocb_decrypt,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni_ocb_decrypt: lea (%rsp),%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa0(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,0x00(%rsp) # offload everything movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0x90(%rsp) .Locb_dec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov $seventh_arg(%rax),$L_p # 7th argument mov $seventh_arg+8(%rax),$checksum_p# 8th argument mov 240($key),$rnds_ mov $key,$key_ shl \$4,$rnds_ $movkey ($key),$rndkey0l # round[0] $movkey 16($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1 # round[last] movdqu ($offset_p),@offset[5] # load last offset_i pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey0l # round[0] ^ round[last] pxor $rndkey1,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[last] mov \$16+32,$rounds lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 # round[1] sub %r10,%rax # twisted $rounds mov %rax,%r10 # backup twisted $rounds movdqu ($L_p),@offset[0] # L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks movdqu ($checksum_p),$checksum # load checksum test \$1,$block_num # is first block number odd? jnz .Locb_dec_odd bsf $block_num,$i1 add \$1,$block_num shl \$4,$i1 movdqu ($L_p,$i1),$inout5 # borrow movdqu ($inp),$inout0 lea 16($inp),$inp call __ocb_decrypt1 movdqa $inout5,@offset[5] movups $inout0,($out) xorps $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum lea 16($out),$out sub \$1,$blocks jz .Locb_dec_done .Locb_dec_odd: lea 1($block_num),$i1 # even-numbered blocks lea 3($block_num),$i3 lea 5($block_num),$i5 lea 6($block_num),$block_num bsf $i1,$i1 # ntz(block) bsf $i3,$i3 bsf $i5,$i5 shl \$4,$i1 # ntz(block) -> table offset shl \$4,$i3 shl \$4,$i5 sub \$6,$blocks jc .Locb_dec_short jmp .Locb_dec_grandloop .align 32 .Locb_dec_grandloop: movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 # load input movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1 movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2 movdqu `16*3`($inp),$inout3 movdqu `16*4`($inp),$inout4 movdqu `16*5`($inp),$inout5 lea `16*6`($inp),$inp call __ocb_decrypt6 movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) # store output pxor $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) pxor $inout1,$checksum movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) pxor $inout2,$checksum movups $inout3,`16*3`($out) pxor $inout3,$checksum movups $inout4,`16*4`($out) pxor $inout4,$checksum movups $inout5,`16*5`($out) pxor $inout5,$checksum lea `16*6`($out),$out sub \$6,$blocks jnc .Locb_dec_grandloop .Locb_dec_short: add \$6,$blocks jz .Locb_dec_done movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 cmp \$2,$blocks jb .Locb_dec_one movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1 je .Locb_dec_two movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2 cmp \$4,$blocks jb .Locb_dec_three movdqu `16*3`($inp),$inout3 je .Locb_dec_four movdqu `16*4`($inp),$inout4 pxor $inout5,$inout5 call __ocb_decrypt6 movdqa @offset[4],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) # store output pxor $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) pxor $inout1,$checksum movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) pxor $inout2,$checksum movups $inout3,`16*3`($out) pxor $inout3,$checksum movups $inout4,`16*4`($out) pxor $inout4,$checksum jmp .Locb_dec_done .align 16 .Locb_dec_one: movdqa @offset[0],$inout5 # borrow call __ocb_decrypt1 movdqa $inout5,@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) # store output xorps $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum jmp .Locb_dec_done .align 16 .Locb_dec_two: pxor $inout2,$inout2 pxor $inout3,$inout3 call __ocb_decrypt4 movdqa @offset[1],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) # store output xorps $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) xorps $inout1,$checksum jmp .Locb_dec_done .align 16 .Locb_dec_three: pxor $inout3,$inout3 call __ocb_decrypt4 movdqa @offset[2],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) # store output xorps $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) xorps $inout1,$checksum movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) xorps $inout2,$checksum jmp .Locb_dec_done .align 16 .Locb_dec_four: call __ocb_decrypt4 movdqa @offset[3],@offset[5] movups $inout0,`16*0`($out) # store output pxor $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum movups $inout1,`16*1`($out) pxor $inout1,$checksum movups $inout2,`16*2`($out) pxor $inout2,$checksum movups $inout3,`16*3`($out) pxor $inout3,$checksum .Locb_dec_done: pxor $rndkey0,@offset[5] # "remove" round[last] movdqu $checksum,($checksum_p) # store checksum movdqu @offset[5],($offset_p) # store last offset_i xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear register bank pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); pxor %xmm6,%xmm6 pxor %xmm7,%xmm7 pxor %xmm8,%xmm8 pxor %xmm9,%xmm9 pxor %xmm10,%xmm10 pxor %xmm11,%xmm11 pxor %xmm12,%xmm12 pxor %xmm13,%xmm13 pxor %xmm14,%xmm14 pxor %xmm15,%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x00(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp) movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps %xmm0,0x80(%rsp) movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15 movaps %xmm0,0x90(%rsp) lea 0xa0+0x28(%rsp),%rax .Locb_dec_pop: lea 0xa0(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___; pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx .Locb_dec_epilogue: ret .size aesni_ocb_decrypt,.-aesni_ocb_decrypt .type __ocb_decrypt6,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ocb_decrypt6: pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0] movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1] movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2] movdqu ($L_p,$i3),@offset[3] movdqa @offset[0],@offset[4] pxor @offset[5],@offset[0] movdqu ($L_p,$i5),@offset[5] pxor @offset[0],@offset[1] pxor @offset[0],$inout0 # input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i pxor @offset[1],@offset[2] pxor @offset[1],$inout1 pxor @offset[2],@offset[3] pxor @offset[2],$inout2 pxor @offset[3],@offset[4] pxor @offset[3],$inout3 pxor @offset[4],@offset[5] pxor @offset[4],$inout4 pxor @offset[5],$inout5 $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 lea 1($block_num),$i1 # even-numbered blocks lea 3($block_num),$i3 lea 5($block_num),$i5 add \$6,$block_num pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[0] # offset_i ^ round[last] bsf $i1,$i1 # ntz(block) bsf $i3,$i3 bsf $i5,$i5 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[1] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[2] aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[3] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[4] aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 shl \$4,$i1 # ntz(block) -> table offset shl \$4,$i3 jmp .Locb_dec_loop6 .align 32 .Locb_dec_loop6: aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout5 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Locb_dec_loop6 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 shl \$4,$i5 aesdeclast @offset[0],$inout0 movdqu ($L_p),@offset[0] # L_0 for all odd-numbered blocks mov %r10,%rax # restore twisted rounds aesdeclast @offset[1],$inout1 aesdeclast @offset[2],$inout2 aesdeclast @offset[3],$inout3 aesdeclast @offset[4],$inout4 aesdeclast @offset[5],$inout5 ret .size __ocb_decrypt6,.-__ocb_decrypt6 .type __ocb_decrypt4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ocb_decrypt4: pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0] movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1] movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2] movdqu ($L_p,$i3),@offset[3] pxor @offset[5],@offset[0] pxor @offset[0],@offset[1] pxor @offset[0],$inout0 # input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i pxor @offset[1],@offset[2] pxor @offset[1],$inout1 pxor @offset[2],@offset[3] pxor @offset[2],$inout2 pxor @offset[3],$inout3 $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[0] # offset_i ^ round[last] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[1] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[2] pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[3] aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 jmp .Locb_dec_loop4 .align 32 .Locb_dec_loop4: aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey0,$inout3 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Locb_dec_loop4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 mov %r10,%rax # restore twisted rounds aesdeclast @offset[0],$inout0 aesdeclast @offset[1],$inout1 aesdeclast @offset[2],$inout2 aesdeclast @offset[3],$inout3 ret .size __ocb_decrypt4,.-__ocb_decrypt4 .type __ocb_decrypt1,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ocb_decrypt1: pxor @offset[5],$inout5 # offset_i pxor $rndkey0l,$inout5 # offset_i ^ round[0] pxor $inout5,$inout0 # input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i $movkey 32($key_),$rndkey0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 $movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1 pxor $rndkey0l,$inout5 # offset_i ^ round[last] aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 $movkey 64($key_),$rndkey0 jmp .Locb_dec_loop1 .align 32 .Locb_dec_loop1: aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1 add \$32,%rax aesdec $rndkey0,$inout0 $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0 jnz .Locb_dec_loop1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 $movkey 16($key_),$rndkey1 # redundant in tail mov %r10,%rax # restore twisted rounds aesdeclast $inout5,$inout0 ret .size __ocb_decrypt1,.-__ocb_decrypt1 ___ } }} ######################################################################## # void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out, # size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); { my $frame_size = 0x10 + ($win64?0xa0:0); # used in decrypt my ($iv,$in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$in4)=map("%xmm$_",(10..15)); my $inp_=$key_; $code.=<<___; .globl ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt .type ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6 .align 16 ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt: test $len,$len # check length jz .Lcbc_ret mov 240($key),$rnds_ # key->rounds mov $key,$key_ # backup $key test %r9d,%r9d # 6th argument jz .Lcbc_decrypt #--------------------------- CBC ENCRYPT ------------------------------# movups ($ivp),$inout0 # load iv as initial state mov $rnds_,$rounds cmp \$16,$len jb .Lcbc_enc_tail sub \$16,$len jmp .Lcbc_enc_loop .align 16 .Lcbc_enc_loop: movups ($inp),$inout1 # load input lea 16($inp),$inp #xorps $inout1,$inout0 ___ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds,$inout0,$inout1); $code.=<<___; mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds mov $key_,$key # restore $key movups $inout0,0($out) # store output lea 16($out),$out sub \$16,$len jnc .Lcbc_enc_loop add \$16,$len jnz .Lcbc_enc_tail pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 movups $inout0,($ivp) pxor $inout0,$inout0 pxor $inout1,$inout1 jmp .Lcbc_ret .Lcbc_enc_tail: mov $len,%rcx # zaps $key xchg $inp,$out # $inp is %rsi and $out is %rdi now .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb mov \$16,%ecx # zero tail sub $len,%rcx xor %eax,%eax .long 0x9066AAF3 # rep stosb lea -16(%rdi),%rdi # rewind $out by 1 block mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds mov %rdi,%rsi # $inp and $out are the same mov $key_,$key # restore $key xor $len,$len # len=16 jmp .Lcbc_enc_loop # one more spin #--------------------------- CBC DECRYPT ------------------------------# .align 16 .Lcbc_decrypt: cmp \$16,$len jne .Lcbc_decrypt_bulk # handle single block without allocating stack frame, # useful in ciphertext stealing mode movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load input movdqu ($ivp),$inout1 # load iv movdqa $inout0,$inout2 # future iv ___ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rnds_); $code.=<<___; pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 movdqu $inout2,($ivp) # store iv xorps $inout1,$inout0 # ^=iv pxor $inout1,$inout1 movups $inout0,($out) # store output pxor $inout0,$inout0 jmp .Lcbc_ret .align 16 .Lcbc_decrypt_bulk: lea (%rsp),%rax push %rbp sub \$$frame_size,%rsp and \$-16,%rsp # Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x60(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x70(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x80(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x90(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0xa0(%rsp) .Lcbc_decrypt_body: ___ $code.=<<___; lea -8(%rax),%rbp movups ($ivp),$iv mov $rnds_,$rounds cmp \$0x50,$len jbe .Lcbc_dec_tail $movkey ($key),$rndkey0 movdqu 0x00($inp),$inout0 # load input movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1 movdqa $inout0,$in0 movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2 movdqa $inout1,$in1 movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3 movdqa $inout2,$in2 movdqu 0x40($inp),$inout4 movdqa $inout3,$in3 movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5 movdqa $inout4,$in4 mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r9d cmp \$0x70,$len jbe .Lcbc_dec_six_or_seven and \$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r9d # isolate XSAVE+MOVBE sub \$0x50,$len # $len is biased by -5*16 cmp \$`1<<22`,%r9d # check for MOVBE without XSAVE je .Lcbc_dec_loop6_enter # [which denotes Atom Silvermont] sub \$0x20,$len # $len is biased by -7*16 lea 0x70($key),$key # size optimization jmp .Lcbc_dec_loop8_enter .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_loop8: movups $inout7,($out) lea 0x10($out),$out .Lcbc_dec_loop8_enter: movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6 pxor $rndkey0,$inout0 movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7 pxor $rndkey0,$inout1 $movkey 0x10-0x70($key),$rndkey1 pxor $rndkey0,$inout2 xor $inp_,$inp_ cmp \$0x70,$len # is there at least 0x60 bytes ahead? pxor $rndkey0,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0,$inout4 pxor $rndkey0,$inout5 pxor $rndkey0,$inout6 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 pxor $rndkey0,$inout7 $movkey 0x20-0x70($key),$rndkey0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout6 setnc ${inp_}b shl \$7,$inp_ aesdec $rndkey1,$inout7 add $inp,$inp_ $movkey 0x30-0x70($key),$rndkey1 ___ for($i=1;$i<12;$i++) { my $rndkeyx = ($i&1)?$rndkey0:$rndkey1; $code.=<<___ if ($i==7); cmp \$11,$rounds ___ $code.=<<___; aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout0 aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout1 aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout2 aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout3 aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout4 aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout5 aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout6 aesdec $rndkeyx,$inout7 $movkey `0x30+0x10*$i`-0x70($key),$rndkeyx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<6 || (!($i&1) && $i>7)); nop ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==7); jb .Lcbc_dec_done ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==9); je .Lcbc_dec_done ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==11); jmp .Lcbc_dec_done ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_done: aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout1 pxor $rndkey0,$iv pxor $rndkey0,$in0 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout3 pxor $rndkey0,$in1 pxor $rndkey0,$in2 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout5 pxor $rndkey0,$in3 pxor $rndkey0,$in4 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout6 aesdec $rndkey1,$inout7 movdqu 0x50($inp),$rndkey1 aesdeclast $iv,$inout0 movdqu 0x60($inp),$iv # borrow $iv pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey1 aesdeclast $in0,$inout1 pxor $rndkey0,$iv movdqu 0x70($inp),$rndkey0 # next IV aesdeclast $in1,$inout2 lea 0x80($inp),$inp movdqu 0x00($inp_),$in0 aesdeclast $in2,$inout3 aesdeclast $in3,$inout4 movdqu 0x10($inp_),$in1 movdqu 0x20($inp_),$in2 aesdeclast $in4,$inout5 aesdeclast $rndkey1,$inout6 movdqu 0x30($inp_),$in3 movdqu 0x40($inp_),$in4 aesdeclast $iv,$inout7 movdqa $rndkey0,$iv # return $iv movdqu 0x50($inp_),$rndkey1 $movkey -0x70($key),$rndkey0 movups $inout0,($out) # store output movdqa $in0,$inout0 movups $inout1,0x10($out) movdqa $in1,$inout1 movups $inout2,0x20($out) movdqa $in2,$inout2 movups $inout3,0x30($out) movdqa $in3,$inout3 movups $inout4,0x40($out) movdqa $in4,$inout4 movups $inout5,0x50($out) movdqa $rndkey1,$inout5 movups $inout6,0x60($out) lea 0x70($out),$out sub \$0x80,$len ja .Lcbc_dec_loop8 movaps $inout7,$inout0 lea -0x70($key),$key add \$0x70,$len jle .Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected movups $inout7,($out) lea 0x10($out),$out cmp \$0x50,$len jbe .Lcbc_dec_tail movaps $in0,$inout0 .Lcbc_dec_six_or_seven: cmp \$0x60,$len ja .Lcbc_dec_seven movaps $inout5,$inout6 call _aesni_decrypt6 pxor $iv,$inout0 # ^= IV movaps $inout6,$iv pxor $in0,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) pxor $in1,$inout2 movdqu $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank pxor $in2,$inout3 movdqu $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 pxor $in3,$inout4 movdqu $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 pxor $in4,$inout5 movdqu $inout4,0x40($out) pxor $inout4,$inout4 lea 0x50($out),$out movdqa $inout5,$inout0 pxor $inout5,$inout5 jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_seven: movups 0x60($inp),$inout6 xorps $inout7,$inout7 call _aesni_decrypt8 movups 0x50($inp),$inout7 pxor $iv,$inout0 # ^= IV movups 0x60($inp),$iv pxor $in0,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) pxor $in1,$inout2 movdqu $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank pxor $in2,$inout3 movdqu $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 pxor $in3,$inout4 movdqu $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 pxor $in4,$inout5 movdqu $inout4,0x40($out) pxor $inout4,$inout4 pxor $inout7,$inout6 movdqu $inout5,0x50($out) pxor $inout5,$inout5 lea 0x60($out),$out movdqa $inout6,$inout0 pxor $inout6,$inout6 pxor $inout7,$inout7 jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_loop6: movups $inout5,($out) lea 0x10($out),$out movdqu 0x00($inp),$inout0 # load input movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1 movdqa $inout0,$in0 movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2 movdqa $inout1,$in1 movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3 movdqa $inout2,$in2 movdqu 0x40($inp),$inout4 movdqa $inout3,$in3 movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5 movdqa $inout4,$in4 .Lcbc_dec_loop6_enter: lea 0x60($inp),$inp movdqa $inout5,$inout6 call _aesni_decrypt6 pxor $iv,$inout0 # ^= IV movdqa $inout6,$iv pxor $in0,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) pxor $in1,$inout2 movdqu $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $in2,$inout3 movdqu $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $in3,$inout4 mov $key_,$key movdqu $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $in4,$inout5 mov $rnds_,$rounds movdqu $inout4,0x40($out) lea 0x50($out),$out sub \$0x60,$len ja .Lcbc_dec_loop6 movdqa $inout5,$inout0 add \$0x50,$len jle .Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected movups $inout5,($out) lea 0x10($out),$out .Lcbc_dec_tail: movups ($inp),$inout0 sub \$0x10,$len jbe .Lcbc_dec_one # $len is 1*16 or less movups 0x10($inp),$inout1 movaps $inout0,$in0 sub \$0x10,$len jbe .Lcbc_dec_two # $len is 2*16 or less movups 0x20($inp),$inout2 movaps $inout1,$in1 sub \$0x10,$len jbe .Lcbc_dec_three # $len is 3*16 or less movups 0x30($inp),$inout3 movaps $inout2,$in2 sub \$0x10,$len jbe .Lcbc_dec_four # $len is 4*16 or less movups 0x40($inp),$inout4 # $len is 5*16 or less movaps $inout3,$in3 movaps $inout4,$in4 xorps $inout5,$inout5 call _aesni_decrypt6 pxor $iv,$inout0 movaps $in4,$iv pxor $in0,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) pxor $in1,$inout2 movdqu $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank pxor $in2,$inout3 movdqu $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 pxor $in3,$inout4 movdqu $inout3,0x30($out) pxor $inout3,$inout3 lea 0x40($out),$out movdqa $inout4,$inout0 pxor $inout4,$inout4 pxor $inout5,$inout5 sub \$0x10,$len jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_one: movaps $inout0,$in0 ___ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds); $code.=<<___; xorps $iv,$inout0 movaps $in0,$iv jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_two: movaps $inout1,$in1 call _aesni_decrypt2 pxor $iv,$inout0 movaps $in1,$iv pxor $in0,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) movdqa $inout1,$inout0 pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank lea 0x10($out),$out jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_three: movaps $inout2,$in2 call _aesni_decrypt3 pxor $iv,$inout0 movaps $in2,$iv pxor $in0,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) pxor $in1,$inout2 movdqu $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank movdqa $inout2,$inout0 pxor $inout2,$inout2 lea 0x20($out),$out jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_four: movaps $inout3,$in3 call _aesni_decrypt4 pxor $iv,$inout0 movaps $in3,$iv pxor $in0,$inout1 movdqu $inout0,($out) pxor $in1,$inout2 movdqu $inout1,0x10($out) pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank pxor $in2,$inout3 movdqu $inout2,0x20($out) pxor $inout2,$inout2 movdqa $inout3,$inout0 pxor $inout3,$inout3 lea 0x30($out),$out jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected: pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank pxor $inout2,$inout2 pxor $inout3,$inout3 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); pxor $inout4,$inout4 # %xmm6..9 pxor $inout5,$inout5 pxor $inout6,$inout6 pxor $inout7,$inout7 ___ $code.=<<___; .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected: movups $iv,($ivp) and \$15,$len jnz .Lcbc_dec_tail_partial movups $inout0,($out) pxor $inout0,$inout0 jmp .Lcbc_dec_ret .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_tail_partial: movaps $inout0,(%rsp) pxor $inout0,$inout0 mov \$16,%rcx mov $out,%rdi sub $len,%rcx lea (%rsp),%rsi .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb movdqa $inout0,(%rsp) .Lcbc_dec_ret: xorps $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # %xmm0 pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) # clear stack movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp) movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp) movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp) movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp) movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp) movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp) movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps %xmm0,0x80(%rsp) movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps %xmm0,0x90(%rsp) movaps 0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15 movaps %xmm0,0xa0(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%rbp),%rsp pop %rbp .Lcbc_ret: ret .size ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt ___ } # int ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *inp, # int bits, AES_KEY *key) # # input: $inp user-supplied key # $bits $inp length in bits # $key pointer to key schedule # output: %eax 0 denoting success, -1 or -2 - failure (see C) # *$key key schedule # { my ($inp,$bits,$key) = @_4args; $bits =~ s/%r/%e/; $code.=<<___; .globl ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key .type ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key: .byte 0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x08 # sub rsp,8 call __aesni_set_encrypt_key shl \$4,$bits # rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key test %eax,%eax jnz .Ldec_key_ret lea 16($key,$bits),$inp # points at the end of key schedule $movkey ($key),%xmm0 # just swap $movkey ($inp),%xmm1 $movkey %xmm0,($inp) $movkey %xmm1,($key) lea 16($key),$key lea -16($inp),$inp .Ldec_key_inverse: $movkey ($key),%xmm0 # swap and inverse $movkey ($inp),%xmm1 aesimc %xmm0,%xmm0 aesimc %xmm1,%xmm1 lea 16($key),$key lea -16($inp),$inp $movkey %xmm0,16($inp) $movkey %xmm1,-16($key) cmp $key,$inp ja .Ldec_key_inverse $movkey ($key),%xmm0 # inverse middle aesimc %xmm0,%xmm0 pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 $movkey %xmm0,($inp) pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 .Ldec_key_ret: add \$8,%rsp ret .LSEH_end_set_decrypt_key: .size ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key ___ # This is based on submission by # # Huang Ying # Vinodh Gopal # Kahraman Akdemir # # Aggressively optimized in respect to aeskeygenassist's critical path # and is contained in %xmm0-5 to meet Win64 ABI requirement. # # int ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *inp, # int bits, AES_KEY * const key); # # input: $inp user-supplied key # $bits $inp length in bits # $key pointer to key schedule # output: %eax 0 denoting success, -1 or -2 - failure (see C) # $bits rounds-1 (used in aesni_set_decrypt_key) # *$key key schedule # $key pointer to key schedule (used in # aesni_set_decrypt_key) # # Subroutine is frame-less, which means that only volatile registers # are used. Note that it's declared "abi-omnipotent", which means that # amount of volatile registers is smaller on Windows. # $code.=<<___; .globl ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .type ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key: __aesni_set_encrypt_key: .byte 0x48,0x83,0xEC,0x08 # sub rsp,8 mov \$-1,%rax test $inp,$inp jz .Lenc_key_ret test $key,$key jz .Lenc_key_ret mov \$`1<<28|1<<11`,%r10d # AVX and XOP bits movups ($inp),%xmm0 # pull first 128 bits of *userKey xorps %xmm4,%xmm4 # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0 and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r10d lea 16($key),%rax # %rax is used as modifiable copy of $key cmp \$256,$bits je .L14rounds cmp \$192,$bits je .L12rounds cmp \$128,$bits jne .Lbad_keybits .L10rounds: mov \$9,$bits # 10 rounds for 128-bit key cmp \$`1<<28`,%r10d # AVX, bit no XOP je .L10rounds_alt $movkey %xmm0,($key) # round 0 aeskeygenassist \$0x1,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 1 call .Lkey_expansion_128_cold aeskeygenassist \$0x2,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 2 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x4,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 3 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x8,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 4 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x10,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 5 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x20,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 6 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x40,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 7 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x80,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 8 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x1b,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 9 call .Lkey_expansion_128 aeskeygenassist \$0x36,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 10 call .Lkey_expansion_128 $movkey %xmm0,(%rax) mov $bits,80(%rax) # 240(%rdx) xor %eax,%eax jmp .Lenc_key_ret .align 16 .L10rounds_alt: movdqa .Lkey_rotate(%rip),%xmm5 mov \$8,%r10d movdqa .Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4 movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2 movdqu %xmm0,($key) jmp .Loop_key128 .align 16 .Loop_key128: pshufb %xmm5,%xmm0 aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm0 pslld \$1,%xmm4 lea 16(%rax),%rax movdqa %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,-16(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2 dec %r10d jnz .Loop_key128 movdqa .Lkey_rcon1b(%rip),%xmm4 pshufb %xmm5,%xmm0 aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm0 pslld \$1,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2 pshufb %xmm5,%xmm0 aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm2 pxor %xmm2,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,16(%rax) mov $bits,96(%rax) # 240($key) xor %eax,%eax jmp .Lenc_key_ret .align 16 .L12rounds: movq 16($inp),%xmm2 # remaining 1/3 of *userKey mov \$11,$bits # 12 rounds for 192 cmp \$`1<<28`,%r10d # AVX, but no XOP je .L12rounds_alt $movkey %xmm0,($key) # round 0 aeskeygenassist \$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 1,2 call .Lkey_expansion_192a_cold aeskeygenassist \$0x2,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 2,3 call .Lkey_expansion_192b aeskeygenassist \$0x4,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 4,5 call .Lkey_expansion_192a aeskeygenassist \$0x8,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 5,6 call .Lkey_expansion_192b aeskeygenassist \$0x10,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 7,8 call .Lkey_expansion_192a aeskeygenassist \$0x20,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 8,9 call .Lkey_expansion_192b aeskeygenassist \$0x40,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 10,11 call .Lkey_expansion_192a aeskeygenassist \$0x80,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 11,12 call .Lkey_expansion_192b $movkey %xmm0,(%rax) mov $bits,48(%rax) # 240(%rdx) xor %rax, %rax jmp .Lenc_key_ret .align 16 .L12rounds_alt: movdqa .Lkey_rotate192(%rip),%xmm5 movdqa .Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4 mov \$8,%r10d movdqu %xmm0,($key) jmp .Loop_key192 .align 16 .Loop_key192: movq %xmm2,0(%rax) movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1 pshufb %xmm5,%xmm2 aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm2 pslld \$1, %xmm4 lea 24(%rax),%rax movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm0 pxor %xmm0,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm0 pxor %xmm0,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm0 pxor %xmm3,%xmm0 pshufd \$0xff,%xmm0,%xmm3 pxor %xmm1,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm3 pxor %xmm2,%xmm0 pxor %xmm3,%xmm2 movdqu %xmm0,-16(%rax) dec %r10d jnz .Loop_key192 mov $bits,32(%rax) # 240($key) xor %eax,%eax jmp .Lenc_key_ret .align 16 .L14rounds: movups 16($inp),%xmm2 # remaning half of *userKey mov \$13,$bits # 14 rounds for 256 lea 16(%rax),%rax cmp \$`1<<28`,%r10d # AVX, but no XOP je .L14rounds_alt $movkey %xmm0,($key) # round 0 $movkey %xmm2,16($key) # round 1 aeskeygenassist \$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 2 call .Lkey_expansion_256a_cold aeskeygenassist \$0x1,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 3 call .Lkey_expansion_256b aeskeygenassist \$0x2,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 4 call .Lkey_expansion_256a aeskeygenassist \$0x2,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 5 call .Lkey_expansion_256b aeskeygenassist \$0x4,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 6 call .Lkey_expansion_256a aeskeygenassist \$0x4,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 7 call .Lkey_expansion_256b aeskeygenassist \$0x8,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 8 call .Lkey_expansion_256a aeskeygenassist \$0x8,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 9 call .Lkey_expansion_256b aeskeygenassist \$0x10,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 10 call .Lkey_expansion_256a aeskeygenassist \$0x10,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 11 call .Lkey_expansion_256b aeskeygenassist \$0x20,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 12 call .Lkey_expansion_256a aeskeygenassist \$0x20,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 13 call .Lkey_expansion_256b aeskeygenassist \$0x40,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 14 call .Lkey_expansion_256a $movkey %xmm0,(%rax) mov $bits,16(%rax) # 240(%rdx) xor %rax,%rax jmp .Lenc_key_ret .align 16 .L14rounds_alt: movdqa .Lkey_rotate(%rip),%xmm5 movdqa .Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4 mov \$7,%r10d movdqu %xmm0,0($key) movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1 movdqu %xmm2,16($key) jmp .Loop_key256 .align 16 .Loop_key256: pshufb %xmm5,%xmm2 aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm0 pxor %xmm0,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm0 pxor %xmm0,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm0 pxor %xmm3,%xmm0 pslld \$1,%xmm4 pxor %xmm2,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm0,(%rax) dec %r10d jz .Ldone_key256 pshufd \$0xff,%xmm0,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 aesenclast %xmm3,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm3 pslldq \$4,%xmm1 pxor %xmm3,%xmm1 pxor %xmm1,%xmm2 movdqu %xmm2,16(%rax) lea 32(%rax),%rax movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1 jmp .Loop_key256 .Ldone_key256: mov $bits,16(%rax) # 240($key) xor %eax,%eax jmp .Lenc_key_ret .align 16 .Lbad_keybits: mov \$-2,%rax .Lenc_key_ret: pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 add \$8,%rsp ret .LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key: .align 16 .Lkey_expansion_128: $movkey %xmm0,(%rax) lea 16(%rax),%rax .Lkey_expansion_128_cold: shufps \$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4 xorps %xmm4, %xmm0 shufps \$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4 xorps %xmm4, %xmm0 shufps \$0b11111111,%xmm1,%xmm1 # critical path xorps %xmm1,%xmm0 ret .align 16 .Lkey_expansion_192a: $movkey %xmm0,(%rax) lea 16(%rax),%rax .Lkey_expansion_192a_cold: movaps %xmm2, %xmm5 .Lkey_expansion_192b_warm: shufps \$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm2,%xmm3 xorps %xmm4,%xmm0 shufps \$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4 pslldq \$4,%xmm3 xorps %xmm4,%xmm0 pshufd \$0b01010101,%xmm1,%xmm1 # critical path pxor %xmm3,%xmm2 pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 pshufd \$0b11111111,%xmm0,%xmm3 pxor %xmm3,%xmm2 ret .align 16 .Lkey_expansion_192b: movaps %xmm0,%xmm3 shufps \$0b01000100,%xmm0,%xmm5 $movkey %xmm5,(%rax) shufps \$0b01001110,%xmm2,%xmm3 $movkey %xmm3,16(%rax) lea 32(%rax),%rax jmp .Lkey_expansion_192b_warm .align 16 .Lkey_expansion_256a: $movkey %xmm2,(%rax) lea 16(%rax),%rax .Lkey_expansion_256a_cold: shufps \$0b00010000,%xmm0,%xmm4 xorps %xmm4,%xmm0 shufps \$0b10001100,%xmm0,%xmm4 xorps %xmm4,%xmm0 shufps \$0b11111111,%xmm1,%xmm1 # critical path xorps %xmm1,%xmm0 ret .align 16 .Lkey_expansion_256b: $movkey %xmm0,(%rax) lea 16(%rax),%rax shufps \$0b00010000,%xmm2,%xmm4 xorps %xmm4,%xmm2 shufps \$0b10001100,%xmm2,%xmm4 xorps %xmm4,%xmm2 shufps \$0b10101010,%xmm1,%xmm1 # critical path xorps %xmm1,%xmm2 ret .size ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .size __aesni_set_encrypt_key,.-__aesni_set_encrypt_key ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .Lbswap_mask: .byte 15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0 .Lincrement32: .long 6,6,6,0 .Lincrement64: .long 1,0,0,0 .Lxts_magic: .long 0x87,0,1,0 .Lincrement1: .byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 .Lkey_rotate: .long 0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d .Lkey_rotate192: .long 0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605 .Lkey_rcon1: .long 1,1,1,1 .Lkey_rcon1b: .long 0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b .asciz "AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind ___ $code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); .type ecb_ccm64_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ecb_ccm64_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail lea 0(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$8,%ecx # 4*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq lea 0x58(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail .size ecb_ccm64_se_handler,.-ecb_ccm64_se_handler .type ctr_xts_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ctr_xts_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue lable cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 160($context),%rax # pull context->Rbp lea -0xa0(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # & context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq jmp .Lcommon_rbp_tail .size ctr_xts_se_handler,.-ctr_xts_se_handler .type ocb_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ocb_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue lable cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 8(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[2] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=pop label jae .Locb_no_xmm mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp lea (%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # & context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq lea 0xa0+0x28(%rax),%rax .Locb_no_xmm: mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail .size ocb_se_handler,.-ocb_se_handler ___ $code.=<<___; .type cbc_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 cbc_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lcbc_decrypt_bulk(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<"prologue" label jb .Lcommon_seh_tail lea .Lcbc_decrypt_body(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRip>="epilogue" label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail lea 16(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lcommon_rbp_tail: mov 160($context),%rax # pull context->Rbp mov (%rax),%rbp # restore saved %rbp lea 8(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail .Lrestore_cbc_rax: mov 120($context),%rax .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_ecb_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_ecb_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_ecb .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks .rva .LSEH_info_ccm64_enc .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks .rva .LSEH_info_ccm64_dec .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks .rva .LSEH_info_ctr32 .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_xts_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_xts_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_xts_enc .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_xts_decrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_xts_decrypt .rva .LSEH_info_xts_dec .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_ocb_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_ocb_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_ocb_enc .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_ocb_decrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_ocb_decrypt .rva .LSEH_info_ocb_dec ___ $code.=<<___; .rva .LSEH_begin_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_cbc .rva ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_end_set_decrypt_key .rva .LSEH_info_key .rva ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key .rva .LSEH_info_key .section .xdata .align 8 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni"); .LSEH_info_ecb: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ecb_ccm64_se_handler .rva .Lecb_enc_body,.Lecb_enc_ret # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_ccm64_enc: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ecb_ccm64_se_handler .rva .Lccm64_enc_body,.Lccm64_enc_ret # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_ccm64_dec: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ecb_ccm64_se_handler .rva .Lccm64_dec_body,.Lccm64_dec_ret # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_ctr32: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ctr_xts_se_handler .rva .Lctr32_body,.Lctr32_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_xts_enc: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ctr_xts_se_handler .rva .Lxts_enc_body,.Lxts_enc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_xts_dec: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ctr_xts_se_handler .rva .Lxts_dec_body,.Lxts_dec_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_ocb_enc: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ocb_se_handler .rva .Locb_enc_body,.Locb_enc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .rva .Locb_enc_pop .long 0 .LSEH_info_ocb_dec: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ocb_se_handler .rva .Locb_dec_body,.Locb_dec_epilogue # HandlerData[] .rva .Locb_dec_pop .long 0 ___ $code.=<<___; .LSEH_info_cbc: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva cbc_se_handler .LSEH_info_key: .byte 0x01,0x04,0x01,0x00 .byte 0x04,0x02,0x00,0x00 # sub rsp,8 ___ } sub rex { local *opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src)=@_; my $rex=0; $rex|=0x04 if($dst>=8); $rex|=0x01 if($src>=8); push @opcode,$rex|0x40 if($rex); } sub aesni { my $line=shift; my @opcode=(0x66); if ($line=~/(aeskeygenassist)\s+\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { rex(\@opcode,$4,$3); push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf; push @opcode,0xc0|($3&7)|(($4&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$2; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my %opcodelet = ( "aesimc" => 0xdb, "aesenc" => 0xdc, "aesenclast" => 0xdd, "aesdec" => 0xde, "aesdeclast" => 0xdf ); return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1})); rex(\@opcode,$3,$2); push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1}; push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } elsif ($line=~/(aes[a-z]+)\s+([0x1-9a-fA-F]*)\(%rsp\),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my %opcodelet = ( "aesenc" => 0xdc, "aesenclast" => 0xdd, "aesdec" => 0xde, "aesdeclast" => 0xdf ); return undef if (!defined($opcodelet{$1})); my $off = $2; push @opcode,0x44 if ($3>=8); push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet{$1}; push @opcode,0x44|(($3&7)<<3),0x24; # ModR/M push @opcode,($off=~/^0/?oct($off):$off)&0xff; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } return $line; } sub movbe { ".byte 0x0f,0x38,0xf1,0x44,0x24,".shift; } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; $code =~ s/\b(aes.*%xmm[0-9]+).*$/aesni($1)/gem; #$code =~ s/\bmovbe\s+%eax/bswap %eax; mov %eax/gm; # debugging artefact $code =~ s/\bmovbe\s+%eax,\s*([0-9]+)\(%rsp\)/movbe($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000012263613176625656020342 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # January 2013 # # This is AESNI-CBC+SHA256 stitch implementation. The idea, as spelled # in http://download.intel.com/design/intarch/papers/323686.pdf, is # that since AESNI-CBC encrypt exhibit *very* low instruction-level # parallelism, interleaving it with another algorithm would allow to # utilize processor resources better and achieve better performance. # SHA256 instruction sequences(*) are taken from sha512-x86_64.pl and # AESNI code is weaved into it. As SHA256 dominates execution time, # stitch performance does not depend on AES key length. Below are # performance numbers in cycles per processed byte, less is better, # for standalone AESNI-CBC encrypt, standalone SHA256, and stitched # subroutine: # # AES-128/-192/-256+SHA256 this(**) gain # Sandy Bridge 5.05/6.05/7.05+11.6 13.0 +28%/36%/43% # Ivy Bridge 5.05/6.05/7.05+10.3 11.6 +32%/41%/50% # Haswell 4.43/5.29/6.19+7.80 8.79 +39%/49%/59% # Skylake 2.62/3.14/3.62+7.70 8.10 +27%/34%/40% # Bulldozer 5.77/6.89/8.00+13.7 13.7 +42%/50%/58% # Ryzen(***) 2.71/-/3.71+2.05 2.74/-/3.73 +74%/-/54% # Goldmont(***) 3.82/-/5.35+4.16 4.73/-/5.94 +69%/-/60% # # (*) there are XOP, AVX1 and AVX2 code paths, meaning that # Westmere is omitted from loop, this is because gain was not # estimated high enough to justify the effort; # (**) these are EVP-free results, results obtained with 'speed # -evp aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256' will vary by percent or two; # (***) these are SHAEXT results; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } $shaext=$avx; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 $avx=1 if (!$shaext && $avx); open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; $func="aesni_cbc_sha256_enc"; $TABLE="K256"; $SZ=4; @ROT=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx", "%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d"); ($T1,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=("%r12d","%r13d","%r14d","%r15d","%esi"); @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 7,18, 3); @sigma1=(17,19,10); $rounds=64; ######################################################################## # void aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(const void *inp, # void *out, # size_t length, # const AES_KEY *key, # unsigned char *iv, # SHA256_CTX *ctx, # const void *in0); ($inp, $out, $len, $key, $ivp, $ctx, $in0) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10"); $Tbl="%rbp"; $_inp="16*$SZ+0*8(%rsp)"; $_out="16*$SZ+1*8(%rsp)"; $_end="16*$SZ+2*8(%rsp)"; $_key="16*$SZ+3*8(%rsp)"; $_ivp="16*$SZ+4*8(%rsp)"; $_ctx="16*$SZ+5*8(%rsp)"; $_in0="16*$SZ+6*8(%rsp)"; $_rsp="16*$SZ+7*8(%rsp)"; $framesz=16*$SZ+8*8; $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl $func .type $func,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 $func: ___ if ($avx) { $code.=<<___; lea OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r11 mov \$1,%eax cmp \$0,`$win64?"%rcx":"%rdi"` je .Lprobe mov 0(%r11),%eax mov 4(%r11),%r10 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); bt \$61,%r10 # check for SHA jc ${func}_shaext ___ $code.=<<___; mov %r10,%r11 shr \$32,%r11 test \$`1<<11`,%r10d # check for XOP jnz ${func}_xop ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); and \$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d # check for BMI2+AVX2+BMI1 cmp \$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d je ${func}_avx2 ___ $code.=<<___; and \$`1<<28`,%r10d # check for AVX jnz ${func}_avx ud2 ___ } $code.=<<___; xor %eax,%eax cmp \$0,`$win64?"%rcx":"%rdi"` je .Lprobe ud2 .Lprobe: ret .size $func,.-$func .align 64 .type $TABLE,\@object $TABLE: .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f .long 0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0, -1,-1,-1,-1 .long 0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0 .asciz "AESNI-CBC+SHA256 stitch for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 ___ ###################################################################### # SIMD code paths # {{{ ($iv,$inout,$roundkey,$temp, $mask10,$mask12,$mask14,$offload)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15)); $aesni_cbc_idx=0; @aesni_cbc_block = ( ## &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x00-0x80($inp)");' ## &vmovdqu ($inout,($inp)); ## &mov ($_inp,$inp); '&vpxor ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x10-0x80($inp)");', '&vpxor ($inout,$inout,$iv);', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x20-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x30-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x40-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x50-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x60-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x70-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x80-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x90-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0xa0-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenclast ($temp,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0xb0-0x80($inp)");', '&vpand ($iv,$temp,$mask10);'. ' &vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0xc0-0x80($inp)");', '&vaesenclast ($temp,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0xd0-0x80($inp)");', '&vpand ($temp,$temp,$mask12);'. ' &vaesenc ($inout,$inout,$roundkey);'. '&vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0xe0-0x80($inp)");', '&vpor ($iv,$iv,$temp);'. ' &vaesenclast ($temp,$inout,$roundkey);'. ' &vmovdqu ($roundkey,"0x00-0x80($inp)");' ## &mov ($inp,$_inp); ## &mov ($out,$_out); ## &vpand ($temp,$temp,$mask14); ## &vpor ($iv,$iv,$temp); ## &vmovdqu ($iv,($out,$inp); ## &lea (inp,16($inp)); ); my $a4=$T1; my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h); sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; my $arg = pop; $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n"; } sub body_00_15 () { ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'. '&ror ($a0,$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1])', '&mov ($a,$a1)', '&mov ($a4,$f)', '&xor ($a0,$e)', '&ror ($a1,$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1])', '&xor ($a4,$g)', # f^g '&ror ($a0,$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0])', '&xor ($a1,$a)', '&and ($a4,$e)', # (f^g)&e @aesni_cbc_block[$aesni_cbc_idx++]. '&xor ($a0,$e)', '&add ($h,$SZ*($i&15)."(%rsp)")', # h+=X[i]+K[i] '&mov ($a2,$a)', '&ror ($a1,$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0])', '&xor ($a4,$g)', # Ch(e,f,g)=((f^g)&e)^g '&xor ($a2,$b)', # a^b, b^c in next round '&ror ($a0,$Sigma1[0])', # Sigma1(e) '&add ($h,$a4)', # h+=Ch(e,f,g) '&and ($a3,$a2)', # (b^c)&(a^b) '&xor ($a1,$a)', '&add ($h,$a0)', # h+=Sigma1(e) '&xor ($a3,$b)', # Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b) '&add ($d,$h)', # d+=h '&ror ($a1,$Sigma0[0])', # Sigma0(a) '&add ($h,$a3)', # h+=Maj(a,b,c) '&mov ($a0,$d)', '&add ($a1,$h);'. # h+=Sigma0(a) '($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;' ); } if ($avx) {{ ###################################################################### # XOP code path # $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_xop,\@function,6 .align 64 ${func}_xop: .Lxop_shortcut: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$in0 # load 7th parameter push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp sub \$`$framesz+$win64*16*10`,%rsp and \$-64,%rsp # align stack frame shl \$6,$len sub $inp,$out # re-bias sub $inp,$in0 add $inp,$len # end of input #mov $inp,$_inp # saved later mov $out,$_out mov $len,$_end #mov $key,$_key # remains resident in $inp register mov $ivp,$_ivp mov $ctx,$_ctx mov $in0,$_in0 mov %r11,$_rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lprologue_xop: vzeroall mov $inp,%r12 # borrow $a4 lea 0x80($key),$inp # size optimization, reassign lea $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds+32`(%rip),%r13 # borrow $a0 mov 0xf0-0x80($inp),%r14d # rounds, borrow $a1 mov $ctx,%r15 # borrow $a2 mov $in0,%rsi # borrow $a3 vmovdqu ($ivp),$iv # load IV sub \$9,%r14 mov $SZ*0(%r15),$A mov $SZ*1(%r15),$B mov $SZ*2(%r15),$C mov $SZ*3(%r15),$D mov $SZ*4(%r15),$E mov $SZ*5(%r15),$F mov $SZ*6(%r15),$G mov $SZ*7(%r15),$H vmovdqa 0x00(%r13,%r14,8),$mask14 vmovdqa 0x10(%r13,%r14,8),$mask12 vmovdqa 0x20(%r13,%r14,8),$mask10 vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($inp),$roundkey jmp .Lloop_xop ___ if ($SZ==4) { # SHA256 my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(4..7)); $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lloop_xop: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu 0x00(%rsi,%r12),@X[0] vmovdqu 0x10(%rsi,%r12),@X[1] vmovdqu 0x20(%rsi,%r12),@X[2] vmovdqu 0x30(%rsi,%r12),@X[3] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] vpaddd 0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vpaddd 0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpaddd 0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddd 0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) mov $A,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x10(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x20(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x30(%rsp) mov $E,$a0 jmp .Lxop_00_47 .align 16 .Lxop_00_47: sub \$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl # size optimization vmovdqu (%r12),$inout # $a4 mov %r12,$_inp # $a4 ___ sub XOP_256_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 104 instructions &vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ); # X[1..4] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpalignr ($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ); # X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld ($t0,$t0,$sigma0[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[0..3] += X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t2,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t3,@X[3],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2); # sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld ($t2,@X[3],$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t0); # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t1); # sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrldq ($t3,$t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t3,@X[0],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld ($t2,@X[0],$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t1); # sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslldq ($t3,$t3,8); # 22 instructions eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2); } $aesni_cbc_idx=0; for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &XOP_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &mov ("%r12",$_inp); # borrow $a4 &vpand ($temp,$temp,$mask14); &mov ("%r15",$_out); # borrow $a2 &vpor ($iv,$iv,$temp); &vmovdqu ("(%r15,%r12)",$iv); # write output &lea ("%r12","16(%r12)"); # inp++ &cmpb ($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lxop_00_47"); &vmovdqu ($inout,"(%r12)"); &mov ($_inp,"%r12"); $aesni_cbc_idx=0; for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } } $code.=<<___; mov $_inp,%r12 # borrow $a4 mov $_out,%r13 # borrow $a0 mov $_ctx,%r15 # borrow $a2 mov $_in0,%rsi # borrow $a3 vpand $mask14,$temp,$temp mov $a1,$A vpor $temp,$iv,$iv vmovdqu $iv,(%r13,%r12) # write output lea 16(%r12),%r12 # inp++ add $SZ*0(%r15),$A add $SZ*1(%r15),$B add $SZ*2(%r15),$C add $SZ*3(%r15),$D add $SZ*4(%r15),$E add $SZ*5(%r15),$F add $SZ*6(%r15),$G add $SZ*7(%r15),$H cmp $_end,%r12 mov $A,$SZ*0(%r15) mov $B,$SZ*1(%r15) mov $C,$SZ*2(%r15) mov $D,$SZ*3(%r15) mov $E,$SZ*4(%r15) mov $F,$SZ*5(%r15) mov $G,$SZ*6(%r15) mov $H,$SZ*7(%r15) jb .Lloop_xop mov $_ivp,$ivp mov $_rsp,%rsi vmovdqu $iv,($ivp) # output IV vzeroall ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps `$framesz+16*0`(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps `$framesz+16*1`(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps `$framesz+16*2`(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps `$framesz+16*3`(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps `$framesz+16*4`(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps `$framesz+16*5`(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps `$framesz+16*6`(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps `$framesz+16*7`(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps `$framesz+16*8`(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps `$framesz+16*9`(%rsp),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_xop: ret .size ${func}_xop,.-${func}_xop ___ ###################################################################### # AVX+shrd code path # local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_avx,\@function,6 .align 64 ${func}_avx: .Lavx_shortcut: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$in0 # load 7th parameter push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp sub \$`$framesz+$win64*16*10`,%rsp and \$-64,%rsp # align stack frame shl \$6,$len sub $inp,$out # re-bias sub $inp,$in0 add $inp,$len # end of input #mov $inp,$_inp # saved later mov $out,$_out mov $len,$_end #mov $key,$_key # remains resident in $inp register mov $ivp,$_ivp mov $ctx,$_ctx mov $in0,$_in0 mov %r11,$_rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lprologue_avx: vzeroall mov $inp,%r12 # borrow $a4 lea 0x80($key),$inp # size optimization, reassign lea $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds+32`(%rip),%r13 # borrow $a0 mov 0xf0-0x80($inp),%r14d # rounds, borrow $a1 mov $ctx,%r15 # borrow $a2 mov $in0,%rsi # borrow $a3 vmovdqu ($ivp),$iv # load IV sub \$9,%r14 mov $SZ*0(%r15),$A mov $SZ*1(%r15),$B mov $SZ*2(%r15),$C mov $SZ*3(%r15),$D mov $SZ*4(%r15),$E mov $SZ*5(%r15),$F mov $SZ*6(%r15),$G mov $SZ*7(%r15),$H vmovdqa 0x00(%r13,%r14,8),$mask14 vmovdqa 0x10(%r13,%r14,8),$mask12 vmovdqa 0x20(%r13,%r14,8),$mask10 vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($inp),$roundkey ___ if ($SZ==4) { # SHA256 my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(4..7)); $code.=<<___; jmp .Lloop_avx .align 16 .Lloop_avx: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu 0x00(%rsi,%r12),@X[0] vmovdqu 0x10(%rsi,%r12),@X[1] vmovdqu 0x20(%rsi,%r12),@X[2] vmovdqu 0x30(%rsi,%r12),@X[3] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] vpaddd 0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vpaddd 0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpaddd 0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddd 0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) mov $A,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x10(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x20(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x30(%rsp) mov $E,$a0 jmp .Lavx_00_47 .align 16 .Lavx_00_47: sub \$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl # size optimization vmovdqu (%r12),$inout # $a4 mov %r12,$_inp # $a4 ___ sub Xupdate_256_AVX () { ( '&vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ)', # X[1..4] '&vpalignr ($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ)', # X[9..12] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t0,$sigma0[0]);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3)', # X[0..3] += X[9..12] '&vpsrld ($t3,$t0,$sigma0[2])', '&vpslld ($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t3,$t2)', '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1)', '&vpslld ($t1,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2)', '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1)', # sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0]);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t0)', # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3)', # sigma1(X[14..15]) '&vpshufd ($t2,$t2,0b10000100)', '&vpsrldq ($t2,$t2,8)', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t2)', # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2])', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0])', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3)', '&vpshufd ($t2,$t2,0b11101000)', '&vpslldq ($t2,$t2,8)', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t2)' # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) ); } sub AVX_256_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 104 instructions foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) { # 29 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2); } $aesni_cbc_idx=0; for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &mov ("%r12",$_inp); # borrow $a4 &vpand ($temp,$temp,$mask14); &mov ("%r15",$_out); # borrow $a2 &vpor ($iv,$iv,$temp); &vmovdqu ("(%r15,%r12)",$iv); # write output &lea ("%r12","16(%r12)"); # inp++ &cmpb ($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lavx_00_47"); &vmovdqu ($inout,"(%r12)"); &mov ($_inp,"%r12"); $aesni_cbc_idx=0; for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } } $code.=<<___; mov $_inp,%r12 # borrow $a4 mov $_out,%r13 # borrow $a0 mov $_ctx,%r15 # borrow $a2 mov $_in0,%rsi # borrow $a3 vpand $mask14,$temp,$temp mov $a1,$A vpor $temp,$iv,$iv vmovdqu $iv,(%r13,%r12) # write output lea 16(%r12),%r12 # inp++ add $SZ*0(%r15),$A add $SZ*1(%r15),$B add $SZ*2(%r15),$C add $SZ*3(%r15),$D add $SZ*4(%r15),$E add $SZ*5(%r15),$F add $SZ*6(%r15),$G add $SZ*7(%r15),$H cmp $_end,%r12 mov $A,$SZ*0(%r15) mov $B,$SZ*1(%r15) mov $C,$SZ*2(%r15) mov $D,$SZ*3(%r15) mov $E,$SZ*4(%r15) mov $F,$SZ*5(%r15) mov $G,$SZ*6(%r15) mov $H,$SZ*7(%r15) jb .Lloop_avx mov $_ivp,$ivp mov $_rsp,%rsi vmovdqu $iv,($ivp) # output IV vzeroall ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps `$framesz+16*0`(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps `$framesz+16*1`(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps `$framesz+16*2`(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps `$framesz+16*3`(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps `$framesz+16*4`(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps `$framesz+16*5`(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps `$framesz+16*6`(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps `$framesz+16*7`(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps `$framesz+16*8`(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps `$framesz+16*9`(%rsp),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx: ret .size ${func}_avx,.-${func}_avx ___ if ($avx>1) {{ ###################################################################### # AVX2+BMI code path # my $a5=$SZ==4?"%esi":"%rsi"; # zap $inp my $PUSH8=8*2*$SZ; use integer; sub bodyx_00_15 () { # at start $a1 should be zero, $a3 - $b^$c and $a4 copy of $f ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'. '&add ($h,(32*($i/(16/$SZ))+$SZ*($i%(16/$SZ)))%$PUSH8.$base)', # h+=X[i]+K[i] '&and ($a4,$e)', # f&e '&rorx ($a0,$e,$Sigma1[2])', '&rorx ($a2,$e,$Sigma1[1])', '&lea ($a,"($a,$a1)")', # h+=Sigma0(a) from the past '&lea ($h,"($h,$a4)")', '&andn ($a4,$e,$g)', # ~e&g '&xor ($a0,$a2)', '&rorx ($a1,$e,$Sigma1[0])', '&lea ($h,"($h,$a4)")', # h+=Ch(e,f,g)=(e&f)+(~e&g) '&xor ($a0,$a1)', # Sigma1(e) '&mov ($a2,$a)', '&rorx ($a4,$a,$Sigma0[2])', '&lea ($h,"($h,$a0)")', # h+=Sigma1(e) '&xor ($a2,$b)', # a^b, b^c in next round '&rorx ($a1,$a,$Sigma0[1])', '&rorx ($a0,$a,$Sigma0[0])', '&lea ($d,"($d,$h)")', # d+=h '&and ($a3,$a2)', # (b^c)&(a^b) @aesni_cbc_block[$aesni_cbc_idx++]. '&xor ($a1,$a4)', '&xor ($a3,$b)', # Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b) '&xor ($a1,$a0)', # Sigma0(a) '&lea ($h,"($h,$a3)");'. # h+=Maj(a,b,c) '&mov ($a4,$e)', # copy of f in future '($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;' ); # and at the finish one has to $a+=$a1 } $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_avx2,\@function,6 .align 64 ${func}_avx2: .Lavx2_shortcut: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$in0 # load 7th parameter push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp sub \$`2*$SZ*$rounds+8*8+$win64*16*10`,%rsp and \$-256*$SZ,%rsp # align stack frame add \$`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`,%rsp shl \$6,$len sub $inp,$out # re-bias sub $inp,$in0 add $inp,$len # end of input #mov $inp,$_inp # saved later #mov $out,$_out # kept in $offload mov $len,$_end #mov $key,$_key # remains resident in $inp register mov $ivp,$_ivp mov $ctx,$_ctx mov $in0,$_in0 mov %r11,$_rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,`$framesz+16*0`(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,`$framesz+16*1`(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,`$framesz+16*2`(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,`$framesz+16*3`(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,`$framesz+16*4`(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,`$framesz+16*5`(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,`$framesz+16*6`(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,`$framesz+16*7`(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,`$framesz+16*8`(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,`$framesz+16*9`(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lprologue_avx2: vzeroall mov $inp,%r13 # borrow $a0 vpinsrq \$1,$out,$offload,$offload lea 0x80($key),$inp # size optimization, reassign lea $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds+32`(%rip),%r12 # borrow $a4 mov 0xf0-0x80($inp),%r14d # rounds, borrow $a1 mov $ctx,%r15 # borrow $a2 mov $in0,%rsi # borrow $a3 vmovdqu ($ivp),$iv # load IV lea -9(%r14),%r14 vmovdqa 0x00(%r12,%r14,8),$mask14 vmovdqa 0x10(%r12,%r14,8),$mask12 vmovdqa 0x20(%r12,%r14,8),$mask10 sub \$-16*$SZ,%r13 # inp++, size optimization mov $SZ*0(%r15),$A lea (%rsi,%r13),%r12 # borrow $a0 mov $SZ*1(%r15),$B cmp $len,%r13 # $_end mov $SZ*2(%r15),$C cmove %rsp,%r12 # next block or random data mov $SZ*3(%r15),$D mov $SZ*4(%r15),$E mov $SZ*5(%r15),$F mov $SZ*6(%r15),$G mov $SZ*7(%r15),$H vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($inp),$roundkey ___ if ($SZ==4) { # SHA256 my @X = map("%ymm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%ymm$_",(4..7)); $code.=<<___; jmp .Loop_avx2 .align 16 .Loop_avx2: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+0(%rsi,%r13),%xmm0 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+16(%rsi,%r13),%xmm1 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+32(%rsi,%r13),%xmm2 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+48(%rsi,%r13),%xmm3 vinserti128 \$1,(%r12),@X[0],@X[0] vinserti128 \$1,16(%r12),@X[1],@X[1] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] vinserti128 \$1,32(%r12),@X[2],@X[2] vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vinserti128 \$1,48(%r12),@X[3],@X[3] lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] lea -16*$SZ(%r13),%r13 vpaddd 0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vpaddd 0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpaddd 0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddd 0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) xor $a1,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x20(%rsp) lea -$PUSH8(%rsp),%rsp mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x00(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x20(%rsp) mov $F,$a4 sub \$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl # size optimization jmp .Lavx2_00_47 .align 16 .Lavx2_00_47: vmovdqu (%r13),$inout vpinsrq \$0,%r13,$offload,$offload ___ sub AVX2_256_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 96 instructions my $base = "+2*$PUSH8(%rsp)"; &lea ("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)") if (($j%2)==0); foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) { # 29 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa ((32*$j)%$PUSH8."(%rsp)",$t2); } $aesni_cbc_idx=0; for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX2_256_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &vmovq ("%r13",$offload); # borrow $a0 &vpextrq ("%r15",$offload,1); # borrow $a2 &vpand ($temp,$temp,$mask14); &vpor ($iv,$iv,$temp); &vmovdqu ("(%r15,%r13)",$iv); # write output &lea ("%r13","16(%r13)"); # inp++ &lea ($Tbl,16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)"); &cmpb (($SZ-1)."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lavx2_00_47"); &vmovdqu ($inout,"(%r13)"); &vpinsrq ($offload,$offload,"%r13",0); $aesni_cbc_idx=0; for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { my $base=$i<8?"+$PUSH8(%rsp)":"(%rsp)"; foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; } } } $code.=<<___; vpextrq \$1,$offload,%r12 # $_out, borrow $a4 vmovq $offload,%r13 # $_inp, borrow $a0 mov `2*$SZ*$rounds+5*8`(%rsp),%r15 # $_ctx, borrow $a2 add $a1,$A lea `2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),$Tbl vpand $mask14,$temp,$temp vpor $temp,$iv,$iv vmovdqu $iv,(%r12,%r13) # write output lea 16(%r13),%r13 add $SZ*0(%r15),$A add $SZ*1(%r15),$B add $SZ*2(%r15),$C add $SZ*3(%r15),$D add $SZ*4(%r15),$E add $SZ*5(%r15),$F add $SZ*6(%r15),$G add $SZ*7(%r15),$H mov $A,$SZ*0(%r15) mov $B,$SZ*1(%r15) mov $C,$SZ*2(%r15) mov $D,$SZ*3(%r15) mov $E,$SZ*4(%r15) mov $F,$SZ*5(%r15) mov $G,$SZ*6(%r15) mov $H,$SZ*7(%r15) cmp `$PUSH8+2*8`($Tbl),%r13 # $_end je .Ldone_avx2 xor $a1,$a1 mov $B,$a3 mov $F,$a4 xor $C,$a3 # magic jmp .Lower_avx2 .align 16 .Lower_avx2: vmovdqu (%r13),$inout vpinsrq \$0,%r13,$offload,$offload ___ $aesni_cbc_idx=0; for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { my $base="+16($Tbl)"; foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; } &lea ($Tbl,"-$PUSH8($Tbl)") if ($i==8); } $code.=<<___; vmovq $offload,%r13 # borrow $a0 vpextrq \$1,$offload,%r15 # borrow $a2 vpand $mask14,$temp,$temp vpor $temp,$iv,$iv lea -$PUSH8($Tbl),$Tbl vmovdqu $iv,(%r15,%r13) # write output lea 16(%r13),%r13 # inp++ cmp %rsp,$Tbl jae .Lower_avx2 mov `2*$SZ*$rounds+5*8`(%rsp),%r15 # $_ctx, borrow $a2 lea 16*$SZ(%r13),%r13 mov `2*$SZ*$rounds+6*8`(%rsp),%rsi # $_in0, borrow $a3 add $a1,$A lea `2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),%rsp add $SZ*0(%r15),$A add $SZ*1(%r15),$B add $SZ*2(%r15),$C add $SZ*3(%r15),$D add $SZ*4(%r15),$E add $SZ*5(%r15),$F add $SZ*6(%r15),$G lea (%rsi,%r13),%r12 add $SZ*7(%r15),$H cmp $_end,%r13 mov $A,$SZ*0(%r15) cmove %rsp,%r12 # next block or stale data mov $B,$SZ*1(%r15) mov $C,$SZ*2(%r15) mov $D,$SZ*3(%r15) mov $E,$SZ*4(%r15) mov $F,$SZ*5(%r15) mov $G,$SZ*6(%r15) mov $H,$SZ*7(%r15) jbe .Loop_avx2 lea (%rsp),$Tbl .Ldone_avx2: lea ($Tbl),%rsp mov $_ivp,$ivp mov $_rsp,%rsi vmovdqu $iv,($ivp) # output IV vzeroall ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps `$framesz+16*0`(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps `$framesz+16*1`(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps `$framesz+16*2`(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps `$framesz+16*3`(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps `$framesz+16*4`(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps `$framesz+16*5`(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps `$framesz+16*6`(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps `$framesz+16*7`(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps `$framesz+16*8`(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps `$framesz+16*9`(%rsp),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx2: ret .size ${func}_avx2,.-${func}_avx2 ___ }} }} {{ my ($in0,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$ctx,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9","%r10"); my ($rounds,$Tbl)=("%r11d","%rbx"); my ($iv,$in,$rndkey0)=map("%xmm$_",(6,14,15)); my @rndkey=("%xmm4","%xmm5"); my $r=0; my $sn=0; my ($Wi,$ABEF,$CDGH,$TMP,$BSWAP,$ABEF_SAVE,$CDGH_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,7..9)); my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(10..13)); my $aesenc=sub { use integer; my ($n,$k)=($r/10,$r%10); if ($k==0) { $code.=<<___; movups `16*$n`($in0),$in # load input xorps $rndkey0,$in ___ $code.=<<___ if ($n); movups $iv,`16*($n-1)`($out,$in0) # write output ___ $code.=<<___; xorps $in,$iv movups `32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv ___ } elsif ($k==9) { $sn++; $code.=<<___; cmp \$11,$rounds jb .Laesenclast$sn movups `32+16*($k+0)-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv movups `32+16*($k+1)-112`($key),$rndkey[0] aesenc $rndkey[1],$iv je .Laesenclast$sn movups `32+16*($k+2)-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv movups `32+16*($k+3)-112`($key),$rndkey[0] aesenc $rndkey[1],$iv .Laesenclast$sn: aesenclast $rndkey[0],$iv movups 16-112($key),$rndkey[1] # forward reference nop ___ } else { $code.=<<___; movups `32+16*$k-112`($key),$rndkey[1] aesenc $rndkey[0],$iv ___ } $r++; unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey)); }; if ($shaext) { my $Tbl="%rax"; $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_shaext,\@function,6 .align 32 ${func}_shaext: mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea `-8-10*16`(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,-8-10*16(%rax) movaps %xmm7,-8-9*16(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-8-8*16(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-8-7*16(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-8-6*16(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-8-5*16(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-8-4*16(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-8-3*16(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-8-2*16(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-8-1*16(%rax) .Lprologue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; lea K256+0x80(%rip),$Tbl movdqu ($ctx),$ABEF # DCBA movdqu 16($ctx),$CDGH # HGFE movdqa 0x200-0x80($Tbl),$TMP # byte swap mask mov 240($key),$rounds sub $in0,$out movups ($key),$rndkey0 # $key[0] movups ($ivp),$iv # load IV movups 16($key),$rndkey[0] # forward reference lea 112($key),$key # size optimization pshufd \$0x1b,$ABEF,$Wi # ABCD pshufd \$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF # CDAB pshufd \$0x1b,$CDGH,$CDGH # EFGH movdqa $TMP,$BSWAP # offload palignr \$8,$CDGH,$ABEF # ABEF punpcklqdq $Wi,$CDGH # CDGH jmp .Loop_shaext .align 16 .Loop_shaext: movdqu ($inp),@MSG[0] movdqu 0x10($inp),@MSG[1] movdqu 0x20($inp),@MSG[2] pshufb $TMP,@MSG[0] movdqu 0x30($inp),@MSG[3] movdqa 0*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[0],$Wi pshufb $TMP,@MSG[1] movdqa $CDGH,$CDGH_SAVE # offload movdqa $ABEF,$ABEF_SAVE # offload ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 0-3 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 1*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[1],$Wi pshufb $TMP,@MSG[2] lea 0x40($inp),$inp ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 4-7 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 2*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[2],$Wi pshufb $TMP,@MSG[3] sha256msg1 @MSG[1],@MSG[0] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 8-11 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi movdqa @MSG[3],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[2],$TMP paddd $TMP,@MSG[0] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 3*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[3],$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[3],@MSG[0] sha256msg1 @MSG[2],@MSG[1] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 12-15 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; movdqa @MSG[0],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[3],$TMP paddd $TMP,@MSG[1] sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF ___ for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) { &$aesenc() if (($r%10)==0); $code.=<<___; movdqa $i*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[0],$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] sha256msg1 @MSG[3],@MSG[2] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 16-19... pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi movdqa @MSG[1],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[0],$TMP paddd $TMP,@MSG[2] ___ &$aesenc(); &$aesenc() if ($r==19); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF ___ push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } $code.=<<___; movdqa 13*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[0],$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] sha256msg1 @MSG[3],@MSG[2] ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 52-55 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi movdqa @MSG[1],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[0],$TMP paddd $TMP,@MSG[2] ___ &$aesenc(); &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 14*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[1],$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[1],@MSG[2] movdqa $BSWAP,$TMP ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 56-59 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 15*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[2],$Wi ___ &$aesenc(); &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 60-63 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi ___ &$aesenc(); $code.=<<___; sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF #pxor $CDGH,$rndkey0 # black magic ___ while ($r<40) { &$aesenc(); } # remaining aesenc's $code.=<<___; #xorps $CDGH,$rndkey0 # black magic paddd $CDGH_SAVE,$CDGH paddd $ABEF_SAVE,$ABEF dec $len movups $iv,48($out,$in0) # write output lea 64($in0),$in0 jnz .Loop_shaext pshufd \$0xb1,$CDGH,$CDGH # DCHG pshufd \$0x1b,$ABEF,$TMP # FEBA pshufd \$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF # BAFE punpckhqdq $CDGH,$ABEF # DCBA palignr \$8,$TMP,$CDGH # HGFE movups $iv,($ivp) # write IV movdqu $ABEF,($ctx) movdqu $CDGH,16($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0*16(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 1*16(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 2*16(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 3*16(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 4*16(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 5*16(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 6*16(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 7*16(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 8*16(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 9*16(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 8+10*16(%rsp),%rsp .Lepilogue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ${func}_shaext,.-${func}_shaext ___ } }}}}} # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64 && $avx) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HanderlData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); lea aesni_cbc_sha256_enc_shaext(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx jb .Lnot_in_shaext lea (%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq lea 168(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer jmp .Lin_prologue .Lnot_in_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); lea .Lavx2_shortcut(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 lea 16*$SZ+8*8(%rsi),%rsi # Xmm6- save area lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_xop .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_xop .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_xop .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_avx .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_avx .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_avx2 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_shaext .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_shaext .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_shaext ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_${func}_xop: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_xop,.Lepilogue_xop # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_${func}_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .LSEH_info_${func}_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2 # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); .LSEH_info_${func}_shaext: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext # HandlerData[] ___ } #################################################################### sub rex { local *opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src)=@_; my $rex=0; $rex|=0x04 if($dst>=8); $rex|=0x01 if($src>=8); unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40 if($rex); } { my %opcodelet = ( "sha256rnds2" => 0xcb, "sha256msg1" => 0xcc, "sha256msg2" => 0xcd ); sub sha256op38 { my $instr = shift; if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38); rex(\@opcode,$2,$1); push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr}; push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return $instr."\t".@_[0]; } } } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/\b(sha256[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha256op38($1,$2)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_misc.c0000644000000000000000000000102113176625656016073 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "aes_locl.h" const char *AES_options(void) { #ifdef FULL_UNROLL return "aes(full)"; #else return "aes(partial)"; #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c0000644000000000000000000000164413176625656016124 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include int AES_wrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen) { return CRYPTO_128_wrap(key, iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); } int AES_unwrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen) { return CRYPTO_128_unwrap(key, iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_decrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c0000644000000000000000000000145613176625656015703 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include void AES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, const int enc) { if (enc) CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); else CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, (block128_f) AES_decrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c0000644000000000000000000000307313176625656015703 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include /* * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void AES_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc) { CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); } /* N.B. This expects the input to be packed, MS bit first */ void AES_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc) { CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); } void AES_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc) { CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c0000644000000000000000000002256213176625656015721 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "aes_locl.h" #define N_WORDS (AES_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)) typedef struct { unsigned long data[N_WORDS]; } aes_block_t; /* XXX: probably some better way to do this */ #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) # define UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST 1 #else # define UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST 0 #endif #if UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST # define load_block(d, s) (d) = *(const aes_block_t *)(s) # define store_block(d, s) *(aes_block_t *)(d) = (s) #else # define load_block(d, s) memcpy((d).data, (s), AES_BLOCK_SIZE) # define store_block(d, s) memcpy((d), (s).data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) #endif /* N.B. The IV for this mode is _twice_ the block size */ void AES_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, const int enc) { size_t n; size_t len = length; if (length == 0) return; OPENSSL_assert(in && out && key && ivec); OPENSSL_assert((AES_ENCRYPT == enc) || (AES_DECRYPT == enc)); OPENSSL_assert((length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0); len = length / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (AES_ENCRYPT == enc) { if (in != out && (UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST || ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(long) == 0)) { aes_block_t *ivp = (aes_block_t *) ivec; aes_block_t *iv2p = (aes_block_t *) (ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); while (len) { aes_block_t *inp = (aes_block_t *) in; aes_block_t *outp = (aes_block_t *) out; for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) outp->data[n] = inp->data[n] ^ ivp->data[n]; AES_encrypt((unsigned char *)outp->data, (unsigned char *)outp->data, key); for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) outp->data[n] ^= iv2p->data[n]; ivp = outp; iv2p = inp; --len; in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } memcpy(ivec, ivp->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2p->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } else { aes_block_t tmp, tmp2; aes_block_t iv; aes_block_t iv2; load_block(iv, ivec); load_block(iv2, ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); while (len) { load_block(tmp, in); for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) tmp2.data[n] = tmp.data[n] ^ iv.data[n]; AES_encrypt((unsigned char *)tmp2.data, (unsigned char *)tmp2.data, key); for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) tmp2.data[n] ^= iv2.data[n]; store_block(out, tmp2); iv = tmp2; iv2 = tmp; --len; in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } memcpy(ivec, iv.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } } else { if (in != out && (UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST || ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(long) == 0)) { aes_block_t *ivp = (aes_block_t *) ivec; aes_block_t *iv2p = (aes_block_t *) (ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); while (len) { aes_block_t tmp; aes_block_t *inp = (aes_block_t *) in; aes_block_t *outp = (aes_block_t *) out; for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) tmp.data[n] = inp->data[n] ^ iv2p->data[n]; AES_decrypt((unsigned char *)tmp.data, (unsigned char *)outp->data, key); for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) outp->data[n] ^= ivp->data[n]; ivp = inp; iv2p = outp; --len; in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } memcpy(ivec, ivp->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2p->data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } else { aes_block_t tmp, tmp2; aes_block_t iv; aes_block_t iv2; load_block(iv, ivec); load_block(iv2, ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); while (len) { load_block(tmp, in); tmp2 = tmp; for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) tmp.data[n] ^= iv2.data[n]; AES_decrypt((unsigned char *)tmp.data, (unsigned char *)tmp.data, key); for (n = 0; n < N_WORDS; ++n) tmp.data[n] ^= iv.data[n]; store_block(out, tmp); iv = tmp2; iv2 = tmp; --len; in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } memcpy(ivec, iv.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); memcpy(ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, iv2.data, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } } } /* * Note that its effectively impossible to do biIGE in anything other * than a single pass, so no provision is made for chaining. */ /* N.B. The IV for this mode is _four times_ the block size */ void AES_bi_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec, const int enc) { size_t n; size_t len = length; unsigned char tmp[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char tmp2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char tmp3[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char prev[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; const unsigned char *iv; const unsigned char *iv2; OPENSSL_assert(in && out && key && ivec); OPENSSL_assert((AES_ENCRYPT == enc) || (AES_DECRYPT == enc)); OPENSSL_assert((length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0); if (AES_ENCRYPT == enc) { /* * XXX: Do a separate case for when in != out (strictly should check * for overlap, too) */ /* First the forward pass */ iv = ivec; iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE; while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) out[n] = in[n] ^ iv[n]; AES_encrypt(out, out, key); for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) out[n] ^= iv2[n]; iv = out; memcpy(prev, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); iv2 = prev; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } /* And now backwards */ iv = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2; iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3; len = length; while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { out -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* * XXX: reduce copies by alternating between buffers */ memcpy(tmp, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) out[n] ^= iv[n]; /* * hexdump(stdout, "out ^ iv", out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); */ AES_encrypt(out, out, key); /* * hexdump(stdout,"enc", out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); */ /* * hexdump(stdout,"iv2", iv2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); */ for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) out[n] ^= iv2[n]; /* * hexdump(stdout,"out", out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); */ iv = out; memcpy(prev, tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); iv2 = prev; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } } else { /* First backwards */ iv = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2; iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3; in += length; out += length; while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { in -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; memcpy(tmp, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); memcpy(tmp2, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) tmp[n] ^= iv2[n]; AES_decrypt(tmp, out, key); for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) out[n] ^= iv[n]; memcpy(tmp3, tmp2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); iv = tmp3; iv2 = out; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } /* And now forwards */ iv = ivec; iv2 = ivec + AES_BLOCK_SIZE; len = length; while (len >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { memcpy(tmp, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); memcpy(tmp2, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) tmp[n] ^= iv2[n]; AES_decrypt(tmp, out, key); for (n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++n) out[n] ^= iv[n]; memcpy(tmp3, tmp2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); iv = tmp3; iv2 = out; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c0000644000000000000000000012070513176625656016451 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.c * * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * This is experimental x86[_64] derivative. It assumes little-endian * byte order and expects CPU to sustain unaligned memory references. * It is used as playground for cache-time attack mitigations and * serves as reference C implementation for x86[_64] assembler. * * */ #include #include #include #include "aes_locl.h" /* * These two parameters control which table, 256-byte or 2KB, is * referenced in outer and respectively inner rounds. */ #define AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS #ifdef AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS /* AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS costs ~30% in performance, while * adding AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS reduces benchmark *further* * by factor of ~2. */ # undef AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS #endif #if 1 static void prefetch256(const void *table) { volatile unsigned long *t=(void *)table,ret; unsigned long sum; int i; /* 32 is common least cache-line size */ for (sum=0,i=0;i<256/sizeof(t[0]);i+=32/sizeof(t[0])) sum ^= t[i]; ret = sum; } #else # define prefetch256(t) #endif #undef GETU32 #define GETU32(p) (*((u32*)(p))) #if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__) typedef unsigned __int64 u64; #define U64(C) C##UI64 #elif defined(__arch64__) typedef unsigned long u64; #define U64(C) C##UL #else typedef unsigned long long u64; #define U64(C) C##ULL #endif #undef ROTATE #if defined(_MSC_VER) # define ROTATE(a,n) _lrotl(a,n) #elif defined(__ICC) # define ROTATE(a,n) _rotl(a,n) #elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ( \ "roll %1,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "I"(n), "0"(a) \ : "cc"); \ ret; \ }) # endif #endif /*- Te [x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03, 02, 01, 01, 03]; Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; */ #define Te0 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+0)) #define Te1 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+3)) #define Te2 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+2)) #define Te3 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+1)) /*- Td [x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b, 0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; Td4[x] = Si[x].[01]; */ #define Td0 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+0)) #define Td1 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+3)) #define Td2 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+2)) #define Td3 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Td+1)) static const u64 Te[256] = { U64(0xa56363c6a56363c6), U64(0x847c7cf8847c7cf8), U64(0x997777ee997777ee), U64(0x8d7b7bf68d7b7bf6), U64(0x0df2f2ff0df2f2ff), U64(0xbd6b6bd6bd6b6bd6), U64(0xb16f6fdeb16f6fde), U64(0x54c5c59154c5c591), U64(0x5030306050303060), U64(0x0301010203010102), U64(0xa96767cea96767ce), U64(0x7d2b2b567d2b2b56), U64(0x19fefee719fefee7), U64(0x62d7d7b562d7d7b5), U64(0xe6abab4de6abab4d), U64(0x9a7676ec9a7676ec), U64(0x45caca8f45caca8f), U64(0x9d82821f9d82821f), U64(0x40c9c98940c9c989), U64(0x877d7dfa877d7dfa), U64(0x15fafaef15fafaef), U64(0xeb5959b2eb5959b2), U64(0xc947478ec947478e), U64(0x0bf0f0fb0bf0f0fb), U64(0xecadad41ecadad41), U64(0x67d4d4b367d4d4b3), U64(0xfda2a25ffda2a25f), U64(0xeaafaf45eaafaf45), U64(0xbf9c9c23bf9c9c23), U64(0xf7a4a453f7a4a453), U64(0x967272e4967272e4), U64(0x5bc0c09b5bc0c09b), U64(0xc2b7b775c2b7b775), U64(0x1cfdfde11cfdfde1), U64(0xae93933dae93933d), U64(0x6a26264c6a26264c), U64(0x5a36366c5a36366c), U64(0x413f3f7e413f3f7e), U64(0x02f7f7f502f7f7f5), U64(0x4fcccc834fcccc83), U64(0x5c3434685c343468), U64(0xf4a5a551f4a5a551), U64(0x34e5e5d134e5e5d1), U64(0x08f1f1f908f1f1f9), U64(0x937171e2937171e2), U64(0x73d8d8ab73d8d8ab), U64(0x5331316253313162), U64(0x3f15152a3f15152a), U64(0x0c0404080c040408), U64(0x52c7c79552c7c795), U64(0x6523234665232346), U64(0x5ec3c39d5ec3c39d), U64(0x2818183028181830), U64(0xa1969637a1969637), U64(0x0f05050a0f05050a), U64(0xb59a9a2fb59a9a2f), U64(0x0907070e0907070e), U64(0x3612122436121224), U64(0x9b80801b9b80801b), U64(0x3de2e2df3de2e2df), U64(0x26ebebcd26ebebcd), U64(0x6927274e6927274e), U64(0xcdb2b27fcdb2b27f), U64(0x9f7575ea9f7575ea), U64(0x1b0909121b090912), U64(0x9e83831d9e83831d), U64(0x742c2c58742c2c58), U64(0x2e1a1a342e1a1a34), U64(0x2d1b1b362d1b1b36), U64(0xb26e6edcb26e6edc), U64(0xee5a5ab4ee5a5ab4), U64(0xfba0a05bfba0a05b), U64(0xf65252a4f65252a4), U64(0x4d3b3b764d3b3b76), U64(0x61d6d6b761d6d6b7), U64(0xceb3b37dceb3b37d), U64(0x7b2929527b292952), U64(0x3ee3e3dd3ee3e3dd), U64(0x712f2f5e712f2f5e), U64(0x9784841397848413), U64(0xf55353a6f55353a6), U64(0x68d1d1b968d1d1b9), U64(0x0000000000000000), U64(0x2cededc12cededc1), U64(0x6020204060202040), U64(0x1ffcfce31ffcfce3), U64(0xc8b1b179c8b1b179), U64(0xed5b5bb6ed5b5bb6), U64(0xbe6a6ad4be6a6ad4), U64(0x46cbcb8d46cbcb8d), U64(0xd9bebe67d9bebe67), U64(0x4b3939724b393972), U64(0xde4a4a94de4a4a94), U64(0xd44c4c98d44c4c98), U64(0xe85858b0e85858b0), U64(0x4acfcf854acfcf85), U64(0x6bd0d0bb6bd0d0bb), U64(0x2aefefc52aefefc5), U64(0xe5aaaa4fe5aaaa4f), U64(0x16fbfbed16fbfbed), U64(0xc5434386c5434386), U64(0xd74d4d9ad74d4d9a), U64(0x5533336655333366), U64(0x9485851194858511), U64(0xcf45458acf45458a), U64(0x10f9f9e910f9f9e9), U64(0x0602020406020204), U64(0x817f7ffe817f7ffe), U64(0xf05050a0f05050a0), U64(0x443c3c78443c3c78), U64(0xba9f9f25ba9f9f25), U64(0xe3a8a84be3a8a84b), U64(0xf35151a2f35151a2), U64(0xfea3a35dfea3a35d), U64(0xc0404080c0404080), U64(0x8a8f8f058a8f8f05), U64(0xad92923fad92923f), U64(0xbc9d9d21bc9d9d21), U64(0x4838387048383870), U64(0x04f5f5f104f5f5f1), U64(0xdfbcbc63dfbcbc63), U64(0xc1b6b677c1b6b677), U64(0x75dadaaf75dadaaf), U64(0x6321214263212142), U64(0x3010102030101020), U64(0x1affffe51affffe5), U64(0x0ef3f3fd0ef3f3fd), U64(0x6dd2d2bf6dd2d2bf), U64(0x4ccdcd814ccdcd81), U64(0x140c0c18140c0c18), U64(0x3513132635131326), U64(0x2fececc32fececc3), U64(0xe15f5fbee15f5fbe), U64(0xa2979735a2979735), U64(0xcc444488cc444488), U64(0x3917172e3917172e), U64(0x57c4c49357c4c493), U64(0xf2a7a755f2a7a755), U64(0x827e7efc827e7efc), U64(0x473d3d7a473d3d7a), U64(0xac6464c8ac6464c8), U64(0xe75d5dbae75d5dba), U64(0x2b1919322b191932), U64(0x957373e6957373e6), U64(0xa06060c0a06060c0), U64(0x9881811998818119), U64(0xd14f4f9ed14f4f9e), U64(0x7fdcdca37fdcdca3), U64(0x6622224466222244), U64(0x7e2a2a547e2a2a54), U64(0xab90903bab90903b), U64(0x8388880b8388880b), U64(0xca46468cca46468c), U64(0x29eeeec729eeeec7), U64(0xd3b8b86bd3b8b86b), U64(0x3c1414283c141428), U64(0x79dedea779dedea7), U64(0xe25e5ebce25e5ebc), U64(0x1d0b0b161d0b0b16), U64(0x76dbdbad76dbdbad), U64(0x3be0e0db3be0e0db), U64(0x5632326456323264), U64(0x4e3a3a744e3a3a74), U64(0x1e0a0a141e0a0a14), U64(0xdb494992db494992), U64(0x0a06060c0a06060c), U64(0x6c2424486c242448), U64(0xe45c5cb8e45c5cb8), U64(0x5dc2c29f5dc2c29f), U64(0x6ed3d3bd6ed3d3bd), U64(0xefacac43efacac43), U64(0xa66262c4a66262c4), U64(0xa8919139a8919139), U64(0xa4959531a4959531), U64(0x37e4e4d337e4e4d3), U64(0x8b7979f28b7979f2), U64(0x32e7e7d532e7e7d5), U64(0x43c8c88b43c8c88b), U64(0x5937376e5937376e), U64(0xb76d6ddab76d6dda), U64(0x8c8d8d018c8d8d01), U64(0x64d5d5b164d5d5b1), U64(0xd24e4e9cd24e4e9c), U64(0xe0a9a949e0a9a949), U64(0xb46c6cd8b46c6cd8), U64(0xfa5656acfa5656ac), U64(0x07f4f4f307f4f4f3), U64(0x25eaeacf25eaeacf), U64(0xaf6565caaf6565ca), U64(0x8e7a7af48e7a7af4), U64(0xe9aeae47e9aeae47), U64(0x1808081018080810), U64(0xd5baba6fd5baba6f), U64(0x887878f0887878f0), U64(0x6f25254a6f25254a), U64(0x722e2e5c722e2e5c), U64(0x241c1c38241c1c38), U64(0xf1a6a657f1a6a657), U64(0xc7b4b473c7b4b473), U64(0x51c6c69751c6c697), U64(0x23e8e8cb23e8e8cb), U64(0x7cdddda17cdddda1), U64(0x9c7474e89c7474e8), U64(0x211f1f3e211f1f3e), U64(0xdd4b4b96dd4b4b96), U64(0xdcbdbd61dcbdbd61), U64(0x868b8b0d868b8b0d), U64(0x858a8a0f858a8a0f), U64(0x907070e0907070e0), U64(0x423e3e7c423e3e7c), U64(0xc4b5b571c4b5b571), U64(0xaa6666ccaa6666cc), U64(0xd8484890d8484890), U64(0x0503030605030306), U64(0x01f6f6f701f6f6f7), U64(0x120e0e1c120e0e1c), U64(0xa36161c2a36161c2), U64(0x5f35356a5f35356a), U64(0xf95757aef95757ae), U64(0xd0b9b969d0b9b969), U64(0x9186861791868617), U64(0x58c1c19958c1c199), U64(0x271d1d3a271d1d3a), U64(0xb99e9e27b99e9e27), U64(0x38e1e1d938e1e1d9), U64(0x13f8f8eb13f8f8eb), U64(0xb398982bb398982b), U64(0x3311112233111122), U64(0xbb6969d2bb6969d2), U64(0x70d9d9a970d9d9a9), U64(0x898e8e07898e8e07), U64(0xa7949433a7949433), U64(0xb69b9b2db69b9b2d), U64(0x221e1e3c221e1e3c), U64(0x9287871592878715), U64(0x20e9e9c920e9e9c9), U64(0x49cece8749cece87), U64(0xff5555aaff5555aa), U64(0x7828285078282850), U64(0x7adfdfa57adfdfa5), U64(0x8f8c8c038f8c8c03), U64(0xf8a1a159f8a1a159), U64(0x8089890980898909), U64(0x170d0d1a170d0d1a), U64(0xdabfbf65dabfbf65), U64(0x31e6e6d731e6e6d7), U64(0xc6424284c6424284), U64(0xb86868d0b86868d0), U64(0xc3414182c3414182), U64(0xb0999929b0999929), U64(0x772d2d5a772d2d5a), U64(0x110f0f1e110f0f1e), U64(0xcbb0b07bcbb0b07b), U64(0xfc5454a8fc5454a8), U64(0xd6bbbb6dd6bbbb6d), U64(0x3a16162c3a16162c) }; static const u8 Te4[256] = { 0x63U, 0x7cU, 0x77U, 0x7bU, 0xf2U, 0x6bU, 0x6fU, 0xc5U, 0x30U, 0x01U, 0x67U, 0x2bU, 0xfeU, 0xd7U, 0xabU, 0x76U, 0xcaU, 0x82U, 0xc9U, 0x7dU, 0xfaU, 0x59U, 0x47U, 0xf0U, 0xadU, 0xd4U, 0xa2U, 0xafU, 0x9cU, 0xa4U, 0x72U, 0xc0U, 0xb7U, 0xfdU, 0x93U, 0x26U, 0x36U, 0x3fU, 0xf7U, 0xccU, 0x34U, 0xa5U, 0xe5U, 0xf1U, 0x71U, 0xd8U, 0x31U, 0x15U, 0x04U, 0xc7U, 0x23U, 0xc3U, 0x18U, 0x96U, 0x05U, 0x9aU, 0x07U, 0x12U, 0x80U, 0xe2U, 0xebU, 0x27U, 0xb2U, 0x75U, 0x09U, 0x83U, 0x2cU, 0x1aU, 0x1bU, 0x6eU, 0x5aU, 0xa0U, 0x52U, 0x3bU, 0xd6U, 0xb3U, 0x29U, 0xe3U, 0x2fU, 0x84U, 0x53U, 0xd1U, 0x00U, 0xedU, 0x20U, 0xfcU, 0xb1U, 0x5bU, 0x6aU, 0xcbU, 0xbeU, 0x39U, 0x4aU, 0x4cU, 0x58U, 0xcfU, 0xd0U, 0xefU, 0xaaU, 0xfbU, 0x43U, 0x4dU, 0x33U, 0x85U, 0x45U, 0xf9U, 0x02U, 0x7fU, 0x50U, 0x3cU, 0x9fU, 0xa8U, 0x51U, 0xa3U, 0x40U, 0x8fU, 0x92U, 0x9dU, 0x38U, 0xf5U, 0xbcU, 0xb6U, 0xdaU, 0x21U, 0x10U, 0xffU, 0xf3U, 0xd2U, 0xcdU, 0x0cU, 0x13U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x97U, 0x44U, 0x17U, 0xc4U, 0xa7U, 0x7eU, 0x3dU, 0x64U, 0x5dU, 0x19U, 0x73U, 0x60U, 0x81U, 0x4fU, 0xdcU, 0x22U, 0x2aU, 0x90U, 0x88U, 0x46U, 0xeeU, 0xb8U, 0x14U, 0xdeU, 0x5eU, 0x0bU, 0xdbU, 0xe0U, 0x32U, 0x3aU, 0x0aU, 0x49U, 0x06U, 0x24U, 0x5cU, 0xc2U, 0xd3U, 0xacU, 0x62U, 0x91U, 0x95U, 0xe4U, 0x79U, 0xe7U, 0xc8U, 0x37U, 0x6dU, 0x8dU, 0xd5U, 0x4eU, 0xa9U, 0x6cU, 0x56U, 0xf4U, 0xeaU, 0x65U, 0x7aU, 0xaeU, 0x08U, 0xbaU, 0x78U, 0x25U, 0x2eU, 0x1cU, 0xa6U, 0xb4U, 0xc6U, 0xe8U, 0xddU, 0x74U, 0x1fU, 0x4bU, 0xbdU, 0x8bU, 0x8aU, 0x70U, 0x3eU, 0xb5U, 0x66U, 0x48U, 0x03U, 0xf6U, 0x0eU, 0x61U, 0x35U, 0x57U, 0xb9U, 0x86U, 0xc1U, 0x1dU, 0x9eU, 0xe1U, 0xf8U, 0x98U, 0x11U, 0x69U, 0xd9U, 0x8eU, 0x94U, 0x9bU, 0x1eU, 0x87U, 0xe9U, 0xceU, 0x55U, 0x28U, 0xdfU, 0x8cU, 0xa1U, 0x89U, 0x0dU, 0xbfU, 0xe6U, 0x42U, 0x68U, 0x41U, 0x99U, 0x2dU, 0x0fU, 0xb0U, 0x54U, 0xbbU, 0x16U }; static const u64 Td[256] = { U64(0x50a7f45150a7f451), U64(0x5365417e5365417e), U64(0xc3a4171ac3a4171a), U64(0x965e273a965e273a), U64(0xcb6bab3bcb6bab3b), U64(0xf1459d1ff1459d1f), U64(0xab58faacab58faac), U64(0x9303e34b9303e34b), U64(0x55fa302055fa3020), U64(0xf66d76adf66d76ad), U64(0x9176cc889176cc88), U64(0x254c02f5254c02f5), U64(0xfcd7e54ffcd7e54f), U64(0xd7cb2ac5d7cb2ac5), U64(0x8044352680443526), U64(0x8fa362b58fa362b5), U64(0x495ab1de495ab1de), U64(0x671bba25671bba25), U64(0x980eea45980eea45), U64(0xe1c0fe5de1c0fe5d), U64(0x02752fc302752fc3), U64(0x12f04c8112f04c81), U64(0xa397468da397468d), U64(0xc6f9d36bc6f9d36b), U64(0xe75f8f03e75f8f03), U64(0x959c9215959c9215), U64(0xeb7a6dbfeb7a6dbf), U64(0xda595295da595295), U64(0x2d83bed42d83bed4), U64(0xd3217458d3217458), U64(0x2969e0492969e049), U64(0x44c8c98e44c8c98e), U64(0x6a89c2756a89c275), U64(0x78798ef478798ef4), U64(0x6b3e58996b3e5899), U64(0xdd71b927dd71b927), U64(0xb64fe1beb64fe1be), U64(0x17ad88f017ad88f0), U64(0x66ac20c966ac20c9), U64(0xb43ace7db43ace7d), U64(0x184adf63184adf63), U64(0x82311ae582311ae5), U64(0x6033519760335197), U64(0x457f5362457f5362), U64(0xe07764b1e07764b1), U64(0x84ae6bbb84ae6bbb), U64(0x1ca081fe1ca081fe), U64(0x942b08f9942b08f9), U64(0x5868487058684870), U64(0x19fd458f19fd458f), U64(0x876cde94876cde94), U64(0xb7f87b52b7f87b52), U64(0x23d373ab23d373ab), U64(0xe2024b72e2024b72), U64(0x578f1fe3578f1fe3), U64(0x2aab55662aab5566), U64(0x0728ebb20728ebb2), U64(0x03c2b52f03c2b52f), U64(0x9a7bc5869a7bc586), U64(0xa50837d3a50837d3), U64(0xf2872830f2872830), U64(0xb2a5bf23b2a5bf23), U64(0xba6a0302ba6a0302), U64(0x5c8216ed5c8216ed), U64(0x2b1ccf8a2b1ccf8a), U64(0x92b479a792b479a7), U64(0xf0f207f3f0f207f3), U64(0xa1e2694ea1e2694e), U64(0xcdf4da65cdf4da65), U64(0xd5be0506d5be0506), U64(0x1f6234d11f6234d1), U64(0x8afea6c48afea6c4), U64(0x9d532e349d532e34), U64(0xa055f3a2a055f3a2), U64(0x32e18a0532e18a05), U64(0x75ebf6a475ebf6a4), U64(0x39ec830b39ec830b), U64(0xaaef6040aaef6040), U64(0x069f715e069f715e), U64(0x51106ebd51106ebd), U64(0xf98a213ef98a213e), U64(0x3d06dd963d06dd96), U64(0xae053eddae053edd), U64(0x46bde64d46bde64d), U64(0xb58d5491b58d5491), U64(0x055dc471055dc471), U64(0x6fd406046fd40604), U64(0xff155060ff155060), U64(0x24fb981924fb9819), U64(0x97e9bdd697e9bdd6), U64(0xcc434089cc434089), U64(0x779ed967779ed967), U64(0xbd42e8b0bd42e8b0), U64(0x888b8907888b8907), U64(0x385b19e7385b19e7), U64(0xdbeec879dbeec879), U64(0x470a7ca1470a7ca1), U64(0xe90f427ce90f427c), U64(0xc91e84f8c91e84f8), U64(0x0000000000000000), U64(0x8386800983868009), U64(0x48ed2b3248ed2b32), U64(0xac70111eac70111e), U64(0x4e725a6c4e725a6c), U64(0xfbff0efdfbff0efd), U64(0x5638850f5638850f), U64(0x1ed5ae3d1ed5ae3d), U64(0x27392d3627392d36), U64(0x64d90f0a64d90f0a), U64(0x21a65c6821a65c68), U64(0xd1545b9bd1545b9b), U64(0x3a2e36243a2e3624), U64(0xb1670a0cb1670a0c), U64(0x0fe757930fe75793), U64(0xd296eeb4d296eeb4), U64(0x9e919b1b9e919b1b), U64(0x4fc5c0804fc5c080), U64(0xa220dc61a220dc61), U64(0x694b775a694b775a), U64(0x161a121c161a121c), U64(0x0aba93e20aba93e2), U64(0xe52aa0c0e52aa0c0), U64(0x43e0223c43e0223c), U64(0x1d171b121d171b12), U64(0x0b0d090e0b0d090e), U64(0xadc78bf2adc78bf2), U64(0xb9a8b62db9a8b62d), U64(0xc8a91e14c8a91e14), U64(0x8519f1578519f157), U64(0x4c0775af4c0775af), U64(0xbbdd99eebbdd99ee), U64(0xfd607fa3fd607fa3), U64(0x9f2601f79f2601f7), U64(0xbcf5725cbcf5725c), U64(0xc53b6644c53b6644), U64(0x347efb5b347efb5b), U64(0x7629438b7629438b), U64(0xdcc623cbdcc623cb), U64(0x68fcedb668fcedb6), U64(0x63f1e4b863f1e4b8), U64(0xcadc31d7cadc31d7), U64(0x1085634210856342), U64(0x4022971340229713), U64(0x2011c6842011c684), U64(0x7d244a857d244a85), U64(0xf83dbbd2f83dbbd2), U64(0x1132f9ae1132f9ae), U64(0x6da129c76da129c7), U64(0x4b2f9e1d4b2f9e1d), U64(0xf330b2dcf330b2dc), U64(0xec52860dec52860d), U64(0xd0e3c177d0e3c177), U64(0x6c16b32b6c16b32b), U64(0x99b970a999b970a9), U64(0xfa489411fa489411), U64(0x2264e9472264e947), U64(0xc48cfca8c48cfca8), U64(0x1a3ff0a01a3ff0a0), U64(0xd82c7d56d82c7d56), U64(0xef903322ef903322), U64(0xc74e4987c74e4987), U64(0xc1d138d9c1d138d9), U64(0xfea2ca8cfea2ca8c), U64(0x360bd498360bd498), U64(0xcf81f5a6cf81f5a6), U64(0x28de7aa528de7aa5), U64(0x268eb7da268eb7da), U64(0xa4bfad3fa4bfad3f), U64(0xe49d3a2ce49d3a2c), U64(0x0d9278500d927850), U64(0x9bcc5f6a9bcc5f6a), U64(0x62467e5462467e54), U64(0xc2138df6c2138df6), U64(0xe8b8d890e8b8d890), U64(0x5ef7392e5ef7392e), U64(0xf5afc382f5afc382), U64(0xbe805d9fbe805d9f), U64(0x7c93d0697c93d069), U64(0xa92dd56fa92dd56f), U64(0xb31225cfb31225cf), U64(0x3b99acc83b99acc8), U64(0xa77d1810a77d1810), U64(0x6e639ce86e639ce8), U64(0x7bbb3bdb7bbb3bdb), U64(0x097826cd097826cd), U64(0xf418596ef418596e), U64(0x01b79aec01b79aec), U64(0xa89a4f83a89a4f83), U64(0x656e95e6656e95e6), U64(0x7ee6ffaa7ee6ffaa), U64(0x08cfbc2108cfbc21), U64(0xe6e815efe6e815ef), U64(0xd99be7bad99be7ba), U64(0xce366f4ace366f4a), U64(0xd4099fead4099fea), U64(0xd67cb029d67cb029), U64(0xafb2a431afb2a431), U64(0x31233f2a31233f2a), U64(0x3094a5c63094a5c6), U64(0xc066a235c066a235), U64(0x37bc4e7437bc4e74), U64(0xa6ca82fca6ca82fc), U64(0xb0d090e0b0d090e0), U64(0x15d8a73315d8a733), U64(0x4a9804f14a9804f1), U64(0xf7daec41f7daec41), U64(0x0e50cd7f0e50cd7f), U64(0x2ff691172ff69117), U64(0x8dd64d768dd64d76), U64(0x4db0ef434db0ef43), U64(0x544daacc544daacc), U64(0xdf0496e4df0496e4), U64(0xe3b5d19ee3b5d19e), U64(0x1b886a4c1b886a4c), U64(0xb81f2cc1b81f2cc1), U64(0x7f5165467f516546), U64(0x04ea5e9d04ea5e9d), U64(0x5d358c015d358c01), U64(0x737487fa737487fa), U64(0x2e410bfb2e410bfb), U64(0x5a1d67b35a1d67b3), U64(0x52d2db9252d2db92), U64(0x335610e9335610e9), U64(0x1347d66d1347d66d), U64(0x8c61d79a8c61d79a), U64(0x7a0ca1377a0ca137), U64(0x8e14f8598e14f859), U64(0x893c13eb893c13eb), U64(0xee27a9ceee27a9ce), U64(0x35c961b735c961b7), U64(0xede51ce1ede51ce1), U64(0x3cb1477a3cb1477a), U64(0x59dfd29c59dfd29c), U64(0x3f73f2553f73f255), U64(0x79ce141879ce1418), U64(0xbf37c773bf37c773), U64(0xeacdf753eacdf753), U64(0x5baafd5f5baafd5f), U64(0x146f3ddf146f3ddf), U64(0x86db447886db4478), U64(0x81f3afca81f3afca), U64(0x3ec468b93ec468b9), U64(0x2c3424382c342438), U64(0x5f40a3c25f40a3c2), U64(0x72c31d1672c31d16), U64(0x0c25e2bc0c25e2bc), U64(0x8b493c288b493c28), U64(0x41950dff41950dff), U64(0x7101a8397101a839), U64(0xdeb30c08deb30c08), U64(0x9ce4b4d89ce4b4d8), U64(0x90c1566490c15664), U64(0x6184cb7b6184cb7b), U64(0x70b632d570b632d5), U64(0x745c6c48745c6c48), U64(0x4257b8d04257b8d0) }; static const u8 Td4[256] = { 0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U, 0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU, 0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U, 0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU, 0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU, 0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU, 0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U, 0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U, 0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U, 0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U, 0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU, 0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U, 0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU, 0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U, 0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U, 0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU, 0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU, 0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U, 0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U, 0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU, 0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U, 0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU, 0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U, 0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U, 0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U, 0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU, 0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU, 0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U, 0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U, 0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U, 0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU }; static const u32 rcon[] = { 0x00000001U, 0x00000002U, 0x00000004U, 0x00000008U, 0x00000010U, 0x00000020U, 0x00000040U, 0x00000080U, 0x0000001bU, 0x00000036U, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ }; /** * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. */ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key) { u32 *rk; int i = 0; u32 temp; if (!userKey || !key) return -1; if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) return -2; rk = key->rd_key; if (bits==128) key->rounds = 10; else if (bits==192) key->rounds = 12; else key->rounds = 14; rk[0] = GETU32(userKey ); rk[1] = GETU32(userKey + 4); rk[2] = GETU32(userKey + 8); rk[3] = GETU32(userKey + 12); if (bits == 128) { while (1) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; if (++i == 10) { return 0; } rk += 4; } } rk[4] = GETU32(userKey + 16); rk[5] = GETU32(userKey + 20); if (bits == 192) { while (1) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; if (++i == 8) { return 0; } rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; rk += 6; } } rk[6] = GETU32(userKey + 24); rk[7] = GETU32(userKey + 28); if (bits == 256) { while (1) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; if (++i == 7) { return 0; } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] ) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; rk += 8; } } return 0; } /** * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. */ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key) { u32 *rk; int i, j, status; u32 temp; /* first, start with an encryption schedule */ status = AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key); if (status < 0) return status; rk = key->rd_key; /* invert the order of the round keys: */ for (i = 0, j = 4*(key->rounds); i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; } /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ for (i = 1; i < (key->rounds); i++) { rk += 4; #if 1 for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m; tp1 = rk[j]; m = tp1 & 0x80808080; tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp2 & 0x80808080; tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp4 & 0x80808080; tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1; tpb = tp9 ^ tp2; tpd = tp9 ^ tp4; tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2; #if defined(ROTATE) rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^ ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24); #else rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^ (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24); #endif } #else rk[0] = Td0[Te2[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te2[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te2[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te2[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff]; rk[1] = Td0[Te2[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te2[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te2[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te2[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff]; rk[2] = Td0[Te2[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te2[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te2[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te2[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff]; rk[3] = Td0[Te2[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te2[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te2[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te2[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff]; #endif } return 0; } /* * Encrypt a single block * in and out can overlap */ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key) { const u32 *rk; u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t[4]; int r; assert(in && out && key); rk = key->rd_key; /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(in ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(in + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(in + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3]; #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS) prefetch256(Te4); t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { int i; u32 r0, r1, r2; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { r0 = t[i]; r1 = r0 & 0x80808080; r2 = ((r0 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((r1 - (r1 >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); #if defined(ROTATE) t[i] = r2 ^ ROTATE(r2,24) ^ ROTATE(r0,24) ^ ROTATE(r0,16) ^ ROTATE(r0,8); #else t[i] = r2 ^ ((r2 ^ r0) << 24) ^ ((r2 ^ r0) >> 8) ^ (r0 << 16) ^ (r0 >> 16) ^ (r0 << 8) ^ (r0 >> 24); #endif t[i] ^= rk[4+i]; } } #else t[0] = Te0[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ rk[4]; t[1] = Te0[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ rk[5]; t[2] = Te0[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ rk[6]; t[3] = Te0[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ rk[7]; #endif s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3]; /* * Nr - 2 full rounds: */ for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) { #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS) t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { int i; u32 r0, r1, r2; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { r0 = t[i]; r1 = r0 & 0x80808080; r2 = ((r0 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((r1 - (r1 >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); #if defined(ROTATE) t[i] = r2 ^ ROTATE(r2,24) ^ ROTATE(r0,24) ^ ROTATE(r0,16) ^ ROTATE(r0,8); #else t[i] = r2 ^ ((r2 ^ r0) << 24) ^ ((r2 ^ r0) >> 8) ^ (r0 << 16) ^ (r0 >> 16) ^ (r0 << 8) ^ (r0 >> 24); #endif t[i] ^= rk[i]; } } #else t[0] = Te0[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ rk[0]; t[1] = Te0[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ rk[1]; t[2] = Te0[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ rk[2]; t[3] = Te0[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ rk[3]; #endif s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3]; } /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS) prefetch256(Te4); *(u32*)(out+0) = (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[0]; *(u32*)(out+4) = (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[1]; *(u32*)(out+8) = (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[2]; *(u32*)(out+12) = (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24 ^ rk[3]; #else *(u32*)(out+0) = (Te2[(s0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^ (Te3[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^ (Te0[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^ (Te1[(s3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000U) ^ rk[0]; *(u32*)(out+4) = (Te2[(s1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^ (Te3[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^ (Te0[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^ (Te1[(s0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000U) ^ rk[1]; *(u32*)(out+8) = (Te2[(s2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^ (Te3[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^ (Te0[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^ (Te1[(s1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000U) ^ rk[2]; *(u32*)(out+12) = (Te2[(s3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ffU) ^ (Te3[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00U) ^ (Te0[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000U) ^ (Te1[(s2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000U) ^ rk[3]; #endif } /* * Decrypt a single block * in and out can overlap */ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key) { const u32 *rk; u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t[4]; int r; assert(in && out && key); rk = key->rd_key; /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(in ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(in + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(in + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3]; #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS) prefetch256(Td4); t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { int i; u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { tp1 = t[i]; m = tp1 & 0x80808080; tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp2 & 0x80808080; tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp4 & 0x80808080; tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1; tpb = tp9 ^ tp2; tpd = tp9 ^ tp4; tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2; #if defined(ROTATE) t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^ ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24); #else t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^ (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24); #endif t[i] ^= rk[4+i]; } } #else t[0] = Td0[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ rk[4]; t[1] = Td0[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ rk[5]; t[2] = Td0[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ rk[6]; t[3] = Td0[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ rk[7]; #endif s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3]; /* * Nr - 2 full rounds: */ for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) { #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS) t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24; t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24; t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24; t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^ (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^ (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24; /* now do the linear transform using words */ { int i; u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { tp1 = t[i]; m = tp1 & 0x80808080; tp2 = ((tp1 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp2 & 0x80808080; tp4 = ((tp2 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); m = tp4 & 0x80808080; tp8 = ((tp4 & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1) ^ ((m - (m >> 7)) & 0x1b1b1b1b); tp9 = tp8 ^ tp1; tpb = tp9 ^ tp2; tpd = tp9 ^ tp4; tpe = tp8 ^ tp4 ^ tp2; #if defined(ROTATE) t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^ ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24); #else t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^ (tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^ (tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24); #endif t[i] ^= rk[i]; } } #else t[0] = Td0[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ rk[0]; t[1] = Td0[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ rk[1]; t[2] = Td0[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ rk[2]; t[3] = Td0[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ rk[3]; #endif s0 = t[0]; s1 = t[1]; s2 = t[2]; s3 = t[3]; } /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ prefetch256(Td4); *(u32*)(out+0) = ((u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff]) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[0]; *(u32*)(out+4) = ((u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff]) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[1]; *(u32*)(out+8) = ((u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff]) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[2]; *(u32*)(out+12) = ((u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff]) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ rk[3]; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000132613176625656015701 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "aes_locl.h" void AES_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key, const int enc) { assert(in && out && key); assert((AES_ENCRYPT == enc) || (AES_DECRYPT == enc)); if (AES_ENCRYPT == enc) AES_encrypt(in, out, key); else AES_decrypt(in, out, key); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014001 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c0000644000000000000000000001632213176625656015554 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #include #include static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { unsigned char *buf = NULL; int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask; time_t tim; if (bits == 0) { if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY) goto toosmall; BN_zero(rnd); return 1; } if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) goto toosmall; bytes = (bits + 7) / 8; bit = (bits - 1) % 8; mask = 0xff << (bit + 1); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes); if (buf == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */ time(&tim); RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0); if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0) goto err; if (pseudorand == 2) { /* * generate patterns that are more likely to trigger BN library bugs */ int i; unsigned char c; for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { if (RAND_bytes(&c, 1) <= 0) goto err; if (c >= 128 && i > 0) buf[i] = buf[i - 1]; else if (c < 42) buf[i] = 0; else if (c < 84) buf[i] = 255; } } if (top >= 0) { if (top) { if (bit == 0) { buf[0] = 1; buf[1] |= 0x80; } else { buf[0] |= (3 << (bit - 1)); } } else { buf[0] |= (1 << bit); } } buf[0] &= ~mask; if (bottom) /* set bottom bit if requested */ buf[bytes - 1] |= 1; if (!BN_bin2bn(buf, bytes, rnd)) goto err; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bytes); bn_check_top(rnd); return (ret); toosmall: BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { return bnrand(0, rnd, bits, top, bottom); } int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { return bnrand(1, rnd, bits, top, bottom); } int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { return bnrand(2, rnd, bits, top, bottom); } /* random number r: 0 <= r < range */ static int bn_rand_range(int pseudo, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { int (*bn_rand) (BIGNUM *, int, int, int) = pseudo ? BN_pseudo_rand : BN_rand; int n; int count = 100; if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE); return 0; } n = BN_num_bits(range); /* n > 0 */ /* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */ if (n == 1) BN_zero(r); else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 3)) { /* * range = 100..._2, so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer * than range */ do { if (!bn_rand(r, n + 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) return 0; /* * If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range (which is either r, r - * range, or r - 2*range). Otherwise, iterate once more. Since * 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with probability >= * .75. */ if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) { if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0; if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0; } if (!--count) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); return 0; } } while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); } else { do { /* range = 11..._2 or range = 101..._2 */ if (!bn_rand(r, n, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) return 0; if (!--count) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); return 0; } } while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); } bn_check_top(r); return 1; } int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { return bn_rand_range(0, r, range); } int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { return bn_rand_range(1, r, range); } /* * BN_generate_dsa_nonce generates a random number 0 <= out < range. Unlike * BN_rand_range, it also includes the contents of |priv| and |message| in * the generation so that an RNG failure isn't fatal as long as |priv| * remains secret. This is intended for use in DSA and ECDSA where an RNG * weakness leads directly to private key exposure unless this function is * used. */ int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message, size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx) { SHA512_CTX sha; /* * We use 512 bits of random data per iteration to ensure that we have at * least |range| bits of randomness. */ unsigned char random_bytes[64]; unsigned char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned done, todo; /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */ const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 8; unsigned char private_bytes[96]; unsigned char *k_bytes; int ret = 0; k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes); if (k_bytes == NULL) goto err; /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */ todo = sizeof(priv->d[0]) * priv->top; if (todo > sizeof(private_bytes)) { /* * No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key this * large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid leaking the * length of the private key. */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } memcpy(private_bytes, priv->d, todo); memset(private_bytes + todo, 0, sizeof(private_bytes) - todo); for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) { if (RAND_bytes(random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)) != 1) goto err; SHA512_Init(&sha); SHA512_Update(&sha, &done, sizeof(done)); SHA512_Update(&sha, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)); SHA512_Update(&sha, message, message_len); SHA512_Update(&sha, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)); SHA512_Final(digest, &sha); todo = num_k_bytes - done; if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo); done += todo; } if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out)) goto err; if (BN_mod(out, out, range, ctx) != 1) goto err; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(k_bytes); OPENSSL_cleanse(private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c0000644000000000000000000004137713176625656015375 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *in_a, const BIGNUM *in_b, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *t; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(in_a); bn_check_top(in_b); BN_CTX_start(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (a == NULL || b == NULL) goto err; if (BN_copy(a, in_a) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_copy(b, in_b) == NULL) goto err; a->neg = 0; b->neg = 0; if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) { t = a; a = b; b = t; } t = euclid(a, b); if (t == NULL) goto err; if (BN_copy(r, t) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b) { BIGNUM *t; int shifts = 0; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); /* 0 <= b <= a */ while (!BN_is_zero(b)) { /* 0 < b <= a */ if (BN_is_odd(a)) { if (BN_is_odd(b)) { if (!BN_sub(a, a, b)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(a, a)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) { t = a; a = b; b = t; } } else { /* a odd - b even */ if (!BN_rshift1(b, b)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) { t = a; a = b; b = t; } } } else { /* a is even */ if (BN_is_odd(b)) { if (!BN_rshift1(a, a)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) { t = a; a = b; b = t; } } else { /* a even - b even */ if (!BN_rshift1(a, a)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(b, b)) goto err; shifts++; } } /* 0 <= b <= a */ } if (shifts) { if (!BN_lshift(a, a, shifts)) goto err; } bn_check_top(a); return (a); err: return (NULL); } /* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *rv; int noinv; rv = int_bn_mod_inverse(in, a, n, ctx, &noinv); if (noinv) BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE, BN_R_NO_INVERSE); return rv; } BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx, int *pnoinv) { BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL; BIGNUM *ret = NULL; int sign; if (pnoinv) *pnoinv = 0; if ((BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) || (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) { return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx); } bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(n); BN_CTX_start(ctx); A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); B = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); D = BN_CTX_get(ctx); M = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); T = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (T == NULL) goto err; if (in == NULL) R = BN_new(); else R = in; if (R == NULL) goto err; BN_one(X); BN_zero(Y); if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL) goto err; A->neg = 0; if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) { if (!BN_nnmod(B, B, A, ctx)) goto err; } sign = -1; /*- * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that * * 0 <= B < A, * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). */ if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= 2048)) { /* * Binary inversion algorithm; requires odd modulus. This is faster * than the general algorithm if the modulus is sufficiently small * (about 400 .. 500 bits on 32-bit systems, but much more on 64-bit * systems) */ int shift; while (!BN_is_zero(B)) { /*- * 0 < B < |n|, * 0 < A <= |n|, * (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) */ /* * Now divide B by the maximum possible power of two in the * integers, and divide X by the same value mod |n|. When we're * done, (1) still holds. */ shift = 0; while (!BN_is_bit_set(B, shift)) { /* note that 0 < B */ shift++; if (BN_is_odd(X)) { if (!BN_uadd(X, X, n)) goto err; } /* * now X is even, so we can easily divide it by two */ if (!BN_rshift1(X, X)) goto err; } if (shift > 0) { if (!BN_rshift(B, B, shift)) goto err; } /* * Same for A and Y. Afterwards, (2) still holds. */ shift = 0; while (!BN_is_bit_set(A, shift)) { /* note that 0 < A */ shift++; if (BN_is_odd(Y)) { if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, n)) goto err; } /* now Y is even */ if (!BN_rshift1(Y, Y)) goto err; } if (shift > 0) { if (!BN_rshift(A, A, shift)) goto err; } /*- * We still have (1) and (2). * Both A and B are odd. * The following computations ensure that * * 0 <= B < |n|, * 0 < A < |n|, * (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|), * * and that either A or B is even in the next iteration. */ if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) { /* -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A (mod |n|) */ if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y)) goto err; /* * NB: we could use BN_mod_add_quick(X, X, Y, n), but that * actually makes the algorithm slower */ if (!BN_usub(B, B, A)) goto err; } else { /* sign*(X + Y)*a == A - B (mod |n|) */ if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, X)) goto err; /* * as above, BN_mod_add_quick(Y, Y, X, n) would slow things down */ if (!BN_usub(A, A, B)) goto err; } } } else { /* general inversion algorithm */ while (!BN_is_zero(B)) { BIGNUM *tmp; /*- * 0 < B < A, * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) */ /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */ if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B)) { if (!BN_one(D)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(M, A, B)) goto err; } else if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B) + 1) { /* A/B is 1, 2, or 3 */ if (!BN_lshift1(T, B)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(A, T) < 0) { /* A < 2*B, so D=1 */ if (!BN_one(D)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(M, A, B)) goto err; } else { /* A >= 2*B, so D=2 or D=3 */ if (!BN_sub(M, A, T)) goto err; if (!BN_add(D, T, B)) goto err; /* use D (:= 3*B) as temp */ if (BN_ucmp(A, D) < 0) { /* A < 3*B, so D=2 */ if (!BN_set_word(D, 2)) goto err; /* * M (= A - 2*B) already has the correct value */ } else { /* only D=3 remains */ if (!BN_set_word(D, 3)) goto err; /* * currently M = A - 2*B, but we need M = A - 3*B */ if (!BN_sub(M, M, B)) goto err; } } } else { if (!BN_div(D, M, A, B, ctx)) goto err; } /*- * Now * A = D*B + M; * thus we have * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|). */ tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */ /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */ A = B; B = M; /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */ /*- * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, * (**) translates into * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|), * i.e. * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|). * Similarly, (*) translates into * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|). * * Thus, * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * i.e. * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|). * * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time. */ /* * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp := D*X+Y */ if (BN_is_one(D)) { if (!BN_add(tmp, X, Y)) goto err; } else { if (BN_is_word(D, 2)) { if (!BN_lshift1(tmp, X)) goto err; } else if (BN_is_word(D, 4)) { if (!BN_lshift(tmp, X, 2)) goto err; } else if (D->top == 1) { if (!BN_copy(tmp, X)) goto err; if (!BN_mul_word(tmp, D->d[0])) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx)) goto err; } if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y)) goto err; } M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */ Y = X; X = tmp; sign = -sign; } } /*- * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when * A == gcd(a,n); * we have * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|), * where Y is non-negative. */ if (sign < 0) { if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y)) goto err; } /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */ if (BN_is_one(A)) { /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */ if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) { if (!BN_copy(R, Y)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx)) goto err; } } else { if (pnoinv) *pnoinv = 1; goto err; } ret = R; err: if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL)) BN_free(R); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(ret); return (ret); } /* * BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. It does * not contain branches that may leak sensitive information. */ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL; BIGNUM *ret = NULL; int sign; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(n); BN_CTX_start(ctx); A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); B = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); D = BN_CTX_get(ctx); M = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); T = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (T == NULL) goto err; if (in == NULL) R = BN_new(); else R = in; if (R == NULL) goto err; BN_one(X); BN_zero(Y); if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL) goto err; A->neg = 0; if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) { /* * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. */ { BIGNUM local_B; bn_init(&local_B); BN_with_flags(&local_B, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_nnmod(B, &local_B, A, ctx)) goto err; /* Ensure local_B goes out of scope before any further use of B */ } } sign = -1; /*- * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that * * 0 <= B < A, * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). */ while (!BN_is_zero(B)) { BIGNUM *tmp; /*- * 0 < B < A, * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) */ /* * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. */ { BIGNUM local_A; bn_init(&local_A); BN_with_flags(&local_A, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */ if (!BN_div(D, M, &local_A, B, ctx)) goto err; /* Ensure local_A goes out of scope before any further use of A */ } /*- * Now * A = D*B + M; * thus we have * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|). */ tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not * matter */ /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */ A = B; B = M; /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */ /*- * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, * (**) translates into * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|), * i.e. * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|). * Similarly, (*) translates into * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|). * * Thus, * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * i.e. * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|). * * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time. */ if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y)) goto err; M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not * matter */ Y = X; X = tmp; sign = -sign; } /*- * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when * A == gcd(a,n); * we have * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|), * where Y is non-negative. */ if (sign < 0) { if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y)) goto err; } /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */ if (BN_is_one(A)) { /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */ if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) { if (!BN_copy(R, Y)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx)) goto err; } } else { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH, BN_R_NO_INVERSE); goto err; } ret = R; err: if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL)) BN_free(R); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(ret); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c0000644000000000000000000001351113176625656015503 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #define TABLE_SIZE 32 int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1, const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { int i, j, bits, b, bits1, bits2, ret = 0, wpos1, wpos2, window1, window2, wvalue1, wvalue2; int r_is_one = 1; BIGNUM *d, *r; const BIGNUM *a_mod_m; /* Tables of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val1[TABLE_SIZE], *val2[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; bn_check_top(a1); bn_check_top(p1); bn_check_top(a2); bn_check_top(p2); bn_check_top(m); if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } bits1 = BN_num_bits(p1); bits2 = BN_num_bits(p2); if ((bits1 == 0) && (bits2 == 0)) { ret = BN_one(rr); return ret; } bits = (bits1 > bits2) ? bits1 : bits2; BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val1[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val2[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!d || !r || !val1[0] || !val2[0]) goto err; if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } window1 = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits1); window2 = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits2); /* * Build table for a1: val1[i] := a1^(2*i + 1) mod m for i = 0 .. 2^(window1-1) */ if (a1->neg || BN_ucmp(a1, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_mod(val1[0], a1, m, ctx)) goto err; a_mod_m = val1[0]; } else a_mod_m = a1; if (BN_is_zero(a_mod_m)) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } if (!BN_to_montgomery(val1[0], a_mod_m, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (window1 > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val1[0], val1[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; j = 1 << (window1 - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val1[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val1[i], val1[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } /* * Build table for a2: val2[i] := a2^(2*i + 1) mod m for i = 0 .. 2^(window2-1) */ if (a2->neg || BN_ucmp(a2, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_mod(val2[0], a2, m, ctx)) goto err; a_mod_m = val2[0]; } else a_mod_m = a2; if (BN_is_zero(a_mod_m)) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } if (!BN_to_montgomery(val2[0], a_mod_m, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (window2 > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val2[0], val2[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; j = 1 << (window2 - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val2[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val2[i], val2[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } /* Now compute the power product, using independent windows. */ r_is_one = 1; wvalue1 = 0; /* The 'value' of the first window */ wvalue2 = 0; /* The 'value' of the second window */ wpos1 = 0; /* If wvalue1 > 0, the bottom bit of the * first window */ wpos2 = 0; /* If wvalue2 > 0, the bottom bit of the * second window */ if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) goto err; for (b = bits - 1; b >= 0; b--) { if (!r_is_one) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } if (!wvalue1) if (BN_is_bit_set(p1, b)) { /* * consider bits b-window1+1 .. b for this window */ i = b - window1 + 1; while (!BN_is_bit_set(p1, i)) /* works for i<0 */ i++; wpos1 = i; wvalue1 = 1; for (i = b - 1; i >= wpos1; i--) { wvalue1 <<= 1; if (BN_is_bit_set(p1, i)) wvalue1++; } } if (!wvalue2) if (BN_is_bit_set(p2, b)) { /* * consider bits b-window2+1 .. b for this window */ i = b - window2 + 1; while (!BN_is_bit_set(p2, i)) i++; wpos2 = i; wvalue2 = 1; for (i = b - 1; i >= wpos2; i--) { wvalue2 <<= 1; if (BN_is_bit_set(p2, i)) wvalue2++; } } if (wvalue1 && b == wpos1) { /* wvalue1 is odd and < 2^window1 */ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val1[wvalue1 >> 1], mont, ctx)) goto err; wvalue1 = 0; r_is_one = 0; } if (wvalue2 && b == wpos2) { /* wvalue2 is odd and < 2^window2 */ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val2[wvalue2 >> 1], mont, ctx)) goto err; wvalue2 = 0; r_is_one = 0; } } if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (in_mont == NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rr); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/README.pod0000644000000000000000000002314613176625656015450 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME bn_mul_words, bn_mul_add_words, bn_sqr_words, bn_div_words, bn_add_words, bn_sub_words, bn_mul_comba4, bn_mul_comba8, bn_sqr_comba4, bn_sqr_comba8, bn_cmp_words, bn_mul_normal, bn_mul_low_normal, bn_mul_recursive, bn_mul_part_recursive, bn_mul_low_recursive, bn_mul_high, bn_sqr_normal, bn_sqr_recursive, bn_expand, bn_wexpand, bn_expand2, bn_fix_top, bn_check_top, bn_print, bn_dump, bn_set_max, bn_set_high, bn_set_low - BIGNUM library internal functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num); BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d); BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp, int num); BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp, int num); void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a); void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a); int bn_cmp_words(BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n); void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb); void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n); void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp); void mul(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c); void mul_add(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c); void sqr(BN_ULONG r0, BN_ULONG r1, BN_ULONG a); BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits); BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int n); BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int n); void bn_fix_top(BIGNUM *a); void bn_check_top(BIGNUM *a); void bn_print(BIGNUM *a); void bn_dump(BN_ULONG *d, int n); void bn_set_max(BIGNUM *a); void bn_set_high(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); void bn_set_low(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); =head1 DESCRIPTION This page documents the internal functions used by the OpenSSL B implementation. They are described here to facilitate debugging and extending the library. They are I to be used by applications. =head2 The BIGNUM structure typedef struct bignum_st BIGNUM; struct bignum_st { BN_ULONG *d; /* Pointer to an array of 'BN_BITS2' bit chunks. */ int top; /* Index of last used d +1. */ /* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */ int dmax; /* Size of the d array. */ int neg; /* one if the number is negative */ int flags; }; The integer value is stored in B, a malloc()ed array of words (B), least significant word first. A B can be either 16, 32 or 64 bits in size, depending on the 'number of bits' (B) specified in C. B is the size of the B array that has been allocated. B is the number of words being used, so for a value of 4, bn.d[0]=4 and bn.top=1. B is 1 if the number is negative. When a B is B<0>, the B field can be B and B == B<0>. B is a bit field of flags which are defined in C. The flags begin with B. The macros BN_set_flags(b, n) and BN_get_flags(b, n) exist to enable or fetch flag(s) B from B structure B. Various routines in this library require the use of temporary B variables during their execution. Since dynamic memory allocation to create Bs is rather expensive when used in conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the B structure is used. This structure contains B Bs, see L. =head2 Low-level arithmetic operations These functions are implemented in C and for several platforms in assembly language: bn_mul_words(B, B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B and B. It computes B * B, places the result in B, and returns the high word (carry). bn_mul_add_words(B, B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B and B. It computes B * B + B, places the result in B, and returns the high word (carry). bn_sqr_words(B, B, B) operates on the B word array B and the 2*B word array B. It computes B * B word-wise, and places the low and high bytes of the result in B. bn_div_words(B, B, B) divides the two word number (B, B) by B and returns the result. bn_add_words(B, B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B, B and B. It computes B + B, places the result in B, and returns the high word (carry). bn_sub_words(B, B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B, B and B. It computes B - B, places the result in B, and returns the carry (1 if B E B, 0 otherwise). bn_mul_comba4(B, B, B) operates on the 4 word arrays B and B and the 8 word array B. It computes B*B and places the result in B. bn_mul_comba8(B, B, B) operates on the 8 word arrays B and B and the 16 word array B. It computes B*B and places the result in B. bn_sqr_comba4(B, B, B) operates on the 4 word arrays B and B and the 8 word array B. bn_sqr_comba8(B, B, B) operates on the 8 word arrays B and B and the 16 word array B. The following functions are implemented in C: bn_cmp_words(B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B and B. It returns 1, 0 and -1 if B is greater than, equal and less than B. bn_mul_normal(B, B, B, B, B) operates on the B word array B, the B word array B and the B+B word array B. It computes B*B and places the result in B. bn_mul_low_normal(B, B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B, B and B. It computes the B low words of B*B and places the result in B. bn_mul_recursive(B, B, B, B, B, B, B) operates on the word arrays B and B of length B+B and B+B (B and B are currently allowed to be 0 or negative) and the 2*B word arrays B and B. B must be a power of 2. It computes B*B and places the result in B. bn_mul_part_recursive(B, B, B, B, B, B, B) operates on the word arrays B and B of length B+B and B+B and the 4*B word arrays B and B. bn_mul_low_recursive(B, B, B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B and B and the B/2 word arrays B and B. bn_mul_high(B, B, B, B, B, B) operates on the B word arrays B, B, B and B (?) and the 3*B word array B. BN_mul() calls bn_mul_normal(), or an optimized implementation if the factors have the same size: bn_mul_comba8() is used if they are 8 words long, bn_mul_recursive() if they are larger than B and the size is an exact multiple of the word size, and bn_mul_part_recursive() for others that are larger than B. bn_sqr_normal(B, B, B, B) operates on the B word array B and the 2*B word arrays B and B. The implementations use the following macros which, depending on the architecture, may use "long long" C operations or inline assembler. They are defined in C. mul(B, B, B, B) computes B*B+B and places the low word of the result in B and the high word in B. mul_add(B, B, B, B) computes B*B+B+B and places the low word of the result in B and the high word in B. sqr(B, B, B) computes B*B and places the low word of the result in B and the high word in B. =head2 Size changes bn_expand() ensures that B has enough space for a B bit number. bn_wexpand() ensures that B has enough space for an B word number. If the number has to be expanded, both macros call bn_expand2(), which allocates a new B array and copies the data. They return B on error, B otherwise. The bn_fix_top() macro reduces Btop> to point to the most significant non-zero word plus one when B has shrunk. =head2 Debugging bn_check_top() verifies that C<((a)-Etop E= 0 && (a)-Etop E= (a)-Edmax)>. A violation will cause the program to abort. bn_print() prints B to stderr. bn_dump() prints B words at B (in reverse order, i.e. most significant word first) to stderr. bn_set_max() makes B a static number with a B of its current size. This is used by bn_set_low() and bn_set_high() to make B a read-only B that contains the B low or high words of B. If B is not defined, bn_check_top(), bn_print(), bn_dump() and bn_set_max() are defined as empty macros. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c0000644000000000000000000006537613176625656015442 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) || !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS) /* * Here follows specialised variants of bn_add_words() and bn_sub_words(). * They have the property performing operations on arrays of different sizes. * The sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common * length ( basically, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta * between the two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the * number of BN_ULONGs... For the operations that require a result array as * parameter, it must have the length cl+abs(dl). These functions should * probably end up in bn_asm.c as soon as there are assembler counterparts * for the systems that use assembler files. */ BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) { BN_ULONG c, t; assert(cl >= 0); c = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, cl); if (dl == 0) return c; r += cl; a += cl; b += cl; if (dl < 0) { for (;;) { t = b[0]; r[0] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; t = b[1]; r[1] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; t = b[2]; r[2] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; t = b[3]; r[3] = (0 - t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 1; if (++dl >= 0) break; b += 4; r += 4; } } else { int save_dl = dl; while (c) { t = a[0]; r[0] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = a[1]; r[1] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = a[2]; r[2] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = a[3]; r[3] = (t - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t != 0) c = 0; if (--dl <= 0) break; save_dl = dl; a += 4; r += 4; } if (dl > 0) { if (save_dl > dl) { switch (save_dl - dl) { case 1: r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; /* fall thru */ case 2: r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; /* fall thru */ case 3: r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; } a += 4; r += 4; } } if (dl > 0) { for (;;) { r[0] = a[0]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; a += 4; r += 4; } } } return c; } #endif BN_ULONG bn_add_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) { BN_ULONG c, l, t; assert(cl >= 0); c = bn_add_words(r, a, b, cl); if (dl == 0) return c; r += cl; a += cl; b += cl; if (dl < 0) { int save_dl = dl; while (c) { l = (c + b[0]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[0] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; l = (c + b[1]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[1] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; l = (c + b[2]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[2] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; l = (c + b[3]) & BN_MASK2; c = (l < c); r[3] = l; if (++dl >= 0) break; save_dl = dl; b += 4; r += 4; } if (dl < 0) { if (save_dl < dl) { switch (dl - save_dl) { case 1: r[1] = b[1]; if (++dl >= 0) break; /* fall thru */ case 2: r[2] = b[2]; if (++dl >= 0) break; /* fall thru */ case 3: r[3] = b[3]; if (++dl >= 0) break; } b += 4; r += 4; } } if (dl < 0) { for (;;) { r[0] = b[0]; if (++dl >= 0) break; r[1] = b[1]; if (++dl >= 0) break; r[2] = b[2]; if (++dl >= 0) break; r[3] = b[3]; if (++dl >= 0) break; b += 4; r += 4; } } } else { int save_dl = dl; while (c) { t = (a[0] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[0] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = (a[1] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[1] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = (a[2] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[2] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; t = (a[3] + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); r[3] = t; if (--dl <= 0) break; save_dl = dl; a += 4; r += 4; } if (dl > 0) { if (save_dl > dl) { switch (save_dl - dl) { case 1: r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; /* fall thru */ case 2: r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; /* fall thru */ case 3: r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; } a += 4; r += 4; } } if (dl > 0) { for (;;) { r[0] = a[0]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[1] = a[1]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[2] = a[2]; if (--dl <= 0) break; r[3] = a[3]; if (--dl <= 0) break; a += 4; r += 4; } } } return c; } #ifdef BN_RECURSION /* * Karatsuba recursive multiplication algorithm (cf. Knuth, The Art of * Computer Programming, Vol. 2) */ /*- * r is 2*n2 words in size, * a and b are both n2 words in size. * n2 must be a power of 2. * We multiply and return the result. * t must be 2*n2 words in size * We calculate * a[0]*b[0] * a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * a[1]*b[1] */ /* dnX may not be positive, but n2/2+dnX has to be */ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t) { int n = n2 / 2, c1, c2; int tna = n + dna, tnb = n + dnb; unsigned int neg, zero; BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p; # ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA # if 0 if (n2 == 4) { bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); return; } # endif /* * Only call bn_mul_comba 8 if n2 == 8 and the two arrays are complete * [steve] */ if (n2 == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); return; } # endif /* BN_MUL_COMBA */ /* Else do normal multiply */ if (n2 < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_mul_normal(r, a, n2 + dna, b, n2 + dnb); if ((dna + dnb) < 0) memset(&r[2 * n2 + dna + dnb], 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * -(dna + dnb)); return; } /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */ c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); zero = neg = 0; switch (c1 * 3 + c2) { case -4: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ break; case -3: zero = 1; break; case -2: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); /* + */ neg = 1; break; case -1: case 0: case 1: zero = 1; break; case 2: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); /* + */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ neg = 1; break; case 3: zero = 1; break; case 4: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); break; } # ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA if (n == 4 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { /* XXX: bn_mul_comba4 could take * extra args to do this well */ if (!zero) bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); else memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 8); bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); bn_mul_comba4(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n])); } else if (n == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) { /* XXX: bn_mul_comba8 could * take extra args to do * this well */ if (!zero) bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); else memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 16); bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); bn_mul_comba8(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n])); } else # endif /* BN_MUL_COMBA */ { p = &(t[n2 * 2]); if (!zero) bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p); else memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2); bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p); bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p); } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2)); if (neg) { /* if t[32] is negative */ c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2)); } else { /* Might have a carry */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2)); } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2)); if (c1) { p = &(r[n + n2]); lo = *p; ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; /* * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not * overwrite */ if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) { do { p++; lo = *p; ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; } while (ln == 0); } } } /* * n+tn is the word length t needs to be n*4 is size, as does r */ /* tnX may not be negative but less than n */ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t) { int i, j, n2 = n * 2; int c1, c2, neg; BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p; if (n < 8) { bn_mul_normal(r, a, n + tna, b, n + tnb); return; } /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */ c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); neg = 0; switch (c1 * 3 + c2) { case -4: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ break; case -3: /* break; */ case -2: bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n); /* - */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); /* + */ neg = 1; break; case -1: case 0: case 1: /* break; */ case 2: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); /* + */ bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb); /* - */ neg = 1; break; case 3: /* break; */ case 4: bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna); bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n); break; } /* * The zero case isn't yet implemented here. The speedup would probably * be negligible. */ # if 0 if (n == 4) { bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tn, &(b[n]), tn); memset(&r[n2 + tn * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tn * 2)); } else # endif if (n == 8) { bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb); memset(&r[n2 + tna + tnb], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tna - tnb)); } else { p = &(t[n2 * 2]); bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p); bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p); i = n / 2; /* * If there is only a bottom half to the number, just do it */ if (tna > tnb) j = tna - i; else j = tnb - i; if (j == 0) { bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); memset(&r[n2 + i * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - i * 2)); } else if (j > 0) { /* eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 11 */ bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb)); } else { /* (j < 0) eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 5 */ memset(&r[n2], 0, sizeof(*r) * n2); if (tna < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL && tnb < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb); } else { for (;;) { i /= 2; /* * these simplified conditions work exclusively because * difference between tna and tnb is 1 or 0 */ if (i < tna || i < tnb) { bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); break; } else if (i == tna || i == tnb) { bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); break; } } } } } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2)); if (neg) { /* if t[32] is negative */ c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2)); } else { /* Might have a carry */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2)); } /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2)); if (c1) { p = &(r[n + n2]); lo = *p; ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; /* * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not * overwrite */ if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) { do { p++; lo = *p; ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; } while (ln == 0); } } } /*- * a and b must be the same size, which is n2. * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2 */ void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) { int n = n2 / 2; bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, &(t[0])); if (n >= BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_mul_low_recursive(&(t[0]), &(a[0]), &(b[n]), n, &(t[n2])); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n); bn_mul_low_recursive(&(t[0]), &(a[n]), &(b[0]), n, &(t[n2])); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n); } else { bn_mul_low_normal(&(t[0]), &(a[0]), &(b[n]), n); bn_mul_low_normal(&(t[n]), &(a[n]), &(b[0]), n); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[0]), n); bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n]), n); } } /*- * a and b must be the same size, which is n2. * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2 * l is the low words of the output. * t needs to be n2*3 */ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) { int i, n; int c1, c2; int neg, oneg, zero; BN_ULONG ll, lc, *lp, *mp; n = n2 / 2; /* Calculate (al-ah)*(bh-bl) */ neg = zero = 0; c1 = bn_cmp_words(&(a[0]), &(a[n]), n); c2 = bn_cmp_words(&(b[n]), &(b[0]), n); switch (c1 * 3 + c2) { case -4: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[n]), &(a[0]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[0]), &(b[n]), n); break; case -3: zero = 1; break; case -2: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[n]), &(a[0]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[n]), &(b[0]), n); neg = 1; break; case -1: case 0: case 1: zero = 1; break; case 2: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[0]), &(a[n]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[0]), &(b[n]), n); neg = 1; break; case 3: zero = 1; break; case 4: bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(a[0]), &(a[n]), n); bn_sub_words(&(r[n]), &(b[n]), &(b[0]), n); break; } oneg = neg; /* t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */ /* r[10] = (a[1]*b[1]) */ # ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA if (n == 8) { bn_mul_comba8(&(t[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n])); bn_mul_comba8(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n])); } else # endif { bn_mul_recursive(&(t[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2])); bn_mul_recursive(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2])); } /*- * s0 == low(al*bl) * s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl) * We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl) * high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl)) * high(al*bl) == s1 - (r[0]+l[0]+t[0]) */ if (l != NULL) { lp = &(t[n2 + n]); bn_add_words(lp, &(r[0]), &(l[0]), n); } else { lp = &(r[0]); } if (neg) neg = (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(t[0]), n)); else { bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(t[0]), n); neg = 0; } if (l != NULL) { bn_sub_words(&(t[n2 + n]), &(l[n]), &(t[n2]), n); } else { lp = &(t[n2 + n]); mp = &(t[n2]); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) lp[i] = ((~mp[i]) + 1) & BN_MASK2; } /*- * s[0] = low(al*bl) * t[3] = high(al*bl) * t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign * r[10] = (a[1]*b[1]) */ /*- * R[10] = al*bl * R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * R[32] = ah*bh */ /*- * R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow) * R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow) * R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow) */ if (l != NULL) { lp = &(t[n2]); c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(t[n2 + n]), &(l[0]), n)); } else { lp = &(t[n2 + n]); c1 = 0; } c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), lp, &(r[0]), n)); if (oneg) c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), &(t[0]), n)); else c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), &(t[0]), n)); c2 = (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n2 + n]), n)); c2 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(r[n]), n)); if (oneg) c2 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n]), n)); else c2 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[0]), &(r[0]), &(t[n]), n)); if (c1 != 0) { /* Add starting at r[0], could be +ve or -ve */ i = 0; if (c1 > 0) { lc = c1; do { ll = (r[i] + lc) & BN_MASK2; r[i++] = ll; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } else { lc = -c1; do { ll = r[i]; r[i++] = (ll - lc) & BN_MASK2; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } } if (c2 != 0) { /* Add starting at r[1] */ i = n; if (c2 > 0) { lc = c2; do { ll = (r[i] + lc) & BN_MASK2; r[i++] = ll; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } else { lc = -c2; do { ll = r[i]; r[i++] = (ll - lc) & BN_MASK2; lc = (lc > ll); } while (lc); } } } #endif /* BN_RECURSION */ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; int top, al, bl; BIGNUM *rr; #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION) int i; #endif #ifdef BN_RECURSION BIGNUM *t = NULL; int j = 0, k; #endif bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(r); al = a->top; bl = b->top; if ((al == 0) || (bl == 0)) { BN_zero(r); return (1); } top = al + bl; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((r == a) || (r == b)) { if ((rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; } else rr = r; #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION) i = al - bl; #endif #ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA if (i == 0) { # if 0 if (al == 4) { if (bn_wexpand(rr, 8) == NULL) goto err; rr->top = 8; bn_mul_comba4(rr->d, a->d, b->d); goto end; } # endif if (al == 8) { if (bn_wexpand(rr, 16) == NULL) goto err; rr->top = 16; bn_mul_comba8(rr->d, a->d, b->d); goto end; } } #endif /* BN_MUL_COMBA */ #ifdef BN_RECURSION if ((al >= BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL) && (bl >= BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL)) { if (i >= -1 && i <= 1) { /* * Find out the power of two lower or equal to the longest of the * two numbers */ if (i >= 0) { j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al); } if (i == -1) { j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)bl); } j = 1 << (j - 1); assert(j <= al || j <= bl); k = j + j; t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t == NULL) goto err; if (al > j || bl > j) { if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 4) == NULL) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 4) == NULL) goto err; bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d); } else { /* al <= j || bl <= j */ if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 2) == NULL) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 2) == NULL) goto err; bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d); } rr->top = top; goto end; } } #endif /* BN_RECURSION */ if (bn_wexpand(rr, top) == NULL) goto err; rr->top = top; bn_mul_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, b->d, bl); #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) || defined(BN_RECURSION) end: #endif rr->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg; bn_correct_top(rr); if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: bn_check_top(r); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb) { BN_ULONG *rr; if (na < nb) { int itmp; BN_ULONG *ltmp; itmp = na; na = nb; nb = itmp; ltmp = a; a = b; b = ltmp; } rr = &(r[na]); if (nb <= 0) { (void)bn_mul_words(r, a, na, 0); return; } else rr[0] = bn_mul_words(r, a, na, b[0]); for (;;) { if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[1] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, na, b[1]); if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[2] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, na, b[2]); if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[3] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, na, b[3]); if (--nb <= 0) return; rr[4] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, na, b[4]); rr += 4; r += 4; b += 4; } } void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) { bn_mul_words(r, a, n, b[0]); for (;;) { if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, n, b[1]); if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, n, b[2]); if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, n, b[3]); if (--n <= 0) return; bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, n, b[4]); r += 4; b += 4; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_word.c0000644000000000000000000001065513176625656015606 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { #ifndef BN_LLONG BN_ULONG ret = 0; #else BN_ULLONG ret = 0; #endif int i; if (w == 0) return (BN_ULONG)-1; #ifndef BN_LLONG /* * If |w| is too long and we don't have BN_ULLONG then we need to fall * back to using BN_div_word */ if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) { BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a); if (tmp == NULL) return (BN_ULONG)-1; ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w); BN_free(tmp); return ret; } #endif bn_check_top(a); w &= BN_MASK2; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { #ifndef BN_LLONG /* * We can assume here that | w <= ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and so * | ret < ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and therefore the shifts here are * safe and will not overflow */ ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w; ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w; #else ret = (BN_ULLONG) (((ret << (BN_ULLONG) BN_BITS2) | a->d[i]) % (BN_ULLONG) w); #endif } return ((BN_ULONG)ret); } BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG ret = 0; int i, j; bn_check_top(a); w &= BN_MASK2; if (!w) /* actually this an error (division by zero) */ return (BN_ULONG)-1; if (a->top == 0) return 0; /* normalize input (so bn_div_words doesn't complain) */ j = BN_BITS2 - BN_num_bits_word(w); w <<= j; if (!BN_lshift(a, a, j)) return (BN_ULONG)-1; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { BN_ULONG l, d; l = a->d[i]; d = bn_div_words(ret, l, w); ret = (l - ((d * w) & BN_MASK2)) & BN_MASK2; a->d[i] = d; } if ((a->top > 0) && (a->d[a->top - 1] == 0)) a->top--; ret >>= j; if (!a->top) a->neg = 0; /* don't allow negative zero */ bn_check_top(a); return (ret); } int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG l; int i; bn_check_top(a); w &= BN_MASK2; /* degenerate case: w is zero */ if (!w) return 1; /* degenerate case: a is zero */ if (BN_is_zero(a)) return BN_set_word(a, w); /* handle 'a' when negative */ if (a->neg) { a->neg = 0; i = BN_sub_word(a, w); if (!BN_is_zero(a)) a->neg = !(a->neg); return (i); } for (i = 0; w != 0 && i < a->top; i++) { a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i] + w) & BN_MASK2; w = (w > l) ? 1 : 0; } if (w && i == a->top) { if (bn_wexpand(a, a->top + 1) == NULL) return 0; a->top++; a->d[i] = w; } bn_check_top(a); return (1); } int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { int i; bn_check_top(a); w &= BN_MASK2; /* degenerate case: w is zero */ if (!w) return 1; /* degenerate case: a is zero */ if (BN_is_zero(a)) { i = BN_set_word(a, w); if (i != 0) BN_set_negative(a, 1); return i; } /* handle 'a' when negative */ if (a->neg) { a->neg = 0; i = BN_add_word(a, w); a->neg = 1; return (i); } if ((a->top == 1) && (a->d[0] < w)) { a->d[0] = w - a->d[0]; a->neg = 1; return (1); } i = 0; for (;;) { if (a->d[i] >= w) { a->d[i] -= w; break; } else { a->d[i] = (a->d[i] - w) & BN_MASK2; i++; w = 1; } } if ((a->d[i] == 0) && (i == (a->top - 1))) a->top--; bn_check_top(a); return (1); } int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG ll; bn_check_top(a); w &= BN_MASK2; if (a->top) { if (w == 0) BN_zero(a); else { ll = bn_mul_words(a->d, a->d, a->top, w); if (ll) { if (bn_wexpand(a, a->top + 1) == NULL) return (0); a->d[a->top++] = ll; } } } bn_check_top(a); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/build.info0000644000000000000000000000663713176625656015771 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ bn_add.c bn_div.c bn_exp.c bn_lib.c bn_ctx.c bn_mul.c bn_mod.c \ bn_print.c bn_rand.c bn_shift.c bn_word.c bn_blind.c \ bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \ {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \ bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \ bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c INCLUDE[../../libcrypto]=../../crypto/include INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=.. GENERATE[bn-586.s]=asm/bn-586.pl \ $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[bn-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[co-586.s]=asm/co-586.pl \ $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[co-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[x86-mont.s]=asm/x86-mont.pl \ $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[x86-mont.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[x86-gf2m.s]=asm/x86-gf2m.pl \ $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[x86-gf2m.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[sparcv9a-mont.S]=asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sparcv9a-mont.o]=.. GENERATE[sparcv9-mont.S]=asm/sparcv9-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sparcv9-mont.o]=.. GENERATE[vis3-mont.S]=asm/vis3-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[vis3-mont.o]=.. GENERATE[sparct4-mont.S]=asm/sparct4-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sparct4-mont.o]=.. GENERATE[sparcv9-gf2m.S]=asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sparcv9-gf2m.o]=.. GENERATE[bn-mips.s]=asm/mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[mips-mont.s]=asm/mips-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[s390x-mont.S]=asm/s390x-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[s390x-gf2m.s]=asm/s390x-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[x86_64-mont.s]=asm/x86_64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[x86_64-mont5.s]=asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[x86_64-gf2m.s]=asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[rsaz-x86_64.s]=asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[rsaz-avx2.s]=asm/rsaz-avx2.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[bn-ia64.s]=asm/ia64.S GENERATE[ia64-mont.s]=asm/ia64-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) GENERATE[parisc-mont.s]=asm/parisc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) # ppc - AIX, Linux, MacOS X... GENERATE[bn-ppc.s]=asm/ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ppc-mont.s]=asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ppc64-mont.s]=asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[alpha-mont.S]=asm/alpha-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[armv4-mont.S]=asm/armv4-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[armv4-mont.o]=.. GENERATE[armv4-gf2m.S]=asm/armv4-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[armv4-gf2m.o]=.. GENERATE[armv8-mont.S]=asm/armv8-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) OVERRIDES=bn-mips3.o pa-risc2W.o pa-risc2.c BEGINRAW[Makefile] ##### BN assembler implementations {- $builddir -}/bn-mips3.o: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/mips3.s @if [ "$(CC)" = "gcc" ]; then \ ABI=`expr "$(CFLAGS)" : ".*-mabi=\([n3264]*\)"` && \ as -$$ABI -O -o $@ {- $sourcedir -}/asm/mips3.s; \ else $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) -o $@ {- $sourcedir -}/asm/mips3.s; fi # GNU assembler fails to compile PA-RISC2 modules, insist on calling # vendor assembler... {- $builddir -}/pa-risc2W.o: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2W.s CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/fipsas.pl $(SRCDIR) $< /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2W.o {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2W.s {- $builddir -}/pa-risc2.o: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2.s CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/fipsas.pl $(SRCDIR) $< /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2.o {- $sourcedir -}/asm/pa-risc2.s ENDRAW[Makefile] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_const.c0000644000000000000000000006444713176625656015771 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include /*- * "First Oakley Default Group" from RFC2409, section 6.1. * * The prime is: 2^768 - 2 ^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 } * * RFC2409 specifies a generator of 2. * RFC2412 specifies a generator of of 22. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC2409_PRIME_768[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x3A, 0x36, 0x20, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC2409_PRIME_768, sizeof(RFC2409_PRIME_768), bn); } /*- * "Second Oakley Default Group" from RFC2409, section 6.2. * * The prime is: 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }. * * RFC2409 specifies a generator of 2. * RFC2412 specifies a generator of 22. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC2409_PRIME_1024[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC2409_PRIME_1024, sizeof(RFC2409_PRIME_1024), bn); } /*- * "1536-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 2. * * The prime is: 2^1536 - 2^1472 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1406 pi] + 741804 } * * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2. * RFC2312 specifies a generator of 22. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_1536[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x23, 0x73, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_1536, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_1536), bn); } /*- * "2048-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 3. * * The prime is: 2^2048 - 2^1984 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1918 pi] + 124476 } * * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_2048[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_2048, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_2048), bn); } /*- * "3072-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 4. * * The prime is: 2^3072 - 2^3008 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^2942 pi] + 1690314 } * * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_3072[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_3072, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_3072), bn); } /*- * "4096-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 5. * * The prime is: 2^4096 - 2^4032 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^3966 pi] + 240904 } * * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_4096[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_4096, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_4096), bn); } /*- * "6144-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 6. * * The prime is: 2^6144 - 2^6080 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^6014 pi] + 929484 } * * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_6144[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x02, 0x84, 0x92, 0x36, 0xC3, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xD4, 0xDC, 0xB2, 0x60, 0x26, 0x46, 0xDE, 0xC9, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x76, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0x37, 0xBD, 0xF8, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x9E, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xE5, 0xDB, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x41, 0x30, 0x01, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xED, 0x90, 0x27, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x17, 0x97, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x86, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x18, 0xDA, 0x3E, 0xDB, 0xEB, 0xCF, 0x9B, 0x14, 0xED, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0xD4, 0xBB, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0x7F, 0x14, 0x47, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x25, 0x4B, 0x33, 0x20, 0x51, 0x51, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x42, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x01, 0x37, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0xBF, 0x59, 0x83, 0xCA, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x4B, 0x92, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x32, 0xEA, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x72, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xF4, 0x82, 0xD7, 0xCE, 0x6E, 0x74, 0xFE, 0xF6, 0xD5, 0x5E, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x46, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x82, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x40, 0x31, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x1C, 0x9E, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xC9, 0x7F, 0xBE, 0xC7, 0xE8, 0xF3, 0x23, 0xA9, 0x7A, 0x7E, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x88, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0x1D, 0x45, 0xB7, 0xFF, 0x58, 0x5A, 0xC5, 0x4B, 0xD4, 0x07, 0xB2, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x54, 0xAA, 0xCC, 0x8F, 0x6D, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x48, 0xE1, 0xD8, 0x14, 0xCC, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x97, 0x15, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x9B, 0xE3, 0x28, 0x06, 0xA1, 0xD5, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xDA, 0x76, 0xF5, 0x50, 0xAA, 0x3D, 0x8A, 0x1F, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xEB, 0x19, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xA3, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x56, 0xC9, 0xEC, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0x96, 0x32, 0x38, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x04, 0x68, 0x04, 0x3E, 0x8F, 0x66, 0x3F, 0x48, 0x60, 0xEE, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x2D, 0x5B, 0x0B, 0x74, 0x74, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0x94, 0xF9, 0x1E, 0x6D, 0xCC, 0x40, 0x24, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_6144, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_6144), bn); } /*- * "8192-bit MODP Group" from RFC3526, Section 7. * * The prime is: 2^8192 - 2^8128 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^8062 pi] + 4743158 } * * RFC3526 specifies a generator of 2. */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(BIGNUM *bn) { static const unsigned char RFC3526_PRIME_8192[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 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0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x02, 0x84, 0x92, 0x36, 0xC3, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xD4, 0xDC, 0xB2, 0x60, 0x26, 0x46, 0xDE, 0xC9, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x76, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0x37, 0xBD, 0xF8, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x9E, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xE5, 0xDB, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x41, 0x30, 0x01, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xED, 0x90, 0x27, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x17, 0x97, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x86, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x18, 0xDA, 0x3E, 0xDB, 0xEB, 0xCF, 0x9B, 0x14, 0xED, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0xBA, 0xCE, 0xD4, 0xBB, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0x7F, 0x14, 0x47, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x25, 0x4B, 0x33, 0x20, 0x51, 0x51, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x42, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x01, 0x37, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0xBF, 0x59, 0x83, 0xCA, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x4B, 0x92, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x32, 0xEA, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x72, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xF4, 0x82, 0xD7, 0xCE, 0x6E, 0x74, 0xFE, 0xF6, 0xD5, 0x5E, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x46, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x82, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x40, 0x31, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x1C, 0x9E, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xC9, 0x7F, 0xBE, 0xC7, 0xE8, 0xF3, 0x23, 0xA9, 0x7A, 0x7E, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x88, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0x1D, 0x45, 0xB7, 0xFF, 0x58, 0x5A, 0xC5, 0x4B, 0xD4, 0x07, 0xB2, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x54, 0xAA, 0xCC, 0x8F, 0x6D, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x48, 0xE1, 0xD8, 0x14, 0xCC, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x97, 0x15, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x9B, 0xE3, 0x28, 0x06, 0xA1, 0xD5, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xDA, 0x76, 0xF5, 0x50, 0xAA, 0x3D, 0x8A, 0x1F, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xEB, 0x19, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xA3, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x56, 0xC9, 0xEC, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0x96, 0x32, 0x38, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x04, 0x68, 0x04, 0x3E, 0x8F, 0x66, 0x3F, 0x48, 0x60, 0xEE, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x2D, 0x5B, 0x0B, 0x74, 0x74, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0x94, 0xF9, 0x1E, 0x6D, 0xBE, 0x11, 0x59, 0x74, 0xA3, 0x92, 0x6F, 0x12, 0xFE, 0xE5, 0xE4, 0x38, 0x77, 0x7C, 0xB6, 0xA9, 0x32, 0xDF, 0x8C, 0xD8, 0xBE, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x73, 0xB9, 0x31, 0xBA, 0x3B, 0xC8, 0x32, 0xB6, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x74, 0x1F, 0xA7, 0xBF, 0x8A, 0xFC, 0x47, 0xED, 0x25, 0x76, 0xF6, 0x93, 0x6B, 0xA4, 0x24, 0x66, 0x3A, 0xAB, 0x63, 0x9C, 0x5A, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x68, 0x34, 0x23, 0xB4, 0x74, 0x2B, 0xF1, 0xC9, 0x78, 0x23, 0x8F, 0x16, 0xCB, 0xE3, 0x9D, 0x65, 0x2D, 0xE3, 0xFD, 0xB8, 0xBE, 0xFC, 0x84, 0x8A, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x22, 0x2E, 0x04, 0xA4, 0x03, 0x7C, 0x07, 0x13, 0xEB, 0x57, 0xA8, 0x1A, 0x23, 0xF0, 0xC7, 0x34, 0x73, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6C, 0xEA, 0x30, 0x6B, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xC8, 0x86, 0x2F, 0x83, 0x85, 0xDD, 0xFA, 0x9D, 0x4B, 0x7F, 0xA2, 0xC0, 0x87, 0xE8, 0x79, 0x68, 0x33, 0x03, 0xED, 0x5B, 0xDD, 0x3A, 0x06, 0x2B, 0x3C, 0xF5, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x78, 0xA6, 0x6D, 0x2A, 0x13, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0x44, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x31, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x6A, 0x36, 0x45, 0x97, 0xE8, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x25, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x64, 0xF3, 0x1C, 0xC5, 0x08, 0x46, 0x85, 0x1D, 0xF9, 0xAB, 0x48, 0x19, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xD5, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0x4D, 0x73, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0x6B, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x68, 0x35, 0x90, 0x46, 0xF4, 0xEB, 0x87, 0x9F, 0x92, 0x40, 0x09, 0x43, 0x8B, 0x48, 0x1C, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x88, 0x9A, 0x00, 0x2E, 0xD5, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x2B, 0xC9, 0x19, 0x0D, 0xA6, 0xFC, 0x02, 0x6E, 0x47, 0x95, 0x58, 0xE4, 0x47, 0x56, 0x77, 0xE9, 0xAA, 0x9E, 0x30, 0x50, 0xE2, 0x76, 0x56, 0x94, 0xDF, 0xC8, 0x1F, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x80, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x60, 0xC9, 0x80, 0xDD, 0x98, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; return BN_bin2bn(RFC3526_PRIME_8192, sizeof(RFC3526_PRIME_8192), bn); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_err.c0000644000000000000000000001106013176625656015412 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BNRAND), "bnrand"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX), "BN_BLINDING_convert_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM), "BN_BLINDING_create_param"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX), "BN_BLINDING_invert_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW), "BN_BLINDING_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE), "BN_BLINDING_update"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC), "BN_bn2dec"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX), "BN_bn2hex"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF), "bn_compute_wNAF"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_CTX_GET), "BN_CTX_get"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_CTX_NEW), "BN_CTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_CTX_START), "BN_CTX_start"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_DIV), "BN_div"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP), "BN_div_recp"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_EXP), "BN_exp"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL), "bn_expand_internal"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GENCB_NEW), "BN_GENCB_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE), "BN_generate_dsa_nonce"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX), "BN_generate_prime_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD), "BN_GF2m_mod"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP), "BN_GF2m_mod_exp"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL), "BN_GF2m_mod_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT), "BN_lshift"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT), "BN_mod_exp2_mont"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT), "BN_mod_exp_mont"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME), "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD), "BN_mod_exp_mont_word"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP), "BN_mod_exp_recp"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE), "BN_mod_exp_simple"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE), "BN_mod_inverse"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH), "BN_mod_inverse_no_branch"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK), "BN_mod_lshift_quick"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT), "BN_mod_sqrt"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MPI2BN), "BN_mpi2bn"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_NEW), "BN_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND), "BN_rand"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE), "BN_rand_range"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT), "BN_rshift"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS), "bn_set_words"}, {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_USUB), "BN_usub"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3), "arg2 lt arg3"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL), "bad reciprocal"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG), "bignum too long"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL), "bits too small"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS), "called with even modulus"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO), "div by zero"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR), "encoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA), "expand on static bignum data"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED), "input not reduced"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_RANGE), "invalid range"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT), "invalid shift"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE), "not a square"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_INVERSE), "no inverse"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_SOLUTION), "no solution"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE), "private key too large"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME), "p is not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS), "too many iterations"}, {ERR_REASON(BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES), "too many temporary variables"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_BN_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(BN_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, BN_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, BN_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c0000644000000000000000000001260013176625656015430 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* r must not be a */ /* * I've just gone over this and it is now %20 faster on x86 - eay - 27 Jun 96 */ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { int max, al; int ret = 0; BIGNUM *tmp, *rr; bn_check_top(a); al = a->top; if (al <= 0) { r->top = 0; r->neg = 0; return 1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); rr = (a != r) ? r : BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!rr || !tmp) goto err; max = 2 * al; /* Non-zero (from above) */ if (bn_wexpand(rr, max) == NULL) goto err; if (al == 4) { #ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA BN_ULONG t[8]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 4, t); #else bn_sqr_comba4(rr->d, a->d); #endif } else if (al == 8) { #ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA BN_ULONG t[16]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, 8, t); #else bn_sqr_comba8(rr->d, a->d); #endif } else { #if defined(BN_RECURSION) if (al < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { BN_ULONG t[BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL * 2]; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, t); } else { int j, k; j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al); j = 1 << (j - 1); k = j + j; if (al == j) { if (bn_wexpand(tmp, k * 2) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_recursive(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); } else { if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); } } #else if (bn_wexpand(tmp, max) == NULL) goto err; bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d); #endif } rr->neg = 0; /* * If the most-significant half of the top word of 'a' is zero, then the * square of 'a' will max-1 words. */ if (a->d[al - 1] == (a->d[al - 1] & BN_MASK2l)) rr->top = max - 1; else rr->top = max; if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: bn_check_top(rr); bn_check_top(tmp); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } /* tmp must have 2*n words */ void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp) { int i, j, max; const BN_ULONG *ap; BN_ULONG *rp; max = n * 2; ap = a; rp = r; rp[0] = rp[max - 1] = 0; rp++; j = n; if (--j > 0) { ap++; rp[j] = bn_mul_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]); rp += 2; } for (i = n - 2; i > 0; i--) { j--; ap++; rp[j] = bn_mul_add_words(rp, ap, j, ap[-1]); rp += 2; } bn_add_words(r, r, r, max); /* There will not be a carry */ bn_sqr_words(tmp, a, n); bn_add_words(r, r, tmp, max); } #ifdef BN_RECURSION /*- * r is 2*n words in size, * a and b are both n words in size. (There's not actually a 'b' here ...) * n must be a power of 2. * We multiply and return the result. * t must be 2*n words in size * We calculate * a[0]*b[0] * a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * a[1]*b[1] */ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) { int n = n2 / 2; int zero, c1; BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p; if (n2 == 4) { # ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 4, t); # else bn_sqr_comba4(r, a); # endif return; } else if (n2 == 8) { # ifndef BN_SQR_COMBA bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 8, t); # else bn_sqr_comba8(r, a); # endif return; } if (n2 < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_sqr_normal(r, a, n2, t); return; } /* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]) */ c1 = bn_cmp_words(a, &(a[n]), n); zero = 0; if (c1 > 0) bn_sub_words(t, a, &(a[n]), n); else if (c1 < 0) bn_sub_words(t, &(a[n]), a, n); else zero = 1; /* The result will always be negative unless it is zero */ p = &(t[n2 * 2]); if (!zero) bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, n, p); else memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2); bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p); bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p); /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2)); /* t[32] is negative */ c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2)); /*- * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0]) * r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits */ c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2)); if (c1) { p = &(r[n + n2]); lo = *p; ln = (lo + c1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; /* * The overflow will stop before we over write words we should not * overwrite */ if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) { do { p++; lo = *p; ln = (lo + 1) & BN_MASK2; *p = ln; } while (ln == 0); } } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000006145613176625656015417 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_BN_LCL_H # define HEADER_BN_LCL_H /* * The EDK2 build doesn't use bn_conf.h; it sets THIRTY_TWO_BIT or * SIXTY_FOUR_BIT in its own environment since it doesn't re-run our * Configure script and needs to support both 32-bit and 64-bit. */ # include # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) # include "internal/bn_conf.h" # endif # include "internal/bn_int.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * These preprocessor symbols control various aspects of the bignum headers * and library code. They're not defined by any "normal" configuration, as * they are intended for development and testing purposes. NB: defining all * three can be useful for debugging application code as well as openssl * itself. BN_DEBUG - turn on various debugging alterations to the bignum * code BN_DEBUG_RAND - uses random poisoning of unused words to trip up * mismanagement of bignum internals. You must also define BN_DEBUG. */ /* #define BN_DEBUG */ /* #define BN_DEBUG_RAND */ # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT # define BN_MUL_COMBA # define BN_SQR_COMBA # define BN_RECURSION # endif /* * This next option uses the C libraries (2 word)/(1 word) function. If it is * not defined, I use my C version (which is slower). The reason for this * flag is that when the particular C compiler library routine is used, and * the library is linked with a different compiler, the library is missing. * This mostly happens when the library is built with gcc and then linked * using normal cc. This would be a common occurrence because gcc normally * produces code that is 2 times faster than system compilers for the big * number stuff. For machines with only one compiler (or shared libraries), * this should be on. Again this in only really a problem on machines using * "long long's", are 32bit, and are not using my assembler code. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || \ defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(linux) # define BN_DIV2W # endif /* * 64-bit processor with LP64 ABI */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG # define BN_ULLONG unsigned long long # define BN_BITS4 32 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000L) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000L) # define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000UL) # define BN_DEC_NUM 19 # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%lu" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%019lu" # endif /* * 64-bit processor other than LP64 ABI */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT # undef BN_LLONG # undef BN_ULLONG # define BN_BITS4 32 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffLL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000LL) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000LL) # define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000ULL) # define BN_DEC_NUM 19 # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%llu" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%019llu" # endif # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT # ifdef BN_LLONG # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__GNUC__) # define BN_ULLONG unsigned __int64 # else # define BN_ULLONG unsigned long long # endif # endif # define BN_BITS4 16 # define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffL) # define BN_MASK2l (0xffff) # define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000L) # define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000L) # define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000L) # define BN_DEC_NUM 9 # define BN_DEC_FMT1 "%u" # define BN_DEC_FMT2 "%09u" # endif /*- * Bignum consistency macros * There is one "API" macro, bn_fix_top(), for stripping leading zeroes from * bignum data after direct manipulations on the data. There is also an * "internal" macro, bn_check_top(), for verifying that there are no leading * zeroes. Unfortunately, some auditing is required due to the fact that * bn_fix_top() has become an overabused duct-tape because bignum data is * occasionally passed around in an inconsistent state. So the following * changes have been made to sort this out; * - bn_fix_top()s implementation has been moved to bn_correct_top() * - if BN_DEBUG isn't defined, bn_fix_top() maps to bn_correct_top(), and * bn_check_top() is as before. * - if BN_DEBUG *is* defined; * - bn_check_top() tries to pollute unused words even if the bignum 'top' is * consistent. (ed: only if BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined) * - bn_fix_top() maps to bn_check_top() rather than "fixing" anything. * The idea is to have debug builds flag up inconsistent bignums when they * occur. If that occurs in a bn_fix_top(), we examine the code in question; if * the use of bn_fix_top() was appropriate (ie. it follows directly after code * that manipulates the bignum) it is converted to bn_correct_top(), and if it * was not appropriate, we convert it permanently to bn_check_top() and track * down the cause of the bug. Eventually, no internal code should be using the * bn_fix_top() macro. External applications and libraries should try this with * their own code too, both in terms of building against the openssl headers * with BN_DEBUG defined *and* linking with a version of OpenSSL built with it * defined. This not only improves external code, it provides more test * coverage for openssl's own code. */ # ifdef BN_DEBUG # ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND /* To avoid "make update" cvs wars due to BN_DEBUG, use some tricks */ # ifndef RAND_bytes int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); # define BN_DEBUG_TRIX # endif # define bn_pollute(a) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum1 = (a); \ if (_bnum1->top < _bnum1->dmax) { \ unsigned char _tmp_char; \ /* We cast away const without the compiler knowing, any \ * *genuinely* constant variables that aren't mutable \ * wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \ BN_ULONG *_not_const; \ memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(_not_const)); \ RAND_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */\ memset(_not_const + _bnum1->top, _tmp_char, \ sizeof(*_not_const) * (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top)); \ } \ } while(0) # ifdef BN_DEBUG_TRIX # undef RAND_bytes # endif # else # define bn_pollute(a) # endif # define bn_check_top(a) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (a); \ if (_bnum2 != NULL) { \ OPENSSL_assert(((_bnum2->top == 0) && !_bnum2->neg) || \ (_bnum2->top && (_bnum2->d[_bnum2->top - 1] != 0))); \ bn_pollute(_bnum2); \ } \ } while(0) # define bn_fix_top(a) bn_check_top(a) # define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2) # define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \ do { \ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \ OPENSSL_assert((words) <= (_bnum2)->dmax && \ (words) >= (_bnum2)->top); \ /* avoid unused variable warning with NDEBUG */ \ (void)(_bnum2); \ } while(0) # else /* !BN_DEBUG */ # define bn_pollute(a) # define bn_check_top(a) # define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a) # define bn_check_size(bn, bits) # define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) # endif BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num); BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d); BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int num); BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int num); struct bignum_st { BN_ULONG *d; /* Pointer to an array of 'BN_BITS2' bit * chunks. */ int top; /* Index of last used d +1. */ /* The next are internal book keeping for bn_expand. */ int dmax; /* Size of the d array. */ int neg; /* one if the number is negative */ int flags; }; /* Used for montgomery multiplication */ struct bn_mont_ctx_st { int ri; /* number of bits in R */ BIGNUM RR; /* used to convert to montgomery form */ BIGNUM N; /* The modulus */ BIGNUM Ni; /* R*(1/R mod N) - N*Ni = 1 (Ni is only * stored for bignum algorithm) */ BN_ULONG n0[2]; /* least significant word(s) of Ni; (type * changed with 0.9.9, was "BN_ULONG n0;" * before) */ int flags; }; /* * Used for reciprocal division/mod functions It cannot be shared between * threads */ struct bn_recp_ctx_st { BIGNUM N; /* the divisor */ BIGNUM Nr; /* the reciprocal */ int num_bits; int shift; int flags; }; /* Used for slow "generation" functions. */ struct bn_gencb_st { unsigned int ver; /* To handle binary (in)compatibility */ void *arg; /* callback-specific data */ union { /* if (ver==1) - handles old style callbacks */ void (*cb_1) (int, int, void *); /* if (ver==2) - new callback style */ int (*cb_2) (int, int, BN_GENCB *); } cb; }; /*- * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions * * * For window size 'w' (w >= 2) and a random 'b' bits exponent, * the number of multiplications is a constant plus on average * * 2^(w-1) + (b-w)/(w+1); * * here 2^(w-1) is for precomputing the table (we actually need * entries only for windows that have the lowest bit set), and * (b-w)/(w+1) is an approximation for the expected number of * w-bit windows, not counting the first one. * * Thus we should use * * w >= 6 if b > 671 * w = 5 if 671 > b > 239 * w = 4 if 239 > b > 79 * w = 3 if 79 > b > 23 * w <= 2 if 23 > b * * (with draws in between). Very small exponents are often selected * with low Hamming weight, so we use w = 1 for b <= 23. */ # define BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 671 ? 6 : \ (b) > 239 ? 5 : \ (b) > 79 ? 4 : \ (b) > 23 ? 3 : 1) /* * BN_mod_exp_mont_conttime is based on the assumption that the L1 data cache * line width of the target processor is at least the following value. */ # define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH ( 64 ) # define MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - 1) /* * Window sizes optimized for fixed window size modular exponentiation * algorithm (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime). To achieve the security goals of * BN_mode_exp_mont_consttime, the maximum size of the window must not exceed * log_2(MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH). Window size thresholds are * defined for cache line sizes of 32 and 64, cache line sizes where * log_2(32)=5 and log_2(64)=6 respectively. A window size of 7 should only be * used on processors that have a 128 byte or greater cache line size. */ # if MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 64 # define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 937 ? 6 : \ (b) > 306 ? 5 : \ (b) > 89 ? 4 : \ (b) > 22 ? 3 : 1) # define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE (6) # elif MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH == 32 # define BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(b) \ ((b) > 306 ? 5 : \ (b) > 89 ? 4 : \ (b) > 22 ? 3 : 1) # define BN_MAX_WINDOW_BITS_FOR_CTIME_EXPONENT_SIZE (5) # endif /* Pentium pro 16,16,16,32,64 */ /* Alpha 16,16,16,16.64 */ # define BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 */ # define BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 less than */ # define BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (16)/* 32 */ # define BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (32)/* 32 */ # define BN_MONT_CTX_SET_SIZE_WORD (64)/* 32 */ /* * 2011-02-22 SMS. In various places, a size_t variable or a type cast to * size_t was used to perform integer-only operations on pointers. This * failed on VMS with 64-bit pointers (CC /POINTER_SIZE = 64) because size_t * is still only 32 bits. What's needed in these cases is an integer type * with the same size as a pointer, which size_t is not certain to be. The * only fix here is VMS-specific. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define PTR_SIZE_INT long long # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define PTR_SIZE_INT int # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ # elif !defined(PTR_SIZE_INT) /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) */ # define PTR_SIZE_INT size_t # endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) [else] */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC) /* * BN_UMULT_HIGH section. * * No, I'm not trying to overwhelm you when stating that the * product of N-bit numbers is 2*N bits wide:-) No, I don't expect * you to be impressed when I say that if the compiler doesn't * support 2*N integer type, then you have to replace every N*N * multiplication with 4 (N/2)*(N/2) accompanied by some shifts * and additions which unavoidably results in severe performance * penalties. Of course provided that the hardware is capable of * producing 2*N result... That's when you normally start * considering assembler implementation. However! It should be * pointed out that some CPUs (most notably Alpha, PowerPC and * upcoming IA-64 family:-) provide *separate* instruction * calculating the upper half of the product placing the result * into a general purpose register. Now *if* the compiler supports * inline assembler, then it's not impossible to implement the * "bignum" routines (and have the compiler optimize 'em) * exhibiting "native" performance in C. That's what BN_UMULT_HIGH * macro is about:-) * * */ # if defined(__alpha) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT)) # if defined(__DECC) # include # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (BN_ULONG)asm("umulh %a0,%a1,%v0",(a),(b)) # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("umulh %1,%2,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif /* compiler */ # elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) && defined(__64BIT__) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("mulhdu %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif /* compiler */ # elif (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) && \ (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT)) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret,discard; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(discard),"=d"(ret) \ : "a"(a), "g"(b) \ : "cc"); \ ret; }) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(a),"g"(b) \ : "cc"); # endif # elif (defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) # if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400 unsigned __int64 __umulh(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b); unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b, unsigned __int64 *h); # pragma intrinsic(__umulh,_umul128) # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) __umulh((a),(b)) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ((low)=_umul128((a),(b),&(high))) # endif # elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__==16 /* "h" constraint is not an option on R6 and was removed in 4.4 */ # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({ \ __uint128_t ret=(__uint128_t)(a)*(b); \ (high)=ret>>64; (low)=ret; }) # else # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("dmultu %1,%2" \ : "=h"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b) : "l"); \ ret; }) # define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)\ asm ("dmultu %2,%3" \ : "=l"(low),"=h"(high) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); # endif # endif # elif defined(__aarch64__) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) ({ \ register BN_ULONG ret; \ asm ("umulh %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "r"(b)); \ ret; }) # endif # endif /* cpu */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ /************************************************************* * Using the long long type */ # define Lw(t) (((BN_ULONG)(t))&BN_MASK2) # define Hw(t) (((BN_ULONG)((t)>>BN_BITS2))&BN_MASK2) # ifdef BN_DEBUG_RAND # define bn_clear_top2max(a) \ { \ int ind = (a)->dmax - (a)->top; \ BN_ULONG *ftl = &(a)->d[(a)->top-1]; \ for (; ind != 0; ind--) \ *(++ftl) = 0x0; \ } # else # define bn_clear_top2max(a) # endif # ifdef BN_LLONG # define mul_add(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (r) + (c); \ (r)= Lw(t); \ (c)= Hw(t); \ } # define mul(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)w * (a) + (c); \ (r)= Lw(t); \ (c)= Hw(t); \ } # define sqr(r0,r1,a) { \ BN_ULLONG t; \ t=(BN_ULLONG)(a)*(a); \ (r0)=Lw(t); \ (r1)=Hw(t); \ } # elif defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) # define mul_add(r,a,w,c) { \ BN_ULONG high,low,ret,tmp=(a); \ ret = (r); \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,tmp); \ ret += (c); \ (c) = (ret<(c))?1:0; \ (c) += high; \ ret += low; \ (c) += (ret>BN_BITS4)&BN_MASK2l) # define L2HBITS(a) (((a)<>BN_BITS2)&BN_MASKl) # define LL2HBITS(a) ((BN_ULLONG)((a)&BN_MASKl)<>(BN_BITS4-1); \ m =(m&BN_MASK2l)<<(BN_BITS4+1); \ l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; if (l < m) h++; \ (lo)=l; \ (ho)=h; \ } # define mul_add(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \ BN_ULONG l,h; \ \ h= (a); \ l=LBITS(h); \ h=HBITS(h); \ mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \ (c)=(r); \ l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l; \ } # define mul(r,a,bl,bh,c) { \ BN_ULONG l,h; \ \ h= (a); \ l=LBITS(h); \ h=HBITS(h); \ mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ l+=(c); if ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)) h++; \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l&BN_MASK2; \ } # endif /* !BN_LLONG */ void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx); void bn_init(BIGNUM *a); void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, int nb); void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp); void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a); void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a); int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n); int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n); void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2, BN_ULONG *t); BN_ULONG bn_add_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl); int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx, int *noinv); int bn_probable_prime_dh(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx); int bn_probable_prime_dh_retry(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx); int bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx); static ossl_inline BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits) { if (bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1)) return NULL; if (((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) return a; return bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2); } #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c0000644000000000000000000001573013176625656015722 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER 32 struct bn_blinding_st { BIGNUM *A; BIGNUM *Ai; BIGNUM *e; BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; int counter; unsigned long flags; BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx; int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod) { BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; bn_check_top(mod); if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(ret); if (A != NULL) { if ((ret->A = BN_dup(A)) == NULL) goto err; } if (Ai != NULL) { if ((ret->Ai = BN_dup(Ai)) == NULL) goto err; } /* save a copy of mod in the BN_BLINDING structure */ if ((ret->mod = BN_dup(mod)) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* * Set the counter to the special value -1 to indicate that this is * never-used fresh blinding that does not need updating before first * use. */ ret->counter = -1; return ret; err: BN_BLINDING_free(ret); return NULL; } void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *r) { if (r == NULL) return; BN_free(r->A); BN_free(r->Ai); BN_free(r->e); BN_free(r->mod); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); OPENSSL_free(r); } int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); goto err; } if (b->counter == -1) b->counter = 0; if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL && !(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE)) { /* re-create blinding parameters */ if (!BN_BLINDING_create_param(b, NULL, NULL, ctx, NULL, NULL)) goto err; } else if (!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE)) { if (!BN_mod_mul(b->A, b->A, b->A, b->mod, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER) b->counter = 0; return (ret); } int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(n, NULL, b, ctx); } int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 1; bn_check_top(n); if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return (0); } if (b->counter == -1) /* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */ b->counter = 0; else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b, ctx)) return (0); if (r != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret = 0; } if (!BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->A, b->mod, ctx)) ret = 0; return ret; } int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(n, NULL, b, ctx); } int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret; bn_check_top(n); if (r != NULL) ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx); else { if (b->Ai == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return (0); } ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx); } bn_check_top(n); return (ret); } int BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b) { return CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(), b->tid); } void BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b) { b->tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); } int BN_BLINDING_lock(BN_BLINDING *b) { return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(b->lock); } int BN_BLINDING_unlock(BN_BLINDING *b) { return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(b->lock); } unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *b) { return b->flags; } void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *b, unsigned long flags) { b->flags = flags; } BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx), BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { int retry_counter = 32; BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; if (b == NULL) ret = BN_BLINDING_new(NULL, NULL, m); else ret = b; if (ret == NULL) goto err; if (ret->A == NULL && (ret->A = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (ret->Ai == NULL && (ret->Ai = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (e != NULL) { BN_free(ret->e); ret->e = BN_dup(e); } if (ret->e == NULL) goto err; if (bn_mod_exp != NULL) ret->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp; if (m_ctx != NULL) ret->m_ctx = m_ctx; do { int rv; if (!BN_rand_range(ret->A, ret->mod)) goto err; if (!int_bn_mod_inverse(ret->Ai, ret->A, ret->mod, ctx, &rv)) { /* * this should almost never happen for good RSA keys */ if (rv) { if (retry_counter-- == 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); goto err; } } else goto err; } else break; } while (1); if (ret->bn_mod_exp != NULL && ret->m_ctx != NULL) { if (!ret->bn_mod_exp (ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx, ret->m_ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp(ret->A, ret->A, ret->e, ret->mod, ctx)) goto err; } return ret; err: if (b == NULL) { BN_BLINDING_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_ctx.c0000644000000000000000000002244613176625656015432 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /*- * TODO list * * 1. Check a bunch of "(words+1)" type hacks in various bignum functions and * check they can be safely removed. * - Check +1 and other ugliness in BN_from_montgomery() * * 2. Consider allowing a BN_new_ex() that, at least, lets you specify an * appropriate 'block' size that will be honoured by bn_expand_internal() to * prevent piddly little reallocations. OTOH, profiling bignum expansions in * BN_CTX doesn't show this to be a big issue. */ /* How many bignums are in each "pool item"; */ #define BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE 16 /* The stack frame info is resizing, set a first-time expansion size; */ #define BN_CTX_START_FRAMES 32 /***********/ /* BN_POOL */ /***********/ /* A bundle of bignums that can be linked with other bundles */ typedef struct bignum_pool_item { /* The bignum values */ BIGNUM vals[BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE]; /* Linked-list admin */ struct bignum_pool_item *prev, *next; } BN_POOL_ITEM; /* A linked-list of bignums grouped in bundles */ typedef struct bignum_pool { /* Linked-list admin */ BN_POOL_ITEM *head, *current, *tail; /* Stack depth and allocation size */ unsigned used, size; } BN_POOL; static void BN_POOL_init(BN_POOL *); static void BN_POOL_finish(BN_POOL *); static BIGNUM *BN_POOL_get(BN_POOL *, int); static void BN_POOL_release(BN_POOL *, unsigned int); /************/ /* BN_STACK */ /************/ /* A wrapper to manage the "stack frames" */ typedef struct bignum_ctx_stack { /* Array of indexes into the bignum stack */ unsigned int *indexes; /* Number of stack frames, and the size of the allocated array */ unsigned int depth, size; } BN_STACK; static void BN_STACK_init(BN_STACK *); static void BN_STACK_finish(BN_STACK *); static int BN_STACK_push(BN_STACK *, unsigned int); static unsigned int BN_STACK_pop(BN_STACK *); /**********/ /* BN_CTX */ /**********/ /* The opaque BN_CTX type */ struct bignum_ctx { /* The bignum bundles */ BN_POOL pool; /* The "stack frames", if you will */ BN_STACK stack; /* The number of bignums currently assigned */ unsigned int used; /* Depth of stack overflow */ int err_stack; /* Block "gets" until an "end" (compatibility behaviour) */ int too_many; /* Flags. */ int flags; }; /* Enable this to find BN_CTX bugs */ #ifdef BN_CTX_DEBUG static const char *ctxdbg_cur = NULL; static void ctxdbg(BN_CTX *ctx) { unsigned int bnidx = 0, fpidx = 0; BN_POOL_ITEM *item = ctx->pool.head; BN_STACK *stack = &ctx->stack; fprintf(stderr, "(%16p): ", ctx); while (bnidx < ctx->used) { fprintf(stderr, "%03x ", item->vals[bnidx++ % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE].dmax); if (!(bnidx % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE)) item = item->next; } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); bnidx = 0; fprintf(stderr, " : "); while (fpidx < stack->depth) { while (bnidx++ < stack->indexes[fpidx]) fprintf(stderr, " "); fprintf(stderr, "^^^ "); bnidx++; fpidx++; } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } # define CTXDBG_ENTRY(str, ctx) do { \ ctxdbg_cur = (str); \ fprintf(stderr,"Starting %s\n", ctxdbg_cur); \ ctxdbg(ctx); \ } while(0) # define CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx) do { \ fprintf(stderr,"Ending %s\n", ctxdbg_cur); \ ctxdbg(ctx); \ } while(0) # define CTXDBG_RET(ctx,ret) #else # define CTXDBG_ENTRY(str, ctx) # define CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx) # define CTXDBG_RET(ctx,ret) #endif BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void) { BN_CTX *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Initialise the structure */ BN_POOL_init(&ret->pool); BN_STACK_init(&ret->stack); return ret; } BN_CTX *BN_CTX_secure_new(void) { BN_CTX *ret = BN_CTX_new(); if (ret != NULL) ret->flags = BN_FLG_SECURE; return ret; } void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; #ifdef BN_CTX_DEBUG { BN_POOL_ITEM *pool = ctx->pool.head; fprintf(stderr, "BN_CTX_free, stack-size=%d, pool-bignums=%d\n", ctx->stack.size, ctx->pool.size); fprintf(stderr, "dmaxs: "); while (pool) { unsigned loop = 0; while (loop < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE) fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", pool->vals[loop++].dmax); pool = pool->next; } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif BN_STACK_finish(&ctx->stack); BN_POOL_finish(&ctx->pool); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx) { CTXDBG_ENTRY("BN_CTX_start", ctx); /* If we're already overflowing ... */ if (ctx->err_stack || ctx->too_many) ctx->err_stack++; /* (Try to) get a new frame pointer */ else if (!BN_STACK_push(&ctx->stack, ctx->used)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_CTX_START, BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES); ctx->err_stack++; } CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx); } void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx) { CTXDBG_ENTRY("BN_CTX_end", ctx); if (ctx->err_stack) ctx->err_stack--; else { unsigned int fp = BN_STACK_pop(&ctx->stack); /* Does this stack frame have anything to release? */ if (fp < ctx->used) BN_POOL_release(&ctx->pool, ctx->used - fp); ctx->used = fp; /* Unjam "too_many" in case "get" had failed */ ctx->too_many = 0; } CTXDBG_EXIT(ctx); } BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *ret; CTXDBG_ENTRY("BN_CTX_get", ctx); if (ctx->err_stack || ctx->too_many) return NULL; if ((ret = BN_POOL_get(&ctx->pool, ctx->flags)) == NULL) { /* * Setting too_many prevents repeated "get" attempts from cluttering * the error stack. */ ctx->too_many = 1; BNerr(BN_F_BN_CTX_GET, BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES); return NULL; } /* OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero" */ BN_zero(ret); ctx->used++; CTXDBG_RET(ctx, ret); return ret; } /************/ /* BN_STACK */ /************/ static void BN_STACK_init(BN_STACK *st) { st->indexes = NULL; st->depth = st->size = 0; } static void BN_STACK_finish(BN_STACK *st) { OPENSSL_free(st->indexes); st->indexes = NULL; } static int BN_STACK_push(BN_STACK *st, unsigned int idx) { if (st->depth == st->size) { /* Need to expand */ unsigned int newsize = st->size ? (st->size * 3 / 2) : BN_CTX_START_FRAMES; unsigned int *newitems = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newitems) * newsize); if (newitems == NULL) return 0; if (st->depth) memcpy(newitems, st->indexes, sizeof(*newitems) * st->depth); OPENSSL_free(st->indexes); st->indexes = newitems; st->size = newsize; } st->indexes[(st->depth)++] = idx; return 1; } static unsigned int BN_STACK_pop(BN_STACK *st) { return st->indexes[--(st->depth)]; } /***********/ /* BN_POOL */ /***********/ static void BN_POOL_init(BN_POOL *p) { p->head = p->current = p->tail = NULL; p->used = p->size = 0; } static void BN_POOL_finish(BN_POOL *p) { unsigned int loop; BIGNUM *bn; while (p->head) { for (loop = 0, bn = p->head->vals; loop++ < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; bn++) if (bn->d) BN_clear_free(bn); p->current = p->head->next; OPENSSL_free(p->head); p->head = p->current; } } static BIGNUM *BN_POOL_get(BN_POOL *p, int flag) { BIGNUM *bn; unsigned int loop; /* Full; allocate a new pool item and link it in. */ if (p->used == p->size) { BN_POOL_ITEM *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item)); if (item == NULL) return NULL; for (loop = 0, bn = item->vals; loop++ < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; bn++) { bn_init(bn); if ((flag & BN_FLG_SECURE) != 0) BN_set_flags(bn, BN_FLG_SECURE); } item->prev = p->tail; item->next = NULL; if (p->head == NULL) p->head = p->current = p->tail = item; else { p->tail->next = item; p->tail = item; p->current = item; } p->size += BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; p->used++; /* Return the first bignum from the new pool */ return item->vals; } if (!p->used) p->current = p->head; else if ((p->used % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE) == 0) p->current = p->current->next; return p->current->vals + ((p->used++) % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE); } static void BN_POOL_release(BN_POOL *p, unsigned int num) { unsigned int offset = (p->used - 1) % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; p->used -= num; while (num--) { bn_check_top(p->current->vals + offset); if (offset == 0) { offset = BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE - 1; p->current = p->current->prev; } else offset--; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c0000644000000000000000000001277113176625656016133 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* * Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'. * This is an array r[] of values that are either zero or odd with an * absolute value less than 2^w satisfying * scalar = \sum_j r[j]*2^j * where at most one of any w+1 consecutive digits is non-zero * with the exception that the most significant digit may be only * w-1 zeros away from that next non-zero digit. */ signed char *bn_compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len) { int window_val; signed char *r = NULL; int sign = 1; int bit, next_bit, mask; size_t len = 0, j; if (BN_is_zero(scalar)) { r = OPENSSL_malloc(1); if (r == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } r[0] = 0; *ret_len = 1; return r; } if (w <= 0 || w > 7) { /* 'signed char' can represent integers with * absolute values less than 2^7 */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } bit = 1 << w; /* at most 128 */ next_bit = bit << 1; /* at most 256 */ mask = next_bit - 1; /* at most 255 */ if (BN_is_negative(scalar)) { sign = -1; } if (scalar->d == NULL || scalar->top == 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } len = BN_num_bits(scalar); r = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); /* * Modified wNAF may be one digit longer than binary representation * (*ret_len will be set to the actual length, i.e. at most * BN_num_bits(scalar) + 1) */ if (r == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } window_val = scalar->d[0] & mask; j = 0; while ((window_val != 0) || (j + w + 1 < len)) { /* if j+w+1 >= len, * window_val will not * increase */ int digit = 0; /* 0 <= window_val <= 2^(w+1) */ if (window_val & 1) { /* 0 < window_val < 2^(w+1) */ if (window_val & bit) { digit = window_val - next_bit; /* -2^w < digit < 0 */ #if 1 /* modified wNAF */ if (j + w + 1 >= len) { /* * Special case for generating modified wNAFs: * no new bits will be added into window_val, * so using a positive digit here will decrease * the total length of the representation */ digit = window_val & (mask >> 1); /* 0 < digit < 2^w */ } #endif } else { digit = window_val; /* 0 < digit < 2^w */ } if (digit <= -bit || digit >= bit || !(digit & 1)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } window_val -= digit; /* * now window_val is 0 or 2^(w+1) in standard wNAF generation; * for modified window NAFs, it may also be 2^w */ if (window_val != 0 && window_val != next_bit && window_val != bit) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } r[j++] = sign * digit; window_val >>= 1; window_val += bit * BN_is_bit_set(scalar, j + w); if (window_val > next_bit) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (j > len + 1) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *ret_len = j; return r; err: OPENSSL_free(r); return NULL; } int bn_get_top(const BIGNUM *a) { return a->top; } void bn_set_top(BIGNUM *a, int top) { a->top = top; } int bn_get_dmax(const BIGNUM *a) { return a->dmax; } void bn_set_all_zero(BIGNUM *a) { int i; for (i = a->top; i < a->dmax; i++) a->d[i] = 0; } int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, const BIGNUM *in, int size) { if (in->top > size) return 0; memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * size); if (in->d != NULL) memcpy(out, in->d, sizeof(*out) * in->top); return 1; } BN_ULONG *bn_get_words(const BIGNUM *a) { return a->d; } void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int size) { a->d = words; a->dmax = a->top = size; a->neg = 0; a->flags |= BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; bn_correct_top(a); } int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int num_words) { if (bn_wexpand(a, num_words) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(a->d, words, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * num_words); a->top = num_words; bn_correct_top(a); return 1; } size_t bn_sizeof_BIGNUM(void) { return sizeof(BIGNUM); } BIGNUM *bn_array_el(BIGNUM *base, int el) { return &base[el]; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_div.c0000644000000000000000000003017413176625656015413 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* The old slow way */ #if 0 int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, nm, nd; int ret = 0; BIGNUM *D; bn_check_top(m); bn_check_top(d); if (BN_is_zero(d)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); return (0); } if (BN_ucmp(m, d) < 0) { if (rem != NULL) { if (BN_copy(rem, m) == NULL) return (0); } if (dv != NULL) BN_zero(dv); return (1); } BN_CTX_start(ctx); D = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (dv == NULL) dv = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (rem == NULL) rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (D == NULL || dv == NULL || rem == NULL) goto end; nd = BN_num_bits(d); nm = BN_num_bits(m); if (BN_copy(D, d) == NULL) goto end; if (BN_copy(rem, m) == NULL) goto end; /* * The next 2 are needed so we can do a dv->d[0]|=1 later since * BN_lshift1 will only work once there is a value :-) */ BN_zero(dv); if (bn_wexpand(dv, 1) == NULL) goto end; dv->top = 1; if (!BN_lshift(D, D, nm - nd)) goto end; for (i = nm - nd; i >= 0; i--) { if (!BN_lshift1(dv, dv)) goto end; if (BN_ucmp(rem, D) >= 0) { dv->d[0] |= 1; if (!BN_usub(rem, rem, D)) goto end; } /* CAN IMPROVE (and have now :=) */ if (!BN_rshift1(D, D)) goto end; } rem->neg = BN_is_zero(rem) ? 0 : m->neg; dv->neg = m->neg ^ d->neg; ret = 1; end: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } #else # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) \ && !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(BN_DIV3W) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__i386) || defined (__i386__) /*- * There were two reasons for implementing this template: * - GNU C generates a call to a function (__udivdi3 to be exact) * in reply to ((((BN_ULLONG)n0)< */ # undef bn_div_words # define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0) \ ({ asm volatile ( \ "divl %4" \ : "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \ : "cc"); \ q; \ }) # define REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED # elif defined(__x86_64) && defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) /* * Same story here, but it's 128-bit by 64-bit division. Wow! * */ # undef bn_div_words # define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0) \ ({ asm volatile ( \ "divq %4" \ : "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \ : "cc"); \ q; \ }) # define REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED # endif /* __ */ # endif /* __GNUC__ */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ /*- * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards * zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. * Thus: * dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero) * rm->neg == num->neg (unless the remainder is zero) * If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned. */ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) { int norm_shift, i, loop; BIGNUM *tmp, wnum, *snum, *sdiv, *res; BN_ULONG *resp, *wnump; BN_ULONG d0, d1; int num_n, div_n; int no_branch = 0; /* * Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences so don't * just rely on bn_check_top() here (bn_check_top() works only for * BN_DEBUG builds) */ if ((num->top > 0 && num->d[num->top - 1] == 0) || (divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] == 0)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } bn_check_top(num); bn_check_top(divisor); if ((BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) || (BN_get_flags(divisor, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) { no_branch = 1; } bn_check_top(dv); bn_check_top(rm); /*- bn_check_top(num); *//* * 'num' has been checked already */ /*- bn_check_top(divisor); *//* * 'divisor' has been checked already */ if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); return (0); } if (!no_branch && BN_ucmp(num, divisor) < 0) { if (rm != NULL) { if (BN_copy(rm, num) == NULL) return (0); } if (dv != NULL) BN_zero(dv); return (1); } BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx); sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (dv == NULL) res = BN_CTX_get(ctx); else res = dv; if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL || tmp == NULL || snum == NULL) goto err; /* First we normalise the numbers */ norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - ((BN_num_bits(divisor)) % BN_BITS2); if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift))) goto err; sdiv->neg = 0; norm_shift += BN_BITS2; if (!(BN_lshift(snum, num, norm_shift))) goto err; snum->neg = 0; if (no_branch) { /* * Since we don't know whether snum is larger than sdiv, we pad snum * with enough zeroes without changing its value. */ if (snum->top <= sdiv->top + 1) { if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL) goto err; for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++) snum->d[i] = 0; snum->top = sdiv->top + 2; } else { if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL) goto err; snum->d[snum->top] = 0; snum->top++; } } div_n = sdiv->top; num_n = snum->top; loop = num_n - div_n; /* * Lets setup a 'window' into snum This is the part that corresponds to * the current 'area' being divided */ wnum.neg = 0; wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]); wnum.top = div_n; /* * only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max */ wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */ /* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */ /* div_n=sdiv->top; */ d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1]; d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2]; /* pointer to the 'top' of snum */ wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]); /* Setup to 'res' */ if (!bn_wexpand(res, (loop + 1))) goto err; res->neg = (num->neg ^ divisor->neg); res->top = loop - no_branch; resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]); /* space for temp */ if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, (div_n + 1))) goto err; if (!no_branch) { if (BN_ucmp(&wnum, sdiv) >= 0) { /* * If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined BN_ucmp changes (via bn_pollute) * the const bignum arguments => clean the values between top and * max again */ bn_clear_top2max(&wnum); bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n); *resp = 1; } else res->top--; } /* Increase the resp pointer so that we never create an invalid pointer. */ resp++; /* * if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease the resp * pointer */ if (res->top == 0) res->neg = 0; else resp--; for (i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--) { BN_ULONG q, l0; /* * the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv * to calculate a BN_ULONG q such that | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv */ # if defined(BN_DIV3W) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(BN_ULONG *, BN_ULONG, BN_ULONG); q = bn_div_3_words(wnump, d1, d0); # else BN_ULONG n0, n1, rem = 0; n0 = wnump[0]; n1 = wnump[-1]; if (n0 == d0) q = BN_MASK2; else { /* n0 < d0 */ # ifdef BN_LLONG BN_ULLONG t2; # if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) && !defined(bn_div_words) q = (BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG) n0) << BN_BITS2) | n1) / d0); # else q = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0); # endif # ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED /* * rem doesn't have to be BN_ULLONG. The least we * know it's less that d0, isn't it? */ rem = (n1 - q * d0) & BN_MASK2; # endif t2 = (BN_ULLONG) d1 *q; for (;;) { if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG) rem) << BN_BITS2) | wnump[-2])) break; q--; rem += d0; if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */ t2 -= d1; } # else /* !BN_LLONG */ BN_ULONG t2l, t2h; q = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0); # ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED rem = (n1 - q * d0) & BN_MASK2; # endif # if defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q); # elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH) t2l = d1 * q; t2h = BN_UMULT_HIGH(d1, q); # else { BN_ULONG ql, qh; t2l = LBITS(d1); t2h = HBITS(d1); ql = LBITS(q); qh = HBITS(q); mul64(t2l, t2h, ql, qh); /* t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q; */ } # endif for (;;) { if ((t2h < rem) || ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2]))) break; q--; rem += d0; if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */ if (t2l < d1) t2h--; t2l -= d1; } # endif /* !BN_LLONG */ } # endif /* !BN_DIV3W */ l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q); tmp->d[div_n] = l0; wnum.d--; /* * ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two BN_ULONG arrays * with bn_sub_words */ if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) { /* * Note: As we have considered only the leading two BN_ULONGs in * the calculation of q, sdiv * q might be greater than wnum (but * then (q-1) * sdiv is less or equal than wnum) */ q--; if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n)) /* * we can't have an overflow here (assuming that q != 0, but * if q == 0 then tmp is zero anyway) */ (*wnump)++; } /* store part of the result */ resp--; *resp = q; } bn_correct_top(snum); if (rm != NULL) { /* * Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num BN_rshift() * will overwrite it. */ int neg = num->neg; BN_rshift(rm, snum, norm_shift); if (!BN_is_zero(rm)) rm->neg = neg; bn_check_top(rm); } if (no_branch) bn_correct_top(res); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (1); err: bn_check_top(rm); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (0); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h0000644000000000000000000001043613176625656016011 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /***************************************************************************** * * * Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation * * * * All rights reserved. * * * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are * * met: * * * * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * * * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * * documentation and/or other materials provided with the * * distribution. * * * * * Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its * * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from * * this software without specific prior written permission. * * * * * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY * * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR * * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, * * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, * * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR * * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING * * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS * * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * ****************************************************************************** * Developers and authors: * * Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) * * (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel * * (2) University of Haifa, Israel * *****************************************************************************/ #ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H # define RSAZ_EXP_H # undef RSAZ_ENABLED # if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && \ (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) # define RSAZ_ENABLED # include void RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(BN_ULONG result[16], const BN_ULONG base_norm[16], const BN_ULONG exponent[16], const BN_ULONG m_norm[16], const BN_ULONG RR[16], BN_ULONG k0); int rsaz_avx2_eligible(); void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8], const BN_ULONG base_norm[8], const BN_ULONG exponent[8], const BN_ULONG m_norm[8], BN_ULONG k0, const BN_ULONG RR[8]); # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014561 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000001553013176625656016763 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # April 2007. # # Performance improvement over vanilla C code varies from 85% to 45% # depending on key length and benchmark. Unfortunately in this context # these are not very impressive results [for code that utilizes "wide" # 64x64=128-bit multiplication, which is not commonly available to C # programmers], at least hand-coded bn_asm.c replacement is known to # provide 30-40% better results for longest keys. Well, on a second # thought it's not very surprising, because z-CPUs are single-issue # and _strictly_ in-order execution, while bn_mul_mont is more or less # dependent on CPU ability to pipe-line instructions and have several # of them "in-flight" at the same time. I mean while other methods, # for example Karatsuba, aim to minimize amount of multiplications at # the cost of other operations increase, bn_mul_mont aim to neatly # "overlap" multiplications and the other operations [and on most # platforms even minimize the amount of the other operations, in # particular references to memory]. But it's possible to improve this # module performance by implementing dedicated squaring code-path and # possibly by unrolling loops... # January 2009. # # Reschedule to minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard, # make inner loops counter-based. # November 2010. # # Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" # feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit # instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy # application context. The feature is not specific to any particular # processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code # remains z/Architecture specific. Compatibility with 32-bit BN_ULONG # is achieved by swapping words after 64-bit loads, follow _dswap-s. # On z990 it was measured to perform 2.6-2.2 times better than # compiler-generated code, less for longer keys... $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8; $mn0="%r0"; $num="%r1"; # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%r2"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%r3"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%r4"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%r5"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%r6"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, #$num="160(%r15)" # int num); $bi="%r2"; # zaps rp $j="%r7"; $ahi="%r8"; $alo="%r9"; $nhi="%r10"; $nlo="%r11"; $AHI="%r12"; $NHI="%r13"; $count="%r14"; $sp="%r15"; $code.=<<___; .text .globl bn_mul_mont .type bn_mul_mont,\@function bn_mul_mont: lgf $num,`$stdframe+$SIZE_T-4`($sp) # pull $num sla $num,`log($SIZE_T)/log(2)` # $num to enumerate bytes la $bp,0($num,$bp) st${g} %r2,2*$SIZE_T($sp) cghi $num,16 # lghi %r2,0 # blr %r14 # if($num<16) return 0; ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/); tmll $num,4 bnzr %r14 # if ($num&1) return 0; ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /3[12]/); cghi $num,96 # bhr %r14 # if($num>96) return 0; ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r3,%r15,3*$SIZE_T($sp) lghi $rp,-$stdframe-8 # leave room for carry bit lcgr $j,$num # -$num lgr %r0,$sp la $rp,0($rp,$sp) la $sp,0($j,$rp) # alloca st${g} %r0,0($sp) # back chain sra $num,3 # restore $num la $bp,0($j,$bp) # restore $bp ahi $num,-1 # adjust $num for inner loop lg $n0,0($n0) # pull n0 _dswap $n0 lg $bi,0($bp) _dswap $bi lg $alo,0($ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[0]*bp[0] lgr $AHI,$ahi lgr $mn0,$alo # "tp[0]"*n0 msgr $mn0,$n0 lg $nlo,0($np) # _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[0]*m1 algr $nlo,$alo # +="tp[0]" lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $NHI,$nhi la $j,8(%r0) # j=1 lr $count,$num .align 16 .L1st: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[j]*bp[0] algr $alo,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$ahi lg $nlo,0($j,$np) _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[j]*m1 algr $nlo,$NHI lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $nhi,$NHI # +="tp[j]" algr $nlo,$alo alcgr $NHI,$nhi stg $nlo,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) # tp[j-1]= la $j,8($j) # j++ brct $count,.L1st algr $NHI,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$AHI # upmost overflow bit stg $NHI,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) stg $AHI,$stdframe($j,$sp) la $bp,8($bp) # bp++ .Louter: lg $bi,0($bp) # bp[i] _dswap $bi lg $alo,0($ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[0]*bp[i] alg $alo,$stdframe($sp) # +=tp[0] lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$ahi lgr $mn0,$alo msgr $mn0,$n0 # tp[0]*n0 lg $nlo,0($np) # np[0] _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[0]*m1 algr $nlo,$alo # +="tp[0]" lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $NHI,$nhi la $j,8(%r0) # j=1 lr $count,$num .align 16 .Linner: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) _dswap $alo mlgr $ahi,$bi # ap[j]*bp[i] algr $alo,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $ahi,$AHI alg $alo,$stdframe($j,$sp)# +=tp[j] alcgr $AHI,$ahi lg $nlo,0($j,$np) _dswap $nlo mlgr $nhi,$mn0 # np[j]*m1 algr $nlo,$NHI lghi $NHI,0 alcgr $nhi,$NHI algr $nlo,$alo # +="tp[j]" alcgr $NHI,$nhi stg $nlo,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) # tp[j-1]= la $j,8($j) # j++ brct $count,.Linner algr $NHI,$AHI lghi $AHI,0 alcgr $AHI,$AHI alg $NHI,$stdframe($j,$sp)# accumulate previous upmost overflow bit lghi $ahi,0 alcgr $AHI,$ahi # new upmost overflow bit stg $NHI,$stdframe-8($j,$sp) stg $AHI,$stdframe($j,$sp) la $bp,8($bp) # bp++ cl${g} $bp,`$stdframe+8+4*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp) # compare to &bp[num] jne .Louter l${g} $rp,`$stdframe+8+2*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp) # reincarnate rp la $ap,$stdframe($sp) ahi $num,1 # restore $num, incidentally clears "borrow" la $j,0(%r0) lr $count,$num .Lsub: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) lg $nlo,0($j,$np) _dswap $nlo slbgr $alo,$nlo stg $alo,0($j,$rp) la $j,8($j) brct $count,.Lsub lghi $ahi,0 slbgr $AHI,$ahi # handle upmost carry ngr $ap,$AHI lghi $np,-1 xgr $np,$AHI ngr $np,$rp ogr $ap,$np # ap=borrow?tp:rp la $j,0(%r0) lgr $count,$num .Lcopy: lg $alo,0($j,$ap) # copy or in-place refresh _dswap $alo stg $j,$stdframe($j,$sp) # zap tp stg $alo,0($j,$rp) la $j,8($j) brct $count,.Lcopy la %r1,`$stdframe+8+6*$SIZE_T`($j,$sp) lm${g} %r6,%r15,0(%r1) lghi %r2,1 # signal "processed" br %r14 .size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont .string "Montgomery Multiplication for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/_dswap\s+(%r[0-9]+)/sprintf("rllg\t%s,%s,32",$1,$1) if($SIZE_T==4)/e; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000002207713176625656016765 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # October 2012. # # SPARCv9 VIS3 Montgomery multiplicaion procedure suitable for T3 and # onward. There are three new instructions used here: umulxhi, # addxc[cc] and initializing store. On T3 RSA private key operations # are 1.54/1.87/2.11/2.26 times faster for 512/1024/2048/4096-bit key # lengths. This is without dedicated squaring procedure. On T4 # corresponding coefficients are 1.47/2.10/2.80/2.90x, which is mostly # for reference purposes, because T4 has dedicated Montgomery # multiplication and squaring *instructions* that deliver even more. $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $frame = "STACK_FRAME"; $bias = "STACK_BIAS"; $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr ___ ($n0,$m0,$m1,$lo0,$hi0, $lo1,$hi1,$aj,$alo,$nj,$nlo,$tj)= (map("%g$_",(1..5)),map("%o$_",(0..5,7))); # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%o0"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%o1"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%o2"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%o3"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0p="%o4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%o5"; # int num); # caller ensures that num is even # and >=6 $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_vis3 .align 32 bn_mul_mont_vis3: add %sp, $bias, %g4 ! real top of stack sll $num, 2, $num ! size in bytes add $num, 63, %g5 andn %g5, 63, %g5 ! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes add %g5, %g5, %g1 add %g5, %g1, %g1 ! 3*buffer size sub %g4, %g1, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! align at 64 byte sub %g1, $frame, %g1 ! new top of stack sub %g1, %g4, %g1 save %sp, %g1, %sp ___ # +-------------------------------+<----- %sp # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 tmp[0] | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 ap[1..0] | converted ap[] # +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 np[1..0] | converted np[] # +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 ap[3..2] | # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+ ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz,$anp)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); ($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1); $code.=<<___; ld [$n0p+0], $t0 ! pull n0[0..1] value add %sp, $bias+$frame, $tp ld [$n0p+4], $t1 add $tp, %g5, $anp ld [$bp+0], $t2 ! m0=bp[0] sllx $t1, 32, $n0 ld [$bp+4], $t3 or $t0, $n0, $n0 add $bp, 8, $bp ld [$ap+0], $t0 ! ap[0] sllx $t3, 32, $m0 ld [$ap+4], $t1 or $t2, $m0, $m0 ld [$ap+8], $t2 ! ap[1] sllx $t1, 32, $aj ld [$ap+12], $t3 or $t0, $aj, $aj add $ap, 16, $ap stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ld [$np+0], $t0 ! np[0] sllx $t3, 32, $aj ld [$np+4], $t1 or $t2, $aj, $aj ld [$np+8], $t2 ! np[1] sllx $t1, 32, $nj ld [$np+12], $t3 or $t0, $nj, $nj add $np, 16, $np stx $nj, [$anp+8] ! converted np[0] mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! "tp[0]"*n0 stx $aj, [$anp+16] ! converted ap[1] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 sllx $t3, 32, $nj or $t2, $nj, $nj stx $nj, [$anp+24] ! converted np[1] add $anp, 32, $anp addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .L1st sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .L1st: ld [$ap+0], $t0 ! ap[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ld [$ap+4], $t1 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 sllx $t1, 32, $aj add $ap, 8, $ap or $t0, $aj, $aj stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[j] ld [$np+0], $t2 ! np[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 ld [$np+4], $t3 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj sllx $t3, 32, $nj add $np, 8, $np mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[0] or $t2, $nj, $nj umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj stx $nj, [$anp+8] ! converted np[j] add $anp, 16, $anp ! anp++ mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++ brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st sub $cnt, 8, $cnt ! j-- !.L1st addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit stx $hi1, [$tp] add $tp, 8, $tp ba .Louter sub $num, 16, $i ! i=num-2 .align 16 .Louter: ld [$bp+0], $t2 ! m0=bp[i] ld [$bp+4], $t3 sub $anp, $num, $anp ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $anp, $num, $anp add $bp, 8, $bp sllx $t3, 32, $m0 ldx [$anp+0], $aj ! ap[0] or $t2, $m0, $m0 ldx [$anp+8], $nj ! np[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i] ldx [$tp], $tj ! tp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$anp+16], $aj ! ap[1] addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[i] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! tp[0]*n0 umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$anp+24], $nj ! np[1] add $anp, 32, $anp addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .Linner sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .Linner: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj ldx [$anp+0], $aj ! ap[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[i] addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$anp+8], $nj ! np[j] add $anp, 16, $anp umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp brnz,pt $cnt, .Linner sub $cnt, 8, $cnt !.Linner ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] subcc %g0, $ovf, %g0 ! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc addxccc $hi1, $hi0, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf stx $hi1, [$tp+8] add $tp, 16, $tp brnz,pt $i, .Louter sub $i, 8, $i sub $anp, $num, $anp ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $anp, $num, $anp ba .Lsub subcc $num, 8, $cnt ! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc .align 16 .Lsub: ldx [$tp], $tj add $tp, 8, $tp ldx [$anp+8], $nj add $anp, 16, $anp subccc $tj, $nj, $t2 ! tp[j]-np[j] srlx $tj, 32, $tj srlx $nj, 32, $nj subccc $tj, $nj, $t3 add $rp, 8, $rp st $t2, [$rp-4] ! reverse order st $t3, [$rp-8] brnz,pt $cnt, .Lsub sub $cnt, 8, $cnt sub $anp, $num, $anp ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $anp, $num, $anp sub $rp, $num, $rp subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit and $tp, $ovf, $ap andn $rp, $ovf, $np or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp ba .Lcopy sub $num, 8, $cnt .align 16 .Lcopy: ! copy or in-place refresh ld [$ap+0], $t2 ld [$ap+4], $t3 add $ap, 8, $ap stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap add $tp, 8, $tp stx %g0, [$anp] ! zap stx %g0, [$anp+8] add $anp, 16, $anp st $t3, [$rp+0] ! flip order st $t2, [$rp+4] add $rp, 8, $rp brnz $cnt, .Lcopy sub $cnt, 8, $cnt mov 1, %o0 ret restore .type bn_mul_mont_vis3, #function .size bn_mul_mont_vis3, .-bn_mul_mont_vis3 .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for SPARCv9 VIS3, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis3 { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "addxc" => 0x011, "addxccc" => 0x013, "umulxhi" => 0x016 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(umulxhi|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl0000644000000000000000000013124213176625656016071 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. # # Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are # granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is # disclaimed. # ==================================================================== # July 1999 # # This is drop-in MIPS III/IV ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c. # # The module is designed to work with either of the "new" MIPS ABI(5), # namely N32 or N64, offered by IRIX 6.x. It's not meant to work under # IRIX 5.x not only because it doesn't support new ABIs but also # because 5.x kernels put R4x00 CPU into 32-bit mode and all those # 64-bit instructions (daddu, dmultu, etc.) found below gonna only # cause illegal instruction exception:-( # # In addition the code depends on preprocessor flags set up by MIPSpro # compiler driver (either as or cc) and therefore (probably?) can't be # compiled by the GNU assembler. GNU C driver manages fine though... # I mean as long as -mmips-as is specified or is the default option, # because then it simply invokes /usr/bin/as which in turn takes # perfect care of the preprocessor definitions. Another neat feature # offered by the MIPSpro assembler is an optimization pass. This gave # me the opportunity to have the code looking more regular as all those # architecture dependent instruction rescheduling details were left to # the assembler. Cool, huh? # # Performance improvement is astonishing! 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' # goes way over 3 times faster! # # # October 2010 # # Adapt the module even for 32-bit ABIs and other OSes. The former was # achieved by mechanical replacement of 64-bit arithmetic instructions # such as dmultu, daddu, etc. with their 32-bit counterparts and # adjusting offsets denoting multiples of BN_ULONG. Above mentioned # >3x performance improvement naturally does not apply to 32-bit code # [because there is no instruction 32-bit compiler can't use], one # has to content with 40-85% improvement depending on benchmark and # key length, more for longer keys. $flavour = shift || "o32"; while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $LD="ld"; $ST="sd"; $MULTU="dmultu"; $DIVU="ddivu"; $ADDU="daddu"; $SUBU="dsubu"; $SRL="dsrl"; $SLL="dsll"; $BNSZ=8; $PTR_ADD="daddu"; $PTR_SUB="dsubu"; $SZREG=8; $REG_S="sd"; $REG_L="ld"; } else { $LD="lw"; $ST="sw"; $MULTU="multu"; $DIVU="divu"; $ADDU="addu"; $SUBU="subu"; $SRL="srl"; $SLL="sll"; $BNSZ=4; $PTR_ADD="addu"; $PTR_SUB="subu"; $SZREG=4; $REG_S="sw"; $REG_L="lw"; $code=".set mips2\n"; } # Below is N32/64 register layout used in the original module. # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); ($ta0,$ta1,$ta2,$ta3)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7); # # No special adaptation is required for O32. NUBI on the other hand # is treated by saving/restoring ($v1,$t0..$t3). $gp=$v1 if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $minus4=$v1; $code.=<<___; .rdata .asciiz "mips3.s, Version 1.2" .asciiz "MIPS II/III/IV ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov " .text .set noat .align 5 .globl bn_mul_add_words .ent bn_mul_add_words bn_mul_add_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a2,bn_mul_add_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_add_words .align 5 .ent bn_mul_add_words_internal bn_mul_add_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 $LD $t1,0($a0) $LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $t3,$BNSZ($a0) $LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 # All manuals say it "compares 32-bit # values", but it seems to work fine # even on 64-bit registers. mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 $MULTU $t2,$a3 sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at $LD $ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta3,3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $t3,$v0 sltu $v0,$t3,$v0 mflo $at mfhi $t2 $ADDU $t3,$at $ADDU $v0,$t2 $MULTU $ta0,$a3 sltu $at,$t3,$at $ST $t3,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at subu $a2,4 $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ $ADDU $ta1,$v0 sltu $v0,$ta1,$v0 mflo $at mfhi $ta0 $ADDU $ta1,$at $ADDU $v0,$ta0 $MULTU $ta2,$a3 sltu $at,$ta1,$at $ST $ta1,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 $ADDU $ta3,$v0 sltu $v0,$ta3,$v0 mflo $at mfhi $ta2 $ADDU $ta3,$at $ADDU $v0,$ta2 sltu $at,$ta3,$at $ST $ta3,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$at beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return nop .L_bn_mul_add_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 $LD $t1,0($a0) subu $a2,1 $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return $LD $t0,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a0) subu $a2,1 $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return $LD $t0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 $LD $t1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at .L_bn_mul_add_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_add_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_mul_words .ent bn_mul_words bn_mul_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a2,bn_mul_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_words .align 5 .ent bn_mul_words_internal bn_mul_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail .L_bn_mul_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 $LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1) mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $MULTU $t2,$a3 $ST $v0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 subu $a2,4 $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ mflo $at mfhi $t2 $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t3,$v0,$at $MULTU $ta0,$a3 $ST $v0,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t3,$t2 mflo $at mfhi $ta0 $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $ta1,$v0,$at $MULTU $ta2,$a3 $ST $v0,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$ta1,$ta0 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 mflo $at mfhi $ta2 $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $ta3,$v0,$at $ST $v0,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2 beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return nop .L_bn_mul_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 subu $a2,1 mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $ST $v0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return $LD $t0,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 subu $a2,1 mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $ST $v0,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return $LD $t0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $t0,$a3 mflo $at mfhi $t0 $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $ST $v0,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 .L_bn_mul_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_sqr_words .ent bn_sqr_words bn_sqr_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a2,bn_sqr_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_sqr_words .align 5 .ent bn_sqr_words_internal bn_sqr_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 beqz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail .L_bn_sqr_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU $t0,$t0 $LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1) mflo $t1 mfhi $t0 $ST $t1,0($a0) $ST $t0,$BNSZ($a0) $MULTU $t2,$t2 subu $a2,4 $PTR_ADD $a0,8*$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ mflo $t3 mfhi $t2 $ST $t3,-6*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $t2,-5*$BNSZ($a0) $MULTU $ta0,$ta0 mflo $ta1 mfhi $ta0 $ST $ta1,-4*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $ta0,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $MULTU $ta2,$ta2 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 mflo $ta3 mfhi $ta2 $ST $ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop $ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0) beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return nop .L_bn_sqr_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU $t0,$t0 subu $a2,1 mflo $t1 mfhi $t0 $ST $t1,0($a0) $ST $t0,$BNSZ($a0) beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return $LD $t0,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $t0,$t0 subu $a2,1 mflo $t1 mfhi $t0 $ST $t1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $t0,3*$BNSZ($a0) beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return $LD $t0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $t0,$t0 mflo $t1 mfhi $t0 $ST $t1,4*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $t0,5*$BNSZ($a0) .L_bn_sqr_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_sqr_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_add_words .ent bn_add_words bn_add_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a3,bn_add_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_add_words .align 5 .ent bn_add_words_internal bn_add_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $at,$a3,$minus4 beqz $at,.L_bn_add_words_tail .L_bn_add_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) subu $a3,4 $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) and $at,$a3,$minus4 $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a2,4*$BNSZ $LD $t3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta1,-3*$BNSZ($a2) $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta2,-2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $ta3,-$BNSZ($a2) $ADDU $ta0,$t0 sltu $t8,$ta0,$t0 $ADDU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sltu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,-4*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 $ADDU $ta1,$t1 sltu $t9,$ta1,$t1 $ADDU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 $ADDU $ta2,$t2 sltu $t8,$ta2,$t2 $ADDU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sltu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 $ADDU $ta3,$t3 sltu $t9,$ta3,$t3 $ADDU $t3,$ta3,$v0 sltu $v0,$t3,$ta3 $ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return nop .L_bn_add_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) $ADDU $ta0,$t0 subu $a3,1 sltu $t8,$ta0,$t0 $ADDU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sltu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta1,$BNSZ($a2) $ADDU $ta1,$t1 subu $a3,1 sltu $t9,$ta1,$t1 $ADDU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,2*$BNSZ($a2) $ADDU $ta2,$t2 sltu $t8,$ta2,$t2 $ADDU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sltu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 .L_bn_add_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_add_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_sub_words .ent bn_sub_words bn_sub_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a3,bn_sub_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$zero .end bn_sub_words .align 5 .ent bn_sub_words_internal bn_sub_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $at,$a3,$minus4 beqz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail .L_bn_sub_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) subu $a3,4 $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) and $at,$a3,$minus4 $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a2,4*$BNSZ $LD $t3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta1,-3*$BNSZ($a2) $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta2,-2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $ta3,-$BNSZ($a2) sltu $t8,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $ta0,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,-4*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 sltu $t9,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $ta1,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 sltu $t8,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $ta2,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 sltu $t9,$t3,$ta3 $SUBU $ta3,$t3,$ta3 $SUBU $t3,$ta3,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t3,$ta3 $ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return nop .L_bn_sub_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) subu $a3,1 sltu $t8,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $ta0,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) subu $a3,1 $LD $ta1,$BNSZ($a2) sltu $t9,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $ta1,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,2*$BNSZ($a2) sltu $t8,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $ta2,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 .L_bn_sub_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_sub_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_div_3_words .ent bn_div_3_words bn_div_3_words: .set noreorder move $a3,$a0 # we know that bn_div_words does not # touch $a3, $ta2, $ta3 and preserves $a2 # so that we can save two arguments # and return address in registers # instead of stack:-) $LD $a0,($a3) move $ta2,$a1 bne $a0,$a2,bn_div_3_words_internal $LD $a1,-$BNSZ($a3) li $v0,-1 jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_3_words .align 5 .ent bn_div_3_words_internal bn_div_3_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder move $ta3,$ra bal bn_div_words_internal move $ra,$ta3 $MULTU $ta2,$v0 $LD $t2,-2*$BNSZ($a3) move $ta0,$zero mfhi $t1 mflo $t0 sltu $t8,$t1,$a1 .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop: bnez $t8,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done sgeu $at,$t2,$t0 seq $t9,$t1,$a1 and $at,$t9 sltu $t3,$t0,$ta2 $ADDU $a1,$a2 $SUBU $t1,$t3 $SUBU $t0,$ta2 sltu $t8,$t1,$a1 sltu $ta0,$a1,$a2 or $t8,$ta0 .set noreorder beqz $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop $SUBU $v0,1 $ADDU $v0,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_3_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_div_words .ent bn_div_words bn_div_words: .set noreorder bnez $a2,bn_div_words_internal li $v0,-1 # I would rather signal div-by-zero # which can be done with 'break 7' jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_words .align 5 .ent bn_div_words_internal bn_div_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; move $v1,$zero bltz $a2,.L_bn_div_words_body move $t9,$v1 $SLL $a2,1 bgtz $a2,.-4 addu $t9,1 .set reorder negu $t1,$t9 li $t2,-1 $SLL $t2,$t1 and $t2,$a0 $SRL $at,$a1,$t1 .set noreorder beqz $t2,.+12 nop break 6 # signal overflow .set reorder $SLL $a0,$t9 $SLL $a1,$t9 or $a0,$at ___ $QT=$ta0; $HH=$ta1; $DH=$v1; $code.=<<___; .L_bn_div_words_body: $SRL $DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ # bits sgeu $at,$a0,$a2 .set noreorder beqz $at,.+12 nop $SUBU $a0,$a2 .set reorder li $QT,-1 $SRL $HH,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $QT,4*$BNSZ # q=0xffffffff beq $DH,$HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div1 $DIVU $zero,$a0,$DH mflo $QT .L_bn_div_words_skip_div1: $MULTU $a2,$QT $SLL $t3,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $at,$a1,4*$BNSZ # bits or $t3,$at mflo $t0 mfhi $t1 .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1: sltu $t2,$t3,$t0 seq $t8,$HH,$t1 sltu $at,$HH,$t1 and $t2,$t8 sltu $v0,$t0,$a2 or $at,$t2 .set noreorder beqz $at,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done $SUBU $t1,$v0 $SUBU $t0,$a2 b .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1 $SUBU $QT,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done: $SLL $a1,4*$BNSZ # bits $SUBU $a0,$t3,$t0 $SLL $v0,$QT,4*$BNSZ # bits li $QT,-1 $SRL $HH,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $QT,4*$BNSZ # q=0xffffffff beq $DH,$HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div2 $DIVU $zero,$a0,$DH mflo $QT .L_bn_div_words_skip_div2: $MULTU $a2,$QT $SLL $t3,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $at,$a1,4*$BNSZ # bits or $t3,$at mflo $t0 mfhi $t1 .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2: sltu $t2,$t3,$t0 seq $t8,$HH,$t1 sltu $at,$HH,$t1 and $t2,$t8 sltu $v1,$t0,$a2 or $at,$t2 .set noreorder beqz $at,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done $SUBU $t1,$v1 $SUBU $t0,$a2 b .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2 $SUBU $QT,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done: $SUBU $a0,$t3,$t0 or $v0,$QT $SRL $v1,$a0,$t9 # $v1 contains remainder if anybody wants it $SRL $a2,$t9 # restore $a2 .set noreorder move $a1,$v1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_words_internal ___ undef $HH; undef $QT; undef $DH; ($a_0,$a_1,$a_2,$a_3)=($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3); ($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3)=($ta0,$ta1,$ta2,$ta3); ($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($s0,$s2,$s4,$a1); # once we load a[7], no use for $a1 ($b_4,$b_5,$b_6,$b_7)=($s1,$s3,$s5,$a2); # once we load b[7], no use for $a2 ($t_1,$t_2,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3)=($t8,$t9,$v0,$v1,$a3); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .globl bn_mul_comba8 .ent bn_mul_comba8 bn_mul_comba8: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,12*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x803ff008,-$SZREG $PTR_SUB $sp,12*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,10*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s3,8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x003f0000,-$SZREG $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $s5,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s3,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) # If compiled with -mips3 option on # R5000 box assembler barks on this # 1ine with "should not have mult/div # as last instruction in bb (R10K # bug)" warning. If anybody out there # has a clue about how to circumvent # this do send me a note. # $LD $b_0,0($a2) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $a_0,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $b_1,$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_2,2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_3,3*$BNSZ($a2) mflo $c_1 mfhi $c_2 $LD $a_4,4*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_5,5*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $a_0,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $LD $a_6,6*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_7,7*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $b_4,4*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_5,5*$BNSZ($a2) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at $LD $b_6,6*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_7,7*$BNSZ($a2) $ST $c_1,0($a0) # r[0]=c1; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) # r[1]=c2; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) # r[2]=c3; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) # r[3]=c1; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) # r[4]=c2; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) # r[5]=c3; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) # r[6]=c1; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) # r[7]=c2; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0) # r[8]=c3; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0) # r[9]=c1; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0) # r[10]=c2; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_4 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_5 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0) # r[11]=c3; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_5,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0) # r[12]=c1; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_6 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_7,$b_7 # mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0) # r[13]=c2; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 $ST $c_3,14*$BNSZ($a0) # r[14]=c3; $ST $c_1,15*$BNSZ($a0) # r[15]=c1; .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s5,10*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s3,8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,12*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s5,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s3,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,0*$SZREG($sp) jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; .end bn_mul_comba8 .align 5 .globl bn_mul_comba4 .ent bn_mul_comba4 bn_mul_comba4: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) $LD $b_0,0($a2) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $a_0,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $b_1,$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_2,2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_3,3*$BNSZ($a2) mflo $c_1 mfhi $c_2 $ST $c_1,0($a0) $MULTU $a_0,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_0 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_1 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_1,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_2 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_3,$b_3 # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra nop .end bn_mul_comba4 ___ ($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3); sub add_c2 () { my ($hi,$lo,$c0,$c1,$c2, $warm, # !$warm denotes first call with specific sequence of # $c_[XYZ] when there is no Z-carry to accumulate yet; $an,$bn # these two are arguments for multiplication which # result is used in *next* step [which is why it's # commented as "forward multiplication" below]; )=@_; $code.=<<___; mflo $lo mfhi $hi $ADDU $c0,$lo sltu $at,$c0,$lo $MULTU $an,$bn # forward multiplication $ADDU $c0,$lo $ADDU $at,$hi sltu $lo,$c0,$lo $ADDU $c1,$at $ADDU $hi,$lo ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$warm); sltu $c2,$c1,$at $ADDU $c1,$hi sltu $hi,$c1,$hi $ADDU $c2,$hi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($warm); sltu $at,$c1,$at $ADDU $c1,$hi $ADDU $c2,$at sltu $hi,$c1,$hi $ADDU $c2,$hi ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 5 .globl bn_sqr_comba8 .ent bn_sqr_comba8 bn_sqr_comba8: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $a_0,$a_0 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_4,4*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_5,5*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_6,6*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_7,7*$BNSZ($a1) mflo $c_1 mfhi $c_2 $ST $c_1,0($a0) $MULTU $a_0,$a_1 # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 slt $c_1,$t_2,$zero $SLL $t_2,1 $MULTU $a_2,$a_0 # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); slt $a2,$t_1,$zero $ADDU $t_2,$a2 $SLL $t_1,1 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_1,$a_1); # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$a_3 # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_1,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_4,$a_0); # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_3,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_2,$a_2); # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$a_5 # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_1,$a_4); # mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_2,$a_3); # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_6,$a_0); # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_5,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_4,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_3,$a_3); # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$a_7 # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_1,$a_6); # mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_2,$a_5); # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_3,$a_4); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_7,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_6,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_5,$a_3); # mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_4,$a_4); # mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$a_7 # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_3,$a_6); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_4,$a_5); # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_7,$a_3); # mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_6,$a_4); # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_5,$a_5); # mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_4,$a_7 # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_5,$a_6); # mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_7,$a_5); # mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_6,$a_6); # mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU $a_6,$a_7 # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_7,$a_7); # mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 $ST $c_3,14*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $c_1,15*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra nop .end bn_sqr_comba8 .align 5 .globl bn_sqr_comba4 .ent bn_sqr_comba4 bn_sqr_comba4: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU $a_0,$a_0 # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) mflo $c_1 mfhi $c_2 $ST $c_1,0($a0) $MULTU $a_0,$a_1 # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 slt $c_1,$t_2,$zero $SLL $t_2,1 $MULTU $a_2,$a_0 # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); slt $a2,$t_1,$zero $ADDU $t_2,$a2 $SLL $t_1,1 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_1,$a_1); # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU $a_0,$a_3 # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_1,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_3,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_2,$a_2); # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU $a_2,$a_3 # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_3,$a_3); # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) mflo $t_1 mfhi $t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra nop .end bn_sqr_comba4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl0000644000000000000000000001764413176625656016410 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # May 2011 # # The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for # the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer # code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later # and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies # from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values # for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated # code: # # PIII 16%-30% # P4 12%-12% # Opteron 18%-40% # Core2 19%-44% # Atom 38%-64% # Westmere 53%-121%(PCLMULQDQ)/20%-32%(MMX) # Sandy Bridge 72%-127%(PCLMULQDQ)/27%-23%(MMX) # # Note that above improvement coefficients are not coefficients for # bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself. For example 120% ECDH improvement is result # of bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 being >4x faster. As it gets faster, benchmark # is more and more dominated by other subroutines, most notably by # BN_GF2m_mod[_mul]_arr... $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0,$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $sse2=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2); $a="eax"; $b="ebx"; ($a1,$a2,$a4)=("ecx","edx","ebp"); $R="mm0"; @T=("mm1","mm2"); ($A,$B,$B30,$B31)=("mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5"); @i=("esi","edi"); if (!$x86only) { &function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_mmx"); &sub ("esp",32+4); &mov ($a1,$a); &lea ($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a)); &and ($a1,0x3fffffff); &lea ($a4,&DWP(0,$a2,$a2)); &mov (&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0); &and ($a2,0x7fffffff); &movd ($A,$a); &movd ($B,$b); &mov (&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1 &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a2 &pxor ($B31,$B31); &pxor ($B30,$B30); &mov (&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2 &xor ($a2,$a4); # a2^a4 &mov (&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a2 &pcmpgtd($B31,$A); # broadcast 31st bit &paddd ($A,$A); # $A<<=1 &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4 &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4); # a4 &xor ($a4,$a2); # a2=a4^a2^a4 &pand ($B31,$B); &pcmpgtd($B30,$A); # broadcast 30th bit &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a4 &xor ($a4,$a1); # a1^a2^a4 &psllq ($B31,31); &pand ($B30,$B); &mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2^a4 &mov (@i[0],0x7); &mov (&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4); # a1^a2^a4 &mov ($a4,@i[0]); &and (@i[0],$b); &shr ($b,3); &mov (@i[1],$a4); &psllq ($B30,30); &and (@i[1],$b); &shr ($b,3); &movd ($R,&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4)); &mov (@i[0],$a4); &and (@i[0],$b); &shr ($b,3); for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) { &movd (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4)); &mov (@i[1],$a4); &psllq (@T[1],3*$n); &and (@i[1],$b); &shr ($b,3); &pxor ($R,@T[1]); push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T)); } &movd (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4)); &pxor ($R,$B30); &psllq (@T[1],3*$n++); &pxor ($R,@T[1]); &movd (@T[0],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4)); &pxor ($R,$B31); &psllq (@T[0],3*$n); &add ("esp",32+4); &pxor ($R,@T[0]); &ret (); &function_end_B("_mul_1x1_mmx"); } ($lo,$hi)=("eax","edx"); @T=("ecx","ebp"); &function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_ialu"); &sub ("esp",32+4); &mov ($a1,$a); &lea ($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a)); &lea ($a4,&DWP(0,"",$a,4)); &and ($a1,0x3fffffff); &lea (@i[1],&DWP(0,$lo,$lo)); &sar ($lo,31); # broadcast 31st bit &mov (&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0); &and ($a2,0x7fffffff); &mov (&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1 &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a2 &mov (&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2 &xor ($a2,$a4); # a2^a4 &mov (&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a2 &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4 &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4); # a4 &xor ($a4,$a2); # a2=a4^a2^a4 &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a4 &xor ($a4,$a1); # a1^a2^a4 &sar (@i[1],31); # broardcast 30th bit &and ($lo,$b); &mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2^a4 &and (@i[1],$b); &mov (&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4); # a1^a2^a4 &mov ($hi,$lo); &shl ($lo,31); &mov (@T[0],@i[1]); &shr ($hi,1); &mov (@i[0],0x7); &shl (@i[1],30); &and (@i[0],$b); &shr (@T[0],2); &xor ($lo,@i[1]); &shr ($b,3); &mov (@i[1],0x7); # 5-byte instruction!? &and (@i[1],$b); &shr ($b,3); &xor ($hi,@T[0]); &xor ($lo,&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4)); &mov (@i[0],0x7); &and (@i[0],$b); &shr ($b,3); for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) { &mov (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4)); &mov (@i[1],0x7); &mov (@T[0],@T[1]); &shl (@T[1],3*$n); &and (@i[1],$b); &shr (@T[0],32-3*$n); &xor ($lo,@T[1]); &shr ($b,3); &xor ($hi,@T[0]); push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T)); } &mov (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[1],4)); &mov (@T[0],@T[1]); &shl (@T[1],3*$n); &mov (@i[1],&DWP(0,"esp",@i[0],4)); &shr (@T[0],32-3*$n); $n++; &mov (@i[0],@i[1]); &xor ($lo,@T[1]); &shl (@i[1],3*$n); &xor ($hi,@T[0]); &shr (@i[0],32-3*$n); &xor ($lo,@i[1]); &xor ($hi,@i[0]); &add ("esp",32+4); &ret (); &function_end_B("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1, BN_ULONG b0); &function_begin_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2"); if (!$x86only) { &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edx")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edx")); &test ("eax",1<<23); # check MMX bit &jz (&label("ialu")); if ($sse2) { &test ("eax",1<<24); # check FXSR bit &jz (&label("mmx")); &test ("edx",1<<1); # check PCLMULQDQ bit &jz (&label("mmx")); &movups ("xmm0",&QWP(8,"esp")); &shufps ("xmm0","xmm0",0b10110001); &pclmulqdq ("xmm0","xmm0",1); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,"esp")); &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0"); &ret (); &set_label("mmx",16); } &push ("ebp"); &push ("ebx"); &push ("esi"); &push ("edi"); &mov ($a,&wparam(1)); &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1 &movq ("mm7",$R); &mov ($a,&wparam(2)); &mov ($b,&wparam(4)); &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0 &movq ("mm6",$R); &mov ($a,&wparam(1)); &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); &xor ($a,&wparam(2)); &xor ($b,&wparam(4)); &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) &pxor ($R,"mm7"); &mov ($a,&wparam(0)); &pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0 &movq ($A,$R); &psllq ($R,32); &pop ("edi"); &psrlq ($A,32); &pop ("esi"); &pxor ($R,"mm6"); &pop ("ebx"); &pxor ($A,"mm7"); &movq (&QWP(0,$a),$R); &pop ("ebp"); &movq (&QWP(8,$a),$A); &emms (); &ret (); &set_label("ialu",16); } &push ("ebp"); &push ("ebx"); &push ("esi"); &push ("edi"); &stack_push(4+1); &mov ($a,&wparam(1)); &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1 &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi); &mov ($a,&wparam(2)); &mov ($b,&wparam(4)); &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0 &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi); &mov ($a,&wparam(1)); &mov ($b,&wparam(3)); &xor ($a,&wparam(2)); &xor ($b,&wparam(4)); &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) &mov ("ebp",&wparam(0)); @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi"); &mov (@r[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &mov (@r[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); &mov (@r[2],&DWP(8,"esp")); &mov (@r[3],&DWP(12,"esp")); &xor ($lo,$hi); &xor ($hi,@r[1]); &xor ($lo,@r[0]); &mov (&DWP(0,"ebp"),@r[0]); &xor ($hi,@r[2]); &mov (&DWP(12,"ebp"),@r[3]); &xor ($lo,@r[3]); &stack_pop(4+1); &xor ($hi,@r[3]); &pop ("edi"); &xor ($lo,$hi); &pop ("esi"); &mov (&DWP(8,"ebp"),$hi); &pop ("ebx"); &mov (&DWP(4,"ebp"),$lo); &pop ("ebp"); &ret (); &function_end_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2"); &asciz ("GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s0000644000000000000000000013362313176625656016524 0ustar rootroot; Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. ; ; Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use ; this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy ; in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at ; https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ; ; PA-RISC 64-bit implementation of bn_asm code ; ; This code is approximately 2x faster than the C version ; for RSA/DSA. ; ; See http://devresource.hp.com/ for more details on the PA-RISC ; architecture. Also see the book "PA-RISC 2.0 Architecture" ; by Gerry Kane for information on the instruction set architecture. ; ; Code written by Chris Ruemmler (with some help from the HP C ; compiler). ; ; The code compiles with HP's assembler ; .level 2.0W .space $TEXT$ .subspa $CODE$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2c,CODE_ONLY ; ; Global Register definitions used for the routines. ; ; Some information about HP's runtime architecture for 64-bits. ; ; "Caller save" means the calling function must save the register ; if it wants the register to be preserved. ; "Callee save" means if a function uses the register, it must save ; the value before using it. ; ; For the floating point registers ; ; "caller save" registers: fr4-fr11, fr22-fr31 ; "callee save" registers: fr12-fr21 ; "special" registers: fr0-fr3 (status and exception registers) ; ; For the integer registers ; value zero : r0 ; "caller save" registers: r1,r19-r26 ; "callee save" registers: r3-r18 ; return register : r2 (rp) ; return values ; r28 (ret0,ret1) ; Stack pointer ; r30 (sp) ; global data pointer ; r27 (dp) ; argument pointer ; r29 (ap) ; millicode return ptr ; r31 (also a caller save register) ; ; Arguments to the routines ; r_ptr .reg %r26 a_ptr .reg %r25 b_ptr .reg %r24 num .reg %r24 w .reg %r23 n .reg %r23 ; ; Globals used in some routines ; top_overflow .reg %r29 high_mask .reg %r22 ; value 0xffffffff80000000L ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ; ; bn_mul_add_words ; ;BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *r_ptr, BN_ULONG *a_ptr, ; int num, BN_ULONG w) ; ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; arg2 = num ; arg3 = w ; ; Local register definitions ; fm1 .reg %fr22 fm .reg %fr23 ht_temp .reg %fr24 ht_temp_1 .reg %fr25 lt_temp .reg %fr26 lt_temp_1 .reg %fr27 fm1_1 .reg %fr28 fm_1 .reg %fr29 fw_h .reg %fr7L fw_l .reg %fr7R fw .reg %fr7 fht_0 .reg %fr8L flt_0 .reg %fr8R t_float_0 .reg %fr8 fht_1 .reg %fr9L flt_1 .reg %fr9R t_float_1 .reg %fr9 tmp_0 .reg %r31 tmp_1 .reg %r21 m_0 .reg %r20 m_1 .reg %r19 ht_0 .reg %r1 ht_1 .reg %r3 lt_0 .reg %r4 lt_1 .reg %r5 m1_0 .reg %r6 m1_1 .reg %r7 rp_val .reg %r8 rp_val_1 .reg %r9 bn_mul_add_words .export bn_mul_add_words,entry,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .proc .callinfo frame=128 .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 NOP ; Needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned NOP ; Needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 STD %r7,32(%sp) ; save r7 STD %r8,40(%sp) ; save r8 STD %r9,48(%sp) ; save r9 COPY %r0,%ret0 ; return 0 by default DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32 STD w,56(%sp) ; store w on stack CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit ; if (num <= 0) then exit LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack ; ; The loop is unrolled twice, so if there is only 1 number ; then go straight to the cleanup code. ; CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_add_words_single_top FLDD -72(%sp),fw ; load up w into fp register fw (fw_h/fw_l) ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; ; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle. ; bn_mul_add_words_unroll2 FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) FLDD 8(a_ptr),t_float_1 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) LDD 0(r_ptr),rp_val ; rp[0] LDD 8(r_ptr),rp_val_1 ; rp[1] XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l XMPYU fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1 ; m1[1] = fht_1*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1[0] FSTD fm1_1,-48(%sp) ; -48(sp) = m1[1] XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m[0] = flt_0*fw_h XMPYU flt_1,fw_h,fm_1 ; m[1] = flt_1*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m[0] FSTD fm_1,-40(%sp) ; -40(sp) = m[1] XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = fht_0*fw_h XMPYU fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1 ; ht_temp_1 = fht_1*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht_temp FSTD ht_temp_1,-56(%sp) ; -56(sp) = ht_temp_1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l XMPYU flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1 ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt_temp FSTD lt_temp_1,-64(%sp) ; -64(sp) = lt_temp_1 LDD -8(%sp),m_0 ; m[0] LDD -40(%sp),m_1 ; m[1] LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 ; m1[0] LDD -48(%sp),m1_1 ; m1[1] LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 ; ht[0] LDD -56(%sp),ht_1 ; ht[1] ADD,L m1_0,m_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m[0] + m1[0]; ADD,L m1_1,m_1,tmp_1 ; tmp_1 = m[1] + m1[1]; LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 LDD -64(%sp),lt_1 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0 ; if (m[0] < m1[0]) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht[0] += (1<<32) CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0 ; if (m[1] < m1[1]) ADD,L ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1 ; ht[1] += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m[0]>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1[0] = m[0]<<32 EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1 ; m[1]>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_1,31,32,m1_1 ; m1[1] = m[1]<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht[0]+= (m[0]>>32) ADD,L ht_1,m_1,ht_1 ; ht[1]+= (m[1]>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,lt_0 ; lt[0] = lt[0]+m1[0]; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ ADD lt_1,m1_1,lt_1 ; lt[1] = lt[1]+m1[1]; ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht[1]++ ADD %ret0,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt[0] = lt[0] + c; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ ADD lt_0,rp_val,lt_0 ; lt[0] = lt[0]+rp[0] ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ LDO -2(num),num ; num = num - 2; ADD ht_0,lt_1,lt_1 ; lt[1] = lt[1] + ht_0 (c); ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht[1]++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt[0] ADD lt_1,rp_val_1,lt_1 ; lt[1] = lt[1]+rp[1] ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,%ret0 ; ht[1]++ LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr ; a_ptr += 2 STD lt_1,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = lt[1] CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_add_words_unroll2 ; go again if more to do LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr ; r_ptr += 2 CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit ; are we done, or cleanup last one ; ; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary ; bn_mul_add_words_single_top FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) LDD 0(r_ptr),rp_val ; rp[0] LDO 8(a_ptr),a_ptr ; a_ptr++ XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1 = ht*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m = lt*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt LDD -8(%sp),m_0 LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 ; m1 = temp1 ADD,L m_0,m1_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m + m1; LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1 = m<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD %ret0,tmp_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt + c; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD lt_0,rp_val,lt_0 ; lt = lt+rp[0] ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,%ret0 ; ht++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt bn_mul_add_words_exit .EXIT LDD -80(%sp),%r9 ; restore r9 LDD -88(%sp),%r8 ; restore r8 LDD -96(%sp),%r7 ; restore r7 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 ; restore r3 .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg2 = num ; arg3 = w bn_mul_words .proc .callinfo frame=128 .entry .EXPORT bn_mul_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 STD %r7,32(%sp) ; save r7 COPY %r0,%ret0 ; return 0 by default DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32 STD w,56(%sp) ; w on stack CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack ; ; See if only 1 word to do, thus just do cleanup ; CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_words_single_top FLDD -72(%sp),fw ; load up w into fp register fw (fw_h/fw_l) ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; ; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle. ; bn_mul_words_unroll2 FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) FLDD 8(a_ptr),t_float_1 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l XMPYU fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1 ; m1[1] = ht*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1 FSTD fm1_1,-48(%sp) ; -48(sp) = m1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m = lt*fw_h XMPYU flt_1,fw_h,fm_1 ; m = lt*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m FSTD fm_1,-40(%sp) ; -40(sp) = m XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = fht_0*fw_h XMPYU fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1 ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht FSTD ht_temp_1,-56(%sp) ; -56(sp) = ht XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l XMPYU flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1 ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt FSTD lt_temp_1,-64(%sp) ; -64(sp) = lt LDD -8(%sp),m_0 LDD -40(%sp),m_1 LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 LDD -48(%sp),m1_1 LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 LDD -56(%sp),ht_1 ADD,L m1_0,m_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m + m1; ADD,L m1_1,m_1,tmp_1 ; tmp_1 = m + m1; LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 LDD -64(%sp),lt_1 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht += (1<<32) CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1 ; ht += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1 = m<<32 EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_1,31,32,m1_1 ; m1 = m<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD,L ht_1,m_1,ht_1 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD lt_1,m1_1,lt_1 ; lt = lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht++ ADD %ret0,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt + c (ret0); ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD ht_0,lt_1,lt_1 ; lt = lt + c (ht_0) ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt STD lt_1,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = lt COPY ht_1,%ret0 ; carry = ht LDO -2(num),num ; num = num - 2; LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr ; ap += 2 CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_words_unroll2 LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr ; rp++ CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit ; are we done? ; ; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary ; bn_mul_words_single_top FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1 = ht*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m = lt*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt LDD -8(%sp),m_0 LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 ADD,L m_0,m1_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m + m1; LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1 = m<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,lt_0 ; lt= lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD %ret0,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt + c; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ COPY ht_0,%ret0 ; copy carry STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt bn_mul_words_exit .EXIT LDD -96(%sp),%r7 ; restore r7 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 ; restore r3 .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg2 = num ; bn_sqr_words .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_sqr_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 NOP STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack ; ; If only 1, the goto straight to cleanup ; CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_sqr_words_single_top DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; bn_sqr_words_unroll2 FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; a[0] FLDD 8(a_ptr),t_float_1 ; a[1] XMPYU fht_0,flt_0,fm ; m[0] XMPYU fht_1,flt_1,fm_1 ; m[1] FSTD fm,-24(%sp) ; store m[0] FSTD fm_1,-56(%sp) ; store m[1] XMPYU flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp ; lt[0] XMPYU flt_1,flt_1,lt_temp_1 ; lt[1] FSTD lt_temp,-16(%sp) ; store lt[0] FSTD lt_temp_1,-48(%sp) ; store lt[1] XMPYU fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp ; ht[0] XMPYU fht_1,fht_1,ht_temp_1 ; ht[1] FSTD ht_temp,-8(%sp) ; store ht[0] FSTD ht_temp_1,-40(%sp) ; store ht[1] LDD -24(%sp),m_0 LDD -56(%sp),m_1 AND m_0,high_mask,tmp_0 ; m[0] & Mask AND m_1,high_mask,tmp_1 ; m[1] & Mask DEPD,Z m_0,30,31,m_0 ; m[0] << 32+1 DEPD,Z m_1,30,31,m_1 ; m[1] << 32+1 LDD -16(%sp),lt_0 LDD -48(%sp),lt_1 EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m[0]&Mask >> 32-1 EXTRD,U tmp_1,32,33,tmp_1 ; tmp_1 = m[1]&Mask >> 32-1 LDD -8(%sp),ht_0 LDD -40(%sp),ht_1 ADD,L ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0 ; ht[0] += tmp_0 ADD,L ht_1,tmp_1,ht_1 ; ht[1] += tmp_1 ADD lt_0,m_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt+m ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt[0] STD ht_0,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = ht[1] ADD lt_1,m_1,lt_1 ; lt = lt+m ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht[1]++ STD lt_1,16(r_ptr) ; rp[2] = lt[1] STD ht_1,24(r_ptr) ; rp[3] = ht[1] LDO -2(num),num ; num = num - 2; LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr ; ap += 2 CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_sqr_words_unroll2 LDO 32(r_ptr),r_ptr ; rp += 4 CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit ; are we done? ; ; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary ; bn_sqr_words_single_top FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) XMPYU fht_0,flt_0,fm ; m FSTD fm,-24(%sp) ; store m XMPYU flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp ; lt FSTD lt_temp,-16(%sp) ; store lt XMPYU fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp ; ht FSTD ht_temp,-8(%sp) ; store ht LDD -24(%sp),m_0 ; load m AND m_0,high_mask,tmp_0 ; m & Mask DEPD,Z m_0,30,31,m_0 ; m << 32+1 LDD -16(%sp),lt_0 ; lt LDD -8(%sp),ht_0 ; ht EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m&Mask >> 32-1 ADD m_0,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt+m ADD,L ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0 ; ht += tmp_0 ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt STD ht_0,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = ht bn_sqr_words_exit .EXIT LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg2 = bp ; arg3 = n t .reg %r22 b .reg %r21 l .reg %r20 bn_add_words .proc .entry .callinfo .EXPORT bn_add_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .align 64 CMPIB,>= 0,n,bn_add_words_exit COPY %r0,%ret0 ; return 0 by default ; ; If 2 or more numbers do the loop ; CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_add_words_single_top NOP ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; bn_add_words_unroll2 LDD 0(a_ptr),t LDD 0(b_ptr),b ADD t,%ret0,t ; t = t+c; ADD,DC %r0,%r0,%ret0 ; set c to carry ADD t,b,l ; l = t + b[0] ADD,DC %ret0,%r0,%ret0 ; c+= carry STD l,0(r_ptr) LDD 8(a_ptr),t LDD 8(b_ptr),b ADD t,%ret0,t ; t = t+c; ADD,DC %r0,%r0,%ret0 ; set c to carry ADD t,b,l ; l = t + b[0] ADD,DC %ret0,%r0,%ret0 ; c+= carry STD l,8(r_ptr) LDO -2(n),n LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr LDO 16(b_ptr),b_ptr CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_add_words_unroll2 LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_add_words_exit ; are we done? bn_add_words_single_top LDD 0(a_ptr),t LDD 0(b_ptr),b ADD t,%ret0,t ; t = t+c; ADD,DC %r0,%r0,%ret0 ; set c to carry (could use CMPCLR??) ADD t,b,l ; l = t + b[0] ADD,DC %ret0,%r0,%ret0 ; c+= carry STD l,0(r_ptr) bn_add_words_exit .EXIT BVE (%rp) NOP .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg2 = bp ; arg3 = n t1 .reg %r22 t2 .reg %r21 sub_tmp1 .reg %r20 sub_tmp2 .reg %r19 bn_sub_words .proc .callinfo .EXPORT bn_sub_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 CMPIB,>= 0,n,bn_sub_words_exit COPY %r0,%ret0 ; return 0 by default ; ; If 2 or more numbers do the loop ; CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_sub_words_single_top NOP ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; bn_sub_words_unroll2 LDD 0(a_ptr),t1 LDD 0(b_ptr),t2 SUB t1,t2,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t1-t2; SUB sub_tmp1,%ret0,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t3- c; CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2 ; clear if t1 > t2 LDO 1(%r0),sub_tmp2 CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0 COPY sub_tmp2,%ret0 STD sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr) LDD 8(a_ptr),t1 LDD 8(b_ptr),t2 SUB t1,t2,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t1-t2; SUB sub_tmp1,%ret0,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t3- c; CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2 ; clear if t1 > t2 LDO 1(%r0),sub_tmp2 CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0 COPY sub_tmp2,%ret0 STD sub_tmp1,8(r_ptr) LDO -2(n),n LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr LDO 16(b_ptr),b_ptr CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_sub_words_unroll2 LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_sub_words_exit ; are we done? bn_sub_words_single_top LDD 0(a_ptr),t1 LDD 0(b_ptr),t2 SUB t1,t2,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t1-t2; SUB sub_tmp1,%ret0,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t3- c; CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2 ; clear if t1 > t2 LDO 1(%r0),sub_tmp2 CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0 COPY sub_tmp2,%ret0 STD sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr) bn_sub_words_exit .EXIT BVE (%rp) NOP .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ; ; unsigned long bn_div_words(unsigned long h, unsigned long l, unsigned long d) ; ; arg0 = h ; arg1 = l ; arg2 = d ; ; This is mainly just modified assembly from the compiler, thus the ; lack of variable names. ; ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ bn_div_words .proc .callinfo CALLER,FRAME=272,ENTRY_GR=%r10,SAVE_RP,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_div_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .IMPORT BN_num_bits_word,CODE,NO_RELOCATION .IMPORT __iob,DATA .IMPORT fprintf,CODE,NO_RELOCATION .IMPORT abort,CODE,NO_RELOCATION .IMPORT $$div2U,MILLICODE .entry STD %r2,-16(%r30) STD,MA %r3,352(%r30) STD %r4,-344(%r30) STD %r5,-336(%r30) STD %r6,-328(%r30) STD %r7,-320(%r30) STD %r8,-312(%r30) STD %r9,-304(%r30) STD %r10,-296(%r30) STD %r27,-288(%r30) ; save gp COPY %r24,%r3 ; save d COPY %r26,%r4 ; save h (high 64-bits) LDO -1(%r0),%ret0 ; return -1 by default CMPB,*= %r0,%arg2,$D3 ; if (d == 0) COPY %r25,%r5 ; save l (low 64-bits) LDO -48(%r30),%r29 ; create ap .CALL ;in=26,29;out=28; B,L BN_num_bits_word,%r2 COPY %r3,%r26 LDD -288(%r30),%r27 ; restore gp LDI 64,%r21 CMPB,= %r21,%ret0,$00000012 ;if (i == 64) (forward) COPY %ret0,%r24 ; i MTSARCM %r24 DEPDI,Z -1,%sar,1,%r29 CMPB,*<<,N %r29,%r4,bn_div_err_case ; if (h > 1<= d) SUB %r4,%r3,%r4 ; h -= d CMPB,= %r31,%r0,$0000001A ; if (i) COPY %r0,%r10 ; ret = 0 MTSARCM %r31 ; i to shift DEPD,Z %r3,%sar,64,%r3 ; d <<= i; SUBI 64,%r31,%r19 ; 64 - i; redundent MTSAR %r19 ; (64 -i) to shift SHRPD %r4,%r5,%sar,%r4 ; l>> (64-i) MTSARCM %r31 ; i to shift DEPD,Z %r5,%sar,64,%r5 ; l <<= i; $0000001A DEPDI,Z -1,31,32,%r19 EXTRD,U %r3,31,32,%r6 ; dh=(d&0xfff)>>32 EXTRD,U %r3,63,32,%r8 ; dl = d&0xffffff LDO 2(%r0),%r9 STD %r3,-280(%r30) ; "d" to stack $0000001C DEPDI,Z -1,63,32,%r29 ; EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r31 ; h >> 32 CMPB,*=,N %r31,%r6,$D2 ; if ((h>>32) != dh)(forward) div COPY %r4,%r26 EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r25 COPY %r6,%r24 .CALL ;in=23,24,25,26;out=20,21,22,28,29; (MILLICALL) B,L $$div2U,%r2 EXTRD,U %r6,31,32,%r23 DEPD %r28,31,32,%r29 $D2 STD %r29,-272(%r30) ; q AND %r5,%r19,%r24 ; t & 0xffffffff00000000; EXTRD,U %r24,31,32,%r24 ; ??? FLDD -272(%r30),%fr7 ; q FLDD -280(%r30),%fr8 ; d XMPYU %fr8L,%fr7L,%fr10 FSTD %fr10,-256(%r30) XMPYU %fr8L,%fr7R,%fr22 FSTD %fr22,-264(%r30) XMPYU %fr8R,%fr7L,%fr11 XMPYU %fr8R,%fr7R,%fr23 FSTD %fr11,-232(%r30) FSTD %fr23,-240(%r30) LDD -256(%r30),%r28 DEPD,Z %r28,31,32,%r2 LDD -264(%r30),%r20 ADD,L %r20,%r2,%r31 LDD -232(%r30),%r22 DEPD,Z %r22,31,32,%r22 LDD -240(%r30),%r21 B $00000024 ; enter loop ADD,L %r21,%r22,%r23 $0000002A LDO -1(%r29),%r29 SUB %r23,%r8,%r23 $00000024 SUB %r4,%r31,%r25 AND %r25,%r19,%r26 CMPB,*<>,N %r0,%r26,$00000046 ; (forward) DEPD,Z %r25,31,32,%r20 OR %r20,%r24,%r21 CMPB,*<<,N %r21,%r23,$0000002A ;(backward) SUB %r31,%r6,%r31 ;-------------Break path--------------------- $00000046 DEPD,Z %r23,31,32,%r25 ;tl EXTRD,U %r23,31,32,%r26 ;t AND %r25,%r19,%r24 ;tl = (tl<<32)&0xfffffff0000000L ADD,L %r31,%r26,%r31 ;th += t; CMPCLR,*>>= %r5,%r24,%r0 ;if (l>32)); DEPD,Z %r29,31,32,%r10 ; ret = q<<32 b $0000001C DEPD,Z %r28,31,32,%r5 ; l = l << 32 $D1 OR %r10,%r29,%r28 ; ret |= q $D3 LDD -368(%r30),%r2 $D0 LDD -296(%r30),%r10 LDD -304(%r30),%r9 LDD -312(%r30),%r8 LDD -320(%r30),%r7 LDD -328(%r30),%r6 LDD -336(%r30),%r5 LDD -344(%r30),%r4 BVE (%r2) .EXIT LDD,MB -352(%r30),%r3 bn_div_err_case MFIA %r6 ADDIL L'bn_div_words-bn_div_err_case,%r6,%r1 LDO R'bn_div_words-bn_div_err_case(%r1),%r6 ADDIL LT'__iob,%r27,%r1 LDD RT'__iob(%r1),%r26 ADDIL L'C$4-bn_div_words,%r6,%r1 LDO R'C$4-bn_div_words(%r1),%r25 LDO 64(%r26),%r26 .CALL ;in=24,25,26,29;out=28; B,L fprintf,%r2 LDO -48(%r30),%r29 LDD -288(%r30),%r27 .CALL ;in=29; B,L abort,%r2 LDO -48(%r30),%r29 LDD -288(%r30),%r27 B $D0 LDD -368(%r30),%r2 .PROCEND ;in=24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ; Registers to hold 64-bit values to manipulate. The "L" part ; of the register corresponds to the upper 32-bits, while the "R" ; part corresponds to the lower 32-bits ; ; Note, that when using b6 and b7, the code must save these before ; using them because they are callee save registers ; ; ; Floating point registers to use to save values that ; are manipulated. These don't collide with ftemp1-6 and ; are all caller save registers ; a0 .reg %fr22 a0L .reg %fr22L a0R .reg %fr22R a1 .reg %fr23 a1L .reg %fr23L a1R .reg %fr23R a2 .reg %fr24 a2L .reg %fr24L a2R .reg %fr24R a3 .reg %fr25 a3L .reg %fr25L a3R .reg %fr25R a4 .reg %fr26 a4L .reg %fr26L a4R .reg %fr26R a5 .reg %fr27 a5L .reg %fr27L a5R .reg %fr27R a6 .reg %fr28 a6L .reg %fr28L a6R .reg %fr28R a7 .reg %fr29 a7L .reg %fr29L a7R .reg %fr29R b0 .reg %fr30 b0L .reg %fr30L b0R .reg %fr30R b1 .reg %fr31 b1L .reg %fr31L b1R .reg %fr31R ; ; Temporary floating point variables, these are all caller save ; registers ; ftemp1 .reg %fr4 ftemp2 .reg %fr5 ftemp3 .reg %fr6 ftemp4 .reg %fr7 ; ; The B set of registers when used. ; b2 .reg %fr8 b2L .reg %fr8L b2R .reg %fr8R b3 .reg %fr9 b3L .reg %fr9L b3R .reg %fr9R b4 .reg %fr10 b4L .reg %fr10L b4R .reg %fr10R b5 .reg %fr11 b5L .reg %fr11L b5R .reg %fr11R b6 .reg %fr12 b6L .reg %fr12L b6R .reg %fr12R b7 .reg %fr13 b7L .reg %fr13L b7R .reg %fr13R c1 .reg %r21 ; only reg temp1 .reg %r20 ; only reg temp2 .reg %r19 ; only reg temp3 .reg %r31 ; only reg m1 .reg %r28 c2 .reg %r23 high_one .reg %r1 ht .reg %r6 lt .reg %r5 m .reg %r4 c3 .reg %r3 SQR_ADD_C .macro A0L,A0R,C1,C2,C3 XMPYU A0L,A0R,ftemp1 ; m FSTD ftemp1,-24(%sp) ; store m XMPYU A0R,A0R,ftemp2 ; lt FSTD ftemp2,-16(%sp) ; store lt XMPYU A0L,A0L,ftemp3 ; ht FSTD ftemp3,-8(%sp) ; store ht LDD -24(%sp),m ; load m AND m,high_mask,temp2 ; m & Mask DEPD,Z m,30,31,temp3 ; m << 32+1 LDD -16(%sp),lt ; lt LDD -8(%sp),ht ; ht EXTRD,U temp2,32,33,temp1 ; temp1 = m&Mask >> 32-1 ADD temp3,lt,lt ; lt = lt+m ADD,L ht,temp1,ht ; ht += temp1 ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD C1,lt,C1 ; c1=c1+lt ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD C2,ht,C2 ; c2=c2+ht ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; c3++ .endm SQR_ADD_C2 .macro A0L,A0R,A1L,A1R,C1,C2,C3 XMPYU A0L,A1R,ftemp1 ; m1 = bl*ht FSTD ftemp1,-16(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,A1L,ftemp2 ; m = bh*lt FSTD ftemp2,-8(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,A1R,ftemp3 ; lt = bl*lt FSTD ftemp3,-32(%sp) XMPYU A0L,A1L,ftemp4 ; ht = bh*ht FSTD ftemp4,-24(%sp) ; LDD -8(%sp),m ; r21 = m LDD -16(%sp),m1 ; r19 = m1 ADD,L m,m1,m ; m+m1 DEPD,Z m,31,32,temp3 ; (m+m1<<32) LDD -24(%sp),ht ; r24 = ht CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht,high_one,ht ; ht+=high_one EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1 ; m >> 32 LDD -32(%sp),lt ; lt ADD,L ht,temp1,ht ; ht+= m>>32 ADD lt,temp3,lt ; lt = lt+m1 ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD ht,ht,ht ; ht=ht+ht; ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; add in carry (c3++) ADD lt,lt,lt ; lt=lt+lt; ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; add in carry (ht++) ADD C1,lt,C1 ; c1=c1+lt ADD,DC,*NUV ht,%r0,ht ; add in carry (ht++) LDO 1(C3),C3 ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise ADD C2,ht,C2 ; c2 = c2 + ht ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; add in carry (c3++) .endm ; ;void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; bn_sqr_comba8 .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_sqr_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .ENTRY .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 32(a_ptr),a4 FLDD 40(a_ptr),a5 FLDD 48(a_ptr),a6 FLDD 56(a_ptr),a7 SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) ; r[0] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) ; r[1] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) ; r[2] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) ; r[3] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) ; r[4] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) ; r[5] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) ; r[6] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,56(r_ptr) ; r[7] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a3L,a3R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,64(r_ptr) ; r[8] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a4L,a4R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,72(r_ptr) ; r[9] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C a5L,a5R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a4L,a4R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,80(r_ptr) ; r[10] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a5L,a5R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,88(r_ptr) ; r[11] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C a6L,a6R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a5L,a5R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,96(r_ptr) ; r[12] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a6L,a6R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,104(r_ptr) ; r[13] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a7L,a7R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3, 112(r_ptr) ; r[14] = c3 STD c1, 120(r_ptr) ; r[15] = c1 .EXIT LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; bn_sqr_comba4 .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_sqr_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 32(a_ptr),a4 FLDD 40(a_ptr),a5 FLDD 48(a_ptr),a6 FLDD 56(a_ptr),a7 SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) ; r[0] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) ; r[1] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) ; r[2] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) ; r[3] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) ; r[4] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) ; r[5] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) ; r[6] = c1; STD c2,56(r_ptr) ; r[7] = c2; .EXIT LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;--------------------------------------------------------------------------- MUL_ADD_C .macro A0L,A0R,B0L,B0R,C1,C2,C3 XMPYU A0L,B0R,ftemp1 ; m1 = bl*ht FSTD ftemp1,-16(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,B0L,ftemp2 ; m = bh*lt FSTD ftemp2,-8(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,B0R,ftemp3 ; lt = bl*lt FSTD ftemp3,-32(%sp) XMPYU A0L,B0L,ftemp4 ; ht = bh*ht FSTD ftemp4,-24(%sp) ; LDD -8(%sp),m ; r21 = m LDD -16(%sp),m1 ; r19 = m1 ADD,L m,m1,m ; m+m1 DEPD,Z m,31,32,temp3 ; (m+m1<<32) LDD -24(%sp),ht ; r24 = ht CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht,high_one,ht ; ht+=high_one EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1 ; m >> 32 LDD -32(%sp),lt ; lt ADD,L ht,temp1,ht ; ht+= m>>32 ADD lt,temp3,lt ; lt = lt+m1 ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD C1,lt,C1 ; c1=c1+lt ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise ADD C2,ht,C2 ; c2 = c2 + ht ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; add in carry (c3++) .endm ; ;void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; arg2 = b_ptr ; bn_mul_comba8 .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_mul_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr12,32(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr13,40(%sp) ; save r7 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 32(a_ptr),a4 FLDD 40(a_ptr),a5 FLDD 48(a_ptr),a6 FLDD 56(a_ptr),a7 FLDD 0(b_ptr),b0 FLDD 8(b_ptr),b1 FLDD 16(b_ptr),b2 FLDD 24(b_ptr),b3 FLDD 32(b_ptr),b4 FLDD 40(b_ptr),b5 FLDD 48(b_ptr),b6 FLDD 56(b_ptr),b7 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,56(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,64(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,72(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,80(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,88(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,96(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,104(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,112(r_ptr) STD c1,120(r_ptr) .EXIT FLDD -88(%sp),%fr13 FLDD -96(%sp),%fr12 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; arg2 = b_ptr ; bn_mul_comba4 .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_mul_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr12,32(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr13,40(%sp) ; save r7 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 0(b_ptr),b0 FLDD 8(b_ptr),b1 FLDD 16(b_ptr),b2 FLDD 24(b_ptr),b3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) STD c2,56(r_ptr) .EXIT FLDD -88(%sp),%fr13 FLDD -96(%sp),%fr12 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .SPACE $TEXT$ .SUBSPA $CODE$ .SPACE $PRIVATE$,SORT=16 .IMPORT $global$,DATA .SPACE $TEXT$ .SUBSPA $CODE$ .SUBSPA $LIT$,ACCESS=0x2c C$4 .ALIGN 8 .STRINGZ "Division would overflow (%d)\n" .END openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/bn-586.pl0000644000000000000000000004063213176625656016042 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); $sse2=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2); &bn_mul_add_words("bn_mul_add_words"); &bn_mul_words("bn_mul_words"); &bn_sqr_words("bn_sqr_words"); &bn_div_words("bn_div_words"); &bn_add_words("bn_add_words"); &bn_sub_words("bn_sub_words"); &bn_sub_part_words("bn_sub_part_words"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub bn_mul_add_words { local($name)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,$sse2?"EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD":""); $r="eax"; $a="edx"; $c="ecx"; if ($sse2) { &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt(&DWP(0,"eax"),26); &jnc(&label("maw_non_sse2")); &mov($r,&wparam(0)); &mov($a,&wparam(1)); &mov($c,&wparam(2)); &movd("mm0",&wparam(3)); # mm0 = w &pxor("mm1","mm1"); # mm1 = carry_in &jmp(&label("maw_sse2_entry")); &set_label("maw_sse2_unrolled",16); &movd("mm3",&DWP(0,$r,"",0)); # mm3 = r[0] &paddq("mm1","mm3"); # mm1 = carry_in + r[0] &movd("mm2",&DWP(0,$a,"",0)); # mm2 = a[0] &pmuludq("mm2","mm0"); # mm2 = w*a[0] &movd("mm4",&DWP(4,$a,"",0)); # mm4 = a[1] &pmuludq("mm4","mm0"); # mm4 = w*a[1] &movd("mm6",&DWP(8,$a,"",0)); # mm6 = a[2] &pmuludq("mm6","mm0"); # mm6 = w*a[2] &movd("mm7",&DWP(12,$a,"",0)); # mm7 = a[3] &pmuludq("mm7","mm0"); # mm7 = w*a[3] &paddq("mm1","mm2"); # mm1 = carry_in + r[0] + w*a[0] &movd("mm3",&DWP(4,$r,"",0)); # mm3 = r[1] &paddq("mm3","mm4"); # mm3 = r[1] + w*a[1] &movd("mm5",&DWP(8,$r,"",0)); # mm5 = r[2] &paddq("mm5","mm6"); # mm5 = r[2] + w*a[2] &movd("mm4",&DWP(12,$r,"",0)); # mm4 = r[3] &paddq("mm7","mm4"); # mm7 = r[3] + w*a[3] &movd(&DWP(0,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &movd("mm2",&DWP(16,$a,"",0)); # mm2 = a[4] &pmuludq("mm2","mm0"); # mm2 = w*a[4] &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry0 &movd("mm4",&DWP(20,$a,"",0)); # mm4 = a[5] &pmuludq("mm4","mm0"); # mm4 = w*a[5] &paddq("mm1","mm3"); # mm1 = carry0 + r[1] + w*a[1] &movd("mm6",&DWP(24,$a,"",0)); # mm6 = a[6] &pmuludq("mm6","mm0"); # mm6 = w*a[6] &movd(&DWP(4,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry1 &movd("mm3",&DWP(28,$a,"",0)); # mm3 = a[7] &add($a,32); &pmuludq("mm3","mm0"); # mm3 = w*a[7] &paddq("mm1","mm5"); # mm1 = carry1 + r[2] + w*a[2] &movd("mm5",&DWP(16,$r,"",0)); # mm5 = r[4] &paddq("mm2","mm5"); # mm2 = r[4] + w*a[4] &movd(&DWP(8,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry2 &paddq("mm1","mm7"); # mm1 = carry2 + r[3] + w*a[3] &movd("mm5",&DWP(20,$r,"",0)); # mm5 = r[5] &paddq("mm4","mm5"); # mm4 = r[5] + w*a[5] &movd(&DWP(12,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry3 &paddq("mm1","mm2"); # mm1 = carry3 + r[4] + w*a[4] &movd("mm5",&DWP(24,$r,"",0)); # mm5 = r[6] &paddq("mm6","mm5"); # mm6 = r[6] + w*a[6] &movd(&DWP(16,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry4 &paddq("mm1","mm4"); # mm1 = carry4 + r[5] + w*a[5] &movd("mm5",&DWP(28,$r,"",0)); # mm5 = r[7] &paddq("mm3","mm5"); # mm3 = r[7] + w*a[7] &movd(&DWP(20,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry5 &paddq("mm1","mm6"); # mm1 = carry5 + r[6] + w*a[6] &movd(&DWP(24,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry6 &paddq("mm1","mm3"); # mm1 = carry6 + r[7] + w*a[7] &movd(&DWP(28,$r,"",0),"mm1"); &lea($r,&DWP(32,$r)); &psrlq("mm1",32); # mm1 = carry_out &sub($c,8); &jz(&label("maw_sse2_exit")); &set_label("maw_sse2_entry"); &test($c,0xfffffff8); &jnz(&label("maw_sse2_unrolled")); &set_label("maw_sse2_loop",4); &movd("mm2",&DWP(0,$a)); # mm2 = a[i] &movd("mm3",&DWP(0,$r)); # mm3 = r[i] &pmuludq("mm2","mm0"); # a[i] *= w &lea($a,&DWP(4,$a)); &paddq("mm1","mm3"); # carry += r[i] &paddq("mm1","mm2"); # carry += a[i]*w &movd(&DWP(0,$r),"mm1"); # r[i] = carry_low &sub($c,1); &psrlq("mm1",32); # carry = carry_high &lea($r,&DWP(4,$r)); &jnz(&label("maw_sse2_loop")); &set_label("maw_sse2_exit"); &movd("eax","mm1"); # c = carry_out &emms(); &ret(); &set_label("maw_non_sse2",16); } # function_begin prologue &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &comment(""); $Low="eax"; $High="edx"; $a="ebx"; $w="ebp"; $r="edi"; $c="esi"; &xor($c,$c); # clear carry &mov($r,&wparam(0)); # &mov("ecx",&wparam(2)); # &mov($a,&wparam(1)); # &and("ecx",0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &mov($w,&wparam(3)); # &push("ecx"); # Up the stack for a tmp variable &jz(&label("maw_finish")); &set_label("maw_loop",16); for ($i=0; $i<32; $i+=4) { &comment("Round $i"); &mov("eax",&DWP($i,$a)); # *a &mul($w); # *a * w &add("eax",$c); # L(t)+= c &adc("edx",0); # H(t)+=carry &add("eax",&DWP($i,$r)); # L(t)+= *r &adc("edx",0); # H(t)+=carry &mov(&DWP($i,$r),"eax"); # *r= L(t); &mov($c,"edx"); # c= H(t); } &comment(""); &sub("ecx",8); &lea($a,&DWP(32,$a)); &lea($r,&DWP(32,$r)); &jnz(&label("maw_loop")); &set_label("maw_finish",0); &mov("ecx",&wparam(2)); # get num &and("ecx",7); &jnz(&label("maw_finish2")); # helps branch prediction &jmp(&label("maw_end")); &set_label("maw_finish2",1); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("Tail Round $i"); &mov("eax",&DWP($i*4,$a)); # *a &mul($w); # *a * w &add("eax",$c); # L(t)+=c &adc("edx",0); # H(t)+=carry &add("eax",&DWP($i*4,$r)); # L(t)+= *r &adc("edx",0); # H(t)+=carry &dec("ecx") if ($i != 7-1); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r),"eax"); # *r= L(t); &mov($c,"edx"); # c= H(t); &jz(&label("maw_end")) if ($i != 7-1); } &set_label("maw_end",0); &mov("eax",$c); &pop("ecx"); # clear variable from &function_end($name); } sub bn_mul_words { local($name)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,$sse2?"EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD":""); $r="eax"; $a="edx"; $c="ecx"; if ($sse2) { &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt(&DWP(0,"eax"),26); &jnc(&label("mw_non_sse2")); &mov($r,&wparam(0)); &mov($a,&wparam(1)); &mov($c,&wparam(2)); &movd("mm0",&wparam(3)); # mm0 = w &pxor("mm1","mm1"); # mm1 = carry = 0 &set_label("mw_sse2_loop",16); &movd("mm2",&DWP(0,$a)); # mm2 = a[i] &pmuludq("mm2","mm0"); # a[i] *= w &lea($a,&DWP(4,$a)); &paddq("mm1","mm2"); # carry += a[i]*w &movd(&DWP(0,$r),"mm1"); # r[i] = carry_low &sub($c,1); &psrlq("mm1",32); # carry = carry_high &lea($r,&DWP(4,$r)); &jnz(&label("mw_sse2_loop")); &movd("eax","mm1"); # return carry &emms(); &ret(); &set_label("mw_non_sse2",16); } # function_begin prologue &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &comment(""); $Low="eax"; $High="edx"; $a="ebx"; $w="ecx"; $r="edi"; $c="esi"; $num="ebp"; &xor($c,$c); # clear carry &mov($r,&wparam(0)); # &mov($a,&wparam(1)); # &mov($num,&wparam(2)); # &mov($w,&wparam(3)); # &and($num,0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &jz(&label("mw_finish")); &set_label("mw_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<32; $i+=4) { &comment("Round $i"); &mov("eax",&DWP($i,$a,"",0)); # *a &mul($w); # *a * w &add("eax",$c); # L(t)+=c # XXX &adc("edx",0); # H(t)+=carry &mov(&DWP($i,$r,"",0),"eax"); # *r= L(t); &mov($c,"edx"); # c= H(t); } &comment(""); &add($a,32); &add($r,32); &sub($num,8); &jz(&label("mw_finish")); &jmp(&label("mw_loop")); &set_label("mw_finish",0); &mov($num,&wparam(2)); # get num &and($num,7); &jnz(&label("mw_finish2")); &jmp(&label("mw_end")); &set_label("mw_finish2",1); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("Tail Round $i"); &mov("eax",&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0));# *a &mul($w); # *a * w &add("eax",$c); # L(t)+=c # XXX &adc("edx",0); # H(t)+=carry &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),"eax");# *r= L(t); &mov($c,"edx"); # c= H(t); &dec($num) if ($i != 7-1); &jz(&label("mw_end")) if ($i != 7-1); } &set_label("mw_end",0); &mov("eax",$c); &function_end($name); } sub bn_sqr_words { local($name)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,$sse2?"EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD":""); $r="eax"; $a="edx"; $c="ecx"; if ($sse2) { &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt(&DWP(0,"eax"),26); &jnc(&label("sqr_non_sse2")); &mov($r,&wparam(0)); &mov($a,&wparam(1)); &mov($c,&wparam(2)); &set_label("sqr_sse2_loop",16); &movd("mm0",&DWP(0,$a)); # mm0 = a[i] &pmuludq("mm0","mm0"); # a[i] *= a[i] &lea($a,&DWP(4,$a)); # a++ &movq(&QWP(0,$r),"mm0"); # r[i] = a[i]*a[i] &sub($c,1); &lea($r,&DWP(8,$r)); # r += 2 &jnz(&label("sqr_sse2_loop")); &emms(); &ret(); &set_label("sqr_non_sse2",16); } # function_begin prologue &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &comment(""); $r="esi"; $a="edi"; $num="ebx"; &mov($r,&wparam(0)); # &mov($a,&wparam(1)); # &mov($num,&wparam(2)); # &and($num,0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &jz(&label("sw_finish")); &set_label("sw_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<32; $i+=4) { &comment("Round $i"); &mov("eax",&DWP($i,$a,"",0)); # *a # XXX &mul("eax"); # *a * *a &mov(&DWP($i*2,$r,"",0),"eax"); # &mov(&DWP($i*2+4,$r,"",0),"edx");# } &comment(""); &add($a,32); &add($r,64); &sub($num,8); &jnz(&label("sw_loop")); &set_label("sw_finish",0); &mov($num,&wparam(2)); # get num &and($num,7); &jz(&label("sw_end")); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("Tail Round $i"); &mov("eax",&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a # XXX &mul("eax"); # *a * *a &mov(&DWP($i*8,$r,"",0),"eax"); # &dec($num) if ($i != 7-1); &mov(&DWP($i*8+4,$r,"",0),"edx"); &jz(&label("sw_end")) if ($i != 7-1); } &set_label("sw_end",0); &function_end($name); } sub bn_div_words { local($name)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,""); &mov("edx",&wparam(0)); # &mov("eax",&wparam(1)); # &mov("ecx",&wparam(2)); # &div("ecx"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } sub bn_add_words { local($name)=@_; &function_begin($name,""); &comment(""); $a="esi"; $b="edi"; $c="eax"; $r="ebx"; $tmp1="ecx"; $tmp2="edx"; $num="ebp"; &mov($r,&wparam(0)); # get r &mov($a,&wparam(1)); # get a &mov($b,&wparam(2)); # get b &mov($num,&wparam(3)); # get num &xor($c,$c); # clear carry &and($num,0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &jz(&label("aw_finish")); &set_label("aw_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++) { &comment("Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); # *b &add($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &add($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r } &comment(""); &add($a,32); &add($b,32); &add($r,32); &sub($num,8); &jnz(&label("aw_loop")); &set_label("aw_finish",0); &mov($num,&wparam(3)); # get num &and($num,7); &jz(&label("aw_end")); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("Tail Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0));# *b &add($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &add($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &dec($num) if ($i != 6); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &jz(&label("aw_end")) if ($i != 6); } &set_label("aw_end",0); # &mov("eax",$c); # $c is "eax" &function_end($name); } sub bn_sub_words { local($name)=@_; &function_begin($name,""); &comment(""); $a="esi"; $b="edi"; $c="eax"; $r="ebx"; $tmp1="ecx"; $tmp2="edx"; $num="ebp"; &mov($r,&wparam(0)); # get r &mov($a,&wparam(1)); # get a &mov($b,&wparam(2)); # get b &mov($num,&wparam(3)); # get num &xor($c,$c); # clear carry &and($num,0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &jz(&label("aw_finish")); &set_label("aw_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++) { &comment("Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); # *b &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &sub($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r } &comment(""); &add($a,32); &add($b,32); &add($r,32); &sub($num,8); &jnz(&label("aw_loop")); &set_label("aw_finish",0); &mov($num,&wparam(3)); # get num &and($num,7); &jz(&label("aw_end")); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("Tail Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0));# *b &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &sub($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &dec($num) if ($i != 6); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &jz(&label("aw_end")) if ($i != 6); } &set_label("aw_end",0); # &mov("eax",$c); # $c is "eax" &function_end($name); } sub bn_sub_part_words { local($name)=@_; &function_begin($name,""); &comment(""); $a="esi"; $b="edi"; $c="eax"; $r="ebx"; $tmp1="ecx"; $tmp2="edx"; $num="ebp"; &mov($r,&wparam(0)); # get r &mov($a,&wparam(1)); # get a &mov($b,&wparam(2)); # get b &mov($num,&wparam(3)); # get num &xor($c,$c); # clear carry &and($num,0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &jz(&label("aw_finish")); &set_label("aw_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++) { &comment("Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); # *b &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &sub($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r } &comment(""); &add($a,32); &add($b,32); &add($r,32); &sub($num,8); &jnz(&label("aw_loop")); &set_label("aw_finish",0); &mov($num,&wparam(3)); # get num &and($num,7); &jz(&label("aw_end")); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("Tail Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP(0,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov($tmp2,&DWP(0,$b,"",0));# *b &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &sub($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &mov(&DWP(0,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &add($a, 4); &add($b, 4); &add($r, 4); &dec($num) if ($i != 6); &jz(&label("aw_end")) if ($i != 6); } &set_label("aw_end",0); &cmp(&wparam(4),0); &je(&label("pw_end")); &mov($num,&wparam(4)); # get dl &cmp($num,0); &je(&label("pw_end")); &jge(&label("pw_pos")); &comment("pw_neg"); &mov($tmp2,0); &sub($tmp2,$num); &mov($num,$tmp2); &and($num,0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &jz(&label("pw_neg_finish")); &set_label("pw_neg_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++) { &comment("dl<0 Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,0); &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0)); # *b &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &sub($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r } &comment(""); &add($b,32); &add($r,32); &sub($num,8); &jnz(&label("pw_neg_loop")); &set_label("pw_neg_finish",0); &mov($tmp2,&wparam(4)); # get dl &mov($num,0); &sub($num,$tmp2); &and($num,7); &jz(&label("pw_end")); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("dl<0 Tail Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,0); &mov($tmp2,&DWP($i*4,$b,"",0));# *b &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov($c,0); &adc($c,$c); &sub($tmp1,$tmp2); &adc($c,0); &dec($num) if ($i != 6); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &jz(&label("pw_end")) if ($i != 6); } &jmp(&label("pw_end")); &set_label("pw_pos",0); &and($num,0xfffffff8); # num / 8 &jz(&label("pw_pos_finish")); &set_label("pw_pos_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++) { &comment("dl>0 Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &jnc(&label("pw_nc".$i)); } &comment(""); &add($a,32); &add($r,32); &sub($num,8); &jnz(&label("pw_pos_loop")); &set_label("pw_pos_finish",0); &mov($num,&wparam(4)); # get dl &and($num,7); &jz(&label("pw_end")); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &comment("dl>0 Tail Round $i"); &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &sub($tmp1,$c); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &jnc(&label("pw_tail_nc".$i)); &dec($num) if ($i != 6); &jz(&label("pw_end")) if ($i != 6); } &mov($c,1); &jmp(&label("pw_end")); &set_label("pw_nc_loop",0); for ($i=0; $i<8; $i++) { &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &set_label("pw_nc".$i,0); } &comment(""); &add($a,32); &add($r,32); &sub($num,8); &jnz(&label("pw_nc_loop")); &mov($num,&wparam(4)); # get dl &and($num,7); &jz(&label("pw_nc_end")); for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) { &mov($tmp1,&DWP($i*4,$a,"",0)); # *a &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$tmp1); # *r &set_label("pw_tail_nc".$i,0); &dec($num) if ($i != 6); &jz(&label("pw_nc_end")) if ($i != 6); } &set_label("pw_nc_end",0); &mov($c,0); &set_label("pw_end",0); # &mov("eax",$c); # $c is "eax" &function_end($name); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl0000755000000000000000000007612413176625656017044 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # October 2005. # # Montgomery multiplication routine for x86_64. While it gives modest # 9% improvement of rsa4096 sign on Opteron, rsa512 sign runs more # than twice, >2x, as fast. Most common rsa1024 sign is improved by # respectful 50%. It remains to be seen if loop unrolling and # dedicated squaring routine can provide further improvement... # July 2011. # # Add dedicated squaring procedure. Performance improvement varies # from platform to platform, but in average it's ~5%/15%/25%/33% # for 512-/1024-/2048-/4096-bit RSA *sign* benchmarks respectively. # August 2011. # # Unroll and modulo-schedule inner loops in such manner that they # are "fallen through" for input lengths of 8, which is critical for # 1024-bit RSA *sign*. Average performance improvement in comparison # to *initial* version of this module from 2005 is ~0%/30%/40%/45% # for 512-/1024-/2048-/4096-bit RSA *sign* benchmarks respectively. # June 2013. # # Optimize reduction in squaring procedure and improve 1024+-bit RSA # sign performance by 10-16% on Intel Sandy Bridge and later # (virtually same on non-Intel processors). # August 2013. # # Add MULX/ADOX/ADCX code path. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $addx = ($1>=12); } if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%r9"; # int num); $lo0="%r10"; $hi0="%r11"; $hi1="%r13"; $i="%r14"; $j="%r15"; $m0="%rbx"; $m1="%rbp"; $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl bn_mul_mont .type bn_mul_mont,\@function,6 .align 16 bn_mul_mont: mov ${num}d,${num}d mov %rsp,%rax test \$3,${num}d jnz .Lmul_enter cmp \$8,${num}d jb .Lmul_enter ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d ___ $code.=<<___; cmp $ap,$bp jne .Lmul4x_enter test \$7,${num}d jz .Lsqr8x_enter jmp .Lmul4x_enter .align 16 .Lmul_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 neg $num mov %rsp,%r11 lea -16(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+2)) neg $num # restore $num and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage # An OS-agnostic version of __chkstk. # # Some OSes (Windows) insist on stack being "wired" to # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... sub %r10,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk jmp .Lmul_page_walk_done .align 16 .Lmul_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk .Lmul_page_walk_done: mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp .Lmul_body: mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp ___ $bp="%r12"; $code.=<<___; mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($bp),$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov ($ap),%rax xor $i,$i # i=0 xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$lo0 mov ($np),%rax imulq $lo0,$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .L1st_enter .align 16 .L1st: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] mov $lo0,$hi0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .L1st_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx lea 1($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$lo0 mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .L1st add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 mov $lo0,$hi0 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ jmp .Louter .align 16 .Louter: mov ($bp,$i,8),$m0 # m0=bp[i] xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mov (%rsp),$lo0 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$lo0 # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $lo0,$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov 8(%rsp),$lo0 # tp[1] mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .Linner_enter .align 16 .Linner: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$j,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .Linner_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$lo0 # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov %rdx,$hi0 adc \$0,$hi0 lea 1($j),$j # j++ mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .Linner add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$j,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ cmp $num,$i jb .Louter xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF! mov (%rsp),%rax # tp[0] lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp mov $num,$j # j=num jmp .Lsub .align 16 .Lsub: sbb ($np,$i,8),%rax mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov 8($ap,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1] lea 1($i),$i # i++ dec $j # doesnn't affect CF! jnz .Lsub sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit xor $i,$i and %rax,$ap not %rax mov $rp,$np and %rax,$np mov $num,$j # j=num or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp .align 16 .Lcopy: # copy or in-place refresh mov ($ap,$i,8),%rax mov $i,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i] lea 1($i),$i sub \$1,$j jnz .Lcopy mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont ___ {{{ my @A=("%r10","%r11"); my @N=("%r13","%rdi"); $code.=<<___; .type bn_mul4x_mont,\@function,6 .align 16 bn_mul4x_mont: mov ${num}d,${num}d mov %rsp,%rax .Lmul4x_enter: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); and \$0x80100,%r11d cmp \$0x80100,%r11d je .Lmulx4x_enter ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 neg $num mov %rsp,%r11 lea -32(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+4)) neg $num # restore and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage sub %r10,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk jmp .Lmul4x_page_walk_done .Lmul4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk .Lmul4x_page_walk_done: mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp .Lmul4x_body: mov $rp,16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+2]=$rp mov %rdx,%r12 # reassign $bp ___ $bp="%r12"; $code.=<<___; mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($bp),$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov ($ap),%rax xor $i,$i # i=0 xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$A[0] mov ($np),%rax imulq $A[0],$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] lea 4($j),$j # j++ adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],(%rsp) mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .L1st4x .align 16 .L1st4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx lea 4($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov -16($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] cmp $num,$j jb .L1st4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) mov $N[1],(%rsp,$j,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ .align 4 .Louter4x: mov ($bp,$i,8),$m0 # m0=bp[i] xor $j,$j # j=0 mov (%rsp),$A[0] mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $A[0],$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # "$N[0]", discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8(%rsp),$A[1] # +tp[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 4($j),$j # j+=2 adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],(%rsp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .Linner4x .align 16 .Linner4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -16(%rsp,$j,8),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add (%rsp,$j,8),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx lea 4($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov -16($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] cmp $num,$j jb .Linner4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -16($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -16(%rsp,$j,8),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8(%rsp,$j,8),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx lea 1($i),$i # i++ mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] add (%rsp,$num,8),$N[0] # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,$N[1] mov $N[0],-8(%rsp,$j,8) mov $N[1],(%rsp,$j,8) # store upmost overflow bit cmp $num,$i jb .Louter4x ___ { my @ri=("%rax","%rdx",$m0,$m1); $code.=<<___; mov 16(%rsp,$num,8),$rp # restore $rp mov 0(%rsp),@ri[0] # tp[0] pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 mov 8(%rsp),@ri[1] # tp[1] shr \$2,$num # num/=4 lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF! sub 0($np),@ri[0] mov 16($ap),@ri[2] # tp[2] mov 24($ap),@ri[3] # tp[3] sbb 8($np),@ri[1] lea -1($num),$j # j=num/4-1 jmp .Lsub4x .align 16 .Lsub4x: mov @ri[0],0($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov @ri[1],8($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb 16($np,$i,8),@ri[2] mov 32($ap,$i,8),@ri[0] # tp[i+1] mov 40($ap,$i,8),@ri[1] sbb 24($np,$i,8),@ri[3] mov @ri[2],16($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov @ri[3],24($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb 32($np,$i,8),@ri[0] mov 48($ap,$i,8),@ri[2] mov 56($ap,$i,8),@ri[3] sbb 40($np,$i,8),@ri[1] lea 4($i),$i # i++ dec $j # doesnn't affect CF! jnz .Lsub4x mov @ri[0],0($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov 32($ap,$i,8),@ri[0] # load overflow bit sbb 16($np,$i,8),@ri[2] mov @ri[1],8($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb 24($np,$i,8),@ri[3] mov @ri[2],16($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] sbb \$0,@ri[0] # handle upmost overflow bit mov @ri[3],24($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] xor $i,$i # i=0 and @ri[0],$ap not @ri[0] mov $rp,$np and @ri[0],$np lea -1($num),$j or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp movdqu ($ap),%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,(%rsp) movdqu %xmm1,($rp) jmp .Lcopy4x .align 16 .Lcopy4x: # copy or in-place refresh movdqu 16($ap,$i),%xmm2 movdqu 32($ap,$i),%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,$i) movdqu %xmm2,16($rp,$i) movdqa %xmm0,32(%rsp,$i) movdqu %xmm1,32($rp,$i) lea 32($i),$i dec $j jnz .Lcopy4x shl \$2,$num movdqu 16($ap,$i),%xmm2 movdqa %xmm0,16(%rsp,$i) movdqu %xmm2,16($rp,$i) ___ } $code.=<<___; mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul4x_mont,.-bn_mul4x_mont ___ }}} {{{ ###################################################################### # void bn_sqr8x_mont( my $rptr="%rdi"; # const BN_ULONG *rptr, my $aptr="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *aptr, my $bptr="%rdx"; # not used my $nptr="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *nptr, my $n0 ="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0); my $num ="%r9"; # int num, has to be divisible by 8 my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr); my @A0=("%r10","%r11"); my @A1=("%r12","%r13"); my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx"); $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .extern bn_sqrx8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module ___ $code.=<<___; .extern bn_sqr8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module .type bn_sqr8x_mont,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_sqr8x_mont: mov %rsp,%rax .Lsqr8x_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lsqr8x_prologue: mov ${num}d,%r10d shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes shl \$3+2,%r10 # 4*$num neg $num ############################################################## # ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr modulo # 4096. this is done to allow memory disambiguation logic # do its job. # lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 sub $aptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lsqr8x_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num) jmp .Lsqr8x_sp_done .align 32 .Lsqr8x_sp_alt: lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num lea -64(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lsqr8x_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lsqr8x_page_walk jmp .Lsqr8x_page_walk_done .align 16 .Lsqr8x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lsqr8x_page_walk .Lsqr8x_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lsqr8x_body: movq $nptr, %xmm2 # save pointer to modulus pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax and \$0x80100,%eax cmp \$0x80100,%eax jne .Lsqr8x_nox call bn_sqrx8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module # %rax top-most carry # %rbp nptr # %rcx -8*num # %r8 end of tp[2*num] lea (%r8,%rcx),%rbx mov %rcx,$num mov %rcx,%rdx movq %xmm1,$rptr sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0 jmp .Lsqr8x_sub .align 32 .Lsqr8x_nox: ___ $code.=<<___; call bn_sqr8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module # %rax top-most carry # %rbp nptr # %r8 -8*num # %rdi end of tp[2*num] lea (%rdi,$num),%rbx mov $num,%rcx mov $num,%rdx movq %xmm1,$rptr sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0 jmp .Lsqr8x_sub .align 32 .Lsqr8x_sub: mov 8*0(%rbx),%r12 mov 8*1(%rbx),%r13 mov 8*2(%rbx),%r14 mov 8*3(%rbx),%r15 lea 8*4(%rbx),%rbx sbb 8*0(%rbp),%r12 sbb 8*1(%rbp),%r13 sbb 8*2(%rbp),%r14 sbb 8*3(%rbp),%r15 lea 8*4(%rbp),%rbp mov %r12,8*0($rptr) mov %r13,8*1($rptr) mov %r14,8*2($rptr) mov %r15,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr inc %rcx # preserves %cf jnz .Lsqr8x_sub sbb \$0,%rax # top-most carry lea (%rbx,$num),%rbx # rewind lea ($rptr,$num),$rptr # rewind movq %rax,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1 mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lsqr8x_cond_copy .align 32 .Lsqr8x_cond_copy: movdqa 16*0(%rbx),%xmm2 movdqa 16*1(%rbx),%xmm3 lea 16*2(%rbx),%rbx movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4 movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5 lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx) # zero tp movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx) movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx,%rdx) movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx,%rdx) pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0 pand %xmm1,%xmm2 pand %xmm1,%xmm3 pand %xmm0,%xmm4 pand %xmm0,%xmm5 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr) movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr) add \$32,$num jnz .Lsqr8x_cond_copy mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lsqr8x_epilogue: ret .size bn_sqr8x_mont,.-bn_sqr8x_mont ___ }}} if ($addx) {{{ my $bp="%rdx"; # original value $code.=<<___; .type bn_mulx4x_mont,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_mulx4x_mont: mov %rsp,%rax .Lmulx4x_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lmulx4x_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes xor %r10,%r10 sub $num,%r10 # -$num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 lea -72(%rsp,%r10),%rbp # future alloca(frame+$num+8) and \$-128,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk jmp .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done .align 16 .Lmulx4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done: lea ($bp,$num),%r10 ############################################################## # Stack layout # +0 num # +8 off-loaded &b[i] # +16 end of b[num] # +24 saved n0 # +32 saved rp # +40 saved %rsp # +48 inner counter # +56 # +64 tmp[num+1] # mov $num,0(%rsp) # save $num shr \$5,$num mov %r10,16(%rsp) # end of b[num] sub \$1,$num mov $n0, 24(%rsp) # save *n0 mov $rp, 32(%rsp) # save $rp mov %rax,40(%rsp) # save original %rsp mov $num,48(%rsp) # inner counter jmp .Lmulx4x_body .align 32 .Lmulx4x_body: ___ my ($aptr, $bptr, $nptr, $tptr, $mi, $bi, $zero, $num)= ("%rsi","%rdi","%rcx","%rbx","%r8","%r9","%rbp","%rax"); my $rptr=$bptr; $code.=<<___; lea 8($bp),$bptr mov ($bp),%rdx # b[0], $bp==%rdx actually lea 64+32(%rsp),$tptr mov %rdx,$bi mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%rax # a[0]*b[0] mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[1]*b[0] add %rax,%r11 mov $bptr,8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%r13 # ... adc %r14,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 mov $mi,$bptr # borrow $bptr imulq 24(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,$bptr # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa1,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 mov 48(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r10,-4*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r12,-2*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_1st .align 32 .Lmulx4x_1st: adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[0] adcx %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[0] adcx %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 .byte 0x67,0x67 mov $mi,%rdx adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) adox %r15,%r13 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_1st mov 0(%rsp),$num # load num mov 8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled add %r15,%r14 sbb %r15,%r15 # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_outer .align 32 .Lmulx4x_outer: mov ($bptr),%rdx # b[i] lea 8($bptr),$bptr # b++ sub $num,$aptr # rewind $aptr mov %r15,($tptr) # save top-most carry lea 64+4*8(%rsp),$tptr sub $num,$nptr # rewind $nptr mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%r11 # a[0]*b[i] xor %ebp,%ebp # xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov %rdx,$bi mulx 1*8($aptr),%r14,%r12 # a[1]*b[i] adox -4*8($tptr),$mi adcx %r14,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r15,%r13 # ... adox -3*8($tptr),%r11 adcx %r15,%r12 adox -2*8($tptr),%r12 adcx $zero,%r13 adox $zero,%r13 mov $bptr,8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] mov $mi,%r15 imulq 24(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 xor %ebp,%ebp # xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx adcx %rax,%r13 adox -1*8($tptr),%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adox $zero,%r14 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 mov %r10,-4*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-3*8($tptr) lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 mov 48(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r12,-2*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_inner .align 32 .Lmulx4x_inner: mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[i] adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled adox %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[i] adcx 0*8($tptr),%r10 adox %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx 1*8($tptr),%r11 adox %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx adcx 2*8($tptr),%r12 adox %rax,%r13 adcx 3*8($tptr),%r13 adox $zero,%r14 # of=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r15,%r13 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_inner mov 0(%rsp),$num # load num mov 8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled sub 0*8($tptr),$zero # pull top-most carry adc %r15,%r14 sbb %r15,%r15 # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) cmp 16(%rsp),$bptr jne .Lmulx4x_outer lea 64(%rsp),$tptr sub $num,$nptr # rewind $nptr neg %r15 mov $num,%rdx shr \$3+2,$num # %cf=0 mov 32(%rsp),$rptr # restore rp jmp .Lmulx4x_sub .align 32 .Lmulx4x_sub: mov 8*0($tptr),%r11 mov 8*1($tptr),%r12 mov 8*2($tptr),%r13 mov 8*3($tptr),%r14 lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr sbb 8*0($nptr),%r11 sbb 8*1($nptr),%r12 sbb 8*2($nptr),%r13 sbb 8*3($nptr),%r14 lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr mov %r11,8*0($rptr) mov %r12,8*1($rptr) mov %r13,8*2($rptr) mov %r14,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr dec $num # preserves %cf jnz .Lmulx4x_sub sbb \$0,%r15 # top-most carry lea 64(%rsp),$tptr sub %rdx,$rptr # rewind movq %r15,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1 mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lmulx4x_cond_copy .align 32 .Lmulx4x_cond_copy: movdqa 16*0($tptr),%xmm2 movdqa 16*1($tptr),%xmm3 lea 16*2($tptr),$tptr movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4 movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5 lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr movdqa %xmm0,-16*2($tptr) # zero tp movdqa %xmm0,-16*1($tptr) pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0 pand %xmm1,%xmm2 pand %xmm1,%xmm3 pand %xmm0,%xmm4 pand %xmm0,%xmm5 pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr) movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr) sub \$32,%rdx jnz .Lmulx4x_cond_copy mov %rdx,($tptr) mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmulx4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mulx4x_mont,.-bn_mulx4x_mont ___ }}} $code.=<<___; .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 16 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type mul_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 mul_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer jmp .Lcommon_pop_regs .size mul_handler,.-mul_handler .type sqr_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 sqr_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lsqr_body jb .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # body label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue jb .Lcommon_pop_regs mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 8(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[2] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lsqr_epilogue jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 40(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer .Lcommon_pop_regs: mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size sqr_handler,.-sqr_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul4x_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul4x_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_sqr8x_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_sqr8x_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_sqr8x_mont ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mulx4x_mont .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mulx4x_mont .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_bn_sqr8x_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva sqr_handler .rva .Lsqr8x_prologue,.Lsqr8x_body,.Lsqr8x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva sqr_handler .rva .Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 ___ } print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000004635213176625656017134 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # January 2007. # Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4. # # Performance improvement naturally varies among CPU implementations # and compilers. The code was observed to provide +65-35% improvement # [depending on key length, less for longer keys] on ARM920T, and # +115-80% on Intel IXP425. This is compared to pre-bn_mul_mont code # base and compiler generated code with in-lined umull and even umlal # instructions. The latter means that this code didn't really have an # "advantage" of utilizing some "secret" instruction. # # The code is interoperable with Thumb ISA and is rather compact, less # than 1/2KB. Windows CE port would be trivial, as it's exclusively # about decorations, ABI and instruction syntax are identical. # November 2013 # # Add NEON code path, which handles lengths divisible by 8. RSA/DSA # performance improvement on Cortex-A8 is ~45-100% depending on key # length, more for longer keys. On Cortex-A15 the span is ~10-105%. # On Snapdragon S4 improvement was measured to vary from ~70% to # incredible ~380%, yes, 4.8x faster, for RSA4096 sign. But this is # rather because original integer-only code seems to perform # suboptimally on S4. Situation on Cortex-A9 is unfortunately # different. It's being looked into, but the trouble is that # performance for vectors longer than 256 bits is actually couple # of percent worse than for integer-only code. The code is chosen # for execution on all NEON-capable processors, because gain on # others outweighs the marginal loss on Cortex-A9. # September 2015 # # Align Cortex-A9 performance with November 2013 improvements, i.e. # NEON code is now ~20-105% faster than integer-only one on this # processor. But this optimization further improved performance even # on other processors: NEON code path is ~45-180% faster than original # integer-only on Cortex-A8, ~10-210% on Cortex-A15, ~70-450% on # Snapdragon S4. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $num="r0"; # starts as num argument, but holds &tp[num-1] $ap="r1"; $bp="r2"; $bi="r2"; $rp="r2"; $np="r3"; $tp="r4"; $aj="r5"; $nj="r6"; $tj="r7"; $n0="r8"; ########### # r9 is reserved by ELF as platform specific, e.g. TLS pointer $alo="r10"; # sl, gcc uses it to keep @GOT $ahi="r11"; # fp $nlo="r12"; # ip ########### # r13 is stack pointer $nhi="r14"; # lr ########### # r15 is program counter #### argument block layout relative to &tp[num-1], a.k.a. $num $_rp="$num,#12*4"; # ap permanently resides in r1 $_bp="$num,#13*4"; # np permanently resides in r3 $_n0="$num,#14*4"; $_num="$num,#15*4"; $_bpend=$_num; $code=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #endif #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .align 5 .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lbn_mul_mont #endif .global bn_mul_mont .type bn_mul_mont,%function .align 5 bn_mul_mont: .Lbn_mul_mont: ldr ip,[sp,#4] @ load num stmdb sp!,{r0,r2} @ sp points at argument block #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 tst ip,#7 bne .Lialu adr r0,.Lbn_mul_mont ldr r2,.LOPENSSL_armcap ldr r0,[r0,r2] #ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r0,[r0] #endif tst r0,#ARMV7_NEON @ NEON available? ldmia sp, {r0,r2} beq .Lialu add sp,sp,#8 b bn_mul8x_mont_neon .align 4 .Lialu: #endif cmp ip,#2 mov $num,ip @ load num #ifdef __thumb2__ ittt lt #endif movlt r0,#0 addlt sp,sp,#2*4 blt .Labrt stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} @ save 10 registers mov $num,$num,lsl#2 @ rescale $num for byte count sub sp,sp,$num @ alloca(4*num) sub sp,sp,#4 @ +extra dword sub $num,$num,#4 @ "num=num-1" add $tp,$bp,$num @ &bp[num-1] add $num,sp,$num @ $num to point at &tp[num-1] ldr $n0,[$_n0] @ &n0 ldr $bi,[$bp] @ bp[0] ldr $aj,[$ap],#4 @ ap[0],ap++ ldr $nj,[$np],#4 @ np[0],np++ ldr $n0,[$n0] @ *n0 str $tp,[$_bpend] @ save &bp[num] umull $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[0]*bp[0] str $n0,[$_n0] @ save n0 value mul $n0,$alo,$n0 @ "tp[0]"*n0 mov $nlo,#0 umlal $alo,$nlo,$nj,$n0 @ np[0]*n0+"t[0]" mov $tp,sp .L1st: ldr $aj,[$ap],#4 @ ap[j],ap++ mov $alo,$ahi ldr $nj,[$np],#4 @ np[j],np++ mov $ahi,#0 umlal $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[j]*bp[0] mov $nhi,#0 umlal $nlo,$nhi,$nj,$n0 @ np[j]*n0 adds $nlo,$nlo,$alo str $nlo,[$tp],#4 @ tp[j-1]=,tp++ adc $nlo,$nhi,#0 cmp $tp,$num bne .L1st adds $nlo,$nlo,$ahi ldr $tp,[$_bp] @ restore bp mov $nhi,#0 ldr $n0,[$_n0] @ restore n0 adc $nhi,$nhi,#0 str $nlo,[$num] @ tp[num-1]= mov $tj,sp str $nhi,[$num,#4] @ tp[num]= .Louter: sub $tj,$num,$tj @ "original" $num-1 value sub $ap,$ap,$tj @ "rewind" ap to &ap[1] ldr $bi,[$tp,#4]! @ *(++bp) sub $np,$np,$tj @ "rewind" np to &np[1] ldr $aj,[$ap,#-4] @ ap[0] ldr $alo,[sp] @ tp[0] ldr $nj,[$np,#-4] @ np[0] ldr $tj,[sp,#4] @ tp[1] mov $ahi,#0 umlal $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] str $tp,[$_bp] @ save bp mul $n0,$alo,$n0 mov $nlo,#0 umlal $alo,$nlo,$nj,$n0 @ np[0]*n0+"tp[0]" mov $tp,sp .Linner: ldr $aj,[$ap],#4 @ ap[j],ap++ adds $alo,$ahi,$tj @ +=tp[j] ldr $nj,[$np],#4 @ np[j],np++ mov $ahi,#0 umlal $alo,$ahi,$aj,$bi @ ap[j]*bp[i] mov $nhi,#0 umlal $nlo,$nhi,$nj,$n0 @ np[j]*n0 adc $ahi,$ahi,#0 ldr $tj,[$tp,#8] @ tp[j+1] adds $nlo,$nlo,$alo str $nlo,[$tp],#4 @ tp[j-1]=,tp++ adc $nlo,$nhi,#0 cmp $tp,$num bne .Linner adds $nlo,$nlo,$ahi mov $nhi,#0 ldr $tp,[$_bp] @ restore bp adc $nhi,$nhi,#0 ldr $n0,[$_n0] @ restore n0 adds $nlo,$nlo,$tj ldr $tj,[$_bpend] @ restore &bp[num] adc $nhi,$nhi,#0 str $nlo,[$num] @ tp[num-1]= str $nhi,[$num,#4] @ tp[num]= cmp $tp,$tj #ifdef __thumb2__ itt ne #endif movne $tj,sp bne .Louter ldr $rp,[$_rp] @ pull rp mov $aj,sp add $num,$num,#4 @ $num to point at &tp[num] sub $aj,$num,$aj @ "original" num value mov $tp,sp @ "rewind" $tp mov $ap,$tp @ "borrow" $ap sub $np,$np,$aj @ "rewind" $np to &np[0] subs $tj,$tj,$tj @ "clear" carry flag .Lsub: ldr $tj,[$tp],#4 ldr $nj,[$np],#4 sbcs $tj,$tj,$nj @ tp[j]-np[j] str $tj,[$rp],#4 @ rp[j]= teq $tp,$num @ preserve carry bne .Lsub sbcs $nhi,$nhi,#0 @ upmost carry mov $tp,sp @ "rewind" $tp sub $rp,$rp,$aj @ "rewind" $rp and $ap,$tp,$nhi bic $np,$rp,$nhi orr $ap,$ap,$np @ ap=borrow?tp:rp .Lcopy: ldr $tj,[$ap],#4 @ copy or in-place refresh str sp,[$tp],#4 @ zap tp str $tj,[$rp],#4 cmp $tp,$num bne .Lcopy mov sp,$num add sp,sp,#4 @ skip over tp[num+1] ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} @ restore registers add sp,sp,#2*4 @ skip over {r0,r2} mov r0,#1 .Labrt: #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ret @ bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont ___ { my ($A0,$A1,$A2,$A3)=map("d$_",(0..3)); my ($N0,$N1,$N2,$N3)=map("d$_",(4..7)); my ($Z,$Temp)=("q4","q5"); my @ACC=map("q$_",(6..13)); my ($Bi,$Ni,$M0)=map("d$_",(28..31)); my $zero="$Z#lo"; my $temp="$Temp#lo"; my ($rptr,$aptr,$bptr,$nptr,$n0,$num)=map("r$_",(0..5)); my ($tinptr,$toutptr,$inner,$outer,$bnptr)=map("r$_",(6..11)); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .type bn_mul8x_mont_neon,%function .align 5 bn_mul8x_mont_neon: mov ip,sp stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so ldmia ip,{r4-r5} @ load rest of parameter block mov ip,sp cmp $num,#8 bhi .LNEON_8n @ special case for $num==8, everything is in register bank... vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]! veor $zero,$zero,$zero sub $toutptr,sp,$num,lsl#4 vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]! @ can't specify :32 :-( and $toutptr,$toutptr,#-64 vld1.32 {${M0}[0]}, [$n0,:32] mov sp,$toutptr @ alloca vzip.16 $Bi,$zero vmull.u32 @ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vmull.u32 @ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] vmull.u32 @ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] vshl.i64 $Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16 vmull.u32 @ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] vadd.u64 $Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo veor $zero,$zero,$zero vmul.u32 $Ni,$Ni,$M0 vmull.u32 @ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vld1.32 {$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]! vmull.u32 @ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vmull.u32 @ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vzip.16 $Ni,$zero vmull.u32 @ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0] sub $outer,$num,#1 vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0] vmov $Temp,@ACC[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1] vmov @ACC[0],@ACC[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0] vmov @ACC[1],@ACC[2] vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1] vmov @ACC[2],@ACC[3] vmov @ACC[3],@ACC[4] vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 vmov @ACC[4],@ACC[5] vmov @ACC[5],@ACC[6] vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,$Temp#hi vmov @ACC[6],@ACC[7] veor @ACC[7],@ACC[7] vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 b .LNEON_outer8 .align 4 .LNEON_outer8: vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]! veor $zero,$zero,$zero vzip.16 $Bi,$zero vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,$temp vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] vshl.i64 $Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16 vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] vadd.u64 $Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo veor $zero,$zero,$zero subs $outer,$outer,#1 vmul.u32 $Ni,$Ni,$M0 vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vzip.16 $Ni,$zero vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0] vmov $Temp,@ACC[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1] vmov @ACC[0],@ACC[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0] vmov @ACC[1],@ACC[2] vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1] vmov @ACC[2],@ACC[3] vmov @ACC[3],@ACC[4] vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 vmov @ACC[4],@ACC[5] vmov @ACC[5],@ACC[6] vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,$Temp#hi vmov @ACC[6],@ACC[7] veor @ACC[7],@ACC[7] vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16 bne .LNEON_outer8 vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,$temp mov $toutptr,sp vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[0]#lo,#16 mov $inner,$num vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#hi,@ACC[0]#hi,$temp add $tinptr,sp,#96 vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[0]#hi,#16 vzip.16 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi b .LNEON_tail_entry .align 4 .LNEON_8n: veor @ACC[0],@ACC[0],@ACC[0] sub $toutptr,sp,#128 veor @ACC[1],@ACC[1],@ACC[1] sub $toutptr,$toutptr,$num,lsl#4 veor @ACC[2],@ACC[2],@ACC[2] and $toutptr,$toutptr,#-64 veor @ACC[3],@ACC[3],@ACC[3] mov sp,$toutptr @ alloca veor @ACC[4],@ACC[4],@ACC[4] add $toutptr,$toutptr,#256 veor @ACC[5],@ACC[5],@ACC[5] sub $inner,$num,#8 veor @ACC[6],@ACC[6],@ACC[6] veor @ACC[7],@ACC[7],@ACC[7] .LNEON_8n_init: vst1.64 {@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]},[$toutptr,:256]! subs $inner,$inner,#8 vst1.64 {@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]},[$toutptr,:256]! vst1.64 {@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]},[$toutptr,:256]! vst1.64 {@ACC[6]-@ACC[7]},[$toutptr,:256]! bne .LNEON_8n_init add $tinptr,sp,#256 vld1.32 {$A0-$A3},[$aptr]! add $bnptr,sp,#8 vld1.32 {${M0}[0]},[$n0,:32] mov $outer,$num b .LNEON_8n_outer .align 4 .LNEON_8n_outer: vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]! @ *b++ veor $zero,$zero,$zero vzip.16 $Bi,$zero add $toutptr,sp,#128 vld1.32 {$N0-$N3},[$nptr]! vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] veor $zero,$zero,$zero vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] vshl.i64 $Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16 vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] vadd.u64 $Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vmul.u32 $Ni,$Ni,$M0 vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vst1.32 {$Bi},[sp,:64] @ put aside smashed b[8*i+0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vzip.16 $Ni,$zero vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] ___ for ($i=0; $i<7;) { $code.=<<___; vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]! @ *b++ vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0] veor $temp,$temp,$temp vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1] vzip.16 $Bi,$temp vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0] vshr.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16 vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0] vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1] vshr.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16 vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1] vadd.u64 @ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo vst1.32 {$Ni},[$bnptr,:64]! @ put aside smashed m[8*i+$i] ___ push(@ACC,shift(@ACC)); $i++; $code.=<<___; vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vld1.64 {@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:128]! vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] veor $zero,$zero,$zero vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] vshl.i64 $Ni,@ACC[0]#hi,#16 vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] vadd.u64 $Ni,$Ni,@ACC[0]#lo vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vmul.u32 $Ni,$Ni,$M0 vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vst1.32 {$Bi},[$bnptr,:64]! @ put aside smashed b[8*i+$i] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vzip.16 $Ni,$zero vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] ___ } $code.=<<___; vld1.32 {$Bi},[sp,:64] @ pull smashed b[8*i+0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0] vld1.32 {$A0-$A3},[$aptr]! vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0] vshr.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16 vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0] vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1] vshr.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,#16 vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1] vadd.u64 @ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo vst1.32 {$Ni},[$bnptr,:64] @ put aside smashed m[8*i+$i] add $bnptr,sp,#8 @ rewind ___ push(@ACC,shift(@ACC)); $code.=<<___; sub $inner,$num,#8 b .LNEON_8n_inner .align 4 .LNEON_8n_inner: subs $inner,$inner,#8 vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vld1.64 {@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:128] vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] vld1.32 {$Ni},[$bnptr,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] vld1.32 {$N0-$N3},[$nptr]! vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] it ne addne $tinptr,$tinptr,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] ___ for ($i=1; $i<8; $i++) { $code.=<<___; vld1.32 {$Bi},[$bnptr,:64]! @ pull smashed b[8*i+$i] vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1] vst1.64 {@ACC[0]},[$toutptr,:128]! ___ push(@ACC,shift(@ACC)); $code.=<<___; vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vld1.64 {@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:128] vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] vld1.32 {$Ni},[$bnptr,:64]! @ pull smashed m[8*i+$i] vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] it ne addne $tinptr,$tinptr,#16 @ don't advance in last iteration vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] ___ } $code.=<<___; it eq subeq $aptr,$aptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind vmlal.u32 @ACC[0],$Ni,${N0}[0] vld1.32 {$Bi},[sp,:64] @ pull smashed b[8*i+0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[1],$Ni,${N0}[1] vld1.32 {$A0-$A3},[$aptr]! vmlal.u32 @ACC[2],$Ni,${N1}[0] add $bnptr,sp,#8 @ rewind vmlal.u32 @ACC[3],$Ni,${N1}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[4],$Ni,${N2}[0] vmlal.u32 @ACC[5],$Ni,${N2}[1] vmlal.u32 @ACC[6],$Ni,${N3}[0] vst1.64 {@ACC[0]},[$toutptr,:128]! vmlal.u32 @ACC[7],$Ni,${N3}[1] bne .LNEON_8n_inner ___ push(@ACC,shift(@ACC)); $code.=<<___; add $tinptr,sp,#128 vst1.64 {@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]},[$toutptr,:256]! veor q2,q2,q2 @ $N0-$N1 vst1.64 {@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]},[$toutptr,:256]! veor q3,q3,q3 @ $N2-$N3 vst1.64 {@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]},[$toutptr,:256]! vst1.64 {@ACC[6]},[$toutptr,:128] subs $outer,$outer,#8 vld1.64 {@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]},[$tinptr,:256]! vld1.64 {@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]},[$tinptr,:256]! vld1.64 {@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]},[$tinptr,:256]! vld1.64 {@ACC[6]-@ACC[7]},[$tinptr,:256]! itt ne subne $nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind bne .LNEON_8n_outer add $toutptr,sp,#128 vst1.64 {q2-q3}, [sp,:256]! @ start wiping stack frame vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[0]#lo,#16 vst1.64 {q2-q3},[sp,:256]! vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#hi,@ACC[0]#hi,$temp vst1.64 {q2-q3}, [sp,:256]! vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[0]#hi,#16 vst1.64 {q2-q3}, [sp,:256]! vzip.16 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi mov $inner,$num b .LNEON_tail_entry .align 4 .LNEON_tail: vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#lo,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[0]#lo,#16 vld1.64 {@ACC[2]-@ACC[3]}, [$tinptr, :256]! vadd.u64 @ACC[0]#hi,@ACC[0]#hi,$temp vld1.64 {@ACC[4]-@ACC[5]}, [$tinptr, :256]! vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[0]#hi,#16 vld1.64 {@ACC[6]-@ACC[7]}, [$tinptr, :256]! vzip.16 @ACC[0]#lo,@ACC[0]#hi .LNEON_tail_entry: ___ for ($i=1; $i<8; $i++) { $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#lo,$temp vst1.32 {@ACC[0]#lo[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[1]#lo,#16 vadd.u64 @ACC[1]#hi,@ACC[1]#hi,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,@ACC[1]#hi,#16 vzip.16 @ACC[1]#lo,@ACC[1]#hi ___ push(@ACC,shift(@ACC)); } push(@ACC,shift(@ACC)); $code.=<<___; vld1.64 {@ACC[0]-@ACC[1]}, [$tinptr, :256]! subs $inner,$inner,#8 vst1.32 {@ACC[7]#lo[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]! bne .LNEON_tail vst1.32 {${temp}[0]}, [$toutptr, :32] @ top-most bit sub $nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $nptr subs $aptr,sp,#0 @ clear carry flag add $bptr,sp,$num,lsl#2 .LNEON_sub: ldmia $aptr!, {r4-r7} ldmia $nptr!, {r8-r11} sbcs r8, r4,r8 sbcs r9, r5,r9 sbcs r10,r6,r10 sbcs r11,r7,r11 teq $aptr,$bptr @ preserves carry stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11} bne .LNEON_sub ldr r10, [$aptr] @ load top-most bit mov r11,sp veor q0,q0,q0 sub r11,$bptr,r11 @ this is num*4 veor q1,q1,q1 mov $aptr,sp sub $rptr,$rptr,r11 @ rewind $rptr mov $nptr,$bptr @ second 3/4th of frame sbcs r10,r10,#0 @ result is carry flag .LNEON_copy_n_zap: ldmia $aptr!, {r4-r7} ldmia $rptr, {r8-r11} it cc movcc r8, r4 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe itt cc movcc r9, r5 movcc r10,r6 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe it cc movcc r11,r7 ldmia $aptr, {r4-r7} stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11} sub $aptr,$aptr,#16 ldmia $rptr, {r8-r11} it cc movcc r8, r4 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$aptr,:256]! @ wipe itt cc movcc r9, r5 movcc r10,r6 vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe it cc movcc r11,r7 teq $aptr,$bptr @ preserves carry stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11} bne .LNEON_copy_n_zap mov sp,ip vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r11} ret @ bx lr .size bn_mul8x_mont_neon,.-bn_mul8x_mont_neon #endif ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/ge or s/\bret\b/bx lr/g or s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/g; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000006532413176625656017364 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # On PA-7100LC this module performs ~90-50% better, less for longer # keys, than code generated by gcc 3.2 for PA-RISC 1.1. Latter means # that compiler utilized xmpyu instruction to perform 32x32=64-bit # multiplication, which in turn means that "baseline" performance was # optimal in respect to instruction set capabilities. Fair comparison # with vendor compiler is problematic, because OpenSSL doesn't define # BN_LLONG [presumably] for historical reasons, which drives compiler # toward 4 times 16x16=32-bit multiplicatons [plus complementary # shifts and additions] instead. This means that you should observe # several times improvement over code generated by vendor compiler # for PA-RISC 1.1, but the "baseline" is far from optimal. The actual # improvement coefficient was never collected on PA-7100LC, or any # other 1.1 CPU, because I don't have access to such machine with # vendor compiler. But to give you a taste, PA-RISC 1.1 code path # reportedly outperformed code generated by cc +DA1.1 +O3 by factor # of ~5x on PA-8600. # # On PA-RISC 2.0 it has to compete with pa-risc2[W].s, which is # reportedly ~2x faster than vendor compiler generated code [according # to comment in pa-risc2[W].s]. Here comes a catch. Execution core of # this implementation is actually 32-bit one, in the sense that it # operates on 32-bit values. But pa-risc2[W].s operates on arrays of # 64-bit BN_LONGs... How do they interoperate then? No problem. This # module picks halves of 64-bit values in reverse order and pretends # they were 32-bit BN_LONGs. But can 32-bit core compete with "pure" # 64-bit code such as pa-risc2[W].s then? Well, the thing is that # 32x32=64-bit multiplication is the best even PA-RISC 2.0 can do, # i.e. there is no "wider" multiplication like on most other 64-bit # platforms. This means that even being effectively 32-bit, this # implementation performs "64-bit" computational task in same amount # of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires # more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't # seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC # 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s: # it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest # one. # # In case it wasn't clear. The module has two distinct code paths: # PA-RISC 1.1 and PA-RISC 2.0 ones. Latter features carry-free 64-bit # additions and 64-bit integer loads, not to mention specific # instruction scheduling. In 64-bit build naturally only 2.0 code path # is assembled. In 32-bit application context both code paths are # assembled, PA-RISC 2.0 CPU is detected at run-time and proper path # is taken automatically. Also, in 32-bit build the module imposes # couple of limitations: vector lengths has to be even and vector # addresses has to be 64-bit aligned. Normally neither is a problem: # most common key lengths are even and vectors are commonly malloc-ed, # which ensures alignment. # # Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account on # PA-RISC 1.1 machine, and to correspondent who chose to remain # anonymous for testing the code on PA-RISC 2.0 machine. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $FRAME_MARKER =80; $SAVED_RP =16; $PUSH ="std"; $PUSHMA ="std,ma"; $POP ="ldd"; $POPMB ="ldd,mb"; $BN_SZ =$SIZE_T; } else { $LEVEL ="1.1"; #$LEVEL.="\n\t.ALLOW\t2.0"; $SIZE_T =4; $FRAME_MARKER =48; $SAVED_RP =20; $PUSH ="stw"; $PUSHMA ="stwm"; $POP ="ldw"; $POPMB ="ldwm"; $BN_SZ =$SIZE_T; if (open CONF,"<${dir}../../opensslconf.h") { while() { if (m/#\s*define\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/) { $BN_SZ=8; $LEVEL="2.0"; last; } } close CONF; } } $FRAME=8*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER; # 8 saved regs + frame marker # [+ argument transfer] $LOCALS=$FRAME-$FRAME_MARKER; $FRAME+=32; # local variables $tp="%r31"; $ti1="%r29"; $ti0="%r28"; $rp="%r26"; $ap="%r25"; $bp="%r24"; $np="%r23"; $n0="%r22"; # passed through stack in 32-bit $num="%r21"; # passed through stack in 32-bit $idx="%r20"; $arrsz="%r19"; $nm1="%r7"; $nm0="%r6"; $ab1="%r5"; $ab0="%r4"; $fp="%r3"; $hi1="%r2"; $hi0="%r1"; $xfer=$n0; # accommodates [-16..15] offset in fld[dw]s $fm0="%fr4"; $fti=$fm0; $fbi="%fr5L"; $fn0="%fr5R"; $fai="%fr6"; $fab0="%fr7"; $fab1="%fr8"; $fni="%fr9"; $fnm0="%fr10"; $fnm1="%fr11"; $code=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .EXPORT bn_mul_mont,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR .ALIGN 64 bn_mul_mont .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-8*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,SAVE_SP,ENTRY_GR=6 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ldo -$FRAME(%sp),$fp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); ldw `-$FRAME_MARKER-4`($fp),$n0 ldw `-$FRAME_MARKER-8`($fp),$num nop nop ; alignment ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); comiclr,<= 6,$num,%r0 ; are vectors long enough? b L\$abort ldi 0,%r28 ; signal "unhandled" add,ev %r0,$num,$num ; is $num even? b L\$abort nop or $ap,$np,$ti1 extru,= $ti1,31,3,%r0 ; are ap and np 64-bit aligned? b L\$abort nop nop ; alignment nop fldws 0($n0),${fn0} fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[0] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); comib,> 3,$num,L\$abort ; are vectors long enough? ldi 0,%r28 ; signal "unhandled" addl $num,$num,$num ; I operate on 32-bit values fldws 4($n0),${fn0} ; only low part of n0 fldws 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[0] in flipped word order ___ $code.=<<___; fldds 0($ap),${fai} ; ap[0,1] fldds 0($np),${fni} ; np[0,1] sh2addl $num,%r0,$arrsz ldi 31,$hi0 ldo 36($arrsz),$hi1 ; space for tp[num+1] andcm $hi1,$hi0,$hi1 ; align addl $hi1,%sp,%sp $PUSH $fp,-$SIZE_T(%sp) ldo `$LOCALS+16`($fp),$xfer ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} addl $arrsz,$ap,$ap ; point at the end addl $arrsz,$np,$np subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[0]*m xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[1]*m fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[2,3] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[2,3] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); mtctl $hi0,%cr11 ; $hi0 still holds 31 extrd,u,*= $hi0,%sar,1,$hi0 ; executes on PA-RISC 1.0 b L\$parisc11 nop ___ $code.=<<___; # PA-RISC 2.0 code-path xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ; low part is discarded extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 L\$1st xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) addl $hi0,$ab0,$ab0 extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$1st ; j++++ extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 addl $hi0,$ab0,$ab0 extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ldd,mb 8($xfer),$nm1 extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] ldo -1($num),$num ; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); fldws 0($bp),${fbi} ; bp[1] in flipped word order ___ $code.=<<___; flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0,1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0,1] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[1] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[1] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L addl $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 extrd,u $hi0,31,32,$hi1 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outer xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[0]*m xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[1]*m fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) ; 33-bit value fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[2] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[2] ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 ; 33-bit value ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 ldw 0($xfer),$hi0 ; high part xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$ti0 ; carry bit extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 ; account carry bit fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ; low part is discarded ldw 0($tp),$ti1 ; tp[1] extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) L\$inner xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ti1,$ti1 addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) addl $hi0,$ti0,$ti0 addl $ti0,$ab0,$ab0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$inner ; j++++ extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $hi0,$ti1,$ti1 addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 ldd 8($xfer),$nm1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 ldd -16($xfer),$ab0 ldd -8($xfer),$nm0 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 addl $hi0,$ab0,$ab0 addl $ti0,$ab0,$ab0 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] extrd,u $ab0,31,32,$hi0 ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] extrd,u $ab0,63,32,$ab0 addl $hi1,$nm0,$nm0 ldd 0($xfer),$ab1 addl $ab0,$nm0,$nm0 ldd,mb 8($xfer),$nm1 extrd,u $nm0,31,32,$hi1 stw,ma $nm0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,= -1,$num,L\$outerdone ; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[i] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); ldi 12,$ti0 ; bp[i] in flipped word order addl,ev %r0,$num,$num ldi -4,$ti0 addl $ti0,$bp,$bp fldws 0($bp),${fbi} ___ $code.=<<___; flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0] addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[i] ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} addl $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] addl $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 extrd,u $hi0,31,32,$hi1 fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} b L\$outer ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outerdone addl $hi0,$ab1,$ab1 addl $ti1,$ab1,$ab1 extrd,u $ab1,31,32,$hi0 extrd,u $ab1,63,32,$ab1 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addl $hi1,$nm1,$nm1 addl $ab1,$nm1,$nm1 extrd,u $nm1,31,32,$hi1 stw $nm1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addl $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addl $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 extrd,u $hi0,31,32,$hi1 stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp sub %r0,%r0,%r0 ; clear borrow ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==4); ldws,ma 4($tp),$ti0 extru,= $rp,31,3,%r0 ; is rp 64-bit aligned? b L\$sub_pa11 addl $tp,$arrsz,$tp L\$sub ldwx $idx($np),$hi0 subb $ti0,$hi0,$hi1 ldwx $idx($tp),$ti0 addib,<> 4,$idx,L\$sub stws,ma $hi1,4($rp) subb $ti0,%r0,$hi1 ldo -4($tp),$tp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BN_SZ==8); ldd,ma 8($tp),$ti0 L\$sub ldd $idx($np),$hi0 shrpd $ti0,$ti0,32,$ti0 ; flip word order std $ti0,-8($tp) ; save flipped value sub,db $ti0,$hi0,$hi1 ldd,ma 8($tp),$ti0 addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$sub std,ma $hi1,8($rp) extrd,u $ti0,31,32,$ti0 ; carry in flipped word order sub,db $ti0,%r0,$hi1 ldo -8($tp),$tp ___ $code.=<<___; and $tp,$hi1,$ap andcm $rp,$hi1,$bp or $ap,$bp,$np sub $rp,$arrsz,$rp ; rewind rp subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp L\$copy ldd $idx($np),$hi0 std,ma %r0,8($tp) addib,<> 8,$idx,.-8 ; L\$copy std,ma $hi0,8($rp) ___ if ($BN_SZ==4) { # PA-RISC 1.1 code-path $ablo=$ab0; $abhi=$ab1; $nmlo0=$nm0; $nmhi0=$nm1; $nmlo1="%r9"; $nmhi1="%r8"; $code.=<<___; b L\$done nop .ALIGN 8 L\$parisc11 xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldw -12($xfer),$ablo ldw -16($xfer),$hi0 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ; discarded addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo ldw 0($xfer),$abhi nop L\$1st_pa11 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[0] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[0] ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$1st_pa11 ; j++++ addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[0] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldws,mb 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] ldo -1($num),$num ; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[1] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0,1] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0,1] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[1] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[1] add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L add $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,%r0,$hi1 fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outer_pa11 xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[0]*m xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[1]*m fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) ; 33-bit value fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[2,3] flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[2,3] ldw -16($xfer),$abhi ; carry bit actually ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ ldw -12($xfer),$ablo ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 ldw 0($xfer),$hi0 ; high part xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) addl $abhi,$hi0,$hi0 ; account carry bit fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ; discarded ldw 0($tp),$ti1 ; tp[1] addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) ldw 4($xfer),$ablo ldw 0($xfer),$abhi L\$inner_pa11 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j+1]*bp[i] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[j,j+1] xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j+1]*m flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[j,j+1] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[j]*bp[i] ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] xmpyu ${fni}L,${fm0}R,${fnm0} ; np[j]*m ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] add $ti0,$ablo,$ablo fstds ${fab0},-16($xfer) addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 fstds ${fnm0},-8($xfer) add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,<> 8,$idx,L\$inner_pa11 ; j++++ addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[j]*bp[i] ldw 12($xfer),$nmlo1 xmpyu ${fni}R,${fm0}R,${fnm1} ; np[j]*m ldw 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi fstds ${fab1},0($xfer) add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo fstds ${fnm1},8($xfer) addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw -16($xfer),$abhi add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -12($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 ldw -8($xfer),$nmhi0 add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 ldw -4($xfer),$nmlo0 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi add $ti0,$ablo,$ablo ldw 8($tp),$ti1 ; tp[j] addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 0($xfer),$abhi add $ablo,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$ablo addc %r0,$nmhi0,$nmhi0 ldws,mb 8($xfer),$nmhi1 add $hi1,$nmlo0,$nmlo0 ldw 4($xfer),$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi0,$hi1 stws,ma $nmlo0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] addib,= -1,$num,L\$outerdone_pa11; i-- subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ; j=0 fldws,ma 4($bp),${fbi} ; bp[i] flddx $idx($ap),${fai} ; ap[0] add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi flddx $idx($np),${fni} ; np[0] fldws 8($xfer),${fti}R ; tp[0] add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldo 8($idx),$idx ; j++++ xmpyu ${fai}L,${fbi},${fab0} ; ap[0]*bp[i] xmpyu ${fai}R,${fbi},${fab1} ; ap[1]*bp[i] ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 fstws,mb ${fab0}L,-8($xfer) ; save high part add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fti}L ; zero high part fcpy,sgl %fr0,${fab0}L stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fti},${fti} ; 32-bit unsigned int -> double fcnvxf,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} add $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,%r0,$hi1 fadd,dbl ${fti},${fab0},${fab0} ; add tp[0] add $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,$hi1,$hi1 fcnvfx,dbl,dbl ${fab0},${fab0} ; double -> 33-bit unsigned int stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) xmpyu ${fn0},${fab0}R,${fm0} b L\$outer_pa11 ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp L\$outerdone_pa11 add $hi0,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$abhi add $ti1,$ablo,$ablo addc %r0,$abhi,$hi0 ldw 4($tp),$ti0 ; tp[j] add $hi1,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$nmhi1 add $ablo,$nmlo1,$nmlo1 addc %r0,$nmhi1,$hi1 stw $nmlo1,-4($tp) ; tp[j-1] add $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,%r0,$hi1 add $ti0,$hi0,$hi0 addc %r0,$hi1,$hi1 stw $hi0,0($tp) stw $hi1,4($tp) ldo `$LOCALS+32+4`($fp),$tp sub %r0,%r0,%r0 ; clear borrow ldw -4($tp),$ti0 addl $tp,$arrsz,$tp L\$sub_pa11 ldwx $idx($np),$hi0 subb $ti0,$hi0,$hi1 ldwx $idx($tp),$ti0 addib,<> 4,$idx,L\$sub_pa11 stws,ma $hi1,4($rp) subb $ti0,%r0,$hi1 ldo -4($tp),$tp and $tp,$hi1,$ap andcm $rp,$hi1,$bp or $ap,$bp,$np sub $rp,$arrsz,$rp ; rewind rp subi 0,$arrsz,$idx ldo `$LOCALS+32`($fp),$tp L\$copy_pa11 ldwx $idx($np),$hi0 stws,ma %r0,4($tp) addib,<> 4,$idx,L\$copy_pa11 stws,ma $hi0,4($rp) nop ; alignment L\$done ___ } $code.=<<___; ldi 1,%r28 ; signal "handled" ldo $FRAME($fp),%sp ; destroy tp[num+1] $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 L\$abort bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .STRINGZ "Montgomery Multiplication for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ # Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so # that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I # wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0 # directive... my $ldd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 4 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(3<<6)|$3; sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 5 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|(1<<12)|(3<<6)|$3; $opcode|=(($1&0xF)<<17)|(($1&0x10)<<12); # encode offset $opcode|=(1<<5) if ($mod =~ /^,m/); $opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $std = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "std$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 6 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<12)|(0xB<<6); $opcode|=(($2&0xF)<<1)|(($2&0x10)>>4); # encode offset $opcode|=(1<<5) if ($mod =~ /^,m/); $opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $extrd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args"; # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded... if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 15 { my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16); my $len=32-$3; $opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5); # encode pos $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f); # encode len sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 12 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9); my $len=32-$2; $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f); # encode len $opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $shrpd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 14 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4; my $cpos=63-$3; $opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5); # encode sa sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $sub = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "sub$mod\t$args"; if ($mod eq ",db" && $args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) { my $opcode=(0x02<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|$3; $opcode|=(1<<10); # e1 $opcode|=(1<<8); # e2 $opcode|=(1<<5); # d sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig } else { "\t".$orig; } }; sub assemble { my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_; my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic"); ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args"; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; # flip word order in 64-bit mode... s/(xmpyu\s+)($fai|$fni)([LR])/$1.$2.($3 eq "L"?"R":"L")/e if ($BN_SZ==8); # assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode... s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4); s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8); print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl0000755000000000000000000006643113176625656017466 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by David S. Miller and Andy Polyakov # . The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD # license. November 2012. All rights reserved. # ==================================================================== ###################################################################### # Montgomery squaring-n-multiplication module for SPARC T4. # # The module consists of three parts: # # 1) collection of "single-op" subroutines that perform single # operation, Montgomery squaring or multiplication, on 512-, # 1024-, 1536- and 2048-bit operands; # 2) collection of "multi-op" subroutines that perform 5 squaring and # 1 multiplication operations on operands of above lengths; # 3) fall-back and helper VIS3 subroutines. # # RSA sign is dominated by multi-op subroutine, while RSA verify and # DSA - by single-op. Special note about 4096-bit RSA verify result. # Operands are too long for dedicated hardware and it's handled by # VIS3 code, which is why you don't see any improvement. It's surely # possible to improve it [by deploying 'mpmul' instruction], maybe in # the future... # # Performance improvement. # # 64-bit process, VIS3: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000628s 0.000028s 1592.4 35434.4 # rsa 2048 bits 0.003282s 0.000106s 304.7 9438.3 # rsa 4096 bits 0.025866s 0.000340s 38.7 2940.9 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000301s 0.000332s 3323.7 3013.9 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001056s 0.001233s 946.9 810.8 # # 64-bit process, this module: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000256s 0.000016s 3904.4 61411.9 # rsa 2048 bits 0.000946s 0.000029s 1056.8 34292.7 # rsa 4096 bits 0.005061s 0.000340s 197.6 2940.5 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000176s 0.000195s 5674.7 5130.5 # dsa 2048 bits 0.000296s 0.000354s 3383.2 2827.6 # ###################################################################### # 32-bit process, VIS3: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000665s 0.000028s 1504.8 35233.3 # rsa 2048 bits 0.003349s 0.000106s 298.6 9433.4 # rsa 4096 bits 0.025959s 0.000341s 38.5 2934.8 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000320s 0.000341s 3123.3 2929.6 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001101s 0.001260s 908.2 793.4 # # 32-bit process, this module: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 1024 bits 0.000301s 0.000017s 3317.1 60240.0 # rsa 2048 bits 0.001034s 0.000030s 966.9 33812.7 # rsa 4096 bits 0.005244s 0.000341s 190.7 2935.4 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000201s 0.000205s 4976.1 4879.2 # dsa 2048 bits 0.000328s 0.000360s 3051.1 2774.2 # # 32-bit code is prone to performance degradation as interrupt rate # dispatched to CPU executing the code grows. This is because in # standard process of handling interrupt in 32-bit process context # upper halves of most integer registers used as input or output are # zeroed. This renders result invalid, and operation has to be re-run. # If CPU is "bothered" with timer interrupts only, the penalty is # hardly measurable. But in order to mitigate this problem for higher # interrupt rates contemporary Linux kernel recognizes biased stack # even in 32-bit process context and preserves full register contents. # See http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=517ffce4e1a03aea979fe3a18a3dd1761a24fafb # for details. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "sparcv9_modes.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif ___ ######################################################################## # Register layout for mont[mul|sqr] instructions. # For details see "Oracle SPARC Architecture 2011" manual at # http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/sun-sparc-enterprise/documentation/. # my @R=map("%f".2*$_,(0..11,30,31,12..29)); my @N=(map("%l$_",(0..7)),map("%o$_",(0..5))); @N=(@N,@N,@N[0..3]); my @A=(@N[0..13],@R[14..31]); my @B=(map("%i$_",(0..5)),map("%l$_",(0..7))); @B=(@B,@B,map("%o$_",(0..3))); ######################################################################## # int bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM(u64 *rp,const u64 *ap,const u64 *bp, # const u64 *np,const BN_ULONG *n0); # sub generate_bn_mul_mont_t4() { my $NUM=shift; my ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$sentinel)=map("%g$_",(1..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM .align 32 bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM: #ifdef __arch64__ mov 0,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #elif defined(SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK) SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+0],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9_P[0] mov -2047,%g4 and %g1,SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK,%g1 movrz %g1,0,%g4 mov -1,$sentinel add %g4,-128,%g4 #else mov -1,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #endif sllx $sentinel,32,$sentinel save %sp,%g4,%sp #ifndef __arch64__ save %sp,-128,%sp ! warm it up save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp restore restore restore restore restore restore #endif and %sp,1,%g4 or $sentinel,%fp,%fp or %g4,$sentinel,$sentinel ! copy arguments to global registers mov %i0,$rp mov %i1,$ap mov %i2,$bp mov %i3,$np ld [%i4+0],%f1 ! load *n0 ld [%i4+4],%f0 fsrc2 %f0,%f60 ___ # load ap[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<13?@A[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$ap+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$ap+$i*8+4],@A[$i] sllx @A[$i],32,@A[$i] or $lo,@A[$i],@A[$i] ___ } for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my ($hi,$lo)=("%f".2*($i%4),"%f".(2*($i%4)+1)); $code.=<<___; ld [$ap+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$ap+$i*8+4],$hi fsrc2 $hi,@A[$i] ___ } # load np[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<13?@N[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$np+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i] sllx @N[$i],32,@N[$i] or $lo,@N[$i],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<28 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<27?@N[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$np+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i] sllx @N[$i],32,@N[$i] or $lo,@N[$i],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=($i<$NUM-1)?@N[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$np+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$np+$i*8+4],@N[$i] sllx @N[$i],32,@N[$i] or $lo,@N[$i],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; cmp $ap,$bp be SIZE_T_CC,.Lmsquare_$NUM nop ___ # load bp[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=$i<13?@B[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$bp+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$bp+$i*8+4],@B[$i] sllx @B[$i],32,@B[$i] or $lo,@B[$i],@B[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my $lo=($i<$NUM-1)?@B[$i+1]:"%o7"; $code.=<<___; ld [$bp+$i*8+0],$lo ld [$bp+$i*8+4],@B[$i] sllx @B[$i],32,@B[$i] or $lo,@B[$i],@B[$i] ___ } # magic ################################################################ $code.=<<___; .word 0x81b02920+$NUM-1 ! montmul $NUM-1 .Lmresume_$NUM: fbu,pn %fcc3,.Lmabort_$NUM #ifndef __arch64__ and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Lmabort_$NUM #endif nop #ifdef __arch64__ restore restore restore restore restore #else restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Lmabort1_$NUM restore #endif ___ # save tp[$NUM] ######################################################## for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; movxtod @A[$i],@R[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; #ifdef __arch64__ restore #else and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore and $sentinel,1,%o7 and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel srl %fp,0,%fp ! just in case? or %o7,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,a,pn $sentinel,.Lmdone_$NUM mov 0,%i0 ! return failure #endif ___ for($i=0; $i<12 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { @R[$i] =~ /%f([0-9]+)/; my $lo = "%f".($1+1); $code.=<<___; st $lo,[$rp+$i*8+0] st @R[$i],[$rp+$i*8+4] ___ } for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { my ($hi,$lo)=("%f".2*($i%4),"%f".(2*($i%4)+1)); $code.=<<___; fsrc2 @R[$i],$hi st $lo,[$rp+$i*8+0] st $hi,[$rp+$i*8+4] ___ } $code.=<<___; mov 1,%i0 ! return success .Lmdone_$NUM: ret restore .Lmabort_$NUM: restore restore restore restore restore .Lmabort1_$NUM: restore mov 0,%i0 ! return failure ret restore .align 32 .Lmsquare_$NUM: save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp .word 0x81b02940+$NUM-1 ! montsqr $NUM-1 ba .Lmresume_$NUM nop .type bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM, #function .size bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM, .-bn_mul_mont_t4_$NUM ___ } for ($i=8;$i<=32;$i+=8) { &generate_bn_mul_mont_t4($i); } ######################################################################## # sub load_ccr { my ($ptbl,$pwr,$ccr,$skip_wr)=@_; $code.=<<___; srl $pwr, 2, %o4 and $pwr, 3, %o5 and %o4, 7, %o4 sll %o5, 3, %o5 ! offset within first cache line add %o5, $ptbl, $ptbl ! of the pwrtbl or %g0, 1, %o5 sll %o5, %o4, $ccr ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$skip_wr); wr $ccr, %g0, %ccr ___ } sub load_b_pair { my ($pwrtbl,$B0,$B1)=@_; $code.=<<___; ldx [$pwrtbl+0*32], $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+8*32], $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+1*32], %o4 ldx [$pwrtbl+9*32], %o5 movvs %icc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+2*32], %o4 movvs %icc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+10*32],%o5 move %icc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+3*32], %o4 move %icc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+11*32],%o5 movneg %icc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+4*32], %o4 movneg %icc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+12*32],%o5 movcs %xcc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+5*32],%o4 movcs %xcc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+13*32],%o5 movvs %xcc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+6*32], %o4 movvs %xcc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+14*32],%o5 move %xcc, %o4, $B0 ldx [$pwrtbl+7*32], %o4 move %xcc, %o5, $B1 ldx [$pwrtbl+15*32],%o5 movneg %xcc, %o4, $B0 add $pwrtbl,16*32, $pwrtbl movneg %xcc, %o5, $B1 ___ } sub load_b { my ($pwrtbl,$Bi)=@_; $code.=<<___; ldx [$pwrtbl+0*32], $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+1*32], %o4 ldx [$pwrtbl+2*32], %o5 movvs %icc, %o4, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+3*32], %o4 move %icc, %o5, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+4*32], %o5 movneg %icc, %o4, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+5*32], %o4 movcs %xcc, %o5, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+6*32], %o5 movvs %xcc, %o4, $Bi ldx [$pwrtbl+7*32], %o4 move %xcc, %o5, $Bi add $pwrtbl,8*32, $pwrtbl movneg %xcc, %o4, $Bi ___ } ######################################################################## # int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM(u64 *tp,const u64 *np,const BN_ULONG *n0, # const u64 *pwrtbl,int pwr,int stride); # sub generate_bn_pwr5_mont_t4() { my $NUM=shift; my ($tp,$np,$pwrtbl,$pwr,$sentinel)=map("%g$_",(1..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM .align 32 bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM: #ifdef __arch64__ mov 0,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #elif defined(SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK) SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+0],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9_P[0] mov -2047,%g4 and %g1,SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK,%g1 movrz %g1,0,%g4 mov -1,$sentinel add %g4,-128,%g4 #else mov -1,$sentinel mov -128,%g4 #endif sllx $sentinel,32,$sentinel save %sp,%g4,%sp #ifndef __arch64__ save %sp,-128,%sp ! warm it up save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp save %sp,-128,%sp restore restore restore restore restore restore #endif and %sp,1,%g4 or $sentinel,%fp,%fp or %g4,$sentinel,$sentinel ! copy arguments to global registers mov %i0,$tp mov %i1,$np ld [%i2+0],%f1 ! load *n0 ld [%i2+4],%f0 mov %i3,$pwrtbl srl %i4,%g0,%i4 ! pack last arguments sllx %i5,32,$pwr or %i4,$pwr,$pwr fsrc2 %f0,%f60 ___ # load tp[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$tp+$i*8],@A[$i] ___ } for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldd [$tp+$i*8],@A[$i] ___ } # load np[$NUM] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$np+$i*8],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<28 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$np+$i*8],@N[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$np+$i*8],@N[$i] ___ } # load pwrtbl[pwr] ######################################################## $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp srlx $pwr, 32, %o4 ! unpack $pwr srl $pwr, %g0, %o5 sub %o4, 5, %o4 mov $pwrtbl, %o7 sllx %o4, 32, $pwr ! re-pack $pwr or %o5, $pwr, $pwr srl %o5, %o4, %o5 ___ &load_ccr("%o7","%o5","%o4"); $code.=<<___; b .Lstride_$NUM nop .align 16 .Lstride_$NUM: ___ for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i+=2) { &load_b_pair("%o7",@B[$i],@B[$i+1]); } $code.=<<___; save %sp,-128,%sp; or $sentinel,%fp,%fp ___ for(; $i<$NUM; $i+=2) { &load_b_pair("%i7",@B[$i],@B[$i+1]); } $code.=<<___; srax $pwr, 32, %o4 ! unpack $pwr srl $pwr, %g0, %o5 sub %o4, 5, %o4 mov $pwrtbl, %i7 sllx %o4, 32, $pwr ! re-pack $pwr or %o5, $pwr, $pwr srl %o5, %o4, %o5 ___ &load_ccr("%i7","%o5","%o4",1); # magic ################################################################ for($i=0; $i<5; $i++) { $code.=<<___; .word 0x81b02940+$NUM-1 ! montsqr $NUM-1 fbu,pn %fcc3,.Labort_$NUM #ifndef __arch64__ and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Labort_$NUM #endif nop ___ } $code.=<<___; wr %o4, %g0, %ccr .word 0x81b02920+$NUM-1 ! montmul $NUM-1 fbu,pn %fcc3,.Labort_$NUM #ifndef __arch64__ and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Labort_$NUM #endif srax $pwr, 32, %o4 #ifdef __arch64__ brgez %o4,.Lstride_$NUM restore restore restore restore restore #else brgez %o4,.Lstride_$NUM restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore; and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,pn $sentinel,.Labort1_$NUM restore #endif ___ # save tp[$NUM] ######################################################## for($i=0; $i<14 && $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; movxtod @A[$i],@R[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; #ifdef __arch64__ restore #else and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel restore and $sentinel,1,%o7 and %fp,$sentinel,$sentinel srl %fp,0,%fp ! just in case? or %o7,$sentinel,$sentinel brz,a,pn $sentinel,.Ldone_$NUM mov 0,%i0 ! return failure #endif ___ for($i=0; $i<$NUM; $i++) { $code.=<<___; std @R[$i],[$tp+$i*8] ___ } $code.=<<___; mov 1,%i0 ! return success .Ldone_$NUM: ret restore .Labort_$NUM: restore restore restore restore restore .Labort1_$NUM: restore mov 0,%i0 ! return failure ret restore .type bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM, #function .size bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM, .-bn_pwr5_mont_t4_$NUM ___ } for ($i=8;$i<=32;$i+=8) { &generate_bn_pwr5_mont_t4($i); } { ######################################################################## # Fall-back subroutines # # copy of bn_mul_mont_vis3 adjusted for vectors of 64-bit values # ($n0,$m0,$m1,$lo0,$hi0, $lo1,$hi1,$aj,$alo,$nj,$nlo,$tj)= (map("%g$_",(1..5)),map("%o$_",(0..5,7))); # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%o0"; # u64 *rp, $ap="%o1"; # const u64 *ap, $bp="%o2"; # const u64 *bp, $np="%o3"; # const u64 *np, $n0p="%o4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%o5"; # int num); # caller ensures that num is >=3 $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_t4 .align 32 bn_mul_mont_t4: add %sp, STACK_BIAS, %g4 ! real top of stack sll $num, 3, $num ! size in bytes add $num, 63, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes sub %g4, %g1, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! align at 64 byte sub %g1, STACK_FRAME, %g1 ! new top of stack sub %g1, %g4, %g1 save %sp, %g1, %sp ___ # +-------------------------------+<----- %sp # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 tmp[0] | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # . . ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); ($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1); $code.=<<___; ld [$n0p+0], $t0 ! pull n0[0..1] value ld [$n0p+4], $t1 add %sp, STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME, $tp ldx [$bp+0], $m0 ! m0=bp[0] sllx $t1, 32, $n0 add $bp, 8, $bp or $t0, $n0, $n0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] add $ap, 16, $ap ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! "tp[0]"*n0 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 add $np, 16, $np addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .L1st sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .L1st: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 add $ap, 8, $ap addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[0] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++ brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st sub $cnt, 8, $cnt ! j-- !.L1st addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit stxa $hi1, [$tp]0xe2 add $tp, 8, $tp ba .Louter sub $num, 16, $i ! i=num-2 .align 16 .Louter: ldx [$bp+0], $m0 ! m0=bp[i] add $bp, 8, $bp sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i] ldx [$tp], $tj ! tp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[i] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! tp[0]*n0 umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 add $ap, 16, $ap umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] add $np, 16, $np addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .Linner sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .Linner: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] add $ap, 8, $ap addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[i] addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp brnz,pt $cnt, .Linner sub $cnt, 8, $cnt !.Linner ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] subcc %g0, $ovf, %g0 ! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc addxccc $hi1, $hi0, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf stx $hi1, [$tp+8] add $tp, 16, $tp brnz,pt $i, .Louter sub $i, 8, $i sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ba .Lsub subcc $num, 8, $cnt ! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc .align 16 .Lsub: ldx [$tp], $tj add $tp, 8, $tp ldx [$np+0], $nj add $np, 8, $np subccc $tj, $nj, $t2 ! tp[j]-np[j] srlx $tj, 32, $tj srlx $nj, 32, $nj subccc $tj, $nj, $t3 add $rp, 8, $rp st $t2, [$rp-4] ! reverse order st $t3, [$rp-8] brnz,pt $cnt, .Lsub sub $cnt, 8, $cnt sub $np, $num, $np ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $rp, $num, $rp subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit and $tp, $ovf, $ap andn $rp, $ovf, $np or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp ba .Lcopy sub $num, 8, $cnt .align 16 .Lcopy: ! copy or in-place refresh ldx [$ap+0], $t2 add $ap, 8, $ap stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap add $tp, 8, $tp stx $t2, [$rp+0] add $rp, 8, $rp brnz $cnt, .Lcopy sub $cnt, 8, $cnt mov 1, %o0 ret restore .type bn_mul_mont_t4, #function .size bn_mul_mont_t4, .-bn_mul_mont_t4 ___ # int bn_mul_mont_gather5( $rp="%o0"; # u64 *rp, $ap="%o1"; # const u64 *ap, $bp="%o2"; # const u64 *pwrtbl, $np="%o3"; # const u64 *np, $n0p="%o4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%o5"; # int num, # caller ensures that num is >=3 # int power); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4 .align 32 bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4: add %sp, STACK_BIAS, %g4 ! real top of stack sll $num, 3, $num ! size in bytes add $num, 63, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! buffer size rounded up to 64 bytes sub %g4, %g1, %g1 andn %g1, 63, %g1 ! align at 64 byte sub %g1, STACK_FRAME, %g1 ! new top of stack sub %g1, %g4, %g1 LDPTR [%sp+STACK_7thARG], %g4 ! load power, 7th argument save %sp, %g1, %sp ___ # +-------------------------------+<----- %sp # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # | __int64 tmp[0] | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+<----- aligned at 64 bytes # . . ($rp,$ap,$bp,$np,$n0p,$num)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$cnt,$tp,$bufsz,$ccr)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); ($ovf,$i)=($t0,$t1); &load_ccr($bp,"%g4",$ccr); &load_b($bp,$m0,"%o7"); # m0=bp[0] $code.=<<___; ld [$n0p+0], $t0 ! pull n0[0..1] value ld [$n0p+4], $t1 add %sp, STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME, $tp sllx $t1, 32, $n0 or $t0, $n0, $n0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] add $ap, 16, $ap ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! "tp[0]"*n0 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 add $np, 16, $np addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .L1st_g5 sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .L1st_g5: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 add $ap, 8, $ap addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[0] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++ brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt ! j-- !.L1st_g5 addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit stxa $hi1, [$tp]0xe2 add $tp, 8, $tp ba .Louter_g5 sub $num, 16, $i ! i=num-2 .align 16 .Louter_g5: wr $ccr, %g0, %ccr ___ &load_b($bp,$m0); # m0=bp[i] $code.=<<___; sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[0] ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i] ldx [$tp], $tj ! tp[0] umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0 ldx [$ap+8], $aj ! ap[1] addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[1]*bp[i] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 mulx $lo0, $n0, $m1 ! tp[0]*n0 umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj mulx $nj, $m1, $lo1 ! np[0]*m1 add $ap, 16, $ap umulxhi $nj, $m1, $hi1 ldx [$np+8], $nj ! np[1] add $np, 16, $np addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[1]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj ba .Linner_g5 sub $num, 24, $cnt ! cnt=num-3 .align 16 .Linner_g5: addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj ldx [$ap+0], $aj ! ap[j] add $ap, 8, $ap addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 mulx $aj, $m0, $alo ! ap[j]*bp[i] addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj ldx [$np+0], $nj ! np[j] add $np, 8, $np umulxhi $aj, $m0, $aj ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mulx $nj, $m1, $nlo ! np[j]*m1 addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp, 8, $tp brnz,pt $cnt, .Linner_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt !.Linner_g5 ldx [$tp+8], $tj ! tp[j] addcc $alo, $hi0, $lo0 addxc $aj, %g0, $hi0 ! ahi=aj addcc $lo0, $tj, $lo0 ! ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi0, $hi0 addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1 addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1 ! nhi=nj addcc $lo1, $lo0, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1 stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1] subcc %g0, $ovf, %g0 ! move upmost overflow to CCR.xcc addxccc $hi1, $hi0, $hi1 addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf stx $hi1, [$tp+8] add $tp, 16, $tp brnz,pt $i, .Louter_g5 sub $i, 8, $i sub $ap, $num, $ap ! rewind sub $np, $num, $np sub $tp, $num, $tp ba .Lsub_g5 subcc $num, 8, $cnt ! cnt=num-1 and clear CCR.xcc .align 16 .Lsub_g5: ldx [$tp], $tj add $tp, 8, $tp ldx [$np+0], $nj add $np, 8, $np subccc $tj, $nj, $t2 ! tp[j]-np[j] srlx $tj, 32, $tj srlx $nj, 32, $nj subccc $tj, $nj, $t3 add $rp, 8, $rp st $t2, [$rp-4] ! reverse order st $t3, [$rp-8] brnz,pt $cnt, .Lsub_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt sub $np, $num, $np ! rewind sub $tp, $num, $tp sub $rp, $num, $rp subc $ovf, %g0, $ovf ! handle upmost overflow bit and $tp, $ovf, $ap andn $rp, $ovf, $np or $np, $ap, $ap ! ap=borrow?tp:rp ba .Lcopy_g5 sub $num, 8, $cnt .align 16 .Lcopy_g5: ! copy or in-place refresh ldx [$ap+0], $t2 add $ap, 8, $ap stx %g0, [$tp] ! zap add $tp, 8, $tp stx $t2, [$rp+0] add $rp, 8, $rp brnz $cnt, .Lcopy_g5 sub $cnt, 8, $cnt mov 1, %o0 ret restore .type bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4, #function .size bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4, .-bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4 ___ } $code.=<<___; .globl bn_flip_t4 .align 32 bn_flip_t4: .Loop_flip: ld [%o1+0], %o4 sub %o2, 1, %o2 ld [%o1+4], %o5 add %o1, 8, %o1 st %o5, [%o0+0] st %o4, [%o0+4] brnz %o2, .Loop_flip add %o0, 8, %o0 retl nop .type bn_flip_t4, #function .size bn_flip_t4, .-bn_flip_t4 .globl bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4 .align 32 bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4: sll %o3, 3, %o3 srl %o1, 1, %o1 add %o3, %o2, %o2 ! &pwrtbl[pwr] sub %o1, 1, %o1 .Loop_flip_n_scatter5: ld [%o0+0], %o4 ! inp[i] ld [%o0+4], %o5 add %o0, 8, %o0 sllx %o5, 32, %o5 or %o4, %o5, %o5 stx %o5, [%o2] add %o2, 32*8, %o2 brnz %o1, .Loop_flip_n_scatter5 sub %o1, 1, %o1 retl nop .type bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4, #function .size bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4, .-bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4 .globl bn_gather5_t4 .align 32 bn_gather5_t4: ___ &load_ccr("%o2","%o3","%g1"); $code.=<<___; sub %o1, 1, %o1 .Loop_gather5: ___ &load_b("%o2","%g1"); $code.=<<___; stx %g1, [%o0] add %o0, 8, %o0 brnz %o1, .Loop_gather5 sub %o1, 1, %o1 retl nop .type bn_gather5_t4, #function .size bn_gather5_t4, .-bn_gather5_t4 .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov" .align 4 ___ &emit_assembler(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl0000755000000000000000000010763113176625656017141 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # March 2015 # # "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for ARMv8. Needs more # work. While it does improve RSA sign performance by 20-30% (less for # longer keys) on most processors, for some reason RSA2048 is not # faster and RSA4096 goes 15-20% slower on Cortex-A57. Multiplication # instruction issue rate is limited on processor in question, meaning # that dedicated squaring procedure is a must. Well, actually all # contemporary AArch64 processors seem to have limited multiplication # issue rate, i.e. they can't issue multiplication every cycle, which # explains moderate improvement coefficients in comparison to # compiler-generated code. Recall that compiler is instructed to use # umulh and therefore uses same amount of multiplication instructions # to do the job. Assembly's edge is to minimize number of "collateral" # instructions and of course instruction scheduling. # # April 2015 # # Squaring procedure that handles lengths divisible by 8 improves # RSA/DSA performance by 25-40-60% depending on processor and key # length. Overall improvement coefficients are always positive in # comparison to compiler-generated code. On Cortex-A57 improvement # is still modest on longest key lengths, while others exhibit e.g. # 50-70% improvement for RSA4096 sign. RSA2048 sign is ~25% faster # on Cortex-A57 and ~60-100% faster on others. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; ($lo0,$hi0,$aj,$m0,$alo,$ahi, $lo1,$hi1,$nj,$m1,$nlo,$nhi, $ovf, $i,$j,$tp,$tj) = map("x$_",6..17,19..24); # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="x0"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="x1"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="x2"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="x3"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="x4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="x5"; # int num); $code.=<<___; .text .globl bn_mul_mont .type bn_mul_mont,%function .align 5 bn_mul_mont: tst $num,#7 b.eq __bn_sqr8x_mont tst $num,#3 b.eq __bn_mul4x_mont .Lmul_mont: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-64]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] ldr $m0,[$bp],#8 // bp[0] sub $tp,sp,$num,lsl#3 ldp $hi0,$aj,[$ap],#16 // ap[0..1] lsl $num,$num,#3 ldr $n0,[$n0] // *n0 and $tp,$tp,#-16 // ABI says so ldp $hi1,$nj,[$np],#16 // np[0..1] mul $lo0,$hi0,$m0 // ap[0]*bp[0] sub $j,$num,#16 // j=num-2 umulh $hi0,$hi0,$m0 mul $alo,$aj,$m0 // ap[1]*bp[0] umulh $ahi,$aj,$m0 mul $m1,$lo0,$n0 // "tp[0]"*n0 mov sp,$tp // alloca // (*) mul $lo1,$hi1,$m1 // np[0]*m1 umulh $hi1,$hi1,$m1 mul $nlo,$nj,$m1 // np[1]*m1 // (*) adds $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 // discarded // (*) As for removal of first multiplication and addition // instructions. The outcome of first addition is // guaranteed to be zero, which leaves two computationally // significant outcomes: it either carries or not. Then // question is when does it carry? Is there alternative // way to deduce it? If you follow operations, you can // observe that condition for carry is quite simple: // $lo0 being non-zero. So that carry can be calculated // by adding -1 to $lo0. That's what next instruction does. subs xzr,$lo0,#1 // (*) umulh $nhi,$nj,$m1 adc $hi1,$hi1,xzr cbz $j,.L1st_skip .L1st: ldr $aj,[$ap],#8 adds $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sub $j,$j,#8 // j-- adc $hi0,$ahi,xzr ldr $nj,[$np],#8 adds $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 mul $alo,$aj,$m0 // ap[j]*bp[0] adc $hi1,$nhi,xzr umulh $ahi,$aj,$m0 adds $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 mul $nlo,$nj,$m1 // np[j]*m1 adc $hi1,$hi1,xzr umulh $nhi,$nj,$m1 str $lo1,[$tp],#8 // tp[j-1] cbnz $j,.L1st .L1st_skip: adds $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sub $ap,$ap,$num // rewind $ap adc $hi0,$ahi,xzr adds $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sub $np,$np,$num // rewind $np adc $hi1,$nhi,xzr adds $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 sub $i,$num,#8 // i=num-1 adcs $hi1,$hi1,$hi0 adc $ovf,xzr,xzr // upmost overflow bit stp $lo1,$hi1,[$tp] .Louter: ldr $m0,[$bp],#8 // bp[i] ldp $hi0,$aj,[$ap],#16 ldr $tj,[sp] // tp[0] add $tp,sp,#8 mul $lo0,$hi0,$m0 // ap[0]*bp[i] sub $j,$num,#16 // j=num-2 umulh $hi0,$hi0,$m0 ldp $hi1,$nj,[$np],#16 mul $alo,$aj,$m0 // ap[1]*bp[i] adds $lo0,$lo0,$tj umulh $ahi,$aj,$m0 adc $hi0,$hi0,xzr mul $m1,$lo0,$n0 sub $i,$i,#8 // i-- // (*) mul $lo1,$hi1,$m1 // np[0]*m1 umulh $hi1,$hi1,$m1 mul $nlo,$nj,$m1 // np[1]*m1 // (*) adds $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 subs xzr,$lo0,#1 // (*) umulh $nhi,$nj,$m1 cbz $j,.Linner_skip .Linner: ldr $aj,[$ap],#8 adc $hi1,$hi1,xzr ldr $tj,[$tp],#8 // tp[j] adds $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sub $j,$j,#8 // j-- adc $hi0,$ahi,xzr adds $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 ldr $nj,[$np],#8 adc $hi1,$nhi,xzr mul $alo,$aj,$m0 // ap[j]*bp[i] adds $lo0,$lo0,$tj umulh $ahi,$aj,$m0 adc $hi0,$hi0,xzr mul $nlo,$nj,$m1 // np[j]*m1 adds $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 umulh $nhi,$nj,$m1 str $lo1,[$tp,#-16] // tp[j-1] cbnz $j,.Linner .Linner_skip: ldr $tj,[$tp],#8 // tp[j] adc $hi1,$hi1,xzr adds $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sub $ap,$ap,$num // rewind $ap adc $hi0,$ahi,xzr adds $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sub $np,$np,$num // rewind $np adcs $hi1,$nhi,$ovf adc $ovf,xzr,xzr adds $lo0,$lo0,$tj adc $hi0,$hi0,xzr adds $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 adcs $hi1,$hi1,$hi0 adc $ovf,$ovf,xzr // upmost overflow bit stp $lo1,$hi1,[$tp,#-16] cbnz $i,.Louter // Final step. We see if result is larger than modulus, and // if it is, subtract the modulus. But comparison implies // subtraction. So we subtract modulus, see if it borrowed, // and conditionally copy original value. ldr $tj,[sp] // tp[0] add $tp,sp,#8 ldr $nj,[$np],#8 // np[0] subs $j,$num,#8 // j=num-1 and clear borrow mov $ap,$rp .Lsub: sbcs $aj,$tj,$nj // tp[j]-np[j] ldr $tj,[$tp],#8 sub $j,$j,#8 // j-- ldr $nj,[$np],#8 str $aj,[$ap],#8 // rp[j]=tp[j]-np[j] cbnz $j,.Lsub sbcs $aj,$tj,$nj sbcs $ovf,$ovf,xzr // did it borrow? str $aj,[$ap],#8 // rp[num-1] ldr $tj,[sp] // tp[0] add $tp,sp,#8 ldr $aj,[$rp],#8 // rp[0] sub $num,$num,#8 // num-- nop .Lcond_copy: sub $num,$num,#8 // num-- csel $nj,$tj,$aj,lo // did it borrow? ldr $tj,[$tp],#8 ldr $aj,[$rp],#8 str xzr,[$tp,#-16] // wipe tp str $nj,[$rp,#-16] cbnz $num,.Lcond_copy csel $nj,$tj,$aj,lo str xzr,[$tp,#-8] // wipe tp str $nj,[$rp,#-8] ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] mov sp,x29 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] mov x0,#1 ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldr x29,[sp],#64 ret .size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont ___ { ######################################################################## # Following is ARMv8 adaptation of sqrx8x_mont from x86_64-mont5 module. my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("x$_",(6..13)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("x$_",(14..17)); my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7)=map("x$_",(19..26)); my ($cnt,$carry,$topmost)=("x27","x28","x30"); my ($tp,$ap_end,$na0)=($bp,$np,$carry); $code.=<<___; .type __bn_sqr8x_mont,%function .align 5 __bn_sqr8x_mont: cmp $ap,$bp b.ne __bn_mul4x_mont .Lsqr8x_mont: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] stp x27,x28,[sp,#80] stp $rp,$np,[sp,#96] // offload rp and np ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] ldp $a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4] ldp $a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6] sub $tp,sp,$num,lsl#4 lsl $num,$num,#3 ldr $n0,[$n0] // *n0 mov sp,$tp // alloca sub $cnt,$num,#8*8 b .Lsqr8x_zero_start .Lsqr8x_zero: sub $cnt,$cnt,#8*8 stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0] stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2] stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*4] stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*6] .Lsqr8x_zero_start: stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*8] stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*10] stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*12] stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*14] add $tp,$tp,#8*16 cbnz $cnt,.Lsqr8x_zero add $ap_end,$ap,$num add $ap,$ap,#8*8 mov $acc0,xzr mov $acc1,xzr mov $acc2,xzr mov $acc3,xzr mov $acc4,xzr mov $acc5,xzr mov $acc6,xzr mov $acc7,xzr mov $tp,sp str $n0,[x29,#112] // offload n0 // Multiply everything but a[i]*a[i] .align 4 .Lsqr8x_outer_loop: // a[1]a[0] (i) // a[2]a[0] // a[3]a[0] // a[4]a[0] // a[5]a[0] // a[6]a[0] // a[7]a[0] // a[2]a[1] (ii) // a[3]a[1] // a[4]a[1] // a[5]a[1] // a[6]a[1] // a[7]a[1] // a[3]a[2] (iii) // a[4]a[2] // a[5]a[2] // a[6]a[2] // a[7]a[2] // a[4]a[3] (iv) // a[5]a[3] // a[6]a[3] // a[7]a[3] // a[5]a[4] (v) // a[6]a[4] // a[7]a[4] // a[6]a[5] (vi) // a[7]a[5] // a[7]a[6] (vii) mul $t0,$a1,$a0 // lo(a[1..7]*a[0]) (i) mul $t1,$a2,$a0 mul $t2,$a3,$a0 mul $t3,$a4,$a0 adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 // t[1]+lo(a[1]*a[0]) mul $t0,$a5,$a0 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 mul $t1,$a6,$a0 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$a7,$a0 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t3 umulh $t3,$a1,$a0 // hi(a[1..7]*a[0]) adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t0 umulh $t0,$a2,$a0 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t1 umulh $t1,$a3,$a0 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t2 umulh $t2,$a4,$a0 stp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp],#8*2 // t[0..1] adc $acc0,xzr,xzr // t[8] adds $acc2,$acc2,$t3 // t[2]+lo(a[1]*a[0]) umulh $t3,$a5,$a0 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t0 umulh $t0,$a6,$a0 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t1 umulh $t1,$a7,$a0 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t2 mul $t2,$a2,$a1 // lo(a[2..7]*a[1]) (ii) adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t3 mul $t3,$a3,$a1 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t0 mul $t0,$a4,$a1 adc $acc0,$acc0,$t1 mul $t1,$a5,$a1 adds $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$a6,$a1 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t3 mul $t3,$a7,$a1 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t0 umulh $t0,$a2,$a1 // hi(a[2..7]*a[1]) adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t1 umulh $t1,$a3,$a1 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t2 umulh $t2,$a4,$a1 adcs $acc0,$acc0,$t3 umulh $t3,$a5,$a1 stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp],#8*2 // t[2..3] adc $acc1,xzr,xzr // t[9] adds $acc4,$acc4,$t0 umulh $t0,$a6,$a1 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t1 umulh $t1,$a7,$a1 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t2 mul $t2,$a3,$a2 // lo(a[3..7]*a[2]) (iii) adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t3 mul $t3,$a4,$a2 adcs $acc0,$acc0,$t0 mul $t0,$a5,$a2 adc $acc1,$acc1,$t1 mul $t1,$a6,$a2 adds $acc5,$acc5,$t2 mul $t2,$a7,$a2 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t3 umulh $t3,$a3,$a2 // hi(a[3..7]*a[2]) adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t0 umulh $t0,$a4,$a2 adcs $acc0,$acc0,$t1 umulh $t1,$a5,$a2 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t2 umulh $t2,$a6,$a2 stp $acc4,$acc5,[$tp],#8*2 // t[4..5] adc $acc2,xzr,xzr // t[10] adds $acc6,$acc6,$t3 umulh $t3,$a7,$a2 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t0 mul $t0,$a4,$a3 // lo(a[4..7]*a[3]) (iv) adcs $acc0,$acc0,$t1 mul $t1,$a5,$a3 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t2 mul $t2,$a6,$a3 adc $acc2,$acc2,$t3 mul $t3,$a7,$a3 adds $acc7,$acc7,$t0 umulh $t0,$a4,$a3 // hi(a[4..7]*a[3]) adcs $acc0,$acc0,$t1 umulh $t1,$a5,$a3 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t2 umulh $t2,$a6,$a3 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t3 umulh $t3,$a7,$a3 stp $acc6,$acc7,[$tp],#8*2 // t[6..7] adc $acc3,xzr,xzr // t[11] adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 mul $t0,$a5,$a4 // lo(a[5..7]*a[4]) (v) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 mul $t1,$a6,$a4 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 mul $t2,$a7,$a4 adc $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$a5,$a4 // hi(a[5..7]*a[4]) adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 umulh $t0,$a6,$a4 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 umulh $t1,$a7,$a4 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$a6,$a5 // lo(a[6..7]*a[5]) (vi) adc $acc4,xzr,xzr // t[12] adds $acc2,$acc2,$t3 mul $t3,$a7,$a5 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t0 umulh $t0,$a6,$a5 // hi(a[6..7]*a[5]) adc $acc4,$acc4,$t1 umulh $t1,$a7,$a5 adds $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$a7,$a6 // lo(a[7]*a[6]) (vii) adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t3 umulh $t3,$a7,$a6 // hi(a[7]*a[6]) adc $acc5,xzr,xzr // t[13] adds $acc4,$acc4,$t0 sub $cnt,$ap_end,$ap // done yet? adc $acc5,$acc5,$t1 adds $acc5,$acc5,$t2 sub $t0,$ap_end,$num // rewinded ap adc $acc6,xzr,xzr // t[14] add $acc6,$acc6,$t3 cbz $cnt,.Lsqr8x_outer_break mov $n0,$a0 ldp $a0,$a1,[$tp,#8*0] ldp $a2,$a3,[$tp,#8*2] ldp $a4,$a5,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $a6,$a7,[$tp,#8*6] adds $acc0,$acc0,$a0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$a1 ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] adcs $acc2,$acc2,$a2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$a3 ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] adcs $acc4,$acc4,$a4 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$a5 ldp $a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4] adcs $acc6,$acc6,$a6 mov $rp,$ap adcs $acc7,xzr,$a7 ldp $a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6] add $ap,$ap,#8*8 //adc $carry,xzr,xzr // moved below mov $cnt,#-8*8 // a[8]a[0] // a[9]a[0] // a[a]a[0] // a[b]a[0] // a[c]a[0] // a[d]a[0] // a[e]a[0] // a[f]a[0] // a[8]a[1] // a[f]a[1]........................ // a[8]a[2] // a[f]a[2]........................ // a[8]a[3] // a[f]a[3]........................ // a[8]a[4] // a[f]a[4]........................ // a[8]a[5] // a[f]a[5]........................ // a[8]a[6] // a[f]a[6]........................ // a[8]a[7] // a[f]a[7]........................ .Lsqr8x_mul: mul $t0,$a0,$n0 adc $carry,xzr,xzr // carry bit, modulo-scheduled mul $t1,$a1,$n0 add $cnt,$cnt,#8 mul $t2,$a2,$n0 mul $t3,$a3,$n0 adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 mul $t0,$a4,$n0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 mul $t1,$a5,$n0 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 mul $t2,$a6,$n0 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 mul $t3,$a7,$n0 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t0 umulh $t0,$a0,$n0 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t1 umulh $t1,$a1,$n0 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t2 umulh $t2,$a2,$n0 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t3 umulh $t3,$a3,$n0 adc $carry,$carry,xzr str $acc0,[$tp],#8 adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 umulh $t0,$a4,$n0 adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 umulh $t1,$a5,$n0 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 umulh $t2,$a6,$n0 adcs $acc3,$acc4,$t3 umulh $t3,$a7,$n0 ldr $n0,[$rp,$cnt] adcs $acc4,$acc5,$t0 adcs $acc5,$acc6,$t1 adcs $acc6,$acc7,$t2 adcs $acc7,$carry,$t3 //adc $carry,xzr,xzr // moved above cbnz $cnt,.Lsqr8x_mul // note that carry flag is guaranteed // to be zero at this point cmp $ap,$ap_end // done yet? b.eq .Lsqr8x_break ldp $a0,$a1,[$tp,#8*0] ldp $a2,$a3,[$tp,#8*2] ldp $a4,$a5,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $a6,$a7,[$tp,#8*6] adds $acc0,$acc0,$a0 ldr $n0,[$rp,#-8*8] adcs $acc1,$acc1,$a1 ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] adcs $acc2,$acc2,$a2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$a3 ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] adcs $acc4,$acc4,$a4 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$a5 ldp $a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4] adcs $acc6,$acc6,$a6 mov $cnt,#-8*8 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$a7 ldp $a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6] add $ap,$ap,#8*8 //adc $carry,xzr,xzr // moved above b .Lsqr8x_mul .align 4 .Lsqr8x_break: ldp $a0,$a1,[$rp,#8*0] add $ap,$rp,#8*8 ldp $a2,$a3,[$rp,#8*2] sub $t0,$ap_end,$ap // is it last iteration? ldp $a4,$a5,[$rp,#8*4] sub $t1,$tp,$t0 ldp $a6,$a7,[$rp,#8*6] cbz $t0,.Lsqr8x_outer_loop stp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$t1,#8*0] stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$t1,#8*2] stp $acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $acc4,$acc5,[$t1,#8*4] stp $acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6] mov $tp,$t1 ldp $acc6,$acc7,[$t1,#8*6] b .Lsqr8x_outer_loop .align 4 .Lsqr8x_outer_break: // Now multiply above result by 2 and add a[n-1]*a[n-1]|...|a[0]*a[0] ldp $a1,$a3,[$t0,#8*0] // recall that $t0 is &a[0] ldp $t1,$t2,[sp,#8*1] ldp $a5,$a7,[$t0,#8*2] add $ap,$t0,#8*4 ldp $t3,$t0,[sp,#8*3] stp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] mul $acc0,$a1,$a1 stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] umulh $a1,$a1,$a1 stp $acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4] mul $a2,$a3,$a3 stp $acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6] mov $tp,sp umulh $a3,$a3,$a3 adds $acc1,$a1,$t1,lsl#1 extr $t1,$t2,$t1,#63 sub $cnt,$num,#8*4 .Lsqr4x_shift_n_add: adcs $acc2,$a2,$t1 extr $t2,$t3,$t2,#63 sub $cnt,$cnt,#8*4 adcs $acc3,$a3,$t2 ldp $t1,$t2,[$tp,#8*5] mul $a4,$a5,$a5 ldp $a1,$a3,[$ap],#8*2 umulh $a5,$a5,$a5 mul $a6,$a7,$a7 umulh $a7,$a7,$a7 extr $t3,$t0,$t3,#63 stp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] adcs $acc4,$a4,$t3 extr $t0,$t1,$t0,#63 stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] adcs $acc5,$a5,$t0 ldp $t3,$t0,[$tp,#8*7] extr $t1,$t2,$t1,#63 adcs $acc6,$a6,$t1 extr $t2,$t3,$t2,#63 adcs $acc7,$a7,$t2 ldp $t1,$t2,[$tp,#8*9] mul $a0,$a1,$a1 ldp $a5,$a7,[$ap],#8*2 umulh $a1,$a1,$a1 mul $a2,$a3,$a3 umulh $a3,$a3,$a3 stp $acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4] extr $t3,$t0,$t3,#63 stp $acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6] add $tp,$tp,#8*8 adcs $acc0,$a0,$t3 extr $t0,$t1,$t0,#63 adcs $acc1,$a1,$t0 ldp $t3,$t0,[$tp,#8*3] extr $t1,$t2,$t1,#63 cbnz $cnt,.Lsqr4x_shift_n_add ___ my ($np,$np_end)=($ap,$ap_end); $code.=<<___; ldp $np,$n0,[x29,#104] // pull np and n0 adcs $acc2,$a2,$t1 extr $t2,$t3,$t2,#63 adcs $acc3,$a3,$t2 ldp $t1,$t2,[$tp,#8*5] mul $a4,$a5,$a5 umulh $a5,$a5,$a5 stp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] mul $a6,$a7,$a7 umulh $a7,$a7,$a7 stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] extr $t3,$t0,$t3,#63 adcs $acc4,$a4,$t3 extr $t0,$t1,$t0,#63 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[sp,#8*0] adcs $acc5,$a5,$t0 extr $t1,$t2,$t1,#63 ldp $a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0] adcs $acc6,$a6,$t1 extr $t2,xzr,$t2,#63 ldp $a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2] adc $acc7,$a7,$t2 ldp $a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4] // Reduce by 512 bits per iteration mul $na0,$n0,$acc0 // t[0]*n0 ldp $a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6] add $np_end,$np,$num ldp $acc2,$acc3,[sp,#8*2] stp $acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $acc4,$acc5,[sp,#8*4] stp $acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6] ldp $acc6,$acc7,[sp,#8*6] add $np,$np,#8*8 mov $topmost,xzr // initial top-most carry mov $tp,sp mov $cnt,#8 .Lsqr8x_reduction: // (*) mul $t0,$a0,$na0 // lo(n[0-7])*lo(t[0]*n0) mul $t1,$a1,$na0 sub $cnt,$cnt,#1 mul $t2,$a2,$na0 str $na0,[$tp],#8 // put aside t[0]*n0 for tail processing mul $t3,$a3,$na0 // (*) adds xzr,$acc0,$t0 subs xzr,$acc0,#1 // (*) mul $t0,$a4,$na0 adcs $acc0,$acc1,$t1 mul $t1,$a5,$na0 adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t2 mul $t2,$a6,$na0 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t3 mul $t3,$a7,$na0 adcs $acc3,$acc4,$t0 umulh $t0,$a0,$na0 // hi(n[0-7])*lo(t[0]*n0) adcs $acc4,$acc5,$t1 umulh $t1,$a1,$na0 adcs $acc5,$acc6,$t2 umulh $t2,$a2,$na0 adcs $acc6,$acc7,$t3 umulh $t3,$a3,$na0 adc $acc7,xzr,xzr adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 umulh $t0,$a4,$na0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$a5,$na0 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$a6,$na0 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$a7,$na0 mul $na0,$n0,$acc0 // next t[0]*n0 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t0 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t1 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t2 adc $acc7,$acc7,$t3 cbnz $cnt,.Lsqr8x_reduction ldp $t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*0] ldp $t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*2] mov $rp,$tp sub $cnt,$np_end,$np // done yet? adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 ldp $t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*4] adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 ldp $t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*6] adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t0 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t1 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t2 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t3 //adc $carry,xzr,xzr // moved below cbz $cnt,.Lsqr8x8_post_condition ldr $n0,[$tp,#-8*8] ldp $a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0] ldp $a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2] ldp $a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4] mov $cnt,#-8*8 ldp $a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6] add $np,$np,#8*8 .Lsqr8x_tail: mul $t0,$a0,$n0 adc $carry,xzr,xzr // carry bit, modulo-scheduled mul $t1,$a1,$n0 add $cnt,$cnt,#8 mul $t2,$a2,$n0 mul $t3,$a3,$n0 adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 mul $t0,$a4,$n0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 mul $t1,$a5,$n0 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 mul $t2,$a6,$n0 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 mul $t3,$a7,$n0 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t0 umulh $t0,$a0,$n0 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t1 umulh $t1,$a1,$n0 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t2 umulh $t2,$a2,$n0 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$t3 umulh $t3,$a3,$n0 adc $carry,$carry,xzr str $acc0,[$tp],#8 adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 umulh $t0,$a4,$n0 adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 umulh $t1,$a5,$n0 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 umulh $t2,$a6,$n0 adcs $acc3,$acc4,$t3 umulh $t3,$a7,$n0 ldr $n0,[$rp,$cnt] adcs $acc4,$acc5,$t0 adcs $acc5,$acc6,$t1 adcs $acc6,$acc7,$t2 adcs $acc7,$carry,$t3 //adc $carry,xzr,xzr // moved above cbnz $cnt,.Lsqr8x_tail // note that carry flag is guaranteed // to be zero at this point ldp $a0,$a1,[$tp,#8*0] sub $cnt,$np_end,$np // done yet? sub $t2,$np_end,$num // rewinded np ldp $a2,$a3,[$tp,#8*2] ldp $a4,$a5,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $a6,$a7,[$tp,#8*6] cbz $cnt,.Lsqr8x_tail_break ldr $n0,[$rp,#-8*8] adds $acc0,$acc0,$a0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$a1 ldp $a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0] adcs $acc2,$acc2,$a2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$a3 ldp $a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2] adcs $acc4,$acc4,$a4 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$a5 ldp $a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4] adcs $acc6,$acc6,$a6 mov $cnt,#-8*8 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$a7 ldp $a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6] add $np,$np,#8*8 //adc $carry,xzr,xzr // moved above b .Lsqr8x_tail .align 4 .Lsqr8x_tail_break: ldr $n0,[x29,#112] // pull n0 add $cnt,$tp,#8*8 // end of current t[num] window subs xzr,$topmost,#1 // "move" top-most carry to carry bit adcs $t0,$acc0,$a0 adcs $t1,$acc1,$a1 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp,#8*0] adcs $acc2,$acc2,$a2 ldp $a0,$a1,[$t2,#8*0] // recall that $t2 is &n[0] adcs $acc3,$acc3,$a3 ldp $a2,$a3,[$t2,#8*2] adcs $acc4,$acc4,$a4 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$a5 ldp $a4,$a5,[$t2,#8*4] adcs $acc6,$acc6,$a6 adcs $acc7,$acc7,$a7 ldp $a6,$a7,[$t2,#8*6] add $np,$t2,#8*8 adc $topmost,xzr,xzr // top-most carry mul $na0,$n0,$acc0 stp $t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*0] stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#8*2] stp $acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $acc4,$acc5,[$rp,#8*4] cmp $cnt,x29 // did we hit the bottom? stp $acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6] mov $tp,$rp // slide the window ldp $acc6,$acc7,[$rp,#8*6] mov $cnt,#8 b.ne .Lsqr8x_reduction // Final step. We see if result is larger than modulus, and // if it is, subtract the modulus. But comparison implies // subtraction. So we subtract modulus, see if it borrowed, // and conditionally copy original value. ldr $rp,[x29,#96] // pull rp add $tp,$tp,#8*8 subs $t0,$acc0,$a0 sbcs $t1,$acc1,$a1 sub $cnt,$num,#8*8 mov $ap_end,$rp // $rp copy .Lsqr8x_sub: sbcs $t2,$acc2,$a2 ldp $a0,$a1,[$np,#8*0] sbcs $t3,$acc3,$a3 stp $t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0] sbcs $t0,$acc4,$a4 ldp $a2,$a3,[$np,#8*2] sbcs $t1,$acc5,$a5 stp $t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2] sbcs $t2,$acc6,$a6 ldp $a4,$a5,[$np,#8*4] sbcs $t3,$acc7,$a7 ldp $a6,$a7,[$np,#8*6] add $np,$np,#8*8 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] sub $cnt,$cnt,#8*8 ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] ldp $acc4,$acc5,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $acc6,$acc7,[$tp,#8*6] add $tp,$tp,#8*8 stp $t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*4] sbcs $t0,$acc0,$a0 stp $t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*6] add $rp,$rp,#8*8 sbcs $t1,$acc1,$a1 cbnz $cnt,.Lsqr8x_sub sbcs $t2,$acc2,$a2 mov $tp,sp add $ap,sp,$num ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*0] sbcs $t3,$acc3,$a3 stp $t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0] sbcs $t0,$acc4,$a4 ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*2] sbcs $t1,$acc5,$a5 stp $t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2] sbcs $t2,$acc6,$a6 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*0] sbcs $t3,$acc7,$a7 ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*2] sbcs xzr,$topmost,xzr // did it borrow? ldr x30,[x29,#8] // pull return address stp $t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*4] stp $t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*6] sub $cnt,$num,#8*4 .Lsqr4x_cond_copy: sub $cnt,$cnt,#8*4 csel $t0,$acc0,$a0,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0] csel $t1,$acc1,$a1,lo ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*4] ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*4] csel $t2,$acc2,$a2,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2] add $tp,$tp,#8*4 csel $t3,$acc3,$a3,lo ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*6] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*6] add $ap,$ap,#8*4 stp $t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0] stp $t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2] add $ap_end,$ap_end,#8*4 stp xzr,xzr,[$ap,#8*0] stp xzr,xzr,[$ap,#8*2] cbnz $cnt,.Lsqr4x_cond_copy csel $t0,$acc0,$a0,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0] csel $t1,$acc1,$a1,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2] csel $t2,$acc2,$a2,lo csel $t3,$acc3,$a3,lo stp $t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0] stp $t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2] b .Lsqr8x_done .align 4 .Lsqr8x8_post_condition: adc $carry,xzr,xzr ldr x30,[x29,#8] // pull return address // $acc0-7,$carry hold result, $a0-7 hold modulus subs $a0,$acc0,$a0 ldr $ap,[x29,#96] // pull rp sbcs $a1,$acc1,$a1 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*0] sbcs $a2,$acc2,$a2 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*2] sbcs $a3,$acc3,$a3 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*4] sbcs $a4,$acc4,$a4 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*6] sbcs $a5,$acc5,$a5 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*8] sbcs $a6,$acc6,$a6 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*10] sbcs $a7,$acc7,$a7 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*12] sbcs $carry,$carry,xzr // did it borrow? stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*14] // $a0-7 hold result-modulus csel $a0,$acc0,$a0,lo csel $a1,$acc1,$a1,lo csel $a2,$acc2,$a2,lo csel $a3,$acc3,$a3,lo stp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] csel $a4,$acc4,$a4,lo csel $a5,$acc5,$a5,lo stp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] csel $a6,$acc6,$a6,lo csel $a7,$acc7,$a7,lo stp $a4,$a5,[$ap,#8*4] stp $a6,$a7,[$ap,#8*6] .Lsqr8x_done: ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] mov sp,x29 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] mov x0,#1 ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldr x29,[sp],#128 ret .size __bn_sqr8x_mont,.-__bn_sqr8x_mont ___ } { ######################################################################## # Even though this might look as ARMv8 adaptation of mulx4x_mont from # x86_64-mont5 module, it's different in sense that it performs # reduction 256 bits at a time. my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3, $t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $m0,$m1,$m2,$m3, $acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4, $bi,$mi,$tp,$ap_end,$cnt) = map("x$_",(6..17,19..28)); my $bp_end=$rp; my ($carry,$topmost) = ($rp,"x30"); $code.=<<___; .type __bn_mul4x_mont,%function .align 5 __bn_mul4x_mont: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] stp x27,x28,[sp,#80] sub $tp,sp,$num,lsl#3 lsl $num,$num,#3 ldr $n0,[$n0] // *n0 sub sp,$tp,#8*4 // alloca add $t0,$bp,$num add $ap_end,$ap,$num stp $rp,$t0,[x29,#96] // offload rp and &b[num] ldr $bi,[$bp,#8*0] // b[0] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] // a[0..3] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] add $ap,$ap,#8*4 mov $acc0,xzr mov $acc1,xzr mov $acc2,xzr mov $acc3,xzr ldp $m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0] // n[0..3] ldp $m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2] adds $np,$np,#8*4 // clear carry bit mov $carry,xzr mov $cnt,#0 mov $tp,sp .Loop_mul4x_1st_reduction: mul $t0,$a0,$bi // lo(a[0..3]*b[0]) adc $carry,$carry,xzr // modulo-scheduled mul $t1,$a1,$bi add $cnt,$cnt,#8 mul $t2,$a2,$bi and $cnt,$cnt,#31 mul $t3,$a3,$bi adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 umulh $t0,$a0,$bi // hi(a[0..3]*b[0]) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 mul $mi,$acc0,$n0 // t[0]*n0 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t1,$a1,$bi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t2,$a2,$bi adc $acc4,xzr,xzr umulh $t3,$a3,$bi ldr $bi,[$bp,$cnt] // next b[i] (or b[0]) adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 // (*) mul $t0,$m0,$mi // lo(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0) str $mi,[$tp],#8 // put aside t[0]*n0 for tail processing adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 mul $t1,$m1,$mi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$m2,$mi adc $acc4,$acc4,$t3 // can't overflow mul $t3,$m3,$mi // (*) adds xzr,$acc0,$t0 subs xzr,$acc0,#1 // (*) umulh $t0,$m0,$mi // hi(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0) adcs $acc0,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$m1,$mi adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$m2,$mi adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$m3,$mi adcs $acc3,$acc4,$carry adc $carry,xzr,xzr adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 sub $t0,$ap_end,$ap adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 //adc $carry,$carry,xzr cbnz $cnt,.Loop_mul4x_1st_reduction cbz $t0,.Lmul4x4_post_condition ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] // a[4..7] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] add $ap,$ap,#8*4 ldr $mi,[sp] // a[0]*n0 ldp $m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0] // n[4..7] ldp $m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2] add $np,$np,#8*4 .Loop_mul4x_1st_tail: mul $t0,$a0,$bi // lo(a[4..7]*b[i]) adc $carry,$carry,xzr // modulo-scheduled mul $t1,$a1,$bi add $cnt,$cnt,#8 mul $t2,$a2,$bi and $cnt,$cnt,#31 mul $t3,$a3,$bi adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 umulh $t0,$a0,$bi // hi(a[4..7]*b[i]) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$a1,$bi adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$a2,$bi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$a3,$bi adc $acc4,xzr,xzr ldr $bi,[$bp,$cnt] // next b[i] (or b[0]) adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 mul $t0,$m0,$mi // lo(n[4..7]*a[0]*n0) adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 mul $t1,$m1,$mi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$m2,$mi adc $acc4,$acc4,$t3 // can't overflow mul $t3,$m3,$mi adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 umulh $t0,$m0,$mi // hi(n[4..7]*a[0]*n0) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$m1,$mi adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$m2,$mi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$carry umulh $t3,$m3,$mi adc $carry,xzr,xzr ldr $mi,[sp,$cnt] // next t[0]*n0 str $acc0,[$tp],#8 // result!!! adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 sub $t0,$ap_end,$ap // done yet? adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc4,$t3 //adc $carry,$carry,xzr cbnz $cnt,.Loop_mul4x_1st_tail sub $t1,$ap_end,$num // rewinded $ap cbz $t0,.Lmul4x_proceed ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] add $ap,$ap,#8*4 ldp $m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0] ldp $m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2] add $np,$np,#8*4 b .Loop_mul4x_1st_tail .align 5 .Lmul4x_proceed: ldr $bi,[$bp,#8*4]! // *++b adc $topmost,$carry,xzr ldp $a0,$a1,[$t1,#8*0] // a[0..3] sub $np,$np,$num // rewind np ldp $a2,$a3,[$t1,#8*2] add $ap,$t1,#8*4 stp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] // result!!! ldp $acc0,$acc1,[sp,#8*4] // t[0..3] stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] // result!!! ldp $acc2,$acc3,[sp,#8*6] ldp $m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0] // n[0..3] mov $tp,sp ldp $m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2] adds $np,$np,#8*4 // clear carry bit mov $carry,xzr .align 4 .Loop_mul4x_reduction: mul $t0,$a0,$bi // lo(a[0..3]*b[4]) adc $carry,$carry,xzr // modulo-scheduled mul $t1,$a1,$bi add $cnt,$cnt,#8 mul $t2,$a2,$bi and $cnt,$cnt,#31 mul $t3,$a3,$bi adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 umulh $t0,$a0,$bi // hi(a[0..3]*b[4]) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 mul $mi,$acc0,$n0 // t[0]*n0 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t1,$a1,$bi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t2,$a2,$bi adc $acc4,xzr,xzr umulh $t3,$a3,$bi ldr $bi,[$bp,$cnt] // next b[i] adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 // (*) mul $t0,$m0,$mi str $mi,[$tp],#8 // put aside t[0]*n0 for tail processing adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 mul $t1,$m1,$mi // lo(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$m2,$mi adc $acc4,$acc4,$t3 // can't overflow mul $t3,$m3,$mi // (*) adds xzr,$acc0,$t0 subs xzr,$acc0,#1 // (*) umulh $t0,$m0,$mi // hi(n[0..3]*t[0]*n0 adcs $acc0,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$m1,$mi adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$m2,$mi adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$m3,$mi adcs $acc3,$acc4,$carry adc $carry,xzr,xzr adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 //adc $carry,$carry,xzr cbnz $cnt,.Loop_mul4x_reduction adc $carry,$carry,xzr ldp $t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*4] // t[4..7] ldp $t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*6] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] // a[4..7] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] add $ap,$ap,#8*4 adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 //adc $carry,$carry,xzr ldr $mi,[sp] // t[0]*n0 ldp $m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0] // n[4..7] ldp $m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2] add $np,$np,#8*4 .align 4 .Loop_mul4x_tail: mul $t0,$a0,$bi // lo(a[4..7]*b[4]) adc $carry,$carry,xzr // modulo-scheduled mul $t1,$a1,$bi add $cnt,$cnt,#8 mul $t2,$a2,$bi and $cnt,$cnt,#31 mul $t3,$a3,$bi adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 umulh $t0,$a0,$bi // hi(a[4..7]*b[4]) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$a1,$bi adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$a2,$bi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$a3,$bi adc $acc4,xzr,xzr ldr $bi,[$bp,$cnt] // next b[i] adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 mul $t0,$m0,$mi // lo(n[4..7]*t[0]*n0) adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 mul $t1,$m1,$mi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$m2,$mi adc $acc4,$acc4,$t3 // can't overflow mul $t3,$m3,$mi adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 umulh $t0,$m0,$mi // hi(n[4..7]*t[0]*n0) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$m1,$mi adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$m2,$mi adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$m3,$mi adcs $acc4,$acc4,$carry ldr $mi,[sp,$cnt] // next a[0]*n0 adc $carry,xzr,xzr str $acc0,[$tp],#8 // result!!! adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 sub $t0,$ap_end,$ap // done yet? adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc4,$t3 //adc $carry,$carry,xzr cbnz $cnt,.Loop_mul4x_tail sub $t1,$np,$num // rewinded np? adc $carry,$carry,xzr cbz $t0,.Loop_mul4x_break ldp $t0,$t1,[$tp,#8*4] ldp $t2,$t3,[$tp,#8*6] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] add $ap,$ap,#8*4 adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 //adc $carry,$carry,xzr ldp $m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0] ldp $m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2] add $np,$np,#8*4 b .Loop_mul4x_tail .align 4 .Loop_mul4x_break: ldp $t2,$t3,[x29,#96] // pull rp and &b[num] adds $acc0,$acc0,$topmost add $bp,$bp,#8*4 // bp++ adcs $acc1,$acc1,xzr sub $ap,$ap,$num // rewind ap adcs $acc2,$acc2,xzr stp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] // result!!! adcs $acc3,$acc3,xzr ldp $acc0,$acc1,[sp,#8*4] // t[0..3] adc $topmost,$carry,xzr stp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] // result!!! cmp $bp,$t3 // done yet? ldp $acc2,$acc3,[sp,#8*6] ldp $m0,$m1,[$t1,#8*0] // n[0..3] ldp $m2,$m3,[$t1,#8*2] add $np,$t1,#8*4 b.eq .Lmul4x_post ldr $bi,[$bp] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] // a[0..3] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] adds $ap,$ap,#8*4 // clear carry bit mov $carry,xzr mov $tp,sp b .Loop_mul4x_reduction .align 4 .Lmul4x_post: // Final step. We see if result is larger than modulus, and // if it is, subtract the modulus. But comparison implies // subtraction. So we subtract modulus, see if it borrowed, // and conditionally copy original value. mov $rp,$t2 mov $ap_end,$t2 // $rp copy subs $t0,$acc0,$m0 add $tp,sp,#8*8 sbcs $t1,$acc1,$m1 sub $cnt,$num,#8*4 .Lmul4x_sub: sbcs $t2,$acc2,$m2 ldp $m0,$m1,[$np,#8*0] sub $cnt,$cnt,#8*4 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$tp,#8*0] sbcs $t3,$acc3,$m3 ldp $m2,$m3,[$np,#8*2] add $np,$np,#8*4 ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$tp,#8*2] add $tp,$tp,#8*4 stp $t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0] sbcs $t0,$acc0,$m0 stp $t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2] add $rp,$rp,#8*4 sbcs $t1,$acc1,$m1 cbnz $cnt,.Lmul4x_sub sbcs $t2,$acc2,$m2 mov $tp,sp add $ap,sp,#8*4 ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*0] sbcs $t3,$acc3,$m3 stp $t0,$t1,[$rp,#8*0] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*2] stp $t2,$t3,[$rp,#8*2] ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*0] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*2] sbcs xzr,$topmost,xzr // did it borrow? ldr x30,[x29,#8] // pull return address sub $cnt,$num,#8*4 .Lmul4x_cond_copy: sub $cnt,$cnt,#8*4 csel $t0,$acc0,$a0,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0] csel $t1,$acc1,$a1,lo ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_end,#8*4] ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#8*4] csel $t2,$acc2,$a2,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2] add $tp,$tp,#8*4 csel $t3,$acc3,$a3,lo ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_end,#8*6] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#8*6] add $ap,$ap,#8*4 stp $t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0] stp $t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2] add $ap_end,$ap_end,#8*4 cbnz $cnt,.Lmul4x_cond_copy csel $t0,$acc0,$a0,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*0] csel $t1,$acc1,$a1,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*2] csel $t2,$acc2,$a2,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*3] csel $t3,$acc3,$a3,lo stp xzr,xzr,[$tp,#8*4] stp $t0,$t1,[$ap_end,#8*0] stp $t2,$t3,[$ap_end,#8*2] b .Lmul4x_done .align 4 .Lmul4x4_post_condition: adc $carry,$carry,xzr ldr $ap,[x29,#96] // pull rp // $acc0-3,$carry hold result, $m0-7 hold modulus subs $a0,$acc0,$m0 ldr x30,[x29,#8] // pull return address sbcs $a1,$acc1,$m1 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*0] sbcs $a2,$acc2,$m2 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*2] sbcs $a3,$acc3,$m3 stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*4] sbcs xzr,$carry,xzr // did it borrow? stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#8*6] // $a0-3 hold result-modulus csel $a0,$acc0,$a0,lo csel $a1,$acc1,$a1,lo csel $a2,$acc2,$a2,lo csel $a3,$acc3,$a3,lo stp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#8*0] stp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#8*2] .Lmul4x_done: ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] mov sp,x29 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] mov x0,#1 ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldr x29,[sp],#128 ret .size __bn_mul4x_mont,.-__bn_mul4x_mont ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl0000644000000000000000000002132513176625656016710 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # May 2011 # # The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for # the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable # for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and # later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. # Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code # [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on # 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that # these coefficients are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not # all CPU time is burnt in it... $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; ($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx"); $a=$lo; ($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi"); ($t0,$t1)=("%rbx","%rcx"); ($b,$mask)=("%rbp","%r8"); ($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(9..15)); ($R,$Tx)=("%xmm0","%xmm1"); $code.=<<___; .text .type _mul_1x1,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _mul_1x1: sub \$128+8,%rsp mov \$-1,$a1 lea ($a,$a),$i0 shr \$3,$a1 lea (,$a,4),$i1 and $a,$a1 # a1=a&0x1fffffffffffffff lea (,$a,8),$a8 sar \$63,$a # broadcast 63rd bit lea ($a1,$a1),$a2 sar \$63,$i0 # broadcast 62nd bit lea (,$a1,4),$a4 and $b,$a sar \$63,$i1 # boardcast 61st bit mov $a,$hi # $a is $lo shl \$63,$lo and $b,$i0 shr \$1,$hi mov $i0,$t1 shl \$62,$i0 and $b,$i1 shr \$2,$t1 xor $i0,$lo mov $i1,$t0 shl \$61,$i1 xor $t1,$hi shr \$3,$t0 xor $i1,$lo xor $t0,$hi mov $a1,$a12 movq \$0,0(%rsp) # tab[0]=0 xor $a2,$a12 # a1^a2 mov $a1,8(%rsp) # tab[1]=a1 mov $a4,$a48 mov $a2,16(%rsp) # tab[2]=a2 xor $a8,$a48 # a4^a8 mov $a12,24(%rsp) # tab[3]=a1^a2 xor $a4,$a1 mov $a4,32(%rsp) # tab[4]=a4 xor $a4,$a2 mov $a1,40(%rsp) # tab[5]=a1^a4 xor $a4,$a12 mov $a2,48(%rsp) # tab[6]=a2^a4 xor $a48,$a1 # a1^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8 mov $a12,56(%rsp) # tab[7]=a1^a2^a4 xor $a48,$a2 # a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8 mov $a8,64(%rsp) # tab[8]=a8 xor $a48,$a12 # a1^a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a2^a8 mov $a1,72(%rsp) # tab[9]=a1^a8 xor $a4,$a1 # a1^a8^a4 mov $a2,80(%rsp) # tab[10]=a2^a8 xor $a4,$a2 # a2^a8^a4 mov $a12,88(%rsp) # tab[11]=a1^a2^a8 xor $a4,$a12 # a1^a2^a8^a4 mov $a48,96(%rsp) # tab[12]=a4^a8 mov $mask,$i0 mov $a1,104(%rsp) # tab[13]=a1^a4^a8 and $b,$i0 mov $a2,112(%rsp) # tab[14]=a2^a4^a8 shr \$4,$b mov $a12,120(%rsp) # tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8 mov $mask,$i1 and $b,$i1 shr \$4,$b movq (%rsp,$i0,8),$R # half of calculations is done in SSE2 mov $mask,$i0 and $b,$i0 shr \$4,$b ___ for ($n=1;$n<8;$n++) { $code.=<<___; mov (%rsp,$i1,8),$t1 mov $mask,$i1 mov $t1,$t0 shl \$`8*$n-4`,$t1 and $b,$i1 movq (%rsp,$i0,8),$Tx shr \$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0 xor $t1,$lo pslldq \$$n,$Tx mov $mask,$i0 shr \$4,$b xor $t0,$hi and $b,$i0 shr \$4,$b pxor $Tx,$R ___ } $code.=<<___; mov (%rsp,$i1,8),$t1 mov $t1,$t0 shl \$`8*$n-4`,$t1 movq $R,$i0 shr \$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0 xor $t1,$lo psrldq \$8,$R xor $t0,$hi movq $R,$i1 xor $i0,$lo xor $i1,$hi add \$128+8,%rsp ret .Lend_mul_1x1: .size _mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1 ___ ($rp,$a1,$a0,$b1,$b0) = $win64? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9","%r10") : # Win64 order ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8"); # Unix order $code.=<<___; .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%rax bt \$33,%rax jnc .Lvanilla_mul_2x2 movq $a1,%xmm0 movq $b1,%xmm1 movq $a0,%xmm2 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movq 40(%rsp),%xmm3 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); movq $b0,%xmm3 ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm5 pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm4 pxor %xmm3,%xmm5 pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0 pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) xorps %xmm0,%xmm4 xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5 pslldq \$8,%xmm4 psrldq \$8,%xmm5 pxor %xmm4,%xmm2 pxor %xmm5,%xmm0 movdqu %xmm2,0($rp) movdqu %xmm0,16($rp) ret .align 16 .Lvanilla_mul_2x2: lea -8*17(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); mov `8*17+40`(%rsp),$b0 mov %rdi,8*15(%rsp) mov %rsi,8*16(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; mov %r14,8*10(%rsp) mov %r13,8*11(%rsp) mov %r12,8*12(%rsp) mov %rbp,8*13(%rsp) mov %rbx,8*14(%rsp) .Lbody_mul_2x2: mov $rp,32(%rsp) # save the arguments mov $a1,40(%rsp) mov $a0,48(%rsp) mov $b1,56(%rsp) mov $b0,64(%rsp) mov \$0xf,$mask mov $a1,$a mov $b1,$b call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1 mov $lo,16(%rsp) mov $hi,24(%rsp) mov 48(%rsp),$a mov 64(%rsp),$b call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0 mov $lo,0(%rsp) mov $hi,8(%rsp) mov 40(%rsp),$a mov 56(%rsp),$b xor 48(%rsp),$a xor 64(%rsp),$b call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) ___ @r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi"); $code.=<<___; mov 0(%rsp),@r[0] mov 8(%rsp),@r[1] mov 16(%rsp),@r[2] mov 24(%rsp),@r[3] mov 32(%rsp),%rbp xor $hi,$lo xor @r[1],$hi xor @r[0],$lo mov @r[0],0(%rbp) xor @r[2],$hi mov @r[3],24(%rbp) xor @r[3],$lo xor @r[3],$hi xor $hi,$lo mov $hi,16(%rbp) mov $lo,8(%rbp) mov 8*10(%rsp),%r14 mov 8*11(%rsp),%r13 mov 8*12(%rsp),%r12 mov 8*13(%rsp),%rbp mov 8*14(%rsp),%rbx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); mov 8*15(%rsp),%rdi mov 8*16(%rsp),%rsi ___ $code.=<<___; lea 8*17(%rsp),%rsp ret .Lend_mul_2x2: .size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .asciz "GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 16 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lbody_mul_2x2(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<"prologue" label jb .Lin_prologue mov 8*10(%rax),%r14 # mimic epilogue mov 8*11(%rax),%r13 mov 8*12(%rax),%r12 mov 8*13(%rax),%rbp mov 8*14(%rax),%rbx mov 8*15(%rax),%rdi mov 8*16(%rax),%rsi mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 .Lin_prologue: lea 8*17(%rax),%rax mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva _mul_1x1 .rva .Lend_mul_1x1 .rva .LSEH_info_1x1 .rva .Lvanilla_mul_2x2 .rva .Lend_mul_2x2 .rva .LSEH_info_2x2 .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_1x1: .byte 0x01,0x07,0x02,0x00 .byte 0x07,0x01,0x11,0x00 # sub rsp,128+8 .LSEH_info_2x2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/bn-c64xplus.asm0000644000000000000000000002362113176625656017354 0ustar rootroot;; Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. ;; ;; Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use ;; this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy ;; in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at ;; https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ;; ;;==================================================================== ;; Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL ;; project. ;; ;; Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are ;; granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is ;; disclaimed. ;;==================================================================== ;; Compiler-generated multiply-n-add SPLOOP runs at 12*n cycles, n ;; being the number of 32-bit words, addition - 8*n. Corresponding 4x ;; unrolled SPLOOP-free loops - at ~8*n and ~5*n. Below assembler ;; SPLOOPs spin at ... 2*n cycles [plus epilogue]. ;;==================================================================== .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .asg bn_mul_add_words,_bn_mul_add_words .asg bn_mul_words,_bn_mul_words .asg bn_sqr_words,_bn_sqr_words .asg bn_add_words,_bn_add_words .asg bn_sub_words,_bn_sub_words .asg bn_div_words,_bn_div_words .asg bn_sqr_comba8,_bn_sqr_comba8 .asg bn_mul_comba8,_bn_mul_comba8 .asg bn_sqr_comba4,_bn_sqr_comba4 .asg bn_mul_comba4,_bn_mul_comba4 .endif .asg B3,RA .asg A4,ARG0 .asg B4,ARG1 .asg A6,ARG2 .asg B6,ARG3 .asg A8,ARG4 .asg B8,ARG5 .asg A4,RET .asg A15,FP .asg B14,DP .asg B15,SP .global _bn_mul_add_words _bn_mul_add_words: .asmfunc MV ARG2,B0 [!B0] BNOP RA ||[!B0] MVK 0,RET [B0] MVC B0,ILC [B0] ZERO A19 ; high part of accumulator || [B0] MV ARG0,A2 || [B0] MV ARG3,A3 NOP 3 SPLOOP 2 ; 2*n+10 ;;==================================================================== LDW *ARG1++,B7 ; ap[i] NOP 3 LDW *ARG0++,A7 ; rp[i] MPY32U B7,A3,A17:A16 NOP 3 ; [2,0] in epilogue ADDU A16,A7,A21:A20 ADDU A19,A21:A20,A19:A18 || MV.S A17,A23 SPKERNEL 2,1 ; leave slot for "return value" || STW A18,*A2++ ; rp[i] || ADD A19,A23,A19 ;;==================================================================== BNOP RA,4 MV A19,RET ; return value .endasmfunc .global _bn_mul_words _bn_mul_words: .asmfunc MV ARG2,B0 [!B0] BNOP RA ||[!B0] MVK 0,RET [B0] MVC B0,ILC [B0] ZERO A19 ; high part of accumulator NOP 3 SPLOOP 2 ; 2*n+10 ;;==================================================================== LDW *ARG1++,A7 ; ap[i] NOP 4 MPY32U A7,ARG3,A17:A16 NOP 4 ; [2,0] in epiloque ADDU A19,A16,A19:A18 || MV.S A17,A21 SPKERNEL 2,1 ; leave slot for "return value" || STW A18,*ARG0++ ; rp[i] || ADD.L A19,A21,A19 ;;==================================================================== BNOP RA,4 MV A19,RET ; return value .endasmfunc .global _bn_sqr_words _bn_sqr_words: .asmfunc MV ARG2,B0 [!B0] BNOP RA ||[!B0] MVK 0,RET [B0] MVC B0,ILC [B0] MV ARG0,B2 || [B0] ADD 4,ARG0,ARG0 NOP 3 SPLOOP 2 ; 2*n+10 ;;==================================================================== LDW *ARG1++,B7 ; ap[i] NOP 4 MPY32U B7,B7,B1:B0 NOP 3 ; [2,0] in epilogue STW B0,*B2++(8) ; rp[2*i] MV B1,A1 SPKERNEL 2,0 ; fully overlap BNOP RA,5 || STW A1,*ARG0++(8) ; rp[2*i+1] ;;==================================================================== BNOP RA,5 .endasmfunc .global _bn_add_words _bn_add_words: .asmfunc MV ARG3,B0 [!B0] BNOP RA ||[!B0] MVK 0,RET [B0] MVC B0,ILC [B0] ZERO A1 ; carry flag || [B0] MV ARG0,A3 NOP 3 SPLOOP 2 ; 2*n+6 ;;==================================================================== LDW *ARG2++,A7 ; bp[i] || LDW *ARG1++,B7 ; ap[i] NOP 4 ADDU A7,B7,A9:A8 ADDU A1,A9:A8,A1:A0 SPKERNEL 0,0 ; fully overlap BNOP RA,5 || STW A0,*A3++ ; write result || MV A1,RET ; keep carry flag in RET ;;==================================================================== BNOP RA,5 .endasmfunc .global _bn_sub_words _bn_sub_words: .asmfunc MV ARG3,B0 [!B0] BNOP RA ||[!B0] MVK 0,RET [B0] MVC B0,ILC [B0] ZERO A2 ; borrow flag || [B0] MV ARG0,A3 NOP 3 SPLOOP 2 ; 2*n+6 ;;==================================================================== LDW *ARG2++,A7 ; bp[i] || LDW *ARG1++,B7 ; ap[i] NOP 4 SUBU B7,A7,A1:A0 [A2] SUB A1:A0,1,A1:A0 SPKERNEL 0,1 ; leave slot for "return borrow flag" || STW A0,*A3++ ; write result || AND 1,A1,A2 ; pass on borrow flag ;;==================================================================== BNOP RA,4 AND 1,A1,RET ; return borrow flag .endasmfunc .global _bn_div_words _bn_div_words: .asmfunc LMBD 1,A6,A0 ; leading zero bits in dv LMBD 1,A4,A1 ; leading zero bits in hi || MVK 32,B0 CMPLTU A1,A0,A2 || ADD A0,B0,B0 [ A2] BNOP RA ||[ A2] MVK -1,A4 ; return overflow ||[!A2] MV A4,A3 ; reassign hi [!A2] MV B4,A4 ; reassign lo, will be quotient ||[!A2] MVC B0,ILC [!A2] SHL A6,A0,A6 ; normalize dv || MVK 1,A1 [!A2] CMPLTU A3,A6,A1 ; hi>31 SPLOOP 3 [!A1] CMPLTU A3,A6,A1 ; hi>31 SPKERNEL BNOP RA,5 .endasmfunc ;;==================================================================== ;; Not really Comba algorithm, just straightforward NxM... Dedicated ;; fully unrolled real Comba implementations are asymptotically 2x ;; faster, but naturally larger undertaking. Purpose of this exercise ;; was rather to learn to master nested SPLOOPs... ;;==================================================================== .global _bn_sqr_comba8 .global _bn_mul_comba8 _bn_sqr_comba8: MV ARG1,ARG2 _bn_mul_comba8: .asmfunc MVK 8,B0 ; N, RILC || MVK 8,A0 ; M, outer loop counter || MV ARG1,A5 ; copy ap || MV ARG0,B4 ; copy rp || ZERO B19 ; high part of accumulator MVC B0,RILC || SUB B0,2,B1 ; N-2, initial ILC || SUB B0,1,B2 ; const B2=N-1 || LDW *A5++,B6 ; ap[0] || MV A0,A3 ; const A3=M sploopNxM?: ; for best performance arrange M<=N [A0] SPLOOPD 2 ; 2*n+10 || MVC B1,ILC || ADDAW B4,B0,B5 || ZERO B7 || LDW *A5++,A9 ; pre-fetch ap[1] || ZERO A1 || SUB A0,1,A0 ;;==================================================================== ;; SPLOOP from bn_mul_add_words, but with flipped A<>B register files. ;; This is because of Advisory 15 from TI publication SPRZ247I. LDW *ARG2++,A7 ; bp[i] NOP 3 [A1] LDW *B5++,B7 ; rp[i] MPY32U A7,B6,B17:B16 NOP 3 ADDU B16,B7,B21:B20 ADDU B19,B21:B20,B19:B18 || MV.S B17,B23 SPKERNEL || STW B18,*B4++ ; rp[i] || ADD.S B19,B23,B19 ;;==================================================================== outer?: ; m*2*(n+1)+10 SUBAW ARG2,A3,ARG2 ; rewind bp to bp[0] SPMASKR || CMPGT A0,1,A2 ; done pre-fetching ap[i+1]? MVD A9,B6 ; move through .M unit(*) [A2] LDW *A5++,A9 ; pre-fetch ap[i+1] SUBAW B5,B2,B5 ; rewind rp to rp[1] MVK 1,A1 [A0] BNOP.S1 outer?,4 || [A0] SUB.L A0,1,A0 STW B19,*B4--[B2] ; rewind rp tp rp[1] || ZERO.S B19 ; high part of accumulator ;; end of outer? BNOP RA,5 ; return .endasmfunc ;; (*) It should be noted that B6 is used as input to MPY32U in ;; chronologically next cycle in *preceding* SPLOOP iteration. ;; Normally such arrangement would require DINT, but at this ;; point SPLOOP is draining and interrupts are disabled ;; implicitly. .global _bn_sqr_comba4 .global _bn_mul_comba4 _bn_sqr_comba4: MV ARG1,ARG2 _bn_mul_comba4: .asmfunc .if 0 BNOP sploopNxM?,3 ;; Above mentioned m*2*(n+1)+10 does not apply in n=m=4 case, ;; because of low-counter effect, when prologue phase finishes ;; before SPKERNEL instruction is reached. As result it's 25% ;; slower than expected... MVK 4,B0 ; N, RILC || MVK 4,A0 ; M, outer loop counter || MV ARG1,A5 ; copy ap || MV ARG0,B4 ; copy rp || ZERO B19 ; high part of accumulator MVC B0,RILC || SUB B0,2,B1 ; first ILC || SUB B0,1,B2 ; const B2=N-1 || LDW *A5++,B6 ; ap[0] || MV A0,A3 ; const A3=M .else ;; This alternative is an exercise in fully unrolled Comba ;; algorithm implementation that operates at n*(n+1)+12, or ;; as little as 32 cycles... LDW *ARG1[0],B16 ; a[0] || LDW *ARG2[0],A16 ; b[0] LDW *ARG1[1],B17 ; a[1] || LDW *ARG2[1],A17 ; b[1] LDW *ARG1[2],B18 ; a[2] || LDW *ARG2[2],A18 ; b[2] LDW *ARG1[3],B19 ; a[3] || LDW *ARG2[3],A19 ; b[3] NOP MPY32U A16,B16,A1:A0 ; a[0]*b[0] MPY32U A17,B16,A23:A22 ; a[0]*b[1] MPY32U A16,B17,A25:A24 ; a[1]*b[0] MPY32U A16,B18,A27:A26 ; a[2]*b[0] STW A0,*ARG0[0] || MPY32U A17,B17,A29:A28 ; a[1]*b[1] MPY32U A18,B16,A31:A30 ; a[0]*b[2] || ADDU A22,A1,A1:A0 MV A23,B0 || MPY32U A19,B16,A21:A20 ; a[3]*b[0] || ADDU A24,A1:A0,A1:A0 ADDU A25,B0,B1:B0 || STW A0,*ARG0[1] || MPY32U A18,B17,A23:A22 ; a[2]*b[1] || ADDU A26,A1,A9:A8 ADDU A27,B1,B9:B8 || MPY32U A17,B18,A25:A24 ; a[1]*b[2] || ADDU A28,A9:A8,A9:A8 ADDU A29,B9:B8,B9:B8 || MPY32U A16,B19,A27:A26 ; a[0]*b[3] || ADDU A30,A9:A8,A9:A8 ADDU A31,B9:B8,B9:B8 || ADDU B0,A9:A8,A9:A8 STW A8,*ARG0[2] || ADDU A20,A9,A1:A0 ADDU A21,B9,B1:B0 || MPY32U A19,B17,A21:A20 ; a[3]*b[1] || ADDU A22,A1:A0,A1:A0 ADDU A23,B1:B0,B1:B0 || MPY32U A18,B18,A23:A22 ; a[2]*b[2] || ADDU A24,A1:A0,A1:A0 ADDU A25,B1:B0,B1:B0 || MPY32U A17,B19,A25:A24 ; a[1]*b[3] || ADDU A26,A1:A0,A1:A0 ADDU A27,B1:B0,B1:B0 || ADDU B8,A1:A0,A1:A0 STW A0,*ARG0[3] || MPY32U A19,B18,A27:A26 ; a[3]*b[2] || ADDU A20,A1,A9:A8 ADDU A21,B1,B9:B8 || MPY32U A18,B19,A29:A28 ; a[2]*b[3] || ADDU A22,A9:A8,A9:A8 ADDU A23,B9:B8,B9:B8 || MPY32U A19,B19,A31:A30 ; a[3]*b[3] || ADDU A24,A9:A8,A9:A8 ADDU A25,B9:B8,B9:B8 || ADDU B0,A9:A8,A9:A8 STW A8,*ARG0[4] || ADDU A26,A9,A1:A0 ADDU A27,B9,B1:B0 || ADDU A28,A1:A0,A1:A0 ADDU A29,B1:B0,B1:B0 || BNOP RA || ADDU B8,A1:A0,A1:A0 STW A0,*ARG0[5] || ADDU A30,A1,A9:A8 ADD A31,B1,B8 ADDU B0,A9:A8,A9:A8 ; removed || to avoid cross-path stall below ADD B8,A9,A9 || STW A8,*ARG0[6] STW A9,*ARG0[7] .endif .endasmfunc openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000001741613176625656016664 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # April 2006 # "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for PowerPC. It's possible # to gain a bit more by modulo-scheduling outer loop, then dedicated # squaring procedure should give further 20% and code can be adapted # for 32-bit application running on 64-bit CPU. As for the latter. # It won't be able to achieve "native" 64-bit performance, because in # 32-bit application context every addc instruction will have to be # expanded as addc, twice right shift by 32 and finally adde, etc. # So far RSA *sign* performance improvement over pre-bn_mul_mont asm # for 64-bit application running on PPC970/G5 is: # # 512-bit +65% # 1024-bit +35% # 2048-bit +18% # 4096-bit +4% $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /32/) { $BITS= 32; $BNSZ= $BITS/8; $SIZE_T=4; $RZONE= 224; $LD= "lwz"; # load $LDU= "lwzu"; # load and update $LDX= "lwzx"; # load indexed $ST= "stw"; # store $STU= "stwu"; # store and update $STX= "stwx"; # store indexed $STUX= "stwux"; # store indexed and update $UMULL= "mullw"; # unsigned multiply low $UMULH= "mulhwu"; # unsigned multiply high $UCMP= "cmplw"; # unsigned compare $SHRI= "srwi"; # unsigned shift right by immediate $PUSH= $ST; $POP= $LD; } elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) { $BITS= 64; $BNSZ= $BITS/8; $SIZE_T=8; $RZONE= 288; # same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics... $LD= "ld"; # load $LDU= "ldu"; # load and update $LDX= "ldx"; # load indexed $ST= "std"; # store $STU= "stdu"; # store and update $STX= "stdx"; # store indexed $STUX= "stdux"; # store indexed and update $UMULL= "mulld"; # unsigned multiply low $UMULH= "mulhdu"; # unsigned multiply high $UCMP= "cmpld"; # unsigned compare $SHRI= "srdi"; # unsigned shift right by immediate $PUSH= $ST; $POP= $LD; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $FRAME=8*$SIZE_T+$RZONE; $LOCALS=8*$SIZE_T; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $sp="r1"; $toc="r2"; $rp="r3"; $ovf="r3"; $ap="r4"; $bp="r5"; $np="r6"; $n0="r7"; $num="r8"; $rp="r9"; # $rp is reassigned $aj="r10"; $nj="r11"; $tj="r12"; # non-volatile registers $i="r20"; $j="r21"; $tp="r22"; $m0="r23"; $m1="r24"; $lo0="r25"; $hi0="r26"; $lo1="r27"; $hi1="r28"; $alo="r29"; $ahi="r30"; $nlo="r31"; # $nhi="r0"; $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .bn_mul_mont_int .align 4 .bn_mul_mont_int: cmpwi $num,4 mr $rp,r3 ; $rp is reassigned li r3,0 bltlr ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BNSZ==4); cmpwi $num,32 ; longer key performance is not better bgelr ___ $code.=<<___; slwi $num,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` li $tj,-4096 addi $ovf,$num,$FRAME subf $ovf,$ovf,$sp ; $sp-$ovf and $ovf,$ovf,$tj ; minimize TLB usage subf $ovf,$sp,$ovf ; $ovf-$sp mr $tj,$sp srwi $num,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` $STUX $sp,$sp,$ovf $PUSH r20,`-12*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r21,`-11*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r22,`-10*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r23,`-9*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r24,`-8*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r25,`-7*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r26,`-6*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r27,`-5*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r28,`-4*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r29,`-3*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r30,`-2*$SIZE_T`($tj) $PUSH r31,`-1*$SIZE_T`($tj) $LD $n0,0($n0) ; pull n0[0] value addi $num,$num,-2 ; adjust $num for counter register $LD $m0,0($bp) ; m0=bp[0] $LD $aj,0($ap) ; ap[0] addi $tp,$sp,$LOCALS $UMULL $lo0,$aj,$m0 ; ap[0]*bp[0] $UMULH $hi0,$aj,$m0 $LD $aj,$BNSZ($ap) ; ap[1] $LD $nj,0($np) ; np[0] $UMULL $m1,$lo0,$n0 ; "tp[0]"*n0 $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[1]*bp[0] $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 $UMULL $lo1,$nj,$m1 ; np[0]*m1 $UMULH $hi1,$nj,$m1 $LD $nj,$BNSZ($np) ; np[1] addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 addze $hi1,$hi1 $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[1]*m1 $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 mtctr $num li $j,`2*$BNSZ` .align 4 L1st: $LDX $aj,$ap,$j ; ap[j] addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $LDX $nj,$np,$j ; np[j] addze $hi0,$ahi $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[j]*bp[0] addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 addze $hi1,$nhi $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[j]*m1 addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] addi $j,$j,$BNSZ ; j++ addi $tp,$tp,$BNSZ ; tp++ bdnz L1st ;L1st addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 addze $hi0,$ahi addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 addze $hi1,$nhi addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] li $ovf,0 addc $hi1,$hi1,$hi0 addze $ovf,$ovf ; upmost overflow bit $ST $hi1,$BNSZ($tp) li $i,$BNSZ .align 4 Louter: $LDX $m0,$bp,$i ; m0=bp[i] $LD $aj,0($ap) ; ap[0] addi $tp,$sp,$LOCALS $LD $tj,$LOCALS($sp); tp[0] $UMULL $lo0,$aj,$m0 ; ap[0]*bp[i] $UMULH $hi0,$aj,$m0 $LD $aj,$BNSZ($ap) ; ap[1] $LD $nj,0($np) ; np[0] addc $lo0,$lo0,$tj ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[j]*bp[i] addze $hi0,$hi0 $UMULL $m1,$lo0,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0 $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 $UMULL $lo1,$nj,$m1 ; np[0]*m1 $UMULH $hi1,$nj,$m1 $LD $nj,$BNSZ($np) ; np[1] addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[1]*m1 addze $hi1,$hi1 $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 mtctr $num li $j,`2*$BNSZ` .align 4 Linner: $LDX $aj,$ap,$j ; ap[j] addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $LD $tj,$BNSZ($tp) ; tp[j] addze $hi0,$ahi $LDX $nj,$np,$j ; np[j] addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 $UMULL $alo,$aj,$m0 ; ap[j]*bp[i] addze $hi1,$nhi $UMULH $ahi,$aj,$m0 addc $lo0,$lo0,$tj ; ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] $UMULL $nlo,$nj,$m1 ; np[j]*m1 addze $hi0,$hi0 $UMULH $nhi,$nj,$m1 addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addi $j,$j,$BNSZ ; j++ addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] addi $tp,$tp,$BNSZ ; tp++ bdnz Linner ;Linner $LD $tj,$BNSZ($tp) ; tp[j] addc $lo0,$alo,$hi0 addze $hi0,$ahi addc $lo0,$lo0,$tj ; ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addze $hi0,$hi0 addc $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 addze $hi1,$nhi addc $lo1,$lo1,$lo0 ; np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] addze $hi1,$hi1 $ST $lo1,0($tp) ; tp[j-1] addic $ovf,$ovf,-1 ; move upmost overflow to XER[CA] li $ovf,0 adde $hi1,$hi1,$hi0 addze $ovf,$ovf $ST $hi1,$BNSZ($tp) ; slwi $tj,$num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` $UCMP $i,$tj addi $i,$i,$BNSZ ble Louter addi $num,$num,2 ; restore $num subfc $j,$j,$j ; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA] addi $tp,$sp,$LOCALS mtctr $num .align 4 Lsub: $LDX $tj,$tp,$j $LDX $nj,$np,$j subfe $aj,$nj,$tj ; tp[j]-np[j] $STX $aj,$rp,$j addi $j,$j,$BNSZ bdnz Lsub li $j,0 mtctr $num subfe $ovf,$j,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit and $ap,$tp,$ovf andc $np,$rp,$ovf or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp .align 4 Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh $LDX $tj,$ap,$j $STX $tj,$rp,$j $STX $j,$tp,$j ; zap at once addi $j,$j,$BNSZ bdnz Lcopy $POP $tj,0($sp) li r3,1 $POP r20,`-12*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r21,`-11*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r22,`-10*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r23,`-9*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r24,`-8*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r25,`-7*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r26,`-6*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r27,`-5*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r28,`-4*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r29,`-3*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r30,`-2*$SIZE_T`($tj) $POP r31,`-1*$SIZE_T`($tj) mr $sp,$tj blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,0,0x80,12,6,0 .long 0 .size .bn_mul_mont_int,.-.bn_mul_mont_int .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl0000644000000000000000000000777313176625656017455 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # February 2012 # # The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication # used in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from # C for the time being... The subroutine runs in 37 cycles, which is # 4.5x faster than compiler-generated code. Though comparison is # totally unfair, because this module utilizes Galois Field Multiply # instruction. while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; ($rp,$a1,$a0,$b1,$b0)=("A4","B4","A6","B6","A8"); # argument vector ($Alo,$Alox0,$Alox1,$Alox2,$Alox3)=map("A$_",(16..20)); ($Ahi,$Ahix0,$Ahix1,$Ahix2,$Ahix3)=map("B$_",(16..20)); ($B_0,$B_1,$B_2,$B_3)=("B5","A5","A7","B7"); ($A,$B)=($Alo,$B_1); $xFF="B1"; sub mul_1x1_upper { my ($A,$B)=@_; $code.=<<___; EXTU $B,8,24,$B_2 ; smash $B to 4 bytes || AND $B,$xFF,$B_0 || SHRU $B,24,$B_3 SHRU $A,16, $Ahi ; smash $A to two halfwords || EXTU $A,16,16,$Alo XORMPY $Alo,$B_2,$Alox2 ; 16x8 bits muliplication || XORMPY $Ahi,$B_2,$Ahix2 || EXTU $B,16,24,$B_1 XORMPY $Alo,$B_0,$Alox0 || XORMPY $Ahi,$B_0,$Ahix0 XORMPY $Alo,$B_3,$Alox3 || XORMPY $Ahi,$B_3,$Ahix3 XORMPY $Alo,$B_1,$Alox1 || XORMPY $Ahi,$B_1,$Ahix1 ___ } sub mul_1x1_merged { my ($OUTlo,$OUThi,$A,$B)=@_; $code.=<<___; EXTU $B,8,24,$B_2 ; smash $B to 4 bytes || AND $B,$xFF,$B_0 || SHRU $B,24,$B_3 SHRU $A,16, $Ahi ; smash $A to two halfwords || EXTU $A,16,16,$Alo XOR $Ahix0,$Alox2,$Ahix0 || MV $Ahix2,$OUThi || XORMPY $Alo,$B_2,$Alox2 XORMPY $Ahi,$B_2,$Ahix2 || EXTU $B,16,24,$B_1 || XORMPY $Alo,$B_0,A1 ; $Alox0 XOR $Ahix1,$Alox3,$Ahix1 || SHL $Ahix0,16,$OUTlo || SHRU $Ahix0,16,$Ahix0 XOR $Alox0,$OUTlo,$OUTlo || XOR $Ahix0,$OUThi,$OUThi || XORMPY $Ahi,$B_0,$Ahix0 || XORMPY $Alo,$B_3,$Alox3 || SHL $Alox1,8,$Alox1 || SHL $Ahix3,8,$Ahix3 XOR $Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo || XOR $Ahix3,$OUThi,$OUThi || XORMPY $Ahi,$B_3,$Ahix3 || SHL $Ahix1,24,$Alox1 || SHRU $Ahix1,8, $Ahix1 XOR $Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo || XOR $Ahix1,$OUThi,$OUThi || XORMPY $Alo,$B_1,$Alox1 || XORMPY $Ahi,$B_1,$Ahix1 || MV A1,$Alox0 ___ } sub mul_1x1_lower { my ($OUTlo,$OUThi)=@_; $code.=<<___; ;NOP XOR $Ahix0,$Alox2,$Ahix0 || MV $Ahix2,$OUThi NOP XOR $Ahix1,$Alox3,$Ahix1 || SHL $Ahix0,16,$OUTlo || SHRU $Ahix0,16,$Ahix0 XOR $Alox0,$OUTlo,$OUTlo || XOR $Ahix0,$OUThi,$OUThi || SHL $Alox1,8,$Alox1 || SHL $Ahix3,8,$Ahix3 XOR $Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo || XOR $Ahix3,$OUThi,$OUThi || SHL $Ahix1,24,$Alox1 || SHRU $Ahix1,8, $Ahix1 XOR $Alox1,$OUTlo,$OUTlo || XOR $Ahix1,$OUThi,$OUThi ___ } $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .asg bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,_bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .endif .global _bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 _bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: .asmfunc MVK 0xFF,$xFF ___ &mul_1x1_upper($a0,$b0); # a0·b0 $code.=<<___; || MV $b1,$B MV $a1,$A ___ &mul_1x1_merged("A28","B28",$A,$B); # a0·b0/a1·b1 $code.=<<___; || XOR $b0,$b1,$B XOR $a0,$a1,$A ___ &mul_1x1_merged("A31","B31",$A,$B); # a1·b1/(a0+a1)·(b0+b1) $code.=<<___; XOR A28,A31,A29 || XOR B28,B31,B29 ; a0·b0+a1·b1 ___ &mul_1x1_lower("A30","B30"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) $code.=<<___; || BNOP B3 XOR A29,A30,A30 || XOR B29,B30,B30 ; (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1 XOR B28,A30,A30 || STW A28,*${rp}[0] XOR B30,A31,A31 || STW A30,*${rp}[1] STW A31,*${rp}[2] STW B31,*${rp}[3] .endasmfunc ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl0000644000000000000000000002030113176625656016774 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # May 2011 # # The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication # used in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from # C for the time being... Except that it has two code paths: pure # integer code suitable for any ARMv4 and later CPU and NEON code # suitable for ARMv7. Pure integer 1x1 multiplication subroutine runs # in ~45 cycles on dual-issue core such as Cortex A8, which is ~50% # faster than compiler-generated code. For ECDH and ECDSA verify (but # not for ECDSA sign) it means 25%-45% improvement depending on key # length, more for longer keys. Even though NEON 1x1 multiplication # runs in even less cycles, ~30, improvement is measurable only on # longer keys. One has to optimize code elsewhere to get NEON glow... # # April 2014 # # Double bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 performance by using algorithm from paper # referred below, which improves ECDH and ECDSA verify benchmarks # by 18-40%. # # Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software # Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine. # # http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $code=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #endif ___ ################ # private interface to mul_1x1_ialu # $a="r1"; $b="r0"; ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a12,$a4,$a14)= ($hi,$lo,$t0,$t1, $i0,$i1 )=map("r$_",(4..9),12); $mask="r12"; $code.=<<___; .type mul_1x1_ialu,%function .align 5 mul_1x1_ialu: mov $a0,#0 bic $a1,$a,#3<<30 @ a1=a&0x3fffffff str $a0,[sp,#0] @ tab[0]=0 add $a2,$a1,$a1 @ a2=a1<<1 str $a1,[sp,#4] @ tab[1]=a1 eor $a12,$a1,$a2 @ a1^a2 str $a2,[sp,#8] @ tab[2]=a2 mov $a4,$a1,lsl#2 @ a4=a1<<2 str $a12,[sp,#12] @ tab[3]=a1^a2 eor $a14,$a1,$a4 @ a1^a4 str $a4,[sp,#16] @ tab[4]=a4 eor $a0,$a2,$a4 @ a2^a4 str $a14,[sp,#20] @ tab[5]=a1^a4 eor $a12,$a12,$a4 @ a1^a2^a4 str $a0,[sp,#24] @ tab[6]=a2^a4 and $i0,$mask,$b,lsl#2 str $a12,[sp,#28] @ tab[7]=a1^a2^a4 and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#1 ldr $lo,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b & 0x7] and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#4 ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 3 & 0x7] and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#7 ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 6 & 0x7] eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#3 @ stall mov $hi,$t1,lsr#29 ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 9 & 0x7] and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#10 eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#6 eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#26 ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 12 & 0x7] and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#13 eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#9 eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#23 ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 15 & 0x7] and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#16 eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#12 eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#20 ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 18 & 0x7] and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#19 eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#15 eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#17 ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 21 & 0x7] and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#22 eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#18 eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#14 ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 24 & 0x7] and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#25 eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#21 eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#11 ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 27 & 0x7] tst $a,#1<<30 and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#28 eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#24 eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#8 ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 30 ] #ifdef __thumb2__ itt ne #endif eorne $lo,$lo,$b,lsl#30 eorne $hi,$hi,$b,lsr#2 tst $a,#1<<31 eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#27 eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#5 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt ne #endif eorne $lo,$lo,$b,lsl#31 eorne $hi,$hi,$b,lsr#1 eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#30 eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#2 mov pc,lr .size mul_1x1_ialu,.-mul_1x1_ialu ___ ################ # void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, # BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0, # BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0 { $code.=<<___; .global bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,%function .align 5 bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 stmdb sp!,{r10,lr} ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap adr r10,.LOPENSSL_armcap ldr r12,[r12,r10] #ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r12,[r12] #endif tst r12,#ARMV7_NEON itt ne ldrne r10,[sp],#8 bne .LNEON stmdb sp!,{r4-r9} #else stmdb sp!,{r4-r10,lr} #endif ___ $ret="r10"; # reassigned 1st argument $code.=<<___; mov $ret,r0 @ reassign 1st argument mov $b,r3 @ $b=b1 sub r7,sp,#36 mov r8,sp and r7,r7,#-32 ldr r3,[sp,#32] @ load b0 mov $mask,#7<<2 mov sp,r7 @ allocate tab[8] str r8,[r7,#32] bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1 str $lo,[$ret,#8] str $hi,[$ret,#12] eor $b,$b,r3 @ flip b0 and b1 eor $a,$a,r2 @ flip a0 and a1 eor r3,r3,$b eor r2,r2,$a eor $b,$b,r3 eor $a,$a,r2 bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0 str $lo,[$ret] str $hi,[$ret,#4] eor $a,$a,r2 eor $b,$b,r3 bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0) ___ @r=map("r$_",(6..9)); $code.=<<___; ldmia $ret,{@r[0]-@r[3]} eor $lo,$lo,$hi ldr sp,[sp,#32] @ destroy tab[8] eor $hi,$hi,@r[1] eor $lo,$lo,@r[0] eor $hi,$hi,@r[2] eor $lo,$lo,@r[3] eor $hi,$hi,@r[3] str $hi,[$ret,#8] eor $lo,$lo,$hi str $lo,[$ret,#4] #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif ___ } { my ($r,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("q$_",(0..3,8..12)); my ($a,$b,$k48,$k32,$k16)=map("d$_",(26..31)); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .align 5 .LNEON: ldr r12, [sp] @ 5th argument vmov $a, r2, r1 vmov $b, r12, r3 vmov.i64 $k48, #0x0000ffffffffffff vmov.i64 $k32, #0x00000000ffffffff vmov.i64 $k16, #0x000000000000ffff vext.8 $t0#lo, $a, $a, #1 @ A1 vmull.p8 $t0, $t0#lo, $b @ F = A1*B vext.8 $r#lo, $b, $b, #1 @ B1 vmull.p8 $r, $a, $r#lo @ E = A*B1 vext.8 $t1#lo, $a, $a, #2 @ A2 vmull.p8 $t1, $t1#lo, $b @ H = A2*B vext.8 $t3#lo, $b, $b, #2 @ B2 vmull.p8 $t3, $a, $t3#lo @ G = A*B2 vext.8 $t2#lo, $a, $a, #3 @ A3 veor $t0, $t0, $r @ L = E + F vmull.p8 $t2, $t2#lo, $b @ J = A3*B vext.8 $r#lo, $b, $b, #3 @ B3 veor $t1, $t1, $t3 @ M = G + H vmull.p8 $r, $a, $r#lo @ I = A*B3 veor $t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi @ t0 = (L) (P0 + P1) << 8 vand $t0#hi, $t0#hi, $k48 vext.8 $t3#lo, $b, $b, #4 @ B4 veor $t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi @ t1 = (M) (P2 + P3) << 16 vand $t1#hi, $t1#hi, $k32 vmull.p8 $t3, $a, $t3#lo @ K = A*B4 veor $t2, $t2, $r @ N = I + J veor $t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi veor $t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi veor $t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi @ t2 = (N) (P4 + P5) << 24 vand $t2#hi, $t2#hi, $k16 vext.8 $t0, $t0, $t0, #15 veor $t3#lo, $t3#lo, $t3#hi @ t3 = (K) (P6 + P7) << 32 vmov.i64 $t3#hi, #0 vext.8 $t1, $t1, $t1, #14 veor $t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi vmull.p8 $r, $a, $b @ D = A*B vext.8 $t3, $t3, $t3, #12 vext.8 $t2, $t2, $t2, #13 veor $t0, $t0, $t1 veor $t2, $t2, $t3 veor $r, $r, $t0 veor $r, $r, $t2 vst1.32 {$r}, [r0] ret @ bx lr #endif ___ } $code.=<<___; .size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .align 5 .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #endif .asciz "GF(2^m) Multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 5 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo or s/\bret\b/bx lr/go or s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s0000644000000000000000000013742713176625656016403 0ustar rootroot; Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. ; ; Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use ; this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy ; in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at ; https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ; ; PA-RISC 2.0 implementation of bn_asm code, based on the ; 64-bit version of the code. This code is effectively the ; same as the 64-bit version except the register model is ; slightly different given all values must be 32-bit between ; function calls. Thus the 64-bit return values are returned ; in %ret0 and %ret1 vs just %ret0 as is done in 64-bit ; ; ; This code is approximately 2x faster than the C version ; for RSA/DSA. ; ; See http://devresource.hp.com/ for more details on the PA-RISC ; architecture. Also see the book "PA-RISC 2.0 Architecture" ; by Gerry Kane for information on the instruction set architecture. ; ; Code written by Chris Ruemmler (with some help from the HP C ; compiler). ; ; The code compiles with HP's assembler ; .level 2.0N .space $TEXT$ .subspa $CODE$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2c,CODE_ONLY ; ; Global Register definitions used for the routines. ; ; Some information about HP's runtime architecture for 32-bits. ; ; "Caller save" means the calling function must save the register ; if it wants the register to be preserved. ; "Callee save" means if a function uses the register, it must save ; the value before using it. ; ; For the floating point registers ; ; "caller save" registers: fr4-fr11, fr22-fr31 ; "callee save" registers: fr12-fr21 ; "special" registers: fr0-fr3 (status and exception registers) ; ; For the integer registers ; value zero : r0 ; "caller save" registers: r1,r19-r26 ; "callee save" registers: r3-r18 ; return register : r2 (rp) ; return values ; r28,r29 (ret0,ret1) ; Stack pointer ; r30 (sp) ; millicode return ptr ; r31 (also a caller save register) ; ; Arguments to the routines ; r_ptr .reg %r26 a_ptr .reg %r25 b_ptr .reg %r24 num .reg %r24 n .reg %r23 ; ; Note that the "w" argument for bn_mul_add_words and bn_mul_words ; is passed on the stack at a delta of -56 from the top of stack ; as the routine is entered. ; ; ; Globals used in some routines ; top_overflow .reg %r23 high_mask .reg %r22 ; value 0xffffffff80000000L ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ; ; bn_mul_add_words ; ;BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *r_ptr, BN_ULONG *a_ptr, ; int num, BN_ULONG w) ; ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; arg3 = num ; -56(sp) = w ; ; Local register definitions ; fm1 .reg %fr22 fm .reg %fr23 ht_temp .reg %fr24 ht_temp_1 .reg %fr25 lt_temp .reg %fr26 lt_temp_1 .reg %fr27 fm1_1 .reg %fr28 fm_1 .reg %fr29 fw_h .reg %fr7L fw_l .reg %fr7R fw .reg %fr7 fht_0 .reg %fr8L flt_0 .reg %fr8R t_float_0 .reg %fr8 fht_1 .reg %fr9L flt_1 .reg %fr9R t_float_1 .reg %fr9 tmp_0 .reg %r31 tmp_1 .reg %r21 m_0 .reg %r20 m_1 .reg %r19 ht_0 .reg %r1 ht_1 .reg %r3 lt_0 .reg %r4 lt_1 .reg %r5 m1_0 .reg %r6 m1_1 .reg %r7 rp_val .reg %r8 rp_val_1 .reg %r9 bn_mul_add_words .export bn_mul_add_words,entry,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .proc .callinfo frame=128 .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 NOP ; Needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned NOP ; needed to make the loop 16-byte aligned STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 NOP STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 STD %r7,32(%sp) ; save r7 STD %r8,40(%sp) ; save r8 STD %r9,48(%sp) ; save r9 COPY %r0,%ret1 ; return 0 by default DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32 CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit ; if (num <= 0) then exit LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack ; ; The loop is unrolled twice, so if there is only 1 number ; then go straight to the cleanup code. ; CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_add_words_single_top FLDD -184(%sp),fw ; (-56-128) load up w into fw (fw_h/fw_l) ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; ; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle. ; bn_mul_add_words_unroll2 FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) FLDD 8(a_ptr),t_float_1 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) LDD 0(r_ptr),rp_val ; rp[0] LDD 8(r_ptr),rp_val_1 ; rp[1] XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l XMPYU fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1 ; m1[1] = fht_1*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1[0] FSTD fm1_1,-48(%sp) ; -48(sp) = m1[1] XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m[0] = flt_0*fw_h XMPYU flt_1,fw_h,fm_1 ; m[1] = flt_1*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m[0] FSTD fm_1,-40(%sp) ; -40(sp) = m[1] XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = fht_0*fw_h XMPYU fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1 ; ht_temp_1 = fht_1*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht_temp FSTD ht_temp_1,-56(%sp) ; -56(sp) = ht_temp_1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l XMPYU flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1 ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt_temp FSTD lt_temp_1,-64(%sp) ; -64(sp) = lt_temp_1 LDD -8(%sp),m_0 ; m[0] LDD -40(%sp),m_1 ; m[1] LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 ; m1[0] LDD -48(%sp),m1_1 ; m1[1] LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 ; ht[0] LDD -56(%sp),ht_1 ; ht[1] ADD,L m1_0,m_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m[0] + m1[0]; ADD,L m1_1,m_1,tmp_1 ; tmp_1 = m[1] + m1[1]; LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 LDD -64(%sp),lt_1 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0 ; if (m[0] < m1[0]) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht[0] += (1<<32) CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0 ; if (m[1] < m1[1]) ADD,L ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1 ; ht[1] += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m[0]>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1[0] = m[0]<<32 EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1 ; m[1]>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_1,31,32,m1_1 ; m1[1] = m[1]<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht[0]+= (m[0]>>32) ADD,L ht_1,m_1,ht_1 ; ht[1]+= (m[1]>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,lt_0 ; lt[0] = lt[0]+m1[0]; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ ADD lt_1,m1_1,lt_1 ; lt[1] = lt[1]+m1[1]; ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht[1]++ ADD %ret1,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt[0] = lt[0] + c; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ ADD lt_0,rp_val,lt_0 ; lt[0] = lt[0]+rp[0] ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ LDO -2(num),num ; num = num - 2; ADD ht_0,lt_1,lt_1 ; lt[1] = lt[1] + ht_0 (c); ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht[1]++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt[0] ADD lt_1,rp_val_1,lt_1 ; lt[1] = lt[1]+rp[1] ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,%ret1 ; ht[1]++ LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr ; a_ptr += 2 STD lt_1,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = lt[1] CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_add_words_unroll2 ; go again if more to do LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr ; r_ptr += 2 CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_add_words_exit ; are we done, or cleanup last one ; ; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary ; bn_mul_add_words_single_top FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) LDD 0(r_ptr),rp_val ; rp[0] LDO 8(a_ptr),a_ptr ; a_ptr++ XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1 = ht*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m = lt*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt LDD -8(%sp),m_0 LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 ; m1 = temp1 ADD,L m_0,m1_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m + m1; LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1 = m<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD %ret1,tmp_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt + c; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD lt_0,rp_val,lt_0 ; lt = lt+rp[0] ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,%ret1 ; ht++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt bn_mul_add_words_exit .EXIT EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0 ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1 LDD -80(%sp),%r9 ; restore r9 LDD -88(%sp),%r8 ; restore r8 LDD -96(%sp),%r7 ; restore r7 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 ; restore r3 .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg3 = num ; w on stack at -56(sp) bn_mul_words .proc .callinfo frame=128 .entry .EXPORT bn_mul_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 NOP STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 STD %r7,32(%sp) ; save r7 COPY %r0,%ret1 ; return 0 by default DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,top_overflow ; top_overflow = 1 << 32 CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack ; ; See if only 1 word to do, thus just do cleanup ; CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_mul_words_single_top FLDD -184(%sp),fw ; (-56-128) load up w into fw (fw_h/fw_l) ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; ; PA-RISC 2.0 chips have two fully pipelined multipliers, thus ; two 32-bit mutiplies can be issued per cycle. ; bn_mul_words_unroll2 FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) FLDD 8(a_ptr),t_float_1 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1[0] = fht_0*fw_l XMPYU fht_1,fw_l,fm1_1 ; m1[1] = ht*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1 FSTD fm1_1,-48(%sp) ; -48(sp) = m1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m = lt*fw_h XMPYU flt_1,fw_h,fm_1 ; m = lt*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m FSTD fm_1,-40(%sp) ; -40(sp) = m XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = fht_0*fw_h XMPYU fht_1,fw_h,ht_temp_1 ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht FSTD ht_temp_1,-56(%sp) ; -56(sp) = ht XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l XMPYU flt_1,fw_l,lt_temp_1 ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt FSTD lt_temp_1,-64(%sp) ; -64(sp) = lt LDD -8(%sp),m_0 LDD -40(%sp),m_1 LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 LDD -48(%sp),m1_1 LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 LDD -56(%sp),ht_1 ADD,L m1_0,m_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m + m1; ADD,L m1_1,m_1,tmp_1 ; tmp_1 = m + m1; LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 LDD -64(%sp),lt_1 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0, %r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht += (1<<32) CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_1,m1_1,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_1,top_overflow,ht_1 ; ht += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1 = m<<32 EXTRD,U tmp_1,31,32,m_1 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_1,31,32,m1_1 ; m1 = m<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD,L ht_1,m_1,ht_1 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD lt_1,m1_1,lt_1 ; lt = lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht++ ADD %ret1,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt + c (ret1); ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD ht_0,lt_1,lt_1 ; lt = lt + c (ht_0) ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt STD lt_1,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = lt COPY ht_1,%ret1 ; carry = ht LDO -2(num),num ; num = num - 2; LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr ; ap += 2 CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_mul_words_unroll2 LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr ; rp++ CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_mul_words_exit ; are we done? ; ; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary ; bn_mul_words_single_top FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) XMPYU fht_0,fw_l,fm1 ; m1 = ht*fw_l FSTD fm1,-16(%sp) ; -16(sp) = m1 XMPYU flt_0,fw_h,fm ; m = lt*fw_h FSTD fm,-8(%sp) ; -8(sp) = m XMPYU fht_0,fw_h,ht_temp ; ht_temp = ht*fw_h FSTD ht_temp,-24(%sp) ; -24(sp) = ht XMPYU flt_0,fw_l,lt_temp ; lt_temp = lt*fw_l FSTD lt_temp,-32(%sp) ; -32(sp) = lt LDD -8(%sp),m_0 LDD -16(%sp),m1_0 ADD,L m_0,m1_0,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m + m1; LDD -24(%sp),ht_0 LDD -32(%sp),lt_0 CMPCLR,*>>= tmp_0,m1_0,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht_0,top_overflow,ht_0 ; ht += (1<<32) EXTRD,U tmp_0,31,32,m_0 ; m>>32 DEPD,Z tmp_0,31,32,m1_0 ; m1 = m<<32 ADD,L ht_0,m_0,ht_0 ; ht+= (m>>32) ADD lt_0,m1_0,lt_0 ; lt= lt+m1; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ ADD %ret1,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt + c; ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ COPY ht_0,%ret1 ; copy carry STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt bn_mul_words_exit .EXIT EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0 ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1 LDD -96(%sp),%r7 ; restore r7 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 ; restore r3 .PROCEND ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg2 = num ; bn_sqr_words .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_sqr_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 NOP STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 CMPIB,>= 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack ; ; If only 1, the goto straight to cleanup ; CMPIB,= 1,num,bn_sqr_words_single_top DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; bn_sqr_words_unroll2 FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; a[0] FLDD 8(a_ptr),t_float_1 ; a[1] XMPYU fht_0,flt_0,fm ; m[0] XMPYU fht_1,flt_1,fm_1 ; m[1] FSTD fm,-24(%sp) ; store m[0] FSTD fm_1,-56(%sp) ; store m[1] XMPYU flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp ; lt[0] XMPYU flt_1,flt_1,lt_temp_1 ; lt[1] FSTD lt_temp,-16(%sp) ; store lt[0] FSTD lt_temp_1,-48(%sp) ; store lt[1] XMPYU fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp ; ht[0] XMPYU fht_1,fht_1,ht_temp_1 ; ht[1] FSTD ht_temp,-8(%sp) ; store ht[0] FSTD ht_temp_1,-40(%sp) ; store ht[1] LDD -24(%sp),m_0 LDD -56(%sp),m_1 AND m_0,high_mask,tmp_0 ; m[0] & Mask AND m_1,high_mask,tmp_1 ; m[1] & Mask DEPD,Z m_0,30,31,m_0 ; m[0] << 32+1 DEPD,Z m_1,30,31,m_1 ; m[1] << 32+1 LDD -16(%sp),lt_0 LDD -48(%sp),lt_1 EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m[0]&Mask >> 32-1 EXTRD,U tmp_1,32,33,tmp_1 ; tmp_1 = m[1]&Mask >> 32-1 LDD -8(%sp),ht_0 LDD -40(%sp),ht_1 ADD,L ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0 ; ht[0] += tmp_0 ADD,L ht_1,tmp_1,ht_1 ; ht[1] += tmp_1 ADD lt_0,m_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt+m ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht[0]++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt[0] STD ht_0,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = ht[1] ADD lt_1,m_1,lt_1 ; lt = lt+m ADD,DC ht_1,%r0,ht_1 ; ht[1]++ STD lt_1,16(r_ptr) ; rp[2] = lt[1] STD ht_1,24(r_ptr) ; rp[3] = ht[1] LDO -2(num),num ; num = num - 2; LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr ; ap += 2 CMPIB,<= 2,num,bn_sqr_words_unroll2 LDO 32(r_ptr),r_ptr ; rp += 4 CMPIB,=,N 0,num,bn_sqr_words_exit ; are we done? ; ; Top of loop aligned on 64-byte boundary ; bn_sqr_words_single_top FLDD 0(a_ptr),t_float_0 ; load up 64-bit value (fr8L) ht(L)/lt(R) XMPYU fht_0,flt_0,fm ; m FSTD fm,-24(%sp) ; store m XMPYU flt_0,flt_0,lt_temp ; lt FSTD lt_temp,-16(%sp) ; store lt XMPYU fht_0,fht_0,ht_temp ; ht FSTD ht_temp,-8(%sp) ; store ht LDD -24(%sp),m_0 ; load m AND m_0,high_mask,tmp_0 ; m & Mask DEPD,Z m_0,30,31,m_0 ; m << 32+1 LDD -16(%sp),lt_0 ; lt LDD -8(%sp),ht_0 ; ht EXTRD,U tmp_0,32,33,tmp_0 ; tmp_0 = m&Mask >> 32-1 ADD m_0,lt_0,lt_0 ; lt = lt+m ADD,L ht_0,tmp_0,ht_0 ; ht += tmp_0 ADD,DC ht_0,%r0,ht_0 ; ht++ STD lt_0,0(r_ptr) ; rp[0] = lt STD ht_0,8(r_ptr) ; rp[1] = ht bn_sqr_words_exit .EXIT LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg2 = bp ; arg3 = n t .reg %r22 b .reg %r21 l .reg %r20 bn_add_words .proc .entry .callinfo .EXPORT bn_add_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .align 64 CMPIB,>= 0,n,bn_add_words_exit COPY %r0,%ret1 ; return 0 by default ; ; If 2 or more numbers do the loop ; CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_add_words_single_top NOP ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; bn_add_words_unroll2 LDD 0(a_ptr),t LDD 0(b_ptr),b ADD t,%ret1,t ; t = t+c; ADD,DC %r0,%r0,%ret1 ; set c to carry ADD t,b,l ; l = t + b[0] ADD,DC %ret1,%r0,%ret1 ; c+= carry STD l,0(r_ptr) LDD 8(a_ptr),t LDD 8(b_ptr),b ADD t,%ret1,t ; t = t+c; ADD,DC %r0,%r0,%ret1 ; set c to carry ADD t,b,l ; l = t + b[0] ADD,DC %ret1,%r0,%ret1 ; c+= carry STD l,8(r_ptr) LDO -2(n),n LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr LDO 16(b_ptr),b_ptr CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_add_words_unroll2 LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_add_words_exit ; are we done? bn_add_words_single_top LDD 0(a_ptr),t LDD 0(b_ptr),b ADD t,%ret1,t ; t = t+c; ADD,DC %r0,%r0,%ret1 ; set c to carry (could use CMPCLR??) ADD t,b,l ; l = t + b[0] ADD,DC %ret1,%r0,%ret1 ; c+= carry STD l,0(r_ptr) bn_add_words_exit .EXIT BVE (%rp) EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0 ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1 .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) ; ; arg0 = rp ; arg1 = ap ; arg2 = bp ; arg3 = n t1 .reg %r22 t2 .reg %r21 sub_tmp1 .reg %r20 sub_tmp2 .reg %r19 bn_sub_words .proc .callinfo .EXPORT bn_sub_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 CMPIB,>= 0,n,bn_sub_words_exit COPY %r0,%ret1 ; return 0 by default ; ; If 2 or more numbers do the loop ; CMPIB,= 1,n,bn_sub_words_single_top NOP ; ; This loop is unrolled 2 times (64-byte aligned as well) ; bn_sub_words_unroll2 LDD 0(a_ptr),t1 LDD 0(b_ptr),t2 SUB t1,t2,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t1-t2; SUB sub_tmp1,%ret1,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t3- c; CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2 ; clear if t1 > t2 LDO 1(%r0),sub_tmp2 CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0 COPY sub_tmp2,%ret1 STD sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr) LDD 8(a_ptr),t1 LDD 8(b_ptr),t2 SUB t1,t2,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t1-t2; SUB sub_tmp1,%ret1,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t3- c; CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2 ; clear if t1 > t2 LDO 1(%r0),sub_tmp2 CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0 COPY sub_tmp2,%ret1 STD sub_tmp1,8(r_ptr) LDO -2(n),n LDO 16(a_ptr),a_ptr LDO 16(b_ptr),b_ptr CMPIB,<= 2,n,bn_sub_words_unroll2 LDO 16(r_ptr),r_ptr CMPIB,=,N 0,n,bn_sub_words_exit ; are we done? bn_sub_words_single_top LDD 0(a_ptr),t1 LDD 0(b_ptr),t2 SUB t1,t2,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t1-t2; SUB sub_tmp1,%ret1,sub_tmp1 ; t3 = t3- c; CMPCLR,*>> t1,t2,sub_tmp2 ; clear if t1 > t2 LDO 1(%r0),sub_tmp2 CMPCLR,*= t1,t2,%r0 COPY sub_tmp2,%ret1 STD sub_tmp1,0(r_ptr) bn_sub_words_exit .EXIT BVE (%rp) EXTRD,U %ret1,31,32,%ret0 ; for 32-bit, return in ret0/ret1 .PROCEND ;in=23,24,25,26,29;out=28; ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ; ; unsigned long bn_div_words(unsigned long h, unsigned long l, unsigned long d) ; ; arg0 = h ; arg1 = l ; arg2 = d ; ; This is mainly just output from the HP C compiler. ; ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ bn_div_words .PROC .EXPORT bn_div_words,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR,RTNVAL=GR,LONG_RETURN .IMPORT BN_num_bits_word,CODE ;--- not PIC .IMPORT __iob,DATA ;--- not PIC .IMPORT fprintf,CODE .IMPORT abort,CODE .IMPORT $$div2U,MILLICODE .CALLINFO CALLER,FRAME=144,ENTRY_GR=%r9,SAVE_RP,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .ENTRY STW %r2,-20(%r30) ;offset 0x8ec STW,MA %r3,192(%r30) ;offset 0x8f0 STW %r4,-188(%r30) ;offset 0x8f4 DEPD %r5,31,32,%r6 ;offset 0x8f8 STD %r6,-184(%r30) ;offset 0x8fc DEPD %r7,31,32,%r8 ;offset 0x900 STD %r8,-176(%r30) ;offset 0x904 STW %r9,-168(%r30) ;offset 0x908 LDD -248(%r30),%r3 ;offset 0x90c COPY %r26,%r4 ;offset 0x910 COPY %r24,%r5 ;offset 0x914 DEPD %r25,31,32,%r4 ;offset 0x918 CMPB,*<> %r3,%r0,$0006000C ;offset 0x91c DEPD %r23,31,32,%r5 ;offset 0x920 MOVIB,TR -1,%r29,$00060002 ;offset 0x924 EXTRD,U %r29,31,32,%r28 ;offset 0x928 $0006002A LDO -1(%r29),%r29 ;offset 0x92c SUB %r23,%r7,%r23 ;offset 0x930 $00060024 SUB %r4,%r31,%r25 ;offset 0x934 AND %r25,%r19,%r26 ;offset 0x938 CMPB,*<>,N %r0,%r26,$00060046 ;offset 0x93c DEPD,Z %r25,31,32,%r20 ;offset 0x940 OR %r20,%r24,%r21 ;offset 0x944 CMPB,*<<,N %r21,%r23,$0006002A ;offset 0x948 SUB %r31,%r2,%r31 ;offset 0x94c $00060046 $0006002E DEPD,Z %r23,31,32,%r25 ;offset 0x950 EXTRD,U %r23,31,32,%r26 ;offset 0x954 AND %r25,%r19,%r24 ;offset 0x958 ADD,L %r31,%r26,%r31 ;offset 0x95c CMPCLR,*>>= %r5,%r24,%r0 ;offset 0x960 LDO 1(%r31),%r31 ;offset 0x964 $00060032 CMPB,*<<=,N %r31,%r4,$00060036 ;offset 0x968 LDO -1(%r29),%r29 ;offset 0x96c ADD,L %r4,%r3,%r4 ;offset 0x970 $00060036 ADDIB,=,N -1,%r8,$D0 ;offset 0x974 SUB %r5,%r24,%r28 ;offset 0x978 $0006003A SUB %r4,%r31,%r24 ;offset 0x97c SHRPD %r24,%r28,32,%r4 ;offset 0x980 DEPD,Z %r29,31,32,%r9 ;offset 0x984 DEPD,Z %r28,31,32,%r5 ;offset 0x988 $0006001C EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r31 ;offset 0x98c CMPB,*<>,N %r31,%r2,$00060020 ;offset 0x990 MOVB,TR %r6,%r29,$D1 ;offset 0x994 STD %r29,-152(%r30) ;offset 0x998 $0006000C EXTRD,U %r3,31,32,%r25 ;offset 0x99c COPY %r3,%r26 ;offset 0x9a0 EXTRD,U %r3,31,32,%r9 ;offset 0x9a4 EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r8 ;offset 0x9a8 .CALL ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,RTNVAL=GR ;in=25,26;out=28; B,L BN_num_bits_word,%r2 ;offset 0x9ac EXTRD,U %r5,31,32,%r7 ;offset 0x9b0 LDI 64,%r20 ;offset 0x9b4 DEPD %r7,31,32,%r5 ;offset 0x9b8 DEPD %r8,31,32,%r4 ;offset 0x9bc DEPD %r9,31,32,%r3 ;offset 0x9c0 CMPB,= %r28,%r20,$00060012 ;offset 0x9c4 COPY %r28,%r24 ;offset 0x9c8 MTSARCM %r24 ;offset 0x9cc DEPDI,Z -1,%sar,1,%r19 ;offset 0x9d0 CMPB,*>>,N %r4,%r19,$D2 ;offset 0x9d4 $00060012 SUBI 64,%r24,%r31 ;offset 0x9d8 CMPCLR,*<< %r4,%r3,%r0 ;offset 0x9dc SUB %r4,%r3,%r4 ;offset 0x9e0 $00060016 CMPB,= %r31,%r0,$0006001A ;offset 0x9e4 COPY %r0,%r9 ;offset 0x9e8 MTSARCM %r31 ;offset 0x9ec DEPD,Z %r3,%sar,64,%r3 ;offset 0x9f0 SUBI 64,%r31,%r26 ;offset 0x9f4 MTSAR %r26 ;offset 0x9f8 SHRPD %r4,%r5,%sar,%r4 ;offset 0x9fc MTSARCM %r31 ;offset 0xa00 DEPD,Z %r5,%sar,64,%r5 ;offset 0xa04 $0006001A DEPDI,Z -1,31,32,%r19 ;offset 0xa08 AND %r3,%r19,%r29 ;offset 0xa0c EXTRD,U %r29,31,32,%r2 ;offset 0xa10 DEPDI,Z -1,63,32,%r6 ;offset 0xa14 MOVIB,TR 2,%r8,$0006001C ;offset 0xa18 EXTRD,U %r3,63,32,%r7 ;offset 0xa1c $D2 ;--- not PIC ADDIL LR'__iob-$global$,%r27,%r1 ;offset 0xa20 ;--- not PIC LDIL LR'C$7,%r21 ;offset 0xa24 ;--- not PIC LDO RR'__iob-$global$+32(%r1),%r26 ;offset 0xa28 ;--- not PIC .CALL ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,RTNVAL=GR ;in=24,25,26;out=28; ;--- not PIC B,L fprintf,%r2 ;offset 0xa2c ;--- not PIC LDO RR'C$7(%r21),%r25 ;offset 0xa30 .CALL ; B,L abort,%r2 ;offset 0xa34 NOP ;offset 0xa38 B $D3 ;offset 0xa3c LDW -212(%r30),%r2 ;offset 0xa40 $00060020 COPY %r4,%r26 ;offset 0xa44 EXTRD,U %r4,31,32,%r25 ;offset 0xa48 COPY %r2,%r24 ;offset 0xa4c .CALL ;in=23,24,25,26;out=20,21,22,28,29; (MILLICALL) B,L $$div2U,%r31 ;offset 0xa50 EXTRD,U %r2,31,32,%r23 ;offset 0xa54 DEPD %r28,31,32,%r29 ;offset 0xa58 $00060022 STD %r29,-152(%r30) ;offset 0xa5c $D1 AND %r5,%r19,%r24 ;offset 0xa60 EXTRD,U %r24,31,32,%r24 ;offset 0xa64 STW %r2,-160(%r30) ;offset 0xa68 STW %r7,-128(%r30) ;offset 0xa6c FLDD -152(%r30),%fr4 ;offset 0xa70 FLDD -152(%r30),%fr7 ;offset 0xa74 FLDW -160(%r30),%fr8L ;offset 0xa78 FLDW -128(%r30),%fr5L ;offset 0xa7c XMPYU %fr8L,%fr7L,%fr10 ;offset 0xa80 FSTD %fr10,-136(%r30) ;offset 0xa84 XMPYU %fr8L,%fr7R,%fr22 ;offset 0xa88 FSTD %fr22,-144(%r30) ;offset 0xa8c XMPYU %fr5L,%fr4L,%fr11 ;offset 0xa90 XMPYU %fr5L,%fr4R,%fr23 ;offset 0xa94 FSTD %fr11,-112(%r30) ;offset 0xa98 FSTD %fr23,-120(%r30) ;offset 0xa9c LDD -136(%r30),%r28 ;offset 0xaa0 DEPD,Z %r28,31,32,%r31 ;offset 0xaa4 LDD -144(%r30),%r20 ;offset 0xaa8 ADD,L %r20,%r31,%r31 ;offset 0xaac LDD -112(%r30),%r22 ;offset 0xab0 DEPD,Z %r22,31,32,%r22 ;offset 0xab4 LDD -120(%r30),%r21 ;offset 0xab8 B $00060024 ;offset 0xabc ADD,L %r21,%r22,%r23 ;offset 0xac0 $D0 OR %r9,%r29,%r29 ;offset 0xac4 $00060040 EXTRD,U %r29,31,32,%r28 ;offset 0xac8 $00060002 $L2 LDW -212(%r30),%r2 ;offset 0xacc $D3 LDW -168(%r30),%r9 ;offset 0xad0 LDD -176(%r30),%r8 ;offset 0xad4 EXTRD,U %r8,31,32,%r7 ;offset 0xad8 LDD -184(%r30),%r6 ;offset 0xadc EXTRD,U %r6,31,32,%r5 ;offset 0xae0 LDW -188(%r30),%r4 ;offset 0xae4 BVE (%r2) ;offset 0xae8 .EXIT LDW,MB -192(%r30),%r3 ;offset 0xaec .PROCEND ;in=23,25;out=28,29;fpin=105,107; ;---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ; Registers to hold 64-bit values to manipulate. The "L" part ; of the register corresponds to the upper 32-bits, while the "R" ; part corresponds to the lower 32-bits ; ; Note, that when using b6 and b7, the code must save these before ; using them because they are callee save registers ; ; ; Floating point registers to use to save values that ; are manipulated. These don't collide with ftemp1-6 and ; are all caller save registers ; a0 .reg %fr22 a0L .reg %fr22L a0R .reg %fr22R a1 .reg %fr23 a1L .reg %fr23L a1R .reg %fr23R a2 .reg %fr24 a2L .reg %fr24L a2R .reg %fr24R a3 .reg %fr25 a3L .reg %fr25L a3R .reg %fr25R a4 .reg %fr26 a4L .reg %fr26L a4R .reg %fr26R a5 .reg %fr27 a5L .reg %fr27L a5R .reg %fr27R a6 .reg %fr28 a6L .reg %fr28L a6R .reg %fr28R a7 .reg %fr29 a7L .reg %fr29L a7R .reg %fr29R b0 .reg %fr30 b0L .reg %fr30L b0R .reg %fr30R b1 .reg %fr31 b1L .reg %fr31L b1R .reg %fr31R ; ; Temporary floating point variables, these are all caller save ; registers ; ftemp1 .reg %fr4 ftemp2 .reg %fr5 ftemp3 .reg %fr6 ftemp4 .reg %fr7 ; ; The B set of registers when used. ; b2 .reg %fr8 b2L .reg %fr8L b2R .reg %fr8R b3 .reg %fr9 b3L .reg %fr9L b3R .reg %fr9R b4 .reg %fr10 b4L .reg %fr10L b4R .reg %fr10R b5 .reg %fr11 b5L .reg %fr11L b5R .reg %fr11R b6 .reg %fr12 b6L .reg %fr12L b6R .reg %fr12R b7 .reg %fr13 b7L .reg %fr13L b7R .reg %fr13R c1 .reg %r21 ; only reg temp1 .reg %r20 ; only reg temp2 .reg %r19 ; only reg temp3 .reg %r31 ; only reg m1 .reg %r28 c2 .reg %r23 high_one .reg %r1 ht .reg %r6 lt .reg %r5 m .reg %r4 c3 .reg %r3 SQR_ADD_C .macro A0L,A0R,C1,C2,C3 XMPYU A0L,A0R,ftemp1 ; m FSTD ftemp1,-24(%sp) ; store m XMPYU A0R,A0R,ftemp2 ; lt FSTD ftemp2,-16(%sp) ; store lt XMPYU A0L,A0L,ftemp3 ; ht FSTD ftemp3,-8(%sp) ; store ht LDD -24(%sp),m ; load m AND m,high_mask,temp2 ; m & Mask DEPD,Z m,30,31,temp3 ; m << 32+1 LDD -16(%sp),lt ; lt LDD -8(%sp),ht ; ht EXTRD,U temp2,32,33,temp1 ; temp1 = m&Mask >> 32-1 ADD temp3,lt,lt ; lt = lt+m ADD,L ht,temp1,ht ; ht += temp1 ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD C1,lt,C1 ; c1=c1+lt ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD C2,ht,C2 ; c2=c2+ht ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; c3++ .endm SQR_ADD_C2 .macro A0L,A0R,A1L,A1R,C1,C2,C3 XMPYU A0L,A1R,ftemp1 ; m1 = bl*ht FSTD ftemp1,-16(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,A1L,ftemp2 ; m = bh*lt FSTD ftemp2,-8(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,A1R,ftemp3 ; lt = bl*lt FSTD ftemp3,-32(%sp) XMPYU A0L,A1L,ftemp4 ; ht = bh*ht FSTD ftemp4,-24(%sp) ; LDD -8(%sp),m ; r21 = m LDD -16(%sp),m1 ; r19 = m1 ADD,L m,m1,m ; m+m1 DEPD,Z m,31,32,temp3 ; (m+m1<<32) LDD -24(%sp),ht ; r24 = ht CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht,high_one,ht ; ht+=high_one EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1 ; m >> 32 LDD -32(%sp),lt ; lt ADD,L ht,temp1,ht ; ht+= m>>32 ADD lt,temp3,lt ; lt = lt+m1 ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD ht,ht,ht ; ht=ht+ht; ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; add in carry (c3++) ADD lt,lt,lt ; lt=lt+lt; ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; add in carry (ht++) ADD C1,lt,C1 ; c1=c1+lt ADD,DC,*NUV ht,%r0,ht ; add in carry (ht++) LDO 1(C3),C3 ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise ADD C2,ht,C2 ; c2 = c2 + ht ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; add in carry (c3++) .endm ; ;void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; bn_sqr_comba8 .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_sqr_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .ENTRY .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 32(a_ptr),a4 FLDD 40(a_ptr),a5 FLDD 48(a_ptr),a6 FLDD 56(a_ptr),a7 SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) ; r[0] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) ; r[1] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) ; r[2] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) ; r[3] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) ; r[4] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) ; r[5] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) ; r[6] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a4L,a4R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,56(r_ptr) ; r[7] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a3L,a3R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,64(r_ptr) ; r[8] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a2L,a2R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a5L,a5R,a4L,a4R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,72(r_ptr) ; r[9] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C a5L,a5R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a4L,a4R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a3L,a3R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,80(r_ptr) ; r[10] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a4L,a4R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a6L,a6R,a5L,a5R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,88(r_ptr) ; r[11] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C a6L,a6R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a5L,a5R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,96(r_ptr) ; r[12] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a7L,a7R,a6L,a6R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,104(r_ptr) ; r[13] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a7L,a7R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3, 112(r_ptr) ; r[14] = c3 STD c1, 120(r_ptr) ; r[15] = c1 .EXIT LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; bn_sqr_comba4 .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_sqr_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z -1,32,33,high_mask ; Create Mask 0xffffffff80000000L DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 32(a_ptr),a4 FLDD 40(a_ptr),a5 FLDD 48(a_ptr),a6 FLDD 56(a_ptr),a7 SQR_ADD_C a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) ; r[0] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a1L,a1R,a0L,a0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) ; r[1] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C a1L,a1R,c3,c1,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a0L,a0R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) ; r[2] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a0L,a0R,c1,c2,c3 SQR_ADD_C2 a2L,a2R,a1L,a1R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) ; r[3] = c1; COPY %r0,c1 SQR_ADD_C a2L,a2R,c2,c3,c1 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a1L,a1R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) ; r[4] = c2; COPY %r0,c2 SQR_ADD_C2 a3L,a3R,a2L,a2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) ; r[5] = c3; COPY %r0,c3 SQR_ADD_C a3L,a3R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) ; r[6] = c1; STD c2,56(r_ptr) ; r[7] = c2; .EXIT LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;--------------------------------------------------------------------------- MUL_ADD_C .macro A0L,A0R,B0L,B0R,C1,C2,C3 XMPYU A0L,B0R,ftemp1 ; m1 = bl*ht FSTD ftemp1,-16(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,B0L,ftemp2 ; m = bh*lt FSTD ftemp2,-8(%sp) ; XMPYU A0R,B0R,ftemp3 ; lt = bl*lt FSTD ftemp3,-32(%sp) XMPYU A0L,B0L,ftemp4 ; ht = bh*ht FSTD ftemp4,-24(%sp) ; LDD -8(%sp),m ; r21 = m LDD -16(%sp),m1 ; r19 = m1 ADD,L m,m1,m ; m+m1 DEPD,Z m,31,32,temp3 ; (m+m1<<32) LDD -24(%sp),ht ; r24 = ht CMPCLR,*>>= m,m1,%r0 ; if (m < m1) ADD,L ht,high_one,ht ; ht+=high_one EXTRD,U m,31,32,temp1 ; m >> 32 LDD -32(%sp),lt ; lt ADD,L ht,temp1,ht ; ht+= m>>32 ADD lt,temp3,lt ; lt = lt+m1 ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; ht++ ADD C1,lt,C1 ; c1=c1+lt ADD,DC ht,%r0,ht ; bump c3 if overflow,nullify otherwise ADD C2,ht,C2 ; c2 = c2 + ht ADD,DC C3,%r0,C3 ; add in carry (c3++) .endm ; ;void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; arg2 = b_ptr ; bn_mul_comba8 .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_mul_comba8,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr12,32(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr13,40(%sp) ; save r7 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 32(a_ptr),a4 FLDD 40(a_ptr),a5 FLDD 48(a_ptr),a6 FLDD 56(a_ptr),a7 FLDD 0(b_ptr),b0 FLDD 8(b_ptr),b1 FLDD 16(b_ptr),b2 FLDD 24(b_ptr),b3 FLDD 32(b_ptr),b4 FLDD 40(b_ptr),b5 FLDD 48(b_ptr),b6 FLDD 56(b_ptr),b7 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,56(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,64(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b4L,b4R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,72(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b4L,b4R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b5L,b5R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,80(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a4L,a4R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b6L,b6R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b5L,b5R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b4L,b4R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,88(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b5L,b5R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b6L,b6R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a5L,a5R,b7L,b7R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,96(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a6L,a6R,b7L,b7R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b6L,b6R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,104(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a7L,a7R,b7L,b7R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,112(r_ptr) STD c1,120(r_ptr) .EXIT FLDD -88(%sp),%fr13 FLDD -96(%sp),%fr12 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ; ;void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b) ; arg0 = r_ptr ; arg1 = a_ptr ; arg2 = b_ptr ; bn_mul_comba4 .proc .callinfo FRAME=128,ENTRY_GR=%r3,ARGS_SAVED,ORDERING_AWARE .EXPORT bn_mul_comba4,ENTRY,PRIV_LEV=3,NO_RELOCATION,LONG_RETURN .entry .align 64 STD %r3,0(%sp) ; save r3 STD %r4,8(%sp) ; save r4 STD %r5,16(%sp) ; save r5 STD %r6,24(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr12,32(%sp) ; save r6 FSTD %fr13,40(%sp) ; save r7 ; ; Zero out carries ; COPY %r0,c1 COPY %r0,c2 COPY %r0,c3 LDO 128(%sp),%sp ; bump stack DEPDI,Z 1,31,1,high_one ; Create Value 1 << 32 ; ; Load up all of the values we are going to use ; FLDD 0(a_ptr),a0 FLDD 8(a_ptr),a1 FLDD 16(a_ptr),a2 FLDD 24(a_ptr),a3 FLDD 0(b_ptr),b0 FLDD 8(b_ptr),b1 FLDD 16(b_ptr),b2 FLDD 24(b_ptr),b3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,0(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b0L,b0R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,8(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b0L,b0R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b1L,b1R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,16(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a0L,a0R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b2L,b2R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b1L,b1R,c1,c2,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b0L,b0R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,24(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c1 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b1L,b1R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b2L,b2R,c2,c3,c1 MUL_ADD_C a1L,a1R,b3L,b3R,c2,c3,c1 STD c2,32(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c2 MUL_ADD_C a2L,a2R,b3L,b3R,c3,c1,c2 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b2L,b2R,c3,c1,c2 STD c3,40(r_ptr) COPY %r0,c3 MUL_ADD_C a3L,a3R,b3L,b3R,c1,c2,c3 STD c1,48(r_ptr) STD c2,56(r_ptr) .EXIT FLDD -88(%sp),%fr13 FLDD -96(%sp),%fr12 LDD -104(%sp),%r6 ; restore r6 LDD -112(%sp),%r5 ; restore r5 LDD -120(%sp),%r4 ; restore r4 BVE (%rp) LDD,MB -128(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ;--- not PIC .SPACE $TEXT$ ;--- not PIC .SUBSPA $CODE$ ;--- not PIC .SPACE $PRIVATE$,SORT=16 ;--- not PIC .IMPORT $global$,DATA ;--- not PIC .SPACE $TEXT$ ;--- not PIC .SUBSPA $CODE$ ;--- not PIC .SUBSPA $LIT$,ACCESS=0x2c ;--- not PIC C$7 ;--- not PIC .ALIGN 8 ;--- not PIC .STRINGZ "Division would overflow (%d)\n" .END openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl0000755000000000000000000015227013176625656016765 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ############################################################################## # # # Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation # # # # All rights reserved. # # # # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without # # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are # # met: # # # # * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright # # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. # # # # * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright # # notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the # # documentation and/or other materials provided with the # # distribution. # # # # * Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its # # contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from # # this software without specific prior written permission. # # # # # # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY # # EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE # # IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR # # PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR # # CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, # # EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, # # PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR # # PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF # # LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING # # NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS # # SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # # # ############################################################################## # Developers and authors: # # Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) # # (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel # # (2) University of Haifa, Israel # ############################################################################## # Reference: # # [1] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "Software Implementation of Modular # # Exponentiation, Using Advanced Vector Instructions Architectures", # # F. Ozbudak and F. Rodriguez-Henriquez (Eds.): WAIFI 2012, LNCS 7369, # # pp. 119?135, 2012. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 # # [2] S. Gueron: "Efficient Software Implementations of Modular # # Exponentiation", Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2:31-43 (2012). # # [3] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "Speeding up Big-numbers Squaring",IEEE # # Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Information Technology: # # New Generations (ITNG 2012), pp.821-823 (2012) # # [4] S. Gueron, V. Krasnov: "[PATCH] Efficient and side channel analysis # # resistant 1024-bit modular exponentiation, for optimizing RSA2048 # # on AVX2 capable x86_64 platforms", # # http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2850&user=guest&pass=guest# ############################################################################## # # +13% improvement over original submission by # # rsa2048 sign/sec OpenSSL 1.0.1 scalar(*) this # 2.3GHz Haswell 621 765/+23% 1113/+79% # 2.3GHz Broadwell(**) 688 1200(***)/+74% 1120/+63% # # (*) if system doesn't support AVX2, for reference purposes; # (**) scaled to 2.3GHz to simplify comparison; # (***) scalar AD*X code is faster than AVX2 and is preferred code # path for Broadwell; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); $addx = ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01); $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT = *OUT; if ($avx>1) {{{ { # void AMS_WW( my $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, my $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, my $np="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, my $n0="%ecx"; # const BN_ULONG n0, my $rep="%r8d"; # int repeat); # The registers that hold the accumulated redundant result # The AMM works on 1024 bit operands, and redundant word size is 29 # Therefore: ceil(1024/29)/4 = 9 my $ACC0="%ymm0"; my $ACC1="%ymm1"; my $ACC2="%ymm2"; my $ACC3="%ymm3"; my $ACC4="%ymm4"; my $ACC5="%ymm5"; my $ACC6="%ymm6"; my $ACC7="%ymm7"; my $ACC8="%ymm8"; my $ACC9="%ymm9"; # Registers that hold the broadcasted words of bp, currently used my $B1="%ymm10"; my $B2="%ymm11"; # Registers that hold the broadcasted words of Y, currently used my $Y1="%ymm12"; my $Y2="%ymm13"; # Helper registers my $TEMP1="%ymm14"; my $AND_MASK="%ymm15"; # alu registers that hold the first words of the ACC my $r0="%r9"; my $r1="%r10"; my $r2="%r11"; my $r3="%r12"; my $i="%r14d"; # loop counter my $tmp = "%r15"; my $FrameSize=32*18+32*8; # place for A^2 and 2*A my $aap=$r0; my $tp0="%rbx"; my $tp1=$r3; my $tpa=$tmp; $np="%r13"; # reassigned argument $code.=<<___; .text .globl rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,\@function,5 .align 64 rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2: # 702 cycles, 14% faster than rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 lea (%rsp), %rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp vmovaps %xmm6,-0xd8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7,-0xc8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8,-0xb8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9,-0xa8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10,-0x98(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11,-0x88(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) .Lsqr_1024_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,%rbp mov %rdx, $np # reassigned argument sub \$$FrameSize, %rsp mov $np, $tmp sub \$-128, $rp # size optimization sub \$-128, $ap sub \$-128, $np and \$4095, $tmp # see if $np crosses page add \$32*10, $tmp shr \$12, $tmp vpxor $ACC9,$ACC9,$ACC9 jz .Lsqr_1024_no_n_copy # unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can # cause >2x performance degradation here, so if $np does # cross page boundary, copy it to stack and make sure stack # frame doesn't... sub \$32*10,%rsp vmovdqu 32*0-128($np), $ACC0 and \$-2048, %rsp vmovdqu 32*1-128($np), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-128($np), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-128($np), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-128($np), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-128($np), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-128($np), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-128($np), $ACC7 vmovdqu 32*8-128($np), $ACC8 lea $FrameSize+128(%rsp),$np vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-128($np) vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-128($np) # $ACC9 is zero .Lsqr_1024_no_n_copy: and \$-1024, %rsp vmovdqu 32*1-128($ap), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-128($ap), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-128($ap), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-128($ap), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-128($ap), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-128($ap), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-128($ap), $ACC7 vmovdqu 32*8-128($ap), $ACC8 lea 192(%rsp), $tp0 # 64+128=192 vpbroadcastq .Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK jmp .LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024 .align 32 .LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024: lea 32*18+128(%rsp), $aap # size optimization lea 448(%rsp), $tp1 # 64+128+256=448 # the squaring is performed as described in Variant B of # "Speeding up Big-Number Squaring", so start by calculating # the A*2=A+A vector vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpbroadcastq 32*0-128($ap), $B1 vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*0-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*1-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*2-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*3-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*4-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*5-128($aap) vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*6-128($aap) vpxor $ACC9, $ACC9, $ACC9 vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*7-128($aap) vpmuludq 32*0-128($ap), $B1, $ACC0 vpbroadcastq 32*1-128($ap), $B2 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-192($tp0) # zero upper half vpmuludq $B1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*10-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*11-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*12-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*13-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*14-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*15-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*16-448($tp1) vpmuludq $B1, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpbroadcastq 32*2-128($ap), $B1 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*17-448($tp1) mov $ap, $tpa mov \$4, $i jmp .Lsqr_entry_1024 ___ $TEMP0=$Y1; $TEMP2=$Y2; $code.=<<___; .align 32 .LOOP_SQR_1024: vpbroadcastq 32*1-128($tpa), $B2 vpmuludq 32*0-128($ap), $B1, $ACC0 vpaddq 32*0-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*0-128($aap), $B1, $ACC1 vpaddq 32*1-192($tp0), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*1-128($aap), $B1, $ACC2 vpaddq 32*2-192($tp0), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*2-128($aap), $B1, $ACC3 vpaddq 32*3-192($tp0), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B1, $ACC4 vpaddq 32*4-192($tp0), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B1, $ACC5 vpaddq 32*5-192($tp0), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B1, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*6-192($tp0), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $ACC7 vpaddq 32*7-192($tp0), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC8 vpbroadcastq 32*2-128($tpa), $B1 vpaddq 32*8-192($tp0), $ACC8, $ACC8 .Lsqr_entry_1024: vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*1-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*1-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*2-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC0 vpbroadcastq 32*3-128($tpa), $B2 vpaddq 32*9-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0 vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*2-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*2-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC1 vpbroadcastq 32*4-128($tpa), $B1 vpaddq 32*10-448($tp1), $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*3-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*3-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC2 vpbroadcastq 32*5-128($tpa), $B2 vpaddq 32*11-448($tp1), $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-192($tp0) vpmuludq 32*4-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq 32*4-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC3 vpbroadcastq 32*6-128($tpa), $B1 vpaddq 32*12-448($tp1), $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*9-192($tp0) lea 8($tp0), $tp0 vpmuludq 32*5-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*5-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC4 vpbroadcastq 32*7-128($tpa), $B2 vpaddq 32*13-448($tp1), $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*10-448($tp1) vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*11-448($tp1) vpmuludq 32*6-128($ap), $B1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*6-128($aap), $B1, $TEMP1 vpbroadcastq 32*8-128($tpa), $ACC0 # borrow $ACC0 for $B1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B1, $ACC5 vpbroadcastq 32*0+8-128($tpa), $B1 # for next iteration vpaddq 32*14-448($tp1), $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*12-448($tp1) vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*13-448($tp1) lea 8($tpa), $tpa vpmuludq 32*7-128($ap), $B2, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*7-128($aap), $B2, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*15-448($tp1), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*8-128($ap), $ACC0, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*14-448($tp1) vpaddq 32*16-448($tp1), $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*15-448($tp1) vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*16-448($tp1) lea 8($tp1), $tp1 dec $i jnz .LOOP_SQR_1024 ___ $ZERO = $ACC9; $TEMP0 = $B1; $TEMP2 = $B2; $TEMP3 = $Y1; $TEMP4 = $Y2; $code.=<<___; # we need to fix indices 32-39 to avoid overflow vmovdqu 32*8(%rsp), $ACC8 # 32*8-192($tp0), vmovdqu 32*9(%rsp), $ACC1 # 32*9-192($tp0) vmovdqu 32*10(%rsp), $ACC2 # 32*10-192($tp0) lea 192(%rsp), $tp0 # 64+128=192 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpxor $ZERO, $ZERO, $ZERO vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $ZERO, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*9-192($tp0) vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*10-192($tp0) mov (%rsp), %rax mov 8(%rsp), $r1 mov 16(%rsp), $r2 mov 24(%rsp), $r3 vmovdqu 32*1(%rsp), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-192($tp0), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-192($tp0), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-192($tp0), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-192($tp0), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-192($tp0), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-192($tp0), $ACC7 mov %rax, $r0 imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vmovd %eax, $Y1 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax vpbroadcastq $Y1, $Y1 add %rax, $r0 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax shr \$29, $r0 add %rax, $r1 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 16-128($np), %rax add $r0, $r1 add %rax, $r2 imulq 24-128($np), %rdx add %rdx, $r3 mov $r1, %rax imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax mov \$9, $i jmp .LOOP_REDUCE_1024 .align 32 .LOOP_REDUCE_1024: vmovd %eax, $Y2 vpbroadcastq $Y2, $Y2 vpmuludq 32*1-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC1, $ACC1 add %rax, $r1 vpmuludq 32*2-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP2 .byte 0x67 add %rax, $r2 .byte 0x67 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 16-128($np), %rax shr \$29, $r1 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0 add %rax, $r3 add $r1, $r2 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1 mov $r2, %rax imull $n0, %eax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP2 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*7-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*8-128($np), $Y1, $TEMP1 vmovd %eax, $Y1 #vmovdqu 32*1-8-128($np), $TEMP2 # moved below vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC8, $ACC8 #vmovdqu 32*2-8-128($np), $TEMP0 # moved below vpbroadcastq $Y1, $Y1 vpmuludq 32*1-8-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP2 # see above vmovdqu 32*3-8-128($np), $TEMP1 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*2-8-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP0 # see above vmovdqu 32*4-8-128($np), $TEMP2 add %rax, $r2 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC2, $ACC2 add $r3, %rax shr \$29, $r2 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*5-8-128($np), $TEMP0 add $r2, %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*6-8-128($np), $TEMP1 .byte 0x67 mov %rax, $r3 imull $n0, %eax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 .byte 0xc4,0x41,0x7e,0x6f,0x9d,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00 # vmovdqu 32*7-8-128($np), $TEMP2 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*8-8-128($np), $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*9-8-128($np), $ACC9 vmovd %eax, $ACC0 # borrow ACC0 for Y2 imulq -128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*1-16-128($np), $TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq $Y2, $ACC9, $ACC9 vmovdqu 32*2-16-128($np), $TEMP2 add %rax, $r3 ___ ($ACC0,$Y2)=($Y2,$ACC0); $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 32*1-24-128($np), $ACC0 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*3-16-128($np), $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq $Y2, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 .byte 0xc4,0x41,0x7e,0x6f,0xb5,0xf0,0xff,0xff,0xff # vmovdqu 32*4-16-128($np), $TEMP1 vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*5-16-128($np), $TEMP2 .byte 0x67 vmovq $ACC0, %rax vmovdqu $ACC0, (%rsp) # transfer $r0-$r3 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*6-16-128($np), $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*7-16-128($np), $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*8-16-128($np), $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 shr \$29, $r3 vmovdqu 32*9-16-128($np), $TEMP0 add $r3, %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 #vmovdqu 32*2-24-128($np), $TEMP1 # moved below mov %rax, $r0 imull $n0, %eax vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpmuludq $Y1, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vmovd %eax, $Y1 vmovdqu 32*3-24-128($np), $TEMP2 .byte 0x67 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC9, $ACC9 vpbroadcastq $Y1, $Y1 vpmuludq 32*2-24-128($np), $Y2, $TEMP1 # see above vmovdqu 32*4-24-128($np), $TEMP0 mov %rax, %rdx imulq -128($np), %rax mov 8(%rsp), $r1 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*5-24-128($np), $TEMP1 add %rax, $r0 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 8-128($np), %rax .byte 0x67 shr \$29, $r0 mov 16(%rsp), $r2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC3, $ACC2 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vmovdqu 32*6-24-128($np), $TEMP2 add %rax, $r1 mov %rdx, %rax imulq 16-128($np), %rax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC3 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vmovdqu 32*7-24-128($np), $TEMP0 imulq 24-128($np), %rdx # future $r3 add %rax, $r2 lea ($r0,$r1), %rax vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vmovdqu 32*8-24-128($np), $TEMP1 mov %rax, $r1 imull $n0, %eax vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP0, $TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*9-24-128($np), $TEMP2 and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 add 24(%rsp), %rdx vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC8, $ACC7 vpmuludq $Y2, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC9, $ACC8 vmovq $r3, $ACC9 mov %rdx, $r3 dec $i jnz .LOOP_REDUCE_1024 ___ ($ACC0,$Y2)=($Y2,$ACC0); $code.=<<___; lea 448(%rsp), $tp1 # size optimization vpaddq $ACC9, $Y2, $ACC0 vpxor $ZERO, $ZERO, $ZERO vpaddq 32*9-192($tp0), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq 32*10-448($tp1), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq 32*11-448($tp1), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq 32*12-448($tp1), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq 32*13-448($tp1), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq 32*14-448($tp1), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq 32*15-448($tp1), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*16-448($tp1), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq 32*17-448($tp1), $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-128($rp) vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-128($rp) ___ $TEMP5=$ACC0; $code.=<<___; vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-128($rp) vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-128($rp) vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-128($rp) mov $rp, $ap dec $rep jne .LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024 vzeroall mov %rbp, %rax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp # restore %rsp .Lsqr_1024_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 ___ } { # void AMM_WW( my $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, my $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, my $bp="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, my $np="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, my $n0="%r8d"; # unsigned int n0); # The registers that hold the accumulated redundant result # The AMM works on 1024 bit operands, and redundant word size is 29 # Therefore: ceil(1024/29)/4 = 9 my $ACC0="%ymm0"; my $ACC1="%ymm1"; my $ACC2="%ymm2"; my $ACC3="%ymm3"; my $ACC4="%ymm4"; my $ACC5="%ymm5"; my $ACC6="%ymm6"; my $ACC7="%ymm7"; my $ACC8="%ymm8"; my $ACC9="%ymm9"; # Registers that hold the broadcasted words of multiplier, currently used my $Bi="%ymm10"; my $Yi="%ymm11"; # Helper registers my $TEMP0=$ACC0; my $TEMP1="%ymm12"; my $TEMP2="%ymm13"; my $ZERO="%ymm14"; my $AND_MASK="%ymm15"; # alu registers that hold the first words of the ACC my $r0="%r9"; my $r1="%r10"; my $r2="%r11"; my $r3="%r12"; my $i="%r14d"; my $tmp="%r15"; $bp="%r13"; # reassigned argument $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_mul_avx2,\@function,5 .align 64 rsaz_1024_mul_avx2: lea (%rsp), %rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); vzeroupper lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp vmovaps %xmm6,-0xd8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7,-0xc8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8,-0xb8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9,-0xa8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10,-0x98(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11,-0x88(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) .Lmul_1024_body: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,%rbp vzeroall mov %rdx, $bp # reassigned argument sub \$64,%rsp # unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can # cause severe performance degradation here, so if $ap does # cross page boundary, swap it with $bp [meaning that caller # is advised to lay down $ap and $bp next to each other, so # that only one can cross page boundary]. .byte 0x67,0x67 mov $ap, $tmp and \$4095, $tmp add \$32*10, $tmp shr \$12, $tmp mov $ap, $tmp cmovnz $bp, $ap cmovnz $tmp, $bp mov $np, $tmp sub \$-128,$ap # size optimization sub \$-128,$np sub \$-128,$rp and \$4095, $tmp # see if $np crosses page add \$32*10, $tmp .byte 0x67,0x67 shr \$12, $tmp jz .Lmul_1024_no_n_copy # unaligned 256-bit load that crosses page boundary can # cause severe performance degradation here, so if $np does # cross page boundary, copy it to stack and make sure stack # frame doesn't... sub \$32*10,%rsp vmovdqu 32*0-128($np), $ACC0 and \$-512, %rsp vmovdqu 32*1-128($np), $ACC1 vmovdqu 32*2-128($np), $ACC2 vmovdqu 32*3-128($np), $ACC3 vmovdqu 32*4-128($np), $ACC4 vmovdqu 32*5-128($np), $ACC5 vmovdqu 32*6-128($np), $ACC6 vmovdqu 32*7-128($np), $ACC7 vmovdqu 32*8-128($np), $ACC8 lea 64+128(%rsp),$np vmovdqu $ACC0, 32*0-128($np) vpxor $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vmovdqu $ACC1, 32*1-128($np) vpxor $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqu $ACC2, 32*2-128($np) vpxor $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqu $ACC3, 32*3-128($np) vpxor $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqu $ACC4, 32*4-128($np) vpxor $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC5, 32*5-128($np) vpxor $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqu $ACC6, 32*6-128($np) vpxor $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqu $ACC7, 32*7-128($np) vpxor $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqu $ACC8, 32*8-128($np) vmovdqa $ACC0, $ACC8 vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-128($np) # $ACC9 is zero after vzeroall .Lmul_1024_no_n_copy: and \$-64,%rsp mov ($bp), %rbx vpbroadcastq ($bp), $Bi vmovdqu $ACC0, (%rsp) # clear top of stack xor $r0, $r0 .byte 0x67 xor $r1, $r1 xor $r2, $r2 xor $r3, $r3 vmovdqu .Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK mov \$9, $i vmovdqu $ACC9, 32*9-128($rp) # $ACC9 is zero after vzeroall jmp .Loop_mul_1024 .align 32 .Loop_mul_1024: vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $ACC9 # correct $ACC3(*) mov %rbx, %rax imulq -128($ap), %rax add $r0, %rax mov %rbx, $r1 imulq 8-128($ap), $r1 add 8(%rsp), $r1 mov %rax, $r0 imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax mov %rbx, $r2 imulq 16-128($ap), $r2 add 16(%rsp), $r2 mov %rbx, $r3 imulq 24-128($ap), $r3 add 24(%rsp), $r3 vpmuludq 32*1-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0 vmovd %eax, $Yi vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq 32*2-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq 32*7-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $ACC9, $ACC9 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq 32*8-128($ap),$Bi,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq 8($bp), $Bi vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 mov %rax,%rdx imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r0 mov %rdx,%rax imulq 8-128($np),%rax add %rax,$r1 mov %rdx,%rax imulq 16-128($np),%rax add %rax,$r2 shr \$29, $r0 imulq 24-128($np),%rdx add %rdx,$r3 add $r0, $r1 vpmuludq 32*1-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq 32*2-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq 32*7-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $ACC9, $ACC9 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq 32*8-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0 vpaddq $ACC9, $ACC3, $ACC3 # correct $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC8,$ACC8 mov %rbx, %rax imulq -128($ap),%rax add %rax,$r1 vmovdqu -8+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP1 mov %rbx, %rax imulq 8-128($ap),%rax add %rax,$r2 vmovdqu -8+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP2 mov $r1, %rax imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax imulq 16-128($ap),%rbx add %rbx,$r3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovd %eax, $Yi vmovdqu -8+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vmovdqu -8+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -8+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*9-128($ap),$ACC9 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Bi,$ACC9,$ACC9 vpbroadcastq 16($bp), $Bi mov %rax,%rdx imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r1 vmovdqu -8+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0 mov %rdx,%rax imulq 8-128($np),%rax add %rax,$r2 vmovdqu -8+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1 shr \$29, $r1 imulq 16-128($np),%rdx add %rdx,$r3 add $r1, $r2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vmovdqu -8+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -8+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -8+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -8+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -8+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 vmovdqu -16+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP0 mov %rbx,%rax imulq -128($ap),%rax add $r2,%rax vmovdqu -16+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP1 mov %rax,$r2 imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax imulq 8-128($ap),%rbx add %rbx,$r3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovd %eax, $Yi vmovdqu -16+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vmovdqu -16+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -16+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*9-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpbroadcastq 24($bp), $Bi vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 vmovdqu -16+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0 mov %rax,%rdx imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r2 vmovdqu -16+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1 imulq 8-128($np),%rdx add %rdx,$r3 shr \$29, $r2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vmovdqu -16+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -16+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -16+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -16+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -16+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -24+32*1-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 add $r2, $r3 imulq -128($ap),%rbx add %rbx,$r3 mov $r3, %rax imull $n0, %eax and \$0x1fffffff, %eax vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovd %eax, $Yi vmovdqu -24+32*3-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC1 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpbroadcastq $Yi, $Yi vmovdqu -24+32*4-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*5-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*6-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -24+32*7-128($ap),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*8-128($ap),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*9-128($ap),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC8 vpmuludq $Bi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vpbroadcastq 32($bp), $Bi vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC9 add \$32, $bp # $bp++ vmovdqu -24+32*1-128($np),$TEMP0 imulq -128($np),%rax add %rax,$r3 shr \$29, $r3 vmovdqu -24+32*2-128($np),$TEMP1 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovq $Bi, %rbx vmovdqu -24+32*3-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC1,$ACC0 # $ACC0==$TEMP0 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu $ACC0, (%rsp) # transfer $r0-$r3 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC2,$ACC1 vmovdqu -24+32*4-128($np),$TEMP0 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*5-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC3,$ACC2 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*6-128($np),$TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC4,$ACC3 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 vmovdqu -24+32*7-128($np),$TEMP0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC5,$ACC4 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovdqu -24+32*8-128($np),$TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC6,$ACC5 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP0,$TEMP0 vmovdqu -24+32*9-128($np),$TEMP2 mov $r3, $r0 vpaddq $TEMP0,$ACC7,$ACC6 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP1,$TEMP1 add (%rsp), $r0 vpaddq $TEMP1,$ACC8,$ACC7 vpmuludq $Yi,$TEMP2,$TEMP2 vmovq $r3, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP2,$ACC9,$ACC8 dec $i jnz .Loop_mul_1024 ___ # (*) Original implementation was correcting ACC1-ACC3 for overflow # after 7 loop runs, or after 28 iterations, or 56 additions. # But as we underutilize resources, it's possible to correct in # each iteration with marginal performance loss. But then, as # we do it in each iteration, we can correct less digits, and # avoid performance penalties completely. Also note that we # correct only three digits out of four. This works because # most significant digit is subjected to less additions. $TEMP0 = $ACC9; $TEMP3 = $Bi; $TEMP4 = $Yi; $code.=<<___; vpermq \$0, $AND_MASK, $AND_MASK vpaddq (%rsp), $TEMP1, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC1, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC2, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC3, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $ZERO, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqu $ACC0, 0-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC1, 32-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC2, 64-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC3, 96-128($rp) ___ $TEMP5=$ACC0; $code.=<<___; vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC4, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC5, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC6, $TEMP3 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP1, $TEMP1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC7, $TEMP4 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP2, $TEMP2 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq \$29, $ACC8, $TEMP5 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP3, $TEMP3 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP4, $TEMP4 vpblendd \$3, $ZERO, $TEMP1, $TEMP0 vpermq \$0x93, $TEMP5, $TEMP5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP1, $TEMP2, $TEMP1 vpaddq $TEMP0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP2, $TEMP3, $TEMP2 vpaddq $TEMP1, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP3, $TEMP4, $TEMP3 vpaddq $TEMP2, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpblendd \$3, $TEMP4, $TEMP5, $TEMP4 vpaddq $TEMP3, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $TEMP4, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqu $ACC4, 128-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC5, 160-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC6, 192-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC7, 224-128($rp) vmovdqu $ACC8, 256-128($rp) vzeroupper mov %rbp, %rax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp # restore %rsp .Lmul_1024_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_1024_mul_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 ___ } { my ($out,$inp) = $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx") : ("%rdi","%rsi"); my @T = map("%r$_",(8..11)); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2: sub \$-128,$inp # size optimization xor %rax,%rax ___ for ($j=0,$i=0; $i<16; $i++) { my $k=0; while (29*$j<64*($i+1)) { # load data till boundary $code.=" mov `8*$j-128`($inp), @T[0]\n"; $j++; $k++; push(@T,shift(@T)); } $l=$k; while ($k>1) { # shift loaded data but last value $code.=" shl \$`29*($j-$k)`,@T[-$k]\n"; $k--; } $code.=<<___; # shift last value mov @T[-1], @T[0] shl \$`29*($j-1)`, @T[-1] shr \$`-29*($j-1)`, @T[0] ___ while ($l) { # accumulate all values $code.=" add @T[-$l], %rax\n"; $l--; } $code.=<<___; adc \$0, @T[0] # consume eventual carry mov %rax, 8*$i($out) mov @T[0], %rax ___ push(@T,shift(@T)); } $code.=<<___; ret .size rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2: sub \$-128,$out # size optimization mov ($inp),@T[0] mov \$0x1fffffff,%eax ___ for ($j=0,$i=0; $i<16; $i++) { $code.=" mov `8*($i+1)`($inp),@T[1]\n" if ($i<15); $code.=" xor @T[1],@T[1]\n" if ($i==15); my $k=1; while (29*($j+1)<64*($i+1)) { $code.=<<___; mov @T[0],@T[-$k] shr \$`29*$j`,@T[-$k] and %rax,@T[-$k] # &0x1fffffff mov @T[-$k],`8*$j-128`($out) ___ $j++; $k++; } $code.=<<___; shrd \$`29*$j`,@T[1],@T[0] and %rax,@T[0] mov @T[0],`8*$j-128`($out) ___ $j++; push(@T,shift(@T)); } $code.=<<___; mov @T[0],`8*$j-128`($out) # zero mov @T[0],`8*($j+1)-128`($out) mov @T[0],`8*($j+2)-128`($out) mov @T[0],`8*($j+3)-128`($out) ret .size rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2 ___ } { my ($out,$inp,$power) = $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d") : ("%rdi","%rsi","%edx"); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2: vzeroupper vmovdqu .Lscatter_permd(%rip),%ymm5 shl \$4,$power lea ($out,$power),$out mov \$9,%eax jmp .Loop_scatter_1024 .align 32 .Loop_scatter_1024: vmovdqu ($inp),%ymm0 lea 32($inp),$inp vpermd %ymm0,%ymm5,%ymm0 vmovdqu %xmm0,($out) lea 16*32($out),$out dec %eax jnz .Loop_scatter_1024 vzeroupper ret .size rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2: vzeroupper mov %rsp,%r11 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp),%rax .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5: # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 # lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 # vmovaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 # vmovaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 # vmovaps %xmm8,0(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 # vmovaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 # vmovaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 # vmovaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 # vmovaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 # vmovaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 # vmovaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 # vmovaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; lea -0x100(%rsp),%rsp and \$-32, %rsp lea .Linc(%rip), %r10 lea -128(%rsp),%rax # control u-op density vmovd $power, %xmm4 vmovdqa (%r10),%ymm0 vmovdqa 32(%r10),%ymm1 vmovdqa 64(%r10),%ymm5 vpbroadcastd %xmm4,%ymm4 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1 vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*0+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm0 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2 vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*1+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm1 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3 vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*2+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0 vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*3+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1 vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*4+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm8 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2 vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*5+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm9 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3 vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*6+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm8, %ymm10 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm8, %ymm8 vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*7+128(%rax) vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm9, %ymm11 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm9, %ymm9 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm10, %ymm12 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm10, %ymm10 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm11, %ymm13 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm11, %ymm11 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm12, %ymm14 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm12, %ymm12 vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm13, %ymm15 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm13, %ymm13 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm14, %ymm14 vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm15, %ymm15 vmovdqa -32(%r10),%ymm7 # .Lgather_permd lea 128($inp), $inp mov \$9,$power .Loop_gather_1024: vmovdqa 32*0-128($inp), %ymm0 vmovdqa 32*1-128($inp), %ymm1 vmovdqa 32*2-128($inp), %ymm2 vmovdqa 32*3-128($inp), %ymm3 vpand 32*0+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpand 32*1+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1 vpand 32*2+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2 vpor %ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm4 vpand 32*3+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3 vmovdqa 32*4-128($inp), %ymm0 vmovdqa 32*5-128($inp), %ymm1 vpor %ymm2, %ymm3, %ymm5 vmovdqa 32*6-128($inp), %ymm2 vmovdqa 32*7-128($inp), %ymm3 vpand 32*4+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpand 32*5+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1 vpand 32*6+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2 vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*7+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3 vpand 32*8-128($inp), %ymm8, %ymm0 vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*9-128($inp), %ymm9, %ymm1 vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*10-128($inp),%ymm10, %ymm2 vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*11-128($inp),%ymm11, %ymm3 vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*12-128($inp),%ymm12, %ymm0 vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*13-128($inp),%ymm13, %ymm1 vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpand 32*14-128($inp),%ymm14, %ymm2 vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpand 32*15-128($inp),%ymm15, %ymm3 lea 32*16($inp), $inp vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4 vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5 vpor %ymm5, %ymm4, %ymm4 vextracti128 \$1, %ymm4, %xmm5 # upper half is cleared vpor %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm5 vpermd %ymm5,%ymm7,%ymm5 vmovdqu %ymm5,($out) lea 32($out),$out dec $power jnz .Loop_gather_1024 vpxor %ymm0,%ymm0,%ymm0 vmovdqu %ymm0,($out) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xa8(%r11),%xmm6 movaps -0x98(%r11),%xmm7 movaps -0x88(%r11),%xmm8 movaps -0x78(%r11),%xmm9 movaps -0x68(%r11),%xmm10 movaps -0x58(%r11),%xmm11 movaps -0x48(%r11),%xmm12 movaps -0x38(%r11),%xmm13 movaps -0x28(%r11),%xmm14 movaps -0x18(%r11),%xmm15 .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5: ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%r11),%rsp ret .size rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2 ___ } $code.=<<___; .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl rsaz_avx2_eligible .type rsaz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 rsaz_avx2_eligible: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$`1<<8|1<<19`,%ecx mov \$0,%edx and %eax,%ecx cmp \$`1<<8|1<<19`,%ecx # check for BMI2+AD*X cmove %edx,%eax ___ $code.=<<___; and \$`1<<5`,%eax shr \$5,%eax ret .size rsaz_avx2_eligible,.-rsaz_avx2_eligible .align 64 .Land_mask: .quad 0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,-1 .Lscatter_permd: .long 0,2,4,6,7,7,7,7 .Lgather_permd: .long 0,7,1,7,2,7,3,7 .Linc: .long 0,0,0,0, 1,1,1,1 .long 2,2,2,2, 3,3,3,3 .long 4,4,4,4, 4,4,4,4 .align 64 ___ if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___ .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type rsaz_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 rsaz_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 160($context),%rax # pull context->Rbp mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov %r15,240($context) mov %r14,232($context) mov %r13,224($context) mov %r12,216($context) mov %rbp,160($context) mov %rbx,144($context) lea -0xd8(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # & context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size rsaz_se_handler,.-rsaz_se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5 .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva rsaz_se_handler .rva .Lsqr_1024_body,.Lsqr_1024_epilogue .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_mul_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva rsaz_se_handler .rva .Lmul_1024_body,.Lmul_1024_epilogue .LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5: .byte 0x01,0x36,0x17,0x0b .byte 0x36,0xf8,0x09,0x00 # vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15 .byte 0x31,0xe8,0x08,0x00 # vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14 .byte 0x2c,0xd8,0x07,0x00 # vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13 .byte 0x27,0xc8,0x06,0x00 # vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12 .byte 0x22,0xb8,0x05,0x00 # vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11 .byte 0x1d,0xa8,0x04,0x00 # vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10 .byte 0x18,0x98,0x03,0x00 # vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9 .byte 0x13,0x88,0x02,0x00 # vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8 .byte 0x0e,0x78,0x01,0x00 # vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7 .byte 0x09,0x68,0x00,0x00 # vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6 .byte 0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00 # sub rsp,0xa8 .byte 0x00,0xb3,0x00,0x00 # set_frame r11 ___ } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge; s/\b(sh[rl]d?\s+\$)(-?[0-9]+)/$1.$2%64/ge or s/\b(vmov[dq])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vmovdqu)\b(.+)%x%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpinsr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpextr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpbroadcast[qd]\s+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1%xmm$2/go; print $_,"\n"; } }}} else {{{ print <<___; # assembler is too old .text .globl rsaz_avx2_eligible .type rsaz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent rsaz_avx2_eligible: xor %eax,%eax ret .size rsaz_avx2_eligible,.-rsaz_avx2_eligible .globl rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2 .globl rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2 .type rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2: rsaz_1024_mul_avx2: rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2: rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2: rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2: rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2: .byte 0x0f,0x0b # ud2 ret .size rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2 ___ }}} close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000011705513176625656017036 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # December 2007 # The reason for undertaken effort is basically following. Even though # Power 6 CPU operates at incredible 4.7GHz clock frequency, its PKI # performance was observed to be less than impressive, essentially as # fast as 1.8GHz PPC970, or 2.6 times(!) slower than one would hope. # Well, it's not surprising that IBM had to make some sacrifices to # boost the clock frequency that much, but no overall improvement? # Having observed how much difference did switching to FPU make on # UltraSPARC, playing same stunt on Power 6 appeared appropriate... # Unfortunately the resulting performance improvement is not as # impressive, ~30%, and in absolute terms is still very far from what # one would expect from 4.7GHz CPU. There is a chance that I'm doing # something wrong, but in the lack of assembler level micro-profiling # data or at least decent platform guide I can't tell... Or better # results might be achieved with VMX... Anyway, this module provides # *worse* performance on other PowerPC implementations, ~40-15% slower # on PPC970 depending on key length and ~40% slower on Power 5 for all # key lengths. As it's obviously inappropriate as "best all-round" # alternative, it has to be complemented with run-time CPU family # detection. Oh! It should also be noted that unlike other PowerPC # implementation IALU ppc-mont.pl module performs *suboptimaly* on # >=1024-bit key lengths on Power 6. It should also be noted that # *everything* said so far applies to 64-bit builds! As far as 32-bit # application executed on 64-bit CPU goes, this module is likely to # become preferred choice, because it's easy to adapt it for such # case and *is* faster than 32-bit ppc-mont.pl on *all* processors. # February 2008 # Micro-profiling assisted optimization results in ~15% improvement # over original ppc64-mont.pl version, or overall ~50% improvement # over ppc.pl module on Power 6. If compared to ppc-mont.pl on same # Power 6 CPU, this module is 5-150% faster depending on key length, # [hereafter] more for longer keys. But if compared to ppc-mont.pl # on 1.8GHz PPC970, it's only 5-55% faster. Still far from impressive # in absolute terms, but it's apparently the way Power 6 is... # December 2009 # Adapted for 32-bit build this module delivers 25-120%, yes, more # than *twice* for longer keys, performance improvement over 32-bit # ppc-mont.pl on 1.8GHz PPC970. However! This implementation utilizes # even 64-bit integer operations and the trouble is that most PPC # operating systems don't preserve upper halves of general purpose # registers upon 32-bit signal delivery. They do preserve them upon # context switch, but not signalling:-( This means that asynchronous # signals have to be blocked upon entry to this subroutine. Signal # masking (and of course complementary unmasking) has quite an impact # on performance, naturally larger for shorter keys. It's so severe # that 512-bit key performance can be as low as 1/3 of expected one. # This is why this routine can be engaged for longer key operations # only on these OSes, see crypto/ppccap.c for further details. MacOS X # is an exception from this and doesn't require signal masking, and # that's where above improvement coefficients were collected. For # others alternative would be to break dependence on upper halves of # GPRs by sticking to 32-bit integer operations... # December 2012 # Remove above mentioned dependence on GPRs' upper halves in 32-bit # build. No signal masking overhead, but integer instructions are # *more* numerous... It's still "universally" faster than 32-bit # ppc-mont.pl, but improvement coefficient is not as impressive # for longer keys... $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T=4; $RZONE= 224; $fname= "bn_mul_mont_fpu64"; $STUX= "stwux"; # store indexed and update $PUSH= "stw"; $POP= "lwz"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T=8; $RZONE= 288; $fname= "bn_mul_mont_fpu64"; # same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics... $STUX= "stdux"; # store indexed and update $PUSH= "std"; $POP= "ld"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $FRAME=64; # padded frame header $TRANSFER=16*8; $carry="r0"; $sp="r1"; $toc="r2"; $rp="r3"; $ovf="r3"; $ap="r4"; $bp="r5"; $np="r6"; $n0="r7"; $num="r8"; $rp="r9"; # $rp is reassigned $tp="r10"; $j="r11"; $i="r12"; # non-volatile registers $c1="r19"; $n1="r20"; $a1="r21"; $nap_d="r22"; # interleaved ap and np in double format $a0="r23"; # ap[0] $t0="r24"; # temporary registers $t1="r25"; $t2="r26"; $t3="r27"; $t4="r28"; $t5="r29"; $t6="r30"; $t7="r31"; # PPC offers enough register bank capacity to unroll inner loops twice # # ..A3A2A1A0 # dcba # ----------- # A0a # A0b # A0c # A0d # A1a # A1b # A1c # A1d # A2a # A2b # A2c # A2d # A3a # A3b # A3c # A3d # ..a # ..b # $ba="f0"; $bb="f1"; $bc="f2"; $bd="f3"; $na="f4"; $nb="f5"; $nc="f6"; $nd="f7"; $dota="f8"; $dotb="f9"; $A0="f10"; $A1="f11"; $A2="f12"; $A3="f13"; $N0="f20"; $N1="f21"; $N2="f22"; $N3="f23"; $T0a="f24"; $T0b="f25"; $T1a="f26"; $T1b="f27"; $T2a="f28"; $T2b="f29"; $T3a="f30"; $T3b="f31"; # sp----------->+-------------------------------+ # | saved sp | # +-------------------------------+ # . . # +64 +-------------------------------+ # | 16 gpr<->fpr transfer zone | # . . # . . # +16*8 +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 tmp[-1] | # +-------------------------------+ # | __int64 tmp[num] | # . . # . . # . . # +(num+1)*8 +-------------------------------+ # | padding to 64 byte boundary | # . . # +X +-------------------------------+ # | double nap_d[4*num] | # . . # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+ # . . # -13*size_t +-------------------------------+ # | 13 saved gpr, r19-r31 | # . . # . . # -12*8 +-------------------------------+ # | 12 saved fpr, f20-f31 | # . . # . . # +-------------------------------+ $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .$fname .align 5 .$fname: cmpwi $num,`3*8/$SIZE_T` mr $rp,r3 ; $rp is reassigned li r3,0 ; possible "not handled" return code bltlr- andi. r0,$num,`16/$SIZE_T-1` ; $num has to be "even" bnelr- slwi $num,$num,`log($SIZE_T)/log(2)` ; num*=sizeof(BN_LONG) li $i,-4096 slwi $tp,$num,2 ; place for {an}p_{lh}[num], i.e. 4*num add $tp,$tp,$num ; place for tp[num+1] addi $tp,$tp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+64+$RZONE` subf $tp,$tp,$sp ; $sp-$tp and $tp,$tp,$i ; minimize TLB usage subf $tp,$sp,$tp ; $tp-$sp mr $i,$sp $STUX $sp,$sp,$tp ; alloca $PUSH r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r25,`-12*8-7*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r26,`-12*8-6*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r27,`-12*8-5*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r28,`-12*8-4*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r29,`-12*8-3*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r30,`-12*8-2*$SIZE_T`($i) $PUSH r31,`-12*8-1*$SIZE_T`($i) stfd f20,`-12*8`($i) stfd f21,`-11*8`($i) stfd f22,`-10*8`($i) stfd f23,`-9*8`($i) stfd f24,`-8*8`($i) stfd f25,`-7*8`($i) stfd f26,`-6*8`($i) stfd f27,`-5*8`($i) stfd f28,`-4*8`($i) stfd f29,`-3*8`($i) stfd f30,`-2*8`($i) stfd f31,`-1*8`($i) addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+64` li $i,-64 add $nap_d,$tp,$num and $nap_d,$nap_d,$i ; align to 64 bytes ; nap_d is off by 1, because it's used with stfdu/lfdu addi $nap_d,$nap_d,-8 srwi $j,$num,`3+1` ; counter register, num/2 addi $j,$j,-1 addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER-8` li $carry,0 mtctr $j ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); ld $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0] value ld $t3,0($bp) ; bp[0] ld $n0,0($n0) ; pull n0[0] value mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[0] ; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t0,$t3,16,48 extrdi $t1,$t3,16,32 extrdi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrdi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t4,$t7,16,48 extrdi $t5,$t7,16,32 extrdi $t6,$t7,16,16 extrdi $t7,$t7,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) extrdi $t0,$a0,32,32 ; lwz $t0,4($ap) extrdi $t1,$a0,32,0 ; lwz $t1,0($ap) lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); lwz $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0,1] value mr $n1,$n0 lwz $a1,4($ap) li $c1,0 lwz $t1,0($bp) ; bp[0,1] lwz $t3,4($bp) lwz $n0,0($n1) ; pull n0[0,1] value lwz $n1,4($n1) mullw $t4,$a0,$t1 ; mulld ap[0]*bp[0] mulhwu $t5,$a0,$t1 mullw $t6,$a1,$t1 mullw $t7,$a0,$t3 add $t5,$t5,$t6 add $t5,$t5,$t7 ; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t0,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t1,$t1,16,0 extrwi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrwi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mullw $t0,$t4,$n0 ; mulld tp[0]*n0 mulhwu $t1,$t4,$n0 mullw $t2,$t5,$n0 mullw $t3,$t4,$n1 add $t1,$t1,$t2 add $t1,$t1,$t3 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t4,$t0,16,16 extrwi $t5,$t0,16,0 extrwi $t6,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t7,$t1,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) mr $t0,$a0 ; lwz $t0,0($ap) mr $t1,$a1 ; lwz $t1,4($ap) lwz $t2,8($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t3,12($ap) lwz $t4,0($np) ; load n[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t5,4($np) lwz $t6,8($np) lwz $t7,12($np) ___ $code.=<<___; lfd $ba,`$FRAME+0`($sp) lfd $bb,`$FRAME+8`($sp) lfd $bc,`$FRAME+16`($sp) lfd $bd,`$FRAME+24`($sp) lfd $na,`$FRAME+32`($sp) lfd $nb,`$FRAME+40`($sp) lfd $nc,`$FRAME+48`($sp) lfd $nd,`$FRAME+56`($sp) std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ; yes, std even in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) std $t4,`$FRAME+96`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+104`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+112`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+120`($sp) fcfid $ba,$ba fcfid $bb,$bb fcfid $bc,$bc fcfid $bd,$bd fcfid $na,$na fcfid $nb,$nb fcfid $nc,$nc fcfid $nd,$nd lfd $A0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) lfd $A1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) lfd $A2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) lfd $A3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) lfd $N0,`$FRAME+96`($sp) lfd $N1,`$FRAME+104`($sp) lfd $N2,`$FRAME+112`($sp) lfd $N3,`$FRAME+120`($sp) fcfid $A0,$A0 fcfid $A1,$A1 fcfid $A2,$A2 fcfid $A3,$A3 fcfid $N0,$N0 fcfid $N1,$N1 fcfid $N2,$N2 fcfid $N3,$N3 addi $ap,$ap,16 addi $np,$np,16 fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb stfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; save a[j] in double format stfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb stfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; save a[j+1] in double format stfd $A3,32($nap_d) fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb stfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; save n[j] in double format stfd $N1,48($nap_d) fmul $T0a,$A0,$ba fmul $T0b,$A0,$bb stfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; save n[j+1] in double format stfdu $N3,64($nap_d) fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) .align 5 L1st: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); lwz $t0,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t1,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); lwz $t0,0($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t1,4($ap) lwz $t2,8($ap) lwz $t3,12($ap) lwz $t4,0($np) ; load n[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs lwz $t5,4($np) lwz $t6,8($np) lwz $t7,12($np) ___ $code.=<<___; std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ; yes, std even in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) std $t4,`$FRAME+96`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+104`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+112`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+120`($sp) ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ___ } else { $code.=<<___; lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ___ } $code.=<<___; lfd $A0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) lfd $A1,`$FRAME+72`($sp) lfd $A2,`$FRAME+80`($sp) lfd $A3,`$FRAME+88`($sp) lfd $N0,`$FRAME+96`($sp) lfd $N1,`$FRAME+104`($sp) lfd $N2,`$FRAME+112`($sp) lfd $N3,`$FRAME+120`($sp) fcfid $A0,$A0 fcfid $A1,$A1 fcfid $A2,$A2 fcfid $A3,$A3 fcfid $N0,$N0 fcfid $N1,$N1 fcfid $N2,$N2 fcfid $N3,$N3 addi $ap,$ap,16 addi $np,$np,16 fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb stfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; save a[j] in double format stfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb fmadd $T0a,$A0,$ba,$dota fmadd $T0b,$A0,$bb,$dotb stfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; save a[j+1] in double format stfd $A3,32($nap_d) ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b stfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; save n[j] in double format stfd $N1,48($nap_d) fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd stfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; save n[j+1] in double format stfdu $N3,64($nap_d) srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b add $t2,$t2,$carry fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b srdi $carry,$t2,16 fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 add $t3,$t3,$carry srdi $carry,$t3,16 fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b add $t4,$t4,$carry fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b srdi $carry,$t4,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb add $t5,$t5,$carry srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b add $t6,$t6,$carry fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b srdi $carry,$t6,16 fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) std $t0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] stdu $t4,16($tp) ; tp[j] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b stfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; save n[j] in double format stfd $N1,48($nap_d) srwi $c1,$t1,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd stfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; save n[j+1] in double format stfdu $N3,64($nap_d) insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b srwi $c1,$t5,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits srwi $c1,$t7,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,8($tp) srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits srwi $c1,$t7,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b srwi $c1,$t1,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits srwi $c1,$t5,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j] stwu $t0,16($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; bdnz L1st fctid $dota,$dota fctid $dotb,$dotb ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 add $t2,$t2,$carry srdi $carry,$t2,16 insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 add $t3,$t3,$carry srdi $carry,$t3,16 insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits add $t4,$t4,$carry srdi $carry,$t4,16 add $t5,$t5,$carry srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 add $t6,$t6,$carry srdi $carry,$t6,16 insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits ld $t6,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+72`($sp) std $t0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1] stdu $t4,16($tp) ; tp[j] add $t6,$t6,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t6,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t6,$t7,48,0 srdi $ovf,$t7,48 std $t6,8($tp) ; tp[num-1] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,8($tp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j] stwu $t0,16($tp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 insrwi $t6,$t4,16,0 srwi $t4,$t4,16 insrwi $t4,$t5,16,0 srwi $ovf,$t5,16 stw $t6,12($tp) ; tp[num-1] stw $t4,8($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; slwi $t7,$num,2 subf $nap_d,$t7,$nap_d ; rewind pointer li $i,8 ; i=1 .align 5 Louter: addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER` li $carry,0 mtctr $j ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); ldx $t3,$bp,$i ; bp[i] ld $t6,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp) ; tp[0] mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[i] add $t7,$t7,$t6 ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] ; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t0,$t3,16,48 extrdi $t1,$t3,16,32 extrdi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrdi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrdi $t4,$t7,16,48 extrdi $t5,$t7,16,32 extrdi $t6,$t7,16,16 extrdi $t7,$t7,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); add $t0,$bp,$i li $c1,0 lwz $t1,0($t0) ; bp[i,i+1] lwz $t3,4($t0) mullw $t4,$a0,$t1 ; ap[0]*bp[i] lwz $t0,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+4`($sp) ; tp[0] mulhwu $t5,$a0,$t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp) ; tp[0] mullw $t6,$a1,$t1 mullw $t7,$a0,$t3 add $t5,$t5,$t6 add $t5,$t5,$t7 addc $t4,$t4,$t0 ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] adde $t5,$t5,$t2 ; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t0,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t1,$t1,16,0 extrwi $t2,$t3,16,16 extrwi $t3,$t3,16,0 std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) mullw $t0,$t4,$n0 ; mulld tp[0]*n0 mulhwu $t1,$t4,$n0 mullw $t2,$t5,$n0 mullw $t3,$t4,$n1 add $t1,$t1,$t2 add $t1,$t1,$t3 ; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values extrwi $t4,$t0,16,16 extrwi $t5,$t0,16,0 extrwi $t6,$t1,16,16 extrwi $t7,$t1,16,0 std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; lfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; load a[j] in double format lfd $A1,16($nap_d) lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format lfd $A3,32($nap_d) lfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; load n[j] in double format lfd $N1,48($nap_d) lfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; load n[j+1] in double format lfdu $N3,64($nap_d) lfd $ba,`$FRAME+0`($sp) lfd $bb,`$FRAME+8`($sp) lfd $bc,`$FRAME+16`($sp) lfd $bd,`$FRAME+24`($sp) lfd $na,`$FRAME+32`($sp) lfd $nb,`$FRAME+40`($sp) lfd $nc,`$FRAME+48`($sp) lfd $nd,`$FRAME+56`($sp) fcfid $ba,$ba fcfid $bb,$bb fcfid $bc,$bc fcfid $bd,$bd fcfid $na,$na fcfid $nb,$nb fcfid $nc,$nc fcfid $nd,$nd fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb fmul $T0a,$A0,$ba fmul $T0b,$A0,$bb fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b lfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; load a[j] in double format lfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format lfd $A3,32($nap_d) fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) .align 5 Linner: fmul $T1a,$A1,$ba fmul $T1b,$A1,$bb fmul $T2a,$A2,$ba fmul $T2b,$A2,$bb lfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; load n[j] in double format lfd $N1,48($nap_d) fmul $T3a,$A3,$ba fmul $T3b,$A3,$bb fmadd $T0a,$A0,$ba,$dota fmadd $T0b,$A0,$bb,$dotb lfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; load n[j+1] in double format lfdu $N3,64($nap_d) fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b lfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; load a[j] in double format lfd $A1,16($nap_d) fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b fmul $dota,$A3,$bc fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format lfd $A3,32($nap_d) ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 ld $t1,8($tp) ; tp[j] fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b add $t2,$t2,$carry fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b srdi $carry,$t2,16 insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb add $t3,$t3,$carry ldu $t2,16($tp) ; tp[j+1] srdi $carry,$t3,16 insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits add $t4,$t4,$carry fctid $T0a,$T0a fctid $T0b,$T0b srdi $carry,$t4,16 fctid $T1a,$T1a fctid $T1b,$T1b add $t5,$t5,$carry fctid $T2a,$T2a fctid $T2b,$T2b srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 fctid $T3a,$T3a fctid $T3b,$T3b add $t6,$t6,$carry srdi $carry,$t6,16 insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) add $t7,$t7,$carry addc $t3,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t0,$t0,32,0 extrdi $t1,$t1,32,0 adde $t0,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___; stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) adde $t5,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t4,$t4,32,0 extrdi $t2,$t2,32,0 adde $t4,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___; stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) addze $carry,$carry std $t3,-16($tp) ; tp[j-1] std $t5,-8($tp) ; tp[j] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) srwi $c1,$t1,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b lwz $t2,12($tp) ; tp[j] lwz $t3,8($tp) addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb srwi $c1,$t5,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 fctid $T0a,$T0a addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 fctid $T0b,$T0b insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits srwi $c1,$t7,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 fctid $T1a,$T1a addc $t0,$t0,$t2 adde $t4,$t4,$t3 lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 fctid $T1b,$T1b addze $carry,$carry addze $c1,$c1 stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,0($tp) fctid $T2a,$T2a addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 fctid $T2b,$T2b srwi $c1,$t3,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 fctid $T3a,$T3a addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 fctid $T3b,$T3b insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 lwz $t6,20($tp) lwzu $t7,16($tp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp) adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp) insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp) adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp) insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t2,$t2,$t6 stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp) adde $t0,$t0,$t7 stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp) addze $carry,$carry stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp) addze $c1,$c1 stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stw $t2,-4($tp) ; tp[j] stw $t0,-8($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; bdnz Linner fctid $dota,$dota fctid $dotb,$dotb ___ if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) { $code.=<<___; ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp) ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp) ld $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp) ld $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) add $t0,$t0,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t0,16 add $t1,$t1,$carry srdi $carry,$t1,16 insrdi $t0,$t1,16,32 add $t2,$t2,$carry ld $t1,8($tp) ; tp[j] srdi $carry,$t2,16 insrdi $t0,$t2,16,16 add $t3,$t3,$carry ldu $t2,16($tp) ; tp[j+1] srdi $carry,$t3,16 insrdi $t0,$t3,16,0 ; 0..63 bits add $t4,$t4,$carry srdi $carry,$t4,16 add $t5,$t5,$carry srdi $carry,$t5,16 insrdi $t4,$t5,16,32 add $t6,$t6,$carry srdi $carry,$t6,16 insrdi $t4,$t6,16,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t4,$t7,16,0 ; 64..127 bits srdi $carry,$t7,16 ; upper 33 bits ld $t6,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ld $t7,`$FRAME+72`($sp) addc $t3,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t0,$t0,32,0 extrdi $t1,$t1,32,0 adde $t0,$t0,$t1 ___ $code.=<<___; adde $t5,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); # adjust XER[CA] extrdi $t4,$t4,32,0 extrdi $t2,$t2,32,0 adde $t4,$t4,$t2 ___ $code.=<<___; addze $carry,$carry std $t3,-16($tp) ; tp[j-1] std $t5,-8($tp) ; tp[j] add $carry,$carry,$ovf ; comsume upmost overflow add $t6,$t6,$carry ; can not overflow srdi $carry,$t6,16 add $t7,$t7,$carry insrdi $t6,$t7,48,0 srdi $ovf,$t7,48 std $t6,0($tp) ; tp[num-1] ___ } else { $code.=<<___; lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp) stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits lwz $t2,12($tp) ; tp[j] insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 lwz $t3,8($tp) addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t0,$t0,$t2 adde $t4,$t4,$t3 addze $carry,$carry addze $c1,$c1 stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1] stw $t4,0($tp) lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1 lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3 lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2 lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5 lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7 lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6 addc $t2,$t2,$carry adde $t3,$t3,$c1 srwi $carry,$t2,16 insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0 srwi $c1,$t3,16 addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits lwz $t6,20($tp) insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 lwzu $t7,16($tp) addc $t0,$t0,$carry adde $t1,$t1,$c1 srwi $carry,$t0,16 insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0 srwi $c1,$t1,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 srwi $carry,$t4,16 insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0 srwi $c1,$t5,16 addc $t2,$t2,$t6 adde $t0,$t0,$t7 lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addze $carry,$carry addze $c1,$c1 lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) addc $t6,$t6,$carry adde $t7,$t7,$c1 stw $t2,-4($tp) ; tp[j] stw $t0,-8($tp) addc $t6,$t6,$ovf addze $t7,$t7 srwi $carry,$t6,16 insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0 srwi $c1,$t7,16 addc $t4,$t4,$carry adde $t5,$t5,$c1 insrwi $t6,$t4,16,0 srwi $t4,$t4,16 insrwi $t4,$t5,16,0 srwi $ovf,$t5,16 stw $t6,4($tp) ; tp[num-1] stw $t4,0($tp) ___ } $code.=<<___; slwi $t7,$num,2 addi $i,$i,8 subf $nap_d,$t7,$nap_d ; rewind pointer cmpw $i,$num blt- Louter ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8); subf $np,$num,$np ; rewind np addi $j,$j,1 ; restore counter subfc $i,$i,$i ; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA] addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8` addi $t4,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+16` addi $t5,$np,8 addi $t6,$rp,8 mtctr $j .align 4 Lsub: ldx $t0,$tp,$i ldx $t1,$np,$i ldx $t2,$t4,$i ldx $t3,$t5,$i subfe $t0,$t1,$t0 ; tp[j]-np[j] subfe $t2,$t3,$t2 ; tp[j+1]-np[j+1] stdx $t0,$rp,$i stdx $t2,$t6,$i addi $i,$i,16 bdnz Lsub li $i,0 subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit and $ap,$tp,$ovf andc $np,$rp,$ovf or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp addi $t7,$ap,8 mtctr $j .align 4 Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh ldx $t0,$ap,$i ldx $t1,$t7,$i std $i,8($nap_d) ; zap nap_d std $i,16($nap_d) std $i,24($nap_d) std $i,32($nap_d) std $i,40($nap_d) std $i,48($nap_d) std $i,56($nap_d) stdu $i,64($nap_d) stdx $t0,$rp,$i stdx $t1,$t6,$i stdx $i,$tp,$i ; zap tp at once stdx $i,$t4,$i addi $i,$i,16 bdnz Lcopy ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); subf $np,$num,$np ; rewind np addi $j,$j,1 ; restore counter subfc $i,$i,$i ; j=0 and "clear" XER[CA] addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER` addi $np,$np,-4 addi $rp,$rp,-4 addi $ap,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4` mtctr $j .align 4 Lsub: lwz $t0,12($tp) ; load tp[j..j+3] in 64-bit word order lwz $t1,8($tp) lwz $t2,20($tp) lwzu $t3,16($tp) lwz $t4,4($np) ; load np[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order lwz $t5,8($np) lwz $t6,12($np) lwzu $t7,16($np) subfe $t4,$t4,$t0 ; tp[j]-np[j] stw $t0,4($ap) ; save tp[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order subfe $t5,$t5,$t1 ; tp[j+1]-np[j+1] stw $t1,8($ap) subfe $t6,$t6,$t2 ; tp[j+2]-np[j+2] stw $t2,12($ap) subfe $t7,$t7,$t3 ; tp[j+3]-np[j+3] stwu $t3,16($ap) stw $t4,4($rp) stw $t5,8($rp) stw $t6,12($rp) stwu $t7,16($rp) bdnz Lsub li $i,0 subfe $ovf,$i,$ovf ; handle upmost overflow bit addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+4` subf $rp,$num,$rp ; rewind rp and $ap,$tp,$ovf andc $np,$rp,$ovf or $ap,$ap,$np ; ap=borrow?tp:rp addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER` mtctr $j .align 4 Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh lwz $t0,4($ap) lwz $t1,8($ap) lwz $t2,12($ap) lwzu $t3,16($ap) std $i,8($nap_d) ; zap nap_d std $i,16($nap_d) std $i,24($nap_d) std $i,32($nap_d) std $i,40($nap_d) std $i,48($nap_d) std $i,56($nap_d) stdu $i,64($nap_d) stw $t0,4($rp) stw $t1,8($rp) stw $t2,12($rp) stwu $t3,16($rp) std $i,8($tp) ; zap tp at once stdu $i,16($tp) bdnz Lcopy ___ $code.=<<___; $POP $i,0($sp) li r3,1 ; signal "handled" $POP r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r25,`-12*8-7*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r26,`-12*8-6*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r27,`-12*8-5*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r28,`-12*8-4*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r29,`-12*8-3*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r30,`-12*8-2*$SIZE_T`($i) $POP r31,`-12*8-1*$SIZE_T`($i) lfd f20,`-12*8`($i) lfd f21,`-11*8`($i) lfd f22,`-10*8`($i) lfd f23,`-9*8`($i) lfd f24,`-8*8`($i) lfd f25,`-7*8`($i) lfd f26,`-6*8`($i) lfd f27,`-5*8`($i) lfd f28,`-4*8`($i) lfd f29,`-3*8`($i) lfd f30,`-2*8`($i) lfd f31,`-1*8`($i) mr $sp,$i blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,0,0x8c,13,6,0 .long 0 .size .$fname,.-.$fname .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/co-586.pl0000644000000000000000000001357613176625656016053 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); &bn_mul_comba("bn_mul_comba8",8); &bn_mul_comba("bn_mul_comba4",4); &bn_sqr_comba("bn_sqr_comba8",8); &bn_sqr_comba("bn_sqr_comba4",4); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub mul_add_c { local($a,$ai,$b,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$pos,$i,$na,$nb)=@_; # pos == -1 if eax and edx are pre-loaded, 0 to load from next # words, and 1 if load return value &comment("mul a[$ai]*b[$bi]"); # "eax" and "edx" will always be pre-loaded. # &mov("eax",&DWP($ai*4,$a,"",0)) ; # &mov("edx",&DWP($bi*4,$b,"",0)); &mul("edx"); &add($c0,"eax"); &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0; # laod next a &mov("eax",&wparam(0)) if $pos > 0; # load r[] ### &adc($c1,"edx"); &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 0; # laod next b &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 1; # laod next b ### &adc($c2,0); # is pos > 1, it means it is the last loop &mov(&DWP($i*4,"eax","",0),$c0) if $pos > 0; # save r[]; &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1; # laod next a } sub sqr_add_c { local($r,$a,$ai,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$pos,$i,$na,$nb)=@_; # pos == -1 if eax and edx are pre-loaded, 0 to load from next # words, and 1 if load return value &comment("sqr a[$ai]*a[$bi]"); # "eax" and "edx" will always be pre-loaded. # &mov("eax",&DWP($ai*4,$a,"",0)) ; # &mov("edx",&DWP($bi*4,$b,"",0)); if ($ai == $bi) { &mul("eax");} else { &mul("edx");} &add($c0,"eax"); &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0; # load next a ### &adc($c1,"edx"); &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$a,"",0)) if ($pos == 1) && ($na != $nb); ### &adc($c2,0); # is pos > 1, it means it is the last loop &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0) if $pos > 0; # save r[]; &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1; # load next b } sub sqr_add_c2 { local($r,$a,$ai,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$pos,$i,$na,$nb)=@_; # pos == -1 if eax and edx are pre-loaded, 0 to load from next # words, and 1 if load return value &comment("sqr a[$ai]*a[$bi]"); # "eax" and "edx" will always be pre-loaded. # &mov("eax",&DWP($ai*4,$a,"",0)) ; # &mov("edx",&DWP($bi*4,$a,"",0)); if ($ai == $bi) { &mul("eax");} else { &mul("edx");} &add("eax","eax"); ### &adc("edx","edx"); ### &adc($c2,0); &add($c0,"eax"); &adc($c1,"edx"); &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0; # load next a &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1; # load next b &adc($c2,0); &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0) if $pos > 0; # save r[]; &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$a,"",0)) if ($pos <= 1) && ($na != $nb); ### } sub bn_mul_comba { local($name,$num)=@_; local($a,$b,$c0,$c1,$c2); local($i,$as,$ae,$bs,$be,$ai,$bi); local($tot,$end); &function_begin_B($name,""); $c0="ebx"; $c1="ecx"; $c2="ebp"; $a="esi"; $b="edi"; $as=0; $ae=0; $bs=0; $be=0; $tot=$num+$num-1; &push("esi"); &mov($a,&wparam(1)); &push("edi"); &mov($b,&wparam(2)); &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &xor($c0,$c0); &mov("eax",&DWP(0,$a,"",0)); # load the first word &xor($c1,$c1); &mov("edx",&DWP(0,$b,"",0)); # load the first second for ($i=0; $i<$tot; $i++) { $ai=$as; $bi=$bs; $end=$be+1; &comment("################## Calculate word $i"); for ($j=$bs; $j<$end; $j++) { &xor($c2,$c2) if ($j == $bs); if (($j+1) == $end) { $v=1; $v=2 if (($i+1) == $tot); } else { $v=0; } if (($j+1) != $end) { $na=($ai-1); $nb=($bi+1); } else { $na=$as+($i < ($num-1)); $nb=$bs+($i >= ($num-1)); } #printf STDERR "[$ai,$bi] -> [$na,$nb]\n"; &mul_add_c($a,$ai,$b,$bi,$c0,$c1,$c2,$v,$i,$na,$nb); if ($v) { &comment("saved r[$i]"); # &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); # &mov(&DWP($i*4,"eax","",0),$c0); ($c0,$c1,$c2)=($c1,$c2,$c0); } $ai--; $bi++; } $as++ if ($i < ($num-1)); $ae++ if ($i >= ($num-1)); $bs++ if ($i >= ($num-1)); $be++ if ($i < ($num-1)); } &comment("save r[$i]"); # &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); &mov(&DWP($i*4,"eax","",0),$c0); &pop("ebx"); &pop("ebp"); &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } sub bn_sqr_comba { local($name,$num)=@_; local($r,$a,$c0,$c1,$c2)=@_; local($i,$as,$ae,$bs,$be,$ai,$bi); local($b,$tot,$end,$half); &function_begin_B($name,""); $c0="ebx"; $c1="ecx"; $c2="ebp"; $a="esi"; $r="edi"; &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &mov($r,&wparam(0)); &mov($a,&wparam(1)); &xor($c0,$c0); &xor($c1,$c1); &mov("eax",&DWP(0,$a,"",0)); # load the first word $as=0; $ae=0; $bs=0; $be=0; $tot=$num+$num-1; for ($i=0; $i<$tot; $i++) { $ai=$as; $bi=$bs; $end=$be+1; &comment("############### Calculate word $i"); for ($j=$bs; $j<$end; $j++) { &xor($c2,$c2) if ($j == $bs); if (($ai-1) < ($bi+1)) { $v=1; $v=2 if ($i+1) == $tot; } else { $v=0; } if (!$v) { $na=$ai-1; $nb=$bi+1; } else { $na=$as+($i < ($num-1)); $nb=$bs+($i >= ($num-1)); } if ($ai == $bi) { &sqr_add_c($r,$a,$ai,$bi, $c0,$c1,$c2,$v,$i,$na,$nb); } else { &sqr_add_c2($r,$a,$ai,$bi, $c0,$c1,$c2,$v,$i,$na,$nb); } if ($v) { &comment("saved r[$i]"); #&mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0); ($c0,$c1,$c2)=($c1,$c2,$c0); last; } $ai--; $bi++; } $as++ if ($i < ($num-1)); $ae++ if ($i >= ($num-1)); $bs++ if ($i >= ($num-1)); $be++ if ($i < ($num-1)); } &mov(&DWP($i*4,$r,"",0),$c0); &pop("ebx"); &pop("ebp"); &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S0000644000000000000000000010101013176625656017170 0ustar rootroot.ident "sparcv8plus.s, Version 1.4" .ident "SPARC v9 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov " /* * ==================================================================== * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * ==================================================================== */ /* * This is my modest contributon to OpenSSL project (see * http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is * a drop-in UltraSPARC ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c * module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/. * * Questions-n-answers. * * Q. How to compile? * A. With SC4.x/SC5.x: * * cc -xarch=v8plus -c bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S -o bn_asm.o * * and with gcc: * * gcc -mcpu=ultrasparc -c bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S -o bn_asm.o * * or if above fails (it does if you have gas installed): * * gcc -E bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S | as -xarch=v8plus /dev/fd/0 -o bn_asm.o * * Quick-n-dirty way to fuse the module into the library. * Provided that the library is already configured and built * (in 0.9.2 case with no-asm option): * * # cd crypto/bn * # cp /some/place/bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S . * # cc -xarch=v8plus -c bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S -o bn_asm.o * # make * # cd ../.. * # make; make test * * Quick-n-dirty way to get rid of it: * * # cd crypto/bn * # touch bn_asm.c * # make * # cd ../.. * # make; make test * * Q. V8plus architecture? What kind of beast is that? * A. Well, it's rather a programming model than an architecture... * It's actually v9-compliant, i.e. *any* UltraSPARC, CPU under * special conditions, namely when kernel doesn't preserve upper * 32 bits of otherwise 64-bit registers during a context switch. * * Q. Why just UltraSPARC? What about SuperSPARC? * A. Original release did target UltraSPARC only. Now SuperSPARC * version is provided along. Both version share bn_*comba[48] * implementations (see comment later in code for explanation). * But what's so special about this UltraSPARC implementation? * Why didn't I let compiler do the job? Trouble is that most of * available compilers (well, SC5.0 is the only exception) don't * attempt to take advantage of UltraSPARC's 64-bitness under * 32-bit kernels even though it's perfectly possible (see next * question). * * Q. 64-bit registers under 32-bit kernels? Didn't you just say it * doesn't work? * A. You can't address *all* registers as 64-bit wide:-( The catch is * that you actually may rely upon %o0-%o5 and %g1-%g4 being fully * preserved if you're in a leaf function, i.e. such never calling * any other functions. All functions in this module are leaf and * 10 registers is a handful. And as a matter of fact none-"comba" * routines don't require even that much and I could even afford to * not allocate own stack frame for 'em:-) * * Q. What about 64-bit kernels? * A. What about 'em? Just kidding:-) Pure 64-bit version is currently * under evaluation and development... * * Q. What about shared libraries? * A. What about 'em? Kidding again:-) Code does *not* contain any * code position dependencies and it's safe to include it into * shared library as is. * * Q. How much faster does it go? * A. Do you have a good benchmark? In either case below is what I * experience with crypto/bn/expspeed.c test program: * * v8plus module on U10/300MHz against bn_asm.c compiled with: * * cc-5.0 -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xdepend +7-12% * cc-4.2 -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xdepend +25-35% * egcs-1.1.2 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 +35-45% * * v8 module on SS10/60MHz against bn_asm.c compiled with: * * cc-5.0 -xarch=v8 -xO5 -xdepend +7-10% * cc-4.2 -xarch=v8 -xO5 -xdepend +10% * egcs-1.1.2 -mv8 -O3 +35-45% * * As you can see it's damn hard to beat the new Sun C compiler * and it's in first place GNU C users who will appreciate this * assembler implementation:-) */ /* * Revision history. * * 1.0 - initial release; * 1.1 - new loop unrolling model(*); * - some more fine tuning; * 1.2 - made gas friendly; * - updates to documentation concerning v9; * - new performance comparison matrix; * 1.3 - fixed problem with /usr/ccs/lib/cpp; * 1.4 - native V9 bn_*_comba[48] implementation (15% more efficient) * resulting in slight overall performance kick; * - some retunes; * - support for GNU as added; * * (*) Originally unrolled loop looked like this: * for (;;) { * op(p+0); if (--n==0) break; * op(p+1); if (--n==0) break; * op(p+2); if (--n==0) break; * op(p+3); if (--n==0) break; * p+=4; * } * I unroll according to following: * while (n&~3) { * op(p+0); op(p+1); op(p+2); op(p+3); * p+=4; n=-4; * } * if (n) { * op(p+0); if (--n==0) return; * op(p+2); if (--n==0) return; * op(p+3); return; * } */ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER #include #endif #if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9) /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch # define FRAME_SIZE -192 #elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__) /* They've said -m64 at command line */ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch # define FRAME_SIZE -192 #else # define FRAME_SIZE -96 #endif /* * GNU assembler can't stand stuw:-( */ #define stuw st .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .file "bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S" .align 32 .global bn_mul_add_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(rp,ap,num,w) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap; * int num; * BN_ULONG w; */ bn_mul_add_words: sra %o2,%g0,%o2 ! signx %o2 brgz,a %o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed lduw [%o1],%g2 retl clr %o0 nop nop nop .L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed: srl %o3,%g0,%o3 ! clruw %o3 andcc %o2,-4,%g0 bz,pn %icc,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail clr %o5 .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop: ! wow! 32 aligned! lduw [%o0],%g1 lduw [%o1+4],%g3 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g1,%o5,%o4 nop add %o4,%g2,%o4 stuw %o4,[%o0] srlx %o4,32,%o5 lduw [%o0+4],%g1 lduw [%o1+8],%g2 mulx %o3,%g3,%g3 add %g1,%o5,%o4 dec 4,%o2 add %o4,%g3,%o4 stuw %o4,[%o0+4] srlx %o4,32,%o5 lduw [%o0+8],%g1 lduw [%o1+12],%g3 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g1,%o5,%o4 inc 16,%o1 add %o4,%g2,%o4 stuw %o4,[%o0+8] srlx %o4,32,%o5 lduw [%o0+12],%g1 mulx %o3,%g3,%g3 add %g1,%o5,%o4 inc 16,%o0 add %o4,%g3,%o4 andcc %o2,-4,%g0 stuw %o4,[%o0-4] srlx %o4,32,%o5 bnz,a,pt %icc,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop lduw [%o1],%g2 brnz,a,pn %o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail lduw [%o1],%g2 .L_bn_mul_add_words_return: retl mov %o5,%o0 .L_bn_mul_add_words_tail: lduw [%o0],%g1 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g1,%o5,%o4 dec %o2 add %o4,%g2,%o4 srlx %o4,32,%o5 brz,pt %o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return stuw %o4,[%o0] lduw [%o1+4],%g2 lduw [%o0+4],%g1 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g1,%o5,%o4 dec %o2 add %o4,%g2,%o4 srlx %o4,32,%o5 brz,pt %o2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return stuw %o4,[%o0+4] lduw [%o1+8],%g2 lduw [%o0+8],%g1 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g1,%o5,%o4 add %o4,%g2,%o4 stuw %o4,[%o0+8] retl srlx %o4,32,%o0 .type bn_mul_add_words,#function .size bn_mul_add_words,(.-bn_mul_add_words) .align 32 .global bn_mul_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(rp,ap,num,w) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap; * int num; * BN_ULONG w; */ bn_mul_words: sra %o2,%g0,%o2 ! signx %o2 brgz,a %o2,.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed lduw [%o1],%g2 retl clr %o0 nop nop nop .L_bn_mul_words_proceeed: srl %o3,%g0,%o3 ! clruw %o3 andcc %o2,-4,%g0 bz,pn %icc,.L_bn_mul_words_tail clr %o5 .L_bn_mul_words_loop: ! wow! 32 aligned! lduw [%o1+4],%g3 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g2,%o5,%o4 nop stuw %o4,[%o0] srlx %o4,32,%o5 lduw [%o1+8],%g2 mulx %o3,%g3,%g3 add %g3,%o5,%o4 dec 4,%o2 stuw %o4,[%o0+4] srlx %o4,32,%o5 lduw [%o1+12],%g3 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g2,%o5,%o4 inc 16,%o1 stuw %o4,[%o0+8] srlx %o4,32,%o5 mulx %o3,%g3,%g3 add %g3,%o5,%o4 inc 16,%o0 stuw %o4,[%o0-4] srlx %o4,32,%o5 andcc %o2,-4,%g0 bnz,a,pt %icc,.L_bn_mul_words_loop lduw [%o1],%g2 nop nop brnz,a,pn %o2,.L_bn_mul_words_tail lduw [%o1],%g2 .L_bn_mul_words_return: retl mov %o5,%o0 .L_bn_mul_words_tail: mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g2,%o5,%o4 dec %o2 srlx %o4,32,%o5 brz,pt %o2,.L_bn_mul_words_return stuw %o4,[%o0] lduw [%o1+4],%g2 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g2,%o5,%o4 dec %o2 srlx %o4,32,%o5 brz,pt %o2,.L_bn_mul_words_return stuw %o4,[%o0+4] lduw [%o1+8],%g2 mulx %o3,%g2,%g2 add %g2,%o5,%o4 stuw %o4,[%o0+8] retl srlx %o4,32,%o0 .type bn_mul_words,#function .size bn_mul_words,(.-bn_mul_words) .align 32 .global bn_sqr_words /* * void bn_sqr_words(r,a,n) * BN_ULONG *r,*a; * int n; */ bn_sqr_words: sra %o2,%g0,%o2 ! signx %o2 brgz,a %o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed lduw [%o1],%g2 retl clr %o0 nop nop nop .L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed: andcc %o2,-4,%g0 nop bz,pn %icc,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail nop .L_bn_sqr_words_loop: ! wow! 32 aligned! lduw [%o1+4],%g3 mulx %g2,%g2,%o4 stuw %o4,[%o0] srlx %o4,32,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0+4] nop lduw [%o1+8],%g2 mulx %g3,%g3,%o4 dec 4,%o2 stuw %o4,[%o0+8] srlx %o4,32,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0+12] lduw [%o1+12],%g3 mulx %g2,%g2,%o4 srlx %o4,32,%o5 stuw %o4,[%o0+16] inc 16,%o1 stuw %o5,[%o0+20] mulx %g3,%g3,%o4 inc 32,%o0 stuw %o4,[%o0-8] srlx %o4,32,%o5 andcc %o2,-4,%g2 stuw %o5,[%o0-4] bnz,a,pt %icc,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop lduw [%o1],%g2 nop brnz,a,pn %o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail lduw [%o1],%g2 .L_bn_sqr_words_return: retl clr %o0 .L_bn_sqr_words_tail: mulx %g2,%g2,%o4 dec %o2 stuw %o4,[%o0] srlx %o4,32,%o5 brz,pt %o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return stuw %o5,[%o0+4] lduw [%o1+4],%g2 mulx %g2,%g2,%o4 dec %o2 stuw %o4,[%o0+8] srlx %o4,32,%o5 brz,pt %o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return stuw %o5,[%o0+12] lduw [%o1+8],%g2 mulx %g2,%g2,%o4 srlx %o4,32,%o5 stuw %o4,[%o0+16] stuw %o5,[%o0+20] retl clr %o0 .type bn_sqr_words,#function .size bn_sqr_words,(.-bn_sqr_words) .align 32 .global bn_div_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_div_words(h,l,d) * BN_ULONG h,l,d; */ bn_div_words: sllx %o0,32,%o0 or %o0,%o1,%o0 udivx %o0,%o2,%o0 retl srl %o0,%g0,%o0 ! clruw %o0 .type bn_div_words,#function .size bn_div_words,(.-bn_div_words) .align 32 .global bn_add_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_add_words(rp,ap,bp,n) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp; * int n; */ bn_add_words: sra %o3,%g0,%o3 ! signx %o3 brgz,a %o3,.L_bn_add_words_proceed lduw [%o1],%o4 retl clr %o0 .L_bn_add_words_proceed: andcc %o3,-4,%g0 bz,pn %icc,.L_bn_add_words_tail addcc %g0,0,%g0 ! clear carry flag .L_bn_add_words_loop: ! wow! 32 aligned! dec 4,%o3 lduw [%o2],%o5 lduw [%o1+4],%g1 lduw [%o2+4],%g2 lduw [%o1+8],%g3 lduw [%o2+8],%g4 addccc %o5,%o4,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0] lduw [%o1+12],%o4 lduw [%o2+12],%o5 inc 16,%o1 addccc %g1,%g2,%g1 stuw %g1,[%o0+4] inc 16,%o2 addccc %g3,%g4,%g3 stuw %g3,[%o0+8] inc 16,%o0 addccc %o5,%o4,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0-4] and %o3,-4,%g1 brnz,a,pt %g1,.L_bn_add_words_loop lduw [%o1],%o4 brnz,a,pn %o3,.L_bn_add_words_tail lduw [%o1],%o4 .L_bn_add_words_return: clr %o0 retl movcs %icc,1,%o0 nop .L_bn_add_words_tail: lduw [%o2],%o5 dec %o3 addccc %o5,%o4,%o5 brz,pt %o3,.L_bn_add_words_return stuw %o5,[%o0] lduw [%o1+4],%o4 lduw [%o2+4],%o5 dec %o3 addccc %o5,%o4,%o5 brz,pt %o3,.L_bn_add_words_return stuw %o5,[%o0+4] lduw [%o1+8],%o4 lduw [%o2+8],%o5 addccc %o5,%o4,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0+8] clr %o0 retl movcs %icc,1,%o0 .type bn_add_words,#function .size bn_add_words,(.-bn_add_words) .global bn_sub_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(rp,ap,bp,n) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp; * int n; */ bn_sub_words: sra %o3,%g0,%o3 ! signx %o3 brgz,a %o3,.L_bn_sub_words_proceed lduw [%o1],%o4 retl clr %o0 .L_bn_sub_words_proceed: andcc %o3,-4,%g0 bz,pn %icc,.L_bn_sub_words_tail addcc %g0,0,%g0 ! clear carry flag .L_bn_sub_words_loop: ! wow! 32 aligned! dec 4,%o3 lduw [%o2],%o5 lduw [%o1+4],%g1 lduw [%o2+4],%g2 lduw [%o1+8],%g3 lduw [%o2+8],%g4 subccc %o4,%o5,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0] lduw [%o1+12],%o4 lduw [%o2+12],%o5 inc 16,%o1 subccc %g1,%g2,%g2 stuw %g2,[%o0+4] inc 16,%o2 subccc %g3,%g4,%g4 stuw %g4,[%o0+8] inc 16,%o0 subccc %o4,%o5,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0-4] and %o3,-4,%g1 brnz,a,pt %g1,.L_bn_sub_words_loop lduw [%o1],%o4 brnz,a,pn %o3,.L_bn_sub_words_tail lduw [%o1],%o4 .L_bn_sub_words_return: clr %o0 retl movcs %icc,1,%o0 nop .L_bn_sub_words_tail: ! wow! 32 aligned! lduw [%o2],%o5 dec %o3 subccc %o4,%o5,%o5 brz,pt %o3,.L_bn_sub_words_return stuw %o5,[%o0] lduw [%o1+4],%o4 lduw [%o2+4],%o5 dec %o3 subccc %o4,%o5,%o5 brz,pt %o3,.L_bn_sub_words_return stuw %o5,[%o0+4] lduw [%o1+8],%o4 lduw [%o2+8],%o5 subccc %o4,%o5,%o5 stuw %o5,[%o0+8] clr %o0 retl movcs %icc,1,%o0 .type bn_sub_words,#function .size bn_sub_words,(.-bn_sub_words) /* * Code below depends on the fact that upper parts of the %l0-%l7 * and %i0-%i7 are zeroed by kernel after context switch. In * previous versions this comment stated that "the trouble is that * it's not feasible to implement the mumbo-jumbo in less V9 * instructions:-(" which apparently isn't true thanks to * 'bcs,a %xcc,.+8; inc %rd' pair. But the performance improvement * results not from the shorter code, but from elimination of * multicycle none-pairable 'rd %y,%rd' instructions. * * Andy. */ /* * Here is register usage map for *all* routines below. */ #define t_1 %o0 #define t_2 %o1 #define c_12 %o2 #define c_3 %o3 #define ap(I) [%i1+4*I] #define bp(I) [%i2+4*I] #define rp(I) [%i0+4*I] #define a_0 %l0 #define a_1 %l1 #define a_2 %l2 #define a_3 %l3 #define a_4 %l4 #define a_5 %l5 #define a_6 %l6 #define a_7 %l7 #define b_0 %i3 #define b_1 %i4 #define b_2 %i5 #define b_3 %o4 #define b_4 %o5 #define b_5 %o7 #define b_6 %g1 #define b_7 %g4 .align 32 .global bn_mul_comba8 /* * void bn_mul_comba8(r,a,b) * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b; */ bn_mul_comba8: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp mov 1,t_2 lduw ap(0),a_0 sllx t_2,32,t_2 lduw bp(0),b_0 != lduw bp(1),b_1 mulx a_0,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(0) !=!r[0]=c1; lduw ap(1),a_1 mulx a_0,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(2),a_2 mulx a_1,b_0,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 != stuw t_1,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw bp(2),b_2 != mulx a_1,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != lduw bp(3),b_3 mulx a_0,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_0,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,b_2,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(3),a_3 mulx a_2,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(4),a_4 mulx a_3,b_0,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);!= addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 != stuw t_1,rp(3) !r[3]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_4,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_2,b_2,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw bp(4),b_4 != mulx a_1,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != lduw bp(5),b_5 mulx a_0,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(4) !r[4]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_0,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_2,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(5),a_5 mulx a_4,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(6),a_6 mulx a_5,b_0,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 != stuw t_1,rp(5) !r[5]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_6,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_4,b_2,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,b_3,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_2,b_4,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw bp(6),b_6 != mulx a_1,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != lduw bp(7),b_7 mulx a_0,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_0,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_2,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_4,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(7),a_7 mulx a_6,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_7,b_0,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 != stuw t_1,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_7,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != mulx a_6,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != mulx a_5,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != mulx a_4,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != mulx a_3,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != mulx a_2,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != mulx a_1,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(8) !r[8]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,b_7,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != mulx a_3,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_4,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_6,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_7,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(9) !r[9]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_7,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_6,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_4,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(10) !r[10]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_4,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_6,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_7,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(11) !r[11]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_7,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_6,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(12) !r[12]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_6,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_7,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 st t_1,rp(13) !r[13]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_7,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 srlx t_1,32,c_12 != stuw t_1,rp(14) !r[14]=c3; stuw c_12,rp(15) !r[15]=c1; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 != .type bn_mul_comba8,#function .size bn_mul_comba8,(.-bn_mul_comba8) .align 32 .global bn_mul_comba4 /* * void bn_mul_comba4(r,a,b) * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b; */ bn_mul_comba4: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp lduw ap(0),a_0 mov 1,t_2 lduw bp(0),b_0 sllx t_2,32,t_2 != lduw bp(1),b_1 mulx a_0,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(0) !=!r[0]=c1; lduw ap(1),a_1 mulx a_0,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(2),a_2 mulx a_1,b_0,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 != stuw t_1,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw bp(2),b_2 != mulx a_1,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 != lduw bp(3),b_3 mulx a_0,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 != mulx a_0,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 != add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(3),a_3 mulx a_2,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);!= addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(3) !=!r[3]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_3,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_2,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(4) !=!r[4]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 != bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(5) !=!r[5]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_3,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 srlx t_1,32,c_12 != stuw t_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; stuw c_12,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 .type bn_mul_comba4,#function .size bn_mul_comba4,(.-bn_mul_comba4) .align 32 .global bn_sqr_comba8 bn_sqr_comba8: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp mov 1,t_2 lduw ap(0),a_0 sllx t_2,32,t_2 lduw ap(1),a_1 mulx a_0,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3); srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(0) !r[0]=c1; lduw ap(2),a_2 mulx a_0,a_1,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(3),a_3 mulx a_1,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_0,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(4),a_4 mulx a_1,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 st t_1,rp(3) !r[3]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_4,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(5),a_5 mulx a_2,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(4) !r[4]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_0,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,0,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(6),a_6 mulx a_2,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(5) !r[5]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_6,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,0,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,1,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_4,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,2,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(7),a_7 mulx a_3,a_3,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_0,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,a_6,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,1,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_2,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,2,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,3,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_7,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_6,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,2,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,3,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_4,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,4,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(8) !r[8]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,2,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_3,a_6,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,3,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_4,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,4,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(9) !r[9]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_7,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,3,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_6,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,4,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,5,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(10) !r[10]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_4,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,4,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_5,a_6,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,5,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(11) !r[11]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_7,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,5,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_6,a_6,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,6,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(12) !r[12]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_6,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,6,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(13) !r[13]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_7,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,7,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(14) !r[14]=c3; stuw c_12,rp(15) !r[15]=c1; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 .type bn_sqr_comba8,#function .size bn_sqr_comba8,(.-bn_sqr_comba8) .align 32 .global bn_sqr_comba4 /* * void bn_sqr_comba4(r,a) * BN_ULONG *r,*a; */ bn_sqr_comba4: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp mov 1,t_2 lduw ap(0),a_0 sllx t_2,32,t_2 lduw ap(1),a_1 mulx a_0,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3); srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(0) !r[0]=c1; lduw ap(2),a_2 mulx a_0,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 lduw ap(3),a_3 mulx a_1,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_0,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_1,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(3) !r[3]=c1; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_3,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 mulx a_2,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(4) !r[4]=c2; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_2,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_12,t_1,c_12 clr c_3 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add c_3,t_2,c_3 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(5) !r[5]=c3; or c_12,c_3,c_12 mulx a_3,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_12,t_1,t_1 srlx t_1,32,c_12 stuw t_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; stuw c_12,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 .type bn_sqr_comba4,#function .size bn_sqr_comba4,(.-bn_sqr_comba4) .align 32 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S0000644000000000000000000013111213176625656015447 0ustar rootroot.explicit .text .ident "ia64.S, Version 2.1" .ident "IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov " // Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. // // Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use // this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy // in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at // https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html // // ==================================================================== // Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL // project. // // Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are // granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is // disclaimed. // ==================================================================== // // Version 2.x is Itanium2 re-tune. Few words about how Itanum2 is // different from Itanium to this module viewpoint. Most notably, is it // "wider" than Itanium? Can you experience loop scalability as // discussed in commentary sections? Not really:-( Itanium2 has 6 // integer ALU ports, i.e. it's 2 ports wider, but it's not enough to // spin twice as fast, as I need 8 IALU ports. Amount of floating point // ports is the same, i.e. 2, while I need 4. In other words, to this // module Itanium2 remains effectively as "wide" as Itanium. Yet it's // essentially different in respect to this module, and a re-tune was // required. Well, because some instruction latencies has changed. Most // noticeably those intensively used: // // Itanium Itanium2 // ldf8 9 6 L2 hit // ld8 2 1 L1 hit // getf 2 5 // xma[->getf] 7[+1] 4[+0] // add[->st8] 1[+1] 1[+0] // // What does it mean? You might ratiocinate that the original code // should run just faster... Because sum of latencies is smaller... // Wrong! Note that getf latency increased. This means that if a loop is // scheduled for lower latency (as they were), then it will suffer from // stall condition and the code will therefore turn anti-scalable, e.g. // original bn_mul_words spun at 5*n or 2.5 times slower than expected // on Itanium2! What to do? Reschedule loops for Itanium2? But then // Itanium would exhibit anti-scalability. So I've chosen to reschedule // for worst latency for every instruction aiming for best *all-round* // performance. // Q. How much faster does it get? // A. Here is the output from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for vanilla // 0.9.6a compiled with gcc version 2.96 20000731 (Red Hat // Linux 7.1 2.96-81): // // sign verify sign/s verify/s // rsa 512 bits 0.0036s 0.0003s 275.3 2999.2 // rsa 1024 bits 0.0203s 0.0011s 49.3 894.1 // rsa 2048 bits 0.1331s 0.0040s 7.5 250.9 // rsa 4096 bits 0.9270s 0.0147s 1.1 68.1 // sign verify sign/s verify/s // dsa 512 bits 0.0035s 0.0043s 288.3 234.8 // dsa 1024 bits 0.0111s 0.0135s 90.0 74.2 // // And here is similar output but for this assembler // implementation:-) // // sign verify sign/s verify/s // rsa 512 bits 0.0021s 0.0001s 549.4 9638.5 // rsa 1024 bits 0.0055s 0.0002s 183.8 4481.1 // rsa 2048 bits 0.0244s 0.0006s 41.4 1726.3 // rsa 4096 bits 0.1295s 0.0018s 7.7 561.5 // sign verify sign/s verify/s // dsa 512 bits 0.0012s 0.0013s 891.9 756.6 // dsa 1024 bits 0.0023s 0.0028s 440.4 376.2 // // Yes, you may argue that it's not fair comparison as it's // possible to craft the C implementation with BN_UMULT_HIGH // inline assembler macro. But of course! Here is the output // with the macro: // // sign verify sign/s verify/s // rsa 512 bits 0.0020s 0.0002s 495.0 6561.0 // rsa 1024 bits 0.0086s 0.0004s 116.2 2235.7 // rsa 2048 bits 0.0519s 0.0015s 19.3 667.3 // rsa 4096 bits 0.3464s 0.0053s 2.9 187.7 // sign verify sign/s verify/s // dsa 512 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 613.1 510.5 // dsa 1024 bits 0.0045s 0.0054s 221.0 183.9 // // My code is still way faster, huh:-) And I believe that even // higher performance can be achieved. Note that as keys get // longer, performance gain is larger. Why? According to the // profiler there is another player in the field, namely // BN_from_montgomery consuming larger and larger portion of CPU // time as keysize decreases. I therefore consider putting effort // to assembler implementation of the following routine: // // void bn_mul_add_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,BN_ULONG *np,int nl,BN_ULONG n0) // { // int i,j; // BN_ULONG v; // // for (i=0; i for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # October 2012 # # The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for # the time being... Except that it has two code paths: one suitable # for all SPARCv9 processors and one for VIS3-capable ones. Former # delivers ~25-45% more, more for longer keys, heaviest DH and DSA # verify operations on venerable UltraSPARC II. On T4 VIS3 code is # ~100-230% faster than gcc-generated code and ~35-90% faster than # the pure SPARCv9 code path. $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $locals=16*8; $tab="%l0"; @T=("%g2","%g3"); @i=("%g4","%g5"); ($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); ($lo,$hi,$b)=("%g1",$a8,"%o7"); $a=$lo; $code.=<<___; #include #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif .globl bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .align 16 bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+0],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] andcc %g1, SPARCV9_VIS3, %g0 bz,pn %icc,.Lsoftware nop sllx %o1, 32, %o1 sllx %o3, 32, %o3 or %o2, %o1, %o1 or %o4, %o3, %o3 .word 0x95b262ab ! xmulx %o1, %o3, %o2 .word 0x99b262cb ! xmulxhi %o1, %o3, %o4 srlx %o2, 32, %o1 ! 13 cycles later st %o2, [%o0+0] st %o1, [%o0+4] srlx %o4, 32, %o3 st %o4, [%o0+8] retl st %o3, [%o0+12] .align 16 .Lsoftware: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-$locals,%sp sllx %i1,32,$a mov -1,$a12 sllx %i3,32,$b or %i2,$a,$a srlx $a12,1,$a48 ! 0x7fff... or %i4,$b,$b srlx $a12,2,$a12 ! 0x3fff... add %sp,STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME,$tab sllx $a,2,$a4 mov $a,$a1 sllx $a,1,$a2 srax $a4,63,@i[1] ! broadcast 61st bit and $a48,$a4,$a4 ! (a<<2)&0x7fff... srlx $a48,2,$a48 srax $a2,63,@i[0] ! broadcast 62nd bit and $a12,$a2,$a2 ! (a<<1)&0x3fff... srax $a1,63,$lo ! broadcast 63rd bit and $a48,$a1,$a1 ! (a<<0)&0x1fff... sllx $a1,3,$a8 and $b,$lo,$lo and $b,@i[0],@i[0] and $b,@i[1],@i[1] stx %g0,[$tab+0*8] ! tab[0]=0 xor $a1,$a2,$a12 stx $a1,[$tab+1*8] ! tab[1]=a1 stx $a2,[$tab+2*8] ! tab[2]=a2 xor $a4,$a8,$a48 stx $a12,[$tab+3*8] ! tab[3]=a1^a2 xor $a4,$a1,$a1 stx $a4,[$tab+4*8] ! tab[4]=a4 xor $a4,$a2,$a2 stx $a1,[$tab+5*8] ! tab[5]=a1^a4 xor $a4,$a12,$a12 stx $a2,[$tab+6*8] ! tab[6]=a2^a4 xor $a48,$a1,$a1 stx $a12,[$tab+7*8] ! tab[7]=a1^a2^a4 xor $a48,$a2,$a2 stx $a8,[$tab+8*8] ! tab[8]=a8 xor $a48,$a12,$a12 stx $a1,[$tab+9*8] ! tab[9]=a1^a8 xor $a4,$a1,$a1 stx $a2,[$tab+10*8] ! tab[10]=a2^a8 xor $a4,$a2,$a2 stx $a12,[$tab+11*8] ! tab[11]=a1^a2^a8 xor $a4,$a12,$a12 stx $a48,[$tab+12*8] ! tab[12]=a4^a8 srlx $lo,1,$hi stx $a1,[$tab+13*8] ! tab[13]=a1^a4^a8 sllx $lo,63,$lo stx $a2,[$tab+14*8] ! tab[14]=a2^a4^a8 srlx @i[0],2,@T[0] stx $a12,[$tab+15*8] ! tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8 sllx @i[0],62,$a1 sllx $b,3,@i[0] srlx @i[1],3,@T[1] and @i[0],`0xf<<3`,@i[0] sllx @i[1],61,$a2 ldx [$tab+@i[0]],@i[0] srlx $b,4-3,@i[1] xor @T[0],$hi,$hi and @i[1],`0xf<<3`,@i[1] xor $a1,$lo,$lo ldx [$tab+@i[1]],@i[1] xor @T[1],$hi,$hi xor @i[0],$lo,$lo srlx $b,8-3,@i[0] xor $a2,$lo,$lo and @i[0],`0xf<<3`,@i[0] ___ for($n=1;$n<14;$n++) { $code.=<<___; sllx @i[1],`$n*4`,@T[0] ldx [$tab+@i[0]],@i[0] srlx @i[1],`64-$n*4`,@T[1] xor @T[0],$lo,$lo srlx $b,`($n+2)*4`-3,@i[1] xor @T[1],$hi,$hi and @i[1],`0xf<<3`,@i[1] ___ push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T)); } $code.=<<___; sllx @i[1],`$n*4`,@T[0] ldx [$tab+@i[0]],@i[0] srlx @i[1],`64-$n*4`,@T[1] xor @T[0],$lo,$lo sllx @i[0],`($n+1)*4`,@T[0] xor @T[1],$hi,$hi srlx @i[0],`64-($n+1)*4`,@T[1] xor @T[0],$lo,$lo xor @T[1],$hi,$hi srlx $lo,32,%i1 st $lo,[%i0+0] st %i1,[%i0+4] srlx $hi,32,%i2 st $hi,[%i0+8] st %i2,[%i0+12] ret restore .type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,#function .size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .asciz "GF(2^m) Multiplication for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/x86.pl0000644000000000000000000000174413176625656015551 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html push(@INC,"perlasm","../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; require("x86/mul_add.pl"); require("x86/mul.pl"); require("x86/sqr.pl"); require("x86/div.pl"); require("x86/add.pl"); require("x86/sub.pl"); require("x86/comba.pl"); $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); &bn_mul_add_words("bn_mul_add_words"); &bn_mul_words("bn_mul_words"); &bn_sqr_words("bn_sqr_words"); &bn_div_words("bn_div_words"); &bn_add_words("bn_add_words"); &bn_sub_words("bn_sub_words"); &bn_mul_comba("bn_mul_comba8",8); &bn_mul_comba("bn_mul_comba4",4); &bn_sqr_comba("bn_sqr_comba8",8); &bn_sqr_comba("bn_sqr_comba4",4); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8.S0000644000000000000000000006725713176625656016314 0ustar rootroot.ident "sparcv8.s, Version 1.4" .ident "SPARC v8 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov " /* * ==================================================================== * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * ==================================================================== */ /* * This is my modest contributon to OpenSSL project (see * http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is * a drop-in SuperSPARC ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c * module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/. * * See bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S for more details. */ /* * Revision history. * * 1.1 - new loop unrolling model(*); * 1.2 - made gas friendly; * 1.3 - fixed problem with /usr/ccs/lib/cpp; * 1.4 - some retunes; * * (*) see bn_asm.sparc.v8plus.S for details */ .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .file "bn_asm.sparc.v8.S" .align 32 .global bn_mul_add_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(rp,ap,num,w) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap; * int num; * BN_ULONG w; */ bn_mul_add_words: cmp %o2,0 bg,a .L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed ld [%o1],%g2 retl clr %o0 .L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed: andcc %o2,-4,%g0 bz .L_bn_mul_add_words_tail clr %o5 .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop: ld [%o0],%o4 ld [%o1+4],%g3 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 rd %y,%g1 addcc %o4,%o5,%o4 addx %g1,0,%g1 addcc %o4,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0] addx %g1,0,%o5 ld [%o0+4],%o4 ld [%o1+8],%g2 umul %o3,%g3,%g3 dec 4,%o2 rd %y,%g1 addcc %o4,%o5,%o4 addx %g1,0,%g1 addcc %o4,%g3,%o4 st %o4,[%o0+4] addx %g1,0,%o5 ld [%o0+8],%o4 ld [%o1+12],%g3 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 inc 16,%o1 rd %y,%g1 addcc %o4,%o5,%o4 addx %g1,0,%g1 addcc %o4,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0+8] addx %g1,0,%o5 ld [%o0+12],%o4 umul %o3,%g3,%g3 inc 16,%o0 rd %y,%g1 addcc %o4,%o5,%o4 addx %g1,0,%g1 addcc %o4,%g3,%o4 st %o4,[%o0-4] addx %g1,0,%o5 andcc %o2,-4,%g0 bnz,a .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop ld [%o1],%g2 tst %o2 bnz,a .L_bn_mul_add_words_tail ld [%o1],%g2 .L_bn_mul_add_words_return: retl mov %o5,%o0 nop .L_bn_mul_add_words_tail: ld [%o0],%o4 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 addcc %o4,%o5,%o4 rd %y,%g1 addx %g1,0,%g1 addcc %o4,%g2,%o4 addx %g1,0,%o5 deccc %o2 bz .L_bn_mul_add_words_return st %o4,[%o0] ld [%o1+4],%g2 ld [%o0+4],%o4 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 rd %y,%g1 addcc %o4,%o5,%o4 addx %g1,0,%g1 addcc %o4,%g2,%o4 addx %g1,0,%o5 deccc %o2 bz .L_bn_mul_add_words_return st %o4,[%o0+4] ld [%o1+8],%g2 ld [%o0+8],%o4 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 rd %y,%g1 addcc %o4,%o5,%o4 addx %g1,0,%g1 addcc %o4,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0+8] retl addx %g1,0,%o0 .type bn_mul_add_words,#function .size bn_mul_add_words,(.-bn_mul_add_words) .align 32 .global bn_mul_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(rp,ap,num,w) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap; * int num; * BN_ULONG w; */ bn_mul_words: cmp %o2,0 bg,a .L_bn_mul_words_proceeed ld [%o1],%g2 retl clr %o0 .L_bn_mul_words_proceeed: andcc %o2,-4,%g0 bz .L_bn_mul_words_tail clr %o5 .L_bn_mul_words_loop: ld [%o1+4],%g3 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 addcc %g2,%o5,%g2 rd %y,%g1 addx %g1,0,%o5 st %g2,[%o0] ld [%o1+8],%g2 umul %o3,%g3,%g3 addcc %g3,%o5,%g3 rd %y,%g1 dec 4,%o2 addx %g1,0,%o5 st %g3,[%o0+4] ld [%o1+12],%g3 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 addcc %g2,%o5,%g2 rd %y,%g1 inc 16,%o1 st %g2,[%o0+8] addx %g1,0,%o5 umul %o3,%g3,%g3 addcc %g3,%o5,%g3 rd %y,%g1 inc 16,%o0 addx %g1,0,%o5 st %g3,[%o0-4] andcc %o2,-4,%g0 nop bnz,a .L_bn_mul_words_loop ld [%o1],%g2 tst %o2 bnz,a .L_bn_mul_words_tail ld [%o1],%g2 .L_bn_mul_words_return: retl mov %o5,%o0 nop .L_bn_mul_words_tail: umul %o3,%g2,%g2 addcc %g2,%o5,%g2 rd %y,%g1 addx %g1,0,%o5 deccc %o2 bz .L_bn_mul_words_return st %g2,[%o0] nop ld [%o1+4],%g2 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 addcc %g2,%o5,%g2 rd %y,%g1 addx %g1,0,%o5 deccc %o2 bz .L_bn_mul_words_return st %g2,[%o0+4] ld [%o1+8],%g2 umul %o3,%g2,%g2 addcc %g2,%o5,%g2 rd %y,%g1 st %g2,[%o0+8] retl addx %g1,0,%o0 .type bn_mul_words,#function .size bn_mul_words,(.-bn_mul_words) .align 32 .global bn_sqr_words /* * void bn_sqr_words(r,a,n) * BN_ULONG *r,*a; * int n; */ bn_sqr_words: cmp %o2,0 bg,a .L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed ld [%o1],%g2 retl clr %o0 .L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed: andcc %o2,-4,%g0 bz .L_bn_sqr_words_tail clr %o5 .L_bn_sqr_words_loop: ld [%o1+4],%g3 umul %g2,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0] rd %y,%o5 st %o5,[%o0+4] ld [%o1+8],%g2 umul %g3,%g3,%o4 dec 4,%o2 st %o4,[%o0+8] rd %y,%o5 st %o5,[%o0+12] nop ld [%o1+12],%g3 umul %g2,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0+16] rd %y,%o5 inc 16,%o1 st %o5,[%o0+20] umul %g3,%g3,%o4 inc 32,%o0 st %o4,[%o0-8] rd %y,%o5 st %o5,[%o0-4] andcc %o2,-4,%g2 bnz,a .L_bn_sqr_words_loop ld [%o1],%g2 tst %o2 nop bnz,a .L_bn_sqr_words_tail ld [%o1],%g2 .L_bn_sqr_words_return: retl clr %o0 .L_bn_sqr_words_tail: umul %g2,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0] deccc %o2 rd %y,%o5 bz .L_bn_sqr_words_return st %o5,[%o0+4] ld [%o1+4],%g2 umul %g2,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0+8] deccc %o2 rd %y,%o5 nop bz .L_bn_sqr_words_return st %o5,[%o0+12] ld [%o1+8],%g2 umul %g2,%g2,%o4 st %o4,[%o0+16] rd %y,%o5 st %o5,[%o0+20] retl clr %o0 .type bn_sqr_words,#function .size bn_sqr_words,(.-bn_sqr_words) .align 32 .global bn_div_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_div_words(h,l,d) * BN_ULONG h,l,d; */ bn_div_words: wr %o0,%y udiv %o1,%o2,%o0 retl nop .type bn_div_words,#function .size bn_div_words,(.-bn_div_words) .align 32 .global bn_add_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_add_words(rp,ap,bp,n) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp; * int n; */ bn_add_words: cmp %o3,0 bg,a .L_bn_add_words_proceed ld [%o1],%o4 retl clr %o0 .L_bn_add_words_proceed: andcc %o3,-4,%g0 bz .L_bn_add_words_tail clr %g1 ba .L_bn_add_words_warn_loop addcc %g0,0,%g0 ! clear carry flag .L_bn_add_words_loop: ld [%o1],%o4 .L_bn_add_words_warn_loop: ld [%o2],%o5 ld [%o1+4],%g3 ld [%o2+4],%g4 dec 4,%o3 addxcc %o5,%o4,%o5 st %o5,[%o0] ld [%o1+8],%o4 ld [%o2+8],%o5 inc 16,%o1 addxcc %g3,%g4,%g3 st %g3,[%o0+4] ld [%o1-4],%g3 ld [%o2+12],%g4 inc 16,%o2 addxcc %o5,%o4,%o5 st %o5,[%o0+8] inc 16,%o0 addxcc %g3,%g4,%g3 st %g3,[%o0-4] addx %g0,0,%g1 andcc %o3,-4,%g0 bnz,a .L_bn_add_words_loop addcc %g1,-1,%g0 tst %o3 bnz,a .L_bn_add_words_tail ld [%o1],%o4 .L_bn_add_words_return: retl mov %g1,%o0 .L_bn_add_words_tail: addcc %g1,-1,%g0 ld [%o2],%o5 addxcc %o5,%o4,%o5 addx %g0,0,%g1 deccc %o3 bz .L_bn_add_words_return st %o5,[%o0] ld [%o1+4],%o4 addcc %g1,-1,%g0 ld [%o2+4],%o5 addxcc %o5,%o4,%o5 addx %g0,0,%g1 deccc %o3 bz .L_bn_add_words_return st %o5,[%o0+4] ld [%o1+8],%o4 addcc %g1,-1,%g0 ld [%o2+8],%o5 addxcc %o5,%o4,%o5 st %o5,[%o0+8] retl addx %g0,0,%o0 .type bn_add_words,#function .size bn_add_words,(.-bn_add_words) .align 32 .global bn_sub_words /* * BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(rp,ap,bp,n) * BN_ULONG *rp,*ap,*bp; * int n; */ bn_sub_words: cmp %o3,0 bg,a .L_bn_sub_words_proceed ld [%o1],%o4 retl clr %o0 .L_bn_sub_words_proceed: andcc %o3,-4,%g0 bz .L_bn_sub_words_tail clr %g1 ba .L_bn_sub_words_warm_loop addcc %g0,0,%g0 ! clear carry flag .L_bn_sub_words_loop: ld [%o1],%o4 .L_bn_sub_words_warm_loop: ld [%o2],%o5 ld [%o1+4],%g3 ld [%o2+4],%g4 dec 4,%o3 subxcc %o4,%o5,%o5 st %o5,[%o0] ld [%o1+8],%o4 ld [%o2+8],%o5 inc 16,%o1 subxcc %g3,%g4,%g4 st %g4,[%o0+4] ld [%o1-4],%g3 ld [%o2+12],%g4 inc 16,%o2 subxcc %o4,%o5,%o5 st %o5,[%o0+8] inc 16,%o0 subxcc %g3,%g4,%g4 st %g4,[%o0-4] addx %g0,0,%g1 andcc %o3,-4,%g0 bnz,a .L_bn_sub_words_loop addcc %g1,-1,%g0 tst %o3 nop bnz,a .L_bn_sub_words_tail ld [%o1],%o4 .L_bn_sub_words_return: retl mov %g1,%o0 .L_bn_sub_words_tail: addcc %g1,-1,%g0 ld [%o2],%o5 subxcc %o4,%o5,%o5 addx %g0,0,%g1 deccc %o3 bz .L_bn_sub_words_return st %o5,[%o0] nop ld [%o1+4],%o4 addcc %g1,-1,%g0 ld [%o2+4],%o5 subxcc %o4,%o5,%o5 addx %g0,0,%g1 deccc %o3 bz .L_bn_sub_words_return st %o5,[%o0+4] ld [%o1+8],%o4 addcc %g1,-1,%g0 ld [%o2+8],%o5 subxcc %o4,%o5,%o5 st %o5,[%o0+8] retl addx %g0,0,%o0 .type bn_sub_words,#function .size bn_sub_words,(.-bn_sub_words) #define FRAME_SIZE -96 /* * Here is register usage map for *all* routines below. */ #define t_1 %o0 #define t_2 %o1 #define c_1 %o2 #define c_2 %o3 #define c_3 %o4 #define ap(I) [%i1+4*I] #define bp(I) [%i2+4*I] #define rp(I) [%i0+4*I] #define a_0 %l0 #define a_1 %l1 #define a_2 %l2 #define a_3 %l3 #define a_4 %l4 #define a_5 %l5 #define a_6 %l6 #define a_7 %l7 #define b_0 %i3 #define b_1 %i4 #define b_2 %i5 #define b_3 %o5 #define b_4 %g1 #define b_5 %g2 #define b_6 %g3 #define b_7 %g4 .align 32 .global bn_mul_comba8 /* * void bn_mul_comba8(r,a,b) * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b; */ bn_mul_comba8: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp ld ap(0),a_0 ld bp(0),b_0 umul a_0,b_0,c_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); ld bp(1),b_1 rd %y,c_2 st c_1,rp(0) !r[0]=c1; umul a_0,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); ld ap(1),a_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc %g0,t_2,c_3 != addx %g0,%g0,c_1 ld ap(2),a_2 umul a_1,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 st c_2,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != umul a_2,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx %g0,%g0,c_2 ld bp(2),b_2 umul a_1,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 ld bp(3),b_3 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_0,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 st c_3,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; umul a_0,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx %g0,%g0,c_3 umul a_1,b_2,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != ld ap(3),a_3 umul a_2,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 ld ap(4),a_4 umul a_3,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);!= addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != st c_1,rp(3) !r[3]=c1; umul a_4,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 umul a_3,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_2,b_2,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != ld bp(4),b_4 umul a_1,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 ld bp(5),b_5 umul a_0,b_4,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != st c_2,rp(4) !r[4]=c2; umul a_0,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 umul a_1,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_2,b_3,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_3,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 ld ap(5),a_5 umul a_4,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 ld ap(6),a_6 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_5,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 st c_3,rp(5) !r[5]=c3; umul a_6,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx %g0,%g0,c_3 umul a_5,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_4,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_3,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_2,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 ld bp(6),b_6 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_1,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 ld bp(7),b_7 umul a_0,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 st c_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_0,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx %g0,%g0,c_1 umul a_1,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_2,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_3,b_4,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != umul a_4,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_5,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 ld ap(7),a_7 umul a_6,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != umul a_7,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 st c_2,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; umul a_7,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 umul a_6,b_2,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_5,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_4,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_3,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_2,b_6,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_1,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 ! addx c_2,%g0,c_2 st c_3,rp(8) !r[8]=c3; umul a_2,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx %g0,%g0,c_3 umul a_3,b_6,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_4,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_5,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_6,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_7,b_2,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != st c_1,rp(9) !r[9]=c1; umul a_7,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 umul a_6,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_5,b_5,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != umul a_4,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_3,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 st c_2,rp(10) !r[10]=c2; umul a_4,b_7,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 != umul a_5,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_6,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_7,b_4,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 st c_3,rp(11) !r[11]=c3; addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_7,b_5,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx %g0,%g0,c_3 umul a_6,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_5,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 st c_1,rp(12) !r[12]=c1; addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_6,b_7,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx %g0,%g0,c_1 umul a_7,b_6,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 st c_2,rp(13) !r[13]=c2; umul a_7,b_7,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 nop != st c_3,rp(14) !r[14]=c3; st c_1,rp(15) !r[15]=c1; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 .type bn_mul_comba8,#function .size bn_mul_comba8,(.-bn_mul_comba8) .align 32 .global bn_mul_comba4 /* * void bn_mul_comba4(r,a,b) * BN_ULONG *r,*a,*b; */ bn_mul_comba4: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp ld ap(0),a_0 ld bp(0),b_0 umul a_0,b_0,c_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); ld bp(1),b_1 rd %y,c_2 st c_1,rp(0) !r[0]=c1; umul a_0,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); ld ap(1),a_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc %g0,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 ld ap(2),a_2 umul a_1,b_0,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != st c_2,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; umul a_2,b_0,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 ld bp(2),b_2 umul a_1,b_1,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != ld bp(3),b_3 umul a_0,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 st c_3,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; umul a_0,b_3,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx %g0,%g0,c_3 != umul a_1,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 ld ap(3),a_3 umul a_2,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_3,b_0,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != st c_1,rp(3) !r[3]=c1; umul a_3,b_1,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 umul a_2,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_1,b_3,t_1 !=!mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != st c_2,rp(4) !r[4]=c2; umul a_2,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 umul a_3,b_2,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 st c_3,rp(5) !r[5]=c3; addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_3,b_3,t_1 !mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != st c_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; st c_2,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 .type bn_mul_comba4,#function .size bn_mul_comba4,(.-bn_mul_comba4) .align 32 .global bn_sqr_comba8 bn_sqr_comba8: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp ld ap(0),a_0 ld ap(1),a_1 umul a_0,a_0,c_1 !=!sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3); rd %y,c_2 st c_1,rp(0) !r[0]=c1; ld ap(2),a_2 umul a_0,a_1,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc %g0,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 != addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 st c_2,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != umul a_2,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx %g0,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != ld ap(3),a_3 umul a_1,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 st c_3,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; umul a_0,a_3,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx %g0,%g0,c_3 != addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 ld ap(4),a_4 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_1,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != st c_1,rp(3) !r[3]=c1; umul a_4,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_3,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 ld ap(5),a_5 umul a_2,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 st c_2,rp(4) !r[4]=c2; addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != umul a_0,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,0,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx %g0,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_1,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != ld ap(6),a_6 umul a_2,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 st c_3,rp(5) !r[5]=c3; umul a_6,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,0,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx %g0,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_5,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,1,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 umul a_4,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,2,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 != addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 ld ap(7),a_7 umul a_3,a_3,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != st c_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; umul a_0,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_1,a_6,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,1,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_2,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,2,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_3,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,4,3,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 st c_2,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; umul a_7,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_6,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,2,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_5,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,3,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_4,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,4,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 st c_3,rp(8) !r[8]=c3; addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_2,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,2,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx %g0,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_3,a_6,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,3,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_4,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,5,4,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != st c_1,rp(9) !r[9]=c1; umul a_7,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,3,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_6,a_4,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,6,4,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_5,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,5,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 st c_2,rp(10) !r[10]=c2; umul a_4,a_7,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c2(a,7,4,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 != addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 umul a_5,a_6,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c2(a,6,5,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 st c_3,rp(11) !r[11]=c3; addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_7,a_5,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,5,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx %g0,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_6,a_6,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,6,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 st c_1,rp(12) !r[12]=c1; umul a_6,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,7,6,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 st c_2,rp(13) !r[13]=c2; addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != umul a_7,a_7,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,7,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != st c_3,rp(14) !r[14]=c3; st c_1,rp(15) !r[15]=c1; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 .type bn_sqr_comba8,#function .size bn_sqr_comba8,(.-bn_sqr_comba8) .align 32 .global bn_sqr_comba4 /* * void bn_sqr_comba4(r,a) * BN_ULONG *r,*a; */ bn_sqr_comba4: save %sp,FRAME_SIZE,%sp ld ap(0),a_0 umul a_0,a_0,c_1 !sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3); ld ap(1),a_1 != rd %y,c_2 st c_1,rp(0) !r[0]=c1; ld ap(2),a_2 umul a_0,a_1,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 addxcc %g0,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 != addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 != st c_2,rp(1) !r[1]=c2; umul a_2,a_0,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 != addx c_2,%g0,c_2 ld ap(3),a_3 umul a_1,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 != rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 st c_3,rp(2) !r[2]=c3; addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_0,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx %g0,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != umul a_1,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != addx c_3,%g0,c_3 addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 addx c_3,%g0,c_3 != st c_1,rp(3) !r[3]=c1; umul a_3,a_1,t_1 !sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx %g0,%g0,c_1 addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 != addx c_1,%g0,c_1 umul a_2,a_2,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1); addcc c_2,t_1,c_2 rd %y,t_2 != addxcc c_3,t_2,c_3 addx c_1,%g0,c_1 st c_2,rp(4) !r[4]=c2; umul a_2,a_3,t_1 !=!sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2); addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 addx %g0,%g0,c_2 != addcc c_3,t_1,c_3 addxcc c_1,t_2,c_1 st c_3,rp(5) !r[5]=c3; addx c_2,%g0,c_2 != umul a_3,a_3,t_1 !sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3); addcc c_1,t_1,c_1 rd %y,t_2 addxcc c_2,t_2,c_2 != st c_1,rp(6) !r[6]=c1; st c_2,rp(7) !r[7]=c2; ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 .type bn_sqr_comba4,#function .size bn_sqr_comba4,(.-bn_sqr_comba4) .align 32 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000006335613176625656016651 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # January 2010 # # "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for IA-64. There are # several possibilities for improvement: # # - modulo-scheduling outer loop would eliminate quite a number of # stalls after ldf8, xma and getf.sig outside inner loop and # improve shorter key performance; # - shorter vector support [with input vectors being fetched only # once] should be added; # - 2x unroll with help of n0[1] would make the code scalable on # "wider" IA-64, "wider" than Itanium 2 that is, which is not of # acute interest, because upcoming Tukwila's individual cores are # reportedly based on Itanium 2 design; # - dedicated squaring procedure(?); # # January 2010 # # Shorter vector support is implemented by zero-padding ap and np # vectors up to 8 elements, or 512 bits. This means that 256-bit # inputs will be processed only 2 times faster than 512-bit inputs, # not 4 [as one would expect, because algorithm complexity is n^2]. # The reason for padding is that inputs shorter than 512 bits won't # be processed faster anyway, because minimal critical path of the # core loop happens to match 512-bit timing. Either way, it resulted # in >100% improvement of 512-bit RSA sign benchmark and 50% - of # 1024-bit one [in comparison to original version of *this* module]. # # So far 'openssl speed rsa dsa' output on 900MHz Itanium 2 *with* # this module is: # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 512 bits 0.000290s 0.000024s 3452.8 42031.4 # rsa 1024 bits 0.000793s 0.000058s 1261.7 17172.0 # rsa 2048 bits 0.005908s 0.000148s 169.3 6754.0 # rsa 4096 bits 0.033456s 0.000469s 29.9 2133.6 # dsa 512 bits 0.000253s 0.000198s 3949.9 5057.0 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000585s 0.000607s 1708.4 1647.4 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001453s 0.001703s 688.1 587.4 # # ... and *without* (but still with ia64.S): # # rsa 512 bits 0.000670s 0.000041s 1491.8 24145.5 # rsa 1024 bits 0.001988s 0.000080s 502.9 12499.3 # rsa 2048 bits 0.008702s 0.000189s 114.9 5293.9 # rsa 4096 bits 0.043860s 0.000533s 22.8 1875.9 # dsa 512 bits 0.000441s 0.000427s 2265.3 2340.6 # dsa 1024 bits 0.000823s 0.000867s 1215.6 1153.2 # dsa 2048 bits 0.001894s 0.002179s 528.1 458.9 # # As it can be seen, RSA sign performance improves by 130-30%, # hereafter less for longer keys, while verify - by 74-13%. # DSA performance improves by 115-30%. $output=pop; if ($^O eq "hpux") { $ADDP="addp4"; for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); } } else { $ADDP="add"; } $code=<<___; .explicit .text // int bn_mul_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,const BN_ULONG *ap, // const BN_ULONG *bp,const BN_ULONG *np, // const BN_ULONG *n0p,int num); .align 64 .global bn_mul_mont# .proc bn_mul_mont# bn_mul_mont: .prologue .body { .mmi; cmp4.le p6,p7=2,r37;; (p6) cmp4.lt.unc p8,p9=8,r37 mov ret0=r0 };; { .bbb; (p9) br.cond.dptk.many bn_mul_mont_8 (p8) br.cond.dpnt.many bn_mul_mont_general (p7) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };; .endp bn_mul_mont# prevfs=r2; prevpr=r3; prevlc=r10; prevsp=r11; rptr=r8; aptr=r9; bptr=r14; nptr=r15; tptr=r16; // &tp[0] tp_1=r17; // &tp[-1] num=r18; len=r19; lc=r20; topbit=r21; // carry bit from tmp[num] n0=f6; m0=f7; bi=f8; .align 64 .local bn_mul_mont_general# .proc bn_mul_mont_general# bn_mul_mont_general: .prologue { .mmi; .save ar.pfs,prevfs alloc prevfs=ar.pfs,6,2,0,8 $ADDP aptr=0,in1 .save ar.lc,prevlc mov prevlc=ar.lc } { .mmi; .vframe prevsp mov prevsp=sp $ADDP bptr=0,in2 .save pr,prevpr mov prevpr=pr };; .body .rotf alo[6],nlo[4],ahi[8],nhi[6] .rotr a[3],n[3],t[2] { .mmi; ldf8 bi=[bptr],8 // (*bp++) ldf8 alo[4]=[aptr],16 // ap[0] $ADDP r30=8,in1 };; { .mmi; ldf8 alo[3]=[r30],16 // ap[1] ldf8 alo[2]=[aptr],16 // ap[2] $ADDP in4=0,in4 };; { .mmi; ldf8 alo[1]=[r30] // ap[3] ldf8 n0=[in4] // n0 $ADDP rptr=0,in0 } { .mmi; $ADDP nptr=0,in3 mov r31=16 zxt4 num=in5 };; { .mmi; ldf8 nlo[2]=[nptr],8 // np[0] shladd len=num,3,r0 shladd r31=num,3,r31 };; { .mmi; ldf8 nlo[1]=[nptr],8 // np[1] add lc=-5,num sub r31=sp,r31 };; { .mfb; and sp=-16,r31 // alloca xmpy.hu ahi[2]=alo[4],bi // ap[0]*bp[0] nop.b 0 } { .mfb; nop.m 0 xmpy.lu alo[4]=alo[4],bi brp.loop.imp .L1st_ctop,.L1st_cend-16 };; { .mfi; nop.m 0 xma.hu ahi[1]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] // ap[1]*bp[0] add tp_1=8,sp } { .mfi; nop.m 0 xma.lu alo[3]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] mov pr.rot=0x20001f<<16 // ------^----- (p40) at first (p23) // ----------^^ p[16:20]=1 };; { .mfi; nop.m 0 xmpy.lu m0=alo[4],n0 // (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 mov ar.lc=lc } { .mfi; nop.m 0 fcvt.fxu.s1 nhi[1]=f0 mov ar.ec=8 };; .align 32 .L1st_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 { .mfi; (p16) ldf8 alo[0]=[aptr],8 // *(aptr++) (p18) xma.hu ahi[0]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p40) add n[2]=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) } { .mfi; (p18) ldf8 nlo[0]=[nptr],8 // *(nptr++)(p16) (p18) xma.lu alo[2]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p42) add n[2]=n[2],a[2],1 };; // (p23) { .mfi; (p21) getf.sig a[0]=alo[5] (p20) xma.hu nhi[0]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mfi; (p23) st8 [tp_1]=n[2],8 (p20) xma.lu nlo[2]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mmb; (p21) getf.sig n[0]=nlo[3] (p16) nop.m 0 br.ctop.sptk .L1st_ctop };; .L1st_cend: { .mmi; getf.sig a[0]=ahi[6] // (p24) getf.sig n[0]=nhi[4] add num=-1,num };; // num-- { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 (p40) add n[0]=n[0],a[0] (p42) add n[0]=n[0],a[0],1 sub aptr=aptr,len };; // rewind { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] sub nptr=nptr,len };; { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p39,p41 (p39) add topbit=r0,r0 (p41) add topbit=r0,r0,1 nop.i 0 } { .mmi; st8 [tp_1]=n[0] add tptr=16,sp add tp_1=8,sp };; .Louter: { .mmi; ldf8 bi=[bptr],8 // (*bp++) ldf8 ahi[3]=[tptr] // tp[0] add r30=8,aptr };; { .mmi; ldf8 alo[4]=[aptr],16 // ap[0] ldf8 alo[3]=[r30],16 // ap[1] add r31=8,nptr };; { .mfb; ldf8 alo[2]=[aptr],16 // ap[2] xma.hu ahi[2]=alo[4],bi,ahi[3] // ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] brp.loop.imp .Linner_ctop,.Linner_cend-16 } { .mfb; ldf8 alo[1]=[r30] // ap[3] xma.lu alo[4]=alo[4],bi,ahi[3] clrrrb.pr };; { .mfi; ldf8 nlo[2]=[nptr],16 // np[0] xma.hu ahi[1]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] // ap[1]*bp[i] nop.i 0 } { .mfi; ldf8 nlo[1]=[r31] // np[1] xma.lu alo[3]=alo[3],bi,ahi[2] mov pr.rot=0x20101f<<16 // ------^----- (p40) at first (p23) // --------^--- (p30) at first (p22) // ----------^^ p[16:20]=1 };; { .mfi; st8 [tptr]=r0 // tp[0] is already accounted xmpy.lu m0=alo[4],n0 // (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 mov ar.lc=lc } { .mfi; fcvt.fxu.s1 nhi[1]=f0 mov ar.ec=8 };; // This loop spins in 4*(n+7) ticks on Itanium 2 and should spin in // 7*(n+7) ticks on Itanium (the one codenamed Merced). Factor of 7 // in latter case accounts for two-tick pipeline stall, which means // that its performance would be ~20% lower than optimal one. No // attempt was made to address this, because original Itanium is // hardly represented out in the wild... .align 32 .Linner_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p30,p32 { .mfi; (p16) ldf8 alo[0]=[aptr],8 // *(aptr++) (p18) xma.hu ahi[0]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p40) add n[2]=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 (p18) xma.lu alo[2]=alo[2],bi,ahi[1] (p42) add n[2]=n[2],a[2],1 };; // (p23) { .mfi; (p21) getf.sig a[0]=alo[5] (p16) nop.f 0 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] } // (p23) { .mfi; (p21) ld8 t[0]=[tptr],8 (p16) nop.f 0 (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[2],a[2] };; // (p23) { .mfi; (p18) ldf8 nlo[0]=[nptr],8 // *(nptr++) (p20) xma.hu nhi[0]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p30) add a[1]=a[1],t[1] } // (p22) { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 (p20) xma.lu nlo[2]=nlo[2],m0,nhi[1] (p32) add a[1]=a[1],t[1],1 };; // (p22) { .mmi; (p21) getf.sig n[0]=nlo[3] (p16) nop.m 0 (p30) cmp.ltu p31,p29=a[1],t[1] } // (p22) { .mmb; (p23) st8 [tp_1]=n[2],8 (p32) cmp.leu p31,p29=a[1],t[1] // (p22) br.ctop.sptk .Linner_ctop };; .Linner_cend: { .mmi; getf.sig a[0]=ahi[6] // (p24) getf.sig n[0]=nhi[4] nop.i 0 };; { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p31,p33 (p31) add a[0]=a[0],topbit (p33) add a[0]=a[0],topbit,1 mov topbit=r0 };; { .mfi; .pred.rel "mutex",p31,p33 (p31) cmp.ltu p32,p30=a[0],topbit (p33) cmp.leu p32,p30=a[0],topbit } { .mfi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 (p40) add n[0]=n[0],a[0] (p42) add n[0]=n[0],a[0],1 };; { .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p44,p46 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=n[0],a[0] (p32) add topbit=r0,r0,1 } { .mmi; st8 [tp_1]=n[0],8 cmp4.ne p6,p0=1,num sub aptr=aptr,len };; // rewind { .mmi; sub nptr=nptr,len (p41) add topbit=r0,r0,1 add tptr=16,sp } { .mmb; add tp_1=8,sp add num=-1,num // num-- (p6) br.cond.sptk.many .Louter };; { .mbb; add lc=4,lc brp.loop.imp .Lsub_ctop,.Lsub_cend-16 clrrrb.pr };; { .mii; nop.m 0 mov pr.rot=0x10001<<16 // ------^---- (p33) at first (p17) mov ar.lc=lc } { .mii; nop.m 0 mov ar.ec=3 nop.i 0 };; .Lsub_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 { .mfi; (p16) ld8 t[0]=[tptr],8 // t=*(tp++) (p16) nop.f 0 (p33) sub n[1]=t[1],n[1] } // (p17) { .mfi; (p16) ld8 n[0]=[nptr],8 // n=*(np++) (p16) nop.f 0 (p35) sub n[1]=t[1],n[1],1 };; // (p17) { .mib; (p18) st8 [rptr]=n[2],8 // *(rp++)=r (p33) cmp.gtu p34,p32=n[1],t[1] // (p17) (p18) nop.b 0 } { .mib; (p18) nop.m 0 (p35) cmp.geu p34,p32=n[1],t[1] // (p17) br.ctop.sptk .Lsub_ctop };; .Lsub_cend: { .mmb; .pred.rel "mutex",p34,p36 (p34) sub topbit=topbit,r0 // (p19) (p36) sub topbit=topbit,r0,1 brp.loop.imp .Lcopy_ctop,.Lcopy_cend-16 } { .mmb; sub rptr=rptr,len // rewind sub tptr=tptr,len clrrrb.pr };; { .mmi; and aptr=tptr,topbit andcm bptr=rptr,topbit mov pr.rot=1<<16 };; { .mii; or nptr=aptr,bptr mov ar.lc=lc mov ar.ec=3 };; .Lcopy_ctop: { .mmb; (p16) ld8 n[0]=[nptr],8 (p18) st8 [tptr]=r0,8 (p16) nop.b 0 } { .mmb; (p16) nop.m 0 (p18) st8 [rptr]=n[2],8 br.ctop.sptk .Lcopy_ctop };; .Lcopy_cend: { .mmi; mov ret0=1 // signal "handled" rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh mov ar.lc=prevlc } { .mib; .restore sp mov sp=prevsp mov pr=prevpr,0x1ffff br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp bn_mul_mont_general# a1=r16; a2=r17; a3=r18; a4=r19; a5=r20; a6=r21; a7=r22; a8=r23; n1=r24; n2=r25; n3=r26; n4=r27; n5=r28; n6=r29; n7=r30; n8=r31; t0=r15; ai0=f8; ai1=f9; ai2=f10; ai3=f11; ai4=f12; ai5=f13; ai6=f14; ai7=f15; ni0=f16; ni1=f17; ni2=f18; ni3=f19; ni4=f20; ni5=f21; ni6=f22; ni7=f23; .align 64 .skip 48 // aligns loop body .local bn_mul_mont_8# .proc bn_mul_mont_8# bn_mul_mont_8: .prologue { .mmi; .save ar.pfs,prevfs alloc prevfs=ar.pfs,6,2,0,8 .vframe prevsp mov prevsp=sp .save ar.lc,prevlc mov prevlc=ar.lc } { .mmi; add r17=-6*16,sp add sp=-7*16,sp .save pr,prevpr mov prevpr=pr };; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x10 stf.spill [sp]=f16,-16 .save.gf 0,0x20 stf.spill [r17]=f17,32 add r16=-5*16,prevsp};; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x40 stf.spill [r16]=f18,32 .save.gf 0,0x80 stf.spill [r17]=f19,32 $ADDP aptr=0,in1 };; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x100 stf.spill [r16]=f20,32 .save.gf 0,0x200 stf.spill [r17]=f21,32 $ADDP r29=8,in1 };; { .mmi; .save.gf 0,0x400 stf.spill [r16]=f22 .save.gf 0,0x800 stf.spill [r17]=f23 $ADDP rptr=0,in0 };; .body .rotf bj[8],mj[2],tf[2],alo[10],ahi[10],nlo[10],nhi[10] .rotr t[8] // load input vectors padding them to 8 elements { .mmi; ldf8 ai0=[aptr],16 // ap[0] ldf8 ai1=[r29],16 // ap[1] $ADDP bptr=0,in2 } { .mmi; $ADDP r30=8,in2 $ADDP nptr=0,in3 $ADDP r31=8,in3 };; { .mmi; ldf8 bj[7]=[bptr],16 // bp[0] ldf8 bj[6]=[r30],16 // bp[1] cmp4.le p4,p5=3,in5 } { .mmi; ldf8 ni0=[nptr],16 // np[0] ldf8 ni1=[r31],16 // np[1] cmp4.le p6,p7=4,in5 };; { .mfi; (p4)ldf8 ai2=[aptr],16 // ap[2] (p5)fcvt.fxu ai2=f0 cmp4.le p8,p9=5,in5 } { .mfi; (p6)ldf8 ai3=[r29],16 // ap[3] (p7)fcvt.fxu ai3=f0 cmp4.le p10,p11=6,in5 } { .mfi; (p4)ldf8 bj[5]=[bptr],16 // bp[2] (p5)fcvt.fxu bj[5]=f0 cmp4.le p12,p13=7,in5 } { .mfi; (p6)ldf8 bj[4]=[r30],16 // bp[3] (p7)fcvt.fxu bj[4]=f0 cmp4.le p14,p15=8,in5 } { .mfi; (p4)ldf8 ni2=[nptr],16 // np[2] (p5)fcvt.fxu ni2=f0 addp4 r28=-1,in5 } { .mfi; (p6)ldf8 ni3=[r31],16 // np[3] (p7)fcvt.fxu ni3=f0 $ADDP in4=0,in4 };; { .mfi; ldf8 n0=[in4] fcvt.fxu tf[1]=f0 nop.i 0 } { .mfi; (p8)ldf8 ai4=[aptr],16 // ap[4] (p9)fcvt.fxu ai4=f0 mov t[0]=r0 } { .mfi; (p10)ldf8 ai5=[r29],16 // ap[5] (p11)fcvt.fxu ai5=f0 mov t[1]=r0 } { .mfi; (p8)ldf8 bj[3]=[bptr],16 // bp[4] (p9)fcvt.fxu bj[3]=f0 mov t[2]=r0 } { .mfi; (p10)ldf8 bj[2]=[r30],16 // bp[5] (p11)fcvt.fxu bj[2]=f0 mov t[3]=r0 } { .mfi; (p8)ldf8 ni4=[nptr],16 // np[4] (p9)fcvt.fxu ni4=f0 mov t[4]=r0 } { .mfi; (p10)ldf8 ni5=[r31],16 // np[5] (p11)fcvt.fxu ni5=f0 mov t[5]=r0 };; { .mfi; (p12)ldf8 ai6=[aptr],16 // ap[6] (p13)fcvt.fxu ai6=f0 mov t[6]=r0 } { .mfi; (p14)ldf8 ai7=[r29],16 // ap[7] (p15)fcvt.fxu ai7=f0 mov t[7]=r0 } { .mfi; (p12)ldf8 bj[1]=[bptr],16 // bp[6] (p13)fcvt.fxu bj[1]=f0 mov ar.lc=r28 } { .mfi; (p14)ldf8 bj[0]=[r30],16 // bp[7] (p15)fcvt.fxu bj[0]=f0 mov ar.ec=1 } { .mfi; (p12)ldf8 ni6=[nptr],16 // np[6] (p13)fcvt.fxu ni6=f0 mov pr.rot=1<<16 } { .mfb; (p14)ldf8 ni7=[r31],16 // np[7] (p15)fcvt.fxu ni7=f0 brp.loop.imp .Louter_8_ctop,.Louter_8_cend-16 };; // The loop is scheduled for 32*n ticks on Itanium 2. Actual attempt // to measure with help of Interval Time Counter indicated that the // factor is a tad higher: 33 or 34, if not 35. Exact measurement and // addressing the issue is problematic, because I don't have access // to platform-specific instruction-level profiler. On Itanium it // should run in 56*n ticks, because of higher xma latency... .Louter_8_ctop: .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 0: (p16) xma.hu ahi[0]=ai0,bj[7],tf[1] // ap[0]*b[i]+t[0] (p40) add a3=a3,n3 } // (p17) a3+=n3 { .mfi; (p42) add a3=a3,n3,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[0]=ai0,bj[7],tf[1] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig a7=alo[8] // 1: (p48) add t[6]=t[6],a3 // (p17) t[6]+=a3 (p50) add t[6]=t[6],a3,1 };; { .mfi; (p17) getf.sig a8=ahi[8] // 2: (p17) xma.hu nhi[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] // np[6]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a3,n3 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a3,n3 (p17) xma.lu nlo[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n5=nlo[6] // 3: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[6],a3 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[6],a3 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 4: (p16) xma.hu ahi[1]=ai1,bj[7],ahi[0] // ap[1]*b[i] (p41) add a4=a4,n4 } // (p17) a4+=n4 { .mfi; (p43) add a4=a4,n4,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[1]=ai1,bj[7],ahi[0] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mfi; (p49) add t[5]=t[5],a4 // 5: (p17) t[5]+=a4 (p16) xmpy.lu mj[0]=alo[0],n0 // (ap[0]*b[i]+t[0])*n0 (p51) add t[5]=t[5],a4,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 6: (p17) xma.hu nhi[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] // np[7]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a4,n4 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a4,n4 (p17) xma.lu nlo[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n6=nlo[7] // 7: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[5],a4 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[5],a4 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 8: (p16) xma.hu ahi[2]=ai2,bj[7],ahi[1] // ap[2]*b[i] (p40) add a5=a5,n5 } // (p17) a5+=n5 { .mfi; (p42) add a5=a5,n5,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[2]=ai2,bj[7],ahi[1] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a1=alo[1] // 9: (p48) add t[4]=t[4],a5 // p(17) t[4]+=a5 (p50) add t[4]=t[4],a5,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 10: (p16) xma.hu nhi[0]=ni0,mj[0],alo[0] // np[0]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a5,n5 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a5,n5 (p16) xma.lu nlo[0]=ni0,mj[0],alo[0] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n7=nlo[8] // 11: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[4],a5 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[4],a5 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mfi; (p17) getf.sig n8=nhi[8] // 12: (p16) xma.hu ahi[3]=ai3,bj[7],ahi[2] // ap[3]*b[i] (p41) add a6=a6,n6 } // (p17) a6+=n6 { .mfi; (p43) add a6=a6,n6,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[3]=ai3,bj[7],ahi[2] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a2=alo[2] // 13: (p49) add t[3]=t[3],a6 // (p17) t[3]+=a6 (p51) add t[3]=t[3],a6,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 14: (p16) xma.hu nhi[1]=ni1,mj[0],nhi[0] // np[1]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a6,n6 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a6,n6 (p16) xma.lu nlo[1]=ni1,mj[0],nhi[0] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) nop.m 0 // 15: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[3],a6 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[3],a6 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 16: (p16) xma.hu ahi[4]=ai4,bj[7],ahi[3] // ap[4]*b[i] (p40) add a7=a7,n7 } // (p17) a7+=n7 { .mfi; (p42) add a7=a7,n7,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[4]=ai4,bj[7],ahi[3] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a3=alo[3] // 17: (p48) add t[2]=t[2],a7 // (p17) t[2]+=a7 (p50) add t[2]=t[2],a7,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 18: (p16) xma.hu nhi[2]=ni2,mj[0],nhi[1] // np[2]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a7,n7 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a7,n7 (p16) xma.lu nlo[2]=ni2,mj[0],nhi[1] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig n1=nlo[1] // 19: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[2],a7 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[2],a7 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 20: (p16) xma.hu ahi[5]=ai5,bj[7],ahi[4] // ap[5]*b[i] (p41) add a8=a8,n8 } // (p17) a8+=n8 { .mfi; (p43) add a8=a8,n8,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[5]=ai5,bj[7],ahi[4] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a4=alo[4] // 21: (p49) add t[1]=t[1],a8 // (p17) t[1]+=a8 (p51) add t[1]=t[1],a8,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 22: (p16) xma.hu nhi[3]=ni3,mj[0],nhi[2] // np[3]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a8,n8 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a8,n8 (p16) xma.lu nlo[3]=ni3,mj[0],nhi[2] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig n2=nlo[2] // 23: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[1],a8 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[1],a8 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 24: (p16) xma.hu ahi[6]=ai6,bj[7],ahi[5] // ap[6]*b[i] (p16) add a1=a1,n1 } // (p16) a1+=n1 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 (p16) xma.lu alo[6]=ai6,bj[7],ahi[5] (p17) mov t[0]=r0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a5=alo[5] // 25: (p16) add t0=t[7],a1 // (p16) t[7]+=a1 (p42) add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) setf.sig tf[0]=t0 // 26: (p16) xma.hu nhi[4]=ni4,mj[0],nhi[3] // np[4]*m0 (p50) add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 } { .mfi; (p16) cmp.ltu.unc p42,p40=a1,n1 (p16) xma.lu nlo[4]=ni4,mj[0],nhi[3] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig n3=nlo[3] // 27: (p16) cmp.ltu.unc p50,p48=t0,a1 (p16) nop.i 0 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 28: (p16) xma.hu ahi[7]=ai7,bj[7],ahi[6] // ap[7]*b[i] (p40) add a2=a2,n2 } // (p16) a2+=n2 { .mfi; (p42) add a2=a2,n2,1 (p16) xma.lu alo[7]=ai7,bj[7],ahi[6] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p16) getf.sig a6=alo[6] // 29: (p48) add t[6]=t[6],a2 // (p16) t[6]+=a2 (p50) add t[6]=t[6],a2,1 };; { .mfi; (p16) nop.m 0 // 30: (p16) xma.hu nhi[5]=ni5,mj[0],nhi[4] // np[5]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=a2,n2 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=a2,n2 (p16) xma.lu nlo[5]=ni5,mj[0],nhi[4] (p16) nop.i 0 };; { .mfi; (p16) getf.sig n4=nlo[4] // 31: (p16) nop.f 0 (p48) cmp.ltu p49,p47=t[6],a2 } { .mfb; (p50) cmp.leu p49,p47=t[6],a2 (p16) nop.f 0 br.ctop.sptk.many .Louter_8_ctop };; .Louter_8_cend: // above loop has to execute one more time, without (p16), which is // replaced with merged move of np[8] to GPR bank .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mmi; (p0) getf.sig n1=ni0 // 0: (p40) add a3=a3,n3 // (p17) a3+=n3 (p42) add a3=a3,n3,1 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig a7=alo[8] // 1: (p48) add t[6]=t[6],a3 // (p17) t[6]+=a3 (p50) add t[6]=t[6],a3,1 };; { .mfi; (p17) getf.sig a8=ahi[8] // 2: (p17) xma.hu nhi[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] // np[6]*m0 (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a3,n3 } { .mfi; (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a3,n3 (p17) xma.lu nlo[7]=ni6,mj[1],nhi[6] (p0) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n5=nlo[6] // 3: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[6],a3 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[6],a3 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mmi; (p0) getf.sig n2=ni1 // 4: (p41) add a4=a4,n4 // (p17) a4+=n4 (p43) add a4=a4,n4,1 };; { .mfi; (p49) add t[5]=t[5],a4 // 5: (p17) t[5]+=a4 (p0) nop.f 0 (p51) add t[5]=t[5],a4,1 };; { .mfi; (p0) getf.sig n3=ni2 // 6: (p17) xma.hu nhi[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] // np[7]*m0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a4,n4 } { .mfi; (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a4,n4 (p17) xma.lu nlo[8]=ni7,mj[1],nhi[7] (p0) nop.i 0 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n6=nlo[7] // 7: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[5],a4 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[5],a4 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n4=ni3 // 8: (p40) add a5=a5,n5 // (p17) a5+=n5 (p42) add a5=a5,n5,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 9: (p48) add t[4]=t[4],a5 // p(17) t[4]+=a5 (p50) add t[4]=t[4],a5,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 10: (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a5,n5 (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a5,n5 };; { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n7=nlo[8] // 11: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[4],a5 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[4],a5 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mii; (p17) getf.sig n8=nhi[8] // 12: (p41) add a6=a6,n6 // (p17) a6+=n6 (p43) add a6=a6,n6,1 };; { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n5=ni4 // 13: (p49) add t[3]=t[3],a6 // (p17) t[3]+=a6 (p51) add t[3]=t[3],a6,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 14: (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a6,n6 (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a6,n6 };; { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n6=ni5 // 15: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[3],a6 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[3],a6 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42 .pred.rel "mutex",p48,p50 { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 16: (p40) add a7=a7,n7 // (p17) a7+=n7 (p42) add a7=a7,n7,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 17: (p48) add t[2]=t[2],a7 // (p17) t[2]+=a7 (p50) add t[2]=t[2],a7,1 };; { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 18: (p40) cmp.ltu p43,p41=a7,n7 (p42) cmp.leu p43,p41=a7,n7 };; { .mii; (p0) getf.sig n7=ni6 // 19: (p48) cmp.ltu p51,p49=t[2],a7 (p50) cmp.leu p51,p49=t[2],a7 };; .pred.rel "mutex",p41,p43 .pred.rel "mutex",p49,p51 { .mii; (p0) nop.m 0 // 20: (p41) add a8=a8,n8 // (p17) a8+=n8 (p43) add a8=a8,n8,1 };; { .mmi; (p0) nop.m 0 // 21: (p49) add t[1]=t[1],a8 // (p17) t[1]+=a8 (p51) add t[1]=t[1],a8,1 } { .mmi; (p17) mov t[0]=r0 (p41) cmp.ltu p42,p40=a8,n8 (p43) cmp.leu p42,p40=a8,n8 };; { .mmi; (p0) getf.sig n8=ni7 // 22: (p49) cmp.ltu p50,p48=t[1],a8 (p51) cmp.leu p50,p48=t[1],a8 } { .mmi; (p42) add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 (p0) add r16=-7*16,prevsp (p0) add r17=-6*16,prevsp };; // subtract np[8] from carrybit|tmp[8] // carrybit|tmp[8] layout upon exit from above loop is: // t[0]|t[1]|t[2]|t[3]|t[4]|t[5]|t[6]|t[7]|t0 (least significant) { .mmi; (p50)add t[0]=t[0],r0,1 add r18=-5*16,prevsp sub n1=t0,n1 };; { .mmi; cmp.gtu p34,p32=n1,t0;; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 (p32)sub n2=t[7],n2 (p34)sub n2=t[7],n2,1 };; { .mii; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n2,t[7] (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n2,t[7];; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 (p33)sub n3=t[6],n3 } { .mmi; (p35)sub n3=t[6],n3,1;; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=n3,t[6] (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=n3,t[6] };; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 { .mii; (p32)sub n4=t[5],n4 (p34)sub n4=t[5],n4,1;; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n4,t[5] } { .mmi; (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n4,t[5];; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 (p33)sub n5=t[4],n5 (p35)sub n5=t[4],n5,1 };; { .mii; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=n5,t[4] (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=n5,t[4];; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 (p32)sub n6=t[3],n6 } { .mmi; (p34)sub n6=t[3],n6,1;; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n6,t[3] (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n6,t[3] };; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 { .mii; (p33)sub n7=t[2],n7 (p35)sub n7=t[2],n7,1;; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=n7,t[2] } { .mmi; (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=n7,t[2];; .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 (p32)sub n8=t[1],n8 (p34)sub n8=t[1],n8,1 };; { .mii; (p32)cmp.gtu p35,p33=n8,t[1] (p34)cmp.geu p35,p33=n8,t[1];; .pred.rel "mutex",p33,p35 (p33)sub a8=t[0],r0 } { .mmi; (p35)sub a8=t[0],r0,1;; (p33)cmp.gtu p34,p32=a8,t[0] (p35)cmp.geu p34,p32=a8,t[0] };; // save the result, either tmp[num] or tmp[num]-np[num] .pred.rel "mutex",p32,p34 { .mmi; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n1,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t0,8 add r19=-4*16,prevsp};; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n2,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[7],8 (p5)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n3,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[6],8 (p7)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n4,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[5],8 (p9)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n5,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[4],8 (p11)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n6,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[3],8 (p13)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n7,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[2],8 (p15)br.cond.dpnt.few .Ldone };; { .mmb; (p32)st8 [rptr]=n8,8 (p34)st8 [rptr]=t[1],8 nop.b 0 };; .Ldone: // epilogue { .mmi; ldf.fill f16=[r16],64 ldf.fill f17=[r17],64 nop.i 0 } { .mmi; ldf.fill f18=[r18],64 ldf.fill f19=[r19],64 mov pr=prevpr,0x1ffff };; { .mmi; ldf.fill f20=[r16] ldf.fill f21=[r17] mov ar.lc=prevlc } { .mmi; ldf.fill f22=[r18] ldf.fill f23=[r19] mov ret0=1 } // signal "handled" { .mib; rum 1<<5 .restore sp mov sp=prevsp br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp bn_mul_mont_8# .type copyright#,\@object copyright: stringz "Montgomery multiplication for IA-64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ open STDOUT,">$output" if $output; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S0000644000000000000000000003204713176625656015601 0ustar rootroot.ident "s390x.S, version 1.1" // ==================================================================== // Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. // // Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use // this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy // in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at // https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html // ==================================================================== .text #define zero %r0 // BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,int r4,BN_ULONG r5); .globl bn_mul_add_words .type bn_mul_add_words,@function .align 4 bn_mul_add_words: lghi zero,0 // zero = 0 la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside [to give way to] lghi %r2,0 // return value ltgfr %r4,%r4 bler %r14 // if (len<=0) return 0; stmg %r6,%r13,48(%r15) lghi %r2,3 lghi %r12,0 // carry = 0 slgr %r1,%r3 // rp-=ap nr %r2,%r4 // len%4 sra %r4,2 // cnt=len/4 jz .Loop1_madd // carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken algr zero,zero // clear carry lg %r7,0(%r3) // ap[0] lg %r9,8(%r3) // ap[1] mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w brct %r4,.Loop4_madd j .Loop4_madd_tail .Loop4_madd: mlgr %r8,%r5 lg %r11,16(%r3) // ap[i+2] alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry alcgr %r6,zero alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i] stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]= mlgr %r10,%r5 lg %r13,24(%r3) alcgr %r9,%r6 alcgr %r8,zero alg %r9,8(%r3,%r1) stg %r9,8(%r3,%r1) mlgr %r12,%r5 lg %r7,32(%r3) alcgr %r11,%r8 alcgr %r10,zero alg %r11,16(%r3,%r1) stg %r11,16(%r3,%r1) mlgr %r6,%r5 lg %r9,40(%r3) alcgr %r13,%r10 alcgr %r12,zero alg %r13,24(%r3,%r1) stg %r13,24(%r3,%r1) la %r3,32(%r3) // i+=4 brct %r4,.Loop4_madd .Loop4_madd_tail: mlgr %r8,%r5 lg %r11,16(%r3) alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry alcgr %r6,zero alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i] stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]= mlgr %r10,%r5 lg %r13,24(%r3) alcgr %r9,%r6 alcgr %r8,zero alg %r9,8(%r3,%r1) stg %r9,8(%r3,%r1) mlgr %r12,%r5 alcgr %r11,%r8 alcgr %r10,zero alg %r11,16(%r3,%r1) stg %r11,16(%r3,%r1) alcgr %r13,%r10 alcgr %r12,zero alg %r13,24(%r3,%r1) stg %r13,24(%r3,%r1) la %r3,32(%r3) // i+=4 la %r2,1(%r2) // see if len%4 is zero ... brct %r2,.Loop1_madd // without touching condition code:-) .Lend_madd: lgr %r2,zero // return value alcgr %r2,%r12 // collect even carry bit lmg %r6,%r13,48(%r15) br %r14 .Loop1_madd: lg %r7,0(%r3) // ap[i] mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry alcgr %r6,zero alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i] stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]= lgr %r12,%r6 la %r3,8(%r3) // i++ brct %r2,.Loop1_madd j .Lend_madd .size bn_mul_add_words,.-bn_mul_add_words // BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,int r4,BN_ULONG r5); .globl bn_mul_words .type bn_mul_words,@function .align 4 bn_mul_words: lghi zero,0 // zero = 0 la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside lghi %r2,0 // i=0; ltgfr %r4,%r4 bler %r14 // if (len<=0) return 0; stmg %r6,%r10,48(%r15) lghi %r10,3 lghi %r8,0 // carry = 0 nr %r10,%r4 // len%4 sra %r4,2 // cnt=len/4 jz .Loop1_mul // carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken algr zero,zero // clear carry .Loop4_mul: lg %r7,0(%r2,%r3) // ap[i] mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w alcgr %r7,%r8 // +=carry stg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // rp[i]= lg %r9,8(%r2,%r3) mlgr %r8,%r5 alcgr %r9,%r6 stg %r9,8(%r2,%r1) lg %r7,16(%r2,%r3) mlgr %r6,%r5 alcgr %r7,%r8 stg %r7,16(%r2,%r1) lg %r9,24(%r2,%r3) mlgr %r8,%r5 alcgr %r9,%r6 stg %r9,24(%r2,%r1) la %r2,32(%r2) // i+=4 brct %r4,.Loop4_mul la %r10,1(%r10) // see if len%4 is zero ... brct %r10,.Loop1_mul // without touching condition code:-) .Lend_mul: alcgr %r8,zero // collect carry bit lgr %r2,%r8 lmg %r6,%r10,48(%r15) br %r14 .Loop1_mul: lg %r7,0(%r2,%r3) // ap[i] mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w alcgr %r7,%r8 // +=carry stg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // rp[i]= lgr %r8,%r6 la %r2,8(%r2) // i++ brct %r10,.Loop1_mul j .Lend_mul .size bn_mul_words,.-bn_mul_words // void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r2,int r4) .globl bn_sqr_words .type bn_sqr_words,@function .align 4 bn_sqr_words: ltgfr %r4,%r4 bler %r14 stmg %r6,%r7,48(%r15) srag %r1,%r4,2 // cnt=len/4 jz .Loop1_sqr .Loop4_sqr: lg %r7,0(%r3) mlgr %r6,%r7 stg %r7,0(%r2) stg %r6,8(%r2) lg %r7,8(%r3) mlgr %r6,%r7 stg %r7,16(%r2) stg %r6,24(%r2) lg %r7,16(%r3) mlgr %r6,%r7 stg %r7,32(%r2) stg %r6,40(%r2) lg %r7,24(%r3) mlgr %r6,%r7 stg %r7,48(%r2) stg %r6,56(%r2) la %r3,32(%r3) la %r2,64(%r2) brct %r1,.Loop4_sqr lghi %r1,3 nr %r4,%r1 // cnt=len%4 jz .Lend_sqr .Loop1_sqr: lg %r7,0(%r3) mlgr %r6,%r7 stg %r7,0(%r2) stg %r6,8(%r2) la %r3,8(%r3) la %r2,16(%r2) brct %r4,.Loop1_sqr .Lend_sqr: lmg %r6,%r7,48(%r15) br %r14 .size bn_sqr_words,.-bn_sqr_words // BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h,BN_ULONG l,BN_ULONG d); .globl bn_div_words .type bn_div_words,@function .align 4 bn_div_words: dlgr %r2,%r4 lgr %r2,%r3 br %r14 .size bn_div_words,.-bn_div_words // BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4,int r5); .globl bn_add_words .type bn_add_words,@function .align 4 bn_add_words: la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside lghi %r2,0 // i=0 ltgfr %r5,%r5 bler %r14 // if (len<=0) return 0; stg %r6,48(%r15) lghi %r6,3 nr %r6,%r5 // len%4 sra %r5,2 // len/4, use sra because it sets condition code jz .Loop1_add // carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken algr %r2,%r2 // clear carry .Loop4_add: lg %r0,0(%r2,%r3) alcg %r0,0(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,0(%r2,%r1) lg %r0,8(%r2,%r3) alcg %r0,8(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,8(%r2,%r1) lg %r0,16(%r2,%r3) alcg %r0,16(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,16(%r2,%r1) lg %r0,24(%r2,%r3) alcg %r0,24(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,24(%r2,%r1) la %r2,32(%r2) // i+=4 brct %r5,.Loop4_add la %r6,1(%r6) // see if len%4 is zero ... brct %r6,.Loop1_add // without touching condition code:-) .Lexit_add: lghi %r2,0 alcgr %r2,%r2 lg %r6,48(%r15) br %r14 .Loop1_add: lg %r0,0(%r2,%r3) alcg %r0,0(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,0(%r2,%r1) la %r2,8(%r2) // i++ brct %r6,.Loop1_add j .Lexit_add .size bn_add_words,.-bn_add_words // BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4,int r5); .globl bn_sub_words .type bn_sub_words,@function .align 4 bn_sub_words: la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside lghi %r2,0 // i=0 ltgfr %r5,%r5 bler %r14 // if (len<=0) return 0; stg %r6,48(%r15) lghi %r6,3 nr %r6,%r5 // len%4 sra %r5,2 // len/4, use sra because it sets condition code jnz .Loop4_sub // borrow is incidentally cleared if branch taken slgr %r2,%r2 // clear borrow .Loop1_sub: lg %r0,0(%r2,%r3) slbg %r0,0(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,0(%r2,%r1) la %r2,8(%r2) // i++ brct %r6,.Loop1_sub j .Lexit_sub .Loop4_sub: lg %r0,0(%r2,%r3) slbg %r0,0(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,0(%r2,%r1) lg %r0,8(%r2,%r3) slbg %r0,8(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,8(%r2,%r1) lg %r0,16(%r2,%r3) slbg %r0,16(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,16(%r2,%r1) lg %r0,24(%r2,%r3) slbg %r0,24(%r2,%r4) stg %r0,24(%r2,%r1) la %r2,32(%r2) // i+=4 brct %r5,.Loop4_sub la %r6,1(%r6) // see if len%4 is zero ... brct %r6,.Loop1_sub // without touching condition code:-) .Lexit_sub: lghi %r2,0 slbgr %r2,%r2 lcgr %r2,%r2 lg %r6,48(%r15) br %r14 .size bn_sub_words,.-bn_sub_words #define c1 %r1 #define c2 %r5 #define c3 %r8 #define mul_add_c(ai,bi,c1,c2,c3) \ lg %r7,ai*8(%r3); \ mlg %r6,bi*8(%r4); \ algr c1,%r7; \ alcgr c2,%r6; \ alcgr c3,zero // void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4); .globl bn_mul_comba8 .type bn_mul_comba8,@function .align 4 bn_mul_comba8: stmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) lghi c1,0 lghi c2,0 lghi c3,0 lghi zero,0 mul_add_c(0,0,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,0*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 mul_add_c(0,1,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(1,0,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,1*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 mul_add_c(2,0,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(1,1,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(0,2,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,2*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 mul_add_c(0,3,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(1,2,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(2,1,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(3,0,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,3*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 mul_add_c(4,0,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(3,1,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(2,2,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(1,3,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(0,4,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,4*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 mul_add_c(0,5,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(1,4,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(2,3,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(3,2,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(4,1,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(5,0,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,5*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 mul_add_c(6,0,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(5,1,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(4,2,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(3,3,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(2,4,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(1,5,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(0,6,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,6*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 mul_add_c(0,7,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(1,6,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(2,5,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(3,4,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(4,3,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(5,2,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(6,1,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(7,0,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,7*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 mul_add_c(7,1,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(6,2,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(5,3,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(4,4,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(3,5,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(2,6,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(1,7,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,8*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 mul_add_c(2,7,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(3,6,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(4,5,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(5,4,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(6,3,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(7,2,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,9*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 mul_add_c(7,3,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(6,4,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(5,5,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(4,6,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(3,7,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,10*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 mul_add_c(4,7,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(5,6,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(6,5,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(7,4,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,11*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 mul_add_c(7,5,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(6,6,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(5,7,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,12*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 mul_add_c(6,7,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(7,6,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,13*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 mul_add_c(7,7,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,14*8(%r2) stg c1,15*8(%r2) lmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) br %r14 .size bn_mul_comba8,.-bn_mul_comba8 // void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3,BN_ULONG *r4); .globl bn_mul_comba4 .type bn_mul_comba4,@function .align 4 bn_mul_comba4: stmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) lghi c1,0 lghi c2,0 lghi c3,0 lghi zero,0 mul_add_c(0,0,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,0*8(%r3) lghi c1,0 mul_add_c(0,1,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(1,0,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,1*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 mul_add_c(2,0,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(1,1,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(0,2,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,2*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 mul_add_c(0,3,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(1,2,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(2,1,c1,c2,c3); mul_add_c(3,0,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,3*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 mul_add_c(3,1,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(2,2,c2,c3,c1); mul_add_c(1,3,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,4*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 mul_add_c(2,3,c3,c1,c2); mul_add_c(3,2,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,5*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 mul_add_c(3,3,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,6*8(%r2) stg c2,7*8(%r2) stmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) br %r14 .size bn_mul_comba4,.-bn_mul_comba4 #define sqr_add_c(ai,c1,c2,c3) \ lg %r7,ai*8(%r3); \ mlgr %r6,%r7; \ algr c1,%r7; \ alcgr c2,%r6; \ alcgr c3,zero #define sqr_add_c2(ai,aj,c1,c2,c3) \ lg %r7,ai*8(%r3); \ mlg %r6,aj*8(%r3); \ algr c1,%r7; \ alcgr c2,%r6; \ alcgr c3,zero; \ algr c1,%r7; \ alcgr c2,%r6; \ alcgr c3,zero // void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3); .globl bn_sqr_comba8 .type bn_sqr_comba8,@function .align 4 bn_sqr_comba8: stmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) lghi c1,0 lghi c2,0 lghi c3,0 lghi zero,0 sqr_add_c(0,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,0*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 sqr_add_c2(1,0,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,1*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 sqr_add_c(1,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(2,0,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,2*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 sqr_add_c2(3,0,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(2,1,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,3*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 sqr_add_c(2,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(3,1,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(4,0,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,4*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 sqr_add_c2(5,0,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(4,1,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(3,2,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,5*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 sqr_add_c(3,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(4,2,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(5,1,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(6,0,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,6*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 sqr_add_c2(7,0,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(6,1,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(5,2,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(4,3,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,7*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 sqr_add_c(4,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(5,3,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(6,2,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(7,1,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,8*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 sqr_add_c2(7,2,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(6,3,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(5,4,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,9*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 sqr_add_c(5,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(6,4,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(7,3,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,10*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 sqr_add_c2(7,4,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(6,5,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,11*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 sqr_add_c(6,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(7,5,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,12*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 sqr_add_c2(7,6,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,13*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 sqr_add_c(7,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,14*8(%r2) stg c1,15*8(%r2) lmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) br %r14 .size bn_sqr_comba8,.-bn_sqr_comba8 // void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r2,BN_ULONG *r3); .globl bn_sqr_comba4 .type bn_sqr_comba4,@function .align 4 bn_sqr_comba4: stmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) lghi c1,0 lghi c2,0 lghi c3,0 lghi zero,0 sqr_add_c(0,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,0*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 sqr_add_c2(1,0,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,1*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 sqr_add_c(1,c3,c1,c2); sqr_add_c2(2,0,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,2*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 sqr_add_c2(3,0,c1,c2,c3); sqr_add_c2(2,1,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,3*8(%r2) lghi c1,0 sqr_add_c(2,c2,c3,c1); sqr_add_c2(3,1,c2,c3,c1); stg c2,4*8(%r2) lghi c2,0 sqr_add_c2(3,2,c3,c1,c2); stg c3,5*8(%r2) lghi c3,0 sqr_add_c(3,c1,c2,c3); stg c1,6*8(%r2) stg c2,7*8(%r2) lmg %r6,%r8,48(%r15) br %r14 .size bn_sqr_comba4,.-bn_sqr_comba4 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/via-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000002222713176625656016655 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # Wrapper around 'rep montmul', VIA-specific instruction accessing # PadLock Montgomery Multiplier. The wrapper is designed as drop-in # replacement for OpenSSL bn_mul_mont [first implemented in 0.9.9]. # # Below are interleaved outputs from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for 4 # different software configurations on 1.5GHz VIA Esther processor. # Lines marked with "software integer" denote performance of hand- # coded integer-only assembler found in OpenSSL 0.9.7. "Software SSE2" # refers to hand-coded SSE2 Montgomery multiplication procedure found # OpenSSL 0.9.9. "Hardware VIA SDK" refers to padlock_pmm routine from # Padlock SDK 2.0.1 available for download from VIA, which naturally # utilizes the magic 'repz montmul' instruction. And finally "hardware # this" refers to *this* implementation which also uses 'repz montmul' # # sign verify sign/s verify/s # rsa 512 bits 0.001720s 0.000140s 581.4 7149.7 software integer # rsa 512 bits 0.000690s 0.000086s 1450.3 11606.0 software SSE2 # rsa 512 bits 0.006136s 0.000201s 163.0 4974.5 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 512 bits 0.000712s 0.000050s 1404.9 19858.5 hardware this # # rsa 1024 bits 0.008518s 0.000413s 117.4 2420.8 software integer # rsa 1024 bits 0.004275s 0.000277s 233.9 3609.7 software SSE2 # rsa 1024 bits 0.012136s 0.000260s 82.4 3844.5 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 1024 bits 0.002522s 0.000116s 396.5 8650.9 hardware this # # rsa 2048 bits 0.050101s 0.001371s 20.0 729.6 software integer # rsa 2048 bits 0.030273s 0.001008s 33.0 991.9 software SSE2 # rsa 2048 bits 0.030833s 0.000976s 32.4 1025.1 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 2048 bits 0.011879s 0.000342s 84.2 2921.7 hardware this # # rsa 4096 bits 0.327097s 0.004859s 3.1 205.8 software integer # rsa 4096 bits 0.229318s 0.003859s 4.4 259.2 software SSE2 # rsa 4096 bits 0.233953s 0.003274s 4.3 305.4 hardware VIA SDK # rsa 4096 bits 0.070493s 0.001166s 14.2 857.6 hardware this # # dsa 512 bits 0.001342s 0.001651s 745.2 605.7 software integer # dsa 512 bits 0.000844s 0.000987s 1185.3 1013.1 software SSE2 # dsa 512 bits 0.001902s 0.002247s 525.6 444.9 hardware VIA SDK # dsa 512 bits 0.000458s 0.000524s 2182.2 1909.1 hardware this # # dsa 1024 bits 0.003964s 0.004926s 252.3 203.0 software integer # dsa 1024 bits 0.002686s 0.003166s 372.3 315.8 software SSE2 # dsa 1024 bits 0.002397s 0.002823s 417.1 354.3 hardware VIA SDK # dsa 1024 bits 0.000978s 0.001170s 1022.2 855.0 hardware this # # dsa 2048 bits 0.013280s 0.016518s 75.3 60.5 software integer # dsa 2048 bits 0.009911s 0.011522s 100.9 86.8 software SSE2 # dsa 2048 bits 0.009542s 0.011763s 104.8 85.0 hardware VIA SDK # dsa 2048 bits 0.002884s 0.003352s 346.8 298.3 hardware this # # To give you some other reference point here is output for 2.4GHz P4 # running hand-coded SSE2 bn_mul_mont found in 0.9.9, i.e. "software # SSE2" in above terms. # # rsa 512 bits 0.000407s 0.000047s 2454.2 21137.0 # rsa 1024 bits 0.002426s 0.000141s 412.1 7100.0 # rsa 2048 bits 0.015046s 0.000491s 66.5 2034.9 # rsa 4096 bits 0.109770s 0.002379s 9.1 420.3 # dsa 512 bits 0.000438s 0.000525s 2281.1 1904.1 # dsa 1024 bits 0.001346s 0.001595s 742.7 627.0 # dsa 2048 bits 0.004745s 0.005582s 210.7 179.1 # # Conclusions: # - VIA SDK leaves a *lot* of room for improvement (which this # implementation successfully fills:-); # - 'rep montmul' gives up to >3x performance improvement depending on # key length; # - in terms of absolute performance it delivers approximately as much # as modern out-of-order 32-bit cores [again, for longer keys]. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"via-mont.pl"); # int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); $func="bn_mul_mont_padlock"; $pad=16*1; # amount of reserved bytes on top of every vector # stack layout $mZeroPrime=&DWP(0,"esp"); # these are specified by VIA $A=&DWP(4,"esp"); $B=&DWP(8,"esp"); $T=&DWP(12,"esp"); $M=&DWP(16,"esp"); $scratch=&DWP(20,"esp"); $rp=&DWP(24,"esp"); # these are mine $sp=&DWP(28,"esp"); # &DWP(32,"esp") # 32 byte scratch area # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*0,"esp") # padded tp[num] # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*1,"esp") # padded copy of ap[num] # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*2,"esp") # padded copy of bp[num] # &DWP(64+(4*$num+$pad)*3,"esp") # padded copy of np[num] # Note that SDK suggests to unconditionally allocate 2K per vector. This # has quite an impact on performance. It naturally depends on key length, # but to give an example 1024 bit private RSA key operations suffer >30% # penalty. I allocate only as much as actually required... &function_begin($func); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("ecx",&wparam(5)); # num # meet VIA's limitations for num [note that the specification # expresses them in bits, while we work with amount of 32-bit words] &test ("ecx",3); &jnz (&label("leave")); # num % 4 != 0 &cmp ("ecx",8); &jb (&label("leave")); # num < 8 &cmp ("ecx",1024); &ja (&label("leave")); # num > 1024 &pushf (); &cld (); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); # rp &mov ("eax",&wparam(1)); # ap &mov ("ebx",&wparam(2)); # bp &mov ("edx",&wparam(3)); # np &mov ("esi",&wparam(4)); # n0 &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,"esi")); # *n0 &lea ("ecx",&DWP($pad,"","ecx",4)); # ecx becomes vector size in bytes &lea ("ebp",&DWP(64,"","ecx",4)); # allocate 4 vectors + 64 bytes &neg ("ebp"); &add ("ebp","esp"); &and ("ebp",-64); # align to cache-line &xchg ("ebp","esp"); # alloca &mov ($rp,"edi"); # save rp &mov ($sp,"ebp"); # save esp &mov ($mZeroPrime,"esi"); &lea ("esi",&DWP(64,"esp")); # tp &mov ($T,"esi"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(32,"esp")); # scratch area &mov ($scratch,"edi"); &mov ("esi","eax"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$pad,"ecx")); &shr ("ebp",2); # restore original num value in ebp &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &lea ("ecx",&DWP((32+$pad)/4,"ecx"));# padded tp + scratch &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(64+$pad,"esp","ecx",4));# pointer to ap copy &mov ($A,"edi"); &data_byte(0xf3,0xa5); # rep movsl, memcpy &mov ("ecx",$pad/4); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero pad # edi points at the end of padded ap copy... &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &mov ("esi","ebx"); &mov ($B,"edi"); &data_byte(0xf3,0xa5); # rep movsl, memcpy &mov ("ecx",$pad/4); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero pad # edi points at the end of padded bp copy... &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &mov ("esi","edx"); &mov ($M,"edi"); &data_byte(0xf3,0xa5); # rep movsl, memcpy &mov ("ecx",$pad/4); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero pad # edi points at the end of padded np copy... # let magic happen... &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &mov ("esi","esp"); &shl ("ecx",5); # convert word counter to bit counter &align (4); &data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xc0);# rep montmul &mov ("ecx","ebp"); &lea ("esi",&DWP(64,"esp")); # tp # edi still points at the end of padded np copy... &neg ("ebp"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$pad,"edi","ebp",4)); # so just "rewind" &mov ("edi",$rp); # restore rp &xor ("edx","edx"); # i=0 and clear CF &set_label("sub",8); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); &sbb ("eax",&DWP(0,"ebp","edx",4)); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4),"eax"); # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] &lea ("edx",&DWP(1,"edx")); # i++ &loop (&label("sub")); # doesn't affect CF! &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); # upmost overflow bit &sbb ("eax",0); &and ("esi","eax"); ¬ ("eax"); &mov ("ebp","edi"); &and ("ebp","eax"); &or ("esi","ebp"); # tp=carry?tp:rp &mov ("ecx","edx"); # num &xor ("edx","edx"); # i=0 &set_label("copy",8); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi","edx",4)); &mov (&DWP(64,"esp","edx",4),"ecx"); # zap tp &mov (&DWP(0,"edi","edx",4),"eax"); &lea ("edx",&DWP(1,"edx")); # i++ &loop (&label("copy")); &mov ("ebp",$sp); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("ecx",64/4); &mov ("edi","esp"); # zap frame including scratch area &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero # zap copies of ap, bp and np &lea ("edi",&DWP(64+$pad,"esp","edx",4));# pointer to ap &lea ("ecx",&DWP(3*$pad/4,"edx","edx",2)); &data_byte(0xf3,0xab); # rep stosl, bzero &mov ("esp","ebp"); &inc ("eax"); # signal "done" &popf (); &set_label("leave"); &function_end($func); &asciz("Padlock Montgomery Multiplication, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000002176713176625656017056 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # This module doesn't present direct interest for OpenSSL, because it # doesn't provide better performance for longer keys, at least not on # in-order-execution cores. While 512-bit RSA sign operations can be # 65% faster in 64-bit mode, 1024-bit ones are only 15% faster, and # 4096-bit ones are up to 15% slower. In 32-bit mode it varies from # 16% improvement for 512-bit RSA sign to -33% for 4096-bit RSA # verify:-( All comparisons are against bn_mul_mont-free assembler. # The module might be of interest to embedded system developers, as # the code is smaller than 1KB, yet offers >3x improvement on MIPS64 # and 75-30% [less for longer keys] on MIPS32 over compiler-generated # code. ###################################################################### # There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most # widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if # one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral # manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout: # ($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23)); ($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31)); # # The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate # interoperability: # # - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp; # - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting # old code]; # - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary; # # For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs: # # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); # ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); # ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); # ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); # ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); # $flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64 if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $PTR_ADD="dadd"; # incidentally works even on n32 $PTR_SUB="dsub"; # incidentally works even on n32 $REG_S="sd"; $REG_L="ld"; $SZREG=8; } else { $PTR_ADD="add"; $PTR_SUB="sub"; $REG_S="sw"; $REG_L="lw"; $SZREG=4; } $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? 0x00fff000 : 0x00ff0000; # # # ###################################################################### while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $LD="ld"; $ST="sd"; $MULTU="dmultu"; $ADDU="daddu"; $SUBU="dsubu"; $BNSZ=8; } else { $LD="lw"; $ST="sw"; $MULTU="multu"; $ADDU="addu"; $SUBU="subu"; $BNSZ=4; } # int bn_mul_mont( $rp=$a0; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap=$a1; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp=$a2; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np=$a3; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0=$a4; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num=$a5; # int num); $lo0=$a6; $hi0=$a7; $lo1=$t1; $hi1=$t2; $aj=$s0; $bi=$s1; $nj=$s2; $tp=$s3; $alo=$s4; $ahi=$s5; $nlo=$s6; $nhi=$s7; $tj=$s8; $i=$s9; $j=$s10; $m1=$s11; $FRAMESIZE=14; $code=<<___; .text .set noat .set noreorder .align 5 .globl bn_mul_mont .ent bn_mul_mont bn_mul_mont: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i); lw $n0,16($sp) lw $num,20($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; slt $at,$num,4 bnez $at,1f li $t0,0 slt $at,$num,17 # on in-order CPU bnez $at,bn_mul_mont_internal nop 1: jr $ra li $a0,0 .end bn_mul_mont .align 5 .ent bn_mul_mont_internal bn_mul_mont_internal: .frame $fp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x40000000|$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG $REG_S $fp,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s11,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s10,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s9,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s8,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s7,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s6,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_S $s3,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; move $fp,$sp .set reorder $LD $n0,0($n0) $LD $bi,0($bp) # bp[0] $LD $aj,0($ap) # ap[0] $LD $nj,0($np) # np[0] $PTR_SUB $sp,2*$BNSZ # place for two extra words sll $num,`log($BNSZ)/log(2)` li $at,-4096 $PTR_SUB $sp,$num and $sp,$at $MULTU $aj,$bi $LD $alo,$BNSZ($ap) $LD $nlo,$BNSZ($np) mflo $lo0 mfhi $hi0 $MULTU $lo0,$n0 mflo $m1 $MULTU $alo,$bi mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $MULTU $nj,$m1 mflo $lo1 mfhi $hi1 $MULTU $nlo,$m1 $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$at mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi move $tp,$sp li $j,2*$BNSZ .align 4 .L1st: .set noreorder $PTR_ADD $aj,$ap,$j $PTR_ADD $nj,$np,$j $LD $aj,($aj) $LD $nj,($nj) $MULTU $aj,$bi $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 sltu $t0,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$t0 mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $MULTU $nj,$m1 $ADDU $hi1,$at addu $j,$BNSZ $ST $lo1,($tp) sltu $t0,$j,$num mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi bnez $t0,.L1st $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ .set reorder $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $t0,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$t0 $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$at $ST $lo1,($tp) $ADDU $hi1,$hi0 sltu $at,$hi1,$hi0 $ST $hi1,$BNSZ($tp) $ST $at,2*$BNSZ($tp) li $i,$BNSZ .align 4 .Louter: $PTR_ADD $bi,$bp,$i $LD $bi,($bi) $LD $aj,($ap) $LD $alo,$BNSZ($ap) $LD $tj,($sp) $MULTU $aj,$bi $LD $nj,($np) $LD $nlo,$BNSZ($np) mflo $lo0 mfhi $hi0 $ADDU $lo0,$tj $MULTU $lo0,$n0 sltu $at,$lo0,$tj $ADDU $hi0,$at mflo $m1 $MULTU $alo,$bi mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $MULTU $nj,$m1 mflo $lo1 mfhi $hi1 $MULTU $nlo,$m1 $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$at mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi move $tp,$sp li $j,2*$BNSZ $LD $tj,$BNSZ($tp) .align 4 .Linner: .set noreorder $PTR_ADD $aj,$ap,$j $PTR_ADD $nj,$np,$j $LD $aj,($aj) $LD $nj,($nj) $MULTU $aj,$bi $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 sltu $t0,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$t0 mflo $alo mfhi $ahi $ADDU $lo0,$tj addu $j,$BNSZ $MULTU $nj,$m1 sltu $at,$lo0,$tj $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi0,$at sltu $t0,$lo1,$lo0 $LD $tj,2*$BNSZ($tp) $ADDU $hi1,$t0 sltu $at,$j,$num mflo $nlo mfhi $nhi $ST $lo1,($tp) bnez $at,.Linner $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ .set reorder $ADDU $lo0,$alo,$hi0 sltu $at,$lo0,$hi0 $ADDU $hi0,$ahi,$at $ADDU $lo0,$tj sltu $t0,$lo0,$tj $ADDU $hi0,$t0 $LD $tj,2*$BNSZ($tp) $ADDU $lo1,$nlo,$hi1 sltu $at,$lo1,$hi1 $ADDU $hi1,$nhi,$at $ADDU $lo1,$lo0 sltu $t0,$lo1,$lo0 $ADDU $hi1,$t0 $ST $lo1,($tp) $ADDU $lo1,$hi1,$hi0 sltu $hi1,$lo1,$hi0 $ADDU $lo1,$tj sltu $at,$lo1,$tj $ADDU $hi1,$at $ST $lo1,$BNSZ($tp) $ST $hi1,2*$BNSZ($tp) addu $i,$BNSZ sltu $t0,$i,$num bnez $t0,.Louter .set noreorder $PTR_ADD $tj,$sp,$num # &tp[num] move $tp,$sp move $ap,$sp li $hi0,0 # clear borrow bit .align 4 .Lsub: $LD $lo0,($tp) $LD $lo1,($np) $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $np,$BNSZ $SUBU $lo1,$lo0,$lo1 # tp[i]-np[i] sgtu $at,$lo1,$lo0 $SUBU $lo0,$lo1,$hi0 sgtu $hi0,$lo0,$lo1 $ST $lo0,($rp) or $hi0,$at sltu $at,$tp,$tj bnez $at,.Lsub $PTR_ADD $rp,$BNSZ $SUBU $hi0,$hi1,$hi0 # handle upmost overflow bit move $tp,$sp $PTR_SUB $rp,$num # restore rp not $hi1,$hi0 and $ap,$hi0,$sp and $bp,$hi1,$rp or $ap,$ap,$bp # ap=borrow?tp:rp .align 4 .Lcopy: $LD $aj,($ap) $PTR_ADD $ap,$BNSZ $ST $zero,($tp) $PTR_ADD $tp,$BNSZ sltu $at,$tp,$tj $ST $aj,($rp) bnez $at,.Lcopy $PTR_ADD $rp,$BNSZ li $a0,1 li $t0,1 .set noreorder move $sp,$fp $REG_L $fp,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s11,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s10,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s9,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s8,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s7,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s6,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s5,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s3,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG .end bn_mul_mont_internal .rdata .asciiz "Montgomery Multiplication for MIPS, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl0000644000000000000000000001252713176625656016644 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # May 2011 # # The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for # the time being... gcc 4.3 appeared to generate poor code, therefore # the effort. And indeed, the module delivers 55%-90%(*) improvement # on haviest ECDSA verify and ECDH benchmarks for 163- and 571-bit # key lengths on z990, 30%-55%(*) - on z10, and 70%-110%(*) - on z196. # This is for 64-bit build. In 32-bit "highgprs" case improvement is # even higher, for example on z990 it was measured 80%-150%. ECDSA # sign is modest 9%-12% faster. Keep in mind that these coefficients # are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not all CPU time is # burnt in it... # # (*) gcc 4.1 was observed to deliver better results than gcc 4.3, # so that improvement coefficients can vary from one specific # setup to another. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8; $rp="%r2"; $a1="%r3"; $a0="%r4"; $b1="%r5"; $b0="%r6"; $ra="%r14"; $sp="%r15"; @T=("%r0","%r1"); @i=("%r12","%r13"); ($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(6..11)); ($lo,$hi,$b)=map("%r$_",(3..5)); $a=$lo; $mask=$a8; $code.=<<___; .text .type _mul_1x1,\@function .align 16 _mul_1x1: lgr $a1,$a sllg $a2,$a,1 sllg $a4,$a,2 sllg $a8,$a,3 srag $lo,$a1,63 # broadcast 63rd bit nihh $a1,0x1fff srag @i[0],$a2,63 # broadcast 62nd bit nihh $a2,0x3fff srag @i[1],$a4,63 # broadcast 61st bit nihh $a4,0x7fff ngr $lo,$b ngr @i[0],$b ngr @i[1],$b lghi @T[0],0 lgr $a12,$a1 stg @T[0],`$stdframe+0*8`($sp) # tab[0]=0 xgr $a12,$a2 stg $a1,`$stdframe+1*8`($sp) # tab[1]=a1 lgr $a48,$a4 stg $a2,`$stdframe+2*8`($sp) # tab[2]=a2 xgr $a48,$a8 stg $a12,`$stdframe+3*8`($sp) # tab[3]=a1^a2 xgr $a1,$a4 stg $a4,`$stdframe+4*8`($sp) # tab[4]=a4 xgr $a2,$a4 stg $a1,`$stdframe+5*8`($sp) # tab[5]=a1^a4 xgr $a12,$a4 stg $a2,`$stdframe+6*8`($sp) # tab[6]=a2^a4 xgr $a1,$a48 stg $a12,`$stdframe+7*8`($sp) # tab[7]=a1^a2^a4 xgr $a2,$a48 stg $a8,`$stdframe+8*8`($sp) # tab[8]=a8 xgr $a12,$a48 stg $a1,`$stdframe+9*8`($sp) # tab[9]=a1^a8 xgr $a1,$a4 stg $a2,`$stdframe+10*8`($sp) # tab[10]=a2^a8 xgr $a2,$a4 stg $a12,`$stdframe+11*8`($sp) # tab[11]=a1^a2^a8 xgr $a12,$a4 stg $a48,`$stdframe+12*8`($sp) # tab[12]=a4^a8 srlg $hi,$lo,1 stg $a1,`$stdframe+13*8`($sp) # tab[13]=a1^a4^a8 sllg $lo,$lo,63 stg $a2,`$stdframe+14*8`($sp) # tab[14]=a2^a4^a8 srlg @T[0],@i[0],2 stg $a12,`$stdframe+15*8`($sp) # tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8 lghi $mask,`0xf<<3` sllg $a1,@i[0],62 sllg @i[0],$b,3 srlg @T[1],@i[1],3 ngr @i[0],$mask sllg $a2,@i[1],61 srlg @i[1],$b,4-3 xgr $hi,@T[0] ngr @i[1],$mask xgr $lo,$a1 xgr $hi,@T[1] xgr $lo,$a2 xg $lo,$stdframe(@i[0],$sp) srlg @i[0],$b,8-3 ngr @i[0],$mask ___ for($n=1;$n<14;$n++) { $code.=<<___; lg @T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp) srlg @i[1],$b,`($n+2)*4`-3 sllg @T[0],@T[1],`$n*4` ngr @i[1],$mask srlg @T[1],@T[1],`64-$n*4` xgr $lo,@T[0] xgr $hi,@T[1] ___ push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T)); } $code.=<<___; lg @T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp) sllg @T[0],@T[1],`$n*4` srlg @T[1],@T[1],`64-$n*4` xgr $lo,@T[0] xgr $hi,@T[1] lg @T[0],$stdframe(@i[0],$sp) sllg @T[1],@T[0],`($n+1)*4` srlg @T[0],@T[0],`64-($n+1)*4` xgr $lo,@T[1] xgr $hi,@T[0] br $ra .size _mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1 .globl bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@function .align 16 bn_GF2m_mul_2x2: stm${g} %r3,%r15,3*$SIZE_T($sp) lghi %r1,-$stdframe-128 la %r0,0($sp) la $sp,0(%r1,$sp) # alloca st${g} %r0,0($sp) # back chain ___ if ($SIZE_T==8) { my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9)); $code.=<<___; bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1 stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp) lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0 stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp) lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1) lmg @r[0],@r[3],0($rp) xgr $lo,$hi xgr $hi,@r[1] xgr $lo,@r[0] xgr $hi,@r[2] xgr $lo,@r[3] xgr $hi,@r[3] xgr $lo,$hi stg $hi,16($rp) stg $lo,8($rp) ___ } else { $code.=<<___; sllg %r3,%r3,32 sllg %r5,%r5,32 or %r3,%r4 or %r5,%r6 bras $ra,_mul_1x1 rllg $lo,$lo,32 rllg $hi,$hi,32 stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp) ___ } $code.=<<___; lm${g} %r6,%r15,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) br $ra .size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 .string "GF(2^m) Multiplication for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c0000644000000000000000000004521313176625656016422 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "../bn_lcl.h" #if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2) # include "../bn_asm.c" /* kind of dirty hack for Sun Studio */ #else /*- * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002. * * Implemented by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL * project. * * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is * disclaimed. * * Q. Version 0.1? It doesn't sound like Andy, he used to assign real * versions, like 1.0... * A. Well, that's because this code is basically a quick-n-dirty * proof-of-concept hack. As you can see it's implemented with * inline assembler, which means that you're bound to GCC and that * there might be enough room for further improvement. * * Q. Why inline assembler? * A. x86_64 features own ABI which I'm not familiar with. This is * why I decided to let the compiler take care of subroutine * prologue/epilogue as well as register allocation. For reference. * Win64 implements different ABI for AMD64, different from Linux. * * Q. How much faster does it get? * A. 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with no-asm: * * sign verify sign/s verify/s * rsa 512 bits 0.0006s 0.0001s 1683.8 18456.2 * rsa 1024 bits 0.0028s 0.0002s 356.0 6407.0 * rsa 2048 bits 0.0172s 0.0005s 58.0 1957.8 * rsa 4096 bits 0.1155s 0.0018s 8.7 555.6 * sign verify sign/s verify/s * dsa 512 bits 0.0005s 0.0006s 2100.8 1768.3 * dsa 1024 bits 0.0014s 0.0018s 692.3 559.2 * dsa 2048 bits 0.0049s 0.0061s 204.7 165.0 * * 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with this module: * * sign verify sign/s verify/s * rsa 512 bits 0.0004s 0.0000s 2767.1 33297.9 * rsa 1024 bits 0.0012s 0.0001s 867.4 14674.7 * rsa 2048 bits 0.0061s 0.0002s 164.0 5270.0 * rsa 4096 bits 0.0384s 0.0006s 26.1 1650.8 * sign verify sign/s verify/s * dsa 512 bits 0.0002s 0.0003s 4442.2 3786.3 * dsa 1024 bits 0.0005s 0.0007s 1835.1 1497.4 * dsa 2048 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 620.4 504.6 * * For the reference. IA-32 assembler implementation performs * very much like 64-bit code compiled with no-asm on the same * machine. */ # if defined(_WIN64) || !defined(__LP64__) # define BN_ULONG unsigned long long # else # define BN_ULONG unsigned long # endif # undef mul # undef mul_add /*- * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code; * "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it * want to keep the value of zero; */ # define mul_add(r,a,word,carry) do { \ register BN_ULONG high,low; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(word),"m"(a) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+m"(r),"+d"(high) \ : "r"(carry),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ carry=high; \ } while (0) # define mul(r,a,word,carry) do { \ register BN_ULONG high,low; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(word),"g"(a) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ (r)=carry, carry=high; \ } while (0) # undef sqr # define sqr(r0,r1,a) \ asm ("mulq %2" \ : "=a"(r0),"=d"(r1) \ : "a"(a) \ : "cc"); BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1 = 0; if (num <= 0) return (c1); while (num & ~3) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } if (num) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); return c1; } return (c1); } BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1 = 0; if (num <= 0) return (c1); while (num & ~3) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); mul(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } if (num) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); } return (c1); } void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) { if (n <= 0) return; while (n & ~3) { sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]); sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]); sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]); sqr(r[6], r[7], a[3]); a += 4; r += 8; n -= 4; } if (n) { sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]); } } BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) { BN_ULONG ret, waste; asm("divq %4":"=a"(ret), "=d"(waste) : "a"(l), "d"(h), "r"(d) : "cc"); return ret; } BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int n) { BN_ULONG ret; size_t i = 0; if (n <= 0) return 0; asm volatile (" subq %0,%0 \n" /* clear carry */ " jmp 1f \n" ".p2align 4 \n" "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n" " adcq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n" " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n" " lea 1(%2),%2 \n" " loop 1b \n" " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&r" (ret), "+c"(n), "+r"(i) :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp) :"cc", "memory"); return ret & 1; } # ifndef SIMICS BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, int n) { BN_ULONG ret; size_t i = 0; if (n <= 0) return 0; asm volatile (" subq %0,%0 \n" /* clear borrow */ " jmp 1f \n" ".p2align 4 \n" "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n" " sbbq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n" " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n" " lea 1(%2),%2 \n" " loop 1b \n" " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&r" (ret), "+c"(n), "+r"(i) :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp) :"cc", "memory"); return ret & 1; } # else /* Simics 1.4<7 has buggy sbbq:-( */ # define BN_MASK2 0xffffffffffffffffL BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULONG t1, t2; int c = 0; if (n <= 0) return ((BN_ULONG)0); for (;;) { t1 = a[0]; t2 = b[0]; r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1 = a[1]; t2 = b[1]; r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1 = a[2]; t2 = b[2]; r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1 = a[3]; t2 = b[3]; r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; a += 4; b += 4; r += 4; } return (c); } # endif /* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* * sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number * c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones. */ # if 0 /* original macros are kept for reference purposes */ # define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b); \ BN_ULONG lo, hi; \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb); \ c0 += lo; hi += (c0 # # RSA1024 sign/sec this/original |this/rsax(*) this/fips(*) # ----------------+--------------------------- # Opteron +13% |+5% +20% # Bulldozer -0% |-1% +10% # P4 +11% |+7% +8% # Westmere +5% |+14% +17% # Sandy Bridge +2% |+12% +29% # Ivy Bridge +1% |+11% +35% # Haswell(**) -0% |+12% +39% # Atom +13% |+11% +4% # VIA Nano +70% |+9% +25% # # (*) rsax engine and fips numbers are presented for reference # purposes; # (**) MULX was attempted, but found to give only marginal improvement; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $addx = ($1>=12); } if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } ($out, $inp, $mod) = ("%rdi", "%rsi", "%rbp"); # common internal API { my ($out,$inp,$mod,$n0,$times) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8d"); $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl rsaz_512_sqr .type rsaz_512_sqr,\@function,5 .align 32 rsaz_512_sqr: # 25-29% faster than rsaz_512_mul push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 subq \$128+24, %rsp .Lsqr_body: movq $mod, %rbp # common argument movq ($inp), %rdx movq 8($inp), %rax movq $n0, 128(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); movl \$0x80100,%r11d andl OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d cmpl \$0x80100,%r11d # check for MULX and ADO/CX je .Loop_sqrx ___ $code.=<<___; jmp .Loop_sqr .align 32 .Loop_sqr: movl $times,128+8(%rsp) #first iteration movq %rdx, %rbx mulq %rdx movq %rax, %r8 movq 16($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %r9 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r9 movq 24($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r10 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r10 movq 32($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %r11 adcq \$0, %r11 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r11 movq 40($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r12 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r12 movq 48($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %r13 adcq \$0, %r13 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r13 movq 56($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %r14 adcq \$0, %r14 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r14 movq %rbx, %rax movq %rdx, %r15 adcq \$0, %r15 addq %r8, %r8 #shlq \$1, %r8 movq %r9, %rcx adcq %r9, %r9 #shld \$1, %r8, %r9 mulq %rax movq %rax, (%rsp) addq %rdx, %r8 adcq \$0, %r9 movq %r8, 8(%rsp) shrq \$63, %rcx #second iteration movq 8($inp), %r8 movq 16($inp), %rax mulq %r8 addq %rax, %r10 movq 24($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r8 addq %rax, %r11 movq 32($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r11 movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r8 addq %rax, %r12 movq 40($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r12 movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r8 addq %rax, %r13 movq 48($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r13 movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r8 addq %rax, %r14 movq 56($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r14 movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r8 addq %rax, %r15 movq %r8, %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r15 movq %rdx, %r8 movq %r10, %rdx adcq \$0, %r8 add %rdx, %rdx lea (%rcx,%r10,2), %r10 #shld \$1, %rcx, %r10 movq %r11, %rbx adcq %r11, %r11 #shld \$1, %r10, %r11 mulq %rax addq %rax, %r9 adcq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r11 movq %r9, 16(%rsp) movq %r10, 24(%rsp) shrq \$63, %rbx #third iteration movq 16($inp), %r9 movq 24($inp), %rax mulq %r9 addq %rax, %r12 movq 32($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %rcx adcq \$0, %rcx mulq %r9 addq %rax, %r13 movq 40($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rcx, %r13 movq %rdx, %rcx adcq \$0, %rcx mulq %r9 addq %rax, %r14 movq 48($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rcx, %r14 movq %rdx, %rcx adcq \$0, %rcx mulq %r9 movq %r12, %r10 lea (%rbx,%r12,2), %r12 #shld \$1, %rbx, %r12 addq %rax, %r15 movq 56($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rcx, %r15 movq %rdx, %rcx adcq \$0, %rcx mulq %r9 shrq \$63, %r10 addq %rax, %r8 movq %r9, %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rcx, %r8 movq %rdx, %r9 adcq \$0, %r9 movq %r13, %rcx leaq (%r10,%r13,2), %r13 #shld \$1, %r12, %r13 mulq %rax addq %rax, %r11 adcq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r13 movq %r11, 32(%rsp) movq %r12, 40(%rsp) shrq \$63, %rcx #fourth iteration movq 24($inp), %r10 movq 32($inp), %rax mulq %r10 addq %rax, %r14 movq 40($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r10 addq %rax, %r15 movq 48($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r15 movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r10 movq %r14, %r12 leaq (%rcx,%r14,2), %r14 #shld \$1, %rcx, %r14 addq %rax, %r8 movq 56($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r8 movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r10 shrq \$63, %r12 addq %rax, %r9 movq %r10, %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rbx, %r9 movq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r10 movq %r15, %rbx leaq (%r12,%r15,2),%r15 #shld \$1, %r14, %r15 mulq %rax addq %rax, %r13 adcq %rdx, %r14 adcq \$0, %r15 movq %r13, 48(%rsp) movq %r14, 56(%rsp) shrq \$63, %rbx #fifth iteration movq 32($inp), %r11 movq 40($inp), %rax mulq %r11 addq %rax, %r8 movq 48($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %rcx adcq \$0, %rcx mulq %r11 addq %rax, %r9 movq 56($inp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx movq %r8, %r12 leaq (%rbx,%r8,2), %r8 #shld \$1, %rbx, %r8 addq %rcx, %r9 movq %rdx, %rcx adcq \$0, %rcx mulq %r11 shrq \$63, %r12 addq %rax, %r10 movq %r11, %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rcx, %r10 movq %rdx, %r11 adcq \$0, %r11 movq %r9, %rcx leaq (%r12,%r9,2), %r9 #shld \$1, %r8, %r9 mulq %rax addq %rax, %r15 adcq %rdx, %r8 adcq \$0, %r9 movq %r15, 64(%rsp) movq %r8, 72(%rsp) shrq \$63, %rcx #sixth iteration movq 40($inp), %r12 movq 48($inp), %rax mulq %r12 addq %rax, %r10 movq 56($inp), %rax movq %rdx, %rbx adcq \$0, %rbx mulq %r12 addq %rax, %r11 movq %r12, %rax movq %r10, %r15 leaq (%rcx,%r10,2), %r10 #shld \$1, %rcx, %r10 adcq \$0, %rdx shrq \$63, %r15 addq %rbx, %r11 movq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r12 movq %r11, %rbx leaq (%r15,%r11,2), %r11 #shld \$1, %r10, %r11 mulq %rax addq %rax, %r9 adcq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r11 movq %r9, 80(%rsp) movq %r10, 88(%rsp) #seventh iteration movq 48($inp), %r13 movq 56($inp), %rax mulq %r13 addq %rax, %r12 movq %r13, %rax movq %rdx, %r13 adcq \$0, %r13 xorq %r14, %r14 shlq \$1, %rbx adcq %r12, %r12 #shld \$1, %rbx, %r12 adcq %r13, %r13 #shld \$1, %r12, %r13 adcq %r14, %r14 #shld \$1, %r13, %r14 mulq %rax addq %rax, %r11 adcq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r13 movq %r11, 96(%rsp) movq %r12, 104(%rsp) #eighth iteration movq 56($inp), %rax mulq %rax addq %rax, %r13 adcq \$0, %rdx addq %rdx, %r14 movq %r13, 112(%rsp) movq %r14, 120(%rsp) movq (%rsp), %r8 movq 8(%rsp), %r9 movq 16(%rsp), %r10 movq 24(%rsp), %r11 movq 32(%rsp), %r12 movq 40(%rsp), %r13 movq 48(%rsp), %r14 movq 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reduce addq 64(%rsp), %r8 adcq 72(%rsp), %r9 adcq 80(%rsp), %r10 adcq 88(%rsp), %r11 adcq 96(%rsp), %r12 adcq 104(%rsp), %r13 adcq 112(%rsp), %r14 adcq 120(%rsp), %r15 sbbq %rcx, %rcx call __rsaz_512_subtract movq %r8, %rdx movq %r9, %rax movl 128+8(%rsp), $times movq $out, $inp decl $times jnz .Loop_sqr ___ if ($addx) { $code.=<<___; jmp .Lsqr_tail .align 32 .Loop_sqrx: movl $times,128+8(%rsp) movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load movq %rbp, %xmm1 # off-load #first iteration mulx %rax, %r8, %r9 mulx 16($inp), %rcx, %r10 xor %rbp, %rbp # cf=0, of=0 mulx 24($inp), %rax, %r11 adcx %rcx, %r9 mulx 32($inp), %rcx, %r12 adcx %rax, %r10 mulx 40($inp), %rax, %r13 adcx %rcx, %r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xf3,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($inp), %rcx, %r14 adcx %rax, %r12 adcx %rcx, %r13 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbe,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), %rax, %r15 adcx %rax, %r14 adcx %rbp, %r15 # %rbp is 0 mov %r9, %rcx shld \$1, %r8, %r9 shl \$1, %r8 xor %ebp, %ebp mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx adcx %rdx, %r8 mov 8($inp), %rdx adcx %rbp, %r9 mov %rax, (%rsp) mov %r8, 8(%rsp) #second iteration mulx 16($inp), %rax, %rbx adox %rax, %r10 adcx %rbx, %r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x86,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 24($inp), $out, %r8 adox $out, %r11 adcx %r8, %r12 mulx 32($inp), %rax, %rbx adox %rax, %r12 adcx %rbx, %r13 mulx 40($inp), $out, %r8 adox $out, %r13 adcx %r8, %r14 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($inp), %rax, %rbx adox %rax, %r14 adcx %rbx, %r15 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x86,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), $out, %r8 adox $out, %r15 adcx %rbp, %r8 adox %rbp, %r8 mov %r11, %rbx shld \$1, %r10, %r11 shld \$1, %rcx, %r10 xor %ebp,%ebp mulx %rdx, %rax, %rcx mov 16($inp), %rdx adcx %rax, %r9 adcx %rcx, %r10 adcx %rbp, %r11 mov %r9, 16(%rsp) .byte 0x4c,0x89,0x94,0x24,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r10, 24(%rsp) #third iteration .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x8e,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 24($inp), $out, %r9 adox $out, %r12 adcx %r9, %r13 mulx 32($inp), %rax, %rcx adox %rax, %r13 adcx %rcx, %r14 mulx 40($inp), $out, %r9 adox $out, %r14 adcx %r9, %r15 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x8e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($inp), %rax, %rcx adox %rax, %r15 adcx %rcx, %r8 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x8e,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), $out, %r9 adox $out, %r8 adcx %rbp, %r9 adox %rbp, %r9 mov %r13, %rcx shld \$1, %r12, %r13 shld \$1, %rbx, %r12 xor %ebp, %ebp mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx adcx %rax, %r11 adcx %rdx, %r12 mov 24($inp), %rdx adcx %rbp, %r13 mov %r11, 32(%rsp) .byte 0x4c,0x89,0xa4,0x24,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r12, 40(%rsp) #fourth iteration .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 32($inp), %rax, %rbx adox %rax, %r14 adcx %rbx, %r15 mulx 40($inp), $out, %r10 adox $out, %r15 adcx %r10, %r8 mulx 48($inp), %rax, %rbx adox %rax, %r8 adcx %rbx, %r9 mulx 56($inp), $out, %r10 adox $out, %r9 adcx %rbp, %r10 adox %rbp, %r10 .byte 0x66 mov %r15, %rbx shld \$1, %r14, %r15 shld \$1, %rcx, %r14 xor %ebp, %ebp mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx adcx %rax, %r13 adcx %rdx, %r14 mov 32($inp), %rdx adcx %rbp, %r15 mov %r13, 48(%rsp) mov %r14, 56(%rsp) #fifth iteration .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x9e,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 40($inp), $out, %r11 adox $out, %r8 adcx %r11, %r9 mulx 48($inp), %rax, %rcx adox %rax, %r9 adcx %rcx, %r10 mulx 56($inp), $out, %r11 adox $out, %r10 adcx %rbp, %r11 adox %rbp, %r11 mov %r9, %rcx shld \$1, %r8, %r9 shld \$1, %rbx, %r8 xor %ebp, %ebp mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx adcx %rax, %r15 adcx %rdx, %r8 mov 40($inp), %rdx adcx %rbp, %r9 mov %r15, 64(%rsp) mov %r8, 72(%rsp) #sixth iteration .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($inp), %rax, %rbx adox %rax, %r10 adcx %rbx, %r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0xa6,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), $out, %r12 adox $out, %r11 adcx %rbp, %r12 adox %rbp, %r12 mov %r11, %rbx shld \$1, %r10, %r11 shld \$1, %rcx, %r10 xor %ebp, %ebp mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx adcx %rax, %r9 adcx %rdx, %r10 mov 48($inp), %rdx adcx %rbp, %r11 mov %r9, 80(%rsp) mov %r10, 88(%rsp) #seventh iteration .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xae,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), %rax, %r13 adox %rax, %r12 adox %rbp, %r13 xor %r14, %r14 shld \$1, %r13, %r14 shld \$1, %r12, %r13 shld \$1, %rbx, %r12 xor %ebp, %ebp mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx adcx %rax, %r11 adcx %rdx, %r12 mov 56($inp), %rdx adcx %rbp, %r13 .byte 0x4c,0x89,0x9c,0x24,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r11, 96(%rsp) .byte 0x4c,0x89,0xa4,0x24,0x68,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r12, 104(%rsp) #eighth iteration mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx adox %rax, %r13 adox %rbp, %rdx .byte 0x66 add %rdx, %r14 movq %r13, 112(%rsp) movq %r14, 120(%rsp) movq %xmm0, $out movq %xmm1, %rbp movq 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0 movq (%rsp), %r8 movq 8(%rsp), %r9 movq 16(%rsp), %r10 movq 24(%rsp), %r11 movq 32(%rsp), %r12 movq 40(%rsp), %r13 movq 48(%rsp), %r14 movq 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reducex addq 64(%rsp), %r8 adcq 72(%rsp), %r9 adcq 80(%rsp), %r10 adcq 88(%rsp), %r11 adcq 96(%rsp), %r12 adcq 104(%rsp), %r13 adcq 112(%rsp), %r14 adcq 120(%rsp), %r15 sbbq %rcx, %rcx call __rsaz_512_subtract movq %r8, %rdx movq %r9, %rax movl 128+8(%rsp), $times movq $out, $inp decl $times jnz .Loop_sqrx .Lsqr_tail: ___ } $code.=<<___; leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax movq -48(%rax), %r15 movq -40(%rax), %r14 movq -32(%rax), %r13 movq -24(%rax), %r12 movq -16(%rax), %rbp movq -8(%rax), %rbx leaq (%rax), %rsp .Lsqr_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_512_sqr,.-rsaz_512_sqr ___ } { my ($out,$ap,$bp,$mod,$n0) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8"); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_512_mul .type rsaz_512_mul,\@function,5 .align 32 rsaz_512_mul: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 subq \$128+24, %rsp .Lmul_body: movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments movq $mod, %xmm1 movq $n0, 128(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); movl \$0x80100,%r11d andl OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d cmpl \$0x80100,%r11d # check for MULX and ADO/CX je .Lmulx ___ $code.=<<___; movq ($bp), %rbx # pass b[0] movq $bp, %rbp # pass argument call __rsaz_512_mul movq %xmm0, $out movq %xmm1, %rbp movq (%rsp), %r8 movq 8(%rsp), %r9 movq 16(%rsp), %r10 movq 24(%rsp), %r11 movq 32(%rsp), %r12 movq 40(%rsp), %r13 movq 48(%rsp), %r14 movq 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reduce ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); jmp .Lmul_tail .align 32 .Lmulx: movq $bp, %rbp # pass argument movq ($bp), %rdx # pass b[0] call __rsaz_512_mulx movq %xmm0, $out movq %xmm1, %rbp movq 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0 movq (%rsp), %r8 movq 8(%rsp), %r9 movq 16(%rsp), %r10 movq 24(%rsp), %r11 movq 32(%rsp), %r12 movq 40(%rsp), %r13 movq 48(%rsp), %r14 movq 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reducex .Lmul_tail: ___ $code.=<<___; addq 64(%rsp), %r8 adcq 72(%rsp), %r9 adcq 80(%rsp), %r10 adcq 88(%rsp), %r11 adcq 96(%rsp), %r12 adcq 104(%rsp), %r13 adcq 112(%rsp), %r14 adcq 120(%rsp), %r15 sbbq %rcx, %rcx call __rsaz_512_subtract leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax movq -48(%rax), %r15 movq -40(%rax), %r14 movq -32(%rax), %r13 movq -24(%rax), %r12 movq -16(%rax), %rbp movq -8(%rax), %rbx leaq (%rax), %rsp .Lmul_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_512_mul,.-rsaz_512_mul ___ } { my ($out,$ap,$bp,$mod,$n0,$pwr) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9d"); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_512_mul_gather4 .type rsaz_512_mul_gather4,\@function,6 .align 32 rsaz_512_mul_gather4: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 subq \$`128+24+($win64?0xb0:0)`, %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,0xa0(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0xb0(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0xc0(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0xd0(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0xe0(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0xf0(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,0x100(%rsp) movaps %xmm13,0x110(%rsp) movaps %xmm14,0x120(%rsp) movaps %xmm15,0x130(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lmul_gather4_body: movd $pwr,%xmm8 movdqa .Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 movdqa .Linc(%rip),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 pshufd \$0,%xmm8,%xmm8 # broadcast $power movdqa %xmm1,%xmm7 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power # for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1` pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i` movdqa %xmm7,%xmm`$i+3` ___ } for(;$i<7;$i++) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1` pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i` ___ } $code.=<<___; pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm7 movdqa 16*0($bp),%xmm8 movdqa 16*1($bp),%xmm9 movdqa 16*2($bp),%xmm10 movdqa 16*3($bp),%xmm11 pand %xmm0,%xmm8 movdqa 16*4($bp),%xmm12 pand %xmm1,%xmm9 movdqa 16*5($bp),%xmm13 pand %xmm2,%xmm10 movdqa 16*6($bp),%xmm14 pand %xmm3,%xmm11 movdqa 16*7($bp),%xmm15 leaq 128($bp), %rbp pand %xmm4,%xmm12 pand %xmm5,%xmm13 pand %xmm6,%xmm14 pand %xmm7,%xmm15 por %xmm10,%xmm8 por %xmm11,%xmm9 por %xmm12,%xmm8 por %xmm13,%xmm9 por %xmm14,%xmm8 por %xmm15,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); movl \$0x80100,%r11d andl OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d cmpl \$0x80100,%r11d # check for MULX and ADO/CX je .Lmulx_gather ___ $code.=<<___; movq %xmm8,%rbx movq $n0, 128(%rsp) # off-load arguments movq $out, 128+8(%rsp) movq $mod, 128+16(%rsp) movq ($ap), %rax movq 8($ap), %rcx mulq %rbx # 0 iteration movq %rax, (%rsp) movq %rcx, %rax movq %rdx, %r8 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r8 movq 16($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r9 adcq \$0, %r9 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r9 movq 24($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r10 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r10 movq 32($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r11 adcq \$0, %r11 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r11 movq 40($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r12 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r12 movq 48($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r13 adcq \$0, %r13 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r13 movq 56($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r14 adcq \$0, %r14 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r14 movq ($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r15 adcq \$0, %r15 leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi movl \$7, %ecx jmp .Loop_mul_gather .align 32 .Loop_mul_gather: movdqa 16*0(%rbp),%xmm8 movdqa 16*1(%rbp),%xmm9 movdqa 16*2(%rbp),%xmm10 movdqa 16*3(%rbp),%xmm11 pand %xmm0,%xmm8 movdqa 16*4(%rbp),%xmm12 pand %xmm1,%xmm9 movdqa 16*5(%rbp),%xmm13 pand %xmm2,%xmm10 movdqa 16*6(%rbp),%xmm14 pand %xmm3,%xmm11 movdqa 16*7(%rbp),%xmm15 leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp pand %xmm4,%xmm12 pand %xmm5,%xmm13 pand %xmm6,%xmm14 pand %xmm7,%xmm15 por %xmm10,%xmm8 por %xmm11,%xmm9 por %xmm12,%xmm8 por %xmm13,%xmm9 por %xmm14,%xmm8 por %xmm15,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 movq %xmm8,%rbx mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r8 movq 8($ap), %rax movq %r8, (%rdi) movq %rdx, %r8 adcq \$0, %r8 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r9 movq 16($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r9, %r8 movq %rdx, %r9 adcq \$0, %r9 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r10 movq 24($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r10, %r9 movq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r10 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r11 movq 32($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r11, %r10 movq %rdx, %r11 adcq \$0, %r11 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r12 movq 40($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r12, %r11 movq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r12 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r13 movq 48($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r13, %r12 movq %rdx, %r13 adcq \$0, %r13 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r14 movq 56($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r14, %r13 movq %rdx, %r14 adcq \$0, %r14 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r15 movq ($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r15, %r14 movq %rdx, %r15 adcq \$0, %r15 leaq 8(%rdi), %rdi decl %ecx jnz .Loop_mul_gather movq %r8, (%rdi) movq %r9, 8(%rdi) movq %r10, 16(%rdi) movq %r11, 24(%rdi) movq %r12, 32(%rdi) movq %r13, 40(%rdi) movq %r14, 48(%rdi) movq %r15, 56(%rdi) movq 128+8(%rsp), $out movq 128+16(%rsp), %rbp movq (%rsp), %r8 movq 8(%rsp), %r9 movq 16(%rsp), %r10 movq 24(%rsp), %r11 movq 32(%rsp), %r12 movq 40(%rsp), %r13 movq 48(%rsp), %r14 movq 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reduce ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); jmp .Lmul_gather_tail .align 32 .Lmulx_gather: movq %xmm8,%rdx mov $n0, 128(%rsp) # off-load arguments mov $out, 128+8(%rsp) mov $mod, 128+16(%rsp) mulx ($ap), %rbx, %r8 # 0 iteration mov %rbx, (%rsp) xor %edi, %edi # cf=0, of=0 mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9 mulx 16($ap), %rbx, %r10 adcx %rax, %r8 mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11 adcx %rbx, %r9 mulx 32($ap), %rbx, %r12 adcx %rax, %r10 mulx 40($ap), %rax, %r13 adcx %rbx, %r11 mulx 48($ap), %rbx, %r14 adcx %rax, %r12 mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15 adcx %rbx, %r13 adcx %rax, %r14 .byte 0x67 mov %r8, %rbx adcx %rdi, %r15 # %rdi is 0 mov \$-7, %rcx jmp .Loop_mulx_gather .align 32 .Loop_mulx_gather: movdqa 16*0(%rbp),%xmm8 movdqa 16*1(%rbp),%xmm9 movdqa 16*2(%rbp),%xmm10 movdqa 16*3(%rbp),%xmm11 pand %xmm0,%xmm8 movdqa 16*4(%rbp),%xmm12 pand %xmm1,%xmm9 movdqa 16*5(%rbp),%xmm13 pand %xmm2,%xmm10 movdqa 16*6(%rbp),%xmm14 pand %xmm3,%xmm11 movdqa 16*7(%rbp),%xmm15 leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp pand %xmm4,%xmm12 pand %xmm5,%xmm13 pand %xmm6,%xmm14 pand %xmm7,%xmm15 por %xmm10,%xmm8 por %xmm11,%xmm9 por %xmm12,%xmm8 por %xmm13,%xmm9 por %xmm14,%xmm8 por %xmm15,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 movq %xmm8,%rdx .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x86,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx ($ap), %rax, %r8 adcx %rax, %rbx adox %r9, %r8 mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9 adcx %rax, %r8 adox %r10, %r9 mulx 16($ap), %rax, %r10 adcx %rax, %r9 adox %r11, %r10 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11 adcx %rax, %r10 adox %r12, %r11 mulx 32($ap), %rax, %r12 adcx %rax, %r11 adox %r13, %r12 mulx 40($ap), %rax, %r13 adcx %rax, %r12 adox %r14, %r13 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($ap), %rax, %r14 adcx %rax, %r13 .byte 0x67 adox %r15, %r14 mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15 mov %rbx, 64(%rsp,%rcx,8) adcx %rax, %r14 adox %rdi, %r15 mov %r8, %rbx adcx %rdi, %r15 # cf=0 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Loop_mulx_gather mov %r8, 64(%rsp) mov %r9, 64+8(%rsp) mov %r10, 64+16(%rsp) mov %r11, 64+24(%rsp) mov %r12, 64+32(%rsp) mov %r13, 64+40(%rsp) mov %r14, 64+48(%rsp) mov %r15, 64+56(%rsp) mov 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull arguments mov 128+8(%rsp), $out mov 128+16(%rsp), %rbp mov (%rsp), %r8 mov 8(%rsp), %r9 mov 16(%rsp), %r10 mov 24(%rsp), %r11 mov 32(%rsp), %r12 mov 40(%rsp), %r13 mov 48(%rsp), %r14 mov 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reducex .Lmul_gather_tail: ___ $code.=<<___; addq 64(%rsp), %r8 adcq 72(%rsp), %r9 adcq 80(%rsp), %r10 adcq 88(%rsp), %r11 adcq 96(%rsp), %r12 adcq 104(%rsp), %r13 adcq 112(%rsp), %r14 adcq 120(%rsp), %r15 sbbq %rcx, %rcx call __rsaz_512_subtract leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0xa0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps 0xb0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps 0xc0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps 0xd0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps 0xe0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm10 movaps 0xf0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm11 movaps 0x100-0xc8(%rax),%xmm12 movaps 0x110-0xc8(%rax),%xmm13 movaps 0x120-0xc8(%rax),%xmm14 movaps 0x130-0xc8(%rax),%xmm15 lea 0xb0(%rax),%rax ___ $code.=<<___; movq -48(%rax), %r15 movq -40(%rax), %r14 movq -32(%rax), %r13 movq -24(%rax), %r12 movq -16(%rax), %rbp movq -8(%rax), %rbx leaq (%rax), %rsp .Lmul_gather4_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_512_mul_gather4,.-rsaz_512_mul_gather4 ___ } { my ($out,$ap,$mod,$n0,$tbl,$pwr) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9d"); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_512_mul_scatter4 .type rsaz_512_mul_scatter4,\@function,6 .align 32 rsaz_512_mul_scatter4: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov $pwr, $pwr subq \$128+24, %rsp .Lmul_scatter4_body: leaq ($tbl,$pwr,8), $tbl movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments movq $mod, %xmm1 movq $tbl, %xmm2 movq $n0, 128(%rsp) movq $out, %rbp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); movl \$0x80100,%r11d andl OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d cmpl \$0x80100,%r11d # check for MULX and ADO/CX je .Lmulx_scatter ___ $code.=<<___; movq ($out),%rbx # pass b[0] call __rsaz_512_mul movq %xmm0, $out movq %xmm1, %rbp movq (%rsp), %r8 movq 8(%rsp), %r9 movq 16(%rsp), %r10 movq 24(%rsp), %r11 movq 32(%rsp), %r12 movq 40(%rsp), %r13 movq 48(%rsp), %r14 movq 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reduce ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); jmp .Lmul_scatter_tail .align 32 .Lmulx_scatter: movq ($out), %rdx # pass b[0] call __rsaz_512_mulx movq %xmm0, $out movq %xmm1, %rbp movq 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0 movq (%rsp), %r8 movq 8(%rsp), %r9 movq 16(%rsp), %r10 movq 24(%rsp), %r11 movq 32(%rsp), %r12 movq 40(%rsp), %r13 movq 48(%rsp), %r14 movq 56(%rsp), %r15 call __rsaz_512_reducex .Lmul_scatter_tail: ___ $code.=<<___; addq 64(%rsp), %r8 adcq 72(%rsp), %r9 adcq 80(%rsp), %r10 adcq 88(%rsp), %r11 adcq 96(%rsp), %r12 adcq 104(%rsp), %r13 adcq 112(%rsp), %r14 adcq 120(%rsp), %r15 movq %xmm2, $inp sbbq %rcx, %rcx call __rsaz_512_subtract movq %r8, 128*0($inp) # scatter movq %r9, 128*1($inp) movq %r10, 128*2($inp) movq %r11, 128*3($inp) movq %r12, 128*4($inp) movq %r13, 128*5($inp) movq %r14, 128*6($inp) movq %r15, 128*7($inp) leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax movq -48(%rax), %r15 movq -40(%rax), %r14 movq -32(%rax), %r13 movq -24(%rax), %r12 movq -16(%rax), %rbp movq -8(%rax), %rbx leaq (%rax), %rsp .Lmul_scatter4_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_512_mul_scatter4,.-rsaz_512_mul_scatter4 ___ } { my ($out,$inp,$mod,$n0) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_512_mul_by_one .type rsaz_512_mul_by_one,\@function,4 .align 32 rsaz_512_mul_by_one: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 subq \$128+24, %rsp .Lmul_by_one_body: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); movl OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax ___ $code.=<<___; movq $mod, %rbp # reassign argument movq $n0, 128(%rsp) movq ($inp), %r8 pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 movq 8($inp), %r9 movq 16($inp), %r10 movq 24($inp), %r11 movq 32($inp), %r12 movq 40($inp), %r13 movq 48($inp), %r14 movq 56($inp), %r15 movdqa %xmm0, (%rsp) movdqa %xmm0, 16(%rsp) movdqa %xmm0, 32(%rsp) movdqa %xmm0, 48(%rsp) movdqa %xmm0, 64(%rsp) movdqa %xmm0, 80(%rsp) movdqa %xmm0, 96(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); andl \$0x80100,%eax cmpl \$0x80100,%eax # check for MULX and ADO/CX je .Lby_one_callx ___ $code.=<<___; call __rsaz_512_reduce ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); jmp .Lby_one_tail .align 32 .Lby_one_callx: movq 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0 call __rsaz_512_reducex .Lby_one_tail: ___ $code.=<<___; movq %r8, ($out) movq %r9, 8($out) movq %r10, 16($out) movq %r11, 24($out) movq %r12, 32($out) movq %r13, 40($out) movq %r14, 48($out) movq %r15, 56($out) leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax movq -48(%rax), %r15 movq -40(%rax), %r14 movq -32(%rax), %r13 movq -24(%rax), %r12 movq -16(%rax), %rbp movq -8(%rax), %rbx leaq (%rax), %rsp .Lmul_by_one_epilogue: ret .size rsaz_512_mul_by_one,.-rsaz_512_mul_by_one ___ } { # __rsaz_512_reduce # # input: %r8-%r15, %rbp - mod, 128(%rsp) - n0 # output: %r8-%r15 # clobbers: everything except %rbp and %rdi $code.=<<___; .type __rsaz_512_reduce,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __rsaz_512_reduce: movq %r8, %rbx imulq 128+8(%rsp), %rbx movq 0(%rbp), %rax movl \$8, %ecx jmp .Lreduction_loop .align 32 .Lreduction_loop: mulq %rbx movq 8(%rbp), %rax negq %r8 movq %rdx, %r8 adcq \$0, %r8 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r9 movq 16(%rbp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r9, %r8 movq %rdx, %r9 adcq \$0, %r9 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r10 movq 24(%rbp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r10, %r9 movq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r10 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r11 movq 32(%rbp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r11, %r10 movq 128+8(%rsp), %rsi #movq %rdx, %r11 #adcq \$0, %r11 adcq \$0, %rdx movq %rdx, %r11 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r12 movq 40(%rbp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx imulq %r8, %rsi addq %r12, %r11 movq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r12 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r13 movq 48(%rbp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r13, %r12 movq %rdx, %r13 adcq \$0, %r13 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r14 movq 56(%rbp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r14, %r13 movq %rdx, %r14 adcq \$0, %r14 mulq %rbx movq %rsi, %rbx addq %rax, %r15 movq 0(%rbp), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r15, %r14 movq %rdx, %r15 adcq \$0, %r15 decl %ecx jne .Lreduction_loop ret .size __rsaz_512_reduce,.-__rsaz_512_reduce ___ } if ($addx) { # __rsaz_512_reducex # # input: %r8-%r15, %rbp - mod, 128(%rsp) - n0 # output: %r8-%r15 # clobbers: everything except %rbp and %rdi $code.=<<___; .type __rsaz_512_reducex,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __rsaz_512_reducex: #movq 128+8(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0 imulq %r8, %rdx xorq %rsi, %rsi # cf=0,of=0 movl \$8, %ecx jmp .Lreduction_loopx .align 32 .Lreduction_loopx: mov %r8, %rbx mulx 0(%rbp), %rax, %r8 adcx %rbx, %rax adox %r9, %r8 mulx 8(%rbp), %rax, %r9 adcx %rax, %r8 adox %r10, %r9 mulx 16(%rbp), %rbx, %r10 adcx %rbx, %r9 adox %r11, %r10 mulx 24(%rbp), %rbx, %r11 adcx %rbx, %r10 adox %r12, %r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xe3,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 32(%rbp), %rbx, %r12 mov %rdx, %rax mov %r8, %rdx adcx %rbx, %r11 adox %r13, %r12 mulx 128+8(%rsp), %rbx, %rdx mov %rax, %rdx mulx 40(%rbp), %rax, %r13 adcx %rax, %r12 adox %r14, %r13 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb5,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48(%rbp), %rax, %r14 adcx %rax, %r13 adox %r15, %r14 mulx 56(%rbp), %rax, %r15 mov %rbx, %rdx adcx %rax, %r14 adox %rsi, %r15 # %rsi is 0 adcx %rsi, %r15 # cf=0 decl %ecx # of=0 jne .Lreduction_loopx ret .size __rsaz_512_reducex,.-__rsaz_512_reducex ___ } { # __rsaz_512_subtract # input: %r8-%r15, %rdi - $out, %rbp - $mod, %rcx - mask # output: # clobbers: everything but %rdi, %rsi and %rbp $code.=<<___; .type __rsaz_512_subtract,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __rsaz_512_subtract: movq %r8, ($out) movq %r9, 8($out) movq %r10, 16($out) movq %r11, 24($out) movq %r12, 32($out) movq %r13, 40($out) movq %r14, 48($out) movq %r15, 56($out) movq 0($mod), %r8 movq 8($mod), %r9 negq %r8 notq %r9 andq %rcx, %r8 movq 16($mod), %r10 andq %rcx, %r9 notq %r10 movq 24($mod), %r11 andq %rcx, %r10 notq %r11 movq 32($mod), %r12 andq %rcx, %r11 notq %r12 movq 40($mod), %r13 andq %rcx, %r12 notq %r13 movq 48($mod), %r14 andq %rcx, %r13 notq %r14 movq 56($mod), %r15 andq %rcx, %r14 notq %r15 andq %rcx, %r15 addq ($out), %r8 adcq 8($out), %r9 adcq 16($out), %r10 adcq 24($out), %r11 adcq 32($out), %r12 adcq 40($out), %r13 adcq 48($out), %r14 adcq 56($out), %r15 movq %r8, ($out) movq %r9, 8($out) movq %r10, 16($out) movq %r11, 24($out) movq %r12, 32($out) movq %r13, 40($out) movq %r14, 48($out) movq %r15, 56($out) ret .size __rsaz_512_subtract,.-__rsaz_512_subtract ___ } { # __rsaz_512_mul # # input: %rsi - ap, %rbp - bp # output: # clobbers: everything my ($ap,$bp) = ("%rsi","%rbp"); $code.=<<___; .type __rsaz_512_mul,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __rsaz_512_mul: leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi movq ($ap), %rax mulq %rbx movq %rax, (%rdi) movq 8($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r8 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r8 movq 16($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r9 adcq \$0, %r9 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r9 movq 24($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r10 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r10 movq 32($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r11 adcq \$0, %r11 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r11 movq 40($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r12 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r12 movq 48($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r13 adcq \$0, %r13 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r13 movq 56($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r14 adcq \$0, %r14 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r14 movq ($ap), %rax movq %rdx, %r15 adcq \$0, %r15 leaq 8($bp), $bp leaq 8(%rdi), %rdi movl \$7, %ecx jmp .Loop_mul .align 32 .Loop_mul: movq ($bp), %rbx mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r8 movq 8($ap), %rax movq %r8, (%rdi) movq %rdx, %r8 adcq \$0, %r8 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r9 movq 16($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r9, %r8 movq %rdx, %r9 adcq \$0, %r9 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r10 movq 24($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r10, %r9 movq %rdx, %r10 adcq \$0, %r10 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r11 movq 32($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r11, %r10 movq %rdx, %r11 adcq \$0, %r11 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r12 movq 40($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r12, %r11 movq %rdx, %r12 adcq \$0, %r12 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r13 movq 48($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r13, %r12 movq %rdx, %r13 adcq \$0, %r13 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r14 movq 56($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r14, %r13 movq %rdx, %r14 leaq 8($bp), $bp adcq \$0, %r14 mulq %rbx addq %rax, %r15 movq ($ap), %rax adcq \$0, %rdx addq %r15, %r14 movq %rdx, %r15 adcq \$0, %r15 leaq 8(%rdi), %rdi decl %ecx jnz .Loop_mul movq %r8, (%rdi) movq %r9, 8(%rdi) movq %r10, 16(%rdi) movq %r11, 24(%rdi) movq %r12, 32(%rdi) movq %r13, 40(%rdi) movq %r14, 48(%rdi) movq %r15, 56(%rdi) ret .size __rsaz_512_mul,.-__rsaz_512_mul ___ } if ($addx) { # __rsaz_512_mulx # # input: %rsi - ap, %rbp - bp # output: # clobbers: everything my ($ap,$bp,$zero) = ("%rsi","%rbp","%rdi"); $code.=<<___; .type __rsaz_512_mulx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __rsaz_512_mulx: mulx ($ap), %rbx, %r8 # initial %rdx preloaded by caller mov \$-6, %rcx mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9 movq %rbx, 8(%rsp) mulx 16($ap), %rbx, %r10 adc %rax, %r8 mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11 adc %rbx, %r9 mulx 32($ap), %rbx, %r12 adc %rax, %r10 mulx 40($ap), %rax, %r13 adc %rbx, %r11 mulx 48($ap), %rbx, %r14 adc %rax, %r12 mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15 mov 8($bp), %rdx adc %rbx, %r13 adc %rax, %r14 adc \$0, %r15 xor $zero, $zero # cf=0,of=0 jmp .Loop_mulx .align 32 .Loop_mulx: movq %r8, %rbx mulx ($ap), %rax, %r8 adcx %rax, %rbx adox %r9, %r8 mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9 adcx %rax, %r8 adox %r10, %r9 mulx 16($ap), %rax, %r10 adcx %rax, %r9 adox %r11, %r10 mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11 adcx %rax, %r10 adox %r12, %r11 .byte 0x3e,0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa6,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 32($ap), %rax, %r12 adcx %rax, %r11 adox %r13, %r12 mulx 40($ap), %rax, %r13 adcx %rax, %r12 adox %r14, %r13 mulx 48($ap), %rax, %r14 adcx %rax, %r13 adox %r15, %r14 mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15 movq 64($bp,%rcx,8), %rdx movq %rbx, 8+64-8(%rsp,%rcx,8) adcx %rax, %r14 adox $zero, %r15 adcx $zero, %r15 # cf=0 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Loop_mulx movq %r8, %rbx mulx ($ap), %rax, %r8 adcx %rax, %rbx adox %r9, %r8 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x8e,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9 adcx %rax, %r8 adox %r10, %r9 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x96,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 16($ap), %rax, %r10 adcx %rax, %r9 adox %r11, %r10 mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11 adcx %rax, %r10 adox %r12, %r11 mulx 32($ap), %rax, %r12 adcx %rax, %r11 adox %r13, %r12 mulx 40($ap), %rax, %r13 adcx %rax, %r12 adox %r14, %r13 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($ap), %rax, %r14 adcx %rax, %r13 adox %r15, %r14 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbe,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15 adcx %rax, %r14 adox $zero, %r15 adcx $zero, %r15 mov %rbx, 8+64-8(%rsp) mov %r8, 8+64(%rsp) mov %r9, 8+64+8(%rsp) mov %r10, 8+64+16(%rsp) mov %r11, 8+64+24(%rsp) mov %r12, 8+64+32(%rsp) mov %r13, 8+64+40(%rsp) mov %r14, 8+64+48(%rsp) mov %r15, 8+64+56(%rsp) ret .size __rsaz_512_mulx,.-__rsaz_512_mulx ___ } { my ($out,$inp,$power)= $win64 ? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d") : ("%rdi","%rsi","%edx"); $code.=<<___; .globl rsaz_512_scatter4 .type rsaz_512_scatter4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 rsaz_512_scatter4: leaq ($out,$power,8), $out movl \$8, %r9d jmp .Loop_scatter .align 16 .Loop_scatter: movq ($inp), %rax leaq 8($inp), $inp movq %rax, ($out) leaq 128($out), $out decl %r9d jnz .Loop_scatter ret .size rsaz_512_scatter4,.-rsaz_512_scatter4 .globl rsaz_512_gather4 .type rsaz_512_gather4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 rsaz_512_gather4: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4: .byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa8,0x00,0x00,0x00 # sub $0xa8,%rsp .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24 # movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x7c,0x24,0x10 # movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x44,0x24,0x20 # movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x4c,0x24,0x30 # movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x54,0x24,0x40 # movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x5c,0x24,0x50 # movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x64,0x24,0x60 # movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x6c,0x24,0x70 # movaps %xmm13,0x70(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xb4,0x24,0x80,0,0,0 # movaps %xmm14,0x80(%rsp) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xbc,0x24,0x90,0,0,0 # movaps %xmm15,0x90(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; movd $power,%xmm8 movdqa .Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 movdqa .Linc(%rip),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 pshufd \$0,%xmm8,%xmm8 # broadcast $power movdqa %xmm1,%xmm7 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power # for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1` pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i` movdqa %xmm7,%xmm`$i+3` ___ } for(;$i<7;$i++) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1` pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i` ___ } $code.=<<___; pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm7 movl \$8, %r9d jmp .Loop_gather .align 16 .Loop_gather: movdqa 16*0($inp),%xmm8 movdqa 16*1($inp),%xmm9 movdqa 16*2($inp),%xmm10 movdqa 16*3($inp),%xmm11 pand %xmm0,%xmm8 movdqa 16*4($inp),%xmm12 pand %xmm1,%xmm9 movdqa 16*5($inp),%xmm13 pand %xmm2,%xmm10 movdqa 16*6($inp),%xmm14 pand %xmm3,%xmm11 movdqa 16*7($inp),%xmm15 leaq 128($inp), $inp pand %xmm4,%xmm12 pand %xmm5,%xmm13 pand %xmm6,%xmm14 pand %xmm7,%xmm15 por %xmm10,%xmm8 por %xmm11,%xmm9 por %xmm12,%xmm8 por %xmm13,%xmm9 por %xmm14,%xmm8 por %xmm15,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9 por %xmm9,%xmm8 movq %xmm8,($out) leaq 8($out), $out decl %r9d jnz .Loop_gather ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 0x00(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15 add \$0xa8,%rsp ___ $code.=<<___; ret .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4: .size rsaz_512_gather4,.-rsaz_512_gather4 .align 64 .Linc: .long 0,0, 1,1 .long 2,2, 2,2 ___ } # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail lea 128+24+48(%rax),%rax lea .Lmul_gather4_epilogue(%rip),%rbx cmp %r10,%rbx jne .Lse_not_in_mul_gather4 lea 0xb0(%rax),%rax lea -48-0xa8(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lse_not_in_mul_gather4: mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_sqr .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_sqr .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_sqr .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul_gather4 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_gather4 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_gather4 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4 .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_mul_by_one .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_by_one .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_by_one .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4 .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4 .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4 .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_sqr: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lsqr_body,.Lsqr_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_gather4: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lmul_gather4_body,.Lmul_gather4_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_scatter4: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lmul_scatter4_body,.Lmul_scatter4_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_by_one: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lmul_by_one_body,.Lmul_by_one_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4: .byte 0x01,0x46,0x16,0x00 .byte 0x46,0xf8,0x09,0x00 # vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15 .byte 0x3d,0xe8,0x08,0x00 # vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14 .byte 0x34,0xd8,0x07,0x00 # vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13 .byte 0x2e,0xc8,0x06,0x00 # vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12 .byte 0x28,0xb8,0x05,0x00 # vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11 .byte 0x22,0xa8,0x04,0x00 # vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10 .byte 0x1c,0x98,0x03,0x00 # vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9 .byte 0x16,0x88,0x02,0x00 # vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8 .byte 0x10,0x78,0x01,0x00 # vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7 .byte 0x0b,0x68,0x00,0x00 # vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6 .byte 0x07,0x01,0x15,0x00 # sub rsp,0xa8 ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl0000755000000000000000000004236013176625656016526 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # October 2005 # # This is a "teaser" code, as it can be improved in several ways... # First of all non-SSE2 path should be implemented (yes, for now it # performs Montgomery multiplication/convolution only on SSE2-capable # CPUs such as P4, others fall down to original code). Then inner loop # can be unrolled and modulo-scheduled to improve ILP and possibly # moved to 128-bit XMM register bank (though it would require input # rearrangement and/or increase bus bandwidth utilization). Dedicated # squaring procedure should give further performance improvement... # Yet, for being draft, the code improves rsa512 *sign* benchmark by # 110%(!), rsa1024 one - by 70% and rsa4096 - by 20%:-) # December 2006 # # Modulo-scheduling SSE2 loops results in further 15-20% improvement. # Integer-only code [being equipped with dedicated squaring procedure] # gives ~40% on rsa512 sign benchmark... $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); $sse2=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2); &function_begin("bn_mul_mont"); $i="edx"; $j="ecx"; $ap="esi"; $tp="esi"; # overlapping variables!!! $rp="edi"; $bp="edi"; # overlapping variables!!! $np="ebp"; $num="ebx"; $_num=&DWP(4*0,"esp"); # stack top layout $_rp=&DWP(4*1,"esp"); $_ap=&DWP(4*2,"esp"); $_bp=&DWP(4*3,"esp"); $_np=&DWP(4*4,"esp"); $_n0=&DWP(4*5,"esp"); $_n0q=&QWP(4*5,"esp"); $_sp=&DWP(4*6,"esp"); $_bpend=&DWP(4*7,"esp"); $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(5)); # int num &cmp ("edi",4); &jl (&label("just_leave")); &lea ("esi",&wparam(0)); # put aside pointer to argument block &lea ("edx",&wparam(1)); # load ap &add ("edi",2); # extra two words on top of tp &neg ("edi"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$frame,"esp","edi",4)); # future alloca($frame+4*(num+2)) &neg ("edi"); # minimize cache contention by arraning 2K window between stack # pointer and ap argument [np is also position sensitive vector, # but it's assumed to be near ap, as it's allocated at ~same # time]. &mov ("eax","ebp"); &sub ("eax","edx"); &and ("eax",2047); &sub ("ebp","eax"); # this aligns sp and ap modulo 2048 &xor ("edx","ebp"); &and ("edx",2048); &xor ("edx",2048); &sub ("ebp","edx"); # this splits them apart modulo 4096 &and ("ebp",-64); # align to cache line # An OS-agnostic version of __chkstk. # # Some OSes (Windows) insist on stack being "wired" to # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... &mov ("eax","esp"); &sub ("eax","ebp"); &and ("eax",-4096); &mov ("edx","esp"); # saved stack pointer! &lea ("esp",&DWP(0,"ebp","eax")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &cmp ("esp","ebp"); &ja (&label("page_walk")); &jmp (&label("page_walk_done")); &set_label("page_walk",16); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-4096,"esp")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &cmp ("esp","ebp"); &ja (&label("page_walk")); &set_label("page_walk_done"); ################################# load argument block... &mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));# BN_ULONG *rp &mov ("ebx",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *ap &mov ("ecx",&DWP(2*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *bp &mov ("ebp",&DWP(3*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *np &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *n0 #&mov ("edi",&DWP(5*4,"esi"));# int num &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,"esi")); # pull n0[0] &mov ($_rp,"eax"); # ... save a copy of argument block &mov ($_ap,"ebx"); &mov ($_bp,"ecx"); &mov ($_np,"ebp"); &mov ($_n0,"esi"); &lea ($num,&DWP(-3,"edi")); # num=num-1 to assist modulo-scheduling #&mov ($_num,$num); # redundant as $num is not reused &mov ($_sp,"edx"); # saved stack pointer! if($sse2) { $acc0="mm0"; # mmx register bank layout $acc1="mm1"; $car0="mm2"; $car1="mm3"; $mul0="mm4"; $mul1="mm5"; $temp="mm6"; $mask="mm7"; &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt (&DWP(0,"eax"),26); &jnc (&label("non_sse2")); &mov ("eax",-1); &movd ($mask,"eax"); # mask 32 lower bits &mov ($ap,$_ap); # load input pointers &mov ($bp,$_bp); &mov ($np,$_np); &xor ($i,$i); # i=0 &xor ($j,$j); # j=0 &movd ($mul0,&DWP(0,$bp)); # bp[0] &movd ($mul1,&DWP(0,$ap)); # ap[0] &movd ($car1,&DWP(0,$np)); # np[0] &pmuludq($mul1,$mul0); # ap[0]*bp[0] &movq ($car0,$mul1); &movq ($acc0,$mul1); # I wish movd worked for &pand ($acc0,$mask); # inter-register transfers &pmuludq($mul1,$_n0q); # *=n0 &pmuludq($car1,$mul1); # "t[0]"*np[0]*n0 &paddq ($car1,$acc0); &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np)); # np[1] &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap)); # ap[1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &inc ($j); # j++ &set_label("1st",16); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[j]*bp[0] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[j]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[j]*bp[0]; &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1); # tp[j-1]= &psrlq ($car1,32); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &cmp ($j,$num); &jl (&label("1st")); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[num-1]*bp[0] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[num-1]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[num-1]*bp[0]; &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1); # tp[num-2]= &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &paddq ($car1,$car0); &movq (&QWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$car1); # tp[num].tp[num-1] &inc ($i); # i++ &set_label("outer"); &xor ($j,$j); # j=0 &movd ($mul0,&DWP(0,$bp,$i,4)); # bp[i] &movd ($mul1,&DWP(0,$ap)); # ap[0] &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # tp[0] &movd ($car1,&DWP(0,$np)); # np[0] &pmuludq($mul1,$mul0); # ap[0]*bp[i] &paddq ($mul1,$temp); # +=tp[0] &movq ($acc0,$mul1); &movq ($car0,$mul1); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &pmuludq($mul1,$_n0q); # *=n0 &pmuludq($car1,$mul1); &paddq ($car1,$acc0); &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp")); # tp[1] &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np)); # np[1] &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap)); # ap[1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &paddq ($car0,$temp); # +=tp[1] &inc ($j); # j++ &dec ($num); &set_label("inner"); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[j]*bp[i] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[j]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4));# tp[j+1] &pand ($acc0,$mask); &movd ($acc1,&DWP(4,$np,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] &movd ($acc0,&DWP(4,$ap,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &psrlq ($car0,32); &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1);# tp[j-1]= &psrlq ($car1,32); &paddq ($car0,$temp); # +=tp[j+1] &dec ($num); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); # j++ &jnz (&label("inner")); &mov ($num,$j); &pmuludq($acc0,$mul0); # ap[num-1]*bp[i] &pmuludq($acc1,$mul1); # np[num-1]*m1 &paddq ($car0,$acc0); # +=c0 &paddq ($car1,$acc1); # +=c1 &movq ($acc0,$car0); &pand ($acc0,$mask); &paddq ($car1,$acc0); # +=ap[num-1]*bp[i]+tp[num-1] &movd (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$car1); # tp[num-2]= &psrlq ($car0,32); &psrlq ($car1,32); &movd ($temp,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # += tp[num] &paddq ($car1,$car0); &paddq ($car1,$temp); &movq (&QWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$car1); # tp[num].tp[num-1] &lea ($i,&DWP(1,$i)); # i++ &cmp ($i,$num); &jle (&label("outer")); &emms (); # done with mmx bank &jmp (&label("common_tail")); &set_label("non_sse2",16); } if (0) { &mov ("esp",$_sp); &xor ("eax","eax"); # signal "not fast enough [yet]" &jmp (&label("just_leave")); # While the below code provides competitive performance for # all key lengths on modern Intel cores, it's still more # than 10% slower for 4096-bit key elsewhere:-( "Competitive" # means compared to the original integer-only assembler. # 512-bit RSA sign is better by ~40%, but that's about all # one can say about all CPUs... } else { $inp="esi"; # integer path uses these registers differently $word="edi"; $carry="ebp"; &mov ($inp,$_ap); &lea ($carry,&DWP(1,$num)); &mov ($word,$_bp); &xor ($j,$j); # j=0 &mov ("edx",$inp); &and ($carry,1); # see if num is even &sub ("edx",$word); # see if ap==bp &lea ("eax",&DWP(4,$word,$num,4)); # &bp[num] &or ($carry,"edx"); &mov ($word,&DWP(0,$word)); # bp[0] &jz (&label("bn_sqr_mont")); &mov ($_bpend,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); &xor ("edx","edx"); &set_label("mull",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*bp[0] &add ($carry,"eax"); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("mull")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[num-1]*bp[0] &mov ($word,$_n0); &add ("eax",$carry); &mov ($inp,$_np); &adc ("edx",0); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"eax"); # tp[num-1]= &xor ($j,$j); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4),$j); # tp[num+1]= &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &adc ("edx",0); &inc ($j); &jmp (&label("2ndmadd")); &set_label("1stmadd",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*bp[i] &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j+1] &adc ("edx",0); &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("1stmadd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[num-1]*bp[i] &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num-1] &mov ($word,$_n0); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($inp,$_np); &add ($carry,"eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &xor ($j,$j); &add ("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # carry+=tp[num] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$carry); # tp[num-1]= &adc ($j,0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4),$j); # tp[num+1]= &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($j,1); &set_label("2ndmadd",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &adc ("edx",0); &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-8,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j-1]= &jl (&label("2ndmadd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num-1] &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$num,4),$carry); # tp[num-2]= &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ($j,$_bp); # &bp[i] &add ("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # carry+=tp[num] &adc ("eax",&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num+1] &lea ($j,&DWP(4,$j)); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num-1]= &cmp ($j,$_bpend); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"eax"); # tp[num]= &je (&label("common_tail")); &mov ($word,&DWP(0,$j)); # bp[i+1] &mov ($inp,$_ap); &mov ($_bp,$j); # &bp[++i] &xor ($j,$j); &xor ("edx","edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); &jmp (&label("1stmadd")); &set_label("bn_sqr_mont",16); $sbit=$num; &mov ($_num,$num); &mov ($_bp,$j); # i=0 &mov ("eax",$word); # ap[0] &mul ($word); # ap[0]*ap[0] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp"),"eax"); # tp[0]= &mov ($sbit,"edx"); &shr ("edx",1); &and ($sbit,1); &inc ($j); &set_label("sqr",16); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j] &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*ap[0] &add ("eax",$carry); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,$sbit,"eax",2)); &shr ("eax",31); &cmp ($j,$_num); &mov ($sbit,"eax"); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("sqr")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[num-1] &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[num-1]*ap[0] &add ("eax",$carry); &mov ($word,$_n0); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($inp,$_np); &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,$sbit,"eax",2)); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &shr ("eax",31); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[num-1]= &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,"eax","edx",2)); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &shr ("edx",31); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$j,4),"edx"); # tp[num+1]= &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &mov ($num,$j); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &mov ($j,1); &set_label("3rdmadd",16); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp,$j,4)); # np[j+1] &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j-1]= &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j+1]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j+1] &lea ($j,&DWP(2,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # np[j+2] &adc ("edx",0); &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame-8,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &jl (&label("3rdmadd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # np[j]*m &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num-1] &adc ("edx",0); &add ($carry,"eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$num,4),$carry); # tp[num-2]= &mov ($j,$_bp); # i &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ($inp,$_ap); &add ("edx",&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4)); # carry+=tp[num] &adc ("eax",&DWP($frame+8,"esp",$num,4)); # +=tp[num+1] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),"edx"); # tp[num-1]= &cmp ($j,$num); &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$num,4),"eax"); # tp[num]= &je (&label("common_tail")); &mov ($word,&DWP(4,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[i] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &mov ("eax",$word); &mov ($_bp,$j); # ++i &mul ($word); # ap[i]*ap[i] &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[i] &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),"eax"); # tp[i]= &xor ($carry,$carry); &cmp ($j,$num); &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &je (&label("sqrlast")); &mov ($sbit,"edx"); # zaps $num &shr ("edx",1); &and ($sbit,1); &set_label("sqradd",16); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp,$j,4)); # ap[j] &mov ($carry,"edx"); &mul ($word); # ap[j]*ap[i] &add ("eax",$carry); &lea ($carry,&DWP(0,"eax","eax")); &adc ("edx",0); &shr ("eax",31); &add ($carry,&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[j] &lea ($j,&DWP(1,$j)); &adc ("eax",0); &add ($carry,$sbit); &adc ("eax",0); &cmp ($j,$_num); &mov (&DWP($frame-4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[j]= &mov ($sbit,"eax"); &jle (&label("sqradd")); &mov ($carry,"edx"); &add ("edx","edx"); &shr ($carry,31); &add ("edx",$sbit); &adc ($carry,0); &set_label("sqrlast"); &mov ($word,$_n0); &mov ($inp,$_np); &imul ($word,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # n0*tp[0] &add ("edx",&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4)); # +=tp[num] &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$inp)); # np[0] &adc ($carry,0); &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$j,4),"edx"); # tp[num]= &mov (&DWP($frame+4,"esp",$j,4),$carry); # tp[num+1]= &mul ($word); # np[0]*m &add ("eax",&DWP($frame,"esp")); # +=tp[0] &lea ($num,&DWP(-1,$j)); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ($j,1); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$inp)); # np[1] &jmp (&label("3rdmadd")); } &set_label("common_tail",16); &mov ($np,$_np); # load modulus pointer &mov ($rp,$_rp); # load result pointer &lea ($tp,&DWP($frame,"esp")); # [$ap and $bp are zapped] &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$tp)); # tp[0] &mov ($j,$num); # j=num-1 &xor ($i,$i); # i=0 and clear CF! &set_label("sub",16); &sbb ("eax",&DWP(0,$np,$i,4)); &mov (&DWP(0,$rp,$i,4),"eax"); # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] &dec ($j); # doesn't affect CF! &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,$tp,$i,4)); # tp[i+1] &lea ($i,&DWP(1,$i)); # i++ &jge (&label("sub")); &sbb ("eax",0); # handle upmost overflow bit &and ($tp,"eax"); ¬ ("eax"); &mov ($np,$rp); &and ($np,"eax"); &or ($tp,$np); # tp=carry?tp:rp &set_label("copy",16); # copy or in-place refresh &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$tp,$num,4)); &mov (&DWP(0,$rp,$num,4),"eax"); # rp[i]=tp[i] &mov (&DWP($frame,"esp",$num,4),$j); # zap temporary vector &dec ($num); &jge (&label("copy")); &mov ("esp",$_sp); # pull saved stack pointer &mov ("eax",1); &set_label("just_leave"); &function_end("bn_mul_mont"); &asciz("Montgomery Multiplication for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl0000644000000000000000000013113713176625656015706 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Implemented as a Perl wrapper as we want to support several different # architectures with single file. We pick up the target based on the # file name we are asked to generate. # # It should be noted though that this perl code is nothing like # /crypto/perlasm/x86*. In this case perl is used pretty much # as pre-processor to cover for platform differences in name decoration, # linker tables, 32-/64-bit instruction sets... # # As you might know there're several PowerPC ABI in use. Most notably # Linux and AIX use different 32-bit ABIs. Good news are that these ABIs # are similar enough to implement leaf(!) functions, which would be ABI # neutral. And that's what you find here: ABI neutral leaf functions. # In case you wonder what that is... # # AIX performance # # MEASUREMENTS WITH cc ON a 200 MhZ PowerPC 604e. # # The following is the performance of 32-bit compiler # generated code: # # OpenSSL 0.9.6c 21 dec 2001 # built on: Tue Jun 11 11:06:51 EDT 2002 # options:bn(64,32) ... #compiler: cc -DTHREADS -DAIX -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_LLONG -O3 # sign verify sign/s verify/s #rsa 512 bits 0.0098s 0.0009s 102.0 1170.6 #rsa 1024 bits 0.0507s 0.0026s 19.7 387.5 #rsa 2048 bits 0.3036s 0.0085s 3.3 117.1 #rsa 4096 bits 2.0040s 0.0299s 0.5 33.4 #dsa 512 bits 0.0087s 0.0106s 114.3 94.5 #dsa 1024 bits 0.0256s 0.0313s 39.0 32.0 # # Same bechmark with this assembler code: # #rsa 512 bits 0.0056s 0.0005s 178.6 2049.2 #rsa 1024 bits 0.0283s 0.0015s 35.3 674.1 #rsa 2048 bits 0.1744s 0.0050s 5.7 201.2 #rsa 4096 bits 1.1644s 0.0179s 0.9 55.7 #dsa 512 bits 0.0052s 0.0062s 191.6 162.0 #dsa 1024 bits 0.0149s 0.0180s 67.0 55.5 # # Number of operations increases by at almost 75% # # Here are performance numbers for 64-bit compiler # generated code: # # OpenSSL 0.9.6g [engine] 9 Aug 2002 # built on: Fri Apr 18 16:59:20 EDT 2003 # options:bn(64,64) ... # compiler: cc -DTHREADS -D_REENTRANT -q64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 # sign verify sign/s verify/s #rsa 512 bits 0.0028s 0.0003s 357.1 3844.4 #rsa 1024 bits 0.0148s 0.0008s 67.5 1239.7 #rsa 2048 bits 0.0963s 0.0028s 10.4 353.0 #rsa 4096 bits 0.6538s 0.0102s 1.5 98.1 #dsa 512 bits 0.0026s 0.0032s 382.5 313.7 #dsa 1024 bits 0.0081s 0.0099s 122.8 100.6 # # Same benchmark with this assembler code: # #rsa 512 bits 0.0020s 0.0002s 510.4 6273.7 #rsa 1024 bits 0.0088s 0.0005s 114.1 2128.3 #rsa 2048 bits 0.0540s 0.0016s 18.5 622.5 #rsa 4096 bits 0.3700s 0.0058s 2.7 171.0 #dsa 512 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 610.7 507.1 #dsa 1024 bits 0.0047s 0.0058s 212.5 173.2 # # Again, performance increases by at about 75% # # Mac OS X, Apple G5 1.8GHz (Note this is 32 bit code) # OpenSSL 0.9.7c 30 Sep 2003 # # Original code. # #rsa 512 bits 0.0011s 0.0001s 906.1 11012.5 #rsa 1024 bits 0.0060s 0.0003s 166.6 3363.1 #rsa 2048 bits 0.0370s 0.0010s 27.1 982.4 #rsa 4096 bits 0.2426s 0.0036s 4.1 280.4 #dsa 512 bits 0.0010s 0.0012s 1038.1 841.5 #dsa 1024 bits 0.0030s 0.0037s 329.6 269.7 #dsa 2048 bits 0.0101s 0.0127s 98.9 78.6 # # Same benchmark with this assembler code: # #rsa 512 bits 0.0007s 0.0001s 1416.2 16645.9 #rsa 1024 bits 0.0036s 0.0002s 274.4 5380.6 #rsa 2048 bits 0.0222s 0.0006s 45.1 1589.5 #rsa 4096 bits 0.1469s 0.0022s 6.8 449.6 #dsa 512 bits 0.0006s 0.0007s 1664.2 1376.2 #dsa 1024 bits 0.0018s 0.0023s 545.0 442.2 #dsa 2048 bits 0.0061s 0.0075s 163.5 132.8 # # Performance increase of ~60% # # If you have comments or suggestions to improve code send # me a note at schari@us.ibm.com # $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /32/) { $BITS= 32; $BNSZ= $BITS/8; $ISA= "\"ppc\""; $LD= "lwz"; # load $LDU= "lwzu"; # load and update $ST= "stw"; # store $STU= "stwu"; # store and update $UMULL= "mullw"; # unsigned multiply low $UMULH= "mulhwu"; # unsigned multiply high $UDIV= "divwu"; # unsigned divide $UCMPI= "cmplwi"; # unsigned compare with immediate $UCMP= "cmplw"; # unsigned compare $CNTLZ= "cntlzw"; # count leading zeros $SHL= "slw"; # shift left $SHR= "srw"; # unsigned shift right $SHRI= "srwi"; # unsigned shift right by immediate $SHLI= "slwi"; # shift left by immediate $CLRU= "clrlwi"; # clear upper bits $INSR= "insrwi"; # insert right $ROTL= "rotlwi"; # rotate left by immediate $TR= "tw"; # conditional trap } elsif ($flavour =~ /64/) { $BITS= 64; $BNSZ= $BITS/8; $ISA= "\"ppc64\""; # same as above, but 64-bit mnemonics... $LD= "ld"; # load $LDU= "ldu"; # load and update $ST= "std"; # store $STU= "stdu"; # store and update $UMULL= "mulld"; # unsigned multiply low $UMULH= "mulhdu"; # unsigned multiply high $UDIV= "divdu"; # unsigned divide $UCMPI= "cmpldi"; # unsigned compare with immediate $UCMP= "cmpld"; # unsigned compare $CNTLZ= "cntlzd"; # count leading zeros $SHL= "sld"; # shift left $SHR= "srd"; # unsigned shift right $SHRI= "srdi"; # unsigned shift right by immediate $SHLI= "sldi"; # shift left by immediate $CLRU= "clrldi"; # clear upper bits $INSR= "insrdi"; # insert right $ROTL= "rotldi"; # rotate left by immediate $TR= "td"; # conditional trap } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $data=< 0 then result !=0 # In either case carry bit is set. beq Lppcasm_sub_adios addi r4,r4,-$BNSZ addi r3,r3,-$BNSZ addi r5,r5,-$BNSZ mtctr r6 Lppcasm_sub_mainloop: $LDU r7,$BNSZ(r4) $LDU r8,$BNSZ(r5) subfe r6,r8,r7 # r6 = r7+carry bit + onescomplement(r8) # if carry = 1 this is r7-r8. Else it # is r7-r8 -1 as we need. $STU r6,$BNSZ(r3) bdnz Lppcasm_sub_mainloop Lppcasm_sub_adios: subfze r3,r0 # if carry bit is set then r3 = 0 else -1 andi. r3,r3,1 # keep only last bit. blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0 .long 0 .size .bn_sub_words,.-.bn_sub_words # # NOTE: The following label name should be changed to # "bn_add_words" i.e. remove the first dot # for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically # done in the build # .align 4 .bn_add_words: # # Handcoded version of bn_add_words # #BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) # # r3 = r # r4 = a # r5 = b # r6 = n # # Note: No loop unrolling done since this is not a performance # critical loop. xor r0,r0,r0 # # check for r6 = 0. Is this needed? # addic. r6,r6,0 #test r6 and clear carry bit. beq Lppcasm_add_adios addi r4,r4,-$BNSZ addi r3,r3,-$BNSZ addi r5,r5,-$BNSZ mtctr r6 Lppcasm_add_mainloop: $LDU r7,$BNSZ(r4) $LDU r8,$BNSZ(r5) adde r8,r7,r8 $STU r8,$BNSZ(r3) bdnz Lppcasm_add_mainloop Lppcasm_add_adios: addze r3,r0 #return carry bit. blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0 .long 0 .size .bn_add_words,.-.bn_add_words # # NOTE: The following label name should be changed to # "bn_div_words" i.e. remove the first dot # for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically # done in the build # .align 4 .bn_div_words: # # This is a cleaned up version of code generated by # the AIX compiler. The only optimization is to use # the PPC instruction to count leading zeros instead # of call to num_bits_word. Since this was compiled # only at level -O2 we can possibly squeeze it more? # # r3 = h # r4 = l # r5 = d $UCMPI 0,r5,0 # compare r5 and 0 bne Lppcasm_div1 # proceed if d!=0 li r3,-1 # d=0 return -1 blr Lppcasm_div1: xor r0,r0,r0 #r0=0 li r8,$BITS $CNTLZ. r7,r5 #r7 = num leading 0s in d. beq Lppcasm_div2 #proceed if no leading zeros subf r8,r7,r8 #r8 = BN_num_bits_word(d) $SHR. r9,r3,r8 #are there any bits above r8'th? $TR 16,r9,r0 #if there're, signal to dump core... Lppcasm_div2: $UCMP 0,r3,r5 #h>=d? blt Lppcasm_div3 #goto Lppcasm_div3 if not subf r3,r5,r3 #h-=d ; Lppcasm_div3: #r7 = BN_BITS2-i. so r7=i cmpi 0,0,r7,0 # is (i == 0)? beq Lppcasm_div4 $SHL r3,r3,r7 # h = (h<< i) $SHR r8,r4,r8 # r8 = (l >> BN_BITS2 -i) $SHL r5,r5,r7 # d<<=i or r3,r3,r8 # h = (h<>(BN_BITS2-i)) $SHL r4,r4,r7 # l <<=i Lppcasm_div4: $SHRI r9,r5,`$BITS/2` # r9 = dh # dl will be computed when needed # as it saves registers. li r6,2 #r6=2 mtctr r6 #counter will be in count. Lppcasm_divouterloop: $SHRI r8,r3,`$BITS/2` #r8 = (h>>BN_BITS4) $SHRI r11,r4,`$BITS/2` #r11= (l&BN_MASK2h)>>BN_BITS4 # compute here for innerloop. $UCMP 0,r8,r9 # is (h>>BN_BITS4)==dh bne Lppcasm_div5 # goto Lppcasm_div5 if not li r8,-1 $CLRU r8,r8,`$BITS/2` #q = BN_MASK2l b Lppcasm_div6 Lppcasm_div5: $UDIV r8,r3,r9 #q = h/dh Lppcasm_div6: $UMULL r12,r9,r8 #th = q*dh $CLRU r10,r5,`$BITS/2` #r10=dl $UMULL r6,r8,r10 #tl = q*dl Lppcasm_divinnerloop: subf r10,r12,r3 #t = h -th $SHRI r7,r10,`$BITS/2` #r7= (t &BN_MASK2H), sort of... addic. r7,r7,0 #test if r7 == 0. used below. # now want to compute # r7 = (t<>BN_BITS4) # the following 2 instructions do that $SHLI r7,r10,`$BITS/2` # r7 = (t<>BN_BITS4) $UCMP cr1,r6,r7 # compare (tl <= r7) bne Lppcasm_divinnerexit ble cr1,Lppcasm_divinnerexit addi r8,r8,-1 #q-- subf r12,r9,r12 #th -=dh $CLRU r10,r5,`$BITS/2` #r10=dl. t is no longer needed in loop. subf r6,r10,r6 #tl -=dl b Lppcasm_divinnerloop Lppcasm_divinnerexit: $SHRI r10,r6,`$BITS/2` #t=(tl>>BN_BITS4) $SHLI r11,r6,`$BITS/2` #tl=(tl<=tl) goto Lppcasm_div7 addi r12,r12,1 # th++ Lppcasm_div7: subf r11,r11,r4 #r11=l-tl $UCMP cr1,r3,r12 #compare h and th bge cr1,Lppcasm_div8 #if (h>=th) goto Lppcasm_div8 addi r8,r8,-1 # q-- add r3,r5,r3 # h+=d Lppcasm_div8: subf r12,r12,r3 #r12 = h-th $SHLI r4,r11,`$BITS/2` #l=(l&BN_MASK2l)<>BN_BITS4))&BN_MASK2 # the following 2 instructions will do this. $INSR r11,r12,`$BITS/2`,`$BITS/2` # r11 is the value we want rotated $BITS/2. $ROTL r3,r11,`$BITS/2` # rotate by $BITS/2 and store in r3 bdz Lppcasm_div9 #if (count==0) break ; $SHLI r0,r8,`$BITS/2` #ret =q<> 2 beq Lppcasm_mw_REM mtctr r7 Lppcasm_mw_LOOP: #mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); $LD r8,`0*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 addc r9,r9,r12 #addze r10,r10 #carry is NOT ignored. #will be taken care of #in second spin below #using adde. $ST r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3) #mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); $LD r8,`1*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r11,r6,r8 $UMULH r12,r6,r8 adde r11,r11,r10 #addze r12,r12 $ST r11,`1*$BNSZ`(r3) #mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); $LD r8,`2*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 adde r9,r9,r12 #addze r10,r10 $ST r9,`2*$BNSZ`(r3) #mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1); $LD r8,`3*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r11,r6,r8 $UMULH r12,r6,r8 adde r11,r11,r10 addze r12,r12 #this spin we collect carry into #r12 $ST r11,`3*$BNSZ`(r3) addi r3,r3,`4*$BNSZ` addi r4,r4,`4*$BNSZ` bdnz Lppcasm_mw_LOOP Lppcasm_mw_REM: andi. r5,r5,0x3 beq Lppcasm_mw_OVER #mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); $LD r8,`0*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 addc r9,r9,r12 addze r10,r10 $ST r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3) addi r12,r10,0 addi r5,r5,-1 cmpli 0,0,r5,0 beq Lppcasm_mw_OVER #mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); $LD r8,`1*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 addc r9,r9,r12 addze r10,r10 $ST r9,`1*$BNSZ`(r3) addi r12,r10,0 addi r5,r5,-1 cmpli 0,0,r5,0 beq Lppcasm_mw_OVER #mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); $LD r8,`2*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 addc r9,r9,r12 addze r10,r10 $ST r9,`2*$BNSZ`(r3) addi r12,r10,0 Lppcasm_mw_OVER: addi r3,r12,0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0 .long 0 .size bn_mul_words,.-bn_mul_words # # NOTE: The following label name should be changed to # "bn_mul_add_words" i.e. remove the first dot # for the gcc compiler. This should be automatically # done in the build # .align 4 .bn_mul_add_words: # # BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) # # r3 = rp # r4 = ap # r5 = num # r6 = w # # empirical evidence suggests that unrolled version performs best!! # xor r0,r0,r0 #r0 = 0 xor r12,r12,r12 #r12 = 0 . used for carry rlwinm. r7,r5,30,2,31 # num >> 2 beq Lppcasm_maw_leftover # if (num < 4) go LPPCASM_maw_leftover mtctr r7 Lppcasm_maw_mainloop: #mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); $LD r8,`0*$BNSZ`(r4) $LD r11,`0*$BNSZ`(r3) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 addc r9,r9,r12 #r12 is carry. addze r10,r10 addc r9,r9,r11 #addze r10,r10 #the above instruction addze #is NOT needed. Carry will NOT #be ignored. It's not affected #by multiply and will be collected #in the next spin $ST r9,`0*$BNSZ`(r3) #mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); $LD r8,`1*$BNSZ`(r4) $LD r9,`1*$BNSZ`(r3) $UMULL r11,r6,r8 $UMULH r12,r6,r8 adde r11,r11,r10 #r10 is carry. addze r12,r12 addc r11,r11,r9 #addze r12,r12 $ST r11,`1*$BNSZ`(r3) #mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); $LD r8,`2*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $LD r11,`2*$BNSZ`(r3) $UMULH r10,r6,r8 adde r9,r9,r12 addze r10,r10 addc r9,r9,r11 #addze r10,r10 $ST r9,`2*$BNSZ`(r3) #mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1); $LD r8,`3*$BNSZ`(r4) $UMULL r11,r6,r8 $LD r9,`3*$BNSZ`(r3) $UMULH r12,r6,r8 adde r11,r11,r10 addze r12,r12 addc r11,r11,r9 addze r12,r12 $ST r11,`3*$BNSZ`(r3) addi r3,r3,`4*$BNSZ` addi r4,r4,`4*$BNSZ` bdnz Lppcasm_maw_mainloop Lppcasm_maw_leftover: andi. r5,r5,0x3 beq Lppcasm_maw_adios addi r3,r3,-$BNSZ addi r4,r4,-$BNSZ #mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); mtctr r5 $LDU r8,$BNSZ(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 $LDU r11,$BNSZ(r3) addc r9,r9,r11 addze r10,r10 addc r9,r9,r12 addze r12,r10 $ST r9,0(r3) bdz Lppcasm_maw_adios #mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); $LDU r8,$BNSZ(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 $LDU r11,$BNSZ(r3) addc r9,r9,r11 addze r10,r10 addc r9,r9,r12 addze r12,r10 $ST r9,0(r3) bdz Lppcasm_maw_adios #mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); $LDU r8,$BNSZ(r4) $UMULL r9,r6,r8 $UMULH r10,r6,r8 $LDU r11,$BNSZ(r3) addc r9,r9,r11 addze r10,r10 addc r9,r9,r12 addze r12,r10 $ST r9,0(r3) Lppcasm_maw_adios: addi r3,r12,0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0 .long 0 .size .bn_mul_add_words,.-.bn_mul_add_words .align 4 EOF $data =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $data; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/alpha-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000001347413176625656017167 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # On 21264 RSA sign performance improves by 70/35/20/15 percent for # 512/1024/2048/4096 bit key lengths. This is against vendor compiler # instructed to '-tune host' code with in-line assembler. Other # benchmarks improve by 15-20%. To anchor it to something else, the # code provides approximately the same performance per GHz as AMD64. # I.e. if you compare 1GHz 21264 and 2GHz Opteron, you'll observe ~2x # difference. $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="a0"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="a1"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="a2"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="a3"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="a4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="a5"; # int num); $lo0="t0"; $hi0="t1"; $lo1="t2"; $hi1="t3"; $aj="t4"; $bi="t5"; $nj="t6"; $tp="t7"; $alo="t8"; $ahi="t9"; $nlo="t10"; $nhi="t11"; $tj="t12"; $i="s3"; $j="s4"; $m1="s5"; $code=<<___; #ifdef __linux__ #include #else #include #include #endif .text .set noat .set noreorder .globl bn_mul_mont .align 5 .ent bn_mul_mont bn_mul_mont: lda sp,-48(sp) stq ra,0(sp) stq s3,8(sp) stq s4,16(sp) stq s5,24(sp) stq fp,32(sp) mov sp,fp .mask 0x0400f000,-48 .frame fp,48,ra .prologue 0 .align 4 .set reorder sextl $num,$num mov 0,v0 cmplt $num,4,AT bne AT,.Lexit ldq $hi0,0($ap) # ap[0] s8addq $num,16,AT ldq $aj,8($ap) subq sp,AT,sp ldq $bi,0($bp) # bp[0] lda AT,-4096(zero) # mov -4096,AT ldq $n0,0($n0) and sp,AT,sp mulq $hi0,$bi,$lo0 ldq $hi1,0($np) # np[0] umulh $hi0,$bi,$hi0 ldq $nj,8($np) mulq $lo0,$n0,$m1 mulq $hi1,$m1,$lo1 umulh $hi1,$m1,$hi1 addq $lo1,$lo0,$lo1 cmpult $lo1,$lo0,AT addq $hi1,AT,$hi1 mulq $aj,$bi,$alo mov 2,$j umulh $aj,$bi,$ahi mov sp,$tp mulq $nj,$m1,$nlo s8addq $j,$ap,$aj umulh $nj,$m1,$nhi s8addq $j,$np,$nj .align 4 .L1st: .set noreorder ldq $aj,0($aj) addl $j,1,$j ldq $nj,0($nj) lda $tp,8($tp) addq $alo,$hi0,$lo0 mulq $aj,$bi,$alo cmpult $lo0,$hi0,AT addq $nlo,$hi1,$lo1 mulq $nj,$m1,$nlo addq $ahi,AT,$hi0 cmpult $lo1,$hi1,v0 cmplt $j,$num,$tj umulh $aj,$bi,$ahi addq $nhi,v0,$hi1 addq $lo1,$lo0,$lo1 s8addq $j,$ap,$aj umulh $nj,$m1,$nhi cmpult $lo1,$lo0,v0 addq $hi1,v0,$hi1 s8addq $j,$np,$nj stq $lo1,-8($tp) nop unop bne $tj,.L1st .set reorder addq $alo,$hi0,$lo0 addq $nlo,$hi1,$lo1 cmpult $lo0,$hi0,AT cmpult $lo1,$hi1,v0 addq $ahi,AT,$hi0 addq $nhi,v0,$hi1 addq $lo1,$lo0,$lo1 cmpult $lo1,$lo0,v0 addq $hi1,v0,$hi1 stq $lo1,0($tp) addq $hi1,$hi0,$hi1 cmpult $hi1,$hi0,AT stq $hi1,8($tp) stq AT,16($tp) mov 1,$i .align 4 .Louter: s8addq $i,$bp,$bi ldq $hi0,0($ap) ldq $aj,8($ap) ldq $bi,0($bi) ldq $hi1,0($np) ldq $nj,8($np) ldq $tj,0(sp) mulq $hi0,$bi,$lo0 umulh $hi0,$bi,$hi0 addq $lo0,$tj,$lo0 cmpult $lo0,$tj,AT addq $hi0,AT,$hi0 mulq $lo0,$n0,$m1 mulq $hi1,$m1,$lo1 umulh $hi1,$m1,$hi1 addq $lo1,$lo0,$lo1 cmpult $lo1,$lo0,AT mov 2,$j addq $hi1,AT,$hi1 mulq $aj,$bi,$alo mov sp,$tp umulh $aj,$bi,$ahi mulq $nj,$m1,$nlo s8addq $j,$ap,$aj umulh $nj,$m1,$nhi .align 4 .Linner: .set noreorder ldq $tj,8($tp) #L0 nop #U1 ldq $aj,0($aj) #L1 s8addq $j,$np,$nj #U0 ldq $nj,0($nj) #L0 nop #U1 addq $alo,$hi0,$lo0 #L1 lda $tp,8($tp) mulq $aj,$bi,$alo #U1 cmpult $lo0,$hi0,AT #L0 addq $nlo,$hi1,$lo1 #L1 addl $j,1,$j mulq $nj,$m1,$nlo #U1 addq $ahi,AT,$hi0 #L0 addq $lo0,$tj,$lo0 #L1 cmpult $lo1,$hi1,v0 #U0 umulh $aj,$bi,$ahi #U1 cmpult $lo0,$tj,AT #L0 addq $lo1,$lo0,$lo1 #L1 addq $nhi,v0,$hi1 #U0 umulh $nj,$m1,$nhi #U1 s8addq $j,$ap,$aj #L0 cmpult $lo1,$lo0,v0 #L1 cmplt $j,$num,$tj #U0 # borrow $tj addq $hi0,AT,$hi0 #L0 addq $hi1,v0,$hi1 #U1 stq $lo1,-8($tp) #L1 bne $tj,.Linner #U0 .set reorder ldq $tj,8($tp) addq $alo,$hi0,$lo0 addq $nlo,$hi1,$lo1 cmpult $lo0,$hi0,AT cmpult $lo1,$hi1,v0 addq $ahi,AT,$hi0 addq $nhi,v0,$hi1 addq $lo0,$tj,$lo0 cmpult $lo0,$tj,AT addq $hi0,AT,$hi0 ldq $tj,16($tp) addq $lo1,$lo0,$j cmpult $j,$lo0,v0 addq $hi1,v0,$hi1 addq $hi1,$hi0,$lo1 stq $j,0($tp) cmpult $lo1,$hi0,$hi1 addq $lo1,$tj,$lo1 cmpult $lo1,$tj,AT addl $i,1,$i addq $hi1,AT,$hi1 stq $lo1,8($tp) cmplt $i,$num,$tj # borrow $tj stq $hi1,16($tp) bne $tj,.Louter s8addq $num,sp,$tj # &tp[num] mov $rp,$bp # put rp aside mov sp,$tp mov sp,$ap mov 0,$hi0 # clear borrow bit .align 4 .Lsub: ldq $lo0,0($tp) ldq $lo1,0($np) lda $tp,8($tp) lda $np,8($np) subq $lo0,$lo1,$lo1 # tp[i]-np[i] cmpult $lo0,$lo1,AT subq $lo1,$hi0,$lo0 cmpult $lo1,$lo0,$hi0 or $hi0,AT,$hi0 stq $lo0,0($rp) cmpult $tp,$tj,v0 lda $rp,8($rp) bne v0,.Lsub subq $hi1,$hi0,$hi0 # handle upmost overflow bit mov sp,$tp mov $bp,$rp # restore rp and sp,$hi0,$ap bic $bp,$hi0,$bp bis $bp,$ap,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp .align 4 .Lcopy: ldq $aj,0($ap) # copy or in-place refresh lda $tp,8($tp) lda $rp,8($rp) lda $ap,8($ap) stq zero,-8($tp) # zap tp cmpult $tp,$tj,AT stq $aj,-8($rp) bne AT,.Lcopy mov 1,v0 .Lexit: .set noreorder mov fp,sp /*ldq ra,0(sp)*/ ldq s3,8(sp) ldq s4,16(sp) ldq s5,24(sp) ldq fp,32(sp) lda sp,48(sp) ret (ra) .end bn_mul_mont .ascii "Montgomery Multiplication for Alpha, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl0000755000000000000000000024672113176625656017133 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # August 2011. # # Companion to x86_64-mont.pl that optimizes cache-timing attack # countermeasures. The subroutines are produced by replacing bp[i] # references in their x86_64-mont.pl counterparts with cache-neutral # references to powers table computed in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime. # In addition subroutine that scatters elements of the powers table # is implemented, so that scatter-/gathering can be tuned without # bn_exp.c modifications. # August 2013. # # Add MULX/AD*X code paths and additional interfaces to optimize for # branch prediction unit. For input lengths that are multiples of 8 # the np argument is not just modulus value, but one interleaved # with 0. This is to optimize post-condition... $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $addx = ($1>=12); } if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } # int bn_mul_mont_gather5( $rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%rdx"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%r9"; # int num, # int idx); # 0 to 2^5-1, "index" in $bp holding # pre-computed powers of a', interlaced # in such manner that b[0] is $bp[idx], # b[1] is [2^5+idx], etc. $lo0="%r10"; $hi0="%r11"; $hi1="%r13"; $i="%r14"; $j="%r15"; $m0="%rbx"; $m1="%rbp"; $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl bn_mul_mont_gather5 .type bn_mul_mont_gather5,\@function,6 .align 64 bn_mul_mont_gather5: mov ${num}d,${num}d mov %rsp,%rax test \$7,${num}d jnz .Lmul_enter ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d ___ $code.=<<___; jmp .Lmul4x_enter .align 16 .Lmul_enter: movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5 # load 7th argument push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 neg $num mov %rsp,%r11 lea -280(%rsp,$num,8),%r10 # future alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8) neg $num # restore $num and \$-1024,%r10 # minimize TLB usage # An OS-agnostic version of __chkstk. # # Some OSes (Windows) insist on stack being "wired" to # physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack # allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can # be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on # other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits # the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... sub %r10,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%r10,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk jmp .Lmul_page_walk_done .Lmul_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r11 cmp %r10,%rsp ja .Lmul_page_walk .Lmul_page_walk_done: lea .Linc(%rip),%r10 mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp .Lmul_body: lea 128($bp),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization) ___ $bp="%r12"; $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size" $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size $code.=<<___; movdqa 0(%r10),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%r10),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 24-112(%rsp,$num,8),%r10# place the mask after tp[num+3] (+ICache optimization) and \$-16,%r10 pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack # $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 .byte 0x67 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ } $code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10) paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 .byte 0x67 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10) pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register pand `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 pand `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5 movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 pand `16*($k+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($k+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5 por %xmm4,%xmm0 pand `16*($k+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm5,%xmm1 pand `16*($k+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm1,%xmm0 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1 por %xmm1,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($ap),%rax xor $i,$i # i=0 xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$lo0 mov ($np),%rax imulq $lo0,$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .L1st_enter .align 16 .L1st: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] mov $lo0,$hi0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .L1st_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx lea 1($j),$j # j++ mov %rdx,$lo0 mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .L1st # note that upon exit $j==$num, so # they can be used interchangeably add %rax,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 mov $lo0,$hi0 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ jmp .Louter .align 16 .Louter: lea 24+128(%rsp,$num,8),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization) and \$-16,%rdx pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16;$k+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($k+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0 pand `16*($k+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($k+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($k+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0] movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i] xor $j,$j # j=0 mov $n0,$m1 mov (%rsp),$lo0 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$lo0 # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $lo0,$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$hi0 mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$lo0 # discarded mov 8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov 8(%rsp),$lo0 # tp[1] mov %rdx,$hi1 lea 1($j),$j # j++ jmp .Linner_enter .align 16 .Linner: add %rax,$hi1 mov ($ap,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$j,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 .Linner_enter: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$hi0 mov ($np,$j,8),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $hi0,$lo0 # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov %rdx,$hi0 adc \$0,$hi0 lea 1($j),$j # j++ mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 cmp $num,$j jne .Linner # note that upon exit $j==$num, so # they can be used interchangeably add %rax,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] mov (%rsp,$num,8),$lo0 adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num-1] mov %rdx,$hi1 xor %rdx,%rdx add $hi0,$hi1 adc \$0,%rdx add $lo0,$hi1 # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,%rdx mov $hi1,-8(%rsp,$num,8) mov %rdx,(%rsp,$num,8) # store upmost overflow bit lea 1($i),$i # i++ cmp $num,$i jb .Louter xor $i,$i # i=0 and clear CF! mov (%rsp),%rax # tp[0] lea (%rsp),$ap # borrow ap for tp mov $num,$j # j=num jmp .Lsub .align 16 .Lsub: sbb ($np,$i,8),%rax mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i] mov 8($ap,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1] lea 1($i),$i # i++ dec $j # doesnn't affect CF! jnz .Lsub sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit xor $i,$i and %rax,$ap not %rax mov $rp,$np and %rax,$np mov $num,$j # j=num or $np,$ap # ap=borrow?tp:rp .align 16 .Lcopy: # copy or in-place refresh mov ($ap,$i,8),%rax mov $i,(%rsp,$i,8) # zap temporary vector mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i] lea 1($i),$i sub \$1,$j jnz .Lcopy mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul_mont_gather5,.-bn_mul_mont_gather5 ___ {{{ my @A=("%r10","%r11"); my @N=("%r13","%rdi"); $code.=<<___; .type bn_mul4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_mul4x_mont_gather5: .byte 0x67 mov %rsp,%rax .Lmul4x_enter: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); and \$0x80108,%r11d cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1 je .Lmulx4x_enter ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lmul4x_prologue: .byte 0x67 shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num # -$num ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order # to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after # completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rp,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lmul4xsp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $rp lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) jmp .Lmul4xsp_done .align 32 .Lmul4xsp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lmul4xsp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk jmp .Lmul4x_page_walk_done .Lmul4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmul4x_page_walk .Lmul4x_page_walk_done: neg $num mov %rax,40(%rsp) .Lmul4x_body: call mul4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmul4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mul4x_mont_gather5,.-bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .type mul4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 mul4x_internal: shl \$5,$num # $num was in bytes movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5 # load 7th argument, index lea .Linc(%rip),%rax lea 128(%rdx,$num),%r13 # end of powers table (+size optimization) shr \$5,$num # restore $num ___ $bp="%r12"; $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size" $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size $tp=$i; $code.=<<___; movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 88-112(%rsp,$num),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimization) lea 128(%rdx),$bp # size optimization pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 .byte 0x67,0x67 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack # $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 .byte 0x67 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ } $code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 .byte 0x67 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register pand `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 pand `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5 por %xmm4,%xmm0 pand `16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm5,%xmm1 pand `16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm1,%xmm0 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1 por %xmm1,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0] mov %r13,16+8(%rsp) # save end of b[num] mov $rp, 56+8(%rsp) # save $rp mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value mov ($ap),%rax lea ($ap,$num),$ap # end of a[num] neg $num mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0] mov %rax,$A[0] mov ($np),%rax imulq $A[0],$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0 lea 64+8(%rsp),$tp mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # discarded mov 8($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] lea 4*8($num),$j # j=4 lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],($tp) mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .L1st4x .align 32 .L1st4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov 8*0($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] add \$32,$j # j+=4 jnz .L1st4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$num),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] lea ($np,$num),$np # rewind $np xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] mov $N[0],-8($tp) jmp .Louter4x .align 32 .Louter4x: lea 16+128($tp),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization) pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0 pand `16*($i+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($i+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($i+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i] mov ($tp,$num),$A[0] mov $n0,$m1 mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0] mov ($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq $A[0],$m1 # tp[0]*n0 mov %rdx,$A[1] mov $N[1],($tp) # store upmost overflow bit lea ($tp,$num),$tp # rewind $tp mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1 add %rax,$A[0] # "$N[0]", discarded mov 8($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8($tp),$A[1] # +tp[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$num),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 4*8($num),$j # j=4 lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$N[0] jmp .Linner4x .align 32 .Linner4x: mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 16($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov -8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8($tp),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov 8*0($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add ($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov 8($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov 8*1($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 8($tp),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov 16($ap,$j),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] lea 8*4($np),$np adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-8($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] add \$32,$j # j+=4 jnz .Linner4x mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[0] mov -8*2($np),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add 16($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j] lea 32($tp),$tp adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[1] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[0] mov -8($ap),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[1],-32($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[1] mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i] add %rax,$A[1] mov $m1,%rax mov -8*1($np),$m1 adc \$0,%rdx add -8($tp),$A[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rdx,$A[0] mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1 add %rax,$N[1] mov ($ap,$num),%rax # ap[0] adc \$0,%rdx add $A[1],$N[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1] mov %rdx,$N[0] mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1] lea ($np,$num),$np # rewind $np xor $N[1],$N[1] add $A[0],$N[0] adc \$0,$N[1] add ($tp),$N[0] # pull upmost overflow bit adc \$0,$N[1] # upmost overflow bit mov $N[0],-8($tp) cmp 16+8(%rsp),$bp jb .Louter4x ___ if (1) { $code.=<<___; xor %rax,%rax sub $N[0],$m1 # compare top-most words adc $j,$j # $j is zero or $j,$N[1] sub $N[1],%rax # %rax=-$N[1] lea ($tp,$num),%rbx # tptr in .sqr4x_sub mov ($np),%r12 lea ($np),%rbp # nptr in .sqr4x_sub mov %r9,%rcx sar \$3+2,%rcx mov 56+8(%rsp),%rdi # rptr in .sqr4x_sub dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] xor %r10,%r10 mov 8*1(%rbp),%r13 mov 8*2(%rbp),%r14 mov 8*3(%rbp),%r15 jmp .Lsqr4x_sub_entry ___ } else { my @ri=("%rax",$bp,$m0,$m1); my $rp="%rdx"; $code.=<<___ xor \$1,$N[1] lea ($tp,$num),$tp # rewind $tp sar \$5,$num # cf=0 lea ($np,$N[1],8),$np mov 56+8(%rsp),$rp # restore $rp jmp .Lsub4x .align 32 .Lsub4x: .byte 0x66 mov 8*0($tp),@ri[0] mov 8*1($tp),@ri[1] .byte 0x66 sbb 16*0($np),@ri[0] mov 8*2($tp),@ri[2] sbb 16*1($np),@ri[1] mov 3*8($tp),@ri[3] lea 4*8($tp),$tp sbb 16*2($np),@ri[2] mov @ri[0],8*0($rp) sbb 16*3($np),@ri[3] lea 16*4($np),$np mov @ri[1],8*1($rp) mov @ri[2],8*2($rp) mov @ri[3],8*3($rp) lea 8*4($rp),$rp inc $num jnz .Lsub4x ret ___ } $code.=<<___; .size mul4x_internal,.-mul4x_internal ___ }}} {{{ ###################################################################### # void bn_power5( my $rptr="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rptr, my $aptr="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *aptr, my $bptr="%rdx"; # const void *table, my $nptr="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *nptr, my $n0 ="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0); my $num ="%r9"; # int num, has to be divisible by 8 # int pwr my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr); my @A0=("%r10","%r11"); my @A1=("%r12","%r13"); my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx"); $code.=<<___; .globl bn_power5 .type bn_power5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_power5: mov %rsp,%rax ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d and \$0x80108,%r11d cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1 je .Lpowerx5_enter ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lpower5_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10d # 3*$num neg $num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lpwr_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) jmp .Lpwr_sp_done .align 32 .Lpwr_sp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lpwr_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwr_page_walk jmp .Lpwr_page_walk_done .Lpwr_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwr_page_walk .Lpwr_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num ############################################################## # Stack layout # # +0 saved $num, used in reduction section # +8 &t[2*$num], used in reduction section # +32 saved *n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 t[2*$num] # mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lpower5_body: movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr, used in sqr8x movq $nptr,%xmm2 # save $nptr movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num, used in sqr8x movq $bptr,%xmm4 call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal call __bn_sqr8x_internal call __bn_post4x_internal movq %xmm2,$nptr movq %xmm4,$bptr mov $aptr,$rptr mov 40(%rsp),%rax lea 32(%rsp),$n0 call mul4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lpower5_epilogue: ret .size bn_power5,.-bn_power5 .globl bn_sqr8x_internal .hidden bn_sqr8x_internal .type bn_sqr8x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_sqr8x_internal: __bn_sqr8x_internal: ############################################################## # Squaring part: # # a) multiply-n-add everything but a[i]*a[i]; # b) shift result of a) by 1 to the left and accumulate # a[i]*a[i] products; # ############################################################## # a[1]a[0] # a[2]a[0] # a[3]a[0] # a[2]a[1] # a[4]a[0] # a[3]a[1] # a[5]a[0] # a[4]a[1] # a[3]a[2] # a[6]a[0] # a[5]a[1] # a[4]a[2] # a[7]a[0] # a[6]a[1] # a[5]a[2] # a[4]a[3] # a[7]a[1] # a[6]a[2] # a[5]a[3] # a[7]a[2] # a[6]a[3] # a[5]a[4] # a[7]a[3] # a[6]a[4] # a[7]a[4] # a[6]a[5] # a[7]a[5] # a[7]a[6] # a[1]a[0] # a[2]a[0] # a[3]a[0] # a[4]a[0] # a[5]a[0] # a[6]a[0] # a[7]a[0] # a[2]a[1] # a[3]a[1] # a[4]a[1] # a[5]a[1] # a[6]a[1] # a[7]a[1] # a[3]a[2] # a[4]a[2] # a[5]a[2] # a[6]a[2] # a[7]a[2] # a[4]a[3] # a[5]a[3] # a[6]a[3] # a[7]a[3] # a[5]a[4] # a[6]a[4] # a[7]a[4] # a[6]a[5] # a[7]a[5] # a[7]a[6] # a[0]a[0] # a[1]a[1] # a[2]a[2] # a[3]a[3] # a[4]a[4] # a[5]a[5] # a[6]a[6] # a[7]a[7] lea 32(%r10),$i # $i=-($num-32) lea ($aptr,$num),$aptr # end of a[] buffer, ($aptr,$i)=&ap[2] mov $num,$j # $j=$num # comments apply to $num==8 case mov -32($aptr,$i),$a0 # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num] mov -24($aptr,$i),%rax # a[1] lea -32($tptr,$i),$tptr # end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"] mov -16($aptr,$i),$ai # a[2] mov %rax,$a1 mul $a0 # a[1]*a[0] mov %rax,$A0[0] # a[1]*a[0] mov $ai,%rax # a[2] mov %rdx,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-24($tptr,$i) # t[1] mul $a0 # a[2]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx mov $A0[1],-16($tptr,$i) # t[2] mov %rdx,$A0[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),$ai # a[3] mul $a1 # a[2]*a[1] mov %rax,$A1[0] # a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[1] lea ($i),$j mul $a0 # a[3]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$j) # t[3] jmp .Lsqr4x_1st .align 32 .Lsqr4x_1st: mov ($aptr,$j),$ai # a[4] mul $a1 # a[3]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[1] # a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[0] adc \$0,$A1[0] mul $a0 # a[4]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] # a[4]*a[0]+a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax # a[3] mov 8($aptr,$j),$ai # a[5] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[4]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[1],($tptr,$j) # t[4] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[5]*a[2] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[5]*a[2]+a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $ai,%rax mov 16($aptr,$j),$ai # a[6] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mul $a1 # a[5]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[1] # a[5]*a[3]+t[6] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[0],8($tptr,$j) # t[5] mov %rdx,$A1[0] adc \$0,$A1[0] mul $a0 # a[6]*a[2] add %rax,$A0[1] # a[6]*a[2]+a[5]*a[3]+t[6] mov $ai,%rax # a[3] mov 24($aptr,$j),$ai # a[7] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[6]*a[5] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[6]*a[5]+t[7] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[1],16($tptr,$j) # t[6] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] lea 32($j),$j mul $a0 # a[7]*a[4] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[7]*a[4]+a[6]*a[5]+t[6] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$j) # t[7] cmp \$0,$j jne .Lsqr4x_1st mul $a1 # a[7]*a[5] add %rax,$A1[1] lea 16($i),$i adc \$0,%rdx add $A0[1],$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A1[1],($tptr) # t[8] mov %rdx,$A1[0] mov %rdx,8($tptr) # t[9] jmp .Lsqr4x_outer .align 32 .Lsqr4x_outer: # comments apply to $num==6 case mov -32($aptr,$i),$a0 # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num] mov -24($aptr,$i),%rax # a[1] lea -32($tptr,$i),$tptr # end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"] mov -16($aptr,$i),$ai # a[2] mov %rax,$a1 mul $a0 # a[1]*a[0] mov -24($tptr,$i),$A0[0] # t[1] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[1]*a[0]+t[1] mov $ai,%rax # a[2] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A0[0],-24($tptr,$i) # t[1] mov %rdx,$A0[1] mul $a0 # a[2]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -16($tptr,$i),$A0[1] # a[2]*a[0]+t[2] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] mov $A0[1],-16($tptr,$i) # t[2] xor $A1[0],$A1[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),$ai # a[3] mul $a1 # a[2]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add -8($tptr,$i),$A1[0] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[3]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A1[0],$A0[0] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$i) # t[3] lea ($i),$j jmp .Lsqr4x_inner .align 32 .Lsqr4x_inner: mov ($aptr,$j),$ai # a[4] mul $a1 # a[3]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[1] # a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[0] adc \$0,$A1[0] add ($tptr,$j),$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[0] .byte 0x67 mul $a0 # a[4]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] # a[4]*a[0]+a[3]*a[1]+t[4] mov $ai,%rax # a[3] mov 8($aptr,$j),$ai # a[5] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[4]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $A0[1],($tptr,$j) # t[4] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] add 8($tptr,$j),$A1[0] lea 16($j),$j # j++ adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[5]*a[2] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[5]*a[2]+a[4]*a[3]+t[5] mov $ai,%rax adc \$0,%rdx add $A1[0],$A0[0] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr,$j) # t[5], "preloaded t[1]" below cmp \$0,$j jne .Lsqr4x_inner .byte 0x67 mul $a1 # a[5]*a[3] add %rax,$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx add $A0[1],$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A1[1],($tptr) # t[6], "preloaded t[2]" below mov %rdx,$A1[0] mov %rdx,8($tptr) # t[7], "preloaded t[3]" below add \$16,$i jnz .Lsqr4x_outer # comments apply to $num==4 case mov -32($aptr),$a0 # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of tp[] buffer, &tp[2*$num] mov -24($aptr),%rax # a[1] lea -32($tptr,$i),$tptr # end of tp[] window, &tp[2*$num-"$i"] mov -16($aptr),$ai # a[2] mov %rax,$a1 mul $a0 # a[1]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[1]*a[0]+t[1], preloaded t[1] mov $ai,%rax # a[2] mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] mul $a0 # a[2]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[1] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[0],-24($tptr) # t[1] mov %rdx,$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[0] add $A1[1],$A0[1] # a[2]*a[0]+t[2], preloaded t[2] mov -8($aptr),$ai # a[3] adc \$0,$A0[0] mul $a1 # a[2]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[0] # a[2]*a[1]+t[3], preloaded t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov $A0[1],-16($tptr) # t[2] mov %rdx,$A1[1] adc \$0,$A1[1] mul $a0 # a[3]*a[0] add %rax,$A0[0] # a[3]*a[0]+a[2]*a[1]+t[3] mov $ai,%rax mov %rdx,$A0[1] adc \$0,$A0[1] add $A1[0],$A0[0] adc \$0,$A0[1] mov $A0[0],-8($tptr) # t[3] mul $a1 # a[3]*a[1] add %rax,$A1[1] mov -16($aptr),%rax # a[2] adc \$0,%rdx add $A0[1],$A1[1] adc \$0,%rdx mov $A1[1],($tptr) # t[4] mov %rdx,$A1[0] mov %rdx,8($tptr) # t[5] mul $ai # a[2]*a[3] ___ { my ($shift,$carry)=($a0,$a1); my @S=(@A1,$ai,$n0); $code.=<<___; add \$16,$i xor $shift,$shift sub $num,$i # $i=16-$num xor $carry,$carry add $A1[0],%rax # t[5] adc \$0,%rdx mov %rax,8($tptr) # t[5] mov %rdx,16($tptr) # t[6] mov $carry,24($tptr) # t[7] mov -16($aptr,$i),%rax # a[0] lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr xor $A0[0],$A0[0] # t[0] mov 8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 24($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[1],8($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 32($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 40($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[2] mov 0($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[2],16($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[3] lea 16($i),$i mov $S[3],24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry lea 64($tptr),$tptr jmp .Lsqr4x_shift_n_add .align 32 .Lsqr4x_shift_n_add: lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov -16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov -8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov -8($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],-32($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[1],-24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 0($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[2] mov 0($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[2],-16($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[3] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[3],-8($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 24($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov 8($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],0($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift mov $S[1],8($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov 32($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov 40($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[2] mov 16($aptr,$i),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[2],16($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[3] mov $S[3],24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry lea 64($tptr),$tptr add \$32,$i jnz .Lsqr4x_shift_n_add lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[0] # t[2*i]<<1 | shift .byte 0x67 shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[1] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[1] # | t[2*i]>>63 mov -16($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+2] # prefetch mov $A0[1],$shift # shift=t[2*i+1]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf mov -8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+2+1] # prefetch adc %rax,$S[0] mov -8($aptr),%rax # a[i+1] # prefetch mov $S[0],-32($tptr) adc %rdx,$S[1] lea ($shift,$A0[0],2),$S[2] # t[2*i]<<1|shift mov $S[1],-24($tptr) sbb $carry,$carry # mov cf,$carry shr \$63,$A0[0] lea ($j,$A0[1],2),$S[3] # t[2*i+1]<<1 | shr \$63,$A0[1] or $A0[0],$S[3] # | t[2*i]>>63 mul %rax # a[i]*a[i] neg $carry # mov $carry,cf adc %rax,$S[2] adc %rdx,$S[3] mov $S[2],-16($tptr) mov $S[3],-8($tptr) ___ } ###################################################################### # Montgomery reduction part, "word-by-word" algorithm. # # This new path is inspired by multiple submissions from Intel, by # Shay Gueron, Vlad Krasnov, Erdinc Ozturk, James Guilford, # Vinodh Gopal... { my ($nptr,$tptr,$carry,$m0)=("%rbp","%rdi","%rsi","%rbx"); $code.=<<___; movq %xmm2,$nptr __bn_sqr8x_reduction: xor %rax,%rax lea ($nptr,$num),%rcx # end of n[] lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx # end of t[] buffer mov %rcx,0+8(%rsp) lea 48+8(%rsp,$num),$tptr # end of initial t[] window mov %rdx,8+8(%rsp) neg $num jmp .L8x_reduction_loop .align 32 .L8x_reduction_loop: lea ($tptr,$num),$tptr # start of current t[] window .byte 0x66 mov 8*0($tptr),$m0 mov 8*1($tptr),%r9 mov 8*2($tptr),%r10 mov 8*3($tptr),%r11 mov 8*4($tptr),%r12 mov 8*5($tptr),%r13 mov 8*6($tptr),%r14 mov 8*7($tptr),%r15 mov %rax,(%rdx) # store top-most carry bit lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr .byte 0x67 mov $m0,%r8 imulq 32+8(%rsp),$m0 # n0*a[0] mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # n[0] mov \$8,%ecx jmp .L8x_reduce .align 32 .L8x_reduce: mulq $m0 mov 8*1($nptr),%rax # n[1] neg %r8 mov %rdx,%r8 adc \$0,%r8 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r9 mov 8*2($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r9,%r8 mov $m0,48-8+8(%rsp,%rcx,8) # put aside n0*a[i] mov %rdx,%r9 adc \$0,%r9 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r10 mov 8*3($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r10,%r9 mov 32+8(%rsp),$carry # pull n0, borrow $carry mov %rdx,%r10 adc \$0,%r10 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r11 mov 8*4($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx imulq %r8,$carry # modulo-scheduled add %r11,%r10 mov %rdx,%r11 adc \$0,%r11 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r12 mov 8*5($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r12,%r11 mov %rdx,%r12 adc \$0,%r12 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r13 mov 8*6($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r13,%r12 mov %rdx,%r13 adc \$0,%r13 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r14 mov 8*7($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r14,%r13 mov %rdx,%r14 adc \$0,%r14 mulq $m0 mov $carry,$m0 # n0*a[i] add %rax,%r15 mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # n[0] adc \$0,%rdx add %r15,%r14 mov %rdx,%r15 adc \$0,%r15 dec %ecx jnz .L8x_reduce lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr xor %rax,%rax mov 8+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull end of t[] cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .L8x_no_tail .byte 0x66 add 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 sbb $carry,$carry # top carry mov 48+56+8(%rsp),$m0 # pull n0*a[0] mov \$8,%ecx mov 8*0($nptr),%rax jmp .L8x_tail .align 32 .L8x_tail: mulq $m0 add %rax,%r8 mov 8*1($nptr),%rax mov %r8,($tptr) # save result mov %rdx,%r8 adc \$0,%r8 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r9 mov 8*2($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r9,%r8 lea 8($tptr),$tptr # $tptr++ mov %rdx,%r9 adc \$0,%r9 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r10 mov 8*3($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r10,%r9 mov %rdx,%r10 adc \$0,%r10 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r11 mov 8*4($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r11,%r10 mov %rdx,%r11 adc \$0,%r11 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r12 mov 8*5($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r12,%r11 mov %rdx,%r12 adc \$0,%r12 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r13 mov 8*6($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r13,%r12 mov %rdx,%r13 adc \$0,%r13 mulq $m0 add %rax,%r14 mov 8*7($nptr),%rax adc \$0,%rdx add %r14,%r13 mov %rdx,%r14 adc \$0,%r14 mulq $m0 mov 48-16+8(%rsp,%rcx,8),$m0# pull n0*a[i] add %rax,%r15 adc \$0,%rdx add %r15,%r14 mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # pull n[0] mov %rdx,%r15 adc \$0,%r15 dec %ecx jnz .L8x_tail lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr mov 8+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull end of t[] cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .L8x_tail_done # break out of loop mov 48+56+8(%rsp),$m0 # pull n0*a[0] neg $carry mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # pull n[0] adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 sbb $carry,$carry # top carry mov \$8,%ecx jmp .L8x_tail .align 32 .L8x_tail_done: xor %rax,%rax add (%rdx),%r8 # can this overflow? adc \$0,%r9 adc \$0,%r10 adc \$0,%r11 adc \$0,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 adc \$0,%r14 adc \$0,%r15 adc \$0,%rax neg $carry .L8x_no_tail: adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 adc \$0,%rax # top-most carry mov -8($nptr),%rcx # np[num-1] xor $carry,$carry movq %xmm2,$nptr # restore $nptr mov %r8,8*0($tptr) # store top 512 bits mov %r9,8*1($tptr) movq %xmm3,$num # $num is %r9, can't be moved upwards mov %r10,8*2($tptr) mov %r11,8*3($tptr) mov %r12,8*4($tptr) mov %r13,8*5($tptr) mov %r14,8*6($tptr) mov %r15,8*7($tptr) lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr cmp %rdx,$tptr # end of t[]? jb .L8x_reduction_loop ret .size bn_sqr8x_internal,.-bn_sqr8x_internal ___ } ############################################################## # Post-condition, 4x unrolled # { my ($tptr,$nptr)=("%rbx","%rbp"); $code.=<<___; .type __bn_post4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __bn_post4x_internal: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 lea (%rdi,$num),$tptr # %rdi was $tptr above mov $num,%rcx movq %xmm1,$rptr # restore $rptr neg %rax movq %xmm1,$aptr # prepare for back-to-back call sar \$3+2,%rcx dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] xor %r10,%r10 mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 jmp .Lsqr4x_sub_entry .align 16 .Lsqr4x_sub: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 .Lsqr4x_sub_entry: lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr not %r12 not %r13 not %r14 not %r15 and %rax,%r12 and %rax,%r13 and %rax,%r14 and %rax,%r15 neg %r10 # mov %r10,%cf adc 8*0($tptr),%r12 adc 8*1($tptr),%r13 adc 8*2($tptr),%r14 adc 8*3($tptr),%r15 mov %r12,8*0($rptr) lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr mov %r13,8*1($rptr) sbb %r10,%r10 # mov %cf,%r10 mov %r14,8*2($rptr) mov %r15,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr inc %rcx # pass %cf jnz .Lsqr4x_sub mov $num,%r10 # prepare for back-to-back call neg $num # restore $num ret .size __bn_post4x_internal,.-__bn_post4x_internal ___ } { $code.=<<___; .globl bn_from_montgomery .type bn_from_montgomery,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_from_montgomery: testl \$7,`($win64?"48(%rsp)":"%r9d")` jz bn_from_mont8x xor %eax,%eax ret .size bn_from_montgomery,.-bn_from_montgomery .type bn_from_mont8x,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_from_mont8x: .byte 0x67 mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lfrom_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). The stack is allocated to aligned with # bn_power5's frame, and as bn_from_montgomery happens to be # last operation, we use the opportunity to cleanse it. # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lfrom_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) jmp .Lfrom_sp_done .align 32 .Lfrom_sp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lfrom_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lfrom_page_walk jmp .Lfrom_page_walk_done .Lfrom_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lfrom_page_walk .Lfrom_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num ############################################################## # Stack layout # # +0 saved $num, used in reduction section # +8 &t[2*$num], used in reduction section # +32 saved *n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 t[2*$num] # mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lfrom_body: mov $num,%r11 lea 48(%rsp),%rax pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 jmp .Lmul_by_1 .align 32 .Lmul_by_1: movdqu ($aptr),%xmm1 movdqu 16($aptr),%xmm2 movdqu 32($aptr),%xmm3 movdqa %xmm0,(%rax,$num) movdqu 48($aptr),%xmm4 movdqa %xmm0,16(%rax,$num) .byte 0x48,0x8d,0xb6,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00 # lea 64($aptr),$aptr movdqa %xmm1,(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,32(%rax,$num) movdqa %xmm2,16(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,48(%rax,$num) movdqa %xmm3,32(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,48(%rax) lea 64(%rax),%rax sub \$64,%r11 jnz .Lmul_by_1 movq $rptr,%xmm1 movq $nptr,%xmm2 .byte 0x67 mov $nptr,%rbp movq %r10, %xmm3 # -num ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d and \$0x80108,%r11d cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1 jne .Lfrom_mont_nox lea (%rax,$num),$rptr call __bn_sqrx8x_reduction call __bn_postx4x_internal pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 lea 48(%rsp),%rax mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lfrom_mont_zero .align 32 .Lfrom_mont_nox: ___ $code.=<<___; call __bn_sqr8x_reduction call __bn_post4x_internal pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 lea 48(%rsp),%rax mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp jmp .Lfrom_mont_zero .align 32 .Lfrom_mont_zero: movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,16*1(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,16*2(%rax) movdqa %xmm0,16*3(%rax) lea 16*4(%rax),%rax sub \$32,$num jnz .Lfrom_mont_zero mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lfrom_epilogue: ret .size bn_from_mont8x,.-bn_from_mont8x ___ } }}} if ($addx) {{{ my $bp="%rdx"; # restore original value $code.=<<___; .type bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5: mov %rsp,%rax .Lmulx4x_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lmulx4x_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num # -$num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order # to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after # completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rp,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lmulx4xsp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) jmp .Lmulx4xsp_done .Lmulx4xsp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lmulx4xsp_done: and \$-64,%rbp # ensure alignment mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk jmp .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done .Lmulx4x_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lmulx4x_page_walk .Lmulx4x_page_walk_done: ############################################################## # Stack layout # +0 -num # +8 off-loaded &b[i] # +16 end of b[num] # +24 inner counter # +32 saved n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 # +56 saved rp # +64 tmp[num+1] # mov $n0, 32(%rsp) # save *n0 mov %rax,40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lmulx4x_body: call mulx4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lmulx4x_epilogue: ret .size bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5,.-bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .type mulx4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 mulx4x_internal: mov $num,8(%rsp) # save -$num (it was in bytes) mov $num,%r10 neg $num # restore $num shl \$5,$num neg %r10 # restore $num lea 128($bp,$num),%r13 # end of powers table (+size optimization) shr \$5+5,$num movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5 # load 7th argument sub \$1,$num lea .Linc(%rip),%rax mov %r13,16+8(%rsp) # end of b[num] mov $num,24+8(%rsp) # inner counter mov $rp, 56+8(%rsp) # save $rp ___ my ($aptr, $bptr, $nptr, $tptr, $mi, $bi, $zero, $num)= ("%rsi","%rdi","%rcx","%rbx","%r8","%r9","%rbp","%rax"); my $rptr=$bptr; my $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size" my $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size $code.=<<___; movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 88-112(%rsp,%r10),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimizaton) lea 128($bp),$bptr # size optimization pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 .byte 0x67 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack # $code.=<<___; .byte 0x67 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 ___ } $code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized .byte 0x67 paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10) paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10) pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0 # while it's still in register pand `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1 pand `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2 movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10) pand `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm5 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5 por %xmm4,%xmm0 pand `16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm5,%xmm1 pand `16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm0 por %xmm3,%xmm1 ___ } $code.=<<___; pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1 por %xmm1,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bptr),$bptr movq %xmm0,%rdx # bp[0] lea 64+8*4+8(%rsp),$tptr mov %rdx,$bi mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%rax # a[0]*b[0] mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r12 # a[1]*b[0] add %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%rax,%r13 # ... adc %rax,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rax,%r14 mov $mi,%r15 imulq 32+8(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov $mi,%rdx mov $bptr,8+8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 mov 24+8(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r10,-8*4($tptr) adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r11,-8*3($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r12,-8*2($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_1st .align 32 .Lmulx4x_1st: adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[0] adcx %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[0] adcx %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 .byte 0x67,0x67 mov $mi,%rdx adcx %rax,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) adox %r15,%r13 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_1st mov 8(%rsp),$num # load -num adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled lea ($aptr,$num),$aptr # rewind $aptr add %r15,%r14 mov 8+8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] adc $zero,$zero # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) jmp .Lmulx4x_outer .align 32 .Lmulx4x_outer: lea 16-256($tptr),%r10 # where 256-byte mask is (+density control) pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 .byte 0x67,0x67 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)+256`(%r10),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)+256`(%r10),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($i+2)+256`(%r10),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($i+3)+256`(%r10),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 lea $STRIDE($bptr),$bptr movq %xmm0,%rdx # m0=bp[i] mov $zero,($tptr) # save top-most carry lea 4*8($tptr,$num),$tptr # rewind $tptr mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%r11 # a[0]*b[i] xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov %rdx,$bi mulx 1*8($aptr),%r14,%r12 # a[1]*b[i] adox -4*8($tptr),$mi # +t[0] adcx %r14,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r15,%r13 # ... adox -3*8($tptr),%r11 adcx %r15,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%rdx,%r14 adox -2*8($tptr),%r12 adcx %rdx,%r13 lea ($nptr,$num),$nptr # rewind $nptr lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr adox -1*8($tptr),%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 adox $zero,%r14 mov $mi,%r15 imulq 32+8(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0 mov $mi,%rdx xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mov $bptr,8+8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i] mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded adox %r11,%r10 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx mov 24+8(%rsp),$bptr # counter value mov %r10,-8*4($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 mov %r11,-8*3($tptr) adox $zero,%r15 # of=0 mov %r12,-8*2($tptr) lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr jmp .Lmulx4x_inner .align 32 .Lmulx4x_inner: mulx 0*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # a[4]*b[i] adcx $zero,%r15 # cf=0, modulo-scheduled adox %r14,%r10 mulx 1*8($aptr),%r11,%r14 # a[5]*b[i] adcx 0*8($tptr),%r10 adox %rax,%r11 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r12,%rax # ... adcx 1*8($tptr),%r11 adox %r14,%r12 mulx 3*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 mov $mi,%rdx adcx 2*8($tptr),%r12 adox %rax,%r13 adcx 3*8($tptr),%r13 adox $zero,%r14 # of=0 lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 adox %r15,%r10 mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r15,%r11 mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r15,%r12 mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %r10,-5*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r15,%r13 mov %r11,-4*8($tptr) mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov $bi,%rdx lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr mov %r12,-3*8($tptr) adcx %rax,%r13 adox $zero,%r15 mov %r13,-2*8($tptr) dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf jnz .Lmulx4x_inner mov 0+8(%rsp),$num # load -num adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled sub 0*8($tptr),$bptr # pull top-most carry to %cf mov 8+8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i] mov 16+8(%rsp),%r10 adc %r15,%r14 lea ($aptr,$num),$aptr # rewind $aptr adc $zero,$zero # top-most carry mov %r14,-1*8($tptr) cmp %r10,$bptr jb .Lmulx4x_outer mov -8($nptr),%r10 mov $zero,%r8 mov ($nptr,$num),%r12 lea ($nptr,$num),%rbp # rewind $nptr mov $num,%rcx lea ($tptr,$num),%rdi # rewind $tptr xor %eax,%eax xor %r15,%r15 sub %r14,%r10 # compare top-most words adc %r15,%r15 or %r15,%r8 sar \$3+2,%rcx sub %r8,%rax # %rax=-%r8 mov 56+8(%rsp),%rdx # restore rp dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] mov 8*1(%rbp),%r13 xor %r8,%r8 mov 8*2(%rbp),%r14 mov 8*3(%rbp),%r15 jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry # common post-condition .size mulx4x_internal,.-mulx4x_internal ___ } { ###################################################################### # void bn_power5( my $rptr="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rptr, my $aptr="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *aptr, my $bptr="%rdx"; # const void *table, my $nptr="%rcx"; # const BN_ULONG *nptr, my $n0 ="%r8"; # const BN_ULONG *n0); my $num ="%r9"; # int num, has to be divisible by 8 # int pwr); my ($i,$j,$tptr)=("%rbp","%rcx",$rptr); my @A0=("%r10","%r11"); my @A1=("%r12","%r13"); my ($a0,$a1,$ai)=("%r14","%r15","%rbx"); $code.=<<___; .type bn_powerx5,\@function,6 .align 32 bn_powerx5: mov %rsp,%rax .Lpowerx5_enter: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lpowerx5_prologue: shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes neg $num mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0 ############################################################## # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num] # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation # logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask # calculated from 7th argument, the index.] # lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 mov %rsp,%rbp sub $rptr,%r11 and \$4095,%r11 cmp %r11,%r10 jb .Lpwrx_sp_alt sub %r11,%rbp # align with $aptr lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # future alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) jmp .Lpwrx_sp_done .align 32 .Lpwrx_sp_alt: lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10 lea -320(%rbp,$num,2),%rbp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256) sub %r10,%r11 mov \$0,%r10 cmovc %r10,%r11 sub %r11,%rbp .Lpwrx_sp_done: and \$-64,%rbp mov %rsp,%r11 sub %rbp,%r11 and \$-4096,%r11 lea (%rbp,%r11),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwrx_page_walk jmp .Lpwrx_page_walk_done .Lpwrx_page_walk: lea -4096(%rsp),%rsp mov (%rsp),%r10 cmp %rbp,%rsp ja .Lpwrx_page_walk .Lpwrx_page_walk_done: mov $num,%r10 neg $num ############################################################## # Stack layout # # +0 saved $num, used in reduction section # +8 &t[2*$num], used in reduction section # +16 intermediate carry bit # +24 top-most carry bit, used in reduction section # +32 saved *n0 # +40 saved %rsp # +48 t[2*$num] # pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr movq $nptr,%xmm2 # save $nptr movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num movq $bptr,%xmm4 mov $n0, 32(%rsp) mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp .Lpowerx5_body: call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal call __bn_sqrx8x_internal call __bn_postx4x_internal mov %r10,$num # -num mov $aptr,$rptr movq %xmm2,$nptr movq %xmm4,$bptr mov 40(%rsp),%rax call mulx4x_internal mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp mov \$1,%rax mov -48(%rsi),%r15 mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lpowerx5_epilogue: ret .size bn_powerx5,.-bn_powerx5 .globl bn_sqrx8x_internal .hidden bn_sqrx8x_internal .type bn_sqrx8x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_sqrx8x_internal: __bn_sqrx8x_internal: ################################################################## # Squaring part: # # a) multiply-n-add everything but a[i]*a[i]; # b) shift result of a) by 1 to the left and accumulate # a[i]*a[i] products; # ################################################################## # a[7]a[7]a[6]a[6]a[5]a[5]a[4]a[4]a[3]a[3]a[2]a[2]a[1]a[1]a[0]a[0] # a[1]a[0] # a[2]a[0] # a[3]a[0] # a[2]a[1] # a[3]a[1] # a[3]a[2] # # a[4]a[0] # a[5]a[0] # a[6]a[0] # a[7]a[0] # a[4]a[1] # a[5]a[1] # a[6]a[1] # a[7]a[1] # a[4]a[2] # a[5]a[2] # a[6]a[2] # a[7]a[2] # a[4]a[3] # a[5]a[3] # a[6]a[3] # a[7]a[3] # # a[5]a[4] # a[6]a[4] # a[7]a[4] # a[6]a[5] # a[7]a[5] # a[7]a[6] # a[7]a[7]a[6]a[6]a[5]a[5]a[4]a[4]a[3]a[3]a[2]a[2]a[1]a[1]a[0]a[0] ___ { my ($zero,$carry)=("%rbp","%rcx"); my $aaptr=$zero; $code.=<<___; lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr lea ($aptr,$num),$aaptr mov $num,0+8(%rsp) # save $num mov $aaptr,8+8(%rsp) # save end of $aptr jmp .Lsqr8x_zero_start .align 32 .byte 0x66,0x66,0x66,0x2e,0x0f,0x1f,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 .Lsqrx8x_zero: .byte 0x3e movdqa %xmm0,0*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,2*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,4*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,6*8($tptr) .Lsqr8x_zero_start: # aligned at 32 movdqa %xmm0,8*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,10*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,12*8($tptr) movdqa %xmm0,14*8($tptr) lea 16*8($tptr),$tptr sub \$64,$num jnz .Lsqrx8x_zero mov 0*8($aptr),%rdx # a[0], modulo-scheduled #xor %r9,%r9 # t[1], ex-$num, zero already xor %r10,%r10 xor %r11,%r11 xor %r12,%r12 xor %r13,%r13 xor %r14,%r14 xor %r15,%r15 lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, cf=0 jmp .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop: mulx 1*8($aptr),%r8,%rax # a[1]*a[0] adcx %r9,%r8 # a[1]*a[0]+=t[1] adox %rax,%r10 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r9,%rax # a[2]*a[0] adcx %r10,%r9 adox %rax,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xab,0xf6,0x86,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 3*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # ... adcx %r11,%r10 adox %rax,%r12 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 4*8($aptr),%r11,%rax adcx %r12,%r11 adox %rax,%r13 mulx 5*8($aptr),%r12,%rax adcx %r13,%r12 adox %rax,%r14 mulx 6*8($aptr),%r13,%rax adcx %r14,%r13 adox %r15,%rax mulx 7*8($aptr),%r14,%r15 mov 1*8($aptr),%rdx # a[1] adcx %rax,%r14 adox $zero,%r15 adc 8*8($tptr),%r15 mov %r8,1*8($tptr) # t[1] mov %r9,2*8($tptr) # t[2] sbb $carry,$carry # mov %cf,$carry xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0 mulx 2*8($aptr),%r8,%rbx # a[2]*a[1] mulx 3*8($aptr),%r9,%rax # a[3]*a[1] adcx %r10,%r8 adox %rbx,%r9 mulx 4*8($aptr),%r10,%rbx # ... adcx %r11,%r9 adox %rax,%r10 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 5*8($aptr),%r11,%rax adcx %r12,%r10 adox %rbx,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0x9b,0xf6,0x9e,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 6*8($aptr),%r12,%rbx adcx %r13,%r11 adox %r14,%r12 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0x93,0xf6,0xb6,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 7*8($aptr),%r13,%r14 mov 2*8($aptr),%rdx # a[2] adcx %rax,%r12 adox %rbx,%r13 adcx %r15,%r13 adox $zero,%r14 # of=0 adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0 mov %r8,3*8($tptr) # t[3] mov %r9,4*8($tptr) # t[4] mulx 3*8($aptr),%r8,%rbx # a[3]*a[2] mulx 4*8($aptr),%r9,%rax # a[4]*a[2] adcx %r10,%r8 adox %rbx,%r9 mulx 5*8($aptr),%r10,%rbx # ... adcx %r11,%r9 adox %rax,%r10 .byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xa3,0xf6,0x86,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 6*8($aptr),%r11,%rax adcx %r12,%r10 adox %r13,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0x9b,0xf6,0xae,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 7*8($aptr),%r12,%r13 .byte 0x3e mov 3*8($aptr),%rdx # a[3] adcx %rbx,%r11 adox %rax,%r12 adcx %r14,%r12 mov %r8,5*8($tptr) # t[5] mov %r9,6*8($tptr) # t[6] mulx 4*8($aptr),%r8,%rax # a[4]*a[3] adox $zero,%r13 # of=0 adcx $zero,%r13 # cf=0 mulx 5*8($aptr),%r9,%rbx # a[5]*a[3] adcx %r10,%r8 adox %rax,%r9 mulx 6*8($aptr),%r10,%rax # ... adcx %r11,%r9 adox %r12,%r10 mulx 7*8($aptr),%r11,%r12 mov 4*8($aptr),%rdx # a[4] mov 5*8($aptr),%r14 # a[5] adcx %rbx,%r10 adox %rax,%r11 mov 6*8($aptr),%r15 # a[6] adcx %r13,%r11 adox $zero,%r12 # of=0 adcx $zero,%r12 # cf=0 mov %r8,7*8($tptr) # t[7] mov %r9,8*8($tptr) # t[8] mulx %r14,%r9,%rax # a[5]*a[4] mov 7*8($aptr),%r8 # a[7] adcx %r10,%r9 mulx %r15,%r10,%rbx # a[6]*a[4] adox %rax,%r10 adcx %r11,%r10 mulx %r8,%r11,%rax # a[7]*a[4] mov %r14,%rdx # a[5] adox %rbx,%r11 adcx %r12,%r11 #adox $zero,%rax # of=0 adcx $zero,%rax # cf=0 mulx %r15,%r14,%rbx # a[6]*a[5] mulx %r8,%r12,%r13 # a[7]*a[5] mov %r15,%rdx # a[6] lea 8*8($aptr),$aptr adcx %r14,%r11 adox %rbx,%r12 adcx %rax,%r12 adox $zero,%r13 .byte 0x67,0x67 mulx %r8,%r8,%r14 # a[7]*a[6] adcx %r8,%r13 adcx $zero,%r14 cmp 8+8(%rsp),$aptr je .Lsqrx8x_outer_break neg $carry # mov $carry,%cf mov \$-8,%rcx mov $zero,%r15 mov 8*8($tptr),%r8 adcx 9*8($tptr),%r9 # +=t[9] adcx 10*8($tptr),%r10 # ... adcx 11*8($tptr),%r11 adc 12*8($tptr),%r12 adc 13*8($tptr),%r13 adc 14*8($tptr),%r14 adc 15*8($tptr),%r15 lea ($aptr),$aaptr lea 2*64($tptr),$tptr sbb %rax,%rax # mov %cf,$carry mov -64($aptr),%rdx # a[0] mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) # offload $carry mov $tptr,24+8(%rsp) #lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr # see 2*8*8($tptr) above xor %eax,%eax # cf=0, of=0 jmp .Lsqrx8x_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_loop: mov %r8,%rbx mulx 0*8($aaptr),%rax,%r8 # a[8]*a[i] adcx %rax,%rbx # +=t[8] adox %r9,%r8 mulx 1*8($aaptr),%rax,%r9 # ... adcx %rax,%r8 adox %r10,%r9 mulx 2*8($aaptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r9 adox %r11,%r10 mulx 3*8($aaptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 4*8($aaptr),%rax,%r12 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 5*8($aaptr),%rax,%r13 adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r14,%r13 mulx 6*8($aaptr),%rax,%r14 mov %rbx,($tptr,%rcx,8) # store t[8+i] mov \$0,%ebx adcx %rax,%r13 adox %r15,%r14 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbd,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 7*8($aaptr),%rax,%r15 mov 8($aptr,%rcx,8),%rdx # a[i] adcx %rax,%r14 adox %rbx,%r15 # %rbx is 0, of=0 adcx %rbx,%r15 # cf=0 .byte 0x67 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Lsqrx8x_loop lea 8*8($aaptr),$aaptr mov \$-8,%rcx cmp 8+8(%rsp),$aaptr # done? je .Lsqrx8x_break sub 16+8(%rsp),%rbx # mov 16(%rsp),%cf .byte 0x66 mov -64($aptr),%rdx adcx 0*8($tptr),%r8 adcx 1*8($tptr),%r9 adc 2*8($tptr),%r10 adc 3*8($tptr),%r11 adc 4*8($tptr),%r12 adc 5*8($tptr),%r13 adc 6*8($tptr),%r14 adc 7*8($tptr),%r15 lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr .byte 0x67 sbb %rax,%rax # mov %cf,%rax xor %ebx,%ebx # cf=0, of=0 mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) # offload carry jmp .Lsqrx8x_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_break: xor $zero,$zero sub 16+8(%rsp),%rbx # mov 16(%rsp),%cf adcx $zero,%r8 mov 24+8(%rsp),$carry # initial $tptr, borrow $carry adcx $zero,%r9 mov 0*8($aptr),%rdx # a[8], modulo-scheduled adc \$0,%r10 mov %r8,0*8($tptr) adc \$0,%r11 adc \$0,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 adc \$0,%r14 adc \$0,%r15 cmp $carry,$tptr # cf=0, of=0 je .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop mov %r9,1*8($tptr) mov 1*8($carry),%r9 mov %r10,2*8($tptr) mov 2*8($carry),%r10 mov %r11,3*8($tptr) mov 3*8($carry),%r11 mov %r12,4*8($tptr) mov 4*8($carry),%r12 mov %r13,5*8($tptr) mov 5*8($carry),%r13 mov %r14,6*8($tptr) mov 6*8($carry),%r14 mov %r15,7*8($tptr) mov 7*8($carry),%r15 mov $carry,$tptr jmp .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_outer_break: mov %r9,9*8($tptr) # t[9] movq %xmm3,%rcx # -$num mov %r10,10*8($tptr) # ... mov %r11,11*8($tptr) mov %r12,12*8($tptr) mov %r13,13*8($tptr) mov %r14,14*8($tptr) ___ } { my $i="%rcx"; $code.=<<___; lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr mov ($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[0] mov 8($tptr),$A0[1] # t[1] xor $A0[0],$A0[0] # t[0], of=0, cf=0 mov 0+8(%rsp),$num # restore $num adox $A0[1],$A0[1] mov 16($tptr),$A1[0] # t[2] # prefetch mov 24($tptr),$A1[1] # t[3] # prefetch #jmp .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add # happens to be aligned .align 32 .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add: mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A1[0],$A1[0] adcx $A0[0],%rax .byte 0x48,0x8b,0x94,0x0e,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov 8($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+1] # prefetch .byte 0x4c,0x8b,0x97,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov 32($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+4] # prefetch adox $A1[1],$A1[1] adcx $A0[1],%rbx mov 40($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+4+1] # prefetch mov %rax,0($tptr) mov %rbx,8($tptr) mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A0[0],$A0[0] adcx $A1[0],%rax mov 16($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+2] # prefetch mov 48($tptr),$A1[0] # t[2*i+6] # prefetch adox $A0[1],$A0[1] adcx $A1[1],%rbx mov 56($tptr),$A1[1] # t[2*i+6+1] # prefetch mov %rax,16($tptr) mov %rbx,24($tptr) mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A1[0],$A1[0] adcx $A0[0],%rax mov 24($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+3] # prefetch lea 32($i),$i mov 64($tptr),$A0[0] # t[2*i+8] # prefetch adox $A1[1],$A1[1] adcx $A0[1],%rbx mov 72($tptr),$A0[1] # t[2*i+8+1] # prefetch mov %rax,32($tptr) mov %rbx,40($tptr) mulx %rdx,%rax,%rbx adox $A0[0],$A0[0] adcx $A1[0],%rax jrcxz .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add_break .byte 0x48,0x8b,0x94,0x0e,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov 0($aptr,$i),%rdx # a[i+4] # prefetch adox $A0[1],$A0[1] adcx $A1[1],%rbx mov 80($tptr),$A1[0] # t[2*i+10] # prefetch mov 88($tptr),$A1[1] # t[2*i+10+1] # prefetch mov %rax,48($tptr) mov %rbx,56($tptr) lea 64($tptr),$tptr nop jmp .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add .align 32 .Lsqrx4x_shift_n_add_break: adcx $A1[1],%rbx mov %rax,48($tptr) mov %rbx,56($tptr) lea 64($tptr),$tptr # end of t[] buffer ___ } ###################################################################### # Montgomery reduction part, "word-by-word" algorithm. # # This new path is inspired by multiple submissions from Intel, by # Shay Gueron, Vlad Krasnov, Erdinc Ozturk, James Guilford, # Vinodh Gopal... { my ($nptr,$carry,$m0)=("%rbp","%rsi","%rdx"); $code.=<<___; movq %xmm2,$nptr __bn_sqrx8x_reduction: xor %eax,%eax # initial top-most carry bit mov 32+8(%rsp),%rbx # n0 mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # "%r8", 8*0($tptr) lea -8*8($nptr,$num),%rcx # end of n[] #lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of t[] buffer mov %rcx, 0+8(%rsp) # save end of n[] mov $tptr,8+8(%rsp) # save end of t[] lea 48+8(%rsp),$tptr # initial t[] window jmp .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop: mov 8*1($tptr),%r9 mov 8*2($tptr),%r10 mov 8*3($tptr),%r11 mov 8*4($tptr),%r12 mov %rdx,%r8 imulq %rbx,%rdx # n0*a[i] mov 8*5($tptr),%r13 mov 8*6($tptr),%r14 mov 8*7($tptr),%r15 mov %rax,24+8(%rsp) # store top-most carry bit lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr xor $carry,$carry # cf=0,of=0 mov \$-8,%rcx jmp .Lsqrx8x_reduce .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_reduce: mov %r8, %rbx mulx 8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8 # n[0] adcx %rbx,%rax # discarded adox %r9,%r8 mulx 8*1($nptr),%rbx,%r9 # n[1] adcx %rbx,%r8 adox %r10,%r9 mulx 8*2($nptr),%rbx,%r10 adcx %rbx,%r9 adox %r11,%r10 mulx 8*3($nptr),%rbx,%r11 adcx %rbx,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xe3,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 8*4($nptr),%rbx,%r12 mov %rdx,%rax mov %r8,%rdx adcx %rbx,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 32+8(%rsp),%rbx,%rdx # %rdx discarded mov %rax,%rdx mov %rax,64+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8) # put aside n0*a[i] mulx 8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13 adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r14,%r13 mulx 8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14 adcx %rax,%r13 adox %r15,%r14 mulx 8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov %rbx,%rdx adcx %rax,%r14 adox $carry,%r15 # $carry is 0 adcx $carry,%r15 # cf=0 .byte 0x67,0x67,0x67 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Lsqrx8x_reduce mov $carry,%rax # xor %rax,%rax cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .Lsqrx8x_no_tail mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull n0*a[0] add 8*0($tptr),%r8 lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr mov \$-8,%rcx adcx 8*1($tptr),%r9 adcx 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr sbb %rax,%rax # top carry xor $carry,$carry # of=0, cf=0 mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) jmp .Lsqrx8x_tail .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_tail: mov %r8,%rbx mulx 8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8 adcx %rax,%rbx adox %r9,%r8 mulx 8*1($nptr),%rax,%r9 adcx %rax,%r8 adox %r10,%r9 mulx 8*2($nptr),%rax,%r10 adcx %rax,%r9 adox %r11,%r10 mulx 8*3($nptr),%rax,%r11 adcx %rax,%r10 adox %r12,%r11 .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 8*4($nptr),%rax,%r12 adcx %rax,%r11 adox %r13,%r12 mulx 8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13 adcx %rax,%r12 adox %r14,%r13 mulx 8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14 adcx %rax,%r13 adox %r15,%r14 mulx 8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15 mov 72+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8),%rdx # pull n0*a[i] adcx %rax,%r14 adox $carry,%r15 mov %rbx,($tptr,%rcx,8) # save result mov %r8,%rbx adcx $carry,%r15 # cf=0 inc %rcx # of=0 jnz .Lsqrx8x_tail cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]? jae .Lsqrx8x_tail_done # break out of loop sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull n0*a[0] lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 lea 8*8($tptr),$tptr sbb %rax,%rax sub \$8,%rcx # mov \$-8,%rcx xor $carry,$carry # of=0, cf=0 mov %rax,16+8(%rsp) jmp .Lsqrx8x_tail .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_tail_done: xor %rax,%rax add 24+8(%rsp),%r8 # can this overflow? adc \$0,%r9 adc \$0,%r10 adc \$0,%r11 adc \$0,%r12 adc \$0,%r13 adc \$0,%r14 adc \$0,%r15 adc \$0,%rax sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf .Lsqrx8x_no_tail: # %cf is 0 if jumped here adc 8*0($tptr),%r8 movq %xmm3,%rcx adc 8*1($tptr),%r9 mov 8*7($nptr),$carry movq %xmm2,$nptr # restore $nptr adc 8*2($tptr),%r10 adc 8*3($tptr),%r11 adc 8*4($tptr),%r12 adc 8*5($tptr),%r13 adc 8*6($tptr),%r14 adc 8*7($tptr),%r15 adc \$0,%rax # top-most carry mov 32+8(%rsp),%rbx # n0 mov 8*8($tptr,%rcx),%rdx # modulo-scheduled "%r8" mov %r8,8*0($tptr) # store top 512 bits lea 8*8($tptr),%r8 # borrow %r8 mov %r9,8*1($tptr) mov %r10,8*2($tptr) mov %r11,8*3($tptr) mov %r12,8*4($tptr) mov %r13,8*5($tptr) mov %r14,8*6($tptr) mov %r15,8*7($tptr) lea 8*8($tptr,%rcx),$tptr # start of current t[] window cmp 8+8(%rsp),%r8 # end of t[]? jb .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop ret .size bn_sqrx8x_internal,.-bn_sqrx8x_internal ___ } ############################################################## # Post-condition, 4x unrolled # { my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp"); $code.=<<___; .align 32 __bn_postx4x_internal: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 mov %rcx,%r10 # -$num mov %rcx,%r9 # -$num neg %rax sar \$3+2,%rcx #lea 48+8(%rsp,%r9),$tptr movq %xmm1,$rptr # restore $rptr movq %xmm1,$aptr # prepare for back-to-back call dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0] mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 xor %r8,%r8 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry .align 16 .Lsqrx4x_sub: mov 8*0($nptr),%r12 mov 8*1($nptr),%r13 mov 8*2($nptr),%r14 mov 8*3($nptr),%r15 .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry: andn %rax,%r12,%r12 lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr andn %rax,%r13,%r13 andn %rax,%r14,%r14 andn %rax,%r15,%r15 neg %r8 # mov %r8,%cf adc 8*0($tptr),%r12 adc 8*1($tptr),%r13 adc 8*2($tptr),%r14 adc 8*3($tptr),%r15 mov %r12,8*0($rptr) lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr mov %r13,8*1($rptr) sbb %r8,%r8 # mov %cf,%r8 mov %r14,8*2($rptr) mov %r15,8*3($rptr) lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr inc %rcx jnz .Lsqrx4x_sub neg %r9 # restore $num ret .size __bn_postx4x_internal,.-__bn_postx4x_internal ___ } }}} { my ($inp,$num,$tbl,$idx)=$win64?("%rcx","%edx","%r8", "%r9d") : # Win64 order ("%rdi","%esi","%rdx","%ecx"); # Unix order my $out=$inp; my $STRIDE=2**5*8; my $N=$STRIDE/4; $code.=<<___; .globl bn_get_bits5 .type bn_get_bits5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bn_get_bits5: lea 0($inp),%r10 lea 1($inp),%r11 mov $num,%ecx shr \$4,$num and \$15,%ecx lea -8(%ecx),%eax cmp \$11,%ecx cmova %r11,%r10 cmova %eax,%ecx movzw (%r10,$num,2),%eax shrl %cl,%eax and \$31,%eax ret .size bn_get_bits5,.-bn_get_bits5 .globl bn_scatter5 .type bn_scatter5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 bn_scatter5: cmp \$0, $num jz .Lscatter_epilogue lea ($tbl,$idx,8),$tbl .Lscatter: mov ($inp),%rax lea 8($inp),$inp mov %rax,($tbl) lea 32*8($tbl),$tbl sub \$1,$num jnz .Lscatter .Lscatter_epilogue: ret .size bn_scatter5,.-bn_scatter5 .globl bn_gather5 .type bn_gather5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 bn_gather5: .LSEH_begin_bn_gather5: # Win64 thing, but harmless in other cases # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x4c,0x8d,0x14,0x24 #lea (%rsp),%r10 .byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0x08,0x01,0x00,0x00 #sub $0x108,%rsp lea .Linc(%rip),%rax and \$-16,%rsp # shouldn't be formally required movd $idx,%xmm5 movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000 movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002 lea 128($tbl),%r11 # size optimization lea 128(%rsp),%rax # size optimization pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast $idx movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4 movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ ######################################################################## # calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to $idx and save result to stack # for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; paddd %xmm0,%xmm1 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i); movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3 paddd %xmm1,%xmm2 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2 movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)-128`(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0 paddd %xmm2,%xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4 movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)-128`(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1 paddd %xmm3,%xmm0 pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6 movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)-128`(%rax) movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2 ___ } $code.=<<___; movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax) jmp .Lgather .align 32 .Lgather: pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 ___ for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) { $code.=<<___; movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`(%r11),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`(%r11),%xmm1 movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`(%r11),%xmm2 pand `16*($i+0)-128`(%rax),%xmm0 movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`(%r11),%xmm3 pand `16*($i+1)-128`(%rax),%xmm1 por %xmm0,%xmm4 pand `16*($i+2)-128`(%rax),%xmm2 por %xmm1,%xmm5 pand `16*($i+3)-128`(%rax),%xmm3 por %xmm2,%xmm4 por %xmm3,%xmm5 ___ } $code.=<<___; por %xmm5,%xmm4 lea $STRIDE(%r11),%r11 pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0 por %xmm4,%xmm0 movq %xmm0,($out) # m0=bp[0] lea 8($out),$out sub \$1,$num jnz .Lgather lea (%r10),%rsp ret .LSEH_end_bn_gather5: .size bn_gather5,.-bn_gather5 ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .Linc: .long 0,0, 1,1 .long 2,2, 2,2 .asciz "Montgomery Multiplication with scatter/gather for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type mul_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 mul_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRip>=epilogue label jb .Lcommon_pop_regs mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 8(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[2] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail lea .Lmul_epilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx ja .Lbody_40 mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer jmp .Lcommon_pop_regs .Lbody_40: mov 40(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer .Lcommon_pop_regs: mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size mul_handler,.-mul_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_power5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_power5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_power5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_from_mont8x .rva .LSEH_end_bn_from_mont8x .rva .LSEH_info_bn_from_mont8x ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5 .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_powerx5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_powerx5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_powerx5 ___ $code.=<<___; .rva .LSEH_begin_bn_gather5 .rva .LSEH_end_bn_gather5 .rva .LSEH_info_bn_gather5 .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mul_mont_gather5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul_body,.Lmul_body,.Lmul_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mul4x_mont_gather5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmul4x_prologue,.Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_power5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lpower5_prologue,.Lpower5_body,.Lpower5_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_from_mont8x: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lfrom_prologue,.Lfrom_body,.Lfrom_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lmulx4x_prologue,.Lmulx4x_body,.Lmulx4x_epilogue # HandlerData[] .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_powerx5: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva mul_handler .rva .Lpowerx5_prologue,.Lpowerx5_body,.Lpowerx5_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___; .align 8 .LSEH_info_bn_gather5: .byte 0x01,0x0b,0x03,0x0a .byte 0x0b,0x01,0x21,0x00 # sub rsp,0x108 .byte 0x04,0xa3,0x00,0x00 # lea r10,(rsp) .align 8 ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl0000755000000000000000000005074513176625656017637 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # October 2005 # # "Teaser" Montgomery multiplication module for UltraSPARC. Why FPU? # Because unlike integer multiplier, which simply stalls whole CPU, # FPU is fully pipelined and can effectively emit 48 bit partial # product every cycle. Why not blended SPARC v9? One can argue that # making this module dependent on UltraSPARC VIS extension limits its # binary compatibility. Well yes, it does exclude SPARC64 prior-V(!) # implementations from compatibility matrix. But the rest, whole Sun # UltraSPARC family and brand new Fujitsu's SPARC64 V, all support # VIS extension instructions used in this module. This is considered # good enough to not care about HAL SPARC64 users [if any] who have # integer-only pure SPARCv9 module to "fall down" to. # USI&II cores currently exhibit uniform 2x improvement [over pre- # bn_mul_mont codebase] for all key lengths and benchmarks. On USIII # performance improves few percents for shorter keys and worsens few # percents for longer keys. This is because USIII integer multiplier # is >3x faster than USI&II one, which is harder to match [but see # TODO list below]. It should also be noted that SPARC64 V features # out-of-order execution, which *might* mean that integer multiplier # is pipelined, which in turn *might* be impossible to match... On # additional note, SPARC64 V implements FP Multiply-Add instruction, # which is perfectly usable in this context... In other words, as far # as Fujitsu SPARC64 V goes, talk to the author:-) # The implementation implies following "non-natural" limitations on # input arguments: # - num may not be less than 4; # - num has to be even; # Failure to meet either condition has no fatal effects, simply # doesn't give any performance gain. # TODO: # - modulo-schedule inner loop for better performance (on in-order # execution core such as UltraSPARC this shall result in further # noticeable(!) improvement); # - dedicated squaring procedure[?]; ###################################################################### # November 2006 # # Modulo-scheduled inner loops allow to interleave floating point and # integer instructions and minimize Read-After-Write penalties. This # results in *further* 20-50% performance improvement [depending on # key length, more for longer keys] on USI&II cores and 30-80% - on # USIII&IV. $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $fname="bn_mul_mont_fpu"; $frame="STACK_FRAME"; $bias="STACK_BIAS"; $locals=64; # In order to provide for 32-/64-bit ABI duality, I keep integers wider # than 32 bit in %g1-%g4 and %o0-%o5. %l0-%l7 and %i0-%i5 are used # exclusively for pointers, indexes and other small values... # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%i0"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%i1"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%i2"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%i3"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%i4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%i5"; # int num); $tp="%l0"; # t[num] $ap_l="%l1"; # a[num],n[num] are smashed to 32-bit words and saved $ap_h="%l2"; # to these four vectors as double-precision FP values. $np_l="%l3"; # This way a bunch of fxtods are eliminated in second $np_h="%l4"; # loop and L1-cache aliasing is minimized... $i="%l5"; $j="%l6"; $mask="%l7"; # 16-bit mask, 0xffff $n0="%g4"; # reassigned(!) to "64-bit" register $carry="%i4"; # %i4 reused(!) for a carry bit # FP register naming chart # # ..HILO # dcba # -------- # LOa # LOb # LOc # LOd # HIa # HIb # HIc # HId # ..a # ..b $ba="%f0"; $bb="%f2"; $bc="%f4"; $bd="%f6"; $na="%f8"; $nb="%f10"; $nc="%f12"; $nd="%f14"; $alo="%f16"; $alo_="%f17"; $ahi="%f18"; $ahi_="%f19"; $nlo="%f20"; $nlo_="%f21"; $nhi="%f22"; $nhi_="%f23"; $dota="%f24"; $dotb="%f26"; $aloa="%f32"; $alob="%f34"; $aloc="%f36"; $alod="%f38"; $ahia="%f40"; $ahib="%f42"; $ahic="%f44"; $ahid="%f46"; $nloa="%f48"; $nlob="%f50"; $nloc="%f52"; $nlod="%f54"; $nhia="%f56"; $nhib="%f58"; $nhic="%f60"; $nhid="%f62"; $ASI_FL16_P=0xD2; # magic ASI value to engage 16-bit FP load $code=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .global $fname .align 32 $fname: save %sp,-$frame-$locals,%sp cmp $num,4 bl,a,pn %icc,.Lret clr %i0 andcc $num,1,%g0 ! $num has to be even... bnz,a,pn %icc,.Lret clr %i0 ! signal "unsupported input value" srl $num,1,$num sethi %hi(0xffff),$mask ld [%i4+0],$n0 ! $n0 reassigned, remember? or $mask,%lo(0xffff),$mask ld [%i4+4],%o0 sllx %o0,32,%o0 or %o0,$n0,$n0 ! $n0=n0[1].n0[0] sll $num,3,$num ! num*=8 add %sp,$bias,%o0 ! real top of stack sll $num,2,%o1 add %o1,$num,%o1 ! %o1=num*5 sub %o0,%o1,%o0 and %o0,-2048,%o0 ! optimize TLB utilization sub %o0,$bias,%sp ! alloca(5*num*8) rd %asi,%o7 ! save %asi add %sp,$bias+$frame+$locals,$tp add $tp,$num,$ap_l add $ap_l,$num,$ap_l ! [an]p_[lh] point at the vectors' ends ! add $ap_l,$num,$ap_h add $ap_h,$num,$np_l add $np_l,$num,$np_h wr %g0,$ASI_FL16_P,%asi ! setup %asi for 16-bit FP loads add $rp,$num,$rp ! readjust input pointers to point add $ap,$num,$ap ! at the ends too... add $bp,$num,$bp add $np,$num,$np stx %o7,[%sp+$bias+$frame+48] ! save %asi sub %g0,$num,$i ! i=-num sub %g0,$num,$j ! j=-num add $ap,$j,%o3 add $bp,$i,%o4 ld [%o3+4],%g1 ! bp[0] ld [%o3+0],%o0 ld [%o4+4],%g5 ! ap[0] sllx %g1,32,%g1 ld [%o4+0],%o1 sllx %g5,32,%g5 or %g1,%o0,%o0 or %g5,%o1,%o1 add $np,$j,%o5 mulx %o1,%o0,%o0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] mulx $n0,%o0,%o0 ! ap[0]*bp[0]*n0 stx %o0,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] ld [%o3+0],$alo_ ! load a[j] as pair of 32-bit words fzeros $alo ld [%o3+4],$ahi_ fzeros $ahi ld [%o5+0],$nlo_ ! load n[j] as pair of 32-bit words fzeros $nlo ld [%o5+4],$nhi_ fzeros $nhi ! transfer b[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values ldda [%o4+2]%asi,$ba fxtod $alo,$alo ldda [%o4+0]%asi,$bb fxtod $ahi,$ahi ldda [%o4+6]%asi,$bc fxtod $nlo,$nlo ldda [%o4+4]%asi,$bd fxtod $nhi,$nhi ! transfer ap[0]*b[0]*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+6]%asi,$na fxtod $ba,$ba ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+4]%asi,$nb fxtod $bb,$bb ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+2]%asi,$nc fxtod $bc,$bc ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+0]%asi,$nd fxtod $bd,$bd std $alo,[$ap_l+$j] ! save smashed ap[j] in double format fxtod $na,$na std $ahi,[$ap_h+$j] fxtod $nb,$nb std $nlo,[$np_l+$j] ! save smashed np[j] in double format fxtod $nc,$nc std $nhi,[$np_h+$j] fxtod $nd,$nd fmuld $alo,$ba,$aloa fmuld $nlo,$na,$nloa fmuld $alo,$bb,$alob fmuld $nlo,$nb,$nlob fmuld $alo,$bc,$aloc faddd $aloa,$nloa,$nloa fmuld $nlo,$nc,$nloc fmuld $alo,$bd,$alod faddd $alob,$nlob,$nlob fmuld $nlo,$nd,$nlod fmuld $ahi,$ba,$ahia faddd $aloc,$nloc,$nloc fmuld $nhi,$na,$nhia fmuld $ahi,$bb,$ahib faddd $alod,$nlod,$nlod fmuld $nhi,$nb,$nhib fmuld $ahi,$bc,$ahic faddd $ahia,$nhia,$nhia fmuld $nhi,$nc,$nhic fmuld $ahi,$bd,$ahid faddd $ahib,$nhib,$nhib fmuld $nhi,$nd,$nhid faddd $ahic,$nhic,$dota ! $nhic faddd $ahid,$nhid,$dotb ! $nhid faddd $nloc,$nhia,$nloc faddd $nlod,$nhib,$nlod fdtox $nloa,$nloa fdtox $nlob,$nlob fdtox $nloc,$nloc fdtox $nlod,$nlod std $nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] add $j,8,$j std $nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8] add $ap,$j,%o4 std $nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16] add $np,$j,%o5 std $nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24] ld [%o4+0],$alo_ ! load a[j] as pair of 32-bit words fzeros $alo ld [%o4+4],$ahi_ fzeros $ahi ld [%o5+0],$nlo_ ! load n[j] as pair of 32-bit words fzeros $nlo ld [%o5+4],$nhi_ fzeros $nhi fxtod $alo,$alo fxtod $ahi,$ahi fxtod $nlo,$nlo fxtod $nhi,$nhi ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0 fmuld $alo,$ba,$aloa ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1 fmuld $nlo,$na,$nloa ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2 fmuld $alo,$bb,$alob ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3 fmuld $nlo,$nb,$nlob srlx %o0,16,%o7 std $alo,[$ap_l+$j] ! save smashed ap[j] in double format fmuld $alo,$bc,$aloc add %o7,%o1,%o1 std $ahi,[$ap_h+$j] faddd $aloa,$nloa,$nloa fmuld $nlo,$nc,$nloc srlx %o1,16,%o7 std $nlo,[$np_l+$j] ! save smashed np[j] in double format fmuld $alo,$bd,$alod add %o7,%o2,%o2 std $nhi,[$np_h+$j] faddd $alob,$nlob,$nlob fmuld $nlo,$nd,$nlod srlx %o2,16,%o7 fmuld $ahi,$ba,$ahia add %o7,%o3,%o3 ! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15] faddd $aloc,$nloc,$nloc fmuld $nhi,$na,$nhia !and %o0,$mask,%o0 !and %o1,$mask,%o1 !and %o2,$mask,%o2 !sllx %o1,16,%o1 !sllx %o2,32,%o2 !sllx %o3,48,%o7 !or %o1,%o0,%o0 !or %o2,%o0,%o0 !or %o7,%o0,%o0 ! 64-bit result srlx %o3,16,%g1 ! 34-bit carry fmuld $ahi,$bb,$ahib faddd $alod,$nlod,$nlod fmuld $nhi,$nb,$nhib fmuld $ahi,$bc,$ahic faddd $ahia,$nhia,$nhia fmuld $nhi,$nc,$nhic fmuld $ahi,$bd,$ahid faddd $ahib,$nhib,$nhib fmuld $nhi,$nd,$nhid faddd $dota,$nloa,$nloa faddd $dotb,$nlob,$nlob faddd $ahic,$nhic,$dota ! $nhic faddd $ahid,$nhid,$dotb ! $nhid faddd $nloc,$nhia,$nloc faddd $nlod,$nhib,$nlod fdtox $nloa,$nloa fdtox $nlob,$nlob fdtox $nloc,$nloc fdtox $nlod,$nlod std $nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] std $nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8] addcc $j,8,$j std $nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16] bz,pn %icc,.L1stskip std $nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24] .align 32 ! incidentally already aligned ! .L1st: add $ap,$j,%o4 add $np,$j,%o5 ld [%o4+0],$alo_ ! load a[j] as pair of 32-bit words fzeros $alo ld [%o4+4],$ahi_ fzeros $ahi ld [%o5+0],$nlo_ ! load n[j] as pair of 32-bit words fzeros $nlo ld [%o5+4],$nhi_ fzeros $nhi fxtod $alo,$alo fxtod $ahi,$ahi fxtod $nlo,$nlo fxtod $nhi,$nhi ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0 fmuld $alo,$ba,$aloa ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1 fmuld $nlo,$na,$nloa ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2 fmuld $alo,$bb,$alob ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3 fmuld $nlo,$nb,$nlob srlx %o0,16,%o7 std $alo,[$ap_l+$j] ! save smashed ap[j] in double format fmuld $alo,$bc,$aloc add %o7,%o1,%o1 std $ahi,[$ap_h+$j] faddd $aloa,$nloa,$nloa fmuld $nlo,$nc,$nloc srlx %o1,16,%o7 std $nlo,[$np_l+$j] ! save smashed np[j] in double format fmuld $alo,$bd,$alod add %o7,%o2,%o2 std $nhi,[$np_h+$j] faddd $alob,$nlob,$nlob fmuld $nlo,$nd,$nlod srlx %o2,16,%o7 fmuld $ahi,$ba,$ahia add %o7,%o3,%o3 ! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15] and %o0,$mask,%o0 faddd $aloc,$nloc,$nloc fmuld $nhi,$na,$nhia and %o1,$mask,%o1 and %o2,$mask,%o2 fmuld $ahi,$bb,$ahib sllx %o1,16,%o1 faddd $alod,$nlod,$nlod fmuld $nhi,$nb,$nhib sllx %o2,32,%o2 fmuld $ahi,$bc,$ahic sllx %o3,48,%o7 or %o1,%o0,%o0 faddd $ahia,$nhia,$nhia fmuld $nhi,$nc,$nhic or %o2,%o0,%o0 fmuld $ahi,$bd,$ahid or %o7,%o0,%o0 ! 64-bit result faddd $ahib,$nhib,$nhib fmuld $nhi,$nd,$nhid addcc %g1,%o0,%o0 faddd $dota,$nloa,$nloa srlx %o3,16,%g1 ! 34-bit carry faddd $dotb,$nlob,$nlob bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 stx %o0,[$tp] ! tp[j-1]= faddd $ahic,$nhic,$dota ! $nhic faddd $ahid,$nhid,$dotb ! $nhid faddd $nloc,$nhia,$nloc faddd $nlod,$nhib,$nlod fdtox $nloa,$nloa fdtox $nlob,$nlob fdtox $nloc,$nloc fdtox $nlod,$nlod std $nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] std $nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8] std $nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16] std $nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24] addcc $j,8,$j bnz,pt %icc,.L1st add $tp,8,$tp .L1stskip: fdtox $dota,$dota fdtox $dotb,$dotb ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3 srlx %o0,16,%o7 std $dota,[%sp+$bias+$frame+32] add %o7,%o1,%o1 std $dotb,[%sp+$bias+$frame+40] srlx %o1,16,%o7 add %o7,%o2,%o2 srlx %o2,16,%o7 add %o7,%o3,%o3 ! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15] and %o0,$mask,%o0 and %o1,$mask,%o1 and %o2,$mask,%o2 sllx %o1,16,%o1 sllx %o2,32,%o2 sllx %o3,48,%o7 or %o1,%o0,%o0 or %o2,%o0,%o0 or %o7,%o0,%o0 ! 64-bit result ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+32],%o4 addcc %g1,%o0,%o0 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+40],%o5 srlx %o3,16,%g1 ! 34-bit carry bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 stx %o0,[$tp] ! tp[j-1]= add $tp,8,$tp srlx %o4,16,%o7 add %o7,%o5,%o5 and %o4,$mask,%o4 sllx %o5,16,%o7 or %o7,%o4,%o4 addcc %g1,%o4,%o4 srlx %o5,48,%g1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 mov %g1,$carry stx %o4,[$tp] ! tp[num-1]= ba .Louter add $i,8,$i .align 32 .Louter: sub %g0,$num,$j ! j=-num add %sp,$bias+$frame+$locals,$tp add $ap,$j,%o3 add $bp,$i,%o4 ld [%o3+4],%g1 ! bp[i] ld [%o3+0],%o0 ld [%o4+4],%g5 ! ap[0] sllx %g1,32,%g1 ld [%o4+0],%o1 sllx %g5,32,%g5 or %g1,%o0,%o0 or %g5,%o1,%o1 ldx [$tp],%o2 ! tp[0] mulx %o1,%o0,%o0 addcc %o2,%o0,%o0 mulx $n0,%o0,%o0 ! (ap[0]*bp[i]+t[0])*n0 stx %o0,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] ! transfer b[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values ldda [%o4+2]%asi,$ba ldda [%o4+0]%asi,$bb ldda [%o4+6]%asi,$bc ldda [%o4+4]%asi,$bd ! transfer (ap[0]*b[i]+t[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+6]%asi,$na fxtod $ba,$ba ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+4]%asi,$nb fxtod $bb,$bb ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+2]%asi,$nc fxtod $bc,$bc ldda [%sp+$bias+$frame+0]%asi,$nd fxtod $bd,$bd ldd [$ap_l+$j],$alo ! load a[j] in double format fxtod $na,$na ldd [$ap_h+$j],$ahi fxtod $nb,$nb ldd [$np_l+$j],$nlo ! load n[j] in double format fxtod $nc,$nc ldd [$np_h+$j],$nhi fxtod $nd,$nd fmuld $alo,$ba,$aloa fmuld $nlo,$na,$nloa fmuld $alo,$bb,$alob fmuld $nlo,$nb,$nlob fmuld $alo,$bc,$aloc faddd $aloa,$nloa,$nloa fmuld $nlo,$nc,$nloc fmuld $alo,$bd,$alod faddd $alob,$nlob,$nlob fmuld $nlo,$nd,$nlod fmuld $ahi,$ba,$ahia faddd $aloc,$nloc,$nloc fmuld $nhi,$na,$nhia fmuld $ahi,$bb,$ahib faddd $alod,$nlod,$nlod fmuld $nhi,$nb,$nhib fmuld $ahi,$bc,$ahic faddd $ahia,$nhia,$nhia fmuld $nhi,$nc,$nhic fmuld $ahi,$bd,$ahid faddd $ahib,$nhib,$nhib fmuld $nhi,$nd,$nhid faddd $ahic,$nhic,$dota ! $nhic faddd $ahid,$nhid,$dotb ! $nhid faddd $nloc,$nhia,$nloc faddd $nlod,$nhib,$nlod fdtox $nloa,$nloa fdtox $nlob,$nlob fdtox $nloc,$nloc fdtox $nlod,$nlod std $nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] std $nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8] std $nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16] add $j,8,$j std $nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24] ldd [$ap_l+$j],$alo ! load a[j] in double format ldd [$ap_h+$j],$ahi ldd [$np_l+$j],$nlo ! load n[j] in double format ldd [$np_h+$j],$nhi fmuld $alo,$ba,$aloa fmuld $nlo,$na,$nloa fmuld $alo,$bb,$alob fmuld $nlo,$nb,$nlob fmuld $alo,$bc,$aloc ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0 faddd $aloa,$nloa,$nloa fmuld $nlo,$nc,$nloc ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1 fmuld $alo,$bd,$alod ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2 faddd $alob,$nlob,$nlob fmuld $nlo,$nd,$nlod ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3 fmuld $ahi,$ba,$ahia srlx %o0,16,%o7 faddd $aloc,$nloc,$nloc fmuld $nhi,$na,$nhia add %o7,%o1,%o1 fmuld $ahi,$bb,$ahib srlx %o1,16,%o7 faddd $alod,$nlod,$nlod fmuld $nhi,$nb,$nhib add %o7,%o2,%o2 fmuld $ahi,$bc,$ahic srlx %o2,16,%o7 faddd $ahia,$nhia,$nhia fmuld $nhi,$nc,$nhic add %o7,%o3,%o3 ! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15] ! why? and %o0,$mask,%o0 fmuld $ahi,$bd,$ahid and %o1,$mask,%o1 and %o2,$mask,%o2 faddd $ahib,$nhib,$nhib fmuld $nhi,$nd,$nhid sllx %o1,16,%o1 faddd $dota,$nloa,$nloa sllx %o2,32,%o2 faddd $dotb,$nlob,$nlob sllx %o3,48,%o7 or %o1,%o0,%o0 faddd $ahic,$nhic,$dota ! $nhic or %o2,%o0,%o0 faddd $ahid,$nhid,$dotb ! $nhid or %o7,%o0,%o0 ! 64-bit result ldx [$tp],%o7 faddd $nloc,$nhia,$nloc addcc %o7,%o0,%o0 ! end-of-why? faddd $nlod,$nhib,$nlod srlx %o3,16,%g1 ! 34-bit carry fdtox $nloa,$nloa bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 fdtox $nlob,$nlob fdtox $nloc,$nloc fdtox $nlod,$nlod std $nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] std $nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8] addcc $j,8,$j std $nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16] bz,pn %icc,.Linnerskip std $nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24] ba .Linner nop .align 32 .Linner: ldd [$ap_l+$j],$alo ! load a[j] in double format ldd [$ap_h+$j],$ahi ldd [$np_l+$j],$nlo ! load n[j] in double format ldd [$np_h+$j],$nhi fmuld $alo,$ba,$aloa fmuld $nlo,$na,$nloa fmuld $alo,$bb,$alob fmuld $nlo,$nb,$nlob fmuld $alo,$bc,$aloc ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0 faddd $aloa,$nloa,$nloa fmuld $nlo,$nc,$nloc ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1 fmuld $alo,$bd,$alod ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2 faddd $alob,$nlob,$nlob fmuld $nlo,$nd,$nlod ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3 fmuld $ahi,$ba,$ahia srlx %o0,16,%o7 faddd $aloc,$nloc,$nloc fmuld $nhi,$na,$nhia add %o7,%o1,%o1 fmuld $ahi,$bb,$ahib srlx %o1,16,%o7 faddd $alod,$nlod,$nlod fmuld $nhi,$nb,$nhib add %o7,%o2,%o2 fmuld $ahi,$bc,$ahic srlx %o2,16,%o7 faddd $ahia,$nhia,$nhia fmuld $nhi,$nc,$nhic add %o7,%o3,%o3 ! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15] and %o0,$mask,%o0 fmuld $ahi,$bd,$ahid and %o1,$mask,%o1 and %o2,$mask,%o2 faddd $ahib,$nhib,$nhib fmuld $nhi,$nd,$nhid sllx %o1,16,%o1 faddd $dota,$nloa,$nloa sllx %o2,32,%o2 faddd $dotb,$nlob,$nlob sllx %o3,48,%o7 or %o1,%o0,%o0 faddd $ahic,$nhic,$dota ! $nhic or %o2,%o0,%o0 faddd $ahid,$nhid,$dotb ! $nhid or %o7,%o0,%o0 ! 64-bit result faddd $nloc,$nhia,$nloc addcc %g1,%o0,%o0 ldx [$tp+8],%o7 ! tp[j] faddd $nlod,$nhib,$nlod srlx %o3,16,%g1 ! 34-bit carry fdtox $nloa,$nloa bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 fdtox $nlob,$nlob addcc %o7,%o0,%o0 fdtox $nloc,$nloc bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 stx %o0,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] fdtox $nlod,$nlod std $nloa,[%sp+$bias+$frame+0] std $nlob,[%sp+$bias+$frame+8] std $nloc,[%sp+$bias+$frame+16] addcc $j,8,$j std $nlod,[%sp+$bias+$frame+24] bnz,pt %icc,.Linner add $tp,8,$tp .Linnerskip: fdtox $dota,$dota fdtox $dotb,$dotb ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+0],%o0 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],%o1 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+16],%o2 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+24],%o3 srlx %o0,16,%o7 std $dota,[%sp+$bias+$frame+32] add %o7,%o1,%o1 std $dotb,[%sp+$bias+$frame+40] srlx %o1,16,%o7 add %o7,%o2,%o2 srlx %o2,16,%o7 add %o7,%o3,%o3 ! %o3.%o2[0..15].%o1[0..15].%o0[0..15] and %o0,$mask,%o0 and %o1,$mask,%o1 and %o2,$mask,%o2 sllx %o1,16,%o1 sllx %o2,32,%o2 sllx %o3,48,%o7 or %o1,%o0,%o0 or %o2,%o0,%o0 ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+32],%o4 or %o7,%o0,%o0 ! 64-bit result ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+40],%o5 addcc %g1,%o0,%o0 ldx [$tp+8],%o7 ! tp[j] srlx %o3,16,%g1 ! 34-bit carry bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 addcc %o7,%o0,%o0 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 stx %o0,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] add $tp,8,$tp srlx %o4,16,%o7 add %o7,%o5,%o5 and %o4,$mask,%o4 sllx %o5,16,%o7 or %o7,%o4,%o4 addcc %g1,%o4,%o4 srlx %o5,48,%g1 bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add %g1,1,%g1 addcc $carry,%o4,%o4 stx %o4,[$tp] ! tp[num-1] mov %g1,$carry bcs,a %xcc,.+8 add $carry,1,$carry addcc $i,8,$i bnz %icc,.Louter nop add $tp,8,$tp ! adjust tp to point at the end orn %g0,%g0,%g4 sub %g0,$num,%o7 ! n=-num ba .Lsub subcc %g0,%g0,%g0 ! clear %icc.c .align 32 .Lsub: ldx [$tp+%o7],%o0 add $np,%o7,%g1 ld [%g1+0],%o2 ld [%g1+4],%o3 srlx %o0,32,%o1 subccc %o0,%o2,%o2 add $rp,%o7,%g1 subccc %o1,%o3,%o3 st %o2,[%g1+0] add %o7,8,%o7 brnz,pt %o7,.Lsub st %o3,[%g1+4] subc $carry,0,%g4 sub %g0,$num,%o7 ! n=-num ba .Lcopy nop .align 32 .Lcopy: ldx [$tp+%o7],%o0 add $rp,%o7,%g1 ld [%g1+0],%o2 ld [%g1+4],%o3 stx %g0,[$tp+%o7] and %o0,%g4,%o0 srlx %o0,32,%o1 andn %o2,%g4,%o2 andn %o3,%g4,%o3 or %o2,%o0,%o0 or %o3,%o1,%o1 st %o0,[%g1+0] add %o7,8,%o7 brnz,pt %o7,.Lcopy st %o1,[%g1+4] sub %g0,$num,%o7 ! n=-num .Lzap: stx %g0,[$ap_l+%o7] stx %g0,[$ap_h+%o7] stx %g0,[$np_l+%o7] stx %g0,[$np_h+%o7] add %o7,8,%o7 brnz,pt %o7,.Lzap nop ldx [%sp+$bias+$frame+48],%o7 wr %g0,%o7,%asi ! restore %asi mov 1,%i0 .Lret: ret restore .type $fname,#function .size $fname,(.-$fname) .asciz "Montgomery Multipltication for UltraSPARC, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 32 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; # Below substitution makes it possible to compile without demanding # VIS extensions on command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. I # dare to do this, because VIS capability is detected at run-time now # and this routine is not called on CPU not capable to execute it. Do # note that fzeros is not the only VIS dependency! Another dependency # is implicit and is just _a_ numerical value loaded to %asi register, # which assembler can't recognize as VIS specific... $code =~ s/fzeros\s+%f([0-9]+)/ sprintf(".word\t0x%x\t! fzeros %%f%d",0x81b00c20|($1<<25),$1) /gem; print $code; # flush close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl0000644000000000000000000003333013176625656017462 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # December 2005 # # Pure SPARCv9/8+ and IALU-only bn_mul_mont implementation. The reasons # for undertaken effort are multiple. First of all, UltraSPARC is not # the whole SPARCv9 universe and other VIS-free implementations deserve # optimized code as much. Secondly, newly introduced UltraSPARC T1, # a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU and concurrent FPU-intensive paths, # such as sparcv9a-mont, will simply sink it. Yes, T1 is equipped with # several integrated RSA/DSA accelerator circuits accessible through # kernel driver [only(*)], but having decent user-land software # implementation is important too. Finally, reasons like desire to # experiment with dedicated squaring procedure. Yes, this module # implements one, because it was easiest to draft it in SPARCv9 # instructions... # (*) Engine accessing the driver in question is on my TODO list. # For reference, accelerator is estimated to give 6 to 10 times # improvement on single-threaded RSA sign. It should be noted # that 6-10x improvement coefficient does not actually mean # something extraordinary in terms of absolute [single-threaded] # performance, as SPARCv9 instruction set is by all means least # suitable for high performance crypto among other 64 bit # platforms. 6-10x factor simply places T1 in same performance # domain as say AMD64 and IA-64. Improvement of RSA verify don't # appear impressive at all, but it's the sign operation which is # far more critical/interesting. # You might notice that inner loops are modulo-scheduled:-) This has # essentially negligible impact on UltraSPARC performance, it's # Fujitsu SPARC64 V users who should notice and hopefully appreciate # the advantage... Currently this module surpasses sparcv9a-mont.pl # by ~20% on UltraSPARC-III and later cores, but recall that sparcv9a # module still have hidden potential [see TODO list there], which is # estimated to be larger than 20%... $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; # int bn_mul_mont( $rp="%i0"; # BN_ULONG *rp, $ap="%i1"; # const BN_ULONG *ap, $bp="%i2"; # const BN_ULONG *bp, $np="%i3"; # const BN_ULONG *np, $n0="%i4"; # const BN_ULONG *n0, $num="%i5"; # int num); $frame="STACK_FRAME"; $bias="STACK_BIAS"; $car0="%o0"; $car1="%o1"; $car2="%o2"; # 1 bit $acc0="%o3"; $acc1="%o4"; $mask="%g1"; # 32 bits, what a waste... $tmp0="%g4"; $tmp1="%g5"; $i="%l0"; $j="%l1"; $mul0="%l2"; $mul1="%l3"; $tp="%l4"; $apj="%l5"; $npj="%l6"; $tpj="%l7"; $fname="bn_mul_mont_int"; $code=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .global $fname .align 32 $fname: cmp %o5,4 ! 128 bits minimum bge,pt %icc,.Lenter sethi %hi(0xffffffff),$mask retl clr %o0 .align 32 .Lenter: save %sp,-$frame,%sp sll $num,2,$num ! num*=4 or $mask,%lo(0xffffffff),$mask ld [$n0],$n0 cmp $ap,$bp and $num,$mask,$num ld [$bp],$mul0 ! bp[0] nop add %sp,$bias,%o7 ! real top of stack ld [$ap],$car0 ! ap[0] ! redundant in squaring context sub %o7,$num,%o7 ld [$ap+4],$apj ! ap[1] and %o7,-1024,%o7 ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] sub %o7,$bias,%sp ! alloca ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] be,pt SIZE_T_CC,.Lbn_sqr_mont mov 12,$j mulx $car0,$mul0,$car0 ! ap[0]*bp[0] mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !prologue! ap[1]*bp[0] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp ld [$ap+8],$apj !prologue! mulx $n0,$acc0,$mul1 ! "t[0]"*n0 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 ! np[0]*"t[0]"*n0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 !prologue! np[1]*"t[0]"*n0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+8],$npj !prologue! srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp0,$acc0 !prologue! .L1st: mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $j,4,$j ! j++ mov $tmp0,$acc0 st $car1,[$tp] cmp $j,$num mov $tmp1,$acc1 srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.L1st add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.L1st mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !epilogue! mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tmp0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+8] srlx $car1,32,$car2 mov 4,$i ! i++ ld [$bp+4],$mul0 ! bp[1] .Louter: add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp ld [$ap],$car0 ! ap[0] ld [$ap+4],$apj ! ap[1] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] ld [$tp],$tmp1 ! tp[0] ld [$tp+4],$tpj ! tp[1] mov 12,$j mulx $car0,$mul0,$car0 mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !prologue! add $tmp1,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+8],$apj !prologue! and $car0,$mask,$acc0 mulx $n0,$acc0,$mul1 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 !prologue! srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+8],$npj !prologue! srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp0,$acc0 !prologue! .Linner: mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $tpj,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] add $acc0,$car0,$car0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $j,4,$j ! j++ mov $tmp0,$acc0 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp1,$acc1 cmp $j,$num bl %icc,.Linner add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.Linner mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !epilogue! mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $tpj,$car0,$car0 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tpj,$car0,$car0 add $tmp0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $i,4,$i ! i++ srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car1,$car1 cmp $i,$num add $car2,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+8] srlx $car1,32,$car2 bl,a %icc,.Louter ld [$bp+$i],$mul0 ! bp[i] !.Louter add $tp,12,$tp .Ltail: add $np,$num,$np add $rp,$num,$rp mov $tp,$ap sub %g0,$num,%o7 ! k=-num ba .Lsub subcc %g0,%g0,%g0 ! clear %icc.c .align 16 .Lsub: ld [$tp+%o7],%o0 ld [$np+%o7],%o1 subccc %o0,%o1,%o1 ! tp[j]-np[j] add $rp,%o7,$i add %o7,4,%o7 brnz %o7,.Lsub st %o1,[$i] subc $car2,0,$car2 ! handle upmost overflow bit and $tp,$car2,$ap andn $rp,$car2,$np or $ap,$np,$ap sub %g0,$num,%o7 .Lcopy: ld [$ap+%o7],%o0 ! copy or in-place refresh st %g0,[$tp+%o7] ! zap tp st %o0,[$rp+%o7] add %o7,4,%o7 brnz %o7,.Lcopy nop mov 1,%i0 ret restore ___ ######## ######## .Lbn_sqr_mont gives up to 20% *overall* improvement over ######## code without following dedicated squaring procedure. ######## $sbit="%o5"; $code.=<<___; .align 32 .Lbn_sqr_mont: mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 ! ap[0]*ap[0] mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 !prologue! and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp ld [$ap+8],$apj !prologue! mulx $n0,$acc0,$mul1 ! "t[0]"*n0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 ! np[0]*"t[0]"*n0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 !prologue! and $car0,1,$sbit ld [$np+8],$npj !prologue! srlx $car0,1,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 srlx $car1,32,$car1 mov $tmp0,$acc0 !prologue! .Lsqr_1st: mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ! ap[j]*a0+c0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 or $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 mov $tmp1,$acc1 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit add $j,4,$j ! j++ and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 cmp $j,$num add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] mov $tmp0,$acc0 srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_1st add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.Lsqr_1st mulx $apj,$mul0,$tmp0 ! epilogue mulx $npj,$mul1,$tmp1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ! ap[j]*a0+c0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 or $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tmp0,$car0,$car0 ! ap[j]*a0+c0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 or $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car0,$car0 or $sbit,$car0,$car0 add $car0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+8] srlx $car1,32,$car2 ld [%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp0 ! tp[0] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tmp1 ! tp[1] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+8],$tpj ! tp[2] ld [$ap+4],$mul0 ! ap[1] ld [$ap+8],$apj ! ap[2] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] mulx $n0,$tmp0,$mul1 mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tmp0,$car1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+8],$npj ! np[2] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 and $car0,1,$sbit add $acc1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,1,$car0 mov 12,$j st $car1,[%sp+$bias+$frame] ! tp[0]= srlx $car1,32,$car1 add %sp,$bias+$frame+4,$tp .Lsqr_2nd: mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 add $j,4,$j ! j++ add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 cmp $j,$num add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_2nd add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ !.Lsqr_2nd mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $acc0,$car0,$car0 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car0,$car0 add $sbit,$car0,$car0 add $car0,$car1,$car1 add $car2,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car2 ld [%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp1 ! tp[0] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tpj ! tp[1] ld [$ap+8],$mul0 ! ap[2] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] mulx $n0,$tmp1,$mul1 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 mov 8,$i mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp srlx $car1,32,$car1 and $car0,1,$sbit srlx $car0,1,$car0 mov 4,$j .Lsqr_outer: .Lsqr_inner1: mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$car1,$car1 add $j,4,$j ld [$tp+8],$tpj cmp $j,$i add $acc1,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_inner1 add $tp,4,$tp !.Lsqr_inner1 add $j,4,$j ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$car1,$car1 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] add $acc0,$car1,$car1 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] add $acc1,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $j,4,$j cmp $j,$num be,pn %icc,.Lsqr_no_inner2 add $tp,4,$tp .Lsqr_inner2: mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit add $acc0,$car0,$car0 ld [$ap+$j],$apj ! ap[j] and $car0,$mask,$acc0 ld [$np+$j],$npj ! np[j] srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 ld [$tp+8],$tpj ! tp[j] add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 add $j,4,$j ! j++ srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 cmp $j,$num add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 bl %icc,.Lsqr_inner2 add $tp,4,$tp ! tp++ .Lsqr_no_inner2: mulx $apj,$mul0,$acc0 mulx $npj,$mul1,$acc1 add $tpj,$sbit,$sbit add $acc0,$car0,$car0 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 add $sbit,$acc0,$acc0 srlx $acc0,32,$sbit and $acc0,$mask,$acc0 add $acc0,$car1,$car1 add $acc1,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp] ! tp[j-1] srlx $car1,32,$car1 add $car0,$car0,$car0 add $sbit,$car0,$car0 add $car0,$car1,$car1 add $car2,$car1,$car1 st $car1,[$tp+4] srlx $car1,32,$car2 add $i,4,$i ! i++ ld [%sp+$bias+$frame],$tmp1 ! tp[0] ld [%sp+$bias+$frame+4],$tpj ! tp[1] ld [$ap+$i],$mul0 ! ap[j] ld [$np],$car1 ! np[0] ld [$np+4],$npj ! np[1] mulx $n0,$tmp1,$mul1 and $mul1,$mask,$mul1 add $i,4,$tmp0 mulx $mul0,$mul0,$car0 mulx $car1,$mul1,$car1 and $car0,$mask,$acc0 add $tmp1,$car1,$car1 srlx $car0,32,$car0 add %sp,$bias+$frame,$tp srlx $car1,32,$car1 and $car0,1,$sbit srlx $car0,1,$car0 cmp $tmp0,$num ! i" .align 32 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c0000644000000000000000000001325513176625656015516 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bn_lcl.h" /* X9.31 routines for prime derivation */ /* * X9.31 prime derivation. This is used to generate the primes pi (p1, p2, * q1, q2) from a parameter Xpi by checking successive odd integers. */ static int bn_x931_derive_pi(BIGNUM *pi, const BIGNUM *Xpi, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) { int i = 0, is_prime; if (!BN_copy(pi, Xpi)) return 0; if (!BN_is_odd(pi) && !BN_add_word(pi, 1)) return 0; for (;;) { i++; BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i); /* NB 27 MR is specified in X9.31 */ is_prime = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(pi, 27, ctx, 1, cb); if (is_prime < 0) return 0; if (is_prime) break; if (!BN_add_word(pi, 2)) return 0; } BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i); return 1; } /* * This is the main X9.31 prime derivation function. From parameters Xp1, Xp2 * and Xp derive the prime p. If the parameters p1 or p2 are not NULL they * will be returned too: this is needed for testing. */ int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *t, *p1p2, *pm1; /* Only even e supported */ if (!BN_is_odd(e)) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (!p1) p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!p2) p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p1p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (pm1 == NULL) goto err; if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p1, Xp1, ctx, cb)) goto err; if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p2, Xp2, ctx, cb)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(p1p2, p1, p2, ctx)) goto err; /* First set p to value of Rp */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(p, p2, p1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(p, p, p2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_inverse(t, p1, p2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(t, t, p1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, p, t)) goto err; if (p->neg && !BN_add(p, p, p1p2)) goto err; /* p now equals Rp */ if (!BN_mod_sub(p, p, Xp, p1p2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(p, p, Xp)) goto err; /* p now equals Yp0 */ for (;;) { int i = 1; BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i++); if (!BN_copy(pm1, p)) goto err; if (!BN_sub_word(pm1, 1)) goto err; if (!BN_gcd(t, pm1, e, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_one(t)) { /* * X9.31 specifies 8 MR and 1 Lucas test or any prime test * offering similar or better guarantees 50 MR is considerably * better. */ int r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, 50, ctx, 1, cb); if (r < 0) goto err; if (r) break; } if (!BN_add(p, p, p1p2)) goto err; } BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Generate pair of parameters Xp, Xq for X9.31 prime generation. Note: nbits * parameter is sum of number of bits in both. */ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t; int i; /* * Number of bits for each prime is of the form 512+128s for s = 0, 1, * ... */ if ((nbits < 1024) || (nbits & 0xff)) return 0; nbits >>= 1; /* * The random value Xp must be between sqrt(2) * 2^(nbits-1) and 2^nbits * - 1. By setting the top two bits we ensure that the lower bound is * exceeded. */ if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto err; /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */ BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq); if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100)) break; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (i < 1000) return 1; return 0; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return 0; } /* * Generate primes using X9.31 algorithm. Of the values p, p1, p2, Xp1 and * Xp2 only 'p' needs to be non-NULL. If any of the others are not NULL the * relevant parameter will be stored in it. Due to the fact that |Xp - Xq| > * 2^(nbits - 100) must be satisfied Xp and Xq are generated using the * previous function and supplied as input. */ int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *Xp1, BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (Xp1 == NULL) Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Xp2 == NULL) Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Xp1 == NULL || Xp2 == NULL) goto error; if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto error; if (!BN_rand(Xp2, 101, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto error; if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(p, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb)) goto error; ret = 1; error: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c0000644000000000000000000003331513176625656016005 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /***************************************************************************** * * * Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation * * * * All rights reserved. * * * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are * * met: * * * * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * * * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * * documentation and/or other materials provided with the * * distribution. * * * * * Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its * * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from * * this software without specific prior written permission. * * * * * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY * * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR * * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, * * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, * * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR * * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF * * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING * * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS * * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * ****************************************************************************** * Developers and authors: * * Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) * * (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel * * (2) University of Haifa, Israel * *****************************************************************************/ #include #include "rsaz_exp.h" #ifndef RSAZ_ENABLED NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else /* * See crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl for further details. */ void rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(void *red, const void *norm); void rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(void *ret, const void *a, const void *b, const void *n, BN_ULONG k); void rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n, BN_ULONG k, int cnt); void rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(void *tbl, const void *val, int i); void rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(void *val, const void *tbl, int i); void rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2(void *norm, const void *red); #if defined(__GNUC__) # define ALIGN64 __attribute__((aligned(64))) #elif defined(_MSC_VER) # define ALIGN64 __declspec(align(64)) #elif defined(__SUNPRO_C) # define ALIGN64 # pragma align 64(one,two80) #else /* not fatal, might hurt performance a little */ # define ALIGN64 #endif ALIGN64 static const BN_ULONG one[40] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; ALIGN64 static const BN_ULONG two80[40] = { 0, 0, 1 << 22, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; void RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(BN_ULONG result_norm[16], const BN_ULONG base_norm[16], const BN_ULONG exponent[16], const BN_ULONG m_norm[16], const BN_ULONG RR[16], BN_ULONG k0) { unsigned char storage[320 * 3 + 32 * 9 * 16 + 64]; /* 5.5KB */ unsigned char *p_str = storage + (64 - ((size_t)storage % 64)); unsigned char *a_inv, *m, *result; unsigned char *table_s = p_str + 320 * 3; unsigned char *R2 = table_s; /* borrow */ int index; int wvalue; if ((((size_t)p_str & 4095) + 320) >> 12) { result = p_str; a_inv = p_str + 320; m = p_str + 320 * 2; /* should not cross page */ } else { m = p_str; /* should not cross page */ result = p_str + 320; a_inv = p_str + 320 * 2; } rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(m, m_norm); rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(a_inv, base_norm); rsaz_1024_norm2red_avx2(R2, RR); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(R2, R2, R2, m, k0); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(R2, R2, two80, m, k0); /* table[0] = 1 */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, R2, one, m, k0); /* table[1] = a_inv^1 */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(a_inv, a_inv, R2, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, a_inv, 1); /* table[2] = a_inv^2 */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, a_inv, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 2); #if 0 /* this is almost 2x smaller and less than 1% slower */ for (index = 3; index < 32; index++) { rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, index); } #else /* table[4] = a_inv^4 */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 4); /* table[8] = a_inv^8 */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 8); /* table[16] = a_inv^16 */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 16); /* table[17] = a_inv^17 */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 17); /* table[3] */ rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 2); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 3); /* table[6] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 6); /* table[12] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 12); /* table[24] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 24); /* table[25] */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 25); /* table[5] */ rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 4); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 5); /* table[10] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 10); /* table[20] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 20); /* table[21] */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 21); /* table[7] */ rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 6); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 7); /* table[14] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 14); /* table[28] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 28); /* table[29] */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 29); /* table[9] */ rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 8); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 9); /* table[18] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 18); /* table[19] */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 19); /* table[11] */ rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 10); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 11); /* table[22] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 22); /* table[23] */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 23); /* table[13] */ rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 12); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 13); /* table[26] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 26); /* table[27] */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 27); /* table[15] */ rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, 14); rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 15); /* table[30] */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 1); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 30); /* table[31] */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2(table_s, result, 31); #endif /* load first window */ p_str = (unsigned char *)exponent; wvalue = p_str[127] >> 3; rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(result, table_s, wvalue); index = 1014; while (index > -1) { /* loop for the remaining 127 windows */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 5); wvalue = (p_str[(index / 8) + 1] << 8) | p_str[index / 8]; wvalue = (wvalue >> (index % 8)) & 31; index -= 5; rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(a_inv, table_s, wvalue); /* borrow a_inv */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); } /* square four times */ rsaz_1024_sqr_avx2(result, result, m, k0, 4); wvalue = p_str[0] & 15; rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2(a_inv, table_s, wvalue); /* borrow a_inv */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, a_inv, m, k0); /* from Montgomery */ rsaz_1024_mul_avx2(result, result, one, m, k0); rsaz_1024_red2norm_avx2(result_norm, result); OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, sizeof(storage)); } /* * See crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.pl for further details. */ void rsaz_512_mul(void *ret, const void *a, const void *b, const void *n, BN_ULONG k); void rsaz_512_mul_scatter4(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n, BN_ULONG k, const void *tbl, unsigned int power); void rsaz_512_mul_gather4(void *ret, const void *a, const void *tbl, const void *n, BN_ULONG k, unsigned int power); void rsaz_512_mul_by_one(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n, BN_ULONG k); void rsaz_512_sqr(void *ret, const void *a, const void *n, BN_ULONG k, int cnt); void rsaz_512_scatter4(void *tbl, const BN_ULONG *val, int power); void rsaz_512_gather4(BN_ULONG *val, const void *tbl, int power); void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8], const BN_ULONG base[8], const BN_ULONG exponent[8], const BN_ULONG m[8], BN_ULONG k0, const BN_ULONG RR[8]) { unsigned char storage[16 * 8 * 8 + 64 * 2 + 64]; /* 1.2KB */ unsigned char *table = storage + (64 - ((size_t)storage % 64)); BN_ULONG *a_inv = (BN_ULONG *)(table + 16 * 8 * 8); BN_ULONG *temp = (BN_ULONG *)(table + 16 * 8 * 8 + 8 * 8); unsigned char *p_str = (unsigned char *)exponent; int index; unsigned int wvalue; /* table[0] = 1_inv */ temp[0] = 0 - m[0]; temp[1] = ~m[1]; temp[2] = ~m[2]; temp[3] = ~m[3]; temp[4] = ~m[4]; temp[5] = ~m[5]; temp[6] = ~m[6]; temp[7] = ~m[7]; rsaz_512_scatter4(table, temp, 0); /* table [1] = a_inv^1 */ rsaz_512_mul(a_inv, base, RR, m, k0); rsaz_512_scatter4(table, a_inv, 1); /* table [2] = a_inv^2 */ rsaz_512_sqr(temp, a_inv, m, k0, 1); rsaz_512_scatter4(table, temp, 2); for (index = 3; index < 16; index++) rsaz_512_mul_scatter4(temp, a_inv, m, k0, table, index); /* load first window */ wvalue = p_str[63]; rsaz_512_gather4(temp, table, wvalue >> 4); rsaz_512_sqr(temp, temp, m, k0, 4); rsaz_512_mul_gather4(temp, temp, table, m, k0, wvalue & 0xf); for (index = 62; index >= 0; index--) { wvalue = p_str[index]; rsaz_512_sqr(temp, temp, m, k0, 4); rsaz_512_mul_gather4(temp, temp, table, m, k0, wvalue >> 4); rsaz_512_sqr(temp, temp, m, k0, 4); rsaz_512_mul_gather4(temp, temp, table, m, k0, wvalue & 0x0f); } /* from Montgomery */ rsaz_512_mul_by_one(result, temp, m, k0); OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, sizeof(storage)); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c0000644000000000000000000006566713176625656015430 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #if defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH) BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1 = 0; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return (c1); # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (num & ~3) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } # endif while (num) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); ap++; rp++; num--; } return (c1); } BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1 = 0; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return (c1); # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (num & ~3) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1); mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1); mul(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } # endif while (num) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1); ap++; rp++; num--; } return (c1); } void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) { assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return; # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (n & ~3) { sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]); sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]); sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]); sqr(r[6], r[7], a[3]); a += 4; r += 8; n -= 4; } # endif while (n) { sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]); a++; r += 2; n--; } } #else /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) || * defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */ BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c = 0; BN_ULONG bl, bh; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return ((BN_ULONG)0); bl = LBITS(w); bh = HBITS(w); # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (num & ~3) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, c); mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], bl, bh, c); mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], bl, bh, c); mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], bl, bh, c); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } # endif while (num) { mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, c); ap++; rp++; num--; } return (c); } BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG carry = 0; BN_ULONG bl, bh; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return ((BN_ULONG)0); bl = LBITS(w); bh = HBITS(w); # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (num & ~3) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, carry); mul(rp[1], ap[1], bl, bh, carry); mul(rp[2], ap[2], bl, bh, carry); mul(rp[3], ap[3], bl, bh, carry); ap += 4; rp += 4; num -= 4; } # endif while (num) { mul(rp[0], ap[0], bl, bh, carry); ap++; rp++; num--; } return (carry); } void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) { assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return; # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (n & ~3) { sqr64(r[0], r[1], a[0]); sqr64(r[2], r[3], a[1]); sqr64(r[4], r[5], a[2]); sqr64(r[6], r[7], a[3]); a += 4; r += 8; n -= 4; } # endif while (n) { sqr64(r[0], r[1], a[0]); a++; r += 2; n--; } } #endif /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) || * defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */ #if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) { return ((BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG) h) << BN_BITS2) | l) / (BN_ULLONG) d)); } #else /* Divide h,l by d and return the result. */ /* I need to test this some more :-( */ BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) { BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t; int i, count = 2; if (d == 0) return (BN_MASK2); i = BN_num_bits_word(d); assert((i == BN_BITS2) || (h <= (BN_ULONG)1 << i)); i = BN_BITS2 - i; if (h >= d) h -= d; if (i) { d <<= i; h = (h << i) | (l >> (BN_BITS2 - i)); l <<= i; } dh = (d & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4; dl = (d & BN_MASK2l); for (;;) { if ((h >> BN_BITS4) == dh) q = BN_MASK2l; else q = h / dh; th = q * dh; tl = dl * q; for (;;) { t = h - th; if ((t & BN_MASK2h) || ((tl) <= ((t << BN_BITS4) | ((l & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4)))) break; q--; th -= dh; tl -= dl; } t = (tl >> BN_BITS4); tl = (tl << BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2h; th += t; if (l < tl) th++; l -= tl; if (h < th) { h += d; q--; } h -= th; if (--count == 0) break; ret = q << BN_BITS4; h = ((h << BN_BITS4) | (l >> BN_BITS4)) & BN_MASK2; l = (l & BN_MASK2l) << BN_BITS4; } ret |= q; return (ret); } #endif /* !defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) */ #ifdef BN_LLONG BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULLONG ll = 0; assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return ((BN_ULONG)0); # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (n & ~3) { ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[0] + b[0]; r[0] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2; ll >>= BN_BITS2; ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[1] + b[1]; r[1] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2; ll >>= BN_BITS2; ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[2] + b[2]; r[2] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2; ll >>= BN_BITS2; ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[3] + b[3]; r[3] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2; ll >>= BN_BITS2; a += 4; b += 4; r += 4; n -= 4; } # endif while (n) { ll += (BN_ULLONG) a[0] + b[0]; r[0] = (BN_ULONG)ll & BN_MASK2; ll >>= BN_BITS2; a++; b++; r++; n--; } return ((BN_ULONG)ll); } #else /* !BN_LLONG */ BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULONG c, l, t; assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return ((BN_ULONG)0); c = 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (n & ~3) { t = a[0]; t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); l = (t + b[0]) & BN_MASK2; c += (l < t); r[0] = l; t = a[1]; t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); l = (t + b[1]) & BN_MASK2; c += (l < t); r[1] = l; t = a[2]; t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); l = (t + b[2]) & BN_MASK2; c += (l < t); r[2] = l; t = a[3]; t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); l = (t + b[3]) & BN_MASK2; c += (l < t); r[3] = l; a += 4; b += 4; r += 4; n -= 4; } # endif while (n) { t = a[0]; t = (t + c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t < c); l = (t + b[0]) & BN_MASK2; c += (l < t); r[0] = l; a++; b++; r++; n--; } return ((BN_ULONG)c); } #endif /* !BN_LLONG */ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULONG t1, t2; int c = 0; assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return ((BN_ULONG)0); #ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (n & ~3) { t1 = a[0]; t2 = b[0]; r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); t1 = a[1]; t2 = b[1]; r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); t1 = a[2]; t2 = b[2]; r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); t1 = a[3]; t2 = b[3]; r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); a += 4; b += 4; r += 4; n -= 4; } #endif while (n) { t1 = a[0]; t2 = b[0]; r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c = (t1 < t2); a++; b++; r++; n--; } return (c); } #if defined(BN_MUL_COMBA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) # undef bn_mul_comba8 # undef bn_mul_comba4 # undef bn_sqr_comba8 # undef bn_sqr_comba4 /* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* * sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number * c=(c2,c1,c0) */ # ifdef BN_LLONG /* * Keep in mind that additions to multiplication result can not * overflow, because its high half cannot be all-ones. */ # define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG hi; \ BN_ULLONG t = (BN_ULLONG)(a)*(b); \ t += c0; /* no carry */ \ c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t); \ hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t); \ c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1 /* * This is essentially reference implementation, which may or may not * result in performance improvement. E.g. on IA-32 this routine was * observed to give 40% faster rsa1024 private key operations and 10% * faster rsa4096 ones, while on AMD64 it improves rsa1024 sign only * by 10% and *worsens* rsa4096 sign by 15%. Once again, it's a * reference implementation, one to be used as starting point for * platform-specific assembler. Mentioned numbers apply to compiler * generated code compiled with and without -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT and * can vary not only from platform to platform, but even for compiler * versions. Assembler vs. assembler improvement coefficients can * [and are known to] differ and are to be documented elsewhere. */ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0p, int num) { BN_ULONG c0, c1, ml, *tp, n0; # ifdef mul64 BN_ULONG mh; # endif volatile BN_ULONG *vp; int i = 0, j; # if 0 /* template for platform-specific * implementation */ if (ap == bp) return bn_sqr_mont(rp, ap, np, n0p, num); # endif vp = tp = alloca((num + 2) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); n0 = *n0p; c0 = 0; ml = bp[0]; # ifdef mul64 mh = HBITS(ml); ml = LBITS(ml); for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) mul(tp[j], ap[j], ml, mh, c0); # else for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) mul(tp[j], ap[j], ml, c0); # endif tp[num] = c0; tp[num + 1] = 0; goto enter; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { c0 = 0; ml = bp[i]; # ifdef mul64 mh = HBITS(ml); ml = LBITS(ml); for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) mul_add(tp[j], ap[j], ml, mh, c0); # else for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) mul_add(tp[j], ap[j], ml, c0); # endif c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2; tp[num] = c1; tp[num + 1] = (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0); enter: c1 = tp[0]; ml = (c1 * n0) & BN_MASK2; c0 = 0; # ifdef mul64 mh = HBITS(ml); ml = LBITS(ml); mul_add(c1, np[0], ml, mh, c0); # else mul_add(c1, ml, np[0], c0); # endif for (j = 1; j < num; j++) { c1 = tp[j]; # ifdef mul64 mul_add(c1, np[j], ml, mh, c0); # else mul_add(c1, ml, np[j], c0); # endif tp[j - 1] = c1 & BN_MASK2; } c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2; tp[num - 1] = c1; tp[num] = tp[num + 1] + (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0); } if (tp[num] != 0 || tp[num - 1] >= np[num - 1]) { c0 = bn_sub_words(rp, tp, np, num); if (tp[num] != 0 || c0 == 0) { for (i = 0; i < num + 2; i++) vp[i] = 0; return 1; } } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) rp[i] = tp[i], vp[i] = 0; vp[num] = 0; vp[num + 1] = 0; return 1; } # else /* * Return value of 0 indicates that multiplication/convolution was not * performed to signal the caller to fall down to alternative/original * code-path. */ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num) { return 0; } # endif /* OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT */ # endif #else /* !BN_MUL_COMBA */ /* hmm... is it faster just to do a multiply? */ # undef bn_sqr_comba4 # undef bn_sqr_comba8 void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a) { BN_ULONG t[8]; bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 4, t); } void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a) { BN_ULONG t[16]; bn_sqr_normal(r, a, 8, t); } void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b) { r[4] = bn_mul_words(&(r[0]), a, 4, b[0]); r[5] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, 4, b[1]); r[6] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, 4, b[2]); r[7] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, 4, b[3]); } void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b) { r[8] = bn_mul_words(&(r[0]), a, 8, b[0]); r[9] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, 8, b[1]); r[10] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, 8, b[2]); r[11] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, 8, b[3]); r[12] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, 8, b[4]); r[13] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[5]), a, 8, b[5]); r[14] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[6]), a, 8, b[6]); r[15] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[7]), a, 8, b[7]); } # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ASM # ifdef OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT # include int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0p, int num) { BN_ULONG c0, c1, *tp, n0 = *n0p; volatile BN_ULONG *vp; int i = 0, j; vp = tp = alloca((num + 2) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); for (i = 0; i <= num; i++) tp[i] = 0; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { c0 = bn_mul_add_words(tp, ap, num, bp[i]); c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2; tp[num] = c1; tp[num + 1] = (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0); c0 = bn_mul_add_words(tp, np, num, tp[0] * n0); c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2; tp[num] = c1; tp[num + 1] += (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0); for (j = 0; j <= num; j++) tp[j] = tp[j + 1]; } if (tp[num] != 0 || tp[num - 1] >= np[num - 1]) { c0 = bn_sub_words(rp, tp, np, num); if (tp[num] != 0 || c0 == 0) { for (i = 0; i < num + 2; i++) vp[i] = 0; return 1; } } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) rp[i] = tp[i], vp[i] = 0; vp[num] = 0; vp[num + 1] = 0; return 1; } # else int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num) { return 0; } # endif /* OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT */ # endif #endif /* !BN_MUL_COMBA */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_mod.c0000644000000000000000000001065513176625656015412 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * like BN_mod, but returns non-negative remainder (i.e., 0 <= r < |d| * always holds) */ if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) return 0; if (!r->neg) return 1; /* now -|d| < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + |d| */ return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add) (r, r, d); } int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) return 0; return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_add variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and * less than m */ int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m) { if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b)) return 0; if (BN_ucmp(r, m) >= 0) return BN_usub(r, r, m); return 1; } int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) return 0; return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_sub variant that may be used if both a and b are non-negative and * less than m */ int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m) { if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) return 0; if (r->neg) return BN_add(r, r, m); return 1; } /* slow but works */ int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(m); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (a == b) { if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) goto err; } if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) return 0; /* r->neg == 0, thus we don't need BN_nnmod */ return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx); } int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) return 0; bn_check_top(r); return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx); } /* * BN_mod_lshift1 variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than * m */ int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m) { if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) return 0; bn_check_top(r); if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) return BN_sub(r, r, m); return 1; } int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL; int ret; if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) return 0; if (m->neg) { abs_m = BN_dup(m); if (abs_m == NULL) return 0; abs_m->neg = 0; } ret = BN_mod_lshift_quick(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m)); bn_check_top(r); BN_free(abs_m); return ret; } /* * BN_mod_lshift variant that may be used if a is non-negative and less than * m */ int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) { if (r != a) { if (BN_copy(r, a) == NULL) return 0; } while (n > 0) { int max_shift; /* 0 < r < m */ max_shift = BN_num_bits(m) - BN_num_bits(r); /* max_shift >= 0 */ if (max_shift < 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED); return 0; } if (max_shift > n) max_shift = n; if (max_shift) { if (!BN_lshift(r, r, max_shift)) return 0; n -= max_shift; } else { if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) return 0; --n; } /* BN_num_bits(r) <= BN_num_bits(m) */ if (BN_cmp(r, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_sub(r, r, m)) return 0; } } bn_check_top(r); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_add.c0000644000000000000000000000754213176625656015364 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* r can == a or b */ int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int a_neg = a->neg, ret; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); /*- * a + b a+b * a + -b a-b * -a + b b-a * -a + -b -(a+b) */ if (a_neg ^ b->neg) { /* only one is negative */ if (a_neg) { const BIGNUM *tmp; tmp = a; a = b; b = tmp; } /* we are now a - b */ if (BN_ucmp(a, b) < 0) { if (!BN_usub(r, b, a)) return 0; r->neg = 1; } else { if (!BN_usub(r, a, b)) return 0; r->neg = 0; } return 1; } ret = BN_uadd(r, a, b); r->neg = a_neg; bn_check_top(r); return ret; } /* unsigned add of b to a */ int BN_uadd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int max, min, dif; const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp; BN_ULONG *rp, carry, t1, t2; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a->top < b->top) { const BIGNUM *tmp; tmp = a; a = b; b = tmp; } max = a->top; min = b->top; dif = max - min; if (bn_wexpand(r, max + 1) == NULL) return 0; r->top = max; ap = a->d; bp = b->d; rp = r->d; carry = bn_add_words(rp, ap, bp, min); rp += min; ap += min; while (dif) { dif--; t1 = *(ap++); t2 = (t1 + carry) & BN_MASK2; *(rp++) = t2; carry &= (t2 == 0); } *rp = carry; r->top += carry; r->neg = 0; bn_check_top(r); return 1; } /* unsigned subtraction of b from a, a must be larger than b. */ int BN_usub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int max, min, dif; BN_ULONG t1, t2, borrow, *rp; const BN_ULONG *ap, *bp; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); max = a->top; min = b->top; dif = max - min; if (dif < 0) { /* hmm... should not be happening */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_USUB, BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3); return 0; } if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL) return 0; ap = a->d; bp = b->d; rp = r->d; borrow = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, bp, min); ap += min; rp += min; while (dif) { dif--; t1 = *(ap++); t2 = (t1 - borrow) & BN_MASK2; *(rp++) = t2; borrow &= (t1 == 0); } r->top = max; r->neg = 0; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int max; int add = 0, neg = 0; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); /*- * a - b a-b * a - -b a+b * -a - b -(a+b) * -a - -b b-a */ if (a->neg) { if (b->neg) { const BIGNUM *tmp; tmp = a; a = b; b = tmp; } else { add = 1; neg = 1; } } else { if (b->neg) { add = 1; neg = 0; } } if (add) { if (!BN_uadd(r, a, b)) return 0; r->neg = neg; return 1; } /* We are actually doing a - b :-) */ max = (a->top > b->top) ? a->top : b->top; if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL) return 0; if (BN_ucmp(a, b) < 0) { if (!BN_usub(r, b, a)) return 0; r->neg = 1; } else { if (!BN_usub(r, a, b)) return 0; r->neg = 0; } bn_check_top(r); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c0000644000000000000000000004255513176625656015753 0ustar rootroot/* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* * The quick sieve algorithm approach to weeding out primes is Philip * Zimmermann's, as implemented in PGP. I have had a read of his comments * and implemented my own version. */ #include "bn_prime.h" static int witness(BIGNUM *w, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *a1_odd, int k, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont); static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, prime_t *mods); static int probable_prime_dh_safe(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx); static const int prime_offsets[480] = { 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 169, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 221, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 247, 251, 257, 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 289, 293, 299, 307, 311, 313, 317, 323, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 361, 367, 373, 377, 379, 383, 389, 391, 397, 401, 403, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 437, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 481, 487, 491, 493, 499, 503, 509, 521, 523, 527, 529, 533, 541, 547, 551, 557, 559, 563, 569, 571, 577, 587, 589, 593, 599, 601, 607, 611, 613, 617, 619, 629, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 667, 673, 677, 683, 689, 691, 697, 701, 703, 709, 713, 719, 727, 731, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 767, 769, 773, 779, 787, 793, 797, 799, 809, 811, 817, 821, 823, 827, 829, 839, 841, 851, 853, 857, 859, 863, 871, 877, 881, 883, 887, 893, 899, 901, 907, 911, 919, 923, 929, 937, 941, 943, 947, 949, 953, 961, 967, 971, 977, 983, 989, 991, 997, 1003, 1007, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1027, 1031, 1033, 1037, 1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1073, 1079, 1081, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1121, 1123, 1129, 1139, 1147, 1151, 1153, 1157, 1159, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1189, 1193, 1201, 1207, 1213, 1217, 1219, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1241, 1247, 1249, 1259, 1261, 1271, 1273, 1277, 1279, 1283, 1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1313, 1319, 1321, 1327, 1333, 1339, 1343, 1349, 1357, 1361, 1363, 1367, 1369, 1373, 1381, 1387, 1391, 1399, 1403, 1409, 1411, 1417, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451, 1453, 1457, 1459, 1469, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493, 1499, 1501, 1511, 1513, 1517, 1523, 1531, 1537, 1541, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559, 1567, 1571, 1577, 1579, 1583, 1591, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1633, 1637, 1643, 1649, 1651, 1657, 1663, 1667, 1669, 1679, 1681, 1691, 1693, 1697, 1699, 1703, 1709, 1711, 1717, 1721, 1723, 1733, 1739, 1741, 1747, 1751, 1753, 1759, 1763, 1769, 1777, 1781, 1783, 1787, 1789, 1801, 1807, 1811, 1817, 1819, 1823, 1829, 1831, 1843, 1847, 1849, 1853, 1861, 1867, 1871, 1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1891, 1901, 1907, 1909, 1913, 1919, 1921, 1927, 1931, 1933, 1937, 1943, 1949, 1951, 1957, 1961, 1963, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2011, 2017, 2021, 2027, 2029, 2033, 2039, 2041, 2047, 2053, 2059, 2063, 2069, 2071, 2077, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111, 2113, 2117, 2119, 2129, 2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2147, 2153, 2159, 2161, 2171, 2173, 2179, 2183, 2197, 2201, 2203, 2207, 2209, 2213, 2221, 2227, 2231, 2237, 2239, 2243, 2249, 2251, 2257, 2263, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2279, 2281, 2287, 2291, 2293, 2297, 2309, 2311 }; static const int prime_offset_count = 480; static const int prime_multiplier = 2310; static const int prime_multiplier_bits = 11; /* 2^|prime_multiplier_bits| <= * |prime_multiplier| */ static const int first_prime_index = 5; int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b) { /* No callback means continue */ if (!cb) return 1; switch (cb->ver) { case 1: /* Deprecated-style callbacks */ if (!cb->cb.cb_1) return 1; cb->cb.cb_1(a, b, cb->arg); return 1; case 2: /* New-style callbacks */ return cb->cb.cb_2(a, b, cb); default: break; } /* Unrecognised callback type */ return 0; } int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *t; int found = 0; int i, j, c1 = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; prime_t *mods = NULL; int checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(bits); if (bits < 2) { /* There are no prime numbers this small. */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } else if (bits == 2 && safe) { /* The smallest safe prime (7) is three bits. */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } mods = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*mods) * NUMPRIMES); if (mods == NULL) goto err; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!t) goto err; loop: /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */ if (add == NULL) { if (!probable_prime(ret, bits, mods)) goto err; } else { if (safe) { if (!probable_prime_dh_safe(ret, bits, add, rem, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!bn_probable_prime_dh(ret, bits, add, rem, ctx)) goto err; } } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, c1++)) /* aborted */ goto err; if (!safe) { i = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(ret, checks, ctx, 0, cb); if (i == -1) goto err; if (i == 0) goto loop; } else { /* * for "safe prime" generation, check that (p-1)/2 is prime. Since a * prime is odd, We just need to divide by 2 */ if (!BN_rshift1(t, ret)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < checks; i++) { j = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(ret, 1, ctx, 0, cb); if (j == -1) goto err; if (j == 0) goto loop; j = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(t, 1, ctx, 0, cb); if (j == -1) goto err; if (j == 0) goto loop; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, c1 - 1)) goto err; /* We have a safe prime test pass */ } } /* we have a prime :-) */ found = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(mods); if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); bn_check_top(ret); return found; } int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed, BN_GENCB *cb) { return BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(a, checks, ctx_passed, 0, cb); } int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb) { int i, j, ret = -1; int k; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *A1, *A1_odd, *check; /* taken from ctx */ BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; if (BN_cmp(a, BN_value_one()) <= 0) return 0; if (checks == BN_prime_checks) checks = BN_prime_checks_for_size(BN_num_bits(a)); /* first look for small factors */ if (!BN_is_odd(a)) /* a is even => a is prime if and only if a == 2 */ return BN_is_word(a, 2); if (do_trial_division) { for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) { BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(a, primes[i]); if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; if (mod == 0) return 0; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1)) goto err; } if (ctx_passed != NULL) ctx = ctx_passed; else if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); A1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); A1_odd = BN_CTX_get(ctx); check = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (check == NULL) goto err; /* compute A1 := a - 1 */ if (!BN_copy(A1, a)) goto err; if (!BN_sub_word(A1, 1)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(A1)) { ret = 0; goto err; } /* write A1 as A1_odd * 2^k */ k = 1; while (!BN_is_bit_set(A1, k)) k++; if (!BN_rshift(A1_odd, A1, k)) goto err; /* Montgomery setup for computations mod a */ mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (mont == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, a, ctx)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < checks; i++) { if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(check, A1)) goto err; if (!BN_add_word(check, 1)) goto err; /* now 1 <= check < a */ j = witness(check, a, A1, A1_odd, k, ctx, mont); if (j == -1) goto err; if (j) { ret = 0; goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, i)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_passed == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); } BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); return (ret); } int bn_probable_prime_dh_retry(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i; int ret = 0; loop: if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) goto err; /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */ for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) { /* check that rnd is a prime */ BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]); if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; if (mod <= 1) { goto loop; } } ret = 1; err: bn_check_top(rnd); return (ret); } int bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i; BIGNUM *offset_index; BIGNUM *offset_count; int ret = 0; OPENSSL_assert(bits > prime_multiplier_bits); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((offset_index = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((offset_count = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_add_word(offset_count, prime_offset_count)) goto err; loop: if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits - prime_multiplier_bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) goto err; if (BN_is_bit_set(rnd, bits)) goto loop; if (!BN_rand_range(offset_index, offset_count)) goto err; if (!BN_mul_word(rnd, prime_multiplier) || !BN_add_word(rnd, prime_offsets[BN_get_word(offset_index)])) goto err; /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */ /* skip coprimes */ for (i = first_prime_index; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) { /* check that rnd is a prime */ BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]); if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; if (mod <= 1) goto loop; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rnd); return ret; } static int witness(BIGNUM *w, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *a1_odd, int k, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(w, w, a1_odd, a, ctx, mont)) /* w := w^a1_odd mod a */ return -1; if (BN_is_one(w)) return 0; /* probably prime */ if (BN_cmp(w, a1) == 0) return 0; /* w == -1 (mod a), 'a' is probably prime */ while (--k) { if (!BN_mod_mul(w, w, w, a, ctx)) /* w := w^2 mod a */ return -1; if (BN_is_one(w)) return 1; /* 'a' is composite, otherwise a previous 'w' * would have been == -1 (mod 'a') */ if (BN_cmp(w, a1) == 0) return 0; /* w == -1 (mod a), 'a' is probably prime */ } /* * If we get here, 'w' is the (a-1)/2-th power of the original 'w', and * it is neither -1 nor +1 -- so 'a' cannot be prime */ bn_check_top(w); return 1; } static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, prime_t *mods) { int i; BN_ULONG delta; BN_ULONG maxdelta = BN_MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES - 1]; char is_single_word = bits <= BN_BITS2; again: if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) return (0); /* we now have a random number 'rnd' to test. */ for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) { BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]); if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1) return 0; mods[i] = (prime_t) mod; } /* * If bits is so small that it fits into a single word then we * additionally don't want to exceed that many bits. */ if (is_single_word) { BN_ULONG size_limit; if (bits == BN_BITS2) { /* * Shifting by this much has undefined behaviour so we do it a * different way */ size_limit = ~((BN_ULONG)0) - BN_get_word(rnd); } else { size_limit = (((BN_ULONG)1) << bits) - BN_get_word(rnd) - 1; } if (size_limit < maxdelta) maxdelta = size_limit; } delta = 0; loop: if (is_single_word) { BN_ULONG rnd_word = BN_get_word(rnd); /*- * In the case that the candidate prime is a single word then * we check that: * 1) It's greater than primes[i] because we shouldn't reject * 3 as being a prime number because it's a multiple of * three. * 2) That it's not a multiple of a known prime. We don't * check that rnd-1 is also coprime to all the known * primes because there aren't many small primes where * that's true. */ for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES && primes[i] < rnd_word; i++) { if ((mods[i] + delta) % primes[i] == 0) { delta += 2; if (delta > maxdelta) goto again; goto loop; } } } else { for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) { /* * check that rnd is not a prime and also that gcd(rnd-1,primes) * == 1 (except for 2) */ if (((mods[i] + delta) % primes[i]) <= 1) { delta += 2; if (delta > maxdelta) goto again; goto loop; } } } if (!BN_add_word(rnd, delta)) return (0); if (BN_num_bits(rnd) != bits) goto again; bn_check_top(rnd); return (1); } int bn_probable_prime_dh(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, ret = 0; BIGNUM *t1; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) goto err; /* we need ((rnd-rem) % add) == 0 */ if (!BN_mod(t1, rnd, add, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(rnd, rnd, t1)) goto err; if (rem == NULL) { if (!BN_add_word(rnd, 1)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_add(rnd, rnd, rem)) goto err; } /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */ loop: for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) { /* check that rnd is a prime */ BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]); if (mod == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; if (mod <= 1) { if (!BN_add(rnd, rnd, add)) goto err; goto loop; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rnd); return (ret); } static int probable_prime_dh_safe(BIGNUM *p, int bits, const BIGNUM *padd, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, ret = 0; BIGNUM *t1, *qadd, *q; bits--; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); qadd = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (qadd == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(qadd, padd)) goto err; if (!BN_rand(q, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) goto err; /* we need ((rnd-rem) % add) == 0 */ if (!BN_mod(t1, q, qadd, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(q, q, t1)) goto err; if (rem == NULL) { if (!BN_add_word(q, 1)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_rshift1(t1, rem)) goto err; if (!BN_add(q, q, t1)) goto err; } /* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */ if (!BN_lshift1(p, q)) goto err; if (!BN_add_word(p, 1)) goto err; loop: for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i++) { /* check that p and q are prime */ /* * check that for p and q gcd(p-1,primes) == 1 (except for 2) */ BN_ULONG pmod = BN_mod_word(p, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]); BN_ULONG qmod = BN_mod_word(q, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]); if (pmod == (BN_ULONG)-1 || qmod == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; if (pmod == 0 || qmod == 0) { if (!BN_add(p, p, padd)) goto err; if (!BN_add(q, q, qadd)) goto err; goto loop; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(p); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_srp.c0000644000000000000000000005256313176625656015443 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "bn_lcl.h" #include "e_os.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP #include #include # if (BN_BYTES == 8) # if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__) # define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UI64<<48)|(a2##UI64<<32)|(a3##UI64<<16)|a4##UI64) # elif defined(__arch64__) # define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##UL<<48)|(a2##UL<<32)|(a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL) # else # define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a1##ULL<<48)|(a2##ULL<<32)|(a3##ULL<<16)|a4##ULL) # endif # elif (BN_BYTES == 4) # define bn_pack4(a1,a2,a3,a4) ((a3##UL<<16)|a4##UL), ((a1##UL<<16)|a2##UL) # else # error "unsupported BN_BYTES" # endif static const BN_ULONG bn_group_1024_value[] = { bn_pack4(0x9FC6, 0x1D2F, 0xC0EB, 0x06E3), bn_pack4(0xFD51, 0x38FE, 0x8376, 0x435B), bn_pack4(0x2FD4, 0xCBF4, 0x976E, 0xAA9A), bn_pack4(0x68ED, 0xBC3C, 0x0572, 0x6CC0), bn_pack4(0xC529, 0xF566, 0x660E, 0x57EC), bn_pack4(0x8255, 0x9B29, 0x7BCF, 0x1885), bn_pack4(0xCE8E, 0xF4AD, 0x69B1, 0x5D49), bn_pack4(0x5DC7, 0xD7B4, 0x6154, 0xD6B6), bn_pack4(0x8E49, 0x5C1D, 0x6089, 0xDAD1), bn_pack4(0xE0D5, 0xD8E2, 0x50B9, 0x8BE4), bn_pack4(0x383B, 0x4813, 0xD692, 0xC6E0), bn_pack4(0xD674, 0xDF74, 0x96EA, 0x81D3), bn_pack4(0x9EA2, 0x314C, 0x9C25, 0x6576), bn_pack4(0x6072, 0x6187, 0x75FF, 0x3C0B), bn_pack4(0x9C33, 0xF80A, 0xFA8F, 0xC5E8), bn_pack4(0xEEAF, 0x0AB9, 0xADB3, 0x8DD6) }; const BIGNUM bn_group_1024 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_1024_value, OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1024_value), OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1024_value), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_group_1536_value[] = { bn_pack4(0xCF76, 0xE3FE, 0xD135, 0xF9BB), bn_pack4(0x1518, 0x0F93, 0x499A, 0x234D), bn_pack4(0x8CE7, 0xA28C, 0x2442, 0xC6F3), bn_pack4(0x5A02, 0x1FFF, 0x5E91, 0x479E), bn_pack4(0x7F8A, 0x2FE9, 0xB8B5, 0x292E), bn_pack4(0x837C, 0x264A, 0xE3A9, 0xBEB8), bn_pack4(0xE442, 0x734A, 0xF7CC, 0xB7AE), bn_pack4(0x6577, 0x2E43, 0x7D6C, 0x7F8C), bn_pack4(0xDB2F, 0xD53D, 0x24B7, 0xC486), bn_pack4(0x6EDF, 0x0195, 0x3934, 0x9627), bn_pack4(0x158B, 0xFD3E, 0x2B9C, 0x8CF5), bn_pack4(0x764E, 0x3F4B, 0x53DD, 0x9DA1), bn_pack4(0x4754, 0x8381, 0xDBC5, 0xB1FC), bn_pack4(0x9B60, 0x9E0B, 0xE3BA, 0xB63D), bn_pack4(0x8134, 0xB1C8, 0xB979, 0x8914), bn_pack4(0xDF02, 0x8A7C, 0xEC67, 0xF0D0), bn_pack4(0x80B6, 0x55BB, 0x9A22, 0xE8DC), bn_pack4(0x1558, 0x903B, 0xA0D0, 0xF843), bn_pack4(0x51C6, 0xA94B, 0xE460, 0x7A29), bn_pack4(0x5F4F, 0x5F55, 0x6E27, 0xCBDE), bn_pack4(0xBEEE, 0xA961, 0x4B19, 0xCC4D), bn_pack4(0xDBA5, 0x1DF4, 0x99AC, 0x4C80), bn_pack4(0xB1F1, 0x2A86, 0x17A4, 0x7BBB), bn_pack4(0x9DEF, 0x3CAF, 0xB939, 0x277A) }; const BIGNUM bn_group_1536 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_1536_value, OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1536_value), OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_1536_value), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_group_2048_value[] = { bn_pack4(0x0FA7, 0x111F, 0x9E4A, 0xFF73), bn_pack4(0x9B65, 0xE372, 0xFCD6, 0x8EF2), bn_pack4(0x35DE, 0x236D, 0x525F, 0x5475), bn_pack4(0x94B5, 0xC803, 0xD89F, 0x7AE4), bn_pack4(0x71AE, 0x35F8, 0xE9DB, 0xFBB6), bn_pack4(0x2A56, 0x98F3, 0xA8D0, 0xC382), bn_pack4(0x9CCC, 0x041C, 0x7BC3, 0x08D8), bn_pack4(0xAF87, 0x4E73, 0x03CE, 0x5329), bn_pack4(0x6160, 0x2790, 0x04E5, 0x7AE6), bn_pack4(0x032C, 0xFBDB, 0xF52F, 0xB378), bn_pack4(0x5EA7, 0x7A27, 0x75D2, 0xECFA), bn_pack4(0x5445, 0x23B5, 0x24B0, 0xD57D), bn_pack4(0x5B9D, 0x32E6, 0x88F8, 0x7748), bn_pack4(0xF1D2, 0xB907, 0x8717, 0x461A), bn_pack4(0x76BD, 0x207A, 0x436C, 0x6481), bn_pack4(0xCA97, 0xB43A, 0x23FB, 0x8016), bn_pack4(0x1D28, 0x1E44, 0x6B14, 0x773B), bn_pack4(0x7359, 0xD041, 0xD5C3, 0x3EA7), bn_pack4(0xA80D, 0x740A, 0xDBF4, 0xFF74), bn_pack4(0x55F9, 0x7993, 0xEC97, 0x5EEA), bn_pack4(0x2918, 0xA996, 0x2F0B, 0x93B8), bn_pack4(0x661A, 0x05FB, 0xD5FA, 0xAAE8), bn_pack4(0xCF60, 0x9517, 0x9A16, 0x3AB3), bn_pack4(0xE808, 0x3969, 0xEDB7, 0x67B0), bn_pack4(0xCD7F, 0x48A9, 0xDA04, 0xFD50), bn_pack4(0xD523, 0x12AB, 0x4B03, 0x310D), bn_pack4(0x8193, 0xE075, 0x7767, 0xA13D), bn_pack4(0xA373, 0x29CB, 0xB4A0, 0x99ED), bn_pack4(0xFC31, 0x9294, 0x3DB5, 0x6050), bn_pack4(0xAF72, 0xB665, 0x1987, 0xEE07), bn_pack4(0xF166, 0xDE5E, 0x1389, 0x582F), bn_pack4(0xAC6B, 0xDB41, 0x324A, 0x9A9B) }; const BIGNUM bn_group_2048 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_2048_value, OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_2048_value), OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_2048_value), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_group_3072_value[] = { bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF), bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA93A, 0xD2CA), bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E), bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31), bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2), bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C), bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C), bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64), bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864), bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B), bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D), bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7), bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7), bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D), bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A), bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64), bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33), bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D), bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510), bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5), bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718), bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9), bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F), bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603), bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B), bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C), bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804), bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D), bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB), bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96), bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F), bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A), bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05), bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D), bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6), bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5), bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED), bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B), bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6), bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245), bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437), bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B), bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD), bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22), bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74), bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1), bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234), bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF) }; const BIGNUM bn_group_3072 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_3072_value, OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_3072_value), OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_3072_value), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_group_4096_value[] = { bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF), bn_pack4(0x4DF4, 0x35C9, 0x3406, 0x3199), bn_pack4(0x86FF, 0xB7DC, 0x90A6, 0xC08F), bn_pack4(0x93B4, 0xEA98, 0x8D8F, 0xDDC1), bn_pack4(0xD006, 0x9127, 0xD5B0, 0x5AA9), bn_pack4(0xB81B, 0xDD76, 0x2170, 0x481C), bn_pack4(0x1F61, 0x2970, 0xCEE2, 0xD7AF), bn_pack4(0x233B, 0xA186, 0x515B, 0xE7ED), bn_pack4(0x99B2, 0x964F, 0xA090, 0xC3A2), bn_pack4(0x287C, 0x5947, 0x4E6B, 0xC05D), bn_pack4(0x2E8E, 0xFC14, 0x1FBE, 0xCAA6), bn_pack4(0xDBBB, 0xC2DB, 0x04DE, 0x8EF9), bn_pack4(0x2583, 0xE9CA, 0x2AD4, 0x4CE8), bn_pack4(0x1A94, 0x6834, 0xB615, 0x0BDA), bn_pack4(0x99C3, 0x2718, 0x6AF4, 0xE23C), bn_pack4(0x8871, 0x9A10, 0xBDBA, 0x5B26), bn_pack4(0x1A72, 0x3C12, 0xA787, 0xE6D7), bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA921, 0x0801), bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E), bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31), bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2), bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C), bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C), bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64), bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864), bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B), bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D), bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7), bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7), bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D), bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A), bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64), bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33), bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D), bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510), bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5), bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718), bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9), bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F), bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603), bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B), bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C), bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804), bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D), bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB), bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96), bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F), bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A), bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05), bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D), bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6), bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5), bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED), bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B), bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6), bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245), bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437), bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B), bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD), bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22), bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74), bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1), bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234), bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF) }; const BIGNUM bn_group_4096 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_4096_value, OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_4096_value), OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_4096_value), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_group_6144_value[] = { bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF), bn_pack4(0xE694, 0xF91E, 0x6DCC, 0x4024), bn_pack4(0x12BF, 0x2D5B, 0x0B74, 0x74D6), bn_pack4(0x043E, 0x8F66, 0x3F48, 0x60EE), bn_pack4(0x387F, 0xE8D7, 0x6E3C, 0x0468), bn_pack4(0xDA56, 0xC9EC, 0x2EF2, 0x9632), bn_pack4(0xEB19, 0xCCB1, 0xA313, 0xD55C), bn_pack4(0xF550, 0xAA3D, 0x8A1F, 0xBFF0), bn_pack4(0x06A1, 0xD58B, 0xB7C5, 0xDA76), bn_pack4(0xA797, 0x15EE, 0xF29B, 0xE328), bn_pack4(0x14CC, 0x5ED2, 0x0F80, 0x37E0), bn_pack4(0xCC8F, 0x6D7E, 0xBF48, 0xE1D8), bn_pack4(0x4BD4, 0x07B2, 0x2B41, 0x54AA), bn_pack4(0x0F1D, 0x45B7, 0xFF58, 0x5AC5), bn_pack4(0x23A9, 0x7A7E, 0x36CC, 0x88BE), bn_pack4(0x59E7, 0xC97F, 0xBEC7, 0xE8F3), bn_pack4(0xB5A8, 0x4031, 0x900B, 0x1C9E), bn_pack4(0xD55E, 0x702F, 0x4698, 0x0C82), bn_pack4(0xF482, 0xD7CE, 0x6E74, 0xFEF6), bn_pack4(0xF032, 0xEA15, 0xD172, 0x1D03), bn_pack4(0x5983, 0xCA01, 0xC64B, 0x92EC), bn_pack4(0x6FB8, 0xF401, 0x378C, 0xD2BF), bn_pack4(0x3320, 0x5151, 0x2BD7, 0xAF42), bn_pack4(0xDB7F, 0x1447, 0xE6CC, 0x254B), bn_pack4(0x44CE, 0x6CBA, 0xCED4, 0xBB1B), bn_pack4(0xDA3E, 0xDBEB, 0xCF9B, 0x14ED), bn_pack4(0x1797, 0x27B0, 0x865A, 0x8918), bn_pack4(0xB06A, 0x53ED, 0x9027, 0xD831), bn_pack4(0xE5DB, 0x382F, 0x4130, 0x01AE), bn_pack4(0xF8FF, 0x9406, 0xAD9E, 0x530E), bn_pack4(0xC975, 0x1E76, 0x3DBA, 0x37BD), bn_pack4(0xC1D4, 0xDCB2, 0x6026, 0x46DE), bn_pack4(0x36C3, 0xFAB4, 0xD27C, 0x7026), bn_pack4(0x4DF4, 0x35C9, 0x3402, 0x8492), bn_pack4(0x86FF, 0xB7DC, 0x90A6, 0xC08F), bn_pack4(0x93B4, 0xEA98, 0x8D8F, 0xDDC1), bn_pack4(0xD006, 0x9127, 0xD5B0, 0x5AA9), bn_pack4(0xB81B, 0xDD76, 0x2170, 0x481C), bn_pack4(0x1F61, 0x2970, 0xCEE2, 0xD7AF), bn_pack4(0x233B, 0xA186, 0x515B, 0xE7ED), bn_pack4(0x99B2, 0x964F, 0xA090, 0xC3A2), bn_pack4(0x287C, 0x5947, 0x4E6B, 0xC05D), bn_pack4(0x2E8E, 0xFC14, 0x1FBE, 0xCAA6), bn_pack4(0xDBBB, 0xC2DB, 0x04DE, 0x8EF9), bn_pack4(0x2583, 0xE9CA, 0x2AD4, 0x4CE8), bn_pack4(0x1A94, 0x6834, 0xB615, 0x0BDA), bn_pack4(0x99C3, 0x2718, 0x6AF4, 0xE23C), bn_pack4(0x8871, 0x9A10, 0xBDBA, 0x5B26), bn_pack4(0x1A72, 0x3C12, 0xA787, 0xE6D7), bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA921, 0x0801), bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E), bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31), bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2), bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C), bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C), bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64), bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864), bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B), bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D), bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7), bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7), bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D), bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A), bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64), bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33), bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D), bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510), bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5), bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718), bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9), bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F), bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603), bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B), bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C), bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804), bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D), bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB), bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96), bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F), bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A), bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05), bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D), bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6), bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5), bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED), bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B), bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6), bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245), bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437), bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B), bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD), bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22), bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74), bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1), bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234), bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF) }; const BIGNUM bn_group_6144 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_6144_value, OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_6144_value), OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_6144_value), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_group_8192_value[] = { bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF), bn_pack4(0x60C9, 0x80DD, 0x98ED, 0xD3DF), bn_pack4(0xC81F, 0x56E8, 0x80B9, 0x6E71), bn_pack4(0x9E30, 0x50E2, 0x7656, 0x94DF), bn_pack4(0x9558, 0xE447, 0x5677, 0xE9AA), bn_pack4(0xC919, 0x0DA6, 0xFC02, 0x6E47), bn_pack4(0x889A, 0x002E, 0xD5EE, 0x382B), bn_pack4(0x4009, 0x438B, 0x481C, 0x6CD7), bn_pack4(0x3590, 0x46F4, 0xEB87, 0x9F92), bn_pack4(0xFAF3, 0x6BC3, 0x1ECF, 0xA268), bn_pack4(0xB1D5, 0x10BD, 0x7EE7, 0x4D73), bn_pack4(0xF9AB, 0x4819, 0x5DED, 0x7EA1), bn_pack4(0x64F3, 0x1CC5, 0x0846, 0x851D), bn_pack4(0x4597, 0xE899, 0xA025, 0x5DC1), bn_pack4(0xDF31, 0x0EE0, 0x74AB, 0x6A36), bn_pack4(0x6D2A, 0x13F8, 0x3F44, 0xF82D), bn_pack4(0x062B, 0x3CF5, 0xB3A2, 0x78A6), bn_pack4(0x7968, 0x3303, 0xED5B, 0xDD3A), bn_pack4(0xFA9D, 0x4B7F, 0xA2C0, 0x87E8), bn_pack4(0x4BCB, 0xC886, 0x2F83, 0x85DD), bn_pack4(0x3473, 0xFC64, 0x6CEA, 0x306B), bn_pack4(0x13EB, 0x57A8, 0x1A23, 0xF0C7), bn_pack4(0x2222, 0x2E04, 0xA403, 0x7C07), bn_pack4(0xE3FD, 0xB8BE, 0xFC84, 0x8AD9), bn_pack4(0x238F, 0x16CB, 0xE39D, 0x652D), bn_pack4(0x3423, 0xB474, 0x2BF1, 0xC978), bn_pack4(0x3AAB, 0x639C, 0x5AE4, 0xF568), bn_pack4(0x2576, 0xF693, 0x6BA4, 0x2466), bn_pack4(0x741F, 0xA7BF, 0x8AFC, 0x47ED), bn_pack4(0x3BC8, 0x32B6, 0x8D9D, 0xD300), bn_pack4(0xD8BE, 0xC4D0, 0x73B9, 0x31BA), bn_pack4(0x3877, 0x7CB6, 0xA932, 0xDF8C), bn_pack4(0x74A3, 0x926F, 0x12FE, 0xE5E4), bn_pack4(0xE694, 0xF91E, 0x6DBE, 0x1159), bn_pack4(0x12BF, 0x2D5B, 0x0B74, 0x74D6), bn_pack4(0x043E, 0x8F66, 0x3F48, 0x60EE), bn_pack4(0x387F, 0xE8D7, 0x6E3C, 0x0468), bn_pack4(0xDA56, 0xC9EC, 0x2EF2, 0x9632), bn_pack4(0xEB19, 0xCCB1, 0xA313, 0xD55C), bn_pack4(0xF550, 0xAA3D, 0x8A1F, 0xBFF0), bn_pack4(0x06A1, 0xD58B, 0xB7C5, 0xDA76), bn_pack4(0xA797, 0x15EE, 0xF29B, 0xE328), bn_pack4(0x14CC, 0x5ED2, 0x0F80, 0x37E0), bn_pack4(0xCC8F, 0x6D7E, 0xBF48, 0xE1D8), bn_pack4(0x4BD4, 0x07B2, 0x2B41, 0x54AA), bn_pack4(0x0F1D, 0x45B7, 0xFF58, 0x5AC5), bn_pack4(0x23A9, 0x7A7E, 0x36CC, 0x88BE), bn_pack4(0x59E7, 0xC97F, 0xBEC7, 0xE8F3), bn_pack4(0xB5A8, 0x4031, 0x900B, 0x1C9E), bn_pack4(0xD55E, 0x702F, 0x4698, 0x0C82), bn_pack4(0xF482, 0xD7CE, 0x6E74, 0xFEF6), bn_pack4(0xF032, 0xEA15, 0xD172, 0x1D03), bn_pack4(0x5983, 0xCA01, 0xC64B, 0x92EC), bn_pack4(0x6FB8, 0xF401, 0x378C, 0xD2BF), bn_pack4(0x3320, 0x5151, 0x2BD7, 0xAF42), bn_pack4(0xDB7F, 0x1447, 0xE6CC, 0x254B), bn_pack4(0x44CE, 0x6CBA, 0xCED4, 0xBB1B), bn_pack4(0xDA3E, 0xDBEB, 0xCF9B, 0x14ED), bn_pack4(0x1797, 0x27B0, 0x865A, 0x8918), bn_pack4(0xB06A, 0x53ED, 0x9027, 0xD831), bn_pack4(0xE5DB, 0x382F, 0x4130, 0x01AE), bn_pack4(0xF8FF, 0x9406, 0xAD9E, 0x530E), bn_pack4(0xC975, 0x1E76, 0x3DBA, 0x37BD), bn_pack4(0xC1D4, 0xDCB2, 0x6026, 0x46DE), bn_pack4(0x36C3, 0xFAB4, 0xD27C, 0x7026), bn_pack4(0x4DF4, 0x35C9, 0x3402, 0x8492), bn_pack4(0x86FF, 0xB7DC, 0x90A6, 0xC08F), bn_pack4(0x93B4, 0xEA98, 0x8D8F, 0xDDC1), bn_pack4(0xD006, 0x9127, 0xD5B0, 0x5AA9), bn_pack4(0xB81B, 0xDD76, 0x2170, 0x481C), bn_pack4(0x1F61, 0x2970, 0xCEE2, 0xD7AF), bn_pack4(0x233B, 0xA186, 0x515B, 0xE7ED), bn_pack4(0x99B2, 0x964F, 0xA090, 0xC3A2), bn_pack4(0x287C, 0x5947, 0x4E6B, 0xC05D), bn_pack4(0x2E8E, 0xFC14, 0x1FBE, 0xCAA6), bn_pack4(0xDBBB, 0xC2DB, 0x04DE, 0x8EF9), bn_pack4(0x2583, 0xE9CA, 0x2AD4, 0x4CE8), bn_pack4(0x1A94, 0x6834, 0xB615, 0x0BDA), bn_pack4(0x99C3, 0x2718, 0x6AF4, 0xE23C), bn_pack4(0x8871, 0x9A10, 0xBDBA, 0x5B26), bn_pack4(0x1A72, 0x3C12, 0xA787, 0xE6D7), bn_pack4(0x4B82, 0xD120, 0xA921, 0x0801), bn_pack4(0x43DB, 0x5BFC, 0xE0FD, 0x108E), bn_pack4(0x08E2, 0x4FA0, 0x74E5, 0xAB31), bn_pack4(0x7709, 0x88C0, 0xBAD9, 0x46E2), bn_pack4(0xBBE1, 0x1757, 0x7A61, 0x5D6C), bn_pack4(0x521F, 0x2B18, 0x177B, 0x200C), bn_pack4(0xD876, 0x0273, 0x3EC8, 0x6A64), bn_pack4(0xF12F, 0xFA06, 0xD98A, 0x0864), bn_pack4(0xCEE3, 0xD226, 0x1AD2, 0xEE6B), bn_pack4(0x1E8C, 0x94E0, 0x4A25, 0x619D), bn_pack4(0xABF5, 0xAE8C, 0xDB09, 0x33D7), bn_pack4(0xB397, 0x0F85, 0xA6E1, 0xE4C7), bn_pack4(0x8AEA, 0x7157, 0x5D06, 0x0C7D), bn_pack4(0xECFB, 0x8504, 0x58DB, 0xEF0A), bn_pack4(0xA855, 0x21AB, 0xDF1C, 0xBA64), bn_pack4(0xAD33, 0x170D, 0x0450, 0x7A33), bn_pack4(0x1572, 0x8E5A, 0x8AAA, 0xC42D), bn_pack4(0x15D2, 0x2618, 0x98FA, 0x0510), bn_pack4(0x3995, 0x497C, 0xEA95, 0x6AE5), bn_pack4(0xDE2B, 0xCBF6, 0x9558, 0x1718), bn_pack4(0xB5C5, 0x5DF0, 0x6F4C, 0x52C9), bn_pack4(0x9B27, 0x83A2, 0xEC07, 0xA28F), bn_pack4(0xE39E, 0x772C, 0x180E, 0x8603), bn_pack4(0x3290, 0x5E46, 0x2E36, 0xCE3B), bn_pack4(0xF174, 0x6C08, 0xCA18, 0x217C), bn_pack4(0x670C, 0x354E, 0x4ABC, 0x9804), bn_pack4(0x9ED5, 0x2907, 0x7096, 0x966D), bn_pack4(0x1C62, 0xF356, 0x2085, 0x52BB), bn_pack4(0x8365, 0x5D23, 0xDCA3, 0xAD96), bn_pack4(0x6916, 0x3FA8, 0xFD24, 0xCF5F), bn_pack4(0x98DA, 0x4836, 0x1C55, 0xD39A), bn_pack4(0xC200, 0x7CB8, 0xA163, 0xBF05), bn_pack4(0x4928, 0x6651, 0xECE4, 0x5B3D), bn_pack4(0xAE9F, 0x2411, 0x7C4B, 0x1FE6), bn_pack4(0xEE38, 0x6BFB, 0x5A89, 0x9FA5), bn_pack4(0x0BFF, 0x5CB6, 0xF406, 0xB7ED), bn_pack4(0xF44C, 0x42E9, 0xA637, 0xED6B), bn_pack4(0xE485, 0xB576, 0x625E, 0x7EC6), bn_pack4(0x4FE1, 0x356D, 0x6D51, 0xC245), bn_pack4(0x302B, 0x0A6D, 0xF25F, 0x1437), bn_pack4(0xEF95, 0x19B3, 0xCD3A, 0x431B), bn_pack4(0x514A, 0x0879, 0x8E34, 0x04DD), bn_pack4(0x020B, 0xBEA6, 0x3B13, 0x9B22), bn_pack4(0x2902, 0x4E08, 0x8A67, 0xCC74), bn_pack4(0xC4C6, 0x628B, 0x80DC, 0x1CD1), bn_pack4(0xC90F, 0xDAA2, 0x2168, 0xC234), bn_pack4(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF) }; const BIGNUM bn_group_8192 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_group_8192_value, OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_8192_value), OSSL_NELEM(bn_group_8192_value), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_generator_19_value[] = { 19 }; const BIGNUM bn_generator_19 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_generator_19_value, 1, 1, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_generator_5_value[] = { 5 }; const BIGNUM bn_generator_5 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_generator_5_value, 1, 1, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BN_ULONG bn_generator_2_value[] = { 2 }; const BIGNUM bn_generator_2 = { (BN_ULONG *)bn_generator_2_value, 1, 1, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c0000644000000000000000000012620213176625656015423 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #include #ifdef _WIN32 # include # ifndef alloca # define alloca _alloca # endif #elif defined(__GNUC__) # ifndef alloca # define alloca(s) __builtin_alloca((s)) # endif #elif defined(__sun) # include #endif #include "rsaz_exp.h" #undef SPARC_T4_MONT #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (defined(__sparc__) || defined(__sparc)) # include "sparc_arch.h" extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[]; # define SPARC_T4_MONT #endif /* maximum precomputation table size for *variable* sliding windows */ #define TABLE_SIZE 32 /* this one works - simple but works */ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, bits, ret = 0; BIGNUM *v, *rr; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((r == a) || (r == p)) rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx); else rr = r; v = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (rr == NULL || v == NULL) goto err; if (BN_copy(v, a) == NULL) goto err; bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (BN_is_odd(p)) { if (BN_copy(rr, a) == NULL) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one(rr)) goto err; } for (i = 1; i < bits; i++) { if (!BN_sqr(v, v, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, i)) { if (!BN_mul(rr, rr, v, ctx)) goto err; } } if (r != rr && BN_copy(r, rr) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); /*- * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute * a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT. * * For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise, * exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering * algorithm is used. * * (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations a^p mod m * where a, p, m are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048, * 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the * standard algorithm: * * BN_mod_exp_mont 33 .. 40 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration] * 55 .. 77 % [UltraSparc processor, but * debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.] * * BN_mod_exp_recp 50 .. 70 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration] * 62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc] * * On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont * at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was * slower even than the standard algorithm! * * "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations] * should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code * has been integrated into OpenSSL.) */ #define MONT_MUL_MOD #define MONT_EXP_WORD #define RECP_MUL_MOD #ifdef MONT_MUL_MOD /* * I have finally been able to take out this pre-condition of the top bit * being set. It was caused by an error in BN_div with negatives. There * was also another problem when for a^b%m a >= m. eay 07-May-97 */ /* if ((m->d[m->top-1]&BN_TBIT) && BN_is_odd(m)) */ if (BN_is_odd(m)) { # ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0) && (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0) && (BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) { BN_ULONG A = a->d[0]; ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL); } else # endif ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL); } else #endif #ifdef RECP_MUL_MOD { ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx); } #else { ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r, a, p, m, ctx); } #endif bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue; int start = 1; BIGNUM *aa; /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_RECP_CTX recp; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ if (BN_is_one(m)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(r); } else { ret = BN_one(r); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); aa = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!aa || !val[0]) goto err; BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp); if (m->neg) { /* ignore sign of 'm' */ if (!BN_copy(aa, m)) goto err; aa->neg = 0; if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, aa, ctx) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, m, ctx) <= 0) goto err; } if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx)) goto err; /* 1 */ if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) { BN_zero(r); ret = 1; goto err; } window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits); if (window > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(aa, val[0], val[0], &recp, ctx)) goto err; /* 2 */ j = 1 << (window - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(val[i], val[i - 1], aa, &recp, ctx)) goto err; } } start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc * when there is only the value '1' in the * buffer. */ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */ if (!BN_one(r)) goto err; for (;;) { if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) { if (!start) if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx)) goto err; if (wstart == 0) break; wstart--; continue; } /* * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last * set bit before the end of the window */ j = wstart; wvalue = 1; wend = 0; for (i = 1; i < window; i++) { if (wstart - i < 0) break; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) { wvalue <<= (i - wend); wvalue |= 1; wend = i; } } /* wend is the size of the current window */ j = wend + 1; /* add the 'bytes above' */ if (!start) for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx)) goto err; } /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */ if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], &recp, ctx)) goto err; /* move the 'window' down further */ wstart -= wend + 1; wvalue = 0; start = 0; if (wstart < 0) break; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue; int start = 1; BIGNUM *d, *r; const BIGNUM *aa; /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont); } bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ if (BN_is_one(m)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(rr); } else { ret = BN_one(rr); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!d || !r || !val[0]) goto err; /* * If this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part */ if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx)) goto err; aa = val[0]; } else aa = a; if (BN_is_zero(aa)) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], aa, mont, ctx)) goto err; /* 1 */ window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits); if (window > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; /* 2 */ j = 1 << (window - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc * when there is only the value '1' in the * buffer. */ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */ #if 1 /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */ j = m->top; /* borrow j */ if (m->d[j - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) { if (bn_wexpand(r, j) == NULL) goto err; /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */ r->d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2; for (i = 1; i < j; i++) r->d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2; r->top = j; /* * Upper words will be zero if the corresponding words of 'm' were * 0xfff[...], so decrement r->top accordingly. */ bn_correct_top(r); } else #endif if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) { if (!start) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } if (wstart == 0) break; wstart--; continue; } /* * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last * set bit before the end of the window */ j = wstart; wvalue = 1; wend = 0; for (i = 1; i < window; i++) { if (wstart - i < 0) break; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) { wvalue <<= (i - wend); wvalue |= 1; wend = i; } } /* wend is the size of the current window */ j = wend + 1; /* add the 'bytes above' */ if (!start) for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx)) goto err; /* move the 'window' down further */ wstart -= wend + 1; wvalue = 0; start = 0; if (wstart < 0) break; } #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) { j = mont->N.top; /* borrow j */ val[0]->d[0] = 1; /* borrow val[0] */ for (i = 1; i < j; i++) val[0]->d[i] = 0; val[0]->top = j; if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(rr, r, val[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; } else #endif if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (in_mont == NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rr); return (ret); } #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) static BN_ULONG bn_get_bits(const BIGNUM *a, int bitpos) { BN_ULONG ret = 0; int wordpos; wordpos = bitpos / BN_BITS2; bitpos %= BN_BITS2; if (wordpos >= 0 && wordpos < a->top) { ret = a->d[wordpos] & BN_MASK2; if (bitpos) { ret >>= bitpos; if (++wordpos < a->top) ret |= a->d[wordpos] << (BN_BITS2 - bitpos); } } return ret & BN_MASK2; } #endif /* * BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() stores the precomputed powers in a specific * layout so that accessing any of these table values shows the same access * pattern as far as cache lines are concerned. The following functions are * used to transfer a BIGNUM from/to that table. */ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top, unsigned char *buf, int idx, int window) { int i, j; int width = 1 << window; BN_ULONG *table = (BN_ULONG *)buf; if (top > b->top) top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly * zeroed */ for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top; i++, j += width) { table[j] = b->d[i]; } return 1; } static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top, unsigned char *buf, int idx, int window) { int i, j; int width = 1 << window; /* * We declare table 'volatile' in order to discourage compiler * from reordering loads from the table. Concern is that if * reordered in specific manner loads might give away the * information we are trying to conceal. Some would argue that * compiler can reorder them anyway, but it can as well be * argued that doing so would be violation of standard... */ volatile BN_ULONG *table = (volatile BN_ULONG *)buf; if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL) return 0; if (window <= 3) { for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) { BN_ULONG acc = 0; for (j = 0; j < width; j++) { acc |= table[j] & ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1)); } b->d[i] = acc; } } else { int xstride = 1 << (window - 2); BN_ULONG y0, y1, y2, y3; i = idx >> (window - 2); /* equivalent of idx / xstride */ idx &= xstride - 1; /* equivalent of idx % xstride */ y0 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,0)&1); y1 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,1)&1); y2 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,2)&1); y3 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,3)&1); for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) { BN_ULONG acc = 0; for (j = 0; j < xstride; j++) { acc |= ( (table[j + 0 * xstride] & y0) | (table[j + 1 * xstride] & y1) | (table[j + 2 * xstride] & y2) | (table[j + 3 * xstride] & y3) ) & ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1)); } b->d[i] = acc; } } b->top = top; bn_correct_top(b); return 1; } /* * Given a pointer value, compute the next address that is a cache line * multiple. */ #define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(x_) \ ((unsigned char*)(x_) + (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - (((size_t)(x_)) & (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK)))) /* * This variant of BN_mod_exp_mont() uses fixed windows and the special * precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to * protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed * out by Colin Percival, * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/) */ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { int i, bits, ret = 0, window, wvalue; int top; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int numPowers; unsigned char *powerbufFree = NULL; int powerbufLen = 0; unsigned char *powerbuf = NULL; BIGNUM tmp, am; #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) unsigned int t4 = 0; #endif bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } top = m->top; bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ if (BN_is_one(m)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(rr); } else { ret = BN_one(rr); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); /* * Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. If * this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part. */ if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } #ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED /* * If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized * RSAZ exponentiation. For further information see * crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c and accompanying assembly modules. */ if ((16 == a->top) && (16 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 1024) && rsaz_avx2_eligible()) { if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 16)) goto err; RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d, mont->n0[0]); rr->top = 16; rr->neg = 0; bn_correct_top(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } else if ((8 == a->top) && (8 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 512)) { if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 8)) goto err; RSAZ_512_mod_exp(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->n0[0], mont->RR.d); rr->top = 8; rr->neg = 0; bn_correct_top(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } #endif /* Get the window size to use with size of p. */ window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits); #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (window >= 5 && (top & 15) == 0 && top <= 64 && (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) == (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR) && (t4 = OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0])) window = 5; else #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5) if (window >= 5) { window = 5; /* ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even * for RSA4096 */ /* reserve space for mont->N.d[] copy */ powerbufLen += top * sizeof(mont->N.d[0]); } #endif (void)0; /* * Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed powers * of am, am itself and tmp. */ numPowers = 1 << window; powerbufLen += sizeof(m->d[0]) * (top * numPowers + ((2 * top) > numPowers ? (2 * top) : numPowers)); #ifdef alloca if (powerbufLen < 3072) powerbufFree = alloca(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH); else #endif if ((powerbufFree = OPENSSL_malloc(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH)) == NULL) goto err; powerbuf = MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(powerbufFree); memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbufLen); #ifdef alloca if (powerbufLen < 3072) powerbufFree = NULL; #endif /* lay down tmp and am right after powers table */ tmp.d = (BN_ULONG *)(powerbuf + sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * numPowers); am.d = tmp.d + top; tmp.top = am.top = 0; tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top; tmp.neg = am.neg = 0; tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA; /* prepare a^0 in Montgomery domain */ #if 1 /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */ if (m->d[top - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) { /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */ tmp.d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2; for (i = 1; i < top; i++) tmp.d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2; tmp.top = top; } else #endif if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) goto err; /* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */ if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; } else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx)) goto err; #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (t4) { typedef int (*bn_pwr5_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table, int power, int bits); static const bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_funcs[4] = { bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32 }; bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_worker = pwr5_funcs[top / 16 - 1]; typedef int (*bn_mul_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); static const bn_mul_mont_f mul_funcs[4] = { bn_mul_mont_t4_8, bn_mul_mont_t4_16, bn_mul_mont_t4_24, bn_mul_mont_t4_32 }; bn_mul_mont_f mul_worker = mul_funcs[top / 16 - 1]; void bn_mul_mont_vis3(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); void bn_mul_mont_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); void bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power); void bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_flip_t4(BN_ULONG *dst, BN_ULONG *src, size_t num); BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0; int stride = 5 * (6 - (top / 16 - 1)); /* multiple of 5, but less * than 32 */ /* * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]... */ for (i = am.top; i < top; i++) am.d[i] = 0; for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++) tmp.d[i] = 0; bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0); bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(am.d, top, powerbuf, 1); if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0) && !(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0)) bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top); bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2); for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) { /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */ if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0) && !(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0)) bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0, top); bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } /* switch to 64-bit domain */ np = alloca(top * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); top /= 2; bn_flip_t4(np, mont->N.d, top); bits--; for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); bn_gather5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue); /* * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most * significant bits. */ while (bits >= 0) { if (bits < stride) stride = bits + 1; bits -= stride; wvalue = bn_get_bits(p, bits + 1); if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride)) continue; /* retry once and fall back */ if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride)) continue; bits += stride - 5; wvalue >>= stride - 5; wvalue &= 31; bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue); } bn_flip_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, top); top *= 2; /* back to 32-bit domain */ tmp.top = top; bn_correct_top(&tmp); OPENSSL_cleanse(np, top * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); } else #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5) if (window == 5 && top > 1) { /* * This optimization uses ideas from http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239, * specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures * and pre-computation optimization. */ /* * Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as * 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size... */ void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power); void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power); void bn_power5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power); int bn_get_bits5(const BN_ULONG *ap, int off); int bn_from_montgomery(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); BN_ULONG *n0 = mont->n0, *np; /* * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]... */ for (i = am.top; i < top; i++) am.d[i] = 0; for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++) tmp.d[i] = 0; /* * copy mont->N.d[] to improve cache locality */ for (np = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++) np[i] = mont->N.d[i]; bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0); bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2); # if 0 for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) { /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } # else /* same as above, but uses squaring for 1/2 of operations */ for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) { bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) { int j; bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) { bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j); } } for (; i < 16; i += 2) { bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i); } for (; i < 32; i += 2) { bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1); bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i); } # endif bits--; for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue); /* * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most * significant bits. */ if (top & 7) while (bits >= 0) { for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top); bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue); } else { while (bits >= 0) { wvalue = bn_get_bits5(p->d, bits - 4); bits -= 5; bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue); } } ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np, n0, top); tmp.top = top; bn_correct_top(&tmp); if (ret) { if (!BN_copy(rr, &tmp)) ret = 0; goto err; /* non-zero ret means it's not error */ } } else #endif { if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, window)) goto err; if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, window)) goto err; /* * If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate * val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1) (even * powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2 to use the slight * performance advantage of sqr over mul). */ if (window > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, window)) goto err; for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) { /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, window)) goto err; } } bits--; for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--) wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, window)) goto err; /* * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most * significant bits. */ while (bits >= 0) { wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ /* Scan the window, squaring the result as we go */ for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits); } /* * Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf */ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, window)) goto err; /* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } /* Convert the final result from montgomery to standard format */ #if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT) if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_VIS3 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU)) { am.d[0] = 1; /* borrow am */ for (i = 1; i < top; i++) am.d[i] = 0; if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(rr, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx)) goto err; } else #endif if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (in_mont == NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); if (powerbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen); OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree); } BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int b, bits, ret = 0; int r_is_one; BN_ULONG w, next_w; BIGNUM *d, *r, *t; BIGNUM *swap_tmp; #define BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m) \ (BN_mul_word(r, (w)) && \ (/* BN_ucmp(r, (m)) < 0 ? 1 :*/ \ (BN_mod(t, r, m, ctx) && (swap_tmp = r, r = t, t = swap_tmp, 1)))) /* * BN_MOD_MUL_WORD is only used with 'w' large, so the BN_ucmp test is * probably more overhead than always using BN_mod (which uses BN_copy if * a similar test returns true). */ /* * We can use BN_mod and do not need BN_nnmod because our accumulator is * never negative (the result of BN_mod does not depend on the sign of * the modulus). */ #define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \ (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx)) if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return (0); } if (m->top == 1) a %= m->d[0]; /* make sure that 'a' is reduced */ bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ if (BN_is_one(m)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(rr); } else { ret = BN_one(rr); } return ret; } if (a == 0) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (d == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL) goto err; if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } r_is_one = 1; /* except for Montgomery factor */ /* bits-1 >= 0 */ /* The result is accumulated in the product r*w. */ w = a; /* bit 'bits-1' of 'p' is always set */ for (b = bits - 2; b >= 0; b--) { /* First, square r*w. */ next_w = w * w; if ((next_w / w) != w) { /* overflow */ if (r_is_one) { if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont)) goto err; r_is_one = 0; } else { if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m)) goto err; } next_w = 1; } w = next_w; if (!r_is_one) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } /* Second, multiply r*w by 'a' if exponent bit is set. */ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, b)) { next_w = w * a; if ((next_w / a) != w) { /* overflow */ if (r_is_one) { if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont)) goto err; r_is_one = 0; } else { if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m)) goto err; } next_w = a; } w = next_w; } } /* Finally, set r:=r*w. */ if (w != 1) { if (r_is_one) { if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont)) goto err; r_is_one = 0; } else { if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m)) goto err; } } if (r_is_one) { /* can happen only if a == 1 */ if (!BN_one(rr)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (in_mont == NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rr); return (ret); } /* The old fallback, simple version :-) */ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue; int start = 1; BIGNUM *d; /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (bits == 0) { /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */ if (BN_is_one(m)) { ret = 1; BN_zero(r); } else { ret = BN_one(r); } return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!d || !val[0]) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx)) goto err; /* 1 */ if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) { BN_zero(r); ret = 1; goto err; } window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits); if (window > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul(d, val[0], val[0], m, ctx)) goto err; /* 2 */ j = 1 << (window - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul(val[i], val[i - 1], d, m, ctx)) goto err; } } start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc * when there is only the value '1' in the * buffer. */ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */ if (!BN_one(r)) goto err; for (;;) { if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) { if (!start) if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx)) goto err; if (wstart == 0) break; wstart--; continue; } /* * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last * set bit before the end of the window */ j = wstart; wvalue = 1; wend = 0; for (i = 1; i < window; i++) { if (wstart - i < 0) break; if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) { wvalue <<= (i - wend); wvalue |= 1; wend = i; } } /* wend is the size of the current window */ j = wend + 1; /* add the 'bytes above' */ if (!start) for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx)) goto err; } /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */ if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], m, ctx)) goto err; /* move the 'window' down further */ wstart -= wend + 1; wvalue = 0; start = 0; if (wstart < 0) break; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c0000644000000000000000000002633113176625656015606 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Details about Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found at * http://security.ece.orst.edu/publications.html, e.g. * http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/j37acmon.pdf and * sections 3.8 and 4.2 in http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/r01rsasw.pdf */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #define MONT_WORD /* use the faster word-based algorithm */ #ifdef MONT_WORD static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont); #endif int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *tmp; int ret = 0; #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(MONT_WORD) int num = mont->N.top; if (num > 1 && a->top == num && b->top == num) { if (bn_wexpand(r, num) == NULL) return (0); if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) { r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg; r->top = num; bn_correct_top(r); return (1); } } #endif BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; bn_check_top(tmp); if (a == b) { if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx)) goto err; } /* reduce from aRR to aR */ #ifdef MONT_WORD if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont)) goto err; #else if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx)) goto err; #endif bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } #ifdef MONT_WORD static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { BIGNUM *n; BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry; int nl, max, i; n = &(mont->N); nl = n->top; if (nl == 0) { ret->top = 0; return (1); } max = (2 * nl); /* carry is stored separately */ if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL) return (0); r->neg ^= n->neg; np = n->d; rp = r->d; /* clear the top words of T */ i = max - r->top; if (i) memset(&rp[r->top], 0, sizeof(*rp) * i); r->top = max; n0 = mont->n0[0]; for (carry = 0, i = 0; i < nl; i++, rp++) { v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (rp[0] * n0) & BN_MASK2); v = (v + carry + rp[nl]) & BN_MASK2; carry |= (v != rp[nl]); carry &= (v <= rp[nl]); rp[nl] = v; } if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL) return (0); ret->top = nl; ret->neg = r->neg; rp = ret->d; ap = &(r->d[nl]); # define BRANCH_FREE 1 # if BRANCH_FREE { BN_ULONG *nrp; size_t m; v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry; /* * if subtraction result is real, then trick unconditional memcpy * below to perform in-place "refresh" instead of actual copy. */ m = (0 - (size_t)v); nrp = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) rp & ~m) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) ap & m)); for (i = 0, nl -= 4; i < nl; i += 4) { BN_ULONG t1, t2, t3, t4; t1 = nrp[i + 0]; t2 = nrp[i + 1]; t3 = nrp[i + 2]; ap[i + 0] = 0; t4 = nrp[i + 3]; ap[i + 1] = 0; rp[i + 0] = t1; ap[i + 2] = 0; rp[i + 1] = t2; ap[i + 3] = 0; rp[i + 2] = t3; rp[i + 3] = t4; } for (nl += 4; i < nl; i++) rp[i] = nrp[i], ap[i] = 0; } # else if (bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry) memcpy(rp, ap, nl * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); # endif bn_correct_top(r); bn_correct_top(ret); bn_check_top(ret); return (1); } #endif /* MONT_WORD */ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { int retn = 0; #ifdef MONT_WORD BIGNUM *t; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a)) retn = BN_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont); BN_CTX_end(ctx); #else /* !MONT_WORD */ BIGNUM *t1, *t2; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_copy(t1, a)) goto err; BN_mask_bits(t1, mont->ri); if (!BN_mul(t2, t1, &mont->Ni, ctx)) goto err; BN_mask_bits(t2, mont->ri); if (!BN_mul(t1, t2, &mont->N, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(t2, a, t1)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift(ret, t2, mont->ri)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) { if (!BN_usub(ret, ret, &(mont->N))) goto err; } retn = 1; bn_check_top(ret); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); #endif /* MONT_WORD */ return (retn); } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void) { BN_MONT_CTX *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return (NULL); BN_MONT_CTX_init(ret); ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED; return (ret); } void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx) { ctx->ri = 0; bn_init(&(ctx->RR)); bn_init(&(ctx->N)); bn_init(&(ctx->Ni)); ctx->n0[0] = ctx->n0[1] = 0; ctx->flags = 0; } void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { if (mont == NULL) return; BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR)); BN_clear_free(&(mont->N)); BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni)); if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(mont); } int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *Ri, *R; if (BN_is_zero(mod)) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; R = &(mont->RR); /* grab RR as a temp */ if (!BN_copy(&(mont->N), mod)) goto err; /* Set N */ mont->N.neg = 0; #ifdef MONT_WORD { BIGNUM tmod; BN_ULONG buf[2]; bn_init(&tmod); tmod.d = buf; tmod.dmax = 2; tmod.neg = 0; if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(&tmod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2; # if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32) /* * Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1], * and we could use the #else case (with a shorter R value) for the * others. However, currently only the assembler files do know which * is which. */ BN_zero(R); if (!(BN_set_bit(R, 2 * BN_BITS2))) goto err; tmod.top = 0; if ((buf[0] = mod->d[0])) tmod.top = 1; if ((buf[1] = mod->top > 1 ? mod->d[1] : 0)) tmod.top = 2; if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, 2 * BN_BITS2)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) { if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */ if (bn_expand(Ri, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 2) == NULL) goto err; /* Ri-- (mod double word size) */ Ri->neg = 0; Ri->d[0] = BN_MASK2; Ri->d[1] = BN_MASK2; Ri->top = 2; } if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only couple of least significant words: */ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0; mont->n0[1] = (Ri->top > 1) ? Ri->d[1] : 0; # else BN_zero(R); if (!(BN_set_bit(R, BN_BITS2))) goto err; /* R */ buf[0] = mod->d[0]; /* tmod = N mod word size */ buf[1] = 0; tmod.top = buf[0] != 0 ? 1 : 0; /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_BITS2)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) { if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */ if (!BN_set_word(Ri, BN_MASK2)) goto err; /* Ri-- (mod word size) */ } if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only least significant word: */ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0; mont->n0[1] = 0; # endif } #else /* !MONT_WORD */ { /* bignum version */ mont->ri = BN_num_bits(&mont->N); BN_zero(R); if (!BN_set_bit(R, mont->ri)) goto err; /* R = 2^ri */ /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &mont->N, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, mont->ri)) goto err; /* R*Ri */ if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) goto err; /* * Ni = (R*Ri-1) / N */ if (!BN_div(&(mont->Ni), NULL, Ri, &mont->N, ctx)) goto err; } #endif /* setup RR for conversions */ BN_zero(&(mont->RR)); if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), mont->ri * 2)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from) { if (to == from) return (to); if (!BN_copy(&(to->RR), &(from->RR))) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(&(to->N), &(from->N))) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(&(to->Ni), &(from->Ni))) return NULL; to->ri = from->ri; to->n0[0] = from->n0[0]; to->n0[1] = from->n0[1]; return (to); } BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_MONT_CTX *ret; CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(lock); ret = *pmont; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock); if (ret) return ret; /* * We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */ ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } /* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock); if (*pmont) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); ret = *pmont; } else *pmont = ret; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c0000644000000000000000000001106713176625656015562 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp) { memset(recp, 0, sizeof(*recp)); bn_init(&(recp->N)); bn_init(&(recp->Nr)); } BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void) { BN_RECP_CTX *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return (NULL); bn_init(&(ret->N)); bn_init(&(ret->Nr)); ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED; return (ret); } void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp) { if (recp == NULL) return; BN_free(&(recp->N)); BN_free(&(recp->Nr)); if (recp->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(recp); } int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (!BN_copy(&(recp->N), d)) return 0; BN_zero(&(recp->Nr)); recp->num_bits = BN_num_bits(d); recp->shift = 0; return (1); } int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *a; const BIGNUM *ca; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (y != NULL) { if (x == y) { if (!BN_sqr(a, x, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mul(a, x, y, ctx)) goto err; } ca = a; } else ca = x; /* Just do the mod */ ret = BN_div_recp(NULL, r, ca, recp, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(r); return (ret); } int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, j, ret = 0; BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *r; BN_CTX_start(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (dv != NULL) d = dv; else d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (rem != NULL) r = rem; else r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (a == NULL || b == NULL || d == NULL || r == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) { BN_zero(d); if (!BN_copy(r, m)) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); return 0; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (1); } /* * We want the remainder Given input of ABCDEF / ab we need multiply * ABCDEF by 3 digests of the reciprocal of ab */ /* i := max(BN_num_bits(m), 2*BN_num_bits(N)) */ i = BN_num_bits(m); j = recp->num_bits << 1; if (j > i) i = j; /* Nr := round(2^i / N) */ if (i != recp->shift) recp->shift = BN_reciprocal(&(recp->Nr), &(recp->N), i, ctx); /* BN_reciprocal could have returned -1 for an error */ if (recp->shift == -1) goto err; /*- * d := |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * recp->Nr / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))| * = |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * round(2^i / N) / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))| * <= |(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * (2^i / N) * (2^BN_num_bits(N) / 2^i)| * = |m/N| */ if (!BN_rshift(a, m, recp->num_bits)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(b, a, &(recp->Nr), ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift(d, b, i - recp->num_bits)) goto err; d->neg = 0; if (!BN_mul(b, &(recp->N), d, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_usub(r, m, b)) goto err; r->neg = 0; j = 0; while (BN_ucmp(r, &(recp->N)) >= 0) { if (j++ > 2) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP, BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL); goto err; } if (!BN_usub(r, r, &(recp->N))) goto err; if (!BN_add_word(d, 1)) goto err; } r->neg = BN_is_zero(r) ? 0 : m->neg; d->neg = m->neg ^ recp->N.neg; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(dv); bn_check_top(rem); return (ret); } /* * len is the expected size of the result We actually calculate with an extra * word of precision, so we can do faster division if the remainder is not * required. */ /* r := 2^len / m */ int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = -1; BIGNUM *t; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(t, len)) goto err; if (!BN_div(r, NULL, t, m, ctx)) goto err; ret = len; err: bn_check_top(r); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl0000644000000000000000000000244013176625656016131 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html print <<"EOF"; /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl * * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ EOF my $num = shift || 2048; my @primes = ( 2 ); my $p = 1; loop: while ($#primes < $num-1) { $p += 2; my $s = int(sqrt($p)); for (my $i = 0; defined($primes[$i]) && $primes[$i] <= $s; $i++) { next loop if ($p % $primes[$i]) == 0; } push(@primes, $p); } print "typedef unsigned short prime_t;\n"; printf "# define NUMPRIMES %d\n\n", $num; printf "static const prime_t primes[%d] = {\n", $num; for (my $i = 0; $i <= $#primes; $i++) { printf "\n " if ($i % 8) == 0; printf "%4d, ", $primes[$i]; } print "\n};\n"; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c0000644000000000000000000000356513176625656015422 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *d) { int bits; int num = 0; int ext = 0; long l; bits = BN_num_bits(a); num = (bits + 7) / 8; if (bits > 0) { ext = ((bits & 0x07) == 0); } if (d == NULL) return (num + 4 + ext); l = num + ext; d[0] = (unsigned char)(l >> 24) & 0xff; d[1] = (unsigned char)(l >> 16) & 0xff; d[2] = (unsigned char)(l >> 8) & 0xff; d[3] = (unsigned char)(l) & 0xff; if (ext) d[4] = 0; num = BN_bn2bin(a, &(d[4 + ext])); if (a->neg) d[4] |= 0x80; return (num + 4 + ext); } BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(const unsigned char *d, int n, BIGNUM *ain) { long len; int neg = 0; BIGNUM *a = NULL; if (n < 4) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MPI2BN, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); return NULL; } len = ((long)d[0] << 24) | ((long)d[1] << 16) | ((int)d[2] << 8) | (int) d[3]; if ((len + 4) != n) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MPI2BN, BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR); return NULL; } if (ain == NULL) a = BN_new(); else a = ain; if (a == NULL) return NULL; if (len == 0) { a->neg = 0; a->top = 0; return a; } d += 4; if ((*d) & 0x80) neg = 1; if (BN_bin2bn(d, (int)len, a) == NULL) { if (ain == NULL) BN_free(a); return NULL; } a->neg = neg; if (neg) { BN_clear_bit(a, BN_num_bits(a) - 1); } bn_check_top(a); return a; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c0000644000000000000000000000736313176625656015752 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a) { register BN_ULONG *ap, *rp, t, c; int i; bn_check_top(r); bn_check_top(a); if (r != a) { r->neg = a->neg; if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + 1) == NULL) return (0); r->top = a->top; } else { if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + 1) == NULL) return (0); } ap = a->d; rp = r->d; c = 0; for (i = 0; i < a->top; i++) { t = *(ap++); *(rp++) = ((t << 1) | c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t & BN_TBIT) ? 1 : 0; } if (c) { *rp = 1; r->top++; } bn_check_top(r); return (1); } int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a) { BN_ULONG *ap, *rp, t, c; int i, j; bn_check_top(r); bn_check_top(a); if (BN_is_zero(a)) { BN_zero(r); return (1); } i = a->top; ap = a->d; j = i - (ap[i - 1] == 1); if (a != r) { if (bn_wexpand(r, j) == NULL) return (0); r->neg = a->neg; } rp = r->d; t = ap[--i]; c = (t & 1) ? BN_TBIT : 0; if (t >>= 1) rp[i] = t; while (i > 0) { t = ap[--i]; rp[i] = ((t >> 1) & BN_MASK2) | c; c = (t & 1) ? BN_TBIT : 0; } r->top = j; if (!r->top) r->neg = 0; /* don't allow negative zero */ bn_check_top(r); return (1); } int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, nw, lb, rb; BN_ULONG *t, *f; BN_ULONG l; bn_check_top(r); bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT); return 0; } nw = n / BN_BITS2; if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL) return (0); r->neg = a->neg; lb = n % BN_BITS2; rb = BN_BITS2 - lb; f = a->d; t = r->d; t[a->top + nw] = 0; if (lb == 0) for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) t[nw + i] = f[i]; else for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { l = f[i]; t[nw + i + 1] |= (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2; t[nw + i] = (l << lb) & BN_MASK2; } memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t) * nw); r->top = a->top + nw + 1; bn_correct_top(r); bn_check_top(r); return (1); } int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j, nw, lb, rb; BN_ULONG *t, *f; BN_ULONG l, tmp; bn_check_top(r); bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT); return 0; } nw = n / BN_BITS2; rb = n % BN_BITS2; lb = BN_BITS2 - rb; if (nw >= a->top || a->top == 0) { BN_zero(r); return (1); } i = (BN_num_bits(a) - n + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2; if (r != a) { if (bn_wexpand(r, i) == NULL) return (0); r->neg = a->neg; } else { if (n == 0) return 1; /* or the copying loop will go berserk */ } f = &(a->d[nw]); t = r->d; j = a->top - nw; r->top = i; if (rb == 0) { for (i = j; i != 0; i--) *(t++) = *(f++); } else { l = *(f++); for (i = j - 1; i != 0; i--) { tmp = (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2; l = *(f++); *(t++) = (tmp | (l << lb)) & BN_MASK2; } if ((l = (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2)) *(t) = l; } if (!r->top) r->neg = 0; /* don't allow negative zero */ bn_check_top(r); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c0000644000000000000000000005623613176625656015406 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #include /* This stuff appears to be completely unused, so is deprecated */ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L /*- * For a 32 bit machine * 2 - 4 == 128 * 3 - 8 == 256 * 4 - 16 == 512 * 5 - 32 == 1024 * 6 - 64 == 2048 * 7 - 128 == 4096 * 8 - 256 == 8192 */ static int bn_limit_bits = 0; static int bn_limit_num = 8; /* (1<= 0) { if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) mult = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits = mult; bn_limit_num = 1 << mult; } if (high >= 0) { if (high > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) high = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_high = high; bn_limit_num_high = 1 << high; } if (low >= 0) { if (low > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) low = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_low = low; bn_limit_num_low = 1 << low; } if (mont >= 0) { if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int) * 8) - 1) mont = sizeof(int) * 8 - 1; bn_limit_bits_mont = mont; bn_limit_num_mont = 1 << mont; } } int BN_get_params(int which) { if (which == 0) return (bn_limit_bits); else if (which == 1) return (bn_limit_bits_high); else if (which == 2) return (bn_limit_bits_low); else if (which == 3) return (bn_limit_bits_mont); else return (0); } #endif const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void) { static const BN_ULONG data_one = 1L; static const BIGNUM const_one = { (BN_ULONG *)&data_one, 1, 1, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; return (&const_one); } int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l) { static const unsigned char bits[256] = { 0, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, }; #if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) if (l & 0xffffffff00000000L) { if (l & 0xffff000000000000L) { if (l & 0xff00000000000000L) { return (bits[(int)(l >> 56)] + 56); } else return (bits[(int)(l >> 48)] + 48); } else { if (l & 0x0000ff0000000000L) { return (bits[(int)(l >> 40)] + 40); } else return (bits[(int)(l >> 32)] + 32); } } else #else # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT if (l & 0xffffffff00000000LL) { if (l & 0xffff000000000000LL) { if (l & 0xff00000000000000LL) { return (bits[(int)(l >> 56)] + 56); } else return (bits[(int)(l >> 48)] + 48); } else { if (l & 0x0000ff0000000000LL) { return (bits[(int)(l >> 40)] + 40); } else return (bits[(int)(l >> 32)] + 32); } } else # endif #endif { #if defined(THIRTY_TWO_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) if (l & 0xffff0000L) { if (l & 0xff000000L) return (bits[(int)(l >> 24L)] + 24); else return (bits[(int)(l >> 16L)] + 16); } else #endif { #if defined(THIRTY_TWO_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) if (l & 0xff00L) return (bits[(int)(l >> 8)] + 8); else #endif return (bits[(int)(l)]); } } } int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a) { int i = a->top - 1; bn_check_top(a); if (BN_is_zero(a)) return 0; return ((i * BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i])); } static void bn_free_d(BIGNUM *a) { if (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_SECURE)) OPENSSL_secure_free(a->d); else OPENSSL_free(a->d); } void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; bn_check_top(a); if (a->d != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0])); if (!BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) bn_free_d(a); } i = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_MALLOCED); OPENSSL_cleanse(a, sizeof(*a)); if (i) OPENSSL_free(a); } void BN_free(BIGNUM *a) { if (a == NULL) return; bn_check_top(a); if (!BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) bn_free_d(a); if (a->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) OPENSSL_free(a); else { #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L a->flags |= BN_FLG_FREE; #endif a->d = NULL; } } void bn_init(BIGNUM *a) { static BIGNUM nilbn; *a = nilbn; bn_check_top(a); } BIGNUM *BN_new(void) { BIGNUM *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED; bn_check_top(ret); return (ret); } BIGNUM *BN_secure_new(void) { BIGNUM *ret = BN_new(); if (ret != NULL) ret->flags |= BN_FLG_SECURE; return (ret); } /* This is used by bn_expand2() */ /* The caller MUST check that words > b->dmax before calling this */ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words) { BN_ULONG *A, *a = NULL; const BN_ULONG *B; int i; bn_check_top(b); if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG); return NULL; } if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA); return (NULL); } if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_SECURE)) a = A = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(words * sizeof(*a)); else a = A = OPENSSL_zalloc(words * sizeof(*a)); if (A == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } #if 1 B = b->d; /* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */ if (B != NULL) { for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) { /* * The fact that the loop is unrolled * 4-wise is a tribute to Intel. It's * the one that doesn't have enough * registers to accommodate more data. * I'd unroll it 8-wise otherwise:-) * * */ BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3; a0 = B[0]; a1 = B[1]; a2 = B[2]; a3 = B[3]; A[0] = a0; A[1] = a1; A[2] = a2; A[3] = a3; } switch (b->top & 3) { case 3: A[2] = B[2]; /* fall thru */ case 2: A[1] = B[1]; /* fall thru */ case 1: A[0] = B[0]; /* fall thru */ case 0: /* Without the "case 0" some old optimizers got this wrong. */ ; } } #else memset(A, 0, sizeof(*A) * words); memcpy(A, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif return (a); } /* * This is an internal function that should not be used in applications. It * ensures that 'b' has enough room for a 'words' word number and initialises * any unused part of b->d with leading zeros. It is mostly used by the * various BIGNUM routines. If there is an error, NULL is returned. If not, * 'b' is returned. */ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words) { bn_check_top(b); if (words > b->dmax) { BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words); if (!a) return NULL; if (b->d) { OPENSSL_cleanse(b->d, b->dmax * sizeof(b->d[0])); bn_free_d(b); } b->d = a; b->dmax = words; } bn_check_top(b); return b; } BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a) { BIGNUM *t; if (a == NULL) return NULL; bn_check_top(a); t = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_SECURE) ? BN_secure_new() : BN_new(); if (t == NULL) return NULL; if (!BN_copy(t, a)) { BN_free(t); return NULL; } bn_check_top(t); return t; } BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; BN_ULONG *A; const BN_ULONG *B; bn_check_top(b); if (a == b) return (a); if (bn_wexpand(a, b->top) == NULL) return (NULL); #if 1 A = a->d; B = b->d; for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) { BN_ULONG a0, a1, a2, a3; a0 = B[0]; a1 = B[1]; a2 = B[2]; a3 = B[3]; A[0] = a0; A[1] = a1; A[2] = a2; A[3] = a3; } /* ultrix cc workaround, see comments in bn_expand_internal */ switch (b->top & 3) { case 3: A[2] = B[2]; /* fall thru */ case 2: A[1] = B[1]; /* fall thru */ case 1: A[0] = B[0]; /* fall thru */ case 0:; } #else memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) BN_set_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); a->top = b->top; a->neg = b->neg; bn_check_top(a); return (a); } void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b) { int flags_old_a, flags_old_b; BN_ULONG *tmp_d; int tmp_top, tmp_dmax, tmp_neg; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); flags_old_a = a->flags; flags_old_b = b->flags; tmp_d = a->d; tmp_top = a->top; tmp_dmax = a->dmax; tmp_neg = a->neg; a->d = b->d; a->top = b->top; a->dmax = b->dmax; a->neg = b->neg; b->d = tmp_d; b->top = tmp_top; b->dmax = tmp_dmax; b->neg = tmp_neg; a->flags = (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA); b->flags = (flags_old_b & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (flags_old_a & BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA); bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); } void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a) { bn_check_top(a); if (a->d != NULL) OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, sizeof(*a->d) * a->dmax); a->top = 0; a->neg = 0; } BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a) { if (a->top > 1) return BN_MASK2; else if (a->top == 1) return a->d[0]; /* a->top == 0 */ return 0; } int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) { bn_check_top(a); if (bn_expand(a, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8) == NULL) return (0); a->neg = 0; a->d[0] = w; a->top = (w ? 1 : 0); bn_check_top(a); return (1); } BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret) { unsigned int i, m; unsigned int n; BN_ULONG l; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; if (ret == NULL) ret = bn = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); bn_check_top(ret); /* Skip leading zero's. */ for ( ; len > 0 && *s == 0; s++, len--) continue; n = len; if (n == 0) { ret->top = 0; return (ret); } i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1; m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES)); if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) { BN_free(bn); return NULL; } ret->top = i; ret->neg = 0; l = 0; while (n--) { l = (l << 8L) | *(s++); if (m-- == 0) { ret->d[--i] = l; l = 0; m = BN_BYTES - 1; } } /* * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top * bit set (-ve number) */ bn_correct_top(ret); return (ret); } /* ignore negative */ static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) { int i; BN_ULONG l; bn_check_top(a); i = BN_num_bytes(a); if (tolen == -1) tolen = i; else if (tolen < i) return -1; /* Add leading zeroes if necessary */ if (tolen > i) { memset(to, 0, tolen - i); to += tolen - i; } while (i--) { l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES]; *(to++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff; } return tolen; } int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) { if (tolen < 0) return -1; return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen); } int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to) { return bn2binpad(a, to, -1); } BIGNUM *BN_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret) { unsigned int i, m; unsigned int n; BN_ULONG l; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; if (ret == NULL) ret = bn = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); bn_check_top(ret); s += len; /* Skip trailing zeroes. */ for ( ; len > 0 && s[-1] == 0; s--, len--) continue; n = len; if (n == 0) { ret->top = 0; return ret; } i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1; m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES)); if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) { BN_free(bn); return NULL; } ret->top = i; ret->neg = 0; l = 0; while (n--) { s--; l = (l << 8L) | *s; if (m-- == 0) { ret->d[--i] = l; l = 0; m = BN_BYTES - 1; } } /* * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top * bit set (-ve number) */ bn_correct_top(ret); return ret; } int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) { int i; BN_ULONG l; bn_check_top(a); i = BN_num_bytes(a); if (tolen < i) return -1; /* Add trailing zeroes if necessary */ if (tolen > i) memset(to + i, 0, tolen - i); to += i; while (i--) { l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES]; to--; *to = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff; } return tolen; } int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; BN_ULONG t1, t2, *ap, *bp; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); i = a->top - b->top; if (i != 0) return (i); ap = a->d; bp = b->d; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { t1 = ap[i]; t2 = bp[i]; if (t1 != t2) return ((t1 > t2) ? 1 : -1); } return (0); } int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; int gt, lt; BN_ULONG t1, t2; if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) { if (a != NULL) return (-1); else if (b != NULL) return (1); else return (0); } bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a->neg != b->neg) { if (a->neg) return (-1); else return (1); } if (a->neg == 0) { gt = 1; lt = -1; } else { gt = -1; lt = 1; } if (a->top > b->top) return (gt); if (a->top < b->top) return (lt); for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { t1 = a->d[i]; t2 = b->d[i]; if (t1 > t2) return (gt); if (t1 < t2) return (lt); } return (0); } int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j, k; if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) { if (bn_wexpand(a, i + 1) == NULL) return (0); for (k = a->top; k < i + 1; k++) a->d[k] = 0; a->top = i + 1; } a->d[i] |= (((BN_ULONG)1) << j); bn_check_top(a); return (1); } int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) return (0); a->d[i] &= (~(((BN_ULONG)1) << j)); bn_correct_top(a); return (1); } int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n) { int i, j; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; i = n / BN_BITS2; j = n % BN_BITS2; if (a->top <= i) return 0; return (int)(((a->d[i]) >> j) & ((BN_ULONG)1)); } int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) { int b, w; bn_check_top(a); if (n < 0) return 0; w = n / BN_BITS2; b = n % BN_BITS2; if (w >= a->top) return 0; if (b == 0) a->top = w; else { a->top = w + 1; a->d[w] &= ~(BN_MASK2 << b); } bn_correct_top(a); return (1); } void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int b) { if (b && !BN_is_zero(a)) a->neg = 1; else a->neg = 0; } int bn_cmp_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { int i; BN_ULONG aa, bb; aa = a[n - 1]; bb = b[n - 1]; if (aa != bb) return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1); for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { aa = a[i]; bb = b[i]; if (aa != bb) return ((aa > bb) ? 1 : -1); } return (0); } /* * Here follows a specialised variants of bn_cmp_words(). It has the * capability of performing the operation on arrays of different sizes. The * sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common length * ( basically, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta between the * two lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the number of * BN_ULONGs... */ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) { int n, i; n = cl - 1; if (dl < 0) { for (i = dl; i < 0; i++) { if (b[n - i] != 0) return -1; /* a < b */ } } if (dl > 0) { for (i = dl; i > 0; i--) { if (a[n + i] != 0) return 1; /* a > b */ } } return bn_cmp_words(a, b, cl); } /* * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b. * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0. The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set. * nwords is the number of words to swap. The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b, * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b. * a and b cannot be the same number */ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords) { BN_ULONG t; int i; bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords); bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords); assert(a != b); assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0); assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int)); condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1; t = (a->top ^ b->top) & condition; a->top ^= t; b->top ^= t; #define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \ do { \ t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \ a->d[ind] ^= t; \ b->d[ind] ^= t; \ } while (0) switch (nwords) { default: for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i); /* Fallthrough */ case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */ case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */ case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */ case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */ case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */ case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */ case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */ case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */ case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */ case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0); } #undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP } /* Bits of security, see SP800-57 */ int BN_security_bits(int L, int N) { int secbits, bits; if (L >= 15360) secbits = 256; else if (L >= 7680) secbits = 192; else if (L >= 3072) secbits = 128; else if (L >= 2048) secbits = 112; else if (L >= 1024) secbits = 80; else return 0; if (N == -1) return secbits; bits = N / 2; if (bits < 80) return 0; return bits >= secbits ? secbits : bits; } void BN_zero_ex(BIGNUM *a) { a->top = 0; a->neg = 0; } int BN_abs_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w) { return ((a->top == 1) && (a->d[0] == w)) || ((w == 0) && (a->top == 0)); } int BN_is_zero(const BIGNUM *a) { return a->top == 0; } int BN_is_one(const BIGNUM *a) { return BN_abs_is_word(a, 1) && !a->neg; } int BN_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w) { return BN_abs_is_word(a, w) && (!w || !a->neg); } int BN_is_odd(const BIGNUM *a) { return (a->top > 0) && (a->d[0] & 1); } int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a) { return (a->neg != 0); } int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, &(mont->RR), mont, ctx); } void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags) { dest->d = b->d; dest->top = b->top; dest->dmax = b->dmax; dest->neg = b->neg; dest->flags = ((dest->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | (b->flags & ~BN_FLG_MALLOCED) | BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA | flags); } BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void) { BN_GENCB *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENCB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } return ret; } void BN_GENCB_free(BN_GENCB *cb) { if (cb == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(cb); } void BN_set_flags(BIGNUM *b, int n) { b->flags |= n; } int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n) { return b->flags & n; } /* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with an "old"-style callback */ void BN_GENCB_set_old(BN_GENCB *gencb, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg) { BN_GENCB *tmp_gencb = gencb; tmp_gencb->ver = 1; tmp_gencb->arg = cb_arg; tmp_gencb->cb.cb_1 = callback; } /* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with a "new"-style callback */ void BN_GENCB_set(BN_GENCB *gencb, int (*callback) (int, int, BN_GENCB *), void *cb_arg) { BN_GENCB *tmp_gencb = gencb; tmp_gencb->ver = 2; tmp_gencb->arg = cb_arg; tmp_gencb->cb.cb_2 = callback; } void *BN_GENCB_get_arg(BN_GENCB *cb) { return cb->arg; } BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int words) { return (words <= a->dmax) ? a : bn_expand2(a, words); } void bn_correct_top(BIGNUM *a) { BN_ULONG *ftl; int tmp_top = a->top; if (tmp_top > 0) { for (ftl = &(a->d[tmp_top]); tmp_top > 0; tmp_top--) { ftl--; if (*ftl != 0) break; } a->top = tmp_top; } if (a->top == 0) a->neg = 0; bn_pollute(a); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_depr.c0000644000000000000000000000361413176625656015562 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Support for deprecated functions goes here - static linkage will only * slurp this code if applications are using them directly. */ #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include "bn_lcl.h" BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg) { BN_GENCB cb; BIGNUM *rnd = NULL; BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg); if (ret == NULL) { if ((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else rnd = ret; if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rnd, bits, safe, add, rem, &cb)) goto err; /* we have a prime :-) */ return ret; err: BN_free(rnd); return NULL; } int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx_passed, void *cb_arg) { BN_GENCB cb; BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg); return BN_is_prime_ex(a, checks, ctx_passed, &cb); } int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx_passed, void *cb_arg, int do_trial_division) { BN_GENCB cb; BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg); return BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(a, checks, ctx_passed, do_trial_division, &cb); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c0000644000000000000000000000633613176625656015605 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" /* least significant word */ #define BN_lsw(n) (((n)->top == 0) ? (BN_ULONG) 0 : (n)->d[0]) /* Returns -2 for errors because both -1 and 0 are valid results. */ int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i; int ret = -2; /* avoid 'uninitialized' warning */ int err = 0; BIGNUM *A, *B, *tmp; /*- * In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant: * For any odd BIGNUM n, * tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7] * is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation). * Note that the sign of n does not matter. */ static const int tab[8] = { 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1 }; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); BN_CTX_start(ctx); A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); B = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (B == NULL) goto end; err = !BN_copy(A, a); if (err) goto end; err = !BN_copy(B, b); if (err) goto end; /* * Kronecker symbol, implemented according to Henri Cohen, * "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory" * (algorithm 1.4.10). */ /* Cohen's step 1: */ if (BN_is_zero(B)) { ret = BN_abs_is_word(A, 1); goto end; } /* Cohen's step 2: */ if (!BN_is_odd(A) && !BN_is_odd(B)) { ret = 0; goto end; } /* now B is non-zero */ i = 0; while (!BN_is_bit_set(B, i)) i++; err = !BN_rshift(B, B, i); if (err) goto end; if (i & 1) { /* i is odd */ /* (thus B was even, thus A must be odd!) */ /* set 'ret' to $(-1)^{(A^2-1)/8}$ */ ret = tab[BN_lsw(A) & 7]; } else { /* i is even */ ret = 1; } if (B->neg) { B->neg = 0; if (A->neg) ret = -ret; } /* * now B is positive and odd, so what remains to be done is to compute * the Jacobi symbol (A/B) and multiply it by 'ret' */ while (1) { /* Cohen's step 3: */ /* B is positive and odd */ if (BN_is_zero(A)) { ret = BN_is_one(B) ? ret : 0; goto end; } /* now A is non-zero */ i = 0; while (!BN_is_bit_set(A, i)) i++; err = !BN_rshift(A, A, i); if (err) goto end; if (i & 1) { /* i is odd */ /* multiply 'ret' by $(-1)^{(B^2-1)/8}$ */ ret = ret * tab[BN_lsw(B) & 7]; } /* Cohen's step 4: */ /* multiply 'ret' by $(-1)^{(A-1)(B-1)/4}$ */ if ((A->neg ? ~BN_lsw(A) : BN_lsw(A)) & BN_lsw(B) & 2) ret = -ret; /* (A, B) := (B mod |A|, |A|) */ err = !BN_nnmod(B, B, A, ctx); if (err) goto end; tmp = A; A = B; B = tmp; tmp->neg = 0; } end: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (err) return -2; else return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h0000644000000000000000000003504613176625656015755 0ustar rootroot/* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl * * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ typedef unsigned short prime_t; # define NUMPRIMES 2048 static const prime_t primes[2048] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033, 1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1123, 1129, 1151, 1153, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213, 1217, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1249, 1259, 1277, 1279, 1283, 1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1319, 1321, 1327, 1361, 1367, 1373, 1381, 1399, 1409, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451, 1453, 1459, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493, 1499, 1511, 1523, 1531, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559, 1567, 1571, 1579, 1583, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1637, 1657, 1663, 1667, 1669, 1693, 1697, 1699, 1709, 1721, 1723, 1733, 1741, 1747, 1753, 1759, 1777, 1783, 1787, 1789, 1801, 1811, 1823, 1831, 1847, 1861, 1867, 1871, 1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1901, 1907, 1913, 1931, 1933, 1949, 1951, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2011, 2017, 2027, 2029, 2039, 2053, 2063, 2069, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111, 2113, 2129, 2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2153, 2161, 2179, 2203, 2207, 2213, 2221, 2237, 2239, 2243, 2251, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2281, 2287, 2293, 2297, 2309, 2311, 2333, 2339, 2341, 2347, 2351, 2357, 2371, 2377, 2381, 2383, 2389, 2393, 2399, 2411, 2417, 2423, 2437, 2441, 2447, 2459, 2467, 2473, 2477, 2503, 2521, 2531, 2539, 2543, 2549, 2551, 2557, 2579, 2591, 2593, 2609, 2617, 2621, 2633, 2647, 2657, 2659, 2663, 2671, 2677, 2683, 2687, 2689, 2693, 2699, 2707, 2711, 2713, 2719, 2729, 2731, 2741, 2749, 2753, 2767, 2777, 2789, 2791, 2797, 2801, 2803, 2819, 2833, 2837, 2843, 2851, 2857, 2861, 2879, 2887, 2897, 2903, 2909, 2917, 2927, 2939, 2953, 2957, 2963, 2969, 2971, 2999, 3001, 3011, 3019, 3023, 3037, 3041, 3049, 3061, 3067, 3079, 3083, 3089, 3109, 3119, 3121, 3137, 3163, 3167, 3169, 3181, 3187, 3191, 3203, 3209, 3217, 3221, 3229, 3251, 3253, 3257, 3259, 3271, 3299, 3301, 3307, 3313, 3319, 3323, 3329, 3331, 3343, 3347, 3359, 3361, 3371, 3373, 3389, 3391, 3407, 3413, 3433, 3449, 3457, 3461, 3463, 3467, 3469, 3491, 3499, 3511, 3517, 3527, 3529, 3533, 3539, 3541, 3547, 3557, 3559, 3571, 3581, 3583, 3593, 3607, 3613, 3617, 3623, 3631, 3637, 3643, 3659, 3671, 3673, 3677, 3691, 3697, 3701, 3709, 3719, 3727, 3733, 3739, 3761, 3767, 3769, 3779, 3793, 3797, 3803, 3821, 3823, 3833, 3847, 3851, 3853, 3863, 3877, 3881, 3889, 3907, 3911, 3917, 3919, 3923, 3929, 3931, 3943, 3947, 3967, 3989, 4001, 4003, 4007, 4013, 4019, 4021, 4027, 4049, 4051, 4057, 4073, 4079, 4091, 4093, 4099, 4111, 4127, 4129, 4133, 4139, 4153, 4157, 4159, 4177, 4201, 4211, 4217, 4219, 4229, 4231, 4241, 4243, 4253, 4259, 4261, 4271, 4273, 4283, 4289, 4297, 4327, 4337, 4339, 4349, 4357, 4363, 4373, 4391, 4397, 4409, 4421, 4423, 4441, 4447, 4451, 4457, 4463, 4481, 4483, 4493, 4507, 4513, 4517, 4519, 4523, 4547, 4549, 4561, 4567, 4583, 4591, 4597, 4603, 4621, 4637, 4639, 4643, 4649, 4651, 4657, 4663, 4673, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4721, 4723, 4729, 4733, 4751, 4759, 4783, 4787, 4789, 4793, 4799, 4801, 4813, 4817, 4831, 4861, 4871, 4877, 4889, 4903, 4909, 4919, 4931, 4933, 4937, 4943, 4951, 4957, 4967, 4969, 4973, 4987, 4993, 4999, 5003, 5009, 5011, 5021, 5023, 5039, 5051, 5059, 5077, 5081, 5087, 5099, 5101, 5107, 5113, 5119, 5147, 5153, 5167, 5171, 5179, 5189, 5197, 5209, 5227, 5231, 5233, 5237, 5261, 5273, 5279, 5281, 5297, 5303, 5309, 5323, 5333, 5347, 5351, 5381, 5387, 5393, 5399, 5407, 5413, 5417, 5419, 5431, 5437, 5441, 5443, 5449, 5471, 5477, 5479, 5483, 5501, 5503, 5507, 5519, 5521, 5527, 5531, 5557, 5563, 5569, 5573, 5581, 5591, 5623, 5639, 5641, 5647, 5651, 5653, 5657, 5659, 5669, 5683, 5689, 5693, 5701, 5711, 5717, 5737, 5741, 5743, 5749, 5779, 5783, 5791, 5801, 5807, 5813, 5821, 5827, 5839, 5843, 5849, 5851, 5857, 5861, 5867, 5869, 5879, 5881, 5897, 5903, 5923, 5927, 5939, 5953, 5981, 5987, 6007, 6011, 6029, 6037, 6043, 6047, 6053, 6067, 6073, 6079, 6089, 6091, 6101, 6113, 6121, 6131, 6133, 6143, 6151, 6163, 6173, 6197, 6199, 6203, 6211, 6217, 6221, 6229, 6247, 6257, 6263, 6269, 6271, 6277, 6287, 6299, 6301, 6311, 6317, 6323, 6329, 6337, 6343, 6353, 6359, 6361, 6367, 6373, 6379, 6389, 6397, 6421, 6427, 6449, 6451, 6469, 6473, 6481, 6491, 6521, 6529, 6547, 6551, 6553, 6563, 6569, 6571, 6577, 6581, 6599, 6607, 6619, 6637, 6653, 6659, 6661, 6673, 6679, 6689, 6691, 6701, 6703, 6709, 6719, 6733, 6737, 6761, 6763, 6779, 6781, 6791, 6793, 6803, 6823, 6827, 6829, 6833, 6841, 6857, 6863, 6869, 6871, 6883, 6899, 6907, 6911, 6917, 6947, 6949, 6959, 6961, 6967, 6971, 6977, 6983, 6991, 6997, 7001, 7013, 7019, 7027, 7039, 7043, 7057, 7069, 7079, 7103, 7109, 7121, 7127, 7129, 7151, 7159, 7177, 7187, 7193, 7207, 7211, 7213, 7219, 7229, 7237, 7243, 7247, 7253, 7283, 7297, 7307, 7309, 7321, 7331, 7333, 7349, 7351, 7369, 7393, 7411, 7417, 7433, 7451, 7457, 7459, 7477, 7481, 7487, 7489, 7499, 7507, 7517, 7523, 7529, 7537, 7541, 7547, 7549, 7559, 7561, 7573, 7577, 7583, 7589, 7591, 7603, 7607, 7621, 7639, 7643, 7649, 7669, 7673, 7681, 7687, 7691, 7699, 7703, 7717, 7723, 7727, 7741, 7753, 7757, 7759, 7789, 7793, 7817, 7823, 7829, 7841, 7853, 7867, 7873, 7877, 7879, 7883, 7901, 7907, 7919, 7927, 7933, 7937, 7949, 7951, 7963, 7993, 8009, 8011, 8017, 8039, 8053, 8059, 8069, 8081, 8087, 8089, 8093, 8101, 8111, 8117, 8123, 8147, 8161, 8167, 8171, 8179, 8191, 8209, 8219, 8221, 8231, 8233, 8237, 8243, 8263, 8269, 8273, 8287, 8291, 8293, 8297, 8311, 8317, 8329, 8353, 8363, 8369, 8377, 8387, 8389, 8419, 8423, 8429, 8431, 8443, 8447, 8461, 8467, 8501, 8513, 8521, 8527, 8537, 8539, 8543, 8563, 8573, 8581, 8597, 8599, 8609, 8623, 8627, 8629, 8641, 8647, 8663, 8669, 8677, 8681, 8689, 8693, 8699, 8707, 8713, 8719, 8731, 8737, 8741, 8747, 8753, 8761, 8779, 8783, 8803, 8807, 8819, 8821, 8831, 8837, 8839, 8849, 8861, 8863, 8867, 8887, 8893, 8923, 8929, 8933, 8941, 8951, 8963, 8969, 8971, 8999, 9001, 9007, 9011, 9013, 9029, 9041, 9043, 9049, 9059, 9067, 9091, 9103, 9109, 9127, 9133, 9137, 9151, 9157, 9161, 9173, 9181, 9187, 9199, 9203, 9209, 9221, 9227, 9239, 9241, 9257, 9277, 9281, 9283, 9293, 9311, 9319, 9323, 9337, 9341, 9343, 9349, 9371, 9377, 9391, 9397, 9403, 9413, 9419, 9421, 9431, 9433, 9437, 9439, 9461, 9463, 9467, 9473, 9479, 9491, 9497, 9511, 9521, 9533, 9539, 9547, 9551, 9587, 9601, 9613, 9619, 9623, 9629, 9631, 9643, 9649, 9661, 9677, 9679, 9689, 9697, 9719, 9721, 9733, 9739, 9743, 9749, 9767, 9769, 9781, 9787, 9791, 9803, 9811, 9817, 9829, 9833, 9839, 9851, 9857, 9859, 9871, 9883, 9887, 9901, 9907, 9923, 9929, 9931, 9941, 9949, 9967, 9973, 10007, 10009, 10037, 10039, 10061, 10067, 10069, 10079, 10091, 10093, 10099, 10103, 10111, 10133, 10139, 10141, 10151, 10159, 10163, 10169, 10177, 10181, 10193, 10211, 10223, 10243, 10247, 10253, 10259, 10267, 10271, 10273, 10289, 10301, 10303, 10313, 10321, 10331, 10333, 10337, 10343, 10357, 10369, 10391, 10399, 10427, 10429, 10433, 10453, 10457, 10459, 10463, 10477, 10487, 10499, 10501, 10513, 10529, 10531, 10559, 10567, 10589, 10597, 10601, 10607, 10613, 10627, 10631, 10639, 10651, 10657, 10663, 10667, 10687, 10691, 10709, 10711, 10723, 10729, 10733, 10739, 10753, 10771, 10781, 10789, 10799, 10831, 10837, 10847, 10853, 10859, 10861, 10867, 10883, 10889, 10891, 10903, 10909, 10937, 10939, 10949, 10957, 10973, 10979, 10987, 10993, 11003, 11027, 11047, 11057, 11059, 11069, 11071, 11083, 11087, 11093, 11113, 11117, 11119, 11131, 11149, 11159, 11161, 11171, 11173, 11177, 11197, 11213, 11239, 11243, 11251, 11257, 11261, 11273, 11279, 11287, 11299, 11311, 11317, 11321, 11329, 11351, 11353, 11369, 11383, 11393, 11399, 11411, 11423, 11437, 11443, 11447, 11467, 11471, 11483, 11489, 11491, 11497, 11503, 11519, 11527, 11549, 11551, 11579, 11587, 11593, 11597, 11617, 11621, 11633, 11657, 11677, 11681, 11689, 11699, 11701, 11717, 11719, 11731, 11743, 11777, 11779, 11783, 11789, 11801, 11807, 11813, 11821, 11827, 11831, 11833, 11839, 11863, 11867, 11887, 11897, 11903, 11909, 11923, 11927, 11933, 11939, 11941, 11953, 11959, 11969, 11971, 11981, 11987, 12007, 12011, 12037, 12041, 12043, 12049, 12071, 12073, 12097, 12101, 12107, 12109, 12113, 12119, 12143, 12149, 12157, 12161, 12163, 12197, 12203, 12211, 12227, 12239, 12241, 12251, 12253, 12263, 12269, 12277, 12281, 12289, 12301, 12323, 12329, 12343, 12347, 12373, 12377, 12379, 12391, 12401, 12409, 12413, 12421, 12433, 12437, 12451, 12457, 12473, 12479, 12487, 12491, 12497, 12503, 12511, 12517, 12527, 12539, 12541, 12547, 12553, 12569, 12577, 12583, 12589, 12601, 12611, 12613, 12619, 12637, 12641, 12647, 12653, 12659, 12671, 12689, 12697, 12703, 12713, 12721, 12739, 12743, 12757, 12763, 12781, 12791, 12799, 12809, 12821, 12823, 12829, 12841, 12853, 12889, 12893, 12899, 12907, 12911, 12917, 12919, 12923, 12941, 12953, 12959, 12967, 12973, 12979, 12983, 13001, 13003, 13007, 13009, 13033, 13037, 13043, 13049, 13063, 13093, 13099, 13103, 13109, 13121, 13127, 13147, 13151, 13159, 13163, 13171, 13177, 13183, 13187, 13217, 13219, 13229, 13241, 13249, 13259, 13267, 13291, 13297, 13309, 13313, 13327, 13331, 13337, 13339, 13367, 13381, 13397, 13399, 13411, 13417, 13421, 13441, 13451, 13457, 13463, 13469, 13477, 13487, 13499, 13513, 13523, 13537, 13553, 13567, 13577, 13591, 13597, 13613, 13619, 13627, 13633, 13649, 13669, 13679, 13681, 13687, 13691, 13693, 13697, 13709, 13711, 13721, 13723, 13729, 13751, 13757, 13759, 13763, 13781, 13789, 13799, 13807, 13829, 13831, 13841, 13859, 13873, 13877, 13879, 13883, 13901, 13903, 13907, 13913, 13921, 13931, 13933, 13963, 13967, 13997, 13999, 14009, 14011, 14029, 14033, 14051, 14057, 14071, 14081, 14083, 14087, 14107, 14143, 14149, 14153, 14159, 14173, 14177, 14197, 14207, 14221, 14243, 14249, 14251, 14281, 14293, 14303, 14321, 14323, 14327, 14341, 14347, 14369, 14387, 14389, 14401, 14407, 14411, 14419, 14423, 14431, 14437, 14447, 14449, 14461, 14479, 14489, 14503, 14519, 14533, 14537, 14543, 14549, 14551, 14557, 14561, 14563, 14591, 14593, 14621, 14627, 14629, 14633, 14639, 14653, 14657, 14669, 14683, 14699, 14713, 14717, 14723, 14731, 14737, 14741, 14747, 14753, 14759, 14767, 14771, 14779, 14783, 14797, 14813, 14821, 14827, 14831, 14843, 14851, 14867, 14869, 14879, 14887, 14891, 14897, 14923, 14929, 14939, 14947, 14951, 14957, 14969, 14983, 15013, 15017, 15031, 15053, 15061, 15073, 15077, 15083, 15091, 15101, 15107, 15121, 15131, 15137, 15139, 15149, 15161, 15173, 15187, 15193, 15199, 15217, 15227, 15233, 15241, 15259, 15263, 15269, 15271, 15277, 15287, 15289, 15299, 15307, 15313, 15319, 15329, 15331, 15349, 15359, 15361, 15373, 15377, 15383, 15391, 15401, 15413, 15427, 15439, 15443, 15451, 15461, 15467, 15473, 15493, 15497, 15511, 15527, 15541, 15551, 15559, 15569, 15581, 15583, 15601, 15607, 15619, 15629, 15641, 15643, 15647, 15649, 15661, 15667, 15671, 15679, 15683, 15727, 15731, 15733, 15737, 15739, 15749, 15761, 15767, 15773, 15787, 15791, 15797, 15803, 15809, 15817, 15823, 15859, 15877, 15881, 15887, 15889, 15901, 15907, 15913, 15919, 15923, 15937, 15959, 15971, 15973, 15991, 16001, 16007, 16033, 16057, 16061, 16063, 16067, 16069, 16073, 16087, 16091, 16097, 16103, 16111, 16127, 16139, 16141, 16183, 16187, 16189, 16193, 16217, 16223, 16229, 16231, 16249, 16253, 16267, 16273, 16301, 16319, 16333, 16339, 16349, 16361, 16363, 16369, 16381, 16411, 16417, 16421, 16427, 16433, 16447, 16451, 16453, 16477, 16481, 16487, 16493, 16519, 16529, 16547, 16553, 16561, 16567, 16573, 16603, 16607, 16619, 16631, 16633, 16649, 16651, 16657, 16661, 16673, 16691, 16693, 16699, 16703, 16729, 16741, 16747, 16759, 16763, 16787, 16811, 16823, 16829, 16831, 16843, 16871, 16879, 16883, 16889, 16901, 16903, 16921, 16927, 16931, 16937, 16943, 16963, 16979, 16981, 16987, 16993, 17011, 17021, 17027, 17029, 17033, 17041, 17047, 17053, 17077, 17093, 17099, 17107, 17117, 17123, 17137, 17159, 17167, 17183, 17189, 17191, 17203, 17207, 17209, 17231, 17239, 17257, 17291, 17293, 17299, 17317, 17321, 17327, 17333, 17341, 17351, 17359, 17377, 17383, 17387, 17389, 17393, 17401, 17417, 17419, 17431, 17443, 17449, 17467, 17471, 17477, 17483, 17489, 17491, 17497, 17509, 17519, 17539, 17551, 17569, 17573, 17579, 17581, 17597, 17599, 17609, 17623, 17627, 17657, 17659, 17669, 17681, 17683, 17707, 17713, 17729, 17737, 17747, 17749, 17761, 17783, 17789, 17791, 17807, 17827, 17837, 17839, 17851, 17863, }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c0000644000000000000000000002234113176625656015617 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) /* * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime! */ { BIGNUM *ret = in; int err = 1; int r; BIGNUM *A, *b, *q, *t, *x, *y; int e, i, j; if (!BN_is_odd(p) || BN_abs_is_word(p, 1)) { if (BN_abs_is_word(p, 2)) { if (ret == NULL) ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto end; if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_bit_set(a, 0))) { if (ret != in) BN_free(ret); return NULL; } bn_check_top(ret); return ret; } BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME); return (NULL); } if (BN_is_zero(a) || BN_is_one(a)) { if (ret == NULL) ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto end; if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_one(a))) { if (ret != in) BN_free(ret); return NULL; } bn_check_top(ret); return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) goto end; if (ret == NULL) ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto end; /* A = a mod p */ if (!BN_nnmod(A, a, p, ctx)) goto end; /* now write |p| - 1 as 2^e*q where q is odd */ e = 1; while (!BN_is_bit_set(p, e)) e++; /* we'll set q later (if needed) */ if (e == 1) { /*- * The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse * modulo (|p|-1)/2, and square roots can be computed * directly by modular exponentiation. * We have * 2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1 (mod (|p|-1)/2), * so we can use exponent (|p|+1)/4, i.e. (|p|-3)/4 + 1. */ if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2)) goto end; q->neg = 0; if (!BN_add_word(q, 1)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_exp(ret, A, q, p, ctx)) goto end; err = 0; goto vrfy; } if (e == 2) { /*- * |p| == 5 (mod 8) * * In this case 2 is always a non-square since * Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime. * So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square. * Thus for * b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8), * i := (2*a)*b^2 * we have * i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2) * = (2*a)^((p-1)/2) * = -1; * so if we set * x := a*b*(i-1), * then * x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1) * = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i) * = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2) * = a*(-i)*i * = a. * * (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin, * , * November 1992.) */ /* t := 2*a */ if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p)) goto end; /* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8) */ if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 3)) goto end; q->neg = 0; if (!BN_mod_exp(b, t, q, p, ctx)) goto end; /* y := b^2 */ if (!BN_mod_sqr(y, b, p, ctx)) goto end; /* t := (2*a)*b^2 - 1 */ if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, y, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1)) goto end; /* x = a*b*t */ if (!BN_mod_mul(x, A, b, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_copy(ret, x)) goto end; err = 0; goto vrfy; } /* * e > 2, so we really have to use the Tonelli/Shanks algorithm. First, * find some y that is not a square. */ if (!BN_copy(q, p)) goto end; /* use 'q' as temp */ q->neg = 0; i = 2; do { /* * For efficiency, try small numbers first; if this fails, try random * numbers. */ if (i < 22) { if (!BN_set_word(y, i)) goto end; } else { if (!BN_pseudo_rand(y, BN_num_bits(p), 0, 0)) goto end; if (BN_ucmp(y, p) >= 0) { if (!(p->neg ? BN_add : BN_sub) (y, y, p)) goto end; } /* now 0 <= y < |p| */ if (BN_is_zero(y)) if (!BN_set_word(y, i)) goto end; } r = BN_kronecker(y, q, ctx); /* here 'q' is |p| */ if (r < -1) goto end; if (r == 0) { /* m divides p */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME); goto end; } } while (r == 1 && ++i < 82); if (r != -1) { /* * Many rounds and still no non-square -- this is more likely a bug * than just bad luck. Even if p is not prime, we should have found * some y such that r == -1. */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); goto end; } /* Here's our actual 'q': */ if (!BN_rshift(q, q, e)) goto end; /* * Now that we have some non-square, we can find an element of order 2^e * by computing its q'th power. */ if (!BN_mod_exp(y, y, q, p, ctx)) goto end; if (BN_is_one(y)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME); goto end; } /*- * Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer * k, 0 <= k < 2^e, such that * * a^q * y^k == 1 (mod p). * * As a^q is a square and y is not, k must be even. * q+1 is even, too, so there is an element * * X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2), * * and it satisfies * * X^2 = a^q * a * y^k * = a, * * so it is the square root that we are looking for. */ /* t := (q-1)/2 (note that q is odd) */ if (!BN_rshift1(t, q)) goto end; /* x := a^((q-1)/2) */ if (BN_is_zero(t)) { /* special case: p = 2^e + 1 */ if (!BN_nnmod(t, A, p, ctx)) goto end; if (BN_is_zero(t)) { /* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */ BN_zero(ret); err = 0; goto end; } else if (!BN_one(x)) goto end; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp(x, A, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (BN_is_zero(x)) { /* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */ BN_zero(ret); err = 0; goto end; } } /* b := a*x^2 (= a^q) */ if (!BN_mod_sqr(b, x, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, A, p, ctx)) goto end; /* x := a*x (= a^((q+1)/2)) */ if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, A, p, ctx)) goto end; while (1) { /*- * Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E * where E refers to the original value of e, which we * don't keep in a variable), and x is a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2). * * We have a*b = x^2, * y^2^(e-1) = -1, * b^2^(e-1) = 1. */ if (BN_is_one(b)) { if (!BN_copy(ret, x)) goto end; err = 0; goto vrfy; } /* find smallest i such that b^(2^i) = 1 */ i = 1; if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx)) goto end; while (!BN_is_one(t)) { i++; if (i == e) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE); goto end; } if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx)) goto end; } /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */ if (!BN_copy(t, y)) goto end; for (j = e - i - 1; j > 0; j--) { if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, t, p, ctx)) goto end; } if (!BN_mod_mul(y, t, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, y, p, ctx)) goto end; e = i; } vrfy: if (!err) { /* * verify the result -- the input might have been not a square (test * added in 0.9.8) */ if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, ret, p, ctx)) err = 1; if (!err && 0 != BN_cmp(x, A)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE); err = 1; } } end: if (err) { if (ret != in) BN_clear_free(ret); ret = NULL; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(ret); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_nist.c0000644000000000000000000011242613176625656015607 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "bn_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #define BN_NIST_192_TOP (192+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2 #define BN_NIST_224_TOP (224+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2 #define BN_NIST_256_TOP (256+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2 #define BN_NIST_384_TOP (384+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2 #define BN_NIST_521_TOP (521+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2 /* pre-computed tables are "carry-less" values of modulus*(i+1) */ #if BN_BITS2 == 64 static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192[][BN_NIST_192_TOP] = { {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}, {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}, {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL} }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192_sqr[] = { 0x0000000000000001ULL, 0x0000000000000002ULL, 0x0000000000000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224[][BN_NIST_224_TOP] = { {0x0000000000000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL}, {0x0000000000000002ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFFULL} /* this one is * "carry-full" */ }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224_sqr[] = { 0x0000000000000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x0000000200000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256[][BN_NIST_256_TOP] = { {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFF00000001ULL}, {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFFULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000002ULL}, {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0x00000002FFFFFFFFULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFD00000003ULL}, {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCULL, 0x00000003FFFFFFFFULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFC00000004ULL}, {0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBULL, 0x00000004FFFFFFFFULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFB00000005ULL}, }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256_sqr[] = { 0x0000000000000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000001ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000002ULL }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384[][BN_NIST_384_TOP] = { {0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}, {0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}, {0x00000002FFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFD00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}, {0x00000003FFFFFFFCULL, 0xFFFFFFFC00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}, {0x00000004FFFFFFFBULL, 0xFFFFFFFB00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFAULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL}, }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384_sqr[] = { 0xFFFFFFFE00000001ULL, 0x0000000200000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0x0000000200000000ULL, 0x0000000000000001ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x00000001FFFFFFFEULL, 0xFFFFFFFE00000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521[] = { 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x00000000000001FFULL }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521_sqr[] = { 0x0000000000000001ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFC00ULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL, 0x000000000003FFFFULL }; #elif BN_BITS2 == 32 static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192[][BN_NIST_192_TOP] = { {0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF} }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_192_sqr[] = { 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224[][BN_NIST_224_TOP] = { {0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF} }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_224_sqr[] = { 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256[][BN_NIST_256_TOP] = { {0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0xFFFFFFFE}, {0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000003, 0xFFFFFFFD}, {0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000004, 0xFFFFFFFC}, {0xFFFFFFFB, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000004, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000005, 0xFFFFFFFB}, }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_256_sqr[] = { 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000002, 0xFFFFFFFE }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384[][BN_NIST_384_TOP] = { {0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0xFFFFFFFD, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0xFFFFFFFC, 0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFB, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, {0xFFFFFFFB, 0x00000004, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFB, 0xFFFFFFFA, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF}, }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_384_sqr[] = { 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFE, 0xFFFFFFFD, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521[] = { 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x000001FF }; static const BN_ULONG _nist_p_521_sqr[] = { 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFC00, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x0003FFFF }; #else # error "unsupported BN_BITS2" #endif static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_192 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_192[0], BN_NIST_192_TOP, BN_NIST_192_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_224 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_224[0], BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_256 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_256[0], BN_NIST_256_TOP, BN_NIST_256_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_384 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_384[0], BN_NIST_384_TOP, BN_NIST_384_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_521 = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_521, BN_NIST_521_TOP, BN_NIST_521_TOP, 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void) { return &_bignum_nist_p_192; } const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void) { return &_bignum_nist_p_224; } const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void) { return &_bignum_nist_p_256; } const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void) { return &_bignum_nist_p_384; } const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void) { return &_bignum_nist_p_521; } static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top, int max) { int i; #ifdef BN_DEBUG OPENSSL_assert(top <= max); #endif for (i = 0; i < top; i++) dst[i] = src[i]; for (; i < max; i++) dst[i] = 0; } static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top) { int i; for (i = 0; i < top; i++) dst[i] = src[i]; } #if BN_BITS2 == 64 # define bn_cp_64(to, n, from, m) (to)[n] = (m>=0)?((from)[m]):0; # define bn_64_set_0(to, n) (to)[n] = (BN_ULONG)0; /* * two following macros are implemented under assumption that they * are called in a sequence with *ascending* n, i.e. as they are... */ # define bn_cp_32_naked(to, n, from, m) (((n)&1)?(to[(n)/2]|=((m)&1)?(from[(m)/2]&BN_MASK2h):(from[(m)/2]<<32))\ :(to[(n)/2] =((m)&1)?(from[(m)/2]>>32):(from[(m)/2]&BN_MASK2l))) # define bn_32_set_0(to, n) (((n)&1)?(to[(n)/2]&=BN_MASK2l):(to[(n)/2]=0)); # define bn_cp_32(to,n,from,m) ((m)>=0)?bn_cp_32_naked(to,n,from,m):bn_32_set_0(to,n) # if defined(L_ENDIAN) # if defined(__arch64__) # define NIST_INT64 long # else # define NIST_INT64 long long # endif # endif #else # define bn_cp_64(to, n, from, m) \ { \ bn_cp_32(to, (n)*2, from, (m)*2); \ bn_cp_32(to, (n)*2+1, from, (m)*2+1); \ } # define bn_64_set_0(to, n) \ { \ bn_32_set_0(to, (n)*2); \ bn_32_set_0(to, (n)*2+1); \ } # define bn_cp_32(to, n, from, m) (to)[n] = (m>=0)?((from)[m]):0; # define bn_32_set_0(to, n) (to)[n] = (BN_ULONG)0; # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__GNUC__) # define NIST_INT64 __int64 # elif defined(BN_LLONG) # define NIST_INT64 long long # endif #endif /* BN_BITS2 != 64 */ #define nist_set_192(to, from, a1, a2, a3) \ { \ bn_cp_64(to, 0, from, (a3) - 3) \ bn_cp_64(to, 1, from, (a2) - 3) \ bn_cp_64(to, 2, from, (a1) - 3) \ } int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx) { int top = a->top, i; int carry; register BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d; union { BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_192_TOP]; unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_192_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) / sizeof(unsigned int)]; } buf; BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_192_TOP], *res; PTR_SIZE_INT mask; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_192_sqr = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_192_sqr, OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_192_sqr), OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_192_sqr), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; field = &_bignum_nist_p_192; /* just to make sure */ if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_192_sqr) >= 0) return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx); i = BN_ucmp(field, a); if (i == 0) { BN_zero(r); return 1; } else if (i > 0) return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL); if (r != a) { if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_192_TOP)) return 0; r_d = r->d; nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP); } else r_d = a_d; nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_192_TOP, top - BN_NIST_192_TOP, BN_NIST_192_TOP); #if defined(NIST_INT64) { NIST_INT64 acc; /* accumulator */ unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d; const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui; acc = rp[0]; acc += bp[3 * 2 - 6]; acc += bp[5 * 2 - 6]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[1]; acc += bp[3 * 2 - 5]; acc += bp[5 * 2 - 5]; rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[2]; acc += bp[3 * 2 - 6]; acc += bp[4 * 2 - 6]; acc += bp[5 * 2 - 6]; rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[3]; acc += bp[3 * 2 - 5]; acc += bp[4 * 2 - 5]; acc += bp[5 * 2 - 5]; rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[4]; acc += bp[4 * 2 - 6]; acc += bp[5 * 2 - 6]; rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[5]; acc += bp[4 * 2 - 5]; acc += bp[5 * 2 - 5]; rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc; carry = (int)(acc >> 32); } #else { BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_192_TOP]; nist_set_192(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 3, 3); carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP); nist_set_192(t_d, buf.bn, 4, 4, 0); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP); nist_set_192(t_d, buf.bn, 5, 5, 5) carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_192_TOP); } #endif if (carry > 0) carry = (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_192[carry - 1], BN_NIST_192_TOP); else carry = 1; /* * we need 'if (carry==0 || result>=modulus) result-=modulus;' * as comparison implies subtraction, we can write * 'tmp=result-modulus; if (!carry || !borrow) result=tmp;' * this is what happens below, but without explicit if:-) a. */ mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words(c_d, r_d, _nist_p_192[0], BN_NIST_192_TOP); mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry; res = c_d; res = (BN_ULONG *) (((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask)); nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_192_TOP); r->top = BN_NIST_192_TOP; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } typedef BN_ULONG (*bn_addsub_f) (BN_ULONG *, const BN_ULONG *, const BN_ULONG *, int); #define nist_set_224(to, from, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7) \ { \ bn_cp_32(to, 0, from, (a7) - 7) \ bn_cp_32(to, 1, from, (a6) - 7) \ bn_cp_32(to, 2, from, (a5) - 7) \ bn_cp_32(to, 3, from, (a4) - 7) \ bn_cp_32(to, 4, from, (a3) - 7) \ bn_cp_32(to, 5, from, (a2) - 7) \ bn_cp_32(to, 6, from, (a1) - 7) \ } int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx) { int top = a->top, i; int carry; BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d; union { BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_224_TOP]; unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_224_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) / sizeof(unsigned int)]; } buf; BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP], *res; PTR_SIZE_INT mask; union { bn_addsub_f f; PTR_SIZE_INT p; } u; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_224_sqr = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_224_sqr, OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_224_sqr), OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_224_sqr), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; field = &_bignum_nist_p_224; /* just to make sure */ if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_224_sqr) >= 0) return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx); i = BN_ucmp(field, a); if (i == 0) { BN_zero(r); return 1; } else if (i > 0) return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL); if (r != a) { if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_224_TOP)) return 0; r_d = r->d; nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP); } else r_d = a_d; #if BN_BITS2==64 /* copy upper 256 bits of 448 bit number ... */ nist_cp_bn_0(c_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1), top - (BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1), BN_NIST_224_TOP); /* ... and right shift by 32 to obtain upper 224 bits */ nist_set_224(buf.bn, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8); /* truncate lower part to 224 bits too */ r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1] &= BN_MASK2l; #else nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP); #endif #if defined(NIST_INT64) && BN_BITS2!=64 { NIST_INT64 acc; /* accumulator */ unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d; const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui; acc = rp[0]; acc -= bp[7 - 7]; acc -= bp[11 - 7]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[1]; acc -= bp[8 - 7]; acc -= bp[12 - 7]; rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[2]; acc -= bp[9 - 7]; acc -= bp[13 - 7]; rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[3]; acc += bp[7 - 7]; acc += bp[11 - 7]; acc -= bp[10 - 7]; rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[4]; acc += bp[8 - 7]; acc += bp[12 - 7]; acc -= bp[11 - 7]; rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[5]; acc += bp[9 - 7]; acc += bp[13 - 7]; acc -= bp[12 - 7]; rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[6]; acc += bp[10 - 7]; acc -= bp[13 - 7]; rp[6] = (unsigned int)acc; carry = (int)(acc >> 32); # if BN_BITS2==64 rp[7] = carry; # endif } #else { BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP]; nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0); carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP); nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP); nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP); nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP); # if BN_BITS2==64 carry = (int)(r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1] >> 32); # endif } #endif u.f = bn_sub_words; if (carry > 0) { carry = (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_224[carry - 1], BN_NIST_224_TOP); #if BN_BITS2==64 carry = (int)(~(r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP - 1] >> 32)) & 1; #endif } else if (carry < 0) { /* * it's a bit more complicated logic in this case. if bn_add_words * yields no carry, then result has to be adjusted by unconditionally * *adding* the modulus. but if it does, then result has to be * compared to the modulus and conditionally adjusted by * *subtracting* the latter. */ carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_224[-carry - 1], BN_NIST_224_TOP); mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry; u.p = ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words & mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_add_words & ~mask); } else carry = 1; /* otherwise it's effectively same as in BN_nist_mod_192... */ mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) (*u.f) (c_d, r_d, _nist_p_224[0], BN_NIST_224_TOP); mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry; res = c_d; res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask)); nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_224_TOP); r->top = BN_NIST_224_TOP; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } #define nist_set_256(to, from, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8) \ { \ bn_cp_32(to, 0, from, (a8) - 8) \ bn_cp_32(to, 1, from, (a7) - 8) \ bn_cp_32(to, 2, from, (a6) - 8) \ bn_cp_32(to, 3, from, (a5) - 8) \ bn_cp_32(to, 4, from, (a4) - 8) \ bn_cp_32(to, 5, from, (a3) - 8) \ bn_cp_32(to, 6, from, (a2) - 8) \ bn_cp_32(to, 7, from, (a1) - 8) \ } int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, top = a->top; int carry = 0; register BN_ULONG *a_d = a->d, *r_d; union { BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_256_TOP]; unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_256_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) / sizeof(unsigned int)]; } buf; BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_256_TOP], *res; PTR_SIZE_INT mask; union { bn_addsub_f f; PTR_SIZE_INT p; } u; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_256_sqr = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_256_sqr, OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_256_sqr), OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_256_sqr), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; field = &_bignum_nist_p_256; /* just to make sure */ if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_256_sqr) >= 0) return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx); i = BN_ucmp(field, a); if (i == 0) { BN_zero(r); return 1; } else if (i > 0) return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL); if (r != a) { if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_256_TOP)) return 0; r_d = r->d; nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); } else r_d = a_d; nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_256_TOP, top - BN_NIST_256_TOP, BN_NIST_256_TOP); #if defined(NIST_INT64) { NIST_INT64 acc; /* accumulator */ unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d; const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui; acc = rp[0]; acc += bp[8 - 8]; acc += bp[9 - 8]; acc -= bp[11 - 8]; acc -= bp[12 - 8]; acc -= bp[13 - 8]; acc -= bp[14 - 8]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[1]; acc += bp[9 - 8]; acc += bp[10 - 8]; acc -= bp[12 - 8]; acc -= bp[13 - 8]; acc -= bp[14 - 8]; acc -= bp[15 - 8]; rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[2]; acc += bp[10 - 8]; acc += bp[11 - 8]; acc -= bp[13 - 8]; acc -= bp[14 - 8]; acc -= bp[15 - 8]; rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[3]; acc += bp[11 - 8]; acc += bp[11 - 8]; acc += bp[12 - 8]; acc += bp[12 - 8]; acc += bp[13 - 8]; acc -= bp[15 - 8]; acc -= bp[8 - 8]; acc -= bp[9 - 8]; rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[4]; acc += bp[12 - 8]; acc += bp[12 - 8]; acc += bp[13 - 8]; acc += bp[13 - 8]; acc += bp[14 - 8]; acc -= bp[9 - 8]; acc -= bp[10 - 8]; rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[5]; acc += bp[13 - 8]; acc += bp[13 - 8]; acc += bp[14 - 8]; acc += bp[14 - 8]; acc += bp[15 - 8]; acc -= bp[10 - 8]; acc -= bp[11 - 8]; rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[6]; acc += bp[14 - 8]; acc += bp[14 - 8]; acc += bp[15 - 8]; acc += bp[15 - 8]; acc += bp[14 - 8]; acc += bp[13 - 8]; acc -= bp[8 - 8]; acc -= bp[9 - 8]; rp[6] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[7]; acc += bp[15 - 8]; acc += bp[15 - 8]; acc += bp[15 - 8]; acc += bp[8 - 8]; acc -= bp[10 - 8]; acc -= bp[11 - 8]; acc -= bp[12 - 8]; acc -= bp[13 - 8]; rp[7] = (unsigned int)acc; carry = (int)(acc >> 32); } #else { BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_256_TOP]; /* * S1 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0); /* * S2 */ nist_set_256(c_d, buf.bn, 0, 15, 14, 13, 12, 0, 0, 0); carry = (int)bn_add_words(t_d, t_d, c_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* left shift */ { register BN_ULONG *ap, t, c; ap = t_d; c = 0; for (i = BN_NIST_256_TOP; i != 0; --i) { t = *ap; *(ap++) = ((t << 1) | c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t & BN_TBIT) ? 1 : 0; } carry <<= 1; carry |= c; } carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* * S3 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 15, 14, 0, 0, 0, 10, 9, 8); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* * S4 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 8, 13, 15, 14, 13, 11, 10, 9); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* * D1 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 8, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* * D2 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 11, 9, 0, 0, 15, 14, 13, 12); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* * D3 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 12, 0, 10, 9, 8, 15, 14, 13); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* * D4 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 0, 11, 10, 9, 0, 15, 14); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); } #endif /* see BN_nist_mod_224 for explanation */ u.f = bn_sub_words; if (carry > 0) carry = (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_256[carry - 1], BN_NIST_256_TOP); else if (carry < 0) { carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_256[-carry - 1], BN_NIST_256_TOP); mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry; u.p = ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words & mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_add_words & ~mask); } else carry = 1; mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) (*u.f) (c_d, r_d, _nist_p_256[0], BN_NIST_256_TOP); mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry; res = c_d; res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask)); nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_256_TOP); r->top = BN_NIST_256_TOP; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } #define nist_set_384(to,from,a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8,a9,a10,a11,a12) \ { \ bn_cp_32(to, 0, from, (a12) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 1, from, (a11) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 2, from, (a10) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 3, from, (a9) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 4, from, (a8) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 5, from, (a7) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 6, from, (a6) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 7, from, (a5) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 8, from, (a4) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 9, from, (a3) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 10, from, (a2) - 12) \ bn_cp_32(to, 11, from, (a1) - 12) \ } int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, top = a->top; int carry = 0; register BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d; union { BN_ULONG bn[BN_NIST_384_TOP]; unsigned int ui[BN_NIST_384_TOP * sizeof(BN_ULONG) / sizeof(unsigned int)]; } buf; BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_384_TOP], *res; PTR_SIZE_INT mask; union { bn_addsub_f f; PTR_SIZE_INT p; } u; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_384_sqr = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_384_sqr, OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_384_sqr), OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_384_sqr), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; field = &_bignum_nist_p_384; /* just to make sure */ if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_384_sqr) >= 0) return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx); i = BN_ucmp(field, a); if (i == 0) { BN_zero(r); return 1; } else if (i > 0) return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL); if (r != a) { if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_384_TOP)) return 0; r_d = r->d; nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); } else r_d = a_d; nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_384_TOP, top - BN_NIST_384_TOP, BN_NIST_384_TOP); #if defined(NIST_INT64) { NIST_INT64 acc; /* accumulator */ unsigned int *rp = (unsigned int *)r_d; const unsigned int *bp = (const unsigned int *)buf.ui; acc = rp[0]; acc += bp[12 - 12]; acc += bp[21 - 12]; acc += bp[20 - 12]; acc -= bp[23 - 12]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[1]; acc += bp[13 - 12]; acc += bp[22 - 12]; acc += bp[23 - 12]; acc -= bp[12 - 12]; acc -= bp[20 - 12]; rp[1] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[2]; acc += bp[14 - 12]; acc += bp[23 - 12]; acc -= bp[13 - 12]; acc -= bp[21 - 12]; rp[2] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[3]; acc += bp[15 - 12]; acc += bp[12 - 12]; acc += bp[20 - 12]; acc += bp[21 - 12]; acc -= bp[14 - 12]; acc -= bp[22 - 12]; acc -= bp[23 - 12]; rp[3] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[4]; acc += bp[21 - 12]; acc += bp[21 - 12]; acc += bp[16 - 12]; acc += bp[13 - 12]; acc += bp[12 - 12]; acc += bp[20 - 12]; acc += bp[22 - 12]; acc -= bp[15 - 12]; acc -= bp[23 - 12]; acc -= bp[23 - 12]; rp[4] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[5]; acc += bp[22 - 12]; acc += bp[22 - 12]; acc += bp[17 - 12]; acc += bp[14 - 12]; acc += bp[13 - 12]; acc += bp[21 - 12]; acc += bp[23 - 12]; acc -= bp[16 - 12]; rp[5] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[6]; acc += bp[23 - 12]; acc += bp[23 - 12]; acc += bp[18 - 12]; acc += bp[15 - 12]; acc += bp[14 - 12]; acc += bp[22 - 12]; acc -= bp[17 - 12]; rp[6] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[7]; acc += bp[19 - 12]; acc += bp[16 - 12]; acc += bp[15 - 12]; acc += bp[23 - 12]; acc -= bp[18 - 12]; rp[7] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[8]; acc += bp[20 - 12]; acc += bp[17 - 12]; acc += bp[16 - 12]; acc -= bp[19 - 12]; rp[8] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[9]; acc += bp[21 - 12]; acc += bp[18 - 12]; acc += bp[17 - 12]; acc -= bp[20 - 12]; rp[9] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[10]; acc += bp[22 - 12]; acc += bp[19 - 12]; acc += bp[18 - 12]; acc -= bp[21 - 12]; rp[10] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32; acc += rp[11]; acc += bp[23 - 12]; acc += bp[20 - 12]; acc += bp[19 - 12]; acc -= bp[22 - 12]; rp[11] = (unsigned int)acc; carry = (int)(acc >> 32); } #else { BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_384_TOP]; /* * S1 */ nist_set_256(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23 - 4, 22 - 4, 21 - 4); /* left shift */ { register BN_ULONG *ap, t, c; ap = t_d; c = 0; for (i = 3; i != 0; --i) { t = *ap; *(ap++) = ((t << 1) | c) & BN_MASK2; c = (t & BN_TBIT) ? 1 : 0; } *ap = c; } carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d + (128 / BN_BITS2), r_d + (128 / BN_BITS2), t_d, BN_NIST_256_TOP); /* * S2 */ carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, buf.bn, BN_NIST_384_TOP); /* * S3 */ nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 23, 22, 21); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); /* * S4 */ nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 20, 0, 23, 0); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); /* * S5 */ nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 22, 21, 20, 0, 0, 0, 0); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); /* * S6 */ nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 22, 21, 0, 0, 20); carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); /* * D1 */ nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 13, 12, 23); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); /* * D2 */ nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 22, 21, 20, 0); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); /* * D3 */ nist_set_384(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23, 23, 0, 0, 0); carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_384_TOP); } #endif /* see BN_nist_mod_224 for explanation */ u.f = bn_sub_words; if (carry > 0) carry = (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_384[carry - 1], BN_NIST_384_TOP); else if (carry < 0) { carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, _nist_p_384[-carry - 1], BN_NIST_384_TOP); mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry; u.p = ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words & mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_add_words & ~mask); } else carry = 1; mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) (*u.f) (c_d, r_d, _nist_p_384[0], BN_NIST_384_TOP); mask &= 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) carry; res = c_d; res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask)); nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_384_TOP); r->top = BN_NIST_384_TOP; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } #define BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT (521%BN_BITS2) #define BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT (BN_BITS2-BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT) #define BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK ((BN_ULONG)BN_MASK2>>BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx) { int top = a->top, i; BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d, t_d[BN_NIST_521_TOP], val, tmp, *res; PTR_SIZE_INT mask; static const BIGNUM _bignum_nist_p_521_sqr = { (BN_ULONG *)_nist_p_521_sqr, OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_521_sqr), OSSL_NELEM(_nist_p_521_sqr), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; field = &_bignum_nist_p_521; /* just to make sure */ if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, &_bignum_nist_p_521_sqr) >= 0) return BN_nnmod(r, a, field, ctx); i = BN_ucmp(field, a); if (i == 0) { BN_zero(r); return 1; } else if (i > 0) return (r == a) ? 1 : (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL); if (r != a) { if (!bn_wexpand(r, BN_NIST_521_TOP)) return 0; r_d = r->d; nist_cp_bn(r_d, a_d, BN_NIST_521_TOP); } else r_d = a_d; /* upper 521 bits, copy ... */ nist_cp_bn_0(t_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_521_TOP - 1), top - (BN_NIST_521_TOP - 1), BN_NIST_521_TOP); /* ... and right shift */ for (val = t_d[0], i = 0; i < BN_NIST_521_TOP - 1; i++) { #if 0 /* * MSC ARM compiler [version 2013, presumably even earlier, * much earlier] miscompiles this code, but not one in * #else section. See RT#3541. */ tmp = val >> BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT; val = t_d[i + 1]; t_d[i] = (tmp | val << BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) & BN_MASK2; #else t_d[i] = (val >> BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT | (tmp = t_d[i + 1]) << BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) & BN_MASK2; val = tmp; #endif } t_d[i] = val >> BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT; /* lower 521 bits */ r_d[i] &= BN_NIST_521_TOP_MASK; bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_521_TOP); mask = 0 - (PTR_SIZE_INT) bn_sub_words(t_d, r_d, _nist_p_521, BN_NIST_521_TOP); res = t_d; res = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) res & ~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) r_d & mask)); nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_521_TOP); r->top = BN_NIST_521_TOP; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } int (*BN_nist_mod_func(const BIGNUM *p)) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_192, p) == 0) return BN_nist_mod_192; if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_224, p) == 0) return BN_nist_mod_224; if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_256, p) == 0) return BN_nist_mod_256; if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_384, p) == 0) return BN_nist_mod_384; if (BN_ucmp(&_bignum_nist_p_521, p) == 0) return BN_nist_mod_521; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c0000644000000000000000000007516013176625656015470 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. * * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided below. */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should * fail. */ # define MAX_ITERATIONS 50 static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21, 64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85 }; /* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */ # if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) # define SQR1(w) \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF] # define SQR0(w) \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF] # endif # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT # define SQR1(w) \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] # define SQR0(w) \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \ SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF] # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m) /* * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < BN_BITS2 - 1, result is * a polynomial r with degree < 2 * BN_BITS - 1 The caller MUST ensure that * the variables have the right amount of space allocated. */ # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a, const BN_ULONG b) { register BN_ULONG h, l, s; BN_ULONG tab[8], top2b = a >> 30; register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4; a1 = a & (0x3FFFFFFF); a2 = a1 << 1; a4 = a2 << 1; tab[0] = 0; tab[1] = a1; tab[2] = a2; tab[3] = a1 ^ a2; tab[4] = a4; tab[5] = a1 ^ a4; tab[6] = a2 ^ a4; tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4; s = tab[b & 0x7]; l = s; s = tab[b >> 3 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 3; h = s >> 29; s = tab[b >> 6 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 6; h ^= s >> 26; s = tab[b >> 9 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 9; h ^= s >> 23; s = tab[b >> 12 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 12; h ^= s >> 20; s = tab[b >> 15 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 15; h ^= s >> 17; s = tab[b >> 18 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 18; h ^= s >> 14; s = tab[b >> 21 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 21; h ^= s >> 11; s = tab[b >> 24 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 24; h ^= s >> 8; s = tab[b >> 27 & 0x7]; l ^= s << 27; h ^= s >> 5; s = tab[b >> 30]; l ^= s << 30; h ^= s >> 2; /* compensate for the top two bits of a */ if (top2b & 01) { l ^= b << 30; h ^= b >> 2; } if (top2b & 02) { l ^= b << 31; h ^= b >> 1; } *r1 = h; *r0 = l; } # endif # if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG) static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a, const BN_ULONG b) { register BN_ULONG h, l, s; BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61; register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8; a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL); a2 = a1 << 1; a4 = a2 << 1; a8 = a4 << 1; tab[0] = 0; tab[1] = a1; tab[2] = a2; tab[3] = a1 ^ a2; tab[4] = a4; tab[5] = a1 ^ a4; tab[6] = a2 ^ a4; tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4; tab[8] = a8; tab[9] = a1 ^ a8; tab[10] = a2 ^ a8; tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8; tab[12] = a4 ^ a8; tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8; tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8; tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8; s = tab[b & 0xF]; l = s; s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 4; h = s >> 60; s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 8; h ^= s >> 56; s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 12; h ^= s >> 52; s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 16; h ^= s >> 48; s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 20; h ^= s >> 44; s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 24; h ^= s >> 40; s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 28; h ^= s >> 36; s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 32; h ^= s >> 32; s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 36; h ^= s >> 28; s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 40; h ^= s >> 24; s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 44; h ^= s >> 20; s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 48; h ^= s >> 16; s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 52; h ^= s >> 12; s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF]; l ^= s << 56; h ^= s >> 8; s = tab[b >> 60]; l ^= s << 60; h ^= s >> 4; /* compensate for the top three bits of a */ if (top3b & 01) { l ^= b << 61; h ^= b >> 3; } if (top3b & 02) { l ^= b << 62; h ^= b >> 2; } if (top3b & 04) { l ^= b << 63; h ^= b >> 1; } *r1 = h; *r0 = l; } # endif /* * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < 2 * BN_BITS2 - 1, * result is a polynomial r with degree < 4 * BN_BITS2 - 1 The caller MUST * ensure that the variables have the right amount of space allocated. */ static void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG a1, const BN_ULONG a0, const BN_ULONG b1, const BN_ULONG b0) { BN_ULONG m1, m0; /* r[3] = h1, r[2] = h0; r[1] = l1; r[0] = l0 */ bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 3, r + 2, a1, b1); bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 1, r, a0, b0); bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(&m1, &m0, a0 ^ a1, b0 ^ b1); /* Correction on m1 ^= l1 ^ h1; m0 ^= l0 ^ h0; */ r[2] ^= m1 ^ r[1] ^ r[3]; /* h0 ^= m1 ^ l1 ^ h1; */ r[1] = r[3] ^ r[2] ^ r[0] ^ m1 ^ m0; /* l1 ^= l0 ^ h0 ^ m0; */ } # else void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1, BN_ULONG b0); # endif /* * Add polynomials a and b and store result in r; r could be a or b, a and b * could be equal; r is the bitwise XOR of a and b. */ int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { int i; const BIGNUM *at, *bt; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a->top < b->top) { at = b; bt = a; } else { at = a; bt = b; } if (bn_wexpand(r, at->top) == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < bt->top; i++) { r->d[i] = at->d[i] ^ bt->d[i]; } for (; i < at->top; i++) { r->d[i] = at->d[i]; } r->top = at->top; bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } /*- * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials * as an int[], say p. The irreducible f(t) is then of the form: * t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. */ /* Performs modular reduction of a and store result in r. r could be a. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[]) { int j, k; int n, dN, d0, d1; BN_ULONG zz, *z; bn_check_top(a); if (!p[0]) { /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */ BN_zero(r); return 1; } /* * Since the algorithm does reduction in the r value, if a != r, copy the * contents of a into r so we can do reduction in r. */ if (a != r) { if (!bn_wexpand(r, a->top)) return 0; for (j = 0; j < a->top; j++) { r->d[j] = a->d[j]; } r->top = a->top; } z = r->d; /* start reduction */ dN = p[0] / BN_BITS2; for (j = r->top - 1; j > dN;) { zz = z[j]; if (z[j] == 0) { j--; continue; } z[j] = 0; for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) { /* reducing component t^p[k] */ n = p[0] - p[k]; d0 = n % BN_BITS2; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; n /= BN_BITS2; z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0); if (d0) z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1); } /* reducing component t^0 */ n = dN; d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0); if (d0) z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1); } /* final round of reduction */ while (j == dN) { d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2; zz = z[dN] >> d0; if (zz == 0) break; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; /* clear up the top d1 bits */ if (d0) z[dN] = (z[dN] << d1) >> d1; else z[dN] = 0; z[0] ^= zz; /* reduction t^0 component */ for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) { BN_ULONG tmp_ulong; /* reducing component t^p[k] */ n = p[k] / BN_BITS2; d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2; d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0; z[n] ^= (zz << d0); if (d0 && (tmp_ulong = zz >> d1)) z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong; } } bn_correct_top(r); return 1; } /* * Performs modular reduction of a by p and store result in r. r could be a. * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_arr implementation; this wrapper * function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the * BN_GF2m_mod_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p) { int ret = 0; int arr[6]; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, OSSL_NELEM(arr)); if (!ret || ret > (int)OSSL_NELEM(arr)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); return 0; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, a, arr); bn_check_top(r); return ret; } /* * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could be b. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int zlen, i, j, k, ret = 0; BIGNUM *s; BN_ULONG x1, x0, y1, y0, zz[4]; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (a == b) { return BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, p, ctx); } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; zlen = a->top + b->top + 4; if (!bn_wexpand(s, zlen)) goto err; s->top = zlen; for (i = 0; i < zlen; i++) s->d[i] = 0; for (j = 0; j < b->top; j += 2) { y0 = b->d[j]; y1 = ((j + 1) == b->top) ? 0 : b->d[j + 1]; for (i = 0; i < a->top; i += 2) { x0 = a->d[i]; x1 = ((i + 1) == a->top) ? 0 : a->d[i + 1]; bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(zz, x1, x0, y1, y0); for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) s->d[i + j + k] ^= zz[k]; } } bn_correct_top(s); if (BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p)) ret = 1; bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could equal b. This function calls * down to the BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr implementation; this wrapper function is * only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the * BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int i, ret = 0; BIGNUM *s; bn_check_top(a); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top)) goto err; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { s->d[2 * i + 1] = SQR1(a->d[i]); s->d[2 * i] = SQR0(a->d[i]); } s->top = 2 * a->top; bn_correct_top(s); if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. This * function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr implementation; this * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, * use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Invert a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be a. Uses * Modified Almost Inverse Algorithm (Algorithm 10) from Hankerson, D., * Hernandez, J.L., and Menezes, A. "Software Implementation of Elliptic * Curve Cryptography Over Binary Fields". */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((c = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, a, p)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(v, p)) goto err; # if 0 if (!BN_one(b)) goto err; while (1) { while (!BN_is_odd(u)) { if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(b)) { if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, p)) goto err; } if (!BN_rshift1(b, b)) goto err; } if (BN_abs_is_word(u, 1)) break; if (BN_num_bits(u) < BN_num_bits(v)) { tmp = u; u = v; v = tmp; tmp = b; b = c; c = tmp; } if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, c)) goto err; } # else { int i; int ubits = BN_num_bits(u); int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */ int top = p->top; BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp; if (!bn_wexpand(u, top)) goto err; udp = u->d; for (i = u->top; i < top; i++) udp[i] = 0; u->top = top; if (!bn_wexpand(b, top)) goto err; bdp = b->d; bdp[0] = 1; for (i = 1; i < top; i++) bdp[i] = 0; b->top = top; if (!bn_wexpand(c, top)) goto err; cdp = c->d; for (i = 0; i < top; i++) cdp[i] = 0; c->top = top; vdp = v->d; /* It pays off to "cache" *->d pointers, * because it allows optimizer to be more * aggressive. But we don't have to "cache" * p->d, because *p is declared 'const'... */ while (1) { while (ubits && !(udp[0] & 1)) { BN_ULONG u0, u1, b0, b1, mask; u0 = udp[0]; b0 = bdp[0]; mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - (b0 & 1); b0 ^= p->d[0] & mask; for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) { u1 = udp[i + 1]; udp[i] = ((u0 >> 1) | (u1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2; u0 = u1; b1 = bdp[i + 1] ^ (p->d[i + 1] & mask); bdp[i] = ((b0 >> 1) | (b1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2; b0 = b1; } udp[i] = u0 >> 1; bdp[i] = b0 >> 1; ubits--; } if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) { if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */ goto err; if (udp[0] == 1) break; } if (ubits < vbits) { i = ubits; ubits = vbits; vbits = i; tmp = u; u = v; v = tmp; tmp = b; b = c; c = tmp; udp = vdp; vdp = v->d; bdp = cdp; cdp = c->d; } for (i = 0; i < top; i++) { udp[i] ^= vdp[i]; bdp[i] ^= cdp[i]; } if (ubits == vbits) { BN_ULONG ul; int utop = (ubits - 1) / BN_BITS2; while ((ul = udp[utop]) == 0 && utop) utop--; ubits = utop * BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul); } } bn_correct_top(b); } # endif if (!BN_copy(r, b)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: # ifdef BN_DEBUG /* BN_CTX_end would complain about the * expanded form */ bn_correct_top(c); bn_correct_top(u); bn_correct_top(v); # endif BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Invert xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx. * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_inv implementation; this * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, * use the BN_GF2m_mod_inv function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *field; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(xx); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field)) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, xx, field, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } # ifndef OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV /* * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x * or y, x could equal y. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *xinv = NULL; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(y); bn_check_top(x); bn_check_top(p); BN_CTX_start(ctx); xinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (xinv == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_inv(xinv, x, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul(r, y, xinv, p, ctx)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } # else /* * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x * or y, x could equal y. Uses algorithm Modular_Division_GF(2^m) from * Chang-Shantz, S. "From Euclid's GCD to Montgomery Multiplication to the * Great Divide". */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(y); bn_check_top(x); bn_check_top(p); BN_CTX_start(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); u = BN_CTX_get(ctx); v = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (v == NULL) goto err; /* reduce x and y mod p */ if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(b, p)) goto err; while (!BN_is_odd(a)) { if (!BN_rshift1(a, a)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(u)) if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err; } do { if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) { if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u)) goto err; do { if (!BN_rshift1(b, b)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(v)) if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(v, v)) goto err; } while (!BN_is_odd(b)); } else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1)) break; else { if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v)) goto err; do { if (!BN_rshift1(a, a)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(u)) if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err; } while (!BN_is_odd(a)); } } while (1); if (!BN_copy(r, u)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } # endif /* * Divide yy by xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx * * or yy, xx could equal yy. This function calls down to the * BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for * convenience; for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_div function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *yy, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *field; int ret = 0; bn_check_top(yy); bn_check_top(xx); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field)) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_mod_div(r, yy, xx, field, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r * could be a. Uses simple square-and-multiply algorithm A.5.1 from IEEE * P1363. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0, i, n; BIGNUM *u; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); if (BN_is_zero(b)) return (BN_one(r)); if (BN_abs_is_word(b, 1)) return (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL); BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(u, a, p)) goto err; n = BN_num_bits(b) - 1; for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(u, u, p, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_bit_set(b, i)) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(u, u, a, p, ctx)) goto err; } } if (!BN_copy(r, u)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r * could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience; * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. * r could be a. Uses exponentiation as in algorithm A.4.1 from IEEE P1363. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *u; bn_check_top(a); if (!p[0]) { /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */ BN_zero(r); return 1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(u, p[0] - 1)) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, u, p, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. * r could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience; * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(r, a, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns * 0. Uses algorithms A.4.7 and A.4.6 from IEEE P1363. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a_, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0, count = 0, j; BIGNUM *a, *z, *rho, *w, *w2, *tmp; bn_check_top(a_); if (!p[0]) { /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */ BN_zero(r); return 1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); w = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (w == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(a, a_, p)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(a)) { BN_zero(r); ret = 1; goto err; } if (p[0] & 0x1) { /* m is odd */ /* compute half-trace of a */ if (!BN_copy(z, a)) goto err; for (j = 1; j <= (p[0] - 1) / 2; j++) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, a)) goto err; } } else { /* m is even */ rho = BN_CTX_get(ctx); w2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; do { if (!BN_rand(rho, p[0], BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(rho, rho, p)) goto err; BN_zero(z); if (!BN_copy(w, rho)) goto err; for (j = 1; j <= p[0] - 1; j++) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w2, w, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(tmp, w2, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, tmp)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, w2, rho)) goto err; } count++; } while (BN_is_zero(w) && (count < MAX_ITERATIONS)); if (BN_is_zero(w)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); goto err; } } if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w, z, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, z, w)) goto err; if (BN_GF2m_cmp(w, a)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_NO_SOLUTION); goto err; } if (!BN_copy(r, z)) goto err; bn_check_top(r); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /* * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns * 0. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience; * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr function. */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1; int *arr = NULL; bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(p); if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL) goto err; ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max); if (!ret || ret > max) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); goto err; } ret = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(r, a, arr, ctx); bn_check_top(r); err: OPENSSL_free(arr); return ret; } /* * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i * * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would * be filled if array was large enough. */ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) { int i, j, k = 0; BN_ULONG mask; if (BN_is_zero(a)) return 0; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { if (!a->d[i]) /* skip word if a->d[i] == 0 */ continue; mask = BN_TBIT; for (j = BN_BITS2 - 1; j >= 0; j--) { if (a->d[i] & mask) { if (k < max) p[k] = BN_BITS2 * i + j; k++; } mask >>= 1; } } if (k < max) { p[k] = -1; k++; } return k; } /* * Convert the coefficient array representation of a polynomial to a * bit-string. The array must be terminated by -1. */ int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a) { int i; bn_check_top(a); BN_zero(a); for (i = 0; p[i] != -1; i++) { if (BN_set_bit(a, p[i]) == 0) return 0; } bn_check_top(a); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_print.c0000644000000000000000000001740413176625656015766 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "bn_lcl.h" static const char Hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; /* Must 'OPENSSL_free' the returned data */ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a) { int i, j, v, z = 0; char *buf; char *p; if (BN_is_zero(a)) return OPENSSL_strdup("0"); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2); if (buf == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = buf; if (a->neg) *(p++) = '-'; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { for (j = BN_BITS2 - 8; j >= 0; j -= 8) { /* strip leading zeros */ v = ((int)(a->d[i] >> (long)j)) & 0xff; if (z || (v != 0)) { *(p++) = Hex[v >> 4]; *(p++) = Hex[v & 0x0f]; z = 1; } } } *p = '\0'; err: return (buf); } /* Must 'OPENSSL_free' the returned data */ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a) { int i = 0, num, ok = 0; char *buf = NULL; char *p; BIGNUM *t = NULL; BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp; int bn_data_num; /*- * get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer * num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2) * <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.101 + log(2) + 1 (rounding error) * <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) / 10 + 3 * BN_num_bits / 1000 + 1 + 1 */ i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3; num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1; bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1; bn_data = OPENSSL_malloc(bn_data_num * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3); if ((buf == NULL) || (bn_data == NULL)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((t = BN_dup(a)) == NULL) goto err; #define BUF_REMAIN (num+3 - (size_t)(p - buf)) p = buf; lp = bn_data; if (BN_is_zero(t)) { *(p++) = '0'; *(p++) = '\0'; } else { if (BN_is_negative(t)) *p++ = '-'; while (!BN_is_zero(t)) { if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num) goto err; *lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV); if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; lp++; } lp--; /* * We now have a series of blocks, BN_DEC_NUM chars in length, where * the last one needs truncation. The blocks need to be reversed in * order. */ BIO_snprintf(p, BUF_REMAIN, BN_DEC_FMT1, *lp); while (*p) p++; while (lp != bn_data) { lp--; BIO_snprintf(p, BUF_REMAIN, BN_DEC_FMT2, *lp); while (*p) p++; } } ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(bn_data); BN_free(t); if (ok) return buf; OPENSSL_free(buf); return NULL; } int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a) { BIGNUM *ret = NULL; BN_ULONG l = 0; int neg = 0, h, m, i, j, k, c; int num; if ((a == NULL) || (*a == '\0')) return (0); if (*a == '-') { neg = 1; a++; } for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) continue; if (i == 0 || i > INT_MAX/4) goto err; num = i + neg; if (bn == NULL) return (num); /* a is the start of the hex digits, and it is 'i' long */ if (*bn == NULL) { if ((ret = BN_new()) == NULL) return (0); } else { ret = *bn; BN_zero(ret); } /* i is the number of hex digits */ if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL) goto err; j = i; /* least significant 'hex' */ m = 0; h = 0; while (j > 0) { m = ((BN_BYTES * 2) <= j) ? (BN_BYTES * 2) : j; l = 0; for (;;) { c = a[j - m]; k = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(c); if (k < 0) k = 0; /* paranoia */ l = (l << 4) | k; if (--m <= 0) { ret->d[h++] = l; break; } } j -= (BN_BYTES * 2); } ret->top = h; bn_correct_top(ret); *bn = ret; bn_check_top(ret); /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */ if (ret->top != 0) ret->neg = neg; return (num); err: if (*bn == NULL) BN_free(ret); return (0); } int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a) { BIGNUM *ret = NULL; BN_ULONG l = 0; int neg = 0, i, j; int num; if ((a == NULL) || (*a == '\0')) return (0); if (*a == '-') { neg = 1; a++; } for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) continue; if (i == 0 || i > INT_MAX/4) goto err; num = i + neg; if (bn == NULL) return (num); /* * a is the start of the digits, and it is 'i' long. We chop it into * BN_DEC_NUM digits at a time */ if (*bn == NULL) { if ((ret = BN_new()) == NULL) return (0); } else { ret = *bn; BN_zero(ret); } /* i is the number of digits, a bit of an over expand */ if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL) goto err; j = BN_DEC_NUM - (i % BN_DEC_NUM); if (j == BN_DEC_NUM) j = 0; l = 0; while (--i >= 0) { l *= 10; l += *a - '0'; a++; if (++j == BN_DEC_NUM) { if (!BN_mul_word(ret, BN_DEC_CONV) || !BN_add_word(ret, l)) goto err; l = 0; j = 0; } } bn_correct_top(ret); *bn = ret; bn_check_top(ret); /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */ if (ret->top != 0) ret->neg = neg; return (num); err: if (*bn == NULL) BN_free(ret); return (0); } int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a) { const char *p = a; if (*p == '-') p++; if (p[0] == '0' && (p[1] == 'X' || p[1] == 'x')) { if (!BN_hex2bn(bn, p + 2)) return 0; } else { if (!BN_dec2bn(bn, p)) return 0; } /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */ if (*a == '-' && (*bn)->top != 0) (*bn)->neg = 1; return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) return (0); BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = BN_print(b, a); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } # endif int BN_print(BIO *bp, const BIGNUM *a) { int i, j, v, z = 0; int ret = 0; if ((a->neg) && (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) != 1)) goto end; if (BN_is_zero(a) && (BIO_write(bp, "0", 1) != 1)) goto end; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { for (j = BN_BITS2 - 4; j >= 0; j -= 4) { /* strip leading zeros */ v = ((int)(a->d[i] >> (long)j)) & 0x0f; if (z || (v != 0)) { if (BIO_write(bp, &(Hex[v]), 1) != 1) goto end; z = 1; } } } ret = 1; end: return (ret); } char *BN_options(void) { static int init = 0; static char data[16]; if (!init) { init++; #ifdef BN_LLONG BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof data, "bn(%d,%d)", (int)sizeof(BN_ULLONG) * 8, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8); #else BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof data, "bn(%d,%d)", (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8); #endif } return (data); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bn/bn_dh.c0000644000000000000000000002424413176625656015225 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "bn_lcl.h" #include "e_os.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #include "internal/bn_dh.h" /* DH parameters from RFC5114 */ # if BN_BITS2 == 64 static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_p[] = { 0xDF1FB2BC2E4A4371ULL, 0xE68CFDA76D4DA708ULL, 0x45BF37DF365C1A65ULL, 0xA151AF5F0DC8B4BDULL, 0xFAA31A4FF55BCCC0ULL, 0x4EFFD6FAE5644738ULL, 0x98488E9C219A7372ULL, 0xACCBDD7D90C4BD70ULL, 0x24975C3CD49B83BFULL, 0x13ECB4AEA9061123ULL, 0x9838EF1E2EE652C0ULL, 0x6073E28675A23D18ULL, 0x9A6A9DCA52D23B61ULL, 0x52C99FBCFB06A3C6ULL, 0xDE92DE5EAE5D54ECULL, 0xB10B8F96A080E01DULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_g[] = { 0x855E6EEB22B3B2E5ULL, 0x858F4DCEF97C2A24ULL, 0x2D779D5918D08BC8ULL, 0xD662A4D18E73AFA3ULL, 0x1DBF0A0169B6A28AULL, 0xA6A24C087A091F53ULL, 0x909D0D2263F80A76ULL, 0xD7FBD7D3B9A92EE1ULL, 0x5E91547F9E2749F4ULL, 0x160217B4B01B886AULL, 0x777E690F5504F213ULL, 0x266FEA1E5C41564BULL, 0xD6406CFF14266D31ULL, 0xF8104DD258AC507FULL, 0x6765A442EFB99905ULL, 0xA4D1CBD5C3FD3412ULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_q[] = { 0x64B7CB9D49462353ULL, 0x81A8DF278ABA4E7DULL, 0x00000000F518AA87ULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_p[] = { 0x0AC4DFFE0C10E64FULL, 0xCF9DE5384E71B81CULL, 0x7EF363E2FFA31F71ULL, 0xE3FB73C16B8E75B9ULL, 0xC9B53DCF4BA80A29ULL, 0x23F10B0E16E79763ULL, 0xC52172E413042E9BULL, 0xBE60E69CC928B2B9ULL, 0x80CD86A1B9E587E8ULL, 0x315D75E198C641A4ULL, 0xCDF93ACC44328387ULL, 0x15987D9ADC0A486DULL, 0x7310F7121FD5A074ULL, 0x278273C7DE31EFDCULL, 0x1602E714415D9330ULL, 0x81286130BC8985DBULL, 0xB3BF8A3170918836ULL, 0x6A00E0A0B9C49708ULL, 0xC6BA0B2C8BBC27BEULL, 0xC9F98D11ED34DBF6ULL, 0x7AD5B7D0B6C12207ULL, 0xD91E8FEF55B7394BULL, 0x9037C9EDEFDA4DF8ULL, 0x6D3F8152AD6AC212ULL, 0x1DE6B85A1274A0A6ULL, 0xEB3D688A309C180EULL, 0xAF9A3C407BA1DF15ULL, 0xE6FA141DF95A56DBULL, 0xB54B1597B61D0A75ULL, 0xA20D64E5683B9FD1ULL, 0xD660FAA79559C51FULL, 0xAD107E1E9123A9D0ULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_g[] = { 0x84B890D3191F2BFAULL, 0x81BC087F2A7065B3ULL, 0x19C418E1F6EC0179ULL, 0x7B5A0F1C71CFFF4CULL, 0xEDFE72FE9B6AA4BDULL, 0x81E1BCFE94B30269ULL, 0x566AFBB48D6C0191ULL, 0xB539CCE3409D13CDULL, 0x6AA21E7F5F2FF381ULL, 0xD9E263E4770589EFULL, 0x10E183EDD19963DDULL, 0xB70A8137150B8EEBULL, 0x051AE3D428C8F8ACULL, 0xBB77A86F0C1AB15BULL, 0x6E3025E316A330EFULL, 0x19529A45D6F83456ULL, 0xF180EB34118E98D1ULL, 0xB5F6C6B250717CBEULL, 0x09939D54DA7460CDULL, 0xE247150422EA1ED4ULL, 0xB8A762D0521BC98AULL, 0xF4D027275AC1348BULL, 0xC17669101999024AULL, 0xBE5E9001A8D66AD7ULL, 0xC57DB17C620A8652ULL, 0xAB739D7700C29F52ULL, 0xDD921F01A70C4AFAULL, 0xA6824A4E10B9A6F0ULL, 0x74866A08CFE4FFE3ULL, 0x6CDEBE7B89998CAFULL, 0x9DF30B5C8FFDAC50ULL, 0xAC4032EF4F2D9AE3ULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_q[] = { 0xBF389A99B36371EBULL, 0x1F80535A4738CEBCULL, 0xC58D93FE99717710ULL, 0x00000000801C0D34ULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_p[] = { 0xDB094AE91E1A1597ULL, 0x693877FAD7EF09CAULL, 0x6116D2276E11715FULL, 0xA4B54330C198AF12ULL, 0x75F26375D7014103ULL, 0xC3A3960A54E710C3ULL, 0xDED4010ABD0BE621ULL, 0xC0B857F689962856ULL, 0xB3CA3F7971506026ULL, 0x1CCACB83E6B486F6ULL, 0x67E144E514056425ULL, 0xF6A167B5A41825D9ULL, 0x3AD8347796524D8EULL, 0xF13C6D9A51BFA4ABULL, 0x2D52526735488A0EULL, 0xB63ACAE1CAA6B790ULL, 0x4FDB70C581B23F76ULL, 0xBC39A0BF12307F5CULL, 0xB941F54EB1E59BB8ULL, 0x6C5BFC11D45F9088ULL, 0x22E0B1EF4275BF7BULL, 0x91F9E6725B4758C0ULL, 0x5A8A9D306BCF67EDULL, 0x209E0C6497517ABDULL, 0x3BF4296D830E9A7CULL, 0x16C3D91134096FAAULL, 0xFAF7DF4561B2AA30ULL, 0xE00DF8F1D61957D4ULL, 0x5D2CEED4435E3B00ULL, 0x8CEEF608660DD0F2ULL, 0xFFBBD19C65195999ULL, 0x87A8E61DB4B6663CULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_g[] = { 0x664B4C0F6CC41659ULL, 0x5E2327CFEF98C582ULL, 0xD647D148D4795451ULL, 0x2F63078490F00EF8ULL, 0x184B523D1DB246C3ULL, 0xC7891428CDC67EB6ULL, 0x7FD028370DF92B52ULL, 0xB3353BBB64E0EC37ULL, 0xECD06E1557CD0915ULL, 0xB7D2BBD2DF016199ULL, 0xC8484B1E052588B9ULL, 0xDB2A3B7313D3FE14ULL, 0xD052B985D182EA0AULL, 0xA4BD1BFFE83B9C80ULL, 0xDFC967C1FB3F2E55ULL, 0xB5045AF2767164E1ULL, 0x1D14348F6F2F9193ULL, 0x64E67982428EBC83ULL, 0x8AC376D282D6ED38ULL, 0x777DE62AAAB8A862ULL, 0xDDF463E5E9EC144BULL, 0x0196F931C77A57F2ULL, 0xA55AE31341000A65ULL, 0x901228F8C28CBB18ULL, 0xBC3773BF7E8C6F62ULL, 0xBE3A6C1B0C6B47B1ULL, 0xFF4FED4AAC0BB555ULL, 0x10DBC15077BE463FULL, 0x07F4793A1A0BA125ULL, 0x4CA7B18F21EF2054ULL, 0x2E77506660EDBD48ULL, 0x3FB32C9B73134D0BULL }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_q[] = { 0xA308B0FE64F5FBD3ULL, 0x99B1A47D1EB3750BULL, 0xB447997640129DA2ULL, 0x8CF83642A709A097ULL }; # elif BN_BITS2 == 32 static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_p[] = { 0x2E4A4371, 0xDF1FB2BC, 0x6D4DA708, 0xE68CFDA7, 0x365C1A65, 0x45BF37DF, 0x0DC8B4BD, 0xA151AF5F, 0xF55BCCC0, 0xFAA31A4F, 0xE5644738, 0x4EFFD6FA, 0x219A7372, 0x98488E9C, 0x90C4BD70, 0xACCBDD7D, 0xD49B83BF, 0x24975C3C, 0xA9061123, 0x13ECB4AE, 0x2EE652C0, 0x9838EF1E, 0x75A23D18, 0x6073E286, 0x52D23B61, 0x9A6A9DCA, 0xFB06A3C6, 0x52C99FBC, 0xAE5D54EC, 0xDE92DE5E, 0xA080E01D, 0xB10B8F96 }; static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_g[] = { 0x22B3B2E5, 0x855E6EEB, 0xF97C2A24, 0x858F4DCE, 0x18D08BC8, 0x2D779D59, 0x8E73AFA3, 0xD662A4D1, 0x69B6A28A, 0x1DBF0A01, 0x7A091F53, 0xA6A24C08, 0x63F80A76, 0x909D0D22, 0xB9A92EE1, 0xD7FBD7D3, 0x9E2749F4, 0x5E91547F, 0xB01B886A, 0x160217B4, 0x5504F213, 0x777E690F, 0x5C41564B, 0x266FEA1E, 0x14266D31, 0xD6406CFF, 0x58AC507F, 0xF8104DD2, 0xEFB99905, 0x6765A442, 0xC3FD3412, 0xA4D1CBD5 }; static const BN_ULONG dh1024_160_q[] = { 0x49462353, 0x64B7CB9D, 0x8ABA4E7D, 0x81A8DF27, 0xF518AA87 }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_p[] = { 0x0C10E64F, 0x0AC4DFFE, 0x4E71B81C, 0xCF9DE538, 0xFFA31F71, 0x7EF363E2, 0x6B8E75B9, 0xE3FB73C1, 0x4BA80A29, 0xC9B53DCF, 0x16E79763, 0x23F10B0E, 0x13042E9B, 0xC52172E4, 0xC928B2B9, 0xBE60E69C, 0xB9E587E8, 0x80CD86A1, 0x98C641A4, 0x315D75E1, 0x44328387, 0xCDF93ACC, 0xDC0A486D, 0x15987D9A, 0x1FD5A074, 0x7310F712, 0xDE31EFDC, 0x278273C7, 0x415D9330, 0x1602E714, 0xBC8985DB, 0x81286130, 0x70918836, 0xB3BF8A31, 0xB9C49708, 0x6A00E0A0, 0x8BBC27BE, 0xC6BA0B2C, 0xED34DBF6, 0xC9F98D11, 0xB6C12207, 0x7AD5B7D0, 0x55B7394B, 0xD91E8FEF, 0xEFDA4DF8, 0x9037C9ED, 0xAD6AC212, 0x6D3F8152, 0x1274A0A6, 0x1DE6B85A, 0x309C180E, 0xEB3D688A, 0x7BA1DF15, 0xAF9A3C40, 0xF95A56DB, 0xE6FA141D, 0xB61D0A75, 0xB54B1597, 0x683B9FD1, 0xA20D64E5, 0x9559C51F, 0xD660FAA7, 0x9123A9D0, 0xAD107E1E }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_g[] = { 0x191F2BFA, 0x84B890D3, 0x2A7065B3, 0x81BC087F, 0xF6EC0179, 0x19C418E1, 0x71CFFF4C, 0x7B5A0F1C, 0x9B6AA4BD, 0xEDFE72FE, 0x94B30269, 0x81E1BCFE, 0x8D6C0191, 0x566AFBB4, 0x409D13CD, 0xB539CCE3, 0x5F2FF381, 0x6AA21E7F, 0x770589EF, 0xD9E263E4, 0xD19963DD, 0x10E183ED, 0x150B8EEB, 0xB70A8137, 0x28C8F8AC, 0x051AE3D4, 0x0C1AB15B, 0xBB77A86F, 0x16A330EF, 0x6E3025E3, 0xD6F83456, 0x19529A45, 0x118E98D1, 0xF180EB34, 0x50717CBE, 0xB5F6C6B2, 0xDA7460CD, 0x09939D54, 0x22EA1ED4, 0xE2471504, 0x521BC98A, 0xB8A762D0, 0x5AC1348B, 0xF4D02727, 0x1999024A, 0xC1766910, 0xA8D66AD7, 0xBE5E9001, 0x620A8652, 0xC57DB17C, 0x00C29F52, 0xAB739D77, 0xA70C4AFA, 0xDD921F01, 0x10B9A6F0, 0xA6824A4E, 0xCFE4FFE3, 0x74866A08, 0x89998CAF, 0x6CDEBE7B, 0x8FFDAC50, 0x9DF30B5C, 0x4F2D9AE3, 0xAC4032EF }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_224_q[] = { 0xB36371EB, 0xBF389A99, 0x4738CEBC, 0x1F80535A, 0x99717710, 0xC58D93FE, 0x801C0D34 }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_p[] = { 0x1E1A1597, 0xDB094AE9, 0xD7EF09CA, 0x693877FA, 0x6E11715F, 0x6116D227, 0xC198AF12, 0xA4B54330, 0xD7014103, 0x75F26375, 0x54E710C3, 0xC3A3960A, 0xBD0BE621, 0xDED4010A, 0x89962856, 0xC0B857F6, 0x71506026, 0xB3CA3F79, 0xE6B486F6, 0x1CCACB83, 0x14056425, 0x67E144E5, 0xA41825D9, 0xF6A167B5, 0x96524D8E, 0x3AD83477, 0x51BFA4AB, 0xF13C6D9A, 0x35488A0E, 0x2D525267, 0xCAA6B790, 0xB63ACAE1, 0x81B23F76, 0x4FDB70C5, 0x12307F5C, 0xBC39A0BF, 0xB1E59BB8, 0xB941F54E, 0xD45F9088, 0x6C5BFC11, 0x4275BF7B, 0x22E0B1EF, 0x5B4758C0, 0x91F9E672, 0x6BCF67ED, 0x5A8A9D30, 0x97517ABD, 0x209E0C64, 0x830E9A7C, 0x3BF4296D, 0x34096FAA, 0x16C3D911, 0x61B2AA30, 0xFAF7DF45, 0xD61957D4, 0xE00DF8F1, 0x435E3B00, 0x5D2CEED4, 0x660DD0F2, 0x8CEEF608, 0x65195999, 0xFFBBD19C, 0xB4B6663C, 0x87A8E61D }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_g[] = { 0x6CC41659, 0x664B4C0F, 0xEF98C582, 0x5E2327CF, 0xD4795451, 0xD647D148, 0x90F00EF8, 0x2F630784, 0x1DB246C3, 0x184B523D, 0xCDC67EB6, 0xC7891428, 0x0DF92B52, 0x7FD02837, 0x64E0EC37, 0xB3353BBB, 0x57CD0915, 0xECD06E15, 0xDF016199, 0xB7D2BBD2, 0x052588B9, 0xC8484B1E, 0x13D3FE14, 0xDB2A3B73, 0xD182EA0A, 0xD052B985, 0xE83B9C80, 0xA4BD1BFF, 0xFB3F2E55, 0xDFC967C1, 0x767164E1, 0xB5045AF2, 0x6F2F9193, 0x1D14348F, 0x428EBC83, 0x64E67982, 0x82D6ED38, 0x8AC376D2, 0xAAB8A862, 0x777DE62A, 0xE9EC144B, 0xDDF463E5, 0xC77A57F2, 0x0196F931, 0x41000A65, 0xA55AE313, 0xC28CBB18, 0x901228F8, 0x7E8C6F62, 0xBC3773BF, 0x0C6B47B1, 0xBE3A6C1B, 0xAC0BB555, 0xFF4FED4A, 0x77BE463F, 0x10DBC150, 0x1A0BA125, 0x07F4793A, 0x21EF2054, 0x4CA7B18F, 0x60EDBD48, 0x2E775066, 0x73134D0B, 0x3FB32C9B }; static const BN_ULONG dh2048_256_q[] = { 0x64F5FBD3, 0xA308B0FE, 0x1EB3750B, 0x99B1A47D, 0x40129DA2, 0xB4479976, 0xA709A097, 0x8CF83642 }; # else # error "unsupported BN_BITS2" # endif /* Macro to make a BIGNUM from static data */ # define make_dh_bn(x) extern const BIGNUM _bignum_##x; \ const BIGNUM _bignum_##x = { (BN_ULONG *) x, \ OSSL_NELEM(x),\ OSSL_NELEM(x),\ 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA }; make_dh_bn(dh1024_160_p) make_dh_bn(dh1024_160_g) make_dh_bn(dh1024_160_q) make_dh_bn(dh2048_224_p) make_dh_bn(dh2048_224_g) make_dh_bn(dh2048_224_q) make_dh_bn(dh2048_256_p) make_dh_bn(dh2048_256_g) make_dh_bn(dh2048_256_q) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sparccpuid.S0000644000000000000000000003010013176625660015650 0ustar rootroot! Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. ! ! Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use ! this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy ! in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at ! https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER #include #endif #if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9) # define ABI64 /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */ #elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__) # define ABI64 /* They've said -m64 at command line */ #endif #ifdef ABI64 .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch # define FRAME -192 # define BIAS 2047 #else # define FRAME -96 # define BIAS 0 #endif .text .align 32 .global OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .type OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,#function ! Keep in mind that this does not excuse us from wiping the stack! ! This routine wipes registers, but not the backing store [which ! resides on the stack, toward lower addresses]. To facilitate for ! stack wiping I return pointer to the top of stack of the *caller*. OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: save %sp,FRAME,%sp nop #ifdef __sun #include ta ST_CLEAN_WINDOWS #else call .walk.reg.wins #endif nop call .PIC.zero.up mov .zero-(.-4),%o0 ld [%o0],%f0 ld [%o0],%f1 subcc %g0,1,%o0 ! Following is V9 "rd %ccr,%o0" instruction. However! V8 ! specification says that it ("rd %asr2,%o0" in V8 terms) does ! not cause illegal_instruction trap. It therefore can be used ! to determine if the CPU the code is executing on is V8- or ! V9-compliant, as V9 returns a distinct value of 0x99, ! "negative" and "borrow" bits set in both %icc and %xcc. .word 0x91408000 !rd %ccr,%o0 cmp %o0,0x99 bne .v8 nop ! Even though we do not use %fp register bank, ! we wipe it as memcpy might have used it... .word 0xbfa00040 !fmovd %f0,%f62 .word 0xbba00040 !... .word 0xb7a00040 .word 0xb3a00040 .word 0xafa00040 .word 0xaba00040 .word 0xa7a00040 .word 0xa3a00040 .word 0x9fa00040 .word 0x9ba00040 .word 0x97a00040 .word 0x93a00040 .word 0x8fa00040 .word 0x8ba00040 .word 0x87a00040 .word 0x83a00040 !fmovd %f0,%f32 .v8: fmovs %f1,%f31 clr %o0 fmovs %f0,%f30 clr %o1 fmovs %f1,%f29 clr %o2 fmovs %f0,%f28 clr %o3 fmovs %f1,%f27 clr %o4 fmovs %f0,%f26 clr %o5 fmovs %f1,%f25 clr %o7 fmovs %f0,%f24 clr %l0 fmovs %f1,%f23 clr %l1 fmovs %f0,%f22 clr %l2 fmovs %f1,%f21 clr %l3 fmovs %f0,%f20 clr %l4 fmovs %f1,%f19 clr %l5 fmovs %f0,%f18 clr %l6 fmovs %f1,%f17 clr %l7 fmovs %f0,%f16 clr %i0 fmovs %f1,%f15 clr %i1 fmovs %f0,%f14 clr %i2 fmovs %f1,%f13 clr %i3 fmovs %f0,%f12 clr %i4 fmovs %f1,%f11 clr %i5 fmovs %f0,%f10 clr %g1 fmovs %f1,%f9 clr %g2 fmovs %f0,%f8 clr %g3 fmovs %f1,%f7 clr %g4 fmovs %f0,%f6 clr %g5 fmovs %f1,%f5 fmovs %f0,%f4 fmovs %f1,%f3 fmovs %f0,%f2 add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller´s top of stack ret restore .zero: .long 0x0,0x0 .PIC.zero.up: retl add %o0,%o7,%o0 #ifdef DEBUG .global walk_reg_wins .type walk_reg_wins,#function walk_reg_wins: #endif .walk.reg.wins: save %sp,FRAME,%sp cmp %i7,%o7 be 2f clr %o0 cmp %o7,0 ! compiler never cleans %o7... be 1f ! could have been a leaf function... clr %o1 call .walk.reg.wins nop 1: clr %o2 clr %o3 clr %o4 clr %o5 clr %o7 clr %l0 clr %l1 clr %l2 clr %l3 clr %l4 clr %l5 clr %l6 clr %l7 add %o0,1,%i0 ! used for debugging 2: ret restore .size OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .global OPENSSL_atomic_add .type OPENSSL_atomic_add,#function .align 32 OPENSSL_atomic_add: #ifndef ABI64 subcc %g0,1,%o2 .word 0x95408000 !rd %ccr,%o2, see comment above cmp %o2,0x99 be .v9 nop save %sp,FRAME,%sp ba .enter nop #ifdef __sun ! Note that you do not have to link with libthread to call thr_yield, ! as libc provides a stub, which is overloaded the moment you link ! with *either* libpthread or libthread... #define YIELD_CPU thr_yield #else ! applies at least to Linux and FreeBSD... Feedback expected... #define YIELD_CPU sched_yield #endif .spin: call YIELD_CPU nop .enter: ld [%i0],%i2 cmp %i2,-4096 be .spin mov -1,%i2 swap [%i0],%i2 cmp %i2,-1 be .spin add %i2,%i1,%i2 stbar st %i2,[%i0] sra %i2,%g0,%i0 ret restore .v9: #endif ld [%o0],%o2 1: add %o1,%o2,%o3 .word 0xd7e2100a !cas [%o0],%o2,%o3, compare [%o0] with %o2 and swap %o3 cmp %o2,%o3 bne 1b mov %o3,%o2 ! cas is always fetching to dest. register add %o1,%o2,%o0 ! OpenSSL expects the new value retl sra %o0,%g0,%o0 ! we return signed int, remember? .size OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add .global _sparcv9_rdtick .align 32 _sparcv9_rdtick: subcc %g0,1,%o0 .word 0x91408000 !rd %ccr,%o0 cmp %o0,0x99 bne .notick xor %o0,%o0,%o0 .word 0x91410000 !rd %tick,%o0 retl .word 0x93323020 !srlx %o0,32,%o1 .notick: retl xor %o1,%o1,%o1 .type _sparcv9_rdtick,#function .size _sparcv9_rdtick,.-_sparcv9_rdtick .global _sparcv9_vis1_probe .align 8 _sparcv9_vis1_probe: add %sp,BIAS+2,%o1 .word 0xc19a5a40 !ldda [%o1]ASI_FP16_P,%f0 retl .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0 .type _sparcv9_vis1_probe,#function .size _sparcv9_vis1_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis1_probe ! Probe and instrument VIS1 instruction. Output is number of cycles it ! takes to execute rdtick and pair of VIS1 instructions. US-Tx VIS unit ! is slow (documented to be 6 cycles on T2) and the core is in-order ! single-issue, it should be possible to distinguish Tx reliably... ! Observed return values are: ! ! UltraSPARC IIe 7 ! UltraSPARC III 7 ! UltraSPARC T1 24 ! SPARC T4 65(*) ! ! (*) result has lesser to do with VIS instruction latencies, rdtick ! appears that slow, but it does the trick in sense that FP and ! VIS code paths are still slower than integer-only ones. ! ! Numbers for T2 and SPARC64 V-VII are more than welcomed. ! ! It would be possible to detect specifically US-T1 by instrumenting ! fmul8ulx16, which is emulated on T1 and as such accounts for quite ! a lot of %tick-s, couple of thousand on Linux... .global _sparcv9_vis1_instrument .align 8 _sparcv9_vis1_instrument: .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0 .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2 .word 0x91410000 !rd %tick,%o0 .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0 .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2 .word 0x93410000 !rd %tick,%o1 .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0 .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2 .word 0x95410000 !rd %tick,%o2 .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0 .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2 .word 0x97410000 !rd %tick,%o3 .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0 .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2 .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4 ! calculate intervals sub %o1,%o0,%o0 sub %o2,%o1,%o1 sub %o3,%o2,%o2 sub %o4,%o3,%o3 ! find minimum value cmp %o0,%o1 .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8 mov %o1,%o0 cmp %o0,%o2 .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8 mov %o2,%o0 cmp %o0,%o3 .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8 mov %o3,%o0 retl nop .type _sparcv9_vis1_instrument,#function .size _sparcv9_vis1_instrument,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument .global _sparcv9_vis2_probe .align 8 _sparcv9_vis2_probe: retl .word 0x81b00980 !bshuffle %f0,%f0,%f0 .type _sparcv9_vis2_probe,#function .size _sparcv9_vis2_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis2_probe .global _sparcv9_fmadd_probe .align 8 _sparcv9_fmadd_probe: .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0 .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2 retl .word 0x81b80440 !fmaddd %f0,%f0,%f2,%f0 .type _sparcv9_fmadd_probe,#function .size _sparcv9_fmadd_probe,.-_sparcv9_fmadd_probe .global _sparcv9_rdcfr .align 8 _sparcv9_rdcfr: retl .word 0x91468000 !rd %asr26,%o0 .type _sparcv9_rdcfr,#function .size _sparcv9_rdcfr,.-_sparcv9_rdcfr .global _sparcv9_vis3_probe .align 8 _sparcv9_vis3_probe: retl .word 0x81b022a0 !xmulx %g0,%g0,%g0 .type _sparcv9_vis3_probe,#function .size _sparcv9_vis3_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis3_probe .global _sparcv9_random .align 8 _sparcv9_random: retl .word 0x91b002a0 !random %o0 .type _sparcv9_random,#function .size _sparcv9_random,.-_sparcv9_vis3_probe .global _sparcv9_fjaesx_probe .align 8 _sparcv9_fjaesx_probe: .word 0x81b09206 !faesencx %f2,%f6,%f0 retl nop .size _sparcv9_fjaesx_probe,.-_sparcv9_fjaesx_probe .global OPENSSL_cleanse .align 32 OPENSSL_cleanse: cmp %o1,14 nop #ifdef ABI64 bgu %xcc,.Lot #else bgu .Lot #endif cmp %o1,0 bne .Little nop retl nop .Little: stb %g0,[%o0] subcc %o1,1,%o1 bnz .Little add %o0,1,%o0 retl nop .align 32 .Lot: #ifndef ABI64 subcc %g0,1,%g1 ! see above for explanation .word 0x83408000 !rd %ccr,%g1 cmp %g1,0x99 bne .v8lot nop #endif .v9lot: andcc %o0,7,%g0 bz .v9aligned nop stb %g0,[%o0] sub %o1,1,%o1 ba .v9lot add %o0,1,%o0 .align 16,0x01000000 .v9aligned: .word 0xc0720000 !stx %g0,[%o0] sub %o1,8,%o1 andcc %o1,-8,%g0 #ifdef ABI64 .word 0x126ffffd !bnz %xcc,.v9aligned #else .word 0x124ffffd !bnz %icc,.v9aligned #endif add %o0,8,%o0 cmp %o1,0 bne .Little nop retl nop #ifndef ABI64 .v8lot: andcc %o0,3,%g0 bz .v8aligned nop stb %g0,[%o0] sub %o1,1,%o1 ba .v8lot add %o0,1,%o0 nop .v8aligned: st %g0,[%o0] sub %o1,4,%o1 andcc %o1,-4,%g0 bnz .v8aligned add %o0,4,%o0 cmp %o1,0 bne .Little nop retl nop #endif .type OPENSSL_cleanse,#function .size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse .global CRYPTO_memcmp .align 16 CRYPTO_memcmp: cmp %o2,0 #ifdef ABI64 beq,pn %xcc,.Lno_data #else beq .Lno_data #endif xor %g1,%g1,%g1 nop .Loop_cmp: ldub [%o0],%o3 add %o0,1,%o0 ldub [%o1],%o4 add %o1,1,%o1 subcc %o2,1,%o2 xor %o3,%o4,%o4 #ifdef ABI64 bnz %xcc,.Loop_cmp #else bnz .Loop_cmp #endif or %o4,%g1,%g1 sub %g0,%g1,%g1 srl %g1,31,%g1 .Lno_data: retl mov %g1,%o0 .type CRYPTO_memcmp,#function .size CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp .global _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus .align 8 _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus: mov %o1,%o3 ! save cnt .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4 ! tick mov %o4,%o5 ! lasttick = tick set 0,%g4 ! diff andn %o0,63,%g1 .word 0xc1985e00 !ldda [%g1]0xf0,%f0 ! block load .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync .word 0xc1b85c00 !stda %f0,[%g1]0xe0 ! block store and commit .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync ld [%o0],%o4 add %o4,%g4,%g4 .word 0xc9e2100c !cas [%o0],%o4,%g4 .Loop: .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4 sub %o4,%o5,%g4 ! diff=tick-lasttick mov %o4,%o5 ! lasttick=tick andn %o0,63,%g1 .word 0xc1985e00 !ldda [%g1]0xf0,%f0 ! block load .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync .word 0xc1b85c00 !stda %f0,[%g1]0xe0 ! block store and commit .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync ld [%o0],%o4 add %o4,%g4,%g4 .word 0xc9e2100c !cas [%o0],%o4,%g4 subcc %o1,1,%o1 ! --$cnt bnz .Loop add %o0,4,%o0 ! ++$out retl mov %o3,%o0 .type _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus,#function .size _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus .global _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2 .align 8 _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2: mov %o1,%o3 ! save cnt sll %o1,2,%o1 ! cnt*=4 .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4 ! tick mov %o4,%o5 ! lasttick = tick set 0,%g4 ! diff andn %o0,63,%g1 .word 0xc1985e00 !ldda [%g1]0xf0,%f0 ! block load .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync .word 0xc1b85c00 !stda %f0,[%g1]0xe0 ! block store and commit .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync ld [%o0],%o4 add %o4,%g4,%g4 .word 0xc9e2100c !cas [%o0],%o4,%g4 .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4 ! tick sub %o4,%o5,%g4 ! diff=tick-lasttick mov %o4,%o5 ! lasttick=tick mov %g4,%g5 ! lastdiff=diff .Loop2: andn %o0,63,%g1 .word 0xc1985e00 !ldda [%g1]0xf0,%f0 ! block load .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync .word 0xc1b85c00 !stda %f0,[%g1]0xe0 ! block store and commit .word 0x8143e040 !membar #Sync ld [%o0],%o4 add %o4,%g4,%g4 .word 0xc9e2100c !cas [%o0],%o4,%g4 subcc %o2,1,%o2 ! --max bz .Ldone2 nop .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4 ! tick sub %o4,%o5,%g4 ! diff=tick-lasttick mov %o4,%o5 ! lasttick=tick cmp %g4,%g5 mov %g4,%g5 ! lastdiff=diff .word 0x83408000 !rd %ccr,%g1 and %g1,4,%g1 ! isolate zero flag xor %g1,4,%g1 ! flip zero flag subcc %o1,%g1,%o1 ! conditional --$cnt bnz .Loop2 add %o0,%g1,%o0 ! conditional ++$out .Ldone2: srl %o1,2,%o1 retl sub %o3,%o1,%o0 .type _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2,#function .size _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2 .section ".init",#alloc,#execinstr call OPENSSL_cpuid_setup nop openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cpt_err.c0000644000000000000000000000363413176625656015212 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_dup_ex_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_free_ex_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX), "CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_MEMDUP), "CRYPTO_memdup"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_new_ex_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_set_ex_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_FIPS_MODE_SET), "FIPS_mode_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK), "get_and_lock"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_BUF2HEXSTR), "OPENSSL_buf2hexstr"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF), "OPENSSL_hexstr2buf"}, {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO), "OPENSSL_init_crypto"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED), "fips mode not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT), "illegal hex digit"}, {ERR_REASON(CRYPTO_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS), "odd number of digits"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(CRYPTO_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, CRYPTO_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, CRYPTO_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cryptlib.c0000644000000000000000000002516313176625657015406 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include "internal/cryptlib_int.h" #include #if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[4]; # if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) #include # define OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP typedef uint64_t IA32CAP; void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { static int trigger = 0; IA32CAP OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(unsigned int *); IA32CAP vec; char *env; if (trigger) return; trigger = 1; if ((env = getenv("OPENSSL_ia32cap"))) { int off = (env[0] == '~') ? 1 : 0; # if defined(_WIN32) if (!sscanf(env + off, "%I64i", &vec)) vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0); # else if (!sscanf(env + off, "%lli", (long long *)&vec)) vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0); # endif if (off) { IA32CAP mask = vec; vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P) & ~mask; if (mask & (1<<24)) { /* * User disables FXSR bit, mask even other capabilities * that operate exclusively on XMM, so we don't have to * double-check all the time. We mask PCLMULQDQ, AMD XOP, * AES-NI and AVX. Formally speaking we don't have to * do it in x86_64 case, but we can safely assume that * x86_64 users won't actually flip this flag. */ vec &= ~((IA32CAP)(1<<1|1<<11|1<<25|1<<28) << 32); } } else if (env[0] == ':') { vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P); } if ((env = strchr(env, ':'))) { unsigned int vecx; env++; off = (env[0] == '~') ? 1 : 0; vecx = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0); if (off) OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] &= ~vecx; else OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] = vecx; } else { OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] = 0; } } else { vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P); } /* * |(1<<10) sets a reserved bit to signal that variable * was initialized already... This is to avoid interference * with cpuid snippets in ELF .init segment. */ OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] = (unsigned int)vec | (1 << 10); OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] = (unsigned int)(vec >> 32); } # else unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[4]; # endif #endif int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 0; #if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP) && !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { } #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) # include # include # ifdef __WATCOMC__ # if defined(_UNICODE) || defined(__UNICODE__) # define _vsntprintf _vsnwprintf # else # define _vsntprintf _vsnprintf # endif # endif # ifdef _MSC_VER # define alloca _alloca # endif # if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333 int OPENSSL_isservice(void) { HWINSTA h; DWORD len; WCHAR *name; static union { void *p; FARPROC f; } _OPENSSL_isservice = { NULL }; if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL) { HANDLE mod = GetModuleHandle(NULL); if (mod != NULL) _OPENSSL_isservice.f = GetProcAddress(mod, "_OPENSSL_isservice"); if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL) _OPENSSL_isservice.p = (void *)-1; } if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1) return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) (); h = GetProcessWindowStation(); if (h == NULL) return -1; if (GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, NULL, 0, &len) || GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) return -1; if (len > 512) return -1; /* paranoia */ len++, len &= ~1; /* paranoia */ name = (WCHAR *)alloca(len + sizeof(WCHAR)); if (!GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, name, len, &len)) return -1; len++, len &= ~1; /* paranoia */ name[len / sizeof(WCHAR)] = L'\0'; /* paranoia */ # if 1 /* * This doesn't cover "interactive" services [working with real * WinSta0's] nor programs started non-interactively by Task Scheduler * [those are working with SAWinSta]. */ if (wcsstr(name, L"Service-0x")) return 1; # else /* This covers all non-interactive programs such as services. */ if (!wcsstr(name, L"WinSta0")) return 1; # endif else return 0; } # else int OPENSSL_isservice(void) { return 0; } # endif void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...) { va_list ap; TCHAR buf[256]; const TCHAR *fmt; # ifdef STD_ERROR_HANDLE /* what a dirty trick! */ HANDLE h; if ((h = GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE)) != NULL && GetFileType(h) != FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { /* must be console application */ int len; DWORD out; va_start(ap, fmta); len = _vsnprintf((char *)buf, sizeof(buf), fmta, ap); WriteFile(h, buf, len < 0 ? sizeof(buf) : (DWORD) len, &out, NULL); va_end(ap); return; } # endif if (sizeof(TCHAR) == sizeof(char)) fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmta; else do { int keepgoing; size_t len_0 = strlen(fmta) + 1, i; WCHAR *fmtw; fmtw = (WCHAR *)alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR)); if (fmtw == NULL) { fmt = (const TCHAR *)L"no stack?"; break; } if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, fmta, len_0, fmtw, len_0)) for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) fmtw[i] = (WCHAR)fmta[i]; for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) { if (fmtw[i] == L'%') do { keepgoing = 0; switch (fmtw[i + 1]) { case L'0': case L'1': case L'2': case L'3': case L'4': case L'5': case L'6': case L'7': case L'8': case L'9': case L'.': case L'*': case L'-': i++; keepgoing = 1; break; case L's': fmtw[i + 1] = L'S'; break; case L'S': fmtw[i + 1] = L's'; break; case L'c': fmtw[i + 1] = L'C'; break; case L'C': fmtw[i + 1] = L'c'; break; } } while (keepgoing); } fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmtw; } while (0); va_start(ap, fmta); _vsntprintf(buf, OSSL_NELEM(buf) - 1, fmt, ap); buf[OSSL_NELEM(buf) - 1] = _T('\0'); va_end(ap); # if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333 /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) { HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL")); if (hEventLog != NULL) { const TCHAR *pmsg = buf; if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL, 1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) { #if defined(DEBUG) /* * We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical * error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort, * in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other * tool like DebugView which can monitor the output. */ OutputDebugString(pmsg); #endif } (void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog); } } else # endif MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR); } #else void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmta); vfprintf(stderr, fmta, ap); va_end(ap); #endif } int OPENSSL_isservice(void) { return 0; } #endif void OPENSSL_die(const char *message, const char *file, int line) { OPENSSL_showfatal("%s:%d: OpenSSL internal error: %s\n", file, line, message); #if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__) abort(); #else /* * Win32 abort() customarily shows a dialog, but we just did that... */ # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) raise(SIGABRT); # endif _exit(3); #endif } #if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) /* volatile unsigned char* pointers are there because * 1. Accessing a variable declared volatile via a pointer * that lacks a volatile qualifier causes undefined behavior. * 2. When the variable itself is not volatile the compiler is * not required to keep all those reads and can convert * this into canonical memcmp() which doesn't read the whole block. * Pointers to volatile resolve the first problem fully. The second * problem cannot be resolved in any Standard-compliant way but this * works the problem around. Compilers typically react to * pointers to volatile by preserving the reads and writes through them. * The latter is not required by the Standard if the memory pointed to * is not volatile. * Pointers themselves are volatile in the function signature to work * around a subtle bug in gcc 4.6+ which causes writes through * pointers to volatile to not be emitted in some rare, * never needed in real life, pieces of code. */ int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void * volatile in_a, const volatile void * volatile in_b, size_t len) { size_t i; const volatile unsigned char *a = in_a; const volatile unsigned char *b = in_b; unsigned char x = 0; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) x |= a[i] ^ b[i]; return x; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014156 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/cbc_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000064713176625657015705 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV #include "ncbc_enc.c" /* des_cbc_encrypt */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/cfb64enc.c0000644000000000000000000000405413176625657015717 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc) { register DES_LONG v0, v1; register long l = length; register int n = *num; DES_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv, c, cc; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; if (enc) { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; c2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt1(ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); iv = &(*ivec)[0]; v0 = ti[0]; l2c(v0, iv); v0 = ti[1]; l2c(v0, iv); iv = &(*ivec)[0]; } c = *(in++) ^ iv[n]; *(out++) = c; iv[n] = c; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } else { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; c2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt1(ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); iv = &(*ivec)[0]; v0 = ti[0]; l2c(v0, iv); v0 = ti[1]; l2c(v0, iv); iv = &(*ivec)[0]; } cc = *(in++); c = iv[n]; iv[n] = cc; *(out++) = c ^ cc; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = c = cc = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/xcbc_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000567613176625657016104 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" /* RSA's DESX */ void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, const_DES_cblock *inw, const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc) { register DES_LONG tin0, tin1; register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register DES_LONG inW0, inW1, outW0, outW1; register const unsigned char *in2; register long l = length; DES_LONG tin[2]; unsigned char *iv; in2 = &(*inw)[0]; c2l(in2, inW0); c2l(in2, inW1); in2 = &(*outw)[0]; c2l(in2, outW0); c2l(in2, outW1); iv = &(*ivec)[0]; if (enc) { c2l(iv, tout0); c2l(iv, tout1); for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0 ^ inW0; tin[0] = tin0; tin1 ^= tout1 ^ inW1; tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); tout0 = tin[0] ^ outW0; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1] ^ outW1; l2c(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0 ^ inW0; tin[0] = tin0; tin1 ^= tout1 ^ inW1; tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); tout0 = tin[0] ^ outW0; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1] ^ outW1; l2c(tout1, out); } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(tout0, iv); l2c(tout1, iv); } else { c2l(iv, xor0); c2l(iv, xor1); for (l -= 8; l > 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0 ^ outW0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1 ^ outW1; DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0 ^ inW0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1 ^ inW1; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0 ^ outW0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1 ^ outW1; DES_encrypt1(tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0 ^ inW0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1 ^ inW1; l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(xor0, iv); l2c(xor1, iv); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; inW0 = inW1 = outW0 = outW1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/ecb3_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000163313176625657015766 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc) { register DES_LONG l0, l1; DES_LONG ll[2]; const unsigned char *in = &(*input)[0]; unsigned char *out = &(*output)[0]; c2l(in, l0); c2l(in, l1); ll[0] = l0; ll[1] = l1; if (enc) DES_encrypt3(ll, ks1, ks2, ks3); else DES_decrypt3(ll, ks1, ks2, ks3); l0 = ll[0]; l1 = ll[1]; l2c(l0, out); l2c(l1, out); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/ofb_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000461713176625657015725 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" /* * The input and output are loaded in multiples of 8 bits. What this means is * that if you have numbits=12 and length=2 the first 12 bits will be * retrieved from the first byte and half the second. The second 12 bits * will come from the 3rd and half the 4th byte. */ void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec) { register DES_LONG d0, d1, vv0, vv1, v0, v1, n = (numbits + 7) / 8; register DES_LONG mask0, mask1; register long l = length; register int num = numbits; DES_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; if (num > 64) return; if (num > 32) { mask0 = 0xffffffffL; if (num >= 64) mask1 = mask0; else mask1 = (1L << (num - 32)) - 1; } else { if (num == 32) mask0 = 0xffffffffL; else mask0 = (1L << num) - 1; mask1 = 0x00000000L; } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; while (l-- > 0) { ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); vv0 = ti[0]; vv1 = ti[1]; c2ln(in, d0, d1, n); in += n; d0 = (d0 ^ vv0) & mask0; d1 = (d1 ^ vv1) & mask1; l2cn(d0, d1, out, n); out += n; if (num == 32) { v0 = v1; v1 = vv0; } else if (num == 64) { v0 = vv0; v1 = vv1; } else if (num > 32) { /* && num != 64 */ v0 = ((v1 >> (num - 32)) | (vv0 << (64 - num))) & 0xffffffffL; v1 = ((vv0 >> (num - 32)) | (vv1 << (64 - num))) & 0xffffffffL; } else { /* num < 32 */ v0 = ((v0 >> num) | (v1 << (32 - num))) & 0xffffffffL; v1 = ((v1 >> num) | (vv0 << (32 - num))) & 0xffffffffL; } } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); v0 = v1 = d0 = d1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = vv0 = vv1 = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/build.info0000644000000000000000000000133413176625657016133 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ set_key.c ecb_enc.c cbc_enc.c \ ecb3_enc.c cfb64enc.c cfb64ede.c cfb_enc.c \ ofb64ede.c ofb64enc.c ofb_enc.c \ str2key.c pcbc_enc.c qud_cksm.c rand_key.c \ {- $target{des_asm_src} -} \ fcrypt.c xcbc_enc.c rpc_enc.c cbc_cksm.c GENERATE[des_enc-sparc.S]=asm/des_enc.m4 GENERATE[dest4-sparcv9.S]=asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[dest4-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[des-586.s]=asm/des-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) DEPEND[des-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl GENERATE[crypt586.s]=asm/crypt586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) DEPEND[crypt586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/rand_key.c0000644000000000000000000000114313176625657016115 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include int DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret) { do { if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)ret, sizeof(DES_cblock)) != 1) return (0); } while (DES_is_weak_key(ret)); DES_set_odd_parity(ret); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/rpc_des.h0000644000000000000000000000532113176625657015747 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* @(#)des.h 2.2 88/08/10 4.0 RPCSRC; from 2.7 88/02/08 SMI */ /*- * Sun RPC is a product of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and is provided for * unrestricted use provided that this legend is included on all tape * media and as a part of the software program in whole or part. Users * may copy or modify Sun RPC without charge, but are not authorized * to license or distribute it to anyone else except as part of a product or * program developed by the user. * * SUN RPC IS PROVIDED AS IS WITH NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND INCLUDING THE * WARRANTIES OF DESIGN, MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE, OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE OR TRADE PRACTICE. * * Sun RPC is provided with no support and without any obligation on the * part of Sun Microsystems, Inc. to assist in its use, correction, * modification or enhancement. * * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE * INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS OR ANY PATENTS BY SUN RPC * OR ANY PART THEREOF. * * In no event will Sun Microsystems, Inc. be liable for any lost revenue * or profits or other special, indirect and consequential damages, even if * Sun has been advised of the possibility of such damages. * * Sun Microsystems, Inc. * 2550 Garcia Avenue * Mountain View, California 94043 */ /* * Generic DES driver interface * Keep this file hardware independent! * Copyright (c) 1986 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. */ #define DES_MAXLEN 65536 /* maximum # of bytes to encrypt */ #define DES_QUICKLEN 16 /* maximum # of bytes to encrypt quickly */ enum desdir { ENCRYPT, DECRYPT }; enum desmode { CBC, ECB }; /* * parameters to ioctl call */ struct desparams { unsigned char des_key[8]; /* key (with low bit parity) */ enum desdir des_dir; /* direction */ enum desmode des_mode; /* mode */ unsigned char des_ivec[8]; /* input vector */ unsigned des_len; /* number of bytes to crypt */ union { unsigned char UDES_data[DES_QUICKLEN]; unsigned char *UDES_buf; } UDES; #define des_data UDES.UDES_data /* direct data here if quick */ #define des_buf UDES.UDES_buf /* otherwise, pointer to data */ }; /* * Encrypt an arbitrary sized buffer */ #define DESIOCBLOCK _IOWR('d', 6, struct desparams) /* * Encrypt of small amount of data, quickly */ #define DESIOCQUICK _IOWR('d', 7, struct desparams) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/qud_cksm.c0000644000000000000000000000461513176625657016136 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * From "Message Authentication" R.R. Jueneman, S.M. Matyas, C.H. Meyer IEEE * Communications Magazine Sept 1985 Vol. 23 No. 9 p 29-40 This module in * only based on the code in this paper and is almost definitely not the same * as the MIT implementation. */ #include "des_locl.h" /* bug fix for dos - 7/6/91 - Larry hughes@logos.ucs.indiana.edu */ #define Q_B0(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))) #define Q_B1(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<8) #define Q_B2(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<16) #define Q_B3(a) (((DES_LONG)(a))<<24) /* used to scramble things a bit */ /* Got the value MIT uses via brute force :-) 2/10/90 eay */ #define NOISE ((DES_LONG)83653421L) DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[], long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed) { DES_LONG z0, z1, t0, t1; int i; long l; const unsigned char *cp; DES_LONG *lp; if (out_count < 1) out_count = 1; lp = (DES_LONG *)&(output[0])[0]; z0 = Q_B0((*seed)[0]) | Q_B1((*seed)[1]) | Q_B2((*seed)[2]) | Q_B3((*seed)[3]); z1 = Q_B0((*seed)[4]) | Q_B1((*seed)[5]) | Q_B2((*seed)[6]) | Q_B3((*seed)[7]); for (i = 0; ((i < 4) && (i < out_count)); i++) { cp = input; l = length; while (l > 0) { if (l > 1) { t0 = (DES_LONG)(*(cp++)); t0 |= (DES_LONG)Q_B1(*(cp++)); l--; } else t0 = (DES_LONG)(*(cp++)); l--; /* add */ t0 += z0; t0 &= 0xffffffffL; t1 = z1; /* square, well sort of square */ z0 = ((((t0 * t0) & 0xffffffffL) + ((t1 * t1) & 0xffffffffL)) & 0xffffffffL) % 0x7fffffffL; z1 = ((t0 * ((t1 + NOISE) & 0xffffffffL)) & 0xffffffffL) % 0x7fffffffL; } if (lp != NULL) { /* * The MIT library assumes that the checksum is composed of * 2*out_count 32 bit ints */ *lp++ = z0; *lp++ = z1; } } return (z0); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/spr.h0000644000000000000000000002024513176625657015136 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64] = { { /* nibble 0 */ 0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L, 0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L, 0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L, 0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L, 0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L, 0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L, }, { /* nibble 1 */ 0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L, 0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L, 0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L, }, { /* nibble 2 */ 0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L, 0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L, 0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L, 0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L, 0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L, 0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L, 0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L, }, { /* nibble 3 */ 0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L, 0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L, 0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L, }, { /* nibble 4 */ 0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L, 0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L, 0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L, }, { /* nibble 5 */ 0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L, 0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L, 0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L, }, { /* nibble 6 */ 0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L, 0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000204L, 0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L, 0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00004200L, 0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004004L, 0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, 0x01000200L, 0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00004004L, }, { /* nibble 7 */ 0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00000000L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, 0x20820080L, 0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, 0x20800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L, 0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800080L, 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, 0x20820080L, 0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L, 0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, 0x20000080L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800000L, 0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00000000L, 0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, } }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/cfb_enc.c0000644000000000000000000001056413176625657015707 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "e_os.h" #include "des_locl.h" #include /* * The input and output are loaded in multiples of 8 bits. What this means is * that if you hame numbits=12 and length=2 the first 12 bits will be * retrieved from the first byte and half the second. The second 12 bits * will come from the 3rd and half the 4th byte. */ /* * Until Aug 1 2003 this function did not correctly implement CFB-r, so it * will not be compatible with any encryption prior to that date. Ben. */ void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc) { register DES_LONG d0, d1, v0, v1; register unsigned long l = length; register int num = numbits / 8, n = (numbits + 7) / 8, i, rem = numbits % 8; DES_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; #ifndef L_ENDIAN unsigned char ovec[16]; #else unsigned int sh[4]; unsigned char *ovec = (unsigned char *)sh; /* I kind of count that compiler optimizes away this assertioni, */ assert(sizeof(sh[0]) == 4); /* as this holds true for all, */ /* but 16-bit platforms... */ #endif if (numbits <= 0 || numbits > 64) return; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); if (enc) { while (l >= (unsigned long)n) { l -= n; ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); c2ln(in, d0, d1, n); in += n; d0 ^= ti[0]; d1 ^= ti[1]; l2cn(d0, d1, out, n); out += n; /* * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under * gcc :-( */ if (numbits == 32) { v0 = v1; v1 = d0; } else if (numbits == 64) { v0 = d0; v1 = d1; } else { #ifndef L_ENDIAN iv = &ovec[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); l2c(d0, iv); l2c(d1, iv); #else sh[0] = v0, sh[1] = v1, sh[2] = d0, sh[3] = d1; #endif if (rem == 0) memmove(ovec, ovec + num, 8); else for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) ovec[i] = ovec[i + num] << rem | ovec[i + num + 1] >> (8 - rem); #ifdef L_ENDIAN v0 = sh[0], v1 = sh[1]; #else iv = &ovec[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); #endif } } } else { while (l >= (unsigned long)n) { l -= n; ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); c2ln(in, d0, d1, n); in += n; /* * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under * gcc :-( */ if (numbits == 32) { v0 = v1; v1 = d0; } else if (numbits == 64) { v0 = d0; v1 = d1; } else { #ifndef L_ENDIAN iv = &ovec[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); l2c(d0, iv); l2c(d1, iv); #else sh[0] = v0, sh[1] = v1, sh[2] = d0, sh[3] = d1; #endif if (rem == 0) memmove(ovec, ovec + num, 8); else for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) ovec[i] = ovec[i + num] << rem | ovec[i + num + 1] >> (8 - rem); #ifdef L_ENDIAN v0 = sh[0], v1 = sh[1]; #else iv = &ovec[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); #endif } d0 ^= ti[0]; d1 ^= ti[1]; l2cn(d0, d1, out, n); out += n; } } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); v0 = v1 = d0 = d1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/pcbc_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000371413176625657016063 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc) { register DES_LONG sin0, sin1, xor0, xor1, tout0, tout1; DES_LONG tin[2]; const unsigned char *in; unsigned char *out, *iv; in = input; out = output; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; if (enc) { c2l(iv, xor0); c2l(iv, xor1); for (; length > 0; length -= 8) { if (length >= 8) { c2l(in, sin0); c2l(in, sin1); } else c2ln(in, sin0, sin1, length); tin[0] = sin0 ^ xor0; tin[1] = sin1 ^ xor1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; xor0 = sin0 ^ tout0; xor1 = sin1 ^ tout1; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); } } else { c2l(iv, xor0); c2l(iv, xor1); for (; length > 0; length -= 8) { c2l(in, sin0); c2l(in, sin1); tin[0] = sin0; tin[1] = sin1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, schedule, DES_DECRYPT); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; if (length >= 8) { l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); } else l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, length); xor0 = tout0 ^ sin0; xor1 = tout1 ^ sin1; } } tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; sin0 = sin1 = xor0 = xor1 = tout0 = tout1 = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000571613176625657016065 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * #included by: * cbc_enc.c (DES_cbc_encrypt) * des_enc.c (DES_ncbc_encrypt) */ #include "des_locl.h" #ifdef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV void DES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *_schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc) #else void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *_schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc) #endif { register DES_LONG tin0, tin1; register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register long l = length; DES_LONG tin[2]; unsigned char *iv; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; if (enc) { c2l(iv, tout0); c2l(iv, tout1); for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin[0] = tin0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); tout0 = tin[0]; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin[0] = tin0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); tout0 = tin[0]; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout1, out); } #ifndef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(tout0, iv); l2c(tout1, iv); #endif } else { c2l(iv, xor0); c2l(iv, xor1); for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_DECRYPT); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, _schedule, DES_DECRYPT); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); #ifndef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; #endif } #ifndef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(xor0, iv); l2c(xor1, iv); #endif } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/cbc_cksm.c0000644000000000000000000000315213176625657016067 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *in, DES_cblock *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, const_DES_cblock *ivec) { register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, tin0, tin1; register long l = length; DES_LONG tin[2]; unsigned char *out = &(*output)[0]; const unsigned char *iv = &(*ivec)[0]; c2l(iv, tout0); c2l(iv, tout1); for (; l > 0; l -= 8) { if (l >= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); } else c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l); tin0 ^= tout0; tin[0] = tin0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt1((DES_LONG *)tin, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); /* fix 15/10/91 eay - thanks to keithr@sco.COM */ tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; } if (out != NULL) { l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); } tout0 = tin0 = tin1 = tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; /* * Transform the data in tout1 so that it will match the return value * that the MIT Kerberos mit_des_cbc_cksum API returns. */ tout1 = ((tout1 >> 24L) & 0x000000FF) | ((tout1 >> 8L) & 0x0000FF00) | ((tout1 << 8L) & 0x00FF0000) | ((tout1 << 24L) & 0xFF000000); return (tout1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/fcrypt_b.c0000644000000000000000000000367113176625657016141 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #define DES_FCRYPT #include "des_locl.h" #undef DES_FCRYPT #undef PERM_OP #define PERM_OP(a,b,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)>>(n))^(b))&(m)),\ (b)^=(t),\ (a)^=((t)<<(n))) #undef HPERM_OP #define HPERM_OP(a,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)<<(16-(n)))^(a))&(m)),\ (a)=(a)^(t)^(t>>(16-(n))))\ void fcrypt_body(DES_LONG *out, DES_key_schedule *ks, DES_LONG Eswap0, DES_LONG Eswap1) { register DES_LONG l, r, t, u; register DES_LONG *s; register int j; register DES_LONG E0, E1; l = 0; r = 0; s = (DES_LONG *)ks; E0 = Eswap0; E1 = Eswap1; for (j = 0; j < 25; j++) { D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 0); /* 1 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 2); /* 2 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 4); /* 3 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 6); /* 4 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 8); /* 5 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 10); /* 6 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 12); /* 7 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 14); /* 8 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 16); /* 9 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 18); /* 10 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 20); /* 11 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 22); /* 12 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 24); /* 13 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 26); /* 14 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 28); /* 15 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 30); /* 16 */ t = l; l = r; r = t; } l = ROTATE(l, 3) & 0xffffffffL; r = ROTATE(r, 3) & 0xffffffffL; PERM_OP(l, r, t, 1, 0x55555555L); PERM_OP(r, l, t, 8, 0x00ff00ffL); PERM_OP(l, r, t, 2, 0x33333333L); PERM_OP(r, l, t, 16, 0x0000ffffL); PERM_OP(l, r, t, 4, 0x0f0f0f0fL); out[0] = r; out[1] = l; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014736 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/asm/dest4-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000003642213176625657017712 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by David S. Miller and Andy Polyakov # . The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD # license. March 2013. All rights reserved. # ==================================================================== ###################################################################### # DES for SPARC T4. # # As with other hardware-assisted ciphers CBC encrypt results [for # aligned data] are virtually identical to critical path lengths: # # DES Triple-DES # CBC encrypt 4.14/4.15(*) 11.7/11.7 # CBC decrypt 1.77/4.11(**) 6.42/7.47 # # (*) numbers after slash are for # misaligned data; # (**) this is result for largest # block size, unlike all other # cases smaller blocks results # are better[?]; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "sparcv9_modes.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .text ___ { my ($inp,$out)=("%o0","%o1"); $code.=<<___; .align 32 .globl des_t4_key_expand .type des_t4_key_expand,#function des_t4_key_expand: andcc $inp, 0x7, %g0 alignaddr $inp, %g0, $inp bz,pt %icc, 1f ldd [$inp + 0x00], %f0 ldd [$inp + 0x08], %f2 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 1: des_kexpand %f0, 0, %f0 des_kexpand %f0, 1, %f2 std %f0, [$out + 0x00] des_kexpand %f2, 3, %f6 std %f2, [$out + 0x08] des_kexpand %f2, 2, %f4 des_kexpand %f6, 3, %f10 std %f6, [$out + 0x18] des_kexpand %f6, 2, %f8 std %f4, [$out + 0x10] des_kexpand %f10, 3, %f14 std %f10, [$out + 0x28] des_kexpand %f10, 2, %f12 std %f8, [$out + 0x20] des_kexpand %f14, 1, %f16 std %f14, [$out + 0x38] des_kexpand %f16, 3, %f20 std %f12, [$out + 0x30] des_kexpand %f16, 2, %f18 std %f16, [$out + 0x40] des_kexpand %f20, 3, %f24 std %f20, [$out + 0x50] des_kexpand %f20, 2, %f22 std %f18, [$out + 0x48] des_kexpand %f24, 3, %f28 std %f24, [$out + 0x60] des_kexpand %f24, 2, %f26 std %f22, [$out + 0x58] des_kexpand %f28, 1, %f30 std %f28, [$out + 0x70] std %f26, [$out + 0x68] retl std %f30, [$out + 0x78] .size des_t4_key_expand,.-des_t4_key_expand ___ } { my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec) = map("%o$_",(0..4)); my ($ileft,$iright,$omask) = map("%g$_",(1..3)); $code.=<<___; .globl des_t4_cbc_encrypt .align 32 des_t4_cbc_encrypt: cmp $len, 0 be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 ld [$ivec + 0], %f0 ! load ivec ld [$ivec + 4], %f1 and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 0xff, $omask prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 sub %g0, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, %g4 alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out srl $omask, %g4, $omask srlx $len, 3, $len movrz %g4, 0, $omask prefetch [$out], 22 ldd [$key + 0x00], %f4 ! load key schedule ldd [$key + 0x08], %f6 ldd [$key + 0x10], %f8 ldd [$key + 0x18], %f10 ldd [$key + 0x20], %f12 ldd [$key + 0x28], %f14 ldd [$key + 0x30], %f16 ldd [$key + 0x38], %f18 ldd [$key + 0x40], %f20 ldd [$key + 0x48], %f22 ldd [$key + 0x50], %f24 ldd [$key + 0x58], %f26 ldd [$key + 0x60], %f28 ldd [$key + 0x68], %f30 ldd [$key + 0x70], %f32 ldd [$key + 0x78], %f34 .Ldes_cbc_enc_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %g4 brz,pt $ileft, 4f nop ldx [$inp + 8], %g5 sllx %g4, $ileft, %g4 srlx %g5, $iright, %g5 or %g5, %g4, %g4 4: movxtod %g4, %f2 prefetch [$inp + 8+63], 20 add $inp, 8, $inp fxor %f2, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec prefetch [$out + 63], 22 des_ip %f0, %f0 des_round %f4, %f6, %f0, %f0 des_round %f8, %f10, %f0, %f0 des_round %f12, %f14, %f0, %f0 des_round %f16, %f18, %f0, %f0 des_round %f20, %f22, %f0, %f0 des_round %f24, %f26, %f0, %f0 des_round %f28, %f30, %f0, %f0 des_round %f32, %f34, %f0, %f0 des_iip %f0, %f0 brnz,pn $omask, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_cbc_enc_loop add $out, 8, $out st %f0, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f1, [$ivec + 4] .Lcbc_abort: retl nop .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %g4 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~4x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f2 ! handle unaligned output stda %f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store add $out, 8, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_cbc_enc_loop+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask st %f0, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f1, [$ivec + 4] .type des_t4_cbc_encrypt,#function .size des_t4_cbc_encrypt,.-des_t4_cbc_encrypt .globl des_t4_cbc_decrypt .align 32 des_t4_cbc_decrypt: cmp $len, 0 be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 ld [$ivec + 0], %f2 ! load ivec ld [$ivec + 4], %f3 and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 0xff, $omask prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 sub %g0, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, %g4 alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out srl $omask, %g4, $omask srlx $len, 3, $len movrz %g4, 0, $omask prefetch [$out], 22 ldd [$key + 0x78], %f4 ! load key schedule ldd [$key + 0x70], %f6 ldd [$key + 0x68], %f8 ldd [$key + 0x60], %f10 ldd [$key + 0x58], %f12 ldd [$key + 0x50], %f14 ldd [$key + 0x48], %f16 ldd [$key + 0x40], %f18 ldd [$key + 0x38], %f20 ldd [$key + 0x30], %f22 ldd [$key + 0x28], %f24 ldd [$key + 0x20], %f26 ldd [$key + 0x18], %f28 ldd [$key + 0x10], %f30 ldd [$key + 0x08], %f32 ldd [$key + 0x00], %f34 .Ldes_cbc_dec_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %g4 brz,pt $ileft, 4f nop ldx [$inp + 8], %g5 sllx %g4, $ileft, %g4 srlx %g5, $iright, %g5 or %g5, %g4, %g4 4: movxtod %g4, %f0 prefetch [$inp + 8+63], 20 add $inp, 8, $inp prefetch [$out + 63], 22 des_ip %f0, %f0 des_round %f4, %f6, %f0, %f0 des_round %f8, %f10, %f0, %f0 des_round %f12, %f14, %f0, %f0 des_round %f16, %f18, %f0, %f0 des_round %f20, %f22, %f0, %f0 des_round %f24, %f26, %f0, %f0 des_round %f28, %f30, %f0, %f0 des_round %f32, %f34, %f0, %f0 des_iip %f0, %f0 fxor %f2, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec movxtod %g4, %f2 brnz,pn $omask, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_cbc_dec_loop add $out, 8, $out st %f2, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f3, [$ivec + 4] .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %g4 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~4x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f0 ! handle unaligned output stda %f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store add $out, 8, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_cbc_dec_loop+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask st %f2, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f3, [$ivec + 4] .type des_t4_cbc_decrypt,#function .size des_t4_cbc_decrypt,.-des_t4_cbc_decrypt ___ # One might wonder why does one have back-to-back des_iip/des_ip # pairs between EDE passes. Indeed, aren't they inverse of each other? # They almost are. Outcome of the pair is 32-bit words being swapped # in target register. Consider pair of des_iip/des_ip as a way to # perform the due swap, it's actually fastest way in this case. $code.=<<___; .globl des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt .align 32 des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt: cmp $len, 0 be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 ld [$ivec + 0], %f0 ! load ivec ld [$ivec + 4], %f1 and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 0xff, $omask prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 sub %g0, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, %g4 alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out srl $omask, %g4, $omask srlx $len, 3, $len movrz %g4, 0, $omask prefetch [$out], 22 ldd [$key + 0x00], %f4 ! load key schedule ldd [$key + 0x08], %f6 ldd [$key + 0x10], %f8 ldd [$key + 0x18], %f10 ldd [$key + 0x20], %f12 ldd [$key + 0x28], %f14 ldd [$key + 0x30], %f16 ldd [$key + 0x38], %f18 ldd [$key + 0x40], %f20 ldd [$key + 0x48], %f22 ldd [$key + 0x50], %f24 ldd [$key + 0x58], %f26 ldd [$key + 0x60], %f28 ldd [$key + 0x68], %f30 ldd [$key + 0x70], %f32 ldd [$key + 0x78], %f34 .Ldes_ede3_cbc_enc_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %g4 brz,pt $ileft, 4f nop ldx [$inp + 8], %g5 sllx %g4, $ileft, %g4 srlx %g5, $iright, %g5 or %g5, %g4, %g4 4: movxtod %g4, %f2 prefetch [$inp + 8+63], 20 add $inp, 8, $inp fxor %f2, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec prefetch [$out + 63], 22 des_ip %f0, %f0 des_round %f4, %f6, %f0, %f0 des_round %f8, %f10, %f0, %f0 des_round %f12, %f14, %f0, %f0 des_round %f16, %f18, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x08], %f36 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x10], %f38 des_round %f20, %f22, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x18], %f40 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x20], %f42 des_round %f24, %f26, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x28], %f44 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x30], %f46 des_round %f28, %f30, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x38], %f48 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x40], %f50 des_round %f32, %f34, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x48], %f52 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x50], %f54 des_iip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x58], %f56 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x60], %f58 des_ip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x68], %f60 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x70], %f62 des_round %f36, %f38, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x78], %f36 ldd [$key + 0x100-0x80], %f38 des_round %f40, %f42, %f0, %f0 des_round %f44, %f46, %f0, %f0 des_round %f48, %f50, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x00], %f40 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x08], %f42 des_round %f52, %f54, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x10], %f44 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x18], %f46 des_round %f56, %f58, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x20], %f48 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x28], %f50 des_round %f60, %f62, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x30], %f52 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x38], %f54 des_round %f36, %f38, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x40], %f56 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x48], %f58 des_iip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x50], %f60 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x58], %f62 des_ip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x60], %f36 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x68], %f38 des_round %f40, %f42, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x70], %f40 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x78], %f42 des_round %f44, %f46, %f0, %f0 des_round %f48, %f50, %f0, %f0 des_round %f52, %f54, %f0, %f0 des_round %f56, %f58, %f0, %f0 des_round %f60, %f62, %f0, %f0 des_round %f36, %f38, %f0, %f0 des_round %f40, %f42, %f0, %f0 des_iip %f0, %f0 brnz,pn $omask, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_enc_loop add $out, 8, $out st %f0, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f1, [$ivec + 4] .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %g4 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~2x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f2 ! handle unaligned output stda %f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store add $out, 8, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f2, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_enc_loop+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask st %f0, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f1, [$ivec + 4] .type des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt,#function .size des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt,.-des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt .globl des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt .align 32 des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt: cmp $len, 0 be,pn $::size_t_cc, .Lcbc_abort srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 ld [$ivec + 0], %f2 ! load ivec ld [$ivec + 4], %f3 and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 0xff, $omask prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 sub %g0, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, %g4 alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out srl $omask, %g4, $omask srlx $len, 3, $len movrz %g4, 0, $omask prefetch [$out], 22 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x78], %f4 ! load key schedule ldd [$key + 0x100+0x70], %f6 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x68], %f8 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x60], %f10 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x58], %f12 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x50], %f14 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x48], %f16 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x40], %f18 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x38], %f20 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x30], %f22 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x28], %f24 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x20], %f26 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x18], %f28 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x10], %f30 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x08], %f32 ldd [$key + 0x100+0x00], %f34 .Ldes_ede3_cbc_dec_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %g4 brz,pt $ileft, 4f nop ldx [$inp + 8], %g5 sllx %g4, $ileft, %g4 srlx %g5, $iright, %g5 or %g5, %g4, %g4 4: movxtod %g4, %f0 prefetch [$inp + 8+63], 20 add $inp, 8, $inp prefetch [$out + 63], 22 des_ip %f0, %f0 des_round %f4, %f6, %f0, %f0 des_round %f8, %f10, %f0, %f0 des_round %f12, %f14, %f0, %f0 des_round %f16, %f18, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x00], %f36 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x08], %f38 des_round %f20, %f22, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x10], %f40 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x18], %f42 des_round %f24, %f26, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x20], %f44 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x28], %f46 des_round %f28, %f30, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x30], %f48 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x38], %f50 des_round %f32, %f34, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x40], %f52 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x48], %f54 des_iip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x50], %f56 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x58], %f58 des_ip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x60], %f60 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x68], %f62 des_round %f36, %f38, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x70], %f36 ldd [$key + 0x80+0x78], %f38 des_round %f40, %f42, %f0, %f0 des_round %f44, %f46, %f0, %f0 des_round %f48, %f50, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x08], %f40 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x10], %f42 des_round %f52, %f54, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x18], %f44 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x20], %f46 des_round %f56, %f58, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x28], %f48 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x30], %f50 des_round %f60, %f62, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x38], %f52 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x40], %f54 des_round %f36, %f38, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x48], %f56 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x50], %f58 des_iip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x58], %f60 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x60], %f62 des_ip %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x68], %f36 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x70], %f38 des_round %f40, %f42, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x78], %f40 ldd [$key + 0x80-0x80], %f42 des_round %f44, %f46, %f0, %f0 des_round %f48, %f50, %f0, %f0 des_round %f52, %f54, %f0, %f0 des_round %f56, %f58, %f0, %f0 des_round %f60, %f62, %f0, %f0 des_round %f36, %f38, %f0, %f0 des_round %f40, %f42, %f0, %f0 des_iip %f0, %f0 fxor %f2, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec movxtod %g4, %f2 brnz,pn $omask, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_dec_loop add $out, 8, $out st %f2, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f3, [$ivec + 4] .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %g4 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f0 ! handle unaligned output stda %f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store add $out, 8, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .Ldes_ede3_cbc_dec_loop+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask st %f2, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec retl st %f3, [$ivec + 4] .type des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt,#function .size des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt,.-des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "DES for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov" .align 4 ___ &emit_assembler(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/asm/crypt586.pl0000644000000000000000000001103113176625657016673 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications are from # Svend Olaf Mikkelsen $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"crypt586.pl"); $L="edi"; $R="esi"; &external_label("DES_SPtrans"); &fcrypt_body("fcrypt_body"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub fcrypt_body { local($name,$do_ip)=@_; &function_begin($name); &comment(""); &comment("Load the 2 words"); $trans="ebp"; &xor( $L, $L); &xor( $R, $R); # PIC-ification:-) &picmeup("edx","DES_SPtrans"); #if ($cpp) { &picmeup("edx","DES_SPtrans"); } #else { &lea("edx",&DWP("DES_SPtrans")); } &push("edx"); # becomes &swtmp(1) # &mov($trans,&wparam(1)); # reloaded with DES_SPtrans in D_ENCRYPT &push(&DWC(25)); # add a variable &set_label("start"); for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2) { &comment(""); &comment("Round $i"); &D_ENCRYPT($i,$L,$R,$i*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); &comment(""); &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1)); &D_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,($i+1)*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); } &mov("ebx", &swtmp(0)); &mov("eax", $L); &dec("ebx"); &mov($L, $R); &mov($R, "eax"); &mov(&swtmp(0), "ebx"); &jnz(&label("start")); &comment(""); &comment("FP"); &mov("edx",&wparam(0)); &FP_new($R,$L,"eax",3); &mov(&DWP(0,"edx","",0),"eax"); &mov(&DWP(4,"edx","",0),$L); &add("esp",8); # remove variables &function_end($name); } sub D_ENCRYPT { local($r,$L,$R,$S,$trans,$u,$tmp1,$tmp2,$t)=@_; &mov( $u, &wparam(2)); # 2 &mov( $t, $R); &shr( $t, 16); # 1 &mov( $tmp2, &wparam(3)); # 2 &xor( $t, $R); # 1 &and( $u, $t); # 2 &and( $t, $tmp2); # 2 &mov( $tmp1, $u); &shl( $tmp1, 16); # 1 &mov( $tmp2, $t); &shl( $tmp2, 16); # 1 &xor( $u, $tmp1); # 2 &xor( $t, $tmp2); # 2 &mov( $tmp1, &DWP(&n2a($S*4),$trans,"",0)); # 2 &xor( $u, $tmp1); &mov( $tmp2, &DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$trans,"",0)); # 2 &xor( $u, $R); &xor( $t, $R); &xor( $t, $tmp2); &and( $u, "0xfcfcfcfc" ); # 2 &xor( $tmp1, $tmp1); # 1 &and( $t, "0xcfcfcfcf" ); # 2 &xor( $tmp2, $tmp2); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($u) ); &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($u) ); &rotr( $t, 4 ); &mov( $trans, &swtmp(1)); &xor( $L, &DWP(" ",$trans,$tmp1,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($t) ); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x200",$trans,$tmp2,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); &shr( $u, 16); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x100",$trans,$tmp1,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &HB($u) ); &shr( $t, 16); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x300",$trans,$tmp2,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); &and( $u, "0xff" ); &and( $t, "0xff" ); &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x600",$trans,$tmp1,0)); &xor( $L, $tmp1); &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x700",$trans,$tmp2,0)); &xor( $L, $tmp1); &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x400",$trans,$u,0)); &xor( $L, $tmp1); &mov( $tmp1, &DWP("0x500",$trans,$t,0)); &xor( $L, $tmp1); &mov( $trans, &wparam(1)); } sub n2a { sprintf("%d",$_[0]); } # now has a side affect of rotating $a by $shift sub R_PERM_OP { local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask,$last)=@_; &rotl( $a, $shift ) if ($shift != 0); &mov( $tt, $a ); &xor( $a, $b ); &and( $a, $mask ); if ($notlast eq $b) { &xor( $b, $a ); &xor( $tt, $a ); } else { &xor( $tt, $a ); &xor( $b, $a ); } &comment(""); } sub IP_new { local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_; &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0xf0f0f0f0",$l); &R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,20,"0xfff0000f",$l); &R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,14,"0x33333333",$r); &R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,22,"0x03fc03fc",$r); &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 9,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); if ($lr != 3) { if (($lr-3) < 0) { &rotr($tt, 3-$lr); } else { &rotl($tt, $lr-3); } } if ($lr != 2) { if (($lr-2) < 0) { &rotr($r, 2-$lr); } else { &rotl($r, $lr-2); } } } sub FP_new { local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_; if ($lr != 2) { if (($lr-2) < 0) { &rotl($r, 2-$lr); } else { &rotr($r, $lr-2); } } if ($lr != 3) { if (($lr-3) < 0) { &rotl($l, 3-$lr); } else { &rotr($l, $lr-3); } } &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 0,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); &R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,23,"0x03fc03fc",$r); &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,10,"0x33333333",$l); &R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,18,"0xfff0000f",$l); &R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,12,"0xf0f0f0f0",$r); &rotr($tt , 4); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m40000644000000000000000000013320513176625657016604 0ustar rootroot! Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. ! ! Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use ! this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy ! in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at ! https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ! ! To expand the m4 macros: m4 -B 8192 des_enc.m4 > des_enc.S ! ! Global registers 1 to 5 are used. This is the same as done by the ! cc compiler. The UltraSPARC load/store little endian feature is used. ! ! Instruction grouping often refers to one CPU cycle. ! ! Assemble through gcc: gcc -c -mcpu=ultrasparc -o des_enc.o des_enc.S ! ! Assemble through cc: cc -c -xarch=v8plusa -o des_enc.o des_enc.S ! ! Performance improvement according to './apps/openssl speed des' ! ! 32-bit build: ! 23% faster than cc-5.2 -xarch=v8plus -xO5 ! 115% faster than gcc-3.2.1 -m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O5 ! 64-bit build: ! 50% faster than cc-5.2 -xarch=v9 -xO5 ! 100% faster than gcc-3.2.1 -m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O5 ! .ident "des_enc.m4 2.1" .file "des_enc-sparc.S" #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER #include #endif #if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9) # define ABI64 /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */ #elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__) # define ABI64 /* They've said -m64 at command line */ #endif #ifdef ABI64 .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch # define FRAME -192 # define BIAS 2047 # define LDPTR ldx # define STPTR stx # define ARG0 128 # define ARGSZ 8 #else # define FRAME -96 # define BIAS 0 # define LDPTR ld # define STPTR st # define ARG0 68 # define ARGSZ 4 #endif #define LOOPS 7 #define global0 %g0 #define global1 %g1 #define global2 %g2 #define global3 %g3 #define global4 %g4 #define global5 %g5 #define local0 %l0 #define local1 %l1 #define local2 %l2 #define local3 %l3 #define local4 %l4 #define local5 %l5 #define local7 %l6 #define local6 %l7 #define in0 %i0 #define in1 %i1 #define in2 %i2 #define in3 %i3 #define in4 %i4 #define in5 %i5 #define in6 %i6 #define in7 %i7 #define out0 %o0 #define out1 %o1 #define out2 %o2 #define out3 %o3 #define out4 %o4 #define out5 %o5 #define out6 %o6 #define out7 %o7 #define stub stb changequote({,}) ! Macro definitions: ! {ip_macro} ! ! The logic used in initial and final permutations is the same as in ! the C code. The permutations are done with a clever shift, xor, and ! technique. ! ! The macro also loads address sbox 1 to 5 to global 1 to 5, address ! sbox 6 to local6, and addres sbox 8 to out3. ! ! Rotates the halfs 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions. ! ! Loads key first round from address in parameter 5 to out0, out1. ! ! After the the original LibDES initial permutation, the resulting left ! is in the variable initially used for right and vice versa. The macro ! implements the possibility to keep the halfs in the original registers. ! ! parameter 1 left ! parameter 2 right ! parameter 3 result left (modify in first round) ! parameter 4 result right (use in first round) ! parameter 5 key address ! parameter 6 1/2 for include encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 1 for move in1 to in3 ! parameter 8 1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3 ! parameter 9 1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3 define(ip_macro, { ! {ip_macro} ! $1 $2 $4 $3 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 ld [out2+256], local1 srl $2, 4, local4 xor local4, $1, local4 ifelse($7,1,{mov in1, in3},{nop}) ld [out2+260], local2 and local4, local1, local4 ifelse($8,1,{mov in3, in4},{}) ifelse($8,2,{mov in4, in3},{}) ld [out2+280], out4 ! loop counter sll local4, 4, local1 xor $1, local4, $1 ld [out2+264], local3 srl $1, 16, local4 xor $2, local1, $2 ifelse($9,1,{LDPTR KS3, in4},{}) xor local4, $2, local4 nop !sethi %hi(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! sbox addr ifelse($9,1,{LDPTR KS2, in3},{}) and local4, local2, local4 nop !or global1, %lo(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! sbox addr sll local4, 16, local1 xor $2, local4, $2 srl $2, 2, local4 xor $1, local1, $1 sethi %hi(16711680), local5 xor local4, $1, local4 and local4, local3, local4 or local5, 255, local5 sll local4, 2, local2 xor $1, local4, $1 srl $1, 8, local4 xor $2, local2, $2 xor local4, $2, local4 add global1, 768, global4 and local4, local5, local4 add global1, 1024, global5 ld [out2+272], local7 sll local4, 8, local1 xor $2, local4, $2 srl $2, 1, local4 xor $1, local1, $1 ld [$5], out0 ! key 7531 xor local4, $1, local4 add global1, 256, global2 ld [$5+4], out1 ! key 8642 and local4, local7, local4 add global1, 512, global3 sll local4, 1, local1 xor $1, local4, $1 sll $1, 3, local3 xor $2, local1, $2 sll $2, 3, local2 add global1, 1280, local6 ! address sbox 8 srl $1, 29, local4 add global1, 1792, out3 ! address sbox 8 srl $2, 29, local1 or local4, local3, $4 or local2, local1, $3 ifelse($6, 1, { ld [out2+284], local5 ! 0x0000FC00 used in the rounds or local2, local1, $3 xor $4, out0, local1 call .des_enc.1 and local1, 252, local1 },{}) ifelse($6, 2, { ld [out2+284], local5 ! 0x0000FC00 used in the rounds or local2, local1, $3 xor $4, out0, local1 call .des_dec.1 and local1, 252, local1 },{}) }) ! {rounds_macro} ! ! The logic used in the DES rounds is the same as in the C code, ! except that calculations for sbox 1 and sbox 5 begin before ! the previous round is finished. ! ! In each round one half (work) is modified based on key and the ! other half (use). ! ! In this version we do two rounds in a loop repeated 7 times ! and two rounds separately. ! ! One half has the bits for the sboxes in the following positions: ! ! 777777xx555555xx333333xx111111xx ! ! 88xx666666xx444444xx222222xx8888 ! ! The bits for each sbox are xor-ed with the key bits for that box. ! The above xx bits are cleared, and the result used for lookup in ! the sbox table. Each sbox entry contains the 4 output bits permuted ! into 32 bits according to the P permutation. ! ! In the description of DES, left and right are switched after ! each round, except after last round. In this code the original ! left and right are kept in the same register in all rounds, meaning ! that after the 16 rounds the result for right is in the register ! originally used for left. ! ! parameter 1 first work (left in first round) ! parameter 2 first use (right in first round) ! parameter 3 enc/dec 1/-1 ! parameter 4 loop label ! parameter 5 key address register ! parameter 6 optional address for key next encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 not empty for include retl ! ! also compares in2 to 8 define(rounds_macro, { ! {rounds_macro} ! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 xor $2, out0, local1 ld [out2+284], local5 ! 0x0000FC00 ba $4 and local1, 252, local1 .align 32 $4: ! local6 is address sbox 6 ! out3 is address sbox 8 ! out4 is loop counter ld [global1+local1], local1 xor $2, out1, out1 ! 8642 xor $2, out0, out0 ! 7531 ! fmovs %f0, %f0 ! fxor used for alignment srl out1, 4, local0 ! rotate 4 right and out0, local5, local3 ! 3 ! fmovs %f0, %f0 ld [$5+$3*8], local7 ! key 7531 next round srl local3, 8, local3 ! 3 and local0, 252, local2 ! 2 ! fmovs %f0, %f0 ld [global3+local3],local3 ! 3 sll out1, 28, out1 ! rotate xor $1, local1, $1 ! 1 finished, local1 now sbox 7 ld [global2+local2], local2 ! 2 srl out0, 24, local1 ! 7 or out1, local0, out1 ! rotate ldub [out2+local1], local1 ! 7 (and 0xFC) srl out1, 24, local0 ! 8 and out1, local5, local4 ! 4 ldub [out2+local0], local0 ! 8 (and 0xFC) srl local4, 8, local4 ! 4 xor $1, local2, $1 ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 6 ld [global4+local4],local4 ! 4 srl out1, 16, local2 ! 6 xor $1, local3, $1 ! 3 finished local3 now sbox 5 ld [out3+local0],local0 ! 8 and local2, 252, local2 ! 6 add global1, 1536, local5 ! address sbox 7 ld [local6+local2], local2 ! 6 srl out0, 16, local3 ! 5 xor $1, local4, $1 ! 4 finished ld [local5+local1],local1 ! 7 and local3, 252, local3 ! 5 xor $1, local0, $1 ! 8 finished ld [global5+local3],local3 ! 5 xor $1, local2, $1 ! 6 finished subcc out4, 1, out4 ld [$5+$3*8+4], out0 ! key 8642 next round xor $1, local7, local2 ! sbox 5 next round xor $1, local1, $1 ! 7 finished srl local2, 16, local2 ! sbox 5 next round xor $1, local3, $1 ! 5 finished ld [$5+$3*16+4], out1 ! key 8642 next round again and local2, 252, local2 ! sbox5 next round ! next round xor $1, local7, local7 ! 7531 ld [global5+local2], local2 ! 5 srl local7, 24, local3 ! 7 xor $1, out0, out0 ! 8642 ldub [out2+local3], local3 ! 7 (and 0xFC) srl out0, 4, local0 ! rotate 4 right and local7, 252, local1 ! 1 sll out0, 28, out0 ! rotate xor $2, local2, $2 ! 5 finished local2 used srl local0, 8, local4 ! 4 and local0, 252, local2 ! 2 ld [local5+local3], local3 ! 7 srl local0, 16, local5 ! 6 or out0, local0, out0 ! rotate ld [global2+local2], local2 ! 2 srl out0, 24, local0 ld [$5+$3*16], out0 ! key 7531 next round and local4, 252, local4 ! 4 and local5, 252, local5 ! 6 ld [global4+local4], local4 ! 4 xor $2, local3, $2 ! 7 finished local3 used and local0, 252, local0 ! 8 ld [local6+local5], local5 ! 6 xor $2, local2, $2 ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 3 srl local7, 8, local2 ! 3 start ld [out3+local0], local0 ! 8 xor $2, local4, $2 ! 4 finished and local2, 252, local2 ! 3 ld [global1+local1], local1 ! 1 xor $2, local5, $2 ! 6 finished local5 used ld [global3+local2], local2 ! 3 xor $2, local0, $2 ! 8 finished add $5, $3*16, $5 ! enc add 8, dec add -8 to key pointer ld [out2+284], local5 ! 0x0000FC00 xor $2, out0, local4 ! sbox 1 next round xor $2, local1, $2 ! 1 finished xor $2, local2, $2 ! 3 finished bne $4 and local4, 252, local1 ! sbox 1 next round ! two rounds more: ld [global1+local1], local1 xor $2, out1, out1 xor $2, out0, out0 srl out1, 4, local0 ! rotate and out0, local5, local3 ld [$5+$3*8], local7 ! key 7531 srl local3, 8, local3 and local0, 252, local2 ld [global3+local3],local3 sll out1, 28, out1 ! rotate xor $1, local1, $1 ! 1 finished, local1 now sbox 7 ld [global2+local2], local2 srl out0, 24, local1 or out1, local0, out1 ! rotate ldub [out2+local1], local1 srl out1, 24, local0 and out1, local5, local4 ldub [out2+local0], local0 srl local4, 8, local4 xor $1, local2, $1 ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 6 ld [global4+local4],local4 srl out1, 16, local2 xor $1, local3, $1 ! 3 finished local3 now sbox 5 ld [out3+local0],local0 and local2, 252, local2 add global1, 1536, local5 ! address sbox 7 ld [local6+local2], local2 srl out0, 16, local3 xor $1, local4, $1 ! 4 finished ld [local5+local1],local1 and local3, 252, local3 xor $1, local0, $1 ld [global5+local3],local3 xor $1, local2, $1 ! 6 finished cmp in2, 8 ifelse($6,{}, {}, {ld [out2+280], out4}) ! loop counter xor $1, local7, local2 ! sbox 5 next round xor $1, local1, $1 ! 7 finished ld [$5+$3*8+4], out0 srl local2, 16, local2 ! sbox 5 next round xor $1, local3, $1 ! 5 finished and local2, 252, local2 ! next round (two rounds more) xor $1, local7, local7 ! 7531 ld [global5+local2], local2 srl local7, 24, local3 xor $1, out0, out0 ! 8642 ldub [out2+local3], local3 srl out0, 4, local0 ! rotate and local7, 252, local1 sll out0, 28, out0 ! rotate xor $2, local2, $2 ! 5 finished local2 used srl local0, 8, local4 and local0, 252, local2 ld [local5+local3], local3 srl local0, 16, local5 or out0, local0, out0 ! rotate ld [global2+local2], local2 srl out0, 24, local0 ifelse($6,{}, {}, {ld [$6], out0}) ! key next encryption/decryption and local4, 252, local4 and local5, 252, local5 ld [global4+local4], local4 xor $2, local3, $2 ! 7 finished local3 used and local0, 252, local0 ld [local6+local5], local5 xor $2, local2, $2 ! 2 finished local2 now sbox 3 srl local7, 8, local2 ! 3 start ld [out3+local0], local0 xor $2, local4, $2 and local2, 252, local2 ld [global1+local1], local1 xor $2, local5, $2 ! 6 finished local5 used ld [global3+local2], local2 srl $1, 3, local3 xor $2, local0, $2 ifelse($6,{}, {}, {ld [$6+4], out1}) ! key next encryption/decryption sll $1, 29, local4 xor $2, local1, $2 ifelse($7,{}, {}, {retl}) xor $2, local2, $2 }) ! {fp_macro} ! ! parameter 1 right (original left) ! parameter 2 left (original right) ! parameter 3 1 for optional store to [in0] ! parameter 4 1 for load input/output address to local5/7 ! ! The final permutation logic switches the halfes, meaning that ! left and right ends up the the registers originally used. define(fp_macro, { ! {fp_macro} ! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 ! initially undo the rotate 3 left done after initial permutation ! original left is received shifted 3 right and 29 left in local3/4 sll $2, 29, local1 or local3, local4, $1 srl $2, 3, $2 sethi %hi(0x55555555), local2 or $2, local1, $2 or local2, %lo(0x55555555), local2 srl $2, 1, local3 sethi %hi(0x00ff00ff), local1 xor local3, $1, local3 or local1, %lo(0x00ff00ff), local1 and local3, local2, local3 sethi %hi(0x33333333), local4 sll local3, 1, local2 xor $1, local3, $1 srl $1, 8, local3 xor $2, local2, $2 xor local3, $2, local3 or local4, %lo(0x33333333), local4 and local3, local1, local3 sethi %hi(0x0000ffff), local1 sll local3, 8, local2 xor $2, local3, $2 srl $2, 2, local3 xor $1, local2, $1 xor local3, $1, local3 or local1, %lo(0x0000ffff), local1 and local3, local4, local3 sethi %hi(0x0f0f0f0f), local4 sll local3, 2, local2 ifelse($4,1, {LDPTR INPUT, local5}) xor $1, local3, $1 ifelse($4,1, {LDPTR OUTPUT, local7}) srl $1, 16, local3 xor $2, local2, $2 xor local3, $2, local3 or local4, %lo(0x0f0f0f0f), local4 and local3, local1, local3 sll local3, 16, local2 xor $2, local3, local1 srl local1, 4, local3 xor $1, local2, $1 xor local3, $1, local3 and local3, local4, local3 sll local3, 4, local2 xor $1, local3, $1 ! optional store: ifelse($3,1, {st $1, [in0]}) xor local1, local2, $2 ifelse($3,1, {st $2, [in0+4]}) }) ! {fp_ip_macro} ! ! Does initial permutation for next block mixed with ! final permutation for current block. ! ! parameter 1 original left ! parameter 2 original right ! parameter 3 left ip ! parameter 4 right ip ! parameter 5 1: load ks1/ks2 to in3/in4, add 120 to in4 ! 2: mov in4 to in3 ! ! also adds -8 to length in2 and loads loop counter to out4 define(fp_ip_macro, { ! {fp_ip_macro} ! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 define({temp1},{out4}) define({temp2},{local3}) define({ip1},{local1}) define({ip2},{local2}) define({ip4},{local4}) define({ip5},{local5}) ! $1 in local3, local4 ld [out2+256], ip1 sll out5, 29, temp1 or local3, local4, $1 srl out5, 3, $2 ifelse($5,2,{mov in4, in3}) ld [out2+272], ip5 srl $4, 4, local0 or $2, temp1, $2 srl $2, 1, temp1 xor temp1, $1, temp1 and temp1, ip5, temp1 xor local0, $3, local0 sll temp1, 1, temp2 xor $1, temp1, $1 and local0, ip1, local0 add in2, -8, in2 sll local0, 4, local7 xor $3, local0, $3 ld [out2+268], ip4 srl $1, 8, temp1 xor $2, temp2, $2 ld [out2+260], ip2 srl $3, 16, local0 xor $4, local7, $4 xor temp1, $2, temp1 xor local0, $4, local0 and temp1, ip4, temp1 and local0, ip2, local0 sll temp1, 8, temp2 xor $2, temp1, $2 sll local0, 16, local7 xor $4, local0, $4 srl $2, 2, temp1 xor $1, temp2, $1 ld [out2+264], temp2 ! ip3 srl $4, 2, local0 xor $3, local7, $3 xor temp1, $1, temp1 xor local0, $3, local0 and temp1, temp2, temp1 and local0, temp2, local0 sll temp1, 2, temp2 xor $1, temp1, $1 sll local0, 2, local7 xor $3, local0, $3 srl $1, 16, temp1 xor $2, temp2, $2 srl $3, 8, local0 xor $4, local7, $4 xor temp1, $2, temp1 xor local0, $4, local0 and temp1, ip2, temp1 and local0, ip4, local0 sll temp1, 16, temp2 xor $2, temp1, local4 sll local0, 8, local7 xor $4, local0, $4 srl $4, 1, local0 xor $3, local7, $3 srl local4, 4, temp1 xor local0, $3, local0 xor $1, temp2, $1 and local0, ip5, local0 sll local0, 1, local7 xor temp1, $1, temp1 xor $3, local0, $3 xor $4, local7, $4 sll $3, 3, local5 and temp1, ip1, temp1 sll temp1, 4, temp2 xor $1, temp1, $1 ifelse($5,1,{LDPTR KS2, in4}) sll $4, 3, local2 xor local4, temp2, $2 ! reload since used as temporar: ld [out2+280], out4 ! loop counter srl $3, 29, local0 ifelse($5,1,{add in4, 120, in4}) ifelse($5,1,{LDPTR KS1, in3}) srl $4, 29, local7 or local0, local5, $4 or local2, local7, $3 }) ! {load_little_endian} ! ! parameter 1 address ! parameter 2 destination left ! parameter 3 destination right ! parameter 4 temporar ! parameter 5 label define(load_little_endian, { ! {load_little_endian} ! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 ! first in memory to rightmost in register $5: ldub [$1+3], $2 ldub [$1+2], $4 sll $2, 8, $2 or $2, $4, $2 ldub [$1+1], $4 sll $2, 8, $2 or $2, $4, $2 ldub [$1+0], $4 sll $2, 8, $2 or $2, $4, $2 ldub [$1+3+4], $3 ldub [$1+2+4], $4 sll $3, 8, $3 or $3, $4, $3 ldub [$1+1+4], $4 sll $3, 8, $3 or $3, $4, $3 ldub [$1+0+4], $4 sll $3, 8, $3 or $3, $4, $3 $5a: }) ! {load_little_endian_inc} ! ! parameter 1 address ! parameter 2 destination left ! parameter 3 destination right ! parameter 4 temporar ! parameter 4 label ! ! adds 8 to address define(load_little_endian_inc, { ! {load_little_endian_inc} ! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 ! first in memory to rightmost in register $5: ldub [$1+3], $2 ldub [$1+2], $4 sll $2, 8, $2 or $2, $4, $2 ldub [$1+1], $4 sll $2, 8, $2 or $2, $4, $2 ldub [$1+0], $4 sll $2, 8, $2 or $2, $4, $2 ldub [$1+3+4], $3 add $1, 8, $1 ldub [$1+2+4-8], $4 sll $3, 8, $3 or $3, $4, $3 ldub [$1+1+4-8], $4 sll $3, 8, $3 or $3, $4, $3 ldub [$1+0+4-8], $4 sll $3, 8, $3 or $3, $4, $3 $5a: }) ! {load_n_bytes} ! ! Loads 1 to 7 bytes little endian ! Remaining bytes are zeroed. ! ! parameter 1 address ! parameter 2 length ! parameter 3 destination register left ! parameter 4 destination register right ! parameter 5 temp ! parameter 6 temp2 ! parameter 7 label ! parameter 8 return label define(load_n_bytes, { ! {load_n_bytes} ! $1 $2 $5 $6 $7 $8 $7 $8 $9 $7.0: call .+8 sll $2, 2, $6 add %o7,$7.jmp.table-$7.0,$5 add $5, $6, $5 mov 0, $4 ld [$5], $5 jmp %o7+$5 mov 0, $3 $7.7: ldub [$1+6], $5 sll $5, 16, $5 or $3, $5, $3 $7.6: ldub [$1+5], $5 sll $5, 8, $5 or $3, $5, $3 $7.5: ldub [$1+4], $5 or $3, $5, $3 $7.4: ldub [$1+3], $5 sll $5, 24, $5 or $4, $5, $4 $7.3: ldub [$1+2], $5 sll $5, 16, $5 or $4, $5, $4 $7.2: ldub [$1+1], $5 sll $5, 8, $5 or $4, $5, $4 $7.1: ldub [$1+0], $5 ba $8 or $4, $5, $4 .align 4 $7.jmp.table: .word 0 .word $7.1-$7.0 .word $7.2-$7.0 .word $7.3-$7.0 .word $7.4-$7.0 .word $7.5-$7.0 .word $7.6-$7.0 .word $7.7-$7.0 }) ! {store_little_endian} ! ! parameter 1 address ! parameter 2 source left ! parameter 3 source right ! parameter 4 temporar define(store_little_endian, { ! {store_little_endian} ! $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 ! rightmost in register to first in memory $5: and $2, 255, $4 stub $4, [$1+0] srl $2, 8, $4 and $4, 255, $4 stub $4, [$1+1] srl $2, 16, $4 and $4, 255, $4 stub $4, [$1+2] srl $2, 24, $4 stub $4, [$1+3] and $3, 255, $4 stub $4, [$1+0+4] srl $3, 8, $4 and $4, 255, $4 stub $4, [$1+1+4] srl $3, 16, $4 and $4, 255, $4 stub $4, [$1+2+4] srl $3, 24, $4 stub $4, [$1+3+4] $5a: }) ! {store_n_bytes} ! ! Stores 1 to 7 bytes little endian ! ! parameter 1 address ! parameter 2 length ! parameter 3 source register left ! parameter 4 source register right ! parameter 5 temp ! parameter 6 temp2 ! parameter 7 label ! parameter 8 return label define(store_n_bytes, { ! {store_n_bytes} ! $1 $2 $5 $6 $7 $8 $7 $8 $9 $7.0: call .+8 sll $2, 2, $6 add %o7,$7.jmp.table-$7.0,$5 add $5, $6, $5 ld [$5], $5 jmp %o7+$5 nop $7.7: srl $3, 16, $5 and $5, 0xff, $5 stub $5, [$1+6] $7.6: srl $3, 8, $5 and $5, 0xff, $5 stub $5, [$1+5] $7.5: and $3, 0xff, $5 stub $5, [$1+4] $7.4: srl $4, 24, $5 stub $5, [$1+3] $7.3: srl $4, 16, $5 and $5, 0xff, $5 stub $5, [$1+2] $7.2: srl $4, 8, $5 and $5, 0xff, $5 stub $5, [$1+1] $7.1: and $4, 0xff, $5 ba $8 stub $5, [$1] .align 4 $7.jmp.table: .word 0 .word $7.1-$7.0 .word $7.2-$7.0 .word $7.3-$7.0 .word $7.4-$7.0 .word $7.5-$7.0 .word $7.6-$7.0 .word $7.7-$7.0 }) define(testvalue,{1}) define(register_init, { ! For test purposes: sethi %hi(testvalue), local0 or local0, %lo(testvalue), local0 ifelse($1,{},{}, {mov local0, $1}) ifelse($2,{},{}, {mov local0, $2}) ifelse($3,{},{}, {mov local0, $3}) ifelse($4,{},{}, {mov local0, $4}) ifelse($5,{},{}, {mov local0, $5}) ifelse($6,{},{}, {mov local0, $6}) ifelse($7,{},{}, {mov local0, $7}) ifelse($8,{},{}, {mov local0, $8}) mov local0, local1 mov local0, local2 mov local0, local3 mov local0, local4 mov local0, local5 mov local0, local7 mov local0, local6 mov local0, out0 mov local0, out1 mov local0, out2 mov local0, out3 mov local0, out4 mov local0, out5 mov local0, global1 mov local0, global2 mov local0, global3 mov local0, global4 mov local0, global5 }) .section ".text" .align 32 .des_enc: ! key address in3 ! loads key next encryption/decryption first round from [in4] rounds_macro(in5, out5, 1, .des_enc.1, in3, in4, retl) .align 32 .des_dec: ! implemented with out5 as first parameter to avoid ! register exchange in ede modes ! key address in4 ! loads key next encryption/decryption first round from [in3] rounds_macro(out5, in5, -1, .des_dec.1, in4, in3, retl) ! void DES_encrypt1(data, ks, enc) ! ******************************* .align 32 .global DES_encrypt1 .type DES_encrypt1,#function DES_encrypt1: save %sp, FRAME, %sp sethi %hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 or global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 1: call .+8 add %o7,global1,global1 sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2 ld [in0], in5 ! left cmp in2, 0 ! enc be .encrypt.dec ld [in0+4], out5 ! right ! parameter 6 1/2 for include encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 1 for move in1 to in3 ! parameter 8 1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3 ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3, 0, 1, 1) rounds_macro(in5, out5, 1, .des_encrypt1.1, in3, in4) ! in4 not used fp_macro(in5, out5, 1) ! 1 for store to [in0] ret restore .encrypt.dec: add in1, 120, in3 ! use last subkey for first round ! parameter 6 1/2 for include encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 1 for move in1 to in3 ! parameter 8 1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3 ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 1) ! include dec, ks in4 fp_macro(out5, in5, 1) ! 1 for store to [in0] ret restore .DES_encrypt1.end: .size DES_encrypt1,.DES_encrypt1.end-DES_encrypt1 ! void DES_encrypt2(data, ks, enc) !********************************* ! encrypts/decrypts without initial/final permutation .align 32 .global DES_encrypt2 .type DES_encrypt2,#function DES_encrypt2: save %sp, FRAME, %sp sethi %hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 or global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 1: call .+8 add %o7,global1,global1 sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2 ! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halfs 3 left ! Errors caught by destest? Yes. Still? *NO* !sethi %hi(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! address sbox 1 !or global1, %lo(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! sbox 1 add global1, 256, global2 ! sbox 2 add global1, 512, global3 ! sbox 3 ld [in0], out5 ! right add global1, 768, global4 ! sbox 4 add global1, 1024, global5 ! sbox 5 ld [in0+4], in5 ! left add global1, 1280, local6 ! sbox 6 add global1, 1792, out3 ! sbox 8 ! rotate sll in5, 3, local5 mov in1, in3 ! key address to in3 sll out5, 3, local7 srl in5, 29, in5 srl out5, 29, out5 add in5, local5, in5 add out5, local7, out5 cmp in2, 0 ! we use our own stackframe be .encrypt2.dec STPTR in0, [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ] ld [in3], out0 ! key 7531 first round mov LOOPS, out4 ! loop counter ld [in3+4], out1 ! key 8642 first round sethi %hi(0x0000FC00), local5 call .des_enc mov in3, in4 ! rotate sll in5, 29, in0 srl in5, 3, in5 sll out5, 29, in1 add in5, in0, in5 srl out5, 3, out5 LDPTR [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ], in0 add out5, in1, out5 st in5, [in0] st out5, [in0+4] ret restore .encrypt2.dec: add in3, 120, in4 ld [in4], out0 ! key 7531 first round mov LOOPS, out4 ! loop counter ld [in4+4], out1 ! key 8642 first round sethi %hi(0x0000FC00), local5 mov in5, local1 ! left expected in out5 mov out5, in5 call .des_dec mov local1, out5 .encrypt2.finish: ! rotate sll in5, 29, in0 srl in5, 3, in5 sll out5, 29, in1 add in5, in0, in5 srl out5, 3, out5 LDPTR [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ], in0 add out5, in1, out5 st out5, [in0] st in5, [in0+4] ret restore .DES_encrypt2.end: .size DES_encrypt2, .DES_encrypt2.end-DES_encrypt2 ! void DES_encrypt3(data, ks1, ks2, ks3) ! ************************************** .align 32 .global DES_encrypt3 .type DES_encrypt3,#function DES_encrypt3: save %sp, FRAME, %sp sethi %hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 or global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 1: call .+8 add %o7,global1,global1 sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2 ld [in0], in5 ! left add in2, 120, in4 ! ks2 ld [in0+4], out5 ! right mov in3, in2 ! save ks3 ! parameter 6 1/2 for include encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 1 for mov in1 to in3 ! parameter 8 1 for mov in3 to in4 ! parameter 9 1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3 ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3, 1, 1, 0, 0) call .des_dec mov in2, in3 ! preload ks3 call .des_enc nop fp_macro(in5, out5, 1) ret restore .DES_encrypt3.end: .size DES_encrypt3,.DES_encrypt3.end-DES_encrypt3 ! void DES_decrypt3(data, ks1, ks2, ks3) ! ************************************** .align 32 .global DES_decrypt3 .type DES_decrypt3,#function DES_decrypt3: save %sp, FRAME, %sp sethi %hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 or global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 1: call .+8 add %o7,global1,global1 sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2 ld [in0], in5 ! left add in3, 120, in4 ! ks3 ld [in0+4], out5 ! right mov in2, in3 ! ks2 ! parameter 6 1/2 for include encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 1 for mov in1 to in3 ! parameter 8 1 for mov in3 to in4 ! parameter 9 1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3 ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 0, 0) call .des_enc add in1, 120, in4 ! preload ks1 call .des_dec nop fp_macro(out5, in5, 1) ret restore .DES_decrypt3.end: .size DES_decrypt3,.DES_decrypt3.end-DES_decrypt3 ! void DES_ncbc_encrypt(input, output, length, schedule, ivec, enc) ! ***************************************************************** .align 32 .global DES_ncbc_encrypt .type DES_ncbc_encrypt,#function DES_ncbc_encrypt: save %sp, FRAME, %sp define({INPUT}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+0*ARGSZ] }) define({OUTPUT}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+1*ARGSZ] }) define({IVEC}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+4*ARGSZ] }) sethi %hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 or global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 1: call .+8 add %o7,global1,global1 sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2 cmp in5, 0 ! enc be .ncbc.dec STPTR in4, IVEC ! addr left right temp label load_little_endian(in4, in5, out5, local3, .LLE1) ! iv addcc in2, -8, in2 ! bytes missing when first block done bl .ncbc.enc.seven.or.less mov in3, in4 ! schedule .ncbc.enc.next.block: load_little_endian(in0, out4, global4, local3, .LLE2) ! block .ncbc.enc.next.block_1: xor in5, out4, in5 ! iv xor xor out5, global4, out5 ! iv xor ! parameter 8 1 for move in3 to in4, 2 for move in4 to in3 ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3, 0, 0, 2) .ncbc.enc.next.block_2: !// call .des_enc ! compares in2 to 8 ! rounds inlined for alignment purposes add global1, 768, global4 ! address sbox 4 since register used below rounds_macro(in5, out5, 1, .ncbc.enc.1, in3, in4) ! include encryption ks in3 bl .ncbc.enc.next.block_fp add in0, 8, in0 ! input address ! If 8 or more bytes are to be encrypted after this block, ! we combine final permutation for this block with initial ! permutation for next block. Load next block: load_little_endian(in0, global3, global4, local5, .LLE12) ! parameter 1 original left ! parameter 2 original right ! parameter 3 left ip ! parameter 4 right ip ! parameter 5 1: load ks1/ks2 to in3/in4, add 120 to in4 ! 2: mov in4 to in3 ! ! also adds -8 to length in2 and loads loop counter to out4 fp_ip_macro(out0, out1, global3, global4, 2) store_little_endian(in1, out0, out1, local3, .SLE10) ! block ld [in3], out0 ! key 7531 first round next block mov in5, local1 xor global3, out5, in5 ! iv xor next block ld [in3+4], out1 ! key 8642 add global1, 512, global3 ! address sbox 3 since register used xor global4, local1, out5 ! iv xor next block ba .ncbc.enc.next.block_2 add in1, 8, in1 ! output address .ncbc.enc.next.block_fp: fp_macro(in5, out5) store_little_endian(in1, in5, out5, local3, .SLE1) ! block addcc in2, -8, in2 ! bytes missing when next block done bpos .ncbc.enc.next.block add in1, 8, in1 .ncbc.enc.seven.or.less: cmp in2, -8 ble .ncbc.enc.finish nop add in2, 8, local1 ! bytes to load ! addr, length, dest left, dest right, temp, temp2, label, ret label load_n_bytes(in0, local1, global4, out4, local2, local3, .LNB1, .ncbc.enc.next.block_1) ! Loads 1 to 7 bytes little endian to global4, out4 .ncbc.enc.finish: LDPTR IVEC, local4 store_little_endian(local4, in5, out5, local5, .SLE2) ! ivec ret restore .ncbc.dec: STPTR in0, INPUT cmp in2, 0 ! length add in3, 120, in3 LDPTR IVEC, local7 ! ivec ble .ncbc.dec.finish mov in3, in4 ! schedule STPTR in1, OUTPUT mov in0, local5 ! input load_little_endian(local7, in0, in1, local3, .LLE3) ! ivec .ncbc.dec.next.block: load_little_endian(local5, in5, out5, local3, .LLE4) ! block ! parameter 6 1/2 for include encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 1 for mov in1 to in3 ! parameter 8 1 for mov in3 to in4 ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 1) ! include decryprion ks in4 fp_macro(out5, in5, 0, 1) ! 1 for input and output address to local5/7 ! in2 is bytes left to be stored ! in2 is compared to 8 in the rounds xor out5, in0, out4 ! iv xor bl .ncbc.dec.seven.or.less xor in5, in1, global4 ! iv xor ! Load ivec next block now, since input and output address might be the same. load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE5) ! iv store_little_endian(local7, out4, global4, local3, .SLE3) STPTR local5, INPUT add local7, 8, local7 addcc in2, -8, in2 bg .ncbc.dec.next.block STPTR local7, OUTPUT .ncbc.dec.store.iv: LDPTR IVEC, local4 ! ivec store_little_endian(local4, in0, in1, local5, .SLE4) .ncbc.dec.finish: ret restore .ncbc.dec.seven.or.less: load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE13) ! ivec store_n_bytes(local7, in2, global4, out4, local3, local4, .SNB1, .ncbc.dec.store.iv) .DES_ncbc_encrypt.end: .size DES_ncbc_encrypt, .DES_ncbc_encrypt.end-DES_ncbc_encrypt ! void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(input, output, lenght, ks1, ks2, ks3, ivec, enc) ! ************************************************************************** .align 32 .global DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt .type DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt,#function DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt: save %sp, FRAME, %sp define({KS1}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+3*ARGSZ] }) define({KS2}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+4*ARGSZ] }) define({KS3}, { [%sp+BIAS+ARG0+5*ARGSZ] }) sethi %hi(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 or global1,%lo(.PIC.DES_SPtrans-1f),global1 1: call .+8 add %o7,global1,global1 sub global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2 LDPTR [%fp+BIAS+ARG0+7*ARGSZ], local3 ! enc LDPTR [%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local4 ! ivec cmp local3, 0 ! enc be .ede3.dec STPTR in4, KS2 STPTR in5, KS3 load_little_endian(local4, in5, out5, local3, .LLE6) ! ivec addcc in2, -8, in2 ! bytes missing after next block bl .ede3.enc.seven.or.less STPTR in3, KS1 .ede3.enc.next.block: load_little_endian(in0, out4, global4, local3, .LLE7) .ede3.enc.next.block_1: LDPTR KS2, in4 xor in5, out4, in5 ! iv xor xor out5, global4, out5 ! iv xor LDPTR KS1, in3 add in4, 120, in4 ! for decryption we use last subkey first nop ip_macro(in5, out5, in5, out5, in3) .ede3.enc.next.block_2: call .des_enc ! ks1 in3 nop call .des_dec ! ks2 in4 LDPTR KS3, in3 call .des_enc ! ks3 in3 compares in2 to 8 nop bl .ede3.enc.next.block_fp add in0, 8, in0 ! If 8 or more bytes are to be encrypted after this block, ! we combine final permutation for this block with initial ! permutation for next block. Load next block: load_little_endian(in0, global3, global4, local5, .LLE11) ! parameter 1 original left ! parameter 2 original right ! parameter 3 left ip ! parameter 4 right ip ! parameter 5 1: load ks1/ks2 to in3/in4, add 120 to in4 ! 2: mov in4 to in3 ! ! also adds -8 to length in2 and loads loop counter to out4 fp_ip_macro(out0, out1, global3, global4, 1) store_little_endian(in1, out0, out1, local3, .SLE9) ! block mov in5, local1 xor global3, out5, in5 ! iv xor next block ld [in3], out0 ! key 7531 add global1, 512, global3 ! address sbox 3 xor global4, local1, out5 ! iv xor next block ld [in3+4], out1 ! key 8642 add global1, 768, global4 ! address sbox 4 ba .ede3.enc.next.block_2 add in1, 8, in1 .ede3.enc.next.block_fp: fp_macro(in5, out5) store_little_endian(in1, in5, out5, local3, .SLE5) ! block addcc in2, -8, in2 ! bytes missing when next block done bpos .ede3.enc.next.block add in1, 8, in1 .ede3.enc.seven.or.less: cmp in2, -8 ble .ede3.enc.finish nop add in2, 8, local1 ! bytes to load ! addr, length, dest left, dest right, temp, temp2, label, ret label load_n_bytes(in0, local1, global4, out4, local2, local3, .LNB2, .ede3.enc.next.block_1) .ede3.enc.finish: LDPTR [%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local4 ! ivec store_little_endian(local4, in5, out5, local5, .SLE6) ! ivec ret restore .ede3.dec: STPTR in0, INPUT add in5, 120, in5 STPTR in1, OUTPUT mov in0, local5 add in3, 120, in3 STPTR in3, KS1 cmp in2, 0 ble .ede3.dec.finish STPTR in5, KS3 LDPTR [%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local7 ! iv load_little_endian(local7, in0, in1, local3, .LLE8) .ede3.dec.next.block: load_little_endian(local5, in5, out5, local3, .LLE9) ! parameter 6 1/2 for include encryption/decryption ! parameter 7 1 for mov in1 to in3 ! parameter 8 1 for mov in3 to in4 ! parameter 9 1 for load ks3 and ks2 to in4 and in3 ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 0, 1) ! inc .des_dec ks3 in4 call .des_enc ! ks2 in3 LDPTR KS1, in4 call .des_dec ! ks1 in4 nop fp_macro(out5, in5, 0, 1) ! 1 for input and output address local5/7 ! in2 is bytes left to be stored ! in2 is compared to 8 in the rounds xor out5, in0, out4 bl .ede3.dec.seven.or.less xor in5, in1, global4 load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE10) ! iv next block store_little_endian(local7, out4, global4, local3, .SLE7) ! block STPTR local5, INPUT addcc in2, -8, in2 add local7, 8, local7 bg .ede3.dec.next.block STPTR local7, OUTPUT .ede3.dec.store.iv: LDPTR [%fp+BIAS+ARG0+6*ARGSZ], local4 ! ivec store_little_endian(local4, in0, in1, local5, .SLE8) ! ivec .ede3.dec.finish: ret restore .ede3.dec.seven.or.less: load_little_endian_inc(local5, in0, in1, local3, .LLE14) ! iv store_n_bytes(local7, in2, global4, out4, local3, local4, .SNB2, .ede3.dec.store.iv) .DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt.end: .size DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt,.DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt.end-DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt .align 256 .type .des_and,#object .size .des_and,284 .des_and: ! This table is used for AND 0xFC when it is known that register ! bits 8-31 are zero. Makes it possible to do three arithmetic ! operations in one cycle. .byte 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 4, 4 .byte 8, 8, 8, 8, 12, 12, 12, 12 .byte 16, 16, 16, 16, 20, 20, 20, 20 .byte 24, 24, 24, 24, 28, 28, 28, 28 .byte 32, 32, 32, 32, 36, 36, 36, 36 .byte 40, 40, 40, 40, 44, 44, 44, 44 .byte 48, 48, 48, 48, 52, 52, 52, 52 .byte 56, 56, 56, 56, 60, 60, 60, 60 .byte 64, 64, 64, 64, 68, 68, 68, 68 .byte 72, 72, 72, 72, 76, 76, 76, 76 .byte 80, 80, 80, 80, 84, 84, 84, 84 .byte 88, 88, 88, 88, 92, 92, 92, 92 .byte 96, 96, 96, 96, 100, 100, 100, 100 .byte 104, 104, 104, 104, 108, 108, 108, 108 .byte 112, 112, 112, 112, 116, 116, 116, 116 .byte 120, 120, 120, 120, 124, 124, 124, 124 .byte 128, 128, 128, 128, 132, 132, 132, 132 .byte 136, 136, 136, 136, 140, 140, 140, 140 .byte 144, 144, 144, 144, 148, 148, 148, 148 .byte 152, 152, 152, 152, 156, 156, 156, 156 .byte 160, 160, 160, 160, 164, 164, 164, 164 .byte 168, 168, 168, 168, 172, 172, 172, 172 .byte 176, 176, 176, 176, 180, 180, 180, 180 .byte 184, 184, 184, 184, 188, 188, 188, 188 .byte 192, 192, 192, 192, 196, 196, 196, 196 .byte 200, 200, 200, 200, 204, 204, 204, 204 .byte 208, 208, 208, 208, 212, 212, 212, 212 .byte 216, 216, 216, 216, 220, 220, 220, 220 .byte 224, 224, 224, 224, 228, 228, 228, 228 .byte 232, 232, 232, 232, 236, 236, 236, 236 .byte 240, 240, 240, 240, 244, 244, 244, 244 .byte 248, 248, 248, 248, 252, 252, 252, 252 ! 5 numbers for initil/final permutation .word 0x0f0f0f0f ! offset 256 .word 0x0000ffff ! 260 .word 0x33333333 ! 264 .word 0x00ff00ff ! 268 .word 0x55555555 ! 272 .word 0 ! 276 .word LOOPS ! 280 .word 0x0000FC00 ! 284 .global DES_SPtrans .type DES_SPtrans,#object .size DES_SPtrans,2048 .align 64 DES_SPtrans: .PIC.DES_SPtrans: ! nibble 0 .word 0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x02000002, 0x02080802 .word 0x02000000, 0x00080802, 0x00080002, 0x02000002 .word 0x00080802, 0x02080800, 0x02080000, 0x00000802 .word 0x02000802, 0x02000000, 0x00000000, 0x00080002 .word 0x00080000, 0x00000002, 0x02000800, 0x00080800 .word 0x02080802, 0x02080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800 .word 0x00000002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02080002 .word 0x00000800, 0x02000802, 0x02080002, 0x00000000 .word 0x00000000, 0x02080802, 0x02000800, 0x00080002 .word 0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800 .word 0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02000002 .word 0x00080802, 0x00000002, 0x02000002, 0x02080000 .word 0x02080802, 0x00080800, 0x02080000, 0x02000802 .word 0x02000000, 0x00000802, 0x00080002, 0x00000000 .word 0x00080000, 0x02000000, 0x02000802, 0x02080800 .word 0x00000002, 0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080802 ! nibble 1 .word 0x40108010, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, 0x40100000 .word 0x40000010, 0x00008010, 0x40008000, 0x00108000 .word 0x00008000, 0x40100010, 0x00000010, 0x40008000 .word 0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40100000, 0x00000010 .word 0x00100000, 0x40008010, 0x40100010, 0x00008000 .word 0x00108010, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, 0x00100010 .word 0x40008010, 0x00108010, 0x40108000, 0x40000010 .word 0x40000000, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40108010 .word 0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40008000, 0x00108010 .word 0x40108010, 0x00100010, 0x40000010, 0x00000000 .word 0x40000000, 0x00008010, 0x00100000, 0x40100010 .word 0x00008000, 0x40000000, 0x00108010, 0x40008010 .word 0x40108000, 0x00008000, 0x00000000, 0x40000010 .word 0x00000010, 0x40108010, 0x00108000, 0x40100000 .word 0x40100010, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40008000 .word 0x40008010, 0x00000010, 0x40100000, 0x00108000 ! nibble 2 .word 0x04000001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x04000101 .word 0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04000101, 0x00040100 .word 0x04000100, 0x00040000, 0x04040000, 0x00000001 .word 0x04040101, 0x00000101, 0x00000001, 0x04040001 .word 0x00000000, 0x00040001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100 .word 0x00000101, 0x04040101, 0x00040000, 0x04000001 .word 0x04040001, 0x04000100, 0x00040101, 0x04040000 .word 0x00040100, 0x00000000, 0x04000000, 0x00040101 .word 0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x00000001, 0x00040000 .word 0x00000101, 0x00040001, 0x04040000, 0x04000101 .word 0x00000000, 0x04040100, 0x00040100, 0x04040001 .word 0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101, 0x00000001 .word 0x00040101, 0x04000001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101 .word 0x00040000, 0x04000100, 0x04000101, 0x00040100 .word 0x04000100, 0x00000000, 0x04040001, 0x00000101 .word 0x04000001, 0x00040101, 0x00000100, 0x04040000 ! nibble 3 .word 0x00401008, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10401008 .word 0x00000000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008, 0x00400008 .word 0x10401000, 0x10000008, 0x10000000, 0x00001008 .word 0x10000008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000, 0x10000000 .word 0x10400008, 0x00401000, 0x00001000, 0x00000008 .word 0x00401000, 0x10001008, 0x10400000, 0x00001000 .word 0x00001008, 0x00000000, 0x00400008, 0x10401000 .word 0x10001000, 0x10400008, 0x10401008, 0x00400000 .word 0x10400008, 0x00001008, 0x00400000, 0x10000008 .word 0x00401000, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10400000 .word 0x10001008, 0x00000000, 0x00001000, 0x00400008 .word 0x00000000, 0x10400008, 0x10401000, 0x00001000 .word 0x10000000, 0x10401008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000 .word 0x10401008, 0x00000008, 0x10001000, 0x00401008 .word 0x00400008, 0x00401000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008 .word 0x00001008, 0x10000000, 0x10000008, 0x10401000 ! nibble 4 .word 0x08000000, 0x00010000, 0x00000400, 0x08010420 .word 0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x08010000 .word 0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x00010400 .word 0x08000420, 0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000000 .word 0x00010400, 0x08000000, 0x00010020, 0x00000420 .word 0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x00000000, 0x08000020 .word 0x00000020, 0x08000420, 0x08010420, 0x00010020 .word 0x08010000, 0x00000400, 0x00000420, 0x08010400 .word 0x08010400, 0x08000420, 0x00010020, 0x08010000 .word 0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x08000400 .word 0x08000000, 0x00010400, 0x08010420, 0x00000000 .word 0x00010420, 0x08000000, 0x00000400, 0x00010020 .word 0x08000420, 0x00000400, 0x00000000, 0x08010420 .word 0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000420, 0x00010000 .word 0x00010400, 0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00000420 .word 0x00000020, 0x00010420, 0x08010000, 0x08000020 ! nibble 5 .word 0x80000040, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80202000 .word 0x00200040, 0x00002000, 0x80002040, 0x00200000 .word 0x00002040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x80000000 .word 0x80002000, 0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040 .word 0x00200000, 0x80002040, 0x80200040, 0x00000000 .word 0x00002000, 0x00000040, 0x80202000, 0x80200040 .word 0x80202040, 0x80200000, 0x80000000, 0x00002040 .word 0x00000040, 0x00202000, 0x00202040, 0x80002000 .word 0x00002040, 0x80000000, 0x80002000, 0x00202040 .word 0x80202000, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80002000 .word 0x80000000, 0x00002000, 0x80200040, 0x00200000 .word 0x00200040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00000040 .word 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00200000, 0x80002040 .word 0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040, 0x00000000 .word 0x00002000, 0x80000040, 0x80002040, 0x80202000 .word 0x80200000, 0x00002040, 0x00000040, 0x80200040 ! nibble 6 .word 0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000200, 0x01000004 .word 0x01004204, 0x00004004, 0x00004200, 0x00000000 .word 0x01000000, 0x01000204, 0x00000204, 0x01004000 .word 0x00000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00000204 .word 0x01000204, 0x00004000, 0x00004004, 0x01004204 .word 0x00000000, 0x01000200, 0x01000004, 0x00004200 .word 0x01004004, 0x00004204, 0x01004200, 0x00000004 .word 0x00004204, 0x01004004, 0x00000200, 0x01000000 .word 0x00004204, 0x01004000, 0x01004004, 0x00000204 .word 0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000000, 0x01004004 .word 0x01000204, 0x00004204, 0x00004200, 0x00000000 .word 0x00000200, 0x01000004, 0x00000004, 0x01000200 .word 0x00000000, 0x01000204, 0x01000200, 0x00004200 .word 0x00000204, 0x00004000, 0x01004204, 0x01000000 .word 0x01004200, 0x00000004, 0x00004004, 0x01004204 .word 0x01000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00004004 ! nibble 7 .word 0x20800080, 0x20820000, 0x00020080, 0x00000000 .word 0x20020000, 0x00800080, 0x20800000, 0x20820080 .word 0x00000080, 0x20000000, 0x00820000, 0x00020080 .word 0x00820080, 0x20020080, 0x20000080, 0x20800000 .word 0x00020000, 0x00820080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000 .word 0x20820080, 0x20000080, 0x00000000, 0x00820000 .word 0x20000000, 0x00800000, 0x20020080, 0x20800080 .word 0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20820000, 0x00000080 .word 0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20000080, 0x20820080 .word 0x00020080, 0x20000000, 0x00000000, 0x00820000 .word 0x20800080, 0x20020080, 0x20020000, 0x00800080 .word 0x20820000, 0x00000080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000 .word 0x20820080, 0x00800000, 0x20800000, 0x20000080 .word 0x00820000, 0x00020080, 0x20020080, 0x20800000 .word 0x00000080, 0x20820000, 0x00820080, 0x00000000 .word 0x20000000, 0x20800080, 0x00020000, 0x00820080 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/asm/des-586.pl0000644000000000000000000003511513176625657016373 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # The inner loop instruction sequence and the IP/FP modifications are from # Svend Olaf Mikkelsen $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; require "cbc.pl"; require "desboth.pl"; # base code is in microsft # op dest, source # format. # $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"des-586.pl"); $L="edi"; $R="esi"; $trans="ebp"; $small_footprint=1 if (grep(/\-DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT/,@ARGV)); # one can discuss setting this variable to 1 unconditionally, as # the folded loop is only 3% slower than unrolled, but >7 times smaller &public_label("DES_SPtrans"); &static_label("des_sptrans"); &DES_encrypt_internal(); &DES_decrypt_internal(); &DES_encrypt("DES_encrypt1",1); &DES_encrypt("DES_encrypt2",0); &DES_encrypt3("DES_encrypt3",1); &DES_encrypt3("DES_decrypt3",0); &cbc("DES_ncbc_encrypt","DES_encrypt1","DES_encrypt1",0,4,5,3,5,-1); &cbc("DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt","DES_encrypt3","DES_decrypt3",0,6,7,3,4,5); &DES_SPtrans(); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub DES_encrypt_internal() { &function_begin_B("_x86_DES_encrypt"); if ($small_footprint) { &lea("edx",&DWP(128,"ecx")); &push("edx"); &push("ecx"); &set_label("eloop"); &D_ENCRYPT(0,$L,$R,0,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); &comment(""); &D_ENCRYPT(1,$R,$L,2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); &comment(""); &add("ecx",16); &cmp("ecx",&swtmp(1)); &mov(&swtmp(0),"ecx"); &jb(&label("eloop")); &add("esp",8); } else { &push("ecx"); for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=2) { &comment("Round $i"); &D_ENCRYPT($i,$L,$R,$i*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1)); &D_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,($i+1)*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); } &add("esp",4); } &ret(); &function_end_B("_x86_DES_encrypt"); } sub DES_decrypt_internal() { &function_begin_B("_x86_DES_decrypt"); if ($small_footprint) { &push("ecx"); &lea("ecx",&DWP(128,"ecx")); &push("ecx"); &set_label("dloop"); &D_ENCRYPT(0,$L,$R,-2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); &comment(""); &D_ENCRYPT(1,$R,$L,-4,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); &comment(""); &sub("ecx",16); &cmp("ecx",&swtmp(1)); &mov(&swtmp(0),"ecx"); &ja(&label("dloop")); &add("esp",8); } else { &push("ecx"); for ($i=15; $i>0; $i-=2) { &comment("Round $i"); &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i,$L,$R,$i*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1)); &D_ENCRYPT(15-$i+1,$R,$L,($i-1)*2,$trans,"eax","ebx","ecx","edx",&swtmp(0)); } &add("esp",4); } &ret(); &function_end_B("_x86_DES_decrypt"); } sub DES_encrypt { local($name,$do_ip)=@_; &function_begin_B($name); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &comment(""); &comment("Load the 2 words"); if ($do_ip) { &mov($R,&wparam(0)); &xor( "ecx", "ecx" ); &push("ebx"); &push("ebp"); &mov("eax",&DWP(0,$R,"",0)); &mov("ebx",&wparam(2)); # get encrypt flag &mov($L,&DWP(4,$R,"",0)); &comment(""); &comment("IP"); &IP_new("eax",$L,$R,3); } else { &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); &xor( "ecx", "ecx" ); &push("ebx"); &push("ebp"); &mov($R,&DWP(0,"eax","",0)); &mov("ebx",&wparam(2)); # get encrypt flag &rotl($R,3); &mov($L,&DWP(4,"eax","",0)); &rotl($L,3); } # PIC-ification:-) &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($trans); &lea ($trans,&DWP(&label("des_sptrans")."-".&label("pic_point"),$trans)); &mov( "ecx", &wparam(1) ); &cmp("ebx","0"); &je(&label("decrypt")); &call("_x86_DES_encrypt"); &jmp(&label("done")); &set_label("decrypt"); &call("_x86_DES_decrypt"); &set_label("done"); if ($do_ip) { &comment(""); &comment("FP"); &mov("edx",&wparam(0)); &FP_new($L,$R,"eax",3); &mov(&DWP(0,"edx","",0),"eax"); &mov(&DWP(4,"edx","",0),$R); } else { &comment(""); &comment("Fixup"); &rotr($L,3); # r &mov("eax",&wparam(0)); &rotr($R,3); # l &mov(&DWP(0,"eax","",0),$L); &mov(&DWP(4,"eax","",0),$R); } &pop("ebp"); &pop("ebx"); &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } sub D_ENCRYPT { local($r,$L,$R,$S,$trans,$u,$tmp1,$tmp2,$t,$wp1)=@_; &mov( $u, &DWP(&n2a($S*4),$tmp2,"",0)); &xor( $tmp1, $tmp1); &mov( $t, &DWP(&n2a(($S+1)*4),$tmp2,"",0)); &xor( $u, $R); &xor( $tmp2, $tmp2); &xor( $t, $R); &and( $u, "0xfcfcfcfc" ); &and( $t, "0xcfcfcfcf" ); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($u) ); &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($u) ); &rotr( $t, 4 ); &xor( $L, &DWP(" ",$trans,$tmp1,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &LB($t) ); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x200",$trans,$tmp2,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); &shr( $u, 16); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x100",$trans,$tmp1,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &HB($u) ); &shr( $t, 16); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x300",$trans,$tmp2,0)); &movb( &LB($tmp2), &HB($t) ); &and( $u, "0xff" ); &and( $t, "0xff" ); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x600",$trans,$tmp1,0)); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x700",$trans,$tmp2,0)); &mov( $tmp2, $wp1 ); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x400",$trans,$u,0)); &xor( $L, &DWP("0x500",$trans,$t,0)); } sub n2a { sprintf("%d",$_[0]); } # now has a side affect of rotating $a by $shift sub R_PERM_OP { local($a,$b,$tt,$shift,$mask,$last)=@_; &rotl( $a, $shift ) if ($shift != 0); &mov( $tt, $a ); &xor( $a, $b ); &and( $a, $mask ); # This can never succeed, and besides it is difficult to see what the # idea was - Ben 13 Feb 99 if (!$last eq $b) { &xor( $b, $a ); &xor( $tt, $a ); } else { &xor( $tt, $a ); &xor( $b, $a ); } &comment(""); } sub IP_new { local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_; &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 4,"0xf0f0f0f0",$l); &R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,20,"0xfff0000f",$l); &R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,14,"0x33333333",$r); &R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,22,"0x03fc03fc",$r); &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 9,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); if ($lr != 3) { if (($lr-3) < 0) { &rotr($tt, 3-$lr); } else { &rotl($tt, $lr-3); } } if ($lr != 2) { if (($lr-2) < 0) { &rotr($r, 2-$lr); } else { &rotl($r, $lr-2); } } } sub FP_new { local($l,$r,$tt,$lr)=@_; if ($lr != 2) { if (($lr-2) < 0) { &rotl($r, 2-$lr); } else { &rotr($r, $lr-2); } } if ($lr != 3) { if (($lr-3) < 0) { &rotl($l, 3-$lr); } else { &rotr($l, $lr-3); } } &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt, 0,"0xaaaaaaaa",$r); &R_PERM_OP($tt,$r,$l,23,"0x03fc03fc",$r); &R_PERM_OP($l,$r,$tt,10,"0x33333333",$l); &R_PERM_OP($r,$tt,$l,18,"0xfff0000f",$l); &R_PERM_OP($l,$tt,$r,12,"0xf0f0f0f0",$r); &rotr($tt , 4); } sub DES_SPtrans { &set_label("DES_SPtrans",64); &set_label("des_sptrans"); &data_word(0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x02000002, 0x02080802); &data_word(0x02000000, 0x00080802, 0x00080002, 0x02000002); &data_word(0x00080802, 0x02080800, 0x02080000, 0x00000802); &data_word(0x02000802, 0x02000000, 0x00000000, 0x00080002); &data_word(0x00080000, 0x00000002, 0x02000800, 0x00080800); &data_word(0x02080802, 0x02080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800); &data_word(0x00000002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02080002); &data_word(0x00000800, 0x02000802, 0x02080002, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x02080802, 0x02000800, 0x00080002); &data_word(0x02080800, 0x00080000, 0x00000802, 0x02000800); &data_word(0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080800, 0x02000002); &data_word(0x00080802, 0x00000002, 0x02000002, 0x02080000); &data_word(0x02080802, 0x00080800, 0x02080000, 0x02000802); &data_word(0x02000000, 0x00000802, 0x00080002, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00080000, 0x02000000, 0x02000802, 0x02080800); &data_word(0x00000002, 0x02080002, 0x00000800, 0x00080802); # nibble 1 &data_word(0x40108010, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, 0x40100000); &data_word(0x40000010, 0x00008010, 0x40008000, 0x00108000); &data_word(0x00008000, 0x40100010, 0x00000010, 0x40008000); &data_word(0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40100000, 0x00000010); &data_word(0x00100000, 0x40008010, 0x40100010, 0x00008000); &data_word(0x00108010, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, 0x00100010); &data_word(0x40008010, 0x00108010, 0x40108000, 0x40000010); &data_word(0x40000000, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40108010); &data_word(0x00100010, 0x40108000, 0x40008000, 0x00108010); &data_word(0x40108010, 0x00100010, 0x40000010, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x40000000, 0x00008010, 0x00100000, 0x40100010); &data_word(0x00008000, 0x40000000, 0x00108010, 0x40008010); &data_word(0x40108000, 0x00008000, 0x00000000, 0x40000010); &data_word(0x00000010, 0x40108010, 0x00108000, 0x40100000); &data_word(0x40100010, 0x00100000, 0x00008010, 0x40008000); &data_word(0x40008010, 0x00000010, 0x40100000, 0x00108000); # nibble 2 &data_word(0x04000001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x04000101); &data_word(0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04000101, 0x00040100); &data_word(0x04000100, 0x00040000, 0x04040000, 0x00000001); &data_word(0x04040101, 0x00000101, 0x00000001, 0x04040001); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x00040001, 0x04040100, 0x00000100); &data_word(0x00000101, 0x04040101, 0x00040000, 0x04000001); &data_word(0x04040001, 0x04000100, 0x00040101, 0x04040000); &data_word(0x00040100, 0x00000000, 0x04000000, 0x00040101); &data_word(0x04040100, 0x00000100, 0x00000001, 0x00040000); &data_word(0x00000101, 0x00040001, 0x04040000, 0x04000101); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x04040100, 0x00040100, 0x04040001); &data_word(0x00040001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101, 0x00000001); &data_word(0x00040101, 0x04000001, 0x04000000, 0x04040101); &data_word(0x00040000, 0x04000100, 0x04000101, 0x00040100); &data_word(0x04000100, 0x00000000, 0x04040001, 0x00000101); &data_word(0x04000001, 0x00040101, 0x00000100, 0x04040000); # nibble 3 &data_word(0x00401008, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10401008); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008, 0x00400008); &data_word(0x10401000, 0x10000008, 0x10000000, 0x00001008); &data_word(0x10000008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000, 0x10000000); &data_word(0x10400008, 0x00401000, 0x00001000, 0x00000008); &data_word(0x00401000, 0x10001008, 0x10400000, 0x00001000); &data_word(0x00001008, 0x00000000, 0x00400008, 0x10401000); &data_word(0x10001000, 0x10400008, 0x10401008, 0x00400000); &data_word(0x10400008, 0x00001008, 0x00400000, 0x10000008); &data_word(0x00401000, 0x10001000, 0x00000008, 0x10400000); &data_word(0x10001008, 0x00000000, 0x00001000, 0x00400008); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x10400008, 0x10401000, 0x00001000); &data_word(0x10000000, 0x10401008, 0x00401008, 0x00400000); &data_word(0x10401008, 0x00000008, 0x10001000, 0x00401008); &data_word(0x00400008, 0x00401000, 0x10400000, 0x10001008); &data_word(0x00001008, 0x10000000, 0x10000008, 0x10401000); # nibble 4 &data_word(0x08000000, 0x00010000, 0x00000400, 0x08010420); &data_word(0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x08010000); &data_word(0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x00010400); &data_word(0x08000420, 0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00010400, 0x08000000, 0x00010020, 0x00000420); &data_word(0x08000400, 0x00010420, 0x00000000, 0x08000020); &data_word(0x00000020, 0x08000420, 0x08010420, 0x00010020); &data_word(0x08010000, 0x00000400, 0x00000420, 0x08010400); &data_word(0x08010400, 0x08000420, 0x00010020, 0x08010000); &data_word(0x00010000, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x08000400); &data_word(0x08000000, 0x00010400, 0x08010420, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00010420, 0x08000000, 0x00000400, 0x00010020); &data_word(0x08000420, 0x00000400, 0x00000000, 0x08010420); &data_word(0x08010020, 0x08010400, 0x00000420, 0x00010000); &data_word(0x00010400, 0x08010020, 0x08000400, 0x00000420); &data_word(0x00000020, 0x00010420, 0x08010000, 0x08000020); # nibble 5 &data_word(0x80000040, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80202000); &data_word(0x00200040, 0x00002000, 0x80002040, 0x00200000); &data_word(0x00002040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x80000000); &data_word(0x80002000, 0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040); &data_word(0x00200000, 0x80002040, 0x80200040, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00002000, 0x00000040, 0x80202000, 0x80200040); &data_word(0x80202040, 0x80200000, 0x80000000, 0x00002040); &data_word(0x00000040, 0x00202000, 0x00202040, 0x80002000); &data_word(0x00002040, 0x80000000, 0x80002000, 0x00202040); &data_word(0x80202000, 0x00200040, 0x00000000, 0x80002000); &data_word(0x80000000, 0x00002000, 0x80200040, 0x00200000); &data_word(0x00200040, 0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00000040); &data_word(0x80202040, 0x00202000, 0x00200000, 0x80002040); &data_word(0x80000040, 0x80200000, 0x00202040, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00002000, 0x80000040, 0x80002040, 0x80202000); &data_word(0x80200000, 0x00002040, 0x00000040, 0x80200040); # nibble 6 &data_word(0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000200, 0x01000004); &data_word(0x01004204, 0x00004004, 0x00004200, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x01000000, 0x01000204, 0x00000204, 0x01004000); &data_word(0x00000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00000204); &data_word(0x01000204, 0x00004000, 0x00004004, 0x01004204); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x01000200, 0x01000004, 0x00004200); &data_word(0x01004004, 0x00004204, 0x01004200, 0x00000004); &data_word(0x00004204, 0x01004004, 0x00000200, 0x01000000); &data_word(0x00004204, 0x01004000, 0x01004004, 0x00000204); &data_word(0x00004000, 0x00000200, 0x01000000, 0x01004004); &data_word(0x01000204, 0x00004204, 0x00004200, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x00000200, 0x01000004, 0x00000004, 0x01000200); &data_word(0x00000000, 0x01000204, 0x01000200, 0x00004200); &data_word(0x00000204, 0x00004000, 0x01004204, 0x01000000); &data_word(0x01004200, 0x00000004, 0x00004004, 0x01004204); &data_word(0x01000004, 0x01004200, 0x01004000, 0x00004004); # nibble 7 &data_word(0x20800080, 0x20820000, 0x00020080, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x20020000, 0x00800080, 0x20800000, 0x20820080); &data_word(0x00000080, 0x20000000, 0x00820000, 0x00020080); &data_word(0x00820080, 0x20020080, 0x20000080, 0x20800000); &data_word(0x00020000, 0x00820080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000); &data_word(0x20820080, 0x20000080, 0x00000000, 0x00820000); &data_word(0x20000000, 0x00800000, 0x20020080, 0x20800080); &data_word(0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20820000, 0x00000080); &data_word(0x00800000, 0x00020000, 0x20000080, 0x20820080); &data_word(0x00020080, 0x20000000, 0x00000000, 0x00820000); &data_word(0x20800080, 0x20020080, 0x20020000, 0x00800080); &data_word(0x20820000, 0x00000080, 0x00800080, 0x20020000); &data_word(0x20820080, 0x00800000, 0x20800000, 0x20000080); &data_word(0x00820000, 0x00020080, 0x20020080, 0x20800000); &data_word(0x00000080, 0x20820000, 0x00820080, 0x00000000); &data_word(0x20000000, 0x20800080, 0x00020000, 0x00820080); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/asm/desboth.pl0000644000000000000000000000323713176625657016730 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $L="edi"; $R="esi"; sub DES_encrypt3 { local($name,$enc)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,""); &push("ebx"); &mov("ebx",&wparam(0)); &push("ebp"); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &comment(""); &comment("Load the data words"); &mov($L,&DWP(0,"ebx","",0)); &mov($R,&DWP(4,"ebx","",0)); &stack_push(3); &comment(""); &comment("IP"); &IP_new($L,$R,"edx",0); # put them back if ($enc) { &mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R); &mov("eax",&wparam(1)); &mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"edx"); &mov("edi",&wparam(2)); &mov("esi",&wparam(3)); } else { &mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R); &mov("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"edx"); &mov("edi",&wparam(2)); &mov("eax",&wparam(3)); } &mov(&swtmp(2), (DWC(($enc)?"1":"0"))); &mov(&swtmp(1), "eax"); &mov(&swtmp(0), "ebx"); &call("DES_encrypt2"); &mov(&swtmp(2), (DWC(($enc)?"0":"1"))); &mov(&swtmp(1), "edi"); &mov(&swtmp(0), "ebx"); &call("DES_encrypt2"); &mov(&swtmp(2), (DWC(($enc)?"1":"0"))); &mov(&swtmp(1), "esi"); &mov(&swtmp(0), "ebx"); &call("DES_encrypt2"); &stack_pop(3); &mov($L,&DWP(0,"ebx","",0)); &mov($R,&DWP(4,"ebx","",0)); &comment(""); &comment("FP"); &FP_new($L,$R,"eax",0); &mov(&DWP(0,"ebx","",0),"eax"); &mov(&DWP(4,"ebx","",0),$R); &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &pop("ebp"); &pop("ebx"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/des_locl.h0000644000000000000000000002206713176625657016122 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_DES_LOCL_H # define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif # define ITERATIONS 16 # define HALF_ITERATIONS 8 /* used in des_read and des_write */ # define MAXWRITE (1024*16) # define BSIZE (MAXWRITE+4) # define c2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ # define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c)))); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((DES_LONG)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } # define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff)) /* * replacements for htonl and ntohl since I have no idea what to do when * faced with machines with 8 byte longs. */ # define HDRSIZE 4 # define n2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))) # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ # define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } # if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER)) # define ROTATE(a,n) (_lrotr(a,n)) # elif defined(__ICC) # define ROTATE(a,n) (_rotr(a,n)) # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(__STRICT_ANSI__) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC) # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ("rorl %1,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "I"(n),"0"(a) \ : "cc"); \ ret; \ }) # endif # endif # ifndef ROTATE # define ROTATE(a,n) (((a)>>(n))+((a)<<(32-(n)))) # endif /* * Don't worry about the LOAD_DATA() stuff, that is used by fcrypt() to add * it's little bit to the front */ # ifdef DES_FCRYPT # define LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1) \ { DES_LONG tmp; LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp); } # define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \ t=R^(R>>16L); \ u=t&E0; t&=E1; \ tmp=(u<<16); u^=R^s[S ]; u^=tmp; \ tmp=(t<<16); t^=R^s[S+1]; t^=tmp # else # define LOAD_DATA_tmp(a,b,c,d,e,f) LOAD_DATA(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) # define LOAD_DATA(R,S,u,t,E0,E1,tmp) \ u=R^s[S ]; \ t=R^s[S+1] # endif /* * It recently occurred to me that 0^0^0^0^0^0^0 == 0, so there is no reason * to not xor all the sub items together. This potentially saves a register * since things can be xored directly into L */ # define D_ENCRYPT(LL,R,S) { \ LOAD_DATA_tmp(R,S,u,t,E0,E1); \ t=ROTATE(t,4); \ LL^= \ DES_SPtrans[0][(u>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \ DES_SPtrans[2][(u>>10L)&0x3f]^ \ DES_SPtrans[4][(u>>18L)&0x3f]^ \ DES_SPtrans[6][(u>>26L)&0x3f]^ \ DES_SPtrans[1][(t>> 2L)&0x3f]^ \ DES_SPtrans[3][(t>>10L)&0x3f]^ \ DES_SPtrans[5][(t>>18L)&0x3f]^ \ DES_SPtrans[7][(t>>26L)&0x3f]; } /*- * IP and FP * The problem is more of a geometric problem that random bit fiddling. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 to 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 0 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 The output has been subject to swaps of the form 0 1 -> 3 1 but the odd and even bits have been put into 2 3 2 0 different words. The main trick is to remember that t=((l>>size)^r)&(mask); r^=t; l^=(t<>(n))^(b))&(m)),\ (b)^=(t),\ (a)^=((t)<<(n))) # define IP(l,r) \ { \ register DES_LONG tt; \ PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \ PERM_OP(l,r,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \ PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \ PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \ PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \ } # define FP(l,r) \ { \ register DES_LONG tt; \ PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 1,0x55555555L); \ PERM_OP(r,l,tt, 8,0x00ff00ffL); \ PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 2,0x33333333L); \ PERM_OP(r,l,tt,16,0x0000ffffL); \ PERM_OP(l,r,tt, 4,0x0f0f0f0fL); \ } extern const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64]; void fcrypt_body(DES_LONG *out, DES_key_schedule *ks, DES_LONG Eswap0, DES_LONG Eswap1); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/str2key.c0000644000000000000000000000561213176625657015731 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "des_locl.h" void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key) { DES_key_schedule ks; int i, length; memset(key, 0, 8); length = strlen(str); #ifdef OLD_STR_TO_KEY for (i = 0; i < length; i++) (*key)[i % 8] ^= (str[i] << 1); #else /* MIT COMPATIBLE */ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { register unsigned char j = str[i]; if ((i % 16) < 8) (*key)[i % 8] ^= (j << 1); else { /* Reverse the bit order 05/05/92 eay */ j = ((j << 4) & 0xf0) | ((j >> 4) & 0x0f); j = ((j << 2) & 0xcc) | ((j >> 2) & 0x33); j = ((j << 1) & 0xaa) | ((j >> 1) & 0x55); (*key)[7 - (i % 8)] ^= j; } } #endif DES_set_odd_parity(key); DES_set_key_unchecked(key, &ks); DES_cbc_cksum((const unsigned char *)str, key, length, &ks, key); OPENSSL_cleanse(&ks, sizeof(ks)); DES_set_odd_parity(key); } void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1, DES_cblock *key2) { DES_key_schedule ks; int i, length; memset(key1, 0, 8); memset(key2, 0, 8); length = strlen(str); #ifdef OLD_STR_TO_KEY if (length <= 8) { for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { (*key2)[i] = (*key1)[i] = (str[i] << 1); } } else { for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { if ((i / 8) & 1) (*key2)[i % 8] ^= (str[i] << 1); else (*key1)[i % 8] ^= (str[i] << 1); } } #else /* MIT COMPATIBLE */ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { register unsigned char j = str[i]; if ((i % 32) < 16) { if ((i % 16) < 8) (*key1)[i % 8] ^= (j << 1); else (*key2)[i % 8] ^= (j << 1); } else { j = ((j << 4) & 0xf0) | ((j >> 4) & 0x0f); j = ((j << 2) & 0xcc) | ((j >> 2) & 0x33); j = ((j << 1) & 0xaa) | ((j >> 1) & 0x55); if ((i % 16) < 8) (*key1)[7 - (i % 8)] ^= j; else (*key2)[7 - (i % 8)] ^= j; } } if (length <= 8) memcpy(key2, key1, 8); #endif DES_set_odd_parity(key1); DES_set_odd_parity(key2); DES_set_key_unchecked(key1, &ks); DES_cbc_cksum((const unsigned char *)str, key1, length, &ks, key1); DES_set_key_unchecked(key2, &ks); DES_cbc_cksum((const unsigned char *)str, key2, length, &ks, key2); OPENSSL_cleanse(&ks, sizeof(ks)); DES_set_odd_parity(key1); DES_set_odd_parity(key2); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/fcrypt.c0000644000000000000000000001004113176625657015625 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* NOCW */ #include #ifdef _OSD_POSIX # ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC # define CHARSET_EBCDIC 1 # endif #endif #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include #endif #include #include "des_locl.h" /* * Added more values to handle illegal salt values the way normal crypt() * implementations do. The patch was sent by Bjorn Gronvall */ static unsigned const char con_salt[128] = { 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0xD5, 0xD6, 0xD7, 0xD8, 0xD9, 0xDA, 0xDB, 0xDC, 0xDD, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xE2, 0xE3, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xE7, 0xE8, 0xE9, 0xEA, 0xEB, 0xEC, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xEF, 0xF0, 0xF1, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xF6, 0xF7, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x3F, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, }; static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = { 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6A, 0x6B, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7A }; char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt) { static char buff[14]; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC return (DES_fcrypt(buf, salt, buff)); #else char e_salt[2 + 1]; char e_buf[32 + 1]; /* replace 32 by 8 ? */ char *ret; if (salt[0] == '\0' || salt[1] == '\0') return NULL; /* Copy salt, convert to ASCII. */ e_salt[0] = salt[0]; e_salt[1] = salt[1]; e_salt[2] = '\0'; ebcdic2ascii(e_salt, e_salt, sizeof(e_salt)); /* Convert password to ASCII. */ OPENSSL_strlcpy(e_buf, buf, sizeof(e_buf)); ebcdic2ascii(e_buf, e_buf, sizeof e_buf); /* Encrypt it (from/to ASCII); if it worked, convert back. */ ret = DES_fcrypt(e_buf, e_salt, buff); if (ret != NULL) ascii2ebcdic(ret, ret, strlen(ret)); return ret; #endif } char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret) { unsigned int i, j, x, y; DES_LONG Eswap0, Eswap1; DES_LONG out[2], ll; DES_cblock key; DES_key_schedule ks; unsigned char bb[9]; unsigned char *b = bb; unsigned char c, u; x = ret[0] = salt[0]; if (x == 0 || x >= sizeof(con_salt)) return NULL; Eswap0 = con_salt[x] << 2; x = ret[1] = salt[1]; if (x == 0 || x >= sizeof(con_salt)) return NULL; Eswap1 = con_salt[x] << 6; /* * EAY r=strlen(buf); r=(r+7)/8; */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { c = *(buf++); if (!c) break; key[i] = (c << 1); } for (; i < 8; i++) key[i] = 0; DES_set_key_unchecked(&key, &ks); fcrypt_body(&(out[0]), &ks, Eswap0, Eswap1); ll = out[0]; l2c(ll, b); ll = out[1]; l2c(ll, b); y = 0; u = 0x80; bb[8] = 0; for (i = 2; i < 13; i++) { c = 0; for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) { c <<= 1; if (bb[y] & u) c |= 1; u >>= 1; if (!u) { y++; u = 0x80; } } ret[i] = cov_2char[c]; } ret[13] = '\0'; return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/rpc_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000172313176625657015736 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "rpc_des.h" #include "des_locl.h" int _des_crypt(char *buf, int len, struct desparams *desp); int _des_crypt(char *buf, int len, struct desparams *desp) { DES_key_schedule ks; int enc; DES_set_key_unchecked(&desp->des_key, &ks); enc = (desp->des_dir == ENCRYPT) ? DES_ENCRYPT : DES_DECRYPT; if (desp->des_mode == CBC) DES_ecb_encrypt((const_DES_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf, (DES_cblock *)desp->UDES.UDES_buf, &ks, enc); else { DES_ncbc_encrypt(desp->UDES.UDES_buf, desp->UDES.UDES_buf, len, &ks, &desp->des_ivec, enc); } return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/set_key.c0000644000000000000000000003630413176625657015773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * set_key.c v 1.4 eay 24/9/91 * 1.4 Speed up by 400% :-) * 1.3 added register declarations. * 1.2 unrolled make_key_sched a bit more * 1.1 added norm_expand_bits * 1.0 First working version */ #include #include "des_locl.h" OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int, DES_check_key, 0) /* * defaults to false */ static const unsigned char odd_parity[256] = { 1, 1, 2, 2, 4, 4, 7, 7, 8, 8, 11, 11, 13, 13, 14, 14, 16, 16, 19, 19, 21, 21, 22, 22, 25, 25, 26, 26, 28, 28, 31, 31, 32, 32, 35, 35, 37, 37, 38, 38, 41, 41, 42, 42, 44, 44, 47, 47, 49, 49, 50, 50, 52, 52, 55, 55, 56, 56, 59, 59, 61, 61, 62, 62, 64, 64, 67, 67, 69, 69, 70, 70, 73, 73, 74, 74, 76, 76, 79, 79, 81, 81, 82, 82, 84, 84, 87, 87, 88, 88, 91, 91, 93, 93, 94, 94, 97, 97, 98, 98, 100, 100, 103, 103, 104, 104, 107, 107, 109, 109, 110, 110, 112, 112, 115, 115, 117, 117, 118, 118, 121, 121, 122, 122, 124, 124, 127, 127, 128, 128, 131, 131, 133, 133, 134, 134, 137, 137, 138, 138, 140, 140, 143, 143, 145, 145, 146, 146, 148, 148, 151, 151, 152, 152, 155, 155, 157, 157, 158, 158, 161, 161, 162, 162, 164, 164, 167, 167, 168, 168, 171, 171, 173, 173, 174, 174, 176, 176, 179, 179, 181, 181, 182, 182, 185, 185, 186, 186, 188, 188, 191, 191, 193, 193, 194, 194, 196, 196, 199, 199, 200, 200, 203, 203, 205, 205, 206, 206, 208, 208, 211, 211, 213, 213, 214, 214, 217, 217, 218, 218, 220, 220, 223, 223, 224, 224, 227, 227, 229, 229, 230, 230, 233, 233, 234, 234, 236, 236, 239, 239, 241, 241, 242, 242, 244, 244, 247, 247, 248, 248, 251, 251, 253, 253, 254, 254 }; void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key) { unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < DES_KEY_SZ; i++) (*key)[i] = odd_parity[(*key)[i]]; } int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key) { unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < DES_KEY_SZ; i++) { if ((*key)[i] != odd_parity[(*key)[i]]) return (0); } return (1); } /*- * Weak and semi weak keys as taken from * %A D.W. Davies * %A W.L. Price * %T Security for Computer Networks * %I John Wiley & Sons * %D 1984 * Many thanks to smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) for the reference * (and actual cblock values). */ #define NUM_WEAK_KEY 16 static const DES_cblock weak_keys[NUM_WEAK_KEY] = { /* weak keys */ {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01}, {0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE}, {0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E}, {0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1}, /* semi-weak keys */ {0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE}, {0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01}, {0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1}, {0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E}, {0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1}, {0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01}, {0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE}, {0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E}, {0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E}, {0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01}, {0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE}, {0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1} }; int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < NUM_WEAK_KEY; i++) /* * Added == 0 to comparison, I obviously don't run this section very * often :-(, thanks to engineering@MorningStar.Com for the fix eay * 93/06/29 Another problem, I was comparing only the first 4 bytes, * 97/03/18 */ if (memcmp(weak_keys[i], key, sizeof(DES_cblock)) == 0) return (1); return (0); } /*- * NOW DEFINED IN des_local.h * See ecb_encrypt.c for a pseudo description of these macros. * #define PERM_OP(a,b,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)>>(n))^(b))&(m)),\ * (b)^=(t),\ * (a)=((a)^((t)<<(n)))) */ #define HPERM_OP(a,t,n,m) ((t)=((((a)<<(16-(n)))^(a))&(m)),\ (a)=(a)^(t)^(t>>(16-(n)))) static const DES_LONG des_skb[8][64] = { { /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 */ 0x00000000L, 0x00000010L, 0x20000000L, 0x20000010L, 0x00010000L, 0x00010010L, 0x20010000L, 0x20010010L, 0x00000800L, 0x00000810L, 0x20000800L, 0x20000810L, 0x00010800L, 0x00010810L, 0x20010800L, 0x20010810L, 0x00000020L, 0x00000030L, 0x20000020L, 0x20000030L, 0x00010020L, 0x00010030L, 0x20010020L, 0x20010030L, 0x00000820L, 0x00000830L, 0x20000820L, 0x20000830L, 0x00010820L, 0x00010830L, 0x20010820L, 0x20010830L, 0x00080000L, 0x00080010L, 0x20080000L, 0x20080010L, 0x00090000L, 0x00090010L, 0x20090000L, 0x20090010L, 0x00080800L, 0x00080810L, 0x20080800L, 0x20080810L, 0x00090800L, 0x00090810L, 0x20090800L, 0x20090810L, 0x00080020L, 0x00080030L, 0x20080020L, 0x20080030L, 0x00090020L, 0x00090030L, 0x20090020L, 0x20090030L, 0x00080820L, 0x00080830L, 0x20080820L, 0x20080830L, 0x00090820L, 0x00090830L, 0x20090820L, 0x20090830L, }, { /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 7 8 10 11 12 13 */ 0x00000000L, 0x02000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x02002000L, 0x00200000L, 0x02200000L, 0x00202000L, 0x02202000L, 0x00000004L, 0x02000004L, 0x00002004L, 0x02002004L, 0x00200004L, 0x02200004L, 0x00202004L, 0x02202004L, 0x00000400L, 0x02000400L, 0x00002400L, 0x02002400L, 0x00200400L, 0x02200400L, 0x00202400L, 0x02202400L, 0x00000404L, 0x02000404L, 0x00002404L, 0x02002404L, 0x00200404L, 0x02200404L, 0x00202404L, 0x02202404L, 0x10000000L, 0x12000000L, 0x10002000L, 0x12002000L, 0x10200000L, 0x12200000L, 0x10202000L, 0x12202000L, 0x10000004L, 0x12000004L, 0x10002004L, 0x12002004L, 0x10200004L, 0x12200004L, 0x10202004L, 0x12202004L, 0x10000400L, 0x12000400L, 0x10002400L, 0x12002400L, 0x10200400L, 0x12200400L, 0x10202400L, 0x12202400L, 0x10000404L, 0x12000404L, 0x10002404L, 0x12002404L, 0x10200404L, 0x12200404L, 0x10202404L, 0x12202404L, }, { /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 14 15 16 17 19 20 */ 0x00000000L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L, 0x00040001L, 0x01000000L, 0x01000001L, 0x01040000L, 0x01040001L, 0x00000002L, 0x00000003L, 0x00040002L, 0x00040003L, 0x01000002L, 0x01000003L, 0x01040002L, 0x01040003L, 0x00000200L, 0x00000201L, 0x00040200L, 0x00040201L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000201L, 0x01040200L, 0x01040201L, 0x00000202L, 0x00000203L, 0x00040202L, 0x00040203L, 0x01000202L, 0x01000203L, 0x01040202L, 0x01040203L, 0x08000000L, 0x08000001L, 0x08040000L, 0x08040001L, 0x09000000L, 0x09000001L, 0x09040000L, 0x09040001L, 0x08000002L, 0x08000003L, 0x08040002L, 0x08040003L, 0x09000002L, 0x09000003L, 0x09040002L, 0x09040003L, 0x08000200L, 0x08000201L, 0x08040200L, 0x08040201L, 0x09000200L, 0x09000201L, 0x09040200L, 0x09040201L, 0x08000202L, 0x08000203L, 0x08040202L, 0x08040203L, 0x09000202L, 0x09000203L, 0x09040202L, 0x09040203L, }, { /* for C bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 21 23 24 26 27 28 */ 0x00000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00000100L, 0x00100100L, 0x00000008L, 0x00100008L, 0x00000108L, 0x00100108L, 0x00001000L, 0x00101000L, 0x00001100L, 0x00101100L, 0x00001008L, 0x00101008L, 0x00001108L, 0x00101108L, 0x04000000L, 0x04100000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04100100L, 0x04000008L, 0x04100008L, 0x04000108L, 0x04100108L, 0x04001000L, 0x04101000L, 0x04001100L, 0x04101100L, 0x04001008L, 0x04101008L, 0x04001108L, 0x04101108L, 0x00020000L, 0x00120000L, 0x00020100L, 0x00120100L, 0x00020008L, 0x00120008L, 0x00020108L, 0x00120108L, 0x00021000L, 0x00121000L, 0x00021100L, 0x00121100L, 0x00021008L, 0x00121008L, 0x00021108L, 0x00121108L, 0x04020000L, 0x04120000L, 0x04020100L, 0x04120100L, 0x04020008L, 0x04120008L, 0x04020108L, 0x04120108L, 0x04021000L, 0x04121000L, 0x04021100L, 0x04121100L, 0x04021008L, 0x04121008L, 0x04021108L, 0x04121108L, }, { /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 1 2 3 4 5 6 */ 0x00000000L, 0x10000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x10010000L, 0x00000004L, 0x10000004L, 0x00010004L, 0x10010004L, 0x20000000L, 0x30000000L, 0x20010000L, 0x30010000L, 0x20000004L, 0x30000004L, 0x20010004L, 0x30010004L, 0x00100000L, 0x10100000L, 0x00110000L, 0x10110000L, 0x00100004L, 0x10100004L, 0x00110004L, 0x10110004L, 0x20100000L, 0x30100000L, 0x20110000L, 0x30110000L, 0x20100004L, 0x30100004L, 0x20110004L, 0x30110004L, 0x00001000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00011000L, 0x10011000L, 0x00001004L, 0x10001004L, 0x00011004L, 0x10011004L, 0x20001000L, 0x30001000L, 0x20011000L, 0x30011000L, 0x20001004L, 0x30001004L, 0x20011004L, 0x30011004L, 0x00101000L, 0x10101000L, 0x00111000L, 0x10111000L, 0x00101004L, 0x10101004L, 0x00111004L, 0x10111004L, 0x20101000L, 0x30101000L, 0x20111000L, 0x30111000L, 0x20101004L, 0x30101004L, 0x20111004L, 0x30111004L, }, { /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 8 9 11 12 13 14 */ 0x00000000L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000008L, 0x08000008L, 0x00000400L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000408L, 0x08000408L, 0x00020000L, 0x08020000L, 0x00020008L, 0x08020008L, 0x00020400L, 0x08020400L, 0x00020408L, 0x08020408L, 0x00000001L, 0x08000001L, 0x00000009L, 0x08000009L, 0x00000401L, 0x08000401L, 0x00000409L, 0x08000409L, 0x00020001L, 0x08020001L, 0x00020009L, 0x08020009L, 0x00020401L, 0x08020401L, 0x00020409L, 0x08020409L, 0x02000000L, 0x0A000000L, 0x02000008L, 0x0A000008L, 0x02000400L, 0x0A000400L, 0x02000408L, 0x0A000408L, 0x02020000L, 0x0A020000L, 0x02020008L, 0x0A020008L, 0x02020400L, 0x0A020400L, 0x02020408L, 0x0A020408L, 0x02000001L, 0x0A000001L, 0x02000009L, 0x0A000009L, 0x02000401L, 0x0A000401L, 0x02000409L, 0x0A000409L, 0x02020001L, 0x0A020001L, 0x02020009L, 0x0A020009L, 0x02020401L, 0x0A020401L, 0x02020409L, 0x0A020409L, }, { /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 16 17 18 19 20 21 */ 0x00000000L, 0x00000100L, 0x00080000L, 0x00080100L, 0x01000000L, 0x01000100L, 0x01080000L, 0x01080100L, 0x00000010L, 0x00000110L, 0x00080010L, 0x00080110L, 0x01000010L, 0x01000110L, 0x01080010L, 0x01080110L, 0x00200000L, 0x00200100L, 0x00280000L, 0x00280100L, 0x01200000L, 0x01200100L, 0x01280000L, 0x01280100L, 0x00200010L, 0x00200110L, 0x00280010L, 0x00280110L, 0x01200010L, 0x01200110L, 0x01280010L, 0x01280110L, 0x00000200L, 0x00000300L, 0x00080200L, 0x00080300L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000300L, 0x01080200L, 0x01080300L, 0x00000210L, 0x00000310L, 0x00080210L, 0x00080310L, 0x01000210L, 0x01000310L, 0x01080210L, 0x01080310L, 0x00200200L, 0x00200300L, 0x00280200L, 0x00280300L, 0x01200200L, 0x01200300L, 0x01280200L, 0x01280300L, 0x00200210L, 0x00200310L, 0x00280210L, 0x00280310L, 0x01200210L, 0x01200310L, 0x01280210L, 0x01280310L, }, { /* for D bits (numbered as per FIPS 46) 22 23 24 25 27 28 */ 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000002L, 0x04000002L, 0x00040002L, 0x04040002L, 0x00002000L, 0x04002000L, 0x00042000L, 0x04042000L, 0x00002002L, 0x04002002L, 0x00042002L, 0x04042002L, 0x00000020L, 0x04000020L, 0x00040020L, 0x04040020L, 0x00000022L, 0x04000022L, 0x00040022L, 0x04040022L, 0x00002020L, 0x04002020L, 0x00042020L, 0x04042020L, 0x00002022L, 0x04002022L, 0x00042022L, 0x04042022L, 0x00000800L, 0x04000800L, 0x00040800L, 0x04040800L, 0x00000802L, 0x04000802L, 0x00040802L, 0x04040802L, 0x00002800L, 0x04002800L, 0x00042800L, 0x04042800L, 0x00002802L, 0x04002802L, 0x00042802L, 0x04042802L, 0x00000820L, 0x04000820L, 0x00040820L, 0x04040820L, 0x00000822L, 0x04000822L, 0x00040822L, 0x04040822L, 0x00002820L, 0x04002820L, 0x00042820L, 0x04042820L, 0x00002822L, 0x04002822L, 0x00042822L, 0x04042822L, } }; int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule) { if (DES_check_key) { return DES_set_key_checked(key, schedule); } else { DES_set_key_unchecked(key, schedule); return 0; } } /*- * return 0 if key parity is odd (correct), * return -1 if key parity error, * return -2 if illegal weak key. */ int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule) { if (!DES_check_key_parity(key)) return (-1); if (DES_is_weak_key(key)) return (-2); DES_set_key_unchecked(key, schedule); return 0; } void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule) { static const int shifts2[16] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 }; register DES_LONG c, d, t, s, t2; register const unsigned char *in; register DES_LONG *k; register int i; #ifdef OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO memcpy(schedule->key, key, sizeof schedule->key); schedule->session = NULL; #endif k = &schedule->ks->deslong[0]; in = &(*key)[0]; c2l(in, c); c2l(in, d); /* * do PC1 in 47 simple operations :-) Thanks to John Fletcher * (john_fletcher@lccmail.ocf.llnl.gov) for the inspiration. :-) */ PERM_OP(d, c, t, 4, 0x0f0f0f0fL); HPERM_OP(c, t, -2, 0xcccc0000L); HPERM_OP(d, t, -2, 0xcccc0000L); PERM_OP(d, c, t, 1, 0x55555555L); PERM_OP(c, d, t, 8, 0x00ff00ffL); PERM_OP(d, c, t, 1, 0x55555555L); d = (((d & 0x000000ffL) << 16L) | (d & 0x0000ff00L) | ((d & 0x00ff0000L) >> 16L) | ((c & 0xf0000000L) >> 4L)); c &= 0x0fffffffL; for (i = 0; i < ITERATIONS; i++) { if (shifts2[i]) { c = ((c >> 2L) | (c << 26L)); d = ((d >> 2L) | (d << 26L)); } else { c = ((c >> 1L) | (c << 27L)); d = ((d >> 1L) | (d << 27L)); } c &= 0x0fffffffL; d &= 0x0fffffffL; /* * could be a few less shifts but I am to lazy at this point in time * to investigate */ s = des_skb[0][(c) & 0x3f] | des_skb[1][((c >> 6L) & 0x03) | ((c >> 7L) & 0x3c)] | des_skb[2][((c >> 13L) & 0x0f) | ((c >> 14L) & 0x30)] | des_skb[3][((c >> 20L) & 0x01) | ((c >> 21L) & 0x06) | ((c >> 22L) & 0x38)]; t = des_skb[4][(d) & 0x3f] | des_skb[5][((d >> 7L) & 0x03) | ((d >> 8L) & 0x3c)] | des_skb[6][(d >> 15L) & 0x3f] | des_skb[7][((d >> 21L) & 0x0f) | ((d >> 22L) & 0x30)]; /* table contained 0213 4657 */ t2 = ((t << 16L) | (s & 0x0000ffffL)) & 0xffffffffL; *(k++) = ROTATE(t2, 30) & 0xffffffffL; t2 = ((s >> 16L) | (t & 0xffff0000L)); *(k++) = ROTATE(t2, 26) & 0xffffffffL; } } int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule) { return (DES_set_key(key, schedule)); } /*- #undef des_fixup_key_parity void des_fixup_key_parity(des_cblock *key) { des_set_odd_parity(key); } */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/cfb64ede.c0000644000000000000000000001263413176625657015712 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" #include "e_os.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc) { register DES_LONG v0, v1; register long l = length; register int n = *num; DES_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv, c, cc; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; if (enc) { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3); v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); iv = &(*ivec)[0]; } c = *(in++) ^ iv[n]; *(out++) = c; iv[n] = c; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } else { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3); v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); iv = &(*ivec)[0]; } cc = *(in++); c = iv[n]; iv[n] = cc; *(out++) = c ^ cc; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = c = cc = 0; *num = n; } /* * This is compatible with the single key CFB-r for DES, even thought that's * not what EVP needs. */ void DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc) { register DES_LONG d0, d1, v0, v1; register unsigned long l = length, n = ((unsigned int)numbits + 7) / 8; register int num = numbits, i; DES_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; unsigned char ovec[16]; if (num > 64) return; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); if (enc) { while (l >= n) { l -= n; ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3); c2ln(in, d0, d1, n); in += n; d0 ^= ti[0]; d1 ^= ti[1]; l2cn(d0, d1, out, n); out += n; /* * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under * gcc :-( */ if (num == 32) { v0 = v1; v1 = d0; } else if (num == 64) { v0 = d0; v1 = d1; } else { iv = &ovec[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); l2c(d0, iv); l2c(d1, iv); /* shift ovec left most of the bits... */ memmove(ovec, ovec + num / 8, 8 + (num % 8 ? 1 : 0)); /* now the remaining bits */ if (num % 8 != 0) for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { ovec[i] <<= num % 8; ovec[i] |= ovec[i + 1] >> (8 - num % 8); } iv = &ovec[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); } } } else { while (l >= n) { l -= n; ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; DES_encrypt3(ti, ks1, ks2, ks3); c2ln(in, d0, d1, n); in += n; /* * 30-08-94 - eay - changed because l>>32 and l<<32 are bad under * gcc :-( */ if (num == 32) { v0 = v1; v1 = d0; } else if (num == 64) { v0 = d0; v1 = d1; } else { iv = &ovec[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); l2c(d0, iv); l2c(d1, iv); /* shift ovec left most of the bits... */ memmove(ovec, ovec + num / 8, 8 + (num % 8 ? 1 : 0)); /* now the remaining bits */ if (num % 8 != 0) for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { ovec[i] <<= num % 8; ovec[i] |= ovec[i + 1] >> (8 - num % 8); } iv = &ovec[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); } d0 ^= ti[0]; d1 ^= ti[1]; l2cn(d0, d1, out, n); out += n; } } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); v0 = v1 = d0 = d1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/ecb_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000224413176625657015702 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" #include #include const char *DES_options(void) { static int init = 1; static char buf[32]; if (init) { const char *size; if (sizeof(DES_LONG) != sizeof(long)) size = "int"; else size = "long"; BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "des(%s)", size); init = 0; } return (buf); } void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) { register DES_LONG l; DES_LONG ll[2]; const unsigned char *in = &(*input)[0]; unsigned char *out = &(*output)[0]; c2l(in, l); ll[0] = l; c2l(in, l); ll[1] = l; DES_encrypt1(ll, ks, enc); l = ll[0]; l2c(l, out); l = ll[1]; l2c(l, out); l = ll[0] = ll[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/ofb64enc.c0000644000000000000000000000304513176625657015732 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void DES_ofb64_encrypt(register const unsigned char *in, register unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num) { register DES_LONG v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; DES_cblock d; register unsigned char *dp; DES_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; int save = 0; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; dp = d; l2c(v0, dp); l2c(v1, dp); while (l--) { if (n == 0) { DES_encrypt1(ti, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); dp = d; t = ti[0]; l2c(t, dp); t = ti[1]; l2c(t, dp); save++; } *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n]; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } if (save) { v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); } t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/des_enc.c0000644000000000000000000002111713176625657015724 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "des_locl.h" #include "spr.h" void DES_encrypt1(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) { register DES_LONG l, r, t, u; register DES_LONG *s; r = data[0]; l = data[1]; IP(r, l); /* * Things have been modified so that the initial rotate is done outside * the loop. This required the DES_SPtrans values in sp.h to be rotated * 1 bit to the right. One perl script later and things have a 5% speed * up on a sparc2. Thanks to Richard Outerbridge * <71755.204@CompuServe.COM> for pointing this out. */ /* clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ /* shift left by 2 */ r = ROTATE(r, 29) & 0xffffffffL; l = ROTATE(l, 29) & 0xffffffffL; s = ks->ks->deslong; /* * I don't know if it is worth the effort of loop unrolling the inner * loop */ if (enc) { D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 0); /* 1 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 2); /* 2 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 4); /* 3 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 6); /* 4 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 8); /* 5 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 10); /* 6 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 12); /* 7 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 14); /* 8 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 16); /* 9 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 18); /* 10 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 20); /* 11 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 22); /* 12 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 24); /* 13 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 26); /* 14 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 28); /* 15 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 30); /* 16 */ } else { D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 30); /* 16 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 28); /* 15 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 26); /* 14 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 24); /* 13 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 22); /* 12 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 20); /* 11 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 18); /* 10 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 16); /* 9 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 14); /* 8 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 12); /* 7 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 10); /* 6 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 8); /* 5 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 6); /* 4 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 4); /* 3 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 2); /* 2 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 0); /* 1 */ } /* rotate and clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ l = ROTATE(l, 3) & 0xffffffffL; r = ROTATE(r, 3) & 0xffffffffL; FP(r, l); data[0] = l; data[1] = r; l = r = t = u = 0; } void DES_encrypt2(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) { register DES_LONG l, r, t, u; register DES_LONG *s; r = data[0]; l = data[1]; /* * Things have been modified so that the initial rotate is done outside * the loop. This required the DES_SPtrans values in sp.h to be rotated * 1 bit to the right. One perl script later and things have a 5% speed * up on a sparc2. Thanks to Richard Outerbridge * <71755.204@CompuServe.COM> for pointing this out. */ /* clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ r = ROTATE(r, 29) & 0xffffffffL; l = ROTATE(l, 29) & 0xffffffffL; s = ks->ks->deslong; /* * I don't know if it is worth the effort of loop unrolling the inner * loop */ if (enc) { D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 0); /* 1 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 2); /* 2 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 4); /* 3 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 6); /* 4 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 8); /* 5 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 10); /* 6 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 12); /* 7 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 14); /* 8 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 16); /* 9 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 18); /* 10 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 20); /* 11 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 22); /* 12 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 24); /* 13 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 26); /* 14 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 28); /* 15 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 30); /* 16 */ } else { D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 30); /* 16 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 28); /* 15 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 26); /* 14 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 24); /* 13 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 22); /* 12 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 20); /* 11 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 18); /* 10 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 16); /* 9 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 14); /* 8 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 12); /* 7 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 10); /* 6 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 8); /* 5 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 6); /* 4 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 4); /* 3 */ D_ENCRYPT(l, r, 2); /* 2 */ D_ENCRYPT(r, l, 0); /* 1 */ } /* rotate and clear the top bits on machines with 8byte longs */ data[0] = ROTATE(l, 3) & 0xffffffffL; data[1] = ROTATE(r, 3) & 0xffffffffL; l = r = t = u = 0; } void DES_encrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3) { register DES_LONG l, r; l = data[0]; r = data[1]; IP(l, r); data[0] = l; data[1] = r; DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks1, DES_ENCRYPT); DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks2, DES_DECRYPT); DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks3, DES_ENCRYPT); l = data[0]; r = data[1]; FP(r, l); data[0] = l; data[1] = r; } void DES_decrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3) { register DES_LONG l, r; l = data[0]; r = data[1]; IP(l, r); data[0] = l; data[1] = r; DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks3, DES_DECRYPT); DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks2, DES_ENCRYPT); DES_encrypt2((DES_LONG *)data, ks1, DES_DECRYPT); l = data[0]; r = data[1]; FP(r, l); data[0] = l; data[1] = r; } #ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS # undef CBC_ENC_C__DONT_UPDATE_IV # include "ncbc_enc.c" /* DES_ncbc_encrypt */ void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc) { register DES_LONG tin0, tin1; register DES_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register const unsigned char *in; unsigned char *out; register long l = length; DES_LONG tin[2]; unsigned char *iv; in = input; out = output; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; if (enc) { c2l(iv, tout0); c2l(iv, tout1); for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; DES_encrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(tout0, iv); l2c(tout1, iv); } else { register DES_LONG t0, t1; c2l(iv, xor0); c2l(iv, xor1); for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); t0 = tin0; t1 = tin1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; DES_decrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; tout0 ^= xor0; tout1 ^= xor1; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); xor0 = t0; xor1 = t1; } if (l != -8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); t0 = tin0; t1 = tin1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; DES_decrypt3((DES_LONG *)tin, ks1, ks2, ks3); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; tout0 ^= xor0; tout1 ^= xor1; l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = t0; xor1 = t1; } iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(xor0, iv); l2c(xor1, iv); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } #endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c0000644000000000000000000000320013176625657015713 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "des_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(register const unsigned char *in, register unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *k1, DES_key_schedule *k2, DES_key_schedule *k3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num) { register DES_LONG v0, v1; register int n = *num; register long l = length; DES_cblock d; register char *dp; DES_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; int save = 0; iv = &(*ivec)[0]; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; dp = (char *)d; l2c(v0, dp); l2c(v1, dp); while (l--) { if (n == 0) { /* ti[0]=v0; */ /* ti[1]=v1; */ DES_encrypt3(ti, k1, k2, k3); v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; dp = (char *)d; l2c(v0, dp); l2c(v1, dp); save++; } *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n]; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } if (save) { iv = &(*ivec)[0]; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014506 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c0000644000000000000000000001613013176625657016141 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* Cheap and nasty Unicode stuff */ unsigned char *OPENSSL_asc2uni(const char *asc, int asclen, unsigned char **uni, int *unilen) { int ulen, i; unsigned char *unitmp; if (asclen == -1) asclen = strlen(asc); ulen = asclen * 2 + 2; if ((unitmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ulen)) == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < ulen - 2; i += 2) { unitmp[i] = 0; unitmp[i + 1] = asc[i >> 1]; } /* Make result double null terminated */ unitmp[ulen - 2] = 0; unitmp[ulen - 1] = 0; if (unilen) *unilen = ulen; if (uni) *uni = unitmp; return unitmp; } char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen) { int asclen, i; char *asctmp; /* string must contain an even number of bytes */ if (unilen & 1) return NULL; asclen = unilen / 2; /* If no terminating zero allow for one */ if (!unilen || uni[unilen - 1]) asclen++; uni++; if ((asctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(asclen)) == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < unilen; i += 2) asctmp[i >> 1] = uni[i]; asctmp[asclen - 1] = 0; return asctmp; } /* * OPENSSL_{utf82uni|uni2utf8} perform conversion between UTF-8 and * PKCS#12 BMPString format, which is specified as big-endian UTF-16. * One should keep in mind that even though BMPString is passed as * unsigned char *, it's not the kind of string you can exercise e.g. * strlen on. Caller also has to keep in mind that its length is * expressed not in number of UTF-16 characters, but in number of * bytes the string occupies, and treat it, the length, accordingly. */ unsigned char *OPENSSL_utf82uni(const char *asc, int asclen, unsigned char **uni, int *unilen) { int ulen, i, j; unsigned char *unitmp, *ret; unsigned long utf32chr = 0; if (asclen == -1) asclen = strlen(asc); for (ulen = 0, i = 0; i < asclen; i += j) { j = UTF8_getc((const unsigned char *)asc+i, asclen-i, &utf32chr); /* * Following condition is somewhat opportunistic is sense that * decoding failure is used as *indirect* indication that input * string might in fact be extended ASCII/ANSI/ISO-8859-X. The * fallback is taken in hope that it would allow to process * files created with previous OpenSSL version, which used the * naive OPENSSL_asc2uni all along. It might be worth noting * that probability of false positive depends on language. In * cases covered by ISO Latin 1 probability is very low, because * any printable non-ASCII alphabet letter followed by another * or any ASCII character will trigger failure and fallback. * In other cases situation can be intensified by the fact that * English letters are not part of alternative keyboard layout, * but even then there should be plenty of pairs that trigger * decoding failure... */ if (j < 0) return OPENSSL_asc2uni(asc, asclen, uni, unilen); if (utf32chr > 0x10FFFF) /* UTF-16 cap */ return NULL; if (utf32chr >= 0x10000) /* pair of UTF-16 characters */ ulen += 2*2; else /* or just one */ ulen += 2; } ulen += 2; /* for trailing UTF16 zero */ if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(ulen)) == NULL) return NULL; /* re-run the loop writing down UTF-16 characters in big-endian order */ for (unitmp = ret, i = 0; i < asclen; i += j) { j = UTF8_getc((const unsigned char *)asc+i, asclen-i, &utf32chr); if (utf32chr >= 0x10000) { /* pair if UTF-16 characters */ unsigned int hi, lo; utf32chr -= 0x10000; hi = 0xD800 + (utf32chr>>10); lo = 0xDC00 + (utf32chr&0x3ff); *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(hi>>8); *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(hi); *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(lo>>8); *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(lo); } else { /* or just one */ *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(utf32chr>>8); *unitmp++ = (unsigned char)(utf32chr); } } /* Make result double null terminated */ *unitmp++ = 0; *unitmp++ = 0; if (unilen) *unilen = ulen; if (uni) *uni = ret; return ret; } static int bmp_to_utf8(char *str, const unsigned char *utf16, int len) { unsigned long utf32chr; if (len == 0) return 0; if (len < 2) return -1; /* pull UTF-16 character in big-endian order */ utf32chr = (utf16[0]<<8) | utf16[1]; if (utf32chr >= 0xD800 && utf32chr < 0xE000) { /* two chars */ unsigned int lo; if (len < 4) return -1; utf32chr -= 0xD800; utf32chr <<= 10; lo = (utf16[2]<<8) | utf16[3]; if (lo < 0xDC00 || lo >= 0xE000) return -1; utf32chr |= lo-0xDC00; utf32chr += 0x10000; } return UTF8_putc((unsigned char *)str, len > 4 ? 4 : len, utf32chr); } char *OPENSSL_uni2utf8(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen) { int asclen, i, j; char *asctmp; /* string must contain an even number of bytes */ if (unilen & 1) return NULL; for (asclen = 0, i = 0; i < unilen; ) { j = bmp_to_utf8(NULL, uni+i, unilen-i); /* * falling back to OPENSSL_uni2asc makes lesser sense [than * falling back to OPENSSL_asc2uni in OPENSSL_utf82uni above], * it's done rather to maintain symmetry... */ if (j < 0) return OPENSSL_uni2asc(uni, unilen); if (j == 4) i += 4; else i += 2; asclen += j; } /* If no terminating zero allow for one */ if (!unilen || (uni[unilen-2]||uni[unilen - 1])) asclen++; if ((asctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(asclen)) == NULL) return NULL; /* re-run the loop emitting UTF-8 string */ for (asclen = 0, i = 0; i < unilen; ) { j = bmp_to_utf8(asctmp+asclen, uni+i, unilen-i); if (j == 4) i += 4; else i += 2; asclen += j; } /* If no terminating zero write one */ if (!unilen || (uni[unilen-2]||uni[unilen - 1])) asctmp[asclen] = '\0'; return asctmp; } int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 *p12) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), bp, p12); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int i2d_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 *p12) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), fp, p12); } #endif PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 **p12) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), bp, p12); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **p12) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12), fp, p12); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000000225613176625657016120 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ struct PKCS12_MAC_DATA_st { X509_SIG *dinfo; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt; ASN1_INTEGER *iter; /* defaults to 1 */ }; struct PKCS12_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; PKCS12_MAC_DATA *mac; PKCS7 *authsafes; }; struct PKCS12_SAFEBAG_st { ASN1_OBJECT *type; union { struct pkcs12_bag_st *bag; /* secret, crl and certbag */ struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st *keybag; /* keybag */ X509_SIG *shkeybag; /* shrouded key bag */ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *safes; ASN1_TYPE *other; } value; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrib; }; struct pkcs12_bag_st { ASN1_OBJECT *type; union { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x509cert; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x509crl; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet; ASN1_IA5STRING *sdsicert; ASN1_TYPE *other; /* Secret or other bag */ } value; }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/build.info0000644000000000000000000000036313176625657016464 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ p12_add.c p12_asn.c p12_attr.c p12_crpt.c p12_crt.c p12_decr.c \ p12_init.c p12_key.c p12_kiss.c p12_mutl.c p12_sbag.c \ p12_utl.c p12_npas.c pk12err.c p12_p8d.c p12_p8e.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_init.c0000644000000000000000000000223313176625657016277 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "p12_lcl.h" /* Initialise a PKCS12 structure to take data */ PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode) { PKCS12 *pkcs12; if ((pkcs12 = PKCS12_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ASN1_INTEGER_set(pkcs12->version, 3); pkcs12->authsafes->type = OBJ_nid2obj(mode); switch (mode) { case NID_pkcs7_data: if ((pkcs12->authsafes->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } break; default: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT, PKCS12_R_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS12_MODE); goto err; } return pkcs12; err: PKCS12_free(pkcs12); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c0000644000000000000000000001547313176625657016136 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "p12_lcl.h" static int pkcs12_add_bag(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); static int copy_bag_attr(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int nid) { int idx; X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr; idx = EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID(pkey, nid, -1); if (idx < 0) return 1; attr = EVP_PKEY_get_attr(pkey, idx); if (!X509at_add1_attr(&bag->attrib, attr)) return 0; return 1; } PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype) { PKCS12 *p12 = NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes = NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags = NULL; PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = NULL; int i; unsigned char keyid[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int keyidlen = 0; /* Set defaults */ if (!nid_cert) #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; #else nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; #endif if (!nid_key) nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; if (!iter) iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER; if (!mac_iter) mac_iter = 1; if (!pkey && !cert && !ca) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_CREATE, PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT); return NULL; } if (pkey && cert) { if (!X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) return NULL; X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), keyid, &keyidlen); } if (cert) { bag = PKCS12_add_cert(&bags, cert); if (name && !PKCS12_add_friendlyname(bag, name, -1)) goto err; if (keyidlen && !PKCS12_add_localkeyid(bag, keyid, keyidlen)) goto err; } /* Add all other certificates */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) { if (!PKCS12_add_cert(&bags, sk_X509_value(ca, i))) goto err; } if (bags && !PKCS12_add_safe(&safes, bags, nid_cert, iter, pass)) goto err; sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); bags = NULL; if (pkey) { bag = PKCS12_add_key(&bags, pkey, keytype, iter, nid_key, pass); if (!bag) goto err; if (!copy_bag_attr(bag, pkey, NID_ms_csp_name)) goto err; if (!copy_bag_attr(bag, pkey, NID_LocalKeySet)) goto err; if (name && !PKCS12_add_friendlyname(bag, name, -1)) goto err; if (keyidlen && !PKCS12_add_localkeyid(bag, keyid, keyidlen)) goto err; } if (bags && !PKCS12_add_safe(&safes, bags, -1, 0, NULL)) goto err; sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); bags = NULL; p12 = PKCS12_add_safes(safes, 0); if (!p12) goto err; sk_PKCS7_pop_free(safes, PKCS7_free); safes = NULL; if ((mac_iter != -1) && !PKCS12_set_mac(p12, pass, -1, NULL, 0, mac_iter, NULL)) goto err; return p12; err: PKCS12_free(p12); sk_PKCS7_pop_free(safes, PKCS7_free); sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); return NULL; } PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_cert(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, X509 *cert) { PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = NULL; char *name; int namelen = -1; unsigned char *keyid; int keyidlen = -1; /* Add user certificate */ if ((bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert(cert)) == NULL) goto err; /* * Use friendlyName and localKeyID in certificate. (if present) */ name = (char *)X509_alias_get0(cert, &namelen); if (name && !PKCS12_add_friendlyname(bag, name, namelen)) goto err; keyid = X509_keyid_get0(cert, &keyidlen); if (keyid && !PKCS12_add_localkeyid(bag, keyid, keyidlen)) goto err; if (!pkcs12_add_bag(pbags, bag)) goto err; return bag; err: PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag); return NULL; } PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_key(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, EVP_PKEY *key, int key_usage, int iter, int nid_key, const char *pass) { PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = NULL; PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL; /* Make a PKCS#8 structure */ if ((p8 = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key)) == NULL) goto err; if (key_usage && !PKCS8_add_keyusage(p8, key_usage)) goto err; if (nid_key != -1) { bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt(nid_key, pass, -1, NULL, 0, iter, p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); } else bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf(p8); if (!bag) goto err; if (!pkcs12_add_bag(pbags, bag)) goto err; return bag; err: PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag); return NULL; } int PKCS12_add_safe(STACK_OF(PKCS7) **psafes, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, int nid_safe, int iter, const char *pass) { PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; int free_safes = 0; if (!*psafes) { *psafes = sk_PKCS7_new_null(); if (!*psafes) return 0; free_safes = 1; } else free_safes = 0; if (nid_safe == 0) #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; #else nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; #endif if (nid_safe == -1) p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags); else p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(nid_safe, pass, -1, NULL, 0, iter, bags); if (!p7) goto err; if (!sk_PKCS7_push(*psafes, p7)) goto err; return 1; err: if (free_safes) { sk_PKCS7_free(*psafes); *psafes = NULL; } PKCS7_free(p7); return 0; } static int pkcs12_add_bag(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { int free_bags; if (!pbags) return 1; if (!*pbags) { *pbags = sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new_null(); if (!*pbags) return 0; free_bags = 1; } else free_bags = 0; if (!sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_push(*pbags, bag)) { if (free_bags) { sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(*pbags); *pbags = NULL; } return 0; } return 1; } PKCS12 *PKCS12_add_safes(STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes, int nid_p7) { PKCS12 *p12; if (nid_p7 <= 0) nid_p7 = NID_pkcs7_data; p12 = PKCS12_init(nid_p7); if (!p12) return NULL; if (!PKCS12_pack_authsafes(p12, safes)) { PKCS12_free(p12); return NULL; } return p12; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c0000644000000000000000000001360113176625657016125 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include /* Uncomment out this line to get debugging info about key generation */ /* * #define OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN */ #ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN # include extern BIO *bio_err; void h__dump(unsigned char *p, int len); #endif /* PKCS12 compatible key/IV generation */ #ifndef min # define min(a,b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b)) #endif int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type) { int ret; unsigned char *unipass; int uniplen; if (!pass) { unipass = NULL; uniplen = 0; } else if (!OPENSSL_asc2uni(pass, passlen, &unipass, &uniplen)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen, id, iter, n, out, md_type); if (ret <= 0) return 0; OPENSSL_clear_free(unipass, uniplen); return ret; } int PKCS12_key_gen_utf8(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type) { int ret; unsigned char *unipass; int uniplen; if (!pass) { unipass = NULL; uniplen = 0; } else if (!OPENSSL_utf82uni(pass, passlen, &unipass, &uniplen)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen, id, iter, n, out, md_type); if (ret <= 0) return 0; OPENSSL_clear_free(unipass, uniplen); return ret; } int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type) { unsigned char *B = NULL, *D = NULL, *I = NULL, *p = NULL, *Ai = NULL; int Slen, Plen, Ilen, Ijlen; int i, j, u, v; int ret = 0; BIGNUM *Ij = NULL, *Bpl1 = NULL; /* These hold Ij and B + 1 */ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN unsigned char *tmpout = out; int tmpn = n; #endif ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; #ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN fprintf(stderr, "KEYGEN DEBUG\n"); fprintf(stderr, "ID %d, ITER %d\n", id, iter); fprintf(stderr, "Password (length %d):\n", passlen); h__dump(pass, passlen); fprintf(stderr, "Salt (length %d):\n", saltlen); h__dump(salt, saltlen); #endif v = EVP_MD_block_size(md_type); u = EVP_MD_size(md_type); if (u < 0 || v <= 0) goto err; D = OPENSSL_malloc(v); Ai = OPENSSL_malloc(u); B = OPENSSL_malloc(v + 1); Slen = v * ((saltlen + v - 1) / v); if (passlen) Plen = v * ((passlen + v - 1) / v); else Plen = 0; Ilen = Slen + Plen; I = OPENSSL_malloc(Ilen); Ij = BN_new(); Bpl1 = BN_new(); if (D == NULL || Ai == NULL || B == NULL || I == NULL || Ij == NULL || Bpl1 == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < v; i++) D[i] = id; p = I; for (i = 0; i < Slen; i++) *p++ = salt[i % saltlen]; for (i = 0; i < Plen; i++) *p++ = pass[i % passlen]; for (;;) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_type, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, D, v) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, I, Ilen) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, Ai, NULL)) goto err; for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_type, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, Ai, u) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, Ai, NULL)) goto err; } memcpy(out, Ai, min(n, u)); if (u >= n) { #ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN fprintf(stderr, "Output KEY (length %d)\n", tmpn); h__dump(tmpout, tmpn); #endif ret = 1; goto end; } n -= u; out += u; for (j = 0; j < v; j++) B[j] = Ai[j % u]; /* Work out B + 1 first then can use B as tmp space */ if (!BN_bin2bn(B, v, Bpl1)) goto err; if (!BN_add_word(Bpl1, 1)) goto err; for (j = 0; j < Ilen; j += v) { if (!BN_bin2bn(I + j, v, Ij)) goto err; if (!BN_add(Ij, Ij, Bpl1)) goto err; if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, B)) goto err; Ijlen = BN_num_bytes(Ij); /* If more than 2^(v*8) - 1 cut off MSB */ if (Ijlen > v) { if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, B)) goto err; memcpy(I + j, B + 1, v); #ifndef PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN /* If less than v bytes pad with zeroes */ } else if (Ijlen < v) { memset(I + j, 0, v - Ijlen); if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen)) goto err; #endif } else if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j)) goto err; } } err: PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); end: OPENSSL_free(Ai); OPENSSL_free(B); OPENSSL_free(D); OPENSSL_free(I); BN_free(Ij); BN_free(Bpl1); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } #ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_KEYGEN void h__dump(unsigned char *p, int len) { for (; len--; p++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X", *p); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8d.c0000644000000000000000000000145313176625657016032 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(const X509_SIG *p8, const char *pass, int passlen) { const X509_ALGOR *dalg; const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *doct; X509_SIG_get0(p8, &dalg, &doct); return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(dalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO), pass, passlen, doct, 1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_attr.c0000644000000000000000000000575213176625657016317 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "p12_lcl.h" /* Add a local keyid to a safebag */ int PKCS12_add_localkeyid(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *name, int namelen) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_localKeyID, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, name, namelen)) return 1; else return 0; } /* Add key usage to PKCS#8 structure */ int PKCS8_add_keyusage(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int usage) { unsigned char us_val = (unsigned char)usage; return PKCS8_pkey_add1_attr_by_NID(p8, NID_key_usage, V_ASN1_BIT_STRING, &us_val, 1); } /* Add a friendlyname to a safebag */ int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name, int namelen) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_friendlyName, MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)name, namelen)) return 1; else return 0; } int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_utf8(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name, int namelen) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_friendlyName, MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char *)name, namelen)) return 1; else return 0; } int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const unsigned char *name, int namelen) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_friendlyName, MBSTRING_BMP, name, namelen)) return 1; else return 0; } int PKCS12_add_CSPName_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name, int namelen) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&bag->attrib, NID_ms_csp_name, MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)name, namelen)) return 1; else return 0; } ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr_gen(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrs, int attr_nid) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *attrib; int i; i = X509at_get_attr_by_NID(attrs, attr_nid, -1); attrib = X509at_get_attr(attrs, i); return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attrib, 0); } char *PKCS12_get_friendlyname(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { const ASN1_TYPE *atype; if ((atype = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)) == NULL) return NULL; if (atype->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) return NULL; return OPENSSL_uni2utf8(atype->value.bmpstring->data, atype->value.bmpstring->length); } const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attrs(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { return bag->attrib; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c0000644000000000000000000001564013176625657016313 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */ static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts); static int parse_bags(const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts); static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts); /* * Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert and * other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, or it * should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be passed * uninitialised. */ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca) { STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; if (pkey) *pkey = NULL; if (cert) *cert = NULL; /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */ if (!p12) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER); return 0; } /* Check the mac */ /* * If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases to * determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that under * PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length * password are two different things... */ if (!pass || !*pass) { if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL; else if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = ""; else { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); goto err; } } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Allocate stack for other certificates */ ocerts = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!ocerts) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR); goto err; } while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) { if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) { ERR_set_mark(); if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) { *cert = x; x = NULL; } ERR_pop_to_mark(); } if (ca && x) { if (!*ca) *ca = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!*ca) goto err; if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x)) goto err; x = NULL; } X509_free(x); } sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free); return 1; err: if (pkey) { EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); *pkey = NULL; } if (cert) { X509_free(*cert); *cert = NULL; } X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free); return 0; } /* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */ static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts) { STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes; STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags; int i, bagnid; PKCS7 *p7; if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) { p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i); bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) { bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7); } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) { bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen); } else continue; if (!bags) { sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); return 0; } if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) { sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); return 0; } sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); } sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); return 1; } static int parse_bags(const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) { if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i), pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) return 0; } return 1; } static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8; X509 *x509; const ASN1_TYPE *attrib; ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL; if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName))) fname = attrib->value.bmpstring; if ((attrib = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID))) lkid = attrib->value.octet_string; switch (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag)) { case NID_keyBag: if (!pkey || *pkey) return 1; *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(bag)); if (*pkey == NULL) return 0; break; case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag: if (!pkey || *pkey) return 1; if ((p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)) == NULL) return 0; *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); if (!(*pkey)) return 0; break; case NID_certBag: if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(bag) != NID_x509Certificate) return 1; if ((x509 = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(bag)) == NULL) return 0; if (lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length)) { X509_free(x509); return 0; } if (fname) { int len, r; unsigned char *data; len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname); if (len >= 0) { r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); if (!r) { X509_free(x509); return 0; } } } if (!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509)) { X509_free(x509); return 0; } break; case NID_safeContentsBag: return parse_bags(PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(bag), pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts); default: return 1; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c0000644000000000000000000001024213176625657016137 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS12,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS12,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS12_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_CREATE), "PKCS12_create"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC), "PKCS12_gen_mac"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT), "PKCS12_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I), "PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT), "PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG), "PKCS12_item_pack_safebag"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC), "PKCS12_key_gen_asc"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI), "PKCS12_key_gen_uni"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8), "PKCS12_key_gen_utf8"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS), "PKCS12_newpass"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7data"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7encdata"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE), "PKCS12_parse"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT), "PKCS12_pbe_crypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_P8INF), "PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_PKCS8), "PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT), "PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC), "PKCS12_setup_mac"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC), "PKCS12_set_mac"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES), "PKCS12_unpack_authsafes"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA), "PKCS12_unpack_p7data"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC), "PKCS12_verify_mac"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ENCRYPT), "PKCS8_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE), "PKCS8_set0_pbe"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS12_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE), "cant pack structure"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA), "content type not data"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_ENCODE_ERROR), "encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR), "encrypt error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE), "error setting encrypted data type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT), "invalid null argument"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER), "invalid null pkcs12 pointer"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR), "iv gen error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR), "key gen error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT), "mac absent"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR), "mac generation error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR), "mac setup error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR), "mac string set error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE), "mac verify failure"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR), "parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PKCS12_ALGOR_CIPHERINIT_ERROR), "pkcs12 algor cipherinit error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PKCS12_CIPHERFINAL_ERROR), "pkcs12 cipherfinal error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT_ERROR), "pkcs12 pbe crypt error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM), "unknown digest algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS12_R_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS12_MODE), "unsupported pkcs12 mode"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_PKCS12_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(PKCS12_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS12_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS12_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_decr.c0000644000000000000000000001047613176625657016261 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* Define this to dump decrypted output to files called DERnnn */ /* * #define OPENSSL_DEBUG_DECRYPT */ /* * Encrypt/Decrypt a buffer based on password and algor, result in a * OPENSSL_malloc'ed buffer */ unsigned char *PKCS12_pbe_crypt(const X509_ALGOR *algor, const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, unsigned char **data, int *datalen, int en_de) { unsigned char *out = NULL; int outlen, i; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Decrypt data */ if (!EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algor->algorithm, pass, passlen, algor->parameter, ctx, en_de)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, PKCS12_R_PKCS12_ALGOR_CIPHERINIT_ERROR); goto err; } if ((out = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx))) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, out, &i, in, inlen)) { OPENSSL_free(out); out = NULL; PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } outlen = i; if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, out + i, &i)) { OPENSSL_free(out); out = NULL; PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT, PKCS12_R_PKCS12_CIPHERFINAL_ERROR); goto err; } outlen += i; if (datalen) *datalen = outlen; if (data) *data = out; err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return out; } /* * Decrypt an OCTET STRING and decode ASN1 structure if zbuf set zero buffer * after use. */ void *PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(const X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const char *pass, int passlen, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct, int zbuf) { unsigned char *out; const unsigned char *p; void *ret; int outlen; if (!PKCS12_pbe_crypt(algor, pass, passlen, oct->data, oct->length, &out, &outlen, 0)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I, PKCS12_R_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT_ERROR); return NULL; } p = out; #ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_DECRYPT { FILE *op; char fname[30]; static int fnm = 1; sprintf(fname, "DER%d", fnm++); op = fopen(fname, "wb"); fwrite(p, 1, outlen, op); fclose(op); } #endif ret = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, outlen, it); if (zbuf) OPENSSL_cleanse(out, outlen); if (!ret) PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(out); return ret; } /* * Encode ASN1 structure and encrypt, return OCTET STRING if zbuf set zero * encoding. */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const char *pass, int passlen, void *obj, int zbuf) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL; unsigned char *in = NULL; int inlen; if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } inlen = ASN1_item_i2d(obj, &in, it); if (!in) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT, PKCS12_R_ENCODE_ERROR); goto err; } if (!PKCS12_pbe_crypt(algor, pass, passlen, in, inlen, &oct->data, &oct->length, 1)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(in); goto err; } if (zbuf) OPENSSL_cleanse(in, inlen); OPENSSL_free(in); return oct; err: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c0000644000000000000000000001717613176625657016331 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include # include "p12_lcl.h" int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12) { return p12->mac ? 1 : 0; } void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac, const X509_ALGOR **pmacalg, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **psalt, const ASN1_INTEGER **piter, const PKCS12 *p12) { if (p12->mac) { X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, pmacalg, pmac); if (psalt) *psalt = p12->mac->salt; if (piter) *piter = p12->mac->iter; } else { if (pmac) *pmac = NULL; if (pmacalg) *pmacalg = NULL; if (psalt) *psalt = NULL; if (piter) *piter = NULL; } } # define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32 static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *key, const EVP_MD *digest) { unsigned char out[96]; if (keylen != TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN) { return 0; } if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, digest, sizeof(out), out)) { return 0; } memcpy(key, out + sizeof(out) - TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN, TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN); OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out)); return 1; } /* Generate a MAC */ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen, int (*pkcs12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int slen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type)) { const EVP_MD *md_type; HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt; int saltlen, iter; int md_size = 0; int md_type_nid; const X509_ALGOR *macalg; const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid; if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL) pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8; if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA); return 0; } salt = p12->mac->salt->data; saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length; if (!p12->mac->iter) iter = 1; else iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter); X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL); X509_ALGOR_get0(&macoid, NULL, NULL, macalg); if ((md_type = EVP_get_digestbyobj(macoid)) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); return 0; } md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type); md_type_nid = EVP_MD_type(md_type); if (md_size < 0) return 0; if ((md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_94 || md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256 || md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512) && !getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12")) { md_size = TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN; if (!pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, md_size, key, md_type)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR); return 0; } } else if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID, iter, md_size, key, md_type)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR); return 0; } if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL || !HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL) || !HMAC_Update(hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data, p12->authsafes->d.data->length) || !HMAC_Final(hmac, mac, maclen)) { HMAC_CTX_free(hmac); return 0; } HMAC_CTX_free(hmac); return 1; } int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen) { return pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, maclen, NULL); } /* Verify the mac */ int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen) { unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int maclen; const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct; if (p12->mac == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT); return 0; } if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, PKCS12_key_gen_utf8)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR); return 0; } X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct); if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct)) || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* Set a mac */ int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, const EVP_MD *md_type) { unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int maclen; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct; if (!md_type) md_type = EVP_sha1(); if (PKCS12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, md_type) == PKCS12_ERROR) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR); return 0; } /* * Note that output mac is forced to UTF-8... */ if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, PKCS12_key_gen_utf8)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR); return 0; } X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct); if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } /* Set up a mac structure */ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, const EVP_MD *md_type) { X509_ALGOR *macalg; PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free(p12->mac); p12->mac = NULL; if ((p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()) == NULL) return PKCS12_ERROR; if (iter > 1) { if ((p12->mac->iter = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p12->mac->iter, iter)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } if (!saltlen) saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN; if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen; if (!salt) { if (RAND_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0) return 0; } else memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen); X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL); if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(macalg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md_type)), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_sbag.c0000644000000000000000000001137113176625657016253 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "p12_lcl.h" #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, int attr_nid) { return PKCS12_get_attr_gen(bag->attrib, attr_nid); } #endif const ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, int attr_nid) { return PKCS12_get_attr_gen(bag->attrib, attr_nid); } ASN1_TYPE *PKCS8_get_attr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int attr_nid) { return PKCS12_get_attr_gen(PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(p8), attr_nid); } const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_keyBag) return NULL; return bag->value.keybag; } const X509_SIG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_pkcs8(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->type) != NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag) return NULL; return bag->value.shkeybag; } const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) * PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->type) != NID_safeContentsBag) return NULL; return bag->value.safes; } const ASN1_OBJECT *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_type(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { return bag->type; } int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { return OBJ_obj2nid(bag->type); } int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { int btype = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag); if (btype != NID_certBag && btype != NID_crlBag && btype != NID_secretBag) return -1; return OBJ_obj2nid(bag->value.bag->type); } X509 *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_certBag) return NULL; if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->value.bag->type) != NID_x509Certificate) return NULL; return ASN1_item_unpack(bag->value.bag->value.octet, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)); } X509_CRL *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_crl(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag) { if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_crlBag) return NULL; if (OBJ_obj2nid(bag->value.bag->type) != NID_x509Crl) return NULL; return ASN1_item_unpack(bag->value.bag->value.octet, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL)); } PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert(X509 *x509) { return PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(x509, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), NID_x509Certificate, NID_certBag); } PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_crl(X509_CRL *crl) { return PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(crl, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), NID_x509Crl, NID_crlBag); } /* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new(); if (bag == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_P8INF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_keyBag); bag->value.keybag = p8; return bag; } /* Turn PKCS8 object into a shrouded keybag */ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8(X509_SIG *p8) { PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new(); /* Set up the safe bag */ if (bag == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag); bag->value.shkeybag = p8; return bag; } PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) { PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag; const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph; X509_SIG *p8; pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid); if (pbe_ciph) pbe_nid = -1; p8 = PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, p8inf); if (p8 == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8(p8); if (bag == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509_SIG_free(p8); return NULL; } return bag; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_p8e.c0000644000000000000000000000373213176625657016035 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) { X509_SIG *p8 = NULL; X509_ALGOR *pbe; if (pbe_nid == -1) pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set(cipher, iter, salt, saltlen); else if (EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, pbe_nid, NULL, NULL, 0)) pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(cipher, iter, salt, saltlen, NULL, pbe_nid); else { ERR_clear_error(); pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, salt, saltlen); } if (!pbe) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return NULL; } p8 = PKCS8_set0_pbe(pass, passlen, p8inf, pbe); if (p8 == NULL) { X509_ALGOR_free(pbe); return NULL; } return p8; } X509_SIG *PKCS8_set0_pbe(const char *pass, int passlen, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, X509_ALGOR *pbe) { X509_SIG *p8; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enckey; enckey = PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO), pass, passlen, p8inf, 1); if (!enckey) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR); return NULL; } p8 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*p8)); if (p8 == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(enckey); return NULL; } p8->algor = pbe; p8->digest = enckey; return p8; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_asn.c0000644000000000000000000000601013176625657016112 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "p12_lcl.h" /* PKCS#12 ASN1 module */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12, authsafes, PKCS7), ASN1_OPT(PKCS12, mac, PKCS12_MAC_DATA) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12) ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, dinfo, X509_SIG), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_OPT(PKCS12_MAC_DATA, iter, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(bag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.other, ASN1_ANY, 0); ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_BAGS) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_x509Certificate, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.x509cert, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_x509Crl, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.x509crl, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_sdsiCertificate, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_BAGS, value.sdsicert, ASN1_IA5STRING, 0)), } ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS12_BAGS, 0, type, 0, &bag_default_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_BAGS) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_BAGS, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS12_BAGS), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_BAGS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_BAGS) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(safebag_default) = ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.other, ASN1_ANY, 0); ASN1_ADB(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_keyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.keybag, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.shkeybag, X509_SIG, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_safeContentsBag, ASN1_EXP_SET_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.safes, PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_certBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_crlBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_secretBag, ASN1_EXP(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, value.bag, PKCS12_BAGS, 0)) } ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, 0, type, 0, &safebag_default_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS12_SAFEBAG), ASN1_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS12_SAFEBAG, attrib, X509_ATTRIBUTE) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) /* SEQUENCE OF SafeBag */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, PKCS12_SAFEBAGS, PKCS12_SAFEBAG) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS) /* Authsafes: SEQUENCE OF PKCS7 */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, PKCS12_AUTHSAFES, PKCS7) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c0000644000000000000000000001316513176625657016303 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "p12_lcl.h" /* PKCS#12 password change routine */ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass); static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass); static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass); static int alg_get(const X509_ALGOR *alg, int *pnid, int *piter, int *psaltlen); /* * Change the password on a PKCS#12 structure. */ int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass) { /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */ if (!p12) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS, PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER); return 0; } /* Check the mac */ if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, oldpass, -1)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!newpass_p12(p12, oldpass, newpass)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } /* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass) { STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes = NULL, *newsafes = NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags = NULL; int i, bagnid, pbe_nid = 0, pbe_iter = 0, pbe_saltlen = 0; PKCS7 *p7, *p7new; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *p12_data_tmp = NULL, *macoct = NULL; unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int maclen; int rv = 0; if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL) goto err; if ((newsafes = sk_PKCS7_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) { p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i); bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) { bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7); } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) { bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1); if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm, &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen)) goto err; } else { continue; } if (bags == NULL) goto err; if (!newpass_bags(bags, oldpass, newpass)) goto err; /* Repack bag in same form with new password */ if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags); else p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(pbe_nid, newpass, -1, NULL, pbe_saltlen, pbe_iter, bags); if (!p7new || !sk_PKCS7_push(newsafes, p7new)) goto err; sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); bags = NULL; } /* Repack safe: save old safe in case of error */ p12_data_tmp = p12->authsafes->d.data; if ((p12->authsafes->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!PKCS12_pack_authsafes(p12, newsafes)) goto err; if (!PKCS12_gen_mac(p12, newpass, -1, mac, &maclen)) goto err; X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct); if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) goto err; rv = 1; err: /* Restore old safe if necessary */ if (rv == 1) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12_data_tmp); } else if (p12_data_tmp != NULL) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p12->authsafes->d.data); p12->authsafes->d.data = p12_data_tmp; } sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); sk_PKCS7_pop_free(newsafes, PKCS7_free); return rv; } static int newpass_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) { if (!newpass_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i), oldpass, newpass)) return 0; } return 1; } /* Change password of safebag: only needs handle shrouded keybags */ static int newpass_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8; X509_SIG *p8new; int p8_nid, p8_saltlen, p8_iter; const X509_ALGOR *shalg; if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag) != NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag) return 1; if ((p8 = PKCS8_decrypt(bag->value.shkeybag, oldpass, -1)) == NULL) return 0; X509_SIG_get0(bag->value.shkeybag, &shalg, NULL); if (!alg_get(shalg, &p8_nid, &p8_iter, &p8_saltlen)) return 0; p8new = PKCS8_encrypt(p8_nid, NULL, newpass, -1, NULL, p8_saltlen, p8_iter, p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); if (p8new == NULL) return 0; X509_SIG_free(bag->value.shkeybag); bag->value.shkeybag = p8new; return 1; } static int alg_get(const X509_ALGOR *alg, int *pnid, int *piter, int *psaltlen) { PBEPARAM *pbe; pbe = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), alg->parameter); if (!pbe) return 0; *pnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm); *piter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter); *psaltlen = pbe->salt->length; PBEPARAM_free(pbe); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c0000644000000000000000000001201413176625657016062 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "p12_lcl.h" /* Pack an object into an OCTET STRING and turn into a safebag */ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int nid1, int nid2) { PKCS12_BAGS *bag; PKCS12_SAFEBAG *safebag; if ((bag = PKCS12_BAGS_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1); if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } safebag->value.bag = bag; safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2); return safebag; err: PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag); return NULL; } /* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 data Contentinfo */ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk) { PKCS7 *p7; if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); if ((p7->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE); goto err; } return p7; err: PKCS7_free(p7); return NULL; } /* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7) { if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p7)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA); return NULL; } return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS)); } /* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 encrypted data ContentInfo */ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags) { PKCS7 *p7; X509_ALGOR *pbe; const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph; if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE); goto err; } pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid); if (pbe_ciph) pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set(pbe_ciph, iter, salt, saltlen); else pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, salt, saltlen); if (!pbe) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm); p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data); if (!(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data = PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass, passlen, bags, 1))) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR); goto err; } return p7; err: PKCS7_free(p7); return NULL; } STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass, int passlen) { if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7)) return NULL; return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass, passlen, p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data, 1); } PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_decrypt_skey(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen) { return PKCS8_decrypt(bag->value.shkeybag, pass, passlen); } int PKCS12_pack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12, STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes) { if (ASN1_item_pack(safes, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES), &p12->authsafes->d.data)) return 1; return 0; } STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12) { if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA); return NULL; } return ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c0000644000000000000000000000440113176625657016303 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* PKCS#12 PBE algorithms now in static table */ void PKCS12_PBE_add(void) { } int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) { PBEPARAM *pbe; int saltlen, iter, ret; unsigned char *salt; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; int (*pkcs12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int slen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type); pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8; if (cipher == NULL) return 0; /* Extract useful info from parameter */ pbe = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), param); if (pbe == NULL) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } if (!pbe->iter) iter = 1; else iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter); salt = pbe->salt->data; saltlen = pbe->salt->length; if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_KEY_ID, iter, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key, md)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR); PBEPARAM_free(pbe); return 0; } if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_IV_ID, iter, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), iv, md)) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR); PBEPARAM_free(pbe); return 0; } PBEPARAM_free(pbe); ret = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de); OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mem.c0000644000000000000000000001067113176625657014332 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" /* * the following pointers may be changed as long as 'allow_customize' is set */ static int allow_customize = 1; static void *(*malloc_impl)(size_t, const char *, int) = CRYPTO_malloc; static void *(*realloc_impl)(void *, size_t, const char *, int) = CRYPTO_realloc; static void (*free_impl)(void *, const char *, int) = CRYPTO_free; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG static int call_malloc_debug = 1; #else static int call_malloc_debug = 0; #endif int CRYPTO_set_mem_functions( void *(*m)(size_t, const char *, int), void *(*r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int), void (*f)(void *, const char *, int)) { if (!allow_customize) return 0; if (m) malloc_impl = m; if (r) realloc_impl = r; if (f) free_impl = f; return 1; } int CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(int flag) { if (!allow_customize) return 0; call_malloc_debug = flag; return 1; } void CRYPTO_get_mem_functions( void *(**m)(size_t, const char *, int), void *(**r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int), void (**f)(void *, const char *, int)) { if (m != NULL) *m = malloc_impl; if (r != NULL) *r = realloc_impl; if (f != NULL) *f = free_impl; } void *CRYPTO_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) { void *ret = NULL; if (malloc_impl != NULL && malloc_impl != CRYPTO_malloc) return malloc_impl(num, file, line); if (num == 0) return NULL; allow_customize = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (call_malloc_debug) { CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(NULL, num, 0, file, line); ret = malloc(num); CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(ret, num, 1, file, line); } else { ret = malloc(num); } #else osslargused(file); osslargused(line); ret = malloc(num); #endif return ret; } void *CRYPTO_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) { void *ret = CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line); if (ret != NULL) memset(ret, 0, num); return ret; } void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *str, size_t num, const char *file, int line) { if (realloc_impl != NULL && realloc_impl != &CRYPTO_realloc) return realloc_impl(str, num, file, line); if (str == NULL) return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line); if (num == 0) { CRYPTO_free(str, file, line); return NULL; } allow_customize = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (call_malloc_debug) { void *ret; CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(str, NULL, num, 0, file, line); ret = realloc(str, num); CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(str, ret, num, 1, file, line); return ret; } #else osslargused(file); osslargused(line); #endif return realloc(str, num); } void *CRYPTO_clear_realloc(void *str, size_t old_len, size_t num, const char *file, int line) { void *ret = NULL; if (str == NULL) return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line); if (num == 0) { CRYPTO_clear_free(str, old_len, file, line); return NULL; } /* Can't shrink the buffer since memcpy below copies |old_len| bytes. */ if (num < old_len) { OPENSSL_cleanse((char*)str + num, old_len - num); return str; } ret = CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line); if (ret != NULL) { memcpy(ret, str, old_len); CRYPTO_clear_free(str, old_len, file, line); } return ret; } void CRYPTO_free(void *str, const char *file, int line) { if (free_impl != NULL && free_impl != &CRYPTO_free) { free_impl(str, file, line); return; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (call_malloc_debug) { CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(str, 0, file, line); free(str); CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(str, 1, file, line); } else { free(str); } #else free(str); #endif } void CRYPTO_clear_free(void *str, size_t num, const char *file, int line) { if (str == NULL) return; if (num) OPENSSL_cleanse(str, num); CRYPTO_free(str, file, line); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md4/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014067 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md4/build.info0000644000000000000000000000011413176625657016037 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ md4_dgst.c md4_one.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c0000644000000000000000000001062413176625657015743 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "md4_locl.h" /* * Implemented from RFC1186 The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm */ #define INIT_DATA_A (unsigned long)0x67452301L #define INIT_DATA_B (unsigned long)0xefcdab89L #define INIT_DATA_C (unsigned long)0x98badcfeL #define INIT_DATA_D (unsigned long)0x10325476L int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *c) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); c->A = INIT_DATA_A; c->B = INIT_DATA_B; c->C = INIT_DATA_C; c->D = INIT_DATA_D; return 1; } #ifndef md4_block_data_order # ifdef X # undef X # endif void md4_block_data_order(MD4_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t num) { const unsigned char *data = data_; register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, l; # ifndef MD32_XARRAY /* See comment in crypto/sha/sha_locl.h for details. */ unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7, XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15; # define X(i) XX##i # else MD4_LONG XX[MD4_LBLOCK]; # define X(i) XX[i] # endif A = c->A; B = c->B; C = c->C; D = c->D; for (; num--;) { (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(0) = l; (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(1) = l; /* Round 0 */ R0(A, B, C, D, X(0), 3, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(2) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(1), 7, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(3) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(2), 11, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(4) = l; R0(B, C, D, A, X(3), 19, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(5) = l; R0(A, B, C, D, X(4), 3, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(6) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(5), 7, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(7) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(6), 11, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(8) = l; R0(B, C, D, A, X(7), 19, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(9) = l; R0(A, B, C, D, X(8), 3, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(10) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(9), 7, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(11) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(10), 11, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(12) = l; R0(B, C, D, A, X(11), 19, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(13) = l; R0(A, B, C, D, X(12), 3, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(14) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(13), 7, 0); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(15) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(14), 11, 0); R0(B, C, D, A, X(15), 19, 0); /* Round 1 */ R1(A, B, C, D, X(0), 3, 0x5A827999L); R1(D, A, B, C, X(4), 5, 0x5A827999L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(8), 9, 0x5A827999L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(12), 13, 0x5A827999L); R1(A, B, C, D, X(1), 3, 0x5A827999L); R1(D, A, B, C, X(5), 5, 0x5A827999L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(9), 9, 0x5A827999L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(13), 13, 0x5A827999L); R1(A, B, C, D, X(2), 3, 0x5A827999L); R1(D, A, B, C, X(6), 5, 0x5A827999L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(10), 9, 0x5A827999L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(14), 13, 0x5A827999L); R1(A, B, C, D, X(3), 3, 0x5A827999L); R1(D, A, B, C, X(7), 5, 0x5A827999L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(11), 9, 0x5A827999L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(15), 13, 0x5A827999L); /* Round 2 */ R2(A, B, C, D, X(0), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(8), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(C, D, A, B, X(4), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(12), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(A, B, C, D, X(2), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(10), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(C, D, A, B, X(6), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(14), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(A, B, C, D, X(1), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(9), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(C, D, A, B, X(5), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(13), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(A, B, C, D, X(3), 3, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(11), 9, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(C, D, A, B, X(7), 11, 0x6ED9EBA1L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(15), 15, 0x6ED9EBA1L); A = c->A += A; B = c->B += B; C = c->C += C; D = c->D += D; } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000370313176625657015740 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include void md4_block_data_order(MD4_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num); #define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN #define HASH_LONG MD4_LONG #define HASH_CTX MD4_CTX #define HASH_CBLOCK MD4_CBLOCK #define HASH_UPDATE MD4_Update #define HASH_TRANSFORM MD4_Transform #define HASH_FINAL MD4_Final #define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s) do { \ unsigned long ll; \ ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ } while (0) #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER md4_block_data_order #include "internal/md32_common.h" /*- #define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) #define G(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((x) & ((z))) | ((y) & ((z)))) */ /* * As pointed out by Wei Dai , the above can be simplified * to the code below. Wei attributes these optimizations to Peter Gutmann's * SHS code, and he attributes it to Rich Schroeppel. */ #define F(b,c,d) ((((c) ^ (d)) & (b)) ^ (d)) #define G(b,c,d) (((b) & (c)) | ((b) & (d)) | ((c) & (d))) #define H(b,c,d) ((b) ^ (c) ^ (d)) #define R0(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \ a+=((k)+(t)+F((b),(c),(d))); \ a=ROTATE(a,s); }; #define R1(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \ a+=((k)+(t)+G((b),(c),(d))); \ a=ROTATE(a,s); };\ #define R2(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \ a+=((k)+(t)+H((b),(c),(d))); \ a=ROTATE(a,s); }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md4/md4_one.c0000644000000000000000000000221313176625657015556 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include #endif unsigned char *MD4(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { MD4_CTX c; static unsigned char m[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; if (!MD4_Init(&c)) return NULL; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC MD4_Update(&c, d, n); #else { char temp[1024]; unsigned long chunk; while (n > 0) { chunk = (n > sizeof(temp)) ? sizeof(temp) : n; ebcdic2ascii(temp, d, chunk); MD4_Update(&c, temp, chunk); n -= chunk; d += chunk; } } #endif MD4_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */ return (md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014073 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/build.info0000644000000000000000000000230213176625657016044 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ {- $target{rc4_asm_src} -} GENERATE[rc4-586.s]=asm/rc4-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[rc4-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[rc4-x86_64.s]=asm/rc4-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[rc4-md5-x86_64.s]=asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[rc4-parisc.s]=asm/rc4-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) BEGINRAW[makefile(windows)] {- $builddir -}\rc4-ia64.asm: {- $sourcedir -}\asm\rc4-ia64.pl $(PERL) {- $sourcedir -}\asm\rc4-ia64.pl $@.S $(CC) -DSZ=4 -EP $@.S > $@.i && move /Y $@.i $@ del /Q $@.S ENDRAW[makefile(windows)] BEGINRAW[Makefile] {- $builddir -}/rc4-ia64.s: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/rc4-ia64.pl @(trap "rm $@.*" INT 0; \ $(PERL) $< $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $@.S; \ case `awk '/^#define RC4_INT/{print$$NF}' $(BLDDIR)/include/openssl/opensslconf.h` in \ int) set -x; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) -DSZ=4 -E $@.S > $@.i && mv -f $@.i $@;; \ char) set -x; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) -DSZ=1 -E $@.S > $@.i && mv -f $@.i $@;; \ *) exit 1 ;; \ esac ) # GNU make "catch all" {- $builddir -}/rc4-%.s: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/rc4-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ENDRAW[Makefile] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c0000644000000000000000000000265213176625657015767 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc4_locl.h" #include const char *RC4_options(void) { if (sizeof(RC4_INT) == 1) return ("rc4(char)"); else return ("rc4(int)"); } /*- * RC4 as implemented from a posting from * Newsgroups: sci.crypt * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark) * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed. * Message-ID: * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT */ void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data) { register RC4_INT tmp; register int id1, id2; register RC4_INT *d; unsigned int i; d = &(key->data[0]); key->x = 0; key->y = 0; id1 = id2 = 0; #define SK_LOOP(d,n) { \ tmp=d[(n)]; \ id2 = (data[id1] + tmp + id2) & 0xff; \ if (++id1 == len) id1=0; \ d[(n)]=d[id2]; \ d[id2]=tmp; } for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) d[i] = i; for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 4) { SK_LOOP(d, i + 0); SK_LOOP(d, i + 1); SK_LOOP(d, i + 2); SK_LOOP(d, i + 3); } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000071613176625657015751 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H # define HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014653 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-parisc.pl0000644000000000000000000001556513176625657017173 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # RC4 for PA-RISC. # June 2009. # # Performance is 33% better than gcc 3.2 generated code on PA-7100LC. # For reference, [4x] unrolled loop is >40% faster than folded one. # It's possible to unroll loop 8 times on PA-RISC 2.0, but improvement # is believed to be not sufficient to justify the effort... # # Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $FRAME_MARKER =80; $SAVED_RP =16; $PUSH ="std"; $PUSHMA ="std,ma"; $POP ="ldd"; $POPMB ="ldd,mb"; } else { $LEVEL ="1.0"; $SIZE_T =4; $FRAME_MARKER =48; $SAVED_RP =20; $PUSH ="stw"; $PUSHMA ="stwm"; $POP ="ldw"; $POPMB ="ldwm"; } $FRAME=4*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER; # 4 saved regs + frame marker # [+ argument transfer] $SZ=1; # defaults to RC4_CHAR if (open CONF,"<${dir}../../opensslconf.h") { while() { if (m/#\s*define\s+RC4_INT\s+(.*)/) { $SZ = ($1=~/char$/) ? 1 : 4; last; } } close CONF; } if ($SZ==1) { # RC4_CHAR $LD="ldb"; $LDX="ldbx"; $MKX="addl"; $ST="stb"; } else { # RC4_INT (~5% faster than RC4_CHAR on PA-7100LC) $LD="ldw"; $LDX="ldwx,s"; $MKX="sh2addl"; $ST="stw"; } $key="%r26"; $len="%r25"; $inp="%r24"; $out="%r23"; @XX=("%r19","%r20"); @TX=("%r21","%r22"); $YY="%r28"; $TY="%r29"; $acc="%r1"; $ix="%r2"; $iy="%r3"; $dat0="%r4"; $dat1="%r5"; $rem="%r6"; $mask="%r31"; sub unrolledloopbody { for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; ldo 1($XX[0]),$XX[1] `sprintf("$LDX %$TY(%$key),%$dat1") if ($i>0)` and $mask,$XX[1],$XX[1] $LDX $YY($key),$TY $MKX $YY,$key,$ix $LDX $XX[1]($key),$TX[1] $MKX $XX[0],$key,$iy $ST $TX[0],0($ix) comclr,<> $XX[1],$YY,%r0 ; conditional copy $TX[0],$TX[1] ; move `sprintf("%sdep %$dat1,%d,8,%$acc",$i==1?"z":"",8*($i-1)+7) if ($i>0)` $ST $TY,0($iy) addl $TX[0],$TY,$TY addl $TX[1],$YY,$YY and $mask,$TY,$TY and $mask,$YY,$YY ___ push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers } } sub foldedloop { my ($label,$count)=@_; $code.=<<___; $label $MKX $YY,$key,$iy $LDX $YY($key),$TY $MKX $XX[0],$key,$ix $ST $TX[0],0($iy) ldo 1($XX[0]),$XX[0] $ST $TY,0($ix) addl $TX[0],$TY,$TY ldbx $inp($out),$dat1 and $mask,$TY,$TY and $mask,$XX[0],$XX[0] $LDX $TY($key),$acc $LDX $XX[0]($key),$TX[0] ldo 1($out),$out xor $dat1,$acc,$acc addl $TX[0],$YY,$YY stb $acc,-1($out) addib,<> -1,$count,$label ; $count is always small and $mask,$YY,$YY ___ } $code=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .EXPORT RC4,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR RC4 .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-4*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=6 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$abort sub $inp,$out,$inp ; distance between $inp and $out $LD `0*$SZ`($key),$XX[0] $LD `1*$SZ`($key),$YY ldo `2*$SZ`($key),$key ldi 0xff,$mask ldi 3,$dat0 ldo 1($XX[0]),$XX[0] ; warm up loop and $mask,$XX[0],$XX[0] $LDX $XX[0]($key),$TX[0] addl $TX[0],$YY,$YY cmpib,*>>= 6,$len,L\$oop1 ; is $len large enough to bother? and $mask,$YY,$YY and,<> $out,$dat0,$rem ; is $out aligned? b L\$alignedout subi 4,$rem,$rem sub $len,$rem,$len ___ &foldedloop("L\$alignout",$rem); # process till $out is aligned $code.=<<___; L\$alignedout ; $len is at least 4 here and,<> $inp,$dat0,$acc ; is $inp aligned? b L\$oop4 sub $inp,$acc,$rem ; align $inp sh3addl $acc,%r0,$acc subi 32,$acc,$acc mtctl $acc,%cr11 ; load %sar with vshd align factor ldwx $rem($out),$dat0 ldo 4($rem),$rem L\$oop4misalignedinp ___ &unrolledloopbody(); $code.=<<___; $LDX $TY($key),$ix ldwx $rem($out),$dat1 ldo -4($len),$len or $ix,$acc,$acc ; last piece, no need to dep vshd $dat0,$dat1,$iy ; align data copy $dat1,$dat0 xor $iy,$acc,$acc stw $acc,0($out) cmpib,*<< 3,$len,L\$oop4misalignedinp ldo 4($out),$out cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$done nop b L\$oop1 nop .ALIGN 8 L\$oop4 ___ &unrolledloopbody(); $code.=<<___; $LDX $TY($key),$ix ldwx $inp($out),$dat0 ldo -4($len),$len or $ix,$acc,$acc ; last piece, no need to dep xor $dat0,$acc,$acc stw $acc,0($out) cmpib,*<< 3,$len,L\$oop4 ldo 4($out),$out cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$done nop ___ &foldedloop("L\$oop1",$len); $code.=<<___; L\$done $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ldo -1($XX[0]),$XX[0] ; chill out loop sub $YY,$TX[0],$YY and $mask,$XX[0],$XX[0] and $mask,$YY,$YY $ST $XX[0],`-2*$SZ`($key) $ST $YY,`-1*$SZ`($key) $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 L\$abort bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND ___ $code.=<<___; .EXPORT RC4_set_key,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR .ALIGN 8 RC4_set_key .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY $ST %r0,`0*$SZ`($key) $ST %r0,`1*$SZ`($key) ldo `2*$SZ`($key),$key copy %r0,@XX[0] L\$1st $ST @XX[0],0($key) ldo 1(@XX[0]),@XX[0] bb,>= @XX[0],`31-8`,L\$1st ; @XX[0]<256 ldo $SZ($key),$key ldo `-256*$SZ`($key),$key ; rewind $key addl $len,$inp,$inp ; $inp to point at the end sub %r0,$len,%r23 ; inverse index copy %r0,@XX[0] copy %r0,@XX[1] ldi 0xff,$mask L\$2nd $LDX @XX[0]($key),@TX[0] ldbx %r23($inp),@TX[1] addi,nuv 1,%r23,%r23 ; increment and conditional sub %r0,$len,%r23 ; inverse index addl @TX[0],@XX[1],@XX[1] addl @TX[1],@XX[1],@XX[1] and $mask,@XX[1],@XX[1] $MKX @XX[0],$key,$TY $LDX @XX[1]($key),@TX[1] $MKX @XX[1],$key,$YY ldo 1(@XX[0]),@XX[0] $ST @TX[0],0($YY) bb,>= @XX[0],`31-8`,L\$2nd ; @XX[0]<256 $ST @TX[1],0($TY) bv,n (%r2) .EXIT nop .PROCEND .EXPORT RC4_options,ENTRY .ALIGN 8 RC4_options .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY blr %r0,%r28 ldi 3,%r1 L\$pic andcm %r28,%r1,%r28 bv (%r2) .EXIT ldo L\$opts-L\$pic(%r28),%r28 .PROCEND .ALIGN 8 L\$opts .STRINGZ "rc4(4x,`$SZ==1?"char":"int"`)" .STRINGZ "RC4 for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4); $code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8); print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000003741013176625657016644 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # July 2004 # # 2.22x RC4 tune-up:-) It should be noted though that my hand [as in # "hand-coded assembler"] doesn't stand for the whole improvement # coefficient. It turned out that eliminating RC4_CHAR from config # line results in ~40% improvement (yes, even for C implementation). # Presumably it has everything to do with AMD cache architecture and # RAW or whatever penalties. Once again! The module *requires* config # line *without* RC4_CHAR! As for coding "secret," I bet on partial # register arithmetics. For example instead of 'inc %r8; and $255,%r8' # I simply 'inc %r8b'. Even though optimization manual discourages # to operate on partial registers, it turned out to be the best bet. # At least for AMD... How IA32E would perform remains to be seen... # November 2004 # # As was shown by Marc Bevand reordering of couple of load operations # results in even higher performance gain of 3.3x:-) At least on # Opteron... For reference, 1x in this case is RC4_CHAR C-code # compiled with gcc 3.3.2, which performs at ~54MBps per 1GHz clock. # Latter means that if you want to *estimate* what to expect from # *your* Opteron, then multiply 54 by 3.3 and clock frequency in GHz. # November 2004 # # Intel P4 EM64T core was found to run the AMD64 code really slow... # The only way to achieve comparable performance on P4 was to keep # RC4_CHAR. Kind of ironic, huh? As it's apparently impossible to # compose blended code, which would perform even within 30% marginal # on either AMD and Intel platforms, I implement both cases. See # rc4_skey.c for further details... # April 2005 # # P4 EM64T core appears to be "allergic" to 64-bit inc/dec. Replacing # those with add/sub results in 50% performance improvement of folded # loop... # May 2005 # # As was shown by Zou Nanhai loop unrolling can improve Intel EM64T # performance by >30% [unlike P4 32-bit case that is]. But this is # provided that loads are reordered even more aggressively! Both code # paths, AMD64 and EM64T, reorder loads in essentially same manner # as my IA-64 implementation. On Opteron this resulted in modest 5% # improvement [I had to test it], while final Intel P4 performance # achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference. # If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than # RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25% # slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection # is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be # preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance]. # March 2007 # # Intel Core2 was observed to perform poorly on both code paths:-( It # apparently suffers from some kind of partial register stall, which # occurs in 64-bit mode only [as virtually identical 32-bit loop was # observed to outperform 64-bit one by almost 50%]. Adding two movzb to # cloop1 boosts its performance by 80%! This loop appears to be optimal # fit for Core2 and therefore the code was modified to skip cloop8 on # this CPU. # May 2010 # # Intel Westmere was observed to perform suboptimally. Adding yet # another movzb to cloop1 improved performance by almost 50%! Core2 # performance is improved too, but nominally... # May 2011 # # The only code path that was not modified is P4-specific one. Non-P4 # Intel code path optimization is heavily based on submission by Maxim # Perminov, Maxim Locktyukhin and Jim Guilford of Intel. I've used # some of the ideas even in attempt to optmize the original RC4_INT # code path... Current performance in cycles per processed byte (less # is better) and improvement coefficients relative to previous # version of this module are: # # Opteron 5.3/+0%(*) # P4 6.5 # Core2 6.2/+15%(**) # Westmere 4.2/+60% # Sandy Bridge 4.2/+120% # Atom 9.3/+80% # VIA Nano 6.4/+4% # Ivy Bridge 4.1/+30% # Bulldozer 4.5/+30%(*) # # (*) But corresponding loop has less instructions, which should have # positive effect on upcoming Bulldozer, which has one less ALU. # For reference, Intel code runs at 6.8 cpb rate on Opteron. # (**) Note that Core2 result is ~15% lower than corresponding result # for 32-bit code, meaning that it's possible to improve it, # but more than likely at the cost of the others (see rc4-586.pl # to get the idea)... $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; $dat="%rdi"; # arg1 $len="%rsi"; # arg2 $inp="%rdx"; # arg3 $out="%rcx"; # arg4 { $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl RC4 .type RC4,\@function,4 .align 16 RC4: or $len,$len jne .Lentry ret .Lentry: push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 .Lprologue: mov $len,%r11 mov $inp,%r12 mov $out,%r13 ___ my $len="%r11"; # reassign input arguments my $inp="%r12"; my $out="%r13"; my @XX=("%r10","%rsi"); my @TX=("%rax","%rbx"); my $YY="%rcx"; my $TY="%rdx"; $code.=<<___; xor $XX[0],$XX[0] xor $YY,$YY lea 8($dat),$dat mov -8($dat),$XX[0]#b mov -4($dat),$YY#b cmpl \$-1,256($dat) je .LRC4_CHAR mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r8d xor $TX[1],$TX[1] inc $XX[0]#b sub $XX[0],$TX[1] sub $inp,$out movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d test \$-16,$len jz .Lloop1 bt \$30,%r8d # Intel CPU? jc .Lintel and \$7,$TX[1] lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1] jz .Loop8 sub $TX[1],$len .Loop8_warmup: add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4) add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b inc $XX[0]#b movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d xorb ($inp),$TY#b movb $TY#b,($out,$inp) lea 1($inp),$inp dec $TX[1] jnz .Loop8_warmup lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1] jmp .Loop8 .align 16 .Loop8: ___ for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___ if ($i==7); add \$8,$XX[1]#b ___ $code.=<<___; add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) movl `4*($i==7?-1:$i)`($dat,$XX[1],4),$TX[1]#d ror \$8,%r8 # ror is redundant when $i=0 movl $TY#d,4*$i($dat,$XX[0],4) add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b movb ($dat,$TY,4),%r8b ___ push(@TX,shift(@TX)); #push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers } $code.=<<___; add \$8,$XX[0]#b ror \$8,%r8 sub \$8,$len xor ($inp),%r8 mov %r8,($out,$inp) lea 8($inp),$inp test \$-8,$len jnz .Loop8 cmp \$0,$len jne .Lloop1 jmp .Lexit .align 16 .Lintel: test \$-32,$len jz .Lloop1 and \$15,$TX[1] jz .Loop16_is_hot sub $TX[1],$len .Loop16_warmup: add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4) add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b inc $XX[0]#b movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d xorb ($inp),$TY#b movb $TY#b,($out,$inp) lea 1($inp),$inp dec $TX[1] jnz .Loop16_warmup mov $YY,$TX[1] xor $YY,$YY mov $TX[1]#b,$YY#b .Loop16_is_hot: lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1] ___ sub RC4_loop { my $i=shift; my $j=$i<0?0:$i; my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1); $code.=" add \$16,$XX[0]#b\n" if ($i==15); $code.=" movdqu ($inp),%xmm2\n" if ($i==15); $code.=" add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b\n" if ($i<=0); $code.=" movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d\n"; $code.=" pxor %xmm0,%xmm2\n" if ($i==0); $code.=" psllq \$8,%xmm1\n" if ($i==0); $code.=" pxor $xmm,$xmm\n" if ($i<=1); $code.=" movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)\n"; $code.=" add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b\n"; $code.=" movl `4*($j+1)`($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n" if ($i<15); $code.=" movz $TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d\n"; $code.=" movl $TY#d,4*$j($XX[1])\n"; $code.=" pxor %xmm1,%xmm2\n" if ($i==0); $code.=" lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]\n" if ($i==15); $code.=" add $TX[1]#b,$YY#b\n" if ($i<15); $code.=" pinsrw \$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n"; $code.=" movdqu %xmm2,($out,$inp)\n" if ($i==0); $code.=" lea 16($inp),$inp\n" if ($i==0); $code.=" movl ($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n" if ($i==15); } RC4_loop(-1); $code.=<<___; jmp .Loop16_enter .align 16 .Loop16: ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { $code.=".Loop16_enter:\n" if ($i==1); RC4_loop($i); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); # "rotate" registers } $code.=<<___; mov $YY,$TX[1] xor $YY,$YY # keyword to partial register sub \$16,$len mov $TX[1]#b,$YY#b test \$-16,$len jnz .Loop16 psllq \$8,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm2 pxor %xmm1,%xmm2 movdqu %xmm2,($out,$inp) lea 16($inp),$inp cmp \$0,$len jne .Lloop1 jmp .Lexit .align 16 .Lloop1: add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4) add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b inc $XX[0]#b movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d xorb ($inp),$TY#b movb $TY#b,($out,$inp) lea 1($inp),$inp dec $len jnz .Lloop1 jmp .Lexit .align 16 .LRC4_CHAR: add \$1,$XX[0]#b movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d test \$-8,$len jz .Lcloop1 jmp .Lcloop8 .align 16 .Lcloop8: mov ($inp),%r8d mov 4($inp),%r9d ___ # unroll 2x4-wise, because 64-bit rotates kill Intel P4... for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1] movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d movzb $XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d movzb ($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY) cmp $XX[1],$YY movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0]) jne .Lcmov$i # Intel cmov is sloooow... mov $TX[0],$TX[1] .Lcmov$i: add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b xor ($dat,$TY),%r8b ror \$8,%r8d ___ push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers } for ($i=4;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1] movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d movzb $XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d movzb ($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY) cmp $XX[1],$YY movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0]) jne .Lcmov$i # Intel cmov is sloooow... mov $TX[0],$TX[1] .Lcmov$i: add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b xor ($dat,$TY),%r9b ror \$8,%r9d ___ push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers } $code.=<<___; lea -8($len),$len mov %r8d,($out) lea 8($inp),$inp mov %r9d,4($out) lea 8($out),$out test \$-8,$len jnz .Lcloop8 cmp \$0,$len jne .Lcloop1 jmp .Lexit ___ $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lcloop1: add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b movzb $YY#b,$YY#d movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY) movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0]) add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b add \$1,$XX[0]#b movzb $TY#b,$TY#d movzb $XX[0]#b,$XX[0]#d movzb ($dat,$TY),$TY#d movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d xorb ($inp),$TY#b lea 1($inp),$inp movb $TY#b,($out) lea 1($out),$out sub \$1,$len jnz .Lcloop1 jmp .Lexit .align 16 .Lexit: sub \$1,$XX[0]#b movl $XX[0]#d,-8($dat) movl $YY#d,-4($dat) mov (%rsp),%r13 mov 8(%rsp),%r12 mov 16(%rsp),%rbx add \$24,%rsp .Lepilogue: ret .size RC4,.-RC4 ___ } $idx="%r8"; $ido="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .globl RC4_set_key .type RC4_set_key,\@function,3 .align 16 RC4_set_key: lea 8($dat),$dat lea ($inp,$len),$inp neg $len mov $len,%rcx xor %eax,%eax xor $ido,$ido xor %r10,%r10 xor %r11,%r11 mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),$idx#d bt \$20,$idx#d # RC4_CHAR? jc .Lc1stloop jmp .Lw1stloop .align 16 .Lw1stloop: mov %eax,($dat,%rax,4) add \$1,%al jnc .Lw1stloop xor $ido,$ido xor $idx,$idx .align 16 .Lw2ndloop: mov ($dat,$ido,4),%r10d add ($inp,$len,1),$idx#b add %r10b,$idx#b add \$1,$len mov ($dat,$idx,4),%r11d cmovz %rcx,$len mov %r10d,($dat,$idx,4) mov %r11d,($dat,$ido,4) add \$1,$ido#b jnc .Lw2ndloop jmp .Lexit_key .align 16 .Lc1stloop: mov %al,($dat,%rax) add \$1,%al jnc .Lc1stloop xor $ido,$ido xor $idx,$idx .align 16 .Lc2ndloop: mov ($dat,$ido),%r10b add ($inp,$len),$idx#b add %r10b,$idx#b add \$1,$len mov ($dat,$idx),%r11b jnz .Lcnowrap mov %rcx,$len .Lcnowrap: mov %r10b,($dat,$idx) mov %r11b,($dat,$ido) add \$1,$ido#b jnc .Lc2ndloop movl \$-1,256($dat) .align 16 .Lexit_key: xor %eax,%eax mov %eax,-8($dat) mov %eax,-4($dat) ret .size RC4_set_key,.-RC4_set_key .globl RC4_options .type RC4_options,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 RC4_options: lea .Lopts(%rip),%rax mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%edx bt \$20,%edx jc .L8xchar bt \$30,%edx jnc .Ldone add \$25,%rax ret .L8xchar: add \$12,%rax .Ldone: ret .align 64 .Lopts: .asciz "rc4(8x,int)" .asciz "rc4(8x,char)" .asciz "rc4(16x,int)" .asciz "RC4 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 .size RC4_options,.-RC4_options ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type stream_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 stream_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lprologue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue lea 24(%rax),%rax mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%r12 mov -24(%rax),%r13 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi jmp .Lcommon_seh_exit .size stream_se_handler,.-stream_se_handler .type key_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 key_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi .Lcommon_seh_exit: mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size key_se_handler,.-key_se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_RC4 .rva .LSEH_end_RC4 .rva .LSEH_info_RC4 .rva .LSEH_begin_RC4_set_key .rva .LSEH_end_RC4_set_key .rva .LSEH_info_RC4_set_key .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_RC4: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva stream_se_handler .LSEH_info_RC4_set_key: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva key_se_handler ___ } sub reg_part { my ($reg,$conv)=@_; if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/) { $reg .= $conv; } elsif ($conv eq "b") { $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/; } elsif ($conv eq "w") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/; } elsif ($conv eq "d") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/; } return $reg; } $code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem; $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000004016113176625657017321 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # June 2011 # # This is RC4+MD5 "stitch" implementation. The idea, as spelled in # http://download.intel.com/design/intarch/papers/323686.pdf, is that # since both algorithms exhibit instruction-level parallelism, ILP, # below theoretical maximum, interleaving them would allow to utilize # processor resources better and achieve better performance. RC4 # instruction sequence is virtually identical to rc4-x86_64.pl, which # is heavily based on submission by Maxim Perminov, Maxim Locktyukhin # and Jim Guilford of Intel. MD5 is fresh implementation aiming to # minimize register usage, which was used as "main thread" with RC4 # weaved into it, one RC4 round per one MD5 round. In addition to the # stiched subroutine the script can generate standalone replacement # md5_block_asm_data_order and RC4. Below are performance numbers in # cycles per processed byte, less is better, for these the standalone # subroutines, sum of them, and stitched one: # # RC4 MD5 RC4+MD5 stitch gain # Opteron 6.5(*) 5.4 11.9 7.0 +70%(*) # Core2 6.5 5.8 12.3 7.7 +60% # Westmere 4.3 5.2 9.5 7.0 +36% # Sandy Bridge 4.2 5.5 9.7 6.8 +43% # Ivy Bridge 4.1 5.2 9.3 6.0 +54% # Haswell 4.0 5.0 9.0 5.7 +60% # Skylake 6.3(**) 5.0 11.3 5.3 +110% # Atom 9.3 6.5 15.8 11.1 +42% # VIA Nano 6.3 5.4 11.7 8.6 +37% # Bulldozer 4.5 5.4 9.9 7.7 +29% # # (*) rc4-x86_64.pl delivers 5.3 on Opteron, so real improvement # is +53%... # (**) unidentified anomaly; my ($rc4,$md5)=(1,1); # what to generate? my $D="#" if (!$md5); # if set to "#", MD5 is stitched into RC4(), # but its result is discarded. Idea here is # to be able to use 'openssl speed rc4' for # benchmarking the stitched subroutine... my $flavour = shift; my $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } my $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; my ($dat,$in0,$out,$ctx,$inp,$len, $func,$nargs); if ($rc4 && !$md5) { ($dat,$len,$in0,$out) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); $func="RC4"; $nargs=4; } elsif ($md5 && !$rc4) { ($ctx,$inp,$len) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx"); $func="md5_block_asm_data_order"; $nargs=3; } else { ($dat,$in0,$out,$ctx,$inp,$len) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9"); $func="rc4_md5_enc"; $nargs=6; # void rc4_md5_enc( # RC4_KEY *key, # # const void *in0, # RC4 input # void *out, # RC4 output # MD5_CTX *ctx, # # const void *inp, # MD5 input # size_t len); # number of 64-byte blocks } my @K=( 0xd76aa478,0xe8c7b756,0x242070db,0xc1bdceee, 0xf57c0faf,0x4787c62a,0xa8304613,0xfd469501, 0x698098d8,0x8b44f7af,0xffff5bb1,0x895cd7be, 0x6b901122,0xfd987193,0xa679438e,0x49b40821, 0xf61e2562,0xc040b340,0x265e5a51,0xe9b6c7aa, 0xd62f105d,0x02441453,0xd8a1e681,0xe7d3fbc8, 0x21e1cde6,0xc33707d6,0xf4d50d87,0x455a14ed, 0xa9e3e905,0xfcefa3f8,0x676f02d9,0x8d2a4c8a, 0xfffa3942,0x8771f681,0x6d9d6122,0xfde5380c, 0xa4beea44,0x4bdecfa9,0xf6bb4b60,0xbebfbc70, 0x289b7ec6,0xeaa127fa,0xd4ef3085,0x04881d05, 0xd9d4d039,0xe6db99e5,0x1fa27cf8,0xc4ac5665, 0xf4292244,0x432aff97,0xab9423a7,0xfc93a039, 0x655b59c3,0x8f0ccc92,0xffeff47d,0x85845dd1, 0x6fa87e4f,0xfe2ce6e0,0xa3014314,0x4e0811a1, 0xf7537e82,0xbd3af235,0x2ad7d2bb,0xeb86d391 ); my @V=("%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d"); # MD5 registers my $tmp="%r12d"; my @XX=("%rbp","%rsi"); # RC4 registers my @TX=("%rax","%rbx"); my $YY="%rcx"; my $TY="%rdx"; my $MOD=32; # 16, 32 or 64 $code.=<<___; .text .align 16 .globl $func .type $func,\@function,$nargs $func: cmp \$0,$len je .Labort push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 sub \$40,%rsp .Lbody: ___ if ($rc4) { $code.=<<___; $D#md5# mov $ctx,%r11 # reassign arguments mov $len,%r12 mov $in0,%r13 mov $out,%r14 $D#md5# mov $inp,%r15 ___ $ctx="%r11" if ($md5); # reassign arguments $len="%r12"; $in0="%r13"; $out="%r14"; $inp="%r15" if ($md5); $inp=$in0 if (!$md5); $code.=<<___; xor $XX[0],$XX[0] xor $YY,$YY lea 8($dat),$dat mov -8($dat),$XX[0]#b mov -4($dat),$YY#b inc $XX[0]#b sub $in0,$out movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$md5); xor $TX[1],$TX[1] test \$-128,$len jz .Loop1 sub $XX[0],$TX[1] and \$`$MOD-1`,$TX[1] jz .Loop${MOD}_is_hot sub $TX[1],$len .Loop${MOD}_warmup: add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4) add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b inc $XX[0]#b movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d xorb ($in0),$TY#b movb $TY#b,($out,$in0) lea 1($in0),$in0 dec $TX[1] jnz .Loop${MOD}_warmup mov $YY,$TX[1] xor $YY,$YY mov $TX[1]#b,$YY#b .Loop${MOD}_is_hot: mov $len,32(%rsp) # save original $len shr \$6,$len # number of 64-byte blocks ___ if ($D && !$md5) { # stitch in dummy MD5 $md5=1; $ctx="%r11"; $inp="%r15"; $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,$ctx mov $in0,$inp ___ } } $code.=<<___; #rc4# add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b #rc4# lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1] shl \$6,$len add $inp,$len # pointer to the end of input mov $len,16(%rsp) #md5# mov $ctx,24(%rsp) # save pointer to MD5_CTX #md5# mov 0*4($ctx),$V[0] # load current hash value from MD5_CTX #md5# mov 1*4($ctx),$V[1] #md5# mov 2*4($ctx),$V[2] #md5# mov 3*4($ctx),$V[3] jmp .Loop .align 16 .Loop: #md5# mov $V[0],0*4(%rsp) # put aside current hash value #md5# mov $V[1],1*4(%rsp) #md5# mov $V[2],2*4(%rsp) #md5# mov $V[3],$tmp # forward reference #md5# mov $V[3],3*4(%rsp) ___ sub R0 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_; my @rot0=(7,12,17,22); my $j=$i%16; my $k=$i%$MOD; my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1); $code.=" movdqu ($in0),%xmm2\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15); $code.=" add \$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1); $code.=" pxor $xmm,$xmm\n" if ($rc4 && $j<=1); $code.=<<___; #rc4# movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d #md5# xor $c,$tmp #rc4# movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) #md5# and $b,$tmp #md5# add 4*`$j`($inp),$a #rc4# add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b #rc4# movl `4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d #md5# add \$$K[$i],$a #md5# xor $d,$tmp #rc4# movz $TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d #rc4# movl $TY#d,4*$k($XX[1]) #md5# add $tmp,$a #rc4# add $TX[1]#b,$YY#b #md5# rol \$$rot0[$j%4],$a #md5# mov `$j==15?"$b":"$c"`,$tmp # forward reference #rc4# pinsrw \$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n #md5# add $b,$a ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1); mov $YY,$XX[1] xor $YY,$YY # keyword to partial register mov $XX[1]#b,$YY#b lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15); psllq \$8,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm2 pxor %xmm1,%xmm2 ___ } sub R1 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_; my @rot1=(5,9,14,20); my $j=$i%16; my $k=$i%$MOD; my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1); $code.=" movdqu 16($in0),%xmm3\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15); $code.=" add \$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1); $code.=" pxor $xmm,$xmm\n" if ($rc4 && $j<=1); $code.=<<___; #rc4# movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d #md5# xor $b,$tmp #rc4# movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) #md5# and $d,$tmp #md5# add 4*`((1+5*$j)%16)`($inp),$a #rc4# add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b #rc4# movl `4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d #md5# add \$$K[$i],$a #md5# xor $c,$tmp #rc4# movz $TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d #rc4# movl $TY#d,4*$k($XX[1]) #md5# add $tmp,$a #rc4# add $TX[1]#b,$YY#b #md5# rol \$$rot1[$j%4],$a #md5# mov `$j==15?"$c":"$b"`,$tmp # forward reference #rc4# pinsrw \$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n #md5# add $b,$a ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1); mov $YY,$XX[1] xor $YY,$YY # keyword to partial register mov $XX[1]#b,$YY#b lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15); psllq \$8,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm3 pxor %xmm1,%xmm3 ___ } sub R2 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_; my @rot2=(4,11,16,23); my $j=$i%16; my $k=$i%$MOD; my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1); $code.=" movdqu 32($in0),%xmm4\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15); $code.=" add \$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1); $code.=" pxor $xmm,$xmm\n" if ($rc4 && $j<=1); $code.=<<___; #rc4# movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d #md5# xor $c,$tmp #rc4# movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) #md5# xor $b,$tmp #md5# add 4*`((5+3*$j)%16)`($inp),$a #rc4# add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b #rc4# movl `4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d #md5# add \$$K[$i],$a #rc4# movz $TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d #md5# add $tmp,$a #rc4# movl $TY#d,4*$k($XX[1]) #rc4# add $TX[1]#b,$YY#b #md5# rol \$$rot2[$j%4],$a #md5# mov `$j==15?"\\\$-1":"$c"`,$tmp # forward reference #rc4# pinsrw \$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n #md5# add $b,$a ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1); mov $YY,$XX[1] xor $YY,$YY # keyword to partial register mov $XX[1]#b,$YY#b lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15); psllq \$8,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm4 pxor %xmm1,%xmm4 ___ } sub R3 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d)=@_; my @rot3=(6,10,15,21); my $j=$i%16; my $k=$i%$MOD; my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1); $code.=" movdqu 48($in0),%xmm5\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15); $code.=" add \$$MOD,$XX[0]#b\n" if ($rc4 && $j==15 && $k==$MOD-1); $code.=" pxor $xmm,$xmm\n" if ($rc4 && $j<=1); $code.=<<___; #rc4# movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d #md5# xor $d,$tmp #rc4# movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) #md5# or $b,$tmp #md5# add 4*`((7*$j)%16)`($inp),$a #rc4# add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b #rc4# movl `4*(($k+1)%$MOD)`(`$k==$MOD-1?"$dat,$XX[0],4":"$XX[1]"`),$TX[1]#d #md5# add \$$K[$i],$a #rc4# movz $TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d #md5# xor $c,$tmp #rc4# movl $TY#d,4*$k($XX[1]) #md5# add $tmp,$a #rc4# add $TX[1]#b,$YY#b #md5# rol \$$rot3[$j%4],$a #md5# mov \$-1,$tmp # forward reference #rc4# pinsrw \$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n #md5# add $b,$a ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && $j==15); mov $XX[0],$XX[1] xor $XX[0],$XX[0] # keyword to partial register mov $XX[1]#b,$XX[0]#b mov $YY,$XX[1] xor $YY,$YY # keyword to partial register mov $XX[1]#b,$YY#b lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1] psllq \$8,%xmm1 pxor %xmm0,%xmm5 pxor %xmm1,%xmm5 ___ } my $i=0; for(;$i<16;$i++) { R0($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); } for(;$i<32;$i++) { R1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); } for(;$i<48;$i++) { R2($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); } for(;$i<64;$i++) { R3($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@TX,shift(@TX)); } $code.=<<___; #md5# add 0*4(%rsp),$V[0] # accumulate hash value #md5# add 1*4(%rsp),$V[1] #md5# add 2*4(%rsp),$V[2] #md5# add 3*4(%rsp),$V[3] #rc4# movdqu %xmm2,($out,$in0) # write RC4 output #rc4# movdqu %xmm3,16($out,$in0) #rc4# movdqu %xmm4,32($out,$in0) #rc4# movdqu %xmm5,48($out,$in0) #md5# lea 64($inp),$inp #rc4# lea 64($in0),$in0 cmp 16(%rsp),$inp # are we done? jb .Loop #md5# mov 24(%rsp),$len # restore pointer to MD5_CTX #rc4# sub $TX[0]#b,$YY#b # correct $YY #md5# mov $V[0],0*4($len) # write MD5_CTX #md5# mov $V[1],1*4($len) #md5# mov $V[2],2*4($len) #md5# mov $V[3],3*4($len) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($rc4 && (!$md5 || $D)); mov 32(%rsp),$len # restore original $len and \$63,$len # remaining bytes jnz .Loop1 jmp .Ldone .align 16 .Loop1: add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4) movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4) add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b inc $XX[0]#b movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d xorb ($in0),$TY#b movb $TY#b,($out,$in0) lea 1($in0),$in0 dec $len jnz .Loop1 .Ldone: ___ $code.=<<___; #rc4# sub \$1,$XX[0]#b #rc4# movl $XX[0]#d,-8($dat) #rc4# movl $YY#d,-4($dat) mov 40(%rsp),%r15 mov 48(%rsp),%r14 mov 56(%rsp),%r13 mov 64(%rsp),%r12 mov 72(%rsp),%rbp mov 80(%rsp),%rbx lea 88(%rsp),%rsp .Lepilogue: .Labort: ret .size $func,.-$func ___ if ($rc4 && $D) { # sole purpose of this section is to provide # option to use the generated module as drop-in # replacement for rc4-x86_64.pl for debugging # and testing purposes... my ($idx,$ido)=("%r8","%r9"); my ($dat,$len,$inp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx"); $code.=<<___; .globl RC4_set_key .type RC4_set_key,\@function,3 .align 16 RC4_set_key: lea 8($dat),$dat lea ($inp,$len),$inp neg $len mov $len,%rcx xor %eax,%eax xor $ido,$ido xor %r10,%r10 xor %r11,%r11 jmp .Lw1stloop .align 16 .Lw1stloop: mov %eax,($dat,%rax,4) add \$1,%al jnc .Lw1stloop xor $ido,$ido xor $idx,$idx .align 16 .Lw2ndloop: mov ($dat,$ido,4),%r10d add ($inp,$len,1),$idx#b add %r10b,$idx#b add \$1,$len mov ($dat,$idx,4),%r11d cmovz %rcx,$len mov %r10d,($dat,$idx,4) mov %r11d,($dat,$ido,4) add \$1,$ido#b jnc .Lw2ndloop xor %eax,%eax mov %eax,-8($dat) mov %eax,-4($dat) ret .size RC4_set_key,.-RC4_set_key .globl RC4_options .type RC4_options,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 RC4_options: lea .Lopts(%rip),%rax ret .align 64 .Lopts: .asciz "rc4(64x,int)" .align 64 .size RC4_options,.-RC4_options ___ } # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { my $rec="%rcx"; my $frame="%rdx"; my $context="%r8"; my $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lbody(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lbody jb .Lin_prologue mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lin_prologue mov 40(%rax),%r15 mov 48(%rax),%r14 mov 56(%rax),%r13 mov 64(%rax),%r12 mov 72(%rax),%rbp mov 80(%rax),%rbx lea 88(%rax),%rax mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_$func .rva .LSEH_end_$func .rva .LSEH_info_$func .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_$func: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler ___ } sub reg_part { my ($reg,$conv)=@_; if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/) { $reg .= $conv; } elsif ($conv eq "b") { $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/; } elsif ($conv eq "w") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/; } elsif ($conv eq "d") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/; } return $reg; } $code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem; $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/pinsrw\s+\$0,/movd /gm; $code =~ s/#md5#//gm if ($md5); $code =~ s/#rc4#//gm if ($rc4); print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl0000644000000000000000000003033513176625657016224 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # [Re]written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # At some point it became apparent that the original SSLeay RC4 # assembler implementation performs suboptimally on latest IA-32 # microarchitectures. After re-tuning performance has changed as # following: # # Pentium -10% # Pentium III +12% # AMD +50%(*) # P4 +250%(**) # # (*) This number is actually a trade-off:-) It's possible to # achieve +72%, but at the cost of -48% off PIII performance. # In other words code performing further 13% faster on AMD # would perform almost 2 times slower on Intel PIII... # For reference! This code delivers ~80% of rc4-amd64.pl # performance on the same Opteron machine. # (**) This number requires compressed key schedule set up by # RC4_set_key [see commentary below for further details]. # # # May 2011 # # Optimize for Core2 and Westmere [and incidentally Opteron]. Current # performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better) and # improvement relative to previous version of this module is: # # Pentium 10.2 # original numbers # Pentium III 7.8(*) # Intel P4 7.5 # # Opteron 6.1/+20% # new MMX numbers # Core2 5.3/+67%(**) # Westmere 5.1/+94%(**) # Sandy Bridge 5.0/+8% # Atom 12.6/+6% # VIA Nano 6.4/+9% # Ivy Bridge 4.9/±0% # Bulldozer 4.9/+15% # # (*) PIII can actually deliver 6.6 cycles per byte with MMX code, # but this specific code performs poorly on Core2. And vice # versa, below MMX/SSE code delivering 5.8/7.1 on Core2 performs # poorly on PIII, at 8.0/14.5:-( As PIII is not a "hot" CPU # [anymore], I chose to discard PIII-specific code path and opt # for original IALU-only code, which is why MMX/SSE code path # is guarded by SSE2 bit (see below), not MMX/SSE. # (**) Performance vs. block size on Core2 and Westmere had a maximum # at ... 64 bytes block size. And it was quite a maximum, 40-60% # in comparison to largest 8KB block size. Above improvement # coefficients are for the largest block size. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"rc4-586.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $xx="eax"; $yy="ebx"; $tx="ecx"; $ty="edx"; $inp="esi"; $out="ebp"; $dat="edi"; sub RC4_loop { my $i=shift; my $func = ($i==0)?*mov:*or; &add (&LB($yy),&LB($tx)); &mov ($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4)); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4),$ty); &add ($ty,$tx); &inc (&LB($xx)); &and ($ty,0xff); &ror ($out,8) if ($i!=0); if ($i<3) { &mov ($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4)); } else { &mov ($tx,&wparam(3)); # reload [re-biased] out } &$func ($out,&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4)); } if ($alt=0) { # >20% faster on Atom and Sandy Bridge[!], 8% faster on Opteron, # but ~40% slower on Core2 and Westmere... Attempt to add movz # brings down Opteron by 25%, Atom and Sandy Bridge by 15%, yet # on Core2 with movz it's almost 20% slower than below alternative # code... Yes, it's a total mess... my @XX=($xx,$out); $RC4_loop_mmx = sub { # SSE actually... my $i=shift; my $j=$i<=0?0:$i>>1; my $mm=$i<=0?"mm0":"mm".($i&1); &add (&LB($yy),&LB($tx)); &lea (@XX[1],&DWP(1,@XX[0])); &pxor ("mm2","mm0") if ($i==0); &psllq ("mm1",8) if ($i==0); &and (@XX[1],0xff); &pxor ("mm0","mm0") if ($i<=0); &mov ($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4)); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx); &pxor ("mm1","mm2") if ($i==0); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$XX[0],4),$ty); &add (&LB($ty),&LB($tx)); &movd (@XX[0],"mm7") if ($i==0); &mov ($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,@XX[1],4)); &pxor ("mm1","mm1") if ($i==1); &movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$inp)) if ($i==1); &movq (&QWP(-8,(@XX[0],$inp)),"mm1") if ($i==0); &pinsrw ($mm,&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4),$j); push (@XX,shift(@XX)) if ($i>=0); } } else { # Using pinsrw here improves performane on Intel CPUs by 2-3%, but # brings down AMD by 7%... $RC4_loop_mmx = sub { my $i=shift; &add (&LB($yy),&LB($tx)); &psllq ("mm1",8*(($i-1)&7)) if (abs($i)!=1); &mov ($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4)); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4),$ty); &inc ($xx); &add ($ty,$tx); &movz ($xx,&LB($xx)); # (*) &movz ($ty,&LB($ty)); # (*) &pxor ("mm2",$i==1?"mm0":"mm1") if ($i>=0); &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$inp)) if ($i<=0); &movq (&QWP(-8,($out,$inp)),"mm2") if ($i==0); &mov ($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4)); &movd ($i>0?"mm1":"mm2",&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4)); # (*) This is the key to Core2 and Westmere performance. # Without movz out-of-order execution logic confuses # itself and fails to reorder loads and stores. Problem # appears to be fixed in Sandy Bridge... } } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); # void RC4(RC4_KEY *key,size_t len,const unsigned char *inp,unsigned char *out); &function_begin("RC4"); &mov ($dat,&wparam(0)); # load key schedule pointer &mov ($ty, &wparam(1)); # load len &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load inp &mov ($out,&wparam(3)); # load out &xor ($xx,$xx); # avoid partial register stalls &xor ($yy,$yy); &cmp ($ty,0); # safety net &je (&label("abort")); &mov (&LB($xx),&BP(0,$dat)); # load key->x &mov (&LB($yy),&BP(4,$dat)); # load key->y &add ($dat,8); &lea ($tx,&DWP(0,$inp,$ty)); &sub ($out,$inp); # re-bias out &mov (&wparam(1),$tx); # save input+len &inc (&LB($xx)); # detect compressed key schedule... &cmp (&DWP(256,$dat),-1); &je (&label("RC4_CHAR")); &mov ($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4)); &and ($ty,-4); # how many 4-byte chunks? &jz (&label("loop1")); &mov (&wparam(3),$out); # $out as accumulator in these loops if ($x86only) { &jmp (&label("go4loop4")); } else { &test ($ty,-8); &jz (&label("go4loop4")); &picmeup($out,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt (&DWP(0,$out),26); # check SSE2 bit [could have been MMX] &jnc (&label("go4loop4")); &mov ($out,&wparam(3)) if (!$alt); &movd ("mm7",&wparam(3)) if ($alt); &and ($ty,-8); &lea ($ty,&DWP(-8,$inp,$ty)); &mov (&DWP(-4,$dat),$ty); # save input+(len/8)*8-8 &$RC4_loop_mmx(-1); &jmp(&label("loop_mmx_enter")); &set_label("loop_mmx",16); &$RC4_loop_mmx(0); &set_label("loop_mmx_enter"); for ($i=1;$i<8;$i++) { &$RC4_loop_mmx($i); } &mov ($ty,$yy); &xor ($yy,$yy); # this is second key to Core2 &mov (&LB($yy),&LB($ty)); # and Westmere performance... &cmp ($inp,&DWP(-4,$dat)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(8,$inp)); &jb (&label("loop_mmx")); if ($alt) { &movd ($out,"mm7"); &pxor ("mm2","mm0"); &psllq ("mm1",8); &pxor ("mm1","mm2"); &movq (&QWP(-8,$out,$inp),"mm1"); } else { &psllq ("mm1",56); &pxor ("mm2","mm1"); &movq (&QWP(-8,$out,$inp),"mm2"); } &emms (); &cmp ($inp,&wparam(1)); # compare to input+len &je (&label("done")); &jmp (&label("loop1")); } &set_label("go4loop4",16); &lea ($ty,&DWP(-4,$inp,$ty)); &mov (&wparam(2),$ty); # save input+(len/4)*4-4 &set_label("loop4"); for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { RC4_loop($i); } &ror ($out,8); &xor ($out,&DWP(0,$inp)); &cmp ($inp,&wparam(2)); # compare to input+(len/4)*4-4 &mov (&DWP(0,$tx,$inp),$out);# $tx holds re-biased out here &lea ($inp,&DWP(4,$inp)); &mov ($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4)); &jb (&label("loop4")); &cmp ($inp,&wparam(1)); # compare to input+len &je (&label("done")); &mov ($out,&wparam(3)); # restore $out &set_label("loop1",16); &add (&LB($yy),&LB($tx)); &mov ($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4)); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$yy,4),$tx); &mov (&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4),$ty); &add ($ty,$tx); &inc (&LB($xx)); &and ($ty,0xff); &mov ($ty,&DWP(0,$dat,$ty,4)); &xor (&LB($ty),&BP(0,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp)); &mov ($tx,&DWP(0,$dat,$xx,4)); &cmp ($inp,&wparam(1)); # compare to input+len &mov (&BP(-1,$out,$inp),&LB($ty)); &jb (&label("loop1")); &jmp (&label("done")); # this is essentially Intel P4 specific codepath... &set_label("RC4_CHAR",16); &movz ($tx,&BP(0,$dat,$xx)); # strangely enough unrolled loop performs over 20% slower... &set_label("cloop1"); &add (&LB($yy),&LB($tx)); &movz ($ty,&BP(0,$dat,$yy)); &mov (&BP(0,$dat,$yy),&LB($tx)); &mov (&BP(0,$dat,$xx),&LB($ty)); &add (&LB($ty),&LB($tx)); &movz ($ty,&BP(0,$dat,$ty)); &add (&LB($xx),1); &xor (&LB($ty),&BP(0,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp)); &movz ($tx,&BP(0,$dat,$xx)); &cmp ($inp,&wparam(1)); &mov (&BP(-1,$out,$inp),&LB($ty)); &jb (&label("cloop1")); &set_label("done"); &dec (&LB($xx)); &mov (&DWP(-4,$dat),$yy); # save key->y &mov (&BP(-8,$dat),&LB($xx)); # save key->x &set_label("abort"); &function_end("RC4"); ######################################################################## $inp="esi"; $out="edi"; $idi="ebp"; $ido="ecx"; $idx="edx"; # void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key,int len,const unsigned char *data); &function_begin("RC4_set_key"); &mov ($out,&wparam(0)); # load key &mov ($idi,&wparam(1)); # load len &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load data &picmeup($idx,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &lea ($out,&DWP(2*4,$out)); # &key->data &lea ($inp,&DWP(0,$inp,$idi)); # $inp to point at the end &neg ($idi); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov (&DWP(-4,$out),$idi); # borrow key->y &bt (&DWP(0,$idx),20); # check for bit#20 &jc (&label("c1stloop")); &set_label("w1stloop",16); &mov (&DWP(0,$out,"eax",4),"eax"); # key->data[i]=i; &add (&LB("eax"),1); # i++; &jnc (&label("w1stloop")); &xor ($ido,$ido); &xor ($idx,$idx); &set_label("w2ndloop",16); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,$out,$ido,4)); &add (&LB($idx),&BP(0,$inp,$idi)); &add (&LB($idx),&LB("eax")); &add ($idi,1); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(0,$out,$idx,4)); &jnz (&label("wnowrap")); &mov ($idi,&DWP(-4,$out)); &set_label("wnowrap"); &mov (&DWP(0,$out,$idx,4),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(0,$out,$ido,4),"ebx"); &add (&LB($ido),1); &jnc (&label("w2ndloop")); &jmp (&label("exit")); # Unlike all other x86 [and x86_64] implementations, Intel P4 core # [including EM64T] was found to perform poorly with above "32-bit" key # schedule, a.k.a. RC4_INT. Performance improvement for IA-32 hand-coded # assembler turned out to be 3.5x if re-coded for compressed 8-bit one, # a.k.a. RC4_CHAR! It's however inappropriate to just switch to 8-bit # schedule for x86[_64], because non-P4 implementations suffer from # significant performance losses then, e.g. PIII exhibits >2x # deterioration, and so does Opteron. In order to assure optimal # all-round performance, we detect P4 at run-time and set up compressed # key schedule, which is recognized by RC4 procedure. &set_label("c1stloop",16); &mov (&BP(0,$out,"eax"),&LB("eax")); # key->data[i]=i; &add (&LB("eax"),1); # i++; &jnc (&label("c1stloop")); &xor ($ido,$ido); &xor ($idx,$idx); &xor ("ebx","ebx"); &set_label("c2ndloop",16); &mov (&LB("eax"),&BP(0,$out,$ido)); &add (&LB($idx),&BP(0,$inp,$idi)); &add (&LB($idx),&LB("eax")); &add ($idi,1); &mov (&LB("ebx"),&BP(0,$out,$idx)); &jnz (&label("cnowrap")); &mov ($idi,&DWP(-4,$out)); &set_label("cnowrap"); &mov (&BP(0,$out,$idx),&LB("eax")); &mov (&BP(0,$out,$ido),&LB("ebx")); &add (&LB($ido),1); &jnc (&label("c2ndloop")); &mov (&DWP(256,$out),-1); # mark schedule as compressed &set_label("exit"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov (&DWP(-8,$out),"eax"); # key->x=0; &mov (&DWP(-4,$out),"eax"); # key->y=0; &function_end("RC4_set_key"); # const char *RC4_options(void); &function_begin_B("RC4_options"); &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("eax"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("opts")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax")); &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &mov ("edx",&DWP(0,"edx")); &bt ("edx",20); &jc (&label("1xchar")); &bt ("edx",26); &jnc (&label("ret")); &add ("eax",25); &ret (); &set_label("1xchar"); &add ("eax",12); &set_label("ret"); &ret (); &set_label("opts",64); &asciz ("rc4(4x,int)"); &asciz ("rc4(1x,char)"); &asciz ("rc4(8x,mmx)"); &asciz ("RC4 for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &align (64); &function_end_B("RC4_options"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-c64xplus.pl0000644000000000000000000001026413176625657017371 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # RC4 for C64x+. # # April 2014 # # RC4 subroutine processes one byte in 7.0 cycles, which is 3x faster # than TI CGT-generated code. Loop is scheduled in such way that # there is only one reference to memory in each cycle. This is done # to avoid L1D memory banking conflicts, see SPRU871 TI publication # for further details. Otherwise it should be possible to schedule # the loop for iteration interval of 6... ($KEY,$LEN,$INP,$OUT)=("A4","B4","A6","B6"); ($KEYA,$XX,$TY,$xx,$ONE,$ret)=map("A$_",(5,7,8,9,1,2)); ($KEYB,$YY,$TX,$tx,$SUM,$dat)=map("B$_",(5,7,8,9,1,2)); $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .nocmp .asg RC4,_RC4 .asg RC4_set_key,_RC4_set_key .asg RC4_options,_RC4_options .endif .global _RC4 .align 16 _RC4: .asmfunc MV $LEN,B0 [!B0] BNOP B3 ; if (len==0) return; ||[B0] ADD $KEY,2,$KEYA ||[B0] ADD $KEY,2,$KEYB [B0] MVK 1,$ONE ||[B0] LDBU *${KEYA}[-2],$XX ; key->x [B0] LDBU *${KEYB}[-1],$YY ; key->y || NOP 4 ADD4 $ONE,$XX,$XX LDBU *${KEYA}[$XX],$TX || MVC $LEN,ILC NOP 4 ;;================================================== SPLOOP 7 || ADD4 $TX,$YY,$YY LDBU *${KEYB}[$YY],$TY || MVD $XX,$xx || ADD4 $ONE,$XX,$XX LDBU *${KEYA}[$XX],$tx CMPEQ $YY,$XX,B0 || NOP 3 STB $TX,*${KEYB}[$YY] ||[B0] ADD4 $TX,$YY,$YY STB $TY,*${KEYA}[$xx] ||[!B0] ADD4 $tx,$YY,$YY ||[!B0] MVD $tx,$TX ADD4 $TY,$TX,$SUM ; [0,0] $TX is not replaced by $tx yet! || NOP 2 LDBU *$INP++,$dat || NOP 2 LDBU *${KEYB}[$SUM],$ret || NOP 5 XOR.L $dat,$ret,$ret SPKERNEL || STB $ret,*$OUT++ ;;================================================== SUB4 $XX,$ONE,$XX || NOP 5 STB $XX,*${KEYA}[-2] ; key->x || SUB4 $YY,$TX,$YY || BNOP B3 STB $YY,*${KEYB}[-1] ; key->y || NOP 5 .endasmfunc .global _RC4_set_key .align 16 _RC4_set_key: .asmfunc .if .BIG_ENDIAN MVK 0x00000404,$ONE || MVK 0x00000203,B0 MVKH 0x04040000,$ONE || MVKH 0x00010000,B0 .else MVK 0x00000404,$ONE || MVK 0x00000100,B0 MVKH 0x04040000,$ONE || MVKH 0x03020000,B0 .endif ADD $KEY,2,$KEYA || ADD $KEY,2,$KEYB || ADD $INP,$LEN,$ret ; end of input LDBU *${INP}++,$dat || MVK 0,$TX STH $TX,*${KEY}++ ; key->x=key->y=0 || MV B0,A0 || MVK 64-4,B0 ;;================================================== SPLOOPD 1 || MVC B0,ILC STNW A0,*${KEY}++ || ADD4 $ONE,A0,A0 SPKERNEL ;;================================================== MVK 0,$YY || MVK 0,$XX MVK 1,$ONE || MVK 256-1,B0 ;;================================================== SPLOOPD 8 || MVC B0,ILC ADD4 $dat,$YY,$YY || CMPEQ $INP,$ret,A0 ; end of input? LDBU *${KEYB}[$YY],$TY || MVD $XX,$xx || ADD4 $ONE,$XX,$XX LDBU *${KEYA}[$XX],$tx ||[A0] SUB $INP,$LEN,$INP ; rewind LDBU *${INP}++,$dat || CMPEQ $YY,$XX,B0 || NOP 3 STB $TX,*${KEYB}[$YY] ||[B0] ADD4 $TX,$YY,$YY STB $TY,*${KEYA}[$xx] ||[!B0] ADD4 $tx,$YY,$YY ||[!B0] MV $tx,$TX SPKERNEL ;;================================================== BNOP B3,5 .endasmfunc .global _RC4_options .align 16 _RC4_options: _rc4_options: .asmfunc BNOP B3,1 ADDKPC _rc4_options,B4 .if __TI_EABI__ MVKL \$PCR_OFFSET(rc4_options,_rc4_options),A4 MVKH \$PCR_OFFSET(rc4_options,_rc4_options),A4 .else MVKL (rc4_options-_rc4_options),A4 MVKH (rc4_options-_rc4_options),A4 .endif ADD B4,A4,A4 .endasmfunc .if __TI_EABI__ .sect ".text:rc4_options.const" .else .sect ".const:rc4_options" .endif .align 4 rc4_options: .cstring "rc4(sploop,char)" .cstring "RC4 for C64+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-s390x.pl0000644000000000000000000001106213176625657016564 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # February 2009 # # Performance is 2x of gcc 3.4.6 on z10. Coding "secret" is to # "cluster" Address Generation Interlocks, so that one pipeline stall # resolves several dependencies. # November 2010. # # Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" # feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit # instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy # application context. The feature is not specific to any particular # processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code # remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform # 50% better than code generated by gcc 4.3. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $rp="%r14"; $sp="%r15"; $code=<<___; .text ___ # void RC4(RC4_KEY *key,size_t len,const void *inp,void *out) { $acc="%r0"; $cnt="%r1"; $key="%r2"; $len="%r3"; $inp="%r4"; $out="%r5"; @XX=("%r6","%r7"); @TX=("%r8","%r9"); $YY="%r10"; $TY="%r11"; $code.=<<___; .globl RC4 .type RC4,\@function .align 64 RC4: stm${g} %r6,%r11,6*$SIZE_T($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/); llgfr $len,$len ___ $code.=<<___; llgc $XX[0],0($key) llgc $YY,1($key) la $XX[0],1($XX[0]) nill $XX[0],0xff srlg $cnt,$len,3 ltgr $cnt,$cnt llgc $TX[0],2($XX[0],$key) jz .Lshort j .Loop8 .align 64 .Loop8: ___ for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; la $YY,0($YY,$TX[0]) # $i nill $YY,255 la $XX[1],1($XX[0]) nill $XX[1],255 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==1); llgc $acc,2($TY,$key) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>1); sllg $acc,$acc,8 ic $acc,2($TY,$key) ___ $code.=<<___; llgc $TY,2($YY,$key) stc $TX[0],2($YY,$key) llgc $TX[1],2($XX[1],$key) stc $TY,2($XX[0],$key) cr $XX[1],$YY jne .Lcmov$i la $TX[1],0($TX[0]) .Lcmov$i: la $TY,0($TY,$TX[0]) nill $TY,255 ___ push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers } $code.=<<___; lg $TX[1],0($inp) sllg $acc,$acc,8 la $inp,8($inp) ic $acc,2($TY,$key) xgr $acc,$TX[1] stg $acc,0($out) la $out,8($out) brctg $cnt,.Loop8 .Lshort: lghi $acc,7 ngr $len,$acc jz .Lexit j .Loop1 .align 16 .Loop1: la $YY,0($YY,$TX[0]) nill $YY,255 llgc $TY,2($YY,$key) stc $TX[0],2($YY,$key) stc $TY,2($XX[0],$key) ar $TY,$TX[0] ahi $XX[0],1 nill $TY,255 nill $XX[0],255 llgc $acc,0($inp) la $inp,1($inp) llgc $TY,2($TY,$key) llgc $TX[0],2($XX[0],$key) xr $acc,$TY stc $acc,0($out) la $out,1($out) brct $len,.Loop1 .Lexit: ahi $XX[0],-1 stc $XX[0],0($key) stc $YY,1($key) lm${g} %r6,%r11,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $rp .size RC4,.-RC4 .string "RC4 for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ } # void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key,unsigned int len,const void *inp) { $cnt="%r0"; $idx="%r1"; $key="%r2"; $len="%r3"; $inp="%r4"; $acc="%r5"; $dat="%r6"; $ikey="%r7"; $iinp="%r8"; $code.=<<___; .globl RC4_set_key .type RC4_set_key,\@function .align 64 RC4_set_key: stm${g} %r6,%r8,6*$SIZE_T($sp) lhi $cnt,256 la $idx,0(%r0) sth $idx,0($key) .align 4 .L1stloop: stc $idx,2($idx,$key) la $idx,1($idx) brct $cnt,.L1stloop lghi $ikey,-256 lr $cnt,$len la $iinp,0(%r0) la $idx,0(%r0) .align 16 .L2ndloop: llgc $acc,2+256($ikey,$key) llgc $dat,0($iinp,$inp) la $idx,0($idx,$acc) la $ikey,1($ikey) la $idx,0($idx,$dat) nill $idx,255 la $iinp,1($iinp) tml $ikey,255 llgc $dat,2($idx,$key) stc $dat,2+256-1($ikey,$key) stc $acc,2($idx,$key) jz .Ldone brct $cnt,.L2ndloop lr $cnt,$len la $iinp,0(%r0) j .L2ndloop .Ldone: lm${g} %r6,%r8,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br $rp .size RC4_set_key,.-RC4_set_key ___ } # const char *RC4_options() $code.=<<___; .globl RC4_options .type RC4_options,\@function .align 16 RC4_options: larl %r2,.Loptions br %r14 .size RC4_options,.-RC4_options .section .rodata .Loptions: .align 8 .string "rc4(8x,char)" ___ print $code; close STDOUT; # force flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.pl0000644000000000000000000005415113176625657016447 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by David Mosberger based on the # Itanium optimized Crypto code which was released by HP Labs at # http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/linux/crypto/. # # Copyright (c) 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. # # Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining # a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the # "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including # without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, # distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to # permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to # the following conditions: # # The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be # included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, # EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND # NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE # LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION # OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION # WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. */ # This is a little helper program which generates a software-pipelined # for RC4 encryption. The basic algorithm looks like this: # # for (counter = 0; counter < len; ++counter) # { # in = inp[counter]; # SI = S[I]; # J = (SI + J) & 0xff; # SJ = S[J]; # T = (SI + SJ) & 0xff; # S[I] = SJ, S[J] = SI; # ST = S[T]; # outp[counter] = in ^ ST; # I = (I + 1) & 0xff; # } # # Pipelining this loop isn't easy, because the stores to the S[] array # need to be observed in the right order. The loop generated by the # code below has the following pipeline diagram: # # cycle # | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |10 |11 |12 |13 |14 |15 |16 |17 | # iter # 1: xxx LDI xxx xxx xxx LDJ xxx SWP xxx LDT xxx xxx # 2: xxx LDI xxx xxx xxx LDJ xxx SWP xxx LDT xxx xxx # 3: xxx LDI xxx xxx xxx LDJ xxx SWP xxx LDT xxx xxx # # where: # LDI = load of S[I] # LDJ = load of S[J] # SWP = swap of S[I] and S[J] # LDT = load of S[T] # # Note that in the above diagram, the major trouble-spot is that LDI # of the 2nd iteration is performed BEFORE the SWP of the first # iteration. Fortunately, this is easy to detect (I of the 1st # iteration will be equal to J of the 2nd iteration) and when this # happens, we simply forward the proper value from the 1st iteration # to the 2nd one. The proper value in this case is simply the value # of S[I] from the first iteration (thanks to the fact that SWP # simply swaps the contents of S[I] and S[J]). # # Another potential trouble-spot is in cycle 7, where SWP of the 1st # iteration issues at the same time as the LDI of the 3rd iteration. # However, thanks to IA-64 execution semantics, this can be taken # care of simply by placing LDI later in the instruction-group than # SWP. IA-64 CPUs will automatically forward the value if they # detect that the SWP and LDI are accessing the same memory-location. # The core-loop that can be pipelined then looks like this (annotated # with McKinley/Madison issue port & latency numbers, assuming L1 # cache hits for the most part): # operation: instruction: issue-ports: latency # ------------------ ----------------------------- ------------- ------- # Data = *inp++ ld1 data = [inp], 1 M0-M1 1 cyc c0 # shladd Iptr = I, KeyTable, 3 M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc # I = (I + 1) & 0xff padd1 nextI = I, one M0-M3, I0, I1 3 cyc # ;; # SI = S[I] ld8 SI = [Iptr] M0-M1 1 cyc c1 * after SWAP! # ;; # cmp.eq.unc pBypass = I, J * after J is valid! # J = SI + J add J = J, SI M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc c2 # (pBypass) br.cond.spnt Bypass # ;; # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # J = J & 0xff zxt1 J = J I0, I1, 1 cyc c3 # ;; # shladd Jptr = J, KeyTable, 3 M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc c4 # ;; # SJ = S[J] ld8 SJ = [Jptr] M0-M1 1 cyc c5 # ;; # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # T = (SI + SJ) add T = SI, SJ M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc c6 # ;; # T = T & 0xff zxt1 T = T I0, I1 1 cyc # S[I] = SJ st8 [Iptr] = SJ M2-M3 c7 # S[J] = SI st8 [Jptr] = SI M2-M3 # ;; # shladd Tptr = T, KeyTable, 3 M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc c8 # ;; # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # T = S[T] ld8 T = [Tptr] M0-M1 1 cyc c9 # ;; # data ^= T xor data = data, T M0-M3, I0, I1 1 cyc c10 # ;; # *out++ = Data ^ T dep word = word, data, 8, POS I0, I1 1 cyc c11 # ;; # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # There are several points worth making here: # - Note that due to the bypass/forwarding-path, the first two # phases of the loop are strangly mingled together. In # particular, note that the first stage of the pipeline is # using the value of "J", as calculated by the second stage. # - Each bundle-pair will have exactly 6 instructions. # - Pipelined, the loop can execute in 3 cycles/iteration and # 4 stages. However, McKinley/Madison can issue "st1" to # the same bank at a rate of at most one per 4 cycles. Thus, # instead of storing each byte, we accumulate them in a word # and then write them back at once with a single "st8" (this # implies that the setup code needs to ensure that the output # buffer is properly aligned, if need be, by encoding the # first few bytes separately). # - There is no space for a "br.ctop" instruction. For this # reason we can't use module-loop support in IA-64 and have # to do a traditional, purely software-pipelined loop. # - We can't replace any of the remaining "add/zxt1" pairs with # "padd1" because the latency for that instruction is too high # and would push the loop to the point where more bypasses # would be needed, which we don't have space for. # - The above loop runs at around 3.26 cycles/byte, or roughly # 440 MByte/sec on a 1.5GHz Madison. This is well below the # system bus bandwidth and hence with judicious use of # "lfetch" this loop can run at (almost) peak speed even when # the input and output data reside in memory. The # max. latency that can be tolerated is (PREFETCH_DISTANCE * # L2_LINE_SIZE * 3 cyc), or about 384 cycles assuming (at # least) 1-ahead prefetching of 128 byte cache-lines. Note # that we do NOT prefetch into L1, since that would only # interfere with the S[] table values stored there. This is # acceptable because there is a 10 cycle latency between # load and first use of the input data. # - We use a branch to out-of-line bypass-code of cycle-pressure: # we calculate the next J, check for the need to activate the # bypass path, and activate the bypass path ALL IN THE SAME # CYCLE. If we didn't have these constraints, we could do # the bypass with a simple conditional move instruction. # Fortunately, the bypass paths get activated relatively # infrequently, so the extra branches don't cost all that much # (about 0.04 cycles/byte, measured on a 16396 byte file with # random input data). # $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $phases = 4; # number of stages/phases in the pipelined-loop $unroll_count = 6; # number of times we unrolled it $pComI = (1 << 0); $pComJ = (1 << 1); $pComT = (1 << 2); $pOut = (1 << 3); $NData = 4; $NIP = 3; $NJP = 2; $NI = 2; $NSI = 3; $NSJ = 2; $NT = 2; $NOutWord = 2; # # $threshold is the minimum length before we attempt to use the # big software-pipelined loop. It MUST be greater-or-equal # to: # PHASES * (UNROLL_COUNT + 1) + 7 # # The "+ 7" comes from the fact we may have to encode up to # 7 bytes separately before the output pointer is aligned. # $threshold = (3 * ($phases * ($unroll_count + 1)) + 7); sub I { local *code = shift; local $format = shift; $code .= sprintf ("\t\t".$format."\n", @_); } sub P { local *code = shift; local $format = shift; $code .= sprintf ($format."\n", @_); } sub STOP { local *code = shift; $code .=<<___; ;; ___ } sub emit_body { local *c = shift; local *bypass = shift; local ($iteration, $p) = @_; local $i0 = $iteration; local $i1 = $iteration - 1; local $i2 = $iteration - 2; local $i3 = $iteration - 3; local $iw0 = ($iteration - 3) / 8; local $iw1 = ($iteration > 3) ? ($iteration - 4) / 8 : 1; local $byte_num = ($iteration - 3) % 8; local $label = $iteration + 1; local $pAny = ($p & 0xf) == 0xf; local $pByp = (($p & $pComI) && ($iteration > 0)); $c.=<<___; ////////////////////////////////////////////////// ___ if (($p & 0xf) == 0) { $c.="#ifdef HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN\n"; &I(\$c,"shr.u OutWord[%u] = OutWord[%u], 32;;", $iw1 % $NOutWord, $iw1 % $NOutWord); $c.="#endif\n"; &I(\$c, "st4 [OutPtr] = OutWord[%u], 4", $iw1 % $NOutWord); return; } # Cycle 0 &I(\$c, "{ .mmi") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "ld1 Data[%u] = [InPtr], 1", $i0 % $NData) if ($p & $pComI); &I(\$c, "padd1 I[%u] = One, I[%u]", $i0 % $NI, $i1 % $NI)if ($p & $pComI); &I(\$c, "zxt1 J = J") if ($p & $pComJ); &I(\$c, "}") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "{ .mmi") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "LKEY T[%u] = [T[%u]]", $i1 % $NT, $i1 % $NT) if ($p & $pOut); &I(\$c, "add T[%u] = SI[%u], SJ[%u]", $i0 % $NT, $i2 % $NSI, $i1 % $NSJ) if ($p & $pComT); &I(\$c, "KEYADDR(IPr[%u], I[%u])", $i0 % $NIP, $i1 % $NI) if ($p & $pComI); &I(\$c, "}") if ($pAny); &STOP(\$c); # Cycle 1 &I(\$c, "{ .mmi") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "SKEY [IPr[%u]] = SJ[%u]", $i2 % $NIP, $i1%$NSJ)if ($p & $pComT); &I(\$c, "SKEY [JP[%u]] = SI[%u]", $i1 % $NJP, $i2%$NSI) if ($p & $pComT); &I(\$c, "zxt1 T[%u] = T[%u]", $i0 % $NT, $i0 % $NT) if ($p & $pComT); &I(\$c, "}") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "{ .mmi") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "LKEY SI[%u] = [IPr[%u]]", $i0 % $NSI, $i0%$NIP)if ($p & $pComI); &I(\$c, "KEYADDR(JP[%u], J)", $i0 % $NJP) if ($p & $pComJ); &I(\$c, "xor Data[%u] = Data[%u], T[%u]", $i3 % $NData, $i3 % $NData, $i1 % $NT) if ($p & $pOut); &I(\$c, "}") if ($pAny); &STOP(\$c); # Cycle 2 &I(\$c, "{ .mmi") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "LKEY SJ[%u] = [JP[%u]]", $i0 % $NSJ, $i0%$NJP) if ($p & $pComJ); &I(\$c, "cmp.eq pBypass, p0 = I[%u], J", $i1 % $NI) if ($pByp); &I(\$c, "dep OutWord[%u] = Data[%u], OutWord[%u], BYTE_POS(%u), 8", $iw0%$NOutWord, $i3%$NData, $iw1%$NOutWord, $byte_num) if ($p & $pOut); &I(\$c, "}") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "{ .mmb") if ($pAny); &I(\$c, "add J = J, SI[%u]", $i0 % $NSI) if ($p & $pComI); &I(\$c, "KEYADDR(T[%u], T[%u])", $i0 % $NT, $i0 % $NT) if ($p & $pComT); &P(\$c, "(pBypass)\tbr.cond.spnt.many .rc4Bypass%u",$label)if ($pByp); &I(\$c, "}") if ($pAny); &STOP(\$c); &P(\$c, ".rc4Resume%u:", $label) if ($pByp); if ($byte_num == 0 && $iteration >= $phases) { &I(\$c, "st8 [OutPtr] = OutWord[%u], 8", $iw1 % $NOutWord) if ($p & $pOut); if ($iteration == (1 + $unroll_count) * $phases - 1) { if ($unroll_count == 6) { &I(\$c, "mov OutWord[%u] = OutWord[%u]", $iw1 % $NOutWord, $iw0 % $NOutWord); } &I(\$c, "lfetch.nt1 [InPrefetch], %u", $unroll_count * $phases); &I(\$c, "lfetch.excl.nt1 [OutPrefetch], %u", $unroll_count * $phases); &I(\$c, "br.cloop.sptk.few .rc4Loop"); } } if ($pByp) { &P(\$bypass, ".rc4Bypass%u:", $label); &I(\$bypass, "sub J = J, SI[%u]", $i0 % $NSI); &I(\$bypass, "nop 0"); &I(\$bypass, "nop 0"); &I(\$bypass, ";;"); &I(\$bypass, "add J = J, SI[%u]", $i1 % $NSI); &I(\$bypass, "mov SI[%u] = SI[%u]", $i0 % $NSI, $i1 % $NSI); &I(\$bypass, "br.sptk.many .rc4Resume%u\n", $label); &I(\$bypass, ";;"); } } $code=<<___; .ident \"rc4-ia64.s, version 3.0\" .ident \"Copyright (c) 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.\" #define LCSave r8 #define PRSave r9 /* Inputs become invalid once rotation begins! */ #define StateTable in0 #define DataLen in1 #define InputBuffer in2 #define OutputBuffer in3 #define KTable r14 #define J r15 #define InPtr r16 #define OutPtr r17 #define InPrefetch r18 #define OutPrefetch r19 #define One r20 #define LoopCount r21 #define Remainder r22 #define IFinal r23 #define EndPtr r24 #define tmp0 r25 #define tmp1 r26 #define pBypass p6 #define pDone p7 #define pSmall p8 #define pAligned p9 #define pUnaligned p10 #define pComputeI pPhase[0] #define pComputeJ pPhase[1] #define pComputeT pPhase[2] #define pOutput pPhase[3] #define RetVal r8 #define L_OK p7 #define L_NOK p8 #define _NINPUTS 4 #define _NOUTPUT 0 #define _NROTATE 24 #define _NLOCALS (_NROTATE - _NINPUTS - _NOUTPUT) #ifndef SZ # define SZ 4 // this must be set to sizeof(RC4_INT) #endif #if SZ == 1 # define LKEY ld1 # define SKEY st1 # define KEYADDR(dst, i) add dst = i, KTable #elif SZ == 2 # define LKEY ld2 # define SKEY st2 # define KEYADDR(dst, i) shladd dst = i, 1, KTable #elif SZ == 4 # define LKEY ld4 # define SKEY st4 # define KEYADDR(dst, i) shladd dst = i, 2, KTable #else # define LKEY ld8 # define SKEY st8 # define KEYADDR(dst, i) shladd dst = i, 3, KTable #endif #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) # define ADDP addp4 #else # define ADDP add #endif /* Define a macro for the bit number of the n-th byte: */ #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) || defined(B_ENDIAN) # define HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN # define BYTE_POS(n) (56 - (8 * (n))) #else # define BYTE_POS(n) (8 * (n)) #endif /* We must perform the first phase of the pipeline explicitly since we will always load from the stable the first time. The br.cexit will never be taken since regardless of the number of bytes because the epilogue count is 4. */ /* MODSCHED_RC4 macro was split to _PROLOGUE and _LOOP, because HP-UX assembler failed on original macro with syntax error. */ #define MODSCHED_RC4_PROLOGUE \\ { \\ ld1 Data[0] = [InPtr], 1; \\ add IFinal = 1, I[1]; \\ KEYADDR(IPr[0], I[1]); \\ } ;; \\ { \\ LKEY SI[0] = [IPr[0]]; \\ mov pr.rot = 0x10000; \\ mov ar.ec = 4; \\ } ;; \\ { \\ add J = J, SI[0]; \\ zxt1 I[0] = IFinal; \\ br.cexit.spnt.few .+16; /* never taken */ \\ } ;; #define MODSCHED_RC4_LOOP(label) \\ label: \\ { .mmi; \\ (pComputeI) ld1 Data[0] = [InPtr], 1; \\ (pComputeI) add IFinal = 1, I[1]; \\ (pComputeJ) zxt1 J = J; \\ }{ .mmi; \\ (pOutput) LKEY T[1] = [T[1]]; \\ (pComputeT) add T[0] = SI[2], SJ[1]; \\ (pComputeI) KEYADDR(IPr[0], I[1]); \\ } ;; \\ { .mmi; \\ (pComputeT) SKEY [IPr[2]] = SJ[1]; \\ (pComputeT) SKEY [JP[1]] = SI[2]; \\ (pComputeT) zxt1 T[0] = T[0]; \\ }{ .mmi; \\ (pComputeI) LKEY SI[0] = [IPr[0]]; \\ (pComputeJ) KEYADDR(JP[0], J); \\ (pComputeI) cmp.eq.unc pBypass, p0 = I[1], J; \\ } ;; \\ { .mmi; \\ (pComputeJ) LKEY SJ[0] = [JP[0]]; \\ (pOutput) xor Data[3] = Data[3], T[1]; \\ nop 0x0; \\ }{ .mmi; \\ (pComputeT) KEYADDR(T[0], T[0]); \\ (pBypass) mov SI[0] = SI[1]; \\ (pComputeI) zxt1 I[0] = IFinal; \\ } ;; \\ { .mmb; \\ (pOutput) st1 [OutPtr] = Data[3], 1; \\ (pComputeI) add J = J, SI[0]; \\ br.ctop.sptk.few label; \\ } ;; .text .align 32 .type RC4, \@function .global RC4 .proc RC4 .prologue RC4: { .mmi alloc r2 = ar.pfs, _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE .rotr Data[4], I[2], IPr[3], SI[3], JP[2], SJ[2], T[2], \\ OutWord[2] .rotp pPhase[4] ADDP InPrefetch = 0, InputBuffer ADDP KTable = 0, StateTable } { .mmi ADDP InPtr = 0, InputBuffer ADDP OutPtr = 0, OutputBuffer mov RetVal = r0 } ;; { .mmi lfetch.nt1 [InPrefetch], 0x80 ADDP OutPrefetch = 0, OutputBuffer } { // Return 0 if the input length is nonsensical .mib ADDP StateTable = 0, StateTable cmp.ge.unc L_NOK, L_OK = r0, DataLen (L_NOK) br.ret.sptk.few rp } ;; { .mib cmp.eq.or L_NOK, L_OK = r0, InPtr cmp.eq.or L_NOK, L_OK = r0, OutPtr nop 0x0 } { .mib cmp.eq.or L_NOK, L_OK = r0, StateTable nop 0x0 (L_NOK) br.ret.sptk.few rp } ;; LKEY I[1] = [KTable], SZ /* Prefetch the state-table. It contains 256 elements of size SZ */ #if SZ == 1 ADDP tmp0 = 1*128, StateTable #elif SZ == 2 ADDP tmp0 = 3*128, StateTable ADDP tmp1 = 2*128, StateTable #elif SZ == 4 ADDP tmp0 = 7*128, StateTable ADDP tmp1 = 6*128, StateTable #elif SZ == 8 ADDP tmp0 = 15*128, StateTable ADDP tmp1 = 14*128, StateTable #endif ;; #if SZ >= 8 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0], -256 // 15 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp1], -256;; lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0], -256 // 13 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp1], -256;; lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0], -256 // 11 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp1], -256;; lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0], -256 // 9 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp1], -256;; #endif #if SZ >= 4 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0], -256 // 7 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp1], -256;; lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0], -256 // 5 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp1], -256;; #endif #if SZ >= 2 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0], -256 // 3 lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp1], -256;; #endif { .mii lfetch.fault.nt1 [tmp0] // 1 add I[1]=1,I[1];; zxt1 I[1]=I[1] } { .mmi lfetch.nt1 [InPrefetch], 0x80 lfetch.excl.nt1 [OutPrefetch], 0x80 .save pr, PRSave mov PRSave = pr } ;; { .mmi lfetch.excl.nt1 [OutPrefetch], 0x80 LKEY J = [KTable], SZ ADDP EndPtr = DataLen, InPtr } ;; { .mmi ADDP EndPtr = -1, EndPtr // Make it point to // last data byte. mov One = 1 .save ar.lc, LCSave mov LCSave = ar.lc .body } ;; { .mmb sub Remainder = 0, OutPtr cmp.gtu pSmall, p0 = $threshold, DataLen (pSmall) br.cond.dpnt .rc4Remainder // Data too small for // big loop. } ;; { .mmi and Remainder = 0x7, Remainder ;; cmp.eq pAligned, pUnaligned = Remainder, r0 nop 0x0 } ;; { .mmb .pred.rel "mutex",pUnaligned,pAligned (pUnaligned) add Remainder = -1, Remainder (pAligned) sub Remainder = EndPtr, InPtr (pAligned) br.cond.dptk.many .rc4Aligned } ;; { .mmi nop 0x0 nop 0x0 mov.i ar.lc = Remainder } /* Do the initial few bytes via the compact, modulo-scheduled loop until the output pointer is 8-byte-aligned. */ MODSCHED_RC4_PROLOGUE MODSCHED_RC4_LOOP(.RC4AlignLoop) { .mib sub Remainder = EndPtr, InPtr zxt1 IFinal = IFinal clrrrb // Clear CFM.rrb.pr so ;; // next "mov pr.rot = N" // does the right thing. } { .mmi mov I[1] = IFinal nop 0x0 nop 0x0 } ;; .rc4Aligned: /* Unrolled loop count = (Remainder - ($unroll_count+1)*$phases)/($unroll_count*$phases) */ { .mlx add LoopCount = 1 - ($unroll_count + 1)*$phases, Remainder movl Remainder = 0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab } ;; { .mmi setf.sig f6 = LoopCount // M2, M3 6 cyc setf.sig f7 = Remainder // M2, M3 6 cyc nop 0x0 } ;; { .mfb nop 0x0 xmpy.hu f6 = f6, f7 nop 0x0 } ;; { .mmi getf.sig LoopCount = f6;; // M2 5 cyc nop 0x0 shr.u LoopCount = LoopCount, 4 } ;; { .mmi nop 0x0 nop 0x0 mov.i ar.lc = LoopCount } ;; /* Now comes the unrolled loop: */ .rc4Prologue: ___ $iteration = 0; # Generate the prologue: $predicates = 1; for ($i = 0; $i < $phases; ++$i) { &emit_body (\$code, \$bypass, $iteration++, $predicates); $predicates = ($predicates << 1) | 1; } $code.=<<___; .rc4Loop: ___ # Generate the body: for ($i = 0; $i < $unroll_count*$phases; ++$i) { &emit_body (\$code, \$bypass, $iteration++, $predicates); } $code.=<<___; .rc4Epilogue: ___ # Generate the epilogue: for ($i = 0; $i < $phases; ++$i) { $predicates <<= 1; &emit_body (\$code, \$bypass, $iteration++, $predicates); } $code.=<<___; { .mmi lfetch.nt1 [EndPtr] // fetch line with last byte mov IFinal = I[1] nop 0x0 } .rc4Remainder: { .mmi sub Remainder = EndPtr, InPtr // Calculate // # of bytes // left - 1 nop 0x0 nop 0x0 } ;; { .mib cmp.eq pDone, p0 = -1, Remainder // done already? mov.i ar.lc = Remainder (pDone) br.cond.dptk.few .rc4Complete } /* Do the remaining bytes via the compact, modulo-scheduled loop */ MODSCHED_RC4_PROLOGUE MODSCHED_RC4_LOOP(.RC4RestLoop) .rc4Complete: { .mmi add KTable = -SZ, KTable add IFinal = -1, IFinal mov ar.lc = LCSave } ;; { .mii SKEY [KTable] = J,-SZ zxt1 IFinal = IFinal mov pr = PRSave, 0x1FFFF } ;; { .mib SKEY [KTable] = IFinal add RetVal = 1, r0 br.ret.sptk.few rp } ;; ___ # Last but not least, emit the code for the bypass-code of the unrolled loop: $code.=$bypass; $code.=<<___; .endp RC4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000437513176625657015565 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc4_locl.h" /*- * RC4 as implemented from a posting from * Newsgroups: sci.crypt * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark) * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed. * Message-ID: * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT */ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata, unsigned char *outdata) { register RC4_INT *d; register RC4_INT x, y, tx, ty; size_t i; x = key->x; y = key->y; d = key->data; #define LOOP(in,out) \ x=((x+1)&0xff); \ tx=d[x]; \ y=(tx+y)&0xff; \ d[x]=ty=d[y]; \ d[y]=tx; \ (out) = d[(tx+ty)&0xff]^ (in); i = len >> 3; if (i) { for (;;) { LOOP(indata[0], outdata[0]); LOOP(indata[1], outdata[1]); LOOP(indata[2], outdata[2]); LOOP(indata[3], outdata[3]); LOOP(indata[4], outdata[4]); LOOP(indata[5], outdata[5]); LOOP(indata[6], outdata[6]); LOOP(indata[7], outdata[7]); indata += 8; outdata += 8; if (--i == 0) break; } } i = len & 0x07; if (i) { for (;;) { LOOP(indata[0], outdata[0]); if (--i == 0) break; LOOP(indata[1], outdata[1]); if (--i == 0) break; LOOP(indata[2], outdata[2]); if (--i == 0) break; LOOP(indata[3], outdata[3]); if (--i == 0) break; LOOP(indata[4], outdata[4]); if (--i == 0) break; LOOP(indata[5], outdata[5]); if (--i == 0) break; LOOP(indata[6], outdata[6]); if (--i == 0) break; } } key->x = x; key->y = y; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014327 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_api.c0000644000000000000000000001255113176625656016255 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */ #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" static void value_free_hash(const CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf); static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a); /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was get_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) { CONF_VALUE *v, vv; if ((conf == NULL) || (section == NULL)) return (NULL); vv.name = NULL; vv.section = (char *)section; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); return (v); } /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was CONF_get_section */ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *_CONF_get_section_values(const CONF *conf, const char *section) { CONF_VALUE *v; v = _CONF_get_section(conf, section); if (v != NULL) return ((STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)v->value); else return (NULL); } int _CONF_add_string(CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value) { CONF_VALUE *v = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ts; ts = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)section->value; value->section = section->section; if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(ts, value)) { return 0; } v = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, value); if (v != NULL) { (void)sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts, v); OPENSSL_free(v->name); OPENSSL_free(v->value); OPENSSL_free(v); } return 1; } char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *name) { CONF_VALUE *v, vv; char *p; if (name == NULL) return (NULL); if (conf != NULL) { if (section != NULL) { vv.name = (char *)name; vv.section = (char *)section; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); if (v != NULL) return (v->value); if (strcmp(section, "ENV") == 0) { p = getenv(name); if (p != NULL) return (p); } } vv.section = "default"; vv.name = (char *)name; v = lh_CONF_VALUE_retrieve(conf->data, &vv); if (v != NULL) return (v->value); else return (NULL); } else return (getenv(name)); } static unsigned long conf_value_hash(const CONF_VALUE *v) { return (OPENSSL_LH_strhash(v->section) << 2) ^ OPENSSL_LH_strhash(v->name); } static int conf_value_cmp(const CONF_VALUE *a, const CONF_VALUE *b) { int i; if (a->section != b->section) { i = strcmp(a->section, b->section); if (i) return (i); } if ((a->name != NULL) && (b->name != NULL)) { i = strcmp(a->name, b->name); return (i); } else if (a->name == b->name) return (0); else return ((a->name == NULL) ? -1 : 1); } int _CONF_new_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) { return 0; } if (conf->data == NULL) { conf->data = lh_CONF_VALUE_new(conf_value_hash, conf_value_cmp); if (conf->data == NULL) return 0; } return 1; } typedef LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) LH_CONF_VALUE; IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(CONF_VALUE, LH_CONF_VALUE); void _CONF_free_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL || conf->data == NULL) return; /* evil thing to make sure the 'OPENSSL_free()' works as expected */ lh_CONF_VALUE_set_down_load(conf->data, 0); lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_LH_CONF_VALUE(conf->data, value_free_hash, conf->data); /* * We now have only 'section' entries in the hash table. Due to problems * with */ lh_CONF_VALUE_doall(conf->data, value_free_stack_doall); lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->data); } static void value_free_hash(const CONF_VALUE *a, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf) { if (a->name != NULL) (void)lh_CONF_VALUE_delete(conf, a); } static void value_free_stack_doall(CONF_VALUE *a) { CONF_VALUE *vv; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk; int i; if (a->name != NULL) return; sk = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)a->value; for (i = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { vv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i); OPENSSL_free(vv->value); OPENSSL_free(vv->name); OPENSSL_free(vv); } sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk); OPENSSL_free(a->section); OPENSSL_free(a); } /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was new_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL; int i; CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *vv; if ((sk = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*v))) == NULL) goto err; i = strlen(section) + 1; if ((v->section = OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(v->section, section, i); v->name = NULL; v->value = (char *)sk; vv = lh_CONF_VALUE_insert(conf->data, v); OPENSSL_assert(vv == NULL); return v; err: sk_CONF_VALUE_free(sk); OPENSSL_free(v); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c0000644000000000000000000003251513176625656016265 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/conf.h" #include "internal/dso.h" #include #define DSO_mod_init_name "OPENSSL_init" #define DSO_mod_finish_name "OPENSSL_finish" /* * This structure contains a data about supported modules. entries in this * table correspond to either dynamic or static modules. */ struct conf_module_st { /* DSO of this module or NULL if static */ DSO *dso; /* Name of the module */ char *name; /* Init function */ conf_init_func *init; /* Finish function */ conf_finish_func *finish; /* Number of successfully initialized modules */ int links; void *usr_data; }; /* * This structure contains information about modules that have been * successfully initialized. There may be more than one entry for a given * module. */ struct conf_imodule_st { CONF_MODULE *pmod; char *name; char *value; unsigned long flags; void *usr_data; }; static STACK_OF(CONF_MODULE) *supported_modules = NULL; static STACK_OF(CONF_IMODULE) *initialized_modules = NULL; static void module_free(CONF_MODULE *md); static void module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *imod); static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value, unsigned long flags); static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc); static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name); static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value, const CONF *cnf); static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value); /* Main function: load modules from a CONF structure */ int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname, unsigned long flags) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values; CONF_VALUE *vl; char *vsection = NULL; int ret, i; if (!cnf) return 1; if (appname) vsection = NCONF_get_string(cnf, NULL, appname); if (!appname || (!vsection && (flags & CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION))) vsection = NCONF_get_string(cnf, NULL, "openssl_conf"); if (!vsection) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } values = NCONF_get_section(cnf, vsection); if (!values) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { vl = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); ret = module_run(cnf, vl->name, vl->value, flags); if (ret <= 0) if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS)) return ret; } return 1; } int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname, unsigned long flags) { char *file = NULL; CONF *conf = NULL; int ret = 0; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (conf == NULL) goto err; if (filename == NULL) { file = CONF_get1_default_config_file(); if (!file) goto err; } else file = (char *)filename; if (NCONF_load(conf, file, NULL) <= 0) { if ((flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) && (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE)) { ERR_clear_error(); ret = 1; } goto err; } ret = CONF_modules_load(conf, appname, flags); err: if (filename == NULL) OPENSSL_free(file); NCONF_free(conf); return ret; } static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value, unsigned long flags) { CONF_MODULE *md; int ret; md = module_find(name); /* Module not found: try to load DSO */ if (!md && !(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO)) md = module_load_dso(cnf, name, value); if (!md) { if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT)) { CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN, CONF_R_UNKNOWN_MODULE_NAME); ERR_add_error_data(2, "module=", name); } return -1; } ret = module_init(md, name, value, cnf); if (ret <= 0) { if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT)) { char rcode[DECIMAL_SIZE(ret) + 1]; CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN, CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); BIO_snprintf(rcode, sizeof rcode, "%-8d", ret); ERR_add_error_data(6, "module=", name, ", value=", value, ", retcode=", rcode); } } return ret; } /* Load a module from a DSO */ static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value) { DSO *dso = NULL; conf_init_func *ifunc; conf_finish_func *ffunc; const char *path = NULL; int errcode = 0; CONF_MODULE *md; /* Look for alternative path in module section */ path = NCONF_get_string(cnf, value, "path"); if (!path) { ERR_clear_error(); path = name; } dso = DSO_load(NULL, path, NULL, 0); if (!dso) { errcode = CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO; goto err; } ifunc = (conf_init_func *)DSO_bind_func(dso, DSO_mod_init_name); if (!ifunc) { errcode = CONF_R_MISSING_INIT_FUNCTION; goto err; } ffunc = (conf_finish_func *)DSO_bind_func(dso, DSO_mod_finish_name); /* All OK, add module */ md = module_add(dso, name, ifunc, ffunc); if (!md) goto err; return md; err: DSO_free(dso); CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_LOAD_DSO, errcode); ERR_add_error_data(4, "module=", name, ", path=", path); return NULL; } /* add module to list */ static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc) { CONF_MODULE *tmod = NULL; if (supported_modules == NULL) supported_modules = sk_CONF_MODULE_new_null(); if (supported_modules == NULL) return NULL; tmod = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tmod)); if (tmod == NULL) return NULL; tmod->dso = dso; tmod->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); tmod->init = ifunc; tmod->finish = ffunc; if (tmod->name == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(tmod); return NULL; } if (!sk_CONF_MODULE_push(supported_modules, tmod)) { OPENSSL_free(tmod->name); OPENSSL_free(tmod); return NULL; } return tmod; } /* * Find a module from the list. We allow module names of the form * modname.XXXX to just search for modname to allow the same module to be * initialized more than once. */ static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name) { CONF_MODULE *tmod; int i, nchar; char *p; p = strrchr(name, '.'); if (p) nchar = p - name; else nchar = strlen(name); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules); i++) { tmod = sk_CONF_MODULE_value(supported_modules, i); if (strncmp(tmod->name, name, nchar) == 0) return tmod; } return NULL; } /* initialize a module */ static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value, const CONF *cnf) { int ret = 1; int init_called = 0; CONF_IMODULE *imod = NULL; /* Otherwise add initialized module to list */ imod = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*imod)); if (imod == NULL) goto err; imod->pmod = pmod; imod->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); imod->value = OPENSSL_strdup(value); imod->usr_data = NULL; if (!imod->name || !imod->value) goto memerr; /* Try to initialize module */ if (pmod->init) { ret = pmod->init(imod, cnf); init_called = 1; /* Error occurred, exit */ if (ret <= 0) goto err; } if (initialized_modules == NULL) { initialized_modules = sk_CONF_IMODULE_new_null(); if (!initialized_modules) { CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!sk_CONF_IMODULE_push(initialized_modules, imod)) { CONFerr(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } pmod->links++; return ret; err: /* We've started the module so we'd better finish it */ if (pmod->finish && init_called) pmod->finish(imod); memerr: if (imod) { OPENSSL_free(imod->name); OPENSSL_free(imod->value); OPENSSL_free(imod); } return -1; } /* * Unload any dynamic modules that have a link count of zero: i.e. have no * active initialized modules. If 'all' is set then all modules are unloaded * including static ones. */ void CONF_modules_unload(int all) { int i; CONF_MODULE *md; CONF_modules_finish(); /* unload modules in reverse order */ for (i = sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { md = sk_CONF_MODULE_value(supported_modules, i); /* If static or in use and 'all' not set ignore it */ if (((md->links > 0) || !md->dso) && !all) continue; /* Since we're working in reverse this is OK */ (void)sk_CONF_MODULE_delete(supported_modules, i); module_free(md); } if (sk_CONF_MODULE_num(supported_modules) == 0) { sk_CONF_MODULE_free(supported_modules); supported_modules = NULL; } } /* unload a single module */ static void module_free(CONF_MODULE *md) { DSO_free(md->dso); OPENSSL_free(md->name); OPENSSL_free(md); } /* finish and free up all modules instances */ void CONF_modules_finish(void) { CONF_IMODULE *imod; while (sk_CONF_IMODULE_num(initialized_modules) > 0) { imod = sk_CONF_IMODULE_pop(initialized_modules); module_finish(imod); } sk_CONF_IMODULE_free(initialized_modules); initialized_modules = NULL; } /* finish a module instance */ static void module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *imod) { if (!imod) return; if (imod->pmod->finish) imod->pmod->finish(imod); imod->pmod->links--; OPENSSL_free(imod->name); OPENSSL_free(imod->value); OPENSSL_free(imod); } /* Add a static module to OpenSSL */ int CONF_module_add(const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc) { if (module_add(NULL, name, ifunc, ffunc)) return 1; else return 0; } void conf_modules_free_int(void) { CONF_modules_finish(); CONF_modules_unload(1); } /* Utility functions */ const char *CONF_imodule_get_name(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->name; } const char *CONF_imodule_get_value(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->value; } void *CONF_imodule_get_usr_data(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->usr_data; } void CONF_imodule_set_usr_data(CONF_IMODULE *md, void *usr_data) { md->usr_data = usr_data; } CONF_MODULE *CONF_imodule_get_module(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->pmod; } unsigned long CONF_imodule_get_flags(const CONF_IMODULE *md) { return md->flags; } void CONF_imodule_set_flags(CONF_IMODULE *md, unsigned long flags) { md->flags = flags; } void *CONF_module_get_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod) { return pmod->usr_data; } void CONF_module_set_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod, void *usr_data) { pmod->usr_data = usr_data; } /* Return default config file name */ char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void) { char *file; int len; file = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF"); if (file) return OPENSSL_strdup(file); len = strlen(X509_get_default_cert_area()); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS len++; #endif len += strlen(OPENSSL_CONF); file = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); if (file == NULL) return NULL; OPENSSL_strlcpy(file, X509_get_default_cert_area(), len + 1); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS OPENSSL_strlcat(file, "/", len + 1); #endif OPENSSL_strlcat(file, OPENSSL_CONF, len + 1); return file; } /* * This function takes a list separated by 'sep' and calls the callback * function giving the start and length of each member optionally stripping * leading and trailing whitespace. This can be used to parse comma separated * lists for example. */ int CONF_parse_list(const char *list_, int sep, int nospc, int (*list_cb) (const char *elem, int len, void *usr), void *arg) { int ret; const char *lstart, *tmpend, *p; if (list_ == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_PARSE_LIST, CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL); return 0; } lstart = list_; for (;;) { if (nospc) { while (*lstart && isspace((unsigned char)*lstart)) lstart++; } p = strchr(lstart, sep); if (p == lstart || !*lstart) ret = list_cb(NULL, 0, arg); else { if (p) tmpend = p - 1; else tmpend = lstart + strlen(lstart) - 1; if (nospc) { while (isspace((unsigned char)*tmpend)) tmpend--; } ret = list_cb(lstart, tmpend - lstart + 1, arg); } if (ret <= 0) return ret; if (p == NULL) return 1; lstart = p + 1; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_lib.c0000644000000000000000000002030213176625656016243 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" static CONF_METHOD *default_CONF_method = NULL; /* Init a 'CONF' structure from an old LHASH */ void CONF_set_nconf(CONF *conf, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *hash) { if (default_CONF_method == NULL) default_CONF_method = NCONF_default(); default_CONF_method->init(conf); conf->data = hash; } /* * The following section contains the "CONF classic" functions, rewritten in * terms of the new CONF interface. */ int CONF_set_default_method(CONF_METHOD *meth) { default_CONF_method = meth; return 1; } LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *file, long *eline) { LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ltmp; BIO *in = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS in = BIO_new_file(file, "r"); #else in = BIO_new_file(file, "rb"); #endif if (in == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); return NULL; } ltmp = CONF_load_bio(conf, in, eline); BIO_free(in); return ltmp; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *fp, long *eline) { BIO *btmp; LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ltmp; if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return NULL; } ltmp = CONF_load_bio(conf, btmp, eline); BIO_free(btmp); return ltmp; } #endif LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline) { CONF ctmp; int ret; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); ret = NCONF_load_bio(&ctmp, bp, eline); if (ret) return ctmp.data; return NULL; } STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_get_section(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *section) { if (conf == NULL) { return NULL; } else { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return NCONF_get_section(&ctmp, section); } } char *CONF_get_string(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group, const char *name) { if (conf == NULL) { return NCONF_get_string(NULL, group, name); } else { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return NCONF_get_string(&ctmp, group, name); } } long CONF_get_number(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group, const char *name) { int status; long result = 0; if (conf == NULL) { status = NCONF_get_number_e(NULL, group, name, &result); } else { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); status = NCONF_get_number_e(&ctmp, group, name, &result); } if (status == 0) { /* This function does not believe in errors... */ ERR_clear_error(); } return result; } void CONF_free(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf) { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); NCONF_free_data(&ctmp); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int CONF_dump_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *out) { BIO *btmp; int ret; if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(out, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_CONF_DUMP_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } ret = CONF_dump_bio(conf, btmp); BIO_free(btmp); return ret; } #endif int CONF_dump_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *out) { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return NCONF_dump_bio(&ctmp, out); } /* * The following section contains the "New CONF" functions. They are * completely centralised around a new CONF structure that may contain * basically anything, but at least a method pointer and a table of data. * These functions are also written in terms of the bridge functions used by * the "CONF classic" functions, for consistency. */ CONF *NCONF_new(CONF_METHOD *meth) { CONF *ret; if (meth == NULL) meth = NCONF_default(); ret = meth->create(meth); if (ret == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } return ret; } void NCONF_free(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) return; conf->meth->destroy(conf); } void NCONF_free_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) return; conf->meth->destroy_data(conf); } int NCONF_load(CONF *conf, const char *file, long *eline) { if (conf == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD, CONF_R_NO_CONF); return 0; } return conf->meth->load(conf, file, eline); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int NCONF_load_fp(CONF *conf, FILE *fp, long *eline) { BIO *btmp; int ret; if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } ret = NCONF_load_bio(conf, btmp, eline); BIO_free(btmp); return ret; } #endif int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline) { if (conf == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_NO_CONF); return 0; } return conf->meth->load_bio(conf, bp, eline); } STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *NCONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) { if (conf == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION, CONF_R_NO_CONF); return NULL; } if (section == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION, CONF_R_NO_SECTION); return NULL; } return _CONF_get_section_values(conf, section); } char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name) { char *s = _CONF_get_string(conf, group, name); /* * Since we may get a value from an environment variable even if conf is * NULL, let's check the value first */ if (s) return s; if (conf == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING, CONF_R_NO_CONF_OR_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE); return NULL; } CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING, CONF_R_NO_VALUE); ERR_add_error_data(4, "group=", group, " name=", name); return NULL; } int NCONF_get_number_e(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name, long *result) { char *str; if (result == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_NUMBER_E, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } str = NCONF_get_string(conf, group, name); if (str == NULL) return 0; for (*result = 0; conf->meth->is_number(conf, *str);) { *result = (*result) * 10 + conf->meth->to_int(conf, *str); str++; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int NCONF_dump_fp(const CONF *conf, FILE *out) { BIO *btmp; int ret; if ((btmp = BIO_new_fp(out, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } ret = NCONF_dump_bio(conf, btmp); BIO_free(btmp); return ret; } #endif int NCONF_dump_bio(const CONF *conf, BIO *out) { if (conf == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_BIO, CONF_R_NO_CONF); return 0; } return conf->meth->dump(conf, out); } /* * These routines call the C malloc/free, to avoid intermixing with * OpenSSL function pointers before the library is initialized. */ OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_INIT_new(void) { OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *ret = malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret != NULL) memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings, const char *appname) { char *newappname = NULL; if (appname != NULL) { newappname = strdup(appname); if (newappname == NULL) return 0; } free(settings->appname); settings->appname = newappname; return 1; } #endif void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) { free(settings->appname); free(settings); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/build.info0000644000000000000000000000022013176625656016275 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= \ conf_err.c conf_lib.c conf_api.c conf_def.c conf_mod.c \ conf_mall.c conf_sap.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_err.c0000644000000000000000000000611613176625656016274 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA CONF_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_DUMP_FP), "CONF_dump_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD), "CONF_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_LOAD_FP), "CONF_load_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_CONF_PARSE_LIST), "CONF_parse_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD), "def_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO), "def_load_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_MODULE_INIT), "module_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_MODULE_LOAD_DSO), "module_load_dso"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_MODULE_RUN), "module_run"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_BIO), "NCONF_dump_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_FP), "NCONF_dump_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_NUMBER_E), "NCONF_get_number_e"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION), "NCONF_get_section"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING), "NCONF_get_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD), "NCONF_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_BIO), "NCONF_load_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_FP), "NCONF_load_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_NCONF_NEW), "NCONF_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(CONF_F_STR_COPY), "str_copy"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA CONF_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO), "error loading dso"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL), "list cannot be null"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET), "missing close square bracket"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN), "missing equal sign"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MISSING_INIT_FUNCTION), "missing init function"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR), "module initialization error"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE), "no close brace"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_CONF), "no conf"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_CONF_OR_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE), "no conf or environment variable"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_SECTION), "no section"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE), "no such file"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_NO_VALUE), "no value"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION), "unable to create new section"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_UNKNOWN_MODULE_NAME), "unknown module name"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_VARIABLE_EXPANSION_TOO_LONG), "variable expansion too long"}, {ERR_REASON(CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE), "variable has no value"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_CONF_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(CONF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, CONF_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, CONF_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c0000644000000000000000000000142013176625656016422 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include /* Load all OpenSSL builtin modules */ void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void) { /* Add builtin modules here */ ASN1_add_oid_module(); ASN1_add_stable_module(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_add_conf_module(); #endif EVP_add_alg_module(); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_def.h0000644000000000000000000001656213176625656016255 0ustar rootroot/* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl * * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define CONF_NUMBER 1 #define CONF_UPPER 2 #define CONF_LOWER 4 #define CONF_UNDER 256 #define CONF_PUNCTUATION 512 #define CONF_WS 16 #define CONF_ESC 32 #define CONF_QUOTE 64 #define CONF_DQUOTE 1024 #define CONF_COMMENT 128 #define CONF_FCOMMENT 2048 #define CONF_EOF 8 #define CONF_HIGHBIT 4096 #define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER) #define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER) #define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER| \ CONF_PUNCTUATION) #define KEYTYPES(c) ((const unsigned short *)((c)->meth_data)) #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC # define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT) # define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT) # define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF) # define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC) # define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER) # define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \ (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT) # define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE) # define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE) # define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT) #else /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ # define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_COMMENT) # define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_FCOMMENT) # define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_EOF) # define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ESC) # define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_NUMBER) # define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_WS) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \ (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT) # define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_QUOTE) # define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_DQUOTE) # define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_HIGHBIT) #endif /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[256] = { 0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0040, 0x0080, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0040, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0000, 0x0020, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0100, 0x0040, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, }; static const unsigned short CONF_type_win32[256] = { 0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0400, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0A00, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0100, 0x0000, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0x1000, }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_def.c0000644000000000000000000004045313176625656016244 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "conf_def.h" #include #include /* * The maximum length we can grow a value to after variable expansion. 64k * should be more than enough for all reasonable uses. */ #define MAX_CONF_VALUE_LENGTH 65536 static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p); static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p); static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p); static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **to, char *from); static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p); static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p); #define scan_esc(conf,p) (((IS_EOF((conf),(p)[1]))?((p)+1):((p)+2))) static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth); static int def_init_default(CONF *conf); static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf); static int def_destroy(CONF *conf); static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf); static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *eline); static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline); static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *bp); static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c); static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c); static CONF_METHOD default_method = { "OpenSSL default", def_create, def_init_default, def_destroy, def_destroy_data, def_load_bio, def_dump, def_is_number, def_to_int, def_load }; static CONF_METHOD WIN32_method = { "WIN32", def_create, def_init_WIN32, def_destroy, def_destroy_data, def_load_bio, def_dump, def_is_number, def_to_int, def_load }; CONF_METHOD *NCONF_default() { return &default_method; } CONF_METHOD *NCONF_WIN32() { return &WIN32_method; } static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth) { CONF *ret; ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret != NULL) if (meth->init(ret) == 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return ret; } static int def_init_default(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) return 0; conf->meth = &default_method; conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_default; conf->data = NULL; return 1; } static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) return 0; conf->meth = &WIN32_method; conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_win32; conf->data = NULL; return 1; } static int def_destroy(CONF *conf) { if (def_destroy_data(conf)) { OPENSSL_free(conf); return 1; } return 0; } static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf) { if (conf == NULL) return 0; _CONF_free_data(conf); return 1; } static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *line) { int ret; BIO *in = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS in = BIO_new_file(name, "r"); #else in = BIO_new_file(name, "rb"); #endif if (in == NULL) { if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE) CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE); else CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); return 0; } ret = def_load_bio(conf, in, line); BIO_free(in); return ret; } static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line) { /* The macro BUFSIZE conflicts with a system macro in VxWorks */ #define CONFBUFSIZE 512 int bufnum = 0, i, ii; BUF_MEM *buff = NULL; char *s, *p, *end; int again; long eline = 0; char btmp[DECIMAL_SIZE(eline) + 1]; CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *tv; CONF_VALUE *sv = NULL; char *section = NULL, *buf; char *start, *psection, *pname; void *h = (void *)(conf->data); if ((buff = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } section = OPENSSL_strdup("default"); if (section == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section); if (sv == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION); goto err; } bufnum = 0; again = 0; for (;;) { if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buff, bufnum + CONFBUFSIZE)) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = &(buff->data[bufnum]); *p = '\0'; BIO_gets(in, p, CONFBUFSIZE - 1); p[CONFBUFSIZE - 1] = '\0'; ii = i = strlen(p); if (i == 0 && !again) break; again = 0; while (i > 0) { if ((p[i - 1] != '\r') && (p[i - 1] != '\n')) break; else i--; } /* * we removed some trailing stuff so there is a new line on the end. */ if (ii && i == ii) again = 1; /* long line */ else { p[i] = '\0'; eline++; /* another input line */ } /* we now have a line with trailing \r\n removed */ /* i is the number of bytes */ bufnum += i; v = NULL; /* check for line continuation */ if (bufnum >= 1) { /* * If we have bytes and the last char '\\' and second last char * is not '\\' */ p = &(buff->data[bufnum - 1]); if (IS_ESC(conf, p[0]) && ((bufnum <= 1) || !IS_ESC(conf, p[-1]))) { bufnum--; again = 1; } } if (again) continue; bufnum = 0; buf = buff->data; clear_comments(conf, buf); s = eat_ws(conf, buf); if (IS_EOF(conf, *s)) continue; /* blank line */ if (*s == '[') { char *ss; s++; start = eat_ws(conf, s); ss = start; again: end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, ss); p = eat_ws(conf, end); if (*p != ']') { if (*p != '\0' && ss != p) { ss = p; goto again; } CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET); goto err; } *end = '\0'; if (!str_copy(conf, NULL, §ion, start)) goto err; if ((sv = _CONF_get_section(conf, section)) == NULL) sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section); if (sv == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION); goto err; } continue; } else { pname = s; psection = NULL; end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, s); if ((end[0] == ':') && (end[1] == ':')) { *end = '\0'; end += 2; psection = pname; pname = end; end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, end); } p = eat_ws(conf, end); if (*p != '=') { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN); goto err; } *end = '\0'; p++; start = eat_ws(conf, p); while (!IS_EOF(conf, *p)) p++; p--; while ((p != start) && (IS_WS(conf, *p))) p--; p++; *p = '\0'; if ((v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*v))) == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (psection == NULL) psection = section; v->name = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(pname) + 1); v->value = NULL; if (v->name == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } OPENSSL_strlcpy(v->name, pname, strlen(pname) + 1); if (!str_copy(conf, psection, &(v->value), start)) goto err; if (strcmp(psection, section) != 0) { if ((tv = _CONF_get_section(conf, psection)) == NULL) tv = _CONF_new_section(conf, psection); if (tv == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION); goto err; } } else tv = sv; if (_CONF_add_string(conf, tv, v) == 0) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } v = NULL; } } BUF_MEM_free(buff); OPENSSL_free(section); return (1); err: BUF_MEM_free(buff); OPENSSL_free(section); if (line != NULL) *line = eline; BIO_snprintf(btmp, sizeof btmp, "%ld", eline); ERR_add_error_data(2, "line ", btmp); if (h != conf->data) { CONF_free(conf->data); conf->data = NULL; } if (v != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(v->name); OPENSSL_free(v->value); OPENSSL_free(v); } return (0); } static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p) { for (;;) { if (IS_FCOMMENT(conf, *p)) { *p = '\0'; return; } if (!IS_WS(conf, *p)) { break; } p++; } for (;;) { if (IS_COMMENT(conf, *p)) { *p = '\0'; return; } if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *p)) { p = scan_dquote(conf, p); continue; } if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *p)) { p = scan_quote(conf, p); continue; } if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) { p = scan_esc(conf, p); continue; } if (IS_EOF(conf, *p)) return; else p++; } } static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from) { int q, r, rr = 0, to = 0, len = 0; char *s, *e, *rp, *p, *rrp, *np, *cp, v; BUF_MEM *buf; if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) return (0); len = strlen(from) + 1; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len)) goto err; for (;;) { if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *from)) { q = *from; from++; while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from) && (*from != q)) { if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) { from++; if (IS_EOF(conf, *from)) break; } buf->data[to++] = *(from++); } if (*from == q) from++; } else if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *from)) { q = *from; from++; while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from)) { if (*from == q) { if (*(from + 1) == q) { from++; } else { break; } } buf->data[to++] = *(from++); } if (*from == q) from++; } else if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) { from++; v = *(from++); if (IS_EOF(conf, v)) break; else if (v == 'r') v = '\r'; else if (v == 'n') v = '\n'; else if (v == 'b') v = '\b'; else if (v == 't') v = '\t'; buf->data[to++] = v; } else if (IS_EOF(conf, *from)) break; else if (*from == '$') { size_t newsize; /* try to expand it */ rrp = NULL; s = &(from[1]); if (*s == '{') q = '}'; else if (*s == '(') q = ')'; else q = 0; if (q) s++; cp = section; e = np = s; while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e)) e++; if ((e[0] == ':') && (e[1] == ':')) { cp = np; rrp = e; rr = *e; *rrp = '\0'; e += 2; np = e; while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e)) e++; } r = *e; *e = '\0'; rp = e; if (q) { if (r != q) { CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE); goto err; } e++; } /*- * So at this point we have * np which is the start of the name string which is * '\0' terminated. * cp which is the start of the section string which is * '\0' terminated. * e is the 'next point after'. * r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0' * rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from. */ p = _CONF_get_string(conf, cp, np); if (rrp != NULL) *rrp = rr; *rp = r; if (p == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE); goto err; } newsize = strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from); if (newsize > MAX_CONF_VALUE_LENGTH) { CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_EXPANSION_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, newsize)) { CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } while (*p) buf->data[to++] = *(p++); /* * Since we change the pointer 'from', we also have to change the * perceived length of the string it points at. /RL */ len -= e - from; from = e; /* * In case there were no braces or parenthesis around the * variable reference, we have to put back the character that was * replaced with a '\0'. /RL */ *rp = r; } else buf->data[to++] = *(from++); } buf->data[to] = '\0'; OPENSSL_free(*pto); *pto = buf->data; OPENSSL_free(buf); return (1); err: BUF_MEM_free(buf); return (0); } static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p) { while (IS_WS(conf, *p) && (!IS_EOF(conf, *p))) p++; return (p); } static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p) { for (;;) { if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) { p = scan_esc(conf, p); continue; } if (!IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(conf, *p)) return (p); p++; } } static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p) { int q = *p; p++; while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p)) && (*p != q)) { if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) { p++; if (IS_EOF(conf, *p)) return (p); } p++; } if (*p == q) p++; return (p); } static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p) { int q = *p; p++; while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p))) { if (*p == q) { if (*(p + 1) == q) { p++; } else { break; } } p++; } if (*p == q) p++; return (p); } static void dump_value_doall_arg(const CONF_VALUE *a, BIO *out) { if (a->name) BIO_printf(out, "[%s] %s=%s\n", a->section, a->name, a->value); else BIO_printf(out, "[[%s]]\n", a->section); } IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(CONF_VALUE, BIO); static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *out) { lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_BIO(conf->data, dump_value_doall_arg, out); return 1; } static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c) { return IS_NUMBER(conf, c); } static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c) { return c - '0'; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/keysets.pl0000644000000000000000000001151013176625656016351 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $NUMBER=0x01; $UPPER=0x02; $LOWER=0x04; $UNDER=0x100; $PUNCTUATION=0x200; $WS=0x10; $ESC=0x20; $QUOTE=0x40; $DQUOTE=0x400; $COMMENT=0x80; $FCOMMENT=0x800; $EOF=0x08; $HIGHBIT=0x1000; foreach (0 .. 255) { $v=0; $c=sprintf("%c",$_); $v|=$NUMBER if ($c =~ /[0-9]/); $v|=$UPPER if ($c =~ /[A-Z]/); $v|=$LOWER if ($c =~ /[a-z]/); $v|=$UNDER if ($c =~ /_/); $v|=$PUNCTUATION if ($c =~ /[!\.%&\*\+,\/;\?\@\^\~\|-]/); $v|=$WS if ($c =~ /[ \t\r\n]/); $v|=$ESC if ($c =~ /\\/); $v|=$QUOTE if ($c =~ /['`"]/); # for emacs: "`'}/) $v|=$COMMENT if ($c =~ /\#/); $v|=$EOF if ($c =~ /\0/); $v|=$HIGHBIT if ($c =~/[\x80-\xff]/); push(@V_def,$v); } foreach (0 .. 255) { $v=0; $c=sprintf("%c",$_); $v|=$NUMBER if ($c =~ /[0-9]/); $v|=$UPPER if ($c =~ /[A-Z]/); $v|=$LOWER if ($c =~ /[a-z]/); $v|=$UNDER if ($c =~ /_/); $v|=$PUNCTUATION if ($c =~ /[!\.%&\*\+,\/;\?\@\^\~\|-]/); $v|=$WS if ($c =~ /[ \t\r\n]/); $v|=$DQUOTE if ($c =~ /["]/); # for emacs: "}/) $v|=$FCOMMENT if ($c =~ /;/); $v|=$EOF if ($c =~ /\0/); $v|=$HIGHBIT if ($c =~/[\x80-\xff]/); push(@V_w32,$v); } print <<"EOF"; /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl * * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define CONF_NUMBER $NUMBER #define CONF_UPPER $UPPER #define CONF_LOWER $LOWER #define CONF_UNDER $UNDER #define CONF_PUNCTUATION $PUNCTUATION #define CONF_WS $WS #define CONF_ESC $ESC #define CONF_QUOTE $QUOTE #define CONF_DQUOTE $DQUOTE #define CONF_COMMENT $COMMENT #define CONF_FCOMMENT $FCOMMENT #define CONF_EOF $EOF #define CONF_HIGHBIT $HIGHBIT #define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER) #define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER) #define CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER| \\ CONF_PUNCTUATION) #define KEYTYPES(c) ((const unsigned short *)((c)->meth_data)) #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC # define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_COMMENT) # define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_FCOMMENT) # define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_EOF) # define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ESC) # define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_NUMBER) # define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_WS) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\ (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT) # define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_QUOTE) # define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_DQUOTE) # define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[(a)&0xff]&CONF_HIGHBIT) #else /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ # define IS_COMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_COMMENT) # define IS_FCOMMENT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_FCOMMENT) # define IS_EOF(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_EOF) # define IS_ESC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ESC) # define IS_NUMBER(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_NUMBER) # define IS_WS(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_WS) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC) # define IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(c,a) \\ (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT) # define IS_QUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_QUOTE) # define IS_DQUOTE(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_DQUOTE) # define IS_HIGHBIT(c,a) (KEYTYPES(c)[os_toascii[a & 0xff]]&CONF_HIGHBIT) #endif /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ EOF print "static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[256] = {"; for ($i=0; $i<256; $i++) { print "\n " if ($i % 8) == 0; printf " 0x%04X,",$V_def[$i]; } print "\n};\n\n"; print "static const unsigned short CONF_type_win32[256] = {"; for ($i=0; $i<256; $i++) { print "\n " if ($i % 8) == 0; printf " 0x%04X,",$V_w32[$i]; } print "\n};\n"; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c0000644000000000000000000000313613176625656016266 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include /* * This is the automatic configuration loader: it is called automatically by * OpenSSL when any of a number of standard initialisation functions are * called, unless this is overridden by calling OPENSSL_no_config() */ static int openssl_configured = 0; #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void OPENSSL_config(const char *appname) { OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS settings; memset(&settings, 0, sizeof(settings)); if (appname != NULL) settings.appname = strdup(appname); OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, &settings); } #endif void openssl_config_int(const char *appname) { if (openssl_configured) return; OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Need to load ENGINEs */ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); #endif ERR_clear_error(); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, appname, CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION | CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE); #endif openssl_configured = 1; } void openssl_no_config_int(void) { openssl_configured = 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/build.info0000644000000000000000000000276613176625656015371 0ustar rootroot{- use File::Spec::Functions qw/catdir catfile/; -} LIBS=../libcrypto SOURCE[../libcrypto]=\ cryptlib.c mem.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c cpt_err.c \ ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_fopen.c \ threads_pthread.c threads_win.c threads_none.c \ o_init.c o_fips.c mem_sec.c init.c {- $target{cpuid_asm_src} -} \ {- $target{uplink_aux_src} -} EXTRA= ../ms/uplink-x86.pl ../ms/uplink.c ../ms/applink.c \ x86cpuid.pl x86_64cpuid.pl ia64cpuid.S \ ppccpuid.pl pariscid.pl alphacpuid.pl arm64cpuid.pl armv4cpuid.pl DEPEND[cversion.o]=buildinf.h GENERATE[buildinf.h]=../util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS_Q)" "$(PLATFORM)" DEPEND[buildinf.h]=../configdata.pm GENERATE[uplink-x86.s]=../ms/uplink-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[uplink-x86_64.s]=../ms/uplink-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[uplink-ia64.s]=../ms/uplink-ia64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[x86cpuid.s]=x86cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[x86cpuid.s]=perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[x86_64cpuid.s]=x86_64cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ia64cpuid.s]=ia64cpuid.S GENERATE[ppccpuid.s]=ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[pariscid.s]=pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[alphacpuid.s]=alphacpuid.pl GENERATE[arm64cpuid.S]=arm64cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[arm64cpuid.o]=. GENERATE[armv4cpuid.S]=armv4cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[armv4cpuid.o]=. IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw|VC-)/ -}] SHARED_SOURCE[../libcrypto]=dllmain.c ENDIF openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl0000644000000000000000000002243213176625660015720 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; ($arg1,$arg2,$arg3,$arg4)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") : # Win64 order ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); # Unix order print<<___; .extern OPENSSL_cpuid_setup .hidden OPENSSL_cpuid_setup .section .init call OPENSSL_cpuid_setup .hidden OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .comm OPENSSL_ia32cap_P,16,4 .text .globl OPENSSL_atomic_add .type OPENSSL_atomic_add,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_atomic_add: movl ($arg1),%eax .Lspin: leaq ($arg2,%rax),%r8 .byte 0xf0 # lock cmpxchgl %r8d,($arg1) jne .Lspin movl %r8d,%eax .byte 0x48,0x98 # cltq/cdqe ret .size OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add .globl OPENSSL_rdtsc .type OPENSSL_rdtsc,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_rdtsc: rdtsc shl \$32,%rdx or %rdx,%rax ret .size OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-OPENSSL_rdtsc .globl OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid .type OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid,\@function,1 .align 16 OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid: mov %rbx,%r8 # save %rbx xor %eax,%eax mov %eax,8(%rdi) # clear extended feature flags cpuid mov %eax,%r11d # max value for standard query level xor %eax,%eax cmp \$0x756e6547,%ebx # "Genu" setne %al mov %eax,%r9d cmp \$0x49656e69,%edx # "ineI" setne %al or %eax,%r9d cmp \$0x6c65746e,%ecx # "ntel" setne %al or %eax,%r9d # 0 indicates Intel CPU jz .Lintel cmp \$0x68747541,%ebx # "Auth" setne %al mov %eax,%r10d cmp \$0x69746E65,%edx # "enti" setne %al or %eax,%r10d cmp \$0x444D4163,%ecx # "cAMD" setne %al or %eax,%r10d # 0 indicates AMD CPU jnz .Lintel # AMD specific mov \$0x80000000,%eax cpuid cmp \$0x80000001,%eax jb .Lintel mov %eax,%r10d mov \$0x80000001,%eax cpuid or %ecx,%r9d and \$0x00000801,%r9d # isolate AMD XOP bit, 1<<11 cmp \$0x80000008,%r10d jb .Lintel mov \$0x80000008,%eax cpuid movzb %cl,%r10 # number of cores - 1 inc %r10 # number of cores mov \$1,%eax cpuid bt \$28,%edx # test hyper-threading bit jnc .Lgeneric shr \$16,%ebx # number of logical processors cmp %r10b,%bl ja .Lgeneric and \$0xefffffff,%edx # ~(1<<28) jmp .Lgeneric .Lintel: cmp \$4,%r11d mov \$-1,%r10d jb .Lnocacheinfo mov \$4,%eax mov \$0,%ecx # query L1D cpuid mov %eax,%r10d shr \$14,%r10d and \$0xfff,%r10d # number of cores -1 per L1D .Lnocacheinfo: mov \$1,%eax cpuid and \$0xbfefffff,%edx # force reserved bits to 0 cmp \$0,%r9d jne .Lnotintel or \$0x40000000,%edx # set reserved bit#30 on Intel CPUs and \$15,%ah cmp \$15,%ah # examine Family ID jne .LnotP4 or \$0x00100000,%edx # set reserved bit#20 to engage RC4_CHAR .LnotP4: cmp \$6,%ah jne .Lnotintel and \$0x0fff0ff0,%eax cmp \$0x00050670,%eax # Knights Landing je .Lknights cmp \$0x00080650,%eax # Knights Mill (according to sde) jne .Lnotintel .Lknights: and \$0xfbffffff,%ecx # clear XSAVE flag to mimic Silvermont .Lnotintel: bt \$28,%edx # test hyper-threading bit jnc .Lgeneric and \$0xefffffff,%edx # ~(1<<28) cmp \$0,%r10d je .Lgeneric or \$0x10000000,%edx # 1<<28 shr \$16,%ebx cmp \$1,%bl # see if cache is shared ja .Lgeneric and \$0xefffffff,%edx # ~(1<<28) .Lgeneric: and \$0x00000800,%r9d # isolate AMD XOP flag and \$0xfffff7ff,%ecx or %ecx,%r9d # merge AMD XOP flag mov %edx,%r10d # %r9d:%r10d is copy of %ecx:%edx cmp \$7,%r11d jb .Lno_extended_info mov \$7,%eax xor %ecx,%ecx cpuid bt \$26,%r9d # check XSAVE bit, cleared on Knights jc .Lnotknights and \$0xfff7ffff,%ebx # clear ADCX/ADOX flag .Lnotknights: mov %ebx,8(%rdi) # save extended feature flags .Lno_extended_info: bt \$27,%r9d # check OSXSAVE bit jnc .Lclear_avx xor %ecx,%ecx # XCR0 .byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd0 # xgetbv and \$6,%eax # isolate XMM and YMM state support cmp \$6,%eax je .Ldone .Lclear_avx: mov \$0xefffe7ff,%eax # ~(1<<28|1<<12|1<<11) and %eax,%r9d # clear AVX, FMA and AMD XOP bits andl \$0xffffffdf,8(%rdi) # clear AVX2, ~(1<<5) .Ldone: shl \$32,%r9 mov %r10d,%eax mov %r8,%rbx # restore %rbx or %r9,%rax ret .size OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid,.-OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid .globl OPENSSL_cleanse .type OPENSSL_cleanse,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_cleanse: xor %rax,%rax cmp \$15,$arg2 jae .Lot cmp \$0,$arg2 je .Lret .Little: mov %al,($arg1) sub \$1,$arg2 lea 1($arg1),$arg1 jnz .Little .Lret: ret .align 16 .Lot: test \$7,$arg1 jz .Laligned mov %al,($arg1) lea -1($arg2),$arg2 lea 1($arg1),$arg1 jmp .Lot .Laligned: mov %rax,($arg1) lea -8($arg2),$arg2 test \$-8,$arg2 lea 8($arg1),$arg1 jnz .Laligned cmp \$0,$arg2 jne .Little ret .size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse .globl CRYPTO_memcmp .type CRYPTO_memcmp,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 CRYPTO_memcmp: xor %rax,%rax xor %r10,%r10 cmp \$0,$arg3 je .Lno_data .Loop_cmp: mov ($arg1),%r10b lea 1($arg1),$arg1 xor ($arg2),%r10b lea 1($arg2),$arg2 or %r10b,%al dec $arg3 jnz .Loop_cmp neg %rax shr \$63,%rax .Lno_data: ret .size CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp ___ print<<___ if (!$win64); .globl OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .type OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 pxor %xmm6,%xmm6 pxor %xmm7,%xmm7 pxor %xmm8,%xmm8 pxor %xmm9,%xmm9 pxor %xmm10,%xmm10 pxor %xmm11,%xmm11 pxor %xmm12,%xmm12 pxor %xmm13,%xmm13 pxor %xmm14,%xmm14 pxor %xmm15,%xmm15 xorq %rcx,%rcx xorq %rdx,%rdx xorq %rsi,%rsi xorq %rdi,%rdi xorq %r8,%r8 xorq %r9,%r9 xorq %r10,%r10 xorq %r11,%r11 leaq 8(%rsp),%rax ret .size OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu ___ print<<___ if ($win64); .globl OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .type OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: pxor %xmm0,%xmm0 pxor %xmm1,%xmm1 pxor %xmm2,%xmm2 pxor %xmm3,%xmm3 pxor %xmm4,%xmm4 pxor %xmm5,%xmm5 xorq %rcx,%rcx xorq %rdx,%rdx xorq %r8,%r8 xorq %r9,%r9 xorq %r10,%r10 xorq %r11,%r11 leaq 8(%rsp),%rax ret .size OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu ___ { my $out="%r10"; my $cnt="%rcx"; my $max="%r11"; my $lasttick="%r8d"; my $lastdiff="%r9d"; my $redzone=win64?8:-8; print<<___; .globl OPENSSL_instrument_bus .type OPENSSL_instrument_bus,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_instrument_bus: mov $arg1,$out # tribute to Win64 mov $arg2,$cnt mov $arg2,$max rdtsc # collect 1st tick mov %eax,$lasttick # lasttick = tick mov \$0,$lastdiff # lastdiff = 0 clflush ($out) .byte 0xf0 # lock add $lastdiff,($out) jmp .Loop .align 16 .Loop: rdtsc mov %eax,%edx sub $lasttick,%eax mov %edx,$lasttick mov %eax,$lastdiff clflush ($out) .byte 0xf0 # lock add %eax,($out) lea 4($out),$out sub \$1,$cnt jnz .Loop mov $max,%rax ret .size OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus .globl OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .type OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_instrument_bus2: mov $arg1,$out # tribute to Win64 mov $arg2,$cnt mov $arg3,$max mov $cnt,$redzone(%rsp) rdtsc # collect 1st tick mov %eax,$lasttick # lasttick = tick mov \$0,$lastdiff # lastdiff = 0 clflush ($out) .byte 0xf0 # lock add $lastdiff,($out) rdtsc # collect 1st diff mov %eax,%edx sub $lasttick,%eax # diff mov %edx,$lasttick # lasttick = tick mov %eax,$lastdiff # lastdiff = diff .Loop2: clflush ($out) .byte 0xf0 # lock add %eax,($out) # accumulate diff sub \$1,$max jz .Ldone2 rdtsc mov %eax,%edx sub $lasttick,%eax # diff mov %edx,$lasttick # lasttick = tick cmp $lastdiff,%eax mov %eax,$lastdiff # lastdiff = diff mov \$0,%edx setne %dl sub %rdx,$cnt # conditional --$cnt lea ($out,%rdx,4),$out # conditional ++$out jnz .Loop2 .Ldone2: mov $redzone(%rsp),%rax sub $cnt,%rax ret .size OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 ___ } sub gen_random { my $rdop = shift; print<<___; .globl OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop} .type OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop},\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}: mov \$8,%ecx .Loop_${rdop}: ${rdop} %rax jc .Lbreak_${rdop} loop .Loop_${rdop} .Lbreak_${rdop}: cmp \$0,%rax cmove %rcx,%rax ret .size OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop},.-OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop} .globl OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes .type OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes: xor %rax, %rax # return value cmp \$0,$arg2 je .Ldone_${rdop}_bytes mov \$8,%r11 .Loop_${rdop}_bytes: ${rdop} %r10 jc .Lbreak_${rdop}_bytes dec %r11 jnz .Loop_${rdop}_bytes jmp .Ldone_${rdop}_bytes .align 16 .Lbreak_${rdop}_bytes: cmp \$8,$arg2 jb .Ltail_${rdop}_bytes mov %r10,($arg1) lea 8($arg1),$arg1 add \$8,%rax sub \$8,$arg2 jz .Ldone_${rdop}_bytes mov \$8,%r11 jmp .Loop_${rdop}_bytes .align 16 .Ltail_${rdop}_bytes: mov %r10b,($arg1) lea 1($arg1),$arg1 inc %rax shr \$8,%r8 dec $arg2 jnz .Ltail_${rdop}_bytes .Ldone_${rdop}_bytes: ret .size OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes,.-OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes ___ } gen_random("rdrand"); gen_random("rdseed"); close STDOUT; # flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014305 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/i_skey.c0000644000000000000000000000526313176625657015742 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "idea_lcl.h" static IDEA_INT inverse(unsigned int xin); void IDEA_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks) { int i; register IDEA_INT *kt, *kf, r0, r1, r2; kt = &(ks->data[0][0]); n2s(key, kt[0]); n2s(key, kt[1]); n2s(key, kt[2]); n2s(key, kt[3]); n2s(key, kt[4]); n2s(key, kt[5]); n2s(key, kt[6]); n2s(key, kt[7]); kf = kt; kt += 8; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { r2 = kf[1]; r1 = kf[2]; *(kt++) = ((r2 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff; r0 = kf[3]; *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r0 >> 7)) & 0xffff; r1 = kf[4]; *(kt++) = ((r0 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff; r0 = kf[5]; *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r0 >> 7)) & 0xffff; r1 = kf[6]; *(kt++) = ((r0 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff; r0 = kf[7]; *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r0 >> 7)) & 0xffff; r1 = kf[0]; if (i >= 5) break; *(kt++) = ((r0 << 9) | (r1 >> 7)) & 0xffff; *(kt++) = ((r1 << 9) | (r2 >> 7)) & 0xffff; kf += 8; } } void IDEA_set_decrypt_key(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ek, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *dk) { int r; register IDEA_INT *fp, *tp, t; tp = &(dk->data[0][0]); fp = &(ek->data[8][0]); for (r = 0; r < 9; r++) { *(tp++) = inverse(fp[0]); *(tp++) = ((int)(0x10000L - fp[2]) & 0xffff); *(tp++) = ((int)(0x10000L - fp[1]) & 0xffff); *(tp++) = inverse(fp[3]); if (r == 8) break; fp -= 6; *(tp++) = fp[4]; *(tp++) = fp[5]; } tp = &(dk->data[0][0]); t = tp[1]; tp[1] = tp[2]; tp[2] = t; t = tp[49]; tp[49] = tp[50]; tp[50] = t; } /* taken directly from the 'paper' I'll have a look at it later */ static IDEA_INT inverse(unsigned int xin) { long n1, n2, q, r, b1, b2, t; if (xin == 0) b2 = 0; else { n1 = 0x10001; n2 = xin; b2 = 1; b1 = 0; do { r = (n1 % n2); q = (n1 - r) / n2; if (r == 0) { if (b2 < 0) b2 = 0x10001 + b2; } else { n1 = n2; n2 = r; t = b2; b2 = b1 - q * b2; b1 = t; } } while (r != 0); } return ((IDEA_INT) b2); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/build.info0000644000000000000000000000014413176625657016260 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ i_cbc.c i_cfb64.c i_ofb64.c i_ecb.c i_skey.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/idea_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000001207113176625657016213 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * The new form of this macro (check if the a*b == 0) was suggested by Colin * Plumb */ /* Removal of the inner if from from Wei Dai 24/4/96 */ #define idea_mul(r,a,b,ul) \ ul=(unsigned long)a*b; \ if (ul != 0) \ { \ r=(ul&0xffff)-(ul>>16); \ r-=((r)>>16); \ } \ else \ r=(-(int)a-b+1); /* assuming a or b is 0 and in range */ /* * 7/12/95 - Many thanks to Rhys Weatherley for * pointing out that I was assuming little endian byte order for all * quantities what idea actually used bigendian. No where in the spec does * it mention this, it is all in terms of 16 bit numbers and even the example * does not use byte streams for the input example :-(. If you byte swap each * pair of input, keys and iv, the functions would produce the output as the * old version :-(. */ /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */ #define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */ #define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ } \ } #undef n2l #define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) #undef l2n #define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) #undef s2n #define s2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff)) #undef n2s #define n2s(c,l) (l =((IDEA_INT)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((IDEA_INT)(*((c)++))) ) #define E_IDEA(num) \ x1&=0xffff; \ idea_mul(x1,x1,*p,ul); p++; \ x2+= *(p++); \ x3+= *(p++); \ x4&=0xffff; \ idea_mul(x4,x4,*p,ul); p++; \ t0=(x1^x3)&0xffff; \ idea_mul(t0,t0,*p,ul); p++; \ t1=(t0+(x2^x4))&0xffff; \ idea_mul(t1,t1,*p,ul); p++; \ t0+=t1; \ x1^=t1; \ x4^=t0; \ ul=x2^t0; /* do the swap to x3 */ \ x2=x3^t1; \ x3=ul; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/i_cbc.c0000644000000000000000000000600213176625657015506 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "idea_lcl.h" void IDEA_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv, int encrypt) { register unsigned long tin0, tin1; register unsigned long tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register long l = length; unsigned long tin[2]; if (encrypt) { n2l(iv, tout0); n2l(iv, tout1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; l2n(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; l2n(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout1, out); } l2n(tout0, iv); l2n(tout1, iv); } else { n2l(iv, xor0); n2l(iv, xor1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; n2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { n2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; n2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; IDEA_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } l2n(xor0, iv); l2n(xor1, iv); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } void IDEA_encrypt(unsigned long *d, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *key) { register IDEA_INT *p; register unsigned long x1, x2, x3, x4, t0, t1, ul; x2 = d[0]; x1 = (x2 >> 16); x4 = d[1]; x3 = (x4 >> 16); p = &(key->data[0][0]); E_IDEA(0); E_IDEA(1); E_IDEA(2); E_IDEA(3); E_IDEA(4); E_IDEA(5); E_IDEA(6); E_IDEA(7); x1 &= 0xffff; idea_mul(x1, x1, *p, ul); p++; t0 = x3 + *(p++); t1 = x2 + *(p++); x4 &= 0xffff; idea_mul(x4, x4, *p, ul); d[0] = (t0 & 0xffff) | ((x1 & 0xffff) << 16); d[1] = (x4 & 0xffff) | ((t1 & 0xffff) << 16); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/i_ofb64.c0000644000000000000000000000314313176625657015702 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "idea_lcl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void IDEA_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num) { register unsigned long v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned char d[8]; register char *dp; unsigned long ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; int save = 0; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; n2l(iv, v0); n2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; dp = (char *)d; l2n(v0, dp); l2n(v1, dp); while (l--) { if (n == 0) { IDEA_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); dp = (char *)d; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, dp); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, dp); save++; } *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n]; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } if (save) { v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; l2n(v0, iv); l2n(v1, iv); } t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/i_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000145213176625657015514 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "idea_lcl.h" #include const char *IDEA_options(void) { return ("idea(int)"); } void IDEA_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks) { unsigned long l0, l1, d[2]; n2l(in, l0); d[0] = l0; n2l(in, l1); d[1] = l1; IDEA_encrypt(d, ks); l0 = d[0]; l2n(l0, out); l1 = d[1]; l2n(l1, out); l0 = l1 = d[0] = d[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/idea/i_cfb64.c0000644000000000000000000000423013176625657015664 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "idea_lcl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int encrypt) { register unsigned long v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned long ti[2]; unsigned char *iv, c, cc; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; if (encrypt) { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { n2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; n2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; IDEA_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } c = *(in++) ^ iv[n]; *(out++) = c; iv[n] = c; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } else { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { n2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; n2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; IDEA_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } cc = *(in++); c = iv[n]; iv[n] = cc; *(out++) = c ^ cc; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660015243 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/build.info0000644000000000000000000000041213176625660017214 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=wp_dgst.c {- $target{wp_asm_src} -} GENERATE[wp-mmx.s]=asm/wp-mmx.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[wp-mmx.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[wp-x86_64.s]=asm/wp-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c0000644000000000000000000010427513176625660017220 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /** * The Whirlpool hashing function. * *

* References * *

* The Whirlpool algorithm was developed by * Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and * Vincent Rijmen. * * See * P.S.L.M. Barreto, V. Rijmen, * ``The Whirlpool hashing function,'' * NESSIE submission, 2000 (tweaked version, 2001), * * * Based on "@version 3.0 (2003.03.12)" by Paulo S.L.M. Barreto and * Vincent Rijmen. Lookup "reference implementations" on * * * ============================================================================= * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "wp_locl.h" #include typedef unsigned char u8; #if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32) typedef unsigned __int64 u64; #elif defined(__arch64__) typedef unsigned long u64; #else typedef unsigned long long u64; #endif #define ROUNDS 10 #define STRICT_ALIGNMENT #if !defined(PEDANTIC) && (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || \ defined(_M_X64)) /* * Well, formally there're couple of other architectures, which permit * unaligned loads, specifically those not crossing cache lines, IA-64 and * PowerPC... */ # undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT #endif #undef SMALL_REGISTER_BANK #if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) # define SMALL_REGISTER_BANK # if defined(WHIRLPOOL_ASM) # ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT /* * it appears that for elder non-MMX * CPUs this is actually faster! */ # define OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT # endif # define GO_FOR_MMX(ctx,inp,num) do { \ extern unsigned long OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; \ void whirlpool_block_mmx(void *,const void *,size_t); \ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<23))) break; \ whirlpool_block_mmx(ctx->H.c,inp,num); return; \ } while (0) # endif #endif #undef ROTATE #ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(_MSC_VER) # if defined(_WIN64) /* applies to both IA-64 and AMD64 */ # pragma intrinsic(_rotl64) # define ROTATE(a,n) _rotl64((a),n) # endif # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # if defined(L_ENDIAN) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ u64 ret; asm ("rolq %1,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) : "J"(n),"0"(a) : "cc"); ret; }) # elif defined(B_ENDIAN) /* * Most will argue that x86_64 is always little-endian. Well, yes, but * then we have stratus.com who has modified gcc to "emulate" * big-endian on x86. Is there evidence that they [or somebody else] * won't do same for x86_64? Naturally no. And this line is waiting * ready for that brave soul:-) */ # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ u64 ret; asm ("rorq %1,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) : "J"(n),"0"(a) : "cc"); ret; }) # endif # elif defined(__ia64) || defined(__ia64__) # if defined(L_ENDIAN) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ u64 ret; asm ("shrp %0=%1,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) : "r"(a),"M"(64-(n))); ret; }) # elif defined(B_ENDIAN) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ u64 ret; asm ("shrp %0=%1,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) : "r"(a),"M"(n)); ret; }) # endif # endif # endif #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) # if !defined(ROTATE) # if defined(L_ENDIAN) /* little-endians have to rotate left */ # define ROTATE(i,n) ((i)<<(n) ^ (i)>>(64-n)) # elif defined(B_ENDIAN) /* big-endians have to rotate right */ # define ROTATE(i,n) ((i)>>(n) ^ (i)<<(64-n)) # endif # endif # if defined(ROTATE) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) # define STRICT_ALIGNMENT /* ensure smallest table size */ # endif #endif /* * Table size depends on STRICT_ALIGNMENT and whether or not endian- * specific ROTATE macro is defined. If STRICT_ALIGNMENT is not * defined, which is normally the case on x86[_64] CPUs, the table is * 4KB large unconditionally. Otherwise if ROTATE is defined, the * table is 2KB large, and otherwise - 16KB. 2KB table requires a * whole bunch of additional rotations, but I'm willing to "trade," * because 16KB table certainly trashes L1 cache. I wish all CPUs * could handle unaligned load as 4KB table doesn't trash the cache, * nor does it require additional rotations. */ /* * Note that every Cn macro expands as two loads: one byte load and * one quadword load. One can argue that that many single-byte loads * is too excessive, as one could load a quadword and "milk" it for * eight 8-bit values instead. Well, yes, but in order to do so *and* * avoid excessive loads you have to accommodate a handful of 64-bit * values in the register bank and issue a bunch of shifts and mask. * It's a tradeoff: loads vs. shift and mask in big register bank[!]. * On most CPUs eight single-byte loads are faster and I let other * ones to depend on smart compiler to fold byte loads if beneficial. * Hand-coded assembler would be another alternative:-) */ #ifdef STRICT_ALIGNMENT # if defined(ROTATE) # define N 1 # define LL(c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7) c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7 # define C0(K,i) (Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+0]]) # define C1(K,i) ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+1]],8) # define C2(K,i) ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+2]],16) # define C3(K,i) ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+3]],24) # define C4(K,i) ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+4]],32) # define C5(K,i) ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+5]],40) # define C6(K,i) ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+6]],48) # define C7(K,i) ROTATE(Cx.q[K.c[(i)*8+7]],56) # else # define N 8 # define LL(c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7) c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7, \ c7,c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6, \ c6,c7,c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5, \ c5,c6,c7,c0,c1,c2,c3,c4, \ c4,c5,c6,c7,c0,c1,c2,c3, \ c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c0,c1,c2, \ c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c0,c1, \ c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c0 # define C0(K,i) (Cx.q[0+8*K.c[(i)*8+0]]) # define C1(K,i) (Cx.q[1+8*K.c[(i)*8+1]]) # define C2(K,i) (Cx.q[2+8*K.c[(i)*8+2]]) # define C3(K,i) (Cx.q[3+8*K.c[(i)*8+3]]) # define C4(K,i) (Cx.q[4+8*K.c[(i)*8+4]]) # define C5(K,i) (Cx.q[5+8*K.c[(i)*8+5]]) # define C6(K,i) (Cx.q[6+8*K.c[(i)*8+6]]) # define C7(K,i) (Cx.q[7+8*K.c[(i)*8+7]]) # endif #else # define N 2 # define LL(c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7) c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7, \ c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7 # define C0(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+0))[2*K.c[(i)*8+0]]) # define C1(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+7))[2*K.c[(i)*8+1]]) # define C2(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+6))[2*K.c[(i)*8+2]]) # define C3(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+5))[2*K.c[(i)*8+3]]) # define C4(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+4))[2*K.c[(i)*8+4]]) # define C5(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+3))[2*K.c[(i)*8+5]]) # define C6(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+2))[2*K.c[(i)*8+6]]) # define C7(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+1))[2*K.c[(i)*8+7]]) #endif static const union { u8 c[(256 * N + ROUNDS) * sizeof(u64)]; u64 q[(256 * N + ROUNDS)]; } Cx = { { /* Note endian-neutral representation:-) */ LL(0x18, 0x18, 0x60, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x30, 0xd8), LL(0x23, 0x23, 0x8c, 0x23, 0x05, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x26), LL(0xc6, 0xc6, 0x3f, 0xc6, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0x91, 0xb8), LL(0xe8, 0xe8, 0x87, 0xe8, 0x13, 0x6f, 0xcd, 0xfb), LL(0x87, 0x87, 0x26, 0x87, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0x13, 0xcb), LL(0xb8, 0xb8, 0xda, 0xb8, 0xa9, 0x62, 0x6d, 0x11), LL(0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x08, 0x05, 0x02, 0x09), LL(0x4f, 0x4f, 0x21, 0x4f, 0x42, 0x6e, 0x9e, 0x0d), LL(0x36, 0x36, 0xd8, 0x36, 0xad, 0xee, 0x6c, 0x9b), LL(0xa6, 0xa6, 0xa2, 0xa6, 0x59, 0x04, 0x51, 0xff), LL(0xd2, 0xd2, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0xde, 0xbd, 0xb9, 0x0c), LL(0xf5, 0xf5, 0xf3, 0xf5, 0xfb, 0x06, 0xf7, 0x0e), LL(0x79, 0x79, 0xf9, 0x79, 0xef, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x96), LL(0x6f, 0x6f, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x5f, 0xce, 0xde, 0x30), LL(0x91, 0x91, 0x7e, 0x91, 0xfc, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x6d), LL(0x52, 0x52, 0x55, 0x52, 0xaa, 0x07, 0xa4, 0xf8), LL(0x60, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x60, 0x27, 0xfd, 0xc0, 0x47), LL(0xbc, 0xbc, 0xca, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x76, 0x65, 0x35), LL(0x9b, 0x9b, 0x56, 0x9b, 0xac, 0xcd, 0x2b, 0x37), LL(0x8e, 0x8e, 0x02, 0x8e, 0x04, 0x8c, 0x01, 0x8a), LL(0xa3, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x71, 0x15, 0x5b, 0xd2), LL(0x0c, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x60, 0x3c, 0x18, 0x6c), LL(0x7b, 0x7b, 0xf1, 0x7b, 0xff, 0x8a, 0xf6, 0x84), LL(0x35, 0x35, 0xd4, 0x35, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0x6a, 0x80), LL(0x1d, 0x1d, 0x74, 0x1d, 0xe8, 0x69, 0x3a, 0xf5), LL(0xe0, 0xe0, 0xa7, 0xe0, 0x53, 0x47, 0xdd, 0xb3), LL(0xd7, 0xd7, 0x7b, 0xd7, 0xf6, 0xac, 0xb3, 0x21), LL(0xc2, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0xc2, 0x5e, 0xed, 0x99, 0x9c), LL(0x2e, 0x2e, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x6d, 0x96, 0x5c, 0x43), LL(0x4b, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x4b, 0x62, 0x7a, 0x96, 0x29), LL(0xfe, 0xfe, 0xdf, 0xfe, 0xa3, 0x21, 0xe1, 0x5d), LL(0x57, 0x57, 0x41, 0x57, 0x82, 0x16, 0xae, 0xd5), LL(0x15, 0x15, 0x54, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x41, 0x2a, 0xbd), LL(0x77, 0x77, 0xc1, 0x77, 0x9f, 0xb6, 0xee, 0xe8), LL(0x37, 0x37, 0xdc, 0x37, 0xa5, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x92), LL(0xe5, 0xe5, 0xb3, 0xe5, 0x7b, 0x56, 0xd7, 0x9e), LL(0x9f, 0x9f, 0x46, 0x9f, 0x8c, 0xd9, 0x23, 0x13), LL(0xf0, 0xf0, 0xe7, 0xf0, 0xd3, 0x17, 0xfd, 0x23), LL(0x4a, 0x4a, 0x35, 0x4a, 0x6a, 0x7f, 0x94, 0x20), LL(0xda, 0xda, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x9e, 0x95, 0xa9, 0x44), LL(0x58, 0x58, 0x7d, 0x58, 0xfa, 0x25, 0xb0, 0xa2), LL(0xc9, 0xc9, 0x03, 0xc9, 0x06, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xcf), LL(0x29, 0x29, 0xa4, 0x29, 0x55, 0x8d, 0x52, 0x7c), LL(0x0a, 0x0a, 0x28, 0x0a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x14, 0x5a), LL(0xb1, 0xb1, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xe1, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0x50), LL(0xa0, 0xa0, 0xba, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x1a, 0x5d, 0xc9), LL(0x6b, 0x6b, 0xb1, 0x6b, 0x7f, 0xda, 0xd6, 0x14), LL(0x85, 0x85, 0x2e, 0x85, 0x5c, 0xab, 0x17, 0xd9), LL(0xbd, 0xbd, 0xce, 0xbd, 0x81, 0x73, 0x67, 0x3c), LL(0x5d, 0x5d, 0x69, 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x34, 0xba, 0x8f), LL(0x10, 0x10, 0x40, 0x10, 0x80, 0x50, 0x20, 0x90), LL(0xf4, 0xf4, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0x03, 0xf5, 0x07), LL(0xcb, 0xcb, 0x0b, 0xcb, 0x16, 0xc0, 0x8b, 0xdd), LL(0x3e, 0x3e, 0xf8, 0x3e, 0xed, 0xc6, 0x7c, 0xd3), LL(0x05, 0x05, 0x14, 0x05, 0x28, 0x11, 0x0a, 0x2d), LL(0x67, 0x67, 0x81, 0x67, 0x1f, 0xe6, 0xce, 0x78), LL(0xe4, 0xe4, 0xb7, 0xe4, 0x73, 0x53, 0xd5, 0x97), LL(0x27, 0x27, 0x9c, 0x27, 0x25, 0xbb, 0x4e, 0x02), LL(0x41, 0x41, 0x19, 0x41, 0x32, 0x58, 0x82, 0x73), LL(0x8b, 0x8b, 0x16, 0x8b, 0x2c, 0x9d, 0x0b, 0xa7), LL(0xa7, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0x51, 0x01, 0x53, 0xf6), LL(0x7d, 0x7d, 0xe9, 0x7d, 0xcf, 0x94, 0xfa, 0xb2), LL(0x95, 0x95, 0x6e, 0x95, 0xdc, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x49), LL(0xd8, 0xd8, 0x47, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0x9f, 0xad, 0x56), LL(0xfb, 0xfb, 0xcb, 0xfb, 0x8b, 0x30, 0xeb, 0x70), LL(0xee, 0xee, 0x9f, 0xee, 0x23, 0x71, 0xc1, 0xcd), LL(0x7c, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x7c, 0xc7, 0x91, 0xf8, 0xbb), LL(0x66, 0x66, 0x85, 0x66, 0x17, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x71), LL(0xdd, 0xdd, 0x53, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x8e, 0xa7, 0x7b), LL(0x17, 0x17, 0x5c, 0x17, 0xb8, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0xaf), LL(0x47, 0x47, 0x01, 0x47, 0x02, 0x46, 0x8e, 0x45), LL(0x9e, 0x9e, 0x42, 0x9e, 0x84, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x1a), LL(0xca, 0xca, 0x0f, 0xca, 0x1e, 0xc5, 0x89, 0xd4), LL(0x2d, 0x2d, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x75, 0x99, 0x5a, 0x58), LL(0xbf, 0xbf, 0xc6, 0xbf, 0x91, 0x79, 0x63, 0x2e), LL(0x07, 0x07, 0x1c, 0x07, 0x38, 0x1b, 0x0e, 0x3f), LL(0xad, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xad, 0x01, 0x23, 0x47, 0xac), LL(0x5a, 0x5a, 0x75, 0x5a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xb4, 0xb0), LL(0x83, 0x83, 0x36, 0x83, 0x6c, 0xb5, 0x1b, 0xef), LL(0x33, 0x33, 0xcc, 0x33, 0x85, 0xff, 0x66, 0xb6), LL(0x63, 0x63, 0x91, 0x63, 0x3f, 0xf2, 0xc6, 0x5c), LL(0x02, 0x02, 0x08, 0x02, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x12), LL(0xaa, 0xaa, 0x92, 0xaa, 0x39, 0x38, 0x49, 0x93), LL(0x71, 0x71, 0xd9, 0x71, 0xaf, 0xa8, 0xe2, 0xde), LL(0xc8, 0xc8, 0x07, 0xc8, 0x0e, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0xc6), LL(0x19, 0x19, 0x64, 0x19, 0xc8, 0x7d, 0x32, 0xd1), LL(0x49, 0x49, 0x39, 0x49, 0x72, 0x70, 0x92, 0x3b), LL(0xd9, 0xd9, 0x43, 0xd9, 0x86, 0x9a, 0xaf, 0x5f), LL(0xf2, 0xf2, 0xef, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x1d, 0xf9, 0x31), LL(0xe3, 0xe3, 0xab, 0xe3, 0x4b, 0x48, 0xdb, 0xa8), LL(0x5b, 0x5b, 0x71, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x2a, 0xb6, 0xb9), LL(0x88, 0x88, 0x1a, 0x88, 0x34, 0x92, 0x0d, 0xbc), LL(0x9a, 0x9a, 0x52, 0x9a, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0x29, 0x3e), LL(0x26, 0x26, 0x98, 0x26, 0x2d, 0xbe, 0x4c, 0x0b), LL(0x32, 0x32, 0xc8, 0x32, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x64, 0xbf), LL(0xb0, 0xb0, 0xfa, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x4a, 0x7d, 0x59), LL(0xe9, 0xe9, 0x83, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x6a, 0xcf, 0xf2), LL(0x0f, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x0f, 0x78, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x77), LL(0xd5, 0xd5, 0x73, 0xd5, 0xe6, 0xa6, 0xb7, 0x33), LL(0x80, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x74, 0xba, 0x1d, 0xf4), LL(0xbe, 0xbe, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0x99, 0x7c, 0x61, 0x27), LL(0xcd, 0xcd, 0x13, 0xcd, 0x26, 0xde, 0x87, 0xeb), LL(0x34, 0x34, 0xd0, 0x34, 0xbd, 0xe4, 0x68, 0x89), LL(0x48, 0x48, 0x3d, 0x48, 0x7a, 0x75, 0x90, 0x32), LL(0xff, 0xff, 0xdb, 0xff, 0xab, 0x24, 0xe3, 0x54), LL(0x7a, 0x7a, 0xf5, 0x7a, 0xf7, 0x8f, 0xf4, 0x8d), LL(0x90, 0x90, 0x7a, 0x90, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x3d, 0x64), LL(0x5f, 0x5f, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x9d), LL(0x20, 0x20, 0x80, 0x20, 0x1d, 0xa0, 0x40, 0x3d), LL(0x68, 0x68, 0xbd, 0x68, 0x67, 0xd5, 0xd0, 0x0f), LL(0x1a, 0x1a, 0x68, 0x1a, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x34, 0xca), LL(0xae, 0xae, 0x82, 0xae, 0x19, 0x2c, 0x41, 0xb7), LL(0xb4, 0xb4, 0xea, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x5e, 0x75, 0x7d), LL(0x54, 0x54, 0x4d, 0x54, 0x9a, 0x19, 0xa8, 0xce), LL(0x93, 0x93, 0x76, 0x93, 0xec, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0x7f), LL(0x22, 0x22, 0x88, 0x22, 0x0d, 0xaa, 0x44, 0x2f), LL(0x64, 0x64, 0x8d, 0x64, 0x07, 0xe9, 0xc8, 0x63), LL(0xf1, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0x12, 0xff, 0x2a), LL(0x73, 0x73, 0xd1, 0x73, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe6, 0xcc), LL(0x12, 0x12, 0x48, 0x12, 0x90, 0x5a, 0x24, 0x82), LL(0x40, 0x40, 0x1d, 0x40, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x7a), LL(0x08, 0x08, 0x20, 0x08, 0x40, 0x28, 0x10, 0x48), LL(0xc3, 0xc3, 0x2b, 0xc3, 0x56, 0xe8, 0x9b, 0x95), LL(0xec, 0xec, 0x97, 0xec, 0x33, 0x7b, 0xc5, 0xdf), LL(0xdb, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x90, 0xab, 0x4d), LL(0xa1, 0xa1, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0x61, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0xc0), LL(0x8d, 0x8d, 0x0e, 0x8d, 0x1c, 0x83, 0x07, 0x91), LL(0x3d, 0x3d, 0xf4, 0x3d, 0xf5, 0xc9, 0x7a, 0xc8), LL(0x97, 0x97, 0x66, 0x97, 0xcc, 0xf1, 0x33, 0x5b), LL(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), LL(0xcf, 0xcf, 0x1b, 0xcf, 0x36, 0xd4, 0x83, 0xf9), LL(0x2b, 0x2b, 0xac, 0x2b, 0x45, 0x87, 0x56, 0x6e), LL(0x76, 0x76, 0xc5, 0x76, 0x97, 0xb3, 0xec, 0xe1), LL(0x82, 0x82, 0x32, 0x82, 0x64, 0xb0, 0x19, 0xe6), LL(0xd6, 0xd6, 0x7f, 0xd6, 0xfe, 0xa9, 0xb1, 0x28), LL(0x1b, 0x1b, 0x6c, 0x1b, 0xd8, 0x77, 0x36, 0xc3), LL(0xb5, 0xb5, 0xee, 0xb5, 0xc1, 0x5b, 0x77, 0x74), LL(0xaf, 0xaf, 0x86, 0xaf, 0x11, 0x29, 0x43, 0xbe), LL(0x6a, 0x6a, 0xb5, 0x6a, 0x77, 0xdf, 0xd4, 0x1d), LL(0x50, 0x50, 0x5d, 0x50, 0xba, 0x0d, 0xa0, 0xea), LL(0x45, 0x45, 0x09, 0x45, 0x12, 0x4c, 0x8a, 0x57), LL(0xf3, 0xf3, 0xeb, 0xf3, 0xcb, 0x18, 0xfb, 0x38), LL(0x30, 0x30, 0xc0, 0x30, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0x60, 0xad), LL(0xef, 0xef, 0x9b, 0xef, 0x2b, 0x74, 0xc3, 0xc4), LL(0x3f, 0x3f, 0xfc, 0x3f, 0xe5, 0xc3, 0x7e, 0xda), LL(0x55, 0x55, 0x49, 0x55, 0x92, 0x1c, 0xaa, 0xc7), LL(0xa2, 0xa2, 0xb2, 0xa2, 0x79, 0x10, 0x59, 0xdb), LL(0xea, 0xea, 0x8f, 0xea, 0x03, 0x65, 0xc9, 0xe9), LL(0x65, 0x65, 0x89, 0x65, 0x0f, 0xec, 0xca, 0x6a), LL(0xba, 0xba, 0xd2, 0xba, 0xb9, 0x68, 0x69, 0x03), LL(0x2f, 0x2f, 0xbc, 0x2f, 0x65, 0x93, 0x5e, 0x4a), LL(0xc0, 0xc0, 0x27, 0xc0, 0x4e, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0x8e), LL(0xde, 0xde, 0x5f, 0xde, 0xbe, 0x81, 0xa1, 0x60), LL(0x1c, 0x1c, 0x70, 0x1c, 0xe0, 0x6c, 0x38, 0xfc), LL(0xfd, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x46), LL(0x4d, 0x4d, 0x29, 0x4d, 0x52, 0x64, 0x9a, 0x1f), LL(0x92, 0x92, 0x72, 0x92, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0x39, 0x76), LL(0x75, 0x75, 0xc9, 0x75, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xea, 0xfa), LL(0x06, 0x06, 0x18, 0x06, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x0c, 0x36), LL(0x8a, 0x8a, 0x12, 0x8a, 0x24, 0x98, 0x09, 0xae), LL(0xb2, 0xb2, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x40, 0x79, 0x4b), LL(0xe6, 0xe6, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x63, 0x59, 0xd1, 0x85), LL(0x0e, 0x0e, 0x38, 0x0e, 0x70, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x7e), LL(0x1f, 0x1f, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xf8, 0x63, 0x3e, 0xe7), LL(0x62, 0x62, 0x95, 0x62, 0x37, 0xf7, 0xc4, 0x55), LL(0xd4, 0xd4, 0x77, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xa3, 0xb5, 0x3a), LL(0xa8, 0xa8, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x29, 0x32, 0x4d, 0x81), LL(0x96, 0x96, 0x62, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xf4, 0x31, 0x52), LL(0xf9, 0xf9, 0xc3, 0xf9, 0x9b, 0x3a, 0xef, 0x62), LL(0xc5, 0xc5, 0x33, 0xc5, 0x66, 0xf6, 0x97, 0xa3), LL(0x25, 0x25, 0x94, 0x25, 0x35, 0xb1, 0x4a, 0x10), LL(0x59, 0x59, 0x79, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x20, 0xb2, 0xab), LL(0x84, 0x84, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x54, 0xae, 0x15, 0xd0), LL(0x72, 0x72, 0xd5, 0x72, 0xb7, 0xa7, 0xe4, 0xc5), LL(0x39, 0x39, 0xe4, 0x39, 0xd5, 0xdd, 0x72, 0xec), LL(0x4c, 0x4c, 0x2d, 0x4c, 0x5a, 0x61, 0x98, 0x16), LL(0x5e, 0x5e, 0x65, 0x5e, 0xca, 0x3b, 0xbc, 0x94), LL(0x78, 0x78, 0xfd, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x85, 0xf0, 0x9f), LL(0x38, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x38, 0xdd, 0xd8, 0x70, 0xe5), LL(0x8c, 0x8c, 0x0a, 0x8c, 0x14, 0x86, 0x05, 0x98), LL(0xd1, 0xd1, 0x63, 0xd1, 0xc6, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0x17), LL(0xa5, 0xa5, 0xae, 0xa5, 0x41, 0x0b, 0x57, 0xe4), LL(0xe2, 0xe2, 0xaf, 0xe2, 0x43, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0xa1), LL(0x61, 0x61, 0x99, 0x61, 0x2f, 0xf8, 0xc2, 0x4e), LL(0xb3, 0xb3, 0xf6, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x45, 0x7b, 0x42), LL(0x21, 0x21, 0x84, 0x21, 0x15, 0xa5, 0x42, 0x34), LL(0x9c, 0x9c, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0x94, 0xd6, 0x25, 0x08), LL(0x1e, 0x1e, 0x78, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x66, 0x3c, 0xee), LL(0x43, 0x43, 0x11, 0x43, 0x22, 0x52, 0x86, 0x61), LL(0xc7, 0xc7, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x76, 0xfc, 0x93, 0xb1), LL(0xfc, 0xfc, 0xd7, 0xfc, 0xb3, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0x4f), LL(0x04, 0x04, 0x10, 0x04, 0x20, 0x14, 0x08, 0x24), LL(0x51, 0x51, 0x59, 0x51, 0xb2, 0x08, 0xa2, 0xe3), LL(0x99, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x99, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0x2f, 0x25), LL(0x6d, 0x6d, 0xa9, 0x6d, 0x4f, 0xc4, 0xda, 0x22), LL(0x0d, 0x0d, 0x34, 0x0d, 0x68, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x65), LL(0xfa, 0xfa, 0xcf, 0xfa, 0x83, 0x35, 0xe9, 0x79), LL(0xdf, 0xdf, 0x5b, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x69), LL(0x7e, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xfc, 0xa9), LL(0x24, 0x24, 0x90, 0x24, 0x3d, 0xb4, 0x48, 0x19), LL(0x3b, 0x3b, 0xec, 0x3b, 0xc5, 0xd7, 0x76, 0xfe), LL(0xab, 0xab, 0x96, 0xab, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0x9a), LL(0xce, 0xce, 0x1f, 0xce, 0x3e, 0xd1, 0x81, 0xf0), LL(0x11, 0x11, 0x44, 0x11, 0x88, 0x55, 0x22, 0x99), LL(0x8f, 0x8f, 0x06, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0x89, 0x03, 0x83), LL(0x4e, 0x4e, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x4a, 0x6b, 0x9c, 0x04), LL(0xb7, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0xb7, 0xd1, 0x51, 0x73, 0x66), LL(0xeb, 0xeb, 0x8b, 0xeb, 0x0b, 0x60, 0xcb, 0xe0), LL(0x3c, 0x3c, 0xf0, 0x3c, 0xfd, 0xcc, 0x78, 0xc1), LL(0x81, 0x81, 0x3e, 0x81, 0x7c, 0xbf, 0x1f, 0xfd), LL(0x94, 0x94, 0x6a, 0x94, 0xd4, 0xfe, 0x35, 0x40), LL(0xf7, 0xf7, 0xfb, 0xf7, 0xeb, 0x0c, 0xf3, 0x1c), LL(0xb9, 0xb9, 0xde, 0xb9, 0xa1, 0x67, 0x6f, 0x18), LL(0x13, 0x13, 0x4c, 0x13, 0x98, 0x5f, 0x26, 0x8b), LL(0x2c, 0x2c, 0xb0, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x9c, 0x58, 0x51), LL(0xd3, 0xd3, 0x6b, 0xd3, 0xd6, 0xb8, 0xbb, 0x05), LL(0xe7, 0xe7, 0xbb, 0xe7, 0x6b, 0x5c, 0xd3, 0x8c), LL(0x6e, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0x6e, 0x57, 0xcb, 0xdc, 0x39), LL(0xc4, 0xc4, 0x37, 0xc4, 0x6e, 0xf3, 0x95, 0xaa), LL(0x03, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x03, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x1b), LL(0x56, 0x56, 0x45, 0x56, 0x8a, 0x13, 0xac, 0xdc), LL(0x44, 0x44, 0x0d, 0x44, 0x1a, 0x49, 0x88, 0x5e), LL(0x7f, 0x7f, 0xe1, 0x7f, 0xdf, 0x9e, 0xfe, 0xa0), LL(0xa9, 0xa9, 0x9e, 0xa9, 0x21, 0x37, 0x4f, 0x88), LL(0x2a, 0x2a, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x54, 0x67), LL(0xbb, 0xbb, 0xd6, 0xbb, 0xb1, 0x6d, 0x6b, 0x0a), LL(0xc1, 0xc1, 0x23, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xe2, 0x9f, 0x87), LL(0x53, 0x53, 0x51, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x02, 0xa6, 0xf1), LL(0xdc, 0xdc, 0x57, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x8b, 0xa5, 0x72), LL(0x0b, 0x0b, 0x2c, 0x0b, 0x58, 0x27, 0x16, 0x53), LL(0x9d, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x9d, 0x9c, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x01), LL(0x6c, 0x6c, 0xad, 0x6c, 0x47, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x2b), LL(0x31, 0x31, 0xc4, 0x31, 0x95, 0xf5, 0x62, 0xa4), LL(0x74, 0x74, 0xcd, 0x74, 0x87, 0xb9, 0xe8, 0xf3), LL(0xf6, 0xf6, 0xff, 0xf6, 0xe3, 0x09, 0xf1, 0x15), LL(0x46, 0x46, 0x05, 0x46, 0x0a, 0x43, 0x8c, 0x4c), LL(0xac, 0xac, 0x8a, 0xac, 0x09, 0x26, 0x45, 0xa5), LL(0x89, 0x89, 0x1e, 0x89, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x0f, 0xb5), LL(0x14, 0x14, 0x50, 0x14, 0xa0, 0x44, 0x28, 0xb4), LL(0xe1, 0xe1, 0xa3, 0xe1, 0x5b, 0x42, 0xdf, 0xba), LL(0x16, 0x16, 0x58, 0x16, 0xb0, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0xa6), LL(0x3a, 0x3a, 0xe8, 0x3a, 0xcd, 0xd2, 0x74, 0xf7), LL(0x69, 0x69, 0xb9, 0x69, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xd2, 0x06), LL(0x09, 0x09, 0x24, 0x09, 0x48, 0x2d, 0x12, 0x41), LL(0x70, 0x70, 0xdd, 0x70, 0xa7, 0xad, 0xe0, 0xd7), LL(0xb6, 0xb6, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0x54, 0x71, 0x6f), LL(0xd0, 0xd0, 0x67, 0xd0, 0xce, 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x1e), LL(0xed, 0xed, 0x93, 0xed, 0x3b, 0x7e, 0xc7, 0xd6), LL(0xcc, 0xcc, 0x17, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0x85, 0xe2), LL(0x42, 0x42, 0x15, 0x42, 0x2a, 0x57, 0x84, 0x68), LL(0x98, 0x98, 0x5a, 0x98, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0x2d, 0x2c), LL(0xa4, 0xa4, 0xaa, 0xa4, 0x49, 0x0e, 0x55, 0xed), LL(0x28, 0x28, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x5d, 0x88, 0x50, 0x75), LL(0x5c, 0x5c, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0xda, 0x31, 0xb8, 0x86), LL(0xf8, 0xf8, 0xc7, 0xf8, 0x93, 0x3f, 0xed, 0x6b), LL(0x86, 0x86, 0x22, 0x86, 0x44, 0xa4, 0x11, 0xc2), #define RC (&(Cx.q[256*N])) 0x18, 0x23, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0x87, 0xb8, 0x01, 0x4f, /* rc[ROUNDS] */ 0x36, 0xa6, 0xd2, 0xf5, 0x79, 0x6f, 0x91, 0x52, 0x60, 0xbc, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xa3, 0x0c, 0x7b, 0x35, 0x1d, 0xe0, 0xd7, 0xc2, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xfe, 0x57, 0x15, 0x77, 0x37, 0xe5, 0x9f, 0xf0, 0x4a, 0xda, 0x58, 0xc9, 0x29, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0x6b, 0x85, 0xbd, 0x5d, 0x10, 0xf4, 0xcb, 0x3e, 0x05, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x27, 0x41, 0x8b, 0xa7, 0x7d, 0x95, 0xd8, 0xfb, 0xee, 0x7c, 0x66, 0xdd, 0x17, 0x47, 0x9e, 0xca, 0x2d, 0xbf, 0x07, 0xad, 0x5a, 0x83, 0x33 } }; void whirlpool_block(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *ctx, const void *inp, size_t n) { int r; const u8 *p = inp; union { u64 q[8]; u8 c[64]; } S, K, *H = (void *)ctx->H.q; #ifdef GO_FOR_MMX GO_FOR_MMX(ctx, inp, n); #endif do { #ifdef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT u64 L[8]; int i; for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) S.c[i] = (K.c[i] = H->c[i]) ^ p[i]; for (r = 0; r < ROUNDS; r++) { for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { L[i] = i ? 0 : RC[r]; L[i] ^= C0(K, i) ^ C1(K, (i - 1) & 7) ^ C2(K, (i - 2) & 7) ^ C3(K, (i - 3) & 7) ^ C4(K, (i - 4) & 7) ^ C5(K, (i - 5) & 7) ^ C6(K, (i - 6) & 7) ^ C7(K, (i - 7) & 7); } memcpy(K.q, L, 64); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { L[i] ^= C0(S, i) ^ C1(S, (i - 1) & 7) ^ C2(S, (i - 2) & 7) ^ C3(S, (i - 3) & 7) ^ C4(S, (i - 4) & 7) ^ C5(S, (i - 5) & 7) ^ C6(S, (i - 6) & 7) ^ C7(S, (i - 7) & 7); } memcpy(S.q, L, 64); } for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) H->c[i] ^= S.c[i] ^ p[i]; #else u64 L0, L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7; # ifdef STRICT_ALIGNMENT if ((size_t)p & 7) { memcpy(S.c, p, 64); S.q[0] ^= (K.q[0] = H->q[0]); S.q[1] ^= (K.q[1] = H->q[1]); S.q[2] ^= (K.q[2] = H->q[2]); S.q[3] ^= (K.q[3] = H->q[3]); S.q[4] ^= (K.q[4] = H->q[4]); S.q[5] ^= (K.q[5] = H->q[5]); S.q[6] ^= (K.q[6] = H->q[6]); S.q[7] ^= (K.q[7] = H->q[7]); } else # endif { const u64 *pa = (const u64 *)p; S.q[0] = (K.q[0] = H->q[0]) ^ pa[0]; S.q[1] = (K.q[1] = H->q[1]) ^ pa[1]; S.q[2] = (K.q[2] = H->q[2]) ^ pa[2]; S.q[3] = (K.q[3] = H->q[3]) ^ pa[3]; S.q[4] = (K.q[4] = H->q[4]) ^ pa[4]; S.q[5] = (K.q[5] = H->q[5]) ^ pa[5]; S.q[6] = (K.q[6] = H->q[6]) ^ pa[6]; S.q[7] = (K.q[7] = H->q[7]) ^ pa[7]; } for (r = 0; r < ROUNDS; r++) { # ifdef SMALL_REGISTER_BANK L0 = C0(K, 0) ^ C1(K, 7) ^ C2(K, 6) ^ C3(K, 5) ^ C4(K, 4) ^ C5(K, 3) ^ C6(K, 2) ^ C7(K, 1) ^ RC[r]; L1 = C0(K, 1) ^ C1(K, 0) ^ C2(K, 7) ^ C3(K, 6) ^ C4(K, 5) ^ C5(K, 4) ^ C6(K, 3) ^ C7(K, 2); L2 = C0(K, 2) ^ C1(K, 1) ^ C2(K, 0) ^ C3(K, 7) ^ C4(K, 6) ^ C5(K, 5) ^ C6(K, 4) ^ C7(K, 3); L3 = C0(K, 3) ^ C1(K, 2) ^ C2(K, 1) ^ C3(K, 0) ^ C4(K, 7) ^ C5(K, 6) ^ C6(K, 5) ^ C7(K, 4); L4 = C0(K, 4) ^ C1(K, 3) ^ C2(K, 2) ^ C3(K, 1) ^ C4(K, 0) ^ C5(K, 7) ^ C6(K, 6) ^ C7(K, 5); L5 = C0(K, 5) ^ C1(K, 4) ^ C2(K, 3) ^ C3(K, 2) ^ C4(K, 1) ^ C5(K, 0) ^ C6(K, 7) ^ C7(K, 6); L6 = C0(K, 6) ^ C1(K, 5) ^ C2(K, 4) ^ C3(K, 3) ^ C4(K, 2) ^ C5(K, 1) ^ C6(K, 0) ^ C7(K, 7); L7 = C0(K, 7) ^ C1(K, 6) ^ C2(K, 5) ^ C3(K, 4) ^ C4(K, 3) ^ C5(K, 2) ^ C6(K, 1) ^ C7(K, 0); K.q[0] = L0; K.q[1] = L1; K.q[2] = L2; K.q[3] = L3; K.q[4] = L4; K.q[5] = L5; K.q[6] = L6; K.q[7] = L7; L0 ^= C0(S, 0) ^ C1(S, 7) ^ C2(S, 6) ^ C3(S, 5) ^ C4(S, 4) ^ C5(S, 3) ^ C6(S, 2) ^ C7(S, 1); L1 ^= C0(S, 1) ^ C1(S, 0) ^ C2(S, 7) ^ C3(S, 6) ^ C4(S, 5) ^ C5(S, 4) ^ C6(S, 3) ^ C7(S, 2); L2 ^= C0(S, 2) ^ C1(S, 1) ^ C2(S, 0) ^ C3(S, 7) ^ C4(S, 6) ^ C5(S, 5) ^ C6(S, 4) ^ C7(S, 3); L3 ^= C0(S, 3) ^ C1(S, 2) ^ C2(S, 1) ^ C3(S, 0) ^ C4(S, 7) ^ C5(S, 6) ^ C6(S, 5) ^ C7(S, 4); L4 ^= C0(S, 4) ^ C1(S, 3) ^ C2(S, 2) ^ C3(S, 1) ^ C4(S, 0) ^ C5(S, 7) ^ C6(S, 6) ^ C7(S, 5); L5 ^= C0(S, 5) ^ C1(S, 4) ^ C2(S, 3) ^ C3(S, 2) ^ C4(S, 1) ^ C5(S, 0) ^ C6(S, 7) ^ C7(S, 6); L6 ^= C0(S, 6) ^ C1(S, 5) ^ C2(S, 4) ^ C3(S, 3) ^ C4(S, 2) ^ C5(S, 1) ^ C6(S, 0) ^ C7(S, 7); L7 ^= C0(S, 7) ^ C1(S, 6) ^ C2(S, 5) ^ C3(S, 4) ^ C4(S, 3) ^ C5(S, 2) ^ C6(S, 1) ^ C7(S, 0); S.q[0] = L0; S.q[1] = L1; S.q[2] = L2; S.q[3] = L3; S.q[4] = L4; S.q[5] = L5; S.q[6] = L6; S.q[7] = L7; # else L0 = C0(K, 0); L1 = C1(K, 0); L2 = C2(K, 0); L3 = C3(K, 0); L4 = C4(K, 0); L5 = C5(K, 0); L6 = C6(K, 0); L7 = C7(K, 0); L0 ^= RC[r]; L1 ^= C0(K, 1); L2 ^= C1(K, 1); L3 ^= C2(K, 1); L4 ^= C3(K, 1); L5 ^= C4(K, 1); L6 ^= C5(K, 1); L7 ^= C6(K, 1); L0 ^= C7(K, 1); L2 ^= C0(K, 2); L3 ^= C1(K, 2); L4 ^= C2(K, 2); L5 ^= C3(K, 2); L6 ^= C4(K, 2); L7 ^= C5(K, 2); L0 ^= C6(K, 2); L1 ^= C7(K, 2); L3 ^= C0(K, 3); L4 ^= C1(K, 3); L5 ^= C2(K, 3); L6 ^= C3(K, 3); L7 ^= C4(K, 3); L0 ^= C5(K, 3); L1 ^= C6(K, 3); L2 ^= C7(K, 3); L4 ^= C0(K, 4); L5 ^= C1(K, 4); L6 ^= C2(K, 4); L7 ^= C3(K, 4); L0 ^= C4(K, 4); L1 ^= C5(K, 4); L2 ^= C6(K, 4); L3 ^= C7(K, 4); L5 ^= C0(K, 5); L6 ^= C1(K, 5); L7 ^= C2(K, 5); L0 ^= C3(K, 5); L1 ^= C4(K, 5); L2 ^= C5(K, 5); L3 ^= C6(K, 5); L4 ^= C7(K, 5); L6 ^= C0(K, 6); L7 ^= C1(K, 6); L0 ^= C2(K, 6); L1 ^= C3(K, 6); L2 ^= C4(K, 6); L3 ^= C5(K, 6); L4 ^= C6(K, 6); L5 ^= C7(K, 6); L7 ^= C0(K, 7); L0 ^= C1(K, 7); L1 ^= C2(K, 7); L2 ^= C3(K, 7); L3 ^= C4(K, 7); L4 ^= C5(K, 7); L5 ^= C6(K, 7); L6 ^= C7(K, 7); K.q[0] = L0; K.q[1] = L1; K.q[2] = L2; K.q[3] = L3; K.q[4] = L4; K.q[5] = L5; K.q[6] = L6; K.q[7] = L7; L0 ^= C0(S, 0); L1 ^= C1(S, 0); L2 ^= C2(S, 0); L3 ^= C3(S, 0); L4 ^= C4(S, 0); L5 ^= C5(S, 0); L6 ^= C6(S, 0); L7 ^= C7(S, 0); L1 ^= C0(S, 1); L2 ^= C1(S, 1); L3 ^= C2(S, 1); L4 ^= C3(S, 1); L5 ^= C4(S, 1); L6 ^= C5(S, 1); L7 ^= C6(S, 1); L0 ^= C7(S, 1); L2 ^= C0(S, 2); L3 ^= C1(S, 2); L4 ^= C2(S, 2); L5 ^= C3(S, 2); L6 ^= C4(S, 2); L7 ^= C5(S, 2); L0 ^= C6(S, 2); L1 ^= C7(S, 2); L3 ^= C0(S, 3); L4 ^= C1(S, 3); L5 ^= C2(S, 3); L6 ^= C3(S, 3); L7 ^= C4(S, 3); L0 ^= C5(S, 3); L1 ^= C6(S, 3); L2 ^= C7(S, 3); L4 ^= C0(S, 4); L5 ^= C1(S, 4); L6 ^= C2(S, 4); L7 ^= C3(S, 4); L0 ^= C4(S, 4); L1 ^= C5(S, 4); L2 ^= C6(S, 4); L3 ^= C7(S, 4); L5 ^= C0(S, 5); L6 ^= C1(S, 5); L7 ^= C2(S, 5); L0 ^= C3(S, 5); L1 ^= C4(S, 5); L2 ^= C5(S, 5); L3 ^= C6(S, 5); L4 ^= C7(S, 5); L6 ^= C0(S, 6); L7 ^= C1(S, 6); L0 ^= C2(S, 6); L1 ^= C3(S, 6); L2 ^= C4(S, 6); L3 ^= C5(S, 6); L4 ^= C6(S, 6); L5 ^= C7(S, 6); L7 ^= C0(S, 7); L0 ^= C1(S, 7); L1 ^= C2(S, 7); L2 ^= C3(S, 7); L3 ^= C4(S, 7); L4 ^= C5(S, 7); L5 ^= C6(S, 7); L6 ^= C7(S, 7); S.q[0] = L0; S.q[1] = L1; S.q[2] = L2; S.q[3] = L3; S.q[4] = L4; S.q[5] = L5; S.q[6] = L6; S.q[7] = L7; # endif } # ifdef STRICT_ALIGNMENT if ((size_t)p & 7) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) H->c[i] ^= S.c[i] ^ p[i]; } else # endif { const u64 *pa = (const u64 *)p; H->q[0] ^= S.q[0] ^ pa[0]; H->q[1] ^= S.q[1] ^ pa[1]; H->q[2] ^= S.q[2] ^ pa[2]; H->q[3] ^= S.q[3] ^ pa[3]; H->q[4] ^= S.q[4] ^ pa[4]; H->q[5] ^= S.q[5] ^ pa[5]; H->q[6] ^= S.q[6] ^ pa[6]; H->q[7] ^= S.q[7] ^ pa[7]; } #endif p += 64; } while (--n); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660016023 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000005101113176625660017740 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary # forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license. # ==================================================================== # # whirlpool_block for x86_64. # # 2500 cycles per 64-byte input block on AMD64, which is *identical* # to 32-bit MMX version executed on same CPU. So why did I bother? # Well, it's faster than gcc 3.3.2 generated code by over 50%, and # over 80% faster than PathScale 1.4, an "ambitious" commercial # compiler. Furthermore it surpasses gcc 3.4.3 by 170% and Sun Studio # 10 - by 360%[!]... What is it with x86_64 compilers? It's not the # first example when they fail to generate more optimal code, when # I believe they had *all* chances to... # # Note that register and stack frame layout are virtually identical # to 32-bit MMX version, except that %r8-15 are used instead of # %mm0-8. You can even notice that K[i] and S[i] are loaded to # %eax:%ebx as pair of 32-bit values and not as single 64-bit one. # This is done in order to avoid 64-bit shift penalties on Intel # EM64T core. Speaking of which! I bet it's possible to improve # Opteron performance by compressing the table to 2KB and replacing # unaligned references with complementary rotations [which would # incidentally replace lea instructions], but it would definitely # just "kill" EM64T, because it has only 1 shifter/rotator [against # 3 on Opteron] and which is *unacceptably* slow with 64-bit # operand. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; sub L() { $code.=".byte ".join(',',@_)."\n"; } sub LL(){ $code.=".byte ".join(',',@_).",".join(',',@_)."\n"; } @mm=("%r8","%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15"); $func="whirlpool_block"; $table=".Ltable"; $code=<<___; .text .globl $func .type $func,\@function,3 .align 16 $func: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 sub \$128+40,%rsp and \$-64,%rsp lea 128(%rsp),%r10 mov %rdi,0(%r10) # save parameter block mov %rsi,8(%r10) mov %rdx,16(%r10) mov %r11,32(%r10) # saved stack pointer .Lprologue: mov %r10,%rbx lea $table(%rip),%rbp xor %rcx,%rcx xor %rdx,%rdx ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov $i*8(%rdi),@mm[$i]\n"; } # L=H $code.=".Louterloop:\n"; for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],$i*8(%rsp)\n"; } # K=L for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="xor $i*8(%rsi),@mm[$i]\n"; } # L^=inp for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],64+$i*8(%rsp)\n"; } # S=L $code.=<<___; xor %rsi,%rsi mov %rsi,24(%rbx) # zero round counter jmp .Lround .align 16 .Lround: mov 4096(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[0] # rc[r] mov 0(%rsp),%eax mov 4(%rsp),%ebx movz %al,%ecx movz %ah,%edx ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { my $func = ($i==0)? "mov" : "xor"; $code.=<<___; shr \$16,%eax lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %al,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %ah,%edx xor 0(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[0] $func 7(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[1] mov $i*8+8(%rsp),%eax # ($i+1)*8 lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %bl,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %bh,%edx $func 6(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[2] $func 5(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[3] shr \$16,%ebx lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %bl,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %bh,%edx $func 4(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[4] $func 3(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[5] mov $i*8+8+4(%rsp),%ebx # ($i+1)*8+4 lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %al,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %ah,%edx $func 2(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[6] $func 1(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[7] ___ push(@mm,shift(@mm)); } for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],$i*8(%rsp)\n"; } # K=L for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; shr \$16,%eax lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %al,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %ah,%edx xor 0(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[0] xor 7(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[1] `"mov 64+$i*8+8(%rsp),%eax" if($i<7);` # 64+($i+1)*8 lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %bl,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %bh,%edx xor 6(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[2] xor 5(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[3] shr \$16,%ebx lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %bl,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %bh,%edx xor 4(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[4] xor 3(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[5] `"mov 64+$i*8+8+4(%rsp),%ebx" if($i<7);` # 64+($i+1)*8+4 lea (%rcx,%rcx),%rsi movz %al,%ecx lea (%rdx,%rdx),%rdi movz %ah,%edx xor 2(%rbp,%rsi,8),@mm[6] xor 1(%rbp,%rdi,8),@mm[7] ___ push(@mm,shift(@mm)); } $code.=<<___; lea 128(%rsp),%rbx mov 24(%rbx),%rsi # pull round counter add \$1,%rsi cmp \$10,%rsi je .Lroundsdone mov %rsi,24(%rbx) # update round counter ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],64+$i*8(%rsp)\n"; } # S=L $code.=<<___; jmp .Lround .align 16 .Lroundsdone: mov 0(%rbx),%rdi # reload argument block mov 8(%rbx),%rsi mov 16(%rbx),%rax ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="xor $i*8(%rsi),@mm[$i]\n"; } # L^=inp for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="xor $i*8(%rdi),@mm[$i]\n"; } # L^=H for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.="mov @mm[$i],$i*8(%rdi)\n"; } # H=L $code.=<<___; lea 64(%rsi),%rsi # inp+=64 sub \$1,%rax # num-- jz .Lalldone mov %rsi,8(%rbx) # update parameter block mov %rax,16(%rbx) jmp .Louterloop .Lalldone: mov 32(%rbx),%rsi # restore saved pointer mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue: ret .size $func,.-$func .align 64 .type $table,\@object $table: ___ &LL(0x18,0x18,0x60,0x18,0xc0,0x78,0x30,0xd8); &LL(0x23,0x23,0x8c,0x23,0x05,0xaf,0x46,0x26); &LL(0xc6,0xc6,0x3f,0xc6,0x7e,0xf9,0x91,0xb8); &LL(0xe8,0xe8,0x87,0xe8,0x13,0x6f,0xcd,0xfb); &LL(0x87,0x87,0x26,0x87,0x4c,0xa1,0x13,0xcb); &LL(0xb8,0xb8,0xda,0xb8,0xa9,0x62,0x6d,0x11); &LL(0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x08,0x05,0x02,0x09); &LL(0x4f,0x4f,0x21,0x4f,0x42,0x6e,0x9e,0x0d); &LL(0x36,0x36,0xd8,0x36,0xad,0xee,0x6c,0x9b); &LL(0xa6,0xa6,0xa2,0xa6,0x59,0x04,0x51,0xff); &LL(0xd2,0xd2,0x6f,0xd2,0xde,0xbd,0xb9,0x0c); &LL(0xf5,0xf5,0xf3,0xf5,0xfb,0x06,0xf7,0x0e); &LL(0x79,0x79,0xf9,0x79,0xef,0x80,0xf2,0x96); &LL(0x6f,0x6f,0xa1,0x6f,0x5f,0xce,0xde,0x30); &LL(0x91,0x91,0x7e,0x91,0xfc,0xef,0x3f,0x6d); &LL(0x52,0x52,0x55,0x52,0xaa,0x07,0xa4,0xf8); &LL(0x60,0x60,0x9d,0x60,0x27,0xfd,0xc0,0x47); &LL(0xbc,0xbc,0xca,0xbc,0x89,0x76,0x65,0x35); &LL(0x9b,0x9b,0x56,0x9b,0xac,0xcd,0x2b,0x37); &LL(0x8e,0x8e,0x02,0x8e,0x04,0x8c,0x01,0x8a); &LL(0xa3,0xa3,0xb6,0xa3,0x71,0x15,0x5b,0xd2); &LL(0x0c,0x0c,0x30,0x0c,0x60,0x3c,0x18,0x6c); &LL(0x7b,0x7b,0xf1,0x7b,0xff,0x8a,0xf6,0x84); &LL(0x35,0x35,0xd4,0x35,0xb5,0xe1,0x6a,0x80); &LL(0x1d,0x1d,0x74,0x1d,0xe8,0x69,0x3a,0xf5); &LL(0xe0,0xe0,0xa7,0xe0,0x53,0x47,0xdd,0xb3); &LL(0xd7,0xd7,0x7b,0xd7,0xf6,0xac,0xb3,0x21); &LL(0xc2,0xc2,0x2f,0xc2,0x5e,0xed,0x99,0x9c); &LL(0x2e,0x2e,0xb8,0x2e,0x6d,0x96,0x5c,0x43); &LL(0x4b,0x4b,0x31,0x4b,0x62,0x7a,0x96,0x29); &LL(0xfe,0xfe,0xdf,0xfe,0xa3,0x21,0xe1,0x5d); &LL(0x57,0x57,0x41,0x57,0x82,0x16,0xae,0xd5); &LL(0x15,0x15,0x54,0x15,0xa8,0x41,0x2a,0xbd); &LL(0x77,0x77,0xc1,0x77,0x9f,0xb6,0xee,0xe8); &LL(0x37,0x37,0xdc,0x37,0xa5,0xeb,0x6e,0x92); &LL(0xe5,0xe5,0xb3,0xe5,0x7b,0x56,0xd7,0x9e); &LL(0x9f,0x9f,0x46,0x9f,0x8c,0xd9,0x23,0x13); &LL(0xf0,0xf0,0xe7,0xf0,0xd3,0x17,0xfd,0x23); &LL(0x4a,0x4a,0x35,0x4a,0x6a,0x7f,0x94,0x20); &LL(0xda,0xda,0x4f,0xda,0x9e,0x95,0xa9,0x44); &LL(0x58,0x58,0x7d,0x58,0xfa,0x25,0xb0,0xa2); &LL(0xc9,0xc9,0x03,0xc9,0x06,0xca,0x8f,0xcf); &LL(0x29,0x29,0xa4,0x29,0x55,0x8d,0x52,0x7c); &LL(0x0a,0x0a,0x28,0x0a,0x50,0x22,0x14,0x5a); &LL(0xb1,0xb1,0xfe,0xb1,0xe1,0x4f,0x7f,0x50); &LL(0xa0,0xa0,0xba,0xa0,0x69,0x1a,0x5d,0xc9); &LL(0x6b,0x6b,0xb1,0x6b,0x7f,0xda,0xd6,0x14); &LL(0x85,0x85,0x2e,0x85,0x5c,0xab,0x17,0xd9); &LL(0xbd,0xbd,0xce,0xbd,0x81,0x73,0x67,0x3c); &LL(0x5d,0x5d,0x69,0x5d,0xd2,0x34,0xba,0x8f); &LL(0x10,0x10,0x40,0x10,0x80,0x50,0x20,0x90); &LL(0xf4,0xf4,0xf7,0xf4,0xf3,0x03,0xf5,0x07); &LL(0xcb,0xcb,0x0b,0xcb,0x16,0xc0,0x8b,0xdd); &LL(0x3e,0x3e,0xf8,0x3e,0xed,0xc6,0x7c,0xd3); &LL(0x05,0x05,0x14,0x05,0x28,0x11,0x0a,0x2d); &LL(0x67,0x67,0x81,0x67,0x1f,0xe6,0xce,0x78); &LL(0xe4,0xe4,0xb7,0xe4,0x73,0x53,0xd5,0x97); &LL(0x27,0x27,0x9c,0x27,0x25,0xbb,0x4e,0x02); &LL(0x41,0x41,0x19,0x41,0x32,0x58,0x82,0x73); &LL(0x8b,0x8b,0x16,0x8b,0x2c,0x9d,0x0b,0xa7); &LL(0xa7,0xa7,0xa6,0xa7,0x51,0x01,0x53,0xf6); &LL(0x7d,0x7d,0xe9,0x7d,0xcf,0x94,0xfa,0xb2); &LL(0x95,0x95,0x6e,0x95,0xdc,0xfb,0x37,0x49); &LL(0xd8,0xd8,0x47,0xd8,0x8e,0x9f,0xad,0x56); &LL(0xfb,0xfb,0xcb,0xfb,0x8b,0x30,0xeb,0x70); &LL(0xee,0xee,0x9f,0xee,0x23,0x71,0xc1,0xcd); &LL(0x7c,0x7c,0xed,0x7c,0xc7,0x91,0xf8,0xbb); &LL(0x66,0x66,0x85,0x66,0x17,0xe3,0xcc,0x71); &LL(0xdd,0xdd,0x53,0xdd,0xa6,0x8e,0xa7,0x7b); &LL(0x17,0x17,0x5c,0x17,0xb8,0x4b,0x2e,0xaf); &LL(0x47,0x47,0x01,0x47,0x02,0x46,0x8e,0x45); &LL(0x9e,0x9e,0x42,0x9e,0x84,0xdc,0x21,0x1a); &LL(0xca,0xca,0x0f,0xca,0x1e,0xc5,0x89,0xd4); &LL(0x2d,0x2d,0xb4,0x2d,0x75,0x99,0x5a,0x58); &LL(0xbf,0xbf,0xc6,0xbf,0x91,0x79,0x63,0x2e); &LL(0x07,0x07,0x1c,0x07,0x38,0x1b,0x0e,0x3f); &LL(0xad,0xad,0x8e,0xad,0x01,0x23,0x47,0xac); &LL(0x5a,0x5a,0x75,0x5a,0xea,0x2f,0xb4,0xb0); &LL(0x83,0x83,0x36,0x83,0x6c,0xb5,0x1b,0xef); &LL(0x33,0x33,0xcc,0x33,0x85,0xff,0x66,0xb6); &LL(0x63,0x63,0x91,0x63,0x3f,0xf2,0xc6,0x5c); &LL(0x02,0x02,0x08,0x02,0x10,0x0a,0x04,0x12); &LL(0xaa,0xaa,0x92,0xaa,0x39,0x38,0x49,0x93); &LL(0x71,0x71,0xd9,0x71,0xaf,0xa8,0xe2,0xde); &LL(0xc8,0xc8,0x07,0xc8,0x0e,0xcf,0x8d,0xc6); &LL(0x19,0x19,0x64,0x19,0xc8,0x7d,0x32,0xd1); &LL(0x49,0x49,0x39,0x49,0x72,0x70,0x92,0x3b); &LL(0xd9,0xd9,0x43,0xd9,0x86,0x9a,0xaf,0x5f); &LL(0xf2,0xf2,0xef,0xf2,0xc3,0x1d,0xf9,0x31); &LL(0xe3,0xe3,0xab,0xe3,0x4b,0x48,0xdb,0xa8); &LL(0x5b,0x5b,0x71,0x5b,0xe2,0x2a,0xb6,0xb9); &LL(0x88,0x88,0x1a,0x88,0x34,0x92,0x0d,0xbc); &LL(0x9a,0x9a,0x52,0x9a,0xa4,0xc8,0x29,0x3e); &LL(0x26,0x26,0x98,0x26,0x2d,0xbe,0x4c,0x0b); &LL(0x32,0x32,0xc8,0x32,0x8d,0xfa,0x64,0xbf); &LL(0xb0,0xb0,0xfa,0xb0,0xe9,0x4a,0x7d,0x59); &LL(0xe9,0xe9,0x83,0xe9,0x1b,0x6a,0xcf,0xf2); &LL(0x0f,0x0f,0x3c,0x0f,0x78,0x33,0x1e,0x77); &LL(0xd5,0xd5,0x73,0xd5,0xe6,0xa6,0xb7,0x33); &LL(0x80,0x80,0x3a,0x80,0x74,0xba,0x1d,0xf4); &LL(0xbe,0xbe,0xc2,0xbe,0x99,0x7c,0x61,0x27); &LL(0xcd,0xcd,0x13,0xcd,0x26,0xde,0x87,0xeb); &LL(0x34,0x34,0xd0,0x34,0xbd,0xe4,0x68,0x89); &LL(0x48,0x48,0x3d,0x48,0x7a,0x75,0x90,0x32); &LL(0xff,0xff,0xdb,0xff,0xab,0x24,0xe3,0x54); &LL(0x7a,0x7a,0xf5,0x7a,0xf7,0x8f,0xf4,0x8d); &LL(0x90,0x90,0x7a,0x90,0xf4,0xea,0x3d,0x64); &LL(0x5f,0x5f,0x61,0x5f,0xc2,0x3e,0xbe,0x9d); &LL(0x20,0x20,0x80,0x20,0x1d,0xa0,0x40,0x3d); &LL(0x68,0x68,0xbd,0x68,0x67,0xd5,0xd0,0x0f); &LL(0x1a,0x1a,0x68,0x1a,0xd0,0x72,0x34,0xca); &LL(0xae,0xae,0x82,0xae,0x19,0x2c,0x41,0xb7); &LL(0xb4,0xb4,0xea,0xb4,0xc9,0x5e,0x75,0x7d); &LL(0x54,0x54,0x4d,0x54,0x9a,0x19,0xa8,0xce); &LL(0x93,0x93,0x76,0x93,0xec,0xe5,0x3b,0x7f); &LL(0x22,0x22,0x88,0x22,0x0d,0xaa,0x44,0x2f); &LL(0x64,0x64,0x8d,0x64,0x07,0xe9,0xc8,0x63); &LL(0xf1,0xf1,0xe3,0xf1,0xdb,0x12,0xff,0x2a); &LL(0x73,0x73,0xd1,0x73,0xbf,0xa2,0xe6,0xcc); &LL(0x12,0x12,0x48,0x12,0x90,0x5a,0x24,0x82); &LL(0x40,0x40,0x1d,0x40,0x3a,0x5d,0x80,0x7a); &LL(0x08,0x08,0x20,0x08,0x40,0x28,0x10,0x48); &LL(0xc3,0xc3,0x2b,0xc3,0x56,0xe8,0x9b,0x95); &LL(0xec,0xec,0x97,0xec,0x33,0x7b,0xc5,0xdf); &LL(0xdb,0xdb,0x4b,0xdb,0x96,0x90,0xab,0x4d); &LL(0xa1,0xa1,0xbe,0xa1,0x61,0x1f,0x5f,0xc0); &LL(0x8d,0x8d,0x0e,0x8d,0x1c,0x83,0x07,0x91); &LL(0x3d,0x3d,0xf4,0x3d,0xf5,0xc9,0x7a,0xc8); &LL(0x97,0x97,0x66,0x97,0xcc,0xf1,0x33,0x5b); &LL(0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00); &LL(0xcf,0xcf,0x1b,0xcf,0x36,0xd4,0x83,0xf9); &LL(0x2b,0x2b,0xac,0x2b,0x45,0x87,0x56,0x6e); &LL(0x76,0x76,0xc5,0x76,0x97,0xb3,0xec,0xe1); &LL(0x82,0x82,0x32,0x82,0x64,0xb0,0x19,0xe6); &LL(0xd6,0xd6,0x7f,0xd6,0xfe,0xa9,0xb1,0x28); &LL(0x1b,0x1b,0x6c,0x1b,0xd8,0x77,0x36,0xc3); &LL(0xb5,0xb5,0xee,0xb5,0xc1,0x5b,0x77,0x74); &LL(0xaf,0xaf,0x86,0xaf,0x11,0x29,0x43,0xbe); &LL(0x6a,0x6a,0xb5,0x6a,0x77,0xdf,0xd4,0x1d); &LL(0x50,0x50,0x5d,0x50,0xba,0x0d,0xa0,0xea); &LL(0x45,0x45,0x09,0x45,0x12,0x4c,0x8a,0x57); &LL(0xf3,0xf3,0xeb,0xf3,0xcb,0x18,0xfb,0x38); &LL(0x30,0x30,0xc0,0x30,0x9d,0xf0,0x60,0xad); &LL(0xef,0xef,0x9b,0xef,0x2b,0x74,0xc3,0xc4); &LL(0x3f,0x3f,0xfc,0x3f,0xe5,0xc3,0x7e,0xda); &LL(0x55,0x55,0x49,0x55,0x92,0x1c,0xaa,0xc7); &LL(0xa2,0xa2,0xb2,0xa2,0x79,0x10,0x59,0xdb); &LL(0xea,0xea,0x8f,0xea,0x03,0x65,0xc9,0xe9); &LL(0x65,0x65,0x89,0x65,0x0f,0xec,0xca,0x6a); &LL(0xba,0xba,0xd2,0xba,0xb9,0x68,0x69,0x03); &LL(0x2f,0x2f,0xbc,0x2f,0x65,0x93,0x5e,0x4a); &LL(0xc0,0xc0,0x27,0xc0,0x4e,0xe7,0x9d,0x8e); &LL(0xde,0xde,0x5f,0xde,0xbe,0x81,0xa1,0x60); &LL(0x1c,0x1c,0x70,0x1c,0xe0,0x6c,0x38,0xfc); &LL(0xfd,0xfd,0xd3,0xfd,0xbb,0x2e,0xe7,0x46); &LL(0x4d,0x4d,0x29,0x4d,0x52,0x64,0x9a,0x1f); &LL(0x92,0x92,0x72,0x92,0xe4,0xe0,0x39,0x76); &LL(0x75,0x75,0xc9,0x75,0x8f,0xbc,0xea,0xfa); &LL(0x06,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x30,0x1e,0x0c,0x36); &LL(0x8a,0x8a,0x12,0x8a,0x24,0x98,0x09,0xae); &LL(0xb2,0xb2,0xf2,0xb2,0xf9,0x40,0x79,0x4b); &LL(0xe6,0xe6,0xbf,0xe6,0x63,0x59,0xd1,0x85); &LL(0x0e,0x0e,0x38,0x0e,0x70,0x36,0x1c,0x7e); &LL(0x1f,0x1f,0x7c,0x1f,0xf8,0x63,0x3e,0xe7); &LL(0x62,0x62,0x95,0x62,0x37,0xf7,0xc4,0x55); &LL(0xd4,0xd4,0x77,0xd4,0xee,0xa3,0xb5,0x3a); &LL(0xa8,0xa8,0x9a,0xa8,0x29,0x32,0x4d,0x81); &LL(0x96,0x96,0x62,0x96,0xc4,0xf4,0x31,0x52); &LL(0xf9,0xf9,0xc3,0xf9,0x9b,0x3a,0xef,0x62); &LL(0xc5,0xc5,0x33,0xc5,0x66,0xf6,0x97,0xa3); &LL(0x25,0x25,0x94,0x25,0x35,0xb1,0x4a,0x10); &LL(0x59,0x59,0x79,0x59,0xf2,0x20,0xb2,0xab); &LL(0x84,0x84,0x2a,0x84,0x54,0xae,0x15,0xd0); &LL(0x72,0x72,0xd5,0x72,0xb7,0xa7,0xe4,0xc5); &LL(0x39,0x39,0xe4,0x39,0xd5,0xdd,0x72,0xec); &LL(0x4c,0x4c,0x2d,0x4c,0x5a,0x61,0x98,0x16); &LL(0x5e,0x5e,0x65,0x5e,0xca,0x3b,0xbc,0x94); &LL(0x78,0x78,0xfd,0x78,0xe7,0x85,0xf0,0x9f); &LL(0x38,0x38,0xe0,0x38,0xdd,0xd8,0x70,0xe5); &LL(0x8c,0x8c,0x0a,0x8c,0x14,0x86,0x05,0x98); &LL(0xd1,0xd1,0x63,0xd1,0xc6,0xb2,0xbf,0x17); &LL(0xa5,0xa5,0xae,0xa5,0x41,0x0b,0x57,0xe4); &LL(0xe2,0xe2,0xaf,0xe2,0x43,0x4d,0xd9,0xa1); &LL(0x61,0x61,0x99,0x61,0x2f,0xf8,0xc2,0x4e); &LL(0xb3,0xb3,0xf6,0xb3,0xf1,0x45,0x7b,0x42); &LL(0x21,0x21,0x84,0x21,0x15,0xa5,0x42,0x34); &LL(0x9c,0x9c,0x4a,0x9c,0x94,0xd6,0x25,0x08); &LL(0x1e,0x1e,0x78,0x1e,0xf0,0x66,0x3c,0xee); &LL(0x43,0x43,0x11,0x43,0x22,0x52,0x86,0x61); &LL(0xc7,0xc7,0x3b,0xc7,0x76,0xfc,0x93,0xb1); &LL(0xfc,0xfc,0xd7,0xfc,0xb3,0x2b,0xe5,0x4f); &LL(0x04,0x04,0x10,0x04,0x20,0x14,0x08,0x24); &LL(0x51,0x51,0x59,0x51,0xb2,0x08,0xa2,0xe3); &LL(0x99,0x99,0x5e,0x99,0xbc,0xc7,0x2f,0x25); &LL(0x6d,0x6d,0xa9,0x6d,0x4f,0xc4,0xda,0x22); &LL(0x0d,0x0d,0x34,0x0d,0x68,0x39,0x1a,0x65); &LL(0xfa,0xfa,0xcf,0xfa,0x83,0x35,0xe9,0x79); &LL(0xdf,0xdf,0x5b,0xdf,0xb6,0x84,0xa3,0x69); &LL(0x7e,0x7e,0xe5,0x7e,0xd7,0x9b,0xfc,0xa9); &LL(0x24,0x24,0x90,0x24,0x3d,0xb4,0x48,0x19); &LL(0x3b,0x3b,0xec,0x3b,0xc5,0xd7,0x76,0xfe); &LL(0xab,0xab,0x96,0xab,0x31,0x3d,0x4b,0x9a); &LL(0xce,0xce,0x1f,0xce,0x3e,0xd1,0x81,0xf0); &LL(0x11,0x11,0x44,0x11,0x88,0x55,0x22,0x99); &LL(0x8f,0x8f,0x06,0x8f,0x0c,0x89,0x03,0x83); &LL(0x4e,0x4e,0x25,0x4e,0x4a,0x6b,0x9c,0x04); &LL(0xb7,0xb7,0xe6,0xb7,0xd1,0x51,0x73,0x66); &LL(0xeb,0xeb,0x8b,0xeb,0x0b,0x60,0xcb,0xe0); &LL(0x3c,0x3c,0xf0,0x3c,0xfd,0xcc,0x78,0xc1); &LL(0x81,0x81,0x3e,0x81,0x7c,0xbf,0x1f,0xfd); &LL(0x94,0x94,0x6a,0x94,0xd4,0xfe,0x35,0x40); &LL(0xf7,0xf7,0xfb,0xf7,0xeb,0x0c,0xf3,0x1c); &LL(0xb9,0xb9,0xde,0xb9,0xa1,0x67,0x6f,0x18); &LL(0x13,0x13,0x4c,0x13,0x98,0x5f,0x26,0x8b); &LL(0x2c,0x2c,0xb0,0x2c,0x7d,0x9c,0x58,0x51); &LL(0xd3,0xd3,0x6b,0xd3,0xd6,0xb8,0xbb,0x05); &LL(0xe7,0xe7,0xbb,0xe7,0x6b,0x5c,0xd3,0x8c); &LL(0x6e,0x6e,0xa5,0x6e,0x57,0xcb,0xdc,0x39); &LL(0xc4,0xc4,0x37,0xc4,0x6e,0xf3,0x95,0xaa); &LL(0x03,0x03,0x0c,0x03,0x18,0x0f,0x06,0x1b); &LL(0x56,0x56,0x45,0x56,0x8a,0x13,0xac,0xdc); &LL(0x44,0x44,0x0d,0x44,0x1a,0x49,0x88,0x5e); &LL(0x7f,0x7f,0xe1,0x7f,0xdf,0x9e,0xfe,0xa0); &LL(0xa9,0xa9,0x9e,0xa9,0x21,0x37,0x4f,0x88); &LL(0x2a,0x2a,0xa8,0x2a,0x4d,0x82,0x54,0x67); &LL(0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,0xbb,0xb1,0x6d,0x6b,0x0a); &LL(0xc1,0xc1,0x23,0xc1,0x46,0xe2,0x9f,0x87); &LL(0x53,0x53,0x51,0x53,0xa2,0x02,0xa6,0xf1); &LL(0xdc,0xdc,0x57,0xdc,0xae,0x8b,0xa5,0x72); &LL(0x0b,0x0b,0x2c,0x0b,0x58,0x27,0x16,0x53); &LL(0x9d,0x9d,0x4e,0x9d,0x9c,0xd3,0x27,0x01); &LL(0x6c,0x6c,0xad,0x6c,0x47,0xc1,0xd8,0x2b); &LL(0x31,0x31,0xc4,0x31,0x95,0xf5,0x62,0xa4); &LL(0x74,0x74,0xcd,0x74,0x87,0xb9,0xe8,0xf3); &LL(0xf6,0xf6,0xff,0xf6,0xe3,0x09,0xf1,0x15); &LL(0x46,0x46,0x05,0x46,0x0a,0x43,0x8c,0x4c); &LL(0xac,0xac,0x8a,0xac,0x09,0x26,0x45,0xa5); &LL(0x89,0x89,0x1e,0x89,0x3c,0x97,0x0f,0xb5); &LL(0x14,0x14,0x50,0x14,0xa0,0x44,0x28,0xb4); &LL(0xe1,0xe1,0xa3,0xe1,0x5b,0x42,0xdf,0xba); &LL(0x16,0x16,0x58,0x16,0xb0,0x4e,0x2c,0xa6); &LL(0x3a,0x3a,0xe8,0x3a,0xcd,0xd2,0x74,0xf7); &LL(0x69,0x69,0xb9,0x69,0x6f,0xd0,0xd2,0x06); &LL(0x09,0x09,0x24,0x09,0x48,0x2d,0x12,0x41); &LL(0x70,0x70,0xdd,0x70,0xa7,0xad,0xe0,0xd7); &LL(0xb6,0xb6,0xe2,0xb6,0xd9,0x54,0x71,0x6f); &LL(0xd0,0xd0,0x67,0xd0,0xce,0xb7,0xbd,0x1e); &LL(0xed,0xed,0x93,0xed,0x3b,0x7e,0xc7,0xd6); &LL(0xcc,0xcc,0x17,0xcc,0x2e,0xdb,0x85,0xe2); &LL(0x42,0x42,0x15,0x42,0x2a,0x57,0x84,0x68); &LL(0x98,0x98,0x5a,0x98,0xb4,0xc2,0x2d,0x2c); &LL(0xa4,0xa4,0xaa,0xa4,0x49,0x0e,0x55,0xed); &LL(0x28,0x28,0xa0,0x28,0x5d,0x88,0x50,0x75); &LL(0x5c,0x5c,0x6d,0x5c,0xda,0x31,0xb8,0x86); &LL(0xf8,0xf8,0xc7,0xf8,0x93,0x3f,0xed,0x6b); &LL(0x86,0x86,0x22,0x86,0x44,0xa4,0x11,0xc2); &L(0x18,0x23,0xc6,0xe8,0x87,0xb8,0x01,0x4f); # rc[ROUNDS] &L(0x36,0xa6,0xd2,0xf5,0x79,0x6f,0x91,0x52); &L(0x60,0xbc,0x9b,0x8e,0xa3,0x0c,0x7b,0x35); &L(0x1d,0xe0,0xd7,0xc2,0x2e,0x4b,0xfe,0x57); &L(0x15,0x77,0x37,0xe5,0x9f,0xf0,0x4a,0xda); &L(0x58,0xc9,0x29,0x0a,0xb1,0xa0,0x6b,0x85); &L(0xbd,0x5d,0x10,0xf4,0xcb,0x3e,0x05,0x67); &L(0xe4,0x27,0x41,0x8b,0xa7,0x7d,0x95,0xd8); &L(0xfb,0xee,0x7c,0x66,0xdd,0x17,0x47,0x9e); &L(0xca,0x2d,0xbf,0x07,0xad,0x5a,0x83,0x33); # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lprologue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lprologue jb .Lin_prologue mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lin_prologue mov 128+32(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer lea 48(%rax),%rax mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_$func .rva .LSEH_end_$func .rva .LSEH_info_$func .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_$func: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl0000644000000000000000000004742613176625660017622 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary # forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license. # ==================================================================== # # whirlpool_block_mmx implementation. # *SCALE=\(2); # 2 or 8, that is the question:-) Value of 8 results # in 16KB large table, which is tough on L1 cache, but eliminates # unaligned references to it. Value of 2 results in 4KB table, but # 7/8 of references to it are unaligned. AMD cores seem to be # allergic to the latter, while Intel ones - to former [see the # table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table # minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side- # channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance # gap among different µ-archs is smaller. # # Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by # whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e. # smaller is better and asymptotic throughput can be estimated by # multiplying 64 by CPU clock frequency and dividing by relevant # value from the given table: # # $SCALE=2/8 icc8 gcc3 # Intel P4 3200/4600 4600(*) 6400 # Intel PIII 2900/3000 4900 5400 # AMD K[78] 2500/1800 9900 8200(**) # # (*) I've sketched even non-MMX assembler, but for the record # I've failed to beat the Intel compiler on P4, without using # MMX that is... # (**) ... on AMD on the other hand non-MMX assembler was observed # to perform significantly better, but I figured this MMX # implementation is even faster anyway, so why bother? As for # pre-MMX AMD core[s], the improvement coefficient is more # than likely to vary anyway and I don't know how. But the # least I know is that gcc-generated code compiled with # -DL_ENDIAN and -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT [see C module for # details] and optimized for Pentium was observed to perform # *better* on Pentium 100 than unrolled non-MMX assembler # loop... So we just say that I don't know if maintaining # non-MMX implementation would actually pay off, but till # opposite is proved "unlikely" is assumed. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"wp-mmx.pl"); sub L() { &data_byte(@_); } sub LL() { if ($SCALE==2) { &data_byte(@_); &data_byte(@_); } elsif ($SCALE==8) { for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &data_byte(@_); unshift(@_,pop(@_)); } } else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; } } sub scale() { if ($SCALE==2) { &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,@_[1],@_[1])); } elsif ($SCALE==8) { &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,"",@_[1],8)); } else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; } } sub row() { if ($SCALE==2) { ((8-shift)&7); } elsif ($SCALE==8) { (8*shift); } else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; } } $tbl="ebp"; @mm=("mm0","mm1","mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5","mm6","mm7"); &function_begin_B("whirlpool_block_mmx"); &push ("ebp"); &push ("ebx"); &push ("esi"); &push ("edi"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(0)); # hash value &mov ("edi",&wparam(1)); # input data stream &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); # number of chunks in input &mov ("eax","esp"); # copy stack pointer &sub ("esp",128+20); # allocate frame &and ("esp",-64); # align for cache-line &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(0,"ebx"),"esi"); # save parameter block &mov (&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(8,"ebx"),"ebp"); &mov (&DWP(16,"ebx"),"eax"); # saved stack pointer &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tbl); &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("table")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl)); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &xor ("edx","edx"); for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); } # L=H &set_label("outerloop"); for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); } # K=L for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); } # L^=inp for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); } # S=L &xor ("esi","esi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi"); # zero round counter &set_label("round",16); &movq (@mm[0],&QWP(2048*$SCALE,$tbl,"esi",8)); # rc[r] &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp")); &movz ("ecx",&LB("eax")); &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { my $func = ($i==0)? \&movq : \&pxor; &shr ("eax",16); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("eax")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); &pxor (@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8)); &$func (@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8)); &mov ("eax",&DWP(($i+1)*8,"esp")); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("ebx")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("ebx")); &$func (@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8)); &$func (@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8)); &shr ("ebx",16); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("ebx")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("ebx")); &$func (@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8)); &$func (@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8)); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(($i+1)*8+4,"esp")); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("eax")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); &$func (@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8)); &$func (@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8)); push(@mm,shift(@mm)); } for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); } # K=L for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &shr ("eax",16); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("eax")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); &pxor (@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8)); &pxor (@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8)); &mov ("eax",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8,"esp")) if ($i<7); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("ebx")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("ebx")); &pxor (@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8)); &pxor (@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8)); &shr ("ebx",16); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("ebx")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("ebx")); &pxor (@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8)); &pxor (@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8)); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8+4,"esp")) if ($i<7); &scale ("esi","ecx"); &movz ("ecx",&LB("eax")); &scale ("edi","edx"); &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); &pxor (@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8)); &pxor (@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8)); push(@mm,shift(@mm)); } &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(12,"ebx")); # pull round counter &add ("esi",1); &cmp ("esi",10); &je (&label("roundsdone")); &mov (&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi"); # update round counter for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"),@mm[$i]); } # S=L &jmp (&label("round")); &set_label("roundsdone",16); &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,"ebx")); # reload argument block &mov ("edi",&DWP(4,"ebx")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(8,"ebx")); for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); } # L^=inp for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); } # L^=H for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esi"),@mm[$i]); } # H=L &lea ("edi",&DWP(64,"edi")); # inp+=64 &sub ("eax",1); # num-- &jz (&label("alldone")); &mov (&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi"); # update argument block &mov (&DWP(8,"ebx"),"eax"); &jmp (&label("outerloop")); &set_label("alldone"); &emms (); &mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"ebx")); # restore saved stack pointer &pop ("edi"); &pop ("esi"); &pop ("ebx"); &pop ("ebp"); &ret (); &align(64); &set_label("table"); &LL(0x18,0x18,0x60,0x18,0xc0,0x78,0x30,0xd8); &LL(0x23,0x23,0x8c,0x23,0x05,0xaf,0x46,0x26); &LL(0xc6,0xc6,0x3f,0xc6,0x7e,0xf9,0x91,0xb8); &LL(0xe8,0xe8,0x87,0xe8,0x13,0x6f,0xcd,0xfb); &LL(0x87,0x87,0x26,0x87,0x4c,0xa1,0x13,0xcb); &LL(0xb8,0xb8,0xda,0xb8,0xa9,0x62,0x6d,0x11); &LL(0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x08,0x05,0x02,0x09); &LL(0x4f,0x4f,0x21,0x4f,0x42,0x6e,0x9e,0x0d); &LL(0x36,0x36,0xd8,0x36,0xad,0xee,0x6c,0x9b); &LL(0xa6,0xa6,0xa2,0xa6,0x59,0x04,0x51,0xff); &LL(0xd2,0xd2,0x6f,0xd2,0xde,0xbd,0xb9,0x0c); &LL(0xf5,0xf5,0xf3,0xf5,0xfb,0x06,0xf7,0x0e); &LL(0x79,0x79,0xf9,0x79,0xef,0x80,0xf2,0x96); &LL(0x6f,0x6f,0xa1,0x6f,0x5f,0xce,0xde,0x30); &LL(0x91,0x91,0x7e,0x91,0xfc,0xef,0x3f,0x6d); &LL(0x52,0x52,0x55,0x52,0xaa,0x07,0xa4,0xf8); &LL(0x60,0x60,0x9d,0x60,0x27,0xfd,0xc0,0x47); &LL(0xbc,0xbc,0xca,0xbc,0x89,0x76,0x65,0x35); &LL(0x9b,0x9b,0x56,0x9b,0xac,0xcd,0x2b,0x37); &LL(0x8e,0x8e,0x02,0x8e,0x04,0x8c,0x01,0x8a); &LL(0xa3,0xa3,0xb6,0xa3,0x71,0x15,0x5b,0xd2); &LL(0x0c,0x0c,0x30,0x0c,0x60,0x3c,0x18,0x6c); &LL(0x7b,0x7b,0xf1,0x7b,0xff,0x8a,0xf6,0x84); &LL(0x35,0x35,0xd4,0x35,0xb5,0xe1,0x6a,0x80); &LL(0x1d,0x1d,0x74,0x1d,0xe8,0x69,0x3a,0xf5); &LL(0xe0,0xe0,0xa7,0xe0,0x53,0x47,0xdd,0xb3); &LL(0xd7,0xd7,0x7b,0xd7,0xf6,0xac,0xb3,0x21); &LL(0xc2,0xc2,0x2f,0xc2,0x5e,0xed,0x99,0x9c); &LL(0x2e,0x2e,0xb8,0x2e,0x6d,0x96,0x5c,0x43); &LL(0x4b,0x4b,0x31,0x4b,0x62,0x7a,0x96,0x29); &LL(0xfe,0xfe,0xdf,0xfe,0xa3,0x21,0xe1,0x5d); &LL(0x57,0x57,0x41,0x57,0x82,0x16,0xae,0xd5); &LL(0x15,0x15,0x54,0x15,0xa8,0x41,0x2a,0xbd); &LL(0x77,0x77,0xc1,0x77,0x9f,0xb6,0xee,0xe8); &LL(0x37,0x37,0xdc,0x37,0xa5,0xeb,0x6e,0x92); &LL(0xe5,0xe5,0xb3,0xe5,0x7b,0x56,0xd7,0x9e); &LL(0x9f,0x9f,0x46,0x9f,0x8c,0xd9,0x23,0x13); &LL(0xf0,0xf0,0xe7,0xf0,0xd3,0x17,0xfd,0x23); &LL(0x4a,0x4a,0x35,0x4a,0x6a,0x7f,0x94,0x20); &LL(0xda,0xda,0x4f,0xda,0x9e,0x95,0xa9,0x44); &LL(0x58,0x58,0x7d,0x58,0xfa,0x25,0xb0,0xa2); &LL(0xc9,0xc9,0x03,0xc9,0x06,0xca,0x8f,0xcf); &LL(0x29,0x29,0xa4,0x29,0x55,0x8d,0x52,0x7c); &LL(0x0a,0x0a,0x28,0x0a,0x50,0x22,0x14,0x5a); &LL(0xb1,0xb1,0xfe,0xb1,0xe1,0x4f,0x7f,0x50); &LL(0xa0,0xa0,0xba,0xa0,0x69,0x1a,0x5d,0xc9); &LL(0x6b,0x6b,0xb1,0x6b,0x7f,0xda,0xd6,0x14); &LL(0x85,0x85,0x2e,0x85,0x5c,0xab,0x17,0xd9); &LL(0xbd,0xbd,0xce,0xbd,0x81,0x73,0x67,0x3c); &LL(0x5d,0x5d,0x69,0x5d,0xd2,0x34,0xba,0x8f); &LL(0x10,0x10,0x40,0x10,0x80,0x50,0x20,0x90); &LL(0xf4,0xf4,0xf7,0xf4,0xf3,0x03,0xf5,0x07); &LL(0xcb,0xcb,0x0b,0xcb,0x16,0xc0,0x8b,0xdd); &LL(0x3e,0x3e,0xf8,0x3e,0xed,0xc6,0x7c,0xd3); &LL(0x05,0x05,0x14,0x05,0x28,0x11,0x0a,0x2d); &LL(0x67,0x67,0x81,0x67,0x1f,0xe6,0xce,0x78); &LL(0xe4,0xe4,0xb7,0xe4,0x73,0x53,0xd5,0x97); &LL(0x27,0x27,0x9c,0x27,0x25,0xbb,0x4e,0x02); &LL(0x41,0x41,0x19,0x41,0x32,0x58,0x82,0x73); &LL(0x8b,0x8b,0x16,0x8b,0x2c,0x9d,0x0b,0xa7); &LL(0xa7,0xa7,0xa6,0xa7,0x51,0x01,0x53,0xf6); &LL(0x7d,0x7d,0xe9,0x7d,0xcf,0x94,0xfa,0xb2); &LL(0x95,0x95,0x6e,0x95,0xdc,0xfb,0x37,0x49); &LL(0xd8,0xd8,0x47,0xd8,0x8e,0x9f,0xad,0x56); &LL(0xfb,0xfb,0xcb,0xfb,0x8b,0x30,0xeb,0x70); &LL(0xee,0xee,0x9f,0xee,0x23,0x71,0xc1,0xcd); &LL(0x7c,0x7c,0xed,0x7c,0xc7,0x91,0xf8,0xbb); &LL(0x66,0x66,0x85,0x66,0x17,0xe3,0xcc,0x71); &LL(0xdd,0xdd,0x53,0xdd,0xa6,0x8e,0xa7,0x7b); &LL(0x17,0x17,0x5c,0x17,0xb8,0x4b,0x2e,0xaf); &LL(0x47,0x47,0x01,0x47,0x02,0x46,0x8e,0x45); &LL(0x9e,0x9e,0x42,0x9e,0x84,0xdc,0x21,0x1a); &LL(0xca,0xca,0x0f,0xca,0x1e,0xc5,0x89,0xd4); &LL(0x2d,0x2d,0xb4,0x2d,0x75,0x99,0x5a,0x58); &LL(0xbf,0xbf,0xc6,0xbf,0x91,0x79,0x63,0x2e); &LL(0x07,0x07,0x1c,0x07,0x38,0x1b,0x0e,0x3f); &LL(0xad,0xad,0x8e,0xad,0x01,0x23,0x47,0xac); &LL(0x5a,0x5a,0x75,0x5a,0xea,0x2f,0xb4,0xb0); &LL(0x83,0x83,0x36,0x83,0x6c,0xb5,0x1b,0xef); &LL(0x33,0x33,0xcc,0x33,0x85,0xff,0x66,0xb6); &LL(0x63,0x63,0x91,0x63,0x3f,0xf2,0xc6,0x5c); &LL(0x02,0x02,0x08,0x02,0x10,0x0a,0x04,0x12); &LL(0xaa,0xaa,0x92,0xaa,0x39,0x38,0x49,0x93); &LL(0x71,0x71,0xd9,0x71,0xaf,0xa8,0xe2,0xde); &LL(0xc8,0xc8,0x07,0xc8,0x0e,0xcf,0x8d,0xc6); &LL(0x19,0x19,0x64,0x19,0xc8,0x7d,0x32,0xd1); &LL(0x49,0x49,0x39,0x49,0x72,0x70,0x92,0x3b); &LL(0xd9,0xd9,0x43,0xd9,0x86,0x9a,0xaf,0x5f); &LL(0xf2,0xf2,0xef,0xf2,0xc3,0x1d,0xf9,0x31); &LL(0xe3,0xe3,0xab,0xe3,0x4b,0x48,0xdb,0xa8); &LL(0x5b,0x5b,0x71,0x5b,0xe2,0x2a,0xb6,0xb9); &LL(0x88,0x88,0x1a,0x88,0x34,0x92,0x0d,0xbc); &LL(0x9a,0x9a,0x52,0x9a,0xa4,0xc8,0x29,0x3e); &LL(0x26,0x26,0x98,0x26,0x2d,0xbe,0x4c,0x0b); &LL(0x32,0x32,0xc8,0x32,0x8d,0xfa,0x64,0xbf); &LL(0xb0,0xb0,0xfa,0xb0,0xe9,0x4a,0x7d,0x59); &LL(0xe9,0xe9,0x83,0xe9,0x1b,0x6a,0xcf,0xf2); &LL(0x0f,0x0f,0x3c,0x0f,0x78,0x33,0x1e,0x77); &LL(0xd5,0xd5,0x73,0xd5,0xe6,0xa6,0xb7,0x33); &LL(0x80,0x80,0x3a,0x80,0x74,0xba,0x1d,0xf4); &LL(0xbe,0xbe,0xc2,0xbe,0x99,0x7c,0x61,0x27); &LL(0xcd,0xcd,0x13,0xcd,0x26,0xde,0x87,0xeb); &LL(0x34,0x34,0xd0,0x34,0xbd,0xe4,0x68,0x89); &LL(0x48,0x48,0x3d,0x48,0x7a,0x75,0x90,0x32); &LL(0xff,0xff,0xdb,0xff,0xab,0x24,0xe3,0x54); &LL(0x7a,0x7a,0xf5,0x7a,0xf7,0x8f,0xf4,0x8d); &LL(0x90,0x90,0x7a,0x90,0xf4,0xea,0x3d,0x64); &LL(0x5f,0x5f,0x61,0x5f,0xc2,0x3e,0xbe,0x9d); &LL(0x20,0x20,0x80,0x20,0x1d,0xa0,0x40,0x3d); &LL(0x68,0x68,0xbd,0x68,0x67,0xd5,0xd0,0x0f); &LL(0x1a,0x1a,0x68,0x1a,0xd0,0x72,0x34,0xca); &LL(0xae,0xae,0x82,0xae,0x19,0x2c,0x41,0xb7); &LL(0xb4,0xb4,0xea,0xb4,0xc9,0x5e,0x75,0x7d); &LL(0x54,0x54,0x4d,0x54,0x9a,0x19,0xa8,0xce); &LL(0x93,0x93,0x76,0x93,0xec,0xe5,0x3b,0x7f); &LL(0x22,0x22,0x88,0x22,0x0d,0xaa,0x44,0x2f); &LL(0x64,0x64,0x8d,0x64,0x07,0xe9,0xc8,0x63); &LL(0xf1,0xf1,0xe3,0xf1,0xdb,0x12,0xff,0x2a); &LL(0x73,0x73,0xd1,0x73,0xbf,0xa2,0xe6,0xcc); &LL(0x12,0x12,0x48,0x12,0x90,0x5a,0x24,0x82); &LL(0x40,0x40,0x1d,0x40,0x3a,0x5d,0x80,0x7a); &LL(0x08,0x08,0x20,0x08,0x40,0x28,0x10,0x48); &LL(0xc3,0xc3,0x2b,0xc3,0x56,0xe8,0x9b,0x95); &LL(0xec,0xec,0x97,0xec,0x33,0x7b,0xc5,0xdf); &LL(0xdb,0xdb,0x4b,0xdb,0x96,0x90,0xab,0x4d); &LL(0xa1,0xa1,0xbe,0xa1,0x61,0x1f,0x5f,0xc0); &LL(0x8d,0x8d,0x0e,0x8d,0x1c,0x83,0x07,0x91); &LL(0x3d,0x3d,0xf4,0x3d,0xf5,0xc9,0x7a,0xc8); &LL(0x97,0x97,0x66,0x97,0xcc,0xf1,0x33,0x5b); &LL(0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00); &LL(0xcf,0xcf,0x1b,0xcf,0x36,0xd4,0x83,0xf9); &LL(0x2b,0x2b,0xac,0x2b,0x45,0x87,0x56,0x6e); &LL(0x76,0x76,0xc5,0x76,0x97,0xb3,0xec,0xe1); &LL(0x82,0x82,0x32,0x82,0x64,0xb0,0x19,0xe6); &LL(0xd6,0xd6,0x7f,0xd6,0xfe,0xa9,0xb1,0x28); &LL(0x1b,0x1b,0x6c,0x1b,0xd8,0x77,0x36,0xc3); &LL(0xb5,0xb5,0xee,0xb5,0xc1,0x5b,0x77,0x74); &LL(0xaf,0xaf,0x86,0xaf,0x11,0x29,0x43,0xbe); &LL(0x6a,0x6a,0xb5,0x6a,0x77,0xdf,0xd4,0x1d); &LL(0x50,0x50,0x5d,0x50,0xba,0x0d,0xa0,0xea); &LL(0x45,0x45,0x09,0x45,0x12,0x4c,0x8a,0x57); &LL(0xf3,0xf3,0xeb,0xf3,0xcb,0x18,0xfb,0x38); &LL(0x30,0x30,0xc0,0x30,0x9d,0xf0,0x60,0xad); &LL(0xef,0xef,0x9b,0xef,0x2b,0x74,0xc3,0xc4); &LL(0x3f,0x3f,0xfc,0x3f,0xe5,0xc3,0x7e,0xda); &LL(0x55,0x55,0x49,0x55,0x92,0x1c,0xaa,0xc7); &LL(0xa2,0xa2,0xb2,0xa2,0x79,0x10,0x59,0xdb); &LL(0xea,0xea,0x8f,0xea,0x03,0x65,0xc9,0xe9); &LL(0x65,0x65,0x89,0x65,0x0f,0xec,0xca,0x6a); &LL(0xba,0xba,0xd2,0xba,0xb9,0x68,0x69,0x03); &LL(0x2f,0x2f,0xbc,0x2f,0x65,0x93,0x5e,0x4a); &LL(0xc0,0xc0,0x27,0xc0,0x4e,0xe7,0x9d,0x8e); &LL(0xde,0xde,0x5f,0xde,0xbe,0x81,0xa1,0x60); &LL(0x1c,0x1c,0x70,0x1c,0xe0,0x6c,0x38,0xfc); &LL(0xfd,0xfd,0xd3,0xfd,0xbb,0x2e,0xe7,0x46); &LL(0x4d,0x4d,0x29,0x4d,0x52,0x64,0x9a,0x1f); &LL(0x92,0x92,0x72,0x92,0xe4,0xe0,0x39,0x76); &LL(0x75,0x75,0xc9,0x75,0x8f,0xbc,0xea,0xfa); &LL(0x06,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x30,0x1e,0x0c,0x36); &LL(0x8a,0x8a,0x12,0x8a,0x24,0x98,0x09,0xae); &LL(0xb2,0xb2,0xf2,0xb2,0xf9,0x40,0x79,0x4b); &LL(0xe6,0xe6,0xbf,0xe6,0x63,0x59,0xd1,0x85); &LL(0x0e,0x0e,0x38,0x0e,0x70,0x36,0x1c,0x7e); &LL(0x1f,0x1f,0x7c,0x1f,0xf8,0x63,0x3e,0xe7); &LL(0x62,0x62,0x95,0x62,0x37,0xf7,0xc4,0x55); &LL(0xd4,0xd4,0x77,0xd4,0xee,0xa3,0xb5,0x3a); &LL(0xa8,0xa8,0x9a,0xa8,0x29,0x32,0x4d,0x81); &LL(0x96,0x96,0x62,0x96,0xc4,0xf4,0x31,0x52); &LL(0xf9,0xf9,0xc3,0xf9,0x9b,0x3a,0xef,0x62); &LL(0xc5,0xc5,0x33,0xc5,0x66,0xf6,0x97,0xa3); &LL(0x25,0x25,0x94,0x25,0x35,0xb1,0x4a,0x10); &LL(0x59,0x59,0x79,0x59,0xf2,0x20,0xb2,0xab); &LL(0x84,0x84,0x2a,0x84,0x54,0xae,0x15,0xd0); &LL(0x72,0x72,0xd5,0x72,0xb7,0xa7,0xe4,0xc5); &LL(0x39,0x39,0xe4,0x39,0xd5,0xdd,0x72,0xec); &LL(0x4c,0x4c,0x2d,0x4c,0x5a,0x61,0x98,0x16); &LL(0x5e,0x5e,0x65,0x5e,0xca,0x3b,0xbc,0x94); &LL(0x78,0x78,0xfd,0x78,0xe7,0x85,0xf0,0x9f); &LL(0x38,0x38,0xe0,0x38,0xdd,0xd8,0x70,0xe5); &LL(0x8c,0x8c,0x0a,0x8c,0x14,0x86,0x05,0x98); &LL(0xd1,0xd1,0x63,0xd1,0xc6,0xb2,0xbf,0x17); &LL(0xa5,0xa5,0xae,0xa5,0x41,0x0b,0x57,0xe4); &LL(0xe2,0xe2,0xaf,0xe2,0x43,0x4d,0xd9,0xa1); &LL(0x61,0x61,0x99,0x61,0x2f,0xf8,0xc2,0x4e); &LL(0xb3,0xb3,0xf6,0xb3,0xf1,0x45,0x7b,0x42); &LL(0x21,0x21,0x84,0x21,0x15,0xa5,0x42,0x34); &LL(0x9c,0x9c,0x4a,0x9c,0x94,0xd6,0x25,0x08); &LL(0x1e,0x1e,0x78,0x1e,0xf0,0x66,0x3c,0xee); &LL(0x43,0x43,0x11,0x43,0x22,0x52,0x86,0x61); &LL(0xc7,0xc7,0x3b,0xc7,0x76,0xfc,0x93,0xb1); &LL(0xfc,0xfc,0xd7,0xfc,0xb3,0x2b,0xe5,0x4f); &LL(0x04,0x04,0x10,0x04,0x20,0x14,0x08,0x24); &LL(0x51,0x51,0x59,0x51,0xb2,0x08,0xa2,0xe3); &LL(0x99,0x99,0x5e,0x99,0xbc,0xc7,0x2f,0x25); &LL(0x6d,0x6d,0xa9,0x6d,0x4f,0xc4,0xda,0x22); &LL(0x0d,0x0d,0x34,0x0d,0x68,0x39,0x1a,0x65); &LL(0xfa,0xfa,0xcf,0xfa,0x83,0x35,0xe9,0x79); &LL(0xdf,0xdf,0x5b,0xdf,0xb6,0x84,0xa3,0x69); &LL(0x7e,0x7e,0xe5,0x7e,0xd7,0x9b,0xfc,0xa9); &LL(0x24,0x24,0x90,0x24,0x3d,0xb4,0x48,0x19); &LL(0x3b,0x3b,0xec,0x3b,0xc5,0xd7,0x76,0xfe); &LL(0xab,0xab,0x96,0xab,0x31,0x3d,0x4b,0x9a); &LL(0xce,0xce,0x1f,0xce,0x3e,0xd1,0x81,0xf0); &LL(0x11,0x11,0x44,0x11,0x88,0x55,0x22,0x99); &LL(0x8f,0x8f,0x06,0x8f,0x0c,0x89,0x03,0x83); &LL(0x4e,0x4e,0x25,0x4e,0x4a,0x6b,0x9c,0x04); &LL(0xb7,0xb7,0xe6,0xb7,0xd1,0x51,0x73,0x66); &LL(0xeb,0xeb,0x8b,0xeb,0x0b,0x60,0xcb,0xe0); &LL(0x3c,0x3c,0xf0,0x3c,0xfd,0xcc,0x78,0xc1); &LL(0x81,0x81,0x3e,0x81,0x7c,0xbf,0x1f,0xfd); &LL(0x94,0x94,0x6a,0x94,0xd4,0xfe,0x35,0x40); &LL(0xf7,0xf7,0xfb,0xf7,0xeb,0x0c,0xf3,0x1c); &LL(0xb9,0xb9,0xde,0xb9,0xa1,0x67,0x6f,0x18); &LL(0x13,0x13,0x4c,0x13,0x98,0x5f,0x26,0x8b); &LL(0x2c,0x2c,0xb0,0x2c,0x7d,0x9c,0x58,0x51); &LL(0xd3,0xd3,0x6b,0xd3,0xd6,0xb8,0xbb,0x05); &LL(0xe7,0xe7,0xbb,0xe7,0x6b,0x5c,0xd3,0x8c); &LL(0x6e,0x6e,0xa5,0x6e,0x57,0xcb,0xdc,0x39); &LL(0xc4,0xc4,0x37,0xc4,0x6e,0xf3,0x95,0xaa); &LL(0x03,0x03,0x0c,0x03,0x18,0x0f,0x06,0x1b); &LL(0x56,0x56,0x45,0x56,0x8a,0x13,0xac,0xdc); &LL(0x44,0x44,0x0d,0x44,0x1a,0x49,0x88,0x5e); &LL(0x7f,0x7f,0xe1,0x7f,0xdf,0x9e,0xfe,0xa0); &LL(0xa9,0xa9,0x9e,0xa9,0x21,0x37,0x4f,0x88); &LL(0x2a,0x2a,0xa8,0x2a,0x4d,0x82,0x54,0x67); &LL(0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,0xbb,0xb1,0x6d,0x6b,0x0a); &LL(0xc1,0xc1,0x23,0xc1,0x46,0xe2,0x9f,0x87); &LL(0x53,0x53,0x51,0x53,0xa2,0x02,0xa6,0xf1); &LL(0xdc,0xdc,0x57,0xdc,0xae,0x8b,0xa5,0x72); &LL(0x0b,0x0b,0x2c,0x0b,0x58,0x27,0x16,0x53); &LL(0x9d,0x9d,0x4e,0x9d,0x9c,0xd3,0x27,0x01); &LL(0x6c,0x6c,0xad,0x6c,0x47,0xc1,0xd8,0x2b); &LL(0x31,0x31,0xc4,0x31,0x95,0xf5,0x62,0xa4); &LL(0x74,0x74,0xcd,0x74,0x87,0xb9,0xe8,0xf3); &LL(0xf6,0xf6,0xff,0xf6,0xe3,0x09,0xf1,0x15); &LL(0x46,0x46,0x05,0x46,0x0a,0x43,0x8c,0x4c); &LL(0xac,0xac,0x8a,0xac,0x09,0x26,0x45,0xa5); &LL(0x89,0x89,0x1e,0x89,0x3c,0x97,0x0f,0xb5); &LL(0x14,0x14,0x50,0x14,0xa0,0x44,0x28,0xb4); &LL(0xe1,0xe1,0xa3,0xe1,0x5b,0x42,0xdf,0xba); &LL(0x16,0x16,0x58,0x16,0xb0,0x4e,0x2c,0xa6); &LL(0x3a,0x3a,0xe8,0x3a,0xcd,0xd2,0x74,0xf7); &LL(0x69,0x69,0xb9,0x69,0x6f,0xd0,0xd2,0x06); &LL(0x09,0x09,0x24,0x09,0x48,0x2d,0x12,0x41); &LL(0x70,0x70,0xdd,0x70,0xa7,0xad,0xe0,0xd7); &LL(0xb6,0xb6,0xe2,0xb6,0xd9,0x54,0x71,0x6f); &LL(0xd0,0xd0,0x67,0xd0,0xce,0xb7,0xbd,0x1e); &LL(0xed,0xed,0x93,0xed,0x3b,0x7e,0xc7,0xd6); &LL(0xcc,0xcc,0x17,0xcc,0x2e,0xdb,0x85,0xe2); &LL(0x42,0x42,0x15,0x42,0x2a,0x57,0x84,0x68); &LL(0x98,0x98,0x5a,0x98,0xb4,0xc2,0x2d,0x2c); &LL(0xa4,0xa4,0xaa,0xa4,0x49,0x0e,0x55,0xed); &LL(0x28,0x28,0xa0,0x28,0x5d,0x88,0x50,0x75); &LL(0x5c,0x5c,0x6d,0x5c,0xda,0x31,0xb8,0x86); &LL(0xf8,0xf8,0xc7,0xf8,0x93,0x3f,0xed,0x6b); &LL(0x86,0x86,0x22,0x86,0x44,0xa4,0x11,0xc2); &L(0x18,0x23,0xc6,0xe8,0x87,0xb8,0x01,0x4f); # rc[ROUNDS] &L(0x36,0xa6,0xd2,0xf5,0x79,0x6f,0x91,0x52); &L(0x60,0xbc,0x9b,0x8e,0xa3,0x0c,0x7b,0x35); &L(0x1d,0xe0,0xd7,0xc2,0x2e,0x4b,0xfe,0x57); &L(0x15,0x77,0x37,0xe5,0x9f,0xf0,0x4a,0xda); &L(0x58,0xc9,0x29,0x0a,0xb1,0xa0,0x6b,0x85); &L(0xbd,0x5d,0x10,0xf4,0xcb,0x3e,0x05,0x67); &L(0xe4,0x27,0x41,0x8b,0xa7,0x7d,0x95,0xd8); &L(0xfb,0xee,0x7c,0x66,0xdd,0x17,0x47,0x9e); &L(0xca,0x2d,0xbf,0x07,0xad,0x5a,0x83,0x33); &function_end_B("whirlpool_block_mmx"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c0000644000000000000000000002134513176625660017063 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /** * The Whirlpool hashing function. * *

* References * *

* The Whirlpool algorithm was developed by * Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and * Vincent Rijmen. * * See * P.S.L.M. Barreto, V. Rijmen, * ``The Whirlpool hashing function,'' * NESSIE submission, 2000 (tweaked version, 2001), * * * Based on "@version 3.0 (2003.03.12)" by Paulo S.L.M. Barreto and * Vincent Rijmen. Lookup "reference implementations" on * * * ============================================================================= * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ /* * OpenSSL-specific implementation notes. * * WHIRLPOOL_Update as well as one-stroke WHIRLPOOL both expect * number of *bytes* as input length argument. Bit-oriented routine * as specified by authors is called WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate[!] and * does not have one-stroke counterpart. * * WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate implements byte-oriented loop, essentially * to serve WHIRLPOOL_Update. This is done for performance. * * Unlike authors' reference implementation, block processing * routine whirlpool_block is designed to operate on multi-block * input. This is done for performance. */ #include #include "wp_locl.h" #include int WHIRLPOOL_Init(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); return (1); } int WHIRLPOOL_Update(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bytes) { /* * Well, largest suitable chunk size actually is * (1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-3))-64, but below number is large enough for not * to care about excessive calls to WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate... */ size_t chunk = ((size_t)1) << (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 4); const unsigned char *inp = _inp; while (bytes >= chunk) { WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(c, inp, chunk * 8); bytes -= chunk; inp += chunk; } if (bytes) WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(c, inp, bytes * 8); return (1); } void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits) { size_t n; unsigned int bitoff = c->bitoff, bitrem = bitoff % 8, inpgap = (8 - (unsigned int)bits % 8) & 7; const unsigned char *inp = _inp; /* * This 256-bit increment procedure relies on the size_t being natural * size of CPU register, so that we don't have to mask the value in order * to detect overflows. */ c->bitlen[0] += bits; if (c->bitlen[0] < bits) { /* overflow */ n = 1; do { c->bitlen[n]++; } while (c->bitlen[n] == 0 && ++n < (WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER / sizeof(size_t))); } #ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT reconsider: if (inpgap == 0 && bitrem == 0) { /* byte-oriented loop */ while (bits) { if (bitoff == 0 && (n = bits / WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK)) { whirlpool_block(c, inp, n); inp += n * WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8; bits %= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK; } else { unsigned int byteoff = bitoff / 8; bitrem = WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK - bitoff; /* re-use bitrem */ if (bits >= bitrem) { bits -= bitrem; bitrem /= 8; memcpy(c->data + byteoff, inp, bitrem); inp += bitrem; whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1); bitoff = 0; } else { memcpy(c->data + byteoff, inp, bits / 8); bitoff += (unsigned int)bits; bits = 0; } c->bitoff = bitoff; } } } else /* bit-oriented loop */ #endif { /*- inp | +-------+-------+------- ||||||||||||||||||||| +-------+-------+------- +-------+-------+-------+-------+------- |||||||||||||| c->data +-------+-------+-------+-------+------- | c->bitoff/8 */ while (bits) { unsigned int byteoff = bitoff / 8; unsigned char b; #ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT if (bitrem == inpgap) { c->data[byteoff++] |= inp[0] & (0xff >> inpgap); inpgap = 8 - inpgap; bitoff += inpgap; bitrem = 0; /* bitoff%8 */ bits -= inpgap; inpgap = 0; /* bits%8 */ inp++; if (bitoff == WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK) { whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1); bitoff = 0; } c->bitoff = bitoff; goto reconsider; } else #endif if (bits > 8) { b = ((inp[0] << inpgap) | (inp[1] >> (8 - inpgap))); b &= 0xff; if (bitrem) c->data[byteoff++] |= b >> bitrem; else c->data[byteoff++] = b; bitoff += 8; bits -= 8; inp++; if (bitoff >= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK) { whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1); byteoff = 0; bitoff %= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK; } if (bitrem) c->data[byteoff] = b << (8 - bitrem); } else { /* remaining less than or equal to 8 bits */ b = (inp[0] << inpgap) & 0xff; if (bitrem) c->data[byteoff++] |= b >> bitrem; else c->data[byteoff++] = b; bitoff += (unsigned int)bits; if (bitoff == WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK) { whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1); byteoff = 0; bitoff %= WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK; } if (bitrem) c->data[byteoff] = b << (8 - bitrem); bits = 0; } c->bitoff = bitoff; } } } int WHIRLPOOL_Final(unsigned char *md, WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c) { unsigned int bitoff = c->bitoff, byteoff = bitoff / 8; size_t i, j, v; unsigned char *p; bitoff %= 8; if (bitoff) c->data[byteoff] |= 0x80 >> bitoff; else c->data[byteoff] = 0x80; byteoff++; /* pad with zeros */ if (byteoff > (WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER)) { if (byteoff < WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8) memset(&c->data[byteoff], 0, WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - byteoff); whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1); byteoff = 0; } if (byteoff < (WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER)) memset(&c->data[byteoff], 0, (WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER) - byteoff); /* smash 256-bit c->bitlen in big-endian order */ p = &c->data[WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8 - 1]; /* last byte in c->data */ for (i = 0; i < WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER / sizeof(size_t); i++) for (v = c->bitlen[i], j = 0; j < sizeof(size_t); j++, v >>= 8) *p-- = (unsigned char)(v & 0xff); whirlpool_block(c, c->data, 1); if (md) { memcpy(md, c->H.c, WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH); OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(*c)); return (1); } return (0); } unsigned char *WHIRLPOOL(const void *inp, size_t bytes, unsigned char *md) { WHIRLPOOL_CTX ctx; static unsigned char m[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; WHIRLPOOL_Init(&ctx); WHIRLPOOL_Update(&ctx, inp, bytes); WHIRLPOOL_Final(md, &ctx); return (md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/whrlpool/wp_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000065213176625660017056 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include void whirlpool_block(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *, const void *, size_t); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sparc_arch.h0000644000000000000000000001033713176625660015657 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef __SPARC_ARCH_H__ # define __SPARC_ARCH_H__ # define SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED (1<<0) # define SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU (1<<1) # define SPARCV9_VIS1 (1<<2) # define SPARCV9_VIS2 (1<<3)/* reserved */ # define SPARCV9_FMADD (1<<4) # define SPARCV9_BLK (1<<5)/* VIS1 block copy */ # define SPARCV9_VIS3 (1<<6) # define SPARCV9_RANDOM (1<<7) # define SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK (1<<8) # define SPARCV9_FJAESX (1<<9)/* Fujitsu SPARC64 X AES */ # define SPARCV9_FJDESX (1<<10)/* Fujitsu SPARC64 X DES, reserved */ # define SPARCV9_FJHPCACE (1<<11)/* Fujitsu HPC-ACE, reserved */ # define SPARCV9_IMA (1<<13)/* reserved */ # define SPARCV9_VIS4 (1<<14)/* reserved */ /* * OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] is copy of Compatibility Feature Register, * %asr26, SPARC-T4 and later. There is no SPARCV9_CFR bit in * OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0], as %cfr copy is sufficient... */ # define CFR_AES 0x00000001/* Supports AES opcodes */ # define CFR_DES 0x00000002/* Supports DES opcodes */ # define CFR_KASUMI 0x00000004/* Supports KASUMI opcodes */ # define CFR_CAMELLIA 0x00000008/* Supports CAMELLIA opcodes */ # define CFR_MD5 0x00000010/* Supports MD5 opcodes */ # define CFR_SHA1 0x00000020/* Supports SHA1 opcodes */ # define CFR_SHA256 0x00000040/* Supports SHA256 opcodes */ # define CFR_SHA512 0x00000080/* Supports SHA512 opcodes */ # define CFR_MPMUL 0x00000100/* Supports MPMUL opcodes */ # define CFR_MONTMUL 0x00000200/* Supports MONTMUL opcodes */ # define CFR_MONTSQR 0x00000400/* Supports MONTSQR opcodes */ # define CFR_CRC32C 0x00000800/* Supports CRC32C opcodes */ # define CFR_XMPMUL 0x00001000/* Supports XMPMUL opcodes */ # define CFR_XMONTMUL 0x00002000/* Supports XMONTMUL opcodes */ # define CFR_XMONTSQR 0x00004000/* Supports XMONTSQR opcodes */ # if defined(OPENSSL_PIC) && !defined(__PIC__) # define __PIC__ # endif # if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9) && !defined(__arch64__) # define __arch64__ # endif # define SPARC_PIC_THUNK(reg) \ .align 32; \ .Lpic_thunk: \ jmp %o7 + 8; \ add %o7, reg, reg; # define SPARC_PIC_THUNK_CALL(reg) \ sethi %hi(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_-4), reg; \ call .Lpic_thunk; \ or reg, %lo(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+4), reg; # if 1 # define SPARC_SETUP_GOT_REG(reg) SPARC_PIC_THUNK_CALL(reg) # else # define SPARC_SETUP_GOT_REG(reg) \ sethi %hi(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_-4), reg; \ call .+8; \ or reg,%lo(_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+4), reg; \ add %o7, reg, reg # endif # if defined(__arch64__) # define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg) \ setx SYM, %o7, reg; # define LDPTR ldx # define SIZE_T_CC %xcc # define STACK_FRAME 192 # define STACK_BIAS 2047 # define STACK_7thARG (STACK_BIAS+176) # else # define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg) \ set SYM, reg; # define LDPTR ld # define SIZE_T_CC %icc # define STACK_FRAME 112 # define STACK_BIAS 0 # define STACK_7thARG 92 # define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(SYM,reg,tmp) SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM,reg) # endif # ifdef __PIC__ # undef SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS # undef SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF # define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg) \ SPARC_SETUP_GOT_REG(reg); \ sethi %hi(SYM), %o7; \ or %o7, %lo(SYM), %o7; \ LDPTR [reg + %o7], reg; # endif # ifndef SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF # define SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(SYM, reg, tmp) \ mov %o7, tmp; \ SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(SYM, reg) \ mov tmp, %o7; # endif #endif /* __SPARC_ARCH_H__ */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014170 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/build.info0000644000000000000000000000021613176625657016143 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ dso_dl.c dso_dlfcn.c dso_err.c dso_lib.c \ dso_openssl.c dso_win32.c dso_vms.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c0000644000000000000000000004123713176625657016152 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "dso_locl.h" #if defined(DSO_WIN32) # ifdef _WIN32_WCE # if _WIN32_WCE < 300 static FARPROC GetProcAddressA(HMODULE hModule, LPCSTR lpProcName) { WCHAR lpProcNameW[64]; int i; for (i = 0; lpProcName[i] && i < 64; i++) lpProcNameW[i] = (WCHAR)lpProcName[i]; if (i == 64) return NULL; lpProcNameW[i] = 0; return GetProcAddressW(hModule, lpProcNameW); } # endif # undef GetProcAddress # define GetProcAddress GetProcAddressA static HINSTANCE LoadLibraryA(LPCSTR lpLibFileName) { WCHAR *fnamw; size_t len_0 = strlen(lpLibFileName) + 1, i; # ifdef _MSC_VER fnamw = (WCHAR *)_alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR)); # else fnamw = (WCHAR *)alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR)); # endif if (fnamw == NULL) { SetLastError(ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY); return NULL; } # if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, lpLibFileName, len_0, fnamw, len_0)) # endif for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) fnamw[i] = (WCHAR)lpLibFileName[i]; return LoadLibraryW(fnamw); } # endif /* Part of the hack in "win32_load" ... */ # define DSO_MAX_TRANSLATED_SIZE 256 static int win32_load(DSO *dso); static int win32_unload(DSO *dso); static DSO_FUNC_TYPE win32_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname); static char *win32_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename); static char *win32_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2); static void *win32_globallookup(const char *name); static const char *openssl_strnchr(const char *string, int c, size_t len); static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_win32 = { "OpenSSL 'win32' shared library method", win32_load, win32_unload, win32_bind_func, NULL, /* ctrl */ win32_name_converter, win32_merger, NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* finish */ NULL, /* pathbyaddr */ win32_globallookup }; DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void) { return &dso_meth_win32; } /* * For this DSO_METHOD, our meth_data STACK will contain; (i) a pointer to * the handle (HINSTANCE) returned from LoadLibrary(), and copied. */ static int win32_load(DSO *dso) { HINSTANCE h = NULL, *p = NULL; /* See applicable comments from dso_dl.c */ char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL); if (filename == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); goto err; } h = LoadLibraryA(filename); if (h == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED); ERR_add_error_data(3, "filename(", filename, ")"); goto err; } p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p)); if (p == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } *p = h; if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, p)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); goto err; } /* Success */ dso->loaded_filename = filename; return (1); err: /* Cleanup ! */ OPENSSL_free(filename); OPENSSL_free(p); if (h != NULL) FreeLibrary(h); return (0); } static int win32_unload(DSO *dso) { HINSTANCE *p; if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) return (1); p = sk_void_pop(dso->meth_data); if (p == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); return (0); } if (!FreeLibrary(*p)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD, DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED); /* * We should push the value back onto the stack in case of a retry. */ sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, p); return (0); } /* Cleanup */ OPENSSL_free(p); return (1); } static DSO_FUNC_TYPE win32_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname) { HINSTANCE *ptr; union { void *p; FARPROC f; } sym; if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); return (NULL); } ptr = sk_void_value(dso->meth_data, sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) - 1); if (ptr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); return (NULL); } sym.f = GetProcAddress(*ptr, symname); if (sym.p == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE); ERR_add_error_data(3, "symname(", symname, ")"); return (NULL); } return ((DSO_FUNC_TYPE)sym.f); } struct file_st { const char *node; int nodelen; const char *device; int devicelen; const char *predir; int predirlen; const char *dir; int dirlen; const char *file; int filelen; }; static struct file_st *win32_splitter(DSO *dso, const char *filename, int assume_last_is_dir) { struct file_st *result = NULL; enum { IN_NODE, IN_DEVICE, IN_FILE } position; const char *start = filename; char last; if (!filename) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); /* * goto err; */ return (NULL); } result = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*result)); if (result == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } position = IN_DEVICE; if ((filename[0] == '\\' && filename[1] == '\\') || (filename[0] == '/' && filename[1] == '/')) { position = IN_NODE; filename += 2; start = filename; result->node = start; } do { last = filename[0]; switch (last) { case ':': if (position != IN_DEVICE) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER, DSO_R_INCORRECT_FILE_SYNTAX); /* * goto err; */ OPENSSL_free(result); return (NULL); } result->device = start; result->devicelen = (int)(filename - start); position = IN_FILE; start = ++filename; result->dir = start; break; case '\\': case '/': if (position == IN_NODE) { result->nodelen = (int)(filename - start); position = IN_FILE; start = ++filename; result->dir = start; } else if (position == IN_DEVICE) { position = IN_FILE; filename++; result->dir = start; result->dirlen = (int)(filename - start); start = filename; } else { filename++; result->dirlen += (int)(filename - start); start = filename; } break; case '\0': if (position == IN_NODE) { result->nodelen = (int)(filename - start); } else { if (filename - start > 0) { if (assume_last_is_dir) { if (position == IN_DEVICE) { result->dir = start; result->dirlen = 0; } result->dirlen += (int)(filename - start); } else { result->file = start; result->filelen = (int)(filename - start); } } } break; default: filename++; break; } } while (last); if (!result->nodelen) result->node = NULL; if (!result->devicelen) result->device = NULL; if (!result->dirlen) result->dir = NULL; if (!result->filelen) result->file = NULL; return (result); } static char *win32_joiner(DSO *dso, const struct file_st *file_split) { int len = 0, offset = 0; char *result = NULL; const char *start; if (!file_split) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if (file_split->node) { len += 2 + file_split->nodelen; /* 2 for starting \\ */ if (file_split->predir || file_split->dir || file_split->file) len++; /* 1 for ending \ */ } else if (file_split->device) { len += file_split->devicelen + 1; /* 1 for ending : */ } len += file_split->predirlen; if (file_split->predir && (file_split->dir || file_split->file)) { len++; /* 1 for ending \ */ } len += file_split->dirlen; if (file_split->dir && file_split->file) { len++; /* 1 for ending \ */ } len += file_split->filelen; if (!len) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER, DSO_R_EMPTY_FILE_STRUCTURE); return (NULL); } result = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); if (result == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } if (file_split->node) { strcpy(&result[offset], "\\\\"); offset += 2; strncpy(&result[offset], file_split->node, file_split->nodelen); offset += file_split->nodelen; if (file_split->predir || file_split->dir || file_split->file) { result[offset] = '\\'; offset++; } } else if (file_split->device) { strncpy(&result[offset], file_split->device, file_split->devicelen); offset += file_split->devicelen; result[offset] = ':'; offset++; } start = file_split->predir; while (file_split->predirlen > (start - file_split->predir)) { const char *end = openssl_strnchr(start, '/', file_split->predirlen - (start - file_split->predir)); if (!end) end = start + file_split->predirlen - (start - file_split->predir); strncpy(&result[offset], start, end - start); offset += (int)(end - start); result[offset] = '\\'; offset++; start = end + 1; } start = file_split->dir; while (file_split->dirlen > (start - file_split->dir)) { const char *end = openssl_strnchr(start, '/', file_split->dirlen - (start - file_split->dir)); if (!end) end = start + file_split->dirlen - (start - file_split->dir); strncpy(&result[offset], start, end - start); offset += (int)(end - start); result[offset] = '\\'; offset++; start = end + 1; } strncpy(&result[offset], file_split->file, file_split->filelen); offset += file_split->filelen; result[offset] = '\0'; return (result); } static char *win32_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2) { char *merged = NULL; struct file_st *filespec1_split = NULL; struct file_st *filespec2_split = NULL; if (!filespec1 && !filespec2) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if (!filespec2) { merged = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(filespec1) + 1); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } strcpy(merged, filespec1); } else if (!filespec1) { merged = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(filespec2) + 1); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } strcpy(merged, filespec2); } else { filespec1_split = win32_splitter(dso, filespec1, 0); if (!filespec1_split) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } filespec2_split = win32_splitter(dso, filespec2, 1); if (!filespec2_split) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(filespec1_split); return (NULL); } /* Fill in into filespec1_split */ if (!filespec1_split->node && !filespec1_split->device) { filespec1_split->node = filespec2_split->node; filespec1_split->nodelen = filespec2_split->nodelen; filespec1_split->device = filespec2_split->device; filespec1_split->devicelen = filespec2_split->devicelen; } if (!filespec1_split->dir) { filespec1_split->dir = filespec2_split->dir; filespec1_split->dirlen = filespec2_split->dirlen; } else if (filespec1_split->dir[0] != '\\' && filespec1_split->dir[0] != '/') { filespec1_split->predir = filespec2_split->dir; filespec1_split->predirlen = filespec2_split->dirlen; } if (!filespec1_split->file) { filespec1_split->file = filespec2_split->file; filespec1_split->filelen = filespec2_split->filelen; } merged = win32_joiner(dso, filespec1_split); } OPENSSL_free(filespec1_split); OPENSSL_free(filespec2_split); return (merged); } static char *win32_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { char *translated; int len, transform; len = strlen(filename); transform = ((strstr(filename, "/") == NULL) && (strstr(filename, "\\") == NULL) && (strstr(filename, ":") == NULL)); if (transform) /* We will convert this to "%s.dll" */ translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 5); else /* We will simply duplicate filename */ translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); if (translated == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_NAME_CONVERTER, DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED); return (NULL); } if (transform) sprintf(translated, "%s.dll", filename); else sprintf(translated, "%s", filename); return (translated); } static const char *openssl_strnchr(const char *string, int c, size_t len) { size_t i; const char *p; for (i = 0, p = string; i < len && *p; i++, p++) { if (*p == c) return p; } return NULL; } # include # ifdef _WIN32_WCE # define DLLNAME "TOOLHELP.DLL" # else # ifdef MODULEENTRY32 # undef MODULEENTRY32 /* unmask the ASCII version! */ # endif # define DLLNAME "KERNEL32.DLL" # endif typedef HANDLE(WINAPI *CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) (DWORD, DWORD); typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) (HANDLE); typedef BOOL(WINAPI *MODULE32) (HANDLE, MODULEENTRY32 *); static void *win32_globallookup(const char *name) { HMODULE dll; HANDLE hModuleSnap = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; MODULEENTRY32 me32; CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT create_snap; CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT close_snap; MODULE32 module_first, module_next; union { void *p; FARPROC f; } ret = { NULL }; dll = LoadLibrary(TEXT(DLLNAME)); if (dll == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); return NULL; } create_snap = (CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) GetProcAddress(dll, "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot"); if (create_snap == NULL) { FreeLibrary(dll); DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); return NULL; } /* We take the rest for granted... */ # ifdef _WIN32_WCE close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) GetProcAddress(dll, "CloseToolhelp32Snapshot"); # else close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) CloseHandle; # endif module_first = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(dll, "Module32First"); module_next = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(dll, "Module32Next"); hModuleSnap = (*create_snap) (TH32CS_SNAPMODULE, 0); if (hModuleSnap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { FreeLibrary(dll); DSOerr(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); return NULL; } me32.dwSize = sizeof(me32); if (!(*module_first) (hModuleSnap, &me32)) { (*close_snap) (hModuleSnap); FreeLibrary(dll); return NULL; } do { if ((ret.f = GetProcAddress(me32.hModule, name))) { (*close_snap) (hModuleSnap); FreeLibrary(dll); return ret.p; } } while ((*module_next) (hModuleSnap, &me32)); (*close_snap) (hModuleSnap); FreeLibrary(dll); return NULL; } #endif /* DSO_WIN32 */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_err.c0000644000000000000000000000756613176625657016007 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/dso.h" /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSO,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSO,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA DSO_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC), "dlfcn_bind_func"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD), "dlfcn_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER), "dlfcn_merger"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_NAME_CONVERTER), "dlfcn_name_converter"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD), "dlfcn_unload"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC), "dl_bind_func"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_LOAD), "dl_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_MERGER), "dl_merger"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_NAME_CONVERTER), "dl_name_converter"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD), "dl_unload"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC), "DSO_bind_func"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME), "DSO_convert_filename"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_CTRL), "DSO_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_FREE), "DSO_free"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_GET_FILENAME), "DSO_get_filename"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_GLOBAL_LOOKUP), "DSO_global_lookup"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD), "DSO_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_MERGE), "DSO_merge"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD), "DSO_new_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_PATHBYADDR), "DSO_pathbyaddr"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME), "DSO_set_filename"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_DSO_UP_REF), "DSO_up_ref"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM), "vms_bind_sym"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD), "vms_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_MERGER), "vms_merger"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD), "vms_unload"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC), "win32_bind_func"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP), "win32_globallookup"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER), "win32_joiner"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD), "win32_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER), "win32_merger"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_NAME_CONVERTER), "win32_name_converter"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_PATHBYADDR), "win32_pathbyaddr"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER), "win32_splitter"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD), "win32_unload"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA DSO_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_CTRL_FAILED), "control command failed"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED), "dso already loaded"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_EMPTY_FILE_STRUCTURE), "empty file structure"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_FAILURE), "failure"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_FILENAME_TOO_BIG), "filename too big"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_FINISH_FAILED), "cleanup method function failed"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_INCORRECT_FILE_SYNTAX), "incorrect file syntax"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED), "could not load the shared library"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED), "name translation failed"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_NO_FILENAME), "no filename"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE), "a null shared library handle was used"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_SET_FILENAME_FAILED), "set filename failed"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_STACK_ERROR), "the meth_data stack is corrupt"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE), "could not bind to the requested symbol name"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED), "could not unload the shared library"}, {ERR_REASON(DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED), "functionality not supported"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_DSO_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(DSO_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, DSO_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, DSO_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c0000644000000000000000000003433213176625657016013 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "dso_locl.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # pragma message disable DOLLARID # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include "../vms_rms.h" /* Some compiler options may mask the declaration of "_malloc32". */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined _ANSI_C_SOURCE # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 void *_malloc32(__size_t); # pragma pointer_size restore # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined * _ANSI_C_SOURCE */ # pragma message disable DOLLARID static int vms_load(DSO *dso); static int vms_unload(DSO *dso); static DSO_FUNC_TYPE vms_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname); static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename); static char *vms_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2); static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_vms = { "OpenSSL 'VMS' shared library method", vms_load, NULL, /* unload */ vms_bind_func, NULL, /* ctrl */ vms_name_converter, vms_merger, NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* finish */ NULL, /* pathbyaddr */ NULL /* globallookup */ }; /* * On VMS, the only "handle" is the file name. LIB$FIND_IMAGE_SYMBOL depends * on the reference to the file name being the same for all calls regarding * one shared image, so we'll just store it in an instance of the following * structure and put a pointer to that instance in the meth_data stack. */ typedef struct dso_internal_st { /* * This should contain the name only, no directory, no extension, nothing * but a name. */ struct dsc$descriptor_s filename_dsc; char filename[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; /* * This contains whatever is not in filename, if needed. Normally not * defined. */ struct dsc$descriptor_s imagename_dsc; char imagename[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; } DSO_VMS_INTERNAL; DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void) { return &dso_meth_vms; } static int vms_load(DSO *dso) { void *ptr = NULL; /* See applicable comments in dso_dl.c */ char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL); /* Ensure 32-bit pointer for "p", and appropriate malloc() function. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define DSO_MALLOC _malloc32 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define DSO_MALLOC OPENSSL_malloc # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *p = NULL; # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size restore # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ const char *sp1, *sp2; /* Search result */ const char *ext = NULL; /* possible extension to add */ if (filename == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); goto err; } /*- * A file specification may look like this: * * node::dev:[dir-spec]name.type;ver * * or (for compatibility with TOPS-20): * * node::dev:name.type;ver * * and the dir-spec uses '.' as separator. Also, a dir-spec * may consist of several parts, with mixed use of [] and <>: * * [dir1.] * * We need to split the file specification into the name and * the rest (both before and after the name itself). */ /* * Start with trying to find the end of a dir-spec, and save the position * of the byte after in sp1 */ sp1 = strrchr(filename, ']'); sp2 = strrchr(filename, '>'); if (sp1 == NULL) sp1 = sp2; if (sp2 != NULL && sp2 > sp1) sp1 = sp2; if (sp1 == NULL) sp1 = strrchr(filename, ':'); if (sp1 == NULL) sp1 = filename; else sp1++; /* The byte after the found character */ /* Now, let's see if there's a type, and save the position in sp2 */ sp2 = strchr(sp1, '.'); /* * If there is a period and the next character is a semi-colon, * we need to add an extension */ if (sp2 != NULL && sp2[1] == ';') ext = ".EXE"; /* * If we found it, that's where we'll cut. Otherwise, look for a version * number and save the position in sp2 */ if (sp2 == NULL) { sp2 = strchr(sp1, ';'); ext = ".EXE"; } /* * If there was still nothing to find, set sp2 to point at the end of the * string */ if (sp2 == NULL) sp2 = sp1 + strlen(sp1); /* Check that we won't get buffer overflows */ if (sp2 - sp1 > FILENAME_MAX || (sp1 - filename) + strlen(sp2) > FILENAME_MAX) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_FILENAME_TOO_BIG); goto err; } p = DSO_MALLOC(sizeof(*p)); if (p == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } strncpy(p->filename, sp1, sp2 - sp1); p->filename[sp2 - sp1] = '\0'; strncpy(p->imagename, filename, sp1 - filename); p->imagename[sp1 - filename] = '\0'; if (ext) { strcat(p->imagename, ext); if (*sp2 == '.') sp2++; } strcat(p->imagename, sp2); p->filename_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(p->filename); p->filename_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; p->filename_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; p->filename_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = p->filename; p->imagename_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(p->imagename); p->imagename_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; p->imagename_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; p->imagename_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = p->imagename; if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)p)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); goto err; } /* Success (for now, we lie. We actually do not know...) */ dso->loaded_filename = filename; return (1); err: /* Cleanup! */ OPENSSL_free(p); OPENSSL_free(filename); return (0); } /* * Note that this doesn't actually unload the shared image, as there is no * such thing in VMS. Next time it get loaded again, a new copy will * actually be loaded. */ static int vms_unload(DSO *dso) { DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *p; if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) return (1); p = (DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *)sk_void_pop(dso->meth_data); if (p == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); return (0); } /* Cleanup */ OPENSSL_free(p); return (1); } /* * We must do this in a separate function because of the way the exception * handler works (it makes this function return */ static int do_find_symbol(DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *ptr, struct dsc$descriptor_s *symname_dsc, void **sym, unsigned long flags) { /* * Make sure that signals are caught and returned instead of aborting the * program. The exception handler gets unestablished automatically on * return from this function. */ lib$establish(lib$sig_to_ret); if (ptr->imagename_dsc.dsc$w_length) return lib$find_image_symbol(&ptr->filename_dsc, symname_dsc, sym, &ptr->imagename_dsc, flags); else return lib$find_image_symbol(&ptr->filename_dsc, symname_dsc, sym, 0, flags); } void vms_bind_sym(DSO *dso, const char *symname, void **sym) { DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *ptr; int status; # ifdef LIB$M_FIS_MIXEDCASE int flags = LIB$M_FIS_MIXEDCASE; # else int flags = (1 << 4); # endif struct dsc$descriptor_s symname_dsc; /* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define SYMNAME symname_32p # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 char *symname_32p; # pragma pointer_size restore char symname_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define SYMNAME ((char *) symname) # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ *sym = NULL; if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return; } # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 /* Copy the symbol name to storage with a 32-bit pointer. */ symname_32p = symname_32; strcpy(symname_32p, symname); # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ symname_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(SYMNAME); symname_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; symname_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; symname_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = SYMNAME; if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); return; } ptr = (DSO_VMS_INTERNAL *)sk_void_value(dso->meth_data, sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) - 1); if (ptr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); return; } if (dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_UPCASE_SYMBOL) flags = 0; status = do_find_symbol(ptr, &symname_dsc, sym, flags); if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) { unsigned short length; char errstring[257]; struct dsc$descriptor_s errstring_dsc; errstring_dsc.dsc$w_length = sizeof(errstring); errstring_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; errstring_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; errstring_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = errstring; *sym = NULL; status = sys$getmsg(status, &length, &errstring_dsc, 1, 0); if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) lib$signal(status); /* This is really bad. Abort! */ else { errstring[length] = '\0'; DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE); if (ptr->imagename_dsc.dsc$w_length) ERR_add_error_data(9, "Symbol ", symname, " in ", ptr->filename, " (", ptr->imagename, ")", ": ", errstring); else ERR_add_error_data(6, "Symbol ", symname, " in ", ptr->filename, ": ", errstring); } return; } return; } static DSO_FUNC_TYPE vms_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname) { DSO_FUNC_TYPE sym = 0; vms_bind_sym(dso, symname, (void **)&sym); return sym; } static char *vms_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2) { int status; int filespec1len, filespec2len; struct FAB fab; struct NAMX_STRUCT nam; char esa[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; char *merged; /* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define FILESPEC1 filespec1_32p; # define FILESPEC2 filespec2_32p; # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 char *filespec1_32p; char *filespec2_32p; # pragma pointer_size restore char filespec1_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; char filespec2_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define FILESPEC1 ((char *) filespec1) # define FILESPEC2 ((char *) filespec2) # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ if (!filespec1) filespec1 = ""; if (!filespec2) filespec2 = ""; filespec1len = strlen(filespec1); filespec2len = strlen(filespec2); # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 /* Copy the file names to storage with a 32-bit pointer. */ filespec1_32p = filespec1_32; filespec2_32p = filespec2_32; strcpy(filespec1_32p, filespec1); strcpy(filespec2_32p, filespec2); # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ fab = cc$rms_fab; nam = CC_RMS_NAMX; FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_FNA = FILESPEC1; FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_FNS = filespec1len; FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_DNA = FILESPEC2; FAB_OR_NAML(fab, nam).FAB_OR_NAML_DNS = filespec2len; NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab) nam.NAMX_ESA = esa; nam.NAMX_ESS = NAMX_MAXRSS; nam.NAMX_NOP = NAM$M_SYNCHK | NAM$M_PWD; SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE(nam); fab.FAB_NAMX = &nam; status = sys$parse(&fab, 0, 0); if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) { unsigned short length; char errstring[257]; struct dsc$descriptor_s errstring_dsc; errstring_dsc.dsc$w_length = sizeof(errstring); errstring_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; errstring_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; errstring_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = errstring; status = sys$getmsg(status, &length, &errstring_dsc, 1, 0); if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) lib$signal(status); /* This is really bad. Abort! */ else { errstring[length] = '\0'; DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_MERGER, DSO_R_FAILURE); ERR_add_error_data(7, "filespec \"", filespec1, "\", ", "defaults \"", filespec2, "\": ", errstring); } return (NULL); } merged = OPENSSL_malloc(nam.NAMX_ESL + 1); if (merged == NULL) goto malloc_err; strncpy(merged, nam.NAMX_ESA, nam.NAMX_ESL); merged[nam.NAMX_ESL] = '\0'; return (merged); malloc_err: DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); } static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { int len = strlen(filename); char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); if (not_translated != NULL) strcpy(not_translated, filename); return (not_translated); } #endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_openssl.c0000644000000000000000000000115113176625657016662 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "dso_locl.h" #if !defined(DSO_VMS) && !defined(DSO_DLCFN) && !defined(DSO_DL) && !defined(DSO_WIN32) && !defined(DSO_DLFCN) static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_null = { "NULL shared library method" }; DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void) { return &dso_meth_null; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c0000644000000000000000000002243613176625657015756 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "dso_locl.h" static DSO_METHOD *default_DSO_meth = NULL; static DSO *DSO_new_method(DSO_METHOD *meth) { DSO *ret; if (default_DSO_meth == NULL) { /* * We default to DSO_METH_openssl() which in turn defaults to * stealing the "best available" method. Will fallback to * DSO_METH_null() in the worst case. */ default_DSO_meth = DSO_METHOD_openssl(); } ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } ret->meth_data = sk_void_new_null(); if (ret->meth_data == NULL) { /* sk_new doesn't generate any errors so we do */ DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return (NULL); } ret->meth = default_DSO_meth; ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); sk_void_free(ret->meth_data); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { DSO_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return ret; } DSO *DSO_new(void) { return DSO_new_method(NULL); } int DSO_free(DSO *dso) { int i; if (dso == NULL) return (1); if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dso->references, -1, &i, dso->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSO", dso); if (i > 0) return 1; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); if ((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE) == 0) { if ((dso->meth->dso_unload != NULL) && !dso->meth->dso_unload(dso)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_FREE, DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED); return 0; } } if ((dso->meth->finish != NULL) && !dso->meth->finish(dso)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_FREE, DSO_R_FINISH_FAILED); return 0; } sk_void_free(dso->meth_data); OPENSSL_free(dso->filename); OPENSSL_free(dso->loaded_filename); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dso->lock); OPENSSL_free(dso); return 1; } int DSO_flags(DSO *dso) { return ((dso == NULL) ? 0 : dso->flags); } int DSO_up_ref(DSO *dso) { int i; if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dso->references, 1, &i, dso->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSO", r); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } DSO *DSO_load(DSO *dso, const char *filename, DSO_METHOD *meth, int flags) { DSO *ret; int allocated = 0; if (dso == NULL) { ret = DSO_new_method(meth); if (ret == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } allocated = 1; /* Pass the provided flags to the new DSO object */ if (DSO_ctrl(ret, DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, flags, NULL) < 0) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_CTRL_FAILED); goto err; } } else ret = dso; /* Don't load if we're currently already loaded */ if (ret->filename != NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED); goto err; } /* * filename can only be NULL if we were passed a dso that already has one * set. */ if (filename != NULL) if (!DSO_set_filename(ret, filename)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_SET_FILENAME_FAILED); goto err; } filename = ret->filename; if (filename == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); goto err; } if (ret->meth->dso_load == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); goto err; } if (!ret->meth->dso_load(ret)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED); goto err; } /* Load succeeded */ return (ret); err: if (allocated) DSO_free(ret); return (NULL); } DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname) { DSO_FUNC_TYPE ret = NULL; if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if (dso->meth->dso_bind_func == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); return (NULL); } if ((ret = dso->meth->dso_bind_func(dso, symname)) == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE); return (NULL); } /* Success */ return (ret); } /* * I don't really like these *_ctrl functions very much to be perfectly * honest. For one thing, I think I have to return a negative value for any * error because possible DSO_ctrl() commands may return values such as * "size"s that can legitimately be zero (making the standard * "if (DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd * times. I'd prefer "output" values to be passed by reference and the return * value as success/failure like usual ... but we conform when we must... :-) */ long DSO_ctrl(DSO *dso, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (-1); } /* * We should intercept certain generic commands and only pass control to * the method-specific ctrl() function if it's something we don't handle. */ switch (cmd) { case DSO_CTRL_GET_FLAGS: return dso->flags; case DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS: dso->flags = (int)larg; return (0); case DSO_CTRL_OR_FLAGS: dso->flags |= (int)larg; return (0); default: break; } if ((dso->meth == NULL) || (dso->meth->dso_ctrl == NULL)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CTRL, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); return (-1); } return (dso->meth->dso_ctrl(dso, cmd, larg, parg)); } const char *DSO_get_filename(DSO *dso) { if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_GET_FILENAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } return (dso->filename); } int DSO_set_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { char *copied; if ((dso == NULL) || (filename == NULL)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (dso->loaded_filename) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME, DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED); return (0); } /* We'll duplicate filename */ copied = OPENSSL_strdup(filename); if (copied == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } OPENSSL_free(dso->filename); dso->filename = copied; return (1); } char *DSO_merge(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2) { char *result = NULL; if (dso == NULL || filespec1 == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_MERGE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if ((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0) { if (dso->merger != NULL) result = dso->merger(dso, filespec1, filespec2); else if (dso->meth->dso_merger != NULL) result = dso->meth->dso_merger(dso, filespec1, filespec2); } return (result); } char *DSO_convert_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { char *result = NULL; if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if (filename == NULL) filename = dso->filename; if (filename == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); return (NULL); } if ((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0) { if (dso->name_converter != NULL) result = dso->name_converter(dso, filename); else if (dso->meth->dso_name_converter != NULL) result = dso->meth->dso_name_converter(dso, filename); } if (result == NULL) { result = OPENSSL_strdup(filename); if (result == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } } return (result); } int DSO_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz) { DSO_METHOD *meth = default_DSO_meth; if (meth == NULL) meth = DSO_METHOD_openssl(); if (meth->pathbyaddr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_PATHBYADDR, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); return -1; } return (*meth->pathbyaddr) (addr, path, sz); } DSO *DSO_dsobyaddr(void *addr, int flags) { DSO *ret = NULL; char *filename = NULL; int len = DSO_pathbyaddr(addr, NULL, 0); if (len < 0) return NULL; filename = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (filename != NULL && DSO_pathbyaddr(addr, filename, len) == len) ret = DSO_load(NULL, filename, NULL, flags); OPENSSL_free(filename); return ret; } void *DSO_global_lookup(const char *name) { DSO_METHOD *meth = default_DSO_meth; if (meth == NULL) meth = DSO_METHOD_openssl(); if (meth->globallookup == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_GLOBAL_LOOKUP, DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED); return NULL; } return (*meth->globallookup) (name); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_dl.c0000644000000000000000000002021713176625657015602 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "dso_locl.h" #ifdef DSO_DL # include /* Part of the hack in "dl_load" ... */ # define DSO_MAX_TRANSLATED_SIZE 256 static int dl_load(DSO *dso); static int dl_unload(DSO *dso); static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dl_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname); static char *dl_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename); static char *dl_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2); static int dl_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz); static void *dl_globallookup(const char *name); static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_dl = { "OpenSSL 'dl' shared library method", dl_load, dl_unload, dl_bind_func, NULL, /* ctrl */ dl_name_converter, dl_merger, NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* finish */ dl_pathbyaddr, dl_globallookup }; DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void) { return &dso_meth_dl; } /* * For this DSO_METHOD, our meth_data STACK will contain; (i) the handle * (shl_t) returned from shl_load(). NB: I checked on HPUX11 and shl_t is * itself a pointer type so the cast is safe. */ static int dl_load(DSO *dso) { shl_t ptr = NULL; /* * We don't do any fancy retries or anything, just take the method's (or * DSO's if it has the callback set) best translation of the * platform-independent filename and try once with that. */ char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL); if (filename == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); goto err; } ptr = shl_load(filename, BIND_IMMEDIATE | (dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION ? 0 : DYNAMIC_PATH), 0L); if (ptr == NULL) { char errbuf[160]; DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED); if (openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf))) ERR_add_error_data(4, "filename(", filename, "): ", errbuf); goto err; } if (!sk_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); goto err; } /* * Success, stick the converted filename we've loaded under into the DSO * (it also serves as the indicator that we are currently loaded). */ dso->loaded_filename = filename; return (1); err: /* Cleanup! */ OPENSSL_free(filename); if (ptr != NULL) shl_unload(ptr); return (0); } static int dl_unload(DSO *dso) { shl_t ptr; if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (sk_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) return (1); /* Is this statement legal? */ ptr = (shl_t) sk_pop(dso->meth_data); if (ptr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); /* * Should push the value back onto the stack in case of a retry. */ sk_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr); return (0); } shl_unload(ptr); return (1); } static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dl_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname) { shl_t ptr; void *sym; if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if (sk_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); return (NULL); } ptr = (shl_t) sk_value(dso->meth_data, sk_num(dso->meth_data) - 1); if (ptr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); return (NULL); } if (shl_findsym(&ptr, symname, TYPE_UNDEFINED, &sym) < 0) { char errbuf[160]; DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE); if (openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf))) ERR_add_error_data(4, "symname(", symname, "): ", errbuf); return (NULL); } return ((DSO_FUNC_TYPE)sym); } static char *dl_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2) { char *merged; if (!filespec1 && !filespec2) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } /* * If the first file specification is a rooted path, it rules. same goes * if the second file specification is missing. */ if (!filespec2 || filespec1[0] == '/') { merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec1); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } } /* * If the first file specification is missing, the second one rules. */ else if (!filespec1) { merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec2); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } } else /* * This part isn't as trivial as it looks. It assumes that the * second file specification really is a directory, and makes no * checks whatsoever. Therefore, the result becomes the * concatenation of filespec2 followed by a slash followed by * filespec1. */ { int spec2len, len; spec2len = (filespec2 ? strlen(filespec2) : 0); len = spec2len + (filespec1 ? strlen(filespec1) : 0); if (spec2len && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') { spec2len--; len--; } merged = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 2); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } strcpy(merged, filespec2); merged[spec2len] = '/'; strcpy(&merged[spec2len + 1], filespec1); } return (merged); } /* * This function is identical to the one in dso_dlfcn.c, but as it is highly * unlikely that both the "dl" *and* "dlfcn" variants are being compiled at * the same time, there's no great duplicating the code. Figuring out an * elegant way to share one copy of the code would be more difficult and * would not leave the implementations independent. */ static char *dl_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { char *translated; int len, rsize, transform; len = strlen(filename); rsize = len + 1; transform = (strstr(filename, "/") == NULL); { /* We will convert this to "%s.s?" or "lib%s.s?" */ rsize += strlen(DSO_EXTENSION); /* The length of ".s?" */ if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0) rsize += 3; /* The length of "lib" */ } translated = OPENSSL_malloc(rsize); if (translated == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DL_NAME_CONVERTER, DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED); return (NULL); } if (transform) { if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0) sprintf(translated, "lib%s%s", filename, DSO_EXTENSION); else sprintf(translated, "%s%s", filename, DSO_EXTENSION); } else sprintf(translated, "%s", filename); return (translated); } static int dl_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz) { struct shl_descriptor inf; int i, len; if (addr == NULL) { union { int (*f) (void *, char *, int); void *p; } t = { dl_pathbyaddr }; addr = t.p; } for (i = -1; shl_get_r(i, &inf) == 0; i++) { if (((size_t)addr >= inf.tstart && (size_t)addr < inf.tend) || ((size_t)addr >= inf.dstart && (size_t)addr < inf.dend)) { len = (int)strlen(inf.filename); if (sz <= 0) return len + 1; if (len >= sz) len = sz - 1; memcpy(path, inf.filename, len); path[len++] = 0; return len; } } return -1; } static void *dl_globallookup(const char *name) { void *ret; shl_t h = NULL; return shl_findsym(&h, name, TYPE_UNDEFINED, &ret) ? NULL : ret; } #endif /* DSO_DL */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c0000644000000000000000000002367513176625657016304 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * We need to do this early, because stdio.h includes the header files that * handle _GNU_SOURCE and other similar macros. Defining it later is simply * too late, because those headers are protected from re- inclusion. */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE # define _GNU_SOURCE /* make sure dladdr is declared */ #endif #include "dso_locl.h" #ifdef DSO_DLFCN # ifdef HAVE_DLFCN_H # ifdef __osf__ # define __EXTENSIONS__ # endif # include # define HAVE_DLINFO 1 # if defined(_AIX) || defined(__CYGWIN__) || \ defined(__SCO_VERSION__) || defined(_SCO_ELF) || \ (defined(__osf__) && !defined(RTLD_NEXT)) || \ (defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(RTLD_SELF)) || \ defined(__ANDROID__) # undef HAVE_DLINFO # endif # endif /* Part of the hack in "dlfcn_load" ... */ # define DSO_MAX_TRANSLATED_SIZE 256 static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso); static int dlfcn_unload(DSO *dso); static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dlfcn_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname); static char *dlfcn_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename); static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2); static int dlfcn_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz); static void *dlfcn_globallookup(const char *name); static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_dlfcn = { "OpenSSL 'dlfcn' shared library method", dlfcn_load, dlfcn_unload, dlfcn_bind_func, NULL, /* ctrl */ dlfcn_name_converter, dlfcn_merger, NULL, /* init */ NULL, /* finish */ dlfcn_pathbyaddr, dlfcn_globallookup }; DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void) { return &dso_meth_dlfcn; } /* * Prior to using the dlopen() function, we should decide on the flag we * send. There's a few different ways of doing this and it's a messy * venn-diagram to match up which platforms support what. So as we don't have * autoconf yet, I'm implementing a hack that could be hacked further * relatively easily to deal with cases as we find them. Initially this is to * cope with OpenBSD. */ # if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) # ifdef DL_LAZY # define DLOPEN_FLAG DL_LAZY # else # ifdef RTLD_NOW # define DLOPEN_FLAG RTLD_NOW # else # define DLOPEN_FLAG 0 # endif # endif # else # define DLOPEN_FLAG RTLD_NOW /* Hope this works everywhere else */ # endif /* * For this DSO_METHOD, our meth_data STACK will contain; (i) the handle * (void*) returned from dlopen(). */ static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso) { void *ptr = NULL; /* See applicable comments in dso_dl.c */ char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL); int flags = DLOPEN_FLAG; if (filename == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME); goto err; } # ifdef RTLD_GLOBAL if (dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_GLOBAL_SYMBOLS) flags |= RTLD_GLOBAL; # endif ptr = dlopen(filename, flags); if (ptr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED); ERR_add_error_data(4, "filename(", filename, "): ", dlerror()); goto err; } if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); goto err; } /* Success */ dso->loaded_filename = filename; return (1); err: /* Cleanup! */ OPENSSL_free(filename); if (ptr != NULL) dlclose(ptr); return (0); } static int dlfcn_unload(DSO *dso) { void *ptr; if (dso == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) return (1); ptr = sk_void_pop(dso->meth_data); if (ptr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); /* * Should push the value back onto the stack in case of a retry. */ sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, ptr); return (0); } /* For now I'm not aware of any errors associated with dlclose() */ dlclose(ptr); return (1); } static DSO_FUNC_TYPE dlfcn_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname) { void *ptr; union { DSO_FUNC_TYPE sym; void *dlret; } u; if ((dso == NULL) || (symname == NULL)) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } if (sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) < 1) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR); return (NULL); } ptr = sk_void_value(dso->meth_data, sk_void_num(dso->meth_data) - 1); if (ptr == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE); return (NULL); } u.dlret = dlsym(ptr, symname); if (u.dlret == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC, DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE); ERR_add_error_data(4, "symname(", symname, "): ", dlerror()); return (NULL); } return u.sym; } static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2) { char *merged; if (!filespec1 && !filespec2) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (NULL); } /* * If the first file specification is a rooted path, it rules. same goes * if the second file specification is missing. */ if (!filespec2 || (filespec1 != NULL && filespec1[0] == '/')) { merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec1); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } } /* * If the first file specification is missing, the second one rules. */ else if (!filespec1) { merged = OPENSSL_strdup(filespec2); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } } else { /* * This part isn't as trivial as it looks. It assumes that the * second file specification really is a directory, and makes no * checks whatsoever. Therefore, the result becomes the * concatenation of filespec2 followed by a slash followed by * filespec1. */ int spec2len, len; spec2len = strlen(filespec2); len = spec2len + strlen(filespec1); if (spec2len && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') { spec2len--; len--; } merged = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 2); if (merged == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } strcpy(merged, filespec2); merged[spec2len] = '/'; strcpy(&merged[spec2len + 1], filespec1); } return (merged); } static char *dlfcn_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename) { char *translated; int len, rsize, transform; len = strlen(filename); rsize = len + 1; transform = (strstr(filename, "/") == NULL); if (transform) { /* We will convert this to "%s.so" or "lib%s.so" etc */ rsize += strlen(DSO_EXTENSION); /* The length of ".so" */ if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0) rsize += 3; /* The length of "lib" */ } translated = OPENSSL_malloc(rsize); if (translated == NULL) { DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_NAME_CONVERTER, DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED); return (NULL); } if (transform) { if ((DSO_flags(dso) & DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == 0) sprintf(translated, "lib%s" DSO_EXTENSION, filename); else sprintf(translated, "%s" DSO_EXTENSION, filename); } else sprintf(translated, "%s", filename); return (translated); } # ifdef __sgi /*- This is a quote from IRIX manual for dladdr(3c): does not contain a prototype for dladdr or definition of Dl_info. The #include in the SYNOPSIS line is traditional, but contains no dladdr prototype and no IRIX library contains an implementation. Write your own declaration based on the code below. The following code is dependent on internal interfaces that are not part of the IRIX compatibility guarantee; however, there is no future intention to change this interface, so on a practical level, the code below is safe to use on IRIX. */ # include # ifndef _RLD_INTERFACE_DLFCN_H_DLADDR # define _RLD_INTERFACE_DLFCN_H_DLADDR typedef struct Dl_info { const char *dli_fname; void *dli_fbase; const char *dli_sname; void *dli_saddr; int dli_version; int dli_reserved1; long dli_reserved[4]; } Dl_info; # else typedef struct Dl_info Dl_info; # endif # define _RLD_DLADDR 14 static int dladdr(void *address, Dl_info *dl) { void *v; v = _rld_new_interface(_RLD_DLADDR, address, dl); return (int)v; } # endif /* __sgi */ static int dlfcn_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz) { # ifdef HAVE_DLINFO Dl_info dli; int len; if (addr == NULL) { union { int (*f) (void *, char *, int); void *p; } t = { dlfcn_pathbyaddr }; addr = t.p; } if (dladdr(addr, &dli)) { len = (int)strlen(dli.dli_fname); if (sz <= 0) return len + 1; if (len >= sz) len = sz - 1; memcpy(path, dli.dli_fname, len); path[len++] = 0; return len; } ERR_add_error_data(2, "dlfcn_pathbyaddr(): ", dlerror()); # endif return -1; } static void *dlfcn_globallookup(const char *name) { void *ret = NULL, *handle = dlopen(NULL, RTLD_LAZY); if (handle) { ret = dlsym(handle, name); dlclose(handle); } return ret; } #endif /* DSO_DLFCN */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dso/dso_locl.h0000644000000000000000000001001413176625657016133 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/dso.h" #include "internal/dso_conf.h" /**********************************************************************/ /* The low-level handle type used to refer to a loaded shared library */ struct dso_st { DSO_METHOD *meth; /* * Standard dlopen uses a (void *). Win32 uses a HANDLE. VMS doesn't use * anything but will need to cache the filename for use in the dso_bind * handler. All in all, let each method control its own destiny. * "Handles" and such go in a STACK. */ STACK_OF(void) *meth_data; int references; int flags; /* * For use by applications etc ... use this for your bits'n'pieces, don't * touch meth_data! */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* * If this callback function pointer is set to non-NULL, then it will be * used in DSO_load() in place of meth->dso_name_converter. NB: This * should normally set using DSO_set_name_converter(). */ DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC name_converter; /* * If this callback function pointer is set to non-NULL, then it will be * used in DSO_load() in place of meth->dso_merger. NB: This should * normally set using DSO_set_merger(). */ DSO_MERGER_FUNC merger; /* * This is populated with (a copy of) the platform-independent filename * used for this DSO. */ char *filename; /* * This is populated with (a copy of) the translated filename by which * the DSO was actually loaded. It is NULL iff the DSO is not currently * loaded. NB: This is here because the filename translation process may * involve a callback being invoked more than once not only to convert to * a platform-specific form, but also to try different filenames in the * process of trying to perform a load. As such, this variable can be * used to indicate (a) whether this DSO structure corresponds to a * loaded library or not, and (b) the filename with which it was actually * loaded. */ char *loaded_filename; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct dso_meth_st { const char *name; /* * Loads a shared library, NB: new DSO_METHODs must ensure that a * successful load populates the loaded_filename field, and likewise a * successful unload OPENSSL_frees and NULLs it out. */ int (*dso_load) (DSO *dso); /* Unloads a shared library */ int (*dso_unload) (DSO *dso); /* * Binds a function - assumes a return type of DSO_FUNC_TYPE. This should * be cast to the real function prototype by the caller. Platforms that * don't have compatible representations for different prototypes (this * is possible within ANSI C) are highly unlikely to have shared * libraries at all, let alone a DSO_METHOD implemented for them. */ DSO_FUNC_TYPE (*dso_bind_func) (DSO *dso, const char *symname); /* * The generic (yuck) "ctrl()" function. NB: Negative return values * (rather than zero) indicate errors. */ long (*dso_ctrl) (DSO *dso, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); /* * The default DSO_METHOD-specific function for converting filenames to a * canonical native form. */ DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC dso_name_converter; /* * The default DSO_METHOD-specific function for converting filenames to a * canonical native form. */ DSO_MERGER_FUNC dso_merger; /* [De]Initialisation handlers. */ int (*init) (DSO *dso); int (*finish) (DSO *dso); /* Return pathname of the module containing location */ int (*pathbyaddr) (void *addr, char *path, int sz); /* Perform global symbol lookup, i.e. among *all* modules */ void *(*globallookup) (const char *symname); }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/o_time.c0000644000000000000000000001254413176625657015031 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result) { struct tm *ts = NULL; #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) { /* * On VMS, gmtime_r() takes a 32-bit pointer as second argument. * Since we can't know that |result| is in a space that can easily * translate to a 32-bit pointer, we must store temporarily on stack * and copy the result. The stack is always reachable with 32-bit * pointers. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 #endif struct tm data, *ts2 = &data; #if defined OPENSSL_SYS_VMS && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE # pragma pointer_size restore #endif if (gmtime_r(timer, ts2) == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(result, ts2, sizeof(struct tm)); ts = result; } #elif defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX) if (gmtime_r(timer, result) == NULL) return NULL; ts = result; #else ts = gmtime(timer); if (ts == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(result, ts, sizeof(struct tm)); ts = result; #endif return ts; } /* * Take a tm structure and add an offset to it. This avoids any OS issues * with restricted date types and overflows which cause the year 2038 * problem. */ #define SECS_PER_DAY (24 * 60 * 60) static long date_to_julian(int y, int m, int d); static void julian_to_date(long jd, int *y, int *m, int *d); static int julian_adj(const struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec, long *pday, int *psec); int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec) { int time_sec, time_year, time_month, time_day; long time_jd; /* Convert time and offset into Julian day and seconds */ if (!julian_adj(tm, off_day, offset_sec, &time_jd, &time_sec)) return 0; /* Convert Julian day back to date */ julian_to_date(time_jd, &time_year, &time_month, &time_day); if (time_year < 1900 || time_year > 9999) return 0; /* Update tm structure */ tm->tm_year = time_year - 1900; tm->tm_mon = time_month - 1; tm->tm_mday = time_day; tm->tm_hour = time_sec / 3600; tm->tm_min = (time_sec / 60) % 60; tm->tm_sec = time_sec % 60; return 1; } int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *pday, int *psec, const struct tm *from, const struct tm *to) { int from_sec, to_sec, diff_sec; long from_jd, to_jd, diff_day; if (!julian_adj(from, 0, 0, &from_jd, &from_sec)) return 0; if (!julian_adj(to, 0, 0, &to_jd, &to_sec)) return 0; diff_day = to_jd - from_jd; diff_sec = to_sec - from_sec; /* Adjust differences so both positive or both negative */ if (diff_day > 0 && diff_sec < 0) { diff_day--; diff_sec += SECS_PER_DAY; } if (diff_day < 0 && diff_sec > 0) { diff_day++; diff_sec -= SECS_PER_DAY; } if (pday) *pday = (int)diff_day; if (psec) *psec = diff_sec; return 1; } /* Convert tm structure and offset into julian day and seconds */ static int julian_adj(const struct tm *tm, int off_day, long offset_sec, long *pday, int *psec) { int offset_hms, offset_day; long time_jd; int time_year, time_month, time_day; /* split offset into days and day seconds */ offset_day = offset_sec / SECS_PER_DAY; /* Avoid sign issues with % operator */ offset_hms = offset_sec - (offset_day * SECS_PER_DAY); offset_day += off_day; /* Add current time seconds to offset */ offset_hms += tm->tm_hour * 3600 + tm->tm_min * 60 + tm->tm_sec; /* Adjust day seconds if overflow */ if (offset_hms >= SECS_PER_DAY) { offset_day++; offset_hms -= SECS_PER_DAY; } else if (offset_hms < 0) { offset_day--; offset_hms += SECS_PER_DAY; } /* * Convert date of time structure into a Julian day number. */ time_year = tm->tm_year + 1900; time_month = tm->tm_mon + 1; time_day = tm->tm_mday; time_jd = date_to_julian(time_year, time_month, time_day); /* Work out Julian day of new date */ time_jd += offset_day; if (time_jd < 0) return 0; *pday = time_jd; *psec = offset_hms; return 1; } /* * Convert date to and from julian day Uses Fliegel & Van Flandern algorithm */ static long date_to_julian(int y, int m, int d) { return (1461 * (y + 4800 + (m - 14) / 12)) / 4 + (367 * (m - 2 - 12 * ((m - 14) / 12))) / 12 - (3 * ((y + 4900 + (m - 14) / 12) / 100)) / 4 + d - 32075; } static void julian_to_date(long jd, int *y, int *m, int *d) { long L = jd + 68569; long n = (4 * L) / 146097; long i, j; L = L - (146097 * n + 3) / 4; i = (4000 * (L + 1)) / 1461001; L = L - (1461 * i) / 4 + 31; j = (80 * L) / 2447; *d = L - (2447 * j) / 80; L = j / 11; *m = j + 2 - (12 * L); *y = 100 * (n - 49) + i + L; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/threads_none.c0000644000000000000000000000471613176625660016222 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) || defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void) { CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(unsigned int)); if (lock == NULL) return NULL; *(unsigned int *)lock = 1; return lock; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { OPENSSL_assert(*(unsigned int *)lock == 1); return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { OPENSSL_assert(*(unsigned int *)lock == 1); return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { OPENSSL_assert(*(unsigned int *)lock == 1); return 1; } void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { if (lock == NULL) return; *(unsigned int *)lock = 0; OPENSSL_free(lock); return; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void)) { if (*once != 0) return 1; init(); *once = 1; return 1; } #define OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX 256 static void *thread_local_storage[OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX]; int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *)) { static unsigned int thread_local_key = 0; if (thread_local_key >= OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX) return 0; *key = thread_local_key++; thread_local_storage[*key] = NULL; return 1; } void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key) { if (*key >= OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX) return NULL; return thread_local_storage[*key]; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val) { if (*key >= OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX) return 0; thread_local_storage[*key] = val; return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key) { *key = OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX + 1; return 1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void) { return 0; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b) { return (a == b); } int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { *val += amount; *ret = *val; return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/arm64cpuid.pl0000755000000000000000000000470613176625656015727 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $flavour = shift; $output = shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text .arch armv8-a+crypto .align 5 .globl _armv7_neon_probe .type _armv7_neon_probe,%function _armv7_neon_probe: orr v15.16b, v15.16b, v15.16b ret .size _armv7_neon_probe,.-_armv7_neon_probe .globl _armv7_tick .type _armv7_tick,%function _armv7_tick: #ifdef __APPLE__ mrs x0, CNTPCT_EL0 #else mrs x0, CNTVCT_EL0 #endif ret .size _armv7_tick,.-_armv7_tick .globl _armv8_aes_probe .type _armv8_aes_probe,%function _armv8_aes_probe: aese v0.16b, v0.16b ret .size _armv8_aes_probe,.-_armv8_aes_probe .globl _armv8_sha1_probe .type _armv8_sha1_probe,%function _armv8_sha1_probe: sha1h s0, s0 ret .size _armv8_sha1_probe,.-_armv8_sha1_probe .globl _armv8_sha256_probe .type _armv8_sha256_probe,%function _armv8_sha256_probe: sha256su0 v0.4s, v0.4s ret .size _armv8_sha256_probe,.-_armv8_sha256_probe .globl _armv8_pmull_probe .type _armv8_pmull_probe,%function _armv8_pmull_probe: pmull v0.1q, v0.1d, v0.1d ret .size _armv8_pmull_probe,.-_armv8_pmull_probe .globl OPENSSL_cleanse .type OPENSSL_cleanse,%function .align 5 OPENSSL_cleanse: cbz x1,.Lret // len==0? cmp x1,#15 b.hi .Lot // len>15 nop .Little: strb wzr,[x0],#1 // store byte-by-byte subs x1,x1,#1 b.ne .Little .Lret: ret .align 4 .Lot: tst x0,#7 b.eq .Laligned // inp is aligned strb wzr,[x0],#1 // store byte-by-byte sub x1,x1,#1 b .Lot .align 4 .Laligned: str xzr,[x0],#8 // store word-by-word sub x1,x1,#8 tst x1,#-8 b.ne .Laligned // len>=8 cbnz x1,.Little // len!=0? ret .size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse .globl CRYPTO_memcmp .type CRYPTO_memcmp,%function .align 4 CRYPTO_memcmp: eor w3,w3,w3 cbz x2,.Lno_data // len==0? .Loop_cmp: ldrb w4,[x0],#1 ldrb w5,[x1],#1 eor w4,w4,w5 orr w3,w3,w4 subs x2,x2,#1 b.ne .Loop_cmp .Lno_data: neg w0,w3 lsr w0,w0,#31 ret .size CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014663 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/build.info0000644000000000000000000000033713176625657016642 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ rmd_dgst.c rmd_one.c {- $target{rmd160_asm_src} -} GENERATE[rmd-586.s]=asm/rmd-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) DEPEND[rmd-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000527613176625657016641 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include /* * DO EXAMINE COMMENTS IN crypto/md5/md5_locl.h & crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c * FOR EXPLANATIONS ON FOLLOWING "CODE." * */ #ifdef RMD160_ASM # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) # define ripemd160_block_data_order ripemd160_block_asm_data_order # endif #endif void ripemd160_block_data_order(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num); #define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN #define HASH_LONG RIPEMD160_LONG #define HASH_CTX RIPEMD160_CTX #define HASH_CBLOCK RIPEMD160_CBLOCK #define HASH_UPDATE RIPEMD160_Update #define HASH_TRANSFORM RIPEMD160_Transform #define HASH_FINAL RIPEMD160_Final #define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s) do { \ unsigned long ll; \ ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->E; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ } while (0) #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER ripemd160_block_data_order #include "internal/md32_common.h" /* * Transformed F2 and F4 are courtesy of Wei Dai */ #define F1(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) #define F2(x,y,z) ((((y) ^ (z)) & (x)) ^ (z)) #define F3(x,y,z) (((~(y)) | (x)) ^ (z)) #define F4(x,y,z) ((((x) ^ (y)) & (z)) ^ (y)) #define F5(x,y,z) (((~(z)) | (y)) ^ (x)) #define RIPEMD160_A 0x67452301L #define RIPEMD160_B 0xEFCDAB89L #define RIPEMD160_C 0x98BADCFEL #define RIPEMD160_D 0x10325476L #define RIPEMD160_E 0xC3D2E1F0L #include "rmdconst.h" #define RIP1(a,b,c,d,e,w,s) { \ a+=F1(b,c,d)+X(w); \ a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \ c=ROTATE(c,10); } #define RIP2(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \ a+=F2(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \ a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \ c=ROTATE(c,10); } #define RIP3(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \ a+=F3(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \ a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \ c=ROTATE(c,10); } #define RIP4(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \ a+=F4(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \ a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \ c=ROTATE(c,10); } #define RIP5(a,b,c,d,e,w,s,K) { \ a+=F5(b,c,d)+X(w)+K; \ a=ROTATE(a,s)+e; \ c=ROTATE(c,10); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/rmdconst.h0000644000000000000000000001311113176625657016662 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define KL0 0x00000000L #define KL1 0x5A827999L #define KL2 0x6ED9EBA1L #define KL3 0x8F1BBCDCL #define KL4 0xA953FD4EL #define KR0 0x50A28BE6L #define KR1 0x5C4DD124L #define KR2 0x6D703EF3L #define KR3 0x7A6D76E9L #define KR4 0x00000000L #define WL00 0 #define SL00 11 #define WL01 1 #define SL01 14 #define WL02 2 #define SL02 15 #define WL03 3 #define SL03 12 #define WL04 4 #define SL04 5 #define WL05 5 #define SL05 8 #define WL06 6 #define SL06 7 #define WL07 7 #define SL07 9 #define WL08 8 #define SL08 11 #define WL09 9 #define SL09 13 #define WL10 10 #define SL10 14 #define WL11 11 #define SL11 15 #define WL12 12 #define SL12 6 #define WL13 13 #define SL13 7 #define WL14 14 #define SL14 9 #define WL15 15 #define SL15 8 #define WL16 7 #define SL16 7 #define WL17 4 #define SL17 6 #define WL18 13 #define SL18 8 #define WL19 1 #define SL19 13 #define WL20 10 #define SL20 11 #define WL21 6 #define SL21 9 #define WL22 15 #define SL22 7 #define WL23 3 #define SL23 15 #define WL24 12 #define SL24 7 #define WL25 0 #define SL25 12 #define WL26 9 #define SL26 15 #define WL27 5 #define SL27 9 #define WL28 2 #define SL28 11 #define WL29 14 #define SL29 7 #define WL30 11 #define SL30 13 #define WL31 8 #define SL31 12 #define WL32 3 #define SL32 11 #define WL33 10 #define SL33 13 #define WL34 14 #define SL34 6 #define WL35 4 #define SL35 7 #define WL36 9 #define SL36 14 #define WL37 15 #define SL37 9 #define WL38 8 #define SL38 13 #define WL39 1 #define SL39 15 #define WL40 2 #define SL40 14 #define WL41 7 #define SL41 8 #define WL42 0 #define SL42 13 #define WL43 6 #define SL43 6 #define WL44 13 #define SL44 5 #define WL45 11 #define SL45 12 #define WL46 5 #define SL46 7 #define WL47 12 #define SL47 5 #define WL48 1 #define SL48 11 #define WL49 9 #define SL49 12 #define WL50 11 #define SL50 14 #define WL51 10 #define SL51 15 #define WL52 0 #define SL52 14 #define WL53 8 #define SL53 15 #define WL54 12 #define SL54 9 #define WL55 4 #define SL55 8 #define WL56 13 #define SL56 9 #define WL57 3 #define SL57 14 #define WL58 7 #define SL58 5 #define WL59 15 #define SL59 6 #define WL60 14 #define SL60 8 #define WL61 5 #define SL61 6 #define WL62 6 #define SL62 5 #define WL63 2 #define SL63 12 #define WL64 4 #define SL64 9 #define WL65 0 #define SL65 15 #define WL66 5 #define SL66 5 #define WL67 9 #define SL67 11 #define WL68 7 #define SL68 6 #define WL69 12 #define SL69 8 #define WL70 2 #define SL70 13 #define WL71 10 #define SL71 12 #define WL72 14 #define SL72 5 #define WL73 1 #define SL73 12 #define WL74 3 #define SL74 13 #define WL75 8 #define SL75 14 #define WL76 11 #define SL76 11 #define WL77 6 #define SL77 8 #define WL78 15 #define SL78 5 #define WL79 13 #define SL79 6 #define WR00 5 #define SR00 8 #define WR01 14 #define SR01 9 #define WR02 7 #define SR02 9 #define WR03 0 #define SR03 11 #define WR04 9 #define SR04 13 #define WR05 2 #define SR05 15 #define WR06 11 #define SR06 15 #define WR07 4 #define SR07 5 #define WR08 13 #define SR08 7 #define WR09 6 #define SR09 7 #define WR10 15 #define SR10 8 #define WR11 8 #define SR11 11 #define WR12 1 #define SR12 14 #define WR13 10 #define SR13 14 #define WR14 3 #define SR14 12 #define WR15 12 #define SR15 6 #define WR16 6 #define SR16 9 #define WR17 11 #define SR17 13 #define WR18 3 #define SR18 15 #define WR19 7 #define SR19 7 #define WR20 0 #define SR20 12 #define WR21 13 #define SR21 8 #define WR22 5 #define SR22 9 #define WR23 10 #define SR23 11 #define WR24 14 #define SR24 7 #define WR25 15 #define SR25 7 #define WR26 8 #define SR26 12 #define WR27 12 #define SR27 7 #define WR28 4 #define SR28 6 #define WR29 9 #define SR29 15 #define WR30 1 #define SR30 13 #define WR31 2 #define SR31 11 #define WR32 15 #define SR32 9 #define WR33 5 #define SR33 7 #define WR34 1 #define SR34 15 #define WR35 3 #define SR35 11 #define WR36 7 #define SR36 8 #define WR37 14 #define SR37 6 #define WR38 6 #define SR38 6 #define WR39 9 #define SR39 14 #define WR40 11 #define SR40 12 #define WR41 8 #define SR41 13 #define WR42 12 #define SR42 5 #define WR43 2 #define SR43 14 #define WR44 10 #define SR44 13 #define WR45 0 #define SR45 13 #define WR46 4 #define SR46 7 #define WR47 13 #define SR47 5 #define WR48 8 #define SR48 15 #define WR49 6 #define SR49 5 #define WR50 4 #define SR50 8 #define WR51 1 #define SR51 11 #define WR52 3 #define SR52 14 #define WR53 11 #define SR53 14 #define WR54 15 #define SR54 6 #define WR55 0 #define SR55 14 #define WR56 5 #define SR56 6 #define WR57 12 #define SR57 9 #define WR58 2 #define SR58 12 #define WR59 13 #define SR59 9 #define WR60 9 #define SR60 12 #define WR61 7 #define SR61 5 #define WR62 10 #define SR62 15 #define WR63 14 #define SR63 8 #define WR64 12 #define SR64 8 #define WR65 15 #define SR65 5 #define WR66 10 #define SR66 12 #define WR67 4 #define SR67 9 #define WR68 1 #define SR68 12 #define WR69 5 #define SR69 5 #define WR70 8 #define SR70 14 #define WR71 7 #define SR71 6 #define WR72 6 #define SR72 8 #define WR73 2 #define SR73 13 #define WR74 13 #define SR74 6 #define WR75 14 #define SR75 5 #define WR76 0 #define SR76 15 #define WR77 3 #define SR77 13 #define WR78 9 #define SR78 11 #define WR79 11 #define SR79 11 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657015443 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/asm/rmd-586.pl0000644000000000000000000004035013176625657017104 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Normal is the # ripemd160_block_asm_data_order(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, ULONG *X,int blocks); $normal=0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); $A="ecx"; $B="esi"; $C="edi"; $D="ebx"; $E="ebp"; $tmp1="eax"; $tmp2="edx"; $KL1=0x5A827999; $KL2=0x6ED9EBA1; $KL3=0x8F1BBCDC; $KL4=0xA953FD4E; $KR0=0x50A28BE6; $KR1=0x5C4DD124; $KR2=0x6D703EF3; $KR3=0x7A6D76E9; @wl=( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 7, 4,13, 1,10, 6,15, 3,12, 0, 9, 5, 2,14,11, 8, 3,10,14, 4, 9,15, 8, 1, 2, 7, 0, 6,13,11, 5,12, 1, 9,11,10, 0, 8,12, 4,13, 3, 7,15,14, 5, 6, 2, 4, 0, 5, 9, 7,12, 2,10,14, 1, 3, 8,11, 6,15,13, ); @wr=( 5,14, 7, 0, 9, 2,11, 4,13, 6,15, 8, 1,10, 3,12, 6,11, 3, 7, 0,13, 5,10,14,15, 8,12, 4, 9, 1, 2, 15, 5, 1, 3, 7,14, 6, 9,11, 8,12, 2,10, 0, 4,13, 8, 6, 4, 1, 3,11,15, 0, 5,12, 2,13, 9, 7,10,14, 12,15,10, 4, 1, 5, 8, 7, 6, 2,13,14, 0, 3, 9,11, ); @sl=( 11,14,15,12, 5, 8, 7, 9,11,13,14,15, 6, 7, 9, 8, 7, 6, 8,13,11, 9, 7,15, 7,12,15, 9,11, 7,13,12, 11,13, 6, 7,14, 9,13,15,14, 8,13, 6, 5,12, 7, 5, 11,12,14,15,14,15, 9, 8, 9,14, 5, 6, 8, 6, 5,12, 9,15, 5,11, 6, 8,13,12, 5,12,13,14,11, 8, 5, 6, ); @sr=( 8, 9, 9,11,13,15,15, 5, 7, 7, 8,11,14,14,12, 6, 9,13,15, 7,12, 8, 9,11, 7, 7,12, 7, 6,15,13,11, 9, 7,15,11, 8, 6, 6,14,12,13, 5,14,13,13, 7, 5, 15, 5, 8,11,14,14, 6,14, 6, 9,12, 9,12, 5,15, 8, 8, 5,12, 9,12, 5,14, 6, 8,13, 6, 5,15,13,11,11, ); &ripemd160_block("ripemd160_block_asm_data_order"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub Xv { local($n)=@_; return(&swtmp($n)); # tmp on stack } sub Np { local($p)=@_; local(%n)=($A,$E,$B,$A,$C,$B,$D,$C,$E,$D); return($n{$p}); } sub RIP1 { local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$o,$pos2)=@_; &comment($p++); if ($p & 1) { #&mov($tmp1, $c) if $o == -1; &xor($tmp1, $d) if $o == -1; &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos)); &xor($tmp1, $b); &add($a, $tmp2); &rotl($c, 10); &add($a, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Np($c)); # NEXT # XXX &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } else { &xor($tmp1, $d); &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos)); &xor($tmp1, $b); &add($a, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Np($c)) if $o <= 0; &mov($tmp1, -1) if $o == 1; # XXX if $o == 2; &rotl($c, 10); &add($a, $tmp2); &xor($tmp1, &Np($d)) if $o <= 0; &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos2)) if $o == 1; &mov($tmp2, &wparam(0)) if $o == 2; &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } } sub RIP2 { local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$pos2,$s,$K,$o)=@_; # XXXXXX &comment($p++); if ($p & 1) { # &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos)) if $o < -1; # &mov($tmp1, -1) if $o < -1; &add($a, $tmp2); &mov($tmp2, $c); &sub($tmp1, $b); &and($tmp2, $b); &and($tmp1, $d); &or($tmp2, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Xv($pos2)) if $o <= 0; # XXXXXXXXXXXXXX # XXX &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1)); &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o <= 0; # XXX &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } else { # XXX &add($a, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, $c); &sub($tmp2, $b); &and($tmp1, $b); &and($tmp2, $d); if ($o != 2) { &or($tmp1, $tmp2); &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos2)) if $o <= 0; &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == 1; &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp1,1)); &mov($tmp1, -1) if $o <= 0; &sub($tmp2, &Np($c)) if $o == 1; } else { &or($tmp2, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Np($c)); &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1)); &xor($tmp1, &Np($d)); } &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } } sub RIP3 { local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$K,$o,$pos2)=@_; &comment($p++); if ($p & 1) { # &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o < -1; # &sub($tmp2, $c) if $o < -1; &mov($tmp1, &Xv($pos)); &or($tmp2, $b); &add($a, $tmp1); &xor($tmp2, $d); &mov($tmp1, -1) if $o <= 0; # NEXT # XXX &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1)); &sub($tmp1, &Np($c)) if $o <= 0; # NEXT # XXX &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } else { &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos)); &or($tmp1, $b); &add($a, $tmp2); &xor($tmp1, $d); &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o <= 0; # NEXT &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == 1; &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos2)) if $o == 2; &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp1,1)); &sub($tmp2, &Np($c)) if $o <= 0; # NEXT &mov($tmp1, &Np($d)) if $o == 1; &mov($tmp1, -1) if $o == 2; &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } } sub RIP4 { local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$K,$o)=@_; &comment($p++); if ($p & 1) { # &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == -2; # &mov($tmp1, $d) if $o == -2; &sub($tmp2, $d); &and($tmp1, $b); &and($tmp2, $c); &or($tmp2, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Xv($pos)); &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp2)); &mov($tmp2, -1) unless $o > 0; # NEXT # XXX &add($a, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Np($d)) unless $o > 0; # NEXT # XXX &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } else { &sub($tmp2, $d); &and($tmp1, $b); &and($tmp2, $c); &or($tmp2, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Xv($pos)); &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp2)); &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == 0; # NEXT &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == 1; &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == 2; # XXX &add($a, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &Np($d)) if $o == 0; # NEXT &sub($tmp2, &Np($d)) if $o == 1; &sub($tmp2, &Np($c)) if $o == 2; # XXX &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } } sub RIP5 { local($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$pos,$s,$K,$o)=@_; &comment($p++); if ($p & 1) { &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == -2; &sub($tmp2, $d) if $o == -2; &mov($tmp1, &Xv($pos)); &or($tmp2, $c); &add($a, $tmp1); &xor($tmp2, $b); &mov($tmp1, -1) if $o <= 0; # XXX &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp2,1)); &sub($tmp1, &Np($d)) if $o <= 0; # XXX &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } else { &mov($tmp2, &Xv($pos)); &or($tmp1, $c); &add($a, $tmp2); &xor($tmp1, $b); &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o <= 0; &mov($tmp2, &wparam(0)) if $o == 1; # Middle code &mov($tmp2, -1) if $o == 2; &rotl($c, 10); &lea($a, &DWP($K,$a,$tmp1,1)); &sub($tmp2, &Np($d)) if $o <= 0; &mov(&swtmp(16), $A) if $o == 1; &mov($tmp1, &Np($d)) if $o == 2; &rotl($a, $s); &add($a, $e); } } sub ripemd160_block { local($name)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,"",3); # parameter 1 is the RIPEMD160_CTX structure. # A 0 # B 4 # C 8 # D 12 # E 16 &mov($tmp2, &wparam(0)); &mov($tmp1, &wparam(1)); &push("esi"); &mov($A, &DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0)); &push("edi"); &mov($B, &DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0)); &push("ebp"); &mov($C, &DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0)); &push("ebx"); &stack_push(16+5+6); # Special comment about the figure of 6. # Idea is to pad the current frame so # that the top of the stack gets fairly # aligned. Well, as you realize it would # always depend on how the frame below is # aligned. The good news are that gcc-2.95 # and later does keep first argument at # least double-wise aligned. # &set_label("start") unless $normal; &comment(""); # &mov($tmp1, &wparam(1)); # Done at end of loop # &mov($tmp2, &wparam(0)); # Done at end of loop for ($z=0; $z<16; $z+=2) { &mov($D, &DWP( $z*4,$tmp1,"",0)); &mov($E, &DWP( ($z+1)*4,$tmp1,"",0)); &mov(&swtmp($z), $D); &mov(&swtmp($z+1), $E); } &mov($tmp1, $C); &mov($D, &DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0)); &mov($E, &DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0)); &RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[ 0],$sl[ 0],-1); &RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[ 1],$sl[ 1],0); &RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[ 2],$sl[ 2],0); &RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[ 3],$sl[ 3],0); &RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[ 4],$sl[ 4],0); &RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[ 5],$sl[ 5],0); &RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[ 6],$sl[ 6],0); &RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[ 7],$sl[ 7],0); &RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[ 8],$sl[ 8],0); &RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[ 9],$sl[ 9],0); &RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[10],$sl[10],0); &RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[11],$sl[11],0); &RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[12],$sl[12],0); &RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[13],$sl[13],0); &RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[14],$sl[14],0); &RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[15],$sl[15],1,$wl[16]); &RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[16],$wl[17],$sl[16],$KL1,-1); &RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[17],$wl[18],$sl[17],$KL1,0); &RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[18],$wl[19],$sl[18],$KL1,0); &RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[19],$wl[20],$sl[19],$KL1,0); &RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[20],$wl[21],$sl[20],$KL1,0); &RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[21],$wl[22],$sl[21],$KL1,0); &RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[22],$wl[23],$sl[22],$KL1,0); &RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[23],$wl[24],$sl[23],$KL1,0); &RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[24],$wl[25],$sl[24],$KL1,0); &RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[25],$wl[26],$sl[25],$KL1,0); &RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[26],$wl[27],$sl[26],$KL1,0); &RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[27],$wl[28],$sl[27],$KL1,0); &RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[28],$wl[29],$sl[28],$KL1,0); &RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[29],$wl[30],$sl[29],$KL1,0); &RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[30],$wl[31],$sl[30],$KL1,0); &RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[31],$wl[32],$sl[31],$KL1,1); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[32],$sl[32],$KL2,-1); &RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[33],$sl[33],$KL2,0); &RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[34],$sl[34],$KL2,0); &RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[35],$sl[35],$KL2,0); &RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[36],$sl[36],$KL2,0); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[37],$sl[37],$KL2,0); &RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[38],$sl[38],$KL2,0); &RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[39],$sl[39],$KL2,0); &RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[40],$sl[40],$KL2,0); &RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[41],$sl[41],$KL2,0); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[42],$sl[42],$KL2,0); &RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[43],$sl[43],$KL2,0); &RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[44],$sl[44],$KL2,0); &RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[45],$sl[45],$KL2,0); &RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[46],$sl[46],$KL2,0); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[47],$sl[47],$KL2,1); &RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[48],$sl[48],$KL3,-1); &RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[49],$sl[49],$KL3,0); &RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[50],$sl[50],$KL3,0); &RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[51],$sl[51],$KL3,0); &RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[52],$sl[52],$KL3,0); &RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[53],$sl[53],$KL3,0); &RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[54],$sl[54],$KL3,0); &RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[55],$sl[55],$KL3,0); &RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[56],$sl[56],$KL3,0); &RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[57],$sl[57],$KL3,0); &RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[58],$sl[58],$KL3,0); &RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[59],$sl[59],$KL3,0); &RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[60],$sl[60],$KL3,0); &RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[61],$sl[61],$KL3,0); &RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[62],$sl[62],$KL3,0); &RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[63],$sl[63],$KL3,1); &RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[64],$sl[64],$KL4,-1); &RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[65],$sl[65],$KL4,0); &RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[66],$sl[66],$KL4,0); &RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[67],$sl[67],$KL4,0); &RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[68],$sl[68],$KL4,0); &RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[69],$sl[69],$KL4,0); &RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[70],$sl[70],$KL4,0); &RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[71],$sl[71],$KL4,0); &RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[72],$sl[72],$KL4,0); &RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[73],$sl[73],$KL4,0); &RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[74],$sl[74],$KL4,0); &RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wl[75],$sl[75],$KL4,0); &RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wl[76],$sl[76],$KL4,0); &RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wl[77],$sl[77],$KL4,0); &RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wl[78],$sl[78],$KL4,0); &RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wl[79],$sl[79],$KL4,1); # &mov($tmp2, &wparam(0)); # moved into last RIP5 # &mov(&swtmp(16), $A); &mov($A, &DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0)); &mov(&swtmp(16+1), $B); &mov(&swtmp(16+2), $C); &mov($B, &DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0)); &mov(&swtmp(16+3), $D); &mov($C, &DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0)); &mov(&swtmp(16+4), $E); &mov($D, &DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0)); &mov($E, &DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0)); &RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[ 0],$sr[ 0],$KR0,-2); &RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[ 1],$sr[ 1],$KR0,0); &RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[ 2],$sr[ 2],$KR0,0); &RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[ 3],$sr[ 3],$KR0,0); &RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[ 4],$sr[ 4],$KR0,0); &RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[ 5],$sr[ 5],$KR0,0); &RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[ 6],$sr[ 6],$KR0,0); &RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[ 7],$sr[ 7],$KR0,0); &RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[ 8],$sr[ 8],$KR0,0); &RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[ 9],$sr[ 9],$KR0,0); &RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[10],$sr[10],$KR0,0); &RIP5($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[11],$sr[11],$KR0,0); &RIP5($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[12],$sr[12],$KR0,0); &RIP5($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[13],$sr[13],$KR0,0); &RIP5($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[14],$sr[14],$KR0,0); &RIP5($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[15],$sr[15],$KR0,2); &RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[16],$sr[16],$KR1,-2); &RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[17],$sr[17],$KR1,0); &RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[18],$sr[18],$KR1,0); &RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[19],$sr[19],$KR1,0); &RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[20],$sr[20],$KR1,0); &RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[21],$sr[21],$KR1,0); &RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[22],$sr[22],$KR1,0); &RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[23],$sr[23],$KR1,0); &RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[24],$sr[24],$KR1,0); &RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[25],$sr[25],$KR1,0); &RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[26],$sr[26],$KR1,0); &RIP4($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[27],$sr[27],$KR1,0); &RIP4($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[28],$sr[28],$KR1,0); &RIP4($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[29],$sr[29],$KR1,0); &RIP4($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[30],$sr[30],$KR1,0); &RIP4($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[31],$sr[31],$KR1,2); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[32],$sr[32],$KR2,-2); &RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[33],$sr[33],$KR2,0); &RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[34],$sr[34],$KR2,0); &RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[35],$sr[35],$KR2,0); &RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[36],$sr[36],$KR2,0); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[37],$sr[37],$KR2,0); &RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[38],$sr[38],$KR2,0); &RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[39],$sr[39],$KR2,0); &RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[40],$sr[40],$KR2,0); &RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[41],$sr[41],$KR2,0); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[42],$sr[42],$KR2,0); &RIP3($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[43],$sr[43],$KR2,0); &RIP3($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[44],$sr[44],$KR2,0); &RIP3($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[45],$sr[45],$KR2,0); &RIP3($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[46],$sr[46],$KR2,0); &RIP3($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[47],$sr[47],$KR2,2,$wr[48]); &RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[48],$wr[49],$sr[48],$KR3,-2); &RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[49],$wr[50],$sr[49],$KR3,0); &RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[50],$wr[51],$sr[50],$KR3,0); &RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[51],$wr[52],$sr[51],$KR3,0); &RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[52],$wr[53],$sr[52],$KR3,0); &RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[53],$wr[54],$sr[53],$KR3,0); &RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[54],$wr[55],$sr[54],$KR3,0); &RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[55],$wr[56],$sr[55],$KR3,0); &RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[56],$wr[57],$sr[56],$KR3,0); &RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[57],$wr[58],$sr[57],$KR3,0); &RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[58],$wr[59],$sr[58],$KR3,0); &RIP2($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[59],$wr[60],$sr[59],$KR3,0); &RIP2($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[60],$wr[61],$sr[60],$KR3,0); &RIP2($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[61],$wr[62],$sr[61],$KR3,0); &RIP2($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[62],$wr[63],$sr[62],$KR3,0); &RIP2($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[63],$wr[64],$sr[63],$KR3,2); &RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[64],$sr[64],-2); &RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[65],$sr[65],0); &RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[66],$sr[66],0); &RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[67],$sr[67],0); &RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[68],$sr[68],0); &RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[69],$sr[69],0); &RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[70],$sr[70],0); &RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[71],$sr[71],0); &RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[72],$sr[72],0); &RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[73],$sr[73],0); &RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[74],$sr[74],0); &RIP1($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$wr[75],$sr[75],0); &RIP1($E,$A,$B,$C,$D,$wr[76],$sr[76],0); &RIP1($D,$E,$A,$B,$C,$wr[77],$sr[77],0); &RIP1($C,$D,$E,$A,$B,$wr[78],$sr[78],0); &RIP1($B,$C,$D,$E,$A,$wr[79],$sr[79],2); # &mov($tmp2, &wparam(0)); # Moved into last round &mov($tmp1, &DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0)); # ctx->B &add($D, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &swtmp(16+2)); # $c &add($D, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0)); # ctx->C &add($E, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &swtmp(16+3)); # $d &add($E, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0)); # ctx->D &add($A, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &swtmp(16+4)); # $e &add($A, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0)); # ctx->E &add($B, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &swtmp(16+0)); # $a &add($B, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0)); # ctx->A &add($C, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &swtmp(16+1)); # $b &add($C, $tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &wparam(2)); &mov(&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0), $D); &mov(&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0), $E); &mov(&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0), $A); &sub($tmp1,1); &mov(&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0), $B); &mov(&DWP(16,$tmp2,"",0), $C); &jle(&label("get_out")); &mov(&wparam(2),$tmp1); &mov($C, $A); &mov($tmp1, &wparam(1)); &mov($A, $D); &add($tmp1, 64); &mov($B, $E); &mov(&wparam(1),$tmp1); &jmp(&label("start")); &set_label("get_out"); &stack_pop(16+5+6); &pop("ebx"); &pop("ebp"); &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/rmd_one.c0000644000000000000000000000146013176625657016453 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include unsigned char *RIPEMD160(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { RIPEMD160_CTX c; static unsigned char m[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; if (!RIPEMD160_Init(&c)) return NULL; RIPEMD160_Update(&c, d, n); RIPEMD160_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */ return (md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c0000644000000000000000000002333213176625657016635 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rmd_locl.h" #include #ifdef RMD160_ASM void ripemd160_block_x86(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, unsigned long *p, size_t num); # define ripemd160_block ripemd160_block_x86 #else void ripemd160_block(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, unsigned long *p, size_t num); #endif int RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); c->A = RIPEMD160_A; c->B = RIPEMD160_B; c->C = RIPEMD160_C; c->D = RIPEMD160_D; c->E = RIPEMD160_E; return 1; } #ifndef ripemd160_block_data_order # ifdef X # undef X # endif void ripemd160_block_data_order(RIPEMD160_CTX *ctx, const void *p, size_t num) { const unsigned char *data = p; register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, E; unsigned MD32_REG_T a, b, c, d, e, l; # ifndef MD32_XARRAY /* See comment in crypto/sha/sha_locl.h for details. */ unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7, XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15; # define X(i) XX##i # else RIPEMD160_LONG XX[16]; # define X(i) XX[i] # endif for (; num--;) { A = ctx->A; B = ctx->B; C = ctx->C; D = ctx->D; E = ctx->E; (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(0) = l; (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(1) = l; RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL00, SL00); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(2) = l; RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WL01, SL01); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(3) = l; RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WL02, SL02); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(4) = l; RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WL03, SL03); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(5) = l; RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WL04, SL04); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(6) = l; RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL05, SL05); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(7) = l; RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WL06, SL06); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(8) = l; RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WL07, SL07); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(9) = l; RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WL08, SL08); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(10) = l; RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WL09, SL09); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(11) = l; RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL10, SL10); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(12) = l; RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WL11, SL11); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(13) = l; RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WL12, SL12); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(14) = l; RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WL13, SL13); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(15) = l; RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WL14, SL14); RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WL15, SL15); RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL16, SL16, KL1); RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WL17, SL17, KL1); RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WL18, SL18, KL1); RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WL19, SL19, KL1); RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WL20, SL20, KL1); RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL21, SL21, KL1); RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WL22, SL22, KL1); RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WL23, SL23, KL1); RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WL24, SL24, KL1); RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WL25, SL25, KL1); RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL26, SL26, KL1); RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WL27, SL27, KL1); RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WL28, SL28, KL1); RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WL29, SL29, KL1); RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WL30, SL30, KL1); RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WL31, SL31, KL1); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL32, SL32, KL2); RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WL33, SL33, KL2); RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WL34, SL34, KL2); RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WL35, SL35, KL2); RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WL36, SL36, KL2); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL37, SL37, KL2); RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WL38, SL38, KL2); RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WL39, SL39, KL2); RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WL40, SL40, KL2); RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WL41, SL41, KL2); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL42, SL42, KL2); RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WL43, SL43, KL2); RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WL44, SL44, KL2); RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WL45, SL45, KL2); RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WL46, SL46, KL2); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WL47, SL47, KL2); RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL48, SL48, KL3); RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WL49, SL49, KL3); RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WL50, SL50, KL3); RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WL51, SL51, KL3); RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WL52, SL52, KL3); RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL53, SL53, KL3); RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WL54, SL54, KL3); RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WL55, SL55, KL3); RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WL56, SL56, KL3); RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WL57, SL57, KL3); RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL58, SL58, KL3); RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WL59, SL59, KL3); RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WL60, SL60, KL3); RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WL61, SL61, KL3); RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WL62, SL62, KL3); RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WL63, SL63, KL3); RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL64, SL64, KL4); RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WL65, SL65, KL4); RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WL66, SL66, KL4); RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WL67, SL67, KL4); RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WL68, SL68, KL4); RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL69, SL69, KL4); RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WL70, SL70, KL4); RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WL71, SL71, KL4); RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WL72, SL72, KL4); RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WL73, SL73, KL4); RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL74, SL74, KL4); RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WL75, SL75, KL4); RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WL76, SL76, KL4); RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WL77, SL77, KL4); RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WL78, SL78, KL4); RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WL79, SL79, KL4); a = A; b = B; c = C; d = D; e = E; /* Do other half */ A = ctx->A; B = ctx->B; C = ctx->C; D = ctx->D; E = ctx->E; RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR00, SR00, KR0); RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WR01, SR01, KR0); RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WR02, SR02, KR0); RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WR03, SR03, KR0); RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WR04, SR04, KR0); RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR05, SR05, KR0); RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WR06, SR06, KR0); RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WR07, SR07, KR0); RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WR08, SR08, KR0); RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WR09, SR09, KR0); RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR10, SR10, KR0); RIP5(E, A, B, C, D, WR11, SR11, KR0); RIP5(D, E, A, B, C, WR12, SR12, KR0); RIP5(C, D, E, A, B, WR13, SR13, KR0); RIP5(B, C, D, E, A, WR14, SR14, KR0); RIP5(A, B, C, D, E, WR15, SR15, KR0); RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR16, SR16, KR1); RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WR17, SR17, KR1); RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WR18, SR18, KR1); RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WR19, SR19, KR1); RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WR20, SR20, KR1); RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR21, SR21, KR1); RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WR22, SR22, KR1); RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WR23, SR23, KR1); RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WR24, SR24, KR1); RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WR25, SR25, KR1); RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR26, SR26, KR1); RIP4(D, E, A, B, C, WR27, SR27, KR1); RIP4(C, D, E, A, B, WR28, SR28, KR1); RIP4(B, C, D, E, A, WR29, SR29, KR1); RIP4(A, B, C, D, E, WR30, SR30, KR1); RIP4(E, A, B, C, D, WR31, SR31, KR1); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR32, SR32, KR2); RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WR33, SR33, KR2); RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WR34, SR34, KR2); RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WR35, SR35, KR2); RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WR36, SR36, KR2); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR37, SR37, KR2); RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WR38, SR38, KR2); RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WR39, SR39, KR2); RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WR40, SR40, KR2); RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WR41, SR41, KR2); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR42, SR42, KR2); RIP3(C, D, E, A, B, WR43, SR43, KR2); RIP3(B, C, D, E, A, WR44, SR44, KR2); RIP3(A, B, C, D, E, WR45, SR45, KR2); RIP3(E, A, B, C, D, WR46, SR46, KR2); RIP3(D, E, A, B, C, WR47, SR47, KR2); RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR48, SR48, KR3); RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WR49, SR49, KR3); RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WR50, SR50, KR3); RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WR51, SR51, KR3); RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WR52, SR52, KR3); RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR53, SR53, KR3); RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WR54, SR54, KR3); RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WR55, SR55, KR3); RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WR56, SR56, KR3); RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WR57, SR57, KR3); RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR58, SR58, KR3); RIP2(B, C, D, E, A, WR59, SR59, KR3); RIP2(A, B, C, D, E, WR60, SR60, KR3); RIP2(E, A, B, C, D, WR61, SR61, KR3); RIP2(D, E, A, B, C, WR62, SR62, KR3); RIP2(C, D, E, A, B, WR63, SR63, KR3); RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR64, SR64); RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WR65, SR65); RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WR66, SR66); RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WR67, SR67); RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WR68, SR68); RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR69, SR69); RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WR70, SR70); RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WR71, SR71); RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WR72, SR72); RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WR73, SR73); RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR74, SR74); RIP1(A, B, C, D, E, WR75, SR75); RIP1(E, A, B, C, D, WR76, SR76); RIP1(D, E, A, B, C, WR77, SR77); RIP1(C, D, E, A, B, WR78, SR78); RIP1(B, C, D, E, A, WR79, SR79); D = ctx->B + c + D; ctx->B = ctx->C + d + E; ctx->C = ctx->D + e + A; ctx->D = ctx->E + a + B; ctx->E = ctx->A + b + C; ctx->A = D; } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ppccap.c0000644000000000000000000002472413176625657015026 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(__linux) || defined(_AIX) # include #endif #if defined(_AIX53) /* defined even on post-5.3 */ # include # if !defined(__power_set) # define __power_set(a) (_system_configuration.implementation & (a)) # endif #endif #if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__) # include # include #endif #include #include #include "ppc_arch.h" unsigned int OPENSSL_ppccap_P = 0; static sigset_t all_masked; #ifdef OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num) { int bn_mul_mont_fpu64(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); int bn_mul_mont_int(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) { # if 1 || (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) if (num >= 8 && (num & 3) == 0 && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU64)) return bn_mul_mont_fpu64(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); # else /* * boundary of 32 was experimentally determined on Linux 2.6.22, * might have to be adjusted on AIX... */ if (num >= 32 && (num & 3) == 0 && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU64)) { sigset_t oset; int ret; sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &all_masked, &oset); ret = bn_mul_mont_fpu64(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); return ret; } # endif } else if ((OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU64)) /* * this is a "must" on POWER6, but run-time detection is not * implemented yet... */ return bn_mul_mont_fpu64(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); } #endif void sha256_block_p8(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len); void sha256_block_ppc(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len); void sha256_block_data_order(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len) { OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207 ? sha256_block_p8(ctx, inp, len) : sha256_block_ppc(ctx, inp, len); } void sha512_block_p8(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len); void sha512_block_ppc(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len); void sha512_block_data_order(void *ctx, const void *inp, size_t len) { OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207 ? sha512_block_p8(ctx, inp, len) : sha512_block_ppc(ctx, inp, len); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA void ChaCha20_ctr32_int(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, const unsigned int key[8], const unsigned int counter[4]); void ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, const unsigned int key[8], const unsigned int counter[4]); void ChaCha20_ctr32(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, const unsigned int key[8], const unsigned int counter[4]) { OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC ? ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp, len, key, counter) : ChaCha20_ctr32_int(out, inp, len, key, counter); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 void poly1305_init_int(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]); void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, unsigned int padbit); void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const unsigned int nonce[4]); void poly1305_init_fpu(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]); void poly1305_blocks_fpu(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, unsigned int padbit); void poly1305_emit_fpu(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const unsigned int nonce[4]); int poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16], void *func[2]) { if (sizeof(size_t) == 4 && (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_FPU)) { poly1305_init_fpu(ctx, key); func[0] = poly1305_blocks_fpu; func[1] = poly1305_emit_fpu; } else { poly1305_init_int(ctx, key); func[0] = poly1305_blocks; func[1] = poly1305_emit; } return 1; } #endif static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp; static void ill_handler(int sig) { siglongjmp(ill_jmp, sig); } void OPENSSL_fpu_probe(void); void OPENSSL_ppc64_probe(void); void OPENSSL_altivec_probe(void); void OPENSSL_crypto207_probe(void); void OPENSSL_madd300_probe(void); /* * Use a weak reference to getauxval() so we can use it if it is available * but don't break the build if it is not. Note that this is *link-time* * feature detection, not *run-time*. In other words if we link with * symbol present, it's expected to be present even at run-time. */ #if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) extern unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long type) __attribute__ ((weak)); #else static unsigned long (*getauxval) (unsigned long) = NULL; #endif /* I wish was universally available */ #define HWCAP 16 /* AT_HWCAP */ #define HWCAP_PPC64 (1U << 30) #define HWCAP_ALTIVEC (1U << 28) #define HWCAP_FPU (1U << 27) #define HWCAP_POWER6_EXT (1U << 9) #define HWCAP_VSX (1U << 7) #define HWCAP2 26 /* AT_HWCAP2 */ #define HWCAP_VEC_CRYPTO (1U << 25) #define HWCAP_ARCH_3_00 (1U << 23) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 __attribute__ ((constructor)) # endif void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { char *e; struct sigaction ill_oact, ill_act; sigset_t oset; static int trigger = 0; if (trigger) return; trigger = 1; if ((e = getenv("OPENSSL_ppccap"))) { OPENSSL_ppccap_P = strtoul(e, NULL, 0); return; } OPENSSL_ppccap_P = 0; #if defined(_AIX) OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU; if (sizeof(size_t) == 4) { struct utsname uts; # if defined(_SC_AIX_KERNEL_BITMODE) if (sysconf(_SC_AIX_KERNEL_BITMODE) != 64) return; # endif if (uname(&uts) != 0 || atoi(uts.version) < 6) return; } # if defined(__power_set) /* * Value used in __power_set is a single-bit 1< /** RFC 3394 section 2.2.3.1 Default Initial Value */ static const unsigned char default_iv[] = { 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, }; /** RFC 5649 section 3 Alternative Initial Value 32-bit constant */ static const unsigned char default_aiv[] = { 0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6 }; /** Input size limit: lower than maximum of standards but far larger than * anything that will be used in practice. */ #define CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX (1UL << 31) /** Wrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.1. * * @param[in] key Key value. * @param[in] iv IV value. Length = 8 bytes. NULL = use default_iv. * @param[in] in Plaintext as n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2. * @param[in] inlen Length of in. * @param[out] out Ciphertext. Minimal buffer length = (inlen + 8) bytes. * Input and output buffers can overlap if block function * supports that. * @param[in] block Block processing function. * @return 0 if inlen does not consist of n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2. * or if inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX. * Output length if wrapping succeeded. */ size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block) { unsigned char *A, B[16], *R; size_t i, j, t; if ((inlen & 0x7) || (inlen < 16) || (inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX)) return 0; A = B; t = 1; memmove(out + 8, in, inlen); if (!iv) iv = default_iv; memcpy(A, iv, 8); for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) { R = out + 8; for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t++, R += 8) { memcpy(B + 8, R, 8); block(B, B, key); A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff); if (t > 0xff) { A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff); A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff); A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff); } memcpy(R, B + 8, 8); } } memcpy(out, A, 8); return inlen + 8; } /** Unwrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.2 steps 1-2. * The IV check (step 3) is responsibility of the caller. * * @param[in] key Key value. * @param[out] iv Unchecked IV value. Minimal buffer length = 8 bytes. * @param[out] out Plaintext without IV. * Minimal buffer length = (inlen - 8) bytes. * Input and output buffers can overlap if block function * supports that. * @param[in] in Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks. * @param[in] inlen Length of in. * @param[in] block Block processing function. * @return 0 if inlen is out of range [24, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX] * or if inlen is not a multiple of 8. * Output length otherwise. */ static size_t crypto_128_unwrap_raw(void *key, unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block) { unsigned char *A, B[16], *R; size_t i, j, t; inlen -= 8; if ((inlen & 0x7) || (inlen < 16) || (inlen > CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX)) return 0; A = B; t = 6 * (inlen >> 3); memcpy(A, in, 8); memmove(out, in + 8, inlen); for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) { R = out + inlen - 8; for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t--, R -= 8) { A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff); if (t > 0xff) { A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff); A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff); A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff); } memcpy(B + 8, R, 8); block(B, B, key); memcpy(R, B + 8, 8); } } memcpy(iv, A, 8); return inlen; } /** Unwrapping according to RFC 3394 section 2.2.2, including the IV check. * The first block of plaintext has to match the supplied IV, otherwise an * error is returned. * * @param[in] key Key value. * @param[out] iv IV value to match against. Length = 8 bytes. * NULL = use default_iv. * @param[out] out Plaintext without IV. * Minimal buffer length = (inlen - 8) bytes. * Input and output buffers can overlap if block function * supports that. * @param[in] in Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks. * @param[in] inlen Length of in. * @param[in] block Block processing function. * @return 0 if inlen is out of range [24, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX] * or if inlen is not a multiple of 8 * or if IV doesn't match expected value. * Output length otherwise. */ size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block) { size_t ret; unsigned char got_iv[8]; ret = crypto_128_unwrap_raw(key, got_iv, out, in, inlen, block); if (ret == 0) return 0; if (!iv) iv = default_iv; if (CRYPTO_memcmp(got_iv, iv, 8)) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, ret); return 0; } return ret; } /** Wrapping according to RFC 5649 section 4.1. * * @param[in] key Key value. * @param[in] icv (Non-standard) IV, 4 bytes. NULL = use default_aiv. * @param[out] out Ciphertext. Minimal buffer length = (inlen + 15) bytes. * Input and output buffers can overlap if block function * supports that. * @param[in] in Plaintext as n 64-bit blocks, n >= 2. * @param[in] inlen Length of in. * @param[in] block Block processing function. * @return 0 if inlen is out of range [1, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX]. * Output length if wrapping succeeded. */ size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block) { /* n: number of 64-bit blocks in the padded key data * * If length of plain text is not a multiple of 8, pad the plain text octet * string on the right with octets of zeros, where final length is the * smallest multiple of 8 that is greater than length of plain text. * If length of plain text is a multiple of 8, then there is no padding. */ const size_t blocks_padded = (inlen + 7) / 8; /* CEILING(m/8) */ const size_t padded_len = blocks_padded * 8; const size_t padding_len = padded_len - inlen; /* RFC 5649 section 3: Alternative Initial Value */ unsigned char aiv[8]; int ret; /* Section 1: use 32-bit fixed field for plaintext octet length */ if (inlen == 0 || inlen >= CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX) return 0; /* Section 3: Alternative Initial Value */ if (!icv) memcpy(aiv, default_aiv, 4); else memcpy(aiv, icv, 4); /* Standard doesn't mention this. */ aiv[4] = (inlen >> 24) & 0xFF; aiv[5] = (inlen >> 16) & 0xFF; aiv[6] = (inlen >> 8) & 0xFF; aiv[7] = inlen & 0xFF; if (padded_len == 8) { /* * Section 4.1 - special case in step 2: If the padded plaintext * contains exactly eight octets, then prepend the AIV and encrypt * the resulting 128-bit block using AES in ECB mode. */ memmove(out + 8, in, inlen); memcpy(out, aiv, 8); memset(out + 8 + inlen, 0, padding_len); block(out, out, key); ret = 16; /* AIV + padded input */ } else { memmove(out, in, inlen); memset(out + inlen, 0, padding_len); /* Section 4.1 step 1 */ ret = CRYPTO_128_wrap(key, aiv, out, out, padded_len, block); } return ret; } /** Unwrapping according to RFC 5649 section 4.2. * * @param[in] key Key value. * @param[in] icv (Non-standard) IV, 4 bytes. NULL = use default_aiv. * @param[out] out Plaintext. Minimal buffer length = inlen bytes. * Input and output buffers can overlap if block function * supports that. * @param[in] in Ciphertext as n 64-bit blocks. * @param[in] inlen Length of in. * @param[in] block Block processing function. * @return 0 if inlen is out of range [16, CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX], * or if inlen is not a multiple of 8 * or if IV and message length indicator doesn't match. * Output length if unwrapping succeeded and IV matches. */ size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block) { /* n: number of 64-bit blocks in the padded key data */ size_t n = inlen / 8 - 1; size_t padded_len; size_t padding_len; size_t ptext_len; /* RFC 5649 section 3: Alternative Initial Value */ unsigned char aiv[8]; static unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0x0 }; size_t ret; /* Section 4.2: Ciphertext length has to be (n+1) 64-bit blocks. */ if ((inlen & 0x7) != 0 || inlen < 16 || inlen >= CRYPTO128_WRAP_MAX) return 0; memmove(out, in, inlen); if (inlen == 16) { /* * Section 4.2 - special case in step 1: When n=1, the ciphertext * contains exactly two 64-bit blocks and they are decrypted as a * single AES block using AES in ECB mode: AIV | P[1] = DEC(K, C[0] | * C[1]) */ block(out, out, key); memcpy(aiv, out, 8); /* Remove AIV */ memmove(out, out + 8, 8); padded_len = 8; } else { padded_len = inlen - 8; ret = crypto_128_unwrap_raw(key, aiv, out, out, inlen, block); if (padded_len != ret) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen); return 0; } } /* * Section 3: AIV checks: Check that MSB(32,A) = A65959A6. Optionally a * user-supplied value can be used (even if standard doesn't mention * this). */ if ((!icv && CRYPTO_memcmp(aiv, default_aiv, 4)) || (icv && CRYPTO_memcmp(aiv, icv, 4))) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen); return 0; } /* * Check that 8*(n-1) < LSB(32,AIV) <= 8*n. If so, let ptext_len = * LSB(32,AIV). */ ptext_len = ((unsigned int)aiv[4] << 24) | ((unsigned int)aiv[5] << 16) | ((unsigned int)aiv[6] << 8) | (unsigned int)aiv[7]; if (8 * (n - 1) >= ptext_len || ptext_len > 8 * n) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen); return 0; } /* * Check that the rightmost padding_len octets of the output data are * zero. */ padding_len = padded_len - ptext_len; if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + ptext_len, zeros, padding_len) != 0) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen); return 0; } /* Section 4.2 step 3: Remove padding */ return ptext_len; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/ctr128.c0000644000000000000000000001351413176625657015705 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include /* * NOTE: the IV/counter CTR mode is big-endian. The code itself is * endian-neutral. */ /* increment counter (128-bit int) by 1 */ static void ctr128_inc(unsigned char *counter) { u32 n = 16, c = 1; do { --n; c += counter[n]; counter[n] = (u8)c; c >>= 8; } while (n); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) static void ctr128_inc_aligned(unsigned char *counter) { size_t *data, c, d, n; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (is_endian.little || ((size_t)counter % sizeof(size_t)) != 0) { ctr128_inc(counter); return; } data = (size_t *)counter; c = 1; n = 16 / sizeof(size_t); do { --n; d = data[n] += c; /* did addition carry? */ c = ((d - c) & ~d) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1); } while (n); } #endif /* * The input encrypted as though 128bit counter mode is being used. The * extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have * used is contained in *num, and the encrypted counter is kept in * ecount_buf. Both *num and ecount_buf must be initialised with zeros * before the first call to CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(). This algorithm assumes * that the counter is in the x lower bits of the IV (ivec), and that the * application has full control over overflow and the rest of the IV. This * implementation takes NO responsibility for checking that the counter * doesn't overflow into the rest of the IV when incremented. */ void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], unsigned char ecount_buf[16], unsigned int *num, block128_f block) { unsigned int n; size_t l = 0; n = *num; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */ do { while (n && len) { *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ecount_buf[n]; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } # if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ecount_buf) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) break; # endif while (len >= 16) { (*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key); ctr128_inc_aligned(ivec); for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) *(size_t *)(out + n) = *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ecount_buf + n); len -= 16; out += 16; in += 16; n = 0; } if (len) { (*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key); ctr128_inc_aligned(ivec); while (len--) { out[n] = in[n] ^ ecount_buf[n]; ++n; } } *num = n; return; } while (0); } /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */ #endif while (l < len) { if (n == 0) { (*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key); ctr128_inc(ivec); } out[l] = in[l] ^ ecount_buf[n]; ++l; n = (n + 1) % 16; } *num = n; } /* increment upper 96 bits of 128-bit counter by 1 */ static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter) { u32 n = 12, c = 1; do { --n; c += counter[n]; counter[n] = (u8)c; c >>= 8; } while (n); } void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], unsigned char ecount_buf[16], unsigned int *num, ctr128_f func) { unsigned int n, ctr32; n = *num; while (n && len) { *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ecount_buf[n]; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } ctr32 = GETU32(ivec + 12); while (len >= 16) { size_t blocks = len / 16; /* * 1<<28 is just a not-so-small yet not-so-large number... * Below condition is practically never met, but it has to * be checked for code correctness. */ if (sizeof(size_t) > sizeof(unsigned int) && blocks > (1U << 28)) blocks = (1U << 28); /* * As (*func) operates on 32-bit counter, caller * has to handle overflow. 'if' below detects the * overflow, which is then handled by limiting the * amount of blocks to the exact overflow point... */ ctr32 += (u32)blocks; if (ctr32 < blocks) { blocks -= ctr32; ctr32 = 0; } (*func) (in, out, blocks, key, ivec); /* (*ctr) does not update ivec, caller does: */ PUTU32(ivec + 12, ctr32); /* ... overflow was detected, propagate carry. */ if (ctr32 == 0) ctr96_inc(ivec); blocks *= 16; len -= blocks; out += blocks; in += blocks; } if (len) { memset(ecount_buf, 0, 16); (*func) (ecount_buf, ecount_buf, 1, key, ivec); ++ctr32; PUTU32(ivec + 12, ctr32); if (ctr32 == 0) ctr96_inc(ivec); while (len--) { out[n] = in[n] ^ ecount_buf[n]; ++n; } } *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/build.info0000644000000000000000000000215113176625657016465 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ cbc128.c ctr128.c cts128.c cfb128.c ofb128.c gcm128.c \ ccm128.c xts128.c wrap128.c ocb128.c \ {- $target{modes_asm_src} -} INCLUDE[gcm128.o]=.. GENERATE[ghash-ia64.s]=asm/ghash-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) GENERATE[ghash-x86.s]=asm/ghash-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) GENERATE[ghash-x86_64.s]=asm/ghash-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[aesni-gcm-x86_64.s]=asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ghash-sparcv9.S]=asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[ghash-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[ghash-alpha.S]=asm/ghash-alpha.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ghash-parisc.s]=asm/ghash-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ghashp8-ppc.s]=asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ghash-armv4.S]=asm/ghash-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[ghash-armv4.o]=.. GENERATE[ghashv8-armx.S]=asm/ghashv8-armx.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[ghashv8-armx.o]=.. BEGINRAW[Makefile] # GNU make "catch all" {- $builddir -}/ghash-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/ghash-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ENDRAW[Makefile] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000001354513176625657016634 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__) typedef __int64 i64; typedef unsigned __int64 u64; # define U64(C) C##UI64 #elif defined(__arch64__) typedef long i64; typedef unsigned long u64; # define U64(C) C##UL #else typedef long long i64; typedef unsigned long long u64; # define U64(C) C##ULL #endif typedef unsigned int u32; typedef unsigned char u8; #define STRICT_ALIGNMENT 1 #ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \ defined(__aarch64__) || \ defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) # undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT # endif #endif #if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_=(x); \ asm ("bswapq %0" \ : "+r"(ret_)); ret_; }) # define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_=(x); \ asm ("bswapl %0" \ : "+r"(ret_)); ret_; }) # elif (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY) # define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo_=(u64)(x)>>32,hi_=(x); \ asm ("bswapl %0; bswapl %1" \ : "+r"(hi_),"+r"(lo_)); \ (u64)hi_<<32|lo_; }) # define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_=(x); \ asm ("bswapl %0" \ : "+r"(ret_)); ret_; }) # elif defined(__aarch64__) # define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_; \ asm ("rev %0,%1" \ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_; }) # define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_; \ asm ("rev %w0,%w1" \ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_; }) # elif (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) # define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo_=(u64)(x)>>32,hi_=(x); \ asm ("rev %0,%0; rev %1,%1" \ : "+r"(hi_),"+r"(lo_)); \ (u64)hi_<<32|lo_; }) # define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_; \ asm ("rev %0,%1" \ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"((u32)(x))); \ ret_; }) # endif # elif defined(_MSC_VER) # if _MSC_VER>=1300 # pragma intrinsic(_byteswap_uint64,_byteswap_ulong) # define BSWAP8(x) _byteswap_uint64((u64)(x)) # define BSWAP4(x) _byteswap_ulong((u32)(x)) # elif defined(_M_IX86) __inline u32 _bswap4(u32 val) { _asm mov eax, val _asm bswap eax} # define BSWAP4(x) _bswap4(x) # endif # endif #endif #if defined(BSWAP4) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) # define GETU32(p) BSWAP4(*(const u32 *)(p)) # define PUTU32(p,v) *(u32 *)(p) = BSWAP4(v) #else # define GETU32(p) ((u32)(p)[0]<<24|(u32)(p)[1]<<16|(u32)(p)[2]<<8|(u32)(p)[3]) # define PUTU32(p,v) ((p)[0]=(u8)((v)>>24),(p)[1]=(u8)((v)>>16),(p)[2]=(u8)((v)>>8),(p)[3]=(u8)(v)) #endif /*- GCM definitions */ typedef struct { u64 hi, lo; } u128; #ifdef TABLE_BITS # undef TABLE_BITS #endif /* * Even though permitted values for TABLE_BITS are 8, 4 and 1, it should * never be set to 8 [or 1]. For further information see gcm128.c. */ #define TABLE_BITS 4 struct gcm128_context { /* Following 6 names follow names in GCM specification */ union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; size_t t[16 / sizeof(size_t)]; } Yi, EKi, EK0, len, Xi, H; /* * Relative position of Xi, H and pre-computed Htable is used in some * assembler modules, i.e. don't change the order! */ #if TABLE_BITS==8 u128 Htable[256]; #else u128 Htable[16]; void (*gmult) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void (*ghash) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); #endif unsigned int mres, ares; block128_f block; void *key; }; struct xts128_context { void *key1, *key2; block128_f block1, block2; }; struct ccm128_context { union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } nonce, cmac; u64 blocks; block128_f block; void *key; }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB typedef union { u64 a[2]; unsigned char c[16]; } OCB_BLOCK; # define ocb_block16_xor(in1,in2,out) \ ( (out)->a[0]=(in1)->a[0]^(in2)->a[0], \ (out)->a[1]=(in1)->a[1]^(in2)->a[1] ) # if STRICT_ALIGNMENT # define ocb_block16_xor_misaligned(in1,in2,out) \ ocb_block_xor((in1)->c,(in2)->c,16,(out)->c) # else # define ocb_block16_xor_misaligned ocb_block16_xor # endif struct ocb128_context { /* Need both encrypt and decrypt key schedules for decryption */ block128_f encrypt; block128_f decrypt; void *keyenc; void *keydec; ocb128_f stream; /* direction dependent */ /* Key dependent variables. Can be reused if key remains the same */ size_t l_index; size_t max_l_index; OCB_BLOCK l_star; OCB_BLOCK l_dollar; OCB_BLOCK *l; /* Must be reset for each session */ u64 blocks_hashed; u64 blocks_processed; OCB_BLOCK tag; OCB_BLOCK offset_aad; OCB_BLOCK sum; OCB_BLOCK offset; OCB_BLOCK checksum; }; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/ocb128.c0000644000000000000000000004004513176625657015657 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB /* * Calculate the number of binary trailing zero's in any given number */ static u32 ocb_ntz(u64 n) { u32 cnt = 0; /* * We do a right-to-left simple sequential search. This is surprisingly * efficient as the distribution of trailing zeros is not uniform, * e.g. the number of possible inputs with no trailing zeros is equal to * the number with 1 or more; the number with exactly 1 is equal to the * number with 2 or more, etc. Checking the last two bits covers 75% of * all numbers. Checking the last three covers 87.5% */ while (!(n & 1)) { n >>= 1; cnt++; } return cnt; } /* * Shift a block of 16 bytes left by shift bits */ static void ocb_block_lshift(const unsigned char *in, size_t shift, unsigned char *out) { unsigned char shift_mask; int i; unsigned char mask[15]; shift_mask = 0xff; shift_mask <<= (8 - shift); for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--) { if (i > 0) { mask[i - 1] = in[i] & shift_mask; mask[i - 1] >>= 8 - shift; } out[i] = in[i] << shift; if (i != 15) { out[i] ^= mask[i]; } } } /* * Perform a "double" operation as per OCB spec */ static void ocb_double(OCB_BLOCK *in, OCB_BLOCK *out) { unsigned char mask; /* * Calculate the mask based on the most significant bit. There are more * efficient ways to do this - but this way is constant time */ mask = in->c[0] & 0x80; mask >>= 7; mask *= 135; ocb_block_lshift(in->c, 1, out->c); out->c[15] ^= mask; } /* * Perform an xor on in1 and in2 - each of len bytes. Store result in out */ static void ocb_block_xor(const unsigned char *in1, const unsigned char *in2, size_t len, unsigned char *out) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i]; } } /* * Lookup L_index in our lookup table. If we haven't already got it we need to * calculate it */ static OCB_BLOCK *ocb_lookup_l(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, size_t idx) { size_t l_index = ctx->l_index; if (idx <= l_index) { return ctx->l + idx; } /* We don't have it - so calculate it */ if (idx >= ctx->max_l_index) { void *tmp_ptr; /* * Each additional entry allows to process almost double as * much data, so that in linear world the table will need to * be expanded with smaller and smaller increments. Originally * it was doubling in size, which was a waste. Growing it * linearly is not formally optimal, but is simpler to implement. * We grow table by minimally required 4*n that would accommodate * the index. */ ctx->max_l_index += (idx - ctx->max_l_index + 4) & ~3; tmp_ptr = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->l, ctx->max_l_index * sizeof(OCB_BLOCK)); if (tmp_ptr == NULL) /* prevent ctx->l from being clobbered */ return NULL; ctx->l = tmp_ptr; } while (l_index < idx) { ocb_double(ctx->l + l_index, ctx->l + l_index + 1); l_index++; } ctx->l_index = l_index; return ctx->l + idx; } /* * Create a new OCB128_CONTEXT */ OCB128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_ocb128_new(void *keyenc, void *keydec, block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt, ocb128_f stream) { OCB128_CONTEXT *octx; int ret; if ((octx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*octx))) != NULL) { ret = CRYPTO_ocb128_init(octx, keyenc, keydec, encrypt, decrypt, stream); if (ret) return octx; OPENSSL_free(octx); } return NULL; } /* * Initialise an existing OCB128_CONTEXT */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_init(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *keyenc, void *keydec, block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt, ocb128_f stream) { memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); ctx->l_index = 0; ctx->max_l_index = 5; ctx->l = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->max_l_index * 16); if (ctx->l == NULL) return 0; /* * We set both the encryption and decryption key schedules - decryption * needs both. Don't really need decryption schedule if only doing * encryption - but it simplifies things to take it anyway */ ctx->encrypt = encrypt; ctx->decrypt = decrypt; ctx->stream = stream; ctx->keyenc = keyenc; ctx->keydec = keydec; /* L_* = ENCIPHER(K, zeros(128)) */ ctx->encrypt(ctx->l_star.c, ctx->l_star.c, ctx->keyenc); /* L_$ = double(L_*) */ ocb_double(&ctx->l_star, &ctx->l_dollar); /* L_0 = double(L_$) */ ocb_double(&ctx->l_dollar, ctx->l); /* L_{i} = double(L_{i-1}) */ ocb_double(ctx->l, ctx->l+1); ocb_double(ctx->l+1, ctx->l+2); ocb_double(ctx->l+2, ctx->l+3); ocb_double(ctx->l+3, ctx->l+4); ctx->l_index = 4; /* enough to process up to 496 bytes */ return 1; } /* * Copy an OCB128_CONTEXT object */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(OCB128_CONTEXT *dest, OCB128_CONTEXT *src, void *keyenc, void *keydec) { memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(OCB128_CONTEXT)); if (keyenc) dest->keyenc = keyenc; if (keydec) dest->keydec = keydec; if (src->l) { dest->l = OPENSSL_malloc(src->max_l_index * 16); if (dest->l == NULL) return 0; memcpy(dest->l, src->l, (src->l_index + 1) * 16); } return 1; } /* * Set the IV to be used for this operation. Must be 1 - 15 bytes. */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len, size_t taglen) { unsigned char ktop[16], tmp[16], mask; unsigned char stretch[24], nonce[16]; size_t bottom, shift; /* * Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths. * We don't support this at this stage */ if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) { return -1; } /* Nonce = num2str(TAGLEN mod 128,7) || zeros(120-bitlen(N)) || 1 || N */ nonce[0] = ((taglen * 8) % 128) << 1; memset(nonce + 1, 0, 15); memcpy(nonce + 16 - len, iv, len); nonce[15 - len] |= 1; /* Ktop = ENCIPHER(K, Nonce[1..122] || zeros(6)) */ memcpy(tmp, nonce, 16); tmp[15] &= 0xc0; ctx->encrypt(tmp, ktop, ctx->keyenc); /* Stretch = Ktop || (Ktop[1..64] xor Ktop[9..72]) */ memcpy(stretch, ktop, 16); ocb_block_xor(ktop, ktop + 1, 8, stretch + 16); /* bottom = str2num(Nonce[123..128]) */ bottom = nonce[15] & 0x3f; /* Offset_0 = Stretch[1+bottom..128+bottom] */ shift = bottom % 8; ocb_block_lshift(stretch + (bottom / 8), shift, ctx->offset.c); mask = 0xff; mask <<= 8 - shift; ctx->offset.c[15] |= (*(stretch + (bottom / 8) + 16) & mask) >> (8 - shift); return 1; } /* * Provide any AAD. This can be called multiple times. Only the final time can * have a partial block */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t len) { u64 i, all_num_blocks; size_t num_blocks, last_len; OCB_BLOCK tmp; /* Calculate the number of blocks of AAD provided now, and so far */ num_blocks = len / 16; all_num_blocks = num_blocks + ctx->blocks_hashed; /* Loop through all full blocks of AAD */ for (i = ctx->blocks_hashed + 1; i <= all_num_blocks; i++) { OCB_BLOCK *lookup; /* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */ lookup = ocb_lookup_l(ctx, ocb_ntz(i)); if (lookup == NULL) return 0; ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, lookup, &ctx->offset_aad); memcpy(tmp.c, aad, 16); aad += 16; /* Sum_i = Sum_{i-1} xor ENCIPHER(K, A_i xor Offset_i) */ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &tmp, &tmp); ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc); ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->sum, &ctx->sum); } /* * Check if we have any partial blocks left over. This is only valid in the * last call to this function */ last_len = len % 16; if (last_len > 0) { /* Offset_* = Offset_m xor L_* */ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset_aad); /* CipherInput = (A_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(A_*))) xor Offset_* */ memset(tmp.c, 0, 16); memcpy(tmp.c, aad, last_len); tmp.c[last_len] = 0x80; ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &tmp, &tmp); /* Sum = Sum_m xor ENCIPHER(K, CipherInput) */ ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc); ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->sum, &ctx->sum); } ctx->blocks_hashed = all_num_blocks; return 1; } /* * Provide any data to be encrypted. This can be called multiple times. Only * the final time can have a partial block */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len) { u64 i, all_num_blocks; size_t num_blocks, last_len; /* * Calculate the number of blocks of data to be encrypted provided now, and * so far */ num_blocks = len / 16; all_num_blocks = num_blocks + ctx->blocks_processed; if (num_blocks && all_num_blocks == (size_t)all_num_blocks && ctx->stream != NULL) { size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks; /* * See how many L_{i} entries we need to process data at hand * and pre-compute missing entries in the table [if any]... */ while (top >>= 1) max_idx++; if (ocb_lookup_l(ctx, max_idx) == NULL) return 0; ctx->stream(in, out, num_blocks, ctx->keyenc, (size_t)ctx->blocks_processed + 1, ctx->offset.c, (const unsigned char (*)[16])ctx->l, ctx->checksum.c); } else { /* Loop through all full blocks to be encrypted */ for (i = ctx->blocks_processed + 1; i <= all_num_blocks; i++) { OCB_BLOCK *lookup; OCB_BLOCK tmp; /* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */ lookup = ocb_lookup_l(ctx, ocb_ntz(i)); if (lookup == NULL) return 0; ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, lookup, &ctx->offset); memcpy(tmp.c, in, 16); in += 16; /* Checksum_i = Checksum_{i-1} xor P_i */ ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum); /* C_i = Offset_i xor ENCIPHER(K, P_i xor Offset_i) */ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp); ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc); ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp); memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16); out += 16; } } /* * Check if we have any partial blocks left over. This is only valid in the * last call to this function */ last_len = len % 16; if (last_len > 0) { OCB_BLOCK pad; /* Offset_* = Offset_m xor L_* */ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset); /* Pad = ENCIPHER(K, Offset_*) */ ctx->encrypt(ctx->offset.c, pad.c, ctx->keyenc); /* C_* = P_* xor Pad[1..bitlen(P_*)] */ ocb_block_xor(in, pad.c, last_len, out); /* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */ memset(pad.c, 0, 16); /* borrow pad */ memcpy(pad.c, in, last_len); pad.c[last_len] = 0x80; ocb_block16_xor(&pad, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum); } ctx->blocks_processed = all_num_blocks; return 1; } /* * Provide any data to be decrypted. This can be called multiple times. Only * the final time can have a partial block */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len) { u64 i, all_num_blocks; size_t num_blocks, last_len; /* * Calculate the number of blocks of data to be decrypted provided now, and * so far */ num_blocks = len / 16; all_num_blocks = num_blocks + ctx->blocks_processed; if (num_blocks && all_num_blocks == (size_t)all_num_blocks && ctx->stream != NULL) { size_t max_idx = 0, top = (size_t)all_num_blocks; /* * See how many L_{i} entries we need to process data at hand * and pre-compute missing entries in the table [if any]... */ while (top >>= 1) max_idx++; if (ocb_lookup_l(ctx, max_idx) == NULL) return 0; ctx->stream(in, out, num_blocks, ctx->keydec, (size_t)ctx->blocks_processed + 1, ctx->offset.c, (const unsigned char (*)[16])ctx->l, ctx->checksum.c); } else { OCB_BLOCK tmp; /* Loop through all full blocks to be decrypted */ for (i = ctx->blocks_processed + 1; i <= all_num_blocks; i++) { /* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */ OCB_BLOCK *lookup = ocb_lookup_l(ctx, ocb_ntz(i)); if (lookup == NULL) return 0; ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, lookup, &ctx->offset); memcpy(tmp.c, in, 16); in += 16; /* P_i = Offset_i xor DECIPHER(K, C_i xor Offset_i) */ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp); ctx->decrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keydec); ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &tmp, &tmp); /* Checksum_i = Checksum_{i-1} xor P_i */ ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum); memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16); out += 16; } } /* * Check if we have any partial blocks left over. This is only valid in the * last call to this function */ last_len = len % 16; if (last_len > 0) { OCB_BLOCK pad; /* Offset_* = Offset_m xor L_* */ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset); /* Pad = ENCIPHER(K, Offset_*) */ ctx->encrypt(ctx->offset.c, pad.c, ctx->keyenc); /* P_* = C_* xor Pad[1..bitlen(C_*)] */ ocb_block_xor(in, pad.c, last_len, out); /* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */ memset(pad.c, 0, 16); /* borrow pad */ memcpy(pad.c, out, last_len); pad.c[last_len] = 0x80; ocb_block16_xor(&pad, &ctx->checksum, &ctx->checksum); } ctx->blocks_processed = all_num_blocks; return 1; } /* * Calculate the tag and verify it against the supplied tag */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, size_t len) { OCB_BLOCK tmp; /* * Tag = ENCIPHER(K, Checksum_* xor Offset_* xor L_$) xor HASH(K,A) */ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->checksum, &ctx->offset, &tmp); ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->l_dollar, &tmp, &tmp); ctx->encrypt(tmp.c, tmp.c, ctx->keyenc); ocb_block16_xor(&tmp, &ctx->sum, &ctx->tag); if (len > 16 || len < 1) { return -1; } /* Compare the tag if we've been given one */ if (tag) return CRYPTO_memcmp(&ctx->tag, tag, len); else return -1; } /* * Retrieve the calculated tag */ int CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len) { if (len > 16 || len < 1) { return -1; } /* Calculate the tag */ CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(ctx, NULL, 0); /* Copy the tag into the supplied buffer */ memcpy(tag, ctx->tag.c, len); return 1; } /* * Release all resources */ void CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx) { if (ctx) { OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->l, ctx->max_l_index * 16); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657015272 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000007431413176625657020437 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # # AES-NI-CTR+GHASH stitch. # # February 2013 # # OpenSSL GCM implementation is organized in such way that its # performance is rather close to the sum of its streamed components, # in the context parallelized AES-NI CTR and modulo-scheduled # PCLMULQDQ-enabled GHASH. Unfortunately, as no stitch implementation # was observed to perform significantly better than the sum of the # components on contemporary CPUs, the effort was deemed impossible to # justify. This module is based on combination of Intel submissions, # [1] and [2], with MOVBE twist suggested by Ilya Albrekht and Max # Locktyukhin of Intel Corp. who verified that it reduces shuffles # pressure with notable relative improvement, achieving 1.0 cycle per # byte processed with 128-bit key on Haswell processor, 0.74 - on # Broadwell, 0.63 - on Skylake... [Mentioned results are raw profiled # measurements for favourable packet size, one divisible by 96. # Applications using the EVP interface will observe a few percent # worse performance.] # # [1] http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2900&user=guest&pass=guest # [2] http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/software-support/enabling-high-performance-gcm.pdf $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; if ($avx>1) {{{ ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$Xip)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9"); ($Ii,$T1,$T2,$Hkey, $Z0,$Z1,$Z2,$Z3,$Xi) = map("%xmm$_",(0..8)); ($inout0,$inout1,$inout2,$inout3,$inout4,$inout5,$rndkey) = map("%xmm$_",(9..15)); ($counter,$rounds,$ret,$const,$in0,$end0)=("%ebx","%ebp","%r10","%r11","%r14","%r15"); $code=<<___; .text .type _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x: vmovdqu 0x20($const),$T2 # borrow $T2, .Lone_msb sub \$6,$len vpxor $Z0,$Z0,$Z0 # $Z0 = 0 vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($key),$rndkey vpaddb $T2,$T1,$inout1 vpaddb $T2,$inout1,$inout2 vpaddb $T2,$inout2,$inout3 vpaddb $T2,$inout3,$inout4 vpaddb $T2,$inout4,$inout5 vpxor $rndkey,$T1,$inout0 vmovdqu $Z0,16+8(%rsp) # "$Z3" = 0 jmp .Loop6x .align 32 .Loop6x: add \$`6<<24`,$counter jc .Lhandle_ctr32 # discard $inout[1-5]? vmovdqu 0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^1 vpaddb $T2,$inout5,$T1 # next counter value vpxor $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vpxor $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 .Lresume_ctr32: vmovdqu $T1,($ivp) # save next counter value vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z1 vpxor $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 vmovups 0x10-0x80($key),$T2 # borrow $T2 for $rndkey vpclmulqdq \$0x01,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z2 # At this point, the current block of 96 (0x60) bytes has already been # loaded into registers. Concurrently with processing it, we want to # load the next 96 bytes of input for the next round. Obviously, we can # only do this if there are at least 96 more bytes of input beyond the # input we're currently processing, or else we'd read past the end of # the input buffer. Here, we set |%r12| to 96 if there are at least 96 # bytes of input beyond the 96 bytes we're already processing, and we # set |%r12| to 0 otherwise. In the case where we set |%r12| to 96, # we'll read in the next block so that it is in registers for the next # loop iteration. In the case where we set |%r12| to 0, we'll re-read # the current block and then ignore what we re-read. # # At this point, |$in0| points to the current (already read into # registers) block, and |$end0| points to 2*96 bytes before the end of # the input. Thus, |$in0| > |$end0| means that we do not have the next # 96-byte block to read in, and |$in0| <= |$end0| means we do. xor %r12,%r12 cmp $in0,$end0 vaesenc $T2,$inout0,$inout0 vmovdqu 0x30+8(%rsp),$Ii # I[4] vpxor $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Z3,$T1 vaesenc $T2,$inout1,$inout1 vpxor $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 setnc %r12b vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z3 vaesenc $T2,$inout2,$inout2 vmovdqu 0x10-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^2 neg %r12 vaesenc $T2,$inout3,$inout3 vpxor $Z1,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Z1 vpxor $Z0,$Xi,$Xi # modulo-scheduled vaesenc $T2,$inout4,$inout4 vpxor $Z1,$T1,$Z0 and \$0x60,%r12 vmovups 0x20-0x80($key),$rndkey vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Hkey,$Ii,$T1 vaesenc $T2,$inout5,$inout5 vpclmulqdq \$0x01,$Hkey,$Ii,$T2 lea ($in0,%r12),$in0 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vpxor 16+8(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi # modulo-scheduled [vpxor $Z3,$Xi,$Xi] vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Hkey vmovdqu 0x40+8(%rsp),$Ii # I[3] vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 movbe 0x58($in0),%r13 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 movbe 0x50($in0),%r12 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 mov %r13,0x20+8(%rsp) vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 mov %r12,0x28+8(%rsp) vmovdqu 0x30-0x20($Xip),$Z1 # borrow $Z1 for $Hkey^3 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups 0x30-0x80($key),$rndkey vpxor $T1,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Z1,$Ii,$T1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vpxor $T2,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Z1,$Ii,$T2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vpxor $Hkey,$Z3,$Z3 vpclmulqdq \$0x01,$Z1,$Ii,$Hkey vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Z1,$Ii,$Z1 vmovdqu 0x50+8(%rsp),$Ii # I[2] vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vpxor $T1,$Z0,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x40-0x20($Xip),$T1 # borrow $T1 for $Hkey^4 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups 0x40-0x80($key),$rndkey vpxor $T2,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$T1,$Ii,$T2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vpxor $Hkey,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$T1,$Ii,$Hkey vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 movbe 0x48($in0),%r13 vpxor $Z1,$Z3,$Z3 vpclmulqdq \$0x01,$T1,$Ii,$Z1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 movbe 0x40($in0),%r12 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$T1,$Ii,$T1 vmovdqu 0x60+8(%rsp),$Ii # I[1] vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 mov %r13,0x30+8(%rsp) vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 mov %r12,0x38+8(%rsp) vpxor $T2,$Z0,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x60-0x20($Xip),$T2 # borrow $T2 for $Hkey^5 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups 0x50-0x80($key),$rndkey vpxor $Hkey,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$T2,$Ii,$Hkey vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vpxor $Z1,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$T2,$Ii,$Z1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 movbe 0x38($in0),%r13 vpxor $T1,$Z3,$Z3 vpclmulqdq \$0x01,$T2,$Ii,$T1 vpxor 0x70+8(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi # accumulate I[0] vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 movbe 0x30($in0),%r12 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$T2,$Ii,$T2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 mov %r13,0x40+8(%rsp) vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 mov %r12,0x48+8(%rsp) vpxor $Hkey,$Z0,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x70-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^6 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups 0x60-0x80($key),$rndkey vpxor $Z1,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Hkey,$Xi,$Z1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vpxor $T1,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x01,$Hkey,$Xi,$T1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 movbe 0x28($in0),%r13 vpxor $T2,$Z3,$Z3 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Xi,$T2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 movbe 0x20($in0),%r12 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 mov %r13,0x50+8(%rsp) vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 mov %r12,0x58+8(%rsp) vpxor $Z1,$Z2,$Z2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vpxor $T1,$Z2,$Z2 vmovups 0x70-0x80($key),$rndkey vpslldq \$8,$Z2,$Z1 vpxor $T2,$Z0,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x10($const),$Hkey # .Lpoly vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vpxor $Xi,$Z3,$Z3 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vpxor $Z1,$Z0,$Z0 movbe 0x18($in0),%r13 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 movbe 0x10($in0),%r12 vpalignr \$8,$Z0,$Z0,$Ii # 1st phase vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Hkey,$Z0,$Z0 mov %r13,0x60+8(%rsp) vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 mov %r12,0x68+8(%rsp) vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vmovups 0x80-0x80($key),$T1 # borrow $T1 for $rndkey vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vaesenc $T1,$inout0,$inout0 vmovups 0x90-0x80($key),$rndkey vaesenc $T1,$inout1,$inout1 vpsrldq \$8,$Z2,$Z2 vaesenc $T1,$inout2,$inout2 vpxor $Z2,$Z3,$Z3 vaesenc $T1,$inout3,$inout3 vpxor $Ii,$Z0,$Z0 movbe 0x08($in0),%r13 vaesenc $T1,$inout4,$inout4 movbe 0x00($in0),%r12 vaesenc $T1,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups 0xa0-0x80($key),$T1 cmp \$11,$rounds jb .Lenc_tail # 128-bit key vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vaesenc $T1,$inout0,$inout0 vaesenc $T1,$inout1,$inout1 vaesenc $T1,$inout2,$inout2 vaesenc $T1,$inout3,$inout3 vaesenc $T1,$inout4,$inout4 vmovups 0xb0-0x80($key),$rndkey vaesenc $T1,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups 0xc0-0x80($key),$T1 je .Lenc_tail # 192-bit key vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vaesenc $T1,$inout0,$inout0 vaesenc $T1,$inout1,$inout1 vaesenc $T1,$inout2,$inout2 vaesenc $T1,$inout3,$inout3 vaesenc $T1,$inout4,$inout4 vmovups 0xd0-0x80($key),$rndkey vaesenc $T1,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups 0xe0-0x80($key),$T1 jmp .Lenc_tail # 256-bit key .align 32 .Lhandle_ctr32: vmovdqu ($const),$Ii # borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask vpshufb $Ii,$T1,$Z2 # byte-swap counter vmovdqu 0x30($const),$Z1 # borrow $Z1, .Ltwo_lsb vpaddd 0x40($const),$Z2,$inout1 # .Lone_lsb vpaddd $Z1,$Z2,$inout2 vmovdqu 0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^1 vpaddd $Z1,$inout1,$inout3 vpshufb $Ii,$inout1,$inout1 vpaddd $Z1,$inout2,$inout4 vpshufb $Ii,$inout2,$inout2 vpxor $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vpaddd $Z1,$inout3,$inout5 vpshufb $Ii,$inout3,$inout3 vpxor $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 vpaddd $Z1,$inout4,$T1 # byte-swapped next counter value vpshufb $Ii,$inout4,$inout4 vpshufb $Ii,$inout5,$inout5 vpshufb $Ii,$T1,$T1 # next counter value jmp .Lresume_ctr32 .align 32 .Lenc_tail: vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vmovdqu $Z3,16+8(%rsp) # postpone vpxor $Z3,$Xi,$Xi vpalignr \$8,$Z0,$Z0,$Xi # 2nd phase vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Hkey,$Z0,$Z0 vpxor 0x00($inp),$T1,$T2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 vpxor 0x10($inp),$T1,$Ii vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 vpxor 0x20($inp),$T1,$Z1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vpxor 0x30($inp),$T1,$Z2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vpxor 0x40($inp),$T1,$Z3 vpxor 0x50($inp),$T1,$Hkey vmovdqu ($ivp),$T1 # load next counter value vaesenclast $T2,$inout0,$inout0 vmovdqu 0x20($const),$T2 # borrow $T2, .Lone_msb vaesenclast $Ii,$inout1,$inout1 vpaddb $T2,$T1,$Ii mov %r13,0x70+8(%rsp) lea 0x60($inp),$inp vaesenclast $Z1,$inout2,$inout2 vpaddb $T2,$Ii,$Z1 mov %r12,0x78+8(%rsp) lea 0x60($out),$out vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($key),$rndkey vaesenclast $Z2,$inout3,$inout3 vpaddb $T2,$Z1,$Z2 vaesenclast $Z3, $inout4,$inout4 vpaddb $T2,$Z2,$Z3 vaesenclast $Hkey,$inout5,$inout5 vpaddb $T2,$Z3,$Hkey add \$0x60,$ret sub \$0x6,$len jc .L6x_done vmovups $inout0,-0x60($out) # save output vpxor $rndkey,$T1,$inout0 vmovups $inout1,-0x50($out) vmovdqa $Ii,$inout1 # 0 latency vmovups $inout2,-0x40($out) vmovdqa $Z1,$inout2 # 0 latency vmovups $inout3,-0x30($out) vmovdqa $Z2,$inout3 # 0 latency vmovups $inout4,-0x20($out) vmovdqa $Z3,$inout4 # 0 latency vmovups $inout5,-0x10($out) vmovdqa $Hkey,$inout5 # 0 latency vmovdqu 0x20+8(%rsp),$Z3 # I[5] jmp .Loop6x .L6x_done: vpxor 16+8(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi # modulo-scheduled vpxor $Z0,$Xi,$Xi # modulo-scheduled ret .size _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x,.-_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x ___ ###################################################################### # # size_t aesni_gcm_[en|de]crypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len, # const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16], # struct { u128 Xi,H,Htbl[9]; } *Xip); $code.=<<___; .globl aesni_gcm_decrypt .type aesni_gcm_decrypt,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni_gcm_decrypt: xor $ret,$ret # We call |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x|, which requires at least 96 (0x60) # bytes of input. cmp \$0x60,$len # minimal accepted length jb .Lgcm_dec_abort lea (%rsp),%rax # save stack pointer push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,-0xd8(%rax) movaps %xmm7,-0xc8(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-0xb8(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-0xa8(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-0x98(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x88(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) .Lgcm_dec_body: ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper vmovdqu ($ivp),$T1 # input counter value add \$-128,%rsp mov 12($ivp),$counter lea .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$const lea -0x80($key),$in0 # borrow $in0 mov \$0xf80,$end0 # borrow $end0 vmovdqu ($Xip),$Xi # load Xi and \$-128,%rsp # ensure stack alignment vmovdqu ($const),$Ii # borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask lea 0x80($key),$key # size optimization lea 0x20+0x20($Xip),$Xip # size optimization mov 0xf0-0x80($key),$rounds vpshufb $Ii,$Xi,$Xi and $end0,$in0 and %rsp,$end0 sub $in0,$end0 jc .Ldec_no_key_aliasing cmp \$768,$end0 jnc .Ldec_no_key_aliasing sub $end0,%rsp # avoid aliasing with key .Ldec_no_key_aliasing: vmovdqu 0x50($inp),$Z3 # I[5] lea ($inp),$in0 vmovdqu 0x40($inp),$Z0 # |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x| requires |$end0| to point to 2*96 (0xc0) # bytes before the end of the input. Note, in particular, that this is # correct even if |$len| is not an even multiple of 96 or 16. XXX: This # seems to require that |$inp| + |$len| >= 2*96 (0xc0); i.e. |$inp| must # not be near the very beginning of the address space when |$len| < 2*96 # (0xc0). lea -0xc0($inp,$len),$end0 vmovdqu 0x30($inp),$Z1 shr \$4,$len xor $ret,$ret vmovdqu 0x20($inp),$Z2 vpshufb $Ii,$Z3,$Z3 # passed to _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x vmovdqu 0x10($inp),$T2 vpshufb $Ii,$Z0,$Z0 vmovdqu ($inp),$Hkey vpshufb $Ii,$Z1,$Z1 vmovdqu $Z0,0x30(%rsp) vpshufb $Ii,$Z2,$Z2 vmovdqu $Z1,0x40(%rsp) vpshufb $Ii,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu $Z2,0x50(%rsp) vpshufb $Ii,$Hkey,$Hkey vmovdqu $T2,0x60(%rsp) vmovdqu $Hkey,0x70(%rsp) call _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x vmovups $inout0,-0x60($out) # save output vmovups $inout1,-0x50($out) vmovups $inout2,-0x40($out) vmovups $inout3,-0x30($out) vmovups $inout4,-0x20($out) vmovups $inout5,-0x10($out) vpshufb ($const),$Xi,$Xi # .Lbswap_mask vmovdqu $Xi,-0x40($Xip) # output Xi vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp # restore %rsp .Lgcm_dec_abort: mov $ret,%rax # return value ret .size aesni_gcm_decrypt,.-aesni_gcm_decrypt ___ $code.=<<___; .type _aesni_ctr32_6x,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 _aesni_ctr32_6x: vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($key),$Z0 # borrow $Z0 for $rndkey vmovdqu 0x20($const),$T2 # borrow $T2, .Lone_msb lea -1($rounds),%r13 vmovups 0x10-0x80($key),$rndkey lea 0x20-0x80($key),%r12 vpxor $Z0,$T1,$inout0 add \$`6<<24`,$counter jc .Lhandle_ctr32_2 vpaddb $T2,$T1,$inout1 vpaddb $T2,$inout1,$inout2 vpxor $Z0,$inout1,$inout1 vpaddb $T2,$inout2,$inout3 vpxor $Z0,$inout2,$inout2 vpaddb $T2,$inout3,$inout4 vpxor $Z0,$inout3,$inout3 vpaddb $T2,$inout4,$inout5 vpxor $Z0,$inout4,$inout4 vpaddb $T2,$inout5,$T1 vpxor $Z0,$inout5,$inout5 jmp .Loop_ctr32 .align 16 .Loop_ctr32: vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups (%r12),$rndkey lea 0x10(%r12),%r12 dec %r13d jnz .Loop_ctr32 vmovdqu (%r12),$Hkey # last round key vaesenc $rndkey,$inout0,$inout0 vpxor 0x00($inp),$Hkey,$Z0 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout1,$inout1 vpxor 0x10($inp),$Hkey,$Z1 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout2,$inout2 vpxor 0x20($inp),$Hkey,$Z2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout3,$inout3 vpxor 0x30($inp),$Hkey,$Xi vaesenc $rndkey,$inout4,$inout4 vpxor 0x40($inp),$Hkey,$T2 vaesenc $rndkey,$inout5,$inout5 vpxor 0x50($inp),$Hkey,$Hkey lea 0x60($inp),$inp vaesenclast $Z0,$inout0,$inout0 vaesenclast $Z1,$inout1,$inout1 vaesenclast $Z2,$inout2,$inout2 vaesenclast $Xi,$inout3,$inout3 vaesenclast $T2,$inout4,$inout4 vaesenclast $Hkey,$inout5,$inout5 vmovups $inout0,0x00($out) vmovups $inout1,0x10($out) vmovups $inout2,0x20($out) vmovups $inout3,0x30($out) vmovups $inout4,0x40($out) vmovups $inout5,0x50($out) lea 0x60($out),$out ret .align 32 .Lhandle_ctr32_2: vpshufb $Ii,$T1,$Z2 # byte-swap counter vmovdqu 0x30($const),$Z1 # borrow $Z1, .Ltwo_lsb vpaddd 0x40($const),$Z2,$inout1 # .Lone_lsb vpaddd $Z1,$Z2,$inout2 vpaddd $Z1,$inout1,$inout3 vpshufb $Ii,$inout1,$inout1 vpaddd $Z1,$inout2,$inout4 vpshufb $Ii,$inout2,$inout2 vpxor $Z0,$inout1,$inout1 vpaddd $Z1,$inout3,$inout5 vpshufb $Ii,$inout3,$inout3 vpxor $Z0,$inout2,$inout2 vpaddd $Z1,$inout4,$T1 # byte-swapped next counter value vpshufb $Ii,$inout4,$inout4 vpxor $Z0,$inout3,$inout3 vpshufb $Ii,$inout5,$inout5 vpxor $Z0,$inout4,$inout4 vpshufb $Ii,$T1,$T1 # next counter value vpxor $Z0,$inout5,$inout5 jmp .Loop_ctr32 .size _aesni_ctr32_6x,.-_aesni_ctr32_6x .globl aesni_gcm_encrypt .type aesni_gcm_encrypt,\@function,6 .align 32 aesni_gcm_encrypt: xor $ret,$ret # We call |_aesni_ctr32_6x| twice, each call consuming 96 bytes of # input. Then we call |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x|, which requires at # least 96 more bytes of input. cmp \$0x60*3,$len # minimal accepted length jb .Lgcm_enc_abort lea (%rsp),%rax # save stack pointer push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,-0xd8(%rax) movaps %xmm7,-0xc8(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-0xb8(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-0xa8(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-0x98(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x88(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) .Lgcm_enc_body: ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper vmovdqu ($ivp),$T1 # input counter value add \$-128,%rsp mov 12($ivp),$counter lea .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$const lea -0x80($key),$in0 # borrow $in0 mov \$0xf80,$end0 # borrow $end0 lea 0x80($key),$key # size optimization vmovdqu ($const),$Ii # borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask and \$-128,%rsp # ensure stack alignment mov 0xf0-0x80($key),$rounds and $end0,$in0 and %rsp,$end0 sub $in0,$end0 jc .Lenc_no_key_aliasing cmp \$768,$end0 jnc .Lenc_no_key_aliasing sub $end0,%rsp # avoid aliasing with key .Lenc_no_key_aliasing: lea ($out),$in0 # |_aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x| requires |$end0| to point to 2*96 (0xc0) # bytes before the end of the input. Note, in particular, that this is # correct even if |$len| is not an even multiple of 96 or 16. Unlike in # the decryption case, there's no caveat that |$out| must not be near # the very beginning of the address space, because we know that # |$len| >= 3*96 from the check above, and so we know # |$out| + |$len| >= 2*96 (0xc0). lea -0xc0($out,$len),$end0 shr \$4,$len call _aesni_ctr32_6x vpshufb $Ii,$inout0,$Xi # save bswapped output on stack vpshufb $Ii,$inout1,$T2 vmovdqu $Xi,0x70(%rsp) vpshufb $Ii,$inout2,$Z0 vmovdqu $T2,0x60(%rsp) vpshufb $Ii,$inout3,$Z1 vmovdqu $Z0,0x50(%rsp) vpshufb $Ii,$inout4,$Z2 vmovdqu $Z1,0x40(%rsp) vpshufb $Ii,$inout5,$Z3 # passed to _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x vmovdqu $Z2,0x30(%rsp) call _aesni_ctr32_6x vmovdqu ($Xip),$Xi # load Xi lea 0x20+0x20($Xip),$Xip # size optimization sub \$12,$len mov \$0x60*2,$ret vpshufb $Ii,$Xi,$Xi call _aesni_ctr32_ghash_6x vmovdqu 0x20(%rsp),$Z3 # I[5] vmovdqu ($const),$Ii # borrow $Ii for .Lbswap_mask vmovdqu 0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^1 vpunpckhqdq $Z3,$Z3,$T1 vmovdqu 0x20-0x20($Xip),$rndkey # borrow $rndkey for $HK vmovups $inout0,-0x60($out) # save output vpshufb $Ii,$inout0,$inout0 # but keep bswapped copy vpxor $Z3,$T1,$T1 vmovups $inout1,-0x50($out) vpshufb $Ii,$inout1,$inout1 vmovups $inout2,-0x40($out) vpshufb $Ii,$inout2,$inout2 vmovups $inout3,-0x30($out) vpshufb $Ii,$inout3,$inout3 vmovups $inout4,-0x20($out) vpshufb $Ii,$inout4,$inout4 vmovups $inout5,-0x10($out) vpshufb $Ii,$inout5,$inout5 vmovdqu $inout0,0x10(%rsp) # free $inout0 ___ { my ($HK,$T3)=($rndkey,$inout0); $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 0x30(%rsp),$Z2 # I[4] vmovdqu 0x10-0x20($Xip),$Ii # borrow $Ii for $Hkey^2 vpunpckhqdq $Z2,$Z2,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z1 vpxor $Z2,$T2,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Z3,$Z3 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu 0x40(%rsp),$T3 # I[3] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Ii,$Z2,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x30-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^3 vpxor $Z1,$Z0,$Z0 vpunpckhqdq $T3,$T3,$Z1 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Ii,$Z2,$Z2 vpxor $T3,$Z1,$Z1 vpxor $Z3,$Z2,$Z2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu 0x50-0x20($Xip),$HK vpxor $T1,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu 0x50(%rsp),$T1 # I[2] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$T3,$Z3 vmovdqu 0x40-0x20($Xip),$Ii # borrow $Ii for $Hkey^4 vpxor $Z0,$Z3,$Z3 vpunpckhqdq $T1,$T1,$Z0 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$T3,$T3 vpxor $T1,$Z0,$Z0 vpxor $Z2,$T3,$T3 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Z1,$Z1 vpxor $T2,$Z1,$Z1 vmovdqu 0x60(%rsp),$T2 # I[1] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Ii,$T1,$Z2 vmovdqu 0x60-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^5 vpxor $Z3,$Z2,$Z2 vpunpckhqdq $T2,$T2,$Z3 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Ii,$T1,$T1 vpxor $T2,$Z3,$Z3 vpxor $T3,$T1,$T1 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$Z0,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x80-0x20($Xip),$HK vpxor $Z1,$Z0,$Z0 vpxor 0x70(%rsp),$Xi,$Xi # accumulate I[0] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$T2,$Z1 vmovdqu 0x70-0x20($Xip),$Ii # borrow $Ii for $Hkey^6 vpunpckhqdq $Xi,$Xi,$T3 vpxor $Z2,$Z1,$Z1 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$T2,$T2 vpxor $Xi,$T3,$T3 vpxor $T1,$T2,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Z3,$Z3 vpxor $Z0,$Z3,$Z0 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Ii,$Xi,$Z2 vmovdqu 0x00-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^1 vpunpckhqdq $inout5,$inout5,$T1 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Ii,$Xi,$Xi vpxor $inout5,$T1,$T1 vpxor $Z1,$Z2,$Z1 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T3,$T3 vmovdqu 0x20-0x20($Xip),$HK vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Z3 vpxor $Z0,$T3,$Z2 vmovdqu 0x10-0x20($Xip),$Ii # borrow $Ii for $Hkey^2 vpxor $Z1,$Z3,$T3 # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$inout5,$Z0 vpxor $T3,$Z2,$Z2 vpunpckhqdq $inout4,$inout4,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$inout5,$inout5 vpxor $inout4,$T2,$T2 vpslldq \$8,$Z2,$T3 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$T1 vpxor $T3,$Z1,$Xi vpsrldq \$8,$Z2,$Z2 vpxor $Z2,$Z3,$Z3 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Ii,$inout4,$Z1 vmovdqu 0x30-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^3 vpxor $Z0,$Z1,$Z1 vpunpckhqdq $inout3,$inout3,$T3 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Ii,$inout4,$inout4 vpxor $inout3,$T3,$T3 vpxor $inout5,$inout4,$inout4 vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$inout5 # 1st phase vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu 0x50-0x20($Xip),$HK vpxor $T1,$T2,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$inout3,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x40-0x20($Xip),$Ii # borrow $Ii for $Hkey^4 vpxor $Z1,$Z0,$Z0 vpunpckhqdq $inout2,$inout2,$T1 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$inout3,$inout3 vpxor $inout2,$T1,$T1 vpxor $inout4,$inout3,$inout3 vxorps 0x10(%rsp),$Z3,$Z3 # accumulate $inout0 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T3,$T3 vpxor $T2,$T3,$T3 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,0x10($const),$Xi,$Xi vxorps $inout5,$Xi,$Xi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Ii,$inout2,$Z1 vmovdqu 0x60-0x20($Xip),$Hkey # $Hkey^5 vpxor $Z0,$Z1,$Z1 vpunpckhqdq $inout1,$inout1,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Ii,$inout2,$inout2 vpxor $inout1,$T2,$T2 vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$inout5 # 2nd phase vpxor $inout3,$inout2,$inout2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu 0x80-0x20($Xip),$HK vpxor $T3,$T1,$T1 vxorps $Z3,$inout5,$inout5 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,0x10($const),$Xi,$Xi vxorps $inout5,$Xi,$Xi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$inout1,$Z0 vmovdqu 0x70-0x20($Xip),$Ii # borrow $Ii for $Hkey^6 vpxor $Z1,$Z0,$Z0 vpunpckhqdq $Xi,$Xi,$T3 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$inout1,$inout1 vpxor $Xi,$T3,$T3 vpxor $inout2,$inout1,$inout1 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T2,$T2 vpxor $T1,$T2,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Ii,$Xi,$Z1 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Ii,$Xi,$Z3 vpxor $Z0,$Z1,$Z1 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T3,$Z2 vpxor $inout1,$Z3,$Z3 vpxor $T2,$Z2,$Z2 vpxor $Z1,$Z3,$Z0 # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing vpxor $Z0,$Z2,$Z2 vpslldq \$8,$Z2,$T1 vmovdqu 0x10($const),$Hkey # .Lpoly vpsrldq \$8,$Z2,$Z2 vpxor $T1,$Z1,$Xi vpxor $Z2,$Z3,$Z3 vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$T2 # 1st phase vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Xi vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$T2 # 2nd phase vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi vpxor $Z3,$T2,$T2 vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Xi ___ } $code.=<<___; vpshufb ($const),$Xi,$Xi # .Lbswap_mask vmovdqu $Xi,-0x40($Xip) # output Xi vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp # restore %rsp .Lgcm_enc_abort: mov $ret,%rax # return value ret .size aesni_gcm_encrypt,.-aesni_gcm_encrypt ___ $code.=<<___; .align 64 .Lbswap_mask: .byte 15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0 .Lpoly: .byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2 .Lone_msb: .byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 .Ltwo_lsb: .byte 2,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .Lone_lsb: .byte 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .asciz "AES-NI GCM module for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 ___ if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___ .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type gcm_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 gcm_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov %r15,240($context) mov %r14,232($context) mov %r13,224($context) mov %r12,216($context) mov %rbp,160($context) mov %rbx,144($context) lea -0xd8(%rax),%rsi # %xmm save area lea 512($context),%rdi # & context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx # 10*sizeof(%xmm0)/sizeof(%rax) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size gcm_se_handler,.-gcm_se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_gcm_decrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_gcm_decrypt .rva .LSEH_gcm_dec_info .rva .LSEH_begin_aesni_gcm_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_aesni_gcm_encrypt .rva .LSEH_gcm_enc_info .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_gcm_dec_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva gcm_se_handler .rva .Lgcm_dec_body,.Lgcm_dec_abort .LSEH_gcm_enc_info: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva gcm_se_handler .rva .Lgcm_enc_body,.Lgcm_enc_abort ___ } }}} else {{{ $code=<<___; # assembler is too old .text .globl aesni_gcm_encrypt .type aesni_gcm_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent aesni_gcm_encrypt: xor %eax,%eax ret .size aesni_gcm_encrypt,.-aesni_gcm_encrypt .globl aesni_gcm_decrypt .type aesni_gcm_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent aesni_gcm_decrypt: xor %eax,%eax ret .size aesni_gcm_decrypt,.-aesni_gcm_decrypt ___ }}} $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000003125613176625657020315 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # March 2010 # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it # uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Performance # results are for streamed GHASH subroutine on UltraSPARC pre-Tx CPU # and are expressed in cycles per processed byte, less is better: # # gcc 3.3.x cc 5.2 this assembler # # 32-bit build 81.4 43.3 12.6 (+546%/+244%) # 64-bit build 20.2 21.2 12.6 (+60%/+68%) # # Here is data collected on UltraSPARC T1 system running Linux: # # gcc 4.4.1 this assembler # # 32-bit build 566 50 (+1000%) # 64-bit build 56 50 (+12%) # # I don't quite understand why difference between 32-bit and 64-bit # compiler-generated code is so big. Compilers *were* instructed to # generate code for UltraSPARC and should have used 64-bit registers # for Z vector (see C code) even in 32-bit build... Oh well, it only # means more impressive improvement coefficients for this assembler # module;-) Loops are aggressively modulo-scheduled in respect to # references to input data and Z.hi updates to achieve 12 cycles # timing. To anchor to something else, sha1-sparcv9.pl spends 11.6 # cycles to process one byte on UltraSPARC pre-Tx CPU and ~24 on T1. # # October 2012 # # Add VIS3 lookup-table-free implementation using polynomial # multiplication xmulx[hi] and extended addition addxc[cc] # instructions. 4.52/7.63x improvement on T3/T4 or in absolute # terms 7.90/2.14 cycles per byte. On T4 multi-process benchmark # saturates at ~15.5x single-process result on 8-core processor, # or ~20.5GBps per 2.85GHz socket. $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $frame="STACK_FRAME"; $bias="STACK_BIAS"; $Zhi="%o0"; # 64-bit values $Zlo="%o1"; $Thi="%o2"; $Tlo="%o3"; $rem="%o4"; $tmp="%o5"; $nhi="%l0"; # small values and pointers $nlo="%l1"; $xi0="%l2"; $xi1="%l3"; $rem_4bit="%l4"; $remi="%l5"; $Htblo="%l6"; $cnt="%l7"; $Xi="%i0"; # input argument block $Htbl="%i1"; $inp="%i2"; $len="%i3"; $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .align 64 rem_4bit: .long `0x0000<<16`,0,`0x1C20<<16`,0,`0x3840<<16`,0,`0x2460<<16`,0 .long `0x7080<<16`,0,`0x6CA0<<16`,0,`0x48C0<<16`,0,`0x54E0<<16`,0 .long `0xE100<<16`,0,`0xFD20<<16`,0,`0xD940<<16`,0,`0xC560<<16`,0 .long `0x9180<<16`,0,`0x8DA0<<16`,0,`0xA9C0<<16`,0,`0xB5E0<<16`,0 .type rem_4bit,#object .size rem_4bit,(.-rem_4bit) .globl gcm_ghash_4bit .align 32 gcm_ghash_4bit: save %sp,-$frame,%sp ldub [$inp+15],$nlo ldub [$Xi+15],$xi0 ldub [$Xi+14],$xi1 add $len,$inp,$len add $Htbl,8,$Htblo 1: call .+8 add %o7,rem_4bit-1b,$rem_4bit .Louter: xor $xi0,$nlo,$nlo and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi and $nlo,0x0f,$nlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo ldx [$Htblo+$nlo],$Zlo ldx [$Htbl+$nlo],$Zhi ldub [$inp+14],$nlo ldx [$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi sll $remi,3,$remi ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo mov 13,$cnt sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo xor $xi1,$nlo,$nlo and $Zlo,0xf,$remi and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi and $nlo,0x0f,$nlo ba .Lghash_inner sll $nlo,4,$nlo .align 32 .Lghash_inner: ldx [$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo ldub [$inp+$cnt],$nlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo ldub [$Xi+$cnt],$xi1 xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $xi1,$nlo,$nlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi addcc $cnt,-1,$cnt xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo and $nlo,0x0f,$nlo xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo blu .Lghash_inner and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi add $inp,16,$inp cmp $inp,$len be,pn SIZE_T_CC,.Ldone and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo ldub [$inp+15],$nlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi stx $Zlo,[$Xi+8] xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi stx $Zhi,[$Xi] srl $Zlo,8,$xi1 and $Zlo,0xff,$xi0 ba .Louter and $xi1,0xff,$xi1 .align 32 .Ldone: ldx [$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi stx $Zlo,[$Xi+8] xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi stx $Zhi,[$Xi] ret restore .type gcm_ghash_4bit,#function .size gcm_ghash_4bit,(.-gcm_ghash_4bit) ___ undef $inp; undef $len; $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_gmult_4bit .align 32 gcm_gmult_4bit: save %sp,-$frame,%sp ldub [$Xi+15],$nlo add $Htbl,8,$Htblo 1: call .+8 add %o7,rem_4bit-1b,$rem_4bit and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi and $nlo,0x0f,$nlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo ldx [$Htblo+$nlo],$Zlo ldx [$Htbl+$nlo],$Zhi ldub [$Xi+14],$nlo ldx [$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi sll $remi,3,$remi ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo mov 13,$cnt sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo and $Zlo,0xf,$remi and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi and $nlo,0x0f,$nlo ba .Lgmult_inner sll $nlo,4,$nlo .align 32 .Lgmult_inner: ldx [$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo ldub [$Xi+$cnt],$nlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi addcc $cnt,-1,$cnt xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo and $nlo,0x0f,$nlo xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo blu .Lgmult_inner and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htblo+$nlo],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nlo],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi and $Zlo,0xf,$remi ldx [$Htblo+$nhi],$Tlo sll $remi,3,$remi xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldx [$Htbl+$nhi],$Thi srlx $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldx [$rem_4bit+$remi],$rem sllx $Zhi,60,$tmp xor $Tlo,$Zlo,$Zlo srlx $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Zlo,$tmp,$Zlo xor $Thi,$Zhi,$Zhi stx $Zlo,[$Xi+8] xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi stx $Zhi,[$Xi] ret restore .type gcm_gmult_4bit,#function .size gcm_gmult_4bit,(.-gcm_gmult_4bit) ___ {{{ # Straightforward 128x128-bit multiplication using Karatsuba algorithm # followed by pair of 64-bit reductions [with a shortcut in first one, # which allowed to break dependency between reductions and remove one # multiplication from critical path]. While it might be suboptimal # with regard to sheer number of multiplications, other methods [such # as aggregate reduction] would require more 64-bit registers, which # we don't have in 32-bit application context. ($Xip,$Htable,$inp,$len)=map("%i$_",(0..3)); ($Hhl,$Hlo,$Hhi,$Xlo,$Xhi,$xE1,$sqr, $C0,$C1,$C2,$C3,$V)= (map("%o$_",(0..5,7)),map("%g$_",(1..5))); ($shl,$shr)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); # For details regarding "twisted H" see ghash-x86.pl. $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_init_vis3 .align 32 gcm_init_vis3: save %sp,-$frame,%sp ldx [%i1+0],$Hhi ldx [%i1+8],$Hlo mov 0xE1,$Xhi mov 1,$Xlo sllx $Xhi,57,$Xhi srax $Hhi,63,$C0 ! broadcast carry addcc $Hlo,$Hlo,$Hlo ! H<<=1 addxc $Hhi,$Hhi,$Hhi and $C0,$Xlo,$Xlo and $C0,$Xhi,$Xhi xor $Xlo,$Hlo,$Hlo xor $Xhi,$Hhi,$Hhi stx $Hlo,[%i0+8] ! save twisted H stx $Hhi,[%i0+0] sethi %hi(0xA0406080),$V sethi %hi(0x20C0E000),%l0 or $V,%lo(0xA0406080),$V or %l0,%lo(0x20C0E000),%l0 sllx $V,32,$V or %l0,$V,$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000 stx $V,[%i0+16] ret restore .type gcm_init_vis3,#function .size gcm_init_vis3,.-gcm_init_vis3 .globl gcm_gmult_vis3 .align 32 gcm_gmult_vis3: save %sp,-$frame,%sp ldx [$Xip+8],$Xlo ! load Xi ldx [$Xip+0],$Xhi ldx [$Htable+8],$Hlo ! load twisted H ldx [$Htable+0],$Hhi mov 0xE1,%l7 sllx %l7,57,$xE1 ! 57 is not a typo ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000 xor $Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl ! Karatsuba pre-processing xmulx $Xlo,$Hlo,$C0 xor $Xlo,$Xhi,$C2 ! Karatsuba pre-processing xmulx $C2,$Hhl,$C1 xmulxhi $Xlo,$Hlo,$Xlo xmulxhi $C2,$Hhl,$C2 xmulxhi $Xhi,$Hhi,$C3 xmulx $Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi sll $C0,3,$sqr srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)] xor $C0,$sqr,$sqr sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f] xor $C0,$C1,$C1 ! Karatsuba post-processing xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2 xor $sqr,$Xlo,$Xlo ! real destination is $C1 xor $C3,$C2,$C2 xor $Xlo,$C1,$C1 xor $Xhi,$C2,$C2 xor $Xhi,$C1,$C1 xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56 xor $C0,$C2,$C2 xmulx $C1,$xE1,$C0 xor $C1,$C3,$C3 xmulxhi $C1,$xE1,$C1 xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2 xor $C0,$C2,$C2 xor $C1,$C3,$C3 stx $C2,[$Xip+8] ! save Xi stx $C3,[$Xip+0] ret restore .type gcm_gmult_vis3,#function .size gcm_gmult_vis3,.-gcm_gmult_vis3 .globl gcm_ghash_vis3 .align 32 gcm_ghash_vis3: save %sp,-$frame,%sp nop srln $len,0,$len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 ldx [$Xip+8],$C2 ! load Xi ldx [$Xip+0],$C3 ldx [$Htable+8],$Hlo ! load twisted H ldx [$Htable+0],$Hhi mov 0xE1,%l7 sllx %l7,57,$xE1 ! 57 is not a typo ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000 and $inp,7,$shl andn $inp,7,$inp sll $shl,3,$shl prefetch [$inp+63], 20 sub %g0,$shl,$shr xor $Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl ! Karatsuba pre-processing .Loop: ldx [$inp+8],$Xlo brz,pt $shl,1f ldx [$inp+0],$Xhi ldx [$inp+16],$C1 ! align data srlx $Xlo,$shr,$C0 sllx $Xlo,$shl,$Xlo sllx $Xhi,$shl,$Xhi srlx $C1,$shr,$C1 or $C0,$Xhi,$Xhi or $C1,$Xlo,$Xlo 1: add $inp,16,$inp sub $len,16,$len xor $C2,$Xlo,$Xlo xor $C3,$Xhi,$Xhi prefetch [$inp+63], 20 xmulx $Xlo,$Hlo,$C0 xor $Xlo,$Xhi,$C2 ! Karatsuba pre-processing xmulx $C2,$Hhl,$C1 xmulxhi $Xlo,$Hlo,$Xlo xmulxhi $C2,$Hhl,$C2 xmulxhi $Xhi,$Hhi,$C3 xmulx $Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi sll $C0,3,$sqr srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)] xor $C0,$sqr,$sqr sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f] xor $C0,$C1,$C1 ! Karatsuba post-processing xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2 xor $sqr,$Xlo,$Xlo ! real destination is $C1 xor $C3,$C2,$C2 xor $Xlo,$C1,$C1 xor $Xhi,$C2,$C2 xor $Xhi,$C1,$C1 xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56 xor $C0,$C2,$C2 xmulx $C1,$xE1,$C0 xor $C1,$C3,$C3 xmulxhi $C1,$xE1,$C1 xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2 xor $C0,$C2,$C2 brnz,pt $len,.Loop xor $C1,$C3,$C3 stx $C2,[$Xip+8] ! save Xi stx $C3,[$Xip+0] ret restore .type gcm_ghash_vis3,#function .size gcm_ghash_vis3,.-gcm_ghash_vis3 ___ }}} $code.=<<___; .asciz "GHASH for SPARCv9/VIS3, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis3 { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "addxc" => 0x011, "addxccc" => 0x013, "xmulx" => 0x115, "xmulxhi" => 0x116 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(xmulx[hi]*|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl0000755000000000000000000003470413176625657017764 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # GHASH for for PowerISA v2.07. # # July 2014 # # Accurate performance measurements are problematic, because it's # always virtualized setup with possibly throttled processor. # Relative comparison is therefore more informative. This initial # version is ~2.1x slower than hardware-assisted AES-128-CTR, ~12x # faster than "4-bit" integer-only compiler-generated 64-bit code. # "Initial version" means that there is room for futher improvement. # May 2016 # # 2x aggregated reduction improves performance by 50% (resulting # performance on POWER8 is 1 cycle per processed byte), and 4x # aggregated reduction - by 170% or 2.7x (resulting in 0.55 cpb). $flavour=shift; $output =shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T=8; $LRSAVE=2*$SIZE_T; $STU="stdu"; $POP="ld"; $PUSH="std"; $UCMP="cmpld"; $SHRI="srdi"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T=4; $LRSAVE=$SIZE_T; $STU="stwu"; $POP="lwz"; $PUSH="stw"; $UCMP="cmplw"; $SHRI="srwi"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $sp="r1"; $FRAME=6*$SIZE_T+13*16; # 13*16 is for v20-v31 offload $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output" || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=map("r$_",(3..6)); # argument block my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("v$_",(0..3)); my ($zero,$t0,$t1,$t2,$xC2,$H,$Hh,$Hl,$lemask)=map("v$_",(4..12)); my ($Xl1,$Xm1,$Xh1,$IN1,$H2,$H2h,$H2l)=map("v$_",(13..19)); my $vrsave="r12"; $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .gcm_init_p8 .align 5 .gcm_init_p8: li r0,-4096 li r8,0x10 mfspr $vrsave,256 li r9,0x20 mtspr 256,r0 li r10,0x30 lvx_u $H,0,r4 # load H vspltisb $xC2,-16 # 0xf0 vspltisb $t0,1 # one vaddubm $xC2,$xC2,$xC2 # 0xe0 vxor $zero,$zero,$zero vor $xC2,$xC2,$t0 # 0xe1 vsldoi $xC2,$xC2,$zero,15 # 0xe1... vsldoi $t1,$zero,$t0,1 # ...1 vaddubm $xC2,$xC2,$xC2 # 0xc2... vspltisb $t2,7 vor $xC2,$xC2,$t1 # 0xc2....01 vspltb $t1,$H,0 # most significant byte vsl $H,$H,$t0 # H<<=1 vsrab $t1,$t1,$t2 # broadcast carry bit vand $t1,$t1,$xC2 vxor $IN,$H,$t1 # twisted H vsldoi $H,$IN,$IN,8 # twist even more ... vsldoi $xC2,$zero,$xC2,8 # 0xc2.0 vsldoi $Hl,$zero,$H,8 # ... and split vsldoi $Hh,$H,$zero,8 stvx_u $xC2,0,r3 # save pre-computed table stvx_u $Hl,r8,r3 li r8,0x40 stvx_u $H, r9,r3 li r9,0x50 stvx_u $Hh,r10,r3 li r10,0x60 vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·H.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·H.lo+H.lo·H.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·H.hi vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $IN1,$Xl,$t1 vsldoi $H2,$IN1,$IN1,8 vsldoi $H2l,$zero,$H2,8 vsldoi $H2h,$H2,$zero,8 stvx_u $H2l,r8,r3 # save H^2 li r8,0x70 stvx_u $H2,r9,r3 li r9,0x80 stvx_u $H2h,r10,r3 li r10,0x90 ___ { my ($t4,$t5,$t6) = ($Hl,$H,$Hh); $code.=<<___; vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$H2l # H.lo·H^2.lo vpmsumd $Xl1,$IN1,$H2l # H^2.lo·H^2.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H2 # H.hi·H^2.lo+H.lo·H^2.hi vpmsumd $Xm1,$IN1,$H2 # H^2.hi·H^2.lo+H^2.lo·H^2.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$H2h # H.hi·H^2.hi vpmsumd $Xh1,$IN1,$H2h # H^2.hi·H^2.hi vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vpmsumd $t6,$Xl1,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vsldoi $t4,$Xm1,$zero,8 vsldoi $t5,$zero,$Xm1,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vxor $Xl1,$Xl1,$t4 vxor $Xh1,$Xh1,$t5 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vsldoi $Xl1,$Xl1,$Xl1,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vxor $Xl1,$Xl1,$t6 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vsldoi $t5,$Xl1,$Xl1,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vpmsumd $Xl1,$Xl1,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $t5,$t5,$Xh1 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t1 vxor $Xl1,$Xl1,$t5 vsldoi $H,$Xl,$Xl,8 vsldoi $H2,$Xl1,$Xl1,8 vsldoi $Hl,$zero,$H,8 vsldoi $Hh,$H,$zero,8 vsldoi $H2l,$zero,$H2,8 vsldoi $H2h,$H2,$zero,8 stvx_u $Hl,r8,r3 # save H^3 li r8,0xa0 stvx_u $H,r9,r3 li r9,0xb0 stvx_u $Hh,r10,r3 li r10,0xc0 stvx_u $H2l,r8,r3 # save H^4 stvx_u $H2,r9,r3 stvx_u $H2h,r10,r3 mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .gcm_init_p8,.-.gcm_init_p8 ___ } $code.=<<___; .globl .gcm_gmult_p8 .align 5 .gcm_gmult_p8: lis r0,0xfff8 li r8,0x10 mfspr $vrsave,256 li r9,0x20 mtspr 256,r0 li r10,0x30 lvx_u $IN,0,$Xip # load Xi lvx_u $Hl,r8,$Htbl # load pre-computed table le?lvsl $lemask,r0,r0 lvx_u $H, r9,$Htbl le?vspltisb $t0,0x07 lvx_u $Hh,r10,$Htbl le?vxor $lemask,$lemask,$t0 lvx_u $xC2,0,$Htbl le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask vxor $zero,$zero,$zero vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t1 le?vperm $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask stvx_u $Xl,0,$Xip # write out Xi mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .gcm_gmult_p8,.-.gcm_gmult_p8 .globl .gcm_ghash_p8 .align 5 .gcm_ghash_p8: li r0,-4096 li r8,0x10 mfspr $vrsave,256 li r9,0x20 mtspr 256,r0 li r10,0x30 lvx_u $Xl,0,$Xip # load Xi lvx_u $Hl,r8,$Htbl # load pre-computed table li r8,0x40 le?lvsl $lemask,r0,r0 lvx_u $H, r9,$Htbl li r9,0x50 le?vspltisb $t0,0x07 lvx_u $Hh,r10,$Htbl li r10,0x60 le?vxor $lemask,$lemask,$t0 lvx_u $xC2,0,$Htbl le?vperm $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask vxor $zero,$zero,$zero ${UCMP}i $len,64 bge Lgcm_ghash_p8_4x lvx_u $IN,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 subic. $len,$len,16 le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask vxor $IN,$IN,$Xl beq Lshort lvx_u $H2l,r8,$Htbl # load H^2 li r8,16 lvx_u $H2, r9,$Htbl add r9,$inp,$len # end of input lvx_u $H2h,r10,$Htbl be?b Loop_2x .align 5 Loop_2x: lvx_u $IN1,0,$inp le?vperm $IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask subic $len,$len,32 vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$H2l # H^2.lo·Xi.lo vpmsumd $Xl1,$IN1,$Hl # H.lo·Xi+1.lo subfe r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H2 # H^2.hi·Xi.lo+H^2.lo·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xm1,$IN1,$H # H.hi·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+1.hi and r0,r0,$len vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$H2h # H^2.hi·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xh1,$IN1,$Hh # H.hi·Xi+1.hi add $inp,$inp,r0 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$Xl1 vxor $Xm,$Xm,$Xm1 vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$Xh1 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 lvx_u $IN,r8,$inp addi $inp,$inp,32 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $IN,$IN,$t1 vxor $IN,$IN,$Xl $UCMP r9,$inp bgt Loop_2x # done yet? cmplwi $len,0 bne Leven Lshort: vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh Leven: vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t1 le?vperm $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask stvx_u $Xl,0,$Xip # write out Xi mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0 .long 0 ___ { my ($Xl3,$Xm2,$IN2,$H3l,$H3,$H3h, $Xh3,$Xm3,$IN3,$H4l,$H4,$H4h) = map("v$_",(20..31)); my $IN0=$IN; my ($H21l,$H21h,$loperm,$hiperm) = ($Hl,$Hh,$H2l,$H2h); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .gcm_ghash_p8_4x: Lgcm_ghash_p8_4x: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` stvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp li r10,0x60 stvx v31,r11,$sp li r0,-1 stw $vrsave,`$FRAME-4`($sp) # save vrsave mtspr 256,r0 # preserve all AltiVec registers lvsl $t0,0,r8 # 0x0001..0e0f #lvx_u $H2l,r8,$Htbl # load H^2 li r8,0x70 lvx_u $H2, r9,$Htbl li r9,0x80 vspltisb $t1,8 # 0x0808..0808 #lvx_u $H2h,r10,$Htbl li r10,0x90 lvx_u $H3l,r8,$Htbl # load H^3 li r8,0xa0 lvx_u $H3, r9,$Htbl li r9,0xb0 lvx_u $H3h,r10,$Htbl li r10,0xc0 lvx_u $H4l,r8,$Htbl # load H^4 li r8,0x10 lvx_u $H4, r9,$Htbl li r9,0x20 lvx_u $H4h,r10,$Htbl li r10,0x30 vsldoi $t2,$zero,$t1,8 # 0x0000..0808 vaddubm $hiperm,$t0,$t2 # 0x0001..1617 vaddubm $loperm,$t1,$hiperm # 0x0809..1e1f $SHRI $len,$len,4 # this allows to use sign bit # as carry lvx_u $IN0,0,$inp # load input lvx_u $IN1,r8,$inp subic. $len,$len,8 lvx_u $IN2,r9,$inp lvx_u $IN3,r10,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x40 le?vperm $IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask le?vperm $IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask le?vperm $IN2,$IN2,$IN2,$lemask le?vperm $IN3,$IN3,$IN3,$lemask vxor $Xh,$IN0,$Xl vpmsumd $Xl1,$IN1,$H3l vpmsumd $Xm1,$IN1,$H3 vpmsumd $Xh1,$IN1,$H3h vperm $H21l,$H2,$H,$hiperm vperm $t0,$IN2,$IN3,$loperm vperm $H21h,$H2,$H,$loperm vperm $t1,$IN2,$IN3,$hiperm vpmsumd $Xm2,$IN2,$H2 # H^2.lo·Xi+2.hi+H^2.hi·Xi+2.lo vpmsumd $Xl3,$t0,$H21l # H^2.lo·Xi+2.lo+H.lo·Xi+3.lo vpmsumd $Xm3,$IN3,$H # H.hi·Xi+3.lo +H.lo·Xi+3.hi vpmsumd $Xh3,$t1,$H21h # H^2.hi·Xi+2.hi+H.hi·Xi+3.hi vxor $Xm2,$Xm2,$Xm1 vxor $Xl3,$Xl3,$Xl1 vxor $Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm2 vxor $Xh3,$Xh3,$Xh1 blt Ltail_4x Loop_4x: lvx_u $IN0,0,$inp lvx_u $IN1,r8,$inp subic. $len,$len,4 lvx_u $IN2,r9,$inp lvx_u $IN3,r10,$inp addi $inp,$inp,0x40 le?vperm $IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask le?vperm $IN2,$IN2,$IN2,$lemask le?vperm $IN3,$IN3,$IN3,$lemask le?vperm $IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask vpmsumd $Xl,$Xh,$H4l # H^4.lo·Xi.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$Xh,$H4 # H^4.hi·Xi.lo+H^4.lo·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$Xh,$H4h # H^4.hi·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xl1,$IN1,$H3l vpmsumd $Xm1,$IN1,$H3 vpmsumd $Xh1,$IN1,$H3h vxor $Xl,$Xl,$Xl3 vxor $Xm,$Xm,$Xm3 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$Xh3 vperm $t0,$IN2,$IN3,$loperm vperm $t1,$IN2,$IN3,$hiperm vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl3,$t0,$H21l # H.lo·Xi+3.lo +H^2.lo·Xi+2.lo vpmsumd $Xh3,$t1,$H21h # H.hi·Xi+3.hi +H^2.hi·Xi+2.hi vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xm2,$IN2,$H2 # H^2.hi·Xi+2.lo+H^2.lo·Xi+2.hi vpmsumd $Xm3,$IN3,$H # H.hi·Xi+3.lo +H.lo·Xi+3.hi vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vxor $Xl3,$Xl3,$Xl1 vxor $Xh3,$Xh3,$Xh1 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$IN0 vxor $Xm2,$Xm2,$Xm1 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vxor $Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm2 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$Xl bge Loop_4x Ltail_4x: vpmsumd $Xl,$Xh,$H4l # H^4.lo·Xi.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$Xh,$H4 # H^4.hi·Xi.lo+H^4.lo·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$Xh,$H4h # H^4.hi·Xi.hi vxor $Xl,$Xl,$Xl3 vxor $Xm,$Xm,$Xm3 vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$Xh3 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t1 addic. $len,$len,4 beq Ldone_4x lvx_u $IN0,0,$inp ${UCMP}i $len,2 li $len,-4 blt Lone lvx_u $IN1,r8,$inp beq Ltwo Lthree: lvx_u $IN2,r9,$inp le?vperm $IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask le?vperm $IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask le?vperm $IN2,$IN2,$IN2,$lemask vxor $Xh,$IN0,$Xl vmr $H4l,$H3l vmr $H4, $H3 vmr $H4h,$H3h vperm $t0,$IN1,$IN2,$loperm vperm $t1,$IN1,$IN2,$hiperm vpmsumd $Xm2,$IN1,$H2 # H^2.lo·Xi+1.hi+H^2.hi·Xi+1.lo vpmsumd $Xm3,$IN2,$H # H.hi·Xi+2.lo +H.lo·Xi+2.hi vpmsumd $Xl3,$t0,$H21l # H^2.lo·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+2.lo vpmsumd $Xh3,$t1,$H21h # H^2.hi·Xi+1.hi+H.hi·Xi+2.hi vxor $Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm2 b Ltail_4x .align 4 Ltwo: le?vperm $IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask le?vperm $IN1,$IN1,$IN1,$lemask vxor $Xh,$IN0,$Xl vperm $t0,$zero,$IN1,$loperm vperm $t1,$zero,$IN1,$hiperm vsldoi $H4l,$zero,$H2,8 vmr $H4, $H2 vsldoi $H4h,$H2,$zero,8 vpmsumd $Xl3,$t0, $H21l # H.lo·Xi+1.lo vpmsumd $Xm3,$IN1,$H # H.hi·Xi+1.lo+H.lo·Xi+2.hi vpmsumd $Xh3,$t1, $H21h # H.hi·Xi+1.hi b Ltail_4x .align 4 Lone: le?vperm $IN0,$IN0,$IN0,$lemask vsldoi $H4l,$zero,$H,8 vmr $H4, $H vsldoi $H4h,$H,$zero,8 vxor $Xh,$IN0,$Xl vxor $Xl3,$Xl3,$Xl3 vxor $Xm3,$Xm3,$Xm3 vxor $Xh3,$Xh3,$Xh3 b Ltail_4x Ldone_4x: le?vperm $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask stvx_u $Xl,0,$Xip # write out Xi li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T` li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T` mtspr 256,$vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,0,0x80,0,4,0 .long 0 ___ } $code.=<<___; .size .gcm_ghash_p8,.-.gcm_ghash_p8 .asciz "GHASH for PowerISA 2.07, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) { # little-endian s/le\?//o or s/be\?/#be#/o; } else { s/le\?/#le#/o or s/be\?//o; } print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000012436313176625657017666 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # March, June 2010 # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that # it uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. GHASH # function features so called "528B" variant utilizing additional # 256+16 bytes of per-key storage [+512 bytes shared table]. # Performance results are for this streamed GHASH subroutine and are # expressed in cycles per processed byte, less is better: # # gcc 3.4.x(*) assembler # # P4 28.6 14.0 +100% # Opteron 19.3 7.7 +150% # Core2 17.8 8.1(**) +120% # Atom 31.6 16.8 +88% # VIA Nano 21.8 10.1 +115% # # (*) comparison is not completely fair, because C results are # for vanilla "256B" implementation, while assembler results # are for "528B";-) # (**) it's mystery [to me] why Core2 result is not same as for # Opteron; # May 2010 # # Add PCLMULQDQ version performing at 2.02 cycles per processed byte. # See ghash-x86.pl for background information and details about coding # techniques. # # Special thanks to David Woodhouse for # providing access to a Westmere-based system on behalf of Intel # Open Source Technology Centre. # December 2012 # # Overhaul: aggregate Karatsuba post-processing, improve ILP in # reduction_alg9, increase reduction aggregate factor to 4x. As for # the latter. ghash-x86.pl discusses that it makes lesser sense to # increase aggregate factor. Then why increase here? Critical path # consists of 3 independent pclmulqdq instructions, Karatsuba post- # processing and reduction. "On top" of this we lay down aggregated # multiplication operations, triplets of independent pclmulqdq's. As # issue rate for pclmulqdq is limited, it makes lesser sense to # aggregate more multiplications than it takes to perform remaining # non-multiplication operations. 2x is near-optimal coefficient for # contemporary Intel CPUs (therefore modest improvement coefficient), # but not for Bulldozer. Latter is because logical SIMD operations # are twice as slow in comparison to Intel, so that critical path is # longer. A CPU with higher pclmulqdq issue rate would also benefit # from higher aggregate factor... # # Westmere 1.78(+13%) # Sandy Bridge 1.80(+8%) # Ivy Bridge 1.80(+7%) # Haswell 0.55(+93%) (if system doesn't support AVX) # Broadwell 0.45(+110%)(if system doesn't support AVX) # Skylake 0.44(+110%)(if system doesn't support AVX) # Bulldozer 1.49(+27%) # Silvermont 2.88(+13%) # Goldmont 1.08(+24%) # March 2013 # # ... 8x aggregate factor AVX code path is using reduction algorithm # suggested by Shay Gueron[1]. Even though contemporary AVX-capable # CPUs such as Sandy and Ivy Bridge can execute it, the code performs # sub-optimally in comparison to above mentioned version. But thanks # to Ilya Albrekht and Max Locktyukhin of Intel Corp. we knew that # it performs in 0.41 cycles per byte on Haswell processor, in # 0.29 on Broadwell, and in 0.36 on Skylake. # # [1] http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2900&user=guest&pass=guest $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; $do4xaggr=1; # common register layout $nlo="%rax"; $nhi="%rbx"; $Zlo="%r8"; $Zhi="%r9"; $tmp="%r10"; $rem_4bit = "%r11"; $Xi="%rdi"; $Htbl="%rsi"; # per-function register layout $cnt="%rcx"; $rem="%rdx"; sub LB() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/ or $r =~ s/%[er]([sd]i)/%\1l/ or $r =~ s/%[er](bp)/%\1l/ or $r =~ s/%(r[0-9]+)[d]?/%\1b/; $r; } sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; my $arg = pop; $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n"; } { my $N; sub loop() { my $inp = shift; $N++; $code.=<<___; xor $nlo,$nlo xor $nhi,$nhi mov `&LB("$Zlo")`,`&LB("$nlo")` mov `&LB("$Zlo")`,`&LB("$nhi")` shl \$4,`&LB("$nlo")` mov \$14,$cnt mov 8($Htbl,$nlo),$Zlo mov ($Htbl,$nlo),$Zhi and \$0xf0,`&LB("$nhi")` mov $Zlo,$rem jmp .Loop$N .align 16 .Loop$N: shr \$4,$Zlo and \$0xf,$rem mov $Zhi,$tmp mov ($inp,$cnt),`&LB("$nlo")` shr \$4,$Zhi xor 8($Htbl,$nhi),$Zlo shl \$60,$tmp xor ($Htbl,$nhi),$Zhi mov `&LB("$nlo")`,`&LB("$nhi")` xor ($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi mov $Zlo,$rem shl \$4,`&LB("$nlo")` xor $tmp,$Zlo dec $cnt js .Lbreak$N shr \$4,$Zlo and \$0xf,$rem mov $Zhi,$tmp shr \$4,$Zhi xor 8($Htbl,$nlo),$Zlo shl \$60,$tmp xor ($Htbl,$nlo),$Zhi and \$0xf0,`&LB("$nhi")` xor ($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi mov $Zlo,$rem xor $tmp,$Zlo jmp .Loop$N .align 16 .Lbreak$N: shr \$4,$Zlo and \$0xf,$rem mov $Zhi,$tmp shr \$4,$Zhi xor 8($Htbl,$nlo),$Zlo shl \$60,$tmp xor ($Htbl,$nlo),$Zhi and \$0xf0,`&LB("$nhi")` xor ($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi mov $Zlo,$rem xor $tmp,$Zlo shr \$4,$Zlo and \$0xf,$rem mov $Zhi,$tmp shr \$4,$Zhi xor 8($Htbl,$nhi),$Zlo shl \$60,$tmp xor ($Htbl,$nhi),$Zhi xor $tmp,$Zlo xor ($rem_4bit,$rem,8),$Zhi bswap $Zlo bswap $Zhi ___ }} $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl gcm_gmult_4bit .type gcm_gmult_4bit,\@function,2 .align 16 gcm_gmult_4bit: push %rbx push %rbp # %rbp and %r12 are pushed exclusively in push %r12 # order to reuse Win64 exception handler... .Lgmult_prologue: movzb 15($Xi),$Zlo lea .Lrem_4bit(%rip),$rem_4bit ___ &loop ($Xi); $code.=<<___; mov $Zlo,8($Xi) mov $Zhi,($Xi) mov 16(%rsp),%rbx lea 24(%rsp),%rsp .Lgmult_epilogue: ret .size gcm_gmult_4bit,.-gcm_gmult_4bit ___ # per-function register layout $inp="%rdx"; $len="%rcx"; $rem_8bit=$rem_4bit; $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_ghash_4bit .type gcm_ghash_4bit,\@function,4 .align 16 gcm_ghash_4bit: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 sub \$280,%rsp .Lghash_prologue: mov $inp,%r14 # reassign couple of args mov $len,%r15 ___ { my $inp="%r14"; my $dat="%edx"; my $len="%r15"; my @nhi=("%ebx","%ecx"); my @rem=("%r12","%r13"); my $Hshr4="%rbp"; &sub ($Htbl,-128); # size optimization &lea ($Hshr4,"16+128(%rsp)"); { my @lo =($nlo,$nhi); my @hi =($Zlo,$Zhi); &xor ($dat,$dat); for ($i=0,$j=-2;$i<18;$i++,$j++) { &mov ("$j(%rsp)",&LB($dat)) if ($i>1); &or ($lo[0],$tmp) if ($i>1); &mov (&LB($dat),&LB($lo[1])) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &shr ($lo[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &mov ($tmp,$hi[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &shr ($hi[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &mov ("8*$j($Hshr4)",$hi[0]) if ($i>1); &mov ($hi[0],"16*$i+0-128($Htbl)") if ($i<16); &shl (&LB($dat),4) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &mov ("8*$j-128($Hshr4)",$lo[0]) if ($i>1); &mov ($lo[0],"16*$i+8-128($Htbl)") if ($i<16); &shl ($tmp,60) if ($i>0 && $i<17); push (@lo,shift(@lo)); push (@hi,shift(@hi)); } } &add ($Htbl,-128); &mov ($Zlo,"8($Xi)"); &mov ($Zhi,"0($Xi)"); &add ($len,$inp); # pointer to the end of data &lea ($rem_8bit,".Lrem_8bit(%rip)"); &jmp (".Louter_loop"); $code.=".align 16\n.Louter_loop:\n"; &xor ($Zhi,"($inp)"); &mov ("%rdx","8($inp)"); &lea ($inp,"16($inp)"); &xor ("%rdx",$Zlo); &mov ("($Xi)",$Zhi); &mov ("8($Xi)","%rdx"); &shr ("%rdx",32); &xor ($nlo,$nlo); &rol ($dat,8); &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat)); &movz ($nhi[0],&LB($dat)); &shl (&LB($nlo),4); &shr ($nhi[0],4); for ($j=11,$i=0;$i<15;$i++) { &rol ($dat,8); &xor ($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nlo)") if ($i>0); &xor ($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nlo)") if ($i>0); &mov ($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nlo)") if ($i==0); &mov ($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nlo)") if ($i==0); &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat)); &xor ($Zlo,$tmp) if ($i>0); &movzw ($rem[1],"($rem_8bit,$rem[1],2)") if ($i>0); &movz ($nhi[1],&LB($dat)); &shl (&LB($nlo),4); &movzb ($rem[0],"(%rsp,$nhi[0])"); &shr ($nhi[1],4) if ($i<14); &and ($nhi[1],0xf0) if ($i==14); &shl ($rem[1],48) if ($i>0); &xor ($rem[0],$Zlo); &mov ($tmp,$Zhi); &xor ($Zhi,$rem[1]) if ($i>0); &shr ($Zlo,8); &movz ($rem[0],&LB($rem[0])); &mov ($dat,"$j($Xi)") if (--$j%4==0); &shr ($Zhi,8); &xor ($Zlo,"-128($Hshr4,$nhi[0],8)"); &shl ($tmp,56); &xor ($Zhi,"($Hshr4,$nhi[0],8)"); unshift (@nhi,pop(@nhi)); # "rotate" registers unshift (@rem,pop(@rem)); } &movzw ($rem[1],"($rem_8bit,$rem[1],2)"); &xor ($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nlo)"); &xor ($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nlo)"); &shl ($rem[1],48); &xor ($Zlo,$tmp); &xor ($Zhi,$rem[1]); &movz ($rem[0],&LB($Zlo)); &shr ($Zlo,4); &mov ($tmp,$Zhi); &shl (&LB($rem[0]),4); &shr ($Zhi,4); &xor ($Zlo,"8($Htbl,$nhi[0])"); &movzw ($rem[0],"($rem_8bit,$rem[0],2)"); &shl ($tmp,60); &xor ($Zhi,"($Htbl,$nhi[0])"); &xor ($Zlo,$tmp); &shl ($rem[0],48); &bswap ($Zlo); &xor ($Zhi,$rem[0]); &bswap ($Zhi); &cmp ($inp,$len); &jb (".Louter_loop"); } $code.=<<___; mov $Zlo,8($Xi) mov $Zhi,($Xi) lea 280(%rsp),%rsi mov 0(%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lghash_epilogue: ret .size gcm_ghash_4bit,.-gcm_ghash_4bit ___ ###################################################################### # PCLMULQDQ version. @_4args=$win64? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") : # Win64 order ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); # Unix order ($Xi,$Xhi)=("%xmm0","%xmm1"); $Hkey="%xmm2"; ($T1,$T2,$T3)=("%xmm3","%xmm4","%xmm5"); sub clmul64x64_T2 { # minimal register pressure my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK)=@_; if (!defined($HK)) { $HK = $T2; $code.=<<___; movdqa $Xi,$Xhi # pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1 pshufd \$0b01001110,$Hkey,$T2 pxor $Xi,$T1 # pxor $Hkey,$T2 ___ } else { $code.=<<___; movdqa $Xi,$Xhi # pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1 pxor $Xi,$T1 # ___ } $code.=<<___; pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Xi ####### pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhi ####### pclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1 ####### pxor $Xi,$T1 # pxor $Xhi,$T1 # movdqa $T1,$T2 # psrldq \$8,$T1 pslldq \$8,$T2 # pxor $T1,$Xhi pxor $T2,$Xi # ___ } sub reduction_alg9 { # 17/11 times faster than Intel version my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_; $code.=<<___; # 1st phase movdqa $Xi,$T2 # movdqa $Xi,$T1 psllq \$5,$Xi pxor $Xi,$T1 # psllq \$1,$Xi pxor $T1,$Xi # psllq \$57,$Xi # movdqa $Xi,$T1 # pslldq \$8,$Xi psrldq \$8,$T1 # pxor $T2,$Xi pxor $T1,$Xhi # # 2nd phase movdqa $Xi,$T2 psrlq \$1,$Xi pxor $T2,$Xhi # pxor $Xi,$T2 psrlq \$5,$Xi pxor $T2,$Xi # psrlq \$1,$Xi # pxor $Xhi,$Xi # ___ } { my ($Htbl,$Xip)=@_4args; my $HK="%xmm6"; $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_init_clmul .type gcm_init_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 gcm_init_clmul: .L_init_clmul: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); .LSEH_begin_gcm_init_clmul: # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x48,0x83,0xec,0x18 #sub $0x18,%rsp .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24 #movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqu ($Xip),$Hkey pshufd \$0b01001110,$Hkey,$Hkey # dword swap # <<1 twist pshufd \$0b11111111,$Hkey,$T2 # broadcast uppermost dword movdqa $Hkey,$T1 psllq \$1,$Hkey pxor $T3,$T3 # psrlq \$63,$T1 pcmpgtd $T2,$T3 # broadcast carry bit pslldq \$8,$T1 por $T1,$Hkey # H<<=1 # magic reduction pand .L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),$T3 pxor $T3,$Hkey # if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial # calculate H^2 pshufd \$0b01001110,$Hkey,$HK movdqa $Hkey,$Xi pxor $Hkey,$HK ___ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK); &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; pshufd \$0b01001110,$Hkey,$T1 pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$T2 pxor $Hkey,$T1 # Karatsuba pre-processing movdqu $Hkey,0x00($Htbl) # save H pxor $Xi,$T2 # Karatsuba pre-processing movdqu $Xi,0x10($Htbl) # save H^2 palignr \$8,$T1,$T2 # low part is H.lo^H.hi... movdqu $T2,0x20($Htbl) # save Karatsuba "salt" ___ if ($do4xaggr) { &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK); # H^3 &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; movdqa $Xi,$T3 ___ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK); # H^4 &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; pshufd \$0b01001110,$T3,$T1 pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$T2 pxor $T3,$T1 # Karatsuba pre-processing movdqu $T3,0x30($Htbl) # save H^3 pxor $Xi,$T2 # Karatsuba pre-processing movdqu $Xi,0x40($Htbl) # save H^4 palignr \$8,$T1,$T2 # low part is H^3.lo^H^3.hi... movdqu $T2,0x50($Htbl) # save Karatsuba "salt" ___ } $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp),%xmm6 lea 0x18(%rsp),%rsp .LSEH_end_gcm_init_clmul: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size gcm_init_clmul,.-gcm_init_clmul ___ } { my ($Xip,$Htbl)=@_4args; $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_gmult_clmul .type gcm_gmult_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 gcm_gmult_clmul: .L_gmult_clmul: movdqu ($Xip),$Xi movdqa .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$T3 movdqu ($Htbl),$Hkey movdqu 0x20($Htbl),$T2 pshufb $T3,$Xi ___ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$T2); $code.=<<___ if (0 || (&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi)&&0)); # experimental alternative. special thing about is that there # no dependency between the two multiplications... mov \$`0xE1<<1`,%eax mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10 # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff mov \$0x07,%r11d movq %rax,$T1 movq %r10,$T2 movq %r11,$T3 # borrow $T3 pand $Xi,$T3 pshufb $T3,$T2 # ($Xi&7)·0xE0 movq %rax,$T3 pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Xi,$T1 # ·(0xE1<<1) pxor $Xi,$T2 pslldq \$15,$T2 paddd $T2,$T2 # <<(64+56+1) pxor $T2,$Xi pclmulqdq \$0x01,$T3,$Xi movdqa .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$T3 # reload $T3 psrldq \$1,$T1 pxor $T1,$Xhi pslldq \$7,$Xi pxor $Xhi,$Xi ___ $code.=<<___; pshufb $T3,$Xi movdqu $Xi,($Xip) ret .size gcm_gmult_clmul,.-gcm_gmult_clmul ___ } { my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=@_4args; my ($Xln,$Xmn,$Xhn,$Hkey2,$HK) = map("%xmm$_",(3..7)); my ($T1,$T2,$T3)=map("%xmm$_",(8..10)); $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_ghash_clmul .type gcm_ghash_clmul,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 gcm_ghash_clmul: .L_ghash_clmul: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp),%rax .LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_clmul: # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #movaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax) .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #movaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00 #movaps %xmm8,0(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10 #movaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20 #movaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30 #movaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40 #movaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50 #movaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60 #movaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70 #movaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$T3 movdqu ($Xip),$Xi movdqu ($Htbl),$Hkey movdqu 0x20($Htbl),$HK pshufb $T3,$Xi sub \$0x10,$len jz .Lodd_tail movdqu 0x10($Htbl),$Hkey2 ___ if ($do4xaggr) { my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$Hkey3,$Hkey4)=map("%xmm$_",(11..15)); $code.=<<___; mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%eax cmp \$0x30,$len jb .Lskip4x and \$`1<<26|1<<22`,%eax # isolate MOVBE+XSAVE cmp \$`1<<22`,%eax # check for MOVBE without XSAVE je .Lskip4x sub \$0x30,$len mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff movdqu 0x30($Htbl),$Hkey3 movdqu 0x40($Htbl),$Hkey4 ####### # Xi+4 =[(H*Ii+3) + (H^2*Ii+2) + (H^3*Ii+1) + H^4*(Ii+Xi)] mod P # movdqu 0x30($inp),$Xln movdqu 0x20($inp),$Xl pshufb $T3,$Xln pshufb $T3,$Xl movdqa $Xln,$Xhn pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xln,$Xmn pxor $Xln,$Xmn pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Xln pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhn pclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Xmn movdqa $Xl,$Xh pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm pxor $Xl,$Xm pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xl pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xh pclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$Xm xorps $Xl,$Xln xorps $Xh,$Xhn movups 0x50($Htbl),$HK xorps $Xm,$Xmn movdqu 0x10($inp),$Xl movdqu 0($inp),$T1 pshufb $T3,$Xl pshufb $T3,$T1 movdqa $Xl,$Xh pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm pxor $T1,$Xi pxor $Xl,$Xm pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey3,$Xl movdqa $Xi,$Xhi pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1 pxor $Xi,$T1 pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey3,$Xh pclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Xm xorps $Xl,$Xln xorps $Xh,$Xhn lea 0x40($inp),$inp sub \$0x40,$len jc .Ltail4x jmp .Lmod4_loop .align 32 .Lmod4_loop: pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey4,$Xi xorps $Xm,$Xmn movdqu 0x30($inp),$Xl pshufb $T3,$Xl pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey4,$Xhi xorps $Xln,$Xi movdqu 0x20($inp),$Xln movdqa $Xl,$Xh pclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T1 pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm xorps $Xhn,$Xhi pxor $Xl,$Xm pshufb $T3,$Xln movups 0x20($Htbl),$HK xorps $Xmn,$T1 pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Xl pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xln,$Xmn pxor $Xi,$T1 # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing movdqa $Xln,$Xhn pxor $Xhi,$T1 # pxor $Xln,$Xmn movdqa $T1,$T2 # pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Xh pslldq \$8,$T1 psrldq \$8,$T2 # pxor $T1,$Xi movdqa .L7_mask(%rip),$T1 pxor $T2,$Xhi # movq %rax,$T2 pand $Xi,$T1 # 1st phase pshufb $T1,$T2 # pxor $Xi,$T2 # pclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Xm psllq \$57,$T2 # movdqa $T2,$T1 # pslldq \$8,$T2 pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xln psrldq \$8,$T1 # pxor $T2,$Xi pxor $T1,$Xhi # movdqu 0($inp),$T1 movdqa $Xi,$T2 # 2nd phase psrlq \$1,$Xi pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xhn xorps $Xl,$Xln movdqu 0x10($inp),$Xl pshufb $T3,$Xl pclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$Xmn xorps $Xh,$Xhn movups 0x50($Htbl),$HK pshufb $T3,$T1 pxor $T2,$Xhi # pxor $Xi,$T2 psrlq \$5,$Xi movdqa $Xl,$Xh pxor $Xm,$Xmn pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xl,$Xm pxor $T2,$Xi # pxor $T1,$Xhi pxor $Xl,$Xm pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey3,$Xl psrlq \$1,$Xi # pxor $Xhi,$Xi # movdqa $Xi,$Xhi pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey3,$Xh xorps $Xl,$Xln pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$T1 pxor $Xi,$T1 pclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Xm xorps $Xh,$Xhn lea 0x40($inp),$inp sub \$0x40,$len jnc .Lmod4_loop .Ltail4x: pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey4,$Xi pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey4,$Xhi pclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T1 xorps $Xm,$Xmn xorps $Xln,$Xi xorps $Xhn,$Xhi pxor $Xi,$Xhi # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing pxor $Xmn,$T1 pxor $Xhi,$T1 # pxor $Xi,$Xhi movdqa $T1,$T2 # psrldq \$8,$T1 pslldq \$8,$T2 # pxor $T1,$Xhi pxor $T2,$Xi # ___ &reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; add \$0x40,$len jz .Ldone movdqu 0x20($Htbl),$HK sub \$0x10,$len jz .Lodd_tail .Lskip4x: ___ } $code.=<<___; ####### # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P # movdqu ($inp),$T1 # Ii movdqu 16($inp),$Xln # Ii+1 pshufb $T3,$T1 pshufb $T3,$Xln pxor $T1,$Xi # Ii+Xi movdqa $Xln,$Xhn pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xln,$Xmn pxor $Xln,$Xmn pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Xln pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhn pclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Xmn lea 32($inp),$inp # i+=2 nop sub \$0x20,$len jbe .Leven_tail nop jmp .Lmod_loop .align 32 .Lmod_loop: movdqa $Xi,$Xhi movdqa $Xmn,$T1 pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$Xmn # pxor $Xi,$Xmn # pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xi pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xhi pclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$Xmn pxor $Xln,$Xi # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi) pxor $Xhn,$Xhi movdqu ($inp),$T2 # Ii pxor $Xi,$T1 # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing pshufb $T3,$T2 movdqu 16($inp),$Xln # Ii+1 pxor $Xhi,$T1 pxor $T2,$Xhi # "Ii+Xi", consume early pxor $T1,$Xmn pshufb $T3,$Xln movdqa $Xmn,$T1 # psrldq \$8,$T1 pslldq \$8,$Xmn # pxor $T1,$Xhi pxor $Xmn,$Xi # movdqa $Xln,$Xhn # movdqa $Xi,$T2 # 1st phase movdqa $Xi,$T1 psllq \$5,$Xi pxor $Xi,$T1 # pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Xln ####### psllq \$1,$Xi pxor $T1,$Xi # psllq \$57,$Xi # movdqa $Xi,$T1 # pslldq \$8,$Xi psrldq \$8,$T1 # pxor $T2,$Xi pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xhn,$Xmn pxor $T1,$Xhi # pxor $Xhn,$Xmn # movdqa $Xi,$T2 # 2nd phase psrlq \$1,$Xi pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Xhn ####### pxor $T2,$Xhi # pxor $Xi,$T2 psrlq \$5,$Xi pxor $T2,$Xi # lea 32($inp),$inp psrlq \$1,$Xi # pclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$Xmn ####### pxor $Xhi,$Xi # sub \$0x20,$len ja .Lmod_loop .Leven_tail: movdqa $Xi,$Xhi movdqa $Xmn,$T1 pshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$Xmn # pxor $Xi,$Xmn # pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey2,$Xi pclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey2,$Xhi pclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$Xmn pxor $Xln,$Xi # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi) pxor $Xhn,$Xhi pxor $Xi,$T1 pxor $Xhi,$T1 pxor $T1,$Xmn movdqa $Xmn,$T1 # psrldq \$8,$T1 pslldq \$8,$Xmn # pxor $T1,$Xhi pxor $Xmn,$Xi # ___ &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; test $len,$len jnz .Ldone .Lodd_tail: movdqu ($inp),$T1 # Ii pshufb $T3,$T1 pxor $T1,$Xi # Ii+Xi ___ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK); # H*(Ii+Xi) &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; .Ldone: pshufb $T3,$Xi movdqu $Xi,($Xip) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 0xa8(%rsp),%rsp .LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_clmul: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size gcm_ghash_clmul,.-gcm_ghash_clmul ___ } $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_init_avx .type gcm_init_avx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 gcm_init_avx: ___ if ($avx) { my ($Htbl,$Xip)=@_4args; my $HK="%xmm6"; $code.=<<___ if ($win64); .LSEH_begin_gcm_init_avx: # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x48,0x83,0xec,0x18 #sub $0x18,%rsp .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24 #movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper vmovdqu ($Xip),$Hkey vpshufd \$0b01001110,$Hkey,$Hkey # dword swap # <<1 twist vpshufd \$0b11111111,$Hkey,$T2 # broadcast uppermost dword vpsrlq \$63,$Hkey,$T1 vpsllq \$1,$Hkey,$Hkey vpxor $T3,$T3,$T3 # vpcmpgtd $T2,$T3,$T3 # broadcast carry bit vpslldq \$8,$T1,$T1 vpor $T1,$Hkey,$Hkey # H<<=1 # magic reduction vpand .L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),$T3,$T3 vpxor $T3,$Hkey,$Hkey # if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial vpunpckhqdq $Hkey,$Hkey,$HK vmovdqa $Hkey,$Xi vpxor $Hkey,$HK,$HK mov \$4,%r10 # up to H^8 jmp .Linit_start_avx ___ sub clmul64x64_avx { my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK)=@_; if (!defined($HK)) { $HK = $T2; $code.=<<___; vpunpckhqdq $Xi,$Xi,$T1 vpunpckhqdq $Hkey,$Hkey,$T2 vpxor $Xi,$T1,$T1 # vpxor $Hkey,$T2,$T2 ___ } else { $code.=<<___; vpunpckhqdq $Xi,$Xi,$T1 vpxor $Xi,$T1,$T1 # ___ } $code.=<<___; vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xhi ####### vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Xi,$Xi ####### vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$T1 ####### vpxor $Xi,$Xhi,$T2 # vpxor $T2,$T1,$T1 # vpslldq \$8,$T1,$T2 # vpsrldq \$8,$T1,$T1 vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Xi # vpxor $T1,$Xhi,$Xhi ___ } sub reduction_avx { my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_; $code.=<<___; vpsllq \$57,$Xi,$T1 # 1st phase vpsllq \$62,$Xi,$T2 vpxor $T1,$T2,$T2 # vpsllq \$63,$Xi,$T1 vpxor $T1,$T2,$T2 # vpslldq \$8,$T2,$T1 # vpsrldq \$8,$T2,$T2 vpxor $T1,$Xi,$Xi # vpxor $T2,$Xhi,$Xhi vpsrlq \$1,$Xi,$T2 # 2nd phase vpxor $Xi,$Xhi,$Xhi vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Xi # vpsrlq \$5,$T2,$T2 vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Xi # vpsrlq \$1,$Xi,$Xi # vpxor $Xhi,$Xi,$Xi # ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 32 .Linit_loop_avx: vpalignr \$8,$T1,$T2,$T3 # low part is H.lo^H.hi... vmovdqu $T3,-0x10($Htbl) # save Karatsuba "salt" ___ &clmul64x64_avx ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK); # calculate H^3,5,7 &reduction_avx ($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; .Linit_start_avx: vmovdqa $Xi,$T3 ___ &clmul64x64_avx ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK); # calculate H^2,4,6,8 &reduction_avx ($Xhi,$Xi); $code.=<<___; vpshufd \$0b01001110,$T3,$T1 vpshufd \$0b01001110,$Xi,$T2 vpxor $T3,$T1,$T1 # Karatsuba pre-processing vmovdqu $T3,0x00($Htbl) # save H^1,3,5,7 vpxor $Xi,$T2,$T2 # Karatsuba pre-processing vmovdqu $Xi,0x10($Htbl) # save H^2,4,6,8 lea 0x30($Htbl),$Htbl sub \$1,%r10 jnz .Linit_loop_avx vpalignr \$8,$T2,$T1,$T3 # last "salt" is flipped vmovdqu $T3,-0x10($Htbl) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp),%xmm6 lea 0x18(%rsp),%rsp .LSEH_end_gcm_init_avx: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size gcm_init_avx,.-gcm_init_avx ___ } else { $code.=<<___; jmp .L_init_clmul .size gcm_init_avx,.-gcm_init_avx ___ } $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_gmult_avx .type gcm_gmult_avx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 gcm_gmult_avx: jmp .L_gmult_clmul .size gcm_gmult_avx,.-gcm_gmult_avx ___ $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_ghash_avx .type gcm_ghash_avx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 gcm_ghash_avx: ___ if ($avx) { my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=@_4args; my ($Xlo,$Xhi,$Xmi, $Zlo,$Zhi,$Zmi, $Hkey,$HK,$T1,$T2, $Xi,$Xo,$Tred,$bswap,$Ii,$Ij) = map("%xmm$_",(0..15)); $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp),%rax .LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_avx: # I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-( .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #movaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax) .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #movaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00 #movaps %xmm8,0(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10 #movaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20 #movaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30 #movaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40 #movaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50 #movaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60 #movaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70 #movaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper vmovdqu ($Xip),$Xi # load $Xi lea .L0x1c2_polynomial(%rip),%r10 lea 0x40($Htbl),$Htbl # size optimization vmovdqu .Lbswap_mask(%rip),$bswap vpshufb $bswap,$Xi,$Xi cmp \$0x80,$len jb .Lshort_avx sub \$0x80,$len vmovdqu 0x70($inp),$Ii # I[7] vmovdqu 0x00-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^1 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vmovdqu 0x20-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vmovdqu 0x60($inp),$Ij # I[6] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x10-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^2 vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vmovdqu 0x50($inp),$Ii # I[5] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T2,$Xmi vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi vmovdqu 0x30-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^3 vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu 0x40($inp),$Ij # I[4] vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T1,$Zmi vmovdqu 0x50-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x40-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^4 vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T2,$Xmi vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu 0x30($inp),$Ii # I[3] vpxor $Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo vpxor $Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi vmovdqu 0x60-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^5 vpxor $Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T1,$Zmi vmovdqu 0x80-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu 0x20($inp),$Ij # I[2] vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x70-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^6 vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T2,$Xmi vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu 0x10($inp),$Ii # I[1] vpxor $Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo vpxor $Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi vmovdqu 0x90-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^7 vpxor $Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T1,$Zmi vmovdqu 0xb0-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu ($inp),$Ij # I[0] vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vmovdqu 0xa0-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^8 vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK,$T2,$Xmi lea 0x80($inp),$inp cmp \$0x80,$len jb .Ltail_avx vpxor $Xi,$Ij,$Ij # accumulate $Xi sub \$0x80,$len jmp .Loop8x_avx .align 32 .Loop8x_avx: vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vmovdqu 0x70($inp),$Ii # I[7] vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xi vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xo vmovdqu 0x00-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^1 vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Tred vmovdqu 0x20-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vmovdqu 0x60($inp),$Ij # I[6] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpxor $Zlo,$Xi,$Xi # collect result vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vxorps $Zhi,$Xo,$Xo vmovdqu 0x10-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^2 vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK, $T2,$Xmi vpxor $Zmi,$Tred,$Tred vxorps $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu 0x50($inp),$Ii # I[5] vpxor $Xi,$Tred,$Tred # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo vpxor $Xo,$Tred,$Tred vpslldq \$8,$Tred,$T2 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi vpsrldq \$8,$Tred,$Tred vpxor $T2, $Xi, $Xi vmovdqu 0x30-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^3 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vxorps $Tred,$Xo, $Xo vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK, $T1,$Zmi vmovdqu 0x50-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vmovdqu 0x40($inp),$Ij # I[4] vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Tred # 1st phase vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpxor $Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x40-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^4 vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK, $T2,$Xmi vxorps $Ij,$T1,$T1 vpxor $Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi vmovdqu 0x30($inp),$Ii # I[3] vpclmulqdq \$0x10,(%r10),$Xi,$Xi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi vmovdqu 0x60-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^5 vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK, $T1,$Zmi vmovdqu 0x80-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vmovdqu 0x20($inp),$Ij # I[2] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpxor $Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x70-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^6 vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK, $T2,$Xmi vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vpxor $Zmi,$Xmi,$Xmi vxorps $Tred,$Xi,$Xi vmovdqu 0x10($inp),$Ii # I[1] vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Tred # 2nd phase vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zlo vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ii vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Zhi vmovdqu 0x90-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^7 vpclmulqdq \$0x10,(%r10),$Xi,$Xi vxorps $Xo,$Tred,$Tred vpunpckhqdq $Ii,$Ii,$T2 vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK, $T1,$Zmi vmovdqu 0xb0-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpxor $Ii,$T2,$T2 vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vmovdqu ($inp),$Ij # I[0] vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xlo vpshufb $bswap,$Ij,$Ij vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ii,$Xhi vmovdqu 0xa0-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^8 vpxor $Tred,$Ij,$Ij vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$HK, $T2,$Xmi vpxor $Xi,$Ij,$Ij # accumulate $Xi lea 0x80($inp),$inp sub \$0x80,$len jnc .Loop8x_avx add \$0x80,$len jmp .Ltail_no_xor_avx .align 32 .Lshort_avx: vmovdqu -0x10($inp,$len),$Ii # very last word lea ($inp,$len),$inp vmovdqu 0x00-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^1 vmovdqu 0x20-0x40($Htbl),$HK vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ij vmovdqa $Xlo,$Zlo # subtle way to zero $Zlo, vmovdqa $Xhi,$Zhi # $Zhi and vmovdqa $Xmi,$Zmi # $Zmi sub \$0x10,$len jz .Ltail_avx vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu -0x20($inp),$Ii vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x10-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^2 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ij vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi vpsrldq \$8,$HK,$HK sub \$0x10,$len jz .Ltail_avx vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu -0x30($inp),$Ii vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x30-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^3 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ij vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi vmovdqu 0x50-0x40($Htbl),$HK sub \$0x10,$len jz .Ltail_avx vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu -0x40($inp),$Ii vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x40-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^4 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ij vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi vpsrldq \$8,$HK,$HK sub \$0x10,$len jz .Ltail_avx vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu -0x50($inp),$Ii vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x60-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^5 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ij vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi vmovdqu 0x80-0x40($Htbl),$HK sub \$0x10,$len jz .Ltail_avx vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu -0x60($inp),$Ii vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x70-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^6 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ij vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi vpsrldq \$8,$HK,$HK sub \$0x10,$len jz .Ltail_avx vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vmovdqu -0x70($inp),$Ii vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi vmovdqu 0x90-0x40($Htbl),$Hkey # $Hkey^7 vpshufb $bswap,$Ii,$Ij vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi vmovq 0xb8-0x40($Htbl),$HK sub \$0x10,$len jmp .Ltail_avx .align 32 .Ltail_avx: vpxor $Xi,$Ij,$Ij # accumulate $Xi .Ltail_no_xor_avx: vpunpckhqdq $Ij,$Ij,$T1 vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Zlo vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xlo vpxor $Ij,$T1,$T1 vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Zhi vpclmulqdq \$0x11,$Hkey,$Ij,$Xhi vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpclmulqdq \$0x00,$HK,$T1,$Xmi vmovdqu (%r10),$Tred vpxor $Xlo,$Zlo,$Xi vpxor $Xhi,$Zhi,$Xo vpxor $Xmi,$Zmi,$Zmi vpxor $Xi, $Zmi,$Zmi # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing vpxor $Xo, $Zmi,$Zmi vpslldq \$8, $Zmi,$T2 vpsrldq \$8, $Zmi,$Zmi vpxor $T2, $Xi, $Xi vpxor $Zmi,$Xo, $Xo vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Tred,$Xi,$T2 # 1st phase vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Xi vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Xi vpclmulqdq \$0x10,$Tred,$Xi,$T2 # 2nd phase vpalignr \$8,$Xi,$Xi,$Xi vpxor $Xo,$Xi,$Xi vpxor $T2,$Xi,$Xi cmp \$0,$len jne .Lshort_avx vpshufb $bswap,$Xi,$Xi vmovdqu $Xi,($Xip) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9 movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11 movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12 movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13 movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14 movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15 lea 0xa8(%rsp),%rsp .LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_avx: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size gcm_ghash_avx,.-gcm_ghash_avx ___ } else { $code.=<<___; jmp .L_ghash_clmul .size gcm_ghash_avx,.-gcm_ghash_avx ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .Lbswap_mask: .byte 15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0 .L0x1c2_polynomial: .byte 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2 .L7_mask: .long 7,0,7,0 .L7_mask_poly: .long 7,0,`0xE1<<1`,0 .align 64 .type .Lrem_4bit,\@object .Lrem_4bit: .long 0,`0x0000<<16`,0,`0x1C20<<16`,0,`0x3840<<16`,0,`0x2460<<16` .long 0,`0x7080<<16`,0,`0x6CA0<<16`,0,`0x48C0<<16`,0,`0x54E0<<16` .long 0,`0xE100<<16`,0,`0xFD20<<16`,0,`0xD940<<16`,0,`0xC560<<16` .long 0,`0x9180<<16`,0,`0x8DA0<<16`,0,`0xA9C0<<16`,0,`0xB5E0<<16` .type .Lrem_8bit,\@object .Lrem_8bit: .value 0x0000,0x01C2,0x0384,0x0246,0x0708,0x06CA,0x048C,0x054E .value 0x0E10,0x0FD2,0x0D94,0x0C56,0x0918,0x08DA,0x0A9C,0x0B5E .value 0x1C20,0x1DE2,0x1FA4,0x1E66,0x1B28,0x1AEA,0x18AC,0x196E .value 0x1230,0x13F2,0x11B4,0x1076,0x1538,0x14FA,0x16BC,0x177E .value 0x3840,0x3982,0x3BC4,0x3A06,0x3F48,0x3E8A,0x3CCC,0x3D0E .value 0x3650,0x3792,0x35D4,0x3416,0x3158,0x309A,0x32DC,0x331E .value 0x2460,0x25A2,0x27E4,0x2626,0x2368,0x22AA,0x20EC,0x212E .value 0x2A70,0x2BB2,0x29F4,0x2836,0x2D78,0x2CBA,0x2EFC,0x2F3E .value 0x7080,0x7142,0x7304,0x72C6,0x7788,0x764A,0x740C,0x75CE .value 0x7E90,0x7F52,0x7D14,0x7CD6,0x7998,0x785A,0x7A1C,0x7BDE .value 0x6CA0,0x6D62,0x6F24,0x6EE6,0x6BA8,0x6A6A,0x682C,0x69EE .value 0x62B0,0x6372,0x6134,0x60F6,0x65B8,0x647A,0x663C,0x67FE .value 0x48C0,0x4902,0x4B44,0x4A86,0x4FC8,0x4E0A,0x4C4C,0x4D8E .value 0x46D0,0x4712,0x4554,0x4496,0x41D8,0x401A,0x425C,0x439E .value 0x54E0,0x5522,0x5764,0x56A6,0x53E8,0x522A,0x506C,0x51AE .value 0x5AF0,0x5B32,0x5974,0x58B6,0x5DF8,0x5C3A,0x5E7C,0x5FBE .value 0xE100,0xE0C2,0xE284,0xE346,0xE608,0xE7CA,0xE58C,0xE44E .value 0xEF10,0xEED2,0xEC94,0xED56,0xE818,0xE9DA,0xEB9C,0xEA5E .value 0xFD20,0xFCE2,0xFEA4,0xFF66,0xFA28,0xFBEA,0xF9AC,0xF86E .value 0xF330,0xF2F2,0xF0B4,0xF176,0xF438,0xF5FA,0xF7BC,0xF67E .value 0xD940,0xD882,0xDAC4,0xDB06,0xDE48,0xDF8A,0xDDCC,0xDC0E .value 0xD750,0xD692,0xD4D4,0xD516,0xD058,0xD19A,0xD3DC,0xD21E .value 0xC560,0xC4A2,0xC6E4,0xC726,0xC268,0xC3AA,0xC1EC,0xC02E .value 0xCB70,0xCAB2,0xC8F4,0xC936,0xCC78,0xCDBA,0xCFFC,0xCE3E .value 0x9180,0x9042,0x9204,0x93C6,0x9688,0x974A,0x950C,0x94CE .value 0x9F90,0x9E52,0x9C14,0x9DD6,0x9898,0x995A,0x9B1C,0x9ADE .value 0x8DA0,0x8C62,0x8E24,0x8FE6,0x8AA8,0x8B6A,0x892C,0x88EE .value 0x83B0,0x8272,0x8034,0x81F6,0x84B8,0x857A,0x873C,0x86FE .value 0xA9C0,0xA802,0xAA44,0xAB86,0xAEC8,0xAF0A,0xAD4C,0xAC8E .value 0xA7D0,0xA612,0xA454,0xA596,0xA0D8,0xA11A,0xA35C,0xA29E .value 0xB5E0,0xB422,0xB664,0xB7A6,0xB2E8,0xB32A,0xB16C,0xB0AE .value 0xBBF0,0xBA32,0xB874,0xB9B6,0xBCF8,0xBD3A,0xBF7C,0xBEBE .asciz "GHASH for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue lea 24(%rax),%rax # adjust "rsp" mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$`1232/8`,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_gcm_gmult_4bit .rva .LSEH_end_gcm_gmult_4bit .rva .LSEH_info_gcm_gmult_4bit .rva .LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_4bit .rva .LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_4bit .rva .LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_4bit .rva .LSEH_begin_gcm_init_clmul .rva .LSEH_end_gcm_init_clmul .rva .LSEH_info_gcm_init_clmul .rva .LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_clmul .rva .LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_clmul .rva .LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_clmul ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_gcm_init_avx .rva .LSEH_end_gcm_init_avx .rva .LSEH_info_gcm_init_clmul .rva .LSEH_begin_gcm_ghash_avx .rva .LSEH_end_gcm_ghash_avx .rva .LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_clmul ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_gcm_gmult_4bit: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lgmult_prologue,.Lgmult_epilogue # HandlerData .LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_4bit: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lghash_prologue,.Lghash_epilogue # HandlerData .LSEH_info_gcm_init_clmul: .byte 0x01,0x08,0x03,0x00 .byte 0x08,0x68,0x00,0x00 #movaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6 .byte 0x04,0x22,0x00,0x00 #sub rsp,0x18 .LSEH_info_gcm_ghash_clmul: .byte 0x01,0x33,0x16,0x00 .byte 0x33,0xf8,0x09,0x00 #movaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15 .byte 0x2e,0xe8,0x08,0x00 #movaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14 .byte 0x29,0xd8,0x07,0x00 #movaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13 .byte 0x24,0xc8,0x06,0x00 #movaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12 .byte 0x1f,0xb8,0x05,0x00 #movaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11 .byte 0x1a,0xa8,0x04,0x00 #movaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10 .byte 0x15,0x98,0x03,0x00 #movaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9 .byte 0x10,0x88,0x02,0x00 #movaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8 .byte 0x0c,0x78,0x01,0x00 #movaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7 .byte 0x08,0x68,0x00,0x00 #movaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6 .byte 0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00 #sub rsp,0xa8 ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl0000644000000000000000000002711313176625657020150 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # GHASH for ARMv8 Crypto Extension, 64-bit polynomial multiplication. # # June 2014 # # Initial version was developed in tight cooperation with Ard # Biesheuvel from bits-n-pieces from # other assembly modules. Just like aesv8-armx.pl this module # supports both AArch32 and AArch64 execution modes. # # July 2014 # # Implement 2x aggregated reduction [see ghash-x86.pl for background # information]. # # Current performance in cycles per processed byte: # # PMULL[2] 32-bit NEON(*) # Apple A7 0.92 5.62 # Cortex-A53 1.01 8.39 # Cortex-A57 1.17 7.61 # Denver 0.71 6.02 # Mongoose 1.10 8.06 # # (*) presented for reference/comparison purposes; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; $Xi="x0"; # argument block $Htbl="x1"; $inp="x2"; $len="x3"; $inc="x12"; { my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("q$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$xC2,$H,$Hhl,$H2)=map("q$_",(8..14)); $code=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text ___ $code.=".arch armv8-a+crypto\n" if ($flavour =~ /64/); $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); .fpu neon .code 32 #undef __thumb2__ ___ ################################################################################ # void gcm_init_v8(u128 Htable[16],const u64 H[2]); # # input: 128-bit H - secret parameter E(K,0^128) # output: precomputed table filled with degrees of twisted H; # H is twisted to handle reverse bitness of GHASH; # only few of 16 slots of Htable[16] are used; # data is opaque to outside world (which allows to # optimize the code independently); # $code.=<<___; .global gcm_init_v8 .type gcm_init_v8,%function .align 4 gcm_init_v8: vld1.64 {$t1},[x1] @ load input H vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1 vshl.i64 $xC2,$xC2,#57 @ 0xc2.0 vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8 vshr.u64 $t2,$xC2,#63 vdup.32 $t1,${t1}[1] vext.8 $t0,$t2,$xC2,#8 @ t0=0xc2....01 vshr.u64 $t2,$IN,#63 vshr.s32 $t1,$t1,#31 @ broadcast carry bit vand $t2,$t2,$t0 vshl.i64 $IN,$IN,#1 vext.8 $t2,$t2,$t2,#8 vand $t0,$t0,$t1 vorr $IN,$IN,$t2 @ H<<<=1 veor $H,$IN,$t0 @ twisted H vst1.64 {$H},[x0],#16 @ store Htable[0] @ calculate H^2 vext.8 $t0,$H,$H,#8 @ Karatsuba pre-processing vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$H veor $t0,$t0,$H vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$H vpmull.p64 $Xm,$t0,$t0 vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1 veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2 vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2 vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 veor $t2,$t2,$Xh veor $H2,$Xl,$t2 vext.8 $t1,$H2,$H2,#8 @ Karatsuba pre-processing veor $t1,$t1,$H2 vext.8 $Hhl,$t0,$t1,#8 @ pack Karatsuba pre-processed vst1.64 {$Hhl-$H2},[x0] @ store Htable[1..2] ret .size gcm_init_v8,.-gcm_init_v8 ___ ################################################################################ # void gcm_gmult_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16]); # # input: Xi - current hash value; # Htable - table precomputed in gcm_init_v8; # output: Xi - next hash value Xi; # $code.=<<___; .global gcm_gmult_v8 .type gcm_gmult_v8,%function .align 4 gcm_gmult_v8: vld1.64 {$t1},[$Xi] @ load Xi vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1 vld1.64 {$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl] @ load twisted H, ... vshl.u64 $xC2,$xC2,#57 #ifndef __ARMEB__ vrev64.8 $t1,$t1 #endif vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8 vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi) vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1 veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2 vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2 vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 veor $t2,$t2,$Xh veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 #ifndef __ARMEB__ vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl #endif vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8 vst1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ write out Xi ret .size gcm_gmult_v8,.-gcm_gmult_v8 ___ ################################################################################ # void gcm_ghash_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16],const u8 *inp,size_t len); # # input: table precomputed in gcm_init_v8; # current hash value Xi; # pointer to input data; # length of input data in bytes, but divisible by block size; # output: next hash value Xi; # $code.=<<___; .global gcm_ghash_v8 .type gcm_ghash_v8,%function .align 4 gcm_ghash_v8: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so ___ $code.=<<___; vld1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ load [rotated] Xi @ "[rotated]" means that @ loaded value would have @ to be rotated in order to @ make it appear as in @ alorithm specification subs $len,$len,#32 @ see if $len is 32 or larger mov $inc,#16 @ $inc is used as post- @ increment for input pointer; @ as loop is modulo-scheduled @ $inc is zeroed just in time @ to preclude oversteping @ inp[len], which means that @ last block[s] are actually @ loaded twice, but last @ copy is not processed vld1.64 {$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl],#32 @ load twisted H, ..., H^2 vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1 vld1.64 {$H2},[$Htbl] cclr $inc,eq @ is it time to zero $inc? vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ rotate Xi vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],#16 @ load [rotated] I[0] vshl.u64 $xC2,$xC2,#57 @ compose 0xc2.0 constant #ifndef __ARMEB__ vrev64.8 $t0,$t0 vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl #endif vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8 @ rotate I[0] b.lo .Lodd_tail_v8 @ $len was less than 32 ___ { my ($Xln,$Xmn,$Xhn,$In) = map("q$_",(4..7)); ####### # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P # $code.=<<___; vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[1] #ifndef __ARMEB__ vrev64.8 $t1,$t1 #endif vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8 veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ I[i]^=Xi vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1 veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In b .Loop_mod2x_v8 .align 4 .Loop_mod2x_v8: vext.8 $t2,$IN,$IN,#8 subs $len,$len,#32 @ is there more data? vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H2,$IN @ H^2.lo·Xi.lo cclr $inc,lo @ is it time to zero $inc? vpmull.p64 $Xmn,$Hhl,$t1 veor $t2,$t2,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H2,$IN @ H^2.hi·Xi.hi veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xln @ accumulate vpmull2.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t2 @ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi) vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+2] veor $Xh,$Xh,$Xhn cclr $inc,eq @ is it time to zero $inc? veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xmn vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1 vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+3] #ifndef __ARMEB__ vrev64.8 $t0,$t0 #endif veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2 vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction #ifndef __ARMEB__ vrev64.8 $t1,$t1 #endif vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8 vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8 veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2 vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1 veor $IN,$IN,$Xh @ accumulate $IN early vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 veor $IN,$IN,$t2 veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing veor $IN,$IN,$Xl vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In b.hs .Loop_mod2x_v8 @ there was at least 32 more bytes veor $Xh,$Xh,$t2 vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8 @ re-construct $IN adds $len,$len,#32 @ re-construct $len veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xh @ re-construct $Xl b.eq .Ldone_v8 @ is $len zero? ___ } $code.=<<___; .Lodd_tail_v8: vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi veor $t1,$t0,$t2 @ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi) vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1 veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2 vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2 vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 veor $t2,$t2,$Xh veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 .Ldone_v8: #ifndef __ARMEB__ vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl #endif vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8 vst1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ write out Xi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size gcm_ghash_v8,.-gcm_ghash_v8 ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "GHASH for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code sub unvmov { my $arg=shift; $arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)#(lo|hi),\s*q([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/o && sprintf "ins v%d.d[%d],v%d.d[%d]",$1,($2 eq "lo")?0:1,$3,($4 eq "lo")?0:1; } foreach(split("\n",$code)) { s/cclr\s+([wx])([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/csel $1$2,$1zr,$1$2,$3/o or s/vmov\.i8/movi/o or # fix up legacy mnemonics s/vmov\s+(.*)/unvmov($1)/geo or s/vext\.8/ext/o or s/vshr\.s/sshr\.s/o or s/vshr/ushr/o or s/^(\s+)v/$1/o or # strip off v prefix s/\bbx\s+lr\b/ret/o; s/\bq([0-9]+)\b/"v".($1<8?$1:$1+8).".16b"/geo; # old->new registers s/@\s/\/\//o; # old->new style commentary # fix up remainig legacy suffixes s/\.[ui]?8(\s)/$1/o; s/\.[uis]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go; m/\.p64/o and s/\.16b/\.1q/o; # 1st pmull argument m/l\.p64/o and s/\.16b/\.1d/go; # 2nd and 3rd pmull arguments s/\.[uisp]?64//o and s/\.16b/\.2d/go; s/\.[42]([sd])\[([0-3])\]/\.$1\[$2\]/o; print $_,"\n"; } } else { ######## 32-bit code sub unvdup32 { my $arg=shift; $arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)\[([0-3])\]/o && sprintf "vdup.32 q%d,d%d[%d]",$1,2*$2+($3>>1),$3&1; } sub unvpmullp64 { my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_; if ($arg =~ m/q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+),\s*q([0-9]+)/o) { my $word = 0xf2a00e00|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19) |(($2&7)<<17)|(($2&8)<<4) |(($3&7)<<1) |(($3&8)<<2); $word |= 0x00010001 if ($mnemonic =~ "2"); # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian. # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older # assemblers don't implement it:-( sprintf ".byte\t0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x\t@ %s %s", $word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff, ($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff, $mnemonic,$arg; } } foreach(split("\n",$code)) { s/\b[wx]([0-9]+)\b/r$1/go; # new->old registers s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go; # new->old registers s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary # fix up remainig new-style suffixes s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o; s/cclr\s+([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/mov$2 $1,#0/o or s/vdup\.32\s+(.*)/unvdup32($1)/geo or s/v?(pmull2?)\.p64\s+(.*)/unvpmullp64($1,$2)/geo or s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo or s/^(\s+)b\./$1b/o or s/^(\s+)ret/$1bx\tlr/o; print $_,"\n"; } } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl0000644000000000000000000001643313176625657020416 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # December 2011 # # The module implements GCM GHASH function and underlying single # multiplication operation in GF(2^128). Even though subroutines # have _4bit suffix, they are not using any tables, but rely on # hardware Galois Field Multiply support. Streamed GHASH processes # byte in ~7 cycles, which is >6x faster than "4-bit" table-driven # code compiled with TI's cl6x 6.0 with -mv6400+ -o2 flags. We are # comparing apples vs. oranges, but compiler surely could have done # better, because theoretical [though not necessarily achievable] # estimate for "4-bit" table-driven implementation is ~12 cycles. while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; ($Xip,$Htable,$inp,$len)=("A4","B4","A6","B6"); # arguments ($Z0,$Z1,$Z2,$Z3, $H0, $H1, $H2, $H3, $H0x,$H1x,$H2x,$H3x)=map("A$_",(16..27)); ($H01u,$H01y,$H2u,$H3u, $H0y,$H1y,$H2y,$H3y, $H0z,$H1z,$H2z,$H3z)=map("B$_",(16..27)); ($FF000000,$E10000)=("B30","B31"); ($xip,$x0,$x1,$xib)=map("B$_",(6..9)); # $xip zaps $len $xia="A9"; ($rem,$res)=("B4","B5"); # $rem zaps $Htable $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .asg gcm_gmult_1bit,_gcm_gmult_1bit .asg gcm_gmult_4bit,_gcm_gmult_4bit .asg gcm_ghash_4bit,_gcm_ghash_4bit .endif .asg B3,RA .if 0 .global _gcm_gmult_1bit _gcm_gmult_1bit: ADDAD $Htable,2,$Htable .endif .global _gcm_gmult_4bit _gcm_gmult_4bit: .asmfunc LDDW *${Htable}[-1],$H1:$H0 ; H.lo LDDW *${Htable}[-2],$H3:$H2 ; H.hi || MV $Xip,${xip} ; reassign Xi || MVK 15,B1 ; SPLOOPD constant MVK 0xE1,$E10000 || LDBU *++${xip}[15],$x1 ; Xi[15] MVK 0xFF,$FF000000 || LDBU *--${xip},$x0 ; Xi[14] SHL $E10000,16,$E10000 ; [pre-shifted] reduction polynomial SHL $FF000000,24,$FF000000 ; upper byte mask || BNOP ghash_loop? || MVK 1,B0 ; take a single spin PACKH2 $H0,$H1,$xia ; pack H0' and H1's upper bytes AND $H2,$FF000000,$H2u ; H2's upper byte AND $H3,$FF000000,$H3u ; H3's upper byte || SHRU $H2u,8,$H2u SHRU $H3u,8,$H3u || ZERO $Z1:$Z0 SHRU2 $xia,8,$H01u || ZERO $Z3:$Z2 .endasmfunc .global _gcm_ghash_4bit _gcm_ghash_4bit: .asmfunc LDDW *${Htable}[-1],$H1:$H0 ; H.lo || SHRU $len,4,B0 ; reassign len LDDW *${Htable}[-2],$H3:$H2 ; H.hi || MV $Xip,${xip} ; reassign Xi || MVK 15,B1 ; SPLOOPD constant MVK 0xE1,$E10000 || [B0] LDNDW *${inp}[1],$H1x:$H0x MVK 0xFF,$FF000000 || [B0] LDNDW *${inp}++[2],$H3x:$H2x SHL $E10000,16,$E10000 ; [pre-shifted] reduction polynomial || LDDW *${xip}[1],$Z1:$Z0 SHL $FF000000,24,$FF000000 ; upper byte mask || LDDW *${xip}[0],$Z3:$Z2 PACKH2 $H0,$H1,$xia ; pack H0' and H1's upper bytes AND $H2,$FF000000,$H2u ; H2's upper byte AND $H3,$FF000000,$H3u ; H3's upper byte || SHRU $H2u,8,$H2u SHRU $H3u,8,$H3u SHRU2 $xia,8,$H01u || [B0] XOR $H0x,$Z0,$Z0 ; Xi^=inp || [B0] XOR $H1x,$Z1,$Z1 .if .LITTLE_ENDIAN [B0] XOR $H2x,$Z2,$Z2 || [B0] XOR $H3x,$Z3,$Z3 || [B0] SHRU $Z1,24,$xia ; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall STDW $Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1] || [B0] SHRU $Z1,16,$x0 ; Xi[14] || [B0] ZERO $Z1:$Z0 .else [B0] XOR $H2x,$Z2,$Z2 || [B0] XOR $H3x,$Z3,$Z3 || [B0] MV $Z0,$xia ; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall STDW $Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1] || [B0] SHRU $Z0,8,$x0 ; Xi[14] || [B0] ZERO $Z1:$Z0 .endif STDW $Z3:$Z2,*${xip}[0] || [B0] ZERO $Z3:$Z2 || [B0] MV $xia,$x1 [B0] ADDK 14,${xip} ghash_loop?: SPLOOPD 6 ; 6*16+7 || MVC B1,ILC || [B0] SUB B0,1,B0 || ZERO A0 || ADD $x1,$x1,$xib ; SHL $x1,1,$xib || SHL $x1,1,$xia ___ ########____________________________ # 0 D2. M1 M2 | # 1 M1 | # 2 M1 M2 | # 3 D1. M1 M2 | # 4 S1. L1 | # 5 S2 S1x L1 D2 L2 |____________________________ # 6/0 L1 S1 L2 S2x |D2. M1 M2 | # 7/1 L1 S1 D1x S2 M2 | M1 | # 8/2 S1 L1x S2 | M1 M2 | # 9/3 S1 L1x | D1. M1 M2 | # 10/4 D1x | S1. L1 | # 11/5 |S2 S1x L1 D2 L2 |____________ # 12/6/0 D1x __| L1 S1 L2 S2x |D2. .... # 7/1 L1 S1 D1x S2 M2 | .... # 8/2 S1 L1x S2 | .... #####... ................|............ $code.=<<___; XORMPY $H0,$xia,$H0x ; 0 ; H·(Xi[i]<<1) || XORMPY $H01u,$xib,$H01y || [A0] LDBU *--${xip},$x0 XORMPY $H1,$xia,$H1x ; 1 XORMPY $H2,$xia,$H2x ; 2 || XORMPY $H2u,$xib,$H2y XORMPY $H3,$xia,$H3x ; 3 || XORMPY $H3u,$xib,$H3y ||[!A0] MVK.D 15,A0 ; *--${xip} counter XOR.L $H0x,$Z0,$Z0 ; 4 ; Z^=H·(Xi[i]<<1) || [A0] SUB.S A0,1,A0 XOR.L $H1x,$Z1,$Z1 ; 5 || AND.D $H01y,$FF000000,$H0z || SWAP2.L $H01y,$H1y ; ; SHL $H01y,16,$H1y || SHL $x0,1,$xib || SHL $x0,1,$xia XOR.L $H2x,$Z2,$Z2 ; 6/0 ; [0,0] in epilogue || SHL $Z0,1,$rem ; ; rem=Z<<1 || SHRMB.S $Z1,$Z0,$Z0 ; ; Z>>=8 || AND.L $H1y,$FF000000,$H1z XOR.L $H3x,$Z3,$Z3 ; 7/1 || SHRMB.S $Z2,$Z1,$Z1 || XOR.D $H0z,$Z0,$Z0 ; merge upper byte products || AND.S $H2y,$FF000000,$H2z || XORMPY $E10000,$rem,$res ; ; implicit rem&0x1FE XOR.L $H1z,$Z1,$Z1 ; 8/2 || SHRMB.S $Z3,$Z2,$Z2 || AND.S $H3y,$FF000000,$H3z XOR.L $H2z,$Z2,$Z2 ; 9/3 || SHRU $Z3,8,$Z3 XOR.D $H3z,$Z3,$Z3 ; 10/4 NOP ; 11/5 SPKERNEL 0,2 || XOR.D $res,$Z3,$Z3 ; 12/6/0; Z^=res ; input pre-fetch is possible where D1 slot is available... [B0] LDNDW *${inp}[1],$H1x:$H0x ; 8/- [B0] LDNDW *${inp}++[2],$H3x:$H2x ; 9/- NOP ; 10/- .if .LITTLE_ENDIAN SWAP2 $Z0,$Z1 ; 11/- || SWAP4 $Z1,$Z0 SWAP4 $Z1,$Z1 ; 12/- || SWAP2 $Z0,$Z0 SWAP2 $Z2,$Z3 || SWAP4 $Z3,$Z2 ||[!B0] BNOP RA SWAP4 $Z3,$Z3 || SWAP2 $Z2,$Z2 || [B0] BNOP ghash_loop? [B0] XOR $H0x,$Z0,$Z0 ; Xi^=inp || [B0] XOR $H1x,$Z1,$Z1 [B0] XOR $H2x,$Z2,$Z2 || [B0] XOR $H3x,$Z3,$Z3 || [B0] SHRU $Z1,24,$xia ; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall STDW $Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1] || [B0] SHRU $Z1,16,$x0 ; Xi[14] || [B0] ZERO $Z1:$Z0 .else [!B0] BNOP RA ; 11/- [B0] BNOP ghash_loop? ; 12/- [B0] XOR $H0x,$Z0,$Z0 ; Xi^=inp || [B0] XOR $H1x,$Z1,$Z1 [B0] XOR $H2x,$Z2,$Z2 || [B0] XOR $H3x,$Z3,$Z3 || [B0] MV $Z0,$xia ; Xi[15], avoid cross-path stall STDW $Z1:$Z0,*${xip}[1] || [B0] SHRU $Z0,8,$x0 ; Xi[14] || [B0] ZERO $Z1:$Z0 .endif STDW $Z3:$Z2,*${xip}[0] || [B0] ZERO $Z3:$Z2 || [B0] MV $xia,$x1 [B0] ADDK 14,${xip} .endasmfunc .sect .const .cstring "GHASH for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-ia64.pl0000755000000000000000000004366013176625657017476 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # March 2010 # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it # uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Streamed # GHASH performance was measured to be 6.67 cycles per processed byte # on Itanium 2, which is >90% better than Microsoft compiler generated # code. To anchor to something else sha1-ia64.pl module processes one # byte in 5.7 cycles. On Itanium GHASH should run at ~8.5 cycles per # byte. # September 2010 # # It was originally thought that it makes lesser sense to implement # "528B" variant on Itanium 2 for following reason. Because number of # functional units is naturally limited, it appeared impossible to # implement "528B" loop in 4 cycles, only in 5. This would mean that # theoretically performance improvement couldn't be more than 20%. # But occasionally you prove yourself wrong:-) I figured out a way to # fold couple of instructions and having freed yet another instruction # slot by unrolling the loop... Resulting performance is 4.45 cycles # per processed byte and 50% better than "256B" version. On original # Itanium performance should remain the same as the "256B" version, # i.e. ~8.5 cycles. $output=pop and (open STDOUT,">$output" or die "can't open $output: $!"); if ($^O eq "hpux") { $ADDP="addp4"; for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); } } else { $ADDP="add"; } for (@ARGV) { $big_endian=1 if (/\-DB_ENDIAN/); $big_endian=0 if (/\-DL_ENDIAN/); } if (!defined($big_endian)) { $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1); } sub loop() { my $label=shift; my ($p16,$p17)=(shift)?("p63","p63"):("p16","p17"); # mask references to inp # Loop is scheduled for 6 ticks on Itanium 2 and 8 on Itanium, i.e. # in scalable manner;-) Naturally assuming data in L1 cache... # Special note about 'dep' instruction, which is used to construct # &rem_4bit[Zlo&0xf]. It works, because rem_4bit is aligned at 128 # bytes boundary and lower 7 bits of its address are guaranteed to # be zero. $code.=<<___; $label: { .mfi; (p18) ld8 Hlo=[Hi[1]],-8 (p19) dep rem=Zlo,rem_4bitp,3,4 } { .mfi; (p19) xor Zhi=Zhi,Hhi ($p17) xor xi[1]=xi[1],in[1] };; { .mfi; (p18) ld8 Hhi=[Hi[1]] (p19) shrp Zlo=Zhi,Zlo,4 } { .mfi; (p19) ld8 rem=[rem] (p18) and Hi[1]=mask0xf0,xi[2] };; { .mmi; ($p16) ld1 in[0]=[inp],-1 (p18) xor Zlo=Zlo,Hlo (p19) shr.u Zhi=Zhi,4 } { .mib; (p19) xor Hhi=Hhi,rem (p18) add Hi[1]=Htbl,Hi[1] };; { .mfi; (p18) ld8 Hlo=[Hi[1]],-8 (p18) dep rem=Zlo,rem_4bitp,3,4 } { .mfi; (p17) shladd Hi[0]=xi[1],4,r0 (p18) xor Zhi=Zhi,Hhi };; { .mfi; (p18) ld8 Hhi=[Hi[1]] (p18) shrp Zlo=Zhi,Zlo,4 } { .mfi; (p18) ld8 rem=[rem] (p17) and Hi[0]=mask0xf0,Hi[0] };; { .mmi; (p16) ld1 xi[0]=[Xi],-1 (p18) xor Zlo=Zlo,Hlo (p18) shr.u Zhi=Zhi,4 } { .mib; (p18) xor Hhi=Hhi,rem (p17) add Hi[0]=Htbl,Hi[0] br.ctop.sptk $label };; ___ } $code=<<___; .explicit .text prevfs=r2; prevlc=r3; prevpr=r8; mask0xf0=r21; rem=r22; rem_4bitp=r23; Xi=r24; Htbl=r25; inp=r26; end=r27; Hhi=r28; Hlo=r29; Zhi=r30; Zlo=r31; .align 128 .skip 16 // aligns loop body .global gcm_gmult_4bit# .proc gcm_gmult_4bit# gcm_gmult_4bit: .prologue { .mmi; .save ar.pfs,prevfs alloc prevfs=ar.pfs,2,6,0,8 $ADDP Xi=15,in0 // &Xi[15] mov rem_4bitp=ip } { .mii; $ADDP Htbl=8,in1 // &Htbl[0].lo .save ar.lc,prevlc mov prevlc=ar.lc .save pr,prevpr mov prevpr=pr };; .body .rotr in[3],xi[3],Hi[2] { .mib; ld1 xi[2]=[Xi],-1 // Xi[15] mov mask0xf0=0xf0 brp.loop.imp .Loop1,.Lend1-16};; { .mmi; ld1 xi[1]=[Xi],-1 // Xi[14] };; { .mii; shladd Hi[1]=xi[2],4,r0 mov pr.rot=0x7<<16 mov ar.lc=13 };; { .mii; and Hi[1]=mask0xf0,Hi[1] mov ar.ec=3 xor Zlo=Zlo,Zlo };; { .mii; add Hi[1]=Htbl,Hi[1] // &Htbl[nlo].lo add rem_4bitp=rem_4bit#-gcm_gmult_4bit#,rem_4bitp xor Zhi=Zhi,Zhi };; ___ &loop (".Loop1",1); $code.=<<___; .Lend1: { .mib; xor Zhi=Zhi,Hhi };; // modulo-scheduling artefact { .mib; mux1 Zlo=Zlo,\@rev };; { .mib; mux1 Zhi=Zhi,\@rev };; { .mmi; add Hlo=9,Xi;; // ;; is here to prevent add Hhi=1,Xi };; // pipeline flush on Itanium { .mib; st8 [Hlo]=Zlo mov pr=prevpr,0x1ffff };; { .mib; st8 [Hhi]=Zhi mov ar.lc=prevlc br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp gcm_gmult_4bit# ___ ###################################################################### # "528B" (well, "512B" actualy) streamed GHASH # $Xip="in0"; $Htbl="in1"; $inp="in2"; $len="in3"; $rem_8bit="loc0"; $mask0xff="loc1"; ($sum,$rum) = $big_endian ? ("nop.m","nop.m") : ("sum","rum"); sub load_htable() { for (my $i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; { .mmi; ld8 r`16+2*$i+1`=[r8],16 // Htable[$i].hi ld8 r`16+2*$i`=[r9],16 } // Htable[$i].lo { .mmi; ldf8 f`32+2*$i+1`=[r10],16 // Htable[`8+$i`].hi ldf8 f`32+2*$i`=[r11],16 // Htable[`8+$i`].lo ___ $code.=shift if (($i+$#_)==7); $code.="\t};;\n" } } $code.=<<___; prevsp=r3; .align 32 .skip 16 // aligns loop body .global gcm_ghash_4bit# .proc gcm_ghash_4bit# gcm_ghash_4bit: .prologue { .mmi; .save ar.pfs,prevfs alloc prevfs=ar.pfs,4,2,0,0 .vframe prevsp mov prevsp=sp mov $rem_8bit=ip };; .body { .mfi; $ADDP r8=0+0,$Htbl $ADDP r9=0+8,$Htbl } { .mfi; $ADDP r10=128+0,$Htbl $ADDP r11=128+8,$Htbl };; ___ &load_htable( " $ADDP $Xip=15,$Xip", # &Xi[15] " $ADDP $len=$len,$inp", # &inp[len] " $ADDP $inp=15,$inp", # &inp[15] " mov $mask0xff=0xff", " add sp=-512,sp", " andcm sp=sp,$mask0xff", # align stack frame " add r14=0,sp", " add r15=8,sp"); $code.=<<___; { .mmi; $sum 1<<1 // go big-endian add r8=256+0,sp add r9=256+8,sp } { .mmi; add r10=256+128+0,sp add r11=256+128+8,sp add $len=-17,$len };; ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { # generate first half of Hshr4[] my ($rlo,$rhi)=("r".eval(16+2*$i),"r".eval(16+2*$i+1)); $code.=<<___; { .mmi; st8 [r8]=$rlo,16 // Htable[$i].lo st8 [r9]=$rhi,16 // Htable[$i].hi shrp $rlo=$rhi,$rlo,4 }//;; { .mmi; stf8 [r10]=f`32+2*$i`,16 // Htable[`8+$i`].lo stf8 [r11]=f`32+2*$i+1`,16 // Htable[`8+$i`].hi shr.u $rhi=$rhi,4 };; { .mmi; st8 [r14]=$rlo,16 // Htable[$i].lo>>4 st8 [r15]=$rhi,16 }//;; // Htable[$i].hi>>4 ___ } $code.=<<___; { .mmi; ld8 r16=[r8],16 // Htable[8].lo ld8 r17=[r9],16 };; // Htable[8].hi { .mmi; ld8 r18=[r8],16 // Htable[9].lo ld8 r19=[r9],16 } // Htable[9].hi { .mmi; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh shrp r16=r17,r16,4 };; ___ for($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { # generate second half of Hshr4[] $code.=<<___; { .mmi; ld8 r`20+2*$i`=[r8],16 // Htable[`10+$i`].lo ld8 r`20+2*$i+1`=[r9],16 // Htable[`10+$i`].hi shr.u r`16+2*$i+1`=r`16+2*$i+1`,4 };; { .mmi; st8 [r14]=r`16+2*$i`,16 // Htable[`8+$i`].lo>>4 st8 [r15]=r`16+2*$i+1`,16 // Htable[`8+$i`].hi>>4 shrp r`18+2*$i`=r`18+2*$i+1`,r`18+2*$i`,4 } ___ } $code.=<<___; { .mmi; shr.u r`16+2*$i+1`=r`16+2*$i+1`,4 };; { .mmi; st8 [r14]=r`16+2*$i`,16 // Htable[`8+$i`].lo>>4 st8 [r15]=r`16+2*$i+1`,16 // Htable[`8+$i`].hi>>4 shrp r`18+2*$i`=r`18+2*$i+1`,r`18+2*$i`,4 } { .mmi; add $Htbl=256,sp // &Htable[0] add $rem_8bit=rem_8bit#-gcm_ghash_4bit#,$rem_8bit shr.u r`18+2*$i+1`=r`18+2*$i+1`,4 };; { .mmi; st8 [r14]=r`18+2*$i` // Htable[`8+$i`].lo>>4 st8 [r15]=r`18+2*$i+1` } // Htable[`8+$i`].hi>>4 ___ $in="r15"; @xi=("r16","r17"); @rem=("r18","r19"); ($Alo,$Ahi,$Blo,$Bhi,$Zlo,$Zhi)=("r20","r21","r22","r23","r24","r25"); ($Atbl,$Btbl)=("r26","r27"); $code.=<<___; # (p16) { .mmi; ld1 $in=[$inp],-1 //(p16) *inp-- ld1 $xi[0]=[$Xip],-1 //(p16) *Xi-- cmp.eq p0,p6=r0,r0 };; // clear p6 ___ push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers $code.=<<___; # (p16),(p17) { .mmi; ld1 $xi[0]=[$Xip],-1 //(p16) *Xi-- xor $xi[1]=$xi[1],$in };; //(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i] { .mii; ld1 $in=[$inp],-1 //(p16) *inp-- dep $Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4 //(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo and $xi[1]=-16,$xi[1] };; //(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0 .align 32 .LOOP: { .mmi; (p6) st8 [$Xip]=$Zhi,13 xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Zlo add $Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl };; //(p17) &Htable[nhi].lo ___ push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers $code.=<<___; # (p16),(p17),(p18) { .mmi; ld8 $Alo=[$Atbl],8 //(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi ld8 $rem[0]=[$Btbl],-256 //(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].lo xor $xi[1]=$xi[1],$in };; //(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i] { .mfi; ld8 $Ahi=[$Atbl] //(p18) Htable[nlo].hi dep $Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4 } //(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo { .mfi; shladd $rem[0]=$rem[0],4,r0 //(p18) Htable[nhi].lo<<4 xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo };; //(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo { .mmi; ld8 $Blo=[$Btbl],8 //(p18) Hshr4[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].hi ld1 $in=[$inp],-1 } //(p16) *inp-- { .mmi; xor $rem[0]=$rem[0],$Zlo //(p18) Z.lo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4) mov $Zhi=$Ahi //(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi and $xi[1]=-16,$xi[1] };; //(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0 { .mmi; ld8 $Bhi=[$Btbl] //(p18) Hshr4[nhi].hi ld1 $xi[0]=[$Xip],-1 //(p16) *Xi-- shrp $Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,8 } //(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<56)|(Z.lo>>8) { .mmi; and $rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff //(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff add $Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl };; //(p17) &Htable[nhi] ___ push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers for ($i=1;$i<14;$i++) { # Above and below fragments are derived from this one by removing # unsuitable (p??) instructions. $code.=<<___; # (p16),(p17),(p18),(p19) { .mmi; ld8 $Alo=[$Atbl],8 //(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi ld8 $rem[0]=[$Btbl],-256 //(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].lo shr.u $Zhi=$Zhi,8 } //(p19) Z.hi>>=8 { .mmi; shladd $rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit //(p19) &rem_8bit[rem] xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo //(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo xor $xi[1]=$xi[1],$in };; //(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i] { .mmi; ld8 $Ahi=[$Atbl] //(p18) Htable[nlo].hi ld2 $rem[1]=[$rem[1]] //(p19) rem_8bit[rem] dep $Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4 } //(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo { .mmi; shladd $rem[0]=$rem[0],4,r0 //(p18) Htable[nhi].lo<<4 xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo //(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi };; //(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi { .mmi; ld8 $Blo=[$Btbl],8 //(p18) Hshr4[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].hi ld1 $in=[$inp],-1 //(p16) *inp-- shl $rem[1]=$rem[1],48 } //(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48 { .mmi; xor $rem[0]=$rem[0],$Zlo //(p18) Z.lo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4) xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$Ahi //(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi and $xi[1]=-16,$xi[1] };; //(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0 { .mmi; ld8 $Bhi=[$Btbl] //(p18) Hshr4[nhi].hi ld1 $xi[0]=[$Xip],-1 //(p16) *Xi-- shrp $Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,8 } //(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<56)|(Z.lo>>8) { .mmi; and $rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff //(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1] //(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48 add $Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl };; //(p17) &Htable[nhi] ___ push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers } $code.=<<___; # (p17),(p18),(p19) { .mmi; ld8 $Alo=[$Atbl],8 //(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi ld8 $rem[0]=[$Btbl],-256 //(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].lo shr.u $Zhi=$Zhi,8 } //(p19) Z.hi>>=8 { .mmi; shladd $rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit //(p19) &rem_8bit[rem] xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo //(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo xor $xi[1]=$xi[1],$in };; //(p17) xi=$xi[i]^inp[i] { .mmi; ld8 $Ahi=[$Atbl] //(p18) Htable[nlo].hi ld2 $rem[1]=[$rem[1]] //(p19) rem_8bit[rem] dep $Atbl=$xi[1],$Htbl,4,4 };; //(p17) &Htable[nlo].lo { .mmi; shladd $rem[0]=$rem[0],4,r0 //(p18) Htable[nhi].lo<<4 xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo //(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi };; //(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi { .mmi; ld8 $Blo=[$Btbl],8 //(p18) Hshr4[nhi].lo,&Hshr4[nhi].hi shl $rem[1]=$rem[1],48 } //(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48 { .mmi; xor $rem[0]=$rem[0],$Zlo //(p18) Z.lo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4) xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$Ahi //(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi and $xi[1]=-16,$xi[1] };; //(p17) nhi=xi&0xf0 { .mmi; ld8 $Bhi=[$Btbl] //(p18) Hshr4[nhi].hi shrp $Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,8 } //(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<56)|(Z.lo>>8) { .mmi; and $rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff //(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1] //(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48 add $Btbl=$xi[1],$Htbl };; //(p17) &Htable[nhi] ___ push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers $code.=<<___; # (p18),(p19) { .mfi; ld8 $Alo=[$Atbl],8 //(p18) Htable[nlo].lo,&Htable[nlo].hi shr.u $Zhi=$Zhi,8 } //(p19) Z.hi>>=8 { .mfi; shladd $rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit //(p19) &rem_8bit[rem] xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo };; //(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo { .mfi; ld8 $Ahi=[$Atbl] //(p18) Htable[nlo].hi xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Alo } //(p18) Z.lo^=Htable[nlo].lo { .mfi; ld2 $rem[1]=[$rem[1]] //(p19) rem_8bit[rem] xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi };; //(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi { .mfi; ld8 $Blo=[$Btbl],8 //(p18) Htable[nhi].lo,&Htable[nhi].hi shl $rem[1]=$rem[1],48 } //(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48 { .mfi; shladd $rem[0]=$Zlo,4,r0 //(p18) Z.lo<<4 xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$Ahi };; //(p18) Z.hi^=Htable[nlo].hi { .mfi; ld8 $Bhi=[$Btbl] //(p18) Htable[nhi].hi shrp $Zlo=$Zhi,$Zlo,4 } //(p18) Z.lo=(Z.hi<<60)|(Z.lo>>4) { .mfi; and $rem[0]=$rem[0],$mask0xff //(p18) rem=($Zlo^(Htable[nhi].lo<<4))&0xff xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1] };; //(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48 ___ push (@xi,shift(@xi)); push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers $code.=<<___; # (p19) { .mmi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=$inp,$len add $inp=32,$inp shr.u $Zhi=$Zhi,4 } //(p19) Z.hi>>=4 { .mmi; shladd $rem[1]=$rem[1],1,$rem_8bit //(p19) &rem_8bit[rem] xor $Zlo=$Zlo,$Blo //(p19) Z.lo^=Hshr4[nhi].lo add $Xip=9,$Xip };; // &Xi.lo { .mmi; ld2 $rem[1]=[$rem[1]] //(p19) rem_8bit[rem] (p6) ld1 $in=[$inp],-1 //[p16] *inp-- (p6) extr.u $xi[1]=$Zlo,8,8 } //[p17] Xi[14] { .mmi; xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$Bhi //(p19) Z.hi^=Hshr4[nhi].hi (p6) and $xi[0]=$Zlo,$mask0xff };; //[p16] Xi[15] { .mmi; st8 [$Xip]=$Zlo,-8 (p6) xor $xi[0]=$xi[0],$in //[p17] xi=$xi[i]^inp[i] shl $rem[1]=$rem[1],48 };; //(p19) rem_8bit[rem]<<48 { .mmi; (p6) ld1 $in=[$inp],-1 //[p16] *inp-- xor $Zhi=$Zhi,$rem[1] //(p19) Z.hi^=rem_8bit[rem]<<48 (p6) dep $Atbl=$xi[0],$Htbl,4,4 } //[p17] &Htable[nlo].lo { .mib; (p6) and $xi[0]=-16,$xi[0] //[p17] nhi=xi&0xf0 (p6) br.cond.dptk.many .LOOP };; { .mib; st8 [$Xip]=$Zhi };; { .mib; $rum 1<<1 // return to little-endian .restore sp mov sp=prevsp br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp gcm_ghash_4bit# ___ $code.=<<___; .align 128 .type rem_4bit#,\@object rem_4bit: data8 0x0000<<48, 0x1C20<<48, 0x3840<<48, 0x2460<<48 data8 0x7080<<48, 0x6CA0<<48, 0x48C0<<48, 0x54E0<<48 data8 0xE100<<48, 0xFD20<<48, 0xD940<<48, 0xC560<<48 data8 0x9180<<48, 0x8DA0<<48, 0xA9C0<<48, 0xB5E0<<48 .size rem_4bit#,128 .type rem_8bit#,\@object rem_8bit: data1 0x00,0x00, 0x01,0xC2, 0x03,0x84, 0x02,0x46, 0x07,0x08, 0x06,0xCA, 0x04,0x8C, 0x05,0x4E data1 0x0E,0x10, 0x0F,0xD2, 0x0D,0x94, 0x0C,0x56, 0x09,0x18, 0x08,0xDA, 0x0A,0x9C, 0x0B,0x5E data1 0x1C,0x20, 0x1D,0xE2, 0x1F,0xA4, 0x1E,0x66, 0x1B,0x28, 0x1A,0xEA, 0x18,0xAC, 0x19,0x6E data1 0x12,0x30, 0x13,0xF2, 0x11,0xB4, 0x10,0x76, 0x15,0x38, 0x14,0xFA, 0x16,0xBC, 0x17,0x7E data1 0x38,0x40, 0x39,0x82, 0x3B,0xC4, 0x3A,0x06, 0x3F,0x48, 0x3E,0x8A, 0x3C,0xCC, 0x3D,0x0E data1 0x36,0x50, 0x37,0x92, 0x35,0xD4, 0x34,0x16, 0x31,0x58, 0x30,0x9A, 0x32,0xDC, 0x33,0x1E data1 0x24,0x60, 0x25,0xA2, 0x27,0xE4, 0x26,0x26, 0x23,0x68, 0x22,0xAA, 0x20,0xEC, 0x21,0x2E data1 0x2A,0x70, 0x2B,0xB2, 0x29,0xF4, 0x28,0x36, 0x2D,0x78, 0x2C,0xBA, 0x2E,0xFC, 0x2F,0x3E data1 0x70,0x80, 0x71,0x42, 0x73,0x04, 0x72,0xC6, 0x77,0x88, 0x76,0x4A, 0x74,0x0C, 0x75,0xCE data1 0x7E,0x90, 0x7F,0x52, 0x7D,0x14, 0x7C,0xD6, 0x79,0x98, 0x78,0x5A, 0x7A,0x1C, 0x7B,0xDE data1 0x6C,0xA0, 0x6D,0x62, 0x6F,0x24, 0x6E,0xE6, 0x6B,0xA8, 0x6A,0x6A, 0x68,0x2C, 0x69,0xEE data1 0x62,0xB0, 0x63,0x72, 0x61,0x34, 0x60,0xF6, 0x65,0xB8, 0x64,0x7A, 0x66,0x3C, 0x67,0xFE data1 0x48,0xC0, 0x49,0x02, 0x4B,0x44, 0x4A,0x86, 0x4F,0xC8, 0x4E,0x0A, 0x4C,0x4C, 0x4D,0x8E data1 0x46,0xD0, 0x47,0x12, 0x45,0x54, 0x44,0x96, 0x41,0xD8, 0x40,0x1A, 0x42,0x5C, 0x43,0x9E data1 0x54,0xE0, 0x55,0x22, 0x57,0x64, 0x56,0xA6, 0x53,0xE8, 0x52,0x2A, 0x50,0x6C, 0x51,0xAE data1 0x5A,0xF0, 0x5B,0x32, 0x59,0x74, 0x58,0xB6, 0x5D,0xF8, 0x5C,0x3A, 0x5E,0x7C, 0x5F,0xBE data1 0xE1,0x00, 0xE0,0xC2, 0xE2,0x84, 0xE3,0x46, 0xE6,0x08, 0xE7,0xCA, 0xE5,0x8C, 0xE4,0x4E data1 0xEF,0x10, 0xEE,0xD2, 0xEC,0x94, 0xED,0x56, 0xE8,0x18, 0xE9,0xDA, 0xEB,0x9C, 0xEA,0x5E data1 0xFD,0x20, 0xFC,0xE2, 0xFE,0xA4, 0xFF,0x66, 0xFA,0x28, 0xFB,0xEA, 0xF9,0xAC, 0xF8,0x6E data1 0xF3,0x30, 0xF2,0xF2, 0xF0,0xB4, 0xF1,0x76, 0xF4,0x38, 0xF5,0xFA, 0xF7,0xBC, 0xF6,0x7E data1 0xD9,0x40, 0xD8,0x82, 0xDA,0xC4, 0xDB,0x06, 0xDE,0x48, 0xDF,0x8A, 0xDD,0xCC, 0xDC,0x0E data1 0xD7,0x50, 0xD6,0x92, 0xD4,0xD4, 0xD5,0x16, 0xD0,0x58, 0xD1,0x9A, 0xD3,0xDC, 0xD2,0x1E data1 0xC5,0x60, 0xC4,0xA2, 0xC6,0xE4, 0xC7,0x26, 0xC2,0x68, 0xC3,0xAA, 0xC1,0xEC, 0xC0,0x2E data1 0xCB,0x70, 0xCA,0xB2, 0xC8,0xF4, 0xC9,0x36, 0xCC,0x78, 0xCD,0xBA, 0xCF,0xFC, 0xCE,0x3E data1 0x91,0x80, 0x90,0x42, 0x92,0x04, 0x93,0xC6, 0x96,0x88, 0x97,0x4A, 0x95,0x0C, 0x94,0xCE data1 0x9F,0x90, 0x9E,0x52, 0x9C,0x14, 0x9D,0xD6, 0x98,0x98, 0x99,0x5A, 0x9B,0x1C, 0x9A,0xDE data1 0x8D,0xA0, 0x8C,0x62, 0x8E,0x24, 0x8F,0xE6, 0x8A,0xA8, 0x8B,0x6A, 0x89,0x2C, 0x88,0xEE data1 0x83,0xB0, 0x82,0x72, 0x80,0x34, 0x81,0xF6, 0x84,0xB8, 0x85,0x7A, 0x87,0x3C, 0x86,0xFE data1 0xA9,0xC0, 0xA8,0x02, 0xAA,0x44, 0xAB,0x86, 0xAE,0xC8, 0xAF,0x0A, 0xAD,0x4C, 0xAC,0x8E data1 0xA7,0xD0, 0xA6,0x12, 0xA4,0x54, 0xA5,0x96, 0xA0,0xD8, 0xA1,0x1A, 0xA3,0x5C, 0xA2,0x9E data1 0xB5,0xE0, 0xB4,0x22, 0xB6,0x64, 0xB7,0xA6, 0xB2,0xE8, 0xB3,0x2A, 0xB1,0x6C, 0xB0,0xAE data1 0xBB,0xF0, 0xBA,0x32, 0xB8,0x74, 0xB9,0xB6, 0xBC,0xF8, 0xBD,0x3A, 0xBF,0x7C, 0xBE,0xBE .size rem_8bit#,512 stringz "GHASH for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/mux1(\s+)\S+\@rev/nop.i$1 0x0/gm if ($big_endian); $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl0000644000000000000000000001420613176625657017610 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # September 2010. # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it # uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Performance # was measured to be ~18 cycles per processed byte on z10, which is # almost 40% better than gcc-generated code. It should be noted that # 18 cycles is worse result than expected: loop is scheduled for 12 # and the result should be close to 12. In the lack of instruction- # level profiling data it's impossible to tell why... # November 2010. # # Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" # feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit # instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy # application context. The feature is not specific to any particular # processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code # remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform # 2.8x better than 32-bit code generated by gcc 4.3. # March 2011. # # Support for hardware KIMD-GHASH is verified to produce correct # result and therefore is engaged. On z196 it was measured to process # 8KB buffer ~7 faster than software implementation. It's not as # impressive for smaller buffer sizes and for smallest 16-bytes buffer # it's actually almost 2 times slower. Which is the reason why # KIMD-GHASH is not used in gcm_gmult_4bit. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $softonly=0; $Zhi="%r0"; $Zlo="%r1"; $Xi="%r2"; # argument block $Htbl="%r3"; $inp="%r4"; $len="%r5"; $rem0="%r6"; # variables $rem1="%r7"; $nlo="%r8"; $nhi="%r9"; $xi="%r10"; $cnt="%r11"; $tmp="%r12"; $x78="%r13"; $rem_4bit="%r14"; $sp="%r15"; $code.=<<___; .text .globl gcm_gmult_4bit .align 32 gcm_gmult_4bit: ___ $code.=<<___ if(!$softonly && 0); # hardware is slow for single block... larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P lghi %r0,0 lg %r1,24(%r1) # load second word of kimd capabilities vector tmhh %r1,0x4000 # check for function 65 jz .Lsoft_gmult stg %r0,16($sp) # arrange 16 bytes of zero input stg %r0,24($sp) lghi %r0,65 # function 65 la %r1,0($Xi) # H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context la $inp,16($sp) lghi $len,16 .long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,$inp brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" br %r14 .align 32 .Lsoft_gmult: ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp) aghi $Xi,-1 lghi $len,1 lghi $x78,`0xf<<3` larl $rem_4bit,rem_4bit lg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) # Xi j .Lgmult_shortcut .type gcm_gmult_4bit,\@function .size gcm_gmult_4bit,(.-gcm_gmult_4bit) .globl gcm_ghash_4bit .align 32 gcm_ghash_4bit: ___ $code.=<<___ if(!$softonly); larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P lg %r0,24(%r1) # load second word of kimd capabilities vector tmhh %r0,0x4000 # check for function 65 jz .Lsoft_ghash lghi %r0,65 # function 65 la %r1,0($Xi) # H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context .long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,$inp brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" br %r14 .align 32 .Lsoft_ghash: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/); llgfr $len,$len ___ $code.=<<___; stm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp) aghi $Xi,-1 srlg $len,$len,4 lghi $x78,`0xf<<3` larl $rem_4bit,rem_4bit lg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) # Xi lg $Zhi,0+1($Xi) lghi $tmp,0 .Louter: xg $Zhi,0($inp) # Xi ^= inp xg $Zlo,8($inp) xgr $Zhi,$tmp stg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) stg $Zhi,0+1($Xi) .Lgmult_shortcut: lghi $tmp,0xf0 sllg $nlo,$Zlo,4 srlg $xi,$Zlo,8 # extract second byte ngr $nlo,$tmp lgr $nhi,$Zlo lghi $cnt,14 ngr $nhi,$tmp lg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl) lg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl) sllg $nlo,$xi,4 sllg $rem0,$Zlo,3 ngr $nlo,$tmp ngr $rem0,$x78 ngr $xi,$tmp sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl) xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl) lgr $nhi,$xi sllg $rem1,$Zlo,3 xgr $Zlo,$tmp ngr $rem1,$x78 sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 j .Lghash_inner .align 16 .Lghash_inner: srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 xg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl) llgc $xi,0($cnt,$Xi) xg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl) sllg $nlo,$xi,4 xg $Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit) nill $nlo,0xf0 sllg $rem0,$Zlo,3 xgr $Zlo,$tmp ngr $rem0,$x78 nill $xi,0xf0 sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl) xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl) lgr $nhi,$xi xg $Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit) sllg $rem1,$Zlo,3 xgr $Zlo,$tmp ngr $rem1,$x78 sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 brct $cnt,.Lghash_inner srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 xg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl) xg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl) sllg $xi,$Zlo,3 xg $Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit) xgr $Zlo,$tmp ngr $xi,$x78 sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl) xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl) xgr $Zlo,$tmp xg $Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit) lg $tmp,0($xi,$rem_4bit) la $inp,16($inp) sllg $tmp,$tmp,4 # correct last rem_4bit[rem] brctg $len,.Louter xgr $Zhi,$tmp stg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) stg $Zhi,0+1($Xi) lm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp) br %r14 .type gcm_ghash_4bit,\@function .size gcm_ghash_4bit,(.-gcm_ghash_4bit) .align 64 rem_4bit: .long `0x0000<<12`,0,`0x1C20<<12`,0,`0x3840<<12`,0,`0x2460<<12`,0 .long `0x7080<<12`,0,`0x6CA0<<12`,0,`0x48C0<<12`,0,`0x54E0<<12`,0 .long `0xE100<<12`,0,`0xFD20<<12`,0,`0xD940<<12`,0,`0xC560<<12`,0 .long `0x9180<<12`,0,`0x8DA0<<12`,0,`0xA9C0<<12`,0,`0xB5E0<<12`,0 .type rem_4bit,\@object .size rem_4bit,(.-rem_4bit) .string "GHASH for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl0000644000000000000000000001744213176625657020014 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # March 2010 # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it # uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Even though # loops are aggressively modulo-scheduled in respect to references to # Htbl and Z.hi updates for 8 cycles per byte, measured performance is # ~12 cycles per processed byte on 21264 CPU. It seems to be a dynamic # scheduling "glitch," because uprofile(1) indicates uniform sample # distribution, as if all instruction bundles execute in 1.5 cycles. # Meaning that it could have been even faster, yet 12 cycles is ~60% # better than gcc-generated code and ~80% than code generated by vendor # compiler. $cnt="v0"; # $0 $t0="t0"; $t1="t1"; $t2="t2"; $Thi0="t3"; # $4 $Tlo0="t4"; $Thi1="t5"; $Tlo1="t6"; $rem="t7"; # $8 ################# $Xi="a0"; # $16, input argument block $Htbl="a1"; $inp="a2"; $len="a3"; $nlo="a4"; # $20 $nhi="a5"; $Zhi="t8"; $Zlo="t9"; $Xhi="t10"; # $24 $Xlo="t11"; $remp="t12"; $rem_4bit="AT"; # $28 { my $N; sub loop() { $N++; $code.=<<___; .align 4 extbl $Xlo,7,$nlo and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi sll $nlo,4,$nlo and $nlo,0xf0,$nlo addq $nlo,$Htbl,$nlo ldq $Zlo,8($nlo) addq $nhi,$Htbl,$nhi ldq $Zhi,0($nlo) and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 lda $cnt,6(zero) extbl $Xlo,6,$nlo ldq $Tlo1,8($nhi) s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp ldq $Thi1,0($nhi) srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi xor $Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo xor $Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi and $nlo,0xf0,$nlo addq $nlo,$Htbl,$nlo ldq $Tlo0,8($nlo) addq $nhi,$Htbl,$nhi ldq $Thi0,0($nlo) .Looplo$N: and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 subq $cnt,1,$cnt srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldq $Tlo1,8($nhi) xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $Thi1,0($nhi) s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo extbl $Xlo,$cnt,$nlo and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi xor $Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi xor $Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 and $nlo,0xf0,$nlo srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi addq $nlo,$Htbl,$nlo addq $nhi,$Htbl,$nhi ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi ldq $Tlo0,8($nlo) xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $Thi0,0($nlo) bne $cnt,.Looplo$N and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 lda $cnt,7(zero) srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldq $Tlo1,8($nhi) xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $Thi1,0($nhi) s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo extbl $Xhi,$cnt,$nlo and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi xor $Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi xor $Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 and $nlo,0xf0,$nlo srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi addq $nlo,$Htbl,$nlo addq $nhi,$Htbl,$nhi ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi ldq $Tlo0,8($nlo) xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $Thi0,0($nlo) unop .Loophi$N: and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 subq $cnt,1,$cnt srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldq $Tlo1,8($nhi) xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $Thi1,0($nhi) s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo extbl $Xhi,$cnt,$nlo and $nlo,0xf0,$nhi xor $Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi xor $Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo sll $nlo,4,$nlo and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 and $nlo,0xf0,$nlo srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi addq $nlo,$Htbl,$nlo addq $nhi,$Htbl,$nhi ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi ldq $Tlo0,8($nlo) xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $Thi0,0($nlo) bne $cnt,.Loophi$N and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo ldq $Tlo1,8($nhi) xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $Thi1,0($nhi) s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Tlo0,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Thi0,$Zhi,$Zhi and $Zlo,0x0f,$remp sll $Zhi,60,$t0 srl $Zlo,4,$Zlo s8addq $remp,$rem_4bit,$remp xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ldq $rem,0($remp) srl $Zhi,4,$Zhi xor $Tlo1,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $Thi1,$Zhi,$Zhi xor $t0,$Zlo,$Zlo xor $rem,$Zhi,$Zhi ___ }} $code=<<___; #ifdef __linux__ #include #else #include #include #endif .text .set noat .set noreorder .globl gcm_gmult_4bit .align 4 .ent gcm_gmult_4bit gcm_gmult_4bit: .frame sp,0,ra .prologue 0 ldq $Xlo,8($Xi) ldq $Xhi,0($Xi) bsr $t0,picmeup nop ___ &loop(); $code.=<<___; srl $Zlo,24,$t0 # byte swap srl $Zlo,8,$t1 sll $Zlo,8,$t2 sll $Zlo,24,$Zlo zapnot $t0,0x11,$t0 zapnot $t1,0x22,$t1 zapnot $Zlo,0x88,$Zlo or $t0,$t1,$t0 zapnot $t2,0x44,$t2 or $Zlo,$t0,$Zlo srl $Zhi,24,$t0 srl $Zhi,8,$t1 or $Zlo,$t2,$Zlo sll $Zhi,8,$t2 sll $Zhi,24,$Zhi srl $Zlo,32,$Xlo sll $Zlo,32,$Zlo zapnot $t0,0x11,$t0 zapnot $t1,0x22,$t1 or $Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo zapnot $Zhi,0x88,$Zhi or $t0,$t1,$t0 zapnot $t2,0x44,$t2 or $Zhi,$t0,$Zhi or $Zhi,$t2,$Zhi srl $Zhi,32,$Xhi sll $Zhi,32,$Zhi or $Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi stq $Xlo,8($Xi) stq $Xhi,0($Xi) ret (ra) .end gcm_gmult_4bit ___ $inhi="s0"; $inlo="s1"; $code.=<<___; .globl gcm_ghash_4bit .align 4 .ent gcm_ghash_4bit gcm_ghash_4bit: lda sp,-32(sp) stq ra,0(sp) stq s0,8(sp) stq s1,16(sp) .mask 0x04000600,-32 .frame sp,32,ra .prologue 0 ldq_u $inhi,0($inp) ldq_u $Thi0,7($inp) ldq_u $inlo,8($inp) ldq_u $Tlo0,15($inp) ldq $Xhi,0($Xi) ldq $Xlo,8($Xi) bsr $t0,picmeup nop .Louter: extql $inhi,$inp,$inhi extqh $Thi0,$inp,$Thi0 or $inhi,$Thi0,$inhi lda $inp,16($inp) extql $inlo,$inp,$inlo extqh $Tlo0,$inp,$Tlo0 or $inlo,$Tlo0,$inlo subq $len,16,$len xor $Xlo,$inlo,$Xlo xor $Xhi,$inhi,$Xhi ___ &loop(); $code.=<<___; srl $Zlo,24,$t0 # byte swap srl $Zlo,8,$t1 sll $Zlo,8,$t2 sll $Zlo,24,$Zlo zapnot $t0,0x11,$t0 zapnot $t1,0x22,$t1 zapnot $Zlo,0x88,$Zlo or $t0,$t1,$t0 zapnot $t2,0x44,$t2 or $Zlo,$t0,$Zlo srl $Zhi,24,$t0 srl $Zhi,8,$t1 or $Zlo,$t2,$Zlo sll $Zhi,8,$t2 sll $Zhi,24,$Zhi srl $Zlo,32,$Xlo sll $Zlo,32,$Zlo beq $len,.Ldone zapnot $t0,0x11,$t0 zapnot $t1,0x22,$t1 or $Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo ldq_u $inhi,0($inp) zapnot $Zhi,0x88,$Zhi or $t0,$t1,$t0 zapnot $t2,0x44,$t2 ldq_u $Thi0,7($inp) or $Zhi,$t0,$Zhi or $Zhi,$t2,$Zhi ldq_u $inlo,8($inp) ldq_u $Tlo0,15($inp) srl $Zhi,32,$Xhi sll $Zhi,32,$Zhi or $Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi br zero,.Louter .Ldone: zapnot $t0,0x11,$t0 zapnot $t1,0x22,$t1 or $Zlo,$Xlo,$Xlo zapnot $Zhi,0x88,$Zhi or $t0,$t1,$t0 zapnot $t2,0x44,$t2 or $Zhi,$t0,$Zhi or $Zhi,$t2,$Zhi srl $Zhi,32,$Xhi sll $Zhi,32,$Zhi or $Zhi,$Xhi,$Xhi stq $Xlo,8($Xi) stq $Xhi,0($Xi) .set noreorder /*ldq ra,0(sp)*/ ldq s0,8(sp) ldq s1,16(sp) lda sp,32(sp) ret (ra) .end gcm_ghash_4bit .align 4 .ent picmeup picmeup: .frame sp,0,$t0 .prologue 0 br $rem_4bit,.Lpic .Lpic: lda $rem_4bit,12($rem_4bit) ret ($t0) .end picmeup nop rem_4bit: .long 0,0x0000<<16, 0,0x1C20<<16, 0,0x3840<<16, 0,0x2460<<16 .long 0,0x7080<<16, 0,0x6CA0<<16, 0,0x48C0<<16, 0,0x54E0<<16 .long 0,0xE100<<16, 0,0xFD20<<16, 0,0xD940<<16, 0,0xC560<<16 .long 0,0x9180<<16, 0,0x8DA0<<16, 0,0xA9C0<<16, 0,0xB5E0<<16 .ascii "GHASH for Alpha, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ $output=pop and open STDOUT,">$output"; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl0000644000000000000000000003361013176625657017753 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # April 2010 # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it # uses 256 bytes per-key table [+32 bytes shared table]. There is no # experimental performance data available yet. The only approximation # that can be made at this point is based on code size. Inner loop is # 32 instructions long and on single-issue core should execute in <40 # cycles. Having verified that gcc 3.4 didn't unroll corresponding # loop, this assembler loop body was found to be ~3x smaller than # compiler-generated one... # # July 2010 # # Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 8.5% improvement on # Cortex A8 core and ~25 cycles per processed byte (which was observed # to be ~3 times faster than gcc-generated code:-) # # February 2011 # # Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 7% # improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~23.5 cycles per byte. # # March 2011 # # Add NEON implementation featuring polynomial multiplication, i.e. no # lookup tables involved. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process one # byte in 15 cycles or 55% faster than integer-only code. # # April 2014 # # Switch to multiplication algorithm suggested in paper referred # below and combine it with reduction algorithm from x86 module. # Performance improvement over previous version varies from 65% on # Snapdragon S4 to 110% on Cortex A9. In absolute terms Cortex A8 # processes one byte in 8.45 cycles, A9 - in 10.2, A15 - in 7.63, # Snapdragon S4 - in 9.33. # # Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software # Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine. # # http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf # ==================================================================== # Note about "528B" variant. In ARM case it makes lesser sense to # implement it for following reasons: # # - performance improvement won't be anywhere near 50%, because 128- # bit shift operation is neatly fused with 128-bit xor here, and # "538B" variant would eliminate only 4-5 instructions out of 32 # in the inner loop (meaning that estimated improvement is ~15%); # - ARM-based systems are often embedded ones and extra memory # consumption might be unappreciated (for so little improvement); # # Byte order [in]dependence. ========================================= # # Caller is expected to maintain specific *dword* order in Htable, # namely with *least* significant dword of 128-bit value at *lower* # address. This differs completely from C code and has everything to # do with ldm instruction and order in which dwords are "consumed" by # algorithm. *Byte* order within these dwords in turn is whatever # *native* byte order on current platform. See gcm128.c for working # example... $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $Xi="r0"; # argument block $Htbl="r1"; $inp="r2"; $len="r3"; $Zll="r4"; # variables $Zlh="r5"; $Zhl="r6"; $Zhh="r7"; $Tll="r8"; $Tlh="r9"; $Thl="r10"; $Thh="r11"; $nlo="r12"; ################# r13 is stack pointer $nhi="r14"; ################# r15 is program counter $rem_4bit=$inp; # used in gcm_gmult_4bit $cnt=$len; sub Zsmash() { my $i=12; my @args=@_; for ($Zll,$Zlh,$Zhl,$Zhh) { $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 && defined(__ARMEL__) rev $_,$_ str $_,[$Xi,#$i] #elif defined(__ARMEB__) str $_,[$Xi,#$i] #else mov $Tlh,$_,lsr#8 strb $_,[$Xi,#$i+3] mov $Thl,$_,lsr#16 strb $Tlh,[$Xi,#$i+2] mov $Thh,$_,lsr#24 strb $Thl,[$Xi,#$i+1] strb $Thh,[$Xi,#$i] #endif ___ $code.="\t".shift(@args)."\n"; $i-=4; } } $code=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__clang__) .syntax unified #endif #if defined(__thumb2__) .thumb #else .code 32 #endif #ifdef __clang__ #define ldrplb ldrbpl #define ldrneb ldrbne #endif .type rem_4bit,%object .align 5 rem_4bit: .short 0x0000,0x1C20,0x3840,0x2460 .short 0x7080,0x6CA0,0x48C0,0x54E0 .short 0xE100,0xFD20,0xD940,0xC560 .short 0x9180,0x8DA0,0xA9C0,0xB5E0 .size rem_4bit,.-rem_4bit .type rem_4bit_get,%function rem_4bit_get: #if defined(__thumb2__) adr $rem_4bit,rem_4bit #else sub $rem_4bit,pc,#8+32 @ &rem_4bit #endif b .Lrem_4bit_got nop nop .size rem_4bit_get,.-rem_4bit_get .global gcm_ghash_4bit .type gcm_ghash_4bit,%function .align 4 gcm_ghash_4bit: #if defined(__thumb2__) adr r12,rem_4bit #else sub r12,pc,#8+48 @ &rem_4bit #endif add $len,$inp,$len @ $len to point at the end stmdb sp!,{r3-r11,lr} @ save $len/end too ldmia r12,{r4-r11} @ copy rem_4bit ... stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} @ ... to stack ldrb $nlo,[$inp,#15] ldrb $nhi,[$Xi,#15] .Louter: eor $nlo,$nlo,$nhi and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0 and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f mov $cnt,#14 add $Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4 ldmia $Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh} @ load Htbl[nlo] add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi ldrb $nlo,[$inp,#14] and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi] add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4 ldrh $Tll,[sp,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem] eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28 ldrb $nhi,[$Xi,#14] eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4 eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28 eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4 eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28 eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4 eor $nlo,$nlo,$nhi and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0 and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 .Linner: add $Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4 and $nlo,$Zll,#0xf @ rem subs $cnt,$cnt,#1 add $nlo,$nlo,$nlo ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nlo] eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4 eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28 eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4 eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28 ldrh $Tll,[sp,$nlo] @ rem_4bit[rem] eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4 #ifdef __thumb2__ it pl #endif ldrplb $nlo,[$inp,$cnt] eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28 eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4 add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem] add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi] eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4 #ifdef __thumb2__ it pl #endif ldrplb $Tll,[$Xi,$cnt] eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28 eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4 ldrh $Tlh,[sp,$nhi] eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28 eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4 eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28 #ifdef __thumb2__ it pl #endif eorpl $nlo,$nlo,$Tll eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt pl #endif andpl $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0 andpl $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tlh,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem] bpl .Linner ldr $len,[sp,#32] @ re-load $len/end add $inp,$inp,#16 mov $nhi,$Zll ___ &Zsmash("cmp\t$inp,$len","\n". "#ifdef __thumb2__\n". " it ne\n". "#endif\n". " ldrneb $nlo,[$inp,#15]"); $code.=<<___; bne .Louter add sp,sp,#36 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size gcm_ghash_4bit,.-gcm_ghash_4bit .global gcm_gmult_4bit .type gcm_gmult_4bit,%function gcm_gmult_4bit: stmdb sp!,{r4-r11,lr} ldrb $nlo,[$Xi,#15] b rem_4bit_get .Lrem_4bit_got: and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0 and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f mov $cnt,#14 add $Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4 ldmia $Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh} @ load Htbl[nlo] ldrb $nlo,[$Xi,#14] add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi] add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4 ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem] eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28 eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4 eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28 eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4 eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28 eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4 and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0 eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f .Loop: add $Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4 and $nlo,$Zll,#0xf @ rem subs $cnt,$cnt,#1 add $nlo,$nlo,$nlo ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nlo] eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4 eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28 eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4 eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28 ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nlo] @ rem_4bit[rem] eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4 #ifdef __thumb2__ it pl #endif ldrplb $nlo,[$Xi,$cnt] eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28 eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4 add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem] add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi] eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4 eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28 eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4 ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem] eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28 eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4 eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28 eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt pl #endif andpl $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0 andpl $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem] bpl .Loop ___ &Zsmash(); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size gcm_gmult_4bit,.-gcm_gmult_4bit ___ { my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("q$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("q$_",(8..12)); my ($Hlo,$Hhi,$Hhl,$k48,$k32,$k16)=map("d$_",(26..31)); sub clmul64x64 { my ($r,$a,$b)=@_; $code.=<<___; vext.8 $t0#lo, $a, $a, #1 @ A1 vmull.p8 $t0, $t0#lo, $b @ F = A1*B vext.8 $r#lo, $b, $b, #1 @ B1 vmull.p8 $r, $a, $r#lo @ E = A*B1 vext.8 $t1#lo, $a, $a, #2 @ A2 vmull.p8 $t1, $t1#lo, $b @ H = A2*B vext.8 $t3#lo, $b, $b, #2 @ B2 vmull.p8 $t3, $a, $t3#lo @ G = A*B2 vext.8 $t2#lo, $a, $a, #3 @ A3 veor $t0, $t0, $r @ L = E + F vmull.p8 $t2, $t2#lo, $b @ J = A3*B vext.8 $r#lo, $b, $b, #3 @ B3 veor $t1, $t1, $t3 @ M = G + H vmull.p8 $r, $a, $r#lo @ I = A*B3 veor $t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi @ t0 = (L) (P0 + P1) << 8 vand $t0#hi, $t0#hi, $k48 vext.8 $t3#lo, $b, $b, #4 @ B4 veor $t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi @ t1 = (M) (P2 + P3) << 16 vand $t1#hi, $t1#hi, $k32 vmull.p8 $t3, $a, $t3#lo @ K = A*B4 veor $t2, $t2, $r @ N = I + J veor $t0#lo, $t0#lo, $t0#hi veor $t1#lo, $t1#lo, $t1#hi veor $t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi @ t2 = (N) (P4 + P5) << 24 vand $t2#hi, $t2#hi, $k16 vext.8 $t0, $t0, $t0, #15 veor $t3#lo, $t3#lo, $t3#hi @ t3 = (K) (P6 + P7) << 32 vmov.i64 $t3#hi, #0 vext.8 $t1, $t1, $t1, #14 veor $t2#lo, $t2#lo, $t2#hi vmull.p8 $r, $a, $b @ D = A*B vext.8 $t3, $t3, $t3, #12 vext.8 $t2, $t2, $t2, #13 veor $t0, $t0, $t1 veor $t2, $t2, $t3 veor $r, $r, $t0 veor $r, $r, $t2 ___ } $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .global gcm_init_neon .type gcm_init_neon,%function .align 4 gcm_init_neon: vld1.64 $IN#hi,[r1]! @ load H vmov.i8 $t0,#0xe1 vld1.64 $IN#lo,[r1] vshl.i64 $t0#hi,#57 vshr.u64 $t0#lo,#63 @ t0=0xc2....01 vdup.8 $t1,$IN#hi[7] vshr.u64 $Hlo,$IN#lo,#63 vshr.s8 $t1,#7 @ broadcast carry bit vshl.i64 $IN,$IN,#1 vand $t0,$t0,$t1 vorr $IN#hi,$Hlo @ H<<<=1 veor $IN,$IN,$t0 @ twisted H vstmia r0,{$IN} ret @ bx lr .size gcm_init_neon,.-gcm_init_neon .global gcm_gmult_neon .type gcm_gmult_neon,%function .align 4 gcm_gmult_neon: vld1.64 $IN#hi,[$Xi]! @ load Xi vld1.64 $IN#lo,[$Xi]! vmov.i64 $k48,#0x0000ffffffffffff vldmia $Htbl,{$Hlo-$Hhi} @ load twisted H vmov.i64 $k32,#0x00000000ffffffff #ifdef __ARMEL__ vrev64.8 $IN,$IN #endif vmov.i64 $k16,#0x000000000000ffff veor $Hhl,$Hlo,$Hhi @ Karatsuba pre-processing mov $len,#16 b .Lgmult_neon .size gcm_gmult_neon,.-gcm_gmult_neon .global gcm_ghash_neon .type gcm_ghash_neon,%function .align 4 gcm_ghash_neon: vld1.64 $Xl#hi,[$Xi]! @ load Xi vld1.64 $Xl#lo,[$Xi]! vmov.i64 $k48,#0x0000ffffffffffff vldmia $Htbl,{$Hlo-$Hhi} @ load twisted H vmov.i64 $k32,#0x00000000ffffffff #ifdef __ARMEL__ vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl #endif vmov.i64 $k16,#0x000000000000ffff veor $Hhl,$Hlo,$Hhi @ Karatsuba pre-processing .Loop_neon: vld1.64 $IN#hi,[$inp]! @ load inp vld1.64 $IN#lo,[$inp]! #ifdef __ARMEL__ vrev64.8 $IN,$IN #endif veor $IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi .Lgmult_neon: ___ &clmul64x64 ($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo"); # H.lo·Xi.lo $code.=<<___; veor $IN#lo,$IN#lo,$IN#hi @ Karatsuba pre-processing ___ &clmul64x64 ($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo"); # (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi) &clmul64x64 ($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi"); # H.hi·Xi.hi $code.=<<___; veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xl @ Karatsuba post-processing veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xh veor $Xl#hi,$Xl#hi,$Xm#lo veor $Xh#lo,$Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xl - 256-bit result @ equivalent of reduction_avx from ghash-x86_64.pl vshl.i64 $t1,$Xl,#57 @ 1st phase vshl.i64 $t2,$Xl,#62 veor $t2,$t2,$t1 @ vshl.i64 $t1,$Xl,#63 veor $t2, $t2, $t1 @ veor $Xl#hi,$Xl#hi,$t2#lo @ veor $Xh#lo,$Xh#lo,$t2#hi vshr.u64 $t2,$Xl,#1 @ 2nd phase veor $Xh,$Xh,$Xl veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 @ vshr.u64 $t2,$t2,#6 vshr.u64 $Xl,$Xl,#1 @ veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xh @ veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 @ subs $len,#16 bne .Loop_neon #ifdef __ARMEL__ vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl #endif sub $Xi,#16 vst1.64 $Xl#hi,[$Xi]! @ write out Xi vst1.64 $Xl#lo,[$Xi] ret @ bx lr .size gcm_ghash_neon,.-gcm_ghash_neon #endif ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "GHASH for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo or s/\bret\b/bx lr/go or s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl0000644000000000000000000004057513176625657020213 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # April 2010 # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it # uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. On PA-7100LC # it processes one byte in 19.6 cycles, which is more than twice as # fast as code generated by gcc 3.2. PA-RISC 2.0 loop is scheduled for # 8 cycles, but measured performance on PA-8600 system is ~9 cycles per # processed byte. This is ~2.2x faster than 64-bit code generated by # vendor compiler (which used to be very hard to beat:-). # # Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $FRAME_MARKER =80; $SAVED_RP =16; $PUSH ="std"; $PUSHMA ="std,ma"; $POP ="ldd"; $POPMB ="ldd,mb"; $NREGS =6; } else { $LEVEL ="1.0"; #"\n\t.ALLOW\t2.0"; $SIZE_T =4; $FRAME_MARKER =48; $SAVED_RP =20; $PUSH ="stw"; $PUSHMA ="stwm"; $POP ="ldw"; $POPMB ="ldwm"; $NREGS =11; } $FRAME=10*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# NREGS saved regs + frame marker # [+ argument transfer] ################# volatile registers $Xi="%r26"; # argument block $Htbl="%r25"; $inp="%r24"; $len="%r23"; $Hhh=$Htbl; # variables $Hll="%r22"; $Zhh="%r21"; $Zll="%r20"; $cnt="%r19"; $rem_4bit="%r28"; $rem="%r29"; $mask0xf0="%r31"; ################# preserved registers $Thh="%r1"; $Tll="%r2"; $nlo="%r3"; $nhi="%r4"; $byte="%r5"; if ($SIZE_T==4) { $Zhl="%r6"; $Zlh="%r7"; $Hhl="%r8"; $Hlh="%r9"; $Thl="%r10"; $Tlh="%r11"; } $rem2="%r6"; # used in PA-RISC 2.0 code $code.=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .EXPORT gcm_gmult_4bit,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR .ALIGN 64 gcm_gmult_4bit .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-10*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=$NREGS .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ___ $code.=<<___; blr %r0,$rem_4bit ldi 3,$rem L\$pic_gmult andcm $rem_4bit,$rem,$rem_4bit addl $inp,$len,$len ldo L\$rem_4bit-L\$pic_gmult($rem_4bit),$rem_4bit ldi 0xf0,$mask0xf0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); ldi 31,$rem mtctl $rem,%cr11 extrd,u,*= $rem,%sar,1,$rem ; executes on PA-RISC 1.0 b L\$parisc1_gmult nop ___ $code.=<<___; ldb 15($Xi),$nlo ldo 8($Htbl),$Hll and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi depd,z $nlo,59,4,$nlo ldd $nlo($Hll),$Zll ldd $nlo($Hhh),$Zhh depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldb 14($Xi),$nlo ldd $nhi($Hll),$Tll ldd $nhi($Hhh),$Thh and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi depd,z $nlo,59,4,$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem b L\$oop_gmult_pa2 ldi 13,$cnt .ALIGN 8 L\$oop_gmult_pa2 xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh ; moved here to work around gas bug depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldd $nlo($Hll),$Tll ldd $nlo($Hhh),$Thh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem ldbx $cnt($Xi),$nlo shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldd $nhi($Hll),$Tll ldd $nhi($Hhh),$Thh and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi depd,z $nlo,59,4,$nlo ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_gmult_pa2 xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldd $nlo($Hll),$Tll ldd $nlo($Hhh),$Thh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldd $nhi($Hll),$Tll ldd $nhi($Hhh),$Thh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh std $Zll,8($Xi) std $Zhh,0($Xi) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); b L\$done_gmult nop L\$parisc1_gmult ldb 15($Xi),$nlo ldo 12($Htbl),$Hll ldo 8($Htbl),$Hlh ldo 4($Htbl),$Hhl and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi zdep $nlo,27,4,$nlo ldwx $nlo($Hll),$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hlh),$Zlh ldwx $nlo($Hhl),$Zhl ldwx $nlo($Hhh),$Zhh zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldb 14($Xi),$nlo ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $nhi($Hll),$Tll shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh ldwx $nhi($Hlh),$Tlh shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl ldwx $nhi($Hhl),$Thl extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh ldwx $nhi($Hhh),$Thh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi zdep $nlo,27,4,$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hll),$Tll xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nlo($Hlh),$Tlh xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl b L\$oop_gmult_pa1 ldi 13,$cnt .ALIGN 8 L\$oop_gmult_pa1 zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldwx $nlo($Hhl),$Thl xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hhh),$Thh shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh ldbx $cnt($Xi),$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nhi($Hll),$Tll shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nhi($Hlh),$Tlh extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl ldwx $nhi($Hhl),$Thl xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $nhi($Hhh),$Thh shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh zdep $nlo,27,4,$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hll),$Tll xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nlo($Hlh),$Tlh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_gmult_pa1 xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldwx $nlo($Hhl),$Thl xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hhh),$Thh shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nhi($Hll),$Tll shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nhi($Hlh),$Tlh extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl ldwx $nhi($Hhl),$Thl xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $nhi($Hhh),$Thh zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh stw $Zll,12($Xi) xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl stw $Zlh,8($Xi) xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh stw $Zhl,4($Xi) stw $Zhh,0($Xi) ___ $code.=<<___; L\$done_gmult $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11 ___ $code.=<<___; bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .EXPORT gcm_ghash_4bit,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR,ARGW3=GR .ALIGN 64 gcm_ghash_4bit .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-10*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=11 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ___ $code.=<<___; blr %r0,$rem_4bit ldi 3,$rem L\$pic_ghash andcm $rem_4bit,$rem,$rem_4bit addl $inp,$len,$len ldo L\$rem_4bit-L\$pic_ghash($rem_4bit),$rem_4bit ldi 0xf0,$mask0xf0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); ldi 31,$rem mtctl $rem,%cr11 extrd,u,*= $rem,%sar,1,$rem ; executes on PA-RISC 1.0 b L\$parisc1_ghash nop ___ $code.=<<___; ldb 15($Xi),$nlo ldo 8($Htbl),$Hll L\$outer_ghash_pa2 ldb 15($inp),$nhi xor $nhi,$nlo,$nlo and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi depd,z $nlo,59,4,$nlo ldd $nlo($Hll),$Zll ldd $nlo($Hhh),$Zhh depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldb 14($Xi),$nlo ldb 14($inp),$byte ldd $nhi($Hll),$Tll ldd $nhi($Hhh),$Thh xor $byte,$nlo,$nlo and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi depd,z $nlo,59,4,$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem b L\$oop_ghash_pa2 ldi 13,$cnt .ALIGN 8 L\$oop_ghash_pa2 xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh ; moved here to work around gas bug depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem2 shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldd $nlo($Hll),$Tll ldd $nlo($Hhh),$Thh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldbx $cnt($Xi),$nlo ldbx $cnt($inp),$byte depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldd $rem2($rem_4bit),$rem2 xor $rem2,$Zhh,$Zhh xor $byte,$nlo,$nlo ldd $nhi($Hll),$Tll ldd $nhi($Hhh),$Thh and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi depd,z $nlo,59,4,$nlo extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_ghash_pa2 xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem2 shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh ldd $nlo($Hll),$Tll ldd $nlo($Hhh),$Thh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh depd,z $Zll,60,4,$rem shrpd $Zhh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldd $rem2($rem_4bit),$rem2 xor $rem2,$Zhh,$Zhh ldd $nhi($Hll),$Tll ldd $nhi($Hhh),$Thh extrd,u $Zhh,59,60,$Zhh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldd $rem($rem_4bit),$rem xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh std $Zll,8($Xi) ldo 16($inp),$inp std $Zhh,0($Xi) cmpb,*<> $inp,$len,L\$outer_ghash_pa2 copy $Zll,$nlo ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); b L\$done_ghash nop L\$parisc1_ghash ldb 15($Xi),$nlo ldo 12($Htbl),$Hll ldo 8($Htbl),$Hlh ldo 4($Htbl),$Hhl L\$outer_ghash_pa1 ldb 15($inp),$byte xor $byte,$nlo,$nlo and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi zdep $nlo,27,4,$nlo ldwx $nlo($Hll),$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hlh),$Zlh ldwx $nlo($Hhl),$Zhl ldwx $nlo($Hhh),$Zhh zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldb 14($Xi),$nlo ldb 14($inp),$byte ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $nhi($Hll),$Tll shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh ldwx $nhi($Hlh),$Tlh shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl ldwx $nhi($Hhl),$Thl extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh ldwx $nhi($Hhh),$Thh xor $byte,$nlo,$nlo xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi zdep $nlo,27,4,$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hll),$Tll xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nlo($Hlh),$Tlh xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl b L\$oop_ghash_pa1 ldi 13,$cnt .ALIGN 8 L\$oop_ghash_pa1 zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldwx $nlo($Hhl),$Thl xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hhh),$Thh shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh ldbx $cnt($Xi),$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nhi($Hll),$Tll shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl ldbx $cnt($inp),$byte xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nhi($Hlh),$Tlh extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl ldwx $nhi($Hhl),$Thl xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $nhi($Hhh),$Thh shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh xor $byte,$nlo,$nlo shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl and $mask0xf0,$nlo,$nhi extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh zdep $nlo,27,4,$nlo xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hll),$Tll xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nlo($Hlh),$Tlh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh addib,uv -1,$cnt,L\$oop_ghash_pa1 xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldwx $nlo($Hhl),$Thl xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll ldwx $nlo($Hhh),$Thh shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll ldwx $nhi($Hll),$Tll shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh ldwx $nhi($Hlh),$Tlh extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl ldwx $nhi($Hhl),$Thl xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh ldwx $nhi($Hhh),$Thh zdep $Zll,28,4,$rem ldwx $rem($rem_4bit),$rem shrpw $Zlh,$Zll,4,$Zll shrpw $Zhl,$Zlh,4,$Zlh shrpw $Zhh,$Zhl,4,$Zhl extru $Zhh,27,28,$Zhh xor $Tll,$Zll,$Zll xor $Tlh,$Zlh,$Zlh xor $rem,$Zhh,$Zhh stw $Zll,12($Xi) xor $Thl,$Zhl,$Zhl stw $Zlh,8($Xi) xor $Thh,$Zhh,$Zhh stw $Zhl,4($Xi) ldo 16($inp),$inp stw $Zhh,0($Xi) comb,<> $inp,$len,L\$outer_ghash_pa1 copy $Zll,$nlo ___ $code.=<<___; L\$done_ghash $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4); $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11 ___ $code.=<<___; bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .ALIGN 64 L\$rem_4bit .WORD `0x0000<<16`,0,`0x1C20<<16`,0,`0x3840<<16`,0,`0x2460<<16`,0 .WORD `0x7080<<16`,0,`0x6CA0<<16`,0,`0x48C0<<16`,0,`0x54E0<<16`,0 .WORD `0xE100<<16`,0,`0xFD20<<16`,0,`0xD940<<16`,0,`0xC560<<16`,0 .WORD `0x9180<<16`,0,`0x8DA0<<16`,0,`0xA9C0<<16`,0,`0xB5E0<<16`,0 .STRINGZ "GHASH for PA-RISC, GRYPTOGAMS by " .ALIGN 64 ___ # Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so # that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I # wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0 # directive... my $ldd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 4 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(3<<6)|$3; sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 5 { my $opcode=(0x03<<26)|($2<<21)|(1<<12)|(3<<6)|$3; $opcode|=(($1&0xF)<<17)|(($1&0x10)<<12); # encode offset $opcode|=(1<<5) if ($mod =~ /^,m/); $opcode|=(1<<13) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $std = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "std$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 3 suffices { my $opcode=(0x1c<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(($2&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($2>>13)&1); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $extrd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args"; # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded... if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 15 { my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16); my $len=32-$3; $opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5); # encode pos $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f); # encode len sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 12 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9); my $len=32-$2; $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f); # encode len $opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $shrpd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 14 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4; my $cpos=63-$3; $opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5); # encode sa sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%sar,%r([0-9]+)/) # format 11 { sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s", (0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<9)|$3,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $depd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "depd$mod\t$args"; # I only have ",z" completer, it's impicitly encoded... if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 16 { my $opcode=(0x3c<<26)|($4<<21)|($1<<16); my $cpos=63-$2; my $len=32-$3; $opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5); # encode pos $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f); # encode len sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; sub assemble { my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_; my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic"); ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args"; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; if ($SIZE_T==4) { s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e; s/cmpb,\*/comb,/; s/,\*/,/; } s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8); print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl0000644000000000000000000012123713176625657017352 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # March, May, June 2010 # # The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying # single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it # uses 256 bytes per-key table [+64/128 bytes fixed table]. It has two # code paths: vanilla x86 and vanilla SSE. Former will be executed on # 486 and Pentium, latter on all others. SSE GHASH features so called # "528B" variant of "4-bit" method utilizing additional 256+16 bytes # of per-key storage [+512 bytes shared table]. Performance results # are for streamed GHASH subroutine and are expressed in cycles per # processed byte, less is better: # # gcc 2.95.3(*) SSE assembler x86 assembler # # Pentium 105/111(**) - 50 # PIII 68 /75 12.2 24 # P4 125/125 17.8 84(***) # Opteron 66 /70 10.1 30 # Core2 54 /67 8.4 18 # Atom 105/105 16.8 53 # VIA Nano 69 /71 13.0 27 # # (*) gcc 3.4.x was observed to generate few percent slower code, # which is one of reasons why 2.95.3 results were chosen, # another reason is lack of 3.4.x results for older CPUs; # comparison with SSE results is not completely fair, because C # results are for vanilla "256B" implementation, while # assembler results are for "528B";-) # (**) second number is result for code compiled with -fPIC flag, # which is actually more relevant, because assembler code is # position-independent; # (***) see comment in non-MMX routine for further details; # # To summarize, it's >2-5 times faster than gcc-generated code. To # anchor it to something else SHA1 assembler processes one byte in # ~7 cycles on contemporary x86 cores. As for choice of MMX/SSE # in particular, see comment at the end of the file... # May 2010 # # Add PCLMULQDQ version performing at 2.10 cycles per processed byte. # The question is how close is it to theoretical limit? The pclmulqdq # instruction latency appears to be 14 cycles and there can't be more # than 2 of them executing at any given time. This means that single # Karatsuba multiplication would take 28 cycles *plus* few cycles for # pre- and post-processing. Then multiplication has to be followed by # modulo-reduction. Given that aggregated reduction method [see # "Carry-less Multiplication and Its Usage for Computing the GCM Mode" # white paper by Intel] allows you to perform reduction only once in # a while we can assume that asymptotic performance can be estimated # as (28+Tmod/Naggr)/16, where Tmod is time to perform reduction # and Naggr is the aggregation factor. # # Before we proceed to this implementation let's have closer look at # the best-performing code suggested by Intel in their white paper. # By tracing inter-register dependencies Tmod is estimated as ~19 # cycles and Naggr chosen by Intel is 4, resulting in 2.05 cycles per # processed byte. As implied, this is quite optimistic estimate, # because it does not account for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing, # which for a single multiplication is ~5 cycles. Unfortunately Intel # does not provide performance data for GHASH alone. But benchmarking # AES_GCM_encrypt ripped out of Fig. 15 of the white paper with aadt # alone resulted in 2.46 cycles per byte of out 16KB buffer. Note that # the result accounts even for pre-computing of degrees of the hash # key H, but its portion is negligible at 16KB buffer size. # # Moving on to the implementation in question. Tmod is estimated as # ~13 cycles and Naggr is 2, giving asymptotic performance of ... # 2.16. How is it possible that measured performance is better than # optimistic theoretical estimate? There is one thing Intel failed # to recognize. By serializing GHASH with CTR in same subroutine # former's performance is really limited to above (Tmul + Tmod/Naggr) # equation. But if GHASH procedure is detached, the modulo-reduction # can be interleaved with Naggr-1 multiplications at instruction level # and under ideal conditions even disappear from the equation. So that # optimistic theoretical estimate for this implementation is ... # 28/16=1.75, and not 2.16. Well, it's probably way too optimistic, # at least for such small Naggr. I'd argue that (28+Tproc/Naggr), # where Tproc is time required for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing, # is more realistic estimate. In this case it gives ... 1.91 cycles. # Or in other words, depending on how well we can interleave reduction # and one of the two multiplications the performance should be between # 1.91 and 2.16. As already mentioned, this implementation processes # one byte out of 8KB buffer in 2.10 cycles, while x86_64 counterpart # - in 2.02. x86_64 performance is better, because larger register # bank allows to interleave reduction and multiplication better. # # Does it make sense to increase Naggr? To start with it's virtually # impossible in 32-bit mode, because of limited register bank # capacity. Otherwise improvement has to be weighed agiainst slower # setup, as well as code size and complexity increase. As even # optimistic estimate doesn't promise 30% performance improvement, # there are currently no plans to increase Naggr. # # Special thanks to David Woodhouse for # providing access to a Westmere-based system on behalf of Intel # Open Source Technology Centre. # January 2010 # # Tweaked to optimize transitions between integer and FP operations # on same XMM register, PCLMULQDQ subroutine was measured to process # one byte in 2.07 cycles on Sandy Bridge, and in 2.12 - on Westmere. # The minor regression on Westmere is outweighed by ~15% improvement # on Sandy Bridge. Strangely enough attempt to modify 64-bit code in # similar manner resulted in almost 20% degradation on Sandy Bridge, # where original 64-bit code processes one byte in 1.95 cycles. ##################################################################### # For reference, AMD Bulldozer processes one byte in 1.98 cycles in # 32-bit mode and 1.89 in 64-bit. # February 2013 # # Overhaul: aggregate Karatsuba post-processing, improve ILP in # reduction_alg9. Resulting performance is 1.96 cycles per byte on # Westmere, 1.95 - on Sandy/Ivy Bridge, 1.76 - on Bulldozer. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"ghash-x86.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $sse2=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } ($Zhh,$Zhl,$Zlh,$Zll) = ("ebp","edx","ecx","ebx"); $inp = "edi"; $Htbl = "esi"; $unroll = 0; # Affects x86 loop. Folded loop performs ~7% worse # than unrolled, which has to be weighted against # 2.5x x86-specific code size reduction. sub x86_loop { my $off = shift; my $rem = "eax"; &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$Zll)); &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$Zll)); &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$Zll)); &mov ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$Zll)); &xor ($rem,$rem); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII # shrd practically kills P4, 2.5x deterioration, but P4 has # MMX code-path to execute. shrd runs tad faster [than twice # the shifts, move's and or's] on pre-MMX Pentium (as well as # PIII and Core2), *but* minimizes code size, spares register # and thus allows to fold the loop... if (!$unroll) { my $cnt = $inp; &mov ($cnt,15); &jmp (&label("x86_loop")); &set_label("x86_loop",16); for($i=1;$i<=2;$i++) { &mov (&LB($rem),&LB($Zll)); &shrd ($Zll,$Zlh,4); &and (&LB($rem),0xf); &shrd ($Zlh,$Zhl,4); &shrd ($Zhl,$Zhh,4); &shr ($Zhh,4); &xor ($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4)); &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off,"esp",$cnt)); if ($i&1) { &and (&LB($rem),0xf0); } else { &shl (&LB($rem),4); } &xor ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem)); &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem)); &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem)); &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem)); if ($i&1) { &dec ($cnt); &js (&label("x86_break")); } else { &jmp (&label("x86_loop")); } } &set_label("x86_break",16); } else { for($i=1;$i<32;$i++) { &comment($i); &mov (&LB($rem),&LB($Zll)); &shrd ($Zll,$Zlh,4); &and (&LB($rem),0xf); &shrd ($Zlh,$Zhl,4); &shrd ($Zhl,$Zhh,4); &shr ($Zhh,4); &xor ($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4)); if ($i&1) { &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp")); &and (&LB($rem),0xf0); } else { &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp")); &shl (&LB($rem),4); } &xor ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem)); &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem)); &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem)); &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem)); } } &bswap ($Zll); &bswap ($Zlh); &bswap ($Zhl); if (!$x86only) { &bswap ($Zhh); } else { &mov ("eax",$Zhh); &bswap ("eax"); &mov ($Zhh,"eax"); } } if ($unroll) { &function_begin_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner"); &x86_loop(4); &ret (); &function_end_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner"); } sub deposit_rem_4bit { my $bias = shift; &mov (&DWP($bias+0, "esp"),0x0000<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+4, "esp"),0x1C20<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+8, "esp"),0x3840<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+12,"esp"),0x2460<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+16,"esp"),0x7080<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+20,"esp"),0x6CA0<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+24,"esp"),0x48C0<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+28,"esp"),0x54E0<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+32,"esp"),0xE100<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+36,"esp"),0xFD20<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+40,"esp"),0xD940<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+44,"esp"),0xC560<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+48,"esp"),0x9180<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+52,"esp"),0x8DA0<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+56,"esp"),0xA9C0<<16); &mov (&DWP($bias+60,"esp"),0xB5E0<<16); } $suffix = $x86only ? "" : "_x86"; &function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix); &stack_push(16+4+1); # +1 for stack alignment &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp)); # load Xi[16] &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp)); &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp)); &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp)); &deposit_rem_4bit(16); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh); # copy Xi[16] on stack &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll); &shr ($Zll,20); &and ($Zll,0xf0); if ($unroll) { &call ("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner"); } else { &x86_loop(0); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); } &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll); &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh); &stack_pop(16+4+1); &function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix); &function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix); &stack_push(16+4+1); # +1 for 64-bit alignment &mov ($Zll,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load in &mov ("ecx",&wparam(3)); # load len &add ("ecx",$inp); &mov (&wparam(3),"ecx"); &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zll)); # load Xi[16] &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zll)); &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zll)); &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zll)); &deposit_rem_4bit(16); &set_label("x86_outer_loop",16); &xor ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp)); # xor with input &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp)); &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp)); &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp)); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll); # dump it on stack &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh); &shr ($Zll,20); &and ($Zll,0xf0); if ($unroll) { &call ("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner"); } else { &x86_loop(0); &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); } &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); &cmp ($inp,&wparam(3)); &mov (&wparam(2),$inp) if (!$unroll); &jb (&label("x86_outer_loop")); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll); &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh); &stack_pop(16+4+1); &function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix); if (!$x86only) {{{ &static_label("rem_4bit"); if (!$sse2) {{ # pure-MMX "May" version... $S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit &function_begin_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner"); # MMX version performs 3.5 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX # routine for further details), 100% better on Opteron, ~70% better # on Core2 and PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well # spent... Since initial release the loop was unrolled in order to # "liberate" register previously used as loop counter. Instead it's # used to optimize critical path in 'Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[Z.lo&0xf]'. # The path involves move of Z.lo from MMX to integer register, # effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi. # Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4 # rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement # on contemporary µ-archs. { my $cnt; my $rem_4bit = "eax"; my @rem = ($Zhh,$Zll); my $nhi = $Zhl; my $nlo = $Zlh; my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1"); my $tmp = "mm2"; &xor ($nlo,$nlo); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII &mov ($nhi,$Zll); &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi)); &shl (&LB($nlo),4); &and ($nhi,0xf0); &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo)); &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo)); &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo); for ($cnt=28;$cnt>=-2;$cnt--) { my $odd = $cnt&1; my $nix = $odd ? $nlo : $nhi; &shl (&LB($nlo),4) if ($odd); &psrlq ($Zlo,4); &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,4); &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nix)); &mov (&LB($nlo),&BP($cnt/2,$inp)) if (!$odd && $cnt>=0); &psllq ($tmp,60); &and ($nhi,0xf0) if ($odd); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8)) if ($cnt<28); &and ($rem[0],0xf); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nix)); &mov ($nhi,$nlo) if (!$odd && $cnt>=0); &movd ($rem[1],$Zlo); &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers } &mov ($inp,&DWP(4,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8)); # last rem_4bit[rem] &psrlq ($Zlo,32); # lower part of Zlo is already there &movd ($Zhl,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,32); &movd ($Zlh,$Zlo); &movd ($Zhh,$Zhi); &shl ($inp,4); # compensate for rem_4bit[i] being >>4 &bswap ($Zll); &bswap ($Zhl); &bswap ($Zlh); &xor ($Zhh,$inp); &bswap ($Zhh); &ret (); } &function_end_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner"); &function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("eax"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax")); &movz ($Zll,&BP(15,$inp)); &call ("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &emms (); &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll); &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh); &function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx"); # Streamed version performs 20% better on P4, 7% on Opteron, # 10% on Core2 and PIII... &function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx"); &mov ($Zhh,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load in &mov ($Zlh,&wparam(3)); # load len &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("eax"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax")); &add ($Zlh,$inp); &mov (&wparam(3),$Zlh); # len to point at the end of input &stack_push(4+1); # +1 for stack alignment &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zhh)); # load Xi[16] &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zhh)); &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zhh)); &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zhh)); &jmp (&label("mmx_outer_loop")); &set_label("mmx_outer_loop",16); &xor ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp)); &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp)); &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp)); &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp)); &mov (&wparam(2),$inp); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh); &mov ($inp,"esp"); &shr ($Zll,24); &call ("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp)); &cmp ($inp,&wparam(3)); &jb (&label("mmx_outer_loop")); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &emms (); &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll); &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh); &stack_pop(4+1); &function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx"); }} else {{ # "June" MMX version... # ... has slower "April" gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx with folded # loop. This is done to conserve code size... $S=16; # shift factor for rem_4bit sub mmx_loop() { # MMX version performs 2.8 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX # routine for further details), 40% better on Opteron and Core2, 50% # better on PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well # spent... my $inp = shift; my $rem_4bit = shift; my $cnt = $Zhh; my $nhi = $Zhl; my $nlo = $Zlh; my $rem = $Zll; my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1"); my $tmp = "mm2"; &xor ($nlo,$nlo); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII &mov ($nhi,$Zll); &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi)); &mov ($cnt,14); &shl (&LB($nlo),4); &and ($nhi,0xf0); &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo)); &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo)); &movd ($rem,$Zlo); &jmp (&label("mmx_loop")); &set_label("mmx_loop",16); &psrlq ($Zlo,4); &and ($rem,0xf); &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,4); &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi)); &mov (&LB($nlo),&BP(0,$inp,$cnt)); &psllq ($tmp,60); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8)); &dec ($cnt); &movd ($rem,$Zlo); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi)); &mov ($nhi,$nlo); &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); &js (&label("mmx_break")); &shl (&LB($nlo),4); &and ($rem,0xf); &psrlq ($Zlo,4); &and ($nhi,0xf0); &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,4); &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo)); &psllq ($tmp,60); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8)); &movd ($rem,$Zlo); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo)); &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); &jmp (&label("mmx_loop")); &set_label("mmx_break",16); &shl (&LB($nlo),4); &and ($rem,0xf); &psrlq ($Zlo,4); &and ($nhi,0xf0); &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,4); &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo)); &psllq ($tmp,60); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8)); &movd ($rem,$Zlo); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo)); &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); &psrlq ($Zlo,4); &and ($rem,0xf); &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,4); &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi)); &psllq ($tmp,60); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8)); &movd ($rem,$Zlo); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi)); &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); &psrlq ($Zlo,32); # lower part of Zlo is already there &movd ($Zhl,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,32); &movd ($Zlh,$Zlo); &movd ($Zhh,$Zhi); &bswap ($Zll); &bswap ($Zhl); &bswap ($Zlh); &bswap ($Zhh); } &function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("eax"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax")); &movz ($Zll,&BP(15,$inp)); &mmx_loop($inp,"eax"); &emms (); &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll); &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl); &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh); &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh); &function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx"); ###################################################################### # Below subroutine is "528B" variant of "4-bit" GCM GHASH function # (see gcm128.c for details). It provides further 20-40% performance # improvement over above mentioned "May" version. &static_label("rem_8bit"); &function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx"); { my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm7","mm6"); my $rem_8bit = "esi"; my $Htbl = "ebx"; # parameter block &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); # Xi &mov ("ebx",&wparam(1)); # Htable &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # inp &mov ("edx",&wparam(3)); # len &mov ("ebp","esp"); # original %esp &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label ("pic_point"); &blindpop ($rem_8bit); &lea ($rem_8bit,&DWP(&label("rem_8bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),$rem_8bit)); &sub ("esp",512+16+16); # allocate stack frame... &and ("esp",-64); # ...and align it &sub ("esp",16); # place for (u8)(H[]<<4) &add ("edx","ecx"); # pointer to the end of input &mov (&DWP(528+16+0,"esp"),"eax"); # save Xi &mov (&DWP(528+16+8,"esp"),"edx"); # save inp+len &mov (&DWP(528+16+12,"esp"),"ebp"); # save original %esp { my @lo = ("mm0","mm1","mm2"); my @hi = ("mm3","mm4","mm5"); my @tmp = ("mm6","mm7"); my ($off1,$off2,$i) = (0,0,); &add ($Htbl,128); # optimize for size &lea ("edi",&DWP(16+128,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(16+256+128,"esp")); # decompose Htable (low and high parts are kept separately), # generate Htable[]>>4, (u8)(Htable[]<<4), save to stack... for ($i=0;$i<18;$i++) { &mov ("edx",&DWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16); &movq ($lo[0],&QWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16); &psllq ($tmp[1],60) if ($i>1); &movq ($hi[0],&QWP(16*$i+0-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16); &por ($lo[2],$tmp[1]) if ($i>1); &movq (&QWP($off1-128,"edi"),$lo[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &psrlq ($lo[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &movq (&QWP($off1,"edi"),$hi[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &movq ($tmp[0],$hi[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &movq (&QWP($off2-128,"ebp"),$lo[2]) if ($i>1); &psrlq ($hi[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17); &movq (&QWP($off2,"ebp"),$hi[2]) if ($i>1); &shl ("edx",4) if ($i<16); &mov (&BP($i,"esp"),&LB("edx")) if ($i<16); unshift (@lo,pop(@lo)); # "rotate" registers unshift (@hi,pop(@hi)); unshift (@tmp,pop(@tmp)); $off1 += 8 if ($i>0); $off2 += 8 if ($i>1); } } &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,"eax")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(8,"eax")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"eax")); # load Xi &set_label("outer",16); { my $nlo = "eax"; my $dat = "edx"; my @nhi = ("edi","ebp"); my @rem = ("ebx","ecx"); my @red = ("mm0","mm1","mm2"); my $tmp = "mm3"; &xor ($dat,&DWP(12,"ecx")); # merge input data &xor ("ebx",&DWP(8,"ecx")); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,"ecx")); &lea ("ecx",&DWP(16,"ecx")); # inp+=16 #&mov (&DWP(528+12,"esp"),$dat); # save inp^Xi &mov (&DWP(528+8,"esp"),"ebx"); &movq (&QWP(528+0,"esp"),$Zhi); &mov (&DWP(528+16+4,"esp"),"ecx"); # save inp &xor ($nlo,$nlo); &rol ($dat,8); &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat)); &mov ($nhi[1],$nlo); &and (&LB($nlo),0x0f); &shr ($nhi[1],4); &pxor ($red[0],$red[0]); &rol ($dat,8); # next byte &pxor ($red[1],$red[1]); &pxor ($red[2],$red[2]); # Just like in "May" version modulo-schedule for critical path in # 'Z.hi ^= rem_8bit[Z.lo&0xff^((u8)H[nhi]<<4)]<<48'. Final 'pxor' # is scheduled so late that rem_8bit[] has to be shifted *right* # by 16, which is why last argument to pinsrw is 2, which # corresponds to <<32=<<48>>16... for ($j=11,$i=0;$i<15;$i++) { if ($i>0) { &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8)); # Z^=H[nlo] &rol ($dat,8); # next byte &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8)); &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8)); &xor (&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0])); # rem^(H[nhi]<<4) } else { &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8)); &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8)); } &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat)); &mov ($dat,&DWP(528+$j,"esp")) if (--$j%4==0); &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo); &movz ($rem[1],&LB($rem[1])) if ($i>0); &psrlq ($Zlo,8); # Z>>=8 &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); &mov ($nhi[0],$nlo); &psrlq ($Zhi,8); &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16+256+0,"esp",$nhi[1],8)); # Z^=H[nhi]>>4 &and (&LB($nlo),0x0f); &psllq ($tmp,56); &pxor ($Zhi,$red[1]) if ($i>1); &shr ($nhi[0],4); &pinsrw ($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2) if ($i>0); unshift (@red,pop(@red)); # "rotate" registers unshift (@rem,pop(@rem)); unshift (@nhi,pop(@nhi)); } &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8)); # Z^=H[nlo] &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8)); &xor (&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0])); # rem^(H[nhi]<<4) &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8)); &movz ($rem[1],&LB($rem[1])); &pxor ($red[2],$red[2]); # clear 2nd word &psllq ($red[1],4); &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo); &psrlq ($Zlo,4); # Z>>=4 &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); &psrlq ($Zhi,4); &shl ($rem[0],4); # rem<<4 &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nhi[1],8)); # Z^=H[nhi] &psllq ($tmp,60); &movz ($rem[0],&LB($rem[0])); &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp); &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nhi[1],8)); &pinsrw ($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2); &pxor ($Zhi,$red[1]); &movd ($dat,$Zlo); &pinsrw ($red[2],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[0],2),3); # last is <<48 &psllq ($red[0],12); # correct by <<16>>4 &pxor ($Zhi,$red[0]); &psrlq ($Zlo,32); &pxor ($Zhi,$red[2]); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(528+16+4,"esp")); # restore inp &movd ("ebx",$Zlo); &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); # 01234567 &psllw ($Zhi,8); # 1.3.5.7. &psrlw ($tmp,8); # .0.2.4.6 &por ($Zhi,$tmp); # 10325476 &bswap ($dat); &pshufw ($Zhi,$Zhi,0b00011011); # 76543210 &bswap ("ebx"); &cmp ("ecx",&DWP(528+16+8,"esp")); # are we done? &jne (&label("outer")); } &mov ("eax",&DWP(528+16+0,"esp")); # restore Xi &mov (&DWP(12,"eax"),"edx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"eax"),"ebx"); &movq (&QWP(0,"eax"),$Zhi); &mov ("esp",&DWP(528+16+12,"esp")); # restore original %esp &emms (); } &function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx"); }} if ($sse2) {{ ###################################################################### # PCLMULQDQ version. $Xip="eax"; $Htbl="edx"; $const="ecx"; $inp="esi"; $len="ebx"; ($Xi,$Xhi)=("xmm0","xmm1"); $Hkey="xmm2"; ($T1,$T2,$T3)=("xmm3","xmm4","xmm5"); ($Xn,$Xhn)=("xmm6","xmm7"); &static_label("bswap"); sub clmul64x64_T2 { # minimal "register" pressure my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$HK)=@_; &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi); # &pshufd ($T1,$Xi,0b01001110); &pshufd ($T2,$Hkey,0b01001110) if (!defined($HK)); &pxor ($T1,$Xi); # &pxor ($T2,$Hkey) if (!defined($HK)); $HK=$T2 if (!defined($HK)); &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); ####### &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); ####### &pclmulqdq ($T1,$HK,0x00); ####### &xorps ($T1,$Xi); # &xorps ($T1,$Xhi); # &movdqa ($T2,$T1); # &psrldq ($T1,8); &pslldq ($T2,8); # &pxor ($Xhi,$T1); &pxor ($Xi,$T2); # } sub clmul64x64_T3 { # Even though this subroutine offers visually better ILP, it # was empirically found to be a tad slower than above version. # At least in gcm_ghash_clmul context. But it's just as well, # because loop modulo-scheduling is possible only thanks to # minimized "register" pressure... my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey)=@_; &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); # &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi); &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); ####### &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); ####### &pshufd ($T2,$T1,0b01001110); # &pshufd ($T3,$Hkey,0b01001110); &pxor ($T2,$T1); # &pxor ($T3,$Hkey); &pclmulqdq ($T2,$T3,0x00); ####### &pxor ($T2,$Xi); # &pxor ($T2,$Xhi); # &movdqa ($T3,$T2); # &psrldq ($T2,8); &pslldq ($T3,8); # &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); &pxor ($Xi,$T3); # } if (1) { # Algorithm 9 with <<1 twist. # Reduction is shorter and uses only two # temporary registers, which makes it better # candidate for interleaving with 64x64 # multiplication. Pre-modulo-scheduled loop # was found to be ~20% faster than Algorithm 5 # below. Algorithm 9 was therefore chosen for # further optimization... sub reduction_alg9 { # 17/11 times faster than Intel version my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_; # 1st phase &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); # &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); &psllq ($Xi,5); &pxor ($T1,$Xi); # &psllq ($Xi,1); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # &psllq ($Xi,57); # &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); # &pslldq ($Xi,8); &psrldq ($T1,8); # &pxor ($Xi,$T2); &pxor ($Xhi,$T1); # # 2nd phase &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); &psrlq ($Xi,1); &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); # &pxor ($T2,$Xi); &psrlq ($Xi,5); &pxor ($Xi,$T2); # &psrlq ($Xi,1); # &pxor ($Xi,$Xhi) # } &function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul"); &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(0)); &mov ($Xip,&wparam(1)); &call (&label("pic")); &set_label("pic"); &blindpop ($const); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const)); &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip)); &pshufd ($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap # <<1 twist &pshufd ($T2,$Hkey,0b11111111); # broadcast uppermost dword &movdqa ($T1,$Hkey); &psllq ($Hkey,1); &pxor ($T3,$T3); # &psrlq ($T1,63); &pcmpgtd ($T3,$T2); # broadcast carry bit &pslldq ($T1,8); &por ($Hkey,$T1); # H<<=1 # magic reduction &pand ($T3,&QWP(16,$const)); # 0x1c2_polynomial &pxor ($Hkey,$T3); # if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial # calculate H^2 &movdqa ($Xi,$Hkey); &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); &pshufd ($T1,$Hkey,0b01001110); &pshufd ($T2,$Xi,0b01001110); &pxor ($T1,$Hkey); # Karatsuba pre-processing &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey); # save H &pxor ($T2,$Xi); # Karatsuba pre-processing &movdqu (&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi); # save H^2 &palignr ($T2,$T1,8); # low part is H.lo^H.hi &movdqu (&QWP(32,$Htbl),$T2); # save Karatsuba "salt" &ret (); &function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul"); &function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul"); &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0)); &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); &call (&label("pic")); &set_label("pic"); &blindpop ($const); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const)); &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip)); &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); &pshufb ($Xi,$T3); &movups ($T2,&QWP(32,$Htbl)); &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey,$T2); &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); &pshufb ($Xi,$T3); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi); &ret (); &function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul"); &function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul"); &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0)); &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); &mov ($len,&wparam(3)); &call (&label("pic")); &set_label("pic"); &blindpop ($const); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const)); &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip)); &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); &pshufb ($Xi,$T3); &sub ($len,0x10); &jz (&label("odd_tail")); ####### # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P # &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1 &pshufb ($T1,$T3); &pshufb ($Xn,$T3); &movdqu ($T3,&QWP(32,$Htbl)); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi &pshufd ($T1,$Xn,0b01001110); # H*Ii+1 &movdqa ($Xhn,$Xn); &pxor ($T1,$Xn); # &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); # i+=2 &pclmulqdq ($Xn,$Hkey,0x00); ####### &pclmulqdq ($Xhn,$Hkey,0x11); ####### &pclmulqdq ($T1,$T3,0x00); ####### &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2 &nop (); &sub ($len,0x20); &jbe (&label("even_tail")); &jmp (&label("mod_loop")); &set_label("mod_loop",32); &pshufd ($T2,$Xi,0b01001110); # H^2*(Ii+Xi) &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi); &pxor ($T2,$Xi); # &nop (); &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); ####### &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); ####### &pclmulqdq ($T2,$T3,0x10); ####### &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H &xorps ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi) &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &xorps ($Xhi,$Xhn); &movdqu ($Xhn,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii &pxor ($T1,$Xi); # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1 &pxor ($T1,$Xhi); # &pshufb ($Xhn,$T3); &pxor ($T2,$T1); # &movdqa ($T1,$T2); # &psrldq ($T2,8); &pslldq ($T1,8); # &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # &pshufb ($Xn,$T3); &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn); # "Ii+Xi", consume early &movdqa ($Xhn,$Xn); #&clmul64x64_TX ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); H*Ii+1 &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); #&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi); 1st phase &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); &psllq ($Xi,5); &pxor ($T1,$Xi); # &psllq ($Xi,1); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # &pclmulqdq ($Xn,$Hkey,0x00); ####### &movups ($T3,&QWP(32,$Htbl)); &psllq ($Xi,57); # &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); # &pslldq ($Xi,8); &psrldq ($T1,8); # &pxor ($Xi,$T2); &pxor ($Xhi,$T1); # &pshufd ($T1,$Xhn,0b01001110); &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); # 2nd phase &psrlq ($Xi,1); &pxor ($T1,$Xhn); &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); # &pclmulqdq ($Xhn,$Hkey,0x11); ####### &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2 &pxor ($T2,$Xi); &psrlq ($Xi,5); &pxor ($Xi,$T2); # &psrlq ($Xi,1); # &pxor ($Xi,$Xhi) # &pclmulqdq ($T1,$T3,0x00); ####### &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); &sub ($len,0x20); &ja (&label("mod_loop")); &set_label("even_tail"); &pshufd ($T2,$Xi,0b01001110); # H^2*(Ii+Xi) &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi); &pxor ($T2,$Xi); # &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); ####### &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); ####### &pclmulqdq ($T2,$T3,0x10); ####### &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &xorps ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi) &xorps ($Xhi,$Xhn); &pxor ($T1,$Xi); # aggregated Karatsuba post-processing &pxor ($T1,$Xhi); # &pxor ($T2,$T1); # &movdqa ($T1,$T2); # &psrldq ($T2,8); &pslldq ($T1,8); # &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); &test ($len,$len); &jnz (&label("done")); &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H &set_label("odd_tail"); &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii &pshufb ($T1,$T3); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H*(Ii+Xi) &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi); &set_label("done"); &pshufb ($Xi,$T3); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi); &function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul"); } else { # Algorithm 5. Kept for reference purposes. sub reduction_alg5 { # 19/16 times faster than Intel version my ($Xhi,$Xi)=@_; # <<1 &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); # &movdqa ($T2,$Xhi); &pslld ($Xi,1); &pslld ($Xhi,1); # &psrld ($T1,31); &psrld ($T2,31); # &movdqa ($T3,$T1); &pslldq ($T1,4); &psrldq ($T3,12); # &pslldq ($T2,4); &por ($Xhi,$T3); # &por ($Xi,$T1); &por ($Xhi,$T2); # # 1st phase &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); &movdqa ($T3,$Xi); # &pslld ($T1,31); &pslld ($T2,30); &pslld ($Xi,25); # &pxor ($T1,$T2); &pxor ($T1,$Xi); # &movdqa ($T2,$T1); # &pslldq ($T1,12); &psrldq ($T2,4); # &pxor ($T3,$T1); # 2nd phase &pxor ($Xhi,$T3); # &movdqa ($Xi,$T3); &movdqa ($T1,$T3); &psrld ($Xi,1); # &psrld ($T1,2); &psrld ($T3,7); # &pxor ($Xi,$T1); &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); &pxor ($Xi,$T3); # &pxor ($Xi,$Xhi); # } &function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul"); &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(0)); &mov ($Xip,&wparam(1)); &call (&label("pic")); &set_label("pic"); &blindpop ($const); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const)); &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip)); &pshufd ($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap # calculate H^2 &movdqa ($Xi,$Hkey); &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey); # save H &movdqu (&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi); # save H^2 &ret (); &function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul"); &function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul"); &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0)); &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); &call (&label("pic")); &set_label("pic"); &blindpop ($const); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const)); &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip)); &movdqa ($Xn,&QWP(0,$const)); &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); &pshufb ($Xi,$Xn); &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi); &pshufb ($Xi,$Xn); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi); &ret (); &function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul"); &function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul"); &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0)); &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); &mov ($len,&wparam(3)); &call (&label("pic")); &set_label("pic"); &blindpop ($const); &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const)); &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip)); &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); &pshufb ($Xi,$T3); &sub ($len,0x10); &jz (&label("odd_tail")); ####### # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P = # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P # &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1 &pshufb ($T1,$T3); &pshufb ($Xn,$T3); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1 &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2 &sub ($len,0x20); &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); # i+=2 &jbe (&label("even_tail")); &set_label("mod_loop"); &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi) &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi) &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn); &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi); ####### &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1 &pshufb ($T1,$T3); &pshufb ($Xn,$T3); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1 &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2 &sub ($len,0x20); &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); &ja (&label("mod_loop")); &set_label("even_tail"); &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi) &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi) &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn); &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi); &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &test ($len,$len); &jnz (&label("done")); &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H &set_label("odd_tail"); &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii &pshufb ($T1,$T3); &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H*(Ii+Xi) &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi); &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const)); &set_label("done"); &pshufb ($Xi,$T3); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi); &function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul"); } &set_label("bswap",64); &data_byte(15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0); &data_byte(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2); # 0x1c2_polynomial &set_label("rem_8bit",64); &data_short(0x0000,0x01C2,0x0384,0x0246,0x0708,0x06CA,0x048C,0x054E); &data_short(0x0E10,0x0FD2,0x0D94,0x0C56,0x0918,0x08DA,0x0A9C,0x0B5E); &data_short(0x1C20,0x1DE2,0x1FA4,0x1E66,0x1B28,0x1AEA,0x18AC,0x196E); &data_short(0x1230,0x13F2,0x11B4,0x1076,0x1538,0x14FA,0x16BC,0x177E); &data_short(0x3840,0x3982,0x3BC4,0x3A06,0x3F48,0x3E8A,0x3CCC,0x3D0E); &data_short(0x3650,0x3792,0x35D4,0x3416,0x3158,0x309A,0x32DC,0x331E); &data_short(0x2460,0x25A2,0x27E4,0x2626,0x2368,0x22AA,0x20EC,0x212E); &data_short(0x2A70,0x2BB2,0x29F4,0x2836,0x2D78,0x2CBA,0x2EFC,0x2F3E); &data_short(0x7080,0x7142,0x7304,0x72C6,0x7788,0x764A,0x740C,0x75CE); &data_short(0x7E90,0x7F52,0x7D14,0x7CD6,0x7998,0x785A,0x7A1C,0x7BDE); &data_short(0x6CA0,0x6D62,0x6F24,0x6EE6,0x6BA8,0x6A6A,0x682C,0x69EE); &data_short(0x62B0,0x6372,0x6134,0x60F6,0x65B8,0x647A,0x663C,0x67FE); &data_short(0x48C0,0x4902,0x4B44,0x4A86,0x4FC8,0x4E0A,0x4C4C,0x4D8E); &data_short(0x46D0,0x4712,0x4554,0x4496,0x41D8,0x401A,0x425C,0x439E); &data_short(0x54E0,0x5522,0x5764,0x56A6,0x53E8,0x522A,0x506C,0x51AE); &data_short(0x5AF0,0x5B32,0x5974,0x58B6,0x5DF8,0x5C3A,0x5E7C,0x5FBE); &data_short(0xE100,0xE0C2,0xE284,0xE346,0xE608,0xE7CA,0xE58C,0xE44E); &data_short(0xEF10,0xEED2,0xEC94,0xED56,0xE818,0xE9DA,0xEB9C,0xEA5E); &data_short(0xFD20,0xFCE2,0xFEA4,0xFF66,0xFA28,0xFBEA,0xF9AC,0xF86E); &data_short(0xF330,0xF2F2,0xF0B4,0xF176,0xF438,0xF5FA,0xF7BC,0xF67E); &data_short(0xD940,0xD882,0xDAC4,0xDB06,0xDE48,0xDF8A,0xDDCC,0xDC0E); &data_short(0xD750,0xD692,0xD4D4,0xD516,0xD058,0xD19A,0xD3DC,0xD21E); &data_short(0xC560,0xC4A2,0xC6E4,0xC726,0xC268,0xC3AA,0xC1EC,0xC02E); &data_short(0xCB70,0xCAB2,0xC8F4,0xC936,0xCC78,0xCDBA,0xCFFC,0xCE3E); &data_short(0x9180,0x9042,0x9204,0x93C6,0x9688,0x974A,0x950C,0x94CE); &data_short(0x9F90,0x9E52,0x9C14,0x9DD6,0x9898,0x995A,0x9B1C,0x9ADE); &data_short(0x8DA0,0x8C62,0x8E24,0x8FE6,0x8AA8,0x8B6A,0x892C,0x88EE); &data_short(0x83B0,0x8272,0x8034,0x81F6,0x84B8,0x857A,0x873C,0x86FE); &data_short(0xA9C0,0xA802,0xAA44,0xAB86,0xAEC8,0xAF0A,0xAD4C,0xAC8E); &data_short(0xA7D0,0xA612,0xA454,0xA596,0xA0D8,0xA11A,0xA35C,0xA29E); &data_short(0xB5E0,0xB422,0xB664,0xB7A6,0xB2E8,0xB32A,0xB16C,0xB0AE); &data_short(0xBBF0,0xBA32,0xB874,0xB9B6,0xBCF8,0xBD3A,0xBF7C,0xBEBE); }} # $sse2 &set_label("rem_4bit",64); &data_word(0,0x0000<<$S,0,0x1C20<<$S,0,0x3840<<$S,0,0x2460<<$S); &data_word(0,0x7080<<$S,0,0x6CA0<<$S,0,0x48C0<<$S,0,0x54E0<<$S); &data_word(0,0xE100<<$S,0,0xFD20<<$S,0,0xD940<<$S,0,0xC560<<$S); &data_word(0,0x9180<<$S,0,0x8DA0<<$S,0,0xA9C0<<$S,0,0xB5E0<<$S); }}} # !$x86only &asciz("GHASH for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; # A question was risen about choice of vanilla MMX. Or rather why wasn't # SSE2 chosen instead? In addition to the fact that MMX runs on legacy # CPUs such as PIII, "4-bit" MMX version was observed to provide better # performance than *corresponding* SSE2 one even on contemporary CPUs. # SSE2 results were provided by Peter-Michael Hager. He maintains SSE2 # implementation featuring full range of lookup-table sizes, but with # per-invocation lookup table setup. Latter means that table size is # chosen depending on how much data is to be hashed in every given call, # more data - larger table. Best reported result for Core2 is ~4 cycles # per processed byte out of 64KB block. This number accounts even for # 64KB table setup overhead. As discussed in gcm128.c we choose to be # more conservative in respect to lookup table sizes, but how do the # results compare? Minimalistic "256B" MMX version delivers ~11 cycles # on same platform. As also discussed in gcm128.c, next in line "8-bit # Shoup's" or "4KB" method should deliver twice the performance of # "256B" one, in other words not worse than ~6 cycles per byte. It # should be also be noted that in SSE2 case improvement can be "super- # linear," i.e. more than twice, mostly because >>8 maps to single # instruction on SSE2 register. This is unlike "4-bit" case when >>4 # maps to same amount of instructions in both MMX and SSE2 cases. # Bottom line is that switch to SSE2 is considered to be justifiable # only in case we choose to implement "8-bit" method... openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/cbc128.c0000644000000000000000000001102513176625657015637 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include #if !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) && !defined(PEDANTIC) # define STRICT_ALIGNMENT 0 #endif void CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block) { size_t n; const unsigned char *iv = ivec; if (len == 0) return; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (STRICT_ALIGNMENT && ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) { while (len >= 16) { for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) out[n] = in[n] ^ iv[n]; (*block) (out, out, key); iv = out; len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } } else { while (len >= 16) { for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) *(size_t *)(out + n) = *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(iv + n); (*block) (out, out, key); iv = out; len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } } #endif while (len) { for (n = 0; n < 16 && n < len; ++n) out[n] = in[n] ^ iv[n]; for (; n < 16; ++n) out[n] = iv[n]; (*block) (out, out, key); iv = out; if (len <= 16) break; len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } memcpy(ivec, iv, 16); } void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block) { size_t n; union { size_t t[16 / sizeof(size_t)]; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp; if (len == 0) return; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (in != out) { const unsigned char *iv = ivec; if (STRICT_ALIGNMENT && ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) { while (len >= 16) { (*block) (in, out, key); for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) out[n] ^= iv[n]; iv = in; len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } } else if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */ while (len >= 16) { size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out, *iv_t = (size_t *)iv; (*block) (in, out, key); for (n = 0; n < 16 / sizeof(size_t); n++) out_t[n] ^= iv_t[n]; iv = in; len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } } memcpy(ivec, iv, 16); } else { if (STRICT_ALIGNMENT && ((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) { unsigned char c; while (len >= 16) { (*block) (in, tmp.c, key); for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) { c = in[n]; out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n]; ivec[n] = c; } len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } } else if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */ while (len >= 16) { size_t c, *out_t = (size_t *)out, *ivec_t = (size_t *)ivec; const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; (*block) (in, tmp.c, key); for (n = 0; n < 16 / sizeof(size_t); n++) { c = in_t[n]; out_t[n] = tmp.t[n] ^ ivec_t[n]; ivec_t[n] = c; } len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } } } #endif while (len) { unsigned char c; (*block) (in, tmp.c, key); for (n = 0; n < 16 && n < len; ++n) { c = in[n]; out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n]; ivec[n] = c; } if (len <= 16) { for (; n < 16; ++n) ivec[n] = in[n]; break; } len -= 16; in += 16; out += 16; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/cts128.c0000644000000000000000000003617013176625657015711 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include /* * Trouble with Ciphertext Stealing, CTS, mode is that there is no * common official specification, but couple of cipher/application * specific ones: RFC2040 and RFC3962. Then there is 'Proposal to * Extend CBC Mode By "Ciphertext Stealing"' at NIST site, which * deviates from mentioned RFCs. Most notably it allows input to be * of block length and it doesn't flip the order of the last two * blocks. CTS is being discussed even in ECB context, but it's not * adopted for any known application. This implementation provides * two interfaces: one compliant with above mentioned RFCs and one * compliant with the NIST proposal, both extending CBC mode. */ size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block) { size_t residue, n; if (len <= 16) return 0; if ((residue = len % 16) == 0) residue = 16; len -= residue; CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block); in += len; out += len; for (n = 0; n < residue; ++n) ivec[n] ^= in[n]; (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); memcpy(out, out - 16, residue); memcpy(out - 16, ivec, 16); return len + residue; } size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block) { size_t residue, n; if (len < 16) return 0; residue = len % 16; len -= residue; CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block); if (residue == 0) return len; in += len; out += len; for (n = 0; n < residue; ++n) ivec[n] ^= in[n]; (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); memcpy(out - 16 + residue, ivec, 16); return len + residue; } size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc) { size_t residue; union { size_t align; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp; if (len <= 16) return 0; if ((residue = len % 16) == 0) residue = 16; len -= residue; (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 1); in += len; out += len; #if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO) memcpy(tmp.c, out - 16, 16); (*cbc) (in, out - 16, residue, key, ivec, 1); memcpy(out, tmp.c, residue); #else memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp)); memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue); memcpy(out, out - 16, residue); (*cbc) (tmp.c, out - 16, 16, key, ivec, 1); #endif return len + residue; } size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc) { size_t residue; union { size_t align; unsigned char c[16]; } tmp; if (len < 16) return 0; residue = len % 16; len -= residue; (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 1); if (residue == 0) return len; in += len; out += len; #if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO) (*cbc) (in, out - 16 + residue, residue, key, ivec, 1); #else memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp)); memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue); (*cbc) (tmp.c, out - 16 + residue, 16, key, ivec, 1); #endif return len + residue; } size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block) { size_t residue, n; union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp; if (len <= 16) return 0; if ((residue = len % 16) == 0) residue = 16; len -= 16 + residue; if (len) { CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block); in += len; out += len; } (*block) (in, tmp.c + 16, key); memcpy(tmp.c, tmp.c + 16, 16); memcpy(tmp.c, in + 16, residue); (*block) (tmp.c, tmp.c, key); for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) { unsigned char c = in[n]; out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n]; ivec[n] = c; } for (residue += 16; n < residue; ++n) out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ in[n]; return 16 + len + residue; } size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block) { size_t residue, n; union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp; if (len < 16) return 0; residue = len % 16; if (residue == 0) { CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block); return len; } len -= 16 + residue; if (len) { CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, block); in += len; out += len; } (*block) (in + residue, tmp.c + 16, key); memcpy(tmp.c, tmp.c + 16, 16); memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue); (*block) (tmp.c, tmp.c, key); for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) { unsigned char c = in[n]; out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ ivec[n]; ivec[n] = in[n + residue]; tmp.c[n] = c; } for (residue += 16; n < residue; ++n) out[n] = tmp.c[n] ^ tmp.c[n - 16]; return 16 + len + residue; } size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc) { size_t residue; union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp; if (len <= 16) return 0; if ((residue = len % 16) == 0) residue = 16; len -= 16 + residue; if (len) { (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 0); in += len; out += len; } memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp)); /* * this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */ (*cbc) (in, tmp.c, 16, key, tmp.c + 16, 0); memcpy(tmp.c, in + 16, residue); #if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO) (*cbc) (tmp.c, out, 16 + residue, key, ivec, 0); #else (*cbc) (tmp.c, tmp.c, 32, key, ivec, 0); memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16 + residue); #endif return 16 + len + residue; } size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc) { size_t residue; union { size_t align; unsigned char c[32]; } tmp; if (len < 16) return 0; residue = len % 16; if (residue == 0) { (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 0); return len; } len -= 16 + residue; if (len) { (*cbc) (in, out, len, key, ivec, 0); in += len; out += len; } memset(tmp.c, 0, sizeof(tmp)); /* * this places in[16] at &tmp.c[16] and decrypted block at &tmp.c[0] */ (*cbc) (in + residue, tmp.c, 16, key, tmp.c + 16, 0); memcpy(tmp.c, in, residue); #if defined(CBC_HANDLES_TRUNCATED_IO) (*cbc) (tmp.c, out, 16 + residue, key, ivec, 0); #else (*cbc) (tmp.c, tmp.c, 32, key, ivec, 0); memcpy(out, tmp.c, 16 + residue); #endif return 16 + len + residue; } #if defined(SELFTEST) # include # include /* test vectors from RFC 3962 */ static const unsigned char test_key[16] = "chicken teriyaki"; static const unsigned char test_input[64] = "I would like the" " General Gau's C" "hicken, please, " "and wonton soup."; static const unsigned char test_iv[16] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; static const unsigned char vector_17[17] = { 0xc6, 0x35, 0x35, 0x68, 0xf2, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0xb4, 0xd8, 0xa5, 0x80, 0x36, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x97 }; static const unsigned char vector_31[31] = { 0xfc, 0x00, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x0e, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xc1, 0xd4, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xc8, 0xef, 0xf7, 0xed, 0x22, 0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5 }; static const unsigned char vector_32[32] = { 0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5, 0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8, 0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84 }; static const unsigned char vector_47[47] = { 0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84, 0xb3, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x94, 0x0c, 0x16, 0xa1, 0x8c, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0x38, 0x02, 0x9e, 0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5, 0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5 }; static const unsigned char vector_48[48] = { 0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xc0, 0x3b, 0xc1, 0x03, 0xe1, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xbb, 0xd8, 0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5, 0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8 }; static const unsigned char vector_64[64] = { 0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84, 0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5, 0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8, 0x48, 0x07, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x36, 0xee, 0x89, 0xa5, 0x26, 0x73, 0x0d, 0xbc, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0xc8, 0x40, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xc0, 0x3b, 0xc1, 0x03, 0xe1, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xbb, 0xd8 }; static AES_KEY encks, decks; void test_vector(const unsigned char *vector, size_t len) { unsigned char iv[sizeof(test_iv)]; unsigned char cleartext[64], ciphertext[64]; size_t tail; printf("vector_%d\n", len); fflush(stdout); if ((tail = len % 16) == 0) tail = 16; tail += 16; /* test block-based encryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); if (memcmp(ciphertext, vector, len)) fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1); if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1); /* test block-based decryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv, (block128_f) AES_decrypt); if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len)) fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2); if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2); /* test streamed encryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv, (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt); if (memcmp(ciphertext, vector, len)) fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3); if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3); /* test streamed decryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv, (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt); if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len)) fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4); if (memcmp(iv, vector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4); } void test_nistvector(const unsigned char *vector, size_t len) { unsigned char iv[sizeof(test_iv)]; unsigned char cleartext[64], ciphertext[64], nistvector[64]; size_t tail; printf("nistvector_%d\n", len); fflush(stdout); if ((tail = len % 16) == 0) tail = 16; len -= 16 + tail; memcpy(nistvector, vector, len); /* flip two last blocks */ memcpy(nistvector + len, vector + len + 16, tail); memcpy(nistvector + len + tail, vector + len, 16); len += 16 + tail; tail = 16; /* test block-based encryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt_block(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); if (memcmp(ciphertext, nistvector, len)) fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1); if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(1); /* test block-based decryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv, (block128_f) AES_decrypt); if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len)) fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2); if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(2); /* test streamed encryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(test_input, ciphertext, len, &encks, iv, (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt); if (memcmp(ciphertext, nistvector, len)) fprintf(stderr, "output_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3); if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(3); /* test streamed decryption */ memcpy(iv, test_iv, sizeof(test_iv)); CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(ciphertext, cleartext, len, &decks, iv, (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt); if (memcmp(cleartext, test_input, len)) fprintf(stderr, "input_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4); if (memcmp(iv, nistvector + len - tail, sizeof(iv))) fprintf(stderr, "iv_%d mismatch\n", len), exit(4); } int main() { AES_set_encrypt_key(test_key, 128, &encks); AES_set_decrypt_key(test_key, 128, &decks); test_vector(vector_17, sizeof(vector_17)); test_vector(vector_31, sizeof(vector_31)); test_vector(vector_32, sizeof(vector_32)); test_vector(vector_47, sizeof(vector_47)); test_vector(vector_48, sizeof(vector_48)); test_vector(vector_64, sizeof(vector_64)); test_nistvector(vector_17, sizeof(vector_17)); test_nistvector(vector_31, sizeof(vector_31)); test_nistvector(vector_32, sizeof(vector_32)); test_nistvector(vector_47, sizeof(vector_47)); test_nistvector(vector_48, sizeof(vector_48)); test_nistvector(vector_64, sizeof(vector_64)); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/gcm128.c0000644000000000000000000021321113176625657015657 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include #if defined(BSWAP4) && defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) /* redefine, because alignment is ensured */ # undef GETU32 # define GETU32(p) BSWAP4(*(const u32 *)(p)) # undef PUTU32 # define PUTU32(p,v) *(u32 *)(p) = BSWAP4(v) #endif #define PACK(s) ((size_t)(s)<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-16)) #define REDUCE1BIT(V) do { \ if (sizeof(size_t)==8) { \ u64 T = U64(0xe100000000000000) & (0-(V.lo&1)); \ V.lo = (V.hi<<63)|(V.lo>>1); \ V.hi = (V.hi>>1 )^T; \ } \ else { \ u32 T = 0xe1000000U & (0-(u32)(V.lo&1)); \ V.lo = (V.hi<<63)|(V.lo>>1); \ V.hi = (V.hi>>1 )^((u64)T<<32); \ } \ } while(0) /*- * Even though permitted values for TABLE_BITS are 8, 4 and 1, it should * never be set to 8. 8 is effectively reserved for testing purposes. * TABLE_BITS>1 are lookup-table-driven implementations referred to as * "Shoup's" in GCM specification. In other words OpenSSL does not cover * whole spectrum of possible table driven implementations. Why? In * non-"Shoup's" case memory access pattern is segmented in such manner, * that it's trivial to see that cache timing information can reveal * fair portion of intermediate hash value. Given that ciphertext is * always available to attacker, it's possible for him to attempt to * deduce secret parameter H and if successful, tamper with messages * [which is nothing but trivial in CTR mode]. In "Shoup's" case it's * not as trivial, but there is no reason to believe that it's resistant * to cache-timing attack. And the thing about "8-bit" implementation is * that it consumes 16 (sixteen) times more memory, 4KB per individual * key + 1KB shared. Well, on pros side it should be twice as fast as * "4-bit" version. And for gcc-generated x86[_64] code, "8-bit" version * was observed to run ~75% faster, closer to 100% for commercial * compilers... Yet "4-bit" procedure is preferred, because it's * believed to provide better security-performance balance and adequate * all-round performance. "All-round" refers to things like: * * - shorter setup time effectively improves overall timing for * handling short messages; * - larger table allocation can become unbearable because of VM * subsystem penalties (for example on Windows large enough free * results in VM working set trimming, meaning that consequent * malloc would immediately incur working set expansion); * - larger table has larger cache footprint, which can affect * performance of other code paths (not necessarily even from same * thread in Hyper-Threading world); * * Value of 1 is not appropriate for performance reasons. */ #if TABLE_BITS==8 static void gcm_init_8bit(u128 Htable[256], u64 H[2]) { int i, j; u128 V; Htable[0].hi = 0; Htable[0].lo = 0; V.hi = H[0]; V.lo = H[1]; for (Htable[128] = V, i = 64; i > 0; i >>= 1) { REDUCE1BIT(V); Htable[i] = V; } for (i = 2; i < 256; i <<= 1) { u128 *Hi = Htable + i, H0 = *Hi; for (j = 1; j < i; ++j) { Hi[j].hi = H0.hi ^ Htable[j].hi; Hi[j].lo = H0.lo ^ Htable[j].lo; } } } static void gcm_gmult_8bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[256]) { u128 Z = { 0, 0 }; const u8 *xi = (const u8 *)Xi + 15; size_t rem, n = *xi; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; static const size_t rem_8bit[256] = { PACK(0x0000), PACK(0x01C2), PACK(0x0384), PACK(0x0246), PACK(0x0708), PACK(0x06CA), PACK(0x048C), PACK(0x054E), PACK(0x0E10), PACK(0x0FD2), PACK(0x0D94), PACK(0x0C56), PACK(0x0918), PACK(0x08DA), PACK(0x0A9C), PACK(0x0B5E), PACK(0x1C20), PACK(0x1DE2), PACK(0x1FA4), PACK(0x1E66), PACK(0x1B28), PACK(0x1AEA), PACK(0x18AC), PACK(0x196E), PACK(0x1230), PACK(0x13F2), PACK(0x11B4), PACK(0x1076), PACK(0x1538), PACK(0x14FA), PACK(0x16BC), PACK(0x177E), PACK(0x3840), PACK(0x3982), PACK(0x3BC4), PACK(0x3A06), PACK(0x3F48), PACK(0x3E8A), PACK(0x3CCC), PACK(0x3D0E), PACK(0x3650), PACK(0x3792), PACK(0x35D4), PACK(0x3416), PACK(0x3158), PACK(0x309A), PACK(0x32DC), PACK(0x331E), PACK(0x2460), PACK(0x25A2), PACK(0x27E4), PACK(0x2626), PACK(0x2368), PACK(0x22AA), PACK(0x20EC), PACK(0x212E), PACK(0x2A70), PACK(0x2BB2), PACK(0x29F4), PACK(0x2836), PACK(0x2D78), PACK(0x2CBA), PACK(0x2EFC), PACK(0x2F3E), PACK(0x7080), PACK(0x7142), PACK(0x7304), PACK(0x72C6), PACK(0x7788), PACK(0x764A), PACK(0x740C), PACK(0x75CE), PACK(0x7E90), PACK(0x7F52), PACK(0x7D14), PACK(0x7CD6), PACK(0x7998), PACK(0x785A), PACK(0x7A1C), PACK(0x7BDE), PACK(0x6CA0), PACK(0x6D62), PACK(0x6F24), PACK(0x6EE6), PACK(0x6BA8), PACK(0x6A6A), PACK(0x682C), PACK(0x69EE), PACK(0x62B0), PACK(0x6372), PACK(0x6134), PACK(0x60F6), PACK(0x65B8), PACK(0x647A), PACK(0x663C), PACK(0x67FE), PACK(0x48C0), PACK(0x4902), PACK(0x4B44), PACK(0x4A86), PACK(0x4FC8), PACK(0x4E0A), PACK(0x4C4C), PACK(0x4D8E), PACK(0x46D0), PACK(0x4712), PACK(0x4554), PACK(0x4496), PACK(0x41D8), PACK(0x401A), PACK(0x425C), PACK(0x439E), PACK(0x54E0), PACK(0x5522), PACK(0x5764), PACK(0x56A6), PACK(0x53E8), PACK(0x522A), PACK(0x506C), PACK(0x51AE), PACK(0x5AF0), PACK(0x5B32), PACK(0x5974), PACK(0x58B6), PACK(0x5DF8), PACK(0x5C3A), PACK(0x5E7C), PACK(0x5FBE), PACK(0xE100), PACK(0xE0C2), PACK(0xE284), PACK(0xE346), PACK(0xE608), PACK(0xE7CA), PACK(0xE58C), PACK(0xE44E), PACK(0xEF10), PACK(0xEED2), PACK(0xEC94), PACK(0xED56), PACK(0xE818), PACK(0xE9DA), PACK(0xEB9C), PACK(0xEA5E), PACK(0xFD20), PACK(0xFCE2), PACK(0xFEA4), PACK(0xFF66), PACK(0xFA28), PACK(0xFBEA), PACK(0xF9AC), PACK(0xF86E), PACK(0xF330), PACK(0xF2F2), PACK(0xF0B4), PACK(0xF176), PACK(0xF438), PACK(0xF5FA), PACK(0xF7BC), PACK(0xF67E), PACK(0xD940), PACK(0xD882), PACK(0xDAC4), PACK(0xDB06), PACK(0xDE48), PACK(0xDF8A), PACK(0xDDCC), PACK(0xDC0E), PACK(0xD750), PACK(0xD692), PACK(0xD4D4), PACK(0xD516), PACK(0xD058), PACK(0xD19A), PACK(0xD3DC), PACK(0xD21E), PACK(0xC560), PACK(0xC4A2), PACK(0xC6E4), PACK(0xC726), PACK(0xC268), PACK(0xC3AA), PACK(0xC1EC), PACK(0xC02E), PACK(0xCB70), PACK(0xCAB2), PACK(0xC8F4), PACK(0xC936), PACK(0xCC78), PACK(0xCDBA), PACK(0xCFFC), PACK(0xCE3E), PACK(0x9180), PACK(0x9042), PACK(0x9204), PACK(0x93C6), PACK(0x9688), PACK(0x974A), PACK(0x950C), PACK(0x94CE), PACK(0x9F90), PACK(0x9E52), PACK(0x9C14), PACK(0x9DD6), PACK(0x9898), PACK(0x995A), PACK(0x9B1C), PACK(0x9ADE), PACK(0x8DA0), PACK(0x8C62), PACK(0x8E24), PACK(0x8FE6), PACK(0x8AA8), PACK(0x8B6A), PACK(0x892C), PACK(0x88EE), PACK(0x83B0), PACK(0x8272), PACK(0x8034), PACK(0x81F6), PACK(0x84B8), PACK(0x857A), PACK(0x873C), PACK(0x86FE), PACK(0xA9C0), PACK(0xA802), PACK(0xAA44), PACK(0xAB86), PACK(0xAEC8), PACK(0xAF0A), PACK(0xAD4C), PACK(0xAC8E), PACK(0xA7D0), PACK(0xA612), PACK(0xA454), PACK(0xA596), PACK(0xA0D8), PACK(0xA11A), PACK(0xA35C), PACK(0xA29E), PACK(0xB5E0), PACK(0xB422), PACK(0xB664), PACK(0xB7A6), PACK(0xB2E8), PACK(0xB32A), PACK(0xB16C), PACK(0xB0AE), PACK(0xBBF0), PACK(0xBA32), PACK(0xB874), PACK(0xB9B6), PACK(0xBCF8), PACK(0xBD3A), PACK(0xBF7C), PACK(0xBEBE) }; while (1) { Z.hi ^= Htable[n].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[n].lo; if ((u8 *)Xi == xi) break; n = *(--xi); rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xff; Z.lo = (Z.hi << 56) | (Z.lo >> 8); Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 8); if (sizeof(size_t) == 8) Z.hi ^= rem_8bit[rem]; else Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_8bit[rem] << 32; } if (is_endian.little) { # ifdef BSWAP8 Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi); Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo); # else u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi; u32 v; v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32); PUTU32(p, v); v = (u32)(Z.hi); PUTU32(p + 4, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32); PUTU32(p + 8, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo); PUTU32(p + 12, v); # endif } else { Xi[0] = Z.hi; Xi[1] = Z.lo; } } # define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi) gcm_gmult_8bit(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable) #elif TABLE_BITS==4 static void gcm_init_4bit(u128 Htable[16], u64 H[2]) { u128 V; # if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) int i; # endif Htable[0].hi = 0; Htable[0].lo = 0; V.hi = H[0]; V.lo = H[1]; # if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) for (Htable[8] = V, i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1) { REDUCE1BIT(V); Htable[i] = V; } for (i = 2; i < 16; i <<= 1) { u128 *Hi = Htable + i; int j; for (V = *Hi, j = 1; j < i; ++j) { Hi[j].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[j].hi; Hi[j].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[j].lo; } } # else Htable[8] = V; REDUCE1BIT(V); Htable[4] = V; REDUCE1BIT(V); Htable[2] = V; REDUCE1BIT(V); Htable[1] = V; Htable[3].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[3].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; V = Htable[4]; Htable[5].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[5].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo; Htable[6].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[6].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; Htable[7].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[7].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo; V = Htable[8]; Htable[9].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[9].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo; Htable[10].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[10].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; Htable[11].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[11].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo; Htable[12].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[4].hi, Htable[12].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[4].lo; Htable[13].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[5].hi, Htable[13].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[5].lo; Htable[14].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[6].hi, Htable[14].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[6].lo; Htable[15].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[7].hi, Htable[15].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[7].lo; # endif # if defined(GHASH_ASM) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) /* * ARM assembler expects specific dword order in Htable. */ { int j; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (is_endian.little) for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j) { V = Htable[j]; Htable[j].hi = V.lo; Htable[j].lo = V.hi; } else for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j) { V = Htable[j]; Htable[j].hi = V.lo << 32 | V.lo >> 32; Htable[j].lo = V.hi << 32 | V.hi >> 32; } } # endif } # ifndef GHASH_ASM static const size_t rem_4bit[16] = { PACK(0x0000), PACK(0x1C20), PACK(0x3840), PACK(0x2460), PACK(0x7080), PACK(0x6CA0), PACK(0x48C0), PACK(0x54E0), PACK(0xE100), PACK(0xFD20), PACK(0xD940), PACK(0xC560), PACK(0x9180), PACK(0x8DA0), PACK(0xA9C0), PACK(0xB5E0) }; static void gcm_gmult_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) { u128 Z; int cnt = 15; size_t rem, nlo, nhi; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[15]; nhi = nlo >> 4; nlo &= 0xf; Z.hi = Htable[nlo].hi; Z.lo = Htable[nlo].lo; while (1) { rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf; Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4); Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4); if (sizeof(size_t) == 8) Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem]; else Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32; Z.hi ^= Htable[nhi].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[nhi].lo; if (--cnt < 0) break; nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[cnt]; nhi = nlo >> 4; nlo &= 0xf; rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf; Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4); Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4); if (sizeof(size_t) == 8) Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem]; else Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32; Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo; } if (is_endian.little) { # ifdef BSWAP8 Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi); Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo); # else u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi; u32 v; v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32); PUTU32(p, v); v = (u32)(Z.hi); PUTU32(p + 4, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32); PUTU32(p + 8, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo); PUTU32(p + 12, v); # endif } else { Xi[0] = Z.hi; Xi[1] = Z.lo; } } # if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) /* * Streamed gcm_mult_4bit, see CRYPTO_gcm128_[en|de]crypt for * details... Compiler-generated code doesn't seem to give any * performance improvement, at least not on x86[_64]. It's here * mostly as reference and a placeholder for possible future * non-trivial optimization[s]... */ static void gcm_ghash_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len) { u128 Z; int cnt; size_t rem, nlo, nhi; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; # if 1 do { cnt = 15; nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[15]; nlo ^= inp[15]; nhi = nlo >> 4; nlo &= 0xf; Z.hi = Htable[nlo].hi; Z.lo = Htable[nlo].lo; while (1) { rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf; Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4); Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4); if (sizeof(size_t) == 8) Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem]; else Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32; Z.hi ^= Htable[nhi].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[nhi].lo; if (--cnt < 0) break; nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[cnt]; nlo ^= inp[cnt]; nhi = nlo >> 4; nlo &= 0xf; rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf; Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4); Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4); if (sizeof(size_t) == 8) Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[rem]; else Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_4bit[rem] << 32; Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo; } # else /* * Extra 256+16 bytes per-key plus 512 bytes shared tables * [should] give ~50% improvement... One could have PACK()-ed * the rem_8bit even here, but the priority is to minimize * cache footprint... */ u128 Hshr4[16]; /* Htable shifted right by 4 bits */ u8 Hshl4[16]; /* Htable shifted left by 4 bits */ static const unsigned short rem_8bit[256] = { 0x0000, 0x01C2, 0x0384, 0x0246, 0x0708, 0x06CA, 0x048C, 0x054E, 0x0E10, 0x0FD2, 0x0D94, 0x0C56, 0x0918, 0x08DA, 0x0A9C, 0x0B5E, 0x1C20, 0x1DE2, 0x1FA4, 0x1E66, 0x1B28, 0x1AEA, 0x18AC, 0x196E, 0x1230, 0x13F2, 0x11B4, 0x1076, 0x1538, 0x14FA, 0x16BC, 0x177E, 0x3840, 0x3982, 0x3BC4, 0x3A06, 0x3F48, 0x3E8A, 0x3CCC, 0x3D0E, 0x3650, 0x3792, 0x35D4, 0x3416, 0x3158, 0x309A, 0x32DC, 0x331E, 0x2460, 0x25A2, 0x27E4, 0x2626, 0x2368, 0x22AA, 0x20EC, 0x212E, 0x2A70, 0x2BB2, 0x29F4, 0x2836, 0x2D78, 0x2CBA, 0x2EFC, 0x2F3E, 0x7080, 0x7142, 0x7304, 0x72C6, 0x7788, 0x764A, 0x740C, 0x75CE, 0x7E90, 0x7F52, 0x7D14, 0x7CD6, 0x7998, 0x785A, 0x7A1C, 0x7BDE, 0x6CA0, 0x6D62, 0x6F24, 0x6EE6, 0x6BA8, 0x6A6A, 0x682C, 0x69EE, 0x62B0, 0x6372, 0x6134, 0x60F6, 0x65B8, 0x647A, 0x663C, 0x67FE, 0x48C0, 0x4902, 0x4B44, 0x4A86, 0x4FC8, 0x4E0A, 0x4C4C, 0x4D8E, 0x46D0, 0x4712, 0x4554, 0x4496, 0x41D8, 0x401A, 0x425C, 0x439E, 0x54E0, 0x5522, 0x5764, 0x56A6, 0x53E8, 0x522A, 0x506C, 0x51AE, 0x5AF0, 0x5B32, 0x5974, 0x58B6, 0x5DF8, 0x5C3A, 0x5E7C, 0x5FBE, 0xE100, 0xE0C2, 0xE284, 0xE346, 0xE608, 0xE7CA, 0xE58C, 0xE44E, 0xEF10, 0xEED2, 0xEC94, 0xED56, 0xE818, 0xE9DA, 0xEB9C, 0xEA5E, 0xFD20, 0xFCE2, 0xFEA4, 0xFF66, 0xFA28, 0xFBEA, 0xF9AC, 0xF86E, 0xF330, 0xF2F2, 0xF0B4, 0xF176, 0xF438, 0xF5FA, 0xF7BC, 0xF67E, 0xD940, 0xD882, 0xDAC4, 0xDB06, 0xDE48, 0xDF8A, 0xDDCC, 0xDC0E, 0xD750, 0xD692, 0xD4D4, 0xD516, 0xD058, 0xD19A, 0xD3DC, 0xD21E, 0xC560, 0xC4A2, 0xC6E4, 0xC726, 0xC268, 0xC3AA, 0xC1EC, 0xC02E, 0xCB70, 0xCAB2, 0xC8F4, 0xC936, 0xCC78, 0xCDBA, 0xCFFC, 0xCE3E, 0x9180, 0x9042, 0x9204, 0x93C6, 0x9688, 0x974A, 0x950C, 0x94CE, 0x9F90, 0x9E52, 0x9C14, 0x9DD6, 0x9898, 0x995A, 0x9B1C, 0x9ADE, 0x8DA0, 0x8C62, 0x8E24, 0x8FE6, 0x8AA8, 0x8B6A, 0x892C, 0x88EE, 0x83B0, 0x8272, 0x8034, 0x81F6, 0x84B8, 0x857A, 0x873C, 0x86FE, 0xA9C0, 0xA802, 0xAA44, 0xAB86, 0xAEC8, 0xAF0A, 0xAD4C, 0xAC8E, 0xA7D0, 0xA612, 0xA454, 0xA596, 0xA0D8, 0xA11A, 0xA35C, 0xA29E, 0xB5E0, 0xB422, 0xB664, 0xB7A6, 0xB2E8, 0xB32A, 0xB16C, 0xB0AE, 0xBBF0, 0xBA32, 0xB874, 0xB9B6, 0xBCF8, 0xBD3A, 0xBF7C, 0xBEBE }; /* * This pre-processing phase slows down procedure by approximately * same time as it makes each loop spin faster. In other words * single block performance is approximately same as straightforward * "4-bit" implementation, and then it goes only faster... */ for (cnt = 0; cnt < 16; ++cnt) { Z.hi = Htable[cnt].hi; Z.lo = Htable[cnt].lo; Hshr4[cnt].lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4); Hshr4[cnt].hi = (Z.hi >> 4); Hshl4[cnt] = (u8)(Z.lo << 4); } do { for (Z.lo = 0, Z.hi = 0, cnt = 15; cnt; --cnt) { nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[cnt]; nlo ^= inp[cnt]; nhi = nlo >> 4; nlo &= 0xf; Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo; rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xff; Z.lo = (Z.hi << 56) | (Z.lo >> 8); Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 8); Z.hi ^= Hshr4[nhi].hi; Z.lo ^= Hshr4[nhi].lo; Z.hi ^= (u64)rem_8bit[rem ^ Hshl4[nhi]] << 48; } nlo = ((const u8 *)Xi)[0]; nlo ^= inp[0]; nhi = nlo >> 4; nlo &= 0xf; Z.hi ^= Htable[nlo].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[nlo].lo; rem = (size_t)Z.lo & 0xf; Z.lo = (Z.hi << 60) | (Z.lo >> 4); Z.hi = (Z.hi >> 4); Z.hi ^= Htable[nhi].hi; Z.lo ^= Htable[nhi].lo; Z.hi ^= ((u64)rem_8bit[rem << 4]) << 48; # endif if (is_endian.little) { # ifdef BSWAP8 Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi); Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo); # else u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi; u32 v; v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32); PUTU32(p, v); v = (u32)(Z.hi); PUTU32(p + 4, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32); PUTU32(p + 8, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo); PUTU32(p + 12, v); # endif } else { Xi[0] = Z.hi; Xi[1] = Z.lo; } } while (inp += 16, len -= 16); } # endif # else void gcm_gmult_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_4bit(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); # endif # define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi) gcm_gmult_4bit(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable) # if defined(GHASH_ASM) || !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) # define GHASH(ctx,in,len) gcm_ghash_4bit((ctx)->Xi.u,(ctx)->Htable,in,len) /* * GHASH_CHUNK is "stride parameter" missioned to mitigate cache trashing * effect. In other words idea is to hash data while it's still in L1 cache * after encryption pass... */ # define GHASH_CHUNK (3*1024) # endif #else /* TABLE_BITS */ static void gcm_gmult_1bit(u64 Xi[2], const u64 H[2]) { u128 V, Z = { 0, 0 }; long X; int i, j; const long *xi = (const long *)Xi; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; V.hi = H[0]; /* H is in host byte order, no byte swapping */ V.lo = H[1]; for (j = 0; j < 16 / sizeof(long); ++j) { if (is_endian.little) { if (sizeof(long) == 8) { # ifdef BSWAP8 X = (long)(BSWAP8(xi[j])); # else const u8 *p = (const u8 *)(xi + j); X = (long)((u64)GETU32(p) << 32 | GETU32(p + 4)); # endif } else { const u8 *p = (const u8 *)(xi + j); X = (long)GETU32(p); } } else X = xi[j]; for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(long); ++i, X <<= 1) { u64 M = (u64)(X >> (8 * sizeof(long) - 1)); Z.hi ^= V.hi & M; Z.lo ^= V.lo & M; REDUCE1BIT(V); } } if (is_endian.little) { # ifdef BSWAP8 Xi[0] = BSWAP8(Z.hi); Xi[1] = BSWAP8(Z.lo); # else u8 *p = (u8 *)Xi; u32 v; v = (u32)(Z.hi >> 32); PUTU32(p, v); v = (u32)(Z.hi); PUTU32(p + 4, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo >> 32); PUTU32(p + 8, v); v = (u32)(Z.lo); PUTU32(p + 12, v); # endif } else { Xi[0] = Z.hi; Xi[1] = Z.lo; } } # define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi) gcm_gmult_1bit(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->H.u) #endif #if TABLE_BITS==4 && (defined(GHASH_ASM) || defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)) # if !defined(I386_ONLY) && \ (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) # define GHASH_ASM_X86_OR_64 # define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; void gcm_init_clmul(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]); void gcm_gmult_clmul(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_clmul(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) # define gcm_init_avx gcm_init_clmul # define gcm_gmult_avx gcm_gmult_clmul # define gcm_ghash_avx gcm_ghash_clmul # else void gcm_init_avx(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]); void gcm_gmult_avx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_avx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); # endif # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) # define GHASH_ASM_X86 void gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); void gcm_gmult_4bit_x86(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_4bit_x86(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); # endif # elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) || defined(__aarch64__) # include "arm_arch.h" # if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 # define GHASH_ASM_ARM # define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT # define PMULL_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_PMULL) # if defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) # define NEON_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON) # endif void gcm_init_neon(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]); void gcm_gmult_neon(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_neon(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); void gcm_init_v8(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]); void gcm_gmult_v8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_v8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); # endif # elif defined(__sparc__) || defined(__sparc) # include "sparc_arch.h" # define GHASH_ASM_SPARC # define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[]; void gcm_init_vis3(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]); void gcm_gmult_vis3(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_vis3(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); # elif defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC)) # include "ppc_arch.h" # define GHASH_ASM_PPC # define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void gcm_init_p8(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]); void gcm_gmult_p8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_p8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len); # endif #endif #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT # undef GCM_MUL # define GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi) (*gcm_gmult_p)(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable) # ifdef GHASH # undef GHASH # define GHASH(ctx,in,len) (*gcm_ghash_p)(ctx->Xi.u,ctx->Htable,in,len) # endif #endif void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); ctx->block = block; ctx->key = key; (*block) (ctx->H.c, ctx->H.c, key); if (is_endian.little) { /* H is stored in host byte order */ #ifdef BSWAP8 ctx->H.u[0] = BSWAP8(ctx->H.u[0]); ctx->H.u[1] = BSWAP8(ctx->H.u[1]); #else u8 *p = ctx->H.c; u64 hi, lo; hi = (u64)GETU32(p) << 32 | GETU32(p + 4); lo = (u64)GETU32(p + 8) << 32 | GETU32(p + 12); ctx->H.u[0] = hi; ctx->H.u[1] = lo; #endif } #if TABLE_BITS==8 gcm_init_8bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); #elif TABLE_BITS==4 # if defined(GHASH) # define CTX__GHASH(f) (ctx->ghash = (f)) # else # define CTX__GHASH(f) (ctx->ghash = NULL) # endif # if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_OR_64) # if !defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2) if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 1)) { /* check PCLMULQDQ bit */ if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] >> 22) & 0x41) == 0x41) { /* AVX+MOVBE */ gcm_init_avx(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_avx; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_avx); } else { gcm_init_clmul(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_clmul; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_clmul); } return; } # endif gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); # if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) /* x86 only */ # if defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2) if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 25)) { /* check SSE bit */ # else if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 23)) { /* check MMX bit */ # endif ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx); } else { ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit_x86; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit_x86); } # else ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit); # endif # elif defined(GHASH_ASM_ARM) # ifdef PMULL_CAPABLE if (PMULL_CAPABLE) { gcm_init_v8(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_v8; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_v8); } else # endif # ifdef NEON_CAPABLE if (NEON_CAPABLE) { gcm_init_neon(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_neon; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_neon); } else # endif { gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit); } # elif defined(GHASH_ASM_SPARC) if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3) { gcm_init_vis3(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_vis3; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_vis3); } else { gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit); } # elif defined(GHASH_ASM_PPC) if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207) { gcm_init_p8(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_p8; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_p8); } else { gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit; CTX__GHASH(gcm_ghash_4bit); } # else gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u); # endif # undef CTX__GHASH #endif } void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; unsigned int ctr; #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult; #endif ctx->Yi.u[0] = 0; ctx->Yi.u[1] = 0; ctx->Xi.u[0] = 0; ctx->Xi.u[1] = 0; ctx->len.u[0] = 0; /* AAD length */ ctx->len.u[1] = 0; /* message length */ ctx->ares = 0; ctx->mres = 0; if (len == 12) { memcpy(ctx->Yi.c, iv, 12); ctx->Yi.c[15] = 1; ctr = 1; } else { size_t i; u64 len0 = len; while (len >= 16) { for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) ctx->Yi.c[i] ^= iv[i]; GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi); iv += 16; len -= 16; } if (len) { for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) ctx->Yi.c[i] ^= iv[i]; GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi); } len0 <<= 3; if (is_endian.little) { #ifdef BSWAP8 ctx->Yi.u[1] ^= BSWAP8(len0); #else ctx->Yi.c[8] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 56); ctx->Yi.c[9] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 48); ctx->Yi.c[10] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 40); ctx->Yi.c[11] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 32); ctx->Yi.c[12] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 24); ctx->Yi.c[13] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 16); ctx->Yi.c[14] ^= (u8)(len0 >> 8); ctx->Yi.c[15] ^= (u8)(len0); #endif } else ctx->Yi.u[1] ^= len0; GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi); if (is_endian.little) #ifdef BSWAP4 ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); #else ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12); #endif else ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3]; } (*ctx->block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EK0.c, ctx->key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) #ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); #else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); #endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t len) { size_t i; unsigned int n; u64 alen = ctx->len.u[0]; #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult; # ifdef GHASH void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash; # endif #endif if (ctx->len.u[1]) return -2; alen += len; if (alen > (U64(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len)) return -1; ctx->len.u[0] = alen; n = ctx->ares; if (n) { while (n && len) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(aad++); --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); else { ctx->ares = n; return 0; } } #ifdef GHASH if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) { GHASH(ctx, aad, i); aad += i; len -= i; } #else while (len >= 16) { for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) ctx->Xi.c[i] ^= aad[i]; GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); aad += 16; len -= 16; } #endif if (len) { n = (unsigned int)len; for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) ctx->Xi.c[i] ^= aad[i]; } ctx->ares = n; return 0; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; unsigned int n, ctr; size_t i; u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1]; block128_f block = ctx->block; void *key = ctx->key; #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult; # if defined(GHASH) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash; # endif #endif mlen += len; if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) return -1; ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { /* First call to encrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */ GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } if (is_endian.little) #ifdef BSWAP4 ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); #else ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12); #endif else ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3]; n = ctx->mres; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */ do { if (n) { while (n && len) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); else { ctx->mres = n; return 0; } } # if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) break; # endif # if defined(GHASH) # if defined(GHASH_CHUNK) while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { size_t j = GHASH_CHUNK; while (j) { size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i) out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i]; out += 16; in += 16; j -= 16; } GHASH(ctx, out - GHASH_CHUNK, GHASH_CHUNK); len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } # endif if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) { size_t j = i; while (len >= 16) { size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i) out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i]; out += 16; in += 16; len -= 16; } GHASH(ctx, out - j, j); } # else while (len >= 16) { size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i) ctx->Xi.t[i] ^= out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i]; GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); out += 16; in += 16; len -= 16; } # endif if (len) { (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; while (len--) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 0; } while (0); } #endif for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { if (n == 0) { (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) #ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); #else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); #endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; } ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; n = (n + 1) % 16; if (n == 0) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } ctx->mres = n; return 0; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; unsigned int n, ctr; size_t i; u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1]; block128_f block = ctx->block; void *key = ctx->key; #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult; # if defined(GHASH) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash; # endif #endif mlen += len; if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) return -1; ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { /* First call to decrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */ GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } if (is_endian.little) #ifdef BSWAP4 ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); #else ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12); #endif else ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3]; n = ctx->mres; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */ do { if (n) { while (n && len) { u8 c = *(in++); *(out++) = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); else { ctx->mres = n; return 0; } } # if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) break; # endif # if defined(GHASH) # if defined(GHASH_CHUNK) while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { size_t j = GHASH_CHUNK; GHASH(ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK); while (j) { size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i) out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i]; out += 16; in += 16; j -= 16; } len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } # endif if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) { GHASH(ctx, in, i); while (len >= 16) { size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i) out_t[i] = in_t[i] ^ ctx->EKi.t[i]; out += 16; in += 16; len -= 16; } } # else while (len >= 16) { size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(size_t); ++i) { size_t c = in[i]; out[i] = c ^ ctx->EKi.t[i]; ctx->Xi.t[i] ^= c; } GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); out += 16; in += 16; len -= 16; } # endif if (len) { (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; while (len--) { u8 c = in[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; out[n] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 0; } while (0); } #endif for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { u8 c; if (n == 0) { (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) #ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); #else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); #endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; } c = in[i]; out[i] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; n = (n + 1) % 16; if (n == 0) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } ctx->mres = n; return 0; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ctr128_f stream) { #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) return CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(ctx, in, out, len); #else const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; unsigned int n, ctr; size_t i; u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1]; void *key = ctx->key; # ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult; # ifdef GHASH void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash; # endif # endif mlen += len; if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) return -1; ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { /* First call to encrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */ GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); # else ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12); # endif else ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3]; n = ctx->mres; if (n) { while (n && len) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); else { ctx->mres = n; return 0; } } # if defined(GHASH) && defined(GHASH_CHUNK) while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { (*stream) (in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; GHASH(ctx, out, GHASH_CHUNK); out += GHASH_CHUNK; in += GHASH_CHUNK; len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } # endif if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) { size_t j = i / 16; (*stream) (in, out, j, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += (unsigned int)j; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; in += i; len -= i; # if defined(GHASH) GHASH(ctx, out, i); out += i; # else while (j--) { for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) ctx->Xi.c[i] ^= out[i]; GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); out += 16; } # endif } if (len) { (*ctx->block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; while (len--) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 0; #endif } int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ctr128_f stream) { #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) return CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(ctx, in, out, len); #else const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; unsigned int n, ctr; size_t i; u64 mlen = ctx->len.u[1]; void *key = ctx->key; # ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult; # ifdef GHASH void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx->ghash; # endif # endif mlen += len; if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) return -1; ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { /* First call to decrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) */ GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctr = BSWAP4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); # else ctr = GETU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12); # endif else ctr = ctx->Yi.d[3]; n = ctx->mres; if (n) { while (n && len) { u8 c = *(in++); *(out++) = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); else { ctx->mres = n; return 0; } } # if defined(GHASH) && defined(GHASH_CHUNK) while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { GHASH(ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK); (*stream) (in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; out += GHASH_CHUNK; in += GHASH_CHUNK; len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } # endif if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) { size_t j = i / 16; # if defined(GHASH) GHASH(ctx, in, i); # else while (j--) { size_t k; for (k = 0; k < 16; ++k) ctx->Xi.c[k] ^= in[k]; GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); in += 16; } j = i / 16; in -= i; # endif (*stream) (in, out, j, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += (unsigned int)j; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; out += i; in += i; len -= i; } if (len) { (*ctx->block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; if (is_endian.little) # ifdef BSWAP4 ctx->Yi.d[3] = BSWAP4(ctr); # else PUTU32(ctx->Yi.c + 12, ctr); # endif else ctx->Yi.d[3] = ctr; while (len--) { u8 c = in[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; out[n] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 0; #endif } int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, size_t len) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; u64 alen = ctx->len.u[0] << 3; u64 clen = ctx->len.u[1] << 3; #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT void (*gcm_gmult_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gmult; #endif if (ctx->mres || ctx->ares) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); if (is_endian.little) { #ifdef BSWAP8 alen = BSWAP8(alen); clen = BSWAP8(clen); #else u8 *p = ctx->len.c; ctx->len.u[0] = alen; ctx->len.u[1] = clen; alen = (u64)GETU32(p) << 32 | GETU32(p + 4); clen = (u64)GETU32(p + 8) << 32 | GETU32(p + 12); #endif } ctx->Xi.u[0] ^= alen; ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= clen; GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->Xi.u[0] ^= ctx->EK0.u[0]; ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= ctx->EK0.u[1]; if (tag && len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi)) return CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->Xi.c, tag, len); else return -1; } void CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len) { CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(ctx, NULL, 0); memcpy(tag, ctx->Xi.c, len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi.c) ? len : sizeof(ctx->Xi.c)); } GCM128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_gcm128_new(void *key, block128_f block) { GCM128_CONTEXT *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) != NULL) CRYPTO_gcm128_init(ret, key, block); return ret; } void CRYPTO_gcm128_release(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx) { OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); } #if defined(SELFTEST) # include # include /* Test Case 1 */ static const u8 K1[16], *P1 = NULL, *A1 = NULL, IV1[12], *C1 = NULL; static const u8 T1[] = { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }; /* Test Case 2 */ # define K2 K1 # define A2 A1 # define IV2 IV1 static const u8 P2[16]; static const u8 C2[] = { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, 0xf3, 0x28, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x78 }; static const u8 T2[] = { 0xab, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xec, 0x13, 0xbd, 0xf5, 0x3a, 0x67, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x57, 0xbd, 0xdf }; /* Test Case 3 */ # define A3 A2 static const u8 K3[] = { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }; static const u8 P3[] = { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }; static const u8 IV3[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }; static const u8 C3[] = { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x47, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x85 }; static const u8 T3[] = { 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x64, 0xa6, 0x2c, 0xf3, 0x5a, 0xbd, 0x2b, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xb4 }; /* Test Case 4 */ # define K4 K3 # define IV4 IV3 static const u8 P4[] = { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39 }; static const u8 A4[] = { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }; static const u8 C4[] = { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91 }; static const u8 T4[] = { 0x5b, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0x94, 0xfa, 0xe9, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x1a, 0x47 }; /* Test Case 5 */ # define K5 K4 # define P5 P4 # define A5 A4 static const u8 IV5[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad }; static const u8 C5[] = { 0x61, 0x35, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x28, 0x06, 0x93, 0x4a, 0x77, 0x7f, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0x37, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x23, 0x73, 0x80, 0x69, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x24, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x09, 0x75, 0x44, 0xd4, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x49, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x0f, 0x07, 0xc2, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x98 }; static const u8 T5[] = { 0x36, 0x12, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x3b, 0x07, 0x85, 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb }; /* Test Case 6 */ # define K6 K5 # define P6 P5 # define A6 A5 static const u8 IV6[] = { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39, 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54, 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }; static const u8 C6[] = { 0x8c, 0xe2, 0x49, 0x98, 0x62, 0x56, 0x15, 0xb6, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x94, 0xbe, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xa2, 0x11, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x26, 0x2a, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xa7, 0x01, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x90, 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 }; static const u8 T6[] = { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa, 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 }; /* Test Case 7 */ static const u8 K7[24], *P7 = NULL, *A7 = NULL, IV7[12], *C7 = NULL; static const u8 T7[] = { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b, 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 }; /* Test Case 8 */ # define K8 K7 # define IV8 IV7 # define A8 A7 static const u8 P8[16]; static const u8 C8[] = { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41, 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 }; static const u8 T8[] = { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x75, 0x14, 0xf0, 0xfb }; /* Test Case 9 */ # define A9 A8 static const u8 K9[] = { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c }; static const u8 P9[] = { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }; static const u8 IV9[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }; static const u8 C9[] = { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10, 0xac, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x56 }; static const u8 T9[] = { 0x99, 0x24, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x73, 0x36, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x18, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x14 }; /* Test Case 10 */ # define K10 K9 # define IV10 IV9 static const u8 P10[] = { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39 }; static const u8 A10[] = { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }; static const u8 C10[] = { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10 }; static const u8 T10[] = { 0x25, 0x19, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x80, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x37, 0xba, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x61, 0x8c }; /* Test Case 11 */ # define K11 K10 # define P11 P10 # define A11 A10 static const u8 IV11[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad }; static const u8 C11[] = { 0x0f, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xae, 0x14, 0xa1, 0x54, 0xed, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x25, 0x32, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xc5, 0x66, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x4f, 0x83, 0x47, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0x50, 0x70, 0x57, 0xfd, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1f, 0x75, 0xc6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xd4, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xc9, 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x19, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x3f, 0xa0, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xf7 }; static const u8 T11[] = { 0x65, 0xdc, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xcf, 0x62, 0x3a, 0x24, 0x09, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x33, 0xf8 }; /* Test Case 12 */ # define K12 K11 # define P12 P11 # define A12 A11 static const u8 IV12[] = { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39, 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54, 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }; static const u8 C12[] = { 0xd2, 0x7e, 0x88, 0x68, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0x24, 0x3c, 0x48, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xf9, 0xff, 0x1d, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x47, 0xef, 0x6e, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x98, 0x28, 0x66, 0x6e, 0x45, 0x81, 0xe7, 0x90, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x29, 0x2d, 0xb3, 0xe6, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x67, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xb7, 0x37, 0x3b }; static const u8 T12[] = { 0xdc, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xff, 0x29, 0x1c, 0x25, 0xbb, 0xb8, 0x56, 0x8f, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x76, 0xa6, 0xd9 }; /* Test Case 13 */ static const u8 K13[32], *P13 = NULL, *A13 = NULL, IV13[12], *C13 = NULL; static const u8 T13[] = { 0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b }; /* Test Case 14 */ # define K14 K13 # define A14 A13 static const u8 P14[16], IV14[12]; static const u8 C14[] = { 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e, 0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18 }; static const u8 T14[] = { 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19 }; /* Test Case 15 */ # define A15 A14 static const u8 K15[] = { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }; static const u8 P15[] = { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }; static const u8 IV15[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }; static const u8 C15[] = { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad }; static const u8 T15[] = { 0xb0, 0x94, 0xda, 0xc5, 0xd9, 0x34, 0x71, 0xbd, 0xec, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x70, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x6c }; /* Test Case 16 */ # define K16 K15 # define IV16 IV15 static const u8 P16[] = { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39 }; static const u8 A16[] = { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }; static const u8 C16[] = { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62 }; static const u8 T16[] = { 0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68, 0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b }; /* Test Case 17 */ # define K17 K16 # define P17 P16 # define A17 A16 static const u8 IV17[] = { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad }; static const u8 C17[] = { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32, 0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0, 0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78, 0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99, 0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f }; static const u8 T17[] = { 0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4, 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 }; /* Test Case 18 */ # define K18 K17 # define P18 P17 # define A18 A17 static const u8 IV18[] = { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39, 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54, 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }; static const u8 C18[] = { 0x5a, 0x8d, 0xef, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x9e, 0x53, 0xf1, 0xf7, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x53, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x20, 0xee, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x64, 0x19, 0xa0, 0x58, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6b, 0xf4, 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x45, 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e, 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }; static const u8 T18[] = { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a }; /* Test Case 19 */ # define K19 K1 # define P19 P1 # define IV19 IV1 # define C19 C1 static const u8 A19[] = { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55, 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad }; static const u8 T19[] = { 0x5f, 0xea, 0x79, 0x3a, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x97, 0x4d, 0x37, 0xe6, 0x8e, 0x0c, 0xb8, 0xff, 0x94, 0x92 }; /* Test Case 20 */ # define K20 K1 # define A20 A1 /* this results in 0xff in counter LSB */ static const u8 IV20[64] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; static const u8 P20[288]; static const u8 C20[] = { 0x56, 0xb3, 0x37, 0x3c, 0xa9, 0xef, 0x6e, 0x4a, 0x2b, 0x64, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x9a, 0x17, 0xb6, 0x14, 0x25, 0xf1, 0x0d, 0x47, 0xa7, 0x5a, 0x5f, 0xce, 0x13, 0xef, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0x78, 0x4a, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0x41, 0x41, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0xf7, 0xc7, 0x70, 0x88, 0x7a, 0xfd, 0x57, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x54, 0x18, 0xa9, 0xae, 0xff, 0xcd, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0xed, 0xdf, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x97, 0xb9, 0xa8, 0x5b, 0x49, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x58, 0x25, 0x72, 0x67, 0xca, 0xab, 0x2a, 0xd0, 0xb2, 0x3c, 0xa4, 0x76, 0xa5, 0x3c, 0xb1, 0x7f, 0xb4, 0x1c, 0x4b, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x5c, 0xb4, 0xf3, 0xf7, 0x16, 0x50, 0x94, 0xc2, 0x29, 0xc9, 0xe8, 0xc4, 0xdc, 0x0a, 0x2a, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x90, 0x3e, 0x50, 0x15, 0x11, 0x22, 0x13, 0x76, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0xb8, 0x36, 0x4c, 0x50, 0x61, 0xa2, 0x0c, 0xae, 0x74, 0xbc, 0x4a, 0xcd, 0x76, 0xce, 0xb0, 0xab, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0x32, 0x17, 0xef, 0x9f, 0x8c, 0x90, 0xbe, 0x40, 0x2d, 0xdf, 0x6d, 0x86, 0x97, 0xf4, 0xf8, 0x80, 0xdf, 0xf1, 0x5b, 0xfb, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0x28, 0x24, 0x1e, 0xc8, 0xfe, 0x18, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x59, 0xe3, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xff, 0x65, 0x3c, 0x71, 0x26, 0xf0, 0xac, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x11, 0xf4, 0x2b, 0xae, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x70, 0xbe, 0xf1, 0xab, 0x5e, 0x36, 0x06, 0x87, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0x0d, 0xee, 0x15, 0xb3, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x95, 0x8f, 0x23, 0x13, 0x4c, 0x4b, 0xcc, 0xb7, 0xd0, 0x32, 0x00, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x20, 0xa2, 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x66, 0xdc, 0xf3, 0x64, 0x4d, 0x14, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xb5, 0x69, 0x90, 0x03, 0xc1, 0x3e, 0xce, 0xf4, 0xbf, 0x38, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x0e, 0xed, 0xc3, 0x40, 0x33, 0xba, 0xc1, 0x90, 0x27, 0x83, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x89, 0xe2, 0xe7, 0x74, 0x18, 0x8a, 0x43, 0x9c, 0x7e, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0x67, 0x2d, 0xbd, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0xcf, 0xb2, 0x79, 0x46, 0x13, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x41, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xf7, 0x78, 0x70, 0x8a, 0x70, 0xee, 0x7d, 0x75, 0x16, 0x5c }; static const u8 T20[] = { 0x8b, 0x30, 0x7f, 0x6b, 0x33, 0x28, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0xb0, 0x26, 0xa9, 0xed, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0xe8, 0x5f }; # define TEST_CASE(n) do { \ u8 out[sizeof(P##n)]; \ AES_set_encrypt_key(K##n,sizeof(K##n)*8,&key); \ CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&ctx,&key,(block128_f)AES_encrypt); \ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&ctx,IV##n,sizeof(IV##n)); \ memset(out,0,sizeof(out)); \ if (A##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&ctx,A##n,sizeof(A##n)); \ if (P##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&ctx,P##n,out,sizeof(out)); \ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&ctx,T##n,16) || \ (C##n && memcmp(out,C##n,sizeof(out)))) \ ret++, printf ("encrypt test#%d failed.\n",n); \ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&ctx,IV##n,sizeof(IV##n)); \ memset(out,0,sizeof(out)); \ if (A##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&ctx,A##n,sizeof(A##n)); \ if (C##n) CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&ctx,C##n,out,sizeof(out)); \ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&ctx,T##n,16) || \ (P##n && memcmp(out,P##n,sizeof(out)))) \ ret++, printf ("decrypt test#%d failed.\n",n); \ } while(0) int main() { GCM128_CONTEXT ctx; AES_KEY key; int ret = 0; TEST_CASE(1); TEST_CASE(2); TEST_CASE(3); TEST_CASE(4); TEST_CASE(5); TEST_CASE(6); TEST_CASE(7); TEST_CASE(8); TEST_CASE(9); TEST_CASE(10); TEST_CASE(11); TEST_CASE(12); TEST_CASE(13); TEST_CASE(14); TEST_CASE(15); TEST_CASE(16); TEST_CASE(17); TEST_CASE(18); TEST_CASE(19); TEST_CASE(20); # ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ { size_t start, stop, gcm_t, ctr_t, OPENSSL_rdtsc(); union { u64 u; u8 c[1024]; } buf; int i; AES_set_encrypt_key(K1, sizeof(K1) * 8, &key); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&ctx, &key, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&ctx, IV1, sizeof(IV1)); CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&ctx, buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf)); start = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&ctx, buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf)); gcm_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start; CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf), &key, ctx.Yi.c, ctx.EKi.c, &ctx.mres, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); start = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(buf.c, buf.c, sizeof(buf), &key, ctx.Yi.c, ctx.EKi.c, &ctx.mres, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); ctr_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start; printf("%.2f-%.2f=%.2f\n", gcm_t / (double)sizeof(buf), ctr_t / (double)sizeof(buf), (gcm_t - ctr_t) / (double)sizeof(buf)); # ifdef GHASH { void (*gcm_ghash_p) (u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *inp, size_t len) = ctx.ghash; GHASH((&ctx), buf.c, sizeof(buf)); start = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) GHASH((&ctx), buf.c, sizeof(buf)); gcm_t = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - start; printf("%.2f\n", gcm_t / (double)sizeof(buf) / (double)i); } # endif } # endif return ret; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/ccm128.c0000644000000000000000000002671513176625657015666 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include /* * First you setup M and L parameters and pass the key schedule. This is * called once per session setup... */ void CRYPTO_ccm128_init(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned int M, unsigned int L, void *key, block128_f block) { memset(ctx->nonce.c, 0, sizeof(ctx->nonce.c)); ctx->nonce.c[0] = ((u8)(L - 1) & 7) | (u8)(((M - 2) / 2) & 7) << 3; ctx->blocks = 0; ctx->block = block; ctx->key = key; } /* !!! Following interfaces are to be called *once* per packet !!! */ /* Then you setup per-message nonce and pass the length of the message */ int CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nlen, size_t mlen) { unsigned int L = ctx->nonce.c[0] & 7; /* the L parameter */ if (nlen < (14 - L)) return -1; /* nonce is too short */ if (sizeof(mlen) == 8 && L >= 3) { ctx->nonce.c[8] = (u8)(mlen >> (56 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8))); ctx->nonce.c[9] = (u8)(mlen >> (48 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8))); ctx->nonce.c[10] = (u8)(mlen >> (40 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8))); ctx->nonce.c[11] = (u8)(mlen >> (32 % (sizeof(mlen) * 8))); } else ctx->nonce.u[1] = 0; ctx->nonce.c[12] = (u8)(mlen >> 24); ctx->nonce.c[13] = (u8)(mlen >> 16); ctx->nonce.c[14] = (u8)(mlen >> 8); ctx->nonce.c[15] = (u8)mlen; ctx->nonce.c[0] &= ~0x40; /* clear Adata flag */ memcpy(&ctx->nonce.c[1], nonce, 14 - L); return 0; } /* Then you pass additional authentication data, this is optional */ void CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t alen) { unsigned int i; block128_f block = ctx->block; if (alen == 0) return; ctx->nonce.c[0] |= 0x40; /* set Adata flag */ (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, ctx->key), ctx->blocks++; if (alen < (0x10000 - 0x100)) { ctx->cmac.c[0] ^= (u8)(alen >> 8); ctx->cmac.c[1] ^= (u8)alen; i = 2; } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8 && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) { ctx->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xFF; ctx->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xFF; ctx->cmac.c[2] ^= (u8)(alen >> (56 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))); ctx->cmac.c[3] ^= (u8)(alen >> (48 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))); ctx->cmac.c[4] ^= (u8)(alen >> (40 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))); ctx->cmac.c[5] ^= (u8)(alen >> (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))); ctx->cmac.c[6] ^= (u8)(alen >> 24); ctx->cmac.c[7] ^= (u8)(alen >> 16); ctx->cmac.c[8] ^= (u8)(alen >> 8); ctx->cmac.c[9] ^= (u8)alen; i = 10; } else { ctx->cmac.c[0] ^= 0xFF; ctx->cmac.c[1] ^= 0xFE; ctx->cmac.c[2] ^= (u8)(alen >> 24); ctx->cmac.c[3] ^= (u8)(alen >> 16); ctx->cmac.c[4] ^= (u8)(alen >> 8); ctx->cmac.c[5] ^= (u8)alen; i = 6; } do { for (; i < 16 && alen; ++i, ++aad, --alen) ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= *aad; (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, ctx->key), ctx->blocks++; i = 0; } while (alen); } /* Finally you encrypt or decrypt the message */ /* * counter part of nonce may not be larger than L*8 bits, L is not larger * than 8, therefore 64-bit counter... */ static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) { unsigned int n = 8; u8 c; counter += 8; do { --n; c = counter[n]; ++c; counter[n] = c; if (c) return; } while (n); } int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len) { size_t n; unsigned int i, L; unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0]; block128_f block = ctx->block; void *key = ctx->key; union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } scratch; if (!(flags0 & 0x40)) (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key), ctx->blocks++; ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7; for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) { n |= ctx->nonce.c[i]; ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; n <<= 8; } n |= ctx->nonce.c[15]; /* reconstructed length */ ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1; if (n != len) return -1; /* length mismatch */ ctx->blocks += ((len + 15) >> 3) | 1; if (ctx->blocks > (U64(1) << 61)) return -2; /* too much data */ while (len >= 16) { #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } temp; memcpy(temp.c, inp, 16); ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= temp.u[0]; ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= temp.u[1]; #else ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= ((u64 *)inp)[0]; ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= ((u64 *)inp)[1]; #endif (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); ctr64_inc(ctx->nonce.c); #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) temp.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0]; temp.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1]; memcpy(out, temp.c, 16); #else ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[0]; ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[1]; #endif inp += 16; out += 16; len -= 16; } if (len) { for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= inp[i]; (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i]; } for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i) ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0]; ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1]; ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0; return 0; } int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len) { size_t n; unsigned int i, L; unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0]; block128_f block = ctx->block; void *key = ctx->key; union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } scratch; if (!(flags0 & 0x40)) (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7; for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) { n |= ctx->nonce.c[i]; ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; n <<= 8; } n |= ctx->nonce.c[15]; /* reconstructed length */ ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1; if (n != len) return -1; while (len >= 16) { #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } temp; #endif (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); ctr64_inc(ctx->nonce.c); #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) memcpy(temp.c, inp, 16); ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= (scratch.u[0] ^= temp.u[0]); ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= (scratch.u[1] ^= temp.u[1]); memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16); #else ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= (((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[0]); ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= (((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[1]); #endif (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); inp += 16; out += 16; len -= 16; } if (len) { (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= (out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i]); (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); } for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i) ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0]; ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1]; ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0; return 0; } static void ctr64_add(unsigned char *counter, size_t inc) { size_t n = 8, val = 0; counter += 8; do { --n; val += counter[n] + (inc & 0xff); counter[n] = (unsigned char)val; val >>= 8; /* carry bit */ inc >>= 8; } while (n && (inc || val)); } int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ccm128_f stream) { size_t n; unsigned int i, L; unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0]; block128_f block = ctx->block; void *key = ctx->key; union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } scratch; if (!(flags0 & 0x40)) (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key), ctx->blocks++; ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7; for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) { n |= ctx->nonce.c[i]; ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; n <<= 8; } n |= ctx->nonce.c[15]; /* reconstructed length */ ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1; if (n != len) return -1; /* length mismatch */ ctx->blocks += ((len + 15) >> 3) | 1; if (ctx->blocks > (U64(1) << 61)) return -2; /* too much data */ if ((n = len / 16)) { (*stream) (inp, out, n, key, ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c); n *= 16; inp += n; out += n; len -= n; if (len) ctr64_add(ctx->nonce.c, n / 16); } if (len) { for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= inp[i]; (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i]; } for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i) ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0]; ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1]; ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0; return 0; } int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ccm128_f stream) { size_t n; unsigned int i, L; unsigned char flags0 = ctx->nonce.c[0]; block128_f block = ctx->block; void *key = ctx->key; union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } scratch; if (!(flags0 & 0x40)) (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); ctx->nonce.c[0] = L = flags0 & 7; for (n = 0, i = 15 - L; i < 15; ++i) { n |= ctx->nonce.c[i]; ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; n <<= 8; } n |= ctx->nonce.c[15]; /* reconstructed length */ ctx->nonce.c[15] = 1; if (n != len) return -1; if ((n = len / 16)) { (*stream) (inp, out, n, key, ctx->nonce.c, ctx->cmac.c); n *= 16; inp += n; out += n; len -= n; if (len) ctr64_add(ctx->nonce.c, n / 16); } if (len) { (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) ctx->cmac.c[i] ^= (out[i] = scratch.c[i] ^ inp[i]); (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); } for (i = 15 - L; i < 16; ++i) ctx->nonce.c[i] = 0; (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= scratch.u[0]; ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1]; ctx->nonce.c[0] = flags0; return 0; } size_t CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len) { unsigned int M = (ctx->nonce.c[0] >> 3) & 7; /* the M parameter */ M *= 2; M += 2; if (len < M) return 0; memcpy(tag, ctx->cmac.c, M); return M; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/ofb128.c0000644000000000000000000000417213176625657015663 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include /* * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, block128_f block) { unsigned int n; size_t l = 0; n = *num; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */ do { while (n && len) { *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ivec[n]; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } # if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) break; # endif while (len >= 16) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) *(size_t *)(out + n) = *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ivec + n); len -= 16; out += 16; in += 16; n = 0; } if (len) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); while (len--) { out[n] = in[n] ^ ivec[n]; ++n; } } *num = n; return; } while (0); } /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */ #endif while (l < len) { if (n == 0) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); } out[l] = in[l] ^ ivec[n]; ++l; n = (n + 1) % 16; } *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/cfb128.c0000644000000000000000000001475613176625657015660 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include /* * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, int enc, block128_f block) { unsigned int n; size_t l = 0; n = *num; if (enc) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */ do { while (n && len) { *(out++) = ivec[n] ^= *(in++); --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } # if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) break; # endif while (len >= 16) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) { *(size_t *)(out + n) = *(size_t *)(ivec + n) ^= *(size_t *)(in + n); } len -= 16; out += 16; in += 16; n = 0; } if (len) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); while (len--) { out[n] = ivec[n] ^= in[n]; ++n; } } *num = n; return; } while (0); } /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */ #endif while (l < len) { if (n == 0) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); } out[l] = ivec[n] ^= in[l]; ++l; n = (n + 1) % 16; } *num = n; } else { #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true actually */ do { while (n && len) { unsigned char c; *(out++) = ivec[n] ^ (c = *(in++)); ivec[n] = c; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } # if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) != 0) break; # endif while (len >= 16) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) { size_t t = *(size_t *)(in + n); *(size_t *)(out + n) = *(size_t *)(ivec + n) ^ t; *(size_t *)(ivec + n) = t; } len -= 16; out += 16; in += 16; n = 0; } if (len) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); while (len--) { unsigned char c; out[n] = ivec[n] ^ (c = in[n]); ivec[n] = c; ++n; } } *num = n; return; } while (0); } /* the rest would be commonly eliminated by x86* compiler */ #endif while (l < len) { unsigned char c; if (n == 0) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); } out[l] = ivec[n] ^ (c = in[l]); ivec[n] = c; ++l; n = (n + 1) % 16; } *num = n; } } /* * This expects a single block of size nbits for both in and out. Note that * it corrupts any extra bits in the last byte of out */ static void cfbr_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int nbits, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int enc, block128_f block) { int n, rem, num; unsigned char ovec[16 * 2 + 1]; /* +1 because we dereference (but don't * use) one byte off the end */ if (nbits <= 0 || nbits > 128) return; /* fill in the first half of the new IV with the current IV */ memcpy(ovec, ivec, 16); /* construct the new IV */ (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); num = (nbits + 7) / 8; if (enc) /* encrypt the input */ for (n = 0; n < num; ++n) out[n] = (ovec[16 + n] = in[n] ^ ivec[n]); else /* decrypt the input */ for (n = 0; n < num; ++n) out[n] = (ovec[16 + n] = in[n]) ^ ivec[n]; /* shift ovec left... */ rem = nbits % 8; num = nbits / 8; if (rem == 0) memcpy(ivec, ovec + num, 16); else for (n = 0; n < 16; ++n) ivec[n] = ovec[n + num] << rem | ovec[n + num + 1] >> (8 - rem); /* it is not necessary to cleanse ovec, since the IV is not secret */ } /* N.B. This expects the input to be packed, MS bit first */ void CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t bits, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, int enc, block128_f block) { size_t n; unsigned char c[1], d[1]; for (n = 0; n < bits; ++n) { c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0; cfbr_encrypt_block(c, d, 1, key, ivec, enc, block); out[n / 8] = (out[n / 8] & ~(1 << (unsigned int)(7 - n % 8))) | ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8)); } } void CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, int enc, block128_f block) { size_t n; for (n = 0; n < length; ++n) cfbr_encrypt_block(&in[n], &out[n], 8, key, ivec, enc, block); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/modes/xts128.c0000644000000000000000000001053713176625657015735 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; union { u64 u[2]; u32 d[4]; u8 c[16]; } tweak, scratch; unsigned int i; if (len < 16) return -1; memcpy(tweak.c, iv, 16); (*ctx->block2) (tweak.c, tweak.c, ctx->key2); if (!enc && (len % 16)) len -= 16; while (len >= 16) { #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) memcpy(scratch.c, inp, 16); scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; #else scratch.u[0] = ((u64 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] = ((u64 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak.u[1]; #endif (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1); #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16); #else ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; #endif inp += 16; out += 16; len -= 16; if (len == 0) return 0; if (is_endian.little) { unsigned int carry, res; res = 0x87 & (((int)tweak.d[3]) >> 31); carry = (unsigned int)(tweak.u[0] >> 63); tweak.u[0] = (tweak.u[0] << 1) ^ res; tweak.u[1] = (tweak.u[1] << 1) | carry; } else { size_t c; for (c = 0, i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { /* * + substitutes for |, because c is 1 bit */ c += ((size_t)tweak.c[i]) << 1; tweak.c[i] = (u8)c; c = c >> 8; } tweak.c[0] ^= (u8)(0x87 & (0 - c)); } } if (enc) { for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { u8 c = inp[i]; out[i] = scratch.c[i]; scratch.c[i] = c; } scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1); scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; memcpy(out - 16, scratch.c, 16); } else { union { u64 u[2]; u8 c[16]; } tweak1; if (is_endian.little) { unsigned int carry, res; res = 0x87 & (((int)tweak.d[3]) >> 31); carry = (unsigned int)(tweak.u[0] >> 63); tweak1.u[0] = (tweak.u[0] << 1) ^ res; tweak1.u[1] = (tweak.u[1] << 1) | carry; } else { size_t c; for (c = 0, i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { /* * + substitutes for |, because c is 1 bit */ c += ((size_t)tweak.c[i]) << 1; tweak1.c[i] = (u8)c; c = c >> 8; } tweak1.c[0] ^= (u8)(0x87 & (0 - c)); } #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) memcpy(scratch.c, inp, 16); scratch.u[0] ^= tweak1.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak1.u[1]; #else scratch.u[0] = ((u64 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak1.u[0]; scratch.u[1] = ((u64 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak1.u[1]; #endif (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1); scratch.u[0] ^= tweak1.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak1.u[1]; for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { u8 c = inp[16 + i]; out[16 + i] = scratch.c[i]; scratch.c[i] = c; } scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1); #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16); #else ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ tweak.u[0]; ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ tweak.u[1]; #endif } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656015151 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c0000644000000000000000000000153713176625656017122 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include void Camellia_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char ivec[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned char ecount_buf[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned int *num) { CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, ecount_buf, num, (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/build.info0000644000000000000000000000074013176625656017126 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ cmll_ecb.c cmll_ofb.c cmll_cfb.c cmll_ctr.c \ {- $target{cmll_asm_src} -} GENERATE[cmll-x86.s]=asm/cmll-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[cmll-x86.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[cmll-x86_64.s]=asm/cmll-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[cmllt4-sparcv9.S]=asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[cmllt4-sparcv9.o]=.. DEPEND[cmllt4-sparcv9.S]=../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c0000644000000000000000000000214213176625656017256 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "cmll_locl.h" int Camellia_set_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, CAMELLIA_KEY *key) { if (!userKey || !key) return -1; if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) return -2; key->grand_rounds = Camellia_Ekeygen(bits, userKey, key->u.rd_key); return 0; } void Camellia_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key) { Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(key->grand_rounds, in, key->u.rd_key, out); } void Camellia_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key) { Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(key->grand_rounds, in, key->u.rd_key, out); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656015731 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000006263613176625656020166 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Copyright (c) 2008 Andy Polyakov # # This module may be used under the terms of either the GNU General # Public License version 2 or later, the GNU Lesser General Public # License version 2.1 or later, the Mozilla Public License version # 1.1 or the BSD License. The exact terms of either license are # distributed along with this module. For further details see # http://www.openssl.org/~appro/camellia/. # ==================================================================== # Performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better) in # 'openssl speed ...' benchmark: # # AMD64 Core2 EM64T # -evp camellia-128-ecb 16.7 21.0 22.7 # + over gcc 3.4.6 +25% +5% 0% # # camellia-128-cbc 15.7 20.4 21.1 # # 128-bit key setup 128 216 205 cycles/key # + over gcc 3.4.6 +54% +39% +15% # # Numbers in "+" rows represent performance improvement over compiler # generated code. Key setup timings are impressive on AMD and Core2 # thanks to 64-bit operations being covertly deployed. Improvement on # EM64T, pre-Core2 Intel x86_64 CPU, is not as impressive, because it # apparently emulates some of 64-bit operations in [32-bit] microcode. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; sub hi() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1h/; $r; } sub lo() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/; $r =~ s/%[er]([sd]i)/%\1l/; $r =~ s/%(r[0-9]+)[d]?/%\1b/; $r; } $t0="%eax";$t1="%ebx";$t2="%ecx";$t3="%edx"; @S=("%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d"); $i0="%esi"; $i1="%edi"; $Tbl="%rbp"; # size optimization $inp="%r12"; $out="%r13"; $key="%r14"; $keyend="%r15"; $arg0d=$win64?"%ecx":"%edi"; # const unsigned int Camellia_SBOX[4][256]; # Well, sort of... Camellia_SBOX[0][] is interleaved with [1][], # and [2][] - with [3][]. This is done to minimize code size. $SBOX1_1110=0; # Camellia_SBOX[0] $SBOX4_4404=4; # Camellia_SBOX[1] $SBOX2_0222=2048; # Camellia_SBOX[2] $SBOX3_3033=2052; # Camellia_SBOX[3] sub Camellia_Feistel { my $i=@_[0]; my $seed=defined(@_[1])?@_[1]:0; my $scale=$seed<0?-8:8; my $j=($i&1)*2; my ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3)=(@S[($j)%4],@S[($j+1)%4],@S[($j+2)%4],@S[($j+3)%4]); $code.=<<___; xor $s0,$t0 # t0^=key[0] xor $s1,$t1 # t1^=key[1] movz `&hi("$t0")`,$i0 # (t0>>8)&0xff movz `&lo("$t1")`,$i1 # (t1>>0)&0xff mov $SBOX3_3033($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3 # t3=SBOX3_3033[0] mov $SBOX1_1110($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2 # t2=SBOX1_1110[1] movz `&lo("$t0")`,$i0 # (t0>>0)&0xff shr \$16,$t0 movz `&hi("$t1")`,$i1 # (t1>>8)&0xff xor $SBOX4_4404($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3 # t3^=SBOX4_4404[0] shr \$16,$t1 xor $SBOX4_4404($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2 # t2^=SBOX4_4404[1] movz `&hi("$t0")`,$i0 # (t0>>24)&0xff movz `&lo("$t1")`,$i1 # (t1>>16)&0xff xor $SBOX1_1110($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3 # t3^=SBOX1_1110[0] xor $SBOX3_3033($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2 # t2^=SBOX3_3033[1] movz `&lo("$t0")`,$i0 # (t0>>16)&0xff movz `&hi("$t1")`,$i1 # (t1>>24)&0xff xor $SBOX2_0222($Tbl,$i0,8),$t3 # t3^=SBOX2_0222[0] xor $SBOX2_0222($Tbl,$i1,8),$t2 # t2^=SBOX2_0222[1] mov `$seed+($i+1)*$scale`($key),$t1 # prefetch key[i+1] mov `$seed+($i+1)*$scale+4`($key),$t0 xor $t3,$t2 # t2^=t3 ror \$8,$t3 # t3=RightRotate(t3,8) xor $t2,$s2 xor $t2,$s3 xor $t3,$s3 ___ } # void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds( # int grandRounds, # const Byte plaintext[], # const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, # Byte ciphertext[]) $code=<<___; .text # V1.x API .globl Camellia_EncryptBlock .type Camellia_EncryptBlock,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 Camellia_EncryptBlock: movl \$128,%eax subl $arg0d,%eax movl \$3,$arg0d adcl \$0,$arg0d # keyBitLength==128?3:4 jmp .Lenc_rounds .size Camellia_EncryptBlock,.-Camellia_EncryptBlock # V2 .globl Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds .type Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds,\@function,4 .align 16 .Lenc_rounds: Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds: push %rbx push %rbp push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lenc_prologue: #mov %rsi,$inp # put away arguments mov %rcx,$out mov %rdx,$key shl \$6,%edi # process grandRounds lea .LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl lea ($key,%rdi),$keyend mov 0(%rsi),@S[0] # load plaintext mov 4(%rsi),@S[1] mov 8(%rsi),@S[2] bswap @S[0] mov 12(%rsi),@S[3] bswap @S[1] bswap @S[2] bswap @S[3] call _x86_64_Camellia_encrypt bswap @S[0] bswap @S[1] bswap @S[2] mov @S[0],0($out) bswap @S[3] mov @S[1],4($out) mov @S[2],8($out) mov @S[3],12($out) mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%rbp mov 32(%rsp),%rbx lea 40(%rsp),%rsp .Lenc_epilogue: ret .size Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds,.-Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds .type _x86_64_Camellia_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _x86_64_Camellia_encrypt: xor 0($key),@S[1] xor 4($key),@S[0] # ^=key[0-3] xor 8($key),@S[3] xor 12($key),@S[2] .align 16 .Leloop: mov 16($key),$t1 # prefetch key[4-5] mov 20($key),$t0 ___ for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,16); } $code.=<<___; lea 16*4($key),$key cmp $keyend,$key mov 8($key),$t3 # prefetch key[2-3] mov 12($key),$t2 je .Ledone and @S[0],$t0 or @S[3],$t3 rol \$1,$t0 xor $t3,@S[2] # s2^=s3|key[3]; xor $t0,@S[1] # s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1); and @S[2],$t2 or @S[1],$t1 rol \$1,$t2 xor $t1,@S[0] # s0^=s1|key[1]; xor $t2,@S[3] # s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1); jmp .Leloop .align 16 .Ledone: xor @S[2],$t0 # SwapHalf xor @S[3],$t1 xor @S[0],$t2 xor @S[1],$t3 mov $t0,@S[0] mov $t1,@S[1] mov $t2,@S[2] mov $t3,@S[3] .byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret .size _x86_64_Camellia_encrypt,.-_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt # V1.x API .globl Camellia_DecryptBlock .type Camellia_DecryptBlock,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 Camellia_DecryptBlock: movl \$128,%eax subl $arg0d,%eax movl \$3,$arg0d adcl \$0,$arg0d # keyBitLength==128?3:4 jmp .Ldec_rounds .size Camellia_DecryptBlock,.-Camellia_DecryptBlock # V2 .globl Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds .type Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds,\@function,4 .align 16 .Ldec_rounds: Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds: push %rbx push %rbp push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Ldec_prologue: #mov %rsi,$inp # put away arguments mov %rcx,$out mov %rdx,$keyend shl \$6,%edi # process grandRounds lea .LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl lea ($keyend,%rdi),$key mov 0(%rsi),@S[0] # load plaintext mov 4(%rsi),@S[1] mov 8(%rsi),@S[2] bswap @S[0] mov 12(%rsi),@S[3] bswap @S[1] bswap @S[2] bswap @S[3] call _x86_64_Camellia_decrypt bswap @S[0] bswap @S[1] bswap @S[2] mov @S[0],0($out) bswap @S[3] mov @S[1],4($out) mov @S[2],8($out) mov @S[3],12($out) mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%rbp mov 32(%rsp),%rbx lea 40(%rsp),%rsp .Ldec_epilogue: ret .size Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds,.-Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds .type _x86_64_Camellia_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 _x86_64_Camellia_decrypt: xor 0($key),@S[1] xor 4($key),@S[0] # ^=key[0-3] xor 8($key),@S[3] xor 12($key),@S[2] .align 16 .Ldloop: mov -8($key),$t1 # prefetch key[4-5] mov -4($key),$t0 ___ for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,-8); } $code.=<<___; lea -16*4($key),$key cmp $keyend,$key mov 0($key),$t3 # prefetch key[2-3] mov 4($key),$t2 je .Lddone and @S[0],$t0 or @S[3],$t3 rol \$1,$t0 xor $t3,@S[2] # s2^=s3|key[3]; xor $t0,@S[1] # s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1); and @S[2],$t2 or @S[1],$t1 rol \$1,$t2 xor $t1,@S[0] # s0^=s1|key[1]; xor $t2,@S[3] # s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1); jmp .Ldloop .align 16 .Lddone: xor @S[2],$t2 xor @S[3],$t3 xor @S[0],$t0 xor @S[1],$t1 mov $t2,@S[0] # SwapHalf mov $t3,@S[1] mov $t0,@S[2] mov $t1,@S[3] .byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret .size _x86_64_Camellia_decrypt,.-_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt ___ sub _saveround { my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_; my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0; if ($#T==3) { $code.=<<___; mov @T[1],`$bias+$rnd*8+0`($key) mov @T[0],`$bias+$rnd*8+4`($key) mov @T[3],`$bias+$rnd*8+8`($key) mov @T[2],`$bias+$rnd*8+12`($key) ___ } else { $code.=" mov @T[0],`$bias+$rnd*8+0`($key)\n"; $code.=" mov @T[1],`$bias+$rnd*8+8`($key)\n" if ($#T>=1); } } sub _loadround { my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_; my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0; $code.=" mov `$bias+$rnd*8+0`($key),@T[0]\n"; $code.=" mov `$bias+$rnd*8+8`($key),@T[1]\n" if ($#T>=1); } # shld is very slow on Intel EM64T family. Even on AMD it limits # instruction decode rate [because it's VectorPath] and consequently # performance... sub __rotl128 { my ($i0,$i1,$rot)=@_; if ($rot) { $code.=<<___; mov $i0,%r11 shld \$$rot,$i1,$i0 shld \$$rot,%r11,$i1 ___ } } # ... Implementing 128-bit rotate without shld gives 80% better # performance EM64T, +15% on AMD64 and only ~7% degradation on # Core2. This is therefore preferred. sub _rotl128 { my ($i0,$i1,$rot)=@_; if ($rot) { $code.=<<___; mov $i0,%r11 shl \$$rot,$i0 mov $i1,%r9 shr \$`64-$rot`,%r9 shr \$`64-$rot`,%r11 or %r9,$i0 shl \$$rot,$i1 or %r11,$i1 ___ } } { my $step=0; $code.=<<___; .globl Camellia_Ekeygen .type Camellia_Ekeygen,\@function,3 .align 16 Camellia_Ekeygen: push %rbx push %rbp push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lkey_prologue: mov %edi,${keyend}d # put away arguments, keyBitLength mov %rdx,$out # keyTable mov 0(%rsi),@S[0] # load 0-127 bits mov 4(%rsi),@S[1] mov 8(%rsi),@S[2] mov 12(%rsi),@S[3] bswap @S[0] bswap @S[1] bswap @S[2] bswap @S[3] ___ &_saveround (0,$out,@S); # KL<<<0 $code.=<<___; cmp \$128,$keyend # check keyBitLength je .L1st128 mov 16(%rsi),@S[0] # load 128-191 bits mov 20(%rsi),@S[1] cmp \$192,$keyend je .L1st192 mov 24(%rsi),@S[2] # load 192-255 bits mov 28(%rsi),@S[3] jmp .L1st256 .L1st192: mov @S[0],@S[2] mov @S[1],@S[3] not @S[2] not @S[3] .L1st256: bswap @S[0] bswap @S[1] bswap @S[2] bswap @S[3] ___ &_saveround (4,$out,@S); # temp storage for KR! $code.=<<___; xor 0($out),@S[1] # KR^KL xor 4($out),@S[0] xor 8($out),@S[3] xor 12($out),@S[2] .L1st128: lea .LCamellia_SIGMA(%rip),$key lea .LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl mov 0($key),$t1 mov 4($key),$t0 ___ &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); $code.=<<___; xor 0($out),@S[1] # ^KL xor 4($out),@S[0] xor 8($out),@S[3] xor 12($out),@S[2] ___ &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); $code.=<<___; cmp \$128,$keyend jne .L2nd256 lea 128($out),$out # size optimization shl \$32,%r8 # @S[0]|| shl \$32,%r10 # @S[2]|| or %r9,%r8 # ||@S[1] or %r11,%r10 # ||@S[3] ___ &_loadround (0,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL &_saveround (2,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KA<<<0 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",15); &_saveround (4,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<15 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",15); &_saveround (6,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KA<<<15 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",15); # 15+15=30 &_saveround (8,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KA<<<30 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",30); # 15+30=45 &_saveround (10,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<45 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",15); # 30+15=45 &_saveround (12,$out,-128,"%r8"); # KA<<<45 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",15); # 45+15=60 &_saveround (13,$out,-128,"%rbx"); # KL<<<60 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",15); # 45+15=60 &_saveround (14,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KA<<<60 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",17); # 60+17=77 &_saveround (16,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<77 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",17); # 77+17=94 &_saveround (18,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<94 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",34); # 60+34=94 &_saveround (20,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KA<<<94 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",17); # 94+17=111 &_saveround (22,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<111 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",17); # 94+17=111 &_saveround (24,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KA<<<111 $code.=<<___; mov \$3,%eax jmp .Ldone .align 16 .L2nd256: ___ &_saveround (6,$out,@S); # temp storage for KA! $code.=<<___; xor `4*8+0`($out),@S[1] # KA^KR xor `4*8+4`($out),@S[0] xor `5*8+0`($out),@S[3] xor `5*8+4`($out),@S[2] ___ &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &_loadround (0,$out,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL &_loadround (4,$out,"%rcx","%rdx"); # KR &_loadround (6,$out,"%r14","%r15"); # KA $code.=<<___; lea 128($out),$out # size optimization shl \$32,%r8 # @S[0]|| shl \$32,%r10 # @S[2]|| or %r9,%r8 # ||@S[1] or %r11,%r10 # ||@S[3] ___ &_saveround (2,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KB<<<0 &_rotl128 ("%rcx","%rdx",15); &_saveround (4,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx"); # KR<<<15 &_rotl128 ("%r14","%r15",15); &_saveround (6,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15"); # KA<<<15 &_rotl128 ("%rcx","%rdx",15); # 15+15=30 &_saveround (8,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx"); # KR<<<30 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",30); &_saveround (10,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KB<<<30 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",45); &_saveround (12,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<45 &_rotl128 ("%r14","%r15",30); # 15+30=45 &_saveround (14,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15"); # KA<<<45 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",15); # 45+15=60 &_saveround (16,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<60 &_rotl128 ("%rcx","%rdx",30); # 30+30=60 &_saveround (18,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx"); # KR<<<60 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",30); # 30+30=60 &_saveround (20,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KB<<<60 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",17); # 60+17=77 &_saveround (22,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<77 &_rotl128 ("%r14","%r15",32); # 45+32=77 &_saveround (24,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15"); # KA<<<77 &_rotl128 ("%rcx","%rdx",34); # 60+34=94 &_saveround (26,$out,-128,"%rcx","%rdx"); # KR<<<94 &_rotl128 ("%r14","%r15",17); # 77+17=94 &_saveround (28,$out,-128,"%r14","%r15"); # KA<<<77 &_rotl128 ("%rax","%rbx",34); # 77+34=111 &_saveround (30,$out,-128,"%rax","%rbx"); # KL<<<111 &_rotl128 ("%r8","%r10",51); # 60+51=111 &_saveround (32,$out,-128,"%r8","%r10"); # KB<<<111 $code.=<<___; mov \$4,%eax .Ldone: mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%rbp mov 32(%rsp),%rbx lea 40(%rsp),%rsp .Lkey_epilogue: ret .size Camellia_Ekeygen,.-Camellia_Ekeygen ___ } @SBOX=( 112,130, 44,236,179, 39,192,229,228,133, 87, 53,234, 12,174, 65, 35,239,107,147, 69, 25,165, 33,237, 14, 79, 78, 29,101,146,189, 134,184,175,143,124,235, 31,206, 62, 48,220, 95, 94,197, 11, 26, 166,225, 57,202,213, 71, 93, 61,217, 1, 90,214, 81, 86,108, 77, 139, 13,154,102,251,204,176, 45,116, 18, 43, 32,240,177,132,153, 223, 76,203,194, 52,126,118, 5,109,183,169, 49,209, 23, 4,215, 20, 88, 58, 97,222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15,156, 22, 83, 24,242, 34, 254, 68,207,178,195,181,122,145, 36, 8,232,168, 96,252,105, 80, 170,208,160,125,161,137, 98,151, 84, 91, 30,149,224,255,100,210, 16,196, 0, 72,163,247,117,219,138, 3,230,218, 9, 63,221,148, 135, 92,131, 2,205, 74,144, 51,115,103,246,243,157,127,191,226, 82,155,216, 38,200, 55,198, 59,129,150,111, 75, 19,190, 99, 46, 233,121,167,140,159,110,188,142, 41,245,249,182, 47,253,180, 89, 120,152, 6,106,231, 70,113,186,212, 37,171, 66,136,162,141,250, 114, 7,185, 85,248,238,172, 10, 54, 73, 42,104, 60, 56,241,164, 64, 40,211,123,187,201, 67,193, 21,227,173,244,119,199,128,158); sub S1110 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=$i<<24|$i<<16|$i<<8; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); } sub S4404 { my $i=shift; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=$i<<24|$i<<16|$i; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); } sub S0222 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; $i=$i<<16|$i<<8|$i; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); } sub S3033 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i>>1|$i<<7)&0xff; $i=$i<<24|$i<<8|$i; sprintf("0x%08x",$i); } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .LCamellia_SIGMA: .long 0x3bcc908b, 0xa09e667f, 0x4caa73b2, 0xb67ae858 .long 0xe94f82be, 0xc6ef372f, 0xf1d36f1c, 0x54ff53a5 .long 0xde682d1d, 0x10e527fa, 0xb3e6c1fd, 0xb05688c2 .long 0, 0, 0, 0 .LCamellia_SBOX: ___ # tables are interleaved, remember? sub data_word { $code.=".long\t".join(',',@_)."\n"; } for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S1110($i),&S4404($i)); } for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S0222($i),&S3033($i)); } # void Camellia_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out, # size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); { $_key="0(%rsp)"; $_end="8(%rsp)"; # inp+len&~15 $_res="16(%rsp)"; # len&15 $ivec="24(%rsp)"; $_ivp="40(%rsp)"; $_rsp="48(%rsp)"; $code.=<<___; .globl Camellia_cbc_encrypt .type Camellia_cbc_encrypt,\@function,6 .align 16 Camellia_cbc_encrypt: cmp \$0,%rdx je .Lcbc_abort push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lcbc_prologue: mov %rsp,%rbp sub \$64,%rsp and \$-64,%rsp # place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule, # this ensures that cache associativity suffices lea -64-63(%rcx),%r10 sub %rsp,%r10 neg %r10 and \$0x3C0,%r10 sub %r10,%rsp #add \$8,%rsp # 8 is reserved for callee's ra mov %rdi,$inp # inp argument mov %rsi,$out # out argument mov %r8,%rbx # ivp argument mov %rcx,$key # key argument mov 272(%rcx),${keyend}d # grandRounds mov %r8,$_ivp mov %rbp,$_rsp .Lcbc_body: lea .LCamellia_SBOX(%rip),$Tbl mov \$32,%ecx .align 4 .Lcbc_prefetch_sbox: mov 0($Tbl),%rax mov 32($Tbl),%rsi mov 64($Tbl),%rdi mov 96($Tbl),%r11 lea 128($Tbl),$Tbl loop .Lcbc_prefetch_sbox sub \$4096,$Tbl shl \$6,$keyend mov %rdx,%rcx # len argument lea ($key,$keyend),$keyend cmp \$0,%r9d # enc argument je .LCBC_DECRYPT and \$-16,%rdx and \$15,%rcx # length residue lea ($inp,%rdx),%rdx mov $key,$_key mov %rdx,$_end mov %rcx,$_res cmp $inp,%rdx mov 0(%rbx),@S[0] # load IV mov 4(%rbx),@S[1] mov 8(%rbx),@S[2] mov 12(%rbx),@S[3] je .Lcbc_enc_tail jmp .Lcbc_eloop .align 16 .Lcbc_eloop: xor 0($inp),@S[0] xor 4($inp),@S[1] xor 8($inp),@S[2] bswap @S[0] xor 12($inp),@S[3] bswap @S[1] bswap @S[2] bswap @S[3] call _x86_64_Camellia_encrypt mov $_key,$key # "rewind" the key bswap @S[0] mov $_end,%rdx bswap @S[1] mov $_res,%rcx bswap @S[2] mov @S[0],0($out) bswap @S[3] mov @S[1],4($out) mov @S[2],8($out) lea 16($inp),$inp mov @S[3],12($out) cmp %rdx,$inp lea 16($out),$out jne .Lcbc_eloop cmp \$0,%rcx jne .Lcbc_enc_tail mov $_ivp,$out mov @S[0],0($out) # write out IV residue mov @S[1],4($out) mov @S[2],8($out) mov @S[3],12($out) jmp .Lcbc_done .align 16 .Lcbc_enc_tail: xor %rax,%rax mov %rax,0+$ivec mov %rax,8+$ivec mov %rax,$_res .Lcbc_enc_pushf: pushfq cld mov $inp,%rsi lea 8+$ivec,%rdi .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb popfq .Lcbc_enc_popf: lea $ivec,$inp lea 16+$ivec,%rax mov %rax,$_end jmp .Lcbc_eloop # one more time .align 16 .LCBC_DECRYPT: xchg $key,$keyend add \$15,%rdx and \$15,%rcx # length residue and \$-16,%rdx mov $key,$_key lea ($inp,%rdx),%rdx mov %rdx,$_end mov %rcx,$_res mov (%rbx),%rax # load IV mov 8(%rbx),%rbx jmp .Lcbc_dloop .align 16 .Lcbc_dloop: mov 0($inp),@S[0] mov 4($inp),@S[1] mov 8($inp),@S[2] bswap @S[0] mov 12($inp),@S[3] bswap @S[1] mov %rax,0+$ivec # save IV to temporary storage bswap @S[2] mov %rbx,8+$ivec bswap @S[3] call _x86_64_Camellia_decrypt mov $_key,$key # "rewind" the key mov $_end,%rdx mov $_res,%rcx bswap @S[0] mov ($inp),%rax # load IV for next iteration bswap @S[1] mov 8($inp),%rbx bswap @S[2] xor 0+$ivec,@S[0] bswap @S[3] xor 4+$ivec,@S[1] xor 8+$ivec,@S[2] lea 16($inp),$inp xor 12+$ivec,@S[3] cmp %rdx,$inp je .Lcbc_ddone mov @S[0],0($out) mov @S[1],4($out) mov @S[2],8($out) mov @S[3],12($out) lea 16($out),$out jmp .Lcbc_dloop .align 16 .Lcbc_ddone: mov $_ivp,%rdx cmp \$0,%rcx jne .Lcbc_dec_tail mov @S[0],0($out) mov @S[1],4($out) mov @S[2],8($out) mov @S[3],12($out) mov %rax,(%rdx) # write out IV residue mov %rbx,8(%rdx) jmp .Lcbc_done .align 16 .Lcbc_dec_tail: mov @S[0],0+$ivec mov @S[1],4+$ivec mov @S[2],8+$ivec mov @S[3],12+$ivec .Lcbc_dec_pushf: pushfq cld lea 8+$ivec,%rsi lea ($out),%rdi .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb popfq .Lcbc_dec_popf: mov %rax,(%rdx) # write out IV residue mov %rbx,8(%rdx) jmp .Lcbc_done .align 16 .Lcbc_done: mov $_rsp,%rcx mov 0(%rcx),%r15 mov 8(%rcx),%r14 mov 16(%rcx),%r13 mov 24(%rcx),%r12 mov 32(%rcx),%rbp mov 40(%rcx),%rbx lea 48(%rcx),%rsp .Lcbc_abort: ret .size Camellia_cbc_encrypt,.-Camellia_cbc_encrypt .asciz "Camellia for x86_64 by " ___ } # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type common_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 common_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq lea -64(%rsp),%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue lea 40(%rax),%rax mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r13 mov -32(%rax),%r14 mov -40(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi jmp .Lcommon_seh_exit .size common_se_handler,.-common_se_handler .type cbc_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 cbc_se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq lea -64(%rsp),%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lcbc_prologue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_prologue jb .Lin_cbc_prologue lea .Lcbc_body(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_body jb .Lin_cbc_frame_setup mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp lea .Lcbc_abort(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lcbc_abort jae .Lin_cbc_prologue # handle pushf/popf in Camellia_cbc_encrypt lea .Lcbc_enc_pushf(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<=.Lcbc_enc_pushf jbe .Lin_cbc_no_flag lea 8(%rax),%rax lea .Lcbc_enc_popf(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_enc_popf jb .Lin_cbc_no_flag lea -8(%rax),%rax lea .Lcbc_dec_pushf(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<=.Lcbc_dec_pushf jbe .Lin_cbc_no_flag lea 8(%rax),%rax lea .Lcbc_dec_popf(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lcbc_dec_popf jb .Lin_cbc_no_flag lea -8(%rax),%rax .Lin_cbc_no_flag: mov 48(%rax),%rax # $_rsp lea 48(%rax),%rax .Lin_cbc_frame_setup: mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_cbc_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi .align 4 .Lcommon_seh_exit: mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$`1232/8`,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch lea 64(%rsp),%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size cbc_se_handler,.-cbc_se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds .rva .LSEH_end_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds .rva .LSEH_info_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds .rva .LSEH_begin_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds .rva .LSEH_end_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds .rva .LSEH_info_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds .rva .LSEH_begin_Camellia_Ekeygen .rva .LSEH_end_Camellia_Ekeygen .rva .LSEH_info_Camellia_Ekeygen .rva .LSEH_begin_Camellia_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_end_Camellia_cbc_encrypt .rva .LSEH_info_Camellia_cbc_encrypt .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva common_se_handler .rva .Lenc_prologue,.Lenc_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva common_se_handler .rva .Ldec_prologue,.Ldec_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_Camellia_Ekeygen: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva common_se_handler .rva .Lkey_prologue,.Lkey_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_Camellia_cbc_encrypt: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva cbc_se_handler ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000005624313176625656021064 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by David S. Miller and Andy Polyakov # . The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD # license. October 2012. All rights reserved. # ==================================================================== ###################################################################### # Camellia for SPARC T4. # # As with AES below results [for aligned data] are virtually identical # to critical path lenths for 3-cycle instruction latency: # # 128-bit key 192/256- # CBC encrypt 4.14/4.21(*) 5.46/5.52 # (*) numbers after slash are for # misaligned data. # # As with Intel AES-NI, question is if it's possible to improve # performance of parallelizeable modes by interleaving round # instructions. In Camellia every instruction is dependent on # previous, which means that there is place for 2 additional ones # in between two dependent. Can we expect 3x performance improvement? # At least one can argue that it should be possible to break 2x # barrier... For some reason not even 2x appears to be possible: # # 128-bit key 192/256- # CBC decrypt 2.21/2.74 2.99/3.40 # CTR 2.15/2.68(*) 2.93/3.34 # (*) numbers after slash are for # misaligned data. # # This is for 2x interleave. But compared to 1x interleave CBC decrypt # improved by ... 0% for 128-bit key, and 11% for 192/256-bit one. # So that out-of-order execution logic can take non-interleaved code # to 1.87x, but can't take 2x interleaved one any further. There # surely is some explanation... As result 3x interleave was not even # attempted. Instead an effort was made to share specific modes # implementations with AES module (therefore sparct4_modes.pl). # # To anchor to something else, software C implementation processes # one byte in 38 cycles with 128-bit key on same processor. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "sparcv9_modes.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $::evp=1; # if $evp is set to 0, script generates module with # Camellia_[en|de]crypt, Camellia_set_key and Camellia_cbc_encrypt # entry points. These are fully compatible with openssl/camellia.h. ###################################################################### # single-round subroutines # { my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$tmp,$mask)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" .text .globl cmll_t4_encrypt .align 32 cmll_t4_encrypt: andcc $inp, 7, %g1 ! is input aligned? andn $inp, 7, $inp ldx [$key + 0], %g4 ldx [$key + 8], %g5 ldx [$inp + 0], %o4 bz,pt %icc, 1f ldx [$inp + 8], %o5 ldx [$inp + 16], $inp sll %g1, 3, %g1 sub %g0, %g1, %o3 sllx %o4, %g1, %o4 sllx %o5, %g1, %g1 srlx %o5, %o3, %o5 srlx $inp, %o3, %o3 or %o5, %o4, %o4 or %o3, %g1, %o5 1: ld [$key + 272], $rounds ! grandRounds, 3 or 4 ldd [$key + 16], %f12 ldd [$key + 24], %f14 xor %g4, %o4, %o4 xor %g5, %o5, %o5 ldd [$key + 32], %f16 ldd [$key + 40], %f18 movxtod %o4, %f0 movxtod %o5, %f2 ldd [$key + 48], %f20 ldd [$key + 56], %f22 sub $rounds, 1, $rounds ldd [$key + 64], %f24 ldd [$key + 72], %f26 add $key, 80, $key .Lenc: camellia_f %f12, %f2, %f0, %f2 ldd [$key + 0], %f12 sub $rounds,1,$rounds camellia_f %f14, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 8], %f14 camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 ldd [$key + 32], %f20 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 40], %f22 camellia_fl %f24, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key + 48], %f24 camellia_fli %f26, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 56], %f26 brnz,pt $rounds, .Lenc add $key, 64, $key andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned? camellia_f %f12, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f14, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f4 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f4, %f2 fxor %f24, %f4, %f0 fxor %f26, %f2, %f2 bnz,pn %icc, 2f nop std %f0, [$out + 0] retl std %f2, [$out + 8] 2: alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $tmp, $mask faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $mask, $mask retl stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store .type cmll_t4_encrypt,#function .size cmll_t4_encrypt,.-cmll_t4_encrypt .globl cmll_t4_decrypt .align 32 cmll_t4_decrypt: ld [$key + 272], $rounds ! grandRounds, 3 or 4 andcc $inp, 7, %g1 ! is input aligned? andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $rounds, 6, $rounds add $rounds, $key, $key ldx [$inp + 0], %o4 bz,pt %icc, 1f ldx [$inp + 8], %o5 ldx [$inp + 16], $inp sll %g1, 3, %g1 sub %g0, %g1, %g4 sllx %o4, %g1, %o4 sllx %o5, %g1, %g1 srlx %o5, %g4, %o5 srlx $inp, %g4, %g4 or %o5, %o4, %o4 or %g4, %g1, %o5 1: ldx [$key + 0], %g4 ldx [$key + 8], %g5 ldd [$key - 8], %f12 ldd [$key - 16], %f14 xor %g4, %o4, %o4 xor %g5, %o5, %o5 ldd [$key - 24], %f16 ldd [$key - 32], %f18 movxtod %o4, %f0 movxtod %o5, %f2 ldd [$key - 40], %f20 ldd [$key - 48], %f22 sub $rounds, 64, $rounds ldd [$key - 56], %f24 ldd [$key - 64], %f26 sub $key, 64, $key .Ldec: camellia_f %f12, %f2, %f0, %f2 ldd [$key - 8], %f12 sub $rounds, 64, $rounds camellia_f %f14, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key - 16], %f14 camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 ldd [$key - 24], %f16 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key - 32], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 ldd [$key - 40], %f20 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key - 48], %f22 camellia_fl %f24, %f0, %f0 ldd [$key - 56], %f24 camellia_fli %f26, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key - 64], %f26 brnz,pt $rounds, .Ldec sub $key, 64, $key andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned? camellia_f %f12, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f14, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f4 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f4, %f2 fxor %f26, %f4, %f0 fxor %f24, %f2, %f2 bnz,pn %icc, 2f nop std %f0, [$out + 0] retl std %f2, [$out + 8] 2: alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out mov 0xff, $mask srl $mask, $tmp, $mask faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $mask, $mask retl stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store .type cmll_t4_decrypt,#function .size cmll_t4_decrypt,.-cmll_t4_decrypt ___ } ###################################################################### # key setup subroutines # { sub ROTL128 { my $rot = shift; "srlx %o4, 64-$rot, %g4\n\t". "sllx %o4, $rot, %o4\n\t". "srlx %o5, 64-$rot, %g5\n\t". "sllx %o5, $rot, %o5\n\t". "or %o4, %g5, %o4\n\t". "or %o5, %g4, %o5"; } my ($inp,$bits,$out,$tmp)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl cmll_t4_set_key .align 32 cmll_t4_set_key: and $inp, 7, $tmp alignaddr $inp, %g0, $inp cmp $bits, 192 ldd [$inp + 0], %f0 bl,pt %icc,.L128 ldd [$inp + 8], %f2 be,pt %icc,.L192 ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 brz,pt $tmp, .L256aligned ldd [$inp + 24], %f6 ldd [$inp + 32], %f8 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4 b .L256aligned faligndata %f6, %f8, %f6 .align 16 .L192: brz,a,pt $tmp, .L256aligned fnot2 %f4, %f6 ldd [$inp + 24], %f6 nop faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4 fnot2 %f4, %f6 .L256aligned: std %f0, [$out + 0] ! k[0, 1] fsrc2 %f0, %f28 std %f2, [$out + 8] ! k[2, 3] fsrc2 %f2, %f30 fxor %f4, %f0, %f0 b .L128key fxor %f6, %f2, %f2 .align 16 .L128: brz,pt $tmp, .L128aligned nop ldd [$inp + 16], %f4 nop faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 .L128aligned: std %f0, [$out + 0] ! k[0, 1] fsrc2 %f0, %f28 std %f2, [$out + 8] ! k[2, 3] fsrc2 %f2, %f30 .L128key: mov %o7, %o5 1: call .+8 add %o7, SIGMA-1b, %o4 mov %o5, %o7 ldd [%o4 + 0], %f16 ldd [%o4 + 8], %f18 ldd [%o4 + 16], %f20 ldd [%o4 + 24], %f22 camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 fxor %f28, %f0, %f0 fxor %f30, %f2, %f2 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 bge,pn %icc, .L256key nop std %f0, [$out + 0x10] ! k[ 4, 5] std %f2, [$out + 0x18] ! k[ 6, 7] movdtox %f0, %o4 movdtox %f2, %o5 `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x30] ! k[12, 13] stx %o5, [$out + 0x38] ! k[14, 15] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x40] ! k[16, 17] stx %o5, [$out + 0x48] ! k[18, 19] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x60] ! k[24, 25] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x70] ! k[28, 29] stx %o5, [$out + 0x78] ! k[30, 31] `&ROTL128(34)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xa0] ! k[40, 41] stx %o5, [$out + 0xa8] ! k[42, 43] `&ROTL128(17)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xc0] ! k[48, 49] stx %o5, [$out + 0xc8] ! k[50, 51] movdtox %f28, %o4 ! k[ 0, 1] movdtox %f30, %o5 ! k[ 2, 3] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x20] ! k[ 8, 9] stx %o5, [$out + 0x28] ! k[10, 11] `&ROTL128(30)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x50] ! k[20, 21] stx %o5, [$out + 0x58] ! k[22, 23] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o5, [$out + 0x68] ! k[26, 27] `&ROTL128(17)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x80] ! k[32, 33] stx %o5, [$out + 0x88] ! k[34, 35] `&ROTL128(17)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x90] ! k[36, 37] stx %o5, [$out + 0x98] ! k[38, 39] `&ROTL128(17)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xb0] ! k[44, 45] stx %o5, [$out + 0xb8] ! k[46, 47] mov 3, $tmp st $tmp, [$out + 0x110] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 .align 16 .L256key: ldd [%o4 + 32], %f24 ldd [%o4 + 40], %f26 std %f0, [$out + 0x30] ! k[12, 13] std %f2, [$out + 0x38] ! k[14, 15] fxor %f4, %f0, %f0 fxor %f6, %f2, %f2 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f2, %f0 std %f0, [$out + 0x10] ! k[ 4, 5] std %f2, [$out + 0x18] ! k[ 6, 7] movdtox %f0, %o4 movdtox %f2, %o5 `&ROTL128(30)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x50] ! k[20, 21] stx %o5, [$out + 0x58] ! k[22, 23] `&ROTL128(30)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xa0] ! k[40, 41] stx %o5, [$out + 0xa8] ! k[42, 43] `&ROTL128(51)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x100] ! k[64, 65] stx %o5, [$out + 0x108] ! k[66, 67] movdtox %f4, %o4 ! k[ 8, 9] movdtox %f6, %o5 ! k[10, 11] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x20] ! k[ 8, 9] stx %o5, [$out + 0x28] ! k[10, 11] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x40] ! k[16, 17] stx %o5, [$out + 0x48] ! k[18, 19] `&ROTL128(30)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x90] ! k[36, 37] stx %o5, [$out + 0x98] ! k[38, 39] `&ROTL128(34)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xd0] ! k[52, 53] stx %o5, [$out + 0xd8] ! k[54, 55] ldx [$out + 0x30], %o4 ! k[12, 13] ldx [$out + 0x38], %o5 ! k[14, 15] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x30] ! k[12, 13] stx %o5, [$out + 0x38] ! k[14, 15] `&ROTL128(30)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x70] ! k[28, 29] stx %o5, [$out + 0x78] ! k[30, 31] srlx %o4, 32, %g4 srlx %o5, 32, %g5 st %o4, [$out + 0xc0] ! k[48] st %g5, [$out + 0xc4] ! k[49] st %o5, [$out + 0xc8] ! k[50] st %g4, [$out + 0xcc] ! k[51] `&ROTL128(49)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xe0] ! k[56, 57] stx %o5, [$out + 0xe8] ! k[58, 59] movdtox %f28, %o4 ! k[ 0, 1] movdtox %f30, %o5 ! k[ 2, 3] `&ROTL128(45)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x60] ! k[24, 25] stx %o5, [$out + 0x68] ! k[26, 27] `&ROTL128(15)` stx %o4, [$out + 0x80] ! k[32, 33] stx %o5, [$out + 0x88] ! k[34, 35] `&ROTL128(17)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xb0] ! k[44, 45] stx %o5, [$out + 0xb8] ! k[46, 47] `&ROTL128(34)` stx %o4, [$out + 0xf0] ! k[60, 61] stx %o5, [$out + 0xf8] ! k[62, 63] mov 4, $tmp st $tmp, [$out + 0x110] retl xor %o0, %o0, %o0 .type cmll_t4_set_key,#function .size cmll_t4_set_key,.-cmll_t4_set_key .align 32 SIGMA: .long 0xa09e667f, 0x3bcc908b, 0xb67ae858, 0x4caa73b2 .long 0xc6ef372f, 0xe94f82be, 0x54ff53a5, 0xf1d36f1c .long 0x10e527fa, 0xde682d1d, 0xb05688c2, 0xb3e6c1fd .type SIGMA,#object .size SIGMA,.-SIGMA .asciz "Camellia for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov" ___ } {{{ my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); my ($ileft,$iright,$ooff,$omask,$ivoff)=map("%l$_",(1..7)); $code.=<<___; .align 32 _cmll128_load_enckey: ldx [$key + 0], %g4 ldx [$key + 8], %g5 ___ for ($i=2; $i<26;$i++) { # load key schedule $code.=<<___; ldd [$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i` ___ } $code.=<<___; retl nop .type _cmll128_load_enckey,#function .size _cmll128_load_enckey,.-_cmll128_load_enckey _cmll256_load_enckey=_cmll128_load_enckey .align 32 _cmll256_load_deckey: ldd [$key + 64], %f62 ldd [$key + 72], %f60 b .Load_deckey add $key, 64, $key _cmll128_load_deckey: ldd [$key + 0], %f60 ldd [$key + 8], %f62 .Load_deckey: ___ for ($i=2; $i<24;$i++) { # load key schedule $code.=<<___; ldd [$key + `8*$i`], %f`62-2*$i` ___ } $code.=<<___; ldx [$key + 192], %g4 retl ldx [$key + 200], %g5 .type _cmll256_load_deckey,#function .size _cmll256_load_deckey,.-_cmll256_load_deckey .align 32 _cmll128_encrypt_1x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<3; $i++) { $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<2); camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0, %f0 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f56, %f2, %f0, %f4 camellia_f %f58, %f0, %f4, %f2 fxor %f60, %f4, %f0 retl fxor %f62, %f2, %f2 .type _cmll128_encrypt_1x,#function .size _cmll128_encrypt_1x,.-_cmll128_encrypt_1x _cmll128_decrypt_1x=_cmll128_encrypt_1x .align 32 _cmll128_encrypt_2x: ___ for ($i=0; $i<3; $i++) { $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f4, %f6, %f4 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<2); camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0, %f0 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f4, %f4 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2, %f2 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f56, %f2, %f0, %f8 camellia_f %f56, %f6, %f4, %f10 camellia_f %f58, %f0, %f8, %f2 camellia_f %f58, %f4, %f10, %f6 fxor %f60, %f8, %f0 fxor %f60, %f10, %f4 fxor %f62, %f2, %f2 retl fxor %f62, %f6, %f6 .type _cmll128_encrypt_2x,#function .size _cmll128_encrypt_2x,.-_cmll128_encrypt_2x _cmll128_decrypt_2x=_cmll128_encrypt_2x .align 32 _cmll256_encrypt_1x: camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 208], %f16 ldd [$key + 216], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 224], %f20 ldd [$key + 232], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 240], %f24 ldd [$key + 248], %f26 camellia_fl %f28, %f0, %f0 camellia_fli %f30, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 256], %f28 ldd [$key + 264], %f30 ___ for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) { $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0, %f0 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 32], %f20 ldd [$key + 40], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f4 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f4, %f2 ldd [$key + 48], %f24 ldd [$key + 56], %f26 fxor %f28, %f4, %f0 fxor %f30, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 64], %f28 retl ldd [$key + 72], %f30 .type _cmll256_encrypt_1x,#function .size _cmll256_encrypt_1x,.-_cmll256_encrypt_1x .align 32 _cmll256_encrypt_2x: camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f16, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f18, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key + 208], %f16 ldd [$key + 216], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f20, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f22, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key + 224], %f20 ldd [$key + 232], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f24, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f26, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key + 240], %f24 ldd [$key + 248], %f26 camellia_fl %f28, %f0, %f0 camellia_fl %f28, %f4, %f4 camellia_fli %f30, %f2, %f2 camellia_fli %f30, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 256], %f28 ldd [$key + 264], %f30 ___ for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) { $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0, %f0 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f4, %f4 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2, %f2 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f16, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f18, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key + 16], %f16 ldd [$key + 24], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f20, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f22, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key + 32], %f20 ldd [$key + 40], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f8 camellia_f %f24, %f6, %f4, %f10 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f8, %f2 camellia_f %f26, %f4, %f10, %f6 ldd [$key + 48], %f24 ldd [$key + 56], %f26 fxor %f28, %f8, %f0 fxor %f28, %f10, %f4 fxor %f30, %f2, %f2 fxor %f30, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 64], %f28 retl ldd [$key + 72], %f30 .type _cmll256_encrypt_2x,#function .size _cmll256_encrypt_2x,.-_cmll256_encrypt_2x .align 32 _cmll256_decrypt_1x: camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key - 8], %f16 ldd [$key - 16], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key - 24], %f20 ldd [$key - 32], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key - 40], %f24 ldd [$key - 48], %f26 camellia_fl %f28, %f0, %f0 camellia_fli %f30, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key - 56], %f28 ldd [$key - 64], %f30 ___ for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) { $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0, %f0 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2, %f2 ___ } $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 184], %f16 ldd [$key + 176], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 ldd [$key + 168], %f20 ldd [$key + 160], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f4 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f4, %f2 ldd [$key + 152], %f24 ldd [$key + 144], %f26 fxor %f30, %f4, %f0 fxor %f28, %f2, %f2 ldd [$key + 136], %f28 retl ldd [$key + 128], %f30 .type _cmll256_decrypt_1x,#function .size _cmll256_decrypt_1x,.-_cmll256_decrypt_1x .align 32 _cmll256_decrypt_2x: camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f16, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f18, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key - 8], %f16 ldd [$key - 16], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f20, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f22, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key - 24], %f20 ldd [$key - 32], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f24, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f26, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key - 40], %f24 ldd [$key - 48], %f26 camellia_fl %f28, %f0, %f0 camellia_fl %f28, %f4, %f4 camellia_fli %f30, %f2, %f2 camellia_fli %f30, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key - 56], %f28 ldd [$key - 64], %f30 ___ for ($i=1; $i<3; $i++) { $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+0`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+4`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+6`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+8`, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f`16+16*$i+10`, %f4, %f6, %f4 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f0, %f0 camellia_fl %f`16+16*$i+12`, %f4, %f4 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f2, %f2 camellia_fli %f`16+16*$i+14`, %f6, %f6 ___ } $code.=<<___; camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f16, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f18, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f18, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key + 184], %f16 ldd [$key + 176], %f18 camellia_f %f20, %f2, %f0, %f2 camellia_f %f20, %f6, %f4, %f6 camellia_f %f22, %f0, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f22, %f4, %f6, %f4 ldd [$key + 168], %f20 ldd [$key + 160], %f22 camellia_f %f24, %f2, %f0, %f8 camellia_f %f24, %f6, %f4, %f10 camellia_f %f26, %f0, %f8, %f2 camellia_f %f26, %f4, %f10, %f6 ldd [$key + 152], %f24 ldd [$key + 144], %f26 fxor %f30, %f8, %f0 fxor %f30, %f10, %f4 fxor %f28, %f2, %f2 fxor %f28, %f6, %f6 ldd [$key + 136], %f28 retl ldd [$key + 128], %f30 .type _cmll256_decrypt_2x,#function .size _cmll256_decrypt_2x,.-_cmll256_decrypt_2x ___ &alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("cmll",128); &alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("cmll",256); &alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("cmll",128); &alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("cmll",256); if ($::evp) { &alg_ctr32_implement("cmll",128); &alg_ctr32_implement("cmll",256); } }}} if (!$::evp) { $code.=<<___; .global Camellia_encrypt Camellia_encrypt=cmll_t4_encrypt .global Camellia_decrypt Camellia_decrypt=cmll_t4_decrypt .global Camellia_set_key .align 32 Camellia_set_key: andcc %o2, 7, %g0 ! double-check alignment bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -1, %o0 brz,a,pn %o0, 1f mov -1, %o0 brz,a,pn %o2, 1f mov -1, %o0 andncc %o1, 0x1c0, %g0 bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -2, %o0 cmp %o1, 128 bl,a,pn %icc, 1f mov -2, %o0 b cmll_t4_set_key nop 1: retl nop .type Camellia_set_key,#function .size Camellia_set_key,.-Camellia_set_key ___ my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); $code.=<<___; .globl Camellia_cbc_encrypt .align 32 Camellia_cbc_encrypt: ld [$key + 272], %g1 nop brz $enc, .Lcbc_decrypt cmp %g1, 3 be,pt %icc, cmll128_t4_cbc_encrypt nop ba cmll256_t4_cbc_encrypt nop .Lcbc_decrypt: be,pt %icc, cmll128_t4_cbc_decrypt nop ba cmll256_t4_cbc_decrypt nop .type Camellia_cbc_encrypt,#function .size Camellia_cbc_encrypt,.-Camellia_cbc_encrypt ___ } &emit_assembler(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86.pl0000644000000000000000000010120513176625656017637 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Copyright (c) 2008 Andy Polyakov # # This module may be used under the terms of either the GNU General # Public License version 2 or later, the GNU Lesser General Public # License version 2.1 or later, the Mozilla Public License version # 1.1 or the BSD License. The exact terms of either license are # distributed along with this module. For further details see # http://www.openssl.org/~appro/camellia/. # ==================================================================== # Performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better) in # 'openssl speed ...' benchmark: # # AMD K8 Core2 PIII P4 # -evp camellia-128-ecb 21.5 22.8 27.0 28.9 # + over gcc 3.4.6 +90/11% +70/10% +53/4% +160/64% # + over icc 8.0 +48/19% +21/15% +21/17% +55/37% # # camellia-128-cbc 17.3 21.1 23.9 25.9 # # 128-bit key setup 196 280 256 240 cycles/key # + over gcc 3.4.6 +30/0% +17/11% +11/0% +63/40% # + over icc 8.0 +18/3% +10/0% +10/3% +21/10% # # Pairs of numbers in "+" rows represent performance improvement over # compiler generated position-independent code, PIC, and non-PIC # respectively. PIC results are of greater relevance, as this module # is position-independent, i.e. suitable for a shared library or PIE. # Position independence "costs" one register, which is why compilers # are so close with non-PIC results, they have an extra register to # spare. CBC results are better than ECB ones thanks to "zero-copy" # private _x86_* interface, and are ~30-40% better than with compiler # generated cmll_cbc.o, and reach ~80-90% of x86_64 performance on # same CPU (where applicable). $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $OPENSSL=1; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"cmll-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); @T=("eax","ebx","ecx","edx"); $idx="esi"; $key="edi"; $Tbl="ebp"; # stack frame layout in _x86_Camellia_* routines, frame is allocated # by caller $__ra=&DWP(0,"esp"); # return address $__s0=&DWP(4,"esp"); # s0 backing store $__s1=&DWP(8,"esp"); # s1 backing store $__s2=&DWP(12,"esp"); # s2 backing store $__s3=&DWP(16,"esp"); # s3 backing store $__end=&DWP(20,"esp"); # pointer to end/start of key schedule # stack frame layout in Camellia_[en|crypt] routines, which differs from # above by 4 and overlaps by pointer to end/start of key schedule $_end=&DWP(16,"esp"); $_esp=&DWP(20,"esp"); # const unsigned int Camellia_SBOX[4][256]; # Well, sort of... Camellia_SBOX[0][] is interleaved with [1][], # and [2][] - with [3][]. This is done to optimize code size. $SBOX1_1110=0; # Camellia_SBOX[0] $SBOX4_4404=4; # Camellia_SBOX[1] $SBOX2_0222=2048; # Camellia_SBOX[2] $SBOX3_3033=2052; # Camellia_SBOX[3] &static_label("Camellia_SIGMA"); &static_label("Camellia_SBOX"); sub Camellia_Feistel { my $i=@_[0]; my $seed=defined(@_[1])?@_[1]:0; my $scale=$seed<0?-8:8; my $frame=defined(@_[2])?@_[2]:0; my $j=($i&1)*2; my $t0=@T[($j)%4],$t1=@T[($j+1)%4],$t2=@T[($j+2)%4],$t3=@T[($j+3)%4]; &xor ($t0,$idx); # t0^=key[0] &xor ($t1,&DWP($seed+$i*$scale+4,$key)); # t1^=key[1] &movz ($idx,&HB($t0)); # (t0>>8)&0xff &mov ($t3,&DWP($SBOX3_3033,$Tbl,$idx,8)); # t3=SBOX3_3033[0] &movz ($idx,&LB($t0)); # (t0>>0)&0xff &xor ($t3,&DWP($SBOX4_4404,$Tbl,$idx,8)); # t3^=SBOX4_4404[0] &shr ($t0,16); &movz ($idx,&LB($t1)); # (t1>>0)&0xff &mov ($t2,&DWP($SBOX1_1110,$Tbl,$idx,8)); # t2=SBOX1_1110[1] &movz ($idx,&HB($t0)); # (t0>>24)&0xff &xor ($t3,&DWP($SBOX1_1110,$Tbl,$idx,8)); # t3^=SBOX1_1110[0] &movz ($idx,&HB($t1)); # (t1>>8)&0xff &xor ($t2,&DWP($SBOX4_4404,$Tbl,$idx,8)); # t2^=SBOX4_4404[1] &shr ($t1,16); &movz ($t0,&LB($t0)); # (t0>>16)&0xff &xor ($t3,&DWP($SBOX2_0222,$Tbl,$t0,8)); # t3^=SBOX2_0222[0] &movz ($idx,&HB($t1)); # (t1>>24)&0xff &mov ($t0,&DWP($frame+4*(($j+3)%4),"esp")); # prefetch "s3" &xor ($t2,$t3); # t2^=t3 &rotr ($t3,8); # t3=RightRotate(t3,8) &xor ($t2,&DWP($SBOX2_0222,$Tbl,$idx,8)); # t2^=SBOX2_0222[1] &movz ($idx,&LB($t1)); # (t1>>16)&0xff &mov ($t1,&DWP($frame+4*(($j+2)%4),"esp")); # prefetch "s2" &xor ($t3,$t0); # t3^=s3 &xor ($t2,&DWP($SBOX3_3033,$Tbl,$idx,8)); # t2^=SBOX3_3033[1] &mov ($idx,&DWP($seed+($i+1)*$scale,$key)); # prefetch key[i+1] &xor ($t3,$t2); # t3^=t2 &mov (&DWP($frame+4*(($j+3)%4),"esp"),$t3); # s3=t3 &xor ($t2,$t1); # t2^=s2 &mov (&DWP($frame+4*(($j+2)%4),"esp"),$t2); # s2=t2 } # void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds( # int grandRounds, # const Byte plaintext[], # const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, # Byte ciphertext[]) &function_begin("Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); # load grandRounds &mov ($idx,&wparam(1)); # load plaintext pointer &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key schedule pointer &mov ("ebx","esp"); &sub ("esp",7*4); # place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra &and ("esp",-64); # place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule # this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices &lea ("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key)); &sub ("ecx","esp"); &neg ("ecx"); &and ("ecx",0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ("esp","ecx"); &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for callee's return address &shl ("eax",6); &lea ("eax",&DWP(0,$key,"eax")); &mov ($_esp,"ebx"); # save %esp &mov ($_end,"eax"); # save keyEnd &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($Tbl); &lea ($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl)); &mov (@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx)); # load plaintext &mov (@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov (@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx)); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov (@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx)); &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &call ("_x86_Camellia_encrypt"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov ($idx,&wparam(3)); # load ciphertext pointer &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &mov (&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]); # write ciphertext &mov (&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]); &mov (&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]); &function_end("Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds"); # V1.x API &function_begin_B("Camellia_EncryptBlock"); &mov ("eax",128); &sub ("eax",&wparam(0)); # load keyBitLength &mov ("eax",3); &adc ("eax",0); # keyBitLength==128?3:4 &mov (&wparam(0),"eax"); &jmp (&label("Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds")); &function_end_B("Camellia_EncryptBlock"); if ($OPENSSL) { # void Camellia_encrypt( # const unsigned char *in, # unsigned char *out, # const CAMELLIA_KEY *key) &function_begin("Camellia_encrypt"); &mov ($idx,&wparam(0)); # load plaintext pointer &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key schedule pointer &mov ("ebx","esp"); &sub ("esp",7*4); # place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra &and ("esp",-64); &mov ("eax",&DWP(272,$key)); # load grandRounds counter # place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule # this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices &lea ("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key)); &sub ("ecx","esp"); &neg ("ecx"); &and ("ecx",0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ("esp","ecx"); &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for callee's return address &shl ("eax",6); &lea ("eax",&DWP(0,$key,"eax")); &mov ($_esp,"ebx"); # save %esp &mov ($_end,"eax"); # save keyEnd &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($Tbl); &lea ($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl)); &mov (@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx)); # load plaintext &mov (@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov (@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx)); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov (@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx)); &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &call ("_x86_Camellia_encrypt"); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov ($idx,&wparam(1)); # load ciphertext pointer &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &mov (&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]); # write ciphertext &mov (&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]); &mov (&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]); &function_end("Camellia_encrypt"); } &function_begin_B("_x86_Camellia_encrypt"); &xor (@T[0],&DWP(0,$key)); # ^=key[0-3] &xor (@T[1],&DWP(4,$key)); &xor (@T[2],&DWP(8,$key)); &xor (@T[3],&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($idx,&DWP(16,$key)); # prefetch key[4] &mov ($__s0,@T[0]); # save s[0-3] &mov ($__s1,@T[1]); &mov ($__s2,@T[2]); &mov ($__s3,@T[3]); &set_label("loop",16); for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,16,4); } &add ($key,16*4); &cmp ($key,$__end); &je (&label("done")); # @T[0-1] are preloaded, $idx is preloaded with key[0] &and ($idx,@T[0]); &mov (@T[3],$__s3); &rotl ($idx,1); &mov (@T[2],@T[3]); &xor (@T[1],$idx); &or (@T[2],&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($__s1,@T[1]); # s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1); &xor (@T[2],$__s2); &mov ($idx,&DWP(4,$key)); &mov ($__s2,@T[2]); # s2^=s3|key[3]; &or ($idx,@T[1]); &and (@T[2],&DWP(8,$key)); &xor (@T[0],$idx); &rotl (@T[2],1); &mov ($__s0,@T[0]); # s0^=s1|key[1]; &xor (@T[3],@T[2]); &mov ($idx,&DWP(16,$key)); # prefetch key[4] &mov ($__s3,@T[3]); # s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("done",8); &mov (@T[2],@T[0]); # SwapHalf &mov (@T[3],@T[1]); &mov (@T[0],$__s2); &mov (@T[1],$__s3); &xor (@T[0],$idx); # $idx is preloaded with key[0] &xor (@T[1],&DWP(4,$key)); &xor (@T[2],&DWP(8,$key)); &xor (@T[3],&DWP(12,$key)); &ret (); &function_end_B("_x86_Camellia_encrypt"); # void Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds( # int grandRounds, # const Byte ciphertext[], # const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, # Byte plaintext[]) &function_begin("Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); # load grandRounds &mov ($idx,&wparam(1)); # load ciphertext pointer &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key schedule pointer &mov ("ebx","esp"); &sub ("esp",7*4); # place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra &and ("esp",-64); # place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule # this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices &lea ("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key)); &sub ("ecx","esp"); &neg ("ecx"); &and ("ecx",0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ("esp","ecx"); &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for callee's return address &shl ("eax",6); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$key); # save keyStart &lea ($key,&DWP(0,$key,"eax")); &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),"ebx");# save %esp &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($Tbl); &lea ($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl)); &mov (@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx)); # load ciphertext &mov (@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov (@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx)); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov (@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx)); &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &call ("_x86_Camellia_decrypt"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(5*4,"esp")); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov ($idx,&wparam(3)); # load plaintext pointer &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &mov (&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]); # write plaintext &mov (&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]); &mov (&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]); &function_end("Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds"); # V1.x API &function_begin_B("Camellia_DecryptBlock"); &mov ("eax",128); &sub ("eax",&wparam(0)); # load keyBitLength &mov ("eax",3); &adc ("eax",0); # keyBitLength==128?3:4 &mov (&wparam(0),"eax"); &jmp (&label("Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds")); &function_end_B("Camellia_DecryptBlock"); if ($OPENSSL) { # void Camellia_decrypt( # const unsigned char *in, # unsigned char *out, # const CAMELLIA_KEY *key) &function_begin("Camellia_decrypt"); &mov ($idx,&wparam(0)); # load ciphertext pointer &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key schedule pointer &mov ("ebx","esp"); &sub ("esp",7*4); # place for s[0-3],keyEnd,esp and ra &and ("esp",-64); &mov ("eax",&DWP(272,$key)); # load grandRounds counter # place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule # this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices &lea ("ecx",&DWP(-64-63,$key)); &sub ("ecx","esp"); &neg ("ecx"); &and ("ecx",0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ("esp","ecx"); &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for callee's return address &shl ("eax",6); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$key); # save keyStart &lea ($key,&DWP(0,$key,"eax")); &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),"ebx");# save %esp &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($Tbl); &lea ($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl)); &mov (@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx)); # load ciphertext &mov (@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov (@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx)); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov (@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx)); &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &call ("_x86_Camellia_decrypt"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(5*4,"esp")); &bswap (@T[0]); &mov ($idx,&wparam(1)); # load plaintext pointer &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &mov (&DWP(0,$idx),@T[0]); # write plaintext &mov (&DWP(4,$idx),@T[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,$idx),@T[2]); &mov (&DWP(12,$idx),@T[3]); &function_end("Camellia_decrypt"); } &function_begin_B("_x86_Camellia_decrypt"); &xor (@T[0],&DWP(0,$key)); # ^=key[0-3] &xor (@T[1],&DWP(4,$key)); &xor (@T[2],&DWP(8,$key)); &xor (@T[3],&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($idx,&DWP(-8,$key)); # prefetch key[-2] &mov ($__s0,@T[0]); # save s[0-3] &mov ($__s1,@T[1]); &mov ($__s2,@T[2]); &mov ($__s3,@T[3]); &set_label("loop",16); for ($i=0;$i<6;$i++) { Camellia_Feistel($i,-8,4); } &sub ($key,16*4); &cmp ($key,$__end); &je (&label("done")); # @T[0-1] are preloaded, $idx is preloaded with key[2] &and ($idx,@T[0]); &mov (@T[3],$__s3); &rotl ($idx,1); &mov (@T[2],@T[3]); &xor (@T[1],$idx); &or (@T[2],&DWP(4,$key)); &mov ($__s1,@T[1]); # s1^=LeftRotate(s0&key[0],1); &xor (@T[2],$__s2); &mov ($idx,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov ($__s2,@T[2]); # s2^=s3|key[3]; &or ($idx,@T[1]); &and (@T[2],&DWP(0,$key)); &xor (@T[0],$idx); &rotl (@T[2],1); &mov ($__s0,@T[0]); # s0^=s1|key[1]; &xor (@T[3],@T[2]); &mov ($idx,&DWP(-8,$key)); # prefetch key[4] &mov ($__s3,@T[3]); # s3^=LeftRotate(s2&key[2],1); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("done",8); &mov (@T[2],@T[0]); # SwapHalf &mov (@T[3],@T[1]); &mov (@T[0],$__s2); &mov (@T[1],$__s3); &xor (@T[2],$idx); # $idx is preloaded with key[2] &xor (@T[3],&DWP(12,$key)); &xor (@T[0],&DWP(0,$key)); &xor (@T[1],&DWP(4,$key)); &ret (); &function_end_B("_x86_Camellia_decrypt"); # shld is very slow on Intel P4 family. Even on AMD it limits # instruction decode rate [because it's VectorPath] and consequently # performance. PIII, PM and Core[2] seem to be the only ones which # execute this code ~7% faster... sub __rotl128 { my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3,$rot,$rnd,@T)=@_; $rnd *= 2; if ($rot) { &mov ($idx,$i0); &shld ($i0,$i1,$rot); &shld ($i1,$i2,$rot); &shld ($i2,$i3,$rot); &shld ($i3,$idx,$rot); } &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i0 eq @T[0]); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i1 eq @T[0]); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i2 eq @T[0]); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i3 eq @T[0]); } # ... Implementing 128-bit rotate without shld gives >3x performance # improvement on P4, only ~7% degradation on other Intel CPUs and # not worse performance on AMD. This is therefore preferred. sub _rotl128 { my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3,$rot,$rnd,@T)=@_; $rnd *= 2; if ($rot) { &mov ($Tbl,$i0); &shl ($i0,$rot); &mov ($idx,$i1); &shr ($idx,32-$rot); &shl ($i1,$rot); &or ($i0,$idx); &mov ($idx,$i2); &shl ($i2,$rot); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i0 eq @T[0]); &shr ($idx,32-$rot); &or ($i1,$idx); &shr ($Tbl,32-$rot); &mov ($idx,$i3); &shr ($idx,32-$rot); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i1 eq @T[0]); &shl ($i3,$rot); &or ($i2,$idx); &or ($i3,$Tbl); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i2 eq @T[0]); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i3 eq @T[0]); } else { &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i0 eq @T[0]); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i1 eq @T[0]); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i2 eq @T[0]); &mov (&DWP(-128+4*$rnd++,$key),shift(@T)) if ($i3 eq @T[0]); } } sub _saveround { my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_; my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0; &mov (&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+0,$key),@T[0]); &mov (&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+4,$key),@T[1]) if ($#T>=1); &mov (&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+8,$key),@T[2]) if ($#T>=2); &mov (&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+12,$key),@T[3]) if ($#T>=3); } sub _loadround { my ($rnd,$key,@T)=@_; my $bias=int(@T[0])?shift(@T):0; &mov (@T[0],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+0,$key)); &mov (@T[1],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+4,$key)) if ($#T>=1); &mov (@T[2],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+8,$key)) if ($#T>=2); &mov (@T[3],&DWP($bias+$rnd*8+12,$key)) if ($#T>=3); } # void Camellia_Ekeygen( # const int keyBitLength, # const Byte *rawKey, # KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable) &function_begin("Camellia_Ekeygen"); { my $step=0; &stack_push(4); # place for s[0-3] &mov ($Tbl,&wparam(0)); # load arguments &mov ($idx,&wparam(1)); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &mov (@T[0],&DWP(0,$idx)); # load 0-127 bits &mov (@T[1],&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov (@T[2],&DWP(8,$idx)); &mov (@T[3],&DWP(12,$idx)); &bswap (@T[0]); &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &_saveround (0,$key,@T); # KL<<<0 &cmp ($Tbl,128); &je (&label("1st128")); &mov (@T[0],&DWP(16,$idx)); # load 128-191 bits &mov (@T[1],&DWP(20,$idx)); &cmp ($Tbl,192); &je (&label("1st192")); &mov (@T[2],&DWP(24,$idx)); # load 192-255 bits &mov (@T[3],&DWP(28,$idx)); &jmp (&label("1st256")); &set_label("1st192",4); &mov (@T[2],@T[0]); &mov (@T[3],@T[1]); ¬ (@T[2]); ¬ (@T[3]); &set_label("1st256",4); &bswap (@T[0]); &bswap (@T[1]); &bswap (@T[2]); &bswap (@T[3]); &_saveround (4,$key,@T); # temporary storage for KR! &xor (@T[0],&DWP(0*8+0,$key)); # KR^KL &xor (@T[1],&DWP(0*8+4,$key)); &xor (@T[2],&DWP(1*8+0,$key)); &xor (@T[3],&DWP(1*8+4,$key)); &set_label("1st128",4); &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($Tbl); &lea ($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl)); &lea ($key,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SIGMA")."-".&label("Camellia_SBOX"),$Tbl)); &mov ($idx,&DWP($step*8,$key)); # prefetch SIGMA[0] &mov (&swtmp(0),@T[0]); # save s[0-3] &mov (&swtmp(1),@T[1]); &mov (&swtmp(2),@T[2]); &mov (&swtmp(3),@T[3]); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &mov (@T[2],&swtmp(2)); &mov (@T[3],&swtmp(3)); &mov ($idx,&wparam(2)); &xor (@T[0],&DWP(0*8+0,$idx)); # ^KL &xor (@T[1],&DWP(0*8+4,$idx)); &xor (@T[2],&DWP(1*8+0,$idx)); &xor (@T[3],&DWP(1*8+4,$idx)); &mov ($idx,&DWP($step*8,$key)); # prefetch SIGMA[4] &mov (&swtmp(0),@T[0]); # save s[0-3] &mov (&swtmp(1),@T[1]); &mov (&swtmp(2),@T[2]); &mov (&swtmp(3),@T[3]); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &mov (@T[2],&swtmp(2)); &mov (@T[3],&swtmp(3)); &mov ($idx,&wparam(0)); &cmp ($idx,128); &jne (&label("2nd256")); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &lea ($key,&DWP(128,$key)); # size optimization ####### process KA &_saveround (2,$key,-128,@T); # KA<<<0 &_rotl128 (@T,15,6,@T); # KA<<<15 &_rotl128 (@T,15,8,@T); # KA<<<(15+15=30) &_rotl128 (@T,15,12,@T[0],@T[1]); # KA<<<(30+15=45) &_rotl128 (@T,15,14,@T); # KA<<<(45+15=60) push (@T,shift(@T)); # rotl128(@T,32); &_rotl128 (@T,2,20,@T); # KA<<<(60+32+2=94) &_rotl128 (@T,17,24,@T); # KA<<<(94+17=111) ####### process KL &_loadround (0,$key,-128,@T); # load KL &_rotl128 (@T,15,4,@T); # KL<<<15 &_rotl128 (@T,30,10,@T); # KL<<<(15+30=45) &_rotl128 (@T,15,13,@T[2],@T[3]); # KL<<<(45+15=60) &_rotl128 (@T,17,16,@T); # KL<<<(60+17=77) &_rotl128 (@T,17,18,@T); # KL<<<(77+17=94) &_rotl128 (@T,17,22,@T); # KL<<<(94+17=111) while (@T[0] ne "eax") # restore order { unshift (@T,pop(@T)); } &mov ("eax",3); # 3 grandRounds &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("2nd256",16); &mov ($idx,&wparam(2)); &_saveround (6,$idx,@T); # temporary storage for KA! &xor (@T[0],&DWP(4*8+0,$idx)); # KA^KR &xor (@T[1],&DWP(4*8+4,$idx)); &xor (@T[2],&DWP(5*8+0,$idx)); &xor (@T[3],&DWP(5*8+4,$idx)); &mov ($idx,&DWP($step*8,$key)); # prefetch SIGMA[8] &mov (&swtmp(0),@T[0]); # save s[0-3] &mov (&swtmp(1),@T[1]); &mov (&swtmp(2),@T[2]); &mov (&swtmp(3),@T[3]); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &Camellia_Feistel($step++); &mov (@T[2],&swtmp(2)); &mov (@T[3],&swtmp(3)); &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); &lea ($key,&DWP(128,$key)); # size optimization ####### process KB &_saveround (2,$key,-128,@T); # KB<<<0 &_rotl128 (@T,30,10,@T); # KB<<<30 &_rotl128 (@T,30,20,@T); # KB<<<(30+30=60) push (@T,shift(@T)); # rotl128(@T,32); &_rotl128 (@T,19,32,@T); # KB<<<(60+32+19=111) ####### process KR &_loadround (4,$key,-128,@T); # load KR &_rotl128 (@T,15,4,@T); # KR<<<15 &_rotl128 (@T,15,8,@T); # KR<<<(15+15=30) &_rotl128 (@T,30,18,@T); # KR<<<(30+30=60) push (@T,shift(@T)); # rotl128(@T,32); &_rotl128 (@T,2,26,@T); # KR<<<(60+32+2=94) ####### process KA &_loadround (6,$key,-128,@T); # load KA &_rotl128 (@T,15,6,@T); # KA<<<15 &_rotl128 (@T,30,14,@T); # KA<<<(15+30=45) push (@T,shift(@T)); # rotl128(@T,32); &_rotl128 (@T,0,24,@T); # KA<<<(45+32+0=77) &_rotl128 (@T,17,28,@T); # KA<<<(77+17=94) ####### process KL &_loadround (0,$key,-128,@T); # load KL push (@T,shift(@T)); # rotl128(@T,32); &_rotl128 (@T,13,12,@T); # KL<<<(32+13=45) &_rotl128 (@T,15,16,@T); # KL<<<(45+15=60) &_rotl128 (@T,17,22,@T); # KL<<<(60+17=77) push (@T,shift(@T)); # rotl128(@T,32); &_rotl128 (@T,2,30,@T); # KL<<<(77+32+2=111) while (@T[0] ne "eax") # restore order { unshift (@T,pop(@T)); } &mov ("eax",4); # 4 grandRounds &set_label("done"); &lea ("edx",&DWP(272-128,$key)); # end of key schedule &stack_pop(4); } &function_end("Camellia_Ekeygen"); if ($OPENSSL) { # int Camellia_set_key ( # const unsigned char *userKey, # int bits, # CAMELLIA_KEY *key) &function_begin_B("Camellia_set_key"); &push ("ebx"); &mov ("ecx",&wparam(0)); # pull arguments &mov ("ebx",&wparam(1)); &mov ("edx",&wparam(2)); &mov ("eax",-1); &test ("ecx","ecx"); &jz (&label("done")); # userKey==NULL? &test ("edx","edx"); &jz (&label("done")); # key==NULL? &mov ("eax",-2); &cmp ("ebx",256); &je (&label("arg_ok")); # bits==256? &cmp ("ebx",192); &je (&label("arg_ok")); # bits==192? &cmp ("ebx",128); &jne (&label("done")); # bits!=128? &set_label("arg_ok",4); &push ("edx"); # push arguments &push ("ecx"); &push ("ebx"); &call ("Camellia_Ekeygen"); &stack_pop(3); # eax holds grandRounds and edx points at where to put it &mov (&DWP(0,"edx"),"eax"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &set_label("done",4); &pop ("ebx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("Camellia_set_key"); } @SBOX=( 112,130, 44,236,179, 39,192,229,228,133, 87, 53,234, 12,174, 65, 35,239,107,147, 69, 25,165, 33,237, 14, 79, 78, 29,101,146,189, 134,184,175,143,124,235, 31,206, 62, 48,220, 95, 94,197, 11, 26, 166,225, 57,202,213, 71, 93, 61,217, 1, 90,214, 81, 86,108, 77, 139, 13,154,102,251,204,176, 45,116, 18, 43, 32,240,177,132,153, 223, 76,203,194, 52,126,118, 5,109,183,169, 49,209, 23, 4,215, 20, 88, 58, 97,222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15,156, 22, 83, 24,242, 34, 254, 68,207,178,195,181,122,145, 36, 8,232,168, 96,252,105, 80, 170,208,160,125,161,137, 98,151, 84, 91, 30,149,224,255,100,210, 16,196, 0, 72,163,247,117,219,138, 3,230,218, 9, 63,221,148, 135, 92,131, 2,205, 74,144, 51,115,103,246,243,157,127,191,226, 82,155,216, 38,200, 55,198, 59,129,150,111, 75, 19,190, 99, 46, 233,121,167,140,159,110,188,142, 41,245,249,182, 47,253,180, 89, 120,152, 6,106,231, 70,113,186,212, 37,171, 66,136,162,141,250, 114, 7,185, 85,248,238,172, 10, 54, 73, 42,104, 60, 56,241,164, 64, 40,211,123,187,201, 67,193, 21,227,173,244,119,199,128,158); sub S1110 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; return $i<<24|$i<<16|$i<<8; } sub S4404 { my $i=shift; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; $i=@SBOX[$i]; return $i<<24|$i<<16|$i; } sub S0222 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i<<1|$i>>7)&0xff; return $i<<16|$i<<8|$i; } sub S3033 { my $i=shift; $i=@SBOX[$i]; $i=($i>>1|$i<<7)&0xff; return $i<<24|$i<<8|$i; } &set_label("Camellia_SIGMA",64); &data_word( 0xa09e667f, 0x3bcc908b, 0xb67ae858, 0x4caa73b2, 0xc6ef372f, 0xe94f82be, 0x54ff53a5, 0xf1d36f1c, 0x10e527fa, 0xde682d1d, 0xb05688c2, 0xb3e6c1fd, 0, 0, 0, 0); &set_label("Camellia_SBOX",64); # tables are interleaved, remember? for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S1110($i),&S4404($i)); } for ($i=0;$i<256;$i++) { &data_word(&S0222($i),&S3033($i)); } # void Camellia_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out, # size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, # unsigned char *ivp,const int enc); { # stack frame layout # -4(%esp) # return address 0(%esp) # 0(%esp) # s0 4(%esp) # 4(%esp) # s1 8(%esp) # 8(%esp) # s2 12(%esp) # 12(%esp) # s3 16(%esp) # 16(%esp) # end of key schedule 20(%esp) # 20(%esp) # %esp backup my $_inp=&DWP(24,"esp"); #copy of wparam(0) my $_out=&DWP(28,"esp"); #copy of wparam(1) my $_len=&DWP(32,"esp"); #copy of wparam(2) my $_key=&DWP(36,"esp"); #copy of wparam(3) my $_ivp=&DWP(40,"esp"); #copy of wparam(4) my $ivec=&DWP(44,"esp"); #ivec[16] my $_tmp=&DWP(44,"esp"); #volatile variable [yes, aliases with ivec] my ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3) = @T; &function_begin("Camellia_cbc_encrypt"); &mov ($s2 eq "ecx"? $s2 : "",&wparam(2)); # load len &cmp ($s2,0); &je (&label("enc_out")); &pushf (); &cld (); &mov ($s0,&wparam(0)); # load inp &mov ($s1,&wparam(1)); # load out #&mov ($s2,&wparam(2)); # load len &mov ($s3,&wparam(3)); # load key &mov ($Tbl,&wparam(4)); # load ivp # allocate aligned stack frame... &lea ($idx,&DWP(-64,"esp")); &and ($idx,-64); # place stack frame just "above mod 1024" the key schedule # this ensures that cache associativity of 2 suffices &lea ($key,&DWP(-64-63,$s3)); &sub ($key,$idx); &neg ($key); &and ($key,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line &sub ($idx,$key); &mov ($key,&wparam(5)); # load enc &exch ("esp",$idx); &add ("esp",4); # reserve for return address! &mov ($_esp,$idx); # save %esp &mov ($_inp,$s0); # save copy of inp &mov ($_out,$s1); # save copy of out &mov ($_len,$s2); # save copy of len &mov ($_key,$s3); # save copy of key &mov ($_ivp,$Tbl); # save copy of ivp &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($Tbl); &lea ($Tbl,&DWP(&label("Camellia_SBOX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$Tbl)); &mov ($idx,32); &set_label("prefetch_sbox",4); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$Tbl)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(32,$Tbl)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(64,$Tbl)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(96,$Tbl)); &lea ($Tbl,&DWP(128,$Tbl)); &dec ($idx); &jnz (&label("prefetch_sbox")); &mov ($s0,$_key); &sub ($Tbl,4096); &mov ($idx,$_inp); &mov ($s3,&DWP(272,$s0)); # load grandRounds &cmp ($key,0); &je (&label("DECRYPT")); &mov ($s2,$_len); &mov ($key,$_ivp); &shl ($s3,6); &lea ($s3,&DWP(0,$s0,$s3)); &mov ($_end,$s3); &test ($s2,0xFFFFFFF0); &jz (&label("enc_tail")); # short input... &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &set_label("enc_loop",4); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$idx)); # xor input data &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$idx)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$idx)); &bswap ($s0); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$idx)); &bswap ($s1); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &bswap ($s2); &bswap ($s3); &call ("_x86_Camellia_encrypt"); &mov ($idx,$_inp); # load inp &mov ($key,$_out); # load out &bswap ($s0); &bswap ($s1); &bswap ($s2); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # save output data &bswap ($s3); &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &lea ($idx,&DWP(16,$idx)); &mov ($_inp,$idx); # save inp &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out &sub ($s2,16); &test ($s2,0xFFFFFFF0); &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jnz (&label("enc_loop")); &test ($s2,15); &jnz (&label("enc_tail")); &mov ($idx,$_ivp); # load ivp &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); # restore last dwords &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov (&DWP(0,$idx),$s0); # save ivec &mov (&DWP(4,$idx),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$idx),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$idx),$s3); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &set_label("enc_out"); &function_end_A(); &pushf (); # kludge, never executed &set_label("enc_tail",4); &mov ($s0,$key eq "edi" ? $key : ""); &mov ($key,$_out); # load out &push ($s0); # push ivp &mov ($s1,16); &sub ($s1,$s2); &cmp ($key,$idx); # compare with inp &je (&label("enc_in_place")); &align (4); &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy input &jmp (&label("enc_skip_in_place")); &set_label("enc_in_place"); &lea ($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2)); &set_label("enc_skip_in_place"); &mov ($s2,$s1); &xor ($s0,$s0); &align (4); &data_word(0xAAF3F689); # rep stosb # zero tail &pop ($key); # pop ivp &mov ($idx,$_out); # output as input &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &mov ($_len,16); # len=16 &jmp (&label("enc_loop")); # one more spin... #----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------# &set_label("DECRYPT",16); &shl ($s3,6); &lea ($s3,&DWP(0,$s0,$s3)); &mov ($_end,$s0); &mov ($_key,$s3); &cmp ($idx,$_out); &je (&label("dec_in_place")); # in-place processing... &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp &mov ($_tmp,$key); &set_label("dec_loop",4); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$idx)); # read input &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$idx)); &bswap ($s0); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$idx)); &bswap ($s1); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &bswap ($s2); &bswap ($s3); &call ("_x86_Camellia_decrypt"); &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load ivp &mov ($idx,$_len); # load len &bswap ($s0); &bswap ($s1); &bswap ($s2); &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv &bswap ($s3); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &sub ($idx,16); &jc (&label("dec_partial")); &mov ($_len,$idx); # save len &mov ($idx,$_inp); # load inp &mov ($key,$_out); # load out &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # write output &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($_tmp,$idx); # save ivp &lea ($idx,&DWP(16,$idx)); &mov ($_inp,$idx); # save inp &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); &mov ($_out,$key); # save out &jnz (&label("dec_loop")); &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load temp ivp &set_label("dec_end"); &mov ($idx,$_ivp); # load user ivp &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov (&DWP(0,$idx),$s0); # copy back to user &mov (&DWP(4,$idx),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$idx),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$idx),$s3); &jmp (&label("dec_out")); &set_label("dec_partial",4); &lea ($key,$ivec); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # dump output to stack &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &lea ($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",&DWP(16,$idx)); &mov ($idx eq "esi" ? $idx : "",$key); &mov ($key eq "edi" ? $key : "",$_out); # load out &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy output &mov ($key,$_inp); # use inp as temp ivp &jmp (&label("dec_end")); &set_label("dec_in_place",4); &set_label("dec_in_place_loop"); &lea ($key,$ivec); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$idx)); # read input &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$idx)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$idx)); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy to temp &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &bswap ($s0); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &bswap ($s1); &mov ($key,$_key); # load key &bswap ($s2); &bswap ($s3); &call ("_x86_Camellia_decrypt"); &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp &mov ($idx,$_out); # load out &bswap ($s0); &bswap ($s1); &bswap ($s2); &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv &bswap ($s3); &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key)); &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key)); &mov (&DWP(0,$idx),$s0); # write output &mov (&DWP(4,$idx),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$idx),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$idx),$s3); &lea ($idx,&DWP(16,$idx)); &mov ($_out,$idx); # save out &lea ($idx,$ivec); &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$idx)); # read temp &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$idx)); &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$idx)); &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$idx)); &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy iv &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1); &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2); &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3); &mov ($idx,$_inp); # load inp &lea ($idx,&DWP(16,$idx)); &mov ($_inp,$idx); # save inp &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len &sub ($s2,16); &jc (&label("dec_in_place_partial")); &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len &jnz (&label("dec_in_place_loop")); &jmp (&label("dec_out")); &set_label("dec_in_place_partial",4); # one can argue if this is actually required... &mov ($key eq "edi" ? $key : "",$_out); &lea ($idx eq "esi" ? $idx : "",$ivec); &lea ($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2)); &lea ($idx,&DWP(16,$idx,$s2)); &neg ($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : ""); &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # restore tail &set_label("dec_out",4); &mov ("esp",$_esp); &popf (); &function_end("Camellia_cbc_encrypt"); } &asciz("Camellia for x86 by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000121313176625656017052 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "cmll_locl.h" void Camellia_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, const int enc) { if (CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT == enc) Camellia_encrypt(in, out, key); else Camellia_decrypt(in, out, key); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c0000644000000000000000000000321313176625656017055 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include /* * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void Camellia_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc) { CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc, (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt); } /* N.B. This expects the input to be packed, MS bit first */ void Camellia_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc) { CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc, (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt); } void Camellia_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc) { CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, enc, (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c0000644000000000000000000000152113176625656017052 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include void Camellia_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, const int enc) { if (enc) CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt); else CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, (block128_f) Camellia_decrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c0000644000000000000000000000161213176625656017072 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include /* * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void Camellia_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num) { CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, num, (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/cmll_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000347213176625656017270 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) . * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Intellectual Property information for Camellia: * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html * * News Release for Announcement of Camellia open source: * http://www.ntt.co.jp/news/news06e/0604/060413a.html * * The Camellia Code included herein is developed by * NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation), and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_CAMELLIA_LOCL_H # define HEADER_CAMELLIA_LOCL_H typedef unsigned int u32; typedef unsigned char u8; int Camellia_Ekeygen(int keyBitLength, const u8 *rawKey, KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable); void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 plaintext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[]); void Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 ciphertext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 plaintext[]); void Camellia_EncryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 plaintext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[]); void Camellia_DecryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 ciphertext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 plaintext[]); #endif /* #ifndef HEADER_CAMELLIA_LOCL_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/camellia/camellia.c0000644000000000000000000006525713176625656017103 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) . * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Intellectual Property information for Camellia: * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html * * News Release for Announcement of Camellia open source: * http://www.ntt.co.jp/news/news06e/0604/060413a.html * * The Camellia Code included herein is developed by * NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation), and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. */ /* * Algorithm Specification * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html */ /* * This release balances code size and performance. In particular key * schedule setup is fully unrolled, because doing so *significantly* * reduces amount of instructions per setup round and code increase is * justifiable. In block functions on the other hand only inner loops * are unrolled, as full unroll gives only nominal performance boost, * while code size grows 4 or 7 times. Also, unlike previous versions * this one "encourages" compiler to keep intermediate variables in * registers, which should give better "all round" results, in other * words reasonable performance even with not so modern compilers. */ #include #include "cmll_locl.h" #include #include /* 32-bit rotations */ #if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if defined(_MSC_VER) && (defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) # define RightRotate(x, s) _lrotr(x, s) # define LeftRotate(x, s) _lrotl(x, s) # if _MSC_VER >= 1400 # define SWAP(x) _byteswap_ulong(x) # else # define SWAP(x) (_lrotl(x, 8) & 0x00ff00ff | _lrotr(x, 8) & 0xff00ff00) # endif # define GETU32(p) SWAP(*((u32 *)(p))) # define PUTU32(p,v) (*((u32 *)(p)) = SWAP((v))) # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__i386) || defined(__x86_64) # define RightRotate(x,s) ({u32 ret; asm ("rorl %1,%0":"=r"(ret):"I"(s),"0"(x):"cc"); ret; }) # define LeftRotate(x,s) ({u32 ret; asm ("roll %1,%0":"=r"(ret):"I"(s),"0"(x):"cc"); ret; }) # if defined(B_ENDIAN) /* stratus.com does it */ # define GETU32(p) (*(u32 *)(p)) # define PUTU32(p,v) (*(u32 *)(p)=(v)) # else # define GETU32(p) ({u32 r=*(const u32 *)(p); asm("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); r; }) # define PUTU32(p,v) ({u32 r=(v); asm("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); *(u32 *)(p)=r; }) # endif # elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) || defined(_ARCH_PPC64) || \ defined(__powerpc) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(__powerpc64__) # define LeftRotate(x,s) ({u32 ret; asm ("rlwinm %0,%1,%2,0,31":"=r"(ret):"r"(x),"I"(s)); ret; }) # define RightRotate(x,s) LeftRotate(x,(32-s)) # elif defined(__s390x__) # define LeftRotate(x,s) ({u32 ret; asm ("rll %0,%1,%2":"=r"(ret):"r"(x),"I"(s)); ret; }) # define RightRotate(x,s) LeftRotate(x,(32-s)) # define GETU32(p) (*(u32 *)(p)) # define PUTU32(p,v) (*(u32 *)(p)=(v)) # endif # endif #endif #if !defined(RightRotate) && !defined(LeftRotate) # define RightRotate(x, s) ( ((x) >> (s)) + ((x) << (32 - s)) ) # define LeftRotate(x, s) ( ((x) << (s)) + ((x) >> (32 - s)) ) #endif #if !defined(GETU32) && !defined(PUTU32) # define GETU32(p) (((u32)(p)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(p)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(p)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(p)[3])) # define PUTU32(p,v) ((p)[0] = (u8)((v) >> 24), (p)[1] = (u8)((v) >> 16), (p)[2] = (u8)((v) >> 8), (p)[3] = (u8)(v)) #endif /* S-box data */ #define SBOX1_1110 Camellia_SBOX[0] #define SBOX4_4404 Camellia_SBOX[1] #define SBOX2_0222 Camellia_SBOX[2] #define SBOX3_3033 Camellia_SBOX[3] static const u32 Camellia_SBOX[][256] = { {0x70707000, 0x82828200, 0x2c2c2c00, 0xececec00, 0xb3b3b300, 0x27272700, 0xc0c0c000, 0xe5e5e500, 0xe4e4e400, 0x85858500, 0x57575700, 0x35353500, 0xeaeaea00, 0x0c0c0c00, 0xaeaeae00, 0x41414100, 0x23232300, 0xefefef00, 0x6b6b6b00, 0x93939300, 0x45454500, 0x19191900, 0xa5a5a500, 0x21212100, 0xededed00, 0x0e0e0e00, 0x4f4f4f00, 0x4e4e4e00, 0x1d1d1d00, 0x65656500, 0x92929200, 0xbdbdbd00, 0x86868600, 0xb8b8b800, 0xafafaf00, 0x8f8f8f00, 0x7c7c7c00, 0xebebeb00, 0x1f1f1f00, 0xcecece00, 0x3e3e3e00, 0x30303000, 0xdcdcdc00, 0x5f5f5f00, 0x5e5e5e00, 0xc5c5c500, 0x0b0b0b00, 0x1a1a1a00, 0xa6a6a600, 0xe1e1e100, 0x39393900, 0xcacaca00, 0xd5d5d500, 0x47474700, 0x5d5d5d00, 0x3d3d3d00, 0xd9d9d900, 0x01010100, 0x5a5a5a00, 0xd6d6d600, 0x51515100, 0x56565600, 0x6c6c6c00, 0x4d4d4d00, 0x8b8b8b00, 0x0d0d0d00, 0x9a9a9a00, 0x66666600, 0xfbfbfb00, 0xcccccc00, 0xb0b0b000, 0x2d2d2d00, 0x74747400, 0x12121200, 0x2b2b2b00, 0x20202000, 0xf0f0f000, 0xb1b1b100, 0x84848400, 0x99999900, 0xdfdfdf00, 0x4c4c4c00, 0xcbcbcb00, 0xc2c2c200, 0x34343400, 0x7e7e7e00, 0x76767600, 0x05050500, 0x6d6d6d00, 0xb7b7b700, 0xa9a9a900, 0x31313100, 0xd1d1d100, 0x17171700, 0x04040400, 0xd7d7d700, 0x14141400, 0x58585800, 0x3a3a3a00, 0x61616100, 0xdedede00, 0x1b1b1b00, 0x11111100, 0x1c1c1c00, 0x32323200, 0x0f0f0f00, 0x9c9c9c00, 0x16161600, 0x53535300, 0x18181800, 0xf2f2f200, 0x22222200, 0xfefefe00, 0x44444400, 0xcfcfcf00, 0xb2b2b200, 0xc3c3c300, 0xb5b5b500, 0x7a7a7a00, 0x91919100, 0x24242400, 0x08080800, 0xe8e8e800, 0xa8a8a800, 0x60606000, 0xfcfcfc00, 0x69696900, 0x50505000, 0xaaaaaa00, 0xd0d0d000, 0xa0a0a000, 0x7d7d7d00, 0xa1a1a100, 0x89898900, 0x62626200, 0x97979700, 0x54545400, 0x5b5b5b00, 0x1e1e1e00, 0x95959500, 0xe0e0e000, 0xffffff00, 0x64646400, 0xd2d2d200, 0x10101000, 0xc4c4c400, 0x00000000, 0x48484800, 0xa3a3a300, 0xf7f7f700, 0x75757500, 0xdbdbdb00, 0x8a8a8a00, 0x03030300, 0xe6e6e600, 0xdadada00, 0x09090900, 0x3f3f3f00, 0xdddddd00, 0x94949400, 0x87878700, 0x5c5c5c00, 0x83838300, 0x02020200, 0xcdcdcd00, 0x4a4a4a00, 0x90909000, 0x33333300, 0x73737300, 0x67676700, 0xf6f6f600, 0xf3f3f300, 0x9d9d9d00, 0x7f7f7f00, 0xbfbfbf00, 0xe2e2e200, 0x52525200, 0x9b9b9b00, 0xd8d8d800, 0x26262600, 0xc8c8c800, 0x37373700, 0xc6c6c600, 0x3b3b3b00, 0x81818100, 0x96969600, 0x6f6f6f00, 0x4b4b4b00, 0x13131300, 0xbebebe00, 0x63636300, 0x2e2e2e00, 0xe9e9e900, 0x79797900, 0xa7a7a700, 0x8c8c8c00, 0x9f9f9f00, 0x6e6e6e00, 0xbcbcbc00, 0x8e8e8e00, 0x29292900, 0xf5f5f500, 0xf9f9f900, 0xb6b6b600, 0x2f2f2f00, 0xfdfdfd00, 0xb4b4b400, 0x59595900, 0x78787800, 0x98989800, 0x06060600, 0x6a6a6a00, 0xe7e7e700, 0x46464600, 0x71717100, 0xbababa00, 0xd4d4d400, 0x25252500, 0xababab00, 0x42424200, 0x88888800, 0xa2a2a200, 0x8d8d8d00, 0xfafafa00, 0x72727200, 0x07070700, 0xb9b9b900, 0x55555500, 0xf8f8f800, 0xeeeeee00, 0xacacac00, 0x0a0a0a00, 0x36363600, 0x49494900, 0x2a2a2a00, 0x68686800, 0x3c3c3c00, 0x38383800, 0xf1f1f100, 0xa4a4a400, 0x40404000, 0x28282800, 0xd3d3d300, 0x7b7b7b00, 0xbbbbbb00, 0xc9c9c900, 0x43434300, 0xc1c1c100, 0x15151500, 0xe3e3e300, 0xadadad00, 0xf4f4f400, 0x77777700, 0xc7c7c700, 0x80808000, 0x9e9e9e00}, {0x70700070, 0x2c2c002c, 0xb3b300b3, 0xc0c000c0, 0xe4e400e4, 0x57570057, 0xeaea00ea, 0xaeae00ae, 0x23230023, 0x6b6b006b, 0x45450045, 0xa5a500a5, 0xeded00ed, 0x4f4f004f, 0x1d1d001d, 0x92920092, 0x86860086, 0xafaf00af, 0x7c7c007c, 0x1f1f001f, 0x3e3e003e, 0xdcdc00dc, 0x5e5e005e, 0x0b0b000b, 0xa6a600a6, 0x39390039, 0xd5d500d5, 0x5d5d005d, 0xd9d900d9, 0x5a5a005a, 0x51510051, 0x6c6c006c, 0x8b8b008b, 0x9a9a009a, 0xfbfb00fb, 0xb0b000b0, 0x74740074, 0x2b2b002b, 0xf0f000f0, 0x84840084, 0xdfdf00df, 0xcbcb00cb, 0x34340034, 0x76760076, 0x6d6d006d, 0xa9a900a9, 0xd1d100d1, 0x04040004, 0x14140014, 0x3a3a003a, 0xdede00de, 0x11110011, 0x32320032, 0x9c9c009c, 0x53530053, 0xf2f200f2, 0xfefe00fe, 0xcfcf00cf, 0xc3c300c3, 0x7a7a007a, 0x24240024, 0xe8e800e8, 0x60600060, 0x69690069, 0xaaaa00aa, 0xa0a000a0, 0xa1a100a1, 0x62620062, 0x54540054, 0x1e1e001e, 0xe0e000e0, 0x64640064, 0x10100010, 0x00000000, 0xa3a300a3, 0x75750075, 0x8a8a008a, 0xe6e600e6, 0x09090009, 0xdddd00dd, 0x87870087, 0x83830083, 0xcdcd00cd, 0x90900090, 0x73730073, 0xf6f600f6, 0x9d9d009d, 0xbfbf00bf, 0x52520052, 0xd8d800d8, 0xc8c800c8, 0xc6c600c6, 0x81810081, 0x6f6f006f, 0x13130013, 0x63630063, 0xe9e900e9, 0xa7a700a7, 0x9f9f009f, 0xbcbc00bc, 0x29290029, 0xf9f900f9, 0x2f2f002f, 0xb4b400b4, 0x78780078, 0x06060006, 0xe7e700e7, 0x71710071, 0xd4d400d4, 0xabab00ab, 0x88880088, 0x8d8d008d, 0x72720072, 0xb9b900b9, 0xf8f800f8, 0xacac00ac, 0x36360036, 0x2a2a002a, 0x3c3c003c, 0xf1f100f1, 0x40400040, 0xd3d300d3, 0xbbbb00bb, 0x43430043, 0x15150015, 0xadad00ad, 0x77770077, 0x80800080, 0x82820082, 0xecec00ec, 0x27270027, 0xe5e500e5, 0x85850085, 0x35350035, 0x0c0c000c, 0x41410041, 0xefef00ef, 0x93930093, 0x19190019, 0x21210021, 0x0e0e000e, 0x4e4e004e, 0x65650065, 0xbdbd00bd, 0xb8b800b8, 0x8f8f008f, 0xebeb00eb, 0xcece00ce, 0x30300030, 0x5f5f005f, 0xc5c500c5, 0x1a1a001a, 0xe1e100e1, 0xcaca00ca, 0x47470047, 0x3d3d003d, 0x01010001, 0xd6d600d6, 0x56560056, 0x4d4d004d, 0x0d0d000d, 0x66660066, 0xcccc00cc, 0x2d2d002d, 0x12120012, 0x20200020, 0xb1b100b1, 0x99990099, 0x4c4c004c, 0xc2c200c2, 0x7e7e007e, 0x05050005, 0xb7b700b7, 0x31310031, 0x17170017, 0xd7d700d7, 0x58580058, 0x61610061, 0x1b1b001b, 0x1c1c001c, 0x0f0f000f, 0x16160016, 0x18180018, 0x22220022, 0x44440044, 0xb2b200b2, 0xb5b500b5, 0x91910091, 0x08080008, 0xa8a800a8, 0xfcfc00fc, 0x50500050, 0xd0d000d0, 0x7d7d007d, 0x89890089, 0x97970097, 0x5b5b005b, 0x95950095, 0xffff00ff, 0xd2d200d2, 0xc4c400c4, 0x48480048, 0xf7f700f7, 0xdbdb00db, 0x03030003, 0xdada00da, 0x3f3f003f, 0x94940094, 0x5c5c005c, 0x02020002, 0x4a4a004a, 0x33330033, 0x67670067, 0xf3f300f3, 0x7f7f007f, 0xe2e200e2, 0x9b9b009b, 0x26260026, 0x37370037, 0x3b3b003b, 0x96960096, 0x4b4b004b, 0xbebe00be, 0x2e2e002e, 0x79790079, 0x8c8c008c, 0x6e6e006e, 0x8e8e008e, 0xf5f500f5, 0xb6b600b6, 0xfdfd00fd, 0x59590059, 0x98980098, 0x6a6a006a, 0x46460046, 0xbaba00ba, 0x25250025, 0x42420042, 0xa2a200a2, 0xfafa00fa, 0x07070007, 0x55550055, 0xeeee00ee, 0x0a0a000a, 0x49490049, 0x68680068, 0x38380038, 0xa4a400a4, 0x28280028, 0x7b7b007b, 0xc9c900c9, 0xc1c100c1, 0xe3e300e3, 0xf4f400f4, 0xc7c700c7, 0x9e9e009e}, {0x00e0e0e0, 0x00050505, 0x00585858, 0x00d9d9d9, 0x00676767, 0x004e4e4e, 0x00818181, 0x00cbcbcb, 0x00c9c9c9, 0x000b0b0b, 0x00aeaeae, 0x006a6a6a, 0x00d5d5d5, 0x00181818, 0x005d5d5d, 0x00828282, 0x00464646, 0x00dfdfdf, 0x00d6d6d6, 0x00272727, 0x008a8a8a, 0x00323232, 0x004b4b4b, 0x00424242, 0x00dbdbdb, 0x001c1c1c, 0x009e9e9e, 0x009c9c9c, 0x003a3a3a, 0x00cacaca, 0x00252525, 0x007b7b7b, 0x000d0d0d, 0x00717171, 0x005f5f5f, 0x001f1f1f, 0x00f8f8f8, 0x00d7d7d7, 0x003e3e3e, 0x009d9d9d, 0x007c7c7c, 0x00606060, 0x00b9b9b9, 0x00bebebe, 0x00bcbcbc, 0x008b8b8b, 0x00161616, 0x00343434, 0x004d4d4d, 0x00c3c3c3, 0x00727272, 0x00959595, 0x00ababab, 0x008e8e8e, 0x00bababa, 0x007a7a7a, 0x00b3b3b3, 0x00020202, 0x00b4b4b4, 0x00adadad, 0x00a2a2a2, 0x00acacac, 0x00d8d8d8, 0x009a9a9a, 0x00171717, 0x001a1a1a, 0x00353535, 0x00cccccc, 0x00f7f7f7, 0x00999999, 0x00616161, 0x005a5a5a, 0x00e8e8e8, 0x00242424, 0x00565656, 0x00404040, 0x00e1e1e1, 0x00636363, 0x00090909, 0x00333333, 0x00bfbfbf, 0x00989898, 0x00979797, 0x00858585, 0x00686868, 0x00fcfcfc, 0x00ececec, 0x000a0a0a, 0x00dadada, 0x006f6f6f, 0x00535353, 0x00626262, 0x00a3a3a3, 0x002e2e2e, 0x00080808, 0x00afafaf, 0x00282828, 0x00b0b0b0, 0x00747474, 0x00c2c2c2, 0x00bdbdbd, 0x00363636, 0x00222222, 0x00383838, 0x00646464, 0x001e1e1e, 0x00393939, 0x002c2c2c, 0x00a6a6a6, 0x00303030, 0x00e5e5e5, 0x00444444, 0x00fdfdfd, 0x00888888, 0x009f9f9f, 0x00656565, 0x00878787, 0x006b6b6b, 0x00f4f4f4, 0x00232323, 0x00484848, 0x00101010, 0x00d1d1d1, 0x00515151, 0x00c0c0c0, 0x00f9f9f9, 0x00d2d2d2, 0x00a0a0a0, 0x00555555, 0x00a1a1a1, 0x00414141, 0x00fafafa, 0x00434343, 0x00131313, 0x00c4c4c4, 0x002f2f2f, 0x00a8a8a8, 0x00b6b6b6, 0x003c3c3c, 0x002b2b2b, 0x00c1c1c1, 0x00ffffff, 0x00c8c8c8, 0x00a5a5a5, 0x00202020, 0x00898989, 0x00000000, 0x00909090, 0x00474747, 0x00efefef, 0x00eaeaea, 0x00b7b7b7, 0x00151515, 0x00060606, 0x00cdcdcd, 0x00b5b5b5, 0x00121212, 0x007e7e7e, 0x00bbbbbb, 0x00292929, 0x000f0f0f, 0x00b8b8b8, 0x00070707, 0x00040404, 0x009b9b9b, 0x00949494, 0x00212121, 0x00666666, 0x00e6e6e6, 0x00cecece, 0x00ededed, 0x00e7e7e7, 0x003b3b3b, 0x00fefefe, 0x007f7f7f, 0x00c5c5c5, 0x00a4a4a4, 0x00373737, 0x00b1b1b1, 0x004c4c4c, 0x00919191, 0x006e6e6e, 0x008d8d8d, 0x00767676, 0x00030303, 0x002d2d2d, 0x00dedede, 0x00969696, 0x00262626, 0x007d7d7d, 0x00c6c6c6, 0x005c5c5c, 0x00d3d3d3, 0x00f2f2f2, 0x004f4f4f, 0x00191919, 0x003f3f3f, 0x00dcdcdc, 0x00797979, 0x001d1d1d, 0x00525252, 0x00ebebeb, 0x00f3f3f3, 0x006d6d6d, 0x005e5e5e, 0x00fbfbfb, 0x00696969, 0x00b2b2b2, 0x00f0f0f0, 0x00313131, 0x000c0c0c, 0x00d4d4d4, 0x00cfcfcf, 0x008c8c8c, 0x00e2e2e2, 0x00757575, 0x00a9a9a9, 0x004a4a4a, 0x00575757, 0x00848484, 0x00111111, 0x00454545, 0x001b1b1b, 0x00f5f5f5, 0x00e4e4e4, 0x000e0e0e, 0x00737373, 0x00aaaaaa, 0x00f1f1f1, 0x00dddddd, 0x00595959, 0x00141414, 0x006c6c6c, 0x00929292, 0x00545454, 0x00d0d0d0, 0x00787878, 0x00707070, 0x00e3e3e3, 0x00494949, 0x00808080, 0x00505050, 0x00a7a7a7, 0x00f6f6f6, 0x00777777, 0x00939393, 0x00868686, 0x00838383, 0x002a2a2a, 0x00c7c7c7, 0x005b5b5b, 0x00e9e9e9, 0x00eeeeee, 0x008f8f8f, 0x00010101, 0x003d3d3d}, {0x38003838, 0x41004141, 0x16001616, 0x76007676, 0xd900d9d9, 0x93009393, 0x60006060, 0xf200f2f2, 0x72007272, 0xc200c2c2, 0xab00abab, 0x9a009a9a, 0x75007575, 0x06000606, 0x57005757, 0xa000a0a0, 0x91009191, 0xf700f7f7, 0xb500b5b5, 0xc900c9c9, 0xa200a2a2, 0x8c008c8c, 0xd200d2d2, 0x90009090, 0xf600f6f6, 0x07000707, 0xa700a7a7, 0x27002727, 0x8e008e8e, 0xb200b2b2, 0x49004949, 0xde00dede, 0x43004343, 0x5c005c5c, 0xd700d7d7, 0xc700c7c7, 0x3e003e3e, 0xf500f5f5, 0x8f008f8f, 0x67006767, 0x1f001f1f, 0x18001818, 0x6e006e6e, 0xaf00afaf, 0x2f002f2f, 0xe200e2e2, 0x85008585, 0x0d000d0d, 0x53005353, 0xf000f0f0, 0x9c009c9c, 0x65006565, 0xea00eaea, 0xa300a3a3, 0xae00aeae, 0x9e009e9e, 0xec00ecec, 0x80008080, 0x2d002d2d, 0x6b006b6b, 0xa800a8a8, 0x2b002b2b, 0x36003636, 0xa600a6a6, 0xc500c5c5, 0x86008686, 0x4d004d4d, 0x33003333, 0xfd00fdfd, 0x66006666, 0x58005858, 0x96009696, 0x3a003a3a, 0x09000909, 0x95009595, 0x10001010, 0x78007878, 0xd800d8d8, 0x42004242, 0xcc00cccc, 0xef00efef, 0x26002626, 0xe500e5e5, 0x61006161, 0x1a001a1a, 0x3f003f3f, 0x3b003b3b, 0x82008282, 0xb600b6b6, 0xdb00dbdb, 0xd400d4d4, 0x98009898, 0xe800e8e8, 0x8b008b8b, 0x02000202, 0xeb00ebeb, 0x0a000a0a, 0x2c002c2c, 0x1d001d1d, 0xb000b0b0, 0x6f006f6f, 0x8d008d8d, 0x88008888, 0x0e000e0e, 0x19001919, 0x87008787, 0x4e004e4e, 0x0b000b0b, 0xa900a9a9, 0x0c000c0c, 0x79007979, 0x11001111, 0x7f007f7f, 0x22002222, 0xe700e7e7, 0x59005959, 0xe100e1e1, 0xda00dada, 0x3d003d3d, 0xc800c8c8, 0x12001212, 0x04000404, 0x74007474, 0x54005454, 0x30003030, 0x7e007e7e, 0xb400b4b4, 0x28002828, 0x55005555, 0x68006868, 0x50005050, 0xbe00bebe, 0xd000d0d0, 0xc400c4c4, 0x31003131, 0xcb00cbcb, 0x2a002a2a, 0xad00adad, 0x0f000f0f, 0xca00caca, 0x70007070, 0xff00ffff, 0x32003232, 0x69006969, 0x08000808, 0x62006262, 0x00000000, 0x24002424, 0xd100d1d1, 0xfb00fbfb, 0xba00baba, 0xed00eded, 0x45004545, 0x81008181, 0x73007373, 0x6d006d6d, 0x84008484, 0x9f009f9f, 0xee00eeee, 0x4a004a4a, 0xc300c3c3, 0x2e002e2e, 0xc100c1c1, 0x01000101, 0xe600e6e6, 0x25002525, 0x48004848, 0x99009999, 0xb900b9b9, 0xb300b3b3, 0x7b007b7b, 0xf900f9f9, 0xce00cece, 0xbf00bfbf, 0xdf00dfdf, 0x71007171, 0x29002929, 0xcd00cdcd, 0x6c006c6c, 0x13001313, 0x64006464, 0x9b009b9b, 0x63006363, 0x9d009d9d, 0xc000c0c0, 0x4b004b4b, 0xb700b7b7, 0xa500a5a5, 0x89008989, 0x5f005f5f, 0xb100b1b1, 0x17001717, 0xf400f4f4, 0xbc00bcbc, 0xd300d3d3, 0x46004646, 0xcf00cfcf, 0x37003737, 0x5e005e5e, 0x47004747, 0x94009494, 0xfa00fafa, 0xfc00fcfc, 0x5b005b5b, 0x97009797, 0xfe00fefe, 0x5a005a5a, 0xac00acac, 0x3c003c3c, 0x4c004c4c, 0x03000303, 0x35003535, 0xf300f3f3, 0x23002323, 0xb800b8b8, 0x5d005d5d, 0x6a006a6a, 0x92009292, 0xd500d5d5, 0x21002121, 0x44004444, 0x51005151, 0xc600c6c6, 0x7d007d7d, 0x39003939, 0x83008383, 0xdc00dcdc, 0xaa00aaaa, 0x7c007c7c, 0x77007777, 0x56005656, 0x05000505, 0x1b001b1b, 0xa400a4a4, 0x15001515, 0x34003434, 0x1e001e1e, 0x1c001c1c, 0xf800f8f8, 0x52005252, 0x20002020, 0x14001414, 0xe900e9e9, 0xbd00bdbd, 0xdd00dddd, 0xe400e4e4, 0xa100a1a1, 0xe000e0e0, 0x8a008a8a, 0xf100f1f1, 0xd600d6d6, 0x7a007a7a, 0xbb00bbbb, 0xe300e3e3, 0x40004040, 0x4f004f4f} }; /* Key generation constants */ static const u32 SIGMA[] = { 0xa09e667f, 0x3bcc908b, 0xb67ae858, 0x4caa73b2, 0xc6ef372f, 0xe94f82be, 0x54ff53a5, 0xf1d36f1c, 0x10e527fa, 0xde682d1d, 0xb05688c2, 0xb3e6c1fd }; /* The phi algorithm given in C.2.7 of the Camellia spec document. */ /* * This version does not attempt to minimize amount of temporary * variables, but instead explicitly exposes algorithm's parallelism. * It is therefore most appropriate for platforms with not less than * ~16 registers. For platforms with less registers [well, x86 to be * specific] assembler version should be/is provided anyway... */ #define Camellia_Feistel(_s0,_s1,_s2,_s3,_key) do {\ register u32 _t0,_t1,_t2,_t3;\ \ _t0 = _s0 ^ (_key)[0];\ _t3 = SBOX4_4404[_t0&0xff];\ _t1 = _s1 ^ (_key)[1];\ _t3 ^= SBOX3_3033[(_t0 >> 8)&0xff];\ _t2 = SBOX1_1110[_t1&0xff];\ _t3 ^= SBOX2_0222[(_t0 >> 16)&0xff];\ _t2 ^= SBOX4_4404[(_t1 >> 8)&0xff];\ _t3 ^= SBOX1_1110[(_t0 >> 24)];\ _t2 ^= _t3;\ _t3 = RightRotate(_t3,8);\ _t2 ^= SBOX3_3033[(_t1 >> 16)&0xff];\ _s3 ^= _t3;\ _t2 ^= SBOX2_0222[(_t1 >> 24)];\ _s2 ^= _t2; \ _s3 ^= _t2;\ } while(0) /* * Note that n has to be less than 32. Rotations for larger amount * of bits are achieved by "rotating" order of s-elements and * adjusting n accordingly, e.g. RotLeft128(s1,s2,s3,s0,n-32). */ #define RotLeft128(_s0,_s1,_s2,_s3,_n) do {\ u32 _t0=_s0>>(32-_n);\ _s0 = (_s0<<_n) | (_s1>>(32-_n));\ _s1 = (_s1<<_n) | (_s2>>(32-_n));\ _s2 = (_s2<<_n) | (_s3>>(32-_n));\ _s3 = (_s3<<_n) | _t0;\ } while (0) int Camellia_Ekeygen(int keyBitLength, const u8 *rawKey, KEY_TABLE_TYPE k) { register u32 s0, s1, s2, s3; k[0] = s0 = GETU32(rawKey); k[1] = s1 = GETU32(rawKey + 4); k[2] = s2 = GETU32(rawKey + 8); k[3] = s3 = GETU32(rawKey + 12); if (keyBitLength != 128) { k[8] = s0 = GETU32(rawKey + 16); k[9] = s1 = GETU32(rawKey + 20); if (keyBitLength == 192) { k[10] = s2 = ~s0; k[11] = s3 = ~s1; } else { k[10] = s2 = GETU32(rawKey + 24); k[11] = s3 = GETU32(rawKey + 28); } s0 ^= k[0], s1 ^= k[1], s2 ^= k[2], s3 ^= k[3]; } /* Use the Feistel routine to scramble the key material */ Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, SIGMA + 0); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, SIGMA + 2); s0 ^= k[0], s1 ^= k[1], s2 ^= k[2], s3 ^= k[3]; Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, SIGMA + 4); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, SIGMA + 6); /* Fill the keyTable. Requires many block rotations. */ if (keyBitLength == 128) { k[4] = s0, k[5] = s1, k[6] = s2, k[7] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 15 */ k[12] = s0, k[13] = s1, k[14] = s2, k[15] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 30 */ k[16] = s0, k[17] = s1, k[18] = s2, k[19] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 45 */ k[24] = s0, k[25] = s1; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 60 */ k[28] = s0, k[29] = s1, k[30] = s2, k[31] = s3; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 2); /* KA <<< 94 */ k[40] = s1, k[41] = s2, k[42] = s3, k[43] = s0; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 17); /* KA <<<111 */ k[48] = s1, k[49] = s2, k[50] = s3, k[51] = s0; s0 = k[0], s1 = k[1], s2 = k[2], s3 = k[3]; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KL <<< 15 */ k[8] = s0, k[9] = s1, k[10] = s2, k[11] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KL <<< 45 */ k[20] = s0, k[21] = s1, k[22] = s2, k[23] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KL <<< 60 */ k[26] = s2, k[27] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 17); /* KL <<< 77 */ k[32] = s0, k[33] = s1, k[34] = s2, k[35] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 17); /* KL <<< 94 */ k[36] = s0, k[37] = s1, k[38] = s2, k[39] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 17); /* KL <<<111 */ k[44] = s0, k[45] = s1, k[46] = s2, k[47] = s3; return 3; /* grand rounds */ } else { k[12] = s0, k[13] = s1, k[14] = s2, k[15] = s3; s0 ^= k[8], s1 ^= k[9], s2 ^= k[10], s3 ^= k[11]; Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, (SIGMA + 8)); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, (SIGMA + 10)); k[4] = s0, k[5] = s1, k[6] = s2, k[7] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KB <<< 30 */ k[20] = s0, k[21] = s1, k[22] = s2, k[23] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KB <<< 60 */ k[40] = s0, k[41] = s1, k[42] = s2, k[43] = s3; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 19); /* KB <<<111 */ k[64] = s1, k[65] = s2, k[66] = s3, k[67] = s0; s0 = k[8], s1 = k[9], s2 = k[10], s3 = k[11]; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KR <<< 15 */ k[8] = s0, k[9] = s1, k[10] = s2, k[11] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KR <<< 30 */ k[16] = s0, k[17] = s1, k[18] = s2, k[19] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KR <<< 60 */ k[36] = s0, k[37] = s1, k[38] = s2, k[39] = s3; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 2); /* KR <<< 94 */ k[52] = s1, k[53] = s2, k[54] = s3, k[55] = s0; s0 = k[12], s1 = k[13], s2 = k[14], s3 = k[15]; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 15); /* KA <<< 15 */ k[12] = s0, k[13] = s1, k[14] = s2, k[15] = s3; RotLeft128(s0, s1, s2, s3, 30); /* KA <<< 45 */ k[28] = s0, k[29] = s1, k[30] = s2, k[31] = s3; /* KA <<< 77 */ k[48] = s1, k[49] = s2, k[50] = s3, k[51] = s0; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 17); /* KA <<< 94 */ k[56] = s1, k[57] = s2, k[58] = s3, k[59] = s0; s0 = k[0], s1 = k[1], s2 = k[2], s3 = k[3]; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 13); /* KL <<< 45 */ k[24] = s1, k[25] = s2, k[26] = s3, k[27] = s0; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 15); /* KL <<< 60 */ k[32] = s1, k[33] = s2, k[34] = s3, k[35] = s0; RotLeft128(s1, s2, s3, s0, 17); /* KL <<< 77 */ k[44] = s1, k[45] = s2, k[46] = s3, k[47] = s0; RotLeft128(s2, s3, s0, s1, 2); /* KL <<<111 */ k[60] = s2, k[61] = s3, k[62] = s0, k[63] = s1; return 4; /* grand rounds */ } /* * It is possible to perform certain precalculations, which * would spare few cycles in block procedure. It's not done, * because it upsets the performance balance between key * setup and block procedures, negatively affecting overall * throughput in applications operating on short messages * and volatile keys. */ } void Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 plaintext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[]) { register u32 s0, s1, s2, s3; const u32 *k = keyTable, *kend = keyTable + grandRounds * 16; s0 = GETU32(plaintext) ^ k[0]; s1 = GETU32(plaintext + 4) ^ k[1]; s2 = GETU32(plaintext + 8) ^ k[2]; s3 = GETU32(plaintext + 12) ^ k[3]; k += 4; while (1) { /* Camellia makes 6 Feistel rounds */ Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 0); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 2); Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 4); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 6); Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 8); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 10); k += 12; if (k == kend) break; /* * This is the same function as the diffusion function D of the * accompanying documentation. See section 3.2 for properties of the * FLlayer function. */ s1 ^= LeftRotate(s0 & k[0], 1); s2 ^= s3 | k[3]; s0 ^= s1 | k[1]; s3 ^= LeftRotate(s2 & k[2], 1); k += 4; } s2 ^= k[0], s3 ^= k[1], s0 ^= k[2], s1 ^= k[3]; PUTU32(ciphertext, s2); PUTU32(ciphertext + 4, s3); PUTU32(ciphertext + 8, s0); PUTU32(ciphertext + 12, s1); } void Camellia_EncryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 plaintext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[]) { Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds(keyBitLength == 128 ? 3 : 4, plaintext, keyTable, ciphertext); } void Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(int grandRounds, const u8 ciphertext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 plaintext[]) { u32 s0, s1, s2, s3; const u32 *k = keyTable + grandRounds * 16, *kend = keyTable + 4; s0 = GETU32(ciphertext) ^ k[0]; s1 = GETU32(ciphertext + 4) ^ k[1]; s2 = GETU32(ciphertext + 8) ^ k[2]; s3 = GETU32(ciphertext + 12) ^ k[3]; while (1) { /* Camellia makes 6 Feistel rounds */ k -= 12; Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 10); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 8); Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 6); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 4); Camellia_Feistel(s0, s1, s2, s3, k + 2); Camellia_Feistel(s2, s3, s0, s1, k + 0); if (k == kend) break; /* * This is the same function as the diffusion function D of the * accompanying documentation. See section 3.2 for properties of the * FLlayer function. */ k -= 4; s1 ^= LeftRotate(s0 & k[2], 1); s2 ^= s3 | k[1]; s0 ^= s1 | k[3]; s3 ^= LeftRotate(s2 & k[0], 1); } k -= 4; s2 ^= k[0], s3 ^= k[1], s0 ^= k[2], s1 ^= k[3]; PUTU32(plaintext, s2); PUTU32(plaintext + 4, s3); PUTU32(plaintext + 8, s0); PUTU32(plaintext + 12, s1); } void Camellia_DecryptBlock(int keyBitLength, const u8 plaintext[], const KEY_TABLE_TYPE keyTable, u8 ciphertext[]) { Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds(keyBitLength == 128 ? 3 : 4, plaintext, keyTable, ciphertext); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657015034 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h0000644000000000000000000115316413176625657016622 0ustar rootroot/* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl * * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Serialized OID's */ static const unsigned char so[6765] = { 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D, /* [ 0] OBJ_rsadsi */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01, /* [ 6] OBJ_pkcs */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x02, /* [ 13] OBJ_md2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x05, /* [ 21] OBJ_md5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x04, /* [ 29] OBJ_rc4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 37] OBJ_rsaEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 46] OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 55] OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x01, /* [ 64] OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x03, /* [ 73] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC */ 0x55, /* [ 82] OBJ_X500 */ 0x55,0x04, /* [ 83] OBJ_X509 */ 0x55,0x04,0x03, /* [ 85] OBJ_commonName */ 0x55,0x04,0x06, /* [ 88] OBJ_countryName */ 0x55,0x04,0x07, /* [ 91] OBJ_localityName */ 0x55,0x04,0x08, /* [ 94] OBJ_stateOrProvinceName */ 0x55,0x04,0x0A, /* [ 97] OBJ_organizationName */ 0x55,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 100] OBJ_organizationalUnitName */ 0x55,0x08,0x01,0x01, /* [ 103] OBJ_rsa */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07, /* [ 107] OBJ_pkcs7 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x01, /* [ 115] OBJ_pkcs7_data */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x02, /* [ 124] OBJ_pkcs7_signed */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x03, /* [ 133] OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x04, /* [ 142] OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x05, /* [ 151] OBJ_pkcs7_digest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x06, /* [ 160] OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x03, /* [ 169] OBJ_pkcs3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x03,0x01, /* [ 177] OBJ_dhKeyAgreement */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x06, /* [ 186] OBJ_des_ecb */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x09, /* [ 191] OBJ_des_cfb64 */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x07, /* [ 196] OBJ_des_cbc */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x11, /* [ 201] OBJ_des_ede_ecb */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x81,0x3C,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 206] OBJ_idea_cbc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x02, /* [ 217] OBJ_rc2_cbc */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x12, /* [ 225] OBJ_sha */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0F, /* [ 230] OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x07, /* [ 235] OBJ_des_ede3_cbc */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x08, /* [ 243] OBJ_des_ofb64 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09, /* [ 248] OBJ_pkcs9 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x01, /* [ 256] OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x02, /* [ 265] OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x03, /* [ 274] OBJ_pkcs9_contentType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x04, /* [ 283] OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x05, /* [ 292] OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x06, /* [ 301] OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x07, /* [ 310] OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x08, /* [ 319] OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x09, /* [ 328] OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42, /* [ 337] OBJ_netscape */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01, /* [ 344] OBJ_netscape_cert_extension */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x02, /* [ 352] OBJ_netscape_data_type */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1A, /* [ 360] OBJ_sha1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 365] OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0D, /* [ 374] OBJ_dsaWithSHA */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0C, /* [ 379] OBJ_dsa_2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0B, /* [ 384] OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0C, /* [ 393] OBJ_id_pbkdf2 */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1B, /* [ 402] OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x01, /* [ 407] OBJ_netscape_cert_type */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x02, /* [ 416] OBJ_netscape_base_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x03, /* [ 425] OBJ_netscape_revocation_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x04, /* [ 434] OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x07, /* [ 443] OBJ_netscape_renewal_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x08, /* [ 452] OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 461] OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 470] OBJ_netscape_comment */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x02,0x05, /* [ 479] OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence */ 0x55,0x1D, /* [ 488] OBJ_id_ce */ 0x55,0x1D,0x0E, /* [ 490] OBJ_subject_key_identifier */ 0x55,0x1D,0x0F, /* [ 493] OBJ_key_usage */ 0x55,0x1D,0x10, /* [ 496] OBJ_private_key_usage_period */ 0x55,0x1D,0x11, /* [ 499] OBJ_subject_alt_name */ 0x55,0x1D,0x12, /* [ 502] OBJ_issuer_alt_name */ 0x55,0x1D,0x13, /* [ 505] OBJ_basic_constraints */ 0x55,0x1D,0x14, /* [ 508] OBJ_crl_number */ 0x55,0x1D,0x20, /* [ 511] OBJ_certificate_policies */ 0x55,0x1D,0x23, /* [ 514] OBJ_authority_key_identifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x97,0x55,0x01,0x02, /* [ 517] OBJ_bf_cbc */ 0x55,0x08,0x03,0x65, /* [ 526] OBJ_mdc2 */ 0x55,0x08,0x03,0x64, /* [ 530] OBJ_mdc2WithRSA */ 0x55,0x04,0x2A, /* [ 534] OBJ_givenName */ 0x55,0x04,0x04, /* [ 537] OBJ_surname */ 0x55,0x04,0x2B, /* [ 540] OBJ_initials */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2C, /* [ 543] OBJ_uniqueIdentifier */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1F, /* [ 553] OBJ_crl_distribution_points */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x03, /* [ 556] OBJ_md5WithRSA */ 0x55,0x04,0x05, /* [ 561] OBJ_serialNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x0C, /* [ 564] OBJ_title */ 0x55,0x04,0x0D, /* [ 567] OBJ_description */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0A, /* [ 570] OBJ_cast5_cbc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0C, /* [ 579] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04,0x03, /* [ 588] OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1D, /* [ 595] OBJ_sha1WithRSA */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04,0x01, /* [ 600] OBJ_dsa */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x02,0x01, /* [ 607] OBJ_ripemd160 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x01,0x02, /* [ 612] OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x08, /* [ 618] OBJ_rc5_cbc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x08, /* [ 626] OBJ_zlib_compression */ 0x55,0x1D,0x25, /* [ 637] OBJ_ext_key_usage */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07, /* [ 640] OBJ_id_pkix */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03, /* [ 646] OBJ_id_kp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x01, /* [ 653] OBJ_server_auth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x02, /* [ 661] OBJ_client_auth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x03, /* [ 669] OBJ_code_sign */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x04, /* [ 677] OBJ_email_protect */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x08, /* [ 685] OBJ_time_stamp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x15, /* [ 693] OBJ_ms_code_ind */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x16, /* [ 703] OBJ_ms_code_com */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x01, /* [ 713] OBJ_ms_ctl_sign */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x03, /* [ 723] OBJ_ms_sgc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x04, /* [ 733] OBJ_ms_efs */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x04,0x01, /* [ 743] OBJ_ns_sgc */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1B, /* [ 752] OBJ_delta_crl */ 0x55,0x1D,0x15, /* [ 755] OBJ_crl_reason */ 0x55,0x1D,0x18, /* [ 758] OBJ_invalidity_date */ 0x2B,0x65,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 761] OBJ_sxnet */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x01, /* [ 766] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x02, /* [ 776] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x03, /* [ 786] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x04, /* [ 796] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x05, /* [ 806] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x06, /* [ 816] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x01, /* [ 826] OBJ_keyBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x02, /* [ 837] OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x03, /* [ 848] OBJ_certBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x04, /* [ 859] OBJ_crlBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x05, /* [ 870] OBJ_secretBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x06, /* [ 881] OBJ_safeContentsBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x14, /* [ 892] OBJ_friendlyName */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x15, /* [ 901] OBJ_localKeyID */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x16,0x01, /* [ 910] OBJ_x509Certificate */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x16,0x02, /* [ 920] OBJ_sdsiCertificate */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x17,0x01, /* [ 930] OBJ_x509Crl */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0D, /* [ 940] OBJ_pbes2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0E, /* [ 949] OBJ_pbmac1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x07, /* [ 958] OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x01, /* [ 966] OBJ_id_qt_cps */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x02, /* [ 974] OBJ_id_qt_unotice */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x0F, /* [ 982] OBJ_SMIMECapabilities */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x04, /* [ 991] OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x06, /* [ 1000] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0A, /* [ 1009] OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 1018] OBJ_ms_ext_req */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x0E, /* [ 1028] OBJ_ext_req */ 0x55,0x04,0x29, /* [ 1037] OBJ_name */ 0x55,0x04,0x2E, /* [ 1040] OBJ_dnQualifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01, /* [ 1043] OBJ_id_pe */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30, /* [ 1050] OBJ_id_ad */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x01, /* [ 1057] OBJ_info_access */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01, /* [ 1065] OBJ_ad_OCSP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x02, /* [ 1073] OBJ_ad_ca_issuers */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x09, /* [ 1081] OBJ_OCSP_sign */ 0x2A, /* [ 1089] OBJ_member_body */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48, /* [ 1090] OBJ_ISO_US */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38, /* [ 1093] OBJ_X9_57 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04, /* [ 1098] OBJ_X9cm */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01, /* [ 1104] OBJ_pkcs1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05, /* [ 1112] OBJ_pkcs5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10, /* [ 1120] OBJ_SMIME */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00, /* [ 1129] OBJ_id_smime_mod */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01, /* [ 1139] OBJ_id_smime_ct */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02, /* [ 1149] OBJ_id_smime_aa */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03, /* [ 1159] OBJ_id_smime_alg */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x04, /* [ 1169] OBJ_id_smime_cd */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05, /* [ 1179] OBJ_id_smime_spq */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06, /* [ 1189] OBJ_id_smime_cti */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x01, /* [ 1199] OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x02, /* [ 1210] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x03, /* [ 1221] OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x04, /* [ 1232] OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x05, /* [ 1243] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x06, /* [ 1254] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x07, /* [ 1265] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x08, /* [ 1276] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x01, /* [ 1287] OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x02, /* [ 1298] OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x03, /* [ 1309] OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x04, /* [ 1320] OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x05, /* [ 1331] OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x06, /* [ 1342] OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x07, /* [ 1353] OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x08, /* [ 1364] OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x01, /* [ 1375] OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x02, /* [ 1386] OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x03, /* [ 1397] OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x04, /* [ 1408] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x05, /* [ 1419] OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x06, /* [ 1430] OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x07, /* [ 1441] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x08, /* [ 1452] OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x09, /* [ 1463] OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0A, /* [ 1474] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0B, /* [ 1485] OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0C, /* [ 1496] OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0D, /* [ 1507] OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0E, /* [ 1518] OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0F, /* [ 1529] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x10, /* [ 1540] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x11, /* [ 1551] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x12, /* [ 1562] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x13, /* [ 1573] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x14, /* [ 1584] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x15, /* [ 1595] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x16, /* [ 1606] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x17, /* [ 1617] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x18, /* [ 1628] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x19, /* [ 1639] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1A, /* [ 1650] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1B, /* [ 1661] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1C, /* [ 1672] OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1D, /* [ 1683] OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x01, /* [ 1694] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x02, /* [ 1705] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x03, /* [ 1716] OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x04, /* [ 1727] OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x05, /* [ 1738] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x06, /* [ 1749] OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x07, /* [ 1760] OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x04,0x01, /* [ 1771] OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05,0x01, /* [ 1782] OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05,0x02, /* [ 1793] OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x01, /* [ 1804] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x02, /* [ 1815] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x03, /* [ 1826] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x04, /* [ 1837] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x05, /* [ 1848] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x06, /* [ 1859] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x04, /* [ 1870] OBJ_md4 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00, /* [ 1878] OBJ_id_pkix_mod */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02, /* [ 1885] OBJ_id_qt */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04, /* [ 1892] OBJ_id_it */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05, /* [ 1899] OBJ_id_pkip */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06, /* [ 1906] OBJ_id_alg */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07, /* [ 1913] OBJ_id_cmc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08, /* [ 1920] OBJ_id_on */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09, /* [ 1927] OBJ_id_pda */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A, /* [ 1934] OBJ_id_aca */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B, /* [ 1941] OBJ_id_qcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C, /* [ 1948] OBJ_id_cct */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x01, /* [ 1955] OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x02, /* [ 1963] OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x03, /* [ 1971] OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x04, /* [ 1979] OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x05, /* [ 1987] OBJ_id_mod_crmf */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x06, /* [ 1995] OBJ_id_mod_cmc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x07, /* [ 2003] OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x08, /* [ 2011] OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x09, /* [ 2019] OBJ_id_mod_cmp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 2027] OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0B, /* [ 2035] OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0C, /* [ 2043] OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0D, /* [ 2051] OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0E, /* [ 2059] OBJ_id_mod_ocsp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0F, /* [ 2067] OBJ_id_mod_dvcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x10, /* [ 2075] OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2083] OBJ_biometricInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2091] OBJ_qcStatements */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2099] OBJ_ac_auditEntity */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2107] OBJ_ac_targeting */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2115] OBJ_aaControls */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x07, /* [ 2123] OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x08, /* [ 2131] OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x09, /* [ 2139] OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x03, /* [ 2147] OBJ_textNotice */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x05, /* [ 2155] OBJ_ipsecEndSystem */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x06, /* [ 2163] OBJ_ipsecTunnel */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x07, /* [ 2171] OBJ_ipsecUser */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x0A, /* [ 2179] OBJ_dvcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x01, /* [ 2187] OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x02, /* [ 2195] OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x03, /* [ 2203] OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x04, /* [ 2211] OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x05, /* [ 2219] OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x06, /* [ 2227] OBJ_id_it_currentCRL */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x07, /* [ 2235] OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x08, /* [ 2243] OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x09, /* [ 2251] OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0A, /* [ 2259] OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 2267] OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0C, /* [ 2275] OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0D, /* [ 2283] OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0E, /* [ 2291] OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0F, /* [ 2299] OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01, /* [ 2307] OBJ_id_regCtrl */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02, /* [ 2315] OBJ_id_regInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2323] OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2332] OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2341] OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2350] OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2359] OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2368] OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02,0x01, /* [ 2377] OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02,0x02, /* [ 2386] OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x01, /* [ 2395] OBJ_id_alg_des40 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x02, /* [ 2403] OBJ_id_alg_noSignature */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x03, /* [ 2411] OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x04, /* [ 2419] OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x01, /* [ 2427] OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x02, /* [ 2435] OBJ_id_cmc_identification */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x03, /* [ 2443] OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x04, /* [ 2451] OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x05, /* [ 2459] OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x06, /* [ 2467] OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x07, /* [ 2475] OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x08, /* [ 2483] OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x09, /* [ 2491] OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0A, /* [ 2499] OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0B, /* [ 2507] OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0F, /* [ 2515] OBJ_id_cmc_getCert */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x10, /* [ 2523] OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x11, /* [ 2531] OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x12, /* [ 2539] OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x13, /* [ 2547] OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x15, /* [ 2555] OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x16, /* [ 2563] OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x17, /* [ 2571] OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x18, /* [ 2579] OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,0x01, /* [ 2587] OBJ_id_on_personalData */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x01, /* [ 2595] OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x02, /* [ 2603] OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x03, /* [ 2611] OBJ_id_pda_gender */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x04, /* [ 2619] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x05, /* [ 2627] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x01, /* [ 2635] OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x02, /* [ 2643] OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x03, /* [ 2651] OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x04, /* [ 2659] OBJ_id_aca_group */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x05, /* [ 2667] OBJ_id_aca_role */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B,0x01, /* [ 2675] OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x01, /* [ 2683] OBJ_id_cct_crs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x02, /* [ 2691] OBJ_id_cct_PKIData */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x03, /* [ 2699] OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x03, /* [ 2707] OBJ_ad_timeStamping */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x04, /* [ 2715] OBJ_ad_dvcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2723] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2732] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2741] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2750] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2759] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2768] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x07, /* [ 2777] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x08, /* [ 2786] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x09, /* [ 2795] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 2804] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 2813] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02, /* [ 2822] OBJ_algorithm */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0B, /* [ 2826] OBJ_rsaSignature */ 0x55,0x08, /* [ 2831] OBJ_X500algorithms */ 0x2B, /* [ 2833] OBJ_org */ 0x2B,0x06, /* [ 2834] OBJ_dod */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01, /* [ 2836] OBJ_iana */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2839] OBJ_Directory */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2843] OBJ_Management */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2847] OBJ_Experimental */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2851] OBJ_Private */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2855] OBJ_Security */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2859] OBJ_SNMPv2 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07, /* [ 2863] OBJ_Mail */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 2867] OBJ_Enterprises */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8B,0x3A,0x82,0x58, /* [ 2872] OBJ_dcObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x19, /* [ 2881] OBJ_domainComponent */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0D, /* [ 2891] OBJ_Domain */ 0x55,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2901] OBJ_selected_attribute_types */ 0x55,0x01,0x05,0x37, /* [ 2904] OBJ_clearance */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2908] OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 2917] OBJ_ac_proxying */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 2925] OBJ_sinfo_access */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x06, /* [ 2933] OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs */ 0x55,0x04,0x48, /* [ 2941] OBJ_role */ 0x55,0x1D,0x24, /* [ 2944] OBJ_policy_constraints */ 0x55,0x1D,0x37, /* [ 2947] OBJ_target_information */ 0x55,0x1D,0x38, /* [ 2950] OBJ_no_rev_avail */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D, /* [ 2953] OBJ_ansi_X9_62 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2958] OBJ_X9_62_prime_field */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2965] OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x02,0x01, /* [ 2972] OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2979] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2987] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2995] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x04, /* [ 3003] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x05, /* [ 3011] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x06, /* [ 3019] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x07, /* [ 3027] OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x01, /* [ 3035] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x11,0x01, /* [ 3042] OBJ_ms_csp_name */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3051] OBJ_aes_128_ecb */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3060] OBJ_aes_128_cbc */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x03, /* [ 3069] OBJ_aes_128_ofb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x04, /* [ 3078] OBJ_aes_128_cfb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x15, /* [ 3087] OBJ_aes_192_ecb */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x16, /* [ 3096] OBJ_aes_192_cbc */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x17, /* [ 3105] OBJ_aes_192_ofb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x18, /* [ 3114] OBJ_aes_192_cfb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x29, /* [ 3123] OBJ_aes_256_ecb */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2A, /* [ 3132] OBJ_aes_256_cbc */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2B, /* [ 3141] OBJ_aes_256_ofb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2C, /* [ 3150] OBJ_aes_256_cfb128 */ 0x55,0x1D,0x17, /* [ 3159] OBJ_hold_instruction_code */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x01, /* [ 3162] OBJ_hold_instruction_none */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x02, /* [ 3169] OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x03, /* [ 3176] OBJ_hold_instruction_reject */ 0x09, /* [ 3183] OBJ_data */ 0x09,0x92,0x26, /* [ 3184] OBJ_pss */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C, /* [ 3187] OBJ_ucl */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64, /* [ 3194] OBJ_pilot */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01, /* [ 3202] OBJ_pilotAttributeType */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03, /* [ 3211] OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04, /* [ 3220] OBJ_pilotObjectClass */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x0A, /* [ 3229] OBJ_pilotGroups */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03,0x04, /* [ 3238] OBJ_iA5StringSyntax */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03,0x05, /* [ 3248] OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x03, /* [ 3258] OBJ_pilotObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x04, /* [ 3268] OBJ_pilotPerson */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x05, /* [ 3278] OBJ_account */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x06, /* [ 3288] OBJ_document */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x07, /* [ 3298] OBJ_room */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x09, /* [ 3308] OBJ_documentSeries */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0E, /* [ 3318] OBJ_rFC822localPart */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0F, /* [ 3328] OBJ_dNSDomain */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x11, /* [ 3338] OBJ_domainRelatedObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x12, /* [ 3348] OBJ_friendlyCountry */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x13, /* [ 3358] OBJ_simpleSecurityObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x14, /* [ 3368] OBJ_pilotOrganization */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x15, /* [ 3378] OBJ_pilotDSA */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x16, /* [ 3388] OBJ_qualityLabelledData */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3398] OBJ_userId */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3408] OBJ_textEncodedORAddress */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x03, /* [ 3418] OBJ_rfc822Mailbox */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x04, /* [ 3428] OBJ_info */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x05, /* [ 3438] OBJ_favouriteDrink */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x06, /* [ 3448] OBJ_roomNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x07, /* [ 3458] OBJ_photo */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x08, /* [ 3468] OBJ_userClass */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x09, /* [ 3478] OBJ_host */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 3488] OBJ_manager */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 3498] OBJ_documentIdentifier */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 3508] OBJ_documentTitle */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 3518] OBJ_documentVersion */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 3528] OBJ_documentAuthor */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0F, /* [ 3538] OBJ_documentLocation */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x14, /* [ 3548] OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x15, /* [ 3558] OBJ_secretary */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x16, /* [ 3568] OBJ_otherMailbox */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x17, /* [ 3578] OBJ_lastModifiedTime */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x18, /* [ 3588] OBJ_lastModifiedBy */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1A, /* [ 3598] OBJ_aRecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1B, /* [ 3608] OBJ_pilotAttributeType27 */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1C, /* [ 3618] OBJ_mXRecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1D, /* [ 3628] OBJ_nSRecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1E, /* [ 3638] OBJ_sOARecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1F, /* [ 3648] OBJ_cNAMERecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x25, /* [ 3658] OBJ_associatedDomain */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x26, /* [ 3668] OBJ_associatedName */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x27, /* [ 3678] OBJ_homePostalAddress */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x28, /* [ 3688] OBJ_personalTitle */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x29, /* [ 3698] OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2A, /* [ 3708] OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2B, /* [ 3718] OBJ_friendlyCountryName */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2D, /* [ 3728] OBJ_organizationalStatus */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2E, /* [ 3738] OBJ_janetMailbox */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2F, /* [ 3748] OBJ_mailPreferenceOption */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x30, /* [ 3758] OBJ_buildingName */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x31, /* [ 3768] OBJ_dSAQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x32, /* [ 3778] OBJ_singleLevelQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x33, /* [ 3788] OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x34, /* [ 3798] OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x35, /* [ 3808] OBJ_personalSignature */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x36, /* [ 3818] OBJ_dITRedirect */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x37, /* [ 3828] OBJ_audio */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x38, /* [ 3838] OBJ_documentPublisher */ 0x55,0x04,0x2D, /* [ 3848] OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01, /* [ 3851] OBJ_mime_mhs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3856] OBJ_mime_mhs_headings */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3862] OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3868] OBJ_id_hex_partial_message */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3875] OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message */ 0x55,0x04,0x2C, /* [ 3882] OBJ_generationQualifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x41, /* [ 3885] OBJ_pseudonym */ 0x67,0x2A, /* [ 3888] OBJ_id_set */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00, /* [ 3890] OBJ_set_ctype */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01, /* [ 3893] OBJ_set_msgExt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03, /* [ 3896] OBJ_set_attr */ 0x67,0x2A,0x05, /* [ 3899] OBJ_set_policy */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07, /* [ 3902] OBJ_set_certExt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08, /* [ 3905] OBJ_set_brand */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x00, /* [ 3908] OBJ_setct_PANData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x01, /* [ 3912] OBJ_setct_PANToken */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x02, /* [ 3916] OBJ_setct_PANOnly */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x03, /* [ 3920] OBJ_setct_OIData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x04, /* [ 3924] OBJ_setct_PI */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x05, /* [ 3928] OBJ_setct_PIData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x06, /* [ 3932] OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x07, /* [ 3936] OBJ_setct_HODInput */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x08, /* [ 3940] OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x09, /* [ 3944] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 3948] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0B, /* [ 3952] OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0C, /* [ 3956] OBJ_setct_PInitResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0D, /* [ 3960] OBJ_setct_PI_TBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0E, /* [ 3964] OBJ_setct_PResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x10, /* [ 3968] OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x11, /* [ 3972] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x12, /* [ 3976] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x13, /* [ 3980] OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x14, /* [ 3984] OBJ_setct_CapTokenData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x15, /* [ 3988] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x16, /* [ 3992] OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x17, /* [ 3996] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x18, /* [ 4000] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x19, /* [ 4004] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1A, /* [ 4008] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1B, /* [ 4012] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1C, /* [ 4016] OBJ_setct_CapResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1D, /* [ 4020] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1E, /* [ 4024] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1F, /* [ 4028] OBJ_setct_CapRevResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x20, /* [ 4032] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x21, /* [ 4036] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x22, /* [ 4040] OBJ_setct_CredResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x23, /* [ 4044] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x24, /* [ 4048] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x25, /* [ 4052] OBJ_setct_CredRevResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x26, /* [ 4056] OBJ_setct_PCertReqData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x27, /* [ 4060] OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x28, /* [ 4064] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x29, /* [ 4068] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2A, /* [ 4072] OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2B, /* [ 4076] OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2C, /* [ 4080] OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2D, /* [ 4084] OBJ_setct_CertReqData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2E, /* [ 4088] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2F, /* [ 4092] OBJ_setct_CertResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x30, /* [ 4096] OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x31, /* [ 4100] OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x32, /* [ 4104] OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x33, /* [ 4108] OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x34, /* [ 4112] OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x35, /* [ 4116] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x36, /* [ 4120] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x37, /* [ 4124] OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x38, /* [ 4128] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x39, /* [ 4132] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3A, /* [ 4136] OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3B, /* [ 4140] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3C, /* [ 4144] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3D, /* [ 4148] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3E, /* [ 4152] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3F, /* [ 4156] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x40, /* [ 4160] OBJ_setct_CapResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x41, /* [ 4164] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x42, /* [ 4168] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x43, /* [ 4172] OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x44, /* [ 4176] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x45, /* [ 4180] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x46, /* [ 4184] OBJ_setct_CredResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x47, /* [ 4188] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x48, /* [ 4192] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x49, /* [ 4196] OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4A, /* [ 4200] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4B, /* [ 4204] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4C, /* [ 4208] OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4D, /* [ 4212] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4E, /* [ 4216] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4F, /* [ 4220] OBJ_setct_CertResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x50, /* [ 4224] OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x51, /* [ 4228] OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x52, /* [ 4232] OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x01, /* [ 4236] OBJ_setext_genCrypt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x03, /* [ 4240] OBJ_setext_miAuth */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x04, /* [ 4244] OBJ_setext_pinSecure */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x05, /* [ 4248] OBJ_setext_pinAny */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x07, /* [ 4252] OBJ_setext_track2 */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x08, /* [ 4256] OBJ_setext_cv */ 0x67,0x2A,0x05,0x00, /* [ 4260] OBJ_set_policy_root */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x00, /* [ 4264] OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x01, /* [ 4268] OBJ_setCext_certType */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x02, /* [ 4272] OBJ_setCext_merchData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x03, /* [ 4276] OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x04, /* [ 4280] OBJ_setCext_tunneling */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x05, /* [ 4284] OBJ_setCext_setExt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x06, /* [ 4288] OBJ_setCext_setQualf */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x07, /* [ 4292] OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x08, /* [ 4296] OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x09, /* [ 4300] OBJ_setCext_Track2Data */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x0A, /* [ 4304] OBJ_setCext_TokenType */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x0B, /* [ 4308] OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00, /* [ 4312] OBJ_setAttr_Cert */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x01, /* [ 4316] OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02, /* [ 4320] OBJ_setAttr_TokenType */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03, /* [ 4324] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00,0x00, /* [ 4328] OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00,0x01, /* [ 4333] OBJ_set_addPolicy */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02,0x01, /* [ 4338] OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02,0x02, /* [ 4343] OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x03, /* [ 4348] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04, /* [ 4353] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2 */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05, /* [ 4358] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x03,0x01, /* [ 4363] OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04,0x01, /* [ 4369] OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04,0x02, /* [ 4375] OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05,0x01, /* [ 4381] OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05,0x02, /* [ 4387] OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x01, /* [ 4393] OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x1E, /* [ 4397] OBJ_set_brand_Diners */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x22, /* [ 4401] OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x23, /* [ 4405] OBJ_set_brand_JCB */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x04, /* [ 4409] OBJ_set_brand_Visa */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x05, /* [ 4413] OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0xAE,0x7B, /* [ 4417] OBJ_set_brand_Novus */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x0A, /* [ 4422] OBJ_des_cdmf */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x06, /* [ 4430] OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET */ 0x67, /* [ 4439] OBJ_international_organizations */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x14,0x02,0x02, /* [ 4440] OBJ_ms_smartcard_login */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x14,0x02,0x03, /* [ 4450] OBJ_ms_upn */ 0x55,0x04,0x09, /* [ 4460] OBJ_streetAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x11, /* [ 4463] OBJ_postalCode */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15, /* [ 4466] OBJ_id_ppl */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 4473] OBJ_proxyCertInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x00, /* [ 4481] OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x01, /* [ 4489] OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1E, /* [ 4497] OBJ_name_constraints */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x02, /* [ 4500] OBJ_Independent */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 4508] OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 4517] OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 4526] OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 4535] OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x01, /* [ 4544] OBJ_sha256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x02, /* [ 4553] OBJ_sha384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x03, /* [ 4562] OBJ_sha512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x04, /* [ 4571] OBJ_sha224 */ 0x2B, /* [ 4580] OBJ_identified_organization */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04, /* [ 4581] OBJ_certicom_arc */ 0x67,0x2B, /* [ 4584] OBJ_wap */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01, /* [ 4586] OBJ_wap_wsg */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03, /* [ 4589] OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x01, /* [ 4597] OBJ_X9_62_onBasis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x02, /* [ 4606] OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x03, /* [ 4615] OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x01, /* [ 4624] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x02, /* [ 4632] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x03, /* [ 4640] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x04, /* [ 4648] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x05, /* [ 4656] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x06, /* [ 4664] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x07, /* [ 4672] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x08, /* [ 4680] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x09, /* [ 4688] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 4696] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0B, /* [ 4704] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0C, /* [ 4712] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0D, /* [ 4720] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0E, /* [ 4728] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0F, /* [ 4736] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x10, /* [ 4744] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x11, /* [ 4752] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x12, /* [ 4760] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x13, /* [ 4768] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x14, /* [ 4776] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x06, /* [ 4784] OBJ_secp112r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x07, /* [ 4789] OBJ_secp112r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1C, /* [ 4794] OBJ_secp128r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1D, /* [ 4799] OBJ_secp128r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x09, /* [ 4804] OBJ_secp160k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x08, /* [ 4809] OBJ_secp160r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1E, /* [ 4814] OBJ_secp160r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1F, /* [ 4819] OBJ_secp192k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x20, /* [ 4824] OBJ_secp224k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x21, /* [ 4829] OBJ_secp224r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 4834] OBJ_secp256k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x22, /* [ 4839] OBJ_secp384r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x23, /* [ 4844] OBJ_secp521r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x04, /* [ 4849] OBJ_sect113r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x05, /* [ 4854] OBJ_sect113r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x16, /* [ 4859] OBJ_sect131r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x17, /* [ 4864] OBJ_sect131r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x01, /* [ 4869] OBJ_sect163k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x02, /* [ 4874] OBJ_sect163r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x0F, /* [ 4879] OBJ_sect163r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x18, /* [ 4884] OBJ_sect193r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x19, /* [ 4889] OBJ_sect193r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1A, /* [ 4894] OBJ_sect233k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1B, /* [ 4899] OBJ_sect233r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x03, /* [ 4904] OBJ_sect239k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x10, /* [ 4909] OBJ_sect283k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x11, /* [ 4914] OBJ_sect283r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x24, /* [ 4919] OBJ_sect409k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x25, /* [ 4924] OBJ_sect409r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x26, /* [ 4929] OBJ_sect571k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x27, /* [ 4934] OBJ_sect571r1 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 4939] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x03, /* [ 4944] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x04, /* [ 4949] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x05, /* [ 4954] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x06, /* [ 4959] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x07, /* [ 4964] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x08, /* [ 4969] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x09, /* [ 4974] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0A, /* [ 4979] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 4984] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0C, /* [ 4989] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 */ 0x55,0x1D,0x20,0x00, /* [ 4994] OBJ_any_policy */ 0x55,0x1D,0x21, /* [ 4998] OBJ_policy_mappings */ 0x55,0x1D,0x36, /* [ 5001] OBJ_inhibit_any_policy */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 5004] OBJ_camellia_128_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 5015] OBJ_camellia_192_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 5026] OBJ_camellia_256_cbc */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x01, /* [ 5037] OBJ_camellia_128_ecb */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x15, /* [ 5045] OBJ_camellia_192_ecb */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x29, /* [ 5053] OBJ_camellia_256_ecb */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x04, /* [ 5061] OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x18, /* [ 5069] OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2C, /* [ 5077] OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x03, /* [ 5085] OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x17, /* [ 5093] OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2B, /* [ 5101] OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128 */ 0x55,0x1D,0x09, /* [ 5109] OBJ_subject_directory_attributes */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1C, /* [ 5112] OBJ_issuing_distribution_point */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1D, /* [ 5115] OBJ_certificate_issuer */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44, /* [ 5118] OBJ_kisa */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x03, /* [ 5124] OBJ_seed_ecb */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x04, /* [ 5132] OBJ_seed_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x06, /* [ 5140] OBJ_seed_ofb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x05, /* [ 5148] OBJ_seed_cfb128 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x01, /* [ 5156] OBJ_hmac_md5 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x02, /* [ 5164] OBJ_hmac_sha1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0D, /* [ 5172] OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x1E, /* [ 5181] OBJ_id_DHBasedMac */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x10, /* [ 5190] OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x05, /* [ 5198] OBJ_caRepository */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x09, /* [ 5206] OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x1B, /* [ 5217] OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x05, /* [ 5228] OBJ_id_aes128_wrap */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x19, /* [ 5237] OBJ_id_aes192_wrap */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2D, /* [ 5246] OBJ_id_aes256_wrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x02, /* [ 5255] OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03, /* [ 5262] OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x01, /* [ 5269] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x02, /* [ 5277] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x03, /* [ 5285] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x04, /* [ 5293] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x06, /* [ 5301] OBJ_hmacWithMD5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x08, /* [ 5309] OBJ_hmacWithSHA224 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x09, /* [ 5317] OBJ_hmacWithSHA256 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0A, /* [ 5325] OBJ_hmacWithSHA384 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0B, /* [ 5333] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x01, /* [ 5341] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x02, /* [ 5350] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256 */ 0x28,0xCF,0x06,0x03,0x00,0x37, /* [ 5359] OBJ_whirlpool */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02, /* [ 5365] OBJ_cryptopro */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09, /* [ 5370] OBJ_cryptocom */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x03, /* [ 5375] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x04, /* [ 5381] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x09, /* [ 5387] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0A, /* [ 5393] OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x13, /* [ 5399] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14, /* [ 5405] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x15, /* [ 5411] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x16, /* [ 5417] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x17, /* [ 5423] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x62, /* [ 5429] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x63, /* [ 5435] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0E,0x01, /* [ 5441] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0E,0x00, /* [ 5448] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1E,0x00, /* [ 5455] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1E,0x01, /* [ 5462] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x00, /* [ 5469] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x01, /* [ 5476] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x02, /* [ 5483] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x03, /* [ 5490] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x04, /* [ 5497] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x05, /* [ 5504] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x06, /* [ 5511] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x07, /* [ 5518] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x00, /* [ 5525] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x02, /* [ 5532] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x03, /* [ 5539] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x04, /* [ 5546] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x05, /* [ 5553] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x01, /* [ 5560] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x02, /* [ 5567] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x03, /* [ 5574] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x00, /* [ 5581] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x01, /* [ 5588] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x02, /* [ 5595] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x03, /* [ 5602] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x24,0x00, /* [ 5609] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x24,0x01, /* [ 5616] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x01, /* [ 5623] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x02, /* [ 5630] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x03, /* [ 5637] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x04, /* [ 5644] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x06,0x01, /* [ 5651] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x05,0x03, /* [ 5659] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x05,0x04, /* [ 5667] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x03,0x03, /* [ 5675] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x03,0x04, /* [ 5683] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x08,0x01, /* [ 5691] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x11,0x02, /* [ 5699] OBJ_LocalKeySet */ 0x55,0x1D,0x2E, /* [ 5708] OBJ_freshest_crl */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,0x03, /* [ 5711] OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x0E, /* [ 5719] OBJ_searchGuide */ 0x55,0x04,0x0F, /* [ 5722] OBJ_businessCategory */ 0x55,0x04,0x10, /* [ 5725] OBJ_postalAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x12, /* [ 5728] OBJ_postOfficeBox */ 0x55,0x04,0x13, /* [ 5731] OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName */ 0x55,0x04,0x14, /* [ 5734] OBJ_telephoneNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x15, /* [ 5737] OBJ_telexNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x16, /* [ 5740] OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x17, /* [ 5743] OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x18, /* [ 5746] OBJ_x121Address */ 0x55,0x04,0x19, /* [ 5749] OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x1A, /* [ 5752] OBJ_registeredAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x1B, /* [ 5755] OBJ_destinationIndicator */ 0x55,0x04,0x1C, /* [ 5758] OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod */ 0x55,0x04,0x1D, /* [ 5761] OBJ_presentationAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x1E, /* [ 5764] OBJ_supportedApplicationContext */ 0x55,0x04,0x1F, /* [ 5767] OBJ_member */ 0x55,0x04,0x20, /* [ 5770] OBJ_owner */ 0x55,0x04,0x21, /* [ 5773] OBJ_roleOccupant */ 0x55,0x04,0x22, /* [ 5776] OBJ_seeAlso */ 0x55,0x04,0x23, /* [ 5779] OBJ_userPassword */ 0x55,0x04,0x24, /* [ 5782] OBJ_userCertificate */ 0x55,0x04,0x25, /* [ 5785] OBJ_cACertificate */ 0x55,0x04,0x26, /* [ 5788] OBJ_authorityRevocationList */ 0x55,0x04,0x27, /* [ 5791] OBJ_certificateRevocationList */ 0x55,0x04,0x28, /* [ 5794] OBJ_crossCertificatePair */ 0x55,0x04,0x2F, /* [ 5797] OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide */ 0x55,0x04,0x30, /* [ 5800] OBJ_protocolInformation */ 0x55,0x04,0x31, /* [ 5803] OBJ_distinguishedName */ 0x55,0x04,0x32, /* [ 5806] OBJ_uniqueMember */ 0x55,0x04,0x33, /* [ 5809] OBJ_houseIdentifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x34, /* [ 5812] OBJ_supportedAlgorithms */ 0x55,0x04,0x35, /* [ 5815] OBJ_deltaRevocationList */ 0x55,0x04,0x36, /* [ 5818] OBJ_dmdName */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x09, /* [ 5821] OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x06, /* [ 5832] OBJ_aes_128_gcm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x07, /* [ 5841] OBJ_aes_128_ccm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x08, /* [ 5850] OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1A, /* [ 5859] OBJ_aes_192_gcm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1B, /* [ 5868] OBJ_aes_192_ccm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1C, /* [ 5877] OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2E, /* [ 5886] OBJ_aes_256_gcm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2F, /* [ 5895] OBJ_aes_256_ccm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x30, /* [ 5904] OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x02, /* [ 5913] OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x03, /* [ 5924] OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x04, /* [ 5935] OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap */ 0x55,0x1D,0x25,0x00, /* [ 5946] OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x08, /* [ 5950] OBJ_mgf1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 5959] OBJ_rsassaPss */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x07, /* [ 5968] OBJ_rsaesOaep */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3E,0x02,0x01, /* [ 5977] OBJ_dhpublicnumber */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 5984] OBJ_brainpoolP160r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 5993] OBJ_brainpoolP160t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 6002] OBJ_brainpoolP192r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 6011] OBJ_brainpoolP192t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 6020] OBJ_brainpoolP224r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x06, /* [ 6029] OBJ_brainpoolP224t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x07, /* [ 6038] OBJ_brainpoolP256r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x08, /* [ 6047] OBJ_brainpoolP256t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x09, /* [ 6056] OBJ_brainpoolP320r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 6065] OBJ_brainpoolP320t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 6074] OBJ_brainpoolP384r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 6083] OBJ_brainpoolP384t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 6092] OBJ_brainpoolP512r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 6101] OBJ_brainpoolP512t1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x09, /* [ 6110] OBJ_pSpecified */ 0x2B,0x81,0x05,0x10,0x86,0x48,0x3F,0x00,0x02, /* [ 6119] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x00, /* [ 6128] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x01, /* [ 6134] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x02, /* [ 6140] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x03, /* [ 6146] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x05,0x10,0x86,0x48,0x3F,0x00,0x03, /* [ 6152] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x00, /* [ 6161] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x01, /* [ 6167] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x02, /* [ 6173] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x03, /* [ 6179] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x02, /* [ 6185] OBJ_ct_precert_scts */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x03, /* [ 6195] OBJ_ct_precert_poison */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x04, /* [ 6205] OBJ_ct_precert_signer */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x05, /* [ 6215] OBJ_ct_cert_scts */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6225] OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6236] OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x03, /* [ 6247] OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x06, /* [ 6258] OBJ_camellia_128_gcm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x07, /* [ 6266] OBJ_camellia_128_ccm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x09, /* [ 6274] OBJ_camellia_128_ctr */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x0A, /* [ 6282] OBJ_camellia_128_cmac */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1A, /* [ 6290] OBJ_camellia_192_gcm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1B, /* [ 6298] OBJ_camellia_192_ccm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1D, /* [ 6306] OBJ_camellia_192_ctr */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1E, /* [ 6314] OBJ_camellia_192_cmac */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2E, /* [ 6322] OBJ_camellia_256_gcm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2F, /* [ 6330] OBJ_camellia_256_ccm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x31, /* [ 6338] OBJ_camellia_256_ctr */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x32, /* [ 6346] OBJ_camellia_256_cmac */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xDA,0x47,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 6354] OBJ_id_scrypt */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01, /* [ 6363] OBJ_id_tc26 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6368] OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6374] OBJ_id_tc26_sign */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6381] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6389] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6397] OBJ_id_tc26_digest */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x02, /* [ 6404] OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x03, /* [ 6412] OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 6420] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x02, /* [ 6427] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x03, /* [ 6435] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 6443] OBJ_id_tc26_mac */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 6450] OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x02, /* [ 6458] OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 6466] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06, /* [ 6473] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06,0x01, /* [ 6480] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06,0x02, /* [ 6488] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6496] OBJ_id_tc26_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01, /* [ 6502] OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6509] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x00, /* [ 6517] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x01, /* [ 6526] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x02, /* [ 6535] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x02, /* [ 6544] OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05, /* [ 6551] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05,0x01, /* [ 6558] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6566] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x03,0x81,0x03,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6575] OBJ_INN */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x01, /* [ 6583] OBJ_OGRN */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x03, /* [ 6588] OBJ_SNILS */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x6F, /* [ 6593] OBJ_subjectSignTool */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x70, /* [ 6598] OBJ_issuerSignTool */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x18, /* [ 6603] OBJ_tlsfeature */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x11, /* [ 6611] OBJ_ipsec_IKE */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x12, /* [ 6619] OBJ_capwapAC */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x13, /* [ 6627] OBJ_capwapWTP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x15, /* [ 6635] OBJ_sshClient */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x16, /* [ 6643] OBJ_sshServer */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x17, /* [ 6651] OBJ_sendRouter */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x18, /* [ 6659] OBJ_sendProxiedRouter */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x19, /* [ 6667] OBJ_sendOwner */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x1A, /* [ 6675] OBJ_sendProxiedOwner */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03, /* [ 6683] OBJ_id_pkinit */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03,0x04, /* [ 6689] OBJ_pkInitClientAuth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03,0x05, /* [ 6696] OBJ_pkInitKDC */ 0x2B,0x65,0x6E, /* [ 6703] OBJ_X25519 */ 0x2B,0x65,0x6F, /* [ 6706] OBJ_X448 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8D,0x3A,0x0C,0x02,0x01,0x10, /* [ 6709] OBJ_blake2b512 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8D,0x3A,0x0C,0x02,0x02,0x08, /* [ 6720] OBJ_blake2s256 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x13, /* [ 6731] OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x17, /* [ 6742] OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x1C, /* [ 6753] OBJ_id_ct_xml */ }; #define NUM_NID 1061 static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = { {"UNDEF", "undefined", NID_undef}, {"rsadsi", "RSA Data Security, Inc.", NID_rsadsi, 6, &so[0]}, {"pkcs", "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS", NID_pkcs, 7, &so[6]}, {"MD2", "md2", NID_md2, 8, &so[13]}, {"MD5", "md5", NID_md5, 8, &so[21]}, {"RC4", "rc4", NID_rc4, 8, &so[29]}, {"rsaEncryption", "rsaEncryption", NID_rsaEncryption, 9, &so[37]}, {"RSA-MD2", "md2WithRSAEncryption", NID_md2WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[46]}, {"RSA-MD5", "md5WithRSAEncryption", NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[55]}, {"PBE-MD2-DES", "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[64]}, {"PBE-MD5-DES", "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[73]}, {"X500", "directory services (X.500)", NID_X500, 1, &so[82]}, {"X509", "X509", NID_X509, 2, &so[83]}, {"CN", "commonName", NID_commonName, 3, &so[85]}, {"C", "countryName", NID_countryName, 3, &so[88]}, {"L", "localityName", NID_localityName, 3, &so[91]}, {"ST", "stateOrProvinceName", NID_stateOrProvinceName, 3, &so[94]}, {"O", "organizationName", NID_organizationName, 3, &so[97]}, {"OU", "organizationalUnitName", NID_organizationalUnitName, 3, &so[100]}, {"RSA", "rsa", NID_rsa, 4, &so[103]}, {"pkcs7", "pkcs7", NID_pkcs7, 8, &so[107]}, {"pkcs7-data", "pkcs7-data", NID_pkcs7_data, 9, &so[115]}, {"pkcs7-signedData", "pkcs7-signedData", NID_pkcs7_signed, 9, &so[124]}, {"pkcs7-envelopedData", "pkcs7-envelopedData", NID_pkcs7_enveloped, 9, &so[133]}, {"pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData", "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData", NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped, 9, &so[142]}, {"pkcs7-digestData", "pkcs7-digestData", NID_pkcs7_digest, 9, &so[151]}, {"pkcs7-encryptedData", "pkcs7-encryptedData", NID_pkcs7_encrypted, 9, &so[160]}, {"pkcs3", "pkcs3", NID_pkcs3, 8, &so[169]}, {"dhKeyAgreement", "dhKeyAgreement", NID_dhKeyAgreement, 9, &so[177]}, {"DES-ECB", "des-ecb", NID_des_ecb, 5, &so[186]}, {"DES-CFB", "des-cfb", NID_des_cfb64, 5, &so[191]}, {"DES-CBC", "des-cbc", NID_des_cbc, 5, &so[196]}, {"DES-EDE", "des-ede", NID_des_ede_ecb, 5, &so[201]}, {"DES-EDE3", "des-ede3", NID_des_ede3_ecb}, {"IDEA-CBC", "idea-cbc", NID_idea_cbc, 11, &so[206]}, {"IDEA-CFB", "idea-cfb", NID_idea_cfb64}, {"IDEA-ECB", "idea-ecb", NID_idea_ecb}, {"RC2-CBC", "rc2-cbc", NID_rc2_cbc, 8, &so[217]}, {"RC2-ECB", "rc2-ecb", NID_rc2_ecb}, {"RC2-CFB", "rc2-cfb", NID_rc2_cfb64}, {"RC2-OFB", "rc2-ofb", NID_rc2_ofb64}, {"SHA", "sha", NID_sha, 5, &so[225]}, {"RSA-SHA", "shaWithRSAEncryption", NID_shaWithRSAEncryption, 5, &so[230]}, {"DES-EDE-CBC", "des-ede-cbc", NID_des_ede_cbc}, {"DES-EDE3-CBC", "des-ede3-cbc", NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, &so[235]}, {"DES-OFB", "des-ofb", NID_des_ofb64, 5, &so[243]}, {"IDEA-OFB", "idea-ofb", NID_idea_ofb64}, {"pkcs9", "pkcs9", NID_pkcs9, 8, &so[248]}, {"emailAddress", "emailAddress", NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, 9, &so[256]}, {"unstructuredName", "unstructuredName", NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName, 9, &so[265]}, {"contentType", "contentType", NID_pkcs9_contentType, 9, &so[274]}, {"messageDigest", "messageDigest", NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, 9, &so[283]}, {"signingTime", "signingTime", NID_pkcs9_signingTime, 9, &so[292]}, {"countersignature", "countersignature", NID_pkcs9_countersignature, 9, &so[301]}, {"challengePassword", "challengePassword", NID_pkcs9_challengePassword, 9, &so[310]}, {"unstructuredAddress", "unstructuredAddress", NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress, 9, &so[319]}, {"extendedCertificateAttributes", "extendedCertificateAttributes", NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes, 9, &so[328]}, {"Netscape", "Netscape Communications Corp.", NID_netscape, 7, &so[337]}, {"nsCertExt", "Netscape Certificate Extension", NID_netscape_cert_extension, 8, &so[344]}, {"nsDataType", "Netscape Data Type", NID_netscape_data_type, 8, &so[352]}, {"DES-EDE-CFB", "des-ede-cfb", NID_des_ede_cfb64}, {"DES-EDE3-CFB", "des-ede3-cfb", NID_des_ede3_cfb64}, {"DES-EDE-OFB", "des-ede-ofb", NID_des_ede_ofb64}, {"DES-EDE3-OFB", "des-ede3-ofb", NID_des_ede3_ofb64}, {"SHA1", "sha1", NID_sha1, 5, &so[360]}, {"RSA-SHA1", "sha1WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[365]}, {"DSA-SHA", "dsaWithSHA", NID_dsaWithSHA, 5, &so[374]}, {"DSA-old", "dsaEncryption-old", NID_dsa_2, 5, &so[379]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-64", "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[384]}, {"PBKDF2", "PBKDF2", NID_id_pbkdf2, 9, &so[393]}, {"DSA-SHA1-old", "dsaWithSHA1-old", NID_dsaWithSHA1_2, 5, &so[402]}, {"nsCertType", "Netscape Cert Type", NID_netscape_cert_type, 9, &so[407]}, {"nsBaseUrl", "Netscape Base Url", NID_netscape_base_url, 9, &so[416]}, {"nsRevocationUrl", "Netscape Revocation Url", NID_netscape_revocation_url, 9, &so[425]}, {"nsCaRevocationUrl", "Netscape CA Revocation Url", NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url, 9, &so[434]}, {"nsRenewalUrl", "Netscape Renewal Url", NID_netscape_renewal_url, 9, &so[443]}, {"nsCaPolicyUrl", "Netscape CA Policy Url", NID_netscape_ca_policy_url, 9, &so[452]}, {"nsSslServerName", "Netscape SSL Server Name", NID_netscape_ssl_server_name, 9, &so[461]}, {"nsComment", "Netscape Comment", NID_netscape_comment, 9, &so[470]}, {"nsCertSequence", "Netscape Certificate Sequence", NID_netscape_cert_sequence, 9, &so[479]}, {"DESX-CBC", "desx-cbc", NID_desx_cbc}, {"id-ce", "id-ce", NID_id_ce, 2, &so[488]}, {"subjectKeyIdentifier", "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier", NID_subject_key_identifier, 3, &so[490]}, {"keyUsage", "X509v3 Key Usage", NID_key_usage, 3, &so[493]}, {"privateKeyUsagePeriod", "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period", NID_private_key_usage_period, 3, &so[496]}, {"subjectAltName", "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name", NID_subject_alt_name, 3, &so[499]}, {"issuerAltName", "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name", NID_issuer_alt_name, 3, &so[502]}, {"basicConstraints", "X509v3 Basic Constraints", NID_basic_constraints, 3, &so[505]}, {"crlNumber", "X509v3 CRL Number", NID_crl_number, 3, &so[508]}, {"certificatePolicies", "X509v3 Certificate Policies", NID_certificate_policies, 3, &so[511]}, {"authorityKeyIdentifier", "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier", NID_authority_key_identifier, 3, &so[514]}, {"BF-CBC", "bf-cbc", NID_bf_cbc, 9, &so[517]}, {"BF-ECB", "bf-ecb", NID_bf_ecb}, {"BF-CFB", "bf-cfb", NID_bf_cfb64}, {"BF-OFB", "bf-ofb", NID_bf_ofb64}, {"MDC2", "mdc2", NID_mdc2, 4, &so[526]}, {"RSA-MDC2", "mdc2WithRSA", NID_mdc2WithRSA, 4, &so[530]}, {"RC4-40", "rc4-40", NID_rc4_40}, {"RC2-40-CBC", "rc2-40-cbc", NID_rc2_40_cbc}, {"GN", "givenName", NID_givenName, 3, &so[534]}, {"SN", "surname", NID_surname, 3, &so[537]}, {"initials", "initials", NID_initials, 3, &so[540]}, {"uid", "uniqueIdentifier", NID_uniqueIdentifier, 10, &so[543]}, {"crlDistributionPoints", "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points", NID_crl_distribution_points, 3, &so[553]}, {"RSA-NP-MD5", "md5WithRSA", NID_md5WithRSA, 5, &so[556]}, {"serialNumber", "serialNumber", NID_serialNumber, 3, &so[561]}, {"title", "title", NID_title, 3, &so[564]}, {"description", "description", NID_description, 3, &so[567]}, {"CAST5-CBC", "cast5-cbc", NID_cast5_cbc, 9, &so[570]}, {"CAST5-ECB", "cast5-ecb", NID_cast5_ecb}, {"CAST5-CFB", "cast5-cfb", NID_cast5_cfb64}, {"CAST5-OFB", "cast5-ofb", NID_cast5_ofb64}, {"pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC", "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC, 9, &so[579]}, {"DSA-SHA1", "dsaWithSHA1", NID_dsaWithSHA1, 7, &so[588]}, {"MD5-SHA1", "md5-sha1", NID_md5_sha1}, {"RSA-SHA1-2", "sha1WithRSA", NID_sha1WithRSA, 5, &so[595]}, {"DSA", "dsaEncryption", NID_dsa, 7, &so[600]}, {"RIPEMD160", "ripemd160", NID_ripemd160, 5, &so[607]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"RSA-RIPEMD160", "ripemd160WithRSA", NID_ripemd160WithRSA, 6, &so[612]}, {"RC5-CBC", "rc5-cbc", NID_rc5_cbc, 8, &so[618]}, {"RC5-ECB", "rc5-ecb", NID_rc5_ecb}, {"RC5-CFB", "rc5-cfb", NID_rc5_cfb64}, {"RC5-OFB", "rc5-ofb", NID_rc5_ofb64}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"ZLIB", "zlib compression", NID_zlib_compression, 11, &so[626]}, {"extendedKeyUsage", "X509v3 Extended Key Usage", NID_ext_key_usage, 3, &so[637]}, {"PKIX", "PKIX", NID_id_pkix, 6, &so[640]}, {"id-kp", "id-kp", NID_id_kp, 7, &so[646]}, {"serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication", NID_server_auth, 8, &so[653]}, {"clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication", NID_client_auth, 8, &so[661]}, {"codeSigning", "Code Signing", NID_code_sign, 8, &so[669]}, {"emailProtection", "E-mail Protection", NID_email_protect, 8, &so[677]}, {"timeStamping", "Time Stamping", NID_time_stamp, 8, &so[685]}, {"msCodeInd", "Microsoft Individual Code Signing", NID_ms_code_ind, 10, &so[693]}, {"msCodeCom", "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing", NID_ms_code_com, 10, &so[703]}, {"msCTLSign", "Microsoft Trust List Signing", NID_ms_ctl_sign, 10, &so[713]}, {"msSGC", "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto", NID_ms_sgc, 10, &so[723]}, {"msEFS", "Microsoft Encrypted File System", NID_ms_efs, 10, &so[733]}, {"nsSGC", "Netscape Server Gated Crypto", NID_ns_sgc, 9, &so[743]}, {"deltaCRL", "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator", NID_delta_crl, 3, &so[752]}, {"CRLReason", "X509v3 CRL Reason Code", NID_crl_reason, 3, &so[755]}, {"invalidityDate", "Invalidity Date", NID_invalidity_date, 3, &so[758]}, {"SXNetID", "Strong Extranet ID", NID_sxnet, 5, &so[761]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC4-128", "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, 10, &so[766]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC4-40", "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4, 10, &so[776]}, {"PBE-SHA1-3DES", "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC, 10, &so[786]}, {"PBE-SHA1-2DES", "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC, 10, &so[796]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-128", "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC, 10, &so[806]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-40", "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC, 10, &so[816]}, {"keyBag", "keyBag", NID_keyBag, 11, &so[826]}, {"pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag", "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag", NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, 11, &so[837]}, {"certBag", "certBag", NID_certBag, 11, &so[848]}, {"crlBag", "crlBag", NID_crlBag, 11, &so[859]}, {"secretBag", "secretBag", NID_secretBag, 11, &so[870]}, {"safeContentsBag", "safeContentsBag", NID_safeContentsBag, 11, &so[881]}, {"friendlyName", "friendlyName", NID_friendlyName, 9, &so[892]}, {"localKeyID", "localKeyID", NID_localKeyID, 9, &so[901]}, {"x509Certificate", "x509Certificate", NID_x509Certificate, 10, &so[910]}, {"sdsiCertificate", "sdsiCertificate", NID_sdsiCertificate, 10, &so[920]}, {"x509Crl", "x509Crl", NID_x509Crl, 10, &so[930]}, {"PBES2", "PBES2", NID_pbes2, 9, &so[940]}, {"PBMAC1", "PBMAC1", NID_pbmac1, 9, &so[949]}, {"hmacWithSHA1", "hmacWithSHA1", NID_hmacWithSHA1, 8, &so[958]}, {"id-qt-cps", "Policy Qualifier CPS", NID_id_qt_cps, 8, &so[966]}, {"id-qt-unotice", "Policy Qualifier User Notice", NID_id_qt_unotice, 8, &so[974]}, {"RC2-64-CBC", "rc2-64-cbc", NID_rc2_64_cbc}, {"SMIME-CAPS", "S/MIME Capabilities", NID_SMIMECapabilities, 9, &so[982]}, {"PBE-MD2-RC2-64", "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[991]}, {"PBE-MD5-RC2-64", "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[1000]}, {"PBE-SHA1-DES", "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[1009]}, {"msExtReq", "Microsoft Extension Request", NID_ms_ext_req, 10, &so[1018]}, {"extReq", "Extension Request", NID_ext_req, 9, &so[1028]}, {"name", "name", NID_name, 3, &so[1037]}, {"dnQualifier", "dnQualifier", NID_dnQualifier, 3, &so[1040]}, {"id-pe", "id-pe", NID_id_pe, 7, &so[1043]}, {"id-ad", "id-ad", NID_id_ad, 7, &so[1050]}, {"authorityInfoAccess", "Authority Information Access", NID_info_access, 8, &so[1057]}, {"OCSP", "OCSP", NID_ad_OCSP, 8, &so[1065]}, {"caIssuers", "CA Issuers", NID_ad_ca_issuers, 8, &so[1073]}, {"OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing", NID_OCSP_sign, 8, &so[1081]}, {"ISO", "iso", NID_iso}, {"member-body", "ISO Member Body", NID_member_body, 1, &so[1089]}, {"ISO-US", "ISO US Member Body", NID_ISO_US, 3, &so[1090]}, {"X9-57", "X9.57", NID_X9_57, 5, &so[1093]}, {"X9cm", "X9.57 CM ?", NID_X9cm, 6, &so[1098]}, {"pkcs1", "pkcs1", NID_pkcs1, 8, &so[1104]}, {"pkcs5", "pkcs5", NID_pkcs5, 8, &so[1112]}, {"SMIME", "S/MIME", NID_SMIME, 9, &so[1120]}, {"id-smime-mod", "id-smime-mod", NID_id_smime_mod, 10, &so[1129]}, {"id-smime-ct", "id-smime-ct", NID_id_smime_ct, 10, &so[1139]}, {"id-smime-aa", "id-smime-aa", NID_id_smime_aa, 10, &so[1149]}, {"id-smime-alg", "id-smime-alg", NID_id_smime_alg, 10, &so[1159]}, {"id-smime-cd", "id-smime-cd", NID_id_smime_cd, 10, &so[1169]}, {"id-smime-spq", "id-smime-spq", NID_id_smime_spq, 10, &so[1179]}, {"id-smime-cti", "id-smime-cti", NID_id_smime_cti, 10, &so[1189]}, {"id-smime-mod-cms", "id-smime-mod-cms", NID_id_smime_mod_cms, 11, &so[1199]}, {"id-smime-mod-ess", "id-smime-mod-ess", NID_id_smime_mod_ess, 11, &so[1210]}, {"id-smime-mod-oid", "id-smime-mod-oid", NID_id_smime_mod_oid, 11, &so[1221]}, {"id-smime-mod-msg-v3", "id-smime-mod-msg-v3", NID_id_smime_mod_msg_v3, 11, &so[1232]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88, 11, &so[1243]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97, 11, &so[1254]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88, 11, &so[1265]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97, 11, &so[1276]}, {"id-smime-ct-receipt", "id-smime-ct-receipt", NID_id_smime_ct_receipt, 11, &so[1287]}, {"id-smime-ct-authData", "id-smime-ct-authData", NID_id_smime_ct_authData, 11, &so[1298]}, {"id-smime-ct-publishCert", "id-smime-ct-publishCert", NID_id_smime_ct_publishCert, 11, &so[1309]}, {"id-smime-ct-TSTInfo", "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo, 11, &so[1320]}, {"id-smime-ct-TDTInfo", "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo, 11, &so[1331]}, {"id-smime-ct-contentInfo", "id-smime-ct-contentInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_contentInfo, 11, &so[1342]}, {"id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData", "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData", NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData, 11, &so[1353]}, {"id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData", "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData", NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData, 11, &so[1364]}, {"id-smime-aa-receiptRequest", "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest", NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest, 11, &so[1375]}, {"id-smime-aa-securityLabel", "id-smime-aa-securityLabel", NID_id_smime_aa_securityLabel, 11, &so[1386]}, {"id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory", "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory", NID_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory, 11, &so[1397]}, {"id-smime-aa-contentHint", "id-smime-aa-contentHint", NID_id_smime_aa_contentHint, 11, &so[1408]}, {"id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest", "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest", NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest, 11, &so[1419]}, {"id-smime-aa-encapContentType", "id-smime-aa-encapContentType", NID_id_smime_aa_encapContentType, 11, &so[1430]}, {"id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier", "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier", NID_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier, 11, &so[1441]}, {"id-smime-aa-macValue", "id-smime-aa-macValue", NID_id_smime_aa_macValue, 11, &so[1452]}, {"id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels", "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels", NID_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels, 11, &so[1463]}, {"id-smime-aa-contentReference", "id-smime-aa-contentReference", NID_id_smime_aa_contentReference, 11, &so[1474]}, {"id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref", "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref", NID_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref, 11, &so[1485]}, {"id-smime-aa-signingCertificate", "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate", NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate, 11, &so[1496]}, {"id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts", "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts", NID_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts, 11, &so[1507]}, {"id-smime-aa-timeStampToken", "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken", NID_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken, 11, &so[1518]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId", "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId, 11, &so[1529]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType", "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType, 11, &so[1540]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation", "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation, 11, &so[1551]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr", "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr, 11, &so[1562]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert", "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert, 11, &so[1573]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp, 11, &so[1584]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs", "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs, 11, &so[1595]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs", "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs, 11, &so[1606]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-certValues", "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues, 11, &so[1617]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues", "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues, 11, &so[1628]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp, 11, &so[1639]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp, 11, &so[1650]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp, 11, &so[1661]}, {"id-smime-aa-signatureType", "id-smime-aa-signatureType", NID_id_smime_aa_signatureType, 11, &so[1672]}, {"id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc", "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc", NID_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc, 11, &so[1683]}, {"id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES", "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES, 11, &so[1694]}, {"id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2", "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2, 11, &so[1705]}, {"id-smime-alg-3DESwrap", "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap", NID_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap, 11, &so[1716]}, {"id-smime-alg-RC2wrap", "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap", NID_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap, 11, &so[1727]}, {"id-smime-alg-ESDH", "id-smime-alg-ESDH", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH, 11, &so[1738]}, {"id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap", "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap", NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 11, &so[1749]}, {"id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap", "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap", NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 11, &so[1760]}, {"id-smime-cd-ldap", "id-smime-cd-ldap", NID_id_smime_cd_ldap, 11, &so[1771]}, {"id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri", "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri", NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri, 11, &so[1782]}, {"id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice", "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice", NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice, 11, &so[1793]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin, 11, &so[1804]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt, 11, &so[1815]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery, 11, &so[1826]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender, 11, &so[1837]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval, 11, &so[1848]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation, 11, &so[1859]}, {"MD4", "md4", NID_md4, 8, &so[1870]}, {"id-pkix-mod", "id-pkix-mod", NID_id_pkix_mod, 7, &so[1878]}, {"id-qt", "id-qt", NID_id_qt, 7, &so[1885]}, {"id-it", "id-it", NID_id_it, 7, &so[1892]}, {"id-pkip", "id-pkip", NID_id_pkip, 7, &so[1899]}, {"id-alg", "id-alg", NID_id_alg, 7, &so[1906]}, {"id-cmc", "id-cmc", NID_id_cmc, 7, &so[1913]}, {"id-on", "id-on", NID_id_on, 7, &so[1920]}, {"id-pda", "id-pda", NID_id_pda, 7, &so[1927]}, {"id-aca", "id-aca", NID_id_aca, 7, &so[1934]}, {"id-qcs", "id-qcs", NID_id_qcs, 7, &so[1941]}, {"id-cct", "id-cct", NID_id_cct, 7, &so[1948]}, {"id-pkix1-explicit-88", "id-pkix1-explicit-88", NID_id_pkix1_explicit_88, 8, &so[1955]}, {"id-pkix1-implicit-88", "id-pkix1-implicit-88", NID_id_pkix1_implicit_88, 8, &so[1963]}, {"id-pkix1-explicit-93", "id-pkix1-explicit-93", NID_id_pkix1_explicit_93, 8, &so[1971]}, {"id-pkix1-implicit-93", "id-pkix1-implicit-93", NID_id_pkix1_implicit_93, 8, &so[1979]}, {"id-mod-crmf", "id-mod-crmf", NID_id_mod_crmf, 8, &so[1987]}, {"id-mod-cmc", "id-mod-cmc", NID_id_mod_cmc, 8, &so[1995]}, {"id-mod-kea-profile-88", "id-mod-kea-profile-88", NID_id_mod_kea_profile_88, 8, &so[2003]}, {"id-mod-kea-profile-93", "id-mod-kea-profile-93", NID_id_mod_kea_profile_93, 8, &so[2011]}, {"id-mod-cmp", "id-mod-cmp", NID_id_mod_cmp, 8, &so[2019]}, {"id-mod-qualified-cert-88", "id-mod-qualified-cert-88", NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_88, 8, &so[2027]}, {"id-mod-qualified-cert-93", "id-mod-qualified-cert-93", NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_93, 8, &so[2035]}, {"id-mod-attribute-cert", "id-mod-attribute-cert", NID_id_mod_attribute_cert, 8, &so[2043]}, {"id-mod-timestamp-protocol", "id-mod-timestamp-protocol", NID_id_mod_timestamp_protocol, 8, &so[2051]}, {"id-mod-ocsp", "id-mod-ocsp", NID_id_mod_ocsp, 8, &so[2059]}, {"id-mod-dvcs", "id-mod-dvcs", NID_id_mod_dvcs, 8, &so[2067]}, {"id-mod-cmp2000", "id-mod-cmp2000", NID_id_mod_cmp2000, 8, &so[2075]}, {"biometricInfo", "Biometric Info", NID_biometricInfo, 8, &so[2083]}, {"qcStatements", "qcStatements", NID_qcStatements, 8, &so[2091]}, {"ac-auditEntity", "ac-auditEntity", NID_ac_auditEntity, 8, &so[2099]}, {"ac-targeting", "ac-targeting", NID_ac_targeting, 8, &so[2107]}, {"aaControls", "aaControls", NID_aaControls, 8, &so[2115]}, {"sbgp-ipAddrBlock", "sbgp-ipAddrBlock", NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, 8, &so[2123]}, {"sbgp-autonomousSysNum", "sbgp-autonomousSysNum", NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, 8, &so[2131]}, {"sbgp-routerIdentifier", "sbgp-routerIdentifier", NID_sbgp_routerIdentifier, 8, &so[2139]}, {"textNotice", "textNotice", NID_textNotice, 8, &so[2147]}, {"ipsecEndSystem", "IPSec End System", NID_ipsecEndSystem, 8, &so[2155]}, {"ipsecTunnel", "IPSec Tunnel", NID_ipsecTunnel, 8, &so[2163]}, {"ipsecUser", "IPSec User", NID_ipsecUser, 8, &so[2171]}, {"DVCS", "dvcs", NID_dvcs, 8, &so[2179]}, {"id-it-caProtEncCert", "id-it-caProtEncCert", NID_id_it_caProtEncCert, 8, &so[2187]}, {"id-it-signKeyPairTypes", "id-it-signKeyPairTypes", NID_id_it_signKeyPairTypes, 8, &so[2195]}, {"id-it-encKeyPairTypes", "id-it-encKeyPairTypes", NID_id_it_encKeyPairTypes, 8, &so[2203]}, {"id-it-preferredSymmAlg", "id-it-preferredSymmAlg", NID_id_it_preferredSymmAlg, 8, &so[2211]}, {"id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo", "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo", NID_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo, 8, &so[2219]}, {"id-it-currentCRL", "id-it-currentCRL", NID_id_it_currentCRL, 8, &so[2227]}, {"id-it-unsupportedOIDs", "id-it-unsupportedOIDs", NID_id_it_unsupportedOIDs, 8, &so[2235]}, {"id-it-subscriptionRequest", "id-it-subscriptionRequest", NID_id_it_subscriptionRequest, 8, &so[2243]}, {"id-it-subscriptionResponse", "id-it-subscriptionResponse", NID_id_it_subscriptionResponse, 8, &so[2251]}, {"id-it-keyPairParamReq", "id-it-keyPairParamReq", NID_id_it_keyPairParamReq, 8, &so[2259]}, {"id-it-keyPairParamRep", "id-it-keyPairParamRep", NID_id_it_keyPairParamRep, 8, &so[2267]}, {"id-it-revPassphrase", "id-it-revPassphrase", NID_id_it_revPassphrase, 8, &so[2275]}, {"id-it-implicitConfirm", "id-it-implicitConfirm", NID_id_it_implicitConfirm, 8, &so[2283]}, {"id-it-confirmWaitTime", "id-it-confirmWaitTime", NID_id_it_confirmWaitTime, 8, &so[2291]}, {"id-it-origPKIMessage", "id-it-origPKIMessage", NID_id_it_origPKIMessage, 8, &so[2299]}, {"id-regCtrl", "id-regCtrl", NID_id_regCtrl, 8, &so[2307]}, {"id-regInfo", "id-regInfo", NID_id_regInfo, 8, &so[2315]}, {"id-regCtrl-regToken", "id-regCtrl-regToken", NID_id_regCtrl_regToken, 9, &so[2323]}, {"id-regCtrl-authenticator", "id-regCtrl-authenticator", NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator, 9, &so[2332]}, {"id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo", "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo", NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo, 9, &so[2341]}, {"id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions", "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions", NID_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions, 9, &so[2350]}, {"id-regCtrl-oldCertID", "id-regCtrl-oldCertID", NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID, 9, &so[2359]}, {"id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey", "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey", NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey, 9, &so[2368]}, {"id-regInfo-utf8Pairs", "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs", NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs, 9, &so[2377]}, {"id-regInfo-certReq", "id-regInfo-certReq", NID_id_regInfo_certReq, 9, &so[2386]}, {"id-alg-des40", "id-alg-des40", NID_id_alg_des40, 8, &so[2395]}, {"id-alg-noSignature", "id-alg-noSignature", NID_id_alg_noSignature, 8, &so[2403]}, {"id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1", "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1", NID_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1, 8, &so[2411]}, {"id-alg-dh-pop", "id-alg-dh-pop", NID_id_alg_dh_pop, 8, &so[2419]}, {"id-cmc-statusInfo", "id-cmc-statusInfo", NID_id_cmc_statusInfo, 8, &so[2427]}, {"id-cmc-identification", "id-cmc-identification", NID_id_cmc_identification, 8, &so[2435]}, {"id-cmc-identityProof", "id-cmc-identityProof", NID_id_cmc_identityProof, 8, &so[2443]}, {"id-cmc-dataReturn", "id-cmc-dataReturn", NID_id_cmc_dataReturn, 8, &so[2451]}, {"id-cmc-transactionId", "id-cmc-transactionId", NID_id_cmc_transactionId, 8, &so[2459]}, {"id-cmc-senderNonce", "id-cmc-senderNonce", NID_id_cmc_senderNonce, 8, &so[2467]}, {"id-cmc-recipientNonce", "id-cmc-recipientNonce", NID_id_cmc_recipientNonce, 8, &so[2475]}, {"id-cmc-addExtensions", "id-cmc-addExtensions", NID_id_cmc_addExtensions, 8, &so[2483]}, {"id-cmc-encryptedPOP", "id-cmc-encryptedPOP", NID_id_cmc_encryptedPOP, 8, &so[2491]}, {"id-cmc-decryptedPOP", "id-cmc-decryptedPOP", NID_id_cmc_decryptedPOP, 8, &so[2499]}, {"id-cmc-lraPOPWitness", "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness", NID_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness, 8, &so[2507]}, {"id-cmc-getCert", "id-cmc-getCert", NID_id_cmc_getCert, 8, &so[2515]}, {"id-cmc-getCRL", "id-cmc-getCRL", NID_id_cmc_getCRL, 8, &so[2523]}, {"id-cmc-revokeRequest", "id-cmc-revokeRequest", NID_id_cmc_revokeRequest, 8, &so[2531]}, {"id-cmc-regInfo", "id-cmc-regInfo", NID_id_cmc_regInfo, 8, &so[2539]}, {"id-cmc-responseInfo", "id-cmc-responseInfo", NID_id_cmc_responseInfo, 8, &so[2547]}, {"id-cmc-queryPending", "id-cmc-queryPending", NID_id_cmc_queryPending, 8, &so[2555]}, {"id-cmc-popLinkRandom", "id-cmc-popLinkRandom", NID_id_cmc_popLinkRandom, 8, &so[2563]}, {"id-cmc-popLinkWitness", "id-cmc-popLinkWitness", NID_id_cmc_popLinkWitness, 8, &so[2571]}, {"id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance", "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance", NID_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance, 8, &so[2579]}, {"id-on-personalData", "id-on-personalData", NID_id_on_personalData, 8, &so[2587]}, {"id-pda-dateOfBirth", "id-pda-dateOfBirth", NID_id_pda_dateOfBirth, 8, &so[2595]}, {"id-pda-placeOfBirth", "id-pda-placeOfBirth", NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth, 8, &so[2603]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"id-pda-gender", "id-pda-gender", NID_id_pda_gender, 8, &so[2611]}, {"id-pda-countryOfCitizenship", "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship", NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship, 8, &so[2619]}, {"id-pda-countryOfResidence", "id-pda-countryOfResidence", NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence, 8, &so[2627]}, {"id-aca-authenticationInfo", "id-aca-authenticationInfo", NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo, 8, &so[2635]}, {"id-aca-accessIdentity", "id-aca-accessIdentity", NID_id_aca_accessIdentity, 8, &so[2643]}, {"id-aca-chargingIdentity", "id-aca-chargingIdentity", NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity, 8, &so[2651]}, {"id-aca-group", "id-aca-group", NID_id_aca_group, 8, &so[2659]}, {"id-aca-role", "id-aca-role", NID_id_aca_role, 8, &so[2667]}, {"id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1", "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1", NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1, 8, &so[2675]}, {"id-cct-crs", "id-cct-crs", NID_id_cct_crs, 8, &so[2683]}, {"id-cct-PKIData", "id-cct-PKIData", NID_id_cct_PKIData, 8, &so[2691]}, {"id-cct-PKIResponse", "id-cct-PKIResponse", NID_id_cct_PKIResponse, 8, &so[2699]}, {"ad_timestamping", "AD Time Stamping", NID_ad_timeStamping, 8, &so[2707]}, {"AD_DVCS", "ad dvcs", NID_ad_dvcs, 8, &so[2715]}, {"basicOCSPResponse", "Basic OCSP Response", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic, 9, &so[2723]}, {"Nonce", "OCSP Nonce", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, 9, &so[2732]}, {"CrlID", "OCSP CRL ID", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID, 9, &so[2741]}, {"acceptableResponses", "Acceptable OCSP Responses", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses, 9, &so[2750]}, {"noCheck", "OCSP No Check", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, 9, &so[2759]}, {"archiveCutoff", "OCSP Archive Cutoff", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff, 9, &so[2768]}, {"serviceLocator", "OCSP Service Locator", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator, 9, &so[2777]}, {"extendedStatus", "Extended OCSP Status", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus, 9, &so[2786]}, {"valid", "valid", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid, 9, &so[2795]}, {"path", "path", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path, 9, &so[2804]}, {"trustRoot", "Trust Root", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot, 9, &so[2813]}, {"algorithm", "algorithm", NID_algorithm, 4, &so[2822]}, {"rsaSignature", "rsaSignature", NID_rsaSignature, 5, &so[2826]}, {"X500algorithms", "directory services - algorithms", NID_X500algorithms, 2, &so[2831]}, {"ORG", "org", NID_org, 1, &so[2833]}, {"DOD", "dod", NID_dod, 2, &so[2834]}, {"IANA", "iana", NID_iana, 3, &so[2836]}, {"directory", "Directory", NID_Directory, 4, &so[2839]}, {"mgmt", "Management", NID_Management, 4, &so[2843]}, {"experimental", "Experimental", NID_Experimental, 4, &so[2847]}, {"private", "Private", NID_Private, 4, &so[2851]}, {"security", "Security", NID_Security, 4, &so[2855]}, {"snmpv2", "SNMPv2", NID_SNMPv2, 4, &so[2859]}, {"Mail", "Mail", NID_Mail, 4, &so[2863]}, {"enterprises", "Enterprises", NID_Enterprises, 5, &so[2867]}, {"dcobject", "dcObject", NID_dcObject, 9, &so[2872]}, {"DC", "domainComponent", NID_domainComponent, 10, &so[2881]}, {"domain", "Domain", NID_Domain, 10, &so[2891]}, {"NULL", "NULL", NID_joint_iso_ccitt}, {"selected-attribute-types", "Selected Attribute Types", NID_selected_attribute_types, 3, &so[2901]}, {"clearance", "clearance", NID_clearance, 4, &so[2904]}, {"RSA-MD4", "md4WithRSAEncryption", NID_md4WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[2908]}, {"ac-proxying", "ac-proxying", NID_ac_proxying, 8, &so[2917]}, {"subjectInfoAccess", "Subject Information Access", NID_sinfo_access, 8, &so[2925]}, {"id-aca-encAttrs", "id-aca-encAttrs", NID_id_aca_encAttrs, 8, &so[2933]}, {"role", "role", NID_role, 3, &so[2941]}, {"policyConstraints", "X509v3 Policy Constraints", NID_policy_constraints, 3, &so[2944]}, {"targetInformation", "X509v3 AC Targeting", NID_target_information, 3, &so[2947]}, {"noRevAvail", "X509v3 No Revocation Available", NID_no_rev_avail, 3, &so[2950]}, {"NULL", "NULL", NID_ccitt}, {"ansi-X9-62", "ANSI X9.62", NID_ansi_X9_62, 5, &so[2953]}, {"prime-field", "prime-field", NID_X9_62_prime_field, 7, &so[2958]}, {"characteristic-two-field", "characteristic-two-field", NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 7, &so[2965]}, {"id-ecPublicKey", "id-ecPublicKey", NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey, 7, &so[2972]}, {"prime192v1", "prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 8, &so[2979]}, {"prime192v2", "prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2, 8, &so[2987]}, {"prime192v3", "prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3, 8, &so[2995]}, {"prime239v1", "prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1, 8, &so[3003]}, {"prime239v2", "prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2, 8, &so[3011]}, {"prime239v3", "prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3, 8, &so[3019]}, {"prime256v1", "prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 8, &so[3027]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ecdsa-with-SHA1", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, 7, &so[3035]}, {"CSPName", "Microsoft CSP Name", NID_ms_csp_name, 9, &so[3042]}, {"AES-128-ECB", "aes-128-ecb", NID_aes_128_ecb, 9, &so[3051]}, {"AES-128-CBC", "aes-128-cbc", NID_aes_128_cbc, 9, &so[3060]}, {"AES-128-OFB", "aes-128-ofb", NID_aes_128_ofb128, 9, &so[3069]}, {"AES-128-CFB", "aes-128-cfb", NID_aes_128_cfb128, 9, &so[3078]}, {"AES-192-ECB", "aes-192-ecb", NID_aes_192_ecb, 9, &so[3087]}, {"AES-192-CBC", "aes-192-cbc", NID_aes_192_cbc, 9, &so[3096]}, {"AES-192-OFB", "aes-192-ofb", NID_aes_192_ofb128, 9, &so[3105]}, {"AES-192-CFB", "aes-192-cfb", NID_aes_192_cfb128, 9, &so[3114]}, {"AES-256-ECB", "aes-256-ecb", NID_aes_256_ecb, 9, &so[3123]}, {"AES-256-CBC", "aes-256-cbc", NID_aes_256_cbc, 9, &so[3132]}, {"AES-256-OFB", "aes-256-ofb", NID_aes_256_ofb128, 9, &so[3141]}, {"AES-256-CFB", "aes-256-cfb", NID_aes_256_cfb128, 9, &so[3150]}, {"holdInstructionCode", "Hold Instruction Code", NID_hold_instruction_code, 3, &so[3159]}, {"holdInstructionNone", "Hold Instruction None", NID_hold_instruction_none, 7, &so[3162]}, {"holdInstructionCallIssuer", "Hold Instruction Call Issuer", NID_hold_instruction_call_issuer, 7, &so[3169]}, {"holdInstructionReject", "Hold Instruction Reject", NID_hold_instruction_reject, 7, &so[3176]}, {"data", "data", NID_data, 1, &so[3183]}, {"pss", "pss", NID_pss, 3, &so[3184]}, {"ucl", "ucl", NID_ucl, 7, &so[3187]}, {"pilot", "pilot", NID_pilot, 8, &so[3194]}, {"pilotAttributeType", "pilotAttributeType", NID_pilotAttributeType, 9, &so[3202]}, {"pilotAttributeSyntax", "pilotAttributeSyntax", NID_pilotAttributeSyntax, 9, &so[3211]}, {"pilotObjectClass", "pilotObjectClass", NID_pilotObjectClass, 9, &so[3220]}, {"pilotGroups", "pilotGroups", NID_pilotGroups, 9, &so[3229]}, {"iA5StringSyntax", "iA5StringSyntax", NID_iA5StringSyntax, 10, &so[3238]}, {"caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax", "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax", NID_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax, 10, &so[3248]}, {"pilotObject", "pilotObject", NID_pilotObject, 10, &so[3258]}, {"pilotPerson", "pilotPerson", NID_pilotPerson, 10, &so[3268]}, {"account", "account", NID_account, 10, &so[3278]}, {"document", "document", NID_document, 10, &so[3288]}, {"room", "room", NID_room, 10, &so[3298]}, {"documentSeries", "documentSeries", NID_documentSeries, 10, &so[3308]}, {"rFC822localPart", "rFC822localPart", NID_rFC822localPart, 10, &so[3318]}, {"dNSDomain", "dNSDomain", NID_dNSDomain, 10, &so[3328]}, {"domainRelatedObject", "domainRelatedObject", NID_domainRelatedObject, 10, &so[3338]}, {"friendlyCountry", "friendlyCountry", NID_friendlyCountry, 10, &so[3348]}, {"simpleSecurityObject", "simpleSecurityObject", NID_simpleSecurityObject, 10, &so[3358]}, {"pilotOrganization", "pilotOrganization", NID_pilotOrganization, 10, &so[3368]}, {"pilotDSA", "pilotDSA", NID_pilotDSA, 10, &so[3378]}, {"qualityLabelledData", "qualityLabelledData", NID_qualityLabelledData, 10, &so[3388]}, {"UID", "userId", NID_userId, 10, &so[3398]}, {"textEncodedORAddress", "textEncodedORAddress", NID_textEncodedORAddress, 10, &so[3408]}, {"mail", "rfc822Mailbox", NID_rfc822Mailbox, 10, &so[3418]}, {"info", "info", NID_info, 10, &so[3428]}, {"favouriteDrink", "favouriteDrink", NID_favouriteDrink, 10, &so[3438]}, {"roomNumber", "roomNumber", NID_roomNumber, 10, &so[3448]}, {"photo", "photo", NID_photo, 10, &so[3458]}, {"userClass", "userClass", NID_userClass, 10, &so[3468]}, {"host", "host", NID_host, 10, &so[3478]}, {"manager", "manager", NID_manager, 10, &so[3488]}, {"documentIdentifier", "documentIdentifier", NID_documentIdentifier, 10, &so[3498]}, {"documentTitle", "documentTitle", NID_documentTitle, 10, &so[3508]}, {"documentVersion", "documentVersion", NID_documentVersion, 10, &so[3518]}, {"documentAuthor", "documentAuthor", NID_documentAuthor, 10, &so[3528]}, {"documentLocation", "documentLocation", NID_documentLocation, 10, &so[3538]}, {"homeTelephoneNumber", "homeTelephoneNumber", NID_homeTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3548]}, {"secretary", "secretary", NID_secretary, 10, &so[3558]}, {"otherMailbox", "otherMailbox", NID_otherMailbox, 10, &so[3568]}, {"lastModifiedTime", "lastModifiedTime", NID_lastModifiedTime, 10, &so[3578]}, {"lastModifiedBy", "lastModifiedBy", NID_lastModifiedBy, 10, &so[3588]}, {"aRecord", "aRecord", NID_aRecord, 10, &so[3598]}, {"pilotAttributeType27", "pilotAttributeType27", NID_pilotAttributeType27, 10, &so[3608]}, {"mXRecord", "mXRecord", NID_mXRecord, 10, &so[3618]}, {"nSRecord", "nSRecord", NID_nSRecord, 10, &so[3628]}, {"sOARecord", "sOARecord", NID_sOARecord, 10, &so[3638]}, {"cNAMERecord", "cNAMERecord", NID_cNAMERecord, 10, &so[3648]}, {"associatedDomain", "associatedDomain", NID_associatedDomain, 10, &so[3658]}, {"associatedName", "associatedName", NID_associatedName, 10, &so[3668]}, {"homePostalAddress", "homePostalAddress", NID_homePostalAddress, 10, &so[3678]}, {"personalTitle", "personalTitle", NID_personalTitle, 10, &so[3688]}, {"mobileTelephoneNumber", "mobileTelephoneNumber", NID_mobileTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3698]}, {"pagerTelephoneNumber", "pagerTelephoneNumber", NID_pagerTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3708]}, {"friendlyCountryName", "friendlyCountryName", NID_friendlyCountryName, 10, &so[3718]}, {"organizationalStatus", "organizationalStatus", NID_organizationalStatus, 10, &so[3728]}, {"janetMailbox", "janetMailbox", NID_janetMailbox, 10, &so[3738]}, {"mailPreferenceOption", "mailPreferenceOption", NID_mailPreferenceOption, 10, &so[3748]}, {"buildingName", "buildingName", NID_buildingName, 10, &so[3758]}, {"dSAQuality", "dSAQuality", NID_dSAQuality, 10, &so[3768]}, {"singleLevelQuality", "singleLevelQuality", NID_singleLevelQuality, 10, &so[3778]}, {"subtreeMinimumQuality", "subtreeMinimumQuality", NID_subtreeMinimumQuality, 10, &so[3788]}, {"subtreeMaximumQuality", "subtreeMaximumQuality", NID_subtreeMaximumQuality, 10, &so[3798]}, {"personalSignature", "personalSignature", NID_personalSignature, 10, &so[3808]}, {"dITRedirect", "dITRedirect", NID_dITRedirect, 10, &so[3818]}, {"audio", "audio", NID_audio, 10, &so[3828]}, {"documentPublisher", "documentPublisher", NID_documentPublisher, 10, &so[3838]}, {"x500UniqueIdentifier", "x500UniqueIdentifier", NID_x500UniqueIdentifier, 3, &so[3848]}, {"mime-mhs", "MIME MHS", NID_mime_mhs, 5, &so[3851]}, {"mime-mhs-headings", "mime-mhs-headings", NID_mime_mhs_headings, 6, &so[3856]}, {"mime-mhs-bodies", "mime-mhs-bodies", NID_mime_mhs_bodies, 6, &so[3862]}, {"id-hex-partial-message", "id-hex-partial-message", NID_id_hex_partial_message, 7, &so[3868]}, {"id-hex-multipart-message", "id-hex-multipart-message", NID_id_hex_multipart_message, 7, &so[3875]}, {"generationQualifier", "generationQualifier", NID_generationQualifier, 3, &so[3882]}, {"pseudonym", "pseudonym", NID_pseudonym, 3, &so[3885]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"id-set", "Secure Electronic Transactions", NID_id_set, 2, &so[3888]}, {"set-ctype", "content types", NID_set_ctype, 3, &so[3890]}, {"set-msgExt", "message extensions", NID_set_msgExt, 3, &so[3893]}, {"set-attr", "set-attr", NID_set_attr, 3, &so[3896]}, {"set-policy", "set-policy", NID_set_policy, 3, &so[3899]}, {"set-certExt", "certificate extensions", NID_set_certExt, 3, &so[3902]}, {"set-brand", "set-brand", NID_set_brand, 3, &so[3905]}, {"setct-PANData", "setct-PANData", NID_setct_PANData, 4, &so[3908]}, {"setct-PANToken", "setct-PANToken", NID_setct_PANToken, 4, &so[3912]}, {"setct-PANOnly", "setct-PANOnly", NID_setct_PANOnly, 4, &so[3916]}, {"setct-OIData", "setct-OIData", NID_setct_OIData, 4, &so[3920]}, {"setct-PI", "setct-PI", NID_setct_PI, 4, &so[3924]}, {"setct-PIData", "setct-PIData", NID_setct_PIData, 4, &so[3928]}, {"setct-PIDataUnsigned", "setct-PIDataUnsigned", NID_setct_PIDataUnsigned, 4, &so[3932]}, {"setct-HODInput", "setct-HODInput", NID_setct_HODInput, 4, &so[3936]}, {"setct-AuthResBaggage", "setct-AuthResBaggage", NID_setct_AuthResBaggage, 4, &so[3940]}, {"setct-AuthRevReqBaggage", "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage", NID_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage, 4, &so[3944]}, {"setct-AuthRevResBaggage", "setct-AuthRevResBaggage", NID_setct_AuthRevResBaggage, 4, &so[3948]}, {"setct-CapTokenSeq", "setct-CapTokenSeq", NID_setct_CapTokenSeq, 4, &so[3952]}, {"setct-PInitResData", "setct-PInitResData", NID_setct_PInitResData, 4, &so[3956]}, {"setct-PI-TBS", "setct-PI-TBS", NID_setct_PI_TBS, 4, &so[3960]}, {"setct-PResData", "setct-PResData", NID_setct_PResData, 4, &so[3964]}, {"setct-AuthReqTBS", "setct-AuthReqTBS", NID_setct_AuthReqTBS, 4, &so[3968]}, {"setct-AuthResTBS", "setct-AuthResTBS", NID_setct_AuthResTBS, 4, &so[3972]}, {"setct-AuthResTBSX", "setct-AuthResTBSX", NID_setct_AuthResTBSX, 4, &so[3976]}, {"setct-AuthTokenTBS", "setct-AuthTokenTBS", NID_setct_AuthTokenTBS, 4, &so[3980]}, {"setct-CapTokenData", "setct-CapTokenData", NID_setct_CapTokenData, 4, &so[3984]}, {"setct-CapTokenTBS", "setct-CapTokenTBS", NID_setct_CapTokenTBS, 4, &so[3988]}, {"setct-AcqCardCodeMsg", "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg", NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg, 4, &so[3992]}, {"setct-AuthRevReqTBS", "setct-AuthRevReqTBS", NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBS, 4, &so[3996]}, {"setct-AuthRevResData", "setct-AuthRevResData", NID_setct_AuthRevResData, 4, &so[4000]}, {"setct-AuthRevResTBS", "setct-AuthRevResTBS", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBS, 4, &so[4004]}, {"setct-CapReqTBS", "setct-CapReqTBS", NID_setct_CapReqTBS, 4, &so[4008]}, {"setct-CapReqTBSX", "setct-CapReqTBSX", NID_setct_CapReqTBSX, 4, &so[4012]}, {"setct-CapResData", "setct-CapResData", NID_setct_CapResData, 4, &so[4016]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBS", "setct-CapRevReqTBS", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBS, 4, &so[4020]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBSX", "setct-CapRevReqTBSX", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBSX, 4, &so[4024]}, {"setct-CapRevResData", "setct-CapRevResData", NID_setct_CapRevResData, 4, &so[4028]}, {"setct-CredReqTBS", "setct-CredReqTBS", NID_setct_CredReqTBS, 4, &so[4032]}, {"setct-CredReqTBSX", "setct-CredReqTBSX", NID_setct_CredReqTBSX, 4, &so[4036]}, {"setct-CredResData", "setct-CredResData", NID_setct_CredResData, 4, &so[4040]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBS", "setct-CredRevReqTBS", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBS, 4, &so[4044]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBSX", "setct-CredRevReqTBSX", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBSX, 4, &so[4048]}, {"setct-CredRevResData", "setct-CredRevResData", NID_setct_CredRevResData, 4, &so[4052]}, {"setct-PCertReqData", "setct-PCertReqData", NID_setct_PCertReqData, 4, &so[4056]}, {"setct-PCertResTBS", "setct-PCertResTBS", NID_setct_PCertResTBS, 4, &so[4060]}, {"setct-BatchAdminReqData", "setct-BatchAdminReqData", NID_setct_BatchAdminReqData, 4, &so[4064]}, {"setct-BatchAdminResData", "setct-BatchAdminResData", NID_setct_BatchAdminResData, 4, &so[4068]}, {"setct-CardCInitResTBS", "setct-CardCInitResTBS", NID_setct_CardCInitResTBS, 4, &so[4072]}, {"setct-MeAqCInitResTBS", "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS", NID_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS, 4, &so[4076]}, {"setct-RegFormResTBS", "setct-RegFormResTBS", NID_setct_RegFormResTBS, 4, &so[4080]}, {"setct-CertReqData", "setct-CertReqData", NID_setct_CertReqData, 4, &so[4084]}, {"setct-CertReqTBS", "setct-CertReqTBS", NID_setct_CertReqTBS, 4, &so[4088]}, {"setct-CertResData", "setct-CertResData", NID_setct_CertResData, 4, &so[4092]}, {"setct-CertInqReqTBS", "setct-CertInqReqTBS", NID_setct_CertInqReqTBS, 4, &so[4096]}, {"setct-ErrorTBS", "setct-ErrorTBS", NID_setct_ErrorTBS, 4, &so[4100]}, {"setct-PIDualSignedTBE", "setct-PIDualSignedTBE", NID_setct_PIDualSignedTBE, 4, &so[4104]}, {"setct-PIUnsignedTBE", "setct-PIUnsignedTBE", NID_setct_PIUnsignedTBE, 4, &so[4108]}, {"setct-AuthReqTBE", "setct-AuthReqTBE", NID_setct_AuthReqTBE, 4, &so[4112]}, {"setct-AuthResTBE", "setct-AuthResTBE", NID_setct_AuthResTBE, 4, &so[4116]}, {"setct-AuthResTBEX", "setct-AuthResTBEX", NID_setct_AuthResTBEX, 4, &so[4120]}, {"setct-AuthTokenTBE", "setct-AuthTokenTBE", NID_setct_AuthTokenTBE, 4, &so[4124]}, {"setct-CapTokenTBE", "setct-CapTokenTBE", NID_setct_CapTokenTBE, 4, &so[4128]}, {"setct-CapTokenTBEX", "setct-CapTokenTBEX", NID_setct_CapTokenTBEX, 4, &so[4132]}, {"setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE", "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE", NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE, 4, &so[4136]}, {"setct-AuthRevReqTBE", "setct-AuthRevReqTBE", NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4140]}, {"setct-AuthRevResTBE", "setct-AuthRevResTBE", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBE, 4, &so[4144]}, {"setct-AuthRevResTBEB", "setct-AuthRevResTBEB", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBEB, 4, &so[4148]}, {"setct-CapReqTBE", "setct-CapReqTBE", NID_setct_CapReqTBE, 4, &so[4152]}, {"setct-CapReqTBEX", "setct-CapReqTBEX", NID_setct_CapReqTBEX, 4, &so[4156]}, {"setct-CapResTBE", "setct-CapResTBE", NID_setct_CapResTBE, 4, &so[4160]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBE", "setct-CapRevReqTBE", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4164]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBEX", "setct-CapRevReqTBEX", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBEX, 4, &so[4168]}, {"setct-CapRevResTBE", "setct-CapRevResTBE", NID_setct_CapRevResTBE, 4, &so[4172]}, {"setct-CredReqTBE", "setct-CredReqTBE", NID_setct_CredReqTBE, 4, &so[4176]}, {"setct-CredReqTBEX", "setct-CredReqTBEX", NID_setct_CredReqTBEX, 4, &so[4180]}, {"setct-CredResTBE", "setct-CredResTBE", NID_setct_CredResTBE, 4, &so[4184]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBE", "setct-CredRevReqTBE", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4188]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBEX", "setct-CredRevReqTBEX", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBEX, 4, &so[4192]}, {"setct-CredRevResTBE", "setct-CredRevResTBE", NID_setct_CredRevResTBE, 4, &so[4196]}, {"setct-BatchAdminReqTBE", "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE", NID_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE, 4, &so[4200]}, {"setct-BatchAdminResTBE", "setct-BatchAdminResTBE", NID_setct_BatchAdminResTBE, 4, &so[4204]}, {"setct-RegFormReqTBE", "setct-RegFormReqTBE", NID_setct_RegFormReqTBE, 4, &so[4208]}, {"setct-CertReqTBE", "setct-CertReqTBE", NID_setct_CertReqTBE, 4, &so[4212]}, {"setct-CertReqTBEX", "setct-CertReqTBEX", NID_setct_CertReqTBEX, 4, &so[4216]}, {"setct-CertResTBE", "setct-CertResTBE", NID_setct_CertResTBE, 4, &so[4220]}, {"setct-CRLNotificationTBS", "setct-CRLNotificationTBS", NID_setct_CRLNotificationTBS, 4, &so[4224]}, {"setct-CRLNotificationResTBS", "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS", NID_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS, 4, &so[4228]}, {"setct-BCIDistributionTBS", "setct-BCIDistributionTBS", NID_setct_BCIDistributionTBS, 4, &so[4232]}, {"setext-genCrypt", "generic cryptogram", NID_setext_genCrypt, 4, &so[4236]}, {"setext-miAuth", "merchant initiated auth", NID_setext_miAuth, 4, &so[4240]}, {"setext-pinSecure", "setext-pinSecure", NID_setext_pinSecure, 4, &so[4244]}, {"setext-pinAny", "setext-pinAny", NID_setext_pinAny, 4, &so[4248]}, {"setext-track2", "setext-track2", NID_setext_track2, 4, &so[4252]}, {"setext-cv", "additional verification", NID_setext_cv, 4, &so[4256]}, {"set-policy-root", "set-policy-root", NID_set_policy_root, 4, &so[4260]}, {"setCext-hashedRoot", "setCext-hashedRoot", NID_setCext_hashedRoot, 4, &so[4264]}, {"setCext-certType", "setCext-certType", NID_setCext_certType, 4, &so[4268]}, {"setCext-merchData", "setCext-merchData", NID_setCext_merchData, 4, &so[4272]}, {"setCext-cCertRequired", "setCext-cCertRequired", NID_setCext_cCertRequired, 4, &so[4276]}, {"setCext-tunneling", "setCext-tunneling", NID_setCext_tunneling, 4, &so[4280]}, {"setCext-setExt", "setCext-setExt", NID_setCext_setExt, 4, &so[4284]}, {"setCext-setQualf", "setCext-setQualf", NID_setCext_setQualf, 4, &so[4288]}, {"setCext-PGWYcapabilities", "setCext-PGWYcapabilities", NID_setCext_PGWYcapabilities, 4, &so[4292]}, {"setCext-TokenIdentifier", "setCext-TokenIdentifier", NID_setCext_TokenIdentifier, 4, &so[4296]}, {"setCext-Track2Data", "setCext-Track2Data", NID_setCext_Track2Data, 4, &so[4300]}, {"setCext-TokenType", "setCext-TokenType", NID_setCext_TokenType, 4, &so[4304]}, {"setCext-IssuerCapabilities", "setCext-IssuerCapabilities", NID_setCext_IssuerCapabilities, 4, &so[4308]}, {"setAttr-Cert", "setAttr-Cert", NID_setAttr_Cert, 4, &so[4312]}, {"setAttr-PGWYcap", "payment gateway capabilities", NID_setAttr_PGWYcap, 4, &so[4316]}, {"setAttr-TokenType", "setAttr-TokenType", NID_setAttr_TokenType, 4, &so[4320]}, {"setAttr-IssCap", "issuer capabilities", NID_setAttr_IssCap, 4, &so[4324]}, {"set-rootKeyThumb", "set-rootKeyThumb", NID_set_rootKeyThumb, 5, &so[4328]}, {"set-addPolicy", "set-addPolicy", NID_set_addPolicy, 5, &so[4333]}, {"setAttr-Token-EMV", "setAttr-Token-EMV", NID_setAttr_Token_EMV, 5, &so[4338]}, {"setAttr-Token-B0Prime", "setAttr-Token-B0Prime", NID_setAttr_Token_B0Prime, 5, &so[4343]}, {"setAttr-IssCap-CVM", "setAttr-IssCap-CVM", NID_setAttr_IssCap_CVM, 5, &so[4348]}, {"setAttr-IssCap-T2", "setAttr-IssCap-T2", NID_setAttr_IssCap_T2, 5, &so[4353]}, {"setAttr-IssCap-Sig", "setAttr-IssCap-Sig", NID_setAttr_IssCap_Sig, 5, &so[4358]}, {"setAttr-GenCryptgrm", "generate cryptogram", NID_setAttr_GenCryptgrm, 6, &so[4363]}, {"setAttr-T2Enc", "encrypted track 2", NID_setAttr_T2Enc, 6, &so[4369]}, {"setAttr-T2cleartxt", "cleartext track 2", NID_setAttr_T2cleartxt, 6, &so[4375]}, {"setAttr-TokICCsig", "ICC or token signature", NID_setAttr_TokICCsig, 6, &so[4381]}, {"setAttr-SecDevSig", "secure device signature", NID_setAttr_SecDevSig, 6, &so[4387]}, {"set-brand-IATA-ATA", "set-brand-IATA-ATA", NID_set_brand_IATA_ATA, 4, &so[4393]}, {"set-brand-Diners", "set-brand-Diners", NID_set_brand_Diners, 4, &so[4397]}, {"set-brand-AmericanExpress", "set-brand-AmericanExpress", NID_set_brand_AmericanExpress, 4, &so[4401]}, {"set-brand-JCB", "set-brand-JCB", NID_set_brand_JCB, 4, &so[4405]}, {"set-brand-Visa", "set-brand-Visa", NID_set_brand_Visa, 4, &so[4409]}, {"set-brand-MasterCard", "set-brand-MasterCard", NID_set_brand_MasterCard, 4, &so[4413]}, {"set-brand-Novus", "set-brand-Novus", NID_set_brand_Novus, 5, &so[4417]}, {"DES-CDMF", "des-cdmf", NID_des_cdmf, 8, &so[4422]}, {"rsaOAEPEncryptionSET", "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET", NID_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET, 9, &so[4430]}, {"ITU-T", "itu-t", NID_itu_t}, {"JOINT-ISO-ITU-T", "joint-iso-itu-t", NID_joint_iso_itu_t}, {"international-organizations", "International Organizations", NID_international_organizations, 1, &so[4439]}, {"msSmartcardLogin", "Microsoft Smartcardlogin", NID_ms_smartcard_login, 10, &so[4440]}, {"msUPN", "Microsoft Universal Principal Name", NID_ms_upn, 10, &so[4450]}, {"AES-128-CFB1", "aes-128-cfb1", NID_aes_128_cfb1}, {"AES-192-CFB1", "aes-192-cfb1", NID_aes_192_cfb1}, {"AES-256-CFB1", "aes-256-cfb1", NID_aes_256_cfb1}, {"AES-128-CFB8", "aes-128-cfb8", NID_aes_128_cfb8}, {"AES-192-CFB8", "aes-192-cfb8", NID_aes_192_cfb8}, {"AES-256-CFB8", "aes-256-cfb8", NID_aes_256_cfb8}, {"DES-CFB1", "des-cfb1", NID_des_cfb1}, {"DES-CFB8", "des-cfb8", NID_des_cfb8}, {"DES-EDE3-CFB1", "des-ede3-cfb1", NID_des_ede3_cfb1}, {"DES-EDE3-CFB8", "des-ede3-cfb8", NID_des_ede3_cfb8}, {"street", "streetAddress", NID_streetAddress, 3, &so[4460]}, {"postalCode", "postalCode", NID_postalCode, 3, &so[4463]}, {"id-ppl", "id-ppl", NID_id_ppl, 7, &so[4466]}, {"proxyCertInfo", "Proxy Certificate Information", NID_proxyCertInfo, 8, &so[4473]}, {"id-ppl-anyLanguage", "Any language", NID_id_ppl_anyLanguage, 8, &so[4481]}, {"id-ppl-inheritAll", "Inherit all", NID_id_ppl_inheritAll, 8, &so[4489]}, {"nameConstraints", "X509v3 Name Constraints", NID_name_constraints, 3, &so[4497]}, {"id-ppl-independent", "Independent", NID_Independent, 8, &so[4500]}, {"RSA-SHA256", "sha256WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4508]}, {"RSA-SHA384", "sha384WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4517]}, {"RSA-SHA512", "sha512WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4526]}, {"RSA-SHA224", "sha224WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4535]}, {"SHA256", "sha256", NID_sha256, 9, &so[4544]}, {"SHA384", "sha384", NID_sha384, 9, &so[4553]}, {"SHA512", "sha512", NID_sha512, 9, &so[4562]}, {"SHA224", "sha224", NID_sha224, 9, &so[4571]}, {"identified-organization", "identified-organization", NID_identified_organization, 1, &so[4580]}, {"certicom-arc", "certicom-arc", NID_certicom_arc, 3, &so[4581]}, {"wap", "wap", NID_wap, 2, &so[4584]}, {"wap-wsg", "wap-wsg", NID_wap_wsg, 3, &so[4586]}, {"id-characteristic-two-basis", "id-characteristic-two-basis", NID_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis, 8, &so[4589]}, {"onBasis", "onBasis", NID_X9_62_onBasis, 9, &so[4597]}, {"tpBasis", "tpBasis", NID_X9_62_tpBasis, 9, &so[4606]}, {"ppBasis", "ppBasis", NID_X9_62_ppBasis, 9, &so[4615]}, {"c2pnb163v1", "c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1, 8, &so[4624]}, {"c2pnb163v2", "c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2, 8, &so[4632]}, {"c2pnb163v3", "c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3, 8, &so[4640]}, {"c2pnb176v1", "c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1, 8, &so[4648]}, {"c2tnb191v1", "c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, 8, &so[4656]}, {"c2tnb191v2", "c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2, 8, &so[4664]}, {"c2tnb191v3", "c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3, 8, &so[4672]}, {"c2onb191v4", "c2onb191v4", NID_X9_62_c2onb191v4, 8, &so[4680]}, {"c2onb191v5", "c2onb191v5", NID_X9_62_c2onb191v5, 8, &so[4688]}, {"c2pnb208w1", "c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1, 8, &so[4696]}, {"c2tnb239v1", "c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, 8, &so[4704]}, {"c2tnb239v2", "c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2, 8, &so[4712]}, {"c2tnb239v3", "c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3, 8, &so[4720]}, {"c2onb239v4", "c2onb239v4", NID_X9_62_c2onb239v4, 8, &so[4728]}, {"c2onb239v5", "c2onb239v5", NID_X9_62_c2onb239v5, 8, &so[4736]}, {"c2pnb272w1", "c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1, 8, &so[4744]}, {"c2pnb304w1", "c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1, 8, &so[4752]}, {"c2tnb359v1", "c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1, 8, &so[4760]}, {"c2pnb368w1", "c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1, 8, &so[4768]}, {"c2tnb431r1", "c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1, 8, &so[4776]}, {"secp112r1", "secp112r1", NID_secp112r1, 5, &so[4784]}, {"secp112r2", "secp112r2", NID_secp112r2, 5, &so[4789]}, {"secp128r1", "secp128r1", NID_secp128r1, 5, &so[4794]}, {"secp128r2", "secp128r2", NID_secp128r2, 5, &so[4799]}, {"secp160k1", "secp160k1", NID_secp160k1, 5, &so[4804]}, {"secp160r1", "secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 5, &so[4809]}, {"secp160r2", "secp160r2", NID_secp160r2, 5, &so[4814]}, {"secp192k1", "secp192k1", NID_secp192k1, 5, &so[4819]}, {"secp224k1", "secp224k1", NID_secp224k1, 5, &so[4824]}, {"secp224r1", "secp224r1", NID_secp224r1, 5, &so[4829]}, {"secp256k1", "secp256k1", NID_secp256k1, 5, &so[4834]}, {"secp384r1", "secp384r1", NID_secp384r1, 5, &so[4839]}, {"secp521r1", "secp521r1", NID_secp521r1, 5, &so[4844]}, {"sect113r1", "sect113r1", NID_sect113r1, 5, &so[4849]}, {"sect113r2", "sect113r2", NID_sect113r2, 5, &so[4854]}, {"sect131r1", "sect131r1", NID_sect131r1, 5, &so[4859]}, {"sect131r2", "sect131r2", NID_sect131r2, 5, &so[4864]}, {"sect163k1", "sect163k1", NID_sect163k1, 5, &so[4869]}, {"sect163r1", "sect163r1", NID_sect163r1, 5, &so[4874]}, {"sect163r2", "sect163r2", NID_sect163r2, 5, &so[4879]}, {"sect193r1", "sect193r1", NID_sect193r1, 5, &so[4884]}, {"sect193r2", "sect193r2", NID_sect193r2, 5, &so[4889]}, {"sect233k1", "sect233k1", NID_sect233k1, 5, &so[4894]}, {"sect233r1", "sect233r1", NID_sect233r1, 5, &so[4899]}, {"sect239k1", "sect239k1", NID_sect239k1, 5, &so[4904]}, {"sect283k1", "sect283k1", NID_sect283k1, 5, &so[4909]}, {"sect283r1", "sect283r1", NID_sect283r1, 5, &so[4914]}, {"sect409k1", "sect409k1", NID_sect409k1, 5, &so[4919]}, {"sect409r1", "sect409r1", NID_sect409r1, 5, &so[4924]}, {"sect571k1", "sect571k1", NID_sect571k1, 5, &so[4929]}, {"sect571r1", "sect571r1", NID_sect571r1, 5, &so[4934]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1, 5, &so[4939]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3, 5, &so[4944]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4, 5, &so[4949]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, 5, &so[4954]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6, 5, &so[4959]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7, 5, &so[4964]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8, 5, &so[4969]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9, 5, &so[4974]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10, 5, &so[4979]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11, 5, &so[4984]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, 5, &so[4989]}, {"anyPolicy", "X509v3 Any Policy", NID_any_policy, 4, &so[4994]}, {"policyMappings", "X509v3 Policy Mappings", NID_policy_mappings, 3, &so[4998]}, {"inhibitAnyPolicy", "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy", NID_inhibit_any_policy, 3, &so[5001]}, {"Oakley-EC2N-3", "ipsec3", NID_ipsec3}, {"Oakley-EC2N-4", "ipsec4", NID_ipsec4}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CBC", "camellia-128-cbc", NID_camellia_128_cbc, 11, &so[5004]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CBC", "camellia-192-cbc", NID_camellia_192_cbc, 11, &so[5015]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CBC", "camellia-256-cbc", NID_camellia_256_cbc, 11, &so[5026]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-ECB", "camellia-128-ecb", NID_camellia_128_ecb, 8, &so[5037]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-ECB", "camellia-192-ecb", NID_camellia_192_ecb, 8, &so[5045]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-ECB", "camellia-256-ecb", NID_camellia_256_ecb, 8, &so[5053]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB", "camellia-128-cfb", NID_camellia_128_cfb128, 8, &so[5061]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB", "camellia-192-cfb", NID_camellia_192_cfb128, 8, &so[5069]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB", "camellia-256-cfb", NID_camellia_256_cfb128, 8, &so[5077]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB1", "camellia-128-cfb1", NID_camellia_128_cfb1}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB1", "camellia-192-cfb1", NID_camellia_192_cfb1}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB1", "camellia-256-cfb1", NID_camellia_256_cfb1}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB8", "camellia-128-cfb8", NID_camellia_128_cfb8}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB8", "camellia-192-cfb8", NID_camellia_192_cfb8}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB8", "camellia-256-cfb8", NID_camellia_256_cfb8}, {"CAMELLIA-128-OFB", "camellia-128-ofb", NID_camellia_128_ofb128, 8, &so[5085]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-OFB", "camellia-192-ofb", NID_camellia_192_ofb128, 8, &so[5093]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-OFB", "camellia-256-ofb", NID_camellia_256_ofb128, 8, &so[5101]}, {"subjectDirectoryAttributes", "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes", NID_subject_directory_attributes, 3, &so[5109]}, {"issuingDistributionPoint", "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point", NID_issuing_distribution_point, 3, &so[5112]}, {"certificateIssuer", "X509v3 Certificate Issuer", NID_certificate_issuer, 3, &so[5115]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"KISA", "kisa", NID_kisa, 6, &so[5118]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"SEED-ECB", "seed-ecb", NID_seed_ecb, 8, &so[5124]}, {"SEED-CBC", "seed-cbc", NID_seed_cbc, 8, &so[5132]}, {"SEED-OFB", "seed-ofb", NID_seed_ofb128, 8, &so[5140]}, {"SEED-CFB", "seed-cfb", NID_seed_cfb128, 8, &so[5148]}, {"HMAC-MD5", "hmac-md5", NID_hmac_md5, 8, &so[5156]}, {"HMAC-SHA1", "hmac-sha1", NID_hmac_sha1, 8, &so[5164]}, {"id-PasswordBasedMAC", "password based MAC", NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC, 9, &so[5172]}, {"id-DHBasedMac", "Diffie-Hellman based MAC", NID_id_DHBasedMac, 9, &so[5181]}, {"id-it-suppLangTags", "id-it-suppLangTags", NID_id_it_suppLangTags, 8, &so[5190]}, {"caRepository", "CA Repository", NID_caRepository, 8, &so[5198]}, {"id-smime-ct-compressedData", "id-smime-ct-compressedData", NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData, 11, &so[5206]}, {"id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF", "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF", NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF, 11, &so[5217]}, {"id-aes128-wrap", "id-aes128-wrap", NID_id_aes128_wrap, 9, &so[5228]}, {"id-aes192-wrap", "id-aes192-wrap", NID_id_aes192_wrap, 9, &so[5237]}, {"id-aes256-wrap", "id-aes256-wrap", NID_id_aes256_wrap, 9, &so[5246]}, {"ecdsa-with-Recommended", "ecdsa-with-Recommended", NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended, 7, &so[5255]}, {"ecdsa-with-Specified", "ecdsa-with-Specified", NID_ecdsa_with_Specified, 7, &so[5262]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ecdsa-with-SHA224", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, 8, &so[5269]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ecdsa-with-SHA256", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, 8, &so[5277]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ecdsa-with-SHA384", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, 8, &so[5285]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ecdsa-with-SHA512", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, 8, &so[5293]}, {"hmacWithMD5", "hmacWithMD5", NID_hmacWithMD5, 8, &so[5301]}, {"hmacWithSHA224", "hmacWithSHA224", NID_hmacWithSHA224, 8, &so[5309]}, {"hmacWithSHA256", "hmacWithSHA256", NID_hmacWithSHA256, 8, &so[5317]}, {"hmacWithSHA384", "hmacWithSHA384", NID_hmacWithSHA384, 8, &so[5325]}, {"hmacWithSHA512", "hmacWithSHA512", NID_hmacWithSHA512, 8, &so[5333]}, {"dsa_with_SHA224", "dsa_with_SHA224", NID_dsa_with_SHA224, 9, &so[5341]}, {"dsa_with_SHA256", "dsa_with_SHA256", NID_dsa_with_SHA256, 9, &so[5350]}, {"whirlpool", "whirlpool", NID_whirlpool, 6, &so[5359]}, {"cryptopro", "cryptopro", NID_cryptopro, 5, &so[5365]}, {"cryptocom", "cryptocom", NID_cryptocom, 5, &so[5370]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001, 6, &so[5375]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94, 6, &so[5381]}, {"md_gost94", "GOST R 34.11-94", NID_id_GostR3411_94, 6, &so[5387]}, {"id-HMACGostR3411-94", "HMAC GOST 34.11-94", NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94, 6, &so[5393]}, {"gost2001", "GOST R 34.10-2001", NID_id_GostR3410_2001, 6, &so[5399]}, {"gost94", "GOST R 34.10-94", NID_id_GostR3410_94, 6, &so[5405]}, {"gost89", "GOST 28147-89", NID_id_Gost28147_89, 6, &so[5411]}, {"gost89-cnt", "gost89-cnt", NID_gost89_cnt}, {"gost-mac", "GOST 28147-89 MAC", NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC, 6, &so[5417]}, {"prf-gostr3411-94", "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF", NID_id_GostR3411_94_prf, 6, &so[5423]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001DH", "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH", NID_id_GostR3410_2001DH, 6, &so[5429]}, {"id-GostR3410-94DH", "GOST R 34.10-94 DH", NID_id_GostR3410_94DH, 6, &so[5435]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing, 7, &so[5441]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing", "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing", NID_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing, 7, &so[5448]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5455]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet", "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet", NID_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet, 7, &so[5462]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5469]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5476]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5483]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5490]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet, 7, &so[5497]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet, 7, &so[5504]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet, 7, &so[5511]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet, 7, &so[5518]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5525]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5532]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5539]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5546]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet, 7, &so[5553]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet, 7, &so[5560]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet, 7, &so[5567]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet, 7, &so[5574]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5581]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5588]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5595]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5602]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet, 7, &so[5609]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet, 7, &so[5616]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-a", "id-GostR3410-94-a", NID_id_GostR3410_94_a, 7, &so[5623]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-aBis", "id-GostR3410-94-aBis", NID_id_GostR3410_94_aBis, 7, &so[5630]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-b", "id-GostR3410-94-b", NID_id_GostR3410_94_b, 7, &so[5637]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-bBis", "id-GostR3410-94-bBis", NID_id_GostR3410_94_bBis, 7, &so[5644]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-cc", "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc, 8, &so[5651]}, {"gost94cc", "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc, 8, &so[5659]}, {"gost2001cc", "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc, 8, &so[5667]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc, 8, &so[5675]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc, 8, &so[5683]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc", "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc, 8, &so[5691]}, {"HMAC", "hmac", NID_hmac}, {"LocalKeySet", "Microsoft Local Key set", NID_LocalKeySet, 9, &so[5699]}, {"freshestCRL", "X509v3 Freshest CRL", NID_freshest_crl, 3, &so[5708]}, {"id-on-permanentIdentifier", "Permanent Identifier", NID_id_on_permanentIdentifier, 8, &so[5711]}, {"searchGuide", "searchGuide", NID_searchGuide, 3, &so[5719]}, {"businessCategory", "businessCategory", NID_businessCategory, 3, &so[5722]}, {"postalAddress", "postalAddress", NID_postalAddress, 3, &so[5725]}, {"postOfficeBox", "postOfficeBox", NID_postOfficeBox, 3, &so[5728]}, {"physicalDeliveryOfficeName", "physicalDeliveryOfficeName", NID_physicalDeliveryOfficeName, 3, &so[5731]}, {"telephoneNumber", "telephoneNumber", NID_telephoneNumber, 3, &so[5734]}, {"telexNumber", "telexNumber", NID_telexNumber, 3, &so[5737]}, {"teletexTerminalIdentifier", "teletexTerminalIdentifier", NID_teletexTerminalIdentifier, 3, &so[5740]}, {"facsimileTelephoneNumber", "facsimileTelephoneNumber", NID_facsimileTelephoneNumber, 3, &so[5743]}, {"x121Address", "x121Address", NID_x121Address, 3, &so[5746]}, {"internationaliSDNNumber", "internationaliSDNNumber", NID_internationaliSDNNumber, 3, &so[5749]}, {"registeredAddress", "registeredAddress", NID_registeredAddress, 3, &so[5752]}, {"destinationIndicator", "destinationIndicator", NID_destinationIndicator, 3, &so[5755]}, {"preferredDeliveryMethod", "preferredDeliveryMethod", NID_preferredDeliveryMethod, 3, &so[5758]}, {"presentationAddress", "presentationAddress", NID_presentationAddress, 3, &so[5761]}, {"supportedApplicationContext", "supportedApplicationContext", NID_supportedApplicationContext, 3, &so[5764]}, {"member", "member", NID_member, 3, &so[5767]}, {"owner", "owner", NID_owner, 3, &so[5770]}, {"roleOccupant", "roleOccupant", NID_roleOccupant, 3, &so[5773]}, {"seeAlso", "seeAlso", NID_seeAlso, 3, &so[5776]}, {"userPassword", "userPassword", NID_userPassword, 3, &so[5779]}, {"userCertificate", "userCertificate", NID_userCertificate, 3, &so[5782]}, {"cACertificate", "cACertificate", NID_cACertificate, 3, &so[5785]}, {"authorityRevocationList", "authorityRevocationList", NID_authorityRevocationList, 3, &so[5788]}, {"certificateRevocationList", "certificateRevocationList", NID_certificateRevocationList, 3, &so[5791]}, {"crossCertificatePair", "crossCertificatePair", NID_crossCertificatePair, 3, &so[5794]}, {"enhancedSearchGuide", "enhancedSearchGuide", NID_enhancedSearchGuide, 3, &so[5797]}, {"protocolInformation", "protocolInformation", NID_protocolInformation, 3, &so[5800]}, {"distinguishedName", "distinguishedName", NID_distinguishedName, 3, &so[5803]}, {"uniqueMember", "uniqueMember", NID_uniqueMember, 3, &so[5806]}, {"houseIdentifier", "houseIdentifier", NID_houseIdentifier, 3, &so[5809]}, {"supportedAlgorithms", "supportedAlgorithms", NID_supportedAlgorithms, 3, &so[5812]}, {"deltaRevocationList", "deltaRevocationList", NID_deltaRevocationList, 3, &so[5815]}, {"dmdName", "dmdName", NID_dmdName, 3, &so[5818]}, {"id-alg-PWRI-KEK", "id-alg-PWRI-KEK", NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK, 11, &so[5821]}, {"CMAC", "cmac", NID_cmac}, {"id-aes128-GCM", "aes-128-gcm", NID_aes_128_gcm, 9, &so[5832]}, {"id-aes128-CCM", "aes-128-ccm", NID_aes_128_ccm, 9, &so[5841]}, {"id-aes128-wrap-pad", "id-aes128-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5850]}, {"id-aes192-GCM", "aes-192-gcm", NID_aes_192_gcm, 9, &so[5859]}, {"id-aes192-CCM", "aes-192-ccm", NID_aes_192_ccm, 9, &so[5868]}, {"id-aes192-wrap-pad", "id-aes192-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5877]}, {"id-aes256-GCM", "aes-256-gcm", NID_aes_256_gcm, 9, &so[5886]}, {"id-aes256-CCM", "aes-256-ccm", NID_aes_256_ccm, 9, &so[5895]}, {"id-aes256-wrap-pad", "id-aes256-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5904]}, {"AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr", NID_aes_128_ctr}, {"AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr", NID_aes_192_ctr}, {"AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr", NID_aes_256_ctr}, {"id-camellia128-wrap", "id-camellia128-wrap", NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 11, &so[5913]}, {"id-camellia192-wrap", "id-camellia192-wrap", NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 11, &so[5924]}, {"id-camellia256-wrap", "id-camellia256-wrap", NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 11, &so[5935]}, {"anyExtendedKeyUsage", "Any Extended Key Usage", NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, 4, &so[5946]}, {"MGF1", "mgf1", NID_mgf1, 9, &so[5950]}, {"RSASSA-PSS", "rsassaPss", NID_rsassaPss, 9, &so[5959]}, {"AES-128-XTS", "aes-128-xts", NID_aes_128_xts}, {"AES-256-XTS", "aes-256-xts", NID_aes_256_xts}, {"RC4-HMAC-MD5", "rc4-hmac-md5", NID_rc4_hmac_md5}, {"AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1}, {"AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1}, {"AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1}, {"RSAES-OAEP", "rsaesOaep", NID_rsaesOaep, 9, &so[5968]}, {"dhpublicnumber", "X9.42 DH", NID_dhpublicnumber, 7, &so[5977]}, {"brainpoolP160r1", "brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1, 9, &so[5984]}, {"brainpoolP160t1", "brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1, 9, &so[5993]}, {"brainpoolP192r1", "brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1, 9, &so[6002]}, {"brainpoolP192t1", "brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1, 9, &so[6011]}, {"brainpoolP224r1", "brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1, 9, &so[6020]}, {"brainpoolP224t1", "brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1, 9, &so[6029]}, {"brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1, 9, &so[6038]}, {"brainpoolP256t1", "brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1, 9, &so[6047]}, {"brainpoolP320r1", "brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1, 9, &so[6056]}, {"brainpoolP320t1", "brainpoolP320t1", NID_brainpoolP320t1, 9, &so[6065]}, {"brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", NID_brainpoolP384r1, 9, &so[6074]}, {"brainpoolP384t1", "brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1, 9, &so[6083]}, {"brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1, 9, &so[6092]}, {"brainpoolP512t1", "brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1, 9, &so[6101]}, {"PSPECIFIED", "pSpecified", NID_pSpecified, 9, &so[6110]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme, 9, &so[6119]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6128]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6134]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6140]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6146]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme, 9, &so[6152]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6161]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6167]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6173]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6179]}, {"dh-std-kdf", "dh-std-kdf", NID_dh_std_kdf}, {"dh-cofactor-kdf", "dh-cofactor-kdf", NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {"AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256}, {"AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256}, {"AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256}, {"ct_precert_scts", "CT Precertificate SCTs", NID_ct_precert_scts, 10, &so[6185]}, {"ct_precert_poison", "CT Precertificate Poison", NID_ct_precert_poison, 10, &so[6195]}, {"ct_precert_signer", "CT Precertificate Signer", NID_ct_precert_signer, 10, &so[6205]}, {"ct_cert_scts", "CT Certificate SCTs", NID_ct_cert_scts, 10, &so[6215]}, {"jurisdictionL", "jurisdictionLocalityName", NID_jurisdictionLocalityName, 11, &so[6225]}, {"jurisdictionST", "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName", NID_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName, 11, &so[6236]}, {"jurisdictionC", "jurisdictionCountryName", NID_jurisdictionCountryName, 11, &so[6247]}, {"AES-128-OCB", "aes-128-ocb", NID_aes_128_ocb}, {"AES-192-OCB", "aes-192-ocb", NID_aes_192_ocb}, {"AES-256-OCB", "aes-256-ocb", NID_aes_256_ocb}, {"CAMELLIA-128-GCM", "camellia-128-gcm", NID_camellia_128_gcm, 8, &so[6258]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CCM", "camellia-128-ccm", NID_camellia_128_ccm, 8, &so[6266]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CTR", "camellia-128-ctr", NID_camellia_128_ctr, 8, &so[6274]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CMAC", "camellia-128-cmac", NID_camellia_128_cmac, 8, &so[6282]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-GCM", "camellia-192-gcm", NID_camellia_192_gcm, 8, &so[6290]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CCM", "camellia-192-ccm", NID_camellia_192_ccm, 8, &so[6298]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CTR", "camellia-192-ctr", NID_camellia_192_ctr, 8, &so[6306]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CMAC", "camellia-192-cmac", NID_camellia_192_cmac, 8, &so[6314]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-GCM", "camellia-256-gcm", NID_camellia_256_gcm, 8, &so[6322]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CCM", "camellia-256-ccm", NID_camellia_256_ccm, 8, &so[6330]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CTR", "camellia-256-ctr", NID_camellia_256_ctr, 8, &so[6338]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CMAC", "camellia-256-cmac", NID_camellia_256_cmac, 8, &so[6346]}, {"id-scrypt", "id-scrypt", NID_id_scrypt, 9, &so[6354]}, {"id-tc26", "id-tc26", NID_id_tc26, 5, &so[6363]}, {"gost89-cnt-12", "gost89-cnt-12", NID_gost89_cnt_12}, {"gost-mac-12", "gost-mac-12", NID_gost_mac_12}, {"id-tc26-algorithms", "id-tc26-algorithms", NID_id_tc26_algorithms, 6, &so[6368]}, {"id-tc26-sign", "id-tc26-sign", NID_id_tc26_sign, 7, &so[6374]}, {"gost2012_256", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus", NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6381]}, {"gost2012_512", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus", NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6389]}, {"id-tc26-digest", "id-tc26-digest", NID_id_tc26_digest, 7, &so[6397]}, {"md_gost12_256", "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash", NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 8, &so[6404]}, {"md_gost12_512", "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash", NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 8, &so[6412]}, {"id-tc26-signwithdigest", "id-tc26-signwithdigest", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest, 7, &so[6420]}, {"id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6427]}, {"id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6435]}, {"id-tc26-mac", "id-tc26-mac", NID_id_tc26_mac, 7, &so[6443]}, {"id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256", "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit", NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256, 8, &so[6450]}, {"id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512", "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit", NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512, 8, &so[6458]}, {"id-tc26-cipher", "id-tc26-cipher", NID_id_tc26_cipher, 7, &so[6466]}, {"id-tc26-agreement", "id-tc26-agreement", NID_id_tc26_agreement, 7, &so[6473]}, {"id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256", "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256", NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6480]}, {"id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512", "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512", NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6488]}, {"id-tc26-constants", "id-tc26-constants", NID_id_tc26_constants, 6, &so[6496]}, {"id-tc26-sign-constants", "id-tc26-sign-constants", NID_id_tc26_sign_constants, 7, &so[6502]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants", "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants, 8, &so[6509]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest, 9, &so[6517]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 9, &so[6526]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 9, &so[6535]}, {"id-tc26-digest-constants", "id-tc26-digest-constants", NID_id_tc26_digest_constants, 7, &so[6544]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-constants", "id-tc26-cipher-constants", NID_id_tc26_cipher_constants, 7, &so[6551]}, {"id-tc26-gost-28147-constants", "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants", NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants, 8, &so[6558]}, {"id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z", "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set", NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z, 9, &so[6566]}, {"INN", "INN", NID_INN, 8, &so[6575]}, {"OGRN", "OGRN", NID_OGRN, 5, &so[6583]}, {"SNILS", "SNILS", NID_SNILS, 5, &so[6588]}, {"subjectSignTool", "Signing Tool of Subject", NID_subjectSignTool, 5, &so[6593]}, {"issuerSignTool", "Signing Tool of Issuer", NID_issuerSignTool, 5, &so[6598]}, {"gost89-cbc", "gost89-cbc", NID_gost89_cbc}, {"gost89-ecb", "gost89-ecb", NID_gost89_ecb}, {"gost89-ctr", "gost89-ctr", NID_gost89_ctr}, {"grasshopper-ecb", "grasshopper-ecb", NID_grasshopper_ecb}, {"grasshopper-ctr", "grasshopper-ctr", NID_grasshopper_ctr}, {"grasshopper-ofb", "grasshopper-ofb", NID_grasshopper_ofb}, {"grasshopper-cbc", "grasshopper-cbc", NID_grasshopper_cbc}, {"grasshopper-cfb", "grasshopper-cfb", NID_grasshopper_cfb}, {"grasshopper-mac", "grasshopper-mac", NID_grasshopper_mac}, {"ChaCha20-Poly1305", "chacha20-poly1305", NID_chacha20_poly1305}, {"ChaCha20", "chacha20", NID_chacha20}, {"tlsfeature", "TLS Feature", NID_tlsfeature, 8, &so[6603]}, {"TLS1-PRF", "tls1-prf", NID_tls1_prf}, {"ipsecIKE", "ipsec Internet Key Exchange", NID_ipsec_IKE, 8, &so[6611]}, {"capwapAC", "Ctrl/provision WAP Access", NID_capwapAC, 8, &so[6619]}, {"capwapWTP", "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination", NID_capwapWTP, 8, &so[6627]}, {"secureShellClient", "SSH Client", NID_sshClient, 8, &so[6635]}, {"secureShellServer", "SSH Server", NID_sshServer, 8, &so[6643]}, {"sendRouter", "Send Router", NID_sendRouter, 8, &so[6651]}, {"sendProxiedRouter", "Send Proxied Router", NID_sendProxiedRouter, 8, &so[6659]}, {"sendOwner", "Send Owner", NID_sendOwner, 8, &so[6667]}, {"sendProxiedOwner", "Send Proxied Owner", NID_sendProxiedOwner, 8, &so[6675]}, {"id-pkinit", "id-pkinit", NID_id_pkinit, 6, &so[6683]}, {"pkInitClientAuth", "PKINIT Client Auth", NID_pkInitClientAuth, 7, &so[6689]}, {"pkInitKDC", "Signing KDC Response", NID_pkInitKDC, 7, &so[6696]}, {"X25519", "X25519", NID_X25519, 3, &so[6703]}, {"X448", "X448", NID_X448, 3, &so[6706]}, {"HKDF", "hkdf", NID_hkdf}, {"KxRSA", "kx-rsa", NID_kx_rsa}, {"KxECDHE", "kx-ecdhe", NID_kx_ecdhe}, {"KxDHE", "kx-dhe", NID_kx_dhe}, {"KxECDHE-PSK", "kx-ecdhe-psk", NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, {"KxDHE-PSK", "kx-dhe-psk", NID_kx_dhe_psk}, {"KxRSA_PSK", "kx-rsa-psk", NID_kx_rsa_psk}, {"KxPSK", "kx-psk", NID_kx_psk}, {"KxSRP", "kx-srp", NID_kx_srp}, {"KxGOST", "kx-gost", NID_kx_gost}, {"AuthRSA", "auth-rsa", NID_auth_rsa}, {"AuthECDSA", "auth-ecdsa", NID_auth_ecdsa}, {"AuthPSK", "auth-psk", NID_auth_psk}, {"AuthDSS", "auth-dss", NID_auth_dss}, {"AuthGOST01", "auth-gost01", NID_auth_gost01}, {"AuthGOST12", "auth-gost12", NID_auth_gost12}, {"AuthSRP", "auth-srp", NID_auth_srp}, {"AuthNULL", "auth-null", NID_auth_null}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"BLAKE2b512", "blake2b512", NID_blake2b512, 11, &so[6709]}, {"BLAKE2s256", "blake2s256", NID_blake2s256, 11, &so[6720]}, {"id-smime-ct-contentCollection", "id-smime-ct-contentCollection", NID_id_smime_ct_contentCollection, 11, &so[6731]}, {"id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData", "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData", NID_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData, 11, &so[6742]}, {"id-ct-xml", "id-ct-xml", NID_id_ct_xml, 11, &so[6753]}, }; #define NUM_SN 1052 static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = { 364, /* "AD_DVCS" */ 419, /* "AES-128-CBC" */ 916, /* "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */ 948, /* "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */ 421, /* "AES-128-CFB" */ 650, /* "AES-128-CFB1" */ 653, /* "AES-128-CFB8" */ 904, /* "AES-128-CTR" */ 418, /* "AES-128-ECB" */ 958, /* "AES-128-OCB" */ 420, /* "AES-128-OFB" */ 913, /* "AES-128-XTS" */ 423, /* "AES-192-CBC" */ 917, /* "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */ 949, /* "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */ 425, /* "AES-192-CFB" */ 651, /* "AES-192-CFB1" */ 654, /* "AES-192-CFB8" */ 905, /* "AES-192-CTR" */ 422, /* "AES-192-ECB" */ 959, /* "AES-192-OCB" */ 424, /* "AES-192-OFB" */ 427, /* "AES-256-CBC" */ 918, /* "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */ 950, /* "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */ 429, /* "AES-256-CFB" */ 652, /* "AES-256-CFB1" */ 655, /* "AES-256-CFB8" */ 906, /* "AES-256-CTR" */ 426, /* "AES-256-ECB" */ 960, /* "AES-256-OCB" */ 428, /* "AES-256-OFB" */ 914, /* "AES-256-XTS" */ 1049, /* "AuthDSS" */ 1047, /* "AuthECDSA" */ 1050, /* "AuthGOST01" */ 1051, /* "AuthGOST12" */ 1053, /* "AuthNULL" */ 1048, /* "AuthPSK" */ 1046, /* "AuthRSA" */ 1052, /* "AuthSRP" */ 91, /* "BF-CBC" */ 93, /* "BF-CFB" */ 92, /* "BF-ECB" */ 94, /* "BF-OFB" */ 1056, /* "BLAKE2b512" */ 1057, /* "BLAKE2s256" */ 14, /* "C" */ 751, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CBC" */ 962, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CCM" */ 757, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB" */ 760, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB1" */ 763, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB8" */ 964, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CMAC" */ 963, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CTR" */ 754, /* "CAMELLIA-128-ECB" */ 961, /* "CAMELLIA-128-GCM" */ 766, /* "CAMELLIA-128-OFB" */ 752, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CBC" */ 966, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CCM" */ 758, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB" */ 761, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB1" */ 764, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB8" */ 968, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CMAC" */ 967, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CTR" */ 755, /* "CAMELLIA-192-ECB" */ 965, /* "CAMELLIA-192-GCM" */ 767, /* "CAMELLIA-192-OFB" */ 753, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CBC" */ 970, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CCM" */ 759, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB" */ 762, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB1" */ 765, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB8" */ 972, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CMAC" */ 971, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CTR" */ 756, /* "CAMELLIA-256-ECB" */ 969, /* "CAMELLIA-256-GCM" */ 768, /* "CAMELLIA-256-OFB" */ 108, /* "CAST5-CBC" */ 110, /* "CAST5-CFB" */ 109, /* "CAST5-ECB" */ 111, /* "CAST5-OFB" */ 894, /* "CMAC" */ 13, /* "CN" */ 141, /* "CRLReason" */ 417, /* "CSPName" */ 1019, /* "ChaCha20" */ 1018, /* "ChaCha20-Poly1305" */ 367, /* "CrlID" */ 391, /* "DC" */ 31, /* "DES-CBC" */ 643, /* "DES-CDMF" */ 30, /* "DES-CFB" */ 656, /* "DES-CFB1" */ 657, /* "DES-CFB8" */ 29, /* "DES-ECB" */ 32, /* "DES-EDE" */ 43, /* "DES-EDE-CBC" */ 60, /* "DES-EDE-CFB" */ 62, /* "DES-EDE-OFB" */ 33, /* "DES-EDE3" */ 44, /* "DES-EDE3-CBC" */ 61, /* "DES-EDE3-CFB" */ 658, /* "DES-EDE3-CFB1" */ 659, /* "DES-EDE3-CFB8" */ 63, /* "DES-EDE3-OFB" */ 45, /* "DES-OFB" */ 80, /* "DESX-CBC" */ 380, /* "DOD" */ 116, /* "DSA" */ 66, /* "DSA-SHA" */ 113, /* "DSA-SHA1" */ 70, /* "DSA-SHA1-old" */ 67, /* "DSA-old" */ 297, /* "DVCS" */ 99, /* "GN" */ 1036, /* "HKDF" */ 855, /* "HMAC" */ 780, /* "HMAC-MD5" */ 781, /* "HMAC-SHA1" */ 381, /* "IANA" */ 34, /* "IDEA-CBC" */ 35, /* "IDEA-CFB" */ 36, /* "IDEA-ECB" */ 46, /* "IDEA-OFB" */ 1004, /* "INN" */ 181, /* "ISO" */ 183, /* "ISO-US" */ 645, /* "ITU-T" */ 646, /* "JOINT-ISO-ITU-T" */ 773, /* "KISA" */ 1039, /* "KxDHE" */ 1041, /* "KxDHE-PSK" */ 1038, /* "KxECDHE" */ 1040, /* "KxECDHE-PSK" */ 1045, /* "KxGOST" */ 1043, /* "KxPSK" */ 1037, /* "KxRSA" */ 1042, /* "KxRSA_PSK" */ 1044, /* "KxSRP" */ 15, /* "L" */ 856, /* "LocalKeySet" */ 3, /* "MD2" */ 257, /* "MD4" */ 4, /* "MD5" */ 114, /* "MD5-SHA1" */ 95, /* "MDC2" */ 911, /* "MGF1" */ 388, /* "Mail" */ 393, /* "NULL" */ 404, /* "NULL" */ 57, /* "Netscape" */ 366, /* "Nonce" */ 17, /* "O" */ 178, /* "OCSP" */ 180, /* "OCSPSigning" */ 1005, /* "OGRN" */ 379, /* "ORG" */ 18, /* "OU" */ 749, /* "Oakley-EC2N-3" */ 750, /* "Oakley-EC2N-4" */ 9, /* "PBE-MD2-DES" */ 168, /* "PBE-MD2-RC2-64" */ 10, /* "PBE-MD5-DES" */ 169, /* "PBE-MD5-RC2-64" */ 147, /* "PBE-SHA1-2DES" */ 146, /* "PBE-SHA1-3DES" */ 170, /* "PBE-SHA1-DES" */ 148, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128" */ 149, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40" */ 68, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64" */ 144, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128" */ 145, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40" */ 161, /* "PBES2" */ 69, /* "PBKDF2" */ 162, /* "PBMAC1" */ 127, /* "PKIX" */ 935, /* "PSPECIFIED" */ 98, /* "RC2-40-CBC" */ 166, /* "RC2-64-CBC" */ 37, /* "RC2-CBC" */ 39, /* "RC2-CFB" */ 38, /* "RC2-ECB" */ 40, /* "RC2-OFB" */ 5, /* "RC4" */ 97, /* "RC4-40" */ 915, /* "RC4-HMAC-MD5" */ 120, /* "RC5-CBC" */ 122, /* "RC5-CFB" */ 121, /* "RC5-ECB" */ 123, /* "RC5-OFB" */ 117, /* "RIPEMD160" */ 19, /* "RSA" */ 7, /* "RSA-MD2" */ 396, /* "RSA-MD4" */ 8, /* "RSA-MD5" */ 96, /* "RSA-MDC2" */ 104, /* "RSA-NP-MD5" */ 119, /* "RSA-RIPEMD160" */ 42, /* "RSA-SHA" */ 65, /* "RSA-SHA1" */ 115, /* "RSA-SHA1-2" */ 671, /* "RSA-SHA224" */ 668, /* "RSA-SHA256" */ 669, /* "RSA-SHA384" */ 670, /* "RSA-SHA512" */ 919, /* "RSAES-OAEP" */ 912, /* "RSASSA-PSS" */ 777, /* "SEED-CBC" */ 779, /* "SEED-CFB" */ 776, /* "SEED-ECB" */ 778, /* "SEED-OFB" */ 41, /* "SHA" */ 64, /* "SHA1" */ 675, /* "SHA224" */ 672, /* "SHA256" */ 673, /* "SHA384" */ 674, /* "SHA512" */ 188, /* "SMIME" */ 167, /* "SMIME-CAPS" */ 100, /* "SN" */ 1006, /* "SNILS" */ 16, /* "ST" */ 143, /* "SXNetID" */ 1021, /* "TLS1-PRF" */ 458, /* "UID" */ 0, /* "UNDEF" */ 1034, /* "X25519" */ 1035, /* "X448" */ 11, /* "X500" */ 378, /* "X500algorithms" */ 12, /* "X509" */ 184, /* "X9-57" */ 185, /* "X9cm" */ 125, /* "ZLIB" */ 478, /* "aRecord" */ 289, /* "aaControls" */ 287, /* "ac-auditEntity" */ 397, /* "ac-proxying" */ 288, /* "ac-targeting" */ 368, /* "acceptableResponses" */ 446, /* "account" */ 363, /* "ad_timestamping" */ 376, /* "algorithm" */ 405, /* "ansi-X9-62" */ 910, /* "anyExtendedKeyUsage" */ 746, /* "anyPolicy" */ 370, /* "archiveCutoff" */ 484, /* "associatedDomain" */ 485, /* "associatedName" */ 501, /* "audio" */ 177, /* "authorityInfoAccess" */ 90, /* "authorityKeyIdentifier" */ 882, /* "authorityRevocationList" */ 87, /* "basicConstraints" */ 365, /* "basicOCSPResponse" */ 285, /* "biometricInfo" */ 921, /* "brainpoolP160r1" */ 922, /* "brainpoolP160t1" */ 923, /* "brainpoolP192r1" */ 924, /* "brainpoolP192t1" */ 925, /* "brainpoolP224r1" */ 926, /* "brainpoolP224t1" */ 927, /* "brainpoolP256r1" */ 928, /* "brainpoolP256t1" */ 929, /* "brainpoolP320r1" */ 930, /* "brainpoolP320t1" */ 931, /* "brainpoolP384r1" */ 932, /* "brainpoolP384t1" */ 933, /* "brainpoolP512r1" */ 934, /* "brainpoolP512t1" */ 494, /* "buildingName" */ 860, /* "businessCategory" */ 691, /* "c2onb191v4" */ 692, /* "c2onb191v5" */ 697, /* "c2onb239v4" */ 698, /* "c2onb239v5" */ 684, /* "c2pnb163v1" */ 685, /* "c2pnb163v2" */ 686, /* "c2pnb163v3" */ 687, /* "c2pnb176v1" */ 693, /* "c2pnb208w1" */ 699, /* "c2pnb272w1" */ 700, /* "c2pnb304w1" */ 702, /* "c2pnb368w1" */ 688, /* "c2tnb191v1" */ 689, /* "c2tnb191v2" */ 690, /* "c2tnb191v3" */ 694, /* "c2tnb239v1" */ 695, /* "c2tnb239v2" */ 696, /* "c2tnb239v3" */ 701, /* "c2tnb359v1" */ 703, /* "c2tnb431r1" */ 881, /* "cACertificate" */ 483, /* "cNAMERecord" */ 179, /* "caIssuers" */ 785, /* "caRepository" */ 1023, /* "capwapAC" */ 1024, /* "capwapWTP" */ 443, /* "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" */ 152, /* "certBag" */ 677, /* "certicom-arc" */ 771, /* "certificateIssuer" */ 89, /* "certificatePolicies" */ 883, /* "certificateRevocationList" */ 54, /* "challengePassword" */ 407, /* "characteristic-two-field" */ 395, /* "clearance" */ 130, /* "clientAuth" */ 131, /* "codeSigning" */ 50, /* "contentType" */ 53, /* "countersignature" */ 153, /* "crlBag" */ 103, /* "crlDistributionPoints" */ 88, /* "crlNumber" */ 884, /* "crossCertificatePair" */ 806, /* "cryptocom" */ 805, /* "cryptopro" */ 954, /* "ct_cert_scts" */ 952, /* "ct_precert_poison" */ 951, /* "ct_precert_scts" */ 953, /* "ct_precert_signer" */ 500, /* "dITRedirect" */ 451, /* "dNSDomain" */ 495, /* "dSAQuality" */ 434, /* "data" */ 390, /* "dcobject" */ 140, /* "deltaCRL" */ 891, /* "deltaRevocationList" */ 107, /* "description" */ 871, /* "destinationIndicator" */ 947, /* "dh-cofactor-kdf" */ 946, /* "dh-std-kdf" */ 28, /* "dhKeyAgreement" */ 941, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 942, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 943, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 944, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 945, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 936, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 937, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 938, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 939, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 940, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 920, /* "dhpublicnumber" */ 382, /* "directory" */ 887, /* "distinguishedName" */ 892, /* "dmdName" */ 174, /* "dnQualifier" */ 447, /* "document" */ 471, /* "documentAuthor" */ 468, /* "documentIdentifier" */ 472, /* "documentLocation" */ 502, /* "documentPublisher" */ 449, /* "documentSeries" */ 469, /* "documentTitle" */ 470, /* "documentVersion" */ 392, /* "domain" */ 452, /* "domainRelatedObject" */ 802, /* "dsa_with_SHA224" */ 803, /* "dsa_with_SHA256" */ 791, /* "ecdsa-with-Recommended" */ 416, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA1" */ 793, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA224" */ 794, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA256" */ 795, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA384" */ 796, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA512" */ 792, /* "ecdsa-with-Specified" */ 48, /* "emailAddress" */ 132, /* "emailProtection" */ 885, /* "enhancedSearchGuide" */ 389, /* "enterprises" */ 384, /* "experimental" */ 172, /* "extReq" */ 56, /* "extendedCertificateAttributes" */ 126, /* "extendedKeyUsage" */ 372, /* "extendedStatus" */ 867, /* "facsimileTelephoneNumber" */ 462, /* "favouriteDrink" */ 857, /* "freshestCRL" */ 453, /* "friendlyCountry" */ 490, /* "friendlyCountryName" */ 156, /* "friendlyName" */ 509, /* "generationQualifier" */ 815, /* "gost-mac" */ 976, /* "gost-mac-12" */ 811, /* "gost2001" */ 851, /* "gost2001cc" */ 979, /* "gost2012_256" */ 980, /* "gost2012_512" */ 813, /* "gost89" */ 1009, /* "gost89-cbc" */ 814, /* "gost89-cnt" */ 975, /* "gost89-cnt-12" */ 1011, /* "gost89-ctr" */ 1010, /* "gost89-ecb" */ 812, /* "gost94" */ 850, /* "gost94cc" */ 1015, /* "grasshopper-cbc" */ 1016, /* "grasshopper-cfb" */ 1013, /* "grasshopper-ctr" */ 1012, /* "grasshopper-ecb" */ 1017, /* "grasshopper-mac" */ 1014, /* "grasshopper-ofb" */ 797, /* "hmacWithMD5" */ 163, /* "hmacWithSHA1" */ 798, /* "hmacWithSHA224" */ 799, /* "hmacWithSHA256" */ 800, /* "hmacWithSHA384" */ 801, /* "hmacWithSHA512" */ 432, /* "holdInstructionCallIssuer" */ 430, /* "holdInstructionCode" */ 431, /* "holdInstructionNone" */ 433, /* "holdInstructionReject" */ 486, /* "homePostalAddress" */ 473, /* "homeTelephoneNumber" */ 466, /* "host" */ 889, /* "houseIdentifier" */ 442, /* "iA5StringSyntax" */ 783, /* "id-DHBasedMac" */ 824, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 825, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 826, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 827, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 819, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" */ 829, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" */ 828, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" */ 830, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" */ 820, /* "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" */ 823, /* "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" */ 849, /* "id-Gost28147-89-cc" */ 840, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 841, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 842, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 843, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 844, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 854, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc" */ 839, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" */ 817, /* "id-GostR3410-2001DH" */ 832, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 833, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 834, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 835, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 836, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 837, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 838, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" */ 831, /* "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" */ 845, /* "id-GostR3410-94-a" */ 846, /* "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" */ 847, /* "id-GostR3410-94-b" */ 848, /* "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" */ 818, /* "id-GostR3410-94DH" */ 822, /* "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" */ 821, /* "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" */ 807, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001" */ 853, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc" */ 808, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94" */ 852, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc" */ 810, /* "id-HMACGostR3411-94" */ 782, /* "id-PasswordBasedMAC" */ 266, /* "id-aca" */ 355, /* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */ 354, /* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */ 356, /* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */ 399, /* "id-aca-encAttrs" */ 357, /* "id-aca-group" */ 358, /* "id-aca-role" */ 176, /* "id-ad" */ 896, /* "id-aes128-CCM" */ 895, /* "id-aes128-GCM" */ 788, /* "id-aes128-wrap" */ 897, /* "id-aes128-wrap-pad" */ 899, /* "id-aes192-CCM" */ 898, /* "id-aes192-GCM" */ 789, /* "id-aes192-wrap" */ 900, /* "id-aes192-wrap-pad" */ 902, /* "id-aes256-CCM" */ 901, /* "id-aes256-GCM" */ 790, /* "id-aes256-wrap" */ 903, /* "id-aes256-wrap-pad" */ 262, /* "id-alg" */ 893, /* "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" */ 323, /* "id-alg-des40" */ 326, /* "id-alg-dh-pop" */ 325, /* "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" */ 324, /* "id-alg-noSignature" */ 907, /* "id-camellia128-wrap" */ 908, /* "id-camellia192-wrap" */ 909, /* "id-camellia256-wrap" */ 268, /* "id-cct" */ 361, /* "id-cct-PKIData" */ 362, /* "id-cct-PKIResponse" */ 360, /* "id-cct-crs" */ 81, /* "id-ce" */ 680, /* "id-characteristic-two-basis" */ 263, /* "id-cmc" */ 334, /* "id-cmc-addExtensions" */ 346, /* "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" */ 330, /* "id-cmc-dataReturn" */ 336, /* "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" */ 335, /* "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" */ 339, /* "id-cmc-getCRL" */ 338, /* "id-cmc-getCert" */ 328, /* "id-cmc-identification" */ 329, /* "id-cmc-identityProof" */ 337, /* "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" */ 344, /* "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" */ 345, /* "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" */ 343, /* "id-cmc-queryPending" */ 333, /* "id-cmc-recipientNonce" */ 341, /* "id-cmc-regInfo" */ 342, /* "id-cmc-responseInfo" */ 340, /* "id-cmc-revokeRequest" */ 332, /* "id-cmc-senderNonce" */ 327, /* "id-cmc-statusInfo" */ 331, /* "id-cmc-transactionId" */ 787, /* "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" */ 1060, /* "id-ct-xml" */ 408, /* "id-ecPublicKey" */ 508, /* "id-hex-multipart-message" */ 507, /* "id-hex-partial-message" */ 260, /* "id-it" */ 302, /* "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" */ 298, /* "id-it-caProtEncCert" */ 311, /* "id-it-confirmWaitTime" */ 303, /* "id-it-currentCRL" */ 300, /* "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" */ 310, /* "id-it-implicitConfirm" */ 308, /* "id-it-keyPairParamRep" */ 307, /* "id-it-keyPairParamReq" */ 312, /* "id-it-origPKIMessage" */ 301, /* "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" */ 309, /* "id-it-revPassphrase" */ 299, /* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */ 305, /* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */ 306, /* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */ 784, /* "id-it-suppLangTags" */ 304, /* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */ 128, /* "id-kp" */ 280, /* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */ 274, /* "id-mod-cmc" */ 277, /* "id-mod-cmp" */ 284, /* "id-mod-cmp2000" */ 273, /* "id-mod-crmf" */ 283, /* "id-mod-dvcs" */ 275, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-88" */ 276, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-93" */ 282, /* "id-mod-ocsp" */ 278, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" */ 279, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" */ 281, /* "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" */ 264, /* "id-on" */ 858, /* "id-on-permanentIdentifier" */ 347, /* "id-on-personalData" */ 265, /* "id-pda" */ 352, /* "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" */ 353, /* "id-pda-countryOfResidence" */ 348, /* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */ 351, /* "id-pda-gender" */ 349, /* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */ 175, /* "id-pe" */ 1031, /* "id-pkinit" */ 261, /* "id-pkip" */ 258, /* "id-pkix-mod" */ 269, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-88" */ 271, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-93" */ 270, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-88" */ 272, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-93" */ 662, /* "id-ppl" */ 664, /* "id-ppl-anyLanguage" */ 667, /* "id-ppl-independent" */ 665, /* "id-ppl-inheritAll" */ 267, /* "id-qcs" */ 359, /* "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" */ 259, /* "id-qt" */ 164, /* "id-qt-cps" */ 165, /* "id-qt-unotice" */ 313, /* "id-regCtrl" */ 316, /* "id-regCtrl-authenticator" */ 319, /* "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" */ 318, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" */ 317, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" */ 320, /* "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" */ 315, /* "id-regCtrl-regToken" */ 314, /* "id-regInfo" */ 322, /* "id-regInfo-certReq" */ 321, /* "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" */ 973, /* "id-scrypt" */ 512, /* "id-set" */ 191, /* "id-smime-aa" */ 215, /* "id-smime-aa-contentHint" */ 218, /* "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" */ 221, /* "id-smime-aa-contentReference" */ 240, /* "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" */ 217, /* "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" */ 222, /* "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" */ 220, /* "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" */ 232, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" */ 233, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" */ 238, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" */ 237, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" */ 234, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" */ 227, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" */ 231, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" */ 236, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" */ 230, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" */ 235, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" */ 226, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" */ 229, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" */ 228, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" */ 219, /* "id-smime-aa-macValue" */ 214, /* "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" */ 216, /* "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" */ 212, /* "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" */ 213, /* "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" */ 239, /* "id-smime-aa-signatureType" */ 223, /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" */ 224, /* "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" */ 225, /* "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" */ 192, /* "id-smime-alg" */ 243, /* "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" */ 246, /* "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" */ 247, /* "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" */ 245, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDH" */ 241, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" */ 242, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" */ 244, /* "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" */ 193, /* "id-smime-cd" */ 248, /* "id-smime-cd-ldap" */ 190, /* "id-smime-ct" */ 210, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" */ 211, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" */ 208, /* "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" */ 207, /* "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" */ 205, /* "id-smime-ct-authData" */ 1059, /* "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" */ 786, /* "id-smime-ct-compressedData" */ 1058, /* "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" */ 209, /* "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" */ 206, /* "id-smime-ct-publishCert" */ 204, /* "id-smime-ct-receipt" */ 195, /* "id-smime-cti" */ 255, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" */ 256, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" */ 253, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" */ 251, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" */ 252, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" */ 254, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" */ 189, /* "id-smime-mod" */ 196, /* "id-smime-mod-cms" */ 197, /* "id-smime-mod-ess" */ 202, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" */ 203, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" */ 200, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" */ 201, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */ 199, /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */ 198, /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */ 194, /* "id-smime-spq" */ 250, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */ 249, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */ 974, /* "id-tc26" */ 991, /* "id-tc26-agreement" */ 992, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" */ 993, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" */ 977, /* "id-tc26-algorithms" */ 990, /* "id-tc26-cipher" */ 1001, /* "id-tc26-cipher-constants" */ 994, /* "id-tc26-constants" */ 981, /* "id-tc26-digest" */ 1000, /* "id-tc26-digest-constants" */ 1002, /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" */ 1003, /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z" */ 996, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" */ 998, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA" */ 999, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB" */ 997, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest" */ 988, /* "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256" */ 989, /* "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512" */ 987, /* "id-tc26-mac" */ 978, /* "id-tc26-sign" */ 995, /* "id-tc26-sign-constants" */ 984, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest" */ 985, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256" */ 986, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512" */ 676, /* "identified-organization" */ 461, /* "info" */ 748, /* "inhibitAnyPolicy" */ 101, /* "initials" */ 647, /* "international-organizations" */ 869, /* "internationaliSDNNumber" */ 142, /* "invalidityDate" */ 294, /* "ipsecEndSystem" */ 1022, /* "ipsecIKE" */ 295, /* "ipsecTunnel" */ 296, /* "ipsecUser" */ 86, /* "issuerAltName" */ 1008, /* "issuerSignTool" */ 770, /* "issuingDistributionPoint" */ 492, /* "janetMailbox" */ 957, /* "jurisdictionC" */ 955, /* "jurisdictionL" */ 956, /* "jurisdictionST" */ 150, /* "keyBag" */ 83, /* "keyUsage" */ 477, /* "lastModifiedBy" */ 476, /* "lastModifiedTime" */ 157, /* "localKeyID" */ 480, /* "mXRecord" */ 460, /* "mail" */ 493, /* "mailPreferenceOption" */ 467, /* "manager" */ 982, /* "md_gost12_256" */ 983, /* "md_gost12_512" */ 809, /* "md_gost94" */ 875, /* "member" */ 182, /* "member-body" */ 51, /* "messageDigest" */ 383, /* "mgmt" */ 504, /* "mime-mhs" */ 506, /* "mime-mhs-bodies" */ 505, /* "mime-mhs-headings" */ 488, /* "mobileTelephoneNumber" */ 136, /* "msCTLSign" */ 135, /* "msCodeCom" */ 134, /* "msCodeInd" */ 138, /* "msEFS" */ 171, /* "msExtReq" */ 137, /* "msSGC" */ 648, /* "msSmartcardLogin" */ 649, /* "msUPN" */ 481, /* "nSRecord" */ 173, /* "name" */ 666, /* "nameConstraints" */ 369, /* "noCheck" */ 403, /* "noRevAvail" */ 72, /* "nsBaseUrl" */ 76, /* "nsCaPolicyUrl" */ 74, /* "nsCaRevocationUrl" */ 58, /* "nsCertExt" */ 79, /* "nsCertSequence" */ 71, /* "nsCertType" */ 78, /* "nsComment" */ 59, /* "nsDataType" */ 75, /* "nsRenewalUrl" */ 73, /* "nsRevocationUrl" */ 139, /* "nsSGC" */ 77, /* "nsSslServerName" */ 681, /* "onBasis" */ 491, /* "organizationalStatus" */ 475, /* "otherMailbox" */ 876, /* "owner" */ 489, /* "pagerTelephoneNumber" */ 374, /* "path" */ 112, /* "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" */ 499, /* "personalSignature" */ 487, /* "personalTitle" */ 464, /* "photo" */ 863, /* "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" */ 437, /* "pilot" */ 439, /* "pilotAttributeSyntax" */ 438, /* "pilotAttributeType" */ 479, /* "pilotAttributeType27" */ 456, /* "pilotDSA" */ 441, /* "pilotGroups" */ 444, /* "pilotObject" */ 440, /* "pilotObjectClass" */ 455, /* "pilotOrganization" */ 445, /* "pilotPerson" */ 1032, /* "pkInitClientAuth" */ 1033, /* "pkInitKDC" */ 2, /* "pkcs" */ 186, /* "pkcs1" */ 27, /* "pkcs3" */ 187, /* "pkcs5" */ 20, /* "pkcs7" */ 21, /* "pkcs7-data" */ 25, /* "pkcs7-digestData" */ 26, /* "pkcs7-encryptedData" */ 23, /* "pkcs7-envelopedData" */ 24, /* "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" */ 22, /* "pkcs7-signedData" */ 151, /* "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" */ 47, /* "pkcs9" */ 401, /* "policyConstraints" */ 747, /* "policyMappings" */ 862, /* "postOfficeBox" */ 861, /* "postalAddress" */ 661, /* "postalCode" */ 683, /* "ppBasis" */ 872, /* "preferredDeliveryMethod" */ 873, /* "presentationAddress" */ 816, /* "prf-gostr3411-94" */ 406, /* "prime-field" */ 409, /* "prime192v1" */ 410, /* "prime192v2" */ 411, /* "prime192v3" */ 412, /* "prime239v1" */ 413, /* "prime239v2" */ 414, /* "prime239v3" */ 415, /* "prime256v1" */ 385, /* "private" */ 84, /* "privateKeyUsagePeriod" */ 886, /* "protocolInformation" */ 663, /* "proxyCertInfo" */ 510, /* "pseudonym" */ 435, /* "pss" */ 286, /* "qcStatements" */ 457, /* "qualityLabelledData" */ 450, /* "rFC822localPart" */ 870, /* "registeredAddress" */ 400, /* "role" */ 877, /* "roleOccupant" */ 448, /* "room" */ 463, /* "roomNumber" */ 6, /* "rsaEncryption" */ 644, /* "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" */ 377, /* "rsaSignature" */ 1, /* "rsadsi" */ 482, /* "sOARecord" */ 155, /* "safeContentsBag" */ 291, /* "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" */ 290, /* "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" */ 292, /* "sbgp-routerIdentifier" */ 159, /* "sdsiCertificate" */ 859, /* "searchGuide" */ 704, /* "secp112r1" */ 705, /* "secp112r2" */ 706, /* "secp128r1" */ 707, /* "secp128r2" */ 708, /* "secp160k1" */ 709, /* "secp160r1" */ 710, /* "secp160r2" */ 711, /* "secp192k1" */ 712, /* "secp224k1" */ 713, /* "secp224r1" */ 714, /* "secp256k1" */ 715, /* "secp384r1" */ 716, /* "secp521r1" */ 154, /* "secretBag" */ 474, /* "secretary" */ 717, /* "sect113r1" */ 718, /* "sect113r2" */ 719, /* "sect131r1" */ 720, /* "sect131r2" */ 721, /* "sect163k1" */ 722, /* "sect163r1" */ 723, /* "sect163r2" */ 724, /* "sect193r1" */ 725, /* "sect193r2" */ 726, /* "sect233k1" */ 727, /* "sect233r1" */ 728, /* "sect239k1" */ 729, /* "sect283k1" */ 730, /* "sect283r1" */ 731, /* "sect409k1" */ 732, /* "sect409r1" */ 733, /* "sect571k1" */ 734, /* "sect571r1" */ 1025, /* "secureShellClient" */ 1026, /* "secureShellServer" */ 386, /* "security" */ 878, /* "seeAlso" */ 394, /* "selected-attribute-types" */ 1029, /* "sendOwner" */ 1030, /* "sendProxiedOwner" */ 1028, /* "sendProxiedRouter" */ 1027, /* "sendRouter" */ 105, /* "serialNumber" */ 129, /* "serverAuth" */ 371, /* "serviceLocator" */ 625, /* "set-addPolicy" */ 515, /* "set-attr" */ 518, /* "set-brand" */ 638, /* "set-brand-AmericanExpress" */ 637, /* "set-brand-Diners" */ 636, /* "set-brand-IATA-ATA" */ 639, /* "set-brand-JCB" */ 641, /* "set-brand-MasterCard" */ 642, /* "set-brand-Novus" */ 640, /* "set-brand-Visa" */ 517, /* "set-certExt" */ 513, /* "set-ctype" */ 514, /* "set-msgExt" */ 516, /* "set-policy" */ 607, /* "set-policy-root" */ 624, /* "set-rootKeyThumb" */ 620, /* "setAttr-Cert" */ 631, /* "setAttr-GenCryptgrm" */ 623, /* "setAttr-IssCap" */ 628, /* "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" */ 630, /* "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" */ 629, /* "setAttr-IssCap-T2" */ 621, /* "setAttr-PGWYcap" */ 635, /* "setAttr-SecDevSig" */ 632, /* "setAttr-T2Enc" */ 633, /* "setAttr-T2cleartxt" */ 634, /* "setAttr-TokICCsig" */ 627, /* "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" */ 626, /* "setAttr-Token-EMV" */ 622, /* "setAttr-TokenType" */ 619, /* "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" */ 615, /* "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" */ 616, /* "setCext-TokenIdentifier" */ 618, /* "setCext-TokenType" */ 617, /* "setCext-Track2Data" */ 611, /* "setCext-cCertRequired" */ 609, /* "setCext-certType" */ 608, /* "setCext-hashedRoot" */ 610, /* "setCext-merchData" */ 613, /* "setCext-setExt" */ 614, /* "setCext-setQualf" */ 612, /* "setCext-tunneling" */ 540, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" */ 576, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" */ 570, /* "setct-AuthReqTBE" */ 534, /* "setct-AuthReqTBS" */ 527, /* "setct-AuthResBaggage" */ 571, /* "setct-AuthResTBE" */ 572, /* "setct-AuthResTBEX" */ 535, /* "setct-AuthResTBS" */ 536, /* "setct-AuthResTBSX" */ 528, /* "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" */ 577, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" */ 541, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" */ 529, /* "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" */ 542, /* "setct-AuthRevResData" */ 578, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBE" */ 579, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" */ 543, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBS" */ 573, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBE" */ 537, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBS" */ 600, /* "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" */ 558, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqData" */ 592, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" */ 559, /* "setct-BatchAdminResData" */ 593, /* "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" */ 599, /* "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" */ 598, /* "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" */ 580, /* "setct-CapReqTBE" */ 581, /* "setct-CapReqTBEX" */ 544, /* "setct-CapReqTBS" */ 545, /* "setct-CapReqTBSX" */ 546, /* "setct-CapResData" */ 582, /* "setct-CapResTBE" */ 583, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBE" */ 584, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" */ 547, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBS" */ 548, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" */ 549, /* "setct-CapRevResData" */ 585, /* "setct-CapRevResTBE" */ 538, /* "setct-CapTokenData" */ 530, /* "setct-CapTokenSeq" */ 574, /* "setct-CapTokenTBE" */ 575, /* "setct-CapTokenTBEX" */ 539, /* "setct-CapTokenTBS" */ 560, /* "setct-CardCInitResTBS" */ 566, /* "setct-CertInqReqTBS" */ 563, /* "setct-CertReqData" */ 595, /* "setct-CertReqTBE" */ 596, /* "setct-CertReqTBEX" */ 564, /* "setct-CertReqTBS" */ 565, /* "setct-CertResData" */ 597, /* "setct-CertResTBE" */ 586, /* "setct-CredReqTBE" */ 587, /* "setct-CredReqTBEX" */ 550, /* "setct-CredReqTBS" */ 551, /* "setct-CredReqTBSX" */ 552, /* "setct-CredResData" */ 588, /* "setct-CredResTBE" */ 589, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBE" */ 590, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" */ 553, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBS" */ 554, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" */ 555, /* "setct-CredRevResData" */ 591, /* "setct-CredRevResTBE" */ 567, /* "setct-ErrorTBS" */ 526, /* "setct-HODInput" */ 561, /* "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" */ 522, /* "setct-OIData" */ 519, /* "setct-PANData" */ 521, /* "setct-PANOnly" */ 520, /* "setct-PANToken" */ 556, /* "setct-PCertReqData" */ 557, /* "setct-PCertResTBS" */ 523, /* "setct-PI" */ 532, /* "setct-PI-TBS" */ 524, /* "setct-PIData" */ 525, /* "setct-PIDataUnsigned" */ 568, /* "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" */ 569, /* "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" */ 531, /* "setct-PInitResData" */ 533, /* "setct-PResData" */ 594, /* "setct-RegFormReqTBE" */ 562, /* "setct-RegFormResTBS" */ 606, /* "setext-cv" */ 601, /* "setext-genCrypt" */ 602, /* "setext-miAuth" */ 604, /* "setext-pinAny" */ 603, /* "setext-pinSecure" */ 605, /* "setext-track2" */ 52, /* "signingTime" */ 454, /* "simpleSecurityObject" */ 496, /* "singleLevelQuality" */ 387, /* "snmpv2" */ 660, /* "street" */ 85, /* "subjectAltName" */ 769, /* "subjectDirectoryAttributes" */ 398, /* "subjectInfoAccess" */ 82, /* "subjectKeyIdentifier" */ 1007, /* "subjectSignTool" */ 498, /* "subtreeMaximumQuality" */ 497, /* "subtreeMinimumQuality" */ 890, /* "supportedAlgorithms" */ 874, /* "supportedApplicationContext" */ 402, /* "targetInformation" */ 864, /* "telephoneNumber" */ 866, /* "teletexTerminalIdentifier" */ 865, /* "telexNumber" */ 459, /* "textEncodedORAddress" */ 293, /* "textNotice" */ 133, /* "timeStamping" */ 106, /* "title" */ 1020, /* "tlsfeature" */ 682, /* "tpBasis" */ 375, /* "trustRoot" */ 436, /* "ucl" */ 102, /* "uid" */ 888, /* "uniqueMember" */ 55, /* "unstructuredAddress" */ 49, /* "unstructuredName" */ 880, /* "userCertificate" */ 465, /* "userClass" */ 879, /* "userPassword" */ 373, /* "valid" */ 678, /* "wap" */ 679, /* "wap-wsg" */ 735, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" */ 743, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" */ 744, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" */ 745, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" */ 736, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" */ 737, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" */ 738, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" */ 739, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" */ 740, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" */ 741, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" */ 742, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" */ 804, /* "whirlpool" */ 868, /* "x121Address" */ 503, /* "x500UniqueIdentifier" */ 158, /* "x509Certificate" */ 160, /* "x509Crl" */ }; #define NUM_LN 1052 static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = { 363, /* "AD Time Stamping" */ 405, /* "ANSI X9.62" */ 368, /* "Acceptable OCSP Responses" */ 910, /* "Any Extended Key Usage" */ 664, /* "Any language" */ 177, /* "Authority Information Access" */ 365, /* "Basic OCSP Response" */ 285, /* "Biometric Info" */ 179, /* "CA Issuers" */ 785, /* "CA Repository" */ 954, /* "CT Certificate SCTs" */ 952, /* "CT Precertificate Poison" */ 951, /* "CT Precertificate SCTs" */ 953, /* "CT Precertificate Signer" */ 131, /* "Code Signing" */ 1024, /* "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination" */ 1023, /* "Ctrl/provision WAP Access" */ 783, /* "Diffie-Hellman based MAC" */ 382, /* "Directory" */ 392, /* "Domain" */ 132, /* "E-mail Protection" */ 389, /* "Enterprises" */ 384, /* "Experimental" */ 372, /* "Extended OCSP Status" */ 172, /* "Extension Request" */ 813, /* "GOST 28147-89" */ 849, /* "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet" */ 815, /* "GOST 28147-89 MAC" */ 1003, /* "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set" */ 851, /* "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" */ 850, /* "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom" */ 811, /* "GOST R 34.10-2001" */ 817, /* "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH" */ 998, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A" */ 999, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B" */ 997, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set" */ 979, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus" */ 980, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus" */ 985, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)" */ 986, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)" */ 812, /* "GOST R 34.10-94" */ 818, /* "GOST R 34.10-94 DH" */ 982, /* "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash" */ 983, /* "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash" */ 809, /* "GOST R 34.11-94" */ 816, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF" */ 807, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001" */ 853, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" */ 808, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94" */ 852, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom" */ 854, /* "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom" */ 988, /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit" */ 989, /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit" */ 810, /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-94" */ 432, /* "Hold Instruction Call Issuer" */ 430, /* "Hold Instruction Code" */ 431, /* "Hold Instruction None" */ 433, /* "Hold Instruction Reject" */ 634, /* "ICC or token signature" */ 1004, /* "INN" */ 294, /* "IPSec End System" */ 295, /* "IPSec Tunnel" */ 296, /* "IPSec User" */ 182, /* "ISO Member Body" */ 183, /* "ISO US Member Body" */ 667, /* "Independent" */ 665, /* "Inherit all" */ 647, /* "International Organizations" */ 142, /* "Invalidity Date" */ 504, /* "MIME MHS" */ 388, /* "Mail" */ 383, /* "Management" */ 417, /* "Microsoft CSP Name" */ 135, /* "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing" */ 138, /* "Microsoft Encrypted File System" */ 171, /* "Microsoft Extension Request" */ 134, /* "Microsoft Individual Code Signing" */ 856, /* "Microsoft Local Key set" */ 137, /* "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto" */ 648, /* "Microsoft Smartcardlogin" */ 136, /* "Microsoft Trust List Signing" */ 649, /* "Microsoft Universal Principal Name" */ 393, /* "NULL" */ 404, /* "NULL" */ 72, /* "Netscape Base Url" */ 76, /* "Netscape CA Policy Url" */ 74, /* "Netscape CA Revocation Url" */ 71, /* "Netscape Cert Type" */ 58, /* "Netscape Certificate Extension" */ 79, /* "Netscape Certificate Sequence" */ 78, /* "Netscape Comment" */ 57, /* "Netscape Communications Corp." */ 59, /* "Netscape Data Type" */ 75, /* "Netscape Renewal Url" */ 73, /* "Netscape Revocation Url" */ 77, /* "Netscape SSL Server Name" */ 139, /* "Netscape Server Gated Crypto" */ 178, /* "OCSP" */ 370, /* "OCSP Archive Cutoff" */ 367, /* "OCSP CRL ID" */ 369, /* "OCSP No Check" */ 366, /* "OCSP Nonce" */ 371, /* "OCSP Service Locator" */ 180, /* "OCSP Signing" */ 1005, /* "OGRN" */ 161, /* "PBES2" */ 69, /* "PBKDF2" */ 162, /* "PBMAC1" */ 1032, /* "PKINIT Client Auth" */ 127, /* "PKIX" */ 858, /* "Permanent Identifier" */ 164, /* "Policy Qualifier CPS" */ 165, /* "Policy Qualifier User Notice" */ 385, /* "Private" */ 663, /* "Proxy Certificate Information" */ 1, /* "RSA Data Security, Inc." */ 2, /* "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS" */ 188, /* "S/MIME" */ 167, /* "S/MIME Capabilities" */ 1006, /* "SNILS" */ 387, /* "SNMPv2" */ 1025, /* "SSH Client" */ 1026, /* "SSH Server" */ 512, /* "Secure Electronic Transactions" */ 386, /* "Security" */ 394, /* "Selected Attribute Types" */ 1029, /* "Send Owner" */ 1030, /* "Send Proxied Owner" */ 1028, /* "Send Proxied Router" */ 1027, /* "Send Router" */ 1033, /* "Signing KDC Response" */ 1008, /* "Signing Tool of Issuer" */ 1007, /* "Signing Tool of Subject" */ 143, /* "Strong Extranet ID" */ 398, /* "Subject Information Access" */ 1020, /* "TLS Feature" */ 130, /* "TLS Web Client Authentication" */ 129, /* "TLS Web Server Authentication" */ 133, /* "Time Stamping" */ 375, /* "Trust Root" */ 1034, /* "X25519" */ 1035, /* "X448" */ 12, /* "X509" */ 402, /* "X509v3 AC Targeting" */ 746, /* "X509v3 Any Policy" */ 90, /* "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" */ 87, /* "X509v3 Basic Constraints" */ 103, /* "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points" */ 88, /* "X509v3 CRL Number" */ 141, /* "X509v3 CRL Reason Code" */ 771, /* "X509v3 Certificate Issuer" */ 89, /* "X509v3 Certificate Policies" */ 140, /* "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator" */ 126, /* "X509v3 Extended Key Usage" */ 857, /* "X509v3 Freshest CRL" */ 748, /* "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy" */ 86, /* "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name" */ 770, /* "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point" */ 83, /* "X509v3 Key Usage" */ 666, /* "X509v3 Name Constraints" */ 403, /* "X509v3 No Revocation Available" */ 401, /* "X509v3 Policy Constraints" */ 747, /* "X509v3 Policy Mappings" */ 84, /* "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period" */ 85, /* "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name" */ 769, /* "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes" */ 82, /* "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" */ 920, /* "X9.42 DH" */ 184, /* "X9.57" */ 185, /* "X9.57 CM ?" */ 478, /* "aRecord" */ 289, /* "aaControls" */ 287, /* "ac-auditEntity" */ 397, /* "ac-proxying" */ 288, /* "ac-targeting" */ 446, /* "account" */ 364, /* "ad dvcs" */ 606, /* "additional verification" */ 419, /* "aes-128-cbc" */ 916, /* "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1" */ 948, /* "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256" */ 896, /* "aes-128-ccm" */ 421, /* "aes-128-cfb" */ 650, /* "aes-128-cfb1" */ 653, /* "aes-128-cfb8" */ 904, /* "aes-128-ctr" */ 418, /* "aes-128-ecb" */ 895, /* "aes-128-gcm" */ 958, /* "aes-128-ocb" */ 420, /* "aes-128-ofb" */ 913, /* "aes-128-xts" */ 423, /* "aes-192-cbc" */ 917, /* "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1" */ 949, /* "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256" */ 899, /* "aes-192-ccm" */ 425, /* "aes-192-cfb" */ 651, /* "aes-192-cfb1" */ 654, /* "aes-192-cfb8" */ 905, /* "aes-192-ctr" */ 422, /* "aes-192-ecb" */ 898, /* "aes-192-gcm" */ 959, /* "aes-192-ocb" */ 424, /* "aes-192-ofb" */ 427, /* "aes-256-cbc" */ 918, /* "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1" */ 950, /* "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256" */ 902, /* "aes-256-ccm" */ 429, /* "aes-256-cfb" */ 652, /* "aes-256-cfb1" */ 655, /* "aes-256-cfb8" */ 906, /* "aes-256-ctr" */ 426, /* "aes-256-ecb" */ 901, /* "aes-256-gcm" */ 960, /* "aes-256-ocb" */ 428, /* "aes-256-ofb" */ 914, /* "aes-256-xts" */ 376, /* "algorithm" */ 484, /* "associatedDomain" */ 485, /* "associatedName" */ 501, /* "audio" */ 1049, /* "auth-dss" */ 1047, /* "auth-ecdsa" */ 1050, /* "auth-gost01" */ 1051, /* "auth-gost12" */ 1053, /* "auth-null" */ 1048, /* "auth-psk" */ 1046, /* "auth-rsa" */ 1052, /* "auth-srp" */ 882, /* "authorityRevocationList" */ 91, /* "bf-cbc" */ 93, /* "bf-cfb" */ 92, /* "bf-ecb" */ 94, /* "bf-ofb" */ 1056, /* "blake2b512" */ 1057, /* "blake2s256" */ 921, /* "brainpoolP160r1" */ 922, /* "brainpoolP160t1" */ 923, /* "brainpoolP192r1" */ 924, /* "brainpoolP192t1" */ 925, /* "brainpoolP224r1" */ 926, /* "brainpoolP224t1" */ 927, /* "brainpoolP256r1" */ 928, /* "brainpoolP256t1" */ 929, /* "brainpoolP320r1" */ 930, /* "brainpoolP320t1" */ 931, /* "brainpoolP384r1" */ 932, /* "brainpoolP384t1" */ 933, /* "brainpoolP512r1" */ 934, /* "brainpoolP512t1" */ 494, /* "buildingName" */ 860, /* "businessCategory" */ 691, /* "c2onb191v4" */ 692, /* "c2onb191v5" */ 697, /* "c2onb239v4" */ 698, /* "c2onb239v5" */ 684, /* "c2pnb163v1" */ 685, /* "c2pnb163v2" */ 686, /* "c2pnb163v3" */ 687, /* "c2pnb176v1" */ 693, /* "c2pnb208w1" */ 699, /* "c2pnb272w1" */ 700, /* "c2pnb304w1" */ 702, /* "c2pnb368w1" */ 688, /* "c2tnb191v1" */ 689, /* "c2tnb191v2" */ 690, /* "c2tnb191v3" */ 694, /* "c2tnb239v1" */ 695, /* "c2tnb239v2" */ 696, /* "c2tnb239v3" */ 701, /* "c2tnb359v1" */ 703, /* "c2tnb431r1" */ 881, /* "cACertificate" */ 483, /* "cNAMERecord" */ 751, /* "camellia-128-cbc" */ 962, /* "camellia-128-ccm" */ 757, /* "camellia-128-cfb" */ 760, /* "camellia-128-cfb1" */ 763, /* "camellia-128-cfb8" */ 964, /* "camellia-128-cmac" */ 963, /* "camellia-128-ctr" */ 754, /* "camellia-128-ecb" */ 961, /* "camellia-128-gcm" */ 766, /* "camellia-128-ofb" */ 752, /* "camellia-192-cbc" */ 966, /* "camellia-192-ccm" */ 758, /* "camellia-192-cfb" */ 761, /* "camellia-192-cfb1" */ 764, /* "camellia-192-cfb8" */ 968, /* "camellia-192-cmac" */ 967, /* "camellia-192-ctr" */ 755, /* "camellia-192-ecb" */ 965, /* "camellia-192-gcm" */ 767, /* "camellia-192-ofb" */ 753, /* "camellia-256-cbc" */ 970, /* "camellia-256-ccm" */ 759, /* "camellia-256-cfb" */ 762, /* "camellia-256-cfb1" */ 765, /* "camellia-256-cfb8" */ 972, /* "camellia-256-cmac" */ 971, /* "camellia-256-ctr" */ 756, /* "camellia-256-ecb" */ 969, /* "camellia-256-gcm" */ 768, /* "camellia-256-ofb" */ 443, /* "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" */ 108, /* "cast5-cbc" */ 110, /* "cast5-cfb" */ 109, /* "cast5-ecb" */ 111, /* "cast5-ofb" */ 152, /* "certBag" */ 677, /* "certicom-arc" */ 517, /* "certificate extensions" */ 883, /* "certificateRevocationList" */ 1019, /* "chacha20" */ 1018, /* "chacha20-poly1305" */ 54, /* "challengePassword" */ 407, /* "characteristic-two-field" */ 395, /* "clearance" */ 633, /* "cleartext track 2" */ 894, /* "cmac" */ 13, /* "commonName" */ 513, /* "content types" */ 50, /* "contentType" */ 53, /* "countersignature" */ 14, /* "countryName" */ 153, /* "crlBag" */ 884, /* "crossCertificatePair" */ 806, /* "cryptocom" */ 805, /* "cryptopro" */ 500, /* "dITRedirect" */ 451, /* "dNSDomain" */ 495, /* "dSAQuality" */ 434, /* "data" */ 390, /* "dcObject" */ 891, /* "deltaRevocationList" */ 31, /* "des-cbc" */ 643, /* "des-cdmf" */ 30, /* "des-cfb" */ 656, /* "des-cfb1" */ 657, /* "des-cfb8" */ 29, /* "des-ecb" */ 32, /* "des-ede" */ 43, /* "des-ede-cbc" */ 60, /* "des-ede-cfb" */ 62, /* "des-ede-ofb" */ 33, /* "des-ede3" */ 44, /* "des-ede3-cbc" */ 61, /* "des-ede3-cfb" */ 658, /* "des-ede3-cfb1" */ 659, /* "des-ede3-cfb8" */ 63, /* "des-ede3-ofb" */ 45, /* "des-ofb" */ 107, /* "description" */ 871, /* "destinationIndicator" */ 80, /* "desx-cbc" */ 947, /* "dh-cofactor-kdf" */ 946, /* "dh-std-kdf" */ 28, /* "dhKeyAgreement" */ 941, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 942, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 943, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 944, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 945, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 936, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 937, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 938, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 939, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 940, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 11, /* "directory services (X.500)" */ 378, /* "directory services - algorithms" */ 887, /* "distinguishedName" */ 892, /* "dmdName" */ 174, /* "dnQualifier" */ 447, /* "document" */ 471, /* "documentAuthor" */ 468, /* "documentIdentifier" */ 472, /* "documentLocation" */ 502, /* "documentPublisher" */ 449, /* "documentSeries" */ 469, /* "documentTitle" */ 470, /* "documentVersion" */ 380, /* "dod" */ 391, /* "domainComponent" */ 452, /* "domainRelatedObject" */ 116, /* "dsaEncryption" */ 67, /* "dsaEncryption-old" */ 66, /* "dsaWithSHA" */ 113, /* "dsaWithSHA1" */ 70, /* "dsaWithSHA1-old" */ 802, /* "dsa_with_SHA224" */ 803, /* "dsa_with_SHA256" */ 297, /* "dvcs" */ 791, /* "ecdsa-with-Recommended" */ 416, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA1" */ 793, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA224" */ 794, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA256" */ 795, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA384" */ 796, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA512" */ 792, /* "ecdsa-with-Specified" */ 48, /* "emailAddress" */ 632, /* "encrypted track 2" */ 885, /* "enhancedSearchGuide" */ 56, /* "extendedCertificateAttributes" */ 867, /* "facsimileTelephoneNumber" */ 462, /* "favouriteDrink" */ 453, /* "friendlyCountry" */ 490, /* "friendlyCountryName" */ 156, /* "friendlyName" */ 631, /* "generate cryptogram" */ 509, /* "generationQualifier" */ 601, /* "generic cryptogram" */ 99, /* "givenName" */ 976, /* "gost-mac-12" */ 1009, /* "gost89-cbc" */ 814, /* "gost89-cnt" */ 975, /* "gost89-cnt-12" */ 1011, /* "gost89-ctr" */ 1010, /* "gost89-ecb" */ 1015, /* "grasshopper-cbc" */ 1016, /* "grasshopper-cfb" */ 1013, /* "grasshopper-ctr" */ 1012, /* "grasshopper-ecb" */ 1017, /* "grasshopper-mac" */ 1014, /* "grasshopper-ofb" */ 1036, /* "hkdf" */ 855, /* "hmac" */ 780, /* "hmac-md5" */ 781, /* "hmac-sha1" */ 797, /* "hmacWithMD5" */ 163, /* "hmacWithSHA1" */ 798, /* "hmacWithSHA224" */ 799, /* "hmacWithSHA256" */ 800, /* "hmacWithSHA384" */ 801, /* "hmacWithSHA512" */ 486, /* "homePostalAddress" */ 473, /* "homeTelephoneNumber" */ 466, /* "host" */ 889, /* "houseIdentifier" */ 442, /* "iA5StringSyntax" */ 381, /* "iana" */ 824, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 825, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 826, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 827, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 819, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" */ 829, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" */ 828, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" */ 830, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" */ 820, /* "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" */ 823, /* "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" */ 840, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 841, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 842, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 843, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 844, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 839, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" */ 832, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 833, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 834, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 835, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 836, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 837, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 838, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" */ 831, /* "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" */ 845, /* "id-GostR3410-94-a" */ 846, /* "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" */ 847, /* "id-GostR3410-94-b" */ 848, /* "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" */ 822, /* "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" */ 821, /* "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" */ 266, /* "id-aca" */ 355, /* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */ 354, /* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */ 356, /* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */ 399, /* "id-aca-encAttrs" */ 357, /* "id-aca-group" */ 358, /* "id-aca-role" */ 176, /* "id-ad" */ 788, /* "id-aes128-wrap" */ 897, /* "id-aes128-wrap-pad" */ 789, /* "id-aes192-wrap" */ 900, /* "id-aes192-wrap-pad" */ 790, /* "id-aes256-wrap" */ 903, /* "id-aes256-wrap-pad" */ 262, /* "id-alg" */ 893, /* "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" */ 323, /* "id-alg-des40" */ 326, /* "id-alg-dh-pop" */ 325, /* "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" */ 324, /* "id-alg-noSignature" */ 907, /* "id-camellia128-wrap" */ 908, /* "id-camellia192-wrap" */ 909, /* "id-camellia256-wrap" */ 268, /* "id-cct" */ 361, /* "id-cct-PKIData" */ 362, /* "id-cct-PKIResponse" */ 360, /* "id-cct-crs" */ 81, /* "id-ce" */ 680, /* "id-characteristic-two-basis" */ 263, /* "id-cmc" */ 334, /* "id-cmc-addExtensions" */ 346, /* "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" */ 330, /* "id-cmc-dataReturn" */ 336, /* "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" */ 335, /* "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" */ 339, /* "id-cmc-getCRL" */ 338, /* "id-cmc-getCert" */ 328, /* "id-cmc-identification" */ 329, /* "id-cmc-identityProof" */ 337, /* "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" */ 344, /* "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" */ 345, /* "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" */ 343, /* "id-cmc-queryPending" */ 333, /* "id-cmc-recipientNonce" */ 341, /* "id-cmc-regInfo" */ 342, /* "id-cmc-responseInfo" */ 340, /* "id-cmc-revokeRequest" */ 332, /* "id-cmc-senderNonce" */ 327, /* "id-cmc-statusInfo" */ 331, /* "id-cmc-transactionId" */ 787, /* "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" */ 1060, /* "id-ct-xml" */ 408, /* "id-ecPublicKey" */ 508, /* "id-hex-multipart-message" */ 507, /* "id-hex-partial-message" */ 260, /* "id-it" */ 302, /* "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" */ 298, /* "id-it-caProtEncCert" */ 311, /* "id-it-confirmWaitTime" */ 303, /* "id-it-currentCRL" */ 300, /* "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" */ 310, /* "id-it-implicitConfirm" */ 308, /* "id-it-keyPairParamRep" */ 307, /* "id-it-keyPairParamReq" */ 312, /* "id-it-origPKIMessage" */ 301, /* "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" */ 309, /* "id-it-revPassphrase" */ 299, /* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */ 305, /* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */ 306, /* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */ 784, /* "id-it-suppLangTags" */ 304, /* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */ 128, /* "id-kp" */ 280, /* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */ 274, /* "id-mod-cmc" */ 277, /* "id-mod-cmp" */ 284, /* "id-mod-cmp2000" */ 273, /* "id-mod-crmf" */ 283, /* "id-mod-dvcs" */ 275, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-88" */ 276, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-93" */ 282, /* "id-mod-ocsp" */ 278, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" */ 279, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" */ 281, /* "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" */ 264, /* "id-on" */ 347, /* "id-on-personalData" */ 265, /* "id-pda" */ 352, /* "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" */ 353, /* "id-pda-countryOfResidence" */ 348, /* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */ 351, /* "id-pda-gender" */ 349, /* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */ 175, /* "id-pe" */ 1031, /* "id-pkinit" */ 261, /* "id-pkip" */ 258, /* "id-pkix-mod" */ 269, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-88" */ 271, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-93" */ 270, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-88" */ 272, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-93" */ 662, /* "id-ppl" */ 267, /* "id-qcs" */ 359, /* "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" */ 259, /* "id-qt" */ 313, /* "id-regCtrl" */ 316, /* "id-regCtrl-authenticator" */ 319, /* "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" */ 318, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" */ 317, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" */ 320, /* "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" */ 315, /* "id-regCtrl-regToken" */ 314, /* "id-regInfo" */ 322, /* "id-regInfo-certReq" */ 321, /* "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" */ 973, /* "id-scrypt" */ 191, /* "id-smime-aa" */ 215, /* "id-smime-aa-contentHint" */ 218, /* "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" */ 221, /* "id-smime-aa-contentReference" */ 240, /* "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" */ 217, /* "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" */ 222, /* "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" */ 220, /* "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" */ 232, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" */ 233, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" */ 238, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" */ 237, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" */ 234, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" */ 227, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" */ 231, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" */ 236, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" */ 230, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" */ 235, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" */ 226, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" */ 229, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" */ 228, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" */ 219, /* "id-smime-aa-macValue" */ 214, /* "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" */ 216, /* "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" */ 212, /* "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" */ 213, /* "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" */ 239, /* "id-smime-aa-signatureType" */ 223, /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" */ 224, /* "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" */ 225, /* "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" */ 192, /* "id-smime-alg" */ 243, /* "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" */ 246, /* "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" */ 247, /* "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" */ 245, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDH" */ 241, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" */ 242, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" */ 244, /* "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" */ 193, /* "id-smime-cd" */ 248, /* "id-smime-cd-ldap" */ 190, /* "id-smime-ct" */ 210, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" */ 211, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" */ 208, /* "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" */ 207, /* "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" */ 205, /* "id-smime-ct-authData" */ 1059, /* "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" */ 786, /* "id-smime-ct-compressedData" */ 1058, /* "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" */ 209, /* "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" */ 206, /* "id-smime-ct-publishCert" */ 204, /* "id-smime-ct-receipt" */ 195, /* "id-smime-cti" */ 255, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" */ 256, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" */ 253, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" */ 251, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" */ 252, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" */ 254, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" */ 189, /* "id-smime-mod" */ 196, /* "id-smime-mod-cms" */ 197, /* "id-smime-mod-ess" */ 202, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" */ 203, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" */ 200, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" */ 201, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */ 199, /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */ 198, /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */ 194, /* "id-smime-spq" */ 250, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */ 249, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */ 974, /* "id-tc26" */ 991, /* "id-tc26-agreement" */ 992, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" */ 993, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" */ 977, /* "id-tc26-algorithms" */ 990, /* "id-tc26-cipher" */ 1001, /* "id-tc26-cipher-constants" */ 994, /* "id-tc26-constants" */ 981, /* "id-tc26-digest" */ 1000, /* "id-tc26-digest-constants" */ 1002, /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" */ 996, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" */ 987, /* "id-tc26-mac" */ 978, /* "id-tc26-sign" */ 995, /* "id-tc26-sign-constants" */ 984, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest" */ 34, /* "idea-cbc" */ 35, /* "idea-cfb" */ 36, /* "idea-ecb" */ 46, /* "idea-ofb" */ 676, /* "identified-organization" */ 461, /* "info" */ 101, /* "initials" */ 869, /* "internationaliSDNNumber" */ 1022, /* "ipsec Internet Key Exchange" */ 749, /* "ipsec3" */ 750, /* "ipsec4" */ 181, /* "iso" */ 623, /* "issuer capabilities" */ 645, /* "itu-t" */ 492, /* "janetMailbox" */ 646, /* "joint-iso-itu-t" */ 957, /* "jurisdictionCountryName" */ 955, /* "jurisdictionLocalityName" */ 956, /* "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName" */ 150, /* "keyBag" */ 773, /* "kisa" */ 1039, /* "kx-dhe" */ 1041, /* "kx-dhe-psk" */ 1038, /* "kx-ecdhe" */ 1040, /* "kx-ecdhe-psk" */ 1045, /* "kx-gost" */ 1043, /* "kx-psk" */ 1037, /* "kx-rsa" */ 1042, /* "kx-rsa-psk" */ 1044, /* "kx-srp" */ 477, /* "lastModifiedBy" */ 476, /* "lastModifiedTime" */ 157, /* "localKeyID" */ 15, /* "localityName" */ 480, /* "mXRecord" */ 493, /* "mailPreferenceOption" */ 467, /* "manager" */ 3, /* "md2" */ 7, /* "md2WithRSAEncryption" */ 257, /* "md4" */ 396, /* "md4WithRSAEncryption" */ 4, /* "md5" */ 114, /* "md5-sha1" */ 104, /* "md5WithRSA" */ 8, /* "md5WithRSAEncryption" */ 95, /* "mdc2" */ 96, /* "mdc2WithRSA" */ 875, /* "member" */ 602, /* "merchant initiated auth" */ 514, /* "message extensions" */ 51, /* "messageDigest" */ 911, /* "mgf1" */ 506, /* "mime-mhs-bodies" */ 505, /* "mime-mhs-headings" */ 488, /* "mobileTelephoneNumber" */ 481, /* "nSRecord" */ 173, /* "name" */ 681, /* "onBasis" */ 379, /* "org" */ 17, /* "organizationName" */ 491, /* "organizationalStatus" */ 18, /* "organizationalUnitName" */ 475, /* "otherMailbox" */ 876, /* "owner" */ 935, /* "pSpecified" */ 489, /* "pagerTelephoneNumber" */ 782, /* "password based MAC" */ 374, /* "path" */ 621, /* "payment gateway capabilities" */ 9, /* "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC" */ 168, /* "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC" */ 112, /* "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" */ 10, /* "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC" */ 169, /* "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC" */ 148, /* "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC" */ 144, /* "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4" */ 147, /* "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC" */ 146, /* "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC" */ 149, /* "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC" */ 145, /* "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4" */ 170, /* "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC" */ 68, /* "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC" */ 499, /* "personalSignature" */ 487, /* "personalTitle" */ 464, /* "photo" */ 863, /* "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" */ 437, /* "pilot" */ 439, /* "pilotAttributeSyntax" */ 438, /* "pilotAttributeType" */ 479, /* "pilotAttributeType27" */ 456, /* "pilotDSA" */ 441, /* "pilotGroups" */ 444, /* "pilotObject" */ 440, /* "pilotObjectClass" */ 455, /* "pilotOrganization" */ 445, /* "pilotPerson" */ 186, /* "pkcs1" */ 27, /* "pkcs3" */ 187, /* "pkcs5" */ 20, /* "pkcs7" */ 21, /* "pkcs7-data" */ 25, /* "pkcs7-digestData" */ 26, /* "pkcs7-encryptedData" */ 23, /* "pkcs7-envelopedData" */ 24, /* "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" */ 22, /* "pkcs7-signedData" */ 151, /* "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" */ 47, /* "pkcs9" */ 862, /* "postOfficeBox" */ 861, /* "postalAddress" */ 661, /* "postalCode" */ 683, /* "ppBasis" */ 872, /* "preferredDeliveryMethod" */ 873, /* "presentationAddress" */ 406, /* "prime-field" */ 409, /* "prime192v1" */ 410, /* "prime192v2" */ 411, /* "prime192v3" */ 412, /* "prime239v1" */ 413, /* "prime239v2" */ 414, /* "prime239v3" */ 415, /* "prime256v1" */ 886, /* "protocolInformation" */ 510, /* "pseudonym" */ 435, /* "pss" */ 286, /* "qcStatements" */ 457, /* "qualityLabelledData" */ 450, /* "rFC822localPart" */ 98, /* "rc2-40-cbc" */ 166, /* "rc2-64-cbc" */ 37, /* "rc2-cbc" */ 39, /* "rc2-cfb" */ 38, /* "rc2-ecb" */ 40, /* "rc2-ofb" */ 5, /* "rc4" */ 97, /* "rc4-40" */ 915, /* "rc4-hmac-md5" */ 120, /* "rc5-cbc" */ 122, /* "rc5-cfb" */ 121, /* "rc5-ecb" */ 123, /* "rc5-ofb" */ 870, /* "registeredAddress" */ 460, /* "rfc822Mailbox" */ 117, /* "ripemd160" */ 119, /* "ripemd160WithRSA" */ 400, /* "role" */ 877, /* "roleOccupant" */ 448, /* "room" */ 463, /* "roomNumber" */ 19, /* "rsa" */ 6, /* "rsaEncryption" */ 644, /* "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" */ 377, /* "rsaSignature" */ 919, /* "rsaesOaep" */ 912, /* "rsassaPss" */ 482, /* "sOARecord" */ 155, /* "safeContentsBag" */ 291, /* "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" */ 290, /* "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" */ 292, /* "sbgp-routerIdentifier" */ 159, /* "sdsiCertificate" */ 859, /* "searchGuide" */ 704, /* "secp112r1" */ 705, /* "secp112r2" */ 706, /* "secp128r1" */ 707, /* "secp128r2" */ 708, /* "secp160k1" */ 709, /* "secp160r1" */ 710, /* "secp160r2" */ 711, /* "secp192k1" */ 712, /* "secp224k1" */ 713, /* "secp224r1" */ 714, /* "secp256k1" */ 715, /* "secp384r1" */ 716, /* "secp521r1" */ 154, /* "secretBag" */ 474, /* "secretary" */ 717, /* "sect113r1" */ 718, /* "sect113r2" */ 719, /* "sect131r1" */ 720, /* "sect131r2" */ 721, /* "sect163k1" */ 722, /* "sect163r1" */ 723, /* "sect163r2" */ 724, /* "sect193r1" */ 725, /* "sect193r2" */ 726, /* "sect233k1" */ 727, /* "sect233r1" */ 728, /* "sect239k1" */ 729, /* "sect283k1" */ 730, /* "sect283r1" */ 731, /* "sect409k1" */ 732, /* "sect409r1" */ 733, /* "sect571k1" */ 734, /* "sect571r1" */ 635, /* "secure device signature" */ 878, /* "seeAlso" */ 777, /* "seed-cbc" */ 779, /* "seed-cfb" */ 776, /* "seed-ecb" */ 778, /* "seed-ofb" */ 105, /* "serialNumber" */ 625, /* "set-addPolicy" */ 515, /* "set-attr" */ 518, /* "set-brand" */ 638, /* "set-brand-AmericanExpress" */ 637, /* "set-brand-Diners" */ 636, /* "set-brand-IATA-ATA" */ 639, /* "set-brand-JCB" */ 641, /* "set-brand-MasterCard" */ 642, /* "set-brand-Novus" */ 640, /* "set-brand-Visa" */ 516, /* "set-policy" */ 607, /* "set-policy-root" */ 624, /* "set-rootKeyThumb" */ 620, /* "setAttr-Cert" */ 628, /* "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" */ 630, /* "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" */ 629, /* "setAttr-IssCap-T2" */ 627, /* "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" */ 626, /* "setAttr-Token-EMV" */ 622, /* "setAttr-TokenType" */ 619, /* "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" */ 615, /* "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" */ 616, /* "setCext-TokenIdentifier" */ 618, /* "setCext-TokenType" */ 617, /* "setCext-Track2Data" */ 611, /* "setCext-cCertRequired" */ 609, /* "setCext-certType" */ 608, /* "setCext-hashedRoot" */ 610, /* "setCext-merchData" */ 613, /* "setCext-setExt" */ 614, /* "setCext-setQualf" */ 612, /* "setCext-tunneling" */ 540, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" */ 576, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" */ 570, /* "setct-AuthReqTBE" */ 534, /* "setct-AuthReqTBS" */ 527, /* "setct-AuthResBaggage" */ 571, /* "setct-AuthResTBE" */ 572, /* "setct-AuthResTBEX" */ 535, /* "setct-AuthResTBS" */ 536, /* "setct-AuthResTBSX" */ 528, /* "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" */ 577, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" */ 541, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" */ 529, /* "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" */ 542, /* "setct-AuthRevResData" */ 578, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBE" */ 579, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" */ 543, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBS" */ 573, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBE" */ 537, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBS" */ 600, /* "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" */ 558, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqData" */ 592, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" */ 559, /* "setct-BatchAdminResData" */ 593, /* "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" */ 599, /* "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" */ 598, /* "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" */ 580, /* "setct-CapReqTBE" */ 581, /* "setct-CapReqTBEX" */ 544, /* "setct-CapReqTBS" */ 545, /* "setct-CapReqTBSX" */ 546, /* "setct-CapResData" */ 582, /* "setct-CapResTBE" */ 583, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBE" */ 584, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" */ 547, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBS" */ 548, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" */ 549, /* "setct-CapRevResData" */ 585, /* "setct-CapRevResTBE" */ 538, /* "setct-CapTokenData" */ 530, /* "setct-CapTokenSeq" */ 574, /* "setct-CapTokenTBE" */ 575, /* "setct-CapTokenTBEX" */ 539, /* "setct-CapTokenTBS" */ 560, /* "setct-CardCInitResTBS" */ 566, /* "setct-CertInqReqTBS" */ 563, /* "setct-CertReqData" */ 595, /* "setct-CertReqTBE" */ 596, /* "setct-CertReqTBEX" */ 564, /* "setct-CertReqTBS" */ 565, /* "setct-CertResData" */ 597, /* "setct-CertResTBE" */ 586, /* "setct-CredReqTBE" */ 587, /* "setct-CredReqTBEX" */ 550, /* "setct-CredReqTBS" */ 551, /* "setct-CredReqTBSX" */ 552, /* "setct-CredResData" */ 588, /* "setct-CredResTBE" */ 589, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBE" */ 590, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" */ 553, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBS" */ 554, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" */ 555, /* "setct-CredRevResData" */ 591, /* "setct-CredRevResTBE" */ 567, /* "setct-ErrorTBS" */ 526, /* "setct-HODInput" */ 561, /* "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" */ 522, /* "setct-OIData" */ 519, /* "setct-PANData" */ 521, /* "setct-PANOnly" */ 520, /* "setct-PANToken" */ 556, /* "setct-PCertReqData" */ 557, /* "setct-PCertResTBS" */ 523, /* "setct-PI" */ 532, /* "setct-PI-TBS" */ 524, /* "setct-PIData" */ 525, /* "setct-PIDataUnsigned" */ 568, /* "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" */ 569, /* "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" */ 531, /* "setct-PInitResData" */ 533, /* "setct-PResData" */ 594, /* "setct-RegFormReqTBE" */ 562, /* "setct-RegFormResTBS" */ 604, /* "setext-pinAny" */ 603, /* "setext-pinSecure" */ 605, /* "setext-track2" */ 41, /* "sha" */ 64, /* "sha1" */ 115, /* "sha1WithRSA" */ 65, /* "sha1WithRSAEncryption" */ 675, /* "sha224" */ 671, /* "sha224WithRSAEncryption" */ 672, /* "sha256" */ 668, /* "sha256WithRSAEncryption" */ 673, /* "sha384" */ 669, /* "sha384WithRSAEncryption" */ 674, /* "sha512" */ 670, /* "sha512WithRSAEncryption" */ 42, /* "shaWithRSAEncryption" */ 52, /* "signingTime" */ 454, /* "simpleSecurityObject" */ 496, /* "singleLevelQuality" */ 16, /* "stateOrProvinceName" */ 660, /* "streetAddress" */ 498, /* "subtreeMaximumQuality" */ 497, /* "subtreeMinimumQuality" */ 890, /* "supportedAlgorithms" */ 874, /* "supportedApplicationContext" */ 100, /* "surname" */ 864, /* "telephoneNumber" */ 866, /* "teletexTerminalIdentifier" */ 865, /* "telexNumber" */ 459, /* "textEncodedORAddress" */ 293, /* "textNotice" */ 106, /* "title" */ 1021, /* "tls1-prf" */ 682, /* "tpBasis" */ 436, /* "ucl" */ 0, /* "undefined" */ 102, /* "uniqueIdentifier" */ 888, /* "uniqueMember" */ 55, /* "unstructuredAddress" */ 49, /* "unstructuredName" */ 880, /* "userCertificate" */ 465, /* "userClass" */ 458, /* "userId" */ 879, /* "userPassword" */ 373, /* "valid" */ 678, /* "wap" */ 679, /* "wap-wsg" */ 735, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" */ 743, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" */ 744, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" */ 745, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" */ 736, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" */ 737, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" */ 738, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" */ 739, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" */ 740, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" */ 741, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" */ 742, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" */ 804, /* "whirlpool" */ 868, /* "x121Address" */ 503, /* "x500UniqueIdentifier" */ 158, /* "x509Certificate" */ 160, /* "x509Crl" */ 125, /* "zlib compression" */ }; #define NUM_OBJ 956 static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = { 0, /* OBJ_undef 0 */ 181, /* OBJ_iso 1 */ 393, /* OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t */ 404, /* OBJ_ccitt OBJ_itu_t */ 645, /* OBJ_itu_t 0 */ 646, /* OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t 2 */ 434, /* OBJ_data 0 9 */ 182, /* OBJ_member_body 1 2 */ 379, /* OBJ_org 1 3 */ 676, /* OBJ_identified_organization 1 3 */ 11, /* OBJ_X500 2 5 */ 647, /* OBJ_international_organizations 2 23 */ 380, /* OBJ_dod 1 3 6 */ 12, /* OBJ_X509 2 5 4 */ 378, /* OBJ_X500algorithms 2 5 8 */ 81, /* OBJ_id_ce 2 5 29 */ 512, /* OBJ_id_set 2 23 42 */ 678, /* OBJ_wap 2 23 43 */ 435, /* OBJ_pss 0 9 2342 */ 183, /* OBJ_ISO_US 1 2 840 */ 381, /* OBJ_iana 1 3 6 1 */ 1034, /* OBJ_X25519 1 3 101 110 */ 1035, /* OBJ_X448 1 3 101 111 */ 677, /* OBJ_certicom_arc 1 3 132 */ 394, /* OBJ_selected_attribute_types 2 5 1 5 */ 13, /* OBJ_commonName 2 5 4 3 */ 100, /* OBJ_surname 2 5 4 4 */ 105, /* OBJ_serialNumber 2 5 4 5 */ 14, /* OBJ_countryName 2 5 4 6 */ 15, /* OBJ_localityName 2 5 4 7 */ 16, /* OBJ_stateOrProvinceName 2 5 4 8 */ 660, /* OBJ_streetAddress 2 5 4 9 */ 17, /* OBJ_organizationName 2 5 4 10 */ 18, /* OBJ_organizationalUnitName 2 5 4 11 */ 106, /* OBJ_title 2 5 4 12 */ 107, /* OBJ_description 2 5 4 13 */ 859, /* OBJ_searchGuide 2 5 4 14 */ 860, /* OBJ_businessCategory 2 5 4 15 */ 861, /* OBJ_postalAddress 2 5 4 16 */ 661, /* OBJ_postalCode 2 5 4 17 */ 862, /* OBJ_postOfficeBox 2 5 4 18 */ 863, /* OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName 2 5 4 19 */ 864, /* OBJ_telephoneNumber 2 5 4 20 */ 865, /* OBJ_telexNumber 2 5 4 21 */ 866, /* OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier 2 5 4 22 */ 867, /* OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber 2 5 4 23 */ 868, /* OBJ_x121Address 2 5 4 24 */ 869, /* OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber 2 5 4 25 */ 870, /* OBJ_registeredAddress 2 5 4 26 */ 871, /* OBJ_destinationIndicator 2 5 4 27 */ 872, /* OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod 2 5 4 28 */ 873, /* OBJ_presentationAddress 2 5 4 29 */ 874, /* OBJ_supportedApplicationContext 2 5 4 30 */ 875, /* OBJ_member 2 5 4 31 */ 876, /* OBJ_owner 2 5 4 32 */ 877, /* OBJ_roleOccupant 2 5 4 33 */ 878, /* OBJ_seeAlso 2 5 4 34 */ 879, /* OBJ_userPassword 2 5 4 35 */ 880, /* OBJ_userCertificate 2 5 4 36 */ 881, /* OBJ_cACertificate 2 5 4 37 */ 882, /* OBJ_authorityRevocationList 2 5 4 38 */ 883, /* OBJ_certificateRevocationList 2 5 4 39 */ 884, /* OBJ_crossCertificatePair 2 5 4 40 */ 173, /* OBJ_name 2 5 4 41 */ 99, /* OBJ_givenName 2 5 4 42 */ 101, /* OBJ_initials 2 5 4 43 */ 509, /* OBJ_generationQualifier 2 5 4 44 */ 503, /* OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier 2 5 4 45 */ 174, /* OBJ_dnQualifier 2 5 4 46 */ 885, /* OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide 2 5 4 47 */ 886, /* OBJ_protocolInformation 2 5 4 48 */ 887, /* OBJ_distinguishedName 2 5 4 49 */ 888, /* OBJ_uniqueMember 2 5 4 50 */ 889, /* OBJ_houseIdentifier 2 5 4 51 */ 890, /* OBJ_supportedAlgorithms 2 5 4 52 */ 891, /* OBJ_deltaRevocationList 2 5 4 53 */ 892, /* OBJ_dmdName 2 5 4 54 */ 510, /* OBJ_pseudonym 2 5 4 65 */ 400, /* OBJ_role 2 5 4 72 */ 769, /* OBJ_subject_directory_attributes 2 5 29 9 */ 82, /* OBJ_subject_key_identifier 2 5 29 14 */ 83, /* OBJ_key_usage 2 5 29 15 */ 84, /* OBJ_private_key_usage_period 2 5 29 16 */ 85, /* OBJ_subject_alt_name 2 5 29 17 */ 86, /* OBJ_issuer_alt_name 2 5 29 18 */ 87, /* OBJ_basic_constraints 2 5 29 19 */ 88, /* OBJ_crl_number 2 5 29 20 */ 141, /* OBJ_crl_reason 2 5 29 21 */ 430, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_code 2 5 29 23 */ 142, /* OBJ_invalidity_date 2 5 29 24 */ 140, /* OBJ_delta_crl 2 5 29 27 */ 770, /* OBJ_issuing_distribution_point 2 5 29 28 */ 771, /* OBJ_certificate_issuer 2 5 29 29 */ 666, /* OBJ_name_constraints 2 5 29 30 */ 103, /* OBJ_crl_distribution_points 2 5 29 31 */ 89, /* OBJ_certificate_policies 2 5 29 32 */ 747, /* OBJ_policy_mappings 2 5 29 33 */ 90, /* OBJ_authority_key_identifier 2 5 29 35 */ 401, /* OBJ_policy_constraints 2 5 29 36 */ 126, /* OBJ_ext_key_usage 2 5 29 37 */ 857, /* OBJ_freshest_crl 2 5 29 46 */ 748, /* OBJ_inhibit_any_policy 2 5 29 54 */ 402, /* OBJ_target_information 2 5 29 55 */ 403, /* OBJ_no_rev_avail 2 5 29 56 */ 513, /* OBJ_set_ctype 2 23 42 0 */ 514, /* OBJ_set_msgExt 2 23 42 1 */ 515, /* OBJ_set_attr 2 23 42 3 */ 516, /* OBJ_set_policy 2 23 42 5 */ 517, /* OBJ_set_certExt 2 23 42 7 */ 518, /* OBJ_set_brand 2 23 42 8 */ 679, /* OBJ_wap_wsg 2 23 43 1 */ 382, /* OBJ_Directory 1 3 6 1 1 */ 383, /* OBJ_Management 1 3 6 1 2 */ 384, /* OBJ_Experimental 1 3 6 1 3 */ 385, /* OBJ_Private 1 3 6 1 4 */ 386, /* OBJ_Security 1 3 6 1 5 */ 387, /* OBJ_SNMPv2 1 3 6 1 6 */ 388, /* OBJ_Mail 1 3 6 1 7 */ 376, /* OBJ_algorithm 1 3 14 3 2 */ 395, /* OBJ_clearance 2 5 1 5 55 */ 19, /* OBJ_rsa 2 5 8 1 1 */ 96, /* OBJ_mdc2WithRSA 2 5 8 3 100 */ 95, /* OBJ_mdc2 2 5 8 3 101 */ 746, /* OBJ_any_policy 2 5 29 32 0 */ 910, /* OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage 2 5 29 37 0 */ 519, /* OBJ_setct_PANData 2 23 42 0 0 */ 520, /* OBJ_setct_PANToken 2 23 42 0 1 */ 521, /* OBJ_setct_PANOnly 2 23 42 0 2 */ 522, /* OBJ_setct_OIData 2 23 42 0 3 */ 523, /* OBJ_setct_PI 2 23 42 0 4 */ 524, /* OBJ_setct_PIData 2 23 42 0 5 */ 525, /* OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned 2 23 42 0 6 */ 526, /* OBJ_setct_HODInput 2 23 42 0 7 */ 527, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage 2 23 42 0 8 */ 528, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage 2 23 42 0 9 */ 529, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage 2 23 42 0 10 */ 530, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq 2 23 42 0 11 */ 531, /* OBJ_setct_PInitResData 2 23 42 0 12 */ 532, /* OBJ_setct_PI_TBS 2 23 42 0 13 */ 533, /* OBJ_setct_PResData 2 23 42 0 14 */ 534, /* OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS 2 23 42 0 16 */ 535, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS 2 23 42 0 17 */ 536, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX 2 23 42 0 18 */ 537, /* OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS 2 23 42 0 19 */ 538, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenData 2 23 42 0 20 */ 539, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS 2 23 42 0 21 */ 540, /* OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg 2 23 42 0 22 */ 541, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS 2 23 42 0 23 */ 542, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData 2 23 42 0 24 */ 543, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS 2 23 42 0 25 */ 544, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS 2 23 42 0 26 */ 545, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 27 */ 546, /* OBJ_setct_CapResData 2 23 42 0 28 */ 547, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS 2 23 42 0 29 */ 548, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 30 */ 549, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevResData 2 23 42 0 31 */ 550, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS 2 23 42 0 32 */ 551, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 33 */ 552, /* OBJ_setct_CredResData 2 23 42 0 34 */ 553, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS 2 23 42 0 35 */ 554, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 36 */ 555, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevResData 2 23 42 0 37 */ 556, /* OBJ_setct_PCertReqData 2 23 42 0 38 */ 557, /* OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS 2 23 42 0 39 */ 558, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData 2 23 42 0 40 */ 559, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData 2 23 42 0 41 */ 560, /* OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS 2 23 42 0 42 */ 561, /* OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS 2 23 42 0 43 */ 562, /* OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS 2 23 42 0 44 */ 563, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqData 2 23 42 0 45 */ 564, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS 2 23 42 0 46 */ 565, /* OBJ_setct_CertResData 2 23 42 0 47 */ 566, /* OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS 2 23 42 0 48 */ 567, /* OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS 2 23 42 0 49 */ 568, /* OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE 2 23 42 0 50 */ 569, /* OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE 2 23 42 0 51 */ 570, /* OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE 2 23 42 0 52 */ 571, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE 2 23 42 0 53 */ 572, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX 2 23 42 0 54 */ 573, /* OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE 2 23 42 0 55 */ 574, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE 2 23 42 0 56 */ 575, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX 2 23 42 0 57 */ 576, /* OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE 2 23 42 0 58 */ 577, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE 2 23 42 0 59 */ 578, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE 2 23 42 0 60 */ 579, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB 2 23 42 0 61 */ 580, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE 2 23 42 0 62 */ 581, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 63 */ 582, /* OBJ_setct_CapResTBE 2 23 42 0 64 */ 583, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE 2 23 42 0 65 */ 584, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 66 */ 585, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE 2 23 42 0 67 */ 586, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE 2 23 42 0 68 */ 587, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 69 */ 588, /* OBJ_setct_CredResTBE 2 23 42 0 70 */ 589, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE 2 23 42 0 71 */ 590, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 72 */ 591, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE 2 23 42 0 73 */ 592, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE 2 23 42 0 74 */ 593, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE 2 23 42 0 75 */ 594, /* OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE 2 23 42 0 76 */ 595, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE 2 23 42 0 77 */ 596, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 78 */ 597, /* OBJ_setct_CertResTBE 2 23 42 0 79 */ 598, /* OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS 2 23 42 0 80 */ 599, /* OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS 2 23 42 0 81 */ 600, /* OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS 2 23 42 0 82 */ 601, /* OBJ_setext_genCrypt 2 23 42 1 1 */ 602, /* OBJ_setext_miAuth 2 23 42 1 3 */ 603, /* OBJ_setext_pinSecure 2 23 42 1 4 */ 604, /* OBJ_setext_pinAny 2 23 42 1 5 */ 605, /* OBJ_setext_track2 2 23 42 1 7 */ 606, /* OBJ_setext_cv 2 23 42 1 8 */ 620, /* OBJ_setAttr_Cert 2 23 42 3 0 */ 621, /* OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap 2 23 42 3 1 */ 622, /* OBJ_setAttr_TokenType 2 23 42 3 2 */ 623, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap 2 23 42 3 3 */ 607, /* OBJ_set_policy_root 2 23 42 5 0 */ 608, /* OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot 2 23 42 7 0 */ 609, /* OBJ_setCext_certType 2 23 42 7 1 */ 610, /* OBJ_setCext_merchData 2 23 42 7 2 */ 611, /* OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired 2 23 42 7 3 */ 612, /* OBJ_setCext_tunneling 2 23 42 7 4 */ 613, /* OBJ_setCext_setExt 2 23 42 7 5 */ 614, /* OBJ_setCext_setQualf 2 23 42 7 6 */ 615, /* OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities 2 23 42 7 7 */ 616, /* OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier 2 23 42 7 8 */ 617, /* OBJ_setCext_Track2Data 2 23 42 7 9 */ 618, /* OBJ_setCext_TokenType 2 23 42 7 10 */ 619, /* OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities 2 23 42 7 11 */ 636, /* OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA 2 23 42 8 1 */ 640, /* OBJ_set_brand_Visa 2 23 42 8 4 */ 641, /* OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard 2 23 42 8 5 */ 637, /* OBJ_set_brand_Diners 2 23 42 8 30 */ 638, /* OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress 2 23 42 8 34 */ 639, /* OBJ_set_brand_JCB 2 23 42 8 35 */ 805, /* OBJ_cryptopro 1 2 643 2 2 */ 806, /* OBJ_cryptocom 1 2 643 2 9 */ 974, /* OBJ_id_tc26 1 2 643 7 1 */ 1005, /* OBJ_OGRN 1 2 643 100 1 */ 1006, /* OBJ_SNILS 1 2 643 100 3 */ 1007, /* OBJ_subjectSignTool 1 2 643 100 111 */ 1008, /* OBJ_issuerSignTool 1 2 643 100 112 */ 184, /* OBJ_X9_57 1 2 840 10040 */ 405, /* OBJ_ansi_X9_62 1 2 840 10045 */ 389, /* OBJ_Enterprises 1 3 6 1 4 1 */ 504, /* OBJ_mime_mhs 1 3 6 1 7 1 */ 104, /* OBJ_md5WithRSA 1 3 14 3 2 3 */ 29, /* OBJ_des_ecb 1 3 14 3 2 6 */ 31, /* OBJ_des_cbc 1 3 14 3 2 7 */ 45, /* OBJ_des_ofb64 1 3 14 3 2 8 */ 30, /* OBJ_des_cfb64 1 3 14 3 2 9 */ 377, /* OBJ_rsaSignature 1 3 14 3 2 11 */ 67, /* OBJ_dsa_2 1 3 14 3 2 12 */ 66, /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA 1 3 14 3 2 13 */ 42, /* OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption 1 3 14 3 2 15 */ 32, /* OBJ_des_ede_ecb 1 3 14 3 2 17 */ 41, /* OBJ_sha 1 3 14 3 2 18 */ 64, /* OBJ_sha1 1 3 14 3 2 26 */ 70, /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 1 3 14 3 2 27 */ 115, /* OBJ_sha1WithRSA 1 3 14 3 2 29 */ 117, /* OBJ_ripemd160 1 3 36 3 2 1 */ 143, /* OBJ_sxnet 1 3 101 1 4 1 */ 721, /* OBJ_sect163k1 1 3 132 0 1 */ 722, /* OBJ_sect163r1 1 3 132 0 2 */ 728, /* OBJ_sect239k1 1 3 132 0 3 */ 717, /* OBJ_sect113r1 1 3 132 0 4 */ 718, /* OBJ_sect113r2 1 3 132 0 5 */ 704, /* OBJ_secp112r1 1 3 132 0 6 */ 705, /* OBJ_secp112r2 1 3 132 0 7 */ 709, /* OBJ_secp160r1 1 3 132 0 8 */ 708, /* OBJ_secp160k1 1 3 132 0 9 */ 714, /* OBJ_secp256k1 1 3 132 0 10 */ 723, /* OBJ_sect163r2 1 3 132 0 15 */ 729, /* OBJ_sect283k1 1 3 132 0 16 */ 730, /* OBJ_sect283r1 1 3 132 0 17 */ 719, /* OBJ_sect131r1 1 3 132 0 22 */ 720, /* OBJ_sect131r2 1 3 132 0 23 */ 724, /* OBJ_sect193r1 1 3 132 0 24 */ 725, /* OBJ_sect193r2 1 3 132 0 25 */ 726, /* OBJ_sect233k1 1 3 132 0 26 */ 727, /* OBJ_sect233r1 1 3 132 0 27 */ 706, /* OBJ_secp128r1 1 3 132 0 28 */ 707, /* OBJ_secp128r2 1 3 132 0 29 */ 710, /* OBJ_secp160r2 1 3 132 0 30 */ 711, /* OBJ_secp192k1 1 3 132 0 31 */ 712, /* OBJ_secp224k1 1 3 132 0 32 */ 713, /* OBJ_secp224r1 1 3 132 0 33 */ 715, /* OBJ_secp384r1 1 3 132 0 34 */ 716, /* OBJ_secp521r1 1 3 132 0 35 */ 731, /* OBJ_sect409k1 1 3 132 0 36 */ 732, /* OBJ_sect409r1 1 3 132 0 37 */ 733, /* OBJ_sect571k1 1 3 132 0 38 */ 734, /* OBJ_sect571r1 1 3 132 0 39 */ 624, /* OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb 2 23 42 3 0 0 */ 625, /* OBJ_set_addPolicy 2 23 42 3 0 1 */ 626, /* OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV 2 23 42 3 2 1 */ 627, /* OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime 2 23 42 3 2 2 */ 628, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM 2 23 42 3 3 3 */ 629, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2 2 23 42 3 3 4 */ 630, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig 2 23 42 3 3 5 */ 642, /* OBJ_set_brand_Novus 2 23 42 8 6011 */ 735, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 2 23 43 1 4 1 */ 736, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 2 23 43 1 4 3 */ 737, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 2 23 43 1 4 4 */ 738, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 2 23 43 1 4 5 */ 739, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 2 23 43 1 4 6 */ 740, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 2 23 43 1 4 7 */ 741, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 2 23 43 1 4 8 */ 742, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 2 23 43 1 4 9 */ 743, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 2 23 43 1 4 10 */ 744, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 2 23 43 1 4 11 */ 745, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 2 23 43 1 4 12 */ 804, /* OBJ_whirlpool 1 0 10118 3 0 55 */ 773, /* OBJ_kisa 1 2 410 200004 */ 807, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 1 2 643 2 2 3 */ 808, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 1 2 643 2 2 4 */ 809, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94 1 2 643 2 2 9 */ 810, /* OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94 1 2 643 2 2 10 */ 811, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001 1 2 643 2 2 19 */ 812, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94 1 2 643 2 2 20 */ 813, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89 1 2 643 2 2 21 */ 815, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC 1 2 643 2 2 22 */ 816, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf 1 2 643 2 2 23 */ 817, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH 1 2 643 2 2 98 */ 818, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH 1 2 643 2 2 99 */ 977, /* OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms 1 2 643 7 1 1 */ 994, /* OBJ_id_tc26_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 */ 1, /* OBJ_rsadsi 1 2 840 113549 */ 185, /* OBJ_X9cm 1 2 840 10040 4 */ 1031, /* OBJ_id_pkinit 1 3 6 1 5 2 3 */ 127, /* OBJ_id_pkix 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 */ 505, /* OBJ_mime_mhs_headings 1 3 6 1 7 1 1 */ 506, /* OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies 1 3 6 1 7 1 2 */ 119, /* OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA 1 3 36 3 3 1 2 */ 937, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 0 */ 938, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 1 */ 939, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 2 */ 940, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 3 */ 942, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 0 */ 943, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 1 */ 944, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 2 */ 945, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 3 */ 631, /* OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm 2 23 42 3 3 3 1 */ 632, /* OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc 2 23 42 3 3 4 1 */ 633, /* OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt 2 23 42 3 3 4 2 */ 634, /* OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig 2 23 42 3 3 5 1 */ 635, /* OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig 2 23 42 3 3 5 2 */ 436, /* OBJ_ucl 0 9 2342 19200300 */ 820, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing 1 2 643 2 2 14 0 */ 819, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing 1 2 643 2 2 14 1 */ 845, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a 1 2 643 2 2 20 1 */ 846, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis 1 2 643 2 2 20 2 */ 847, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b 1 2 643 2 2 20 3 */ 848, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis 1 2 643 2 2 20 4 */ 821, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 30 0 */ 822, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 30 1 */ 823, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 0 */ 824, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 1 */ 825, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 2 */ 826, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 3 */ 827, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 4 */ 828, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 5 */ 829, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 6 */ 830, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 7 */ 831, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 0 */ 832, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 2 */ 833, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 3 */ 834, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 4 */ 835, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 5 */ 836, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 1 */ 837, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 2 */ 838, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 3 */ 839, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 0 */ 840, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 1 */ 841, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 2 */ 842, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 3 */ 843, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 36 0 */ 844, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 36 1 */ 978, /* OBJ_id_tc26_sign 1 2 643 7 1 1 1 */ 981, /* OBJ_id_tc26_digest 1 2 643 7 1 1 2 */ 984, /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 */ 987, /* OBJ_id_tc26_mac 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 */ 990, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 */ 991, /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 */ 995, /* OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 */ 1000, /* OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 2 */ 1001, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 5 */ 2, /* OBJ_pkcs 1 2 840 113549 1 */ 431, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_none 1 2 840 10040 2 1 */ 432, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer 1 2 840 10040 2 2 */ 433, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_reject 1 2 840 10040 2 3 */ 116, /* OBJ_dsa 1 2 840 10040 4 1 */ 113, /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 1 2 840 10040 4 3 */ 406, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime_field 1 2 840 10045 1 1 */ 407, /* OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field 1 2 840 10045 1 2 */ 408, /* OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey 1 2 840 10045 2 1 */ 416, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1 1 2 840 10045 4 1 */ 791, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended 1 2 840 10045 4 2 */ 792, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified 1 2 840 10045 4 3 */ 920, /* OBJ_dhpublicnumber 1 2 840 10046 2 1 */ 1032, /* OBJ_pkInitClientAuth 1 3 6 1 5 2 3 4 */ 1033, /* OBJ_pkInitKDC 1 3 6 1 5 2 3 5 */ 258, /* OBJ_id_pkix_mod 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 */ 175, /* OBJ_id_pe 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 */ 259, /* OBJ_id_qt 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 */ 128, /* OBJ_id_kp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 */ 260, /* OBJ_id_it 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 */ 261, /* OBJ_id_pkip 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 */ 262, /* OBJ_id_alg 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 */ 263, /* OBJ_id_cmc 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 */ 264, /* OBJ_id_on 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 */ 265, /* OBJ_id_pda 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 */ 266, /* OBJ_id_aca 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 */ 267, /* OBJ_id_qcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 11 */ 268, /* OBJ_id_cct 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 */ 662, /* OBJ_id_ppl 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 */ 176, /* OBJ_id_ad 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 */ 507, /* OBJ_id_hex_partial_message 1 3 6 1 7 1 1 1 */ 508, /* OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message 1 3 6 1 7 1 1 2 */ 57, /* OBJ_netscape 2 16 840 1 113730 */ 754, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ecb 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 1 */ 766, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 3 */ 757, /* OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 4 */ 961, /* OBJ_camellia_128_gcm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 6 */ 962, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ccm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 7 */ 963, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ctr 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 9 */ 964, /* OBJ_camellia_128_cmac 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 10 */ 755, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ecb 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 21 */ 767, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 23 */ 758, /* OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 24 */ 965, /* OBJ_camellia_192_gcm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 26 */ 966, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ccm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 27 */ 967, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ctr 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 29 */ 968, /* OBJ_camellia_192_cmac 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 30 */ 756, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ecb 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 41 */ 768, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 43 */ 759, /* OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 44 */ 969, /* OBJ_camellia_256_gcm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 46 */ 970, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ccm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 47 */ 971, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ctr 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 49 */ 972, /* OBJ_camellia_256_cmac 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 50 */ 437, /* OBJ_pilot 0 9 2342 19200300 100 */ 776, /* OBJ_seed_ecb 1 2 410 200004 1 3 */ 777, /* OBJ_seed_cbc 1 2 410 200004 1 4 */ 779, /* OBJ_seed_cfb128 1 2 410 200004 1 5 */ 778, /* OBJ_seed_ofb128 1 2 410 200004 1 6 */ 852, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 3 3 */ 853, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 3 4 */ 850, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 5 3 */ 851, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 5 4 */ 849, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 6 1 */ 854, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 8 1 */ 1004, /* OBJ_INN 1 2 643 3 131 1 1 */ 979, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1 */ 980, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 1 2 */ 982, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 2 2 */ 983, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 2 3 */ 985, /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2 */ 986, /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3 */ 988, /* OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 1 */ 989, /* OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 2 */ 992, /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 1 */ 993, /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 2 */ 996, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 */ 1002, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 5 1 */ 186, /* OBJ_pkcs1 1 2 840 113549 1 1 */ 27, /* OBJ_pkcs3 1 2 840 113549 1 3 */ 187, /* OBJ_pkcs5 1 2 840 113549 1 5 */ 20, /* OBJ_pkcs7 1 2 840 113549 1 7 */ 47, /* OBJ_pkcs9 1 2 840 113549 1 9 */ 3, /* OBJ_md2 1 2 840 113549 2 2 */ 257, /* OBJ_md4 1 2 840 113549 2 4 */ 4, /* OBJ_md5 1 2 840 113549 2 5 */ 797, /* OBJ_hmacWithMD5 1 2 840 113549 2 6 */ 163, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 1 2 840 113549 2 7 */ 798, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA224 1 2 840 113549 2 8 */ 799, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA256 1 2 840 113549 2 9 */ 800, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA384 1 2 840 113549 2 10 */ 801, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA512 1 2 840 113549 2 11 */ 37, /* OBJ_rc2_cbc 1 2 840 113549 3 2 */ 5, /* OBJ_rc4 1 2 840 113549 3 4 */ 44, /* OBJ_des_ede3_cbc 1 2 840 113549 3 7 */ 120, /* OBJ_rc5_cbc 1 2 840 113549 3 8 */ 643, /* OBJ_des_cdmf 1 2 840 113549 3 10 */ 680, /* OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 */ 684, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 1 */ 685, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 1 2 840 10045 3 0 2 */ 686, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 1 2 840 10045 3 0 3 */ 687, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 4 */ 688, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 5 */ 689, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 1 2 840 10045 3 0 6 */ 690, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 1 2 840 10045 3 0 7 */ 691, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4 1 2 840 10045 3 0 8 */ 692, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5 1 2 840 10045 3 0 9 */ 693, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 10 */ 694, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 11 */ 695, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 1 2 840 10045 3 0 12 */ 696, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 1 2 840 10045 3 0 13 */ 697, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4 1 2 840 10045 3 0 14 */ 698, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5 1 2 840 10045 3 0 15 */ 699, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 16 */ 700, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 17 */ 701, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 18 */ 702, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 19 */ 703, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 20 */ 409, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1 1 2 840 10045 3 1 1 */ 410, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2 1 2 840 10045 3 1 2 */ 411, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3 1 2 840 10045 3 1 3 */ 412, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1 1 2 840 10045 3 1 4 */ 413, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2 1 2 840 10045 3 1 5 */ 414, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3 1 2 840 10045 3 1 6 */ 415, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1 1 2 840 10045 3 1 7 */ 793, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224 1 2 840 10045 4 3 1 */ 794, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256 1 2 840 10045 4 3 2 */ 795, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384 1 2 840 10045 4 3 3 */ 796, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512 1 2 840 10045 4 3 4 */ 269, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 1 */ 270, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 2 */ 271, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 3 */ 272, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 4 */ 273, /* OBJ_id_mod_crmf 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 5 */ 274, /* OBJ_id_mod_cmc 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 6 */ 275, /* OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 7 */ 276, /* OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 8 */ 277, /* OBJ_id_mod_cmp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 9 */ 278, /* OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 10 */ 279, /* OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 11 */ 280, /* OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 12 */ 281, /* OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 13 */ 282, /* OBJ_id_mod_ocsp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 14 */ 283, /* OBJ_id_mod_dvcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 15 */ 284, /* OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 16 */ 177, /* OBJ_info_access 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1 */ 285, /* OBJ_biometricInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 2 */ 286, /* OBJ_qcStatements 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 */ 287, /* OBJ_ac_auditEntity 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 4 */ 288, /* OBJ_ac_targeting 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 5 */ 289, /* OBJ_aaControls 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 6 */ 290, /* OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7 */ 291, /* OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 8 */ 292, /* OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 9 */ 397, /* OBJ_ac_proxying 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 10 */ 398, /* OBJ_sinfo_access 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11 */ 663, /* OBJ_proxyCertInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 14 */ 1020, /* OBJ_tlsfeature 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 24 */ 164, /* OBJ_id_qt_cps 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1 */ 165, /* OBJ_id_qt_unotice 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 2 */ 293, /* OBJ_textNotice 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 3 */ 129, /* OBJ_server_auth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 1 */ 130, /* OBJ_client_auth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 2 */ 131, /* OBJ_code_sign 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 3 */ 132, /* OBJ_email_protect 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 4 */ 294, /* OBJ_ipsecEndSystem 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 5 */ 295, /* OBJ_ipsecTunnel 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 6 */ 296, /* OBJ_ipsecUser 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 7 */ 133, /* OBJ_time_stamp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 8 */ 180, /* OBJ_OCSP_sign 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 9 */ 297, /* OBJ_dvcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 10 */ 1022, /* OBJ_ipsec_IKE 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 17 */ 1023, /* OBJ_capwapAC 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 18 */ 1024, /* OBJ_capwapWTP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 19 */ 1025, /* OBJ_sshClient 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 21 */ 1026, /* OBJ_sshServer 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 22 */ 1027, /* OBJ_sendRouter 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 23 */ 1028, /* OBJ_sendProxiedRouter 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 24 */ 1029, /* OBJ_sendOwner 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 25 */ 1030, /* OBJ_sendProxiedOwner 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 26 */ 298, /* OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 1 */ 299, /* OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 2 */ 300, /* OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 3 */ 301, /* OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 4 */ 302, /* OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 5 */ 303, /* OBJ_id_it_currentCRL 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 6 */ 304, /* OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 7 */ 305, /* OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 8 */ 306, /* OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 9 */ 307, /* OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 10 */ 308, /* OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 11 */ 309, /* OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 12 */ 310, /* OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 13 */ 311, /* OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 14 */ 312, /* OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 15 */ 784, /* OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 16 */ 313, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 */ 314, /* OBJ_id_regInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 */ 323, /* OBJ_id_alg_des40 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 1 */ 324, /* OBJ_id_alg_noSignature 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 2 */ 325, /* OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 3 */ 326, /* OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 4 */ 327, /* OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 1 */ 328, /* OBJ_id_cmc_identification 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 2 */ 329, /* OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 3 */ 330, /* OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 4 */ 331, /* OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 5 */ 332, /* OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 6 */ 333, /* OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 7 */ 334, /* OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 8 */ 335, /* OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 9 */ 336, /* OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 10 */ 337, /* OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 11 */ 338, /* OBJ_id_cmc_getCert 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 15 */ 339, /* OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 16 */ 340, /* OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 17 */ 341, /* OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 18 */ 342, /* OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 19 */ 343, /* OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 21 */ 344, /* OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 22 */ 345, /* OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 23 */ 346, /* OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 24 */ 347, /* OBJ_id_on_personalData 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 1 */ 858, /* OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 3 */ 348, /* OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 1 */ 349, /* OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 2 */ 351, /* OBJ_id_pda_gender 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 3 */ 352, /* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 4 */ 353, /* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 5 */ 354, /* OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 1 */ 355, /* OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 2 */ 356, /* OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 3 */ 357, /* OBJ_id_aca_group 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 4 */ 358, /* OBJ_id_aca_role 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 5 */ 399, /* OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 6 */ 359, /* OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 11 1 */ 360, /* OBJ_id_cct_crs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 1 */ 361, /* OBJ_id_cct_PKIData 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 2 */ 362, /* OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 3 */ 664, /* OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 0 */ 665, /* OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 1 */ 667, /* OBJ_Independent 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 2 */ 178, /* OBJ_ad_OCSP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 */ 179, /* OBJ_ad_ca_issuers 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2 */ 363, /* OBJ_ad_timeStamping 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 3 */ 364, /* OBJ_ad_dvcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 4 */ 785, /* OBJ_caRepository 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 5 */ 780, /* OBJ_hmac_md5 1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 1 */ 781, /* OBJ_hmac_sha1 1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2 */ 58, /* OBJ_netscape_cert_extension 2 16 840 1 113730 1 */ 59, /* OBJ_netscape_data_type 2 16 840 1 113730 2 */ 438, /* OBJ_pilotAttributeType 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 */ 439, /* OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax 0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 */ 440, /* OBJ_pilotObjectClass 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 */ 441, /* OBJ_pilotGroups 0 9 2342 19200300 100 10 */ 997, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 0 */ 998, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 1 */ 999, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 2 */ 1003, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z 1 2 643 7 1 2 5 1 1 */ 108, /* OBJ_cast5_cbc 1 2 840 113533 7 66 10 */ 112, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 1 2 840 113533 7 66 12 */ 782, /* OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC 1 2 840 113533 7 66 13 */ 783, /* OBJ_id_DHBasedMac 1 2 840 113533 7 66 30 */ 6, /* OBJ_rsaEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 */ 7, /* OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 2 */ 396, /* OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 3 */ 8, /* OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 4 */ 65, /* OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 */ 644, /* OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET 1 2 840 113549 1 1 6 */ 919, /* OBJ_rsaesOaep 1 2 840 113549 1 1 7 */ 911, /* OBJ_mgf1 1 2 840 113549 1 1 8 */ 935, /* OBJ_pSpecified 1 2 840 113549 1 1 9 */ 912, /* OBJ_rsassaPss 1 2 840 113549 1 1 10 */ 668, /* OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 11 */ 669, /* OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 12 */ 670, /* OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 13 */ 671, /* OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 14 */ 28, /* OBJ_dhKeyAgreement 1 2 840 113549 1 3 1 */ 9, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 1 */ 10, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 3 */ 168, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 4 */ 169, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 6 */ 170, /* OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 10 */ 68, /* OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 11 */ 69, /* OBJ_id_pbkdf2 1 2 840 113549 1 5 12 */ 161, /* OBJ_pbes2 1 2 840 113549 1 5 13 */ 162, /* OBJ_pbmac1 1 2 840 113549 1 5 14 */ 21, /* OBJ_pkcs7_data 1 2 840 113549 1 7 1 */ 22, /* OBJ_pkcs7_signed 1 2 840 113549 1 7 2 */ 23, /* OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped 1 2 840 113549 1 7 3 */ 24, /* OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped 1 2 840 113549 1 7 4 */ 25, /* OBJ_pkcs7_digest 1 2 840 113549 1 7 5 */ 26, /* OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted 1 2 840 113549 1 7 6 */ 48, /* OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress 1 2 840 113549 1 9 1 */ 49, /* OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName 1 2 840 113549 1 9 2 */ 50, /* OBJ_pkcs9_contentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 3 */ 51, /* OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest 1 2 840 113549 1 9 4 */ 52, /* OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime 1 2 840 113549 1 9 5 */ 53, /* OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature 1 2 840 113549 1 9 6 */ 54, /* OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword 1 2 840 113549 1 9 7 */ 55, /* OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress 1 2 840 113549 1 9 8 */ 56, /* OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes 1 2 840 113549 1 9 9 */ 172, /* OBJ_ext_req 1 2 840 113549 1 9 14 */ 167, /* OBJ_SMIMECapabilities 1 2 840 113549 1 9 15 */ 188, /* OBJ_SMIME 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 */ 156, /* OBJ_friendlyName 1 2 840 113549 1 9 20 */ 157, /* OBJ_localKeyID 1 2 840 113549 1 9 21 */ 681, /* OBJ_X9_62_onBasis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 1 */ 682, /* OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 2 */ 683, /* OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 3 */ 417, /* OBJ_ms_csp_name 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 1 */ 856, /* OBJ_LocalKeySet 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 2 */ 390, /* OBJ_dcObject 1 3 6 1 4 1 1466 344 */ 91, /* OBJ_bf_cbc 1 3 6 1 4 1 3029 1 2 */ 973, /* OBJ_id_scrypt 1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 11 */ 315, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 1 */ 316, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 2 */ 317, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 3 */ 318, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 4 */ 319, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 5 */ 320, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 6 */ 321, /* OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 1 */ 322, /* OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 2 */ 365, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 1 */ 366, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2 */ 367, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 3 */ 368, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 4 */ 369, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 5 */ 370, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 6 */ 371, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 7 */ 372, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 8 */ 373, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 9 */ 374, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 10 */ 375, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 11 */ 921, /* OBJ_brainpoolP160r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 1 */ 922, /* OBJ_brainpoolP160t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 2 */ 923, /* OBJ_brainpoolP192r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 3 */ 924, /* OBJ_brainpoolP192t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 4 */ 925, /* OBJ_brainpoolP224r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 5 */ 926, /* OBJ_brainpoolP224t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 6 */ 927, /* OBJ_brainpoolP256r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 7 */ 928, /* OBJ_brainpoolP256t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 8 */ 929, /* OBJ_brainpoolP320r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 9 */ 930, /* OBJ_brainpoolP320t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 10 */ 931, /* OBJ_brainpoolP384r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 11 */ 932, /* OBJ_brainpoolP384t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 12 */ 933, /* OBJ_brainpoolP512r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 13 */ 934, /* OBJ_brainpoolP512t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 14 */ 936, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0 2 */ 941, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0 3 */ 418, /* OBJ_aes_128_ecb 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 1 */ 419, /* OBJ_aes_128_cbc 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 2 */ 420, /* OBJ_aes_128_ofb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 3 */ 421, /* OBJ_aes_128_cfb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 4 */ 788, /* OBJ_id_aes128_wrap 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 5 */ 895, /* OBJ_aes_128_gcm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 6 */ 896, /* OBJ_aes_128_ccm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 7 */ 897, /* OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 8 */ 422, /* OBJ_aes_192_ecb 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 21 */ 423, /* OBJ_aes_192_cbc 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 22 */ 424, /* OBJ_aes_192_ofb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 23 */ 425, /* OBJ_aes_192_cfb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 24 */ 789, /* OBJ_id_aes192_wrap 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 25 */ 898, /* OBJ_aes_192_gcm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 26 */ 899, /* OBJ_aes_192_ccm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 27 */ 900, /* OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 28 */ 426, /* OBJ_aes_256_ecb 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 41 */ 427, /* OBJ_aes_256_cbc 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 42 */ 428, /* OBJ_aes_256_ofb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 43 */ 429, /* OBJ_aes_256_cfb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 44 */ 790, /* OBJ_id_aes256_wrap 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 45 */ 901, /* OBJ_aes_256_gcm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 46 */ 902, /* OBJ_aes_256_ccm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 47 */ 903, /* OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 48 */ 672, /* OBJ_sha256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1 */ 673, /* OBJ_sha384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 2 */ 674, /* OBJ_sha512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 3 */ 675, /* OBJ_sha224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 4 */ 802, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 1 */ 803, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 2 */ 71, /* OBJ_netscape_cert_type 2 16 840 1 113730 1 1 */ 72, /* OBJ_netscape_base_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 2 */ 73, /* OBJ_netscape_revocation_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 3 */ 74, /* OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 4 */ 75, /* OBJ_netscape_renewal_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 7 */ 76, /* OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 8 */ 77, /* OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name 2 16 840 1 113730 1 12 */ 78, /* OBJ_netscape_comment 2 16 840 1 113730 1 13 */ 79, /* OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence 2 16 840 1 113730 2 5 */ 139, /* OBJ_ns_sgc 2 16 840 1 113730 4 1 */ 458, /* OBJ_userId 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 1 */ 459, /* OBJ_textEncodedORAddress 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 2 */ 460, /* OBJ_rfc822Mailbox 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 3 */ 461, /* OBJ_info 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 4 */ 462, /* OBJ_favouriteDrink 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 5 */ 463, /* OBJ_roomNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 6 */ 464, /* OBJ_photo 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 7 */ 465, /* OBJ_userClass 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 8 */ 466, /* OBJ_host 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 9 */ 467, /* OBJ_manager 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 10 */ 468, /* OBJ_documentIdentifier 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 11 */ 469, /* OBJ_documentTitle 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 12 */ 470, /* OBJ_documentVersion 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 13 */ 471, /* OBJ_documentAuthor 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 14 */ 472, /* OBJ_documentLocation 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 15 */ 473, /* OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 20 */ 474, /* OBJ_secretary 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 21 */ 475, /* OBJ_otherMailbox 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 22 */ 476, /* OBJ_lastModifiedTime 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 23 */ 477, /* OBJ_lastModifiedBy 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 24 */ 391, /* OBJ_domainComponent 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 */ 478, /* OBJ_aRecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 26 */ 479, /* OBJ_pilotAttributeType27 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 27 */ 480, /* OBJ_mXRecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 28 */ 481, /* OBJ_nSRecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 29 */ 482, /* OBJ_sOARecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 30 */ 483, /* OBJ_cNAMERecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 31 */ 484, /* OBJ_associatedDomain 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 37 */ 485, /* OBJ_associatedName 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 38 */ 486, /* OBJ_homePostalAddress 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 39 */ 487, /* OBJ_personalTitle 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 40 */ 488, /* OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 41 */ 489, /* OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 42 */ 490, /* OBJ_friendlyCountryName 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 43 */ 102, /* OBJ_uniqueIdentifier 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 44 */ 491, /* OBJ_organizationalStatus 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 45 */ 492, /* OBJ_janetMailbox 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 46 */ 493, /* OBJ_mailPreferenceOption 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 47 */ 494, /* OBJ_buildingName 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 48 */ 495, /* OBJ_dSAQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 49 */ 496, /* OBJ_singleLevelQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 50 */ 497, /* OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 51 */ 498, /* OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 52 */ 499, /* OBJ_personalSignature 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 53 */ 500, /* OBJ_dITRedirect 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 54 */ 501, /* OBJ_audio 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 55 */ 502, /* OBJ_documentPublisher 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 56 */ 442, /* OBJ_iA5StringSyntax 0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 4 */ 443, /* OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax 0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 5 */ 444, /* OBJ_pilotObject 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 3 */ 445, /* OBJ_pilotPerson 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 4 */ 446, /* OBJ_account 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 5 */ 447, /* OBJ_document 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 6 */ 448, /* OBJ_room 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 7 */ 449, /* OBJ_documentSeries 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 9 */ 392, /* OBJ_Domain 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 13 */ 450, /* OBJ_rFC822localPart 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 14 */ 451, /* OBJ_dNSDomain 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 15 */ 452, /* OBJ_domainRelatedObject 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 17 */ 453, /* OBJ_friendlyCountry 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 18 */ 454, /* OBJ_simpleSecurityObject 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 19 */ 455, /* OBJ_pilotOrganization 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 20 */ 456, /* OBJ_pilotDSA 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 21 */ 457, /* OBJ_qualityLabelledData 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 22 */ 189, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 */ 190, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 */ 191, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 */ 192, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 */ 193, /* OBJ_id_smime_cd 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 4 */ 194, /* OBJ_id_smime_spq 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 */ 195, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 */ 158, /* OBJ_x509Certificate 1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 1 */ 159, /* OBJ_sdsiCertificate 1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 2 */ 160, /* OBJ_x509Crl 1 2 840 113549 1 9 23 1 */ 144, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 1 */ 145, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 2 */ 146, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 3 */ 147, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 4 */ 148, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 5 */ 149, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 6 */ 171, /* OBJ_ms_ext_req 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 14 */ 134, /* OBJ_ms_code_ind 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 21 */ 135, /* OBJ_ms_code_com 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 22 */ 136, /* OBJ_ms_ctl_sign 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 1 */ 137, /* OBJ_ms_sgc 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 3 */ 138, /* OBJ_ms_efs 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 4 */ 648, /* OBJ_ms_smartcard_login 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 2 */ 649, /* OBJ_ms_upn 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 3 */ 951, /* OBJ_ct_precert_scts 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 2 */ 952, /* OBJ_ct_precert_poison 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 3 */ 953, /* OBJ_ct_precert_signer 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 4 */ 954, /* OBJ_ct_cert_scts 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 5 */ 751, /* OBJ_camellia_128_cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 2 */ 752, /* OBJ_camellia_192_cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 3 */ 753, /* OBJ_camellia_256_cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 4 */ 907, /* OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 2 */ 908, /* OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 3 */ 909, /* OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 4 */ 196, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 1 */ 197, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 2 */ 198, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 3 */ 199, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 4 */ 200, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 5 */ 201, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 6 */ 202, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 7 */ 203, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 8 */ 204, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 1 */ 205, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 2 */ 206, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 3 */ 207, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 4 */ 208, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 5 */ 209, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 6 */ 210, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 7 */ 211, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 8 */ 786, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 9 */ 1058, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 19 */ 1059, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 23 */ 787, /* OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 27 */ 1060, /* OBJ_id_ct_xml 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 28 */ 212, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 1 */ 213, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 2 */ 214, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 3 */ 215, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 4 */ 216, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 5 */ 217, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 6 */ 218, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 7 */ 219, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 8 */ 220, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 9 */ 221, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 10 */ 222, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 11 */ 223, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 12 */ 224, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 13 */ 225, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 14 */ 226, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 15 */ 227, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 16 */ 228, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 17 */ 229, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 18 */ 230, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 19 */ 231, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 20 */ 232, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 21 */ 233, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 22 */ 234, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 23 */ 235, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 24 */ 236, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 25 */ 237, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 26 */ 238, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 27 */ 239, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 28 */ 240, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 29 */ 241, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 1 */ 242, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 2 */ 243, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 3 */ 244, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 4 */ 245, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 5 */ 246, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 6 */ 247, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 7 */ 125, /* OBJ_zlib_compression 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 8 */ 893, /* OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 9 */ 248, /* OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 4 1 */ 249, /* OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 1 */ 250, /* OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 2 */ 251, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 1 */ 252, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 2 */ 253, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 3 */ 254, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 4 */ 255, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 5 */ 256, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 6 */ 150, /* OBJ_keyBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 1 */ 151, /* OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 2 */ 152, /* OBJ_certBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 3 */ 153, /* OBJ_crlBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 4 */ 154, /* OBJ_secretBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 5 */ 155, /* OBJ_safeContentsBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 6 */ 34, /* OBJ_idea_cbc 1 3 6 1 4 1 188 7 1 1 2 */ 955, /* OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 1 */ 956, /* OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 2 */ 957, /* OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 3 */ 1056, /* OBJ_blake2b512 1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 1 16 */ 1057, /* OBJ_blake2s256 1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 2 8 */ }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/build.info0000644000000000000000000000015213176625657017006 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ o_names.c obj_dat.c obj_lib.c obj_err.c obj_xref.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt0000644000000000000000000000467013176625657017402 0ustar rootroot# OID cross reference table. # Links signatures OIDs to their corresponding public key algorithms # and digests. md2WithRSAEncryption md2 rsaEncryption md5WithRSAEncryption md5 rsaEncryption shaWithRSAEncryption sha rsaEncryption sha1WithRSAEncryption sha1 rsaEncryption md4WithRSAEncryption md4 rsaEncryption sha256WithRSAEncryption sha256 rsaEncryption sha384WithRSAEncryption sha384 rsaEncryption sha512WithRSAEncryption sha512 rsaEncryption sha224WithRSAEncryption sha224 rsaEncryption mdc2WithRSA mdc2 rsaEncryption ripemd160WithRSA ripemd160 rsaEncryption # For PSS the digest algorithm can vary and depends on the included # AlgorithmIdentifier. The digest "undef" indicates the public key # method should handle this explicitly. rsassaPss undef rsaEncryption # Alternative deprecated OIDs. By using the older "rsa" OID this # type will be recognized by not normally used. md5WithRSA md5 rsa sha1WithRSA sha1 rsa dsaWithSHA sha dsa dsaWithSHA1 sha1 dsa dsaWithSHA1_2 sha1 dsa_2 ecdsa_with_SHA1 sha1 X9_62_id_ecPublicKey ecdsa_with_SHA224 sha224 X9_62_id_ecPublicKey ecdsa_with_SHA256 sha256 X9_62_id_ecPublicKey ecdsa_with_SHA384 sha384 X9_62_id_ecPublicKey ecdsa_with_SHA512 sha512 X9_62_id_ecPublicKey ecdsa_with_Recommended undef X9_62_id_ecPublicKey ecdsa_with_Specified undef X9_62_id_ecPublicKey dsa_with_SHA224 sha224 dsa dsa_with_SHA256 sha256 dsa id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_2001 id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_94 id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_94_cc id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc id_GostR3411_94 id_GostR3410_2001_cc id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 id_GostR3411_2012_256 id_GostR3410_2012_256 id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 id_GostR3411_2012_512 id_GostR3410_2012_512 # ECDH KDFs and their corresponding message digests and schemes dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme sha1 dh_std_kdf dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme sha224 dh_std_kdf dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme sha256 dh_std_kdf dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme sha384 dh_std_kdf dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme sha512 dh_std_kdf dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme sha1 dh_cofactor_kdf dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme sha224 dh_cofactor_kdf dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme sha256 dh_cofactor_kdf dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme sha384 dh_cofactor_kdf dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme sha512 dh_cofactor_kdf openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/o_names.c0000644000000000000000000002473113176625657016630 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "obj_lcl.h" /* * We define this wrapper for two reasons. Firstly, later versions of * DEC C add linkage information to certain functions, which makes it * tricky to use them as values to regular function pointers. * Secondly, in the EDK2 build environment, the strcmp function is * actually an external function (AsciiStrCmp) with the Microsoft ABI, * so we can't transparently assign function pointers to it. * Arguably the latter is a stupidity of the UEFI environment, but * since the wrapper solves the DEC C issue too, let's just use the * same solution. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) static int obj_strcmp(const char *a, const char *b) { return strcmp(a, b); } #else #define obj_strcmp strcmp #endif /* * I use the ex_data stuff to manage the identifiers for the obj_name_types * that applications may define. I only really use the free function field. */ static LHASH_OF(OBJ_NAME) *names_lh = NULL; static int names_type_num = OBJ_NAME_TYPE_NUM; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = NULL; struct name_funcs_st { unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *name); int (*cmp_func) (const char *a, const char *b); void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *); }; static STACK_OF(NAME_FUNCS) *name_funcs_stack; /* * The LHASH callbacks now use the raw "void *" prototypes and do * per-variable casting in the functions. This prevents function pointer * casting without the need for macro-generated wrapper functions. */ static unsigned long obj_name_hash(const OBJ_NAME *a); static int obj_name_cmp(const OBJ_NAME *a, const OBJ_NAME *b); static CRYPTO_ONCE init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(o_names_init) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); names_lh = lh_OBJ_NAME_new(obj_name_hash, obj_name_cmp); lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); return names_lh != NULL && lock != NULL; } int OBJ_NAME_init(void) { return RUN_ONCE(&init, o_names_init); } int OBJ_NAME_new_index(unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *), int (*cmp_func) (const char *, const char *), void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *)) { int ret = 0, i, push; NAME_FUNCS *name_funcs; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock); if (name_funcs_stack == NULL) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); name_funcs_stack = sk_NAME_FUNCS_new_null(); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); } if (name_funcs_stack == NULL) { /* ERROR */ goto out; } ret = names_type_num; names_type_num++; for (i = sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack); i < names_type_num; i++) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); name_funcs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*name_funcs)); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); if (name_funcs == NULL) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; goto out; } name_funcs->hash_func = OPENSSL_LH_strhash; name_funcs->cmp_func = obj_strcmp; CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); push = sk_NAME_FUNCS_push(name_funcs_stack, name_funcs); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); if (!push) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(name_funcs); ret = 0; goto out; } } name_funcs = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, ret); if (hash_func != NULL) name_funcs->hash_func = hash_func; if (cmp_func != NULL) name_funcs->cmp_func = cmp_func; if (free_func != NULL) name_funcs->free_func = free_func; out: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock); return ret; } static int obj_name_cmp(const OBJ_NAME *a, const OBJ_NAME *b) { int ret; ret = a->type - b->type; if (ret == 0) { if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > a->type)) { ret = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, a->type)->cmp_func(a->name, b->name); } else ret = strcmp(a->name, b->name); } return ret; } static unsigned long obj_name_hash(const OBJ_NAME *a) { unsigned long ret; if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > a->type)) { ret = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, a->type)->hash_func(a->name); } else { ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->name); } ret ^= a->type; return ret; } const char *OBJ_NAME_get(const char *name, int type) { OBJ_NAME on, *ret; int num = 0, alias; const char *value = NULL; if (name == NULL) return NULL; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(lock); alias = type & OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; on.name = name; on.type = type; for (;;) { ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_retrieve(names_lh, &on); if (ret == NULL) break; if ((ret->alias) && !alias) { if (++num > 10) break; on.name = ret->data; } else { value = ret->data; break; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock); return value; } int OBJ_NAME_add(const char *name, int type, const char *data) { OBJ_NAME *onp, *ret; int alias, ok = 0; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock); alias = type & OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; onp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*onp)); if (onp == NULL) { /* ERROR */ goto unlock; } onp->name = name; onp->alias = alias; onp->type = type; onp->data = data; ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_insert(names_lh, onp); if (ret != NULL) { /* free things */ if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > ret->type)) { /* * XXX: I'm not sure I understand why the free function should * get three arguments... -- Richard Levitte */ sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, ret->type)->free_func(ret->name, ret->type, ret->data); } OPENSSL_free(ret); } else { if (lh_OBJ_NAME_error(names_lh)) { /* ERROR */ OPENSSL_free(onp); goto unlock; } } ok = 1; unlock: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock); return ok; } int OBJ_NAME_remove(const char *name, int type) { OBJ_NAME on, *ret; int ok = 0; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock); type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; on.name = name; on.type = type; ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_delete(names_lh, &on); if (ret != NULL) { /* free things */ if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > ret->type)) { /* * XXX: I'm not sure I understand why the free function should * get three arguments... -- Richard Levitte */ sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, ret->type)->free_func(ret->name, ret->type, ret->data); } OPENSSL_free(ret); ok = 1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock); return ok; } typedef struct { int type; void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg); void *arg; } OBJ_DOALL; static void do_all_fn(const OBJ_NAME *name, OBJ_DOALL *d) { if (name->type == d->type) d->fn(name, d->arg); } IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(OBJ_NAME, OBJ_DOALL); void OBJ_NAME_do_all(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg), void *arg) { OBJ_DOALL d; d.type = type; d.fn = fn; d.arg = arg; lh_OBJ_NAME_doall_OBJ_DOALL(names_lh, do_all_fn, &d); } struct doall_sorted { int type; int n; const OBJ_NAME **names; }; static void do_all_sorted_fn(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *d_) { struct doall_sorted *d = d_; if (name->type != d->type) return; d->names[d->n++] = name; } static int do_all_sorted_cmp(const void *n1_, const void *n2_) { const OBJ_NAME *const *n1 = n1_; const OBJ_NAME *const *n2 = n2_; return strcmp((*n1)->name, (*n2)->name); } void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg), void *arg) { struct doall_sorted d; int n; d.type = type; d.names = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d.names) * lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh)); /* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */ if (d.names != NULL) { d.n = 0; OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d); qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof(*d.names), do_all_sorted_cmp); for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n) fn(d.names[n], arg); OPENSSL_free((void *)d.names); } } static int free_type; static void names_lh_free_doall(OBJ_NAME *onp) { if (onp == NULL) return; if (free_type < 0 || free_type == onp->type) OBJ_NAME_remove(onp->name, onp->type); } static void name_funcs_free(NAME_FUNCS *ptr) { OPENSSL_free(ptr); } void OBJ_NAME_cleanup(int type) { unsigned long down_load; if (names_lh == NULL) return; free_type = type; down_load = lh_OBJ_NAME_get_down_load(names_lh); lh_OBJ_NAME_set_down_load(names_lh, 0); lh_OBJ_NAME_doall(names_lh, names_lh_free_doall); if (type < 0) { lh_OBJ_NAME_free(names_lh); sk_NAME_FUNCS_pop_free(name_funcs_stack, name_funcs_free); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(lock); names_lh = NULL; name_funcs_stack = NULL; lock = NULL; } else lh_OBJ_NAME_set_down_load(names_lh, down_load); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_xref.c0000644000000000000000000000763613176625657017012 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "obj_xref.h" #include "e_os.h" static STACK_OF(nid_triple) *sig_app, *sigx_app; static int sig_cmp(const nid_triple *a, const nid_triple *b) { return a->sign_id - b->sign_id; } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(nid_triple, nid_triple, sig); IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(nid_triple, nid_triple, sig); static int sig_sk_cmp(const nid_triple *const *a, const nid_triple *const *b) { return (*a)->sign_id - (*b)->sign_id; } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const nid_triple *, const nid_triple *, sigx); static int sigx_cmp(const nid_triple *const *a, const nid_triple *const *b) { int ret; ret = (*a)->hash_id - (*b)->hash_id; if (ret) return ret; return (*a)->pkey_id - (*b)->pkey_id; } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const nid_triple *, const nid_triple *, sigx); int OBJ_find_sigid_algs(int signid, int *pdig_nid, int *ppkey_nid) { nid_triple tmp; const nid_triple *rv = NULL; tmp.sign_id = signid; if (sig_app) { int idx = sk_nid_triple_find(sig_app, &tmp); if (idx >= 0) rv = sk_nid_triple_value(sig_app, idx); } #ifndef OBJ_XREF_TEST2 if (rv == NULL) { rv = OBJ_bsearch_sig(&tmp, sigoid_srt, OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt)); } #endif if (rv == NULL) return 0; if (pdig_nid) *pdig_nid = rv->hash_id; if (ppkey_nid) *ppkey_nid = rv->pkey_id; return 1; } int OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(int *psignid, int dig_nid, int pkey_nid) { nid_triple tmp; const nid_triple *t = &tmp; const nid_triple **rv = NULL; tmp.hash_id = dig_nid; tmp.pkey_id = pkey_nid; if (sigx_app) { int idx = sk_nid_triple_find(sigx_app, &tmp); if (idx >= 0) { t = sk_nid_triple_value(sigx_app, idx); rv = &t; } } #ifndef OBJ_XREF_TEST2 if (rv == NULL) { rv = OBJ_bsearch_sigx(&t, sigoid_srt_xref, OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt_xref)); } #endif if (rv == NULL) return 0; if (psignid) *psignid = (*rv)->sign_id; return 1; } int OBJ_add_sigid(int signid, int dig_id, int pkey_id) { nid_triple *ntr; if (sig_app == NULL) sig_app = sk_nid_triple_new(sig_sk_cmp); if (sig_app == NULL) return 0; if (sigx_app == NULL) sigx_app = sk_nid_triple_new(sigx_cmp); if (sigx_app == NULL) return 0; ntr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ntr)); if (ntr == NULL) return 0; ntr->sign_id = signid; ntr->hash_id = dig_id; ntr->pkey_id = pkey_id; if (!sk_nid_triple_push(sig_app, ntr)) { OPENSSL_free(ntr); return 0; } if (!sk_nid_triple_push(sigx_app, ntr)) return 0; sk_nid_triple_sort(sig_app); sk_nid_triple_sort(sigx_app); return 1; } static void sid_free(nid_triple *tt) { OPENSSL_free(tt); } void OBJ_sigid_free(void) { sk_nid_triple_pop_free(sig_app, sid_free); sig_app = NULL; sk_nid_triple_free(sigx_app); sigx_app = NULL; } #ifdef OBJ_XREF_TEST main() { int n1, n2, n3; int i, rv; # ifdef OBJ_XREF_TEST2 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt); i++) { OBJ_add_sigid(sigoid_srt[i][0], sigoid_srt[i][1], sigoid_srt[i][2]); } # endif for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigoid_srt); i++) { n1 = sigoid_srt[i][0]; rv = OBJ_find_sigid_algs(n1, &n2, &n3); printf("Forward: %d, %s %s %s\n", rv, OBJ_nid2ln(n1), OBJ_nid2ln(n2), OBJ_nid2ln(n3)); n1 = 0; rv = OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&n1, n2, n3); printf("Reverse: %d, %s %s %s\n", rv, OBJ_nid2ln(n1), OBJ_nid2ln(n2), OBJ_nid2ln(n3)); } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl0000644000000000000000000001371713176625657017004 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use integer; use strict; use warnings; # Generate the DER encoding for the given OID. sub der_it { # Prologue my ($v) = @_; my @a = split(/\s+/, $v); my $ret = pack("C*", $a[0] * 40 + $a[1]); shift @a; shift @a; # Loop over rest of bytes; or in 0x80 for multi-byte numbers. my $t; foreach (@a) { my @r = (); $t = 0; while ($_ >= 128) { my $x = $_ % 128; $_ /= 128; push(@r, ($t++ ? 0x80 : 0) | $x); } push(@r, ($t++ ? 0x80 : 0) | $_); $ret .= pack("C*", reverse(@r)); } return $ret; } # Read input, parse all #define's into OID name and value. # Populate %ln and %sn with long and short names (%dupln and %dupsn) # are used to watch for duplicates. Also %nid and %obj get the # NID and OBJ entries. my %ln; my %sn; my %dupln; my %dupsn; my %nid; my %obj; my %objd; open(IN, "$ARGV[0]") || die "Can't open input file $ARGV[0], $!"; while () { next unless /^\#define\s+(\S+)\s+(.*)$/; my $v = $1; my $d = $2; $d =~ s/^\"//; $d =~ s/\"$//; if ($v =~ /^SN_(.*)$/) { if (defined $dupsn{$d}) { print "WARNING: Duplicate short name \"$d\"\n"; } else { $dupsn{$d} = 1; } $sn{$1} = $d; } elsif ($v =~ /^LN_(.*)$/) { if (defined $dupln{$d}) { print "WARNING: Duplicate long name \"$d\"\n"; } else { $dupln{$d} = 1; } $ln{$1} = $d; } elsif ($v =~ /^NID_(.*)$/) { $nid{$d} = $1; } elsif ($v =~ /^OBJ_(.*)$/) { $obj{$1} = $v; $objd{$v} = $d; } } close IN; # For every value in %obj, recursively expand OBJ_xxx values. That is: # #define OBJ_iso 1L # #define OBJ_identified_organization OBJ_iso,3L # Modify %objd values in-place. Create an %objn array that has my $changed; do { $changed = 0; foreach my $k (keys %objd) { $changed = 1 if $objd{$k} =~ s/(OBJ_[^,]+),/$objd{$1},/; } } while ($changed); my @a = sort { $a <=> $b } keys %nid; my $n = $a[$#a] + 1; my @lvalues = (); my $lvalues = 0; # Scan all defined objects, building up the @out array. # %obj_der holds the DER encoding as an array of bytes, and %obj_len # holds the length in bytes. my @out; my %obj_der; my %obj_len; for (my $i = 0; $i < $n; $i++) { if (!defined $nid{$i}) { push(@out, " { NULL, NULL, NID_undef },\n"); next; } my $sn = defined $sn{$nid{$i}} ? "$sn{$nid{$i}}" : "NULL"; my $ln = defined $ln{$nid{$i}} ? "$ln{$nid{$i}}" : "NULL"; if ($sn eq "NULL") { $sn = $ln; $sn{$nid{$i}} = $ln; } if ($ln eq "NULL") { $ln = $sn; $ln{$nid{$i}} = $sn; } my $out = " {\"$sn\", \"$ln\", NID_$nid{$i}"; if (defined $obj{$nid{$i}} && $objd{$obj{$nid{$i}}} =~ /,/) { my $v = $objd{$obj{$nid{$i}}}; $v =~ s/L//g; $v =~ s/,/ /g; my $r = &der_it($v); my $z = ""; my $length = 0; # Format using fixed-with because we use strcmp later. foreach (unpack("C*",$r)) { $z .= sprintf("0x%02X,", $_); $length++; } $obj_der{$obj{$nid{$i}}} = $z; $obj_len{$obj{$nid{$i}}} = $length; push(@lvalues, sprintf(" %-45s /* [%5d] %s */\n", $z, $lvalues, $obj{$nid{$i}})); $out .= ", $length, &so[$lvalues]"; $lvalues += $length; } $out .= "},\n"; push(@out, $out); } # Finally ready to generate the output. open(OUT, ">$ARGV[1]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[1], $!"; print OUT <<'EOF'; /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl * * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ EOF print OUT "/* Serialized OID's */\n"; printf OUT "static const unsigned char so[%d] = {\n", $lvalues + 1; print OUT @lvalues; print OUT "};\n\n"; printf OUT "#define NUM_NID %d\n", $n; printf OUT "static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = {\n"; print OUT @out; print OUT "};\n\n"; { no warnings "uninitialized"; @a = grep(defined $sn{$nid{$_}}, 0 .. $n); } printf OUT "#define NUM_SN %d\n", $#a + 1; printf OUT "static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {\n"; foreach (sort { $sn{$nid{$a}} cmp $sn{$nid{$b}} } @a) { printf OUT " %4d, /* \"$sn{$nid{$_}}\" */\n", $_; } print OUT "};\n\n"; { no warnings "uninitialized"; @a = grep(defined $ln{$nid{$_}}, 0 .. $n); } printf OUT "#define NUM_LN %d\n", $#a + 1; printf OUT "static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {\n"; foreach (sort { $ln{$nid{$a}} cmp $ln{$nid{$b}} } @a) { printf OUT " %4d, /* \"$ln{$nid{$_}}\" */\n", $_; } print OUT "};\n\n"; { no warnings "uninitialized"; @a = grep(defined $obj{$nid{$_}}, 0 .. $n); } printf OUT "#define NUM_OBJ %d\n", $#a + 1; printf OUT "static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {\n"; # Compare DER; prefer shorter; if some length, use the "smaller" encoding. sub obj_cmp { no warnings "uninitialized"; my $A = $obj_len{$obj{$nid{$a}}}; my $B = $obj_len{$obj{$nid{$b}}}; my $r = $A - $B; return $r if $r != 0; $A = $obj_der{$obj{$nid{$a}}}; $B = $obj_der{$obj{$nid{$b}}}; return $A cmp $B; } foreach (sort obj_cmp @a) { my $m = $obj{$nid{$_}}; my $v = $objd{$m}; $v =~ s/L//g; $v =~ s/,/ /g; printf OUT " %4d, /* %-32s %s */\n", $_, $m, $v; } print OUT "};\n"; close OUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/objects.txt0000644000000000000000000014352713176625657017242 0ustar rootroot# CCITT was renamed to ITU-T quite some time ago 0 : ITU-T : itu-t !Alias ccitt itu-t 1 : ISO : iso 2 : JOINT-ISO-ITU-T : joint-iso-itu-t !Alias joint-iso-ccitt joint-iso-itu-t iso 2 : member-body : ISO Member Body iso 3 : identified-organization # HMAC OIDs identified-organization 6 1 5 5 8 1 1 : HMAC-MD5 : hmac-md5 identified-organization 6 1 5 5 8 1 2 : HMAC-SHA1 : hmac-sha1 identified-organization 132 : certicom-arc joint-iso-itu-t 23 : international-organizations : International Organizations international-organizations 43 : wap wap 1 : wap-wsg joint-iso-itu-t 5 1 5 : selected-attribute-types : Selected Attribute Types selected-attribute-types 55 : clearance member-body 840 : ISO-US : ISO US Member Body ISO-US 10040 : X9-57 : X9.57 X9-57 4 : X9cm : X9.57 CM ? !Cname dsa X9cm 1 : DSA : dsaEncryption X9cm 3 : DSA-SHA1 : dsaWithSHA1 ISO-US 10045 : ansi-X9-62 : ANSI X9.62 !module X9-62 !Alias id-fieldType ansi-X9-62 1 X9-62_id-fieldType 1 : prime-field X9-62_id-fieldType 2 : characteristic-two-field X9-62_characteristic-two-field 3 : id-characteristic-two-basis X9-62_id-characteristic-two-basis 1 : onBasis X9-62_id-characteristic-two-basis 2 : tpBasis X9-62_id-characteristic-two-basis 3 : ppBasis !Alias id-publicKeyType ansi-X9-62 2 X9-62_id-publicKeyType 1 : id-ecPublicKey !Alias ellipticCurve ansi-X9-62 3 !Alias c-TwoCurve X9-62_ellipticCurve 0 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 1 : c2pnb163v1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 2 : c2pnb163v2 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 3 : c2pnb163v3 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 4 : c2pnb176v1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 5 : c2tnb191v1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 6 : c2tnb191v2 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 7 : c2tnb191v3 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 8 : c2onb191v4 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 9 : c2onb191v5 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 10 : c2pnb208w1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 11 : c2tnb239v1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 12 : c2tnb239v2 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 13 : c2tnb239v3 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 14 : c2onb239v4 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 15 : c2onb239v5 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 16 : c2pnb272w1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 17 : c2pnb304w1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 18 : c2tnb359v1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 19 : c2pnb368w1 X9-62_c-TwoCurve 20 : c2tnb431r1 !Alias primeCurve X9-62_ellipticCurve 1 X9-62_primeCurve 1 : prime192v1 X9-62_primeCurve 2 : prime192v2 X9-62_primeCurve 3 : prime192v3 X9-62_primeCurve 4 : prime239v1 X9-62_primeCurve 5 : prime239v2 X9-62_primeCurve 6 : prime239v3 X9-62_primeCurve 7 : prime256v1 !Alias id-ecSigType ansi-X9-62 4 !global X9-62_id-ecSigType 1 : ecdsa-with-SHA1 X9-62_id-ecSigType 2 : ecdsa-with-Recommended X9-62_id-ecSigType 3 : ecdsa-with-Specified ecdsa-with-Specified 1 : ecdsa-with-SHA224 ecdsa-with-Specified 2 : ecdsa-with-SHA256 ecdsa-with-Specified 3 : ecdsa-with-SHA384 ecdsa-with-Specified 4 : ecdsa-with-SHA512 # SECG curve OIDs from "SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters" # (http://www.secg.org/) !Alias secg_ellipticCurve certicom-arc 0 # SECG prime curves OIDs secg-ellipticCurve 6 : secp112r1 secg-ellipticCurve 7 : secp112r2 secg-ellipticCurve 28 : secp128r1 secg-ellipticCurve 29 : secp128r2 secg-ellipticCurve 9 : secp160k1 secg-ellipticCurve 8 : secp160r1 secg-ellipticCurve 30 : secp160r2 secg-ellipticCurve 31 : secp192k1 # NOTE: the curve secp192r1 is the same as prime192v1 defined above # and is therefore omitted secg-ellipticCurve 32 : secp224k1 secg-ellipticCurve 33 : secp224r1 secg-ellipticCurve 10 : secp256k1 # NOTE: the curve secp256r1 is the same as prime256v1 defined above # and is therefore omitted secg-ellipticCurve 34 : secp384r1 secg-ellipticCurve 35 : secp521r1 # SECG characteristic two curves OIDs secg-ellipticCurve 4 : sect113r1 secg-ellipticCurve 5 : sect113r2 secg-ellipticCurve 22 : sect131r1 secg-ellipticCurve 23 : sect131r2 secg-ellipticCurve 1 : sect163k1 secg-ellipticCurve 2 : sect163r1 secg-ellipticCurve 15 : sect163r2 secg-ellipticCurve 24 : sect193r1 secg-ellipticCurve 25 : sect193r2 secg-ellipticCurve 26 : sect233k1 secg-ellipticCurve 27 : sect233r1 secg-ellipticCurve 3 : sect239k1 secg-ellipticCurve 16 : sect283k1 secg-ellipticCurve 17 : sect283r1 secg-ellipticCurve 36 : sect409k1 secg-ellipticCurve 37 : sect409r1 secg-ellipticCurve 38 : sect571k1 secg-ellipticCurve 39 : sect571r1 # WAP/TLS curve OIDs (http://www.wapforum.org/) !Alias wap-wsg-idm-ecid wap-wsg 4 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 1 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 3 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 4 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 5 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 6 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 7 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 8 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 9 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 10 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 11 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11 wap-wsg-idm-ecid 12 : wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12 ISO-US 113533 7 66 10 : CAST5-CBC : cast5-cbc : CAST5-ECB : cast5-ecb !Cname cast5-cfb64 : CAST5-CFB : cast5-cfb !Cname cast5-ofb64 : CAST5-OFB : cast5-ofb !Cname pbeWithMD5AndCast5-CBC ISO-US 113533 7 66 12 : : pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC # Macs for CMP and CRMF ISO-US 113533 7 66 13 : id-PasswordBasedMAC : password based MAC ISO-US 113533 7 66 30 : id-DHBasedMac : Diffie-Hellman based MAC ISO-US 113549 : rsadsi : RSA Data Security, Inc. rsadsi 1 : pkcs : RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS pkcs 1 : pkcs1 pkcs1 1 : : rsaEncryption pkcs1 2 : RSA-MD2 : md2WithRSAEncryption pkcs1 3 : RSA-MD4 : md4WithRSAEncryption pkcs1 4 : RSA-MD5 : md5WithRSAEncryption pkcs1 5 : RSA-SHA1 : sha1WithRSAEncryption # According to PKCS #1 version 2.1 pkcs1 7 : RSAES-OAEP : rsaesOaep pkcs1 8 : MGF1 : mgf1 pkcs1 9 : PSPECIFIED : pSpecified pkcs1 10 : RSASSA-PSS : rsassaPss pkcs1 11 : RSA-SHA256 : sha256WithRSAEncryption pkcs1 12 : RSA-SHA384 : sha384WithRSAEncryption pkcs1 13 : RSA-SHA512 : sha512WithRSAEncryption pkcs1 14 : RSA-SHA224 : sha224WithRSAEncryption pkcs 3 : pkcs3 pkcs3 1 : : dhKeyAgreement pkcs 5 : pkcs5 pkcs5 1 : PBE-MD2-DES : pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC pkcs5 3 : PBE-MD5-DES : pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC pkcs5 4 : PBE-MD2-RC2-64 : pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC pkcs5 6 : PBE-MD5-RC2-64 : pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC pkcs5 10 : PBE-SHA1-DES : pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC pkcs5 11 : PBE-SHA1-RC2-64 : pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC !Cname id_pbkdf2 pkcs5 12 : : PBKDF2 !Cname pbes2 pkcs5 13 : : PBES2 !Cname pbmac1 pkcs5 14 : : PBMAC1 pkcs 7 : pkcs7 pkcs7 1 : : pkcs7-data !Cname pkcs7-signed pkcs7 2 : : pkcs7-signedData !Cname pkcs7-enveloped pkcs7 3 : : pkcs7-envelopedData !Cname pkcs7-signedAndEnveloped pkcs7 4 : : pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData !Cname pkcs7-digest pkcs7 5 : : pkcs7-digestData !Cname pkcs7-encrypted pkcs7 6 : : pkcs7-encryptedData pkcs 9 : pkcs9 !module pkcs9 pkcs9 1 : : emailAddress pkcs9 2 : : unstructuredName pkcs9 3 : : contentType pkcs9 4 : : messageDigest pkcs9 5 : : signingTime pkcs9 6 : : countersignature pkcs9 7 : : challengePassword pkcs9 8 : : unstructuredAddress !Cname extCertAttributes pkcs9 9 : : extendedCertificateAttributes !global !Cname ext-req pkcs9 14 : extReq : Extension Request !Cname SMIMECapabilities pkcs9 15 : SMIME-CAPS : S/MIME Capabilities # S/MIME !Cname SMIME pkcs9 16 : SMIME : S/MIME SMIME 0 : id-smime-mod SMIME 1 : id-smime-ct SMIME 2 : id-smime-aa SMIME 3 : id-smime-alg SMIME 4 : id-smime-cd SMIME 5 : id-smime-spq SMIME 6 : id-smime-cti # S/MIME Modules id-smime-mod 1 : id-smime-mod-cms id-smime-mod 2 : id-smime-mod-ess id-smime-mod 3 : id-smime-mod-oid id-smime-mod 4 : id-smime-mod-msg-v3 id-smime-mod 5 : id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88 id-smime-mod 6 : id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97 id-smime-mod 7 : id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88 id-smime-mod 8 : id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97 # S/MIME Content Types id-smime-ct 1 : id-smime-ct-receipt id-smime-ct 2 : id-smime-ct-authData id-smime-ct 3 : id-smime-ct-publishCert id-smime-ct 4 : id-smime-ct-TSTInfo id-smime-ct 5 : id-smime-ct-TDTInfo id-smime-ct 6 : id-smime-ct-contentInfo id-smime-ct 7 : id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData id-smime-ct 8 : id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData id-smime-ct 9 : id-smime-ct-compressedData id-smime-ct 19 : id-smime-ct-contentCollection id-smime-ct 23 : id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData id-smime-ct 27 : id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF id-smime-ct 28 : id-ct-xml # S/MIME Attributes id-smime-aa 1 : id-smime-aa-receiptRequest id-smime-aa 2 : id-smime-aa-securityLabel id-smime-aa 3 : id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory id-smime-aa 4 : id-smime-aa-contentHint id-smime-aa 5 : id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest # obsolete id-smime-aa 6 : id-smime-aa-encapContentType id-smime-aa 7 : id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier # obsolete id-smime-aa 8 : id-smime-aa-macValue id-smime-aa 9 : id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels id-smime-aa 10 : id-smime-aa-contentReference id-smime-aa 11 : id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref id-smime-aa 12 : id-smime-aa-signingCertificate id-smime-aa 13 : id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts id-smime-aa 14 : id-smime-aa-timeStampToken id-smime-aa 15 : id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId id-smime-aa 16 : id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType id-smime-aa 17 : id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation id-smime-aa 18 : id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr id-smime-aa 19 : id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert id-smime-aa 20 : id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp id-smime-aa 21 : id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs id-smime-aa 22 : id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs id-smime-aa 23 : id-smime-aa-ets-certValues id-smime-aa 24 : id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues id-smime-aa 25 : id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp id-smime-aa 26 : id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp id-smime-aa 27 : id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp id-smime-aa 28 : id-smime-aa-signatureType id-smime-aa 29 : id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc # S/MIME Algorithm Identifiers # obsolete id-smime-alg 1 : id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES # obsolete id-smime-alg 2 : id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2 # obsolete id-smime-alg 3 : id-smime-alg-3DESwrap # obsolete id-smime-alg 4 : id-smime-alg-RC2wrap id-smime-alg 5 : id-smime-alg-ESDH id-smime-alg 6 : id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap id-smime-alg 7 : id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap id-smime-alg 9 : id-alg-PWRI-KEK # S/MIME Certificate Distribution id-smime-cd 1 : id-smime-cd-ldap # S/MIME Signature Policy Qualifier id-smime-spq 1 : id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri id-smime-spq 2 : id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice # S/MIME Commitment Type Identifier id-smime-cti 1 : id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin id-smime-cti 2 : id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt id-smime-cti 3 : id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery id-smime-cti 4 : id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender id-smime-cti 5 : id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval id-smime-cti 6 : id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation pkcs9 20 : : friendlyName pkcs9 21 : : localKeyID !Cname ms-csp-name 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 1 : CSPName : Microsoft CSP Name 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 2 : LocalKeySet : Microsoft Local Key set !Alias certTypes pkcs9 22 certTypes 1 : : x509Certificate certTypes 2 : : sdsiCertificate !Alias crlTypes pkcs9 23 crlTypes 1 : : x509Crl !Alias pkcs12 pkcs 12 !Alias pkcs12-pbeids pkcs12 1 !Cname pbe-WithSHA1And128BitRC4 pkcs12-pbeids 1 : PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 : pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4 !Cname pbe-WithSHA1And40BitRC4 pkcs12-pbeids 2 : PBE-SHA1-RC4-40 : pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4 !Cname pbe-WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES-CBC pkcs12-pbeids 3 : PBE-SHA1-3DES : pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC !Cname pbe-WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES-CBC pkcs12-pbeids 4 : PBE-SHA1-2DES : pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC !Cname pbe-WithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC pkcs12-pbeids 5 : PBE-SHA1-RC2-128 : pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC !Cname pbe-WithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC pkcs12-pbeids 6 : PBE-SHA1-RC2-40 : pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC !Alias pkcs12-Version1 pkcs12 10 !Alias pkcs12-BagIds pkcs12-Version1 1 pkcs12-BagIds 1 : : keyBag pkcs12-BagIds 2 : : pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag pkcs12-BagIds 3 : : certBag pkcs12-BagIds 4 : : crlBag pkcs12-BagIds 5 : : secretBag pkcs12-BagIds 6 : : safeContentsBag rsadsi 2 2 : MD2 : md2 rsadsi 2 4 : MD4 : md4 rsadsi 2 5 : MD5 : md5 : MD5-SHA1 : md5-sha1 rsadsi 2 6 : : hmacWithMD5 rsadsi 2 7 : : hmacWithSHA1 # From RFC4231 rsadsi 2 8 : : hmacWithSHA224 rsadsi 2 9 : : hmacWithSHA256 rsadsi 2 10 : : hmacWithSHA384 rsadsi 2 11 : : hmacWithSHA512 rsadsi 3 2 : RC2-CBC : rc2-cbc : RC2-ECB : rc2-ecb !Cname rc2-cfb64 : RC2-CFB : rc2-cfb !Cname rc2-ofb64 : RC2-OFB : rc2-ofb : RC2-40-CBC : rc2-40-cbc : RC2-64-CBC : rc2-64-cbc rsadsi 3 4 : RC4 : rc4 : RC4-40 : rc4-40 rsadsi 3 7 : DES-EDE3-CBC : des-ede3-cbc rsadsi 3 8 : RC5-CBC : rc5-cbc : RC5-ECB : rc5-ecb !Cname rc5-cfb64 : RC5-CFB : rc5-cfb !Cname rc5-ofb64 : RC5-OFB : rc5-ofb !Cname ms-ext-req 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 14 : msExtReq : Microsoft Extension Request !Cname ms-code-ind 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 21 : msCodeInd : Microsoft Individual Code Signing !Cname ms-code-com 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 22 : msCodeCom : Microsoft Commercial Code Signing !Cname ms-ctl-sign 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 1 : msCTLSign : Microsoft Trust List Signing !Cname ms-sgc 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 3 : msSGC : Microsoft Server Gated Crypto !Cname ms-efs 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 4 : msEFS : Microsoft Encrypted File System !Cname ms-smartcard-login 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 2 : msSmartcardLogin : Microsoft Smartcardlogin !Cname ms-upn 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 3 : msUPN : Microsoft Universal Principal Name 1 3 6 1 4 1 188 7 1 1 2 : IDEA-CBC : idea-cbc : IDEA-ECB : idea-ecb !Cname idea-cfb64 : IDEA-CFB : idea-cfb !Cname idea-ofb64 : IDEA-OFB : idea-ofb 1 3 6 1 4 1 3029 1 2 : BF-CBC : bf-cbc : BF-ECB : bf-ecb !Cname bf-cfb64 : BF-CFB : bf-cfb !Cname bf-ofb64 : BF-OFB : bf-ofb !Cname id-pkix 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 : PKIX # PKIX Arcs id-pkix 0 : id-pkix-mod id-pkix 1 : id-pe id-pkix 2 : id-qt id-pkix 3 : id-kp id-pkix 4 : id-it id-pkix 5 : id-pkip id-pkix 6 : id-alg id-pkix 7 : id-cmc id-pkix 8 : id-on id-pkix 9 : id-pda id-pkix 10 : id-aca id-pkix 11 : id-qcs id-pkix 12 : id-cct id-pkix 21 : id-ppl id-pkix 48 : id-ad # PKIX Modules id-pkix-mod 1 : id-pkix1-explicit-88 id-pkix-mod 2 : id-pkix1-implicit-88 id-pkix-mod 3 : id-pkix1-explicit-93 id-pkix-mod 4 : id-pkix1-implicit-93 id-pkix-mod 5 : id-mod-crmf id-pkix-mod 6 : id-mod-cmc id-pkix-mod 7 : id-mod-kea-profile-88 id-pkix-mod 8 : id-mod-kea-profile-93 id-pkix-mod 9 : id-mod-cmp id-pkix-mod 10 : id-mod-qualified-cert-88 id-pkix-mod 11 : id-mod-qualified-cert-93 id-pkix-mod 12 : id-mod-attribute-cert id-pkix-mod 13 : id-mod-timestamp-protocol id-pkix-mod 14 : id-mod-ocsp id-pkix-mod 15 : id-mod-dvcs id-pkix-mod 16 : id-mod-cmp2000 # PKIX Private Extensions !Cname info-access id-pe 1 : authorityInfoAccess : Authority Information Access id-pe 2 : biometricInfo : Biometric Info id-pe 3 : qcStatements id-pe 4 : ac-auditEntity id-pe 5 : ac-targeting id-pe 6 : aaControls id-pe 7 : sbgp-ipAddrBlock id-pe 8 : sbgp-autonomousSysNum id-pe 9 : sbgp-routerIdentifier id-pe 10 : ac-proxying !Cname sinfo-access id-pe 11 : subjectInfoAccess : Subject Information Access id-pe 14 : proxyCertInfo : Proxy Certificate Information id-pe 24 : tlsfeature : TLS Feature # PKIX policyQualifiers for Internet policy qualifiers id-qt 1 : id-qt-cps : Policy Qualifier CPS id-qt 2 : id-qt-unotice : Policy Qualifier User Notice id-qt 3 : textNotice # PKIX key purpose identifiers !Cname server-auth id-kp 1 : serverAuth : TLS Web Server Authentication !Cname client-auth id-kp 2 : clientAuth : TLS Web Client Authentication !Cname code-sign id-kp 3 : codeSigning : Code Signing !Cname email-protect id-kp 4 : emailProtection : E-mail Protection id-kp 5 : ipsecEndSystem : IPSec End System id-kp 6 : ipsecTunnel : IPSec Tunnel id-kp 7 : ipsecUser : IPSec User !Cname time-stamp id-kp 8 : timeStamping : Time Stamping # From OCSP spec RFC2560 !Cname OCSP-sign id-kp 9 : OCSPSigning : OCSP Signing id-kp 10 : DVCS : dvcs !Cname ipsec-IKE id-kp 17 : ipsecIKE : ipsec Internet Key Exchange id-kp 18 : capwapAC : Ctrl/provision WAP Access id-kp 19 : capwapWTP : Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination !Cname sshClient id-kp 21 : secureShellClient : SSH Client !Cname sshServer id-kp 22 : secureShellServer : SSH Server id-kp 23 : sendRouter : Send Router id-kp 24 : sendProxiedRouter : Send Proxied Router id-kp 25 : sendOwner : Send Owner id-kp 26 : sendProxiedOwner : Send Proxied Owner # CMP information types id-it 1 : id-it-caProtEncCert id-it 2 : id-it-signKeyPairTypes id-it 3 : id-it-encKeyPairTypes id-it 4 : id-it-preferredSymmAlg id-it 5 : id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo id-it 6 : id-it-currentCRL id-it 7 : id-it-unsupportedOIDs # obsolete id-it 8 : id-it-subscriptionRequest # obsolete id-it 9 : id-it-subscriptionResponse id-it 10 : id-it-keyPairParamReq id-it 11 : id-it-keyPairParamRep id-it 12 : id-it-revPassphrase id-it 13 : id-it-implicitConfirm id-it 14 : id-it-confirmWaitTime id-it 15 : id-it-origPKIMessage id-it 16 : id-it-suppLangTags # CRMF registration id-pkip 1 : id-regCtrl id-pkip 2 : id-regInfo # CRMF registration controls id-regCtrl 1 : id-regCtrl-regToken id-regCtrl 2 : id-regCtrl-authenticator id-regCtrl 3 : id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo id-regCtrl 4 : id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions id-regCtrl 5 : id-regCtrl-oldCertID id-regCtrl 6 : id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey # CRMF registration information id-regInfo 1 : id-regInfo-utf8Pairs id-regInfo 2 : id-regInfo-certReq # algorithms id-alg 1 : id-alg-des40 id-alg 2 : id-alg-noSignature id-alg 3 : id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1 id-alg 4 : id-alg-dh-pop # CMC controls id-cmc 1 : id-cmc-statusInfo id-cmc 2 : id-cmc-identification id-cmc 3 : id-cmc-identityProof id-cmc 4 : id-cmc-dataReturn id-cmc 5 : id-cmc-transactionId id-cmc 6 : id-cmc-senderNonce id-cmc 7 : id-cmc-recipientNonce id-cmc 8 : id-cmc-addExtensions id-cmc 9 : id-cmc-encryptedPOP id-cmc 10 : id-cmc-decryptedPOP id-cmc 11 : id-cmc-lraPOPWitness id-cmc 15 : id-cmc-getCert id-cmc 16 : id-cmc-getCRL id-cmc 17 : id-cmc-revokeRequest id-cmc 18 : id-cmc-regInfo id-cmc 19 : id-cmc-responseInfo id-cmc 21 : id-cmc-queryPending id-cmc 22 : id-cmc-popLinkRandom id-cmc 23 : id-cmc-popLinkWitness id-cmc 24 : id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance # other names id-on 1 : id-on-personalData id-on 3 : id-on-permanentIdentifier : Permanent Identifier # personal data attributes id-pda 1 : id-pda-dateOfBirth id-pda 2 : id-pda-placeOfBirth id-pda 3 : id-pda-gender id-pda 4 : id-pda-countryOfCitizenship id-pda 5 : id-pda-countryOfResidence # attribute certificate attributes id-aca 1 : id-aca-authenticationInfo id-aca 2 : id-aca-accessIdentity id-aca 3 : id-aca-chargingIdentity id-aca 4 : id-aca-group # attention : the following seems to be obsolete, replace by 'role' id-aca 5 : id-aca-role id-aca 6 : id-aca-encAttrs # qualified certificate statements id-qcs 1 : id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 # CMC content types id-cct 1 : id-cct-crs id-cct 2 : id-cct-PKIData id-cct 3 : id-cct-PKIResponse # Predefined Proxy Certificate policy languages id-ppl 0 : id-ppl-anyLanguage : Any language id-ppl 1 : id-ppl-inheritAll : Inherit all id-ppl 2 : id-ppl-independent : Independent # access descriptors for authority info access extension !Cname ad-OCSP id-ad 1 : OCSP : OCSP !Cname ad-ca-issuers id-ad 2 : caIssuers : CA Issuers !Cname ad-timeStamping id-ad 3 : ad_timestamping : AD Time Stamping !Cname ad-dvcs id-ad 4 : AD_DVCS : ad dvcs id-ad 5 : caRepository : CA Repository !Alias id-pkix-OCSP ad-OCSP !module id-pkix-OCSP !Cname basic id-pkix-OCSP 1 : basicOCSPResponse : Basic OCSP Response id-pkix-OCSP 2 : Nonce : OCSP Nonce id-pkix-OCSP 3 : CrlID : OCSP CRL ID id-pkix-OCSP 4 : acceptableResponses : Acceptable OCSP Responses id-pkix-OCSP 5 : noCheck : OCSP No Check id-pkix-OCSP 6 : archiveCutoff : OCSP Archive Cutoff id-pkix-OCSP 7 : serviceLocator : OCSP Service Locator id-pkix-OCSP 8 : extendedStatus : Extended OCSP Status id-pkix-OCSP 9 : valid id-pkix-OCSP 10 : path id-pkix-OCSP 11 : trustRoot : Trust Root !global 1 3 14 3 2 : algorithm : algorithm algorithm 3 : RSA-NP-MD5 : md5WithRSA algorithm 6 : DES-ECB : des-ecb algorithm 7 : DES-CBC : des-cbc !Cname des-ofb64 algorithm 8 : DES-OFB : des-ofb !Cname des-cfb64 algorithm 9 : DES-CFB : des-cfb algorithm 11 : rsaSignature !Cname dsa-2 algorithm 12 : DSA-old : dsaEncryption-old algorithm 13 : DSA-SHA : dsaWithSHA algorithm 15 : RSA-SHA : shaWithRSAEncryption !Cname des-ede-ecb algorithm 17 : DES-EDE : des-ede !Cname des-ede3-ecb : DES-EDE3 : des-ede3 : DES-EDE-CBC : des-ede-cbc !Cname des-ede-cfb64 : DES-EDE-CFB : des-ede-cfb !Cname des-ede3-cfb64 : DES-EDE3-CFB : des-ede3-cfb !Cname des-ede-ofb64 : DES-EDE-OFB : des-ede-ofb !Cname des-ede3-ofb64 : DES-EDE3-OFB : des-ede3-ofb : DESX-CBC : desx-cbc algorithm 18 : SHA : sha algorithm 26 : SHA1 : sha1 !Cname dsaWithSHA1-2 algorithm 27 : DSA-SHA1-old : dsaWithSHA1-old algorithm 29 : RSA-SHA1-2 : sha1WithRSA 1 3 36 3 2 1 : RIPEMD160 : ripemd160 1 3 36 3 3 1 2 : RSA-RIPEMD160 : ripemd160WithRSA 1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 1 16 : BLAKE2b512 : blake2b512 1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 2 8 : BLAKE2s256 : blake2s256 !Cname sxnet 1 3 101 1 4 1 : SXNetID : Strong Extranet ID 2 5 : X500 : directory services (X.500) X500 4 : X509 X509 3 : CN : commonName X509 4 : SN : surname X509 5 : : serialNumber X509 6 : C : countryName X509 7 : L : localityName X509 8 : ST : stateOrProvinceName X509 9 : street : streetAddress X509 10 : O : organizationName X509 11 : OU : organizationalUnitName X509 12 : title : title X509 13 : : description X509 14 : : searchGuide X509 15 : : businessCategory X509 16 : : postalAddress X509 17 : : postalCode X509 18 : : postOfficeBox X509 19 : : physicalDeliveryOfficeName X509 20 : : telephoneNumber X509 21 : : telexNumber X509 22 : : teletexTerminalIdentifier X509 23 : : facsimileTelephoneNumber X509 24 : : x121Address X509 25 : : internationaliSDNNumber X509 26 : : registeredAddress X509 27 : : destinationIndicator X509 28 : : preferredDeliveryMethod X509 29 : : presentationAddress X509 30 : : supportedApplicationContext X509 31 : member : X509 32 : owner : X509 33 : : roleOccupant X509 34 : seeAlso : X509 35 : : userPassword X509 36 : : userCertificate X509 37 : : cACertificate X509 38 : : authorityRevocationList X509 39 : : certificateRevocationList X509 40 : : crossCertificatePair X509 41 : name : name X509 42 : GN : givenName X509 43 : initials : initials X509 44 : : generationQualifier X509 45 : : x500UniqueIdentifier X509 46 : dnQualifier : dnQualifier X509 47 : : enhancedSearchGuide X509 48 : : protocolInformation X509 49 : : distinguishedName X509 50 : : uniqueMember X509 51 : : houseIdentifier X509 52 : : supportedAlgorithms X509 53 : : deltaRevocationList X509 54 : dmdName : X509 65 : : pseudonym X509 72 : role : role X500 8 : X500algorithms : directory services - algorithms X500algorithms 1 1 : RSA : rsa X500algorithms 3 100 : RSA-MDC2 : mdc2WithRSA X500algorithms 3 101 : MDC2 : mdc2 X500 29 : id-ce !Cname subject-directory-attributes id-ce 9 : subjectDirectoryAttributes : X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes !Cname subject-key-identifier id-ce 14 : subjectKeyIdentifier : X509v3 Subject Key Identifier !Cname key-usage id-ce 15 : keyUsage : X509v3 Key Usage !Cname private-key-usage-period id-ce 16 : privateKeyUsagePeriod : X509v3 Private Key Usage Period !Cname subject-alt-name id-ce 17 : subjectAltName : X509v3 Subject Alternative Name !Cname issuer-alt-name id-ce 18 : issuerAltName : X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name !Cname basic-constraints id-ce 19 : basicConstraints : X509v3 Basic Constraints !Cname crl-number id-ce 20 : crlNumber : X509v3 CRL Number !Cname crl-reason id-ce 21 : CRLReason : X509v3 CRL Reason Code !Cname invalidity-date id-ce 24 : invalidityDate : Invalidity Date !Cname delta-crl id-ce 27 : deltaCRL : X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator !Cname issuing-distribution-point id-ce 28 : issuingDistributionPoint : X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point !Cname certificate-issuer id-ce 29 : certificateIssuer : X509v3 Certificate Issuer !Cname name-constraints id-ce 30 : nameConstraints : X509v3 Name Constraints !Cname crl-distribution-points id-ce 31 : crlDistributionPoints : X509v3 CRL Distribution Points !Cname certificate-policies id-ce 32 : certificatePolicies : X509v3 Certificate Policies !Cname any-policy certificate-policies 0 : anyPolicy : X509v3 Any Policy !Cname policy-mappings id-ce 33 : policyMappings : X509v3 Policy Mappings !Cname authority-key-identifier id-ce 35 : authorityKeyIdentifier : X509v3 Authority Key Identifier !Cname policy-constraints id-ce 36 : policyConstraints : X509v3 Policy Constraints !Cname ext-key-usage id-ce 37 : extendedKeyUsage : X509v3 Extended Key Usage !Cname freshest-crl id-ce 46 : freshestCRL : X509v3 Freshest CRL !Cname inhibit-any-policy id-ce 54 : inhibitAnyPolicy : X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy !Cname target-information id-ce 55 : targetInformation : X509v3 AC Targeting !Cname no-rev-avail id-ce 56 : noRevAvail : X509v3 No Revocation Available # From RFC5280 ext-key-usage 0 : anyExtendedKeyUsage : Any Extended Key Usage !Cname netscape 2 16 840 1 113730 : Netscape : Netscape Communications Corp. !Cname netscape-cert-extension netscape 1 : nsCertExt : Netscape Certificate Extension !Cname netscape-data-type netscape 2 : nsDataType : Netscape Data Type !Cname netscape-cert-type netscape-cert-extension 1 : nsCertType : Netscape Cert Type !Cname netscape-base-url netscape-cert-extension 2 : nsBaseUrl : Netscape Base Url !Cname netscape-revocation-url netscape-cert-extension 3 : nsRevocationUrl : Netscape Revocation Url !Cname netscape-ca-revocation-url netscape-cert-extension 4 : nsCaRevocationUrl : Netscape CA Revocation Url !Cname netscape-renewal-url netscape-cert-extension 7 : nsRenewalUrl : Netscape Renewal Url !Cname netscape-ca-policy-url netscape-cert-extension 8 : nsCaPolicyUrl : Netscape CA Policy Url !Cname netscape-ssl-server-name netscape-cert-extension 12 : nsSslServerName : Netscape SSL Server Name !Cname netscape-comment netscape-cert-extension 13 : nsComment : Netscape Comment !Cname netscape-cert-sequence netscape-data-type 5 : nsCertSequence : Netscape Certificate Sequence !Cname ns-sgc netscape 4 1 : nsSGC : Netscape Server Gated Crypto # iso(1) iso 3 : ORG : org org 6 : DOD : dod dod 1 : IANA : iana !Alias internet iana internet 1 : directory : Directory internet 2 : mgmt : Management internet 3 : experimental : Experimental internet 4 : private : Private internet 5 : security : Security internet 6 : snmpv2 : SNMPv2 # Documents refer to "internet 7" as "mail". This however leads to ambiguities # with RFC2798, Section 9.1.3, where "mail" is defined as the short name for # rfc822Mailbox. The short name is therefore here left out for a reason. # Subclasses of "mail", e.g. "MIME MHS" don't consitute a problem, as # references are realized via long name "Mail" (with capital M). internet 7 : : Mail Private 1 : enterprises : Enterprises # RFC 2247 Enterprises 1466 344 : dcobject : dcObject # RFC 1495 Mail 1 : mime-mhs : MIME MHS mime-mhs 1 : mime-mhs-headings : mime-mhs-headings mime-mhs 2 : mime-mhs-bodies : mime-mhs-bodies mime-mhs-headings 1 : id-hex-partial-message : id-hex-partial-message mime-mhs-headings 2 : id-hex-multipart-message : id-hex-multipart-message # RFC 3274 !Cname zlib-compression id-smime-alg 8 : ZLIB : zlib compression # AES aka Rijndael !Alias csor 2 16 840 1 101 3 !Alias nistAlgorithms csor 4 !Alias aes nistAlgorithms 1 aes 1 : AES-128-ECB : aes-128-ecb aes 2 : AES-128-CBC : aes-128-cbc !Cname aes-128-ofb128 aes 3 : AES-128-OFB : aes-128-ofb !Cname aes-128-cfb128 aes 4 : AES-128-CFB : aes-128-cfb aes 5 : id-aes128-wrap aes 6 : id-aes128-GCM : aes-128-gcm aes 7 : id-aes128-CCM : aes-128-ccm aes 8 : id-aes128-wrap-pad aes 21 : AES-192-ECB : aes-192-ecb aes 22 : AES-192-CBC : aes-192-cbc !Cname aes-192-ofb128 aes 23 : AES-192-OFB : aes-192-ofb !Cname aes-192-cfb128 aes 24 : AES-192-CFB : aes-192-cfb aes 25 : id-aes192-wrap aes 26 : id-aes192-GCM : aes-192-gcm aes 27 : id-aes192-CCM : aes-192-ccm aes 28 : id-aes192-wrap-pad aes 41 : AES-256-ECB : aes-256-ecb aes 42 : AES-256-CBC : aes-256-cbc !Cname aes-256-ofb128 aes 43 : AES-256-OFB : aes-256-ofb !Cname aes-256-cfb128 aes 44 : AES-256-CFB : aes-256-cfb aes 45 : id-aes256-wrap aes 46 : id-aes256-GCM : aes-256-gcm aes 47 : id-aes256-CCM : aes-256-ccm aes 48 : id-aes256-wrap-pad # There are no OIDs for these modes... : AES-128-CFB1 : aes-128-cfb1 : AES-192-CFB1 : aes-192-cfb1 : AES-256-CFB1 : aes-256-cfb1 : AES-128-CFB8 : aes-128-cfb8 : AES-192-CFB8 : aes-192-cfb8 : AES-256-CFB8 : aes-256-cfb8 : AES-128-CTR : aes-128-ctr : AES-192-CTR : aes-192-ctr : AES-256-CTR : aes-256-ctr : AES-128-OCB : aes-128-ocb : AES-192-OCB : aes-192-ocb : AES-256-OCB : aes-256-ocb : AES-128-XTS : aes-128-xts : AES-256-XTS : aes-256-xts : DES-CFB1 : des-cfb1 : DES-CFB8 : des-cfb8 : DES-EDE3-CFB1 : des-ede3-cfb1 : DES-EDE3-CFB8 : des-ede3-cfb8 # OIDs for SHA224, SHA256, SHA385 and SHA512, according to x9.84. !Alias nist_hashalgs nistAlgorithms 2 nist_hashalgs 1 : SHA256 : sha256 nist_hashalgs 2 : SHA384 : sha384 nist_hashalgs 3 : SHA512 : sha512 nist_hashalgs 4 : SHA224 : sha224 # OIDs for dsa-with-sha224 and dsa-with-sha256 !Alias dsa_with_sha2 nistAlgorithms 3 dsa_with_sha2 1 : dsa_with_SHA224 dsa_with_sha2 2 : dsa_with_SHA256 # Hold instruction CRL entry extension !Cname hold-instruction-code id-ce 23 : holdInstructionCode : Hold Instruction Code !Alias holdInstruction X9-57 2 !Cname hold-instruction-none holdInstruction 1 : holdInstructionNone : Hold Instruction None !Cname hold-instruction-call-issuer holdInstruction 2 : holdInstructionCallIssuer : Hold Instruction Call Issuer !Cname hold-instruction-reject holdInstruction 3 : holdInstructionReject : Hold Instruction Reject # OID's from ITU-T. Most of this is defined in RFC 1274. A couple of # them are also mentioned in RFC 2247 itu-t 9 : data data 2342 : pss pss 19200300 : ucl ucl 100 : pilot pilot 1 : : pilotAttributeType pilot 3 : : pilotAttributeSyntax pilot 4 : : pilotObjectClass pilot 10 : : pilotGroups pilotAttributeSyntax 4 : : iA5StringSyntax pilotAttributeSyntax 5 : : caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax pilotObjectClass 3 : : pilotObject pilotObjectClass 4 : : pilotPerson pilotObjectClass 5 : account pilotObjectClass 6 : document pilotObjectClass 7 : room pilotObjectClass 9 : : documentSeries pilotObjectClass 13 : domain : Domain pilotObjectClass 14 : : rFC822localPart pilotObjectClass 15 : : dNSDomain pilotObjectClass 17 : : domainRelatedObject pilotObjectClass 18 : : friendlyCountry pilotObjectClass 19 : : simpleSecurityObject pilotObjectClass 20 : : pilotOrganization pilotObjectClass 21 : : pilotDSA pilotObjectClass 22 : : qualityLabelledData pilotAttributeType 1 : UID : userId pilotAttributeType 2 : : textEncodedORAddress pilotAttributeType 3 : mail : rfc822Mailbox pilotAttributeType 4 : info pilotAttributeType 5 : : favouriteDrink pilotAttributeType 6 : : roomNumber pilotAttributeType 7 : photo pilotAttributeType 8 : : userClass pilotAttributeType 9 : host pilotAttributeType 10 : manager pilotAttributeType 11 : : documentIdentifier pilotAttributeType 12 : : documentTitle pilotAttributeType 13 : : documentVersion pilotAttributeType 14 : : documentAuthor pilotAttributeType 15 : : documentLocation pilotAttributeType 20 : : homeTelephoneNumber pilotAttributeType 21 : secretary pilotAttributeType 22 : : otherMailbox pilotAttributeType 23 : : lastModifiedTime pilotAttributeType 24 : : lastModifiedBy pilotAttributeType 25 : DC : domainComponent pilotAttributeType 26 : : aRecord pilotAttributeType 27 : : pilotAttributeType27 pilotAttributeType 28 : : mXRecord pilotAttributeType 29 : : nSRecord pilotAttributeType 30 : : sOARecord pilotAttributeType 31 : : cNAMERecord pilotAttributeType 37 : : associatedDomain pilotAttributeType 38 : : associatedName pilotAttributeType 39 : : homePostalAddress pilotAttributeType 40 : : personalTitle pilotAttributeType 41 : : mobileTelephoneNumber pilotAttributeType 42 : : pagerTelephoneNumber pilotAttributeType 43 : : friendlyCountryName pilotAttributeType 44 : uid : uniqueIdentifier pilotAttributeType 45 : : organizationalStatus pilotAttributeType 46 : : janetMailbox pilotAttributeType 47 : : mailPreferenceOption pilotAttributeType 48 : : buildingName pilotAttributeType 49 : : dSAQuality pilotAttributeType 50 : : singleLevelQuality pilotAttributeType 51 : : subtreeMinimumQuality pilotAttributeType 52 : : subtreeMaximumQuality pilotAttributeType 53 : : personalSignature pilotAttributeType 54 : : dITRedirect pilotAttributeType 55 : audio pilotAttributeType 56 : : documentPublisher international-organizations 42 : id-set : Secure Electronic Transactions id-set 0 : set-ctype : content types id-set 1 : set-msgExt : message extensions id-set 3 : set-attr id-set 5 : set-policy id-set 7 : set-certExt : certificate extensions id-set 8 : set-brand set-ctype 0 : setct-PANData set-ctype 1 : setct-PANToken set-ctype 2 : setct-PANOnly set-ctype 3 : setct-OIData set-ctype 4 : setct-PI set-ctype 5 : setct-PIData set-ctype 6 : setct-PIDataUnsigned set-ctype 7 : setct-HODInput set-ctype 8 : setct-AuthResBaggage set-ctype 9 : setct-AuthRevReqBaggage set-ctype 10 : setct-AuthRevResBaggage set-ctype 11 : setct-CapTokenSeq set-ctype 12 : setct-PInitResData set-ctype 13 : setct-PI-TBS set-ctype 14 : setct-PResData set-ctype 16 : setct-AuthReqTBS set-ctype 17 : setct-AuthResTBS set-ctype 18 : setct-AuthResTBSX set-ctype 19 : setct-AuthTokenTBS set-ctype 20 : setct-CapTokenData set-ctype 21 : setct-CapTokenTBS set-ctype 22 : setct-AcqCardCodeMsg set-ctype 23 : setct-AuthRevReqTBS set-ctype 24 : setct-AuthRevResData set-ctype 25 : setct-AuthRevResTBS set-ctype 26 : setct-CapReqTBS set-ctype 27 : setct-CapReqTBSX set-ctype 28 : setct-CapResData set-ctype 29 : setct-CapRevReqTBS set-ctype 30 : setct-CapRevReqTBSX set-ctype 31 : setct-CapRevResData set-ctype 32 : setct-CredReqTBS set-ctype 33 : setct-CredReqTBSX set-ctype 34 : setct-CredResData set-ctype 35 : setct-CredRevReqTBS set-ctype 36 : setct-CredRevReqTBSX set-ctype 37 : setct-CredRevResData set-ctype 38 : setct-PCertReqData set-ctype 39 : setct-PCertResTBS set-ctype 40 : setct-BatchAdminReqData set-ctype 41 : setct-BatchAdminResData set-ctype 42 : setct-CardCInitResTBS set-ctype 43 : setct-MeAqCInitResTBS set-ctype 44 : setct-RegFormResTBS set-ctype 45 : setct-CertReqData set-ctype 46 : setct-CertReqTBS set-ctype 47 : setct-CertResData set-ctype 48 : setct-CertInqReqTBS set-ctype 49 : setct-ErrorTBS set-ctype 50 : setct-PIDualSignedTBE set-ctype 51 : setct-PIUnsignedTBE set-ctype 52 : setct-AuthReqTBE set-ctype 53 : setct-AuthResTBE set-ctype 54 : setct-AuthResTBEX set-ctype 55 : setct-AuthTokenTBE set-ctype 56 : setct-CapTokenTBE set-ctype 57 : setct-CapTokenTBEX set-ctype 58 : setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE set-ctype 59 : setct-AuthRevReqTBE set-ctype 60 : setct-AuthRevResTBE set-ctype 61 : setct-AuthRevResTBEB set-ctype 62 : setct-CapReqTBE set-ctype 63 : setct-CapReqTBEX set-ctype 64 : setct-CapResTBE set-ctype 65 : setct-CapRevReqTBE set-ctype 66 : setct-CapRevReqTBEX set-ctype 67 : setct-CapRevResTBE set-ctype 68 : setct-CredReqTBE set-ctype 69 : setct-CredReqTBEX set-ctype 70 : setct-CredResTBE set-ctype 71 : setct-CredRevReqTBE set-ctype 72 : setct-CredRevReqTBEX set-ctype 73 : setct-CredRevResTBE set-ctype 74 : setct-BatchAdminReqTBE set-ctype 75 : setct-BatchAdminResTBE set-ctype 76 : setct-RegFormReqTBE set-ctype 77 : setct-CertReqTBE set-ctype 78 : setct-CertReqTBEX set-ctype 79 : setct-CertResTBE set-ctype 80 : setct-CRLNotificationTBS set-ctype 81 : setct-CRLNotificationResTBS set-ctype 82 : setct-BCIDistributionTBS set-msgExt 1 : setext-genCrypt : generic cryptogram set-msgExt 3 : setext-miAuth : merchant initiated auth set-msgExt 4 : setext-pinSecure set-msgExt 5 : setext-pinAny set-msgExt 7 : setext-track2 set-msgExt 8 : setext-cv : additional verification set-policy 0 : set-policy-root set-certExt 0 : setCext-hashedRoot set-certExt 1 : setCext-certType set-certExt 2 : setCext-merchData set-certExt 3 : setCext-cCertRequired set-certExt 4 : setCext-tunneling set-certExt 5 : setCext-setExt set-certExt 6 : setCext-setQualf set-certExt 7 : setCext-PGWYcapabilities set-certExt 8 : setCext-TokenIdentifier set-certExt 9 : setCext-Track2Data set-certExt 10 : setCext-TokenType set-certExt 11 : setCext-IssuerCapabilities set-attr 0 : setAttr-Cert set-attr 1 : setAttr-PGWYcap : payment gateway capabilities set-attr 2 : setAttr-TokenType set-attr 3 : setAttr-IssCap : issuer capabilities setAttr-Cert 0 : set-rootKeyThumb setAttr-Cert 1 : set-addPolicy setAttr-TokenType 1 : setAttr-Token-EMV setAttr-TokenType 2 : setAttr-Token-B0Prime setAttr-IssCap 3 : setAttr-IssCap-CVM setAttr-IssCap 4 : setAttr-IssCap-T2 setAttr-IssCap 5 : setAttr-IssCap-Sig setAttr-IssCap-CVM 1 : setAttr-GenCryptgrm : generate cryptogram setAttr-IssCap-T2 1 : setAttr-T2Enc : encrypted track 2 setAttr-IssCap-T2 2 : setAttr-T2cleartxt : cleartext track 2 setAttr-IssCap-Sig 1 : setAttr-TokICCsig : ICC or token signature setAttr-IssCap-Sig 2 : setAttr-SecDevSig : secure device signature set-brand 1 : set-brand-IATA-ATA set-brand 30 : set-brand-Diners set-brand 34 : set-brand-AmericanExpress set-brand 35 : set-brand-JCB set-brand 4 : set-brand-Visa set-brand 5 : set-brand-MasterCard set-brand 6011 : set-brand-Novus rsadsi 3 10 : DES-CDMF : des-cdmf rsadsi 1 1 6 : rsaOAEPEncryptionSET : Oakley-EC2N-3 : ipsec3 : Oakley-EC2N-4 : ipsec4 iso 0 10118 3 0 55 : whirlpool # GOST OIDs member-body 643 2 2 : cryptopro member-body 643 2 9 : cryptocom member-body 643 7 1 : id-tc26 cryptopro 3 : id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 cryptopro 4 : id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 !Cname id-GostR3411-94 cryptopro 9 : md_gost94 : GOST R 34.11-94 cryptopro 10 : id-HMACGostR3411-94 : HMAC GOST 34.11-94 !Cname id-GostR3410-2001 cryptopro 19 : gost2001 : GOST R 34.10-2001 !Cname id-GostR3410-94 cryptopro 20 : gost94 : GOST R 34.10-94 !Cname id-Gost28147-89 cryptopro 21 : gost89 : GOST 28147-89 : gost89-cnt : gost89-cnt-12 : gost89-cbc : gost89-ecb : gost89-ctr !Cname id-Gost28147-89-MAC cryptopro 22 : gost-mac : GOST 28147-89 MAC : gost-mac-12 !Cname id-GostR3411-94-prf cryptopro 23 : prf-gostr3411-94 : GOST R 34.11-94 PRF cryptopro 98 : id-GostR3410-2001DH : GOST R 34.10-2001 DH cryptopro 99 : id-GostR3410-94DH : GOST R 34.10-94 DH cryptopro 14 1 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing cryptopro 14 0 : id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing # GOST parameter set OIDs cryptopro 30 0 : id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet cryptopro 30 1 : id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet cryptopro 31 0 : id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet cryptopro 31 1 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet cryptopro 31 2 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet cryptopro 31 3 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet cryptopro 31 4 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet cryptopro 31 5 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet cryptopro 31 6 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet cryptopro 31 7 : id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet cryptopro 32 0 : id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet cryptopro 32 2 : id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet cryptopro 32 3 : id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet cryptopro 32 4 : id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet cryptopro 32 5 : id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet cryptopro 33 1 : id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet cryptopro 33 2 : id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet cryptopro 33 3 : id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet cryptopro 35 0 : id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet cryptopro 35 1 : id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet cryptopro 35 2 : id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet cryptopro 35 3 : id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet cryptopro 36 0 : id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet cryptopro 36 1 : id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet id-GostR3410-94 1 : id-GostR3410-94-a id-GostR3410-94 2 : id-GostR3410-94-aBis id-GostR3410-94 3 : id-GostR3410-94-b id-GostR3410-94 4 : id-GostR3410-94-bBis # Cryptocom LTD GOST OIDs cryptocom 1 6 1 : id-Gost28147-89-cc : GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet !Cname id-GostR3410-94-cc cryptocom 1 5 3 : gost94cc : GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom !Cname id-GostR3410-2001-cc cryptocom 1 5 4 : gost2001cc : GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom cryptocom 1 3 3 : id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom cryptocom 1 3 4 : id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc : GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom cryptocom 1 8 1 : id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc : GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom # TC26 GOST OIDs id-tc26 1 : id-tc26-algorithms id-tc26-algorithms 1 : id-tc26-sign !Cname id-GostR3410-2012-256 id-tc26-sign 1 : gost2012_256: GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus !Cname id-GostR3410-2012-512 id-tc26-sign 2 : gost2012_512: GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus id-tc26-algorithms 2 : id-tc26-digest !Cname id-GostR3411-2012-256 id-tc26-digest 2 : md_gost12_256: GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash !Cname id-GostR3411-2012-512 id-tc26-digest 3 : md_gost12_512: GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash id-tc26-algorithms 3 : id-tc26-signwithdigest id-tc26-signwithdigest 2: id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256: GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit) id-tc26-signwithdigest 3: id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512: GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit) id-tc26-algorithms 4 : id-tc26-mac id-tc26-mac 1 : id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256 : HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit id-tc26-mac 2 : id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512 : HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit id-tc26-algorithms 5 : id-tc26-cipher id-tc26-algorithms 6 : id-tc26-agreement id-tc26-agreement 1 : id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256 id-tc26-agreement 2 : id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512 id-tc26 2 : id-tc26-constants id-tc26-constants 1 : id-tc26-sign-constants id-tc26-sign-constants 2: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants 0 : id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest: GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants 1 : id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA: GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants 2 : id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB: GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B id-tc26-constants 2 : id-tc26-digest-constants id-tc26-constants 5 : id-tc26-cipher-constants id-tc26-cipher-constants 1 : id-tc26-gost-28147-constants id-tc26-gost-28147-constants 1 : id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z : GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set member-body 643 3 131 1 1 : INN : INN member-body 643 100 1 : OGRN : OGRN member-body 643 100 3 : SNILS : SNILS member-body 643 100 111 : subjectSignTool : Signing Tool of Subject member-body 643 100 112 : issuerSignTool : Signing Tool of Issuer #GOST R34.13-2015 Grasshopper "Kuznechik" : grasshopper-ecb : grasshopper-ctr : grasshopper-ofb : grasshopper-cbc : grasshopper-cfb : grasshopper-mac # Definitions for Camellia cipher - CBC MODE 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 2 : CAMELLIA-128-CBC : camellia-128-cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 3 : CAMELLIA-192-CBC : camellia-192-cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 4 : CAMELLIA-256-CBC : camellia-256-cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 2 : id-camellia128-wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 3 : id-camellia192-wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 4 : id-camellia256-wrap # Definitions for Camellia cipher - ECB, CFB, OFB MODE !Alias ntt-ds 0 3 4401 5 !Alias camellia ntt-ds 3 1 9 camellia 1 : CAMELLIA-128-ECB : camellia-128-ecb !Cname camellia-128-ofb128 camellia 3 : CAMELLIA-128-OFB : camellia-128-ofb !Cname camellia-128-cfb128 camellia 4 : CAMELLIA-128-CFB : camellia-128-cfb camellia 6 : CAMELLIA-128-GCM : camellia-128-gcm camellia 7 : CAMELLIA-128-CCM : camellia-128-ccm camellia 9 : CAMELLIA-128-CTR : camellia-128-ctr camellia 10 : CAMELLIA-128-CMAC : camellia-128-cmac camellia 21 : CAMELLIA-192-ECB : camellia-192-ecb !Cname camellia-192-ofb128 camellia 23 : CAMELLIA-192-OFB : camellia-192-ofb !Cname camellia-192-cfb128 camellia 24 : CAMELLIA-192-CFB : camellia-192-cfb camellia 26 : CAMELLIA-192-GCM : camellia-192-gcm camellia 27 : CAMELLIA-192-CCM : camellia-192-ccm camellia 29 : CAMELLIA-192-CTR : camellia-192-ctr camellia 30 : CAMELLIA-192-CMAC : camellia-192-cmac camellia 41 : CAMELLIA-256-ECB : camellia-256-ecb !Cname camellia-256-ofb128 camellia 43 : CAMELLIA-256-OFB : camellia-256-ofb !Cname camellia-256-cfb128 camellia 44 : CAMELLIA-256-CFB : camellia-256-cfb camellia 46 : CAMELLIA-256-GCM : camellia-256-gcm camellia 47 : CAMELLIA-256-CCM : camellia-256-ccm camellia 49 : CAMELLIA-256-CTR : camellia-256-ctr camellia 50 : CAMELLIA-256-CMAC : camellia-256-cmac # There are no OIDs for these modes... : CAMELLIA-128-CFB1 : camellia-128-cfb1 : CAMELLIA-192-CFB1 : camellia-192-cfb1 : CAMELLIA-256-CFB1 : camellia-256-cfb1 : CAMELLIA-128-CFB8 : camellia-128-cfb8 : CAMELLIA-192-CFB8 : camellia-192-cfb8 : CAMELLIA-256-CFB8 : camellia-256-cfb8 # Definitions for SEED cipher - ECB, CBC, OFB mode member-body 410 200004 : KISA : kisa kisa 1 3 : SEED-ECB : seed-ecb kisa 1 4 : SEED-CBC : seed-cbc !Cname seed-cfb128 kisa 1 5 : SEED-CFB : seed-cfb !Cname seed-ofb128 kisa 1 6 : SEED-OFB : seed-ofb # There is no OID that just denotes "HMAC" oddly enough... : HMAC : hmac # Nor CMAC either : CMAC : cmac # Synthetic composite ciphersuites : RC4-HMAC-MD5 : rc4-hmac-md5 : AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1 : aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1 : AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1 : aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1 : AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1 : aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1 : AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256 : aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256 : AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256 : aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256 : AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256 : aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256 : ChaCha20-Poly1305 : chacha20-poly1305 : ChaCha20 : chacha20 ISO-US 10046 2 1 : dhpublicnumber : X9.42 DH # RFC 5639 curve OIDs (see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt) # versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { # iso(1) identifified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) # signature-algorithm(3) ecSign(2) ecStdCurvesAndGeneration(8) # ellipticCurve(1) 1 } 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 1 : brainpoolP160r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 2 : brainpoolP160t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 3 : brainpoolP192r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 4 : brainpoolP192t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 5 : brainpoolP224r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 6 : brainpoolP224t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 7 : brainpoolP256r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 8 : brainpoolP256t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 9 : brainpoolP320r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 10 : brainpoolP320t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 11 : brainpoolP384r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 12 : brainpoolP384t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 13 : brainpoolP512r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 14 : brainpoolP512t1 # ECDH schemes from RFC5753 !Alias x9-63-scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0 !Alias secg-scheme certicom-arc 1 x9-63-scheme 2 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme secg-scheme 11 0 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme secg-scheme 11 1 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme secg-scheme 11 2 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme secg-scheme 11 3 : dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme x9-63-scheme 3 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme secg-scheme 14 0 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme secg-scheme 14 1 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme secg-scheme 14 2 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme secg-scheme 14 3 : dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme # NIDs for use with lookup tables. : dh-std-kdf : dh-cofactor-kdf # RFC 6962 Extension OIDs (see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6962.txt) 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 2 : ct_precert_scts : CT Precertificate SCTs 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 3 : ct_precert_poison : CT Precertificate Poison 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 4 : ct_precert_signer : CT Precertificate Signer 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 5 : ct_cert_scts : CT Certificate SCTs # CABForum EV SSL Certificate Guidelines # (see https://cabforum.org/extended-validation/) # OIDs for Subject Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 1 : jurisdictionL : jurisdictionLocalityName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 2 : jurisdictionST : jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 3 : jurisdictionC : jurisdictionCountryName # SCRYPT algorithm 1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 11 : id-scrypt # NID for TLS1 PRF : TLS1-PRF : tls1-prf # NID for HKDF : HKDF : hkdf # RFC 4556 1 3 6 1 5 2 3 : id-pkinit id-pkinit 4 : pkInitClientAuth : PKINIT Client Auth id-pkinit 5 : pkInitKDC : Signing KDC Response # New curves from draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-00 1 3 101 110 : X25519 1 3 101 111 : X448 # NIDs for cipher key exchange : KxRSA : kx-rsa : KxECDHE : kx-ecdhe : KxDHE : kx-dhe : KxECDHE-PSK : kx-ecdhe-psk : KxDHE-PSK : kx-dhe-psk : KxRSA_PSK : kx-rsa-psk : KxPSK : kx-psk : KxSRP : kx-srp : KxGOST : kx-gost # NIDs for cipher authentication : AuthRSA : auth-rsa : AuthECDSA : auth-ecdsa : AuthPSK : auth-psk : AuthDSS : auth-dss : AuthGOST01 : auth-gost01 : AuthGOST12 : auth-gost12 : AuthSRP : auth-srp : AuthNULL : auth-null openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_mac.num0000644000000000000000000005561113176625657017157 0ustar rootrootundef 0 rsadsi 1 pkcs 2 md2 3 md5 4 rc4 5 rsaEncryption 6 md2WithRSAEncryption 7 md5WithRSAEncryption 8 pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC 9 pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC 10 X500 11 X509 12 commonName 13 countryName 14 localityName 15 stateOrProvinceName 16 organizationName 17 organizationalUnitName 18 rsa 19 pkcs7 20 pkcs7_data 21 pkcs7_signed 22 pkcs7_enveloped 23 pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped 24 pkcs7_digest 25 pkcs7_encrypted 26 pkcs3 27 dhKeyAgreement 28 des_ecb 29 des_cfb64 30 des_cbc 31 des_ede_ecb 32 des_ede3_ecb 33 idea_cbc 34 idea_cfb64 35 idea_ecb 36 rc2_cbc 37 rc2_ecb 38 rc2_cfb64 39 rc2_ofb64 40 sha 41 shaWithRSAEncryption 42 des_ede_cbc 43 des_ede3_cbc 44 des_ofb64 45 idea_ofb64 46 pkcs9 47 pkcs9_emailAddress 48 pkcs9_unstructuredName 49 pkcs9_contentType 50 pkcs9_messageDigest 51 pkcs9_signingTime 52 pkcs9_countersignature 53 pkcs9_challengePassword 54 pkcs9_unstructuredAddress 55 pkcs9_extCertAttributes 56 netscape 57 netscape_cert_extension 58 netscape_data_type 59 des_ede_cfb64 60 des_ede3_cfb64 61 des_ede_ofb64 62 des_ede3_ofb64 63 sha1 64 sha1WithRSAEncryption 65 dsaWithSHA 66 dsa_2 67 pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC 68 id_pbkdf2 69 dsaWithSHA1_2 70 netscape_cert_type 71 netscape_base_url 72 netscape_revocation_url 73 netscape_ca_revocation_url 74 netscape_renewal_url 75 netscape_ca_policy_url 76 netscape_ssl_server_name 77 netscape_comment 78 netscape_cert_sequence 79 desx_cbc 80 id_ce 81 subject_key_identifier 82 key_usage 83 private_key_usage_period 84 subject_alt_name 85 issuer_alt_name 86 basic_constraints 87 crl_number 88 certificate_policies 89 authority_key_identifier 90 bf_cbc 91 bf_ecb 92 bf_cfb64 93 bf_ofb64 94 mdc2 95 mdc2WithRSA 96 rc4_40 97 rc2_40_cbc 98 givenName 99 surname 100 initials 101 uniqueIdentifier 102 crl_distribution_points 103 md5WithRSA 104 serialNumber 105 title 106 description 107 cast5_cbc 108 cast5_ecb 109 cast5_cfb64 110 cast5_ofb64 111 pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 112 dsaWithSHA1 113 md5_sha1 114 sha1WithRSA 115 dsa 116 ripemd160 117 ripemd160WithRSA 119 rc5_cbc 120 rc5_ecb 121 rc5_cfb64 122 rc5_ofb64 123 rle_compression 124 zlib_compression 125 ext_key_usage 126 id_pkix 127 id_kp 128 server_auth 129 client_auth 130 code_sign 131 email_protect 132 time_stamp 133 ms_code_ind 134 ms_code_com 135 ms_ctl_sign 136 ms_sgc 137 ms_efs 138 ns_sgc 139 delta_crl 140 crl_reason 141 invalidity_date 142 sxnet 143 pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 144 pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 145 pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC 146 pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC 147 pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC 148 pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC 149 keyBag 150 pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 151 certBag 152 crlBag 153 secretBag 154 safeContentsBag 155 friendlyName 156 localKeyID 157 x509Certificate 158 sdsiCertificate 159 x509Crl 160 pbes2 161 pbmac1 162 hmacWithSHA1 163 id_qt_cps 164 id_qt_unotice 165 rc2_64_cbc 166 SMIMECapabilities 167 pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC 168 pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC 169 pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC 170 ms_ext_req 171 ext_req 172 name 173 dnQualifier 174 id_pe 175 id_ad 176 info_access 177 ad_OCSP 178 ad_ca_issuers 179 OCSP_sign 180 iso 181 member_body 182 ISO_US 183 X9_57 184 X9cm 185 pkcs1 186 pkcs5 187 SMIME 188 id_smime_mod 189 id_smime_ct 190 id_smime_aa 191 id_smime_alg 192 id_smime_cd 193 id_smime_spq 194 id_smime_cti 195 id_smime_mod_cms 196 id_smime_mod_ess 197 id_smime_mod_oid 198 id_smime_mod_msg_v3 199 id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 200 id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 201 id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 202 id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 203 id_smime_ct_receipt 204 id_smime_ct_authData 205 id_smime_ct_publishCert 206 id_smime_ct_TSTInfo 207 id_smime_ct_TDTInfo 208 id_smime_ct_contentInfo 209 id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData 210 id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData 211 id_smime_aa_receiptRequest 212 id_smime_aa_securityLabel 213 id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory 214 id_smime_aa_contentHint 215 id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest 216 id_smime_aa_encapContentType 217 id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier 218 id_smime_aa_macValue 219 id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels 220 id_smime_aa_contentReference 221 id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref 222 id_smime_aa_signingCertificate 223 id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts 224 id_smime_aa_timeStampToken 225 id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId 226 id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType 227 id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation 228 id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr 229 id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert 230 id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp 231 id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs 232 id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs 233 id_smime_aa_ets_certValues 234 id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues 235 id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp 236 id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp 237 id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp 238 id_smime_aa_signatureType 239 id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc 240 id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES 241 id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 242 id_smime_alg_3DESwrap 243 id_smime_alg_RC2wrap 244 id_smime_alg_ESDH 245 id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap 246 id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap 247 id_smime_cd_ldap 248 id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri 249 id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice 250 id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin 251 id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt 252 id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery 253 id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender 254 id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval 255 id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation 256 md4 257 id_pkix_mod 258 id_qt 259 id_it 260 id_pkip 261 id_alg 262 id_cmc 263 id_on 264 id_pda 265 id_aca 266 id_qcs 267 id_cct 268 id_pkix1_explicit_88 269 id_pkix1_implicit_88 270 id_pkix1_explicit_93 271 id_pkix1_implicit_93 272 id_mod_crmf 273 id_mod_cmc 274 id_mod_kea_profile_88 275 id_mod_kea_profile_93 276 id_mod_cmp 277 id_mod_qualified_cert_88 278 id_mod_qualified_cert_93 279 id_mod_attribute_cert 280 id_mod_timestamp_protocol 281 id_mod_ocsp 282 id_mod_dvcs 283 id_mod_cmp2000 284 biometricInfo 285 qcStatements 286 ac_auditEntity 287 ac_targeting 288 aaControls 289 sbgp_ipAddrBlock 290 sbgp_autonomousSysNum 291 sbgp_routerIdentifier 292 textNotice 293 ipsecEndSystem 294 ipsecTunnel 295 ipsecUser 296 dvcs 297 id_it_caProtEncCert 298 id_it_signKeyPairTypes 299 id_it_encKeyPairTypes 300 id_it_preferredSymmAlg 301 id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo 302 id_it_currentCRL 303 id_it_unsupportedOIDs 304 id_it_subscriptionRequest 305 id_it_subscriptionResponse 306 id_it_keyPairParamReq 307 id_it_keyPairParamRep 308 id_it_revPassphrase 309 id_it_implicitConfirm 310 id_it_confirmWaitTime 311 id_it_origPKIMessage 312 id_regCtrl 313 id_regInfo 314 id_regCtrl_regToken 315 id_regCtrl_authenticator 316 id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo 317 id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions 318 id_regCtrl_oldCertID 319 id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey 320 id_regInfo_utf8Pairs 321 id_regInfo_certReq 322 id_alg_des40 323 id_alg_noSignature 324 id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 325 id_alg_dh_pop 326 id_cmc_statusInfo 327 id_cmc_identification 328 id_cmc_identityProof 329 id_cmc_dataReturn 330 id_cmc_transactionId 331 id_cmc_senderNonce 332 id_cmc_recipientNonce 333 id_cmc_addExtensions 334 id_cmc_encryptedPOP 335 id_cmc_decryptedPOP 336 id_cmc_lraPOPWitness 337 id_cmc_getCert 338 id_cmc_getCRL 339 id_cmc_revokeRequest 340 id_cmc_regInfo 341 id_cmc_responseInfo 342 id_cmc_queryPending 343 id_cmc_popLinkRandom 344 id_cmc_popLinkWitness 345 id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance 346 id_on_personalData 347 id_pda_dateOfBirth 348 id_pda_placeOfBirth 349 id_pda_pseudonym 350 id_pda_gender 351 id_pda_countryOfCitizenship 352 id_pda_countryOfResidence 353 id_aca_authenticationInfo 354 id_aca_accessIdentity 355 id_aca_chargingIdentity 356 id_aca_group 357 id_aca_role 358 id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 359 id_cct_crs 360 id_cct_PKIData 361 id_cct_PKIResponse 362 ad_timeStamping 363 ad_dvcs 364 id_pkix_OCSP_basic 365 id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce 366 id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID 367 id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses 368 id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck 369 id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff 370 id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator 371 id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus 372 id_pkix_OCSP_valid 373 id_pkix_OCSP_path 374 id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot 375 algorithm 376 rsaSignature 377 X500algorithms 378 org 379 dod 380 iana 381 Directory 382 Management 383 Experimental 384 Private 385 Security 386 SNMPv2 387 Mail 388 Enterprises 389 dcObject 390 domainComponent 391 Domain 392 joint_iso_ccitt 393 selected_attribute_types 394 clearance 395 md4WithRSAEncryption 396 ac_proxying 397 sinfo_access 398 id_aca_encAttrs 399 role 400 policy_constraints 401 target_information 402 no_rev_avail 403 ccitt 404 ansi_X9_62 405 X9_62_prime_field 406 X9_62_characteristic_two_field 407 X9_62_id_ecPublicKey 408 X9_62_prime192v1 409 X9_62_prime192v2 410 X9_62_prime192v3 411 X9_62_prime239v1 412 X9_62_prime239v2 413 X9_62_prime239v3 414 X9_62_prime256v1 415 ecdsa_with_SHA1 416 ms_csp_name 417 aes_128_ecb 418 aes_128_cbc 419 aes_128_ofb128 420 aes_128_cfb128 421 aes_192_ecb 422 aes_192_cbc 423 aes_192_ofb128 424 aes_192_cfb128 425 aes_256_ecb 426 aes_256_cbc 427 aes_256_ofb128 428 aes_256_cfb128 429 hold_instruction_code 430 hold_instruction_none 431 hold_instruction_call_issuer 432 hold_instruction_reject 433 data 434 pss 435 ucl 436 pilot 437 pilotAttributeType 438 pilotAttributeSyntax 439 pilotObjectClass 440 pilotGroups 441 iA5StringSyntax 442 caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax 443 pilotObject 444 pilotPerson 445 account 446 document 447 room 448 documentSeries 449 rFC822localPart 450 dNSDomain 451 domainRelatedObject 452 friendlyCountry 453 simpleSecurityObject 454 pilotOrganization 455 pilotDSA 456 qualityLabelledData 457 userId 458 textEncodedORAddress 459 rfc822Mailbox 460 info 461 favouriteDrink 462 roomNumber 463 photo 464 userClass 465 host 466 manager 467 documentIdentifier 468 documentTitle 469 documentVersion 470 documentAuthor 471 documentLocation 472 homeTelephoneNumber 473 secretary 474 otherMailbox 475 lastModifiedTime 476 lastModifiedBy 477 aRecord 478 pilotAttributeType27 479 mXRecord 480 nSRecord 481 sOARecord 482 cNAMERecord 483 associatedDomain 484 associatedName 485 homePostalAddress 486 personalTitle 487 mobileTelephoneNumber 488 pagerTelephoneNumber 489 friendlyCountryName 490 organizationalStatus 491 janetMailbox 492 mailPreferenceOption 493 buildingName 494 dSAQuality 495 singleLevelQuality 496 subtreeMinimumQuality 497 subtreeMaximumQuality 498 personalSignature 499 dITRedirect 500 audio 501 documentPublisher 502 x500UniqueIdentifier 503 mime_mhs 504 mime_mhs_headings 505 mime_mhs_bodies 506 id_hex_partial_message 507 id_hex_multipart_message 508 generationQualifier 509 pseudonym 510 InternationalRA 511 id_set 512 set_ctype 513 set_msgExt 514 set_attr 515 set_policy 516 set_certExt 517 set_brand 518 setct_PANData 519 setct_PANToken 520 setct_PANOnly 521 setct_OIData 522 setct_PI 523 setct_PIData 524 setct_PIDataUnsigned 525 setct_HODInput 526 setct_AuthResBaggage 527 setct_AuthRevReqBaggage 528 setct_AuthRevResBaggage 529 setct_CapTokenSeq 530 setct_PInitResData 531 setct_PI_TBS 532 setct_PResData 533 setct_AuthReqTBS 534 setct_AuthResTBS 535 setct_AuthResTBSX 536 setct_AuthTokenTBS 537 setct_CapTokenData 538 setct_CapTokenTBS 539 setct_AcqCardCodeMsg 540 setct_AuthRevReqTBS 541 setct_AuthRevResData 542 setct_AuthRevResTBS 543 setct_CapReqTBS 544 setct_CapReqTBSX 545 setct_CapResData 546 setct_CapRevReqTBS 547 setct_CapRevReqTBSX 548 setct_CapRevResData 549 setct_CredReqTBS 550 setct_CredReqTBSX 551 setct_CredResData 552 setct_CredRevReqTBS 553 setct_CredRevReqTBSX 554 setct_CredRevResData 555 setct_PCertReqData 556 setct_PCertResTBS 557 setct_BatchAdminReqData 558 setct_BatchAdminResData 559 setct_CardCInitResTBS 560 setct_MeAqCInitResTBS 561 setct_RegFormResTBS 562 setct_CertReqData 563 setct_CertReqTBS 564 setct_CertResData 565 setct_CertInqReqTBS 566 setct_ErrorTBS 567 setct_PIDualSignedTBE 568 setct_PIUnsignedTBE 569 setct_AuthReqTBE 570 setct_AuthResTBE 571 setct_AuthResTBEX 572 setct_AuthTokenTBE 573 setct_CapTokenTBE 574 setct_CapTokenTBEX 575 setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE 576 setct_AuthRevReqTBE 577 setct_AuthRevResTBE 578 setct_AuthRevResTBEB 579 setct_CapReqTBE 580 setct_CapReqTBEX 581 setct_CapResTBE 582 setct_CapRevReqTBE 583 setct_CapRevReqTBEX 584 setct_CapRevResTBE 585 setct_CredReqTBE 586 setct_CredReqTBEX 587 setct_CredResTBE 588 setct_CredRevReqTBE 589 setct_CredRevReqTBEX 590 setct_CredRevResTBE 591 setct_BatchAdminReqTBE 592 setct_BatchAdminResTBE 593 setct_RegFormReqTBE 594 setct_CertReqTBE 595 setct_CertReqTBEX 596 setct_CertResTBE 597 setct_CRLNotificationTBS 598 setct_CRLNotificationResTBS 599 setct_BCIDistributionTBS 600 setext_genCrypt 601 setext_miAuth 602 setext_pinSecure 603 setext_pinAny 604 setext_track2 605 setext_cv 606 set_policy_root 607 setCext_hashedRoot 608 setCext_certType 609 setCext_merchData 610 setCext_cCertRequired 611 setCext_tunneling 612 setCext_setExt 613 setCext_setQualf 614 setCext_PGWYcapabilities 615 setCext_TokenIdentifier 616 setCext_Track2Data 617 setCext_TokenType 618 setCext_IssuerCapabilities 619 setAttr_Cert 620 setAttr_PGWYcap 621 setAttr_TokenType 622 setAttr_IssCap 623 set_rootKeyThumb 624 set_addPolicy 625 setAttr_Token_EMV 626 setAttr_Token_B0Prime 627 setAttr_IssCap_CVM 628 setAttr_IssCap_T2 629 setAttr_IssCap_Sig 630 setAttr_GenCryptgrm 631 setAttr_T2Enc 632 setAttr_T2cleartxt 633 setAttr_TokICCsig 634 setAttr_SecDevSig 635 set_brand_IATA_ATA 636 set_brand_Diners 637 set_brand_AmericanExpress 638 set_brand_JCB 639 set_brand_Visa 640 set_brand_MasterCard 641 set_brand_Novus 642 des_cdmf 643 rsaOAEPEncryptionSET 644 itu_t 645 joint_iso_itu_t 646 international_organizations 647 ms_smartcard_login 648 ms_upn 649 aes_128_cfb1 650 aes_192_cfb1 651 aes_256_cfb1 652 aes_128_cfb8 653 aes_192_cfb8 654 aes_256_cfb8 655 des_cfb1 656 des_cfb8 657 des_ede3_cfb1 658 des_ede3_cfb8 659 streetAddress 660 postalCode 661 id_ppl 662 proxyCertInfo 663 id_ppl_anyLanguage 664 id_ppl_inheritAll 665 name_constraints 666 Independent 667 sha256WithRSAEncryption 668 sha384WithRSAEncryption 669 sha512WithRSAEncryption 670 sha224WithRSAEncryption 671 sha256 672 sha384 673 sha512 674 sha224 675 identified_organization 676 certicom_arc 677 wap 678 wap_wsg 679 X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis 680 X9_62_onBasis 681 X9_62_tpBasis 682 X9_62_ppBasis 683 X9_62_c2pnb163v1 684 X9_62_c2pnb163v2 685 X9_62_c2pnb163v3 686 X9_62_c2pnb176v1 687 X9_62_c2tnb191v1 688 X9_62_c2tnb191v2 689 X9_62_c2tnb191v3 690 X9_62_c2onb191v4 691 X9_62_c2onb191v5 692 X9_62_c2pnb208w1 693 X9_62_c2tnb239v1 694 X9_62_c2tnb239v2 695 X9_62_c2tnb239v3 696 X9_62_c2onb239v4 697 X9_62_c2onb239v5 698 X9_62_c2pnb272w1 699 X9_62_c2pnb304w1 700 X9_62_c2tnb359v1 701 X9_62_c2pnb368w1 702 X9_62_c2tnb431r1 703 secp112r1 704 secp112r2 705 secp128r1 706 secp128r2 707 secp160k1 708 secp160r1 709 secp160r2 710 secp192k1 711 secp224k1 712 secp224r1 713 secp256k1 714 secp384r1 715 secp521r1 716 sect113r1 717 sect113r2 718 sect131r1 719 sect131r2 720 sect163k1 721 sect163r1 722 sect163r2 723 sect193r1 724 sect193r2 725 sect233k1 726 sect233r1 727 sect239k1 728 sect283k1 729 sect283r1 730 sect409k1 731 sect409r1 732 sect571k1 733 sect571r1 734 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 735 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 736 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 737 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 738 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 739 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 740 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 741 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 742 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 743 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 744 wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 745 any_policy 746 policy_mappings 747 inhibit_any_policy 748 ipsec3 749 ipsec4 750 camellia_128_cbc 751 camellia_192_cbc 752 camellia_256_cbc 753 camellia_128_ecb 754 camellia_192_ecb 755 camellia_256_ecb 756 camellia_128_cfb128 757 camellia_192_cfb128 758 camellia_256_cfb128 759 camellia_128_cfb1 760 camellia_192_cfb1 761 camellia_256_cfb1 762 camellia_128_cfb8 763 camellia_192_cfb8 764 camellia_256_cfb8 765 camellia_128_ofb128 766 camellia_192_ofb128 767 camellia_256_ofb128 768 subject_directory_attributes 769 issuing_distribution_point 770 certificate_issuer 771 korea 772 kisa 773 kftc 774 npki_alg 775 seed_ecb 776 seed_cbc 777 seed_ofb128 778 seed_cfb128 779 hmac_md5 780 hmac_sha1 781 id_PasswordBasedMAC 782 id_DHBasedMac 783 id_it_suppLangTags 784 caRepository 785 id_smime_ct_compressedData 786 id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF 787 id_aes128_wrap 788 id_aes192_wrap 789 id_aes256_wrap 790 ecdsa_with_Recommended 791 ecdsa_with_Specified 792 ecdsa_with_SHA224 793 ecdsa_with_SHA256 794 ecdsa_with_SHA384 795 ecdsa_with_SHA512 796 hmacWithMD5 797 hmacWithSHA224 798 hmacWithSHA256 799 hmacWithSHA384 800 hmacWithSHA512 801 dsa_with_SHA224 802 dsa_with_SHA256 803 whirlpool 804 cryptopro 805 cryptocom 806 id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 807 id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 808 id_GostR3411_94 809 id_HMACGostR3411_94 810 id_GostR3410_2001 811 id_GostR3410_94 812 id_Gost28147_89 813 gost89_cnt 814 id_Gost28147_89_MAC 815 id_GostR3411_94_prf 816 id_GostR3410_2001DH 817 id_GostR3410_94DH 818 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing 819 id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing 820 id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet 821 id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet 822 id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet 823 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 824 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 825 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 826 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 827 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet 828 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet 829 id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet 830 id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet 831 id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 832 id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 833 id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 834 id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 835 id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 836 id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 837 id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet 838 id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet 839 id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 840 id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 841 id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 842 id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 843 id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 844 id_GostR3410_94_a 845 id_GostR3410_94_aBis 846 id_GostR3410_94_b 847 id_GostR3410_94_bBis 848 id_Gost28147_89_cc 849 id_GostR3410_94_cc 850 id_GostR3410_2001_cc 851 id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc 852 id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc 853 id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc 854 hmac 855 LocalKeySet 856 freshest_crl 857 id_on_permanentIdentifier 858 searchGuide 859 businessCategory 860 postalAddress 861 postOfficeBox 862 physicalDeliveryOfficeName 863 telephoneNumber 864 telexNumber 865 teletexTerminalIdentifier 866 facsimileTelephoneNumber 867 x121Address 868 internationaliSDNNumber 869 registeredAddress 870 destinationIndicator 871 preferredDeliveryMethod 872 presentationAddress 873 supportedApplicationContext 874 member 875 owner 876 roleOccupant 877 seeAlso 878 userPassword 879 userCertificate 880 cACertificate 881 authorityRevocationList 882 certificateRevocationList 883 crossCertificatePair 884 enhancedSearchGuide 885 protocolInformation 886 distinguishedName 887 uniqueMember 888 houseIdentifier 889 supportedAlgorithms 890 deltaRevocationList 891 dmdName 892 id_alg_PWRI_KEK 893 cmac 894 aes_128_gcm 895 aes_128_ccm 896 id_aes128_wrap_pad 897 aes_192_gcm 898 aes_192_ccm 899 id_aes192_wrap_pad 900 aes_256_gcm 901 aes_256_ccm 902 id_aes256_wrap_pad 903 aes_128_ctr 904 aes_192_ctr 905 aes_256_ctr 906 id_camellia128_wrap 907 id_camellia192_wrap 908 id_camellia256_wrap 909 anyExtendedKeyUsage 910 mgf1 911 rsassaPss 912 aes_128_xts 913 aes_256_xts 914 rc4_hmac_md5 915 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 916 aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1 917 aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 918 rsaesOaep 919 dhpublicnumber 920 brainpoolP160r1 921 brainpoolP160t1 922 brainpoolP192r1 923 brainpoolP192t1 924 brainpoolP224r1 925 brainpoolP224t1 926 brainpoolP256r1 927 brainpoolP256t1 928 brainpoolP320r1 929 brainpoolP320t1 930 brainpoolP384r1 931 brainpoolP384t1 932 brainpoolP512r1 933 brainpoolP512t1 934 pSpecified 935 dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme 936 dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme 937 dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme 938 dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme 939 dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme 940 dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme 941 dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme 942 dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme 943 dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme 944 dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme 945 dh_std_kdf 946 dh_cofactor_kdf 947 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 948 aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256 949 aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 950 ct_precert_scts 951 ct_precert_poison 952 ct_precert_signer 953 ct_cert_scts 954 jurisdictionLocalityName 955 jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 956 jurisdictionCountryName 957 aes_128_ocb 958 aes_192_ocb 959 aes_256_ocb 960 camellia_128_gcm 961 camellia_128_ccm 962 camellia_128_ctr 963 camellia_128_cmac 964 camellia_192_gcm 965 camellia_192_ccm 966 camellia_192_ctr 967 camellia_192_cmac 968 camellia_256_gcm 969 camellia_256_ccm 970 camellia_256_ctr 971 camellia_256_cmac 972 id_scrypt 973 id_tc26 974 gost89_cnt_12 975 gost_mac_12 976 id_tc26_algorithms 977 id_tc26_sign 978 id_GostR3410_2012_256 979 id_GostR3410_2012_512 980 id_tc26_digest 981 id_GostR3411_2012_256 982 id_GostR3411_2012_512 983 id_tc26_signwithdigest 984 id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 985 id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 986 id_tc26_mac 987 id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 988 id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 989 id_tc26_cipher 990 id_tc26_agreement 991 id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 992 id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 993 id_tc26_constants 994 id_tc26_sign_constants 995 id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants 996 id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest 997 id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA 998 id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB 999 id_tc26_digest_constants 1000 id_tc26_cipher_constants 1001 id_tc26_gost_28147_constants 1002 id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z 1003 INN 1004 OGRN 1005 SNILS 1006 subjectSignTool 1007 issuerSignTool 1008 gost89_cbc 1009 gost89_ecb 1010 gost89_ctr 1011 grasshopper_ecb 1012 grasshopper_ctr 1013 grasshopper_ofb 1014 grasshopper_cbc 1015 grasshopper_cfb 1016 grasshopper_mac 1017 chacha20_poly1305 1018 chacha20 1019 tlsfeature 1020 tls1_prf 1021 ipsec_IKE 1022 capwapAC 1023 capwapWTP 1024 sshClient 1025 sshServer 1026 sendRouter 1027 sendProxiedRouter 1028 sendOwner 1029 sendProxiedOwner 1030 id_pkinit 1031 pkInitClientAuth 1032 pkInitKDC 1033 X25519 1034 X448 1035 hkdf 1036 kx_rsa 1037 kx_ecdhe 1038 kx_dhe 1039 kx_ecdhe_psk 1040 kx_dhe_psk 1041 kx_rsa_psk 1042 kx_psk 1043 kx_srp 1044 kx_gost 1045 auth_rsa 1046 auth_ecdsa 1047 auth_psk 1048 auth_dss 1049 auth_gost01 1050 auth_gost12 1051 auth_srp 1052 auth_null 1053 fips_none 1054 fips_140_2 1055 blake2b512 1056 blake2s256 1057 id_smime_ct_contentCollection 1058 id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData 1059 id_ct_xml 1060 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000000075413176625657016617 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ typedef struct name_funcs_st NAME_FUNCS; DEFINE_STACK_OF(NAME_FUNCS) DEFINE_LHASH_OF(OBJ_NAME); typedef struct added_obj_st ADDED_OBJ; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(ADDED_OBJ); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c0000644000000000000000000004351213176625657016607 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/objects.h" #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "obj_lcl.h" /* obj_dat.h is generated from objects.h by obj_dat.pl */ #include "obj_dat.h" DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, sn); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, ln); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, obj); #define ADDED_DATA 0 #define ADDED_SNAME 1 #define ADDED_LNAME 2 #define ADDED_NID 3 struct added_obj_st { int type; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; }; static int new_nid = NUM_NID; static LHASH_OF(ADDED_OBJ) *added = NULL; static int sn_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const unsigned int *b) { return (strcmp((*a)->sn, nid_objs[*b].sn)); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, sn); static int ln_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const unsigned int *b) { return (strcmp((*a)->ln, nid_objs[*b].ln)); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, ln); static unsigned long added_obj_hash(const ADDED_OBJ *ca) { const ASN1_OBJECT *a; int i; unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char *p; a = ca->obj; switch (ca->type) { case ADDED_DATA: ret = a->length << 20L; p = (unsigned char *)a->data; for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++) ret ^= p[i] << ((i * 3) % 24); break; case ADDED_SNAME: ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->sn); break; case ADDED_LNAME: ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->ln); break; case ADDED_NID: ret = a->nid; break; default: /* abort(); */ return 0; } ret &= 0x3fffffffL; ret |= ((unsigned long)ca->type) << 30L; return (ret); } static int added_obj_cmp(const ADDED_OBJ *ca, const ADDED_OBJ *cb) { ASN1_OBJECT *a, *b; int i; i = ca->type - cb->type; if (i) return (i); a = ca->obj; b = cb->obj; switch (ca->type) { case ADDED_DATA: i = (a->length - b->length); if (i) return (i); return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, (size_t)a->length)); case ADDED_SNAME: if (a->sn == NULL) return (-1); else if (b->sn == NULL) return (1); else return (strcmp(a->sn, b->sn)); case ADDED_LNAME: if (a->ln == NULL) return (-1); else if (b->ln == NULL) return (1); else return (strcmp(a->ln, b->ln)); case ADDED_NID: return (a->nid - b->nid); default: /* abort(); */ return 0; } } static int init_added(void) { if (added != NULL) return (1); added = lh_ADDED_OBJ_new(added_obj_hash, added_obj_cmp); return (added != NULL); } static void cleanup1_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a) { a->obj->nid = 0; a->obj->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; } static void cleanup2_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a) { a->obj->nid++; } static void cleanup3_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a) { if (--a->obj->nid == 0) ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->obj); OPENSSL_free(a); } void obj_cleanup_int(void) { if (added == NULL) return; lh_ADDED_OBJ_set_down_load(added, 0); lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup1_doall); /* zero counters */ lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup2_doall); /* set counters */ lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup3_doall); /* free objects */ lh_ADDED_OBJ_free(added); added = NULL; } int OBJ_new_nid(int num) { int i; i = new_nid; new_nid += num; return (i); } int OBJ_add_object(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { ASN1_OBJECT *o; ADDED_OBJ *ao[4] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, *aop; int i; if (added == NULL) if (!init_added()) return (0); if ((o = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ao[ADDED_NID] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; if ((o->length != 0) && (obj->data != NULL)) if ((ao[ADDED_DATA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; if (o->sn != NULL) if ((ao[ADDED_SNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; if (o->ln != NULL) if ((ao[ADDED_LNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++) { if (ao[i] != NULL) { ao[i]->type = i; ao[i]->obj = o; aop = lh_ADDED_OBJ_insert(added, ao[i]); /* memory leak, but should not normally matter */ OPENSSL_free(aop); } } o->flags &= ~(ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA); return (o->nid); err2: OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++) OPENSSL_free(ao[i]); OPENSSL_free(o); return (NID_undef); } ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n) { ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; ASN1_OBJECT ob; if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) { if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } return ((ASN1_OBJECT *)&(nid_objs[n])); } else if (added == NULL) return (NULL); else { ad.type = ADDED_NID; ad.obj = &ob; ob.nid = n; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return (adp->obj); else { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } } } const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n) { ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; ASN1_OBJECT ob; if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) { if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } return (nid_objs[n].sn); } else if (added == NULL) return (NULL); else { ad.type = ADDED_NID; ad.obj = &ob; ob.nid = n; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return (adp->obj->sn); else { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } } } const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n) { ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; ASN1_OBJECT ob; if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) { if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } return (nid_objs[n].ln); } else if (added == NULL) return (NULL); else { ad.type = ADDED_NID; ad.obj = &ob; ob.nid = n; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return (adp->obj->ln); else { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return (NULL); } } } static int obj_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *ap, const unsigned int *bp) { int j; const ASN1_OBJECT *a = *ap; const ASN1_OBJECT *b = &nid_objs[*bp]; j = (a->length - b->length); if (j) return (j); if (a->length == 0) return 0; return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length)); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, obj); int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a) { const unsigned int *op; ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; if (a == NULL) return (NID_undef); if (a->nid != 0) return (a->nid); if (a->length == 0) return NID_undef; if (added != NULL) { ad.type = ADDED_DATA; ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* XXX: ugly but harmless */ adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return (adp->obj->nid); } op = OBJ_bsearch_obj(&a, obj_objs, NUM_OBJ); if (op == NULL) return (NID_undef); return (nid_objs[*op].nid); } /* * Convert an object name into an ASN1_OBJECT if "noname" is not set then * search for short and long names first. This will convert the "dotted" form * into an object: unlike OBJ_txt2nid it can be used with any objects, not * just registered ones. */ ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name) { int nid = NID_undef; ASN1_OBJECT *op = NULL; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *cp; int i, j; if (!no_name) { if (((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(s)) != NID_undef) || ((nid = OBJ_ln2nid(s)) != NID_undef)) return OBJ_nid2obj(nid); } /* Work out size of content octets */ i = a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, 0, s, -1); if (i <= 0) { /* Don't clear the error */ /* * ERR_clear_error(); */ return NULL; } /* Work out total size */ j = ASN1_object_size(0, i, V_ASN1_OBJECT); if (j < 0) return NULL; if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(j)) == NULL) return NULL; p = buf; /* Write out tag+length */ ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, i, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); /* Write out contents */ a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i, s, -1); cp = buf; op = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &cp, j); OPENSSL_free(buf); return op; } int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) { int i, n = 0, len, nid, first, use_bn; BIGNUM *bl; unsigned long l; const unsigned char *p; char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i) + DECIMAL_SIZE(l) + 2]; /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */ if (buf && buf_len > 0) buf[0] = '\0'; if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return (0); if (!no_name && (nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef) { const char *s; s = OBJ_nid2ln(nid); if (s == NULL) s = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); if (s) { if (buf) OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, buf_len); n = strlen(s); return n; } } len = a->length; p = a->data; first = 1; bl = NULL; while (len > 0) { l = 0; use_bn = 0; for (;;) { unsigned char c = *p++; len--; if ((len == 0) && (c & 0x80)) goto err; if (use_bn) { if (!BN_add_word(bl, c & 0x7f)) goto err; } else l |= c & 0x7f; if (!(c & 0x80)) break; if (!use_bn && (l > (ULONG_MAX >> 7L))) { if (bl == NULL && (bl = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(bl, l)) goto err; use_bn = 1; } if (use_bn) { if (!BN_lshift(bl, bl, 7)) goto err; } else l <<= 7L; } if (first) { first = 0; if (l >= 80) { i = 2; if (use_bn) { if (!BN_sub_word(bl, 80)) goto err; } else l -= 80; } else { i = (int)(l / 40); l -= (long)(i * 40); } if (buf && (buf_len > 1)) { *buf++ = i + '0'; *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } n++; } if (use_bn) { char *bndec; bndec = BN_bn2dec(bl); if (!bndec) goto err; i = strlen(bndec); if (buf) { if (buf_len > 1) { *buf++ = '.'; *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, bndec, buf_len); if (i > buf_len) { buf += buf_len; buf_len = 0; } else { buf += i; buf_len -= i; } } n++; n += i; OPENSSL_free(bndec); } else { BIO_snprintf(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, ".%lu", l); i = strlen(tbuf); if (buf && (buf_len > 0)) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, tbuf, buf_len); if (i > buf_len) { buf += buf_len; buf_len = 0; } else { buf += i; buf_len -= i; } } n += i; l = 0; } } BN_free(bl); return n; err: BN_free(bl); return -1; } int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; int nid; obj = OBJ_txt2obj(s, 0); nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj); ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); return nid; } int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *s) { ASN1_OBJECT o; const ASN1_OBJECT *oo = &o; ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; const unsigned int *op; o.ln = s; if (added != NULL) { ad.type = ADDED_LNAME; ad.obj = &o; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return (adp->obj->nid); } op = OBJ_bsearch_ln(&oo, ln_objs, NUM_LN); if (op == NULL) return (NID_undef); return (nid_objs[*op].nid); } int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *s) { ASN1_OBJECT o; const ASN1_OBJECT *oo = &o; ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; const unsigned int *op; o.sn = s; if (added != NULL) { ad.type = ADDED_SNAME; ad.obj = &o; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return (adp->obj->nid); } op = OBJ_bsearch_sn(&oo, sn_objs, NUM_SN); if (op == NULL) return (NID_undef); return (nid_objs[*op].nid); } const void *OBJ_bsearch_(const void *key, const void *base, int num, int size, int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *)) { return OBJ_bsearch_ex_(key, base, num, size, cmp, 0); } const void *OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key, const void *base_, int num, int size, int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *), int flags) { const char *base = base_; int l, h, i = 0, c = 0; const char *p = NULL; if (num == 0) return (NULL); l = 0; h = num; while (l < h) { i = (l + h) / 2; p = &(base[i * size]); c = (*cmp) (key, p); if (c < 0) h = i; else if (c > 0) l = i + 1; else break; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* * THIS IS A KLUDGE - Because the *_obj is sorted in ASCII order, and I * don't have perl (yet), we revert to a *LINEAR* search when the object * wasn't found in the binary search. */ if (c != 0) { for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { p = &(base[i * size]); c = (*cmp) (key, p); if (c == 0 || (c < 0 && (flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH))) return p; } } #endif if (c != 0 && !(flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH)) p = NULL; else if (c == 0 && (flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH)) { while (i > 0 && (*cmp) (key, &(base[(i - 1) * size])) == 0) i--; p = &(base[i * size]); } return (p); } int OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in) { char buf[512]; int i, num = 0; char *o, *s, *l = NULL; for (;;) { s = o = NULL; i = BIO_gets(in, buf, 512); if (i <= 0) return (num); buf[i - 1] = '\0'; if (!isalnum((unsigned char)buf[0])) return (num); o = s = buf; while (isdigit((unsigned char)*s) || (*s == '.')) s++; if (*s != '\0') { *(s++) = '\0'; while (isspace((unsigned char)*s)) s++; if (*s == '\0') s = NULL; else { l = s; while ((*l != '\0') && !isspace((unsigned char)*l)) l++; if (*l != '\0') { *(l++) = '\0'; while (isspace((unsigned char)*l)) l++; if (*l == '\0') l = NULL; } else l = NULL; } } else s = NULL; if ((o == NULL) || (*o == '\0')) return (num); if (!OBJ_create(o, s, l)) return (num); num++; } /* return(num); */ } int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln) { ASN1_OBJECT *tmpoid = NULL; int ok = 0; /* Check to see if short or long name already present */ if ((sn != NULL && OBJ_sn2nid(sn) != NID_undef) || (ln != NULL && OBJ_ln2nid(ln) != NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE, OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS); return 0; } /* Convert numerical OID string to an ASN1_OBJECT structure */ tmpoid = OBJ_txt2obj(oid, 1); if (tmpoid == NULL) return 0; /* If NID is not NID_undef then object already exists */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(tmpoid) != NID_undef) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE, OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS); goto err; } tmpoid->nid = OBJ_new_nid(1); tmpoid->sn = (char *)sn; tmpoid->ln = (char *)ln; ok = OBJ_add_object(tmpoid); tmpoid->sn = NULL; tmpoid->ln = NULL; err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(tmpoid); return ok; } size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { if (obj == NULL) return 0; return obj->length; } const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { if (obj == NULL) return NULL; return obj->data; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/README0000644000000000000000000000237013176625657015716 0ustar rootrootobjects.txt syntax ------------------ To cover all the naming hacks that were previously in objects.h needed some kind of hacks in objects.txt. The basic syntax for adding an object is as follows: 1 2 3 4 : shortName : Long Name If Long Name contains only word characters and hyphen-minus (0x2D) or full stop (0x2E) then Long Name is used as basis for the base name in C. Otherwise, the shortName is used. The base name (let's call it 'base') will then be used to create the C macros SN_base, LN_base, NID_base and OBJ_base. Note that if the base name contains spaces, dashes or periods, those will be converte to underscore. Then there are some extra commands: !Alias foo 1 2 3 4 This just makes a name foo for an OID. The C macro OBJ_foo will be created as a result. !Cname foo This makes sure that the name foo will be used as base name in C. !module foo 1 2 3 4 : shortName : Long Name !global The !module command was meant to define a kind of modularity. What it does is to make sure the module name is prepended to the base name. !global turns this off. This construction is not recursive. Lines starting with # are treated as comments, as well as any line starting with ! and not matching the commands above. openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_lib.c0000644000000000000000000000334013176625657016600 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o) { ASN1_OBJECT *r; if (o == NULL) return NULL; /* If object isn't dynamic it's an internal OID which is never freed */ if (!(o->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) return ((ASN1_OBJECT *)o); r = ASN1_OBJECT_new(); if (r == NULL) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return (NULL); } /* Set dynamic flags so everything gets freed up on error */ r->flags = o->flags | (ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA); if (o->length > 0 && (r->data = OPENSSL_memdup(o->data, o->length)) == NULL) goto err; r->length = o->length; r->nid = o->nid; if (o->ln != NULL && (r->ln = OPENSSL_strdup(o->ln)) == NULL) goto err; if (o->sn != NULL && (r->sn = OPENSSL_strdup(o->sn)) == NULL) goto err; return r; err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(r); OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b) { int ret; ret = (a->length - b->length); if (ret) return (ret); return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/objxref.pl0000644000000000000000000000520313176625657017030 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; my %xref_tbl; my %oid_tbl; my ($mac_file, $xref_file) = @ARGV; open(IN, $mac_file) || die "Can't open $mac_file, $!\n"; # Read in OID nid values for a lookup table. while () { s|\R$||; # Better chomp my ($name, $num) = /^(\S+)\s+(\S+)$/; $oid_tbl{$name} = $num; } close IN; open(IN, $xref_file) || die "Can't open $xref_file, $!\n"; my $ln = 1; while () { s|\R$||; # Better chomp s/#.*$//; next if (/^\S*$/); my ($xr, $p1, $p2) = /^(\S+)\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)/; check_oid($xr); check_oid($p1); check_oid($p2); $xref_tbl{$xr} = [$p1, $p2, $ln]; } my @xrkeys = keys %xref_tbl; my @srt1 = sort { $oid_tbl{$a} <=> $oid_tbl{$b}} @xrkeys; my $i; for($i = 0; $i <= $#srt1; $i++) { $xref_tbl{$srt1[$i]}[2] = $i; } my @srt2 = sort { my$ap1 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$a}[0]}; my$bp1 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$b}[0]}; return $ap1 - $bp1 if ($ap1 != $bp1); my$ap2 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$a}[1]}; my$bp2 = $oid_tbl{$xref_tbl{$b}[1]}; return $ap2 - $bp2; } @xrkeys; my $pname = $0; $pname =~ s|.*/||; print < #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OBJ,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OBJ,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA OBJ_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT), "OBJ_add_object"}, {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE), "OBJ_create"}, {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP), "OBJ_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX), "OBJ_NAME_new_index"}, {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN), "OBJ_nid2ln"}, {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ), "OBJ_nid2obj"}, {ERR_FUNC(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN), "OBJ_nid2sn"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA OBJ_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS), "oid exists"}, {ERR_REASON(OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID), "unknown nid"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_OBJ_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(OBJ_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, OBJ_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, OBJ_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h0000644000000000000000000001037313176625657017007 0ustar rootroot/* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by objxref.pl * * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ typedef struct { int sign_id; int hash_id; int pkey_id; } nid_triple; DEFINE_STACK_OF(nid_triple) static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = { {NID_md2WithRSAEncryption, NID_md2, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, NID_md5, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_shaWithRSAEncryption, NID_sha, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha1, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_dsaWithSHA, NID_sha, NID_dsa}, {NID_dsaWithSHA1_2, NID_sha1, NID_dsa_2}, {NID_mdc2WithRSA, NID_mdc2, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_md5WithRSA, NID_md5, NID_rsa}, {NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_sha1, NID_dsa}, {NID_sha1WithRSA, NID_sha1, NID_rsa}, {NID_ripemd160WithRSA, NID_ripemd160, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_md4WithRSAEncryption, NID_md4, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_sha1, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha256, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha384, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha512, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha224, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended, NID_undef, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_Specified, NID_undef, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_sha224, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_sha256, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_sha384, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_sha512, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_dsa_with_SHA224, NID_sha224, NID_dsa}, {NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_sha256, NID_dsa}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_94}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc}, {NID_rsassaPss, NID_undef, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme, NID_sha1, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme, NID_sha224, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme, NID_sha256, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme, NID_sha384, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme, NID_sha512, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme, NID_sha1, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme, NID_sha224, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme, NID_sha256, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme, NID_sha384, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme, NID_sha512, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256}, {NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512}, }; static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = { &sigoid_srt[0], &sigoid_srt[1], &sigoid_srt[7], &sigoid_srt[2], &sigoid_srt[4], &sigoid_srt[3], &sigoid_srt[9], &sigoid_srt[5], &sigoid_srt[8], &sigoid_srt[12], &sigoid_srt[30], &sigoid_srt[35], &sigoid_srt[6], &sigoid_srt[10], &sigoid_srt[11], &sigoid_srt[13], &sigoid_srt[24], &sigoid_srt[20], &sigoid_srt[32], &sigoid_srt[37], &sigoid_srt[14], &sigoid_srt[21], &sigoid_srt[33], &sigoid_srt[38], &sigoid_srt[15], &sigoid_srt[22], &sigoid_srt[34], &sigoid_srt[39], &sigoid_srt[16], &sigoid_srt[23], &sigoid_srt[19], &sigoid_srt[31], &sigoid_srt[36], &sigoid_srt[25], &sigoid_srt[26], &sigoid_srt[27], &sigoid_srt[28], &sigoid_srt[40], &sigoid_srt[41], }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/objects/objects.pl0000644000000000000000000001130513176625657017022 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html open (NUMIN,"$ARGV[1]") || die "Can't open number file $ARGV[1]"; $max_nid=0; $o=0; while() { s|\R$||; $o++; s/#.*$//; next if /^\s*$/; $_ = 'X'.$_; ($Cname,$mynum) = split; $Cname =~ s/^X//; if (defined($nidn{$mynum})) { die "$ARGV[1]:$o:There's already an object with NID ",$mynum," on line ",$order{$mynum},"\n"; } if (defined($nid{$Cname})) { die "$ARGV[1]:$o:There's already an object with name ",$Cname," on line ",$order{$nid{$Cname}},"\n"; } $nid{$Cname} = $mynum; $nidn{$mynum} = $Cname; $order{$mynum} = $o; $max_nid = $mynum if $mynum > $max_nid; } close NUMIN; open (IN,"$ARGV[0]") || die "Can't open input file $ARGV[0]"; $Cname=""; $o=0; while () { s|\R$||; $o++; if (/^!module\s+(.*)$/) { $module = $1."-"; $module =~ s/\./_/g; $module =~ s/-/_/g; } if (/^!global$/) { $module = ""; } if (/^!Cname\s+(.*)$/) { $Cname = $1; } if (/^!Alias\s+(.+?)\s+(.*)$/) { $Cname = $module.$1; $myoid = $2; $myoid = &process_oid($myoid); $Cname =~ s/-/_/g; $ordern{$o} = $Cname; $order{$Cname} = $o; $obj{$Cname} = $myoid; $_ = ""; $Cname = ""; } s/!.*$//; s/#.*$//; next if /^\s*$/; ($myoid,$mysn,$myln) = split ':'; $mysn =~ s/^\s*//; $mysn =~ s/\s*$//; $myln =~ s/^\s*//; $myln =~ s/\s*$//; $myoid =~ s/^\s*//; $myoid =~ s/\s*$//; if ($myoid ne "") { $myoid = &process_oid($myoid); } if ($Cname eq "" && ($myln =~ /^[_A-Za-z][\w.-]*$/ )) { $Cname = $myln; $Cname =~ s/\./_/g; $Cname =~ s/-/_/g; if ($Cname ne "" && defined($ln{$module.$Cname})) { die "objects.txt:$o:There's already an object with long name ",$ln{$module.$Cname}," on line ",$order{$module.$Cname},"\n"; } } if ($Cname eq "") { $Cname = $mysn; $Cname =~ s/-/_/g; if ($Cname ne "" && defined($sn{$module.$Cname})) { die "objects.txt:$o:There's already an object with short name ",$sn{$module.$Cname}," on line ",$order{$module.$Cname},"\n"; } } if ($Cname eq "") { $Cname = $myln; $Cname =~ s/-/_/g; $Cname =~ s/\./_/g; $Cname =~ s/ /_/g; if ($Cname ne "" && defined($ln{$module.$Cname})) { die "objects.txt:$o:There's already an object with long name ",$ln{$module.$Cname}," on line ",$order{$module.$Cname},"\n"; } } $Cname =~ s/\./_/g; $Cname =~ s/-/_/g; $Cname = $module.$Cname; $ordern{$o} = $Cname; $order{$Cname} = $o; $sn{$Cname} = $mysn; $ln{$Cname} = $myln; $obj{$Cname} = $myoid; if (!defined($nid{$Cname})) { $max_nid++; $nid{$Cname} = $max_nid; $nidn{$max_nid} = $Cname; print STDERR "Added OID $Cname\n"; } $Cname=""; } close IN; open (NUMOUT,">$ARGV[1]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[1]"; foreach (sort { $a <=> $b } keys %nidn) { print NUMOUT $nidn{$_},"\t\t",$_,"\n"; } close NUMOUT; open (OUT,">$ARGV[2]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[2]"; print OUT <<'EOF'; /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/objects.pl * * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define SN_undef "UNDEF" #define LN_undef "undefined" #define NID_undef 0 #define OBJ_undef 0L EOF sub expand { my $string = shift; 1 while $string =~ s/\t+/' ' x (length($&) * 8 - length($`) % 8)/e; return $string; } foreach (sort { $a <=> $b } keys %ordern) { $Cname=$ordern{$_}; print OUT "\n"; print OUT expand("#define SN_$Cname\t\t\"$sn{$Cname}\"\n") if $sn{$Cname} ne ""; print OUT expand("#define LN_$Cname\t\t\"$ln{$Cname}\"\n") if $ln{$Cname} ne ""; print OUT expand("#define NID_$Cname\t\t$nid{$Cname}\n") if $nid{$Cname} ne ""; print OUT expand("#define OBJ_$Cname\t\t$obj{$Cname}\n") if $obj{$Cname} ne ""; } close OUT; sub process_oid { local($oid)=@_; local(@a,$oid_pref); @a = split(/\s+/,$myoid); $pref_oid = ""; $pref_sep = ""; if (!($a[0] =~ /^[0-9]+$/)) { $a[0] =~ s/-/_/g; if (!defined($obj{$a[0]})) { die "$ARGV[0]:$o:Undefined identifier ",$a[0],"\n"; } $pref_oid = "OBJ_" . $a[0]; $pref_sep = ","; shift @a; } $oids = join('L,',@a) . "L"; if ($oids ne "L") { $oids = $pref_oid . $pref_sep . $oids; } else { $oids = $pref_oid; } return($oids); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/vms_rms.h0000644000000000000000000000414613176625660015241 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef NAML$C_MAXRSS # define CC_RMS_NAMX cc$rms_naml # define FAB_NAMX fab$l_naml # define FAB_OR_NAML( fab, naml) naml # define FAB_OR_NAML_DNA naml$l_long_defname # define FAB_OR_NAML_DNS naml$l_long_defname_size # define FAB_OR_NAML_FNA naml$l_long_filename # define FAB_OR_NAML_FNS naml$l_long_filename_size # define NAMX_ESA naml$l_long_expand # define NAMX_ESL naml$l_long_expand_size # define NAMX_ESS naml$l_long_expand_alloc # define NAMX_NOP naml$b_nop # define SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE( nam) nam.naml$v_no_short_upcase = 1 # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab) fab.fab$l_dna = (__char_ptr32) -1; \ fab.fab$l_fna = (__char_ptr32) -1; # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab) fab.fab$l_dna = (char *) -1; \ fab.fab$l_fna = (char *) -1; # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ # define NAMX_MAXRSS NAML$C_MAXRSS # define NAMX_STRUCT NAML #else /* def NAML$C_MAXRSS */ # define CC_RMS_NAMX cc$rms_nam # define FAB_NAMX fab$l_nam # define FAB_OR_NAML( fab, naml) fab # define FAB_OR_NAML_DNA fab$l_dna # define FAB_OR_NAML_DNS fab$b_dns # define FAB_OR_NAML_FNA fab$l_fna # define FAB_OR_NAML_FNS fab$b_fns # define NAMX_ESA nam$l_esa # define NAMX_ESL nam$b_esl # define NAMX_ESS nam$b_ess # define NAMX_NOP nam$b_nop # define NAMX_DNA_FNA_SET(fab) # define NAMX_MAXRSS NAM$C_MAXRSS # define NAMX_STRUCT NAM # ifdef NAM$M_NO_SHORT_UPCASE # define SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE( nam) naml.naml$v_no_short_upcase = 1 # else /* def NAM$M_NO_SHORT_UPCASE */ # define SET_NAMX_NO_SHORT_UPCASE( nam) # endif /* def NAM$M_NO_SHORT_UPCASE [else] */ #endif /* def NAML$C_MAXRSS [else] */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014353 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h0000644000000000000000000001173313176625660016176 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ typedef struct X509_POLICY_DATA_st X509_POLICY_DATA; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) /* Internal structures */ /* * This structure and the field names correspond to the Policy 'node' of * RFC3280. NB this structure contains no pointers to parent or child data: * X509_POLICY_NODE contains that. This means that the main policy data can * be kept static and cached with the certificate. */ struct X509_POLICY_DATA_st { unsigned int flags; /* Policy OID and qualifiers for this data */ ASN1_OBJECT *valid_policy; STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *qualifier_set; STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expected_policy_set; }; /* X509_POLICY_DATA flags values */ /* * This flag indicates the structure has been mapped using a policy mapping * extension. If policy mapping is not active its references get deleted. */ #define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED 0x1 /* * This flag indicates the data doesn't correspond to a policy in Certificate * Policies: it has been mapped to any policy. */ #define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY 0x2 /* AND with flags to see if any mapping has occurred */ #define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK 0x3 /* qualifiers are shared and shouldn't be freed */ #define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS 0x4 /* Parent node is an extra node and should be freed */ #define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE 0x8 /* Corresponding CertificatePolicies is critical */ #define POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL 0x10 /* This structure is cached with a certificate */ struct X509_POLICY_CACHE_st { /* anyPolicy data or NULL if no anyPolicy */ X509_POLICY_DATA *anyPolicy; /* other policy data */ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *data; /* If InhibitAnyPolicy present this is its value or -1 if absent. */ long any_skip; /* * If policyConstraints and requireExplicitPolicy present this is its * value or -1 if absent. */ long explicit_skip; /* * If policyConstraints and policyMapping present this is its value or -1 * if absent. */ long map_skip; }; /* * #define POLICY_CACHE_FLAG_CRITICAL POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL */ /* This structure represents the relationship between nodes */ struct X509_POLICY_NODE_st { /* node data this refers to */ const X509_POLICY_DATA *data; /* Parent node */ X509_POLICY_NODE *parent; /* Number of child nodes */ int nchild; }; struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st { /* Cert for this level */ X509 *cert; /* nodes at this level */ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; /* anyPolicy node */ X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; /* Extra data */ /* * STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *extra_data; */ unsigned int flags; }; struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st { /* This is the tree 'level' data */ X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels; int nlevel; /* * Extra policy data when additional nodes (not from the certificate) are * required. */ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA) *extra_data; /* This is the authority constrained policy set */ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_policies; STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *user_policies; unsigned int flags; }; /* Set if anyPolicy present in user policies */ #define POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY 0x2 /* Useful macros */ #define node_data_critical(data) (data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL) #define node_critical(node) node_data_critical(node->data) /* Internal functions */ X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_data_new(POLICYINFO *policy, const ASN1_OBJECT *id, int crit); void policy_data_free(X509_POLICY_DATA *data); X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_cache_find_data(const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, const ASN1_OBJECT *id); int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps); STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *policy_node_cmp_new(void); void policy_cache_init(void); void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache); X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, const X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, const ASN1_OBJECT *id); X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk, const ASN1_OBJECT *id); X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, X509_POLICY_DATA *data, X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node); int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); const X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache_set(X509 *x); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c0000644000000000000000000001214213176625660016056 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include ASN1_SEQUENCE(OTHERNAME) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(OTHERNAME, type_id, ASN1_OBJECT), /* Maybe have a true ANY DEFINED BY later */ ASN1_EXP(OTHERNAME, value, ASN1_ANY, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OTHERNAME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME) ASN1_SEQUENCE(EDIPARTYNAME) = { ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EDIPARTYNAME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME) ASN1_CHOICE(GENERAL_NAME) = { ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.otherName, OTHERNAME, GEN_OTHERNAME), ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.rfc822Name, ASN1_IA5STRING, GEN_EMAIL), ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.dNSName, ASN1_IA5STRING, GEN_DNS), /* Don't decode this */ ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.x400Address, ASN1_SEQUENCE, GEN_X400), /* X509_NAME is a CHOICE type so use EXPLICIT */ ASN1_EXP(GENERAL_NAME, d.directoryName, X509_NAME, GEN_DIRNAME), ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.ediPartyName, EDIPARTYNAME, GEN_EDIPARTY), ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.uniformResourceIdentifier, ASN1_IA5STRING, GEN_URI), ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.iPAddress, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, GEN_IPADD), ASN1_IMP(GENERAL_NAME, d.registeredID, ASN1_OBJECT, GEN_RID) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(GENERAL_NAME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAME) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(GENERAL_NAMES) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, GeneralNames, GENERAL_NAME) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(GENERAL_NAMES) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAMES) GENERAL_NAME *GENERAL_NAME_dup(GENERAL_NAME *a) { return (GENERAL_NAME *)ASN1_dup((i2d_of_void *)i2d_GENERAL_NAME, (d2i_of_void *)d2i_GENERAL_NAME, (char *)a); } /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b) { int result = -1; if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type) return -1; switch (a->type) { case GEN_X400: case GEN_EDIPARTY: result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.other, b->d.other); break; case GEN_OTHERNAME: result = OTHERNAME_cmp(a->d.otherName, b->d.otherName); break; case GEN_EMAIL: case GEN_DNS: case GEN_URI: result = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->d.ia5, b->d.ia5); break; case GEN_DIRNAME: result = X509_NAME_cmp(a->d.dirn, b->d.dirn); break; case GEN_IPADD: result = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a->d.ip, b->d.ip); break; case GEN_RID: result = OBJ_cmp(a->d.rid, b->d.rid); break; } return result; } /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */ int OTHERNAME_cmp(OTHERNAME *a, OTHERNAME *b) { int result = -1; if (!a || !b) return -1; /* Check their type first. */ if ((result = OBJ_cmp(a->type_id, b->type_id)) != 0) return result; /* Check the value. */ result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->value, b->value); return result; } void GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int type, void *value) { switch (type) { case GEN_X400: case GEN_EDIPARTY: a->d.other = value; break; case GEN_OTHERNAME: a->d.otherName = value; break; case GEN_EMAIL: case GEN_DNS: case GEN_URI: a->d.ia5 = value; break; case GEN_DIRNAME: a->d.dirn = value; break; case GEN_IPADD: a->d.ip = value; break; case GEN_RID: a->d.rid = value; break; } a->type = type; } void *GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int *ptype) { if (ptype) *ptype = a->type; switch (a->type) { case GEN_X400: case GEN_EDIPARTY: return a->d.other; case GEN_OTHERNAME: return a->d.otherName; case GEN_EMAIL: case GEN_DNS: case GEN_URI: return a->d.ia5; case GEN_DIRNAME: return a->d.dirn; case GEN_IPADD: return a->d.ip; case GEN_RID: return a->d.rid; default: return NULL; } } int GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, ASN1_OBJECT *oid, ASN1_TYPE *value) { OTHERNAME *oth; oth = OTHERNAME_new(); if (oth == NULL) return 0; ASN1_TYPE_free(oth->value); oth->type_id = oid; oth->value = value; GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(gen, GEN_OTHERNAME, oth); return 1; } int GENERAL_NAME_get0_otherName(GENERAL_NAME *gen, ASN1_OBJECT **poid, ASN1_TYPE **pvalue) { if (gen->type != GEN_OTHERNAME) return 0; if (poid) *poid = gen->d.otherName->type_id; if (pvalue) *pvalue = gen->d.otherName->value; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/tabtest.c0000644000000000000000000000225013176625660016164 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Simple program to check the ext_dat.h is correct and print out problems if * it is not. */ #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" main() { int i, prev = -1, bad = 0; X509V3_EXT_METHOD **tmp; i = OSSL_NELEM(standard_exts); if (i != STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT) fprintf(stderr, "Extension number invalid expecting %d\n", i); tmp = standard_exts; for (i = 0; i < STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT; i++, tmp++) { if ((*tmp)->ext_nid < prev) bad = 1; prev = (*tmp)->ext_nid; } if (bad) { tmp = standard_exts; fprintf(stderr, "Extensions out of order!\n"); for (i = 0; i < STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT; i++, tmp++) printf("%d : %s\n", (*tmp)->ext_nid, OBJ_nid2sn((*tmp)->ext_nid)); } else fprintf(stderr, "Order OK\n"); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3conf.c0000644000000000000000000000415713176625660015724 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include /* Test application to add extensions from a config file */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { LHASH *conf; X509 *cert; FILE *inf; char *conf_file; int i; int count; X509_EXTENSION *ext; X509V3_add_standard_extensions(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); if (!argv[1]) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: v3conf cert.pem [file.cnf]\n"); exit(1); } conf_file = argv[2]; if (!conf_file) conf_file = "test.cnf"; conf = CONF_load(NULL, "test.cnf", NULL); if (!conf) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening Config file %s\n", conf_file); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } inf = fopen(argv[1], "r"); if (!inf) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't open certificate file %s\n", argv[1]); exit(1); } cert = PEM_read_X509(inf, NULL, NULL); if (!cert) { fprintf(stderr, "Error reading certificate file %s\n", argv[1]); exit(1); } fclose(inf); sk_pop_free(cert->cert_info->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free); cert->cert_info->extensions = NULL; if (!X509V3_EXT_add_conf(conf, NULL, "test_section", cert)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error adding extensions\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } count = X509_get_ext_count(cert); printf("%d extensions\n", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i); printf("%s", OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object))); if (ext->critical) printf(",critical:\n"); else printf(":\n"); X509V3_EXT_print_fp(stdout, ext, 0, 0); printf("\n"); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c0000644000000000000000000002656013176625660015713 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *ext, BIO *out, int indent); static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pci = { NID_proxyCertInfo, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_pci, (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_pci, NULL, }; static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci, BIO *out, int indent) { BIO_printf(out, "%*sPath Length Constraint: ", indent, ""); if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); else BIO_printf(out, "infinite"); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Language: ", indent, ""); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data) BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "", pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data); return 1; } static int process_pci_value(CONF_VALUE *val, ASN1_OBJECT **language, ASN1_INTEGER **pathlen, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **policy) { int free_policy = 0; if (strcmp(val->name, "language") == 0) { if (*language) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED); X509V3_conf_err(val); return 0; } if ((*language = OBJ_txt2obj(val->value, 0)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); X509V3_conf_err(val); return 0; } } else if (strcmp(val->name, "pathlen") == 0) { if (*pathlen) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED); X509V3_conf_err(val); return 0; } if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, pathlen)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH); X509V3_conf_err(val); return 0; } } else if (strcmp(val->name, "policy") == 0) { unsigned char *tmp_data = NULL; long val_len; if (!*policy) { *policy = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (*policy == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509V3_conf_err(val); return 0; } free_policy = 1; } if (strncmp(val->value, "hex:", 4) == 0) { unsigned char *tmp_data2 = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(val->value + 4, &val_len); if (!tmp_data2) { X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data, (*policy)->length + val_len + 1); if (tmp_data) { (*policy)->data = tmp_data; memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length], tmp_data2, val_len); (*policy)->length += val_len; (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0'; } else { OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2); /* * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked * too! */ OPENSSL_free((*policy)->data); (*policy)->data = NULL; (*policy)->length = 0; X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2); } else if (strncmp(val->value, "file:", 5) == 0) { unsigned char buf[2048]; int n; BIO *b = BIO_new_file(val->value + 5, "r"); if (!b) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } while ((n = BIO_read(b, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0 || (n == 0 && BIO_should_retry(b))) { if (!n) continue; tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data, (*policy)->length + n + 1); if (!tmp_data) { OPENSSL_free((*policy)->data); (*policy)->data = NULL; (*policy)->length = 0; X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509V3_conf_err(val); BIO_free_all(b); goto err; } (*policy)->data = tmp_data; memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length], buf, n); (*policy)->length += n; (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0'; } BIO_free_all(b); if (n < 0) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } } else if (strncmp(val->value, "text:", 5) == 0) { val_len = strlen(val->value + 5); tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data, (*policy)->length + val_len + 1); if (tmp_data) { (*policy)->data = tmp_data; memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length], val->value + 5, val_len); (*policy)->length += val_len; (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0'; } else { /* * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked * too! */ OPENSSL_free((*policy)->data); (*policy)->data = NULL; (*policy)->length = 0; X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } if (!tmp_data) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } } return 1; err: if (free_policy) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*policy); *policy = NULL; } return 0; } static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value) { PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals; ASN1_OBJECT *language = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *pathlen = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *policy = NULL; int i, j; vals = X509V3_parse_list(value); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) { CONF_VALUE *cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i); if (!cnf->name || (*cnf->name != '@' && !cnf->value)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } if (*cnf->name == '@') { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect; int success_p = 1; sect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->name + 1); if (!sect) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } for (j = 0; success_p && j < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); j++) { success_p = process_pci_value(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, j), &language, &pathlen, &policy); } X509V3_section_free(ctx, sect); if (!success_p) goto err; } else { if (!process_pci_value(cnf, &language, &pathlen, &policy)) { X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } } } /* Language is mandatory */ if (!language) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED); goto err; } i = OBJ_obj2nid(language); if ((i == NID_Independent || i == NID_id_ppl_inheritAll) && policy) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY); goto err; } pci = PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new(); if (pci == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage = language; language = NULL; pci->proxyPolicy->policy = policy; policy = NULL; pci->pcPathLengthConstraint = pathlen; pathlen = NULL; goto end; err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(language); ASN1_INTEGER_free(pathlen); pathlen = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(policy); policy = NULL; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); pci = NULL; end: sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free); return pci; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c0000644000000000000000000003503713176625660016257 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "pcy_int.h" #include "ext_dat.h" /* Certificate policies extension support: this one is a bit complex... */ static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol, BIO *out, int indent); static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *value); static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals, int indent); static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent); static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org); static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org); static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_cpols = { NID_certificate_policies, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_certpol, (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_certpol, NULL }; ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, POLICYINFO) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES) ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYINFO) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYINFO, policyid, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(POLICYINFO, qualifiers, POLICYQUALINFO) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYINFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYINFO) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(policydefault) = ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.other, ASN1_ANY); ASN1_ADB(POLICYQUALINFO) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_cps, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.cpsuri, ASN1_IA5STRING)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_unotice, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.usernotice, USERNOTICE)) } ASN1_ADB_END(POLICYQUALINFO, 0, pqualid, 0, &policydefault_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYQUALINFO) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, pqualid, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(POLICYQUALINFO) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYQUALINFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYQUALINFO) ASN1_SEQUENCE(USERNOTICE) = { ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, noticeref, NOTICEREF), ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, exptext, DISPLAYTEXT) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(USERNOTICE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(USERNOTICE) ASN1_SEQUENCE(NOTICEREF) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(NOTICEREF, organization, DISPLAYTEXT), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(NOTICEREF, noticenos, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NOTICEREF) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NOTICEREF) static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *value) { STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pols = NULL; char *pstr; POLICYINFO *pol; ASN1_OBJECT *pobj; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i, ia5org; pols = sk_POLICYINFO_new_null(); if (pols == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } vals = X509V3_parse_list(value); if (vals == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_X509V3_LIB); goto err; } ia5org = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i); if (cnf->value || !cnf->name) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } pstr = cnf->name; if (strcmp(pstr, "ia5org") == 0) { ia5org = 1; continue; } else if (*pstr == '@') { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polsect; polsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, pstr + 1); if (!polsect) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } pol = policy_section(ctx, polsect, ia5org); X509V3_section_free(ctx, polsect); if (pol == NULL) goto err; } else { if ((pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->name, 0)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } pol = POLICYINFO_new(); if (pol == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_OBJECT_free(pobj); goto err; } pol->policyid = pobj; } if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) { POLICYINFO_free(pol); X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free); return pols; err: sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free); sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(pols, POLICYINFO_free); return NULL; } static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org) { int i; CONF_VALUE *cnf; POLICYINFO *pol; POLICYQUALINFO *qual; if ((pol = POLICYINFO_new()) == NULL) goto merr; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(polstrs); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(polstrs, i); if (strcmp(cnf->name, "policyIdentifier") == 0) { ASN1_OBJECT *pobj; if ((pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->value, 0)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } pol->policyid = pobj; } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "CPS")) { if (pol->qualifiers == NULL) pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null(); if ((qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual)) goto merr; if ((qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((qual->d.cpsuri = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value, strlen(cnf->value))) goto merr; } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "userNotice")) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot; if (*cnf->value != '@') { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } unot = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->value + 1); if (!unot) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } qual = notice_section(ctx, unot, ia5org); X509V3_section_free(ctx, unot); if (!qual) goto err; if (!pol->qualifiers) pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null(); if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual)) goto merr; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } } if (!pol->policyid) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER); goto err; } return pol; merr: X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: POLICYINFO_free(pol); return NULL; } static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org) { int i, ret; CONF_VALUE *cnf; USERNOTICE *not; POLICYQUALINFO *qual; if ((qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if ((qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((not = USERNOTICE_new()) == NULL) goto merr; qual->d.usernotice = not; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i); if (strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText") == 0) { if ((not->exptext = ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value, strlen(cnf->value))) goto merr; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "organization") == 0) { NOTICEREF *nref; if (!not->noticeref) { if ((nref = NOTICEREF_new()) == NULL) goto merr; not->noticeref = nref; } else nref = not->noticeref; if (ia5org) nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; else nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(nref->organization, cnf->value, strlen(cnf->value))) goto merr; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "noticeNumbers") == 0) { NOTICEREF *nref; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos; if (!not->noticeref) { if ((nref = NOTICEREF_new()) == NULL) goto merr; not->noticeref = nref; } else nref = not->noticeref; nos = X509V3_parse_list(cnf->value); if (!nos || !sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nos, X509V3_conf_free); goto err; } ret = nref_nos(nref->noticenos, nos); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nos, X509V3_conf_free); if (!ret) goto err; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } } if (not->noticeref && (!not->noticeref->noticenos || !not->noticeref->organization)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS); goto err; } return qual; merr: X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: POLICYQUALINFO_free(qual); return NULL; } static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos) { CONF_VALUE *cnf; ASN1_INTEGER *aint; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nos, i); if ((aint = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, cnf->name)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER); goto err; } if (!sk_ASN1_INTEGER_push(nnums, aint)) goto merr; } return 1; merr: ASN1_INTEGER_free(aint); X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: return 0; } static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol, BIO *out, int indent) { int i; POLICYINFO *pinfo; /* First print out the policy OIDs */ for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(pol); i++) { pinfo = sk_POLICYINFO_value(pol, i); BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, ""); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pinfo->policyid); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); if (pinfo->qualifiers) print_qualifiers(out, pinfo->qualifiers, indent + 2); } return 1; } static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals, int indent) { POLICYQUALINFO *qualinfo; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(quals); i++) { qualinfo = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(quals, i); switch (OBJ_obj2nid(qualinfo->pqualid)) { case NID_id_qt_cps: BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %s\n", indent, "", qualinfo->d.cpsuri->data); break; case NID_id_qt_unotice: BIO_printf(out, "%*sUser Notice:\n", indent, ""); print_notice(out, qualinfo->d.usernotice, indent + 2); break; default: BIO_printf(out, "%*sUnknown Qualifier: ", indent + 2, ""); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, qualinfo->pqualid); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); break; } } } static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent) { int i; if (notice->noticeref) { NOTICEREF *ref; ref = notice->noticeref; BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %s\n", indent, "", ref->organization->data); BIO_printf(out, "%*sNumber%s: ", indent, "", sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos) > 1 ? "s" : ""); for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos); i++) { ASN1_INTEGER *num; char *tmp; num = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(ref->noticenos, i); if (i) BIO_puts(out, ", "); if (num == NULL) BIO_puts(out, "(null)"); else { tmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, num); if (tmp == NULL) return; BIO_puts(out, tmp); OPENSSL_free(tmp); } } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } if (notice->exptext) BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %s\n", indent, "", notice->exptext->data); } void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) { const X509_POLICY_DATA *dat = node->data; BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, ""); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, dat->valid_policy); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s\n", indent + 2, "", node_data_critical(dat) ? "Critical" : "Non Critical"); if (dat->qualifier_set) print_qualifiers(out, dat->qualifier_set, indent + 2); else BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Qualifiers\n", indent + 2, ""); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3prin.c0000644000000000000000000000257513176625660015751 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { X509 *cert; FILE *inf; int i, count; X509_EXTENSION *ext; X509V3_add_standard_extensions(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); if (!argv[1]) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage v3prin cert.pem\n"); exit(1); } if ((inf = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't open %s\n", argv[1]); exit(1); } if ((cert = PEM_read_X509(inf, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't read certificate %s\n", argv[1]); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } fclose(inf); count = X509_get_ext_count(cert); printf("%d extensions\n", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i); printf("%s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object))); if (!X509V3_EXT_print_fp(stdout, ext, 0, 0)) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); printf("\n"); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/build.info0000644000000000000000000000066113176625660016332 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ v3_bcons.c v3_bitst.c v3_conf.c v3_extku.c v3_ia5.c v3_lib.c \ v3_prn.c v3_utl.c v3err.c v3_genn.c v3_alt.c v3_skey.c v3_akey.c v3_pku.c \ v3_int.c v3_enum.c v3_sxnet.c v3_cpols.c v3_crld.c v3_purp.c v3_info.c \ v3_akeya.c v3_pmaps.c v3_pcons.c v3_ncons.c v3_pcia.c v3_pci.c \ pcy_cache.c pcy_node.c pcy_data.c pcy_map.c pcy_tree.c pcy_lib.c \ v3_asid.c v3_addr.c v3_tlsf.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h0000644000000000000000000000241313176625660016154 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ int name_cmp(const char *name, const char *cmp); extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_bcons, v3_nscert, v3_key_usage, v3_ext_ku; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pkey_usage_period, v3_sxnet, v3_info, v3_sinfo; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ns_ia5_list[8], v3_alt[3], v3_skey_id, v3_akey_id; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_num, v3_crl_reason, v3_crl_invdate; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_delta_crl, v3_cpols, v3_crld, v3_freshest_crl; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_nonce, v3_ocsp_accresp, v3_ocsp_acutoff; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_crlid, v3_ocsp_nocheck, v3_ocsp_serviceloc; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_hold, v3_pci; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_policy_mappings, v3_policy_constraints; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints, v3_inhibit_anyp, v3_idp; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_addr, v3_asid; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ct_scts[3]; extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_tls_feature; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c0000644000000000000000000000503713176625660016050 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include #include ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_POLICY) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_POLICY,policyLanguage,ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(PROXY_POLICY,policy,ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_POLICY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_POLICY) ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) = { ASN1_OPT(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,pcPathLengthConstraint,ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,proxyPolicy,PROXY_POLICY) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c0000644000000000000000000006273413176625660016063 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Implementation of RFC 3779 section 3.2. */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include "ext_dat.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* * OpenSSL ASN.1 template translation of RFC 3779 3.2.3. */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(ASRange) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ASRange, min, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(ASRange, max, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ASRange) ASN1_CHOICE(ASIdOrRange) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ASIdOrRange, u.id, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(ASIdOrRange, u.range, ASRange) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(ASIdOrRange) ASN1_CHOICE(ASIdentifierChoice) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ASIdentifierChoice, u.inherit, ASN1_NULL), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(ASIdentifierChoice, u.asIdsOrRanges, ASIdOrRange) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(ASIdentifierChoice) ASN1_SEQUENCE(ASIdentifiers) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(ASIdentifiers, asnum, ASIdentifierChoice, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(ASIdentifiers, rdi, ASIdentifierChoice, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ASIdentifiers) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASRange) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdOrRange) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifierChoice) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifiers) /* * i2r method for an ASIdentifierChoice. */ static int i2r_ASIdentifierChoice(BIO *out, ASIdentifierChoice *choice, int indent, const char *msg) { int i; char *s; if (choice == NULL) return 1; BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s:\n", indent, "", msg); switch (choice->type) { case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit: BIO_printf(out, "%*sinherit\n", indent + 2, ""); break; case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges: for (i = 0; i < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges); i++) { ASIdOrRange *aor = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i); switch (aor->type) { case ASIdOrRange_id: if ((s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aor->u.id)) == NULL) return 0; BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s\n", indent + 2, "", s); OPENSSL_free(s); break; case ASIdOrRange_range: if ((s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aor->u.range->min)) == NULL) return 0; BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s-", indent + 2, "", s); OPENSSL_free(s); if ((s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aor->u.range->max)) == NULL) return 0; BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", s); OPENSSL_free(s); break; default: return 0; } } break; default: return 0; } return 1; } /* * i2r method for an ASIdentifier extension. */ static int i2r_ASIdentifiers(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *ext, BIO *out, int indent) { ASIdentifiers *asid = ext; return (i2r_ASIdentifierChoice(out, asid->asnum, indent, "Autonomous System Numbers") && i2r_ASIdentifierChoice(out, asid->rdi, indent, "Routing Domain Identifiers")); } /* * Sort comparison function for a sequence of ASIdOrRange elements. */ static int ASIdOrRange_cmp(const ASIdOrRange *const *a_, const ASIdOrRange *const *b_) { const ASIdOrRange *a = *a_, *b = *b_; OPENSSL_assert((a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && a->u.id != NULL) || (a->type == ASIdOrRange_range && a->u.range != NULL && a->u.range->min != NULL && a->u.range->max != NULL)); OPENSSL_assert((b->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->u.id != NULL) || (b->type == ASIdOrRange_range && b->u.range != NULL && b->u.range->min != NULL && b->u.range->max != NULL)); if (a->type == ASIdOrRange_id && b->type == ASIdOrRange_id) return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.id, b->u.id); if (a->type == ASIdOrRange_range && b->type == ASIdOrRange_range) { int r = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.range->min, b->u.range->min); return r != 0 ? r : ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.range->max, b->u.range->max); } if (a->type == ASIdOrRange_id) return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.id, b->u.range->min); else return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->u.range->min, b->u.id); } /* * Add an inherit element. */ int X509v3_asid_add_inherit(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which) { ASIdentifierChoice **choice; if (asid == NULL) return 0; switch (which) { case V3_ASID_ASNUM: choice = &asid->asnum; break; case V3_ASID_RDI: choice = &asid->rdi; break; default: return 0; } if (*choice == NULL) { if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL) return 0; OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.inherit == NULL); if (((*choice)->u.inherit = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL) return 0; (*choice)->type = ASIdentifierChoice_inherit; } return (*choice)->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit; } /* * Add an ID or range to an ASIdentifierChoice. */ int X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which, ASN1_INTEGER *min, ASN1_INTEGER *max) { ASIdentifierChoice **choice; ASIdOrRange *aor; if (asid == NULL) return 0; switch (which) { case V3_ASID_ASNUM: choice = &asid->asnum; break; case V3_ASID_RDI: choice = &asid->rdi; break; default: return 0; } if (*choice != NULL && (*choice)->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) return 0; if (*choice == NULL) { if ((*choice = ASIdentifierChoice_new()) == NULL) return 0; OPENSSL_assert((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL); (*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges = sk_ASIdOrRange_new(ASIdOrRange_cmp); if ((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges == NULL) return 0; (*choice)->type = ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges; } if ((aor = ASIdOrRange_new()) == NULL) return 0; if (max == NULL) { aor->type = ASIdOrRange_id; aor->u.id = min; } else { aor->type = ASIdOrRange_range; if ((aor->u.range = ASRange_new()) == NULL) goto err; ASN1_INTEGER_free(aor->u.range->min); aor->u.range->min = min; ASN1_INTEGER_free(aor->u.range->max); aor->u.range->max = max; } if (!(sk_ASIdOrRange_push((*choice)->u.asIdsOrRanges, aor))) goto err; return 1; err: ASIdOrRange_free(aor); return 0; } /* * Extract min and max values from an ASIdOrRange. */ static void extract_min_max(ASIdOrRange *aor, ASN1_INTEGER **min, ASN1_INTEGER **max) { OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL); switch (aor->type) { case ASIdOrRange_id: *min = aor->u.id; *max = aor->u.id; return; case ASIdOrRange_range: *min = aor->u.range->min; *max = aor->u.range->max; return; } } /* * Check whether an ASIdentifierChoice is in canonical form. */ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice) { ASN1_INTEGER *a_max_plus_one = NULL; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; int i, ret = 0; /* * Empty element or inheritance is canonical. */ if (choice == NULL || choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) return 1; /* * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken. */ if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges || sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) return 0; /* * It's a list, check it. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; i++) { ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i); ASIdOrRange *b = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1); ASN1_INTEGER *a_min = NULL, *a_max = NULL, *b_min = NULL, *b_max = NULL; extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max); extract_min_max(b, &b_min, &b_max); /* * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) >= 0 || ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 || ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0) goto done; /* * Calculate a_max + 1 to check for adjacency. */ if ((bn == NULL && (bn = BN_new()) == NULL) || ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a_max, bn) == NULL || !BN_add_word(bn, 1) || (a_max_plus_one = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto done; } /* * Punt if adjacent or overlapping. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_max_plus_one, b_min) >= 0) goto done; } /* * Check for inverted range. */ i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; { ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i); ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max; if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) { extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max); if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0) goto done; } } ret = 1; done: ASN1_INTEGER_free(a_max_plus_one); BN_free(bn); return ret; } /* * Check whether an ASIdentifier extension is in canonical form. */ int X509v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid) { return (asid == NULL || (ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->asnum) && ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(asid->rdi))); } /* * Whack an ASIdentifierChoice into canonical form. */ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice) { ASN1_INTEGER *a_max_plus_one = NULL; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; int i, ret = 0; /* * Nothing to do for empty element or inheritance. */ if (choice == NULL || choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) return 1; /* * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken. */ if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges || sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); return 0; } /* * We have a non-empty list. Sort it. */ sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges); /* * Now check for errors and suboptimal encoding, rejecting the * former and fixing the latter. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; i++) { ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i); ASIdOrRange *b = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1); ASN1_INTEGER *a_min = NULL, *a_max = NULL, *b_min = NULL, *b_max = NULL; extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max); extract_min_max(b, &b_min, &b_max); /* * Make sure we're properly sorted (paranoia). */ OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0); /* * Punt inverted ranges. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 || ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0) goto done; /* * Check for overlaps. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_max, b_min) >= 0) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); goto done; } /* * Calculate a_max + 1 to check for adjacency. */ if ((bn == NULL && (bn = BN_new()) == NULL) || ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a_max, bn) == NULL || !BN_add_word(bn, 1) || (a_max_plus_one = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, a_max_plus_one)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto done; } /* * If a and b are adjacent, merge them. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_max_plus_one, b_min) == 0) { ASRange *r; switch (a->type) { case ASIdOrRange_id: if ((r = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*r))) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto done; } r->min = a_min; r->max = b_max; a->type = ASIdOrRange_range; a->u.range = r; break; case ASIdOrRange_range: ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->u.range->max); a->u.range->max = b_max; break; } switch (b->type) { case ASIdOrRange_id: b->u.id = NULL; break; case ASIdOrRange_range: b->u.range->max = NULL; break; } ASIdOrRange_free(b); (void)sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1); i--; continue; } } /* * Check for final inverted range. */ i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1; { ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i); ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max; if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) { extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max); if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0) goto done; } } OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */ ret = 1; done: ASN1_INTEGER_free(a_max_plus_one); BN_free(bn); return ret; } /* * Whack an ASIdentifier extension into canonical form. */ int X509v3_asid_canonize(ASIdentifiers *asid) { return (asid == NULL || (ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(asid->asnum) && ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(asid->rdi))); } /* * v2i method for an ASIdentifier extension. */ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values) { ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL; ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL; int i; if ((asid = ASIdentifiers_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); int i1 = 0, i2 = 0, i3 = 0, is_range = 0, which = 0; /* * Figure out whether this is an AS or an RDI. */ if (!name_cmp(val->name, "AS")) { which = V3_ASID_ASNUM; } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "RDI")) { which = V3_ASID_RDI; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } /* * Handle inheritance. */ if (strcmp(val->value, "inherit") == 0) { if (X509v3_asid_add_inherit(asid, which)) continue; X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } /* * Number, range, or mistake, pick it apart and figure out which. */ i1 = strspn(val->value, "0123456789"); if (val->value[i1] == '\0') { is_range = 0; } else { is_range = 1; i2 = i1 + strspn(val->value + i1, " \t"); if (val->value[i2] != '-') { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } i2++; i2 = i2 + strspn(val->value + i2, " \t"); i3 = i2 + strspn(val->value + i2, "0123456789"); if (val->value[i3] != '\0') { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } } /* * Syntax is ok, read and add it. */ if (!is_range) { if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &min)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { char *s = OPENSSL_strdup(val->value); if (s == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } s[i1] = '\0'; min = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s); max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2); OPENSSL_free(s); if (min == NULL || max == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); goto err; } } if (!X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } min = max = NULL; } /* * Canonize the result, then we're done. */ if (!X509v3_asid_canonize(asid)) goto err; return asid; err: ASIdentifiers_free(asid); ASN1_INTEGER_free(min); ASN1_INTEGER_free(max); return NULL; } /* * OpenSSL dispatch. */ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_asid = { NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* nid */ 0, /* flags */ ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdentifiers), /* template */ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* old functions, ignored */ 0, /* i2s */ 0, /* s2i */ 0, /* i2v */ v2i_ASIdentifiers, /* v2i */ i2r_ASIdentifiers, /* i2r */ 0, /* r2i */ NULL /* extension-specific data */ }; /* * Figure out whether extension uses inheritance. */ int X509v3_asid_inherits(ASIdentifiers *asid) { return (asid != NULL && ((asid->asnum != NULL && asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) || (asid->rdi != NULL && asid->rdi->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit))); } /* * Figure out whether parent contains child. */ static int asid_contains(ASIdOrRanges *parent, ASIdOrRanges *child) { ASN1_INTEGER *p_min = NULL, *p_max = NULL, *c_min = NULL, *c_max = NULL; int p, c; if (child == NULL || parent == child) return 1; if (parent == NULL) return 0; p = 0; for (c = 0; c < sk_ASIdOrRange_num(child); c++) { extract_min_max(sk_ASIdOrRange_value(child, c), &c_min, &c_max); for (;; p++) { if (p >= sk_ASIdOrRange_num(parent)) return 0; extract_min_max(sk_ASIdOrRange_value(parent, p), &p_min, &p_max); if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(p_max, c_max) < 0) continue; if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(p_min, c_min) > 0) return 0; break; } } return 1; } /* * Test whether a is a subset of b. */ int X509v3_asid_subset(ASIdentifiers *a, ASIdentifiers *b) { return (a == NULL || a == b || (b != NULL && !X509v3_asid_inherits(a) && !X509v3_asid_inherits(b) && asid_contains(b->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges, a->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges) && asid_contains(b->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges, a->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges))); } /* * Validation error handling via callback. */ #define validation_err(_err_) \ do { \ if (ctx != NULL) { \ ctx->error = _err_; \ ctx->error_depth = i; \ ctx->current_cert = x; \ ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); \ } else { \ ret = 0; \ } \ if (!ret) \ goto done; \ } while (0) /* * Core code for RFC 3779 3.3 path validation. */ static int asid_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, ASIdentifiers *ext) { ASIdOrRanges *child_as = NULL, *child_rdi = NULL; int i, ret = 1, inherit_as = 0, inherit_rdi = 0; X509 *x; OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0); OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL); /* * Figure out where to start. If we don't have an extension to * check, we're done. Otherwise, check canonical form and * set up for walking up the chain. */ if (ext != NULL) { i = -1; x = NULL; } else { i = 0; x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); if ((ext = x->rfc3779_asid) == NULL) goto done; } if (!X509v3_asid_is_canonical(ext)) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION); if (ext->asnum != NULL) { switch (ext->asnum->type) { case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit: inherit_as = 1; break; case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges: child_as = ext->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges; break; } } if (ext->rdi != NULL) { switch (ext->rdi->type) { case ASIdentifierChoice_inherit: inherit_rdi = 1; break; case ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges: child_rdi = ext->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges; break; } } /* * Now walk up the chain. Extensions must be in canonical form, no * cert may list resources that its parent doesn't list. */ for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL) { if (child_as != NULL || child_rdi != NULL) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); continue; } if (!X509v3_asid_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_asid)) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION); if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum == NULL && child_as != NULL) { validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); child_as = NULL; inherit_as = 0; } if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum != NULL && x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges) { if (inherit_as || asid_contains(x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges, child_as)) { child_as = x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->u.asIdsOrRanges; inherit_as = 0; } else { validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); } } if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi == NULL && child_rdi != NULL) { validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); child_rdi = NULL; inherit_rdi = 0; } if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL && x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges) { if (inherit_rdi || asid_contains(x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges, child_rdi)) { child_rdi = x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->u.asIdsOrRanges; inherit_rdi = 0; } else { validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); } } } /* * Trust anchor can't inherit. */ OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); if (x->rfc3779_asid != NULL) { if (x->rfc3779_asid->asnum != NULL && x->rfc3779_asid->asnum->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); if (x->rfc3779_asid->rdi != NULL && x->rfc3779_asid->rdi->type == ASIdentifierChoice_inherit) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); } done: return ret; } #undef validation_err /* * RFC 3779 3.3 path validation -- called from X509_verify_cert(). */ int X509v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return asid_validate_path_internal(ctx, ctx->chain, NULL); } /* * RFC 3779 3.3 path validation of an extension. * Test whether chain covers extension. */ int X509v3_asid_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain, ASIdentifiers *ext, int allow_inheritance) { if (ext == NULL) return 1; if (chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(chain) == 0) return 0; if (!allow_inheritance && X509v3_asid_inherits(ext)) return 0; return asid_validate_path_internal(NULL, chain, ext); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3err.c0000644000000000000000000002302413176625660015561 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509V3,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509V3,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA X509V3_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME), "a2i_GENERAL_NAME"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL), "addr_validate_path_internal"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE), "ASIdentifierChoice_canonize"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL), "ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL), "copy_email"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER), "copy_issuer"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME), "do_dirname"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_I2D), "do_ext_i2d"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF), "do_ext_nconf"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_GNAMES_FROM_SECTNAME), "gnames_from_sectname"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_ENUMERATED), "i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_IA5STRING), "i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_INTEGER), "i2s_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_I2V_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS), "i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION), "notice_section"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS), "nref_nos"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION), "policy_section"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE), "process_pci_value"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL), "r2i_certpol"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI), "r2i_pci"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING), "s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "s2i_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID), "s2i_skey_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME), "set_dist_point_name"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ASC), "SXNET_add_id_asc"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER), "SXNET_add_id_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ULONG), "SXNET_add_id_ulong"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ASC), "SXNET_get_id_asc"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ULONG), "SXNET_get_id_ulong"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS), "v2i_ASIdentifiers"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS), "v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID), "v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS), "v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_CRLD), "v2i_crld"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), "v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAMES), "v2i_GENERAL_NAMES"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX), "v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_IDP), "v2i_idp"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS), "v2i_IPAddrBlocks"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_ISSUER_ALT), "v2i_issuer_alt"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS), "v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS), "v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS), "v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_SUBJECT_ALT), "v2i_subject_alt"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE), "v2i_TLS_FEATURE"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION), "v3_generic_extension"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D), "X509V3_add1_i2d"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD_VALUE), "X509V3_add_value"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD), "X509V3_EXT_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS), "X509V3_EXT_add_alias"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_I2D), "X509V3_EXT_i2d"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_NCONF), "X509V3_EXT_nconf"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_SECTION), "X509V3_get_section"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_STRING), "X509V3_get_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_VALUE_BOOL), "X509V3_get_value_bool"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST), "X509V3_parse_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD), "X509_PURPOSE_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET), "X509_PURPOSE_set"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA X509V3_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BAD_IP_ADDRESS), "bad ip address"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT), "bad object"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR), "bn dec2bn error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR), "bn to asn1 integer error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_DIRNAME_ERROR), "dirname error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_DISTPOINT_ALREADY_SET), "distpoint already set"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_DUPLICATE_ZONE_ID), "duplicate zone id"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE), "error converting zone"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ERROR_CREATING_EXTENSION), "error creating extension"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ERROR_IN_EXTENSION), "error in extension"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME), "expected a section name"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_EXISTS), "extension exists"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR), "extension name error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND), "extension not found"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_SETTING_NOT_SUPPORTED), "extension setting not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR), "extension value error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION), "illegal empty extension"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG), "incorrect policy syntax tag"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER), "invalid asnumber"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE), "invalid asrange"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING), "invalid boolean string"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_EXTENSION_STRING), "invalid extension string"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE), "invalid inheritance"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS), "invalid ipaddress"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS), "invalid multiple rdns"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME), "invalid name"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT), "invalid null argument"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME), "invalid null name"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE), "invalid null value"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER), "invalid number"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS), "invalid numbers"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER), "invalid object identifier"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION), "invalid option"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER), "invalid policy identifier"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING), "invalid proxy policy setting"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE), "invalid purpose"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_SAFI), "invalid safi"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION), "invalid section"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX), "invalid syntax"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ISSUER_DECODE_ERROR), "issuer decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE), "missing value"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS), "need organization and numbers"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_CONFIG_DATABASE), "no config database"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE), "no issuer certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_DETAILS), "no issuer details"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER), "no policy identifier"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED), "no proxy cert policy language defined"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY), "no public key"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_NO_SUBJECT_DETAILS), "no subject details"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED), "operation not defined"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR), "othername error"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED), "policy language already defined"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH), "policy path length"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED), "policy path length already defined"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY), "policy when proxy language requires no policy"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND), "section not found"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_DETAILS), "unable to get issuer details"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_KEYID), "unable to get issuer keyid"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_BIT_STRING_ARGUMENT), "unknown bit string argument"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION), "unknown extension"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION_NAME), "unknown extension name"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION), "unknown option"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION), "unsupported option"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE), "unsupported type"}, {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_USER_TOO_LONG), "user too long"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(X509V3_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, X509V3_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, X509V3_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_info.c0000644000000000000000000001301613176625660016063 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *ainfo, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret); static AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_info = { NID_info_access, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE, ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, 0, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_sinfo = { NID_sinfo_access, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE, ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, 0, 0, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, method, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, location, GENERAL_NAME) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, GeneralNames, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS) static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS( X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *ainfo, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret) { ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *desc; int i, nlen; char objtmp[80], *ntmp; CONF_VALUE *vtmp; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *tret = ret; for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(ainfo); i++) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *tmp; desc = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(ainfo, i); tmp = i2v_GENERAL_NAME(method, desc->location, tret); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; tret = tmp; vtmp = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(tret, i); i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(objtmp, sizeof objtmp, desc->method); nlen = strlen(objtmp) + strlen(vtmp->name) + 5; ntmp = OPENSSL_malloc(nlen); if (ntmp == NULL) goto err; OPENSSL_strlcpy(ntmp, objtmp, nlen); OPENSSL_strlcat(ntmp, " - ", nlen); OPENSSL_strlcat(ntmp, vtmp->name, nlen); OPENSSL_free(vtmp->name); vtmp->name = ntmp; } if (ret == NULL && tret == NULL) return sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null(); return tret; err: X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2V_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (ret == NULL && tret != NULL) sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(tret, X509V3_conf_free); return NULL; } static AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *v2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *ainfo = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf, ctmp; ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *acc; int i, objlen; char *objtmp, *ptmp; if ((ainfo = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new_null()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if ((acc = ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new()) == NULL || !sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_push(ainfo, acc)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ptmp = strchr(cnf->name, ';'); if (!ptmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX); goto err; } objlen = ptmp - cnf->name; ctmp.name = ptmp + 1; ctmp.value = cnf->value; if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(acc->location, method, ctx, &ctmp, 0)) goto err; if ((objtmp = OPENSSL_strndup(cnf->name, objlen)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } acc->method = OBJ_txt2obj(objtmp, 0); if (!acc->method) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT); ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", objtmp); OPENSSL_free(objtmp); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(objtmp); } return ainfo; err: sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(ainfo, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); return NULL; } int i2a_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION(BIO *bp, const ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a) { i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, a->method); return 2; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_ia5.c0000644000000000000000000000367413176625660015617 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ns_ia5_list[8] = { EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_base_url), EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_revocation_url), EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url), EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_renewal_url), EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_ca_policy_url), EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_ssl_server_name), EXT_IA5STRING(NID_netscape_comment), EXT_END }; char *i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5) { char *tmp; if (!ia5 || !ia5->length) return NULL; if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ia5->length + 1)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_IA5STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memcpy(tmp, ia5->data, ia5->length); tmp[ia5->length] = 0; return tmp; } ASN1_IA5STRING *s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5; if (!str) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT); return NULL; } if ((ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)ia5, str, strlen(str))) { ASN1_IA5STRING_free(ia5); return NULL; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(ia5->data, ia5->data, ia5->length); #endif /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ return ia5; err: X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c0000644000000000000000000006273213176625660016127 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL}, }; #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(xstandard) static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) { return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; } /* * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const * things. */ int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) { int idx; const X509_PURPOSE *pt; if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock); x509v3_cache_extensions(x); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); } /* Return if side-effect only call */ if (id == -1) return 1; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); if (idx == -1) return -1; pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); } int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) { if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); return 0; } *p = purpose; return 1; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) { if (!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; } X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) { if (idx < 0) return NULL; if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx; return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); } int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) { int i; X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); if (strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname) == 0) return i; } return -1; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) { X509_PURPOSE tmp; int idx; if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; tmp.purpose = purpose; if (!xptable) return -1; idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); if (idx == -1) return -1; return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; } int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), const char *name, const char *sname, void *arg) { int idx; X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; /* * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; /* Get existing entry if any */ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); /* Need a new entry */ if (idx == -1) { if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); } /* dup supplied name */ ptmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); ptmp->sname = OPENSSL_strdup(sname); if (!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; /* Set all other flags */ ptmp->flags |= flags; ptmp->purpose = id; ptmp->trust = trust; ptmp->check_purpose = ck; ptmp->usr_data = arg; /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ if (idx == -1) { if (xptable == NULL && (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } return 1; err: if (idx == -1) { OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); OPENSSL_free(ptmp); } return 0; } static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) { if (!p) return; if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { OPENSSL_free(p->name); OPENSSL_free(p->sname); } OPENSSL_free(p); } } void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) { sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); xptable = NULL; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->purpose; } char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->name; } char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->sname; } int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->trust; } static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) { return *a - *b; } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) { /* * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical * order because it will be searched using bsearch. */ static const int supported_nids[] = { NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ NID_crl_distribution_points, /* 103 */ NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ #endif NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ }; int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); if (ex_nid == NID_undef) return 0; if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, OSSL_NELEM(supported_nids))) return 1; return 0; } static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) { X509_NAME *iname = NULL; int i; if (dp->reasons) { if (dp->reasons->length > 0) dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; if (dp->reasons->length > 1) dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; } else dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { iname = gen->d.directoryName; break; } } if (!iname) iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); } static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) { int i; x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); } #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) { BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; X509_EXTENSION *ex; int i; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return; X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ if (!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; /* Handle basic constraints */ if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { if (bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; if (bs->pathlen) { if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || !bs->ca) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; x->ex_pathlen = 0; } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); } else x->ex_pathlen = -1; BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; } /* Handle proxy certificates */ if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; } if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); } else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; } /* Handle key usage */ if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { if (usage->length > 0) { x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; if (usage->length > 1) x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; } else x->ex_kusage = 0; x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); } x->ex_xkusage = 0; if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { case NID_server_auth: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; break; case NID_client_auth: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; break; case NID_email_protect: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; break; case NID_code_sign: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; break; case NID_ms_sgc: case NID_ns_sgc: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; break; case NID_OCSP_sign: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; break; case NID_time_stamp: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; break; case NID_dvcs: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; break; case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; break; } } sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); } if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { if (ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; else x->ex_nscert = 0; x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); } x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; } x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; setup_crldp(x); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, NULL, NULL); #endif for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == NID_freshest_crl) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) continue; if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; break; } } x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; } /*- * CA checks common to all purposes * return codes: * 0 not a CA * 1 is a CA * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. */ static int check_ca(const X509 *x) { /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1; /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ else return 0; } else { /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3; /* * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4; /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5; /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ return 0; } } void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; } void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l) { x->ex_pcpathlen = l; } int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) { if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock); x509v3_cache_extensions(x); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); } return check_ca(x); } /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) { int ca_ret; ca_ret = check_ca(x); if (!ca_ret) return 0; /* check nsCertType if present */ if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret; else return 0; } static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; if (ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) return 0; /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; return 1; } /* * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual * key types. */ #define KU_TLS \ KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) return 0; if (ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0; if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) return 0; return 1; } static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; return ret; } /* common S/MIME checks */ static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) { if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) return 0; if (ca) { int ca_ret; ca_ret = check_ca(x); if (!ca_ret) return 0; /* check nsCertType if present */ if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret; else return 0; } if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1; /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2; return 0; } return 1; } static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0; return ret; } static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int ret; ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); if (!ret || ca) return ret; if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; return ret; } static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { if (ca) { int ca_ret; if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret; else return 0; } if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; return 1; } /* * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. */ static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { /* * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value * (2)? */ if (ca) return check_ca(x); /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ return 1; } static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { int i_ext; /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ if (ca) return check_ca(x); /* * Check the optional key usage field: * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall * be rejected). */ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) return 0; /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) return 0; /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); if (i_ext >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) return 0; } return 1; } static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { return 1; } /*- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by * subject name. * These are: * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match * codes for X509_verify_cert() */ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) { if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); if (subject->akid) { int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); if (ret != X509_V_OK) return ret; } if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; return X509_V_OK; } int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) { if (!akid) return X509_V_OK; /* Check key ids (if present) */ if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; /* Check serial number */ if (akid->serial && ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; /* Check issuer name */ if (akid->issuer) { /* * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but * we only take any notice of the first. */ GENERAL_NAMES *gens; GENERAL_NAME *gen; X509_NAME *nm = NULL; int i; gens = akid->issuer; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { nm = gen->d.dirn; break; } } if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; } return X509_V_OK; } uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); return x->ex_flags; } uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return x->ex_kusage; return UINT32_MAX; } uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) return x->ex_xkusage; return UINT32_MAX; } const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x) { /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); return x->skid; } long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x) { /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1 || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) return -1; return x->ex_pathlen; } long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x) { /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1 || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) == 0) return -1; return x->ex_pcpathlen; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_pmaps.c0000644000000000000000000000727013176625660016255 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static void *v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pmps, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_policy_mappings = { NID_policy_mappings, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_MAPPINGS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2v_POLICY_MAPPINGS, v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS, 0, 0, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICY_MAPPING) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICY_MAPPING, issuerDomainPolicy, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICY_MAPPING, subjectDomainPolicy, ASN1_OBJECT) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICY_MAPPING) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(POLICY_MAPPINGS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, POLICY_MAPPINGS, POLICY_MAPPING) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(POLICY_MAPPINGS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_MAPPING) static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ext_list) { POLICY_MAPPINGS *pmaps = a; POLICY_MAPPING *pmap; int i; char obj_tmp1[80]; char obj_tmp2[80]; for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(pmaps); i++) { pmap = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(pmaps, i); i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp1, 80, pmap->issuerDomainPolicy); i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp2, 80, pmap->subjectDomainPolicy); X509V3_add_value(obj_tmp1, obj_tmp2, &ext_list); } return ext_list; } static void *v2i_POLICY_MAPPINGS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { POLICY_MAPPINGS *pmaps = NULL; POLICY_MAPPING *pmap = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *obj1 = NULL, *obj2 = NULL; CONF_VALUE *val; int i; if ((pmaps = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (!val->value || !val->name) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS, X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } obj1 = OBJ_txt2obj(val->name, 0); obj2 = OBJ_txt2obj(val->value, 0); if (!obj1 || !obj2) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS, X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } pmap = POLICY_MAPPING_new(); if (pmap == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } pmap->issuerDomainPolicy = obj1; pmap->subjectDomainPolicy = obj2; obj1 = obj2 = NULL; sk_POLICY_MAPPING_push(pmaps, pmap); } return pmaps; err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj1); ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj2); sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(pmaps, POLICY_MAPPING_free); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_bitst.c0000644000000000000000000000614313176625660016260 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static BIT_STRING_BITNAME ns_cert_type_table[] = { {0, "SSL Client", "client"}, {1, "SSL Server", "server"}, {2, "S/MIME", "email"}, {3, "Object Signing", "objsign"}, {4, "Unused", "reserved"}, {5, "SSL CA", "sslCA"}, {6, "S/MIME CA", "emailCA"}, {7, "Object Signing CA", "objCA"}, {-1, NULL, NULL} }; static BIT_STRING_BITNAME key_usage_type_table[] = { {0, "Digital Signature", "digitalSignature"}, {1, "Non Repudiation", "nonRepudiation"}, {2, "Key Encipherment", "keyEncipherment"}, {3, "Data Encipherment", "dataEncipherment"}, {4, "Key Agreement", "keyAgreement"}, {5, "Certificate Sign", "keyCertSign"}, {6, "CRL Sign", "cRLSign"}, {7, "Encipher Only", "encipherOnly"}, {8, "Decipher Only", "decipherOnly"}, {-1, NULL, NULL} }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_nscert = EXT_BITSTRING(NID_netscape_cert_type, ns_cert_type_table); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_key_usage = EXT_BITSTRING(NID_key_usage, key_usage_type_table); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bits, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret) { BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam; for (bnam = method->usr_data; bnam->lname; bnam++) { if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(bits, bnam->bitnum)) X509V3_add_value(bnam->lname, NULL, &ret); } return ret; } ASN1_BIT_STRING *v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { CONF_VALUE *val; ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs; int i; BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam; if ((bs = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); for (bnam = method->usr_data; bnam->lname; bnam++) { if (strcmp(bnam->sname, val->name) == 0 || strcmp(bnam->lname, val->name) == 0) { if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(bs, bnam->bitnum, 1)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(bs); return NULL; } break; } } if (!bnam->lname) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_BIT_STRING_ARGUMENT); X509V3_conf_err(val); ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(bs); return NULL; } } return bs; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_akey.c0000644000000000000000000001223613176625660016064 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akeyid, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); static AUTHORITY_KEYID *v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_akey_id = { NID_authority_key_identifier, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE, ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_KEYID), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_AUTHORITY_KEYID, (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID, 0, 0, NULL }; static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akeyid, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist) { char *tmp; if (akeyid->keyid) { tmp = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(akeyid->keyid->data, akeyid->keyid->length); X509V3_add_value("keyid", tmp, &extlist); OPENSSL_free(tmp); } if (akeyid->issuer) extlist = i2v_GENERAL_NAMES(NULL, akeyid->issuer, extlist); if (akeyid->serial) { tmp = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(akeyid->serial->data, akeyid->serial->length); X509V3_add_value("serial", tmp, &extlist); OPENSSL_free(tmp); } return extlist; } /*- * Currently two options: * keyid: use the issuers subject keyid, the value 'always' means its is * an error if the issuer certificate doesn't have a key id. * issuer: use the issuers cert issuer and serial number. The default is * to only use this if keyid is not present. With the option 'always' * this is always included. */ static AUTHORITY_KEYID *v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values) { char keyid = 0, issuer = 0; int i; CONF_VALUE *cnf; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ikeyid = NULL; X509_NAME *isname = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL; X509_EXTENSION *ext; X509 *cert; AUTHORITY_KEYID *akeyid; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); if (strcmp(cnf->name, "keyid") == 0) { keyid = 1; if (cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "always") == 0) keyid = 2; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "issuer") == 0) { issuer = 1; if (cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "always") == 0) issuer = 2; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION); ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", cnf->name); return NULL; } } if (!ctx || !ctx->issuer_cert) { if (ctx && (ctx->flags == CTX_TEST)) return AUTHORITY_KEYID_new(); X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID, X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE); return NULL; } cert = ctx->issuer_cert; if (keyid) { i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1); if ((i >= 0) && (ext = X509_get_ext(cert, i))) ikeyid = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext); if (keyid == 2 && !ikeyid) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID, X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_KEYID); return NULL; } } if ((issuer && !ikeyid) || (issuer == 2)) { isname = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)); serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert)); if (!isname || !serial) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID, X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_DETAILS); goto err; } } if ((akeyid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (isname) { if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL || (gen = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL || !sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } gen->type = GEN_DIRNAME; gen->d.dirn = isname; } akeyid->issuer = gens; gen = NULL; gens = NULL; akeyid->serial = serial; akeyid->keyid = ikeyid; return akeyid; err: sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens); GENERAL_NAME_free(gen); X509_NAME_free(isname); ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ikeyid); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c0000644000000000000000000004013713176625660015714 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_subject_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_issuer_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); static int copy_email(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens, int move_p); static int copy_issuer(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens); static int do_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx); static int do_dirname(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_alt[3] = { {NID_subject_alt_name, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_GENERAL_NAMES, (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_subject_alt, NULL, NULL, NULL}, {NID_issuer_alt_name, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_GENERAL_NAMES, (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_issuer_alt, NULL, NULL, NULL}, {NID_certificate_issuer, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_GENERAL_NAMES, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, }; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAMES(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, GENERAL_NAMES *gens, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret) { int i; GENERAL_NAME *gen; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); ret = i2v_GENERAL_NAME(method, gen, ret); } if (!ret) return sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null(); return ret; } STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAME(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, GENERAL_NAME *gen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret) { unsigned char *p; char oline[256], htmp[5]; int i; switch (gen->type) { case GEN_OTHERNAME: if (!X509V3_add_value("othername", "", &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_X400: if (!X509V3_add_value("X400Name", "", &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_EDIPARTY: if (!X509V3_add_value("EdiPartyName", "", &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_EMAIL: if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("email", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_DNS: if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("DNS", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_URI: if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("URI", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_DIRNAME: if (X509_NAME_oneline(gen->d.dirn, oline, 256) == NULL || !X509V3_add_value("DirName", oline, &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_IPADD: p = gen->d.ip->data; if (gen->d.ip->length == 4) BIO_snprintf(oline, sizeof oline, "%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]); else if (gen->d.ip->length == 16) { oline[0] = 0; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { BIO_snprintf(htmp, sizeof htmp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]); p += 2; strcat(oline, htmp); if (i != 7) strcat(oline, ":"); } } else { if (!X509V3_add_value("IP Address", "", &ret)) return NULL; break; } if (!X509V3_add_value("IP Address", oline, &ret)) return NULL; break; case GEN_RID: i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(oline, 256, gen->d.rid); if (!X509V3_add_value("Registered ID", oline, &ret)) return NULL; break; } return ret; } int GENERAL_NAME_print(BIO *out, GENERAL_NAME *gen) { unsigned char *p; int i; switch (gen->type) { case GEN_OTHERNAME: BIO_printf(out, "othername:"); break; case GEN_X400: BIO_printf(out, "X400Name:"); break; case GEN_EDIPARTY: /* Maybe fix this: it is supported now */ BIO_printf(out, "EdiPartyName:"); break; case GEN_EMAIL: BIO_printf(out, "email:%s", gen->d.ia5->data); break; case GEN_DNS: BIO_printf(out, "DNS:%s", gen->d.ia5->data); break; case GEN_URI: BIO_printf(out, "URI:%s", gen->d.ia5->data); break; case GEN_DIRNAME: BIO_printf(out, "DirName:"); X509_NAME_print_ex(out, gen->d.dirn, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); break; case GEN_IPADD: p = gen->d.ip->data; if (gen->d.ip->length == 4) BIO_printf(out, "IP Address:%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]); else if (gen->d.ip->length == 16) { BIO_printf(out, "IP Address"); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { BIO_printf(out, ":%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]); p += 2; } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } else { BIO_printf(out, "IP Address:"); break; } break; case GEN_RID: BIO_printf(out, "Registered ID:"); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, gen->d.rid); break; } return 1; } static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_issuer_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i; if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ISSUER_ALT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "issuer") && cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "copy") == 0) { if (!copy_issuer(ctx, gens)) goto err; } else { GENERAL_NAME *gen; if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL) goto err; sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen); } } return gens; err: sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free); return NULL; } /* Append subject altname of issuer to issuer alt name of subject */ static int copy_issuer(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens) { GENERAL_NAMES *ialt; GENERAL_NAME *gen; X509_EXTENSION *ext; int i; if (ctx && (ctx->flags == CTX_TEST)) return 1; if (!ctx || !ctx->issuer_cert) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER, X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_DETAILS); goto err; } i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(ctx->issuer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1); if (i < 0) return 1; if ((ext = X509_get_ext(ctx->issuer_cert, i)) == NULL || (ialt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER, X509V3_R_ISSUER_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ialt, i); if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(ialt); return 1; err: return 0; } static GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_subject_alt(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i; if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_SUBJECT_ALT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "email") && cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "copy") == 0) { if (!copy_email(ctx, gens, 0)) goto err; } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "email") && cnf->value && strcmp(cnf->value, "move") == 0) { if (!copy_email(ctx, gens, 1)) goto err; } else { GENERAL_NAME *gen; if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL) goto err; sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen); } } return gens; err: sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free); return NULL; } /* * Copy any email addresses in a certificate or request to GENERAL_NAMES */ static int copy_email(X509V3_CTX *ctx, GENERAL_NAMES *gens, int move_p) { X509_NAME *nm; ASN1_IA5STRING *email = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL; int i; if (ctx != NULL && ctx->flags == CTX_TEST) return 1; if (!ctx || (!ctx->subject_cert && !ctx->subject_req)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL, X509V3_R_NO_SUBJECT_DETAILS); goto err; } /* Find the subject name */ if (ctx->subject_cert) nm = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->subject_cert); else nm = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(ctx->subject_req); /* Now add any email address(es) to STACK */ i = -1; while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i)) >= 0) { ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); email = ASN1_STRING_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne)); if (move_p) { X509_NAME_delete_entry(nm, i); X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); i--; } if (email == NULL || (gen = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } gen->d.ia5 = email; email = NULL; gen->type = GEN_EMAIL; if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } gen = NULL; } return 1; err: GENERAL_NAME_free(gen); ASN1_IA5STRING_free(email); return 0; } GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_GENERAL_NAMES(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { GENERAL_NAME *gen; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i; if ((gens = sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL) goto err; sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen); } return gens; err: sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free); return NULL; } GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf) { return v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(NULL, method, ctx, cnf, 0); } GENERAL_NAME *a2i_GENERAL_NAME(GENERAL_NAME *out, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type, const char *value, int is_nc) { char is_string = 0; GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL; if (!value) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE); return NULL; } if (out) gen = out; else { gen = GENERAL_NAME_new(); if (gen == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } switch (gen_type) { case GEN_URI: case GEN_EMAIL: case GEN_DNS: is_string = 1; break; case GEN_RID: { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; if ((obj = OBJ_txt2obj(value, 0)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT); ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", value); goto err; } gen->d.rid = obj; } break; case GEN_IPADD: if (is_nc) gen->d.ip = a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(value); else gen->d.ip = a2i_IPADDRESS(value); if (gen->d.ip == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_BAD_IP_ADDRESS); ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", value); goto err; } break; case GEN_DIRNAME: if (!do_dirname(gen, value, ctx)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_DIRNAME_ERROR); goto err; } break; case GEN_OTHERNAME: if (!do_othername(gen, value, ctx)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR); goto err; } break; default: X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE); goto err; } if (is_string) { if ((gen->d.ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_STRING_set(gen->d.ia5, (unsigned char *)value, strlen(value))) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } gen->type = gen_type; return gen; err: if (!out) GENERAL_NAME_free(gen); return NULL; } GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(GENERAL_NAME *out, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf, int is_nc) { int type; char *name, *value; name = cnf->name; value = cnf->value; if (!value) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX, X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE); return NULL; } if (!name_cmp(name, "email")) type = GEN_EMAIL; else if (!name_cmp(name, "URI")) type = GEN_URI; else if (!name_cmp(name, "DNS")) type = GEN_DNS; else if (!name_cmp(name, "RID")) type = GEN_RID; else if (!name_cmp(name, "IP")) type = GEN_IPADD; else if (!name_cmp(name, "dirName")) type = GEN_DIRNAME; else if (!name_cmp(name, "otherName")) type = GEN_OTHERNAME; else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX, X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION); ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", name); return NULL; } return a2i_GENERAL_NAME(out, method, ctx, type, value, is_nc); } static int do_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx) { char *objtmp = NULL, *p; int objlen; if ((p = strchr(value, ';')) == NULL) return 0; if ((gen->d.otherName = OTHERNAME_new()) == NULL) return 0; /* * Free this up because we will overwrite it. no need to free type_id * because it is static */ ASN1_TYPE_free(gen->d.otherName->value); if ((gen->d.otherName->value = ASN1_generate_v3(p + 1, ctx)) == NULL) return 0; objlen = p - value; objtmp = OPENSSL_strndup(value, objlen); if (objtmp == NULL) return 0; gen->d.otherName->type_id = OBJ_txt2obj(objtmp, 0); OPENSSL_free(objtmp); if (!gen->d.otherName->type_id) return 0; return 1; } static int do_dirname(GENERAL_NAME *gen, const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL; X509_NAME *nm; if ((nm = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL) goto err; sk = X509V3_get_section(ctx, value); if (!sk) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME, X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); ERR_add_error_data(2, "section=", value); goto err; } /* FIXME: should allow other character types... */ ret = X509V3_NAME_from_section(nm, sk, MBSTRING_ASC); if (!ret) goto err; gen->d.dirn = nm; err: if (ret == 0) X509_NAME_free(nm); X509V3_section_free(ctx, sk); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/pcy_lib.c0000644000000000000000000000532713176625660016147 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "pcy_int.h" /* accessor functions */ /* X509_POLICY_TREE stuff */ int X509_policy_tree_level_count(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { if (!tree) return 0; return tree->nlevel; } X509_POLICY_LEVEL *X509_policy_tree_get0_level(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, int i) { if (!tree || (i < 0) || (i >= tree->nlevel)) return NULL; return tree->levels + i; } STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { if (!tree) return NULL; return tree->auth_policies; } STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { if (!tree) return NULL; if (tree->flags & POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY) return tree->auth_policies; else return tree->user_policies; } /* X509_POLICY_LEVEL stuff */ int X509_policy_level_node_count(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) { int n; if (!level) return 0; if (level->anyPolicy) n = 1; else n = 0; if (level->nodes) n += sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); return n; } X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_level_get0_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, int i) { if (!level) return NULL; if (level->anyPolicy) { if (i == 0) return level->anyPolicy; i--; } return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i); } /* X509_POLICY_NODE stuff */ const ASN1_OBJECT *X509_policy_node_get0_policy(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node) { if (!node) return NULL; return node->data->valid_policy; } STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *X509_policy_node_get0_qualifiers(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node) { if (!node) return NULL; return node->data->qualifier_set; } const X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_node_get0_parent(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node) { if (!node) return NULL; return node->parent; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_skey.c0000644000000000000000000000551013176625660016103 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "ext_dat.h" static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_skey_id(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_skey_id = { NID_subject_key_identifier, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OCTET_STRING), 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (X509V3_EXT_S2I)s2i_skey_id, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }; char *i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct) { return OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(oct->data, oct->length); } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct; long length; if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if ((oct->data = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(str, &length)) == NULL) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct); return NULL; } oct->length = length; return oct; } static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_skey_id(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct; X509_PUBKEY *pubkey; const unsigned char *pk; int pklen; unsigned char pkey_dig[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int diglen; if (strcmp(str, "hash")) return s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(method, ctx, str); if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (ctx && (ctx->flags == CTX_TEST)) return oct; if (!ctx || (!ctx->subject_req && !ctx->subject_cert)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY); goto err; } if (ctx->subject_req) pubkey = ctx->subject_req->req_info.pubkey; else pubkey = ctx->subject_cert->cert_info.key; if (pubkey == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY); goto err; } X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &pk, &pklen, NULL, pubkey); if (!EVP_Digest(pk, pklen, pkey_dig, &diglen, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) goto err; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(oct, pkey_dig, diglen)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } return oct; err: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c0000644000000000000000000004252213176625660016254 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "ext_dat.h" static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, BIO *bp, int ind); static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp, int ind, const char *name); static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip); static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc); static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen); static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *sub, X509_NAME *nm); static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns); static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml); static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base); static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints = { NID_name_constraints, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME), ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE) ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = { ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees, GENERAL_SUBTREE, 0), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees, GENERAL_SUBTREE, 1), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) /* * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules. * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use * numeric constants below). */ static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) { for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) { if (*s1 != *s2) { unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2; /* Convert to lower case */ if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */) c1 += 0x20; if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */) c2 += 0x20; if (c1 == c2) continue; if (c1 < c2) return -1; /* c1 > c2 */ return 1; } else if (*s1 == 0) { /* If we get here we know that *s2 == 0 too */ return 0; } } return 0; } static int ia5casecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2) { return ia5ncasecmp(s1, s2, SIZE_MAX); } static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { int i; CONF_VALUE tval, *val; STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = NULL; NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = NULL; GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub = NULL; ncons = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new(); if (ncons == NULL) goto memerr; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) == 0 && val->name[9]) { ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees; tval.name = val->name + 10; } else if (strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) == 0 && val->name[8]) { ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees; tval.name = val->name + 9; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX); goto err; } tval.value = val->value; sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new(); if (sub == NULL) goto memerr; if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1)) goto err; if (*ptree == NULL) *ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null(); if (*ptree == NULL || !sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_push(*ptree, sub)) goto memerr; sub = NULL; } return ncons; memerr: X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ncons); GENERAL_SUBTREE_free(sub); return NULL; } static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, BIO *bp, int ind) { NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = a; do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees, bp, ind, "Permitted"); do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees, bp, ind, "Excluded"); return 1; } static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp, int ind, const char *name) { GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree; int i; if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0) BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees); i++) { tree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(trees, i); BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, ""); if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD) print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip); else GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } return 1; } static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip) { int i, len; unsigned char *p; p = ip->data; len = ip->length; BIO_puts(bp, "IP:"); if (len == 8) { BIO_printf(bp, "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5], p[6], p[7]); } else if (len == 32) { for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { BIO_printf(bp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]); p += 2; if (i == 7) BIO_puts(bp, "/"); else if (i != 15) BIO_puts(bp, ":"); } } else BIO_printf(bp, "IP Address:"); return 1; } #define NAME_CHECK_MAX (1 << 20) static int add_lengths(int *out, int a, int b) { /* sk_FOO_num(NULL) returns -1 but is effectively 0 when iterating. */ if (a < 0) a = 0; if (b < 0) b = 0; if (a > INT_MAX - b) return 0; *out = a + b; return 1; } /*- * Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints. * Return values: * X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed. * X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation. * X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation. * X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name */ int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) { int r, i, name_count, constraint_count; X509_NAME *nm; nm = X509_get_subject_name(x); /* * Guard against certificates with an excessive number of names or * constraints causing a computationally expensive name constraints check. */ if (!add_lengths(&name_count, X509_NAME_entry_count(nm), sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname)) || !add_lengths(&constraint_count, sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees), sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees)) || (name_count > 0 && constraint_count > NAME_CHECK_MAX / name_count)) return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) { GENERAL_NAME gntmp; gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME; gntmp.d.directoryName = nm; r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL; /* Process any email address attributes in subject name */ for (i = -1;;) { const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i); if (i == -1) break; ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; } } for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(x->altname, i); r = nc_match(gen, nc); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; } return X509_V_OK; } int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) { int r, i; X509_NAME *nm; ASN1_STRING stmp; GENERAL_NAME gntmp; stmp.flags = 0; stmp.type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; gntmp.type = GEN_DNS; gntmp.d.dNSName = &stmp; nm = X509_get_subject_name(x); /* Process any commonName attributes in subject name */ for (i = -1;;) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; ASN1_STRING *hn; i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, i); if (i == -1) break; ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); hn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); /* Only process attributes that look like host names */ if (asn1_valid_host(hn)) { unsigned char *h; int hlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&h, hn); if (hlen <= 0) return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; stmp.length = hlen; stmp.data = h; r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc); OPENSSL_free(h); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; } } return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) { GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub; int i, r, match = 0; /* * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at * least one subtree must match. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) { sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i); if (gen->type != sub->base->type) continue; if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum) return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX; /* If we already have a match don't bother trying any more */ if (match == 2) continue; if (match == 0) match = 1; r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base); if (r == X509_V_OK) match = 2; else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION) return r; } if (match == 1) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; /* Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) { sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i); if (gen->type != sub->base->type) continue; if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum) return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX; r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base); if (r == X509_V_OK) return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION; else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION) return r; } return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base) { switch (base->type) { case GEN_DIRNAME: return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName); case GEN_DNS: return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName); case GEN_EMAIL: return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name); case GEN_URI: return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier, base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier); case GEN_IPADD: return nc_ip(gen->d.iPAddress, base->d.iPAddress); default: return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE; } } /* * directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of * X509_NAME makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the subtree is a * subset of the name. */ static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *nm, X509_NAME *base) { /* Ensure canonical encodings are up to date. */ if (nm->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) < 0) return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; if (base->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(base, NULL) < 0) return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; if (base->canon_enclen > nm->canon_enclen) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; if (memcmp(base->canon_enc, nm->canon_enc, base->canon_enclen)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) { char *baseptr = (char *)base->data; char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data; /* Empty matches everything */ if (!*baseptr) return X509_V_OK; /* * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS * and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character. */ if (dns->length > base->length) { dnsptr += dns->length - base->length; if (*baseptr != '.' && dnsptr[-1] != '.') return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, dnsptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) { const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data; const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data; const char *baseat = strchr(baseptr, '@'); const char *emlat = strchr(emlptr, '@'); if (!emlat) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */ if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) { if (eml->length > base->length) { emlptr += eml->length - base->length; if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr) == 0) return X509_V_OK; } return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } /* If we have anything before '@' match local part */ if (baseat) { if (baseat != baseptr) { if ((baseat - baseptr) != (emlat - emlptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; /* Case sensitive match of local part */ if (strncmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlat - emlptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } /* Position base after '@' */ baseptr = baseat + 1; } emlptr = emlat + 1; /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */ if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) { const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data; const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data; const char *p = strchr(hostptr, ':'); int hostlen; /* Check for foo:// and skip past it */ if (!p || (p[1] != '/') || (p[2] != '/')) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; hostptr = p + 3; /* Determine length of hostname part of URI */ /* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */ p = strchr(hostptr, ':'); /* Otherwise look for trailing slash */ if (!p) p = strchr(hostptr, '/'); if (!p) hostlen = strlen(hostptr); else hostlen = p - hostptr; if (hostlen == 0) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */ if (*baseptr == '.') { if (hostlen > base->length) { p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length; if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0) return X509_V_OK; } return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } if ((base->length != (int)hostlen) || ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base) { int hostlen, baselen, i; unsigned char *hostptr, *baseptr, *maskptr; hostptr = ip->data; hostlen = ip->length; baseptr = base->data; baselen = base->length; /* Invalid if not IPv4 or IPv6 */ if (!((hostlen == 4) || (hostlen == 16))) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; if (!((baselen == 8) || (baselen == 32))) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; /* Do not match IPv4 with IPv6 */ if (hostlen * 2 != baselen) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; maskptr = base->data + hostlen; /* Considering possible not aligned base ipAddress */ /* Not checking for wrong mask definition: i.e.: 255.0.255.0 */ for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++) if ((hostptr[i] & maskptr[i]) != (baseptr[i] & maskptr[i])) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c0000644000000000000000000002244613176625660015705 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* X509 v3 extension utilities */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static STACK_OF(X509V3_EXT_METHOD) *ext_list = NULL; static int ext_cmp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *a, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *b); static void ext_list_free(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext); int X509V3_EXT_add(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext) { if (ext_list == NULL && (ext_list = sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_new(ext_cmp)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_push(ext_list, ext)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } static int ext_cmp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *a, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *const *b) { return ((*a)->ext_nid - (*b)->ext_nid); } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *, ext); IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *, ext); /* * This table will be searched using OBJ_bsearch so it *must* kept in order * of the ext_nid values. */ static const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *standard_exts[] = { &v3_nscert, &v3_ns_ia5_list[0], &v3_ns_ia5_list[1], &v3_ns_ia5_list[2], &v3_ns_ia5_list[3], &v3_ns_ia5_list[4], &v3_ns_ia5_list[5], &v3_ns_ia5_list[6], &v3_skey_id, &v3_key_usage, &v3_pkey_usage_period, &v3_alt[0], &v3_alt[1], &v3_bcons, &v3_crl_num, &v3_cpols, &v3_akey_id, &v3_crld, &v3_ext_ku, &v3_delta_crl, &v3_crl_reason, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP &v3_crl_invdate, #endif &v3_sxnet, &v3_info, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 &v3_addr, &v3_asid, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP &v3_ocsp_nonce, &v3_ocsp_crlid, &v3_ocsp_accresp, &v3_ocsp_nocheck, &v3_ocsp_acutoff, &v3_ocsp_serviceloc, #endif &v3_sinfo, &v3_policy_constraints, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP &v3_crl_hold, #endif &v3_pci, &v3_name_constraints, &v3_policy_mappings, &v3_inhibit_anyp, &v3_idp, &v3_alt[2], &v3_freshest_crl, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT &v3_ct_scts[0], &v3_ct_scts[1], &v3_ct_scts[2], #endif &v3_tls_feature, }; /* Number of standard extensions */ #define STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(standard_exts) const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get_nid(int nid) { X509V3_EXT_METHOD tmp; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *t = &tmp, *const *ret; int idx; if (nid < 0) return NULL; tmp.ext_nid = nid; ret = OBJ_bsearch_ext(&t, standard_exts, STANDARD_EXTENSION_COUNT); if (ret) return *ret; if (!ext_list) return NULL; idx = sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_find(ext_list, &tmp); if (idx == -1) return NULL; return sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_value(ext_list, idx); } const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get(X509_EXTENSION *ext) { int nid; if ((nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext))) == NID_undef) return NULL; return X509V3_EXT_get_nid(nid); } int X509V3_EXT_add_list(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *extlist) { for (; extlist->ext_nid != -1; extlist++) if (!X509V3_EXT_add(extlist)) return 0; return 1; } int X509V3_EXT_add_alias(int nid_to, int nid_from) { const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext; X509V3_EXT_METHOD *tmpext; if ((ext = X509V3_EXT_get_nid(nid_from)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND); return 0; } if ((tmpext = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmpext))) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } *tmpext = *ext; tmpext->ext_nid = nid_to; tmpext->ext_flags |= X509V3_EXT_DYNAMIC; return X509V3_EXT_add(tmpext); } void X509V3_EXT_cleanup(void) { sk_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_pop_free(ext_list, ext_list_free); ext_list = NULL; } static void ext_list_free(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext) { if (ext->ext_flags & X509V3_EXT_DYNAMIC) OPENSSL_free(ext); } /* * Legacy function: we don't need to add standard extensions any more because * they are now kept in ext_dat.h. */ int X509V3_add_standard_extensions(void) { return 1; } /* Return an extension internal structure */ void *X509V3_EXT_d2i(X509_EXTENSION *ext) { const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method; const unsigned char *p; ASN1_STRING *extvalue; int extlen; if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext)) == NULL) return NULL; extvalue = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext); p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(extvalue); extlen = ASN1_STRING_length(extvalue); if (method->it) return ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, extlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it)); return method->d2i(NULL, &p, extlen); } /*- * Get critical flag and decoded version of extension from a NID. * The "idx" variable returns the last found extension and can * be used to retrieve multiple extensions of the same NID. * However multiple extensions with the same NID is usually * due to a badly encoded certificate so if idx is NULL we * choke if multiple extensions exist. * The "crit" variable is set to the critical value. * The return value is the decoded extension or NULL on * error. The actual error can have several different causes, * the value of *crit reflects the cause: * >= 0, extension found but not decoded (reflects critical value). * -1 extension not found. * -2 extension occurs more than once. */ void *X509V3_get_d2i(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { int lastpos, i; X509_EXTENSION *ex, *found_ex = NULL; if (!x) { if (idx) *idx = -1; if (crit) *crit = -1; return NULL; } if (idx) lastpos = *idx + 1; else lastpos = 0; if (lastpos < 0) lastpos = 0; for (i = lastpos; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(x); i++) { ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(x, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == nid) { if (idx) { *idx = i; found_ex = ex; break; } else if (found_ex) { /* Found more than one */ if (crit) *crit = -2; return NULL; } found_ex = ex; } } if (found_ex) { /* Found it */ if (crit) *crit = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(found_ex); return X509V3_EXT_d2i(found_ex); } /* Extension not found */ if (idx) *idx = -1; if (crit) *crit = -1; return NULL; } /* * This function is a general extension append, replace and delete utility. * The precise operation is governed by the 'flags' value. The 'crit' and * 'value' arguments (if relevant) are the extensions internal structure. */ int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { int extidx = -1; int errcode; X509_EXTENSION *ext, *extmp; unsigned long ext_op = flags & X509V3_ADD_OP_MASK; /* * If appending we don't care if it exists, otherwise look for existing * extension. */ if (ext_op != X509V3_ADD_APPEND) extidx = X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(*x, nid, -1); /* See if extension exists */ if (extidx >= 0) { /* If keep existing, nothing to do */ if (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING) return 1; /* If default then its an error */ if (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT) { errcode = X509V3_R_EXTENSION_EXISTS; goto err; } /* If delete, just delete it */ if (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_DELETE) { if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_delete(*x, extidx)) return -1; return 1; } } else { /* * If replace existing or delete, error since extension must exist */ if ((ext_op == X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING) || (ext_op == X509V3_ADD_DELETE)) { errcode = X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND; goto err; } } /* * If we get this far then we have to create an extension: could have * some flags for alternative encoding schemes... */ ext = X509V3_EXT_i2d(nid, crit, value); if (!ext) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D, X509V3_R_ERROR_CREATING_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* If extension exists replace it.. */ if (extidx >= 0) { extmp = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(*x, extidx); X509_EXTENSION_free(extmp); if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_set(*x, extidx, ext)) return -1; return 1; } if (*x == NULL && (*x = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL) return -1; if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(*x, ext)) return -1; return 1; err: if (!(flags & X509V3_ADD_SILENT)) X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D, errcode); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_pku.c0000644000000000000000000000374713176625660015741 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static int i2r_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *usage, BIO *out, int indent); /* * static PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *v2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, * X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values); */ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pkey_usage_period = { NID_private_key_usage_period, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, NULL, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD) = { ASN1_IMP_OPT(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, notBefore, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, notAfter, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD) static int i2r_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *usage, BIO *out, int indent) { BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); if (usage->notBefore) { BIO_write(out, "Not Before: ", 12); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, usage->notBefore); if (usage->notAfter) BIO_write(out, ", ", 2); } if (usage->notAfter) { BIO_write(out, "Not After: ", 11); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, usage->notAfter); } return 1; } /*- static PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD *v2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD(method, ctx, values) X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method; X509V3_CTX *ctx; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values; { return NULL; } */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_extku.c0000644000000000000000000000617313176625660016276 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static void *v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *eku, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ext_ku = { NID_ext_key_usage, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, 0, 0, NULL }; /* NB OCSP acceptable responses also is a SEQUENCE OF OBJECT */ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_accresp = { NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, 0, 0, NULL }; ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, ASN1_OBJECT) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ext_list) { EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = a; int i; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; char obj_tmp[80]; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) { obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i); i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, 80, obj); X509V3_add_value(NULL, obj_tmp, &ext_list); } return ext_list; } static void *v2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extku; char *extval; ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp; CONF_VALUE *val; int i; if ((extku = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (val->value) extval = val->value; else extval = val->name; if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(extval, 0)) == NULL) { sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extku, ASN1_OBJECT_free); X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); X509V3_conf_err(val); return NULL; } sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(extku, objtmp); } return extku; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcons.c0000644000000000000000000000632013176625660016252 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *bcons, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); static void *v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_policy_constraints = { NID_policy_constraints, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2v_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, NULL, NULL, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS) = { ASN1_IMP_OPT(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, requireExplicitPolicy, ASN1_INTEGER,0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, inhibitPolicyMapping, ASN1_INTEGER,1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS) static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist) { POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *pcons = a; X509V3_add_value_int("Require Explicit Policy", pcons->requireExplicitPolicy, &extlist); X509V3_add_value_int("Inhibit Policy Mapping", pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping, &extlist); return extlist; } static void *v2i_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values) { POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *pcons = NULL; CONF_VALUE *val; int i; if ((pcons = POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); if (strcmp(val->name, "requireExplicitPolicy") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &pcons->requireExplicitPolicy)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(val->name, "inhibitPolicyMapping") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping)) goto err; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } } if (!pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping && !pcons->requireExplicitPolicy) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION); goto err; } return pcons; err: POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(pcons); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c0000644000000000000000000012040013176625660016036 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Implementation of RFC 3779 section 2.2. */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "ext_dat.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* * OpenSSL ASN.1 template translation of RFC 3779 2.2.3. */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(IPAddressRange) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressRange, min, ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressRange, max, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(IPAddressRange) ASN1_CHOICE(IPAddressOrRange) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressOrRange, u.addressPrefix, ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressOrRange, u.addressRange, IPAddressRange) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(IPAddressOrRange) ASN1_CHOICE(IPAddressChoice) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressChoice, u.inherit, ASN1_NULL), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(IPAddressChoice, u.addressesOrRanges, IPAddressOrRange) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(IPAddressChoice) ASN1_SEQUENCE(IPAddressFamily) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressFamily, addressFamily, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(IPAddressFamily, ipAddressChoice, IPAddressChoice) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(IPAddressFamily) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(IPAddrBlocks) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, IPAddrBlocks, IPAddressFamily) static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(IPAddrBlocks) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressRange) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressOrRange) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressChoice) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressFamily) /* * How much buffer space do we need for a raw address? */ #define ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN 16 /* * What's the address length associated with this AFI? */ static int length_from_afi(const unsigned afi) { switch (afi) { case IANA_AFI_IPV4: return 4; case IANA_AFI_IPV6: return 16; default: return 0; } } /* * Extract the AFI from an IPAddressFamily. */ unsigned int X509v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f) { if (f == NULL || f->addressFamily == NULL || f->addressFamily->data == NULL || f->addressFamily->length < 2) return 0; return (f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | f->addressFamily->data[1]; } /* * Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array. * At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed. */ static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, const int length, const unsigned char fill) { if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length) return 0; if (bs->length > 0) { memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length); if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) { unsigned char mask = 0xFF >> (8 - (bs->flags & 7)); if (fill == 0) addr[bs->length - 1] &= ~mask; else addr[bs->length - 1] |= mask; } } memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length); return 1; } /* * Extract the prefix length from a bitstring. */ #define addr_prefixlen(bs) ((int) ((bs)->length * 8 - ((bs)->flags & 7))) /* * i2r handler for one address bitstring. */ static int i2r_address(BIO *out, const unsigned afi, const unsigned char fill, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs) { unsigned char addr[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; int i, n; if (bs->length < 0) return 0; switch (afi) { case IANA_AFI_IPV4: if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill)) return 0; BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]); break; case IANA_AFI_IPV6: if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill)) return 0; for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n - 1] == 0x00 && addr[n - 2] == 0x00; n -= 2) ; for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2) BIO_printf(out, "%x%s", (addr[i] << 8) | addr[i + 1], (i < 14 ? ":" : "")); if (i < 16) BIO_puts(out, ":"); if (i == 0) BIO_puts(out, ":"); break; default: for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) BIO_printf(out, "%s%02x", (i > 0 ? ":" : ""), bs->data[i]); BIO_printf(out, "[%d]", (int)(bs->flags & 7)); break; } return 1; } /* * i2r handler for a sequence of addresses and ranges. */ static int i2r_IPAddressOrRanges(BIO *out, const int indent, const IPAddressOrRanges *aors, const unsigned afi) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors); i++) { const IPAddressOrRange *aor = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, i); BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); switch (aor->type) { case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: if (!i2r_address(out, afi, 0x00, aor->u.addressPrefix)) return 0; BIO_printf(out, "/%d\n", addr_prefixlen(aor->u.addressPrefix)); continue; case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: if (!i2r_address(out, afi, 0x00, aor->u.addressRange->min)) return 0; BIO_puts(out, "-"); if (!i2r_address(out, afi, 0xFF, aor->u.addressRange->max)) return 0; BIO_puts(out, "\n"); continue; } } return 1; } /* * i2r handler for an IPAddrBlocks extension. */ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *ext, BIO *out, int indent) { const IPAddrBlocks *addr = ext; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) { IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i); const unsigned int afi = X509v3_addr_get_afi(f); switch (afi) { case IANA_AFI_IPV4: BIO_printf(out, "%*sIPv4", indent, ""); break; case IANA_AFI_IPV6: BIO_printf(out, "%*sIPv6", indent, ""); break; default: BIO_printf(out, "%*sUnknown AFI %u", indent, "", afi); break; } if (f->addressFamily->length > 2) { switch (f->addressFamily->data[2]) { case 1: BIO_puts(out, " (Unicast)"); break; case 2: BIO_puts(out, " (Multicast)"); break; case 3: BIO_puts(out, " (Unicast/Multicast)"); break; case 4: BIO_puts(out, " (MPLS)"); break; case 64: BIO_puts(out, " (Tunnel)"); break; case 65: BIO_puts(out, " (VPLS)"); break; case 66: BIO_puts(out, " (BGP MDT)"); break; case 128: BIO_puts(out, " (MPLS-labeled VPN)"); break; default: BIO_printf(out, " (Unknown SAFI %u)", (unsigned)f->addressFamily->data[2]); break; } } switch (f->ipAddressChoice->type) { case IPAddressChoice_inherit: BIO_puts(out, ": inherit\n"); break; case IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges: BIO_puts(out, ":\n"); if (!i2r_IPAddressOrRanges(out, indent + 2, f->ipAddressChoice-> u.addressesOrRanges, afi)) return 0; break; } } return 1; } /* * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange * elements. * * There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an * assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool, * so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this * function returns -1. If this messes up your preferred sort order * for garbage input, tough noogies. */ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a, const IPAddressOrRange *b, const int length) { unsigned char addr_a[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], addr_b[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; int prefixlen_a = 0, prefixlen_b = 0; int r; switch (a->type) { case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00)) return -1; prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix); break; case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00)) return -1; prefixlen_a = length * 8; break; } switch (b->type) { case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00)) return -1; prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix); break; case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00)) return -1; prefixlen_b = length * 8; break; } if ((r = memcmp(addr_a, addr_b, length)) != 0) return r; else return prefixlen_a - prefixlen_b; } /* * IPv4-specific closure over IPAddressOrRange_cmp, since sk_sort() * comparison routines are only allowed two arguments. */ static int v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *const *a, const IPAddressOrRange *const *b) { return IPAddressOrRange_cmp(*a, *b, 4); } /* * IPv6-specific closure over IPAddressOrRange_cmp, since sk_sort() * comparison routines are only allowed two arguments. */ static int v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *const *a, const IPAddressOrRange *const *b) { return IPAddressOrRange_cmp(*a, *b, 16); } /* * Calculate whether a range collapses to a prefix. * See last paragraph of RFC 3779 2.2.3.7. */ static int range_should_be_prefix(const unsigned char *min, const unsigned char *max, const int length) { unsigned char mask; int i, j; OPENSSL_assert(memcmp(min, max, length) <= 0); for (i = 0; i < length && min[i] == max[i]; i++) ; for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && min[j] == 0x00 && max[j] == 0xFF; j--) ; if (i < j) return -1; if (i > j) return i * 8; mask = min[i] ^ max[i]; switch (mask) { case 0x01: j = 7; break; case 0x03: j = 6; break; case 0x07: j = 5; break; case 0x0F: j = 4; break; case 0x1F: j = 3; break; case 0x3F: j = 2; break; case 0x7F: j = 1; break; default: return -1; } if ((min[i] & mask) != 0 || (max[i] & mask) != mask) return -1; else return i * 8 + j; } /* * Construct a prefix. */ static int make_addressPrefix(IPAddressOrRange **result, unsigned char *addr, const int prefixlen) { int bytelen = (prefixlen + 7) / 8, bitlen = prefixlen % 8; IPAddressOrRange *aor = IPAddressOrRange_new(); if (aor == NULL) return 0; aor->type = IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix; if (aor->u.addressPrefix == NULL && (aor->u.addressPrefix = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(aor->u.addressPrefix, addr, bytelen)) goto err; aor->u.addressPrefix->flags &= ~7; aor->u.addressPrefix->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; if (bitlen > 0) { aor->u.addressPrefix->data[bytelen - 1] &= ~(0xFF >> bitlen); aor->u.addressPrefix->flags |= 8 - bitlen; } *result = aor; return 1; err: IPAddressOrRange_free(aor); return 0; } /* * Construct a range. If it can be expressed as a prefix, * return a prefix instead. Doing this here simplifies * the rest of the code considerably. */ static int make_addressRange(IPAddressOrRange **result, unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max, const int length) { IPAddressOrRange *aor; int i, prefixlen; if ((prefixlen = range_should_be_prefix(min, max, length)) >= 0) return make_addressPrefix(result, min, prefixlen); if ((aor = IPAddressOrRange_new()) == NULL) return 0; aor->type = IPAddressOrRange_addressRange; OPENSSL_assert(aor->u.addressRange == NULL); if ((aor->u.addressRange = IPAddressRange_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (aor->u.addressRange->min == NULL && (aor->u.addressRange->min = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (aor->u.addressRange->max == NULL && (aor->u.addressRange->max = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; for (i = length; i > 0 && min[i - 1] == 0x00; --i) ; if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(aor->u.addressRange->min, min, i)) goto err; aor->u.addressRange->min->flags &= ~7; aor->u.addressRange->min->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; if (i > 0) { unsigned char b = min[i - 1]; int j = 1; while ((b & (0xFFU >> j)) != 0) ++j; aor->u.addressRange->min->flags |= 8 - j; } for (i = length; i > 0 && max[i - 1] == 0xFF; --i) ; if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(aor->u.addressRange->max, max, i)) goto err; aor->u.addressRange->max->flags &= ~7; aor->u.addressRange->max->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; if (i > 0) { unsigned char b = max[i - 1]; int j = 1; while ((b & (0xFFU >> j)) != (0xFFU >> j)) ++j; aor->u.addressRange->max->flags |= 8 - j; } *result = aor; return 1; err: IPAddressOrRange_free(aor); return 0; } /* * Construct a new address family or find an existing one. */ static IPAddressFamily *make_IPAddressFamily(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi) { IPAddressFamily *f; unsigned char key[3]; int keylen; int i; key[0] = (afi >> 8) & 0xFF; key[1] = afi & 0xFF; if (safi != NULL) { key[2] = *safi & 0xFF; keylen = 3; } else { keylen = 2; } for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) { f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i); OPENSSL_assert(f->addressFamily->data != NULL); if (f->addressFamily->length == keylen && !memcmp(f->addressFamily->data, key, keylen)) return f; } if ((f = IPAddressFamily_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (f->ipAddressChoice == NULL && (f->ipAddressChoice = IPAddressChoice_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (f->addressFamily == NULL && (f->addressFamily = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(f->addressFamily, key, keylen)) goto err; if (!sk_IPAddressFamily_push(addr, f)) goto err; return f; err: IPAddressFamily_free(f); return NULL; } /* * Add an inheritance element. */ int X509v3_addr_add_inherit(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi) { IPAddressFamily *f = make_IPAddressFamily(addr, afi, safi); if (f == NULL || f->ipAddressChoice == NULL || (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges && f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges != NULL)) return 0; if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit && f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit != NULL) return 1; if (f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit == NULL && (f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL) return 0; f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_inherit; return 1; } /* * Construct an IPAddressOrRange sequence, or return an existing one. */ static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi) { IPAddressFamily *f = make_IPAddressFamily(addr, afi, safi); IPAddressOrRanges *aors = NULL; if (f == NULL || f->ipAddressChoice == NULL || (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit && f->ipAddressChoice->u.inherit != NULL)) return NULL; if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) aors = f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges; if (aors != NULL) return aors; if ((aors = sk_IPAddressOrRange_new_null()) == NULL) return NULL; switch (afi) { case IANA_AFI_IPV4: (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp); break; case IANA_AFI_IPV6: (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp); break; } f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges; f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges = aors; return aors; } /* * Add a prefix. */ int X509v3_addr_add_prefix(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi, unsigned char *a, const int prefixlen) { IPAddressOrRanges *aors = make_prefix_or_range(addr, afi, safi); IPAddressOrRange *aor; if (aors == NULL || !make_addressPrefix(&aor, a, prefixlen)) return 0; if (sk_IPAddressOrRange_push(aors, aor)) return 1; IPAddressOrRange_free(aor); return 0; } /* * Add a range. */ int X509v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi, unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max) { IPAddressOrRanges *aors = make_prefix_or_range(addr, afi, safi); IPAddressOrRange *aor; int length = length_from_afi(afi); if (aors == NULL) return 0; if (!make_addressRange(&aor, min, max, length)) return 0; if (sk_IPAddressOrRange_push(aors, aor)) return 1; IPAddressOrRange_free(aor); return 0; } /* * Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange. */ static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor, unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max, int length) { if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL) return 0; switch (aor->type) { case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix: return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) && addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF)); case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange: return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) && addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF)); } return 0; } /* * Public wrapper for extract_min_max(). */ int X509v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor, const unsigned afi, unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max, const int length) { int afi_length = length_from_afi(afi); if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL || afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length || (aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix && aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) || !extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length)) return 0; return afi_length; } /* * Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressFamily. * * The last paragraph of RFC 3779 2.2.3.3 is slightly ambiguous about * the ordering: I can read it as meaning that IPv6 without a SAFI * comes before IPv4 with a SAFI, which seems pretty weird. The * examples in appendix B suggest that the author intended the * null-SAFI rule to apply only within a single AFI, which is what I * would have expected and is what the following code implements. */ static int IPAddressFamily_cmp(const IPAddressFamily *const *a_, const IPAddressFamily *const *b_) { const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a = (*a_)->addressFamily; const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b = (*b_)->addressFamily; int len = ((a->length <= b->length) ? a->length : b->length); int cmp = memcmp(a->data, b->data, len); return cmp ? cmp : a->length - b->length; } /* * Check whether an IPAddrBLocks is in canonical form. */ int X509v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr) { unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; IPAddressOrRanges *aors; int i, j, k; /* * Empty extension is canonical. */ if (addr == NULL) return 1; /* * Check whether the top-level list is in order. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr) - 1; i++) { const IPAddressFamily *a = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i); const IPAddressFamily *b = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i + 1); if (IPAddressFamily_cmp(&a, &b) >= 0) return 0; } /* * Top level's ok, now check each address family. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) { IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i); int length = length_from_afi(X509v3_addr_get_afi(f)); /* * Inheritance is canonical. Anything other than inheritance or * a SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange is an ASN.1 error or something. */ if (f == NULL || f->ipAddressChoice == NULL) return 0; switch (f->ipAddressChoice->type) { case IPAddressChoice_inherit: continue; case IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges: break; default: return 0; } /* * It's an IPAddressOrRanges sequence, check it. */ aors = f->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges; if (sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) == 0) return 0; for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; j++) { IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1); if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) || !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length)) return 0; /* * Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range. */ if (memcmp(a_min, b_min, length) >= 0 || memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 || memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0) return 0; /* * Punt if adjacent or overlapping. Check for adjacency by * subtracting one from b_min first. */ for (k = length - 1; k >= 0 && b_min[k]-- == 0x00; k--) ; if (memcmp(a_max, b_min, length) >= 0) return 0; /* * Check for range that should be expressed as a prefix. */ if (a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange && range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0) return 0; } /* * Check range to see if it's inverted or should be a * prefix. */ j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; { IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length)) return 0; if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 || range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0) return 0; } } } /* * If we made it through all that, we're happy. */ return 1; } /* * Whack an IPAddressOrRanges into canonical form. */ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors, const unsigned afi) { int i, j, length = length_from_afi(afi); /* * Sort the IPAddressOrRanges sequence. */ sk_IPAddressOrRange_sort(aors); /* * Clean up representation issues, punt on duplicates or overlaps. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; i++) { IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, i); IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, i + 1); unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) || !extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length)) return 0; /* * Punt inverted ranges. */ if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 || memcmp(b_min, b_max, length) > 0) return 0; /* * Punt overlaps. */ if (memcmp(a_max, b_min, length) >= 0) return 0; /* * Merge if a and b are adjacent. We check for * adjacency by subtracting one from b_min first. */ for (j = length - 1; j >= 0 && b_min[j]-- == 0x00; j--) ; if (memcmp(a_max, b_min, length) == 0) { IPAddressOrRange *merged; if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length)) return 0; (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged); (void)sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1); IPAddressOrRange_free(a); IPAddressOrRange_free(b); --i; continue; } } /* * Check for inverted final range. */ j = sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(aors) - 1; { IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j); if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) { unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length)) return 0; if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0) return 0; } } return 1; } /* * Whack an IPAddrBlocks extension into canonical form. */ int X509v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) { IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i); if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges && !IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(f->ipAddressChoice-> u.addressesOrRanges, X509v3_addr_get_afi(f))) return 0; } (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp); sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr); OPENSSL_assert(X509v3_addr_is_canonical(addr)); return 1; } /* * v2i handler for the IPAddrBlocks extension. */ static void *v2i_IPAddrBlocks(const struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values) { static const char v4addr_chars[] = "0123456789."; static const char v6addr_chars[] = "0123456789.:abcdefABCDEF"; IPAddrBlocks *addr = NULL; char *s = NULL, *t; int i; if ((addr = sk_IPAddressFamily_new(IPAddressFamily_cmp)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); unsigned char min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; unsigned afi, *safi = NULL, safi_; const char *addr_chars = NULL; int prefixlen, i1, i2, delim, length; if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv4")) { afi = IANA_AFI_IPV4; } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv6")) { afi = IANA_AFI_IPV6; } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv4-SAFI")) { afi = IANA_AFI_IPV4; safi = &safi_; } else if (!name_cmp(val->name, "IPv6-SAFI")) { afi = IANA_AFI_IPV6; safi = &safi_; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } switch (afi) { case IANA_AFI_IPV4: addr_chars = v4addr_chars; break; case IANA_AFI_IPV6: addr_chars = v6addr_chars; break; } length = length_from_afi(afi); /* * Handle SAFI, if any, and OPENSSL_strdup() so we can null-terminate * the other input values. */ if (safi != NULL) { *safi = strtoul(val->value, &t, 0); t += strspn(t, " \t"); if (*safi > 0xFF || *t++ != ':') { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SAFI); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } t += strspn(t, " \t"); s = OPENSSL_strdup(t); } else { s = OPENSSL_strdup(val->value); } if (s == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * Check for inheritance. Not worth additional complexity to * optimize this (seldom-used) case. */ if (strcmp(s, "inherit") == 0) { if (!X509v3_addr_add_inherit(addr, afi, safi)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s); s = NULL; continue; } i1 = strspn(s, addr_chars); i2 = i1 + strspn(s + i1, " \t"); delim = s[i2++]; s[i1] = '\0'; if (a2i_ipadd(min, s) != length) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } switch (delim) { case '/': prefixlen = (int)strtoul(s + i2, &t, 10); if (t == s + i2 || *t != '\0') { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } if (!X509v3_addr_add_prefix(addr, afi, safi, min, prefixlen)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } break; case '-': i1 = i2 + strspn(s + i2, " \t"); i2 = i1 + strspn(s + i1, addr_chars); if (i1 == i2 || s[i2] != '\0') { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } if (a2i_ipadd(max, s + i1) != length) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } if (memcmp(min, max, length_from_afi(afi)) > 0) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } if (!X509v3_addr_add_range(addr, afi, safi, min, max)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } break; case '\0': if (!X509v3_addr_add_prefix(addr, afi, safi, min, length * 8)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } break; default: X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s); s = NULL; } /* * Canonize the result, then we're done. */ if (!X509v3_addr_canonize(addr)) goto err; return addr; err: OPENSSL_free(s); sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(addr, IPAddressFamily_free); return NULL; } /* * OpenSSL dispatch */ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_addr = { NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* nid */ 0, /* flags */ ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddrBlocks), /* template */ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* old functions, ignored */ 0, /* i2s */ 0, /* s2i */ 0, /* i2v */ v2i_IPAddrBlocks, /* v2i */ i2r_IPAddrBlocks, /* i2r */ 0, /* r2i */ NULL /* extension-specific data */ }; /* * Figure out whether extension sues inheritance. */ int X509v3_addr_inherits(IPAddrBlocks *addr) { int i; if (addr == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(addr); i++) { IPAddressFamily *f = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(addr, i); if (f->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit) return 1; } return 0; } /* * Figure out whether parent contains child. */ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent, IPAddressOrRanges *child, int length) { unsigned char p_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], p_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; unsigned char c_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], c_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN]; int p, c; if (child == NULL || parent == child) return 1; if (parent == NULL) return 0; p = 0; for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) { if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c), c_min, c_max, length)) return -1; for (;; p++) { if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent)) return 0; if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p), p_min, p_max, length)) return 0; if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0) continue; if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0) return 0; break; } } return 1; } /* * Test whether a is a subset of b. */ int X509v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b) { int i; if (a == NULL || a == b) return 1; if (b == NULL || X509v3_addr_inherits(a) || X509v3_addr_inherits(b)) return 0; (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp); for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) { IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i); int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa); IPAddressFamily *fb; fb = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(b, j); if (fb == NULL) return 0; if (!addr_contains(fb->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges, fa->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges, length_from_afi(X509v3_addr_get_afi(fb)))) return 0; } return 1; } /* * Validation error handling via callback. */ #define validation_err(_err_) \ do { \ if (ctx != NULL) { \ ctx->error = _err_; \ ctx->error_depth = i; \ ctx->current_cert = x; \ ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); \ } else { \ ret = 0; \ } \ if (!ret) \ goto done; \ } while (0) /* * Core code for RFC 3779 2.3 path validation. * * Returns 1 for success, 0 on error. * * When returning 0, ctx->error MUST be set to an appropriate value other than * X509_V_OK. */ static int addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, IPAddrBlocks *ext) { IPAddrBlocks *child = NULL; int i, j, ret = 1; X509 *x; OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0); OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL); /* * Figure out where to start. If we don't have an extension to * check, we're done. Otherwise, check canonical form and * set up for walking up the chain. */ if (ext != NULL) { i = -1; x = NULL; } else { i = 0; x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); if ((ext = x->rfc3779_addr) == NULL) goto done; } if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(ext)) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION); (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp); if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; ret = 0; goto done; } /* * Now walk up the chain. No cert may list resources that its * parent doesn't list. */ for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr)) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION); if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL) { for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) { IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j); if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type != IPAddressChoice_inherit) { validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); break; } } continue; } (void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp); for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) { IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j); int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc); IPAddressFamily *fp = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, k); if (fp == NULL) { if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) { validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); break; } continue; } if (fp->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) { if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit || addr_contains(fp->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges, fc->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges, length_from_afi(X509v3_addr_get_afi(fc)))) sk_IPAddressFamily_set(child, j, fp); else validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); } } } /* * Trust anchor can't inherit. */ OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL); if (x->rfc3779_addr != NULL) { for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); j++) { IPAddressFamily *fp = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, j); if (fp->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit && sk_IPAddressFamily_find(child, fp) >= 0) validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE); } } done: sk_IPAddressFamily_free(child); return ret; } #undef validation_err /* * RFC 3779 2.3 path validation -- called from X509_verify_cert(). */ int X509v3_addr_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return addr_validate_path_internal(ctx, ctx->chain, NULL); } /* * RFC 3779 2.3 path validation of an extension. * Test whether chain covers extension. */ int X509v3_addr_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain, IPAddrBlocks *ext, int allow_inheritance) { if (ext == NULL) return 1; if (chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(chain) == 0) return 0; if (!allow_inheritance && X509v3_addr_inherits(ext)) return 0; return addr_validate_path_internal(NULL, chain, ext); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c0000644000000000000000000010336113176625660015737 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* X509 v3 extension utilities */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include #include "ext_dat.h" static char *strip_spaces(char *name); static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b); static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *get_email(X509_NAME *name, GENERAL_NAMES *gens); static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str); static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **sk, const ASN1_IA5STRING *email); static int ipv4_from_asc(unsigned char *v4, const char *in); static int ipv6_from_asc(unsigned char *v6, const char *in); static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *usr); static int ipv6_hex(unsigned char *out, const char *in, int inlen); /* Add a CONF_VALUE name value pair to stack */ int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { CONF_VALUE *vtmp = NULL; char *tname = NULL, *tvalue = NULL; int sk_allocated = (*extlist == NULL); if (name && (tname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) goto err; if (value && (tvalue = OPENSSL_strdup(value)) == NULL) goto err; if ((vtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vtmp))) == NULL) goto err; if (sk_allocated && (*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; vtmp->section = NULL; vtmp->name = tname; vtmp->value = tvalue; if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(*extlist, vtmp)) goto err; return 1; err: X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (sk_allocated) { sk_CONF_VALUE_free(*extlist); *extlist = NULL; } OPENSSL_free(vtmp); OPENSSL_free(tname); OPENSSL_free(tvalue); return 0; } int X509V3_add_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { return X509V3_add_value(name, (const char *)value, extlist); } /* Free function for STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) */ void X509V3_conf_free(CONF_VALUE *conf) { if (!conf) return; OPENSSL_free(conf->name); OPENSSL_free(conf->value); OPENSSL_free(conf->section); OPENSSL_free(conf); } int X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { if (asn1_bool) return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist); return X509V3_add_value(name, "FALSE", extlist); } int X509V3_add_value_bool_nf(const char *name, int asn1_bool, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { if (asn1_bool) return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist); return 1; } char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a) { BIGNUM *bntmp = NULL; char *strtmp = NULL; if (!a) return NULL; if ((bntmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(a, NULL)) == NULL || (strtmp = BN_bn2dec(bntmp)) == NULL) X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_ENUMERATED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BN_free(bntmp); return strtmp; } char *i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_INTEGER *a) { BIGNUM *bntmp = NULL; char *strtmp = NULL; if (!a) return NULL; if ((bntmp = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a, NULL)) == NULL || (strtmp = BN_bn2dec(bntmp)) == NULL) X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BN_free(bntmp); return strtmp; } ASN1_INTEGER *s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const char *value) { BIGNUM *bn = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *aint; int isneg, ishex; int ret; if (value == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE); return NULL; } bn = BN_new(); if (bn == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (value[0] == '-') { value++; isneg = 1; } else isneg = 0; if (value[0] == '0' && ((value[1] == 'x') || (value[1] == 'X'))) { value += 2; ishex = 1; } else ishex = 0; if (ishex) ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, value); else ret = BN_dec2bn(&bn, value); if (!ret || value[ret]) { BN_free(bn); X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR); return NULL; } if (isneg && BN_is_zero(bn)) isneg = 0; aint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, NULL); BN_free(bn); if (!aint) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR); return NULL; } if (isneg) aint->type |= V_ASN1_NEG; return aint; } int X509V3_add_value_int(const char *name, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { char *strtmp; int ret; if (!aint) return 1; if ((strtmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aint)) == NULL) return 0; ret = X509V3_add_value(name, strtmp, extlist); OPENSSL_free(strtmp); return ret; } int X509V3_get_value_bool(const CONF_VALUE *value, int *asn1_bool) { const char *btmp; if ((btmp = value->value) == NULL) goto err; if (strcmp(btmp, "TRUE") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "true") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "Y") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "y") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "YES") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "yes") == 0) { *asn1_bool = 0xff; return 1; } if (strcmp(btmp, "FALSE") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "false") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "N") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "n") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "NO") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "no") == 0) { *asn1_bool = 0; return 1; } err: X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_VALUE_BOOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING); X509V3_conf_err(value); return 0; } int X509V3_get_value_int(const CONF_VALUE *value, ASN1_INTEGER **aint) { ASN1_INTEGER *itmp; if ((itmp = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, value->value)) == NULL) { X509V3_conf_err(value); return 0; } *aint = itmp; return 1; } #define HDR_NAME 1 #define HDR_VALUE 2 /* * #define DEBUG */ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_parse_list(const char *line) { char *p, *q, c; char *ntmp, *vtmp; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values = NULL; char *linebuf; int state; /* We are going to modify the line so copy it first */ linebuf = OPENSSL_strdup(line); if (linebuf == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } state = HDR_NAME; ntmp = NULL; /* Go through all characters */ for (p = linebuf, q = linebuf; (c = *p) && (c != '\r') && (c != '\n'); p++) { switch (state) { case HDR_NAME: if (c == ':') { state = HDR_VALUE; *p = 0; ntmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!ntmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME); goto err; } q = p + 1; } else if (c == ',') { *p = 0; ntmp = strip_spaces(q); q = p + 1; if (!ntmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, NULL, &values); } break; case HDR_VALUE: if (c == ',') { state = HDR_NAME; *p = 0; vtmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!vtmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values); ntmp = NULL; q = p + 1; } } } if (state == HDR_VALUE) { vtmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!vtmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values); } else { ntmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!ntmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, NULL, &values); } OPENSSL_free(linebuf); return values; err: OPENSSL_free(linebuf); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(values, X509V3_conf_free); return NULL; } /* Delete leading and trailing spaces from a string */ static char *strip_spaces(char *name) { char *p, *q; /* Skip over leading spaces */ p = name; while (*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++; if (!*p) return NULL; q = p + strlen(p) - 1; while ((q != p) && isspace((unsigned char)*q)) q--; if (p != q) q[1] = 0; if (!*p) return NULL; return p; } /* * V2I name comparison function: returns zero if 'name' matches cmp or cmp.* */ int name_cmp(const char *name, const char *cmp) { int len, ret; char c; len = strlen(cmp); if ((ret = strncmp(name, cmp, len))) return ret; c = name[len]; if (!c || (c == '.')) return 0; return 1; } static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b) { return strcmp(*a, *b); } STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_email(X509 *x) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret; gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); ret = get_email(X509_get_subject_name(x), gens); sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free); return ret; } STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_ocsp(X509 *x) { AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *info; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret = NULL; int i; info = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL); if (!info) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(info); i++) { ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(info, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) { if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) { if (!append_ia5 (&ret, ad->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier)) break; } } } AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free(info); return ret; } STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_REQ_get1_email(X509_REQ *x) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret; exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x); gens = X509V3_get_d2i(exts, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); ret = get_email(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x), gens); sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); return ret; } static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *get_email(X509_NAME *name, GENERAL_NAMES *gens) { STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; ASN1_IA5STRING *email; GENERAL_NAME *gen; int i; /* Now add any email address(es) to STACK */ i = -1; /* First supplied X509_NAME */ while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i)) >= 0) { ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); email = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); if (!append_ia5(&ret, email)) return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type != GEN_EMAIL) continue; if (!append_ia5(&ret, gen->d.ia5)) return NULL; } return ret; } static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str) { OPENSSL_free(str); } static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **sk, const ASN1_IA5STRING *email) { char *emtmp; /* First some sanity checks */ if (email->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) return 1; if (!email->data || !email->length) return 1; if (*sk == NULL) *sk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(sk_strcmp); if (*sk == NULL) return 0; /* Don't add duplicates */ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(*sk, (char *)email->data) != -1) return 1; emtmp = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)email->data); if (emtmp == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*sk, emtmp)) { OPENSSL_free(emtmp); /* free on push failure */ X509_email_free(*sk); *sk = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } void X509_email_free(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk) { sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(sk, str_free); } typedef int (*equal_fn) (const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags); /* Skip pattern prefix to match "wildcard" subject */ static void skip_prefix(const unsigned char **p, size_t *plen, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *pattern = *p; size_t pattern_len = *plen; /* * If subject starts with a leading '.' followed by more octets, and * pattern is longer, compare just an equal-length suffix with the * full subject (starting at the '.'), provided the prefix contains * no NULs. */ if ((flags & _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS) == 0) return; while (pattern_len > subject_len && *pattern) { if ((flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS) && *pattern == '.') break; ++pattern; --pattern_len; } /* Skip if entire prefix acceptable */ if (pattern_len == subject_len) { *p = pattern; *plen = pattern_len; } } /* Compare while ASCII ignoring case. */ static int equal_nocase(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { skip_prefix(&pattern, &pattern_len, subject_len, flags); if (pattern_len != subject_len) return 0; while (pattern_len) { unsigned char l = *pattern; unsigned char r = *subject; /* The pattern must not contain NUL characters. */ if (l == 0) return 0; if (l != r) { if ('A' <= l && l <= 'Z') l = (l - 'A') + 'a'; if ('A' <= r && r <= 'Z') r = (r - 'A') + 'a'; if (l != r) return 0; } ++pattern; ++subject; --pattern_len; } return 1; } /* Compare using memcmp. */ static int equal_case(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { skip_prefix(&pattern, &pattern_len, subject_len, flags); if (pattern_len != subject_len) return 0; return !memcmp(pattern, subject, pattern_len); } /* * RFC 5280, section 7.5, requires that only the domain is compared in a * case-insensitive manner. */ static int equal_email(const unsigned char *a, size_t a_len, const unsigned char *b, size_t b_len, unsigned int unused_flags) { size_t i = a_len; if (a_len != b_len) return 0; /* * We search backwards for the '@' character, so that we do not have to * deal with quoted local-parts. The domain part is compared in a * case-insensitive manner. */ while (i > 0) { --i; if (a[i] == '@' || b[i] == '@') { if (!equal_nocase(a + i, a_len - i, b + i, a_len - i, 0)) return 0; break; } } if (i == 0) i = a_len; return equal_case(a, i, b, i, 0); } /* * Compare the prefix and suffix with the subject, and check that the * characters in-between are valid. */ static int wildcard_match(const unsigned char *prefix, size_t prefix_len, const unsigned char *suffix, size_t suffix_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *wildcard_start; const unsigned char *wildcard_end; const unsigned char *p; int allow_multi = 0; int allow_idna = 0; if (subject_len < prefix_len + suffix_len) return 0; if (!equal_nocase(prefix, prefix_len, subject, prefix_len, flags)) return 0; wildcard_start = subject + prefix_len; wildcard_end = subject + (subject_len - suffix_len); if (!equal_nocase(wildcard_end, suffix_len, suffix, suffix_len, flags)) return 0; /* * If the wildcard makes up the entire first label, it must match at * least one character. */ if (prefix_len == 0 && *suffix == '.') { if (wildcard_start == wildcard_end) return 0; allow_idna = 1; if (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS) allow_multi = 1; } /* IDNA labels cannot match partial wildcards */ if (!allow_idna && subject_len >= 4 && strncasecmp((char *)subject, "xn--", 4) == 0) return 0; /* The wildcard may match a literal '*' */ if (wildcard_end == wildcard_start + 1 && *wildcard_start == '*') return 1; /* * Check that the part matched by the wildcard contains only * permitted characters and only matches a single label unless * allow_multi is set. */ for (p = wildcard_start; p != wildcard_end; ++p) if (!(('0' <= *p && *p <= '9') || ('A' <= *p && *p <= 'Z') || ('a' <= *p && *p <= 'z') || *p == '-' || (allow_multi && *p == '.'))) return 0; return 1; } #define LABEL_START (1 << 0) #define LABEL_END (1 << 1) #define LABEL_HYPHEN (1 << 2) #define LABEL_IDNA (1 << 3) static const unsigned char *valid_star(const unsigned char *p, size_t len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *star = 0; size_t i; int state = LABEL_START; int dots = 0; for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { /* * Locate first and only legal wildcard, either at the start * or end of a non-IDNA first and not final label. */ if (p[i] == '*') { int atstart = (state & LABEL_START); int atend = (i == len - 1 || p[i + 1] == '.'); /*- * At most one wildcard per pattern. * No wildcards in IDNA labels. * No wildcards after the first label. */ if (star != NULL || (state & LABEL_IDNA) != 0 || dots) return NULL; /* Only full-label '*.example.com' wildcards? */ if ((flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS) && (!atstart || !atend)) return NULL; /* No 'foo*bar' wildcards */ if (!atstart && !atend) return NULL; star = &p[i]; state &= ~LABEL_START; } else if (('a' <= p[i] && p[i] <= 'z') || ('A' <= p[i] && p[i] <= 'Z') || ('0' <= p[i] && p[i] <= '9')) { if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0 && len - i >= 4 && strncasecmp((char *)&p[i], "xn--", 4) == 0) state |= LABEL_IDNA; state &= ~(LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START); } else if (p[i] == '.') { if ((state & (LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START)) != 0) return NULL; state = LABEL_START; ++dots; } else if (p[i] == '-') { /* no domain/subdomain starts with '-' */ if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0) return NULL; state |= LABEL_HYPHEN; } else return NULL; } /* * The final label must not end in a hyphen or ".", and * there must be at least two dots after the star. */ if ((state & (LABEL_START | LABEL_HYPHEN)) != 0 || dots < 2) return NULL; return star; } /* Compare using wildcards. */ static int equal_wildcard(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *star = NULL; /* * Subject names starting with '.' can only match a wildcard pattern * via a subject sub-domain pattern suffix match. */ if (!(subject_len > 1 && subject[0] == '.')) star = valid_star(pattern, pattern_len, flags); if (star == NULL) return equal_nocase(pattern, pattern_len, subject, subject_len, flags); return wildcard_match(pattern, star - pattern, star + 1, (pattern + pattern_len) - star - 1, subject, subject_len, flags); } /* * Compare an ASN1_STRING to a supplied string. If they match return 1. If * cmp_type > 0 only compare if string matches the type, otherwise convert it * to UTF8. */ static int do_check_string(const ASN1_STRING *a, int cmp_type, equal_fn equal, unsigned int flags, const char *b, size_t blen, char **peername) { int rv = 0; if (!a->data || !a->length) return 0; if (cmp_type > 0) { if (cmp_type != a->type) return 0; if (cmp_type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) rv = equal(a->data, a->length, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags); else if (a->length == (int)blen && !memcmp(a->data, b, blen)) rv = 1; if (rv > 0 && peername) *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)a->data, a->length); } else { int astrlen; unsigned char *astr; astrlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&astr, a); if (astrlen < 0) { /* * -1 could be an internal malloc failure or a decoding error from * malformed input; we can't distinguish. */ return -1; } rv = equal(astr, astrlen, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags); if (rv > 0 && peername) *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)astr, astrlen); OPENSSL_free(astr); } return rv; } static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags, int check_type, char **peername) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; X509_NAME *name = NULL; int i; int cnid = NID_undef; int alt_type; int san_present = 0; int rv = 0; equal_fn equal; /* See below, this flag is internal-only */ flags &= ~_X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS; if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL) { cnid = NID_pkcs9_emailAddress; alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; equal = equal_email; } else if (check_type == GEN_DNS) { cnid = NID_commonName; /* Implicit client-side DNS sub-domain pattern */ if (chklen > 1 && chk[0] == '.') flags |= _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS; alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; if (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) equal = equal_nocase; else equal = equal_wildcard; } else { alt_type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; equal = equal_case; } if (chklen == 0) chklen = strlen(chk); gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); if (gens) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen; ASN1_STRING *cstr; gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type != check_type) continue; san_present = 1; if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL) cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name; else if (check_type == GEN_DNS) cstr = gen->d.dNSName; else cstr = gen->d.iPAddress; /* Positive on success, negative on error! */ if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags, chk, chklen, peername)) != 0) break; } GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); if (rv != 0) return rv; if (san_present && !(flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT)) return 0; } /* We're done if CN-ID is not pertinent */ if (cnid == NID_undef || (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT)) return 0; i = -1; name = X509_get_subject_name(x); while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, cnid, i)) >= 0) { const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); const ASN1_STRING *str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); /* Positive on success, negative on error! */ if ((rv = do_check_string(str, -1, equal, flags, chk, chklen, peername)) != 0) return rv; } return 0; } int X509_check_host(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags, char **peername) { if (chk == NULL) return -2; /* * Embedded NULs are disallowed, except as the last character of a * string of length 2 or more (tolerate caller including terminating * NUL in string length). */ if (chklen == 0) chklen = strlen(chk); else if (memchr(chk, '\0', chklen > 1 ? chklen - 1 : chklen)) return -2; if (chklen > 1 && chk[chklen - 1] == '\0') --chklen; return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_DNS, peername); } int X509_check_email(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags) { if (chk == NULL) return -2; /* * Embedded NULs are disallowed, except as the last character of a * string of length 2 or more (tolerate caller including terminating * NUL in string length). */ if (chklen == 0) chklen = strlen((char *)chk); else if (memchr(chk, '\0', chklen > 1 ? chklen - 1 : chklen)) return -2; if (chklen > 1 && chk[chklen - 1] == '\0') --chklen; return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_EMAIL, NULL); } int X509_check_ip(X509 *x, const unsigned char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags) { if (chk == NULL) return -2; return do_x509_check(x, (char *)chk, chklen, flags, GEN_IPADD, NULL); } int X509_check_ip_asc(X509 *x, const char *ipasc, unsigned int flags) { unsigned char ipout[16]; size_t iplen; if (ipasc == NULL) return -2; iplen = (size_t)a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc); if (iplen == 0) return -2; return do_x509_check(x, (char *)ipout, iplen, flags, GEN_IPADD, NULL); } /* * Convert IP addresses both IPv4 and IPv6 into an OCTET STRING compatible * with RFC3280. */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS(const char *ipasc) { unsigned char ipout[16]; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret; int iplen; /* If string contains a ':' assume IPv6 */ iplen = a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc); if (!iplen) return NULL; ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen)) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret = NULL; unsigned char ipout[32]; char *iptmp = NULL, *p; int iplen1, iplen2; p = strchr(ipasc, '/'); if (!p) return NULL; iptmp = OPENSSL_strdup(ipasc); if (!iptmp) return NULL; p = iptmp + (p - ipasc); *p++ = 0; iplen1 = a2i_ipadd(ipout, iptmp); if (!iplen1) goto err; iplen2 = a2i_ipadd(ipout + iplen1, p); OPENSSL_free(iptmp); iptmp = NULL; if (!iplen2 || (iplen1 != iplen2)) goto err; ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen1 + iplen2)) goto err; return ret; err: OPENSSL_free(iptmp); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret); return NULL; } int a2i_ipadd(unsigned char *ipout, const char *ipasc) { /* If string contains a ':' assume IPv6 */ if (strchr(ipasc, ':')) { if (!ipv6_from_asc(ipout, ipasc)) return 0; return 16; } else { if (!ipv4_from_asc(ipout, ipasc)) return 0; return 4; } } static int ipv4_from_asc(unsigned char *v4, const char *in) { int a0, a1, a2, a3; if (sscanf(in, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a0, &a1, &a2, &a3) != 4) return 0; if ((a0 < 0) || (a0 > 255) || (a1 < 0) || (a1 > 255) || (a2 < 0) || (a2 > 255) || (a3 < 0) || (a3 > 255)) return 0; v4[0] = a0; v4[1] = a1; v4[2] = a2; v4[3] = a3; return 1; } typedef struct { /* Temporary store for IPV6 output */ unsigned char tmp[16]; /* Total number of bytes in tmp */ int total; /* The position of a zero (corresponding to '::') */ int zero_pos; /* Number of zeroes */ int zero_cnt; } IPV6_STAT; static int ipv6_from_asc(unsigned char *v6, const char *in) { IPV6_STAT v6stat; v6stat.total = 0; v6stat.zero_pos = -1; v6stat.zero_cnt = 0; /* * Treat the IPv6 representation as a list of values separated by ':'. * The presence of a '::' will parse as one, two or three zero length * elements. */ if (!CONF_parse_list(in, ':', 0, ipv6_cb, &v6stat)) return 0; /* Now for some sanity checks */ if (v6stat.zero_pos == -1) { /* If no '::' must have exactly 16 bytes */ if (v6stat.total != 16) return 0; } else { /* If '::' must have less than 16 bytes */ if (v6stat.total == 16) return 0; /* More than three zeroes is an error */ if (v6stat.zero_cnt > 3) return 0; /* Can only have three zeroes if nothing else present */ else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 3) { if (v6stat.total > 0) return 0; } /* Can only have two zeroes if at start or end */ else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 2) { if ((v6stat.zero_pos != 0) && (v6stat.zero_pos != v6stat.total)) return 0; } else /* Can only have one zero if *not* start or end */ { if ((v6stat.zero_pos == 0) || (v6stat.zero_pos == v6stat.total)) return 0; } } /* Format result */ if (v6stat.zero_pos >= 0) { /* Copy initial part */ memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, v6stat.zero_pos); /* Zero middle */ memset(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos, 0, 16 - v6stat.total); /* Copy final part */ if (v6stat.total != v6stat.zero_pos) memcpy(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos + 16 - v6stat.total, v6stat.tmp + v6stat.zero_pos, v6stat.total - v6stat.zero_pos); } else memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, 16); return 1; } static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *usr) { IPV6_STAT *s = usr; /* Error if 16 bytes written */ if (s->total == 16) return 0; if (len == 0) { /* Zero length element, corresponds to '::' */ if (s->zero_pos == -1) s->zero_pos = s->total; /* If we've already got a :: its an error */ else if (s->zero_pos != s->total) return 0; s->zero_cnt++; } else { /* If more than 4 characters could be final a.b.c.d form */ if (len > 4) { /* Need at least 4 bytes left */ if (s->total > 12) return 0; /* Must be end of string */ if (elem[len]) return 0; if (!ipv4_from_asc(s->tmp + s->total, elem)) return 0; s->total += 4; } else { if (!ipv6_hex(s->tmp + s->total, elem, len)) return 0; s->total += 2; } } return 1; } /* * Convert a string of up to 4 hex digits into the corresponding IPv6 form. */ static int ipv6_hex(unsigned char *out, const char *in, int inlen) { unsigned char c; unsigned int num = 0; int x; if (inlen > 4) return 0; while (inlen--) { c = *in++; num <<= 4; x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(c); if (x < 0) return 0; num |= (char)x; } out[0] = num >> 8; out[1] = num & 0xff; return 1; } int X509V3_NAME_from_section(X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, unsigned long chtype) { CONF_VALUE *v; int i, mval, spec_char, plus_char; char *p, *type; if (!nm) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) { v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i); type = v->name; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances */ for (p = type; *p; p++) { #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC spec_char = ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')); #else spec_char = ((*p == os_toascii[':']) || (*p == os_toascii[',']) || (*p == os_toascii['.'])); #endif if (spec_char) { p++; if (*p) type = p; break; } } #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC plus_char = (*type == '+'); #else plus_char = (*type == os_toascii['+']); #endif if (plus_char) { mval = -1; type++; } else mval = 0; if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, type, chtype, (unsigned char *)v->value, -1, -1, mval)) return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c0000644000000000000000000000411313176625660016302 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "pcy_int.h" /* Policy Node routines */ void policy_data_free(X509_POLICY_DATA *data) { if (!data) return; ASN1_OBJECT_free(data->valid_policy); /* Don't free qualifiers if shared */ if (!(data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS)) sk_POLICYQUALINFO_pop_free(data->qualifier_set, POLICYQUALINFO_free); sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(data->expected_policy_set, ASN1_OBJECT_free); OPENSSL_free(data); } /* * Create a data based on an existing policy. If 'id' is NULL use the OID in * the policy, otherwise use 'id'. This behaviour covers the two types of * data in RFC3280: data with from a CertificatePolicies extension and * additional data with just the qualifiers of anyPolicy and ID from another * source. */ X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_data_new(POLICYINFO *policy, const ASN1_OBJECT *cid, int crit) { X509_POLICY_DATA *ret; ASN1_OBJECT *id; if (!policy && !cid) return NULL; if (cid) { id = OBJ_dup(cid); if (!id) return NULL; } else id = NULL; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; ret->expected_policy_set = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null(); if (ret->expected_policy_set == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ret); ASN1_OBJECT_free(id); return NULL; } if (crit) ret->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL; if (id) ret->valid_policy = id; else { ret->valid_policy = policy->policyid; policy->policyid = NULL; } if (policy) { ret->qualifier_set = policy->qualifiers; policy->qualifiers = NULL; } return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_prn.c0000644000000000000000000001363313176625660015734 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* X509 v3 extension utilities */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include /* Extension printing routines */ static int unknown_ext_print(BIO *out, const unsigned char *ext, int extlen, unsigned long flag, int indent, int supported); /* Print out a name+value stack */ void X509V3_EXT_val_prn(BIO *out, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *val, int indent, int ml) { int i; CONF_VALUE *nval; if (!val) return; if (!ml || !sk_CONF_VALUE_num(val)) { BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_num(val)) BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(val); i++) { if (ml) BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); else if (i > 0) BIO_printf(out, ", "); nval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(val, i); if (!nval->name) BIO_puts(out, nval->value); else if (!nval->value) BIO_puts(out, nval->name); #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC else BIO_printf(out, "%s:%s", nval->name, nval->value); #else else { int len; char *tmp; len = strlen(nval->value) + 1; tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (tmp != NULL) { ascii2ebcdic(tmp, nval->value, len); BIO_printf(out, "%s:%s", nval->name, tmp); OPENSSL_free(tmp); } } #endif if (ml) BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } } /* Main routine: print out a general extension */ int X509V3_EXT_print(BIO *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, unsigned long flag, int indent) { void *ext_str = NULL; char *value = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *extoct; const unsigned char *p; int extlen; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval = NULL; int ok = 1; extoct = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext); p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(extoct); extlen = ASN1_STRING_length(extoct); if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext)) == NULL) return unknown_ext_print(out, p, extlen, flag, indent, 0); if (method->it) ext_str = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, extlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it)); else ext_str = method->d2i(NULL, &p, extlen); if (!ext_str) return unknown_ext_print(out, p, extlen, flag, indent, 1); if (method->i2s) { if ((value = method->i2s(method, ext_str)) == NULL) { ok = 0; goto err; } #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s", indent, "", value); #else { int len; char *tmp; len = strlen(value) + 1; tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (tmp != NULL) { ascii2ebcdic(tmp, value, len); BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s", indent, "", tmp); OPENSSL_free(tmp); } } #endif } else if (method->i2v) { if ((nval = method->i2v(method, ext_str, NULL)) == NULL) { ok = 0; goto err; } X509V3_EXT_val_prn(out, nval, indent, method->ext_flags & X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE); } else if (method->i2r) { if (!method->i2r(method, ext_str, out, indent)) ok = 0; } else ok = 0; err: sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free); OPENSSL_free(value); if (method->it) ASN1_item_free(ext_str, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it)); else method->ext_free(ext_str); return ok; } int X509V3_extensions_print(BIO *bp, const char *title, const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts, unsigned long flag, int indent) { int i, j; if (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0) return 1; if (title) { BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", indent, "", title); indent += 4; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509_EXTENSION *ex; ex = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); if (indent && BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj); j = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex); if (BIO_printf(bp, ": %s\n", j ? "critical" : "") <= 0) return 0; if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bp, ex, flag, indent + 4)) { BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", indent + 4, ""); ASN1_STRING_print(bp, X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex)); } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int unknown_ext_print(BIO *out, const unsigned char *ext, int extlen, unsigned long flag, int indent, int supported) { switch (flag & X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK) { case X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT: return 0; case X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN: if (supported) BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); else BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); return 1; case X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN: return ASN1_parse_dump(out, ext, extlen, indent, -1); case X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN: return BIO_dump_indent(out, (const char *)ext, extlen, indent); default: return 1; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int X509V3_EXT_print_fp(FILE *fp, X509_EXTENSION *ext, int flag, int indent) { BIO *bio_tmp; int ret; if ((bio_tmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) return 0; ret = X509V3_EXT_print(bio_tmp, ext, flag, indent); BIO_free(bio_tmp); return ret; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_sxnet.c0000644000000000000000000001376113176625660016300 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" /* Support for Thawte strong extranet extension */ #define SXNET_TEST static int sxnet_i2r(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, SXNET *sx, BIO *out, int indent); #ifdef SXNET_TEST static SXNET *sxnet_v2i(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); #endif const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_sxnet = { NID_sxnet, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE, ASN1_ITEM_ref(SXNET), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, #ifdef SXNET_TEST (X509V3_EXT_V2I)sxnet_v2i, #else 0, #endif (X509V3_EXT_I2R)sxnet_i2r, 0, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(SXNETID) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(SXNETID, zone, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(SXNETID, user, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SXNETID) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNETID) ASN1_SEQUENCE(SXNET) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(SXNET, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(SXNET, ids, SXNETID) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SXNET) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNET) static int sxnet_i2r(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, SXNET *sx, BIO *out, int indent) { long v; char *tmp; SXNETID *id; int i; v = ASN1_INTEGER_get(sx->version); BIO_printf(out, "%*sVersion: %ld (0x%lX)", indent, "", v + 1, v); for (i = 0; i < sk_SXNETID_num(sx->ids); i++) { id = sk_SXNETID_value(sx->ids, i); tmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, id->zone); BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sZone: %s, User: ", indent, "", tmp); OPENSSL_free(tmp); ASN1_STRING_print(out, id->user); } return 1; } #ifdef SXNET_TEST /* * NBB: this is used for testing only. It should *not* be used for anything * else because it will just take static IDs from the configuration file and * they should really be separate values for each user. */ static SXNET *sxnet_v2i(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { CONF_VALUE *cnf; SXNET *sx = NULL; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (!SXNET_add_id_asc(&sx, cnf->name, cnf->value, -1)) return NULL; } return sx; } #endif /* Strong Extranet utility functions */ /* Add an id given the zone as an ASCII number */ int SXNET_add_id_asc(SXNET **psx, const char *zone, const char *user, int userlen) { ASN1_INTEGER *izone; if ((izone = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, zone)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ASC, X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE); return 0; } return SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(psx, izone, user, userlen); } /* Add an id given the zone as an unsigned long */ int SXNET_add_id_ulong(SXNET **psx, unsigned long lzone, const char *user, int userlen) { ASN1_INTEGER *izone; if ((izone = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(izone, lzone)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ULONG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone); return 0; } return SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(psx, izone, user, userlen); } /* * Add an id given the zone as an ASN1_INTEGER. Note this version uses the * passed integer and doesn't make a copy so don't free it up afterwards. */ int SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(SXNET **psx, ASN1_INTEGER *zone, const char *user, int userlen) { SXNET *sx = NULL; SXNETID *id = NULL; if (!psx || !zone || !user) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT); return 0; } if (userlen == -1) userlen = strlen(user); if (userlen > 64) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER, X509V3_R_USER_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (*psx == NULL) { if ((sx = SXNET_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(sx->version, 0)) goto err; *psx = sx; } else sx = *psx; if (SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(sx, zone)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER, X509V3_R_DUPLICATE_ZONE_ID); return 0; } if ((id = SXNETID_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (userlen == -1) userlen = strlen(user); if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(id->user, (const unsigned char *)user, userlen)) goto err; if (!sk_SXNETID_push(sx->ids, id)) goto err; id->zone = zone; return 1; err: X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); SXNETID_free(id); SXNET_free(sx); *psx = NULL; return 0; } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_asc(SXNET *sx, const char *zone) { ASN1_INTEGER *izone; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct; if ((izone = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, zone)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ASC, X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE); return NULL; } oct = SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(sx, izone); ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone); return oct; } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_ulong(SXNET *sx, unsigned long lzone) { ASN1_INTEGER *izone; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct; if ((izone = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(izone, lzone)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ULONG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone); return NULL; } oct = SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(sx, izone); ASN1_INTEGER_free(izone); return oct; } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(SXNET *sx, ASN1_INTEGER *zone) { SXNETID *id; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_SXNETID_num(sx->ids); i++) { id = sk_SXNETID_value(sx->ids, i); if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(id->zone, zone)) return id->user; } return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_enum.c0000644000000000000000000000344613176625660016102 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "ext_dat.h" static ENUMERATED_NAMES crl_reasons[] = { {CRL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED, "Unspecified", "unspecified"}, {CRL_REASON_KEY_COMPROMISE, "Key Compromise", "keyCompromise"}, {CRL_REASON_CA_COMPROMISE, "CA Compromise", "CACompromise"}, {CRL_REASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED, "Affiliation Changed", "affiliationChanged"}, {CRL_REASON_SUPERSEDED, "Superseded", "superseded"}, {CRL_REASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION, "Cessation Of Operation", "cessationOfOperation"}, {CRL_REASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD, "Certificate Hold", "certificateHold"}, {CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL, "Remove From CRL", "removeFromCRL"}, {CRL_REASON_PRIVILEGE_WITHDRAWN, "Privilege Withdrawn", "privilegeWithdrawn"}, {CRL_REASON_AA_COMPROMISE, "AA Compromise", "AACompromise"}, {-1, NULL, NULL} }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_reason = { NID_crl_reason, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ENUMERATED), 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, crl_reasons }; char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *e) { ENUMERATED_NAMES *enam; long strval; strval = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(e); for (enam = method->usr_data; enam->lname; enam++) { if (strval == enam->bitnum) return OPENSSL_strdup(enam->lname); } return i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(method, e); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c0000644000000000000000000000725113176625660016324 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "pcy_int.h" static int node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *a, const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *b) { return OBJ_cmp((*a)->data->valid_policy, (*b)->data->valid_policy); } STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *policy_node_cmp_new(void) { return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(node_cmp); } X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, const ASN1_OBJECT *id) { X509_POLICY_DATA n; X509_POLICY_NODE l; int idx; n.valid_policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)id; l.data = &n; idx = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(nodes, &l); if (idx == -1) return NULL; return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, idx); } X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, const X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, const ASN1_OBJECT *id) { X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i); if (node->parent == parent) { if (!OBJ_cmp(node->data->valid_policy, id)) return node; } } return NULL; } X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, X509_POLICY_DATA *data, X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { X509_POLICY_NODE *node; node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node)); if (node == NULL) return NULL; node->data = data; node->parent = parent; if (level) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { if (level->anyPolicy) goto node_error; level->anyPolicy = node; } else { if (level->nodes == NULL) level->nodes = policy_node_cmp_new(); if (level->nodes == NULL) goto node_error; if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node)) goto node_error; } } if (tree) { if (tree->extra_data == NULL) tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null(); if (tree->extra_data == NULL) goto node_error; if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(tree->extra_data, data)) goto node_error; } if (parent) parent->nchild++; return node; node_error: policy_node_free(node); return NULL; } void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) { OPENSSL_free(node); } /* * See if a policy node matches a policy OID. If mapping enabled look through * expected policy set otherwise just valid policy. */ int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid) { int i; ASN1_OBJECT *policy_oid; const X509_POLICY_DATA *x = node->data; if ((lvl->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) || !(x->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) { if (!OBJ_cmp(x->valid_policy, oid)) return 1; return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(x->expected_policy_set); i++) { policy_oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(x->expected_policy_set, i); if (!OBJ_cmp(policy_oid, oid)) return 1; } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_conf.c0000644000000000000000000003562213176625660016064 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* extension creation utilities */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include static int v3_check_critical(const char **value); static int v3_check_generic(const char **value); static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid, int crit, const char *value); static X509_EXTENSION *v3_generic_extension(const char *ext, const char *value, int crit, int type, X509V3_CTX *ctx); static char *conf_lhash_get_string(void *db, const char *section, const char *value); static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf_lhash_get_section(void *db, const char *section); static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_i2d(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc); static unsigned char *generic_asn1(const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx, long *ext_len); /* CONF *conf: Config file */ /* char *name: Name */ /* char *value: Value */ X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *value) { int crit; int ext_type; X509_EXTENSION *ret; crit = v3_check_critical(&value); if ((ext_type = v3_check_generic(&value))) return v3_generic_extension(name, value, crit, ext_type, ctx); ret = do_ext_nconf(conf, ctx, OBJ_sn2nid(name), crit, value); if (!ret) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_ERROR_IN_EXTENSION); ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", name, ", value=", value); } return ret; } /* CONF *conf: Config file */ /* char *value: Value */ X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid, const char *value) { int crit; int ext_type; crit = v3_check_critical(&value); if ((ext_type = v3_check_generic(&value))) return v3_generic_extension(OBJ_nid2sn(ext_nid), value, crit, ext_type, ctx); return do_ext_nconf(conf, ctx, ext_nid, crit, value); } /* CONF *conf: Config file */ /* char *value: Value */ static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid, int crit, const char *value) { const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method; X509_EXTENSION *ext; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval; void *ext_struc; if (ext_nid == NID_undef) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION_NAME); return NULL; } if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get_nid(ext_nid)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION); return NULL; } /* Now get internal extension representation based on type */ if (method->v2i) { if (*value == '@') nval = NCONF_get_section(conf, value + 1); else nval = X509V3_parse_list(value); if (nval == NULL || sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval) <= 0) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_INVALID_EXTENSION_STRING); ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", OBJ_nid2sn(ext_nid), ",section=", value); if (*value != '@') sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free); return NULL; } ext_struc = method->v2i(method, ctx, nval); if (*value != '@') sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free); if (!ext_struc) return NULL; } else if (method->s2i) { if ((ext_struc = method->s2i(method, ctx, value)) == NULL) return NULL; } else if (method->r2i) { if (!ctx->db || !ctx->db_meth) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_NO_CONFIG_DATABASE); return NULL; } if ((ext_struc = method->r2i(method, ctx, value)) == NULL) return NULL; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_SETTING_NOT_SUPPORTED); ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", OBJ_nid2sn(ext_nid)); return NULL; } ext = do_ext_i2d(method, ext_nid, crit, ext_struc); if (method->it) ASN1_item_free(ext_struc, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it)); else method->ext_free(ext_struc); return ext; } static X509_EXTENSION *do_ext_i2d(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc) { unsigned char *ext_der = NULL; int ext_len; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ext_oct = NULL; X509_EXTENSION *ext; /* Convert internal representation to DER */ if (method->it) { ext_der = NULL; ext_len = ASN1_item_i2d(ext_struc, &ext_der, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(method->it)); if (ext_len < 0) goto merr; } else { unsigned char *p; ext_len = method->i2d(ext_struc, NULL); if ((ext_der = OPENSSL_malloc(ext_len)) == NULL) goto merr; p = ext_der; method->i2d(ext_struc, &p); } if ((ext_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto merr; ext_oct->data = ext_der; ext_der = NULL; ext_oct->length = ext_len; ext = X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(NULL, ext_nid, crit, ext_oct); if (!ext) goto merr; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ext_oct); return ext; merr: X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_EXT_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ext_der); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ext_oct); return NULL; } /* Given an internal structure, nid and critical flag create an extension */ X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_i2d(int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc) { const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method; if ((method = X509V3_EXT_get_nid(ext_nid)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_I2D, X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION); return NULL; } return do_ext_i2d(method, ext_nid, crit, ext_struc); } /* Check the extension string for critical flag */ static int v3_check_critical(const char **value) { const char *p = *value; if ((strlen(p) < 9) || strncmp(p, "critical,", 9)) return 0; p += 9; while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++; *value = p; return 1; } /* Check extension string for generic extension and return the type */ static int v3_check_generic(const char **value) { int gen_type = 0; const char *p = *value; if ((strlen(p) >= 4) && strncmp(p, "DER:", 4) == 0) { p += 4; gen_type = 1; } else if ((strlen(p) >= 5) && strncmp(p, "ASN1:", 5) == 0) { p += 5; gen_type = 2; } else return 0; while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++; *value = p; return gen_type; } /* Create a generic extension: for now just handle DER type */ static X509_EXTENSION *v3_generic_extension(const char *ext, const char *value, int crit, int gen_type, X509V3_CTX *ctx) { unsigned char *ext_der = NULL; long ext_len = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *obj = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL; X509_EXTENSION *extension = NULL; if ((obj = OBJ_txt2obj(ext, 0)) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", ext); goto err; } if (gen_type == 1) ext_der = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &ext_len); else if (gen_type == 2) ext_der = generic_asn1(value, ctx, &ext_len); if (ext_der == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "value=", value); goto err; } if ((oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } oct->data = ext_der; oct->length = ext_len; ext_der = NULL; extension = X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(NULL, obj, crit, oct); err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct); OPENSSL_free(ext_der); return extension; } static unsigned char *generic_asn1(const char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx, long *ext_len) { ASN1_TYPE *typ; unsigned char *ext_der = NULL; typ = ASN1_generate_v3(value, ctx); if (typ == NULL) return NULL; *ext_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(typ, &ext_der); ASN1_TYPE_free(typ); return ext_der; } static void delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, X509_EXTENSION *dext) { int idx; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(dext); while ((idx = X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(sk, obj, -1)) >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *tmpext = X509v3_get_ext(sk, idx); X509v3_delete_ext(sk, idx); X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext); } } /* * This is the main function: add a bunch of extensions based on a config * file section to an extension STACK. */ int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk) { X509_EXTENSION *ext; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval; CONF_VALUE *val; int i; if ((nval = NCONF_get_section(conf, section)) == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if ((ext = X509V3_EXT_nconf(conf, ctx, val->name, val->value)) == NULL) return 0; if (ctx->flags == X509V3_CTX_REPLACE) delete_ext(*sk, ext); if (sk) X509v3_add_ext(sk, ext, -1); X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); } return 1; } /* * Convenience functions to add extensions to a certificate, CRL and request */ int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509 *cert) { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk = NULL; if (cert) sk = &cert->cert_info.extensions; return X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, ctx, section, sk); } /* Same as above but for a CRL */ int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_CRL *crl) { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk = NULL; if (crl) sk = &crl->crl.extensions; return X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, ctx, section, sk); } /* Add extensions to certificate request */ int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_REQ *req) { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extlist = NULL, **sk = NULL; int i; if (req) sk = &extlist; i = X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(conf, ctx, section, sk); if (!i || !sk) return i; i = X509_REQ_add_extensions(req, extlist); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(extlist, X509_EXTENSION_free); return i; } /* Config database functions */ char *X509V3_get_string(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *section) { if (!ctx->db || !ctx->db_meth || !ctx->db_meth->get_string) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_STRING, X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED); return NULL; } if (ctx->db_meth->get_string) return ctx->db_meth->get_string(ctx->db, name, section); return NULL; } STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_get_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section) { if (!ctx->db || !ctx->db_meth || !ctx->db_meth->get_section) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_SECTION, X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED); return NULL; } if (ctx->db_meth->get_section) return ctx->db_meth->get_section(ctx->db, section); return NULL; } void X509V3_string_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str) { if (!str) return; if (ctx->db_meth->free_string) ctx->db_meth->free_string(ctx->db, str); } void X509V3_section_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section) { if (!section) return; if (ctx->db_meth->free_section) ctx->db_meth->free_section(ctx->db, section); } static char *nconf_get_string(void *db, const char *section, const char *value) { return NCONF_get_string(db, section, value); } static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nconf_get_section(void *db, const char *section) { return NCONF_get_section(db, section); } static X509V3_CONF_METHOD nconf_method = { nconf_get_string, nconf_get_section, NULL, NULL }; void X509V3_set_nconf(X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF *conf) { ctx->db_meth = &nconf_method; ctx->db = conf; } void X509V3_set_ctx(X509V3_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer, X509 *subj, X509_REQ *req, X509_CRL *crl, int flags) { ctx->issuer_cert = issuer; ctx->subject_cert = subj; ctx->crl = crl; ctx->subject_req = req; ctx->flags = flags; } /* Old conf compatibility functions */ X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *value) { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return X509V3_EXT_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, name, value); } /* LHASH *conf: Config file */ /* char *value: Value */ X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid, const char *value) { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid(&ctmp, ctx, ext_nid, value); } static char *conf_lhash_get_string(void *db, const char *section, const char *value) { return CONF_get_string(db, section, value); } static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf_lhash_get_section(void *db, const char *section) { return CONF_get_section(db, section); } static X509V3_CONF_METHOD conf_lhash_method = { conf_lhash_get_string, conf_lhash_get_section, NULL, NULL }; void X509V3_set_conf_lhash(X509V3_CTX *ctx, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *lhash) { ctx->db_meth = &conf_lhash_method; ctx->db = lhash; } int X509V3_EXT_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509 *cert) { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, section, cert); } /* Same as above but for a CRL */ int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_CRL *crl) { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, section, crl); } /* Add extensions to certificate request */ int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_REQ *req) { CONF ctmp; CONF_set_nconf(&ctmp, conf); return X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(&ctmp, ctx, section, req); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_akeya.c0000644000000000000000000000145613176625660016227 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include ASN1_SEQUENCE(AUTHORITY_KEYID) = { ASN1_IMP_OPT(AUTHORITY_KEYID, keyid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(AUTHORITY_KEYID, issuer, GENERAL_NAME, 1), ASN1_IMP_OPT(AUTHORITY_KEYID, serial, ASN1_INTEGER, 2) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(AUTHORITY_KEYID) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_KEYID) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c0000644000000000000000000005340213176625660016335 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "pcy_int.h" /* * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during * evaluation. */ /* * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG */ #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) { if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n"); else { int i; STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; ASN1_OBJECT *oid; BIO_puts(err, " Expected: "); for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); if (i) BIO_puts(err, ", "); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); } BIO_puts(err, "\n"); } } static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) { BIO *err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; if (err == NULL) return; if (!curr) curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; else curr++; BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str); BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels); for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { int i; BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", (long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags); } if (plev->anyPolicy) X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); } BIO_free(err); } #endif /*- * Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask: * * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case) * X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required */ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags) { X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */ int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1; int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1; int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1; int i; *ptree = NULL; /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ if (n == 0) return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; /* * First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be * used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all * certificates with invalid policy extensions. */ for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); /* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */ if (policy_cache_set(x) == NULL) return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; } /* * At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy. * Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the * requirement kicking in if and once it does that. The counter is * decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may * be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate. * * The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along * the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit * policy is required we're done. */ for (i = n - 1; i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0); i--) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); /* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */ if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID; /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ cache = policy_cache_set(x); if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL) ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; if (explicit_policy > 0) { if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) explicit_policy--; if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0) && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; } } if (explicit_policy == 0) ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT; if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0) return ret; /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL) return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; /* * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. * * The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected * policies of anyPolicy. (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at * depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n). */ if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(tree); return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; } tree->nlevel = n+1; level = tree->levels; if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) goto bad_tree; if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { policy_data_free(data); goto bad_tree; } /* * In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and * policy mapping are inhibited at each level. */ for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ cache = policy_cache_set(x); X509_up_ref(x); (++level)->cert = x; if (!cache->anyPolicy) level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ if (any_skip == 0) { /* * Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not * the last in the chain. */ if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; } else { if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) any_skip--; if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) any_skip = cache->any_skip; } if (map_skip == 0) level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; else { if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) map_skip--; if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) map_skip = cache->map_skip; } } *ptree = tree; return ret; bad_tree: X509_policy_tree_free(tree); return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; } /* * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise */ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, X509_POLICY_DATA *data) { X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; int i, matched = 0; /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) return 0; matched = 1; } } if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) return 0; } return 1; } /* * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. * * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) return 0; } return 1; } /* * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. * * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, const ASN1_OBJECT *id, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { X509_POLICY_DATA *data; if (id == NULL) id = node->data->valid_policy; /* * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched * node. */ if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL) return 0; /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { policy_data_free(data); return 0; } return 1; } /* * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; int i; if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ if (node->nchild) return 1; if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) return 0; /* Add it */ } else { /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) return 1; /* Locate unmatched nodes */ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) continue; if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) return 0; } } return 1; } /* * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise */ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { int i; X509_POLICY_NODE *node; X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) return 0; } /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ if (last->anyPolicy && level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) return 0; return 1; } /*- * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then * proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no * data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. * * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: * * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree */ static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) { STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int i; nodes = curr->nodes; if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */ if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { node->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(node); (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); } } } for (;;) { --curr; nodes = curr->nodes; for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); if (node->nchild == 0) { node->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(node); (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); } } if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); curr->anyPolicy = NULL; } if (curr == tree->levels) { /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ if (!curr->anyPolicy) return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; break; } } return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; } /* * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) { if (*pnodes == NULL && (*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL) return 0; if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1) return 1; return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0; } #define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0 #define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1 #define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2 /*- * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is * used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set. * If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the * authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of * valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. * * Return value: * TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure, * TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed, * TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed */ static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) { X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; int i, j; curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ if (curr->anyPolicy) { if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; addnodes = pnodes; } else /* Add policies to authority set */ addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; curr = tree->levels; for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { /* * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower * levels so end search. */ if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL) break; curr++; for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); if ((node->parent == anyptr) && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) { if (addnodes == pnodes) { sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes); *pnodes = NULL; } return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; } } } if (addnodes == pnodes) return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE; *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE; } /* * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) { int i; X509_POLICY_NODE *node; ASN1_OBJECT *oid; X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; X509_POLICY_DATA *extra; /* * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this * will happen if it is a leaf node. */ if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) return 1; anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; return 1; } } for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); if (!node) { if (!anyPolicy) continue; /* * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers * from anyPolicy. */ extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); if (extra == NULL) return 0; extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); } if (!tree->user_policies) { tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); if (!tree->user_policies) return 1; } if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) return 0; } return 1; } /*- * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree * (see tree_prune()). */ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { int ret, i; X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr); #endif ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) return ret; } return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; } static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) { if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) OPENSSL_free(node); } void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; int i; if (!tree) return; sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { X509_free(curr->cert); sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); } sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); OPENSSL_free(tree); } /*- * Application policy checking function. * Return codes: * X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE: Failure to satisfy explicit policy * X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID: Inconsistent or invalid extensions * X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: Success (null tree if empty or bare TA) */ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) { int init_ret; int ret; int calc_ret; X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; *ptree = NULL; *pexplicit_policy = 0; init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); if (init_ret <= 0) return init_ret; if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) { if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { X509_policy_tree_free(tree); return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; } } else { *pexplicit_policy = 1; /* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */ if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; } ret = tree_evaluate(tree); #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL); #endif if (ret <= 0) goto error; if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { X509_policy_tree_free(tree); if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; } /* Tree is not empty: continue */ if ((calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0) goto error; ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); if (calc_ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE) sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); if (!ret) goto error; *ptree = tree; if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) { nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; } return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; error: X509_policy_tree_free(tree); return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_int.c0000644000000000000000000000221513176625660015721 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "ext_dat.h" const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_num = { NID_crl_number, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER), 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_INTEGER, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_delta_crl = { NID_delta_crl, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER), 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_INTEGER, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }; static void *s2i_asn1_int(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *value) { return s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(meth, value); } const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_inhibit_anyp = { NID_inhibit_any_policy, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER), 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_INTEGER, (X509V3_EXT_S2I)s2i_asn1_int, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c0000644000000000000000000003624213176625660016062 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "ext_dat.h" static void *v2i_crld(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); static int i2r_crldp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pcrldp, BIO *out, int indent); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crld = { NID_crl_distribution_points, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CRL_DIST_POINTS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, v2i_crld, i2r_crldp, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_freshest_crl = { NID_freshest_crl, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CRL_DIST_POINTS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, v2i_crld, i2r_crldp, 0, NULL }; static STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gnames_from_sectname(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *sect) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *gnsect; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens; if (*sect == '@') gnsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, sect + 1); else gnsect = X509V3_parse_list(sect); if (!gnsect) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_GNAMES_FROM_SECTNAME, X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); return NULL; } gens = v2i_GENERAL_NAMES(NULL, ctx, gnsect); if (*sect == '@') X509V3_section_free(ctx, gnsect); else sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(gnsect, X509V3_conf_free); return gens; } static int set_dist_point_name(DIST_POINT_NAME **pdp, X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf) { STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *fnm = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *rnm = NULL; if (strncmp(cnf->name, "fullname", 9) == 0) { fnm = gnames_from_sectname(ctx, cnf->value); if (!fnm) goto err; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "relativename") == 0) { int ret; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dnsect; X509_NAME *nm; nm = X509_NAME_new(); if (nm == NULL) return -1; dnsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->value); if (!dnsect) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME, X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); return -1; } ret = X509V3_NAME_from_section(nm, dnsect, MBSTRING_ASC); X509V3_section_free(ctx, dnsect); rnm = nm->entries; nm->entries = NULL; X509_NAME_free(nm); if (!ret || sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(rnm) <= 0) goto err; /* * Since its a name fragment can't have more than one RDNSequence */ if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(rnm, sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(rnm) - 1)->set) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME, X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS); goto err; } } else return 0; if (*pdp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME, X509V3_R_DISTPOINT_ALREADY_SET); goto err; } *pdp = DIST_POINT_NAME_new(); if (*pdp == NULL) goto err; if (fnm) { (*pdp)->type = 0; (*pdp)->name.fullname = fnm; } else { (*pdp)->type = 1; (*pdp)->name.relativename = rnm; } return 1; err: sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(fnm, GENERAL_NAME_free); sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(rnm, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); return -1; } static const BIT_STRING_BITNAME reason_flags[] = { {0, "Unused", "unused"}, {1, "Key Compromise", "keyCompromise"}, {2, "CA Compromise", "CACompromise"}, {3, "Affiliation Changed", "affiliationChanged"}, {4, "Superseded", "superseded"}, {5, "Cessation Of Operation", "cessationOfOperation"}, {6, "Certificate Hold", "certificateHold"}, {7, "Privilege Withdrawn", "privilegeWithdrawn"}, {8, "AA Compromise", "AACompromise"}, {-1, NULL, NULL} }; static int set_reasons(ASN1_BIT_STRING **preas, char *value) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *rsk = NULL; const BIT_STRING_BITNAME *pbn; const char *bnam; int i, ret = 0; rsk = X509V3_parse_list(value); if (rsk == NULL) return 0; if (*preas != NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(rsk); i++) { bnam = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(rsk, i)->name; if (*preas == NULL) { *preas = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new(); if (*preas == NULL) goto err; } for (pbn = reason_flags; pbn->lname; pbn++) { if (strcmp(pbn->sname, bnam) == 0) { if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(*preas, pbn->bitnum, 1)) goto err; break; } } if (!pbn->lname) goto err; } ret = 1; err: sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(rsk, X509V3_conf_free); return ret; } static int print_reasons(BIO *out, const char *rname, ASN1_BIT_STRING *rflags, int indent) { int first = 1; const BIT_STRING_BITNAME *pbn; BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s:\n%*s", indent, "", rname, indent + 2, ""); for (pbn = reason_flags; pbn->lname; pbn++) { if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(rflags, pbn->bitnum)) { if (first) first = 0; else BIO_puts(out, ", "); BIO_puts(out, pbn->lname); } } if (first) BIO_puts(out, "\n"); else BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } static DIST_POINT *crldp_from_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { int i; CONF_VALUE *cnf; DIST_POINT *point = NULL; point = DIST_POINT_new(); if (point == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { int ret; cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); ret = set_dist_point_name(&point->distpoint, ctx, cnf); if (ret > 0) continue; if (ret < 0) goto err; if (strcmp(cnf->name, "reasons") == 0) { if (!set_reasons(&point->reasons, cnf->value)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "CRLissuer") == 0) { point->CRLissuer = gnames_from_sectname(ctx, cnf->value); if (!point->CRLissuer) goto err; } } return point; err: DIST_POINT_free(point); return NULL; } static void *v2i_crld(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crld = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i; if ((crld = sk_DIST_POINT_new_null()) == NULL) goto merr; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { DIST_POINT *point; cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (!cnf->value) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dpsect; dpsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->name); if (!dpsect) goto err; point = crldp_from_section(ctx, dpsect); X509V3_section_free(ctx, dpsect); if (!point) goto err; if (!sk_DIST_POINT_push(crld, point)) { DIST_POINT_free(point); goto merr; } } else { if ((gen = v2i_GENERAL_NAME(method, ctx, cnf)) == NULL) goto err; if ((gens = GENERAL_NAMES_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) goto merr; gen = NULL; if ((point = DIST_POINT_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if (!sk_DIST_POINT_push(crld, point)) { DIST_POINT_free(point); goto merr; } if ((point->distpoint = DIST_POINT_NAME_new()) == NULL) goto merr; point->distpoint->name.fullname = gens; point->distpoint->type = 0; gens = NULL; } } return crld; merr: X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_CRLD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: GENERAL_NAME_free(gen); GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crld, DIST_POINT_free); return NULL; } static int dpn_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn = (DIST_POINT_NAME *)*pval; switch (operation) { case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST: dpn->dpname = NULL; break; case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST: X509_NAME_free(dpn->dpname); break; } return 1; } ASN1_CHOICE_cb(DIST_POINT_NAME, dpn_cb) = { ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF(DIST_POINT_NAME, name.fullname, GENERAL_NAME, 0), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF(DIST_POINT_NAME, name.relativename, X509_NAME_ENTRY, 1) } ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(DIST_POINT_NAME, DIST_POINT_NAME, type) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT_NAME) ASN1_SEQUENCE(DIST_POINT) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(DIST_POINT, distpoint, DIST_POINT_NAME, 0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(DIST_POINT, reasons, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(DIST_POINT, CRLissuer, GENERAL_NAME, 2) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(DIST_POINT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CRL_DIST_POINTS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, CRLDistributionPoints, DIST_POINT) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CRL_DIST_POINTS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CRL_DIST_POINTS) ASN1_SEQUENCE(ISSUING_DIST_POINT) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, distpoint, DIST_POINT_NAME, 0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlyuser, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 1), ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlyCA, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 2), ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlysomereasons, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 3), ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, indirectCRL, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 4), ASN1_IMP_OPT(ISSUING_DIST_POINT, onlyattr, ASN1_FBOOLEAN, 5) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ISSUING_DIST_POINT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ISSUING_DIST_POINT) static int i2r_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pidp, BIO *out, int indent); static void *v2i_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_idp = { NID_issuing_distribution_point, X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ISSUING_DIST_POINT), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, v2i_idp, i2r_idp, 0, NULL }; static void *v2i_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf; char *name, *val; int i, ret; idp = ISSUING_DIST_POINT_new(); if (idp == NULL) goto merr; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); name = cnf->name; val = cnf->value; ret = set_dist_point_name(&idp->distpoint, ctx, cnf); if (ret > 0) continue; if (ret < 0) goto err; if (strcmp(name, "onlyuser") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->onlyuser)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(name, "onlyCA") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->onlyCA)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(name, "onlyAA") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->onlyattr)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(name, "indirectCRL") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(cnf, &idp->indirectCRL)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(name, "onlysomereasons") == 0) { if (!set_reasons(&idp->onlysomereasons, val)) goto err; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IDP, X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME); X509V3_conf_err(cnf); goto err; } } return idp; merr: X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_IDP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(idp); return NULL; } static int print_gens(BIO *out, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens, int indent) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent + 2, ""); GENERAL_NAME_print(out, sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i)); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } return 1; } static int print_distpoint(BIO *out, DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn, int indent) { if (dpn->type == 0) { BIO_printf(out, "%*sFull Name:\n", indent, ""); print_gens(out, dpn->name.fullname, indent); } else { X509_NAME ntmp; ntmp.entries = dpn->name.relativename; BIO_printf(out, "%*sRelative Name:\n%*s", indent, "", indent + 2, ""); X509_NAME_print_ex(out, &ntmp, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } return 1; } static int i2r_idp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pidp, BIO *out, int indent) { ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp = pidp; if (idp->distpoint) print_distpoint(out, idp->distpoint, indent); if (idp->onlyuser > 0) BIO_printf(out, "%*sOnly User Certificates\n", indent, ""); if (idp->onlyCA > 0) BIO_printf(out, "%*sOnly CA Certificates\n", indent, ""); if (idp->indirectCRL > 0) BIO_printf(out, "%*sIndirect CRL\n", indent, ""); if (idp->onlysomereasons) print_reasons(out, "Only Some Reasons", idp->onlysomereasons, indent); if (idp->onlyattr > 0) BIO_printf(out, "%*sOnly Attribute Certificates\n", indent, ""); if (!idp->distpoint && (idp->onlyuser <= 0) && (idp->onlyCA <= 0) && (idp->indirectCRL <= 0) && !idp->onlysomereasons && (idp->onlyattr <= 0)) BIO_printf(out, "%*s\n", indent, ""); return 1; } static int i2r_crldp(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *pcrldp, BIO *out, int indent) { STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crld = pcrldp; DIST_POINT *point; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(crld); i++) { BIO_puts(out, "\n"); point = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crld, i); if (point->distpoint) print_distpoint(out, point->distpoint, indent); if (point->reasons) print_reasons(out, "Reasons", point->reasons, indent); if (point->CRLissuer) { BIO_printf(out, "%*sCRL Issuer:\n", indent, ""); print_gens(out, point->CRLissuer, indent); } } return 1; } int DIST_POINT_set_dpname(DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn, X509_NAME *iname) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *frag; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; if (!dpn || (dpn->type != 1)) return 1; frag = dpn->name.relativename; dpn->dpname = X509_NAME_dup(iname); if (!dpn->dpname) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(frag); i++) { ne = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(frag, i); if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(dpn->dpname, ne, -1, i ? 0 : 1)) { X509_NAME_free(dpn->dpname); dpn->dpname = NULL; return 0; } } /* generate cached encoding of name */ if (i2d_X509_NAME(dpn->dpname, NULL) < 0) { X509_NAME_free(dpn->dpname); dpn->dpname = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c0000644000000000000000000000513013176625660016146 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "pcy_int.h" /* * Set policy mapping entries in cache. Note: this modifies the passed * POLICY_MAPPINGS structure */ int policy_cache_set_mapping(X509 *x, POLICY_MAPPINGS *maps) { POLICY_MAPPING *map; X509_POLICY_DATA *data; X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache; int i; int ret = 0; if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(maps) == 0) { ret = -1; goto bad_mapping; } for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(maps); i++) { map = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(maps, i); /* Reject if map to or from anyPolicy */ if ((OBJ_obj2nid(map->subjectDomainPolicy) == NID_any_policy) || (OBJ_obj2nid(map->issuerDomainPolicy) == NID_any_policy)) { ret = -1; goto bad_mapping; } /* Attempt to find matching policy data */ data = policy_cache_find_data(cache, map->issuerDomainPolicy); /* If we don't have anyPolicy can't map */ if (data == NULL && !cache->anyPolicy) continue; /* Create a NODE from anyPolicy */ if (data == NULL) { data = policy_data_new(NULL, map->issuerDomainPolicy, cache->anyPolicy->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_CRITICAL); if (data == NULL) goto bad_mapping; data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; /* * map->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL; */ data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY; data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(cache->data, data)) { policy_data_free(data); goto bad_mapping; } } else data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED; if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(data->expected_policy_set, map->subjectDomainPolicy)) goto bad_mapping; map->subjectDomainPolicy = NULL; } ret = 1; bad_mapping: if (ret == -1) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY; sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(maps, POLICY_MAPPING_free); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_tlsf.c0000644000000000000000000001040713176625660016101 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/o_str.h" #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, TLS_FEATURE *tls_feature, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ext_list); static TLS_FEATURE *v2i_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(TLS_FEATURE) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, TLS_FEATURE, ASN1_INTEGER) static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(TLS_FEATURE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(TLS_FEATURE) const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_tls_feature = { NID_tlsfeature, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(TLS_FEATURE), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V)i2v_TLS_FEATURE, (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_TLS_FEATURE, 0, 0, NULL }; typedef struct { long num; const char *name; } TLS_FEATURE_NAME; static TLS_FEATURE_NAME tls_feature_tbl[] = { { 5, "status_request" }, { 17, "status_request_v2" } }; /* * i2v_TLS_FEATURE converts the TLS_FEATURE structure tls_feature into the * STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) structure ext_list. STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) is the format * used by the CONF library to represent a multi-valued extension. ext_list is * returned. */ static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, TLS_FEATURE *tls_feature, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ext_list) { int i; size_t j; ASN1_INTEGER *ai; long tlsextid; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(tls_feature); i++) { ai = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(tls_feature, i); tlsextid = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ai); for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl); j++) if (tlsextid == tls_feature_tbl[j].num) break; if (j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl)) X509V3_add_value(NULL, tls_feature_tbl[j].name, &ext_list); else X509V3_add_value_int(NULL, ai, &ext_list); } return ext_list; } /* * v2i_TLS_FEATURE converts the multi-valued extension nval into a TLS_FEATURE * structure, which is returned if the conversion is successful. In case of * error, NULL is returned. */ static TLS_FEATURE *v2i_TLS_FEATURE(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { TLS_FEATURE *tlsf; char *extval, *endptr; ASN1_INTEGER *ai; CONF_VALUE *val; int i; size_t j; long tlsextid; if ((tlsf = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_new_null()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (val->value) extval = val->value; else extval = val->name; for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl); j++) if (strcasecmp(extval, tls_feature_tbl[j].name) == 0) break; if (j < OSSL_NELEM(tls_feature_tbl)) tlsextid = tls_feature_tbl[j].num; else { tlsextid = strtol(extval, &endptr, 10); if (((*endptr) != '\0') || (extval == endptr) || (tlsextid < 0) || (tlsextid > 65535)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } } ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (ai == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ASN1_INTEGER_set(ai, tlsextid); sk_ASN1_INTEGER_push(tlsf, ai); } return tlsf; err: sk_ASN1_INTEGER_pop_free(tlsf, ASN1_INTEGER_free); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/pcy_cache.c0000644000000000000000000001371313176625660016442 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "pcy_int.h" static int policy_data_cmp(const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *a, const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *b); static int policy_cache_set_int(long *out, ASN1_INTEGER *value); /* * Set cache entry according to CertificatePolicies extension. Note: this * destroys the passed CERTIFICATEPOLICIES structure. */ static int policy_cache_create(X509 *x, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies, int crit) { int i; int ret = 0; X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache; X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; POLICYINFO *policy; if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) goto bad_policy; cache->data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new(policy_data_cmp); if (cache->data == NULL) goto bad_policy; for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) { policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i); data = policy_data_new(policy, NULL, crit); if (data == NULL) goto bad_policy; /* * Duplicate policy OIDs are illegal: reject if matches found. */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { if (cache->anyPolicy) { ret = -1; goto bad_policy; } cache->anyPolicy = data; } else if (sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_find(cache->data, data) != -1) { ret = -1; goto bad_policy; } else if (!sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_push(cache->data, data)) goto bad_policy; data = NULL; } ret = 1; bad_policy: if (ret == -1) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY; policy_data_free(data); sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(policies, POLICYINFO_free); if (ret <= 0) { sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(cache->data, policy_data_free); cache->data = NULL; } return ret; } static int policy_cache_new(X509 *x) { X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; ASN1_INTEGER *ext_any = NULL; POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *ext_pcons = NULL; CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *ext_cpols = NULL; POLICY_MAPPINGS *ext_pmaps = NULL; int i; if (x->policy_cache != NULL) return 1; cache = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*cache)); if (cache == NULL) return 0; cache->anyPolicy = NULL; cache->data = NULL; cache->any_skip = -1; cache->explicit_skip = -1; cache->map_skip = -1; x->policy_cache = cache; /* * Handle requireExplicitPolicy *first*. Need to process this even if we * don't have any policies. */ ext_pcons = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_policy_constraints, &i, NULL); if (!ext_pcons) { if (i != -1) goto bad_cache; } else { if (!ext_pcons->requireExplicitPolicy && !ext_pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping) goto bad_cache; if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->explicit_skip, ext_pcons->requireExplicitPolicy)) goto bad_cache; if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->map_skip, ext_pcons->inhibitPolicyMapping)) goto bad_cache; } /* Process CertificatePolicies */ ext_cpols = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_certificate_policies, &i, NULL); /* * If no CertificatePolicies extension or problem decoding then there is * no point continuing because the valid policies will be NULL. */ if (!ext_cpols) { /* If not absent some problem with extension */ if (i != -1) goto bad_cache; return 1; } i = policy_cache_create(x, ext_cpols, i); /* NB: ext_cpols freed by policy_cache_set_policies */ if (i <= 0) return i; ext_pmaps = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_policy_mappings, &i, NULL); if (!ext_pmaps) { /* If not absent some problem with extension */ if (i != -1) goto bad_cache; } else { i = policy_cache_set_mapping(x, ext_pmaps); if (i <= 0) goto bad_cache; } ext_any = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_inhibit_any_policy, &i, NULL); if (!ext_any) { if (i != -1) goto bad_cache; } else if (!policy_cache_set_int(&cache->any_skip, ext_any)) goto bad_cache; goto just_cleanup; bad_cache: x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY; just_cleanup: POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(ext_pcons); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ext_any); return 1; } void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) { if (!cache) return; policy_data_free(cache->anyPolicy); sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(cache->data, policy_data_free); OPENSSL_free(cache); } const X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache_set(X509 *x) { if (x->policy_cache == NULL) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock); policy_cache_new(x); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); } return x->policy_cache; } X509_POLICY_DATA *policy_cache_find_data(const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, const ASN1_OBJECT *id) { int idx; X509_POLICY_DATA tmp; tmp.valid_policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)id; idx = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_find(cache->data, &tmp); if (idx == -1) return NULL; return sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, idx); } static int policy_data_cmp(const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *a, const X509_POLICY_DATA *const *b) { return OBJ_cmp((*a)->valid_policy, (*b)->valid_policy); } static int policy_cache_set_int(long *out, ASN1_INTEGER *value) { if (value == NULL) return 1; if (value->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) return 0; *out = ASN1_INTEGER_get(value); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x509v3/v3_bcons.c0000644000000000000000000000566213176625660016244 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ext_dat.h" static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bcons, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); static BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_bcons = { NID_basic_constraints, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (X509V3_EXT_I2V) i2v_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, NULL, NULL, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) = { ASN1_OPT(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, ca, ASN1_FBOOLEAN), ASN1_OPT(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, pathlen, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) static STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bcons, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist) { X509V3_add_value_bool("CA", bcons->ca, &extlist); X509V3_add_value_int("pathlen", bcons->pathlen, &extlist); return extlist; } static BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *v2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values) { BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bcons = NULL; CONF_VALUE *val; int i; if ((bcons = BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new()) == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i); if (strcmp(val->name, "CA") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(val, &bcons->ca)) goto err; } else if (strcmp(val->name, "pathlen") == 0) { if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, &bcons->pathlen)) goto err; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME); X509V3_conf_err(val); goto err; } } return bcons; err: BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bcons); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014074 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/build.info0000644000000000000000000000040413176625657016046 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ rc5_skey.c rc5_ecb.c {- $target{rc5_asm_src} -} rc5cfb64.c rc5ofb64.c GENERATE[rc5-586.s]=asm/rc5-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) DEPEND[rc5-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/rc5_enc.c0000644000000000000000000001021713176625657015557 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "rc5_locl.h" void RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC5_32_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int encrypt) { register unsigned long tin0, tin1; register unsigned long tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register long l = length; unsigned long tin[2]; if (encrypt) { c2l(iv, tout0); c2l(iv, tout1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; RC5_32_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; RC5_32_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout1, out); } l2c(tout0, iv); l2c(tout1, iv); } else { c2l(iv, xor0); c2l(iv, xor1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; RC5_32_decrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; RC5_32_decrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } l2c(xor0, iv); l2c(xor1, iv); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } void RC5_32_encrypt(unsigned long *d, RC5_32_KEY *key) { RC5_32_INT a, b, *s; s = key->data; a = d[0] + s[0]; b = d[1] + s[1]; E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 2); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 4); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 6); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 8); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 10); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 12); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 14); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 16); if (key->rounds == 12) { E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24); } else if (key->rounds == 16) { /* Do a full expansion to avoid a jump */ E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 26); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 28); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 30); E_RC5_32(a, b, s, 32); } d[0] = a; d[1] = b; } void RC5_32_decrypt(unsigned long *d, RC5_32_KEY *key) { RC5_32_INT a, b, *s; s = key->data; a = d[0]; b = d[1]; if (key->rounds == 16) { D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 32); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 30); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 28); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 26); /* Do a full expansion to avoid a jump */ D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18); } else if (key->rounds == 12) { D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 24); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 22); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 20); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 18); } D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 16); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 14); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 12); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 10); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 8); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 6); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 4); D_RC5_32(a, b, s, 2); d[0] = a - s[0]; d[1] = b - s[1]; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/rc5_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000144113176625657015542 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc5_locl.h" #include void RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, RC5_32_KEY *ks, int encrypt) { unsigned long l, d[2]; c2l(in, l); d[0] = l; c2l(in, l); d[1] = l; if (encrypt) RC5_32_encrypt(d, ks); else RC5_32_decrypt(d, ks); l = d[0]; l2c(l, out); l = d[1]; l2c(l, out); l = d[0] = d[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/rc5cfb64.c0000644000000000000000000000423213176625657015557 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc5_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void RC5_32_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int encrypt) { register unsigned long v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned long ti[2]; unsigned char *iv, c, cc; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; if (encrypt) { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; c2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; RC5_32_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2c(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2c(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } c = *(in++) ^ iv[n]; *(out++) = c; iv[n] = c; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } else { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; c2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; RC5_32_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2c(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2c(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } cc = *(in++); c = iv[n]; iv[n] = cc; *(out++) = c ^ cc; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014654 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/asm/rc5-586.pl0000644000000000000000000000451313176625657016225 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; require "cbc.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"rc5-586.pl"); $RC5_MAX_ROUNDS=16; $RC5_32_OFF=($RC5_MAX_ROUNDS+2)*4; $A="edi"; $B="esi"; $S="ebp"; $tmp1="eax"; $r="ebx"; $tmpc="ecx"; $tmp4="edx"; &RC5_32_encrypt("RC5_32_encrypt",1); &RC5_32_encrypt("RC5_32_decrypt",0); &cbc("RC5_32_cbc_encrypt","RC5_32_encrypt","RC5_32_decrypt",0,4,5,3,-1,-1); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub RC5_32_encrypt { local($name,$enc)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,""); &comment(""); &push("ebp"); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &mov($tmp4,&wparam(0)); &mov($S,&wparam(1)); &comment("Load the 2 words"); &mov($A,&DWP(0,$tmp4,"",0)); &mov($B,&DWP(4,$tmp4,"",0)); &push($r); &mov($r, &DWP(0,$S,"",0)); # encrypting part if ($enc) { &add($A, &DWP(4+0,$S,"",0)); &add($B, &DWP(4+4,$S,"",0)); for ($i=0; $i<$RC5_MAX_ROUNDS; $i++) { &xor($A, $B); &mov($tmp1, &DWP(12+$i*8,$S,"",0)); &mov($tmpc, $B); &rotl($A, &LB("ecx")); &add($A, $tmp1); &xor($B, $A); &mov($tmp1, &DWP(16+$i*8,$S,"",0)); &mov($tmpc, $A); &rotl($B, &LB("ecx")); &add($B, $tmp1); if (($i == 7) || ($i == 11)) { &cmp($r, $i+1); &je(&label("rc5_exit")); } } } else { &cmp($r, 12); &je(&label("rc5_dec_12")); &cmp($r, 8); &je(&label("rc5_dec_8")); for ($i=$RC5_MAX_ROUNDS; $i > 0; $i--) { &set_label("rc5_dec_$i") if ($i == 12) || ($i == 8); &mov($tmp1, &DWP($i*8+8,$S,"",0)); &sub($B, $tmp1); &mov($tmpc, $A); &rotr($B, &LB("ecx")); &xor($B, $A); &mov($tmp1, &DWP($i*8+4,$S,"",0)); &sub($A, $tmp1); &mov($tmpc, $B); &rotr($A, &LB("ecx")); &xor($A, $B); } &sub($B, &DWP(4+4,$S,"",0)); &sub($A, &DWP(4+0,$S,"",0)); } &set_label("rc5_exit"); &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp4,"",0),$A); &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp4,"",0),$B); &pop("ebx"); &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &pop("ebp"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/rc5_skey.c0000644000000000000000000000303013176625657015760 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc5_locl.h" void RC5_32_set_key(RC5_32_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data, int rounds) { RC5_32_INT L[64], l, ll, A, B, *S, k; int i, j, m, c, t, ii, jj; if ((rounds != RC5_16_ROUNDS) && (rounds != RC5_12_ROUNDS) && (rounds != RC5_8_ROUNDS)) rounds = RC5_16_ROUNDS; key->rounds = rounds; S = &(key->data[0]); j = 0; for (i = 0; i <= (len - 8); i += 8) { c2l(data, l); L[j++] = l; c2l(data, l); L[j++] = l; } ii = len - i; if (ii) { k = len & 0x07; c2ln(data, l, ll, k); L[j + 0] = l; L[j + 1] = ll; } c = (len + 3) / 4; t = (rounds + 1) * 2; S[0] = RC5_32_P; for (i = 1; i < t; i++) S[i] = (S[i - 1] + RC5_32_Q) & RC5_32_MASK; j = (t > c) ? t : c; j *= 3; ii = jj = 0; A = B = 0; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { k = (S[ii] + A + B) & RC5_32_MASK; A = S[ii] = ROTATE_l32(k, 3); m = (int)(A + B); k = (L[jj] + A + B) & RC5_32_MASK; B = L[jj] = ROTATE_l32(k, m); if (++ii >= t) ii = 0; if (++jj >= c) jj = 0; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/rc5ofb64.c0000644000000000000000000000314313176625657015573 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc5_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void RC5_32_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num) { register unsigned long v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned char d[8]; register char *dp; unsigned long ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; int save = 0; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; dp = (char *)d; l2c(v0, dp); l2c(v1, dp); while (l--) { if (n == 0) { RC5_32_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); dp = (char *)d; t = ti[0]; l2c(t, dp); t = ti[1]; l2c(t, dp); save++; } *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n]; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } if (save) { v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); } t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc5/rc5_locl.h0000644000000000000000000002165413176625657015757 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #undef c2l #define c2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ #undef c2ln #define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } #undef l2c #define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ #undef l2cn #define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */ #define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */ #define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ } \ } #undef n2l #define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) #undef l2n #define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER)) # define ROTATE_l32(a,n) _lrotl(a,n) # define ROTATE_r32(a,n) _lrotr(a,n) #elif defined(__ICC) # define ROTATE_l32(a,n) _rotl(a,n) # define ROTATE_r32(a,n) _rotr(a,n) #elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(__STRICT_ANSI__) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) && !defined(PEDANTIC) # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # define ROTATE_l32(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ("roll %%cl,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "c"(n),"0"((unsigned int)(a)) \ : "cc"); \ ret; \ }) # define ROTATE_r32(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ("rorl %%cl,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "c"(n),"0"((unsigned int)(a)) \ : "cc"); \ ret; \ }) # endif #endif #ifndef ROTATE_l32 # define ROTATE_l32(a,n) (((a)<<(n&0x1f))|(((a)&0xffffffff)>>((32-n)&0x1f))) #endif #ifndef ROTATE_r32 # define ROTATE_r32(a,n) (((a)<<((32-n)&0x1f))|(((a)&0xffffffff)>>(n&0x1f))) #endif #define RC5_32_MASK 0xffffffffL #define RC5_16_P 0xB7E1 #define RC5_16_Q 0x9E37 #define RC5_32_P 0xB7E15163L #define RC5_32_Q 0x9E3779B9L #define RC5_64_P 0xB7E151628AED2A6BLL #define RC5_64_Q 0x9E3779B97F4A7C15LL #define E_RC5_32(a,b,s,n) \ a^=b; \ a=ROTATE_l32(a,b); \ a+=s[n]; \ a&=RC5_32_MASK; \ b^=a; \ b=ROTATE_l32(b,a); \ b+=s[n+1]; \ b&=RC5_32_MASK; #define D_RC5_32(a,b,s,n) \ b-=s[n+1]; \ b&=RC5_32_MASK; \ b=ROTATE_r32(b,a); \ b^=a; \ a-=s[n]; \ a&=RC5_32_MASK; \ a=ROTATE_r32(a,b); \ a^=b; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ia64cpuid.S0000644000000000000000000001453513176625657015327 0ustar rootroot// Copyright 2004-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. // // Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use // this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy // in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at // https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html // Works on all IA-64 platforms: Linux, HP-UX, Win64i... // On Win64i compile with ias.exe. .text #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) #define ADDP addp4 #else #define ADDP add #endif .global OPENSSL_cpuid_setup# .proc OPENSSL_cpuid_setup# OPENSSL_cpuid_setup: { .mib; br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp OPENSSL_cpuid_setup# .global OPENSSL_rdtsc# .proc OPENSSL_rdtsc# OPENSSL_rdtsc: { .mib; mov r8=ar.itc br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp OPENSSL_rdtsc# .global OPENSSL_atomic_add# .proc OPENSSL_atomic_add# .align 32 OPENSSL_atomic_add: { .mii; ld4 r2=[r32] nop.i 0 nop.i 0 };; .Lspin: { .mii; mov ar.ccv=r2 add r8=r2,r33 mov r3=r2 };; { .mmi; mf;; cmpxchg4.acq r2=[r32],r8,ar.ccv nop.i 0 };; { .mib; cmp.ne p6,p0=r2,r3 nop.i 0 (p6) br.dpnt .Lspin };; { .mib; nop.m 0 sxt4 r8=r8 br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp OPENSSL_atomic_add# // Returns a structure comprising pointer to the top of stack of // the caller and pointer beyond backing storage for the current // register frame. The latter is required, because it might be // insufficient to wipe backing storage for the current frame // (as this procedure does), one might have to go further, toward // higher addresses to reach for whole "retroactively" saved // context... .global OPENSSL_wipe_cpu# .proc OPENSSL_wipe_cpu# .align 32 OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: .prologue .fframe 0 .save ar.pfs,r2 .save ar.lc,r3 { .mib; alloc r2=ar.pfs,0,96,0,96 mov r3=ar.lc brp.loop.imp .L_wipe_top,.L_wipe_end-16 };; { .mii; mov r9=ar.bsp mov r8=pr mov ar.lc=96 };; .body { .mii; add r9=96*8-8,r9 mov ar.ec=1 };; // One can sweep double as fast, but then we can't guarantee // that backing storage is wiped... .L_wipe_top: { .mfi; st8 [r9]=r0,-8 mov f127=f0 mov r127=r0 } { .mfb; nop.m 0 nop.f 0 br.ctop.sptk .L_wipe_top };; .L_wipe_end: { .mfi; mov r11=r0 mov f6=f0 mov r14=r0 } { .mfi; mov r15=r0 mov f7=f0 mov r16=r0 } { .mfi; mov r17=r0 mov f8=f0 mov r18=r0 } { .mfi; mov r19=r0 mov f9=f0 mov r20=r0 } { .mfi; mov r21=r0 mov f10=f0 mov r22=r0 } { .mfi; mov r23=r0 mov f11=f0 mov r24=r0 } { .mfi; mov r25=r0 mov f12=f0 mov r26=r0 } { .mfi; mov r27=r0 mov f13=f0 mov r28=r0 } { .mfi; mov r29=r0 mov f14=f0 mov r30=r0 } { .mfi; mov r31=r0 mov f15=f0 nop.i 0 } { .mfi; mov f16=f0 } { .mfi; mov f17=f0 } { .mfi; mov f18=f0 } { .mfi; mov f19=f0 } { .mfi; mov f20=f0 } { .mfi; mov f21=f0 } { .mfi; mov f22=f0 } { .mfi; mov f23=f0 } { .mfi; mov f24=f0 } { .mfi; mov f25=f0 } { .mfi; mov f26=f0 } { .mfi; mov f27=f0 } { .mfi; mov f28=f0 } { .mfi; mov f29=f0 } { .mfi; mov f30=f0 } { .mfi; add r9=96*8+8,r9 mov f31=f0 mov pr=r8,0x1ffff } { .mib; mov r8=sp mov ar.lc=r3 br.ret.sptk b0 };; .endp OPENSSL_wipe_cpu# .global OPENSSL_cleanse# .proc OPENSSL_cleanse# OPENSSL_cleanse: { .mib; cmp.eq p6,p0=0,r33 // len==0 ADDP r32=0,r32 (p6) br.ret.spnt b0 };; { .mib; and r2=7,r32 cmp.leu p6,p0=15,r33 // len>=15 (p6) br.cond.dptk .Lot };; .Little: { .mib; st1 [r32]=r0,1 cmp.ltu p6,p7=1,r33 } // len>1 { .mbb; add r33=-1,r33 // len-- (p6) br.cond.dptk .Little (p7) br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .Lot: { .mib; cmp.eq p6,p0=0,r2 (p6) br.cond.dptk .Laligned };; { .mmi; st1 [r32]=r0,1;; and r2=7,r32 } { .mib; add r33=-1,r33 br .Lot };; .Laligned: { .mmi; st8 [r32]=r0,8 and r2=-8,r33 // len&~7 add r33=-8,r33 };; // len-=8 { .mib; cmp.ltu p6,p0=8,r2 // ((len+8)&~7)>8 (p6) br.cond.dptk .Laligned };; { .mbb; cmp.eq p6,p7=r0,r33 (p7) br.cond.dpnt .Little (p6) br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp OPENSSL_cleanse# .global CRYPTO_memcmp# .proc CRYPTO_memcmp# .align 32 .skip 16 CRYPTO_memcmp: .prologue { .mib; mov r8=0 cmp.eq p6,p0=0,r34 // len==0? (p6) br.ret.spnt b0 };; .save ar.pfs,r2 { .mib; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,5,0,8 .save ar.lc,r3 mov r3=ar.lc brp.loop.imp .Loop_cmp_ctop,.Loop_cmp_cend-16 } { .mib; sub r10=r34,r0,1 .save pr,r9 mov r9=pr };; { .mii; ADDP r16=0,r32 mov ar.lc=r10 mov ar.ec=4 } { .mib; ADDP r17=0,r33 mov pr.rot=1<<16 };; .Loop_cmp_ctop: { .mib; (p16) ld1 r32=[r16],1 (p18) xor r34=r34,r38 } { .mib; (p16) ld1 r36=[r17],1 (p19) or r8=r8,r35 br.ctop.sptk .Loop_cmp_ctop };; .Loop_cmp_cend: { .mib; cmp.ne p6,p0=0,r8 mov ar.lc=r3 };; { .mib; (p6) mov r8=1 mov pr=r9,0x1ffff br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp CRYPTO_memcmp# .global OPENSSL_instrument_bus# .proc OPENSSL_instrument_bus# OPENSSL_instrument_bus: { .mmi; mov r2=r33 ADDP r32=0,r32 } { .mmi; mov r8=ar.itc;; mov r10=r0 mov r9=r8 };; { .mmi; fc r32;; ld4 r8=[r32] };; { .mmi; mf mov ar.ccv=r8 add r8=r8,r10 };; { .mmi; cmpxchg4.acq r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv };; .Loop: { .mmi; mov r8=ar.itc;; sub r10=r8,r9 // diff=tick-lasttick mov r9=r8 };; // lasttick=tick { .mmi; fc r32;; ld4 r8=[r32] };; { .mmi; mf mov ar.ccv=r8 add r8=r8,r10 };; { .mmi; cmpxchg4.acq r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv add r33=-1,r33 add r32=4,r32 };; { .mib; cmp4.ne p6,p0=0,r33 (p6) br.cond.dptk .Loop };; { .mib; sub r8=r2,r33 br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp OPENSSL_instrument_bus# .global OPENSSL_instrument_bus2# .proc OPENSSL_instrument_bus2# OPENSSL_instrument_bus2: { .mmi; mov r2=r33 // put aside cnt ADDP r32=0,r32 } { .mmi; mov r8=ar.itc;; mov r10=r0 mov r9=r8 };; { .mmi; fc r32;; ld4 r8=[r32] };; { .mmi; mf mov ar.ccv=r8 add r8=r8,r10 };; { .mmi; cmpxchg4.acq r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv };; { .mmi; mov r8=ar.itc;; sub r10=r8,r9 mov r9=r8 };; .Loop2: { .mmi; mov r11=r10 // lastdiff=diff add r34=-1,r34 };; // --max { .mmi; fc r32;; ld4 r8=[r32] cmp4.eq p6,p0=0,r34 };; { .mmi; mf mov ar.ccv=r8 add r8=r8,r10 };; { .mmb; cmpxchg4.acq r3=[r32],r8,ar.ccv (p6) br.cond.spnt .Ldone2 };; { .mmi; mov r8=ar.itc;; sub r10=r8,r9 // diff=tick-lasttick mov r9=r8 };; // lasttick=tick { .mmi; cmp.ne p6,p0=r10,r11;; // diff!=lastdiff (p6) add r33=-1,r33 };; // conditional --cnt { .mib; cmp4.ne p7,p0=0,r33 (p6) add r32=4,r32 // conditional ++out (p7) br.cond.dptk .Loop2 };; .Ldone2: { .mib; sub r8=r2,r33 br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp OPENSSL_instrument_bus2# openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/threads_win.c0000644000000000000000000000546213176625660016057 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if defined(_WIN32) # include #endif #include #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void) { CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(CRITICAL_SECTION)); if (lock == NULL) return NULL; /* 0x400 is the spin count value suggested in the documentation */ if (!InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount(lock, 0x400)) { OPENSSL_free(lock); return NULL; } return lock; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { EnterCriticalSection(lock); return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { EnterCriticalSection(lock); return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { LeaveCriticalSection(lock); return 1; } void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { if (lock == NULL) return; DeleteCriticalSection(lock); OPENSSL_free(lock); return; } # define ONCE_UNINITED 0 # define ONCE_ININIT 1 # define ONCE_DONE 2 /* * We don't use InitOnceExecuteOnce because that isn't available in WinXP which * we still have to support. */ int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void)) { LONG volatile *lock = (LONG *)once; LONG result; if (*lock == ONCE_DONE) return 1; do { result = InterlockedCompareExchange(lock, ONCE_ININIT, ONCE_UNINITED); if (result == ONCE_UNINITED) { init(); *lock = ONCE_DONE; return 1; } } while (result == ONCE_ININIT); return (*lock == ONCE_DONE); } int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *)) { *key = TlsAlloc(); if (*key == TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES) return 0; return 1; } void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key) { return TlsGetValue(*key); } int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val) { if (TlsSetValue(*key, val) == 0) return 0; return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key) { if (TlsFree(*key) == 0) return 0; return 1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void) { return GetCurrentThreadId(); } int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b) { return (a == b); } int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { *ret = InterlockedExchangeAdd(val, amount) + amount; return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/o_init.c0000644000000000000000000000160213176625657015027 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include # include #endif /* * Perform any essential OpenSSL initialization operations. Currently only * sets FIPS callbacks */ void OPENSSL_init(void) { static int done = 0; if (done) return; done = 1; #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS FIPS_set_locking_callbacks(CRYPTO_lock, CRYPTO_add_lock); FIPS_set_error_callbacks(ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_vdata); FIPS_set_malloc_callbacks(CRYPTO_malloc, CRYPTO_free); RAND_init_fips(); #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/init.c0000644000000000000000000004600113176625657014513 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static int stopped = 0; static void ossl_init_thread_stop(struct thread_local_inits_st *locals); static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL threadstopkey; static void ossl_init_thread_stop_wrap(void *local) { ossl_init_thread_stop((struct thread_local_inits_st *)local); } static struct thread_local_inits_st *ossl_init_get_thread_local(int alloc) { struct thread_local_inits_st *local = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&threadstopkey); if (local == NULL && alloc) { local = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof *local); if (local != NULL && !CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&threadstopkey, local)) { OPENSSL_free(local); return NULL; } } if (!alloc) { CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&threadstopkey, NULL); } return local; } typedef struct ossl_init_stop_st OPENSSL_INIT_STOP; struct ossl_init_stop_st { void (*handler)(void); OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *next; }; static OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *stop_handlers = NULL; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *init_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_ONCE base = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int base_inited = 0; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_base) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_base: Setting up stop handlers\n"); #endif /* * We use a dummy thread local key here. We use the destructor to detect * when the thread is going to stop (where that feature is available) */ CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&threadstopkey, ossl_init_thread_stop_wrap); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI atexit(OPENSSL_cleanup); #endif if ((init_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) return 0; OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(); /* * BIG FAT WARNING! * Everything needed to be initialized in this function before threads * come along MUST happen before base_inited is set to 1, or we will * see race conditions. */ base_inited = 1; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE) # ifdef DSO_WIN32 { HMODULE handle = NULL; BOOL ret; /* We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better way */ ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS | GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN, (void *)&base_inited, &handle); return (ret == TRUE) ? 1 : 0; } # else /* * Deliberately leak a reference to ourselves. This will force the library * to remain loaded until the atexit() handler is run at process exit. */ { DSO *dso = NULL; ERR_set_mark(); dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(&base_inited, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE); DSO_free(dso); ERR_pop_to_mark(); } # endif #endif return 1; } static CRYPTO_ONCE load_crypto_strings = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int load_crypto_strings_inited = 0; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings) { /* Do nothing in this case */ return 1; } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_strings) { int ret = 1; /* * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time * pulling in all the error strings during static linking */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ERR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT) # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_crypto_strings: " "err_load_crypto_strings_int()\n"); # endif ret = err_load_crypto_strings_int(); load_crypto_strings_inited = 1; #endif return ret; } static CRYPTO_ONCE add_all_ciphers = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_ciphers) { /* * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time * pulling in all the ciphers during static linking */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_add_all_ciphers: " "openssl_add_all_ciphers_int()\n"); # endif openssl_add_all_ciphers_int(); #endif return 1; } static CRYPTO_ONCE add_all_digests = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_digests) { /* * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time * pulling in all the ciphers during static linking */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_add_all_digests: " "openssl_add_all_digests()\n"); # endif openssl_add_all_digests_int(); #endif return 1; } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_add_algs) { /* Do nothing */ return 1; } static CRYPTO_ONCE config = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int config_inited = 0; static const char *appname; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_config) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_config: openssl_config(%s)\n", appname == NULL ? "NULL" : appname); #endif openssl_config_int(appname); config_inited = 1; return 1; } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_config) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_config: openssl_no_config_int()\n"); #endif openssl_no_config_int(); config_inited = 1; return 1; } static CRYPTO_ONCE async = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int async_inited = 0; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_async) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_async: async_init()\n"); #endif if (!async_init()) return 0; async_inited = 1; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_openssl = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_openssl) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_openssl: " "engine_load_openssl_int()\n"); # endif engine_load_openssl_int(); return 1; } # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && \ (defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)) static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_cryptodev = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_cryptodev) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_cryptodev: " "engine_load_cryptodev_int()\n"); # endif engine_load_cryptodev_int(); return 1; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_rdrand = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_rdrand) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_rdrand: " "engine_load_rdrand_int()\n"); # endif engine_load_rdrand_int(); return 1; } # endif static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_dynamic = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_dynamic) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_dynamic: " "engine_load_dynamic_int()\n"); # endif engine_load_dynamic_int(); return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK) static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_padlock = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_padlock) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_padlock: " "engine_load_padlock_int()\n"); # endif engine_load_padlock_int(); return 1; } # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_capi = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_capi) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_capi: " "engine_load_capi_int()\n"); # endif engine_load_capi_int(); return 1; } # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG) static CRYPTO_ONCE engine_afalg = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_engine_afalg) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_engine_afalg: " "engine_load_afalg_int()\n"); # endif engine_load_afalg_int(); return 1; } # endif # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP static CRYPTO_ONCE zlib = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int zlib_inited = 0; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_zlib) { /* Do nothing - we need to know about this for the later cleanup */ zlib_inited = 1; return 1; } #endif static void ossl_init_thread_stop(struct thread_local_inits_st *locals) { /* Can't do much about this */ if (locals == NULL) return; if (locals->async) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_stop: " "ASYNC_cleanup_thread()\n"); #endif ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); } if (locals->err_state) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_stop: " "err_delete_thread_state()\n"); #endif err_delete_thread_state(); } OPENSSL_free(locals); } void OPENSSL_thread_stop(void) { ossl_init_thread_stop( (struct thread_local_inits_st *)ossl_init_get_thread_local(0)); } int ossl_init_thread_start(uint64_t opts) { struct thread_local_inits_st *locals; if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) return 0; locals = ossl_init_get_thread_local(1); if (locals == NULL) return 0; if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ASYNC) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_start: " "marking thread for async\n"); #endif locals->async = 1; } if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_thread_start: " "marking thread for err_state\n"); #endif locals->err_state = 1; } return 1; } void OPENSSL_cleanup(void) { OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *currhandler, *lasthandler; /* If we've not been inited then no need to deinit */ if (!base_inited) return; /* Might be explicitly called and also by atexit */ if (stopped) return; stopped = 1; /* * Thread stop may not get automatically called by the thread library for * the very last thread in some situations, so call it directly. */ ossl_init_thread_stop(ossl_init_get_thread_local(0)); currhandler = stop_handlers; while (currhandler != NULL) { currhandler->handler(); lasthandler = currhandler; currhandler = currhandler->next; OPENSSL_free(lasthandler); } stop_handlers = NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(init_lock); /* * We assume we are single-threaded for this function, i.e. no race * conditions for the various "*_inited" vars below. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (zlib_inited) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "comp_zlib_cleanup_int()\n"); #endif comp_zlib_cleanup_int(); } #endif if (async_inited) { # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "async_deinit()\n"); # endif async_deinit(); } if (load_crypto_strings_inited) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "err_free_strings_int()\n"); #endif err_free_strings_int(); } CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&threadstopkey); #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "rand_cleanup_int()\n"); fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "conf_modules_free_int()\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "engine_cleanup_int()\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int()\n"); fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "bio_sock_cleanup_int()\n"); fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "bio_cleanup()\n"); fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "evp_cleanup_int()\n"); fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "obj_cleanup_int()\n"); fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: " "err_cleanup()\n"); #endif /* * Note that cleanup order is important: * - rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so * must be called before engine_cleanup_int() * - ENGINEs use CRYPTO_EX_DATA and therefore, must be cleaned up * before the ex data handlers are wiped in CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(). * - conf_modules_free_int() can end up in ENGINE code so must be called * before engine_cleanup_int() * - ENGINEs and additional EVP algorithms might use added OIDs names so * obj_cleanup_int() must be called last */ rand_cleanup_int(); conf_modules_free_int(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE engine_cleanup_int(); #endif crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int(); bio_cleanup(); evp_cleanup_int(); obj_cleanup_int(); err_cleanup(); base_inited = 0; } /* * If this function is called with a non NULL settings value then it must be * called prior to any threads making calls to any OpenSSL functions, * i.e. passing a non-null settings value is assumed to be single-threaded. */ int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) { static int stoperrset = 0; if (stopped) { if (!stoperrset) { /* * We only ever set this once to avoid getting into an infinite * loop where the error system keeps trying to init and fails so * sets an error etc */ stoperrset = 1; CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); } return 0; } if (!base_inited && !RUN_ONCE(&base, ossl_init_base)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS) && !RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_strings, ossl_init_no_load_crypto_strings)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS) && !RUN_ONCE(&load_crypto_strings, ossl_init_load_crypto_strings)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS) && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_no_add_algs)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS) && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_ciphers, ossl_init_add_all_ciphers)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS) && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_no_add_algs)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS) && !RUN_ONCE(&add_all_digests, ossl_init_add_all_digests)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG) && !RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_no_config)) return 0; if (opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG) { int ret; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(init_lock); appname = (settings == NULL) ? NULL : settings->appname; ret = RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_config); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(init_lock); if (!ret) return 0; } if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC) && !RUN_ONCE(&async, ossl_init_async)) return 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL) && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_openssl, ossl_init_engine_openssl)) return 0; # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && \ (defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)) if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV) && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_cryptodev, ossl_init_engine_cryptodev)) return 0; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND) && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_rdrand, ossl_init_engine_rdrand)) return 0; # endif if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC) && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_dynamic, ossl_init_engine_dynamic)) return 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK) if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK) && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_padlock, ossl_init_engine_padlock)) return 0; # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI) && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_capi, ossl_init_engine_capi)) return 0; # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG) if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG) && !RUN_ONCE(&engine_afalg, ossl_init_engine_afalg)) return 0; # endif # endif if (opts & (OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG)) { ENGINE_register_all_complete(); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB) && !RUN_ONCE(&zlib, ossl_init_zlib)) return 0; #endif return 1; } int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void)) { OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE) { union { void *sym; void (*func)(void); } handlersym; handlersym.func = handler; # ifdef DSO_WIN32 { HMODULE handle = NULL; BOOL ret; /* * We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better * way */ ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS | GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN, handlersym.sym, &handle); if (!ret) return 0; } # else /* * Deliberately leak a reference to the handler. This will force the * library/code containing the handler to remain loaded until we run the * atexit handler. If -znodelete has been used then this is * unnecessary. */ { DSO *dso = NULL; ERR_set_mark(); dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(handlersym.sym, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE); DSO_free(dso); ERR_pop_to_mark(); } # endif } #endif newhand = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newhand)); if (newhand == NULL) return 0; newhand->handler = handler; newhand->next = stop_handlers; stop_handlers = newhand; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/txt_db/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014661 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/txt_db/build.info0000644000000000000000000000006613176625660016637 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=txt_db.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/txt_db/txt_db.c0000644000000000000000000002075313176625660016320 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #undef BUFSIZE #define BUFSIZE 512 TXT_DB *TXT_DB_read(BIO *in, int num) { TXT_DB *ret = NULL; int esc = 0; long ln = 0; int i, add, n; int size = BUFSIZE; int offset = 0; char *p, *f; OPENSSL_STRING *pp; BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, size)) goto err; if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) goto err; ret->num_fields = num; ret->index = NULL; ret->qual = NULL; if ((ret->data = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->index = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret->index) * num)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->qual = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(ret->qual)) * num)) == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { ret->index[i] = NULL; ret->qual[i] = NULL; } add = (num + 1) * sizeof(char *); buf->data[size - 1] = '\0'; offset = 0; for (;;) { if (offset != 0) { size += BUFSIZE; if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, size)) goto err; } buf->data[offset] = '\0'; BIO_gets(in, &(buf->data[offset]), size - offset); ln++; if (buf->data[offset] == '\0') break; if ((offset == 0) && (buf->data[0] == '#')) continue; i = strlen(&(buf->data[offset])); offset += i; if (buf->data[offset - 1] != '\n') continue; else { buf->data[offset - 1] = '\0'; /* blat the '\n' */ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(add + offset)) == NULL) goto err; offset = 0; } pp = (char **)p; p += add; n = 0; pp[n++] = p; i = 0; f = buf->data; esc = 0; for (;;) { if (*f == '\0') break; if (*f == '\t') { if (esc) p--; else { *(p++) = '\0'; f++; if (n >= num) break; pp[n++] = p; continue; } } esc = (*f == '\\'); *(p++) = *(f++); } *(p++) = '\0'; if ((n != num) || (*f != '\0')) { OPENSSL_free(pp); ret->error = DB_ERROR_WRONG_NUM_FIELDS; goto err; } pp[n] = p; if (!sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_push(ret->data, pp)) { OPENSSL_free(pp); goto err; } } BUF_MEM_free(buf); return ret; err: BUF_MEM_free(buf); if (ret != NULL) { sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_free(ret->data); OPENSSL_free(ret->index); OPENSSL_free(ret->qual); OPENSSL_free(ret); } return (NULL); } OPENSSL_STRING *TXT_DB_get_by_index(TXT_DB *db, int idx, OPENSSL_STRING *value) { OPENSSL_STRING *ret; LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *lh; if (idx >= db->num_fields) { db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; return (NULL); } lh = db->index[idx]; if (lh == NULL) { db->error = DB_ERROR_NO_INDEX; return (NULL); } ret = lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(lh, value); db->error = DB_ERROR_OK; return (ret); } int TXT_DB_create_index(TXT_DB *db, int field, int (*qual) (OPENSSL_STRING *), OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC hash, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cmp) { LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *idx; OPENSSL_STRING *r, *k; int i, n; if (field >= db->num_fields) { db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; return (0); } /* FIXME: we lose type checking at this point */ if ((idx = (LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)OPENSSL_LH_new(hash, cmp)) == NULL) { db->error = DB_ERROR_MALLOC; return (0); } n = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->data); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { r = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i); if ((qual != NULL) && (qual(r) == 0)) continue; if ((k = lh_OPENSSL_STRING_insert(idx, r)) != NULL) { db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_CLASH; db->arg1 = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_find(db->data, k); db->arg2 = i; lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(idx); return (0); } if (lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(idx, r) == NULL) { db->error = DB_ERROR_MALLOC; lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(idx); return (0); } } lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(db->index[field]); db->index[field] = idx; db->qual[field] = qual; return (1); } long TXT_DB_write(BIO *out, TXT_DB *db) { long i, j, n, nn, l, tot = 0; char *p, **pp, *f; BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; long ret = -1; if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) goto err; n = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->data); nn = db->num_fields; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i); l = 0; for (j = 0; j < nn; j++) { if (pp[j] != NULL) l += strlen(pp[j]); } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(l * 2 + nn))) goto err; p = buf->data; for (j = 0; j < nn; j++) { f = pp[j]; if (f != NULL) for (;;) { if (*f == '\0') break; if (*f == '\t') *(p++) = '\\'; *(p++) = *(f++); } *(p++) = '\t'; } p[-1] = '\n'; j = p - buf->data; if (BIO_write(out, buf->data, (int)j) != j) goto err; tot += j; } ret = tot; err: BUF_MEM_free(buf); return (ret); } int TXT_DB_insert(TXT_DB *db, OPENSSL_STRING *row) { int i; OPENSSL_STRING *r; for (i = 0; i < db->num_fields; i++) { if (db->index[i] != NULL) { if ((db->qual[i] != NULL) && (db->qual[i] (row) == 0)) continue; r = lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(db->index[i], row); if (r != NULL) { db->error = DB_ERROR_INDEX_CLASH; db->arg1 = i; db->arg_row = r; goto err; } } } for (i = 0; i < db->num_fields; i++) { if (db->index[i] != NULL) { if ((db->qual[i] != NULL) && (db->qual[i] (row) == 0)) continue; (void)lh_OPENSSL_STRING_insert(db->index[i], row); if (lh_OPENSSL_STRING_retrieve(db->index[i], row) == NULL) goto err1; } } if (!sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_push(db->data, row)) goto err1; return (1); err1: db->error = DB_ERROR_MALLOC; while (i-- > 0) { if (db->index[i] != NULL) { if ((db->qual[i] != NULL) && (db->qual[i] (row) == 0)) continue; (void)lh_OPENSSL_STRING_delete(db->index[i], row); } } err: return (0); } void TXT_DB_free(TXT_DB *db) { int i, n; char **p, *max; if (db == NULL) return; if (db->index != NULL) { for (i = db->num_fields - 1; i >= 0; i--) lh_OPENSSL_STRING_free(db->index[i]); OPENSSL_free(db->index); } OPENSSL_free(db->qual); if (db->data != NULL) { for (i = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->data) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { /* * check if any 'fields' have been allocated from outside of the * initial block */ p = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i); max = p[db->num_fields]; /* last address */ if (max == NULL) { /* new row */ for (n = 0; n < db->num_fields; n++) OPENSSL_free(p[n]); } else { for (n = 0; n < db->num_fields; n++) { if (((p[n] < (char *)p) || (p[n] > max))) OPENSSL_free(p[n]); } } OPENSSL_free(sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->data, i)); } sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_free(db->data); } OPENSSL_free(db); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ex_data.c0000644000000000000000000002617113176625657015163 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib_int.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include /* * Each structure type (sometimes called a class), that supports * exdata has a stack of callbacks for each instance. */ struct ex_callback_st { long argl; /* Arbitrary long */ void *argp; /* Arbitrary void * */ CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func; CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func; CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func; }; /* * The state for each class. This could just be a typedef, but * a structure allows future changes. */ typedef struct ex_callbacks_st { STACK_OF(EX_CALLBACK) *meth; } EX_CALLBACKS; static EX_CALLBACKS ex_data[CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT]; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *ex_data_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_ONCE ex_data_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ex_data_init) { OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); ex_data_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return ex_data_lock != NULL; } /* * Return the EX_CALLBACKS from the |ex_data| array that corresponds to * a given class. On success, *holds the lock.* */ static EX_CALLBACKS *get_and_lock(int class_index) { EX_CALLBACKS *ip; if (class_index < 0 || class_index >= CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return NULL; } if (!RUN_ONCE(&ex_data_init, do_ex_data_init)) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (ex_data_lock == NULL) { /* * This can happen in normal operation when using CRYPTO_mem_leaks(). * The CRYPTO_mem_leaks() function calls OPENSSL_cleanup() which cleans * up the locks. Subsequently the BIO that CRYPTO_mem_leaks() uses gets * freed, which also attempts to free the ex_data. However * CRYPTO_mem_leaks() ensures that the ex_data is freed early (i.e. * before OPENSSL_cleanup() is called), so if we get here we can safely * ignore this operation. We just treat it as an error. */ return NULL; } ip = &ex_data[class_index]; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ex_data_lock); return ip; } static void cleanup_cb(EX_CALLBACK *funcs) { OPENSSL_free(funcs); } /* * Release all "ex_data" state to prevent memory leaks. This can't be made * thread-safe without overhauling a lot of stuff, and shouldn't really be * called under potential race-conditions anyway (it's for program shutdown * after all). */ void crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT; ++i) { EX_CALLBACKS *ip = &ex_data[i]; sk_EX_CALLBACK_pop_free(ip->meth, cleanup_cb); ip->meth = NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ex_data_lock); ex_data_lock = NULL; } /* * Unregister a new index by replacing the callbacks with no-ops. * Any in-use instances are leaked. */ static void dummy_new(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { } static void dummy_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { } static int dummy_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { return 1; } int CRYPTO_free_ex_index(int class_index, int idx) { EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index); EX_CALLBACK *a; int toret = 0; if (ip == NULL) return 0; if (idx < 0 || idx >= sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth)) goto err; a = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, idx); if (a == NULL) goto err; a->new_func = dummy_new; a->dup_func = dummy_dup; a->free_func = dummy_free; toret = 1; err: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock); return toret; } /* * Register a new index. */ int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { int toret = -1; EX_CALLBACK *a; EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index); if (ip == NULL) return -1; if (ip->meth == NULL) { ip->meth = sk_EX_CALLBACK_new_null(); /* We push an initial value on the stack because the SSL * "app_data" routines use ex_data index zero. See RT 3710. */ if (ip->meth == NULL || !sk_EX_CALLBACK_push(ip->meth, NULL)) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } a = (EX_CALLBACK *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a)); if (a == NULL) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } a->argl = argl; a->argp = argp; a->new_func = new_func; a->dup_func = dup_func; a->free_func = free_func; if (!sk_EX_CALLBACK_push(ip->meth, NULL)) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(a); goto err; } toret = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth) - 1; (void)sk_EX_CALLBACK_set(ip->meth, toret, a); err: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock); return toret; } /* * Initialise a new CRYPTO_EX_DATA for use in a particular class - including * calling new() callbacks for each index in the class used by this variable * Thread-safe by copying a class's array of "EX_CALLBACK" entries * in the lock, then using them outside the lock. Note this only applies * to the global "ex_data" state (ie. class definitions), not 'ad' itself. */ int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad) { int mx, i; void *ptr; EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL; EX_CALLBACK *stack[10]; EX_CALLBACKS *ip = get_and_lock(class_index); if (ip == NULL) return 0; ad->sk = NULL; mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth); if (mx > 0) { if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack)) storage = stack; else storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx); if (storage != NULL) for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock); if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) { if (storage[i] && storage[i]->new_func) { ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i); storage[i]->new_func(obj, ptr, ad, i, storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp); } } if (storage != stack) OPENSSL_free(storage); return 1; } /* * Duplicate a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling dup() callbacks * for each index in the class used by this variable */ int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from) { int mx, j, i; void *ptr; EX_CALLBACK *stack[10]; EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL; EX_CALLBACKS *ip; int toret = 0; if (from->sk == NULL) /* Nothing to copy over */ return 1; if ((ip = get_and_lock(class_index)) == NULL) return 0; mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth); j = sk_void_num(from->sk); if (j < mx) mx = j; if (mx > 0) { if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack)) storage = stack; else storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx); if (storage != NULL) for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock); if (mx == 0) return 1; if (storage == NULL) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * Make sure the ex_data stack is at least |mx| elements long to avoid * issues in the for loop that follows; so go get the |mx|'th element * (if it does not exist CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns NULL), and assign * to itself. This is normally a no-op; but ensures the stack is the * proper size */ if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, mx - 1))) goto err; for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) { ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, i); if (storage[i] && storage[i]->dup_func) if (!storage[i]->dup_func(to, from, &ptr, i, storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp)) goto err; CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, i, ptr); } toret = 1; err: if (storage != stack) OPENSSL_free(storage); return toret; } /* * Cleanup a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling free() callbacks for * each index in the class used by this variable */ void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad) { int mx, i; EX_CALLBACKS *ip; void *ptr; EX_CALLBACK *f; EX_CALLBACK *stack[10]; EX_CALLBACK **storage = NULL; if ((ip = get_and_lock(class_index)) == NULL) goto err; mx = sk_EX_CALLBACK_num(ip->meth); if (mx > 0) { if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack)) storage = stack; else storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx); if (storage != NULL) for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) storage[i] = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock); for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) { if (storage != NULL) f = storage[i]; else { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ex_data_lock); f = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, i); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock); } if (f != NULL && f->free_func != NULL) { ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i); f->free_func(obj, ptr, ad, i, f->argl, f->argp); } } if (storage != stack) OPENSSL_free(storage); err: sk_void_free(ad->sk); ad->sk = NULL; } /* * For a given CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable, set the value corresponding to a * particular index in the class used by this variable */ int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, void *val) { int i; if (ad->sk == NULL) { if ((ad->sk = sk_void_new_null()) == NULL) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } for (i = sk_void_num(ad->sk); i <= idx; ++i) { if (!sk_void_push(ad->sk, NULL)) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } sk_void_set(ad->sk, idx, val); return 1; } /* * For a given CRYPTO_EX_DATA_ variable, get the value corresponding to a * particular index in the class used by this variable */ void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx) { if (ad->sk == NULL || idx >= sk_void_num(ad->sk)) return NULL; return sk_void_value(ad->sk, idx); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/uid.c0000644000000000000000000000154713176625660014331 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ > 2) # include OPENSSL_UNISTD int OPENSSL_issetugid(void) { return issetugid(); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) int OPENSSL_issetugid(void) { return 0; } #else # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # include int OPENSSL_issetugid(void) { if (getuid() != geteuid()) return 1; if (getgid() != getegid()) return 1; return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014164 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_err.c0000644000000000000000000003104213176625656015762 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA CMS_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT), "check_content"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_CERT), "CMS_add0_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY), "CMS_add0_recipient_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD), "CMS_add0_recipient_password"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECEIPTREQUEST), "CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT), "CMS_add1_recipient_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER), "CMS_add1_signer"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNINGTIME), "cms_add1_signingTime"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS), "CMS_compress"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_CREATE), "cms_CompressedData_create"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO), "cms_CompressedData_init_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT), "cms_copy_content"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST), "cms_copy_messageDigest"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DATA), "CMS_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL), "CMS_dataFinal"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT), "CMS_dataInit"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT), "CMS_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY), "CMS_decrypt_set1_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD), "CMS_decrypt_set1_password"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY), "CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_FIND_CTX), "cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO), "cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL), "cms_DigestedData_do_final"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY), "CMS_digest_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT), "cms_encode_Receipt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT), "CMS_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO), "cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT), "CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT), "CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY), "CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE), "CMS_EnvelopedData_create"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO), "cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT), "cms_enveloped_data_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL), "cms_env_asn1_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL), "CMS_final"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES), "cms_get0_certificate_choices"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CONTENT), "CMS_get0_content"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ECONTENT_TYPE), "cms_get0_econtent_type"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED), "cms_get0_enveloped"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_REVOCATION_CHOICES), "cms_get0_revocation_choices"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_SIGNED), "cms_get0_signed"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1), "cms_msgSigDigest_add1"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPTREQUEST_CREATE0), "CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY), "cms_Receipt_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT), "CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT), "CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT), "cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT), "cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT), "cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ID_CMP), "CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_CERT_CMP), "CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT), "cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT), "cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_ALGS), "CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID), "CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT), "cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY), "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD), "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY), "CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL), "cms_sd_asn1_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS), "cms_set1_ias"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID), "cms_set1_keyid"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER), "cms_set1_SignerIdentifier"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED), "CMS_set_detached"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN), "CMS_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNED_DATA_INIT), "cms_signed_data_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN), "cms_SignerInfo_content_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN), "CMS_SignerInfo_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY), "CMS_SignerInfo_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT), "cms_signerinfo_verify_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT), "CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT), "CMS_sign_receipt"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_STREAM), "CMS_stream"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS), "CMS_uncompress"}, {ERR_FUNC(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY), "CMS_verify"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA CMS_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR), "add signer error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_ALREADY_PRESENT), "certificate already present"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID), "certificate has no keyid"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR), "certificate verify error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR), "cipher initialisation error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR), "cipher parameter initialisation error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR), "cms datafinal error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CMS_LIB), "cms lib"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENTIDENTIFIER_MISMATCH), "contentidentifier mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_NOT_FOUND), "content not found"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_MISMATCH), "content type mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA), "content type not compressed data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA), "content type not enveloped data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_SIGNED_DATA), "content type not signed data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR), "content verify error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR), "ctrl error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE), "ctrl failure"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR), "decrypt error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY), "error getting public key"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE), "error reading messagedigest attribute"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY), "error setting key"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_RECIPIENTINFO), "error setting recipientinfo"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_INVALID_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH), "invalid encrypted key length"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER), "invalid key encryption parameter"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH), "invalid key length"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MD_BIO_INIT_ERROR), "md bio init error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE_WRONG_LENGTH), "messagedigest attribute wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH), "messagedigest wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR), "msgsigdigest error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_VERIFICATION_FAILURE), "msgsigdigest verification failure"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH), "msgsigdigest wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NEED_ONE_SIGNER), "need one signer"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT), "not a signed receipt"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA), "not encrypted data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEK), "not kek"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT), "not key agreement"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT), "not key transport"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_PWRI), "not pwri"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE), "not supported for this key type"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_CIPHER), "no cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_CONTENT), "no content"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST), "no default digest"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_DIGEST_SET), "no digest set"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_KEY), "no key"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT), "no key or cert"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST), "no matching digest"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT), "no matching recipient"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_SIGNATURE), "no matching signature"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_MSGSIGDIGEST), "no msgsigdigest"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD), "no password"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY), "no private key"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY), "no public key"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST), "no receipt request"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS), "no signers"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE), "private key does not match certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_RECEIPT_DECODE_ERROR), "receipt decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR), "recipient error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND), "signer certificate not found"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_SIGNFINAL_ERROR), "signfinal error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR), "smime text error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR), "store init error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA), "type not compressed data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA), "type not data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA), "type not digested data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA), "type not encrypted data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA), "type not enveloped data"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNABLE_TO_FINALIZE_CONTEXT), "unable to finalize context"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER), "unknown cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORIHM), "unknown digest algorihm"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID), "unknown id"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM), "unsupported compression algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE), "unsupported content type"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM), "unsupported kek algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM), "unsupported key encryption algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE), "unsupported recipient type"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE), "unsupported recpientinfo type"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE), "unsupported type"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR), "unwrap error"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE), "unwrap failure"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE), "verification failure"}, {ERR_REASON(CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR), "wrap error"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_CMS_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(CMS_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, CMS_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, CMS_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_att.c0000644000000000000000000001063213176625656015764 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" /* CMS SignedData Attribute utilities */ int CMS_signed_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si) { return X509at_get_attr_count(si->signedAttrs); } int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(si->signedAttrs, nid, lastpos); } int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(si->signedAttrs, obj, lastpos); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc) { return X509at_get_attr(si->signedAttrs, loc); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc) { return X509at_delete_attr(si->signedAttrs, loc); } int CMS_signed_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr) { if (X509at_add1_attr(&si->signedAttrs, attr)) return 1; return 0; } int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const void *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&si->signedAttrs, obj, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int type, const void *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&si->signedAttrs, nid, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const char *attrname, int type, const void *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&si->signedAttrs, attrname, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } void *CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid, int lastpos, int type) { return X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(si->signedAttrs, oid, lastpos, type); } int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si) { return X509at_get_attr_count(si->unsignedAttrs); } int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(si->unsignedAttrs, nid, lastpos); } int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(si->unsignedAttrs, obj, lastpos); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc) { return X509at_get_attr(si->unsignedAttrs, loc); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc) { return X509at_delete_attr(si->unsignedAttrs, loc); } int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr) { if (X509at_add1_attr(&si->unsignedAttrs, attr)) return 1; return 0; } int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const void *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&si->unsignedAttrs, obj, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int type, const void *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&si->unsignedAttrs, nid, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const char *attrname, int type, const void *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&si->unsignedAttrs, attrname, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } void *CMS_unsigned_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OBJECT *oid, int lastpos, int type) { return X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(si->unsignedAttrs, oid, lastpos, type); } /* Specific attribute cases */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000003263113176625656015756 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CMS_LCL_H # define HEADER_CMS_LCL_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # include /* * Cryptographic message syntax (CMS) structures: taken from RFC3852 */ /* Forward references */ typedef struct CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber_st CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber; typedef struct CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo_st CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo; typedef struct CMS_SignerIdentifier_st CMS_SignerIdentifier; typedef struct CMS_SignedData_st CMS_SignedData; typedef struct CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat_st CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat; typedef struct CMS_OriginatorInfo_st CMS_OriginatorInfo; typedef struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st CMS_EncryptedContentInfo; typedef struct CMS_EnvelopedData_st CMS_EnvelopedData; typedef struct CMS_DigestedData_st CMS_DigestedData; typedef struct CMS_EncryptedData_st CMS_EncryptedData; typedef struct CMS_AuthenticatedData_st CMS_AuthenticatedData; typedef struct CMS_CompressedData_st CMS_CompressedData; typedef struct CMS_OtherCertificateFormat_st CMS_OtherCertificateFormat; typedef struct CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo_st CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo; typedef struct CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_st CMS_OriginatorPublicKey; typedef struct CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey_st CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey; typedef struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_st CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo; typedef struct CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_st CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier; typedef struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier_st CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier; typedef struct CMS_KEKIdentifier_st CMS_KEKIdentifier; typedef struct CMS_KEKRecipientInfo_st CMS_KEKRecipientInfo; typedef struct CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo_st CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo; typedef struct CMS_OtherRecipientInfo_st CMS_OtherRecipientInfo; typedef struct CMS_ReceiptsFrom_st CMS_ReceiptsFrom; struct CMS_ContentInfo_st { ASN1_OBJECT *contentType; union { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data; CMS_SignedData *signedData; CMS_EnvelopedData *envelopedData; CMS_DigestedData *digestedData; CMS_EncryptedData *encryptedData; CMS_AuthenticatedData *authenticatedData; CMS_CompressedData *compressedData; ASN1_TYPE *other; /* Other types ... */ void *otherData; } d; }; DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) struct CMS_SignedData_st { long version; STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *digestAlgorithms; CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo; STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) *certificates; STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) *crls; STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *signerInfos; }; struct CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo_st { ASN1_OBJECT *eContentType; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *eContent; /* Set to 1 if incomplete structure only part set up */ int partial; }; struct CMS_SignerInfo_st { long version; CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid; X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *signedAttrs; X509_ALGOR *signatureAlgorithm; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *signature; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unsignedAttrs; /* Signing certificate and key */ X509 *signer; EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* Digest and public key context for alternative parameters */ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; }; struct CMS_SignerIdentifier_st { int type; union { CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *issuerAndSerialNumber; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjectKeyIdentifier; } d; }; struct CMS_EnvelopedData_st { long version; CMS_OriginatorInfo *originatorInfo; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *recipientInfos; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *encryptedContentInfo; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unprotectedAttrs; }; struct CMS_OriginatorInfo_st { STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) *certificates; STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) *crls; }; struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st { ASN1_OBJECT *contentType; X509_ALGOR *contentEncryptionAlgorithm; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedContent; /* Content encryption algorithm and key */ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned char *key; size_t keylen; /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */ int debug; }; struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st { int type; union { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri; CMS_OtherRecipientInfo *ori; } d; }; typedef CMS_SignerIdentifier CMS_RecipientIdentifier; struct CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo_st { long version; CMS_RecipientIdentifier *rid; X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey; /* Recipient Key and cert */ X509 *recip; EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* Public key context for this operation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; }; struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_st { long version; CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *originator; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *recipientEncryptedKeys; /* Public key context associated with current operation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; /* Cipher context for CEK wrapping */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; }; struct CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey_st { int type; union { CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *issuerAndSerialNumber; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjectKeyIdentifier; CMS_OriginatorPublicKey *originatorKey; } d; }; struct CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_st { X509_ALGOR *algorithm; ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey; }; struct CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_st { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey; /* Public key associated with this recipient */ EVP_PKEY *pkey; }; struct CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier_st { int type; union { CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *issuerAndSerialNumber; CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier *rKeyId; } d; }; struct CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjectKeyIdentifier; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date; CMS_OtherKeyAttribute *other; }; struct CMS_KEKRecipientInfo_st { long version; CMS_KEKIdentifier *kekid; X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey; /* Extra info: symmetric key to use */ unsigned char *key; size_t keylen; }; struct CMS_KEKIdentifier_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyIdentifier; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date; CMS_OtherKeyAttribute *other; }; struct CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo_st { long version; X509_ALGOR *keyDerivationAlgorithm; X509_ALGOR *keyEncryptionAlgorithm; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey; /* Extra info: password to use */ unsigned char *pass; size_t passlen; }; struct CMS_OtherRecipientInfo_st { ASN1_OBJECT *oriType; ASN1_TYPE *oriValue; }; struct CMS_DigestedData_st { long version; X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm; CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest; }; struct CMS_EncryptedData_st { long version; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *encryptedContentInfo; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unprotectedAttrs; }; struct CMS_AuthenticatedData_st { long version; CMS_OriginatorInfo *originatorInfo; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *recipientInfos; X509_ALGOR *macAlgorithm; X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm; CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *authAttrs; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *mac; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unauthAttrs; }; struct CMS_CompressedData_st { long version; X509_ALGOR *compressionAlgorithm; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *recipientInfos; CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo *encapContentInfo; }; struct CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_st { int type; union { X509_CRL *crl; CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat *other; } d; }; # define CMS_REVCHOICE_CRL 0 # define CMS_REVCHOICE_OTHER 1 struct CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat_st { ASN1_OBJECT *otherRevInfoFormat; ASN1_TYPE *otherRevInfo; }; struct CMS_CertificateChoices { int type; union { X509 *certificate; ASN1_STRING *extendedCertificate; /* Obsolete */ ASN1_STRING *v1AttrCert; /* Left encoded for now */ ASN1_STRING *v2AttrCert; /* Left encoded for now */ CMS_OtherCertificateFormat *other; } d; }; # define CMS_CERTCHOICE_CERT 0 # define CMS_CERTCHOICE_EXCERT 1 # define CMS_CERTCHOICE_V1ACERT 2 # define CMS_CERTCHOICE_V2ACERT 3 # define CMS_CERTCHOICE_OTHER 4 struct CMS_OtherCertificateFormat_st { ASN1_OBJECT *otherCertFormat; ASN1_TYPE *otherCert; }; /* * This is also defined in pkcs7.h but we duplicate it to allow the CMS code * to be independent of PKCS#7 */ struct CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber_st { X509_NAME *issuer; ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber; }; struct CMS_OtherKeyAttribute_st { ASN1_OBJECT *keyAttrId; ASN1_TYPE *keyAttr; }; /* ESS structures */ # ifdef HEADER_X509V3_H struct CMS_ReceiptRequest_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *signedContentIdentifier; CMS_ReceiptsFrom *receiptsFrom; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptsTo; }; struct CMS_ReceiptsFrom_st { int type; union { long allOrFirstTier; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptList; } d; }; # endif struct CMS_Receipt_st { long version; ASN1_OBJECT *contentType; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *signedContentIdentifier; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *originatorSignatureValue; }; DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ContentInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_SignerInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_Attributes_Sign) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_Attributes_Verify) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber) # define CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL 0 # define CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER 1 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL 0 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER 1 # define CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL 0 # define CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER 1 # define CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL 0 # define CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER 1 # define CMS_OIK_PUBKEY 2 BIO *cms_content_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); CMS_ContentInfo *cms_Data_create(void); CMS_ContentInfo *cms_DigestedData_create(const EVP_MD *md); BIO *cms_DigestedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int cms_DigestedData_do_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain, int verify); BIO *cms_SignedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int cms_SignedData_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain); int cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert, int type); int cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno); int cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert); CMS_ContentInfo *cms_CompressedData_create(int comp_nid); BIO *cms_CompressedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); BIO *cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm); int cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, BIO *chain, X509_ALGOR *mdalg); int cms_ias_cert_cmp(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias, X509 *cert); int cms_keyid_cert_cmp(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid, X509 *cert); int cms_set1_ias(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber **pias, X509 *cert); int cms_set1_keyid(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pkeyid, X509 *cert); BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec); BIO *cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int cms_EncryptedContent_init(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); int cms_Receipt_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_ContentInfo *req_cms); int cms_msgSigDigest_add1(CMS_SignerInfo *dest, CMS_SignerInfo *src); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cms_encode_Receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si); BIO *cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_get0_enveloped(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd); int cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk); /* KARI routines */ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags); int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); /* PWRI routines */ int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int en_de); DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CertificateChoices) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_DigestedData) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EncryptedData) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EnvelopedData) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_Receipt) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_ReceiptRequest) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_SignedData) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CompressedData) #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/build.info0000644000000000000000000000033113176625656016135 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= \ cms_lib.c cms_asn1.c cms_att.c cms_io.c cms_smime.c cms_err.c \ cms_sd.c cms_dd.c cms_cd.c cms_env.c cms_enc.c cms_ess.c \ cms_pwri.c cms_kari.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000004245313176625656016044 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber, issuer, X509_NAME), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat, otherCertFormat, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat, otherCert, ASN1_ANY) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherCertificateFormat) ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_CertificateChoices) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.certificate, X509), ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.extendedCertificate, ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0), ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.v1AttrCert, ASN1_SEQUENCE, 1), ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.v2AttrCert, ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2), ASN1_IMP(CMS_CertificateChoices, d.other, CMS_OtherCertificateFormat, 3) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_CertificateChoices) ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_SignerIdentifier) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerIdentifier, d.issuerAndSerialNumber, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber), ASN1_IMP(CMS_SignerIdentifier, d.subjectKeyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0) } static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_SignerIdentifier) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo, eContentType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo, eContent, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0) } static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo) /* Minor tweak to operation: free up signer key, cert */ static int cms_si_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) { CMS_SignerInfo *si = (CMS_SignerInfo *)*pval; EVP_PKEY_free(si->pkey); X509_free(si->signer); EVP_MD_CTX_free(si->mctx); } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_SignerInfo, cms_si_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, sid, CMS_SignerIdentifier), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, digestAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignerInfo, signedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, signatureAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignerInfo, signature, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignerInfo, unsignedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_SignerInfo, CMS_SignerInfo) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat, otherRevInfoFormat, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat, otherRevInfo, ASN1_ANY) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat) ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, d.crl, X509_CRL), ASN1_IMP(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, d.other, CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat, 1) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_SignedData) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignedData, version, LONG), ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_SignedData, digestAlgorithms, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SignedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignedData, certificates, CMS_CertificateChoices, 0), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignedData, crls, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, 1), ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_SignedData, signerInfos, CMS_SignerInfo) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_SignedData) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OriginatorInfo) = { ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_OriginatorInfo, certificates, CMS_CertificateChoices, 0), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_OriginatorInfo, crls, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, 1) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OriginatorInfo) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo, contentType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo, contentEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo, encryptedContent, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0) } static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, rid, CMS_SignerIdentifier), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute, keyAttrId, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute, keyAttr, ASN1_ANY) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_OPT(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, date, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_OPT(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, other, CMS_OtherKeyAttribute) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier) ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, d.issuerAndSerialNumber, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber), ASN1_IMP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, d.rKeyId, CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, 0) } static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier) static int cms_rek_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *)*pval; if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) { EVP_PKEY_free(rek->pkey); } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, cms_rek_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, rid, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, algorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey) ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.issuerAndSerialNumber, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber), ASN1_IMP(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.subjectKeyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0), ASN1_IMP(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.originatorKey, CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, 1) } static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey) static int cms_kari_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = (CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *)*pval; if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) { kari->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (kari->ctx == NULL) return 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(kari->ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW); kari->pctx = NULL; } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) { EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(kari->ctx); } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, cms_kari_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, version, LONG), ASN1_EXP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, originator, CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 1), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, recipientEncryptedKeys, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KEKIdentifier) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKIdentifier, keyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_OPT(CMS_KEKIdentifier, date, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_OPT(CMS_KEKIdentifier, other, CMS_OtherKeyAttribute) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KEKIdentifier) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, kekid, CMS_KEKIdentifier), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, version, LONG), ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, keyDerivationAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR, 0), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, oriType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, oriValue, ASN1_ANY) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo) /* Free up RecipientInfo additional data */ static int cms_ri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) { CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = (CMS_RecipientInfo *)*pval; if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri; EVP_PKEY_free(ktri->pkey); X509_free(ktri->recip); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ktri->pctx); } else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) { CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri = ri->d.kekri; OPENSSL_clear_free(kekri->key, kekri->keylen); } else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) { CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri = ri->d.pwri; OPENSSL_clear_free(pwri->pass, pwri->passlen); } } return 1; } ASN1_CHOICE_cb(CMS_RecipientInfo, cms_ri_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.ktri, CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo), ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.kari, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, 1), ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.kekri, CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, 2), ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.pwri, CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, 3), ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.ori, CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, 4) } ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientInfo, CMS_RecipientInfo, type) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EnvelopedData) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EnvelopedData, version, LONG), ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_EnvelopedData, originatorInfo, CMS_OriginatorInfo, 0), ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_EnvelopedData, recipientInfos, CMS_RecipientInfo), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EnvelopedData, encryptedContentInfo, CMS_EncryptedContentInfo), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_EnvelopedData, unprotectedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EnvelopedData) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_DigestedData) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, digestAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_DigestedData, digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_DigestedData) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EncryptedData) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedData, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_EncryptedData, encryptedContentInfo, CMS_EncryptedContentInfo), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_EncryptedData, unprotectedAttrs, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_EncryptedData) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_AuthenticatedData) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, version, LONG), ASN1_IMP_OPT(CMS_AuthenticatedData, originatorInfo, CMS_OriginatorInfo, 0), ASN1_SET_OF(CMS_AuthenticatedData, recipientInfos, CMS_RecipientInfo), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, macAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_IMP(CMS_AuthenticatedData, digestAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR, 1), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_AuthenticatedData, authAttrs, X509_ALGOR, 2), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_AuthenticatedData, mac, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_AuthenticatedData, unauthAttrs, X509_ALGOR, 3) } static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_AuthenticatedData) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_CompressedData) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CompressedData, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CompressedData, compressionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CompressedData, encapContentInfo, CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo), } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_CompressedData) /* This is the ANY DEFINED BY table for the top level ContentInfo structure */ ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(cms_default) = ASN1_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.other, ASN1_ANY, 0); ASN1_ADB(CMS_ContentInfo) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_data, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_signed, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.signedData, CMS_SignedData, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_enveloped, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.envelopedData, CMS_EnvelopedData, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_digest, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.digestedData, CMS_DigestedData, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_encrypted, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.encryptedData, CMS_EncryptedData, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_smime_ct_authData, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.authenticatedData, CMS_AuthenticatedData, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData, ASN1_NDEF_EXP(CMS_ContentInfo, d.compressedData, CMS_CompressedData, 0)), } ASN1_ADB_END(CMS_ContentInfo, 0, contentType, 0, &cms_default_tt, NULL); /* CMS streaming support */ static int cms_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { ASN1_STREAM_ARG *sarg = exarg; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; if (pval) cms = (CMS_ContentInfo *)*pval; else return 1; switch (operation) { case ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE: if (CMS_stream(&sarg->boundary, cms) <= 0) return 0; /* fall thru */ case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE: sarg->ndef_bio = CMS_dataInit(cms, sarg->out); if (!sarg->ndef_bio) return 0; break; case ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST: case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST: if (CMS_dataFinal(cms, sarg->ndef_bio) <= 0) return 0; break; } return 1; } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_ContentInfo, cms_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_ContentInfo, contentType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(CMS_ContentInfo) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_ContentInfo, CMS_ContentInfo) /* Specials for signed attributes */ /* * When signing attributes we want to reorder them to match the sorted * encoding. */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CMS_Attributes_Sign) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER, 0, CMS_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CMS_Attributes_Sign) /* * When verifying attributes we need to use the received order. So we use * SEQUENCE OF and tag it to SET OF */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CMS_Attributes_Verify) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF | ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG | ASN1_TFLG_UNIVERSAL, V_ASN1_SET, CMS_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CMS_Attributes_Verify) ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_ReceiptsFrom) = { ASN1_IMP(CMS_ReceiptsFrom, d.allOrFirstTier, LONG, 0), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_ReceiptsFrom, d.receiptList, GENERAL_NAMES, 1) } static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_ReceiptsFrom) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_ReceiptRequest) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_ReceiptRequest, signedContentIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_ReceiptRequest, receiptsFrom, CMS_ReceiptsFrom), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_ReceiptRequest, receiptsTo, GENERAL_NAMES) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_ReceiptRequest) ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_Receipt) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, contentType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, signedContentIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, originatorSignatureValue, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_Receipt) /* * Utilities to encode the CMS_SharedInfo structure used during key * derivation. */ typedef struct { X509_ALGOR *keyInfo; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *entityUInfo; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *suppPubInfo; } CMS_SharedInfo; ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_SharedInfo) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SharedInfo, keyInfo, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_SharedInfo, entityUInfo, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_SharedInfo, suppPubInfo, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 2), } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_SharedInfo) int CMS_SharedInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *kekalg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen) { union { CMS_SharedInfo *pecsi; ASN1_VALUE *a; } intsi = { NULL }; ASN1_OCTET_STRING oklen; unsigned char kl[4]; CMS_SharedInfo ecsi; keylen <<= 3; kl[0] = (keylen >> 24) & 0xff; kl[1] = (keylen >> 16) & 0xff; kl[2] = (keylen >> 8) & 0xff; kl[3] = keylen & 0xff; oklen.length = 4; oklen.data = kl; oklen.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; oklen.flags = 0; ecsi.keyInfo = kekalg; ecsi.entityUInfo = ukm; ecsi.suppPubInfo = &oklen; intsi.pecsi = &ecsi; return ASN1_item_i2d(intsi.a, pder, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_SharedInfo)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c0000644000000000000000000003050413176625656016122 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } if (palg) *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; if (pukm) *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm; return 1; } /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return NULL; } return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **pubalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } oik = ri->d.kari->originator; if (issuer) *issuer = NULL; if (sno) *sno = NULL; if (keyid) *keyid = NULL; if (pubalg) *pubalg = NULL; if (pubkey) *pubkey = NULL; if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { if (issuer) *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; if (sno) *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { if (keyid) *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) { if (pubalg) *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm; if (pubkey) *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey; } else return 0; return 1; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) { CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return -2; } oik = ri->d.kari->originator; if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); return -1; } int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) { if (issuer) *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; if (sno) *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; if (keyid) *keyid = NULL; if (tm) *tm = NULL; if (other) *other = NULL; } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) { if (keyid) *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier; if (tm) *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date; if (other) *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other; if (issuer) *issuer = NULL; if (sno) *sno = NULL; } else return 0; return 1; } int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, X509 *cert) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid; if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); else return -1; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); kari->pctx = NULL; if (!pk) return 1; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx)) goto err; kari->pctx = pctx; return 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) return ri->d.kari->ctx; return NULL; } /* * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK * or the encrypted CEK. */ static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc) { /* Key encryption key */ unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; size_t keklen; int rv = 0; unsigned char *out = NULL; int outlen; keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx); if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) return 0; /* Derive KEK */ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0) goto err; /* Set KEK in context */ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc)) goto err; /* obtain output length of ciphered key */ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen)) goto err; out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (out == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen)) goto err; *pout = out; *poutlen = (size_t)outlen; rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen); if (!rv) OPENSSL_free(out); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx); /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx); kari->pctx = NULL; return rv; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek) { int rv = 0; unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL; size_t enckeylen; size_t ceklen; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length; enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data; /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) goto err; /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */ if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0)) goto err; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = cek; ec->keylen = ceklen; cek = NULL; rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(cek); return rv; } /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */ static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, EVP_PKEY *pk) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL; int rv = 0; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (!pctx) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0) goto err; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL); if (!pctx) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; kari->pctx = pctx; rv = 1; err: if (!rv) EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); EVP_PKEY_free(ekey); return rv; } /* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL; ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo); if (!ri->d.kari) return 0; ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; kari = ri->d.kari; kari->version = 3; rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) { M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey); return 0; } if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER; rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier); if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL) return 0; if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip)) return 0; } else { rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL; if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip)) return 0; } /* Create ephemeral key */ if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk)) return 0; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); rek->pkey = pk; return 1; } static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */ kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx); if (kekcipher) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) return 0; return 1; } /* * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc) kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap(); else #endif if (keylen <= 16) kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap(); else if (keylen <= 24) kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap(); else kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap(); return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); } /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; int i; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } kari = ri->d.kari; reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */ if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher)) return 0; /* * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value. */ if (kari->originator->type == -1) { CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator; oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY; oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey); if (!oik->d.originatorKey) return 0; } /* Initialise KDF algorithm */ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) return 0; /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { unsigned char *enckey; size_t enckeylen; rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0) return 0; if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kari, 1)) return 0; ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen); } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c0000644000000000000000000000432713176625656015566 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" #ifdef ZLIB /* CMS CompressedData Utilities */ CMS_ContentInfo *cms_CompressedData_create(int comp_nid) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; CMS_CompressedData *cd; /* * Will need something cleverer if there is ever more than one * compression algorithm or parameters have some meaning... */ if (comp_nid != NID_zlib_compression) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_CREATE, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); return NULL; } cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new(); if (cms == NULL) return NULL; cd = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_CompressedData); if (cd == NULL) goto err; cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData); cms->d.compressedData = cd; cd->version = 0; X509_ALGOR_set0(cd->compressionAlgorithm, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_zlib_compression), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); cd->encapContentInfo->eContentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); return cms; err: CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } BIO *cms_CompressedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_CompressedData *cd; const ASN1_OBJECT *compoid; if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA); return NULL; } cd = cms->d.compressedData; X509_ALGOR_get0(&compoid, NULL, NULL, cd->compressionAlgorithm); if (OBJ_obj2nid(compoid) != NID_zlib_compression) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); return NULL; } return BIO_new(BIO_f_zlib()); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c0000644000000000000000000002256213176625656015773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ReceiptRequest) /* ESS services: for now just Signed Receipt related */ int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest **prr) { ASN1_STRING *str; CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL; if (prr) *prr = NULL; str = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si, OBJ_nid2obj (NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest), -3, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (!str) return 0; rr = ASN1_item_unpack(str, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ReceiptRequest)); if (!rr) return -1; if (prr) *prr = rr; else CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr); return 1; } CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen, int allorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptList, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptsTo) { CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL; rr = CMS_ReceiptRequest_new(); if (rr == NULL) goto merr; if (id) ASN1_STRING_set0(rr->signedContentIdentifier, id, idlen); else { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(rr->signedContentIdentifier, NULL, 32)) goto merr; if (RAND_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) <= 0) goto err; } sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(rr->receiptsTo, GENERAL_NAMES_free); rr->receiptsTo = receiptsTo; if (receiptList) { rr->receiptsFrom->type = 1; rr->receiptsFrom->d.receiptList = receiptList; } else { rr->receiptsFrom->type = 0; rr->receiptsFrom->d.allOrFirstTier = allorfirst; } return rr; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPTREQUEST_CREATE0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr); return NULL; } int CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr) { unsigned char *rrder = NULL; int rrderlen, r = 0; rrderlen = i2d_CMS_ReceiptRequest(rr, &rrder); if (rrderlen < 0) goto merr; if (!CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, rrder, rrderlen)) goto merr; r = 1; merr: if (!r) CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECEIPTREQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(rrder); return r; } void CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr, ASN1_STRING **pcid, int *pallorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto) { if (pcid) *pcid = rr->signedContentIdentifier; if (rr->receiptsFrom->type == 0) { if (pallorfirst) *pallorfirst = (int)rr->receiptsFrom->d.allOrFirstTier; if (plist) *plist = NULL; } else { if (pallorfirst) *pallorfirst = -1; if (plist) *plist = rr->receiptsFrom->d.receiptList; } if (prto) *prto = rr->receiptsTo; } /* Digest a SignerInfo structure for msgSigDigest attribute processing */ static int cms_msgSigDigest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, unsigned char *dig, unsigned int *diglen) { const EVP_MD *md; md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm); if (md == NULL) return 0; if (!ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Attributes_Verify), md, si->signedAttrs, dig, diglen)) return 0; return 1; } /* Add a msgSigDigest attribute to a SignerInfo */ int cms_msgSigDigest_add1(CMS_SignerInfo *dest, CMS_SignerInfo *src) { unsigned char dig[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int diglen; if (!cms_msgSigDigest(src, dig, &diglen)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1, CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR); return 0; } if (!CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(dest, NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, dig, diglen)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } /* Verify signed receipt after it has already passed normal CMS verify */ int cms_Receipt_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_ContentInfo *req_cms) { int r = 0, i; CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL; CMS_Receipt *rct = NULL; STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sis, *osis; CMS_SignerInfo *si, *osi = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msig, **pcont; ASN1_OBJECT *octype; unsigned char dig[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int diglen; /* Get SignerInfos, also checks SignedData content type */ osis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(req_cms); sis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms); if (!osis || !sis) goto err; if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sis) != 1) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NEED_ONE_SIGNER); goto err; } /* Check receipt content type */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_eContentType(cms)) != NID_id_smime_ct_receipt) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT); goto err; } /* Extract and decode receipt content */ pcont = CMS_get0_content(cms); if (!pcont || !*pcont) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT); goto err; } rct = ASN1_item_unpack(*pcont, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Receipt)); if (!rct) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_RECEIPT_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } /* Locate original request */ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(osis); i++) { osi = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(osis, i); if (!ASN1_STRING_cmp(osi->signature, rct->originatorSignatureValue)) break; } if (i == sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(osis)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_SIGNATURE); goto err; } si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sis, 0); /* Get msgSigDigest value and compare */ msig = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si, OBJ_nid2obj (NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest), -3, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); if (!msig) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_MSGSIGDIGEST); goto err; } if (!cms_msgSigDigest(osi, dig, &diglen)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR); goto err; } if (diglen != (unsigned int)msig->length) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } if (memcmp(dig, msig->data, diglen)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_VERIFICATION_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Compare content types */ octype = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(osi, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs9_contentType), -3, V_ASN1_OBJECT); if (!octype) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } /* Compare details in receipt request */ if (OBJ_cmp(octype, rct->contentType)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* Get original receipt request details */ if (CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(osi, &rr) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST); goto err; } if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(rr->signedContentIdentifier, rct->signedContentIdentifier)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENTIDENTIFIER_MISMATCH); goto err; } r = 1; err: CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr); M_ASN1_free_of(rct, CMS_Receipt); return r; } /* * Encode a Receipt into an OCTET STRING read for including into content of a * SignedData ContentInfo. */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cms_encode_Receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { CMS_Receipt rct; CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *ctype; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; /* Get original receipt request */ /* Get original receipt request details */ if (CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(si, &rr) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST); goto err; } /* Get original content type */ ctype = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs9_contentType), -3, V_ASN1_OBJECT); if (!ctype) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } rct.version = 1; rct.contentType = ctype; rct.signedContentIdentifier = rr->signedContentIdentifier; rct.originatorSignatureValue = si->signature; os = ASN1_item_pack(&rct, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Receipt), NULL); err: CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr); return os; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_io.c0000644000000000000000000000533613176625656015610 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" int CMS_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos; pos = CMS_get0_content(cms); if (pos == NULL) return 0; if (*pos == NULL) *pos = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (*pos != NULL) { (*pos)->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF; (*pos)->flags &= ~ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT; *boundary = &(*pos)->data; return 1; } CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_STREAM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } CMS_ContentInfo *d2i_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo **cms) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo), bp, cms); } int i2d_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo), bp, cms); } IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(CMS, CMS_ContentInfo, PEM_STRING_CMS, CMS_ContentInfo) BIO *BIO_new_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { return BIO_new_NDEF(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo)); } /* CMS wrappers round generalised stream and MIME routines */ int i2d_CMS_bio_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in, int flags) { return i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms, in, flags, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo)); } int PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in, int flags) { return PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms, in, flags, "CMS", ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo)); } int SMIME_write_CMS(BIO *bio, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags) { STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs; int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType); int econt_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_eContentType(cms)); if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) mdalgs = cms->d.signedData->digestAlgorithms; else mdalgs = NULL; return SMIME_write_ASN1(bio, (ASN1_VALUE *)cms, data, flags, ctype_nid, econt_nid, mdalgs, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo)); } CMS_ContentInfo *SMIME_read_CMS(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont) { return (CMS_ContentInfo *)SMIME_read_ASN1(bio, bcont, ASN1_ITEM_rptr (CMS_ContentInfo)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c0000644000000000000000000003671513176625656015754 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ContentInfo) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentInfo) const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { return cms->contentType; } CMS_ContentInfo *cms_Data_create(void) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new(); if (cms != NULL) { cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); /* Never detached */ CMS_set_detached(cms, 0); } return cms; } BIO *cms_content_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms); if (!pos) return NULL; /* If content detached data goes nowhere: create NULL BIO */ if (!*pos) return BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); /* * If content not detached and created return memory BIO */ if (!*pos || ((*pos)->flags == ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT)) return BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* Else content was read in: return read only BIO for it */ return BIO_new_mem_buf((*pos)->data, (*pos)->length); } BIO *CMS_dataInit(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *icont) { BIO *cmsbio, *cont; if (icont) cont = icont; else cont = cms_content_bio(cms); if (!cont) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT); return NULL; } switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) { case NID_pkcs7_data: return cont; case NID_pkcs7_signed: cmsbio = cms_SignedData_init_bio(cms); break; case NID_pkcs7_digest: cmsbio = cms_DigestedData_init_bio(cms); break; #ifdef ZLIB case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData: cmsbio = cms_CompressedData_init_bio(cms); break; #endif case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: cmsbio = cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(cms); break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: cmsbio = cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(cms); break; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE); return NULL; } if (cmsbio) return BIO_push(cmsbio, cont); if (!icont) BIO_free(cont); return NULL; } int CMS_dataFinal(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *cmsbio) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms); if (!pos) return 0; /* If embedded content find memory BIO and set content */ if (*pos && ((*pos)->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT)) { BIO *mbio; unsigned char *cont; long contlen; mbio = BIO_find_type(cmsbio, BIO_TYPE_MEM); if (!mbio) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL, CMS_R_CONTENT_NOT_FOUND); return 0; } contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(mbio, &cont); /* Set bio as read only so its content can't be clobbered */ BIO_set_flags(mbio, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); BIO_set_mem_eof_return(mbio, 0); ASN1_STRING_set0(*pos, cont, contlen); (*pos)->flags &= ~ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT; } switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) { case NID_pkcs7_data: case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData: /* Nothing to do */ return 1; case NID_pkcs7_signed: return cms_SignedData_final(cms, cmsbio); case NID_pkcs7_digest: return cms_DigestedData_do_final(cms, cmsbio, 0); default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE); return 0; } } /* * Return an OCTET STRING pointer to content. This allows it to be accessed * or set later. */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) { case NID_pkcs7_data: return &cms->d.data; case NID_pkcs7_signed: return &cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContent; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: return &cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->encryptedContent; case NID_pkcs7_digest: return &cms->d.digestedData->encapContentInfo->eContent; case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: return &cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo->encryptedContent; case NID_id_smime_ct_authData: return &cms->d.authenticatedData->encapContentInfo->eContent; case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData: return &cms->d.compressedData->encapContentInfo->eContent; default: if (cms->d.other->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) return &cms->d.other->value.octet_string; CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CONTENT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); return NULL; } } /* * Return an ASN1_OBJECT pointer to content type. This allows it to be * accessed or set later. */ static ASN1_OBJECT **cms_get0_econtent_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: return &cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: return &cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->contentType; case NID_pkcs7_digest: return &cms->d.digestedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType; case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: return &cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo->contentType; case NID_id_smime_ct_authData: return &cms->d.authenticatedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType; case NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData: return &cms->d.compressedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ECONTENT_TYPE, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); return NULL; } } const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { ASN1_OBJECT **petype; petype = cms_get0_econtent_type(cms); if (petype) return *petype; return NULL; } int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid) { ASN1_OBJECT **petype, *etype; petype = cms_get0_econtent_type(cms); if (!petype) return 0; if (!oid) return 1; etype = OBJ_dup(oid); if (!etype) return 0; ASN1_OBJECT_free(*petype); *petype = etype; return 1; } int CMS_is_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos; pos = CMS_get0_content(cms); if (!pos) return -1; if (*pos) return 0; return 1; } int CMS_set_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int detached) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos; pos = CMS_get0_content(cms); if (!pos) return 0; if (detached) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*pos); *pos = NULL; return 1; } if (*pos == NULL) *pos = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (*pos != NULL) { /* * NB: special flag to show content is created and not read in. */ (*pos)->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT; return 1; } CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Create a digest BIO from an X509_ALGOR structure */ BIO *cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm) { BIO *mdbio = NULL; const ASN1_OBJECT *digestoid; const EVP_MD *digest; X509_ALGOR_get0(&digestoid, NULL, NULL, digestAlgorithm); digest = EVP_get_digestbyobj(digestoid); if (!digest) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORIHM); goto err; } mdbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); if (mdbio == NULL || !BIO_set_md(mdbio, digest)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_MD_BIO_INIT_ERROR); goto err; } return mdbio; err: BIO_free(mdbio); return NULL; } /* Locate a message digest content from a BIO chain based on SignerInfo */ int cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, BIO *chain, X509_ALGOR *mdalg) { int nid; const ASN1_OBJECT *mdoid; X509_ALGOR_get0(&mdoid, NULL, NULL, mdalg); nid = OBJ_obj2nid(mdoid); /* Look for digest type to match signature */ for (;;) { EVP_MD_CTX *mtmp; chain = BIO_find_type(chain, BIO_TYPE_MD); if (chain == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_FIND_CTX, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST); return 0; } BIO_get_md_ctx(chain, &mtmp); if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mtmp) == nid /* * Workaround for broken implementations that use signature * algorithm OID instead of digest. */ || EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mtmp)) == nid) return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(mctx, mtmp); chain = BIO_next(chain); } } static STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **cms_get0_certificate_choices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: return &cms->d.signedData->certificates; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: if (cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo == NULL) return NULL; return &cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo->certificates; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); return NULL; } } CMS_CertificateChoices *CMS_add0_CertificateChoices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts; CMS_CertificateChoices *cch; pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms); if (!pcerts) return NULL; if (!*pcerts) *pcerts = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_new_null(); if (!*pcerts) return NULL; cch = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_CertificateChoices); if (!cch) return NULL; if (!sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_push(*pcerts, cch)) { M_ASN1_free_of(cch, CMS_CertificateChoices); return NULL; } return cch; } int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert) { CMS_CertificateChoices *cch; STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts; int i; pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms); if (!pcerts) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++) { cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i); if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_CERT) { if (!X509_cmp(cch->d.certificate, cert)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_CERT, CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_ALREADY_PRESENT); return 0; } } } cch = CMS_add0_CertificateChoices(cms); if (!cch) return 0; cch->type = CMS_CERTCHOICE_CERT; cch->d.certificate = cert; return 1; } int CMS_add1_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert) { int r; r = CMS_add0_cert(cms, cert); if (r > 0) X509_up_ref(cert); return r; } static STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) **cms_get0_revocation_choices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { switch (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType)) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: return &cms->d.signedData->crls; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: if (cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo == NULL) return NULL; return &cms->d.envelopedData->originatorInfo->crls; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_REVOCATION_CHOICES, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); return NULL; } } CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) **pcrls; CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch; pcrls = cms_get0_revocation_choices(cms); if (!pcrls) return NULL; if (!*pcrls) *pcrls = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_new_null(); if (!*pcrls) return NULL; rch = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice); if (!rch) return NULL; if (!sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_push(*pcrls, rch)) { M_ASN1_free_of(rch, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice); return NULL; } return rch; } int CMS_add0_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl) { CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch; rch = CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice(cms); if (!rch) return 0; rch->type = CMS_REVCHOICE_CRL; rch->d.crl = crl; return 1; } int CMS_add1_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl) { int r; r = CMS_add0_crl(cms, crl); if (r > 0) X509_CRL_up_ref(crl); return r; } STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get1_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL; CMS_CertificateChoices *cch; STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts; int i; pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms); if (!pcerts) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++) { cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(*pcerts, i); if (cch->type == 0) { if (!certs) { certs = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!certs) return NULL; } if (!sk_X509_push(certs, cch->d.certificate)) { sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); return NULL; } X509_up_ref(cch->d.certificate); } } return certs; } STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *CMS_get1_crls(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) **pcrls; CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch; int i; pcrls = cms_get0_revocation_choices(cms); if (!pcrls) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(*pcrls); i++) { rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(*pcrls, i); if (rch->type == 0) { if (!crls) { crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!crls) return NULL; } if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, rch->d.crl)) { sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); return NULL; } X509_CRL_up_ref(rch->d.crl); } } return crls; } int cms_ias_cert_cmp(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias, X509 *cert) { int ret; ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ias->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert)); if (ret) return ret; return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ias->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)); } int cms_keyid_cert_cmp(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid, X509 *cert) { const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cert_keyid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert); if (cert_keyid == NULL) return -1; return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(keyid, cert_keyid); } int cms_set1_ias(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber **pias, X509 *cert) { CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber *ias; ias = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber); if (!ias) goto err; if (!X509_NAME_set(&ias->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert))) goto err; if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(ias->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) goto err; M_ASN1_free_of(*pias, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber); *pias = ias; return 1; err: M_ASN1_free_of(ias, CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber); CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } int cms_set1_keyid(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pkeyid, X509 *cert) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL; const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cert_keyid; cert_keyid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert); if (cert_keyid == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID, CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID); return 0; } keyid = ASN1_STRING_dup(cert_keyid); if (!keyid) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*pkeyid); *pkeyid = keyid; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_env.c0000644000000000000000000005603013176625656015766 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" /* CMS EnvelopedData Utilities */ CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_get0_enveloped(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED, CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA); return NULL; } return cms->d.envelopedData; } static CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_enveloped_data_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { if (cms->d.other == NULL) { cms->d.envelopedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_EnvelopedData); if (!cms->d.envelopedData) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } cms->d.envelopedData->version = 0; cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); ASN1_OBJECT_free(cms->contentType); cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_enveloped); return cms->d.envelopedData; } return cms_get0_enveloped(cms); } int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; int i; if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) pkey = ri->d.ktri->pkey; else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ri->d.kari->pctx; if (!pctx) return 0; pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!pkey) return 0; } else return 0; if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) return 1; i = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE, cmd, ri); if (i == -2) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); return 0; } if (i <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_EnvelopedData *env; env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms); if (!env) return NULL; return env->recipientInfos; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_type(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { return ri->type; } EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) return ri->d.ktri->pctx; else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) return ri->d.kari->pctx; return NULL; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EnvelopedData_create(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; CMS_EnvelopedData *env; cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new(); if (cms == NULL) goto merr; env = cms_enveloped_data_init(cms); if (env == NULL) goto merr; if (!cms_EncryptedContent_init(env->encryptedContentInfo, cipher, NULL, 0)) goto merr; return cms; merr: CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Key Transport Recipient Info (KTRI) routines */ /* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; int idtype; ri->d.ktri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo); if (!ri->d.ktri) return 0; ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS; ktri = ri->d.ktri; if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { ktri->version = 2; idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER; } else { ktri->version = 0; idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL; } /* * Not a typo: RecipientIdentifier and SignerIdentifier are the same * structure. */ if (!cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(ktri->rid, recip, idtype)) return 0; X509_up_ref(recip); EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); ktri->pkey = pk; ktri->recip = recip; if (flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM) { ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ktri->pkey, NULL); if (ktri->pctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0) return 0; } else if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) return 0; return 1; } /* * Add a recipient certificate using appropriate type of RecipientInfo */ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *recip, unsigned int flags) { CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL; CMS_EnvelopedData *env; EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms); if (!env) goto err; /* Initialize recipient info */ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo); if (!ri) goto merr; pk = X509_get0_pubkey(recip); if (!pk) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY); goto err; } switch (cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk)) { case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS: if (!cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(ri, recip, pk, flags)) goto err; break; case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE: if (!cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(ri, recip, pk, flags)) goto err; break; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri)) goto merr; return ri; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo); return NULL; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509 **recip, X509_ALGOR **palg) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_ALGS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } ktri = ri->d.ktri; if (pk) *pk = ktri->pkey; if (recip) *recip = ktri->recip; if (palg) *palg = ktri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; return 1; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } ktri = ri->d.ktri; return cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(ktri->rid, keyid, issuer, sno); } int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_CERT_CMP, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return -2; } return cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(ri->d.ktri->rid, cert); } int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } ri->d.ktri->pkey = pkey; return 1; } /* Encrypt content key in key transport recipient info */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; unsigned char *ek = NULL; size_t eklen; int ret = 0; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } ktri = ri->d.ktri; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; pctx = ktri->pctx; if (pctx) { if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) goto err; } else { pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ktri->pkey, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0) goto err; ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen); if (ek == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(ktri->encryptedKey, ek, eklen); ek = NULL; ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); ktri->pctx = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ek); return ret; } /* Decrypt content key from KTRI */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri; EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey; unsigned char *ek = NULL; size_t eklen; int ret = 0; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; if (ktri->pkey == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; } ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (ktri->pctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ktri->pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen, ktri->encryptedKey->data, ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0) goto err; ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen); if (ek == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, ek, &eklen, ktri->encryptedKey->data, ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CMS_LIB); goto err; } ret = 1; OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = ek; ec->keylen = eklen; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ktri->pctx); ktri->pctx = NULL; if (!ret) OPENSSL_free(ek); return ret; } /* Key Encrypted Key (KEK) RecipientInfo routines */ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING tmp_os; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ID_CMP, CMS_R_NOT_KEK); return -2; } kekri = ri->d.kekri; tmp_os.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; tmp_os.flags = 0; tmp_os.data = (unsigned char *)id; tmp_os.length = (int)idlen; return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(&tmp_os, kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier); } /* For now hard code AES key wrap info */ static size_t aes_wrap_keylen(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_id_aes128_wrap: return 16; case NID_id_aes192_wrap: return 24; case NID_id_aes256_wrap: return 32; default: return 0; } } CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *id, size_t idlen, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date, ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId, ASN1_TYPE *otherType) { CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL; CMS_EnvelopedData *env; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms); if (!env) goto err; if (nid == NID_undef) { switch (keylen) { case 16: nid = NID_id_aes128_wrap; break; case 24: nid = NID_id_aes192_wrap; break; case 32: nid = NID_id_aes256_wrap; break; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); goto err; } } else { size_t exp_keylen = aes_wrap_keylen(nid); if (!exp_keylen) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (keylen != exp_keylen) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); goto err; } } /* Initialize recipient info */ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo); if (!ri) goto merr; ri->d.kekri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo); if (!ri->d.kekri) goto merr; ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK; kekri = ri->d.kekri; if (otherTypeId) { kekri->kekid->other = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute); if (kekri->kekid->other == NULL) goto merr; } if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri)) goto merr; /* After this point no calls can fail */ kekri->version = 4; kekri->key = key; kekri->keylen = keylen; ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier, id, idlen); kekri->kekid->date = date; if (kekri->kekid->other) { kekri->kekid->other->keyAttrId = otherTypeId; kekri->kekid->other->keyAttr = otherType; } X509_ALGOR_set0(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm, OBJ_nid2obj(nid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); return ri; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo); return NULL; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate, ASN1_OBJECT **potherid, ASN1_TYPE **pothertype) { CMS_KEKIdentifier *rkid; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID, CMS_R_NOT_KEK); return 0; } rkid = ri->d.kekri->kekid; if (palg) *palg = ri->d.kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; if (pid) *pid = rkid->keyIdentifier; if (pdate) *pdate = rkid->date; if (potherid) { if (rkid->other) *potherid = rkid->other->keyAttrId; else *potherid = NULL; } if (pothertype) { if (rkid->other) *pothertype = rkid->other->keyAttr; else *pothertype = NULL; } return 1; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEK); return 0; } kekri = ri->d.kekri; kekri->key = key; kekri->keylen = keylen; return 1; } /* Encrypt content key in KEK recipient info */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; AES_KEY actx; unsigned char *wkey = NULL; int wkeylen; int r = 0; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; kekri = ri->d.kekri; if (!kekri->key) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY); return 0; } if (AES_set_encrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY); goto err; } wkey = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen + 8); if (wkey == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } wkeylen = AES_wrap_key(&actx, NULL, wkey, ec->key, ec->keylen); if (wkeylen <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->encryptedKey, wkey, wkeylen); r = 1; err: if (!r) OPENSSL_free(wkey); OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx)); return r; } /* Decrypt content key in KEK recipient info */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; AES_KEY actx; unsigned char *ukey = NULL; int ukeylen; int r = 0, wrap_nid; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; kekri = ri->d.kekri; if (!kekri->key) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY); return 0; } wrap_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm); if (aes_wrap_keylen(wrap_nid) != kekri->keylen) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } /* If encrypted key length is invalid don't bother */ if (kekri->encryptedKey->length < 16) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_INVALID_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH); goto err; } if (AES_set_decrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY); goto err; } ukey = OPENSSL_malloc(kekri->encryptedKey->length - 8); if (ukey == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ukeylen = AES_unwrap_key(&actx, NULL, ukey, kekri->encryptedKey->data, kekri->encryptedKey->length); if (ukeylen <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR); goto err; } ec->key = ukey; ec->keylen = ukeylen; r = 1; err: if (!r) OPENSSL_free(ukey); OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx)); return r; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { switch (ri->type) { case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS: return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK: return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS: return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 0); default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE); return 0; } } int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { switch (ri->type) { case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS: return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE: return cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK: return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS: return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 1); default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE); return 0; } } /* Check structures and fixup version numbers (if necessary) */ static void cms_env_set_originfo_version(CMS_EnvelopedData *env) { CMS_OriginatorInfo *org = env->originatorInfo; int i; if (org == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(org->certificates); i++) { CMS_CertificateChoices *cch; cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(org->certificates, i); if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_OTHER) { env->version = 4; return; } else if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_V2ACERT) { if (env->version < 3) env->version = 3; } } for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(org->crls); i++) { CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch; rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(org->crls, i); if (rch->type == CMS_REVCHOICE_OTHER) { env->version = 4; return; } } } static void cms_env_set_version(CMS_EnvelopedData *env) { int i; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; /* * Can't set version higher than 4 so if 4 or more already nothing to do. */ if (env->version >= 4) return; cms_env_set_originfo_version(env); if (env->version >= 3) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(env->recipientInfos); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(env->recipientInfos, i); if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS || ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER) { env->version = 3; return; } else if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS || ri->d.ktri->version != 0) { env->version = 2; } } if (env->originatorInfo || env->unprotectedAttrs) env->version = 2; if (env->version == 2) return; env->version = 0; } BIO *cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *rinfos; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; int i, ok = 0; BIO *ret; /* Get BIO first to set up key */ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; ret = cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(ec); /* If error or no cipher end of processing */ if (!ret || !ec->cipher) return ret; /* Now encrypt content key according to each RecipientInfo type */ rinfos = cms->d.envelopedData->recipientInfos; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(rinfos); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(rinfos, i); if (CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(cms, ri) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_RECIPIENTINFO); goto err; } } cms_env_set_version(cms->d.envelopedData); ok = 1; err: ec->cipher = NULL; OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = NULL; ec->keylen = 0; if (ok) return ret; BIO_free(ret); return NULL; } /* * Get RecipientInfo type (if any) supported by a key (public or private). To * retain compatibility with previous behaviour if the ctrl value isn't * supported we assume key transport. */ int cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk) { if (pk->ameth && pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl) { int i, r; i = pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pk, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE, 0, &r); if (i > 0) return r; } return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c0000644000000000000000000005527013176625656016315 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" static BIO *cms_get_text_bio(BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { BIO *rbio; if (out == NULL) rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); else if (flags & CMS_TEXT) { rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); BIO_set_mem_eof_return(rbio, 0); } else rbio = out; return rbio; } static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags) { unsigned char buf[4096]; int r = 0, i; BIO *tmpout; tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags); if (tmpout == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */ for (;;) { i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (i <= 0) { if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) { if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in)) goto err; } if (i < 0) goto err; break; } if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i)) goto err; } if (flags & CMS_TEXT) { if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR); goto err; } } r = 1; err: if (tmpout != out) BIO_free(tmpout); return r; } static int check_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms); if (!pos || !*pos) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT); return 0; } return 1; } static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto) { if (upto) { BIO *tbio; do { tbio = BIO_pop(f); BIO_free(f); f = tbio; } while (f && f != upto); } else BIO_free_all(f); } int CMS_data(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { BIO *cont; int r; if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_data) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATA, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA); return 0; } cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, NULL); if (!cont) return 0; r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags); BIO_free_all(cont); return r; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_data_create(BIO *in, unsigned int flags) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; cms = cms_Data_create(); if (!cms) return NULL; if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags)) return cms; CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } int CMS_digest_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { BIO *cont; int r; if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_digest) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA); return 0; } if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) return 0; cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont); if (!cont) return 0; r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags); if (r) r = cms_DigestedData_do_final(cms, cont, 1); do_free_upto(cont, dcont); return r; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; if (!md) md = EVP_sha1(); cms = cms_DigestedData_create(md); if (!cms) return NULL; if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED)) CMS_set_detached(cms, 0); if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags)) return cms; CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } int CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { BIO *cont; int r; if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA); return 0; } if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) return 0; if (CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, NULL, key, keylen) <= 0) return 0; cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont); if (!cont) return 0; r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags); do_free_upto(cont, dcont); return r; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int flags) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; if (!cipher) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER); return NULL; } cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new(); if (cms == NULL) return NULL; if (!CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, cipher, key, keylen)) return NULL; if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED)) CMS_set_detached(cms, 0); if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL)) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags)) return cms; CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); X509 *signer; int i, j, r = 0; if (ctx == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, certs)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR); goto err; } X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, "smime_sign"); if (crls) X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls); i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); if (i <= 0) { j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(j)); goto err; } r = 1; err: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return r; } int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { CMS_SignerInfo *si; STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos; STACK_OF(X509) *cms_certs = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509 *signer; int i, scount = 0, ret = 0; BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL; if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) return 0; if (dcont && !(flags & CMS_BINARY)) { const ASN1_OBJECT *coid = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms); if (OBJ_obj2nid(coid) == NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF) flags |= CMS_ASCIICRLF; } /* Attempt to find all signer certificates */ sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms); if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i); CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL); if (signer) scount++; } if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos)) scount += CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, certs, flags); if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); goto err; } /* Attempt to verify all signers certs */ if (!(flags & CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY)) { cms_certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms); if (!(flags & CMS_NOCRL)) crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i); if (!cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(si, store, cms_certs, crls)) goto err; } } /* Attempt to verify all SignerInfo signed attribute signatures */ if (!(flags & CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY)) { for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i); if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) < 0) continue; if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify(si) <= 0) goto err; } } /* * Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then store * its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This avoids * potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will occur when * reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures are calculated. */ if (dcont && (BIO_method_type(dcont) == BIO_TYPE_MEM)) { char *ptr; long len; len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr); tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len); if (tmpin == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err2; } } else tmpin = dcont; /* * If not binary mode and detached generate digests by *writing* through * the BIO. That makes it possible to canonicalise the input. */ if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont) { /* * Create output BIO so we can either handle text or to ensure * included content doesn't override detached content. */ tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags); if (!tmpout) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpout); if (!cmsbio) goto err; /* * Don't use SMIME_TEXT for verify: it adds headers and we want to * remove them. */ SMIME_crlf_copy(dcont, cmsbio, flags & ~SMIME_TEXT); if (flags & CMS_TEXT) { if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR); goto err; } } } else { cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpin); if (!cmsbio) goto err; if (!cms_copy_content(out, cmsbio, flags)) goto err; } if (!(flags & CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY)) { for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i); if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR); goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: if (!(flags & SMIME_BINARY) && dcont) { do_free_upto(cmsbio, tmpout); if (tmpin != dcont) BIO_free(tmpin); } else { if (dcont && (tmpin == dcont)) do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont); else BIO_free_all(cmsbio); } if (out != tmpout) BIO_free_all(tmpout); err2: sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); return ret; } int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags) { int r; flags &= ~(CMS_DETACHED | CMS_TEXT); r = CMS_verify(rcms, certs, store, NULL, NULL, flags); if (r <= 0) return r; return cms_Receipt_verify(rcms, ocms); } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, unsigned int flags) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; int i; cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new(); if (cms == NULL || !CMS_SignedData_init(cms)) goto merr; if (flags & CMS_ASCIICRLF && !CMS_set1_eContentType(cms, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF))) goto err; if (pkey && !CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!CMS_add1_cert(cms, x)) goto merr; } if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED)) CMS_set_detached(cms, 0); if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL)) || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags)) return cms; else goto err; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags) { CMS_SignerInfo *rct_si; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos, *os; BIO *rct_cont = NULL; int r = 0; flags &= ~(CMS_STREAM | CMS_TEXT); /* Not really detached but avoids content being allocated */ flags |= CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY | CMS_DETACHED; if (!pkey || !signcert) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT); return NULL; } /* Initialize signed data */ cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, certs, NULL, flags); if (!cms) goto err; /* Set inner content type to signed receipt */ if (!CMS_set1_eContentType(cms, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_receipt))) goto err; rct_si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags); if (!rct_si) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR); goto err; } os = cms_encode_Receipt(si); if (!os) goto err; /* Set content to digest */ rct_cont = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length); if (!rct_cont) goto err; /* Add msgSigDigest attribute */ if (!cms_msgSigDigest_add1(rct_si, si)) goto err; /* Finalize structure */ if (!CMS_final(cms, rct_cont, NULL, flags)) goto err; /* Set embedded content */ pos = CMS_get0_content(cms); *pos = os; r = 1; err: BIO_free(rct_cont); if (r) return cms; CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; int i; X509 *recip; cms = CMS_EnvelopedData_create(cipher); if (!cms) goto merr; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { recip = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!CMS_add1_recipient_cert(cms, recip, flags)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR); goto err; } } if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED)) CMS_set_detached(cms, 0); if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL)) || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags)) return cms; else goto err; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } static int cms_kari_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert) { int i; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks; CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek; reks = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(ri); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) { int rv; rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i); if (cert != NULL && CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(rek, cert)) continue; CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, pk); rv = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(cms, ri, rek); CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, NULL); if (rv > 0) return 1; return cert == NULL ? 0 : -1; } return 0; } int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert) { STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; int i, r, ri_type; int debug = 0, match_ri = 0; ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms); if (ris) debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug; ri_type = cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk); if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i); if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != ri_type) continue; match_ri = 1; if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { r = cms_kari_set1_pkey(cms, ri, pk, cert); if (r > 0) return 1; if (r < 0) return 0; } /* * If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them * all. */ else if (!cert || !CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert)) { CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk); r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri); CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL); if (cert) { /* * If not debugging clear any error and return success to * avoid leaking of information useful to MMA */ if (!debug) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } if (r > 0) return 1; CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR); return 0; } /* * If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop after first * successful decrypt. Always attempt to decrypt all recipients * to avoid leaking timing of a successful decrypt. */ else if (r > 0 && debug) return 1; } } /* If no cert, key transport and not debugging always return success */ if (cert == NULL && ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS && match_ri && !debug) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT); return 0; } int CMS_decrypt_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen) { STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; int i, r; ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i); if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) continue; /* * If we have an id try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them * all. */ if (!id || (CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(ri, id, idlen) == 0)) { CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, key, keylen); r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri); CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, NULL, 0); if (r > 0) return 1; if (id) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR); return 0; } ERR_clear_error(); } } CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT); return 0; } int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen) { STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; int i, r; ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i); if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) continue; CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen); r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri); CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, NULL, 0); if (r > 0) return 1; } CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT); return 0; } int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { int r; BIO *cont; if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA); return 0; } if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) return 0; if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1; else cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0; if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out) return 1; if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert)) return 0; cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont); if (!cont) return 0; r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags); do_free_upto(cont, dcont); return r; } int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags) { BIO *cmsbio; int ret = 0; if ((cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont)) == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB); return 0; } SMIME_crlf_copy(data, cmsbio, flags); (void)BIO_flush(cmsbio); if (!CMS_dataFinal(cms, cmsbio)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont); return ret; } #ifdef ZLIB int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { BIO *cont; int r; if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA); return 0; } if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) return 0; cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont); if (!cont) return 0; r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags); do_free_upto(cont, dcont); return r; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; if (comp_nid <= 0) comp_nid = NID_zlib_compression; cms = cms_CompressedData_create(comp_nid); if (!cms) return NULL; if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED)) CMS_set_detached(cms, 0); if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags)) return cms; CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } #else int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); return 0; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); return NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c0000644000000000000000000002642113176625656016160 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen) { CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI); return 0; } pwri = ri->d.pwri; pwri->pass = pass; if (pass && passlen < 0) passlen = strlen((char *)pass); pwri->passlen = passlen; return 1; } CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int iter, int wrap_nid, int pbe_nid, unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen, const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph) { CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL; CMS_EnvelopedData *env; CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; int ivlen; env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms); if (!env) return NULL; if (wrap_nid <= 0) wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK; if (pbe_nid <= 0) pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2; /* Get from enveloped data */ if (kekciph == NULL) kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher; if (kekciph == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER); return NULL; } if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM); return NULL; } /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */ encalg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (encalg == NULL) { goto merr; } ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); if (ivlen > 0) { if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (!encalg->parameter) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); goto err; } } encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; /* Initialize recipient info */ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo); if (ri == NULL) goto merr; ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo); if (ri->d.pwri == NULL) goto merr; ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS; pwri = ri->d.pwri; /* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */ X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm); pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm == NULL) goto merr; pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid); pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter == NULL) goto merr; if (!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter-> value.sequence)) goto merr; pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; X509_ALGOR_free(encalg); encalg = NULL; /* Setup PBE algorithm */ pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1); if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm) goto err; CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen); pwri->version = 0; if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri)) goto merr; return ri; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); if (ri) M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo); X509_ALGOR_free(encalg); return NULL; } /* * This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211, at * some point this should go into EVP. */ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx); unsigned char *tmp; int outl, rv = 0; if (inlen < 2 * blocklen) { /* too small */ return 0; } if (inlen % blocklen) { /* Invalid size */ return 0; } tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl, in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2) /* * Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value * output it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block * this works because buffer is at least two block lengths long. */ || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen) /* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */ || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen) /* Reset IV to original value */ || !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) /* Decrypt again */ || !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen)) goto err; /* Check check bytes */ if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff) { /* Check byte failure */ goto err; } if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4)) { /* Invalid length value */ goto err; } *outlen = (size_t)tmp[0]; memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen); rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, inlen); return rv; } static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx); size_t olen; int dummy; /* * First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to * multiple of block length. */ olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1) / blocklen; olen *= blocklen; if (olen < 2 * blocklen) { /* Key too small */ return 0; } if (inlen > 0xFF) { /* Key too large */ return 0; } if (out) { /* Set header */ out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen; out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF; out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF; out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF; memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen); /* Add random padding to end */ if (olen > inlen + 4 && RAND_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) <= 0) return 0; /* Encrypt twice */ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen) || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen)) return 0; } *outlen = olen; return 1; } /* Encrypt/Decrypt content key in PWRI recipient info */ int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int en_de) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri; int r = 0; X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; unsigned char *key = NULL; size_t keylen; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; pwri = ri->d.pwri; if (!pwri->pass) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD); return 0; } algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM); return 0; } kekalg = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), algtmp->parameter); if (kekalg == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER); return 0; } kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm); if (!kekcipher) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER); return 0; } kekctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (kekctx == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de)) goto err; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(kekctx, 0); if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) < 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); goto err; } algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm; /* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */ if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm, (char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen, algtmp->parameter, kekctx, en_de) < 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } /* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */ if (en_de) { if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx)) goto err; key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen); if (key == NULL) goto err; if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx)) goto err; pwri->encryptedKey->data = key; pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen; } else { key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length); if (key == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen, pwri->encryptedKey->data, pwri->encryptedKey->length, kekctx)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE); goto err; } ec->key = key; ec->keylen = keylen; } r = 1; err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(kekctx); if (!r) OPENSSL_free(key); X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg); return r; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c0000644000000000000000000001433513176625656015745 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" /* CMS EncryptedData Utilities */ /* Return BIO based on EncryptedContentInfo and key */ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec) { BIO *b; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; const EVP_CIPHER *ciph; X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL; unsigned char *tkey = NULL; size_t tkeylen = 0; int ok = 0; int enc, keep_key = 0; enc = ec->cipher ? 1 : 0; b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher()); if (b == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } BIO_get_cipher_ctx(b, &ctx); if (enc) { ciph = ec->cipher; /* * If not keeping key set cipher to NULL so subsequent calls decrypt. */ if (ec->key) ec->cipher = NULL; } else { ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm); if (!ciph) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER); goto err; } } if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); goto err; } if (enc) { int ivlen; calg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx)); /* Generate a random IV if we need one */ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); if (ivlen > 0) { if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; piv = iv; } } else if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); goto err; } tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Generate random session key */ if (!enc || !ec->key) { tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen); if (tkey == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0) goto err; } if (!ec->key) { ec->key = tkey; ec->keylen = tkeylen; tkey = NULL; if (enc) keep_key = 1; else ERR_clear_error(); } if (ec->keylen != tkeylen) { /* If necessary set key length */ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0) { /* * Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't leak information * which may be useful in MMA. */ if (enc || ec->debug) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); goto err; } else { /* Use random key */ OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = tkey; ec->keylen = tkeylen; tkey = NULL; ERR_clear_error(); } } } if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ec->key, piv, enc) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); goto err; } if (enc) { calg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (calg->parameter == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR); goto err; } /* If parameter type not set omit parameter */ if (calg->parameter->type == V_ASN1_UNDEF) { ASN1_TYPE_free(calg->parameter); calg->parameter = NULL; } } ok = 1; err: if (!keep_key || !ok) { OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = NULL; } OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen); if (ok) return b; BIO_free(b); return NULL; } int cms_EncryptedContent_init(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { ec->cipher = cipher; if (key) { ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen); if (ec->key == NULL) return 0; memcpy(ec->key, key, keylen); } ec->keylen = keylen; if (cipher) ec->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); return 1; } int CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; if (!key || !keylen) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_KEY); return 0; } if (ciph) { cms->d.encryptedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_EncryptedData); if (!cms->d.encryptedData) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_encrypted); cms->d.encryptedData->version = 0; } else if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA); return 0; } ec = cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo; return cms_EncryptedContent_init(ec, ciph, key, keylen); } BIO *cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_EncryptedData *enc = cms->d.encryptedData; if (enc->encryptedContentInfo->cipher && enc->unprotectedAttrs) enc->version = 2; return cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(enc->encryptedContentInfo); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_dd.c0000644000000000000000000000452713176625656015571 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" /* CMS DigestedData Utilities */ CMS_ContentInfo *cms_DigestedData_create(const EVP_MD *md) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; CMS_DigestedData *dd; cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new(); if (cms == NULL) return NULL; dd = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_DigestedData); if (dd == NULL) goto err; cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_digest); cms->d.digestedData = dd; dd->version = 0; dd->encapContentInfo->eContentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); X509_ALGOR_set_md(dd->digestAlgorithm, md); return cms; err: CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); return NULL; } BIO *cms_DigestedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_DigestedData *dd; dd = cms->d.digestedData; return cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(dd->digestAlgorithm); } int cms_DigestedData_do_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain, int verify) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int mdlen; int r = 0; CMS_DigestedData *dd; if (mctx == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } dd = cms->d.digestedData; if (!cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(mctx, chain, dd->digestAlgorithm)) goto err; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, &mdlen) <= 0) goto err; if (verify) { if (mdlen != (unsigned int)dd->digest->length) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL, CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } if (memcmp(md, dd->digest->data, mdlen)) CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE); else r = 1; } else { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dd->digest, md, mdlen)) goto err; r = 1; } err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return r; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c0000644000000000000000000006417613176625656015616 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_lcl.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" /* CMS SignedData Utilities */ static CMS_SignedData *cms_get0_signed(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_signed) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_SIGNED, CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_SIGNED_DATA); return NULL; } return cms->d.signedData; } static CMS_SignedData *cms_signed_data_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { if (cms->d.other == NULL) { cms->d.signedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_SignedData); if (!cms->d.signedData) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNED_DATA_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } cms->d.signedData->version = 1; cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->partial = 1; ASN1_OBJECT_free(cms->contentType); cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed); return cms->d.signedData; } return cms_get0_signed(cms); } /* Just initialise SignedData e.g. for certs only structure */ int CMS_SignedData_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { if (cms_signed_data_init(cms)) return 1; else return 0; } /* Check structures and fixup version numbers (if necessary) */ static void cms_sd_set_version(CMS_SignedData *sd) { int i; CMS_CertificateChoices *cch; CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch; CMS_SignerInfo *si; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(sd->certificates); i++) { cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(sd->certificates, i); if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_OTHER) { if (sd->version < 5) sd->version = 5; } else if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_V2ACERT) { if (sd->version < 4) sd->version = 4; } else if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_V1ACERT) { if (sd->version < 3) sd->version = 3; } } for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(sd->crls); i++) { rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(sd->crls, i); if (rch->type == CMS_REVCHOICE_OTHER) { if (sd->version < 5) sd->version = 5; } } if ((OBJ_obj2nid(sd->encapContentInfo->eContentType) != NID_pkcs7_data) && (sd->version < 3)) sd->version = 3; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sd->signerInfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sd->signerInfos, i); if (si->sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER) { if (si->version < 3) si->version = 3; if (sd->version < 3) sd->version = 3; } else if (si->version < 1) si->version = 1; } if (sd->version < 1) sd->version = 1; } /* Copy an existing messageDigest value */ static int cms_copy_messageDigest(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_SignerInfo *si) { STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos; CMS_SignerInfo *sitmp; int i; sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *messageDigest; sitmp = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i); if (sitmp == si) continue; if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(sitmp) < 0) continue; if (OBJ_cmp(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm, sitmp->digestAlgorithm->algorithm)) continue; messageDigest = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(sitmp, OBJ_nid2obj (NID_pkcs9_messageDigest), -3, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); if (!messageDigest) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST, CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE); return 0; } if (CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, messageDigest, -1)) return 1; else return 0; } CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST); return 0; } int cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert, int type) { switch (type) { case CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL: if (!cms_set1_ias(&sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert)) return 0; break; case CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER: if (!cms_set1_keyid(&sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert)) return 0; break; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID); return 0; } sid->type = type; return 1; } int cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL) { if (issuer) *issuer = sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer; if (sno) *sno = sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber; } else if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER) { if (keyid) *keyid = sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier; } else return 0; return 1; } int cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerIdentifier *sid, X509 *cert) { if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL) return cms_ias_cert_cmp(sid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert); else if (sid->type == CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER) return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(sid->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert); else return -1; } static int cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int cmd) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = si->pkey; int i; if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) return 1; i = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN, cmd, si); if (i == -2) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); return 0; } if (i <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { CMS_SignedData *sd; CMS_SignerInfo *si = NULL; X509_ALGOR *alg; int i, type; if (!X509_check_private_key(signer, pk)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, CMS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE); return NULL; } sd = cms_signed_data_init(cms); if (!sd) goto err; si = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_SignerInfo); if (!si) goto merr; /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(signer, -1, -1); X509_up_ref(signer); EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); si->pkey = pk; si->signer = signer; si->mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); si->pctx = NULL; if (si->mctx == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { si->version = 3; if (sd->version < 3) sd->version = 3; type = CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER; } else { type = CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL; si->version = 1; } if (!cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(si->sid, signer, type)) goto err; if (md == NULL) { int def_nid; if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pk, &def_nid) <= 0) goto err; md = EVP_get_digestbynid(def_nid); if (md == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, CMS_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST); goto err; } } if (!md) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, CMS_R_NO_DIGEST_SET); goto err; } X509_ALGOR_set_md(si->digestAlgorithm, md); /* See if digest is present in digestAlgorithms */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(sd->digestAlgorithms); i++) { const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; alg = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(sd->digestAlgorithms, i); X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, alg); if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) == EVP_MD_type(md)) break; } if (i == sk_X509_ALGOR_num(sd->digestAlgorithms)) { alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (alg == NULL) goto merr; X509_ALGOR_set_md(alg, md); if (!sk_X509_ALGOR_push(sd->digestAlgorithms, alg)) { X509_ALGOR_free(alg); goto merr; } } if (!(flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM) && !cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 0)) goto err; if (!(flags & CMS_NOATTR)) { /* * Initialize signed attributes structure so other attributes * such as signing time etc are added later even if we add none here. */ if (!si->signedAttrs) { si->signedAttrs = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null(); if (!si->signedAttrs) goto merr; } if (!(flags & CMS_NOSMIMECAP)) { STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *smcap = NULL; i = CMS_add_standard_smimecap(&smcap); if (i) i = CMS_add_smimecap(si, smcap); sk_X509_ALGOR_pop_free(smcap, X509_ALGOR_free); if (!i) goto merr; } if (flags & CMS_REUSE_DIGEST) { if (!cms_copy_messageDigest(cms, si)) goto err; if (!(flags & (CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_KEY_PARAM)) && !CMS_SignerInfo_sign(si)) goto err; } } if (!(flags & CMS_NOCERTS)) { /* NB ignore -1 return for duplicate cert */ if (!CMS_add1_cert(cms, signer)) goto merr; } if (flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM) { if (flags & CMS_NOATTR) { si->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL); if (si->pctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(si->pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(si->pctx, md) <= 0) goto err; } else if (EVP_DigestSignInit(si->mctx, &si->pctx, md, NULL, pk) <= 0) goto err; } if (!sd->signerInfos) sd->signerInfos = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_new_null(); if (!sd->signerInfos || !sk_CMS_SignerInfo_push(sd->signerInfos, si)) goto merr; return si; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: M_ASN1_free_of(si, CMS_SignerInfo); return NULL; } static int cms_add1_signingTime(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_TIME *t) { ASN1_TIME *tt; int r = 0; if (t) tt = t; else tt = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0); if (!tt) goto merr; if (CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime, tt->type, tt, -1) <= 0) goto merr; r = 1; merr: if (!t) ASN1_TIME_free(tt); if (!r) CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNINGTIME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return r; } EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { return si->pctx; } EVP_MD_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_md_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { return si->mctx; } STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *CMS_get0_SignerInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_SignedData *sd; sd = cms_get0_signed(cms); if (!sd) return NULL; return sd->signerInfos; } STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { STACK_OF(X509) *signers = NULL; STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos; CMS_SignerInfo *si; int i; sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i); if (si->signer) { if (!signers) { signers = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!signers) return NULL; } if (!sk_X509_push(signers, si->signer)) { sk_X509_free(signers); return NULL; } } } return signers; } void CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signer) { if (signer) { X509_up_ref(signer); EVP_PKEY_free(si->pkey); si->pkey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); } X509_free(si->signer); si->signer = signer; } int CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { return cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(si->sid, keyid, issuer, sno); } int CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *cert) { return cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(si->sid, cert); } int CMS_set1_signers_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *scerts, unsigned int flags) { CMS_SignedData *sd; CMS_SignerInfo *si; CMS_CertificateChoices *cch; STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) *certs; X509 *x; int i, j; int ret = 0; sd = cms_get0_signed(cms); if (!sd) return -1; certs = sd->certificates; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sd->signerInfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sd->signerInfos, i); if (si->signer) continue; for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(scerts); j++) { x = sk_X509_value(scerts, j); if (CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(si, x) == 0) { CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(si, x); ret++; break; } } if (si->signer || (flags & CMS_NOINTERN)) continue; for (j = 0; j < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(certs); j++) { cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(certs, j); if (cch->type != 0) continue; x = cch->d.certificate; if (CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(si, x) == 0) { CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(si, x); ret++; break; } } } return ret; } void CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(CMS_SignerInfo *si, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509 **signer, X509_ALGOR **pdig, X509_ALGOR **psig) { if (pk) *pk = si->pkey; if (signer) *signer = si->signer; if (pdig) *pdig = si->digestAlgorithm; if (psig) *psig = si->signatureAlgorithm; } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { return si->signature; } static int cms_SignerInfo_content_sign(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); int r = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; if (mctx == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!si->pkey) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY); goto err; } if (!cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(mctx, chain, si->digestAlgorithm)) goto err; /* Set SignerInfo algorithm details if we used custom parameter */ if (si->pctx && !cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 0)) goto err; /* * If any signed attributes calculate and add messageDigest attribute */ if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) >= 0) { ASN1_OBJECT *ctype = cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->eContentType; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int mdlen; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, &mdlen)) goto err; if (!CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, md, mdlen)) goto err; /* Copy content type across */ if (CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT, ctype, -1) <= 0) goto err; if (!CMS_SignerInfo_sign(si)) goto err; } else if (si->pctx) { unsigned char *sig; size_t siglen; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int mdlen; pctx = si->pctx; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, &mdlen)) goto err; siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey); sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (sig == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, sig, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(sig); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(si->signature, sig, siglen); } else { unsigned char *sig; unsigned int siglen; sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey)); if (sig == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen, si->pkey)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN, CMS_R_SIGNFINAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(sig); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(si->signature, sig, siglen); } r = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return r; } int cms_SignedData_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *chain) { STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos; CMS_SignerInfo *si; int i; sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i); if (!cms_SignerInfo_content_sign(cms, si, chain)) return 0; } cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->partial = 0; return 1; } int CMS_SignerInfo_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = si->mctx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; unsigned char *abuf = NULL; int alen; size_t siglen; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm); if (md == NULL) return 0; if (CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime, -1) < 0) { if (!cms_add1_signingTime(si, NULL)) goto err; } if (si->pctx) pctx = si->pctx; else { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx); if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0) goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN, 0, si) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->signedAttrs, &abuf, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Attributes_Sign)); if (!abuf) goto err; if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, abuf, alen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_free(abuf); abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (abuf == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, abuf, &siglen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN, 1, si) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx); ASN1_STRING_set0(si->signature, abuf, siglen); return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(abuf); EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx); return 0; } int CMS_SignerInfo_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; unsigned char *abuf = NULL; int alen, r = -1; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; if (!si->pkey) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY); return -1; } md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digestAlgorithm->algorithm); if (md == NULL) return -1; if (si->mctx == NULL) si->mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); mctx = si->mctx; if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &si->pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0) goto err; if (!cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 1)) goto err; alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->signedAttrs, &abuf, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_Attributes_Verify)); if (!abuf) goto err; r = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, abuf, alen); OPENSSL_free(abuf); if (r <= 0) { r = -1; goto err; } r = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, si->signature->data, si->signature->length); if (r <= 0) CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE); err: EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx); return r; } /* Create a chain of digest BIOs from a CMS ContentInfo */ BIO *cms_SignedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { int i; CMS_SignedData *sd; BIO *chain = NULL; sd = cms_get0_signed(cms); if (!sd) return NULL; if (cms->d.signedData->encapContentInfo->partial) cms_sd_set_version(sd); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(sd->digestAlgorithms); i++) { X509_ALGOR *digestAlgorithm; BIO *mdbio; digestAlgorithm = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(sd->digestAlgorithms, i); mdbio = cms_DigestAlgorithm_init_bio(digestAlgorithm); if (!mdbio) goto err; if (chain) BIO_push(chain, mdbio); else chain = mdbio; } return chain; err: BIO_free_all(chain); return NULL; } int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL; int r = -1; unsigned char mval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int mlen; if (mctx == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* If we have any signed attributes look for messageDigest value */ if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) >= 0) { os = CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(si, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs9_messageDigest), -3, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); if (!os) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT, CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE); goto err; } } if (!cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(mctx, chain, si->digestAlgorithm)) goto err; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, mval, &mlen) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT, CMS_R_UNABLE_TO_FINALIZE_CONTEXT); goto err; } /* If messageDigest found compare it */ if (os) { if (mlen != (unsigned int)os->length) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT, CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } if (memcmp(mval, os->data, mlen)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE); r = 0; } else r = 1; } else { const EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(mctx); pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL); if (pkctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, md) <= 0) goto err; si->pctx = pkctx; if (!cms_sd_asn1_ctrl(si, 1)) goto err; r = EVP_PKEY_verify(pkctx, si->signature->data, si->signature->length, mval, mlen); if (r <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE); r = 0; } } err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return r; } int CMS_add_smimecap(CMS_SignerInfo *si, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *algs) { unsigned char *smder = NULL; int smderlen, r; smderlen = i2d_X509_ALGORS(algs, &smder); if (smderlen <= 0) return 0; r = CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(si, NID_SMIMECapabilities, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, smder, smderlen); OPENSSL_free(smder); return r; } int CMS_add_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **algs, int algnid, int keysize) { X509_ALGOR *alg; ASN1_INTEGER *key = NULL; if (keysize > 0) { key = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (key == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(key, keysize)) return 0; } alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (alg == NULL) { ASN1_INTEGER_free(key); return 0; } X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(algnid), key ? V_ASN1_INTEGER : V_ASN1_UNDEF, key); if (*algs == NULL) *algs = sk_X509_ALGOR_new_null(); if (*algs == NULL || !sk_X509_ALGOR_push(*algs, alg)) { X509_ALGOR_free(alg); return 0; } return 1; } /* Check to see if a cipher exists and if so add S/MIME capabilities */ static int cms_add_cipher_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **sk, int nid, int arg) { if (EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid)) return CMS_add_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg); return 1; } static int cms_add_digest_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **sk, int nid, int arg) { if (EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) return CMS_add_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg); return 1; } int CMS_add_standard_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **smcap) { if (!cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_256_cbc, -1) || !cms_add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, -1) || !cms_add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, -1) || !cms_add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_94, -1) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_id_Gost28147_89, -1) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_192_cbc, -1) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_128_cbc, -1) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_ede3_cbc, -1) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 128) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 64) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_cbc, -1) || !cms_add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 40)) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cversion.c0000644000000000000000000000272413176625657015404 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef NO_WINDOWS_BRAINDEATH # include "buildinf.h" #endif unsigned long OpenSSL_version_num(void) { return OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER; } const char *OpenSSL_version(int t) { if (t == OPENSSL_VERSION) return OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; if (t == OPENSSL_BUILT_ON) { #ifdef DATE # ifdef OPENSSL_USE_BUILD_DATE return (DATE); # else return ("built on: reproducible build, date unspecified"); # endif #else return ("built on: date not available"); #endif } if (t == OPENSSL_CFLAGS) { #ifdef CFLAGS return (CFLAGS); #else return ("compiler: information not available"); #endif } if (t == OPENSSL_PLATFORM) { #ifdef PLATFORM return (PLATFORM); #else return ("platform: information not available"); #endif } if (t == OPENSSL_DIR) { #ifdef OPENSSLDIR return "OPENSSLDIR: \"" OPENSSLDIR "\""; #else return "OPENSSLDIR: N/A"; #endif } if (t == OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR) { #ifdef ENGINESDIR return "ENGINESDIR: \"" ENGINESDIR "\""; #else return "ENGINESDIR: N/A"; #endif } return ("not available"); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cmac/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014305 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cmac/cm_ameth.c0000644000000000000000000000201613176625656016225 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" /* * CMAC "ASN1" method. This is just here to indicate the maximum CMAC output * length and to free up a CMAC key. */ static int cmac_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; } static void cmac_key_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { CMAC_CTX *cmctx = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey); CMAC_CTX_free(cmctx); } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD cmac_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_CMAC, EVP_PKEY_CMAC, 0, "CMAC", "OpenSSL CMAC method", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, cmac_size, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, cmac_key_free, 0, 0, 0 }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cmac/build.info0000644000000000000000000000011213176625656016253 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=cmac.c cm_ameth.c cm_pmeth.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cmac/cmac.c0000644000000000000000000001470413176625656015362 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include struct CMAC_CTX_st { /* Cipher context to use */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx; /* Keys k1 and k2 */ unsigned char k1[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; unsigned char k2[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* Temporary block */ unsigned char tbl[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* Last (possibly partial) block */ unsigned char last_block[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* Number of bytes in last block: -1 means context not initialised */ int nlast_block; }; /* Make temporary keys K1 and K2 */ static void make_kn(unsigned char *k1, const unsigned char *l, int bl) { int i; unsigned char c = l[0], carry = c >> 7, cnext; /* Shift block to left, including carry */ for (i = 0; i < bl - 1; i++, c = cnext) k1[i] = (c << 1) | ((cnext = l[i + 1]) >> 7); /* If MSB set fixup with R */ k1[i] = (c << 1) ^ ((0 - carry) & (bl == 16 ? 0x87 : 0x1b)); } CMAC_CTX *CMAC_CTX_new(void) { CMAC_CTX *ctx; ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return NULL; ctx->cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx->cctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return NULL; } ctx->nlast_block = -1; return ctx; } void CMAC_CTX_cleanup(CMAC_CTX *ctx) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx->cctx); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbl, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k1, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->k2, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->last_block, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); ctx->nlast_block = -1; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cctx; } void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->cctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int CMAC_CTX_copy(CMAC_CTX *out, const CMAC_CTX *in) { int bl; if (in->nlast_block == -1) return 0; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(out->cctx, in->cctx)) return 0; bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(in->cctx); memcpy(out->k1, in->k1, bl); memcpy(out->k2, in->k2, bl); memcpy(out->tbl, in->tbl, bl); memcpy(out->last_block, in->last_block, bl); out->nlast_block = in->nlast_block; return 1; } int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl) { static const unsigned char zero_iv[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 }; /* All zeros means restart */ if (!key && !cipher && !impl && keylen == 0) { /* Not initialised */ if (ctx->nlast_block == -1) return 0; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, zero_iv)) return 0; memset(ctx->tbl, 0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx)); ctx->nlast_block = 0; return 1; } /* Initialise context */ if (cipher && !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, cipher, impl, NULL, NULL)) return 0; /* Non-NULL key means initialisation complete */ if (key) { int bl; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx->cctx)) return 0; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->cctx, keylen)) return 0; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, key, zero_iv)) return 0; bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx); if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, zero_iv, bl)) return 0; make_kn(ctx->k1, ctx->tbl, bl); make_kn(ctx->k2, ctx->k1, bl); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbl, bl); /* Reset context again ready for first data block */ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, zero_iv)) return 0; /* Zero tbl so resume works */ memset(ctx->tbl, 0, bl); ctx->nlast_block = 0; } return 1; } int CMAC_Update(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t dlen) { const unsigned char *data = in; size_t bl; if (ctx->nlast_block == -1) return 0; if (dlen == 0) return 1; bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx); /* Copy into partial block if we need to */ if (ctx->nlast_block > 0) { size_t nleft; nleft = bl - ctx->nlast_block; if (dlen < nleft) nleft = dlen; memcpy(ctx->last_block + ctx->nlast_block, data, nleft); dlen -= nleft; ctx->nlast_block += nleft; /* If no more to process return */ if (dlen == 0) return 1; data += nleft; /* Else not final block so encrypt it */ if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, ctx->last_block, bl)) return 0; } /* Encrypt all but one of the complete blocks left */ while (dlen > bl) { if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, data, bl)) return 0; dlen -= bl; data += bl; } /* Copy any data left to last block buffer */ memcpy(ctx->last_block, data, dlen); ctx->nlast_block = dlen; return 1; } int CMAC_Final(CMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen) { int i, bl, lb; if (ctx->nlast_block == -1) return 0; bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx); *poutlen = (size_t)bl; if (!out) return 1; lb = ctx->nlast_block; /* Is last block complete? */ if (lb == bl) { for (i = 0; i < bl; i++) out[i] = ctx->last_block[i] ^ ctx->k1[i]; } else { ctx->last_block[lb] = 0x80; if (bl - lb > 1) memset(ctx->last_block + lb + 1, 0, bl - lb - 1); for (i = 0; i < bl; i++) out[i] = ctx->last_block[i] ^ ctx->k2[i]; } if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, out, out, bl)) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, bl); return 0; } return 1; } int CMAC_resume(CMAC_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->nlast_block == -1) return 0; /* * The buffer "tbl" contains the last fully encrypted block which is the * last IV (or all zeroes if no last encrypted block). The last block has * not been modified since CMAC_final(). So reinitialising using the last * decrypted block will allow CMAC to continue after calling * CMAC_Final(). */ return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, ctx->tbl); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cmac/cm_pmeth.c0000644000000000000000000000710113176625656016244 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" /* The context structure and "key" is simply a CMAC_CTX */ static int pkey_cmac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { ctx->data = CMAC_CTX_new(); if (ctx->data == NULL) return 0; ctx->keygen_info_count = 0; return 1; } static int pkey_cmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { if (!pkey_cmac_init(dst)) return 0; if (!CMAC_CTX_copy(dst->data, src->data)) return 0; return 1; } static void pkey_cmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { CMAC_CTX_free(ctx->data); } static int pkey_cmac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { CMAC_CTX *cmkey = CMAC_CTX_new(); CMAC_CTX *cmctx = ctx->data; if (cmkey == NULL) return 0; if (!CMAC_CTX_copy(cmkey, cmctx)) { CMAC_CTX_free(cmkey); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_CMAC, cmkey); return 1; } static int int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { if (!CMAC_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->data, data, count)) return 0; return 1; } static int cmac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT); EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, int_update); return 1; } static int cmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { return CMAC_Final(ctx->data, sig, siglen); } static int pkey_cmac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { CMAC_CTX *cmctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY: if (!p2 || p1 < 0) return 0; if (!CMAC_Init(cmctx, p2, p1, NULL, NULL)) return 0; break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER: if (!CMAC_Init(cmctx, NULL, 0, p2, ctx->engine)) return 0; break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: if (ctx->pkey && !CMAC_CTX_copy(ctx->data, (CMAC_CTX *)ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr)) return 0; if (!CMAC_Init(cmctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) return 0; break; default: return -2; } return 1; } static int pkey_cmac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (!value) { return 0; } if (strcmp(type, "cipher") == 0) { const EVP_CIPHER *c; c = EVP_get_cipherbyname(value); if (!c) return 0; return pkey_cmac_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, -1, (void *)c); } if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value); if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value); return -2; } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD cmac_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_CMAC, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM, pkey_cmac_init, pkey_cmac_copy, pkey_cmac_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, pkey_cmac_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, cmac_signctx_init, cmac_signctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_cmac_ctrl, pkey_cmac_ctrl_str }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mem_clr.c0000644000000000000000000000140213176625657015162 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include /* * Pointer to memset is volatile so that compiler must de-reference * the pointer and can't assume that it points to any function in * particular (such as memset, which it then might further "optimize") */ typedef void *(*memset_t)(void *, int, size_t); static volatile memset_t memset_func = memset; void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len) { memset_func(ptr, 0, len); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/kdf/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014147 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/kdf/build.info0000644000000000000000000000012313176625657016117 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c hkdf.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c0000644000000000000000000000242513176625657015732 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR), "pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str"}, {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE), "pkey_tls1_prf_derive"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"}, {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER), "missing parameter"}, {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(KDF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c0000644000000000000000000001644213176625657015236 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024 static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len); static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len); static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len); typedef struct { const EVP_MD *md; unsigned char *salt; size_t salt_len; unsigned char *key; size_t key_len; unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF]; size_t info_len; } HKDF_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_hkdf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx; kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx)); if (kctx == NULL) return 0; ctx->data = kctx; return 1; } static void pkey_hkdf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len); OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->info, kctx->info_len); OPENSSL_free(kctx); } static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD: if (p2 == NULL) return 0; kctx->md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT: if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL) return 1; if (p1 < 0) return 0; if (kctx->salt != NULL) OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len); kctx->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1); if (kctx->salt == NULL) return 0; kctx->salt_len = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY: if (p1 < 0) return 0; if (kctx->key != NULL) OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len); kctx->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1); if (kctx->key == NULL) return 0; kctx->key_len = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO: if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL) return 1; if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(HKDF_MAXBUF - kctx->info_len)) return 0; memcpy(kctx->info + kctx->info_len, p2, p1); kctx->info_len += p1; return 1; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(ctx, EVP_get_digestbyname(value)); if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value); if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value); if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value); if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value); if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value); if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value); return -2; } static int pkey_hkdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->key == NULL) return 0; if (HKDF(kctx->md, kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len, kctx->key, kctx->key_len, kctx->info, kctx->info_len, key, *keylen) == NULL) { return 0; } return 1; } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_HKDF, 0, pkey_hkdf_init, 0, pkey_hkdf_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_hkdf_derive, pkey_hkdf_ctrl, pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str }; static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len) { unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t prk_len; if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &prk_len)) return NULL; return HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len); } static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len) { unsigned int tmp_len; if (!HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &tmp_len)) return NULL; *prk_len = tmp_len; return prk; } static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len) { HMAC_CTX *hmac; unsigned int i; unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t done_len = 0, dig_len = EVP_MD_size(evp_md); size_t n = okm_len / dig_len; if (okm_len % dig_len) n++; if (n > 255) return NULL; if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL)) goto err; for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) { size_t copy_len; const unsigned char ctr = i; if (i > 1) { if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len)) goto err; } if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL)) goto err; copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ? okm_len - done_len : dig_len; memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len); done_len += copy_len; } HMAC_CTX_free(hmac); return okm; err: HMAC_CTX_free(hmac); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c0000644000000000000000000001640613176625657016054 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen, const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *out, size_t olen); #define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024 /* TLS KDF pkey context structure */ typedef struct { /* Digest to use for PRF */ const EVP_MD *md; /* Secret value to use for PRF */ unsigned char *sec; size_t seclen; /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */ unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF]; size_t seedlen; } TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_tls1_prf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx; kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx)); if (kctx == NULL) return 0; ctx->data = kctx; return 1; } static void pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen); OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen); OPENSSL_free(kctx); } static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD: kctx->md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET: if (p1 < 0) return 0; if (kctx->sec != NULL) OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen); OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen); kctx->seedlen = 0; kctx->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1); if (kctx->sec == NULL) return 0; kctx->seclen = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED: if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL) return 1; if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - kctx->seedlen)) return 0; memcpy(kctx->seed + kctx->seedlen, p2, p1); kctx->seedlen += p1; return 1; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (value == NULL) { KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING); return 0; } if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) { TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value); if (md == NULL) { KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST); return 0; } kctx->md = md; return 1; } if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value); if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value); if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value); if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value); return -2; } static int pkey_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data; if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->sec == NULL || kctx->seedlen == 0) { KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER); return 0; } return tls1_prf_alg(kctx->md, kctx->sec, kctx->seclen, kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen, key, *keylen); } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, 0, pkey_tls1_prf_init, 0, pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_tls1_prf_derive, pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl, pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str }; static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len, const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) { int chunk; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL; unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t A1_len; int ret = 0; chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); if (mac_key == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)) goto err; if (seed != NULL && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; for (;;) { /* Reinit mac contexts */ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len)) goto err; if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (seed && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len)) goto err; if (olen > (size_t)chunk) { size_t mac_len; if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &mac_len)) goto err; out += mac_len; olen -= mac_len; /* calc the next A1 value */ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; } else { /* last one */ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; memcpy(out, A1, olen); break; } } ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init); OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); return ret; } static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen, const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) { if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) { size_t i; unsigned char *tmp; if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1), seed, seed_len, out, olen)) return 0; tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1), seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) { OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) out[i] ^= tmp[i]; OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen); return 1; } if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen)) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/s390xcpuid.S0000644000000000000000000000654013176625657015447 0ustar rootroot.text // Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. // // Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use // this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy // in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at // https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html .globl OPENSSL_s390x_facilities .type OPENSSL_s390x_facilities,@function .align 16 OPENSSL_s390x_facilities: lghi %r0,0 larl %r4,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P stg %r0,8(%r4) # wipe capability vectors stg %r0,16(%r4) stg %r0,24(%r4) stg %r0,32(%r4) stg %r0,40(%r4) stg %r0,48(%r4) stg %r0,56(%r4) stg %r0,64(%r4) stg %r0,72(%r4) .long 0xb2b04000 # stfle 0(%r4) brc 8,.Ldone lghi %r0,1 .long 0xb2b04000 # stfle 0(%r4) .Ldone: lmg %r2,%r3,0(%r4) tmhl %r2,0x4000 # check for message-security-assist jz .Lret lghi %r0,0 # query kimd capabilities la %r1,16(%r4) .long 0xb93e0002 # kimd %r0,%r2 lghi %r0,0 # query km capability vector la %r1,32(%r4) .long 0xb92e0042 # km %r4,%r2 lghi %r0,0 # query kmc capability vector la %r1,48(%r4) .long 0xb92f0042 # kmc %r4,%r2 tmhh %r3,0x0004 # check for message-security-assist-4 jz .Lret lghi %r0,0 # query kmctr capability vector la %r1,64(%r4) .long 0xb92d2042 # kmctr %r4,%r2,%r2 .Lret: br %r14 .size OPENSSL_s390x_facilities,.-OPENSSL_s390x_facilities .globl OPENSSL_rdtsc .type OPENSSL_rdtsc,@function .align 16 OPENSSL_rdtsc: stck 16(%r15) lg %r2,16(%r15) br %r14 .size OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-OPENSSL_rdtsc .globl OPENSSL_atomic_add .type OPENSSL_atomic_add,@function .align 16 OPENSSL_atomic_add: l %r1,0(%r2) .Lspin: lr %r0,%r1 ar %r0,%r3 cs %r1,%r0,0(%r2) brc 4,.Lspin lgfr %r2,%r0 # OpenSSL expects the new value br %r14 .size OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add .globl OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .type OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,@function .align 16 OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: xgr %r0,%r0 xgr %r1,%r1 lgr %r2,%r15 xgr %r3,%r3 xgr %r4,%r4 lzdr %f0 lzdr %f1 lzdr %f2 lzdr %f3 lzdr %f4 lzdr %f5 lzdr %f6 lzdr %f7 br %r14 .size OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .globl OPENSSL_cleanse .type OPENSSL_cleanse,@function .align 16 OPENSSL_cleanse: #if !defined(__s390x__) && !defined(__s390x) llgfr %r3,%r3 #endif lghi %r4,15 lghi %r0,0 clgr %r3,%r4 jh .Lot clgr %r3,%r0 bcr 8,%r14 .Little: stc %r0,0(%r2) la %r2,1(%r2) brctg %r3,.Little br %r14 .align 4 .Lot: tmll %r2,7 jz .Laligned stc %r0,0(%r2) la %r2,1(%r2) brctg %r3,.Lot .Laligned: srlg %r4,%r3,3 .Loop: stg %r0,0(%r2) la %r2,8(%r2) brctg %r4,.Loop lghi %r4,7 ngr %r3,%r4 jnz .Little br %r14 .size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse .globl CRYPTO_memcmp .type CRYPTO_memcmp,@function .align 16 CRYPTO_memcmp: #if !defined(__s390x__) && !defined(__s390x) llgfr %r4,%r4 #endif lghi %r5,0 clgr %r4,%r5 je .Lno_data .Loop_cmp: llgc %r0,0(%r2) la %r2,1(%r2) llgc %r1,0(%r3) la %r3,1(%r3) xr %r1,%r0 or %r5,%r1 brctg %r4,.Loop_cmp lnr %r5,%r5 srl %r5,31 .Lno_data: lgr %r2,%r5 br %r14 .size CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp .globl OPENSSL_instrument_bus .type OPENSSL_instrument_bus,@function .align 16 OPENSSL_instrument_bus: lghi %r2,0 br %r14 .size OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus .globl OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .type OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,@function .align 16 OPENSSL_instrument_bus2: lghi %r2,0 br %r14 .size OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .section .init brasl %r14,OPENSSL_cpuid_setup openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/LPdir_nyi.c0000644000000000000000000000370513176625656015444 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef LPDIR_H # include "LPdir.h" #endif struct LP_dir_context_st { void *dummy; }; const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ppc_arch.h0000644000000000000000000000136113176625657015334 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_PPC_ARCH_H # define HEADER_PPC_ARCH_H extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ppccap_P; /* * Flags' usage can appear ambiguous, because they are set rather * to reflect OpenSSL performance preferences than actual processor * capabilities. */ # define PPC_FPU64 (1<<0) # define PPC_ALTIVEC (1<<1) # define PPC_CRYPTO207 (1<<2) # define PPC_FPU (1<<3) # define PPC_MADD300 (1<<4) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/arm_arch.h0000644000000000000000000000502213176625656015326 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef __ARM_ARCH_H__ # define __ARM_ARCH_H__ # if !defined(__ARM_ARCH__) # if defined(__CC_ARM) # define __ARM_ARCH__ __TARGET_ARCH_ARM # if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN) # define __ARMEB__ # else # define __ARMEL__ # endif # elif defined(__GNUC__) # if defined(__aarch64__) # define __ARM_ARCH__ 8 # if __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ # define __ARMEB__ # else # define __ARMEL__ # endif /* * Why doesn't gcc define __ARM_ARCH__? Instead it defines * bunch of below macros. See all_architectires[] table in * gcc/config/arm/arm.c. On a side note it defines * __ARMEL__/__ARMEB__ for little-/big-endian. */ # elif defined(__ARM_ARCH) # define __ARM_ARCH__ __ARM_ARCH # elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_8A__) # define __ARM_ARCH__ 8 # elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_7__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__) || \ defined(__ARM_ARCH_7R__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_7M__) || \ defined(__ARM_ARCH_7EM__) # define __ARM_ARCH__ 7 # elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_6__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_6J__) || \ defined(__ARM_ARCH_6K__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_6M__) || \ defined(__ARM_ARCH_6Z__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_6ZK__) || \ defined(__ARM_ARCH_6T2__) # define __ARM_ARCH__ 6 # elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_5__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_5T__) || \ defined(__ARM_ARCH_5E__)|| defined(__ARM_ARCH_5TE__) || \ defined(__ARM_ARCH_5TEJ__) # define __ARM_ARCH__ 5 # elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_4__) || defined(__ARM_ARCH_4T__) # define __ARM_ARCH__ 4 # else # error "unsupported ARM architecture" # endif # endif # endif # if !defined(__ARM_MAX_ARCH__) # define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ __ARM_ARCH__ # endif # if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__<__ARM_ARCH__ # error "__ARM_MAX_ARCH__ can't be less than __ARM_ARCH__" # elif __ARM_MAX_ARCH__!=__ARM_ARCH__ # if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && defined(__ARMEB__) # error "can't build universal big-endian binary" # endif # endif # if !__ASSEMBLER__ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P; # endif # define ARMV7_NEON (1<<0) # define ARMV7_TICK (1<<1) # define ARMV8_AES (1<<2) # define ARMV8_SHA1 (1<<3) # define ARMV8_SHA256 (1<<4) # define ARMV8_PMULL (1<<5) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014677 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/build.info0000644000000000000000000000162313176625657016655 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ poly1305.c {- $target{poly1305_asm_src} -} GENERATE[poly1305-sparcv9.S]=asm/poly1305-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[poly1305-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[poly1305-x86.s]=asm/poly1305-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) GENERATE[poly1305-x86_64.s]=asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[poly1305-ppc.s]=asm/poly1305-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[poly1305-ppcfp.s]=asm/poly1305-ppcfp.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[poly1305-armv4.S]=asm/poly1305-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[poly1305-armv4.o]=.. GENERATE[poly1305-armv8.S]=asm/poly1305-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[poly1305-armv8.o]=.. GENERATE[poly1305-mips.S]=asm/poly1305-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)] {- $builddir -}/poly1305-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/poly1305-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c0000644000000000000000000010726713176625657016354 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/poly1305.h" typedef void (*poly1305_blocks_f) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, unsigned int padbit); typedef void (*poly1305_emit_f) (void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const unsigned int nonce[4]); struct poly1305_context { double opaque[24]; /* large enough to hold internal state, declared * 'double' to ensure at least 64-bit invariant * alignment across all platforms and * configurations */ unsigned int nonce[4]; unsigned char data[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]; size_t num; struct { poly1305_blocks_f blocks; poly1305_emit_f emit; } func; }; size_t Poly1305_ctx_size () { return sizeof(struct poly1305_context); } /* pick 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian order */ static unsigned int U8TOU32(const unsigned char *p) { return (((unsigned int)(p[0] & 0xff)) | ((unsigned int)(p[1] & 0xff) << 8) | ((unsigned int)(p[2] & 0xff) << 16) | ((unsigned int)(p[3] & 0xff) << 24)); } /* * Implementations can be classified by amount of significant bits in * words making up the multi-precision value, or in other words radix * or base of numerical representation, e.g. base 2^64, base 2^32, * base 2^26. Complementary characteristic is how wide is the result of * multiplication of pair of digits, e.g. it would take 128 bits to * accommodate multiplication result in base 2^64 case. These are used * interchangeably. To describe implementation that is. But interface * is designed to isolate this so that low-level primitives implemented * in assembly can be self-contained/self-coherent. */ #ifndef POLY1305_ASM /* * Even though there is __int128 reference implementation targeting * 64-bit platforms provided below, it's not obvious that it's optimal * choice for every one of them. Depending on instruction set overall * amount of instructions can be comparable to one in __int64 * implementation. Amount of multiplication instructions would be lower, * but not necessarily overall. And in out-of-order execution context, * it is the latter that can be crucial... * * On related note. Poly1305 author, D. J. Bernstein, discusses and * provides floating-point implementations of the algorithm in question. * It made a lot of sense by the time of introduction, because most * then-modern processors didn't have pipelined integer multiplier. * [Not to mention that some had non-constant timing for integer * multiplications.] Floating-point instructions on the other hand could * be issued every cycle, which allowed to achieve better performance. * Nowadays, with SIMD and/or out-or-order execution, shared or * even emulated FPU, it's more complicated, and floating-point * implementation is not necessarily optimal choice in every situation, * rather contrary... * * */ typedef unsigned int u32; /* * poly1305_blocks processes a multiple of POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE blocks * of |inp| no longer than |len|. Behaviour for |len| not divisible by * block size is unspecified in general case, even though in reference * implementation the trailing chunk is simply ignored. Per algorithm * specification, every input block, complete or last partial, is to be * padded with a bit past most significant byte. The latter kind is then * padded with zeros till block size. This last partial block padding * is caller(*)'s responsibility, and because of this the last partial * block is always processed with separate call with |len| set to * POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE and |padbit| to 0. In all other cases |padbit| * should be set to 1 to perform implicit padding with 128th bit. * poly1305_blocks does not actually check for this constraint though, * it's caller(*)'s responsibility to comply. * * (*) In the context "caller" is not application code, but higher * level Poly1305_* from this very module, so that quirks are * handled locally. */ static void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, u32 padbit); /* * Type-agnostic "rip-off" from constant_time_locl.h */ # define CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(a,b) ( \ (a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1) \ ) # if !defined(PEDANTIC) && \ (defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__==16) && \ (defined(__SIZEOF_LONG__) && __SIZEOF_LONG__==8) typedef unsigned long u64; typedef unsigned __int128 u128; typedef struct { u64 h[3]; u64 r[2]; } poly1305_internal; /* pick 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian order */ static u64 U8TOU64(const unsigned char *p) { return (((u64)(p[0] & 0xff)) | ((u64)(p[1] & 0xff) << 8) | ((u64)(p[2] & 0xff) << 16) | ((u64)(p[3] & 0xff) << 24) | ((u64)(p[4] & 0xff) << 32) | ((u64)(p[5] & 0xff) << 40) | ((u64)(p[6] & 0xff) << 48) | ((u64)(p[7] & 0xff) << 56)); } /* store a 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian */ static void U64TO8(unsigned char *p, u64 v) { p[0] = (unsigned char)((v) & 0xff); p[1] = (unsigned char)((v >> 8) & 0xff); p[2] = (unsigned char)((v >> 16) & 0xff); p[3] = (unsigned char)((v >> 24) & 0xff); p[4] = (unsigned char)((v >> 32) & 0xff); p[5] = (unsigned char)((v >> 40) & 0xff); p[6] = (unsigned char)((v >> 48) & 0xff); p[7] = (unsigned char)((v >> 56) & 0xff); } static void poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx; /* h = 0 */ st->h[0] = 0; st->h[1] = 0; st->h[2] = 0; /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ st->r[0] = U8TOU64(&key[0]) & 0x0ffffffc0fffffff; st->r[1] = U8TOU64(&key[8]) & 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc; } static void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, u32 padbit) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *)ctx; u64 r0, r1; u64 s1; u64 h0, h1, h2, c; u128 d0, d1; r0 = st->r[0]; r1 = st->r[1]; s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2); h0 = st->h[0]; h1 = st->h[1]; h2 = st->h[2]; while (len >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) { /* h += m[i] */ h0 = (u64)(d0 = (u128)h0 + U8TOU64(inp + 0)); h1 = (u64)(d1 = (u128)h1 + (d0 >> 64) + U8TOU64(inp + 8)); /* * padbit can be zero only when original len was * POLY1306_BLOCK_SIZE, but we don't check */ h2 += (u64)(d1 >> 64) + padbit; /* h *= r "%" p, where "%" stands for "partial remainder" */ d0 = ((u128)h0 * r0) + ((u128)h1 * s1); d1 = ((u128)h0 * r1) + ((u128)h1 * r0) + (h2 * s1); h2 = (h2 * r0); /* last reduction step: */ /* a) h2:h0 = h2<<128 + d1<<64 + d0 */ h0 = (u64)d0; h1 = (u64)(d1 += d0 >> 64); h2 += (u64)(d1 >> 64); /* b) (h2:h0 += (h2:h0>>130) * 5) %= 2^130 */ c = (h2 >> 2) + (h2 & ~3UL); h2 &= 3; h0 += c; h1 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h0,c)); h2 += CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h1,c); /* * Occasional overflows to 3rd bit of h2 are taken care of * "naturally". If after this point we end up at the top of * this loop, then the overflow bit will be accounted for * in next iteration. If we end up in poly1305_emit, then * comparison to modulus below will still count as "carry * into 131st bit", so that properly reduced value will be * picked in conditional move. */ inp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; } st->h[0] = h0; st->h[1] = h1; st->h[2] = h2; } static void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const u32 nonce[4]) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx; u64 h0, h1, h2; u64 g0, g1, g2; u128 t; u64 mask; h0 = st->h[0]; h1 = st->h[1]; h2 = st->h[2]; /* compare to modulus by computing h + -p */ g0 = (u64)(t = (u128)h0 + 5); g1 = (u64)(t = (u128)h1 + (t >> 64)); g2 = h2 + (u64)(t >> 64); /* if there was carry into 131st bit, h1:h0 = g1:g0 */ mask = 0 - (g2 >> 2); g0 &= mask; g1 &= mask; mask = ~mask; h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0; h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1; /* mac = (h + nonce) % (2^128) */ h0 = (u64)(t = (u128)h0 + nonce[0] + ((u64)nonce[1]<<32)); h1 = (u64)(t = (u128)h1 + nonce[2] + ((u64)nonce[3]<<32) + (t >> 64)); U64TO8(mac + 0, h0); U64TO8(mac + 8, h1); } # else # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__MINGW32__) typedef unsigned __int64 u64; # elif defined(__arch64__) typedef unsigned long u64; # else typedef unsigned long long u64; # endif typedef struct { u32 h[5]; u32 r[4]; } poly1305_internal; /* store a 32-bit unsigned integer in little endian */ static void U32TO8(unsigned char *p, unsigned int v) { p[0] = (unsigned char)((v) & 0xff); p[1] = (unsigned char)((v >> 8) & 0xff); p[2] = (unsigned char)((v >> 16) & 0xff); p[3] = (unsigned char)((v >> 24) & 0xff); } static void poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx; /* h = 0 */ st->h[0] = 0; st->h[1] = 0; st->h[2] = 0; st->h[3] = 0; st->h[4] = 0; /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ st->r[0] = U8TOU32(&key[0]) & 0x0fffffff; st->r[1] = U8TOU32(&key[4]) & 0x0ffffffc; st->r[2] = U8TOU32(&key[8]) & 0x0ffffffc; st->r[3] = U8TOU32(&key[12]) & 0x0ffffffc; } static void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, u32 padbit) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *)ctx; u32 r0, r1, r2, r3; u32 s1, s2, s3; u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, c; u64 d0, d1, d2, d3; r0 = st->r[0]; r1 = st->r[1]; r2 = st->r[2]; r3 = st->r[3]; s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2); s2 = r2 + (r2 >> 2); s3 = r3 + (r3 >> 2); h0 = st->h[0]; h1 = st->h[1]; h2 = st->h[2]; h3 = st->h[3]; h4 = st->h[4]; while (len >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) { /* h += m[i] */ h0 = (u32)(d0 = (u64)h0 + U8TOU32(inp + 0)); h1 = (u32)(d1 = (u64)h1 + (d0 >> 32) + U8TOU32(inp + 4)); h2 = (u32)(d2 = (u64)h2 + (d1 >> 32) + U8TOU32(inp + 8)); h3 = (u32)(d3 = (u64)h3 + (d2 >> 32) + U8TOU32(inp + 12)); h4 += (u32)(d3 >> 32) + padbit; /* h *= r "%" p, where "%" stands for "partial remainder" */ d0 = ((u64)h0 * r0) + ((u64)h1 * s3) + ((u64)h2 * s2) + ((u64)h3 * s1); d1 = ((u64)h0 * r1) + ((u64)h1 * r0) + ((u64)h2 * s3) + ((u64)h3 * s2) + (h4 * s1); d2 = ((u64)h0 * r2) + ((u64)h1 * r1) + ((u64)h2 * r0) + ((u64)h3 * s3) + (h4 * s2); d3 = ((u64)h0 * r3) + ((u64)h1 * r2) + ((u64)h2 * r1) + ((u64)h3 * r0) + (h4 * s3); h4 = (h4 * r0); /* last reduction step: */ /* a) h4:h0 = h4<<128 + d3<<96 + d2<<64 + d1<<32 + d0 */ h0 = (u32)d0; h1 = (u32)(d1 += d0 >> 32); h2 = (u32)(d2 += d1 >> 32); h3 = (u32)(d3 += d2 >> 32); h4 += (u32)(d3 >> 32); /* b) (h4:h0 += (h4:h0>>130) * 5) %= 2^130 */ c = (h4 >> 2) + (h4 & ~3U); h4 &= 3; h0 += c; h1 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h0,c)); h2 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h1,c)); h3 += (c = CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h2,c)); h4 += CONSTANT_TIME_CARRY(h3,c); /* * Occasional overflows to 3rd bit of h4 are taken care of * "naturally". If after this point we end up at the top of * this loop, then the overflow bit will be accounted for * in next iteration. If we end up in poly1305_emit, then * comparison to modulus below will still count as "carry * into 131st bit", so that properly reduced value will be * picked in conditional move. */ inp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; } st->h[0] = h0; st->h[1] = h1; st->h[2] = h2; st->h[3] = h3; st->h[4] = h4; } static void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const u32 nonce[4]) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx; u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4; u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4; u64 t; u32 mask; h0 = st->h[0]; h1 = st->h[1]; h2 = st->h[2]; h3 = st->h[3]; h4 = st->h[4]; /* compare to modulus by computing h + -p */ g0 = (u32)(t = (u64)h0 + 5); g1 = (u32)(t = (u64)h1 + (t >> 32)); g2 = (u32)(t = (u64)h2 + (t >> 32)); g3 = (u32)(t = (u64)h3 + (t >> 32)); g4 = h4 + (u32)(t >> 32); /* if there was carry into 131st bit, h3:h0 = g3:g0 */ mask = 0 - (g4 >> 2); g0 &= mask; g1 &= mask; g2 &= mask; g3 &= mask; mask = ~mask; h0 = (h0 & mask) | g0; h1 = (h1 & mask) | g1; h2 = (h2 & mask) | g2; h3 = (h3 & mask) | g3; /* mac = (h + nonce) % (2^128) */ h0 = (u32)(t = (u64)h0 + nonce[0]); h1 = (u32)(t = (u64)h1 + (t >> 32) + nonce[1]); h2 = (u32)(t = (u64)h2 + (t >> 32) + nonce[2]); h3 = (u32)(t = (u64)h3 + (t >> 32) + nonce[3]); U32TO8(mac + 0, h0); U32TO8(mac + 4, h1); U32TO8(mac + 8, h2); U32TO8(mac + 12, h3); } # endif #else int poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16], void *func); void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, unsigned int padbit); void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const unsigned int nonce[4]); #endif void Poly1305_Init(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]) { ctx->nonce[0] = U8TOU32(&key[16]); ctx->nonce[1] = U8TOU32(&key[20]); ctx->nonce[2] = U8TOU32(&key[24]); ctx->nonce[3] = U8TOU32(&key[28]); #ifndef POLY1305_ASM poly1305_init(ctx->opaque, key); #else /* * Unlike reference poly1305_init assembly counterpart is expected * to return a value: non-zero if it initializes ctx->func, and zero * otherwise. Latter is to simplify assembly in cases when there no * multiple code paths to switch between. */ if (!poly1305_init(ctx->opaque, key, &ctx->func)) { ctx->func.blocks = poly1305_blocks; ctx->func.emit = poly1305_emit; } #endif ctx->num = 0; } #ifdef POLY1305_ASM /* * This "eclipses" poly1305_blocks and poly1305_emit, but it's * conscious choice imposed by -Wshadow compiler warnings. */ # define poly1305_blocks (*poly1305_blocks_p) # define poly1305_emit (*poly1305_emit_p) #endif void Poly1305_Update(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len) { #ifdef POLY1305_ASM /* * As documented, poly1305_blocks is never called with input * longer than single block and padbit argument set to 0. This * property is fluently used in assembly modules to optimize * padbit handling on loop boundary. */ poly1305_blocks_f poly1305_blocks_p = ctx->func.blocks; #endif size_t rem, num; if ((num = ctx->num)) { rem = POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - num; if (len >= rem) { memcpy(ctx->data + num, inp, rem); poly1305_blocks(ctx->opaque, ctx->data, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1); inp += rem; len -= rem; } else { /* Still not enough data to process a block. */ memcpy(ctx->data + num, inp, len); ctx->num = num + len; return; } } rem = len % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= rem; if (len >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) { poly1305_blocks(ctx->opaque, inp, len, 1); inp += len; } if (rem) memcpy(ctx->data, inp, rem); ctx->num = rem; } void Poly1305_Final(POLY1305 *ctx, unsigned char mac[16]) { #ifdef POLY1305_ASM poly1305_blocks_f poly1305_blocks_p = ctx->func.blocks; poly1305_emit_f poly1305_emit_p = ctx->func.emit; #endif size_t num; if ((num = ctx->num)) { ctx->data[num++] = 1; /* pad bit */ while (num < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) ctx->data[num++] = 0; poly1305_blocks(ctx->opaque, ctx->data, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0); } poly1305_emit(ctx->opaque, mac, ctx->nonce); /* zero out the state */ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); } #ifdef SELFTEST #include struct poly1305_test { const char *inputhex; const char *keyhex; const char *outhex; }; static const struct poly1305_test poly1305_tests[] = { /* * RFC7539 */ { "43727970746f6772617068696320466f72756d2052657365617263682047726f" "7570", "85d6be7857556d337f4452fe42d506a8""0103808afb0db2fd4abff6af4149f51b", "a8061dc1305136c6c22b8baf0c0127a9" }, /* * test vectors from "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code" */ { "f3f6", "851fc40c3467ac0be05cc20404f3f700""580b3b0f9447bb1e69d095b5928b6dbc", "f4c633c3044fc145f84f335cb81953de" }, { "", "a0f3080000f46400d0c7e9076c834403""dd3fab2251f11ac759f0887129cc2ee7", "dd3fab2251f11ac759f0887129cc2ee7" }, { "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136", "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c208""83149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef", "0ee1c16bb73f0f4fd19881753c01cdbe" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "5154ad0d2cb26e01274fc51148491f1b" }, /* * self-generated vectors exercise "significant" lengths, such that * are handled by different code paths */ { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee466" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "5b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "bbb613b2b6d753ba07395b916aaece15" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "c794d7057d1778c4bbee0a39b3d97342" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "ffbcb9b371423152d7fca5ad042fbaa9" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136" "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee466", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "069ed6b8ef0f207b3e243bb1019fe632" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136" "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "cca339d9a45fa2368c2c68b3a4179133" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136" "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761" "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "53f6e828a2f0fe0ee815bf0bd5841a34" }, { "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136" "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761" "ab0812724a7f1e342742cbed374d94d136c6b8795d45b3819830f2c04491faf0" "990c62e48b8018b2c3e4a0fa3134cb67fa83e158c994d961c4cb21095c1bf9af" "48443d0bb0d21109c89a100b5ce2c20883149c69b561dd88298a1798b10716ef" "663cea190ffb83d89593f3f476b6bc24d7e679107ea26adb8caf6652d0656136" "812059a5da198637cac7c4a631bee4665b88d7f6228b11e2e28579a5c0c1f761", "12976a08c4426d0ce8a82407c4f48207""80f8c20aa71202d1e29179cbcb555a57", "b846d44e9bbd53cedffbfbb6b7fa4933" }, /* * 4th power of the key spills to 131th bit in SIMD key setup */ { "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", "ad628107e8351d0f2c231a05dc4a4106""00000000000000000000000000000000", "07145a4c02fe5fa32036de68fabe9066" }, { /* * poly1305_ieee754.c failed this in final stage */ "842364e156336c0998b933a6237726180d9e3fdcbde4cd5d17080fc3beb49614" "d7122c037463ff104d73f19c12704628d417c4c54a3fe30d3c3d7714382d43b0" "382a50a5dee54be844b076e8df88201a1cd43b90eb21643fa96f39b518aa8340" "c942ff3c31baf7c9bdbf0f31ae3fa096bf8c63030609829fe72e179824890bc8" "e08c315c1cce2a83144dbbff09f74e3efc770b54d0984a8f19b14719e6363564" "1d6b1eedf63efbf080e1783d32445412114c20de0b837a0dfa33d6b82825fff4" "4c9a70ea54ce47f07df698e6b03323b53079364a5fc3e9dd034392bdde86dccd" "da94321c5e44060489336cb65bf3989c36f7282c2f5d2b882c171e74", "95d5c005503e510d8cd0aa072c4a4d06""6eabc52d11653df47fbf63ab198bcc26", "f248312e578d9d58f8b7bb4d19105431" }, /* * AVX2 in poly1305-x86.pl failed this with 176+32 split */ { "248ac31085b6c2adaaa38259a0d7192c5c35d1bb4ef39ad94c38d1c82479e2dd" "2159a077024b0589bc8a20101b506f0a1ad0bbab76e83a83f1b94be6beae74e8" "74cab692c5963a75436b776121ec9f62399a3e66b2d22707dae81933b6277f3c" "8516bcbe26dbbd86f373103d7cf4cad1888c952118fbfbd0d7b4bedc4ae4936a" "ff91157e7aa47c54442ea78d6ac251d324a0fbe49d89cc3521b66d16e9c66a37" "09894e4eb0a4eedc4ae19468e66b81f2" "71351b1d921ea551047abcc6b87a901fde7db79fa1818c11336dbc07244a40eb", "000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f""00000000000000000000000000000000", "bc939bc5281480fa99c6d68c258ec42f" }, /* * test vectors from Google */ { "", "c8afaac331ee372cd6082de134943b17""4710130e9f6fea8d72293850a667d86c", "4710130e9f6fea8d72293850a667d86c", }, { "48656c6c6f20776f726c6421", "746869732069732033322d6279746520""6b657920666f7220506f6c7931333035", "a6f745008f81c916a20dcc74eef2b2f0" }, { "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "746869732069732033322d6279746520""6b657920666f7220506f6c7931333035", "49ec78090e481ec6c26b33b91ccc0307" }, { "89dab80b7717c1db5db437860a3f70218e93e1b8f461fb677f16f35f6f87e2a9" "1c99bc3a47ace47640cc95c345be5ecca5a3523c35cc01893af0b64a62033427" "0372ec12482d1b1e363561698a578b359803495bb4e2ef1930b17a5190b580f1" "41300df30adbeca28f6427a8bc1a999fd51c554a017d095d8c3e3127daf9f595", "2d773be37adb1e4d683bf0075e79c4ee""037918535a7f99ccb7040fb5f5f43aea", "c85d15ed44c378d6b00e23064c7bcd51" }, { "000000000000000b1703030200000000" "06db1f1f368d696a810a349c0c714c9a5e7850c2407d721acded95e018d7a852" "66a6e1289cdb4aeb18da5ac8a2b0026d24a59ad485227f3eaedbb2e7e35e1c66" "cd60f9abf716dcc9ac42682dd7dab287a7024c4eefc321cc0574e16793e37cec" "03c5bda42b54c114a80b57af26416c7be742005e20855c73e21dc8e2edc9d435" "cb6f6059280011c270b71570051c1c9b3052126620bc1e2730fa066c7a509d53" "c60e5ae1b40aa6e39e49669228c90eecb4a50db32a50bc49e90b4f4b359a1dfd" "11749cd3867fcf2fb7bb6cd4738f6a4ad6f7ca5058f7618845af9f020f6c3b96" "7b8f4cd4a91e2813b507ae66f2d35c18284f7292186062e10fd5510d18775351" "ef334e7634ab4743f5b68f49adcab384d3fd75f7390f4006ef2a295c8c7a076a" "d54546cd25d2107fbe1436c840924aaebe5b370893cd63d1325b8616fc481088" "6bc152c53221b6df373119393255ee72bcaa880174f1717f9184fa91646f17a2" "4ac55d16bfddca9581a92eda479201f0edbf633600d6066d1ab36d5d2415d713" "51bbcd608a25108d25641992c1f26c531cf9f90203bc4cc19f5927d834b0a471" "16d3884bbb164b8ec883d1ac832e56b3918a98601a08d171881541d594db399c" "6ae6151221745aec814c45b0b05b565436fd6f137aa10a0c0b643761dbd6f9a9" "dcb99b1a6e690854ce0769cde39761d82fcdec15f0d92d7d8e94ade8eb83fbe0", "99e5822dd4173c995e3dae0ddefb9774""3fde3b080134b39f76e9bf8d0e88d546", "2637408fe13086ea73f971e3425e2820" }, /* * test vectors from Hanno Böck */ { "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc80cccccccccccc" "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccecccccc" "ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc5cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc" "cccccccccce3cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc" "ccccccccaccccccccccccccccccccce6cccccccccc000000afcccccccccccccc" "ccccfffffff50000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" "00ffffffe7000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000719205a8521d" "fc", "7f1b0264000000000000000000000000""0000000000000000cccccccccccccccc", "8559b876eceed66eb37798c0457baff9" }, { "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0000000000" "00000000800264", "e0001600000000000000000000000000""0000aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "00bd1258978e205444c9aaaa82006fed" }, { "02fc", "0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c""0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c", "06120c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c" }, { "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b" "7b7b7b7b7b7b7a7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b" "7b7b5c7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b" "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b6e7b007b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b" "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7a7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b" "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b5c7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b" "7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b7b" "7b6e7b001300000000b300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" "f20000000000000000000000000000000000002000efff000900000000000000" "0000000000100000000009000000640000000000000000000000001300000000" "b300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f20000000000000000" "000000000000000000002000efff00090000000000000000007a000010000000" "000900000064000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fc", "00ff0000000000000000000000000000""00000000001e00000000000000007b7b", "33205bbf9e9f8f7212ab9e2ab9b7e4a5" }, { "7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777" "7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777" "777777777777777777777777ffffffe9e9acacacacacacacacacacac0000acac" "ec0100acacac2caca2acacacacacacacacacacac64f2", "0000007f0000007f0100002000000000""0000cf77777777777777777777777777", "02ee7c8c546ddeb1a467e4c3981158b9" }, /* * test vectors from Andrew Moon */ { /* nacl */ "8e993b9f48681273c29650ba32fc76ce48332ea7164d96a4476fb8c531a1186a" "c0dfc17c98dce87b4da7f011ec48c97271d2c20f9b928fe2270d6fb863d51738" "b48eeee314a7cc8ab932164548e526ae90224368517acfeabd6bb3732bc0e9da" "99832b61ca01b6de56244a9e88d5f9b37973f622a43d14a6599b1f654cb45a74" "e355a5", "eea6a7251c1e72916d11c2cb214d3c25""2539121d8e234e652d651fa4c8cff880", "f3ffc7703f9400e52a7dfb4b3d3305d9" }, { /* wrap 2^130-5 */ "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", "02000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000", "03000000000000000000000000000000" }, { /* wrap 2^128 */ "02000000000000000000000000000000", "02000000000000000000000000000000""ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", "03000000000000000000000000000000" }, { /* limb carry */ "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" "11000000000000000000000000000000", "01000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000", "05000000000000000000000000000000" }, { /* 2^130-5 */ "fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffbfefefefefefefefefefefefefefefe" "01010101010101010101010101010101", "01000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000", "00000000000000000000000000000000" }, { /* 2^130-6 */ "fdffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", "02000000000000000000000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000", "faffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" }, { /* 5*H+L reduction intermediate */ "e33594d7505e43b900000000000000003394d7505e4379cd0100000000000000" "0000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000", "01000000000000000400000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000", "14000000000000005500000000000000" }, { /* 5*H+L reduction final */ "e33594d7505e43b900000000000000003394d7505e4379cd0100000000000000" "00000000000000000000000000000000", "01000000000000000400000000000000""00000000000000000000000000000000", "13000000000000000000000000000000" } }; static unsigned char hex_digit(char h) { int i = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(h); if (i < 0) abort(); return i; } static void hex_decode(unsigned char *out, const char *hex) { size_t j = 0; while (*hex != 0) { unsigned char v = hex_digit(*hex++); v <<= 4; v |= hex_digit(*hex++); out[j++] = v; } } static void hexdump(unsigned char *a, size_t len) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) printf("%02x", a[i]); } int main() { static const unsigned num_tests = sizeof(poly1305_tests) / sizeof(struct poly1305_test); unsigned i; unsigned char key[32], out[16], expected[16]; POLY1305 poly1305; for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { const struct poly1305_test *test = &poly1305_tests[i]; unsigned char *in; size_t inlen = strlen(test->inputhex); if (strlen(test->keyhex) != sizeof(key) * 2 || strlen(test->outhex) != sizeof(out) * 2 || (inlen & 1) == 1) return 1; inlen /= 2; hex_decode(key, test->keyhex); hex_decode(expected, test->outhex); in = malloc(inlen); hex_decode(in, test->inputhex); Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, inlen); Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out); if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) { printf("Poly1305 test #%d failed.\n", i); printf("got: "); hexdump(out, sizeof(out)); printf("\nexpected: "); hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected)); printf("\n"); return 1; } if (inlen > 16) { Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, 1); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in+1, inlen-1); Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out); if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) { printf("Poly1305 test #%d/1+(N-1) failed.\n", i); printf("got: "); hexdump(out, sizeof(out)); printf("\nexpected: "); hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected)); printf("\n"); return 1; } } if (inlen > 32) { size_t half = inlen / 2; Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, half); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in+half, inlen-half); Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out); if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) { printf("Poly1305 test #%d/2 failed.\n", i); printf("got: "); hexdump(out, sizeof(out)); printf("\nexpected: "); hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected)); printf("\n"); return 1; } for (half = 16; half < inlen; half += 16) { Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in, half); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305, in+half, inlen-half); Poly1305_Final(&poly1305, out); if (memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0) { printf("Poly1305 test #%d/%d+%d failed.\n", i, half, inlen-half); printf("got: "); hexdump(out, sizeof(out)); printf("\nexpected: "); hexdump(expected, sizeof(expected)); printf("\n"); return 1; } } } free(in); } printf("PASS\n"); # ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ { unsigned char buf[8192]; unsigned long long stopwatch; unsigned long long OPENSSL_rdtsc(); memset (buf,0x55,sizeof(buf)); memset (key,0xAA,sizeof(key)); Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key); for (i=0;i<100000;i++) Poly1305_Update(&poly1305,buf,sizeof(buf)); stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); for (i=0;i<10000;i++) Poly1305_Update(&poly1305,buf,sizeof(buf)); stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - stopwatch; printf("%g\n",stopwatch/(double)(i*sizeof(buf))); stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); for (i=0;i<10000;i++) { Poly1305_Init(&poly1305, key); Poly1305_Update(&poly1305,buf,16); Poly1305_Final(&poly1305,buf); } stopwatch = OPENSSL_rdtsc() - stopwatch; printf("%g\n",stopwatch/(double)(i)); } # endif return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657015457 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-c64xplus.pl0000755000000000000000000002077013176625657021007 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # Poly1305 hash for C64x+. # # October 2015 # # Performance is [incredible for a 32-bit processor] 1.82 cycles per # processed byte. Comparison to compiler-generated code is problematic, # because results were observed to vary from 2.1 to 7.6 cpb depending # on compiler's ability to inline small functions. Compiler also # disables interrupts for some reason, thus making interrupt response # time dependent on input length. This module on the other hand is free # from such limitation. $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; ($CTXA,$INPB,$LEN,$PADBIT)=("A4","B4","A6","B6"); ($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4,$H4a)=("A8","B8","A10","B10","B2",$LEN); ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3)= ("A9","B9","A11","B11"); ($R0,$R1,$R2,$R3,$S1,$S2,$S3,$S3b)=("A0","B0","A1","B1","A12","B12","A13","B13"); ($THREE,$R0b,$S2a)=("B7","B5","A5"); $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .asg poly1305_init,_poly1305_init .asg poly1305_blocks,_poly1305_blocks .asg poly1305_emit,_poly1305_emit .endif .asg B3,RA .asg A15,FP .asg B15,SP .if .LITTLE_ENDIAN .asg MV,SWAP2 .asg MV.L,SWAP4 .endif .global _poly1305_init _poly1305_init: .asmfunc LDNDW *${INPB}[0],B17:B16 ; load key material LDNDW *${INPB}[1],A17:A16 || ZERO B9:B8 || MVK -1,B0 STDW B9:B8,*${CTXA}[0] ; initialize h1:h0 || SHRU B0,4,B0 ; 0x0fffffff || MVK -4,B1 STDW B9:B8,*${CTXA}[1] ; initialize h3:h2 || AND B0,B1,B1 ; 0x0ffffffc STW B8,*${CTXA}[4] ; initialize h4 .if .BIG_ENDIAN SWAP2 B16,B17 || SWAP2 B17,B16 SWAP2 A16,A17 || SWAP2 A17,A16 SWAP4 B16,B16 || SWAP4 A16,A16 SWAP4 B17,B17 || SWAP4 A17,A17 .endif AND B16,B0,B20 ; r0 = key[0] & 0x0fffffff || AND B17,B1,B22 ; r1 = key[1] & 0x0ffffffc || EXTU B17,4,6,B16 ; r1>>2 AND A16,B1,B21 ; r2 = key[2] & 0x0ffffffc || AND A17,B1,A23 ; r3 = key[3] & 0x0ffffffc || BNOP RA SHRU B21,2,B18 || ADD B22,B16,B16 ; s1 = r1 + r1>>2 STDW B21:B20,*${CTXA}[3] ; save r2:r0 || ADD B21,B18,B18 ; s2 = r2 + r2>>2 || SHRU A23,2,B17 || MV A23,B23 STDW B23:B22,*${CTXA}[4] ; save r3:r1 || ADD B23,B17,B19 ; s3 = r3 + r3>>2 || ADD B23,B17,B17 ; s3 = r3 + r3>>2 STDW B17:B16,*${CTXA}[5] ; save s3:s1 STDW B19:B18,*${CTXA}[6] ; save s3:s2 || ZERO A4 ; return 0 .endasmfunc .global _poly1305_blocks .align 32 _poly1305_blocks: .asmfunc stack_usage(40) SHRU $LEN,4,A2 ; A2 is loop counter, number of blocks [!A2] BNOP RA ; no data || [A2] STW FP,*SP--(40) ; save frame pointer and alloca(40) || [A2] MV SP,FP [A2] STDW B13:B12,*SP[4] ; ABI says so || [A2] MV $CTXA,$S3b ; borrow $S3b [A2] STDW B11:B10,*SP[3] || [A2] STDW A13:A12,*FP[-3] [A2] STDW A11:A10,*FP[-4] || [A2] LDDW *${S3b}[0],B25:B24 ; load h1:h0 [A2] LDNW *${INPB}++[4],$D0 ; load inp[0] [A2] LDNW *${INPB}[-3],$D1 ; load inp[1] LDDW *${CTXA}[1],B29:B28 ; load h3:h2, B28 is h2 LDNW *${INPB}[-2],$D2 ; load inp[2] LDNW *${INPB}[-1],$D3 ; load inp[3] LDDW *${CTXA}[3],$R2:$R0 ; load r2:r0 || LDDW *${S3b}[4],$R3:$R1 ; load r3:r1 || SWAP2 $D0,$D0 LDDW *${CTXA}[5],$S3:$S1 ; load s3:s1 || LDDW *${S3b}[6],$S3b:$S2 ; load s3:s2 || SWAP4 $D0,$D0 || SWAP2 $D1,$D1 ADDU $D0,B24,$D0:$H0 ; h0+=inp[0] || ADD $D0,B24,B27 ; B-copy of h0+inp[0] || SWAP4 $D1,$D1 ADDU $D1,B25,$D1:$H1 ; h1+=inp[1] || MVK 3,$THREE || SWAP2 $D2,$D2 LDW *${CTXA}[4],$H4 ; load h4 || SWAP4 $D2,$D2 || MV B29,B30 ; B30 is h3 MV $R0,$R0b loop?: MPY32U $H0,$R0,A17:A16 || MPY32U B27,$R1,B17:B16 ; MPY32U $H0,$R1,B17:B16 || ADDU $D0,$D1:$H1,B25:B24 ; ADDU $D0,$D1:$H1,$D1:$H1 || ADDU $D2,B28,$D2:$H2 ; h2+=inp[2] || SWAP2 $D3,$D3 MPY32U $H0,$R2,A19:A18 || MPY32U B27,$R3,B19:B18 ; MPY32U $H0,$R3,B19:B18 || ADD $D0,$H1,A24 ; A-copy of B24 || SWAP4 $D3,$D3 || [A2] SUB A2,1,A2 ; decrement loop counter MPY32U A24,$S3,A21:A20 ; MPY32U $H1,$S3,A21:A20 || MPY32U B24,$R0b,B21:B20 ; MPY32U $H1,$R0,B21:B20 || ADDU B25,$D2:$H2,$D2:$H2 ; ADDU $D1,$D2:$H2,$D2:$H2 || ADDU $D3,B30,$D3:$H3 ; h3+=inp[3] || ADD B25,$H2,B25 ; B-copy of $H2 MPY32U A24,$R1,A23:A22 ; MPY32U $H1,$R1,A23:A22 || MPY32U B24,$R2,B23:B22 ; MPY32U $H1,$R2,B23:B22 MPY32U $H2,$S2,A25:A24 || MPY32U B25,$S3b,B25:B24 ; MPY32U $H2,$S3,B25:B24 || ADDU $D2,$D3:$H3,$D3:$H3 || ADD $PADBIT,$H4,$H4 ; h4+=padbit MPY32U $H2,$R0,A27:A26 || MPY32U $H2,$R1,B27:B26 || ADD $D3,$H4,$H4 || MV $S2,$S2a MPY32U $H3,$S1,A29:A28 || MPY32U $H3,$S2,B29:B28 || ADD A21,A17,A21 ; start accumulating "d3:d0" || ADD B21,B17,B21 || ADDU A20,A16,A17:A16 || ADDU B20,B16,B17:B16 || [A2] LDNW *${INPB}++[4],$D0 ; load inp[0] MPY32U $H3,$S3,A31:A30 || MPY32U $H3,$R0b,B31:B30 || ADD A23,A19,A23 || ADD B23,B19,B23 || ADDU A22,A18,A19:A18 || ADDU B22,B18,B19:B18 || [A2] LDNW *${INPB}[-3],$D1 ; load inp[1] MPY32 $H4,$S1,B20 || MPY32 $H4,$S2a,A20 || ADD A25,A21,A21 || ADD B25,B21,B21 || ADDU A24,A17:A16,A17:A16 || ADDU B24,B17:B16,B17:B16 || [A2] LDNW *${INPB}[-2],$D2 ; load inp[2] MPY32 $H4,$S3b,B22 || ADD A27,A23,A23 || ADD B27,B23,B23 || ADDU A26,A19:A18,A19:A18 || ADDU B26,B19:B18,B19:B18 || [A2] LDNW *${INPB}[-1],$D3 ; load inp[3] MPY32 $H4,$R0b,$H4 || ADD A29,A21,A21 ; final hi("d0") || ADD B29,B21,B21 ; final hi("d1") || ADDU A28,A17:A16,A17:A16 ; final lo("d0") || ADDU B28,B17:B16,B17:B16 ADD A31,A23,A23 ; final hi("d2") || ADD B31,B23,B23 ; final hi("d3") || ADDU A30,A19:A18,A19:A18 || ADDU B30,B19:B18,B19:B18 ADDU B20,B17:B16,B17:B16 ; final lo("d1") || ADDU A20,A19:A18,A19:A18 ; final lo("d2") ADDU B22,B19:B18,B19:B18 ; final lo("d3") || ADD A17,A21,A21 ; "flatten" "d3:d0" MV A19,B29 ; move to avoid cross-path stalls ADDU A21,B17:B16,B27:B26 ; B26 is h1 ADD B21,B27,B27 || DMV B29,A18,B29:B28 ; move to avoid cross-path stalls ADDU B27,B29:B28,B29:B28 ; B28 is h2 || [A2] SWAP2 $D0,$D0 ADD A23,B29,B29 || [A2] SWAP4 $D0,$D0 ADDU B29,B19:B18,B31:B30 ; B30 is h3 ADD B23,B31,B31 || MV A16,B24 ; B24 is h0 || [A2] SWAP2 $D1,$D1 ADD B31,$H4,$H4 || [A2] SWAP4 $D1,$D1 SHRU $H4,2,B16 ; last reduction step || AND $H4,$THREE,$H4 ADDAW B16,B16,B16 ; 5*(h4>>2) || [A2] BNOP loop? ADDU B24,B16,B25:B24 ; B24 is h0 || [A2] SWAP2 $D2,$D2 ADDU B26,B25,B27:B26 ; B26 is h1 || [A2] SWAP4 $D2,$D2 ADDU B28,B27,B29:B28 ; B28 is h2 || [A2] ADDU $D0,B24,$D0:$H0 ; h0+=inp[0] || [A2] ADD $D0,B24,B27 ; B-copy of h0+inp[0] ADDU B30,B29,B31:B30 ; B30 is h3 ADD B31,$H4,$H4 || [A2] ADDU $D1,B26,$D1:$H1 ; h1+=inp[1] ;;===== branch to loop? is taken here LDDW *FP[-4],A11:A10 ; ABI says so LDDW *FP[-3],A13:A12 || LDDW *SP[3],B11:B10 LDDW *SP[4],B13:B12 || MV B26,B25 || BNOP RA LDW *++SP(40),FP ; restore frame pointer || MV B30,B29 STDW B25:B24,*${CTXA}[0] ; save h1:h0 STDW B29:B28,*${CTXA}[1] ; save h3:h2 STW $H4,*${CTXA}[4] ; save h4 NOP 1 .endasmfunc ___ { my ($MAC,$NONCEA,$NONCEB)=($INPB,$LEN,$PADBIT); $code.=<<___; .global _poly1305_emit .align 32 _poly1305_emit: .asmfunc LDDW *${CTXA}[0],A17:A16 ; load h1:h0 LDDW *${CTXA}[1],A19:A18 ; load h3:h2 LDW *${CTXA}[4],A20 ; load h4 MV $NONCEA,$NONCEB MVK 5,A22 ; compare to modulus ADDU A16,A22,A23:A22 || LDW *${NONCEA}[0],A8 || LDW *${NONCEB}[1],B8 ADDU A17,A23,A25:A24 || LDW *${NONCEA}[2],A9 || LDW *${NONCEB}[3],B9 ADDU A19,A25,A27:A26 ADDU A19,A27,A29:A28 ADD A20,A29,A29 SHRU A29,2,A2 ; check for overflow in 130-th bit [A2] MV A22,A16 ; select || [A2] MV A24,A17 [A2] MV A26,A18 || [A2] MV A28,A19 || ADDU A8,A16,A23:A22 ; accumulate nonce ADDU B8,A17,A25:A24 || SWAP2 A22,A22 ADDU A23,A25:A24,A25:A24 ADDU A9,A18,A27:A26 || SWAP2 A24,A24 ADDU A25,A27:A26,A27:A26 || ADD B9,A19,A28 ADD A27,A28,A28 || SWAP2 A26,A26 .if .BIG_ENDIAN SWAP2 A28,A28 || SWAP4 A22,A22 || SWAP4 A24,B24 SWAP4 A26,A26 SWAP4 A28,A28 || MV B24,A24 .endif BNOP RA,1 STNW A22,*${MAC}[0] ; write the result STNW A24,*${MAC}[1] STNW A26,*${MAC}[2] STNW A28,*${MAC}[3] .endasmfunc ___ } $code.=<<___; .sect .const .cstring "Poly1305 for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppcfp.pl0000755000000000000000000004217313176625657020430 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements Poly1305 hash for PowerPC FPU. # # June 2015 # # Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone, # and improvement coefficients relative to gcc-generated code. # # Freescale e300 9.78/+30% # PPC74x0 6.92/+50% # PPC970 6.03/+80% # POWER7 3.50/+30% # POWER8 3.75/+10% $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T =8; $LRSAVE =2*$SIZE_T; $UCMP ="cmpld"; $STU ="stdu"; $POP ="ld"; $PUSH ="std"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T =4; $LRSAVE =$SIZE_T; $UCMP ="cmplw"; $STU ="stwu"; $POP ="lwz"; $PUSH ="stw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0; $LWXLE = $LITTLE_ENDIAN ? "lwzx" : "lwbrx"; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T; $FRAME=$LOCALS+6*8+18*8; my $sp="r1"; my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("r$_",(3..6)); my ($in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$i1,$i2,$i3) = map("r$_",(7..12,6)); my ($h0lo,$h0hi,$h1lo,$h1hi,$h2lo,$h2hi,$h3lo,$h3hi, $two0,$two32,$two64,$two96,$two130,$five_two130, $r0lo,$r0hi,$r1lo,$r1hi,$r2lo,$r2hi, $s2lo,$s2hi,$s3lo,$s3hi, $c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi,$c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi) = map("f$_",(0..31)); # borrowings my ($r3lo,$r3hi,$s1lo,$s1hi) = ($c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi); my ($x0,$x1,$x2,$x3) = ($c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi); my ($y0,$y1,$y2,$y3) = ($c3lo,$c3hi,$c1lo,$c1hi); $code.=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .poly1305_init_fpu .align 6 .poly1305_init_fpu: $STU $sp,-$LOCALS($sp) # minimal frame mflr $padbit $PUSH $padbit,`$LOCALS+$LRSAVE`($sp) bl LPICmeup xor r0,r0,r0 mtlr $padbit # restore lr lfd $two0,8*0($len) # load constants lfd $two32,8*1($len) lfd $two64,8*2($len) lfd $two96,8*3($len) lfd $two130,8*4($len) lfd $five_two130,8*5($len) stfd $two0,8*0($ctx) # initial hash value, biased 0 stfd $two32,8*1($ctx) stfd $two64,8*2($ctx) stfd $two96,8*3($ctx) $UCMP $inp,r0 beq- Lno_key lfd $h3lo,8*13($len) # new fpscr mffs $h3hi # old fpscr stfd $two0,8*4($ctx) # key "template" stfd $two32,8*5($ctx) stfd $two64,8*6($ctx) stfd $two96,8*7($ctx) li $in1,4 li $in2,8 li $in3,12 $LWXLE $in0,0,$inp # load key $LWXLE $in1,$in1,$inp $LWXLE $in2,$in2,$inp $LWXLE $in3,$in3,$inp lis $i1,0xf000 # 0xf0000000 ori $i2,$i1,3 # 0xf0000003 andc $in0,$in0,$i1 # &=0x0fffffff andc $in1,$in1,$i2 # &=0x0ffffffc andc $in2,$in2,$i2 andc $in3,$in3,$i2 stw $in0,`8*4+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) # fill "template" stw $in1,`8*5+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) stw $in2,`8*6+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) stw $in3,`8*7+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) mtfsf 255,$h3lo # fpscr stfd $two0,8*18($ctx) # copy constants to context stfd $two32,8*19($ctx) stfd $two64,8*20($ctx) stfd $two96,8*21($ctx) stfd $two130,8*22($ctx) stfd $five_two130,8*23($ctx) lfd $h0lo,8*4($ctx) # load [biased] key lfd $h1lo,8*5($ctx) lfd $h2lo,8*6($ctx) lfd $h3lo,8*7($ctx) fsub $h0lo,$h0lo,$two0 # r0 fsub $h1lo,$h1lo,$two32 # r1 fsub $h2lo,$h2lo,$two64 # r2 fsub $h3lo,$h3lo,$two96 # r3 lfd $two0,8*6($len) # more constants lfd $two32,8*7($len) lfd $two64,8*8($len) lfd $two96,8*9($len) fmul $h1hi,$h1lo,$five_two130 # s1 fmul $h2hi,$h2lo,$five_two130 # s2 stfd $h3hi,8*15($ctx) # borrow slot for original fpscr fmul $h3hi,$h3lo,$five_two130 # s3 fadd $h0hi,$h0lo,$two0 stfd $h1hi,8*12($ctx) # put aside for now fadd $h1hi,$h1lo,$two32 stfd $h2hi,8*13($ctx) fadd $h2hi,$h2lo,$two64 stfd $h3hi,8*14($ctx) fadd $h3hi,$h3lo,$two96 fsub $h0hi,$h0hi,$two0 fsub $h1hi,$h1hi,$two32 fsub $h2hi,$h2hi,$two64 fsub $h3hi,$h3hi,$two96 lfd $two0,8*10($len) # more constants lfd $two32,8*11($len) lfd $two64,8*12($len) fsub $h0lo,$h0lo,$h0hi fsub $h1lo,$h1lo,$h1hi fsub $h2lo,$h2lo,$h2hi fsub $h3lo,$h3lo,$h3hi stfd $h0hi,8*5($ctx) # r0hi stfd $h1hi,8*7($ctx) # r1hi stfd $h2hi,8*9($ctx) # r2hi stfd $h3hi,8*11($ctx) # r3hi stfd $h0lo,8*4($ctx) # r0lo stfd $h1lo,8*6($ctx) # r1lo stfd $h2lo,8*8($ctx) # r2lo stfd $h3lo,8*10($ctx) # r3lo lfd $h1lo,8*12($ctx) # s1 lfd $h2lo,8*13($ctx) # s2 lfd $h3lo,8*14($ctx) # s3 lfd $h0lo,8*15($ctx) # pull original fpscr fadd $h1hi,$h1lo,$two0 fadd $h2hi,$h2lo,$two32 fadd $h3hi,$h3lo,$two64 fsub $h1hi,$h1hi,$two0 fsub $h2hi,$h2hi,$two32 fsub $h3hi,$h3hi,$two64 fsub $h1lo,$h1lo,$h1hi fsub $h2lo,$h2lo,$h2hi fsub $h3lo,$h3lo,$h3hi stfd $h1hi,8*13($ctx) # s1hi stfd $h2hi,8*15($ctx) # s2hi stfd $h3hi,8*17($ctx) # s3hi stfd $h1lo,8*12($ctx) # s1lo stfd $h2lo,8*14($ctx) # s2lo stfd $h3lo,8*16($ctx) # s3lo mtfsf 255,$h0lo # restore fpscr Lno_key: xor r3,r3,r3 addi $sp,$sp,$LOCALS blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,0,2,0 .size .poly1305_init_fpu,.-.poly1305_init_fpu .globl .poly1305_blocks_fpu .align 4 .poly1305_blocks_fpu: srwi. $len,$len,4 beq- Labort $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 stfd f14,`$FRAME-8*18`($sp) stfd f15,`$FRAME-8*17`($sp) stfd f16,`$FRAME-8*16`($sp) stfd f17,`$FRAME-8*15`($sp) stfd f18,`$FRAME-8*14`($sp) stfd f19,`$FRAME-8*13`($sp) stfd f20,`$FRAME-8*12`($sp) stfd f21,`$FRAME-8*11`($sp) stfd f22,`$FRAME-8*10`($sp) stfd f23,`$FRAME-8*9`($sp) stfd f24,`$FRAME-8*8`($sp) stfd f25,`$FRAME-8*7`($sp) stfd f26,`$FRAME-8*6`($sp) stfd f27,`$FRAME-8*5`($sp) stfd f28,`$FRAME-8*4`($sp) stfd f29,`$FRAME-8*3`($sp) stfd f30,`$FRAME-8*2`($sp) stfd f31,`$FRAME-8*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) xor r0,r0,r0 li $in3,1 mtctr $len neg $len,$len stw r0,`$LOCALS+8*4+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) stw $in3,`$LOCALS+8*4+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) lfd $two0,8*18($ctx) # load constants lfd $two32,8*19($ctx) lfd $two64,8*20($ctx) lfd $two96,8*21($ctx) lfd $two130,8*22($ctx) lfd $five_two130,8*23($ctx) lfd $h0lo,8*0($ctx) # load [biased] hash value lfd $h1lo,8*1($ctx) lfd $h2lo,8*2($ctx) lfd $h3lo,8*3($ctx) stfd $two0,`$LOCALS+8*0`($sp) # input "template" oris $in3,$padbit,`(1023+52+96)<<4` stfd $two32,`$LOCALS+8*1`($sp) stfd $two64,`$LOCALS+8*2`($sp) stw $in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) li $i1,4 li $i2,8 li $i3,12 $LWXLE $in0,0,$inp # load input $LWXLE $in1,$i1,$inp $LWXLE $in2,$i2,$inp $LWXLE $in3,$i3,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 stw $in0,`$LOCALS+8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) # fill "template" stw $in1,`$LOCALS+8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) stw $in2,`$LOCALS+8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) stw $in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) mffs $x0 # original fpscr lfd $x1,`$LOCALS+8*4`($sp) # new fpscr lfd $r0lo,8*4($ctx) # load key lfd $r0hi,8*5($ctx) lfd $r1lo,8*6($ctx) lfd $r1hi,8*7($ctx) lfd $r2lo,8*8($ctx) lfd $r2hi,8*9($ctx) lfd $r3lo,8*10($ctx) lfd $r3hi,8*11($ctx) lfd $s1lo,8*12($ctx) lfd $s1hi,8*13($ctx) lfd $s2lo,8*14($ctx) lfd $s2hi,8*15($ctx) lfd $s3lo,8*16($ctx) lfd $s3hi,8*17($ctx) stfd $x0,`$LOCALS+8*4`($sp) # save original fpscr mtfsf 255,$x1 addic $len,$len,1 addze r0,r0 slwi. r0,r0,4 sub $inp,$inp,r0 # conditional rewind lfd $x0,`$LOCALS+8*0`($sp) lfd $x1,`$LOCALS+8*1`($sp) lfd $x2,`$LOCALS+8*2`($sp) lfd $x3,`$LOCALS+8*3`($sp) fsub $h0lo,$h0lo,$two0 # de-bias hash value $LWXLE $in0,0,$inp # modulo-scheduled input load fsub $h1lo,$h1lo,$two32 $LWXLE $in1,$i1,$inp fsub $h2lo,$h2lo,$two64 $LWXLE $in2,$i2,$inp fsub $h3lo,$h3lo,$two96 $LWXLE $in3,$i3,$inp fsub $x0,$x0,$two0 # de-bias input addi $inp,$inp,16 fsub $x1,$x1,$two32 fsub $x2,$x2,$two64 fsub $x3,$x3,$two96 fadd $x0,$x0,$h0lo # accumulate input stw $in0,`$LOCALS+8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) fadd $x1,$x1,$h1lo stw $in1,`$LOCALS+8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) fadd $x2,$x2,$h2lo stw $in2,`$LOCALS+8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) fadd $x3,$x3,$h3lo stw $in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) b Lentry .align 4 Loop: fsub $y0,$y0,$two0 # de-bias input addic $len,$len,1 fsub $y1,$y1,$two32 addze r0,r0 fsub $y2,$y2,$two64 slwi. r0,r0,4 fsub $y3,$y3,$two96 sub $inp,$inp,r0 # conditional rewind fadd $h0lo,$h0lo,$y0 # accumulate input fadd $h0hi,$h0hi,$y1 fadd $h2lo,$h2lo,$y2 fadd $h2hi,$h2hi,$y3 ######################################### base 2^48 -> base 2^32 fadd $c1lo,$h1lo,$two64 $LWXLE $in0,0,$inp # modulo-scheduled input load fadd $c1hi,$h1hi,$two64 $LWXLE $in1,$i1,$inp fadd $c3lo,$h3lo,$two130 $LWXLE $in2,$i2,$inp fadd $c3hi,$h3hi,$two130 $LWXLE $in3,$i3,$inp fadd $c0lo,$h0lo,$two32 addi $inp,$inp,16 fadd $c0hi,$h0hi,$two32 fadd $c2lo,$h2lo,$two96 fadd $c2hi,$h2hi,$two96 fsub $c1lo,$c1lo,$two64 stw $in0,`$LOCALS+8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) # fill "template" fsub $c1hi,$c1hi,$two64 stw $in1,`$LOCALS+8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) fsub $c3lo,$c3lo,$two130 stw $in2,`$LOCALS+8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) fsub $c3hi,$c3hi,$two130 stw $in3,`$LOCALS+8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($sp) fsub $c0lo,$c0lo,$two32 fsub $c0hi,$c0hi,$two32 fsub $c2lo,$c2lo,$two96 fsub $c2hi,$c2hi,$two96 fsub $h1lo,$h1lo,$c1lo fsub $h1hi,$h1hi,$c1hi fsub $h3lo,$h3lo,$c3lo fsub $h3hi,$h3hi,$c3hi fsub $h2lo,$h2lo,$c2lo fsub $h2hi,$h2hi,$c2hi fsub $h0lo,$h0lo,$c0lo fsub $h0hi,$h0hi,$c0hi fadd $h1lo,$h1lo,$c0lo fadd $h1hi,$h1hi,$c0hi fadd $h3lo,$h3lo,$c2lo fadd $h3hi,$h3hi,$c2hi fadd $h2lo,$h2lo,$c1lo fadd $h2hi,$h2hi,$c1hi fmadd $h0lo,$c3lo,$five_two130,$h0lo fmadd $h0hi,$c3hi,$five_two130,$h0hi fadd $x1,$h1lo,$h1hi lfd $s1lo,8*12($ctx) # reload constants fadd $x3,$h3lo,$h3hi lfd $s1hi,8*13($ctx) fadd $x2,$h2lo,$h2hi lfd $r3lo,8*10($ctx) fadd $x0,$h0lo,$h0hi lfd $r3hi,8*11($ctx) Lentry: fmul $h0lo,$s3lo,$x1 fmul $h0hi,$s3hi,$x1 fmul $h2lo,$r1lo,$x1 fmul $h2hi,$r1hi,$x1 fmul $h1lo,$r0lo,$x1 fmul $h1hi,$r0hi,$x1 fmul $h3lo,$r2lo,$x1 fmul $h3hi,$r2hi,$x1 fmadd $h0lo,$s1lo,$x3,$h0lo fmadd $h0hi,$s1hi,$x3,$h0hi fmadd $h2lo,$s3lo,$x3,$h2lo fmadd $h2hi,$s3hi,$x3,$h2hi fmadd $h1lo,$s2lo,$x3,$h1lo fmadd $h1hi,$s2hi,$x3,$h1hi fmadd $h3lo,$r0lo,$x3,$h3lo fmadd $h3hi,$r0hi,$x3,$h3hi fmadd $h0lo,$s2lo,$x2,$h0lo fmadd $h0hi,$s2hi,$x2,$h0hi fmadd $h2lo,$r0lo,$x2,$h2lo fmadd $h2hi,$r0hi,$x2,$h2hi fmadd $h1lo,$s3lo,$x2,$h1lo fmadd $h1hi,$s3hi,$x2,$h1hi fmadd $h3lo,$r1lo,$x2,$h3lo fmadd $h3hi,$r1hi,$x2,$h3hi fmadd $h0lo,$r0lo,$x0,$h0lo lfd $y0,`$LOCALS+8*0`($sp) # load [biased] input fmadd $h0hi,$r0hi,$x0,$h0hi lfd $y1,`$LOCALS+8*1`($sp) fmadd $h2lo,$r2lo,$x0,$h2lo lfd $y2,`$LOCALS+8*2`($sp) fmadd $h2hi,$r2hi,$x0,$h2hi lfd $y3,`$LOCALS+8*3`($sp) fmadd $h1lo,$r1lo,$x0,$h1lo fmadd $h1hi,$r1hi,$x0,$h1hi fmadd $h3lo,$r3lo,$x0,$h3lo fmadd $h3hi,$r3hi,$x0,$h3hi bdnz Loop ######################################### base 2^48 -> base 2^32 fadd $c0lo,$h0lo,$two32 fadd $c0hi,$h0hi,$two32 fadd $c2lo,$h2lo,$two96 fadd $c2hi,$h2hi,$two96 fadd $c1lo,$h1lo,$two64 fadd $c1hi,$h1hi,$two64 fadd $c3lo,$h3lo,$two130 fadd $c3hi,$h3hi,$two130 fsub $c0lo,$c0lo,$two32 fsub $c0hi,$c0hi,$two32 fsub $c2lo,$c2lo,$two96 fsub $c2hi,$c2hi,$two96 fsub $c1lo,$c1lo,$two64 fsub $c1hi,$c1hi,$two64 fsub $c3lo,$c3lo,$two130 fsub $c3hi,$c3hi,$two130 fsub $h1lo,$h1lo,$c1lo fsub $h1hi,$h1hi,$c1hi fsub $h3lo,$h3lo,$c3lo fsub $h3hi,$h3hi,$c3hi fsub $h2lo,$h2lo,$c2lo fsub $h2hi,$h2hi,$c2hi fsub $h0lo,$h0lo,$c0lo fsub $h0hi,$h0hi,$c0hi fadd $h1lo,$h1lo,$c0lo fadd $h1hi,$h1hi,$c0hi fadd $h3lo,$h3lo,$c2lo fadd $h3hi,$h3hi,$c2hi fadd $h2lo,$h2lo,$c1lo fadd $h2hi,$h2hi,$c1hi fmadd $h0lo,$c3lo,$five_two130,$h0lo fmadd $h0hi,$c3hi,$five_two130,$h0hi fadd $x1,$h1lo,$h1hi fadd $x3,$h3lo,$h3hi fadd $x2,$h2lo,$h2hi fadd $x0,$h0lo,$h0hi lfd $h0lo,`$LOCALS+8*4`($sp) # pull saved fpscr fadd $x1,$x1,$two32 # bias fadd $x3,$x3,$two96 fadd $x2,$x2,$two64 fadd $x0,$x0,$two0 stfd $x1,8*1($ctx) # store [biased] hash value stfd $x3,8*3($ctx) stfd $x2,8*2($ctx) stfd $x0,8*0($ctx) mtfsf 255,$h0lo # restore original fpscr lfd f14,`$FRAME-8*18`($sp) lfd f15,`$FRAME-8*17`($sp) lfd f16,`$FRAME-8*16`($sp) lfd f17,`$FRAME-8*15`($sp) lfd f18,`$FRAME-8*14`($sp) lfd f19,`$FRAME-8*13`($sp) lfd f20,`$FRAME-8*12`($sp) lfd f21,`$FRAME-8*11`($sp) lfd f22,`$FRAME-8*10`($sp) lfd f23,`$FRAME-8*9`($sp) lfd f24,`$FRAME-8*8`($sp) lfd f25,`$FRAME-8*7`($sp) lfd f26,`$FRAME-8*6`($sp) lfd f27,`$FRAME-8*5`($sp) lfd f28,`$FRAME-8*4`($sp) lfd f29,`$FRAME-8*3`($sp) lfd f30,`$FRAME-8*2`($sp) lfd f31,`$FRAME-8*1`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME Labort: blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,0,4,0 .size .poly1305_blocks_fpu,.-.poly1305_blocks_fpu ___ { my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len); my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4, $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3 ) = map("r$_",(7..11,28..31)); my $mask = "r0"; my $FRAME = (6+4)*$SIZE_T; $code.=<<___; .globl .poly1305_emit_fpu .align 4 .poly1305_emit_fpu: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) lwz $d0,`8*0+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) # load hash lwz $h0,`8*0+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) lwz $d1,`8*1+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) lwz $h1,`8*1+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) lwz $d2,`8*2+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) lwz $h2,`8*2+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) lwz $d3,`8*3+(0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) lwz $h3,`8*3+(4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN)`($ctx) lis $mask,0xfff0 andc $d0,$d0,$mask # mask exponent andc $d1,$d1,$mask andc $d2,$d2,$mask andc $d3,$d3,$mask # can be partially reduced... li $mask,3 srwi $padbit,$d3,2 # ... so reduce and $h4,$d3,$mask andc $d3,$d3,$mask add $d3,$d3,$padbit ___ if ($SIZE_T==4) { $code.=<<___; addc $h0,$h0,$d3 adde $h1,$h1,$d0 adde $h2,$h2,$d1 adde $h3,$h3,$d2 addze $h4,$h4 addic $d0,$h0,5 # compare to modulus addze $d1,$h1 addze $d2,$h2 addze $d3,$h3 addze $mask,$h4 srwi $mask,$mask,2 # did it carry/borrow? neg $mask,$mask srawi $mask,$mask,31 # mask andc $h0,$h0,$mask and $d0,$d0,$mask andc $h1,$h1,$mask and $d1,$d1,$mask or $h0,$h0,$d0 lwz $d0,0($nonce) # load nonce andc $h2,$h2,$mask and $d2,$d2,$mask or $h1,$h1,$d1 lwz $d1,4($nonce) andc $h3,$h3,$mask and $d3,$d3,$mask or $h2,$h2,$d2 lwz $d2,8($nonce) or $h3,$h3,$d3 lwz $d3,12($nonce) addc $h0,$h0,$d0 # accumulate nonce adde $h1,$h1,$d1 adde $h2,$h2,$d2 adde $h3,$h3,$d3 ___ } else { $code.=<<___; add $h0,$h0,$d3 add $h1,$h1,$d0 add $h2,$h2,$d1 add $h3,$h3,$d2 srdi $d0,$h0,32 add $h1,$h1,$d0 srdi $d1,$h1,32 add $h2,$h2,$d1 srdi $d2,$h2,32 add $h3,$h3,$d2 srdi $d3,$h3,32 add $h4,$h4,$d3 insrdi $h0,$h1,32,0 insrdi $h2,$h3,32,0 addic $d0,$h0,5 # compare to modulus addze $d1,$h2 addze $d2,$h4 srdi $mask,$d2,2 # did it carry/borrow? neg $mask,$mask sradi $mask,$mask,63 # mask ld $d2,0($nonce) # load nonce ld $d3,8($nonce) andc $h0,$h0,$mask and $d0,$d0,$mask andc $h2,$h2,$mask and $d1,$d1,$mask or $h0,$h0,$d0 or $h2,$h2,$d1 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); rotldi $d2,$d2,32 # flip nonce words rotldi $d3,$d3,32 ___ $code.=<<___; addc $h0,$h0,$d2 # accumulate nonce adde $h2,$h2,$d3 srdi $h1,$h0,32 srdi $h3,$h2,32 ___ } $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); stw $h0,0($mac) # write result stw $h1,4($mac) stw $h2,8($mac) stw $h3,12($mac) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); li $d1,4 stwbrx $h0,0,$mac # write result li $d2,8 stwbrx $h1,$d1,$mac li $d3,12 stwbrx $h2,$d2,$mac stwbrx $h3,$d3,$mac ___ $code.=<<___; $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,4,3,0 .size .poly1305_emit_fpu,.-.poly1305_emit_fpu ___ } # Ugly hack here, because PPC assembler syntax seem to vary too # much from platforms to platform... $code.=<<___; .align 6 LPICmeup: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr $len # vvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry addi $len,$len,`64-8` # borrow $len mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .space `64-9*4` .quad 0x4330000000000000 # 2^(52+0) .quad 0x4530000000000000 # 2^(52+32) .quad 0x4730000000000000 # 2^(52+64) .quad 0x4930000000000000 # 2^(52+96) .quad 0x4b50000000000000 # 2^(52+130) .quad 0x37f4000000000000 # 5/2^130 .quad 0x4430000000000000 # 2^(52+16+0) .quad 0x4630000000000000 # 2^(52+16+32) .quad 0x4830000000000000 # 2^(52+16+64) .quad 0x4a30000000000000 # 2^(52+16+96) .quad 0x3e30000000000000 # 2^(52+16+0-96) .quad 0x4030000000000000 # 2^(52+16+32-96) .quad 0x4230000000000000 # 2^(52+16+64-96) .quad 0x0000000000000001 # fpscr: truncate, no exceptions .asciz "Poly1305 for PPC FPU, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-mips.pl0000755000000000000000000002105013176625657020257 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # Poly1305 hash for MIPS64. # # May 2016 # # Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone. # # IALU/gcc # R1x000 5.64/+120% (big-endian) # Octeon II 3.80/+280% (little-endian) ###################################################################### # There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most # widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if # one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral # manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout: # ($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23)); ($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31)); # # The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate # interoperability: # # - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp [o32 can be # excluded from the rule, because it's specified volatile]; # - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting # old code]; # - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary; # # For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs: # # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); # ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); # ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); # ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); # ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); # # # ###################################################################### $flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64 die "MIPS64 only" unless ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i); $v0 = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $a0 : $t0; $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0x0003f000" : "0x00030000"; ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3); ($in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4) = ($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$at,$t0,$t1); $code.=<<___; #ifdef MIPSEB # define MSB 0 # define LSB 7 #else # define MSB 7 # define LSB 0 #endif .text .set noat .set noreorder .align 5 .globl poly1305_init .ent poly1305_init poly1305_init: .frame $sp,0,$ra .set reorder sd $zero,0($ctx) sd $zero,8($ctx) sd $zero,16($ctx) beqz $inp,.Lno_key ldl $in0,0+MSB($inp) ldl $in1,8+MSB($inp) ldr $in0,0+LSB($inp) ldr $in1,8+LSB($inp) #ifdef MIPSEB # if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) dsbh $in0,$in0 # byte swap dsbh $in1,$in1 dshd $in0,$in0 dshd $in1,$in1 # else ori $tmp0,$zero,0xFF dsll $tmp2,$tmp0,32 or $tmp0,$tmp2 # 0x000000FF000000FF and $tmp1,$in0,$tmp0 # byte swap and $tmp3,$in1,$tmp0 dsrl $tmp2,$in0,24 dsrl $tmp4,$in1,24 dsll $tmp1,24 dsll $tmp3,24 and $tmp2,$tmp0 and $tmp4,$tmp0 dsll $tmp0,8 # 0x0000FF000000FF00 or $tmp1,$tmp2 or $tmp3,$tmp4 and $tmp2,$in0,$tmp0 and $tmp4,$in1,$tmp0 dsrl $in0,8 dsrl $in1,8 dsll $tmp2,8 dsll $tmp4,8 and $in0,$tmp0 and $in1,$tmp0 or $tmp1,$tmp2 or $tmp3,$tmp4 or $in0,$tmp1 or $in1,$tmp3 dsrl $tmp1,$in0,32 dsrl $tmp3,$in1,32 dsll $in0,32 dsll $in1,32 or $in0,$tmp1 or $in1,$tmp3 # endif #endif li $tmp0,1 dsll $tmp0,32 daddiu $tmp0,-63 dsll $tmp0,28 daddiu $tmp0,-1 # 0ffffffc0fffffff and $in0,$tmp0 daddiu $tmp0,-3 # 0ffffffc0ffffffc and $in1,$tmp0 sd $in0,24($ctx) dsrl $tmp0,$in1,2 sd $in1,32($ctx) daddu $tmp0,$in1 # s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) sd $tmp0,40($ctx) .Lno_key: li $v0,0 # return 0 jr $ra .end poly1305_init ___ { my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$r0,$r1,$s1,$d0,$d1,$d2) = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$in0,$in1,$t2); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .globl poly1305_blocks .ent poly1305_blocks poly1305_blocks: .set noreorder dsrl $len,4 # number of complete blocks bnez $len,poly1305_blocks_internal nop jr $ra nop .end poly1305_blocks .align 5 .ent poly1305_blocks_internal poly1305_blocks_internal: .frame $sp,6*8,$ra .mask $SAVED_REGS_MASK,-8 .set noreorder dsub $sp,6*8 sd $s5,40($sp) sd $s4,32($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi prologue sd $s3,24($sp) sd $s2,16($sp) sd $s1,8($sp) sd $s0,0($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder ld $h0,0($ctx) # load hash value ld $h1,8($ctx) ld $h2,16($ctx) ld $r0,24($ctx) # load key ld $r1,32($ctx) ld $s1,40($ctx) .Loop: ldl $in0,0+MSB($inp) # load input ldl $in1,8+MSB($inp) ldr $in0,0+LSB($inp) daddiu $len,-1 ldr $in1,8+LSB($inp) daddiu $inp,16 #ifdef MIPSEB # if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) dsbh $in0,$in0 # byte swap dsbh $in1,$in1 dshd $in0,$in0 dshd $in1,$in1 # else ori $tmp0,$zero,0xFF dsll $tmp2,$tmp0,32 or $tmp0,$tmp2 # 0x000000FF000000FF and $tmp1,$in0,$tmp0 # byte swap and $tmp3,$in1,$tmp0 dsrl $tmp2,$in0,24 dsrl $tmp4,$in1,24 dsll $tmp1,24 dsll $tmp3,24 and $tmp2,$tmp0 and $tmp4,$tmp0 dsll $tmp0,8 # 0x0000FF000000FF00 or $tmp1,$tmp2 or $tmp3,$tmp4 and $tmp2,$in0,$tmp0 and $tmp4,$in1,$tmp0 dsrl $in0,8 dsrl $in1,8 dsll $tmp2,8 dsll $tmp4,8 and $in0,$tmp0 and $in1,$tmp0 or $tmp1,$tmp2 or $tmp3,$tmp4 or $in0,$tmp1 or $in1,$tmp3 dsrl $tmp1,$in0,32 dsrl $tmp3,$in1,32 dsll $in0,32 dsll $in1,32 or $in0,$tmp1 or $in1,$tmp3 # endif #endif daddu $h0,$in0 # accumulate input daddu $h1,$in1 sltu $tmp0,$h0,$in0 sltu $tmp1,$h1,$in1 daddu $h1,$tmp0 dmultu $r0,$h0 # h0*r0 daddu $h2,$padbit sltu $tmp0,$h1,$tmp0 mflo $d0 mfhi $d1 dmultu $s1,$h1 # h1*5*r1 daddu $tmp0,$tmp1 daddu $h2,$tmp0 mflo $tmp0 mfhi $tmp1 dmultu $r1,$h0 # h0*r1 daddu $d0,$tmp0 daddu $d1,$tmp1 mflo $tmp2 mfhi $d2 sltu $tmp0,$d0,$tmp0 daddu $d1,$tmp0 dmultu $r0,$h1 # h1*r0 daddu $d1,$tmp2 sltu $tmp2,$d1,$tmp2 mflo $tmp0 mfhi $tmp1 daddu $d2,$tmp2 dmultu $s1,$h2 # h2*5*r1 daddu $d1,$tmp0 daddu $d2,$tmp1 mflo $tmp2 dmultu $r0,$h2 # h2*r0 sltu $tmp0,$d1,$tmp0 daddu $d2,$tmp0 mflo $tmp3 daddu $d1,$tmp2 daddu $d2,$tmp3 sltu $tmp2,$d1,$tmp2 daddu $d2,$tmp2 li $tmp0,-4 # final reduction and $tmp0,$d2 dsrl $tmp1,$d2,2 andi $h2,$d2,3 daddu $tmp0,$tmp1 daddu $h0,$d0,$tmp0 sltu $tmp0,$h0,$tmp0 daddu $h1,$d1,$tmp0 sltu $tmp0,$h1,$tmp0 daddu $h2,$h2,$tmp0 bnez $len,.Loop sd $h0,0($ctx) # store hash value sd $h1,8($ctx) sd $h2,16($ctx) .set noreorder ld $s5,40($sp) # epilogue ld $s4,32($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi epilogue ld $s3,24($sp) ld $s2,16($sp) ld $s1,8($sp) ld $s0,0($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra dadd $sp,6*8 .end poly1305_blocks_internal ___ } { my ($ctx,$mac,$nonce) = ($a0,$a1,$a2); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .globl poly1305_emit .ent poly1305_emit poly1305_emit: .frame $sp,0,$ra .set reorder ld $tmp0,0($ctx) ld $tmp1,8($ctx) ld $tmp2,16($ctx) daddiu $in0,$tmp0,5 # compare to modulus sltiu $tmp3,$in0,5 daddu $in1,$tmp1,$tmp3 sltu $tmp3,$in1,$tmp3 daddu $tmp2,$tmp2,$tmp3 dsrl $tmp2,2 # see if it carried/borrowed dsubu $tmp2,$zero,$tmp2 nor $tmp3,$zero,$tmp2 and $in0,$tmp2 and $tmp0,$tmp3 and $in1,$tmp2 and $tmp1,$tmp3 or $in0,$tmp0 or $in1,$tmp1 lwu $tmp0,0($nonce) # load nonce lwu $tmp1,4($nonce) lwu $tmp2,8($nonce) lwu $tmp3,12($nonce) dsll $tmp1,32 dsll $tmp3,32 or $tmp0,$tmp1 or $tmp2,$tmp3 daddu $in0,$tmp0 # accumulate nonce daddu $in1,$tmp2 sltu $tmp0,$in0,$tmp0 daddu $in1,$tmp0 dsrl $tmp0,$in0,8 # write mac value dsrl $tmp1,$in0,16 dsrl $tmp2,$in0,24 sb $in0,0($mac) dsrl $tmp3,$in0,32 sb $tmp0,1($mac) dsrl $tmp0,$in0,40 sb $tmp1,2($mac) dsrl $tmp1,$in0,48 sb $tmp2,3($mac) dsrl $tmp2,$in0,56 sb $tmp3,4($mac) dsrl $tmp3,$in1,8 sb $tmp0,5($mac) dsrl $tmp0,$in1,16 sb $tmp1,6($mac) dsrl $tmp1,$in1,24 sb $tmp2,7($mac) sb $in1,8($mac) dsrl $tmp2,$in1,32 sb $tmp3,9($mac) dsrl $tmp3,$in1,40 sb $tmp0,10($mac) dsrl $tmp0,$in1,48 sb $tmp1,11($mac) dsrl $tmp1,$in1,56 sb $tmp2,12($mac) sb $tmp3,13($mac) sb $tmp0,14($mac) sb $tmp1,15($mac) jr $ra .end poly1305_emit .rdata .asciiz "Poly1305 for MIPS64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ } $output=pop and open STDOUT,">$output"; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl0000755000000000000000000007206413176625657020353 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # IALU(*)/gcc-4.4 NEON # # ARM11xx(ARMv6) 7.78/+100% - # Cortex-A5 6.35/+130% 3.00 # Cortex-A8 6.25/+115% 2.36 # Cortex-A9 5.10/+95% 2.55 # Cortex-A15 3.85/+85% 1.25(**) # Snapdragon S4 5.70/+100% 1.48(**) # # (*) this is for -march=armv6, i.e. with bunch of ldrb loading data; # (**) these are trade-off results, they can be improved by ~8% but at # the cost of 15/12% regression on Cortex-A5/A7, it's even possible # to improve Cortex-A9 result, but then A5/A7 loose more than 20%; $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit)=map("r$_",(0..3)); $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #endif .globl poly1305_emit .globl poly1305_blocks .globl poly1305_init .type poly1305_init,%function .align 5 poly1305_init: .Lpoly1305_init: stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} eor r3,r3,r3 cmp $inp,#0 str r3,[$ctx,#0] @ zero hash value str r3,[$ctx,#4] str r3,[$ctx,#8] str r3,[$ctx,#12] str r3,[$ctx,#16] str r3,[$ctx,#36] @ is_base2_26 add $ctx,$ctx,#20 #ifdef __thumb2__ it eq #endif moveq r0,#0 beq .Lno_key #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 adr r11,.Lpoly1305_init ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap #endif ldrb r4,[$inp,#0] mov r10,#0x0fffffff ldrb r5,[$inp,#1] and r3,r10,#-4 @ 0x0ffffffc ldrb r6,[$inp,#2] ldrb r7,[$inp,#3] orr r4,r4,r5,lsl#8 ldrb r5,[$inp,#4] orr r4,r4,r6,lsl#16 ldrb r6,[$inp,#5] orr r4,r4,r7,lsl#24 ldrb r7,[$inp,#6] and r4,r4,r10 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 ldr r12,[r11,r12] @ OPENSSL_armcap_P # ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r12,[r12] # endif #endif ldrb r8,[$inp,#7] orr r5,r5,r6,lsl#8 ldrb r6,[$inp,#8] orr r5,r5,r7,lsl#16 ldrb r7,[$inp,#9] orr r5,r5,r8,lsl#24 ldrb r8,[$inp,#10] and r5,r5,r3 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 tst r12,#ARMV7_NEON @ check for NEON # ifdef __APPLE__ adr r9,poly1305_blocks_neon adr r11,poly1305_blocks # ifdef __thumb2__ it ne # endif movne r11,r9 adr r12,poly1305_emit adr r10,poly1305_emit_neon # ifdef __thumb2__ it ne # endif movne r12,r10 # else # ifdef __thumb2__ itete eq # endif addeq r12,r11,#(poly1305_emit-.Lpoly1305_init) addne r12,r11,#(poly1305_emit_neon-.Lpoly1305_init) addeq r11,r11,#(poly1305_blocks-.Lpoly1305_init) addne r11,r11,#(poly1305_blocks_neon-.Lpoly1305_init) # endif # ifdef __thumb2__ orr r12,r12,#1 @ thumb-ify address orr r11,r11,#1 # endif #endif ldrb r9,[$inp,#11] orr r6,r6,r7,lsl#8 ldrb r7,[$inp,#12] orr r6,r6,r8,lsl#16 ldrb r8,[$inp,#13] orr r6,r6,r9,lsl#24 ldrb r9,[$inp,#14] and r6,r6,r3 ldrb r10,[$inp,#15] orr r7,r7,r8,lsl#8 str r4,[$ctx,#0] orr r7,r7,r9,lsl#16 str r5,[$ctx,#4] orr r7,r7,r10,lsl#24 str r6,[$ctx,#8] and r7,r7,r3 str r7,[$ctx,#12] #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 stmia r2,{r11,r12} @ fill functions table mov r0,#1 #else mov r0,#0 #endif .Lno_key: ldmia sp!,{r4-r11} #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ret @ bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init ___ { my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4,$r0,$r1,$r2,$r3)=map("r$_",(4..12)); my ($s1,$s2,$s3)=($r1,$r2,$r3); $code.=<<___; .type poly1305_blocks,%function .align 5 poly1305_blocks: stmdb sp!,{r3-r11,lr} ands $len,$len,#-16 beq .Lno_data cmp $padbit,#0 add $len,$len,$inp @ end pointer sub sp,sp,#32 ldmia $ctx,{$h0-$r3} @ load context str $ctx,[sp,#12] @ offload stuff mov lr,$inp str $len,[sp,#16] str $r1,[sp,#20] str $r2,[sp,#24] str $r3,[sp,#28] b .Loop .Loop: #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb r0,[lr],#16 @ load input # ifdef __thumb2__ it hi # endif addhi $h4,$h4,#1 @ 1<<128 ldrb r1,[lr,#-15] ldrb r2,[lr,#-14] ldrb r3,[lr,#-13] orr r1,r0,r1,lsl#8 ldrb r0,[lr,#-12] orr r2,r1,r2,lsl#16 ldrb r1,[lr,#-11] orr r3,r2,r3,lsl#24 ldrb r2,[lr,#-10] adds $h0,$h0,r3 @ accumulate input ldrb r3,[lr,#-9] orr r1,r0,r1,lsl#8 ldrb r0,[lr,#-8] orr r2,r1,r2,lsl#16 ldrb r1,[lr,#-7] orr r3,r2,r3,lsl#24 ldrb r2,[lr,#-6] adcs $h1,$h1,r3 ldrb r3,[lr,#-5] orr r1,r0,r1,lsl#8 ldrb r0,[lr,#-4] orr r2,r1,r2,lsl#16 ldrb r1,[lr,#-3] orr r3,r2,r3,lsl#24 ldrb r2,[lr,#-2] adcs $h2,$h2,r3 ldrb r3,[lr,#-1] orr r1,r0,r1,lsl#8 str lr,[sp,#8] @ offload input pointer orr r2,r1,r2,lsl#16 add $s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2 orr r3,r2,r3,lsl#24 #else ldr r0,[lr],#16 @ load input # ifdef __thumb2__ it hi # endif addhi $h4,$h4,#1 @ padbit ldr r1,[lr,#-12] ldr r2,[lr,#-8] ldr r3,[lr,#-4] # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev r0,r0 rev r1,r1 rev r2,r2 rev r3,r3 # endif adds $h0,$h0,r0 @ accumulate input str lr,[sp,#8] @ offload input pointer adcs $h1,$h1,r1 add $s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2 adcs $h2,$h2,r2 #endif add $s2,$r2,$r2,lsr#2 adcs $h3,$h3,r3 add $s3,$r3,$r3,lsr#2 umull r2,r3,$h1,$r0 adc $h4,$h4,#0 umull r0,r1,$h0,$r0 umlal r2,r3,$h4,$s1 umlal r0,r1,$h3,$s1 ldr $r1,[sp,#20] @ reload $r1 umlal r2,r3,$h2,$s3 umlal r0,r1,$h1,$s3 umlal r2,r3,$h3,$s2 umlal r0,r1,$h2,$s2 umlal r2,r3,$h0,$r1 str r0,[sp,#0] @ future $h0 mul r0,$s2,$h4 ldr $r2,[sp,#24] @ reload $r2 adds r2,r2,r1 @ d1+=d0>>32 eor r1,r1,r1 adc lr,r3,#0 @ future $h2 str r2,[sp,#4] @ future $h1 mul r2,$s3,$h4 eor r3,r3,r3 umlal r0,r1,$h3,$s3 ldr $r3,[sp,#28] @ reload $r3 umlal r2,r3,$h3,$r0 umlal r0,r1,$h2,$r0 umlal r2,r3,$h2,$r1 umlal r0,r1,$h1,$r1 umlal r2,r3,$h1,$r2 umlal r0,r1,$h0,$r2 umlal r2,r3,$h0,$r3 ldr $h0,[sp,#0] mul $h4,$r0,$h4 ldr $h1,[sp,#4] adds $h2,lr,r0 @ d2+=d1>>32 ldr lr,[sp,#8] @ reload input pointer adc r1,r1,#0 adds $h3,r2,r1 @ d3+=d2>>32 ldr r0,[sp,#16] @ reload end pointer adc r3,r3,#0 add $h4,$h4,r3 @ h4+=d3>>32 and r1,$h4,#-4 and $h4,$h4,#3 add r1,r1,r1,lsr#2 @ *=5 adds $h0,$h0,r1 adcs $h1,$h1,#0 adcs $h2,$h2,#0 adcs $h3,$h3,#0 adc $h4,$h4,#0 cmp r0,lr @ done yet? bhi .Loop ldr $ctx,[sp,#12] add sp,sp,#32 stmia $ctx,{$h0-$h4} @ store the result .Lno_data: #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r3-r11,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r3-r11,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks ___ } { my ($ctx,$mac,$nonce)=map("r$_",(0..2)); my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4,$g0,$g1,$g2,$g3)=map("r$_",(3..11)); my $g4=$h4; $code.=<<___; .type poly1305_emit,%function .align 5 poly1305_emit: stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} .Lpoly1305_emit_enter: ldmia $ctx,{$h0-$h4} adds $g0,$h0,#5 @ compare to modulus adcs $g1,$h1,#0 adcs $g2,$h2,#0 adcs $g3,$h3,#0 adc $g4,$h4,#0 tst $g4,#4 @ did it carry/borrow? #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne $h0,$g0 ldr $g0,[$nonce,#0] #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne $h1,$g1 ldr $g1,[$nonce,#4] #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne $h2,$g2 ldr $g2,[$nonce,#8] #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne $h3,$g3 ldr $g3,[$nonce,#12] adds $h0,$h0,$g0 adcs $h1,$h1,$g1 adcs $h2,$h2,$g2 adc $h3,$h3,$g3 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $h0,$h0 rev $h1,$h1 rev $h2,$h2 rev $h3,$h3 # endif str $h0,[$mac,#0] str $h1,[$mac,#4] str $h2,[$mac,#8] str $h3,[$mac,#12] #else strb $h0,[$mac,#0] mov $h0,$h0,lsr#8 strb $h1,[$mac,#4] mov $h1,$h1,lsr#8 strb $h2,[$mac,#8] mov $h2,$h2,lsr#8 strb $h3,[$mac,#12] mov $h3,$h3,lsr#8 strb $h0,[$mac,#1] mov $h0,$h0,lsr#8 strb $h1,[$mac,#5] mov $h1,$h1,lsr#8 strb $h2,[$mac,#9] mov $h2,$h2,lsr#8 strb $h3,[$mac,#13] mov $h3,$h3,lsr#8 strb $h0,[$mac,#2] mov $h0,$h0,lsr#8 strb $h1,[$mac,#6] mov $h1,$h1,lsr#8 strb $h2,[$mac,#10] mov $h2,$h2,lsr#8 strb $h3,[$mac,#14] mov $h3,$h3,lsr#8 strb $h0,[$mac,#3] strb $h1,[$mac,#7] strb $h2,[$mac,#11] strb $h3,[$mac,#15] #endif ldmia sp!,{r4-r11} #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ret @ bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit ___ { my ($R0,$R1,$S1,$R2,$S2,$R3,$S3,$R4,$S4) = map("d$_",(0..9)); my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4, $H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4) = map("q$_",(5..14)); my ($T0,$T1,$MASK) = map("q$_",(15,4,0)); my ($in2,$zeros,$tbl0,$tbl1) = map("r$_",(4..7)); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .fpu neon .type poly1305_init_neon,%function .align 5 poly1305_init_neon: ldr r4,[$ctx,#20] @ load key base 2^32 ldr r5,[$ctx,#24] ldr r6,[$ctx,#28] ldr r7,[$ctx,#32] and r2,r4,#0x03ffffff @ base 2^32 -> base 2^26 mov r3,r4,lsr#26 mov r4,r5,lsr#20 orr r3,r3,r5,lsl#6 mov r5,r6,lsr#14 orr r4,r4,r6,lsl#12 mov r6,r7,lsr#8 orr r5,r5,r7,lsl#18 and r3,r3,#0x03ffffff and r4,r4,#0x03ffffff and r5,r5,#0x03ffffff vdup.32 $R0,r2 @ r^1 in both lanes add r2,r3,r3,lsl#2 @ *5 vdup.32 $R1,r3 add r3,r4,r4,lsl#2 vdup.32 $S1,r2 vdup.32 $R2,r4 add r4,r5,r5,lsl#2 vdup.32 $S2,r3 vdup.32 $R3,r5 add r5,r6,r6,lsl#2 vdup.32 $S3,r4 vdup.32 $R4,r6 vdup.32 $S4,r5 mov $zeros,#2 @ counter .Lsquare_neon: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 @ d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 @ d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 @ d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 @ d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 vmull.u32 $D0,$R0,${R0}[1] vmull.u32 $D1,$R1,${R0}[1] vmull.u32 $D2,$R2,${R0}[1] vmull.u32 $D3,$R3,${R0}[1] vmull.u32 $D4,$R4,${R0}[1] vmlal.u32 $D0,$R4,${S1}[1] vmlal.u32 $D1,$R0,${R1}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$R1,${R1}[1] vmlal.u32 $D3,$R2,${R1}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$R3,${R1}[1] vmlal.u32 $D0,$R3,${S2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D1,$R4,${S2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D3,$R1,${R2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$R0,${R2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$R2,${R2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D0,$R2,${S3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D3,$R0,${R3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D1,$R3,${S3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$R4,${S3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$R1,${R3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D3,$R4,${S4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D0,$R1,${S4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D1,$R2,${S4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$R3,${S4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$R0,${R4}[1] @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein @ and P. Schwabe @ @ H0>>+H1>>+H2>>+H3>>+H4 @ H3>>+H4>>*5+H0>>+H1 @ @ Trivia. @ @ Result of multiplication of n-bit number by m-bit number is @ n+m bits wide. However! Even though 2^n is a n+1-bit number, @ m-bit number multiplied by 2^n is still n+m bits wide. @ @ Sum of two n-bit numbers is n+1 bits wide, sum of three - n+2, @ and so is sum of four. Sum of 2^m n-m-bit numbers and n-bit @ one is n+1 bits wide. @ @ >>+ denotes Hnext += Hn>>26, Hn &= 0x3ffffff. This means that @ H0, H2, H3 are guaranteed to be 26 bits wide, while H1 and H4 @ can be 27. However! In cases when their width exceeds 26 bits @ they are limited by 2^26+2^6. This in turn means that *sum* @ of the products with these values can still be viewed as sum @ of 52-bit numbers as long as the amount of addends is not a @ power of 2. For example, @ @ H4 = H4*R0 + H3*R1 + H2*R2 + H1*R3 + H0 * R4, @ @ which can't be larger than 5 * (2^26 + 2^6) * (2^26 + 2^6), or @ 5 * (2^52 + 2*2^32 + 2^12), which in turn is smaller than @ 8 * (2^52) or 2^55. However, the value is then multiplied by @ by 5, so we should be looking at 5 * 5 * (2^52 + 2^33 + 2^12), @ which is less than 32 * (2^52) or 2^57. And when processing @ data we are looking at triple as many addends... @ @ In key setup procedure pre-reduced H0 is limited by 5*4+1 and @ 5*H4 - by 5*5 52-bit addends, or 57 bits. But when hashing the @ input H0 is limited by (5*4+1)*3 addends, or 58 bits, while @ 5*H4 by 5*5*3, or 59[!] bits. How is this relevant? vmlal.u32 @ instruction accepts 2x32-bit input and writes 2x64-bit result. @ This means that result of reduction have to be compressed upon @ loop wrap-around. This can be done in the process of reduction @ to minimize amount of instructions [as well as amount of @ 128-bit instructions, which benefits low-end processors], but @ one has to watch for H2 (which is narrower than H0) and 5*H4 @ not being wider than 58 bits, so that result of right shift @ by 26 bits fits in 32 bits. This is also useful on x86, @ because it allows to use paddd in place for paddq, which @ benefits Atom, where paddq is ridiculously slow. vshr.u64 $T0,$D3,#26 vmovn.i64 $D3#lo,$D3 vshr.u64 $T1,$D0,#26 vmovn.i64 $D0#lo,$D0 vadd.i64 $D4,$D4,$T0 @ h3 -> h4 vbic.i32 $D3#lo,#0xfc000000 @ &=0x03ffffff vadd.i64 $D1,$D1,$T1 @ h0 -> h1 vbic.i32 $D0#lo,#0xfc000000 vshrn.u64 $T0#lo,$D4,#26 vmovn.i64 $D4#lo,$D4 vshr.u64 $T1,$D1,#26 vmovn.i64 $D1#lo,$D1 vadd.i64 $D2,$D2,$T1 @ h1 -> h2 vbic.i32 $D4#lo,#0xfc000000 vbic.i32 $D1#lo,#0xfc000000 vadd.i32 $D0#lo,$D0#lo,$T0#lo vshl.u32 $T0#lo,$T0#lo,#2 vshrn.u64 $T1#lo,$D2,#26 vmovn.i64 $D2#lo,$D2 vadd.i32 $D0#lo,$D0#lo,$T0#lo @ h4 -> h0 vadd.i32 $D3#lo,$D3#lo,$T1#lo @ h2 -> h3 vbic.i32 $D2#lo,#0xfc000000 vshr.u32 $T0#lo,$D0#lo,#26 vbic.i32 $D0#lo,#0xfc000000 vshr.u32 $T1#lo,$D3#lo,#26 vbic.i32 $D3#lo,#0xfc000000 vadd.i32 $D1#lo,$D1#lo,$T0#lo @ h0 -> h1 vadd.i32 $D4#lo,$D4#lo,$T1#lo @ h3 -> h4 subs $zeros,$zeros,#1 beq .Lsquare_break_neon add $tbl0,$ctx,#(48+0*9*4) add $tbl1,$ctx,#(48+1*9*4) vtrn.32 $R0,$D0#lo @ r^2:r^1 vtrn.32 $R2,$D2#lo vtrn.32 $R3,$D3#lo vtrn.32 $R1,$D1#lo vtrn.32 $R4,$D4#lo vshl.u32 $S2,$R2,#2 @ *5 vshl.u32 $S3,$R3,#2 vshl.u32 $S1,$R1,#2 vshl.u32 $S4,$R4,#2 vadd.i32 $S2,$S2,$R2 vadd.i32 $S1,$S1,$R1 vadd.i32 $S3,$S3,$R3 vadd.i32 $S4,$S4,$R4 vst4.32 {${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]! vst4.32 {${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]! vst4.32 {${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]! vst4.32 {${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]! vst1.32 {${S4}[0]},[$tbl0,:32] vst1.32 {${S4}[1]},[$tbl1,:32] b .Lsquare_neon .align 4 .Lsquare_break_neon: add $tbl0,$ctx,#(48+2*4*9) add $tbl1,$ctx,#(48+3*4*9) vmov $R0,$D0#lo @ r^4:r^3 vshl.u32 $S1,$D1#lo,#2 @ *5 vmov $R1,$D1#lo vshl.u32 $S2,$D2#lo,#2 vmov $R2,$D2#lo vshl.u32 $S3,$D3#lo,#2 vmov $R3,$D3#lo vshl.u32 $S4,$D4#lo,#2 vmov $R4,$D4#lo vadd.i32 $S1,$S1,$D1#lo vadd.i32 $S2,$S2,$D2#lo vadd.i32 $S3,$S3,$D3#lo vadd.i32 $S4,$S4,$D4#lo vst4.32 {${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]! vst4.32 {${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]! vst4.32 {${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]! vst4.32 {${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]! vst1.32 {${S4}[0]},[$tbl0] vst1.32 {${S4}[1]},[$tbl1] ret @ bx lr .size poly1305_init_neon,.-poly1305_init_neon .type poly1305_blocks_neon,%function .align 5 poly1305_blocks_neon: ldr ip,[$ctx,#36] @ is_base2_26 ands $len,$len,#-16 beq .Lno_data_neon cmp $len,#64 bhs .Lenter_neon tst ip,ip @ is_base2_26? beq poly1305_blocks .Lenter_neon: stmdb sp!,{r4-r7} vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so tst ip,ip @ is_base2_26? bne .Lbase2_26_neon stmdb sp!,{r1-r3,lr} bl poly1305_init_neon ldr r4,[$ctx,#0] @ load hash value base 2^32 ldr r5,[$ctx,#4] ldr r6,[$ctx,#8] ldr r7,[$ctx,#12] ldr ip,[$ctx,#16] and r2,r4,#0x03ffffff @ base 2^32 -> base 2^26 mov r3,r4,lsr#26 veor $D0#lo,$D0#lo,$D0#lo mov r4,r5,lsr#20 orr r3,r3,r5,lsl#6 veor $D1#lo,$D1#lo,$D1#lo mov r5,r6,lsr#14 orr r4,r4,r6,lsl#12 veor $D2#lo,$D2#lo,$D2#lo mov r6,r7,lsr#8 orr r5,r5,r7,lsl#18 veor $D3#lo,$D3#lo,$D3#lo and r3,r3,#0x03ffffff orr r6,r6,ip,lsl#24 veor $D4#lo,$D4#lo,$D4#lo and r4,r4,#0x03ffffff mov r1,#1 and r5,r5,#0x03ffffff str r1,[$ctx,#36] @ is_base2_26 vmov.32 $D0#lo[0],r2 vmov.32 $D1#lo[0],r3 vmov.32 $D2#lo[0],r4 vmov.32 $D3#lo[0],r5 vmov.32 $D4#lo[0],r6 adr $zeros,.Lzeros ldmia sp!,{r1-r3,lr} b .Lbase2_32_neon .align 4 .Lbase2_26_neon: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ load hash value veor $D0#lo,$D0#lo,$D0#lo veor $D1#lo,$D1#lo,$D1#lo veor $D2#lo,$D2#lo,$D2#lo veor $D3#lo,$D3#lo,$D3#lo veor $D4#lo,$D4#lo,$D4#lo vld4.32 {$D0#lo[0],$D1#lo[0],$D2#lo[0],$D3#lo[0]},[$ctx]! adr $zeros,.Lzeros vld1.32 {$D4#lo[0]},[$ctx] sub $ctx,$ctx,#16 @ rewind .Lbase2_32_neon: add $in2,$inp,#32 mov $padbit,$padbit,lsl#24 tst $len,#31 beq .Leven vld4.32 {$H0#lo[0],$H1#lo[0],$H2#lo[0],$H3#lo[0]},[$inp]! vmov.32 $H4#lo[0],$padbit sub $len,$len,#16 add $in2,$inp,#32 # ifdef __ARMEB__ vrev32.8 $H0,$H0 vrev32.8 $H3,$H3 vrev32.8 $H1,$H1 vrev32.8 $H2,$H2 # endif vsri.u32 $H4#lo,$H3#lo,#8 @ base 2^32 -> base 2^26 vshl.u32 $H3#lo,$H3#lo,#18 vsri.u32 $H3#lo,$H2#lo,#14 vshl.u32 $H2#lo,$H2#lo,#12 vadd.i32 $H4#hi,$H4#lo,$D4#lo @ add hash value and move to #hi vbic.i32 $H3#lo,#0xfc000000 vsri.u32 $H2#lo,$H1#lo,#20 vshl.u32 $H1#lo,$H1#lo,#6 vbic.i32 $H2#lo,#0xfc000000 vsri.u32 $H1#lo,$H0#lo,#26 vadd.i32 $H3#hi,$H3#lo,$D3#lo vbic.i32 $H0#lo,#0xfc000000 vbic.i32 $H1#lo,#0xfc000000 vadd.i32 $H2#hi,$H2#lo,$D2#lo vadd.i32 $H0#hi,$H0#lo,$D0#lo vadd.i32 $H1#hi,$H1#lo,$D1#lo mov $tbl1,$zeros add $tbl0,$ctx,#48 cmp $len,$len b .Long_tail .align 4 .Leven: subs $len,$len,#64 it lo movlo $in2,$zeros vmov.i32 $H4,#1<<24 @ padbit, yes, always vld4.32 {$H0#lo,$H1#lo,$H2#lo,$H3#lo},[$inp] @ inp[0:1] add $inp,$inp,#64 vld4.32 {$H0#hi,$H1#hi,$H2#hi,$H3#hi},[$in2] @ inp[2:3] (or 0) add $in2,$in2,#64 itt hi addhi $tbl1,$ctx,#(48+1*9*4) addhi $tbl0,$ctx,#(48+3*9*4) # ifdef __ARMEB__ vrev32.8 $H0,$H0 vrev32.8 $H3,$H3 vrev32.8 $H1,$H1 vrev32.8 $H2,$H2 # endif vsri.u32 $H4,$H3,#8 @ base 2^32 -> base 2^26 vshl.u32 $H3,$H3,#18 vsri.u32 $H3,$H2,#14 vshl.u32 $H2,$H2,#12 vbic.i32 $H3,#0xfc000000 vsri.u32 $H2,$H1,#20 vshl.u32 $H1,$H1,#6 vbic.i32 $H2,#0xfc000000 vsri.u32 $H1,$H0,#26 vbic.i32 $H0,#0xfc000000 vbic.i32 $H1,#0xfc000000 bls .Lskip_loop vld4.32 {${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]! @ load r^2 vld4.32 {${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]! @ load r^4 vld4.32 {${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]! vld4.32 {${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]! b .Loop_neon .align 5 .Loop_neon: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2 @ ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r @ \___________________/ @ ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2 @ ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r @ \___________________/ \____________________/ @ @ Note that we start with inp[2:3]*r^2. This is because it @ doesn't depend on reduction in previous iteration. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 @ d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 @ d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 @ d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 @ d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ inp[2:3]*r^2 vadd.i32 $H2#lo,$H2#lo,$D2#lo @ accumulate inp[0:1] vmull.u32 $D2,$H2#hi,${R0}[1] vadd.i32 $H0#lo,$H0#lo,$D0#lo vmull.u32 $D0,$H0#hi,${R0}[1] vadd.i32 $H3#lo,$H3#lo,$D3#lo vmull.u32 $D3,$H3#hi,${R0}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H1#hi,${R1}[1] vadd.i32 $H1#lo,$H1#lo,$D1#lo vmull.u32 $D1,$H1#hi,${R0}[1] vadd.i32 $H4#lo,$H4#lo,$D4#lo vmull.u32 $D4,$H4#hi,${R0}[1] subs $len,$len,#64 vmlal.u32 $D0,$H4#hi,${S1}[1] it lo movlo $in2,$zeros vmlal.u32 $D3,$H2#hi,${R1}[1] vld1.32 ${S4}[1],[$tbl1,:32] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H0#hi,${R1}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H3#hi,${R1}[1] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H3#hi,${S2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D3,$H1#hi,${R2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H2#hi,${R2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H4#hi,${S2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H0#hi,${R2}[1] vmlal.u32 $D3,$H0#hi,${R3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H2#hi,${S3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H1#hi,${R3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H3#hi,${S3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H4#hi,${S3}[1] vmlal.u32 $D3,$H4#hi,${S4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H1#hi,${S4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H0#hi,${R4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H2#hi,${S4}[1] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H3#hi,${S4}[1] vld4.32 {$H0#hi,$H1#hi,$H2#hi,$H3#hi},[$in2] @ inp[2:3] (or 0) add $in2,$in2,#64 @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4 and accumulate vmlal.u32 $D3,$H3#lo,${R0}[0] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H0#lo,${R0}[0] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H4#lo,${R0}[0] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H1#lo,${R0}[0] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H2#lo,${R0}[0] vld1.32 ${S4}[0],[$tbl0,:32] vmlal.u32 $D3,$H2#lo,${R1}[0] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H4#lo,${S1}[0] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H3#lo,${R1}[0] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H0#lo,${R1}[0] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H1#lo,${R1}[0] vmlal.u32 $D3,$H1#lo,${R2}[0] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H3#lo,${S2}[0] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H2#lo,${R2}[0] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H4#lo,${S2}[0] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H0#lo,${R2}[0] vmlal.u32 $D3,$H0#lo,${R3}[0] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H2#lo,${S3}[0] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H1#lo,${R3}[0] vmlal.u32 $D1,$H3#lo,${S3}[0] vmlal.u32 $D3,$H4#lo,${S4}[0] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H4#lo,${S3}[0] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H1#lo,${S4}[0] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H0#lo,${R4}[0] vmov.i32 $H4,#1<<24 @ padbit, yes, always vmlal.u32 $D1,$H2#lo,${S4}[0] vmlal.u32 $D2,$H3#lo,${S4}[0] vld4.32 {$H0#lo,$H1#lo,$H2#lo,$H3#lo},[$inp] @ inp[0:1] add $inp,$inp,#64 # ifdef __ARMEB__ vrev32.8 $H0,$H0 vrev32.8 $H1,$H1 vrev32.8 $H2,$H2 vrev32.8 $H3,$H3 # endif @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ lazy reduction interleaved with base 2^32 -> base 2^26 of @ inp[0:3] previously loaded to $H0-$H3 and smashed to $H0-$H4. vshr.u64 $T0,$D3,#26 vmovn.i64 $D3#lo,$D3 vshr.u64 $T1,$D0,#26 vmovn.i64 $D0#lo,$D0 vadd.i64 $D4,$D4,$T0 @ h3 -> h4 vbic.i32 $D3#lo,#0xfc000000 vsri.u32 $H4,$H3,#8 @ base 2^32 -> base 2^26 vadd.i64 $D1,$D1,$T1 @ h0 -> h1 vshl.u32 $H3,$H3,#18 vbic.i32 $D0#lo,#0xfc000000 vshrn.u64 $T0#lo,$D4,#26 vmovn.i64 $D4#lo,$D4 vshr.u64 $T1,$D1,#26 vmovn.i64 $D1#lo,$D1 vadd.i64 $D2,$D2,$T1 @ h1 -> h2 vsri.u32 $H3,$H2,#14 vbic.i32 $D4#lo,#0xfc000000 vshl.u32 $H2,$H2,#12 vbic.i32 $D1#lo,#0xfc000000 vadd.i32 $D0#lo,$D0#lo,$T0#lo vshl.u32 $T0#lo,$T0#lo,#2 vbic.i32 $H3,#0xfc000000 vshrn.u64 $T1#lo,$D2,#26 vmovn.i64 $D2#lo,$D2 vaddl.u32 $D0,$D0#lo,$T0#lo @ h4 -> h0 [widen for a sec] vsri.u32 $H2,$H1,#20 vadd.i32 $D3#lo,$D3#lo,$T1#lo @ h2 -> h3 vshl.u32 $H1,$H1,#6 vbic.i32 $D2#lo,#0xfc000000 vbic.i32 $H2,#0xfc000000 vshrn.u64 $T0#lo,$D0,#26 @ re-narrow vmovn.i64 $D0#lo,$D0 vsri.u32 $H1,$H0,#26 vbic.i32 $H0,#0xfc000000 vshr.u32 $T1#lo,$D3#lo,#26 vbic.i32 $D3#lo,#0xfc000000 vbic.i32 $D0#lo,#0xfc000000 vadd.i32 $D1#lo,$D1#lo,$T0#lo @ h0 -> h1 vadd.i32 $D4#lo,$D4#lo,$T1#lo @ h3 -> h4 vbic.i32 $H1,#0xfc000000 bhi .Loop_neon .Lskip_loop: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1 add $tbl1,$ctx,#(48+0*9*4) add $tbl0,$ctx,#(48+1*9*4) adds $len,$len,#32 it ne movne $len,#0 bne .Long_tail vadd.i32 $H2#hi,$H2#lo,$D2#lo @ add hash value and move to #hi vadd.i32 $H0#hi,$H0#lo,$D0#lo vadd.i32 $H3#hi,$H3#lo,$D3#lo vadd.i32 $H1#hi,$H1#lo,$D1#lo vadd.i32 $H4#hi,$H4#lo,$D4#lo .Long_tail: vld4.32 {${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]! @ load r^1 vld4.32 {${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]! @ load r^2 vadd.i32 $H2#lo,$H2#lo,$D2#lo @ can be redundant vmull.u32 $D2,$H2#hi,$R0 vadd.i32 $H0#lo,$H0#lo,$D0#lo vmull.u32 $D0,$H0#hi,$R0 vadd.i32 $H3#lo,$H3#lo,$D3#lo vmull.u32 $D3,$H3#hi,$R0 vadd.i32 $H1#lo,$H1#lo,$D1#lo vmull.u32 $D1,$H1#hi,$R0 vadd.i32 $H4#lo,$H4#lo,$D4#lo vmull.u32 $D4,$H4#hi,$R0 vmlal.u32 $D0,$H4#hi,$S1 vld4.32 {${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]! vmlal.u32 $D3,$H2#hi,$R1 vld4.32 {${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]! vmlal.u32 $D1,$H0#hi,$R1 vmlal.u32 $D4,$H3#hi,$R1 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H1#hi,$R1 vmlal.u32 $D3,$H1#hi,$R2 vld1.32 ${S4}[1],[$tbl1,:32] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H3#hi,$S2 vld1.32 ${S4}[0],[$tbl0,:32] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H2#hi,$R2 vmlal.u32 $D1,$H4#hi,$S2 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H0#hi,$R2 vmlal.u32 $D3,$H0#hi,$R3 it ne addne $tbl1,$ctx,#(48+2*9*4) vmlal.u32 $D0,$H2#hi,$S3 it ne addne $tbl0,$ctx,#(48+3*9*4) vmlal.u32 $D4,$H1#hi,$R3 vmlal.u32 $D1,$H3#hi,$S3 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H4#hi,$S3 vmlal.u32 $D3,$H4#hi,$S4 vorn $MASK,$MASK,$MASK @ all-ones, can be redundant vmlal.u32 $D0,$H1#hi,$S4 vshr.u64 $MASK,$MASK,#38 vmlal.u32 $D4,$H0#hi,$R4 vmlal.u32 $D1,$H2#hi,$S4 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H3#hi,$S4 beq .Lshort_tail @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4:r^3 and accumulate vld4.32 {${R0}[1],${R1}[1],${S1}[1],${R2}[1]},[$tbl1]! @ load r^3 vld4.32 {${R0}[0],${R1}[0],${S1}[0],${R2}[0]},[$tbl0]! @ load r^4 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H2#lo,$R0 vmlal.u32 $D0,$H0#lo,$R0 vmlal.u32 $D3,$H3#lo,$R0 vmlal.u32 $D1,$H1#lo,$R0 vmlal.u32 $D4,$H4#lo,$R0 vmlal.u32 $D0,$H4#lo,$S1 vld4.32 {${S2}[1],${R3}[1],${S3}[1],${R4}[1]},[$tbl1]! vmlal.u32 $D3,$H2#lo,$R1 vld4.32 {${S2}[0],${R3}[0],${S3}[0],${R4}[0]},[$tbl0]! vmlal.u32 $D1,$H0#lo,$R1 vmlal.u32 $D4,$H3#lo,$R1 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H1#lo,$R1 vmlal.u32 $D3,$H1#lo,$R2 vld1.32 ${S4}[1],[$tbl1,:32] vmlal.u32 $D0,$H3#lo,$S2 vld1.32 ${S4}[0],[$tbl0,:32] vmlal.u32 $D4,$H2#lo,$R2 vmlal.u32 $D1,$H4#lo,$S2 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H0#lo,$R2 vmlal.u32 $D3,$H0#lo,$R3 vmlal.u32 $D0,$H2#lo,$S3 vmlal.u32 $D4,$H1#lo,$R3 vmlal.u32 $D1,$H3#lo,$S3 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H4#lo,$S3 vmlal.u32 $D3,$H4#lo,$S4 vorn $MASK,$MASK,$MASK @ all-ones vmlal.u32 $D0,$H1#lo,$S4 vshr.u64 $MASK,$MASK,#38 vmlal.u32 $D4,$H0#lo,$R4 vmlal.u32 $D1,$H2#lo,$S4 vmlal.u32 $D2,$H3#lo,$S4 .Lshort_tail: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ horizontal addition vadd.i64 $D3#lo,$D3#lo,$D3#hi vadd.i64 $D0#lo,$D0#lo,$D0#hi vadd.i64 $D4#lo,$D4#lo,$D4#hi vadd.i64 $D1#lo,$D1#lo,$D1#hi vadd.i64 $D2#lo,$D2#lo,$D2#hi @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ lazy reduction, but without narrowing vshr.u64 $T0,$D3,#26 vand.i64 $D3,$D3,$MASK vshr.u64 $T1,$D0,#26 vand.i64 $D0,$D0,$MASK vadd.i64 $D4,$D4,$T0 @ h3 -> h4 vadd.i64 $D1,$D1,$T1 @ h0 -> h1 vshr.u64 $T0,$D4,#26 vand.i64 $D4,$D4,$MASK vshr.u64 $T1,$D1,#26 vand.i64 $D1,$D1,$MASK vadd.i64 $D2,$D2,$T1 @ h1 -> h2 vadd.i64 $D0,$D0,$T0 vshl.u64 $T0,$T0,#2 vshr.u64 $T1,$D2,#26 vand.i64 $D2,$D2,$MASK vadd.i64 $D0,$D0,$T0 @ h4 -> h0 vadd.i64 $D3,$D3,$T1 @ h2 -> h3 vshr.u64 $T0,$D0,#26 vand.i64 $D0,$D0,$MASK vshr.u64 $T1,$D3,#26 vand.i64 $D3,$D3,$MASK vadd.i64 $D1,$D1,$T0 @ h0 -> h1 vadd.i64 $D4,$D4,$T1 @ h3 -> h4 cmp $len,#0 bne .Leven @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ store hash value vst4.32 {$D0#lo[0],$D1#lo[0],$D2#lo[0],$D3#lo[0]},[$ctx]! vst1.32 {$D4#lo[0]},[$ctx] vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} @ epilogue ldmia sp!,{r4-r7} .Lno_data_neon: ret @ bx lr .size poly1305_blocks_neon,.-poly1305_blocks_neon .type poly1305_emit_neon,%function .align 5 poly1305_emit_neon: ldr ip,[$ctx,#36] @ is_base2_26 stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} tst ip,ip beq .Lpoly1305_emit_enter ldmia $ctx,{$h0-$h4} eor $g0,$g0,$g0 adds $h0,$h0,$h1,lsl#26 @ base 2^26 -> base 2^32 mov $h1,$h1,lsr#6 adcs $h1,$h1,$h2,lsl#20 mov $h2,$h2,lsr#12 adcs $h2,$h2,$h3,lsl#14 mov $h3,$h3,lsr#18 adcs $h3,$h3,$h4,lsl#8 adc $h4,$g0,$h4,lsr#24 @ can be partially reduced ... and $g0,$h4,#-4 @ ... so reduce and $h4,$h3,#3 add $g0,$g0,$g0,lsr#2 @ *= 5 adds $h0,$h0,$g0 adcs $h1,$h1,#0 adcs $h2,$h2,#0 adcs $h3,$h3,#0 adc $h4,$h4,#0 adds $g0,$h0,#5 @ compare to modulus adcs $g1,$h1,#0 adcs $g2,$h2,#0 adcs $g3,$h3,#0 adc $g4,$h4,#0 tst $g4,#4 @ did it carry/borrow? it ne movne $h0,$g0 ldr $g0,[$nonce,#0] it ne movne $h1,$g1 ldr $g1,[$nonce,#4] it ne movne $h2,$g2 ldr $g2,[$nonce,#8] it ne movne $h3,$g3 ldr $g3,[$nonce,#12] adds $h0,$h0,$g0 @ accumulate nonce adcs $h1,$h1,$g1 adcs $h2,$h2,$g2 adc $h3,$h3,$g3 # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $h0,$h0 rev $h1,$h1 rev $h2,$h2 rev $h3,$h3 # endif str $h0,[$mac,#0] @ store the result str $h1,[$mac,#4] str $h2,[$mac,#8] str $h3,[$mac,#12] ldmia sp!,{r4-r11} ret @ bx lr .size poly1305_emit_neon,.-poly1305_emit_neon .align 5 .Lzeros: .long 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lpoly1305_init #endif ___ } } $code.=<<___; .asciz "Poly1305 for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo or s/\bret\b/bx lr/go or s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000014774413176625657020270 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements Poly1305 hash for x86_64. # # March 2015 # # Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone, # measured with rdtsc at fixed clock frequency. # # IALU/gcc-4.8(*) AVX(**) AVX2 # P4 4.46/+120% - # Core 2 2.41/+90% - # Westmere 1.88/+120% - # Sandy Bridge 1.39/+140% 1.10 # Haswell 1.14/+175% 1.11 0.65 # Skylake 1.13/+120% 0.96 0.51 # Silvermont 2.83/+95% - # Goldmont 1.70/+180% - # VIA Nano 1.82/+150% - # Sledgehammer 1.38/+160% - # Bulldozer 2.30/+130% 0.97 # # (*) improvement coefficients relative to clang are more modest and # are ~50% on most processors, in both cases we are comparing to # __int128 code; # (**) SSE2 implementation was attempted, but among non-AVX processors # it was faster than integer-only code only on older Intel P4 and # Core processors, 50-30%, less newer processor is, but slower on # contemporary ones, for example almost 2x slower on Atom, and as # former are naturally disappearing, SSE2 is deemed unnecessary; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len); # *_emit arguments my ($d1,$d2,$d3, $r0,$r1,$s1)=map("%r$_",(8..13)); my ($h0,$h1,$h2)=("%r14","%rbx","%rbp"); sub poly1305_iteration { # input: copy of $r1 in %rax, $h0-$h2, $r0-$r1 # output: $h0-$h2 *= $r0-$r1 $code.=<<___; mulq $h0 # h0*r1 mov %rax,$d2 mov $r0,%rax mov %rdx,$d3 mulq $h0 # h0*r0 mov %rax,$h0 # future $h0 mov $r0,%rax mov %rdx,$d1 mulq $h1 # h1*r0 add %rax,$d2 mov $s1,%rax adc %rdx,$d3 mulq $h1 # h1*s1 mov $h2,$h1 # borrow $h1 add %rax,$h0 adc %rdx,$d1 imulq $s1,$h1 # h2*s1 add $h1,$d2 mov $d1,$h1 adc \$0,$d3 imulq $r0,$h2 # h2*r0 add $d2,$h1 mov \$-4,%rax # mask value adc $h2,$d3 and $d3,%rax # last reduction step mov $d3,$h2 shr \$2,$d3 and \$3,$h2 add $d3,%rax add %rax,$h0 adc \$0,$h1 adc \$0,$h2 ___ } ######################################################################## # Layout of opaque area is following. # # unsigned __int64 h[3]; # current hash value base 2^64 # unsigned __int64 r[2]; # key value base 2^64 $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl poly1305_init .hidden poly1305_init .globl poly1305_blocks .hidden poly1305_blocks .globl poly1305_emit .hidden poly1305_emit .type poly1305_init,\@function,3 .align 32 poly1305_init: xor %rax,%rax mov %rax,0($ctx) # initialize hash value mov %rax,8($ctx) mov %rax,16($ctx) cmp \$0,$inp je .Lno_key lea poly1305_blocks(%rip),%r10 lea poly1305_emit(%rip),%r11 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r9 lea poly1305_blocks_avx(%rip),%rax lea poly1305_emit_avx(%rip),%rcx bt \$`60-32`,%r9 # AVX? cmovc %rax,%r10 cmovc %rcx,%r11 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); lea poly1305_blocks_avx2(%rip),%rax bt \$`5+32`,%r9 # AVX2? cmovc %rax,%r10 ___ $code.=<<___; mov \$0x0ffffffc0fffffff,%rax mov \$0x0ffffffc0ffffffc,%rcx and 0($inp),%rax and 8($inp),%rcx mov %rax,24($ctx) mov %rcx,32($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /elf32/); mov %r10,0(%rdx) mov %r11,8(%rdx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /elf32/); mov %r10d,0(%rdx) mov %r11d,4(%rdx) ___ $code.=<<___; mov \$1,%eax .Lno_key: ret .size poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init .type poly1305_blocks,\@function,4 .align 32 poly1305_blocks: .Lblocks: shr \$4,$len jz .Lno_data # too short push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lblocks_body: mov $len,%r15 # reassign $len mov 24($ctx),$r0 # load r mov 32($ctx),$s1 mov 0($ctx),$h0 # load hash value mov 8($ctx),$h1 mov 16($ctx),$h2 mov $s1,$r1 shr \$2,$s1 mov $r1,%rax add $r1,$s1 # s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) jmp .Loop .align 32 .Loop: add 0($inp),$h0 # accumulate input adc 8($inp),$h1 lea 16($inp),$inp adc $padbit,$h2 ___ &poly1305_iteration(); $code.=<<___; mov $r1,%rax dec %r15 # len-=16 jnz .Loop mov $h0,0($ctx) # store hash value mov $h1,8($ctx) mov $h2,16($ctx) mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%r12 mov 32(%rsp),%rbp mov 40(%rsp),%rbx lea 48(%rsp),%rsp .Lno_data: .Lblocks_epilogue: ret .size poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks .type poly1305_emit,\@function,3 .align 32 poly1305_emit: .Lemit: mov 0($ctx),%r8 # load hash value mov 8($ctx),%r9 mov 16($ctx),%r10 mov %r8,%rax add \$5,%r8 # compare to modulus mov %r9,%rcx adc \$0,%r9 adc \$0,%r10 shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overfow? cmovnz %r8,%rax cmovnz %r9,%rcx add 0($nonce),%rax # accumulate nonce adc 8($nonce),%rcx mov %rax,0($mac) # write result mov %rcx,8($mac) ret .size poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit ___ if ($avx) { ######################################################################## # Layout of opaque area is following. # # unsigned __int32 h[5]; # current hash value base 2^26 # unsigned __int32 is_base2_26; # unsigned __int64 r[2]; # key value base 2^64 # unsigned __int64 pad; # struct { unsigned __int32 r^2, r^1, r^4, r^3; } r[9]; # # where r^n are base 2^26 digits of degrees of multiplier key. There are # 5 digits, but last four are interleaved with multiples of 5, totalling # in 9 elements: r0, r1, 5*r1, r2, 5*r2, r3, 5*r3, r4, 5*r4. my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4, $T0,$T1,$T2,$T3,$T4, $D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4, $MASK) = map("%xmm$_",(0..15)); $code.=<<___; .type __poly1305_block,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __poly1305_block: ___ &poly1305_iteration(); $code.=<<___; ret .size __poly1305_block,.-__poly1305_block .type __poly1305_init_avx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __poly1305_init_avx: mov $r0,$h0 mov $r1,$h1 xor $h2,$h2 lea 48+64($ctx),$ctx # size optimization mov $r1,%rax call __poly1305_block # r^2 mov \$0x3ffffff,%eax # save interleaved r^2 and r base 2^26 mov \$0x3ffffff,%edx mov $h0,$d1 and $h0#d,%eax mov $r0,$d2 and $r0#d,%edx mov %eax,`16*0+0-64`($ctx) shr \$26,$d1 mov %edx,`16*0+4-64`($ctx) shr \$26,$d2 mov \$0x3ffffff,%eax mov \$0x3ffffff,%edx and $d1#d,%eax and $d2#d,%edx mov %eax,`16*1+0-64`($ctx) lea (%rax,%rax,4),%eax # *5 mov %edx,`16*1+4-64`($ctx) lea (%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx # *5 mov %eax,`16*2+0-64`($ctx) shr \$26,$d1 mov %edx,`16*2+4-64`($ctx) shr \$26,$d2 mov $h1,%rax mov $r1,%rdx shl \$12,%rax shl \$12,%rdx or $d1,%rax or $d2,%rdx and \$0x3ffffff,%eax and \$0x3ffffff,%edx mov %eax,`16*3+0-64`($ctx) lea (%rax,%rax,4),%eax # *5 mov %edx,`16*3+4-64`($ctx) lea (%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx # *5 mov %eax,`16*4+0-64`($ctx) mov $h1,$d1 mov %edx,`16*4+4-64`($ctx) mov $r1,$d2 mov \$0x3ffffff,%eax mov \$0x3ffffff,%edx shr \$14,$d1 shr \$14,$d2 and $d1#d,%eax and $d2#d,%edx mov %eax,`16*5+0-64`($ctx) lea (%rax,%rax,4),%eax # *5 mov %edx,`16*5+4-64`($ctx) lea (%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx # *5 mov %eax,`16*6+0-64`($ctx) shr \$26,$d1 mov %edx,`16*6+4-64`($ctx) shr \$26,$d2 mov $h2,%rax shl \$24,%rax or %rax,$d1 mov $d1#d,`16*7+0-64`($ctx) lea ($d1,$d1,4),$d1 # *5 mov $d2#d,`16*7+4-64`($ctx) lea ($d2,$d2,4),$d2 # *5 mov $d1#d,`16*8+0-64`($ctx) mov $d2#d,`16*8+4-64`($ctx) mov $r1,%rax call __poly1305_block # r^3 mov \$0x3ffffff,%eax # save r^3 base 2^26 mov $h0,$d1 and $h0#d,%eax shr \$26,$d1 mov %eax,`16*0+12-64`($ctx) mov \$0x3ffffff,%edx and $d1#d,%edx mov %edx,`16*1+12-64`($ctx) lea (%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx # *5 shr \$26,$d1 mov %edx,`16*2+12-64`($ctx) mov $h1,%rax shl \$12,%rax or $d1,%rax and \$0x3ffffff,%eax mov %eax,`16*3+12-64`($ctx) lea (%rax,%rax,4),%eax # *5 mov $h1,$d1 mov %eax,`16*4+12-64`($ctx) mov \$0x3ffffff,%edx shr \$14,$d1 and $d1#d,%edx mov %edx,`16*5+12-64`($ctx) lea (%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx # *5 shr \$26,$d1 mov %edx,`16*6+12-64`($ctx) mov $h2,%rax shl \$24,%rax or %rax,$d1 mov $d1#d,`16*7+12-64`($ctx) lea ($d1,$d1,4),$d1 # *5 mov $d1#d,`16*8+12-64`($ctx) mov $r1,%rax call __poly1305_block # r^4 mov \$0x3ffffff,%eax # save r^4 base 2^26 mov $h0,$d1 and $h0#d,%eax shr \$26,$d1 mov %eax,`16*0+8-64`($ctx) mov \$0x3ffffff,%edx and $d1#d,%edx mov %edx,`16*1+8-64`($ctx) lea (%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx # *5 shr \$26,$d1 mov %edx,`16*2+8-64`($ctx) mov $h1,%rax shl \$12,%rax or $d1,%rax and \$0x3ffffff,%eax mov %eax,`16*3+8-64`($ctx) lea (%rax,%rax,4),%eax # *5 mov $h1,$d1 mov %eax,`16*4+8-64`($ctx) mov \$0x3ffffff,%edx shr \$14,$d1 and $d1#d,%edx mov %edx,`16*5+8-64`($ctx) lea (%rdx,%rdx,4),%edx # *5 shr \$26,$d1 mov %edx,`16*6+8-64`($ctx) mov $h2,%rax shl \$24,%rax or %rax,$d1 mov $d1#d,`16*7+8-64`($ctx) lea ($d1,$d1,4),$d1 # *5 mov $d1#d,`16*8+8-64`($ctx) lea -48-64($ctx),$ctx # size [de-]optimization ret .size __poly1305_init_avx,.-__poly1305_init_avx .type poly1305_blocks_avx,\@function,4 .align 32 poly1305_blocks_avx: mov 20($ctx),%r8d # is_base2_26 cmp \$128,$len jae .Lblocks_avx test %r8d,%r8d jz .Lblocks .Lblocks_avx: and \$-16,$len jz .Lno_data_avx vzeroupper test %r8d,%r8d jz .Lbase2_64_avx test \$31,$len jz .Leven_avx push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lblocks_avx_body: mov $len,%r15 # reassign $len mov 0($ctx),$d1 # load hash value mov 8($ctx),$d2 mov 16($ctx),$h2#d mov 24($ctx),$r0 # load r mov 32($ctx),$s1 ################################# base 2^26 -> base 2^64 mov $d1#d,$h0#d and \$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d1 mov $d2,$r1 # borrow $r1 mov $d2#d,$h1#d and \$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d2 shr \$6,$d1 shl \$52,$r1 add $d1,$h0 shr \$12,$h1 shr \$18,$d2 add $r1,$h0 adc $d2,$h1 mov $h2,$d1 shl \$40,$d1 shr \$24,$h2 add $d1,$h1 adc \$0,$h2 # can be partially reduced... mov \$-4,$d2 # ... so reduce mov $h2,$d1 and $h2,$d2 shr \$2,$d1 and \$3,$h2 add $d2,$d1 # =*5 add $d1,$h0 adc \$0,$h1 adc \$0,$h2 mov $s1,$r1 mov $s1,%rax shr \$2,$s1 add $r1,$s1 # s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) add 0($inp),$h0 # accumulate input adc 8($inp),$h1 lea 16($inp),$inp adc $padbit,$h2 call __poly1305_block test $padbit,$padbit # if $padbit is zero, jz .Lstore_base2_64_avx # store hash in base 2^64 format ################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26 mov $h0,%rax mov $h0,%rdx shr \$52,$h0 mov $h1,$r0 mov $h1,$r1 shr \$26,%rdx and \$0x3ffffff,%rax # h[0] shl \$12,$r0 and \$0x3ffffff,%rdx # h[1] shr \$14,$h1 or $r0,$h0 shl \$24,$h2 and \$0x3ffffff,$h0 # h[2] shr \$40,$r1 and \$0x3ffffff,$h1 # h[3] or $r1,$h2 # h[4] sub \$16,%r15 jz .Lstore_base2_26_avx vmovd %rax#d,$H0 vmovd %rdx#d,$H1 vmovd $h0#d,$H2 vmovd $h1#d,$H3 vmovd $h2#d,$H4 jmp .Lproceed_avx .align 32 .Lstore_base2_64_avx: mov $h0,0($ctx) mov $h1,8($ctx) mov $h2,16($ctx) # note that is_base2_26 is zeroed jmp .Ldone_avx .align 16 .Lstore_base2_26_avx: mov %rax#d,0($ctx) # store hash value base 2^26 mov %rdx#d,4($ctx) mov $h0#d,8($ctx) mov $h1#d,12($ctx) mov $h2#d,16($ctx) .align 16 .Ldone_avx: mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%r12 mov 32(%rsp),%rbp mov 40(%rsp),%rbx lea 48(%rsp),%rsp .Lno_data_avx: .Lblocks_avx_epilogue: ret .align 32 .Lbase2_64_avx: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lbase2_64_avx_body: mov $len,%r15 # reassign $len mov 24($ctx),$r0 # load r mov 32($ctx),$s1 mov 0($ctx),$h0 # load hash value mov 8($ctx),$h1 mov 16($ctx),$h2#d mov $s1,$r1 mov $s1,%rax shr \$2,$s1 add $r1,$s1 # s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) test \$31,$len jz .Linit_avx add 0($inp),$h0 # accumulate input adc 8($inp),$h1 lea 16($inp),$inp adc $padbit,$h2 sub \$16,%r15 call __poly1305_block .Linit_avx: ################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26 mov $h0,%rax mov $h0,%rdx shr \$52,$h0 mov $h1,$d1 mov $h1,$d2 shr \$26,%rdx and \$0x3ffffff,%rax # h[0] shl \$12,$d1 and \$0x3ffffff,%rdx # h[1] shr \$14,$h1 or $d1,$h0 shl \$24,$h2 and \$0x3ffffff,$h0 # h[2] shr \$40,$d2 and \$0x3ffffff,$h1 # h[3] or $d2,$h2 # h[4] vmovd %rax#d,$H0 vmovd %rdx#d,$H1 vmovd $h0#d,$H2 vmovd $h1#d,$H3 vmovd $h2#d,$H4 movl \$1,20($ctx) # set is_base2_26 call __poly1305_init_avx .Lproceed_avx: mov %r15,$len mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%r12 mov 32(%rsp),%rbp mov 40(%rsp),%rbx lea 48(%rsp),%rax lea 48(%rsp),%rsp .Lbase2_64_avx_epilogue: jmp .Ldo_avx .align 32 .Leven_avx: vmovd 4*0($ctx),$H0 # load hash value vmovd 4*1($ctx),$H1 vmovd 4*2($ctx),$H2 vmovd 4*3($ctx),$H3 vmovd 4*4($ctx),$H4 .Ldo_avx: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); lea -0x58(%rsp),%r11 sub \$0x178,%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xf8(%rsp),%r11 sub \$0x218,%rsp vmovdqa %xmm6,0x50(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm7,0x60(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm8,0x70(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm9,0x80(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm10,0x90(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm11,0xa0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm12,0xb0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm13,0xc0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm14,0xd0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm15,0xe0(%r11) .Ldo_avx_body: ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$64,$len lea -32($inp),%rax cmovc %rax,$inp vmovdqu `16*3`($ctx),$D4 # preload r0^2 lea `16*3+64`($ctx),$ctx # size optimization lea .Lconst(%rip),%rcx ################################################################ # load input vmovdqu 16*2($inp),$T0 vmovdqu 16*3($inp),$T1 vmovdqa 64(%rcx),$MASK # .Lmask26 vpsrldq \$6,$T0,$T2 # splat input vpsrldq \$6,$T1,$T3 vpunpckhqdq $T1,$T0,$T4 # 4 vpunpcklqdq $T1,$T0,$T0 # 0:1 vpunpcklqdq $T3,$T2,$T3 # 2:3 vpsrlq \$40,$T4,$T4 # 4 vpsrlq \$26,$T0,$T1 vpand $MASK,$T0,$T0 # 0 vpsrlq \$4,$T3,$T2 vpand $MASK,$T1,$T1 # 1 vpsrlq \$30,$T3,$T3 vpand $MASK,$T2,$T2 # 2 vpand $MASK,$T3,$T3 # 3 vpor 32(%rcx),$T4,$T4 # padbit, yes, always jbe .Lskip_loop_avx # expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack vmovdqu `16*1-64`($ctx),$D1 vmovdqu `16*2-64`($ctx),$D2 vpshufd \$0xEE,$D4,$D3 # 34xx -> 3434 vpshufd \$0x44,$D4,$D0 # xx12 -> 1212 vmovdqa $D3,-0x90(%r11) vmovdqa $D0,0x00(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D1,$D4 vmovdqu `16*3-64`($ctx),$D0 vpshufd \$0x44,$D1,$D1 vmovdqa $D4,-0x80(%r11) vmovdqa $D1,0x10(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D2,$D3 vmovdqu `16*4-64`($ctx),$D1 vpshufd \$0x44,$D2,$D2 vmovdqa $D3,-0x70(%r11) vmovdqa $D2,0x20(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D0,$D4 vmovdqu `16*5-64`($ctx),$D2 vpshufd \$0x44,$D0,$D0 vmovdqa $D4,-0x60(%r11) vmovdqa $D0,0x30(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D1,$D3 vmovdqu `16*6-64`($ctx),$D0 vpshufd \$0x44,$D1,$D1 vmovdqa $D3,-0x50(%r11) vmovdqa $D1,0x40(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D2,$D4 vmovdqu `16*7-64`($ctx),$D1 vpshufd \$0x44,$D2,$D2 vmovdqa $D4,-0x40(%r11) vmovdqa $D2,0x50(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D0,$D3 vmovdqu `16*8-64`($ctx),$D2 vpshufd \$0x44,$D0,$D0 vmovdqa $D3,-0x30(%r11) vmovdqa $D0,0x60(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D1,$D4 vpshufd \$0x44,$D1,$D1 vmovdqa $D4,-0x20(%r11) vmovdqa $D1,0x70(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xEE,$D2,$D3 vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),$D4 # preload r0^2 vpshufd \$0x44,$D2,$D2 vmovdqa $D3,-0x10(%r11) vmovdqa $D2,0x80(%rsp) jmp .Loop_avx .align 32 .Loop_avx: ################################################################ # ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2 # ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r # \___________________/ # ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2 # ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r # \___________________/ \____________________/ # # Note that we start with inp[2:3]*r^2. This is because it # doesn't depend on reduction in previous iteration. ################################################################ # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 # # though note that $Tx and $Hx are "reversed" in this section, # and $D4 is preloaded with r0^2... vpmuludq $T0,$D4,$D0 # d0 = h0*r0 vpmuludq $T1,$D4,$D1 # d1 = h1*r0 vmovdqa $H2,0x20(%r11) # offload hash vpmuludq $T2,$D4,$D2 # d3 = h2*r0 vmovdqa 0x10(%rsp),$H2 # r1^2 vpmuludq $T3,$D4,$D3 # d3 = h3*r0 vpmuludq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 = h4*r0 vmovdqa $H0,0x00(%r11) # vpmuludq 0x20(%rsp),$T4,$H0 # h4*s1 vmovdqa $H1,0x10(%r11) # vpmuludq $T3,$H2,$H1 # h3*r1 vpaddq $H0,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h4*s1 vpaddq $H1,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h3*r1 vmovdqa $H3,0x30(%r11) # vpmuludq $T2,$H2,$H0 # h2*r1 vpmuludq $T1,$H2,$H1 # h1*r1 vpaddq $H0,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h2*r1 vmovdqa 0x30(%rsp),$H3 # r2^2 vpaddq $H1,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h1*r1 vmovdqa $H4,0x40(%r11) # vpmuludq $T0,$H2,$H2 # h0*r1 vpmuludq $T2,$H3,$H0 # h2*r2 vpaddq $H2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h0*r1 vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),$H4 # s2^2 vpaddq $H0,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h2*r2 vpmuludq $T1,$H3,$H1 # h1*r2 vpmuludq $T0,$H3,$H3 # h0*r2 vpaddq $H1,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h1*r2 vmovdqa 0x50(%rsp),$H2 # r3^2 vpaddq $H3,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h0*r2 vpmuludq $T4,$H4,$H0 # h4*s2 vpmuludq $T3,$H4,$H4 # h3*s2 vpaddq $H0,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h4*s2 vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),$H3 # s3^2 vpaddq $H4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h3*s2 vmovdqa 0x80(%rsp),$H4 # s4^2 vpmuludq $T1,$H2,$H1 # h1*r3 vpmuludq $T0,$H2,$H2 # h0*r3 vpaddq $H1,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h1*r3 vpaddq $H2,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h0*r3 vpmuludq $T4,$H3,$H0 # h4*s3 vpmuludq $T3,$H3,$H1 # h3*s3 vpaddq $H0,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h4*s3 vmovdqu 16*0($inp),$H0 # load input vpaddq $H1,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h3*s3 vpmuludq $T2,$H3,$H3 # h2*s3 vpmuludq $T2,$H4,$T2 # h2*s4 vpaddq $H3,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h2*s3 vmovdqu 16*1($inp),$H1 # vpaddq $T2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h2*s4 vpmuludq $T3,$H4,$T3 # h3*s4 vpmuludq $T4,$H4,$T4 # h4*s4 vpsrldq \$6,$H0,$H2 # splat input vpaddq $T3,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h3*s4 vpaddq $T4,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h4*s4 vpsrldq \$6,$H1,$H3 # vpmuludq 0x70(%rsp),$T0,$T4 # h0*r4 vpmuludq $T1,$H4,$T0 # h1*s4 vpunpckhqdq $H1,$H0,$H4 # 4 vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h0*r4 vmovdqa -0x90(%r11),$T4 # r0^4 vpaddq $T0,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h1*s4 vpunpcklqdq $H1,$H0,$H0 # 0:1 vpunpcklqdq $H3,$H2,$H3 # 2:3 #vpsrlq \$40,$H4,$H4 # 4 vpsrldq \$`40/8`,$H4,$H4 # 4 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$H1 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 # 0 vpsrlq \$4,$H3,$H2 vpand $MASK,$H1,$H1 # 1 vpand 0(%rcx),$H4,$H4 # .Lmask24 vpsrlq \$30,$H3,$H3 vpand $MASK,$H2,$H2 # 2 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 # 3 vpor 32(%rcx),$H4,$H4 # padbit, yes, always vpaddq 0x00(%r11),$H0,$H0 # add hash value vpaddq 0x10(%r11),$H1,$H1 vpaddq 0x20(%r11),$H2,$H2 vpaddq 0x30(%r11),$H3,$H3 vpaddq 0x40(%r11),$H4,$H4 lea 16*2($inp),%rax lea 16*4($inp),$inp sub \$64,$len cmovc %rax,$inp ################################################################ # Now we accumulate (inp[0:1]+hash)*r^4 ################################################################ # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 vpmuludq $H0,$T4,$T0 # h0*r0 vpmuludq $H1,$T4,$T1 # h1*r0 vpaddq $T0,$D0,$D0 vpaddq $T1,$D1,$D1 vmovdqa -0x80(%r11),$T2 # r1^4 vpmuludq $H2,$T4,$T0 # h2*r0 vpmuludq $H3,$T4,$T1 # h3*r0 vpaddq $T0,$D2,$D2 vpaddq $T1,$D3,$D3 vpmuludq $H4,$T4,$T4 # h4*r0 vpmuludq -0x70(%r11),$H4,$T0 # h4*s1 vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 vpaddq $T0,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h4*s1 vpmuludq $H2,$T2,$T1 # h2*r1 vpmuludq $H3,$T2,$T0 # h3*r1 vpaddq $T1,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h2*r1 vmovdqa -0x60(%r11),$T3 # r2^4 vpaddq $T0,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h3*r1 vpmuludq $H1,$T2,$T1 # h1*r1 vpmuludq $H0,$T2,$T2 # h0*r1 vpaddq $T1,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h1*r1 vpaddq $T2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h0*r1 vmovdqa -0x50(%r11),$T4 # s2^4 vpmuludq $H2,$T3,$T0 # h2*r2 vpmuludq $H1,$T3,$T1 # h1*r2 vpaddq $T0,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h2*r2 vpaddq $T1,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h1*r2 vmovdqa -0x40(%r11),$T2 # r3^4 vpmuludq $H0,$T3,$T3 # h0*r2 vpmuludq $H4,$T4,$T0 # h4*s2 vpaddq $T3,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h0*r2 vpaddq $T0,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h4*s2 vmovdqa -0x30(%r11),$T3 # s3^4 vpmuludq $H3,$T4,$T4 # h3*s2 vpmuludq $H1,$T2,$T1 # h1*r3 vpaddq $T4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h3*s2 vmovdqa -0x10(%r11),$T4 # s4^4 vpaddq $T1,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h1*r3 vpmuludq $H0,$T2,$T2 # h0*r3 vpmuludq $H4,$T3,$T0 # h4*s3 vpaddq $T2,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h0*r3 vpaddq $T0,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h4*s3 vmovdqu 16*2($inp),$T0 # load input vpmuludq $H3,$T3,$T2 # h3*s3 vpmuludq $H2,$T3,$T3 # h2*s3 vpaddq $T2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h3*s3 vmovdqu 16*3($inp),$T1 # vpaddq $T3,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h2*s3 vpmuludq $H2,$T4,$H2 # h2*s4 vpmuludq $H3,$T4,$H3 # h3*s4 vpsrldq \$6,$T0,$T2 # splat input vpaddq $H2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h2*s4 vpmuludq $H4,$T4,$H4 # h4*s4 vpsrldq \$6,$T1,$T3 # vpaddq $H3,$D2,$H2 # h2 = d2 + h3*s4 vpaddq $H4,$D3,$H3 # h3 = d3 + h4*s4 vpmuludq -0x20(%r11),$H0,$H4 # h0*r4 vpmuludq $H1,$T4,$H0 vpunpckhqdq $T1,$T0,$T4 # 4 vpaddq $H4,$D4,$H4 # h4 = d4 + h0*r4 vpaddq $H0,$D0,$H0 # h0 = d0 + h1*s4 vpunpcklqdq $T1,$T0,$T0 # 0:1 vpunpcklqdq $T3,$T2,$T3 # 2:3 #vpsrlq \$40,$T4,$T4 # 4 vpsrldq \$`40/8`,$T4,$T4 # 4 vpsrlq \$26,$T0,$T1 vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),$D4 # preload r0^2 vpand $MASK,$T0,$T0 # 0 vpsrlq \$4,$T3,$T2 vpand $MASK,$T1,$T1 # 1 vpand 0(%rcx),$T4,$T4 # .Lmask24 vpsrlq \$30,$T3,$T3 vpand $MASK,$T2,$T2 # 2 vpand $MASK,$T3,$T3 # 3 vpor 32(%rcx),$T4,$T4 # padbit, yes, always ################################################################ # lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein # and P. Schwabe vpsrlq \$26,$H3,$D3 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $D3,$H4,$H4 # h3 -> h4 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$D0 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 vpaddq $D0,$D1,$H1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$26,$H4,$D0 vpand $MASK,$H4,$H4 vpsrlq \$26,$H1,$D1 vpand $MASK,$H1,$H1 vpaddq $D1,$H2,$H2 # h1 -> h2 vpaddq $D0,$H0,$H0 vpsllq \$2,$D0,$D0 vpaddq $D0,$H0,$H0 # h4 -> h0 vpsrlq \$26,$H2,$D2 vpand $MASK,$H2,$H2 vpaddq $D2,$H3,$H3 # h2 -> h3 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$D0 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 vpaddq $D0,$H1,$H1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$26,$H3,$D3 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $D3,$H4,$H4 # h3 -> h4 ja .Loop_avx .Lskip_loop_avx: ################################################################ # multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1 vpshufd \$0x10,$D4,$D4 # r0^n, xx12 -> x1x2 add \$32,$len jnz .Long_tail_avx vpaddq $H2,$T2,$T2 vpaddq $H0,$T0,$T0 vpaddq $H1,$T1,$T1 vpaddq $H3,$T3,$T3 vpaddq $H4,$T4,$T4 .Long_tail_avx: vmovdqa $H2,0x20(%r11) vmovdqa $H0,0x00(%r11) vmovdqa $H1,0x10(%r11) vmovdqa $H3,0x30(%r11) vmovdqa $H4,0x40(%r11) # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 vpmuludq $T2,$D4,$D2 # d2 = h2*r0 vpmuludq $T0,$D4,$D0 # d0 = h0*r0 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*1-64`($ctx),$H2 # r1^n vpmuludq $T1,$D4,$D1 # d1 = h1*r0 vpmuludq $T3,$D4,$D3 # d3 = h3*r0 vpmuludq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 = h4*r0 vpmuludq $T3,$H2,$H0 # h3*r1 vpaddq $H0,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h3*r1 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*2-64`($ctx),$H3 # s1^n vpmuludq $T2,$H2,$H1 # h2*r1 vpaddq $H1,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h2*r1 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*3-64`($ctx),$H4 # r2^n vpmuludq $T1,$H2,$H0 # h1*r1 vpaddq $H0,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h1*r1 vpmuludq $T0,$H2,$H2 # h0*r1 vpaddq $H2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h0*r1 vpmuludq $T4,$H3,$H3 # h4*s1 vpaddq $H3,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h4*s1 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*4-64`($ctx),$H2 # s2^n vpmuludq $T2,$H4,$H1 # h2*r2 vpaddq $H1,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h2*r2 vpmuludq $T1,$H4,$H0 # h1*r2 vpaddq $H0,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h1*r2 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*5-64`($ctx),$H3 # r3^n vpmuludq $T0,$H4,$H4 # h0*r2 vpaddq $H4,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h0*r2 vpmuludq $T4,$H2,$H1 # h4*s2 vpaddq $H1,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h4*s2 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*6-64`($ctx),$H4 # s3^n vpmuludq $T3,$H2,$H2 # h3*s2 vpaddq $H2,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h3*s2 vpmuludq $T1,$H3,$H0 # h1*r3 vpaddq $H0,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h1*r3 vpmuludq $T0,$H3,$H3 # h0*r3 vpaddq $H3,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h0*r3 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*7-64`($ctx),$H2 # r4^n vpmuludq $T4,$H4,$H1 # h4*s3 vpaddq $H1,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h4*s3 vpshufd \$0x10,`16*8-64`($ctx),$H3 # s4^n vpmuludq $T3,$H4,$H0 # h3*s3 vpaddq $H0,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h3*s3 vpmuludq $T2,$H4,$H4 # h2*s3 vpaddq $H4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h2*s3 vpmuludq $T0,$H2,$H2 # h0*r4 vpaddq $H2,$D4,$D4 # h4 = d4 + h0*r4 vpmuludq $T4,$H3,$H1 # h4*s4 vpaddq $H1,$D3,$D3 # h3 = d3 + h4*s4 vpmuludq $T3,$H3,$H0 # h3*s4 vpaddq $H0,$D2,$D2 # h2 = d2 + h3*s4 vpmuludq $T2,$H3,$H1 # h2*s4 vpaddq $H1,$D1,$D1 # h1 = d1 + h2*s4 vpmuludq $T1,$H3,$H3 # h1*s4 vpaddq $H3,$D0,$D0 # h0 = d0 + h1*s4 jz .Lshort_tail_avx vmovdqu 16*0($inp),$H0 # load input vmovdqu 16*1($inp),$H1 vpsrldq \$6,$H0,$H2 # splat input vpsrldq \$6,$H1,$H3 vpunpckhqdq $H1,$H0,$H4 # 4 vpunpcklqdq $H1,$H0,$H0 # 0:1 vpunpcklqdq $H3,$H2,$H3 # 2:3 vpsrlq \$40,$H4,$H4 # 4 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$H1 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 # 0 vpsrlq \$4,$H3,$H2 vpand $MASK,$H1,$H1 # 1 vpsrlq \$30,$H3,$H3 vpand $MASK,$H2,$H2 # 2 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 # 3 vpor 32(%rcx),$H4,$H4 # padbit, yes, always vpshufd \$0x32,`16*0-64`($ctx),$T4 # r0^n, 34xx -> x3x4 vpaddq 0x00(%r11),$H0,$H0 vpaddq 0x10(%r11),$H1,$H1 vpaddq 0x20(%r11),$H2,$H2 vpaddq 0x30(%r11),$H3,$H3 vpaddq 0x40(%r11),$H4,$H4 ################################################################ # multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) by r^4:r^3 and accumulate vpmuludq $H0,$T4,$T0 # h0*r0 vpaddq $T0,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h0*r0 vpmuludq $H1,$T4,$T1 # h1*r0 vpaddq $T1,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h1*r0 vpmuludq $H2,$T4,$T0 # h2*r0 vpaddq $T0,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h2*r0 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*1-64`($ctx),$T2 # r1^n vpmuludq $H3,$T4,$T1 # h3*r0 vpaddq $T1,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h3*r0 vpmuludq $H4,$T4,$T4 # h4*r0 vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h4*r0 vpmuludq $H3,$T2,$T0 # h3*r1 vpaddq $T0,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h3*r1 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*2-64`($ctx),$T3 # s1 vpmuludq $H2,$T2,$T1 # h2*r1 vpaddq $T1,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h2*r1 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*3-64`($ctx),$T4 # r2 vpmuludq $H1,$T2,$T0 # h1*r1 vpaddq $T0,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h1*r1 vpmuludq $H0,$T2,$T2 # h0*r1 vpaddq $T2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h0*r1 vpmuludq $H4,$T3,$T3 # h4*s1 vpaddq $T3,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h4*s1 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*4-64`($ctx),$T2 # s2 vpmuludq $H2,$T4,$T1 # h2*r2 vpaddq $T1,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h2*r2 vpmuludq $H1,$T4,$T0 # h1*r2 vpaddq $T0,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h1*r2 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*5-64`($ctx),$T3 # r3 vpmuludq $H0,$T4,$T4 # h0*r2 vpaddq $T4,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h0*r2 vpmuludq $H4,$T2,$T1 # h4*s2 vpaddq $T1,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h4*s2 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*6-64`($ctx),$T4 # s3 vpmuludq $H3,$T2,$T2 # h3*s2 vpaddq $T2,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h3*s2 vpmuludq $H1,$T3,$T0 # h1*r3 vpaddq $T0,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h1*r3 vpmuludq $H0,$T3,$T3 # h0*r3 vpaddq $T3,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h0*r3 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*7-64`($ctx),$T2 # r4 vpmuludq $H4,$T4,$T1 # h4*s3 vpaddq $T1,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h4*s3 vpshufd \$0x32,`16*8-64`($ctx),$T3 # s4 vpmuludq $H3,$T4,$T0 # h3*s3 vpaddq $T0,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h3*s3 vpmuludq $H2,$T4,$T4 # h2*s3 vpaddq $T4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h2*s3 vpmuludq $H0,$T2,$T2 # h0*r4 vpaddq $T2,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h0*r4 vpmuludq $H4,$T3,$T1 # h4*s4 vpaddq $T1,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h4*s4 vpmuludq $H3,$T3,$T0 # h3*s4 vpaddq $T0,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h3*s4 vpmuludq $H2,$T3,$T1 # h2*s4 vpaddq $T1,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h2*s4 vpmuludq $H1,$T3,$T3 # h1*s4 vpaddq $T3,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h1*s4 .Lshort_tail_avx: ################################################################ # horizontal addition vpsrldq \$8,$D4,$T4 vpsrldq \$8,$D3,$T3 vpsrldq \$8,$D1,$T1 vpsrldq \$8,$D0,$T0 vpsrldq \$8,$D2,$T2 vpaddq $T3,$D3,$D3 vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 vpaddq $T0,$D0,$D0 vpaddq $T1,$D1,$D1 vpaddq $T2,$D2,$D2 ################################################################ # lazy reduction vpsrlq \$26,$D3,$H3 vpand $MASK,$D3,$D3 vpaddq $H3,$D4,$D4 # h3 -> h4 vpsrlq \$26,$D0,$H0 vpand $MASK,$D0,$D0 vpaddq $H0,$D1,$D1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$26,$D4,$H4 vpand $MASK,$D4,$D4 vpsrlq \$26,$D1,$H1 vpand $MASK,$D1,$D1 vpaddq $H1,$D2,$D2 # h1 -> h2 vpaddq $H4,$D0,$D0 vpsllq \$2,$H4,$H4 vpaddq $H4,$D0,$D0 # h4 -> h0 vpsrlq \$26,$D2,$H2 vpand $MASK,$D2,$D2 vpaddq $H2,$D3,$D3 # h2 -> h3 vpsrlq \$26,$D0,$H0 vpand $MASK,$D0,$D0 vpaddq $H0,$D1,$D1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$26,$D3,$H3 vpand $MASK,$D3,$D3 vpaddq $H3,$D4,$D4 # h3 -> h4 vmovd $D0,`4*0-48-64`($ctx) # save partially reduced vmovd $D1,`4*1-48-64`($ctx) vmovd $D2,`4*2-48-64`($ctx) vmovd $D3,`4*3-48-64`($ctx) vmovd $D4,`4*4-48-64`($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); vmovdqa 0x50(%r11),%xmm6 vmovdqa 0x60(%r11),%xmm7 vmovdqa 0x70(%r11),%xmm8 vmovdqa 0x80(%r11),%xmm9 vmovdqa 0x90(%r11),%xmm10 vmovdqa 0xa0(%r11),%xmm11 vmovdqa 0xb0(%r11),%xmm12 vmovdqa 0xc0(%r11),%xmm13 vmovdqa 0xd0(%r11),%xmm14 vmovdqa 0xe0(%r11),%xmm15 lea 0xf8(%r11),%rsp .Ldo_avx_epilogue: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); lea 0x58(%r11),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper ret .size poly1305_blocks_avx,.-poly1305_blocks_avx .type poly1305_emit_avx,\@function,3 .align 32 poly1305_emit_avx: cmpl \$0,20($ctx) # is_base2_26? je .Lemit mov 0($ctx),%eax # load hash value base 2^26 mov 4($ctx),%ecx mov 8($ctx),%r8d mov 12($ctx),%r11d mov 16($ctx),%r10d shl \$26,%rcx # base 2^26 -> base 2^64 mov %r8,%r9 shl \$52,%r8 add %rcx,%rax shr \$12,%r9 add %rax,%r8 # h0 adc \$0,%r9 shl \$14,%r11 mov %r10,%rax shr \$24,%r10 add %r11,%r9 shl \$40,%rax add %rax,%r9 # h1 adc \$0,%r10 # h2 mov %r10,%rax # could be partially reduced, so reduce mov %r10,%rcx and \$3,%r10 shr \$2,%rax and \$-4,%rcx add %rcx,%rax add %rax,%r8 adc \$0,%r9 adc \$0,%r10 mov %r8,%rax add \$5,%r8 # compare to modulus mov %r9,%rcx adc \$0,%r9 adc \$0,%r10 shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overfow? cmovnz %r8,%rax cmovnz %r9,%rcx add 0($nonce),%rax # accumulate nonce adc 8($nonce),%rcx mov %rax,0($mac) # write result mov %rcx,8($mac) ret .size poly1305_emit_avx,.-poly1305_emit_avx ___ if ($avx>1) { my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4, $MASK, $T4,$T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4) = map("%ymm$_",(0..15)); my $S4=$MASK; $code.=<<___; .type poly1305_blocks_avx2,\@function,4 .align 32 poly1305_blocks_avx2: mov 20($ctx),%r8d # is_base2_26 cmp \$128,$len jae .Lblocks_avx2 test %r8d,%r8d jz .Lblocks .Lblocks_avx2: and \$-16,$len jz .Lno_data_avx2 vzeroupper test %r8d,%r8d jz .Lbase2_64_avx2 test \$63,$len jz .Leven_avx2 push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lblocks_avx2_body: mov $len,%r15 # reassign $len mov 0($ctx),$d1 # load hash value mov 8($ctx),$d2 mov 16($ctx),$h2#d mov 24($ctx),$r0 # load r mov 32($ctx),$s1 ################################# base 2^26 -> base 2^64 mov $d1#d,$h0#d and \$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d1 mov $d2,$r1 # borrow $r1 mov $d2#d,$h1#d and \$`-1*(1<<31)`,$d2 shr \$6,$d1 shl \$52,$r1 add $d1,$h0 shr \$12,$h1 shr \$18,$d2 add $r1,$h0 adc $d2,$h1 mov $h2,$d1 shl \$40,$d1 shr \$24,$h2 add $d1,$h1 adc \$0,$h2 # can be partially reduced... mov \$-4,$d2 # ... so reduce mov $h2,$d1 and $h2,$d2 shr \$2,$d1 and \$3,$h2 add $d2,$d1 # =*5 add $d1,$h0 adc \$0,$h1 adc \$0,$h2 mov $s1,$r1 mov $s1,%rax shr \$2,$s1 add $r1,$s1 # s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) .Lbase2_26_pre_avx2: add 0($inp),$h0 # accumulate input adc 8($inp),$h1 lea 16($inp),$inp adc $padbit,$h2 sub \$16,%r15 call __poly1305_block mov $r1,%rax test \$63,%r15 jnz .Lbase2_26_pre_avx2 test $padbit,$padbit # if $padbit is zero, jz .Lstore_base2_64_avx2 # store hash in base 2^64 format ################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26 mov $h0,%rax mov $h0,%rdx shr \$52,$h0 mov $h1,$r0 mov $h1,$r1 shr \$26,%rdx and \$0x3ffffff,%rax # h[0] shl \$12,$r0 and \$0x3ffffff,%rdx # h[1] shr \$14,$h1 or $r0,$h0 shl \$24,$h2 and \$0x3ffffff,$h0 # h[2] shr \$40,$r1 and \$0x3ffffff,$h1 # h[3] or $r1,$h2 # h[4] test %r15,%r15 jz .Lstore_base2_26_avx2 vmovd %rax#d,%x#$H0 vmovd %rdx#d,%x#$H1 vmovd $h0#d,%x#$H2 vmovd $h1#d,%x#$H3 vmovd $h2#d,%x#$H4 jmp .Lproceed_avx2 .align 32 .Lstore_base2_64_avx2: mov $h0,0($ctx) mov $h1,8($ctx) mov $h2,16($ctx) # note that is_base2_26 is zeroed jmp .Ldone_avx2 .align 16 .Lstore_base2_26_avx2: mov %rax#d,0($ctx) # store hash value base 2^26 mov %rdx#d,4($ctx) mov $h0#d,8($ctx) mov $h1#d,12($ctx) mov $h2#d,16($ctx) .align 16 .Ldone_avx2: mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%r12 mov 32(%rsp),%rbp mov 40(%rsp),%rbx lea 48(%rsp),%rsp .Lno_data_avx2: .Lblocks_avx2_epilogue: ret .align 32 .Lbase2_64_avx2: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 .Lbase2_64_avx2_body: mov $len,%r15 # reassign $len mov 24($ctx),$r0 # load r mov 32($ctx),$s1 mov 0($ctx),$h0 # load hash value mov 8($ctx),$h1 mov 16($ctx),$h2#d mov $s1,$r1 mov $s1,%rax shr \$2,$s1 add $r1,$s1 # s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) test \$63,$len jz .Linit_avx2 .Lbase2_64_pre_avx2: add 0($inp),$h0 # accumulate input adc 8($inp),$h1 lea 16($inp),$inp adc $padbit,$h2 sub \$16,%r15 call __poly1305_block mov $r1,%rax test \$63,%r15 jnz .Lbase2_64_pre_avx2 .Linit_avx2: ################################# base 2^64 -> base 2^26 mov $h0,%rax mov $h0,%rdx shr \$52,$h0 mov $h1,$d1 mov $h1,$d2 shr \$26,%rdx and \$0x3ffffff,%rax # h[0] shl \$12,$d1 and \$0x3ffffff,%rdx # h[1] shr \$14,$h1 or $d1,$h0 shl \$24,$h2 and \$0x3ffffff,$h0 # h[2] shr \$40,$d2 and \$0x3ffffff,$h1 # h[3] or $d2,$h2 # h[4] vmovd %rax#d,%x#$H0 vmovd %rdx#d,%x#$H1 vmovd $h0#d,%x#$H2 vmovd $h1#d,%x#$H3 vmovd $h2#d,%x#$H4 movl \$1,20($ctx) # set is_base2_26 call __poly1305_init_avx .Lproceed_avx2: mov %r15,$len mov 0(%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r13 mov 24(%rsp),%r12 mov 32(%rsp),%rbp mov 40(%rsp),%rbx lea 48(%rsp),%rax lea 48(%rsp),%rsp .Lbase2_64_avx2_epilogue: jmp .Ldo_avx2 .align 32 .Leven_avx2: vmovd 4*0($ctx),%x#$H0 # load hash value base 2^26 vmovd 4*1($ctx),%x#$H1 vmovd 4*2($ctx),%x#$H2 vmovd 4*3($ctx),%x#$H3 vmovd 4*4($ctx),%x#$H4 .Ldo_avx2: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); lea -8(%rsp),%r11 sub \$0x128,%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xf8(%rsp),%r11 sub \$0x1c8,%rsp vmovdqa %xmm6,0x50(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm7,0x60(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm8,0x70(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm9,0x80(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm10,0x90(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm11,0xa0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm12,0xb0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm13,0xc0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm14,0xd0(%r11) vmovdqa %xmm15,0xe0(%r11) .Ldo_avx2_body: ___ $code.=<<___; lea 48+64($ctx),$ctx # size optimization lea .Lconst(%rip),%rcx # expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack vmovdqu `16*0-64`($ctx),%x#$T2 and \$-512,%rsp vmovdqu `16*1-64`($ctx),%x#$T3 vmovdqu `16*2-64`($ctx),%x#$T4 vmovdqu `16*3-64`($ctx),%x#$D0 vmovdqu `16*4-64`($ctx),%x#$D1 vmovdqu `16*5-64`($ctx),%x#$D2 vmovdqu `16*6-64`($ctx),%x#$D3 vpermq \$0x15,$T2,$T2 # 00003412 -> 12343434 vmovdqu `16*7-64`($ctx),%x#$D4 vpermq \$0x15,$T3,$T3 vpshufd \$0xc8,$T2,$T2 # 12343434 -> 14243444 vmovdqu `16*8-64`($ctx),%x#$MASK vpermq \$0x15,$T4,$T4 vpshufd \$0xc8,$T3,$T3 vmovdqa $T2,0x00(%rsp) vpermq \$0x15,$D0,$D0 vpshufd \$0xc8,$T4,$T4 vmovdqa $T3,0x20(%rsp) vpermq \$0x15,$D1,$D1 vpshufd \$0xc8,$D0,$D0 vmovdqa $T4,0x40(%rsp) vpermq \$0x15,$D2,$D2 vpshufd \$0xc8,$D1,$D1 vmovdqa $D0,0x60(%rsp) vpermq \$0x15,$D3,$D3 vpshufd \$0xc8,$D2,$D2 vmovdqa $D1,0x80(%rsp) vpermq \$0x15,$D4,$D4 vpshufd \$0xc8,$D3,$D3 vmovdqa $D2,0xa0(%rsp) vpermq \$0x15,$MASK,$MASK vpshufd \$0xc8,$D4,$D4 vmovdqa $D3,0xc0(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xc8,$MASK,$MASK vmovdqa $D4,0xe0(%rsp) vmovdqa $MASK,0x100(%rsp) vmovdqa 64(%rcx),$MASK # .Lmask26 ################################################################ # load input vmovdqu 16*0($inp),%x#$T0 vmovdqu 16*1($inp),%x#$T1 vinserti128 \$1,16*2($inp),$T0,$T0 vinserti128 \$1,16*3($inp),$T1,$T1 lea 16*4($inp),$inp vpsrldq \$6,$T0,$T2 # splat input vpsrldq \$6,$T1,$T3 vpunpckhqdq $T1,$T0,$T4 # 4 vpunpcklqdq $T3,$T2,$T2 # 2:3 vpunpcklqdq $T1,$T0,$T0 # 0:1 vpsrlq \$30,$T2,$T3 vpsrlq \$4,$T2,$T2 vpsrlq \$26,$T0,$T1 vpsrlq \$40,$T4,$T4 # 4 vpand $MASK,$T2,$T2 # 2 vpand $MASK,$T0,$T0 # 0 vpand $MASK,$T1,$T1 # 1 vpand $MASK,$T3,$T3 # 3 vpor 32(%rcx),$T4,$T4 # padbit, yes, always lea 0x90(%rsp),%rax # size optimization vpaddq $H2,$T2,$H2 # accumulate input sub \$64,$len jz .Ltail_avx2 jmp .Loop_avx2 .align 32 .Loop_avx2: ################################################################ # ((inp[0]*r^4+r[4])*r^4+r[8])*r^4 # ((inp[1]*r^4+r[5])*r^4+r[9])*r^3 # ((inp[2]*r^4+r[6])*r^4+r[10])*r^2 # ((inp[3]*r^4+r[7])*r^4+r[11])*r^1 # \________/\________/ ################################################################ #vpaddq $H2,$T2,$H2 # accumulate input vpaddq $H0,$T0,$H0 vmovdqa `32*0`(%rsp),$T0 # r0^4 vpaddq $H1,$T1,$H1 vmovdqa `32*1`(%rsp),$T1 # r1^4 vpaddq $H3,$T3,$H3 vmovdqa `32*3`(%rsp),$T2 # r2^4 vpaddq $H4,$T4,$H4 vmovdqa `32*6-0x90`(%rax),$T3 # s3^4 vmovdqa `32*8-0x90`(%rax),$S4 # s4^4 # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 # # however, as h2 is "chronologically" first one available pull # corresponding operations up, so it's # # d4 = h2*r2 + h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h2*r1 + h3*r0 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h2*5*r4 + h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 # d0 = h2*5*r3 + h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h1*5*r4 vpmuludq $H2,$T0,$D2 # d2 = h2*r0 vpmuludq $H2,$T1,$D3 # d3 = h2*r1 vpmuludq $H2,$T2,$D4 # d4 = h2*r2 vpmuludq $H2,$T3,$D0 # d0 = h2*s3 vpmuludq $H2,$S4,$D1 # d1 = h2*s4 vpmuludq $H0,$T1,$T4 # h0*r1 vpmuludq $H1,$T1,$H2 # h1*r1, borrow $H2 as temp vpaddq $T4,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h0*r1 vpaddq $H2,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h1*r1 vpmuludq $H3,$T1,$T4 # h3*r1 vpmuludq `32*2`(%rsp),$H4,$H2 # h4*s1 vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h3*r1 vpaddq $H2,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h4*s1 vmovdqa `32*4-0x90`(%rax),$T1 # s2 vpmuludq $H0,$T0,$T4 # h0*r0 vpmuludq $H1,$T0,$H2 # h1*r0 vpaddq $T4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h0*r0 vpaddq $H2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h1*r0 vpmuludq $H3,$T0,$T4 # h3*r0 vpmuludq $H4,$T0,$H2 # h4*r0 vmovdqu 16*0($inp),%x#$T0 # load input vpaddq $T4,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h3*r0 vpaddq $H2,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h4*r0 vinserti128 \$1,16*2($inp),$T0,$T0 vpmuludq $H3,$T1,$T4 # h3*s2 vpmuludq $H4,$T1,$H2 # h4*s2 vmovdqu 16*1($inp),%x#$T1 vpaddq $T4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h3*s2 vpaddq $H2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h4*s2 vmovdqa `32*5-0x90`(%rax),$H2 # r3 vpmuludq $H1,$T2,$T4 # h1*r2 vpmuludq $H0,$T2,$T2 # h0*r2 vpaddq $T4,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h1*r2 vpaddq $T2,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h0*r2 vinserti128 \$1,16*3($inp),$T1,$T1 lea 16*4($inp),$inp vpmuludq $H1,$H2,$T4 # h1*r3 vpmuludq $H0,$H2,$H2 # h0*r3 vpsrldq \$6,$T0,$T2 # splat input vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h1*r3 vpaddq $H2,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h0*r3 vpmuludq $H3,$T3,$T4 # h3*s3 vpmuludq $H4,$T3,$H2 # h4*s3 vpsrldq \$6,$T1,$T3 vpaddq $T4,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h3*s3 vpaddq $H2,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h4*s3 vpunpckhqdq $T1,$T0,$T4 # 4 vpmuludq $H3,$S4,$H3 # h3*s4 vpmuludq $H4,$S4,$H4 # h4*s4 vpunpcklqdq $T1,$T0,$T0 # 0:1 vpaddq $H3,$D2,$H2 # h2 = d2 + h3*r4 vpaddq $H4,$D3,$H3 # h3 = d3 + h4*r4 vpunpcklqdq $T3,$T2,$T3 # 2:3 vpmuludq `32*7-0x90`(%rax),$H0,$H4 # h0*r4 vpmuludq $H1,$S4,$H0 # h1*s4 vmovdqa 64(%rcx),$MASK # .Lmask26 vpaddq $H4,$D4,$H4 # h4 = d4 + h0*r4 vpaddq $H0,$D0,$H0 # h0 = d0 + h1*s4 ################################################################ # lazy reduction (interleaved with tail of input splat) vpsrlq \$26,$H3,$D3 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $D3,$H4,$H4 # h3 -> h4 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$D0 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 vpaddq $D0,$D1,$H1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$26,$H4,$D4 vpand $MASK,$H4,$H4 vpsrlq \$4,$T3,$T2 vpsrlq \$26,$H1,$D1 vpand $MASK,$H1,$H1 vpaddq $D1,$H2,$H2 # h1 -> h2 vpaddq $D4,$H0,$H0 vpsllq \$2,$D4,$D4 vpaddq $D4,$H0,$H0 # h4 -> h0 vpand $MASK,$T2,$T2 # 2 vpsrlq \$26,$T0,$T1 vpsrlq \$26,$H2,$D2 vpand $MASK,$H2,$H2 vpaddq $D2,$H3,$H3 # h2 -> h3 vpaddq $T2,$H2,$H2 # modulo-scheduled vpsrlq \$30,$T3,$T3 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$D0 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 vpaddq $D0,$H1,$H1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$40,$T4,$T4 # 4 vpsrlq \$26,$H3,$D3 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $D3,$H4,$H4 # h3 -> h4 vpand $MASK,$T0,$T0 # 0 vpand $MASK,$T1,$T1 # 1 vpand $MASK,$T3,$T3 # 3 vpor 32(%rcx),$T4,$T4 # padbit, yes, always sub \$64,$len jnz .Loop_avx2 .byte 0x66,0x90 .Ltail_avx2: ################################################################ # while above multiplications were by r^4 in all lanes, in last # iteration we multiply least significant lane by r^4 and most # significant one by r, so copy of above except that references # to the precomputed table are displaced by 4... #vpaddq $H2,$T2,$H2 # accumulate input vpaddq $H0,$T0,$H0 vmovdqu `32*0+4`(%rsp),$T0 # r0^4 vpaddq $H1,$T1,$H1 vmovdqu `32*1+4`(%rsp),$T1 # r1^4 vpaddq $H3,$T3,$H3 vmovdqu `32*3+4`(%rsp),$T2 # r2^4 vpaddq $H4,$T4,$H4 vmovdqu `32*6+4-0x90`(%rax),$T3 # s3^4 vmovdqu `32*8+4-0x90`(%rax),$S4 # s4^4 vpmuludq $H2,$T0,$D2 # d2 = h2*r0 vpmuludq $H2,$T1,$D3 # d3 = h2*r1 vpmuludq $H2,$T2,$D4 # d4 = h2*r2 vpmuludq $H2,$T3,$D0 # d0 = h2*s3 vpmuludq $H2,$S4,$D1 # d1 = h2*s4 vpmuludq $H0,$T1,$T4 # h0*r1 vpmuludq $H1,$T1,$H2 # h1*r1 vpaddq $T4,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h0*r1 vpaddq $H2,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h1*r1 vpmuludq $H3,$T1,$T4 # h3*r1 vpmuludq `32*2+4`(%rsp),$H4,$H2 # h4*s1 vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h3*r1 vpaddq $H2,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h4*s1 vpmuludq $H0,$T0,$T4 # h0*r0 vpmuludq $H1,$T0,$H2 # h1*r0 vpaddq $T4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h0*r0 vmovdqu `32*4+4-0x90`(%rax),$T1 # s2 vpaddq $H2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h1*r0 vpmuludq $H3,$T0,$T4 # h3*r0 vpmuludq $H4,$T0,$H2 # h4*r0 vpaddq $T4,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h3*r0 vpaddq $H2,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h4*r0 vpmuludq $H3,$T1,$T4 # h3*s2 vpmuludq $H4,$T1,$H2 # h4*s2 vpaddq $T4,$D0,$D0 # d0 += h3*s2 vpaddq $H2,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h4*s2 vmovdqu `32*5+4-0x90`(%rax),$H2 # r3 vpmuludq $H1,$T2,$T4 # h1*r2 vpmuludq $H0,$T2,$T2 # h0*r2 vpaddq $T4,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h1*r2 vpaddq $T2,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h0*r2 vpmuludq $H1,$H2,$T4 # h1*r3 vpmuludq $H0,$H2,$H2 # h0*r3 vpaddq $T4,$D4,$D4 # d4 += h1*r3 vpaddq $H2,$D3,$D3 # d3 += h0*r3 vpmuludq $H3,$T3,$T4 # h3*s3 vpmuludq $H4,$T3,$H2 # h4*s3 vpaddq $T4,$D1,$D1 # d1 += h3*s3 vpaddq $H2,$D2,$D2 # d2 += h4*s3 vpmuludq $H3,$S4,$H3 # h3*s4 vpmuludq $H4,$S4,$H4 # h4*s4 vpaddq $H3,$D2,$H2 # h2 = d2 + h3*r4 vpaddq $H4,$D3,$H3 # h3 = d3 + h4*r4 vpmuludq `32*7+4-0x90`(%rax),$H0,$H4 # h0*r4 vpmuludq $H1,$S4,$H0 # h1*s4 vmovdqa 64(%rcx),$MASK # .Lmask26 vpaddq $H4,$D4,$H4 # h4 = d4 + h0*r4 vpaddq $H0,$D0,$H0 # h0 = d0 + h1*s4 ################################################################ # horizontal addition vpsrldq \$8,$D1,$T1 vpsrldq \$8,$H2,$T2 vpsrldq \$8,$H3,$T3 vpsrldq \$8,$H4,$T4 vpsrldq \$8,$H0,$T0 vpaddq $T1,$D1,$D1 vpaddq $T2,$H2,$H2 vpaddq $T3,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $T4,$H4,$H4 vpaddq $T0,$H0,$H0 vpermq \$0x2,$H3,$T3 vpermq \$0x2,$H4,$T4 vpermq \$0x2,$H0,$T0 vpermq \$0x2,$D1,$T1 vpermq \$0x2,$H2,$T2 vpaddq $T3,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $T4,$H4,$H4 vpaddq $T0,$H0,$H0 vpaddq $T1,$D1,$D1 vpaddq $T2,$H2,$H2 ################################################################ # lazy reduction vpsrlq \$26,$H3,$D3 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $D3,$H4,$H4 # h3 -> h4 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$D0 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 vpaddq $D0,$D1,$H1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$26,$H4,$D4 vpand $MASK,$H4,$H4 vpsrlq \$26,$H1,$D1 vpand $MASK,$H1,$H1 vpaddq $D1,$H2,$H2 # h1 -> h2 vpaddq $D4,$H0,$H0 vpsllq \$2,$D4,$D4 vpaddq $D4,$H0,$H0 # h4 -> h0 vpsrlq \$26,$H2,$D2 vpand $MASK,$H2,$H2 vpaddq $D2,$H3,$H3 # h2 -> h3 vpsrlq \$26,$H0,$D0 vpand $MASK,$H0,$H0 vpaddq $D0,$H1,$H1 # h0 -> h1 vpsrlq \$26,$H3,$D3 vpand $MASK,$H3,$H3 vpaddq $D3,$H4,$H4 # h3 -> h4 vmovd %x#$H0,`4*0-48-64`($ctx)# save partially reduced vmovd %x#$H1,`4*1-48-64`($ctx) vmovd %x#$H2,`4*2-48-64`($ctx) vmovd %x#$H3,`4*3-48-64`($ctx) vmovd %x#$H4,`4*4-48-64`($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); vmovdqa 0x50(%r11),%xmm6 vmovdqa 0x60(%r11),%xmm7 vmovdqa 0x70(%r11),%xmm8 vmovdqa 0x80(%r11),%xmm9 vmovdqa 0x90(%r11),%xmm10 vmovdqa 0xa0(%r11),%xmm11 vmovdqa 0xb0(%r11),%xmm12 vmovdqa 0xc0(%r11),%xmm13 vmovdqa 0xd0(%r11),%xmm14 vmovdqa 0xe0(%r11),%xmm15 lea 0xf8(%r11),%rsp .Ldo_avx2_epilogue: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$win64); lea 8(%r11),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper ret .size poly1305_blocks_avx2,.-poly1305_blocks_avx2 ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .Lconst: .Lmask24: .long 0x0ffffff,0,0x0ffffff,0,0x0ffffff,0,0x0ffffff,0 .L129: .long `1<<24`,0,`1<<24`,0,`1<<24`,0,`1<<24`,0 .Lmask26: .long 0x3ffffff,0,0x3ffffff,0,0x3ffffff,0,0x3ffffff,0 .Lfive: .long 5,0,5,0,5,0,5,0 ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "Poly1305 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 16 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lprologue jb .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lcommon_seh_tail lea 48(%rax),%rax mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R14 jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail .size se_handler,.-se_handler .type avx_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 avx_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 208($context),%rax # pull context->R11 lea 0x50(%rax),%rsi lea 0xf8(%rax),%rax lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size avx_handler,.-avx_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_init .rva .LSEH_end_poly1305_init .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_init .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_blocks .rva .LSEH_end_poly1305_blocks .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit .rva .LSEH_end_poly1305_emit .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_emit ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_blocks_avx .rva .Lbase2_64_avx .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_1 .rva .Lbase2_64_avx .rva .Leven_avx .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_2 .rva .Leven_avx .rva .LSEH_end_poly1305_blocks_avx .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_3 .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit_avx .rva .LSEH_end_poly1305_emit_avx .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_emit_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_blocks_avx2 .rva .Lbase2_64_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_1 .rva .Lbase2_64_avx2 .rva .Leven_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_2 .rva .Leven_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_poly1305_blocks_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_3 ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_poly1305_init: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_init,.LSEH_begin_poly1305_init .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lblocks_body,.Lblocks_epilogue .LSEH_info_poly1305_emit: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit,.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_1: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lblocks_avx_body,.Lblocks_avx_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbase2_64_avx_body,.Lbase2_64_avx_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx_3: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva avx_handler .rva .Ldo_avx_body,.Ldo_avx_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_poly1305_emit_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit_avx,.LSEH_begin_poly1305_emit_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_1: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lblocks_avx2_body,.Lblocks_avx2_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbase2_64_avx2_body,.Lbase2_64_avx2_epilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_poly1305_blocks_avx2_3: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva avx_handler .rva .Ldo_avx2_body,.Ldo_avx2_epilogue # HandlerData[] ___ } foreach (split('\n',$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge; s/%r([a-z]+)#d/%e$1/g; s/%r([0-9]+)#d/%r$1d/g; s/%x#%y/%x/g; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl0000755000000000000000000014472713176625657017755 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements Poly1305 hash for x86. # # April 2015 # # Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone, # measured with rdtsc at fixed clock frequency. # # IALU/gcc-3.4(*) SSE2(**) AVX2 # Pentium 15.7/+80% - # PIII 6.21/+90% - # P4 19.8/+40% 3.24 # Core 2 4.85/+90% 1.80 # Westmere 4.58/+100% 1.43 # Sandy Bridge 3.90/+100% 1.36 # Haswell 3.88/+70% 1.18 0.72 # Silvermont 11.0/+40% 4.80 # Goldmont 4.10/+200% 2.10 # VIA Nano 6.71/+90% 2.47 # Sledgehammer 3.51/+180% 4.27 # Bulldozer 4.53/+140% 1.31 # # (*) gcc 4.8 for some reason generated worse code; # (**) besides SSE2 there are floating-point and AVX options; FP # is deemed unnecessary, because pre-SSE2 processor are too # old to care about, while it's not the fastest option on # SSE2-capable ones; AVX is omitted, because it doesn't give # a lot of improvement, 5-10% depending on processor; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"poly1305-x86.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $sse2=$avx=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } if ($sse2) { &static_label("const_sse2"); &static_label("enter_blocks"); &static_label("enter_emit"); &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } } ######################################################################## # Layout of opaque area is following. # # unsigned __int32 h[5]; # current hash value base 2^32 # unsigned __int32 pad; # is_base2_26 in vector context # unsigned __int32 r[4]; # key value base 2^32 &align(64); &function_begin("poly1305_init"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); # context &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # key &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); # function table &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax"); # zero hash value &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*5,"edi"),"eax"); # is_base2_26 &cmp ("esi",0); &je (&label("nokey")); if ($sse2) { &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("ebx"); &lea ("eax",&DWP("poly1305_blocks-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx")); &lea ("edx",&DWP("poly1305_emit-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx")); &picmeup("edi","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","ebx",&label("pic_point")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi")); &and ("ecx",1<<26|1<<24); &cmp ("ecx",1<<26|1<<24); # SSE2 and XMM? &jne (&label("no_sse2")); &lea ("eax",&DWP("_poly1305_blocks_sse2-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx")); &lea ("edx",&DWP("_poly1305_emit_sse2-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx")); if ($avx>1) { &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi")); &test ("ecx",1<<5); # AVX2? &jz (&label("no_sse2")); &lea ("eax",&DWP("_poly1305_blocks_avx2-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx")); } &set_label("no_sse2"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); # reload context &mov (&DWP(0,"ebp"),"eax"); # fill function table &mov (&DWP(4,"ebp"),"edx"); } &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"esi")); # load input key &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"esi")); &and ("eax",0x0fffffff); &and ("ebx",0x0ffffffc); &and ("ecx",0x0ffffffc); &and ("edx",0x0ffffffc); &mov (&DWP(4*6,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*7,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(4*8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*9,"edi"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",$sse2); &set_label("nokey"); &function_end("poly1305_init"); ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4, $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3, $r0,$r1,$r2,$r3, $s1,$s2,$s3)=map(4*$_,(0..15)); &function_begin("poly1305_blocks"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); # ctx &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # inp &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # len &set_label("enter_blocks"); &and ("ecx",-15); &jz (&label("nodata")); &stack_push(16); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*6,"edi")); # r0 &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*7,"edi")); # r1 &lea ("ebp",&DWP(0,"esi","ecx")); # end of input &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*8,"edi")); # r2 &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*9,"edi")); # r3 &mov (&wparam(2),"ebp"); &mov ("ebp","esi"); &mov (&DWP($r0,"esp"),"eax"); # r0 &mov ("eax","ebx"); &shr ("eax",2); &mov (&DWP($r1,"esp"),"ebx"); # r1 &add ("eax","ebx"); # s1 &mov ("ebx","ecx"); &shr ("ebx",2); &mov (&DWP($r2,"esp"),"ecx"); # r2 &add ("ebx","ecx"); # s2 &mov ("ecx","edx"); &shr ("ecx",2); &mov (&DWP($r3,"esp"),"edx"); # r3 &add ("ecx","edx"); # s3 &mov (&DWP($s1,"esp"),"eax"); # s1 &mov (&DWP($s2,"esp"),"ebx"); # s2 &mov (&DWP($s3,"esp"),"ecx"); # s3 &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi")); # load hash value &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*3,"edi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(4*4,"edi")); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("loop",32); &add ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp")); # accumulate input &adc ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp")); &adc ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp")); &adc ("esi",&DWP(4*3,"ebp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(4*4,"ebp")); &adc ("edi",&wparam(3)); # padbit &mov (&DWP($h0,"esp"),"eax"); # put aside hash[+inp] &mov (&DWP($h3,"esp"),"esi"); &mul (&DWP($r0,"esp")); # h0*r0 &mov (&DWP($h4,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ebx"); # h1 &mov ("esi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($s3,"esp")); # h1*s3 &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ecx"); # h2 &adc ("esi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($s2,"esp")); # h2*s2 &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp")); &adc ("esi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($s1,"esp")); # h3*s1 &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h0,"esp")); &adc ("esi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($r1,"esp")); # h0*r1 &mov (&DWP($d0,"esp"),"edi"); &xor ("edi","edi"); &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ebx"); # h1 &adc ("edi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($r0,"esp")); # h1*r0 &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ecx"); # h2 &adc ("edi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($s3,"esp")); # h2*s3 &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp")); &adc ("edi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($s2,"esp")); # h3*s2 &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h4,"esp")); &adc ("edi","edx"); &imul ("eax",&DWP($s1,"esp")); # h4*s1 &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h0,"esp")); &adc ("edi",0); &mul (&DWP($r2,"esp")); # h0*r2 &mov (&DWP($d1,"esp"),"esi"); &xor ("esi","esi"); &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ebx"); # h1 &adc ("esi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($r1,"esp")); # h1*r1 &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ecx"); # h2 &adc ("esi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($r0,"esp")); # h2*r0 &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp")); &adc ("esi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($s3,"esp")); # h3*s3 &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h4,"esp")); &adc ("esi","edx"); &imul ("eax",&DWP($s2,"esp")); # h4*s2 &add ("edi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h0,"esp")); &adc ("esi",0); &mul (&DWP($r3,"esp")); # h0*r3 &mov (&DWP($d2,"esp"),"edi"); &xor ("edi","edi"); &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ebx"); # h1 &adc ("edi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($r2,"esp")); # h1*r2 &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax","ecx"); # h2 &adc ("edi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($r1,"esp")); # h2*r1 &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($h3,"esp")); &adc ("edi","edx"); &mul (&DWP($r0,"esp")); # h3*r0 &add ("esi","eax"); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($h4,"esp")); &adc ("edi","edx"); &mov ("edx","ecx"); &imul ("ecx",&DWP($s3,"esp")); # h4*s3 &add ("esi","ecx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP($d0,"esp")); &adc ("edi",0); &imul ("edx",&DWP($r0,"esp")); # h4*r0 &add ("edx","edi"); &mov ("ebx",&DWP($d1,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($d2,"esp")); &mov ("edi","edx"); # last reduction step &shr ("edx",2); &and ("edi",3); &lea ("edx",&DWP(0,"edx","edx",4)); # *5 &add ("eax","edx"); &adc ("ebx",0); &adc ("ecx",0); &adc ("esi",0); &adc ("edi",0); &cmp ("ebp",&wparam(2)); # done yet? &jne (&label("loop")); &mov ("edx",&wparam(0)); # ctx &stack_pop(16); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edx"),"eax"); # store hash value &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edx"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edx"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edx"),"esi"); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"edx"),"edi"); &set_label("nodata"); &function_end("poly1305_blocks"); &function_begin("poly1305_emit"); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(0)); # context &set_label("enter_emit"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(1)); # output &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp")); # load hash value &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*4,"ebp")); &add ("eax",5); # compare to modulus &adc ("ebx",0); &adc ("ecx",0); &adc ("edx",0); &adc ("esi",0); &shr ("esi",2); # did it carry/borrow? &neg ("esi"); # do we choose hash-modulus? &and ("eax","esi"); &and ("ebx","esi"); &and ("ecx","esi"); &and ("edx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx"); ¬ ("esi"); # or original hash value? &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp")); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); &and ("eax","esi"); &and ("ebx","esi"); &and ("ecx","esi"); &and ("edx","esi"); &or ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi")); &or ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi")); &or ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi")); &or ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"edi")); &add ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp")); # accumulate key &adc ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp")); &adc ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp")); &adc ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx"); &function_end("poly1305_emit"); if ($sse2) { ######################################################################## # Layout of opaque area is following. # # unsigned __int32 h[5]; # current hash value base 2^26 # unsigned __int32 is_base2_26; # unsigned __int32 r[4]; # key value base 2^32 # unsigned __int32 pad[2]; # struct { unsigned __int32 r^4, r^3, r^2, r^1; } r[9]; # # where r^n are base 2^26 digits of degrees of multiplier key. There are # 5 digits, but last four are interleaved with multiples of 5, totalling # in 9 elements: r0, r1, 5*r1, r2, 5*r2, r3, 5*r3, r4, 5*r4. my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4,$T0,$T1,$T2)=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); my $MASK=$T2; # borrow and keep in mind &align (32); &function_begin_B("_poly1305_init_sse2"); &movdqu ($D4,&QWP(4*6,"edi")); # key base 2^32 &lea ("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi")); # size optimization &mov ("ebp","esp"); &sub ("esp",16*(9+5)); &and ("esp",-16); #&pand ($D4,&QWP(96,"ebx")); # magic mask &movq ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &movdqa ($D0,$D4); &movdqa ($D1,$D4); &movdqa ($D2,$D4); &pand ($D0,$MASK); # -> base 2^26 &psrlq ($D1,26); &psrldq ($D2,6); &pand ($D1,$MASK); &movdqa ($D3,$D2); &psrlq ($D2,4) &psrlq ($D3,30); &pand ($D2,$MASK); &pand ($D3,$MASK); &psrldq ($D4,13); &lea ("edx",&DWP(16*9,"esp")); # size optimization &mov ("ecx",2); &set_label("square"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$D0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$D2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$D3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$D4); &movdqa ($T1,$D1); &movdqa ($T0,$D2); &pslld ($T1,2); &pslld ($T0,2); &paddd ($T1,$D1); # *5 &paddd ($T0,$D2); # *5 &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$T1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$T0); &movdqa ($T1,$D3); &movdqa ($T0,$D4); &pslld ($T1,2); &pslld ($T0,2); &paddd ($T1,$D3); # *5 &paddd ($T0,$D4); # *5 &movdqa (&QWP(16*7,"esp"),$T1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*8,"esp"),$T0); &pshufd ($T1,$D0,0b01000100); &movdqa ($T0,$D1); &pshufd ($D1,$D1,0b01000100); &pshufd ($D2,$D2,0b01000100); &pshufd ($D3,$D3,0b01000100); &pshufd ($D4,$D4,0b01000100); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"edx"),$T1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"edx"),$D1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"edx"),$D2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"edx"),$D3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"edx"),$D4); ################################################################ # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 &pmuludq ($D4,$D0); # h4*r0 &pmuludq ($D3,$D0); # h3*r0 &pmuludq ($D2,$D0); # h2*r0 &pmuludq ($D1,$D0); # h1*r0 &pmuludq ($D0,$T1); # h0*r0 sub pmuladd { my $load = shift; my $base = shift; $base = "esp" if (!defined($base)); ################################################################ # As for choice to "rotate" $T0-$T2 in order to move paddq # past next multiplication. While it makes code harder to read # and doesn't have significant effect on most processors, it # makes a lot of difference on Atom, up to 30% improvement. &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&QWP(16*3,$base)); # r1*h3 &movdqa ($T2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,&QWP(16*2,$base)); # r1*h2 &paddq ($D4,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&QWP(16*1,$base)); # r1*h1 &paddq ($D3,$T1); &$load ($T1,5); # s1 &pmuludq ($T0,&QWP(16*0,$base)); # r1*h0 &paddq ($D2,$T2); &pmuludq ($T1,&QWP(16*4,$base)); # s1*h4 &$load ($T2,2); # r2^n &paddq ($D1,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&QWP(16*2,$base)); # r2*h2 &paddq ($D0,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&QWP(16*1,$base)); # r2*h1 &paddq ($D4,$T2); &$load ($T2,6); # s2^n &pmuludq ($T1,&QWP(16*0,$base)); # r2*h0 &paddq ($D3,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&QWP(16*4,$base)); # s2*h4 &paddq ($D2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T0,&QWP(16*3,$base)); # s2*h3 &$load ($T1,3); # r3^n &paddq ($D1,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,&QWP(16*1,$base)); # r3*h1 &paddq ($D0,$T0); &$load ($T0,7); # s3^n &pmuludq ($T2,&QWP(16*0,$base)); # r3*h0 &paddq ($D4,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&QWP(16*4,$base)); # s3*h4 &paddq ($D3,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,&QWP(16*3,$base)); # s3*h3 &paddq ($D2,$T0); &pmuludq ($T2,&QWP(16*2,$base)); # s3*h2 &$load ($T0,4); # r4^n &paddq ($D1,$T1); &$load ($T1,8); # s4^n &pmuludq ($T0,&QWP(16*0,$base)); # r4*h0 &paddq ($D0,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,&QWP(16*4,$base)); # s4*h4 &paddq ($D4,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&QWP(16*1,$base)); # s4*h1 &paddq ($D3,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&QWP(16*2,$base)); # s4*h2 &paddq ($D0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T1,&QWP(16*3,$base)); # s4*h3 &movdqa ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &paddq ($D1,$T0); &paddq ($D2,$T1); } &pmuladd (sub { my ($reg,$i)=@_; &movdqa ($reg,&QWP(16*$i,"esp")); },"edx"); sub lazy_reduction { my $extra = shift; ################################################################ # lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein # and P. Schwabe # # [(*) see discussion in poly1305-armv4 module] &movdqa ($T0,$D3); &pand ($D3,$MASK); &psrlq ($T0,26); &$extra () if (defined($extra)); &paddq ($T0,$D4); # h3 -> h4 &movdqa ($T1,$D0); &pand ($D0,$MASK); &psrlq ($T1,26); &movdqa ($D4,$T0); &paddq ($T1,$D1); # h0 -> h1 &psrlq ($T0,26); &pand ($D4,$MASK); &movdqa ($D1,$T1); &psrlq ($T1,26); &paddd ($D0,$T0); # favour paddd when # possible, because # paddq is "broken" # on Atom &psllq ($T0,2); &paddq ($T1,$D2); # h1 -> h2 &paddq ($T0,$D0); # h4 -> h0 (*) &pand ($D1,$MASK); &movdqa ($D2,$T1); &psrlq ($T1,26); &pand ($D2,$MASK); &paddd ($T1,$D3); # h2 -> h3 &movdqa ($D0,$T0); &psrlq ($T0,26); &movdqa ($D3,$T1); &psrlq ($T1,26); &pand ($D0,$MASK); &paddd ($D1,$T0); # h0 -> h1 &pand ($D3,$MASK); &paddd ($D4,$T1); # h3 -> h4 } &lazy_reduction (); &dec ("ecx"); &jz (&label("square_break")); &punpcklqdq ($D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # 0:r^1:0:r^2 &punpcklqdq ($D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &punpcklqdq ($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &punpcklqdq ($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &punpcklqdq ($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &jmp (&label("square")); &set_label("square_break"); &psllq ($D0,32); # -> r^3:0:r^4:0 &psllq ($D1,32); &psllq ($D2,32); &psllq ($D3,32); &psllq ($D4,32); &por ($D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # r^3:r^1:r^4:r^2 &por ($D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &por ($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &por ($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &por ($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &pshufd ($D0,$D0,0b10001101); # -> r^1:r^2:r^3:r^4 &pshufd ($D1,$D1,0b10001101); &pshufd ($D2,$D2,0b10001101); &pshufd ($D3,$D3,0b10001101); &pshufd ($D4,$D4,0b10001101); &movdqu (&QWP(16*0,"edi"),$D0); # save the table &movdqu (&QWP(16*1,"edi"),$D1); &movdqu (&QWP(16*2,"edi"),$D2); &movdqu (&QWP(16*3,"edi"),$D3); &movdqu (&QWP(16*4,"edi"),$D4); &movdqa ($T1,$D1); &movdqa ($T0,$D2); &pslld ($T1,2); &pslld ($T0,2); &paddd ($T1,$D1); # *5 &paddd ($T0,$D2); # *5 &movdqu (&QWP(16*5,"edi"),$T1); &movdqu (&QWP(16*6,"edi"),$T0); &movdqa ($T1,$D3); &movdqa ($T0,$D4); &pslld ($T1,2); &pslld ($T0,2); &paddd ($T1,$D3); # *5 &paddd ($T0,$D4); # *5 &movdqu (&QWP(16*7,"edi"),$T1); &movdqu (&QWP(16*8,"edi"),$T0); &mov ("esp","ebp"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(-16*3,"edi")); # size de-optimization &ret (); &function_end_B("_poly1305_init_sse2"); &align (32); &function_begin("_poly1305_blocks_sse2"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); # ctx &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # inp &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # len &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*5,"edi")); # is_base2_26 &and ("ecx",-16); &jz (&label("nodata")); &cmp ("ecx",64); &jae (&label("enter_sse2")); &test ("eax","eax"); # is_base2_26? &jz (&label("enter_blocks")); &set_label("enter_sse2",16); &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("ebx"); &lea ("ebx",&DWP(&label("const_sse2")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx")); &test ("eax","eax"); # is_base2_26? &jnz (&label("base2_26")); &call ("_poly1305_init_sse2"); ################################################# base 2^32 -> base 2^26 &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(3,"edi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(6,"edi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(9,"edi")); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(13,"edi")); &mov (&DWP(4*5,"edi"),1); # is_base2_26 &shr ("ecx",2); &and ("eax",0x3ffffff); &shr ("edx",4); &and ("ecx",0x3ffffff); &shr ("esi",6); &and ("edx",0x3ffffff); &movd ($D0,"eax"); &movd ($D1,"ecx"); &movd ($D2,"edx"); &movd ($D3,"esi"); &movd ($D4,"ebp"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # [reload] inp &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # [reload] len &jmp (&label("base2_32")); &set_label("base2_26",16); &movd ($D0,&DWP(4*0,"edi")); # load hash value &movd ($D1,&DWP(4*1,"edi")); &movd ($D2,&DWP(4*2,"edi")); &movd ($D3,&DWP(4*3,"edi")); &movd ($D4,&DWP(4*4,"edi")); &movdqa ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &set_label("base2_32"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(3)); # padbit &mov ("ebp","esp"); &sub ("esp",16*(5+5+5+9+9)); &and ("esp",-16); &lea ("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi")); # size optimization &shl ("eax",24); # padbit &test ("ecx",31); &jz (&label("even")); ################################################################ # process single block, with SSE2, because it's still faster # even though half of result is discarded &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,"esi")); # input &lea ("esi",&DWP(16,"esi")); &movdqa ($T0,$T1); # -> base 2^26 ... &pand ($T1,$MASK); &paddd ($D0,$T1); # ... and accumuate &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &psrlq ($T0,26); &psrldq ($T1,6); &pand ($T0,$MASK); &paddd ($D1,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T1); &psrlq ($T1,4); &pand ($T1,$MASK); &paddd ($D2,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &psrlq ($T0,30); &pand ($T0,$MASK); &psrldq ($T1,7); &paddd ($D3,$T0); &movd ($T0,"eax"); # padbit &paddd ($D4,$T1); &movd ($T1,&DWP(16*0+12,"edi")); # r0 &paddd ($D4,$T0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$D0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$D2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$D3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$D4); ################################################################ # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 &pmuludq ($D0,$T1); # h4*r0 &pmuludq ($D1,$T1); # h3*r0 &pmuludq ($D2,$T1); # h2*r0 &movd ($T0,&DWP(16*1+12,"edi")); # r1 &pmuludq ($D3,$T1); # h1*r0 &pmuludq ($D4,$T1); # h0*r0 &pmuladd (sub { my ($reg,$i)=@_; &movd ($reg,&DWP(16*$i+12,"edi")); }); &lazy_reduction (); &sub ("ecx",16); &jz (&label("done")); &set_label("even"); &lea ("edx",&DWP(16*(5+5+5+9),"esp"));# size optimization &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16*2,"esi")); &sub ("ecx",64); ################################################################ # expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack &movdqu ($T0,&QWP(16*0,"edi")); # r^1:r^2:r^3:r^4 &pshufd ($T1,$T0,0b01000100); # duplicate r^3:r^4 &cmovb ("esi","eax"); &pshufd ($T0,$T0,0b11101110); # duplicate r^1:r^2 &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"edx"),$T1); &lea ("eax",&DWP(16*10,"esp")); &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(16*1,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(0-9),"edx"),$T0); &pshufd ($T0,$T1,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T1,$T1,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"edx"),$T0); &movdqu ($T0,&QWP(16*2,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(1-9),"edx"),$T1); &pshufd ($T1,$T0,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T0,$T0,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"edx"),$T1); &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(16*3,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(2-9),"edx"),$T0); &pshufd ($T0,$T1,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T1,$T1,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"edx"),$T0); &movdqu ($T0,&QWP(16*4,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(3-9),"edx"),$T1); &pshufd ($T1,$T0,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T0,$T0,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"edx"),$T1); &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(16*5,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(4-9),"edx"),$T0); &pshufd ($T0,$T1,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T1,$T1,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"edx"),$T0); &movdqu ($T0,&QWP(16*6,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(5-9),"edx"),$T1); &pshufd ($T1,$T0,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T0,$T0,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*6,"edx"),$T1); &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(16*7,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(6-9),"edx"),$T0); &pshufd ($T0,$T1,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T1,$T1,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*7,"edx"),$T0); &movdqu ($T0,&QWP(16*8,"edi")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(7-9),"edx"),$T1); &pshufd ($T1,$T0,0b01000100); &pshufd ($T0,$T0,0b11101110); &movdqa (&QWP(16*8,"edx"),$T1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(8-9),"edx"),$T0); sub load_input { my ($inpbase,$offbase)=@_; &movdqu ($T0,&QWP($inpbase+0,"esi")); # load input &movdqu ($T1,&QWP($inpbase+16,"esi")); &lea ("esi",&DWP(16*2,"esi")); &movdqa (&QWP($offbase+16*2,"esp"),$D2); &movdqa (&QWP($offbase+16*3,"esp"),$D3); &movdqa (&QWP($offbase+16*4,"esp"),$D4); &movdqa ($D2,$T0); # splat input &movdqa ($D3,$T1); &psrldq ($D2,6); &psrldq ($D3,6); &movdqa ($D4,$T0); &punpcklqdq ($D2,$D3); # 2:3 &punpckhqdq ($D4,$T1); # 4 &punpcklqdq ($T0,$T1); # 0:1 &movdqa ($D3,$D2); &psrlq ($D2,4); &psrlq ($D3,30); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &psrlq ($D4,40); # 4 &psrlq ($T1,26); &pand ($T0,$MASK); # 0 &pand ($T1,$MASK); # 1 &pand ($D2,$MASK); # 2 &pand ($D3,$MASK); # 3 &por ($D4,&QWP(0,"ebx")); # padbit, yes, always &movdqa (&QWP($offbase+16*0,"esp"),$D0) if ($offbase); &movdqa (&QWP($offbase+16*1,"esp"),$D1) if ($offbase); } &load_input (16*2,16*5); &jbe (&label("skip_loop")); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("loop",32); ################################################################ # ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2 # ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r # \___________________/ # ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2 # ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r # \___________________/ \____________________/ ################################################################ &movdqa ($T2,&QWP(16*(0-9),"edx")); # r0^2 &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"eax"),$T1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"eax"),$D2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"eax"),$D3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"eax"),$D4); ################################################################ # d4 = h4*r0 + h0*r4 + h1*r3 + h2*r2 + h3*r1 # d3 = h3*r0 + h0*r3 + h1*r2 + h2*r1 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h0*r2 + h1*r1 + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h2*5*r4 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2 # d0 = h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h2*5*r3 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1 &movdqa ($D1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,$T2); # h0*r0 &movdqa ($D0,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,$T2); # h1*r0 &pmuludq ($D2,$T2); # h2*r0 &pmuludq ($D3,$T2); # h3*r0 &pmuludq ($D4,$T2); # h4*r0 sub pmuladd_alt { my $addr = shift; &pmuludq ($D0,&$addr(8)); # h1*s4 &movdqa ($T2,$D1); &pmuludq ($D1,&$addr(1)); # h0*r1 &paddq ($D0,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&$addr(2)); # h0*r2 &paddq ($D1,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&$addr(3)); # h0*r3 &paddq ($D2,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,&QWP(16*1,"eax")); # pull h1 &pmuludq ($T1,&$addr(4)); # h0*r4 &paddq ($D3,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&$addr(1)); # h1*r1 &paddq ($D4,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&$addr(2)); # h1*r2 &paddq ($D2,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,&QWP(16*2,"eax")); # pull h2 &pmuludq ($T1,&$addr(3)); # h1*r3 &paddq ($D3,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&$addr(7)); # h2*s3 &paddq ($D4,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&$addr(8)); # h2*s4 &paddq ($D0,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,&$addr(1)); # h2*r1 &paddq ($D1,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,&QWP(16*3,"eax")); # pull h3 &pmuludq ($T2,&$addr(2)); # h2*r2 &paddq ($D3,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&$addr(6)); # h3*s2 &paddq ($D4,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,&$addr(7)); # h3*s3 &paddq ($D0,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&$addr(8)); # h3*s4 &paddq ($D1,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,&QWP(16*4,"eax")); # pull h4 &pmuludq ($T0,&$addr(1)); # h3*r1 &paddq ($D2,$T2); &movdqa ($T2,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,&$addr(8)); # h4*s4 &paddq ($D4,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$T2); &pmuludq ($T2,&$addr(5)); # h4*s1 &paddq ($D3,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,&$addr(6)); # h4*s2 &paddq ($D0,$T2); &movdqa ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &pmuludq ($T1,&$addr(7)); # h4*s3 &paddq ($D1,$T0); &paddq ($D2,$T1); } &pmuladd_alt (sub { my $i=shift; &QWP(16*($i-9),"edx"); }); &load_input (-16*2,0); &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16*2,"esi")); &sub ("ecx",64); &paddd ($T0,&QWP(16*(5+0),"esp")); # add hash value &paddd ($T1,&QWP(16*(5+1),"esp")); &paddd ($D2,&QWP(16*(5+2),"esp")); &paddd ($D3,&QWP(16*(5+3),"esp")); &paddd ($D4,&QWP(16*(5+4),"esp")); &cmovb ("esi","eax"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(16*10,"esp")); &movdqa ($T2,&QWP(16*0,"edx")); # r0^4 &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"eax"),$T1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"eax"),$D2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"eax"),$D3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"eax"),$D4); ################################################################ # d4 += h4*r0 + h0*r4 + h1*r3 + h2*r2 + h3*r1 # d3 += h3*r0 + h0*r3 + h1*r2 + h2*r1 + h4*5*r4 # d2 += h2*r0 + h0*r2 + h1*r1 + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3 # d1 += h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h2*5*r4 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2 # d0 += h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h2*5*r3 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1 &movdqa ($D1,$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,$T2); # h0*r0 &paddq ($T0,$D0); &movdqa ($D0,$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,$T2); # h1*r0 &pmuludq ($D2,$T2); # h2*r0 &pmuludq ($D3,$T2); # h3*r0 &pmuludq ($D4,$T2); # h4*r0 &paddq ($T1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &paddq ($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &paddq ($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &paddq ($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &pmuladd_alt (sub { my $i=shift; &QWP(16*$i,"edx"); }); &lazy_reduction (); &load_input (16*2,16*5); &ja (&label("loop")); &set_label("skip_loop"); ################################################################ # multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1 &pshufd ($T2,&QWP(16*(0-9),"edx"),0x10);# r0^n &add ("ecx",32); &jnz (&label("long_tail")); &paddd ($T0,$D0); # add hash value &paddd ($T1,$D1); &paddd ($D2,&QWP(16*7,"esp")); &paddd ($D3,&QWP(16*8,"esp")); &paddd ($D4,&QWP(16*9,"esp")); &set_label("long_tail"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"eax"),$T0); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"eax"),$T1); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"eax"),$D2); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"eax"),$D3); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"eax"),$D4); ################################################################ # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 &pmuludq ($T0,$T2); # h0*r0 &pmuludq ($T1,$T2); # h1*r0 &pmuludq ($D2,$T2); # h2*r0 &movdqa ($D0,$T0); &pshufd ($T0,&QWP(16*(1-9),"edx"),0x10);# r1^n &pmuludq ($D3,$T2); # h3*r0 &movdqa ($D1,$T1); &pmuludq ($D4,$T2); # h4*r0 &pmuladd (sub { my ($reg,$i)=@_; &pshufd ($reg,&QWP(16*($i-9),"edx"),0x10); },"eax"); &jz (&label("short_tail")); &load_input (-16*2,0); &pshufd ($T2,&QWP(16*0,"edx"),0x10); # r0^n &paddd ($T0,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # add hash value &paddd ($T1,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); &paddd ($D2,&QWP(16*7,"esp")); &paddd ($D3,&QWP(16*8,"esp")); &paddd ($D4,&QWP(16*9,"esp")); ################################################################ # multiply inp[0:1] by r^4:r^3 and accumulate &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$T0); &pmuludq ($T0,$T2); # h0*r0 &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$T1); &pmuludq ($T1,$T2); # h1*r0 &paddq ($D0,$T0); &movdqa ($T0,$D2); &pmuludq ($D2,$T2); # h2*r0 &paddq ($D1,$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$D3); &pmuludq ($D3,$T2); # h3*r0 &paddq ($D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$T0); &pshufd ($T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx"),0x10); # r1^n &paddq ($D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$T1); &movdqa ($T1,$D4); &pmuludq ($D4,$T2); # h4*r0 &paddq ($D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$T1); &pmuladd (sub { my ($reg,$i)=@_; &pshufd ($reg,&QWP(16*$i,"edx"),0x10); }); &set_label("short_tail"); ################################################################ # horizontal addition &pshufd ($T1,$D4,0b01001110); &pshufd ($T0,$D3,0b01001110); &paddq ($D4,$T1); &paddq ($D3,$T0); &pshufd ($T1,$D0,0b01001110); &pshufd ($T0,$D1,0b01001110); &paddq ($D0,$T1); &paddq ($D1,$T0); &pshufd ($T1,$D2,0b01001110); #&paddq ($D2,$T1); &lazy_reduction (sub { &paddq ($D2,$T1) }); &set_label("done"); &movd (&DWP(-16*3+4*0,"edi"),$D0); # store hash value &movd (&DWP(-16*3+4*1,"edi"),$D1); &movd (&DWP(-16*3+4*2,"edi"),$D2); &movd (&DWP(-16*3+4*3,"edi"),$D3); &movd (&DWP(-16*3+4*4,"edi"),$D4); &mov ("esp","ebp"); &set_label("nodata"); &function_end("_poly1305_blocks_sse2"); &align (32); &function_begin("_poly1305_emit_sse2"); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(0)); # context &cmp (&DWP(4*5,"ebp"),0); # is_base2_26? &je (&label("enter_emit")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp")); # load hash value &mov ("edi",&DWP(4*1,"ebp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*4,"ebp")); &mov ("ebx","edi"); # base 2^26 -> base 2^32 &shl ("edi",26); &shr ("ebx",6); &add ("eax","edi"); &mov ("edi","ecx"); &adc ("ebx",0); &shl ("edi",20); &shr ("ecx",12); &add ("ebx","edi"); &mov ("edi","edx"); &adc ("ecx",0); &shl ("edi",14); &shr ("edx",18); &add ("ecx","edi"); &mov ("edi","esi"); &adc ("edx",0); &shl ("edi",8); &shr ("esi",24); &add ("edx","edi"); &adc ("esi",0); # can be partially reduced &mov ("edi","esi"); # final reduction &and ("esi",3); &shr ("edi",2); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(0,"edi","edi",4)); # *5 &mov ("edi",&wparam(1)); # output &add ("eax","ebp"); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); # key &adc ("ebx",0); &adc ("ecx",0); &adc ("edx",0); &adc ("esi",0); &movd ($D0,"eax"); # offload original hash value &add ("eax",5); # compare to modulus &movd ($D1,"ebx"); &adc ("ebx",0); &movd ($D2,"ecx"); &adc ("ecx",0); &movd ($D3,"edx"); &adc ("edx",0); &adc ("esi",0); &shr ("esi",2); # did it carry/borrow? &neg ("esi"); # do we choose (hash-modulus) ... &and ("eax","esi"); &and ("ebx","esi"); &and ("ecx","esi"); &and ("edx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax"); &movd ("eax",$D0); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx"); &movd ("ebx",$D1); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx"); &movd ("ecx",$D2); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx"); &movd ("edx",$D3); ¬ ("esi"); # ... or original hash value? &and ("eax","esi"); &and ("ebx","esi"); &or ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi")); &and ("ecx","esi"); &or ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi")); &and ("edx","esi"); &or ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi")); &or ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"edi")); &add ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"ebp")); # accumulate key &adc ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ebx"); &adc ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"edx"); &function_end("_poly1305_emit_sse2"); if ($avx>1) { ######################################################################## # Note that poly1305_init_avx2 operates on %xmm, I could have used # poly1305_init_sse2... &align (32); &function_begin_B("_poly1305_init_avx2"); &vmovdqu ($D4,&QWP(4*6,"edi")); # key base 2^32 &lea ("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi")); # size optimization &mov ("ebp","esp"); &sub ("esp",16*(9+5)); &and ("esp",-16); #&vpand ($D4,$D4,&QWP(96,"ebx")); # magic mask &vmovdqa ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &vpand ($D0,$D4,$MASK); # -> base 2^26 &vpsrlq ($D1,$D4,26); &vpsrldq ($D3,$D4,6); &vpand ($D1,$D1,$MASK); &vpsrlq ($D2,$D3,4) &vpsrlq ($D3,$D3,30); &vpand ($D2,$D2,$MASK); &vpand ($D3,$D3,$MASK); &vpsrldq ($D4,$D4,13); &lea ("edx",&DWP(16*9,"esp")); # size optimization &mov ("ecx",2); &set_label("square"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$D0); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$D1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$D2); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$D3); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$D4); &vpslld ($T1,$D1,2); &vpslld ($T0,$D2,2); &vpaddd ($T1,$T1,$D1); # *5 &vpaddd ($T0,$T0,$D2); # *5 &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),$T1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*6,"esp"),$T0); &vpslld ($T1,$D3,2); &vpslld ($T0,$D4,2); &vpaddd ($T1,$T1,$D3); # *5 &vpaddd ($T0,$T0,$D4); # *5 &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*7,"esp"),$T1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*8,"esp"),$T0); &vpshufd ($T0,$D0,0b01000100); &vmovdqa ($T1,$D1); &vpshufd ($D1,$D1,0b01000100); &vpshufd ($D2,$D2,0b01000100); &vpshufd ($D3,$D3,0b01000100); &vpshufd ($D4,$D4,0b01000100); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*0,"edx"),$T0); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*1,"edx"),$D1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*2,"edx"),$D2); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*3,"edx"),$D3); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*4,"edx"),$D4); ################################################################ # d4 = h4*r0 + h3*r1 + h2*r2 + h1*r3 + h0*r4 # d3 = h3*r0 + h2*r1 + h1*r2 + h0*r3 + h4*5*r4 # d2 = h2*r0 + h1*r1 + h0*r2 + h4*5*r3 + h3*5*r4 # d1 = h1*r0 + h0*r1 + h4*5*r2 + h3*5*r3 + h2*5*r4 # d0 = h0*r0 + h4*5*r1 + h3*5*r2 + h2*5*r3 + h1*5*r4 &vpmuludq ($D4,$D4,$D0); # h4*r0 &vpmuludq ($D3,$D3,$D0); # h3*r0 &vpmuludq ($D2,$D2,$D0); # h2*r0 &vpmuludq ($D1,$D1,$D0); # h1*r0 &vpmuludq ($D0,$T0,$D0); # h0*r0 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"edx")); # r1*h3 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T0); &vpmuludq ($T2,$T1,&QWP(16*2,"edx")); # r1*h2 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T2); &vpmuludq ($T0,$T1,&QWP(16*1,"edx")); # r1*h1 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T0); &vmovdqa ($T2,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # s1 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*0,"edx")); # r1*h0 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T1); &vmovdqa ($T0,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); # r2 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T2,&QWP(16*4,"edx")); # s1*h4 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T2); &vpmuludq ($T1,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"edx")); # r2*h2 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T1); &vpmuludq ($T2,$T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx")); # r2*h1 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T2); &vmovdqa ($T1,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # s2 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*0,"edx")); # r2*h0 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T0); &vpmuludq ($T2,$T1,&QWP(16*4,"edx")); # s2*h4 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T2); &vmovdqa ($T0,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); # r3 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"edx")); # s2*h3 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T1); &vpmuludq ($T2,$T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx")); # r3*h1 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T2); &vmovdqa ($T1,&QWP(16*7,"esp")); # s3 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*0,"edx")); # r3*h0 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T0); &vpmuludq ($T2,$T1,&QWP(16*4,"edx")); # s3*h4 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T2); &vpmuludq ($T0,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"edx")); # s3*h3 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T0); &vmovdqa ($T2,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # r4 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*2,"edx")); # s3*h2 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T1); &vmovdqa ($T0,&QWP(16*8,"esp")); # s4 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T2,&QWP(16*0,"edx")); # r4*h0 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T2); &vpmuludq ($T1,$T0,&QWP(16*4,"edx")); # s4*h4 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T1); &vpmuludq ($T2,$T0,&QWP(16*1,"edx")); # s4*h1 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T2); &vpmuludq ($T1,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"edx")); # s4*h2 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T1); &vmovdqa ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &vpmuludq ($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*3,"edx")); # s4*h3 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T0); ################################################################ # lazy reduction &vpsrlq ($T0,$D3,26); &vpand ($D3,$D3,$MASK); &vpsrlq ($T1,$D0,26); &vpand ($D0,$D0,$MASK); &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T0); # h3 -> h4 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T1); # h0 -> h1 &vpsrlq ($T0,$D4,26); &vpand ($D4,$D4,$MASK); &vpsrlq ($T1,$D1,26); &vpand ($D1,$D1,$MASK); &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T1); # h1 -> h2 &vpaddd ($D0,$D0,$T0); &vpsllq ($T0,$T0,2); &vpsrlq ($T1,$D2,26); &vpand ($D2,$D2,$MASK); &vpaddd ($D0,$D0,$T0); # h4 -> h0 &vpaddd ($D3,$D3,$T1); # h2 -> h3 &vpsrlq ($T1,$D3,26); &vpsrlq ($T0,$D0,26); &vpand ($D0,$D0,$MASK); &vpand ($D3,$D3,$MASK); &vpaddd ($D1,$D1,$T0); # h0 -> h1 &vpaddd ($D4,$D4,$T1); # h3 -> h4 &dec ("ecx"); &jz (&label("square_break")); &vpunpcklqdq ($D0,$D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # 0:r^1:0:r^2 &vpunpcklqdq ($D1,$D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &vpunpcklqdq ($D2,$D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &vpunpcklqdq ($D3,$D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &vpunpcklqdq ($D4,$D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &jmp (&label("square")); &set_label("square_break"); &vpsllq ($D0,$D0,32); # -> r^3:0:r^4:0 &vpsllq ($D1,$D1,32); &vpsllq ($D2,$D2,32); &vpsllq ($D3,$D3,32); &vpsllq ($D4,$D4,32); &vpor ($D0,$D0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # r^3:r^1:r^4:r^2 &vpor ($D1,$D1,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &vpor ($D2,$D2,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &vpor ($D3,$D3,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &vpor ($D4,$D4,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); &vpshufd ($D0,$D0,0b10001101); # -> r^1:r^2:r^3:r^4 &vpshufd ($D1,$D1,0b10001101); &vpshufd ($D2,$D2,0b10001101); &vpshufd ($D3,$D3,0b10001101); &vpshufd ($D4,$D4,0b10001101); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*0,"edi"),$D0); # save the table &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*1,"edi"),$D1); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*2,"edi"),$D2); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*3,"edi"),$D3); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*4,"edi"),$D4); &vpslld ($T1,$D1,2); &vpslld ($T0,$D2,2); &vpaddd ($T1,$T1,$D1); # *5 &vpaddd ($T0,$T0,$D2); # *5 &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*5,"edi"),$T1); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*6,"edi"),$T0); &vpslld ($T1,$D3,2); &vpslld ($T0,$D4,2); &vpaddd ($T1,$T1,$D3); # *5 &vpaddd ($T0,$T0,$D4); # *5 &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*7,"edi"),$T1); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*8,"edi"),$T0); &mov ("esp","ebp"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(-16*3,"edi")); # size de-optimization &ret (); &function_end_B("_poly1305_init_avx2"); ######################################################################## # now it's time to switch to %ymm my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3,$D4,$T0,$T1,$T2)=map("ymm$_",(0..7)); my $MASK=$T2; sub X { my $reg=shift; $reg=~s/^ymm/xmm/; $reg; } &align (32); &function_begin("_poly1305_blocks_avx2"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); # ctx &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # inp &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # len &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*5,"edi")); # is_base2_26 &and ("ecx",-16); &jz (&label("nodata")); &cmp ("ecx",64); &jae (&label("enter_avx2")); &test ("eax","eax"); # is_base2_26? &jz (&label("enter_blocks")); &set_label("enter_avx2"); &vzeroupper (); &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("ebx"); &lea ("ebx",&DWP(&label("const_sse2")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebx")); &test ("eax","eax"); # is_base2_26? &jnz (&label("base2_26")); &call ("_poly1305_init_avx2"); ################################################# base 2^32 -> base 2^26 &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(3,"edi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(6,"edi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(9,"edi")); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(13,"edi")); &shr ("ecx",2); &and ("eax",0x3ffffff); &shr ("edx",4); &and ("ecx",0x3ffffff); &shr ("esi",6); &and ("edx",0x3ffffff); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"edx"); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"esi"); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"edi"),"ebp"); &mov (&DWP(4*5,"edi"),1); # is_base2_26 &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # [reload] inp &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # [reload] len &set_label("base2_26"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(3)); # padbit &mov ("ebp","esp"); &sub ("esp",32*(5+9)); &and ("esp",-512); # ensure that frame # doesn't cross page # boundary, which is # essential for # misaligned 32-byte # loads ################################################################ # expand and copy pre-calculated table to stack &vmovdqu (&X($D0),&QWP(16*(3+0),"edi")); &lea ("edx",&DWP(32*5+128,"esp")); # +128 size optimization &vmovdqu (&X($D1),&QWP(16*(3+1),"edi")); &vmovdqu (&X($D2),&QWP(16*(3+2),"edi")); &vmovdqu (&X($D3),&QWP(16*(3+3),"edi")); &vmovdqu (&X($D4),&QWP(16*(3+4),"edi")); &lea ("edi",&DWP(16*3,"edi")); # size optimization &vpermq ($D0,$D0,0b01000000); # 00001234 -> 12343434 &vpermq ($D1,$D1,0b01000000); &vpermq ($D2,$D2,0b01000000); &vpermq ($D3,$D3,0b01000000); &vpermq ($D4,$D4,0b01000000); &vpshufd ($D0,$D0,0b11001000); # 12343434 -> 14243444 &vpshufd ($D1,$D1,0b11001000); &vpshufd ($D2,$D2,0b11001000); &vpshufd ($D3,$D3,0b11001000); &vpshufd ($D4,$D4,0b11001000); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*0-128,"edx"),$D0); &vmovdqu (&X($D0),&QWP(16*5,"edi")); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*1-128,"edx"),$D1); &vmovdqu (&X($D1),&QWP(16*6,"edi")); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*2-128,"edx"),$D2); &vmovdqu (&X($D2),&QWP(16*7,"edi")); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*3-128,"edx"),$D3); &vmovdqu (&X($D3),&QWP(16*8,"edi")); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*4-128,"edx"),$D4); &vpermq ($D0,$D0,0b01000000); &vpermq ($D1,$D1,0b01000000); &vpermq ($D2,$D2,0b01000000); &vpermq ($D3,$D3,0b01000000); &vpshufd ($D0,$D0,0b11001000); &vpshufd ($D1,$D1,0b11001000); &vpshufd ($D2,$D2,0b11001000); &vpshufd ($D3,$D3,0b11001000); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*5-128,"edx"),$D0); &vmovd (&X($D0),&DWP(-16*3+4*0,"edi"));# load hash value &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*6-128,"edx"),$D1); &vmovd (&X($D1),&DWP(-16*3+4*1,"edi")); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*7-128,"edx"),$D2); &vmovd (&X($D2),&DWP(-16*3+4*2,"edi")); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*8-128,"edx"),$D3); &vmovd (&X($D3),&DWP(-16*3+4*3,"edi")); &vmovd (&X($D4),&DWP(-16*3+4*4,"edi")); &vmovdqa ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &neg ("eax"); # padbit &test ("ecx",63); &jz (&label("even")); &mov ("edx","ecx"); &and ("ecx",-64); &and ("edx",63); &vmovdqu (&X($T0),&QWP(16*0,"esi")); &cmp ("edx",32); &jb (&label("one")); &vmovdqu (&X($T1),&QWP(16*1,"esi")); &je (&label("two")); &vinserti128 ($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"esi"),1); &lea ("esi",&DWP(16*3,"esi")); &lea ("ebx",&DWP(8,"ebx")); # three padbits &lea ("edx",&DWP(32*5+128+8,"esp")); # --:r^1:r^2:r^3 (*) &jmp (&label("tail")); &set_label("two"); &lea ("esi",&DWP(16*2,"esi")); &lea ("ebx",&DWP(16,"ebx")); # two padbits &lea ("edx",&DWP(32*5+128+16,"esp"));# --:--:r^1:r^2 (*) &jmp (&label("tail")); &set_label("one"); &lea ("esi",&DWP(16*1,"esi")); &vpxor ($T1,$T1,$T1); &lea ("ebx",&DWP(32,"ebx","eax",8)); # one or no padbits &lea ("edx",&DWP(32*5+128+24,"esp"));# --:--:--:r^1 (*) &jmp (&label("tail")); # (*) spots marked with '--' are data from next table entry, but they # are multiplied by 0 and therefore rendered insignificant &set_label("even",32); &vmovdqu (&X($T0),&QWP(16*0,"esi")); # load input &vmovdqu (&X($T1),&QWP(16*1,"esi")); &vinserti128 ($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"esi"),1); &vinserti128 ($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"esi"),1); &lea ("esi",&DWP(16*4,"esi")); &sub ("ecx",64); &jz (&label("tail")); &set_label("loop"); ################################################################ # ((inp[0]*r^4+r[4])*r^4+r[8])*r^4 # ((inp[1]*r^4+r[5])*r^4+r[9])*r^3 # ((inp[2]*r^4+r[6])*r^4+r[10])*r^2 # ((inp[3]*r^4+r[7])*r^4+r[11])*r^1 # \________/ \_______/ ################################################################ sub vsplat_input { &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*2,"esp"),$D2); &vpsrldq ($D2,$T0,6); # splat input &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*0,"esp"),$D0); &vpsrldq ($D0,$T1,6); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32*1,"esp"),$D1); &vpunpckhqdq ($D1,$T0,$T1); # 4 &vpunpcklqdq ($T0,$T0,$T1); # 0:1 &vpunpcklqdq ($D2,$D2,$D0); # 2:3 &vpsrlq ($D0,$D2,30); &vpsrlq ($D2,$D2,4); &vpsrlq ($T1,$T0,26); &vpsrlq ($D1,$D1,40); # 4 &vpand ($D2,$D2,$MASK); # 2 &vpand ($T0,$T0,$MASK); # 0 &vpand ($T1,$T1,$MASK); # 1 &vpand ($D0,$D0,$MASK); # 3 (*) &vpor ($D1,$D1,&QWP(0,"ebx")); # padbit, yes, always # (*) note that output is counterintuitive, inp[3:4] is # returned in $D1-2, while $D3-4 are preserved; } &vsplat_input (); sub vpmuladd { my $addr = shift; &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,&QWP(32*2,"esp")); # add hash value &vpaddq ($T0,$T0,&QWP(32*0,"esp")); &vpaddq ($T1,$T1,&QWP(32*1,"esp")); &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$D3); &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$D4); ################################################################ # d3 = h2*r1 + h0*r3 + h1*r2 + h3*r0 + h4*5*r4 # d4 = h2*r2 + h0*r4 + h1*r3 + h3*r1 + h4*r0 # d0 = h2*5*r3 + h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1 # d1 = h2*5*r4 + h0*r1 + h1*r0 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2 # d2 = h2*r0 + h0*r2 + h1*r1 + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3 &vpmuludq ($D3,$D2,&$addr(1)); # d3 = h2*r1 &vmovdqa (QWP(32*1,"esp"),$T1); &vpmuludq ($D4,$D2,&$addr(2)); # d4 = h2*r2 &vmovdqa (QWP(32*3,"esp"),$D0); &vpmuludq ($D0,$D2,&$addr(7)); # d0 = h2*s3 &vmovdqa (QWP(32*4,"esp"),$D1); &vpmuludq ($D1,$D2,&$addr(8)); # d1 = h2*s4 &vpmuludq ($D2,$D2,&$addr(0)); # d2 = h2*r0 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T0,&$addr(3)); # h0*r3 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T2); # d3 += h0*r3 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T0,&$addr(4)); # h0*r4 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T1); # d4 + h0*r4 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T0,&$addr(0)); # h0*r0 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T2); # d0 + h0*r0 &vmovdqa ($T2,&QWP(32*1,"esp")); # h1 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T0,&$addr(1)); # h0*r1 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T1); # d1 += h0*r1 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T0,&$addr(2)); # h0*r2 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T0); # d2 += h0*r2 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T2,&$addr(2)); # h1*r2 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T1); # d3 += h1*r2 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T2,&$addr(3)); # h1*r3 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T0); # d4 += h1*r3 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T2,&$addr(8)); # h1*s4 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T1); # d0 += h1*s4 &vmovdqa ($T1,&QWP(32*3,"esp")); # h3 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T2,&$addr(0)); # h1*r0 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T0); # d1 += h1*r0 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T2,&$addr(1)); # h1*r1 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T2); # d2 += h1*r1 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T1,&$addr(0)); # h3*r0 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T0); # d3 += h3*r0 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T1,&$addr(1)); # h3*r1 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T2); # d4 += h3*r1 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T1,&$addr(6)); # h3*s2 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T0); # d0 += h3*s2 &vmovdqa ($T0,&QWP(32*4,"esp")); # h4 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T1,&$addr(7)); # h3*s3 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T2); # d1+= h3*s3 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T1,&$addr(8)); # h3*s4 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T1); # d2 += h3*s4 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T0,&$addr(8)); # h4*s4 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T2); # d3 += h4*s4 &vpmuludq ($T1,$T0,&$addr(5)); # h4*s1 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T1); # d0 += h4*s1 &vpmuludq ($T2,$T0,&$addr(0)); # h4*r0 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T2); # d4 += h4*r0 &vmovdqa ($MASK,&QWP(64,"ebx")); &vpmuludq ($T1,$T0,&$addr(6)); # h4*s2 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T1); # d1 += h4*s2 &vpmuludq ($T0,$T0,&$addr(7)); # h4*s3 &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T0); # d2 += h4*s3 } &vpmuladd (sub { my $i=shift; &QWP(32*$i-128,"edx"); }); sub vlazy_reduction { ################################################################ # lazy reduction &vpsrlq ($T0,$D3,26); &vpand ($D3,$D3,$MASK); &vpsrlq ($T1,$D0,26); &vpand ($D0,$D0,$MASK); &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T0); # h3 -> h4 &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T1); # h0 -> h1 &vpsrlq ($T0,$D4,26); &vpand ($D4,$D4,$MASK); &vpsrlq ($T1,$D1,26); &vpand ($D1,$D1,$MASK); &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T1); # h1 -> h2 &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T0); &vpsllq ($T0,$T0,2); &vpsrlq ($T1,$D2,26); &vpand ($D2,$D2,$MASK); &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T0); # h4 -> h0 &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T1); # h2 -> h3 &vpsrlq ($T1,$D3,26); &vpsrlq ($T0,$D0,26); &vpand ($D0,$D0,$MASK); &vpand ($D3,$D3,$MASK); &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T0); # h0 -> h1 &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T1); # h3 -> h4 } &vlazy_reduction(); &vmovdqu (&X($T0),&QWP(16*0,"esi")); # load input &vmovdqu (&X($T1),&QWP(16*1,"esi")); &vinserti128 ($T0,$T0,&QWP(16*2,"esi"),1); &vinserti128 ($T1,$T1,&QWP(16*3,"esi"),1); &lea ("esi",&DWP(16*4,"esi")); &sub ("ecx",64); &jnz (&label("loop")); &set_label("tail"); &vsplat_input (); &and ("ebx",-64); # restore pointer &vpmuladd (sub { my $i=shift; &QWP(4+32*$i-128,"edx"); }); ################################################################ # horizontal addition &vpsrldq ($T0,$D4,8); &vpsrldq ($T1,$D3,8); &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T0); &vpsrldq ($T0,$D0,8); &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T1); &vpsrldq ($T1,$D1,8); &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T0); &vpsrldq ($T0,$D2,8); &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T1); &vpermq ($T1,$D4,2); # keep folding &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T0); &vpermq ($T0,$D3,2); &vpaddq ($D4,$D4,$T1); &vpermq ($T1,$D0,2); &vpaddq ($D3,$D3,$T0); &vpermq ($T0,$D1,2); &vpaddq ($D0,$D0,$T1); &vpermq ($T1,$D2,2); &vpaddq ($D1,$D1,$T0); &vpaddq ($D2,$D2,$T1); &vlazy_reduction(); &cmp ("ecx",0); &je (&label("done")); ################################################################ # clear all but single word &vpshufd (&X($D0),&X($D0),0b11111100); &lea ("edx",&DWP(32*5+128,"esp")); # restore pointer &vpshufd (&X($D1),&X($D1),0b11111100); &vpshufd (&X($D2),&X($D2),0b11111100); &vpshufd (&X($D3),&X($D3),0b11111100); &vpshufd (&X($D4),&X($D4),0b11111100); &jmp (&label("even")); &set_label("done",16); &vmovd (&DWP(-16*3+4*0,"edi"),&X($D0));# store hash value &vmovd (&DWP(-16*3+4*1,"edi"),&X($D1)); &vmovd (&DWP(-16*3+4*2,"edi"),&X($D2)); &vmovd (&DWP(-16*3+4*3,"edi"),&X($D3)); &vmovd (&DWP(-16*3+4*4,"edi"),&X($D4)); &vzeroupper (); &mov ("esp","ebp"); &set_label("nodata"); &function_end("_poly1305_blocks_avx2"); } &set_label("const_sse2",64); &data_word(1<<24,0, 1<<24,0, 1<<24,0, 1<<24,0); &data_word(0,0, 0,0, 0,0, 0,0); &data_word(0x03ffffff,0,0x03ffffff,0, 0x03ffffff,0, 0x03ffffff,0); &data_word(0x0fffffff,0x0ffffffc,0x0ffffffc,0x0ffffffc); } &asciz ("Poly1305 for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &align (4); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl0000755000000000000000000005174413176625657020361 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements Poly1305 hash for ARMv8. # # June 2015 # # Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone. # # IALU/gcc-4.9 NEON # # Apple A7 1.86/+5% 0.72 # Cortex-A53 2.69/+58% 1.47 # Cortex-A57 2.70/+7% 1.14 # Denver 1.64/+50% 1.18(*) # X-Gene 2.13/+68% 2.27 # Mongoose 1.77/+75% 1.12 # # (*) estimate based on resources availability is less than 1.0, # i.e. measured result is worse than expected, presumably binary # translator is not almighty; $flavour=shift; $output=shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("x$_",(0..3)); my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len); my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$r0,$r1,$s1,$t0,$t1,$d0,$d1,$d2) = map("x$_",(4..14)); $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text // forward "declarations" are required for Apple .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P .globl poly1305_blocks .globl poly1305_emit .globl poly1305_init .type poly1305_init,%function .align 5 poly1305_init: cmp $inp,xzr stp xzr,xzr,[$ctx] // zero hash value stp xzr,xzr,[$ctx,#16] // [along with is_base2_26] csel x0,xzr,x0,eq b.eq .Lno_key #ifdef __ILP32__ ldrsw $t1,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P #else ldr $t1,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P #endif adr $t0,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P ldp $r0,$r1,[$inp] // load key mov $s1,#0xfffffffc0fffffff movk $s1,#0x0fff,lsl#48 ldr w17,[$t0,$t1] #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $r0,$r0 // flip bytes rev $r1,$r1 #endif and $r0,$r0,$s1 // &=0ffffffc0fffffff and $s1,$s1,#-4 and $r1,$r1,$s1 // &=0ffffffc0ffffffc stp $r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32] // save key value tst w17,#ARMV7_NEON adr $d0,poly1305_blocks adr $r0,poly1305_blocks_neon adr $d1,poly1305_emit adr $r1,poly1305_emit_neon csel $d0,$d0,$r0,eq csel $d1,$d1,$r1,eq #ifdef __ILP32__ stp w12,w13,[$len] #else stp $d0,$d1,[$len] #endif mov x0,#1 .Lno_key: ret .size poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init .type poly1305_blocks,%function .align 5 poly1305_blocks: ands $len,$len,#-16 b.eq .Lno_data ldp $h0,$h1,[$ctx] // load hash value ldp $r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32] // load key value ldr $h2,[$ctx,#16] add $s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2 // s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) b .Loop .align 5 .Loop: ldp $t0,$t1,[$inp],#16 // load input sub $len,$len,#16 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $t0,$t0 rev $t1,$t1 #endif adds $h0,$h0,$t0 // accumulate input adcs $h1,$h1,$t1 mul $d0,$h0,$r0 // h0*r0 adc $h2,$h2,$padbit umulh $d1,$h0,$r0 mul $t0,$h1,$s1 // h1*5*r1 umulh $t1,$h1,$s1 adds $d0,$d0,$t0 mul $t0,$h0,$r1 // h0*r1 adc $d1,$d1,$t1 umulh $d2,$h0,$r1 adds $d1,$d1,$t0 mul $t0,$h1,$r0 // h1*r0 adc $d2,$d2,xzr umulh $t1,$h1,$r0 adds $d1,$d1,$t0 mul $t0,$h2,$s1 // h2*5*r1 adc $d2,$d2,$t1 mul $t1,$h2,$r0 // h2*r0 adds $d1,$d1,$t0 adc $d2,$d2,$t1 and $t0,$d2,#-4 // final reduction and $h2,$d2,#3 add $t0,$t0,$d2,lsr#2 adds $h0,$d0,$t0 adcs $h1,$d1,xzr adc $h2,$h2,xzr cbnz $len,.Loop stp $h0,$h1,[$ctx] // store hash value str $h2,[$ctx,#16] .Lno_data: ret .size poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks .type poly1305_emit,%function .align 5 poly1305_emit: ldp $h0,$h1,[$ctx] // load hash base 2^64 ldr $h2,[$ctx,#16] ldp $t0,$t1,[$nonce] // load nonce adds $d0,$h0,#5 // compare to modulus adcs $d1,$h1,xzr adc $d2,$h2,xzr tst $d2,#-4 // see if it's carried/borrowed csel $h0,$h0,$d0,eq csel $h1,$h1,$d1,eq #ifdef __ARMEB__ ror $t0,$t0,#32 // flip nonce words ror $t1,$t1,#32 #endif adds $h0,$h0,$t0 // accumulate nonce adc $h1,$h1,$t1 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $h0,$h0 // flip output bytes rev $h1,$h1 #endif stp $h0,$h1,[$mac] // write result ret .size poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit ___ my ($R0,$R1,$S1,$R2,$S2,$R3,$S3,$R4,$S4) = map("v$_.4s",(0..8)); my ($IN01_0,$IN01_1,$IN01_2,$IN01_3,$IN01_4) = map("v$_.2s",(9..13)); my ($IN23_0,$IN23_1,$IN23_2,$IN23_3,$IN23_4) = map("v$_.2s",(14..18)); my ($ACC0,$ACC1,$ACC2,$ACC3,$ACC4) = map("v$_.2d",(19..23)); my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$H3,$H4) = map("v$_.2s",(24..28)); my ($T0,$T1,$MASK) = map("v$_",(29..31)); my ($in2,$zeros)=("x16","x17"); my $is_base2_26 = $zeros; # borrow $code.=<<___; .type poly1305_mult,%function .align 5 poly1305_mult: mul $d0,$h0,$r0 // h0*r0 umulh $d1,$h0,$r0 mul $t0,$h1,$s1 // h1*5*r1 umulh $t1,$h1,$s1 adds $d0,$d0,$t0 mul $t0,$h0,$r1 // h0*r1 adc $d1,$d1,$t1 umulh $d2,$h0,$r1 adds $d1,$d1,$t0 mul $t0,$h1,$r0 // h1*r0 adc $d2,$d2,xzr umulh $t1,$h1,$r0 adds $d1,$d1,$t0 mul $t0,$h2,$s1 // h2*5*r1 adc $d2,$d2,$t1 mul $t1,$h2,$r0 // h2*r0 adds $d1,$d1,$t0 adc $d2,$d2,$t1 and $t0,$d2,#-4 // final reduction and $h2,$d2,#3 add $t0,$t0,$d2,lsr#2 adds $h0,$d0,$t0 adcs $h1,$d1,xzr adc $h2,$h2,xzr ret .size poly1305_mult,.-poly1305_mult .type poly1305_splat,%function .align 5 poly1305_splat: and x12,$h0,#0x03ffffff // base 2^64 -> base 2^26 ubfx x13,$h0,#26,#26 extr x14,$h1,$h0,#52 and x14,x14,#0x03ffffff ubfx x15,$h1,#14,#26 extr x16,$h2,$h1,#40 str w12,[$ctx,#16*0] // r0 add w12,w13,w13,lsl#2 // r1*5 str w13,[$ctx,#16*1] // r1 add w13,w14,w14,lsl#2 // r2*5 str w12,[$ctx,#16*2] // s1 str w14,[$ctx,#16*3] // r2 add w14,w15,w15,lsl#2 // r3*5 str w13,[$ctx,#16*4] // s2 str w15,[$ctx,#16*5] // r3 add w15,w16,w16,lsl#2 // r4*5 str w14,[$ctx,#16*6] // s3 str w16,[$ctx,#16*7] // r4 str w15,[$ctx,#16*8] // s4 ret .size poly1305_splat,.-poly1305_splat .type poly1305_blocks_neon,%function .align 5 poly1305_blocks_neon: ldr $is_base2_26,[$ctx,#24] cmp $len,#128 b.hs .Lblocks_neon cbz $is_base2_26,poly1305_blocks .Lblocks_neon: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]! add x29,sp,#0 ands $len,$len,#-16 b.eq .Lno_data_neon cbz $is_base2_26,.Lbase2_64_neon ldp w10,w11,[$ctx] // load hash value base 2^26 ldp w12,w13,[$ctx,#8] ldr w14,[$ctx,#16] tst $len,#31 b.eq .Leven_neon ldp $r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32] // load key value add $h0,x10,x11,lsl#26 // base 2^26 -> base 2^64 lsr $h1,x12,#12 adds $h0,$h0,x12,lsl#52 add $h1,$h1,x13,lsl#14 adc $h1,$h1,xzr lsr $h2,x14,#24 adds $h1,$h1,x14,lsl#40 adc $d2,$h2,xzr // can be partially reduced... ldp $d0,$d1,[$inp],#16 // load input sub $len,$len,#16 add $s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2 // s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) and $t0,$d2,#-4 // ... so reduce and $h2,$d2,#3 add $t0,$t0,$d2,lsr#2 adds $h0,$h0,$t0 adcs $h1,$h1,xzr adc $h2,$h2,xzr #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $d0,$d0 rev $d1,$d1 #endif adds $h0,$h0,$d0 // accumulate input adcs $h1,$h1,$d1 adc $h2,$h2,$padbit bl poly1305_mult ldr x30,[sp,#8] cbz $padbit,.Lstore_base2_64_neon and x10,$h0,#0x03ffffff // base 2^64 -> base 2^26 ubfx x11,$h0,#26,#26 extr x12,$h1,$h0,#52 and x12,x12,#0x03ffffff ubfx x13,$h1,#14,#26 extr x14,$h2,$h1,#40 cbnz $len,.Leven_neon stp w10,w11,[$ctx] // store hash value base 2^26 stp w12,w13,[$ctx,#8] str w14,[$ctx,#16] b .Lno_data_neon .align 4 .Lstore_base2_64_neon: stp $h0,$h1,[$ctx] // store hash value base 2^64 stp $h2,xzr,[$ctx,#16] // note that is_base2_26 is zeroed b .Lno_data_neon .align 4 .Lbase2_64_neon: ldp $r0,$r1,[$ctx,#32] // load key value ldp $h0,$h1,[$ctx] // load hash value base 2^64 ldr $h2,[$ctx,#16] tst $len,#31 b.eq .Linit_neon ldp $d0,$d1,[$inp],#16 // load input sub $len,$len,#16 add $s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2 // s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $d0,$d0 rev $d1,$d1 #endif adds $h0,$h0,$d0 // accumulate input adcs $h1,$h1,$d1 adc $h2,$h2,$padbit bl poly1305_mult .Linit_neon: and x10,$h0,#0x03ffffff // base 2^64 -> base 2^26 ubfx x11,$h0,#26,#26 extr x12,$h1,$h0,#52 and x12,x12,#0x03ffffff ubfx x13,$h1,#14,#26 extr x14,$h2,$h1,#40 stp d8,d9,[sp,#16] // meet ABI requirements stp d10,d11,[sp,#32] stp d12,d13,[sp,#48] stp d14,d15,[sp,#64] fmov ${H0},x10 fmov ${H1},x11 fmov ${H2},x12 fmov ${H3},x13 fmov ${H4},x14 ////////////////////////////////// initialize r^n table mov $h0,$r0 // r^1 add $s1,$r1,$r1,lsr#2 // s1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2) mov $h1,$r1 mov $h2,xzr add $ctx,$ctx,#48+12 bl poly1305_splat bl poly1305_mult // r^2 sub $ctx,$ctx,#4 bl poly1305_splat bl poly1305_mult // r^3 sub $ctx,$ctx,#4 bl poly1305_splat bl poly1305_mult // r^4 sub $ctx,$ctx,#4 bl poly1305_splat ldr x30,[sp,#8] add $in2,$inp,#32 adr $zeros,.Lzeros subs $len,$len,#64 csel $in2,$zeros,$in2,lo mov x4,#1 str x4,[$ctx,#-24] // set is_base2_26 sub $ctx,$ctx,#48 // restore original $ctx b .Ldo_neon .align 4 .Leven_neon: add $in2,$inp,#32 adr $zeros,.Lzeros subs $len,$len,#64 csel $in2,$zeros,$in2,lo stp d8,d9,[sp,#16] // meet ABI requirements stp d10,d11,[sp,#32] stp d12,d13,[sp,#48] stp d14,d15,[sp,#64] fmov ${H0},x10 fmov ${H1},x11 fmov ${H2},x12 fmov ${H3},x13 fmov ${H4},x14 .Ldo_neon: ldp x8,x12,[$in2],#16 // inp[2:3] (or zero) ldp x9,x13,[$in2],#48 lsl $padbit,$padbit,#24 add x15,$ctx,#48 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev x8,x8 rev x12,x12 rev x9,x9 rev x13,x13 #endif and x4,x8,#0x03ffffff // base 2^64 -> base 2^26 and x5,x9,#0x03ffffff ubfx x6,x8,#26,#26 ubfx x7,x9,#26,#26 add x4,x4,x5,lsl#32 // bfi x4,x5,#32,#32 extr x8,x12,x8,#52 extr x9,x13,x9,#52 add x6,x6,x7,lsl#32 // bfi x6,x7,#32,#32 fmov $IN23_0,x4 and x8,x8,#0x03ffffff and x9,x9,#0x03ffffff ubfx x10,x12,#14,#26 ubfx x11,x13,#14,#26 add x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40 add x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40 add x8,x8,x9,lsl#32 // bfi x8,x9,#32,#32 fmov $IN23_1,x6 add x10,x10,x11,lsl#32 // bfi x10,x11,#32,#32 add x12,x12,x13,lsl#32 // bfi x12,x13,#32,#32 fmov $IN23_2,x8 fmov $IN23_3,x10 fmov $IN23_4,x12 ldp x8,x12,[$inp],#16 // inp[0:1] ldp x9,x13,[$inp],#48 ld1 {$R0,$R1,$S1,$R2},[x15],#64 ld1 {$S2,$R3,$S3,$R4},[x15],#64 ld1 {$S4},[x15] #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev x8,x8 rev x12,x12 rev x9,x9 rev x13,x13 #endif and x4,x8,#0x03ffffff // base 2^64 -> base 2^26 and x5,x9,#0x03ffffff ubfx x6,x8,#26,#26 ubfx x7,x9,#26,#26 add x4,x4,x5,lsl#32 // bfi x4,x5,#32,#32 extr x8,x12,x8,#52 extr x9,x13,x9,#52 add x6,x6,x7,lsl#32 // bfi x6,x7,#32,#32 fmov $IN01_0,x4 and x8,x8,#0x03ffffff and x9,x9,#0x03ffffff ubfx x10,x12,#14,#26 ubfx x11,x13,#14,#26 add x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40 add x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40 add x8,x8,x9,lsl#32 // bfi x8,x9,#32,#32 fmov $IN01_1,x6 add x10,x10,x11,lsl#32 // bfi x10,x11,#32,#32 add x12,x12,x13,lsl#32 // bfi x12,x13,#32,#32 movi $MASK.2d,#-1 fmov $IN01_2,x8 fmov $IN01_3,x10 fmov $IN01_4,x12 ushr $MASK.2d,$MASK.2d,#38 b.ls .Lskip_loop .align 4 .Loop_neon: //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2 // ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^3+inp[7]*r // \___________________/ // ((inp[0]*r^4+inp[2]*r^2+inp[4])*r^4+inp[6]*r^2+inp[8])*r^2 // ((inp[1]*r^4+inp[3]*r^2+inp[5])*r^4+inp[7]*r^2+inp[9])*r // \___________________/ \____________________/ // // Note that we start with inp[2:3]*r^2. This is because it // doesn't depend on reduction in previous iteration. //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // d4 = h0*r4 + h1*r3 + h2*r2 + h3*r1 + h4*r0 // d3 = h0*r3 + h1*r2 + h2*r1 + h3*r0 + h4*5*r4 // d2 = h0*r2 + h1*r1 + h2*r0 + h3*5*r4 + h4*5*r3 // d1 = h0*r1 + h1*r0 + h2*5*r4 + h3*5*r3 + h4*5*r2 // d0 = h0*r0 + h1*5*r4 + h2*5*r3 + h3*5*r2 + h4*5*r1 subs $len,$len,#64 umull $ACC4,$IN23_0,${R4}[2] csel $in2,$zeros,$in2,lo umull $ACC3,$IN23_0,${R3}[2] umull $ACC2,$IN23_0,${R2}[2] ldp x8,x12,[$in2],#16 // inp[2:3] (or zero) umull $ACC1,$IN23_0,${R1}[2] ldp x9,x13,[$in2],#48 umull $ACC0,$IN23_0,${R0}[2] #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev x8,x8 rev x12,x12 rev x9,x9 rev x13,x13 #endif umlal $ACC4,$IN23_1,${R3}[2] and x4,x8,#0x03ffffff // base 2^64 -> base 2^26 umlal $ACC3,$IN23_1,${R2}[2] and x5,x9,#0x03ffffff umlal $ACC2,$IN23_1,${R1}[2] ubfx x6,x8,#26,#26 umlal $ACC1,$IN23_1,${R0}[2] ubfx x7,x9,#26,#26 umlal $ACC0,$IN23_1,${S4}[2] add x4,x4,x5,lsl#32 // bfi x4,x5,#32,#32 umlal $ACC4,$IN23_2,${R2}[2] extr x8,x12,x8,#52 umlal $ACC3,$IN23_2,${R1}[2] extr x9,x13,x9,#52 umlal $ACC2,$IN23_2,${R0}[2] add x6,x6,x7,lsl#32 // bfi x6,x7,#32,#32 umlal $ACC1,$IN23_2,${S4}[2] fmov $IN23_0,x4 umlal $ACC0,$IN23_2,${S3}[2] and x8,x8,#0x03ffffff umlal $ACC4,$IN23_3,${R1}[2] and x9,x9,#0x03ffffff umlal $ACC3,$IN23_3,${R0}[2] ubfx x10,x12,#14,#26 umlal $ACC2,$IN23_3,${S4}[2] ubfx x11,x13,#14,#26 umlal $ACC1,$IN23_3,${S3}[2] add x8,x8,x9,lsl#32 // bfi x8,x9,#32,#32 umlal $ACC0,$IN23_3,${S2}[2] fmov $IN23_1,x6 add $IN01_2,$IN01_2,$H2 add x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40 umlal $ACC4,$IN23_4,${R0}[2] add x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40 umlal $ACC3,$IN23_4,${S4}[2] add x10,x10,x11,lsl#32 // bfi x10,x11,#32,#32 umlal $ACC2,$IN23_4,${S3}[2] add x12,x12,x13,lsl#32 // bfi x12,x13,#32,#32 umlal $ACC1,$IN23_4,${S2}[2] fmov $IN23_2,x8 umlal $ACC0,$IN23_4,${S1}[2] fmov $IN23_3,x10 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4 and accumulate add $IN01_0,$IN01_0,$H0 fmov $IN23_4,x12 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_2,${R1}[0] ldp x8,x12,[$inp],#16 // inp[0:1] umlal $ACC0,$IN01_2,${S3}[0] ldp x9,x13,[$inp],#48 umlal $ACC4,$IN01_2,${R2}[0] umlal $ACC1,$IN01_2,${S4}[0] umlal $ACC2,$IN01_2,${R0}[0] #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev x8,x8 rev x12,x12 rev x9,x9 rev x13,x13 #endif add $IN01_1,$IN01_1,$H1 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_0,${R3}[0] umlal $ACC4,$IN01_0,${R4}[0] and x4,x8,#0x03ffffff // base 2^64 -> base 2^26 umlal $ACC2,$IN01_0,${R2}[0] and x5,x9,#0x03ffffff umlal $ACC0,$IN01_0,${R0}[0] ubfx x6,x8,#26,#26 umlal $ACC1,$IN01_0,${R1}[0] ubfx x7,x9,#26,#26 add $IN01_3,$IN01_3,$H3 add x4,x4,x5,lsl#32 // bfi x4,x5,#32,#32 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_1,${R2}[0] extr x8,x12,x8,#52 umlal $ACC4,$IN01_1,${R3}[0] extr x9,x13,x9,#52 umlal $ACC0,$IN01_1,${S4}[0] add x6,x6,x7,lsl#32 // bfi x6,x7,#32,#32 umlal $ACC2,$IN01_1,${R1}[0] fmov $IN01_0,x4 umlal $ACC1,$IN01_1,${R0}[0] and x8,x8,#0x03ffffff add $IN01_4,$IN01_4,$H4 and x9,x9,#0x03ffffff umlal $ACC3,$IN01_3,${R0}[0] ubfx x10,x12,#14,#26 umlal $ACC0,$IN01_3,${S2}[0] ubfx x11,x13,#14,#26 umlal $ACC4,$IN01_3,${R1}[0] add x8,x8,x9,lsl#32 // bfi x8,x9,#32,#32 umlal $ACC1,$IN01_3,${S3}[0] fmov $IN01_1,x6 umlal $ACC2,$IN01_3,${S4}[0] add x12,$padbit,x12,lsr#40 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_4,${S4}[0] add x13,$padbit,x13,lsr#40 umlal $ACC0,$IN01_4,${S1}[0] add x10,x10,x11,lsl#32 // bfi x10,x11,#32,#32 umlal $ACC4,$IN01_4,${R0}[0] add x12,x12,x13,lsl#32 // bfi x12,x13,#32,#32 umlal $ACC1,$IN01_4,${S2}[0] fmov $IN01_2,x8 umlal $ACC2,$IN01_4,${S3}[0] fmov $IN01_3,x10 fmov $IN01_4,x12 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // lazy reduction as discussed in "NEON crypto" by D.J. Bernstein // and P. Schwabe // // [see discussion in poly1305-armv4 module] ushr $T0.2d,$ACC3,#26 xtn $H3,$ACC3 ushr $T1.2d,$ACC0,#26 and $ACC0,$ACC0,$MASK.2d add $ACC4,$ACC4,$T0.2d // h3 -> h4 bic $H3,#0xfc,lsl#24 // &=0x03ffffff add $ACC1,$ACC1,$T1.2d // h0 -> h1 ushr $T0.2d,$ACC4,#26 xtn $H4,$ACC4 ushr $T1.2d,$ACC1,#26 xtn $H1,$ACC1 bic $H4,#0xfc,lsl#24 add $ACC2,$ACC2,$T1.2d // h1 -> h2 add $ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d shl $T0.2d,$T0.2d,#2 shrn $T1.2s,$ACC2,#26 xtn $H2,$ACC2 add $ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d // h4 -> h0 bic $H1,#0xfc,lsl#24 add $H3,$H3,$T1.2s // h2 -> h3 bic $H2,#0xfc,lsl#24 shrn $T0.2s,$ACC0,#26 xtn $H0,$ACC0 ushr $T1.2s,$H3,#26 bic $H3,#0xfc,lsl#24 bic $H0,#0xfc,lsl#24 add $H1,$H1,$T0.2s // h0 -> h1 add $H4,$H4,$T1.2s // h3 -> h4 b.hi .Loop_neon .Lskip_loop: dup $IN23_2,${IN23_2}[0] add $IN01_2,$IN01_2,$H2 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // multiply (inp[0:1]+hash) or inp[2:3] by r^2:r^1 adds $len,$len,#32 b.ne .Long_tail dup $IN23_2,${IN01_2}[0] add $IN23_0,$IN01_0,$H0 add $IN23_3,$IN01_3,$H3 add $IN23_1,$IN01_1,$H1 add $IN23_4,$IN01_4,$H4 .Long_tail: dup $IN23_0,${IN23_0}[0] umull2 $ACC0,$IN23_2,${S3} umull2 $ACC3,$IN23_2,${R1} umull2 $ACC4,$IN23_2,${R2} umull2 $ACC2,$IN23_2,${R0} umull2 $ACC1,$IN23_2,${S4} dup $IN23_1,${IN23_1}[0] umlal2 $ACC0,$IN23_0,${R0} umlal2 $ACC2,$IN23_0,${R2} umlal2 $ACC3,$IN23_0,${R3} umlal2 $ACC4,$IN23_0,${R4} umlal2 $ACC1,$IN23_0,${R1} dup $IN23_3,${IN23_3}[0] umlal2 $ACC0,$IN23_1,${S4} umlal2 $ACC3,$IN23_1,${R2} umlal2 $ACC2,$IN23_1,${R1} umlal2 $ACC4,$IN23_1,${R3} umlal2 $ACC1,$IN23_1,${R0} dup $IN23_4,${IN23_4}[0] umlal2 $ACC3,$IN23_3,${R0} umlal2 $ACC4,$IN23_3,${R1} umlal2 $ACC0,$IN23_3,${S2} umlal2 $ACC1,$IN23_3,${S3} umlal2 $ACC2,$IN23_3,${S4} umlal2 $ACC3,$IN23_4,${S4} umlal2 $ACC0,$IN23_4,${S1} umlal2 $ACC4,$IN23_4,${R0} umlal2 $ACC1,$IN23_4,${S2} umlal2 $ACC2,$IN23_4,${S3} b.eq .Lshort_tail //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // (hash+inp[0:1])*r^4:r^3 and accumulate add $IN01_0,$IN01_0,$H0 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_2,${R1} umlal $ACC0,$IN01_2,${S3} umlal $ACC4,$IN01_2,${R2} umlal $ACC1,$IN01_2,${S4} umlal $ACC2,$IN01_2,${R0} add $IN01_1,$IN01_1,$H1 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_0,${R3} umlal $ACC0,$IN01_0,${R0} umlal $ACC4,$IN01_0,${R4} umlal $ACC1,$IN01_0,${R1} umlal $ACC2,$IN01_0,${R2} add $IN01_3,$IN01_3,$H3 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_1,${R2} umlal $ACC0,$IN01_1,${S4} umlal $ACC4,$IN01_1,${R3} umlal $ACC1,$IN01_1,${R0} umlal $ACC2,$IN01_1,${R1} add $IN01_4,$IN01_4,$H4 umlal $ACC3,$IN01_3,${R0} umlal $ACC0,$IN01_3,${S2} umlal $ACC4,$IN01_3,${R1} umlal $ACC1,$IN01_3,${S3} umlal $ACC2,$IN01_3,${S4} umlal $ACC3,$IN01_4,${S4} umlal $ACC0,$IN01_4,${S1} umlal $ACC4,$IN01_4,${R0} umlal $ACC1,$IN01_4,${S2} umlal $ACC2,$IN01_4,${S3} .Lshort_tail: //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // horizontal add addp $ACC3,$ACC3,$ACC3 ldp d8,d9,[sp,#16] // meet ABI requirements addp $ACC0,$ACC0,$ACC0 ldp d10,d11,[sp,#32] addp $ACC4,$ACC4,$ACC4 ldp d12,d13,[sp,#48] addp $ACC1,$ACC1,$ACC1 ldp d14,d15,[sp,#64] addp $ACC2,$ACC2,$ACC2 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // lazy reduction, but without narrowing ushr $T0.2d,$ACC3,#26 and $ACC3,$ACC3,$MASK.2d ushr $T1.2d,$ACC0,#26 and $ACC0,$ACC0,$MASK.2d add $ACC4,$ACC4,$T0.2d // h3 -> h4 add $ACC1,$ACC1,$T1.2d // h0 -> h1 ushr $T0.2d,$ACC4,#26 and $ACC4,$ACC4,$MASK.2d ushr $T1.2d,$ACC1,#26 and $ACC1,$ACC1,$MASK.2d add $ACC2,$ACC2,$T1.2d // h1 -> h2 add $ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d shl $T0.2d,$T0.2d,#2 ushr $T1.2d,$ACC2,#26 and $ACC2,$ACC2,$MASK.2d add $ACC0,$ACC0,$T0.2d // h4 -> h0 add $ACC3,$ACC3,$T1.2d // h2 -> h3 ushr $T0.2d,$ACC0,#26 and $ACC0,$ACC0,$MASK.2d ushr $T1.2d,$ACC3,#26 and $ACC3,$ACC3,$MASK.2d add $ACC1,$ACC1,$T0.2d // h0 -> h1 add $ACC4,$ACC4,$T1.2d // h3 -> h4 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // write the result, can be partially reduced st4 {$ACC0,$ACC1,$ACC2,$ACC3}[0],[$ctx],#16 st1 {$ACC4}[0],[$ctx] .Lno_data_neon: ldr x29,[sp],#80 ret .size poly1305_blocks_neon,.-poly1305_blocks_neon .type poly1305_emit_neon,%function .align 5 poly1305_emit_neon: ldr $is_base2_26,[$ctx,#24] cbz $is_base2_26,poly1305_emit ldp w10,w11,[$ctx] // load hash value base 2^26 ldp w12,w13,[$ctx,#8] ldr w14,[$ctx,#16] add $h0,x10,x11,lsl#26 // base 2^26 -> base 2^64 lsr $h1,x12,#12 adds $h0,$h0,x12,lsl#52 add $h1,$h1,x13,lsl#14 adc $h1,$h1,xzr lsr $h2,x14,#24 adds $h1,$h1,x14,lsl#40 adc $h2,$h2,xzr // can be partially reduced... ldp $t0,$t1,[$nonce] // load nonce and $d0,$h2,#-4 // ... so reduce add $d0,$d0,$h2,lsr#2 and $h2,$h2,#3 adds $h0,$h0,$d0 adcs $h1,$h1,xzr adc $h2,$h2,xzr adds $d0,$h0,#5 // compare to modulus adcs $d1,$h1,xzr adc $d2,$h2,xzr tst $d2,#-4 // see if it's carried/borrowed csel $h0,$h0,$d0,eq csel $h1,$h1,$d1,eq #ifdef __ARMEB__ ror $t0,$t0,#32 // flip nonce words ror $t1,$t1,#32 #endif adds $h0,$h0,$t0 // accumulate nonce adc $h1,$h1,$t1 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev $h0,$h0 // flip output bytes rev $h1,$h1 #endif stp $h0,$h1,[$mac] // write result ret .size poly1305_emit_neon,.-poly1305_emit_neon .align 5 .Lzeros: .long 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .LOPENSSL_armcap_P: #ifdef __ILP32__ .long OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #else .quad OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #endif .asciz "Poly1305 for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\b(shrn\s+v[0-9]+)\.[24]d/$1.2s/ or s/\b(fmov\s+)v([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*x([0-9]+)/$1d$2,x$3/ or (m/\bdup\b/ and (s/\.[24]s/.2d/g or 1)) or (m/\b(eor|and)/ and (s/\.[248][sdh]/.16b/g or 1)) or (m/\bum(ul|la)l\b/ and (s/\.4s/.2s/g or 1)) or (m/\bum(ul|la)l2\b/ and (s/\.2s/.4s/g or 1)) or (m/\bst[1-4]\s+{[^}]+}\[/ and (s/\.[24]d/.s/g or 1)); s/\.[124]([sd])\[/.$1\[/; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-sparcv9.pl0000755000000000000000000005732113176625657020710 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements Poly1305 hash for SPARCv9, vanilla, as well # as VIS3 and FMA extensions. # # May, August 2015 # # Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone. # # IALU(*) FMA # # UltraSPARC III 12.3(**) # SPARC T3 7.92 # SPARC T4 1.70(***) 6.55 # SPARC64 X 5.60 3.64 # # (*) Comparison to compiler-generated code is really problematic, # because latter's performance varies too much depending on too # many variables. For example, one can measure from 5x to 15x # improvement on T4 for gcc-4.6. Well, in T4 case it's a bit # unfair comparison, because compiler doesn't use VIS3, but # given same initial conditions coefficient varies from 3x to 9x. # (**) Pre-III performance should be even worse; floating-point # performance for UltraSPARC I-IV on the other hand is reported # to be 4.25 for hand-coded assembly, but they are just too old # to care about. # (***) Multi-process benchmark saturates at ~12.5x single-process # result on 8-core processor, or ~21GBps per 2.85GHz socket. my $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit,$shl,$shr) = map("%i$_",(0..5)); my ($r0,$r1,$r2,$r3,$s1,$s2,$s3,$h4) = map("%l$_",(0..7)); my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3, $t0,$t1,$t2) = map("%o$_",(0..5,7)); my ($d0,$d1,$d2,$d3) = map("%g$_",(1..4)); my $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$stdout"; $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch # define STPTR stx # define SIZE_T 8 #else # define STPTR st # define SIZE_T 4 #endif #define LOCALS (STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME) .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif .globl poly1305_init .align 32 poly1305_init: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-16,%sp nop SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1) ld [%g1],%g1 and %g1,SPARCV9_FMADD|SPARCV9_VIS3,%g1 cmp %g1,SPARCV9_FMADD be .Lpoly1305_init_fma nop stx %g0,[$ctx+0] stx %g0,[$ctx+8] ! zero hash value brz,pn $inp,.Lno_key stx %g0,[$ctx+16] and $inp,7,$shr ! alignment factor andn $inp,7,$inp sll $shr,3,$shr ! *8 neg $shr,$shl sethi %hi(0x0ffffffc),$t0 set 8,$h1 or $t0,%lo(0x0ffffffc),$t0 set 16,$h2 sllx $t0,32,$t1 or $t0,$t1,$t1 ! 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc or $t1,3,$t0 ! 0x0ffffffc0fffffff ldxa [$inp+%g0]0x88,$h0 ! load little-endian key brz,pt $shr,.Lkey_aligned ldxa [$inp+$h1]0x88,$h1 ldxa [$inp+$h2]0x88,$h2 srlx $h0,$shr,$h0 sllx $h1,$shl,$t2 srlx $h1,$shr,$h1 or $t2,$h0,$h0 sllx $h2,$shl,$h2 or $h2,$h1,$h1 .Lkey_aligned: and $t0,$h0,$h0 and $t1,$h1,$h1 stx $h0,[$ctx+32+0] ! store key stx $h1,[$ctx+32+8] andcc %g1,SPARCV9_VIS3,%g0 be .Lno_key nop 1: call .+8 add %o7,poly1305_blocks_vis3-1b,%o7 add %o7,poly1305_emit-poly1305_blocks_vis3,%o5 STPTR %o7,[%i2] STPTR %o5,[%i2+SIZE_T] ret restore %g0,1,%o0 ! return 1 .Lno_key: ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 ! return 0 .type poly1305_init,#function .size poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init .globl poly1305_blocks .align 32 poly1305_blocks: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp srln $len,4,$len brz,pn $len,.Lno_data nop ld [$ctx+32+0],$r1 ! load key ld [$ctx+32+4],$r0 ld [$ctx+32+8],$r3 ld [$ctx+32+12],$r2 ld [$ctx+0],$h1 ! load hash value ld [$ctx+4],$h0 ld [$ctx+8],$h3 ld [$ctx+12],$h2 ld [$ctx+16],$h4 and $inp,7,$shr ! alignment factor andn $inp,7,$inp set 8,$d1 sll $shr,3,$shr ! *8 set 16,$d2 neg $shr,$shl srl $r1,2,$s1 srl $r2,2,$s2 add $r1,$s1,$s1 srl $r3,2,$s3 add $r2,$s2,$s2 add $r3,$s3,$s3 .Loop: ldxa [$inp+%g0]0x88,$d0 ! load little-endian input brz,pt $shr,.Linp_aligned ldxa [$inp+$d1]0x88,$d1 ldxa [$inp+$d2]0x88,$d2 srlx $d0,$shr,$d0 sllx $d1,$shl,$t1 srlx $d1,$shr,$d1 or $t1,$d0,$d0 sllx $d2,$shl,$d2 or $d2,$d1,$d1 .Linp_aligned: srlx $d0,32,$t0 addcc $d0,$h0,$h0 ! accumulate input srlx $d1,32,$t1 addccc $t0,$h1,$h1 addccc $d1,$h2,$h2 addccc $t1,$h3,$h3 addc $padbit,$h4,$h4 umul $r0,$h0,$d0 umul $r1,$h0,$d1 umul $r2,$h0,$d2 umul $r3,$h0,$d3 sub $len,1,$len add $inp,16,$inp umul $s3,$h1,$t0 umul $r0,$h1,$t1 umul $r1,$h1,$t2 add $t0,$d0,$d0 add $t1,$d1,$d1 umul $r2,$h1,$t0 add $t2,$d2,$d2 add $t0,$d3,$d3 umul $s2,$h2,$t1 umul $s3,$h2,$t2 umul $r0,$h2,$t0 add $t1,$d0,$d0 add $t2,$d1,$d1 umul $r1,$h2,$t1 add $t0,$d2,$d2 add $t1,$d3,$d3 umul $s1,$h3,$t2 umul $s2,$h3,$t0 umul $s3,$h3,$t1 add $t2,$d0,$d0 add $t0,$d1,$d1 umul $r0,$h3,$t2 add $t1,$d2,$d2 add $t2,$d3,$d3 umul $s1,$h4,$t0 umul $s2,$h4,$t1 umul $s3,$h4,$t2 umul $r0,$h4,$h4 add $t0,$d1,$d1 add $t1,$d2,$d2 srlx $d0,32,$h1 add $t2,$d3,$d3 srlx $d1,32,$h2 addcc $d1,$h1,$h1 srlx $d2,32,$h3 set 8,$d1 addccc $d2,$h2,$h2 srlx $d3,32,$t0 set 16,$d2 addccc $d3,$h3,$h3 addc $t0,$h4,$h4 srl $h4,2,$t0 ! final reduction step andn $h4,3,$t1 and $h4,3,$h4 add $t1,$t0,$t0 addcc $t0,$d0,$h0 addccc %g0,$h1,$h1 addccc %g0,$h2,$h2 addccc %g0,$h3,$h3 brnz,pt $len,.Loop addc %g0,$h4,$h4 st $h1,[$ctx+0] ! store hash value st $h0,[$ctx+4] st $h3,[$ctx+8] st $h2,[$ctx+12] st $h4,[$ctx+16] .Lno_data: ret restore .type poly1305_blocks,#function .size poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks ___ ######################################################################## # VIS3 has umulxhi and addxc... { my ($H0,$H1,$H2,$R0,$R1,$S1,$T1) = map("%o$_",(0..5,7)); my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$T0) = map("%g$_",(1..4)); $code.=<<___; .align 32 poly1305_blocks_vis3: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp srln $len,4,$len brz,pn $len,.Lno_data nop ldx [$ctx+32+0],$R0 ! load key ldx [$ctx+32+8],$R1 ldx [$ctx+0],$H0 ! load hash value ldx [$ctx+8],$H1 ld [$ctx+16],$H2 and $inp,7,$shr ! alignment factor andn $inp,7,$inp set 8,$r1 sll $shr,3,$shr ! *8 set 16,$r2 neg $shr,$shl srlx $R1,2,$S1 b .Loop_vis3 add $R1,$S1,$S1 .Loop_vis3: ldxa [$inp+%g0]0x88,$D0 ! load little-endian input brz,pt $shr,.Linp_aligned_vis3 ldxa [$inp+$r1]0x88,$D1 ldxa [$inp+$r2]0x88,$D2 srlx $D0,$shr,$D0 sllx $D1,$shl,$T1 srlx $D1,$shr,$D1 or $T1,$D0,$D0 sllx $D2,$shl,$D2 or $D2,$D1,$D1 .Linp_aligned_vis3: addcc $D0,$H0,$H0 ! accumulate input sub $len,1,$len addxccc $D1,$H1,$H1 add $inp,16,$inp mulx $R0,$H0,$D0 ! r0*h0 addxc $padbit,$H2,$H2 umulxhi $R0,$H0,$D1 mulx $S1,$H1,$T0 ! s1*h1 umulxhi $S1,$H1,$T1 addcc $T0,$D0,$D0 mulx $R1,$H0,$T0 ! r1*h0 addxc $T1,$D1,$D1 umulxhi $R1,$H0,$D2 addcc $T0,$D1,$D1 mulx $R0,$H1,$T0 ! r0*h1 addxc %g0,$D2,$D2 umulxhi $R0,$H1,$T1 addcc $T0,$D1,$D1 mulx $S1,$H2,$T0 ! s1*h2 addxc $T1,$D2,$D2 mulx $R0,$H2,$T1 ! r0*h2 addcc $T0,$D1,$D1 addxc $T1,$D2,$D2 srlx $D2,2,$T0 ! final reduction step andn $D2,3,$T1 and $D2,3,$H2 add $T1,$T0,$T0 addcc $T0,$D0,$H0 addxccc %g0,$D1,$H1 brnz,pt $len,.Loop_vis3 addxc %g0,$H2,$H2 stx $H0,[$ctx+0] ! store hash value stx $H1,[$ctx+8] st $H2,[$ctx+16] ret restore .type poly1305_blocks_vis3,#function .size poly1305_blocks_vis3,.-poly1305_blocks_vis3 ___ } my ($mac,$nonce) = ($inp,$len); $code.=<<___; .globl poly1305_emit .align 32 poly1305_emit: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp ld [$ctx+0],$h1 ! load hash value ld [$ctx+4],$h0 ld [$ctx+8],$h3 ld [$ctx+12],$h2 ld [$ctx+16],$h4 addcc $h0,5,$r0 ! compare to modulus addccc $h1,0,$r1 addccc $h2,0,$r2 addccc $h3,0,$r3 addc $h4,0,$h4 andcc $h4,4,%g0 ! did it carry/borrow? movnz %icc,$r0,$h0 ld [$nonce+0],$r0 ! load nonce movnz %icc,$r1,$h1 ld [$nonce+4],$r1 movnz %icc,$r2,$h2 ld [$nonce+8],$r2 movnz %icc,$r3,$h3 ld [$nonce+12],$r3 addcc $r0,$h0,$h0 ! accumulate nonce addccc $r1,$h1,$h1 addccc $r2,$h2,$h2 addc $r3,$h3,$h3 srl $h0,8,$r0 stb $h0,[$mac+0] ! store little-endian result srl $h0,16,$r1 stb $r0,[$mac+1] srl $h0,24,$r2 stb $r1,[$mac+2] stb $r2,[$mac+3] srl $h1,8,$r0 stb $h1,[$mac+4] srl $h1,16,$r1 stb $r0,[$mac+5] srl $h1,24,$r2 stb $r1,[$mac+6] stb $r2,[$mac+7] srl $h2,8,$r0 stb $h2,[$mac+8] srl $h2,16,$r1 stb $r0,[$mac+9] srl $h2,24,$r2 stb $r1,[$mac+10] stb $r2,[$mac+11] srl $h3,8,$r0 stb $h3,[$mac+12] srl $h3,16,$r1 stb $r0,[$mac+13] srl $h3,24,$r2 stb $r1,[$mac+14] stb $r2,[$mac+15] ret restore .type poly1305_emit,#function .size poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit ___ { my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("%i$_",(0..3)); my ($in0,$in1,$in2,$in3,$in4) = map("%o$_",(0..4)); my ($i1,$step,$shr,$shl) = map("%l$_",(0..7)); my $i2=$step; my ($h0lo,$h0hi,$h1lo,$h1hi,$h2lo,$h2hi,$h3lo,$h3hi, $two0,$two32,$two64,$two96,$two130,$five_two130, $r0lo,$r0hi,$r1lo,$r1hi,$r2lo,$r2hi, $s2lo,$s2hi,$s3lo,$s3hi, $c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi,$c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi) = map("%f".2*$_,(0..31)); # borrowings my ($r3lo,$r3hi,$s1lo,$s1hi) = ($c0lo,$c0hi,$c1lo,$c1hi); my ($x0,$x1,$x2,$x3) = ($c2lo,$c2hi,$c3lo,$c3hi); my ($y0,$y1,$y2,$y3) = ($c1lo,$c1hi,$c3hi,$c3lo); $code.=<<___; .align 32 poly1305_init_fma: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-16,%sp nop .Lpoly1305_init_fma: 1: call .+8 add %o7,.Lconsts_fma-1b,%o7 ldd [%o7+8*0],$two0 ! load constants ldd [%o7+8*1],$two32 ldd [%o7+8*2],$two64 ldd [%o7+8*3],$two96 ldd [%o7+8*5],$five_two130 std $two0,[$ctx+8*0] ! initial hash value, biased 0 std $two32,[$ctx+8*1] std $two64,[$ctx+8*2] std $two96,[$ctx+8*3] brz,pn $inp,.Lno_key_fma nop stx %fsr,[%sp+LOCALS] ! save original %fsr ldx [%o7+8*6],%fsr ! load new %fsr std $two0,[$ctx+8*4] ! key "template" std $two32,[$ctx+8*5] std $two64,[$ctx+8*6] std $two96,[$ctx+8*7] and $inp,7,$shr andn $inp,7,$inp ! align pointer mov 8,$i1 sll $shr,3,$shr mov 16,$i2 neg $shr,$shl ldxa [$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0 ! load little-endian key ldxa [$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2 brz $shr,.Lkey_aligned_fma sethi %hi(0xf0000000),$i1 ! 0xf0000000 ldxa [$inp+$i2]0x88,$in4 srlx $in0,$shr,$in0 ! align data sllx $in2,$shl,$in1 srlx $in2,$shr,$in2 or $in1,$in0,$in0 sllx $in4,$shl,$in3 or $in3,$in2,$in2 .Lkey_aligned_fma: or $i1,3,$i2 ! 0xf0000003 srlx $in0,32,$in1 andn $in0,$i1,$in0 ! &=0x0fffffff andn $in1,$i2,$in1 ! &=0x0ffffffc srlx $in2,32,$in3 andn $in2,$i2,$in2 andn $in3,$i2,$in3 st $in0,[$ctx+`8*4+4`] ! fill "template" st $in1,[$ctx+`8*5+4`] st $in2,[$ctx+`8*6+4`] st $in3,[$ctx+`8*7+4`] ldd [$ctx+8*4],$h0lo ! load [biased] key ldd [$ctx+8*5],$h1lo ldd [$ctx+8*6],$h2lo ldd [$ctx+8*7],$h3lo fsubd $h0lo,$two0, $h0lo ! r0 ldd [%o7+8*7],$two0 ! more constants fsubd $h1lo,$two32,$h1lo ! r1 ldd [%o7+8*8],$two32 fsubd $h2lo,$two64,$h2lo ! r2 ldd [%o7+8*9],$two64 fsubd $h3lo,$two96,$h3lo ! r3 ldd [%o7+8*10],$two96 fmuld $five_two130,$h1lo,$s1lo ! s1 fmuld $five_two130,$h2lo,$s2lo ! s2 fmuld $five_two130,$h3lo,$s3lo ! s3 faddd $h0lo,$two0, $h0hi faddd $h1lo,$two32,$h1hi faddd $h2lo,$two64,$h2hi faddd $h3lo,$two96,$h3hi fsubd $h0hi,$two0, $h0hi ldd [%o7+8*11],$two0 ! more constants fsubd $h1hi,$two32,$h1hi ldd [%o7+8*12],$two32 fsubd $h2hi,$two64,$h2hi ldd [%o7+8*13],$two64 fsubd $h3hi,$two96,$h3hi fsubd $h0lo,$h0hi,$h0lo std $h0hi,[$ctx+8*5] ! r0hi fsubd $h1lo,$h1hi,$h1lo std $h1hi,[$ctx+8*7] ! r1hi fsubd $h2lo,$h2hi,$h2lo std $h2hi,[$ctx+8*9] ! r2hi fsubd $h3lo,$h3hi,$h3lo std $h3hi,[$ctx+8*11] ! r3hi faddd $s1lo,$two0, $s1hi faddd $s2lo,$two32,$s2hi faddd $s3lo,$two64,$s3hi fsubd $s1hi,$two0, $s1hi fsubd $s2hi,$two32,$s2hi fsubd $s3hi,$two64,$s3hi fsubd $s1lo,$s1hi,$s1lo fsubd $s2lo,$s2hi,$s2lo fsubd $s3lo,$s3hi,$s3lo ldx [%sp+LOCALS],%fsr ! restore %fsr std $h0lo,[$ctx+8*4] ! r0lo std $h1lo,[$ctx+8*6] ! r1lo std $h2lo,[$ctx+8*8] ! r2lo std $h3lo,[$ctx+8*10] ! r3lo std $s1hi,[$ctx+8*13] std $s2hi,[$ctx+8*15] std $s3hi,[$ctx+8*17] std $s1lo,[$ctx+8*12] std $s2lo,[$ctx+8*14] std $s3lo,[$ctx+8*16] add %o7,poly1305_blocks_fma-.Lconsts_fma,%o0 add %o7,poly1305_emit_fma-.Lconsts_fma,%o1 STPTR %o0,[%i2] STPTR %o1,[%i2+SIZE_T] ret restore %g0,1,%o0 ! return 1 .Lno_key_fma: ret restore %g0,%g0,%o0 ! return 0 .type poly1305_init_fma,#function .size poly1305_init_fma,.-poly1305_init_fma .align 32 poly1305_blocks_fma: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-48,%sp srln $len,4,$len brz,pn $len,.Labort sub $len,1,$len 1: call .+8 add %o7,.Lconsts_fma-1b,%o7 ldd [%o7+8*0],$two0 ! load constants ldd [%o7+8*1],$two32 ldd [%o7+8*2],$two64 ldd [%o7+8*3],$two96 ldd [%o7+8*4],$two130 ldd [%o7+8*5],$five_two130 ldd [$ctx+8*0],$h0lo ! load [biased] hash value ldd [$ctx+8*1],$h1lo ldd [$ctx+8*2],$h2lo ldd [$ctx+8*3],$h3lo std $two0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0] ! input "template" sethi %hi((1023+52+96)<<20),$in3 std $two32,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1] or $padbit,$in3,$in3 std $two64,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2] st $in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3] and $inp,7,$shr andn $inp,7,$inp ! align pointer mov 8,$i1 sll $shr,3,$shr mov 16,$step neg $shr,$shl ldxa [$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0 ! load little-endian input brz $shr,.Linp_aligned_fma ldxa [$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2 ldxa [$inp+$step]0x88,$in4 add $inp,8,$inp srlx $in0,$shr,$in0 ! align data sllx $in2,$shl,$in1 srlx $in2,$shr,$in2 or $in1,$in0,$in0 sllx $in4,$shl,$in3 srlx $in4,$shr,$in4 ! pre-shift or $in3,$in2,$in2 .Linp_aligned_fma: srlx $in0,32,$in1 movrz $len,0,$step srlx $in2,32,$in3 add $step,$inp,$inp ! conditional advance st $in0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0+4] ! fill "template" st $in1,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1+4] st $in2,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2+4] st $in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3+4] ldd [$ctx+8*4],$r0lo ! load key ldd [$ctx+8*5],$r0hi ldd [$ctx+8*6],$r1lo ldd [$ctx+8*7],$r1hi ldd [$ctx+8*8],$r2lo ldd [$ctx+8*9],$r2hi ldd [$ctx+8*10],$r3lo ldd [$ctx+8*11],$r3hi ldd [$ctx+8*12],$s1lo ldd [$ctx+8*13],$s1hi ldd [$ctx+8*14],$s2lo ldd [$ctx+8*15],$s2hi ldd [$ctx+8*16],$s3lo ldd [$ctx+8*17],$s3hi stx %fsr,[%sp+LOCALS+8*4] ! save original %fsr ldx [%o7+8*6],%fsr ! load new %fsr subcc $len,1,$len movrz $len,0,$step ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*0],$x0 ! load biased input ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*1],$x1 ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*2],$x2 ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*3],$x3 fsubd $h0lo,$two0, $h0lo ! de-bias hash value fsubd $h1lo,$two32,$h1lo ldxa [$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0 ! modulo-scheduled input load fsubd $h2lo,$two64,$h2lo fsubd $h3lo,$two96,$h3lo ldxa [$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2 fsubd $x0,$two0, $x0 ! de-bias input fsubd $x1,$two32,$x1 fsubd $x2,$two64,$x2 fsubd $x3,$two96,$x3 brz $shr,.Linp_aligned_fma2 add $step,$inp,$inp ! conditional advance sllx $in0,$shl,$in1 ! align data srlx $in0,$shr,$in3 or $in1,$in4,$in0 sllx $in2,$shl,$in1 srlx $in2,$shr,$in4 ! pre-shift or $in3,$in1,$in2 .Linp_aligned_fma2: srlx $in0,32,$in1 srlx $in2,32,$in3 faddd $h0lo,$x0,$x0 ! accumulate input stw $in0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0+4] faddd $h1lo,$x1,$x1 stw $in1,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1+4] faddd $h2lo,$x2,$x2 stw $in2,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2+4] faddd $h3lo,$x3,$x3 stw $in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3+4] b .Lentry_fma nop .align 16 .Loop_fma: ldxa [$inp+%g0]0x88,$in0 ! modulo-scheduled input load ldxa [$inp+$i1]0x88,$in2 movrz $len,0,$step faddd $y0,$h0lo,$h0lo ! accumulate input faddd $y1,$h0hi,$h0hi faddd $y2,$h2lo,$h2lo faddd $y3,$h2hi,$h2hi brz,pn $shr,.Linp_aligned_fma3 add $step,$inp,$inp ! conditional advance sllx $in0,$shl,$in1 ! align data srlx $in0,$shr,$in3 or $in1,$in4,$in0 sllx $in2,$shl,$in1 srlx $in2,$shr,$in4 ! pre-shift or $in3,$in1,$in2 .Linp_aligned_fma3: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! base 2^48 -> base 2^32 faddd $two64,$h1lo,$c1lo srlx $in0,32,$in1 faddd $two64,$h1hi,$c1hi srlx $in2,32,$in3 faddd $two130,$h3lo,$c3lo st $in0,[%sp+LOCALS+8*0+4] ! fill "template" faddd $two130,$h3hi,$c3hi st $in1,[%sp+LOCALS+8*1+4] faddd $two32,$h0lo,$c0lo st $in2,[%sp+LOCALS+8*2+4] faddd $two32,$h0hi,$c0hi st $in3,[%sp+LOCALS+8*3+4] faddd $two96,$h2lo,$c2lo faddd $two96,$h2hi,$c2hi fsubd $c1lo,$two64,$c1lo fsubd $c1hi,$two64,$c1hi fsubd $c3lo,$two130,$c3lo fsubd $c3hi,$two130,$c3hi fsubd $c0lo,$two32,$c0lo fsubd $c0hi,$two32,$c0hi fsubd $c2lo,$two96,$c2lo fsubd $c2hi,$two96,$c2hi fsubd $h1lo,$c1lo,$h1lo fsubd $h1hi,$c1hi,$h1hi fsubd $h3lo,$c3lo,$h3lo fsubd $h3hi,$c3hi,$h3hi fsubd $h2lo,$c2lo,$h2lo fsubd $h2hi,$c2hi,$h2hi fsubd $h0lo,$c0lo,$h0lo fsubd $h0hi,$c0hi,$h0hi faddd $h1lo,$c0lo,$h1lo faddd $h1hi,$c0hi,$h1hi faddd $h3lo,$c2lo,$h3lo faddd $h3hi,$c2hi,$h3hi faddd $h2lo,$c1lo,$h2lo faddd $h2hi,$c1hi,$h2hi fmaddd $five_two130,$c3lo,$h0lo,$h0lo fmaddd $five_two130,$c3hi,$h0hi,$h0hi faddd $h1lo,$h1hi,$x1 ldd [$ctx+8*12],$s1lo ! reload constants faddd $h3lo,$h3hi,$x3 ldd [$ctx+8*13],$s1hi faddd $h2lo,$h2hi,$x2 ldd [$ctx+8*10],$r3lo faddd $h0lo,$h0hi,$x0 ldd [$ctx+8*11],$r3hi .Lentry_fma: fmuld $x1,$s3lo,$h0lo fmuld $x1,$s3hi,$h0hi fmuld $x1,$r1lo,$h2lo fmuld $x1,$r1hi,$h2hi fmuld $x1,$r0lo,$h1lo fmuld $x1,$r0hi,$h1hi fmuld $x1,$r2lo,$h3lo fmuld $x1,$r2hi,$h3hi fmaddd $x3,$s1lo,$h0lo,$h0lo fmaddd $x3,$s1hi,$h0hi,$h0hi fmaddd $x3,$s3lo,$h2lo,$h2lo fmaddd $x3,$s3hi,$h2hi,$h2hi fmaddd $x3,$s2lo,$h1lo,$h1lo fmaddd $x3,$s2hi,$h1hi,$h1hi fmaddd $x3,$r0lo,$h3lo,$h3lo fmaddd $x3,$r0hi,$h3hi,$h3hi fmaddd $x2,$s2lo,$h0lo,$h0lo fmaddd $x2,$s2hi,$h0hi,$h0hi fmaddd $x2,$r0lo,$h2lo,$h2lo fmaddd $x2,$r0hi,$h2hi,$h2hi fmaddd $x2,$s3lo,$h1lo,$h1lo ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*0],$y0 ! load [biased] input fmaddd $x2,$s3hi,$h1hi,$h1hi ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*1],$y1 fmaddd $x2,$r1lo,$h3lo,$h3lo ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*2],$y2 fmaddd $x2,$r1hi,$h3hi,$h3hi ldd [%sp+LOCALS+8*3],$y3 fmaddd $x0,$r0lo,$h0lo,$h0lo fsubd $y0,$two0, $y0 ! de-bias input fmaddd $x0,$r0hi,$h0hi,$h0hi fsubd $y1,$two32,$y1 fmaddd $x0,$r2lo,$h2lo,$h2lo fsubd $y2,$two64,$y2 fmaddd $x0,$r2hi,$h2hi,$h2hi fsubd $y3,$two96,$y3 fmaddd $x0,$r1lo,$h1lo,$h1lo fmaddd $x0,$r1hi,$h1hi,$h1hi fmaddd $x0,$r3lo,$h3lo,$h3lo fmaddd $x0,$r3hi,$h3hi,$h3hi bcc SIZE_T_CC,.Loop_fma subcc $len,1,$len !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! base 2^48 -> base 2^32 faddd $h0lo,$two32,$c0lo faddd $h0hi,$two32,$c0hi faddd $h2lo,$two96,$c2lo faddd $h2hi,$two96,$c2hi faddd $h1lo,$two64,$c1lo faddd $h1hi,$two64,$c1hi faddd $h3lo,$two130,$c3lo faddd $h3hi,$two130,$c3hi fsubd $c0lo,$two32,$c0lo fsubd $c0hi,$two32,$c0hi fsubd $c2lo,$two96,$c2lo fsubd $c2hi,$two96,$c2hi fsubd $c1lo,$two64,$c1lo fsubd $c1hi,$two64,$c1hi fsubd $c3lo,$two130,$c3lo fsubd $c3hi,$two130,$c3hi fsubd $h1lo,$c1lo,$h1lo fsubd $h1hi,$c1hi,$h1hi fsubd $h3lo,$c3lo,$h3lo fsubd $h3hi,$c3hi,$h3hi fsubd $h2lo,$c2lo,$h2lo fsubd $h2hi,$c2hi,$h2hi fsubd $h0lo,$c0lo,$h0lo fsubd $h0hi,$c0hi,$h0hi faddd $h1lo,$c0lo,$h1lo faddd $h1hi,$c0hi,$h1hi faddd $h3lo,$c2lo,$h3lo faddd $h3hi,$c2hi,$h3hi faddd $h2lo,$c1lo,$h2lo faddd $h2hi,$c1hi,$h2hi fmaddd $five_two130,$c3lo,$h0lo,$h0lo fmaddd $five_two130,$c3hi,$h0hi,$h0hi faddd $h1lo,$h1hi,$x1 faddd $h3lo,$h3hi,$x3 faddd $h2lo,$h2hi,$x2 faddd $h0lo,$h0hi,$x0 faddd $x1,$two32,$x1 ! bias faddd $x3,$two96,$x3 faddd $x2,$two64,$x2 faddd $x0,$two0, $x0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS+8*4],%fsr ! restore saved %fsr std $x1,[$ctx+8*1] ! store [biased] hash value std $x3,[$ctx+8*3] std $x2,[$ctx+8*2] std $x0,[$ctx+8*0] .Labort: ret restore .type poly1305_blocks_fma,#function .size poly1305_blocks_fma,.-poly1305_blocks_fma ___ { my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len); my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4, $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3, $mask ) = (map("%l$_",(0..5)),map("%o$_",(0..4))); $code.=<<___; .align 32 poly1305_emit_fma: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp ld [$ctx+8*0+0],$d0 ! load hash ld [$ctx+8*0+4],$h0 ld [$ctx+8*1+0],$d1 ld [$ctx+8*1+4],$h1 ld [$ctx+8*2+0],$d2 ld [$ctx+8*2+4],$h2 ld [$ctx+8*3+0],$d3 ld [$ctx+8*3+4],$h3 sethi %hi(0xfff00000),$mask andn $d0,$mask,$d0 ! mask exponent andn $d1,$mask,$d1 andn $d2,$mask,$d2 andn $d3,$mask,$d3 ! can be partially reduced... mov 3,$mask srl $d3,2,$padbit ! ... so reduce and $d3,$mask,$h4 andn $d3,$mask,$d3 add $padbit,$d3,$d3 addcc $d3,$h0,$h0 addccc $d0,$h1,$h1 addccc $d1,$h2,$h2 addccc $d2,$h3,$h3 addc %g0,$h4,$h4 addcc $h0,5,$d0 ! compare to modulus addccc $h1,0,$d1 addccc $h2,0,$d2 addccc $h3,0,$d3 addc $h4,0,$mask srl $mask,2,$mask ! did it carry/borrow? neg $mask,$mask sra $mask,31,$mask ! mask andn $h0,$mask,$h0 and $d0,$mask,$d0 andn $h1,$mask,$h1 and $d1,$mask,$d1 or $d0,$h0,$h0 ld [$nonce+0],$d0 ! load nonce andn $h2,$mask,$h2 and $d2,$mask,$d2 or $d1,$h1,$h1 ld [$nonce+4],$d1 andn $h3,$mask,$h3 and $d3,$mask,$d3 or $d2,$h2,$h2 ld [$nonce+8],$d2 or $d3,$h3,$h3 ld [$nonce+12],$d3 addcc $d0,$h0,$h0 ! accumulate nonce addccc $d1,$h1,$h1 addccc $d2,$h2,$h2 addc $d3,$h3,$h3 stb $h0,[$mac+0] ! write little-endian result srl $h0,8,$h0 stb $h1,[$mac+4] srl $h1,8,$h1 stb $h2,[$mac+8] srl $h2,8,$h2 stb $h3,[$mac+12] srl $h3,8,$h3 stb $h0,[$mac+1] srl $h0,8,$h0 stb $h1,[$mac+5] srl $h1,8,$h1 stb $h2,[$mac+9] srl $h2,8,$h2 stb $h3,[$mac+13] srl $h3,8,$h3 stb $h0,[$mac+2] srl $h0,8,$h0 stb $h1,[$mac+6] srl $h1,8,$h1 stb $h2,[$mac+10] srl $h2,8,$h2 stb $h3,[$mac+14] srl $h3,8,$h3 stb $h0,[$mac+3] stb $h1,[$mac+7] stb $h2,[$mac+11] stb $h3,[$mac+15] ret restore .type poly1305_emit_fma,#function .size poly1305_emit_fma,.-poly1305_emit_fma ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 64 .Lconsts_fma: .word 0x43300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+0) .word 0x45300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+32) .word 0x47300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+64) .word 0x49300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+96) .word 0x4b500000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+130) .word 0x37f40000,0x00000000 ! 5/2^130 .word 0,1<<30 ! fsr: truncate, no exceptions .word 0x44300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+16+0) .word 0x46300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+16+32) .word 0x48300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+16+64) .word 0x4a300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+16+96) .word 0x3e300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+16+0-96) .word 0x40300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+16+32-96) .word 0x42300000,0x00000000 ! 2^(52+16+64-96) .asciz "Poly1305 for SPARCv9/VIS3/FMA, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ } # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis3 { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "addxc" => 0x011, "addxccc" => 0x013, "umulxhi" => 0x016 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unfma { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %fmaopf = ( "fmadds" => 0x1, "fmaddd" => 0x2, "fmsubs" => 0x5, "fmsubd" => 0x6 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd"; if ($opf=$fmaopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b80000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(umulxhi|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge or s/\b(fmadd[sd])\s+(%f[0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]+)/ &unfma($1,$2,$3,$4,$5) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl0000755000000000000000000003245013176625657020077 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements Poly1305 hash for PowerPC. # # June 2015 # # Numbers are cycles per processed byte with poly1305_blocks alone, # and improvement coefficients relative to gcc-generated code. # # -m32 -m64 # # Freescale e300 14.8/+80% - # PPC74x0 7.60/+60% - # PPC970 7.00/+114% 3.51/+205% # POWER7 3.75/+260% 1.93/+100% # POWER8 - 2.03/+200% # # Do we need floating-point implementation for PPC? Results presented # in poly1305_ieee754.c are tricky to compare to, because they are for # compiler-generated code. On the other hand it's known that floating- # point performance can be dominated by FPU latency, which means that # there is limit even for ideally optimized (and even vectorized) code. # And this limit is estimated to be higher than above -m64 results. Or # in other words floating-point implementation can be meaningful to # consider only in 32-bit application context. We probably have to # recognize that 32-bit builds are getting less popular on high-end # systems and therefore tend to target embedded ones, which might not # even have FPU... # # On side note, Power ISA 2.07 enables vector base 2^26 implementation, # and POWER8 might have capacity to break 1.0 cycle per byte barrier... $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T =8; $LRSAVE =2*$SIZE_T; $UCMP ="cmpld"; $STU ="stdu"; $POP ="ld"; $PUSH ="std"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T =4; $LRSAVE =$SIZE_T; $UCMP ="cmplw"; $STU ="stwu"; $POP ="lwz"; $PUSH ="stw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } # Define endianness based on flavour # i.e.: linux64le $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $FRAME=24*$SIZE_T; $sp="r1"; my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("r$_",(3..6)); my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len); my $mask = "r0"; $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text ___ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ############################################################################### # base 2^64 implementation my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$d0,$d1,$d2, $r0,$r1,$s1, $t0,$t1) = map("r$_",(7..12,27..31)); $code.=<<___; .globl .poly1305_init_int .align 4 .poly1305_init_int: xor r0,r0,r0 std r0,0($ctx) # zero hash value std r0,8($ctx) std r0,16($ctx) $UCMP $inp,r0 beq- Lno_key ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); ld $d0,0($inp) # load key material ld $d1,8($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); li $h0,4 lwbrx $d0,0,$inp # load key material li $d1,8 lwbrx $h0,$h0,$inp li $h1,12 lwbrx $d1,$d1,$inp lwbrx $h1,$h1,$inp insrdi $d0,$h0,32,0 insrdi $d1,$h1,32,0 ___ $code.=<<___; lis $h1,0xfff # 0x0fff0000 ori $h1,$h1,0xfffc # 0x0ffffffc insrdi $h1,$h1,32,0 # 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc ori $h0,$h1,3 # 0x0ffffffc0fffffff and $d0,$d0,$h0 and $d1,$d1,$h1 std $d0,32($ctx) # store key std $d1,40($ctx) Lno_key: xor r3,r3,r3 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .size .poly1305_init_int,.-.poly1305_init_int .globl .poly1305_blocks .align 4 .poly1305_blocks: srdi. $len,$len,4 beq- Labort $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) ld $r0,32($ctx) # load key ld $r1,40($ctx) ld $h0,0($ctx) # load hash value ld $h1,8($ctx) ld $h2,16($ctx) srdi $s1,$r1,2 mtctr $len add $s1,$s1,$r1 # s1 = r1 + r1>>2 li $mask,3 b Loop .align 4 Loop: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); ld $t0,0($inp) # load input ld $t1,8($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); li $d0,4 lwbrx $t0,0,$inp # load input li $t1,8 lwbrx $d0,$d0,$inp li $d1,12 lwbrx $t1,$t1,$inp lwbrx $d1,$d1,$inp insrdi $t0,$d0,32,0 insrdi $t1,$d1,32,0 ___ $code.=<<___; addi $inp,$inp,16 addc $h0,$h0,$t0 # accumulate input adde $h1,$h1,$t1 mulld $d0,$h0,$r0 # h0*r0 mulhdu $d1,$h0,$r0 adde $h2,$h2,$padbit mulld $t0,$h1,$s1 # h1*5*r1 mulhdu $t1,$h1,$s1 addc $d0,$d0,$t0 adde $d1,$d1,$t1 mulld $t0,$h0,$r1 # h0*r1 mulhdu $d2,$h0,$r1 addc $d1,$d1,$t0 addze $d2,$d2 mulld $t0,$h1,$r0 # h1*r0 mulhdu $t1,$h1,$r0 addc $d1,$d1,$t0 adde $d2,$d2,$t1 mulld $t0,$h2,$s1 # h2*5*r1 mulld $t1,$h2,$r0 # h2*r0 addc $d1,$d1,$t0 adde $d2,$d2,$t1 andc $t0,$d2,$mask # final reduction step and $h2,$d2,$mask srdi $t1,$t0,2 add $t0,$t0,$t1 addc $h0,$d0,$t0 addze $h1,$d1 addze $h2,$h2 bdnz Loop std $h0,0($ctx) # store hash value std $h1,8($ctx) std $h2,16($ctx) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME Labort: blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,5,4,0 .size .poly1305_blocks,.-.poly1305_blocks .globl .poly1305_emit .align 4 .poly1305_emit: ld $h0,0($ctx) # load hash ld $h1,8($ctx) ld $h2,16($ctx) ld $padbit,0($nonce) # load nonce ld $nonce,8($nonce) addic $d0,$h0,5 # compare to modulus addze $d1,$h1 addze $d2,$h2 srdi $mask,$d2,2 # did it carry/borrow? neg $mask,$mask andc $h0,$h0,$mask and $d0,$d0,$mask andc $h1,$h1,$mask and $d1,$d1,$mask or $h0,$h0,$d0 or $h1,$h1,$d1 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); rotldi $padbit,$padbit,32 # flip nonce words rotldi $nonce,$nonce,32 ___ $code.=<<___; addc $h0,$h0,$padbit # accumulate nonce adde $h1,$h1,$nonce ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); std $h0,0($mac) # write result std $h1,8($mac) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); extrdi r0,$h0,32,0 li $d0,4 stwbrx $h0,0,$mac # write result extrdi $h0,$h1,32,0 li $d1,8 stwbrx r0,$d0,$mac li $d2,12 stwbrx $h1,$d1,$mac stwbrx $h0,$d2,$mac ___ $code.=<<___; blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0 .size .poly1305_emit,.-.poly1305_emit ___ } else { ############################################################################### # base 2^32 implementation my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4, $r0,$r1,$r2,$r3, $s1,$s2,$s3, $t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $D0,$D1,$D2,$D3, $d0,$d1,$d2,$d3 ) = map("r$_",(7..12,14..31)); $code.=<<___; .globl .poly1305_init_int .align 4 .poly1305_init_int: xor r0,r0,r0 stw r0,0($ctx) # zero hash value stw r0,4($ctx) stw r0,8($ctx) stw r0,12($ctx) stw r0,16($ctx) $UCMP $inp,r0 beq- Lno_key ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); lw $h0,0($inp) # load key material lw $h1,4($inp) lw $h2,8($inp) lw $h3,12($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); li $h1,4 lwbrx $h0,0,$inp # load key material li $h2,8 lwbrx $h1,$h1,$inp li $h3,12 lwbrx $h2,$h2,$inp lwbrx $h3,$h3,$inp ___ $code.=<<___; lis $mask,0xf000 # 0xf0000000 li $r0,-4 andc $r0,$r0,$mask # 0x0ffffffc andc $h0,$h0,$mask and $h1,$h1,$r0 and $h2,$h2,$r0 and $h3,$h3,$r0 stw $h0,32($ctx) # store key stw $h1,36($ctx) stw $h2,40($ctx) stw $h3,44($ctx) Lno_key: xor r3,r3,r3 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .size .poly1305_init_int,.-.poly1305_init_int .globl .poly1305_blocks .align 4 .poly1305_blocks: srwi. $len,$len,4 beq- Labort $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $PUSH r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $PUSH r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $PUSH r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $PUSH r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $PUSH r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $PUSH r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $PUSH r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $PUSH r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $PUSH r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) lwz $r0,32($ctx) # load key lwz $r1,36($ctx) lwz $r2,40($ctx) lwz $r3,44($ctx) lwz $h0,0($ctx) # load hash value lwz $h1,4($ctx) lwz $h2,8($ctx) lwz $h3,12($ctx) lwz $h4,16($ctx) srwi $s1,$r1,2 srwi $s2,$r2,2 srwi $s3,$r3,2 add $s1,$s1,$r1 # si = ri + ri>>2 add $s2,$s2,$r2 add $s3,$s3,$r3 mtctr $len li $mask,3 b Loop .align 4 Loop: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $d0,0($inp) # load input lwz $d1,4($inp) lwz $d2,8($inp) lwz $d3,12($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); li $d1,4 lwbrx $d0,0,$inp # load input li $d2,8 lwbrx $d1,$d1,$inp li $d3,12 lwbrx $d2,$d2,$inp lwbrx $d3,$d3,$inp ___ $code.=<<___; addi $inp,$inp,16 addc $h0,$h0,$d0 # accumulate input adde $h1,$h1,$d1 adde $h2,$h2,$d2 mullw $d0,$h0,$r0 # h0*r0 mulhwu $D0,$h0,$r0 mullw $d1,$h0,$r1 # h0*r1 mulhwu $D1,$h0,$r1 mullw $d2,$h0,$r2 # h0*r2 mulhwu $D2,$h0,$r2 adde $h3,$h3,$d3 adde $h4,$h4,$padbit mullw $d3,$h0,$r3 # h0*r3 mulhwu $D3,$h0,$r3 mullw $t0,$h1,$s3 # h1*s3 mulhwu $t1,$h1,$s3 mullw $t2,$h1,$r0 # h1*r0 mulhwu $t3,$h1,$r0 addc $d0,$d0,$t0 adde $D0,$D0,$t1 mullw $t0,$h1,$r1 # h1*r1 mulhwu $t1,$h1,$r1 addc $d1,$d1,$t2 adde $D1,$D1,$t3 mullw $t2,$h1,$r2 # h1*r2 mulhwu $t3,$h1,$r2 addc $d2,$d2,$t0 adde $D2,$D2,$t1 mullw $t0,$h2,$s2 # h2*s2 mulhwu $t1,$h2,$s2 addc $d3,$d3,$t2 adde $D3,$D3,$t3 mullw $t2,$h2,$s3 # h2*s3 mulhwu $t3,$h2,$s3 addc $d0,$d0,$t0 adde $D0,$D0,$t1 mullw $t0,$h2,$r0 # h2*r0 mulhwu $t1,$h2,$r0 addc $d1,$d1,$t2 adde $D1,$D1,$t3 mullw $t2,$h2,$r1 # h2*r1 mulhwu $t3,$h2,$r1 addc $d2,$d2,$t0 adde $D2,$D2,$t1 mullw $t0,$h3,$s1 # h3*s1 mulhwu $t1,$h3,$s1 addc $d3,$d3,$t2 adde $D3,$D3,$t3 mullw $t2,$h3,$s2 # h3*s2 mulhwu $t3,$h3,$s2 addc $d0,$d0,$t0 adde $D0,$D0,$t1 mullw $t0,$h3,$s3 # h3*s3 mulhwu $t1,$h3,$s3 addc $d1,$d1,$t2 adde $D1,$D1,$t3 mullw $t2,$h3,$r0 # h3*r0 mulhwu $t3,$h3,$r0 addc $d2,$d2,$t0 adde $D2,$D2,$t1 mullw $t0,$h4,$s1 # h4*s1 addc $d3,$d3,$t2 adde $D3,$D3,$t3 addc $d1,$d1,$t0 mullw $t1,$h4,$s2 # h4*s2 addze $D1,$D1 addc $d2,$d2,$t1 addze $D2,$D2 mullw $t2,$h4,$s3 # h4*s3 addc $d3,$d3,$t2 addze $D3,$D3 mullw $h4,$h4,$r0 # h4*r0 addc $h1,$d1,$D0 adde $h2,$d2,$D1 adde $h3,$d3,$D2 adde $h4,$h4,$D3 andc $D0,$h4,$mask # final reduction step and $h4,$h4,$mask srwi $D1,$D0,2 add $D0,$D0,$D1 addc $h0,$d0,$D0 addze $h1,$h1 addze $h2,$h2 addze $h3,$h3 addze $h4,$h4 bdnz Loop stw $h0,0($ctx) # store hash value stw $h1,4($ctx) stw $h2,8($ctx) stw $h3,12($ctx) stw $h4,16($ctx) $POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $POP r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $POP r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $POP r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $POP r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $POP r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $POP r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $POP r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $POP r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $POP r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $POP r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME Labort: blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,18,4,0 .size .poly1305_blocks,.-.poly1305_blocks .globl .poly1305_emit .align 4 .poly1305_emit: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) lwz $h0,0($ctx) # load hash lwz $h1,4($ctx) lwz $h2,8($ctx) lwz $h3,12($ctx) lwz $h4,16($ctx) addic $d0,$h0,5 # compare to modulus addze $d1,$h1 addze $d2,$h2 addze $d3,$h3 addze $mask,$h4 srwi $mask,$mask,2 # did it carry/borrow? neg $mask,$mask andc $h0,$h0,$mask and $d0,$d0,$mask andc $h1,$h1,$mask and $d1,$d1,$mask or $h0,$h0,$d0 lwz $d0,0($nonce) # load nonce andc $h2,$h2,$mask and $d2,$d2,$mask or $h1,$h1,$d1 lwz $d1,4($nonce) andc $h3,$h3,$mask and $d3,$d3,$mask or $h2,$h2,$d2 lwz $d2,8($nonce) or $h3,$h3,$d3 lwz $d3,12($nonce) addc $h0,$h0,$d0 # accumulate nonce adde $h1,$h1,$d1 adde $h2,$h2,$d2 adde $h3,$h3,$d3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); stw $h0,0($mac) # write result stw $h1,4($mac) stw $h2,8($mac) stw $h3,12($mac) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); li $d1,4 stwbrx $h0,0,$mac # write result li $d2,8 stwbrx $h1,$d1,$mac li $d3,12 stwbrx $h2,$d2,$mac stwbrx $h3,$d3,$mac ___ $code.=<<___; $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,4,3,0 .size .poly1305_emit,.-.poly1305_emit ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "Poly1305 for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-s390x.pl0000755000000000000000000001100113176625657020170 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # This module implements Poly1305 hash for s390x. # # June 2015 # # ~6.6/2.3 cpb on z10/z196+, >2x improvement over compiler-generated # code. For older compiler improvement coefficient is >3x, because # then base 2^64 and base 2^32 implementations are compared. # # On side note, z13 enables vector base 2^26 implementation... $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $sp="%r15"; my ($ctx,$inp,$len,$padbit) = map("%r$_",(2..5)); $code.=<<___; .text .globl poly1305_init .type poly1305_init,\@function .align 16 poly1305_init: lghi %r0,0 lghi %r1,-1 stg %r0,0($ctx) # zero hash value stg %r0,8($ctx) stg %r0,16($ctx) cl${g}r $inp,%r0 je .Lno_key lrvg %r4,0($inp) # load little-endian key lrvg %r5,8($inp) nihl %r1,0xffc0 # 0xffffffc0ffffffff srlg %r0,%r1,4 # 0x0ffffffc0fffffff srlg %r1,%r1,4 nill %r1,0xfffc # 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc ngr %r4,%r0 ngr %r5,%r1 stg %r4,32($ctx) stg %r5,40($ctx) .Lno_key: lghi %r2,0 br %r14 .size poly1305_init,.-poly1305_init ___ { my ($d0hi,$d0lo,$d1hi,$d1lo,$t0,$h0,$t1,$h1,$h2) = map("%r$_",(6..14)); my ($r0,$r1,$s1) = map("%r$_",(0..2)); $code.=<<___; .globl poly1305_blocks .type poly1305_blocks,\@function .align 16 poly1305_blocks: srl${g} $len,4 # fixed-up in 64-bit build lghi %r0,0 cl${g}r $len,%r0 je .Lno_data stm${g} %r6,%r14,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp) llgfr $padbit,$padbit # clear upper half, much needed with # non-64-bit ABI lg $r0,32($ctx) # load key lg $r1,40($ctx) lg $h0,0($ctx) # load hash value lg $h1,8($ctx) lg $h2,16($ctx) st$g $ctx,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp) # off-load $ctx srlg $s1,$r1,2 algr $s1,$r1 # s1 = r1 + r1>>2 j .Loop .align 16 .Loop: lrvg $d0lo,0($inp) # load little-endian input lrvg $d1lo,8($inp) la $inp,16($inp) algr $d0lo,$h0 # accumulate input alcgr $d1lo,$h1 lgr $h0,$d0lo mlgr $d0hi,$r0 # h0*r0 -> $d0hi:$d0lo lgr $h1,$d1lo mlgr $d1hi,$s1 # h1*5*r1 -> $d1hi:$d1lo mlgr $t0,$r1 # h0*r1 -> $t0:$h0 mlgr $t1,$r0 # h1*r0 -> $t1:$h1 alcgr $h2,$padbit algr $d0lo,$d1lo lgr $d1lo,$h2 alcgr $d0hi,$d1hi lghi $d1hi,0 algr $h1,$h0 alcgr $t1,$t0 msgr $d1lo,$s1 # h2*s1 msgr $h2,$r0 # h2*r0 algr $h1,$d1lo alcgr $t1,$d1hi # $d1hi is zero algr $h1,$d0hi alcgr $h2,$t1 lghi $h0,-4 # final reduction step ngr $h0,$h2 srlg $t0,$h2,2 algr $h0,$t0 lghi $t1,3 ngr $h2,$t1 algr $h0,$d0lo alcgr $h1,$d1hi # $d1hi is still zero alcgr $h2,$d1hi # $d1hi is still zero brct$g $len,.Loop l$g $ctx,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp) # restore $ctx stg $h0,0($ctx) # store hash value stg $h1,8($ctx) stg $h2,16($ctx) lm${g} %r6,%r14,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp) .Lno_data: br %r14 .size poly1305_blocks,.-poly1305_blocks ___ } { my ($mac,$nonce)=($inp,$len); my ($h0,$h1,$h2,$d0,$d1)=map("%r$_",(5..9)); $code.=<<___; .globl poly1305_emit .type poly1305_emit,\@function .align 16 poly1305_emit: stm${g} %r6,%r9,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp) lg $h0,0($ctx) lg $h1,8($ctx) lg $h2,16($ctx) lghi %r0,5 lghi %r1,0 lgr $d0,$h0 lgr $d1,$h1 algr $h0,%r0 # compare to modulus alcgr $h1,%r1 alcgr $h2,%r1 srlg $h2,$h2,2 # did it borrow/carry? slgr %r1,$h2 # 0-$h2>>2 lg $h2,0($nonce) # load nonce lghi %r0,-1 lg $ctx,8($nonce) xgr %r0,%r1 # ~%r1 ngr $h0,%r1 ngr $d0,%r0 ngr $h1,%r1 ngr $d1,%r0 ogr $h0,$d0 rllg $d0,$h2,32 # flip nonce words ogr $h1,$d1 rllg $d1,$ctx,32 algr $h0,$d0 # accumulate nonce alcgr $h1,$d1 strvg $h0,0($mac) # write little-endian result strvg $h1,8($mac) lm${g} %r6,%r9,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp) br %r14 .size poly1305_emit,.-poly1305_emit .string "Poly1305 for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/\b(srlg\s+)(%r[0-9]+\s*,)\s*([0-9]+)/$1$2$2$3/gm; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_ieee754.c0000644000000000000000000003253713176625657017600 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This module is meant to be used as template for non-x87 floating- * point assembly modules. The template itself is x86_64-specific * though, as it was debugged on x86_64. So that implementor would * have to recognize platform-specific parts, UxTOy and inline asm, * and act accordingly. * * Huh? x86_64-specific code as template for non-x87? Note seven, which * is not a typo, but reference to 80-bit precision. This module on the * other hand relies on 64-bit precision operations, which are default * for x86_64 code. And since we are at it, just for sense of it, * large-block performance in cycles per processed byte for *this* code * is: * gcc-4.8 icc-15.0 clang-3.4(*) * * Westmere 4.96 5.09 4.37 * Sandy Bridge 4.95 4.90 4.17 * Haswell 4.92 4.87 3.78 * Bulldozer 4.67 4.49 4.68 * VIA Nano 7.07 7.05 5.98 * Silvermont 10.6 9.61 12.6 * * (*) clang managed to discover parallelism and deployed SIMD; * * And for range of other platforms with unspecified gcc versions: * * Freescale e300 12.5 * PPC74x0 10.8 * POWER6 4.92 * POWER7 4.50 * POWER8 4.10 * * z10 11.2 * z196+ 7.30 * * UltraSPARC III 16.0 * SPARC T4 16.1 */ #if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2) # error "this is gcc-specific template" #endif #include typedef unsigned char u8; typedef unsigned int u32; typedef unsigned long long u64; typedef union { double d; u64 u; } elem64; #define TWO(p) ((double)(1ULL<<(p))) #define TWO0 TWO(0) #define TWO32 TWO(32) #define TWO64 (TWO32*TWO(32)) #define TWO96 (TWO64*TWO(32)) #define TWO130 (TWO96*TWO(34)) #define EXP(p) ((1023ULL+(p))<<52) #if defined(__x86_64__) || (defined(__PPC__) && defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)) # define U8TOU32(p) (*(const u32 *)(p)) # define U32TO8(p,v) (*(u32 *)(p) = (v)) #elif defined(__PPC__) # define U8TOU32(p) ({u32 ret; asm ("lwbrx %0,0,%1":"=r"(ret):"b"(p)); ret; }) # define U32TO8(p,v) asm ("stwbrx %0,0,%1"::"r"(v),"b"(p):"memory") #elif defined(__s390x__) # define U8TOU32(p) ({u32 ret; asm ("lrv %0,%1":"=d"(ret):"m"(*(u32 *)(p))); ret; }) # define U32TO8(p,v) asm ("strv %1,%0":"=m"(*(u32 *)(p)):"d"(v)) #endif #ifndef U8TOU32 # define U8TOU32(p) ((u32)(p)[0] | (u32)(p)[1]<<8 | \ (u32)(p)[2]<<16 | (u32)(p)[3]<<24 ) #endif #ifndef U32TO8 # define U32TO8(p,v) ((p)[0] = (u8)(v), (p)[1] = (u8)((v)>>8), \ (p)[2] = (u8)((v)>>16), (p)[3] = (u8)((v)>>24) ) #endif typedef struct { elem64 h[4]; double r[8]; double s[6]; } poly1305_internal; /* "round toward zero (truncate), mask all exceptions" */ #if defined(__x86_64__) static const u32 mxcsr = 0x7f80; #elif defined(__PPC__) static const u64 one = 1; #elif defined(__s390x__) static const u32 fpc = 1; #elif defined(__sparc__) static const u64 fsr = 1ULL<<30; #else #error "unrecognized platform" #endif int poly1305_init(void *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx; elem64 r0, r1, r2, r3; /* h = 0, biased */ #if 0 st->h[0].d = TWO(52)*TWO0; st->h[1].d = TWO(52)*TWO32; st->h[2].d = TWO(52)*TWO64; st->h[3].d = TWO(52)*TWO96; #else st->h[0].u = EXP(52+0); st->h[1].u = EXP(52+32); st->h[2].u = EXP(52+64); st->h[3].u = EXP(52+96); #endif if (key) { /* * set "truncate" rounding mode */ #if defined(__x86_64__) u32 mxcsr_orig; asm volatile ("stmxcsr %0":"=m"(mxcsr_orig)); asm volatile ("ldmxcsr %0"::"m"(mxcsr)); #elif defined(__PPC__) double fpscr_orig, fpscr = *(double *)&one; asm volatile ("mffs %0":"=f"(fpscr_orig)); asm volatile ("mtfsf 255,%0"::"f"(fpscr)); #elif defined(__s390x__) u32 fpc_orig; asm volatile ("stfpc %0":"=m"(fpc_orig)); asm volatile ("lfpc %0"::"m"(fpc)); #elif defined(__sparc__) u64 fsr_orig; asm volatile ("stx %%fsr,%0":"=m"(fsr_orig)); asm volatile ("ldx %0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr)); #endif /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ r0.u = EXP(52+0) | (U8TOU32(&key[0]) & 0x0fffffff); r1.u = EXP(52+32) | (U8TOU32(&key[4]) & 0x0ffffffc); r2.u = EXP(52+64) | (U8TOU32(&key[8]) & 0x0ffffffc); r3.u = EXP(52+96) | (U8TOU32(&key[12]) & 0x0ffffffc); st->r[0] = r0.d - TWO(52)*TWO0; st->r[2] = r1.d - TWO(52)*TWO32; st->r[4] = r2.d - TWO(52)*TWO64; st->r[6] = r3.d - TWO(52)*TWO96; st->s[0] = st->r[2] * (5.0/TWO130); st->s[2] = st->r[4] * (5.0/TWO130); st->s[4] = st->r[6] * (5.0/TWO130); /* * base 2^32 -> base 2^16 */ st->r[1] = (st->r[0] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0) - TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0; st->r[0] -= st->r[1]; st->r[3] = (st->r[2] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32) - TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32; st->r[2] -= st->r[3]; st->r[5] = (st->r[4] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64) - TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64; st->r[4] -= st->r[5]; st->r[7] = (st->r[6] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO96; st->r[6] -= st->r[7]; st->s[1] = (st->s[0] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0/TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO0/TWO96; st->s[0] -= st->s[1]; st->s[3] = (st->s[2] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32/TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO32/TWO96; st->s[2] -= st->s[3]; st->s[5] = (st->s[4] + TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64/TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO(16)*TWO64/TWO96; st->s[4] -= st->s[5]; /* * restore original FPU control register */ #if defined(__x86_64__) asm volatile ("ldmxcsr %0"::"m"(mxcsr_orig)); #elif defined(__PPC__) asm volatile ("mtfsf 255,%0"::"f"(fpscr_orig)); #elif defined(__s390x__) asm volatile ("lfpc %0"::"m"(fpc_orig)); #elif defined(__sparc__) asm volatile ("ldx %0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr_orig)); #endif } return 0; } void poly1305_blocks(void *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, int padbit) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *)ctx; elem64 in0, in1, in2, in3; u64 pad = (u64)padbit<<32; double x0, x1, x2, x3; double h0lo, h0hi, h1lo, h1hi, h2lo, h2hi, h3lo, h3hi; double c0lo, c0hi, c1lo, c1hi, c2lo, c2hi, c3lo, c3hi; const double r0lo = st->r[0]; const double r0hi = st->r[1]; const double r1lo = st->r[2]; const double r1hi = st->r[3]; const double r2lo = st->r[4]; const double r2hi = st->r[5]; const double r3lo = st->r[6]; const double r3hi = st->r[7]; const double s1lo = st->s[0]; const double s1hi = st->s[1]; const double s2lo = st->s[2]; const double s2hi = st->s[3]; const double s3lo = st->s[4]; const double s3hi = st->s[5]; /* * set "truncate" rounding mode */ #if defined(__x86_64__) u32 mxcsr_orig; asm volatile ("stmxcsr %0":"=m"(mxcsr_orig)); asm volatile ("ldmxcsr %0"::"m"(mxcsr)); #elif defined(__PPC__) double fpscr_orig, fpscr = *(double *)&one; asm volatile ("mffs %0":"=f"(fpscr_orig)); asm volatile ("mtfsf 255,%0"::"f"(fpscr)); #elif defined(__s390x__) u32 fpc_orig; asm volatile ("stfpc %0":"=m"(fpc_orig)); asm volatile ("lfpc %0"::"m"(fpc)); #elif defined(__sparc__) u64 fsr_orig; asm volatile ("stx %%fsr,%0":"=m"(fsr_orig)); asm volatile ("ldx %0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr)); #endif /* * load base 2^32 and de-bias */ h0lo = st->h[0].d - TWO(52)*TWO0; h1lo = st->h[1].d - TWO(52)*TWO32; h2lo = st->h[2].d - TWO(52)*TWO64; h3lo = st->h[3].d - TWO(52)*TWO96; #ifdef __clang__ h0hi = 0; h1hi = 0; h2hi = 0; h3hi = 0; #else in0.u = EXP(52+0) | U8TOU32(&inp[0]); in1.u = EXP(52+32) | U8TOU32(&inp[4]); in2.u = EXP(52+64) | U8TOU32(&inp[8]); in3.u = EXP(52+96) | U8TOU32(&inp[12]) | pad; x0 = in0.d - TWO(52)*TWO0; x1 = in1.d - TWO(52)*TWO32; x2 = in2.d - TWO(52)*TWO64; x3 = in3.d - TWO(52)*TWO96; x0 += h0lo; x1 += h1lo; x2 += h2lo; x3 += h3lo; goto fast_entry; #endif do { in0.u = EXP(52+0) | U8TOU32(&inp[0]); in1.u = EXP(52+32) | U8TOU32(&inp[4]); in2.u = EXP(52+64) | U8TOU32(&inp[8]); in3.u = EXP(52+96) | U8TOU32(&inp[12]) | pad; x0 = in0.d - TWO(52)*TWO0; x1 = in1.d - TWO(52)*TWO32; x2 = in2.d - TWO(52)*TWO64; x3 = in3.d - TWO(52)*TWO96; /* * note that there are multiple ways to accumulate input, e.g. * one can as well accumulate to h0lo-h1lo-h1hi-h2hi... */ h0lo += x0; h0hi += x1; h2lo += x2; h2hi += x3; /* * carries that cross 32n-bit (and 130-bit) boundaries */ c0lo = (h0lo + TWO(52)*TWO32) - TWO(52)*TWO32; c1lo = (h1lo + TWO(52)*TWO64) - TWO(52)*TWO64; c2lo = (h2lo + TWO(52)*TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO96; c3lo = (h3lo + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130; c0hi = (h0hi + TWO(52)*TWO32) - TWO(52)*TWO32; c1hi = (h1hi + TWO(52)*TWO64) - TWO(52)*TWO64; c2hi = (h2hi + TWO(52)*TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO96; c3hi = (h3hi + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130; /* * base 2^48 -> base 2^32 with last reduction step */ x1 = (h1lo - c1lo) + c0lo; x2 = (h2lo - c2lo) + c1lo; x3 = (h3lo - c3lo) + c2lo; x0 = (h0lo - c0lo) + c3lo * (5.0/TWO130); x1 += (h1hi - c1hi) + c0hi; x2 += (h2hi - c2hi) + c1hi; x3 += (h3hi - c3hi) + c2hi; x0 += (h0hi - c0hi) + c3hi * (5.0/TWO130); #ifndef __clang__ fast_entry: #endif /* * base 2^32 * base 2^16 = base 2^48 */ h0lo = s3lo * x1 + s2lo * x2 + s1lo * x3 + r0lo * x0; h1lo = r0lo * x1 + s3lo * x2 + s2lo * x3 + r1lo * x0; h2lo = r1lo * x1 + r0lo * x2 + s3lo * x3 + r2lo * x0; h3lo = r2lo * x1 + r1lo * x2 + r0lo * x3 + r3lo * x0; h0hi = s3hi * x1 + s2hi * x2 + s1hi * x3 + r0hi * x0; h1hi = r0hi * x1 + s3hi * x2 + s2hi * x3 + r1hi * x0; h2hi = r1hi * x1 + r0hi * x2 + s3hi * x3 + r2hi * x0; h3hi = r2hi * x1 + r1hi * x2 + r0hi * x3 + r3hi * x0; inp += 16; len -= 16; } while (len >= 16); /* * carries that cross 32n-bit (and 130-bit) boundaries */ c0lo = (h0lo + TWO(52)*TWO32) - TWO(52)*TWO32; c1lo = (h1lo + TWO(52)*TWO64) - TWO(52)*TWO64; c2lo = (h2lo + TWO(52)*TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO96; c3lo = (h3lo + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130; c0hi = (h0hi + TWO(52)*TWO32) - TWO(52)*TWO32; c1hi = (h1hi + TWO(52)*TWO64) - TWO(52)*TWO64; c2hi = (h2hi + TWO(52)*TWO96) - TWO(52)*TWO96; c3hi = (h3hi + TWO(52)*TWO130) - TWO(52)*TWO130; /* * base 2^48 -> base 2^32 with last reduction step */ x1 = (h1lo - c1lo) + c0lo; x2 = (h2lo - c2lo) + c1lo; x3 = (h3lo - c3lo) + c2lo; x0 = (h0lo - c0lo) + c3lo * (5.0/TWO130); x1 += (h1hi - c1hi) + c0hi; x2 += (h2hi - c2hi) + c1hi; x3 += (h3hi - c3hi) + c2hi; x0 += (h0hi - c0hi) + c3hi * (5.0/TWO130); /* * store base 2^32, with bias */ st->h[1].d = x1 + TWO(52)*TWO32; st->h[2].d = x2 + TWO(52)*TWO64; st->h[3].d = x3 + TWO(52)*TWO96; st->h[0].d = x0 + TWO(52)*TWO0; /* * restore original FPU control register */ #if defined(__x86_64__) asm volatile ("ldmxcsr %0"::"m"(mxcsr_orig)); #elif defined(__PPC__) asm volatile ("mtfsf 255,%0"::"f"(fpscr_orig)); #elif defined(__s390x__) asm volatile ("lfpc %0"::"m"(fpc_orig)); #elif defined(__sparc__) asm volatile ("ldx %0,%%fsr"::"m"(fsr_orig)); #endif } void poly1305_emit(void *ctx, unsigned char mac[16], const u32 nonce[4]) { poly1305_internal *st = (poly1305_internal *) ctx; u64 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4; u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4; u64 t; u32 mask; /* * thanks to bias masking exponent gives integer result */ h0 = st->h[0].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL; h1 = st->h[1].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL; h2 = st->h[2].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL; h3 = st->h[3].u & 0x000fffffffffffffULL; /* * can be partially reduced, so reduce... */ h4 = h3>>32; h3 &= 0xffffffffU; g4 = h4&-4; h4 &= 3; g4 += g4>>2; h0 += g4; h1 += h0>>32; h0 &= 0xffffffffU; h2 += h1>>32; h1 &= 0xffffffffU; h3 += h2>>32; h2 &= 0xffffffffU; /* compute h + -p */ g0 = (u32)(t = h0 + 5); g1 = (u32)(t = h1 + (t >> 32)); g2 = (u32)(t = h2 + (t >> 32)); g3 = (u32)(t = h3 + (t >> 32)); g4 = h4 + (u32)(t >> 32); /* if there was carry, select g0-g3 */ mask = 0 - (g4 >> 2); g0 &= mask; g1 &= mask; g2 &= mask; g3 &= mask; mask = ~mask; g0 |= (h0 & mask); g1 |= (h1 & mask); g2 |= (h2 & mask); g3 |= (h3 & mask); /* mac = (h + nonce) % (2^128) */ g0 = (u32)(t = (u64)g0 + nonce[0]); g1 = (u32)(t = (u64)g1 + (t >> 32) + nonce[1]); g2 = (u32)(t = (u64)g2 + (t >> 32) + nonce[2]); g3 = (u32)(t = (u64)g3 + (t >> 32) + nonce[3]); U32TO8(mac + 0, g0); U32TO8(mac + 4, g1); U32TO8(mac + 8, g2); U32TO8(mac + 12, g3); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/armv4cpuid.pl0000644000000000000000000001246213176625656016022 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $flavour = shift; $output = shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #undef __thumb2__ #endif .align 5 .global OPENSSL_atomic_add .type OPENSSL_atomic_add,%function OPENSSL_atomic_add: #if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 .Ladd: ldrex r2,[r0] add r3,r2,r1 strex r2,r3,[r0] cmp r2,#0 bne .Ladd mov r0,r3 bx lr #else stmdb sp!,{r4-r6,lr} ldr r2,.Lspinlock adr r3,.Lspinlock mov r4,r0 mov r5,r1 add r6,r3,r2 @ &spinlock b .+8 .Lspin: bl sched_yield mov r0,#-1 swp r0,r0,[r6] cmp r0,#0 bne .Lspin ldr r2,[r4] add r2,r2,r5 str r2,[r4] str r0,[r6] @ release spinlock ldmia sp!,{r4-r6,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr .word 0xe12fff1e @ bx lr #endif .size OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add .global OPENSSL_cleanse .type OPENSSL_cleanse,%function OPENSSL_cleanse: eor ip,ip,ip cmp r1,#7 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs #endif subhs r1,r1,#4 bhs .Lot cmp r1,#0 beq .Lcleanse_done .Little: strb ip,[r0],#1 subs r1,r1,#1 bhi .Little b .Lcleanse_done .Lot: tst r0,#3 beq .Laligned strb ip,[r0],#1 sub r1,r1,#1 b .Lot .Laligned: str ip,[r0],#4 subs r1,r1,#4 bhs .Laligned adds r1,r1,#4 bne .Little .Lcleanse_done: #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr .word 0xe12fff1e @ bx lr #endif .size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse .global CRYPTO_memcmp .type CRYPTO_memcmp,%function .align 4 CRYPTO_memcmp: eor ip,ip,ip cmp r2,#0 beq .Lno_data stmdb sp!,{r4,r5} .Loop_cmp: ldrb r4,[r0],#1 ldrb r5,[r1],#1 eor r4,r4,r5 orr ip,ip,r4 subs r2,r2,#1 bne .Loop_cmp ldmia sp!,{r4,r5} .Lno_data: neg r0,ip mov r0,r0,lsr#31 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr .word 0xe12fff1e @ bx lr #endif .size CRYPTO_memcmp,.-CRYPTO_memcmp #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .align 5 .global _armv7_neon_probe .type _armv7_neon_probe,%function _armv7_neon_probe: vorr q0,q0,q0 bx lr .size _armv7_neon_probe,.-_armv7_neon_probe .global _armv7_tick .type _armv7_tick,%function _armv7_tick: #ifdef __APPLE__ mrrc p15,0,r0,r1,c14 @ CNTPCT #else mrrc p15,1,r0,r1,c14 @ CNTVCT #endif bx lr .size _armv7_tick,.-_armv7_tick .global _armv8_aes_probe .type _armv8_aes_probe,%function _armv8_aes_probe: #if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__) .byte 0xb0,0xff,0x00,0x03 @ aese.8 q0,q0 #else .byte 0x00,0x03,0xb0,0xf3 @ aese.8 q0,q0 #endif bx lr .size _armv8_aes_probe,.-_armv8_aes_probe .global _armv8_sha1_probe .type _armv8_sha1_probe,%function _armv8_sha1_probe: #if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__) .byte 0x00,0xef,0x40,0x0c @ sha1c.32 q0,q0,q0 #else .byte 0x40,0x0c,0x00,0xf2 @ sha1c.32 q0,q0,q0 #endif bx lr .size _armv8_sha1_probe,.-_armv8_sha1_probe .global _armv8_sha256_probe .type _armv8_sha256_probe,%function _armv8_sha256_probe: #if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__) .byte 0x00,0xff,0x40,0x0c @ sha256h.32 q0,q0,q0 #else .byte 0x40,0x0c,0x00,0xf3 @ sha256h.32 q0,q0,q0 #endif bx lr .size _armv8_sha256_probe,.-_armv8_sha256_probe .global _armv8_pmull_probe .type _armv8_pmull_probe,%function _armv8_pmull_probe: #if defined(__thumb2__) && !defined(__APPLE__) .byte 0xa0,0xef,0x00,0x0e @ vmull.p64 q0,d0,d0 #else .byte 0x00,0x0e,0xa0,0xf2 @ vmull.p64 q0,d0,d0 #endif bx lr .size _armv8_pmull_probe,.-_armv8_pmull_probe #endif .global OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .type OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,%function OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 ldr r0,.LOPENSSL_armcap adr r1,.LOPENSSL_armcap ldr r0,[r1,r0] #ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r0,[r0] #endif #endif eor r2,r2,r2 eor r3,r3,r3 eor ip,ip,ip #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 tst r0,#1 beq .Lwipe_done veor q0, q0, q0 veor q1, q1, q1 veor q2, q2, q2 veor q3, q3, q3 veor q8, q8, q8 veor q9, q9, q9 veor q10, q10, q10 veor q11, q11, q11 veor q12, q12, q12 veor q13, q13, q13 veor q14, q14, q14 veor q15, q15, q15 .Lwipe_done: #endif mov r0,sp #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr .word 0xe12fff1e @ bx lr #endif .size OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .global OPENSSL_instrument_bus .type OPENSSL_instrument_bus,%function OPENSSL_instrument_bus: eor r0,r0,r0 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr .word 0xe12fff1e @ bx lr #endif .size OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus .global OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .type OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,%function OPENSSL_instrument_bus2: eor r0,r0,r0 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 bx lr #else tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr .word 0xe12fff1e @ bx lr #endif .size OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .align 5 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #endif #if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 .align 5 #else .Lspinlock: .word atomic_add_spinlock-.Lspinlock .align 5 .data .align 2 atomic_add_spinlock: .word 0 #endif .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 .hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/o_fips.c0000644000000000000000000000134613176625657015032 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include #endif int FIPS_mode(void) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS return FIPS_module_mode(); #else return 0; #endif } int FIPS_mode_set(int r) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS return FIPS_module_mode_set(r); #else if (r == 0) return 1; CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_FIPS_MODE_SET, CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014152 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c0000644000000000000000000000116313176625657015743 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Original version from Steven Schoch */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "dsa_locl.h" int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) { return dsa->meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, dsa); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c0000644000000000000000000001564113176625657016271 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "dsa_locl.h" /* DSA pkey context structure */ typedef struct { /* Parameter gen parameters */ int nbits; /* size of p in bits (default: 1024) */ int qbits; /* size of q in bits (default: 160) */ const EVP_MD *pmd; /* MD for parameter generation */ /* Keygen callback info */ int gentmp[2]; /* message digest */ const EVP_MD *md; /* MD for the signature */ } DSA_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_dsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx; dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dctx)); if (dctx == NULL) return 0; dctx->nbits = 1024; dctx->qbits = 160; dctx->pmd = NULL; dctx->md = NULL; ctx->data = dctx; ctx->keygen_info = dctx->gentmp; ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; return 1; } static int pkey_dsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; if (!pkey_dsa_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = src->data; dctx = dst->data; dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits; dctx->qbits = sctx->qbits; dctx->pmd = sctx->pmd; dctx->md = sctx->md; return 1; } static void pkey_dsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; OPENSSL_free(dctx); } static int pkey_dsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { int ret; unsigned int sltmp; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa; if (dctx->md) { if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(dctx->md)) return 0; } else { if (tbslen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return 0; } ret = DSA_sign(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, dsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; *siglen = sltmp; return 1; } static int pkey_dsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { int ret; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; DSA *dsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.dsa; if (dctx->md) { if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(dctx->md)) return 0; } else { if (tbslen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return 0; } ret = DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, dsa); return ret; } static int pkey_dsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS: if (p1 < 256) return -2; dctx->nbits = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS: if (p1 != 160 && p1 != 224 && p1 && p1 != 256) return -2; dctx->qbits = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD: if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256) { DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); return 0; } dctx->pmd = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsa && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_dsaWithSHA && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512) { DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); return 0; } dctx->md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_dsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_bits") == 0) { int nbits; nbits = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(ctx, nbits); } if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_q_bits") == 0) { int qbits = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS, qbits, NULL); } if (strcmp(type, "dsa_paramgen_md") == 0) { return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD, 0, (void *)EVP_get_digestbyname(value)); } return -2; } static int pkey_dsa_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *dsa = NULL; DSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; BN_GENCB *pcb; int ret; if (ctx->pkey_gencb) { pcb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (pcb == NULL) return 0; evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); } else pcb = NULL; dsa = DSA_new(); if (dsa == NULL) { BN_GENCB_free(pcb); return 0; } ret = dsa_builtin_paramgen(dsa, dctx->nbits, dctx->qbits, dctx->pmd, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb); BN_GENCB_free(pcb); if (ret) EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); else DSA_free(dsa); return ret; } static int pkey_dsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *dsa = NULL; if (ctx->pkey == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN, DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET); return 0; } dsa = DSA_new(); if (dsa == NULL) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */ if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) return 0; return DSA_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dsa); } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, pkey_dsa_init, pkey_dsa_copy, pkey_dsa_cleanup, 0, pkey_dsa_paramgen, 0, pkey_dsa_keygen, 0, pkey_dsa_sign, 0, pkey_dsa_verify, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_dsa_ctrl, pkey_dsa_ctrl_str }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/build.info0000644000000000000000000000032613176625657016127 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ dsa_gen.c dsa_key.c dsa_lib.c dsa_asn1.c dsa_vrf.c dsa_sign.c \ dsa_err.c dsa_ossl.c dsa_depr.c dsa_ameth.c dsa_pmeth.c dsa_prn.c \ dsa_meth.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c0000644000000000000000000002300113176625657016121 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Original version from Steven Schoch */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "dsa_locl.h" #include static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen); static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { "OpenSSL DSA method", dsa_do_sign, dsa_sign_setup_no_digest, dsa_do_verify, NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp, */ NULL, /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */ dsa_init, dsa_finish, DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, NULL, NULL, NULL }; static const DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method = &openssl_dsa_meth; void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth) { default_DSA_method = meth; } const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void) { return default_DSA_method; } const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void) { return &openssl_dsa_meth; } static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) { BIGNUM *kinv = NULL; BIGNUM *m; BIGNUM *xr; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB; DSA_SIG *ret = NULL; int rv = 0; m = BN_new(); xr = BN_new(); if (m == NULL || xr == NULL) goto err; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS; goto err; } ret = DSA_SIG_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ret->r = BN_new(); ret->s = BN_new(); if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL) goto err; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; redo: if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dlen)) goto err; if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL) goto err; /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(xr, dsa->priv_key, ret->r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* s = xr */ if (!BN_add(ret->s, xr, m)) goto err; /* s = m + xr */ if (BN_cmp(ret->s, dsa->q) > 0) if (!BN_sub(ret->s, ret->s, dsa->q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very * unlikely. */ if (BN_is_zero(ret->r) || BN_is_zero(ret->s)) goto redo; rv = 1; err: if (rv == 0) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason); DSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; } BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(m); BN_clear_free(xr); BN_clear_free(kinv); return ret; } static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { return dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0); } static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; BIGNUM *l, *m; int ret = 0; int q_bits; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } k = BN_new(); l = BN_new(); m = BN_new(); if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL) goto err; if (ctx_in == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else ctx = ctx_in; /* Preallocate space */ q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) goto err; /* Get random k */ do { if (dgst != NULL) { /* * We calculate k from SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random). * This protects the private key from a weak PRNG. */ if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, dgst, dlen, ctx)) goto err; } else if (!BN_rand_range(k, dsa->q)) goto err; } while (BN_is_zero(k)); BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. * * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is * one bit longer than the modulus. * * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic * conditional copy. */ if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) goto err; if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err; } if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; BN_clear_free(*kinvp); *kinvp = kinv; kinv = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (ctx != ctx_in) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(k); BN_clear_free(l); BN_clear_free(m); return ret; } static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *t1; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; const BIGNUM *r, *s; int ret = -1, i; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return -1; } i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */ if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE); return -1; } if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } u1 = BN_new(); u2 = BN_new(); t1 = BN_new(); ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || t1 == NULL || ctx == NULL) goto err; DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s); if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_negative(r) || BN_ucmp(r, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(s) || BN_is_negative(s) || BN_ucmp(s, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } /* * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2 */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; /* save M in u1 */ if (dgst_len > (i >> 3)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dgst_len = (i >> 3); if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL) goto err; /* u1 = M * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* u2 = r * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx); if (!mont) goto err; } if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) { if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) goto err; } /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* * V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R. */ ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, r) == 0); err: if (ret < 0) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(u1); BN_free(u2); BN_free(t1); return (ret); } static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa) { dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; return (1); } static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c0000644000000000000000000000566313176625657015747 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT), "DSAparams_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP), "DSAparams_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN), "dsa_builtin_paramgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2), "dsa_builtin_paramgen2"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN), "DSA_do_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY), "DSA_do_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP), "DSA_meth_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW), "DSA_meth_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME), "DSA_meth_set1_name"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD), "DSA_new_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE), "dsa_param_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP), "DSA_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "dsa_priv_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "dsa_priv_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE), "dsa_pub_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE), "dsa_pub_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN), "DSA_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP), "DSA_sign_setup"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW), "DSA_SIG_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE), "old_dsa_priv_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL), "pkey_dsa_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN), "pkey_dsa_keygen"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE), "bad q value"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR), "bn decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BN_ERROR), "bn error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE), "invalid digest type"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS), "invalid parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR), "parameter encoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL), "seed_len is less than the length of q"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_DSA_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(DSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, DSA_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, DSA_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c0000644000000000000000000000343613176625657015743 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "dsa_locl.h" static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa); int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) { if (dsa->meth->dsa_keygen) return dsa->meth->dsa_keygen(dsa); return dsa_builtin_keygen(dsa); } static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa) { int ok = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) { if ((priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else priv_key = dsa->priv_key; do if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dsa->q)) goto err; while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ; if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) { if ((pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else pub_key = dsa->pub_key; { BIGNUM *prk = BN_new(); if (prk == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, dsa->g, prk, dsa->p, ctx)) { BN_free(prk); goto err; } /* We MUST free prk before any further use of priv_key */ BN_free(prk); } dsa->priv_key = priv_key; dsa->pub_key = pub_key; ok = 1; err: if (pub_key != dsa->pub_key) BN_free(pub_key); if (priv_key != dsa->priv_key) BN_free(priv_key); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return (ok); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_prn.c0000644000000000000000000000313213176625657015743 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x, int off) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = DSA_print(b, x, off); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = DSAparams_print(b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off) { EVP_PKEY *pk; int ret; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, (DSA *)x)) return 0; ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return ret; } int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x) { EVP_PKEY *pk; int ret; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, (DSA *)x)) return 0; ret = EVP_PKEY_print_params(bp, pk, 4, NULL); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c0000644000000000000000000000135413176625657016110 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Original version from Steven Schoch */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "dsa_locl.h" #include DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) { return dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa); } int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { return dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c0000644000000000000000000004034113176625657015720 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186, * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB * 180-1) */ #define xxxHASH EVP_sha1() #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "dsa_locl.h" int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits, const unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { if (ret->meth->dsa_paramgen) return ret->meth->dsa_paramgen(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); else { const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1(); size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8; return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd, seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret, h_ret, cb); } } int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ok = 0; unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test; BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = qbits >> 3; int counter = 0; int r = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned int h = 2; if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) /* invalid q size */ return 0; if (evpmd == NULL) /* use SHA1 as default */ evpmd = EVP_sha1(); if (bits < 512) bits = 512; bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64; if (seed_in != NULL) { if (seed_len < (size_t)qsize) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN, DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL); return 0; } if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) { /* Only consume as much seed as is expected. */ seed_len = qsize; } memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len); } if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); c = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); test = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (test == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1)) goto err; for (;;) { for (;;) { /* find q */ int use_random_seed = (seed_in == NULL); /* step 1 */ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; if (use_random_seed) { if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0) goto err; } else { /* If we come back through, use random seed next time. */ seed_in = NULL; } memcpy(buf, seed, qsize); memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize); /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } /* step 2 */ if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++) md[i] ^= buf2[i]; /* step 3 */ md[0] |= 0x80; md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01; if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q)) goto err; /* step 4 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, use_random_seed, cb); if (r > 0) break; if (r != 0) goto err; /* do a callback call */ /* step 5 */ } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; /* step 6 */ counter = 0; /* "offset = 2" */ n = (bits - 1) / 160; for (;;) { if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) goto err; /* step 7 */ BN_zero(W); /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */ for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) { /* * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* step 8 */ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k)) goto err; if (!BN_add(W, W, r0)) goto err; } /* more of step 8 */ if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(X, W)) goto err; if (!BN_add(X, X, test)) goto err; /* step 9 */ if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) goto err; /* step 10 */ if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) { /* step 11 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb); if (r > 0) goto end; /* found it */ if (r != 0) goto err; } /* step 13 */ counter++; /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */ /* step 14 */ if (counter >= 4096) break; } } end: if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) goto err; /* We now need to generate g */ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */ if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(test, h)) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { /* g=test^r0%p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(g)) break; if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) goto err; h++; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok) { BN_free(ret->p); BN_free(ret->q); BN_free(ret->g); ret->p = BN_dup(p); ret->q = BN_dup(q); ret->g = BN_dup(g); if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) { ok = 0; goto err; } if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret = counter; if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret = h; if (seed_out) memcpy(seed_out, seed, qsize); } if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); return ok; } /* * This is a parameter generation algorithm for the DSA2 algorithm as * described in FIPS 186-3. */ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ok = -1; unsigned char *seed = NULL, *seed_tmp = NULL; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdsize; BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test; BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = N >> 3; int counter = 0; int r = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned int h = 2; if (mctx == NULL) goto err; if (evpmd == NULL) { if (N == 160) evpmd = EVP_sha1(); else if (N == 224) evpmd = EVP_sha224(); else evpmd = EVP_sha256(); } mdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd); /* If unverifiable g generation only don't need seed */ if (!ret->p || !ret->q || idx >= 0) { if (seed_len == 0) seed_len = mdsize; seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len); if (seed_out) seed_tmp = seed_out; else seed_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len); if (seed == NULL || seed_tmp == NULL) goto err; if (seed_in) memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len); } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); c = BN_CTX_get(ctx); test = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (test == NULL) goto err; /* if p, q already supplied generate g only */ if (ret->p && ret->q) { p = ret->p; q = ret->q; if (idx >= 0) memcpy(seed_tmp, seed, seed_len); goto g_only; } else { p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (q == NULL) goto err; } if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1)) goto err; for (;;) { for (;;) { /* find q */ unsigned char *pmd; /* step 1 */ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++)) goto err; if (!seed_in) { if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0) goto err; } /* step 2 */ if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* Take least significant bits of md */ if (mdsize > qsize) pmd = md + mdsize - qsize; else pmd = md; if (mdsize < qsize) memset(md + mdsize, 0, qsize - mdsize); /* step 3 */ pmd[0] |= 0x80; pmd[qsize - 1] |= 0x01; if (!BN_bin2bn(pmd, qsize, q)) goto err; /* step 4 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, seed_in ? 1 : 0, cb); if (r > 0) break; if (r != 0) goto err; /* Provided seed didn't produce a prime: error */ if (seed_in) { ok = 0; DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME); goto err; } /* do a callback call */ /* step 5 */ } /* Copy seed to seed_out before we mess with it */ if (seed_out) memcpy(seed_out, seed, seed_len); if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; /* step 6 */ counter = 0; /* "offset = 1" */ n = (L - 1) / (mdsize << 3); for (;;) { if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter)) goto err; /* step 7 */ BN_zero(W); /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */ for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) { /* * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */ for (i = seed_len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { seed[i]++; if (seed[i] != 0) break; } if (!EVP_Digest(seed, seed_len, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; /* step 8 */ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, r0)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (mdsize << 3) * k)) goto err; if (!BN_add(W, W, r0)) goto err; } /* more of step 8 */ if (!BN_mask_bits(W, L - 1)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(X, W)) goto err; if (!BN_add(X, X, test)) goto err; /* step 9 */ if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0)) goto err; /* step 10 */ if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) { /* step 11 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb); if (r > 0) goto end; /* found it */ if (r != 0) goto err; } /* step 13 */ counter++; /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */ /* step 14 */ if (counter >= (int)(4 * L)) break; } if (seed_in) { ok = 0; DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS); goto err; } } end: if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) goto err; g_only: /* We now need to generate g */ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */ if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) goto err; if (idx < 0) { if (!BN_set_word(test, h)) goto err; } else h = 1; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) goto err; for (;;) { static const unsigned char ggen[4] = { 0x67, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6e }; if (idx >= 0) { md[0] = idx & 0xff; md[1] = (h >> 8) & 0xff; md[2] = h & 0xff; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, evpmd, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, seed_tmp, seed_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, ggen, sizeof(ggen))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, md, 3)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md, NULL)) goto err; if (!BN_bin2bn(md, mdsize, test)) goto err; } /* g=test^r0%p */ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(g)) break; if (idx < 0 && !BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) goto err; h++; if (idx >= 0 && h > 0xffff) goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok == 1) { if (p != ret->p) { BN_free(ret->p); ret->p = BN_dup(p); } if (q != ret->q) { BN_free(ret->q); ret->q = BN_dup(q); } BN_free(ret->g); ret->g = BN_dup(g); if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) { ok = -1; goto err; } if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret = counter; if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret = h; } OPENSSL_free(seed); if (seed_out != seed_tmp) OPENSSL_free(seed_tmp); if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return ok; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001662513176625657015725 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Original version from Steven Schoch */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "dsa_locl.h" #include #include #include DSA *DSA_new(void) { return DSA_new_method(NULL); } int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth) { /* * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. */ const DSA_METHOD *mtmp; mtmp = dsa->meth; if (mtmp->finish) mtmp->finish(dsa); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(dsa->engine); dsa->engine = NULL; #endif dsa->meth = meth; if (meth->init) meth->init(dsa); return 1; } const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_method(DSA *d) { return d->meth; } DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) { DSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } ret->meth = DSA_get_default_method(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; /* early default init */ if (engine) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } ret->engine = engine; } else ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_DSA(); if (ret->engine) { ret->meth = ENGINE_get_DSA(ret->engine); if (ret->meth == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } } #endif ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) goto err; if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); err: DSA_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return ret; } void DSA_free(DSA *r) { int i; if (r == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSA", r); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); if (r->meth->finish) r->meth->finish(r); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(r->engine); #endif CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, r, &r->ex_data); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); BN_clear_free(r->p); BN_clear_free(r->q); BN_clear_free(r->g); BN_clear_free(r->pub_key); BN_clear_free(r->priv_key); OPENSSL_free(r); } int DSA_up_ref(DSA *r) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("DSA", r); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int DSA_size(const DSA *r) { int ret, i; ASN1_INTEGER bs; unsigned char buf[4]; /* 4 bytes looks really small. However, * i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() will not look beyond * the first byte, as long as the second * parameter is NULL. */ i = BN_num_bits(r->q); bs.length = (i + 7) / 8; bs.data = buf; bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; /* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */ buf[0] = 0xff; i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL); i += i; /* r and s */ ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); return (ret); } int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx)); } int DSA_security_bits(const DSA *d) { if (d->p && d->q) return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(d->p), BN_num_bits(d->q)); return -1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r) { /* * DSA has p, q, g, optional pub_key, optional priv_key. DH has p, * optional length, g, optional pub_key, optional priv_key, optional q. */ DH *ret = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; if (r == NULL) goto err; ret = DH_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; if (r->p != NULL || r->g != NULL || r->q != NULL) { if (r->p == NULL || r->g == NULL || r->q == NULL) { /* Shouldn't happen */ goto err; } p = BN_dup(r->p); g = BN_dup(r->g); q = BN_dup(r->q); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || q == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(ret, p, q, g)) goto err; p = g = q = NULL; } if (r->pub_key != NULL) { pub_key = BN_dup(r->pub_key); if (pub_key == NULL) goto err; if (r->priv_key != NULL) { priv_key = BN_dup(r->priv_key); if (priv_key == NULL) goto err; } if (!DH_set0_key(ret, pub_key, priv_key)) goto err; } else if (r->priv_key != NULL) { /* Shouldn't happen */ goto err; } return ret; err: BN_free(p); BN_free(g); BN_free(q); BN_free(pub_key); BN_free(priv_key); DH_free(ret); return NULL; } #endif void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) { if (p != NULL) *p = d->p; if (q != NULL) *q = d->q; if (g != NULL) *g = d->g; } int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input * parameters MUST be non-NULL. */ if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(d->p); d->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(d->q); d->q = q; } if (g != NULL) { BN_free(d->g); d->g = g; } return 1; } void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) *pub_key = d->pub_key; if (priv_key != NULL) *priv_key = d->priv_key; } int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input * parameters MUST be non-NULL. The priv_key field may * be left NULL. */ if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) return 0; if (pub_key != NULL) { BN_free(d->pub_key); d->pub_key = pub_key; } if (priv_key != NULL) { BN_free(d->priv_key); d->priv_key = priv_key; } return 1; } void DSA_clear_flags(DSA *d, int flags) { d->flags &= ~flags; } int DSA_test_flags(const DSA *d, int flags) { return d->flags & flags; } void DSA_set_flags(DSA *d, int flags) { d->flags |= flags; } ENGINE *DSA_get0_engine(DSA *d) { return d->engine; } int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa) { return BN_num_bits(dsa->p); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_meth.c0000644000000000000000000001204013176625657016077 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include "dsa_locl.h" #include #include DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags) { DSA_METHOD *dsam = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dsam)); if (dsam != NULL) { dsam->flags = flags; dsam->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (dsam->name != NULL) return dsam; OPENSSL_free(dsam); } DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } void DSA_meth_free(DSA_METHOD *dsam) { if (dsam != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(dsam->name); OPENSSL_free(dsam); } } DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_dup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam) { DSA_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret != NULL) { memcpy(ret, dsam, sizeof(*dsam)); ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(dsam->name); if (ret->name != NULL) return ret; OPENSSL_free(ret); } DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } const char *DSA_meth_get0_name(const DSA_METHOD *dsam) { return dsam->name; } int DSA_meth_set1_name(DSA_METHOD *dsam, const char *name) { char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (tmpname == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(dsam->name); dsam->name = tmpname; return 1; } int DSA_meth_get_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam) { return dsam->flags; } int DSA_meth_set_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int flags) { dsam->flags = flags; return 1; } void *DSA_meth_get0_app_data(const DSA_METHOD *dsam) { return dsam->app_data; } int DSA_meth_set0_app_data(DSA_METHOD *dsam, void *app_data) { dsam->app_data = app_data; return 1; } DSA_SIG *(*DSA_meth_get_sign(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *) { return dsam->dsa_do_sign; } int DSA_meth_set_sign(DSA_METHOD *dsam, DSA_SIG *(*sign) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *)) { dsam->dsa_do_sign = sign; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_sign_setup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **) { return dsam->dsa_sign_setup; } int DSA_meth_set_sign_setup(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*sign_setup) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **)) { dsam->dsa_sign_setup = sign_setup; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_verify(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (const unsigned char *, int , DSA_SIG *, DSA *) { return dsam->dsa_do_verify; } int DSA_meth_set_verify(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*verify) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *)) { dsam->dsa_do_verify = verify; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *) { return dsam->dsa_mod_exp; } int DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)) { dsam->dsa_mod_exp = mod_exp; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *) { return dsam->bn_mod_exp; } int DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)) { dsam->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_init(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))(DSA *) { return dsam->init; } int DSA_meth_set_init(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*init)(DSA *)) { dsam->init = init; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_finish(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *) { return dsam->finish; } int DSA_meth_set_finish(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*finish) (DSA *)) { dsam->finish = finish; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_paramgen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *) { return dsam->dsa_paramgen; } int DSA_meth_set_paramgen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*paramgen) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *)) { dsam->dsa_paramgen = paramgen; return 1; } int (*DSA_meth_get_keygen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *) { return dsam->dsa_keygen; } int DSA_meth_set_keygen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*keygen) (DSA *)) { dsam->dsa_keygen = keygen; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c0000644000000000000000000003307113176625657016247 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "dsa_locl.h" #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p, *pm; int pklen, pmlen; int ptype; const void *pval; const ASN1_STRING *pstr; X509_ALGOR *palg; ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL; DSA *dsa = NULL; if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { pstr = pval; pm = pstr->data; pmlen = pstr->length; if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } } else if ((ptype == V_ASN1_NULL) || (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)) { if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR); goto err; } if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dsa->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); return 1; err: ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); DSA_free(dsa); return 0; } static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *dsa; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; ASN1_STRING *str = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *pubint = NULL; dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa; if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) { str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (str == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data); if (str->length <= 0) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } else ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF; pubint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dsa->pub_key, NULL); if (pubint == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubint, &penc); ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubint); if (penclen <= 0) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA), ptype, str, penc, penclen)) return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(penc); ASN1_STRING_free(str); return 0; } /* * In PKCS#8 DSA: you just get a private key integer and parameters in the * AlgorithmIdentifier the pubkey must be recalculated. */ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p, *pm; int pklen, pmlen; int ptype; const void *pval; const ASN1_STRING *pstr; const X509_ALGOR *palg; ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; DSA *dsa = NULL; int ret = 0; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) goto decerr; if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER || ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) goto decerr; pstr = pval; pm = pstr->data; pmlen = pstr->length; if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) goto decerr; /* We have parameters now set private key */ if ((dsa->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dsa->priv_key)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR); goto dsaerr; } /* Calculate public key */ if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto dsaerr; } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto dsaerr; } BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR); goto dsaerr; } EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); ret = 1; goto done; decerr: DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR); dsaerr: DSA_free(dsa); done: BN_CTX_free(ctx); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return ret; } static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { ASN1_STRING *params = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL; unsigned char *dp = NULL; int dplen; if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); goto err; } params = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (params == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } params->length = i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, ¶ms->data); if (params->length <= 0) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; /* Get private key into integer */ prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key, NULL); if (!prkey) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR); goto err; } dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); prkey = NULL; if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen)) goto err; return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(dp); ASN1_STRING_free(params); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); return 0; } static int int_dsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return (DSA_size(pkey->pkey.dsa)); } static int dsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return DSA_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa); } static int dsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return DSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa); } static int dsa_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *dsa; dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa; if (dsa == NULL || dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) return 1; return 0; } static int dsa_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) { BIGNUM *a; if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL) { to->pkey.dsa = DSA_new(); if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL) return 0; } if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->p)) == NULL) return 0; BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->p); to->pkey.dsa->p = a; if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->q)) == NULL) return 0; BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->q); to->pkey.dsa->q = a; if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->g)) == NULL) return 0; BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->g); to->pkey.dsa->g = a; return 1; } static int dsa_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->p, b->pkey.dsa->p) || BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->q, b->pkey.dsa->q) || BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->g, b->pkey.dsa->g)) return 0; else return 1; } static int dsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dsa->pub_key, a->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0) return 0; else return 1; } static void int_dsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA_free(pkey->pkey.dsa); } static int do_dsa_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off, int ptype) { int ret = 0; const char *ktype = NULL; const BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key; if (ptype == 2) priv_key = x->priv_key; else priv_key = NULL; if (ptype > 0) pub_key = x->pub_key; else pub_key = NULL; if (ptype == 2) ktype = "Private-Key"; else if (ptype == 1) ktype = "Public-Key"; else ktype = "DSA-Parameters"; if (priv_key) { if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p)) <= 0) goto err; } if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "priv:", priv_key, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "pub: ", pub_key, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "P: ", x->p, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Q: ", x->q, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "G: ", x->g, NULL, off)) goto err; ret = 1; err: return (ret); } static int dsa_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { DSA *dsa; if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); return 1; } static int dsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder); } static int dsa_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 0); } static int dsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 1); } static int dsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 2); } static int old_dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { DSA *dsa; if ((dsa = d2i_DSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { DSAerr(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa); return 1; } static int old_dsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_DSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder); } static int dsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { DSA_SIG *dsa_sig; const unsigned char *p; if (!sig) { if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) return 0; else return 1; } p = sig->data; dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &p, sig->length); if (dsa_sig) { int rv = 0; const BIGNUM *r, *s; DSA_SIG_get0(dsa_sig, &r, &s); if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "r: ", r, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "s: ", s, NULL, indent)) goto err; rv = 1; err: DSA_SIG_free(dsa_sig); return rv; } return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent); } static int dsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { switch (op) { case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) { int snid, hnid; X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2); if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL) return -1; hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm); if (hnid == NID_undef) return -1; if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) return -1; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0); } return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) { int snid, hnid; X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2; CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2); if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL) return -1; hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm); if (hnid == NID_undef) return -1; if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) return -1; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0); } return 1; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE: *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE; return 1; #endif case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; return 2; default: return -2; } } /* NB these are sorted in pkey_id order, lowest first */ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[5] = { { EVP_PKEY_DSA2, EVP_PKEY_DSA, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}, { EVP_PKEY_DSA1, EVP_PKEY_DSA, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}, { EVP_PKEY_DSA4, EVP_PKEY_DSA, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}, { EVP_PKEY_DSA3, EVP_PKEY_DSA, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}, { EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0, "DSA", "OpenSSL DSA method", dsa_pub_decode, dsa_pub_encode, dsa_pub_cmp, dsa_pub_print, dsa_priv_decode, dsa_priv_encode, dsa_priv_print, int_dsa_size, dsa_bits, dsa_security_bits, dsa_param_decode, dsa_param_encode, dsa_missing_parameters, dsa_copy_parameters, dsa_cmp_parameters, dsa_param_print, dsa_sig_print, int_dsa_free, dsa_pkey_ctrl, old_dsa_priv_decode, old_dsa_priv_encode} }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_depr.c0000644000000000000000000000316313176625657016102 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This file contains deprecated function(s) that are now wrappers to the new * version(s). */ /* * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186, * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB * 180-1) */ #define xxxHASH EVP_sha1() #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg) { BN_GENCB *cb; DSA *ret; if ((ret = DSA_new()) == NULL) return NULL; cb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (cb == NULL) goto err; BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg); if (DSA_generate_parameters_ex(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len, counter_ret, h_ret, cb)) { BN_GENCB_free(cb); return ret; } BN_GENCB_free(cb); err: DSA_free(ret); return NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000001010013176625657015777 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "dsa_locl.h" #include #include #include ASN1_SEQUENCE(DSA_SIG) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(DSA_SIG) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA_SIG, DSA_SIG, DSA_SIG) DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) { DSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sig)); if (sig == NULL) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return sig; } void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) { if (sig == NULL) return; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); OPENSSL_free(sig); } void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) { if (pr != NULL) *pr = sig->r; if (ps != NULL) *ps = sig->s; } int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { if (r == NULL || s == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); sig->r = r; sig->s = s; return 1; } /* Override the default free and new methods */ static int dsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)DSA_new(); if (*pval != NULL) return 2; return 0; } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) { DSA_free((DSA *)*pval); *pval = NULL; return 2; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAPrivateKey, dsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, priv_key, CBIGNUM) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPrivateKey) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPrivateKey, DSAPrivateKey) ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAparams, dsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM), } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAparams) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAparams, DSAparams) ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAPublicKey, dsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPublicKey) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPublicKey, DSAPublicKey) DSA *DSAparams_dup(DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(DSAparams), dsa); } int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa) { DSA_SIG *s; RAND_seed(dgst, dlen); s = DSA_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa); if (s == NULL) { *siglen = 0; return (0); } *siglen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &sig); DSA_SIG_free(s); return (1); } /* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */ /*- * returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error */ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa) { DSA_SIG *s; const unsigned char *p = sigbuf; unsigned char *der = NULL; int derlen = -1; int ret = -1; s = DSA_SIG_new(); if (s == NULL) return (ret); if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s, &p, siglen) == NULL) goto err; /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */ derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der); if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen)) goto err; ret = DSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, dsa); err: OPENSSL_clear_free(der, derlen); DSA_SIG_free(s); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dsa/dsa_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000550413176625657016107 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include struct dsa_st { /* * This first variable is used to pick up errors where a DSA is passed * instead of of a EVP_PKEY */ int pad; long version; BIGNUM *p; BIGNUM *q; /* == 20 */ BIGNUM *g; BIGNUM *pub_key; /* y public key */ BIGNUM *priv_key; /* x private key */ int flags; /* Normally used to cache montgomery values */ BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p; int references; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const DSA_METHOD *meth; /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */ ENGINE *engine; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct DSA_SIG_st { BIGNUM *r; BIGNUM *s; }; struct dsa_method { char *name; DSA_SIG *(*dsa_do_sign) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); int (*dsa_sign_setup) (DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); int (*dsa_do_verify) (const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); int (*dsa_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1, const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); /* Can be null */ int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int (*init) (DSA *dsa); int (*finish) (DSA *dsa); int flags; void *app_data; /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA parameters */ int (*dsa_paramgen) (DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); /* If this is non-NULL, it is used to generate DSA keys */ int (*dsa_keygen) (DSA *dsa); }; int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ui/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014012 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ui/ui_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000650413176625660015616 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_UI_LOCL_H # define HEADER_UI_LOCL_H # include # include # ifdef _ # undef _ # endif struct ui_method_st { char *name; /* * All the functions return 1 or non-NULL for success and 0 or NULL for * failure */ /* * Open whatever channel for this, be it the console, an X window or * whatever. This function should use the ex_data structure to save * intermediate data. */ int (*ui_open_session) (UI *ui); int (*ui_write_string) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); /* * Flush the output. If a GUI dialog box is used, this function can be * used to actually display it. */ int (*ui_flush) (UI *ui); int (*ui_read_string) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); int (*ui_close_session) (UI *ui); /* * Construct a prompt in a user-defined manner. object_desc is a textual * short description of the object, for example "pass phrase", and * object_name is the name of the object (might be a card name or a file * name. The returned string shall always be allocated on the heap with * OPENSSL_malloc(), and need to be free'd with OPENSSL_free(). */ char *(*ui_construct_prompt) (UI *ui, const char *object_desc, const char *object_name); }; struct ui_string_st { enum UI_string_types type; /* Input */ const char *out_string; /* Input */ int input_flags; /* Flags from the user */ /* * The following parameters are completely irrelevant for UIT_INFO, and * can therefore be set to 0 or NULL */ char *result_buf; /* Input and Output: If not NULL, * user-defined with size in result_maxsize. * Otherwise, it may be allocated by the UI * routine, meaning result_minsize is going * to be overwritten. */ union { struct { int result_minsize; /* Input: minimum required size of the * result. */ int result_maxsize; /* Input: maximum permitted size of the * result */ const char *test_buf; /* Input: test string to verify against */ } string_data; struct { const char *action_desc; /* Input */ const char *ok_chars; /* Input */ const char *cancel_chars; /* Input */ } boolean_data; } _; # define OUT_STRING_FREEABLE 0x01 int flags; /* flags for internal use */ }; struct ui_st { const UI_METHOD *meth; STACK_OF(UI_STRING) *strings; /* We might want to prompt for more than * one thing at a time, and with different * echoing status. */ void *user_data; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; # define UI_FLAG_REDOABLE 0x0001 # define UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS 0x0100 int flags; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c0000644000000000000000000005502013176625660015423 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ui_locl.h" UI *UI_new(void) { return (UI_new_method(NULL)); } UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method) { UI *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } if (method == NULL) ret->meth = UI_get_default_method(); else ret->meth = method; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } static void free_string(UI_STRING *uis) { if (uis->flags & OUT_STRING_FREEABLE) { OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->out_string); switch (uis->type) { case UIT_BOOLEAN: OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->_.boolean_data.action_desc); OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->_.boolean_data.ok_chars); OPENSSL_free((char *)uis->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars); break; default: break; } } OPENSSL_free(uis); } void UI_free(UI *ui) { if (ui == NULL) return; sk_UI_STRING_pop_free(ui->strings, free_string); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI, ui, &ui->ex_data); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ui->lock); OPENSSL_free(ui); } static int allocate_string_stack(UI *ui) { if (ui->strings == NULL) { ui->strings = sk_UI_STRING_new_null(); if (ui->strings == NULL) { return -1; } } return 0; } static UI_STRING *general_allocate_prompt(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int prompt_freeable, enum UI_string_types type, int input_flags, char *result_buf) { UI_STRING *ret = NULL; if (prompt == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); } else if ((type == UIT_PROMPT || type == UIT_VERIFY || type == UIT_BOOLEAN) && result_buf == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT, UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER); } else if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) != NULL) { ret->out_string = prompt; ret->flags = prompt_freeable ? OUT_STRING_FREEABLE : 0; ret->input_flags = input_flags; ret->type = type; ret->result_buf = result_buf; } return ret; } static int general_allocate_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int prompt_freeable, enum UI_string_types type, int input_flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf) { int ret = -1; UI_STRING *s = general_allocate_prompt(ui, prompt, prompt_freeable, type, input_flags, result_buf); if (s != NULL) { if (allocate_string_stack(ui) >= 0) { s->_.string_data.result_minsize = minsize; s->_.string_data.result_maxsize = maxsize; s->_.string_data.test_buf = test_buf; ret = sk_UI_STRING_push(ui->strings, s); /* sk_push() returns 0 on error. Let's adapt that */ if (ret <= 0) { ret--; free_string(s); } } else free_string(s); } return ret; } static int general_allocate_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, int prompt_freeable, enum UI_string_types type, int input_flags, char *result_buf) { int ret = -1; UI_STRING *s; const char *p; if (ok_chars == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); } else if (cancel_chars == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); } else { for (p = ok_chars; *p != '\0'; p++) { if (strchr(cancel_chars, *p) != NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN, UI_R_COMMON_OK_AND_CANCEL_CHARACTERS); } } s = general_allocate_prompt(ui, prompt, prompt_freeable, type, input_flags, result_buf); if (s != NULL) { if (allocate_string_stack(ui) >= 0) { s->_.boolean_data.action_desc = action_desc; s->_.boolean_data.ok_chars = ok_chars; s->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars = cancel_chars; ret = sk_UI_STRING_push(ui->strings, s); /* * sk_push() returns 0 on error. Let's adapt that */ if (ret <= 0) { ret--; free_string(s); } } else free_string(s); } } return ret; } /* * Returns the index to the place in the stack or -1 for error. Uses a * direct reference to the prompt. */ int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize) { return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt, 0, UIT_PROMPT, flags, result_buf, minsize, maxsize, NULL); } /* Same as UI_add_input_string(), excepts it takes a copy of the prompt */ int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize) { char *prompt_copy = NULL; if (prompt != NULL) { prompt_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(prompt); if (prompt_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt_copy, 1, UIT_PROMPT, flags, result_buf, minsize, maxsize, NULL); } int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf) { return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt, 0, UIT_VERIFY, flags, result_buf, minsize, maxsize, test_buf); } int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf) { char *prompt_copy = NULL; if (prompt != NULL) { prompt_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(prompt); if (prompt_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_VERIFY_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } } return general_allocate_string(ui, prompt_copy, 1, UIT_VERIFY, flags, result_buf, minsize, maxsize, test_buf); } int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, int flags, char *result_buf) { return general_allocate_boolean(ui, prompt, action_desc, ok_chars, cancel_chars, 0, UIT_BOOLEAN, flags, result_buf); } int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, int flags, char *result_buf) { char *prompt_copy = NULL; char *action_desc_copy = NULL; char *ok_chars_copy = NULL; char *cancel_chars_copy = NULL; if (prompt != NULL) { prompt_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(prompt); if (prompt_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (action_desc != NULL) { action_desc_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(action_desc); if (action_desc_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (ok_chars != NULL) { ok_chars_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(ok_chars); if (ok_chars_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (cancel_chars != NULL) { cancel_chars_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(cancel_chars); if (cancel_chars_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } return general_allocate_boolean(ui, prompt_copy, action_desc_copy, ok_chars_copy, cancel_chars_copy, 1, UIT_BOOLEAN, flags, result_buf); err: OPENSSL_free(prompt_copy); OPENSSL_free(action_desc_copy); OPENSSL_free(ok_chars_copy); OPENSSL_free(cancel_chars_copy); return -1; } int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text) { return general_allocate_string(ui, text, 0, UIT_INFO, 0, NULL, 0, 0, NULL); } int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text) { char *text_copy = NULL; if (text != NULL) { text_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(text); if (text_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_INFO_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } } return general_allocate_string(ui, text_copy, 1, UIT_INFO, 0, NULL, 0, 0, NULL); } int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text) { return general_allocate_string(ui, text, 0, UIT_ERROR, 0, NULL, 0, 0, NULL); } int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text) { char *text_copy = NULL; if (text != NULL) { text_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(text); if (text_copy == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_DUP_ERROR_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } } return general_allocate_string(ui, text_copy, 1, UIT_ERROR, 0, NULL, 0, 0, NULL); } char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui, const char *object_desc, const char *object_name) { char *prompt = NULL; if (ui->meth->ui_construct_prompt != NULL) prompt = ui->meth->ui_construct_prompt(ui, object_desc, object_name); else { char prompt1[] = "Enter "; char prompt2[] = " for "; char prompt3[] = ":"; int len = 0; if (object_desc == NULL) return NULL; len = sizeof(prompt1) - 1 + strlen(object_desc); if (object_name != NULL) len += sizeof(prompt2) - 1 + strlen(object_name); len += sizeof(prompt3) - 1; prompt = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); if (prompt == NULL) return NULL; OPENSSL_strlcpy(prompt, prompt1, len + 1); OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, object_desc, len + 1); if (object_name != NULL) { OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, prompt2, len + 1); OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, object_name, len + 1); } OPENSSL_strlcat(prompt, prompt3, len + 1); } return prompt; } void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data) { void *old_data = ui->user_data; ui->user_data = user_data; return old_data; } void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui) { return ui->user_data; } const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i) { if (i < 0) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT, UI_R_INDEX_TOO_SMALL); return NULL; } if (i >= sk_UI_STRING_num(ui->strings)) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT, UI_R_INDEX_TOO_LARGE); return NULL; } return UI_get0_result_string(sk_UI_STRING_value(ui->strings, i)); } static int print_error(const char *str, size_t len, UI *ui) { UI_STRING uis; memset(&uis, 0, sizeof(uis)); uis.type = UIT_ERROR; uis.out_string = str; if (ui->meth->ui_write_string != NULL && ui->meth->ui_write_string(ui, &uis) <= 0) return -1; return 0; } int UI_process(UI *ui) { int i, ok = 0; const char *state = "processing"; if (ui->meth->ui_open_session != NULL && ui->meth->ui_open_session(ui) <= 0) { state = "opening session"; ok = -1; goto err; } if (ui->flags & UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS) ERR_print_errors_cb((int (*)(const char *, size_t, void *)) print_error, (void *)ui); for (i = 0; i < sk_UI_STRING_num(ui->strings); i++) { if (ui->meth->ui_write_string != NULL && (ui->meth->ui_write_string(ui, sk_UI_STRING_value(ui->strings, i)) <= 0)) { state = "writing strings"; ok = -1; goto err; } } if (ui->meth->ui_flush != NULL) switch (ui->meth->ui_flush(ui)) { case -1: /* Interrupt/Cancel/something... */ ok = -2; goto err; case 0: /* Errors */ state = "flushing"; ok = -1; goto err; default: /* Success */ ok = 0; break; } for (i = 0; i < sk_UI_STRING_num(ui->strings); i++) { if (ui->meth->ui_read_string != NULL) { switch (ui->meth->ui_read_string(ui, sk_UI_STRING_value(ui->strings, i))) { case -1: /* Interrupt/Cancel/something... */ ok = -2; goto err; case 0: /* Errors */ state = "reading strings"; ok = -1; goto err; default: /* Success */ ok = 0; break; } } } state = NULL; err: if (ui->meth->ui_close_session != NULL && ui->meth->ui_close_session(ui) <= 0) { if (state == NULL) state = "closing session"; ok = -1; } if (ok == -1) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_PROCESS, UI_R_PROCESSING_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "while ", state); } return ok; } int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) { if (ui == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return -1; } switch (cmd) { case UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS: { int save_flag = ! !(ui->flags & UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS); if (i) ui->flags |= UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS; else ui->flags &= ~UI_FLAG_PRINT_ERRORS; return save_flag; } case UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE: return ! !(ui->flags & UI_FLAG_REDOABLE); default: break; } UIerr(UI_F_UI_CTRL, UI_R_UNKNOWN_CONTROL_COMMAND); return -1; } int UI_set_ex_data(UI *r, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *UI_get_ex_data(UI *r, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx)); } const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui) { return ui->meth; } const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth) { ui->meth = meth; return ui->meth; } UI_METHOD *UI_create_method(const char *name) { UI_METHOD *ui_method = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ui_method)); if (ui_method != NULL) { ui_method->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (ui_method->name == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ui_method); UIerr(UI_F_UI_CREATE_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } return ui_method; } /* * BIG FSCKING WARNING!!!! If you use this on a statically allocated method * (that is, it hasn't been allocated using UI_create_method(), you deserve * anything Murphy can throw at you and more! You have been warned. */ void UI_destroy_method(UI_METHOD *ui_method) { OPENSSL_free(ui_method->name); ui_method->name = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ui_method); } int UI_method_set_opener(UI_METHOD *method, int (*opener) (UI *ui)) { if (method != NULL) { method->ui_open_session = opener; return 0; } return -1; } int UI_method_set_writer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*writer) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)) { if (method != NULL) { method->ui_write_string = writer; return 0; } return -1; } int UI_method_set_flusher(UI_METHOD *method, int (*flusher) (UI *ui)) { if (method != NULL) { method->ui_flush = flusher; return 0; } return -1; } int UI_method_set_reader(UI_METHOD *method, int (*reader) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)) { if (method != NULL) { method->ui_read_string = reader; return 0; } return -1; } int UI_method_set_closer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*closer) (UI *ui)) { if (method != NULL) { method->ui_close_session = closer; return 0; } return -1; } int UI_method_set_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method, char *(*prompt_constructor) (UI *ui, const char *object_desc, const char *object_name)) { if (method != NULL) { method->ui_construct_prompt = prompt_constructor; return 0; } return -1; } int (*UI_method_get_opener(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *) { if (method != NULL) return method->ui_open_session; return NULL; } int (*UI_method_get_writer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *) { if (method != NULL) return method->ui_write_string; return NULL; } int (*UI_method_get_flusher(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *) { if (method != NULL) return method->ui_flush; return NULL; } int (*UI_method_get_reader(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *) { if (method != NULL) return method->ui_read_string; return NULL; } int (*UI_method_get_closer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *) { if (method != NULL) return method->ui_close_session; return NULL; } char *(*UI_method_get_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, const char *, const char *) { if (method != NULL) return method->ui_construct_prompt; return NULL; } enum UI_string_types UI_get_string_type(UI_STRING *uis) { return uis->type; } int UI_get_input_flags(UI_STRING *uis) { return uis->input_flags; } const char *UI_get0_output_string(UI_STRING *uis) { return uis->out_string; } const char *UI_get0_action_string(UI_STRING *uis) { switch (uis->type) { case UIT_BOOLEAN: return uis->_.boolean_data.action_desc; default: return NULL; } } const char *UI_get0_result_string(UI_STRING *uis) { switch (uis->type) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: return uis->result_buf; default: return NULL; } } const char *UI_get0_test_string(UI_STRING *uis) { switch (uis->type) { case UIT_VERIFY: return uis->_.string_data.test_buf; default: return NULL; } } int UI_get_result_minsize(UI_STRING *uis) { switch (uis->type) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: return uis->_.string_data.result_minsize; default: return -1; } } int UI_get_result_maxsize(UI_STRING *uis) { switch (uis->type) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: return uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize; default: return -1; } } int UI_set_result(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, const char *result) { int l = strlen(result); ui->flags &= ~UI_FLAG_REDOABLE; switch (uis->type) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: { char number1[DECIMAL_SIZE(uis->_.string_data.result_minsize) + 1]; char number2[DECIMAL_SIZE(uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize) + 1]; BIO_snprintf(number1, sizeof(number1), "%d", uis->_.string_data.result_minsize); BIO_snprintf(number2, sizeof(number2), "%d", uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize); if (l < uis->_.string_data.result_minsize) { ui->flags |= UI_FLAG_REDOABLE; UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_RESULT_TOO_SMALL); ERR_add_error_data(5, "You must type in ", number1, " to ", number2, " characters"); return -1; } if (l > uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize) { ui->flags |= UI_FLAG_REDOABLE; UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_RESULT_TOO_LARGE); ERR_add_error_data(5, "You must type in ", number1, " to ", number2, " characters"); return -1; } } if (uis->result_buf == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER); return -1; } OPENSSL_strlcpy(uis->result_buf, result, uis->_.string_data.result_maxsize + 1); break; case UIT_BOOLEAN: { const char *p; if (uis->result_buf == NULL) { UIerr(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT, UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER); return -1; } uis->result_buf[0] = '\0'; for (p = result; *p; p++) { if (strchr(uis->_.boolean_data.ok_chars, *p)) { uis->result_buf[0] = uis->_.boolean_data.ok_chars[0]; break; } if (strchr(uis->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars, *p)) { uis->result_buf[0] = uis->_.boolean_data.cancel_chars[0]; break; } } } default: break; } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ui/ui_err.c0000644000000000000000000000531213176625660015444 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA UI_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_CLOSE_CONSOLE), "close_console"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_ECHO_CONSOLE), "echo_console"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN), "general_allocate_boolean"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT), "general_allocate_prompt"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_NOECHO_CONSOLE), "noecho_console"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE), "open_console"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_CREATE_METHOD), "UI_create_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_CTRL), "UI_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_ERROR_STRING), "UI_dup_error_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_INFO_STRING), "UI_dup_info_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN), "UI_dup_input_boolean"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_STRING), "UI_dup_input_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_DUP_VERIFY_STRING), "UI_dup_verify_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT), "UI_get0_result"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD), "UI_new_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_PROCESS), "UI_process"}, {ERR_FUNC(UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT), "UI_set_result"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA UI_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(UI_R_COMMON_OK_AND_CANCEL_CHARACTERS), "common ok and cancel characters"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_INDEX_TOO_LARGE), "index too large"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_INDEX_TOO_SMALL), "index too small"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER), "no result buffer"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_PROCESSING_ERROR), "processing error"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_RESULT_TOO_LARGE), "result too large"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_RESULT_TOO_SMALL), "result too small"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_SYSASSIGN_ERROR), "sys$assign error"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_SYSDASSGN_ERROR), "sys$dassgn error"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR), "sys$qiow error"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_UNKNOWN_CONTROL_COMMAND), "unknown control command"}, {ERR_REASON(UI_R_UNKNOWN_TTYGET_ERRNO_VALUE), "unknown ttyget errno value"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_UI_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(UI_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, UI_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, UI_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ui/build.info0000644000000000000000000000014013176625660015761 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ ui_err.c ui_lib.c ui_openssl.c ui_util.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c0000644000000000000000000004432313176625660016344 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include /* * need for #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE arises whenever you pass -ansi to gcc * [maybe others?], because it masks interfaces not discussed in standard, * sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for the * intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # include #endif #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 # endif #endif #include #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # else # include # endif /* * If unistd.h defines _POSIX_VERSION, we conclude that we are on a POSIX * system and have sigaction and termios. */ # if defined(_POSIX_VERSION) # define SIGACTION # if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # define TERMIOS # endif # endif #endif /* 06-Apr-92 Luke Brennan Support for VMS */ #include "ui_locl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* prototypes for sys$whatever */ # include # ifdef __DECC # pragma message disable DOLLARID # endif #endif #ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG # include # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE # include # endif #endif /* * There are 6 types of terminal interface supported, TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS, * MSDOS, WIN32 Console and SGTTY. * * If someone defines one of the macros TERMIO, TERMIOS or SGTTY, it will * remain respected. Otherwise, we default to TERMIOS except for a few * systems that require something different. * * Note: we do not use SGTTY unless it's defined by the configuration. We * may eventually opt to remove it's use entirely. */ #if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # if defined(_LIBC) # undef TERMIOS # define TERMIO # undef SGTTY /* * We know that VMS, MSDOS, VXWORKS, use entirely other mechanisms. */ # elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # define TERMIOS # undef TERMIO # undef SGTTY # endif #endif #ifdef TERMIOS # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termios # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) tcgetattr(tty,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) tcsetattr(tty,TCSANOW,data) #endif #ifdef TERMIO # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termio # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCGETA,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCSETA,data) #endif #ifdef SGTTY # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct sgttyb # define TTY_FLAGS sg_flags # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCGETP,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCSETP,data) #endif #if !defined(_LIBC) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include # include # include # include struct IOSB { short iosb$w_value; short iosb$w_count; long iosb$l_info; }; #endif #ifndef NX509_SIG # define NX509_SIG 32 #endif /* Define globals. They are protected by a lock */ #ifdef SIGACTION static struct sigaction savsig[NX509_SIG]; #else static void (*savsig[NX509_SIG]) (int); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS static struct IOSB iosb; static $DESCRIPTOR(terminal, "TT"); static long tty_orig[3], tty_new[3]; /* XXX Is there any guarantee that this * will always suffice for the actual * structures? */ static long status; static unsigned short channel = 0; #elif defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) static DWORD tty_orig, tty_new; #else # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(__DJGPP__) static TTY_STRUCT tty_orig, tty_new; # endif #endif static FILE *tty_in, *tty_out; static int is_a_tty; /* Declare static functions */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) static int read_till_nl(FILE *); static void recsig(int); static void pushsig(void); static void popsig(void); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty); #endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl); static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int open_console(UI *ui); static int echo_console(UI *ui); static int noecho_console(UI *ui); static int close_console(UI *ui); static UI_METHOD ui_openssl = { "OpenSSL default user interface", open_console, write_string, NULL, /* No flusher is needed for command lines */ read_string, close_console, NULL }; static const UI_METHOD *default_UI_meth = &ui_openssl; void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth) { default_UI_meth = meth; } const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void) { return default_UI_meth; } /* The method with all the built-in thingies */ UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void) { return &ui_openssl; } /* * The following function makes sure that info and error strings are printed * before any prompt. */ static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_ERROR: case UIT_INFO: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); break; default: break; } return 1; } static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { int ok = 0; switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_BOOLEAN: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fputs(UI_get0_action_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 0); case UIT_PROMPT: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1); case UIT_VERIFY: fprintf(tty_out, "Verifying - %s", UI_get0_output_string(uis)); fflush(tty_out); if ((ok = read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1)) <= 0) return ok; if (strcmp(UI_get0_result_string(uis), UI_get0_test_string(uis)) != 0) { fprintf(tty_out, "Verify failure\n"); fflush(tty_out); return 0; } break; default: break; } return 1; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to read a string without echoing */ static int read_till_nl(FILE *in) { # define SIZE 4 char buf[SIZE + 1]; do { if (!fgets(buf, SIZE, in)) return 0; } while (strchr(buf, '\n') == NULL); return 1; } static volatile sig_atomic_t intr_signal; #endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl) { static int ps; int ok; char result[BUFSIZ]; int maxsize = BUFSIZ - 1; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) char *p = NULL; int echo_eol = !echo; intr_signal = 0; ok = 0; ps = 0; pushsig(); ps = 1; if (!echo && !noecho_console(ui)) goto error; ps = 2; result[0] = '\0'; # if defined(_WIN32) if (is_a_tty) { DWORD numread; # if defined(CP_UTF8) if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8", NULL, 0) != 0) { WCHAR wresult[BUFSIZ]; if (ReadConsoleW(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), wresult, maxsize, &numread, NULL)) { if (numread >= 2 && wresult[numread-2] == L'\r' && wresult[numread-1] == L'\n') { wresult[numread-2] = L'\n'; numread--; } wresult[numread] = '\0'; if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wresult, -1, result, sizeof(result), NULL, 0) > 0) p = result; OPENSSL_cleanse(wresult, sizeof(wresult)); } } else # endif if (ReadConsoleA(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), result, maxsize, &numread, NULL)) { if (numread >= 2 && result[numread-2] == '\r' && result[numread-1] == '\n') { result[numread-2] = '\n'; numread--; } result[numread] = '\0'; p = result; } } else # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (!echo) { noecho_fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); p = result; /* FIXME: noecho_fgets doesn't return errors */ } else # endif p = fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); if (p == NULL) goto error; if (feof(tty_in)) goto error; if (ferror(tty_in)) goto error; if ((p = (char *)strchr(result, '\n')) != NULL) { if (strip_nl) *p = '\0'; } else if (!read_till_nl(tty_in)) goto error; if (UI_set_result(ui, uis, result) >= 0) ok = 1; error: if (intr_signal == SIGINT) ok = -1; if (echo_eol) fprintf(tty_out, "\n"); if (ps >= 2 && !echo && !echo_console(ui)) ok = 0; if (ps >= 1) popsig(); #else ok = 1; #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(result, BUFSIZ); return ok; } /* Internal functions to open, handle and close a channel to the console. */ static int open_console(UI *ui) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ui->lock); is_a_tty = 1; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) tty_in = stdin; tty_out = stderr; #elif defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) if ((tty_out = fopen("conout$", "w")) == NULL) tty_out = stderr; if (GetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), &tty_orig)) { tty_in = stdin; } else { is_a_tty = 0; if ((tty_in = fopen("conin$", "r")) == NULL) tty_in = stdin; } #else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # define DEV_TTY "con" # else # define DEV_TTY "/dev/tty" # endif if ((tty_in = fopen(DEV_TTY, "r")) == NULL) tty_in = stdin; if ((tty_out = fopen(DEV_TTY, "w")) == NULL) tty_out = stderr; #endif #if defined(TTY_get) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (TTY_get(fileno(tty_in), &tty_orig) == -1) { # ifdef ENOTTY if (errno == ENOTTY) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef EINVAL /* * Ariel Glenn ariel@columbia.edu reports that solaris can return * EINVAL instead. This should be ok */ if (errno == EINVAL) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef ENODEV /* * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device), * which seems appropriate. */ if (errno == ENODEV) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif { char tmp_num[10]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%d", errno); UIerr(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE, UI_R_UNKNOWN_TTYGET_ERRNO_VALUE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "errno=", tmp_num); return 0; } } #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$assign(&terminal, &channel, 0, 0); /* if there isn't a TT device, something is very wrong */ if (status != SS$_NORMAL) { char tmp_num[12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); UIerr(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSASSIGN_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "status=", tmp_num); return 0; } status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SENSEMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_orig, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); /* If IO$_SENSEMODE doesn't work, this is not a terminal device */ if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) is_a_tty = 0; #endif return 1; } static int noecho_console(UI *ui) { #ifdef TTY_FLAGS memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); tty_new.TTY_FLAGS &= ~ECHO; #endif #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] | TT$M_NOECHO; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) { char tmp_num[2][12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[0], sizeof(tmp_num[0]) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[1], sizeof(tmp_num[1]) - 1, "%%X%08X", iosb.iosb$w_value); UIerr(UI_F_NOECHO_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(5, "status=", tmp_num[0], ",", "iosb.iosb$w_value=", tmp_num[1]); return 0; } } #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) if (is_a_tty) { tty_new = tty_orig; tty_new &= ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT; SetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), tty_new); } #endif return 1; } static int echo_console(UI *ui) { #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); tty_new.TTY_FLAGS |= ECHO; #endif #if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] & ~TT$M_NOECHO; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) { char tmp_num[2][12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[0], sizeof(tmp_num[0]) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[1], sizeof(tmp_num[1]) - 1, "%%X%08X", iosb.iosb$w_value); UIerr(UI_F_ECHO_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(5, "status=", tmp_num[0], ",", "iosb.iosb$w_value=", tmp_num[1]); return 0; } } #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) if (is_a_tty) { tty_new = tty_orig; tty_new |= ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT; SetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), tty_new); } #endif return 1; } static int close_console(UI *ui) { if (tty_in != stdin) fclose(tty_in); if (tty_out != stderr) fclose(tty_out); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$dassgn(channel); if (status != SS$_NORMAL) { char tmp_num[12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); UIerr(UI_F_CLOSE_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSDASSGN_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "status=", tmp_num); return 0; } #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ui->lock); return 1; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to handle signals and act on them */ static void pushsig(void) { # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 int i; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION struct sigaction sa; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = recsig; # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 savsig[SIGABRT] = signal(SIGABRT, recsig); savsig[SIGFPE] = signal(SIGFPE, recsig); savsig[SIGILL] = signal(SIGILL, recsig); savsig[SIGINT] = signal(SIGINT, recsig); savsig[SIGSEGV] = signal(SIGSEGV, recsig); savsig[SIGTERM] = signal(SIGTERM, recsig); # else for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGKILL if (i == SIGKILL) /* We can't make any action on that. */ continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &sa, &savsig[i]); # else savsig[i] = signal(i, recsig); # endif } # endif # ifdef SIGWINCH signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); # endif } static void popsig(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 signal(SIGABRT, savsig[SIGABRT]); signal(SIGFPE, savsig[SIGFPE]); signal(SIGILL, savsig[SIGILL]); signal(SIGINT, savsig[SIGINT]); signal(SIGSEGV, savsig[SIGSEGV]); signal(SIGTERM, savsig[SIGTERM]); # else int i; for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &savsig[i], NULL); # else signal(i, savsig[i]); # endif } # endif } static void recsig(int i) { intr_signal = i; } #endif /* Internal functions specific for Windows */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty) { int i; char *p; p = buf; for (;;) { if (size == 0) { *p = '\0'; break; } size--; # if defined(_WIN32) i = _getch(); # else i = getch(); # endif if (i == '\r') i = '\n'; *(p++) = i; if (i == '\n') { *p = '\0'; break; } } # ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG /* * Win95 has several evil console bugs: one of these is that the last * character read using getch() is passed to the next read: this is * usually a CR so this can be trouble. No STDIO fix seems to work but * flushing the console appears to do the trick. */ { HANDLE inh; inh = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); FlushConsoleInputBuffer(inh); } # endif return (strlen(buf)); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ui/ui_util.c0000644000000000000000000000236413176625660015635 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ui_locl.h" #ifndef BUFSIZ #define BUFSIZ 256 #endif int UI_UTIL_read_pw_string(char *buf, int length, const char *prompt, int verify) { char buff[BUFSIZ]; int ret; ret = UI_UTIL_read_pw(buf, buff, (length > BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ : length, prompt, verify); OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ); return (ret); } int UI_UTIL_read_pw(char *buf, char *buff, int size, const char *prompt, int verify) { int ok = 0; UI *ui; if (size < 1) return -1; ui = UI_new(); if (ui != NULL) { ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, 0, size - 1); if (ok >= 0 && verify) ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, buff, 0, size - 1, buf); if (ok >= 0) ok = UI_process(ui); UI_free(ui); } if (ok > 0) ok = 0; return (ok); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/threads_pthread.c0000644000000000000000000000663313176625660016712 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # ifdef PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER # define USE_RWLOCK # endif CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void) { # ifdef USE_RWLOCK CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(pthread_rwlock_t)); if (lock == NULL) return NULL; if (pthread_rwlock_init(lock, NULL) != 0) { OPENSSL_free(lock); return NULL; } # else pthread_mutexattr_t attr; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(pthread_mutex_t)); if (lock == NULL) return NULL; pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr); pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE); if (pthread_mutex_init(lock, &attr) != 0) { pthread_mutexattr_destroy(&attr); OPENSSL_free(lock); return NULL; } pthread_mutexattr_destroy(&attr); # endif return lock; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { # ifdef USE_RWLOCK if (pthread_rwlock_rdlock(lock) != 0) return 0; # else if (pthread_mutex_lock(lock) != 0) return 0; # endif return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { # ifdef USE_RWLOCK if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(lock) != 0) return 0; # else if (pthread_mutex_lock(lock) != 0) return 0; # endif return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { # ifdef USE_RWLOCK if (pthread_rwlock_unlock(lock) != 0) return 0; # else if (pthread_mutex_unlock(lock) != 0) return 0; # endif return 1; } void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { if (lock == NULL) return; # ifdef USE_RWLOCK pthread_rwlock_destroy(lock); # else pthread_mutex_destroy(lock); # endif OPENSSL_free(lock); return; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void)) { if (pthread_once(once, init) != 0) return 0; return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *)) { if (pthread_key_create(key, cleanup) != 0) return 0; return 1; } void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key) { return pthread_getspecific(*key); } int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val) { if (pthread_setspecific(*key, val) != 0) return 0; return 1; } int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key) { if (pthread_key_delete(*key) != 0) return 0; return 1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void) { return pthread_self(); } int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b) { return pthread_equal(a, b); } int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { # if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ATOMIC_ACQ_REL) if (__atomic_is_lock_free(sizeof(*val), val)) { *ret = __atomic_add_fetch(val, amount, __ATOMIC_ACQ_REL); return 1; } # endif if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock)) return 0; *val += amount; *ret = *val; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock)) return 0; return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014150 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/sha256.c0000644000000000000000000003022413176625660015325 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); c->h[0] = 0xc1059ed8UL; c->h[1] = 0x367cd507UL; c->h[2] = 0x3070dd17UL; c->h[3] = 0xf70e5939UL; c->h[4] = 0xffc00b31UL; c->h[5] = 0x68581511UL; c->h[6] = 0x64f98fa7UL; c->h[7] = 0xbefa4fa4UL; c->md_len = SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH; return 1; } int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); c->h[0] = 0x6a09e667UL; c->h[1] = 0xbb67ae85UL; c->h[2] = 0x3c6ef372UL; c->h[3] = 0xa54ff53aUL; c->h[4] = 0x510e527fUL; c->h[5] = 0x9b05688cUL; c->h[6] = 0x1f83d9abUL; c->h[7] = 0x5be0cd19UL; c->md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; return 1; } unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { SHA256_CTX c; static unsigned char m[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; SHA224_Init(&c); SHA256_Update(&c, d, n); SHA256_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); return (md); } unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { SHA256_CTX c; static unsigned char m[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; SHA256_Init(&c); SHA256_Update(&c, d, n); SHA256_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); return (md); } int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len) { return SHA256_Update(c, data, len); } int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c) { return SHA256_Final(md, c); } #define DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN #define HASH_LONG SHA_LONG #define HASH_CTX SHA256_CTX #define HASH_CBLOCK SHA_CBLOCK /* * Note that FIPS180-2 discusses "Truncation of the Hash Function Output." * default: case below covers for it. It's not clear however if it's * permitted to truncate to amount of bytes not divisible by 4. I bet not, * but if it is, then default: case shall be extended. For reference. * Idea behind separate cases for pre-defined lengths is to let the * compiler decide if it's appropriate to unroll small loops. */ #define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s) do { \ unsigned long ll; \ unsigned int nn; \ switch ((c)->md_len) \ { case SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH: \ for (nn=0;nnh[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); } \ break; \ case SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH: \ for (nn=0;nnh[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); } \ break; \ default: \ if ((c)->md_len > SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) \ return 0; \ for (nn=0;nn<(c)->md_len/4;nn++) \ { ll=(c)->h[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); } \ break; \ } \ } while (0) #define HASH_UPDATE SHA256_Update #define HASH_TRANSFORM SHA256_Transform #define HASH_FINAL SHA256_Final #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER sha256_block_data_order #ifndef SHA256_ASM static #endif void sha256_block_data_order(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num); #include "internal/md32_common.h" #ifndef SHA256_ASM static const SHA_LONG K256[64] = { 0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL, 0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL, 0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL, 0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL, 0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL, 0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL, 0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL, 0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL, 0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL, 0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL, 0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL, 0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL, 0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL, 0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL, 0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL, 0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL }; /* * FIPS specification refers to right rotations, while our ROTATE macro * is left one. This is why you might notice that rotation coefficients * differ from those observed in FIPS document by 32-N... */ # define Sigma0(x) (ROTATE((x),30) ^ ROTATE((x),19) ^ ROTATE((x),10)) # define Sigma1(x) (ROTATE((x),26) ^ ROTATE((x),21) ^ ROTATE((x),7)) # define sigma0(x) (ROTATE((x),25) ^ ROTATE((x),14) ^ ((x)>>3)) # define sigma1(x) (ROTATE((x),15) ^ ROTATE((x),13) ^ ((x)>>10)) # define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z))) # define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z))) # ifdef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT static void sha256_block_data_order(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num) { unsigned MD32_REG_T a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1, T2; SHA_LONG X[16], l; int i; const unsigned char *data = in; while (num--) { a = ctx->h[0]; b = ctx->h[1]; c = ctx->h[2]; d = ctx->h[3]; e = ctx->h[4]; f = ctx->h[5]; g = ctx->h[6]; h = ctx->h[7]; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[i] = l; T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[i]; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; } for (; i < 64; i++) { s0 = X[(i + 1) & 0x0f]; s0 = sigma0(s0); s1 = X[(i + 14) & 0x0f]; s1 = sigma1(s1); T1 = X[i & 0xf] += s0 + s1 + X[(i + 9) & 0xf]; T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[i]; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; } ctx->h[0] += a; ctx->h[1] += b; ctx->h[2] += c; ctx->h[3] += d; ctx->h[4] += e; ctx->h[5] += f; ctx->h[6] += g; ctx->h[7] += h; } } # else # define ROUND_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + K256[i]; \ h = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); \ d += T1; h += T1; } while (0) # define ROUND_16_63(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,X) do { \ s0 = X[(i+1)&0x0f]; s0 = sigma0(s0); \ s1 = X[(i+14)&0x0f]; s1 = sigma1(s1); \ T1 = X[(i)&0x0f] += s0 + s1 + X[(i+9)&0x0f]; \ ROUND_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); } while (0) static void sha256_block_data_order(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num) { unsigned MD32_REG_T a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1; SHA_LONG X[16]; int i; const unsigned char *data = in; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; while (num--) { a = ctx->h[0]; b = ctx->h[1]; c = ctx->h[2]; d = ctx->h[3]; e = ctx->h[4]; f = ctx->h[5]; g = ctx->h[6]; h = ctx->h[7]; if (!is_endian.little && sizeof(SHA_LONG) == 4 && ((size_t)in % 4) == 0) { const SHA_LONG *W = (const SHA_LONG *)data; T1 = X[0] = W[0]; ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); T1 = X[1] = W[1]; ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); T1 = X[2] = W[2]; ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); T1 = X[3] = W[3]; ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); T1 = X[4] = W[4]; ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); T1 = X[5] = W[5]; ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); T1 = X[6] = W[6]; ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); T1 = X[7] = W[7]; ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); T1 = X[8] = W[8]; ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); T1 = X[9] = W[9]; ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); T1 = X[10] = W[10]; ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); T1 = X[11] = W[11]; ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); T1 = X[12] = W[12]; ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); T1 = X[13] = W[13]; ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); T1 = X[14] = W[14]; ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); T1 = X[15] = W[15]; ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); data += SHA256_CBLOCK; } else { SHA_LONG l; (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[0] = l; ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[1] = l; ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[2] = l; ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[3] = l; ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[4] = l; ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[5] = l; ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[6] = l; ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[7] = l; ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[8] = l; ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[9] = l; ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[10] = l; ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[11] = l; ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[12] = l; ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[13] = l; ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[14] = l; ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); T1 = X[15] = l; ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); } for (i = 16; i < 64; i += 8) { ROUND_16_63(i + 0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X); ROUND_16_63(i + 1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X); ROUND_16_63(i + 2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X); ROUND_16_63(i + 3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X); ROUND_16_63(i + 4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X); ROUND_16_63(i + 5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X); ROUND_16_63(i + 6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X); ROUND_16_63(i + 7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X); } ctx->h[0] += a; ctx->h[1] += b; ctx->h[2] += c; ctx->h[3] += d; ctx->h[4] += e; ctx->h[5] += f; ctx->h[6] += g; ctx->h[7] += h; } } # endif #endif /* SHA256_ASM */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/build.info0000644000000000000000000000574313176625660016135 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ sha1dgst.c sha1_one.c sha256.c sha512.c {- $target{sha1_asm_src} -} GENERATE[sha1-586.s]=asm/sha1-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[sha1-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[sha256-586.s]=asm/sha256-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[sha256-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[sha512-586.s]=asm/sha512-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[sha512-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl GENERATE[sha1-ia64.s]=asm/sha1-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) GENERATE[sha256-ia64.s]=asm/sha512-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) GENERATE[sha512-ia64.s]=asm/sha512-ia64.pl $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) GENERATE[sha1-alpha.S]=asm/sha1-alpha.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha1-x86_64.s]=asm/sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha1-mb-x86_64.s]=asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha256-x86_64.s]=asm/sha512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha256-mb-x86_64.s]=asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha512-x86_64.s]=asm/sha512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha1-sparcv9.S]=asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha1-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[sha256-sparcv9.S]=asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha256-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[sha512-sparcv9.S]=asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha512-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[sha1-ppc.s]=asm/sha1-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha256-ppc.s]=asm/sha512-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha512-ppc.s]=asm/sha512-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha256p8-ppc.s]=asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha512p8-ppc.s]=asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha1-parisc.s]=asm/sha1-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha256-parisc.s]=asm/sha512-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha512-parisc.s]=asm/sha512-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha1-mips.S]=asm/sha1-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha256-mips.S]=asm/sha512-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha512-mips.S]=asm/sha512-mips.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[sha1-armv4-large.S]=asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha1-armv4-large.o]=.. GENERATE[sha256-armv4.S]=asm/sha256-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha256-armv4.o]=.. GENERATE[sha512-armv4.S]=asm/sha512-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha512-armv4.o]=.. GENERATE[sha1-armv8.S]=asm/sha1-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha1-armv8.o]=.. GENERATE[sha256-armv8.S]=asm/sha512-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha256-armv8.o]=.. GENERATE[sha512-armv8.S]=asm/sha512-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[sha512-armv8.o]=.. BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)] ##### SHA assembler implementations # GNU make "catch all" {- $builddir -}/sha1-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/sha1-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ {- $builddir -}/sha256-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/sha512-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ {- $builddir -}/sha512-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/sha512-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c0000644000000000000000000000076413176625660016041 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include # include /* The implementation is in ../md32_common.h */ # include "sha_locl.h" openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014730 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000017000613176625660017233 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary # forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license. # ==================================================================== # # sha256/512_block procedure for x86_64. # # 40% improvement over compiler-generated code on Opteron. On EM64T # sha256 was observed to run >80% faster and sha512 - >40%. No magical # tricks, just straight implementation... I really wonder why gcc # [being armed with inline assembler] fails to generate as fast code. # The only thing which is cool about this module is that it's very # same instruction sequence used for both SHA-256 and SHA-512. In # former case the instructions operate on 32-bit operands, while in # latter - on 64-bit ones. All I had to do is to get one flavor right, # the other one passed the test right away:-) # # sha256_block runs in ~1005 cycles on Opteron, which gives you # asymptotic performance of 64*1000/1005=63.7MBps times CPU clock # frequency in GHz. sha512_block runs in ~1275 cycles, which results # in 128*1000/1275=100MBps per GHz. Is there room for improvement? # Well, if you compare it to IA-64 implementation, which maintains # X[16] in register bank[!], tends to 4 instructions per CPU clock # cycle and runs in 1003 cycles, 1275 is very good result for 3-way # issue Opteron pipeline and X[16] maintained in memory. So that *if* # there is a way to improve it, *then* the only way would be to try to # offload X[16] updates to SSE unit, but that would require "deeper" # loop unroll, which in turn would naturally cause size blow-up, not # to mention increased complexity! And once again, only *if* it's # actually possible to noticeably improve overall ILP, instruction # level parallelism, on a given CPU implementation in this case. # # Special note on Intel EM64T. While Opteron CPU exhibits perfect # performance ratio of 1.5 between 64- and 32-bit flavors [see above], # [currently available] EM64T CPUs apparently are far from it. On the # contrary, 64-bit version, sha512_block, is ~30% *slower* than 32-bit # sha256_block:-( This is presumably because 64-bit shifts/rotates # apparently are not atomic instructions, but implemented in microcode. # # May 2012. # # Optimization including one of Pavel Semjanov's ideas, alternative # Maj, resulted in >=5% improvement on most CPUs, +20% SHA256 and # unfortunately -2% SHA512 on P4 [which nobody should care about # that much]. # # June 2012. # # Add SIMD code paths, see below for improvement coefficients. SSSE3 # code path was not attempted for SHA512, because improvement is not # estimated to be high enough, noticeably less than 9%, to justify # the effort, not on pre-AVX processors. [Obviously with exclusion # for VIA Nano, but it has SHA512 instruction that is faster and # should be used instead.] For reference, corresponding estimated # upper limit for improvement for SSSE3 SHA256 is 28%. The fact that # higher coefficients are observed on VIA Nano and Bulldozer has more # to do with specifics of their architecture [which is topic for # separate discussion]. # # November 2012. # # Add AVX2 code path. Two consecutive input blocks are loaded to # 256-bit %ymm registers, with data from first block to least # significant 128-bit halves and data from second to most significant. # The data is then processed with same SIMD instruction sequence as # for AVX, but with %ymm as operands. Side effect is increased stack # frame, 448 additional bytes in SHA256 and 1152 in SHA512, and 1.2KB # code size increase. # # March 2014. # # Add support for Intel SHA Extensions. ###################################################################### # Current performance in cycles per processed byte (less is better): # # SHA256 SSSE3 AVX/XOP(*) SHA512 AVX/XOP(*) # # AMD K8 14.9 - - 9.57 - # P4 17.3 - - 30.8 - # Core 2 15.6 13.8(+13%) - 9.97 - # Westmere 14.8 12.3(+19%) - 9.58 - # Sandy Bridge 17.4 14.2(+23%) 11.6(+50%(**)) 11.2 8.10(+38%(**)) # Ivy Bridge 12.6 10.5(+20%) 10.3(+22%) 8.17 7.22(+13%) # Haswell 12.2 9.28(+31%) 7.80(+56%) 7.66 5.40(+42%) # Skylake 11.4 9.03(+26%) 7.70(+48%) 7.25 5.20(+40%) # Bulldozer 21.1 13.6(+54%) 13.6(+54%(***)) 13.5 8.58(+57%) # VIA Nano 23.0 16.5(+39%) - 14.7 - # Atom 23.0 18.9(+22%) - 14.7 - # Silvermont 27.4 20.6(+33%) - 17.5 - # Goldmont 18.9 14.3(+32%) 4.16(+350%) 12.0 - # # (*) whichever best applicable, including SHAEXT; # (**) switch from ror to shrd stands for fair share of improvement; # (***) execution time is fully determined by remaining integer-only # part, body_00_15; reducing the amount of SIMD instructions # below certain limit makes no difference/sense; to conserve # space SHA256 XOP code path is therefore omitted; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } $shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 $avx=1 if (!$shaext && $avx); open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; if ($output =~ /512/) { $func="sha512_block_data_order"; $TABLE="K512"; $SZ=8; @ROT=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%rax","%rbx","%rcx","%rdx", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10","%r11"); ($T1,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=("%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%rdi"); @Sigma0=(28,34,39); @Sigma1=(14,18,41); @sigma0=(1, 8, 7); @sigma1=(19,61, 6); $rounds=80; } else { $func="sha256_block_data_order"; $TABLE="K256"; $SZ=4; @ROT=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx", "%r8d","%r9d","%r10d","%r11d"); ($T1,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=("%r12d","%r13d","%r14d","%r15d","%edi"); @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 7,18, 3); @sigma1=(17,19,10); $rounds=64; } $ctx="%rdi"; # 1st arg, zapped by $a3 $inp="%rsi"; # 2nd arg $Tbl="%rbp"; $_ctx="16*$SZ+0*8(%rsp)"; $_inp="16*$SZ+1*8(%rsp)"; $_end="16*$SZ+2*8(%rsp)"; $_rsp="16*$SZ+3*8(%rsp)"; $framesz="16*$SZ+4*8"; sub ROUND_00_15() { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_; my $STRIDE=$SZ; $STRIDE += 16 if ($i%(16/$SZ)==(16/$SZ-1)); $code.=<<___; ror \$`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`,$a0 mov $f,$a2 xor $e,$a0 ror \$`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`,$a1 xor $g,$a2 # f^g mov $T1,`$SZ*($i&0xf)`(%rsp) xor $a,$a1 and $e,$a2 # (f^g)&e ror \$`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]`,$a0 add $h,$T1 # T1+=h xor $g,$a2 # Ch(e,f,g)=((f^g)&e)^g ror \$`$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0]`,$a1 xor $e,$a0 add $a2,$T1 # T1+=Ch(e,f,g) mov $a,$a2 add ($Tbl),$T1 # T1+=K[round] xor $a,$a1 xor $b,$a2 # a^b, b^c in next round ror \$$Sigma1[0],$a0 # Sigma1(e) mov $b,$h and $a2,$a3 ror \$$Sigma0[0],$a1 # Sigma0(a) add $a0,$T1 # T1+=Sigma1(e) xor $a3,$h # h=Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b) add $T1,$d # d+=T1 add $T1,$h # h+=T1 lea $STRIDE($Tbl),$Tbl # round++ ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); add $a1,$h # h+=Sigma0(a) ___ ($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); } sub ROUND_16_XX() { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_; $code.=<<___; mov `$SZ*(($i+1)&0xf)`(%rsp),$a0 mov `$SZ*(($i+14)&0xf)`(%rsp),$a2 mov $a0,$T1 ror \$`$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]`,$a0 add $a1,$a # modulo-scheduled h+=Sigma0(a) mov $a2,$a1 ror \$`$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]`,$a2 xor $T1,$a0 shr \$$sigma0[2],$T1 ror \$$sigma0[0],$a0 xor $a1,$a2 shr \$$sigma1[2],$a1 ror \$$sigma1[0],$a2 xor $a0,$T1 # sigma0(X[(i+1)&0xf]) xor $a1,$a2 # sigma1(X[(i+14)&0xf]) add `$SZ*(($i+9)&0xf)`(%rsp),$T1 add `$SZ*($i&0xf)`(%rsp),$T1 mov $e,$a0 add $a2,$T1 mov $a,$a1 ___ &ROUND_00_15(@_); } $code=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl $func .type $func,\@function,3 .align 16 $func: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 || $avx); lea OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r11 mov 0(%r11),%r9d mov 4(%r11),%r10d mov 8(%r11),%r11d ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext); test \$`1<<29`,%r11d # check for SHA jnz _shaext_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx && $SZ==8); test \$`1<<11`,%r10d # check for XOP jnz .Lxop_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); and \$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d # check for BMI2+AVX2+BMI1 cmp \$`1<<8|1<<5|1<<3`,%r11d je .Lavx2_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); and \$`1<<30`,%r9d # mask "Intel CPU" bit and \$`1<<28|1<<9`,%r10d # mask AVX and SSSE3 bits or %r9d,%r10d cmp \$`1<<28|1<<9|1<<30`,%r10d je .Lavx_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); test \$`1<<9`,%r10d jnz .Lssse3_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp shl \$4,%rdx # num*16 sub \$$framesz,%rsp lea ($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx # inp+num*16*$SZ and \$-64,%rsp # align stack frame mov $ctx,$_ctx # save ctx, 1st arg mov $inp,$_inp # save inp, 2nd arh mov %rdx,$_end # save end pointer, "3rd" arg mov %r11,$_rsp # save copy of %rsp .Lprologue: mov $SZ*0($ctx),$A mov $SZ*1($ctx),$B mov $SZ*2($ctx),$C mov $SZ*3($ctx),$D mov $SZ*4($ctx),$E mov $SZ*5($ctx),$F mov $SZ*6($ctx),$G mov $SZ*7($ctx),$H jmp .Lloop .align 16 .Lloop: mov $B,$a3 lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl xor $C,$a3 # magic ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { $code.=" mov $SZ*$i($inp),$T1\n"; $code.=" mov @ROT[4],$a0\n"; $code.=" mov @ROT[0],$a1\n"; $code.=" bswap $T1\n"; &ROUND_00_15($i,@ROT); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); } $code.=<<___; jmp .Lrounds_16_xx .align 16 .Lrounds_16_xx: ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_XX($i,@ROT); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); } $code.=<<___; cmpb \$0,`$SZ-1`($Tbl) jnz .Lrounds_16_xx mov $_ctx,$ctx add $a1,$A # modulo-scheduled h+=Sigma0(a) lea 16*$SZ($inp),$inp add $SZ*0($ctx),$A add $SZ*1($ctx),$B add $SZ*2($ctx),$C add $SZ*3($ctx),$D add $SZ*4($ctx),$E add $SZ*5($ctx),$F add $SZ*6($ctx),$G add $SZ*7($ctx),$H cmp $_end,$inp mov $A,$SZ*0($ctx) mov $B,$SZ*1($ctx) mov $C,$SZ*2($ctx) mov $D,$SZ*3($ctx) mov $E,$SZ*4($ctx) mov $F,$SZ*5($ctx) mov $G,$SZ*6($ctx) mov $H,$SZ*7($ctx) jb .Lloop mov $_rsp,%rsi mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue: ret .size $func,.-$func ___ if ($SZ==4) { $code.=<<___; .align 64 .type $TABLE,\@object $TABLE: .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f .long 0x03020100,0x0b0a0908,0xffffffff,0xffffffff .long 0x03020100,0x0b0a0908,0xffffffff,0xffffffff .long 0xffffffff,0xffffffff,0x03020100,0x0b0a0908 .long 0xffffffff,0xffffffff,0x03020100,0x0b0a0908 .asciz "SHA256 block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ } else { $code.=<<___; .align 64 .type $TABLE,\@object $TABLE: .quad 0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd .quad 0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd .quad 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc .quad 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc .quad 0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019 .quad 0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019 .quad 0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 .quad 0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 .quad 0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe .quad 0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe .quad 0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2 .quad 0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2 .quad 0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1 .quad 0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1 .quad 0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694 .quad 0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694 .quad 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3 .quad 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3 .quad 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65 .quad 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65 .quad 0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483 .quad 0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483 .quad 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5 .quad 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5 .quad 0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210 .quad 0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210 .quad 0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4 .quad 0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4 .quad 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725 .quad 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725 .quad 0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70 .quad 0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70 .quad 0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926 .quad 0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926 .quad 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df .quad 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df .quad 0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8 .quad 0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8 .quad 0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b .quad 0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b .quad 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001 .quad 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001 .quad 0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30 .quad 0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30 .quad 0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910 .quad 0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910 .quad 0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8 .quad 0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8 .quad 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53 .quad 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53 .quad 0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8 .quad 0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8 .quad 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb .quad 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb .quad 0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3 .quad 0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3 .quad 0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60 .quad 0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60 .quad 0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec .quad 0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec .quad 0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9 .quad 0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9 .quad 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b .quad 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b .quad 0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207 .quad 0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207 .quad 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178 .quad 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178 .quad 0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6 .quad 0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6 .quad 0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b .quad 0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b .quad 0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493 .quad 0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493 .quad 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c .quad 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c .quad 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a .quad 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a .quad 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817 .quad 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817 .quad 0x0001020304050607,0x08090a0b0c0d0e0f .quad 0x0001020304050607,0x08090a0b0c0d0e0f .asciz "SHA512 block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ } ###################################################################### # SIMD code paths # if ($SZ==4 && $shaext) {{{ ###################################################################### # Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA256 update function. # my ($ctx,$inp,$num,$Tbl)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); my ($Wi,$ABEF,$CDGH,$TMP,$BSWAP,$ABEF_SAVE,$CDGH_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(0..2,7..10)); my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(3..6)); $code.=<<___; .type sha256_block_data_order_shaext,\@function,3 .align 64 sha256_block_data_order_shaext: _shaext_shortcut: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea `-8-5*16`(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,-8-5*16(%rax) movaps %xmm7,-8-4*16(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-8-3*16(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-8-2*16(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-8-1*16(%rax) .Lprologue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; lea K256+0x80(%rip),$Tbl movdqu ($ctx),$ABEF # DCBA movdqu 16($ctx),$CDGH # HGFE movdqa 0x200-0x80($Tbl),$TMP # byte swap mask pshufd \$0x1b,$ABEF,$Wi # ABCD pshufd \$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF # CDAB pshufd \$0x1b,$CDGH,$CDGH # EFGH movdqa $TMP,$BSWAP # offload palignr \$8,$CDGH,$ABEF # ABEF punpcklqdq $Wi,$CDGH # CDGH jmp .Loop_shaext .align 16 .Loop_shaext: movdqu ($inp),@MSG[0] movdqu 0x10($inp),@MSG[1] movdqu 0x20($inp),@MSG[2] pshufb $TMP,@MSG[0] movdqu 0x30($inp),@MSG[3] movdqa 0*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[0],$Wi pshufb $TMP,@MSG[1] movdqa $CDGH,$CDGH_SAVE # offload sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 0-3 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi nop movdqa $ABEF,$ABEF_SAVE # offload sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 1*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[1],$Wi pshufb $TMP,@MSG[2] sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 4-7 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi lea 0x40($inp),$inp sha256msg1 @MSG[1],@MSG[0] sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 2*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[2],$Wi pshufb $TMP,@MSG[3] sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 8-11 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi movdqa @MSG[3],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[2],$TMP nop paddd $TMP,@MSG[0] sha256msg1 @MSG[2],@MSG[1] sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 3*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[3],$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[3],@MSG[0] sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 12-15 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi movdqa @MSG[0],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[3],$TMP nop paddd $TMP,@MSG[1] sha256msg1 @MSG[3],@MSG[2] sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF ___ for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) { $code.=<<___; movdqa $i*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[0],$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 16-19... pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi movdqa @MSG[1],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[0],$TMP nop paddd $TMP,@MSG[2] sha256msg1 @MSG[0],@MSG[3] sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF ___ push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } $code.=<<___; movdqa 13*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[0],$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 52-55 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi movdqa @MSG[1],$TMP palignr \$4,@MSG[0],$TMP sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF paddd $TMP,@MSG[2] movdqa 14*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[1],$Wi sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 56-59 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi sha256msg2 @MSG[1],@MSG[2] movdqa $BSWAP,$TMP sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF movdqa 15*32-0x80($Tbl),$Wi paddd @MSG[2],$Wi nop sha256rnds2 $ABEF,$CDGH # 60-63 pshufd \$0x0e,$Wi,$Wi dec $num nop sha256rnds2 $CDGH,$ABEF paddd $CDGH_SAVE,$CDGH paddd $ABEF_SAVE,$ABEF jnz .Loop_shaext pshufd \$0xb1,$CDGH,$CDGH # DCHG pshufd \$0x1b,$ABEF,$TMP # FEBA pshufd \$0xb1,$ABEF,$ABEF # BAFE punpckhqdq $CDGH,$ABEF # DCBA palignr \$8,$TMP,$CDGH # HGFE movdqu $ABEF,($ctx) movdqu $CDGH,16($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -8-5*16(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -8-4*16(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -8-3*16(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -8-2*16(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -8-1*16(%rax),%xmm10 mov %rax,%rsp .Lepilogue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size sha256_block_data_order_shaext,.-sha256_block_data_order_shaext ___ }}} {{{ my $a4=$T1; my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h); sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; my $arg = pop; $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n"; } sub body_00_15 () { ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'. '&ror ($a0,$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1])', '&mov ($a,$a1)', '&mov ($a4,$f)', '&ror ($a1,$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1])', '&xor ($a0,$e)', '&xor ($a4,$g)', # f^g '&ror ($a0,$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0])', '&xor ($a1,$a)', '&and ($a4,$e)', # (f^g)&e '&xor ($a0,$e)', '&add ($h,$SZ*($i&15)."(%rsp)")', # h+=X[i]+K[i] '&mov ($a2,$a)', '&xor ($a4,$g)', # Ch(e,f,g)=((f^g)&e)^g '&ror ($a1,$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0])', '&xor ($a2,$b)', # a^b, b^c in next round '&add ($h,$a4)', # h+=Ch(e,f,g) '&ror ($a0,$Sigma1[0])', # Sigma1(e) '&and ($a3,$a2)', # (b^c)&(a^b) '&xor ($a1,$a)', '&add ($h,$a0)', # h+=Sigma1(e) '&xor ($a3,$b)', # Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b) '&ror ($a1,$Sigma0[0])', # Sigma0(a) '&add ($d,$h)', # d+=h '&add ($h,$a3)', # h+=Maj(a,b,c) '&mov ($a0,$d)', '&add ($a1,$h);'. # h+=Sigma0(a) '($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;' ); } ###################################################################### # SSSE3 code path # if ($SZ==4) { # SHA256 only my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $t4,$t5) = map("%xmm$_",(4..9)); $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_ssse3,\@function,3 .align 64 ${func}_ssse3: .Lssse3_shortcut: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp shl \$4,%rdx # num*16 sub \$`$framesz+$win64*16*4`,%rsp lea ($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx # inp+num*16*$SZ and \$-64,%rsp # align stack frame mov $ctx,$_ctx # save ctx, 1st arg mov $inp,$_inp # save inp, 2nd arh mov %rdx,$_end # save end pointer, "3rd" arg mov %r11,$_rsp # save copy of %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lprologue_ssse3: mov $SZ*0($ctx),$A mov $SZ*1($ctx),$B mov $SZ*2($ctx),$C mov $SZ*3($ctx),$D mov $SZ*4($ctx),$E mov $SZ*5($ctx),$F mov $SZ*6($ctx),$G mov $SZ*7($ctx),$H ___ $code.=<<___; #movdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+32(%rip),$t4 #movdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+64(%rip),$t5 jmp .Lloop_ssse3 .align 16 .Lloop_ssse3: movdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 movdqu 0x00($inp),@X[0] movdqu 0x10($inp),@X[1] movdqu 0x20($inp),@X[2] pshufb $t3,@X[0] movdqu 0x30($inp),@X[3] lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl pshufb $t3,@X[1] movdqa 0x00($Tbl),$t0 movdqa 0x20($Tbl),$t1 pshufb $t3,@X[2] paddd @X[0],$t0 movdqa 0x40($Tbl),$t2 pshufb $t3,@X[3] movdqa 0x60($Tbl),$t3 paddd @X[1],$t1 paddd @X[2],$t2 paddd @X[3],$t3 movdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) mov $A,$a1 movdqa $t1,0x10(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 movdqa $t2,0x20(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic movdqa $t3,0x30(%rsp) mov $E,$a0 jmp .Lssse3_00_47 .align 16 .Lssse3_00_47: sub \$`-16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl # size optimization ___ sub Xupdate_256_SSSE3 () { ( '&movdqa ($t0,@X[1]);', '&movdqa ($t3,@X[3])', '&palignr ($t0,@X[0],$SZ)', # X[1..4] '&palignr ($t3,@X[2],$SZ);', # X[9..12] '&movdqa ($t1,$t0)', '&movdqa ($t2,$t0);', '&psrld ($t0,$sigma0[2])', '&paddd (@X[0],$t3);', # X[0..3] += X[9..12] '&psrld ($t2,$sigma0[0])', '&pshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15] '&pslld ($t1,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);'. '&pxor ($t0,$t2)', '&psrld ($t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);'. '&pxor ($t0,$t1)', '&pslld ($t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);'. '&pxor ($t0,$t2);', '&movdqa ($t2,$t3)', '&pxor ($t0,$t1);', # sigma0(X[1..4]) '&psrld ($t3,$sigma1[2])', '&paddd (@X[0],$t0);', # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) '&psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[0])', '&pxor ($t3,$t2);', '&psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])', '&pxor ($t3,$t2)', '&pshufb ($t3,$t4)', # sigma1(X[14..15]) '&paddd (@X[0],$t3)', # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) '&pshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17] '&movdqa ($t2,$t3);', '&psrld ($t3,$sigma1[2])', '&psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[0])', '&pxor ($t3,$t2);', '&psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])', '&pxor ($t3,$t2);', '&movdqa ($t2,16*2*$j."($Tbl)")', '&pshufb ($t3,$t5)', '&paddd (@X[0],$t3)' # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) ); } sub SSSE3_256_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 104 instructions if (0) { foreach (Xupdate_256_SSSE3()) { # 36 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } } else { # squeeze extra 4% on Westmere and 19% on Atom eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &movdqa ($t0,@X[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t3,@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); &palignr ($t0,@X[0],$SZ); # X[1..4] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &palignr ($t3,@X[2],$SZ); # X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &movdqa ($t1,$t0); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t0); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t0,$sigma0[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[0..3] += X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t2,$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010); # X[4..15] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &pslld ($t1,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t0,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &psrld ($t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t0,$t1); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld ($t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t0,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &movdqa ($t2,$t3); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t0,$t1); # sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t3,$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[0],$t0); # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #&pshufb ($t3,$t4); # sigma1(X[14..15]) &pshufd ($t3,$t3,0b10000000); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrldq ($t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000); # X[16..17] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t3); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t3,$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ &psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ #&pshufb ($t3,$t5); &pshufd ($t3,$t3,0b00001000); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,16*2*$j."($Tbl)"); eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); &pslldq ($t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); #@ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } &paddd ($t2,@X[0]); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &movdqa (16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &SSSE3_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmpb ($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lssse3_00_47"); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } $code.=<<___; mov $_ctx,$ctx mov $a1,$A add $SZ*0($ctx),$A lea 16*$SZ($inp),$inp add $SZ*1($ctx),$B add $SZ*2($ctx),$C add $SZ*3($ctx),$D add $SZ*4($ctx),$E add $SZ*5($ctx),$F add $SZ*6($ctx),$G add $SZ*7($ctx),$H cmp $_end,$inp mov $A,$SZ*0($ctx) mov $B,$SZ*1($ctx) mov $C,$SZ*2($ctx) mov $D,$SZ*3($ctx) mov $E,$SZ*4($ctx) mov $F,$SZ*5($ctx) mov $G,$SZ*6($ctx) mov $H,$SZ*7($ctx) jb .Lloop_ssse3 mov $_rsp,%rsi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9 ___ $code.=<<___; mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_ssse3: ret .size ${func}_ssse3,.-${func}_ssse3 ___ } if ($avx) {{ ###################################################################### # XOP code path # if ($SZ==8) { # SHA512 only $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_xop,\@function,3 .align 64 ${func}_xop: .Lxop_shortcut: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp shl \$4,%rdx # num*16 sub \$`$framesz+$win64*16*($SZ==4?4:6)`,%rsp lea ($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx # inp+num*16*$SZ and \$-64,%rsp # align stack frame mov $ctx,$_ctx # save ctx, 1st arg mov $inp,$_inp # save inp, 2nd arh mov %rdx,$_end # save end pointer, "3rd" arg mov %r11,$_rsp # save copy of %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4); movaps %xmm10,16*$SZ+96(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,16*$SZ+112(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lprologue_xop: vzeroupper mov $SZ*0($ctx),$A mov $SZ*1($ctx),$B mov $SZ*2($ctx),$C mov $SZ*3($ctx),$D mov $SZ*4($ctx),$E mov $SZ*5($ctx),$F mov $SZ*6($ctx),$G mov $SZ*7($ctx),$H jmp .Lloop_xop ___ if ($SZ==4) { # SHA256 my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(4..7)); $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lloop_xop: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu 0x00($inp),@X[0] vmovdqu 0x10($inp),@X[1] vmovdqu 0x20($inp),@X[2] vmovdqu 0x30($inp),@X[3] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] vpaddd 0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vpaddd 0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpaddd 0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddd 0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) mov $A,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x10(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x20(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x30(%rsp) mov $E,$a0 jmp .Lxop_00_47 .align 16 .Lxop_00_47: sub \$`-16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl # size optimization ___ sub XOP_256_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 104 instructions &vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ); # X[1..4] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpalignr ($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ); # X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld ($t0,$t0,$sigma0[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[0..3] += X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t2,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t3,@X[3],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2); # sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld ($t2,@X[3],$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t0); # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t1); # sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrldq ($t3,$t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t3,@X[0],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld ($t2,@X[0],$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotd ($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t1); # sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslldq ($t3,$t3,8); # 22 instructions eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &XOP_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmpb ($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lxop_00_47"); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } } else { # SHA512 my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..7)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(8..11)); $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lloop_xop: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu 0x00($inp),@X[0] lea $TABLE+0x80(%rip),$Tbl # size optimization vmovdqu 0x10($inp),@X[1] vmovdqu 0x20($inp),@X[2] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] vmovdqu 0x30($inp),@X[3] vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vmovdqu 0x40($inp),@X[4] vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] vmovdqu 0x50($inp),@X[5] vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vmovdqu 0x60($inp),@X[6] vpshufb $t3,@X[4],@X[4] vmovdqu 0x70($inp),@X[7] vpshufb $t3,@X[5],@X[5] vpaddq -0x80($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[6],@X[6] vpaddq -0x60($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpshufb $t3,@X[7],@X[7] vpaddq -0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddq -0x20($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) vpaddq 0x00($Tbl),@X[4],$t0 vmovdqa $t1,0x10(%rsp) vpaddq 0x20($Tbl),@X[5],$t1 vmovdqa $t2,0x20(%rsp) vpaddq 0x40($Tbl),@X[6],$t2 vmovdqa $t3,0x30(%rsp) vpaddq 0x60($Tbl),@X[7],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x40(%rsp) mov $A,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x50(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x60(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x70(%rsp) mov $E,$a0 jmp .Lxop_00_47 .align 16 .Lxop_00_47: add \$`16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl ___ sub XOP_512_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body); # 52 instructions &vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ); # X[1..2] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpalignr ($t3,@X[5],@X[4],$SZ); # X[9..10] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotq ($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrlq ($t0,$t0,$sigma0[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddq (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[0..1] += X[9..10] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotq ($t2,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotq ($t3,@X[7],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2); # sigma0(X[1..2]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrlq ($t2,@X[7],$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddq (@X[0],@X[0],$t0); # X[0..1] += sigma0(X[1..2]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vprotq ($t1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t1); # sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddq (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddq ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j-0x80."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<8; $j++) { &XOP_512_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmpb ($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ-0x80."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lxop_00_47"); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } } $code.=<<___; mov $_ctx,$ctx mov $a1,$A add $SZ*0($ctx),$A lea 16*$SZ($inp),$inp add $SZ*1($ctx),$B add $SZ*2($ctx),$C add $SZ*3($ctx),$D add $SZ*4($ctx),$E add $SZ*5($ctx),$F add $SZ*6($ctx),$G add $SZ*7($ctx),$H cmp $_end,$inp mov $A,$SZ*0($ctx) mov $B,$SZ*1($ctx) mov $C,$SZ*2($ctx) mov $D,$SZ*3($ctx) mov $E,$SZ*4($ctx) mov $F,$SZ*5($ctx) mov $G,$SZ*6($ctx) mov $H,$SZ*7($ctx) jb .Lloop_xop mov $_rsp,%rsi vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4); movaps 16*$SZ+96(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 16*$SZ+112(%rsp),%xmm11 ___ $code.=<<___; mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_xop: ret .size ${func}_xop,.-${func}_xop ___ } ###################################################################### # AVX+shrd code path # local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_avx,\@function,3 .align 64 ${func}_avx: .Lavx_shortcut: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp shl \$4,%rdx # num*16 sub \$`$framesz+$win64*16*($SZ==4?4:6)`,%rsp lea ($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx # inp+num*16*$SZ and \$-64,%rsp # align stack frame mov $ctx,$_ctx # save ctx, 1st arg mov $inp,$_inp # save inp, 2nd arh mov %rdx,$_end # save end pointer, "3rd" arg mov %r11,$_rsp # save copy of %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4); movaps %xmm10,16*$SZ+96(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,16*$SZ+112(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lprologue_avx: vzeroupper mov $SZ*0($ctx),$A mov $SZ*1($ctx),$B mov $SZ*2($ctx),$C mov $SZ*3($ctx),$D mov $SZ*4($ctx),$E mov $SZ*5($ctx),$F mov $SZ*6($ctx),$G mov $SZ*7($ctx),$H ___ if ($SZ==4) { # SHA256 my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $t4,$t5) = map("%xmm$_",(4..9)); $code.=<<___; vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+32(%rip),$t4 vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+64(%rip),$t5 jmp .Lloop_avx .align 16 .Lloop_avx: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu 0x00($inp),@X[0] vmovdqu 0x10($inp),@X[1] vmovdqu 0x20($inp),@X[2] vmovdqu 0x30($inp),@X[3] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] vpaddd 0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vpaddd 0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpaddd 0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddd 0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) mov $A,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x10(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x20(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x30(%rsp) mov $E,$a0 jmp .Lavx_00_47 .align 16 .Lavx_00_47: sub \$`-16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl # size optimization ___ sub Xupdate_256_AVX () { ( '&vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ)', # X[1..4] '&vpalignr ($t3,@X[3],@X[2],$SZ)', # X[9..12] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t0,$sigma0[0]);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3)', # X[0..3] += X[9..12] '&vpsrld ($t3,$t0,$sigma0[2])', '&vpslld ($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t3,$t2)', '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1)', '&vpslld ($t1,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2)', '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1)', # sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0]);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t0)', # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3)', '&vpshufb ($t2,$t2,$t4)', # sigma1(X[14..15]) '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t2)', # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,$sigma1[2])', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[0])', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0])', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3)', '&vpshufb ($t2,$t2,$t5)', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t2)' # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) ); } sub AVX_256_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 104 instructions foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) { # 29 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX_256_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmpb ($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lavx_00_47"); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } } else { # SHA512 my @X = map("%xmm$_",(0..7)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%xmm$_",(8..11)); $code.=<<___; jmp .Lloop_avx .align 16 .Lloop_avx: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu 0x00($inp),@X[0] lea $TABLE+0x80(%rip),$Tbl # size optimization vmovdqu 0x10($inp),@X[1] vmovdqu 0x20($inp),@X[2] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] vmovdqu 0x30($inp),@X[3] vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vmovdqu 0x40($inp),@X[4] vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] vmovdqu 0x50($inp),@X[5] vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vmovdqu 0x60($inp),@X[6] vpshufb $t3,@X[4],@X[4] vmovdqu 0x70($inp),@X[7] vpshufb $t3,@X[5],@X[5] vpaddq -0x80($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[6],@X[6] vpaddq -0x60($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpshufb $t3,@X[7],@X[7] vpaddq -0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddq -0x20($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) vpaddq 0x00($Tbl),@X[4],$t0 vmovdqa $t1,0x10(%rsp) vpaddq 0x20($Tbl),@X[5],$t1 vmovdqa $t2,0x20(%rsp) vpaddq 0x40($Tbl),@X[6],$t2 vmovdqa $t3,0x30(%rsp) vpaddq 0x60($Tbl),@X[7],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x40(%rsp) mov $A,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x50(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x60(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x70(%rsp) mov $E,$a0 jmp .Lavx_00_47 .align 16 .Lavx_00_47: add \$`16*2*$SZ`,$Tbl ___ sub Xupdate_512_AVX () { ( '&vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],$SZ)', # X[1..2] '&vpalignr ($t3,@X[5],@X[4],$SZ)', # X[9..10] '&vpsrlq ($t2,$t0,$sigma0[0])', '&vpaddq (@X[0],@X[0],$t3);', # X[0..1] += X[9..10] '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t0,$sigma0[2])', '&vpsllq ($t1,$t0,8*$SZ-$sigma0[1]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t3,$t2)', '&vpsrlq ($t2,$t2,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1)', '&vpsllq ($t1,$t1,$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2)', '&vpsrlq ($t3,@X[7],$sigma1[2]);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1)', # sigma0(X[1..2]) '&vpsllq ($t2,@X[7],8*$SZ-$sigma1[1]);', '&vpaddq (@X[0],@X[0],$t0)', # X[0..1] += sigma0(X[1..2]) '&vpsrlq ($t1,@X[7],$sigma1[0]);', '&vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t2)', '&vpsllq ($t2,$t2,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);', '&vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t1)', '&vpsrlq ($t1,$t1,$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]);', '&vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t2)', '&vpxor ($t3,$t3,$t1)', # sigma1(X[14..15]) '&vpaddq (@X[0],@X[0],$t3)', # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) ); } sub AVX_512_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body); # 52 instructions foreach (Xupdate_512_AVX()) { # 23 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } &vpaddq ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j-0x80."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (16*$j."(%rsp)",$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<8; $j++) { &AVX_512_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmpb ($SZ-1+16*2*$SZ-0x80."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lavx_00_47"); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } } $code.=<<___; mov $_ctx,$ctx mov $a1,$A add $SZ*0($ctx),$A lea 16*$SZ($inp),$inp add $SZ*1($ctx),$B add $SZ*2($ctx),$C add $SZ*3($ctx),$D add $SZ*4($ctx),$E add $SZ*5($ctx),$F add $SZ*6($ctx),$G add $SZ*7($ctx),$H cmp $_end,$inp mov $A,$SZ*0($ctx) mov $B,$SZ*1($ctx) mov $C,$SZ*2($ctx) mov $D,$SZ*3($ctx) mov $E,$SZ*4($ctx) mov $F,$SZ*5($ctx) mov $G,$SZ*6($ctx) mov $H,$SZ*7($ctx) jb .Lloop_avx mov $_rsp,%rsi vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4); movaps 16*$SZ+96(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 16*$SZ+112(%rsp),%xmm11 ___ $code.=<<___; mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx: ret .size ${func}_avx,.-${func}_avx ___ if ($avx>1) {{ ###################################################################### # AVX2+BMI code path # my $a5=$SZ==4?"%esi":"%rsi"; # zap $inp my $PUSH8=8*2*$SZ; use integer; sub bodyx_00_15 () { # at start $a1 should be zero, $a3 - $b^$c and $a4 copy of $f ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@ROT;'. '&add ($h,(32*($i/(16/$SZ))+$SZ*($i%(16/$SZ)))%$PUSH8.$base)', # h+=X[i]+K[i] '&and ($a4,$e)', # f&e '&rorx ($a0,$e,$Sigma1[2])', '&rorx ($a2,$e,$Sigma1[1])', '&lea ($a,"($a,$a1)")', # h+=Sigma0(a) from the past '&lea ($h,"($h,$a4)")', '&andn ($a4,$e,$g)', # ~e&g '&xor ($a0,$a2)', '&rorx ($a1,$e,$Sigma1[0])', '&lea ($h,"($h,$a4)")', # h+=Ch(e,f,g)=(e&f)+(~e&g) '&xor ($a0,$a1)', # Sigma1(e) '&mov ($a2,$a)', '&rorx ($a4,$a,$Sigma0[2])', '&lea ($h,"($h,$a0)")', # h+=Sigma1(e) '&xor ($a2,$b)', # a^b, b^c in next round '&rorx ($a1,$a,$Sigma0[1])', '&rorx ($a0,$a,$Sigma0[0])', '&lea ($d,"($d,$h)")', # d+=h '&and ($a3,$a2)', # (b^c)&(a^b) '&xor ($a1,$a4)', '&xor ($a3,$b)', # Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b) '&xor ($a1,$a0)', # Sigma0(a) '&lea ($h,"($h,$a3)");'. # h+=Maj(a,b,c) '&mov ($a4,$e)', # copy of f in future '($a2,$a3) = ($a3,$a2); unshift(@ROT,pop(@ROT)); $i++;' ); # and at the finish one has to $a+=$a1 } $code.=<<___; .type ${func}_avx2,\@function,3 .align 64 ${func}_avx2: .Lavx2_shortcut: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 mov %rsp,%r11 # copy %rsp sub \$`2*$SZ*$rounds+4*8+$win64*16*($SZ==4?4:6)`,%rsp shl \$4,%rdx # num*16 and \$-256*$SZ,%rsp # align stack frame lea ($inp,%rdx,$SZ),%rdx # inp+num*16*$SZ add \$`2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`,%rsp mov $ctx,$_ctx # save ctx, 1st arg mov $inp,$_inp # save inp, 2nd arh mov %rdx,$_end # save end pointer, "3rd" arg mov %r11,$_rsp # save copy of %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,16*$SZ+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,16*$SZ+48(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,16*$SZ+64(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,16*$SZ+80(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4); movaps %xmm10,16*$SZ+96(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,16*$SZ+112(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; .Lprologue_avx2: vzeroupper sub \$-16*$SZ,$inp # inp++, size optimization mov $SZ*0($ctx),$A mov $inp,%r12 # borrow $T1 mov $SZ*1($ctx),$B cmp %rdx,$inp # $_end mov $SZ*2($ctx),$C cmove %rsp,%r12 # next block or random data mov $SZ*3($ctx),$D mov $SZ*4($ctx),$E mov $SZ*5($ctx),$F mov $SZ*6($ctx),$G mov $SZ*7($ctx),$H ___ if ($SZ==4) { # SHA256 my @X = map("%ymm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3, $t4,$t5) = map("%ymm$_",(4..9)); $code.=<<___; vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+32(%rip),$t4 vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`+64(%rip),$t5 jmp .Loop_avx2 .align 16 .Loop_avx2: vmovdqa $TABLE+`$SZ*2*$rounds`(%rip),$t3 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+0($inp),%xmm0 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+16($inp),%xmm1 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+32($inp),%xmm2 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+48($inp),%xmm3 #mov $inp,$_inp # offload $inp vinserti128 \$1,(%r12),@X[0],@X[0] vinserti128 \$1,16(%r12),@X[1],@X[1] vpshufb $t3,@X[0],@X[0] vinserti128 \$1,32(%r12),@X[2],@X[2] vpshufb $t3,@X[1],@X[1] vinserti128 \$1,48(%r12),@X[3],@X[3] lea $TABLE(%rip),$Tbl vpshufb $t3,@X[2],@X[2] vpaddd 0x00($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t3,@X[3],@X[3] vpaddd 0x20($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpaddd 0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddd 0x60($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) xor $a1,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x20(%rsp) lea -$PUSH8(%rsp),%rsp mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x00(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x20(%rsp) mov $F,$a4 sub \$-16*2*$SZ,$Tbl # size optimization jmp .Lavx2_00_47 .align 16 .Lavx2_00_47: ___ sub AVX2_256_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 96 instructions my $base = "+2*$PUSH8(%rsp)"; &lea ("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)") if (($j%2)==0); foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) { # 29 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa ((32*$j)%$PUSH8."(%rsp)",$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX2_256_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &lea ($Tbl,16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)"); &cmpb (($SZ-1)."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lavx2_00_47"); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { my $base=$i<8?"+$PUSH8(%rsp)":"(%rsp)"; foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; } } } else { # SHA512 my @X = map("%ymm$_",(0..7)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("%ymm$_",(8..11)); $code.=<<___; jmp .Loop_avx2 .align 16 .Loop_avx2: vmovdqu -16*$SZ($inp),%xmm0 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+16($inp),%xmm1 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+32($inp),%xmm2 lea $TABLE+0x80(%rip),$Tbl # size optimization vmovdqu -16*$SZ+48($inp),%xmm3 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+64($inp),%xmm4 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+80($inp),%xmm5 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+96($inp),%xmm6 vmovdqu -16*$SZ+112($inp),%xmm7 #mov $inp,$_inp # offload $inp vmovdqa `$SZ*2*$rounds-0x80`($Tbl),$t2 vinserti128 \$1,(%r12),@X[0],@X[0] vinserti128 \$1,16(%r12),@X[1],@X[1] vpshufb $t2,@X[0],@X[0] vinserti128 \$1,32(%r12),@X[2],@X[2] vpshufb $t2,@X[1],@X[1] vinserti128 \$1,48(%r12),@X[3],@X[3] vpshufb $t2,@X[2],@X[2] vinserti128 \$1,64(%r12),@X[4],@X[4] vpshufb $t2,@X[3],@X[3] vinserti128 \$1,80(%r12),@X[5],@X[5] vpshufb $t2,@X[4],@X[4] vinserti128 \$1,96(%r12),@X[6],@X[6] vpshufb $t2,@X[5],@X[5] vinserti128 \$1,112(%r12),@X[7],@X[7] vpaddq -0x80($Tbl),@X[0],$t0 vpshufb $t2,@X[6],@X[6] vpaddq -0x60($Tbl),@X[1],$t1 vpshufb $t2,@X[7],@X[7] vpaddq -0x40($Tbl),@X[2],$t2 vpaddq -0x20($Tbl),@X[3],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) vpaddq 0x00($Tbl),@X[4],$t0 vmovdqa $t1,0x20(%rsp) vpaddq 0x20($Tbl),@X[5],$t1 vmovdqa $t2,0x40(%rsp) vpaddq 0x40($Tbl),@X[6],$t2 vmovdqa $t3,0x60(%rsp) lea -$PUSH8(%rsp),%rsp vpaddq 0x60($Tbl),@X[7],$t3 vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp) xor $a1,$a1 vmovdqa $t1,0x20(%rsp) mov $B,$a3 vmovdqa $t2,0x40(%rsp) xor $C,$a3 # magic vmovdqa $t3,0x60(%rsp) mov $F,$a4 add \$16*2*$SZ,$Tbl jmp .Lavx2_00_47 .align 16 .Lavx2_00_47: ___ sub AVX2_512_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body); # 48 instructions my $base = "+2*$PUSH8(%rsp)"; &lea ("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)") if (($j%4)==0); foreach (Xupdate_512_AVX()) { # 23 instructions eval; if ($_ !~ /\;$/) { eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); } } &vpaddq ($t2,@X[0],16*2*$j-0x80."($Tbl)"); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa ((32*$j)%$PUSH8."(%rsp)",$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<8; $j++) { &AVX2_512_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &lea ($Tbl,16*2*$SZ."($Tbl)"); &cmpb (($SZ-1-0x80)."($Tbl)",0); &jne (".Lavx2_00_47"); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { my $base=$i<8?"+$PUSH8(%rsp)":"(%rsp)"; foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; } } } $code.=<<___; mov `2*$SZ*$rounds`(%rsp),$ctx # $_ctx add $a1,$A #mov `2*$SZ*$rounds+8`(%rsp),$inp # $_inp lea `2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),$Tbl add $SZ*0($ctx),$A add $SZ*1($ctx),$B add $SZ*2($ctx),$C add $SZ*3($ctx),$D add $SZ*4($ctx),$E add $SZ*5($ctx),$F add $SZ*6($ctx),$G add $SZ*7($ctx),$H mov $A,$SZ*0($ctx) mov $B,$SZ*1($ctx) mov $C,$SZ*2($ctx) mov $D,$SZ*3($ctx) mov $E,$SZ*4($ctx) mov $F,$SZ*5($ctx) mov $G,$SZ*6($ctx) mov $H,$SZ*7($ctx) cmp `$PUSH8+2*8`($Tbl),$inp # $_end je .Ldone_avx2 xor $a1,$a1 mov $B,$a3 xor $C,$a3 # magic mov $F,$a4 jmp .Lower_avx2 .align 16 .Lower_avx2: ___ for ($i=0; $i<8; ) { my $base="+16($Tbl)"; foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; } } $code.=<<___; lea -$PUSH8($Tbl),$Tbl cmp %rsp,$Tbl jae .Lower_avx2 mov `2*$SZ*$rounds`(%rsp),$ctx # $_ctx add $a1,$A #mov `2*$SZ*$rounds+8`(%rsp),$inp # $_inp lea `2*$SZ*($rounds-8)`(%rsp),%rsp add $SZ*0($ctx),$A add $SZ*1($ctx),$B add $SZ*2($ctx),$C add $SZ*3($ctx),$D add $SZ*4($ctx),$E add $SZ*5($ctx),$F lea `2*16*$SZ`($inp),$inp # inp+=2 add $SZ*6($ctx),$G mov $inp,%r12 add $SZ*7($ctx),$H cmp $_end,$inp mov $A,$SZ*0($ctx) cmove %rsp,%r12 # next block or stale data mov $B,$SZ*1($ctx) mov $C,$SZ*2($ctx) mov $D,$SZ*3($ctx) mov $E,$SZ*4($ctx) mov $F,$SZ*5($ctx) mov $G,$SZ*6($ctx) mov $H,$SZ*7($ctx) jbe .Loop_avx2 lea (%rsp),$Tbl .Ldone_avx2: lea ($Tbl),%rsp mov $_rsp,%rsi vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*$SZ+32(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 16*$SZ+48(%rsp),%xmm7 movaps 16*$SZ+64(%rsp),%xmm8 movaps 16*$SZ+80(%rsp),%xmm9 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64 && $SZ>4); movaps 16*$SZ+96(%rsp),%xmm10 movaps 16*$SZ+112(%rsp),%xmm11 ___ $code.=<<___; mov (%rsi),%r15 mov 8(%rsi),%r14 mov 16(%rsi),%r13 mov 24(%rsi),%r12 mov 32(%rsi),%rbp mov 40(%rsi),%rbx lea 48(%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx2: ret .size ${func}_avx2,.-${func}_avx2 ___ }} }}}}} # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HanderlData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); lea .Lavx2_shortcut(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx jb .Lin_prologue # non-AVX code lea 16*$SZ+4*8(%rsi),%rsi # Xmm6- save area lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$`$SZ==4?8:12`,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext); .type shaext_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 shaext_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lprologue_shaext(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lprologue jb .Lin_prologue lea .Lepilogue_shaext(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lin_prologue lea -8-5*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$10,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq jmp .Lin_prologue .size shaext_handler,.-shaext_handler ___ $code.=<<___; .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_$func .rva .LSEH_end_$func .rva .LSEH_info_$func ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext); .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_shaext .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_shaext .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_shaext ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_ssse3 .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_ssse3 .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_ssse3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx && $SZ==8); .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_xop .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_xop .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_xop ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_avx .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_avx .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .rva .LSEH_begin_${func}_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_${func}_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_${func}_avx2 ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_$func: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue,.Lepilogue # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $shaext); .LSEH_info_${func}_shaext: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva shaext_handler ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); .LSEH_info_${func}_ssse3: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_ssse3,.Lepilogue_ssse3 # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx && $SZ==8); .LSEH_info_${func}_xop: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_xop,.Lepilogue_xop # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .LSEH_info_${func}_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .LSEH_info_${func}_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lprologue_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2 # HandlerData[] ___ } sub sha256op38 { my $instr = shift; my %opcodelet = ( "sha256rnds2" => 0xcb, "sha256msg1" => 0xcc, "sha256msg2" => 0xcd ); if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-7]),\s*%xmm([0-7])/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38); push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr}; push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return $instr."\t".@_[0]; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\b(sha256[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha256op38($1,$2)/geo; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl0000644000000000000000000012652413176625657016461 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # [Re]written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # "[Re]written" was achieved in two major overhauls. In 2004 BODY_* # functions were re-implemented to address P4 performance issue [see # commentary below], and in 2006 the rest was rewritten in order to # gain freedom to liberate licensing terms. # January, September 2004. # # It was noted that Intel IA-32 C compiler generates code which # performs ~30% *faster* on P4 CPU than original *hand-coded* # SHA1 assembler implementation. To address this problem (and # prove that humans are still better than machines:-), the # original code was overhauled, which resulted in following # performance changes: # # compared with original compared with Intel cc # assembler impl. generated code # Pentium -16% +48% # PIII/AMD +8% +16% # P4 +85%(!) +45% # # As you can see Pentium came out as looser:-( Yet I reckoned that # improvement on P4 outweights the loss and incorporate this # re-tuned code to 0.9.7 and later. # ---------------------------------------------------------------- # # August 2009. # # George Spelvin has tipped that F_40_59(b,c,d) can be rewritten as # '(c&d) + (b&(c^d))', which allows to accumulate partial results # and lighten "pressure" on scratch registers. This resulted in # >12% performance improvement on contemporary AMD cores (with no # degradation on other CPUs:-). Also, the code was revised to maximize # "distance" between instructions producing input to 'lea' instruction # and the 'lea' instruction itself, which is essential for Intel Atom # core and resulted in ~15% improvement. # October 2010. # # Add SSSE3, Supplemental[!] SSE3, implementation. The idea behind it # is to offload message schedule denoted by Wt in NIST specification, # or Xupdate in OpenSSL source, to SIMD unit. The idea is not novel, # and in SSE2 context was first explored by Dean Gaudet in 2004, see # http://arctic.org/~dean/crypto/sha1.html. Since then several things # have changed that made it interesting again: # # a) XMM units became faster and wider; # b) instruction set became more versatile; # c) an important observation was made by Max Locktykhin, which made # it possible to reduce amount of instructions required to perform # the operation in question, for further details see # http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/improving-the-performance-of-the-secure-hash-algorithm-1/. # April 2011. # # Add AVX code path, probably most controversial... The thing is that # switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in # comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like # 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as # pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that # make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded # as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with # equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1 # cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used # to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer # [according to its optimization manual]. Which is why AVX code path # is guarded by *both* AVX and synthetic bit denoting Intel CPUs. # One can argue that it's unfair to AMD, but without 'sh[rl]d' it # makes no sense to keep the AVX code path. If somebody feels that # strongly, it's probably more appropriate to discuss possibility of # using vector rotate XOP on AMD... # March 2014. # # Add support for Intel SHA Extensions. ###################################################################### # Current performance is summarized in following table. Numbers are # CPU clock cycles spent to process single byte (less is better). # # x86 SSSE3 AVX # Pentium 15.7 - # PIII 11.5 - # P4 10.6 - # AMD K8 7.1 - # Core2 7.3 6.0/+22% - # Westmere 7.3 5.5/+33% - # Sandy Bridge 8.8 6.2/+40% 5.1(**)/+73% # Ivy Bridge 7.2 4.8/+51% 4.7(**)/+53% # Haswell 6.5 4.3/+51% 4.1(**)/+58% # Bulldozer 11.6 6.0/+92% # VIA Nano 10.6 7.5/+41% # Atom 12.5 9.3(*)/+35% # Silvermont 14.5 9.9(*)/+46% # # (*) Loop is 1056 instructions long and expected result is ~8.25. # The discrepancy is because of front-end limitations, so # called MS-ROM penalties, and on Silvermont even rotate's # limited parallelism. # # (**) As per above comment, the result is for AVX *plus* sh[rl]d. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha1-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $xmm=$ymm=0; for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } $ymm=1 if ($xmm && `$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $1>=2.19); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $1>=2.03); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" && `ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=10); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); # first version supporting AVX $shaext=$xmm; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($xmm); $A="eax"; $B="ebx"; $C="ecx"; $D="edx"; $E="edi"; $T="esi"; $tmp1="ebp"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T); $alt=0; # 1 denotes alternative IALU implementation, which performs # 8% *worse* on P4, same on Westmere and Atom, 2% better on # Sandy Bridge... sub BODY_00_15 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; &comment("00_15 $n"); &mov($f,$c); # f to hold F_00_19(b,c,d) if ($n==0) { &mov($tmp1,$a); } else { &mov($a,$tmp1); } &rotl($tmp1,5); # tmp1=ROTATE(a,5) &xor($f,$d); &add($tmp1,$e); # tmp1+=e; &mov($e,&swtmp($n%16)); # e becomes volatile and is loaded # with xi, also note that e becomes # f in next round... &and($f,$b); &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &xor($f,$d); # f holds F_00_19(b,c,d) &lea($tmp1,&DWP(0x5a827999,$tmp1,$e)); # tmp1+=K_00_19+xi if ($n==15) { &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));# pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); } # f+=tmp1 else { &add($tmp1,$f); } # f becomes a in next round &mov($tmp1,$a) if ($alt && $n==15); } sub BODY_16_19 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; &comment("16_19 $n"); if ($alt) { &xor($c,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &and($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d), b&=c^d &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d) &xor($c,$d); # restore $c &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round &rotr($b,$n==16?2:7); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } else { &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &and($tmp1,$b); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d) &mov($tmp1,$a); &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } } sub BODY_20_39 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; local $K=($n<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6; &comment("20_39 $n"); if ($alt) { &xor($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d), b^=c &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &xor($b,$c) if($n==39);# warm up for BODY_40_59 &and($tmp1,$b) if($n==39); &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) &rotr($a,5) if ($n==79); } else { &mov($tmp1,$b); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$c); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d) &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov($tmp1,$a); &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } } sub BODY_40_59 { local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; &comment("40_59 $n"); if ($alt) { &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=b&(c^d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &mov($tmp1,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &xor($c,$d); # restore $c &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &and($tmp1,$c); &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=c&d &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &xor($b,$c) if ($n<59); &and($tmp1,$b) if ($n<59);# tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d) &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$e));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d)) &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) } else { &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d) &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) &xor($tmp1,$d); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16)); &and($tmp1,$b); &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1) &add($tmp1,$e); # b&(c^d)+=e &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30) &mov($e,$a); # e becomes volatile &rotl($e,5); # ROTATE(a,5) &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$tmp1));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d)) &mov($tmp1,$c); &add($f,$e); # f+=ROTATE(a,5) &and($tmp1,$d); &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=c&d } } &function_begin("sha1_block_data_order"); if ($xmm) { &static_label("shaext_shortcut") if ($shaext); &static_label("ssse3_shortcut"); &static_label("avx_shortcut") if ($ymm); &static_label("K_XX_XX"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &picmeup($T,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tmp1,&label("pic_point")); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$T)); &mov ($D,&DWP(4,$T)); &test ($D,1<<9); # check SSSE3 bit &jz (&label("x86")); &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$T)); &test ($A,1<<24); # check FXSR bit &jz (&label("x86")); if ($shaext) { &test ($C,1<<29); # check SHA bit &jnz (&label("shaext_shortcut")); } if ($ymm) { &and ($D,1<<28); # mask AVX bit &and ($A,1<<30); # mask "Intel CPU" bit &or ($A,$D); &cmp ($A,1<<28|1<<30); &je (&label("avx_shortcut")); } &jmp (&label("ssse3_shortcut")); &set_label("x86",16); } &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # SHA_CTX *c &mov($T,&wparam(1)); # const void *input &mov($A,&wparam(2)); # size_t num &stack_push(16+3); # allocate X[16] &shl($A,6); &add($A,$T); &mov(&wparam(2),$A); # pointer beyond the end of input &mov($E,&DWP(16,$tmp1));# pre-load E &jmp(&label("loop")); &set_label("loop",16); # copy input chunk to X, but reversing byte order! for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=4) { &mov($A,&DWP(4*($i+0),$T)); &mov($B,&DWP(4*($i+1),$T)); &mov($C,&DWP(4*($i+2),$T)); &mov($D,&DWP(4*($i+3),$T)); &bswap($A); &bswap($B); &bswap($C); &bswap($D); &mov(&swtmp($i+0),$A); &mov(&swtmp($i+1),$B); &mov(&swtmp($i+2),$C); &mov(&swtmp($i+3),$D); } &mov(&wparam(1),$T); # redundant in 1st spin &mov($A,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # load SHA_CTX &mov($B,&DWP(4,$tmp1)); &mov($C,&DWP(8,$tmp1)); &mov($D,&DWP(12,$tmp1)); # E is pre-loaded for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_16_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } (($V[5] eq $D) and ($V[0] eq $E)) or die; # double-check &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # re-load SHA_CTX* &mov($D,&wparam(1)); # D is last "T" and is discarded &add($E,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # E is last "A"... &add($T,&DWP(4,$tmp1)); &add($A,&DWP(8,$tmp1)); &add($B,&DWP(12,$tmp1)); &add($C,&DWP(16,$tmp1)); &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp1),$E); # update SHA_CTX &add($D,64); # advance input pointer &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp1),$T); &cmp($D,&wparam(2)); # have we reached the end yet? &mov(&DWP(8,$tmp1),$A); &mov($E,$C); # C is last "E" which needs to be "pre-loaded" &mov(&DWP(12,$tmp1),$B); &mov($T,$D); # input pointer &mov(&DWP(16,$tmp1),$C); &jb(&label("loop")); &stack_pop(16+3); &function_end("sha1_block_data_order"); if ($xmm) { if ($shaext) { ###################################################################### # Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA1 update function. # my ($ctx,$inp,$num)=("edi","esi","ecx"); my ($ABCD,$E,$E_,$BSWAP)=map("xmm$_",(0..3)); my @MSG=map("xmm$_",(4..7)); sub sha1rnds4 { my ($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm); } } sub sha1op38 { my ($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2); } } sub sha1nexte { sha1op38(0xc8,@_); } sub sha1msg1 { sha1op38(0xc9,@_); } sub sha1msg2 { sha1op38(0xca,@_); } &function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_shaext"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &set_label("shaext_shortcut"); &mov ($ctx,&wparam(0)); &mov ("ebx","esp"); &mov ($inp,&wparam(1)); &mov ($num,&wparam(2)); &sub ("esp",32); &movdqu ($ABCD,&QWP(0,$ctx)); &movd ($E,&DWP(16,$ctx)); &and ("esp",-32); &movdqa ($BSWAP,&QWP(0x50,$tmp1)); # byte-n-word swap &movdqu (@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp)); &pshufd ($ABCD,$ABCD,0b00011011); # flip word order &movdqu (@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &pshufd ($E,$E,0b00011011); # flip word order &movdqu (@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[0],$BSWAP); &movdqu (@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[1],$BSWAP); &pshufb (@MSG[2],$BSWAP); &pshufb (@MSG[3],$BSWAP); &jmp (&label("loop_shaext")); &set_label("loop_shaext",16); &dec ($num); &lea ("eax",&DWP(0x40,$inp)); &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$E); # offload $E &paddd ($E,@MSG[0]); &cmovne ($inp,"eax"); &movdqa (&QWP(16,"esp"),$ABCD); # offload $ABCD for($i=0;$i<20-4;$i+=2) { &sha1msg1 (@MSG[0],@MSG[1]); &movdqa ($E_,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E,int($i/5)); # 0-3... &sha1nexte ($E_,@MSG[1]); &pxor (@MSG[0],@MSG[2]); &sha1msg1 (@MSG[1],@MSG[2]); &sha1msg2 (@MSG[0],@MSG[3]); &movdqa ($E,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E_,int(($i+1)/5)); &sha1nexte ($E,@MSG[2]); &pxor (@MSG[1],@MSG[3]); &sha1msg2 (@MSG[1],@MSG[0]); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } &movdqu (@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp)); &movdqa ($E_,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E,3); # 64-67 &sha1nexte ($E_,@MSG[1]); &movdqu (@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[0],$BSWAP); &movdqa ($E,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E_,3); # 68-71 &sha1nexte ($E,@MSG[2]); &movdqu (@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[1],$BSWAP); &movdqa ($E_,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E,3); # 72-75 &sha1nexte ($E_,@MSG[3]); &movdqu (@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[2],$BSWAP); &movdqa ($E,$ABCD); &sha1rnds4 ($ABCD,$E_,3); # 76-79 &movdqa ($E_,&QWP(0,"esp")); &pshufb (@MSG[3],$BSWAP); &sha1nexte ($E,$E_); &paddd ($ABCD,&QWP(16,"esp")); &jnz (&label("loop_shaext")); &pshufd ($ABCD,$ABCD,0b00011011); &pshufd ($E,$E,0b00011011); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$ctx),$ABCD) &movd (&DWP(16,$ctx),$E); &mov ("esp","ebx"); &function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_shaext"); } ###################################################################### # The SSSE3 implementation. # # %xmm[0-7] are used as ring @X[] buffer containing quadruples of last # 32 elements of the message schedule or Xupdate outputs. First 4 # quadruples are simply byte-swapped input, next 4 are calculated # according to method originally suggested by Dean Gaudet (modulo # being implemented in SSSE3). Once 8 quadruples or 32 elements are # collected, it switches to routine proposed by Max Locktyukhin. # # Calculations inevitably require temporary reqisters, and there are # no %xmm registers left to spare. For this reason part of the ring # buffer, X[2..4] to be specific, is offloaded to 3 quadriples ring # buffer on the stack. Keep in mind that X[2] is alias X[-6], X[3] - # X[-5], and X[4] - X[-4]... # # Another notable optimization is aggressive stack frame compression # aiming to minimize amount of 9-byte instructions... # # Yet another notable optimization is "jumping" $B variable. It means # that there is no register permanently allocated for $B value. This # allowed to eliminate one instruction from body_20_39... # my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4 my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); my $j=0; # hash round my $rx=0; my @T=($T,$tmp1); my $inp; my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) }; &function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &set_label("ssse3_shortcut"); &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19 &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39 &movdqa (@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59 &movdqa (@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79 &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1)); &mov ($D,&wparam(2)); &mov (@T[0],"esp"); # stack frame layout # # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K # # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7] # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19 # # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 # pbswap mask # # +192 ctx # argument block # +196 inp # +200 end # +204 esp &sub ("esp",208); &and ("esp",-64); &movdqa (&QWP(112+0,"esp"),@X[4]); # copy constants &movdqa (&QWP(112+16,"esp"),@X[5]); &movdqa (&QWP(112+32,"esp"),@X[6]); &shl ($D,6); # len*64 &movdqa (&QWP(112+48,"esp"),@X[3]); &add ($D,$inp); # end of input &movdqa (&QWP(112+64,"esp"),@X[2]); &add ($inp,64); &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D); &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"),@T[0]); # save original %esp &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E)); &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E)); &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E)); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E)); &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3] &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp)); &pshufb (@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &pshufb (@X[-3&7],@X[2]); &pshufb (@X[-2&7],@X[2]); &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot &pshufb (@X[-1&7],@X[2]); &paddd (@X[-4&7],@X[3]); # add K_00_19 &paddd (@X[-3&7],@X[3]); &paddd (@X[-2&7],@X[3]); &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),@X[-4&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU &psubd (@X[-4&7],@X[3]); # restore X[] &movdqa (&QWP(0+16,"esp"),@X[-3&7]); &psubd (@X[-3&7],@X[3]); &movdqa (&QWP(0+32,"esp"),@X[-2&7]); &mov (@T[1],$C); &psubd (@X[-2&7],@X[3]); &xor (@T[1],$D); &pshufd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee); # was &movdqa (@X[0],@X[-3&7]); &and (@T[0],@T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); ###################################################################### # SSE instruction sequence is first broken to groups of independent # instructions, independent in respect to their inputs and shifter # (not all architectures have more than one). Then IALU instructions # are "knitted in" between the SSE groups. Distance is maintained for # SSE latency of 2 in hope that it fits better upcoming AMD Bulldozer # [which allegedly also implements SSSE3]... # # Temporary registers usage. X[2] is volatile at the entry and at the # end is restored from backtrace ring buffer. X[3] is expected to # contain current K_XX_XX constant and is used to calculate X[-1]+K # from previous round, it becomes volatile the moment the value is # saved to stack for transfer to IALU. X[4] becomes volatile whenever # X[-4] is accumulated and offloaded to backtrace ring buffer, at the # end it is loaded with next K_XX_XX [which becomes X[3] in next # round]... # sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &punpcklqdq(@X[0],@X[-3&7]); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]", was &palignr(@X[0],@X[-4&7],8); &movdqa (@X[2],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[3],@X[-1&7]); &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); &psrldq (@X[2],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pxor (@X[2],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@X[4],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &movdqa (@X[2],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslldq (@X[4],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &paddd (@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@X[2],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (@X[3],@X[4]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@X[4],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &por (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld (@X[3],2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &pxor (@X[0],@X[4]); &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[3]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2 &pshufd (@X[1],@X[-3&7],0xee) if ($Xi<7); # was &movdqa (@X[1],@X[-2&7]) &pshufd (@X[3],@X[-1&7],0xee) if ($Xi==7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 44 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" &punpcklqdq(@X[2],@X[-1&7]); # compose "X[-6]", was &palignr(@X[2],@X[-2&7],8) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &pxor (@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); if ($Xi%5) { &movdqa (@X[4],@X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX... } else { # ... or load next one &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp")); } eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &paddd (@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (@X[2],@X[0]); &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); &pslld (@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@X[2],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[1] =~ /_rol/); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); &por (@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pshufd (@X[3],@X[-1],0xee) if ($Xi<19); # was &movdqa (@X[3],@X[0]) eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xuplast_ssse3_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp")); &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp")); &je (&label("done")); &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19 &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp)); &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp)); &add ($inp,64); &pshufb (@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"),@X[($Xi-4)&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psubd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } sub body_00_19 () { # ((c^d)&b)^d # on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b return &body_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&$_ror ($b,$j?7:2);', # $b>>>2 '&xor (@T[0],$d);', '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&xor ($b,$c);', # $c^$d for next round '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&and (@T[1],$b);', # ($b&($c^$d)) for next round '&xor ($b,$c);', # restore $b '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub body_20_39 () { # b^d^c # on entry @T[0]=b^d return &body_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&xor (@T[0],$d) if($j==19);'. '&xor (@T[0],$c) if($j> 19);', # ($b^$d^$c) '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j< 79);', # $b^$d for next round '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2 '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub body_40_59 () { # ((b^c)&(c^d))^c # on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d) $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&and (@T[0],$c) if ($j>=40);', # (b^c)&(c^d) '&xor ($c,$d) if ($j>=40);', # restore $c '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2 '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b for next round '&xor (@T[0],$c);', '&$_rol ($a,5);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j==59);'. '&xor (@T[1],$b) if ($j< 59);', # b^c for next round '&xor ($b,$c) if ($j< 59);', # c^d for next round '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } ###### sub bodyx_00_19 () { # ((c^d)&b)^d # on start @T[0]=(b&c)^(~b&d), $e+=X[]+K return &bodyx_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&rorx ($b,$b,2) if ($j==0);'. # $b>>>2 '&rorx ($b,@T[1],7) if ($j!=0);', # $b>>>2 '&lea ($e,&DWP(0,$e,@T[0]));', '&rorx (@T[0],$a,5);', '&andn (@T[1],$a,$c);', '&and ($a,$b)', '&add ($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer '&xor (@T[1],$a)', '&add ($e,@T[0]);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub bodyx_20_39 () { # b^d^c # on start $b=b^c^d return &bodyx_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,($j==19?@T[0]:$b))', '&rorx ($b,@T[1],7);', # $b>>>2 '&rorx (@T[0],$a,5);', '&xor ($a,$b) if ($j<79);', '&add ($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp")) if ($j<79);', # X[]+K xfer '&xor ($a,$c) if ($j<79);', '&add ($e,@T[0]);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub bodyx_40_59 () { # ((b^c)&(c^d))^c # on start $b=((b^c)&(c^d))^c return &bodyx_20_39() if ($rx==59); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&rorx (@T[0],$a,5)', '&lea ($e,&DWP(0,$e,$b))', '&rorx ($b,@T[1],7)', # $b>>>2 '&add ($d,&DWP(4*(($j+1)&15),"esp"))', # X[]+K xfer '&mov (@T[1],$c)', '&xor ($a,$b)', # b^c for next round '&xor (@T[1],$b)', # c^d for next round '&and ($a,@T[1])', '&add ($e,@T[0])', '&xor ($a,$b)' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } &set_label("loop",16); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &mov ($B,$C); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &xor ($B,$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &mov (@T[1],@T[0]); &pshufd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee); # was &movdqa (@X[0],@X[-3&7]); &and (@T[0],$B); &mov ($B,$T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3"); $rx=0; # reset if ($ymm) { my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4 my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); my $j=0; # hash round my @T=($T,$tmp1); my $inp; my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0],@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; &function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_avx"); &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($tmp1); &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1)); &set_label("avx_shortcut"); &vzeroall(); &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19 &vmovdqa(@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39 &vmovdqa(@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59 &vmovdqa(@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79 &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1)); &mov ($D,&wparam(2)); &mov (@T[0],"esp"); # stack frame layout # # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K # # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7] # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19 # # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 # pbswap mask # # +192 ctx # argument block # +196 inp # +200 end # +204 esp &sub ("esp",208); &and ("esp",-64); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+0,"esp"),@X[4]); # copy constants &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+16,"esp"),@X[5]); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+32,"esp"),@X[6]); &shl ($D,6); # len*64 &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+48,"esp"),@X[3]); &add ($D,$inp); # end of input &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+64,"esp"),@X[2]); &add ($inp,64); &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D); &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"),@T[0]); # save original %esp &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E)); &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E)); &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E)); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E)); &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3] &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp)); &vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &vpshufb(@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7],@X[2]); &vpshufb(@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7],@X[2]); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot &vpshufb(@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7],@X[2]); &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],@X[3]); # add K_00_19 &vpaddd (@X[1],@X[-3&7],@X[3]); &vpaddd (@X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[3]); &vmovdqa(&QWP(0,"esp"),@X[0]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU &mov (@T[1],$C); &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+16,"esp"),@X[1]); &xor (@T[1],$D); &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+32,"esp"),@X[2]); &and (@T[0],@T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]); &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrldq(@X[2],@X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[2],@X[2],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@X[2],@X[0],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslldq(@X[4],@X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@X[3],@X[4],30); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@X[4],@X[4],2); &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[4]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_avx_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 44 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vpalignr(@X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]" &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"),@X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); if ($Xi%5) { &vmovdqa (@X[4],@X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX... } else { # ... or load next one &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp")); } &vpaddd (@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpsrld (@X[2],@X[0],30); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@X[0],@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xuplast_avx_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[3],@X[3],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"),@X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp")); &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp")); &je (&label("done")); &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19 &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp)); &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp)); &add ($inp,64); &vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp); &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"),@X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[$Xi&7],@X[($Xi-4)&7],@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"),@X[$Xi&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } &set_label("loop",16); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov ($B,$C); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &xor ($B,$D); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &mov (@T[1],@T[0]); &and (@T[0],$B); &mov ($B,@T[1]); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &vzeroall(); &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context &add ($A,&DWP(0,@T[1])); &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp &add (@T[0],&DWP(4,@T[1])); # $b &add ($C,&DWP(8,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(0,@T[1]),$A); &add ($D,&DWP(12,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(4,@T[1]),@T[0]); &add ($E,&DWP(16,@T[1])); &mov (&DWP(8,@T[1]),$C); &mov (&DWP(12,@T[1]),$D); &mov (&DWP(16,@T[1]),$E); &function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_avx"); } &set_label("K_XX_XX",64); &data_word(0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999); # K_00_19 &data_word(0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1); # K_20_39 &data_word(0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc); # K_40_59 &data_word(0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6); # K_60_79 &data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f); # pbswap mask &data_byte(0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0); } &asciz("SHA1 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000014342713176625660017073 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # sha1_block procedure for x86_64. # # It was brought to my attention that on EM64T compiler-generated code # was far behind 32-bit assembler implementation. This is unlike on # Opteron where compiler-generated code was only 15% behind 32-bit # assembler, which originally made it hard to motivate the effort. # There was suggestion to mechanically translate 32-bit code, but I # dismissed it, reasoning that x86_64 offers enough register bank # capacity to fully utilize SHA-1 parallelism. Therefore this fresh # implementation:-) However! While 64-bit code does perform better # on Opteron, I failed to beat 32-bit assembler on EM64T core. Well, # x86_64 does offer larger *addressable* bank, but out-of-order core # reaches for even more registers through dynamic aliasing, and EM64T # core must have managed to run-time optimize even 32-bit code just as # good as 64-bit one. Performance improvement is summarized in the # following table: # # gcc 3.4 32-bit asm cycles/byte # Opteron +45% +20% 6.8 # Xeon P4 +65% +0% 9.9 # Core2 +60% +10% 7.0 # August 2009. # # The code was revised to minimize code size and to maximize # "distance" between instructions producing input to 'lea' # instruction and the 'lea' instruction itself, which is essential # for Intel Atom core. # October 2010. # # Add SSSE3, Supplemental[!] SSE3, implementation. The idea behind it # is to offload message schedule denoted by Wt in NIST specification, # or Xupdate in OpenSSL source, to SIMD unit. See sha1-586.pl module # for background and implementation details. The only difference from # 32-bit code is that 64-bit code doesn't have to spill @X[] elements # to free temporary registers. # April 2011. # # Add AVX code path. See sha1-586.pl for further information. # May 2013. # # Add AVX2+BMI code path. Initial attempt (utilizing BMI instructions # and loading pair of consecutive blocks to 256-bit %ymm registers) # did not provide impressive performance improvement till a crucial # hint regarding the number of Xupdate iterations to pre-compute in # advance was provided by Ilya Albrekht of Intel Corp. # March 2014. # # Add support for Intel SHA Extensions. ###################################################################### # Current performance is summarized in following table. Numbers are # CPU clock cycles spent to process single byte (less is better). # # x86_64 SSSE3 AVX[2] # P4 9.05 - # Opteron 6.26 - # Core2 6.55 6.05/+8% - # Westmere 6.73 5.30/+27% - # Sandy Bridge 7.70 6.10/+26% 4.99/+54% # Ivy Bridge 6.06 4.67/+30% 4.60/+32% # Haswell 5.45 4.15/+31% 3.57/+53% # Skylake 5.18 4.06/+28% 3.54/+46% # Bulldozer 9.11 5.95/+53% # VIA Nano 9.32 7.15/+30% # Atom 10.3 9.17/+12% # Silvermont 13.1(*) 9.37/+40% # Goldmont 8.13 6.42/+27% 1.70/+380%(**) # # (*) obviously suboptimal result, nothing was done about it, # because SSSE3 code is compiled unconditionally; # (**) SHAEXT result $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } $shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 $avx=1 if (!$shaext && $avx); open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; $ctx="%rdi"; # 1st arg $inp="%rsi"; # 2nd arg $num="%rdx"; # 3rd arg # reassign arguments in order to produce more compact code $ctx="%r8"; $inp="%r9"; $num="%r10"; $t0="%eax"; $t1="%ebx"; $t2="%ecx"; @xi=("%edx","%ebp","%r14d"); $A="%esi"; $B="%edi"; $C="%r11d"; $D="%r12d"; $E="%r13d"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i==0); mov `4*$i`($inp),$xi[0] bswap $xi[0] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); mov `4*$j`($inp),$xi[1] mov $d,$t0 mov $xi[0],`4*$i`(%rsp) mov $a,$t2 bswap $xi[1] xor $c,$t0 rol \$5,$t2 and $b,$t0 lea 0x5a827999($xi[0],$e),$e add $t2,$e xor $d,$t0 rol \$30,$b add $t0,$e ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); xor `4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] mov $d,$t0 mov $xi[0],`4*($i%16)`(%rsp) mov $a,$t2 xor `4*(($j+2)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] xor $c,$t0 rol \$5,$t2 xor `4*(($j+8)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] and $b,$t0 lea 0x5a827999($xi[0],$e),$e rol \$30,$b xor $d,$t0 add $t2,$e rol \$1,$xi[1] add $t0,$e ___ push(@xi,shift(@xi)); } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; my $K=($i<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); xor `4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] mov $b,$t0 `"mov $xi[0],".4*($i%16)."(%rsp)" if ($i<72)` mov $a,$t2 xor `4*(($j+2)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] xor $d,$t0 rol \$5,$t2 xor `4*(($j+8)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] lea $K($xi[0],$e),$e xor $c,$t0 add $t2,$e rol \$30,$b add $t0,$e rol \$1,$xi[1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); mov $b,$t0 mov $a,$t2 xor $d,$t0 lea $K($xi[0],$e),$e rol \$5,$t2 xor $c,$t0 add $t2,$e rol \$30,$b add $t0,$e ___ push(@xi,shift(@xi)); } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___; xor `4*($j%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] mov $d,$t0 mov $xi[0],`4*($i%16)`(%rsp) mov $d,$t1 xor `4*(($j+2)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] and $c,$t0 mov $a,$t2 xor `4*(($j+8)%16)`(%rsp),$xi[1] lea 0x8f1bbcdc($xi[0],$e),$e xor $c,$t1 rol \$5,$t2 add $t0,$e rol \$1,$xi[1] and $b,$t1 add $t2,$e rol \$30,$b add $t1,$e ___ push(@xi,shift(@xi)); } $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl sha1_block_data_order .type sha1_block_data_order,\@function,3 .align 16 sha1_block_data_order: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r9d mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r8d mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r10d test \$`1<<9`,%r8d # check SSSE3 bit jz .Lialu ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); test \$`1<<29`,%r10d # check SHA bit jnz _shaext_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); and \$`1<<3|1<<5|1<<8`,%r10d # check AVX2+BMI1+BMI2 cmp \$`1<<3|1<<5|1<<8`,%r10d je _avx2_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); and \$`1<<28`,%r8d # mask AVX bit and \$`1<<30`,%r9d # mask "Intel CPU" bit or %r9d,%r8d cmp \$`1<<28|1<<30`,%r8d je _avx_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___; jmp _ssse3_shortcut .align 16 .Lialu: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 mov %rdi,$ctx # reassigned argument sub \$`8+16*4`,%rsp mov %rsi,$inp # reassigned argument and \$-64,%rsp mov %rdx,$num # reassigned argument mov %rax,`16*4`(%rsp) .Lprologue: mov 0($ctx),$A mov 4($ctx),$B mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov 16($ctx),$E jmp .Lloop .align 16 .Lloop: ___ for($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; add 0($ctx),$A add 4($ctx),$B add 8($ctx),$C add 12($ctx),$D add 16($ctx),$E mov $A,0($ctx) mov $B,4($ctx) mov $C,8($ctx) mov $D,12($ctx) mov $E,16($ctx) sub \$1,$num lea `16*4`($inp),$inp jnz .Lloop mov `16*4`(%rsp),%rsi mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue: ret .size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order ___ if ($shaext) {{{ ###################################################################### # Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA1 update function. # my ($ctx,$inp,$num)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx"); my ($ABCD,$E,$E_,$BSWAP,$ABCD_SAVE,$E_SAVE)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,8,9)); my @MSG=map("%xmm$_",(4..7)); $code.=<<___; .type sha1_block_data_order_shaext,\@function,3 .align 32 sha1_block_data_order_shaext: _shaext_shortcut: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea `-8-4*16`(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,-8-4*16(%rax) movaps %xmm7,-8-3*16(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-8-2*16(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-8-1*16(%rax) .Lprologue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; movdqu ($ctx),$ABCD movd 16($ctx),$E movdqa K_XX_XX+0xa0(%rip),$BSWAP # byte-n-word swap movdqu ($inp),@MSG[0] pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD # flip word order movdqu 0x10($inp),@MSG[1] pshufd \$0b00011011,$E,$E # flip word order movdqu 0x20($inp),@MSG[2] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[0] movdqu 0x30($inp),@MSG[3] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[1] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[2] movdqa $E,$E_SAVE # offload $E pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[3] jmp .Loop_shaext .align 16 .Loop_shaext: dec $num lea 0x40($inp),%r8 # next input block paddd @MSG[0],$E cmovne %r8,$inp movdqa $ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE # offload $ABCD ___ for($i=0;$i<20-4;$i+=2) { $code.=<<___; sha1msg1 @MSG[1],@MSG[0] movdqa $ABCD,$E_ sha1rnds4 \$`int($i/5)`,$E,$ABCD # 0-3... sha1nexte @MSG[1],$E_ pxor @MSG[2],@MSG[0] sha1msg1 @MSG[2],@MSG[1] sha1msg2 @MSG[3],@MSG[0] movdqa $ABCD,$E sha1rnds4 \$`int(($i+1)/5)`,$E_,$ABCD sha1nexte @MSG[2],$E pxor @MSG[3],@MSG[1] sha1msg2 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] ___ push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } $code.=<<___; movdqu ($inp),@MSG[0] movdqa $ABCD,$E_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E,$ABCD # 64-67 sha1nexte @MSG[1],$E_ movdqu 0x10($inp),@MSG[1] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[0] movdqa $ABCD,$E sha1rnds4 \$3,$E_,$ABCD # 68-71 sha1nexte @MSG[2],$E movdqu 0x20($inp),@MSG[2] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[1] movdqa $ABCD,$E_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E,$ABCD # 72-75 sha1nexte @MSG[3],$E_ movdqu 0x30($inp),@MSG[3] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[2] movdqa $ABCD,$E sha1rnds4 \$3,$E_,$ABCD # 76-79 sha1nexte $E_SAVE,$E pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG[3] paddd $ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD movdqa $E,$E_SAVE # offload $E jnz .Loop_shaext pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD,$ABCD pshufd \$0b00011011,$E,$E movdqu $ABCD,($ctx) movd $E,16($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -8-4*16(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -8-3*16(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -8-2*16(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -8-1*16(%rax),%xmm9 mov %rax,%rsp .Lepilogue_shaext: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size sha1_block_data_order_shaext,.-sha1_block_data_order_shaext ___ }}} {{{ my $Xi=4; my @X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); my @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10)); my $Kx="%xmm11"; my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%ebp"); # size optimization my @T=("%esi","%edi"); my $j=0; my $rx=0; my $K_XX_XX="%r11"; my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) }; { my $sn; sub align32() { ++$sn; $code.=<<___; jmp .Lalign32_$sn # see "Decoded ICache" in manual .align 32 .Lalign32_$sn: ___ } } $code.=<<___; .type sha1_block_data_order_ssse3,\@function,3 .align 16 sha1_block_data_order_ssse3: _ssse3_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 # redundant, done to share Win64 SE handler push %r14 lea `-64-($win64?6*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,-40-6*16(%rax) movaps %xmm7,-40-5*16(%rax) movaps %xmm8,-40-4*16(%rax) movaps %xmm9,-40-3*16(%rax) movaps %xmm10,-40-2*16(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-40-1*16(%rax) .Lprologue_ssse3: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,%r14 # original %rsp and \$-64,%rsp mov %rdi,$ctx # reassigned argument mov %rsi,$inp # reassigned argument mov %rdx,$num # reassigned argument shl \$6,$num add $inp,$num lea K_XX_XX+64(%rip),$K_XX_XX mov 0($ctx),$A # load context mov 4($ctx),$B mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov $B,@T[0] # magic seed mov 16($ctx),$E mov $C,@T[1] xor $D,@T[1] and @T[1],@T[0] movdqa 64($K_XX_XX),@X[2] # pbswap mask movdqa -64($K_XX_XX),@Tx[1] # K_00_19 movdqu 0($inp),@X[-4&7] # load input to %xmm[0-3] movdqu 16($inp),@X[-3&7] movdqu 32($inp),@X[-2&7] movdqu 48($inp),@X[-1&7] pshufb @X[2],@X[-4&7] # byte swap pshufb @X[2],@X[-3&7] pshufb @X[2],@X[-2&7] add \$64,$inp paddd @Tx[1],@X[-4&7] # add K_00_19 pshufb @X[2],@X[-1&7] paddd @Tx[1],@X[-3&7] paddd @Tx[1],@X[-2&7] movdqa @X[-4&7],0(%rsp) # X[]+K xfer to IALU psubd @Tx[1],@X[-4&7] # restore X[] movdqa @X[-3&7],16(%rsp) psubd @Tx[1],@X[-3&7] movdqa @X[-2&7],32(%rsp) psubd @Tx[1],@X[-2&7] jmp .Loop_ssse3 ___ sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; my $arg = pop; $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n"; } sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pshufd (@X[0],@X[-4&7],0xee); # was &movdqa (@X[0],@X[-3&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]); &paddd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &punpcklqdq(@X[0],@X[-3&7]); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]", was &palignr(@X[0],@X[-4&7],8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); &psrldq (@Tx[0],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &pxor (@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &movdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[2],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslldq (@Tx[2],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &paddd (@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@Tx[0],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[1],@Tx[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@Tx[2],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &por (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld (@Tx[1],2); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (@Tx[2],eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)"); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[1]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2 &pshufd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee) if ($Xi==7); # was &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]) in Xupdate_ssse3_32_79 foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] push(@Tx,shift(@Tx)); } sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 44 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)) if ($Xi==8); &pxor (@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)) if ($Xi==8); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[1] =~ /_ror/); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/); &punpcklqdq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7]); # compose "X[-6]", was &palignr(@Tx[0],@X[-2&7],8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &pxor (@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); if ($Xi%5) { &movdqa (@Tx[2],@Tx[1]);# "perpetuate" K_XX_XX... } else { # ... or load next one &movdqa (@Tx[2],eval(2*16*($Xi/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)"); } eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &paddd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); &pxor (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_ror/); &movdqa (@Tx[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 &pslld (@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld (@Tx[0],30); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/);# rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror &por (@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[1] =~ /_rol/); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] =~ /_rol/); &pshufd(@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],0xee) if ($Xi<19); # was &movdqa (@Tx[1],@X[0]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] push(@Tx,shift(@Tx)); } sub Xuplast_ssse3_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &cmp ($inp,$num); &je (".Ldone_ssse3"); unshift(@Tx,pop(@Tx)); &movdqa (@X[2],"64($K_XX_XX)"); # pbswap mask &movdqa (@Tx[1],"-64($K_XX_XX)"); # K_00_19 &movdqu (@X[-4&7],"0($inp)"); # load input &movdqu (@X[-3&7],"16($inp)"); &movdqu (@X[-2&7],"32($inp)"); &movdqu (@X[-1&7],"48($inp)"); &pshufb (@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &add ($inp,64); $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa (eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@X[($Xi-4)&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psubd (@X[($Xi-4)&7],@Tx[1]); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_ssse3() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } sub body_00_19 () { # ((c^d)&b)^d # on start @T[0]=(c^d)&b return &body_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&$_ror ($b,$j?7:2)', # $b>>>2 '&xor (@T[0],$d)', '&mov (@T[1],$a)', # $b for next round '&add ($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)")', # X[]+K xfer '&xor ($b,$c)', # $c^$d for next round '&$_rol ($a,5)', '&add ($e,@T[0])', '&and (@T[1],$b)', # ($b&($c^$d)) for next round '&xor ($b,$c)', # restore $b '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub body_20_39 () { # b^d^c # on entry @T[0]=b^d return &body_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)")', # X[]+K xfer '&xor (@T[0],$d) if($j==19);'. '&xor (@T[0],$c) if($j> 19)', # ($b^$d^$c) '&mov (@T[1],$a)', # $b for next round '&$_rol ($a,5)', '&add ($e,@T[0])', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j< 79)', # $b^$d for next round '&$_ror ($b,7)', # $b>>>2 '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } sub body_40_59 () { # ((b^c)&(c^d))^c # on entry @T[0]=(b^c), (c^=d) $rx++; ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. '&add ($e,eval(4*($j&15))."(%rsp)")', # X[]+K xfer '&and (@T[0],$c) if ($j>=40)', # (b^c)&(c^d) '&xor ($c,$d) if ($j>=40)', # restore $c '&$_ror ($b,7)', # $b>>>2 '&mov (@T[1],$a)', # $b for next round '&xor (@T[0],$c)', '&$_rol ($a,5)', '&add ($e,@T[0])', '&xor (@T[1],$c) if ($j==59);'. '&xor (@T[1],$b) if ($j< 59)', # b^c for next round '&xor ($b,$c) if ($j< 59)', # c^d for next round '&add ($e,$a);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));' ); } $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Loop_ssse3: ___ &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C add 12($ctx),$D mov $A,0($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov @T[0],4($ctx) mov @T[0],$B # magic seed mov $C,8($ctx) mov $C,@T[1] mov $D,12($ctx) xor $D,@T[1] mov $E,16($ctx) and @T[1],@T[0] jmp .Loop_ssse3 .align 16 .Ldone_ssse3: ___ $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C mov $A,0($ctx) add 12($ctx),$D mov @T[0],4($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov $C,8($ctx) mov $D,12($ctx) mov $E,16($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -40-6*16(%r14),%xmm6 movaps -40-5*16(%r14),%xmm7 movaps -40-4*16(%r14),%xmm8 movaps -40-3*16(%r14),%xmm9 movaps -40-2*16(%r14),%xmm10 movaps -40-1*16(%r14),%xmm11 ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%r14),%rsi mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_ssse3: ret .size sha1_block_data_order_ssse3,.-sha1_block_data_order_ssse3 ___ if ($avx) { $Xi=4; # reset variables @X=map("%xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); @Tx=map("%xmm$_",(8..10)); $j=0; $rx=0; my $done_avx_label=".Ldone_avx"; my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0],@_) }; my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; $code.=<<___; .type sha1_block_data_order_avx,\@function,3 .align 16 sha1_block_data_order_avx: _avx_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 # redundant, done to share Win64 SE handler push %r14 lea `-64-($win64?6*16:0)`(%rsp),%rsp vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); vmovaps %xmm6,-40-6*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7,-40-5*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8,-40-4*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9,-40-3*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10,-40-2*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11,-40-1*16(%rax) .Lprologue_avx: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,%r14 # original %rsp and \$-64,%rsp mov %rdi,$ctx # reassigned argument mov %rsi,$inp # reassigned argument mov %rdx,$num # reassigned argument shl \$6,$num add $inp,$num lea K_XX_XX+64(%rip),$K_XX_XX mov 0($ctx),$A # load context mov 4($ctx),$B mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov $B,@T[0] # magic seed mov 16($ctx),$E mov $C,@T[1] xor $D,@T[1] and @T[1],@T[0] vmovdqa 64($K_XX_XX),@X[2] # pbswap mask vmovdqa -64($K_XX_XX),$Kx # K_00_19 vmovdqu 0($inp),@X[-4&7] # load input to %xmm[0-3] vmovdqu 16($inp),@X[-3&7] vmovdqu 32($inp),@X[-2&7] vmovdqu 48($inp),@X[-1&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7] # byte swap add \$64,$inp vpshufb @X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7] vpaddd $Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0] # add K_00_19 vpaddd $Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1] vpaddd $Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2] vmovdqa @X[0],0(%rsp) # X[]+K xfer to IALU vmovdqa @X[1],16(%rsp) vmovdqa @X[2],32(%rsp) jmp .Loop_avx ___ sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@X[0],31); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslldq(@Tx[2],@X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@Tx[1],@Tx[2],30); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@Tx[2],@Tx[2],2); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[2]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa ($Kx,eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)") if ($Xi%5==0); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_avx_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 44 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vpalignr(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]" &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if (@insns[0] !~ /&ro[rl]/); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]); &vmovdqa ($Kx,eval(2*16*($Xi/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)") if ($Xi%5==0); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@X[0],30); &vmovdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@X[0],@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # ror eval(shift(@insns)); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # rol eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xuplast_avx_80() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],$Kx,@X[-1&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa (eval(16*(($Xi-1)&3))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &cmp ($inp,$num); &je ($done_avx_label); &vmovdqa(@X[2],"64($K_XX_XX)"); # pbswap mask &vmovdqa($Kx,"-64($K_XX_XX)"); # K_00_19 &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],"0($inp)"); # load input &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],"16($inp)"); &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],"32($inp)"); &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],"48($inp)"); &vpshufb(@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &add ($inp,64); $Xi=0; } sub Xloop_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpshufb(@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@X[$Xi&7],@X[($Xi-4)&7],$Kx); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqa(eval(16*$Xi)."(%rsp)",@X[$Xi&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } sub Xtail_avx() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Loop_avx: ___ &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done" $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V; &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C add 12($ctx),$D mov $A,0($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov @T[0],4($ctx) mov @T[0],$B # magic seed mov $C,8($ctx) mov $C,@T[1] mov $D,12($ctx) xor $D,@T[1] mov $E,16($ctx) and @T[1],@T[0] jmp .Loop_avx .align 16 $done_avx_label: ___ $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V; &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; vzeroupper add 0($ctx),$A # update context add 4($ctx),@T[0] add 8($ctx),$C mov $A,0($ctx) add 12($ctx),$D mov @T[0],4($ctx) add 16($ctx),$E mov $C,8($ctx) mov $D,12($ctx) mov $E,16($ctx) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -40-6*16(%r14),%xmm6 movaps -40-5*16(%r14),%xmm7 movaps -40-4*16(%r14),%xmm8 movaps -40-3*16(%r14),%xmm9 movaps -40-2*16(%r14),%xmm10 movaps -40-1*16(%r14),%xmm11 ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%r14),%rsi mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx: ret .size sha1_block_data_order_avx,.-sha1_block_data_order_avx ___ if ($avx>1) { use integer; $Xi=4; # reset variables @X=map("%ymm$_",(4..7,0..3)); @Tx=map("%ymm$_",(8..10)); $Kx="%ymm11"; $j=0; my @ROTX=("%eax","%ebp","%ebx","%ecx","%edx","%esi"); my ($a5,$t0)=("%r12d","%edi"); my ($A,$F,$B,$C,$D,$E)=@ROTX; my $rx=0; my $frame="%r13"; $code.=<<___; .type sha1_block_data_order_avx2,\@function,3 .align 16 sha1_block_data_order_avx2: _avx2_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -6*16(%rsp),%rsp vmovaps %xmm6,-40-6*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7,-40-5*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8,-40-4*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9,-40-3*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10,-40-2*16(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11,-40-1*16(%rax) .Lprologue_avx2: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rax,%r14 # original %rsp mov %rdi,$ctx # reassigned argument mov %rsi,$inp # reassigned argument mov %rdx,$num # reassigned argument lea -640(%rsp),%rsp shl \$6,$num lea 64($inp),$frame and \$-128,%rsp add $inp,$num lea K_XX_XX+64(%rip),$K_XX_XX mov 0($ctx),$A # load context cmp $num,$frame cmovae $inp,$frame # next or same block mov 4($ctx),$F mov 8($ctx),$C mov 12($ctx),$D mov 16($ctx),$E vmovdqu 64($K_XX_XX),@X[2] # pbswap mask vmovdqu ($inp),%xmm0 vmovdqu 16($inp),%xmm1 vmovdqu 32($inp),%xmm2 vmovdqu 48($inp),%xmm3 lea 64($inp),$inp vinserti128 \$1,($frame),@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7] vinserti128 \$1,16($frame),@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7] vinserti128 \$1,32($frame),@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7] vinserti128 \$1,48($frame),@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7] vpshufb @X[2],@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7] vmovdqu -64($K_XX_XX),$Kx # K_00_19 vpshufb @X[2],@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7] vpaddd $Kx,@X[-4&7],@X[0] # add K_00_19 vpaddd $Kx,@X[-3&7],@X[1] vmovdqu @X[0],0(%rsp) # X[]+K xfer to IALU vpaddd $Kx,@X[-2&7],@X[2] vmovdqu @X[1],32(%rsp) vpaddd $Kx,@X[-1&7],@X[3] vmovdqu @X[2],64(%rsp) vmovdqu @X[3],96(%rsp) ___ for (;$Xi<8;$Xi++) { # Xupdate_avx2_16_31 use integer; &vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]" &vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" &vpxor (@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@X[0],31); &vmovdqu($Kx,eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)") if ($Xi%5==0); # K_XX_XX &vpslldq(@Tx[2],@X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]); &vpsrld (@Tx[1],@Tx[2],30); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 &vpslld (@Tx[2],@Tx[2],2); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[2]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2 &vpaddd (@Tx[1],@X[0],$Kx); &vmovdqu("32*$Xi(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } $code.=<<___; lea 128(%rsp),$frame jmp .Loop_avx2 .align 32 .Loop_avx2: rorx \$2,$F,$B andn $D,$F,$t0 and $C,$F xor $t0,$F ___ sub bodyx_00_19 () { # 8 instructions, 3 cycles critical path # at start $f=(b&c)^(~b&d), $b>>>=2 return &bodyx_20_39() if ($rx==19); $rx++; ( '($a,$f,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@ROTX;'. '&add ($e,((32*($j/4)+4*($j%4))%256-128)."($frame)");'. # e+=X[i]+K '&lea ($frame,"256($frame)") if ($j%32==31);', '&andn ($t0,$a,$c)', # ~b&d for next round '&add ($e,$f)', # e+=(b&c)^(~b&d) '&rorx ($a5,$a,27)', # a<<<5 '&rorx ($f,$a,2)', # b>>>2 for next round '&and ($a,$b)', # b&c for next round '&add ($e,$a5)', # e+=a<<<5 '&xor ($a,$t0);'. # f=(b&c)^(~b&d) for next round 'unshift(@ROTX,pop(@ROTX)); $j++;' ) } sub bodyx_20_39 () { # 7 instructions, 2 cycles critical path # on entry $f=b^c^d, $b>>>=2 return &bodyx_40_59() if ($rx==39); $rx++; ( '($a,$f,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@ROTX;'. '&add ($e,((32*($j/4)+4*($j%4))%256-128)."($frame)");'. # e+=X[i]+K '&lea ($frame,"256($frame)") if ($j%32==31);', '&lea ($e,"($e,$f)")', # e+=b^c^d '&rorx ($a5,$a,27)', # a<<<5 '&rorx ($f,$a,2) if ($j<79)', # b>>>2 in next round '&xor ($a,$b) if ($j<79)', # b^c for next round '&add ($e,$a5)', # e+=a<<<5 '&xor ($a,$c) if ($j<79);'. # f=b^c^d for next round 'unshift(@ROTX,pop(@ROTX)); $j++;' ) } sub bodyx_40_59 () { # 10 instructions, 3 cycles critical path # on entry $f=((b^c)&(c^d)), $b>>>=2 $rx++; ( '($a,$f,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@ROTX;'. '&add ($e,((32*($j/4)+4*($j%4))%256-128)."($frame)");'. # e+=X[i]+K '&lea ($frame,"256($frame)") if ($j%32==31);', '&xor ($f,$c) if ($j>39)', # (b^c)&(c^d)^c '&mov ($t0,$b) if ($j<59)', # count on zero latency '&xor ($t0,$c) if ($j<59)', # c^d for next round '&lea ($e,"($e,$f)")', # e+=(b^c)&(c^d)^c '&rorx ($a5,$a,27)', # a<<<5 '&rorx ($f,$a,2)', # b>>>2 in next round '&xor ($a,$b)', # b^c for next round '&add ($e,$a5)', # e+=a<<<5 '&and ($a,$t0) if ($j< 59);'. # f=(b^c)&(c^d) for next round '&xor ($a,$c) if ($j==59);'. # f=b^c^d for next round 'unshift(@ROTX,pop(@ROTX)); $j++;' ) } sub Xupdate_avx2_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4 { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 35 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vpalignr(@X[0],@X[-3&7],@X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrldq(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" &vpxor (@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@X[0],31); &vmovdqu($Kx,eval(2*16*(($Xi)/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)") if ($Xi%5==0); # K_XX_XX eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslldq(@Tx[2],@X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword &vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@Tx[1],@Tx[2],30); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpslld (@Tx[2],@Tx[2],2); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[2]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],@X[0],$Kx); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqu(eval(32*($Xi))."(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_avx2_32_79() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 35 to 50 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vpalignr(@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],@X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]" &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" &vmovdqu($Kx,eval(2*16*($Xi/5)-64)."($K_XX_XX)") if ($Xi%5==0); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpxor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpsrld (@Tx[0],@X[0],30); &vpslld (@X[0],@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); #&vpslld (@X[0],@X[0],2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); # "X[0]"<<<=2 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],@X[0],$Kx); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vmovdqu("32*$Xi(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xloop_avx2() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); foreach (@insns) { eval; } } &align32(); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_00_19); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_20_39); &align32(); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59); &Xupdate_avx2_32_79(\&bodyx_40_59); &Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xloop_avx2(\&bodyx_20_39); $code.=<<___; lea 128($inp),$frame lea 128($inp),%rdi # borrow $t0 cmp $num,$frame cmovae $inp,$frame # next or previous block # output is d-e-[a]-f-b-c => A=d,F=e,C=f,D=b,E=c add 0($ctx),@ROTX[0] # update context add 4($ctx),@ROTX[1] add 8($ctx),@ROTX[3] mov @ROTX[0],0($ctx) add 12($ctx),@ROTX[4] mov @ROTX[1],4($ctx) mov @ROTX[0],$A # A=d add 16($ctx),@ROTX[5] mov @ROTX[3],$a5 mov @ROTX[3],8($ctx) mov @ROTX[4],$D # D=b #xchg @ROTX[5],$F # F=c, C=f mov @ROTX[4],12($ctx) mov @ROTX[1],$F # F=e mov @ROTX[5],16($ctx) #mov $F,16($ctx) mov @ROTX[5],$E # E=c mov $a5,$C # C=f #xchg $F,$E # E=c, F=e cmp $num,$inp je .Ldone_avx2 ___ $Xi=4; # reset variables @X=map("%ymm$_",(4..7,0..3)); $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 64($K_XX_XX),@X[2] # pbswap mask cmp $num,%rdi # borrowed $t0 ja .Last_avx2 vmovdqu -64(%rdi),%xmm0 # low part of @X[-4&7] vmovdqu -48(%rdi),%xmm1 vmovdqu -32(%rdi),%xmm2 vmovdqu -16(%rdi),%xmm3 vinserti128 \$1,0($frame),@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7] vinserti128 \$1,16($frame),@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7] vinserti128 \$1,32($frame),@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7] vinserti128 \$1,48($frame),@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7] jmp .Last_avx2 .align 32 .Last_avx2: lea 128+16(%rsp),$frame rorx \$2,$F,$B andn $D,$F,$t0 and $C,$F xor $t0,$F sub \$-128,$inp ___ $rx=$j=0; @ROTX=($A,$F,$B,$C,$D,$E); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_00_19); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_00_19); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_00_19); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_00_19); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_20_39); &vmovdqu ($Kx,"-64($K_XX_XX)"); # K_00_19 &vpshufb (@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7],@X[2]); # byte swap &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_20_39); &vpshufb (@X[-3&7],@X[-3&7],@X[2]); &vpaddd (@Tx[0],@X[-4&7],$Kx); # add K_00_19 &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_20_39); &vmovdqu ("0(%rsp)",@Tx[0]); &vpshufb (@X[-2&7],@X[-2&7],@X[2]); &vpaddd (@Tx[1],@X[-3&7],$Kx); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_20_39); &vmovdqu ("32(%rsp)",@Tx[1]); &vpshufb (@X[-1&7],@X[-1&7],@X[2]); &vpaddd (@X[2],@X[-2&7],$Kx); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_40_59); &align32 (); &vmovdqu ("64(%rsp)",@X[2]); &vpaddd (@X[3],@X[-1&7],$Kx); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_40_59); &vmovdqu ("96(%rsp)",@X[3]); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_40_59); &Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_40_59); &Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xupdate_avx2_16_31(\&bodyx_20_39); &Xloop_avx2 (\&bodyx_20_39); $code.=<<___; lea 128(%rsp),$frame # output is d-e-[a]-f-b-c => A=d,F=e,C=f,D=b,E=c add 0($ctx),@ROTX[0] # update context add 4($ctx),@ROTX[1] add 8($ctx),@ROTX[3] mov @ROTX[0],0($ctx) add 12($ctx),@ROTX[4] mov @ROTX[1],4($ctx) mov @ROTX[0],$A # A=d add 16($ctx),@ROTX[5] mov @ROTX[3],$a5 mov @ROTX[3],8($ctx) mov @ROTX[4],$D # D=b #xchg @ROTX[5],$F # F=c, C=f mov @ROTX[4],12($ctx) mov @ROTX[1],$F # F=e mov @ROTX[5],16($ctx) #mov $F,16($ctx) mov @ROTX[5],$E # E=c mov $a5,$C # C=f #xchg $F,$E # E=c, F=e cmp $num,$inp jbe .Loop_avx2 .Ldone_avx2: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -40-6*16(%r14),%xmm6 movaps -40-5*16(%r14),%xmm7 movaps -40-4*16(%r14),%xmm8 movaps -40-3*16(%r14),%xmm9 movaps -40-2*16(%r14),%xmm10 movaps -40-1*16(%r14),%xmm11 ___ $code.=<<___; lea (%r14),%rsi mov -40(%rsi),%r14 mov -32(%rsi),%r13 mov -24(%rsi),%r12 mov -16(%rsi),%rbp mov -8(%rsi),%rbx lea (%rsi),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx2: ret .size sha1_block_data_order_avx2,.-sha1_block_data_order_avx2 ___ } } $code.=<<___; .align 64 K_XX_XX: .long 0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999 # K_00_19 .long 0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999 # K_00_19 .long 0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1 # K_20_39 .long 0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1 # K_20_39 .long 0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc # K_40_59 .long 0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc # K_40_59 .long 0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6 # K_60_79 .long 0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6 # K_60_79 .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f # pbswap mask .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f # pbswap mask .byte 0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0 ___ }}} $code.=<<___; .asciz "SHA1 block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 64 ___ # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lprologue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lprologue jb .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov `16*4`(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail .size se_handler,.-se_handler ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); .type shaext_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 shaext_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lprologue_shaext(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lprologue jb .Lcommon_seh_tail lea .Lepilogue_shaext(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lcommon_seh_tail lea -8-4*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$8,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail .size shaext_handler,.-shaext_handler ___ $code.=<<___; .type ssse3_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 ssse3_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lcommon_seh_tail mov 232($context),%rax # pull context->R14 lea -40-6*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$12,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14 .Lcommon_seh_tail: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size ssse3_handler,.-ssse3_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_shaext .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_shaext .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_shaext ___ $code.=<<___; .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3 .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3 .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_avx .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_avx .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_block_data_order_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_block_data_order_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx2 ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler ___ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext); .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_shaext: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva shaext_handler ___ $code.=<<___; .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ssse3_handler .rva .Lprologue_ssse3,.Lepilogue_ssse3 # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ssse3_handler .rva .Lprologue_avx,.Lepilogue_avx # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .LSEH_info_sha1_block_data_order_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva ssse3_handler .rva .Lprologue_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2 # HandlerData[] ___ } #################################################################### sub sha1rnds4 { if (@_[0] =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-7]),\s*%xmm([0-7])/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc); push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$1; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return "sha1rnds4\t".@_[0]; } } sub sha1op38 { my $instr = shift; my %opcodelet = ( "sha1nexte" => 0xc8, "sha1msg1" => 0xc9, "sha1msg2" => 0xca ); if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38); my $rex=0; $rex|=0x04 if ($2>=8); $rex|=0x01 if ($1>=8); unshift @opcode,0x40|$rex if ($rex); push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr}; push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return $instr."\t".@_[0]; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\b(sha1rnds4)\s+(.*)/sha1rnds4($2)/geo or s/\b(sha1[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha1op38($1,$2)/geo; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl0000644000000000000000000002005713176625657017166 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA1 for ARMv8. # # Performance in cycles per processed byte and improvement coefficient # over code generated with "default" compiler: # # hardware-assisted software(*) # Apple A7 2.31 4.13 (+14%) # Cortex-A53 2.24 8.03 (+97%) # Cortex-A57 2.35 7.88 (+74%) # Denver 2.13 3.97 (+0%)(**) # X-Gene 8.80 (+200%) # Mongoose 2.05 6.50 (+160%) # # (*) Software results are presented mostly for reference purposes. # (**) Keep in mind that Denver relies on binary translation, which # optimizes compiler output at run-time. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; ($ctx,$inp,$num)=("x0","x1","x2"); @Xw=map("w$_",(3..17,19)); @Xx=map("x$_",(3..17,19)); @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("w$_",(20..24)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$K)=map("w$_",(25..28)); sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=($i+2)&15; $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && !($i&1)); lsr @Xx[$i+1],@Xx[$i],#32 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<14 && !($i&1)); ldr @Xx[$i+2],[$inp,#`($i+2)*4-64`] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<14 && ($i&1)); #ifdef __ARMEB__ ror @Xx[$i+1],@Xx[$i+1],#32 #else rev32 @Xx[$i+1],@Xx[$i+1] #endif ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<14); bic $t0,$d,$b and $t1,$c,$b ror $t2,$a,#27 add $d,$d,$K // future e+=K orr $t0,$t0,$t1 add $e,$e,$t2 // e+=rot(a,5) ror $b,$b,#2 add $d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15] // future e+=X[i] add $e,$e,$t0 // e+=F(b,c,d) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==19); movz $K,#0xeba1 movk $K,#0x6ed9,lsl#16 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=14); eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+2)&15] bic $t0,$d,$b and $t1,$c,$b ror $t2,$a,#27 eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+8)&15] add $d,$d,$K // future e+=K orr $t0,$t0,$t1 add $e,$e,$t2 // e+=rot(a,5) eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+13)&15] ror $b,$b,#2 add $d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15] // future e+=X[i] add $e,$e,$t0 // e+=F(b,c,d) ror @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],#31 ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=($i+2)&15; $code.=<<___ if ($i==59); movz $K,#0xc1d6 movk $K,#0xca62,lsl#16 ___ $code.=<<___; orr $t0,$b,$c and $t1,$b,$c eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+2)&15] ror $t2,$a,#27 and $t0,$t0,$d add $d,$d,$K // future e+=K eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+8)&15] add $e,$e,$t2 // e+=rot(a,5) orr $t0,$t0,$t1 ror $b,$b,#2 eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+13)&15] add $d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15] // future e+=X[i] add $e,$e,$t0 // e+=F(b,c,d) ror @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],#31 ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=($i+2)&15; $code.=<<___ if ($i==39); movz $K,#0xbcdc movk $K,#0x8f1b,lsl#16 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<78); eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+2)&15] eor $t0,$d,$b ror $t2,$a,#27 add $d,$d,$K // future e+=K eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+8)&15] eor $t0,$t0,$c add $e,$e,$t2 // e+=rot(a,5) ror $b,$b,#2 eor @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],@Xw[($j+13)&15] add $d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15] // future e+=X[i] add $e,$e,$t0 // e+=F(b,c,d) ror @Xw[$j],@Xw[$j],#31 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==78); ldp @Xw[1],@Xw[2],[$ctx] eor $t0,$d,$b ror $t2,$a,#27 add $d,$d,$K // future e+=K eor $t0,$t0,$c add $e,$e,$t2 // e+=rot(a,5) ror $b,$b,#2 add $d,$d,@Xw[($i+1)&15] // future e+=X[i] add $e,$e,$t0 // e+=F(b,c,d) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); ldp @Xw[3],@Xw[4],[$ctx,#8] eor $t0,$d,$b ror $t2,$a,#27 eor $t0,$t0,$c add $e,$e,$t2 // e+=rot(a,5) ror $b,$b,#2 ldr @Xw[5],[$ctx,#16] add $e,$e,$t0 // e+=F(b,c,d) ___ } $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P .globl sha1_block_data_order .type sha1_block_data_order,%function .align 6 sha1_block_data_order: #ifdef __ILP32__ ldrsw x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P #else ldr x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P #endif adr x17,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P add x16,x16,x17 ldr w16,[x16] tst w16,#ARMV8_SHA1 b.ne .Lv8_entry stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] stp x27,x28,[sp,#80] ldp $A,$B,[$ctx] ldp $C,$D,[$ctx,#8] ldr $E,[$ctx,#16] .Loop: ldr @Xx[0],[$inp],#64 movz $K,#0x7999 sub $num,$num,#1 movk $K,#0x5a82,lsl#16 #ifdef __ARMEB__ ror $Xx[0],@Xx[0],#32 #else rev32 @Xx[0],@Xx[0] #endif add $E,$E,$K // warm it up add $E,$E,@Xw[0] ___ for($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; add $B,$B,@Xw[2] add $C,$C,@Xw[3] add $A,$A,@Xw[1] add $D,$D,@Xw[4] add $E,$E,@Xw[5] stp $A,$B,[$ctx] stp $C,$D,[$ctx,#8] str $E,[$ctx,#16] cbnz $num,.Loop ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldp x21,x22,[sp,#32] ldp x23,x24,[sp,#48] ldp x25,x26,[sp,#64] ldp x27,x28,[sp,#80] ldr x29,[sp],#96 ret .size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order ___ {{{ my ($ABCD,$E,$E0,$E1)=map("v$_.16b",(0..3)); my @MSG=map("v$_.16b",(4..7)); my @Kxx=map("v$_.4s",(16..19)); my ($W0,$W1)=("v20.4s","v21.4s"); my $ABCD_SAVE="v22.16b"; $code.=<<___; .type sha1_block_armv8,%function .align 6 sha1_block_armv8: .Lv8_entry: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 adr x4,.Lconst eor $E,$E,$E ld1.32 {$ABCD},[$ctx],#16 ld1.32 {$E}[0],[$ctx] sub $ctx,$ctx,#16 ld1.32 {@Kxx[0]-@Kxx[3]},[x4] .Loop_hw: ld1 {@MSG[0]-@MSG[3]},[$inp],#64 sub $num,$num,#1 rev32 @MSG[0],@MSG[0] rev32 @MSG[1],@MSG[1] add.i32 $W0,@Kxx[0],@MSG[0] rev32 @MSG[2],@MSG[2] orr $ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD,$ABCD // offload add.i32 $W1,@Kxx[0],@MSG[1] rev32 @MSG[3],@MSG[3] sha1h $E1,$ABCD sha1c $ABCD,$E,$W0 // 0 add.i32 $W0,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[2] sha1su0 @MSG[0],@MSG[1],@MSG[2] ___ for ($j=0,$i=1;$i<20-3;$i++) { my $f=("c","p","m","p")[$i/5]; $code.=<<___; sha1h $E0,$ABCD // $i sha1$f $ABCD,$E1,$W1 add.i32 $W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3] sha1su1 @MSG[0],@MSG[3] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<20-4); sha1su0 @MSG[1],@MSG[2],@MSG[3] ___ ($E0,$E1)=($E1,$E0); ($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); $j++ if ((($i+3)%5)==0); } $code.=<<___; sha1h $E0,$ABCD // $i sha1p $ABCD,$E1,$W1 add.i32 $W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3] sha1h $E1,$ABCD // 18 sha1p $ABCD,$E0,$W0 sha1h $E0,$ABCD // 19 sha1p $ABCD,$E1,$W1 add.i32 $E,$E,$E0 add.i32 $ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE cbnz $num,.Loop_hw st1.32 {$ABCD},[$ctx],#16 st1.32 {$E}[0],[$ctx] ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret .size sha1_block_armv8,.-sha1_block_armv8 .align 6 .Lconst: .long 0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999 //K_00_19 .long 0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1 //K_20_39 .long 0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc //K_40_59 .long 0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6 //K_60_79 .LOPENSSL_armcap_P: #ifdef __ILP32__ .long OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #else .quad OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #endif .asciz "SHA1 block transform for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 ___ }}} { my %opcode = ( "sha1c" => 0x5e000000, "sha1p" => 0x5e001000, "sha1m" => 0x5e002000, "sha1su0" => 0x5e003000, "sha1h" => 0x5e280800, "sha1su1" => 0x5e281800 ); sub unsha1 { my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_; $arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*(?:,\s*[qv]([0-9]+))?/o && sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s", $opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5)|($3<<16), $mnemonic,$arg; } } foreach(split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo; s/\b(sha1\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unsha1($1,$2)/geo; s/\.\w?32\b//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go; m/(ld|st)1[^\[]+\[0\]/o and s/\.4s/\.s/go; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl0000644000000000000000000010760413176625660016625 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007. # # Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from # 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but # it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes. # # May 2012. # # Optimization including two of Pavel Semjanov's ideas, alternative # Maj and full unroll, resulted in ~20-25% improvement on most CPUs, # ~7% on Pentium, ~40% on Atom. As fully unrolled loop body is almost # 15x larger, 8KB vs. 560B, it's fired only for longer inputs. But not # on P4, where it kills performance, nor Sandy Bridge, where folded # loop is approximately as fast... # # June 2012. # # Add AMD XOP-specific code path, >30% improvement on Bulldozer over # May version, >60% over original. Add AVX+shrd code path, >25% # improvement on Sandy Bridge over May version, 60% over original. # # May 2013. # # Replace AMD XOP code path with SSSE3 to cover more processors. # (Biggest improvement coefficient is on upcoming Atom Silvermont, # not shown.) Add AVX+BMI code path. # # March 2014. # # Add support for Intel SHA Extensions. # # Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better): # # gcc icc x86 asm(*) SIMD x86_64 asm(**) # Pentium 46 57 40/38 - - # PIII 36 33 27/24 - - # P4 41 38 28 - 17.3 # AMD K8 27 25 19/15.5 - 14.9 # Core2 26 23 18/15.6 14.3 13.8 # Westmere 27 - 19/15.7 13.4 12.3 # Sandy Bridge 25 - 15.9 12.4 11.6 # Ivy Bridge 24 - 15.0 11.4 10.3 # Haswell 22 - 13.9 9.46 7.80 # Bulldozer 36 - 27/22 17.0 13.6 # VIA Nano 36 - 25/22 16.8 16.5 # Atom 50 - 30/25 21.9 18.9 # Silvermont 40 - 34/31 22.9 20.6 # # (*) numbers after slash are for unrolled loop, where applicable; # (**) x86_64 assembly performance is presented for reference # purposes, results are best-available; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $xmm=$avx=0; for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } if ($xmm && `$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if ($xmm && !$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.03) + ($1>=2.10); } if ($xmm && !$avx && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" && `ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } $shaext=$xmm; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 $unroll_after = 64*4; # If pre-evicted from L1P cache first spin of # fully unrolled loop was measured to run about # 3-4x slower. If slowdown coefficient is N and # unrolled loop is m times faster, then you break # even at (N-1)/(m-1) blocks. Then it needs to be # adjusted for probability of code being evicted, # code size/cache size=1/4. Typical m is 1.15... $A="eax"; $E="edx"; $T="ebx"; $Aoff=&DWP(4,"esp"); $Boff=&DWP(8,"esp"); $Coff=&DWP(12,"esp"); $Doff=&DWP(16,"esp"); $Eoff=&DWP(20,"esp"); $Foff=&DWP(24,"esp"); $Goff=&DWP(28,"esp"); $Hoff=&DWP(32,"esp"); $Xoff=&DWP(36,"esp"); $K256="ebp"; sub BODY_16_63() { &mov ($T,"ecx"); # "ecx" is preloaded &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-14),"esp")); &ror ("ecx",18-7); &mov ("edi","esi"); &ror ("esi",19-17); &xor ("ecx",$T); &shr ($T,3); &ror ("ecx",7); &xor ("esi","edi"); &xor ($T,"ecx"); # T = sigma0(X[-15]) &ror ("esi",17); &add ($T,&DWP(4*(9+15+16),"esp")); # T += X[-16] &shr ("edi",10); &add ($T,&DWP(4*(9+15+16-9),"esp")); # T += X[-7] #&xor ("edi","esi") # sigma1(X[-2]) # &add ($T,"edi"); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) # &mov (&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T); # save X[0] &BODY_00_15(1); } sub BODY_00_15() { my $in_16_63=shift; &mov ("ecx",$E); &xor ("edi","esi") if ($in_16_63); # sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ("esi",$Foff); &ror ("ecx",25-11); &add ($T,"edi") if ($in_16_63); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ("edi",$Goff); &xor ("ecx",$E); &xor ("esi","edi"); &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp")) if (!$in_16_63); &mov (&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T) if ($in_16_63); # save X[0] &ror ("ecx",11-6); &and ("esi",$E); &mov ($Eoff,$E); # modulo-scheduled &xor ($E,"ecx"); &add ($T,$Hoff); # T += h &xor ("esi","edi"); # Ch(e,f,g) &ror ($E,6); # Sigma1(e) &mov ("ecx",$A); &add ($T,"esi"); # T += Ch(e,f,g) &ror ("ecx",22-13); &add ($T,$E); # T += Sigma1(e) &mov ("edi",$Boff); &xor ("ecx",$A); &mov ($Aoff,$A); # modulo-scheduled &lea ("esp",&DWP(-4,"esp")); &ror ("ecx",13-2); &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,$K256)); &xor ("ecx",$A); &mov ($E,$Eoff); # e in next iteration, d in this one &xor ($A,"edi"); # a ^= b &ror ("ecx",2); # Sigma0(a) &add ($T,"esi"); # T+= K[i] &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$A); # (b^c) in next round &add ($E,$T); # d += T &and ($A,&DWP(4,"esp")); # a &= (b^c) &add ($T,"ecx"); # T += Sigma0(a) &xor ($A,"edi"); # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-1),"esp")) if ($in_16_63); # preload T &add ($K256,4); &add ($A,$T); # h += T } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if (!$i386); &function_begin("sha256_block_data_order"); &mov ("esi",wparam(0)); # ctx &mov ("edi",wparam(1)); # inp &mov ("eax",wparam(2)); # num &mov ("ebx","esp"); # saved sp &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($K256); &lea ($K256,&DWP(&label("K256")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K256)); &sub ("esp",16); &and ("esp",-64); &shl ("eax",6); &add ("eax","edi"); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi"); # ctx &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi"); # inp &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); # inp+num*128 &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); # saved sp if (!$i386 && $xmm) { &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$K256,&label("K256")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edx")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edx")); &test ("ecx",1<<20); # check for P4 &jnz (&label("loop")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(8,"edx")) if ($xmm); &test ("ecx",1<<24); # check for FXSR &jz ($unroll_after?&label("no_xmm"):&label("loop")); &and ("ecx",1<<30); # mask "Intel CPU" bit &and ("ebx",1<<28|1<<9); # mask AVX and SSSE3 bits &test ("edx",1<<29) if ($shaext); # check for SHA &jnz (&label("shaext")) if ($shaext); &or ("ecx","ebx"); &and ("ecx",1<<28|1<<30); &cmp ("ecx",1<<28|1<<30); if ($xmm) { &je (&label("AVX")) if ($avx); &test ("ebx",1<<9); # check for SSSE3 &jnz (&label("SSSE3")); } else { &je (&label("loop_shrd")); } if ($unroll_after) { &set_label("no_xmm"); &sub ("eax","edi"); &cmp ("eax",$unroll_after); &jae (&label("unrolled")); } } &jmp (&label("loop")); sub COMPACT_LOOP() { my $suffix=shift; &set_label("loop$suffix",$suffix?32:16); # copy input block to stack reversing byte and dword order for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi")); &bswap ("eax"); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi")); &bswap ("ebx"); &push ("eax"); &bswap ("ecx"); &push ("ebx"); &bswap ("edx"); &push ("ecx"); &push ("edx"); } &add ("edi",64); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-4*9,"esp"));# place for A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H &mov (&DWP(4*(9+16)+4,"esp"),"edi"); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($A,&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); # &mov ($Aoff,$A); &mov ($Boff,"ebx"); &xor ("ebx","ecx"); &mov ($Coff,"ecx"); &mov ($Doff,"edi"); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"ebx"); # magic &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); # &mov ($Eoff,$E); &mov ($Foff,"ebx"); &mov ($Goff,"ecx"); &mov ($Hoff,"edi"); &set_label("00_15$suffix",16); &BODY_00_15(); &cmp ("esi",0xc19bf174); &jne (&label("00_15$suffix")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*(9+15+16-1),"esp")); # preloaded in BODY_00_15(1) &jmp (&label("16_63$suffix")); &set_label("16_63$suffix",16); &BODY_16_63(); &cmp ("esi",0xc67178f2); &jne (&label("16_63$suffix")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*(9+16+64)+0,"esp"));#ctx # &mov ($A,$Aoff); &mov ("ebx",$Boff); # &mov ("edi",$Coff); &mov ("ecx",$Doff); &add ($A,&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$A); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); # &mov ($E,$Eoff); &mov ("eax",$Foff); &mov ("ebx",$Goff); &mov ("ecx",$Hoff); &mov ("edi",&DWP(4*(9+16+64)+4,"esp"));#inp &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("eax",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx"); &lea ("esp",&DWP(4*(9+16+64),"esp"));# destroy frame &sub ($K256,4*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("loop$suffix")); } &COMPACT_LOOP(); &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); if (!$i386 && !$xmm) { # ~20% improvement on Sandy Bridge local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; &COMPACT_LOOP("_shrd"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); } &set_label("K256",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment! @K256=( 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5, 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174, 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da, 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967, 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13, 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85, 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070, 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3, 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 ); &data_word(@K256); &data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f); # byte swap mask &asciz("SHA256 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=(0..7); # offsets sub off { &DWP(4*(((shift)-$i)&7),"esp"); } if (!$i386 && $unroll_after) { my @AH=($A,$K256); &set_label("unrolled",16); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &jmp (&label("grand_loop")); &set_label("grand_loop",16); # copy input block to stack reversing byte order for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) { &mov ("ebx",&DWP(12*$i+0,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12*$i+4,"edi")); &bswap ("ebx"); &mov ("esi",&DWP(12*$i+8,"edi")); &bswap ("ecx"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i+0,"esp"),"ebx"); &bswap ("esi"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i+4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i+8,"esp"),"esi"); } &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*12,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &bswap ("ebx"); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(32+12*$i,"esp"),"ebx"); my ($t1,$t2) = ("ecx","esi"); for ($i=0;$i<64;$i++) { if ($i>=16) { &mov ($T,$t1); # $t1 is preloaded # &mov ($t2,&DWP(32+4*(($i+14)&15),"esp")); &ror ($t1,18-7); &mov ("edi",$t2); &ror ($t2,19-17); &xor ($t1,$T); &shr ($T,3); &ror ($t1,7); &xor ($t2,"edi"); &xor ($T,$t1); # T = sigma0(X[-15]) &ror ($t2,17); &add ($T,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp")); # T += X[-16] &shr ("edi",10); &add ($T,&DWP(32+4*(($i+9)&15),"esp")); # T += X[-7] #&xor ("edi",$t2) # sigma1(X[-2]) # &add ($T,"edi"); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) # &mov (&DWP(4*(9+15),"esp"),$T); # save X[0] } &mov ($t1,$E); &xor ("edi",$t2) if ($i>=16); # sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ($t2,&off($f)); &ror ($E,25-11); &add ($T,"edi") if ($i>=16); # T += sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ("edi",&off($g)); &xor ($E,$t1); &mov ($T,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp")) if ($i<16); # X[i] &mov (&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"),$T) if ($i>=16 && $i<62); # save X[0] &xor ($t2,"edi"); &ror ($E,11-6); &and ($t2,$t1); &mov (&off($e),$t1); # save $E, modulo-scheduled &xor ($E,$t1); &add ($T,&off($h)); # T += h &xor ("edi",$t2); # Ch(e,f,g) &ror ($E,6); # Sigma1(e) &mov ($t1,$AH[0]); &add ($T,"edi"); # T += Ch(e,f,g) &ror ($t1,22-13); &mov ($t2,$AH[0]); &mov ("edi",&off($b)); &xor ($t1,$AH[0]); &mov (&off($a),$AH[0]); # save $A, modulo-scheduled &xor ($AH[0],"edi"); # a ^= b, (b^c) in next round &ror ($t1,13-2); &and ($AH[1],$AH[0]); # (b^c) &= (a^b) &lea ($E,&DWP(@K256[$i],$T,$E)); # T += Sigma1(1)+K[i] &xor ($t1,$t2); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) &mov ($t2,&DWP(32+4*(($i+2)&15),"esp")) if ($i>=15 && $i<63); &ror ($t1,2); # Sigma0(a) &add ($AH[1],$E); # h += T &add ($E,&off($d)); # d += T &add ($AH[1],$t1); # h += Sigma0(a) &mov ($t1,&DWP(32+4*(($i+15)&15),"esp")) if ($i>=15 && $i<63); @AH = reverse(@AH); # rotate(a,h) ($t1,$t2) = ($t2,$t1); # rotate(t1,t2) } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"ecx"); &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_loop")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); } if (!$i386 && $xmm) {{{ if ($shaext) { ###################################################################### # Intel SHA Extensions implementation of SHA256 update function. # my ($ctx,$inp,$end)=("esi","edi","eax"); my ($Wi,$ABEF,$CDGH,$TMP)=map("xmm$_",(0..2,7)); my @MSG=map("xmm$_",(3..6)); sub sha256op38 { my ($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2); } } sub sha256rnds2 { sha256op38(0xcb,@_); } sub sha256msg1 { sha256op38(0xcc,@_); } sub sha256msg2 { sha256op38(0xcd,@_); } &set_label("shaext",32); &sub ("esp",32); &movdqu ($ABEF,&QWP(0,$ctx)); # DCBA &lea ($K256,&DWP(0x80,$K256)); &movdqu ($CDGH,&QWP(16,$ctx)); # HGFE &movdqa ($TMP,&QWP(0x100-0x80,$K256)); # byte swap mask &pshufd ($Wi,$ABEF,0x1b); # ABCD &pshufd ($ABEF,$ABEF,0xb1); # CDAB &pshufd ($CDGH,$CDGH,0x1b); # EFGH &palignr ($ABEF,$CDGH,8); # ABEF &punpcklqdq ($CDGH,$Wi); # CDGH &jmp (&label("loop_shaext")); &set_label("loop_shaext",16); &movdqu (@MSG[0],&QWP(0,$inp)); &movdqu (@MSG[1],&QWP(0x10,$inp)); &movdqu (@MSG[2],&QWP(0x20,$inp)); &pshufb (@MSG[0],$TMP); &movdqu (@MSG[3],&QWP(0x30,$inp)); &movdqa (&QWP(16,"esp"),$CDGH); # offload &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(0*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[0]); &pshufb (@MSG[1],$TMP); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 0-3 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &nop (); &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ABEF); # offload &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(1*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[1]); &pshufb (@MSG[2],$TMP); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 4-7 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x40,$inp)); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[0],@MSG[1]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(2*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[2]); &pshufb (@MSG[3],$TMP); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 8-11 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[3]); &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[2],4); &nop (); &paddd (@MSG[0],$TMP); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[1],@MSG[2]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(3*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[3]); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[0],@MSG[3]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 12-15 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[0]); &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[3],4); &nop (); &paddd (@MSG[1],$TMP); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[2],@MSG[3]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) { &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP($i*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[0]); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[1],@MSG[0]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 16-19... &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[1]); &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[0],4); &nop (); &paddd (@MSG[2],$TMP); &sha256msg1 (@MSG[3],@MSG[0]); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(13*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[0]); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[1],@MSG[0]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 52-55 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &movdqa ($TMP,@MSG[1]) &palignr ($TMP,@MSG[0],4); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &paddd (@MSG[2],$TMP); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(14*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[1]); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 56-59 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &sha256msg2 (@MSG[2],@MSG[1]); &movdqa ($TMP,&QWP(0x100-0x80,$K256)); # byte swap mask &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &movdqa ($Wi,&QWP(15*16-0x80,$K256)); &paddd ($Wi,@MSG[2]); &nop (); &sha256rnds2 ($CDGH,$ABEF); # 60-63 &pshufd ($Wi,$Wi,0x0e); &cmp ($end,$inp); &nop (); &sha256rnds2 ($ABEF,$CDGH); &paddd ($CDGH,&QWP(16,"esp")); &paddd ($ABEF,&QWP(0,"esp")); &jnz (&label("loop_shaext")); &pshufd ($CDGH,$CDGH,0xb1); # DCHG &pshufd ($TMP,$ABEF,0x1b); # FEBA &pshufd ($ABEF,$ABEF,0xb1); # BAFE &punpckhqdq ($ABEF,$CDGH); # DCBA &palignr ($CDGH,$TMP,8); # HGFE &mov ("esp",&DWP(32+12,"esp")); &movdqu (&QWP(0,$ctx),$ABEF); &movdqu (&QWP(16,$ctx),$CDGH); &function_end_A(); } my @X = map("xmm$_",(0..3)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("xmm$_",(4..7)); my @AH = ($A,$T); &set_label("SSSE3",32); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &movdqa ($t3,&QWP(256,$K256)); &jmp (&label("grand_ssse3")); &set_label("grand_ssse3",16); # load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack &movdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi")); &movdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi")); &movdqu (@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi")); &movdqu (@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &pshufb (@X[0],$t3); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &pshufb (@X[1],$t3); &movdqa ($t0,&QWP(0,$K256)); &pshufb (@X[2],$t3); &movdqa ($t1,&QWP(16,$K256)); &paddd ($t0,@X[0]); &pshufb (@X[3],$t3); &movdqa ($t2,&QWP(32,$K256)); &paddd ($t1,@X[1]); &movdqa ($t3,&QWP(48,$K256)); &movdqa (&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0); &paddd ($t2,@X[2]); &movdqa (&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1); &paddd ($t3,@X[3]); &movdqa (&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2); &movdqa (&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3); &jmp (&label("ssse3_00_47")); &set_label("ssse3_00_47",16); &add ($K256,64); sub SSSE3_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 120 instructions eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t0,@X[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t3,@X[3]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &palignr ($t0,@X[0],4); # X[1..4] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &palignr ($t3,@X[2],4); # X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t1,$t0); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t0); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t0,3); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[0..3] += X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t2,7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010); # X[14..15] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld ($t1,32-18); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t2,18-7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t1); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslld ($t1,18-7); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t3); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t0,$t1); # sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrld ($t3,10); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &paddd (@X[0],$t0); # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,19-17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,$t3,0b10000000); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &psrldq ($t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000); # X[16..17] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &movdqa ($t2,$t3); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &psrld ($t3,10); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &psrlq ($t2,19-17); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &pxor ($t3,$t2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pshufd ($t3,$t3,0b00001000); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &movdqa ($t2,&QWP(16*$j,$K256)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &pslldq ($t3,8); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ &paddd (@X[0],$t3); # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddd ($t2,@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); # @ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &movdqa (&QWP(32+16*$j,"esp"),$t2); } sub body_00_15 () { ( '&mov ("ecx",$E);', '&ror ($E,25-11);', '&mov ("esi",&off($f));', '&xor ($E,"ecx");', '&mov ("edi",&off($g));', '&xor ("esi","edi");', '&ror ($E,11-6);', '&and ("esi","ecx");', '&mov (&off($e),"ecx");', # save $E, modulo-scheduled '&xor ($E,"ecx");', '&xor ("edi","esi");', # Ch(e,f,g) '&ror ($E,6);', # T = Sigma1(e) '&mov ("ecx",$AH[0]);', '&add ($E,"edi");', # T += Ch(e,f,g) '&mov ("edi",&off($b));', '&mov ("esi",$AH[0]);', '&ror ("ecx",22-13);', '&mov (&off($a),$AH[0]);', # save $A, modulo-scheduled '&xor ("ecx",$AH[0]);', '&xor ($AH[0],"edi");', # a ^= b, (b^c) in next round '&add ($E,&off($h));', # T += h '&ror ("ecx",13-2);', '&and ($AH[1],$AH[0]);', # (b^c) &= (a^b) '&xor ("ecx","esi");', '&add ($E,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"));', # T += K[i]+X[i] '&xor ($AH[1],"edi");', # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) '&ror ("ecx",2);', # Sigma0(a) '&add ($AH[1],$E);', # h += T '&add ($E,&off($d));', # d += T '&add ($AH[1],"ecx");'. # h += Sigma0(a) '@AH = reverse(@AH); $i++;' # rotate(a,h) ); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &SSSE3_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmp (&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203); &jne (&label("ssse3_00_47")); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &add ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &movdqa ($t3,&QWP(64,$K256)); &sub ($K256,3*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_ssse3")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); if ($avx) { &set_label("AVX",32); if ($avx>1) { &and ("edx",1<<8|1<<3); # check for BMI2+BMI1 &cmp ("edx",1<<8|1<<3); &je (&label("AVX_BMI")); } &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); &vzeroall (); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(256,$K256)); &jmp (&label("grand_avx")); &set_label("grand_avx",32); # load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack &vmovdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &vpshufb (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &vpshufb (@X[1],@X[1],$t3); &vpshufb (@X[2],@X[2],$t3); &vpaddd ($t0,@X[0],&QWP(0,$K256)); &vpshufb (@X[3],@X[3],$t3); &vpaddd ($t1,@X[1],&QWP(16,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t2,@X[2],&QWP(32,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t3,@X[3],&QWP(48,$K256)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3); &jmp (&label("avx_00_47")); &set_label("avx_00_47",16); &add ($K256,64); sub Xupdate_AVX () { ( '&vpalignr ($t0,@X[1],@X[0],4);', # X[1..4] '&vpalignr ($t3,@X[3],@X[2],4);', # X[9..12] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t0,7);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3);', # X[0..3] += X[9..16] '&vpsrld ($t3,$t0,3);', '&vpslld ($t1,$t0,14);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t3,$t2);', '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[3],0b11111010)',# X[14..15] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t2,18-7);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1);', '&vpslld ($t1,$t1,25-14);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t2);', '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,10);', '&vpxor ($t0,$t0,$t1);', # sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpsrlq ($t1,$t3,17);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t0);', # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t1);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,19);', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', # sigma1(X[14..15] '&vpshufd ($t3,$t2,0b10000100);', '&vpsrldq ($t3,$t3,8);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3);', # X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) '&vpshufd ($t3,@X[0],0b01010000)',# X[16..17] '&vpsrld ($t2,$t3,10);', '&vpsrlq ($t1,$t3,17);', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t1);', '&vpsrlq ($t3,$t3,19);', '&vpxor ($t2,$t2,$t3);', # sigma1(X[16..17] '&vpshufd ($t3,$t2,0b11101000);', '&vpslldq ($t3,$t3,8);', '&vpaddd (@X[0],@X[0],$t3);' # X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) ); } local *ror = sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) }; sub AVX_00_47 () { my $j = shift; my $body = shift; my @X = @_; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 120 instructions my $insn; foreach (Xupdate_AVX()) { # 31 instructions eval; eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval($insn = shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)) if ($insn =~ /rorx/ && @insns[0] =~ /rorx/); } &vpaddd ($t2,@X[0],&QWP(16*$j,$K256)); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+16*$j,"esp"),$t2); } for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX_00_47($j,\&body_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmp (&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203); &jne (&label("avx_00_47")); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(body_00_15()) { eval; } } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &add ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(64,$K256)); &sub ($K256,3*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_avx")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &vzeroall (); &function_end_A(); if ($avx>1) { sub bodyx_00_15 () { # +10% ( '&rorx ("ecx",$E,6)', '&rorx ("esi",$E,11)', '&mov (&off($e),$E)', # save $E, modulo-scheduled '&rorx ("edi",$E,25)', '&xor ("ecx","esi")', '&andn ("esi",$E,&off($g))', '&xor ("ecx","edi")', # Sigma1(e) '&and ($E,&off($f))', '&mov (&off($a),$AH[0]);', # save $A, modulo-scheduled '&or ($E,"esi")', # T = Ch(e,f,g) '&rorx ("edi",$AH[0],2)', '&rorx ("esi",$AH[0],13)', '&lea ($E,&DWP(0,$E,"ecx"))', # T += Sigma1(e) '&rorx ("ecx",$AH[0],22)', '&xor ("esi","edi")', '&mov ("edi",&off($b))', '&xor ("ecx","esi")', # Sigma0(a) '&xor ($AH[0],"edi")', # a ^= b, (b^c) in next round '&add ($E,&off($h))', # T += h '&and ($AH[1],$AH[0])', # (b^c) &= (a^b) '&add ($E,&DWP(32+4*($i&15),"esp"))', # T += K[i]+X[i] '&xor ($AH[1],"edi")', # h = Maj(a,b,c) = Ch(a^b,c,b) '&add ("ecx",$E)', # h += T '&add ($E,&off($d))', # d += T '&lea ($AH[1],&DWP(0,$AH[1],"ecx"));'. # h += Sigma0(a) '@AH = reverse(@AH); $i++;' # rotate(a,h) ); } &set_label("AVX_BMI",32); &lea ("esp",&DWP(-96,"esp")); &vzeroall (); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"ecx"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(28,"esi")); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"esi"); &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(256,$K256)); &jmp (&label("grand_avx_bmi")); &set_label("grand_avx_bmi",32); # load input, reverse byte order, add K256[0..15], save to stack &vmovdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[2],&QWP(32,"edi")); &vmovdqu (@X[3],&QWP(48,"edi")); &add ("edi",64); &vpshufb (@X[0],@X[0],$t3); &mov (&DWP(96+4,"esp"),"edi"); &vpshufb (@X[1],@X[1],$t3); &vpshufb (@X[2],@X[2],$t3); &vpaddd ($t0,@X[0],&QWP(0,$K256)); &vpshufb (@X[3],@X[3],$t3); &vpaddd ($t1,@X[1],&QWP(16,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t2,@X[2],&QWP(32,$K256)); &vpaddd ($t3,@X[3],&QWP(48,$K256)); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+0,"esp"),$t0); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+16,"esp"),$t1); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+32,"esp"),$t2); &vmovdqa (&QWP(32+48,"esp"),$t3); &jmp (&label("avx_bmi_00_47")); &set_label("avx_bmi_00_47",16); &add ($K256,64); for ($i=0,$j=0; $j<4; $j++) { &AVX_00_47($j,\&bodyx_00_15,@X); push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &cmp (&DWP(16*$j,$K256),0x00010203); &jne (&label("avx_bmi_00_47")); for ($i=0; $i<16; ) { foreach(bodyx_00_15()) { eval; } } &mov ("esi",&DWP(96,"esp")); #ctx #&mov ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esp")); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); #&mov ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esp")); #&mov ("edi", &DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esp")); &add ($AH[0],&DWP(0,"esi")); &add ($AH[1],&DWP(4,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),$AH[1]); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$AH[0]); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$AH[1]); &xor ($AH[1],"edi"); # magic &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ecx"); #&mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(20,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esp")); &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi")); &add ("edi",&DWP(20,"esi")); &add ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E); &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ecx"); #&mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$E); &add ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"edi"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"edi"); &mov ("edi",&DWP(96+4,"esp")); # inp &vmovdqa ($t3,&QWP(64,$K256)); &sub ($K256,3*64); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(96+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("grand_avx_bmi")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(96+12,"esp")); # restore sp &vzeroall (); &function_end_A(); } } }}} &function_end_B("sha256_block_data_order"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-s390x.pl0000644000000000000000000001236313176625660017012 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA1 block procedure for s390x. # April 2007. # # Performance is >30% better than gcc 3.3 generated code. But the real # twist is that SHA1 hardware support is detected and utilized. In # which case performance can reach further >4.5x for larger chunks. # January 2009. # # Optimize Xupdate for amount of memory references and reschedule # instructions to favour dual-issue z10 pipeline. On z10 hardware is # "only" ~2.3x faster than software. # November 2010. # # Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" # feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit # instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy # application context. The feature is not specific to any particular # processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code # remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform # 23% better than code generated by gcc 4.3. $kimdfunc=1; # magic function code for kimd instruction $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $K_00_39="%r0"; $K=$K_00_39; $K_40_79="%r1"; $ctx="%r2"; $prefetch="%r2"; $inp="%r3"; $len="%r4"; $A="%r5"; $B="%r6"; $C="%r7"; $D="%r8"; $E="%r9"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); $t0="%r10"; $t1="%r11"; @X=("%r12","%r13","%r14"); $sp="%r15"; $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8; $frame=$stdframe+16*4; sub Xupdate { my $i=shift; $code.=<<___ if ($i==15); lg $prefetch,$stdframe($sp) ### Xupdate(16) warm-up lr $X[0],$X[2] ___ return if ($i&1); # Xupdate is vectorized and executed every 2nd cycle $code.=<<___ if ($i<16); lg $X[0],`$i*4`($inp) ### Xload($i) rllg $X[1],$X[0],32 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=16); xgr $X[0],$prefetch ### Xupdate($i) lg $prefetch,`$stdframe+4*(($i+2)%16)`($sp) xg $X[0],`$stdframe+4*(($i+8)%16)`($sp) xgr $X[0],$prefetch rll $X[0],$X[0],1 rllg $X[1],$X[0],32 rll $X[1],$X[1],1 rllg $X[0],$X[1],32 lr $X[2],$X[1] # feedback ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<=70); stg $X[0],`$stdframe+4*($i%16)`($sp) ___ unshift(@X,pop(@X)); } sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $xi=$X[1]; &Xupdate($i); $code.=<<___; alr $e,$K ### $i rll $t1,$a,5 lr $t0,$d xr $t0,$c alr $e,$t1 nr $t0,$b alr $e,$xi xr $t0,$d rll $b,$b,30 alr $e,$t0 ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $xi=$X[1]; &Xupdate($i); $code.=<<___; alr $e,$K ### $i rll $t1,$a,5 lr $t0,$b alr $e,$t1 xr $t0,$c alr $e,$xi xr $t0,$d rll $b,$b,30 alr $e,$t0 ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $xi=$X[1]; &Xupdate($i); $code.=<<___; alr $e,$K ### $i rll $t1,$a,5 lr $t0,$b alr $e,$t1 or $t0,$c lr $t1,$b nr $t0,$d nr $t1,$c alr $e,$xi or $t0,$t1 rll $b,$b,30 alr $e,$t0 ___ } $code.=<<___; .text .align 64 .type Ktable,\@object Ktable: .long 0x5a827999,0x6ed9eba1,0x8f1bbcdc,0xca62c1d6 .skip 48 #.long 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .size Ktable,.-Ktable .globl sha1_block_data_order .type sha1_block_data_order,\@function sha1_block_data_order: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($kimdfunc); larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P lg %r0,16(%r1) # check kimd capabilities tmhh %r0,`0x8000>>$kimdfunc` jz .Lsoftware lghi %r0,$kimdfunc lgr %r1,$ctx lgr %r2,$inp sllg %r3,$len,6 .long 0xb93e0002 # kimd %r0,%r2 brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" br %r14 .align 16 .Lsoftware: ___ $code.=<<___; lghi %r1,-$frame st${g} $ctx,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp) stm${g} %r6,%r15,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp) lgr %r0,$sp la $sp,0(%r1,$sp) st${g} %r0,0($sp) larl $t0,Ktable llgf $A,0($ctx) llgf $B,4($ctx) llgf $C,8($ctx) llgf $D,12($ctx) llgf $E,16($ctx) lg $K_00_39,0($t0) lg $K_40_79,8($t0) .Lloop: rllg $K_00_39,$K_00_39,32 ___ for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; rllg $K_00_39,$K_00_39,32 ___ for (;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; $K=$K_40_79; rllg $K_40_79,$K_40_79,32 ___ for (;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; rllg $K_40_79,$K_40_79,32 ___ for (;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; l${g} $ctx,`$frame+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) la $inp,64($inp) al $A,0($ctx) al $B,4($ctx) al $C,8($ctx) al $D,12($ctx) al $E,16($ctx) st $A,0($ctx) st $B,4($ctx) st $C,8($ctx) st $D,12($ctx) st $E,16($ctx) brct${g} $len,.Lloop lm${g} %r6,%r15,`$frame+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) br %r14 .size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order .string "SHA1 block transform for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000011332013176625660017625 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # Multi-buffer SHA256 procedure processes n buffers in parallel by # placing buffer data to designated lane of SIMD register. n is # naturally limited to 4 on pre-AVX2 processors and to 8 on # AVX2-capable processors such as Haswell. # # this +aesni(i) sha256 aesni-sha256 gain(iv) # ------------------------------------------------------------------- # Westmere(ii) 23.3/n +1.28=7.11(n=4) 12.3 +3.75=16.1 +126% # Atom(ii) 38.7/n +3.93=13.6(n=4) 20.8 +5.69=26.5 +95% # Sandy Bridge (20.5 +5.15=25.7)/n 11.6 13.0 +103% # Ivy Bridge (20.4 +5.14=25.5)/n 10.3 11.6 +82% # Haswell(iii) (21.0 +5.00=26.0)/n 7.80 8.79 +170% # Skylake (18.9 +5.00=23.9)/n 7.70 8.17 +170% # Bulldozer (21.6 +5.76=27.4)/n 13.6 13.7 +100% # # (i) multi-block CBC encrypt with 128-bit key; # (ii) (HASH+AES)/n does not apply to Westmere for n>3 and Atom, # because of lower AES-NI instruction throughput, nor is there # AES-NI-SHA256 stitch for these processors; # (iii) "this" is for n=8, when we gather twice as much data, result # for n=4 is 20.3+4.44=24.7; # (iv) presented improvement coefficients are asymptotic limits and # in real-life application are somewhat lower, e.g. for 2KB # fragments they range from 75% to 130% (on Haswell); $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; $avx=0; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; # void sha256_multi_block ( # struct { unsigned int A[8]; # unsigned int B[8]; # unsigned int C[8]; # unsigned int D[8]; # unsigned int E[8]; # unsigned int F[8]; # unsigned int G[8]; # unsigned int H[8]; } *ctx, # struct { void *ptr; int blocks; } inp[8], # int num); /* 1 or 2 */ # $ctx="%rdi"; # 1st arg $inp="%rsi"; # 2nd arg $num="%edx"; # 3rd arg @ptr=map("%r$_",(8..11)); $Tbl="%rbp"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15)); ($t1,$t2,$t3,$axb,$bxc,$Xi,$Xn,$sigma)=map("%xmm$_",(0..7)); $REG_SZ=16; sub Xi_off { my $off = shift; $off %= 16; $off *= $REG_SZ; $off<256 ? "$off-128(%rax)" : "$off-256-128(%rbx)"; } sub ROUND_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); movd `4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi movd `4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1 movd `4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$t2 movd `4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t3 punpckldq $t2,$Xi punpckldq $t3,$t1 punpckldq $t1,$Xi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==15); movd `4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi lea `16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] movd `4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1 lea `16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] movd `4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$t2 lea `16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2] movd `4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t3 lea `16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3] punpckldq $t2,$Xi punpckldq $t3,$t1 punpckldq $t1,$Xi ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa $e,$sigma `"pshufb $Xn,$Xi" if ($i<=15 && ($i&1)==0)` movdqa $e,$t3 `"pshufb $Xn,$Xi" if ($i<=15 && ($i&1)==1)` psrld \$6,$sigma movdqa $e,$t2 pslld \$7,$t3 movdqa $Xi,`&Xi_off($i)` paddd $h,$Xi # Xi+=h psrld \$11,$t2 pxor $t3,$sigma pslld \$21-7,$t3 paddd `32*($i%8)-128`($Tbl),$Xi # Xi+=K[round] pxor $t2,$sigma psrld \$25-11,$t2 movdqa $e,$t1 `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[0])" if ($i==15)` pxor $t3,$sigma movdqa $e,$axb # borrow $axb pslld \$26-21,$t3 pandn $g,$t1 pand $f,$axb pxor $t2,$sigma `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[1])" if ($i==15)` movdqa $a,$t2 pxor $t3,$sigma # Sigma1(e) movdqa $a,$t3 psrld \$2,$t2 paddd $sigma,$Xi # Xi+=Sigma1(e) pxor $axb,$t1 # Ch(e,f,g) movdqa $b,$axb movdqa $a,$sigma pslld \$10,$t3 pxor $a,$axb # a^b, b^c in next round `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[2])" if ($i==15)` psrld \$13,$sigma pxor $t3,$t2 paddd $t1,$Xi # Xi+=Ch(e,f,g) pslld \$19-10,$t3 pand $axb,$bxc pxor $sigma,$t2 `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[3])" if ($i==15)` psrld \$22-13,$sigma pxor $t3,$t2 movdqa $b,$h pslld \$30-19,$t3 pxor $t2,$sigma pxor $bxc,$h # h=Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b) paddd $Xi,$d # d+=Xi pxor $t3,$sigma # Sigma0(a) paddd $Xi,$h # h+=Xi paddd $sigma,$h # h+=Sigma0(a) ___ $code.=<<___ if (($i%8)==7); lea `32*8`($Tbl),$Tbl ___ ($axb,$bxc)=($bxc,$axb); } sub ROUND_16_XX { my $i=shift; $code.=<<___; movdqa `&Xi_off($i+1)`,$Xn paddd `&Xi_off($i+9)`,$Xi # Xi+=X[i+9] movdqa $Xn,$sigma movdqa $Xn,$t2 psrld \$3,$sigma movdqa $Xn,$t3 psrld \$7,$t2 movdqa `&Xi_off($i+14)`,$t1 pslld \$14,$t3 pxor $t2,$sigma psrld \$18-7,$t2 movdqa $t1,$axb # borrow $axb pxor $t3,$sigma pslld \$25-14,$t3 pxor $t2,$sigma psrld \$10,$t1 movdqa $axb,$t2 psrld \$17,$axb pxor $t3,$sigma # sigma0(X[i+1]) pslld \$13,$t2 paddd $sigma,$Xi # Xi+=sigma0(e) pxor $axb,$t1 psrld \$19-17,$axb pxor $t2,$t1 pslld \$15-13,$t2 pxor $axb,$t1 pxor $t2,$t1 # sigma0(X[i+14]) paddd $t1,$Xi # Xi+=sigma1(X[i+14]) ___ &ROUND_00_15($i,@_); ($Xi,$Xn)=($Xn,$Xi); } $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl sha256_multi_block .type sha256_multi_block,\@function,3 .align 32 sha256_multi_block: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%rcx bt \$61,%rcx # check SHA bit jc _shaext_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); test \$`1<<28`,%ecx jnz _avx_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x28(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp and \$-256,%rsp mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody: lea K256+128(%rip),$Tbl lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx lea 0x80($ctx),$ctx # size optimization .Loop_grande: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldone movdqu 0x00-0x80($ctx),$A # load context lea 128(%rsp),%rax movdqu 0x20-0x80($ctx),$B movdqu 0x40-0x80($ctx),$C movdqu 0x60-0x80($ctx),$D movdqu 0x80-0x80($ctx),$E movdqu 0xa0-0x80($ctx),$F movdqu 0xc0-0x80($ctx),$G movdqu 0xe0-0x80($ctx),$H movdqu .Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn jmp .Loop .align 32 .Loop: movdqa $C,$bxc pxor $B,$bxc # magic seed ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; movdqu `&Xi_off($i)`,$Xi mov \$3,%ecx jmp .Loop_16_xx .align 32 .Loop_16_xx: ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; dec %ecx jnz .Loop_16_xx mov \$1,%ecx lea K256+128(%rip),$Tbl movdqa (%rbx),$sigma # pull counters cmp 4*0(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters pxor $t1,$t1 cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[0] # cancel input cmp 4*1(%rbx),%ecx movdqa $sigma,$Xn cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[1] cmp 4*2(%rbx),%ecx pcmpgtd $t1,$Xn # mask value cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[2] cmp 4*3(%rbx),%ecx paddd $Xn,$sigma # counters-- cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[3] movdqu 0x00-0x80($ctx),$t1 pand $Xn,$A movdqu 0x20-0x80($ctx),$t2 pand $Xn,$B movdqu 0x40-0x80($ctx),$t3 pand $Xn,$C movdqu 0x60-0x80($ctx),$Xi pand $Xn,$D paddd $t1,$A movdqu 0x80-0x80($ctx),$t1 pand $Xn,$E paddd $t2,$B movdqu 0xa0-0x80($ctx),$t2 pand $Xn,$F paddd $t3,$C movdqu 0xc0-0x80($ctx),$t3 pand $Xn,$G paddd $Xi,$D movdqu 0xe0-0x80($ctx),$Xi pand $Xn,$H paddd $t1,$E paddd $t2,$F movdqu $A,0x00-0x80($ctx) paddd $t3,$G movdqu $B,0x20-0x80($ctx) paddd $Xi,$H movdqu $C,0x40-0x80($ctx) movdqu $D,0x60-0x80($ctx) movdqu $E,0x80-0x80($ctx) movdqu $F,0xa0-0x80($ctx) movdqu $G,0xc0-0x80($ctx) movdqu $H,0xe0-0x80($ctx) movdqa $sigma,(%rbx) # save counters movdqa .Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn dec $num jnz .Loop mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num lea $REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx lea `16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Loop_grande .Ldone: mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x38(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x28(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue: ret .size sha256_multi_block,.-sha256_multi_block ___ {{{ my ($Wi,$TMP0,$TMP1,$TMPx,$ABEF0,$CDGH0,$ABEF1,$CDGH1)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,12..15)); my @MSG0=map("%xmm$_",(4..7)); my @MSG1=map("%xmm$_",(8..11)); $code.=<<___; .type sha256_multi_block_shaext,\@function,3 .align 32 sha256_multi_block_shaext: _shaext_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x28(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`,%rsp shl \$1,$num # we process pair at a time and \$-256,%rsp lea 0x80($ctx),$ctx # size optimization mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody_shaext: lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx lea K256_shaext+0x80(%rip),$Tbl .Loop_grande_shaext: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<2;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle %rsp,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldone_shaext movq 0x00-0x80($ctx),$ABEF0 # A1.A0 movq 0x20-0x80($ctx),@MSG0[0] # B1.B0 movq 0x40-0x80($ctx),$CDGH0 # C1.C0 movq 0x60-0x80($ctx),@MSG0[1] # D1.D0 movq 0x80-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[0] # E1.E0 movq 0xa0-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[1] # F1.F0 movq 0xc0-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[2] # G1.G0 movq 0xe0-0x80($ctx),@MSG1[3] # H1.H0 punpckldq @MSG0[0],$ABEF0 # B1.A1.B0.A0 punpckldq @MSG0[1],$CDGH0 # D1.C1.D0.C0 punpckldq @MSG1[1],@MSG1[0] # F1.E1.F0.E0 punpckldq @MSG1[3],@MSG1[2] # H1.G1.H0.G0 movdqa K256_shaext-0x10(%rip),$TMPx # byte swap movdqa $ABEF0,$ABEF1 movdqa $CDGH0,$CDGH1 punpcklqdq @MSG1[0],$ABEF0 # F0.E0.B0.A0 punpcklqdq @MSG1[2],$CDGH0 # H0.G0.D0.C0 punpckhqdq @MSG1[0],$ABEF1 # F1.E1.B1.A1 punpckhqdq @MSG1[2],$CDGH1 # H1.G1.D1.C1 pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABEF0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0b00011011,$CDGH0,$CDGH0 pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABEF1,$ABEF1 pshufd \$0b00011011,$CDGH1,$CDGH1 jmp .Loop_shaext .align 32 .Loop_shaext: movdqu 0x00(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[0] movdqu 0x00(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[0] movdqu 0x10(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[1] movdqu 0x10(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[1] movdqu 0x20(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[2] pshufb $TMPx,@MSG0[0] movdqu 0x20(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[2] pshufb $TMPx,@MSG1[0] movdqu 0x30(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[3] lea 0x40(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] movdqu 0x30(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[3] lea 0x40(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] movdqa 0*16-0x80($Tbl),$Wi pshufb $TMPx,@MSG0[1] paddd @MSG0[0],$Wi pxor $ABEF0,@MSG0[0] # black magic movdqa $Wi,$TMP0 movdqa 0*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 pshufb $TMPx,@MSG1[1] paddd @MSG1[0],$TMP1 movdqa $CDGH0,0x50(%rsp) # offload sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 0-3 pxor $ABEF1,@MSG1[0] # black magic movdqa $TMP1,$Wi movdqa $CDGH1,0x70(%rsp) sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 0-3 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi pxor $ABEF0,@MSG0[0] # black magic movdqa $ABEF0,0x40(%rsp) # offload sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi pxor $ABEF1,@MSG1[0] # black magic movdqa $ABEF1,0x60(%rsp) movdqa 1*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0 paddd @MSG0[1],$TMP0 pshufb $TMPx,@MSG0[2] sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 movdqa $TMP0,$Wi movdqa 1*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 paddd @MSG1[1],$TMP1 sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 4-7 movdqa $TMP1,$Wi prefetcht0 127(@ptr[0]) pshufb $TMPx,@MSG0[3] pshufb $TMPx,@MSG1[2] prefetcht0 127(@ptr[1]) sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 4-7 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi pshufb $TMPx,@MSG1[3] sha256msg1 @MSG0[1],@MSG0[0] sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi movdqa 2*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0 paddd @MSG0[2],$TMP0 sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 movdqa $TMP0,$Wi movdqa 2*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 paddd @MSG1[2],$TMP1 sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 8-11 sha256msg1 @MSG1[1],@MSG1[0] movdqa $TMP1,$Wi movdqa @MSG0[3],$TMPx sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 8-11 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi palignr \$4,@MSG0[2],$TMPx paddd $TMPx,@MSG0[0] movdqa @MSG1[3],$TMPx palignr \$4,@MSG1[2],$TMPx sha256msg1 @MSG0[2],@MSG0[1] sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi movdqa 3*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0 paddd @MSG0[3],$TMP0 sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 sha256msg1 @MSG1[2],@MSG1[1] movdqa $TMP0,$Wi movdqa 3*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 paddd $TMPx,@MSG1[0] paddd @MSG1[3],$TMP1 sha256msg2 @MSG0[3],@MSG0[0] sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 12-15 movdqa $TMP1,$Wi movdqa @MSG0[0],$TMPx palignr \$4,@MSG0[3],$TMPx sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 12-15 sha256msg2 @MSG1[3],@MSG1[0] pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi paddd $TMPx,@MSG0[1] movdqa @MSG1[0],$TMPx palignr \$4,@MSG1[3],$TMPx sha256msg1 @MSG0[3],@MSG0[2] sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi movdqa 4*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0 paddd @MSG0[0],$TMP0 sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 sha256msg1 @MSG1[3],@MSG1[2] ___ for($i=4;$i<16-3;$i++) { $code.=<<___; movdqa $TMP0,$Wi movdqa $i*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 paddd $TMPx,@MSG1[1] paddd @MSG1[0],$TMP1 sha256msg2 @MSG0[0],@MSG0[1] sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 16-19... movdqa $TMP1,$Wi movdqa @MSG0[1],$TMPx palignr \$4,@MSG0[0],$TMPx sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 16-19... sha256msg2 @MSG1[0],@MSG1[1] pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi paddd $TMPx,@MSG0[2] movdqa @MSG1[1],$TMPx palignr \$4,@MSG1[0],$TMPx sha256msg1 @MSG0[0],@MSG0[3] sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi movdqa `($i+1)*16`-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0 paddd @MSG0[1],$TMP0 sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 sha256msg1 @MSG1[0],@MSG1[3] ___ push(@MSG0,shift(@MSG0)); push(@MSG1,shift(@MSG1)); } $code.=<<___; movdqa $TMP0,$Wi movdqa 13*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 paddd $TMPx,@MSG1[1] paddd @MSG1[0],$TMP1 sha256msg2 @MSG0[0],@MSG0[1] sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 52-55 movdqa $TMP1,$Wi movdqa @MSG0[1],$TMPx palignr \$4,@MSG0[0],$TMPx sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 52-55 sha256msg2 @MSG1[0],@MSG1[1] pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi paddd $TMPx,@MSG0[2] movdqa @MSG1[1],$TMPx palignr \$4,@MSG1[0],$TMPx nop sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi movdqa 14*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0 paddd @MSG0[1],$TMP0 sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 movdqa $TMP0,$Wi movdqa 14*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 paddd $TMPx,@MSG1[2] paddd @MSG1[1],$TMP1 sha256msg2 @MSG0[1],@MSG0[2] nop sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 56-59 movdqa $TMP1,$Wi mov \$1,%ecx pxor @MSG0[1],@MSG0[1] # zero sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 56-59 sha256msg2 @MSG1[1],@MSG1[2] pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi movdqa 15*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP0 paddd @MSG0[2],$TMP0 movq (%rbx),@MSG0[2] # pull counters nop sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi movdqa 15*16-0x80($Tbl),$TMP1 paddd @MSG1[2],$TMP1 sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 movdqa $TMP0,$Wi cmp 4*0(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters cmovge %rsp,@ptr[0] # cancel input cmp 4*1(%rbx),%ecx cmovge %rsp,@ptr[1] pshufd \$0x00,@MSG0[2],@MSG1[0] sha256rnds2 $ABEF0,$CDGH0 # 60-63 movdqa $TMP1,$Wi pshufd \$0x55,@MSG0[2],@MSG1[1] movdqa @MSG0[2],@MSG1[2] sha256rnds2 $ABEF1,$CDGH1 # 60-63 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP0,$Wi pcmpgtd @MSG0[1],@MSG1[0] pcmpgtd @MSG0[1],@MSG1[1] sha256rnds2 $CDGH0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0x0e,$TMP1,$Wi pcmpgtd @MSG0[1],@MSG1[2] # counter mask movdqa K256_shaext-0x10(%rip),$TMPx sha256rnds2 $CDGH1,$ABEF1 pand @MSG1[0],$CDGH0 pand @MSG1[1],$CDGH1 pand @MSG1[0],$ABEF0 pand @MSG1[1],$ABEF1 paddd @MSG0[2],@MSG1[2] # counters-- paddd 0x50(%rsp),$CDGH0 paddd 0x70(%rsp),$CDGH1 paddd 0x40(%rsp),$ABEF0 paddd 0x60(%rsp),$ABEF1 movq @MSG1[2],(%rbx) # save counters dec $num jnz .Loop_shaext mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABEF0,$ABEF0 pshufd \$0b00011011,$CDGH0,$CDGH0 pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABEF1,$ABEF1 pshufd \$0b00011011,$CDGH1,$CDGH1 movdqa $ABEF0,@MSG0[0] movdqa $CDGH0,@MSG0[1] punpckldq $ABEF1,$ABEF0 # B1.B0.A1.A0 punpckhdq $ABEF1,@MSG0[0] # F1.F0.E1.E0 punpckldq $CDGH1,$CDGH0 # D1.D0.C1.C0 punpckhdq $CDGH1,@MSG0[1] # H1.H0.G1.G0 movq $ABEF0,0x00-0x80($ctx) # A1.A0 psrldq \$8,$ABEF0 movq @MSG0[0],0x80-0x80($ctx) # E1.E0 psrldq \$8,@MSG0[0] movq $ABEF0,0x20-0x80($ctx) # B1.B0 movq @MSG0[0],0xa0-0x80($ctx) # F1.F0 movq $CDGH0,0x40-0x80($ctx) # C1.C0 psrldq \$8,$CDGH0 movq @MSG0[1],0xc0-0x80($ctx) # G1.G0 psrldq \$8,@MSG0[1] movq $CDGH0,0x60-0x80($ctx) # D1.D0 movq @MSG0[1],0xe0-0x80($ctx) # H1.H0 lea `$REG_SZ/2`($ctx),$ctx lea `16*2`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Loop_grande_shaext .Ldone_shaext: #mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x38(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x28(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue_shaext: ret .size sha256_multi_block_shaext,.-sha256_multi_block_shaext ___ }}} if ($avx) {{{ sub ROUND_00_15_avx { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==16); vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1 vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t1,$t1 vpunpckldq $t1,$Xi,$Xi vpshufb $Xn,$Xi,$Xi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==16); vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi lea `16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t1 lea `16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi lea `16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t1,$t1 lea `16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3] vpunpckldq $t1,$Xi,$Xi vpshufb $Xn,$Xi,$Xi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==32); vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[4]),$t1 vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t2 vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[5]),$t3 vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[6]),$t1,$t1 vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2 vpunpckldq $t2,$Xi,$Xi vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[7]),$t3,$t3 vpunpckldq $t3,$t1,$t1 vinserti128 $t1,$Xi,$Xi vpshufb $Xn,$Xi,$Xi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32); vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[0]),$Xi lea `16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[4]),$t1 lea `16*4`(@ptr[4]),@ptr[4] vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[1]),$t2 lea `16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] vmovd `4*$i`(@ptr[5]),$t3 lea `16*4`(@ptr[5]),@ptr[5] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[2]),$Xi,$Xi lea `16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[6]),$t1,$t1 lea `16*4`(@ptr[6]),@ptr[6] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2 lea `16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3] vpunpckldq $t2,$Xi,$Xi vpinsrd \$1,`4*$i`(@ptr[7]),$t3,$t3 lea `16*4`(@ptr[7]),@ptr[7] vpunpckldq $t3,$t1,$t1 vinserti128 $t1,$Xi,$Xi vpshufb $Xn,$Xi,$Xi ___ $code.=<<___; vpsrld \$6,$e,$sigma vpslld \$26,$e,$t3 vmovdqu $Xi,`&Xi_off($i)` vpaddd $h,$Xi,$Xi # Xi+=h vpsrld \$11,$e,$t2 vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma vpslld \$21,$e,$t3 vpaddd `32*($i%8)-128`($Tbl),$Xi,$Xi # Xi+=K[round] vpxor $t2,$sigma,$sigma vpsrld \$25,$e,$t2 vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[0])" if ($i==15)` vpslld \$7,$e,$t3 vpandn $g,$e,$t1 vpand $f,$e,$axb # borrow $axb `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[1])" if ($i==15)` vpxor $t2,$sigma,$sigma vpsrld \$2,$a,$h # borrow $h vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma # Sigma1(e) `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[2])" if ($i==15)` vpslld \$30,$a,$t2 vpxor $axb,$t1,$t1 # Ch(e,f,g) vpxor $a,$b,$axb # a^b, b^c in next round `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[3])" if ($i==15)` vpxor $t2,$h,$h vpaddd $sigma,$Xi,$Xi # Xi+=Sigma1(e) vpsrld \$13,$a,$t2 `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[4])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpslld \$19,$a,$t3 vpaddd $t1,$Xi,$Xi # Xi+=Ch(e,f,g) vpand $axb,$bxc,$bxc `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[5])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpxor $t2,$h,$sigma vpsrld \$22,$a,$t2 vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[6])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpslld \$10,$a,$t3 vpxor $bxc,$b,$h # h=Maj(a,b,c)=Ch(a^b,c,b) vpaddd $Xi,$d,$d # d+=Xi `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[7])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpxor $t2,$sigma,$sigma vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma # Sigma0(a) vpaddd $Xi,$h,$h # h+=Xi vpaddd $sigma,$h,$h # h+=Sigma0(a) ___ $code.=<<___ if (($i%8)==7); add \$`32*8`,$Tbl ___ ($axb,$bxc)=($bxc,$axb); } sub ROUND_16_XX_avx { my $i=shift; $code.=<<___; vmovdqu `&Xi_off($i+1)`,$Xn vpaddd `&Xi_off($i+9)`,$Xi,$Xi # Xi+=X[i+9] vpsrld \$3,$Xn,$sigma vpsrld \$7,$Xn,$t2 vpslld \$25,$Xn,$t3 vpxor $t2,$sigma,$sigma vpsrld \$18,$Xn,$t2 vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma vpslld \$14,$Xn,$t3 vmovdqu `&Xi_off($i+14)`,$t1 vpsrld \$10,$t1,$axb # borrow $axb vpxor $t2,$sigma,$sigma vpsrld \$17,$t1,$t2 vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma # sigma0(X[i+1]) vpslld \$15,$t1,$t3 vpaddd $sigma,$Xi,$Xi # Xi+=sigma0(e) vpxor $t2,$axb,$sigma vpsrld \$19,$t1,$t2 vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma vpslld \$13,$t1,$t3 vpxor $t2,$sigma,$sigma vpxor $t3,$sigma,$sigma # sigma0(X[i+14]) vpaddd $sigma,$Xi,$Xi # Xi+=sigma1(X[i+14]) ___ &ROUND_00_15_avx($i,@_); ($Xi,$Xn)=($Xn,$Xi); } $code.=<<___; .type sha256_multi_block_avx,\@function,3 .align 32 sha256_multi_block_avx: _avx_shortcut: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); shr \$32,%rcx cmp \$2,$num jb .Lavx test \$`1<<5`,%ecx jnz _avx2_shortcut jmp .Lavx .align 32 .Lavx: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x28(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp and \$-256,%rsp mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody_avx: lea K256+128(%rip),$Tbl lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx lea 0x80($ctx),$ctx # size optimization .Loop_grande_avx: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldone_avx vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($ctx),$A # load context lea 128(%rsp),%rax vmovdqu 0x20-0x80($ctx),$B vmovdqu 0x40-0x80($ctx),$C vmovdqu 0x60-0x80($ctx),$D vmovdqu 0x80-0x80($ctx),$E vmovdqu 0xa0-0x80($ctx),$F vmovdqu 0xc0-0x80($ctx),$G vmovdqu 0xe0-0x80($ctx),$H vmovdqu .Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn jmp .Loop_avx .align 32 .Loop_avx: vpxor $B,$C,$bxc # magic seed ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu `&Xi_off($i)`,$Xi mov \$3,%ecx jmp .Loop_16_xx_avx .align 32 .Loop_16_xx_avx: ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_XX_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; dec %ecx jnz .Loop_16_xx_avx mov \$1,%ecx lea K256+128(%rip),$Tbl ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; cmp `4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqa (%rbx),$sigma # pull counters vpxor $t1,$t1,$t1 vmovdqa $sigma,$Xn vpcmpgtd $t1,$Xn,$Xn # mask value vpaddd $Xn,$sigma,$sigma # counters-- vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($ctx),$t1 vpand $Xn,$A,$A vmovdqu 0x20-0x80($ctx),$t2 vpand $Xn,$B,$B vmovdqu 0x40-0x80($ctx),$t3 vpand $Xn,$C,$C vmovdqu 0x60-0x80($ctx),$Xi vpand $Xn,$D,$D vpaddd $t1,$A,$A vmovdqu 0x80-0x80($ctx),$t1 vpand $Xn,$E,$E vpaddd $t2,$B,$B vmovdqu 0xa0-0x80($ctx),$t2 vpand $Xn,$F,$F vpaddd $t3,$C,$C vmovdqu 0xc0-0x80($ctx),$t3 vpand $Xn,$G,$G vpaddd $Xi,$D,$D vmovdqu 0xe0-0x80($ctx),$Xi vpand $Xn,$H,$H vpaddd $t1,$E,$E vpaddd $t2,$F,$F vmovdqu $A,0x00-0x80($ctx) vpaddd $t3,$G,$G vmovdqu $B,0x20-0x80($ctx) vpaddd $Xi,$H,$H vmovdqu $C,0x40-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $D,0x60-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $E,0x80-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $F,0xa0-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $G,0xc0-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $H,0xe0-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $sigma,(%rbx) # save counters vmovdqu .Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn dec $num jnz .Loop_avx mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num lea $REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx lea `16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Loop_grande_avx .Ldone_avx: mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x38(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x28(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx: ret .size sha256_multi_block_avx,.-sha256_multi_block_avx ___ if ($avx>1) { $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $REG_SZ=32; @ptr=map("%r$_",(12..15,8..11)); @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("%ymm$_",(8..15)); ($t1,$t2,$t3,$axb,$bxc,$Xi,$Xn,$sigma)=map("%ymm$_",(0..7)); $code.=<<___; .type sha256_multi_block_avx2,\@function,3 .align 32 sha256_multi_block_avx2: _avx2_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp and \$-256,%rsp mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody_avx2: lea K256+128(%rip),$Tbl lea 0x80($ctx),$ctx # size optimization .Loop_grande_avx2: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($ctx),$A # load context lea 128(%rsp),%rax vmovdqu 0x20-0x80($ctx),$B lea 256+128(%rsp),%rbx vmovdqu 0x40-0x80($ctx),$C vmovdqu 0x60-0x80($ctx),$D vmovdqu 0x80-0x80($ctx),$E vmovdqu 0xa0-0x80($ctx),$F vmovdqu 0xc0-0x80($ctx),$G vmovdqu 0xe0-0x80($ctx),$H vmovdqu .Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn jmp .Loop_avx2 .align 32 .Loop_avx2: vpxor $B,$C,$bxc # magic seed ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu `&Xi_off($i)`,$Xi mov \$3,%ecx jmp .Loop_16_xx_avx2 .align 32 .Loop_16_xx_avx2: ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_XX_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; dec %ecx jnz .Loop_16_xx_avx2 mov \$1,%ecx lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx lea K256+128(%rip),$Tbl ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; cmp `4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqa (%rbx),$sigma # pull counters vpxor $t1,$t1,$t1 vmovdqa $sigma,$Xn vpcmpgtd $t1,$Xn,$Xn # mask value vpaddd $Xn,$sigma,$sigma # counters-- vmovdqu 0x00-0x80($ctx),$t1 vpand $Xn,$A,$A vmovdqu 0x20-0x80($ctx),$t2 vpand $Xn,$B,$B vmovdqu 0x40-0x80($ctx),$t3 vpand $Xn,$C,$C vmovdqu 0x60-0x80($ctx),$Xi vpand $Xn,$D,$D vpaddd $t1,$A,$A vmovdqu 0x80-0x80($ctx),$t1 vpand $Xn,$E,$E vpaddd $t2,$B,$B vmovdqu 0xa0-0x80($ctx),$t2 vpand $Xn,$F,$F vpaddd $t3,$C,$C vmovdqu 0xc0-0x80($ctx),$t3 vpand $Xn,$G,$G vpaddd $Xi,$D,$D vmovdqu 0xe0-0x80($ctx),$Xi vpand $Xn,$H,$H vpaddd $t1,$E,$E vpaddd $t2,$F,$F vmovdqu $A,0x00-0x80($ctx) vpaddd $t3,$G,$G vmovdqu $B,0x20-0x80($ctx) vpaddd $Xi,$H,$H vmovdqu $C,0x40-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $D,0x60-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $E,0x80-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $F,0xa0-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $G,0xc0-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $H,0xe0-0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $sigma,(%rbx) # save counters lea 256+128(%rsp),%rbx vmovdqu .Lpbswap(%rip),$Xn dec $num jnz .Loop_avx2 #mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num #lea $REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx #lea `16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp #dec $num #jnz .Loop_grande_avx2 .Ldone_avx2: mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx2: ret .size sha256_multi_block_avx2,.-sha256_multi_block_avx2 ___ } }}} $code.=<<___; .align 256 K256: ___ sub TABLE { foreach (@_) { $code.=<<___; .long $_,$_,$_,$_ .long $_,$_,$_,$_ ___ } } &TABLE( 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5, 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174, 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da, 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967, 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13, 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85, 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070, 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3, 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 ); $code.=<<___; .Lpbswap: .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f # pbswap .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f # pbswap K256_shaext: .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .asciz "SHA256 multi-block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ if ($win64) { # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lbody jb .Lin_prologue mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lin_prologue mov `16*17`(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp lea -24-10*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .type avx2_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 avx2_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue mov `32*17`($context),%rax # pull saved stack pointer mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore cotnext->R15 lea -56-10*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq jmp .Lin_prologue .size avx2_handler,.-avx2_handler ___ $code.=<<___; .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block .rva .LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block .rva .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block .rva .LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block_shaext .rva .LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block_shaext .rva .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_shaext ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block_avx .rva .LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block_avx .rva .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .rva .LSEH_begin_sha256_multi_block_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_sha256_multi_block_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx2 ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbody,.Lepilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_shaext: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbody_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbody_avx,.Lepilogue_avx # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .LSEH_info_sha256_multi_block_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva avx2_handler .rva .Lbody_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2 # HandlerData[] ___ } #################################################################### sub rex { local *opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src)=@_; my $rex=0; $rex|=0x04 if ($dst>=8); $rex|=0x01 if ($src>=8); unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40 if ($rex); } sub sha256op38 { my $instr = shift; my %opcodelet = ( "sha256rnds2" => 0xcb, "sha256msg1" => 0xcc, "sha256msg2" => 0xcd ); if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38); rex(\@opcode,$2,$1); push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr}; push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return $instr."\t".@_[0]; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge; s/\b(sha256[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha256op38($1,$2)/geo or s/\b(vmov[dq])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vmovdqu)\b(.+)%x%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpinsr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+),%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3,%xmm$4/go or s/\b(vpextr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vinserti128)\b(\s+)%ymm/$1$2\$1,%xmm/go or s/\b(vpbroadcast[qd]\s+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1%xmm$2/go; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl0000644000000000000000000011232013176625660017450 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # Multi-buffer SHA1 procedure processes n buffers in parallel by # placing buffer data to designated lane of SIMD register. n is # naturally limited to 4 on pre-AVX2 processors and to 8 on # AVX2-capable processors such as Haswell. # # this +aesni(i) sha1 aesni-sha1 gain(iv) # ------------------------------------------------------------------- # Westmere(ii) 10.7/n +1.28=3.96(n=4) 5.30 6.66 +68% # Atom(ii) 18.1/n +3.93=8.46(n=4) 9.37 12.8 +51% # Sandy Bridge (8.16 +5.15=13.3)/n 4.99 5.98 +80% # Ivy Bridge (8.08 +5.14=13.2)/n 4.60 5.54 +68% # Haswell(iii) (8.96 +5.00=14.0)/n 3.57 4.55 +160% # Skylake (8.70 +5.00=13.7)/n 3.64 4.20 +145% # Bulldozer (9.76 +5.76=15.5)/n 5.95 6.37 +64% # # (i) multi-block CBC encrypt with 128-bit key; # (ii) (HASH+AES)/n does not apply to Westmere for n>3 and Atom, # because of lower AES-NI instruction throughput; # (iii) "this" is for n=8, when we gather twice as much data, result # for n=4 is 8.00+4.44=12.4; # (iv) presented improvement coefficients are asymptotic limits and # in real-life application are somewhat lower, e.g. for 2KB # fragments they range from 30% to 100% (on Haswell); $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; $avx=0; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; # void sha1_multi_block ( # struct { unsigned int A[8]; # unsigned int B[8]; # unsigned int C[8]; # unsigned int D[8]; # unsigned int E[8]; } *ctx, # struct { void *ptr; int blocks; } inp[8], # int num); /* 1 or 2 */ # $ctx="%rdi"; # 1st arg $inp="%rsi"; # 2nd arg $num="%edx"; @ptr=map("%r$_",(8..11)); $Tbl="%rbp"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("%xmm$_",(0..4)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$tx)=map("%xmm$_",(5..9)); @Xi=map("%xmm$_",(10..14)); $K="%xmm15"; if (1) { # Atom-specific optimization aiming to eliminate pshufb with high # registers [and thus get rid of 48 cycles accumulated penalty] @Xi=map("%xmm$_",(0..4)); ($tx,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("%xmm$_",(5..9)); @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("%xmm$_",(10..14)); } $REG_SZ=16; sub Xi_off { my $off = shift; $off %= 16; $off *= $REG_SZ; $off<256 ? "$off-128(%rax)" : "$off-256-128(%rbx)"; } sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; my $k=$i+2; # Loads are performed 2+3/4 iterations in advance. 3/4 means that out # of 4 words you would expect to be loaded per given iteration one is # spilled to next iteration. In other words indices in four input # streams are distributed as following: # # $i==0: 0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,2,2,2, # $i==1: 2,3,3,3, # $i==2: 3,4,4,4, # ... # $i==13: 14,15,15,15, # $i==14: 15 # # Then at $i==15 Xupdate is applied one iteration in advance... $code.=<<___ if ($i==0); movd (@ptr[0]),@Xi[0] lea `16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] movd (@ptr[1]),@Xi[2] # borrow @Xi[2] lea `16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] movd (@ptr[2]),@Xi[3] # borrow @Xi[3] lea `16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2] movd (@ptr[3]),@Xi[4] # borrow @Xi[4] lea `16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3] punpckldq @Xi[3],@Xi[0] movd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[1] punpckldq @Xi[4],@Xi[2] movd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[1]),$t3 punpckldq @Xi[2],@Xi[0] movd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[2]),$t2 pshufb $tx,@Xi[0] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<14); # just load input movd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t1 punpckldq $t2,@Xi[1] movdqa $a,$t2 paddd $K,$e # e+=K_00_19 punpckldq $t1,$t3 movdqa $b,$t1 movdqa $b,$t0 pslld \$5,$t2 pandn $d,$t1 pand $c,$t0 punpckldq $t3,@Xi[1] movdqa $a,$t3 movdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` paddd @Xi[0],$e # e+=X[i] movd `4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[2] psrld \$27,$t3 pxor $t1,$t0 # Ch(b,c,d) movdqa $b,$t1 por $t3,$t2 # rol(a,5) movd `4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[1]),$t3 pslld \$30,$t1 paddd $t0,$e # e+=Ch(b,c,d) psrld \$2,$b paddd $t2,$e # e+=rol(a,5) pshufb $tx,@Xi[1] movd `4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[2]),$t2 por $t1,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==14); # just load input movd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t1 punpckldq $t2,@Xi[1] movdqa $a,$t2 paddd $K,$e # e+=K_00_19 punpckldq $t1,$t3 movdqa $b,$t1 movdqa $b,$t0 pslld \$5,$t2 prefetcht0 63(@ptr[0]) pandn $d,$t1 pand $c,$t0 punpckldq $t3,@Xi[1] movdqa $a,$t3 movdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` paddd @Xi[0],$e # e+=X[i] psrld \$27,$t3 pxor $t1,$t0 # Ch(b,c,d) movdqa $b,$t1 prefetcht0 63(@ptr[1]) por $t3,$t2 # rol(a,5) pslld \$30,$t1 paddd $t0,$e # e+=Ch(b,c,d) prefetcht0 63(@ptr[2]) psrld \$2,$b paddd $t2,$e # e+=rol(a,5) pshufb $tx,@Xi[1] prefetcht0 63(@ptr[3]) por $t1,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=13 && $i<15); movdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # preload "X[2]" ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); # apply Xupdate pxor @Xi[-2],@Xi[1] # "X[13]" movdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # "X[2]" movdqa $a,$t2 pxor `&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1] paddd $K,$e # e+=K_00_19 movdqa $b,$t1 pslld \$5,$t2 pxor @Xi[3],@Xi[1] movdqa $b,$t0 pandn $d,$t1 movdqa @Xi[1],$tx pand $c,$t0 movdqa $a,$t3 psrld \$31,$tx paddd @Xi[1],@Xi[1] movdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` paddd @Xi[0],$e # e+=X[i] psrld \$27,$t3 pxor $t1,$t0 # Ch(b,c,d) movdqa $b,$t1 por $t3,$t2 # rol(a,5) pslld \$30,$t1 paddd $t0,$e # e+=Ch(b,c,d) psrld \$2,$b paddd $t2,$e # e+=rol(a,5) por $tx,@Xi[1] # rol \$1,@Xi[1] por $t1,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ push(@Xi,shift(@Xi)); } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); pxor @Xi[-2],@Xi[1] # "X[13]" movdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # "X[2]" movdqa $a,$t2 movdqa $d,$t0 pxor `&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1] paddd $K,$e # e+=K_20_39 pslld \$5,$t2 pxor $b,$t0 movdqa $a,$t3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<72); movdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); paddd @Xi[0],$e # e+=X[i] pxor @Xi[3],@Xi[1] psrld \$27,$t3 pxor $c,$t0 # Parity(b,c,d) movdqa $b,$t1 pslld \$30,$t1 movdqa @Xi[1],$tx por $t3,$t2 # rol(a,5) psrld \$31,$tx paddd $t0,$e # e+=Parity(b,c,d) paddd @Xi[1],@Xi[1] psrld \$2,$b paddd $t2,$e # e+=rol(a,5) por $tx,@Xi[1] # rol(@Xi[1],1) por $t1,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); movdqa $a,$t2 paddd $K,$e # e+=K_20_39 movdqa $d,$t0 pslld \$5,$t2 pxor $b,$t0 movdqa $a,$t3 paddd @Xi[0],$e # e+=X[i] psrld \$27,$t3 movdqa $b,$t1 pxor $c,$t0 # Parity(b,c,d) pslld \$30,$t1 por $t3,$t2 # rol(a,5) paddd $t0,$e # e+=Parity(b,c,d) psrld \$2,$b paddd $t2,$e # e+=rol(a,5) por $t1,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ push(@Xi,shift(@Xi)); } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___; pxor @Xi[-2],@Xi[1] # "X[13]" movdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # "X[2]" movdqa $a,$t2 movdqa $d,$t1 pxor `&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1] pxor @Xi[3],@Xi[1] paddd $K,$e # e+=K_40_59 pslld \$5,$t2 movdqa $a,$t3 pand $c,$t1 movdqa $d,$t0 movdqa @Xi[1],$tx psrld \$27,$t3 paddd $t1,$e pxor $c,$t0 movdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` paddd @Xi[0],$e # e+=X[i] por $t3,$t2 # rol(a,5) psrld \$31,$tx pand $b,$t0 movdqa $b,$t1 pslld \$30,$t1 paddd @Xi[1],@Xi[1] paddd $t0,$e # e+=Maj(b,d,c) psrld \$2,$b paddd $t2,$e # e+=rol(a,5) por $tx,@Xi[1] # rol(@X[1],1) por $t1,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ push(@Xi,shift(@Xi)); } $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl sha1_multi_block .type sha1_multi_block,\@function,3 .align 32 sha1_multi_block: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%rcx bt \$61,%rcx # check SHA bit jc _shaext_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); test \$`1<<28`,%ecx jnz _avx_shortcut ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x28(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`,%rsp and \$-256,%rsp mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody: lea K_XX_XX(%rip),$Tbl lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx .Loop_grande: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldone movdqu 0x00($ctx),$A # load context lea 128(%rsp),%rax movdqu 0x20($ctx),$B movdqu 0x40($ctx),$C movdqu 0x60($ctx),$D movdqu 0x80($ctx),$E movdqa 0x60($Tbl),$tx # pbswap_mask movdqa -0x20($Tbl),$K # K_00_19 jmp .Loop .align 32 .Loop: ___ for($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" movdqa 0x00($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_20_39 for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" movdqa 0x20($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_40_59 for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" movdqa 0x40($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_60_79 for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; movdqa (%rbx),@Xi[0] # pull counters mov \$1,%ecx cmp 4*0(%rbx),%ecx # examinte counters pxor $t2,$t2 cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[0] # cancel input cmp 4*1(%rbx),%ecx movdqa @Xi[0],@Xi[1] cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[1] cmp 4*2(%rbx),%ecx pcmpgtd $t2,@Xi[1] # mask value cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[2] cmp 4*3(%rbx),%ecx paddd @Xi[1],@Xi[0] # counters-- cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[3] movdqu 0x00($ctx),$t0 pand @Xi[1],$A movdqu 0x20($ctx),$t1 pand @Xi[1],$B paddd $t0,$A movdqu 0x40($ctx),$t2 pand @Xi[1],$C paddd $t1,$B movdqu 0x60($ctx),$t3 pand @Xi[1],$D paddd $t2,$C movdqu 0x80($ctx),$tx pand @Xi[1],$E movdqu $A,0x00($ctx) paddd $t3,$D movdqu $B,0x20($ctx) paddd $tx,$E movdqu $C,0x40($ctx) movdqu $D,0x60($ctx) movdqu $E,0x80($ctx) movdqa @Xi[0],(%rbx) # save counters movdqa 0x60($Tbl),$tx # pbswap_mask movdqa -0x20($Tbl),$K # K_00_19 dec $num jnz .Loop mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num lea $REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx lea `16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Loop_grande .Ldone: mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x38(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x28(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue: ret .size sha1_multi_block,.-sha1_multi_block ___ {{{ my ($ABCD0,$E0,$E0_,$BSWAP,$ABCD1,$E1,$E1_)=map("%xmm$_",(0..3,8..10)); my @MSG0=map("%xmm$_",(4..7)); my @MSG1=map("%xmm$_",(11..14)); $code.=<<___; .type sha1_multi_block_shaext,\@function,3 .align 32 sha1_multi_block_shaext: _shaext_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x28(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`,%rsp shl \$1,$num # we process pair at a time and \$-256,%rsp lea 0x40($ctx),$ctx # size optimization mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody_shaext: lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx movdqa K_XX_XX+0x80(%rip),$BSWAP # byte-n-word swap .Loop_grande_shaext: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<2;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle %rsp,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldone_shaext movq 0x00-0x40($ctx),$ABCD0 # a1.a0 movq 0x20-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[0]# b1.b0 movq 0x40-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[1]# c1.c0 movq 0x60-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[2]# d1.d0 movq 0x80-0x40($ctx),@MSG0[3]# e1.e0 punpckldq @MSG0[0],$ABCD0 # b1.a1.b0.a0 punpckldq @MSG0[2],@MSG0[1] # d1.c1.d0.c0 movdqa $ABCD0,$ABCD1 punpcklqdq @MSG0[1],$ABCD0 # d0.c0.b0.a0 punpckhqdq @MSG0[1],$ABCD1 # d1.c1.b1.a1 pshufd \$0b00111111,@MSG0[3],$E0 pshufd \$0b01111111,@MSG0[3],$E1 pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD0,$ABCD0 pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD1,$ABCD1 jmp .Loop_shaext .align 32 .Loop_shaext: movdqu 0x00(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[0] movdqu 0x00(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[0] movdqu 0x10(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[1] movdqu 0x10(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[1] movdqu 0x20(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[2] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG0[0] movdqu 0x20(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[2] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG1[0] movdqu 0x30(@ptr[0]),@MSG0[3] lea 0x40(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG0[1] movdqu 0x30(@ptr[1]),@MSG1[3] lea 0x40(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG1[1] movdqa $E0,0x50(%rsp) # offload paddd @MSG0[0],$E0 movdqa $E1,0x70(%rsp) paddd @MSG1[0],$E1 movdqa $ABCD0,0x40(%rsp) # offload movdqa $ABCD0,$E0_ movdqa $ABCD1,0x60(%rsp) movdqa $ABCD1,$E1_ sha1rnds4 \$0,$E0,$ABCD0 # 0-3 sha1nexte @MSG0[1],$E0_ sha1rnds4 \$0,$E1,$ABCD1 # 0-3 sha1nexte @MSG1[1],$E1_ pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG0[2] prefetcht0 127(@ptr[0]) sha1msg1 @MSG0[1],@MSG0[0] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG1[2] prefetcht0 127(@ptr[1]) sha1msg1 @MSG1[1],@MSG1[0] pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG0[3] movdqa $ABCD0,$E0 pshufb $BSWAP,@MSG1[3] movdqa $ABCD1,$E1 sha1rnds4 \$0,$E0_,$ABCD0 # 4-7 sha1nexte @MSG0[2],$E0 sha1rnds4 \$0,$E1_,$ABCD1 # 4-7 sha1nexte @MSG1[2],$E1 pxor @MSG0[2],@MSG0[0] sha1msg1 @MSG0[2],@MSG0[1] pxor @MSG1[2],@MSG1[0] sha1msg1 @MSG1[2],@MSG1[1] ___ for($i=2;$i<20-4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; movdqa $ABCD0,$E0_ movdqa $ABCD1,$E1_ sha1rnds4 \$`int($i/5)`,$E0,$ABCD0 # 8-11 sha1nexte @MSG0[3],$E0_ sha1rnds4 \$`int($i/5)`,$E1,$ABCD1 # 8-11 sha1nexte @MSG1[3],$E1_ sha1msg2 @MSG0[3],@MSG0[0] sha1msg2 @MSG1[3],@MSG1[0] pxor @MSG0[3],@MSG0[1] sha1msg1 @MSG0[3],@MSG0[2] pxor @MSG1[3],@MSG1[1] sha1msg1 @MSG1[3],@MSG1[2] ___ ($E0,$E0_)=($E0_,$E0); ($E1,$E1_)=($E1_,$E1); push(@MSG0,shift(@MSG0)); push(@MSG1,shift(@MSG1)); } $code.=<<___; movdqa $ABCD0,$E0_ movdqa $ABCD1,$E1_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E0,$ABCD0 # 64-67 sha1nexte @MSG0[3],$E0_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E1,$ABCD1 # 64-67 sha1nexte @MSG1[3],$E1_ sha1msg2 @MSG0[3],@MSG0[0] sha1msg2 @MSG1[3],@MSG1[0] pxor @MSG0[3],@MSG0[1] pxor @MSG1[3],@MSG1[1] mov \$1,%ecx pxor @MSG0[2],@MSG0[2] # zero cmp 4*0(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters cmovge %rsp,@ptr[0] # cancel input movdqa $ABCD0,$E0 movdqa $ABCD1,$E1 sha1rnds4 \$3,$E0_,$ABCD0 # 68-71 sha1nexte @MSG0[0],$E0 sha1rnds4 \$3,$E1_,$ABCD1 # 68-71 sha1nexte @MSG1[0],$E1 sha1msg2 @MSG0[0],@MSG0[1] sha1msg2 @MSG1[0],@MSG1[1] cmp 4*1(%rbx),%ecx cmovge %rsp,@ptr[1] movq (%rbx),@MSG0[0] # pull counters movdqa $ABCD0,$E0_ movdqa $ABCD1,$E1_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E0,$ABCD0 # 72-75 sha1nexte @MSG0[1],$E0_ sha1rnds4 \$3,$E1,$ABCD1 # 72-75 sha1nexte @MSG1[1],$E1_ pshufd \$0x00,@MSG0[0],@MSG1[2] pshufd \$0x55,@MSG0[0],@MSG1[3] movdqa @MSG0[0],@MSG0[1] pcmpgtd @MSG0[2],@MSG1[2] pcmpgtd @MSG0[2],@MSG1[3] movdqa $ABCD0,$E0 movdqa $ABCD1,$E1 sha1rnds4 \$3,$E0_,$ABCD0 # 76-79 sha1nexte $MSG0[2],$E0 sha1rnds4 \$3,$E1_,$ABCD1 # 76-79 sha1nexte $MSG0[2],$E1 pcmpgtd @MSG0[2],@MSG0[1] # counter mask pand @MSG1[2],$ABCD0 pand @MSG1[2],$E0 pand @MSG1[3],$ABCD1 pand @MSG1[3],$E1 paddd @MSG0[1],@MSG0[0] # counters-- paddd 0x40(%rsp),$ABCD0 paddd 0x50(%rsp),$E0 paddd 0x60(%rsp),$ABCD1 paddd 0x70(%rsp),$E1 movq @MSG0[0],(%rbx) # save counters dec $num jnz .Loop_shaext mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD0,$ABCD0 pshufd \$0b00011011,$ABCD1,$ABCD1 movdqa $ABCD0,@MSG0[0] punpckldq $ABCD1,$ABCD0 # b1.b0.a1.a0 punpckhdq $ABCD1,@MSG0[0] # d1.d0.c1.c0 punpckhdq $E1,$E0 # e1.e0.xx.xx movq $ABCD0,0x00-0x40($ctx) # a1.a0 psrldq \$8,$ABCD0 movq @MSG0[0],0x40-0x40($ctx)# c1.c0 psrldq \$8,@MSG0[0] movq $ABCD0,0x20-0x40($ctx) # b1.b0 psrldq \$8,$E0 movq @MSG0[0],0x60-0x40($ctx)# d1.d0 movq $E0,0x80-0x40($ctx) # e1.e0 lea `$REG_SZ/2`($ctx),$ctx lea `16*2`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Loop_grande_shaext .Ldone_shaext: #mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x38(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x28(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue_shaext: ret .size sha1_multi_block_shaext,.-sha1_multi_block_shaext ___ }}} if ($avx) {{{ sub BODY_00_19_avx { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; my $k=$i+2; my $vpack = $REG_SZ==16 ? "vpunpckldq" : "vinserti128"; my $ptr_n = $REG_SZ==16 ? @ptr[1] : @ptr[4]; $code.=<<___ if ($i==0 && $REG_SZ==16); vmovd (@ptr[0]),@Xi[0] lea `16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] vmovd (@ptr[1]),@Xi[2] # borrow Xi[2] lea `16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] vpinsrd \$1,(@ptr[2]),@Xi[0],@Xi[0] lea `16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2] vpinsrd \$1,(@ptr[3]),@Xi[2],@Xi[2] lea `16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3] vmovd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[1] vpunpckldq @Xi[2],@Xi[0],@Xi[0] vmovd `4*$j-16*4`($ptr_n),$t3 vpshufb $tx,@Xi[0],@Xi[0] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==16); # just load input vpinsrd \$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[2]),@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t3,$t3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==0 && $REG_SZ==32); vmovd (@ptr[0]),@Xi[0] lea `16*4`(@ptr[0]),@ptr[0] vmovd (@ptr[4]),@Xi[2] # borrow Xi[2] lea `16*4`(@ptr[4]),@ptr[4] vmovd (@ptr[1]),$t2 lea `16*4`(@ptr[1]),@ptr[1] vmovd (@ptr[5]),$t1 lea `16*4`(@ptr[5]),@ptr[5] vpinsrd \$1,(@ptr[2]),@Xi[0],@Xi[0] lea `16*4`(@ptr[2]),@ptr[2] vpinsrd \$1,(@ptr[6]),@Xi[2],@Xi[2] lea `16*4`(@ptr[6]),@ptr[6] vpinsrd \$1,(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2 lea `16*4`(@ptr[3]),@ptr[3] vpunpckldq $t2,@Xi[0],@Xi[0] vpinsrd \$1,(@ptr[7]),$t1,$t1 lea `16*4`(@ptr[7]),@ptr[7] vpunpckldq $t1,@Xi[2],@Xi[2] vmovd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[1] vinserti128 @Xi[2],@Xi[0],@Xi[0] vmovd `4*$j-16*4`($ptr_n),$t3 vpshufb $tx,@Xi[0],@Xi[0] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $REG_SZ==32); # just load input vmovd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[1]),$t2 vmovd `4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[5]),$t1 vpinsrd \$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[2]),@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[6]),$t3,$t3 vpinsrd \$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[3]),$t2,$t2 vpunpckldq $t2,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpinsrd \$1,`4*$j-16*4`(@ptr[7]),$t1,$t1 vpunpckldq $t1,$t3,$t3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<14); vpaddd $K,$e,$e # e+=K_00_19 vpslld \$5,$a,$t2 vpandn $d,$b,$t1 vpand $c,$b,$t0 vmovdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` vpaddd @Xi[0],$e,$e # e+=X[i] $vpack $t3,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpsrld \$27,$a,$t3 vpxor $t1,$t0,$t0 # Ch(b,c,d) vmovd `4*$k-16*4`(@ptr[0]),@Xi[2] vpslld \$30,$b,$t1 vpor $t3,$t2,$t2 # rol(a,5) vmovd `4*$k-16*4`($ptr_n),$t3 vpaddd $t0,$e,$e # e+=Ch(b,c,d) vpsrld \$2,$b,$b vpaddd $t2,$e,$e # e+=rol(a,5) vpshufb $tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpor $t1,$b,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==14); vpaddd $K,$e,$e # e+=K_00_19 prefetcht0 63(@ptr[0]) vpslld \$5,$a,$t2 vpandn $d,$b,$t1 vpand $c,$b,$t0 vmovdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` vpaddd @Xi[0],$e,$e # e+=X[i] $vpack $t3,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpsrld \$27,$a,$t3 prefetcht0 63(@ptr[1]) vpxor $t1,$t0,$t0 # Ch(b,c,d) vpslld \$30,$b,$t1 vpor $t3,$t2,$t2 # rol(a,5) prefetcht0 63(@ptr[2]) vpaddd $t0,$e,$e # e+=Ch(b,c,d) vpsrld \$2,$b,$b vpaddd $t2,$e,$e # e+=rol(a,5) prefetcht0 63(@ptr[3]) vpshufb $tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpor $t1,$b,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=13 && $i<15); vmovdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # preload "X[2]" ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); # apply Xupdate vpxor @Xi[-2],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] # "X[13]" vmovdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # "X[2]" vpaddd $K,$e,$e # e+=K_00_19 vpslld \$5,$a,$t2 vpandn $d,$b,$t1 `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[4])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpand $c,$b,$t0 vmovdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` vpaddd @Xi[0],$e,$e # e+=X[i] vpxor `&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpsrld \$27,$a,$t3 vpxor $t1,$t0,$t0 # Ch(b,c,d) vpxor @Xi[3],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[5])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpslld \$30,$b,$t1 vpor $t3,$t2,$t2 # rol(a,5) vpaddd $t0,$e,$e # e+=Ch(b,c,d) `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[6])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpsrld \$31,@Xi[1],$tx vpaddd @Xi[1],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpsrld \$2,$b,$b `"prefetcht0 63(@ptr[7])" if ($i==15 && $REG_SZ==32)` vpaddd $t2,$e,$e # e+=rol(a,5) vpor $tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] # rol \$1,@Xi[1] vpor $t1,$b,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ push(@Xi,shift(@Xi)); } sub BODY_20_39_avx { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); vpxor @Xi[-2],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] # "X[13]" vmovdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # "X[2]" vpslld \$5,$a,$t2 vpaddd $K,$e,$e # e+=K_20_39 vpxor $b,$d,$t0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<72); vmovdqa @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); vpaddd @Xi[0],$e,$e # e+=X[i] vpxor `&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpsrld \$27,$a,$t3 vpxor $c,$t0,$t0 # Parity(b,c,d) vpxor @Xi[3],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpslld \$30,$b,$t1 vpor $t3,$t2,$t2 # rol(a,5) vpaddd $t0,$e,$e # e+=Parity(b,c,d) vpsrld \$31,@Xi[1],$tx vpaddd @Xi[1],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpsrld \$2,$b,$b vpaddd $t2,$e,$e # e+=rol(a,5) vpor $tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] # rol(@Xi[1],1) vpor $t1,$b,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); vpslld \$5,$a,$t2 vpaddd $K,$e,$e # e+=K_20_39 vpxor $b,$d,$t0 vpsrld \$27,$a,$t3 vpaddd @Xi[0],$e,$e # e+=X[i] vpxor $c,$t0,$t0 # Parity(b,c,d) vpslld \$30,$b,$t1 vpor $t3,$t2,$t2 # rol(a,5) vpaddd $t0,$e,$e # e+=Parity(b,c,d) vpsrld \$2,$b,$b vpaddd $t2,$e,$e # e+=rol(a,5) vpor $t1,$b,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ push(@Xi,shift(@Xi)); } sub BODY_40_59_avx { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___; vpxor @Xi[-2],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] # "X[13]" vmovdqa `&Xi_off($j+2)`,@Xi[3] # "X[2]" vpaddd $K,$e,$e # e+=K_40_59 vpslld \$5,$a,$t2 vpand $c,$d,$t1 vpxor `&Xi_off($j+8)`,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpaddd $t1,$e,$e vpsrld \$27,$a,$t3 vpxor $c,$d,$t0 vpxor @Xi[3],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vmovdqu @Xi[0],`&Xi_off($i)` vpaddd @Xi[0],$e,$e # e+=X[i] vpor $t3,$t2,$t2 # rol(a,5) vpsrld \$31,@Xi[1],$tx vpand $b,$t0,$t0 vpaddd @Xi[1],@Xi[1],@Xi[1] vpslld \$30,$b,$t1 vpaddd $t0,$e,$e # e+=Maj(b,d,c) vpsrld \$2,$b,$b vpaddd $t2,$e,$e # e+=rol(a,5) vpor $tx,@Xi[1],@Xi[1] # rol(@X[1],1) vpor $t1,$b,$b # b=rol(b,30) ___ push(@Xi,shift(@Xi)); } $code.=<<___; .type sha1_multi_block_avx,\@function,3 .align 32 sha1_multi_block_avx: _avx_shortcut: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); shr \$32,%rcx cmp \$2,$num jb .Lavx test \$`1<<5`,%ecx jnz _avx2_shortcut jmp .Lavx .align 32 .Lavx: ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm11,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm12,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x48(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x38(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x28(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp and \$-256,%rsp mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody_avx: lea K_XX_XX(%rip),$Tbl lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx vzeroupper .Loop_grande_avx: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; test $num,$num jz .Ldone_avx vmovdqu 0x00($ctx),$A # load context lea 128(%rsp),%rax vmovdqu 0x20($ctx),$B vmovdqu 0x40($ctx),$C vmovdqu 0x60($ctx),$D vmovdqu 0x80($ctx),$E vmovdqu 0x60($Tbl),$tx # pbswap_mask jmp .Loop_avx .align 32 .Loop_avx: ___ $code.=" vmovdqa -0x20($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_00_19 for($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" vmovdqa 0x00($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_20_39 for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" vmovdqa 0x20($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_40_59 for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" vmovdqa 0x40($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_60_79 for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; mov \$1,%ecx ___ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; cmp `4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu (%rbx),$t0 # pull counters vpxor $t2,$t2,$t2 vmovdqa $t0,$t1 vpcmpgtd $t2,$t1,$t1 # mask value vpaddd $t1,$t0,$t0 # counters-- vpand $t1,$A,$A vpand $t1,$B,$B vpaddd 0x00($ctx),$A,$A vpand $t1,$C,$C vpaddd 0x20($ctx),$B,$B vpand $t1,$D,$D vpaddd 0x40($ctx),$C,$C vpand $t1,$E,$E vpaddd 0x60($ctx),$D,$D vpaddd 0x80($ctx),$E,$E vmovdqu $A,0x00($ctx) vmovdqu $B,0x20($ctx) vmovdqu $C,0x40($ctx) vmovdqu $D,0x60($ctx) vmovdqu $E,0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $t0,(%rbx) # save counters vmovdqu 0x60($Tbl),$tx # pbswap_mask dec $num jnz .Loop_avx mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num lea $REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx lea `16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp dec $num jnz .Loop_grande_avx .Ldone_avx: mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x38(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x28(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx: ret .size sha1_multi_block_avx,.-sha1_multi_block_avx ___ if ($avx>1) { $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $REG_SZ=32; @ptr=map("%r$_",(12..15,8..11)); @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=map("%ymm$_",(0..4)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$tx)=map("%ymm$_",(5..9)); @Xi=map("%ymm$_",(10..14)); $K="%ymm15"; $code.=<<___; .type sha1_multi_block_avx2,\@function,3 .align 32 sha1_multi_block_avx2: _avx2_shortcut: mov %rsp,%rax push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0xa8(%rsp),%rsp movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp) movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp) movaps %xmm12,-0x78(%rax) movaps %xmm13,-0x68(%rax) movaps %xmm14,-0x58(%rax) movaps %xmm15,-0x48(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; sub \$`$REG_SZ*18`, %rsp and \$-256,%rsp mov %rax,`$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp) # original %rsp .Lbody_avx2: lea K_XX_XX(%rip),$Tbl shr \$1,$num vzeroupper .Loop_grande_avx2: mov $num,`$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp) # original $num xor $num,$num lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; mov `16*$i+0`($inp),@ptr[$i] # input pointer mov `16*$i+8`($inp),%ecx # number of blocks cmp $num,%ecx cmovg %ecx,$num # find maximum test %ecx,%ecx mov %ecx,`4*$i`(%rbx) # initialize counters cmovle $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu 0x00($ctx),$A # load context lea 128(%rsp),%rax vmovdqu 0x20($ctx),$B lea 256+128(%rsp),%rbx vmovdqu 0x40($ctx),$C vmovdqu 0x60($ctx),$D vmovdqu 0x80($ctx),$E vmovdqu 0x60($Tbl),$tx # pbswap_mask jmp .Loop_avx2 .align 32 .Loop_avx2: ___ $code.=" vmovdqa -0x20($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_00_19 for($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" vmovdqa 0x00($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_20_39 for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" vmovdqa 0x20($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_40_59 for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=" vmovdqa 0x40($Tbl),$K\n"; # K_60_79 for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39_avx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; mov \$1,%ecx lea `$REG_SZ*16`(%rsp),%rbx ___ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; cmp `4*$i`(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[$i] # cancel input ___ } $code.=<<___; vmovdqu (%rbx),$t0 # pull counters vpxor $t2,$t2,$t2 vmovdqa $t0,$t1 vpcmpgtd $t2,$t1,$t1 # mask value vpaddd $t1,$t0,$t0 # counters-- vpand $t1,$A,$A vpand $t1,$B,$B vpaddd 0x00($ctx),$A,$A vpand $t1,$C,$C vpaddd 0x20($ctx),$B,$B vpand $t1,$D,$D vpaddd 0x40($ctx),$C,$C vpand $t1,$E,$E vpaddd 0x60($ctx),$D,$D vpaddd 0x80($ctx),$E,$E vmovdqu $A,0x00($ctx) vmovdqu $B,0x20($ctx) vmovdqu $C,0x40($ctx) vmovdqu $D,0x60($ctx) vmovdqu $E,0x80($ctx) vmovdqu $t0,(%rbx) # save counters lea 256+128(%rsp),%rbx vmovdqu 0x60($Tbl),$tx # pbswap_mask dec $num jnz .Loop_avx2 #mov `$REG_SZ*17+8`(%rsp),$num #lea $REG_SZ($ctx),$ctx #lea `16*$REG_SZ/4`($inp),$inp #dec $num #jnz .Loop_grande_avx2 .Ldone_avx2: mov `$REG_SZ*17`(%rsp),%rax # original %rsp vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6 movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7 movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8 movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9 movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10 movaps -0x88(%rax),%xmm11 movaps -0x78(%rax),%xmm12 movaps -0x68(%rax),%xmm13 movaps -0x58(%rax),%xmm14 movaps -0x48(%rax),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -8(%rax),%rbx lea (%rax),%rsp .Lepilogue_avx2: ret .size sha1_multi_block_avx2,.-sha1_multi_block_avx2 ___ } }}} $code.=<<___; .align 256 .long 0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999 # K_00_19 .long 0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999 # K_00_19 K_XX_XX: .long 0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1 # K_20_39 .long 0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1 # K_20_39 .long 0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc # K_40_59 .long 0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc # K_40_59 .long 0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6 # K_60_79 .long 0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6 # K_60_79 .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f # pbswap .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f # pbswap .byte 0xf,0xe,0xd,0xc,0xb,0xa,0x9,0x8,0x7,0x6,0x5,0x4,0x3,0x2,0x1,0x0 .asciz "SHA1 multi-block transform for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ if ($win64) { # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) $rec="%rcx"; $frame="%rdx"; $context="%r8"; $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lbody jb .Lin_prologue mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lin_prologue mov `16*17`(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp lea -24-10*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .type avx2_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 avx2_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip mov 8($disp),%rsi # disp->ImageBase mov 56($disp),%r11 # disp->HandlerData mov 0(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[0] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of prologue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->RipRsp mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1] lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # epilogue label cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label jae .Lin_prologue mov `32*17`($context),%rax # pull saved stack pointer mov -8(%rax),%rbx mov -16(%rax),%rbp mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r13 mov -40(%rax),%r14 mov -48(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12 mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13 mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore cotnext->R15 lea -56-10*16(%rax),%rsi lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6 mov \$20,%ecx .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq jmp .Lin_prologue .size avx2_handler,.-avx2_handler ___ $code.=<<___; .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block_shaext .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block_shaext .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_shaext ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block_avx .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block_avx .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .rva .LSEH_begin_sha1_multi_block_avx2 .rva .LSEH_end_sha1_multi_block_avx2 .rva .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx2 ___ $code.=<<___; .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbody,.Lepilogue # HandlerData[] .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_shaext: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbody_shaext,.Lepilogue_shaext # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler .rva .Lbody_avx,.Lepilogue_avx # HandlerData[] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); .LSEH_info_sha1_multi_block_avx2: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva avx2_handler .rva .Lbody_avx2,.Lepilogue_avx2 # HandlerData[] ___ } #################################################################### sub rex { local *opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src)=@_; my $rex=0; $rex|=0x04 if ($dst>=8); $rex|=0x01 if ($src>=8); unshift @opcode,$rex|0x40 if ($rex); } sub sha1rnds4 { if (@_[0] =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x3a,0xcc); rex(\@opcode,$3,$2); push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$1; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return "sha1rnds4\t".@_[0]; } } sub sha1op38 { my $instr = shift; my %opcodelet = ( "sha1nexte" => 0xc8, "sha1msg1" => 0xc9, "sha1msg2" => 0xca ); if (defined($opcodelet{$instr}) && @_[0] =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x0f,0x38); rex(\@opcode,$2,$1); push @opcode,$opcodelet{$instr}; push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3); # ModR/M return ".byte\t".join(',',@opcode); } else { return $instr."\t".@_[0]; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/ge; s/\b(sha1rnds4)\s+(.*)/sha1rnds4($2)/geo or s/\b(sha1[^\s]*)\s+(.*)/sha1op38($1,$2)/geo or s/\b(vmov[dq])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vmovdqu)\b(.+)%x%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vpinsr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+),%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3,%xmm$4/go or s/\b(vpextr[qd])\b(.+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1$2%xmm$3/go or s/\b(vinserti128)\b(\s+)%ymm/$1$2\$1,%xmm/go or s/\b(vpbroadcast[qd]\s+)%ymm([0-9]+)/$1%xmm$2/go; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ia64.pl0000755000000000000000000005165013176625660017043 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA256/512_Transform for Itanium. # # sha512_block runs in 1003 cycles on Itanium 2, which is almost 50% # faster than gcc and >60%(!) faster than code generated by HP-UX # compiler (yes, HP-UX is generating slower code, because unlike gcc, # it failed to deploy "shift right pair," 'shrp' instruction, which # substitutes for 64-bit rotate). # # 924 cycles long sha256_block outperforms gcc by over factor of 2(!) # and HP-UX compiler - by >40% (yes, gcc won sha512_block, but lost # this one big time). Note that "formally" 924 is about 100 cycles # too much. I mean it's 64 32-bit rounds vs. 80 virtually identical # 64-bit ones and 1003*64/80 gives 802. Extra cycles, 2 per round, # are spent on extra work to provide for 32-bit rotations. 32-bit # rotations are still handled by 'shrp' instruction and for this # reason lower 32 bits are deposited to upper half of 64-bit register # prior 'shrp' issue. And in order to minimize the amount of such # operations, X[16] values are *maintained* with copies of lower # halves in upper halves, which is why you'll spot such instructions # as custom 'mux2', "parallel 32-bit add," 'padd4' and "parallel # 32-bit unsigned right shift," 'pshr4.u' instructions here. # # Rules of engagement. # # There is only one integer shifter meaning that if I have two rotate, # deposit or extract instructions in adjacent bundles, they shall # split [at run-time if they have to]. But note that variable and # parallel shifts are performed by multi-media ALU and *are* pairable # with rotates [and alike]. On the backside MMALU is rather slow: it # takes 2 extra cycles before the result of integer operation is # available *to* MMALU and 2(*) extra cycles before the result of MM # operation is available "back" *to* integer ALU, not to mention that # MMALU itself has 2 cycles latency. However! I explicitly scheduled # these MM instructions to avoid MM stalls, so that all these extra # latencies get "hidden" in instruction-level parallelism. # # (*) 2 cycles on Itanium 1 and 1 cycle on Itanium 2. But I schedule # for 2 in order to provide for best *overall* performance, # because on Itanium 1 stall on MM result is accompanied by # pipeline flush, which takes 6 cycles:-( # # June 2012 # # Improve performance by 15-20%. Note about "rules of engagement" # above. Contemporary cores are equipped with additional shifter, # so that they should perform even better than below, presumably # by ~10%. # ###################################################################### # Current performance in cycles per processed byte for Itanium 2 # pre-9000 series [little-endian] system: # # SHA1(*) 5.7 # SHA256 12.6 # SHA512 6.7 # # (*) SHA1 result is presented purely for reference purposes. # # To generate code, pass the file name with either 256 or 512 in its # name and compiler flags. $output=pop; if ($output =~ /512.*\.[s|asm]/) { $SZ=8; $BITS=8*$SZ; $LDW="ld8"; $STW="st8"; $ADD="add"; $SHRU="shr.u"; $TABLE="K512"; $func="sha512_block_data_order"; @Sigma0=(28,34,39); @Sigma1=(14,18,41); @sigma0=(1, 8, 7); @sigma1=(19,61, 6); $rounds=80; } elsif ($output =~ /256.*\.[s|asm]/) { $SZ=4; $BITS=8*$SZ; $LDW="ld4"; $STW="st4"; $ADD="padd4"; $SHRU="pshr4.u"; $TABLE="K256"; $func="sha256_block_data_order"; @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 7,18, 3); @sigma1=(17,19,10); $rounds=64; } else { die "nonsense $output"; } open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!"; if ($^O eq "hpux") { $ADDP="addp4"; for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); } } else { $ADDP="add"; } for (@ARGV) { $big_endian=1 if (/\-DB_ENDIAN/); $big_endian=0 if (/\-DL_ENDIAN/); } if (!defined($big_endian)) { $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1); } $code=<<___; .ident \"$output, version 2.0\" .ident \"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov \" .explicit .text pfssave=r2; lcsave=r3; prsave=r14; K=r15; A_=r16; B_=r17; C_=r18; D_=r19; E_=r20; F_=r21; G_=r22; H_=r23; T1=r24; T2=r25; s0=r26; s1=r27; t0=r28; t1=r29; Ktbl=r30; ctx=r31; // 1st arg input=r56; // 2nd arg num=r57; // 3rd arg sgm0=r58; sgm1=r59; // small constants // void $func (SHA_CTX *ctx, const void *in,size_t num[,int host]) .global $func# .proc $func# .align 32 .skip 16 $func: .prologue .save ar.pfs,pfssave { .mmi; alloc pfssave=ar.pfs,3,25,0,24 $ADDP ctx=0,r32 // 1st arg .save ar.lc,lcsave mov lcsave=ar.lc } { .mmi; $ADDP input=0,r33 // 2nd arg mov num=r34 // 3rd arg .save pr,prsave mov prsave=pr };; .body { .mib; add r8=0*$SZ,ctx add r9=1*$SZ,ctx } { .mib; add r10=2*$SZ,ctx add r11=3*$SZ,ctx };; // load A-H .Lpic_point: { .mmi; $LDW A_=[r8],4*$SZ $LDW B_=[r9],4*$SZ mov Ktbl=ip } { .mmi; $LDW C_=[r10],4*$SZ $LDW D_=[r11],4*$SZ mov sgm0=$sigma0[2] };; { .mmi; $LDW E_=[r8] $LDW F_=[r9] add Ktbl=($TABLE#-.Lpic_point),Ktbl } { .mmi; $LDW G_=[r10] $LDW H_=[r11] cmp.ne p0,p16=0,r0 };; ___ $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==64); { .mii; and r8=7,input and input=~7,input;; cmp.eq p9,p0=1,r8 } { .mmi; cmp.eq p10,p0=2,r8 cmp.eq p11,p0=3,r8 cmp.eq p12,p0=4,r8 } { .mmi; cmp.eq p13,p0=5,r8 cmp.eq p14,p0=6,r8 cmp.eq p15,p0=7,r8 };; ___ $code.=<<___; .L_outer: .rotr R[8],X[16] A=R[0]; B=R[1]; C=R[2]; D=R[3]; E=R[4]; F=R[5]; G=R[6]; H=R[7] { .mmi; ld1 X[15]=[input],$SZ // eliminated in sha512 mov A=A_ mov ar.lc=14 } { .mmi; mov B=B_ mov C=C_ mov D=D_ } { .mmi; mov E=E_ mov F=F_ mov ar.ec=2 };; { .mmi; mov G=G_ mov H=H_ mov sgm1=$sigma1[2] } { .mib; mov r8=0 add r9=1-$SZ,input brp.loop.imp .L_first16,.L_first16_end-16 };; ___ $t0="A", $t1="E", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==64); // in sha512 case I load whole X[16] at once and take care of alignment... { .mmi; add r8=1*$SZ,input add r9=2*$SZ,input add r10=3*$SZ,input };; { .mmb; $LDW X[15]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[14]=[r8],4*$SZ (p9) br.cond.dpnt.many .L1byte };; { .mmb; $LDW X[13]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[12]=[r10],4*$SZ (p10) br.cond.dpnt.many .L2byte };; { .mmb; $LDW X[11]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[10]=[r8],4*$SZ (p11) br.cond.dpnt.many .L3byte };; { .mmb; $LDW X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ (p12) br.cond.dpnt.many .L4byte };; { .mmb; $LDW X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ (p13) br.cond.dpnt.many .L5byte };; { .mmb; $LDW X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ (p14) br.cond.dpnt.many .L6byte };; { .mmb; $LDW X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ (p15) br.cond.dpnt.many .L7byte };; { .mmb; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev // eliminated on big-endian br.many .L_first16 };; .L1byte: { .mmi; $LDW X[13]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[12]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[15]=X[15],X[14],56 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[11]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[10]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[14]=X[14],X[13],56 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[13]=X[13],X[12],56 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[12]=X[12],X[11],56 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[11]=X[11],X[10],56 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],56 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],56 };; { .mii; $LDW T1=[input] shrp X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],56 shrp X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],56 } { .mii; shrp X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],56 shrp X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],56 };; { .mii; shrp X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],56 shrp X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],56 } { .mii; shrp X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],56 shrp X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],56 } { .mib; shrp X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,56 } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev // eliminated on big-endian br.many .L_first16 };; .L2byte: { .mmi; $LDW X[11]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[10]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[15]=X[15],X[14],48 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[14]=X[14],X[13],48 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[13]=X[13],X[12],48 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[12]=X[12],X[11],48 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[11]=X[11],X[10],48 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],48 };; { .mii; $LDW T1=[input] shrp X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],48 shrp X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],48 } { .mii; shrp X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],48 shrp X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],48 };; { .mii; shrp X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],48 shrp X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],48 } { .mii; shrp X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],48 shrp X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],48 } { .mii; shrp X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],48 shrp X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,48 } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev // eliminated on big-endian br.many .L_first16 };; .L3byte: { .mmi; $LDW X[ 9]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 8]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[15]=X[15],X[14],40 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[14]=X[14],X[13],40 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[13]=X[13],X[12],40 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[12]=X[12],X[11],40 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[11]=X[11],X[10],40 };; { .mii; $LDW T1=[input] shrp X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],40 shrp X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],40 } { .mii; shrp X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],40 shrp X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],40 };; { .mii; shrp X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],40 shrp X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],40 } { .mii; shrp X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],40 shrp X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],40 } { .mii; shrp X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],40 shrp X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],40 } { .mib; shrp X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,40 } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev // eliminated on big-endian br.many .L_first16 };; .L4byte: { .mmi; $LDW X[ 7]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 6]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[15]=X[15],X[14],32 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[14]=X[14],X[13],32 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[13]=X[13],X[12],32 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[12]=X[12],X[11],32 };; { .mii; $LDW T1=[input] shrp X[11]=X[11],X[10],32 shrp X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],32 } { .mii; shrp X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],32 shrp X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],32 };; { .mii; shrp X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],32 shrp X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],32 } { .mii; shrp X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],32 shrp X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],32 } { .mii; shrp X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],32 shrp X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],32 } { .mii; shrp X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],32 shrp X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,32 } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev // eliminated on big-endian br.many .L_first16 };; .L5byte: { .mmi; $LDW X[ 5]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 4]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[15]=X[15],X[14],24 };; { .mmi; $LDW X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[14]=X[14],X[13],24 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[13]=X[13],X[12],24 };; { .mii; $LDW T1=[input] shrp X[12]=X[12],X[11],24 shrp X[11]=X[11],X[10],24 } { .mii; shrp X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],24 shrp X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],24 };; { .mii; shrp X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],24 shrp X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],24 } { .mii; shrp X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],24 shrp X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],24 } { .mii; shrp X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],24 shrp X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],24 } { .mii; shrp X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],24 shrp X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],24 } { .mib; shrp X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,24 } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev // eliminated on big-endian br.many .L_first16 };; .L6byte: { .mmi; $LDW X[ 3]=[input],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 2]=[r8],4*$SZ shrp X[15]=X[15],X[14],16 } { .mmi; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[14]=X[14],X[13],16 };; { .mii; $LDW T1=[input] shrp X[13]=X[13],X[12],16 shrp X[12]=X[12],X[11],16 } { .mii; shrp X[11]=X[11],X[10],16 shrp X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],16 };; { .mii; shrp X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],16 shrp X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],16 } { .mii; shrp X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],16 shrp X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],16 } { .mii; shrp X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],16 shrp X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],16 } { .mii; shrp X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],16 shrp X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],16 } { .mii; shrp X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],16 shrp X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,16 } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev // eliminated on big-endian br.many .L_first16 };; .L7byte: { .mmi; $LDW X[ 1]=[r9],4*$SZ $LDW X[ 0]=[r10],4*$SZ shrp X[15]=X[15],X[14],8 };; { .mii; $LDW T1=[input] shrp X[14]=X[14],X[13],8 shrp X[13]=X[13],X[12],8 } { .mii; shrp X[12]=X[12],X[11],8 shrp X[11]=X[11],X[10],8 };; { .mii; shrp X[10]=X[10],X[ 9],8 shrp X[ 9]=X[ 9],X[ 8],8 } { .mii; shrp X[ 8]=X[ 8],X[ 7],8 shrp X[ 7]=X[ 7],X[ 6],8 } { .mii; shrp X[ 6]=X[ 6],X[ 5],8 shrp X[ 5]=X[ 5],X[ 4],8 } { .mii; shrp X[ 4]=X[ 4],X[ 3],8 shrp X[ 3]=X[ 3],X[ 2],8 } { .mii; shrp X[ 2]=X[ 2],X[ 1],8 shrp X[ 1]=X[ 1],X[ 0],8 } { .mib; shrp X[ 0]=X[ 0],T1,8 } { .mib; mov r8=0 mux1 X[15]=X[15],\@rev };; // eliminated on big-endian .align 32 .L_first16: { .mmi; $LDW K=[Ktbl],$SZ add A=A,r8 // H+=Sigma(0) from the past _rotr r10=$t1,$Sigma1[0] } // ROTR(e,14) { .mmi; and T1=F,E andcm r8=G,E (p16) mux1 X[14]=X[14],\@rev };; // eliminated on big-endian { .mmi; and T2=A,B and r9=A,C _rotr r11=$t1,$Sigma1[1] } // ROTR(e,41) { .mmi; xor T1=T1,r8 // T1=((e & f) ^ (~e & g)) and r8=B,C };; ___ $t0="t0", $t1="t1", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==32); .align 32 .L_first16: { .mmi; add A=A,r8 // H+=Sigma(0) from the past add r10=2-$SZ,input add r11=3-$SZ,input };; { .mmi; ld1 r9=[r9] ld1 r10=[r10] dep.z $t1=E,32,32 } { .mmi; ld1 r11=[r11] $LDW K=[Ktbl],$SZ zxt4 E=E };; { .mii; or $t1=$t1,E dep X[15]=X[15],r9,8,8 mux2 $t0=A,0x44 };; // copy lower half to upper { .mmi; and T1=F,E andcm r8=G,E dep r11=r10,r11,8,8 };; { .mmi; and T2=A,B and r9=A,C dep X[15]=X[15],r11,16,16 };; { .mmi; (p16) ld1 X[15-1]=[input],$SZ // prefetch xor T1=T1,r8 // T1=((e & f) ^ (~e & g)) _rotr r10=$t1,$Sigma1[0] } // ROTR(e,14) { .mmi; and r8=B,C _rotr r11=$t1,$Sigma1[1] };; // ROTR(e,18) ___ $code.=<<___; { .mmi; add T1=T1,H // T1=Ch(e,f,g)+h xor r10=r10,r11 _rotr r11=$t1,$Sigma1[2] } // ROTR(e,41) { .mmi; xor T2=T2,r9 add K=K,X[15] };; { .mmi; add T1=T1,K // T1+=K[i]+X[i] xor T2=T2,r8 // T2=((a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c)) _rotr r8=$t0,$Sigma0[0] } // ROTR(a,28) { .mmi; xor r11=r11,r10 // Sigma1(e) _rotr r9=$t0,$Sigma0[1] };; // ROTR(a,34) { .mmi; add T1=T1,r11 // T+=Sigma1(e) xor r8=r8,r9 _rotr r9=$t0,$Sigma0[2] };; // ROTR(a,39) { .mmi; xor r8=r8,r9 // Sigma0(a) add D=D,T1 mux2 H=X[15],0x44 } // mov H=X[15] in sha512 { .mib; (p16) add r9=1-$SZ,input // not used in sha512 add X[15]=T1,T2 // H=T1+Maj(a,b,c) br.ctop.sptk .L_first16 };; .L_first16_end: { .mib; mov ar.lc=$rounds-17 brp.loop.imp .L_rest,.L_rest_end-16 } { .mib; mov ar.ec=1 br.many .L_rest };; .align 32 .L_rest: { .mmi; $LDW K=[Ktbl],$SZ add A=A,r8 // H+=Sigma0(a) from the past _rotr r8=X[15-1],$sigma0[0] } // ROTR(s0,1) { .mmi; add X[15]=X[15],X[15-9] // X[i&0xF]+=X[(i+9)&0xF] $SHRU s0=X[15-1],sgm0 };; // s0=X[(i+1)&0xF]>>7 { .mib; and T1=F,E _rotr r9=X[15-1],$sigma0[1] } // ROTR(s0,8) { .mib; andcm r10=G,E $SHRU s1=X[15-14],sgm1 };; // s1=X[(i+14)&0xF]>>6 // Pair of mmi; splits on Itanium 1 and prevents pipeline flush // upon $SHRU output usage { .mmi; xor T1=T1,r10 // T1=((e & f) ^ (~e & g)) xor r9=r8,r9 _rotr r10=X[15-14],$sigma1[0] }// ROTR(s1,19) { .mmi; and T2=A,B and r8=A,C _rotr r11=X[15-14],$sigma1[1] };;// ROTR(s1,61) ___ $t0="t0", $t1="t1", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==32); { .mib; xor s0=s0,r9 // s0=sigma0(X[(i+1)&0xF]) dep.z $t1=E,32,32 } { .mib; xor r10=r11,r10 zxt4 E=E };; { .mii; xor s1=s1,r10 // s1=sigma1(X[(i+14)&0xF]) shrp r9=E,$t1,32+$Sigma1[0] // ROTR(e,14) mux2 $t0=A,0x44 };; // copy lower half to upper // Pair of mmi; splits on Itanium 1 and prevents pipeline flush // upon mux2 output usage { .mmi; xor T2=T2,r8 shrp r8=E,$t1,32+$Sigma1[1]} // ROTR(e,18) { .mmi; and r10=B,C add T1=T1,H // T1=Ch(e,f,g)+h or $t1=$t1,E };; ___ $t0="A", $t1="E", $code.=<<___ if ($BITS==64); { .mib; xor s0=s0,r9 // s0=sigma0(X[(i+1)&0xF]) _rotr r9=$t1,$Sigma1[0] } // ROTR(e,14) { .mib; xor r10=r11,r10 xor T2=T2,r8 };; { .mib; xor s1=s1,r10 // s1=sigma1(X[(i+14)&0xF]) _rotr r8=$t1,$Sigma1[1] } // ROTR(e,18) { .mib; and r10=B,C add T1=T1,H };; // T1+=H ___ $code.=<<___; { .mib; xor r9=r9,r8 _rotr r8=$t1,$Sigma1[2] } // ROTR(e,41) { .mib; xor T2=T2,r10 // T2=((a & b) ^ (a & c) ^ (b & c)) add X[15]=X[15],s0 };; // X[i]+=sigma0(X[i+1]) { .mmi; xor r9=r9,r8 // Sigma1(e) add X[15]=X[15],s1 // X[i]+=sigma0(X[i+14]) _rotr r8=$t0,$Sigma0[0] };; // ROTR(a,28) { .mmi; add K=K,X[15] add T1=T1,r9 // T1+=Sigma1(e) _rotr r9=$t0,$Sigma0[1] };; // ROTR(a,34) { .mmi; add T1=T1,K // T1+=K[i]+X[i] xor r8=r8,r9 _rotr r9=$t0,$Sigma0[2] };; // ROTR(a,39) { .mib; add D=D,T1 mux2 H=X[15],0x44 } // mov H=X[15] in sha512 { .mib; xor r8=r8,r9 // Sigma0(a) add X[15]=T1,T2 // H=T1+Maj(a,b,c) br.ctop.sptk .L_rest };; .L_rest_end: { .mmi; add A=A,r8 };; // H+=Sigma0(a) from the past { .mmi; add A_=A_,A add B_=B_,B add C_=C_,C } { .mmi; add D_=D_,D add E_=E_,E cmp.ltu p16,p0=1,num };; { .mmi; add F_=F_,F add G_=G_,G add H_=H_,H } { .mmb; add Ktbl=-$SZ*$rounds,Ktbl (p16) add num=-1,num (p16) br.dptk.many .L_outer };; { .mib; add r8=0*$SZ,ctx add r9=1*$SZ,ctx } { .mib; add r10=2*$SZ,ctx add r11=3*$SZ,ctx };; { .mmi; $STW [r8]=A_,4*$SZ $STW [r9]=B_,4*$SZ mov ar.lc=lcsave } { .mmi; $STW [r10]=C_,4*$SZ $STW [r11]=D_,4*$SZ mov pr=prsave,0x1ffff };; { .mmb; $STW [r8]=E_ $STW [r9]=F_ } { .mmb; $STW [r10]=G_ $STW [r11]=H_ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp $func# ___ foreach(split($/,$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; s/_rotr(\s+)([^=]+)=([^,]+),([0-9]+)/shrp$1$2=$3,$3,$4/gm; if ($BITS==64) { s/mux2(\s+)([^=]+)=([^,]+),\S+/mov$1 $2=$3/gm; s/mux1(\s+)\S+/nop.i$1 0x0/gm if ($big_endian); s/(shrp\s+X\[[^=]+)=([^,]+),([^,]+),([1-9]+)/$1=$3,$2,64-$4/gm if (!$big_endian); s/ld1(\s+)X\[\S+/nop.m$1 0x0/gm; } print $_,"\n"; } print<<___ if ($BITS==32); .align 64 .type K256#,\@object K256: data4 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 data4 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 data4 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 data4 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 data4 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc data4 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da data4 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 data4 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 data4 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 data4 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 data4 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 data4 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 data4 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 data4 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 data4 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 data4 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .size K256#,$SZ*$rounds stringz "SHA256 block transform for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ print<<___ if ($BITS==64); .align 64 .type K512#,\@object K512: data8 0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd data8 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc data8 0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019 data8 0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 data8 0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe data8 0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2 data8 0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1 data8 0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694 data8 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3 data8 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65 data8 0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483 data8 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5 data8 0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210 data8 0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4 data8 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725 data8 0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70 data8 0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926 data8 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df data8 0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8 data8 0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b data8 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001 data8 0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30 data8 0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910 data8 0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8 data8 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53 data8 0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8 data8 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb data8 0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3 data8 0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60 data8 0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec data8 0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9 data8 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b data8 0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207 data8 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178 data8 0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6 data8 0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b data8 0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493 data8 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c data8 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a data8 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817 .size K512#,$SZ*$rounds stringz "SHA512 block transform for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl0000644000000000000000000006400713176625660016617 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA512 block transform for x86. September 2007. # # May 2013. # # Add SSSE3 code path, 20-25% improvement [over original SSE2 code]. # # Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better): # # gcc icc x86 asm SIMD(*) x86_64(**) # Pentium 100 97 61 - - # PIII 75 77 56 - - # P4 116 95 82 34.6 30.8 # AMD K8 54 55 36 20.7 9.57 # Core2 66 57 40 15.9 9.97 # Westmere 70 - 38 12.2 9.58 # Sandy Bridge 58 - 35 11.9 11.2 # Ivy Bridge 50 - 33 11.5 8.17 # Haswell 46 - 29 11.3 7.66 # Bulldozer 121 - 50 14.0 13.5 # VIA Nano 91 - 52 33 14.7 # Atom 126 - 68 48(***) 14.7 # Silvermont 97 - 58 42(***) 17.5 # Goldmont 80 - 48 19.5 12.0 # # (*) whichever best applicable. # (**) x86_64 assembler performance is presented for reference # purposes, the results are for integer-only code. # (***) paddq is increadibly slow on Atom. # # IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium # performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%, # while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15% # to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2 # code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated # code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even # though it does not use 128-bit operations. The latter means that # SSE2-aware kernel is no longer required to execute the code. Another # difference is that new code optimizes amount of writes, but at the # cost of increased data cache "footprint" by 1/2KB. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $sse2=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2); $Tlo=&DWP(0,"esp"); $Thi=&DWP(4,"esp"); $Alo=&DWP(8,"esp"); $Ahi=&DWP(8+4,"esp"); $Blo=&DWP(16,"esp"); $Bhi=&DWP(16+4,"esp"); $Clo=&DWP(24,"esp"); $Chi=&DWP(24+4,"esp"); $Dlo=&DWP(32,"esp"); $Dhi=&DWP(32+4,"esp"); $Elo=&DWP(40,"esp"); $Ehi=&DWP(40+4,"esp"); $Flo=&DWP(48,"esp"); $Fhi=&DWP(48+4,"esp"); $Glo=&DWP(56,"esp"); $Ghi=&DWP(56+4,"esp"); $Hlo=&DWP(64,"esp"); $Hhi=&DWP(64+4,"esp"); $K512="ebp"; $Asse2=&QWP(0,"esp"); $Bsse2=&QWP(8,"esp"); $Csse2=&QWP(16,"esp"); $Dsse2=&QWP(24,"esp"); $Esse2=&QWP(32,"esp"); $Fsse2=&QWP(40,"esp"); $Gsse2=&QWP(48,"esp"); $Hsse2=&QWP(56,"esp"); $A="mm0"; # B-D and $E="mm4"; # F-H are commonly loaded to respectively mm1-mm3 and # mm5-mm7, but it's done on on-demand basis... $BxC="mm2"; # ... except for B^C sub BODY_00_15_sse2 { my $phase=shift; #&movq ("mm5",$Fsse2); # load f #&movq ("mm6",$Gsse2); # load g &movq ("mm1",$E); # %mm1 is sliding right &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # f^=g &psrlq ("mm1",14); &movq ($Esse2,$E); # modulo-scheduled save e &pand ("mm5",$E); # f&=e &psllq ($E,23); # $E is sliding left &movq ($A,"mm3") if ($phase<2); &movq (&QWP(8*9,"esp"),"mm7") # save X[i] &movq ("mm3","mm1"); # %mm3 is T1 &psrlq ("mm1",4); &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # Ch(e,f,g) &pxor ("mm3",$E); &psllq ($E,23); &pxor ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ($Asse2,$A); # modulo-scheduled save a &paddq ("mm7","mm5"); # X[i]+=Ch(e,f,g) &pxor ("mm3",$E); &psrlq ("mm1",23); &paddq ("mm7",$Hsse2); # X[i]+=h &pxor ("mm3","mm1"); &psllq ($E,4); &paddq ("mm7",QWP(0,$K512)); # X[i]+=K512[i] &pxor ("mm3",$E); # T1=Sigma1_512(e) &movq ($E,$Dsse2); # e = load d, e in next round &paddq ("mm3","mm7"); # T1+=X[i] &movq ("mm5",$A); # %mm5 is sliding right &psrlq ("mm5",28); &paddq ($E,"mm3"); # d += T1 &movq ("mm6",$A); # %mm6 is sliding left &movq ("mm7","mm5"); &psllq ("mm6",25); &movq ("mm1",$Bsse2); # load b &psrlq ("mm5",6); &pxor ("mm7","mm6"); &sub ("esp",8); &psllq ("mm6",5); &pxor ("mm7","mm5"); &pxor ($A,"mm1"); # a^b, b^c in next round &psrlq ("mm5",5); &pxor ("mm7","mm6"); &pand ($BxC,$A); # (b^c)&(a^b) &psllq ("mm6",6); &pxor ("mm7","mm5"); &pxor ($BxC,"mm1"); # [h=]Maj(a,b,c) &pxor ("mm6","mm7"); # Sigma0_512(a) &movq ("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp")) if ($phase!=0); # pre-fetch &movq ("mm5",$Fsse2) if ($phase==0); # load f if ($phase>1) { &paddq ($BxC,"mm6"); # h+=Sigma0(a) &add ($K512,8); #&paddq ($BxC,"mm3"); # h+=T1 ($A,$BxC) = ($BxC,$A); # rotate registers } else { &paddq ("mm3",$BxC); # T1+=Maj(a,b,c) &movq ($BxC,$A); &add ($K512,8); &paddq ("mm3","mm6"); # T1+=Sigma0(a) &movq ("mm6",$Gsse2) if ($phase==0); # load g #&movq ($A,"mm3"); # h=T1 } } sub BODY_00_15_x86 { #define Sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18) ^ ROTR((x),41)) # LO lo>>14^hi<<18 ^ lo>>18^hi<<14 ^ hi>>9^lo<<23 # HI hi>>14^lo<<18 ^ hi>>18^lo<<14 ^ lo>>9^hi<<23 &mov ("ecx",$Elo); &mov ("edx",$Ehi); &mov ("esi","ecx"); &shr ("ecx",9); # lo>>9 &mov ("edi","edx"); &shr ("edx",9); # hi>>9 &mov ("ebx","ecx"); &shl ("esi",14); # lo<<14 &mov ("eax","edx"); &shl ("edi",14); # hi<<14 &xor ("ebx","esi"); &shr ("ecx",14-9); # lo>>14 &xor ("eax","edi"); &shr ("edx",14-9); # hi>>14 &xor ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("esi",18-14); # lo<<18 &xor ("ebx","edx"); &shl ("edi",18-14); # hi<<18 &xor ("ebx","esi"); &shr ("ecx",18-14); # lo>>18 &xor ("eax","edi"); &shr ("edx",18-14); # hi>>18 &xor ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("esi",23-18); # lo<<23 &xor ("ebx","edx"); &shl ("edi",23-18); # hi<<23 &xor ("eax","esi"); &xor ("ebx","edi"); # T1 = Sigma1(e) &mov ("ecx",$Flo); &mov ("edx",$Fhi); &mov ("esi",$Glo); &mov ("edi",$Ghi); &add ("eax",$Hlo); &adc ("ebx",$Hhi); # T1 += h &xor ("ecx","esi"); &xor ("edx","edi"); &and ("ecx",$Elo); &and ("edx",$Ehi); &add ("eax",&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp")); &adc ("ebx",&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp")); # T1 += X[0] &xor ("ecx","esi"); &xor ("edx","edi"); # Ch(e,f,g) = (f^g)&e)^g &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,$K512)); &mov ("edi",&DWP(4,$K512)); # K[i] &add ("eax","ecx"); &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += Ch(e,f,g) &mov ("ecx",$Dlo); &mov ("edx",$Dhi); &add ("eax","esi"); &adc ("ebx","edi"); # T1 += K[i] &mov ($Tlo,"eax"); &mov ($Thi,"ebx"); # put T1 away &add ("eax","ecx"); &adc ("ebx","edx"); # d += T1 #define Sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39)) # LO lo>>28^hi<<4 ^ hi>>2^lo<<30 ^ hi>>7^lo<<25 # HI hi>>28^lo<<4 ^ lo>>2^hi<<30 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25 &mov ("ecx",$Alo); &mov ("edx",$Ahi); &mov ($Dlo,"eax"); &mov ($Dhi,"ebx"); &mov ("esi","ecx"); &shr ("ecx",2); # lo>>2 &mov ("edi","edx"); &shr ("edx",2); # hi>>2 &mov ("ebx","ecx"); &shl ("esi",4); # lo<<4 &mov ("eax","edx"); &shl ("edi",4); # hi<<4 &xor ("ebx","esi"); &shr ("ecx",7-2); # lo>>7 &xor ("eax","edi"); &shr ("edx",7-2); # hi>>7 &xor ("ebx","ecx"); &shl ("esi",25-4); # lo<<25 &xor ("eax","edx"); &shl ("edi",25-4); # hi<<25 &xor ("eax","esi"); &shr ("ecx",28-7); # lo>>28 &xor ("ebx","edi"); &shr ("edx",28-7); # hi>>28 &xor ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("esi",30-25); # lo<<30 &xor ("ebx","edx"); &shl ("edi",30-25); # hi<<30 &xor ("eax","esi"); &xor ("ebx","edi"); # Sigma0(a) &mov ("ecx",$Alo); &mov ("edx",$Ahi); &mov ("esi",$Blo); &mov ("edi",$Bhi); &add ("eax",$Tlo); &adc ("ebx",$Thi); # T1 = Sigma0(a)+T1 &or ("ecx","esi"); &or ("edx","edi"); &and ("ecx",$Clo); &and ("edx",$Chi); &and ("esi",$Alo); &and ("edi",$Ahi); &or ("ecx","esi"); &or ("edx","edi"); # Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b) &add ("eax","ecx"); &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += Maj(a,b,c) &mov ($Tlo,"eax"); &mov ($Thi,"ebx"); &mov (&LB("edx"),&BP(0,$K512)); # pre-fetch LSB of *K &sub ("esp",8); &lea ($K512,&DWP(8,$K512)); # K++ } &function_begin("sha512_block_data_order"); &mov ("esi",wparam(0)); # ctx &mov ("edi",wparam(1)); # inp &mov ("eax",wparam(2)); # num &mov ("ebx","esp"); # saved sp &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC! &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop($K512); &lea ($K512,&DWP(&label("K512")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K512)); &sub ("esp",16); &and ("esp",-64); &shl ("eax",7); &add ("eax","edi"); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi"); # ctx &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi"); # inp &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); # inp+num*128 &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); # saved sp if ($sse2) { &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$K512,&label("K512")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edx")); &test ("ecx",1<<26); &jz (&label("loop_x86")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edx")); # load ctx->h[0-7] &movq ($A,&QWP(0,"esi")); &and ("ecx",1<<24); # XMM registers availability &movq ("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi")); &and ("edx",1<<9); # SSSE3 bit &movq ($BxC,&QWP(16,"esi")); &or ("ecx","edx"); &movq ("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi")); &movq ($E,&QWP(32,"esi")); &movq ("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi")); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi")); &movq ("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi")); &cmp ("ecx",1<<24|1<<9); &je (&label("SSSE3")); &sub ("esp",8*10); &jmp (&label("loop_sse2")); &set_label("loop_sse2",16); #&movq ($Asse2,$A); &movq ($Bsse2,"mm1"); &movq ($Csse2,$BxC); &movq ($Dsse2,"mm3"); #&movq ($Esse2,$E); &movq ($Fsse2,"mm5"); &movq ($Gsse2,"mm6"); &pxor ($BxC,"mm1"); # magic &movq ($Hsse2,"mm7"); &movq ("mm3",$A); # magic &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &add ("edi",8); &mov ("edx",15); # counter &bswap ("eax"); &bswap ("ebx"); &jmp (&label("00_14_sse2")); &set_label("00_14_sse2",16); &movd ("mm1","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &movd ("mm7","ebx"); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &add ("edi",8); &bswap ("eax"); &bswap ("ebx"); &punpckldq("mm7","mm1"); &BODY_00_15_sse2(); &dec ("edx"); &jnz (&label("00_14_sse2")); &movd ("mm1","eax"); &movd ("mm7","ebx"); &punpckldq("mm7","mm1"); &BODY_00_15_sse2(1); &pxor ($A,$A); # A is in %mm3 &mov ("edx",32); # counter &jmp (&label("16_79_sse2")); &set_label("16_79_sse2",16); for ($j=0;$j<2;$j++) { # 2x unroll #&movq ("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp")); # prefetched in BODY_00_15 &movq ("mm5",&QWP(8*(9+16-14),"esp")); &movq ("mm1","mm7"); &psrlq ("mm7",1); &movq ("mm6","mm5"); &psrlq ("mm5",6); &psllq ("mm1",56); &paddq ($A,"mm3"); # from BODY_00_15 &movq ("mm3","mm7"); &psrlq ("mm7",7-1); &pxor ("mm3","mm1"); &psllq ("mm1",63-56); &pxor ("mm3","mm7"); &psrlq ("mm7",8-7); &pxor ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm1","mm5"); &psrlq ("mm5",19-6); &pxor ("mm7","mm3"); # sigma0 &psllq ("mm6",3); &pxor ("mm1","mm5"); &paddq ("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16),"esp")); &pxor ("mm1","mm6"); &psrlq ("mm5",61-19); &paddq ("mm7",&QWP(8*(9+16-9),"esp")); &pxor ("mm1","mm5"); &psllq ("mm6",45-3); &movq ("mm5",$Fsse2); # load f &pxor ("mm1","mm6"); # sigma1 &movq ("mm6",$Gsse2); # load g &paddq ("mm7","mm1"); # X[i] #&movq (&QWP(8*9,"esp"),"mm7"); # moved to BODY_00_15 &BODY_00_15_sse2(2); } &dec ("edx"); &jnz (&label("16_79_sse2")); #&movq ($A,$Asse2); &paddq ($A,"mm3"); # from BODY_00_15 &movq ("mm1",$Bsse2); #&movq ($BxC,$Csse2); &movq ("mm3",$Dsse2); #&movq ($E,$Esse2); &movq ("mm5",$Fsse2); &movq ("mm6",$Gsse2); &movq ("mm7",$Hsse2); &pxor ($BxC,"mm1"); # de-magic &paddq ($A,&QWP(0,"esi")); &paddq ("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi")); &paddq ($BxC,&QWP(16,"esi")); &paddq ("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi")); &paddq ($E,&QWP(32,"esi")); &paddq ("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi")); &paddq ("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi")); &paddq ("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi")); &mov ("eax",8*80); &movq (&QWP(0,"esi"),$A); &movq (&QWP(8,"esi"),"mm1"); &movq (&QWP(16,"esi"),$BxC); &movq (&QWP(24,"esi"),"mm3"); &movq (&QWP(32,"esi"),$E); &movq (&QWP(40,"esi"),"mm5"); &movq (&QWP(48,"esi"),"mm6"); &movq (&QWP(56,"esi"),"mm7"); &lea ("esp",&DWP(0,"esp","eax")); # destroy frame &sub ($K512,"eax"); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8*10+8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("loop_sse2")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(8*10+12,"esp")); # restore sp &emms (); &function_end_A(); &set_label("SSSE3",32); { my ($cnt,$frame)=("ecx","edx"); my @X=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); my $j; my $i=0; &lea ($frame,&DWP(-64,"esp")); &sub ("esp",256); # fixed stack frame layout # # +0 A B C D E F G H # backing store # +64 X[0]+K[i] .. X[15]+K[i] # XMM->MM xfer area # +192 # XMM off-load ring buffer # +256 # saved parameters &movdqa (@X[1],&QWP(80*8,$K512)); # byte swap mask &movdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"edi")); &pshufb (@X[0],@X[1]); for ($j=0;$j<8;$j++) { &movdqa (&QWP(16*(($j-1)%4),$frame),@X[3]) if ($j>4); # off-load &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(16*($j%8),$K512)); &movdqa (@X[2],@X[1]) if ($j<7); # perpetuate byte swap mask &movdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16*($j+1),"edi")) if ($j<7); # next input &movdqa (@X[1],&QWP(16*(($j+1)%4),$frame)) if ($j==7);# restore @X[0] &paddq (@X[3],@X[0]); &pshufb (@X[1],@X[2]) if ($j<7); &movdqa (&QWP(16*($j%8)-128,$frame),@X[3]); # xfer X[i]+K[i] push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } #&jmp (&label("loop_ssse3")); &nop (); &set_label("loop_ssse3",32); &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(16*(($j+1)%4),$frame)); # pre-restore @X[1] &movdqa (&QWP(16*(($j-1)%4),$frame),@X[3]); # off-load @X[3] &lea ($K512,&DWP(16*8,$K512)); #&movq ($Asse2,$A); # off-load A-H &movq ($Bsse2,"mm1"); &mov ("ebx","edi"); &movq ($Csse2,$BxC); &lea ("edi",&DWP(128,"edi")); # advance input &movq ($Dsse2,"mm3"); &cmp ("edi","eax"); #&movq ($Esse2,$E); &movq ($Fsse2,"mm5"); &cmovb ("ebx","edi"); &movq ($Gsse2,"mm6"); &mov ("ecx",4); # loop counter &pxor ($BxC,"mm1"); # magic &movq ($Hsse2,"mm7"); &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); # magic &jmp (&label("00_47_ssse3")); sub BODY_00_15_ssse3 { # "phase-less" copy of BODY_00_15_sse2 ( '&movq ("mm1",$E)', # %mm1 is sliding right '&movq ("mm7",&QWP(((-8*$i)%128)-128,$frame))',# X[i]+K[i] '&pxor ("mm5","mm6")', # f^=g '&psrlq ("mm1",14)', '&movq (&QWP(8*($i+4)%64,"esp"),$E)', # modulo-scheduled save e '&pand ("mm5",$E)', # f&=e '&psllq ($E,23)', # $E is sliding left '&paddq ($A,"mm3")', # [h+=Maj(a,b,c)] '&movq ("mm3","mm1")', # %mm3 is T1 '&psrlq("mm1",4)', '&pxor ("mm5","mm6")', # Ch(e,f,g) '&pxor ("mm3",$E)', '&psllq($E,23)', '&pxor ("mm3","mm1")', '&movq (&QWP(8*$i%64,"esp"),$A)', # modulo-scheduled save a '&paddq("mm7","mm5")', # X[i]+=Ch(e,f,g) '&pxor ("mm3",$E)', '&psrlq("mm1",23)', '&paddq("mm7",&QWP(8*($i+7)%64,"esp"))', # X[i]+=h '&pxor ("mm3","mm1")', '&psllq($E,4)', '&pxor ("mm3",$E)', # T1=Sigma1_512(e) '&movq ($E,&QWP(8*($i+3)%64,"esp"))', # e = load d, e in next round '&paddq ("mm3","mm7")', # T1+=X[i] '&movq ("mm5",$A)', # %mm5 is sliding right '&psrlq("mm5",28)', '&paddq ($E,"mm3")', # d += T1 '&movq ("mm6",$A)', # %mm6 is sliding left '&movq ("mm7","mm5")', '&psllq("mm6",25)', '&movq ("mm1",&QWP(8*($i+1)%64,"esp"))', # load b '&psrlq("mm5",6)', '&pxor ("mm7","mm6")', '&psllq("mm6",5)', '&pxor ("mm7","mm5")', '&pxor ($A,"mm1")', # a^b, b^c in next round '&psrlq("mm5",5)', '&pxor ("mm7","mm6")', '&pand ($BxC,$A)', # (b^c)&(a^b) '&psllq("mm6",6)', '&pxor ("mm7","mm5")', '&pxor ($BxC,"mm1")', # [h=]Maj(a,b,c) '&pxor ("mm6","mm7")', # Sigma0_512(a) '&movq ("mm5",&QWP(8*($i+5-1)%64,"esp"))', # pre-load f '&paddq ($BxC,"mm6")', # h+=Sigma0(a) '&movq ("mm6",&QWP(8*($i+6-1)%64,"esp"))', # pre-load g '($A,$BxC) = ($BxC,$A); $i--;' ); } &set_label("00_47_ssse3",32); for(;$j<16;$j++) { my ($t0,$t2,$t1)=@X[2..4]; my @insns = (&BODY_00_15_ssse3(),&BODY_00_15_ssse3()); &movdqa ($t2,@X[5]); &movdqa (@X[1],$t0); # restore @X[1] &palignr ($t0,@X[0],8); # X[1..2] &movdqa (&QWP(16*($j%4),$frame),@X[4]); # off-load @X[4] &palignr ($t2,@X[4],8); # X[9..10] &movdqa ($t1,$t0); &psrlq ($t0,7); &paddq (@X[0],$t2); # X[0..1] += X[9..10] &movdqa ($t2,$t1); &psrlq ($t1,1); &psllq ($t2,64-8); &pxor ($t0,$t1); &psrlq ($t1,8-1); &pxor ($t0,$t2); &psllq ($t2,8-1); &pxor ($t0,$t1); &movdqa ($t1,@X[7]); &pxor ($t0,$t2); # sigma0(X[1..2]) &movdqa ($t2,@X[7]); &psrlq ($t1,6); &paddq (@X[0],$t0); # X[0..1] += sigma0(X[1..2]) &movdqa ($t0,@X[7]); &psrlq ($t2,19); &psllq ($t0,64-61); &pxor ($t1,$t2); &psrlq ($t2,61-19); &pxor ($t1,$t0); &psllq ($t0,61-19); &pxor ($t1,$t2); &movdqa ($t2,&QWP(16*(($j+2)%4),$frame));# pre-restore @X[1] &pxor ($t1,$t0); # sigma0(X[1..2]) &movdqa ($t0,&QWP(16*($j%8),$K512)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddq (@X[0],$t1); # X[0..1] += sigma0(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &paddq ($t0,@X[0]); foreach(@insns) { eval; } &movdqa (&QWP(16*($j%8)-128,$frame),$t0);# xfer X[i]+K[i] push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } &lea ($K512,&DWP(16*8,$K512)); &dec ("ecx"); &jnz (&label("00_47_ssse3")); &movdqa (@X[1],&QWP(0,$K512)); # byte swap mask &lea ($K512,&DWP(-80*8,$K512)); # rewind &movdqu (@X[0],&QWP(0,"ebx")); &pshufb (@X[0],@X[1]); for ($j=0;$j<8;$j++) { # load next or same block my @insns = (&BODY_00_15_ssse3(),&BODY_00_15_ssse3()); &movdqa (&QWP(16*(($j-1)%4),$frame),@X[3]) if ($j>4); # off-load &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(16*($j%8),$K512)); &movdqa (@X[2],@X[1]) if ($j<7); # perpetuate byte swap mask &movdqu (@X[1],&QWP(16*($j+1),"ebx")) if ($j<7); # next input &movdqa (@X[1],&QWP(16*(($j+1)%4),$frame)) if ($j==7);# restore @X[0] &paddq (@X[3],@X[0]); &pshufb (@X[1],@X[2]) if ($j<7); foreach(@insns) { eval; } &movdqa (&QWP(16*($j%8)-128,$frame),@X[3]);# xfer X[i]+K[i] push(@X,shift(@X)); # rotate(@X) } #&movq ($A,$Asse2); # load A-H &movq ("mm1",$Bsse2); &paddq ($A,"mm3"); # from BODY_00_15 #&movq ($BxC,$Csse2); &movq ("mm3",$Dsse2); #&movq ($E,$Esse2); #&movq ("mm5",$Fsse2); #&movq ("mm6",$Gsse2); &movq ("mm7",$Hsse2); &pxor ($BxC,"mm1"); # de-magic &paddq ($A,&QWP(0,"esi")); &paddq ("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi")); &paddq ($BxC,&QWP(16,"esi")); &paddq ("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi")); &paddq ($E,&QWP(32,"esi")); &paddq ("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi")); &paddq ("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi")); &paddq ("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi")); &movq (&QWP(0,"esi"),$A); &movq (&QWP(8,"esi"),"mm1"); &movq (&QWP(16,"esi"),$BxC); &movq (&QWP(24,"esi"),"mm3"); &movq (&QWP(32,"esi"),$E); &movq (&QWP(40,"esi"),"mm5"); &movq (&QWP(48,"esi"),"mm6"); &movq (&QWP(56,"esi"),"mm7"); &cmp ("edi","eax") # are we done yet? &jb (&label("loop_ssse3")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(64+12,$frame)); # restore sp &emms (); } &function_end_A(); } &set_label("loop_x86",16); # copy input block to stack reversing byte and qword order for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi")); &bswap ("eax"); &bswap ("ebx"); &bswap ("ecx"); &bswap ("edx"); &push ("eax"); &push ("ebx"); &push ("ecx"); &push ("edx"); } &add ("edi",128); &sub ("esp",9*8); # place for T,A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H &mov (&DWP(8*(9+16)+4,"esp"),"edi"); # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack &lea ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",16); &data_word(0xA5F3F689); # rep movsd &set_label("00_15_x86",16); &BODY_00_15_x86(); &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x94); &jne (&label("00_15_x86")); &set_label("16_79_x86",16); #define sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),1) ^ ROTR((x),8) ^ ((x)>>7)) # LO lo>>1^hi<<31 ^ lo>>8^hi<<24 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25 # HI hi>>1^lo<<31 ^ hi>>8^lo<<24 ^ hi>>7 &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+0,"esp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+4,"esp")); &mov ("esi","ecx"); &shr ("ecx",1); # lo>>1 &mov ("edi","edx"); &shr ("edx",1); # hi>>1 &mov ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("esi",24); # lo<<24 &mov ("ebx","edx"); &shl ("edi",24); # hi<<24 &xor ("ebx","esi"); &shr ("ecx",7-1); # lo>>7 &xor ("eax","edi"); &shr ("edx",7-1); # hi>>7 &xor ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("esi",31-24); # lo<<31 &xor ("ebx","edx"); &shl ("edi",25-24); # hi<<25 &xor ("ebx","esi"); &shr ("ecx",8-7); # lo>>8 &xor ("eax","edi"); &shr ("edx",8-7); # hi>>8 &xor ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("edi",31-25); # hi<<31 &xor ("ebx","edx"); &xor ("eax","edi"); # T1 = sigma0(X[-15]) &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"ebx"); # put T1 away #define sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6)) # LO lo>>19^hi<<13 ^ hi>>29^lo<<3 ^ lo>>6^hi<<26 # HI hi>>19^lo<<13 ^ lo>>29^hi<<3 ^ hi>>6 &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+0,"esp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+4,"esp")); &mov ("esi","ecx"); &shr ("ecx",6); # lo>>6 &mov ("edi","edx"); &shr ("edx",6); # hi>>6 &mov ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("esi",3); # lo<<3 &mov ("ebx","edx"); &shl ("edi",3); # hi<<3 &xor ("eax","esi"); &shr ("ecx",19-6); # lo>>19 &xor ("ebx","edi"); &shr ("edx",19-6); # hi>>19 &xor ("eax","ecx"); &shl ("esi",13-3); # lo<<13 &xor ("ebx","edx"); &shl ("edi",13-3); # hi<<13 &xor ("ebx","esi"); &shr ("ecx",29-19); # lo>>29 &xor ("eax","edi"); &shr ("edx",29-19); # hi>>29 &xor ("ebx","ecx"); &shl ("edi",26-13); # hi<<26 &xor ("eax","edx"); &xor ("eax","edi"); # sigma1(X[-2]) &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+0,"esp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+4,"esp")); &add ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &adc ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp")); # T1 = sigma1(X[-2])+T1 &mov ("esi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+0,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+4,"esp")); &add ("eax","ecx"); &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += X[-16] &add ("eax","esi"); &adc ("ebx","edi"); # T1 += X[-7] &mov (&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp"),"ebx"); # save X[0] &BODY_00_15_x86(); &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x17); &jne (&label("16_79_x86")); &mov ("esi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+0,"esp"));# ctx &mov ("edi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+4,"esp"));# inp for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"esi")); &add ("eax",&DWP(8+($i*16)+0,"esp")); &adc ("ebx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+4,"esp")); &mov (&DWP($i*16+0,"esi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP($i*16+4,"esi"),"ebx"); &add ("ecx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+8,"esp")); &adc ("edx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+12,"esp")); &mov (&DWP($i*16+8,"esi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP($i*16+12,"esi"),"edx"); } &add ("esp",8*(9+16+80)); # destroy frame &sub ($K512,8*80); # rewind K &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); # are we done yet? &jb (&label("loop_x86")); &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp &function_end_A(); &set_label("K512",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment! &data_word(0xd728ae22,0x428a2f98); # u64 &data_word(0x23ef65cd,0x71374491); # u64 &data_word(0xec4d3b2f,0xb5c0fbcf); # u64 &data_word(0x8189dbbc,0xe9b5dba5); # u64 &data_word(0xf348b538,0x3956c25b); # u64 &data_word(0xb605d019,0x59f111f1); # u64 &data_word(0xaf194f9b,0x923f82a4); # u64 &data_word(0xda6d8118,0xab1c5ed5); # u64 &data_word(0xa3030242,0xd807aa98); # u64 &data_word(0x45706fbe,0x12835b01); # u64 &data_word(0x4ee4b28c,0x243185be); # u64 &data_word(0xd5ffb4e2,0x550c7dc3); # u64 &data_word(0xf27b896f,0x72be5d74); # u64 &data_word(0x3b1696b1,0x80deb1fe); # u64 &data_word(0x25c71235,0x9bdc06a7); # u64 &data_word(0xcf692694,0xc19bf174); # u64 &data_word(0x9ef14ad2,0xe49b69c1); # u64 &data_word(0x384f25e3,0xefbe4786); # u64 &data_word(0x8b8cd5b5,0x0fc19dc6); # u64 &data_word(0x77ac9c65,0x240ca1cc); # u64 &data_word(0x592b0275,0x2de92c6f); # u64 &data_word(0x6ea6e483,0x4a7484aa); # u64 &data_word(0xbd41fbd4,0x5cb0a9dc); # u64 &data_word(0x831153b5,0x76f988da); # u64 &data_word(0xee66dfab,0x983e5152); # u64 &data_word(0x2db43210,0xa831c66d); # u64 &data_word(0x98fb213f,0xb00327c8); # u64 &data_word(0xbeef0ee4,0xbf597fc7); # u64 &data_word(0x3da88fc2,0xc6e00bf3); # u64 &data_word(0x930aa725,0xd5a79147); # u64 &data_word(0xe003826f,0x06ca6351); # u64 &data_word(0x0a0e6e70,0x14292967); # u64 &data_word(0x46d22ffc,0x27b70a85); # u64 &data_word(0x5c26c926,0x2e1b2138); # u64 &data_word(0x5ac42aed,0x4d2c6dfc); # u64 &data_word(0x9d95b3df,0x53380d13); # u64 &data_word(0x8baf63de,0x650a7354); # u64 &data_word(0x3c77b2a8,0x766a0abb); # u64 &data_word(0x47edaee6,0x81c2c92e); # u64 &data_word(0x1482353b,0x92722c85); # u64 &data_word(0x4cf10364,0xa2bfe8a1); # u64 &data_word(0xbc423001,0xa81a664b); # u64 &data_word(0xd0f89791,0xc24b8b70); # u64 &data_word(0x0654be30,0xc76c51a3); # u64 &data_word(0xd6ef5218,0xd192e819); # u64 &data_word(0x5565a910,0xd6990624); # u64 &data_word(0x5771202a,0xf40e3585); # u64 &data_word(0x32bbd1b8,0x106aa070); # u64 &data_word(0xb8d2d0c8,0x19a4c116); # u64 &data_word(0x5141ab53,0x1e376c08); # u64 &data_word(0xdf8eeb99,0x2748774c); # u64 &data_word(0xe19b48a8,0x34b0bcb5); # u64 &data_word(0xc5c95a63,0x391c0cb3); # u64 &data_word(0xe3418acb,0x4ed8aa4a); # u64 &data_word(0x7763e373,0x5b9cca4f); # u64 &data_word(0xd6b2b8a3,0x682e6ff3); # u64 &data_word(0x5defb2fc,0x748f82ee); # u64 &data_word(0x43172f60,0x78a5636f); # u64 &data_word(0xa1f0ab72,0x84c87814); # u64 &data_word(0x1a6439ec,0x8cc70208); # u64 &data_word(0x23631e28,0x90befffa); # u64 &data_word(0xde82bde9,0xa4506ceb); # u64 &data_word(0xb2c67915,0xbef9a3f7); # u64 &data_word(0xe372532b,0xc67178f2); # u64 &data_word(0xea26619c,0xca273ece); # u64 &data_word(0x21c0c207,0xd186b8c7); # u64 &data_word(0xcde0eb1e,0xeada7dd6); # u64 &data_word(0xee6ed178,0xf57d4f7f); # u64 &data_word(0x72176fba,0x06f067aa); # u64 &data_word(0xa2c898a6,0x0a637dc5); # u64 &data_word(0xbef90dae,0x113f9804); # u64 &data_word(0x131c471b,0x1b710b35); # u64 &data_word(0x23047d84,0x28db77f5); # u64 &data_word(0x40c72493,0x32caab7b); # u64 &data_word(0x15c9bebc,0x3c9ebe0a); # u64 &data_word(0x9c100d4c,0x431d67c4); # u64 &data_word(0xcb3e42b6,0x4cc5d4be); # u64 &data_word(0xfc657e2a,0x597f299c); # u64 &data_word(0x3ad6faec,0x5fcb6fab); # u64 &data_word(0x4a475817,0x6c44198c); # u64 &data_word(0x04050607,0x00010203); # byte swap &data_word(0x0c0d0e0f,0x08090a0b); # mask &function_end_B("sha512_block_data_order"); &asciz("SHA512 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mips.pl0000644000000000000000000002456213176625660017100 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA1 block procedure for MIPS. # Performance improvement is 30% on unaligned input. The "secret" is # to deploy lwl/lwr pair to load unaligned input. One could have # vectorized Xupdate on MIPSIII/IV, but the goal was to code MIPS32- # compatible subroutine. There is room for minor optimization on # little-endian platforms... # September 2012. # # Add MIPS32r2 code (>25% less instructions). ###################################################################### # There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most # widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if # one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral # manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout: # ($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23)); ($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31)); # # The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate # interoperability: # # - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp; # - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting # old code]; # - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary; # # For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs: # # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); # ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); # ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); # ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); # ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); # $flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64 if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $PTR_ADD="dadd"; # incidentally works even on n32 $PTR_SUB="dsub"; # incidentally works even on n32 $REG_S="sd"; $REG_L="ld"; $PTR_SLL="dsll"; # incidentally works even on n32 $SZREG=8; } else { $PTR_ADD="add"; $PTR_SUB="sub"; $REG_S="sw"; $REG_L="lw"; $PTR_SLL="sll"; $SZREG=4; } # # # ###################################################################### $big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC}); for (@ARGV) { $output=$_ if (/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/); } open STDOUT,">$output"; if (!defined($big_endian)) { $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1); } # offsets of the Most and Least Significant Bytes $MSB=$big_endian?0:3; $LSB=3&~$MSB; @X=map("\$$_",(8..23)); # a4-a7,s0-s11 $ctx=$a0; $inp=$a1; $num=$a2; $A="\$1"; $B="\$2"; $C="\$3"; $D="\$7"; $E="\$24"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); $t0="\$25"; $t1=$num; # $num is offloaded to stack $t2="\$30"; # fp $K="\$31"; # ra sub BODY_00_14 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if (!$big_endian); #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) wsbh @X[$i],@X[$i] # byte swap($i) rotr @X[$i],@X[$i],16 #else srl $t0,@X[$i],24 # byte swap($i) srl $t1,@X[$i],8 andi $t2,@X[$i],0xFF00 sll @X[$i],@X[$i],24 andi $t1,0xFF00 sll $t2,$t2,8 or @X[$i],$t0 or $t1,$t2 or @X[$i],$t1 #endif ___ $code.=<<___; #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) addu $e,$K # $i xor $t0,$c,$d rotr $t1,$a,27 lwl @X[$j],$j*4+$MSB($inp) and $t0,$b addu $e,$t1 lwr @X[$j],$j*4+$LSB($inp) xor $t0,$d addu $e,@X[$i] rotr $b,$b,2 addu $e,$t0 #else lwl @X[$j],$j*4+$MSB($inp) sll $t0,$a,5 # $i addu $e,$K lwr @X[$j],$j*4+$LSB($inp) srl $t1,$a,27 addu $e,$t0 xor $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 sll $t2,$b,30 and $t0,$b srl $b,$b,2 xor $t0,$d addu $e,@X[$i] or $b,$t2 addu $e,$t0 #endif ___ } sub BODY_15_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if (!$big_endian && $i==15); #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) wsbh @X[$i],@X[$i] # byte swap($i) rotr @X[$i],@X[$i],16 #else srl $t0,@X[$i],24 # byte swap($i) srl $t1,@X[$i],8 andi $t2,@X[$i],0xFF00 sll @X[$i],@X[$i],24 andi $t1,0xFF00 sll $t2,$t2,8 or @X[$i],$t0 or @X[$i],$t1 or @X[$i],$t2 #endif ___ $code.=<<___; #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) addu $e,$K # $i xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] xor $t0,$c,$d rotr $t1,$a,27 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] and $t0,$b addu $e,$t1 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] xor $t0,$d addu $e,@X[$i%16] rotr @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31 rotr $b,$b,2 addu $e,$t0 #else xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] sll $t0,$a,5 # $i addu $e,$K srl $t1,$a,27 addu $e,$t0 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] xor $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] sll $t2,$b,30 and $t0,$b srl $t1,@X[$j%16],31 addu @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] srl $b,$b,2 xor $t0,$d or @X[$j%16],$t1 addu $e,@X[$i%16] or $b,$t2 addu $e,$t0 #endif ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] addu $e,$K # $i rotr $t1,$a,27 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] xor $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] xor $t0,$b addu $e,@X[$i%16] rotr @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31 rotr $b,$b,2 addu $e,$t0 #else xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] sll $t0,$a,5 # $i addu $e,$K srl $t1,$a,27 addu $e,$t0 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] xor $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] sll $t2,$b,30 xor $t0,$b srl $t1,@X[$j%16],31 addu @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] srl $b,$b,2 addu $e,@X[$i%16] or @X[$j%16],$t1 or $b,$t2 addu $e,$t0 #endif ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) lw @X[0],0($ctx) addu $e,$K # $i lw @X[1],4($ctx) rotr $t1,$a,27 lw @X[2],8($ctx) xor $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 lw @X[3],12($ctx) xor $t0,$b addu $e,@X[$i%16] lw @X[4],16($ctx) rotr $b,$b,2 addu $e,$t0 #else lw @X[0],0($ctx) sll $t0,$a,5 # $i addu $e,$K lw @X[1],4($ctx) srl $t1,$a,27 addu $e,$t0 lw @X[2],8($ctx) xor $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 lw @X[3],12($ctx) sll $t2,$b,30 xor $t0,$b lw @X[4],16($ctx) srl $b,$b,2 addu $e,@X[$i%16] or $b,$t2 addu $e,$t0 #endif ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) addu $e,$K # $i and $t0,$c,$d xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] rotr $t1,$a,27 addu $e,$t0 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] xor $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] and $t0,$b addu $e,@X[$i%16] rotr @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31 rotr $b,$b,2 addu $e,$t0 #else xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] sll $t0,$a,5 # $i addu $e,$K srl $t1,$a,27 addu $e,$t0 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] and $t0,$c,$d addu $e,$t1 xor @X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] sll $t2,$b,30 addu $e,$t0 srl $t1,@X[$j%16],31 xor $t0,$c,$d addu @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] and $t0,$b srl $b,$b,2 or @X[$j%16],$t1 addu $e,@X[$i%16] or $b,$t2 addu $e,$t0 #endif ___ } $FRAMESIZE=16; # large enough to accommodate NUBI saved registers $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc0fff008" : "0xc0ff0000"; $code=<<___; #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER # include #endif #if defined(__mips_smartmips) && !defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) #define _MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2 #endif .text .set noat .set noreorder .align 5 .globl sha1_block_data_order .ent sha1_block_data_order sha1_block_data_order: .frame $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG,$ra .mask $SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $fp,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s11,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s10,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s9,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s8,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s7,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s6,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi prologue $REG_S $s3,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,($FRAMESIZE-14)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,($FRAMESIZE-15)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; $PTR_SLL $num,6 $PTR_ADD $num,$inp $REG_S $num,0($sp) lw $A,0($ctx) lw $B,4($ctx) lw $C,8($ctx) lw $D,12($ctx) b .Loop lw $E,16($ctx) .align 4 .Loop: .set reorder lwl @X[0],$MSB($inp) lui $K,0x5a82 lwr @X[0],$LSB($inp) ori $K,0x7999 # K_00_19 ___ for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) { &BODY_00_14($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_15_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; lui $K,0x6ed9 ori $K,0xeba1 # K_20_39 ___ for (;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; lui $K,0x8f1b ori $K,0xbcdc # K_40_59 ___ for (;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; lui $K,0xca62 ori $K,0xc1d6 # K_60_79 ___ for (;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; $PTR_ADD $inp,64 $REG_L $num,0($sp) addu $A,$X[0] addu $B,$X[1] sw $A,0($ctx) addu $C,$X[2] addu $D,$X[3] sw $B,4($ctx) addu $E,$X[4] sw $C,8($ctx) sw $D,12($ctx) sw $E,16($ctx) .set noreorder bne $inp,$num,.Loop nop .set noreorder $REG_L $ra,($FRAMESIZE-1)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $fp,($FRAMESIZE-2)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s11,($FRAMESIZE-3)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s10,($FRAMESIZE-4)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s9,($FRAMESIZE-5)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s8,($FRAMESIZE-6)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s7,($FRAMESIZE-7)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s6,($FRAMESIZE-8)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s5,($FRAMESIZE-9)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,($FRAMESIZE-10)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s3,($FRAMESIZE-11)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,($FRAMESIZE-12)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,($FRAMESIZE-13)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,($FRAMESIZE-14)*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,($FRAMESIZE-15)*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE*$SZREG .end sha1_block_data_order .rdata .asciiz "SHA1 for MIPS, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-thumb.pl0000644000000000000000000001206113176625660017236 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # sha1_block for Thumb. # # January 2007. # # The code does not present direct interest to OpenSSL, because of low # performance. Its purpose is to establish _size_ benchmark. Pretty # useless one I must say, because 30% or 88 bytes larger ARMv4 code # [avialable on demand] is almost _twice_ as fast. It should also be # noted that in-lining of .Lcommon and .Lrotate improves performance # by over 40%, while code increases by only 10% or 32 bytes. But once # again, the goal was to establish _size_ benchmark, not performance. $output=shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; $inline=0; #$cheat_on_binutils=1; $t0="r0"; $t1="r1"; $t2="r2"; $a="r3"; $b="r4"; $c="r5"; $d="r6"; $e="r7"; $K="r8"; # "upper" registers can be used in add/sub and mov insns $ctx="r9"; $inp="r10"; $len="r11"; $Xi="r12"; sub common { <<___; sub $t0,#4 ldr $t1,[$t0] add $e,$K @ E+=K_xx_xx lsl $t2,$a,#5 add $t2,$e lsr $e,$a,#27 add $t2,$e @ E+=ROR(A,27) add $t2,$t1 @ E+=X[i] ___ } sub rotate { <<___; mov $e,$d @ E=D mov $d,$c @ D=C lsl $c,$b,#30 lsr $b,$b,#2 orr $c,$b @ C=ROR(B,2) mov $b,$a @ B=A add $a,$t2,$t1 @ A=E+F_xx_xx(B,C,D) ___ } sub BODY_00_19 { $code.=$inline?&common():"\tbl .Lcommon\n"; $code.=<<___; mov $t1,$c eor $t1,$d and $t1,$b eor $t1,$d @ F_00_19(B,C,D) ___ $code.=$inline?&rotate():"\tbl .Lrotate\n"; } sub BODY_20_39 { $code.=$inline?&common():"\tbl .Lcommon\n"; $code.=<<___; mov $t1,$b eor $t1,$c eor $t1,$d @ F_20_39(B,C,D) ___ $code.=$inline?&rotate():"\tbl .Lrotate\n"; } sub BODY_40_59 { $code.=$inline?&common():"\tbl .Lcommon\n"; $code.=<<___; mov $t1,$b and $t1,$c mov $e,$b orr $e,$c and $e,$d orr $t1,$e @ F_40_59(B,C,D) ___ $code.=$inline?&rotate():"\tbl .Lrotate\n"; } $code=<<___; .text .code 16 .global sha1_block_data_order .type sha1_block_data_order,%function .align 2 sha1_block_data_order: ___ if ($cheat_on_binutils) { $code.=<<___; .code 32 add r3,pc,#1 bx r3 @ switch to Thumb ISA .code 16 ___ } $code.=<<___; push {r4-r7} mov r3,r8 mov r4,r9 mov r5,r10 mov r6,r11 mov r7,r12 push {r3-r7,lr} lsl r2,#6 mov $ctx,r0 @ save context mov $inp,r1 @ save inp mov $len,r2 @ save len add $len,$inp @ $len to point at inp end .Lloop: mov $Xi,sp mov $t2,sp sub $t2,#16*4 @ [3] .LXload: ldrb $a,[$t1,#0] @ $t1 is r1 and holds inp ldrb $b,[$t1,#1] ldrb $c,[$t1,#2] ldrb $d,[$t1,#3] lsl $a,#24 lsl $b,#16 lsl $c,#8 orr $a,$b orr $a,$c orr $a,$d add $t1,#4 push {$a} cmp sp,$t2 bne .LXload @ [+14*16] mov $inp,$t1 @ update $inp sub $t2,#32*4 sub $t2,#32*4 mov $e,#31 @ [+4] .LXupdate: ldr $a,[sp,#15*4] ldr $b,[sp,#13*4] ldr $c,[sp,#7*4] ldr $d,[sp,#2*4] eor $a,$b eor $a,$c eor $a,$d ror $a,$e push {$a} cmp sp,$t2 bne .LXupdate @ [+(11+1)*64] ldmia $t0!,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e} @ $t0 is r0 and holds ctx mov $t0,$Xi ldr $t2,.LK_00_19 mov $t1,$t0 sub $t1,#20*4 mov $Xi,$t1 mov $K,$t2 @ [+7+4] .L_00_19: ___ &BODY_00_19(); $code.=<<___; cmp $Xi,$t0 bne .L_00_19 @ [+(2+9+4+2+8+2)*20] ldr $t2,.LK_20_39 mov $t1,$t0 sub $t1,#20*4 mov $Xi,$t1 mov $K,$t2 @ [+5] .L_20_39_or_60_79: ___ &BODY_20_39(); $code.=<<___; cmp $Xi,$t0 bne .L_20_39_or_60_79 @ [+(2+9+3+2+8+2)*20*2] cmp sp,$t0 beq .Ldone @ [+2] ldr $t2,.LK_40_59 mov $t1,$t0 sub $t1,#20*4 mov $Xi,$t1 mov $K,$t2 @ [+5] .L_40_59: ___ &BODY_40_59(); $code.=<<___; cmp $Xi,$t0 bne .L_40_59 @ [+(2+9+6+2+8+2)*20] ldr $t2,.LK_60_79 mov $Xi,sp mov $K,$t2 b .L_20_39_or_60_79 @ [+4] .Ldone: mov $t0,$ctx ldr $t1,[$t0,#0] ldr $t2,[$t0,#4] add $a,$t1 ldr $t1,[$t0,#8] add $b,$t2 ldr $t2,[$t0,#12] add $c,$t1 ldr $t1,[$t0,#16] add $d,$t2 add $e,$t1 stmia $t0!,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e} @ [+20] add sp,#80*4 @ deallocate stack frame mov $t0,$ctx @ restore ctx mov $t1,$inp @ restore inp cmp $t1,$len beq .Lexit b .Lloop @ [+6] total 3212 cycles .Lexit: pop {r2-r7} mov r8,r2 mov r9,r3 mov r10,r4 mov r11,r5 mov r12,r6 mov lr,r7 pop {r4-r7} bx lr .align 2 ___ $code.=".Lcommon:\n".&common()."\tmov pc,lr\n" if (!$inline); $code.=".Lrotate:\n".&rotate()."\tmov pc,lr\n" if (!$inline); $code.=<<___; .align 2 .LK_00_19: .word 0x5a827999 .LK_20_39: .word 0x6ed9eba1 .LK_40_59: .word 0x8f1bbcdc .LK_60_79: .word 0xca62c1d6 .size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order .asciz "SHA1 block transform for Thumb, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ print $code; close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl0000644000000000000000000004523113176625657020253 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # sha1_block procedure for ARMv4. # # January 2007. # Size/performance trade-off # ==================================================================== # impl size in bytes comp cycles[*] measured performance # ==================================================================== # thumb 304 3212 4420 # armv4-small 392/+29% 1958/+64% 2250/+96% # armv4-compact 740/+89% 1552/+26% 1840/+22% # armv4-large 1420/+92% 1307/+19% 1370/+34%[***] # full unroll ~5100/+260% ~1260/+4% ~1300/+5% # ==================================================================== # thumb = same as 'small' but in Thumb instructions[**] and # with recurring code in two private functions; # small = detached Xload/update, loops are folded; # compact = detached Xload/update, 5x unroll; # large = interleaved Xload/update, 5x unroll; # full unroll = interleaved Xload/update, full unroll, estimated[!]; # # [*] Manually counted instructions in "grand" loop body. Measured # performance is affected by prologue and epilogue overhead, # i-cache availability, branch penalties, etc. # [**] While each Thumb instruction is twice smaller, they are not as # diverse as ARM ones: e.g., there are only two arithmetic # instructions with 3 arguments, no [fixed] rotate, addressing # modes are limited. As result it takes more instructions to do # the same job in Thumb, therefore the code is never twice as # small and always slower. # [***] which is also ~35% better than compiler generated code. Dual- # issue Cortex A8 core was measured to process input block in # ~990 cycles. # August 2010. # # Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 13% improvement on # Cortex A8 core and in absolute terms ~870 cycles per input block # [or 13.6 cycles per byte]. # February 2011. # # Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 10% # improvement on Cortex A8 core and 12.2 cycles per byte. # September 2013. # # Add NEON implementation (see sha1-586.pl for background info). On # Cortex A8 it was measured to process one byte in 6.7 cycles or >80% # faster than integer-only code. Because [fully unrolled] NEON code # is ~2.5x larger and there are some redundant instructions executed # when processing last block, improvement is not as big for smallest # blocks, only ~30%. Snapdragon S4 is a tad faster, 6.4 cycles per # byte, which is also >80% faster than integer-only code. Cortex-A15 # is even faster spending 5.6 cycles per byte outperforming integer- # only code by factor of 2. # May 2014. # # Add ARMv8 code path performing at 2.35 cpb on Apple A7. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $ctx="r0"; $inp="r1"; $len="r2"; $a="r3"; $b="r4"; $c="r5"; $d="r6"; $e="r7"; $K="r8"; $t0="r9"; $t1="r10"; $t2="r11"; $t3="r12"; $Xi="r14"; @V=($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); sub Xupdate { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$opt1,$opt2)=@_; $code.=<<___; ldr $t0,[$Xi,#15*4] ldr $t1,[$Xi,#13*4] ldr $t2,[$Xi,#7*4] add $e,$K,$e,ror#2 @ E+=K_xx_xx ldr $t3,[$Xi,#2*4] eor $t0,$t0,$t1 eor $t2,$t2,$t3 @ 1 cycle stall eor $t1,$c,$d @ F_xx_xx mov $t0,$t0,ror#31 add $e,$e,$a,ror#27 @ E+=ROR(A,27) eor $t0,$t0,$t2,ror#31 str $t0,[$Xi,#-4]! $opt1 @ F_xx_xx $opt2 @ F_xx_xx add $e,$e,$t0 @ E+=X[i] ___ } sub BODY_00_15 { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb $t1,[$inp,#2] ldrb $t0,[$inp,#3] ldrb $t2,[$inp,#1] add $e,$K,$e,ror#2 @ E+=K_00_19 ldrb $t3,[$inp],#4 orr $t0,$t0,$t1,lsl#8 eor $t1,$c,$d @ F_xx_xx orr $t0,$t0,$t2,lsl#16 add $e,$e,$a,ror#27 @ E+=ROR(A,27) orr $t0,$t0,$t3,lsl#24 #else ldr $t0,[$inp],#4 @ handles unaligned add $e,$K,$e,ror#2 @ E+=K_00_19 eor $t1,$c,$d @ F_xx_xx add $e,$e,$a,ror#27 @ E+=ROR(A,27) #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $t0,$t0 @ byte swap #endif #endif and $t1,$b,$t1,ror#2 add $e,$e,$t0 @ E+=X[i] eor $t1,$t1,$d,ror#2 @ F_00_19(B,C,D) str $t0,[$Xi,#-4]! add $e,$e,$t1 @ E+=F_00_19(B,C,D) ___ } sub BODY_16_19 { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; &Xupdate(@_,"and $t1,$b,$t1,ror#2"); $code.=<<___; eor $t1,$t1,$d,ror#2 @ F_00_19(B,C,D) add $e,$e,$t1 @ E+=F_00_19(B,C,D) ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; &Xupdate(@_,"eor $t1,$b,$t1,ror#2"); $code.=<<___; add $e,$e,$t1 @ E+=F_20_39(B,C,D) ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; &Xupdate(@_,"and $t1,$b,$t1,ror#2","and $t2,$c,$d"); $code.=<<___; add $e,$e,$t1 @ E+=F_40_59(B,C,D) add $e,$e,$t2,ror#2 ___ } $code=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #endif .global sha1_block_data_order .type sha1_block_data_order,%function .align 5 sha1_block_data_order: #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .Lsha1_block: adr r3,.Lsha1_block ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap ldr r12,[r3,r12] @ OPENSSL_armcap_P #ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r12,[r12] #endif tst r12,#ARMV8_SHA1 bne .LARMv8 tst r12,#ARMV7_NEON bne .LNEON #endif stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ $len to point at the end of $inp ldmia $ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e} .Lloop: ldr $K,.LK_00_19 mov $Xi,sp sub sp,sp,#15*4 mov $c,$c,ror#30 mov $d,$d,ror#30 mov $e,$e,ror#30 @ [6] .L_00_15: ___ for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) { &BODY_00_15(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; #if defined(__thumb2__) mov $t3,sp teq $Xi,$t3 #else teq $Xi,sp #endif bne .L_00_15 @ [((11+4)*5+2)*3] sub sp,sp,#25*4 ___ &BODY_00_15(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); &BODY_16_19(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); &BODY_16_19(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); &BODY_16_19(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); &BODY_16_19(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); $code.=<<___; ldr $K,.LK_20_39 @ [+15+16*4] cmn sp,#0 @ [+3], clear carry to denote 20_39 .L_20_39_or_60_79: ___ for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) { &BODY_20_39(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; #if defined(__thumb2__) mov $t3,sp teq $Xi,$t3 #else teq $Xi,sp @ preserve carry #endif bne .L_20_39_or_60_79 @ [+((12+3)*5+2)*4] bcs .L_done @ [+((12+3)*5+2)*4], spare 300 bytes ldr $K,.LK_40_59 sub sp,sp,#20*4 @ [+2] .L_40_59: ___ for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) { &BODY_40_59(@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; #if defined(__thumb2__) mov $t3,sp teq $Xi,$t3 #else teq $Xi,sp #endif bne .L_40_59 @ [+((12+5)*5+2)*4] ldr $K,.LK_60_79 sub sp,sp,#20*4 cmp sp,#0 @ set carry to denote 60_79 b .L_20_39_or_60_79 @ [+4], spare 300 bytes .L_done: add sp,sp,#80*4 @ "deallocate" stack frame ldmia $ctx,{$K,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3} add $a,$K,$a add $b,$t0,$b add $c,$t1,$c,ror#2 add $d,$t2,$d,ror#2 add $e,$t3,$e,ror#2 stmia $ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e} teq $inp,$len bne .Lloop @ [+18], total 1307 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size sha1_block_data_order,.-sha1_block_data_order .align 5 .LK_00_19: .word 0x5a827999 .LK_20_39: .word 0x6ed9eba1 .LK_40_59: .word 0x8f1bbcdc .LK_60_79: .word 0xca62c1d6 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lsha1_block #endif .asciz "SHA1 block transform for ARMv4/NEON/ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 5 ___ ##################################################################### # NEON stuff # {{{ my @V=($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); my ($K_XX_XX,$Ki,$t0,$t1,$Xfer,$saved_sp)=map("r$_",(8..12,14)); my $Xi=4; my @X=map("q$_",(8..11,0..3)); my @Tx=("q12","q13"); my ($K,$zero)=("q14","q15"); my $j=0; sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./; my $arg = pop; $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n"; } sub body_00_19 () { ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. # '$code.="@ $j\n";'. '&bic ($t0,$d,$b)', '&add ($e,$e,$Ki)', # e+=X[i]+K '&and ($t1,$c,$b)', '&ldr ($Ki,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15))', '&add ($e,$e,$a,"ror#27")', # e+=ROR(A,27) '&eor ($t1,$t1,$t0)', # F_00_19 '&mov ($b,$b,"ror#2")', # b=ROR(b,2) '&add ($e,$e,$t1);'. # e+=F_00_19 '$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V));' ) } sub body_20_39 () { ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. # '$code.="@ $j\n";'. '&eor ($t0,$b,$d)', '&add ($e,$e,$Ki)', # e+=X[i]+K '&ldr ($Ki,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15)) if ($j<79)', '&eor ($t1,$t0,$c)', # F_20_39 '&add ($e,$e,$a,"ror#27")', # e+=ROR(A,27) '&mov ($b,$b,"ror#2")', # b=ROR(b,2) '&add ($e,$e,$t1);'. # e+=F_20_39 '$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V));' ) } sub body_40_59 () { ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'. # '$code.="@ $j\n";'. '&add ($e,$e,$Ki)', # e+=X[i]+K '&and ($t0,$c,$d)', '&ldr ($Ki,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15))', '&add ($e,$e,$a,"ror#27")', # e+=ROR(A,27) '&eor ($t1,$c,$d)', '&add ($e,$e,$t0)', '&and ($t1,$t1,$b)', '&mov ($b,$b,"ror#2")', # b=ROR(b,2) '&add ($e,$e,$t1);'. # e+=F_40_59 '$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V));' ) } sub Xupdate_16_31 () { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vext_8 (@X[0],@X[-4&7],@X[-3&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],$K); eval(shift(@insns)); &vld1_32 ("{$K\[]}","[$K_XX_XX,:32]!") if ($Xi%5==0); eval(shift(@insns)); &vext_8 (@Tx[0],@X[-1&7],$zero,4); # "X[-3]", 3 words eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[0]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vst1_32 ("{@Tx[1]}","[$Xfer,:128]!"); # X[]+K xfer &sub ($Xfer,$Xfer,64) if ($Xi%4==0); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vext_8 (@Tx[1],$zero,@Tx[0],4); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (@X[0],@Tx[0],@Tx[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsri_32 (@X[0],@Tx[0],31); # "X[0]"<<<=1 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 (@Tx[0],@Tx[1],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshl_u32 (@Tx[1],@Tx[1],2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@X[0],@X[0],@Tx[1]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]">>96)<<<2 foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xupdate_32_79 () { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vext_8 (@Tx[0],@X[-2&7],@X[-1&7],8); # compose "X[-6]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@X[0],@X[0],@X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],$K); eval(shift(@insns)); &vld1_32 ("{$K\[]}","[$K_XX_XX,:32]!") if ($Xi%5==0); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor (@Tx[0],@Tx[0],@X[0]); # "X[-6]"^="X[0]" eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 (@X[0],@Tx[0],30); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vst1_32 ("{@Tx[1]}","[$Xfer,:128]!"); # X[]+K xfer &sub ($Xfer,$Xfer,64) if ($Xi%4==0); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsli_32 (@X[0],@Tx[0],2); # "X[0]"="X[-6]"<<<2 foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any] $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xuplast_80 () { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vadd_i32 (@Tx[1],@X[-1&7],$K); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vst1_32 ("{@Tx[1]}","[$Xfer,:128]!"); &sub ($Xfer,$Xfer,64); &teq ($inp,$len); &sub ($K_XX_XX,$K_XX_XX,16); # rewind $K_XX_XX &it ("eq"); &subeq ($inp,$inp,64); # reload last block to avoid SEGV &vld1_8 ("{@X[-4&7]-@X[-3&7]}","[$inp]!"); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vld1_8 ("{@X[-2&7]-@X[-1&7]}","[$inp]!"); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vld1_32 ("{$K\[]}","[$K_XX_XX,:32]!"); # load K_00_19 eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vrev32_8 (@X[-4&7],@X[-4&7]); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions $Xi=0; } sub Xloop() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e); &vrev32_8 (@X[($Xi-3)&7],@X[($Xi-3)&7]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (@X[$Xi&7],@X[($Xi-4)&7],$K); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vst1_32 ("{@X[$Xi&7]}","[$Xfer,:128]!");# X[]+K xfer to IALU foreach (@insns) { eval; } $Xi++; } $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .type sha1_block_data_order_neon,%function .align 4 sha1_block_data_order_neon: .LNEON: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ $len to point at the end of $inp @ dmb @ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8 @ vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so mov $saved_sp,sp sub $Xfer,sp,#64 adr $K_XX_XX,.LK_00_19 bic $Xfer,$Xfer,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores ldmia $ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e} @ load context mov sp,$Xfer @ alloca vld1.8 {@X[-4&7]-@X[-3&7]},[$inp]! @ handles unaligned veor $zero,$zero,$zero vld1.8 {@X[-2&7]-@X[-1&7]},[$inp]! vld1.32 {${K}\[]},[$K_XX_XX,:32]! @ load K_00_19 vrev32.8 @X[-4&7],@X[-4&7] @ yes, even on vrev32.8 @X[-3&7],@X[-3&7] @ big-endian... vrev32.8 @X[-2&7],@X[-2&7] vadd.i32 @X[0],@X[-4&7],$K vrev32.8 @X[-1&7],@X[-1&7] vadd.i32 @X[1],@X[-3&7],$K vst1.32 {@X[0]},[$Xfer,:128]! vadd.i32 @X[2],@X[-2&7],$K vst1.32 {@X[1]},[$Xfer,:128]! vst1.32 {@X[2]},[$Xfer,:128]! ldr $Ki,[sp] @ big RAW stall .Loop_neon: ___ &Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_16_31(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_00_19); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_40_59); &Xupdate_32_79(\&body_20_39); &Xuplast_80(\&body_20_39); &Xloop(\&body_20_39); &Xloop(\&body_20_39); &Xloop(\&body_20_39); $code.=<<___; ldmia $ctx,{$Ki,$t0,$t1,$Xfer} @ accumulate context add $a,$a,$Ki ldr $Ki,[$ctx,#16] add $b,$b,$t0 add $c,$c,$t1 add $d,$d,$Xfer it eq moveq sp,$saved_sp add $e,$e,$Ki it ne ldrne $Ki,[sp] stmia $ctx,{$a,$b,$c,$d,$e} itt ne addne $Xfer,sp,#3*16 bne .Loop_neon @ vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} .size sha1_block_data_order_neon,.-sha1_block_data_order_neon #endif ___ }}} ##################################################################### # ARMv8 stuff # {{{ my ($ABCD,$E,$E0,$E1)=map("q$_",(0..3)); my @MSG=map("q$_",(4..7)); my @Kxx=map("q$_",(8..11)); my ($W0,$W1,$ABCD_SAVE)=map("q$_",(12..14)); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 # if defined(__thumb2__) # define INST(a,b,c,d) .byte c,d|0xf,a,b # else # define INST(a,b,c,d) .byte a,b,c,d|0x10 # endif .type sha1_block_data_order_armv8,%function .align 5 sha1_block_data_order_armv8: .LARMv8: vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so veor $E,$E,$E adr r3,.LK_00_19 vld1.32 {$ABCD},[$ctx]! vld1.32 {$E\[0]},[$ctx] sub $ctx,$ctx,#16 vld1.32 {@Kxx[0]\[]},[r3,:32]! vld1.32 {@Kxx[1]\[]},[r3,:32]! vld1.32 {@Kxx[2]\[]},[r3,:32]! vld1.32 {@Kxx[3]\[]},[r3,:32] .Loop_v8: vld1.8 {@MSG[0]-@MSG[1]},[$inp]! vld1.8 {@MSG[2]-@MSG[3]},[$inp]! vrev32.8 @MSG[0],@MSG[0] vrev32.8 @MSG[1],@MSG[1] vadd.i32 $W0,@Kxx[0],@MSG[0] vrev32.8 @MSG[2],@MSG[2] vmov $ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD @ offload subs $len,$len,#1 vadd.i32 $W1,@Kxx[0],@MSG[1] vrev32.8 @MSG[3],@MSG[3] sha1h $E1,$ABCD @ 0 sha1c $ABCD,$E,$W0 vadd.i32 $W0,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[2] sha1su0 @MSG[0],@MSG[1],@MSG[2] ___ for ($j=0,$i=1;$i<20-3;$i++) { my $f=("c","p","m","p")[$i/5]; $code.=<<___; sha1h $E0,$ABCD @ $i sha1$f $ABCD,$E1,$W1 vadd.i32 $W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3] sha1su1 @MSG[0],@MSG[3] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<20-4); sha1su0 @MSG[1],@MSG[2],@MSG[3] ___ ($E0,$E1)=($E1,$E0); ($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); $j++ if ((($i+3)%5)==0); } $code.=<<___; sha1h $E0,$ABCD @ $i sha1p $ABCD,$E1,$W1 vadd.i32 $W1,@Kxx[$j],@MSG[3] sha1h $E1,$ABCD @ 18 sha1p $ABCD,$E0,$W0 sha1h $E0,$ABCD @ 19 sha1p $ABCD,$E1,$W1 vadd.i32 $E,$E,$E0 vadd.i32 $ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE bne .Loop_v8 vst1.32 {$ABCD},[$ctx]! vst1.32 {$E\[0]},[$ctx] vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} ret @ bx lr .size sha1_block_data_order_armv8,.-sha1_block_data_order_armv8 #endif ___ }}} $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ { my %opcode = ( "sha1c" => 0xf2000c40, "sha1p" => 0xf2100c40, "sha1m" => 0xf2200c40, "sha1su0" => 0xf2300c40, "sha1h" => 0xf3b902c0, "sha1su1" => 0xf3ba0380 ); sub unsha1 { my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_; if ($arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)(?:,\s*q([0-9]+))?,\s*q([0-9]+)/o) { my $word = $opcode{$mnemonic}|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19) |(($2&7)<<17)|(($2&8)<<4) |(($3&7)<<1) |(($3&8)<<2); # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian. # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older # assemblers don't implement it:-( # this fix-up provides Thumb encoding in conjunction with INST $word &= ~0x10000000 if (($word & 0x0f000000) == 0x02000000); sprintf "INST(0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x)\t@ %s %s", $word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff, ($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff, $mnemonic,$arg; } } } foreach (split($/,$code)) { s/{q([0-9]+)\[\]}/sprintf "{d%d[],d%d[]}",2*$1,2*$1+1/eo or s/{q([0-9]+)\[0\]}/sprintf "{d%d[0]}",2*$1/eo; s/\b(sha1\w+)\s+(q.*)/unsha1($1,$2)/geo; s/\bret\b/bx lr/o or s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/o; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 print $_,$/; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl0000644000000000000000000004433013176625660017330 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # # Permission to use under GPL terms is granted. # ==================================================================== # SHA256 block procedure for ARMv4. May 2007. # Performance is ~2x better than gcc 3.4 generated code and in "abso- # lute" terms is ~2250 cycles per 64-byte block or ~35 cycles per # byte [on single-issue Xscale PXA250 core]. # July 2010. # # Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 22% improvement on # Cortex A8 core and ~20 cycles per processed byte. # February 2011. # # Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 16% # improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~15.4 cycles per processed byte. # September 2013. # # Add NEON implementation. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process one # byte in 12.5 cycles or 23% faster than integer-only code. Snapdragon # S4 does it in 12.5 cycles too, but it's 50% faster than integer-only # code (meaning that latter performs sub-optimally, nothing was done # about it). # May 2014. # # Add ARMv8 code path performing at 2.0 cpb on Apple A7. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $ctx="r0"; $t0="r0"; $inp="r1"; $t4="r1"; $len="r2"; $t1="r2"; $T1="r3"; $t3="r3"; $A="r4"; $B="r5"; $C="r6"; $D="r7"; $E="r8"; $F="r9"; $G="r10"; $H="r11"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H); $t2="r12"; $Ktbl="r14"; @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 7,18, 3); @sigma1=(17,19,10); sub BODY_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_; $code.=<<___ if ($i<16); #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 @ ldr $t1,[$inp],#4 @ $i # if $i==15 str $inp,[sp,#17*4] @ make room for $t4 # endif eor $t0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]` add $a,$a,$t2 @ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past eor $t0,$t0,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]` @ Sigma1(e) # ifndef __ARMEB__ rev $t1,$t1 # endif #else @ ldrb $t1,[$inp,#3] @ $i add $a,$a,$t2 @ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past ldrb $t2,[$inp,#2] ldrb $t0,[$inp,#1] orr $t1,$t1,$t2,lsl#8 ldrb $t2,[$inp],#4 orr $t1,$t1,$t0,lsl#16 # if $i==15 str $inp,[sp,#17*4] @ make room for $t4 # endif eor $t0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]` orr $t1,$t1,$t2,lsl#24 eor $t0,$t0,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]` @ Sigma1(e) #endif ___ $code.=<<___; ldr $t2,[$Ktbl],#4 @ *K256++ add $h,$h,$t1 @ h+=X[i] str $t1,[sp,#`$i%16`*4] eor $t1,$f,$g add $h,$h,$t0,ror#$Sigma1[0] @ h+=Sigma1(e) and $t1,$t1,$e add $h,$h,$t2 @ h+=K256[i] eor $t1,$t1,$g @ Ch(e,f,g) eor $t0,$a,$a,ror#`$Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0]` add $h,$h,$t1 @ h+=Ch(e,f,g) #if $i==31 and $t2,$t2,#0xff cmp $t2,#0xf2 @ done? #endif #if $i<15 # if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 ldr $t1,[$inp],#4 @ prefetch # else ldrb $t1,[$inp,#3] # endif eor $t2,$a,$b @ a^b, b^c in next round #else ldr $t1,[sp,#`($i+2)%16`*4] @ from future BODY_16_xx eor $t2,$a,$b @ a^b, b^c in next round ldr $t4,[sp,#`($i+15)%16`*4] @ from future BODY_16_xx #endif eor $t0,$t0,$a,ror#`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[0]` @ Sigma0(a) and $t3,$t3,$t2 @ (b^c)&=(a^b) add $d,$d,$h @ d+=h eor $t3,$t3,$b @ Maj(a,b,c) add $h,$h,$t0,ror#$Sigma0[0] @ h+=Sigma0(a) @ add $h,$h,$t3 @ h+=Maj(a,b,c) ___ ($t2,$t3)=($t3,$t2); } sub BODY_16_XX { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_; $code.=<<___; @ ldr $t1,[sp,#`($i+1)%16`*4] @ $i @ ldr $t4,[sp,#`($i+14)%16`*4] mov $t0,$t1,ror#$sigma0[0] add $a,$a,$t2 @ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past mov $t2,$t4,ror#$sigma1[0] eor $t0,$t0,$t1,ror#$sigma0[1] eor $t2,$t2,$t4,ror#$sigma1[1] eor $t0,$t0,$t1,lsr#$sigma0[2] @ sigma0(X[i+1]) ldr $t1,[sp,#`($i+0)%16`*4] eor $t2,$t2,$t4,lsr#$sigma1[2] @ sigma1(X[i+14]) ldr $t4,[sp,#`($i+9)%16`*4] add $t2,$t2,$t0 eor $t0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]` @ from BODY_00_15 add $t1,$t1,$t2 eor $t0,$t0,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]` @ Sigma1(e) add $t1,$t1,$t4 @ X[i] ___ &BODY_00_15(@_); } $code=<<___; #ifndef __KERNEL__ # include "arm_arch.h" #else # define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ # define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ 7 #endif .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #endif .type K256,%object .align 5 K256: .word 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .word 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .word 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .word 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .word 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .word 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .word 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .word 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .word 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .word 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .word 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .word 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .word 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .word 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .word 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .word 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .size K256,.-K256 .word 0 @ terminator #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__) .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lsha256_block_data_order #endif .align 5 .global sha256_block_data_order .type sha256_block_data_order,%function sha256_block_data_order: .Lsha256_block_data_order: #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && !defined(__thumb2__) sub r3,pc,#8 @ sha256_block_data_order #else adr r3,.Lsha256_block_data_order #endif #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__) ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap ldr r12,[r3,r12] @ OPENSSL_armcap_P #ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r12,[r12] #endif tst r12,#ARMV8_SHA256 bne .LARMv8 tst r12,#ARMV7_NEON bne .LNEON #endif add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ len to point at the end of inp stmdb sp!,{$ctx,$inp,$len,r4-r11,lr} ldmia $ctx,{$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H} sub $Ktbl,r3,#256+32 @ K256 sub sp,sp,#16*4 @ alloca(X[16]) .Loop: # if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 ldr $t1,[$inp],#4 # else ldrb $t1,[$inp,#3] # endif eor $t3,$B,$C @ magic eor $t2,$t2,$t2 ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=".Lrounds_16_xx:\n"; for (;$i<32;$i++) { &BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 ite eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif ldreq $t3,[sp,#16*4] @ pull ctx bne .Lrounds_16_xx add $A,$A,$t2 @ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past ldr $t0,[$t3,#0] ldr $t1,[$t3,#4] ldr $t2,[$t3,#8] add $A,$A,$t0 ldr $t0,[$t3,#12] add $B,$B,$t1 ldr $t1,[$t3,#16] add $C,$C,$t2 ldr $t2,[$t3,#20] add $D,$D,$t0 ldr $t0,[$t3,#24] add $E,$E,$t1 ldr $t1,[$t3,#28] add $F,$F,$t2 ldr $inp,[sp,#17*4] @ pull inp ldr $t2,[sp,#18*4] @ pull inp+len add $G,$G,$t0 add $H,$H,$t1 stmia $t3,{$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H} cmp $inp,$t2 sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256 @ rewind Ktbl bne .Loop add sp,sp,#`16+3`*4 @ destroy frame #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size sha256_block_data_order,.-sha256_block_data_order ___ ###################################################################### # NEON stuff # {{{ my @X=map("q$_",(0..3)); my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3,$T4,$T5)=("q8","q9","q10","q11","d24","d25"); my $Xfer=$t4; my $j=0; sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; } sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; } sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./; my $arg = pop; $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n"; } sub Xupdate() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h); &vext_8 ($T0,@X[0],@X[1],4); # X[1..4] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vext_8 ($T1,@X[2],@X[3],4); # X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T2,$T0,$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (@X[0],@X[0],$T1); # X[0..3] += X[9..12] eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T1,$T0,$sigma0[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsli_32 ($T2,$T0,32-$sigma0[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T3,$T0,$sigma0[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor ($T1,$T1,$T2); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsli_32 ($T3,$T0,32-$sigma0[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor ($T1,$T1,$T3); # sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsli_32 ($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),32-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T5,&Dhi(@X[3]),$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (@X[0],@X[0],$T1); # X[0..3] += sigma0(X[1..4]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor ($T5,$T5,$T4); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsli_32 ($T4,&Dhi(@X[3]),32-$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor ($T5,$T5,$T4); # sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (&Dlo(@X[0]),&Dlo(@X[0]),$T5);# X[0..1] += sigma1(X[14..15]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsli_32 ($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),32-$sigma1[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T5,&Dlo(@X[0]),$sigma1[2]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor ($T5,$T5,$T4); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vshr_u32 ($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vld1_32 ("{$T0}","[$Ktbl,:128]!"); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vsli_32 ($T4,&Dlo(@X[0]),32-$sigma1[1]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &veor ($T5,$T5,$T4); # sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 (&Dhi(@X[0]),&Dhi(@X[0]),$T5);# X[2..3] += sigma1(X[16..17]) eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 ($T0,$T0,@X[0]); while($#insns>=2) { eval(shift(@insns)); } &vst1_32 ("{$T0}","[$Xfer,:128]!"); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub Xpreload() { use integer; my $body = shift; my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vld1_32 ("{$T0}","[$Ktbl,:128]!"); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vrev32_8 (@X[0],@X[0]); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); eval(shift(@insns)); &vadd_i32 ($T0,$T0,@X[0]); foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions &vst1_32 ("{$T0}","[$Xfer,:128]!"); push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[] } sub body_00_15 () { ( '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@V;'. '&add ($h,$h,$t1)', # h+=X[i]+K[i] '&eor ($t1,$f,$g)', '&eor ($t0,$e,$e,"ror#".($Sigma1[1]-$Sigma1[0]))', '&add ($a,$a,$t2)', # h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past '&and ($t1,$t1,$e)', '&eor ($t2,$t0,$e,"ror#".($Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[0]))', # Sigma1(e) '&eor ($t0,$a,$a,"ror#".($Sigma0[1]-$Sigma0[0]))', '&eor ($t1,$t1,$g)', # Ch(e,f,g) '&add ($h,$h,$t2,"ror#$Sigma1[0]")', # h+=Sigma1(e) '&eor ($t2,$a,$b)', # a^b, b^c in next round '&eor ($t0,$t0,$a,"ror#".($Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[0]))', # Sigma0(a) '&add ($h,$h,$t1)', # h+=Ch(e,f,g) '&ldr ($t1,sprintf "[sp,#%d]",4*(($j+1)&15)) if (($j&15)!=15);'. '&ldr ($t1,"[$Ktbl]") if ($j==15);'. '&ldr ($t1,"[sp,#64]") if ($j==31)', '&and ($t3,$t3,$t2)', # (b^c)&=(a^b) '&add ($d,$d,$h)', # d+=h '&add ($h,$h,$t0,"ror#$Sigma0[0]");'. # h+=Sigma0(a) '&eor ($t3,$t3,$b)', # Maj(a,b,c) '$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); ($t2,$t3)=($t3,$t2);' ) } $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .global sha256_block_data_order_neon .type sha256_block_data_order_neon,%function .align 5 .skip 16 sha256_block_data_order_neon: .LNEON: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} sub $H,sp,#16*4+16 adr $Ktbl,K256 bic $H,$H,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores mov $t2,sp mov sp,$H @ alloca add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ len to point at the end of inp vld1.8 {@X[0]},[$inp]! vld1.8 {@X[1]},[$inp]! vld1.8 {@X[2]},[$inp]! vld1.8 {@X[3]},[$inp]! vld1.32 {$T0},[$Ktbl,:128]! vld1.32 {$T1},[$Ktbl,:128]! vld1.32 {$T2},[$Ktbl,:128]! vld1.32 {$T3},[$Ktbl,:128]! vrev32.8 @X[0],@X[0] @ yes, even on str $ctx,[sp,#64] vrev32.8 @X[1],@X[1] @ big-endian str $inp,[sp,#68] mov $Xfer,sp vrev32.8 @X[2],@X[2] str $len,[sp,#72] vrev32.8 @X[3],@X[3] str $t2,[sp,#76] @ save original sp vadd.i32 $T0,$T0,@X[0] vadd.i32 $T1,$T1,@X[1] vst1.32 {$T0},[$Xfer,:128]! vadd.i32 $T2,$T2,@X[2] vst1.32 {$T1},[$Xfer,:128]! vadd.i32 $T3,$T3,@X[3] vst1.32 {$T2},[$Xfer,:128]! vst1.32 {$T3},[$Xfer,:128]! ldmia $ctx,{$A-$H} sub $Xfer,$Xfer,#64 ldr $t1,[sp,#0] eor $t2,$t2,$t2 eor $t3,$B,$C b .L_00_48 .align 4 .L_00_48: ___ &Xupdate(\&body_00_15); &Xupdate(\&body_00_15); &Xupdate(\&body_00_15); &Xupdate(\&body_00_15); $code.=<<___; teq $t1,#0 @ check for K256 terminator ldr $t1,[sp,#0] sub $Xfer,$Xfer,#64 bne .L_00_48 ldr $inp,[sp,#68] ldr $t0,[sp,#72] sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256 @ rewind $Ktbl teq $inp,$t0 it eq subeq $inp,$inp,#64 @ avoid SEGV vld1.8 {@X[0]},[$inp]! @ load next input block vld1.8 {@X[1]},[$inp]! vld1.8 {@X[2]},[$inp]! vld1.8 {@X[3]},[$inp]! it ne strne $inp,[sp,#68] mov $Xfer,sp ___ &Xpreload(\&body_00_15); &Xpreload(\&body_00_15); &Xpreload(\&body_00_15); &Xpreload(\&body_00_15); $code.=<<___; ldr $t0,[$t1,#0] add $A,$A,$t2 @ h+=Maj(a,b,c) from the past ldr $t2,[$t1,#4] ldr $t3,[$t1,#8] ldr $t4,[$t1,#12] add $A,$A,$t0 @ accumulate ldr $t0,[$t1,#16] add $B,$B,$t2 ldr $t2,[$t1,#20] add $C,$C,$t3 ldr $t3,[$t1,#24] add $D,$D,$t4 ldr $t4,[$t1,#28] add $E,$E,$t0 str $A,[$t1],#4 add $F,$F,$t2 str $B,[$t1],#4 add $G,$G,$t3 str $C,[$t1],#4 add $H,$H,$t4 str $D,[$t1],#4 stmia $t1,{$E-$H} ittte ne movne $Xfer,sp ldrne $t1,[sp,#0] eorne $t2,$t2,$t2 ldreq sp,[sp,#76] @ restore original sp itt ne eorne $t3,$B,$C bne .L_00_48 ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} .size sha256_block_data_order_neon,.-sha256_block_data_order_neon #endif ___ }}} ###################################################################### # ARMv8 stuff # {{{ my ($ABCD,$EFGH,$abcd)=map("q$_",(0..2)); my @MSG=map("q$_",(8..11)); my ($W0,$W1,$ABCD_SAVE,$EFGH_SAVE)=map("q$_",(12..15)); my $Ktbl="r3"; $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__) # if defined(__thumb2__) # define INST(a,b,c,d) .byte c,d|0xc,a,b # else # define INST(a,b,c,d) .byte a,b,c,d # endif .type sha256_block_data_order_armv8,%function .align 5 sha256_block_data_order_armv8: .LARMv8: vld1.32 {$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx] sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256+32 add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ len to point at the end of inp b .Loop_v8 .align 4 .Loop_v8: vld1.8 {@MSG[0]-@MSG[1]},[$inp]! vld1.8 {@MSG[2]-@MSG[3]},[$inp]! vld1.32 {$W0},[$Ktbl]! vrev32.8 @MSG[0],@MSG[0] vrev32.8 @MSG[1],@MSG[1] vrev32.8 @MSG[2],@MSG[2] vrev32.8 @MSG[3],@MSG[3] vmov $ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD @ offload vmov $EFGH_SAVE,$EFGH teq $inp,$len ___ for($i=0;$i<12;$i++) { $code.=<<___; vld1.32 {$W1},[$Ktbl]! vadd.i32 $W0,$W0,@MSG[0] sha256su0 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] vmov $abcd,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W0 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W0 sha256su1 @MSG[0],@MSG[2],@MSG[3] ___ ($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } $code.=<<___; vld1.32 {$W1},[$Ktbl]! vadd.i32 $W0,$W0,@MSG[0] vmov $abcd,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W0 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W0 vld1.32 {$W0},[$Ktbl]! vadd.i32 $W1,$W1,@MSG[1] vmov $abcd,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W1 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W1 vld1.32 {$W1},[$Ktbl] vadd.i32 $W0,$W0,@MSG[2] sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256-16 @ rewind vmov $abcd,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W0 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W0 vadd.i32 $W1,$W1,@MSG[3] vmov $abcd,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W1 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W1 vadd.i32 $ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE vadd.i32 $EFGH,$EFGH,$EFGH_SAVE it ne bne .Loop_v8 vst1.32 {$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx] ret @ bx lr .size sha256_block_data_order_armv8,.-sha256_block_data_order_armv8 #endif ___ }}} $code.=<<___; .asciz "SHA256 block transform for ARMv4/NEON/ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__) .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ open SELF,$0; while() { next if (/^#!/); last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/); print; } close SELF; { my %opcode = ( "sha256h" => 0xf3000c40, "sha256h2" => 0xf3100c40, "sha256su0" => 0xf3ba03c0, "sha256su1" => 0xf3200c40 ); sub unsha256 { my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_; if ($arg =~ m/q([0-9]+)(?:,\s*q([0-9]+))?,\s*q([0-9]+)/o) { my $word = $opcode{$mnemonic}|(($1&7)<<13)|(($1&8)<<19) |(($2&7)<<17)|(($2&8)<<4) |(($3&7)<<1) |(($3&8)<<2); # since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian. # correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older # assemblers don't implement it:-( sprintf "INST(0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x)\t@ %s %s", $word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff, ($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff, $mnemonic,$arg; } } } foreach (split($/,$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\b(sha256\w+)\s+(q.*)/unsha256($1,$2)/geo; s/\bret\b/bx lr/go or s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/go; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000002233513176625660017513 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # # Hardware SPARC T4 support by David S. Miller . # ==================================================================== # Performance improvement is not really impressive on pre-T1 CPU: +8% # over Sun C and +25% over gcc [3.3]. While on T1, a.k.a. Niagara, it # turned to be 40% faster than 64-bit code generated by Sun C 5.8 and # >2x than 64-bit code generated by gcc 3.4. And there is a gimmick. # X[16] vector is packed to 8 64-bit registers and as result nothing # is spilled on stack. In addition input data is loaded in compact # instruction sequence, thus minimizing the window when the code is # subject to [inter-thread] cache-thrashing hazard. The goal is to # ensure scalability on UltraSPARC T1, or rather to avoid decay when # amount of active threads exceeds the number of physical cores. # SPARC T4 SHA1 hardware achieves 3.72 cycles per byte, which is 3.1x # faster than software. Multi-process benchmark saturates at 11x # single-process result on 8-core processor, or ~9GBps per 2.85GHz # socket. $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; @X=("%o0","%o1","%o2","%o3","%o4","%o5","%g1","%o7"); $rot1m="%g2"; $tmp64="%g3"; $Xi="%g4"; $A="%l0"; $B="%l1"; $C="%l2"; $D="%l3"; $E="%l4"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); $K_00_19="%l5"; $K_20_39="%l6"; $K_40_59="%l7"; $K_60_79="%g5"; @K=($K_00_19,$K_20_39,$K_40_59,$K_60_79); $ctx="%i0"; $inp="%i1"; $len="%i2"; $tmp0="%i3"; $tmp1="%i4"; $tmp2="%i5"; sub BODY_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $xi=($i&1)?@X[($i/2)%8]:$Xi; $code.=<<___; sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i add @K[$i/20],$e,$e srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e and $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 andn $d,$b,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b or $tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1 or $tmp2,$b,$b add $xi,$e,$e ___ if ($i&1 && $i<15) { $code.= " srlx @X[(($i+1)/2)%8],32,$Xi\n"; } $code.=<<___; add $tmp1,$e,$e ___ } sub Xupdate { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i/2; if ($i&1) { $code.=<<___; sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i add @K[$i/20],$e,$e srl $a,27,$tmp1 ___ } else { $code.=<<___; sllx @X[($j+6)%8],32,$Xi ! Xupdate($i) xor @X[($j+1)%8],@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8] srlx @X[($j+7)%8],32,$tmp1 xor @X[($j+4)%8],@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8] sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i or $tmp1,$Xi,$Xi add @K[$i/20],$e,$e !! xor $Xi,@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8] srlx @X[$j%8],31,$Xi add @X[$j%8],@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8] and $Xi,$rot1m,$Xi andn @X[$j%8],$rot1m,@X[$j%8] srl $a,27,$tmp1 !! or $Xi,@X[$j%8],@X[$j%8] ___ } } sub BODY_16_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; &Xupdate(@_); if ($i&1) { $xi=@X[($i/2)%8]; } else { $xi=$Xi; $code.="\tsrlx @X[($i/2)%8],32,$xi\n"; } $code.=<<___; add $tmp0,$e,$e !! and $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 add $xi,$e,$e andn $d,$b,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b or $tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1 or $tmp2,$b,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $xi; &Xupdate(@_); if ($i&1) { $xi=@X[($i/2)%8]; } else { $xi=$Xi; $code.="\tsrlx @X[($i/2)%8],32,$xi\n"; } $code.=<<___; add $tmp0,$e,$e !! xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e or $tmp2,$b,$b add $xi,$e,$e ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $xi; &Xupdate(@_); if ($i&1) { $xi=@X[($i/2)%8]; } else { $xi=$Xi; $code.="\tsrlx @X[($i/2)%8],32,$xi\n"; } $code.=<<___; add $tmp0,$e,$e !! and $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 or $c,$b,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b and $d,$tmp1,$tmp1 add $xi,$e,$e or $tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1 or $tmp2,$b,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e ___ } $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif .align 32 .globl sha1_block_data_order sha1_block_data_order: SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+4],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] andcc %g1, CFR_SHA1, %g0 be .Lsoftware nop ld [%o0 + 0x00], %f0 ! load context ld [%o0 + 0x04], %f1 ld [%o0 + 0x08], %f2 andcc %o1, 0x7, %g0 ld [%o0 + 0x0c], %f3 bne,pn %icc, .Lhwunaligned ld [%o0 + 0x10], %f4 .Lhw_loop: ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f8 ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f10 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f12 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f14 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f16 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f18 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f20 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f22 add %o1, 0x40, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 .word 0x81b02820 ! SHA1 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhw_loop nop .Lhwfinish: st %f0, [%o0 + 0x00] ! store context st %f1, [%o0 + 0x04] st %f2, [%o0 + 0x08] st %f3, [%o0 + 0x0c] retl st %f4, [%o0 + 0x10] .align 8 .Lhwunaligned: alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1 ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f10 .Lhwunaligned_loop: ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f12 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f14 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f16 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f18 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f20 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f22 ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f24 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x40], %f26 add %o1, 0x40, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 faligndata %f10, %f12, %f8 faligndata %f12, %f14, %f10 faligndata %f14, %f16, %f12 faligndata %f16, %f18, %f14 faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16 faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18 faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20 faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22 .word 0x81b02820 ! SHA1 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop for %f26, %f26, %f10 ! %f10=%f26 ba .Lhwfinish nop .align 16 .Lsoftware: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp sllx $len,6,$len add $inp,$len,$len or %g0,1,$rot1m sllx $rot1m,32,$rot1m or $rot1m,1,$rot1m ld [$ctx+0],$A ld [$ctx+4],$B ld [$ctx+8],$C ld [$ctx+12],$D ld [$ctx+16],$E andn $inp,7,$tmp0 sethi %hi(0x5a827999),$K_00_19 or $K_00_19,%lo(0x5a827999),$K_00_19 sethi %hi(0x6ed9eba1),$K_20_39 or $K_20_39,%lo(0x6ed9eba1),$K_20_39 sethi %hi(0x8f1bbcdc),$K_40_59 or $K_40_59,%lo(0x8f1bbcdc),$K_40_59 sethi %hi(0xca62c1d6),$K_60_79 or $K_60_79,%lo(0xca62c1d6),$K_60_79 .Lloop: ldx [$tmp0+0],@X[0] ldx [$tmp0+16],@X[2] ldx [$tmp0+32],@X[4] ldx [$tmp0+48],@X[6] and $inp,7,$tmp1 ldx [$tmp0+8],@X[1] sll $tmp1,3,$tmp1 ldx [$tmp0+24],@X[3] subcc %g0,$tmp1,$tmp2 ! should be 64-$tmp1, but -$tmp1 works too ldx [$tmp0+40],@X[5] bz,pt %icc,.Laligned ldx [$tmp0+56],@X[7] sllx @X[0],$tmp1,@X[0] ldx [$tmp0+64],$tmp64 ___ for($i=0;$i<7;$i++) { $code.=<<___; srlx @X[$i+1],$tmp2,$Xi sllx @X[$i+1],$tmp1,@X[$i+1] or $Xi,@X[$i],@X[$i] ___ } $code.=<<___; srlx $tmp64,$tmp2,$tmp64 or $tmp64,@X[7],@X[7] .Laligned: srlx @X[0],32,$Xi ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_16_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; ld [$ctx+0],@X[0] ld [$ctx+4],@X[1] ld [$ctx+8],@X[2] ld [$ctx+12],@X[3] add $inp,64,$inp ld [$ctx+16],@X[4] cmp $inp,$len add $A,@X[0],$A st $A,[$ctx+0] add $B,@X[1],$B st $B,[$ctx+4] add $C,@X[2],$C st $C,[$ctx+8] add $D,@X[3],$D st $D,[$ctx+12] add $E,@X[4],$E st $E,[$ctx+16] bne SIZE_T_CC,.Lloop andn $inp,7,$tmp0 ret restore .type sha1_block_data_order,#function .size sha1_block_data_order,(.-sha1_block_data_order) .asciz "SHA1 block transform for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my $ref,$opf; my %visopf = ( "faligndata" => 0x048, "for" => 0x07c ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unalignaddr { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { if (/%([goli])([0-7])/) { $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } else { return $ref; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2, $ref; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unvis($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-alpha.pl0000644000000000000000000001420613176625657017215 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA1 block procedure for Alpha. # On 21264 performance is 33% better than code generated by vendor # compiler, and 75% better than GCC [3.4], and in absolute terms is # 8.7 cycles per processed byte. Implementation features vectorized # byte swap, but not Xupdate. @X=( "\$0", "\$1", "\$2", "\$3", "\$4", "\$5", "\$6", "\$7", "\$8", "\$9", "\$10", "\$11", "\$12", "\$13", "\$14", "\$15"); $ctx="a0"; # $16 $inp="a1"; $num="a2"; $A="a3"; $B="a4"; # 20 $C="a5"; $D="t8"; $E="t9"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); $t0="t10"; # 24 $t1="t11"; $t2="ra"; $t3="t12"; $K="AT"; # 28 sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i==0); ldq_u @X[0],0+0($inp) ldq_u @X[1],0+7($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!($i&1) && $i<14); ldq_u @X[$i+2],($i+2)*4+0($inp) ldq_u @X[$i+3],($i+2)*4+7($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!($i&1) && $i<15); extql @X[$i],$inp,@X[$i] extqh @X[$i+1],$inp,@X[$i+1] or @X[$i+1],@X[$i],@X[$i] # pair of 32-bit values are fetched srl @X[$i],24,$t0 # vectorized byte swap srl @X[$i],8,$t2 sll @X[$i],8,$t3 sll @X[$i],24,@X[$i] zapnot $t0,0x11,$t0 zapnot $t2,0x22,$t2 zapnot @X[$i],0x88,@X[$i] or $t0,$t2,$t0 zapnot $t3,0x44,$t3 sll $a,5,$t1 or @X[$i],$t0,@X[$i] addl $K,$e,$e and $b,$c,$t2 zapnot $a,0xf,$a or @X[$i],$t3,@X[$i] srl $a,27,$t0 bic $d,$b,$t3 sll $b,30,$b extll @X[$i],4,@X[$i+1] # extract upper half or $t2,$t3,$t2 addl @X[$i],$e,$e addl $t1,$e,$e srl $b,32,$t3 zapnot @X[$i],0xf,@X[$i] addl $t0,$e,$e addl $t2,$e,$e or $t3,$b,$b ___ $code.=<<___ if (($i&1) && $i<15); sll $a,5,$t1 addl $K,$e,$e and $b,$c,$t2 zapnot $a,0xf,$a srl $a,27,$t0 addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e bic $d,$b,$t3 sll $b,30,$b or $t2,$t3,$t2 addl $t1,$e,$e srl $b,32,$t3 zapnot @X[$i],0xf,@X[$i] addl $t0,$e,$e addl $t2,$e,$e or $t3,$b,$b ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); # with forward Xupdate sll $a,5,$t1 addl $K,$e,$e and $b,$c,$t2 xor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] zapnot $a,0xf,$a addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e bic $d,$b,$t3 xor @X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] srl $a,27,$t0 addl $t1,$e,$e or $t2,$t3,$t2 xor @X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] sll $b,30,$b addl $t0,$e,$e srl @X[$j%16],31,$t1 addl $t2,$e,$e srl $b,32,$t3 addl @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] or $t3,$b,$b zapnot @X[$i%16],0xf,@X[$i%16] or $t1,@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); # with forward Xupdate sll $a,5,$t1 addl $K,$e,$e zapnot $a,0xf,$a xor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] sll $b,30,$t3 addl $t1,$e,$e xor $b,$c,$t2 xor @X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] srl $b,2,$b addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e xor $d,$t2,$t2 xor @X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] srl @X[$j%16],31,$t1 addl $t2,$e,$e srl $a,27,$t0 addl @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] or $t3,$b,$b addl $t0,$e,$e or $t1,@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<77); zapnot @X[$i%16],0xf,@X[$i%16] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); # with context fetch sll $a,5,$t1 addl $K,$e,$e zapnot $a,0xf,$a ldl @X[0],0($ctx) sll $b,30,$t3 addl $t1,$e,$e xor $b,$c,$t2 ldl @X[1],4($ctx) srl $b,2,$b addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e xor $d,$t2,$t2 ldl @X[2],8($ctx) srl $a,27,$t0 addl $t2,$e,$e ldl @X[3],12($ctx) or $t3,$b,$b addl $t0,$e,$e ldl @X[4],16($ctx) ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___; # with forward Xupdate sll $a,5,$t1 addl $K,$e,$e zapnot $a,0xf,$a xor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] srl $a,27,$t0 and $b,$c,$t2 and $b,$d,$t3 xor @X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] sll $b,30,$b addl $t1,$e,$e xor @X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] srl @X[$j%16],31,$t1 addl $t0,$e,$e or $t2,$t3,$t2 and $c,$d,$t3 or $t2,$t3,$t2 srl $b,32,$t3 addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e addl @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] or $t3,$b,$b addl $t2,$e,$e or $t1,@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] zapnot @X[$i%16],0xf,@X[$i%16] ___ } $code=<<___; #ifdef __linux__ #include #else #include #include #endif .text .set noat .set noreorder .globl sha1_block_data_order .align 5 .ent sha1_block_data_order sha1_block_data_order: lda sp,-64(sp) stq ra,0(sp) stq s0,8(sp) stq s1,16(sp) stq s2,24(sp) stq s3,32(sp) stq s4,40(sp) stq s5,48(sp) stq fp,56(sp) .mask 0x0400fe00,-64 .frame sp,64,ra .prologue 0 ldl $A,0($ctx) ldl $B,4($ctx) sll $num,6,$num ldl $C,8($ctx) ldl $D,12($ctx) ldl $E,16($ctx) addq $inp,$num,$num .Lloop: .set noreorder ldah $K,23170(zero) zapnot $B,0xf,$B lda $K,31129($K) # K_00_19 ___ for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; ldah $K,28378(zero) lda $K,-5215($K) # K_20_39 ___ for (;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; ldah $K,-28900(zero) lda $K,-17188($K) # K_40_59 ___ for (;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; ldah $K,-13725(zero) lda $K,-15914($K) # K_60_79 ___ for (;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; addl @X[0],$A,$A addl @X[1],$B,$B addl @X[2],$C,$C addl @X[3],$D,$D addl @X[4],$E,$E stl $A,0($ctx) stl $B,4($ctx) addq $inp,64,$inp stl $C,8($ctx) stl $D,12($ctx) stl $E,16($ctx) cmpult $inp,$num,$t1 bne $t1,.Lloop .set noreorder ldq ra,0(sp) ldq s0,8(sp) ldq s1,16(sp) ldq s2,24(sp) ldq s3,32(sp) ldq s4,40(sp) ldq s5,48(sp) ldq fp,56(sp) lda sp,64(sp) ret (ra) .end sha1_block_data_order .ascii "SHA1 block transform for Alpha, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ $output=pop and open STDOUT,">$output"; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl0000755000000000000000000005207513176625660017563 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA256/512 block procedure for PA-RISC. # June 2009. # # SHA256 performance is >75% better than gcc 3.2 generated code on # PA-7100LC. Compared to code generated by vendor compiler this # implementation is almost 70% faster in 64-bit build, but delivers # virtually same performance in 32-bit build on PA-8600. # # SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on # PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the # code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit # code path delivering adequate performance even in "blended" 32-bit # build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by # vendor compiler on PA-8600... # # Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $FRAME_MARKER =80; $SAVED_RP =16; $PUSH ="std"; $PUSHMA ="std,ma"; $POP ="ldd"; $POPMB ="ldd,mb"; } else { $LEVEL ="1.0"; $SIZE_T =4; $FRAME_MARKER =48; $SAVED_RP =20; $PUSH ="stw"; $PUSHMA ="stwm"; $POP ="ldw"; $POPMB ="ldwm"; } if ($output =~ /512/) { $func="sha512_block_data_order"; $SZ=8; @Sigma0=(28,34,39); @Sigma1=(14,18,41); @sigma0=(1, 8, 7); @sigma1=(19,61, 6); $rounds=80; $LAST10BITS=0x017; $LD="ldd"; $LDM="ldd,ma"; $ST="std"; } else { $func="sha256_block_data_order"; $SZ=4; @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 7,18, 3); @sigma1=(17,19,10); $rounds=64; $LAST10BITS=0x0f2; $LD="ldw"; $LDM="ldwm"; $ST="stw"; } $FRAME=16*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 16 saved regs + frame marker # [+ argument transfer] $XOFF=16*$SZ+32; # local variables $FRAME+=$XOFF; $XOFF+=$FRAME_MARKER; # distance between %sp and local variables $ctx="%r26"; # zapped by $a0 $inp="%r25"; # zapped by $a1 $num="%r24"; # zapped by $t0 $a0 ="%r26"; $a1 ="%r25"; $t0 ="%r24"; $t1 ="%r29"; $Tbl="%r31"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%r17","%r18","%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23","%r28"); @X=("%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16",$inp); sub ROUND_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; $code.=<<___; _ror $e,$Sigma1[0],$a0 and $f,$e,$t0 _ror $e,$Sigma1[1],$a1 addl $t1,$h,$h andcm $g,$e,$t1 xor $a1,$a0,$a0 _ror $a1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`,$a1 or $t0,$t1,$t1 ; Ch(e,f,g) addl @X[$i%16],$h,$h xor $a0,$a1,$a1 ; Sigma1(e) addl $t1,$h,$h _ror $a,$Sigma0[0],$a0 addl $a1,$h,$h _ror $a,$Sigma0[1],$a1 and $a,$b,$t0 and $a,$c,$t1 xor $a1,$a0,$a0 _ror $a1,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`,$a1 xor $t1,$t0,$t0 and $b,$c,$t1 xor $a0,$a1,$a1 ; Sigma0(a) addl $h,$d,$d xor $t1,$t0,$t0 ; Maj(a,b,c) `"$LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1" if ($i<15)` addl $a1,$h,$h addl $t0,$h,$h ___ } sub ROUND_16_xx { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; $i-=16; $code.=<<___; _ror @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[0],$a0 _ror @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[1],$a1 addl @X[($i+9)%16],@X[$i],@X[$i] _ror @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[0],$t0 _ror @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[1],$t1 xor $a1,$a0,$a0 _shr @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[2],$a1 xor $t1,$t0,$t0 _shr @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[2],$t1 xor $a1,$a0,$a0 ; sigma0(X[(i+1)&0x0f]) xor $t1,$t0,$t0 ; sigma1(X[(i+14)&0x0f]) $LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1 addl $a0,@X[$i],@X[$i] addl $t0,@X[$i],@X[$i] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==15); extru $t1,31,10,$a1 comiclr,<> $LAST10BITS,$a1,%r0 ldo 1($Tbl),$Tbl ; signal end of $Tbl ___ &ROUND_00_15($i+16,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h); } $code=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .ALIGN 64 L\$table ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); .WORD 0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22,0x71374491,0x23ef65cd .WORD 0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc .WORD 0x3956c25b,0xf348b538,0x59f111f1,0xb605d019 .WORD 0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b,0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118 .WORD 0xd807aa98,0xa3030242,0x12835b01,0x45706fbe .WORD 0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2 .WORD 0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f,0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1 .WORD 0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235,0xc19bf174,0xcf692694 .WORD 0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2,0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3 .WORD 0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65 .WORD 0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275,0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483 .WORD 0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4,0x76f988da,0x831153b5 .WORD 0x983e5152,0xee66dfab,0xa831c66d,0x2db43210 .WORD 0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f,0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4 .WORD 0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2,0xd5a79147,0x930aa725 .WORD 0x06ca6351,0xe003826f,0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70 .WORD 0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc,0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926 .WORD 0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed,0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df .WORD 0x650a7354,0x8baf63de,0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8 .WORD 0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6,0x92722c85,0x1482353b .WORD 0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364,0xa81a664b,0xbc423001 .WORD 0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791,0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30 .WORD 0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218,0xd6990624,0x5565a910 .WORD 0xf40e3585,0x5771202a,0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8 .WORD 0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8,0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53 .WORD 0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8 .WORD 0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb .WORD 0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373,0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3 .WORD 0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc,0x78a5636f,0x43172f60 .WORD 0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72,0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec .WORD 0x90befffa,0x23631e28,0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9 .WORD 0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915,0xc67178f2,0xe372532b .WORD 0xca273ece,0xea26619c,0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207 .WORD 0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178 .WORD 0x06f067aa,0x72176fba,0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6 .WORD 0x113f9804,0xbef90dae,0x1b710b35,0x131c471b .WORD 0x28db77f5,0x23047d84,0x32caab7b,0x40c72493 .WORD 0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc,0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c .WORD 0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6,0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a .WORD 0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec,0x6c44198c,0x4a475817 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); .WORD 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .WORD 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .WORD 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .WORD 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .WORD 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .WORD 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .WORD 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .WORD 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .WORD 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .WORD 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .WORD 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .WORD 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .WORD 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .WORD 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .WORD 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .WORD 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 ___ $code.=<<___; .EXPORT $func,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR .ALIGN 64 $func .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp) _shl $num,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`,$num addl $inp,$num,$num ; $num to point at the end of $inp $PUSH $num,`-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save arguments $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH $ctx,`-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) blr %r0,$Tbl ldi 3,$t1 L\$pic andcm $Tbl,$t1,$Tbl ; wipe privilege level ldo L\$table-L\$pic($Tbl),$Tbl ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4); ldi 31,$t1 mtctl $t1,%cr11 extrd,u,*= $t1,%sar,1,$t1 ; executes on PA-RISC 1.0 b L\$parisc1 nop ___ $code.=<<___; $LD `0*$SZ`($ctx),$A ; load context $LD `1*$SZ`($ctx),$B $LD `2*$SZ`($ctx),$C $LD `3*$SZ`($ctx),$D $LD `4*$SZ`($ctx),$E $LD `5*$SZ`($ctx),$F $LD `6*$SZ`($ctx),$G $LD `7*$SZ`($ctx),$H extru $inp,31,`log($SZ)/log(2)`,$t0 sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0 subi `8*$SZ`,$t0,$t0 mtctl $t0,%cr11 ; load %sar with align factor L\$oop ldi `$SZ-1`,$t0 $LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1 andcm $inp,$t0,$t0 ; align $inp ___ for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) { # load input block $code.="\t$LD `$SZ*$i`($t0),@X[$i]\n"; } $code.=<<___; cmpb,*= $inp,$t0,L\$aligned $LD `$SZ*15`($t0),@X[15] $LD `$SZ*16`($t0),@X[16] ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { # align data $code.="\t_align @X[$i],@X[$i+1],@X[$i]\n"; } $code.=<<___; L\$aligned nop ; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; L\$rounds nop ; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; bb,>= $Tbl,31,L\$rounds ; end of $Tbl signalled? nop $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx ; restore arguments $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num ldo `-$rounds*$SZ-1`($Tbl),$Tbl ; rewind $Tbl $LD `0*$SZ`($ctx),@X[0] ; load context $LD `1*$SZ`($ctx),@X[1] $LD `2*$SZ`($ctx),@X[2] $LD `3*$SZ`($ctx),@X[3] $LD `4*$SZ`($ctx),@X[4] $LD `5*$SZ`($ctx),@X[5] addl @X[0],$A,$A $LD `6*$SZ`($ctx),@X[6] addl @X[1],$B,$B $LD `7*$SZ`($ctx),@X[7] ldo `16*$SZ`($inp),$inp ; advance $inp $ST $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) ; save context addl @X[2],$C,$C $ST $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx) addl @X[3],$D,$D $ST $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx) addl @X[4],$E,$E $ST $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx) addl @X[5],$F,$F $ST $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx) addl @X[6],$G,$G $ST $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx) addl @X[7],$H,$H $ST $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx) cmpb,*<>,n $inp,$num,L\$oop $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save $inp ___ if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4) # SHA512 for 32-bit PA-RISC 1.0 {{ $code.=<<___; b L\$done nop .ALIGN 64 L\$parisc1 ___ @V=( $Ahi, $Alo, $Bhi, $Blo, $Chi, $Clo, $Dhi, $Dlo, $Ehi, $Elo, $Fhi, $Flo, $Ghi, $Glo, $Hhi, $Hlo) = ( "%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8", "%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16"); $a0 ="%r17"; $a1 ="%r18"; $a2 ="%r19"; $a3 ="%r20"; $t0 ="%r21"; $t1 ="%r22"; $t2 ="%r28"; $t3 ="%r29"; $Tbl="%r31"; @X=("%r23","%r24","%r25","%r26"); # zaps $num,$inp,$ctx sub ROUND_00_15_pa1 { my ($i,$ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo, $ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo,$flag)=@_; my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X; $code.=<<___ if (!$flag); ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo ; load X[i+1] ___ $code.=<<___; shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[0],$t0 add $Xlo,$hlo,$hlo shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[0],$t1 addc $Xhi,$hhi,$hhi ; h += X[i] shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[1],$t2 ldwm 8($Tbl),$Xhi shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[1],$t3 ldw -4($Tbl),$Xlo ; load K[i] xor $t2,$t0,$t0 xor $t3,$t1,$t1 and $flo,$elo,$a0 and $fhi,$ehi,$a1 shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[2],$t2 andcm $glo,$elo,$a2 shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[2],$t3 andcm $ghi,$ehi,$a3 xor $t2,$t0,$t0 xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; Sigma1(e) add $Xlo,$hlo,$hlo xor $a2,$a0,$a0 addc $Xhi,$hhi,$hhi ; h += K[i] xor $a3,$a1,$a1 ; Ch(e,f,g) add $t0,$hlo,$hlo shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[0],$t0 addc $t1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Sigma1(e) shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[0],$t1 add $a0,$hlo,$hlo shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[1],$t2 addc $a1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Ch(e,f,g) shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[1],$t3 xor $t2,$t0,$t0 xor $t3,$t1,$t1 shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[2],$t2 and $alo,$blo,$a0 shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[2],$t3 and $ahi,$bhi,$a1 xor $t2,$t0,$t0 xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; Sigma0(a) and $alo,$clo,$a2 and $ahi,$chi,$a3 xor $a2,$a0,$a0 add $hlo,$dlo,$dlo xor $a3,$a1,$a1 addc $hhi,$dhi,$dhi ; d += h and $blo,$clo,$a2 add $t0,$hlo,$hlo and $bhi,$chi,$a3 addc $t1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Sigma0(a) xor $a2,$a0,$a0 add $a0,$hlo,$hlo xor $a3,$a1,$a1 ; Maj(a,b,c) addc $a1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Maj(a,b,c) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $flag); extru $Xlo,31,10,$Xlo comiclr,= $LAST10BITS,$Xlo,%r0 b L\$rounds_pa1 nop ___ push(@X,shift(@X)); push(@X,shift(@X)); } sub ROUND_16_xx_pa1 { my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X; my ($i)=shift; $i-=16; $code.=<<___; ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo ; load X[i+1] ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)`(%sp),$a1 ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)+4`(%sp),$a0 ; load X[i+9] ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)`(%sp),$a3 ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)+4`(%sp),$a2 ; load X[i+14] shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[0],$t0 shd $Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[0],$t1 add $a0,$Xlo,$Xlo shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[1],$t2 addc $a1,$Xhi,$Xhi shd $Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[1],$t3 xor $t2,$t0,$t0 shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[2],$t2 xor $t3,$t1,$t1 extru $Xnhi,`31-$sigma0[2]`,`32-$sigma0[2]`,$t3 xor $t2,$t0,$t0 shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[0],$a0 xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; sigma0(X[i+1)&0x0f]) shd $a2,$a3,$sigma1[0],$a1 add $t0,$Xlo,$Xlo shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[1],$t2 addc $t1,$Xhi,$Xhi shd $a2,$a3,$sigma1[1],$t3 xor $t2,$a0,$a0 shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[2],$t2 xor $t3,$a1,$a1 extru $a3,`31-$sigma1[2]`,`32-$sigma1[2]`,$t3 xor $t2,$a0,$a0 xor $t3,$a1,$a1 ; sigma0(X[i+14)&0x0f]) add $a0,$Xlo,$Xlo addc $a1,$Xhi,$Xhi stw $Xhi,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)`(%sp) stw $Xlo,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)+4`(%sp) ___ &ROUND_00_15_pa1($i,@_,1); } $code.=<<___; ldw `0*4`($ctx),$Ahi ; load context ldw `1*4`($ctx),$Alo ldw `2*4`($ctx),$Bhi ldw `3*4`($ctx),$Blo ldw `4*4`($ctx),$Chi ldw `5*4`($ctx),$Clo ldw `6*4`($ctx),$Dhi ldw `7*4`($ctx),$Dlo ldw `8*4`($ctx),$Ehi ldw `9*4`($ctx),$Elo ldw `10*4`($ctx),$Fhi ldw `11*4`($ctx),$Flo ldw `12*4`($ctx),$Ghi ldw `13*4`($ctx),$Glo ldw `14*4`($ctx),$Hhi ldw `15*4`($ctx),$Hlo extru $inp,31,2,$t0 sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0 subi 32,$t0,$t0 mtctl $t0,%cr11 ; load %sar with align factor L\$oop_pa1 extru $inp,31,2,$a3 comib,= 0,$a3,L\$aligned_pa1 sub $inp,$a3,$inp ldw `0*4`($inp),$X[0] ldw `1*4`($inp),$X[1] ldw `2*4`($inp),$t2 ldw `3*4`($inp),$t3 ldw `4*4`($inp),$a0 ldw `5*4`($inp),$a1 ldw `6*4`($inp),$a2 ldw `7*4`($inp),$a3 vshd $X[0],$X[1],$X[0] vshd $X[1],$t2,$X[1] stw $X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp) ldw `8*4`($inp),$t0 vshd $t2,$t3,$t2 stw $X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp) ldw `9*4`($inp),$t1 vshd $t3,$a0,$t3 ___ { my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1); for ($i=2;$i<=(128/4-8);$i++) { $code.=<<___; stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp) ldw `(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0] vshd $t[1],$t[2],$t[1] ___ push(@t,shift(@t)); } for (;$i<(128/4-1);$i++) { $code.=<<___; stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp) vshd $t[1],$t[2],$t[1] ___ push(@t,shift(@t)); } $code.=<<___; b L\$collected_pa1 stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp) ___ } $code.=<<___; L\$aligned_pa1 ldw `0*4`($inp),$X[0] ldw `1*4`($inp),$X[1] ldw `2*4`($inp),$t2 ldw `3*4`($inp),$t3 ldw `4*4`($inp),$a0 ldw `5*4`($inp),$a1 ldw `6*4`($inp),$a2 ldw `7*4`($inp),$a3 stw $X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp) ldw `8*4`($inp),$t0 stw $X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp) ldw `9*4`($inp),$t1 ___ { my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1); for ($i=2;$i<(128/4-8);$i++) { $code.=<<___; stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp) ldw `(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0] ___ push(@t,shift(@t)); } for (;$i<128/4;$i++) { $code.=<<___; stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp) ___ push(@t,shift(@t)); } $code.="L\$collected_pa1\n"; } for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15_pa1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.="L\$rounds_pa1\n"; for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx_pa1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx ; restore arguments $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num ldo `-$rounds*$SZ`($Tbl),$Tbl ; rewind $Tbl ldw `0*4`($ctx),$t1 ; update context ldw `1*4`($ctx),$t0 ldw `2*4`($ctx),$t3 ldw `3*4`($ctx),$t2 ldw `4*4`($ctx),$a1 ldw `5*4`($ctx),$a0 ldw `6*4`($ctx),$a3 add $t0,$Alo,$Alo ldw `7*4`($ctx),$a2 addc $t1,$Ahi,$Ahi ldw `8*4`($ctx),$t1 add $t2,$Blo,$Blo ldw `9*4`($ctx),$t0 addc $t3,$Bhi,$Bhi ldw `10*4`($ctx),$t3 add $a0,$Clo,$Clo ldw `11*4`($ctx),$t2 addc $a1,$Chi,$Chi ldw `12*4`($ctx),$a1 add $a2,$Dlo,$Dlo ldw `13*4`($ctx),$a0 addc $a3,$Dhi,$Dhi ldw `14*4`($ctx),$a3 add $t0,$Elo,$Elo ldw `15*4`($ctx),$a2 addc $t1,$Ehi,$Ehi stw $Ahi,`0*4`($ctx) add $t2,$Flo,$Flo stw $Alo,`1*4`($ctx) addc $t3,$Fhi,$Fhi stw $Bhi,`2*4`($ctx) add $a0,$Glo,$Glo stw $Blo,`3*4`($ctx) addc $a1,$Ghi,$Ghi stw $Chi,`4*4`($ctx) add $a2,$Hlo,$Hlo stw $Clo,`5*4`($ctx) addc $a3,$Hhi,$Hhi stw $Dhi,`6*4`($ctx) ldo `16*$SZ`($inp),$inp ; advance $inp stw $Dlo,`7*4`($ctx) stw $Ehi,`8*4`($ctx) stw $Elo,`9*4`($ctx) stw $Fhi,`10*4`($ctx) stw $Flo,`11*4`($ctx) stw $Ghi,`12*4`($ctx) stw $Glo,`13*4`($ctx) stw $Hhi,`14*4`($ctx) comb,= $inp,$num,L\$done stw $Hlo,`15*4`($ctx) b L\$oop_pa1 $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save $inp L\$done ___ }} $code.=<<___; $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11 $POP `-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12 $POP `-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13 $POP `-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14 $POP `-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15 $POP `-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16 $POP `-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17 $POP `-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18 bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .STRINGZ "SHA`64*$SZ` block transform for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ # Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so # that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I # wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0 # directive... my $ldd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 3 suffices { my $opcode=(0x14<<26)|($2<<21)|($3<<16)|(($1&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($1>>13)&1); $opcode|=(1<<3) if ($mod =~ /^,m/); $opcode|=(1<<2) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $std = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "std$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 3 suffices { my $opcode=(0x1c<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(($2&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($2>>13)&1); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $extrd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args"; # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded... if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 15 { my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16); my $len=32-$3; $opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5); # encode pos $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f); # encode len sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 12 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9); my $len=32-$2; $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f); # encode len $opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/); sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; my $shrpd = sub { my ($mod,$args) = @_; my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args"; if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 14 { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4; my $cpos=63-$3; $opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5); # encode sa sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig; } elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%sar,%r([0-9]+)/) # format 11 { sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s", (0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<9)|$3,$orig; } else { "\t".$orig; } }; sub assemble { my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_; my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic"); ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args"; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/shd\s+(%r[0-9]+),(%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/ $3>31 ? sprintf("shd\t%$2,%$1,%d",$3-32) # rotation for >=32 : sprintf("shd\t%$1,%$2,%d",$3)/e or # translate made up instructons: _ror, _shr, _align, _shl s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/ ($SZ==4 ? "shd" : "shrpd")."$1$2,$2,"/e or s/_shr(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/ $SZ==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2) : sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e or s/_align(\s+%r[0-9]+,%r[0-9]+),/ ($SZ==4 ? "vshd$1," : "shrpd$1,%sar,")/e or s/_shl(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/ $SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("zdep%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2) : sprintf("depd,z%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e; s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($SIZE_T==4); s/cmpb,\*/comb,/ if ($SIZE_T==4); s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8); print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000005276613176625660017675 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # # Hardware SPARC T4 support by David S. Miller . # ==================================================================== # SHA256 performance improvement over compiler generated code varies # from 40% for Sun C [32-bit build] to 70% for gcc [3.3, 64-bit # build]. Just like in SHA1 module I aim to ensure scalability on # UltraSPARC T1 by packing X[16] to 8 64-bit registers. # SHA512 on pre-T1 UltraSPARC. # # Performance is >75% better than 64-bit code generated by Sun C and # over 2x than 32-bit code. X[16] resides on stack, but access to it # is scheduled for L2 latency and staged through 32 least significant # bits of %l0-%l7. The latter is done to achieve 32-/64-bit ABI # duality. Nevetheless it's ~40% faster than SHA256, which is pretty # good [optimal coefficient is 50%]. # # SHA512 on UltraSPARC T1. # # It's not any faster than 64-bit code generated by Sun C 5.8. This is # because 64-bit code generator has the advantage of using 64-bit # loads(*) to access X[16], which I consciously traded for 32-/64-bit # ABI duality [as per above]. But it surpasses 32-bit Sun C generated # code by 60%, not to mention that it doesn't suffer from severe decay # when running 4 times physical cores threads and that it leaves gcc # [3.4] behind by over 4x factor! If compared to SHA256, single thread # performance is only 10% better, but overall throughput for maximum # amount of threads for given CPU exceeds corresponding one of SHA256 # by 30% [again, optimal coefficient is 50%]. # # (*) Unlike pre-T1 UltraSPARC loads on T1 are executed strictly # in-order, i.e. load instruction has to complete prior next # instruction in given thread is executed, even if the latter is # not dependent on load result! This means that on T1 two 32-bit # loads are always slower than one 64-bit load. Once again this # is unlike pre-T1 UltraSPARC, where, if scheduled appropriately, # 2x32-bit loads can be as fast as 1x64-bit ones. # # SPARC T4 SHA256/512 hardware achieves 3.17/2.01 cycles per byte, # which is 9.3x/11.1x faster than software. Multi-process benchmark # saturates at 11.5x single-process result on 8-core processor, or # ~11/16GBps per 2.85GHz socket. $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($output =~ /512/) { $label="512"; $SZ=8; $LD="ldx"; # load from memory $ST="stx"; # store to memory $SLL="sllx"; # shift left logical $SRL="srlx"; # shift right logical @Sigma0=(28,34,39); @Sigma1=(14,18,41); @sigma0=( 7, 1, 8); # right shift first @sigma1=( 6,19,61); # right shift first $lastK=0x817; $rounds=80; $align=4; $locals=16*$SZ; # X[16] $A="%o0"; $B="%o1"; $C="%o2"; $D="%o3"; $E="%o4"; $F="%o5"; $G="%g1"; $H="%o7"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H); } else { $label="256"; $SZ=4; $LD="ld"; # load from memory $ST="st"; # store to memory $SLL="sll"; # shift left logical $SRL="srl"; # shift right logical @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 3, 7,18); # right shift first @sigma1=(10,17,19); # right shift first $lastK=0x8f2; $rounds=64; $align=8; $locals=0; # X[16] is register resident @X=("%o0","%o1","%o2","%o3","%o4","%o5","%g1","%o7"); $A="%l0"; $B="%l1"; $C="%l2"; $D="%l3"; $E="%l4"; $F="%l5"; $G="%l6"; $H="%l7"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H); } $T1="%g2"; $tmp0="%g3"; $tmp1="%g4"; $tmp2="%g5"; $ctx="%i0"; $inp="%i1"; $len="%i2"; $Ktbl="%i3"; $tmp31="%i4"; $tmp32="%i5"; ########### SHA256 $Xload = sub { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; if ($i==0) { $code.=<<___; ldx [$inp+0],@X[0] ldx [$inp+16],@X[2] ldx [$inp+32],@X[4] ldx [$inp+48],@X[6] ldx [$inp+8],@X[1] ldx [$inp+24],@X[3] subcc %g0,$tmp31,$tmp32 ! should be 64-$tmp31, but -$tmp31 works too ldx [$inp+40],@X[5] bz,pt %icc,.Laligned ldx [$inp+56],@X[7] sllx @X[0],$tmp31,@X[0] ldx [$inp+64],$T1 ___ for($j=0;$j<7;$j++) { $code.=<<___; srlx @X[$j+1],$tmp32,$tmp1 sllx @X[$j+1],$tmp31,@X[$j+1] or $tmp1,@X[$j],@X[$j] ___ } $code.=<<___; srlx $T1,$tmp32,$T1 or $T1,@X[7],@X[7] .Laligned: ___ } if ($i&1) { $code.="\tadd @X[$i/2],$h,$T1\n"; } else { $code.="\tsrlx @X[$i/2],32,$T1\n\tadd $h,$T1,$T1\n"; } } if ($SZ==4); ########### SHA512 $Xload = sub { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; my @pair=("%l".eval(($i*2)%8),"%l".eval(($i*2)%8+1),"%l".eval((($i+1)*2)%8)); $code.=<<___ if ($i==0); ld [$inp+0],%l0 ld [$inp+4],%l1 ld [$inp+8],%l2 ld [$inp+12],%l3 ld [$inp+16],%l4 ld [$inp+20],%l5 ld [$inp+24],%l6 cmp $tmp31,0 ld [$inp+28],%l7 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); sllx @pair[1],$tmp31,$tmp2 ! Xload($i) add $tmp31,32,$tmp0 sllx @pair[0],$tmp0,$tmp1 `"ld [$inp+".eval(32+0+$i*8)."],@pair[0]" if ($i<12)` srlx @pair[2],$tmp32,@pair[1] or $tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2 or @pair[1],$tmp2,$tmp2 `"ld [$inp+".eval(32+4+$i*8)."],@pair[1]" if ($i<12)` add $h,$tmp2,$T1 $ST $tmp2,[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`$i*$SZ`] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==12); bnz,a,pn %icc,.+8 ld [$inp+128],%l0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==15); ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l2 sllx @pair[1],$tmp31,$tmp2 ! Xload($i) add $tmp31,32,$tmp0 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l3 sllx @pair[0],$tmp0,$tmp1 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l4 srlx @pair[2],$tmp32,@pair[1] or $tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l5 or @pair[1],$tmp2,$tmp2 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l6 add $h,$tmp2,$T1 $ST $tmp2,[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`$i*$SZ`] ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l7 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l0 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l1 ___ } if ($SZ==8); ########### common sub BODY_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; if ($i<16) { &$Xload(@_); } else { $code.="\tadd $h,$T1,$T1\n"; } $code.=<<___; $SRL $e,@Sigma1[0],$h !! $i xor $f,$g,$tmp2 $SLL $e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[2]`,$tmp1 and $e,$tmp2,$tmp2 $SRL $e,@Sigma1[1],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$h,$h $SLL $e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[1]`,$tmp1 xor $tmp0,$h,$h $SRL $e,@Sigma1[2],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$h,$h $SLL $e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[0]`,$tmp1 xor $tmp0,$h,$h xor $g,$tmp2,$tmp2 ! Ch(e,f,g) xor $tmp1,$h,$tmp0 ! Sigma1(e) $SRL $a,@Sigma0[0],$h add $tmp2,$T1,$T1 $LD [$Ktbl+`$i*$SZ`],$tmp2 ! K[$i] $SLL $a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[2]`,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$T1,$T1 $SRL $a,@Sigma0[1],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$h,$h $SLL $a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[1]`,$tmp1 xor $tmp0,$h,$h $SRL $a,@Sigma0[2],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$h,$h $SLL $a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[0]`,$tmp1 xor $tmp0,$h,$h xor $tmp1,$h,$h ! Sigma0(a) or $a,$b,$tmp0 and $a,$b,$tmp1 and $c,$tmp0,$tmp0 or $tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp1 ! Maj(a,b,c) add $tmp2,$T1,$T1 ! +=K[$i] add $tmp1,$h,$h add $T1,$d,$d add $T1,$h,$h ___ } ########### SHA256 $BODY_16_XX = sub { my $i=@_[0]; my $xi; if ($i&1) { $xi=$tmp32; $code.="\tsrlx @X[(($i+1)/2)%8],32,$xi\n"; } else { $xi=@X[(($i+1)/2)%8]; } $code.=<<___; srl $xi,@sigma0[0],$T1 !! Xupdate($i) sll $xi,`32-@sigma0[2]`,$tmp1 srl $xi,@sigma0[1],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$T1,$T1 sll $tmp1,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]`,$tmp1 xor $tmp0,$T1,$T1 srl $xi,@sigma0[2],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$T1,$T1 ___ if ($i&1) { $xi=@X[(($i+14)/2)%8]; } else { $xi=$tmp32; $code.="\tsrlx @X[(($i+14)/2)%8],32,$xi\n"; } $code.=<<___; srl $xi,@sigma1[0],$tmp2 xor $tmp0,$T1,$T1 ! T1=sigma0(X[i+1]) sll $xi,`32-@sigma1[2]`,$tmp1 srl $xi,@sigma1[1],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2 sll $tmp1,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]`,$tmp1 xor $tmp0,$tmp2,$tmp2 srl $xi,@sigma1[2],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp2 ___ if ($i&1) { $xi=@X[($i/2)%8]; $code.=<<___; srlx @X[(($i+9)/2)%8],32,$tmp1 ! X[i+9] xor $tmp0,$tmp2,$tmp2 ! sigma1(X[i+14]) srl @X[($i/2)%8],0,$tmp0 add $tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1 add $xi,$T1,$T1 ! +=X[i] xor $tmp0,@X[($i/2)%8],@X[($i/2)%8] add $tmp1,$T1,$T1 srl $T1,0,$T1 or $T1,@X[($i/2)%8],@X[($i/2)%8] ___ } else { $xi=@X[(($i+9)/2)%8]; $code.=<<___; srlx @X[($i/2)%8],32,$tmp1 ! X[i] xor $tmp0,$tmp2,$tmp2 ! sigma1(X[i+14]) add $xi,$T1,$T1 ! +=X[i+9] add $tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1 srl @X[($i/2)%8],0,@X[($i/2)%8] add $tmp1,$T1,$T1 sllx $T1,32,$tmp0 or $tmp0,@X[($i/2)%8],@X[($i/2)%8] ___ } &BODY_00_15(@_); } if ($SZ==4); ########### SHA512 $BODY_16_XX = sub { my $i=@_[0]; my @pair=("%l".eval(($i*2)%8),"%l".eval(($i*2)%8+1)); $code.=<<___; sllx %l2,32,$tmp0 !! Xupdate($i) or %l3,$tmp0,$tmp0 srlx $tmp0,@sigma0[0],$T1 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l2 sllx $tmp0,`64-@sigma0[2]`,$tmp1 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+1)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l3 srlx $tmp0,@sigma0[1],$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$T1,$T1 sllx $tmp1,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]`,$tmp1 xor $tmp0,$T1,$T1 srlx $tmp0,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]`,$tmp0 xor $tmp1,$T1,$T1 sllx %l6,32,$tmp2 xor $tmp0,$T1,$T1 ! sigma0(X[$i+1]) or %l7,$tmp2,$tmp2 srlx $tmp2,@sigma1[0],$tmp1 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l6 sllx $tmp2,`64-@sigma1[2]`,$tmp0 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+14)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l7 srlx $tmp2,@sigma1[1],$tmp2 xor $tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp1 sllx $tmp0,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]`,$tmp0 xor $tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1 srlx $tmp2,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]`,$tmp2 xor $tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp1 sllx %l4,32,$tmp0 xor $tmp2,$tmp1,$tmp1 ! sigma1(X[$i+14]) ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l4 or %l5,$tmp0,$tmp0 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+9)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l5 sllx %l0,32,$tmp2 add $tmp1,$T1,$T1 ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+0`],%l0 or %l1,$tmp2,$tmp2 add $tmp0,$T1,$T1 ! +=X[$i+9] ld [%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`(($i+1+0)%16)*$SZ+4`],%l1 add $tmp2,$T1,$T1 ! +=X[$i] $ST $T1,[%sp+STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME+`($i%16)*$SZ`] ___ &BODY_00_15(@_); } if ($SZ==8); $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .align 64 K${label}: .type K${label},#object ___ if ($SZ==4) { $code.=<<___; .long 0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5 .long 0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3 .long 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174 .long 0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc .long 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da .long 0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7 .long 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967 .long 0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13 .long 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85 .long 0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3 .long 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070 .long 0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3 .long 0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208 .long 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2 ___ } else { $code.=<<___; .long 0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22, 0x71374491,0x23ef65cd .long 0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc .long 0x3956c25b,0xf348b538, 0x59f111f1,0xb605d019 .long 0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118 .long 0xd807aa98,0xa3030242, 0x12835b01,0x45706fbe .long 0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2 .long 0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f, 0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1 .long 0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235, 0xc19bf174,0xcf692694 .long 0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3 .long 0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65 .long 0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275, 0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483 .long 0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da,0x831153b5 .long 0x983e5152,0xee66dfab, 0xa831c66d,0x2db43210 .long 0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f, 0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2, 0xd5a79147,0x930aa725 .long 0x06ca6351,0xe003826f, 0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70 .long 0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc, 0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926 .long 0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed, 0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df .long 0x650a7354,0x8baf63de, 0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8 .long 0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6, 0x92722c85,0x1482353b .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364, 0xa81a664b,0xbc423001 .long 0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791, 0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218, 0xd6990624,0x5565a910 .long 0xf40e3585,0x5771202a, 0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8 .long 0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53 .long 0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8 .long 0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb .long 0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373, 0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3 .long 0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f,0x43172f60 .long 0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72, 0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec .long 0x90befffa,0x23631e28, 0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9 .long 0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915, 0xc67178f2,0xe372532b .long 0xca273ece,0xea26619c, 0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207 .long 0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178 .long 0x06f067aa,0x72176fba, 0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6 .long 0x113f9804,0xbef90dae, 0x1b710b35,0x131c471b .long 0x28db77f5,0x23047d84, 0x32caab7b,0x40c72493 .long 0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc, 0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c .long 0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6, 0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a .long 0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817 ___ } $code.=<<___; .size K${label},.-K${label} #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif .globl sha${label}_block_data_order .align 32 sha${label}_block_data_order: SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+4],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] andcc %g1, CFR_SHA${label}, %g0 be .Lsoftware nop ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); # SHA512 ldd [%o0 + 0x00], %f0 ! load context ldd [%o0 + 0x08], %f2 ldd [%o0 + 0x10], %f4 ldd [%o0 + 0x18], %f6 ldd [%o0 + 0x20], %f8 ldd [%o0 + 0x28], %f10 andcc %o1, 0x7, %g0 ldd [%o0 + 0x30], %f12 bne,pn %icc, .Lhwunaligned ldd [%o0 + 0x38], %f14 .Lhwaligned_loop: ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f16 ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f18 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f20 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f22 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f24 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f26 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f28 ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f30 ldd [%o1 + 0x40], %f32 ldd [%o1 + 0x48], %f34 ldd [%o1 + 0x50], %f36 ldd [%o1 + 0x58], %f38 ldd [%o1 + 0x60], %f40 ldd [%o1 + 0x68], %f42 ldd [%o1 + 0x70], %f44 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x78], %f46 add %o1, 0x80, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 prefetch [%o1 + 64+63], 20 .word 0x81b02860 ! SHA512 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwaligned_loop nop .Lhwfinish: std %f0, [%o0 + 0x00] ! store context std %f2, [%o0 + 0x08] std %f4, [%o0 + 0x10] std %f6, [%o0 + 0x18] std %f8, [%o0 + 0x20] std %f10, [%o0 + 0x28] std %f12, [%o0 + 0x30] retl std %f14, [%o0 + 0x38] .align 16 .Lhwunaligned: alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1 ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f18 .Lhwunaligned_loop: ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f20 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f22 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f24 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f26 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f28 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f30 ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f32 ldd [%o1 + 0x40], %f34 ldd [%o1 + 0x48], %f36 ldd [%o1 + 0x50], %f38 ldd [%o1 + 0x58], %f40 ldd [%o1 + 0x60], %f42 ldd [%o1 + 0x68], %f44 ldd [%o1 + 0x70], %f46 ldd [%o1 + 0x78], %f48 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x80], %f50 add %o1, 0x80, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 prefetch [%o1 + 64+63], 20 faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16 faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18 faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20 faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22 faligndata %f26, %f28, %f24 faligndata %f28, %f30, %f26 faligndata %f30, %f32, %f28 faligndata %f32, %f34, %f30 faligndata %f34, %f36, %f32 faligndata %f36, %f38, %f34 faligndata %f38, %f40, %f36 faligndata %f40, %f42, %f38 faligndata %f42, %f44, %f40 faligndata %f44, %f46, %f42 faligndata %f46, %f48, %f44 faligndata %f48, %f50, %f46 .word 0x81b02860 ! SHA512 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop for %f50, %f50, %f18 ! %f18=%f50 ba .Lhwfinish nop ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); # SHA256 ld [%o0 + 0x00], %f0 ld [%o0 + 0x04], %f1 ld [%o0 + 0x08], %f2 ld [%o0 + 0x0c], %f3 ld [%o0 + 0x10], %f4 ld [%o0 + 0x14], %f5 andcc %o1, 0x7, %g0 ld [%o0 + 0x18], %f6 bne,pn %icc, .Lhwunaligned ld [%o0 + 0x1c], %f7 .Lhwloop: ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f8 ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f10 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f12 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f14 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f16 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f18 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f20 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f22 add %o1, 0x40, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 .word 0x81b02840 ! SHA256 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwloop nop .Lhwfinish: st %f0, [%o0 + 0x00] ! store context st %f1, [%o0 + 0x04] st %f2, [%o0 + 0x08] st %f3, [%o0 + 0x0c] st %f4, [%o0 + 0x10] st %f5, [%o0 + 0x14] st %f6, [%o0 + 0x18] retl st %f7, [%o0 + 0x1c] .align 8 .Lhwunaligned: alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1 ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f10 .Lhwunaligned_loop: ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f12 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f14 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f16 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f18 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f20 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f22 ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f24 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x40], %f26 add %o1, 0x40, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 faligndata %f10, %f12, %f8 faligndata %f12, %f14, %f10 faligndata %f14, %f16, %f12 faligndata %f16, %f18, %f14 faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16 faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18 faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20 faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22 .word 0x81b02840 ! SHA256 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop for %f26, %f26, %f10 ! %f10=%f26 ba .Lhwfinish nop ___ $code.=<<___; .align 16 .Lsoftware: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-$locals,%sp and $inp,`$align-1`,$tmp31 sllx $len,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`,$len andn $inp,`$align-1`,$inp sll $tmp31,3,$tmp31 add $inp,$len,$len ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); # SHA512 mov 32,$tmp32 sub $tmp32,$tmp31,$tmp32 ___ $code.=<<___; .Lpic: call .+8 add %o7,K${label}-.Lpic,$Ktbl $LD [$ctx+`0*$SZ`],$A $LD [$ctx+`1*$SZ`],$B $LD [$ctx+`2*$SZ`],$C $LD [$ctx+`3*$SZ`],$D $LD [$ctx+`4*$SZ`],$E $LD [$ctx+`5*$SZ`],$F $LD [$ctx+`6*$SZ`],$G $LD [$ctx+`7*$SZ`],$H .Lloop: ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=".L16_xx:\n"; for (;$i<32;$i++) { &$BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; and $tmp2,0xfff,$tmp2 cmp $tmp2,$lastK bne .L16_xx add $Ktbl,`16*$SZ`,$Ktbl ! Ktbl+=16 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); # SHA256 $LD [$ctx+`0*$SZ`],@X[0] $LD [$ctx+`1*$SZ`],@X[1] $LD [$ctx+`2*$SZ`],@X[2] $LD [$ctx+`3*$SZ`],@X[3] $LD [$ctx+`4*$SZ`],@X[4] $LD [$ctx+`5*$SZ`],@X[5] $LD [$ctx+`6*$SZ`],@X[6] $LD [$ctx+`7*$SZ`],@X[7] add $A,@X[0],$A $ST $A,[$ctx+`0*$SZ`] add $B,@X[1],$B $ST $B,[$ctx+`1*$SZ`] add $C,@X[2],$C $ST $C,[$ctx+`2*$SZ`] add $D,@X[3],$D $ST $D,[$ctx+`3*$SZ`] add $E,@X[4],$E $ST $E,[$ctx+`4*$SZ`] add $F,@X[5],$F $ST $F,[$ctx+`5*$SZ`] add $G,@X[6],$G $ST $G,[$ctx+`6*$SZ`] add $H,@X[7],$H $ST $H,[$ctx+`7*$SZ`] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); # SHA512 ld [$ctx+`0*$SZ+0`],%l0 ld [$ctx+`0*$SZ+4`],%l1 ld [$ctx+`1*$SZ+0`],%l2 ld [$ctx+`1*$SZ+4`],%l3 ld [$ctx+`2*$SZ+0`],%l4 ld [$ctx+`2*$SZ+4`],%l5 ld [$ctx+`3*$SZ+0`],%l6 sllx %l0,32,$tmp0 ld [$ctx+`3*$SZ+4`],%l7 sllx %l2,32,$tmp1 or %l1,$tmp0,$tmp0 or %l3,$tmp1,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$A,$A add $tmp1,$B,$B $ST $A,[$ctx+`0*$SZ`] sllx %l4,32,$tmp2 $ST $B,[$ctx+`1*$SZ`] sllx %l6,32,$T1 or %l5,$tmp2,$tmp2 or %l7,$T1,$T1 add $tmp2,$C,$C $ST $C,[$ctx+`2*$SZ`] add $T1,$D,$D $ST $D,[$ctx+`3*$SZ`] ld [$ctx+`4*$SZ+0`],%l0 ld [$ctx+`4*$SZ+4`],%l1 ld [$ctx+`5*$SZ+0`],%l2 ld [$ctx+`5*$SZ+4`],%l3 ld [$ctx+`6*$SZ+0`],%l4 ld [$ctx+`6*$SZ+4`],%l5 ld [$ctx+`7*$SZ+0`],%l6 sllx %l0,32,$tmp0 ld [$ctx+`7*$SZ+4`],%l7 sllx %l2,32,$tmp1 or %l1,$tmp0,$tmp0 or %l3,$tmp1,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$E,$E add $tmp1,$F,$F $ST $E,[$ctx+`4*$SZ`] sllx %l4,32,$tmp2 $ST $F,[$ctx+`5*$SZ`] sllx %l6,32,$T1 or %l5,$tmp2,$tmp2 or %l7,$T1,$T1 add $tmp2,$G,$G $ST $G,[$ctx+`6*$SZ`] add $T1,$H,$H $ST $H,[$ctx+`7*$SZ`] ___ $code.=<<___; add $inp,`16*$SZ`,$inp ! advance inp cmp $inp,$len bne SIZE_T_CC,.Lloop sub $Ktbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ`,$Ktbl ! rewind Ktbl ret restore .type sha${label}_block_data_order,#function .size sha${label}_block_data_order,(.-sha${label}_block_data_order) .asciz "SHA${label} block transform for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my $ref,$opf; my %visopf = ( "faligndata" => 0x048, "for" => 0x07c ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unalignaddr { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { if (/%([goli])([0-7])/) { $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } else { return $ref; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2, $ref; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unvis($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl0000644000000000000000000003004613176625660017326 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA256/512 for ARMv8. # # Performance in cycles per processed byte and improvement coefficient # over code generated with "default" compiler: # # SHA256-hw SHA256(*) SHA512 # Apple A7 1.97 10.5 (+33%) 6.73 (-1%(**)) # Cortex-A53 2.38 15.5 (+115%) 10.0 (+150%(***)) # Cortex-A57 2.31 11.6 (+86%) 7.51 (+260%(***)) # Denver 2.01 10.5 (+26%) 6.70 (+8%) # X-Gene 20.0 (+100%) 12.8 (+300%(***)) # Mongoose 2.36 13.0 (+50%) 8.36 (+33%) # # (*) Software SHA256 results are of lesser relevance, presented # mostly for informational purposes. # (**) The result is a trade-off: it's possible to improve it by # 10% (or by 1 cycle per round), but at the cost of 20% loss # on Cortex-A53 (or by 4 cycles per round). # (***) Super-impressive coefficients over gcc-generated code are # indication of some compiler "pathology", most notably code # generated with -mgeneral-regs-only is significanty faster # and the gap is only 40-90%. $flavour=shift; $output=shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; if ($output =~ /512/) { $BITS=512; $SZ=8; @Sigma0=(28,34,39); @Sigma1=(14,18,41); @sigma0=(1, 8, 7); @sigma1=(19,61, 6); $rounds=80; $reg_t="x"; } else { $BITS=256; $SZ=4; @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 7,18, 3); @sigma1=(17,19,10); $rounds=64; $reg_t="w"; } $func="sha${BITS}_block_data_order"; ($ctx,$inp,$num,$Ktbl)=map("x$_",(0..2,30)); @X=map("$reg_t$_",(3..15,0..2)); @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("$reg_t$_",(20..27)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("$reg_t$_",(16,17,19,28)); sub BODY_00_xx { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; my $j=($i+1)&15; my ($T0,$T1,$T2)=(@X[($i-8)&15],@X[($i-9)&15],@X[($i-10)&15]); $T0=@X[$i+3] if ($i<11); $code.=<<___ if ($i<16); #ifndef __ARMEB__ rev @X[$i],@X[$i] // $i #endif ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<13 && ($i&1)); ldp @X[$i+1],@X[$i+2],[$inp],#2*$SZ ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==13); ldp @X[14],@X[15],[$inp] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=14); ldr @X[($i-11)&15],[sp,#`$SZ*(($i-11)%4)`] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>0 && $i<16); add $a,$a,$t1 // h+=Sigma0(a) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=11); str @X[($i-8)&15],[sp,#`$SZ*(($i-8)%4)`] ___ # While ARMv8 specifies merged rotate-n-logical operation such as # 'eor x,y,z,ror#n', it was found to negatively affect performance # on Apple A7. The reason seems to be that it requires even 'y' to # be available earlier. This means that such merged instruction is # not necessarily best choice on critical path... On the other hand # Cortex-A5x handles merged instructions much better than disjoint # rotate and logical... See (**) footnote above. $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); ror $t0,$e,#$Sigma1[0] add $h,$h,$t2 // h+=K[i] eor $T0,$e,$e,ror#`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]` and $t1,$f,$e bic $t2,$g,$e add $h,$h,@X[$i&15] // h+=X[i] orr $t1,$t1,$t2 // Ch(e,f,g) eor $t2,$a,$b // a^b, b^c in next round eor $t0,$t0,$T0,ror#$Sigma1[1] // Sigma1(e) ror $T0,$a,#$Sigma0[0] add $h,$h,$t1 // h+=Ch(e,f,g) eor $t1,$a,$a,ror#`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]` add $h,$h,$t0 // h+=Sigma1(e) and $t3,$t3,$t2 // (b^c)&=(a^b) add $d,$d,$h // d+=h eor $t3,$t3,$b // Maj(a,b,c) eor $t1,$T0,$t1,ror#$Sigma0[1] // Sigma0(a) add $h,$h,$t3 // h+=Maj(a,b,c) ldr $t3,[$Ktbl],#$SZ // *K++, $t2 in next round //add $h,$h,$t1 // h+=Sigma0(a) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); ror $t0,$e,#$Sigma1[0] add $h,$h,$t2 // h+=K[i] ror $T1,@X[($j+1)&15],#$sigma0[0] and $t1,$f,$e ror $T2,@X[($j+14)&15],#$sigma1[0] bic $t2,$g,$e ror $T0,$a,#$Sigma0[0] add $h,$h,@X[$i&15] // h+=X[i] eor $t0,$t0,$e,ror#$Sigma1[1] eor $T1,$T1,@X[($j+1)&15],ror#$sigma0[1] orr $t1,$t1,$t2 // Ch(e,f,g) eor $t2,$a,$b // a^b, b^c in next round eor $t0,$t0,$e,ror#$Sigma1[2] // Sigma1(e) eor $T0,$T0,$a,ror#$Sigma0[1] add $h,$h,$t1 // h+=Ch(e,f,g) and $t3,$t3,$t2 // (b^c)&=(a^b) eor $T2,$T2,@X[($j+14)&15],ror#$sigma1[1] eor $T1,$T1,@X[($j+1)&15],lsr#$sigma0[2] // sigma0(X[i+1]) add $h,$h,$t0 // h+=Sigma1(e) eor $t3,$t3,$b // Maj(a,b,c) eor $t1,$T0,$a,ror#$Sigma0[2] // Sigma0(a) eor $T2,$T2,@X[($j+14)&15],lsr#$sigma1[2] // sigma1(X[i+14]) add @X[$j],@X[$j],@X[($j+9)&15] add $d,$d,$h // d+=h add $h,$h,$t3 // h+=Maj(a,b,c) ldr $t3,[$Ktbl],#$SZ // *K++, $t2 in next round add @X[$j],@X[$j],$T1 add $h,$h,$t1 // h+=Sigma0(a) add @X[$j],@X[$j],$T2 ___ ($t2,$t3)=($t3,$t2); } $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P .globl $func .type $func,%function .align 6 $func: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); #ifdef __ILP32__ ldrsw x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P #else ldr x16,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P #endif adr x17,.LOPENSSL_armcap_P add x16,x16,x17 ldr w16,[x16] tst w16,#ARMV8_SHA256 b.ne .Lv8_entry ___ $code.=<<___; stp x29,x30,[sp,#-128]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] stp x27,x28,[sp,#80] sub sp,sp,#4*$SZ ldp $A,$B,[$ctx] // load context ldp $C,$D,[$ctx,#2*$SZ] ldp $E,$F,[$ctx,#4*$SZ] add $num,$inp,$num,lsl#`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)` // end of input ldp $G,$H,[$ctx,#6*$SZ] adr $Ktbl,.LK$BITS stp $ctx,$num,[x29,#96] .Loop: ldp @X[0],@X[1],[$inp],#2*$SZ ldr $t2,[$Ktbl],#$SZ // *K++ eor $t3,$B,$C // magic seed str $inp,[x29,#112] ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_xx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=".Loop_16_xx:\n"; for (;$i<32;$i++) { &BODY_00_xx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; cbnz $t2,.Loop_16_xx ldp $ctx,$num,[x29,#96] ldr $inp,[x29,#112] sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#`$SZ*($rounds+1)` // rewind ldp @X[0],@X[1],[$ctx] ldp @X[2],@X[3],[$ctx,#2*$SZ] add $inp,$inp,#14*$SZ // advance input pointer ldp @X[4],@X[5],[$ctx,#4*$SZ] add $A,$A,@X[0] ldp @X[6],@X[7],[$ctx,#6*$SZ] add $B,$B,@X[1] add $C,$C,@X[2] add $D,$D,@X[3] stp $A,$B,[$ctx] add $E,$E,@X[4] add $F,$F,@X[5] stp $C,$D,[$ctx,#2*$SZ] add $G,$G,@X[6] add $H,$H,@X[7] cmp $inp,$num stp $E,$F,[$ctx,#4*$SZ] stp $G,$H,[$ctx,#6*$SZ] b.ne .Loop ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] add sp,sp,#4*$SZ ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#128 ret .size $func,.-$func .align 6 .type .LK$BITS,%object .LK$BITS: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); .quad 0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd .quad 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc .quad 0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019 .quad 0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 .quad 0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe .quad 0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2 .quad 0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1 .quad 0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694 .quad 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3 .quad 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65 .quad 0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483 .quad 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5 .quad 0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210 .quad 0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4 .quad 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725 .quad 0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70 .quad 0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926 .quad 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df .quad 0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8 .quad 0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b .quad 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001 .quad 0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30 .quad 0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910 .quad 0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8 .quad 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53 .quad 0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8 .quad 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb .quad 0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3 .quad 0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60 .quad 0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec .quad 0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9 .quad 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b .quad 0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207 .quad 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178 .quad 0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6 .quad 0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b .quad 0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493 .quad 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c .quad 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a .quad 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817 .quad 0 // terminator ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 .long 0 //terminator ___ $code.=<<___; .size .LK$BITS,.-.LK$BITS .align 3 .LOPENSSL_armcap_P: #ifdef __ILP32__ .long OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #else .quad OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #endif .asciz "SHA$BITS block transform for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ if ($SZ==4) { my $Ktbl="x3"; my ($ABCD,$EFGH,$abcd)=map("v$_.16b",(0..2)); my @MSG=map("v$_.16b",(4..7)); my ($W0,$W1)=("v16.4s","v17.4s"); my ($ABCD_SAVE,$EFGH_SAVE)=("v18.16b","v19.16b"); $code.=<<___; .type sha256_block_armv8,%function .align 6 sha256_block_armv8: .Lv8_entry: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ld1.32 {$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx] adr $Ktbl,.LK256 .Loop_hw: ld1 {@MSG[0]-@MSG[3]},[$inp],#64 sub $num,$num,#1 ld1.32 {$W0},[$Ktbl],#16 rev32 @MSG[0],@MSG[0] rev32 @MSG[1],@MSG[1] rev32 @MSG[2],@MSG[2] rev32 @MSG[3],@MSG[3] orr $ABCD_SAVE,$ABCD,$ABCD // offload orr $EFGH_SAVE,$EFGH,$EFGH ___ for($i=0;$i<12;$i++) { $code.=<<___; ld1.32 {$W1},[$Ktbl],#16 add.i32 $W0,$W0,@MSG[0] sha256su0 @MSG[0],@MSG[1] orr $abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W0 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W0 sha256su1 @MSG[0],@MSG[2],@MSG[3] ___ ($W0,$W1)=($W1,$W0); push(@MSG,shift(@MSG)); } $code.=<<___; ld1.32 {$W1},[$Ktbl],#16 add.i32 $W0,$W0,@MSG[0] orr $abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W0 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W0 ld1.32 {$W0},[$Ktbl],#16 add.i32 $W1,$W1,@MSG[1] orr $abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W1 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W1 ld1.32 {$W1},[$Ktbl] add.i32 $W0,$W0,@MSG[2] sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#$rounds*$SZ-16 // rewind orr $abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W0 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W0 add.i32 $W1,$W1,@MSG[3] orr $abcd,$ABCD,$ABCD sha256h $ABCD,$EFGH,$W1 sha256h2 $EFGH,$abcd,$W1 add.i32 $ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE add.i32 $EFGH,$EFGH,$EFGH_SAVE cbnz $num,.Loop_hw st1.32 {$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx] ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret .size sha256_block_armv8,.-sha256_block_armv8 ___ } $code.=<<___; .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 ___ { my %opcode = ( "sha256h" => 0x5e004000, "sha256h2" => 0x5e005000, "sha256su0" => 0x5e282800, "sha256su1" => 0x5e006000 ); sub unsha256 { my ($mnemonic,$arg)=@_; $arg =~ m/[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*,\s*[qv]([0-9]+)[^,]*(?:,\s*[qv]([0-9]+))?/o && sprintf ".inst\t0x%08x\t//%s %s", $opcode{$mnemonic}|$1|($2<<5)|($3<<16), $mnemonic,$arg; } } foreach(split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo; s/\b(sha256\w+)\s+([qv].*)/unsha256($1,$2)/geo; s/\.\w?32\b//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go; m/(ld|st)1[^\[]+\[0\]/o and s/\.4s/\.s/go; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv4.pl0000644000000000000000000004234713176625660017331 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # # Permission to use under GPL terms is granted. # ==================================================================== # SHA512 block procedure for ARMv4. September 2007. # This code is ~4.5 (four and a half) times faster than code generated # by gcc 3.4 and it spends ~72 clock cycles per byte [on single-issue # Xscale PXA250 core]. # # July 2010. # # Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 6% improvement on # Cortex A8 core and ~40 cycles per processed byte. # February 2011. # # Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 7% # improvement on Coxtex A8 core and ~38 cycles per byte. # March 2011. # # Add NEON implementation. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process # one byte in 23.3 cycles or ~60% faster than integer-only code. # August 2012. # # Improve NEON performance by 12% on Snapdragon S4. In absolute # terms it's 22.6 cycles per byte, which is disappointing result. # Technical writers asserted that 3-way S4 pipeline can sustain # multiple NEON instructions per cycle, but dual NEON issue could # not be observed, see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/Snapdragon-S4.html # for further details. On side note Cortex-A15 processes one byte in # 16 cycles. # Byte order [in]dependence. ========================================= # # Originally caller was expected to maintain specific *dword* order in # h[0-7], namely with most significant dword at *lower* address, which # was reflected in below two parameters as 0 and 4. Now caller is # expected to maintain native byte order for whole 64-bit values. $hi="HI"; $lo="LO"; # ==================================================================== $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $ctx="r0"; # parameter block $inp="r1"; $len="r2"; $Tlo="r3"; $Thi="r4"; $Alo="r5"; $Ahi="r6"; $Elo="r7"; $Ehi="r8"; $t0="r9"; $t1="r10"; $t2="r11"; $t3="r12"; ############ r13 is stack pointer $Ktbl="r14"; ############ r15 is program counter $Aoff=8*0; $Boff=8*1; $Coff=8*2; $Doff=8*3; $Eoff=8*4; $Foff=8*5; $Goff=8*6; $Hoff=8*7; $Xoff=8*8; sub BODY_00_15() { my $magic = shift; $code.=<<___; @ Sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18) ^ ROTR((x),41)) @ LO lo>>14^hi<<18 ^ lo>>18^hi<<14 ^ hi>>9^lo<<23 @ HI hi>>14^lo<<18 ^ hi>>18^lo<<14 ^ lo>>9^hi<<23 mov $t0,$Elo,lsr#14 str $Tlo,[sp,#$Xoff+0] mov $t1,$Ehi,lsr#14 str $Thi,[sp,#$Xoff+4] eor $t0,$t0,$Ehi,lsl#18 ldr $t2,[sp,#$Hoff+0] @ h.lo eor $t1,$t1,$Elo,lsl#18 ldr $t3,[sp,#$Hoff+4] @ h.hi eor $t0,$t0,$Elo,lsr#18 eor $t1,$t1,$Ehi,lsr#18 eor $t0,$t0,$Ehi,lsl#14 eor $t1,$t1,$Elo,lsl#14 eor $t0,$t0,$Ehi,lsr#9 eor $t1,$t1,$Elo,lsr#9 eor $t0,$t0,$Elo,lsl#23 eor $t1,$t1,$Ehi,lsl#23 @ Sigma1(e) adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0 ldr $t0,[sp,#$Foff+0] @ f.lo adc $Thi,$Thi,$t1 @ T += Sigma1(e) ldr $t1,[sp,#$Foff+4] @ f.hi adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t2 ldr $t2,[sp,#$Goff+0] @ g.lo adc $Thi,$Thi,$t3 @ T += h ldr $t3,[sp,#$Goff+4] @ g.hi eor $t0,$t0,$t2 str $Elo,[sp,#$Eoff+0] eor $t1,$t1,$t3 str $Ehi,[sp,#$Eoff+4] and $t0,$t0,$Elo str $Alo,[sp,#$Aoff+0] and $t1,$t1,$Ehi str $Ahi,[sp,#$Aoff+4] eor $t0,$t0,$t2 ldr $t2,[$Ktbl,#$lo] @ K[i].lo eor $t1,$t1,$t3 @ Ch(e,f,g) ldr $t3,[$Ktbl,#$hi] @ K[i].hi adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0 ldr $Elo,[sp,#$Doff+0] @ d.lo adc $Thi,$Thi,$t1 @ T += Ch(e,f,g) ldr $Ehi,[sp,#$Doff+4] @ d.hi adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t2 and $t0,$t2,#0xff adc $Thi,$Thi,$t3 @ T += K[i] adds $Elo,$Elo,$Tlo ldr $t2,[sp,#$Boff+0] @ b.lo adc $Ehi,$Ehi,$Thi @ d += T teq $t0,#$magic ldr $t3,[sp,#$Coff+0] @ c.lo #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 it eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif orreq $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#1 @ Sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39)) @ LO lo>>28^hi<<4 ^ hi>>2^lo<<30 ^ hi>>7^lo<<25 @ HI hi>>28^lo<<4 ^ lo>>2^hi<<30 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25 mov $t0,$Alo,lsr#28 mov $t1,$Ahi,lsr#28 eor $t0,$t0,$Ahi,lsl#4 eor $t1,$t1,$Alo,lsl#4 eor $t0,$t0,$Ahi,lsr#2 eor $t1,$t1,$Alo,lsr#2 eor $t0,$t0,$Alo,lsl#30 eor $t1,$t1,$Ahi,lsl#30 eor $t0,$t0,$Ahi,lsr#7 eor $t1,$t1,$Alo,lsr#7 eor $t0,$t0,$Alo,lsl#25 eor $t1,$t1,$Ahi,lsl#25 @ Sigma0(a) adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0 and $t0,$Alo,$t2 adc $Thi,$Thi,$t1 @ T += Sigma0(a) ldr $t1,[sp,#$Boff+4] @ b.hi orr $Alo,$Alo,$t2 ldr $t2,[sp,#$Coff+4] @ c.hi and $Alo,$Alo,$t3 and $t3,$Ahi,$t1 orr $Ahi,$Ahi,$t1 orr $Alo,$Alo,$t0 @ Maj(a,b,c).lo and $Ahi,$Ahi,$t2 adds $Alo,$Alo,$Tlo orr $Ahi,$Ahi,$t3 @ Maj(a,b,c).hi sub sp,sp,#8 adc $Ahi,$Ahi,$Thi @ h += T tst $Ktbl,#1 add $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#8 ___ } $code=<<___; #ifndef __KERNEL__ # include "arm_arch.h" # define VFP_ABI_PUSH vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} # define VFP_ABI_POP vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} #else # define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ # define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ 7 # define VFP_ABI_PUSH # define VFP_ABI_POP #endif #ifdef __ARMEL__ # define LO 0 # define HI 4 # define WORD64(hi0,lo0,hi1,lo1) .word lo0,hi0, lo1,hi1 #else # define HI 0 # define LO 4 # define WORD64(hi0,lo0,hi1,lo1) .word hi0,lo0, hi1,lo1 #endif .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb # define adrl adr #else .code 32 #endif .type K512,%object .align 5 K512: WORD64(0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22, 0x71374491,0x23ef65cd) WORD64(0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc) WORD64(0x3956c25b,0xf348b538, 0x59f111f1,0xb605d019) WORD64(0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118) WORD64(0xd807aa98,0xa3030242, 0x12835b01,0x45706fbe) WORD64(0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2) WORD64(0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f, 0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1) WORD64(0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235, 0xc19bf174,0xcf692694) WORD64(0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3) WORD64(0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65) WORD64(0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275, 0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483) WORD64(0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da,0x831153b5) WORD64(0x983e5152,0xee66dfab, 0xa831c66d,0x2db43210) WORD64(0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f, 0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4) WORD64(0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2, 0xd5a79147,0x930aa725) WORD64(0x06ca6351,0xe003826f, 0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70) WORD64(0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc, 0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926) WORD64(0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed, 0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df) WORD64(0x650a7354,0x8baf63de, 0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8) WORD64(0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6, 0x92722c85,0x1482353b) WORD64(0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364, 0xa81a664b,0xbc423001) WORD64(0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791, 0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30) WORD64(0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218, 0xd6990624,0x5565a910) WORD64(0xf40e3585,0x5771202a, 0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8) WORD64(0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53) WORD64(0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8) WORD64(0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb) WORD64(0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373, 0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3) WORD64(0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f,0x43172f60) WORD64(0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72, 0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec) WORD64(0x90befffa,0x23631e28, 0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9) WORD64(0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915, 0xc67178f2,0xe372532b) WORD64(0xca273ece,0xea26619c, 0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207) WORD64(0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178) WORD64(0x06f067aa,0x72176fba, 0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6) WORD64(0x113f9804,0xbef90dae, 0x1b710b35,0x131c471b) WORD64(0x28db77f5,0x23047d84, 0x32caab7b,0x40c72493) WORD64(0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc, 0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c) WORD64(0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6, 0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a) WORD64(0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817) .size K512,.-K512 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__) .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-.Lsha512_block_data_order .skip 32-4 #else .skip 32 #endif .global sha512_block_data_order .type sha512_block_data_order,%function sha512_block_data_order: .Lsha512_block_data_order: #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && !defined(__thumb2__) sub r3,pc,#8 @ sha512_block_data_order #else adr r3,.Lsha512_block_data_order #endif #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__) ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap ldr r12,[r3,r12] @ OPENSSL_armcap_P #ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r12,[r12] #endif tst r12,#ARMV7_NEON bne .LNEON #endif add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#7 @ len to point at the end of inp stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} sub $Ktbl,r3,#672 @ K512 sub sp,sp,#9*8 ldr $Elo,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$lo] ldr $Ehi,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$hi] ldr $t0, [$ctx,#$Goff+$lo] ldr $t1, [$ctx,#$Goff+$hi] ldr $t2, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$lo] ldr $t3, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$hi] .Loop: str $t0, [sp,#$Goff+0] str $t1, [sp,#$Goff+4] str $t2, [sp,#$Hoff+0] str $t3, [sp,#$Hoff+4] ldr $Alo,[$ctx,#$Aoff+$lo] ldr $Ahi,[$ctx,#$Aoff+$hi] ldr $Tlo,[$ctx,#$Boff+$lo] ldr $Thi,[$ctx,#$Boff+$hi] ldr $t0, [$ctx,#$Coff+$lo] ldr $t1, [$ctx,#$Coff+$hi] ldr $t2, [$ctx,#$Doff+$lo] ldr $t3, [$ctx,#$Doff+$hi] str $Tlo,[sp,#$Boff+0] str $Thi,[sp,#$Boff+4] str $t0, [sp,#$Coff+0] str $t1, [sp,#$Coff+4] str $t2, [sp,#$Doff+0] str $t3, [sp,#$Doff+4] ldr $Tlo,[$ctx,#$Foff+$lo] ldr $Thi,[$ctx,#$Foff+$hi] str $Tlo,[sp,#$Foff+0] str $Thi,[sp,#$Foff+4] .L00_15: #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldrb $Tlo,[$inp,#7] ldrb $t0, [$inp,#6] ldrb $t1, [$inp,#5] ldrb $t2, [$inp,#4] ldrb $Thi,[$inp,#3] ldrb $t3, [$inp,#2] orr $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0,lsl#8 ldrb $t0, [$inp,#1] orr $Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#16 ldrb $t1, [$inp],#8 orr $Tlo,$Tlo,$t2,lsl#24 orr $Thi,$Thi,$t3,lsl#8 orr $Thi,$Thi,$t0,lsl#16 orr $Thi,$Thi,$t1,lsl#24 #else ldr $Tlo,[$inp,#4] ldr $Thi,[$inp],#8 #ifdef __ARMEL__ rev $Tlo,$Tlo rev $Thi,$Thi #endif #endif ___ &BODY_00_15(0x94); $code.=<<___; tst $Ktbl,#1 beq .L00_15 ldr $t0,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+0] ldr $t1,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+4] bic $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#1 .L16_79: @ sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),1) ^ ROTR((x),8) ^ ((x)>>7)) @ LO lo>>1^hi<<31 ^ lo>>8^hi<<24 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25 @ HI hi>>1^lo<<31 ^ hi>>8^lo<<24 ^ hi>>7 mov $Tlo,$t0,lsr#1 ldr $t2,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-14)`+0] mov $Thi,$t1,lsr#1 ldr $t3,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-14)`+4] eor $Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#31 eor $Thi,$Thi,$t0,lsl#31 eor $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0,lsr#8 eor $Thi,$Thi,$t1,lsr#8 eor $Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#24 eor $Thi,$Thi,$t0,lsl#24 eor $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0,lsr#7 eor $Thi,$Thi,$t1,lsr#7 eor $Tlo,$Tlo,$t1,lsl#25 @ sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6)) @ LO lo>>19^hi<<13 ^ hi>>29^lo<<3 ^ lo>>6^hi<<26 @ HI hi>>19^lo<<13 ^ lo>>29^hi<<3 ^ hi>>6 mov $t0,$t2,lsr#19 mov $t1,$t3,lsr#19 eor $t0,$t0,$t3,lsl#13 eor $t1,$t1,$t2,lsl#13 eor $t0,$t0,$t3,lsr#29 eor $t1,$t1,$t2,lsr#29 eor $t0,$t0,$t2,lsl#3 eor $t1,$t1,$t3,lsl#3 eor $t0,$t0,$t2,lsr#6 eor $t1,$t1,$t3,lsr#6 ldr $t2,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-9)`+0] eor $t0,$t0,$t3,lsl#26 ldr $t3,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-9)`+4] adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0 ldr $t0,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*16`+0] adc $Thi,$Thi,$t1 ldr $t1,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*16`+4] adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t2 adc $Thi,$Thi,$t3 adds $Tlo,$Tlo,$t0 adc $Thi,$Thi,$t1 ___ &BODY_00_15(0x17); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 ittt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM #endif ldreq $t0,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+0] ldreq $t1,[sp,#`$Xoff+8*(16-1)`+4] beq .L16_79 bic $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#1 ldr $Tlo,[sp,#$Boff+0] ldr $Thi,[sp,#$Boff+4] ldr $t0, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$lo] ldr $t1, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$hi] ldr $t2, [$ctx,#$Boff+$lo] ldr $t3, [$ctx,#$Boff+$hi] adds $t0,$Alo,$t0 str $t0, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$lo] adc $t1,$Ahi,$t1 str $t1, [$ctx,#$Aoff+$hi] adds $t2,$Tlo,$t2 str $t2, [$ctx,#$Boff+$lo] adc $t3,$Thi,$t3 str $t3, [$ctx,#$Boff+$hi] ldr $Alo,[sp,#$Coff+0] ldr $Ahi,[sp,#$Coff+4] ldr $Tlo,[sp,#$Doff+0] ldr $Thi,[sp,#$Doff+4] ldr $t0, [$ctx,#$Coff+$lo] ldr $t1, [$ctx,#$Coff+$hi] ldr $t2, [$ctx,#$Doff+$lo] ldr $t3, [$ctx,#$Doff+$hi] adds $t0,$Alo,$t0 str $t0, [$ctx,#$Coff+$lo] adc $t1,$Ahi,$t1 str $t1, [$ctx,#$Coff+$hi] adds $t2,$Tlo,$t2 str $t2, [$ctx,#$Doff+$lo] adc $t3,$Thi,$t3 str $t3, [$ctx,#$Doff+$hi] ldr $Tlo,[sp,#$Foff+0] ldr $Thi,[sp,#$Foff+4] ldr $t0, [$ctx,#$Eoff+$lo] ldr $t1, [$ctx,#$Eoff+$hi] ldr $t2, [$ctx,#$Foff+$lo] ldr $t3, [$ctx,#$Foff+$hi] adds $Elo,$Elo,$t0 str $Elo,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$lo] adc $Ehi,$Ehi,$t1 str $Ehi,[$ctx,#$Eoff+$hi] adds $t2,$Tlo,$t2 str $t2, [$ctx,#$Foff+$lo] adc $t3,$Thi,$t3 str $t3, [$ctx,#$Foff+$hi] ldr $Alo,[sp,#$Goff+0] ldr $Ahi,[sp,#$Goff+4] ldr $Tlo,[sp,#$Hoff+0] ldr $Thi,[sp,#$Hoff+4] ldr $t0, [$ctx,#$Goff+$lo] ldr $t1, [$ctx,#$Goff+$hi] ldr $t2, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$lo] ldr $t3, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$hi] adds $t0,$Alo,$t0 str $t0, [$ctx,#$Goff+$lo] adc $t1,$Ahi,$t1 str $t1, [$ctx,#$Goff+$hi] adds $t2,$Tlo,$t2 str $t2, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$lo] adc $t3,$Thi,$t3 str $t3, [$ctx,#$Hoff+$hi] add sp,sp,#640 sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#640 teq $inp,$len bne .Loop add sp,sp,#8*9 @ destroy frame #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} tst lr,#1 moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size sha512_block_data_order,.-sha512_block_data_order ___ { my @Sigma0=(28,34,39); my @Sigma1=(14,18,41); my @sigma0=(1, 8, 7); my @sigma1=(19,61,6); my $Ktbl="r3"; my $cnt="r12"; # volatile register known as ip, intra-procedure-call scratch my @X=map("d$_",(0..15)); my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("d$_",(16..23)); sub NEON_00_15() { my $i=shift; my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$T1,$K,$Ch,$Maj)=map("d$_",(24..31)); # temps $code.=<<___ if ($i<16 || $i&1); vshr.u64 $t0,$e,#@Sigma1[0] @ $i #if $i<16 vld1.64 {@X[$i%16]},[$inp]! @ handles unaligned #endif vshr.u64 $t1,$e,#@Sigma1[1] #if $i>0 vadd.i64 $a,$Maj @ h+=Maj from the past #endif vshr.u64 $t2,$e,#@Sigma1[2] ___ $code.=<<___; vld1.64 {$K},[$Ktbl,:64]! @ K[i++] vsli.64 $t0,$e,#`64-@Sigma1[0]` vsli.64 $t1,$e,#`64-@Sigma1[1]` vmov $Ch,$e vsli.64 $t2,$e,#`64-@Sigma1[2]` #if $i<16 && defined(__ARMEL__) vrev64.8 @X[$i],@X[$i] #endif veor $t1,$t0 vbsl $Ch,$f,$g @ Ch(e,f,g) vshr.u64 $t0,$a,#@Sigma0[0] veor $t2,$t1 @ Sigma1(e) vadd.i64 $T1,$Ch,$h vshr.u64 $t1,$a,#@Sigma0[1] vsli.64 $t0,$a,#`64-@Sigma0[0]` vadd.i64 $T1,$t2 vshr.u64 $t2,$a,#@Sigma0[2] vadd.i64 $K,@X[$i%16] vsli.64 $t1,$a,#`64-@Sigma0[1]` veor $Maj,$a,$b vsli.64 $t2,$a,#`64-@Sigma0[2]` veor $h,$t0,$t1 vadd.i64 $T1,$K vbsl $Maj,$c,$b @ Maj(a,b,c) veor $h,$t2 @ Sigma0(a) vadd.i64 $d,$T1 vadd.i64 $Maj,$T1 @ vadd.i64 $h,$Maj ___ } sub NEON_16_79() { my $i=shift; if ($i&1) { &NEON_00_15($i,@_); return; } # 2x-vectorized, therefore runs every 2nd round my @X=map("q$_",(0..7)); # view @X as 128-bit vector my ($t0,$t1,$s0,$s1) = map("q$_",(12..15)); # temps my ($d0,$d1,$d2) = map("d$_",(24..26)); # temps from NEON_00_15 my $e=@_[4]; # $e from NEON_00_15 $i /= 2; $code.=<<___; vshr.u64 $t0,@X[($i+7)%8],#@sigma1[0] vshr.u64 $t1,@X[($i+7)%8],#@sigma1[1] vadd.i64 @_[0],d30 @ h+=Maj from the past vshr.u64 $s1,@X[($i+7)%8],#@sigma1[2] vsli.64 $t0,@X[($i+7)%8],#`64-@sigma1[0]` vext.8 $s0,@X[$i%8],@X[($i+1)%8],#8 @ X[i+1] vsli.64 $t1,@X[($i+7)%8],#`64-@sigma1[1]` veor $s1,$t0 vshr.u64 $t0,$s0,#@sigma0[0] veor $s1,$t1 @ sigma1(X[i+14]) vshr.u64 $t1,$s0,#@sigma0[1] vadd.i64 @X[$i%8],$s1 vshr.u64 $s1,$s0,#@sigma0[2] vsli.64 $t0,$s0,#`64-@sigma0[0]` vsli.64 $t1,$s0,#`64-@sigma0[1]` vext.8 $s0,@X[($i+4)%8],@X[($i+5)%8],#8 @ X[i+9] veor $s1,$t0 vshr.u64 $d0,$e,#@Sigma1[0] @ from NEON_00_15 vadd.i64 @X[$i%8],$s0 vshr.u64 $d1,$e,#@Sigma1[1] @ from NEON_00_15 veor $s1,$t1 @ sigma0(X[i+1]) vshr.u64 $d2,$e,#@Sigma1[2] @ from NEON_00_15 vadd.i64 @X[$i%8],$s1 ___ &NEON_00_15(2*$i,@_); } $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .global sha512_block_data_order_neon .type sha512_block_data_order_neon,%function .align 4 sha512_block_data_order_neon: .LNEON: dmb @ errata #451034 on early Cortex A8 add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#7 @ len to point at the end of inp adr $Ktbl,K512 VFP_ABI_PUSH vldmia $ctx,{$A-$H} @ load context .Loop_neon: ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &NEON_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; mov $cnt,#4 .L16_79_neon: subs $cnt,#1 ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &NEON_16_79($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; bne .L16_79_neon vadd.i64 $A,d30 @ h+=Maj from the past vldmia $ctx,{d24-d31} @ load context to temp vadd.i64 q8,q12 @ vectorized accumulate vadd.i64 q9,q13 vadd.i64 q10,q14 vadd.i64 q11,q15 vstmia $ctx,{$A-$H} @ save context teq $inp,$len sub $Ktbl,#640 @ rewind K512 bne .Loop_neon VFP_ABI_POP ret @ bx lr .size sha512_block_data_order_neon,.-sha512_block_data_order_neon #endif ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "SHA512 block transform for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__) .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4 $code =~ s/\bret\b/bx lr/gm; open SELF,$0; while() { next if (/^#!/); last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/); print; } close SELF; print $code; close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-c64xplus.pl0000644000000000000000000002134613176625660017771 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA256 for C64x+. # # January 2012 # # Performance is just below 10 cycles per processed byte, which is # almost 40% faster than compiler-generated code. Unroll is unlikely # to give more than ~8% improvement... # # !!! Note that this module uses AMR, which means that all interrupt # service routines are expected to preserve it and for own well-being # zero it upon entry. while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; ($CTXA,$INP,$NUM) = ("A4","B4","A6"); # arguments $K256="A3"; ($A,$Actx,$B,$Bctx,$C,$Cctx,$D,$Dctx,$T2,$S0,$s1,$t0a,$t1a,$t2a,$X9,$X14) =map("A$_",(16..31)); ($E,$Ectx,$F,$Fctx,$G,$Gctx,$H,$Hctx,$T1,$S1,$s0,$t0e,$t1e,$t2e,$X1,$X15) =map("B$_",(16..31)); ($Xia,$Xib)=("A5","B5"); # circular/ring buffer $CTXB=$t2e; ($Xn,$X0,$K)=("B7","B8","B9"); ($Maj,$Ch)=($T2,"B6"); $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .nocmp .asg sha256_block_data_order,_sha256_block_data_order .endif .asg B3,RA .asg A15,FP .asg B15,SP .if .BIG_ENDIAN .asg SWAP2,MV .asg SWAP4,MV .endif .global _sha256_block_data_order _sha256_block_data_order: __sha256_block: .asmfunc stack_usage(64) MV $NUM,A0 ; reassign $NUM || MVK -64,B0 [!A0] BNOP RA ; if ($NUM==0) return; || [A0] STW FP,*SP--[16] ; save frame pointer and alloca(64) || [A0] MV SP,FP [A0] ADDKPC __sha256_block,B2 || [A0] AND B0,SP,SP ; align stack at 64 bytes .if __TI_EABI__ [A0] MVK 0x00404,B1 || [A0] MVKL \$PCR_OFFSET(K256,__sha256_block),$K256 [A0] MVKH 0x50000,B1 || [A0] MVKH \$PCR_OFFSET(K256,__sha256_block),$K256 .else [A0] MVK 0x00404,B1 || [A0] MVKL (K256-__sha256_block),$K256 [A0] MVKH 0x50000,B1 || [A0] MVKH (K256-__sha256_block),$K256 .endif [A0] MVC B1,AMR ; setup circular addressing || [A0] MV SP,$Xia [A0] MV SP,$Xib || [A0] ADD B2,$K256,$K256 || [A0] MV $CTXA,$CTXB || [A0] SUBAW SP,2,SP ; reserve two words above buffer LDW *${CTXA}[0],$A ; load ctx || LDW *${CTXB}[4],$E LDW *${CTXA}[1],$B || LDW *${CTXB}[5],$F LDW *${CTXA}[2],$C || LDW *${CTXB}[6],$G LDW *${CTXA}[3],$D || LDW *${CTXB}[7],$H LDNW *$INP++,$Xn ; pre-fetch input LDW *$K256++,$K ; pre-fetch K256[0] MVK 14,B0 ; loop counters MVK 47,B1 || ADDAW $Xia,9,$Xia outerloop?: SUB A0,1,A0 || MV $A,$Actx || MV $E,$Ectx || MVD $B,$Bctx || MVD $F,$Fctx MV $C,$Cctx || MV $G,$Gctx || MVD $D,$Dctx || MVD $H,$Hctx || SWAP4 $Xn,$X0 SPLOOPD 8 ; BODY_00_14 || MVC B0,ILC || SWAP2 $X0,$X0 LDNW *$INP++,$Xn || ROTL $A,30,$S0 || OR $A,$B,$Maj || AND $A,$B,$t2a || ROTL $E,26,$S1 || AND $F,$E,$Ch || ANDN $G,$E,$t2e ROTL $A,19,$t0a || AND $C,$Maj,$Maj || ROTL $E,21,$t0e || XOR $t2e,$Ch,$Ch ; Ch(e,f,g) = (e&f)^(~e&g) ROTL $A,10,$t1a || OR $t2a,$Maj,$Maj ; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b) || ROTL $E,7,$t1e || ADD $K,$H,$T1 ; T1 = h + K256[i] ADD $X0,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += X[i]; || STW $X0,*$Xib++ || XOR $t0a,$S0,$S0 || XOR $t0e,$S1,$S1 XOR $t1a,$S0,$S0 ; Sigma0(a) || XOR $t1e,$S1,$S1 ; Sigma1(e) || LDW *$K256++,$K ; pre-fetch K256[i+1] || ADD $Ch,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += Ch(e,f,g) ADD $S1,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += Sigma1(e) || ADD $S0,$Maj,$T2 ; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c) || ROTL $G,0,$H ; h = g || MV $F,$G ; g = f || MV $X0,$X14 || SWAP4 $Xn,$X0 SWAP2 $X0,$X0 || MV $E,$F ; f = e || ADD $D,$T1,$E ; e = d + T1 || MV $C,$D ; d = c MV $B,$C ; c = b || MV $A,$B ; b = a || ADD $T1,$T2,$A ; a = T1 + T2 SPKERNEL ROTL $A,30,$S0 ; BODY_15 || OR $A,$B,$Maj || AND $A,$B,$t2a || ROTL $E,26,$S1 || AND $F,$E,$Ch || ANDN $G,$E,$t2e || LDW *${Xib}[1],$Xn ; modulo-scheduled ROTL $A,19,$t0a || AND $C,$Maj,$Maj || ROTL $E,21,$t0e || XOR $t2e,$Ch,$Ch ; Ch(e,f,g) = (e&f)^(~e&g) || LDW *${Xib}[2],$X1 ; modulo-scheduled ROTL $A,10,$t1a || OR $t2a,$Maj,$Maj ; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b) || ROTL $E,7,$t1e || ADD $K,$H,$T1 ; T1 = h + K256[i] ADD $X0,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += X[i]; || STW $X0,*$Xib++ || XOR $t0a,$S0,$S0 || XOR $t0e,$S1,$S1 XOR $t1a,$S0,$S0 ; Sigma0(a) || XOR $t1e,$S1,$S1 ; Sigma1(e) || LDW *$K256++,$K ; pre-fetch K256[i+1] || ADD $Ch,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += Ch(e,f,g) ADD $S1,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += Sigma1(e) || ADD $S0,$Maj,$T2 ; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c) || ROTL $G,0,$H ; h = g || MV $F,$G ; g = f || MV $X0,$X15 MV $E,$F ; f = e || ADD $D,$T1,$E ; e = d + T1 || MV $C,$D ; d = c || MV $Xn,$X0 ; modulo-scheduled || LDW *$Xia,$X9 ; modulo-scheduled || ROTL $X1,25,$t0e ; modulo-scheduled || ROTL $X14,15,$t0a ; modulo-scheduled SHRU $X1,3,$s0 ; modulo-scheduled || SHRU $X14,10,$s1 ; modulo-scheduled || ROTL $B,0,$C ; c = b || MV $A,$B ; b = a || ADD $T1,$T2,$A ; a = T1 + T2 SPLOOPD 10 ; BODY_16_63 || MVC B1,ILC || ROTL $X1,14,$t1e ; modulo-scheduled || ROTL $X14,13,$t1a ; modulo-scheduled XOR $t0e,$s0,$s0 || XOR $t0a,$s1,$s1 || MV $X15,$X14 || MV $X1,$Xn XOR $t1e,$s0,$s0 ; sigma0(X[i+1]) || XOR $t1a,$s1,$s1 ; sigma1(X[i+14]) || LDW *${Xib}[2],$X1 ; module-scheduled ROTL $A,30,$S0 || OR $A,$B,$Maj || AND $A,$B,$t2a || ROTL $E,26,$S1 || AND $F,$E,$Ch || ANDN $G,$E,$t2e || ADD $X9,$X0,$X0 ; X[i] += X[i+9] ROTL $A,19,$t0a || AND $C,$Maj,$Maj || ROTL $E,21,$t0e || XOR $t2e,$Ch,$Ch ; Ch(e,f,g) = (e&f)^(~e&g) || ADD $s0,$X0,$X0 ; X[i] += sigma1(X[i+1]) ROTL $A,10,$t1a || OR $t2a,$Maj,$Maj ; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b) || ROTL $E,7,$t1e || ADD $H,$K,$T1 ; T1 = h + K256[i] || ADD $s1,$X0,$X0 ; X[i] += sigma1(X[i+14]) XOR $t0a,$S0,$S0 || XOR $t0e,$S1,$S1 || ADD $X0,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += X[i] || STW $X0,*$Xib++ XOR $t1a,$S0,$S0 ; Sigma0(a) || XOR $t1e,$S1,$S1 ; Sigma1(e) || ADD $Ch,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += Ch(e,f,g) || MV $X0,$X15 || ROTL $G,0,$H ; h = g || LDW *$K256++,$K ; pre-fetch K256[i+1] ADD $S1,$T1,$T1 ; T1 += Sigma1(e) || ADD $S0,$Maj,$T2 ; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c) || MV $F,$G ; g = f || MV $Xn,$X0 ; modulo-scheduled || LDW *++$Xia,$X9 ; modulo-scheduled || ROTL $X1,25,$t0e ; module-scheduled || ROTL $X14,15,$t0a ; modulo-scheduled ROTL $X1,14,$t1e ; modulo-scheduled || ROTL $X14,13,$t1a ; modulo-scheduled || MV $E,$F ; f = e || ADD $D,$T1,$E ; e = d + T1 || MV $C,$D ; d = c || MV $B,$C ; c = b MV $A,$B ; b = a || ADD $T1,$T2,$A ; a = T1 + T2 || SHRU $X1,3,$s0 ; modulo-scheduled || SHRU $X14,10,$s1 ; modulo-scheduled SPKERNEL [A0] B outerloop? || [A0] LDNW *$INP++,$Xn ; pre-fetch input || [A0] ADDK -260,$K256 ; rewind K256 || ADD $Actx,$A,$A ; accumulate ctx || ADD $Ectx,$E,$E || ADD $Bctx,$B,$B ADD $Fctx,$F,$F || ADD $Cctx,$C,$C || ADD $Gctx,$G,$G || ADD $Dctx,$D,$D || ADD $Hctx,$H,$H || [A0] LDW *$K256++,$K ; pre-fetch K256[0] [!A0] BNOP RA ||[!A0] MV $CTXA,$CTXB [!A0] MV FP,SP ; restore stack pointer ||[!A0] LDW *FP[0],FP ; restore frame pointer [!A0] STW $A,*${CTXA}[0] ; save ctx ||[!A0] STW $E,*${CTXB}[4] ||[!A0] MVK 0,B0 [!A0] STW $B,*${CTXA}[1] ||[!A0] STW $F,*${CTXB}[5] ||[!A0] MVC B0,AMR ; clear AMR STW $C,*${CTXA}[2] || STW $G,*${CTXB}[6] STW $D,*${CTXA}[3] || STW $H,*${CTXB}[7] .endasmfunc .if __TI_EABI__ .sect ".text:sha_asm.const" .else .sect ".const:sha_asm" .endif .align 128 K256: .uword 0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5 .uword 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5 .uword 0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3 .uword 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174 .uword 0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc .uword 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da .uword 0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7 .uword 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967 .uword 0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13 .uword 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85 .uword 0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3 .uword 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070 .uword 0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5 .uword 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3 .uword 0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208 .uword 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2 .cstring "SHA256 block transform for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ppc.pl0000755000000000000000000001776413176625660016723 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # I let hardware handle unaligned input(*), except on page boundaries # (see below for details). Otherwise straightforward implementation # with X vector in register bank. # # (*) this means that this module is inappropriate for PPC403? Does # anybody know if pre-POWER3 can sustain unaligned load? # -m64 -m32 # ---------------------------------- # PPC970,gcc-4.0.0 +76% +59% # Power6,xlc-7 +68% +33% $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T =8; $LRSAVE =2*$SIZE_T; $UCMP ="cmpld"; $STU ="stdu"; $POP ="ld"; $PUSH ="std"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T =4; $LRSAVE =$SIZE_T; $UCMP ="cmplw"; $STU ="stwu"; $POP ="lwz"; $PUSH ="stw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } # Define endianness based on flavour # i.e.: linux64le $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $FRAME=24*$SIZE_T+64; $LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T; $K ="r0"; $sp ="r1"; $toc="r2"; $ctx="r3"; $inp="r4"; $num="r5"; $t0 ="r15"; $t1 ="r6"; $A ="r7"; $B ="r8"; $C ="r9"; $D ="r10"; $E ="r11"; $T ="r12"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T); @X=("r16","r17","r18","r19","r20","r21","r22","r23", "r24","r25","r26","r27","r28","r29","r30","r31"); sub loadbe { my ($dst, $src, $temp_reg) = @_; $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $dst,$src ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $temp_reg,$src rotlwi $dst,$temp_reg,8 rlwimi $dst,$temp_reg,24,0,7 rlwimi $dst,$temp_reg,24,16,23 ___ } sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; my $j=$i+1; # Since the last value of $f is discarded, we can use # it as a temp reg to swap byte-order when needed. loadbe("@X[$i]","`$i*4`($inp)",$f) if ($i==0); loadbe("@X[$j]","`$j*4`($inp)",$f) if ($i<15); $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); add $f,$K,$e rotlwi $e,$a,5 add $f,$f,@X[$i] and $t0,$c,$b add $f,$f,$e andc $t1,$d,$b rotlwi $b,$b,30 or $t0,$t0,$t1 add $f,$f,$t0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); add $f,$K,$e rotlwi $e,$a,5 xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] add $f,$f,@X[$i%16] and $t0,$c,$b xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] add $f,$f,$e andc $t1,$d,$b rotlwi $b,$b,30 or $t0,$t0,$t1 xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] add $f,$f,$t0 rotlwi @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],1 ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); add $f,$K,$e xor $t0,$b,$d rotlwi $e,$a,5 xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] add $f,$f,@X[$i%16] xor $t0,$t0,$c xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] add $f,$f,$t0 rotlwi $b,$b,30 xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] add $f,$f,$e rotlwi @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); add $f,$K,$e xor $t0,$b,$d rotlwi $e,$a,5 lwz r16,0($ctx) add $f,$f,@X[$i%16] xor $t0,$t0,$c lwz r17,4($ctx) add $f,$f,$t0 rotlwi $b,$b,30 lwz r18,8($ctx) lwz r19,12($ctx) add $f,$f,$e lwz r20,16($ctx) ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___; add $f,$K,$e rotlwi $e,$a,5 xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+2)%16] add $f,$f,@X[$i%16] and $t0,$b,$c xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+8)%16] add $f,$f,$e or $t1,$b,$c rotlwi $b,$b,30 xor @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],@X[($j+13)%16] and $t1,$t1,$d or $t0,$t0,$t1 rotlwi @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],1 add $f,$f,$t0 ___ } $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .sha1_block_data_order .align 4 .sha1_block_data_order: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $PUSH r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $PUSH r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $PUSH r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $PUSH r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $PUSH r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $PUSH r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $PUSH r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $PUSH r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $PUSH r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) lwz $A,0($ctx) lwz $B,4($ctx) lwz $C,8($ctx) lwz $D,12($ctx) lwz $E,16($ctx) andi. r0,$inp,3 bne Lunaligned Laligned: mtctr $num bl Lsha1_block_private b Ldone ; PowerPC specification allows an implementation to be ill-behaved ; upon unaligned access which crosses page boundary. "Better safe ; than sorry" principle makes me treat it specially. But I don't ; look for particular offending word, but rather for 64-byte input ; block which crosses the boundary. Once found that block is aligned ; and hashed separately... .align 4 Lunaligned: subfic $t1,$inp,4096 andi. $t1,$t1,4095 ; distance to closest page boundary srwi. $t1,$t1,6 ; t1/=64 beq Lcross_page $UCMP $num,$t1 ble Laligned ; didn't cross the page boundary mtctr $t1 subfc $num,$t1,$num bl Lsha1_block_private Lcross_page: li $t1,16 mtctr $t1 addi r20,$sp,$LOCALS ; spot within the frame Lmemcpy: lbz r16,0($inp) lbz r17,1($inp) lbz r18,2($inp) lbz r19,3($inp) addi $inp,$inp,4 stb r16,0(r20) stb r17,1(r20) stb r18,2(r20) stb r19,3(r20) addi r20,r20,4 bdnz Lmemcpy $PUSH $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) li $t1,1 addi $inp,$sp,$LOCALS mtctr $t1 bl Lsha1_block_private $POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) addic. $num,$num,-1 bne Lunaligned Ldone: $POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) $POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $POP r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $POP r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $POP r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $POP r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $POP r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $POP r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $POP r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $POP r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $POP r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $POP r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) mtlr r0 addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0 .long 0 ___ # This is private block function, which uses tailored calling # interface, namely upon entry SHA_CTX is pre-loaded to given # registers and counter register contains amount of chunks to # digest... $code.=<<___; .align 4 Lsha1_block_private: ___ $code.=<<___; # load K_00_19 lis $K,0x5a82 ori $K,$K,0x7999 ___ for($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; # load K_20_39 lis $K,0x6ed9 ori $K,$K,0xeba1 ___ for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; # load K_40_59 lis $K,0x8f1b ori $K,$K,0xbcdc ___ for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; # load K_60_79 lis $K,0xca62 ori $K,$K,0xc1d6 ___ for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; add r16,r16,$E add r17,r17,$T add r18,r18,$A add r19,r19,$B add r20,r20,$C stw r16,0($ctx) mr $A,r16 stw r17,4($ctx) mr $B,r17 stw r18,8($ctx) mr $C,r18 stw r19,12($ctx) mr $D,r19 stw r20,16($ctx) mr $E,r20 addi $inp,$inp,`16*4` bdnz Lsha1_block_private blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .sha1_block_data_order,.-.sha1_block_data_order ___ $code.=<<___; .asciz "SHA1 block transform for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-s390x.pl0000644000000000000000000002177513176625660017170 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA256/512 block procedures for s390x. # April 2007. # # sha256_block_data_order is reportedly >3 times faster than gcc 3.3 # generated code (must be a bug in compiler, as improvement is # "pathologically" high, in particular in comparison to other SHA # modules). But the real twist is that it detects if hardware support # for SHA256 is available and in such case utilizes it. Then the # performance can reach >6.5x of assembler one for larger chunks. # # sha512_block_data_order is ~70% faster than gcc 3.3 generated code. # January 2009. # # Add support for hardware SHA512 and reschedule instructions to # favour dual-issue z10 pipeline. Hardware SHA256/512 is ~4.7x faster # than software. # November 2010. # # Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" # feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit # instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy # application context. The feature is not specific to any particular # processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code # remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 SHA256 was measured to # perform 2.4x and SHA512 - 13x better than code generated by gcc 4.3. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } $t0="%r0"; $t1="%r1"; $ctx="%r2"; $t2="%r2"; $inp="%r3"; $len="%r4"; # used as index in inner loop $A="%r5"; $B="%r6"; $C="%r7"; $D="%r8"; $E="%r9"; $F="%r10"; $G="%r11"; $H="%r12"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H); $tbl="%r13"; $T1="%r14"; $sp="%r15"; while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($output =~ /512/) { $label="512"; $SZ=8; $LD="lg"; # load from memory $ST="stg"; # store to memory $ADD="alg"; # add with memory operand $ROT="rllg"; # rotate left $SHR="srlg"; # logical right shift [see even at the end] @Sigma0=(25,30,36); @Sigma1=(23,46,50); @sigma0=(56,63, 7); @sigma1=( 3,45, 6); $rounds=80; $kimdfunc=3; # 0 means unknown/unsupported/unimplemented/disabled } else { $label="256"; $SZ=4; $LD="llgf"; # load from memory $ST="st"; # store to memory $ADD="al"; # add with memory operand $ROT="rll"; # rotate left $SHR="srl"; # logical right shift @Sigma0=(10,19,30); @Sigma1=( 7,21,26); @sigma0=(14,25, 3); @sigma1=(13,15,10); $rounds=64; $kimdfunc=2; # magic function code for kimd instruction } $Func="sha${label}_block_data_order"; $Table="K${label}"; $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8; $frame=$stdframe+16*$SZ; sub BODY_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_; $code.=<<___ if ($i<16); $LD $T1,`$i*$SZ`($inp) ### $i ___ $code.=<<___; $ROT $t0,$e,$Sigma1[0] $ROT $t1,$e,$Sigma1[1] lgr $t2,$f xgr $t0,$t1 $ROT $t1,$t1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]` xgr $t2,$g $ST $T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp) xgr $t0,$t1 # Sigma1(e) algr $T1,$h # T1+=h ngr $t2,$e lgr $t1,$a algr $T1,$t0 # T1+=Sigma1(e) $ROT $h,$a,$Sigma0[0] xgr $t2,$g # Ch(e,f,g) $ADD $T1,`$i*$SZ`($len,$tbl) # T1+=K[i] $ROT $t0,$a,$Sigma0[1] algr $T1,$t2 # T1+=Ch(e,f,g) ogr $t1,$b xgr $h,$t0 lgr $t2,$a ngr $t1,$c $ROT $t0,$t0,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]` xgr $h,$t0 # h=Sigma0(a) ngr $t2,$b algr $h,$T1 # h+=T1 ogr $t2,$t1 # Maj(a,b,c) algr $d,$T1 # d+=T1 algr $h,$t2 # h+=Maj(a,b,c) ___ } sub BODY_16_XX { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h) = @_; $code.=<<___; $LD $T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*(($i+1)%16)`($sp) ### $i $LD $t1,`$stdframe+$SZ*(($i+14)%16)`($sp) $ROT $t0,$T1,$sigma0[0] $SHR $T1,$sigma0[2] $ROT $t2,$t0,`$sigma0[1]-$sigma0[0]` xgr $T1,$t0 $ROT $t0,$t1,$sigma1[0] xgr $T1,$t2 # sigma0(X[i+1]) $SHR $t1,$sigma1[2] $ADD $T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp) # +=X[i] xgr $t1,$t0 $ROT $t0,$t0,`$sigma1[1]-$sigma1[0]` $ADD $T1,`$stdframe+$SZ*(($i+9)%16)`($sp) # +=X[i+9] xgr $t1,$t0 # sigma1(X[i+14]) algr $T1,$t1 # +=sigma1(X[i+14]) ___ &BODY_00_15(@_); } $code.=<<___; .text .align 64 .type $Table,\@object $Table: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); .quad 0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd .quad 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc .quad 0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019 .quad 0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 .quad 0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe .quad 0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2 .quad 0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1 .quad 0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694 .quad 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3 .quad 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65 .quad 0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483 .quad 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5 .quad 0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210 .quad 0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4 .quad 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725 .quad 0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70 .quad 0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926 .quad 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df .quad 0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8 .quad 0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b .quad 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001 .quad 0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30 .quad 0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910 .quad 0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8 .quad 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53 .quad 0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8 .quad 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb .quad 0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3 .quad 0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60 .quad 0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec .quad 0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9 .quad 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b .quad 0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207 .quad 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178 .quad 0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6 .quad 0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b .quad 0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493 .quad 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c .quad 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a .quad 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817 ___ $code.=<<___; .size $Table,.-$Table .globl $Func .type $Func,\@function $Func: sllg $len,$len,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)` ___ $code.=<<___ if ($kimdfunc); larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P lg %r0,16(%r1) # check kimd capabilities tmhh %r0,`0x8000>>$kimdfunc` jz .Lsoftware lghi %r0,$kimdfunc lgr %r1,$ctx lgr %r2,$inp lgr %r3,$len .long 0xb93e0002 # kimd %r0,%r2 brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" br %r14 .align 16 .Lsoftware: ___ $code.=<<___; lghi %r1,-$frame la $len,0($len,$inp) stm${g} $ctx,%r15,`2*$SIZE_T`($sp) lgr %r0,$sp la $sp,0(%r1,$sp) st${g} %r0,0($sp) larl $tbl,$Table $LD $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx) .Lloop: lghi $len,0 ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=".Lrounds_16_xx:\n"; for (;$i<32;$i++) { &BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; aghi $len,`16*$SZ` lghi $t0,`($rounds-16)*$SZ` clgr $len,$t0 jne .Lrounds_16_xx l${g} $ctx,`$frame+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) la $inp,`16*$SZ`($inp) $ADD $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) $ADD $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx) $ADD $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx) $ADD $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx) $ADD $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx) $ADD $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx) $ADD $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx) $ADD $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx) cl${g} $inp,`$frame+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) jne .Lloop lm${g} %r6,%r15,`$frame+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) br %r14 .size $Func,.-$Func .string "SHA${label} block transform for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; # unlike 32-bit shift 64-bit one takes three arguments $code =~ s/(srlg\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/$1$2,$2,/gm; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-mips.pl0000644000000000000000000003424713176625660017250 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA2 block procedures for MIPS. # October 2010. # # SHA256 performance improvement on MIPS R5000 CPU is ~27% over gcc- # generated code in o32 build and ~55% in n32/64 build. SHA512 [which # for now can only be compiled for MIPS64 ISA] improvement is modest # ~17%, but it comes for free, because it's same instruction sequence. # Improvement coefficients are for aligned input. # September 2012. # # Add MIPS[32|64]R2 code (>25% less instructions). ###################################################################### # There is a number of MIPS ABI in use, O32 and N32/64 are most # widely used. Then there is a new contender: NUBI. It appears that if # one picks the latter, it's possible to arrange code in ABI neutral # manner. Therefore let's stick to NUBI register layout: # ($zero,$at,$t0,$t1,$t2)=map("\$$_",(0..2,24,25)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10,$s11)=map("\$$_",(12..23)); ($gp,$tp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(3,28..31)); # # The return value is placed in $a0. Following coding rules facilitate # interoperability: # # - never ever touch $tp, "thread pointer", former $gp [o32 can be # excluded from the rule, because it's specified volatile]; # - copy return value to $t0, former $v0 [or to $a0 if you're adapting # old code]; # - on O32 populate $a4-$a7 with 'lw $aN,4*N($sp)' if necessary; # # For reference here is register layout for N32/64 MIPS ABIs: # # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); # ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); # ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); # ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); # ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); # $flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64 if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $PTR_LA="dla"; $PTR_ADD="dadd"; # incidentally works even on n32 $PTR_SUB="dsub"; # incidentally works even on n32 $REG_S="sd"; $REG_L="ld"; $PTR_SLL="dsll"; # incidentally works even on n32 $SZREG=8; } else { $PTR_LA="la"; $PTR_ADD="add"; $PTR_SUB="sub"; $REG_S="sw"; $REG_L="lw"; $PTR_SLL="sll"; $SZREG=4; } $pf = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? $t0 : $t2; # # # ###################################################################### $big_endian=(`echo MIPSEL | $ENV{CC} -E -`=~/MIPSEL/)?1:0 if ($ENV{CC}); for (@ARGV) { $output=$_ if (/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/); } open STDOUT,">$output"; if (!defined($big_endian)) { $big_endian=(unpack('L',pack('N',1))==1); } if ($output =~ /512/) { $label="512"; $SZ=8; $LD="ld"; # load from memory $ST="sd"; # store to memory $SLL="dsll"; # shift left logical $SRL="dsrl"; # shift right logical $ADDU="daddu"; $ROTR="drotr"; @Sigma0=(28,34,39); @Sigma1=(14,18,41); @sigma0=( 7, 1, 8); # right shift first @sigma1=( 6,19,61); # right shift first $lastK=0x817; $rounds=80; } else { $label="256"; $SZ=4; $LD="lw"; # load from memory $ST="sw"; # store to memory $SLL="sll"; # shift left logical $SRL="srl"; # shift right logical $ADDU="addu"; $ROTR="rotr"; @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 3, 7,18); # right shift first @sigma1=(10,17,19); # right shift first $lastK=0x8f2; $rounds=64; } $MSB = $big_endian ? 0 : ($SZ-1); $LSB = ($SZ-1)&~$MSB; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("\$$_",(1,2,3,7,24,25,30,31)); @X=map("\$$_",(8..23)); $ctx=$a0; $inp=$a1; $len=$a2; $Ktbl=$len; sub BODY_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; my ($T1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp2)=(@X[4],@X[5],@X[6],@X[7]); $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); ${LD}l @X[1],`($i+1)*$SZ+$MSB`($inp) ${LD}r @X[1],`($i+1)*$SZ+$LSB`($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$big_endian && $i<16 && $SZ==4); #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) wsbh @X[0],@X[0] # byte swap($i) rotr @X[0],@X[0],16 #else srl $tmp0,@X[0],24 # byte swap($i) srl $tmp1,@X[0],8 andi $tmp2,@X[0],0xFF00 sll @X[0],@X[0],24 andi $tmp1,0xFF00 sll $tmp2,$tmp2,8 or @X[0],$tmp0 or $tmp1,$tmp2 or @X[0],$tmp1 #endif ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$big_endian && $i<16 && $SZ==8); #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) dsbh @X[0],@X[0] # byte swap($i) dshd @X[0],@X[0] #else ori $tmp0,$zero,0xFF dsll $tmp2,$tmp0,32 or $tmp0,$tmp2 # 0x000000FF000000FF and $tmp1,@X[0],$tmp0 # byte swap($i) dsrl $tmp2,@X[0],24 dsll $tmp1,24 and $tmp2,$tmp0 dsll $tmp0,8 # 0x0000FF000000FF00 or $tmp1,$tmp2 and $tmp2,@X[0],$tmp0 dsrl @X[0],8 dsll $tmp2,8 and @X[0],$tmp0 or $tmp1,$tmp2 or @X[0],$tmp1 dsrl $tmp1,@X[0],32 dsll @X[0],32 or @X[0],$tmp1 #endif ___ $code.=<<___; #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) xor $tmp2,$f,$g # $i $ROTR $tmp0,$e,@Sigma1[0] $ADDU $T1,$X[0],$h $ROTR $tmp1,$e,@Sigma1[1] and $tmp2,$e $ROTR $h,$e,@Sigma1[2] xor $tmp0,$tmp1 $ROTR $tmp1,$a,@Sigma0[0] xor $tmp2,$g # Ch(e,f,g) xor $tmp0,$h # Sigma1(e) $ROTR $h,$a,@Sigma0[1] $ADDU $T1,$tmp2 $LD $tmp2,`$i*$SZ`($Ktbl) # K[$i] xor $h,$tmp1 $ROTR $tmp1,$a,@Sigma0[2] $ADDU $T1,$tmp0 and $tmp0,$b,$c xor $h,$tmp1 # Sigma0(a) xor $tmp1,$b,$c #else $ADDU $T1,$X[0],$h # $i $SRL $h,$e,@Sigma1[0] xor $tmp2,$f,$g $SLL $tmp1,$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[2]` and $tmp2,$e $SRL $tmp0,$e,@Sigma1[1] xor $h,$tmp1 $SLL $tmp1,$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[1]` xor $h,$tmp0 $SRL $tmp0,$e,@Sigma1[2] xor $h,$tmp1 $SLL $tmp1,$e,`$SZ*8-@Sigma1[0]` xor $h,$tmp0 xor $tmp2,$g # Ch(e,f,g) xor $tmp0,$tmp1,$h # Sigma1(e) $SRL $h,$a,@Sigma0[0] $ADDU $T1,$tmp2 $LD $tmp2,`$i*$SZ`($Ktbl) # K[$i] $SLL $tmp1,$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[2]` $ADDU $T1,$tmp0 $SRL $tmp0,$a,@Sigma0[1] xor $h,$tmp1 $SLL $tmp1,$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[1]` xor $h,$tmp0 $SRL $tmp0,$a,@Sigma0[2] xor $h,$tmp1 $SLL $tmp1,$a,`$SZ*8-@Sigma0[0]` xor $h,$tmp0 and $tmp0,$b,$c xor $h,$tmp1 # Sigma0(a) xor $tmp1,$b,$c #endif $ST @X[0],`($i%16)*$SZ`($sp) # offload to ring buffer $ADDU $h,$tmp0 and $tmp1,$a $ADDU $T1,$tmp2 # +=K[$i] $ADDU $h,$tmp1 # +=Maj(a,b,c) $ADDU $d,$T1 $ADDU $h,$T1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=13); $LD @X[3],`(($i+3)%16)*$SZ`($sp) # prefetch from ring buffer ___ } sub BODY_16_XX { my $i=@_[0]; my ($tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3)=(@X[4],@X[5],@X[6],@X[7]); $code.=<<___; #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) || defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R2) $SRL $tmp2,@X[1],@sigma0[0] # Xupdate($i) $ROTR $tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[1] $ADDU @X[0],@X[9] # +=X[i+9] xor $tmp2,$tmp0 $ROTR $tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[2] $SRL $tmp3,@X[14],@sigma1[0] $ROTR $tmp1,@X[14],@sigma1[1] xor $tmp2,$tmp0 # sigma0(X[i+1]) $ROTR $tmp0,@X[14],@sigma1[2] xor $tmp3,$tmp1 $ADDU @X[0],$tmp2 #else $SRL $tmp2,@X[1],@sigma0[0] # Xupdate($i) $ADDU @X[0],@X[9] # +=X[i+9] $SLL $tmp1,@X[1],`$SZ*8-@sigma0[2]` $SRL $tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[1] xor $tmp2,$tmp1 $SLL $tmp1,`@sigma0[2]-@sigma0[1]` xor $tmp2,$tmp0 $SRL $tmp0,@X[1],@sigma0[2] xor $tmp2,$tmp1 $SRL $tmp3,@X[14],@sigma1[0] xor $tmp2,$tmp0 # sigma0(X[i+1]) $SLL $tmp1,@X[14],`$SZ*8-@sigma1[2]` $ADDU @X[0],$tmp2 $SRL $tmp0,@X[14],@sigma1[1] xor $tmp3,$tmp1 $SLL $tmp1,`@sigma1[2]-@sigma1[1]` xor $tmp3,$tmp0 $SRL $tmp0,@X[14],@sigma1[2] xor $tmp3,$tmp1 #endif xor $tmp3,$tmp0 # sigma1(X[i+14]) $ADDU @X[0],$tmp3 ___ &BODY_00_15(@_); } $FRAMESIZE=16*$SZ+16*$SZREG; $SAVED_REGS_MASK = ($flavour =~ /nubi/i) ? "0xc0fff008" : "0xc0ff0000"; $code.=<<___; #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER # include #endif #if defined(__mips_smartmips) && !defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2) #define _MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R2 #endif .text .set noat #if !defined(__mips_eabi) && (!defined(__vxworks) || defined(__pic__)) .option pic2 #endif .align 5 .globl sha${label}_block_data_order .ent sha${label}_block_data_order sha${label}_block_data_order: .frame $sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra .mask $SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /o32/i); # o32 PIC-ification .cpload $pf ___ $code.=<<___; $PTR_SUB $sp,$FRAMESIZE $REG_S $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); # optimize non-nubi prologue $REG_S $s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; $PTR_SLL @X[15],$len,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)` ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i); # non-o32 PIC-ification .cplocal $Ktbl .cpsetup $pf,$zero,sha${label}_block_data_order ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $PTR_LA $Ktbl,K${label} # PIC-ified 'load address' $LD $A,0*$SZ($ctx) # load context $LD $B,1*$SZ($ctx) $LD $C,2*$SZ($ctx) $LD $D,3*$SZ($ctx) $LD $E,4*$SZ($ctx) $LD $F,5*$SZ($ctx) $LD $G,6*$SZ($ctx) $LD $H,7*$SZ($ctx) $PTR_ADD @X[15],$inp # pointer to the end of input $REG_S @X[15],16*$SZ($sp) b .Loop .align 5 .Loop: ${LD}l @X[0],$MSB($inp) ${LD}r @X[0],$LSB($inp) ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@X,shift(@X)); } $code.=<<___; b .L16_xx .align 4 .L16_xx: ___ for (;$i<32;$i++) { &BODY_16_XX($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); push(@X,shift(@X)); } $code.=<<___; and @X[6],0xfff li @X[7],$lastK .set noreorder bne @X[6],@X[7],.L16_xx $PTR_ADD $Ktbl,16*$SZ # Ktbl+=16 $REG_L @X[15],16*$SZ($sp) # restore pointer to the end of input $LD @X[0],0*$SZ($ctx) $LD @X[1],1*$SZ($ctx) $LD @X[2],2*$SZ($ctx) $PTR_ADD $inp,16*$SZ $LD @X[3],3*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $A,@X[0] $LD @X[4],4*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $B,@X[1] $LD @X[5],5*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $C,@X[2] $LD @X[6],6*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $D,@X[3] $LD @X[7],7*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $E,@X[4] $ST $A,0*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $F,@X[5] $ST $B,1*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $G,@X[6] $ST $C,2*$SZ($ctx) $ADDU $H,@X[7] $ST $D,3*$SZ($ctx) $ST $E,4*$SZ($ctx) $ST $F,5*$SZ($ctx) $ST $G,6*$SZ($ctx) $ST $H,7*$SZ($ctx) bne $inp,@X[15],.Loop $PTR_SUB $Ktbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ` # rewind $Ktbl $REG_L $ra,$FRAMESIZE-1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $fp,$FRAMESIZE-2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s11,$FRAMESIZE-3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s10,$FRAMESIZE-4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s9,$FRAMESIZE-5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s8,$FRAMESIZE-6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s7,$FRAMESIZE-7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s6,$FRAMESIZE-8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s5,$FRAMESIZE-9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,$FRAMESIZE-10*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s3,$FRAMESIZE-11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,$FRAMESIZE-12*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,$FRAMESIZE-13*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,$FRAMESIZE-14*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,$FRAMESIZE-15*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE .end sha${label}_block_data_order .rdata .align 5 K${label}: ___ if ($SZ==4) { $code.=<<___; .word 0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5 .word 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5 .word 0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3 .word 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174 .word 0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc .word 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da .word 0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7 .word 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967 .word 0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13 .word 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85 .word 0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3 .word 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070 .word 0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5 .word 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3 .word 0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208 .word 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2 ___ } else { $code.=<<___; .dword 0x428a2f98d728ae22, 0x7137449123ef65cd .dword 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbc .dword 0x3956c25bf348b538, 0x59f111f1b605d019 .dword 0x923f82a4af194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 .dword 0xd807aa98a3030242, 0x12835b0145706fbe .dword 0x243185be4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2 .dword 0x72be5d74f27b896f, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1 .dword 0x9bdc06a725c71235, 0xc19bf174cf692694 .dword 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786384f25e3 .dword 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65 .dword 0x2de92c6f592b0275, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483 .dword 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da831153b5 .dword 0x983e5152ee66dfab, 0xa831c66d2db43210 .dword 0xb00327c898fb213f, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4 .dword 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2, 0xd5a79147930aa725 .dword 0x06ca6351e003826f, 0x142929670a0e6e70 .dword 0x27b70a8546d22ffc, 0x2e1b21385c26c926 .dword 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed, 0x53380d139d95b3df .dword 0x650a73548baf63de, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8 .dword 0x81c2c92e47edaee6, 0x92722c851482353b .dword 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364, 0xa81a664bbc423001 .dword 0xc24b8b70d0f89791, 0xc76c51a30654be30 .dword 0xd192e819d6ef5218, 0xd69906245565a910 .dword 0xf40e35855771202a, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8 .dword 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c085141ab53 .dword 0x2748774cdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8 .dword 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb .dword 0x5b9cca4f7763e373, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3 .dword 0x748f82ee5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f43172f60 .dword 0x84c87814a1f0ab72, 0x8cc702081a6439ec .dword 0x90befffa23631e28, 0xa4506cebde82bde9 .dword 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915, 0xc67178f2e372532b .dword 0xca273eceea26619c, 0xd186b8c721c0c207 .dword 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178 .dword 0x06f067aa72176fba, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6 .dword 0x113f9804bef90dae, 0x1b710b35131c471b .dword 0x28db77f523047d84, 0x32caab7b40c72493 .dword 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc, 0x431d67c49c100d4c .dword 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6, 0x597f299cfc657e2a .dword 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c4a475817 ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciiz "SHA${label} for MIPS, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 5 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-parisc.pl0000644000000000000000000001464613176625660017413 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA1 block procedure for PA-RISC. # June 2009. # # On PA-7100LC performance is >30% better than gcc 3.2 generated code # for aligned input and >50% better for unaligned. Compared to vendor # compiler on PA-8600 it's almost 60% faster in 64-bit build and just # few percent faster in 32-bit one (this for aligned input, data for # unaligned input is not available). # # Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $FRAME_MARKER =80; $SAVED_RP =16; $PUSH ="std"; $PUSHMA ="std,ma"; $POP ="ldd"; $POPMB ="ldd,mb"; } else { $LEVEL ="1.0"; $SIZE_T =4; $FRAME_MARKER =48; $SAVED_RP =20; $PUSH ="stw"; $PUSHMA ="stwm"; $POP ="ldw"; $POPMB ="ldwm"; } $FRAME=14*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 14 saved regs + frame marker # [+ argument transfer] $ctx="%r26"; # arg0 $inp="%r25"; # arg1 $num="%r24"; # arg2 $t0="%r28"; $t1="%r29"; $K="%r31"; @X=("%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8", "%r9", "%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16",$t0); @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E)=("%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23"); sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); addl $K,$e,$e ; $i shd $a,$a,27,$t1 addl @X[$i],$e,$e and $c,$b,$t0 addl $t1,$e,$e andcm $d,$b,$t1 shd $b,$b,2,$b or $t1,$t0,$t0 addl $t0,$e,$e ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); # with forward Xupdate addl $K,$e,$e ; $i shd $a,$a,27,$t1 xor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e and $c,$b,$t0 xor @X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] addl $t1,$e,$e andcm $d,$b,$t1 shd $b,$b,2,$b or $t1,$t0,$t0 xor @X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] add $t0,$e,$e shd @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31,@X[$j%16] ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___ if ($i<79); xor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] ; $i addl $K,$e,$e shd $a,$a,27,$t1 xor @X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e xor $b,$c,$t0 xor @X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] addl $t1,$e,$e shd $b,$b,2,$b xor $d,$t0,$t0 shd @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31,@X[$j%16] addl $t0,$e,$e ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==79); # with context load ldw 0($ctx),@X[0] ; $i addl $K,$e,$e shd $a,$a,27,$t1 ldw 4($ctx),@X[1] addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e xor $b,$c,$t0 ldw 8($ctx),@X[2] addl $t1,$e,$e shd $b,$b,2,$b xor $d,$t0,$t0 ldw 12($ctx),@X[3] addl $t0,$e,$e ldw 16($ctx),@X[4] ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; $code.=<<___; shd $a,$a,27,$t1 ; $i addl $K,$e,$e xor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] xor $d,$c,$t0 addl @X[$i%16],$e,$e xor @X[($j+8)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] and $b,$t0,$t0 addl $t1,$e,$e shd $b,$b,2,$b xor @X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j%16],@X[$j%16] addl $t0,$e,$e and $d,$c,$t1 shd @X[$j%16],@X[$j%16],31,@X[$j%16] addl $t1,$e,$e ___ } $code=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .EXPORT sha1_block_data_order,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR sha1_block_data_order .PROC .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-14*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=16 .ENTRY $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp) $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp) $PUSH %r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ldw 0($ctx),$A ldw 4($ctx),$B ldw 8($ctx),$C ldw 12($ctx),$D ldw 16($ctx),$E extru $inp,31,2,$t0 ; t0=inp&3; sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0 ; t0*=8; subi 32,$t0,$t0 ; t0=32-t0; mtctl $t0,%cr11 ; %sar=t0; L\$oop ldi 3,$t0 andcm $inp,$t0,$t0 ; 64-bit neutral ___ for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) { # load input block $code.="\tldw `4*$i`($t0),@X[$i]\n"; } $code.=<<___; cmpb,*= $inp,$t0,L\$aligned ldw 60($t0),@X[15] ldw 64($t0),@X[16] ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { # align input $code.="\tvshd @X[$i],@X[$i+1],@X[$i]\n"; } $code.=<<___; L\$aligned ldil L'0x5a827000,$K ; K_00_19 ldo 0x999($K),$K ___ for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; ldil L'0x6ed9e000,$K ; K_20_39 ldo 0xba1($K),$K ___ for (;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; ldil L'0x8f1bb000,$K ; K_40_59 ldo 0xcdc($K),$K ___ for (;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; ldil L'0xca62c000,$K ; K_60_79 ldo 0x1d6($K),$K ___ for (;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; addl @X[0],$A,$A addl @X[1],$B,$B addl @X[2],$C,$C addl @X[3],$D,$D addl @X[4],$E,$E stw $A,0($ctx) stw $B,4($ctx) stw $C,8($ctx) stw $D,12($ctx) stw $E,16($ctx) addib,*<> -1,$num,L\$oop ldo 64($inp),$inp $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4 $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5 $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6 $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7 $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8 $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9 $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10 $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11 $POP `-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12 $POP `-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13 $POP `-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14 $POP `-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15 $POP `-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16 bv (%r2) .EXIT $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3 .PROCEND .STRINGZ "SHA1 block transform for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4); $code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8); print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl0000755000000000000000000002727513176625660017340 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # SHA256/512 for PowerISA v2.07. # # Accurate performance measurements are problematic, because it's # always virtualized setup with possibly throttled processor. # Relative comparison is therefore more informative. This module is # ~60% faster than integer-only sha512-ppc.pl. To anchor to something # else, SHA256 is 24% slower than sha1-ppc.pl and 2.5x slower than # hardware-assisted aes-128-cbc encrypt. SHA512 is 20% faster than # sha1-ppc.pl and 1.6x slower than aes-128-cbc. Another interesting # result is degree of computational resources' utilization. POWER8 is # "massively multi-threaded chip" and difference between single- and # maximum multi-process benchmark results tells that utlization is # whooping 94%. For sha512-ppc.pl we get [not unimpressive] 84% and # for sha1-ppc.pl - 73%. 100% means that multi-process result equals # to single-process one, given that all threads end up on the same # physical core. $flavour=shift; $output =shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T=8; $LRSAVE=2*$SIZE_T; $STU="stdu"; $POP="ld"; $PUSH="std"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T=4; $LRSAVE=$SIZE_T; $STU="stwu"; $POP="lwz"; $PUSH="stw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LENDIAN=($flavour=~/le/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output" || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; if ($output =~ /512/) { $bits=512; $SZ=8; $sz="d"; $rounds=80; } else { $bits=256; $SZ=4; $sz="w"; $rounds=64; } $func="sha${bits}_block_p8"; $FRAME=8*$SIZE_T; $sp ="r1"; $toc="r2"; $ctx="r3"; $inp="r4"; $num="r5"; $Tbl="r6"; $idx="r7"; $lrsave="r8"; $offload="r11"; $vrsave="r12"; ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,10,26..31)); $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/); @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=map("v$_",(0..7)); @X=map("v$_",(8..23)); ($Ki,$Func,$S0,$S1,$s0,$s1,$lemask)=map("v$_",(24..31)); sub ROUND { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; my $j=($i+1)%16; $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && ($i%(16/$SZ))==(16/$SZ-1)); lvx_u @X[$i+1],0,$inp ; load X[i] in advance addi $inp,$inp,16 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<16 && ($i%(16/$SZ))); vsldoi @X[$i],@X[$i-1],@X[$i-1],$SZ ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LENDIAN && $i<16 && ($i%(16/$SZ))==0); vperm @X[$i],@X[$i],@X[$i],$lemask ___ $code.=<<___; `"vshasigma${sz} $s0,@X[($j+1)%16],0,0" if ($i>=15)` vsel $Func,$g,$f,$e ; Ch(e,f,g) vshasigma${sz} $S1,$e,1,15 ; Sigma1(e) vaddu${sz}m $h,$h,@X[$i%16] ; h+=X[i] vshasigma${sz} $S0,$a,1,0 ; Sigma0(a) `"vshasigma${sz} $s1,@X[($j+14)%16],0,15" if ($i>=15)` vaddu${sz}m $h,$h,$Func ; h+=Ch(e,f,g) vxor $Func,$a,$b `"vaddu${sz}m @X[$j],@X[$j],@X[($j+9)%16]" if ($i>=15)` vaddu${sz}m $h,$h,$S1 ; h+=Sigma1(e) vsel $Func,$b,$c,$Func ; Maj(a,b,c) vaddu${sz}m $g,$g,$Ki ; future h+=K[i] vaddu${sz}m $d,$d,$h ; d+=h vaddu${sz}m $S0,$S0,$Func ; Sigma0(a)+Maj(a,b,c) `"vaddu${sz}m @X[$j],@X[$j],$s0" if ($i>=15)` lvx $Ki,$idx,$Tbl ; load next K[i] addi $idx,$idx,16 vaddu${sz}m $h,$h,$S0 ; h+=Sigma0(a)+Maj(a,b,c) `"vaddu${sz}m @X[$j],@X[$j],$s1" if ($i>=15)` ___ } $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl $func .align 6 $func: $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp) mflr $lrsave li r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15` li r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31` stvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 mfspr $vrsave,256 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp li r11,-1 stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp) # save vrsave li $x10,0x10 $PUSH r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x20,0x20 $PUSH r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x30,0x30 $PUSH r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x40,0x40 $PUSH r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x50,0x50 $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x60,0x60 $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) li $x70,0x70 $PUSH $lrsave,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp) mtspr 256,r11 bl LPICmeup addi $offload,$sp,$FRAME+15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LENDIAN); li $idx,8 lvsl $lemask,0,$idx vspltisb $Ki,0x0f vxor $lemask,$lemask,$Ki ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); lvx_4w $A,$x00,$ctx lvx_4w $E,$x10,$ctx vsldoi $B,$A,$A,4 # unpack vsldoi $C,$A,$A,8 vsldoi $D,$A,$A,12 vsldoi $F,$E,$E,4 vsldoi $G,$E,$E,8 vsldoi $H,$E,$E,12 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); lvx_u $A,$x00,$ctx lvx_u $C,$x10,$ctx lvx_u $E,$x20,$ctx vsldoi $B,$A,$A,8 # unpack lvx_u $G,$x30,$ctx vsldoi $D,$C,$C,8 vsldoi $F,$E,$E,8 vsldoi $H,$G,$G,8 ___ $code.=<<___; li r0,`($rounds-16)/16` # inner loop counter b Loop .align 5 Loop: lvx $Ki,$x00,$Tbl li $idx,16 lvx_u @X[0],0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 stvx $A,$x00,$offload # offload $A-$H stvx $B,$x10,$offload stvx $C,$x20,$offload stvx $D,$x30,$offload stvx $E,$x40,$offload stvx $F,$x50,$offload stvx $G,$x60,$offload stvx $H,$x70,$offload vaddu${sz}m $H,$H,$Ki # h+K[i] lvx $Ki,$idx,$Tbl addi $idx,$idx,16 ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; mtctr r0 b L16_xx .align 5 L16_xx: ___ for (;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; bdnz L16_xx lvx @X[2],$x00,$offload subic. $num,$num,1 lvx @X[3],$x10,$offload vaddu${sz}m $A,$A,@X[2] lvx @X[4],$x20,$offload vaddu${sz}m $B,$B,@X[3] lvx @X[5],$x30,$offload vaddu${sz}m $C,$C,@X[4] lvx @X[6],$x40,$offload vaddu${sz}m $D,$D,@X[5] lvx @X[7],$x50,$offload vaddu${sz}m $E,$E,@X[6] lvx @X[8],$x60,$offload vaddu${sz}m $F,$F,@X[7] lvx @X[9],$x70,$offload vaddu${sz}m $G,$G,@X[8] vaddu${sz}m $H,$H,@X[9] bne Loop ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); lvx @X[0],$idx,$Tbl addi $idx,$idx,16 vperm $A,$A,$B,$Ki # pack the answer lvx @X[1],$idx,$Tbl vperm $E,$E,$F,$Ki vperm $A,$A,$C,@X[0] vperm $E,$E,$G,@X[0] vperm $A,$A,$D,@X[1] vperm $E,$E,$H,@X[1] stvx_4w $A,$x00,$ctx stvx_4w $E,$x10,$ctx ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); vperm $A,$A,$B,$Ki # pack the answer vperm $C,$C,$D,$Ki vperm $E,$E,$F,$Ki vperm $G,$G,$H,$Ki stvx_u $A,$x00,$ctx stvx_u $C,$x10,$ctx stvx_u $E,$x20,$ctx stvx_u $G,$x30,$ctx ___ $code.=<<___; li r10,`$FRAME+8*16+15` mtlr $lrsave li r11,`$FRAME+8*16+31` mtspr 256,$vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp $POP r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp) addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T` blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,6,3,0 .long 0 .size $func,.-$func ___ # Ugly hack here, because PPC assembler syntax seem to vary too # much from platforms to platform... $code.=<<___; .align 6 LPICmeup: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr $Tbl ; vvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry addi $Tbl,$Tbl,`64-8` mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .space `64-9*4` ___ if ($SZ==8) { local *table = sub { foreach(@_) { $code.=".quad $_,$_\n"; } }; table( "0x428a2f98d728ae22","0x7137449123ef65cd", "0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f","0xe9b5dba58189dbbc", "0x3956c25bf348b538","0x59f111f1b605d019", "0x923f82a4af194f9b","0xab1c5ed5da6d8118", "0xd807aa98a3030242","0x12835b0145706fbe", "0x243185be4ee4b28c","0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2", "0x72be5d74f27b896f","0x80deb1fe3b1696b1", "0x9bdc06a725c71235","0xc19bf174cf692694", "0xe49b69c19ef14ad2","0xefbe4786384f25e3", "0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5","0x240ca1cc77ac9c65", "0x2de92c6f592b0275","0x4a7484aa6ea6e483", "0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4","0x76f988da831153b5", "0x983e5152ee66dfab","0xa831c66d2db43210", "0xb00327c898fb213f","0xbf597fc7beef0ee4", "0xc6e00bf33da88fc2","0xd5a79147930aa725", "0x06ca6351e003826f","0x142929670a0e6e70", "0x27b70a8546d22ffc","0x2e1b21385c26c926", "0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed","0x53380d139d95b3df", "0x650a73548baf63de","0x766a0abb3c77b2a8", "0x81c2c92e47edaee6","0x92722c851482353b", "0xa2bfe8a14cf10364","0xa81a664bbc423001", "0xc24b8b70d0f89791","0xc76c51a30654be30", "0xd192e819d6ef5218","0xd69906245565a910", "0xf40e35855771202a","0x106aa07032bbd1b8", "0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8","0x1e376c085141ab53", "0x2748774cdf8eeb99","0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8", "0x391c0cb3c5c95a63","0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb", "0x5b9cca4f7763e373","0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3", "0x748f82ee5defb2fc","0x78a5636f43172f60", "0x84c87814a1f0ab72","0x8cc702081a6439ec", "0x90befffa23631e28","0xa4506cebde82bde9", "0xbef9a3f7b2c67915","0xc67178f2e372532b", "0xca273eceea26619c","0xd186b8c721c0c207", "0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e","0xf57d4f7fee6ed178", "0x06f067aa72176fba","0x0a637dc5a2c898a6", "0x113f9804bef90dae","0x1b710b35131c471b", "0x28db77f523047d84","0x32caab7b40c72493", "0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc","0x431d67c49c100d4c", "0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6","0x597f299cfc657e2a", "0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec","0x6c44198c4a475817","0"); $code.=<<___ if (!$LENDIAN); .quad 0x0001020304050607,0x1011121314151617 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LENDIAN); # quad-swapped .quad 0x1011121314151617,0x0001020304050607 ___ } else { local *table = sub { foreach(@_) { $code.=".long $_,$_,$_,$_\n"; } }; table( "0x428a2f98","0x71374491","0xb5c0fbcf","0xe9b5dba5", "0x3956c25b","0x59f111f1","0x923f82a4","0xab1c5ed5", "0xd807aa98","0x12835b01","0x243185be","0x550c7dc3", "0x72be5d74","0x80deb1fe","0x9bdc06a7","0xc19bf174", "0xe49b69c1","0xefbe4786","0x0fc19dc6","0x240ca1cc", "0x2de92c6f","0x4a7484aa","0x5cb0a9dc","0x76f988da", "0x983e5152","0xa831c66d","0xb00327c8","0xbf597fc7", "0xc6e00bf3","0xd5a79147","0x06ca6351","0x14292967", "0x27b70a85","0x2e1b2138","0x4d2c6dfc","0x53380d13", "0x650a7354","0x766a0abb","0x81c2c92e","0x92722c85", "0xa2bfe8a1","0xa81a664b","0xc24b8b70","0xc76c51a3", "0xd192e819","0xd6990624","0xf40e3585","0x106aa070", "0x19a4c116","0x1e376c08","0x2748774c","0x34b0bcb5", "0x391c0cb3","0x4ed8aa4a","0x5b9cca4f","0x682e6ff3", "0x748f82ee","0x78a5636f","0x84c87814","0x8cc70208", "0x90befffa","0xa4506ceb","0xbef9a3f7","0xc67178f2","0"); $code.=<<___ if (!$LENDIAN); .long 0x00010203,0x10111213,0x10111213,0x10111213 .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x10111213,0x10111213 .long 0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x10111213 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LENDIAN); # word-swapped .long 0x10111213,0x10111213,0x10111213,0x00010203 .long 0x10111213,0x10111213,0x04050607,0x00010203 .long 0x10111213,0x08090a0b,0x04050607,0x00010203 ___ } $code.=<<___; .asciz "SHA${bits} for PowerISA 2.07, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl0000644000000000000000000004021313176625660017647 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # January 2009 # # Provided that UltraSPARC VIS instructions are pipe-lined(*) and # pairable(*) with IALU ones, offloading of Xupdate to the UltraSPARC # Graphic Unit would make it possible to achieve higher instruction- # level parallelism, ILP, and thus higher performance. It should be # explicitly noted that ILP is the keyword, and it means that this # code would be unsuitable for cores like UltraSPARC-Tx. The idea is # not really novel, Sun had VIS-powered implementation for a while. # Unlike Sun's implementation this one can process multiple unaligned # input blocks, and as such works as drop-in replacement for OpenSSL # sha1_block_data_order. Performance improvement was measured to be # 40% over pure IALU sha1-sparcv9.pl on UltraSPARC-IIi, but 12% on # UltraSPARC-III. See below for discussion... # # The module does not present direct interest for OpenSSL, because # it doesn't provide better performance on contemporary SPARCv9 CPUs, # UltraSPARC-Tx and SPARC64-V[II] to be specific. Those who feel they # absolutely must score on UltraSPARC-I-IV can simply replace # crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9.pl with this module. # # (*) "Pipe-lined" means that even if it takes several cycles to # complete, next instruction using same functional unit [but not # depending on the result of the current instruction] can start # execution without having to wait for the unit. "Pairable" # means that two [or more] independent instructions can be # issued at the very same time. $bits=32; for (@ARGV) { $bits=64 if (/\-m64/ || /\-xarch\=v9/); } if ($bits==64) { $bias=2047; $frame=192; } else { $bias=0; $frame=112; } $output=shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; $ctx="%i0"; $inp="%i1"; $len="%i2"; $tmp0="%i3"; $tmp1="%i4"; $tmp2="%i5"; $tmp3="%g5"; $base="%g1"; $align="%g4"; $Xfer="%o5"; $nXfer=$tmp3; $Xi="%o7"; $A="%l0"; $B="%l1"; $C="%l2"; $D="%l3"; $E="%l4"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); $Actx="%o0"; $Bctx="%o1"; $Cctx="%o2"; $Dctx="%o3"; $Ectx="%o4"; $fmul="%f32"; $VK_00_19="%f34"; $VK_20_39="%f36"; $VK_40_59="%f38"; $VK_60_79="%f40"; @VK=($VK_00_19,$VK_20_39,$VK_40_59,$VK_60_79); @X=("%f0", "%f1", "%f2", "%f3", "%f4", "%f5", "%f6", "%f7", "%f8", "%f9","%f10","%f11","%f12","%f13","%f14","%f15","%f16"); # This is reference 2x-parallelized VIS-powered Xupdate procedure. It # covers even K_NN_MM addition... sub Xupdate { my ($i)=@_; my $K=@VK[($i+16)/20]; my $j=($i+16)%16; # [ provided that GSR.alignaddr_offset is 5, $mul contains # 0x100ULL<<32|0x100 value and K_NN_MM are pre-loaded to # chosen registers... ] $code.=<<___; fxors @X[($j+13)%16],@X[$j],@X[$j] !-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13] fxors @X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14] fxor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9] fxor %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9] faligndata @X[$j],@X[$j],%f18 ! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24 fpadd32 @X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1 fmul8ulx16 %f18,$fmul,%f18 ! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1 ![fxors %f15,%f2,%f2] for %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp ![fxors %f0,%f3,%f3] !10/17/12:X[0] dependency fpadd32 $K,@X[$j],%f20 std %f20,[$Xfer+`4*$j`] ___ # The numbers delimited with slash are the earliest possible dispatch # cycles for given instruction assuming 1 cycle latency for simple VIS # instructions, such as on UltraSPARC-I&II, 3 cycles latency, such as # on UltraSPARC-III&IV, and 2 cycles latency(*), respectively. Being # 2x-parallelized the procedure is "worth" 5, 8.5 or 6 ticks per SHA1 # round. As [long as] FPU/VIS instructions are perfectly pairable with # IALU ones, the round timing is defined by the maximum between VIS # and IALU timings. The latter varies from round to round and averages # out at 6.25 ticks. This means that USI&II should operate at IALU # rate, while USIII&IV - at VIS rate. This explains why performance # improvement varies among processors. Well, given that pure IALU # sha1-sparcv9.pl module exhibits virtually uniform performance of # ~9.3 cycles per SHA1 round. Timings mentioned above are theoretical # lower limits. Real-life performance was measured to be 6.6 cycles # per SHA1 round on USIIi and 8.3 on USIII. The latter is lower than # half-round VIS timing, because there are 16 Xupdate-free rounds, # which "push down" average theoretical timing to 8 cycles... # (*) SPARC64-V[II] was originally believed to have 2 cycles VIS # latency. Well, it might have, but it doesn't have dedicated # VIS-unit. Instead, VIS instructions are executed by other # functional units, ones used here - by IALU. This doesn't # improve effective ILP... } # The reference Xupdate procedure is then "strained" over *pairs* of # BODY_NN_MM and kind of modulo-scheduled in respect to X[n]^=X[n+13] # and K_NN_MM addition. It's "running" 15 rounds ahead, which leaves # plenty of room to amortize for read-after-write hazard, as well as # to fetch and align input for the next spin. The VIS instructions are # scheduled for latency of 2 cycles, because there are not enough IALU # instructions to schedule for latency of 3, while scheduling for 1 # would give no gain on USI&II anyway. sub BODY_00_19 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i&~1; my $k=($j+16+2)%16; # ahead reference my $l=($j+16-2)%16; # behind reference my $K=@VK[($j+16-2)/20]; $j=($j+16)%16; $code.=<<___ if (!($i&1)); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i and $c,$b,$tmp3 ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi fxors @X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14] srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e fxor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9] sll $b,30,$tmp2 add $tmp1,$e,$e andn $d,$b,$tmp1 add $Xi,$e,$e fxor %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9] srl $b,2,$b or $tmp1,$tmp3,$tmp1 or $tmp2,$b,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e faligndata @X[$j],@X[$j],%f18 ! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i&1); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i and $c,$b,$tmp3 ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi fpadd32 @X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1 srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e fmul8ulx16 %f18,$fmul,%f18 ! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1 sll $b,30,$tmp2 add $tmp1,$e,$e fpadd32 $K,@X[$l],%f20 ! andn $d,$b,$tmp1 add $Xi,$e,$e fxors @X[($k+13)%16],@X[$k],@X[$k] !-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13] srl $b,2,$b or $tmp1,$tmp3,$tmp1 fxor %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp or $tmp2,$b,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i&1 && $i>=2); std %f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`] ! ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i&~1; my $k=($j+16+2)%16; # ahead reference my $l=($j+16-2)%16; # behind reference my $K=@VK[($j+16-2)/20]; $j=($j+16)%16; $code.=<<___ if (!($i&1) && $i<64); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi fxors @X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14] srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e fxor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9] xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 fxor %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9] srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e or $tmp2,$b,$b add $Xi,$e,$e faligndata @X[$j],@X[$j],%f18 ! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i&1 && $i<64); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi fpadd32 @X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1 srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e fmul8ulx16 %f18,$fmul,%f18 ! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1 xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e fpadd32 $K,@X[$l],%f20 ! sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 fxors @X[($k+13)%16],@X[$k],@X[$k] !-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13] srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e fxor %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp or $tmp2,$b,$b add $Xi,$e,$e std %f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`] ! ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==64); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi fpadd32 $K,@X[$l],%f20 srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 std %f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`] srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e or $tmp2,$b,$b add $Xi,$e,$e ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>64); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e or $tmp2,$b,$b add $Xi,$e,$e ___ } sub BODY_40_59 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i&~1; my $k=($j+16+2)%16; # ahead reference my $l=($j+16-2)%16; # behind reference my $K=@VK[($j+16-2)/20]; $j=($j+16)%16; $code.=<<___ if (!($i&1)); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi fxors @X[($j+14)%16],@X[$j+1],@X[$j+1]! 0/ 0/ 0:X[1]^=X[14] srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e fxor @X[($j+2)%16],@X[($j+8)%16],%f18! 1/ 1/ 1:Tmp=X[2,3]^X[8,9] and $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 or $c,$b,$tmp1 fxor %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 2/ 4/ 3:X[0,1]^=X[2,3]^X[8,9] srl $b,2,$b and $d,$tmp1,$tmp1 add $Xi,$e,$e or $tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1 faligndata @X[$j],@X[$j],%f18 ! 3/ 7/ 5:Tmp=X[0,1]>>>24 or $tmp2,$b,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e fpadd32 @X[$j],@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 4/ 8/ 6:X[0,1]<<=1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i&1); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e fmul8ulx16 %f18,$fmul,%f18 ! 5/10/ 7:Tmp>>=7, Tmp&=1 and $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e fpadd32 $K,@X[$l],%f20 ! sll $b,30,$tmp2 or $c,$b,$tmp1 fxors @X[($k+13)%16],@X[$k],@X[$k] !-1/-1/-1:X[0]^=X[13] srl $b,2,$b and $d,$tmp1,$tmp1 fxor %f18,@X[$j],@X[$j] ! 8/14/10:X[0,1]|=Tmp add $Xi,$e,$e or $tmp1,$tmp0,$tmp1 or $tmp2,$b,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e std %f20,[$Xfer+`4*$l`] ! ___ } # If there is more data to process, then we pre-fetch the data for # next iteration in last ten rounds... sub BODY_70_79 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i&~1; my $m=($i%8)*2; $j=($j+16)%16; $code.=<<___ if ($i==70); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e ldd [$inp+64],@X[0] xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e or $tmp2,$b,$b add $Xi,$e,$e and $inp,-64,$nXfer inc 64,$inp and $nXfer,255,$nXfer alignaddr %g0,$align,%g0 add $base,$nXfer,$nXfer ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==71); sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e or $tmp2,$b,$b add $Xi,$e,$e ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=72); faligndata @X[$m],@X[$m+2],@X[$m] sll $a,5,$tmp0 !! $i ld [$Xfer+`4*($i%16)`],$Xi srl $a,27,$tmp1 add $tmp0,$e,$e xor $c,$b,$tmp0 add $tmp1,$e,$e fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[$m],%f20 sll $b,30,$tmp2 xor $d,$tmp0,$tmp1 srl $b,2,$b add $tmp1,$e,$e or $tmp2,$b,$b add $Xi,$e,$e ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<77); ldd [$inp+`8*($i+1-70)`],@X[2*($i+1-70)] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==77); # redundant if $inp was aligned add $align,63,$tmp0 and $tmp0,-8,$tmp0 ldd [$inp+$tmp0],@X[16] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=72); std %f20,[$nXfer+`4*$m`] ___ } $code.=<<___; .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr .align 64 vis_const: .long 0x5a827999,0x5a827999 ! K_00_19 .long 0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1 ! K_20_39 .long 0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc ! K_40_59 .long 0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6 ! K_60_79 .long 0x00000100,0x00000100 .align 64 .type vis_const,#object .size vis_const,(.-vis_const) .globl sha1_block_data_order sha1_block_data_order: save %sp,-$frame,%sp add %fp,$bias-256,$base 1: call .+8 add %o7,vis_const-1b,$tmp0 ldd [$tmp0+0],$VK_00_19 ldd [$tmp0+8],$VK_20_39 ldd [$tmp0+16],$VK_40_59 ldd [$tmp0+24],$VK_60_79 ldd [$tmp0+32],$fmul ld [$ctx+0],$Actx and $base,-256,$base ld [$ctx+4],$Bctx sub $base,$bias+$frame,%sp ld [$ctx+8],$Cctx and $inp,7,$align ld [$ctx+12],$Dctx and $inp,-8,$inp ld [$ctx+16],$Ectx ! X[16] is maintained in FP register bank alignaddr %g0,$align,%g0 ldd [$inp+0],@X[0] sub $inp,-64,$Xfer ldd [$inp+8],@X[2] and $Xfer,-64,$Xfer ldd [$inp+16],@X[4] and $Xfer,255,$Xfer ldd [$inp+24],@X[6] add $base,$Xfer,$Xfer ldd [$inp+32],@X[8] ldd [$inp+40],@X[10] ldd [$inp+48],@X[12] brz,pt $align,.Laligned ldd [$inp+56],@X[14] ldd [$inp+64],@X[16] faligndata @X[0],@X[2],@X[0] faligndata @X[2],@X[4],@X[2] faligndata @X[4],@X[6],@X[4] faligndata @X[6],@X[8],@X[6] faligndata @X[8],@X[10],@X[8] faligndata @X[10],@X[12],@X[10] faligndata @X[12],@X[14],@X[12] faligndata @X[14],@X[16],@X[14] .Laligned: mov 5,$tmp0 dec 1,$len alignaddr %g0,$tmp0,%g0 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[0],%f16 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[2],%f18 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[4],%f20 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[6],%f22 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[8],%f24 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[10],%f26 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[12],%f28 fpadd32 $VK_00_19,@X[14],%f30 std %f16,[$Xfer+0] mov $Actx,$A std %f18,[$Xfer+8] mov $Bctx,$B std %f20,[$Xfer+16] mov $Cctx,$C std %f22,[$Xfer+24] mov $Dctx,$D std %f24,[$Xfer+32] mov $Ectx,$E std %f26,[$Xfer+40] fxors @X[13],@X[0],@X[0] std %f28,[$Xfer+48] ba .Loop std %f30,[$Xfer+56] .align 32 .Loop: ___ for ($i=0;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_00_19($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<70;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; tst $len bz,pn `$bits==32?"%icc":"%xcc"`,.Ltail nop ___ for (;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_70_79($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; add $A,$Actx,$Actx add $B,$Bctx,$Bctx add $C,$Cctx,$Cctx add $D,$Dctx,$Dctx add $E,$Ectx,$Ectx mov 5,$tmp0 fxors @X[13],@X[0],@X[0] mov $Actx,$A mov $Bctx,$B mov $Cctx,$C mov $Dctx,$D mov $Ectx,$E alignaddr %g0,$tmp0,%g0 dec 1,$len ba .Loop mov $nXfer,$Xfer .align 32 .Ltail: ___ for($i=70;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; add $A,$Actx,$Actx add $B,$Bctx,$Bctx add $C,$Cctx,$Cctx add $D,$Dctx,$Dctx add $E,$Ectx,$Ectx st $Actx,[$ctx+0] st $Bctx,[$ctx+4] st $Cctx,[$ctx+8] st $Dctx,[$ctx+12] st $Ectx,[$ctx+16] ret restore .type sha1_block_data_order,#function .size sha1_block_data_order,(.-sha1_block_data_order) .asciz "SHA1 block transform for SPARCv9a, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "fmul8ulx16" => 0x037, "faligndata" => 0x048, "fpadd32" => 0x052, "fxor" => 0x06c, "fxors" => 0x06d ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unalignaddr { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { if (/%([goli])([0-7])/) { $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } else { return $ref; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2, $ref; } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; $code =~ s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),(%f[0-9]{1,2}),(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unvis($1,$2,$3,$4) /gem; $code =~ s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),(%[goli][0-7]),(%[goli][0-7])/ &unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4) /gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl0000755000000000000000000005137713176625660017070 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # I let hardware handle unaligned input, except on page boundaries # (see below for details). Otherwise straightforward implementation # with X vector in register bank. # sha256 | sha512 # -m64 -m32 | -m64 -m32 # --------------------------------------+----------------------- # PPC970,gcc-4.0.0 +50% +38% | +40% +410%(*) # Power6,xlc-7 +150% +90% | +100% +430%(*) # # (*) 64-bit code in 32-bit application context, which actually is # on TODO list. It should be noted that for safe deployment in # 32-bit *mutli-threaded* context asyncronous signals should be # blocked upon entry to SHA512 block routine. This is because # 32-bit signaling procedure invalidates upper halves of GPRs. # Context switch procedure preserves them, but not signaling:-( # Second version is true multi-thread safe. Trouble with the original # version was that it was using thread local storage pointer register. # Well, it scrupulously preserved it, but the problem would arise the # moment asynchronous signal was delivered and signal handler would # dereference the TLS pointer. While it's never the case in openssl # application or test suite, we have to respect this scenario and not # use TLS pointer register. Alternative would be to require caller to # block signals prior calling this routine. For the record, in 32-bit # context R2 serves as TLS pointer, while in 64-bit context - R13. $flavour=shift; $output =shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T=8; $LRSAVE=2*$SIZE_T; $STU="stdu"; $UCMP="cmpld"; $SHL="sldi"; $POP="ld"; $PUSH="std"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T=4; $LRSAVE=$SIZE_T; $STU="stwu"; $UCMP="cmplw"; $SHL="slwi"; $POP="lwz"; $PUSH="stw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output" || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; if ($output =~ /512/) { $func="sha512_block_ppc"; $SZ=8; @Sigma0=(28,34,39); @Sigma1=(14,18,41); @sigma0=(1, 8, 7); @sigma1=(19,61, 6); $rounds=80; $LD="ld"; $ST="std"; $ROR="rotrdi"; $SHR="srdi"; } else { $func="sha256_block_ppc"; $SZ=4; @Sigma0=( 2,13,22); @Sigma1=( 6,11,25); @sigma0=( 7,18, 3); @sigma1=(17,19,10); $rounds=64; $LD="lwz"; $ST="stw"; $ROR="rotrwi"; $SHR="srwi"; } $FRAME=32*$SIZE_T+16*$SZ; $LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T; $sp ="r1"; $toc="r2"; $ctx="r3"; # zapped by $a0 $inp="r4"; # zapped by $a1 $num="r5"; # zapped by $t0 $T ="r0"; $a0 ="r3"; $a1 ="r4"; $t0 ="r5"; $t1 ="r6"; $Tbl="r7"; $A ="r8"; $B ="r9"; $C ="r10"; $D ="r11"; $E ="r12"; $F =$t1; $t1 = "r0"; # stay away from "r13"; $G ="r14"; $H ="r15"; @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H); @X=("r16","r17","r18","r19","r20","r21","r22","r23", "r24","r25","r26","r27","r28","r29","r30","r31"); $inp="r31" if($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8); # reassigned $inp! aliases with @X[15] sub ROUND_00_15 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; $code.=<<___; $ROR $a0,$e,$Sigma1[0] $ROR $a1,$e,$Sigma1[1] and $t0,$f,$e xor $a0,$a0,$a1 add $h,$h,$t1 andc $t1,$g,$e $ROR $a1,$a1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]` or $t0,$t0,$t1 ; Ch(e,f,g) add $h,$h,@X[$i%16] xor $a0,$a0,$a1 ; Sigma1(e) add $h,$h,$t0 add $h,$h,$a0 $ROR $a0,$a,$Sigma0[0] $ROR $a1,$a,$Sigma0[1] and $t0,$a,$b and $t1,$a,$c xor $a0,$a0,$a1 $ROR $a1,$a1,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]` xor $t0,$t0,$t1 and $t1,$b,$c xor $a0,$a0,$a1 ; Sigma0(a) add $d,$d,$h xor $t0,$t0,$t1 ; Maj(a,b,c) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15); $LD $t1,`($i+1)*$SZ`($Tbl) ___ $code.=<<___; add $h,$h,$a0 add $h,$h,$t0 ___ } sub ROUND_16_xx { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_; $i-=16; $code.=<<___; $ROR $a0,@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[0] $ROR $a1,@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[1] $ROR $t0,@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[0] $ROR $t1,@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[1] xor $a0,$a0,$a1 $SHR $a1,@X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[2] xor $t0,$t0,$t1 $SHR $t1,@X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[2] add @X[$i],@X[$i],@X[($i+9)%16] xor $a0,$a0,$a1 ; sigma0(X[(i+1)&0x0f]) xor $t0,$t0,$t1 ; sigma1(X[(i+14)&0x0f]) $LD $t1,`$i*$SZ`($Tbl) add @X[$i],@X[$i],$a0 add @X[$i],@X[$i],$t0 ___ &ROUND_00_15($i+16,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h); } $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl $func .align 6 $func: $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $SHL $num,$num,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)` $PUSH $ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp) $PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $PUSH r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $PUSH r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $PUSH r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $PUSH r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $PUSH r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $PUSH r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $PUSH r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $PUSH r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $PUSH r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) ___ if ($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8) { $code.=<<___; $LD $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) mr $inp,r4 ; incarnate $inp $LD $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx) $LD $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx) ___ } else { for ($i=16;$i<32;$i++) { $code.=<<___; lwz r$i,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^(4*($i-16))`($ctx) ___ } } $code.=<<___; bl LPICmeup LPICedup: andi. r0,$inp,3 bne Lunaligned Laligned: add $num,$inp,$num $PUSH $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp) ; end pointer $PUSH $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) ; inp pointer bl Lsha2_block_private b Ldone ; PowerPC specification allows an implementation to be ill-behaved ; upon unaligned access which crosses page boundary. "Better safe ; than sorry" principle makes me treat it specially. But I don't ; look for particular offending word, but rather for the input ; block which crosses the boundary. Once found that block is aligned ; and hashed separately... .align 4 Lunaligned: subfic $t1,$inp,4096 andi. $t1,$t1,`4096-16*$SZ` ; distance to closest page boundary beq Lcross_page $UCMP $num,$t1 ble Laligned ; didn't cross the page boundary subfc $num,$t1,$num add $t1,$inp,$t1 $PUSH $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp) ; save real remaining num $PUSH $t1,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp) ; intermediate end pointer $PUSH $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) ; inp pointer bl Lsha2_block_private ; $inp equals to the intermediate end pointer here $POP $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp) ; restore real remaining num Lcross_page: li $t1,`16*$SZ/4` mtctr $t1 ___ if ($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8) { $code.=<<___; addi r20,$sp,$LOCALS ; aligned spot below the frame Lmemcpy: lbz r16,0($inp) lbz r17,1($inp) lbz r18,2($inp) lbz r19,3($inp) addi $inp,$inp,4 stb r16,0(r20) stb r17,1(r20) stb r18,2(r20) stb r19,3(r20) addi r20,r20,4 bdnz Lmemcpy ___ } else { $code.=<<___; addi r12,$sp,$LOCALS ; aligned spot below the frame Lmemcpy: lbz r8,0($inp) lbz r9,1($inp) lbz r10,2($inp) lbz r11,3($inp) addi $inp,$inp,4 stb r8,0(r12) stb r9,1(r12) stb r10,2(r12) stb r11,3(r12) addi r12,r12,4 bdnz Lmemcpy ___ } $code.=<<___; $PUSH $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*26`($sp) ; save real inp addi $t1,$sp,`$LOCALS+16*$SZ` ; fictitious end pointer addi $inp,$sp,$LOCALS ; fictitious inp pointer $PUSH $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp) ; save real num $PUSH $t1,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp) ; end pointer $PUSH $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) ; inp pointer bl Lsha2_block_private $POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*26`($sp) ; restore real inp $POP $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*25`($sp) ; restore real num addic. $num,$num,`-16*$SZ` ; num-- bne Lunaligned Ldone: $POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) $POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $POP r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $POP r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $POP r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $POP r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $POP r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $POP r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $POP r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $POP r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $POP r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $POP r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) mtlr r0 addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,18,3,0 .long 0 ___ if ($SZ==4 || $SIZE_T==8) { $code.=<<___; .align 4 Lsha2_block_private: $LD $t1,0($Tbl) ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && !$LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz @X[$i],`$i*$SZ`($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4 && $LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $a0,`$i*$SZ`($inp) rotlwi @X[$i],$a0,8 rlwimi @X[$i],$a0,24,0,7 rlwimi @X[$i],$a0,24,16,23 ___ # 64-bit loads are split to 2x32-bit ones, as CPU can't handle # unaligned 64-bit loads, only 32-bit ones... $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && !$LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $t0,`$i*$SZ`($inp) lwz @X[$i],`$i*$SZ+4`($inp) insrdi @X[$i],$t0,32,0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && $LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $a0,`$i*$SZ`($inp) lwz $a1,`$i*$SZ+4`($inp) rotlwi $t0,$a0,8 rotlwi @X[$i],$a1,8 rlwimi $t0,$a0,24,0,7 rlwimi @X[$i],$a1,24,0,7 rlwimi $t0,$a0,24,16,23 rlwimi @X[$i],$a1,24,16,23 insrdi @X[$i],$t0,32,0 ___ &ROUND_00_15($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; li $t0,`$rounds/16-1` mtctr $t0 .align 4 Lrounds: addi $Tbl,$Tbl,`16*$SZ` ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; bdnz Lrounds $POP $ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp) $POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) ; inp pointer $POP $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp) ; end pointer subi $Tbl,$Tbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ` ; rewind Tbl $LD r16,`0*$SZ`($ctx) $LD r17,`1*$SZ`($ctx) $LD r18,`2*$SZ`($ctx) $LD r19,`3*$SZ`($ctx) $LD r20,`4*$SZ`($ctx) $LD r21,`5*$SZ`($ctx) $LD r22,`6*$SZ`($ctx) addi $inp,$inp,`16*$SZ` ; advance inp $LD r23,`7*$SZ`($ctx) add $A,$A,r16 add $B,$B,r17 $PUSH $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) add $C,$C,r18 $ST $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) add $D,$D,r19 $ST $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx) add $E,$E,r20 $ST $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx) add $F,$F,r21 $ST $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx) add $G,$G,r22 $ST $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx) add $H,$H,r23 $ST $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx) $ST $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx) $UCMP $inp,$num $ST $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx) bne Lsha2_block_private blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size $func,.-$func ___ } else { ######################################################################## # SHA512 for PPC32, X vector is off-loaded to stack... # # | sha512 # | -m32 # ----------------------+----------------------- # PPC74x0,gcc-4.0.1 | +48% # POWER6,gcc-4.4.6 | +124%(*) # POWER7,gcc-4.4.6 | +79%(*) # e300,gcc-4.1.0 | +167% # # (*) ~1/3 of -m64 result [and ~20% better than -m32 code generated # by xlc-12.1] my $XOFF=$LOCALS; my @V=map("r$_",(16..31)); # A..H my ($s0,$s1,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=map("r$_",(0,5,6,8..12,14,15)); my ($x0,$x1)=("r3","r4"); # zaps $ctx and $inp sub ROUND_00_15_ppc32 { my ($i, $ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo, $ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo)=@_; $code.=<<___; lwz $t2,`$SZ*($i%16)+($LITTLE_ENDIAN^4)`($Tbl) xor $a0,$flo,$glo lwz $t3,`$SZ*($i%16)+($LITTLE_ENDIAN^0)`($Tbl) xor $a1,$fhi,$ghi addc $hlo,$hlo,$t0 ; h+=x[i] stw $t0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp) ; save x[i] srwi $s0,$elo,$Sigma1[0] srwi $s1,$ehi,$Sigma1[0] and $a0,$a0,$elo adde $hhi,$hhi,$t1 and $a1,$a1,$ehi stw $t1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*($i%16)`($sp) srwi $t0,$elo,$Sigma1[1] srwi $t1,$ehi,$Sigma1[1] addc $hlo,$hlo,$t2 ; h+=K512[i] insrwi $s0,$ehi,$Sigma1[0],0 insrwi $s1,$elo,$Sigma1[0],0 xor $a0,$a0,$glo ; Ch(e,f,g) adde $hhi,$hhi,$t3 xor $a1,$a1,$ghi insrwi $t0,$ehi,$Sigma1[1],0 insrwi $t1,$elo,$Sigma1[1],0 addc $hlo,$hlo,$a0 ; h+=Ch(e,f,g) srwi $t2,$ehi,$Sigma1[2]-32 srwi $t3,$elo,$Sigma1[2]-32 xor $s0,$s0,$t0 xor $s1,$s1,$t1 insrwi $t2,$elo,$Sigma1[2]-32,0 insrwi $t3,$ehi,$Sigma1[2]-32,0 xor $a0,$alo,$blo ; a^b, b^c in next round adde $hhi,$hhi,$a1 xor $a1,$ahi,$bhi xor $s0,$s0,$t2 ; Sigma1(e) xor $s1,$s1,$t3 srwi $t0,$alo,$Sigma0[0] and $a2,$a2,$a0 addc $hlo,$hlo,$s0 ; h+=Sigma1(e) and $a3,$a3,$a1 srwi $t1,$ahi,$Sigma0[0] srwi $s0,$ahi,$Sigma0[1]-32 adde $hhi,$hhi,$s1 srwi $s1,$alo,$Sigma0[1]-32 insrwi $t0,$ahi,$Sigma0[0],0 insrwi $t1,$alo,$Sigma0[0],0 xor $a2,$a2,$blo ; Maj(a,b,c) addc $dlo,$dlo,$hlo ; d+=h xor $a3,$a3,$bhi insrwi $s0,$alo,$Sigma0[1]-32,0 insrwi $s1,$ahi,$Sigma0[1]-32,0 adde $dhi,$dhi,$hhi srwi $t2,$ahi,$Sigma0[2]-32 srwi $t3,$alo,$Sigma0[2]-32 xor $s0,$s0,$t0 addc $hlo,$hlo,$a2 ; h+=Maj(a,b,c) xor $s1,$s1,$t1 insrwi $t2,$alo,$Sigma0[2]-32,0 insrwi $t3,$ahi,$Sigma0[2]-32,0 adde $hhi,$hhi,$a3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i>=15); lwz $t0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+2)%16)`($sp) lwz $t1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+2)%16)`($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && !$LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $t1,`$SZ*($i+1)+0`($inp) lwz $t0,`$SZ*($i+1)+4`($inp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<15 && $LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $a2,`$SZ*($i+1)+0`($inp) lwz $a3,`$SZ*($i+1)+4`($inp) rotlwi $t1,$a2,8 rotlwi $t0,$a3,8 rlwimi $t1,$a2,24,0,7 rlwimi $t0,$a3,24,0,7 rlwimi $t1,$a2,24,16,23 rlwimi $t0,$a3,24,16,23 ___ $code.=<<___; xor $s0,$s0,$t2 ; Sigma0(a) xor $s1,$s1,$t3 addc $hlo,$hlo,$s0 ; h+=Sigma0(a) adde $hhi,$hhi,$s1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==15); lwz $x0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+1)%16)`($sp) lwz $x1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+1)%16)`($sp) ___ } sub ROUND_16_xx_ppc32 { my ($i, $ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo, $ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo)=@_; $code.=<<___; srwi $s0,$t0,$sigma0[0] srwi $s1,$t1,$sigma0[0] srwi $t2,$t0,$sigma0[1] srwi $t3,$t1,$sigma0[1] insrwi $s0,$t1,$sigma0[0],0 insrwi $s1,$t0,$sigma0[0],0 srwi $a0,$t0,$sigma0[2] insrwi $t2,$t1,$sigma0[1],0 insrwi $t3,$t0,$sigma0[1],0 insrwi $a0,$t1,$sigma0[2],0 xor $s0,$s0,$t2 lwz $t2,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+14)%16)`($sp) srwi $a1,$t1,$sigma0[2] xor $s1,$s1,$t3 lwz $t3,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+14)%16)`($sp) xor $a0,$a0,$s0 srwi $s0,$t2,$sigma1[0] xor $a1,$a1,$s1 srwi $s1,$t3,$sigma1[0] addc $x0,$x0,$a0 ; x[i]+=sigma0(x[i+1]) srwi $a0,$t3,$sigma1[1]-32 insrwi $s0,$t3,$sigma1[0],0 insrwi $s1,$t2,$sigma1[0],0 adde $x1,$x1,$a1 srwi $a1,$t2,$sigma1[1]-32 insrwi $a0,$t2,$sigma1[1]-32,0 srwi $t2,$t2,$sigma1[2] insrwi $a1,$t3,$sigma1[1]-32,0 insrwi $t2,$t3,$sigma1[2],0 xor $s0,$s0,$a0 lwz $a0,`$XOFF+0+$SZ*(($i+9)%16)`($sp) srwi $t3,$t3,$sigma1[2] xor $s1,$s1,$a1 lwz $a1,`$XOFF+4+$SZ*(($i+9)%16)`($sp) xor $s0,$s0,$t2 addc $x0,$x0,$a0 ; x[i]+=x[i+9] xor $s1,$s1,$t3 adde $x1,$x1,$a1 addc $x0,$x0,$s0 ; x[i]+=sigma1(x[i+14]) adde $x1,$x1,$s1 ___ ($t0,$t1,$x0,$x1) = ($x0,$x1,$t0,$t1); &ROUND_00_15_ppc32(@_); } $code.=<<___; .align 4 Lsha2_block_private: ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $t1,0($inp) xor $a2,@V[3],@V[5] ; B^C, magic seed lwz $t0,4($inp) xor $a3,@V[2],@V[4] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); lwz $a1,0($inp) xor $a2,@V[3],@V[5] ; B^C, magic seed lwz $a0,4($inp) xor $a3,@V[2],@V[4] rotlwi $t1,$a1,8 rotlwi $t0,$a0,8 rlwimi $t1,$a1,24,0,7 rlwimi $t0,$a0,24,0,7 rlwimi $t1,$a1,24,16,23 rlwimi $t0,$a0,24,16,23 ___ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15_ppc32($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = ($a2,$a3,$a0,$a1); } $code.=<<___; li $a0,`$rounds/16-1` mtctr $a0 .align 4 Lrounds: addi $Tbl,$Tbl,`16*$SZ` ___ for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx_ppc32($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = ($a2,$a3,$a0,$a1); } $code.=<<___; bdnz Lrounds $POP $ctx,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*22`($sp) $POP $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) ; inp pointer $POP $num,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*24`($sp) ; end pointer subi $Tbl,$Tbl,`($rounds-16)*$SZ` ; rewind Tbl lwz $t0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^0`($ctx) lwz $t1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^4`($ctx) lwz $t2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^8`($ctx) lwz $t3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^12`($ctx) lwz $a0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^16`($ctx) lwz $a1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^20`($ctx) lwz $a2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^24`($ctx) addc @V[1],@V[1],$t1 lwz $a3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^28`($ctx) adde @V[0],@V[0],$t0 lwz $t0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^32`($ctx) addc @V[3],@V[3],$t3 lwz $t1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^36`($ctx) adde @V[2],@V[2],$t2 lwz $t2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^40`($ctx) addc @V[5],@V[5],$a1 lwz $t3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^44`($ctx) adde @V[4],@V[4],$a0 lwz $a0,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^48`($ctx) addc @V[7],@V[7],$a3 lwz $a1,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^52`($ctx) adde @V[6],@V[6],$a2 lwz $a2,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^56`($ctx) addc @V[9],@V[9],$t1 lwz $a3,`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^60`($ctx) adde @V[8],@V[8],$t0 stw @V[0],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^0`($ctx) stw @V[1],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^4`($ctx) addc @V[11],@V[11],$t3 stw @V[2],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^8`($ctx) stw @V[3],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^12`($ctx) adde @V[10],@V[10],$t2 stw @V[4],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^16`($ctx) stw @V[5],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^20`($ctx) addc @V[13],@V[13],$a1 stw @V[6],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^24`($ctx) stw @V[7],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^28`($ctx) adde @V[12],@V[12],$a0 stw @V[8],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^32`($ctx) stw @V[9],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^36`($ctx) addc @V[15],@V[15],$a3 stw @V[10],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^40`($ctx) stw @V[11],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^44`($ctx) adde @V[14],@V[14],$a2 stw @V[12],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^48`($ctx) stw @V[13],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^52`($ctx) stw @V[14],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^56`($ctx) stw @V[15],`$LITTLE_ENDIAN^60`($ctx) addi $inp,$inp,`16*$SZ` ; advance inp $PUSH $inp,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*23`($sp) $UCMP $inp,$num bne Lsha2_block_private blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size $func,.-$func ___ } # Ugly hack here, because PPC assembler syntax seem to vary too # much from platforms to platform... $code.=<<___; .align 6 LPICmeup: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr $Tbl ; vvvvvv "distance" between . and 1st data entry addi $Tbl,$Tbl,`64-8` mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .space `64-9*4` ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8); .quad 0x428a2f98d728ae22,0x7137449123ef65cd .quad 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba58189dbbc .quad 0x3956c25bf348b538,0x59f111f1b605d019 .quad 0x923f82a4af194f9b,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118 .quad 0xd807aa98a3030242,0x12835b0145706fbe .quad 0x243185be4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2 .quad 0x72be5d74f27b896f,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1 .quad 0x9bdc06a725c71235,0xc19bf174cf692694 .quad 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2,0xefbe4786384f25e3 .quad 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65 .quad 0x2de92c6f592b0275,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483 .quad 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4,0x76f988da831153b5 .quad 0x983e5152ee66dfab,0xa831c66d2db43210 .quad 0xb00327c898fb213f,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4 .quad 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2,0xd5a79147930aa725 .quad 0x06ca6351e003826f,0x142929670a0e6e70 .quad 0x27b70a8546d22ffc,0x2e1b21385c26c926 .quad 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed,0x53380d139d95b3df .quad 0x650a73548baf63de,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8 .quad 0x81c2c92e47edaee6,0x92722c851482353b .quad 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364,0xa81a664bbc423001 .quad 0xc24b8b70d0f89791,0xc76c51a30654be30 .quad 0xd192e819d6ef5218,0xd69906245565a910 .quad 0xf40e35855771202a,0x106aa07032bbd1b8 .quad 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8,0x1e376c085141ab53 .quad 0x2748774cdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8 .quad 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb .quad 0x5b9cca4f7763e373,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3 .quad 0x748f82ee5defb2fc,0x78a5636f43172f60 .quad 0x84c87814a1f0ab72,0x8cc702081a6439ec .quad 0x90befffa23631e28,0xa4506cebde82bde9 .quad 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915,0xc67178f2e372532b .quad 0xca273eceea26619c,0xd186b8c721c0c207 .quad 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178 .quad 0x06f067aa72176fba,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6 .quad 0x113f9804bef90dae,0x1b710b35131c471b .quad 0x28db77f523047d84,0x32caab7b40c72493 .quad 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc,0x431d67c49c100d4c .quad 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6,0x597f299cfc657e2a .quad 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec,0x6c44198c4a475817 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4); .long 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5 .long 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5 .long 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3 .long 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174 .long 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc .long 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da .long 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7 .long 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967 .long 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13 .long 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85 .long 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3 .long 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070 .long 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5 .long 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3 .long 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208 .long 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2 ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-c64xplus.pl0000644000000000000000000003225513176625660017765 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA512 for C64x+. # # January 2012 # # Performance is 19 cycles per processed byte. Compared to block # transform function from sha512.c compiled with cl6x with -mv6400+ # -o2 -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT it's almost 7x faster and 2x smaller. # Loop unroll won't make it, this implementation, any faster, because # it's effectively dominated by SHRU||SHL pairs and you can't schedule # more of them. # # !!! Note that this module uses AMR, which means that all interrupt # service routines are expected to preserve it and for own well-being # zero it upon entry. while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; ($CTXA,$INP,$NUM) = ("A4","B4","A6"); # arguments $K512="A3"; ($Ahi,$Actxhi,$Bhi,$Bctxhi,$Chi,$Cctxhi,$Dhi,$Dctxhi, $Ehi,$Ectxhi,$Fhi,$Fctxhi,$Ghi,$Gctxhi,$Hhi,$Hctxhi)=map("A$_",(16..31)); ($Alo,$Actxlo,$Blo,$Bctxlo,$Clo,$Cctxlo,$Dlo,$Dctxlo, $Elo,$Ectxlo,$Flo,$Fctxlo,$Glo,$Gctxlo,$Hlo,$Hctxlo)=map("B$_",(16..31)); ($S1hi,$CHhi,$S0hi,$t0hi)=map("A$_",(10..13)); ($S1lo,$CHlo,$S0lo,$t0lo)=map("B$_",(10..13)); ($T1hi, $T2hi)= ("A6","A7"); ($T1lo,$T1carry,$T2lo,$T2carry)=("B6","B7","B8","B9"); ($Khi,$Klo)=("A9","A8"); ($MAJhi,$MAJlo)=($T2hi,$T2lo); ($t1hi,$t1lo)=($Khi,"B2"); $CTXB=$t1lo; ($Xihi,$Xilo)=("A5","B5"); # circular/ring buffer $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .nocmp .asg sha512_block_data_order,_sha512_block_data_order .endif .asg B3,RA .asg A15,FP .asg B15,SP .if .BIG_ENDIAN .asg $Khi,KHI .asg $Klo,KLO .else .asg $Khi,KLO .asg $Klo,KHI .endif .global _sha512_block_data_order _sha512_block_data_order: __sha512_block: .asmfunc stack_usage(40+128) MV $NUM,A0 ; reassign $NUM || MVK -128,B0 [!A0] BNOP RA ; if ($NUM==0) return; || [A0] STW FP,*SP--(40) ; save frame pointer || [A0] MV SP,FP [A0] STDW B13:B12,*SP[4] || [A0] MVK 0x00404,B1 [A0] STDW B11:B10,*SP[3] || [A0] STDW A13:A12,*FP[-3] || [A0] MVKH 0x60000,B1 [A0] STDW A11:A10,*SP[1] || [A0] MVC B1,AMR ; setup circular addressing || [A0] ADD B0,SP,SP ; alloca(128) .if __TI_EABI__ [A0] AND B0,SP,SP ; align stack at 128 bytes || [A0] ADDKPC __sha512_block,B1 || [A0] MVKL \$PCR_OFFSET(K512,__sha512_block),$K512 [A0] MVKH \$PCR_OFFSET(K512,__sha512_block),$K512 || [A0] SUBAW SP,2,SP ; reserve two words above buffer .else [A0] AND B0,SP,SP ; align stack at 128 bytes || [A0] ADDKPC __sha512_block,B1 || [A0] MVKL (K512-__sha512_block),$K512 [A0] MVKH (K512-__sha512_block),$K512 || [A0] SUBAW SP,2,SP ; reserve two words above buffer .endif ADDAW SP,3,$Xilo ADDAW SP,2,$Xihi || MV $CTXA,$CTXB LDW *${CTXA}[0^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Ahi ; load ctx || LDW *${CTXB}[1^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Alo || ADD B1,$K512,$K512 LDW *${CTXA}[2^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Bhi || LDW *${CTXB}[3^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Blo LDW *${CTXA}[4^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Chi || LDW *${CTXB}[5^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Clo LDW *${CTXA}[6^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Dhi || LDW *${CTXB}[7^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Dlo LDW *${CTXA}[8^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Ehi || LDW *${CTXB}[9^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Elo LDW *${CTXA}[10^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Fhi || LDW *${CTXB}[11^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Flo LDW *${CTXA}[12^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Ghi || LDW *${CTXB}[13^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Glo LDW *${CTXA}[14^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Hhi || LDW *${CTXB}[15^.LITTLE_ENDIAN],$Hlo LDNDW *$INP++,B11:B10 ; pre-fetch input LDDW *$K512++,$Khi:$Klo ; pre-fetch K512[0] outerloop?: MVK 15,B0 ; loop counters || MVK 64,B1 || SUB A0,1,A0 MV $Ahi,$Actxhi || MV $Alo,$Actxlo || MV $Bhi,$Bctxhi || MV $Blo,$Bctxlo || MV $Chi,$Cctxhi || MV $Clo,$Cctxlo || MVD $Dhi,$Dctxhi || MVD $Dlo,$Dctxlo MV $Ehi,$Ectxhi || MV $Elo,$Ectxlo || MV $Fhi,$Fctxhi || MV $Flo,$Fctxlo || MV $Ghi,$Gctxhi || MV $Glo,$Gctxlo || MVD $Hhi,$Hctxhi || MVD $Hlo,$Hctxlo loop0_15?: .if .BIG_ENDIAN MV B11,$T1hi || MV B10,$T1lo .else SWAP4 B10,$T1hi || SWAP4 B11,$T1lo SWAP2 $T1hi,$T1hi || SWAP2 $T1lo,$T1lo .endif loop16_79?: STW $T1hi,*$Xihi++[2] || STW $T1lo,*$Xilo++[2] ; X[i] = T1 || ADD $Hhi,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU $Hlo,$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 += h || SHRU $Ehi,14,$S1hi || SHL $Ehi,32-14,$S1lo XOR $Fhi,$Ghi,$CHhi || XOR $Flo,$Glo,$CHlo || ADD KHI,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU KLO,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 += K512[i] || SHRU $Elo,14,$t0lo || SHL $Elo,32-14,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || AND $Ehi,$CHhi,$CHhi || AND $Elo,$CHlo,$CHlo || ROTL $Ghi,0,$Hhi || ROTL $Glo,0,$Hlo ; h = g || SHRU $Ehi,18,$t0hi || SHL $Ehi,32-18,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || XOR $Ghi,$CHhi,$CHhi || XOR $Glo,$CHlo,$CHlo ; Ch(e,f,g) = ((f^g)&e)^g || ROTL $Fhi,0,$Ghi || ROTL $Flo,0,$Glo ; g = f || SHRU $Elo,18,$t0lo || SHL $Elo,32-18,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || OR $Ahi,$Bhi,$MAJhi || OR $Alo,$Blo,$MAJlo || ROTL $Ehi,0,$Fhi || ROTL $Elo,0,$Flo ; f = e || SHRU $Ehi,41-32,$t0lo || SHL $Ehi,64-41,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || AND $Chi,$MAJhi,$MAJhi || AND $Clo,$MAJlo,$MAJlo || ROTL $Dhi,0,$Ehi || ROTL $Dlo,0,$Elo ; e = d || SHRU $Elo,41-32,$t0hi || SHL $Elo,64-41,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo ; Sigma1(e) || AND $Ahi,$Bhi,$t1hi || AND $Alo,$Blo,$t1lo || ROTL $Chi,0,$Dhi || ROTL $Clo,0,$Dlo ; d = c || SHRU $Ahi,28,$S0hi || SHL $Ahi,32-28,$S0lo OR $t1hi,$MAJhi,$MAJhi || OR $t1lo,$MAJlo,$MAJlo ; Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b) || ADD $CHhi,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU $CHlo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 += Ch(e,f,g) || ROTL $Bhi,0,$Chi || ROTL $Blo,0,$Clo ; c = b || SHRU $Alo,28,$t0lo || SHL $Alo,32-28,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || ADD $S1hi,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU $S1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 += Sigma1(e) || ROTL $Ahi,0,$Bhi || ROTL $Alo,0,$Blo ; b = a || SHRU $Ahi,34-32,$t0lo || SHL $Ahi,64-34,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || ADD $MAJhi,$T1hi,$T2hi || ADDU $MAJlo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T2carry:$T2lo ; T2 = T1+Maj(a,b,c) || SHRU $Alo,34-32,$t0hi || SHL $Alo,64-34,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || ADD $Ehi,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU $Elo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 += e || [B0] BNOP loop0_15? || SHRU $Ahi,39-32,$t0lo || SHL $Ahi,64-39,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || [B0] LDNDW *$INP++,B11:B10 ; pre-fetch input ||[!B1] BNOP break? || SHRU $Alo,39-32,$t0hi || SHL $Alo,64-39,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo ; Sigma0(a) || ADD $T1carry,$T1hi,$Ehi || MV $T1lo,$Elo ; e = T1 ||[!B0] LDW *${Xihi}[28],$T1hi ||[!B0] LDW *${Xilo}[28],$T1lo ; X[i+14] ADD $S0hi,$T2hi,$T2hi || ADDU $S0lo,$T2carry:$T2lo,$T2carry:$T2lo ; T2 += Sigma0(a) || [B1] LDDW *$K512++,$Khi:$Klo ; pre-fetch K512[i] NOP ; avoid cross-path stall ADD $T2carry,$T2hi,$Ahi || MV $T2lo,$Alo ; a = T2 || [B0] SUB B0,1,B0 ;;===== branch to loop00_15? is taken here NOP ;;===== branch to break? is taken here LDW *${Xihi}[2],$T2hi || LDW *${Xilo}[2],$T2lo ; X[i+1] || SHRU $T1hi,19,$S1hi || SHL $T1hi,32-19,$S1lo SHRU $T1lo,19,$t0lo || SHL $T1lo,32-19,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || SHRU $T1hi,61-32,$t0lo || SHL $T1hi,64-61,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || SHRU $T1lo,61-32,$t0hi || SHL $T1lo,64-61,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || SHRU $T1hi,6,$t0hi || SHL $T1hi,32-6,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S1hi,$S1hi || XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo || SHRU $T1lo,6,$t0lo || LDW *${Xihi}[18],$T1hi || LDW *${Xilo}[18],$T1lo ; X[i+9] XOR $t0lo,$S1lo,$S1lo ; sigma1(Xi[i+14]) || LDW *${Xihi}[0],$CHhi || LDW *${Xilo}[0],$CHlo ; X[i] || SHRU $T2hi,1,$S0hi || SHL $T2hi,32-1,$S0lo SHRU $T2lo,1,$t0lo || SHL $T2lo,32-1,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || SHRU $T2hi,8,$t0hi || SHL $T2hi,32-8,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || SHRU $T2lo,8,$t0lo || SHL $T2lo,32-8,$t0hi XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || ADD $S1hi,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU $S1lo,$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 = X[i+9]+sigma1() || [B1] BNOP loop16_79? || SHRU $T2hi,7,$t0hi || SHL $T2hi,32-7,$t0lo XOR $t0hi,$S0hi,$S0hi || XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo || ADD $CHhi,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU $CHlo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 += X[i] || SHRU $T2lo,7,$t0lo XOR $t0lo,$S0lo,$S0lo ; sigma0(Xi[i+1] ADD $S0hi,$T1hi,$T1hi || ADDU $S0lo,$T1carry:$T1lo,$T1carry:$T1lo ; T1 += sigma0() || [B1] SUB B1,1,B1 NOP ; avoid cross-path stall ADD $T1carry,$T1hi,$T1hi ;;===== branch to loop16_79? is taken here break?: ADD $Ahi,$Actxhi,$Ahi ; accumulate ctx || ADDU $Alo,$Actxlo,$Actxlo:$Alo || [A0] LDNDW *$INP++,B11:B10 ; pre-fetch input || [A0] ADDK -640,$K512 ; rewind pointer to K512 ADD $Bhi,$Bctxhi,$Bhi || ADDU $Blo,$Bctxlo,$Bctxlo:$Blo || [A0] LDDW *$K512++,$Khi:$Klo ; pre-fetch K512[0] ADD $Chi,$Cctxhi,$Chi || ADDU $Clo,$Cctxlo,$Cctxlo:$Clo || ADD $Actxlo,$Ahi,$Ahi ||[!A0] MV $CTXA,$CTXB ADD $Dhi,$Dctxhi,$Dhi || ADDU $Dlo,$Dctxlo,$Dctxlo:$Dlo || ADD $Bctxlo,$Bhi,$Bhi ||[!A0] STW $Ahi,*${CTXA}[0^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ; save ctx ||[!A0] STW $Alo,*${CTXB}[1^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ADD $Ehi,$Ectxhi,$Ehi || ADDU $Elo,$Ectxlo,$Ectxlo:$Elo || ADD $Cctxlo,$Chi,$Chi || [A0] BNOP outerloop? ||[!A0] STW $Bhi,*${CTXA}[2^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ||[!A0] STW $Blo,*${CTXB}[3^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ADD $Fhi,$Fctxhi,$Fhi || ADDU $Flo,$Fctxlo,$Fctxlo:$Flo || ADD $Dctxlo,$Dhi,$Dhi ||[!A0] STW $Chi,*${CTXA}[4^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ||[!A0] STW $Clo,*${CTXB}[5^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ADD $Ghi,$Gctxhi,$Ghi || ADDU $Glo,$Gctxlo,$Gctxlo:$Glo || ADD $Ectxlo,$Ehi,$Ehi ||[!A0] STW $Dhi,*${CTXA}[6^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ||[!A0] STW $Dlo,*${CTXB}[7^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ADD $Hhi,$Hctxhi,$Hhi || ADDU $Hlo,$Hctxlo,$Hctxlo:$Hlo || ADD $Fctxlo,$Fhi,$Fhi ||[!A0] STW $Ehi,*${CTXA}[8^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ||[!A0] STW $Elo,*${CTXB}[9^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ADD $Gctxlo,$Ghi,$Ghi ||[!A0] STW $Fhi,*${CTXA}[10^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ||[!A0] STW $Flo,*${CTXB}[11^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ADD $Hctxlo,$Hhi,$Hhi ||[!A0] STW $Ghi,*${CTXA}[12^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ||[!A0] STW $Glo,*${CTXB}[13^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] ;;===== branch to outerloop? is taken here STW $Hhi,*${CTXA}[14^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] || STW $Hlo,*${CTXB}[15^.LITTLE_ENDIAN] || MVK -40,B0 ADD FP,B0,SP ; destroy circular buffer || LDDW *FP[-4],A11:A10 LDDW *SP[2],A13:A12 || LDDW *FP[-2],B11:B10 LDDW *SP[4],B13:B12 || BNOP RA LDW *++SP(40),FP ; restore frame pointer MVK 0,B0 MVC B0,AMR ; clear AMR NOP 2 ; wait till FP is committed .endasmfunc .if __TI_EABI__ .sect ".text:sha_asm.const" .else .sect ".const:sha_asm" .endif .align 128 K512: .uword 0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22, 0x71374491,0x23ef65cd .uword 0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f, 0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc .uword 0x3956c25b,0xf348b538, 0x59f111f1,0xb605d019 .uword 0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b, 0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118 .uword 0xd807aa98,0xa3030242, 0x12835b01,0x45706fbe .uword 0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c, 0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2 .uword 0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f, 0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1 .uword 0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235, 0xc19bf174,0xcf692694 .uword 0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2, 0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3 .uword 0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5, 0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65 .uword 0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275, 0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483 .uword 0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4, 0x76f988da,0x831153b5 .uword 0x983e5152,0xee66dfab, 0xa831c66d,0x2db43210 .uword 0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f, 0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4 .uword 0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2, 0xd5a79147,0x930aa725 .uword 0x06ca6351,0xe003826f, 0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70 .uword 0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc, 0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926 .uword 0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed, 0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df .uword 0x650a7354,0x8baf63de, 0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8 .uword 0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6, 0x92722c85,0x1482353b .uword 0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364, 0xa81a664b,0xbc423001 .uword 0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791, 0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30 .uword 0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218, 0xd6990624,0x5565a910 .uword 0xf40e3585,0x5771202a, 0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8 .uword 0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8, 0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53 .uword 0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99, 0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8 .uword 0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63, 0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb .uword 0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373, 0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3 .uword 0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc, 0x78a5636f,0x43172f60 .uword 0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72, 0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec .uword 0x90befffa,0x23631e28, 0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9 .uword 0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915, 0xc67178f2,0xe372532b .uword 0xca273ece,0xea26619c, 0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207 .uword 0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e, 0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178 .uword 0x06f067aa,0x72176fba, 0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6 .uword 0x113f9804,0xbef90dae, 0x1b710b35,0x131c471b .uword 0x28db77f5,0x23047d84, 0x32caab7b,0x40c72493 .uword 0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc, 0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c .uword 0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6, 0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a .uword 0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec, 0x6c44198c,0x4a475817 .cstring "SHA512 block transform for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl0000644000000000000000000002167713176625660016677 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # Eternal question is what's wrong with compiler generated code? The # trick is that it's possible to reduce the number of shifts required # to perform rotations by maintaining copy of 32-bit value in upper # bits of 64-bit register. Just follow mux2 and shrp instructions... # Performance under big-endian OS such as HP-UX is 179MBps*1GHz, which # is >50% better than HP C and >2x better than gcc. $output = pop; $code=<<___; .ident \"sha1-ia64.s, version 1.3\" .ident \"IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov \" .explicit ___ if ($^O eq "hpux") { $ADDP="addp4"; for (@ARGV) { $ADDP="add" if (/[\+DD|\-mlp]64/); } } else { $ADDP="add"; } #$human=1; if ($human) { # useful for visual code auditing... ($A,$B,$C,$D,$E) = ("A","B","C","D","E"); ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4) = ("h0","h1","h2","h3","h4"); ($K_00_19, $K_20_39, $K_40_59, $K_60_79) = ( "K_00_19","K_20_39","K_40_59","K_60_79" ); @X= ( "X0", "X1", "X2", "X3", "X4", "X5", "X6", "X7", "X8", "X9","X10","X11","X12","X13","X14","X15" ); } else { ($A,$B,$C,$D,$E) = ("loc0","loc1","loc2","loc3","loc4"); ($h0,$h1,$h2,$h3,$h4) = ("loc5","loc6","loc7","loc8","loc9"); ($K_00_19, $K_20_39, $K_40_59, $K_60_79) = ( "r14", "r15", "loc10", "loc11" ); @X= ( "r16", "r17", "r18", "r19", "r20", "r21", "r22", "r23", "r24", "r25", "r26", "r27", "r28", "r29", "r30", "r31" ); } sub BODY_00_15 { local *code=shift; my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; my $Xn=@X[$j%16]; $code.=<<___ if ($i==0); { .mmi; ld1 $X[$i]=[inp],2 // MSB ld1 tmp2=[tmp3],2 };; { .mmi; ld1 tmp0=[inp],2 ld1 tmp4=[tmp3],2 // LSB dep $X[$i]=$X[$i],tmp2,8,8 };; ___ if ($i<15) { $code.=<<___; { .mmi; ld1 $Xn=[inp],2 // forward Xload nop.m 0x0 dep tmp1=tmp0,tmp4,8,8 };; { .mmi; ld1 tmp2=[tmp3],2 // forward Xload and tmp4=$c,$b dep $X[$i]=$X[$i],tmp1,16,16} //;; { .mmi; add $e=$e,$K_00_19 // e+=K_00_19 andcm tmp1=$d,$b dep.z tmp5=$a,5,27 };; // a<<5 { .mmi; add $e=$e,$X[$i] // e+=Xload or tmp4=tmp4,tmp1 // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d) extr.u tmp1=$a,27,5 };; // a>>27 { .mmi; ld1 tmp0=[inp],2 // forward Xload add $e=$e,tmp4 // e+=F_00_19(b,c,d) shrp $b=tmp6,tmp6,2 } // b=ROTATE(b,30) { .mmi; ld1 tmp4=[tmp3],2 // forward Xload or tmp5=tmp1,tmp5 // ROTATE(a,5) mux2 tmp6=$a,0x44 };; // see b in next iteration { .mii; add $e=$e,tmp5 // e+=ROTATE(a,5) dep $Xn=$Xn,tmp2,8,8 // forward Xload mux2 $X[$i]=$X[$i],0x44 } //;; ___ } else { $code.=<<___; { .mii; and tmp3=$c,$b dep tmp1=tmp0,tmp4,8,8;; dep $X[$i]=$X[$i],tmp1,16,16} //;; { .mmi; add $e=$e,$K_00_19 // e+=K_00_19 andcm tmp1=$d,$b dep.z tmp5=$a,5,27 };; // a<<5 { .mmi; add $e=$e,$X[$i] // e+=Xupdate or tmp4=tmp3,tmp1 // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d) extr.u tmp1=$a,27,5 } // a>>27 { .mmi; xor $Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16] // forward Xupdate xor tmp3=$X[($j+8)%16],$X[($j+13)%16] // forward Xupdate nop.i 0 };; { .mmi; add $e=$e,tmp4 // e+=F_00_19(b,c,d) xor $Xn=$Xn,tmp3 // forward Xupdate shrp $b=tmp6,tmp6,2 } // b=ROTATE(b,30) { .mmi; or tmp1=tmp1,tmp5 // ROTATE(a,5) mux2 tmp6=$a,0x44 };; // see b in next iteration { .mii; add $e=$e,tmp1 // e+=ROTATE(a,5) shrp $Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31 // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1) mux2 $X[$i]=$X[$i],0x44 };; ___ } } sub BODY_16_19 { local *code=shift; my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; my $Xn=@X[$j%16]; $code.=<<___; { .mib; add $e=$e,$K_00_19 // e+=K_00_19 dep.z tmp5=$a,5,27 } // a<<5 { .mib; andcm tmp1=$d,$b and tmp0=$c,$b };; { .mmi; add $e=$e,$X[$i%16] // e+=Xupdate or tmp0=tmp0,tmp1 // F_00_19(b,c,d)=(b&c)|(~b&d) extr.u tmp1=$a,27,5 } // a>>27 { .mmi; xor $Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16] // forward Xupdate xor tmp3=$X[($j+8)%16],$X[($j+13)%16] // forward Xupdate nop.i 0 };; { .mmi; add $e=$e,tmp0 // f+=F_00_19(b,c,d) xor $Xn=$Xn,tmp3 // forward Xupdate shrp $b=tmp6,tmp6,2 } // b=ROTATE(b,30) { .mmi; or tmp1=tmp1,tmp5 // ROTATE(a,5) mux2 tmp6=$a,0x44 };; // see b in next iteration { .mii; add $e=$e,tmp1 // e+=ROTATE(a,5) shrp $Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31 // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1) nop.i 0 };; ___ } sub BODY_20_39 { local *code=shift; my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$Konst)=@_; $Konst = $K_20_39 if (!defined($Konst)); my $j=$i+1; my $Xn=@X[$j%16]; if ($i<79) { $code.=<<___; { .mib; add $e=$e,$Konst // e+=K_XX_XX dep.z tmp5=$a,5,27 } // a<<5 { .mib; xor tmp0=$c,$b xor $Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16] };; // forward Xupdate { .mib; add $e=$e,$X[$i%16] // e+=Xupdate extr.u tmp1=$a,27,5 } // a>>27 { .mib; xor tmp0=tmp0,$d // F_20_39(b,c,d)=b^c^d xor $Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+8)%16] };; // forward Xupdate { .mmi; add $e=$e,tmp0 // e+=F_20_39(b,c,d) xor $Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+13)%16] // forward Xupdate shrp $b=tmp6,tmp6,2 } // b=ROTATE(b,30) { .mmi; or tmp1=tmp1,tmp5 // ROTATE(a,5) mux2 tmp6=$a,0x44 };; // see b in next iteration { .mii; add $e=$e,tmp1 // e+=ROTATE(a,5) shrp $Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31 // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1) nop.i 0 };; ___ } else { $code.=<<___; { .mib; add $e=$e,$Konst // e+=K_60_79 dep.z tmp5=$a,5,27 } // a<<5 { .mib; xor tmp0=$c,$b add $h1=$h1,$a };; // wrap up { .mib; add $e=$e,$X[$i%16] // e+=Xupdate extr.u tmp1=$a,27,5 } // a>>27 { .mib; xor tmp0=tmp0,$d // F_20_39(b,c,d)=b^c^d add $h3=$h3,$c };; // wrap up { .mmi; add $e=$e,tmp0 // e+=F_20_39(b,c,d) or tmp1=tmp1,tmp5 // ROTATE(a,5) shrp $b=tmp6,tmp6,2 };; // b=ROTATE(b,30) ;;? { .mmi; add $e=$e,tmp1 // e+=ROTATE(a,5) add tmp3=1,inp // used in unaligned codepath add $h4=$h4,$d };; // wrap up ___ } } sub BODY_40_59 { local *code=shift; my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@_; my $j=$i+1; my $Xn=@X[$j%16]; $code.=<<___; { .mib; add $e=$e,$K_40_59 // e+=K_40_59 dep.z tmp5=$a,5,27 } // a<<5 { .mib; and tmp1=$c,$d xor tmp0=$c,$d };; { .mmi; add $e=$e,$X[$i%16] // e+=Xupdate add tmp5=tmp5,tmp1 // a<<5+(c&d) extr.u tmp1=$a,27,5 } // a>>27 { .mmi; and tmp0=tmp0,$b xor $Xn=$Xn,$X[($j+2)%16] // forward Xupdate xor tmp3=$X[($j+8)%16],$X[($j+13)%16] };; // forward Xupdate { .mmi; add $e=$e,tmp0 // e+=b&(c^d) add tmp5=tmp5,tmp1 // ROTATE(a,5)+(c&d) shrp $b=tmp6,tmp6,2 } // b=ROTATE(b,30) { .mmi; xor $Xn=$Xn,tmp3 mux2 tmp6=$a,0x44 };; // see b in next iteration { .mii; add $e=$e,tmp5 // e+=ROTATE(a,5)+(c&d) shrp $Xn=$Xn,$Xn,31 // ROTATE(x[0]^x[2]^x[8]^x[13],1) nop.i 0x0 };; ___ } sub BODY_60_79 { &BODY_20_39(@_,$K_60_79); } $code.=<<___; .text tmp0=r8; tmp1=r9; tmp2=r10; tmp3=r11; ctx=r32; // in0 inp=r33; // in1 // void sha1_block_data_order(SHA_CTX *c,const void *p,size_t num); .global sha1_block_data_order# .proc sha1_block_data_order# .align 32 sha1_block_data_order: .prologue { .mmi; alloc tmp1=ar.pfs,3,14,0,0 $ADDP tmp0=4,ctx .save ar.lc,r3 mov r3=ar.lc } { .mmi; $ADDP ctx=0,ctx $ADDP inp=0,inp mov r2=pr };; tmp4=in2; tmp5=loc12; tmp6=loc13; .body { .mlx; ld4 $h0=[ctx],8 movl $K_00_19=0x5a827999 } { .mlx; ld4 $h1=[tmp0],8 movl $K_20_39=0x6ed9eba1 };; { .mlx; ld4 $h2=[ctx],8 movl $K_40_59=0x8f1bbcdc } { .mlx; ld4 $h3=[tmp0] movl $K_60_79=0xca62c1d6 };; { .mmi; ld4 $h4=[ctx],-16 add in2=-1,in2 // adjust num for ar.lc mov ar.ec=1 };; { .mmi; nop.m 0 add tmp3=1,inp mov ar.lc=in2 };; // brp.loop.imp: too far .Ldtop: { .mmi; mov $A=$h0 mov $B=$h1 mux2 tmp6=$h1,0x44 } { .mmi; mov $C=$h2 mov $D=$h3 mov $E=$h4 };; ___ { my $i; my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E); for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_16_19(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_60_79(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } (($V[0] eq $A) and ($V[4] eq $E)) or die; # double-check } $code.=<<___; { .mmb; add $h0=$h0,$A add $h2=$h2,$C br.ctop.dptk.many .Ldtop };; .Ldend: { .mmi; add tmp0=4,ctx mov ar.lc=r3 };; { .mmi; st4 [ctx]=$h0,8 st4 [tmp0]=$h1,8 };; { .mmi; st4 [ctx]=$h2,8 st4 [tmp0]=$h3 };; { .mib; st4 [ctx]=$h4,-16 mov pr=r2,0x1ffff br.ret.sptk.many b0 };; .endp sha1_block_data_order# stringz "SHA1 block transform for IA64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ open STDOUT,">$output" if $output; print $code; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-c64xplus.pl0000644000000000000000000002000513176625660017604 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # SHA1 for C64x+. # # November 2011 # # If compared to compiler-generated code with similar characteristics, # i.e. compiled with OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT and utilizing SPLOOPs, # this implementation is 25% smaller and >2x faster. In absolute terms # performance is (quite impressive) ~6.5 cycles per processed byte. # Fully unrolled assembler would be ~5x larger and is likely to be # ~15% faster. It would be free from references to intermediate ring # buffer, but put more pressure on L1P [both because the code would be # larger and won't be using SPLOOP buffer]. There are no plans to # realize fully unrolled variant though... # # !!! Note that this module uses AMR, which means that all interrupt # service routines are expected to preserve it and for own well-being # zero it upon entry. while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; ($CTX,$INP,$NUM) = ("A4","B4","A6"); # arguments ($A,$B,$C,$D,$E, $Arot,$F,$F0,$T,$K) = map("A$_",(16..20, 21..25)); ($X0,$X2,$X8,$X13) = ("A26","B26","A27","B27"); ($TX0,$TX1,$TX2,$TX3) = map("B$_",(28..31)); ($XPA,$XPB) = ("A5","B5"); # X circular buffer ($Actx,$Bctx,$Cctx,$Dctx,$Ectx) = map("A$_",(3,6..9)); # zaps $NUM $code=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .asg sha1_block_data_order,_sha1_block_data_order .endif .asg B3,RA .asg A15,FP .asg B15,SP .if .BIG_ENDIAN .asg MV,SWAP2 .asg MV,SWAP4 .endif .global _sha1_block_data_order _sha1_block_data_order: .asmfunc stack_usage(64) MV $NUM,A0 ; reassign $NUM || MVK -64,B0 [!A0] BNOP RA ; if ($NUM==0) return; || [A0] STW FP,*SP--[16] ; save frame pointer and alloca(64) || [A0] MV SP,FP [A0] LDW *${CTX}[0],$A ; load A-E... || [A0] AND B0,SP,SP ; align stack at 64 bytes [A0] LDW *${CTX}[1],$B || [A0] SUBAW SP,2,SP ; reserve two words above buffer [A0] LDW *${CTX}[2],$C || [A0] MVK 0x00404,B0 [A0] LDW *${CTX}[3],$D || [A0] MVKH 0x50000,B0 ; 0x050404, 64 bytes for $XP[AB] [A0] LDW *${CTX}[4],$E || [A0] MVC B0,AMR ; setup circular addressing LDNW *${INP}++,$TX1 ; pre-fetch input NOP 1 loop?: MVK 0x00007999,$K || ADDAW SP,2,$XPA || SUB A0,1,A0 || MVK 13,B0 MVKH 0x5a820000,$K ; K_00_19 || ADDAW SP,2,$XPB || MV $A,$Actx || MV $B,$Bctx ;;================================================== SPLOOPD 5 ; BODY_00_13 || MV $C,$Cctx || MV $D,$Dctx || MV $E,$Ectx || MVC B0,ILC ROTL $A,5,$Arot || AND $C,$B,$F || ANDN $D,$B,$F0 || ADD $K,$E,$T ; T=E+K XOR $F0,$F,$F ; F_00_19(B,C,D) || MV $D,$E ; E=D || MV $C,$D ; D=C || SWAP2 $TX1,$TX2 || LDNW *${INP}++,$TX1 ADD $F,$T,$T ; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D) || ROTL $B,30,$C ; C=ROL(B,30) || SWAP4 $TX2,$TX3 ; byte swap ADD $Arot,$T,$T ; T+=ROL(A,5) || MV $A,$B ; B=A ADD $TX3,$T,$A ; A=T+Xi || STW $TX3,*${XPB}++ SPKERNEL ;;================================================== ROTL $A,5,$Arot ; BODY_14 || AND $C,$B,$F || ANDN $D,$B,$F0 || ADD $K,$E,$T ; T=E+K XOR $F0,$F,$F ; F_00_19(B,C,D) || MV $D,$E ; E=D || MV $C,$D ; D=C || SWAP2 $TX1,$TX2 || LDNW *${INP}++,$TX1 ADD $F,$T,$T ; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D) || ROTL $B,30,$C ; C=ROL(B,30) || SWAP4 $TX2,$TX2 ; byte swap || LDW *${XPA}++,$X0 ; fetches from X ring buffer are || LDW *${XPB}[4],$X2 ; 2 iterations ahead ADD $Arot,$T,$T ; T+=ROL(A,5) || MV $A,$B ; B=A || LDW *${XPA}[7],$X8 || MV $TX3,$X13 ; || LDW *${XPB}[15],$X13 || MV $TX2,$TX3 ADD $TX2,$T,$A ; A=T+Xi || STW $TX2,*${XPB}++ ;;================================================== ROTL $A,5,$Arot ; BODY_15 || AND $C,$B,$F || ANDN $D,$B,$F0 || ADD $K,$E,$T ; T=E+K XOR $F0,$F,$F ; F_00_19(B,C,D) || MV $D,$E ; E=D || MV $C,$D ; D=C || SWAP2 $TX1,$TX2 ADD $F,$T,$T ; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D) || ROTL $B,30,$C ; C=ROL(B,30) || SWAP4 $TX2,$TX2 ; byte swap || XOR $X0,$X2,$TX0 ; Xupdate XORs are 1 iteration ahead || LDW *${XPA}++,$X0 || LDW *${XPB}[4],$X2 ADD $Arot,$T,$T ; T+=ROL(A,5) || MV $A,$B ; B=A || XOR $X8,$X13,$TX1 || LDW *${XPA}[7],$X8 || MV $TX3,$X13 ; || LDW *${XPB}[15],$X13 || MV $TX2,$TX3 ADD $TX2,$T,$A ; A=T+Xi || STW $TX2,*${XPB}++ || XOR $TX0,$TX1,$TX1 || MVK 3,B0 ;;================================================== SPLOOPD 5 ; BODY_16_19 || MVC B0,ILC ROTL $A,5,$Arot || AND $C,$B,$F || ANDN $D,$B,$F0 || ADD $K,$E,$T ; T=E+K || ROTL $TX1,1,$TX2 ; Xupdate output XOR $F0,$F,$F ; F_00_19(B,C,D) || MV $D,$E ; E=D || MV $C,$D ; D=C ADD $F,$T,$T ; T+=F_00_19(B,C,D) || ROTL $B,30,$C ; C=ROL(B,30) || XOR $X0,$X2,$TX0 || LDW *${XPA}++,$X0 || LDW *${XPB}[4],$X2 ADD $Arot,$T,$T ; T+=ROL(A,5) || MV $A,$B ; B=A || XOR $X8,$X13,$TX1 || LDW *${XPA}[7],$X8 || MV $TX3,$X13 ; || LDW *${XPB}[15],$X13 || MV $TX2,$TX3 ADD $TX2,$T,$A ; A=T+Xi || STW $TX2,*${XPB}++ || XOR $TX0,$TX1,$TX1 SPKERNEL MVK 0xffffeba1,$K || MVK 19,B0 MVKH 0x6ed90000,$K ; K_20_39 ___ sub BODY_20_39 { $code.=<<___; ;;================================================== SPLOOPD 5 ; BODY_20_39 || MVC B0,ILC ROTL $A,5,$Arot || XOR $B,$C,$F || ADD $K,$E,$T ; T=E+K || ROTL $TX1,1,$TX2 ; Xupdate output XOR $D,$F,$F ; F_20_39(B,C,D) || MV $D,$E ; E=D || MV $C,$D ; D=C ADD $F,$T,$T ; T+=F_20_39(B,C,D) || ROTL $B,30,$C ; C=ROL(B,30) || XOR $X0,$X2,$TX0 || LDW *${XPA}++,$X0 || LDW *${XPB}[4],$X2 ADD $Arot,$T,$T ; T+=ROL(A,5) || MV $A,$B ; B=A || XOR $X8,$X13,$TX1 || LDW *${XPA}[7],$X8 || MV $TX3,$X13 ; || LDW *${XPB}[15],$X13 || MV $TX2,$TX3 ADD $TX2,$T,$A ; A=T+Xi || STW $TX2,*${XPB}++ ; last one is redundant || XOR $TX0,$TX1,$TX1 SPKERNEL ___ $code.=<<___ if (!shift); MVK 0xffffbcdc,$K MVKH 0x8f1b0000,$K ; K_40_59 ___ } &BODY_20_39(); $code.=<<___; ;;================================================== SPLOOPD 5 ; BODY_40_59 || MVC B0,ILC || AND $B,$C,$F || AND $B,$D,$F0 ROTL $A,5,$Arot || XOR $F0,$F,$F || AND $C,$D,$F0 || ADD $K,$E,$T ; T=E+K || ROTL $TX1,1,$TX2 ; Xupdate output XOR $F0,$F,$F ; F_40_59(B,C,D) || MV $D,$E ; E=D || MV $C,$D ; D=C ADD $F,$T,$T ; T+=F_40_59(B,C,D) || ROTL $B,30,$C ; C=ROL(B,30) || XOR $X0,$X2,$TX0 || LDW *${XPA}++,$X0 || LDW *${XPB}[4],$X2 ADD $Arot,$T,$T ; T+=ROL(A,5) || MV $A,$B ; B=A || XOR $X8,$X13,$TX1 || LDW *${XPA}[7],$X8 || MV $TX3,$X13 ; || LDW *${XPB}[15],$X13 || MV $TX2,$TX3 ADD $TX2,$T,$A ; A=T+Xi || STW $TX2,*${XPB}++ || XOR $TX0,$TX1,$TX1 || AND $B,$C,$F || AND $B,$D,$F0 SPKERNEL MVK 0xffffc1d6,$K || MVK 18,B0 MVKH 0xca620000,$K ; K_60_79 ___ &BODY_20_39(-1); # BODY_60_78 $code.=<<___; ;;================================================== [A0] B loop? || ROTL $A,5,$Arot ; BODY_79 || XOR $B,$C,$F || ROTL $TX1,1,$TX2 ; Xupdate output [A0] LDNW *${INP}++,$TX1 ; pre-fetch input || ADD $K,$E,$T ; T=E+K || XOR $D,$F,$F ; F_20_39(B,C,D) ADD $F,$T,$T ; T+=F_20_39(B,C,D) || ADD $Ectx,$D,$E ; E=D,E+=Ectx || ADD $Dctx,$C,$D ; D=C,D+=Dctx || ROTL $B,30,$C ; C=ROL(B,30) ADD $Arot,$T,$T ; T+=ROL(A,5) || ADD $Bctx,$A,$B ; B=A,B+=Bctx ADD $TX2,$T,$A ; A=T+Xi ADD $Actx,$A,$A ; A+=Actx || ADD $Cctx,$C,$C ; C+=Cctx ;; end of loop? BNOP RA ; return || MV FP,SP ; restore stack pointer || LDW *FP[0],FP ; restore frame pointer STW $A,*${CTX}[0] ; emit A-E... || MVK 0,B0 STW $B,*${CTX}[1] || MVC B0,AMR ; clear AMR STW $C,*${CTX}[2] STW $D,*${CTX}[3] STW $E,*${CTX}[4] .endasmfunc .sect .const .cstring "SHA1 block transform for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c0000644000000000000000000000136013176625660016011 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { SHA_CTX c; static unsigned char m[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; if (!SHA1_Init(&c)) return NULL; SHA1_Update(&c, d, n); SHA1_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); return (md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/sha512.c0000644000000000000000000005521613176625660015330 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include /*- * IMPLEMENTATION NOTES. * * As you might have noticed 32-bit hash algorithms: * * - permit SHA_LONG to be wider than 32-bit * - optimized versions implement two transform functions: one operating * on [aligned] data in host byte order and one - on data in input * stream byte order; * - share common byte-order neutral collector and padding function * implementations, ../md32_common.h; * * Neither of the above applies to this SHA-512 implementations. Reasons * [in reverse order] are: * * - it's the only 64-bit hash algorithm for the moment of this writing, * there is no need for common collector/padding implementation [yet]; * - by supporting only one transform function [which operates on * *aligned* data in input stream byte order, big-endian in this case] * we minimize burden of maintenance in two ways: a) collector/padding * function is simpler; b) only one transform function to stare at; * - SHA_LONG64 is required to be exactly 64-bit in order to be able to * apply a number of optimizations to mitigate potential performance * penalties caused by previous design decision; * * Caveat lector. * * Implementation relies on the fact that "long long" is 64-bit on * both 32- and 64-bit platforms. If some compiler vendor comes up * with 128-bit long long, adjustment to sha.h would be required. * As this implementation relies on 64-bit integer type, it's totally * inappropriate for platforms which don't support it, most notably * 16-bit platforms. * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \ defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || \ defined(__aarch64__) || \ defined(SHA512_ASM) # define SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA #endif int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c) { c->h[0] = U64(0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8); c->h[1] = U64(0x629a292a367cd507); c->h[2] = U64(0x9159015a3070dd17); c->h[3] = U64(0x152fecd8f70e5939); c->h[4] = U64(0x67332667ffc00b31); c->h[5] = U64(0x8eb44a8768581511); c->h[6] = U64(0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7); c->h[7] = U64(0x47b5481dbefa4fa4); c->Nl = 0; c->Nh = 0; c->num = 0; c->md_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH; return 1; } int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c) { c->h[0] = U64(0x6a09e667f3bcc908); c->h[1] = U64(0xbb67ae8584caa73b); c->h[2] = U64(0x3c6ef372fe94f82b); c->h[3] = U64(0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1); c->h[4] = U64(0x510e527fade682d1); c->h[5] = U64(0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f); c->h[6] = U64(0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b); c->h[7] = U64(0x5be0cd19137e2179); c->Nl = 0; c->Nh = 0; c->num = 0; c->md_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; return 1; } #ifndef SHA512_ASM static #endif void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num); int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)c->u.p; size_t n = c->num; p[n] = 0x80; /* There always is a room for one */ n++; if (n > (sizeof(c->u) - 16)) { memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - n); n = 0; sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1); } memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - 16 - n); #ifdef B_ENDIAN c->u.d[SHA_LBLOCK - 2] = c->Nh; c->u.d[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] = c->Nl; #else p[sizeof(c->u) - 1] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl); p[sizeof(c->u) - 2] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 8); p[sizeof(c->u) - 3] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 16); p[sizeof(c->u) - 4] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 24); p[sizeof(c->u) - 5] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 32); p[sizeof(c->u) - 6] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 40); p[sizeof(c->u) - 7] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 48); p[sizeof(c->u) - 8] = (unsigned char)(c->Nl >> 56); p[sizeof(c->u) - 9] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh); p[sizeof(c->u) - 10] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 8); p[sizeof(c->u) - 11] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 16); p[sizeof(c->u) - 12] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 24); p[sizeof(c->u) - 13] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 32); p[sizeof(c->u) - 14] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 40); p[sizeof(c->u) - 15] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 48); p[sizeof(c->u) - 16] = (unsigned char)(c->Nh >> 56); #endif sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1); if (md == 0) return 0; switch (c->md_len) { /* Let compiler decide if it's appropriate to unroll... */ case SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH: for (n = 0; n < SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH / 8; n++) { SHA_LONG64 t = c->h[n]; *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 56); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 48); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 40); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 32); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 24); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 16); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 8); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t); } break; case SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH: for (n = 0; n < SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH / 8; n++) { SHA_LONG64 t = c->h[n]; *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 56); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 48); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 40); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 32); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 24); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 16); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t >> 8); *(md++) = (unsigned char)(t); } break; /* ... as well as make sure md_len is not abused. */ default: return 0; } return 1; } int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c) { return SHA512_Final(md, c); } int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *_data, size_t len) { SHA_LONG64 l; unsigned char *p = c->u.p; const unsigned char *data = (const unsigned char *)_data; if (len == 0) return 1; l = (c->Nl + (((SHA_LONG64) len) << 3)) & U64(0xffffffffffffffff); if (l < c->Nl) c->Nh++; if (sizeof(len) >= 8) c->Nh += (((SHA_LONG64) len) >> 61); c->Nl = l; if (c->num != 0) { size_t n = sizeof(c->u) - c->num; if (len < n) { memcpy(p + c->num, data, len), c->num += (unsigned int)len; return 1; } else { memcpy(p + c->num, data, n), c->num = 0; len -= n, data += n; sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1); } } if (len >= sizeof(c->u)) { #ifndef SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA if ((size_t)data % sizeof(c->u.d[0]) != 0) while (len >= sizeof(c->u)) memcpy(p, data, sizeof(c->u)), sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1), len -= sizeof(c->u), data += sizeof(c->u); else #endif sha512_block_data_order(c, data, len / sizeof(c->u)), data += len, len %= sizeof(c->u), data -= len; } if (len != 0) memcpy(p, data, len), c->num = (int)len; return 1; } int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len) { return SHA512_Update(c, data, len); } void SHA512_Transform(SHA512_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data) { #ifndef SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA if ((size_t)data % sizeof(c->u.d[0]) != 0) memcpy(c->u.p, data, sizeof(c->u.p)), data = c->u.p; #endif sha512_block_data_order(c, data, 1); } unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { SHA512_CTX c; static unsigned char m[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; SHA384_Init(&c); SHA512_Update(&c, d, n); SHA512_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); return (md); } unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { SHA512_CTX c; static unsigned char m[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; SHA512_Init(&c); SHA512_Update(&c, d, n); SHA512_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); return (md); } #ifndef SHA512_ASM static const SHA_LONG64 K512[80] = { U64(0x428a2f98d728ae22), U64(0x7137449123ef65cd), U64(0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f), U64(0xe9b5dba58189dbbc), U64(0x3956c25bf348b538), U64(0x59f111f1b605d019), U64(0x923f82a4af194f9b), U64(0xab1c5ed5da6d8118), U64(0xd807aa98a3030242), U64(0x12835b0145706fbe), U64(0x243185be4ee4b28c), U64(0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2), U64(0x72be5d74f27b896f), U64(0x80deb1fe3b1696b1), U64(0x9bdc06a725c71235), U64(0xc19bf174cf692694), U64(0xe49b69c19ef14ad2), U64(0xefbe4786384f25e3), U64(0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5), U64(0x240ca1cc77ac9c65), U64(0x2de92c6f592b0275), U64(0x4a7484aa6ea6e483), U64(0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4), U64(0x76f988da831153b5), U64(0x983e5152ee66dfab), U64(0xa831c66d2db43210), U64(0xb00327c898fb213f), U64(0xbf597fc7beef0ee4), U64(0xc6e00bf33da88fc2), U64(0xd5a79147930aa725), U64(0x06ca6351e003826f), U64(0x142929670a0e6e70), U64(0x27b70a8546d22ffc), U64(0x2e1b21385c26c926), U64(0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed), U64(0x53380d139d95b3df), U64(0x650a73548baf63de), U64(0x766a0abb3c77b2a8), U64(0x81c2c92e47edaee6), U64(0x92722c851482353b), U64(0xa2bfe8a14cf10364), U64(0xa81a664bbc423001), U64(0xc24b8b70d0f89791), U64(0xc76c51a30654be30), U64(0xd192e819d6ef5218), U64(0xd69906245565a910), U64(0xf40e35855771202a), U64(0x106aa07032bbd1b8), U64(0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8), U64(0x1e376c085141ab53), U64(0x2748774cdf8eeb99), U64(0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8), U64(0x391c0cb3c5c95a63), U64(0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb), U64(0x5b9cca4f7763e373), U64(0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3), U64(0x748f82ee5defb2fc), U64(0x78a5636f43172f60), U64(0x84c87814a1f0ab72), U64(0x8cc702081a6439ec), U64(0x90befffa23631e28), U64(0xa4506cebde82bde9), U64(0xbef9a3f7b2c67915), U64(0xc67178f2e372532b), U64(0xca273eceea26619c), U64(0xd186b8c721c0c207), U64(0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e), U64(0xf57d4f7fee6ed178), U64(0x06f067aa72176fba), U64(0x0a637dc5a2c898a6), U64(0x113f9804bef90dae), U64(0x1b710b35131c471b), U64(0x28db77f523047d84), U64(0x32caab7b40c72493), U64(0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc), U64(0x431d67c49c100d4c), U64(0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6), U64(0x597f299cfc657e2a), U64(0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec), U64(0x6c44198c4a475817) }; # ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && \ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # define ROTR(a,n) ({ SHA_LONG64 ret; \ asm ("rorq %1,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "J"(n),"0"(a) \ : "cc"); ret; }) # if !defined(B_ENDIAN) # define PULL64(x) ({ SHA_LONG64 ret=*((const SHA_LONG64 *)(&(x))); \ asm ("bswapq %0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "0"(ret)); ret; }) # endif # elif (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(B_ENDIAN) # if defined(I386_ONLY) # define PULL64(x) ({ const unsigned int *p=(const unsigned int *)(&(x));\ unsigned int hi=p[0],lo=p[1]; \ asm("xchgb %%ah,%%al;xchgb %%dh,%%dl;"\ "roll $16,%%eax; roll $16,%%edx; "\ "xchgb %%ah,%%al;xchgb %%dh,%%dl;"\ : "=a"(lo),"=d"(hi) \ : "0"(lo),"1"(hi) : "cc"); \ ((SHA_LONG64)hi)<<32|lo; }) # else # define PULL64(x) ({ const unsigned int *p=(const unsigned int *)(&(x));\ unsigned int hi=p[0],lo=p[1]; \ asm ("bswapl %0; bswapl %1;" \ : "=r"(lo),"=r"(hi) \ : "0"(lo),"1"(hi)); \ ((SHA_LONG64)hi)<<32|lo; }) # endif # elif (defined(_ARCH_PPC) && defined(__64BIT__)) || defined(_ARCH_PPC64) # define ROTR(a,n) ({ SHA_LONG64 ret; \ asm ("rotrdi %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a),"K"(n)); ret; }) # elif defined(__aarch64__) # define ROTR(a,n) ({ SHA_LONG64 ret; \ asm ("ror %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a),"I"(n)); ret; }) # if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \ __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ # define PULL64(x) ({ SHA_LONG64 ret; \ asm ("rev %0,%1" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(*((const SHA_LONG64 *)(&(x))))); ret; }) # endif # endif # elif defined(_MSC_VER) # if defined(_WIN64) /* applies to both IA-64 and AMD64 */ # pragma intrinsic(_rotr64) # define ROTR(a,n) _rotr64((a),n) # endif # if defined(_M_IX86) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if defined(I386_ONLY) static SHA_LONG64 __fastcall __pull64be(const void *x) { _asm mov edx,[ecx + 0] _asm mov eax,[ecx + 4] _asm xchg dh, dl _asm xchg ah, al _asm rol edx, 16 _asm rol eax, 16 _asm xchg dh, dl _asm xchg ah, al } # else static SHA_LONG64 __fastcall __pull64be(const void *x) { _asm mov edx,[ecx + 0] _asm mov eax,[ecx + 4] _asm bswap edx _asm bswap eax } # endif # define PULL64(x) __pull64be(&(x)) # if _MSC_VER<=1200 # pragma inline_depth(0) # endif # endif # endif # endif # ifndef PULL64 # define B(x,j) (((SHA_LONG64)(*(((const unsigned char *)(&x))+j)))<<((7-j)*8)) # define PULL64(x) (B(x,0)|B(x,1)|B(x,2)|B(x,3)|B(x,4)|B(x,5)|B(x,6)|B(x,7)) # endif # ifndef ROTR # define ROTR(x,s) (((x)>>s) | (x)<<(64-s)) # endif # define Sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39)) # define Sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18) ^ ROTR((x),41)) # define sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),1) ^ ROTR((x),8) ^ ((x)>>7)) # define sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6)) # define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z))) # define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z))) # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) /* * This code should give better results on 32-bit CPU with less than * ~24 registers, both size and performance wise... */ static void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num) { const SHA_LONG64 *W = in; SHA_LONG64 A, E, T; SHA_LONG64 X[9 + 80], *F; int i; while (num--) { F = X + 80; A = ctx->h[0]; F[1] = ctx->h[1]; F[2] = ctx->h[2]; F[3] = ctx->h[3]; E = ctx->h[4]; F[5] = ctx->h[5]; F[6] = ctx->h[6]; F[7] = ctx->h[7]; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, F--) { # ifdef B_ENDIAN T = W[i]; # else T = PULL64(W[i]); # endif F[0] = A; F[4] = E; F[8] = T; T += F[7] + Sigma1(E) + Ch(E, F[5], F[6]) + K512[i]; E = F[3] + T; A = T + Sigma0(A) + Maj(A, F[1], F[2]); } for (; i < 80; i++, F--) { T = sigma0(F[8 + 16 - 1]); T += sigma1(F[8 + 16 - 14]); T += F[8 + 16] + F[8 + 16 - 9]; F[0] = A; F[4] = E; F[8] = T; T += F[7] + Sigma1(E) + Ch(E, F[5], F[6]) + K512[i]; E = F[3] + T; A = T + Sigma0(A) + Maj(A, F[1], F[2]); } ctx->h[0] += A; ctx->h[1] += F[1]; ctx->h[2] += F[2]; ctx->h[3] += F[3]; ctx->h[4] += E; ctx->h[5] += F[5]; ctx->h[6] += F[6]; ctx->h[7] += F[7]; W += SHA_LBLOCK; } } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) static void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num) { const SHA_LONG64 *W = in; SHA_LONG64 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1, T2; SHA_LONG64 X[16]; int i; while (num--) { a = ctx->h[0]; b = ctx->h[1]; c = ctx->h[2]; d = ctx->h[3]; e = ctx->h[4]; f = ctx->h[5]; g = ctx->h[6]; h = ctx->h[7]; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { # ifdef B_ENDIAN T1 = X[i] = W[i]; # else T1 = X[i] = PULL64(W[i]); # endif T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i]; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; } for (; i < 80; i++) { s0 = X[(i + 1) & 0x0f]; s0 = sigma0(s0); s1 = X[(i + 14) & 0x0f]; s1 = sigma1(s1); T1 = X[i & 0xf] += s0 + s1 + X[(i + 9) & 0xf]; T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i]; T2 = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); h = g; g = f; f = e; e = d + T1; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = T1 + T2; } ctx->h[0] += a; ctx->h[1] += b; ctx->h[2] += c; ctx->h[3] += d; ctx->h[4] += e; ctx->h[5] += f; ctx->h[6] += g; ctx->h[7] += h; W += SHA_LBLOCK; } } # else # define ROUND_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + K512[i]; \ h = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); \ d += T1; h += T1; } while (0) # define ROUND_16_80(i,j,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,X) do { \ s0 = X[(j+1)&0x0f]; s0 = sigma0(s0); \ s1 = X[(j+14)&0x0f]; s1 = sigma1(s1); \ T1 = X[(j)&0x0f] += s0 + s1 + X[(j+9)&0x0f]; \ ROUND_00_15(i+j,a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); } while (0) static void sha512_block_data_order(SHA512_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num) { const SHA_LONG64 *W = in; SHA_LONG64 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1; SHA_LONG64 X[16]; int i; while (num--) { a = ctx->h[0]; b = ctx->h[1]; c = ctx->h[2]; d = ctx->h[3]; e = ctx->h[4]; f = ctx->h[5]; g = ctx->h[6]; h = ctx->h[7]; # ifdef B_ENDIAN T1 = X[0] = W[0]; ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); T1 = X[1] = W[1]; ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); T1 = X[2] = W[2]; ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); T1 = X[3] = W[3]; ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); T1 = X[4] = W[4]; ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); T1 = X[5] = W[5]; ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); T1 = X[6] = W[6]; ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); T1 = X[7] = W[7]; ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); T1 = X[8] = W[8]; ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); T1 = X[9] = W[9]; ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); T1 = X[10] = W[10]; ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); T1 = X[11] = W[11]; ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); T1 = X[12] = W[12]; ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); T1 = X[13] = W[13]; ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); T1 = X[14] = W[14]; ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); T1 = X[15] = W[15]; ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); # else T1 = X[0] = PULL64(W[0]); ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); T1 = X[1] = PULL64(W[1]); ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); T1 = X[2] = PULL64(W[2]); ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); T1 = X[3] = PULL64(W[3]); ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); T1 = X[4] = PULL64(W[4]); ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); T1 = X[5] = PULL64(W[5]); ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); T1 = X[6] = PULL64(W[6]); ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); T1 = X[7] = PULL64(W[7]); ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); T1 = X[8] = PULL64(W[8]); ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h); T1 = X[9] = PULL64(W[9]); ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g); T1 = X[10] = PULL64(W[10]); ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f); T1 = X[11] = PULL64(W[11]); ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e); T1 = X[12] = PULL64(W[12]); ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d); T1 = X[13] = PULL64(W[13]); ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c); T1 = X[14] = PULL64(W[14]); ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b); T1 = X[15] = PULL64(W[15]); ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a); # endif for (i = 16; i < 80; i += 16) { ROUND_16_80(i, 0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X); ROUND_16_80(i, 15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X); } ctx->h[0] += a; ctx->h[1] += b; ctx->h[2] += c; ctx->h[3] += d; ctx->h[4] += e; ctx->h[5] += f; ctx->h[6] += g; ctx->h[7] += h; W += SHA_LBLOCK; } } # endif #endif /* SHA512_ASM */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h0000644000000000000000000003634613176625660016121 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #define DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN #define HASH_LONG SHA_LONG #define HASH_CTX SHA_CTX #define HASH_CBLOCK SHA_CBLOCK #define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s) do { \ unsigned long ll; \ ll=(c)->h0; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->h1; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->h2; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->h3; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->h4; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ } while (0) #define HASH_UPDATE SHA1_Update #define HASH_TRANSFORM SHA1_Transform #define HASH_FINAL SHA1_Final #define HASH_INIT SHA1_Init #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER sha1_block_data_order #define Xupdate(a,ix,ia,ib,ic,id) ( (a)=(ia^ib^ic^id), \ ix=(a)=ROTATE((a),1) \ ) #ifndef SHA1_ASM static void sha1_block_data_order(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num); #else void sha1_block_data_order(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num); #endif #include "internal/md32_common.h" #define INIT_DATA_h0 0x67452301UL #define INIT_DATA_h1 0xefcdab89UL #define INIT_DATA_h2 0x98badcfeUL #define INIT_DATA_h3 0x10325476UL #define INIT_DATA_h4 0xc3d2e1f0UL int HASH_INIT(SHA_CTX *c) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); c->h0 = INIT_DATA_h0; c->h1 = INIT_DATA_h1; c->h2 = INIT_DATA_h2; c->h3 = INIT_DATA_h3; c->h4 = INIT_DATA_h4; return 1; } #define K_00_19 0x5a827999UL #define K_20_39 0x6ed9eba1UL #define K_40_59 0x8f1bbcdcUL #define K_60_79 0xca62c1d6UL /* * As pointed out by Wei Dai , F() below can be simplified * to the code in F_00_19. Wei attributes these optimisations to Peter * Gutmann's SHS code, and he attributes it to Rich Schroeppel. #define * F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) I've just become aware of another * tweak to be made, again from Wei Dai, in F_40_59, (x&a)|(y&a) -> (x|y)&a */ #define F_00_19(b,c,d) ((((c) ^ (d)) & (b)) ^ (d)) #define F_20_39(b,c,d) ((b) ^ (c) ^ (d)) #define F_40_59(b,c,d) (((b) & (c)) | (((b)|(c)) & (d))) #define F_60_79(b,c,d) F_20_39(b,c,d) #ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT # define BODY_00_15(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xi) \ (f)=xi+(e)+K_00_19+ROTATE((a),5)+F_00_19((b),(c),(d)); \ (b)=ROTATE((b),30); # define BODY_16_19(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) \ Xupdate(f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ (f)+=(e)+K_00_19+ROTATE((a),5)+F_00_19((b),(c),(d)); \ (b)=ROTATE((b),30); # define BODY_20_31(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd) \ Xupdate(f,xi,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ (f)+=(e)+K_20_39+ROTATE((a),5)+F_20_39((b),(c),(d)); \ (b)=ROTATE((b),30); # define BODY_32_39(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xa,xb,xc,xd) \ Xupdate(f,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ (f)+=(e)+K_20_39+ROTATE((a),5)+F_20_39((b),(c),(d)); \ (b)=ROTATE((b),30); # define BODY_40_59(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xa,xb,xc,xd) \ Xupdate(f,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ (f)+=(e)+K_40_59+ROTATE((a),5)+F_40_59((b),(c),(d)); \ (b)=ROTATE((b),30); # define BODY_60_79(i,a,b,c,d,e,f,xa,xb,xc,xd) \ Xupdate(f,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ (f)=xa+(e)+K_60_79+ROTATE((a),5)+F_60_79((b),(c),(d)); \ (b)=ROTATE((b),30); # ifdef X # undef X # endif # ifndef MD32_XARRAY /* * Originally X was an array. As it's automatic it's natural * to expect RISC compiler to accommodate at least part of it in * the register bank, isn't it? Unfortunately not all compilers * "find" this expectation reasonable:-( On order to make such * compilers generate better code I replace X[] with a bunch of * X0, X1, etc. See the function body below... * */ # define X(i) XX##i # else /* * However! Some compilers (most notably HP C) get overwhelmed by * that many local variables so that we have to have the way to * fall down to the original behavior. */ # define X(i) XX[i] # endif # if !defined(SHA1_ASM) static void HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num) { const unsigned char *data = p; register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, E, T, l; # ifndef MD32_XARRAY unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7, XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15; # else SHA_LONG XX[16]; # endif A = c->h0; B = c->h1; C = c->h2; D = c->h3; E = c->h4; for (;;) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (!is_endian.little && sizeof(SHA_LONG) == 4 && ((size_t)p % 4) == 0) { const SHA_LONG *W = (const SHA_LONG *)data; X(0) = W[0]; X(1) = W[1]; BODY_00_15(0, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(0)); X(2) = W[2]; BODY_00_15(1, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(1)); X(3) = W[3]; BODY_00_15(2, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(2)); X(4) = W[4]; BODY_00_15(3, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(3)); X(5) = W[5]; BODY_00_15(4, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(4)); X(6) = W[6]; BODY_00_15(5, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(5)); X(7) = W[7]; BODY_00_15(6, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(6)); X(8) = W[8]; BODY_00_15(7, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(7)); X(9) = W[9]; BODY_00_15(8, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(8)); X(10) = W[10]; BODY_00_15(9, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(9)); X(11) = W[11]; BODY_00_15(10, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(10)); X(12) = W[12]; BODY_00_15(11, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(11)); X(13) = W[13]; BODY_00_15(12, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(12)); X(14) = W[14]; BODY_00_15(13, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(13)); X(15) = W[15]; BODY_00_15(14, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(14)); BODY_00_15(15, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(15)); data += SHA_CBLOCK; } else { (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(0) = l; (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(1) = l; BODY_00_15(0, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(0)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(2) = l; BODY_00_15(1, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(1)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(3) = l; BODY_00_15(2, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(2)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(4) = l; BODY_00_15(3, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(3)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(5) = l; BODY_00_15(4, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(4)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(6) = l; BODY_00_15(5, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(5)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(7) = l; BODY_00_15(6, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(6)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(8) = l; BODY_00_15(7, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(7)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(9) = l; BODY_00_15(8, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(8)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(10) = l; BODY_00_15(9, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(9)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(11) = l; BODY_00_15(10, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(10)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(12) = l; BODY_00_15(11, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(11)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(13) = l; BODY_00_15(12, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(12)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(14) = l; BODY_00_15(13, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(13)); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(15) = l; BODY_00_15(14, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(14)); BODY_00_15(15, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(15)); } BODY_16_19(16, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(0), X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13)); BODY_16_19(17, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(1), X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14)); BODY_16_19(18, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(2), X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15)); BODY_16_19(19, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(3), X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0)); BODY_20_31(20, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(4), X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1)); BODY_20_31(21, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(5), X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2)); BODY_20_31(22, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(6), X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3)); BODY_20_31(23, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(7), X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4)); BODY_20_31(24, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(8), X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5)); BODY_20_31(25, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(9), X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6)); BODY_20_31(26, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(10), X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7)); BODY_20_31(27, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(11), X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8)); BODY_20_31(28, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(12), X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9)); BODY_20_31(29, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(13), X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10)); BODY_20_31(30, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(14), X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11)); BODY_20_31(31, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(15), X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12)); BODY_32_39(32, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13)); BODY_32_39(33, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14)); BODY_32_39(34, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15)); BODY_32_39(35, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0)); BODY_32_39(36, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1)); BODY_32_39(37, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2)); BODY_32_39(38, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3)); BODY_32_39(39, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4)); BODY_40_59(40, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5)); BODY_40_59(41, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6)); BODY_40_59(42, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7)); BODY_40_59(43, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8)); BODY_40_59(44, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9)); BODY_40_59(45, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10)); BODY_40_59(46, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11)); BODY_40_59(47, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12)); BODY_40_59(48, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13)); BODY_40_59(49, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14)); BODY_40_59(50, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15)); BODY_40_59(51, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0)); BODY_40_59(52, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1)); BODY_40_59(53, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2)); BODY_40_59(54, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3)); BODY_40_59(55, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4)); BODY_40_59(56, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5)); BODY_40_59(57, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6)); BODY_40_59(58, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7)); BODY_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8)); BODY_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9)); BODY_60_79(61, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10)); BODY_60_79(62, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11)); BODY_60_79(63, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12)); BODY_60_79(64, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(0), X(2), X(8), X(13)); BODY_60_79(65, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(1), X(3), X(9), X(14)); BODY_60_79(66, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(2), X(4), X(10), X(15)); BODY_60_79(67, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(3), X(5), X(11), X(0)); BODY_60_79(68, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(4), X(6), X(12), X(1)); BODY_60_79(69, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(5), X(7), X(13), X(2)); BODY_60_79(70, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(6), X(8), X(14), X(3)); BODY_60_79(71, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(7), X(9), X(15), X(4)); BODY_60_79(72, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(8), X(10), X(0), X(5)); BODY_60_79(73, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(9), X(11), X(1), X(6)); BODY_60_79(74, E, T, A, B, C, D, X(10), X(12), X(2), X(7)); BODY_60_79(75, D, E, T, A, B, C, X(11), X(13), X(3), X(8)); BODY_60_79(76, C, D, E, T, A, B, X(12), X(14), X(4), X(9)); BODY_60_79(77, B, C, D, E, T, A, X(13), X(15), X(5), X(10)); BODY_60_79(78, A, B, C, D, E, T, X(14), X(0), X(6), X(11)); BODY_60_79(79, T, A, B, C, D, E, X(15), X(1), X(7), X(12)); c->h0 = (c->h0 + E) & 0xffffffffL; c->h1 = (c->h1 + T) & 0xffffffffL; c->h2 = (c->h2 + A) & 0xffffffffL; c->h3 = (c->h3 + B) & 0xffffffffL; c->h4 = (c->h4 + C) & 0xffffffffL; if (--num == 0) break; A = c->h0; B = c->h1; C = c->h2; D = c->h3; E = c->h4; } } # endif #else /* OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT */ # define BODY_00_15(xi) do { \ T=E+K_00_19+F_00_19(B,C,D); \ E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A; \ A=ROTATE(A,5)+T+xi; } while(0) # define BODY_16_19(xa,xb,xc,xd) do { \ Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ T+=E+K_00_19+F_00_19(B,C,D); \ E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A; \ A=ROTATE(A,5)+T; } while(0) # define BODY_20_39(xa,xb,xc,xd) do { \ Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ T+=E+K_20_39+F_20_39(B,C,D); \ E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A; \ A=ROTATE(A,5)+T; } while(0) # define BODY_40_59(xa,xb,xc,xd) do { \ Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ T+=E+K_40_59+F_40_59(B,C,D); \ E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A; \ A=ROTATE(A,5)+T; } while(0) # define BODY_60_79(xa,xb,xc,xd) do { \ Xupdate(T,xa,xa,xb,xc,xd); \ T=E+K_60_79+F_60_79(B,C,D); \ E=D, D=C, C=ROTATE(B,30), B=A; \ A=ROTATE(A,5)+T+xa; } while(0) # if !defined(SHA1_ASM) static void HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num) { const unsigned char *data = p; register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, E, T, l; int i; SHA_LONG X[16]; A = c->h0; B = c->h1; C = c->h2; D = c->h3; E = c->h4; for (;;) { for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X[i] = l; BODY_00_15(X[i]); } for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { BODY_16_19(X[i], X[i + 2], X[i + 8], X[(i + 13) & 15]); } for (; i < 24; i++) { BODY_20_39(X[i & 15], X[(i + 2) & 15], X[(i + 8) & 15], X[(i + 13) & 15]); } for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { BODY_40_59(X[(i + 8) & 15], X[(i + 10) & 15], X[i & 15], X[(i + 5) & 15]); } for (i = 4; i < 24; i++) { BODY_60_79(X[(i + 8) & 15], X[(i + 10) & 15], X[i & 15], X[(i + 5) & 15]); } c->h0 = (c->h0 + A) & 0xffffffffL; c->h1 = (c->h1 + B) & 0xffffffffL; c->h2 = (c->h2 + C) & 0xffffffffL; c->h3 = (c->h3 + D) & 0xffffffffL; c->h4 = (c->h4 + E) & 0xffffffffL; if (--num == 0) break; A = c->h0; B = c->h1; C = c->h2; D = c->h3; E = c->h4; } } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/alphacpuid.pl0000644000000000000000000000755613176625656016066 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; print <<'___'; .text .set noat .globl OPENSSL_cpuid_setup .ent OPENSSL_cpuid_setup OPENSSL_cpuid_setup: .frame $30,0,$26 .prologue 0 ret ($26) .end OPENSSL_cpuid_setup .globl OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .ent OPENSSL_wipe_cpu OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: .frame $30,0,$26 .prologue 0 clr $1 clr $2 clr $3 clr $4 clr $5 clr $6 clr $7 clr $8 clr $16 clr $17 clr $18 clr $19 clr $20 clr $21 clr $22 clr $23 clr $24 clr $25 clr $27 clr $at clr $29 fclr $f0 fclr $f1 fclr $f10 fclr $f11 fclr $f12 fclr $f13 fclr $f14 fclr $f15 fclr $f16 fclr $f17 fclr $f18 fclr $f19 fclr $f20 fclr $f21 fclr $f22 fclr $f23 fclr $f24 fclr $f25 fclr $f26 fclr $f27 fclr $f28 fclr $f29 fclr $f30 mov $sp,$0 ret ($26) .end OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .globl OPENSSL_atomic_add .ent OPENSSL_atomic_add OPENSSL_atomic_add: .frame $30,0,$26 .prologue 0 1: ldl_l $0,0($16) addl $0,$17,$1 stl_c $1,0($16) beq $1,1b addl $0,$17,$0 ret ($26) .end OPENSSL_atomic_add .globl OPENSSL_rdtsc .ent OPENSSL_rdtsc OPENSSL_rdtsc: .frame $30,0,$26 .prologue 0 rpcc $0 ret ($26) .end OPENSSL_rdtsc .globl OPENSSL_cleanse .ent OPENSSL_cleanse OPENSSL_cleanse: .frame $30,0,$26 .prologue 0 beq $17,.Ldone and $16,7,$0 bic $17,7,$at beq $at,.Little beq $0,.Laligned .Little: subq $0,8,$0 ldq_u $1,0($16) mov $16,$2 .Lalign: mskbl $1,$16,$1 lda $16,1($16) subq $17,1,$17 addq $0,1,$0 beq $17,.Lout bne $0,.Lalign .Lout: stq_u $1,0($2) beq $17,.Ldone bic $17,7,$at beq $at,.Little .Laligned: stq $31,0($16) subq $17,8,$17 lda $16,8($16) bic $17,7,$at bne $at,.Laligned bne $17,.Little .Ldone: ret ($26) .end OPENSSL_cleanse .globl CRYPTO_memcmp .ent CRYPTO_memcmp CRYPTO_memcmp: .frame $30,0,$26 .prologue 0 xor $0,$0,$0 beq $18,.Lno_data xor $1,$1,$1 nop .Loop_cmp: ldq_u $2,0($16) subq $18,1,$18 ldq_u $3,0($17) extbl $2,$16,$2 lda $16,1($16) extbl $3,$17,$3 lda $17,1($17) xor $3,$2,$2 or $2,$0,$0 bne $18,.Loop_cmp subq $31,$0,$0 srl $0,63,$0 .Lno_data: ret ($26) .end CRYPTO_memcmp ___ { my ($out,$cnt,$max)=("\$16","\$17","\$18"); my ($tick,$lasttick)=("\$19","\$20"); my ($diff,$lastdiff)=("\$21","\$22"); my ($v0,$ra,$sp,$zero)=("\$0","\$26","\$30","\$31"); print <<___; .globl OPENSSL_instrument_bus .ent OPENSSL_instrument_bus OPENSSL_instrument_bus: .frame $sp,0,$ra .prologue 0 mov $cnt,$v0 rpcc $lasttick mov 0,$diff ecb ($out) ldl_l $tick,0($out) addl $diff,$tick,$tick mov $tick,$diff stl_c $tick,0($out) stl $diff,0($out) .Loop: rpcc $tick subq $tick,$lasttick,$diff mov $tick,$lasttick ecb ($out) ldl_l $tick,0($out) addl $diff,$tick,$tick mov $tick,$diff stl_c $tick,0($out) stl $diff,0($out) subl $cnt,1,$cnt lda $out,4($out) bne $cnt,.Loop ret ($ra) .end OPENSSL_instrument_bus .globl OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .ent OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 OPENSSL_instrument_bus2: .frame $sp,0,$ra .prologue 0 mov $cnt,$v0 rpcc $lasttick mov 0,$diff ecb ($out) ldl_l $tick,0($out) addl $diff,$tick,$tick mov $tick,$diff stl_c $tick,0($out) stl $diff,0($out) rpcc $tick subq $tick,$lasttick,$diff mov $tick,$lasttick mov $diff,$lastdiff .Loop2: ecb ($out) ldl_l $tick,0($out) addl $diff,$tick,$tick mov $tick,$diff stl_c $tick,0($out) stl $diff,0($out) subl $max,1,$max beq $max,.Ldone2 rpcc $tick subq $tick,$lasttick,$diff mov $tick,$lasttick subq $lastdiff,$diff,$tick mov $diff,$lastdiff cmovne $tick,1,$tick subl $cnt,$tick,$cnt s4addq $tick,$out,$out bne $cnt,.Loop2 .Ldone2: subl $v0,$cnt,$v0 ret ($ra) .end OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 ___ } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014432 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c0000644000000000000000000003772413176625657016506 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple PKCS#7 processing functions */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #define BUFFERSIZE 4096 static int pkcs7_copy_existing_digest(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si); PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, int flags) { PKCS7 *p7; int i; if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_signed)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_content_new(p7, NID_pkcs7_data)) goto err; if (pkey && !PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN, PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR); goto err; } if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCERTS)) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { if (!PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) goto err; } } if (flags & PKCS7_DETACHED) PKCS7_set_detached(p7, 1); if (flags & (PKCS7_STREAM | PKCS7_PARTIAL)) return p7; if (PKCS7_final(p7, data, flags)) return p7; err: PKCS7_free(p7); return NULL; } int PKCS7_final(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags) { BIO *p7bio; int ret = 0; if ((p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(p7, NULL)) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } SMIME_crlf_copy(data, p7bio, flags); (void)BIO_flush(p7bio); if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7, p7bio)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL, PKCS7_R_PKCS7_DATASIGN); goto err; } ret = 1; err: BIO_free_all(p7bio); return ret; } /* Check to see if a cipher exists and if so add S/MIME capabilities */ static int add_cipher_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg) { if (EVP_get_cipherbynid(nid)) return PKCS7_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg); return 1; } static int add_digest_smcap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg) { if (EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) return PKCS7_simple_smimecap(sk, nid, arg); return 1; } PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_sign_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, int flags) { PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *smcap = NULL; if (!X509_check_private_key(signcert, pkey)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER, PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE); return NULL; } if ((si = PKCS7_add_signature(p7, signcert, pkey, md)) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER, PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR); return NULL; } if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCERTS)) { if (!PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, signcert)) goto err; } if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOATTR)) { if (!PKCS7_add_attrib_content_type(si, NULL)) goto err; /* Add SMIMECapabilities */ if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP)) { if ((smcap = sk_X509_ALGOR_new_null()) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_256_cbc, -1) || !add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, -1) || !add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, -1) || !add_digest_smcap(smcap, NID_id_GostR3411_94, -1) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_id_Gost28147_89, -1) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_192_cbc, -1) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_aes_128_cbc, -1) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_ede3_cbc, -1) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 128) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 64) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_des_cbc, -1) || !add_cipher_smcap(smcap, NID_rc2_cbc, 40) || !PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap(si, smcap)) goto err; sk_X509_ALGOR_pop_free(smcap, X509_ALGOR_free); smcap = NULL; } if (flags & PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST) { if (!pkcs7_copy_existing_digest(p7, si)) goto err; if (!(flags & PKCS7_PARTIAL) && !PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(si)) goto err; } } return si; err: sk_X509_ALGOR_pop_free(smcap, X509_ALGOR_free); return NULL; } /* * Search for a digest matching SignerInfo digest type and if found copy * across. */ static int pkcs7_copy_existing_digest(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) { int i; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *sitmp; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *osdig = NULL; sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7); for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos); i++) { sitmp = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, i); if (si == sitmp) break; if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sitmp->auth_attr) <= 0) continue; if (!OBJ_cmp(si->digest_alg->algorithm, sitmp->digest_alg->algorithm)) { osdig = PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(sitmp->auth_attr); break; } } if (osdig) return PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(si, osdig->data, osdig->length); PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_COPY_EXISTING_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST_TYPE_FOUND); return 0; } int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags) { STACK_OF(X509) *signers; X509 *signer; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si; X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx = NULL; char *buf = NULL; int i, j = 0, k, ret = 0; BIO *p7bio = NULL; BIO *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL; if (!p7) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return 0; } if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return 0; } /* Check for no data and no content: no data to verify signature */ if (PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && !indata) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); return 0; } if (flags & PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT) { /* * This was originally "#if 0" because we thought that only old broken * Netscape did this. It turns out that Authenticode uses this kind * of "extended" PKCS7 format, and things like UEFI secure boot and * tools like osslsigncode need it. In Authenticode the verification * process is different, but the existing PKCs7 verification works. */ if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && indata) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT); return 0; } } sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7); if (!sinfos || !sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNATURES_ON_DATA); return 0; } signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, certs, flags); if (!signers) return 0; /* Now verify the certificates */ cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (cert_ctx == NULL) goto err; if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOVERIFY)) for (k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(signers); k++) { signer = sk_X509_value(signers, k); if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCHAIN)) { if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, p7->d.sign->cert)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(cert_ctx, "smime_sign"); } else if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, NULL)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCRL)) X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(cert_ctx, p7->d.sign->crl); i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(j)); goto err; } /* Check for revocation status here */ } /* * Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then store * its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This avoids * potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will occur when * reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures are calculated. */ if (indata && (BIO_method_type(indata) == BIO_TYPE_MEM)) { char *ptr; long len; len = BIO_get_mem_data(indata, &ptr); tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len); if (tmpin == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else tmpin = indata; if ((p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(p7, tmpin)) == NULL) goto err; if (flags & PKCS7_TEXT) { if ((tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } BIO_set_mem_eof_return(tmpout, 0); } else tmpout = out; /* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFFERSIZE)) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } for (;;) { i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, BUFFERSIZE); if (i <= 0) break; if (tmpout) BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i); } if (flags & PKCS7_TEXT) { if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR); BIO_free(tmpout); goto err; } BIO_free(tmpout); } /* Now Verify All Signatures */ if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOSIGS)) for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, i); signer = sk_X509_value(signers, i); j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, p7, si, signer); if (j <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); goto err; } } ret = 1; err: X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx); OPENSSL_free(buf); if (tmpin == indata) { if (indata) BIO_pop(p7bio); } BIO_free_all(p7bio); sk_X509_free(signers); return ret; } STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags) { STACK_OF(X509) *signers; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si; PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *ias; X509 *signer; int i; if (!p7) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return NULL; } if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return NULL; } /* Collect all the signers together */ sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7); if (sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNERS); return 0; } if ((signers = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos); i++) { si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, i); ias = si->issuer_and_serial; signer = NULL; /* If any certificates passed they take priority */ if (certs) signer = X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(certs, ias->issuer, ias->serial); if (!signer && !(flags & PKCS7_NOINTERN) && p7->d.sign->cert) signer = X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(p7->d.sign->cert, ias->issuer, ias->serial); if (!signer) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS, PKCS7_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); sk_X509_free(signers); return 0; } if (!sk_X509_push(signers, signer)) { sk_X509_free(signers); return NULL; } } return signers; } /* Build a complete PKCS#7 enveloped data */ PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int flags) { PKCS7 *p7; BIO *p7bio = NULL; int i; X509 *x509; if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_enveloped)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_set_cipher(p7, cipher)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!PKCS7_add_recipient(p7, x509)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, PKCS7_R_ERROR_ADDING_RECIPIENT); goto err; } } if (flags & PKCS7_STREAM) return p7; if (PKCS7_final(p7, in, flags)) return p7; err: BIO_free_all(p7bio); PKCS7_free(p7); return NULL; } int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags) { BIO *tmpmem; int ret = 0, i; char *buf = NULL; if (!p7) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return 0; } if (!PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return 0; } if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } if ((tmpmem = PKCS7_dataDecode(p7, pkey, NULL, cert)) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, PKCS7_R_DECRYPT_ERROR); return 0; } if (flags & PKCS7_TEXT) { BIO *tmpbuf, *bread; /* Encrypt BIOs can't do BIO_gets() so add a buffer BIO */ if ((tmpbuf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BIO_free_all(tmpmem); return 0; } if ((bread = BIO_push(tmpbuf, tmpmem)) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BIO_free_all(tmpbuf); BIO_free_all(tmpmem); return 0; } ret = SMIME_text(bread, data); if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) { if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem)) ret = 0; } BIO_free_all(bread); return ret; } if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFFERSIZE)) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } for (;;) { i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, BUFFERSIZE); if (i <= 0) { ret = 1; if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) { if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem)) ret = 0; } break; } if (BIO_write(data, buf, i) != i) { break; } } err: OPENSSL_free(buf); BIO_free_all(tmpmem); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/build.info0000644000000000000000000000023013176625657016401 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ pk7_asn1.c pk7_lib.c pkcs7err.c pk7_doit.c pk7_smime.c pk7_attr.c \ pk7_mime.c bio_pk7.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c0000644000000000000000000003641113176625657016132 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg) { int nid; long ret; nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (cmd) { /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */ case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) { ret = p7->detached = (int)larg; if (ret && PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents)) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os; os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; } } else { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE); ret = 0; } break; case PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) { if (!p7->d.sign || !p7->d.sign->contents->d.ptr) ret = 1; else ret = 0; p7->detached = ret; } else { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE); ret = 0; } break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION); ret = 0; } return (ret); } int PKCS7_content_new(PKCS7 *p7, int type) { PKCS7 *ret = NULL; if ((ret = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!PKCS7_set_type(ret, type)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_set_content(p7, ret)) goto err; return (1); err: PKCS7_free(ret); return (0); } int PKCS7_set_content(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7 *p7_data) { int i; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: PKCS7_free(p7->d.sign->contents); p7->d.sign->contents = p7_data; break; case NID_pkcs7_digest: PKCS7_free(p7->d.digest->contents); p7->d.digest->contents = p7_data; break; case NID_pkcs7_data: case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CONTENT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } return (1); err: return (0); } int PKCS7_set_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; /* * PKCS7_content_free(p7); */ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(type); /* will not fail */ switch (type) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.sign = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.sign->version, 1)) { PKCS7_SIGNED_free(p7->d.sign); p7->d.sign = NULL; goto err; } break; case NID_pkcs7_data: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.data = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.signed_and_enveloped = PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1); if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->version, 1)) goto err; p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.enveloped = PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.enveloped->version, 0)) goto err; p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); break; case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.encrypted = PKCS7_ENCRYPT_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.encrypted->version, 0)) goto err; p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); break; case NID_pkcs7_digest: p7->type = obj; if ((p7->d.digest = PKCS7_DIGEST_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.digest->version, 0)) goto err; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_TYPE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } return (1); err: return (0); } int PKCS7_set0_type_other(PKCS7 *p7, int type, ASN1_TYPE *other) { p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(type); p7->d.other = other; return 1; } int PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *psi) { int i, j, nid; X509_ALGOR *alg; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *signer_sk; STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: signer_sk = p7->d.sign->signer_info; md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: signer_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info; md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } nid = OBJ_obj2nid(psi->digest_alg->algorithm); /* If the digest is not currently listed, add it */ j = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) { alg = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) == nid) { j = 1; break; } } if (!j) { /* we need to add another algorithm */ if ((alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL || (alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) { X509_ALGOR_free(alg); PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; if (!sk_X509_ALGOR_push(md_sk, alg)) { X509_ALGOR_free(alg); return 0; } } if (!sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_push(signer_sk, psi)) return 0; return (1); } int PKCS7_add_certificate(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509) { int i; STACK_OF(X509) **sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: sk = &(p7->d.sign->cert); break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: sk = &(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert); break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } if (*sk == NULL) *sk = sk_X509_new_null(); if (*sk == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } X509_up_ref(x509); if (!sk_X509_push(*sk, x509)) { X509_free(x509); return 0; } return (1); } int PKCS7_add_crl(PKCS7 *p7, X509_CRL *crl) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: sk = &(p7->d.sign->crl); break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: sk = &(p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl); break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } if (*sk == NULL) *sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (*sk == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } X509_CRL_up_ref(crl); if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*sk, crl)) { X509_CRL_free(crl); return 0; } return (1); } int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *dgst) { int ret; /* We now need to add another PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO entry */ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7i->version, 1)) goto err; if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7i->issuer_and_serial->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x509))) goto err; /* * because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do things the * ugly way. */ ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial); if (!(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) goto err; /* lets keep the pkey around for a while */ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey); p7i->pkey = pkey; /* Set the algorithms */ X509_ALGOR_set0(p7i->digest_alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(dgst)), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL); if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) { ret = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 0, p7i); if (ret > 0) return 1; if (ret != -2) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_SIGNING_CTRL_FAILURE); return 0; } } PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_SIGNING_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); err: return 0; } PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *dgst) { PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = NULL; if (dgst == NULL) { int def_nid; if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) goto err; dgst = EVP_get_digestbynid(def_nid); if (dgst == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE, PKCS7_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST); goto err; } } if ((si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(si, x509, pkey, dgst)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, si)) goto err; return (si); err: PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_free(si); return (NULL); } int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md) { if (PKCS7_type_is_digest(p7)) { if ((p7->d.digest->md->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } p7->d.digest->md->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; p7->d.digest->md->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_nid(md)); return 1; } PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return 1; } STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7) { if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL) return NULL; if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { return (p7->d.sign->signer_info); } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) { return (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info); } else return (NULL); } void PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509_ALGOR **pdig, X509_ALGOR **psig) { if (pk) *pk = si->pkey; if (pdig) *pdig = si->digest_alg; if (psig) *psig = si->digest_enc_alg; } void PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509_ALGOR **penc) { if (penc) *penc = ri->key_enc_algor; } PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *PKCS7_add_recipient(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509) { PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri; if ((ri = PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(ri, x509)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_add_recipient_info(p7, ri)) goto err; return ri; err: PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_free(ri); return NULL; } int PKCS7_add_recipient_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri) { int i; STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *sk; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: sk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_RECIPIENT_INFO, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } if (!sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_push(sk, ri)) return 0; return (1); } int PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509) { int ret; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7i->version, 0)) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7i->issuer_and_serial->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x509))) return 0; ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial); if (!(p7i->issuer_and_serial->serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) return 0; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509); if (!pkey || !pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } ret = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, p7i); if (ret == -2) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (ret <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET, PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_CTRL_FAILURE); goto err; } X509_up_ref(x509); p7i->cert = x509; return 1; err: return 0; } X509 *PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) { if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) return (X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(p7->d.sign->cert, si->issuer_and_serial->issuer, si-> issuer_and_serial->serial)); else return (NULL); } int PKCS7_set_cipher(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { int i; PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *ec; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: ec = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data; break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: ec = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data; break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER, PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); return (0); } /* Check cipher OID exists and has data in it */ i = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher); if (i == NID_undef) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); return (0); } ec->cipher = cipher; return 1; } int PKCS7_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, PKCS7 *p7) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; switch (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type)) { case NID_pkcs7_data: os = p7->d.data; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: os = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; if (os == NULL) { os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os; } break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: os = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; if (os == NULL) { os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os; } break; case NID_pkcs7_signed: os = p7->d.sign->contents->d.data; break; default: os = NULL; break; } if (os == NULL) return 0; os->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF; *boundary = &os->data; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c0000644000000000000000000001415713176625657016346 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS7,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS7,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS7_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB), "do_pkcs7_signed_attrib"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD0_ATTRIB_SIGNING_TIME), "PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_ATTRIB_SMIMECAP), "PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE), "PKCS7_add_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL), "PKCS7_add_crl"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_RECIPIENT_INFO), "PKCS7_add_recipient_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE), "PKCS7_add_signature"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER), "PKCS7_add_signer"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST), "PKCS7_bio_add_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_COPY_EXISTING_DIGEST), "pkcs7_copy_existing_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL), "PKCS7_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE), "PKCS7_dataDecode"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL), "PKCS7_dataFinal"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT), "PKCS7_dataInit"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY), "PKCS7_dataVerify"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT), "PKCS7_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO), "pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO), "pkcs7_encode_rinfo"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT), "PKCS7_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL), "PKCS7_final"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST), "PKCS7_find_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS), "PKCS7_get0_signers"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET), "PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER), "PKCS7_set_cipher"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CONTENT), "PKCS7_set_content"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST), "PKCS7_set_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_TYPE), "PKCS7_set_type"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN), "PKCS7_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY), "PKCS7_signatureVerify"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET), "PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN), "PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER), "PKCS7_sign_add_signer"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP), "PKCS7_simple_smimecap"}, {ERR_FUNC(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY), "PKCS7_verify"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS7_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR), "certificate verify error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER), "cipher has no object identifier"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED), "cipher not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT), "content and data present"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR), "ctrl error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_DECRYPT_ERROR), "decrypt error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE), "digest failure"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_CTRL_FAILURE), "encryption ctrl failure"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE), "encryption not supported for this key type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ERROR_ADDING_RECIPIENT), "error adding recipient"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER), "error setting cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER), "invalid null pointer"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE), "invalid signed data type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT), "no content"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST), "no default digest"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST_TYPE_FOUND), "no matching digest type found"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE), "no recipient matches certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNATURES_ON_DATA), "no signatures on data"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNERS), "no signers"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE), "operation not supported on this type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR), "pkcs7 add signature error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR), "pkcs7 add signer error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PKCS7_DATASIGN), "pkcs7 datasign"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE), "private key does not match certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE), "signature failure"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND), "signer certificate not found"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNING_CTRL_FAILURE), "signing ctrl failure"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SIGNING_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE), "signing not supported for this key type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR), "smime text error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE), "unable to find certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO), "unable to find mem bio"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST), "unable to find message digest"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE), "unknown digest type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION), "unknown operation"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE), "unsupported cipher type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE), "unsupported content type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE), "wrong content type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE), "wrong pkcs7 type"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(PKCS7_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS7_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, PKCS7_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_attr.c0000644000000000000000000000723513176625657016340 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include int PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *cap) { ASN1_STRING *seq; if ((seq = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_ATTRIB_SMIMECAP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } seq->length = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)cap, &seq->data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGORS)); return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_SMIMECapabilities, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, seq); } STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *PKCS7_get_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) { ASN1_TYPE *cap; const unsigned char *p; cap = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_SMIMECapabilities); if (cap == NULL || (cap->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) return NULL; p = cap->value.sequence->data; return (STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *) ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, cap->value.sequence->length, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGORS)); } /* Basic smime-capabilities OID and optional integer arg */ int PKCS7_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg) { ASN1_INTEGER *nbit = NULL; X509_ALGOR *alg; if ((alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm); alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (arg > 0) { if ((alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) { goto err; } if ((nbit = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) { goto err; } if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(nbit, arg)) { goto err; } alg->parameter->value.integer = nbit; alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; nbit = NULL; } if (!sk_X509_ALGOR_push(sk, alg)) { goto err; } return 1; err: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_INTEGER_free(nbit); X509_ALGOR_free(alg); return 0; } int PKCS7_add_attrib_content_type(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_OBJECT *coid) { if (PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType)) return 0; if (!coid) coid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT, coid); } int PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_TIME *t) { if (t == NULL && (t = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0)) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD0_ATTRIB_SIGNING_TIME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime, V_ASN1_UTCTIME, t); } int PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, const unsigned char *md, int mdlen) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os; os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (os == NULL) return 0; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(os, md, mdlen) || !PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, os)) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_dgst.c0000644000000000000000000000075313176625657016325 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000001657513176625657016237 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include /* PKCS#7 ASN1 module */ /* This is the ANY DEFINED BY table for the top level PKCS#7 structure */ ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(p7default) = ASN1_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.other, ASN1_ANY, 0); ASN1_ADB(PKCS7) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_data, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_signed, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.sign, PKCS7_SIGNED, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_enveloped, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.enveloped, PKCS7_ENVELOPE, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.signed_and_enveloped, PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_digest, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.digest, PKCS7_DIGEST, 0)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_pkcs7_encrypted, ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(PKCS7, d.encrypted, PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0)) } ASN1_ADB_END(PKCS7, 0, type, 0, &p7default_tt, NULL); /* PKCS#7 streaming support */ static int pk7_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { ASN1_STREAM_ARG *sarg = exarg; PKCS7 **pp7 = (PKCS7 **)pval; switch (operation) { case ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE: if (PKCS7_stream(&sarg->boundary, *pp7) <= 0) return 0; /* fall thru */ case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE: sarg->ndef_bio = PKCS7_dataInit(*pp7, sarg->out); if (!sarg->ndef_bio) return 0; break; case ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST: case ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST: if (PKCS7_dataFinal(*pp7, sarg->ndef_bio) <= 0) return 0; break; } return 1; } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS7, pk7_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(PKCS7) }ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS7, PKCS7) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(PKCS7) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(PKCS7) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_SIGNED) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNED, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGNED, md_algs, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNED, contents, PKCS7), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNED, cert, X509, 0), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNED, crl, X509_CRL, 1), ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGNED, signer_info, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_SIGNED) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNED) /* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */ static int si_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) { PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si = (PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *)*pval; EVP_PKEY_free(si->pkey); } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, si_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, issuer_and_serial, PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, digest_alg, X509_ALGOR), /* NB this should be a SET OF but we use a SEQUENCE OF so the * original order * is retained when the structure is reencoded. * Since the attributes are implicitly tagged this will not affect * the encoding. */ ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, auth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, digest_enc_alg, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, enc_digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, unauth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) ASN1_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, issuer, X509_NAME), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, serial, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ENVELOPE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENVELOPE, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_ENVELOPE, recipientinfo, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENVELOPE, enc_data, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ENVELOPE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENVELOPE) /* Minor tweak to operation: free up X509 */ static int ri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) { PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = (PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *)*pval; X509_free(ri->cert); } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, ri_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, issuer_and_serial, PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, key_enc_algor, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, enc_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, content_type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, algorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_IMP_OPT(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, enc_data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, 0) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, recipientinfo, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO), ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, md_algs, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, enc_data, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, cert, X509, 0), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, crl, X509_CRL, 1), ASN1_SET_OF(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, signer_info, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_ENCRYPT) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENCRYPT, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_ENCRYPT, enc_data, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_ENCRYPT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENCRYPT) ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(PKCS7_DIGEST) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, md, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, contents, PKCS7), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS7_DIGEST, digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(PKCS7_DIGEST) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_DIGEST) /* Specials for authenticated attributes */ /* * When signing attributes we want to reorder them to match the sorted * encoding. */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER, 0, PKCS7_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN) /* * When verifying attributes we need to use the received order. So we use * SEQUENCE OF and tag it to SET OF */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF | ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG | ASN1_TFLG_UNIVERSAL, V_ASN1_SET, PKCS7_ATTRIBUTES, X509_ATTRIBUTE) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(PKCS7) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c0000644000000000000000000010337113176625657016323 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype, void *value); static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid); static int PKCS7_type_is_other(PKCS7 *p7) { int isOther = 1; int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (nid) { case NID_pkcs7_data: case NID_pkcs7_signed: case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: case NID_pkcs7_digest: case NID_pkcs7_encrypted: isOther = 0; break; default: isOther = 1; } return isOther; } static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_get_octet_string(PKCS7 *p7) { if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7)) return p7->d.data; if (PKCS7_type_is_other(p7) && p7->d.other && (p7->d.other->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) return p7->d.other->value.octet_string; return NULL; } static int PKCS7_bio_add_digest(BIO **pbio, X509_ALGOR *alg) { BIO *btmp; const EVP_MD *md; if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm); if (md == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE); goto err; } BIO_set_md(btmp, md); if (*pbio == NULL) *pbio = btmp; else if (!BIO_push(*pbio, btmp)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } btmp = NULL; return 1; err: BIO_free(btmp); return 0; } static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, unsigned char *key, int keylen) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; unsigned char *ek = NULL; int ret = 0; size_t eklen; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ri->cert); if (!pkey) return 0; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (!pctx) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0) goto err; ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen); if (ek == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(ri->enc_key, ek, eklen); ek = NULL; ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); OPENSSL_free(ek); return ret; } static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; unsigned char *ek = NULL; size_t eklen; int ret = -1; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (!pctx) return -1; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) goto err; ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen); if (ek == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) { ret = 0; PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } ret = 1; OPENSSL_clear_free(*pek, *peklen); *pek = ek; *peklen = eklen; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); if (!ret) OPENSSL_free(ek); return ret; } BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) { int i; BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL; X509_ALGOR *xa = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL; X509_ALGOR *xalg = NULL; PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; if (p7 == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return NULL; } /* * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures). * * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an * error. * * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error. */ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); return NULL; } i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER; switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs; os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents); break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs; xalg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; evp_cipher = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->cipher; if (evp_cipher == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED); goto err; } break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo; xalg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; evp_cipher = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->cipher; if (evp_cipher == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED); goto err; } break; case NID_pkcs7_digest: xa = p7->d.digest->md; os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents); break; case NID_pkcs7_data: break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) if (!PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i))) goto err; if (xa && !PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, xa)) goto err; if (evp_cipher != NULL) { unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; int keylen, ivlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } BIO_get_cipher_ctx(btmp, &ctx); keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher); ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher); xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher)); if (ivlen > 0) if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, 1) <= 0) goto err; if (ivlen > 0) { if (xalg->parameter == NULL) { xalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (xalg->parameter == NULL) goto err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, xalg->parameter) < 0) goto err; } /* Lets do the pub key stuff :-) */ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i); if (pkcs7_encode_rinfo(ri, key, keylen) <= 0) goto err; } OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); if (out == NULL) out = btmp; else BIO_push(out, btmp); btmp = NULL; } if (bio == NULL) { if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); else if (os && os->length > 0) bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length); if (bio == NULL) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (bio == NULL) goto err; BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0); } } if (out) BIO_push(out, bio); else out = bio; return out; err: BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free_all(btmp); return NULL; } static int pkcs7_cmp_ri(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509 *pcert) { int ret; ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(pcert)); if (ret) return ret; return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(pcert), ri->issuer_and_serial->serial); } /* int */ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) { int i, j; BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL, *etmp = NULL, *bio = NULL; X509_ALGOR *xa; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = NULL; const EVP_MD *evp_md; const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL; X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL; PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL; unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL; int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0; if (p7 == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return NULL; } if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); return NULL; } i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER; switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: /* * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType * field and optional content. * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data"). */ data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents); if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE); goto err; } md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs; /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */ data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); if (evp_cipher == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo; enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */ data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); if (evp_cipher == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */ if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); goto err; } /* We will be checking the signature */ if (md_sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) { xa = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i); if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } j = OBJ_obj2nid(xa->algorithm); evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(j); if (evp_md == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE); goto err; } BIO_set_md(btmp, evp_md); if (out == NULL) out = btmp; else BIO_push(out, btmp); btmp = NULL; } } if (evp_cipher != NULL) { if ((etmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); goto err; } /* * It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key with the * private key */ /* * Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate (if * any) */ if (pcert) { for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i); if (!pkcs7_cmp_ri(ri, pcert)) break; ri = NULL; } if (ri == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } } /* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */ if (pcert == NULL) { /* * Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even after success as a * defence against MMA timing attacks. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) { ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i); if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0) goto err; ERR_clear_error(); } } else { /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */ if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0) goto err; ERR_clear_error(); } evp_ctx = NULL; BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp, &evp_ctx); if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) < 0) goto err; /* Generate random key as MMA defence */ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx); tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen); if (tkey == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0) goto err; if (ek == NULL) { ek = tkey; eklen = tkeylen; tkey = NULL; } if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) { /* * Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key and effective key * length. The key length is determined by the size of the * decrypted RSA key. */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen)) { /* Use random key as MMA defence */ OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen); ek = tkey; eklen = tkeylen; tkey = NULL; } } /* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */ ERR_clear_error(); if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, ek, NULL, 0) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen); ek = NULL; OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen); tkey = NULL; if (out == NULL) out = etmp; else BIO_push(out, etmp); etmp = NULL; } if (in_bio != NULL) { bio = in_bio; } else { if (data_body->length > 0) bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length); else { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (bio == NULL) goto err; BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0); } if (bio == NULL) goto err; } BIO_push(out, bio); bio = NULL; return out; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(ek, eklen); OPENSSL_clear_free(tkey, tkeylen); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free_all(btmp); BIO_free_all(etmp); BIO_free_all(bio); return NULL; } static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid) { for (;;) { bio = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MD); if (bio == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST); return NULL; } BIO_get_md_ctx(bio, pmd); if (*pmd == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(*pmd) == nid) return bio; bio = BIO_next(bio); } return NULL; } static int do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int md_len; /* Add signing time if not already present */ if (!PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime)) { if (!PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(si, NULL)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } /* Add digest */ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md_data, &md_len)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return 0; } if (!PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(si, md_data, md_len)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Now sign the attributes */ if (!PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(si)) return 0; return 1; } int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) { int ret = 0; int i, j; BIO *btmp; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si; EVP_MD_CTX *mdc, *ctx_tmp; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; if (p7 == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return 0; } if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); return 0; } ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx_tmp == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER; switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_data: os = p7->d.data; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */ si_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info; os = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; if (os == NULL) { os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (os == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os; } break; case NID_pkcs7_enveloped: /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */ os = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data; if (os == NULL) { os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (os == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os; } break; case NID_pkcs7_signed: si_sk = p7->d.sign->signer_info; os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents); /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); os = NULL; p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; } break; case NID_pkcs7_digest: os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents); /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); os = NULL; p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL; } break; default: PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } if (si_sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(si_sk); i++) { si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(si_sk, i); if (si->pkey == NULL) continue; j = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm); btmp = bio; btmp = PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, btmp, j); if (btmp == NULL) goto err; /* * We now have the EVP_MD_CTX, lets do the signing. */ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, mdc)) goto err; sk = si->auth_attr; /* * If there are attributes, we add the digest attribute and only * sign the attributes */ if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) > 0) { if (!do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(si, ctx_tmp)) goto err; } else { unsigned char *abuf = NULL; unsigned int abuflen; abuflen = EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey); abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(abuflen); if (abuf == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_SignFinal(ctx_tmp, abuf, &abuflen, si->pkey)) { OPENSSL_free(abuf); PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, abuflen); } } } else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest) { unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int md_len; if (!PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, bio, OBJ_obj2nid(p7->d.digest->md->algorithm))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdc, md_data, &md_len)) goto err; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len)) goto err; } if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) { /* * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached * digested data support is broken. */ if (os == NULL) goto err; if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) { char *cont; long contlen; btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM); if (btmp == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); goto err; } contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); /* * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data * instead of making an extra copy. */ BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); } } ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp); return (ret); } int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; unsigned char *abuf = NULL; int alen; size_t siglen; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digest_alg->algorithm); if (md == NULL) return 0; mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 0, si) <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->auth_attr, &abuf, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN)); if (!abuf) goto err; if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, abuf, alen) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_free(abuf); abuf = NULL; if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) goto err; abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (abuf == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, abuf, &siglen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 1, si) <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, siglen); return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(abuf); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 0; } int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) { PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *ias; int ret = 0, i; STACK_OF(X509) *cert; X509 *x509; if (p7 == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return 0; } if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); return 0; } if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) { cert = p7->d.sign->cert; } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) { cert = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert; } else { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE); goto err; } /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */ ias = si->issuer_and_serial; x509 = X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(cert, ias->issuer, ias->serial); /* were we able to find the cert in passed to us */ if (x509 == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } /* Lets verify */ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, cert_store, x509, cert)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN); i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); if (i <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); goto err; } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return PKCS7_signatureVerify(bio, p7, si, x509); err: return ret; } int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, X509 *x509) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os; EVP_MD_CTX *mdc_tmp, *mdc; int ret = 0, i; int md_type; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk; BIO *btmp; EVP_PKEY *pkey; mdc_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mdc_tmp == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7) && !PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE); goto err; } md_type = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm); btmp = bio; for (;;) { if ((btmp == NULL) || ((btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD)) == NULL)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST); goto err; } BIO_get_md_ctx(btmp, &mdc); if (mdc == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mdc) == md_type) break; /* * Workaround for some broken clients that put the signature OID * instead of the digest OID in digest_alg->algorithm */ if (EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mdc)) == md_type) break; btmp = BIO_next(btmp); } /* * mdc is the digest ctx that we want, unless there are attributes, in * which case the digest is the signed attributes */ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(mdc_tmp, mdc)) goto err; sk = si->auth_attr; if ((sk != NULL) && (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) != 0)) { unsigned char md_dat[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *abuf = NULL; unsigned int md_len; int alen; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *message_digest; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdc_tmp, md_dat, &md_len)) goto err; message_digest = PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(sk); if (!message_digest) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST); goto err; } if ((message_digest->length != (int)md_len) || (memcmp(message_digest->data, md_dat, md_len))) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE); ret = -1; goto err; } if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mdc_tmp, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL)) goto err; alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)sk, &abuf, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY)); if (alen <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); ret = -1; goto err; } if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(mdc_tmp, abuf, alen)) goto err; OPENSSL_free(abuf); } os = si->enc_digest; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509); if (!pkey) { ret = -1; goto err; } i = EVP_VerifyFinal(mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length, pkey); if (i <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); ret = -1; goto err; } ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdc_tmp); return (ret); } PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx) { STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk; PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri; int i; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); if (i != NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped) return NULL; if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped == NULL) return NULL; rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo; if (rsk == NULL) return NULL; if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx) return (NULL); ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx); return (ri->issuer_and_serial); } ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid) { return (get_attribute(si->auth_attr, nid)); } ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid) { return (get_attribute(si->unauth_attr, nid)); } static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid) { int idx; X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa; idx = X509at_get_attr_by_NID(sk, nid, -1); xa = X509at_get_attr(sk, idx); return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(xa, 0); } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk) { ASN1_TYPE *astype; if ((astype = get_attribute(sk, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest)) == NULL) return NULL; return astype->value.octet_string; } int PKCS7_set_signed_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk) { int i; sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->auth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free); p7si->auth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk); if (p7si->auth_attr == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) { if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->auth_attr, i, X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value (sk, i)))) == NULL) return (0); } return (1); } int PKCS7_set_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk) { int i; sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->unauth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free); p7si->unauth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk); if (p7si->unauth_attr == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) { if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->unauth_attr, i, X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value (sk, i)))) == NULL) return (0); } return (1); } int PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype, void *value) { return (add_attribute(&(p7si->auth_attr), nid, atrtype, value)); } int PKCS7_add_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype, void *value) { return (add_attribute(&(p7si->unauth_attr), nid, atrtype, value)); } static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype, void *value) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL; if (*sk == NULL) { if ((*sk = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null()) == NULL) return 0; new_attrib: if ((attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value)) == NULL) return 0; if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(*sk, attr)) { X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr); return 0; } } else { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(*sk); i++) { attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(*sk, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(attr)) == nid) { X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr); attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value); if (attr == NULL) return 0; if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(*sk, i, attr)) { X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr); return 0; } goto end; } } goto new_attrib; } end: return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000134213176625657016124 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include PKCS7_in_bio(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in); PKCS7_out_bio(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *out); PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key); PKCS7_cipher(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_CIPHER *cipher); PKCS7_Init(PKCS7 *p7); PKCS7_Update(PKCS7 *p7); PKCS7_Finish(PKCS7 *p7); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c0000644000000000000000000000121513176625657016127 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # include #endif #include /* Streaming encode support for PKCS#7 */ BIO *BIO_new_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7) { return BIO_new_NDEF(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c0000644000000000000000000000275213176625657016314 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include /* PKCS#7 wrappers round generalised stream and MIME routines */ int i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags) { return i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, in, flags, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7)); } int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags) { return PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, in, flags, "PKCS7", ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7)); } int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags) { STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs; int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs; else mdalgs = NULL; flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME; return SMIME_write_ASN1(bio, (ASN1_VALUE *)p7, data, flags, ctype_nid, NID_undef, mdalgs, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7)); } PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont) { return (PKCS7 *)SMIME_read_ASN1(bio, bcont, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/hmac/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014313 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/hmac/build.info0000644000000000000000000000012413176625657016264 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ hmac.c hm_ameth.c hm_pmeth.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c0000644000000000000000000001147213176625657016265 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" /* HMAC pkey context structure */ typedef struct { const EVP_MD *md; /* MD for HMAC use */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING ktmp; /* Temp storage for key */ HMAC_CTX *ctx; } HMAC_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_hmac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx; hctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*hctx)); if (hctx == NULL) return 0; hctx->ktmp.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; hctx->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (hctx->ctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(hctx); return 0; } ctx->data = hctx; ctx->keygen_info_count = 0; return 1; } static void pkey_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); static int pkey_hmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { HMAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx; /* allocate memory for dst->data and a new HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx */ if (!pkey_hmac_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src); dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst); dctx->md = sctx->md; if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(dctx->ctx, sctx->ctx)) goto err; if (sctx->ktmp.data) { if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&dctx->ktmp, sctx->ktmp.data, sctx->ktmp.length)) goto err; } return 1; err: /* release HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx and memory allocated for dst->data */ pkey_hmac_cleanup (dst); return 0; } static void pkey_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); if (hctx != NULL) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->ktmp.data, hctx->ktmp.length); OPENSSL_free(hctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL); } } static int pkey_hmac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hkey = NULL; HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data; if (!hctx->ktmp.data) return 0; hkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(&hctx->ktmp); if (!hkey) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, hkey); return 1; } static int int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->data; if (!HMAC_Update(hctx->ctx, data, count)) return 0; return 1; } static int hmac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data; HMAC_CTX_set_flags(hctx->ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(mctx, ~EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT)); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT); EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, int_update); return 1; } static int hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { unsigned int hlen; HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data; int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx); if (l < 0) return 0; *siglen = l; if (!sig) return 1; if (!HMAC_Final(hctx->ctx, sig, &hlen)) return 0; *siglen = (size_t)hlen; return 1; } static int pkey_hmac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY: if ((!p2 && p1 > 0) || (p1 < -1)) return 0; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&hctx->ktmp, p2, p1)) return 0; break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: hctx->md = p2; break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: key = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx->ctx, key->data, key->length, hctx->md, ctx->engine)) return 0; break; default: return -2; } return 1; } static int pkey_hmac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (!value) { return 0; } if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value); if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, value); return -2; } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hmac_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_HMAC, 0, pkey_hmac_init, pkey_hmac_copy, pkey_hmac_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, pkey_hmac_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, hmac_signctx_init, hmac_signctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_hmac_ctrl, pkey_hmac_ctrl_str }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c0000644000000000000000000000530413176625657016243 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #define HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT /* * HMAC "ASN1" method. This is just here to indicate the maximum HMAC output * length and to free up an HMAC key. */ static int hmac_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; } static void hmac_key_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey); if (os) { if (os->data) OPENSSL_cleanse(os->data, os->length); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); } } static int hmac_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { switch (op) { case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; return 1; default: return -2; } } static int hmac_pkey_public_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(EVP_PKEY_get0(a), EVP_PKEY_get0(b)); } #ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT /* * A bogus private key format for test purposes. This is simply the HMAC key * with "HMAC PRIVATE KEY" in the headers. When enabled the genpkey utility * can be used to "generate" HMAC keys. */ static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os; os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (os == NULL || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen)) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os)) goto err; return 1; err: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); return 0; } static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { int inc; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey); if (pder) { if (!*pder) { *pder = OPENSSL_malloc(os->length); if (*pder == NULL) return -1; inc = 0; } else inc = 1; memcpy(*pder, os->data, os->length); if (inc) *pder += os->length; } return os->length; } #endif const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, 0, "HMAC", "OpenSSL HMAC method", 0, 0, hmac_pkey_public_cmp, 0, 0, 0, 0, hmac_size, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, hmac_key_free, hmac_pkey_ctrl, #ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT old_hmac_decode, old_hmac_encode #else 0, 0 #endif }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/hmac/hmac.c0000644000000000000000000001402013176625657015364 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "hmac_lcl.h" int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl) { int i, j, reset = 0; unsigned char pad[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK]; /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */ if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0)) return 0; if (md != NULL) { reset = 1; ctx->md = md; } else if (ctx->md) { md = ctx->md; } else { return 0; } if (key != NULL) { reset = 1; j = EVP_MD_block_size(md); OPENSSL_assert(j <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key)); if (j < len) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md_ctx, md, impl)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, key, len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->key, &ctx->key_length)) goto err; } else { if (len < 0 || len > (int)sizeof(ctx->key)) return 0; memcpy(ctx->key, key, len); ctx->key_length = len; } if (ctx->key_length != HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK) memset(&ctx->key[ctx->key_length], 0, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK - ctx->key_length); } if (reset) { for (i = 0; i < HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK; i++) pad[i] = 0x36 ^ ctx->key[i]; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->i_ctx, md, impl)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->i_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md))) goto err; for (i = 0; i < HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK; i++) pad[i] = 0x5c ^ ctx->key[i]; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->o_ctx, md, impl)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->o_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md))) goto err; } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->i_ctx)) goto err; return 1; err: return 0; } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, const EVP_MD *md) { if (key && md) HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx); return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, md, NULL); } #endif int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) { if (!ctx->md) return 0; return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, data, len); } int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { unsigned int i; unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (!ctx->md) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i)) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx->md_ctx, ctx->o_ctx)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md_ctx, buf, i)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md_ctx, md, len)) goto err; return 1; err: return 0; } size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return EVP_MD_size((ctx)->md); } HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void) { HMAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX)); if (ctx != NULL) { if (!HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx)) { HMAC_CTX_free(ctx); return NULL; } } return ctx; } static void hmac_ctx_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->i_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->o_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx->md_ctx); ctx->md = NULL; ctx->key_length = 0; OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->key, sizeof(ctx->key)); } void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx != NULL) { hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->i_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->o_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md_ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } } int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx) { hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx); if (ctx->i_ctx == NULL) ctx->i_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx->i_ctx == NULL) goto err; if (ctx->o_ctx == NULL) ctx->o_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx->o_ctx == NULL) goto err; if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) ctx->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) goto err; ctx->md = NULL; return 1; err: hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx); return 0; } int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx) { if (!HMAC_CTX_reset(dctx)) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx->i_ctx, sctx->i_ctx)) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx->o_ctx, sctx->o_ctx)) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx->md_ctx, sctx->md_ctx)) goto err; memcpy(dctx->key, sctx->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK); dctx->key_length = sctx->key_length; dctx->md = sctx->md; return 1; err: hmac_ctx_cleanup(dctx); return 0; } unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len, const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *md_len) { HMAC_CTX *c = NULL; static unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; static const unsigned char dummy_key[1] = {'\0'}; if (md == NULL) md = m; if ((c = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* For HMAC_Init_ex, NULL key signals reuse. */ if (key == NULL && key_len == 0) { key = dummy_key; } if (!HMAC_Init_ex(c, key, key_len, evp_md, NULL)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Update(c, d, n)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Final(c, md, md_len)) goto err; HMAC_CTX_free(c); return md; err: HMAC_CTX_free(c); return NULL; } void HMAC_CTX_set_flags(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx->i_ctx, flags); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx->o_ctx, flags); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx->md_ctx, flags); } const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->md; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/hmac/hmac_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000000134513176625657016231 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_HMAC_LCL_H # define HEADER_HMAC_LCL_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if 0 /* emacs indentation fix */ } #endif struct hmac_ctx_st { const EVP_MD *md; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX *i_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX *o_ctx; unsigned int key_length; unsigned char key[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK]; }; #ifdef __cplusplus } /* extern "C" */ #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014327 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c0000644000000000000000000000743113176625657016311 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016) * Eliminate looping through all processes (performance) * Add additional randomizations using rand() function */ #include #include "rand_lcl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef __DECC # pragma message disable DOLLARID # endif /* * Use 32-bit pointers almost everywhere. Define the type to which to cast a * pointer passed to an external function. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define PTR_T __void_ptr64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define PTR_T void * # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ static struct items_data_st { short length, code; /* length is number of bytes */ } items_data[] = { {4, JPI$_BUFIO}, {4, JPI$_CPUTIM}, {4, JPI$_DIRIO}, {4, JPI$_IMAGECOUNT}, {8, JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I}, {8, JPI$_LOGINTIM}, {4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS}, {4, JPI$_PID}, {4, JPI$_PPGCNT}, {4, JPI$_WSPEAK}, {4, JPI$_FINALEXC}, {0, 0} /* zero terminated */ }; int RAND_poll(void) { /* determine the number of items in the JPI array */ struct items_data_st item_entry; int item_entry_count = sizeof(items_data)/sizeof(item_entry); /* Create the JPI itemlist array to hold item_data content */ struct { short length, code; int *buffer; int *retlen; } item[item_entry_count], *pitem; /* number of entries in items_data */ struct items_data_st *pitems_data; int data_buffer[(item_entry_count*2)+4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */ int iosb[2]; int sys_time[2]; int *ptr; int i, j ; int tmp_length = 0; int total_length = 0; pitems_data = items_data; pitem = item; /* Setup itemlist for GETJPI */ while (pitems_data->length) { pitem->length = pitems_data->length; pitem->code = pitems_data->code; pitem->buffer = &data_buffer[total_length]; pitem->retlen = 0; /* total_length is in longwords */ total_length += pitems_data->length/4; pitems_data++; pitem ++; } pitem->length = pitem->code = 0; /* Fill data_buffer with various info bits from this process */ /* and twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */ if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) == SS$_NORMAL) { for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) { sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]); srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i); if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */ ptr = &data_buffer[i]; for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j]; /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */ data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand()); tmp_length++; } } else { /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */ data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand()); } } total_length += (tmp_length - 1); /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */ RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length*4, total_length * 2); } else { return 0; } return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000000345413176625657016264 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H # define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H # define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */ # if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND) # define USE_SHA1_RAND # endif # include # define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) # define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL) # if defined(USE_MD5_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL) # elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL) # elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL) # elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND) # include # define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH # define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL) # define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL) # endif void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001011013176625657016236 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/rand.h" #include #include "internal/thread_once.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */ static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock = NULL; #endif static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) { int ret = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL; #endif rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL; return ret; } int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(funct_ref); funct_ref = NULL; #endif default_RAND_meth = meth; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock); return 1; } const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) { const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) return NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); if (!default_RAND_meth) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND(); if (e) { default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e); if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) { ENGINE_finish(e); e = NULL; } } if (e) funct_ref = e; else #endif default_RAND_meth = RAND_OpenSSL(); } tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock); return tmp_meth; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine) { const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) return 0; if (engine) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) return 0; tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine); if (tmp_meth == NULL) { ENGINE_finish(engine); return 0; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock); /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */ RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth); funct_ref = engine; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock); return 1; } #endif void rand_cleanup_int(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; if (meth && meth->cleanup) meth->cleanup(); RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); #endif } void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->seed) meth->seed(buf, num); } void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->add) meth->add(buf, num, entropy); } int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->bytes) return meth->bytes(buf, num); return (-1); } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->pseudorand) return meth->pseudorand(buf, num); return (-1); } #endif int RAND_status(void) { const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); if (meth && meth->status) return meth->status(); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/build.info0000644000000000000000000000023113176625657016277 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c0000644000000000000000000001572213176625657016245 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EGD NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include /*- * Query the EGD . * * This module supplies three routines: * * RAND_query_egd_bytes(path, buf, bytes) * will actually query "bytes" bytes of entropy form the egd-socket located * at path and will write them to buf (if supplied) or will directly feed * it to RAND_seed() if buf==NULL. * The number of bytes is not limited by the maximum chunk size of EGD, * which is 255 bytes. If more than 255 bytes are wanted, several chunks * of entropy bytes are requested. The connection is left open until the * query is competed. * RAND_query_egd_bytes() returns with * -1 if an error occurred during connection or communication. * num the number of bytes read from the EGD socket. This number is either * the number of bytes requested or smaller, if the EGD pool is * drained and the daemon signals that the pool is empty. * This routine does not touch any RAND_status(). This is necessary, since * PRNG functions may call it during initialization. * * RAND_egd_bytes(path, bytes) will query "bytes" bytes and have them * used to seed the PRNG. * RAND_egd_bytes() is a wrapper for RAND_query_egd_bytes() with buf=NULL. * Unlike RAND_query_egd_bytes(), RAND_status() is used to test the * seed status so that the return value can reflect the seed state: * -1 if an error occurred during connection or communication _or_ * if the PRNG has still not received the required seeding. * num the number of bytes read from the EGD socket. This number is either * the number of bytes requested or smaller, if the EGD pool is * drained and the daemon signals that the pool is empty. * * RAND_egd(path) will query 255 bytes and use the bytes retrieved to seed * the PRNG. * RAND_egd() is a wrapper for RAND_egd_bytes() with numbytes=255. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes) { return (-1); } int RAND_egd(const char *path) { return (-1); } int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes) { return (-1); } # else # include # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # include # include # include # ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS # include # else # include # endif # else struct sockaddr_un { short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */ char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */ }; # endif /* NO_SYS_UN_H */ # include # include int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes) { int ret = 0; struct sockaddr_un addr; int len, num, numbytes; int fd = -1; int success; unsigned char egdbuf[2], tempbuf[255], *retrievebuf; memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) return (-1); OPENSSL_strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof addr.sun_path); len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path); fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd == -1) return (-1); success = 0; while (!success) { if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len) == 0) success = 1; else { switch (errno) { # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif # ifdef EINPROGRESS case EINPROGRESS: # endif # ifdef EALREADY case EALREADY: # endif /* No error, try again */ break; # ifdef EISCONN case EISCONN: success = 1; break; # endif default: ret = -1; goto err; /* failure */ } } } while (bytes > 0) { egdbuf[0] = 1; egdbuf[1] = bytes < 255 ? bytes : 255; numbytes = 0; while (numbytes != 2) { num = write(fd, egdbuf + numbytes, 2 - numbytes); if (num >= 0) numbytes += num; else { switch (errno) { # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif /* No error, try again */ break; default: ret = -1; goto err; /* failure */ } } } numbytes = 0; while (numbytes != 1) { num = read(fd, egdbuf, 1); if (num == 0) goto err; /* descriptor closed */ else if (num > 0) numbytes += num; else { switch (errno) { # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif /* No error, try again */ break; default: ret = -1; goto err; /* failure */ } } } if (egdbuf[0] == 0) goto err; if (buf) retrievebuf = buf + ret; else retrievebuf = tempbuf; numbytes = 0; while (numbytes != egdbuf[0]) { num = read(fd, retrievebuf + numbytes, egdbuf[0] - numbytes); if (num == 0) goto err; /* descriptor closed */ else if (num > 0) numbytes += num; else { switch (errno) { # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif /* No error, try again */ break; default: ret = -1; goto err; /* failure */ } } } ret += egdbuf[0]; bytes -= egdbuf[0]; if (!buf) RAND_seed(tempbuf, egdbuf[0]); } err: if (fd != -1) close(fd); return (ret); } int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes) { int num, ret = -1; num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(path, NULL, bytes); if (num < 0) goto err; if (RAND_status() == 1) ret = num; err: return (ret); } int RAND_egd(const char *path) { return (RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255)); } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/rand_win.c0000644000000000000000000000664013176625657016302 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "rand_lcl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # include /* On Windows 7 or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */ # if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0601 # define RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT # endif # ifdef RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT # include # pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib") # ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS # define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L) # endif # else # include /* * Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from * http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm */ # define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22 # define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider" # endif static void readtimer(void); int RAND_poll(void) { MEMORYSTATUS mst; # ifndef RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT HCRYPTPROV hProvider; # endif DWORD w; BYTE buf[64]; # ifdef RAND_WINDOWS_USE_BCRYPT if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buf, (ULONG)sizeof(buf), BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); } # else /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */ /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */ if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); } CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */ if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); } CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } # endif /* timer data */ readtimer(); /* memory usage statistics */ GlobalMemoryStatus(&mst); RAND_add(&mst, sizeof(mst), 1); /* process ID */ w = GetCurrentProcessId(); RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1); return (1); } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) { RAND_poll(); return RAND_status(); } void RAND_screen(void) { RAND_poll(); } #endif /* feed timing information to the PRNG */ static void readtimer(void) { DWORD w; LARGE_INTEGER l; static int have_perfc = 1; # if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_X86) static int have_tsc = 1; DWORD cyclecount; if (have_tsc) { __try { __asm { _emit 0x0f _emit 0x31 mov cyclecount, eax} RAND_add(&cyclecount, sizeof(cyclecount), 1); } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { have_tsc = 0; } } # else # define have_tsc 0 # endif if (have_perfc) { if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&l) == 0) have_perfc = 0; else RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0); } if (!have_tsc && !have_perfc) { w = GetTickCount(); RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 0); } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/randfile.c0000644000000000000000000002450213176625657016262 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include # include /* * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback... */ # if !defined(S_ISBLK) # if defined(_S_IFBLK) # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & _S_IFBLK) # elif defined(S_IFBLK) # define S_ISBLK(m) ((m) & S_IFBLK) # elif defined(_WIN32) # define S_ISBLK(m) 0 /* no concept of block devices on Windows */ # endif # endif # if !defined(S_ISCHR) # if defined(_S_IFCHR) # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & _S_IFCHR) # elif defined(S_IFCHR) # define S_ISCHR(m) ((m) & S_IFCHR) # endif # endif #endif #ifdef _WIN32 # define stat _stat # define chmod _chmod # define open _open # define fdopen _fdopen # define fstat _fstat # define fileno _fileno #endif #undef BUFSIZE #define BUFSIZE 1024 #define RAND_DATA 1024 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* * Misc hacks needed for specific cases. * * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically) * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that * stdio function return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it). * Additionally, we create a similar char pointer type for the sake of * vms_setbuf below. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 typedef char *char_ptr32; # pragma pointer_size restore /* * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here. * Since we know that the FILE* really is a 32-bit pointer expanded to * 64 bits, we also know it's safe to convert it back to a 32-bit pointer. * As for the buffer parameter, we only use NULL here, so that passes as * well... */ # define setbuf(fp,buf) (setbuf)((__FILE_ptr32)(fp), (char_ptr32)(buf)) # endif /* * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89 */ static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) = (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen; # define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0" # define openssl_fopen(fname,mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS) #endif #define RFILE ".rnd" /* * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c */ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes) { /*- * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes. * if bytes == -1, read complete file. */ unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; #endif int i, ret = 0, n; FILE *in = NULL; if (file == NULL) return 0; if (bytes == 0) return ret; in = openssl_fopen(file, "rb"); if (in == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO /* * struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from * applications such as Valgrind. */ memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); if (fstat(fileno(in), &sb) < 0) goto err; RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0); # if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { /* * this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of * bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O * because we will waste system entropy. */ bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */ setbuf(in, NULL); /* don't do buffered reads */ } # endif #endif for (;;) { if (bytes > 0) n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE; else n = BUFSIZE; i = fread(buf, 1, n, in); if (i <= 0) break; RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i); ret += i; if (bytes > 0) { bytes -= n; if (bytes <= 0) break; } } OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE); err: if (in != NULL) fclose(in); return ret; } int RAND_write_file(const char *file) { unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE]; int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0; FILE *out = NULL; int n; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO struct stat sb; # if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR) # ifdef _WIN32 /* * Check for |file| being a driver as "ASCII-safe" on Windows, * because driver paths are always ASCII. */ # endif i = stat(file, &sb); if (i != -1) { if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) { /* * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device * causes problems. */ return 1; } } # endif #endif #if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) { # ifndef O_BINARY # define O_BINARY 0 # endif /* * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions * should be restrictive from the start */ int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600); if (fd != -1) out = fdopen(fd, "wb"); } #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent * rand file in a concurrent use situation. */ out = openssl_fopen(file, "rb+"); #endif if (out == NULL) out = openssl_fopen(file, "wb"); if (out == NULL) goto err; #if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) chmod(file, 0600); #endif n = RAND_DATA; for (;;) { i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n; n -= BUFSIZE; if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0) rand_err = 1; i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out); if (i <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } ret += i; if (n <= 0) break; } fclose(out); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE); err: return (rand_err ? -1 : ret); } const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size) { char *s = NULL; int use_randfile = 1; #ifdef __OpenBSD__ struct stat sb; #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) DWORD len; WCHAR *var, *val; if ((var = L"RANDFILE", len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0 && (var = L"HOME", use_randfile = 0, len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0 && (var = L"USERPROFILE", len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0)) == 0) { var = L"SYSTEMROOT", len = GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, NULL, 0); } if (len != 0) { int sz; val = _alloca(len * sizeof(WCHAR)); if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var, val, len) < len && (sz = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { s = _alloca(sz); if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, val, -1, s, sz, NULL, NULL) == 0) s = NULL; } } #else if (OPENSSL_issetugid() != 0) { use_randfile = 0; } else { s = getenv("RANDFILE"); if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') { use_randfile = 0; s = getenv("HOME"); } } #endif #ifdef DEFAULT_HOME if (!use_randfile && s == NULL) { s = DEFAULT_HOME; } #endif if (s != NULL && *s) { size_t len = strlen(s); if (use_randfile && len + 1 < size) { if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size) return NULL; } else if (len + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, size); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "/", size); #endif OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size); } } else { buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */ } #ifdef __OpenBSD__ /* * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't * available. */ if (!buf[0] || stat(buf, &sb) == -1) if (OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) { return NULL; } #endif return buf[0] ? buf : NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/md_rand.c0000644000000000000000000004503113176625657016102 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "e_os.h" #if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)) # include #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "rand_lcl.h" #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include #endif #ifdef BN_DEBUG # define PREDICT #endif /* #define PREDICT 1 */ #define STATE_SIZE 1023 static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0; static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 }; static double entropy = 0; static int initialized = 0; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; /* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */ /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid; #ifdef PREDICT int rand_predictable = 0; #endif static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); static void rand_cleanup(void); static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); #endif static int rand_status(void); static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { rand_seed, rand_nopseudo_bytes, rand_cleanup, rand_add, #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L rand_pseudo_bytes, #else NULL, #endif rand_status }; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) { OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL; } RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) { return (&rand_meth); } static void rand_cleanup(void) { OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state)); state_num = 0; state_index = 0; OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); md_count[0] = 0; md_count[1] = 0; entropy = 0; initialized = 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock); } static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) { int i, j, k, st_idx; long md_c[2]; unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX *m; int do_not_lock; int rv = 0; if (!num) return 1; /* * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) * * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' * (which is incremented after each use). * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the * hash function. */ m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (m == NULL) goto err; if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) goto err; /* check if we already have the lock */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); } else do_not_lock = 0; if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); st_idx = state_index; /* * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's * _some_ difference */ md_c[0] = md_count[0]; md_c[1] = md_count[1]; memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ state_index += num; if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { state_index %= STATE_SIZE; state_num = STATE_SIZE; } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) { if (state_index > state_num) state_num = state_index; } /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ /* * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we * will use now, but other threads may use them as well */ md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) { j = (num - i); j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; if (!MD_Init(m)) goto err; if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; if (k > 0) { if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k)) goto err; if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) goto err; } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j)) goto err; /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j)) goto err; /* * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very * insecure keys. */ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) goto err; if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) goto err; md_c[1]++; buf = (const char *)buf + j; for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { /* * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and * local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking * could hurt performance more than necessary given that * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the * random state. */ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) st_idx = 0; } } if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); /* * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into * md. */ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) { md[k] ^= local_md[k]; } if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ entropy += add; if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); rv = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); return rv; } static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) { return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); } static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) { static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; int i, j, k; size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; int ok; long md_c[2]; unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX *m; #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); #endif time_t curr_time = time(NULL); int do_stir_pool = 0; /* time value for various platforms */ #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 FILETIME tv; # ifdef _WIN32_WCE SYSTEMTIME t; GetSystemTime(&t); SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv); # else GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv); # endif #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) struct timespec tv; clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS) unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc(); tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); #else struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); #endif #ifdef PREDICT if (rand_predictable) { static unsigned char val = 0; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) buf[i] = val++; return (1); } #endif if (num <= 0) return 1; m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (m == NULL) goto err_mem; /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ num_ceil = (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); /* * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) * * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: * * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. * * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the * global 'md'. */ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) goto err_mem; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); /* * We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure * we don't pause and cause a deadlock */ ASYNC_block_pause(); /* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); crypto_lock_rand = 1; if (!initialized) { RAND_poll(); initialized = 1; } if (!stirred_pool) do_stir_pool = 1; ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); if (!ok) { /* * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though, * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the * entropy limit has been reached. */ entropy -= num; if (entropy < 0) entropy = 0; } if (do_stir_pool) { /* * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more * suitable for this purpose. */ int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ while (n > 0) { #if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." #endif #define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ /* * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that * rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; } if (ok) stirred_pool = 1; } st_idx = state_index; st_num = state_num; md_c[0] = md_count[0]; md_c[1] = md_count[1]; memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); state_index += num_ceil; if (state_index > state_num) state_index %= state_num; /* * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now * ours (but other threads may use them too) */ md_count[0] += 1; /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ crypto_lock_rand = 0; ASYNC_unblock_pause(); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); while (num > 0) { /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; num -= j; if (!MD_Init(m)) goto err; #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid)) goto err; curr_pid = 0; } #endif if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time)) goto err; if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv)) goto err; curr_time = 0; if (!rand_hw_seed(m)) goto err; } if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) goto err; k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; if (k > 0) { if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k)) goto err; if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) goto err; } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) goto err; if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { /* may compete with other threads */ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; if (st_idx >= st_num) st_idx = 0; if (i < j) *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; } } if (!MD_Init(m) || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); /* * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine */ ASYNC_block_pause(); if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) { ASYNC_unblock_pause(); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); goto err; } ASYNC_unblock_pause(); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); if (ok) return (1); else if (pseudo) return 0; else { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html"); return (0); } err: RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); return 0; err_mem: RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); return 0; } static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable */ static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); } #endif static int rand_status(void) { CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur; int ret; int do_not_lock; if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) return 0; cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); /* * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll() * implementation calls RAND_status()) */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); } else do_not_lock = 0; if (!do_not_lock) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); /* * Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine */ ASYNC_block_pause(); /* * prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); locking_threadid = cur; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); crypto_lock_rand = 1; } if (!initialized) { RAND_poll(); initialized = 1; } ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; if (!do_not_lock) { /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ crypto_lock_rand = 0; ASYNC_unblock_pause(); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); } return ret; } /* * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only * currently supports rdrand. */ /* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */ #if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND) # define RDRAND_CALLS 4 size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void); extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { int i; if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) return 1; for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) { size_t rnd; rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); if (rnd == 0) return 1; if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t))) return 0; } return 1; } /* XOR an existing buffer with random data */ void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) { size_t rnd; if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) return; while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) { rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); if (rnd == 0) return; *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd; buf += sizeof(size_t); num -= sizeof(size_t); } if (num) { rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); if (rnd == 0) return; while (num) { *buf ^= rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; buf++; num--; } } } #else static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return 1; } void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) { return; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/rand_err.c0000644000000000000000000000211613176625657016267 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES), "RAND_bytes"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED), "PRNG not seeded"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_RAND_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(RAND_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, RAND_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, RAND_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c0000644000000000000000000002266613176625657016476 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "e_os.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "rand_lcl.h" #if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) /* should actually be available virtually * everywhere */ # include # endif # include # ifndef FD_SETSIZE # define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set)) # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) /* * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses, * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which * it can be read. * * If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is more * constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the clock can be * read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results would be far * more predictable. * * As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of seed * data. */ int RAND_poll(void) { short int code; gid_t curr_gid; pid_t curr_pid; uid_t curr_uid; int i, k; struct timespec ts; unsigned char v; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA long duration; extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code); # else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 long long duration; extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code); # else # error "Unsupported Platform." # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */ /* * Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some* variation between * different processes. */ curr_gid = getgid(); RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1); curr_gid = 0; curr_pid = getpid(); RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1); curr_pid = 0; curr_uid = getuid(); RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1); curr_uid = 0; for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) { /* * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus * interference, etc. */ for (k = 0; k < 99; k++) ts.tv_nsec = random(); # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */ duration = 1; s$sleep(&duration, &code); # else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */ duration = 1; s$sleep2(&duration, &code); # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */ /* get wall clock time. */ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); /* take 8 bits */ v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec % 256); RAND_add(&v, sizeof v, 1); v = 0; } return 1; } # elif defined __OpenBSD__ int RAND_poll(void) { u_int32_t rnd = 0, i; unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); buf[i] = rnd; rnd >>= 8; } RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); return 1; } # else /* !defined(__OpenBSD__) */ int RAND_poll(void) { unsigned long l; pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); # if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSS_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)) unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; int n = 0; # endif # ifdef DEVRANDOM static const char *randomfiles[] = { DEVRANDOM }; struct stat randomstats[OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)]; int fd; unsigned int i; # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) static const char *egdsockets[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL }; const char **egdsocket = NULL; # endif # ifdef DEVRANDOM memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats)); /* * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs * out of random entries. */ for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) { if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY # ifdef O_NONBLOCK | O_NONBLOCK # endif # ifdef O_BINARY | O_BINARY # endif # ifdef O_NOCTTY /* If it happens to be a TTY (god forbid), do * not make it our controlling tty */ | O_NOCTTY # endif )) >= 0) { int usec = 10 * 1000; /* spend 10ms on each file */ int r; unsigned int j; struct stat *st = &randomstats[i]; /* * Avoid using same input... Used to be O_NOFOLLOW above, but * it's not universally appropriate... */ if (fstat(fd, st) != 0) { close(fd); continue; } for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { if (randomstats[j].st_ino == st->st_ino && randomstats[j].st_dev == st->st_dev) break; } if (j < i) { close(fd); continue; } do { int try_read = 0; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) /* use poll() */ struct pollfd pset; pset.fd = fd; pset.events = POLLIN; pset.revents = 0; if (poll(&pset, 1, usec / 1000) < 0) usec = 0; else try_read = (pset.revents & POLLIN) != 0; # else /* use select() */ fd_set fset; struct timeval t; t.tv_sec = 0; t.tv_usec = usec; if (FD_SETSIZE > 0 && (unsigned)fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { /* * can't use select, so just try to read once anyway */ try_read = 1; } else { FD_ZERO(&fset); FD_SET(fd, &fset); if (select(fd + 1, &fset, NULL, NULL, &t) >= 0) { usec = t.tv_usec; if (FD_ISSET(fd, &fset)) try_read = 1; } else usec = 0; } # endif if (try_read) { r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); if (r > 0) n += r; } else r = -1; /* * Some Unixen will update t in select(), some won't. For * those who won't, or if we didn't use select() in the first * place, give up here, otherwise, we will do this once again * for the remaining time. */ if (usec == 10 * 1000) usec = 0; } while ((r > 0 || (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0 && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); close(fd); } } # endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM) */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) /* * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy * collecting daemon. */ for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED; egdsocket++) { int r; r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n, ENTROPY_NEEDED - n); if (r > 0) n += r; } # endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) */ # if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)) if (n > 0) { RAND_add(tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, (double)n); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmpbuf, n); } # endif /* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */ l = curr_pid; RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0); l = getuid(); RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0); l = time(NULL); RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0); # if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)) return 1; # else return 0; # endif } # endif /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ #endif /* !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) int RAND_poll(void) { return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pariscid.pl0000644000000000000000000001042213176625657015535 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $flavour = shift; $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $LEVEL ="2.0W"; $SIZE_T =8; $ST ="std"; } else { $LEVEL ="1.1"; $SIZE_T =4; $ST ="stw"; } $rp="%r2"; $sp="%r30"; $rv="%r28"; $code=<<___; .LEVEL $LEVEL .SPACE \$TEXT\$ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY .EXPORT OPENSSL_cpuid_setup,ENTRY .ALIGN 8 OPENSSL_cpuid_setup .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY bv ($rp) .EXIT nop .PROCEND .EXPORT OPENSSL_rdtsc,ENTRY .ALIGN 8 OPENSSL_rdtsc .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY mfctl %cr16,$rv bv ($rp) .EXIT nop .PROCEND .EXPORT OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,ENTRY .ALIGN 8 OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY xor %r0,%r0,%r1 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr4 xor %r0,%r0,%r19 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr5 xor %r0,%r0,%r20 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr6 xor %r0,%r0,%r21 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr7 xor %r0,%r0,%r22 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr8 xor %r0,%r0,%r23 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr9 xor %r0,%r0,%r24 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr10 xor %r0,%r0,%r25 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr11 xor %r0,%r0,%r26 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr22 xor %r0,%r0,%r29 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr23 xor %r0,%r0,%r31 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr24 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr25 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr26 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr27 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr28 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr29 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr30 fcpy,dbl %fr0,%fr31 bv ($rp) .EXIT ldo 0($sp),$rv .PROCEND ___ { my $inp="%r26"; my $len="%r25"; $code.=<<___; .EXPORT OPENSSL_cleanse,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR .ALIGN 8 OPENSSL_cleanse .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$done nop cmpib,*>>= 15,$len,L\$ittle ldi $SIZE_T-1,%r1 L\$align and,*<> $inp,%r1,%r28 b,n L\$aligned stb %r0,0($inp) ldo -1($len),$len b L\$align ldo 1($inp),$inp L\$aligned andcm $len,%r1,%r28 L\$ot $ST %r0,0($inp) addib,*<> -$SIZE_T,%r28,L\$ot ldo $SIZE_T($inp),$inp and,*<> $len,%r1,$len b,n L\$done L\$ittle stb %r0,0($inp) addib,*<> -1,$len,L\$ittle ldo 1($inp),$inp L\$done bv ($rp) .EXIT nop .PROCEND ___ } { my ($in1,$in2,$len)=("%r26","%r25","%r24"); $code.=<<___; .EXPORT CRYPTO_memcmp,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW1=GR .ALIGN 8 CRYPTO_memcmp .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY cmpib,*= 0,$len,L\$no_data xor $rv,$rv,$rv L\$oop_cmp ldb 0($in1),%r19 ldb 0($in2),%r20 ldo 1($in1),$in1 ldo 1($in2),$in2 xor %r19,%r20,%r29 addib,*<> -1,$len,L\$oop_cmp or %r29,$rv,$rv sub %r0,$rv,%r29 extru %r29,31,1,$rv L\$no_data bv ($rp) .EXIT nop .PROCEND ___ } { my ($out,$cnt,$max)=("%r26","%r25","%r24"); my ($tick,$lasttick)=("%r23","%r22"); my ($diff,$lastdiff)=("%r21","%r20"); $code.=<<___; .EXPORT OPENSSL_instrument_bus,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR .ALIGN 8 OPENSSL_instrument_bus .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY copy $cnt,$rv mfctl %cr16,$tick copy $tick,$lasttick ldi 0,$diff fdc 0($out) ldw 0($out),$tick add $diff,$tick,$tick stw $tick,0($out) L\$oop mfctl %cr16,$tick sub $tick,$lasttick,$diff copy $tick,$lasttick fdc 0($out) ldw 0($out),$tick add $diff,$tick,$tick stw $tick,0($out) addib,<> -1,$cnt,L\$oop addi 4,$out,$out bv ($rp) .EXIT sub $rv,$cnt,$rv .PROCEND .EXPORT OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR .ALIGN 8 OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .PROC .CALLINFO NO_CALLS .ENTRY copy $cnt,$rv sub %r0,$cnt,$cnt mfctl %cr16,$tick copy $tick,$lasttick ldi 0,$diff fdc 0($out) ldw 0($out),$tick add $diff,$tick,$tick stw $tick,0($out) mfctl %cr16,$tick sub $tick,$lasttick,$diff copy $tick,$lasttick L\$oop2 copy $diff,$lastdiff fdc 0($out) ldw 0($out),$tick add $diff,$tick,$tick stw $tick,0($out) addib,= -1,$max,L\$done2 nop mfctl %cr16,$tick sub $tick,$lasttick,$diff copy $tick,$lasttick cmpclr,<> $lastdiff,$diff,$tick ldi 1,$tick ldi 1,%r1 xor %r1,$tick,$tick addb,<> $tick,$cnt,L\$oop2 shladd,l $tick,2,$out,$out L\$done2 bv ($rp) .EXIT add $rv,$cnt,$rv .PROCEND ___ } $code =~ s/cmpib,\*/comib,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4); $code =~ s/,\*/,/gm if ($SIZE_T==4); $code =~ s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8); print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/LPdir_win32.c0000644000000000000000000000342013176625656015601 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #define LP_SYS_WIN32 #define LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE #include "LPdir_win.c" openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014323 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/seed.c0000644000000000000000000006247013176625657015420 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2007 KISA(Korea Information Security Agency). All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Neither the name of author nor the names of its contributors may * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED # include # include # include # ifdef _WIN32 # include # endif # include # include "seed_locl.h" # ifdef SS /* can get defined on Solaris by inclusion of * */ # undef SS # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) # define G_FUNC(v) \ SS[0][(unsigned char) (v) & 0xff] ^ \ SS[1][(unsigned char) ((v)>>8) & 0xff] ^ \ SS[2][(unsigned char)((v)>>16) & 0xff] ^ \ SS[3][(unsigned char)((v)>>24) & 0xff] static const seed_word SS[4][256] = { { 0x2989a1a8, 0x05858184, 0x16c6d2d4, 0x13c3d3d0, 0x14445054, 0x1d0d111c, 0x2c8ca0ac, 0x25052124, 0x1d4d515c, 0x03434340, 0x18081018, 0x1e0e121c, 0x11415150, 0x3cccf0fc, 0x0acac2c8, 0x23436360, 0x28082028, 0x04444044, 0x20002020, 0x1d8d919c, 0x20c0e0e0, 0x22c2e2e0, 0x08c8c0c8, 0x17071314, 0x2585a1a4, 0x0f8f838c, 0x03030300, 0x3b4b7378, 0x3b8bb3b8, 0x13031310, 0x12c2d2d0, 0x2ecee2ec, 0x30407070, 0x0c8c808c, 0x3f0f333c, 0x2888a0a8, 0x32023230, 0x1dcdd1dc, 0x36c6f2f4, 0x34447074, 0x2ccce0ec, 0x15859194, 0x0b0b0308, 0x17475354, 0x1c4c505c, 0x1b4b5358, 0x3d8db1bc, 0x01010100, 0x24042024, 0x1c0c101c, 0x33437370, 0x18889098, 0x10001010, 0x0cccc0cc, 0x32c2f2f0, 0x19c9d1d8, 0x2c0c202c, 0x27c7e3e4, 0x32427270, 0x03838380, 0x1b8b9398, 0x11c1d1d0, 0x06868284, 0x09c9c1c8, 0x20406060, 0x10405050, 0x2383a3a0, 0x2bcbe3e8, 0x0d0d010c, 0x3686b2b4, 0x1e8e929c, 0x0f4f434c, 0x3787b3b4, 0x1a4a5258, 0x06c6c2c4, 0x38487078, 0x2686a2a4, 0x12021210, 0x2f8fa3ac, 0x15c5d1d4, 0x21416160, 0x03c3c3c0, 0x3484b0b4, 0x01414140, 0x12425250, 0x3d4d717c, 0x0d8d818c, 0x08080008, 0x1f0f131c, 0x19899198, 0x00000000, 0x19091118, 0x04040004, 0x13435350, 0x37c7f3f4, 0x21c1e1e0, 0x3dcdf1fc, 0x36467274, 0x2f0f232c, 0x27072324, 0x3080b0b0, 0x0b8b8388, 0x0e0e020c, 0x2b8ba3a8, 0x2282a2a0, 0x2e4e626c, 0x13839390, 0x0d4d414c, 0x29496168, 0x3c4c707c, 0x09090108, 0x0a0a0208, 0x3f8fb3bc, 0x2fcfe3ec, 0x33c3f3f0, 0x05c5c1c4, 0x07878384, 0x14041014, 0x3ecef2fc, 0x24446064, 0x1eced2dc, 0x2e0e222c, 0x0b4b4348, 0x1a0a1218, 0x06060204, 0x21012120, 0x2b4b6368, 0x26466264, 0x02020200, 0x35c5f1f4, 0x12829290, 0x0a8a8288, 0x0c0c000c, 0x3383b3b0, 0x3e4e727c, 0x10c0d0d0, 0x3a4a7278, 0x07474344, 0x16869294, 0x25c5e1e4, 0x26062224, 0x00808080, 0x2d8da1ac, 0x1fcfd3dc, 0x2181a1a0, 0x30003030, 0x37073334, 0x2e8ea2ac, 0x36063234, 0x15051114, 0x22022220, 0x38083038, 0x34c4f0f4, 0x2787a3a4, 0x05454144, 0x0c4c404c, 0x01818180, 0x29c9e1e8, 0x04848084, 0x17879394, 0x35053134, 0x0bcbc3c8, 0x0ecec2cc, 0x3c0c303c, 0x31417170, 0x11011110, 0x07c7c3c4, 0x09898188, 0x35457174, 0x3bcbf3f8, 0x1acad2d8, 0x38c8f0f8, 0x14849094, 0x19495158, 0x02828280, 0x04c4c0c4, 0x3fcff3fc, 0x09494148, 0x39093138, 0x27476364, 0x00c0c0c0, 0x0fcfc3cc, 0x17c7d3d4, 0x3888b0b8, 0x0f0f030c, 0x0e8e828c, 0x02424240, 0x23032320, 0x11819190, 0x2c4c606c, 0x1bcbd3d8, 0x2484a0a4, 0x34043034, 0x31c1f1f0, 0x08484048, 0x02c2c2c0, 0x2f4f636c, 0x3d0d313c, 0x2d0d212c, 0x00404040, 0x3e8eb2bc, 0x3e0e323c, 0x3c8cb0bc, 0x01c1c1c0, 0x2a8aa2a8, 0x3a8ab2b8, 0x0e4e424c, 0x15455154, 0x3b0b3338, 0x1cccd0dc, 0x28486068, 0x3f4f737c, 0x1c8c909c, 0x18c8d0d8, 0x0a4a4248, 0x16465254, 0x37477374, 0x2080a0a0, 0x2dcde1ec, 0x06464244, 0x3585b1b4, 0x2b0b2328, 0x25456164, 0x3acaf2f8, 0x23c3e3e0, 0x3989b1b8, 0x3181b1b0, 0x1f8f939c, 0x1e4e525c, 0x39c9f1f8, 0x26c6e2e4, 0x3282b2b0, 0x31013130, 0x2acae2e8, 0x2d4d616c, 0x1f4f535c, 0x24c4e0e4, 0x30c0f0f0, 0x0dcdc1cc, 0x08888088, 0x16061214, 0x3a0a3238, 0x18485058, 0x14c4d0d4, 0x22426260, 0x29092128, 0x07070304, 0x33033330, 0x28c8e0e8, 0x1b0b1318, 0x05050104, 0x39497178, 0x10809090, 0x2a4a6268, 0x2a0a2228, 0x1a8a9298 }, { 0x38380830, 0xe828c8e0, 0x2c2d0d21, 0xa42686a2, 0xcc0fcfc3, 0xdc1eced2, 0xb03383b3, 0xb83888b0, 0xac2f8fa3, 0x60204060, 0x54154551, 0xc407c7c3, 0x44044440, 0x6c2f4f63, 0x682b4b63, 0x581b4b53, 0xc003c3c3, 0x60224262, 0x30330333, 0xb43585b1, 0x28290921, 0xa02080a0, 0xe022c2e2, 0xa42787a3, 0xd013c3d3, 0x90118191, 0x10110111, 0x04060602, 0x1c1c0c10, 0xbc3c8cb0, 0x34360632, 0x480b4b43, 0xec2fcfe3, 0x88088880, 0x6c2c4c60, 0xa82888a0, 0x14170713, 0xc404c4c0, 0x14160612, 0xf434c4f0, 0xc002c2c2, 0x44054541, 0xe021c1e1, 0xd416c6d2, 0x3c3f0f33, 0x3c3d0d31, 0x8c0e8e82, 0x98188890, 0x28280820, 0x4c0e4e42, 0xf436c6f2, 0x3c3e0e32, 0xa42585a1, 0xf839c9f1, 0x0c0d0d01, 0xdc1fcfd3, 0xd818c8d0, 0x282b0b23, 0x64264662, 0x783a4a72, 0x24270723, 0x2c2f0f23, 0xf031c1f1, 0x70324272, 0x40024242, 0xd414c4d0, 0x40014141, 0xc000c0c0, 0x70334373, 0x64274763, 0xac2c8ca0, 0x880b8b83, 0xf437c7f3, 0xac2d8da1, 0x80008080, 0x1c1f0f13, 0xc80acac2, 0x2c2c0c20, 0xa82a8aa2, 0x34340430, 0xd012c2d2, 0x080b0b03, 0xec2ecee2, 0xe829c9e1, 0x5c1d4d51, 0x94148490, 0x18180810, 0xf838c8f0, 0x54174753, 0xac2e8ea2, 0x08080800, 0xc405c5c1, 0x10130313, 0xcc0dcdc1, 0x84068682, 0xb83989b1, 0xfc3fcff3, 0x7c3d4d71, 0xc001c1c1, 0x30310131, 0xf435c5f1, 0x880a8a82, 0x682a4a62, 0xb03181b1, 0xd011c1d1, 0x20200020, 0xd417c7d3, 0x00020202, 0x20220222, 0x04040400, 0x68284860, 0x70314171, 0x04070703, 0xd81bcbd3, 0x9c1d8d91, 0x98198991, 0x60214161, 0xbc3e8eb2, 0xe426c6e2, 0x58194951, 0xdc1dcdd1, 0x50114151, 0x90108090, 0xdc1cccd0, 0x981a8a92, 0xa02383a3, 0xa82b8ba3, 0xd010c0d0, 0x80018181, 0x0c0f0f03, 0x44074743, 0x181a0a12, 0xe023c3e3, 0xec2ccce0, 0x8c0d8d81, 0xbc3f8fb3, 0x94168692, 0x783b4b73, 0x5c1c4c50, 0xa02282a2, 0xa02181a1, 0x60234363, 0x20230323, 0x4c0d4d41, 0xc808c8c0, 0x9c1e8e92, 0x9c1c8c90, 0x383a0a32, 0x0c0c0c00, 0x2c2e0e22, 0xb83a8ab2, 0x6c2e4e62, 0x9c1f8f93, 0x581a4a52, 0xf032c2f2, 0x90128292, 0xf033c3f3, 0x48094941, 0x78384870, 0xcc0cccc0, 0x14150511, 0xf83bcbf3, 0x70304070, 0x74354571, 0x7c3f4f73, 0x34350531, 0x10100010, 0x00030303, 0x64244460, 0x6c2d4d61, 0xc406c6c2, 0x74344470, 0xd415c5d1, 0xb43484b0, 0xe82acae2, 0x08090901, 0x74364672, 0x18190911, 0xfc3ecef2, 0x40004040, 0x10120212, 0xe020c0e0, 0xbc3d8db1, 0x04050501, 0xf83acaf2, 0x00010101, 0xf030c0f0, 0x282a0a22, 0x5c1e4e52, 0xa82989a1, 0x54164652, 0x40034343, 0x84058581, 0x14140410, 0x88098981, 0x981b8b93, 0xb03080b0, 0xe425c5e1, 0x48084840, 0x78394971, 0x94178793, 0xfc3cccf0, 0x1c1e0e12, 0x80028282, 0x20210121, 0x8c0c8c80, 0x181b0b13, 0x5c1f4f53, 0x74374773, 0x54144450, 0xb03282b2, 0x1c1d0d11, 0x24250521, 0x4c0f4f43, 0x00000000, 0x44064642, 0xec2dcde1, 0x58184850, 0x50124252, 0xe82bcbe3, 0x7c3e4e72, 0xd81acad2, 0xc809c9c1, 0xfc3dcdf1, 0x30300030, 0x94158591, 0x64254561, 0x3c3c0c30, 0xb43686b2, 0xe424c4e0, 0xb83b8bb3, 0x7c3c4c70, 0x0c0e0e02, 0x50104050, 0x38390931, 0x24260622, 0x30320232, 0x84048480, 0x68294961, 0x90138393, 0x34370733, 0xe427c7e3, 0x24240420, 0xa42484a0, 0xc80bcbc3, 0x50134353, 0x080a0a02, 0x84078783, 0xd819c9d1, 0x4c0c4c40, 0x80038383, 0x8c0f8f83, 0xcc0ecec2, 0x383b0b33, 0x480a4a42, 0xb43787b3 }, { 0xa1a82989, 0x81840585, 0xd2d416c6, 0xd3d013c3, 0x50541444, 0x111c1d0d, 0xa0ac2c8c, 0x21242505, 0x515c1d4d, 0x43400343, 0x10181808, 0x121c1e0e, 0x51501141, 0xf0fc3ccc, 0xc2c80aca, 0x63602343, 0x20282808, 0x40440444, 0x20202000, 0x919c1d8d, 0xe0e020c0, 0xe2e022c2, 0xc0c808c8, 0x13141707, 0xa1a42585, 0x838c0f8f, 0x03000303, 0x73783b4b, 0xb3b83b8b, 0x13101303, 0xd2d012c2, 0xe2ec2ece, 0x70703040, 0x808c0c8c, 0x333c3f0f, 0xa0a82888, 0x32303202, 0xd1dc1dcd, 0xf2f436c6, 0x70743444, 0xe0ec2ccc, 0x91941585, 0x03080b0b, 0x53541747, 0x505c1c4c, 0x53581b4b, 0xb1bc3d8d, 0x01000101, 0x20242404, 0x101c1c0c, 0x73703343, 0x90981888, 0x10101000, 0xc0cc0ccc, 0xf2f032c2, 0xd1d819c9, 0x202c2c0c, 0xe3e427c7, 0x72703242, 0x83800383, 0x93981b8b, 0xd1d011c1, 0x82840686, 0xc1c809c9, 0x60602040, 0x50501040, 0xa3a02383, 0xe3e82bcb, 0x010c0d0d, 0xb2b43686, 0x929c1e8e, 0x434c0f4f, 0xb3b43787, 0x52581a4a, 0xc2c406c6, 0x70783848, 0xa2a42686, 0x12101202, 0xa3ac2f8f, 0xd1d415c5, 0x61602141, 0xc3c003c3, 0xb0b43484, 0x41400141, 0x52501242, 0x717c3d4d, 0x818c0d8d, 0x00080808, 0x131c1f0f, 0x91981989, 0x00000000, 0x11181909, 0x00040404, 0x53501343, 0xf3f437c7, 0xe1e021c1, 0xf1fc3dcd, 0x72743646, 0x232c2f0f, 0x23242707, 0xb0b03080, 0x83880b8b, 0x020c0e0e, 0xa3a82b8b, 0xa2a02282, 0x626c2e4e, 0x93901383, 0x414c0d4d, 0x61682949, 0x707c3c4c, 0x01080909, 0x02080a0a, 0xb3bc3f8f, 0xe3ec2fcf, 0xf3f033c3, 0xc1c405c5, 0x83840787, 0x10141404, 0xf2fc3ece, 0x60642444, 0xd2dc1ece, 0x222c2e0e, 0x43480b4b, 0x12181a0a, 0x02040606, 0x21202101, 0x63682b4b, 0x62642646, 0x02000202, 0xf1f435c5, 0x92901282, 0x82880a8a, 0x000c0c0c, 0xb3b03383, 0x727c3e4e, 0xd0d010c0, 0x72783a4a, 0x43440747, 0x92941686, 0xe1e425c5, 0x22242606, 0x80800080, 0xa1ac2d8d, 0xd3dc1fcf, 0xa1a02181, 0x30303000, 0x33343707, 0xa2ac2e8e, 0x32343606, 0x11141505, 0x22202202, 0x30383808, 0xf0f434c4, 0xa3a42787, 0x41440545, 0x404c0c4c, 0x81800181, 0xe1e829c9, 0x80840484, 0x93941787, 0x31343505, 0xc3c80bcb, 0xc2cc0ece, 0x303c3c0c, 0x71703141, 0x11101101, 0xc3c407c7, 0x81880989, 0x71743545, 0xf3f83bcb, 0xd2d81aca, 0xf0f838c8, 0x90941484, 0x51581949, 0x82800282, 0xc0c404c4, 0xf3fc3fcf, 0x41480949, 0x31383909, 0x63642747, 0xc0c000c0, 0xc3cc0fcf, 0xd3d417c7, 0xb0b83888, 0x030c0f0f, 0x828c0e8e, 0x42400242, 0x23202303, 0x91901181, 0x606c2c4c, 0xd3d81bcb, 0xa0a42484, 0x30343404, 0xf1f031c1, 0x40480848, 0xc2c002c2, 0x636c2f4f, 0x313c3d0d, 0x212c2d0d, 0x40400040, 0xb2bc3e8e, 0x323c3e0e, 0xb0bc3c8c, 0xc1c001c1, 0xa2a82a8a, 0xb2b83a8a, 0x424c0e4e, 0x51541545, 0x33383b0b, 0xd0dc1ccc, 0x60682848, 0x737c3f4f, 0x909c1c8c, 0xd0d818c8, 0x42480a4a, 0x52541646, 0x73743747, 0xa0a02080, 0xe1ec2dcd, 0x42440646, 0xb1b43585, 0x23282b0b, 0x61642545, 0xf2f83aca, 0xe3e023c3, 0xb1b83989, 0xb1b03181, 0x939c1f8f, 0x525c1e4e, 0xf1f839c9, 0xe2e426c6, 0xb2b03282, 0x31303101, 0xe2e82aca, 0x616c2d4d, 0x535c1f4f, 0xe0e424c4, 0xf0f030c0, 0xc1cc0dcd, 0x80880888, 0x12141606, 0x32383a0a, 0x50581848, 0xd0d414c4, 0x62602242, 0x21282909, 0x03040707, 0x33303303, 0xe0e828c8, 0x13181b0b, 0x01040505, 0x71783949, 0x90901080, 0x62682a4a, 0x22282a0a, 0x92981a8a }, { 0x08303838, 0xc8e0e828, 0x0d212c2d, 0x86a2a426, 0xcfc3cc0f, 0xced2dc1e, 0x83b3b033, 0x88b0b838, 0x8fa3ac2f, 0x40606020, 0x45515415, 0xc7c3c407, 0x44404404, 0x4f636c2f, 0x4b63682b, 0x4b53581b, 0xc3c3c003, 0x42626022, 0x03333033, 0x85b1b435, 0x09212829, 0x80a0a020, 0xc2e2e022, 0x87a3a427, 0xc3d3d013, 0x81919011, 0x01111011, 0x06020406, 0x0c101c1c, 0x8cb0bc3c, 0x06323436, 0x4b43480b, 0xcfe3ec2f, 0x88808808, 0x4c606c2c, 0x88a0a828, 0x07131417, 0xc4c0c404, 0x06121416, 0xc4f0f434, 0xc2c2c002, 0x45414405, 0xc1e1e021, 0xc6d2d416, 0x0f333c3f, 0x0d313c3d, 0x8e828c0e, 0x88909818, 0x08202828, 0x4e424c0e, 0xc6f2f436, 0x0e323c3e, 0x85a1a425, 0xc9f1f839, 0x0d010c0d, 0xcfd3dc1f, 0xc8d0d818, 0x0b23282b, 0x46626426, 0x4a72783a, 0x07232427, 0x0f232c2f, 0xc1f1f031, 0x42727032, 0x42424002, 0xc4d0d414, 0x41414001, 0xc0c0c000, 0x43737033, 0x47636427, 0x8ca0ac2c, 0x8b83880b, 0xc7f3f437, 0x8da1ac2d, 0x80808000, 0x0f131c1f, 0xcac2c80a, 0x0c202c2c, 0x8aa2a82a, 0x04303434, 0xc2d2d012, 0x0b03080b, 0xcee2ec2e, 0xc9e1e829, 0x4d515c1d, 0x84909414, 0x08101818, 0xc8f0f838, 0x47535417, 0x8ea2ac2e, 0x08000808, 0xc5c1c405, 0x03131013, 0xcdc1cc0d, 0x86828406, 0x89b1b839, 0xcff3fc3f, 0x4d717c3d, 0xc1c1c001, 0x01313031, 0xc5f1f435, 0x8a82880a, 0x4a62682a, 0x81b1b031, 0xc1d1d011, 0x00202020, 0xc7d3d417, 0x02020002, 0x02222022, 0x04000404, 0x48606828, 0x41717031, 0x07030407, 0xcbd3d81b, 0x8d919c1d, 0x89919819, 0x41616021, 0x8eb2bc3e, 0xc6e2e426, 0x49515819, 0xcdd1dc1d, 0x41515011, 0x80909010, 0xccd0dc1c, 0x8a92981a, 0x83a3a023, 0x8ba3a82b, 0xc0d0d010, 0x81818001, 0x0f030c0f, 0x47434407, 0x0a12181a, 0xc3e3e023, 0xcce0ec2c, 0x8d818c0d, 0x8fb3bc3f, 0x86929416, 0x4b73783b, 0x4c505c1c, 0x82a2a022, 0x81a1a021, 0x43636023, 0x03232023, 0x4d414c0d, 0xc8c0c808, 0x8e929c1e, 0x8c909c1c, 0x0a32383a, 0x0c000c0c, 0x0e222c2e, 0x8ab2b83a, 0x4e626c2e, 0x8f939c1f, 0x4a52581a, 0xc2f2f032, 0x82929012, 0xc3f3f033, 0x49414809, 0x48707838, 0xccc0cc0c, 0x05111415, 0xcbf3f83b, 0x40707030, 0x45717435, 0x4f737c3f, 0x05313435, 0x00101010, 0x03030003, 0x44606424, 0x4d616c2d, 0xc6c2c406, 0x44707434, 0xc5d1d415, 0x84b0b434, 0xcae2e82a, 0x09010809, 0x46727436, 0x09111819, 0xcef2fc3e, 0x40404000, 0x02121012, 0xc0e0e020, 0x8db1bc3d, 0x05010405, 0xcaf2f83a, 0x01010001, 0xc0f0f030, 0x0a22282a, 0x4e525c1e, 0x89a1a829, 0x46525416, 0x43434003, 0x85818405, 0x04101414, 0x89818809, 0x8b93981b, 0x80b0b030, 0xc5e1e425, 0x48404808, 0x49717839, 0x87939417, 0xccf0fc3c, 0x0e121c1e, 0x82828002, 0x01212021, 0x8c808c0c, 0x0b13181b, 0x4f535c1f, 0x47737437, 0x44505414, 0x82b2b032, 0x0d111c1d, 0x05212425, 0x4f434c0f, 0x00000000, 0x46424406, 0xcde1ec2d, 0x48505818, 0x42525012, 0xcbe3e82b, 0x4e727c3e, 0xcad2d81a, 0xc9c1c809, 0xcdf1fc3d, 0x00303030, 0x85919415, 0x45616425, 0x0c303c3c, 0x86b2b436, 0xc4e0e424, 0x8bb3b83b, 0x4c707c3c, 0x0e020c0e, 0x40505010, 0x09313839, 0x06222426, 0x02323032, 0x84808404, 0x49616829, 0x83939013, 0x07333437, 0xc7e3e427, 0x04202424, 0x84a0a424, 0xcbc3c80b, 0x43535013, 0x0a02080a, 0x87838407, 0xc9d1d819, 0x4c404c0c, 0x83838003, 0x8f838c0f, 0xcec2cc0e, 0x0b33383b, 0x4a42480a, 0x87b3b437 } }; #else /* on x86_64 >5x size reduction at 40% performance penalty */ static const unsigned char SEED_Sbox[2][256] = { { 0xA9, 0x85, 0xD6, 0xD3, 0x54, 0x1D, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x5D, 0x43, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x51, 0xFC, 0xCA, 0x63, 0x28, 0x44, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xE0, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x8F, 0x03, 0x7B, 0xBB, 0x13, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x8C, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x74, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x57, 0x5C, 0x5B, 0xBD, 0x01, 0x24, 0x1C, 0x73, 0x98, 0x10, 0xCC, 0xF2, 0xD9, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x83, 0x9B, 0xD1, 0x86, 0xC9, 0x60, 0x50, 0xA3, 0xEB, 0x0D, 0xB6, 0x9E, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x78, 0xA6, 0x12, 0xAF, 0xD5, 0x61, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0x41, 0x52, 0x7D, 0x8D, 0x08, 0x1F, 0x99, 0x00, 0x19, 0x04, 0x53, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x2F, 0x27, 0xB0, 0x8B, 0x0E, 0xAB, 0xA2, 0x6E, 0x93, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x7C, 0x09, 0x0A, 0xBF, 0xEF, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0x87, 0x14, 0xFE, 0x64, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x4B, 0x1A, 0x06, 0x21, 0x6B, 0x66, 0x02, 0xF5, 0x92, 0x8A, 0x0C, 0xB3, 0x7E, 0xD0, 0x7A, 0x47, 0x96, 0xE5, 0x26, 0x80, 0xAD, 0xDF, 0xA1, 0x30, 0x37, 0xAE, 0x36, 0x15, 0x22, 0x38, 0xF4, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x4C, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x97, 0x35, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x71, 0x11, 0xC7, 0x89, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x94, 0x59, 0x82, 0xC4, 0xFF, 0x49, 0x39, 0x67, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0xD7, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x8E, 0x42, 0x23, 0x91, 0x6C, 0xDB, 0xA4, 0x34, 0xF1, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x6F, 0x3D, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xBE, 0x3E, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x3B, 0xDC, 0x68, 0x7F, 0x9C, 0xD8, 0x4A, 0x56, 0x77, 0xA0, 0xED, 0x46, 0xB5, 0x2B, 0x65, 0xFA, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0xE6, 0xB2, 0x31, 0xEA, 0x6D, 0x5F, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x88, 0x16, 0x3A, 0x58, 0xD4, 0x62, 0x29, 0x07, 0x33, 0xE8, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x79, 0x90, 0x6A, 0x2A, 0x9A }, { 0x38, 0xE8, 0x2D, 0xA6, 0xCF, 0xDE, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x55, 0xC7, 0x44, 0x6F, 0x6B, 0x5B, 0xC3, 0x62, 0x33, 0xB5, 0x29, 0xA0, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0x91, 0x11, 0x06, 0x1C, 0xBC, 0x36, 0x4B, 0xEF, 0x88, 0x6C, 0xA8, 0x17, 0xC4, 0x16, 0xF4, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xE1, 0xD6, 0x3F, 0x3D, 0x8E, 0x98, 0x28, 0x4E, 0xF6, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0xF9, 0x0D, 0xDF, 0xD8, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x7A, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x42, 0xD4, 0x41, 0xC0, 0x73, 0x67, 0xAC, 0x8B, 0xF7, 0xAD, 0x80, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x2C, 0xAA, 0x34, 0xD2, 0x0B, 0xEE, 0xE9, 0x5D, 0x94, 0x18, 0xF8, 0x57, 0xAE, 0x08, 0xC5, 0x13, 0xCD, 0x86, 0xB9, 0xFF, 0x7D, 0xC1, 0x31, 0xF5, 0x8A, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xD7, 0x02, 0x22, 0x04, 0x68, 0x71, 0x07, 0xDB, 0x9D, 0x99, 0x61, 0xBE, 0xE6, 0x59, 0xDD, 0x51, 0x90, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xD0, 0x81, 0x0F, 0x47, 0x1A, 0xE3, 0xEC, 0x8D, 0xBF, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x5C, 0xA2, 0xA1, 0x63, 0x23, 0x4D, 0xC8, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x3A, 0x0C, 0x2E, 0xBA, 0x6E, 0x9F, 0x5A, 0xF2, 0x92, 0xF3, 0x49, 0x78, 0xCC, 0x15, 0xFB, 0x70, 0x75, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x10, 0x03, 0x64, 0x6D, 0xC6, 0x74, 0xD5, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x09, 0x76, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x40, 0x12, 0xE0, 0xBD, 0x05, 0xFA, 0x01, 0xF0, 0x2A, 0x5E, 0xA9, 0x56, 0x43, 0x85, 0x14, 0x89, 0x9B, 0xB0, 0xE5, 0x48, 0x79, 0x97, 0xFC, 0x1E, 0x82, 0x21, 0x8C, 0x1B, 0x5F, 0x77, 0x54, 0xB2, 0x1D, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x46, 0xED, 0x58, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x7E, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x95, 0x65, 0x3C, 0xB6, 0xE4, 0xBB, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x50, 0x39, 0x26, 0x32, 0x84, 0x69, 0x93, 0x37, 0xE7, 0x24, 0xA4, 0xCB, 0x53, 0x0A, 0x87, 0xD9, 0x4C, 0x83, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0x4A, 0xB7 } }; static unsigned int G_FUNC(unsigned int v) { unsigned int s0, s1, s2, s3, ret; s0 = SEED_Sbox[0][(unsigned char) (v) & 0xff]; s1 = SEED_Sbox[1][(unsigned char)((v)>> 8) & 0xff]; s2 = SEED_Sbox[0][(unsigned char)((v)>>16) & 0xff]; s3 = SEED_Sbox[1][(unsigned char)((v)>>24) & 0xff]; ret = ((s0 & 0xFC) ^ (s1 & 0xF3) ^ (s2 & 0xCF) ^ (s3 & 0x3F)); ret |= ((s0 & 0xF3) ^ (s1 & 0xCF) ^ (s2 & 0x3F) ^ (s3 & 0xFC)) << 8; ret |= ((s0 & 0xCF) ^ (s1 & 0x3F) ^ (s2 & 0xFC) ^ (s3 & 0xF3)) << 16; ret |= ((s0 & 0x3F) ^ (s1 & 0xFC) ^ (s2 & 0xF3) ^ (s3 & 0xCF)) << 24; return ret; } # endif /* key schedule constants - golden ratio */ # define KC0 0x9e3779b9 # define KC1 0x3c6ef373 # define KC2 0x78dde6e6 # define KC3 0xf1bbcdcc # define KC4 0xe3779b99 # define KC5 0xc6ef3733 # define KC6 0x8dde6e67 # define KC7 0x1bbcdccf # define KC8 0x3779b99e # define KC9 0x6ef3733c # define KC10 0xdde6e678 # define KC11 0xbbcdccf1 # define KC12 0x779b99e3 # define KC13 0xef3733c6 # define KC14 0xde6e678d # define KC15 0xbcdccf1b # if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) static const seed_word KC[] = { KC0, KC1, KC2, KC3, KC4, KC5, KC6, KC7, KC8, KC9, KC10, KC11, KC12, KC13, KC14, KC15 }; # endif void SEED_set_key(const unsigned char rawkey[SEED_KEY_LENGTH], SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks) { seed_word x1, x2, x3, x4; seed_word t0, t1; char2word(rawkey, x1); char2word(rawkey + 4, x2); char2word(rawkey + 8, x3); char2word(rawkey + 12, x4); t0 = (x1 + x3 - KC0) & 0xffffffff; t1 = (x2 - x4 + KC0) & 0xffffffff; KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[0]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC1); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[2]); # if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC2); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[4]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC3); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[6]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC4); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[8]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC5); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[10]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC6); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[12]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC7); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[14]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC8); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[16]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC9); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[18]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC10); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[20]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC11); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[22]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC12); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[24]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC13); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[26]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC14); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[28]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC15); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[30]); # else { int i; for (i = 2; i < 16; i += 2) { KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC[i]); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[i * 2]); KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, KC[i + 1]); KEYUPDATE_TEMP(t0, t1, &ks->data[i * 2 + 2]); } } # endif } void SEED_encrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks) { seed_word x1, x2, x3, x4; seed_word t0, t1; char2word(s, x1); char2word(s + 4, x2); char2word(s + 8, x3); char2word(s + 12, x4); # if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 0); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 2); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 4); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 6); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 8); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 10); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 12); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 14); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 16); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 18); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 20); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 22); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 24); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 26); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 28); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 30); # else { int i; for (i = 0; i < 30; i += 4) { E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, i); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, i + 2); } } # endif word2char(x3, d); word2char(x4, d + 4); word2char(x1, d + 8); word2char(x2, d + 12); } void SEED_decrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks) { seed_word x1, x2, x3, x4; seed_word t0, t1; char2word(s, x1); char2word(s + 4, x2); char2word(s + 8, x3); char2word(s + 12, x4); # if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 30); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 28); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 26); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 24); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 22); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 20); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 18); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 16); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 14); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 12); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 10); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 8); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 6); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 4); E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, 2); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, 0); # else { int i; for (i = 30; i > 0; i -= 4) { E_SEED(t0, t1, x1, x2, x3, x4, i); E_SEED(t0, t1, x3, x4, x1, x2, i - 2); } } # endif word2char(x3, d); word2char(x4, d + 4); word2char(x1, d + 8); word2char(x2, d + 12); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/build.info0000644000000000000000000000014013176625657016272 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=seed.c seed_ecb.c seed_cbc.c seed_cfb.c seed_ofb.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/seed_locl.h0000644000000000000000000001100613176625657016423 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2007 KISA(Korea Information Security Agency). All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Neither the name of author nor the names of its contributors may * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef HEADER_SEED_LOCL_H # define HEADER_SEED_LOCL_H # include "openssl/e_os2.h" # include # ifdef SEED_LONG /* need 32-bit type */ typedef unsigned long seed_word; # else typedef unsigned int seed_word; # endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define char2word(c, i) \ (i) = ((((seed_word)(c)[0]) << 24) | (((seed_word)(c)[1]) << 16) | (((seed_word)(c)[2]) << 8) | ((seed_word)(c)[3])) # define word2char(l, c) \ *((c)+0) = (unsigned char)((l)>>24) & 0xff; \ *((c)+1) = (unsigned char)((l)>>16) & 0xff; \ *((c)+2) = (unsigned char)((l)>> 8) & 0xff; \ *((c)+3) = (unsigned char)((l)) & 0xff # define KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE0(T0, T1, X1, X2, X3, X4, KC) \ (T0) = (X3); \ (X3) = (((X3)<<8) ^ ((X4)>>24)) & 0xffffffff; \ (X4) = (((X4)<<8) ^ ((T0)>>24)) & 0xffffffff; \ (T0) = ((X1) + (X3) - (KC)) & 0xffffffff; \ (T1) = ((X2) + (KC) - (X4)) & 0xffffffff # define KEYSCHEDULE_UPDATE1(T0, T1, X1, X2, X3, X4, KC) \ (T0) = (X1); \ (X1) = (((X1)>>8) ^ ((X2)<<24)) & 0xffffffff; \ (X2) = (((X2)>>8) ^ ((T0)<<24)) & 0xffffffff; \ (T0) = ((X1) + (X3) - (KC)) & 0xffffffff; \ (T1) = ((X2) + (KC) - (X4)) & 0xffffffff # define KEYUPDATE_TEMP(T0, T1, K) \ (K)[0] = G_FUNC((T0)); \ (K)[1] = G_FUNC((T1)) # define XOR_SEEDBLOCK(DST, SRC) \ ((DST))[0] ^= ((SRC))[0]; \ ((DST))[1] ^= ((SRC))[1]; \ ((DST))[2] ^= ((SRC))[2]; \ ((DST))[3] ^= ((SRC))[3] # define MOV_SEEDBLOCK(DST, SRC) \ ((DST))[0] = ((SRC))[0]; \ ((DST))[1] = ((SRC))[1]; \ ((DST))[2] = ((SRC))[2]; \ ((DST))[3] = ((SRC))[3] # define CHAR2WORD(C, I) \ char2word((C), (I)[0]); \ char2word((C+4), (I)[1]); \ char2word((C+8), (I)[2]); \ char2word((C+12), (I)[3]) # define WORD2CHAR(I, C) \ word2char((I)[0], (C)); \ word2char((I)[1], (C+4)); \ word2char((I)[2], (C+8)); \ word2char((I)[3], (C+12)) # define E_SEED(T0, T1, X1, X2, X3, X4, rbase) \ (T0) = (X3) ^ (ks->data)[(rbase)]; \ (T1) = (X4) ^ (ks->data)[(rbase)+1]; \ (T1) ^= (T0); \ (T1) = G_FUNC((T1)); \ (T0) = ((T0) + (T1)) & 0xffffffff; \ (T0) = G_FUNC((T0)); \ (T1) = ((T1) + (T0)) & 0xffffffff; \ (T1) = G_FUNC((T1)); \ (T0) = ((T0) + (T1)) & 0xffffffff; \ (X1) ^= (T0); \ (X2) ^= (T1) #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_SEED_LOCL_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c0000644000000000000000000000150413176625657016216 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include void SEED_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int enc) { if (enc) CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec, (block128_f) SEED_encrypt); else CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec, (block128_f) SEED_decrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c0000644000000000000000000000130513176625657016234 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include void SEED_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num) { CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec, num, (block128_f) SEED_encrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000111013176625657016211 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include void SEED_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, int enc) { if (enc) SEED_encrypt(in, out, ks); else SEED_decrypt(in, out, ks); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c0000644000000000000000000000135413176625657016224 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include void SEED_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num, int enc) { CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, ks, ivec, num, enc, (block128_f) SEED_encrypt); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014347 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c0000644000000000000000000003373113176625657016346 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ocsp_lcl.h" #include #include /* Standard wrapper functions for extensions */ /* OCSP request extensions */ int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_count(OCSP_REQUEST *x) { return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions)); } int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID (x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, nid, lastpos)); } int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_REQUEST *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ (x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, obj, lastpos)); } int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int crit, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical (x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, crit, lastpos)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_get_ext(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, loc)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_delete_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, loc)); } void *OCSP_REQUEST_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, nid, crit, idx); } int OCSP_REQUEST_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, nid, value, crit, flags); } int OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->tbsRequest.requestExtensions), ex, loc) != NULL); } /* Single extensions */ int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_count(OCSP_ONEREQ *x) { return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->singleRequestExtensions)); } int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->singleRequestExtensions, nid, lastpos)); } int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->singleRequestExtensions, obj, lastpos)); } int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int crit, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical (x->singleRequestExtensions, crit, lastpos)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_get_ext(x->singleRequestExtensions, loc)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_delete_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->singleRequestExtensions, loc)); } void *OCSP_ONEREQ_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(x->singleRequestExtensions, nid, crit, idx); } int OCSP_ONEREQ_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->singleRequestExtensions, nid, value, crit, flags); } int OCSP_ONEREQ_add_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->singleRequestExtensions), ex, loc) != NULL); } /* OCSP Basic response */ int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *x) { return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions)); } int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID (x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, nid, lastpos)); } int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ (x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, obj, lastpos)); } int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int crit, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical (x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, crit, lastpos)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_get_ext(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, loc)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_delete_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, loc)); } void *OCSP_BASICRESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, nid, crit, idx); } int OCSP_BASICRESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, nid, value, crit, flags); } int OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions), ex, loc) != NULL); } /* OCSP single response extensions */ int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x) { return (X509v3_get_ext_count(x->singleExtensions)); } int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(x->singleExtensions, nid, lastpos)); } int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(x->singleExtensions, obj, lastpos)); } int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int crit, int lastpos) { return (X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(x->singleExtensions, crit, lastpos)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_get_ext(x->singleExtensions, loc)); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_delete_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc) { return (X509v3_delete_ext(x->singleExtensions, loc)); } void *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(x->singleExtensions, nid, crit, idx); } int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags) { return X509V3_add1_i2d(&x->singleExtensions, nid, value, crit, flags); } int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return (X509v3_add_ext(&(x->singleExtensions), ex, loc) != NULL); } /* also CRL Entry Extensions */ /* Nonce handling functions */ /* * Add a nonce to an extension stack. A nonce can be specified or if NULL a * random nonce will be generated. Note: OpenSSL 0.9.7d and later create an * OCTET STRING containing the nonce, previous versions used the raw nonce. */ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts, unsigned char *val, int len) { unsigned char *tmpval; ASN1_OCTET_STRING os; int ret = 0; if (len <= 0) len = OCSP_DEFAULT_NONCE_LENGTH; /* * Create the OCTET STRING manually by writing out the header and * appending the content octets. This avoids an extra memory allocation * operation in some cases. Applications should *NOT* do this because it * relies on library internals. */ os.length = ASN1_object_size(0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); if (os.length < 0) return 0; os.data = OPENSSL_malloc(os.length); if (os.data == NULL) goto err; tmpval = os.data; ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); if (val) memcpy(tmpval, val, len); else if (RAND_bytes(tmpval, len) <= 0) goto err; if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, &os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE)) goto err; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(os.data); return ret; } /* Add nonce to an OCSP request */ int OCSP_request_add1_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, unsigned char *val, int len) { return ocsp_add1_nonce(&req->tbsRequest.requestExtensions, val, len); } /* Same as above but for a response */ int OCSP_basic_add1_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, unsigned char *val, int len) { return ocsp_add1_nonce(&resp->tbsResponseData.responseExtensions, val, len); } /*- * Check nonce validity in a request and response. * Return value reflects result: * 1: nonces present and equal. * 2: nonces both absent. * 3: nonce present in response only. * 0: nonces both present and not equal. * -1: nonce in request only. * * For most responders clients can check return > 0. * If responder doesn't handle nonces return != 0 may be * necessary. return == 0 is always an error. */ int OCSP_check_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs) { /* * Since we are only interested in the presence or absence of * the nonce and comparing its value there is no need to use * the X509V3 routines: this way we can avoid them allocating an * ASN1_OCTET_STRING structure for the value which would be * freed immediately anyway. */ int req_idx, resp_idx; X509_EXTENSION *req_ext, *resp_ext; req_idx = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(req, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, -1); resp_idx = OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID(bs, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, -1); /* Check both absent */ if ((req_idx < 0) && (resp_idx < 0)) return 2; /* Check in request only */ if ((req_idx >= 0) && (resp_idx < 0)) return -1; /* Check in response but not request */ if ((req_idx < 0) && (resp_idx >= 0)) return 3; /* * Otherwise nonce in request and response so retrieve the extensions */ req_ext = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(req, req_idx); resp_ext = OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext(bs, resp_idx); if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(X509_EXTENSION_get_data(req_ext), X509_EXTENSION_get_data(resp_ext))) return 0; return 1; } /* * Copy the nonce value (if any) from an OCSP request to a response. */ int OCSP_copy_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req) { X509_EXTENSION *req_ext; int req_idx; /* Check for nonce in request */ req_idx = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(req, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, -1); /* If no nonce that's OK */ if (req_idx < 0) return 2; req_ext = OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(req, req_idx); return OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext(resp, req_ext, -1); } X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_crlID_new(const char *url, long *n, char *tim) { X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL; OCSP_CRLID *cid = NULL; if ((cid = OCSP_CRLID_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (url) { if ((cid->crlUrl = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!(ASN1_STRING_set(cid->crlUrl, url, -1))) goto err; } if (n) { if ((cid->crlNum = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!(ASN1_INTEGER_set(cid->crlNum, *n))) goto err; } if (tim) { if ((cid->crlTime = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(cid->crlTime, tim))) goto err; } x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID, 0, cid); err: OCSP_CRLID_free(cid); return x; } /* AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER */ X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_accept_responses_new(char **oids) { int nid; STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *sk = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL; X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL; if ((sk = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; while (oids && *oids) { if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(*oids)) != NID_undef && (o = OBJ_nid2obj(nid))) sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(sk, o); oids++; } x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses, 0, sk); err: sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(sk, ASN1_OBJECT_free); return x; } /* ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime */ X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_archive_cutoff_new(char *tim) { X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gt = NULL; if ((gt = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(gt, tim))) goto err; x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff, 0, gt); err: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(gt); return x; } /* * per ACCESS_DESCRIPTION parameter are oids, of which there are currently * two--NID_ad_ocsp, NID_id_ad_caIssuers--and GeneralName value. This method * forces NID_ad_ocsp and uniformResourceLocator [6] IA5String. */ X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_url_svcloc_new(X509_NAME *issuer, const char **urls) { X509_EXTENSION *x = NULL; ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5 = NULL; OCSP_SERVICELOC *sloc = NULL; ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad = NULL; if ((sloc = OCSP_SERVICELOC_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((sloc->issuer = X509_NAME_dup(issuer)) == NULL) goto err; if (urls && *urls && (sloc->locator = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; while (urls && *urls) { if ((ad = ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ad->method = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ad_OCSP)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ad->location = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ia5 = ASN1_IA5STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)ia5, *urls, -1)) goto err; ad->location->type = GEN_URI; ad->location->d.ia5 = ia5; ia5 = NULL; if (!sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_push(sloc->locator, ad)) goto err; ad = NULL; urls++; } x = X509V3_EXT_i2d(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator, 0, sloc); err: ASN1_IA5STRING_free(ia5); ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free(ad); OCSP_SERVICELOC_free(sloc); return x; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/v3_ocsp.c0000644000000000000000000001551113176625657016072 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include "ocsp_lcl.h" # include # include "../x509v3/ext_dat.h" /* * OCSP extensions and a couple of CRL entry extensions */ static int i2r_ocsp_crlid(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce, BIO *out, int indent); static int i2r_ocsp_acutoff(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce, BIO *out, int indent); static int i2r_object(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *obj, BIO *out, int indent); static void *ocsp_nonce_new(void); static int i2d_ocsp_nonce(void *a, unsigned char **pp); static void *d2i_ocsp_nonce(void *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); static void ocsp_nonce_free(void *a); static int i2r_ocsp_nonce(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce, BIO *out, int indent); static int i2r_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nocheck, BIO *out, int indent); static void *s2i_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str); static int i2r_ocsp_serviceloc(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *in, BIO *bp, int ind); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_crlid = { NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CRLID), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2r_ocsp_crlid, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_acutoff = { NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2r_ocsp_acutoff, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_invdate = { NID_invalidity_date, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2r_ocsp_acutoff, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_crl_hold = { NID_hold_instruction_code, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OBJECT), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2r_object, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_nonce = { NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, 0, NULL, ocsp_nonce_new, ocsp_nonce_free, d2i_ocsp_nonce, i2d_ocsp_nonce, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2r_ocsp_nonce, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_nocheck = { NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_NULL), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, s2i_ocsp_nocheck, 0, 0, i2r_ocsp_nocheck, 0, NULL }; const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ocsp_serviceloc = { NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SERVICELOC), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, i2r_ocsp_serviceloc, 0, NULL }; static int i2r_ocsp_crlid(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *in, BIO *bp, int ind) { OCSP_CRLID *a = in; if (a->crlUrl) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*scrlUrl: ", ind, "") <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_STRING_print(bp, (ASN1_STRING *)a->crlUrl)) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } if (a->crlNum) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*scrlNum: ", ind, "") <= 0) goto err; if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, a->crlNum) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } if (a->crlTime) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*scrlTime: ", ind, "") <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, a->crlTime)) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } static int i2r_ocsp_acutoff(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *cutoff, BIO *bp, int ind) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind, "") <= 0) return 0; if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, cutoff)) return 0; return 1; } static int i2r_object(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *oid, BIO *bp, int ind) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind, "") <= 0) return 0; if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, oid) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * OCSP nonce. This is needs special treatment because it doesn't have an * ASN1 encoding at all: it just contains arbitrary data. */ static void *ocsp_nonce_new(void) { return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); } static int i2d_ocsp_nonce(void *a, unsigned char **pp) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = a; if (pp) { memcpy(*pp, os->data, os->length); *pp += os->length; } return os->length; } static void *d2i_ocsp_nonce(void *a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os, **pos; pos = a; if (pos == NULL || *pos == NULL) { os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (os == NULL) goto err; } else { os = *pos; } if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pp, length)) goto err; *pp += length; if (pos) *pos = os; return os; err: if ((pos == NULL) || (*pos != os)) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); OCSPerr(OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } static void ocsp_nonce_free(void *a) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(a); } static int i2r_ocsp_nonce(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nonce, BIO *out, int indent) { if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; if (i2a_ASN1_STRING(out, nonce, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } /* Nocheck is just a single NULL. Don't print anything and always set it */ static int i2r_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *nocheck, BIO *out, int indent) { return 1; } static void *s2i_ocsp_nocheck(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { return ASN1_NULL_new(); } static int i2r_ocsp_serviceloc(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *in, BIO *bp, int ind) { int i; OCSP_SERVICELOC *a = in; ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*sIssuer: ", ind, "") <= 0) goto err; if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, a->issuer, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE) <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(a->locator); i++) { ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(a->locator, i); if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*s", (2 * ind), "") <= 0) goto err; if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, ad->method) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, " - ") <= 0) goto err; if (GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, ad->location) <= 0) goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000001626213176625657016325 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- CertID ::= SEQUENCE { * hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN * issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key (excluding the tag & length fields) * serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } */ struct ocsp_cert_id_st { X509_ALGOR hashAlgorithm; ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerNameHash; ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerKeyHash; ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber; }; /*- Request ::= SEQUENCE { * reqCert CertID, * singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_one_request_st { OCSP_CERTID *reqCert; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleRequestExtensions; }; /*- TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE { * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, * requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL, * requestList SEQUENCE OF Request, * requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_req_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; GENERAL_NAME *requestorName; STACK_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ) *requestList; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *requestExtensions; }; /*- Signature ::= SEQUENCE { * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * signature BIT STRING, * certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_signature_st { X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm; ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; }; /*- OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE { * tbsRequest TBSRequest, * optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_request_st { OCSP_REQINFO tbsRequest; OCSP_SIGNATURE *optionalSignature; /* OPTIONAL */ }; /*- OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED { * successful (0), --Response has valid confirmations * malformedRequest (1), --Illegal confirmation request * internalError (2), --Internal error in issuer * tryLater (3), --Try again later * --(4) is not used * sigRequired (5), --Must sign the request * unauthorized (6) --Request unauthorized * } */ /*- ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE { * responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, * response OCTET STRING } */ struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st { ASN1_OBJECT *responseType; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *response; }; /*- OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { * responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus, * responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_response_st { ASN1_ENUMERATED *responseStatus; OCSP_RESPBYTES *responseBytes; }; /*- ResponderID ::= CHOICE { * byName [1] Name, * byKey [2] KeyHash } */ struct ocsp_responder_id_st { int type; union { X509_NAME *byName; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey; } value; }; /*- KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key * --(excluding the tag and length fields) */ /*- RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { * revocationTime GeneralizedTime, * revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_revoked_info_st { ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revocationTime; ASN1_ENUMERATED *revocationReason; }; /*- CertStatus ::= CHOICE { * good [0] IMPLICIT NULL, * revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo, * unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo } */ struct ocsp_cert_status_st { int type; union { ASN1_NULL *good; OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *revoked; ASN1_NULL *unknown; } value; }; /*- SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE { * certID CertID, * certStatus CertStatus, * thisUpdate GeneralizedTime, * nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, * singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_single_response_st { OCSP_CERTID *certId; OCSP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisUpdate; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextUpdate; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleExtensions; }; /*- ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE { * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, * responderID ResponderID, * producedAt GeneralizedTime, * responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse, * responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_response_data_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; OCSP_RESPID responderId; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *producedAt; STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *responses; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *responseExtensions; }; /*- BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { * tbsResponseData ResponseData, * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * signature BIT STRING, * certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } */ /* * Note 1: The value for "signature" is specified in the OCSP rfc2560 as * follows: "The value for the signature SHALL be computed on the hash of * the DER encoding ResponseData." This means that you must hash the * DER-encoded tbsResponseData, and then run it through a crypto-signing * function, which will (at least w/RSA) do a hash-'n'-private-encrypt * operation. This seems a bit odd, but that's the spec. Also note that * the data structures do not leave anywhere to independently specify the * algorithm used for the initial hash. So, we look at the * signature-specification algorithm, and try to do something intelligent. * -- Kathy Weinhold, CertCo */ /* * Note 2: It seems that the mentioned passage from RFC 2560 (section * 4.2.1) is open for interpretation. I've done tests against another * responder, and found that it doesn't do the double hashing that the RFC * seems to say one should. Therefore, all relevant functions take a flag * saying which variant should be used. -- Richard Levitte, OpenSSL team * and CeloCom */ struct ocsp_basic_response_st { OCSP_RESPDATA tbsResponseData; X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm; ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; }; /*- * CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { * crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL, * crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_crl_id_st { ASN1_IA5STRING *crlUrl; ASN1_INTEGER *crlNum; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *crlTime; }; /*- * ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { * issuer Name, * locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax OPTIONAL } */ struct ocsp_service_locator_st { X509_NAME *issuer; STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) *locator; }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_cl.c0000644000000000000000000002370413176625657016143 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "ocsp_lcl.h" /* * Utility functions related to sending OCSP requests and extracting relevant * information from the response. */ /* * Add an OCSP_CERTID to an OCSP request. Return new OCSP_ONEREQ pointer: * useful if we want to add extensions. */ OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid) { OCSP_ONEREQ *one = NULL; if ((one = OCSP_ONEREQ_new()) == NULL) return NULL; OCSP_CERTID_free(one->reqCert); one->reqCert = cid; if (req && !sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_push(req->tbsRequest.requestList, one)) { one->reqCert = NULL; /* do not free on error */ goto err; } return one; err: OCSP_ONEREQ_free(one); return NULL; } /* Set requestorName from an X509_NAME structure */ int OCSP_request_set1_name(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm) { GENERAL_NAME *gen; gen = GENERAL_NAME_new(); if (gen == NULL) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_set(&gen->d.directoryName, nm)) { GENERAL_NAME_free(gen); return 0; } gen->type = GEN_DIRNAME; GENERAL_NAME_free(req->tbsRequest.requestorName); req->tbsRequest.requestorName = gen; return 1; } /* Add a certificate to an OCSP request */ int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert) { OCSP_SIGNATURE *sig; if (req->optionalSignature == NULL) req->optionalSignature = OCSP_SIGNATURE_new(); sig = req->optionalSignature; if (sig == NULL) return 0; if (cert == NULL) return 1; if (sig->certs == NULL && (sig->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) return 0; if (!sk_X509_push(sig->certs, cert)) return 0; X509_up_ref(cert); return 1; } /* * Sign an OCSP request set the requestorName to the subject name of an * optional signers certificate and include one or more optional certificates * in the request. Behaves like PKCS7_sign(). */ int OCSP_request_sign(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags) { int i; X509 *x; if (!OCSP_request_set1_name(req, X509_get_subject_name(signer))) goto err; if ((req->optionalSignature = OCSP_SIGNATURE_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (key) { if (!X509_check_private_key(signer, key)) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_SIGN, OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } if (!OCSP_REQUEST_sign(req, key, dgst)) goto err; } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOCERTS)) { if (!OCSP_request_add1_cert(req, signer)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!OCSP_request_add1_cert(req, x)) goto err; } } return 1; err: OCSP_SIGNATURE_free(req->optionalSignature); req->optionalSignature = NULL; return 0; } /* Get response status */ int OCSP_response_status(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp) { return ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(resp->responseStatus); } /* * Extract basic response from OCSP_RESPONSE or NULL if no basic response * present. */ OCSP_BASICRESP *OCSP_response_get1_basic(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp) { OCSP_RESPBYTES *rb; rb = resp->responseBytes; if (!rb) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC, OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA); return NULL; } if (OBJ_obj2nid(rb->responseType) != NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC, OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE); return NULL; } return ASN1_item_unpack(rb->response, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_BASICRESP)); } const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OCSP_resp_get0_signature(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs) { return bs->signature; } /* * Return number of OCSP_SINGLERESP responses present in a basic response. */ int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs) { if (!bs) return -1; return sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(bs->tbsResponseData.responses); } /* Extract an OCSP_SINGLERESP response with a given index */ OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx) { if (!bs) return NULL; return sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(bs->tbsResponseData.responses, idx); } const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at(const OCSP_BASICRESP* bs) { return bs->tbsResponseData.producedAt; } const STACK_OF(X509) *OCSP_resp_get0_certs(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs) { return bs->certs; } int OCSP_resp_get0_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, const X509_NAME **pname) { const OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId; if (rid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) { *pname = rid->value.byName; *pid = NULL; } else if (rid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY) { *pid = rid->value.byKey; *pname = NULL; } else { return 0; } return 1; } /* Look single response matching a given certificate ID */ int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last) { int i; STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp; OCSP_SINGLERESP *single; if (!bs) return -1; if (last < 0) last = 0; else last++; sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses; for (i = last; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) { single = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i); if (!OCSP_id_cmp(id, single->certId)) return i; } return -1; } /* * Extract status information from an OCSP_SINGLERESP structure. Note: the * revtime and reason values are only set if the certificate status is * revoked. Returns numerical value of status. */ int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd) { int ret; OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cst; if (!single) return -1; cst = single->certStatus; ret = cst->type; if (ret == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) { OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *rev = cst->value.revoked; if (revtime) *revtime = rev->revocationTime; if (reason) { if (rev->revocationReason) *reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(rev->revocationReason); else *reason = -1; } } if (thisupd) *thisupd = single->thisUpdate; if (nextupd) *nextupd = single->nextUpdate; return ret; } /* * This function combines the previous ones: look up a certificate ID and if * found extract status information. Return 0 is successful. */ int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status, int *reason, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd) { int i; OCSP_SINGLERESP *single; i = OCSP_resp_find(bs, id, -1); /* Maybe check for multiple responses and give an error? */ if (i < 0) return 0; single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, i); i = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, reason, revtime, thisupd, nextupd); if (status) *status = i; return 1; } /* * Check validity of thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields. It is possible that * the request will take a few seconds to process and/or the time won't be * totally accurate. Therefore to avoid rejecting otherwise valid time we * allow the times to be within 'nsec' of the current time. Also to avoid * accepting very old responses without a nextUpdate field an optional maxage * parameter specifies the maximum age the thisUpdate field can be. */ int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd, long nsec, long maxsec) { int ret = 1; time_t t_now, t_tmp; time(&t_now); /* Check thisUpdate is valid and not more than nsec in the future */ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(thisupd)) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_THISUPDATE_FIELD); ret = 0; } else { t_tmp = t_now + nsec; if (X509_cmp_time(thisupd, &t_tmp) > 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_STATUS_NOT_YET_VALID); ret = 0; } /* * If maxsec specified check thisUpdate is not more than maxsec in * the past */ if (maxsec >= 0) { t_tmp = t_now - maxsec; if (X509_cmp_time(thisupd, &t_tmp) < 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_STATUS_TOO_OLD); ret = 0; } } } if (!nextupd) return ret; /* Check nextUpdate is valid and not more than nsec in the past */ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(nextupd)) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_NEXTUPDATE_FIELD); ret = 0; } else { t_tmp = t_now - nsec; if (X509_cmp_time(nextupd, &t_tmp) < 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_STATUS_EXPIRED); ret = 0; } } /* Also don't allow nextUpdate to precede thisUpdate */ if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(nextupd, thisupd) < 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY, OCSP_R_NEXTUPDATE_BEFORE_THISUPDATE); ret = 0; } return ret; } const OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(const OCSP_SINGLERESP *single) { return single->certId; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c0000644000000000000000000000751213176625657016334 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OCSP,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OCSP,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA OCSP_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE), "d2i_ocsp_nonce"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_ADD1_STATUS), "OCSP_basic_add1_status"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN), "OCSP_basic_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY), "OCSP_basic_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW), "OCSP_cert_id_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED), "ocsp_check_delegated"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS), "ocsp_check_ids"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER), "ocsp_check_issuer"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY), "OCSP_check_validity"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID), "ocsp_match_issuerid"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL), "OCSP_parse_url"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_SIGN), "OCSP_request_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY), "OCSP_request_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC), "OCSP_response_get1_basic"}, {ERR_FUNC(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1), "parse_http_line1"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA OCSP_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR), "certificate verify error"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR), "digest err"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_NEXTUPDATE_FIELD), "error in nextupdate field"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_THISUPDATE_FIELD), "error in thisupdate field"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL), "error parsing url"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE), "missing ocspsigning usage"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NEXTUPDATE_BEFORE_THISUPDATE), "nextupdate before thisupdate"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE), "not basic response"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN), "no certificates in chain"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA), "no response data"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_REVOKED_TIME), "no revoked time"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY), "no signer key"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE), "private key does not match certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED), "request not signed"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA), "response contains no revocation data"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED), "root ca not trusted"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR), "server response error"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR), "server response parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE), "signature failure"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND), "signer certificate not found"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_STATUS_EXPIRED), "status expired"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_STATUS_NOT_YET_VALID), "status not yet valid"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_STATUS_TOO_OLD), "status too old"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST), "unknown message digest"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID), "unknown nid"}, {ERR_REASON(OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE), "unsupported requestorname type"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_OCSP_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(OCSP_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, OCSP_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, OCSP_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/build.info0000644000000000000000000000025413176625657016324 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ ocsp_asn.c ocsp_ext.c ocsp_ht.c ocsp_lib.c ocsp_cl.c \ ocsp_srv.c ocsp_prn.c ocsp_vfy.c ocsp_err.c v3_ocsp.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c0000644000000000000000000002037613176625657016346 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "ocsp_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include static int ocsp_certid_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_CERTID *a, int indent) { BIO_printf(bp, "%*sCertificate ID:\n", indent, ""); indent += 2; BIO_printf(bp, "%*sHash Algorithm: ", indent, ""); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, a->hashAlgorithm.algorithm); BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Name Hash: ", indent, ""); i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, &a->issuerNameHash, 0); BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Key Hash: ", indent, ""); i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, &a->issuerKeyHash, 0); BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sSerial Number: ", indent, ""); i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, &a->serialNumber); BIO_printf(bp, "\n"); return 1; } typedef struct { long t; const char *m; } OCSP_TBLSTR; static const char *do_table2string(long s, const OCSP_TBLSTR *ts, size_t len) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++, ts++) if (ts->t == s) return ts->m; return "(UNKNOWN)"; } #define table2string(s, tbl) do_table2string(s, tbl, OSSL_NELEM(tbl)) const char *OCSP_response_status_str(long s) { static const OCSP_TBLSTR rstat_tbl[] = { {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, "successful"}, {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, "malformedrequest"}, {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, "internalerror"}, {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER, "trylater"}, {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED, "sigrequired"}, {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized"} }; return table2string(s, rstat_tbl); } const char *OCSP_cert_status_str(long s) { static const OCSP_TBLSTR cstat_tbl[] = { {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD, "good"}, {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED, "revoked"}, {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, "unknown"} }; return table2string(s, cstat_tbl); } const char *OCSP_crl_reason_str(long s) { static const OCSP_TBLSTR reason_tbl[] = { {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED, "unspecified"}, {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE, "keyCompromise"}, {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE, "cACompromise"}, {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED, "affiliationChanged"}, {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED, "superseded"}, {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION, "cessationOfOperation"}, {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD, "certificateHold"}, {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL, "removeFromCRL"} }; return table2string(s, reason_tbl); } int OCSP_REQUEST_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_REQUEST *o, unsigned long flags) { int i; long l; OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL; OCSP_ONEREQ *one = NULL; OCSP_REQINFO *inf = &o->tbsRequest; OCSP_SIGNATURE *sig = o->optionalSignature; if (BIO_write(bp, "OCSP Request Data:\n", 19) <= 0) goto err; l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(inf->version); if (BIO_printf(bp, " Version: %lu (0x%lx)", l + 1, l) <= 0) goto err; if (inf->requestorName != NULL) { if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Requestor Name: ", 21) <= 0) goto err; GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, inf->requestorName); } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Requestor List:\n", 21) <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_num(inf->requestList); i++) { one = sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_value(inf->requestList, i); cid = one->reqCert; ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 8); if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Request Single Extensions", one->singleRequestExtensions, flags, 8)) goto err; } if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Request Extensions", inf->requestExtensions, flags, 4)) goto err; if (sig) { X509_signature_print(bp, &sig->signatureAlgorithm, sig->signature); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sig->certs); i++) { X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i)); PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i)); } } return 1; err: return 0; } int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags) { int i, ret = 0; long l; OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL; OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; OCSP_RESPID *rid = NULL; OCSP_RESPDATA *rd = NULL; OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cst = NULL; OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *rev = NULL; OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL; OCSP_RESPBYTES *rb = o->responseBytes; if (BIO_puts(bp, "OCSP Response Data:\n") <= 0) goto err; l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(o->responseStatus); if (BIO_printf(bp, " OCSP Response Status: %s (0x%lx)\n", OCSP_response_status_str(l), l) <= 0) goto err; if (rb == NULL) return 1; if (BIO_puts(bp, " Response Type: ") <= 0) goto err; if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, rb->responseType) <= 0) goto err; if (OBJ_obj2nid(rb->responseType) != NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic) { BIO_puts(bp, " (unknown response type)\n"); return 1; } if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL) goto err; rd = &br->tbsResponseData; l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version); if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", l + 1, l) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, " Responder Id: ") <= 0) goto err; rid = &rd->responderId; switch (rid->type) { case V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME: X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, rid->value.byName, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); break; case V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY: i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, rid->value.byKey, 0); break; } if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Produced At: ") <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rd->producedAt)) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Responses:\n") <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(rd->responses); i++) { if (!sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i)) continue; single = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i); cid = single->certId; if (ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 4) <= 0) goto err; cst = single->certStatus; if (BIO_printf(bp, " Cert Status: %s", OCSP_cert_status_str(cst->type)) <= 0) goto err; if (cst->type == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) { rev = cst->value.revoked; if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Revocation Time: ") <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rev->revocationTime)) goto err; if (rev->revocationReason) { l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(rev->revocationReason); if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Revocation Reason: %s (0x%lx)", OCSP_crl_reason_str(l), l) <= 0) goto err; } } if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n This Update: ") <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->thisUpdate)) goto err; if (single->nextUpdate) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Next Update: ") <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->nextUpdate)) goto err; } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Response Single Extensions", single->singleExtensions, flags, 8)) goto err; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto err; } if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Response Extensions", rd->responseExtensions, flags, 4)) goto err; if (X509_signature_print(bp, &br->signatureAlgorithm, br->signature) <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(br->certs); i++) { X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i)); PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i)); } ret = 1; err: OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001222613176625657016310 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "ocsp_lcl.h" #include /* Convert a certificate and its issuer to an OCSP_CERTID */ OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, const X509 *subject, const X509 *issuer) { X509_NAME *iname; const ASN1_INTEGER *serial; ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey; if (!dgst) dgst = EVP_sha1(); if (subject) { iname = X509_get_issuer_name(subject); serial = X509_get0_serialNumber(subject); } else { iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer); serial = NULL; } ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer); return OCSP_cert_id_new(dgst, iname, ikey, serial); } OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst, const X509_NAME *issuerName, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey, const ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber) { int nid; unsigned int i; X509_ALGOR *alg; OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if ((cid = OCSP_CERTID_new()) == NULL) goto err; alg = &cid->hashAlgorithm; ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm); if ((nid = EVP_MD_type(dgst)) == NID_undef) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID); goto err; } if ((alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) goto err; if ((alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; if (!X509_NAME_digest(issuerName, dgst, md, &i)) goto digerr; if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&cid->issuerNameHash, md, i))) goto err; /* Calculate the issuerKey hash, excluding tag and length */ if (!EVP_Digest(issuerKey->data, issuerKey->length, md, &i, dgst, NULL)) goto err; if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&cid->issuerKeyHash, md, i))) goto err; if (serialNumber) { if (ASN1_STRING_copy(&cid->serialNumber, serialNumber) == 0) goto err; } return cid; digerr: OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR); err: OCSP_CERTID_free(cid); return NULL; } int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b) { int ret; ret = OBJ_cmp(a->hashAlgorithm.algorithm, b->hashAlgorithm.algorithm); if (ret) return ret; ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(&a->issuerNameHash, &b->issuerNameHash); if (ret) return ret; return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(&a->issuerKeyHash, &b->issuerKeyHash); } int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b) { int ret; ret = OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(a, b); if (ret) return ret; return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&a->serialNumber, &b->serialNumber); } /* * Parse a URL and split it up into host, port and path components and * whether it is SSL. */ int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, int *pssl) { char *p, *buf; char *host, *port; *phost = NULL; *pport = NULL; *ppath = NULL; /* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */ buf = OPENSSL_strdup(url); if (!buf) goto mem_err; /* Check for initial colon */ p = strchr(buf, ':'); if (!p) goto parse_err; *(p++) = '\0'; if (strcmp(buf, "http") == 0) { *pssl = 0; port = "80"; } else if (strcmp(buf, "https") == 0) { *pssl = 1; port = "443"; } else goto parse_err; /* Check for double slash */ if ((p[0] != '/') || (p[1] != '/')) goto parse_err; p += 2; host = p; /* Check for trailing part of path */ p = strchr(p, '/'); if (!p) *ppath = OPENSSL_strdup("/"); else { *ppath = OPENSSL_strdup(p); /* Set start of path to 0 so hostname is valid */ *p = '\0'; } if (!*ppath) goto mem_err; p = host; if (host[0] == '[') { /* ipv6 literal */ host++; p = strchr(host, ']'); if (!p) goto parse_err; *p = '\0'; p++; } /* Look for optional ':' for port number */ if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) { *p = 0; port = p + 1; } *pport = OPENSSL_strdup(port); if (!*pport) goto mem_err; *phost = OPENSSL_strdup(host); if (!*phost) goto mem_err; OPENSSL_free(buf); return 1; mem_err: OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; parse_err: OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL); err: OPENSSL_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(*ppath); *ppath = NULL; OPENSSL_free(*pport); *pport = NULL; OPENSSL_free(*phost); *phost = NULL; return 0; } IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OCSP_CERTID) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c0000644000000000000000000001661013176625657016355 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "ocsp_lcl.h" /* * Utility functions related to sending OCSP responses and extracting * relevant information from the request. */ int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req) { return sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_num(req->tbsRequest.requestList); } OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i) { return sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_value(req->tbsRequest.requestList, i); } OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_onereq_get0_id(OCSP_ONEREQ *one) { return one->reqCert; } int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash, ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid) { if (!cid) return 0; if (pmd) *pmd = cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm; if (piNameHash) *piNameHash = &cid->issuerNameHash; if (pikeyHash) *pikeyHash = &cid->issuerKeyHash; if (pserial) *pserial = &cid->serialNumber; return 1; } int OCSP_request_is_signed(OCSP_REQUEST *req) { if (req->optionalSignature) return 1; return 0; } /* Create an OCSP response and encode an optional basic response */ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs) { OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; if ((rsp = OCSP_RESPONSE_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!(ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rsp->responseStatus, status))) goto err; if (!bs) return rsp; if ((rsp->responseBytes = OCSP_RESPBYTES_new()) == NULL) goto err; rsp->responseBytes->responseType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic); if (!ASN1_item_pack (bs, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_BASICRESP), &rsp->responseBytes->response)) goto err; return rsp; err: OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return NULL; } OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_basic_add1_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *rsp, OCSP_CERTID *cid, int status, int reason, ASN1_TIME *revtime, ASN1_TIME *thisupd, ASN1_TIME *nextupd) { OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL; OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cs; OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *ri; if (rsp->tbsResponseData.responses == NULL && (rsp->tbsResponseData.responses = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((single = OCSP_SINGLERESP_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(thisupd, &single->thisUpdate)) goto err; if (nextupd && !ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(nextupd, &single->nextUpdate)) goto err; OCSP_CERTID_free(single->certId); if ((single->certId = OCSP_CERTID_dup(cid)) == NULL) goto err; cs = single->certStatus; switch (cs->type = status) { case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED: if (!revtime) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_ADD1_STATUS, OCSP_R_NO_REVOKED_TIME); goto err; } if ((cs->value.revoked = ri = OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(revtime, &ri->revocationTime)) goto err; if (reason != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) { if ((ri->revocationReason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!(ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ri->revocationReason, reason))) goto err; } break; case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD: if ((cs->value.good = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL) goto err; break; case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN: if ((cs->value.unknown = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL) goto err; break; default: goto err; } if (!(sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_push(rsp->tbsResponseData.responses, single))) goto err; return single; err: OCSP_SINGLERESP_free(single); return NULL; } /* Add a certificate to an OCSP request */ int OCSP_basic_add1_cert(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, X509 *cert) { if (resp->certs == NULL && (resp->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) return 0; if (!sk_X509_push(resp->certs, cert)) return 0; X509_up_ref(cert); return 1; } int OCSP_basic_sign(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags) { int i; OCSP_RESPID *rid; if (!X509_check_private_key(signer, key)) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN, OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOCERTS)) { if (!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(brsp, signer)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { X509 *tmpcert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(brsp, tmpcert)) goto err; } } rid = &brsp->tbsResponseData.responderId; if (flags & OCSP_RESPID_KEY) { if (!OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(rid, signer)) goto err; } else if (!OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(rid, signer)) { goto err; } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOTIME) && !X509_gmtime_adj(brsp->tbsResponseData.producedAt, 0)) goto err; /* * Right now, I think that not doing double hashing is the right thing. * -- Richard Levitte */ if (!OCSP_BASICRESP_sign(brsp, key, dgst, 0)) goto err; return 1; err: return 0; } int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert) { if (!X509_NAME_set(&respid->value.byName, X509_get_subject_name(cert))) return 0; respid->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME; return 1; } int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey = NULL; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* RFC2560 requires SHA1 */ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), md, NULL)) return 0; byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (byKey == NULL) return 0; if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(byKey, md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(byKey); return 0; } respid->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY; respid->value.byKey = byKey; return 1; } int OCSP_RESPID_match(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert) { if (respid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY) { unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (respid->value.byKey == NULL) return 0; /* RFC2560 requires SHA1 */ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), md, NULL)) return 0; return (ASN1_STRING_length(respid->value.byKey) == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) && (memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(respid->value.byKey), md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0); } else if(respid->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) { if (respid->value.byName == NULL) return 0; return X509_NAME_cmp(respid->value.byName, X509_get_subject_name(cert)) == 0; } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c0000644000000000000000000003146313176625657016352 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ocsp_lcl.h" #include #include static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags); static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id); static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret); static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp); static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x); static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags); /* Verify a basic response message */ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags) { X509 *signer, *x; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags); if (!ret) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); goto end; } ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) { EVP_PKEY *skey; skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer); if (skey == NULL) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY); goto err; } ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); if (ret <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); goto end; } } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { int init_res; if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) { untrusted = NULL; } else if (bs->certs && certs) { untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } } } else if (certs != NULL) { untrusted = certs; } else { untrusted = bs->certs; } init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted); if (!init_res) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto f_err; } X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx); chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); if (ret <= 0) { i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); goto end; } if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) { ret = 1; goto end; } /* * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it * against the OCSP issuer criteria. */ ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain); /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */ if (ret != 0) goto end; /* * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit * trust */ if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) goto end; x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED); goto err; } ret = 1; } end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); if (bs->certs && certs) sk_X509_free(untrusted); return ret; err: ret = 0; goto end; f_err: ret = -1; goto end; } static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags) { X509 *signer; OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId; if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) { *psigner = signer; return 2; } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) && (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) { *psigner = signer; return 1; } /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */ *psigner = NULL; return 0; } static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id) { int i; unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash; X509 *x; /* Easy if lookup by name */ if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName); /* Lookup by key hash */ /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */ if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL; keyhash = id->value.byKey->data; /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL); if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) return x; } return NULL; } static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp; X509 *signer, *sca; OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL; int i; sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses; if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN); return -1; } /* See if the issuer IDs match. */ i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid); /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */ if (i <= 0) return i; signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) { sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1); i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp); if (i < 0) return i; if (i) { /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */ if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer)) return 1; return 0; } } /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */ return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp); } /* * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check * equality against one of them. */ static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret) { OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid; int i, idcount; idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); if (idcount <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA); return -1; } cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId; *ret = NULL; for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) { tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; /* Check to see if IDs match */ if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) { /* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */ if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm, cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm)) return 2; /* Else mismatch */ return 0; } } /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */ *ret = cid; return 1; } static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp) { /* If only one ID to match then do it */ if (cid) { const EVP_MD *dgst; X509_NAME *iname; int mdlen; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm)) == NULL) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST); return -1; } mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); if (mdlen < 0) return -1; if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) || (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen)) return 0; iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert); if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL)) return -1; if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen)) return 0; X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL); if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen)) return 0; return 1; } else { /* We have to match the whole lot */ int i, ret; OCSP_CERTID *tmpid; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) { tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL); if (ret <= 0) return ret; } return 1; } } static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x) { if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN)) return 1; OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE); return 0; } /* * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given * trust value. */ int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags) { X509 *signer; X509_NAME *nm; GENERAL_NAME *gen; int ret = 0; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!req->optionalSignature) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED); goto err; } gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName; if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE); goto err; } nm = gen->d.directoryName; ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags); if (ret <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); goto err; } if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) { EVP_PKEY *skey; skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer); ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey); if (ret <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { int init_res; if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL); else init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, req->optionalSignature->certs); if (!init_res) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST); ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx); if (ret <= 0) { ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret)); goto err; } } ret = 1; goto end; err: ret = 0; end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags) { X509 *signer; if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) { signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm); if (signer) { *psigner = signer; return 1; } } signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm); if (signer) { *psigner = signer; return 2; } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c0000644000000000000000000003120213176625657016150 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #include /* Stateful OCSP request code, supporting non-blocking I/O */ /* Opaque OCSP request status structure */ struct ocsp_req_ctx_st { int state; /* Current I/O state */ unsigned char *iobuf; /* Line buffer */ int iobuflen; /* Line buffer length */ BIO *io; /* BIO to perform I/O with */ BIO *mem; /* Memory BIO response is built into */ unsigned long asn1_len; /* ASN1 length of response */ unsigned long max_resp_len; /* Maximum length of response */ }; #define OCSP_MAX_RESP_LENGTH (100 * 1024) #define OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN 4096; /* OCSP states */ /* If set no reading should be performed */ #define OHS_NOREAD 0x1000 /* Error condition */ #define OHS_ERROR (0 | OHS_NOREAD) /* First line being read */ #define OHS_FIRSTLINE 1 /* MIME headers being read */ #define OHS_HEADERS 2 /* OCSP initial header (tag + length) being read */ #define OHS_ASN1_HEADER 3 /* OCSP content octets being read */ #define OHS_ASN1_CONTENT 4 /* First call: ready to start I/O */ #define OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT (5 | OHS_NOREAD) /* Request being sent */ #define OHS_ASN1_WRITE (6 | OHS_NOREAD) /* Request being flushed */ #define OHS_ASN1_FLUSH (7 | OHS_NOREAD) /* Completed */ #define OHS_DONE (8 | OHS_NOREAD) /* Headers set, no final \r\n included */ #define OHS_HTTP_HEADER (9 | OHS_NOREAD) static int parse_http_line1(char *line); OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(BIO *io, int maxline) { OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx)); if (rctx == NULL) return NULL; rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; rctx->max_resp_len = OCSP_MAX_RESP_LENGTH; rctx->mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); rctx->io = io; if (maxline > 0) rctx->iobuflen = maxline; else rctx->iobuflen = OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN; rctx->iobuf = OPENSSL_malloc(rctx->iobuflen); if (rctx->iobuf == NULL || rctx->mem == NULL) { OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx); return NULL; } return rctx; } void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx) { if (!rctx) return; BIO_free(rctx->mem); OPENSSL_free(rctx->iobuf); OPENSSL_free(rctx); } BIO *OCSP_REQ_CTX_get0_mem_bio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx) { return rctx->mem; } void OCSP_set_max_response_length(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, unsigned long len) { if (len == 0) rctx->max_resp_len = OCSP_MAX_RESP_LENGTH; else rctx->max_resp_len = len; } int OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_VALUE *val) { static const char req_hdr[] = "Content-Type: application/ocsp-request\r\n" "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n"; int reqlen = ASN1_item_i2d(val, NULL, it); if (BIO_printf(rctx->mem, req_hdr, reqlen) <= 0) return 0; if (ASN1_item_i2d_bio(it, rctx->mem, val) <= 0) return 0; rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT; return 1; } int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { int rv, len; const unsigned char *p; rv = OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio(rctx); if (rv != 1) return rv; len = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); *pval = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, len, it); if (*pval == NULL) { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } int OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *op, const char *path) { static const char http_hdr[] = "%s %s HTTP/1.0\r\n"; if (!path) path = "/"; if (BIO_printf(rctx->mem, http_hdr, op, path) <= 0) return 0; rctx->state = OHS_HTTP_HEADER; return 1; } int OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, OCSP_REQUEST *req) { return OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(rctx, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQUEST), (ASN1_VALUE *)req); } int OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *name, const char *value) { if (!name) return 0; if (BIO_puts(rctx->mem, name) <= 0) return 0; if (value) { if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, ": ", 2) != 2) return 0; if (BIO_puts(rctx->mem, value) <= 0) return 0; } if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, "\r\n", 2) != 2) return 0; rctx->state = OHS_HTTP_HEADER; return 1; } OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int maxline) { OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = NULL; rctx = OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(io, maxline); if (rctx == NULL) return NULL; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(rctx, "POST", path)) goto err; if (req && !OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(rctx, req)) goto err; return rctx; err: OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx); return NULL; } /* * Parse the HTTP response. This will look like this: "HTTP/1.0 200 OK". We * need to obtain the numeric code and (optional) informational message. */ static int parse_http_line1(char *line) { int retcode; char *p, *q, *r; /* Skip to first white space (passed protocol info) */ for (p = line; *p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p); p++) continue; if (!*p) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); return 0; } /* Skip past white space to start of response code */ while (*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++; if (!*p) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); return 0; } /* Find end of response code: first whitespace after start of code */ for (q = p; *q && !isspace((unsigned char)*q); q++) continue; if (!*q) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR); return 0; } /* Set end of response code and start of message */ *q++ = 0; /* Attempt to parse numeric code */ retcode = strtoul(p, &r, 10); if (*r) return 0; /* Skip over any leading white space in message */ while (*q && isspace((unsigned char)*q)) q++; if (*q) { /* * Finally zap any trailing white space in message (include CRLF) */ /* We know q has a non white space character so this is OK */ for (r = q + strlen(q) - 1; isspace((unsigned char)*r); r--) *r = 0; } if (retcode != 200) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1, OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR); if (!*q) ERR_add_error_data(2, "Code=", p); else ERR_add_error_data(4, "Code=", p, ",Reason=", q); return 0; } return 1; } int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx) { int i, n; const unsigned char *p; next_io: if (!(rctx->state & OHS_NOREAD)) { n = BIO_read(rctx->io, rctx->iobuf, rctx->iobuflen); if (n <= 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io)) return -1; return 0; } /* Write data to memory BIO */ if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, rctx->iobuf, n) != n) return 0; } switch (rctx->state) { case OHS_HTTP_HEADER: /* Last operation was adding headers: need a final \r\n */ if (BIO_write(rctx->mem, "\r\n", 2) != 2) { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT; /* fall thru */ case OHS_ASN1_WRITE_INIT: rctx->asn1_len = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, NULL); rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_WRITE; /* fall thru */ case OHS_ASN1_WRITE: n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); i = BIO_write(rctx->io, p + (n - rctx->asn1_len), rctx->asn1_len); if (i <= 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io)) return -1; rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } rctx->asn1_len -= i; if (rctx->asn1_len > 0) goto next_io; rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_FLUSH; (void)BIO_reset(rctx->mem); /* fall thru */ case OHS_ASN1_FLUSH: i = BIO_flush(rctx->io); if (i > 0) { rctx->state = OHS_FIRSTLINE; goto next_io; } if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->io)) return -1; rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; case OHS_ERROR: return 0; case OHS_FIRSTLINE: case OHS_HEADERS: /* Attempt to read a line in */ next_line: /* * Due to &%^*$" memory BIO behaviour with BIO_gets we have to check * there's a complete line in there before calling BIO_gets or we'll * just get a partial read. */ n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); if ((n <= 0) || !memchr(p, '\n', n)) { if (n >= rctx->iobuflen) { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } goto next_io; } n = BIO_gets(rctx->mem, (char *)rctx->iobuf, rctx->iobuflen); if (n <= 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(rctx->mem)) goto next_io; rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } /* Don't allow excessive lines */ if (n == rctx->iobuflen) { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } /* First line */ if (rctx->state == OHS_FIRSTLINE) { if (parse_http_line1((char *)rctx->iobuf)) { rctx->state = OHS_HEADERS; goto next_line; } else { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } } else { /* Look for blank line: end of headers */ for (p = rctx->iobuf; *p; p++) { if ((*p != '\r') && (*p != '\n')) break; } if (*p) goto next_line; rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_HEADER; } /* Fall thru */ case OHS_ASN1_HEADER: /* * Now reading ASN1 header: can read at least 2 bytes which is enough * for ASN1 SEQUENCE header and either length field or at least the * length of the length field. */ n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, &p); if (n < 2) goto next_io; /* Check it is an ASN1 SEQUENCE */ if (*p++ != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } /* Check out length field */ if (*p & 0x80) { /* * If MSB set on initial length octet we can now always read 6 * octets: make sure we have them. */ if (n < 6) goto next_io; n = *p & 0x7F; /* Not NDEF or excessive length */ if (!n || (n > 4)) { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } p++; rctx->asn1_len = 0; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { rctx->asn1_len <<= 8; rctx->asn1_len |= *p++; } if (rctx->asn1_len > rctx->max_resp_len) { rctx->state = OHS_ERROR; return 0; } rctx->asn1_len += n + 2; } else rctx->asn1_len = *p + 2; rctx->state = OHS_ASN1_CONTENT; /* Fall thru */ case OHS_ASN1_CONTENT: n = BIO_get_mem_data(rctx->mem, NULL); if (n < (int)rctx->asn1_len) goto next_io; rctx->state = OHS_DONE; return 1; case OHS_DONE: return 1; } return 0; } int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx) { return OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(rctx, (ASN1_VALUE **)presp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPONSE)); } /* Blocking OCSP request handler: now a special case of non-blocking I/O */ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req) { OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx; int rv; ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(b, path, req, -1); if (ctx == NULL) return NULL; do { rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx); } while ((rv == -1) && BIO_should_retry(b)); OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx); if (rv) return resp; return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_asn.c0000644000000000000000000001215213176625657016321 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "ocsp_lcl.h" ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_SIGNATURE) = { ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_SIGNATURE, signatureAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SIGNATURE, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_SIGNATURE, certs, X509, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_SIGNATURE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SIGNATURE) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_CERTID) = { ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, issuerNameHash, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, issuerKeyHash, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_CERTID, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_CERTID) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTID) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_ONEREQ) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_ONEREQ, reqCert, OCSP_CERTID), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_ONEREQ, singleRequestExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_ONEREQ) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_ONEREQ) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_REQINFO) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REQINFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REQINFO, requestorName, GENERAL_NAME, 1), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(OCSP_REQINFO, requestList, OCSP_ONEREQ), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_REQINFO, requestExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 2) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_REQINFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQINFO) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_REQUEST) = { ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_REQUEST, tbsRequest, OCSP_REQINFO), ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REQUEST, optionalSignature, OCSP_SIGNATURE, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_REQUEST) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQUEST) /* OCSP_RESPONSE templates */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_RESPBYTES) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPBYTES, responseType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPBYTES, response, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_RESPBYTES) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPBYTES) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_RESPONSE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPONSE, responseStatus, ASN1_ENUMERATED), ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_RESPONSE, responseBytes, OCSP_RESPBYTES, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_RESPONSE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPONSE) ASN1_CHOICE(OCSP_RESPID) = { ASN1_EXP(OCSP_RESPID, value.byName, X509_NAME, 1), ASN1_EXP(OCSP_RESPID, value.byKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 2) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(OCSP_RESPID) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, revocationTime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, revocationReason, ASN1_ENUMERATED, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO) ASN1_CHOICE(OCSP_CERTSTATUS) = { ASN1_IMP(OCSP_CERTSTATUS, value.good, ASN1_NULL, 0), ASN1_IMP(OCSP_CERTSTATUS, value.revoked, OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, 1), ASN1_IMP(OCSP_CERTSTATUS, value.unknown, ASN1_NULL, 2) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(OCSP_CERTSTATUS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTSTATUS) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_SINGLERESP) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SINGLERESP, certId, OCSP_CERTID), ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SINGLERESP, certStatus, OCSP_CERTSTATUS), ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SINGLERESP, thisUpdate, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_SINGLERESP, nextUpdate, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 0), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_SINGLERESP, singleExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_SINGLERESP) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SINGLERESP) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_RESPDATA) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_RESPDATA, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_RESPDATA, responderId, OCSP_RESPID), ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_RESPDATA, producedAt, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(OCSP_RESPDATA, responses, OCSP_SINGLERESP), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_RESPDATA, responseExtensions, X509_EXTENSION, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_RESPDATA) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPDATA) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_BASICRESP) = { ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_BASICRESP, tbsResponseData, OCSP_RESPDATA), ASN1_EMBED(OCSP_BASICRESP, signatureAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_BASICRESP, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_BASICRESP, certs, X509, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_BASICRESP) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_BASICRESP) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_CRLID) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_CRLID, crlUrl, ASN1_IA5STRING, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_CRLID, crlNum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1), ASN1_EXP_OPT(OCSP_CRLID, crlTime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 2) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_CRLID) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CRLID) ASN1_SEQUENCE(OCSP_SERVICELOC) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(OCSP_SERVICELOC, issuer, X509_NAME), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OCSP_SERVICELOC, locator, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OCSP_SERVICELOC) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SERVICELOC) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657015026 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657016642 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/bn_srp.h0000644000000000000000000000133113176625657020274 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP extern const BIGNUM bn_group_1024; extern const BIGNUM bn_group_1536; extern const BIGNUM bn_group_2048; extern const BIGNUM bn_group_3072; extern const BIGNUM bn_group_4096; extern const BIGNUM bn_group_6144; extern const BIGNUM bn_group_8192; extern const BIGNUM bn_generator_19; extern const BIGNUM bn_generator_5; extern const BIGNUM bn_generator_2; #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/evp_int.h0000644000000000000000000003625213176625657020467 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ struct evp_pkey_ctx_st { /* Method associated with this operation */ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth; /* Engine that implements this method or NULL if builtin */ ENGINE *engine; /* Key: may be NULL */ EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* Peer key for key agreement, may be NULL */ EVP_PKEY *peerkey; /* Actual operation */ int operation; /* Algorithm specific data */ void *data; /* Application specific data */ void *app_data; /* Keygen callback */ EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *pkey_gencb; /* implementation specific keygen data */ int *keygen_info; int keygen_info_count; } /* EVP_PKEY_CTX */ ; #define EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC 1 struct evp_pkey_method_st { int pkey_id; int flags; int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src); void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*encrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen); int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2); int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value); } /* EVP_PKEY_METHOD */ ; DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(EVP_PKEY_METHOD) void evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(BN_GENCB *cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD cmac_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dhx_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dsa_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ecx25519_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hmac_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth; struct evp_md_st { int type; int pkey_type; int md_size; unsigned long flags; int (*init) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count); int (*final) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); int (*copy) (EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); int (*cleanup) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int block_size; int ctx_size; /* how big does the ctx->md_data need to be */ /* control function */ int (*md_ctrl) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2); } /* EVP_MD */ ; struct evp_cipher_st { int nid; int block_size; /* Default value for variable length ciphers */ int key_len; int iv_len; /* Various flags */ unsigned long flags; /* init key */ int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); /* encrypt/decrypt data */ int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); /* cleanup ctx */ int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); /* how big ctx->cipher_data needs to be */ int ctx_size; /* Populate a ASN1_TYPE with parameters */ int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *); /* Get parameters from a ASN1_TYPE */ int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *); /* Miscellaneous operations */ int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); /* Application data */ void *app_data; } /* EVP_CIPHER */ ; /* Macros to code block cipher wrappers */ /* Wrapper functions for each cipher mode */ #define EVP_C_DATA(kstruct, ctx) \ ((kstruct *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop() \ size_t i, bl; \ bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)->block_size; \ if (inl < bl) return 1;\ inl -= bl; \ for (i=0; i <= inl; i+=bl) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ecb(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \ static int cname##_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \ {\ BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop() \ cprefix##_ecb_encrypt(in + i, out + i, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); \ return 1;\ } #define EVP_MAXCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(long)*8-2)) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ofb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \ static int cname##_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \ {\ while(inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK) {\ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);\ cprefix##_ofb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);\ inl-=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\ in +=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\ out+=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\ }\ if (inl) {\ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);\ cprefix##_ofb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); \ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);\ }\ return 1;\ } #define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cbc(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \ static int cname##_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \ {\ while(inl>=EVP_MAXCHUNK) \ {\ cprefix##_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));\ inl-=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\ in +=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\ out+=EVP_MAXCHUNK;\ }\ if (inl)\ cprefix##_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct,ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));\ return 1;\ } #define BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \ static int cname##_cfb##cbits##_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) \ {\ size_t chunk = EVP_MAXCHUNK;\ if (cbits == 1) chunk >>= 3;\ if (inl < chunk) chunk = inl;\ while (inl && inl >= chunk)\ {\ int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);\ cprefix##_cfb##cbits##_encrypt(in, out, (long) \ ((cbits == 1) \ && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS) \ ? inl*8 : inl), \ &EVP_C_DATA(kstruct, ctx)->ksched, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),\ &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx));\ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);\ inl -= chunk;\ in += chunk;\ out += chunk;\ if (inl < chunk) chunk = inl;\ }\ return 1;\ } #define BLOCK_CIPHER_all_funcs(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cbc(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ecb(cname, cprefix, kstruct, ksched) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ofb(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, nmode, mode, MODE, kstruct, nid, block_size, \ key_len, iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, \ set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_##mode = { \ nid##_##nmode, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \ flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ init_key, \ cname##_##mode##_cipher, \ cleanup, \ sizeof(kstruct), \ set_asn1, get_asn1,\ ctrl, \ NULL \ }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_##mode(void) { return &cname##_##mode; } #define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cbc(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \ iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \ get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, cbc, cbc, CBC, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \ iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, \ iv_len, cbits, flags, init_key, cleanup, \ set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, cfb##cbits, cfb##cbits, CFB, kstruct, nid, 1, \ key_len, iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \ get_asn1, ctrl) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ofb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, \ iv_len, cbits, flags, init_key, cleanup, \ set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, ofb##cbits, ofb, OFB, kstruct, nid, 1, \ key_len, iv_len, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \ get_asn1, ctrl) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ecb(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \ flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \ get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def1(cname, ecb, ecb, ECB, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, \ 0, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) #define BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(cname, kstruct, \ nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, cbits, flags, \ init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cbc(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, flags, \ init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, iv_len, cbits, \ flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ofb(cname, kstruct, nid, key_len, iv_len, cbits, \ flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ecb(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, flags, \ init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) /*- #define BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(cname, kstruct, \ nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, flags,\ init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl)\ static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_cbc = {\ nid##_cbc, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \ flags | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,\ init_key,\ cname##_cbc_cipher,\ cleanup,\ sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\ sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\ set_asn1, get_asn1,\ ctrl, \ NULL \ };\ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_cbc(void) { return &cname##_cbc; }\ static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_cfb = {\ nid##_cfb64, 1, key_len, iv_len, \ flags | EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE,\ init_key,\ cname##_cfb_cipher,\ cleanup,\ sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\ sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\ set_asn1, get_asn1,\ ctrl,\ NULL \ };\ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_cfb(void) { return &cname##_cfb; }\ static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_ofb = {\ nid##_ofb64, 1, key_len, iv_len, \ flags | EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE,\ init_key,\ cname##_ofb_cipher,\ cleanup,\ sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\ sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\ set_asn1, get_asn1,\ ctrl,\ NULL \ };\ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_ofb(void) { return &cname##_ofb; }\ static const EVP_CIPHER cname##_ecb = {\ nid##_ecb, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \ flags | EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,\ init_key,\ cname##_ecb_cipher,\ cleanup,\ sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)-sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c))+\ sizeof((((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)NULL)->c.kstruct)),\ set_asn1, get_asn1,\ ctrl,\ NULL \ };\ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_##cname##_ecb(void) { return &cname##_ecb; } */ #define IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(cname, ksched, cprefix, kstruct, nid, \ block_size, key_len, iv_len, cbits, \ flags, init_key, \ cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_all_funcs(cname, cprefix, cbits, kstruct, ksched) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, \ cbits, flags, init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, \ get_asn1, ctrl) #define IMPLEMENT_CFBR(cipher,cprefix,kstruct,ksched,keysize,cbits,iv_len,fl) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(cipher##_##keysize,cprefix,cbits,kstruct,ksched) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(cipher##_##keysize,kstruct, \ NID_##cipher##_##keysize, keysize/8, iv_len, cbits, \ (fl)|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, \ cipher##_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) /* * Type needs to be a bit field Sub-type needs to be for variations on the * method, as in, can it do arbitrary encryption.... */ struct evp_pkey_st { int type; int save_type; int references; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *engine; ENGINE *pmeth_engine; /* If not NULL public key ENGINE to use */ union { void *ptr; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA struct rsa_st *rsa; /* RSA */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA struct dsa_st *dsa; /* DSA */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH struct dh_st *dh; /* DH */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC struct ec_key_st *ec; /* ECC */ # endif } pkey; int save_parameters; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; /* [ 0 ] */ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; } /* EVP_PKEY */ ; void openssl_add_all_ciphers_int(void); void openssl_add_all_digests_int(void); void evp_cleanup_int(void); /* Pulling defines out of C soure files */ #define EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE 16 #ifndef TLS1_1_VERSION # define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302 #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/err_int.h0000644000000000000000000000075413176625657020463 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef INTERNAL_ERR_INT_H # define INTERNAL_ERR_INT_H int err_load_crypto_strings_int(void); void err_cleanup(void); void err_delete_thread_state(void); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in0000644000000000000000000000155113176625657021026 0ustar rootroot{- join("\n",map { "/* $_ */" } @autowarntext) -} /* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_BN_CONF_H # define HEADER_BN_CONF_H /* * The contents of this file are not used in the UEFI build, as * both 32-bit and 64-bit builds are supported from a single run * of the Configure script. */ /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ /* Only one for the following should be defined */ {- $config{b64l} ? "#define" : "#undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG {- $config{b64} ? "#define" : "#undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT {- $config{b32} ? "#define" : "#undef" -} THIRTY_TWO_BIT #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/objects.h0000644000000000000000000000060313176625657020443 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include void obj_cleanup_int(void); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/rand.h0000644000000000000000000000122613176625657017740 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include void rand_cleanup_int(void); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/async.h0000644000000000000000000000062513176625657020133 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include int async_init(void); void async_deinit(void); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib_int.h0000644000000000000000000000160413176625657021516 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include /* This file is not scanned by mkdef.pl, whereas cryptlib.h is */ struct thread_local_inits_st { int async; int err_state; }; int ossl_init_thread_start(uint64_t opts); /* * OPENSSL_INIT flags. The primary list of these is in crypto.h. Flags below * are those omitted from crypto.h because they are "reserved for internal * use". */ # define OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB 0x00010000L /* OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD flags */ # define OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ASYNC 0x01 # define OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE 0x02 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h0000644000000000000000000002156013176625657020376 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Internal X509 structures and functions: not for application use */ /* Note: unless otherwise stated a field pointer is mandatory and should * never be set to NULL: the ASN.1 code and accessors rely on mandatory * fields never being NULL. */ /* * name entry structure, equivalent to AttributeTypeAndValue defined * in RFC5280 et al. */ struct X509_name_entry_st { ASN1_OBJECT *object; /* AttributeType */ ASN1_STRING *value; /* AttributeValue */ int set; /* index of RDNSequence for this entry */ int size; /* temp variable */ }; /* Name from RFC 5280. */ struct X509_name_st { STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries; /* DN components */ int modified; /* true if 'bytes' needs to be built */ BUF_MEM *bytes; /* cached encoding: cannot be NULL */ /* canonical encoding used for rapid Name comparison */ unsigned char *canon_enc; int canon_enclen; } /* X509_NAME */ ; /* PKCS#10 certificate request */ struct X509_req_info_st { ASN1_ENCODING enc; /* cached encoding of signed part */ ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version, defaults to v1(0) so can be NULL */ X509_NAME *subject; /* certificate request DN */ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey; /* public key of request */ /* * Zero or more attributes. * NB: although attributes is a mandatory field some broken * encodings omit it so this may be NULL in that case. */ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; }; struct X509_req_st { X509_REQ_INFO req_info; /* signed certificate request data */ X509_ALGOR sig_alg; /* signature algorithm */ ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; /* signature */ int references; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct X509_crl_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version: defaults to v1(0) so may be NULL */ X509_ALGOR sig_alg; /* signature algorithm */ X509_NAME *issuer; /* CRL issuer name */ ASN1_TIME *lastUpdate; /* lastUpdate field */ ASN1_TIME *nextUpdate; /* nextUpdate field: optional */ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked; /* revoked entries: optional */ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* extensions: optional */ ASN1_ENCODING enc; /* encoding of signed portion of CRL */ }; struct X509_crl_st { X509_CRL_INFO crl; /* signed CRL data */ X509_ALGOR sig_alg; /* CRL signature algorithm */ ASN1_BIT_STRING signature; /* CRL signature */ int references; int flags; /* * Cached copies of decoded extension values, since extensions * are optional any of these can be NULL. */ AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp; /* Convenient breakdown of IDP */ int idp_flags; int idp_reasons; /* CRL and base CRL numbers for delta processing */ ASN1_INTEGER *crl_number; ASN1_INTEGER *base_crl_number; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *issuers; /* hash of CRL */ unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* alternative method to handle this CRL */ const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth; void *meth_data; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct x509_revoked_st { ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber; /* revoked entry serial number */ ASN1_TIME *revocationDate; /* revocation date */ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* CRL entry extensions: optional */ /* decoded value of CRLissuer extension: set if indirect CRL */ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *issuer; /* revocation reason: set to CRL_REASON_NONE if reason extension absent */ int reason; /* * CRL entries are reordered for faster lookup of serial numbers. This * field contains the original load sequence for this entry. */ int sequence; }; /* * This stuff is certificate "auxiliary info": it contains details which are * useful in certificate stores and databases. When used this is tagged onto * the end of the certificate itself. OpenSSL specific structure not defined * in any RFC. */ struct x509_cert_aux_st { STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust; /* trusted uses */ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *reject; /* rejected uses */ ASN1_UTF8STRING *alias; /* "friendly name" */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid; /* key id of private key */ STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *other; /* other unspecified info */ }; struct x509_cinf_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* [ 0 ] default of v1 */ ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber; X509_ALGOR signature; X509_NAME *issuer; X509_VAL validity; X509_NAME *subject; X509_PUBKEY *key; ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerUID; /* [ 1 ] optional in v2 */ ASN1_BIT_STRING *subjectUID; /* [ 2 ] optional in v2 */ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* [ 3 ] optional in v3 */ ASN1_ENCODING enc; }; struct x509_st { X509_CINF cert_info; X509_ALGOR sig_alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING signature; int references; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* These contain copies of various extension values */ long ex_pathlen; long ex_pcpathlen; uint32_t ex_flags; uint32_t ex_kusage; uint32_t ex_xkusage; uint32_t ex_nscert; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid; AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache; STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altname; NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) *rfc3779_addr; struct ASIdentifiers_st *rfc3779_asid; # endif unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; X509_CERT_AUX *aux; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; } /* X509 */ ; /* * This is a used when verifying cert chains. Since the gathering of the * cert chain can take some time (and have to be 'retried', this needs to be * kept and passed around. */ struct x509_store_ctx_st { /* X509_STORE_CTX */ X509_STORE *ctx; /* The following are set by the caller */ /* The cert to check */ X509 *cert; /* chain of X509s - untrusted - passed in */ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted; /* set of CRLs passed in */ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; /* Other info for use with get_issuer() */ void *other_ctx; /* Callbacks for various operations */ /* called to verify a certificate */ int (*verify) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* error callback */ int (*verify_cb) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* get issuers cert from ctx */ int (*get_issuer) (X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); /* check issued */ int (*check_issued) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); /* Check revocation status of chain */ int (*check_revocation) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* retrieve CRL */ int (*get_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x); /* Check CRL validity */ int (*check_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl); /* Check certificate against CRL */ int (*cert_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); /* Check policy status of the chain */ int (*check_policy) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); STACK_OF(X509) *(*lookup_certs) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*lookup_crls) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); int (*cleanup) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* The following is built up */ /* if 0, rebuild chain */ int valid; /* number of untrusted certs */ int num_untrusted; /* chain of X509s - built up and trusted */ STACK_OF(X509) *chain; /* Valid policy tree */ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; /* Require explicit policy value */ int explicit_policy; /* When something goes wrong, this is why */ int error_depth; int error; X509 *current_cert; /* cert currently being tested as valid issuer */ X509 *current_issuer; /* current CRL */ X509_CRL *current_crl; /* score of current CRL */ int current_crl_score; /* Reason mask */ unsigned int current_reasons; /* For CRL path validation: parent context */ X509_STORE_CTX *parent; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; SSL_DANE *dane; /* signed via bare TA public key, rather than CA certificate */ int bare_ta_signed; }; /* PKCS#8 private key info structure */ struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; X509_ALGOR *pkeyalg; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkey; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; }; struct X509_sig_st { X509_ALGOR *algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest; }; struct x509_object_st { /* one of the above types */ X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type; union { char *ptr; X509 *x509; X509_CRL *crl; EVP_PKEY *pkey; } data; }; int a2i_ipadd(unsigned char *ipout, const char *ipasc); int x509_set1_time(ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/cryptlib.h0000644000000000000000000000436113176625657020647 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H # define HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H # include # include # include "e_os.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK # undef BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK # define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK 0x8000 # include "ms/uplink.h" # endif # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct ex_callback_st EX_CALLBACK; DEFINE_STACK_OF(EX_CALLBACK) typedef struct app_mem_info_st APP_INFO; typedef struct mem_st MEM; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(MEM); # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # define X509_CERT_AREA OPENSSLDIR # define X509_CERT_DIR OPENSSLDIR "/certs" # define X509_CERT_FILE OPENSSLDIR "/cert.pem" # define X509_PRIVATE_DIR OPENSSLDIR "/private" # define CTLOG_FILE OPENSSLDIR "/ct_log_list.cnf" # else # define X509_CERT_AREA "OSSL$DATAROOT:[000000]" # define X509_CERT_DIR "OSSL$DATAROOT:[CERTS]" # define X509_CERT_FILE "OSSL$DATAROOT:[000000]cert.pem" # define X509_PRIVATE_DIR "OSSL$DATAROOT:[PRIVATE]" # define CTLOG_FILE "OSSL$DATAROOT:[000000]ct_log_list.cnf" # endif # define X509_CERT_DIR_EVP "SSL_CERT_DIR" # define X509_CERT_FILE_EVP "SSL_CERT_FILE" # define CTLOG_FILE_EVP "CTLOG_FILE" /* size of string representations */ # define DECIMAL_SIZE(type) ((sizeof(type)*8+2)/3+1) # define HEX_SIZE(type) (sizeof(type)*2) void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void); extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...); extern int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated; void crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int(void); int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char *buf, size_t buflen); # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) FILE *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode); # else void *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode); # endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/engine.h0000644000000000000000000000124013176625657020255 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include void engine_load_openssl_int(void); void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void); void engine_load_rdrand_int(void); void engine_load_dynamic_int(void); void engine_load_padlock_int(void); void engine_load_capi_int(void); void engine_load_dasync_int(void); void engine_load_afalg_int(void); void engine_cleanup_int(void); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/md32_common.h0000644000000000000000000003301513176625657021132 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * This is a generic 32 bit "collector" for message digest algorithms. * Whenever needed it collects input character stream into chunks of * 32 bit values and invokes a block function that performs actual hash * calculations. * * Porting guide. * * Obligatory macros: * * DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN or DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN * this macro defines byte order of input stream. * HASH_CBLOCK * size of a unit chunk HASH_BLOCK operates on. * HASH_LONG * has to be at lest 32 bit wide. * HASH_CTX * context structure that at least contains following * members: * typedef struct { * ... * HASH_LONG Nl,Nh; * either { * HASH_LONG data[HASH_LBLOCK]; * unsigned char data[HASH_CBLOCK]; * }; * unsigned int num; * ... * } HASH_CTX; * data[] vector is expected to be zeroed upon first call to * HASH_UPDATE. * HASH_UPDATE * name of "Update" function, implemented here. * HASH_TRANSFORM * name of "Transform" function, implemented here. * HASH_FINAL * name of "Final" function, implemented here. * HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER * name of "block" function capable of treating *unaligned* input * message in original (data) byte order, implemented externally. * HASH_MAKE_STRING * macro convering context variables to an ASCII hash string. * * MD5 example: * * #define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN * * #define HASH_LONG MD5_LONG * #define HASH_CTX MD5_CTX * #define HASH_CBLOCK MD5_CBLOCK * #define HASH_UPDATE MD5_Update * #define HASH_TRANSFORM MD5_Transform * #define HASH_FINAL MD5_Final * #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER md5_block_data_order * * */ #include #if !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) && !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) # error "DATA_ORDER must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_CBLOCK # error "HASH_CBLOCK must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_LONG # error "HASH_LONG must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_CTX # error "HASH_CTX must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_UPDATE # error "HASH_UPDATE must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_TRANSFORM # error "HASH_TRANSFORM must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_FINAL # error "HASH_FINAL must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER # error "HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER must be defined!" #endif /* * Engage compiler specific rotate intrinsic function if available. */ #undef ROTATE #ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(_MSC_VER) # define ROTATE(a,n) _lrotl(a,n) # elif defined(__ICC) # define ROTATE(a,n) _rotl(a,n) # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) /* * Some GNU C inline assembler templates. Note that these are * rotates by *constant* number of bits! But that's exactly * what we need here... * */ # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ( \ "roll %1,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "I"(n), "0"((unsigned int)(a)) \ : "cc"); \ ret; \ }) # elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) || defined(_ARCH_PPC64) || \ defined(__powerpc) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(__powerpc64__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ( \ "rlwinm %0,%1,%2,0,31" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "I"(n)); \ ret; \ }) # elif defined(__s390x__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ("rll %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "I"(n)); \ ret; \ }) # endif # endif #endif /* PEDANTIC */ #ifndef ROTATE # define ROTATE(a,n) (((a)<<(n))|(((a)&0xffffffff)>>(32-(n)))) #endif #if defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) # ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if ((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY)) || \ (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) # if !defined(B_ENDIAN) /* * This gives ~30-40% performance improvement in SHA-256 compiled * with gcc [on P4]. Well, first macro to be frank. We can pull * this trick on x86* platforms only, because these CPUs can fetch * unaligned data without raising an exception. */ # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ({ unsigned int r=*((const unsigned int *)(c)); \ asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); \ (c)+=4; (l)=r; }) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) ({ unsigned int r=(l); \ asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); \ *((unsigned int *)(c))=r; (c)+=4; r; }) # endif # elif defined(__aarch64__) # if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) # if defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ({ unsigned int r; \ asm ("rev %w0,%w1" \ :"=r"(r) \ :"r"(*((const unsigned int *)(c))));\ (c)+=4; (l)=r; }) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) ({ unsigned int r; \ asm ("rev %w0,%w1" \ :"=r"(r) \ :"r"((unsigned int)(l)));\ *((unsigned int *)(c))=r; (c)+=4; r; }) # elif defined(__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) && __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, (l)) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, (l)) # endif # endif # endif # endif # if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, (l)) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, (l)) # endif # endif # ifndef HOST_c2l # define HOST_c2l(c,l) (l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) ) ) # endif # ifndef HOST_l2c # define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ l) # endif #elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) # ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if defined(__s390x__) # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ({ asm ("lrv %0,%1" \ :"=d"(l) :"m"(*(const unsigned int *)(c)));\ (c)+=4; (l); }) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) ({ asm ("strv %1,%0" \ :"=m"(*(unsigned int *)(c)) :"d"(l));\ (c)+=4; (l); }) # endif # endif # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # ifndef B_ENDIAN /* See comment in DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN section. */ # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, l) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, l) # endif # endif # endif # ifndef HOST_c2l # define HOST_c2l(c,l) (l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) ), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24) ) # endif # ifndef HOST_l2c # define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ l) # endif #endif /* * Time for some action:-) */ int HASH_UPDATE(HASH_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t len) { const unsigned char *data = data_; unsigned char *p; HASH_LONG l; size_t n; if (len == 0) return 1; l = (c->Nl + (((HASH_LONG) len) << 3)) & 0xffffffffUL; /* * 95-05-24 eay Fixed a bug with the overflow handling, thanks to Wei Dai * for pointing it out. */ if (l < c->Nl) /* overflow */ c->Nh++; c->Nh += (HASH_LONG) (len >> 29); /* might cause compiler warning on * 16-bit */ c->Nl = l; n = c->num; if (n != 0) { p = (unsigned char *)c->data; if (len >= HASH_CBLOCK || len + n >= HASH_CBLOCK) { memcpy(p + n, data, HASH_CBLOCK - n); HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, p, 1); n = HASH_CBLOCK - n; data += n; len -= n; c->num = 0; /* * We use memset rather than OPENSSL_cleanse() here deliberately. * Using OPENSSL_cleanse() here could be a performance issue. It * will get properly cleansed on finalisation so this isn't a * security problem. */ memset(p, 0, HASH_CBLOCK); /* keep it zeroed */ } else { memcpy(p + n, data, len); c->num += (unsigned int)len; return 1; } } n = len / HASH_CBLOCK; if (n > 0) { HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, data, n); n *= HASH_CBLOCK; data += n; len -= n; } if (len != 0) { p = (unsigned char *)c->data; c->num = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(p, data, len); } return 1; } void HASH_TRANSFORM(HASH_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data) { HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, data, 1); } int HASH_FINAL(unsigned char *md, HASH_CTX *c) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)c->data; size_t n = c->num; p[n] = 0x80; /* there is always room for one */ n++; if (n > (HASH_CBLOCK - 8)) { memset(p + n, 0, HASH_CBLOCK - n); n = 0; HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, p, 1); } memset(p + n, 0, HASH_CBLOCK - 8 - n); p += HASH_CBLOCK - 8; #if defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nh, p); (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nl, p); #elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nl, p); (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nh, p); #endif p -= HASH_CBLOCK; HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER(c, p, 1); c->num = 0; OPENSSL_cleanse(p, HASH_CBLOCK); #ifndef HASH_MAKE_STRING # error "HASH_MAKE_STRING must be defined!" #else HASH_MAKE_STRING(c, md); #endif return 1; } #ifndef MD32_REG_T # if defined(__alpha) || defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__mips) # define MD32_REG_T long /* * This comment was originally written for MD5, which is why it * discusses A-D. But it basically applies to all 32-bit digests, * which is why it was moved to common header file. * * In case you wonder why A-D are declared as long and not * as MD5_LONG. Doing so results in slight performance * boost on LP64 architectures. The catch is we don't * really care if 32 MSBs of a 64-bit register get polluted * with eventual overflows as we *save* only 32 LSBs in * *either* case. Now declaring 'em long excuses the compiler * from keeping 32 MSBs zeroed resulting in 13% performance * improvement under SPARC Solaris7/64 and 5% under AlphaLinux. * Well, to be honest it should say that this *prevents* * performance degradation. * */ # else /* * Above is not absolute and there are LP64 compilers that * generate better code if MD32_REG_T is defined int. The above * pre-processor condition reflects the circumstances under which * the conclusion was made and is subject to further extension. * */ # define MD32_REG_T int # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/bn_dh.h0000644000000000000000000000112113176625657020060 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define declare_dh_bn(x) \ extern const BIGNUM _bignum_dh##x##_p; \ extern const BIGNUM _bignum_dh##x##_g; \ extern const BIGNUM _bignum_dh##x##_q; declare_dh_bn(1024_160) declare_dh_bn(2048_224) declare_dh_bn(2048_256) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/chacha.h0000644000000000000000000000326113176625657020224 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CHACHA_H #define HEADER_CHACHA_H #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * ChaCha20_ctr32 encrypts |len| bytes from |inp| with the given key and * nonce and writes the result to |out|, which may be equal to |inp|. * The |key| is not 32 bytes of verbatim key material though, but the * said material collected into 8 32-bit elements array in host byte * order. Same approach applies to nonce: the |counter| argument is * pointer to concatenated nonce and counter values collected into 4 * 32-bit elements. This, passing crypto material collected into 32-bit * elements as opposite to passing verbatim byte vectors, is chosen for * efficiency in multi-call scenarios. */ void ChaCha20_ctr32(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, const unsigned int key[8], const unsigned int counter[4]); /* * You can notice that there is no key setup procedure. Because it's * as trivial as collecting bytes into 32-bit elements, it's reckoned * that below macro is sufficient. */ #define CHACHA_U8TOU32(p) ( \ ((unsigned int)(p)[0]) | ((unsigned int)(p)[1]<<8) | \ ((unsigned int)(p)[2]<<16) | ((unsigned int)(p)[3]<<24) ) #define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 32 #define CHACHA_CTR_SIZE 16 #define CHACHA_BLK_SIZE 64 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/poly1305.h0000644000000000000000000000122413176625657020306 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE 16 typedef struct poly1305_context POLY1305; size_t Poly1305_ctx_size(void); void Poly1305_Init(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]); void Poly1305_Update(POLY1305 *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len); void Poly1305_Final(POLY1305 *ctx, unsigned char mac[16]); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in0000644000000000000000000000075613176625657021222 0ustar rootroot{- join("\n",map { "/* $_ */" } @autowarntext) -} /* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_DSO_CONF_H # define HEADER_DSO_CONF_H # define DSO_EXTENSION "{- $target{dso_extension} -}" #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/asn1_int.h0000644000000000000000000000753113176625657020535 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Internal ASN1 structures and functions: not for application use */ /* ASN1 public key method structure */ struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st { int pkey_id; int pkey_base_id; unsigned long pkey_flags; char *pem_str; char *info; int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub); int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf); int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen); int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder); int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from); int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); int (*sig_print) (BIO *out, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey); int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2); /* Legacy functions for old PEM */ int (*old_priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen); int (*old_priv_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder); /* Custom ASN1 signature verification */ int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig); } /* EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD */ ; DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD) extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD cmac_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[5]; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ecx25519_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth; extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2]; /* * These are used internally in the ASN1_OBJECT to keep track of whether the * names and data need to be free()ed */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC 0x01/* internal use */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_CRITICAL 0x02/* critical x509v3 object id */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS 0x04/* internal use */ # define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA 0x08/* internal use */ struct asn1_object_st { const char *sn, *ln; int nid; int length; const unsigned char *data; /* data remains const after init */ int flags; /* Should we free this one */ }; /* ASN1 print context structure */ struct asn1_pctx_st { unsigned long flags; unsigned long nm_flags; unsigned long cert_flags; unsigned long oid_flags; unsigned long str_flags; } /* ASN1_PCTX */ ; int asn1_valid_host(const ASN1_STRING *host); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h0000644000000000000000000000435713176625657020275 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_BN_INT_H # define HEADER_BN_INT_H # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int words); BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words); void bn_correct_top(BIGNUM *a); /* * Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'. * This is an array r[] of values that are either zero or odd with an * absolute value less than 2^w satisfying scalar = \sum_j r[j]*2^j where at * most one of any w+1 consecutive digits is non-zero with the exception that * the most significant digit may be only w-1 zeros away from that next * non-zero digit. */ signed char *bn_compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len); int bn_get_top(const BIGNUM *a); void bn_set_top(BIGNUM *a, int top); int bn_get_dmax(const BIGNUM *a); /* Set all words to zero */ void bn_set_all_zero(BIGNUM *a); /* * Copy the internal BIGNUM words into out which holds size elements (and size * must be bigger than top) */ int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, const BIGNUM *in, int size); BN_ULONG *bn_get_words(const BIGNUM *a); /* * Set the internal data words in a to point to words which contains size * elements. The BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA flag is set */ void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int size); /* * Copy words into the BIGNUM |a|, reallocating space as necessary. * The negative flag of |a| is not modified. * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ /* * |num_words| is int because bn_expand2 takes an int. This is an internal * function so we simply trust callers not to pass negative values. */ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG *words, int num_words); size_t bn_sizeof_BIGNUM(void); /* * Return element el from an array of BIGNUMs starting at base (required * because callers do not know the size of BIGNUM at compilation time) */ BIGNUM *bn_array_el(BIGNUM *base, int el); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/sparcv9cap.c0000644000000000000000000002474013176625660015623 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sparc_arch.h" #if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__linux) __attribute__ ((visibility("hidden"))) #endif unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[2] = { SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED, 0 }; int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num) { int bn_mul_mont_vis3(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); int bn_mul_mont_fpu(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); int bn_mul_mont_int(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); if (!(num & 1) && num >= 6) { if ((num & 15) == 0 && num <= 64 && (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) == (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) { typedef int (*bn_mul_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); int bn_mul_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0); static const bn_mul_mont_f funcs[4] = { bn_mul_mont_t4_8, bn_mul_mont_t4_16, bn_mul_mont_t4_24, bn_mul_mont_t4_32 }; bn_mul_mont_f worker = funcs[num / 16 - 1]; if ((*worker) (rp, ap, bp, np, n0)) return 1; /* retry once and fall back */ if ((*worker) (rp, ap, bp, np, n0)) return 1; return bn_mul_mont_vis3(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); } if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3)) return bn_mul_mont_vis3(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); else if (num >= 8 && /* * bn_mul_mont_fpu doesn't use FMADD, we just use the * flag to detect when FPU path is preferable in cases * when current heuristics is unreliable. [it works * out because FMADD-capable processors where FPU * code path is undesirable are also VIS3-capable and * VIS3 code path takes precedence.] */ ( (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_FMADD) || (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU | SPARCV9_VIS1)) == (SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU | SPARCV9_VIS1) )) return bn_mul_mont_fpu(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); } return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num); } unsigned long _sparcv9_rdtick(void); void _sparcv9_vis1_probe(void); unsigned long _sparcv9_vis1_instrument(void); void _sparcv9_vis2_probe(void); void _sparcv9_fmadd_probe(void); unsigned long _sparcv9_rdcfr(void); void _sparcv9_vis3_probe(void); void _sparcv9_fjaesx_probe(void); unsigned long _sparcv9_random(void); size_t _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus(unsigned int *, size_t); size_t _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2(unsigned int *, size_t, size_t); unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void) { if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED) #if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4) return gethrtime(); #else return 0; #endif else return _sparcv9_rdtick(); } size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt) { if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED | SPARCV9_BLK)) == SPARCV9_BLK) return _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus(out, cnt); else return 0; } size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2(unsigned int *out, size_t cnt, size_t max) { if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & (SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED | SPARCV9_BLK)) == SPARCV9_BLK) return _sparcv9_vis1_instrument_bus2(out, cnt, max); else return 0; } static sigjmp_buf common_jmp; static void common_handler(int sig) { siglongjmp(common_jmp, sig); } #if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 extern unsigned int getisax(unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz) __attribute__ ((weak)); # elif defined(__SUNPRO_C) #pragma weak getisax extern unsigned int getisax(unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz); # else static unsigned int (*getisax) (unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz) = NULL; # endif #endif void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { char *e; struct sigaction common_act, ill_oact, bus_oact; sigset_t all_masked, oset; static int trigger = 0; if (trigger) return; trigger = 1; if ((e = getenv("OPENSSL_sparcv9cap"))) { OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] = strtoul(e, NULL, 0); if ((e = strchr(e, ':'))) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] = strtoul(e + 1, NULL, 0); return; } #if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4) if (getisax != NULL) { unsigned int vec[2] = { 0, 0 }; if (getisax (vec,2)) { if (vec[0]&0x00020) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS1; if (vec[0]&0x00040) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS2; if (vec[0]&0x00080) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_BLK; if (vec[0]&0x00100) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FMADD; if (vec[0]&0x00400) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS3; if (vec[0]&0x01000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJHPCACE; if (vec[0]&0x02000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJDESX; if (vec[0]&0x08000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_IMA; if (vec[0]&0x10000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJAESX; if (vec[1]&0x00008) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS4; /* reconstruct %cfr copy */ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] = (vec[0]>>17)&0x3ff; OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1]&CFR_MONTMUL)<<1; if (vec[0]&0x20000000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= CFR_CRC32C; if (vec[1]&0x00000020) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= CFR_XMPMUL; if (vec[1]&0x00000040) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= CFR_XMONTMUL|CFR_XMONTSQR; /* Some heuristics */ /* all known VIS2-capable CPUs have unprivileged tick counter */ if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]&SPARCV9_VIS2) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED; OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU; /* detect UltraSPARC-Tx, see sparccpud.S for details... */ if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]&SPARCV9_VIS1) && _sparcv9_vis1_instrument() >= 12) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~(SPARCV9_VIS1 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU); } if (sizeof(size_t) == 8) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK; return; } #endif /* Initial value, fits UltraSPARC-I&II... */ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] = SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU | SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED; sigfillset(&all_masked); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGTRAP); # ifdef SIGEMT sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGEMT); # endif sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGFPE); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGBUS); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGSEGV); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &all_masked, &oset); memset(&common_act, 0, sizeof(common_act)); common_act.sa_handler = common_handler; common_act.sa_mask = all_masked; sigaction(SIGILL, &common_act, &ill_oact); sigaction(SIGBUS, &common_act, &bus_oact); /* T1 fails 16-bit ldda [on * Linux] */ if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) { _sparcv9_rdtick(); OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED; } if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) { _sparcv9_vis1_probe(); OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS1 | SPARCV9_BLK; /* detect UltraSPARC-Tx, see sparccpud.S for details... */ if (_sparcv9_vis1_instrument() >= 12) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~(SPARCV9_VIS1 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU); else { _sparcv9_vis2_probe(); OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS2; } } if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) { _sparcv9_fmadd_probe(); OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FMADD; } /* * VIS3 flag is tested independently from VIS1, unlike VIS2 that is, * because VIS3 defines even integer instructions. */ if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) { _sparcv9_vis3_probe(); OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS3; } if (sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) { _sparcv9_fjaesx_probe(); OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FJAESX; } /* * In wait for better solution _sparcv9_rdcfr is masked by * VIS3 flag, because it goes to uninterruptable endless * loop on UltraSPARC II running Solaris. Things might be * different on Linux... */ if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3) && sigsetjmp(common_jmp, 1) == 0) { OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] = (unsigned int)_sparcv9_rdcfr(); } sigaction(SIGBUS, &bus_oact, NULL); sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_oact, NULL); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); if (sizeof(size_t) == 8) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK; # ifdef __linux else { int ret = syscall(340); if (ret >= 0 && ret & 1) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK; } # endif } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mem_dbg.c0000644000000000000000000004143313176625657015146 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include #include #include "internal/bio.h" #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE # include #endif /* * The state changes to CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON | CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE when * the application asks for it (usually after library initialisation for * which no book-keeping is desired). State CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON exists only * temporarily when the library thinks that certain allocations should not be * checked (e.g. the data structures used for memory checking). It is not * suitable as an initial state: the library will unexpectedly enable memory * checking when it executes one of those sections that want to disable * checking temporarily. State CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE without ..._ON makes * no sense whatsoever. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG static int mh_mode = CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG static unsigned long order = 0; /* number of memory requests */ /*- * For application-defined information (static C-string `info') * to be displayed in memory leak list. * Each thread has its own stack. For applications, there is * OPENSSL_mem_debug_push("...") to push an entry, * OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop() to pop an entry, */ struct app_mem_info_st { CRYPTO_THREAD_ID threadid; const char *file; int line; const char *info; struct app_mem_info_st *next; /* tail of thread's stack */ int references; }; static CRYPTO_ONCE memdbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *malloc_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *long_malloc_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL appinfokey; /* memory-block description */ struct mem_st { void *addr; int num; const char *file; int line; CRYPTO_THREAD_ID threadid; unsigned long order; time_t time; APP_INFO *app_info; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE void *array[30]; size_t array_siz; #endif }; static LHASH_OF(MEM) *mh = NULL; /* hash-table of memory requests (address as * key); access requires MALLOC2 lock */ /* num_disable > 0 iff mh_mode == CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON (w/o ..._ENABLE) */ static unsigned int num_disable = 0; /* * Valid iff num_disable > 0. long_malloc_lock is locked exactly in this * case (by the thread named in disabling_thread). */ static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID disabling_threadid; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_memdbg_init) { malloc_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); long_malloc_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (malloc_lock == NULL || long_malloc_lock == NULL || !CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&appinfokey, NULL)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(malloc_lock); malloc_lock = NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(long_malloc_lock); long_malloc_lock = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } static void app_info_free(APP_INFO *inf) { if (!inf) return; if (--(inf->references) <= 0) { app_info_free(inf->next); OPENSSL_free(inf); } } #endif int CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(int mode) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG return mode - mode; #else int ret = mh_mode; if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init)) return -1; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(malloc_lock); switch (mode) { default: break; case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON: mh_mode = CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON | CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE; num_disable = 0; break; case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF: mh_mode = 0; num_disable = 0; break; /* switch off temporarily (for library-internal use): */ case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE: if (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) { CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); /* see if we don't have long_malloc_lock already */ if (!num_disable || !CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(disabling_threadid, cur)) { /* * Long-time lock long_malloc_lock must not be claimed * while we're holding malloc_lock, or we'll deadlock * if somebody else holds long_malloc_lock (and cannot * release it because we block entry to this function). Give * them a chance, first, and then claim the locks in * appropriate order (long-time lock first). */ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock); /* * Note that after we have waited for long_malloc_lock and * malloc_lock, we'll still be in the right "case" and * "if" branch because MemCheck_start and MemCheck_stop may * never be used while there are multiple OpenSSL threads. */ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(long_malloc_lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(malloc_lock); mh_mode &= ~CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE; disabling_threadid = cur; } num_disable++; } break; case CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE: if (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) { if (num_disable) { /* always true, or something is going wrong */ num_disable--; if (num_disable == 0) { mh_mode |= CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(long_malloc_lock); } } } break; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock); return (ret); #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG static int mem_check_on(void) { int ret = 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur; if (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init)) return 0; cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(malloc_lock); ret = (mh_mode & CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) || !CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(disabling_threadid, cur); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock); } return (ret); } static int mem_cmp(const MEM *a, const MEM *b) { #ifdef _WIN64 const char *ap = (const char *)a->addr, *bp = (const char *)b->addr; if (ap == bp) return 0; else if (ap > bp) return 1; else return -1; #else return (const char *)a->addr - (const char *)b->addr; #endif } static unsigned long mem_hash(const MEM *a) { size_t ret; ret = (size_t)a->addr; ret = ret * 17851 + (ret >> 14) * 7 + (ret >> 4) * 251; return (ret); } /* returns 1 if there was an info to pop, 0 if the stack was empty. */ static int pop_info(void) { APP_INFO *current = NULL; if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init)) return 0; current = (APP_INFO *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&appinfokey); if (current != NULL) { APP_INFO *next = current->next; if (next != NULL) { next->references++; CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&appinfokey, next); } else { CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&appinfokey, NULL); } if (--(current->references) <= 0) { current->next = NULL; if (next != NULL) next->references--; OPENSSL_free(current); } return 1; } return 0; } int CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(const char *info, const char *file, int line) { APP_INFO *ami, *amim; int ret = 0; if (mem_check_on()) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init) || (ami = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ami))) == NULL) goto err; ami->threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); ami->file = file; ami->line = line; ami->info = info; ami->references = 1; ami->next = NULL; amim = (APP_INFO *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&appinfokey); CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&appinfokey, ami); if (amim != NULL) ami->next = amim; ret = 1; err: CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); } return (ret); } int CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop(void) { int ret = 0; if (mem_check_on()) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); ret = pop_info(); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); } return (ret); } static unsigned long break_order_num = 0; void CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(void *addr, size_t num, int before_p, const char *file, int line) { MEM *m, *mm; APP_INFO *amim; switch (before_p & 127) { case 0: break; case 1: if (addr == NULL) break; if (mem_check_on()) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init) || (m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*m))) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(addr); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); return; } if (mh == NULL) { if ((mh = lh_MEM_new(mem_hash, mem_cmp)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(addr); OPENSSL_free(m); addr = NULL; goto err; } } m->addr = addr; m->file = file; m->line = line; m->num = num; m->threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); if (order == break_order_num) { /* BREAK HERE */ m->order = order; } m->order = order++; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE m->array_siz = backtrace(m->array, OSSL_NELEM(m->array)); # endif m->time = time(NULL); amim = (APP_INFO *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&appinfokey); m->app_info = amim; if (amim != NULL) amim->references++; if ((mm = lh_MEM_insert(mh, m)) != NULL) { /* Not good, but don't sweat it */ if (mm->app_info != NULL) { mm->app_info->references--; } OPENSSL_free(mm); } err: CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); } break; } return; } void CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(void *addr, int before_p, const char *file, int line) { MEM m, *mp; switch (before_p) { case 0: if (addr == NULL) break; if (mem_check_on() && (mh != NULL)) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); m.addr = addr; mp = lh_MEM_delete(mh, &m); if (mp != NULL) { app_info_free(mp->app_info); OPENSSL_free(mp); } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); } break; case 1: break; } } void CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(void *addr1, void *addr2, size_t num, int before_p, const char *file, int line) { MEM m, *mp; switch (before_p) { case 0: break; case 1: if (addr2 == NULL) break; if (addr1 == NULL) { CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(addr2, num, 128 | before_p, file, line); break; } if (mem_check_on()) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); m.addr = addr1; mp = lh_MEM_delete(mh, &m); if (mp != NULL) { mp->addr = addr2; mp->num = num; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE mp->array_siz = backtrace(mp->array, OSSL_NELEM(mp->array)); #endif (void)lh_MEM_insert(mh, mp); } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); } break; } return; } typedef struct mem_leak_st { BIO *bio; int chunks; long bytes; } MEM_LEAK; static void print_leak(const MEM *m, MEM_LEAK *l) { char buf[1024]; char *bufp = buf; APP_INFO *amip; int ami_cnt; struct tm *lcl = NULL; /* * Convert between CRYPTO_THREAD_ID (which could be anything at all) and * a long. This may not be meaningful depending on what CRYPTO_THREAD_ID is * but hopefully should give something sensible on most platforms */ union { CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; unsigned long ltid; } tid; CRYPTO_THREAD_ID ti; #define BUF_REMAIN (sizeof buf - (size_t)(bufp - buf)) lcl = localtime(&m->time); BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "[%02d:%02d:%02d] ", lcl->tm_hour, lcl->tm_min, lcl->tm_sec); bufp += strlen(bufp); BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "%5lu file=%s, line=%d, ", m->order, m->file, m->line); bufp += strlen(bufp); tid.ltid = 0; tid.tid = m->threadid; BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "thread=%lu, ", tid.ltid); bufp += strlen(bufp); BIO_snprintf(bufp, BUF_REMAIN, "number=%d, address=%p\n", m->num, m->addr); bufp += strlen(bufp); BIO_puts(l->bio, buf); l->chunks++; l->bytes += m->num; amip = m->app_info; ami_cnt = 0; if (amip) { ti = amip->threadid; do { int buf_len; int info_len; ami_cnt++; memset(buf, '>', ami_cnt); tid.ltid = 0; tid.tid = amip->threadid; BIO_snprintf(buf + ami_cnt, sizeof buf - ami_cnt, " thread=%lu, file=%s, line=%d, info=\"", tid.ltid, amip->file, amip->line); buf_len = strlen(buf); info_len = strlen(amip->info); if (128 - buf_len - 3 < info_len) { memcpy(buf + buf_len, amip->info, 128 - buf_len - 3); buf_len = 128 - 3; } else { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf + buf_len, amip->info, sizeof buf - buf_len); buf_len = strlen(buf); } BIO_snprintf(buf + buf_len, sizeof buf - buf_len, "\"\n"); BIO_puts(l->bio, buf); amip = amip->next; } while (amip && CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(amip->threadid, ti)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE { size_t i; char **strings = backtrace_symbols(m->array, m->array_siz); for (i = 0; i < m->array_siz; i++) fprintf(stderr, "##> %s\n", strings[i]); free(strings); } #endif } IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(MEM, MEM_LEAK); int CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *b) { MEM_LEAK ml; /* * OPENSSL_cleanup() will free the ex_data locks so we can't have any * ex_data hanging around */ bio_free_ex_data(b); /* Ensure all resources are released */ OPENSSL_cleanup(); if (!RUN_ONCE(&memdbg_init, do_memdbg_init)) return -1; CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); ml.bio = b; ml.bytes = 0; ml.chunks = 0; if (mh != NULL) lh_MEM_doall_MEM_LEAK(mh, print_leak, &ml); if (ml.chunks != 0) { BIO_printf(b, "%ld bytes leaked in %d chunks\n", ml.bytes, ml.chunks); } else { /* * Make sure that, if we found no leaks, memory-leak debugging itself * does not introduce memory leaks (which might irritate external * debugging tools). (When someone enables leak checking, but does not * call this function, we declare it to be their fault.) */ int old_mh_mode; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(malloc_lock); /* * avoid deadlock when lh_free() uses CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(), which uses * mem_check_on */ old_mh_mode = mh_mode; mh_mode = CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF; lh_MEM_free(mh); mh = NULL; mh_mode = old_mh_mode; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(malloc_lock); } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF); /* Clean up locks etc */ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&appinfokey); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(malloc_lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(long_malloc_lock); malloc_lock = NULL; long_malloc_lock = NULL; return ml.chunks == 0 ? 1 : 0; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *fp) { BIO *b; int ret; /* * Need to turn off memory checking when allocated BIOs ... especially as * we're creating them at a time when we're trying to check we've not * left anything un-free()'d!! */ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); if (b == NULL) return -1; BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = CRYPTO_mem_leaks(b); BIO_free(b); return ret; } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mem_sec.c0000644000000000000000000003743713176625657015175 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright 2004-2014, Akamai Technologies. All Rights Reserved. * This file is distributed under the terms of the OpenSSL license. */ /* * This file is in two halves. The first half implements the public API * to be used by external consumers, and to be used by OpenSSL to store * data in a "secure arena." The second half implements the secure arena. * For details on that implementation, see below (look for uppercase * "SECURE HEAP IMPLEMENTATION"). */ #include #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) # define IMPLEMENTED # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include #endif #define CLEAR(p, s) OPENSSL_cleanse(p, s) #ifndef PAGE_SIZE # define PAGE_SIZE 4096 #endif #ifdef IMPLEMENTED static size_t secure_mem_used; static int secure_mem_initialized; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *sec_malloc_lock = NULL; /* * These are the functions that must be implemented by a secure heap (sh). */ static int sh_init(size_t size, int minsize); static char *sh_malloc(size_t size); static void sh_free(char *ptr); static void sh_done(void); static size_t sh_actual_size(char *ptr); static int sh_allocated(const char *ptr); #endif int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t size, int minsize) { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED int ret = 0; if (!secure_mem_initialized) { sec_malloc_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (sec_malloc_lock == NULL) return 0; if ((ret = sh_init(size, minsize)) != 0) { secure_mem_initialized = 1; } else { CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(sec_malloc_lock); sec_malloc_lock = NULL; } } return ret; #else return 0; #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ } int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED if (secure_mem_used == 0) { sh_done(); secure_mem_initialized = 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(sec_malloc_lock); sec_malloc_lock = NULL; return 1; } #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ return 0; } int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized() { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED return secure_mem_initialized; #else return 0; #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ } void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED void *ret; size_t actual_size; if (!secure_mem_initialized) { return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line); } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock); ret = sh_malloc(num); actual_size = ret ? sh_actual_size(ret) : 0; secure_mem_used += actual_size; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock); return ret; #else return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line); #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ } void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) { void *ret = CRYPTO_secure_malloc(num, file, line); if (ret != NULL) memset(ret, 0, num); return ret; } void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line) { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED size_t actual_size; if (ptr == NULL) return; if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(ptr)) { CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line); return; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock); actual_size = sh_actual_size(ptr); CLEAR(ptr, actual_size); secure_mem_used -= actual_size; sh_free(ptr); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock); #else CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line); #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ } void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, const char *file, int line) { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED size_t actual_size; if (ptr == NULL) return; if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(ptr)) { OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, num); CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line); return; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock); actual_size = sh_actual_size(ptr); CLEAR(ptr, actual_size); secure_mem_used -= actual_size; sh_free(ptr); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock); #else if (ptr == NULL) return; OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, num); CRYPTO_free(ptr, file, line); #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ } int CRYPTO_secure_allocated(const void *ptr) { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED int ret; if (!secure_mem_initialized) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock); ret = sh_allocated(ptr); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock); return ret; #else return 0; #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ } size_t CRYPTO_secure_used() { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED return secure_mem_used; #else return 0; #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ } size_t CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(void *ptr) { #ifdef IMPLEMENTED size_t actual_size; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(sec_malloc_lock); actual_size = sh_actual_size(ptr); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sec_malloc_lock); return actual_size; #else return 0; #endif } /* END OF PAGE ... ... START OF PAGE */ /* * SECURE HEAP IMPLEMENTATION */ #ifdef IMPLEMENTED /* * The implementation provided here uses a fixed-sized mmap() heap, * which is locked into memory, not written to core files, and protected * on either side by an unmapped page, which will catch pointer overruns * (or underruns) and an attempt to read data out of the secure heap. * Free'd memory is zero'd or otherwise cleansed. * * This is a pretty standard buddy allocator. We keep areas in a multiple * of "sh.minsize" units. The freelist and bitmaps are kept separately, * so all (and only) data is kept in the mmap'd heap. * * This code assumes eight-bit bytes. The numbers 3 and 7 are all over the * place. */ #define ONE ((size_t)1) # define TESTBIT(t, b) (t[(b) >> 3] & (ONE << ((b) & 7))) # define SETBIT(t, b) (t[(b) >> 3] |= (ONE << ((b) & 7))) # define CLEARBIT(t, b) (t[(b) >> 3] &= (0xFF & ~(ONE << ((b) & 7)))) #define WITHIN_ARENA(p) \ ((char*)(p) >= sh.arena && (char*)(p) < &sh.arena[sh.arena_size]) #define WITHIN_FREELIST(p) \ ((char*)(p) >= (char*)sh.freelist && (char*)(p) < (char*)&sh.freelist[sh.freelist_size]) typedef struct sh_list_st { struct sh_list_st *next; struct sh_list_st **p_next; } SH_LIST; typedef struct sh_st { char* map_result; size_t map_size; char *arena; size_t arena_size; char **freelist; ossl_ssize_t freelist_size; size_t minsize; unsigned char *bittable; unsigned char *bitmalloc; size_t bittable_size; /* size in bits */ } SH; static SH sh; static size_t sh_getlist(char *ptr) { ossl_ssize_t list = sh.freelist_size - 1; size_t bit = (sh.arena_size + ptr - sh.arena) / sh.minsize; for (; bit; bit >>= 1, list--) { if (TESTBIT(sh.bittable, bit)) break; OPENSSL_assert((bit & 1) == 0); } return list; } static int sh_testbit(char *ptr, int list, unsigned char *table) { size_t bit; OPENSSL_assert(list >= 0 && list < sh.freelist_size); OPENSSL_assert(((ptr - sh.arena) & ((sh.arena_size >> list) - 1)) == 0); bit = (ONE << list) + ((ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list)); OPENSSL_assert(bit > 0 && bit < sh.bittable_size); return TESTBIT(table, bit); } static void sh_clearbit(char *ptr, int list, unsigned char *table) { size_t bit; OPENSSL_assert(list >= 0 && list < sh.freelist_size); OPENSSL_assert(((ptr - sh.arena) & ((sh.arena_size >> list) - 1)) == 0); bit = (ONE << list) + ((ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list)); OPENSSL_assert(bit > 0 && bit < sh.bittable_size); OPENSSL_assert(TESTBIT(table, bit)); CLEARBIT(table, bit); } static void sh_setbit(char *ptr, int list, unsigned char *table) { size_t bit; OPENSSL_assert(list >= 0 && list < sh.freelist_size); OPENSSL_assert(((ptr - sh.arena) & ((sh.arena_size >> list) - 1)) == 0); bit = (ONE << list) + ((ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list)); OPENSSL_assert(bit > 0 && bit < sh.bittable_size); OPENSSL_assert(!TESTBIT(table, bit)); SETBIT(table, bit); } static void sh_add_to_list(char **list, char *ptr) { SH_LIST *temp; OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_FREELIST(list)); OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(ptr)); temp = (SH_LIST *)ptr; temp->next = *(SH_LIST **)list; OPENSSL_assert(temp->next == NULL || WITHIN_ARENA(temp->next)); temp->p_next = (SH_LIST **)list; if (temp->next != NULL) { OPENSSL_assert((char **)temp->next->p_next == list); temp->next->p_next = &(temp->next); } *list = ptr; } static void sh_remove_from_list(char *ptr) { SH_LIST *temp, *temp2; temp = (SH_LIST *)ptr; if (temp->next != NULL) temp->next->p_next = temp->p_next; *temp->p_next = temp->next; if (temp->next == NULL) return; temp2 = temp->next; OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_FREELIST(temp2->p_next) || WITHIN_ARENA(temp2->p_next)); } static int sh_init(size_t size, int minsize) { int ret; size_t i; size_t pgsize; size_t aligned; memset(&sh, 0, sizeof sh); /* make sure size and minsize are powers of 2 */ OPENSSL_assert(size > 0); OPENSSL_assert((size & (size - 1)) == 0); OPENSSL_assert(minsize > 0); OPENSSL_assert((minsize & (minsize - 1)) == 0); if (size <= 0 || (size & (size - 1)) != 0) goto err; if (minsize <= 0 || (minsize & (minsize - 1)) != 0) goto err; while (minsize < (int)sizeof(SH_LIST)) minsize *= 2; sh.arena_size = size; sh.minsize = minsize; sh.bittable_size = (sh.arena_size / sh.minsize) * 2; /* Prevent allocations of size 0 later on */ if (sh.bittable_size >> 3 == 0) goto err; sh.freelist_size = -1; for (i = sh.bittable_size; i; i >>= 1) sh.freelist_size++; sh.freelist = OPENSSL_zalloc(sh.freelist_size * sizeof (char *)); OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist != NULL); if (sh.freelist == NULL) goto err; sh.bittable = OPENSSL_zalloc(sh.bittable_size >> 3); OPENSSL_assert(sh.bittable != NULL); if (sh.bittable == NULL) goto err; sh.bitmalloc = OPENSSL_zalloc(sh.bittable_size >> 3); OPENSSL_assert(sh.bitmalloc != NULL); if (sh.bitmalloc == NULL) goto err; /* Allocate space for heap, and two extra pages as guards */ #if defined(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) || defined (_SC_PAGESIZE) { # if defined(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) long tmppgsize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); # else long tmppgsize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); # endif if (tmppgsize < 1) pgsize = PAGE_SIZE; else pgsize = (size_t)tmppgsize; } #else pgsize = PAGE_SIZE; #endif sh.map_size = pgsize + sh.arena_size + pgsize; if (1) { #ifdef MAP_ANON sh.map_result = mmap(NULL, sh.map_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); } else { #endif int fd; sh.map_result = MAP_FAILED; if ((fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR)) >= 0) { sh.map_result = mmap(NULL, sh.map_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); close(fd); } } if (sh.map_result == MAP_FAILED) goto err; sh.arena = (char *)(sh.map_result + pgsize); sh_setbit(sh.arena, 0, sh.bittable); sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[0], sh.arena); /* Now try to add guard pages and lock into memory. */ ret = 1; /* Starting guard is already aligned from mmap. */ if (mprotect(sh.map_result, pgsize, PROT_NONE) < 0) ret = 2; /* Ending guard page - need to round up to page boundary */ aligned = (pgsize + sh.arena_size + (pgsize - 1)) & ~(pgsize - 1); if (mprotect(sh.map_result + aligned, pgsize, PROT_NONE) < 0) ret = 2; if (mlock(sh.arena, sh.arena_size) < 0) ret = 2; #ifdef MADV_DONTDUMP if (madvise(sh.arena, sh.arena_size, MADV_DONTDUMP) < 0) ret = 2; #endif return ret; err: sh_done(); return 0; } static void sh_done() { OPENSSL_free(sh.freelist); OPENSSL_free(sh.bittable); OPENSSL_free(sh.bitmalloc); if (sh.map_result != NULL && sh.map_size) munmap(sh.map_result, sh.map_size); memset(&sh, 0, sizeof sh); } static int sh_allocated(const char *ptr) { return WITHIN_ARENA(ptr) ? 1 : 0; } static char *sh_find_my_buddy(char *ptr, int list) { size_t bit; char *chunk = NULL; bit = (ONE << list) + (ptr - sh.arena) / (sh.arena_size >> list); bit ^= 1; if (TESTBIT(sh.bittable, bit) && !TESTBIT(sh.bitmalloc, bit)) chunk = sh.arena + ((bit & ((ONE << list) - 1)) * (sh.arena_size >> list)); return chunk; } static char *sh_malloc(size_t size) { ossl_ssize_t list, slist; size_t i; char *chunk; if (size > sh.arena_size) return NULL; list = sh.freelist_size - 1; for (i = sh.minsize; i < size; i <<= 1) list--; if (list < 0) return NULL; /* try to find a larger entry to split */ for (slist = list; slist >= 0; slist--) if (sh.freelist[slist] != NULL) break; if (slist < 0) return NULL; /* split larger entry */ while (slist != list) { char *temp = sh.freelist[slist]; /* remove from bigger list */ OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(temp, slist, sh.bitmalloc)); sh_clearbit(temp, slist, sh.bittable); sh_remove_from_list(temp); OPENSSL_assert(temp != sh.freelist[slist]); /* done with bigger list */ slist++; /* add to smaller list */ OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(temp, slist, sh.bitmalloc)); sh_setbit(temp, slist, sh.bittable); sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[slist], temp); OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist[slist] == temp); /* split in 2 */ temp += sh.arena_size >> slist; OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(temp, slist, sh.bitmalloc)); sh_setbit(temp, slist, sh.bittable); sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[slist], temp); OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist[slist] == temp); OPENSSL_assert(temp-(sh.arena_size >> slist) == sh_find_my_buddy(temp, slist)); } /* peel off memory to hand back */ chunk = sh.freelist[list]; OPENSSL_assert(sh_testbit(chunk, list, sh.bittable)); sh_setbit(chunk, list, sh.bitmalloc); sh_remove_from_list(chunk); OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(chunk)); return chunk; } static void sh_free(char *ptr) { size_t list; char *buddy; if (ptr == NULL) return; OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(ptr)); if (!WITHIN_ARENA(ptr)) return; list = sh_getlist(ptr); OPENSSL_assert(sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable)); sh_clearbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc); sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[list], ptr); /* Try to coalesce two adjacent free areas. */ while ((buddy = sh_find_my_buddy(ptr, list)) != NULL) { OPENSSL_assert(ptr == sh_find_my_buddy(buddy, list)); OPENSSL_assert(ptr != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc)); sh_clearbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable); sh_remove_from_list(ptr); OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc)); sh_clearbit(buddy, list, sh.bittable); sh_remove_from_list(buddy); list--; if (ptr > buddy) ptr = buddy; OPENSSL_assert(!sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bitmalloc)); sh_setbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable); sh_add_to_list(&sh.freelist[list], ptr); OPENSSL_assert(sh.freelist[list] == ptr); } } static size_t sh_actual_size(char *ptr) { int list; OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(ptr)); if (!WITHIN_ARENA(ptr)) return 0; list = sh_getlist(ptr); OPENSSL_assert(sh_testbit(ptr, list, sh.bittable)); return sh.arena_size / (ONE << list); } #endif /* IMPLEMENTED */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/buffer/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014653 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/buffer/build.info0000644000000000000000000000010013176625656016616 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=buffer.c buf_err.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/buffer/buf_err.c0000644000000000000000000000220013176625656016435 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BUF,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BUF,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA BUF_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW), "BUF_MEM_grow"}, {ERR_FUNC(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN), "BUF_MEM_grow_clean"}, {ERR_FUNC(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW), "BUF_MEM_new"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA BUF_str_reasons[] = { {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_BUF_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(BUF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, BUF_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, BUF_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/buffer/buffer.c0000644000000000000000000001015313176625656016270 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* * LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit * ensures that the result fits in an int. */ #define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new_ex(unsigned long flags) { BUF_MEM *ret; ret = BUF_MEM_new(); if (ret != NULL) ret->flags = flags; return (ret); } BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void) { BUF_MEM *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } return (ret); } void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a) { if (a == NULL) return; if (a->data != NULL) { if (a->flags & BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE) OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(a->data, a->max); else OPENSSL_clear_free(a->data, a->max); } OPENSSL_free(a); } /* Allocate a block of secure memory; copy over old data if there * was any, and then free it. */ static char *sec_alloc_realloc(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len) { char *ret; ret = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(len); if (str->data != NULL) { if (ret != NULL) { memcpy(ret, str->data, str->length); OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(str->data, str->length); str->data = NULL; } } return (ret); } size_t BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len) { char *ret; size_t n; if (str->length >= len) { str->length = len; return (len); } if (str->max >= len) { if (str->data != NULL) memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length); str->length = len; return (len); } /* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */ if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION) { BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } n = (len + 3) / 3 * 4; if ((str->flags & BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE)) ret = sec_alloc_realloc(str, n); else ret = OPENSSL_realloc(str->data, n); if (ret == NULL) { BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); len = 0; } else { str->data = ret; str->max = n; memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length); str->length = len; } return (len); } size_t BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len) { char *ret; size_t n; if (str->length >= len) { if (str->data != NULL) memset(&str->data[len], 0, str->length - len); str->length = len; return (len); } if (str->max >= len) { memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length); str->length = len; return (len); } /* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */ if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION) { BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } n = (len + 3) / 3 * 4; if ((str->flags & BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE)) ret = sec_alloc_realloc(str, n); else ret = OPENSSL_clear_realloc(str->data, str->max, n); if (ret == NULL) { BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); len = 0; } else { str->data = ret; str->max = n; memset(&str->data[str->length], 0, len - str->length); str->length = len; } return (len); } void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size) { size_t i; if (in) { out += size - 1; for (i = 0; i < size; i++) *out-- = *in++; } else { unsigned char *q; char c; q = out + size - 1; for (i = 0; i < size / 2; i++) { c = *q; *q-- = *out; *out++ = c; } } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ebcdic.c0000644000000000000000000003617413176625657014773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ # include #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include /*- * Initial Port for Apache-1.3 by * Adapted for OpenSSL-0.9.4 by */ # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC_TEST /* * Here we're looking to test the EBCDIC code on an ASCII system so we don't do * any translation in these tables at all. */ /* The ebcdic-to-ascii table: */ const unsigned char os_toascii[256] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x60, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f, 0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff }; /* The ascii-to-ebcdic table: */ const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x60, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f, 0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff }; # elif defined(_OSD_POSIX) /* * "BS2000 OSD" is a POSIX subsystem on a main frame. It is made by Siemens * AG, Germany, for their BS2000 mainframe machines. Within the POSIX * subsystem, the same character set was chosen as in "native BS2000", namely * EBCDIC. (EDF04) * * The name "ASCII" in these routines is misleading: actually, conversion is * not between EBCDIC and ASCII, but EBCDIC(EDF04) and ISO-8859.1; that means * that (western european) national characters are preserved. * * This table is identical to the one used by rsh/rcp/ftp and other POSIX * tools. */ /* Here's the bijective ebcdic-to-ascii table: */ const unsigned char os_toascii[256] = { /* * 00 */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x85, 0x09, 0x86, 0x7f, 0x87, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */ /* * 10 */ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x8f, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x97, 0x18, 0x19, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */ /* * 20 */ 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x92, 0x17, 0x1b, 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, /* ................ */ /* * 30 */ 0x90, 0x91, 0x16, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x04, 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x14, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x1a, /* ................ */ /* * 40 */ 0x20, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe3, 0xe5, 0xe7, 0xf1, 0x60, 0x2e, 0x3c, 0x28, 0x2b, 0x7c, /* .........`.<(+| */ /* * 50 */ 0x26, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xec, 0xdf, 0x21, 0x24, 0x2a, 0x29, 0x3b, 0x9f, /* &.........!$*);. */ /* * 60 */ 0x2d, 0x2f, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0xc7, 0xd1, 0x5e, 0x2c, 0x25, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0x3f, /*-/........^,%_>?*/ /* * 70 */ 0xf8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xcc, 0xa8, 0x3a, 0x23, 0x40, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x22, /* ..........:#@'=" */ /* * 80 */ 0xd8, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0xab, 0xbb, 0xf0, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xb1, /* .abcdefghi...... */ /* * 90 */ 0xb0, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0xaa, 0xba, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0xc6, 0xa4, /* .jklmnopqr...... */ /* * a0 */ 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xae, /* ..stuvwxyz...... */ /* * b0 */ 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xac, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0x5d, 0xb4, 0xd7, /* ...........[\].. */ /* * c0 */ 0xf9, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0xad, 0xf4, 0xf6, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf5, /* .ABCDEFGHI...... */ /* * d0 */ 0xa6, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0xb9, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0xfa, 0xff, /* .JKLMNOPQR...... */ /* * e0 */ 0xd9, 0xf7, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xd6, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd5, /* ..STUVWXYZ...... */ /* * f0 */ 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xda, 0x7e /* 0123456789.{.}.~ */ }; /* The ascii-to-ebcdic table: */ const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256] = { /* * 00 */ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x37, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x16, 0x05, 0x15, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */ /* * 10 */ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x32, 0x26, 0x18, 0x19, 0x3f, 0x27, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */ /* * 20 */ 0x40, 0x5a, 0x7f, 0x7b, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x50, 0x7d, 0x4d, 0x5d, 0x5c, 0x4e, 0x6b, 0x60, 0x4b, 0x61, /* !"#$%&'()*+,-./ */ /* * 30 */ 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x7e, 0x6e, 0x6f, /* 0123456789:;<=>? */ /* * 40 */ 0x7c, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, /* @ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO */ /* * 50 */ 0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0x6a, 0x6d, /* PQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_ */ /* * 60 */ 0x4a, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, /* `abcdefghijklmno */ /* * 70 */ 0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x07, /* pqrstuvwxyz{|}~. */ /* * 80 */ 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x04, 0x06, 0x08, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x14, /* ................ */ /* * 90 */ 0x30, 0x31, 0x25, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x17, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x3e, 0x5f, /* ................ */ /* * a0 */ 0x41, 0xaa, 0xb0, 0xb1, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xb4, 0x9a, 0x8a, 0xba, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xa1, /* ................ */ /* * b0 */ 0x90, 0x8f, 0xea, 0xfa, 0xbe, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xb3, 0x9d, 0xda, 0x9b, 0x8b, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xab, /* ................ */ /* * c0 */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x62, 0x66, 0x63, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x68, 0x74, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x78, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, /* ................ */ /* * d0 */ 0xac, 0x69, 0xed, 0xee, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xec, 0xbf, 0x80, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xdd, 0xfc, 0xad, 0xae, 0x59, /* ................ */ /* * e0 */ 0x44, 0x45, 0x42, 0x46, 0x43, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x48, 0x54, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x58, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, /* ................ */ /* * f0 */ 0x8c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xcc, 0xe1, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xde, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0xdf /* ................ */ }; # else /*_OSD_POSIX*/ /* * This code does basic character mapping for IBM's TPF and OS/390 operating * systems. It is a modified version of the BS2000 table. * * Bijective EBCDIC (character set IBM-1047) to US-ASCII table: This table is * bijective - there are no ambiguous or duplicate characters. */ const unsigned char os_toascii[256] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x85, 0x09, 0x86, 0x7f, /* 00-0f: */ 0x87, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x8f, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x97, /* 10-1f: */ 0x18, 0x19, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */ 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x92, 0x17, 0x1b, /* 20-2f: */ 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, /* ................ */ 0x90, 0x91, 0x16, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x04, /* 30-3f: */ 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x14, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x1a, /* ................ */ 0x20, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe3, 0xe5, /* 40-4f: */ 0xe7, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0x2e, 0x3c, 0x28, 0x2b, 0x7c, /* ...........<(+| */ 0x26, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, /* 50-5f: */ 0xec, 0xdf, 0x21, 0x24, 0x2a, 0x29, 0x3b, 0x5e, /* &.........!$*);^ */ 0x2d, 0x2f, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc3, 0xc5, /* 60-6f: */ 0xc7, 0xd1, 0xa6, 0x2c, 0x25, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0x3f, /* -/.........,%_>? */ 0xf8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, /* 70-7f: */ 0xcc, 0x60, 0x3a, 0x23, 0x40, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x22, /* .........`:#@'=" */ 0xd8, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, /* 80-8f: */ 0x68, 0x69, 0xab, 0xbb, 0xf0, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xb1, /* .abcdefghi...... */ 0xb0, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, /* 90-9f: */ 0x71, 0x72, 0xaa, 0xba, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0xc6, 0xa4, /* .jklmnopqr...... */ 0xb5, 0x7e, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, /* a0-af: */ 0x79, 0x7a, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0x5b, 0xde, 0xae, /* .~stuvwxyz...[.. */ 0xac, 0xa3, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0xbc, /* b0-bf: */ 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0x5d, 0xb4, 0xd7, /* .............].. */ 0x7b, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, /* c0-cf: */ 0x48, 0x49, 0xad, 0xf4, 0xf6, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf5, /* {ABCDEFGHI...... */ 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50, /* d0-df: */ 0x51, 0x52, 0xb9, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xff, /* }JKLMNOPQR...... */ 0x5c, 0xf7, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, /* e0-ef: */ 0x59, 0x5a, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xd6, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd5, /* \.STUVWXYZ...... */ 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, /* f0-ff: */ 0x38, 0x39, 0xb3, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xd9, 0xda, 0x9f /* 0123456789...... */ }; /* * The US-ASCII to EBCDIC (character set IBM-1047) table: This table is * bijective (no ambiguous or duplicate characters) */ const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x37, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, /* 00-0f: */ 0x16, 0x05, 0x15, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, /* ................ */ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x3d, 0x32, 0x26, /* 10-1f: */ 0x18, 0x19, 0x3f, 0x27, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, /* ................ */ 0x40, 0x5a, 0x7f, 0x7b, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x50, 0x7d, /* 20-2f: */ 0x4d, 0x5d, 0x5c, 0x4e, 0x6b, 0x60, 0x4b, 0x61, /* !"#$%&'()*+,-./ */ 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, /* 30-3f: */ 0xf8, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x7e, 0x6e, 0x6f, /* 0123456789:;<=>? */ 0x7c, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, /* 40-4f: */ 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, /* @ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO */ 0xd7, 0xd8, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, /* 50-5f: */ 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0xad, 0xe0, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x6d, /* PQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_ */ 0x79, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, /* 60-6f: */ 0x88, 0x89, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, /* `abcdefghijklmno */ 0x97, 0x98, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, /* 70-7f: */ 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xd0, 0xa1, 0x07, /* pqrstuvwxyz{|}~. */ 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x04, 0x06, 0x08, /* 80-8f: */ 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x14, /* ................ */ 0x30, 0x31, 0x25, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x17, /* 90-9f: */ 0x38, 0x39, 0x3a, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x3e, 0xff, /* ................ */ 0x41, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0xb1, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x6a, 0xb5, /* a0-af: */ 0xbb, 0xb4, 0x9a, 0x8a, 0xb0, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xbc, /* ................ */ 0x90, 0x8f, 0xea, 0xfa, 0xbe, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0xb3, /* b0-bf: */ 0x9d, 0xda, 0x9b, 0x8b, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xab, /* ................ */ 0x64, 0x65, 0x62, 0x66, 0x63, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x68, /* c0-cf: */ 0x74, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x78, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, /* ................ */ 0xac, 0x69, 0xed, 0xee, 0xeb, 0xef, 0xec, 0xbf, /* d0-df: */ 0x80, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xba, 0xae, 0x59, /* ................ */ 0x44, 0x45, 0x42, 0x46, 0x43, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x48, /* e0-ef: */ 0x54, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x58, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, /* ................ */ 0x8c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0xcc, 0xe1, /* f0-ff: */ 0x70, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0xdf /* ................ */ }; # endif/*_OSD_POSIX*/ /* * Translate a memory block from EBCDIC (host charset) to ASCII (net charset) * dest and srce may be identical, or separate memory blocks, but should not * overlap. These functions intentionally have an interface compatible to * memcpy(3). */ void *ebcdic2ascii(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count) { unsigned char *udest = dest; const unsigned char *usrce = srce; while (count-- != 0) { *udest++ = os_toascii[*usrce++]; } return dest; } void *ascii2ebcdic(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count) { unsigned char *udest = dest; const unsigned char *usrce = srce; while (count-- != 0) { *udest++ = os_toebcdic[*usrce++]; } return dest; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014334 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/build.info0000644000000000000000000000041713176625656016312 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ c_skey.c c_ecb.c {- $target{cast_asm_src} -} c_cfb64.c c_ofb64.c GENERATE[cast-586.s]=asm/cast-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[cast-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/c_ofb64.c0000644000000000000000000000306213176625656015723 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "cast_lcl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void CAST_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num) { register CAST_LONG v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned char d[8]; register char *dp; CAST_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; int save = 0; iv = ivec; n2l(iv, v0); n2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; dp = (char *)d; l2n(v0, dp); l2n(v1, dp); while (l--) { if (n == 0) { CAST_encrypt((CAST_LONG *)ti, schedule); dp = (char *)d; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, dp); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, dp); save++; } *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n]; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } if (save) { v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = ivec; l2n(v0, iv); l2n(v1, iv); } t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656015114 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/asm/cast-586.pl0000644000000000000000000001176413176625656016734 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # This flag makes the inner loop one cycle longer, but generates # code that runs %30 faster on the pentium pro/II, 44% faster # of PIII, while only %7 slower on the pentium. # By default, this flag is on. $ppro=1; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; require "cbc.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"cast-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $CAST_ROUNDS=16; $L="edi"; $R="esi"; $K="ebp"; $tmp1="ecx"; $tmp2="ebx"; $tmp3="eax"; $tmp4="edx"; $S1="CAST_S_table0"; $S2="CAST_S_table1"; $S3="CAST_S_table2"; $S4="CAST_S_table3"; @F1=("add","xor","sub"); @F2=("xor","sub","add"); @F3=("sub","add","xor"); &CAST_encrypt("CAST_encrypt",1); &CAST_encrypt("CAST_decrypt",0); &cbc("CAST_cbc_encrypt","CAST_encrypt","CAST_decrypt",1,4,5,3,-1,-1); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub CAST_encrypt { local($name,$enc)=@_; local($win_ex)=<<"EOF"; EXTERN _CAST_S_table0:DWORD EXTERN _CAST_S_table1:DWORD EXTERN _CAST_S_table2:DWORD EXTERN _CAST_S_table3:DWORD EOF &main::external_label( "CAST_S_table0", "CAST_S_table1", "CAST_S_table2", "CAST_S_table3", ); &function_begin_B($name,$win_ex); &comment(""); &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &mov($tmp2,&wparam(0)); &mov($K,&wparam(1)); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &comment("Load the 2 words"); &mov($L,&DWP(0,$tmp2,"",0)); &mov($R,&DWP(4,$tmp2,"",0)); &comment('Get short key flag'); &mov($tmp3,&DWP(128,$K,"",0)); if($enc) { &push($tmp3); } else { &or($tmp3,$tmp3); &jnz(&label('cast_dec_skip')); } &xor($tmp3, $tmp3); # encrypting part if ($enc) { &E_CAST( 0,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 1,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 2,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 3,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 4,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 5,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 6,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 7,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 8,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 9,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(10,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(11,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &comment('test short key flag'); &pop($tmp4); &or($tmp4,$tmp4); &jnz(&label('cast_enc_done')); &E_CAST(12,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(13,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(14,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(15,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); } else { &E_CAST(15,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(14,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(13,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(12,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &set_label('cast_dec_skip'); &E_CAST(11,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST(10,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 9,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 8,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 7,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 6,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 5,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 4,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 3,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 2,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 1,$S,$L,$R,$K,@F2,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); &E_CAST( 0,$S,$R,$L,$K,@F1,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4); } &set_label('cast_enc_done') if $enc; # Why the nop? - Ben 17/1/99 &nop(); &mov($tmp3,&wparam(0)); &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp3,"",0),$L); &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp3,"",0),$R); &function_end($name); } sub E_CAST { local($i,$S,$L,$R,$K,$OP1,$OP2,$OP3,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4)=@_; # Ri needs to have 16 pre added. &comment("round $i"); &mov( $tmp4, &DWP($i*8,$K,"",1)); &mov( $tmp1, &DWP($i*8+4,$K,"",1)); &$OP1( $tmp4, $R); &rotl( $tmp4, &LB($tmp1)); if ($ppro) { &xor( $tmp1, $tmp1); &mov( $tmp2, 0xff); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &HB($tmp4)); # A &and( $tmp2, $tmp4); &shr( $tmp4, 16); # &xor( $tmp3, $tmp3); } else { &mov( $tmp2, $tmp4); # B &movb( &LB($tmp1), &HB($tmp4)); # A # BAD BAD BAD &shr( $tmp4, 16); # &and( $tmp2, 0xff); } &movb( &LB($tmp3), &HB($tmp4)); # C # BAD BAD BAD &and( $tmp4, 0xff); # D &mov( $tmp1, &DWP($S1,"",$tmp1,4)); &mov( $tmp2, &DWP($S2,"",$tmp2,4)); &$OP2( $tmp1, $tmp2); &mov( $tmp2, &DWP($S3,"",$tmp3,4)); &$OP3( $tmp1, $tmp2); &mov( $tmp2, &DWP($S4,"",$tmp4,4)); &$OP1( $tmp1, $tmp2); # XXX &xor( $L, $tmp1); # XXX } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/c_cfb64.c0000644000000000000000000000405013176625656015705 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "cast_lcl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void CAST_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc) { register CAST_LONG v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; CAST_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv, c, cc; iv = ivec; if (enc) { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { n2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; n2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; CAST_encrypt((CAST_LONG *)ti, schedule); iv = ivec; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, iv); iv = ivec; } c = *(in++) ^ iv[n]; *(out++) = c; iv[n] = c; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } else { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { n2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; n2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; CAST_encrypt((CAST_LONG *)ti, schedule); iv = ivec; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, iv); iv = ivec; } cc = *(in++); c = iv[n]; iv[n] = cc; *(out++) = c ^ cc; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/cast_s.h0000644000000000000000000006543513176625656015776 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table0[256] = { 0x30fb40d4, 0x9fa0ff0b, 0x6beccd2f, 0x3f258c7a, 0x1e213f2f, 0x9c004dd3, 0x6003e540, 0xcf9fc949, 0xbfd4af27, 0x88bbbdb5, 0xe2034090, 0x98d09675, 0x6e63a0e0, 0x15c361d2, 0xc2e7661d, 0x22d4ff8e, 0x28683b6f, 0xc07fd059, 0xff2379c8, 0x775f50e2, 0x43c340d3, 0xdf2f8656, 0x887ca41a, 0xa2d2bd2d, 0xa1c9e0d6, 0x346c4819, 0x61b76d87, 0x22540f2f, 0x2abe32e1, 0xaa54166b, 0x22568e3a, 0xa2d341d0, 0x66db40c8, 0xa784392f, 0x004dff2f, 0x2db9d2de, 0x97943fac, 0x4a97c1d8, 0x527644b7, 0xb5f437a7, 0xb82cbaef, 0xd751d159, 0x6ff7f0ed, 0x5a097a1f, 0x827b68d0, 0x90ecf52e, 0x22b0c054, 0xbc8e5935, 0x4b6d2f7f, 0x50bb64a2, 0xd2664910, 0xbee5812d, 0xb7332290, 0xe93b159f, 0xb48ee411, 0x4bff345d, 0xfd45c240, 0xad31973f, 0xc4f6d02e, 0x55fc8165, 0xd5b1caad, 0xa1ac2dae, 0xa2d4b76d, 0xc19b0c50, 0x882240f2, 0x0c6e4f38, 0xa4e4bfd7, 0x4f5ba272, 0x564c1d2f, 0xc59c5319, 0xb949e354, 0xb04669fe, 0xb1b6ab8a, 0xc71358dd, 0x6385c545, 0x110f935d, 0x57538ad5, 0x6a390493, 0xe63d37e0, 0x2a54f6b3, 0x3a787d5f, 0x6276a0b5, 0x19a6fcdf, 0x7a42206a, 0x29f9d4d5, 0xf61b1891, 0xbb72275e, 0xaa508167, 0x38901091, 0xc6b505eb, 0x84c7cb8c, 0x2ad75a0f, 0x874a1427, 0xa2d1936b, 0x2ad286af, 0xaa56d291, 0xd7894360, 0x425c750d, 0x93b39e26, 0x187184c9, 0x6c00b32d, 0x73e2bb14, 0xa0bebc3c, 0x54623779, 0x64459eab, 0x3f328b82, 0x7718cf82, 0x59a2cea6, 0x04ee002e, 0x89fe78e6, 0x3fab0950, 0x325ff6c2, 0x81383f05, 0x6963c5c8, 0x76cb5ad6, 0xd49974c9, 0xca180dcf, 0x380782d5, 0xc7fa5cf6, 0x8ac31511, 0x35e79e13, 0x47da91d0, 0xf40f9086, 0xa7e2419e, 0x31366241, 0x051ef495, 0xaa573b04, 0x4a805d8d, 0x548300d0, 0x00322a3c, 0xbf64cddf, 0xba57a68e, 0x75c6372b, 0x50afd341, 0xa7c13275, 0x915a0bf5, 0x6b54bfab, 0x2b0b1426, 0xab4cc9d7, 0x449ccd82, 0xf7fbf265, 0xab85c5f3, 0x1b55db94, 0xaad4e324, 0xcfa4bd3f, 0x2deaa3e2, 0x9e204d02, 0xc8bd25ac, 0xeadf55b3, 0xd5bd9e98, 0xe31231b2, 0x2ad5ad6c, 0x954329de, 0xadbe4528, 0xd8710f69, 0xaa51c90f, 0xaa786bf6, 0x22513f1e, 0xaa51a79b, 0x2ad344cc, 0x7b5a41f0, 0xd37cfbad, 0x1b069505, 0x41ece491, 0xb4c332e6, 0x032268d4, 0xc9600acc, 0xce387e6d, 0xbf6bb16c, 0x6a70fb78, 0x0d03d9c9, 0xd4df39de, 0xe01063da, 0x4736f464, 0x5ad328d8, 0xb347cc96, 0x75bb0fc3, 0x98511bfb, 0x4ffbcc35, 0xb58bcf6a, 0xe11f0abc, 0xbfc5fe4a, 0xa70aec10, 0xac39570a, 0x3f04442f, 0x6188b153, 0xe0397a2e, 0x5727cb79, 0x9ceb418f, 0x1cacd68d, 0x2ad37c96, 0x0175cb9d, 0xc69dff09, 0xc75b65f0, 0xd9db40d8, 0xec0e7779, 0x4744ead4, 0xb11c3274, 0xdd24cb9e, 0x7e1c54bd, 0xf01144f9, 0xd2240eb1, 0x9675b3fd, 0xa3ac3755, 0xd47c27af, 0x51c85f4d, 0x56907596, 0xa5bb15e6, 0x580304f0, 0xca042cf1, 0x011a37ea, 0x8dbfaadb, 0x35ba3e4a, 0x3526ffa0, 0xc37b4d09, 0xbc306ed9, 0x98a52666, 0x5648f725, 0xff5e569d, 0x0ced63d0, 0x7c63b2cf, 0x700b45e1, 0xd5ea50f1, 0x85a92872, 0xaf1fbda7, 0xd4234870, 0xa7870bf3, 0x2d3b4d79, 0x42e04198, 0x0cd0ede7, 0x26470db8, 0xf881814c, 0x474d6ad7, 0x7c0c5e5c, 0xd1231959, 0x381b7298, 0xf5d2f4db, 0xab838653, 0x6e2f1e23, 0x83719c9e, 0xbd91e046, 0x9a56456e, 0xdc39200c, 0x20c8c571, 0x962bda1c, 0xe1e696ff, 0xb141ab08, 0x7cca89b9, 0x1a69e783, 0x02cc4843, 0xa2f7c579, 0x429ef47d, 0x427b169c, 0x5ac9f049, 0xdd8f0f00, 0x5c8165bf, }; OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table1[256] = { 0x1f201094, 0xef0ba75b, 0x69e3cf7e, 0x393f4380, 0xfe61cf7a, 0xeec5207a, 0x55889c94, 0x72fc0651, 0xada7ef79, 0x4e1d7235, 0xd55a63ce, 0xde0436ba, 0x99c430ef, 0x5f0c0794, 0x18dcdb7d, 0xa1d6eff3, 0xa0b52f7b, 0x59e83605, 0xee15b094, 0xe9ffd909, 0xdc440086, 0xef944459, 0xba83ccb3, 0xe0c3cdfb, 0xd1da4181, 0x3b092ab1, 0xf997f1c1, 0xa5e6cf7b, 0x01420ddb, 0xe4e7ef5b, 0x25a1ff41, 0xe180f806, 0x1fc41080, 0x179bee7a, 0xd37ac6a9, 0xfe5830a4, 0x98de8b7f, 0x77e83f4e, 0x79929269, 0x24fa9f7b, 0xe113c85b, 0xacc40083, 0xd7503525, 0xf7ea615f, 0x62143154, 0x0d554b63, 0x5d681121, 0xc866c359, 0x3d63cf73, 0xcee234c0, 0xd4d87e87, 0x5c672b21, 0x071f6181, 0x39f7627f, 0x361e3084, 0xe4eb573b, 0x602f64a4, 0xd63acd9c, 0x1bbc4635, 0x9e81032d, 0x2701f50c, 0x99847ab4, 0xa0e3df79, 0xba6cf38c, 0x10843094, 0x2537a95e, 0xf46f6ffe, 0xa1ff3b1f, 0x208cfb6a, 0x8f458c74, 0xd9e0a227, 0x4ec73a34, 0xfc884f69, 0x3e4de8df, 0xef0e0088, 0x3559648d, 0x8a45388c, 0x1d804366, 0x721d9bfd, 0xa58684bb, 0xe8256333, 0x844e8212, 0x128d8098, 0xfed33fb4, 0xce280ae1, 0x27e19ba5, 0xd5a6c252, 0xe49754bd, 0xc5d655dd, 0xeb667064, 0x77840b4d, 0xa1b6a801, 0x84db26a9, 0xe0b56714, 0x21f043b7, 0xe5d05860, 0x54f03084, 0x066ff472, 0xa31aa153, 0xdadc4755, 0xb5625dbf, 0x68561be6, 0x83ca6b94, 0x2d6ed23b, 0xeccf01db, 0xa6d3d0ba, 0xb6803d5c, 0xaf77a709, 0x33b4a34c, 0x397bc8d6, 0x5ee22b95, 0x5f0e5304, 0x81ed6f61, 0x20e74364, 0xb45e1378, 0xde18639b, 0x881ca122, 0xb96726d1, 0x8049a7e8, 0x22b7da7b, 0x5e552d25, 0x5272d237, 0x79d2951c, 0xc60d894c, 0x488cb402, 0x1ba4fe5b, 0xa4b09f6b, 0x1ca815cf, 0xa20c3005, 0x8871df63, 0xb9de2fcb, 0x0cc6c9e9, 0x0beeff53, 0xe3214517, 0xb4542835, 0x9f63293c, 0xee41e729, 0x6e1d2d7c, 0x50045286, 0x1e6685f3, 0xf33401c6, 0x30a22c95, 0x31a70850, 0x60930f13, 0x73f98417, 0xa1269859, 0xec645c44, 0x52c877a9, 0xcdff33a6, 0xa02b1741, 0x7cbad9a2, 0x2180036f, 0x50d99c08, 0xcb3f4861, 0xc26bd765, 0x64a3f6ab, 0x80342676, 0x25a75e7b, 0xe4e6d1fc, 0x20c710e6, 0xcdf0b680, 0x17844d3b, 0x31eef84d, 0x7e0824e4, 0x2ccb49eb, 0x846a3bae, 0x8ff77888, 0xee5d60f6, 0x7af75673, 0x2fdd5cdb, 0xa11631c1, 0x30f66f43, 0xb3faec54, 0x157fd7fa, 0xef8579cc, 0xd152de58, 0xdb2ffd5e, 0x8f32ce19, 0x306af97a, 0x02f03ef8, 0x99319ad5, 0xc242fa0f, 0xa7e3ebb0, 0xc68e4906, 0xb8da230c, 0x80823028, 0xdcdef3c8, 0xd35fb171, 0x088a1bc8, 0xbec0c560, 0x61a3c9e8, 0xbca8f54d, 0xc72feffa, 0x22822e99, 0x82c570b4, 0xd8d94e89, 0x8b1c34bc, 0x301e16e6, 0x273be979, 0xb0ffeaa6, 0x61d9b8c6, 0x00b24869, 0xb7ffce3f, 0x08dc283b, 0x43daf65a, 0xf7e19798, 0x7619b72f, 0x8f1c9ba4, 0xdc8637a0, 0x16a7d3b1, 0x9fc393b7, 0xa7136eeb, 0xc6bcc63e, 0x1a513742, 0xef6828bc, 0x520365d6, 0x2d6a77ab, 0x3527ed4b, 0x821fd216, 0x095c6e2e, 0xdb92f2fb, 0x5eea29cb, 0x145892f5, 0x91584f7f, 0x5483697b, 0x2667a8cc, 0x85196048, 0x8c4bacea, 0x833860d4, 0x0d23e0f9, 0x6c387e8a, 0x0ae6d249, 0xb284600c, 0xd835731d, 0xdcb1c647, 0xac4c56ea, 0x3ebd81b3, 0x230eabb0, 0x6438bc87, 0xf0b5b1fa, 0x8f5ea2b3, 0xfc184642, 0x0a036b7a, 0x4fb089bd, 0x649da589, 0xa345415e, 0x5c038323, 0x3e5d3bb9, 0x43d79572, 0x7e6dd07c, 0x06dfdf1e, 0x6c6cc4ef, 0x7160a539, 0x73bfbe70, 0x83877605, 0x4523ecf1, }; OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table2[256] = { 0x8defc240, 0x25fa5d9f, 0xeb903dbf, 0xe810c907, 0x47607fff, 0x369fe44b, 0x8c1fc644, 0xaececa90, 0xbeb1f9bf, 0xeefbcaea, 0xe8cf1950, 0x51df07ae, 0x920e8806, 0xf0ad0548, 0xe13c8d83, 0x927010d5, 0x11107d9f, 0x07647db9, 0xb2e3e4d4, 0x3d4f285e, 0xb9afa820, 0xfade82e0, 0xa067268b, 0x8272792e, 0x553fb2c0, 0x489ae22b, 0xd4ef9794, 0x125e3fbc, 0x21fffcee, 0x825b1bfd, 0x9255c5ed, 0x1257a240, 0x4e1a8302, 0xbae07fff, 0x528246e7, 0x8e57140e, 0x3373f7bf, 0x8c9f8188, 0xa6fc4ee8, 0xc982b5a5, 0xa8c01db7, 0x579fc264, 0x67094f31, 0xf2bd3f5f, 0x40fff7c1, 0x1fb78dfc, 0x8e6bd2c1, 0x437be59b, 0x99b03dbf, 0xb5dbc64b, 0x638dc0e6, 0x55819d99, 0xa197c81c, 0x4a012d6e, 0xc5884a28, 0xccc36f71, 0xb843c213, 0x6c0743f1, 0x8309893c, 0x0feddd5f, 0x2f7fe850, 0xd7c07f7e, 0x02507fbf, 0x5afb9a04, 0xa747d2d0, 0x1651192e, 0xaf70bf3e, 0x58c31380, 0x5f98302e, 0x727cc3c4, 0x0a0fb402, 0x0f7fef82, 0x8c96fdad, 0x5d2c2aae, 0x8ee99a49, 0x50da88b8, 0x8427f4a0, 0x1eac5790, 0x796fb449, 0x8252dc15, 0xefbd7d9b, 0xa672597d, 0xada840d8, 0x45f54504, 0xfa5d7403, 0xe83ec305, 0x4f91751a, 0x925669c2, 0x23efe941, 0xa903f12e, 0x60270df2, 0x0276e4b6, 0x94fd6574, 0x927985b2, 0x8276dbcb, 0x02778176, 0xf8af918d, 0x4e48f79e, 0x8f616ddf, 0xe29d840e, 0x842f7d83, 0x340ce5c8, 0x96bbb682, 0x93b4b148, 0xef303cab, 0x984faf28, 0x779faf9b, 0x92dc560d, 0x224d1e20, 0x8437aa88, 0x7d29dc96, 0x2756d3dc, 0x8b907cee, 0xb51fd240, 0xe7c07ce3, 0xe566b4a1, 0xc3e9615e, 0x3cf8209d, 0x6094d1e3, 0xcd9ca341, 0x5c76460e, 0x00ea983b, 0xd4d67881, 0xfd47572c, 0xf76cedd9, 0xbda8229c, 0x127dadaa, 0x438a074e, 0x1f97c090, 0x081bdb8a, 0x93a07ebe, 0xb938ca15, 0x97b03cff, 0x3dc2c0f8, 0x8d1ab2ec, 0x64380e51, 0x68cc7bfb, 0xd90f2788, 0x12490181, 0x5de5ffd4, 0xdd7ef86a, 0x76a2e214, 0xb9a40368, 0x925d958f, 0x4b39fffa, 0xba39aee9, 0xa4ffd30b, 0xfaf7933b, 0x6d498623, 0x193cbcfa, 0x27627545, 0x825cf47a, 0x61bd8ba0, 0xd11e42d1, 0xcead04f4, 0x127ea392, 0x10428db7, 0x8272a972, 0x9270c4a8, 0x127de50b, 0x285ba1c8, 0x3c62f44f, 0x35c0eaa5, 0xe805d231, 0x428929fb, 0xb4fcdf82, 0x4fb66a53, 0x0e7dc15b, 0x1f081fab, 0x108618ae, 0xfcfd086d, 0xf9ff2889, 0x694bcc11, 0x236a5cae, 0x12deca4d, 0x2c3f8cc5, 0xd2d02dfe, 0xf8ef5896, 0xe4cf52da, 0x95155b67, 0x494a488c, 0xb9b6a80c, 0x5c8f82bc, 0x89d36b45, 0x3a609437, 0xec00c9a9, 0x44715253, 0x0a874b49, 0xd773bc40, 0x7c34671c, 0x02717ef6, 0x4feb5536, 0xa2d02fff, 0xd2bf60c4, 0xd43f03c0, 0x50b4ef6d, 0x07478cd1, 0x006e1888, 0xa2e53f55, 0xb9e6d4bc, 0xa2048016, 0x97573833, 0xd7207d67, 0xde0f8f3d, 0x72f87b33, 0xabcc4f33, 0x7688c55d, 0x7b00a6b0, 0x947b0001, 0x570075d2, 0xf9bb88f8, 0x8942019e, 0x4264a5ff, 0x856302e0, 0x72dbd92b, 0xee971b69, 0x6ea22fde, 0x5f08ae2b, 0xaf7a616d, 0xe5c98767, 0xcf1febd2, 0x61efc8c2, 0xf1ac2571, 0xcc8239c2, 0x67214cb8, 0xb1e583d1, 0xb7dc3e62, 0x7f10bdce, 0xf90a5c38, 0x0ff0443d, 0x606e6dc6, 0x60543a49, 0x5727c148, 0x2be98a1d, 0x8ab41738, 0x20e1be24, 0xaf96da0f, 0x68458425, 0x99833be5, 0x600d457d, 0x282f9350, 0x8334b362, 0xd91d1120, 0x2b6d8da0, 0x642b1e31, 0x9c305a00, 0x52bce688, 0x1b03588a, 0xf7baefd5, 0x4142ed9c, 0xa4315c11, 0x83323ec5, 0xdfef4636, 0xa133c501, 0xe9d3531c, 0xee353783, }; OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table3[256] = { 0x9db30420, 0x1fb6e9de, 0xa7be7bef, 0xd273a298, 0x4a4f7bdb, 0x64ad8c57, 0x85510443, 0xfa020ed1, 0x7e287aff, 0xe60fb663, 0x095f35a1, 0x79ebf120, 0xfd059d43, 0x6497b7b1, 0xf3641f63, 0x241e4adf, 0x28147f5f, 0x4fa2b8cd, 0xc9430040, 0x0cc32220, 0xfdd30b30, 0xc0a5374f, 0x1d2d00d9, 0x24147b15, 0xee4d111a, 0x0fca5167, 0x71ff904c, 0x2d195ffe, 0x1a05645f, 0x0c13fefe, 0x081b08ca, 0x05170121, 0x80530100, 0xe83e5efe, 0xac9af4f8, 0x7fe72701, 0xd2b8ee5f, 0x06df4261, 0xbb9e9b8a, 0x7293ea25, 0xce84ffdf, 0xf5718801, 0x3dd64b04, 0xa26f263b, 0x7ed48400, 0x547eebe6, 0x446d4ca0, 0x6cf3d6f5, 0x2649abdf, 0xaea0c7f5, 0x36338cc1, 0x503f7e93, 0xd3772061, 0x11b638e1, 0x72500e03, 0xf80eb2bb, 0xabe0502e, 0xec8d77de, 0x57971e81, 0xe14f6746, 0xc9335400, 0x6920318f, 0x081dbb99, 0xffc304a5, 0x4d351805, 0x7f3d5ce3, 0xa6c866c6, 0x5d5bcca9, 0xdaec6fea, 0x9f926f91, 0x9f46222f, 0x3991467d, 0xa5bf6d8e, 0x1143c44f, 0x43958302, 0xd0214eeb, 0x022083b8, 0x3fb6180c, 0x18f8931e, 0x281658e6, 0x26486e3e, 0x8bd78a70, 0x7477e4c1, 0xb506e07c, 0xf32d0a25, 0x79098b02, 0xe4eabb81, 0x28123b23, 0x69dead38, 0x1574ca16, 0xdf871b62, 0x211c40b7, 0xa51a9ef9, 0x0014377b, 0x041e8ac8, 0x09114003, 0xbd59e4d2, 0xe3d156d5, 0x4fe876d5, 0x2f91a340, 0x557be8de, 0x00eae4a7, 0x0ce5c2ec, 0x4db4bba6, 0xe756bdff, 0xdd3369ac, 0xec17b035, 0x06572327, 0x99afc8b0, 0x56c8c391, 0x6b65811c, 0x5e146119, 0x6e85cb75, 0xbe07c002, 0xc2325577, 0x893ff4ec, 0x5bbfc92d, 0xd0ec3b25, 0xb7801ab7, 0x8d6d3b24, 0x20c763ef, 0xc366a5fc, 0x9c382880, 0x0ace3205, 0xaac9548a, 0xeca1d7c7, 0x041afa32, 0x1d16625a, 0x6701902c, 0x9b757a54, 0x31d477f7, 0x9126b031, 0x36cc6fdb, 0xc70b8b46, 0xd9e66a48, 0x56e55a79, 0x026a4ceb, 0x52437eff, 0x2f8f76b4, 0x0df980a5, 0x8674cde3, 0xedda04eb, 0x17a9be04, 0x2c18f4df, 0xb7747f9d, 0xab2af7b4, 0xefc34d20, 0x2e096b7c, 0x1741a254, 0xe5b6a035, 0x213d42f6, 0x2c1c7c26, 0x61c2f50f, 0x6552daf9, 0xd2c231f8, 0x25130f69, 0xd8167fa2, 0x0418f2c8, 0x001a96a6, 0x0d1526ab, 0x63315c21, 0x5e0a72ec, 0x49bafefd, 0x187908d9, 0x8d0dbd86, 0x311170a7, 0x3e9b640c, 0xcc3e10d7, 0xd5cad3b6, 0x0caec388, 0xf73001e1, 0x6c728aff, 0x71eae2a1, 0x1f9af36e, 0xcfcbd12f, 0xc1de8417, 0xac07be6b, 0xcb44a1d8, 0x8b9b0f56, 0x013988c3, 0xb1c52fca, 0xb4be31cd, 0xd8782806, 0x12a3a4e2, 0x6f7de532, 0x58fd7eb6, 0xd01ee900, 0x24adffc2, 0xf4990fc5, 0x9711aac5, 0x001d7b95, 0x82e5e7d2, 0x109873f6, 0x00613096, 0xc32d9521, 0xada121ff, 0x29908415, 0x7fbb977f, 0xaf9eb3db, 0x29c9ed2a, 0x5ce2a465, 0xa730f32c, 0xd0aa3fe8, 0x8a5cc091, 0xd49e2ce7, 0x0ce454a9, 0xd60acd86, 0x015f1919, 0x77079103, 0xdea03af6, 0x78a8565e, 0xdee356df, 0x21f05cbe, 0x8b75e387, 0xb3c50651, 0xb8a5c3ef, 0xd8eeb6d2, 0xe523be77, 0xc2154529, 0x2f69efdf, 0xafe67afb, 0xf470c4b2, 0xf3e0eb5b, 0xd6cc9876, 0x39e4460c, 0x1fda8538, 0x1987832f, 0xca007367, 0xa99144f8, 0x296b299e, 0x492fc295, 0x9266beab, 0xb5676e69, 0x9bd3ddda, 0xdf7e052f, 0xdb25701c, 0x1b5e51ee, 0xf65324e6, 0x6afce36c, 0x0316cc04, 0x8644213e, 0xb7dc59d0, 0x7965291f, 0xccd6fd43, 0x41823979, 0x932bcdf6, 0xb657c34d, 0x4edfd282, 0x7ae5290c, 0x3cb9536b, 0x851e20fe, 0x9833557e, 0x13ecf0b0, 0xd3ffb372, 0x3f85c5c1, 0x0aef7ed2, }; OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table4[256] = { 0x7ec90c04, 0x2c6e74b9, 0x9b0e66df, 0xa6337911, 0xb86a7fff, 0x1dd358f5, 0x44dd9d44, 0x1731167f, 0x08fbf1fa, 0xe7f511cc, 0xd2051b00, 0x735aba00, 0x2ab722d8, 0x386381cb, 0xacf6243a, 0x69befd7a, 0xe6a2e77f, 0xf0c720cd, 0xc4494816, 0xccf5c180, 0x38851640, 0x15b0a848, 0xe68b18cb, 0x4caadeff, 0x5f480a01, 0x0412b2aa, 0x259814fc, 0x41d0efe2, 0x4e40b48d, 0x248eb6fb, 0x8dba1cfe, 0x41a99b02, 0x1a550a04, 0xba8f65cb, 0x7251f4e7, 0x95a51725, 0xc106ecd7, 0x97a5980a, 0xc539b9aa, 0x4d79fe6a, 0xf2f3f763, 0x68af8040, 0xed0c9e56, 0x11b4958b, 0xe1eb5a88, 0x8709e6b0, 0xd7e07156, 0x4e29fea7, 0x6366e52d, 0x02d1c000, 0xc4ac8e05, 0x9377f571, 0x0c05372a, 0x578535f2, 0x2261be02, 0xd642a0c9, 0xdf13a280, 0x74b55bd2, 0x682199c0, 0xd421e5ec, 0x53fb3ce8, 0xc8adedb3, 0x28a87fc9, 0x3d959981, 0x5c1ff900, 0xfe38d399, 0x0c4eff0b, 0x062407ea, 0xaa2f4fb1, 0x4fb96976, 0x90c79505, 0xb0a8a774, 0xef55a1ff, 0xe59ca2c2, 0xa6b62d27, 0xe66a4263, 0xdf65001f, 0x0ec50966, 0xdfdd55bc, 0x29de0655, 0x911e739a, 0x17af8975, 0x32c7911c, 0x89f89468, 0x0d01e980, 0x524755f4, 0x03b63cc9, 0x0cc844b2, 0xbcf3f0aa, 0x87ac36e9, 0xe53a7426, 0x01b3d82b, 0x1a9e7449, 0x64ee2d7e, 0xcddbb1da, 0x01c94910, 0xb868bf80, 0x0d26f3fd, 0x9342ede7, 0x04a5c284, 0x636737b6, 0x50f5b616, 0xf24766e3, 0x8eca36c1, 0x136e05db, 0xfef18391, 0xfb887a37, 0xd6e7f7d4, 0xc7fb7dc9, 0x3063fcdf, 0xb6f589de, 0xec2941da, 0x26e46695, 0xb7566419, 0xf654efc5, 0xd08d58b7, 0x48925401, 0xc1bacb7f, 0xe5ff550f, 0xb6083049, 0x5bb5d0e8, 0x87d72e5a, 0xab6a6ee1, 0x223a66ce, 0xc62bf3cd, 0x9e0885f9, 0x68cb3e47, 0x086c010f, 0xa21de820, 0xd18b69de, 0xf3f65777, 0xfa02c3f6, 0x407edac3, 0xcbb3d550, 0x1793084d, 0xb0d70eba, 0x0ab378d5, 0xd951fb0c, 0xded7da56, 0x4124bbe4, 0x94ca0b56, 0x0f5755d1, 0xe0e1e56e, 0x6184b5be, 0x580a249f, 0x94f74bc0, 0xe327888e, 0x9f7b5561, 0xc3dc0280, 0x05687715, 0x646c6bd7, 0x44904db3, 0x66b4f0a3, 0xc0f1648a, 0x697ed5af, 0x49e92ff6, 0x309e374f, 0x2cb6356a, 0x85808573, 0x4991f840, 0x76f0ae02, 0x083be84d, 0x28421c9a, 0x44489406, 0x736e4cb8, 0xc1092910, 0x8bc95fc6, 0x7d869cf4, 0x134f616f, 0x2e77118d, 0xb31b2be1, 0xaa90b472, 0x3ca5d717, 0x7d161bba, 0x9cad9010, 0xaf462ba2, 0x9fe459d2, 0x45d34559, 0xd9f2da13, 0xdbc65487, 0xf3e4f94e, 0x176d486f, 0x097c13ea, 0x631da5c7, 0x445f7382, 0x175683f4, 0xcdc66a97, 0x70be0288, 0xb3cdcf72, 0x6e5dd2f3, 0x20936079, 0x459b80a5, 0xbe60e2db, 0xa9c23101, 0xeba5315c, 0x224e42f2, 0x1c5c1572, 0xf6721b2c, 0x1ad2fff3, 0x8c25404e, 0x324ed72f, 0x4067b7fd, 0x0523138e, 0x5ca3bc78, 0xdc0fd66e, 0x75922283, 0x784d6b17, 0x58ebb16e, 0x44094f85, 0x3f481d87, 0xfcfeae7b, 0x77b5ff76, 0x8c2302bf, 0xaaf47556, 0x5f46b02a, 0x2b092801, 0x3d38f5f7, 0x0ca81f36, 0x52af4a8a, 0x66d5e7c0, 0xdf3b0874, 0x95055110, 0x1b5ad7a8, 0xf61ed5ad, 0x6cf6e479, 0x20758184, 0xd0cefa65, 0x88f7be58, 0x4a046826, 0x0ff6f8f3, 0xa09c7f70, 0x5346aba0, 0x5ce96c28, 0xe176eda3, 0x6bac307f, 0x376829d2, 0x85360fa9, 0x17e3fe2a, 0x24b79767, 0xf5a96b20, 0xd6cd2595, 0x68ff1ebf, 0x7555442c, 0xf19f06be, 0xf9e0659a, 0xeeb9491d, 0x34010718, 0xbb30cab8, 0xe822fe15, 0x88570983, 0x750e6249, 0xda627e55, 0x5e76ffa8, 0xb1534546, 0x6d47de08, 0xefe9e7d4, }; OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table5[256] = { 0xf6fa8f9d, 0x2cac6ce1, 0x4ca34867, 0xe2337f7c, 0x95db08e7, 0x016843b4, 0xeced5cbc, 0x325553ac, 0xbf9f0960, 0xdfa1e2ed, 0x83f0579d, 0x63ed86b9, 0x1ab6a6b8, 0xde5ebe39, 0xf38ff732, 0x8989b138, 0x33f14961, 0xc01937bd, 0xf506c6da, 0xe4625e7e, 0xa308ea99, 0x4e23e33c, 0x79cbd7cc, 0x48a14367, 0xa3149619, 0xfec94bd5, 0xa114174a, 0xeaa01866, 0xa084db2d, 0x09a8486f, 0xa888614a, 0x2900af98, 0x01665991, 0xe1992863, 0xc8f30c60, 0x2e78ef3c, 0xd0d51932, 0xcf0fec14, 0xf7ca07d2, 0xd0a82072, 0xfd41197e, 0x9305a6b0, 0xe86be3da, 0x74bed3cd, 0x372da53c, 0x4c7f4448, 0xdab5d440, 0x6dba0ec3, 0x083919a7, 0x9fbaeed9, 0x49dbcfb0, 0x4e670c53, 0x5c3d9c01, 0x64bdb941, 0x2c0e636a, 0xba7dd9cd, 0xea6f7388, 0xe70bc762, 0x35f29adb, 0x5c4cdd8d, 0xf0d48d8c, 0xb88153e2, 0x08a19866, 0x1ae2eac8, 0x284caf89, 0xaa928223, 0x9334be53, 0x3b3a21bf, 0x16434be3, 0x9aea3906, 0xefe8c36e, 0xf890cdd9, 0x80226dae, 0xc340a4a3, 0xdf7e9c09, 0xa694a807, 0x5b7c5ecc, 0x221db3a6, 0x9a69a02f, 0x68818a54, 0xceb2296f, 0x53c0843a, 0xfe893655, 0x25bfe68a, 0xb4628abc, 0xcf222ebf, 0x25ac6f48, 0xa9a99387, 0x53bddb65, 0xe76ffbe7, 0xe967fd78, 0x0ba93563, 0x8e342bc1, 0xe8a11be9, 0x4980740d, 0xc8087dfc, 0x8de4bf99, 0xa11101a0, 0x7fd37975, 0xda5a26c0, 0xe81f994f, 0x9528cd89, 0xfd339fed, 0xb87834bf, 0x5f04456d, 0x22258698, 0xc9c4c83b, 0x2dc156be, 0x4f628daa, 0x57f55ec5, 0xe2220abe, 0xd2916ebf, 0x4ec75b95, 0x24f2c3c0, 0x42d15d99, 0xcd0d7fa0, 0x7b6e27ff, 0xa8dc8af0, 0x7345c106, 0xf41e232f, 0x35162386, 0xe6ea8926, 0x3333b094, 0x157ec6f2, 0x372b74af, 0x692573e4, 0xe9a9d848, 0xf3160289, 0x3a62ef1d, 0xa787e238, 0xf3a5f676, 0x74364853, 0x20951063, 0x4576698d, 0xb6fad407, 0x592af950, 0x36f73523, 0x4cfb6e87, 0x7da4cec0, 0x6c152daa, 0xcb0396a8, 0xc50dfe5d, 0xfcd707ab, 0x0921c42f, 0x89dff0bb, 0x5fe2be78, 0x448f4f33, 0x754613c9, 0x2b05d08d, 0x48b9d585, 0xdc049441, 0xc8098f9b, 0x7dede786, 0xc39a3373, 0x42410005, 0x6a091751, 0x0ef3c8a6, 0x890072d6, 0x28207682, 0xa9a9f7be, 0xbf32679d, 0xd45b5b75, 0xb353fd00, 0xcbb0e358, 0x830f220a, 0x1f8fb214, 0xd372cf08, 0xcc3c4a13, 0x8cf63166, 0x061c87be, 0x88c98f88, 0x6062e397, 0x47cf8e7a, 0xb6c85283, 0x3cc2acfb, 0x3fc06976, 0x4e8f0252, 0x64d8314d, 0xda3870e3, 0x1e665459, 0xc10908f0, 0x513021a5, 0x6c5b68b7, 0x822f8aa0, 0x3007cd3e, 0x74719eef, 0xdc872681, 0x073340d4, 0x7e432fd9, 0x0c5ec241, 0x8809286c, 0xf592d891, 0x08a930f6, 0x957ef305, 0xb7fbffbd, 0xc266e96f, 0x6fe4ac98, 0xb173ecc0, 0xbc60b42a, 0x953498da, 0xfba1ae12, 0x2d4bd736, 0x0f25faab, 0xa4f3fceb, 0xe2969123, 0x257f0c3d, 0x9348af49, 0x361400bc, 0xe8816f4a, 0x3814f200, 0xa3f94043, 0x9c7a54c2, 0xbc704f57, 0xda41e7f9, 0xc25ad33a, 0x54f4a084, 0xb17f5505, 0x59357cbe, 0xedbd15c8, 0x7f97c5ab, 0xba5ac7b5, 0xb6f6deaf, 0x3a479c3a, 0x5302da25, 0x653d7e6a, 0x54268d49, 0x51a477ea, 0x5017d55b, 0xd7d25d88, 0x44136c76, 0x0404a8c8, 0xb8e5a121, 0xb81a928a, 0x60ed5869, 0x97c55b96, 0xeaec991b, 0x29935913, 0x01fdb7f1, 0x088e8dfa, 0x9ab6f6f5, 0x3b4cbf9f, 0x4a5de3ab, 0xe6051d35, 0xa0e1d855, 0xd36b4cf1, 0xf544edeb, 0xb0e93524, 0xbebb8fbd, 0xa2d762cf, 0x49c92f54, 0x38b5f331, 0x7128a454, 0x48392905, 0xa65b1db8, 0x851c97bd, 0xd675cf2f, }; OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table6[256] = { 0x85e04019, 0x332bf567, 0x662dbfff, 0xcfc65693, 0x2a8d7f6f, 0xab9bc912, 0xde6008a1, 0x2028da1f, 0x0227bce7, 0x4d642916, 0x18fac300, 0x50f18b82, 0x2cb2cb11, 0xb232e75c, 0x4b3695f2, 0xb28707de, 0xa05fbcf6, 0xcd4181e9, 0xe150210c, 0xe24ef1bd, 0xb168c381, 0xfde4e789, 0x5c79b0d8, 0x1e8bfd43, 0x4d495001, 0x38be4341, 0x913cee1d, 0x92a79c3f, 0x089766be, 0xbaeeadf4, 0x1286becf, 0xb6eacb19, 0x2660c200, 0x7565bde4, 0x64241f7a, 0x8248dca9, 0xc3b3ad66, 0x28136086, 0x0bd8dfa8, 0x356d1cf2, 0x107789be, 0xb3b2e9ce, 0x0502aa8f, 0x0bc0351e, 0x166bf52a, 0xeb12ff82, 0xe3486911, 0xd34d7516, 0x4e7b3aff, 0x5f43671b, 0x9cf6e037, 0x4981ac83, 0x334266ce, 0x8c9341b7, 0xd0d854c0, 0xcb3a6c88, 0x47bc2829, 0x4725ba37, 0xa66ad22b, 0x7ad61f1e, 0x0c5cbafa, 0x4437f107, 0xb6e79962, 0x42d2d816, 0x0a961288, 0xe1a5c06e, 0x13749e67, 0x72fc081a, 0xb1d139f7, 0xf9583745, 0xcf19df58, 0xbec3f756, 0xc06eba30, 0x07211b24, 0x45c28829, 0xc95e317f, 0xbc8ec511, 0x38bc46e9, 0xc6e6fa14, 0xbae8584a, 0xad4ebc46, 0x468f508b, 0x7829435f, 0xf124183b, 0x821dba9f, 0xaff60ff4, 0xea2c4e6d, 0x16e39264, 0x92544a8b, 0x009b4fc3, 0xaba68ced, 0x9ac96f78, 0x06a5b79a, 0xb2856e6e, 0x1aec3ca9, 0xbe838688, 0x0e0804e9, 0x55f1be56, 0xe7e5363b, 0xb3a1f25d, 0xf7debb85, 0x61fe033c, 0x16746233, 0x3c034c28, 0xda6d0c74, 0x79aac56c, 0x3ce4e1ad, 0x51f0c802, 0x98f8f35a, 0x1626a49f, 0xeed82b29, 0x1d382fe3, 0x0c4fb99a, 0xbb325778, 0x3ec6d97b, 0x6e77a6a9, 0xcb658b5c, 0xd45230c7, 0x2bd1408b, 0x60c03eb7, 0xb9068d78, 0xa33754f4, 0xf430c87d, 0xc8a71302, 0xb96d8c32, 0xebd4e7be, 0xbe8b9d2d, 0x7979fb06, 0xe7225308, 0x8b75cf77, 0x11ef8da4, 0xe083c858, 0x8d6b786f, 0x5a6317a6, 0xfa5cf7a0, 0x5dda0033, 0xf28ebfb0, 0xf5b9c310, 0xa0eac280, 0x08b9767a, 0xa3d9d2b0, 0x79d34217, 0x021a718d, 0x9ac6336a, 0x2711fd60, 0x438050e3, 0x069908a8, 0x3d7fedc4, 0x826d2bef, 0x4eeb8476, 0x488dcf25, 0x36c9d566, 0x28e74e41, 0xc2610aca, 0x3d49a9cf, 0xbae3b9df, 0xb65f8de6, 0x92aeaf64, 0x3ac7d5e6, 0x9ea80509, 0xf22b017d, 0xa4173f70, 0xdd1e16c3, 0x15e0d7f9, 0x50b1b887, 0x2b9f4fd5, 0x625aba82, 0x6a017962, 0x2ec01b9c, 0x15488aa9, 0xd716e740, 0x40055a2c, 0x93d29a22, 0xe32dbf9a, 0x058745b9, 0x3453dc1e, 0xd699296e, 0x496cff6f, 0x1c9f4986, 0xdfe2ed07, 0xb87242d1, 0x19de7eae, 0x053e561a, 0x15ad6f8c, 0x66626c1c, 0x7154c24c, 0xea082b2a, 0x93eb2939, 0x17dcb0f0, 0x58d4f2ae, 0x9ea294fb, 0x52cf564c, 0x9883fe66, 0x2ec40581, 0x763953c3, 0x01d6692e, 0xd3a0c108, 0xa1e7160e, 0xe4f2dfa6, 0x693ed285, 0x74904698, 0x4c2b0edd, 0x4f757656, 0x5d393378, 0xa132234f, 0x3d321c5d, 0xc3f5e194, 0x4b269301, 0xc79f022f, 0x3c997e7e, 0x5e4f9504, 0x3ffafbbd, 0x76f7ad0e, 0x296693f4, 0x3d1fce6f, 0xc61e45be, 0xd3b5ab34, 0xf72bf9b7, 0x1b0434c0, 0x4e72b567, 0x5592a33d, 0xb5229301, 0xcfd2a87f, 0x60aeb767, 0x1814386b, 0x30bcc33d, 0x38a0c07d, 0xfd1606f2, 0xc363519b, 0x589dd390, 0x5479f8e6, 0x1cb8d647, 0x97fd61a9, 0xea7759f4, 0x2d57539d, 0x569a58cf, 0xe84e63ad, 0x462e1b78, 0x6580f87e, 0xf3817914, 0x91da55f4, 0x40a230f3, 0xd1988f35, 0xb6e318d2, 0x3ffa50bc, 0x3d40f021, 0xc3c0bdae, 0x4958c24c, 0x518f36b2, 0x84b1d370, 0x0fedce83, 0x878ddada, 0xf2a279c7, 0x94e01be8, 0x90716f4b, 0x954b8aa3, }; OPENSSL_GLOBAL const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table7[256] = { 0xe216300d, 0xbbddfffc, 0xa7ebdabd, 0x35648095, 0x7789f8b7, 0xe6c1121b, 0x0e241600, 0x052ce8b5, 0x11a9cfb0, 0xe5952f11, 0xece7990a, 0x9386d174, 0x2a42931c, 0x76e38111, 0xb12def3a, 0x37ddddfc, 0xde9adeb1, 0x0a0cc32c, 0xbe197029, 0x84a00940, 0xbb243a0f, 0xb4d137cf, 0xb44e79f0, 0x049eedfd, 0x0b15a15d, 0x480d3168, 0x8bbbde5a, 0x669ded42, 0xc7ece831, 0x3f8f95e7, 0x72df191b, 0x7580330d, 0x94074251, 0x5c7dcdfa, 0xabbe6d63, 0xaa402164, 0xb301d40a, 0x02e7d1ca, 0x53571dae, 0x7a3182a2, 0x12a8ddec, 0xfdaa335d, 0x176f43e8, 0x71fb46d4, 0x38129022, 0xce949ad4, 0xb84769ad, 0x965bd862, 0x82f3d055, 0x66fb9767, 0x15b80b4e, 0x1d5b47a0, 0x4cfde06f, 0xc28ec4b8, 0x57e8726e, 0x647a78fc, 0x99865d44, 0x608bd593, 0x6c200e03, 0x39dc5ff6, 0x5d0b00a3, 0xae63aff2, 0x7e8bd632, 0x70108c0c, 0xbbd35049, 0x2998df04, 0x980cf42a, 0x9b6df491, 0x9e7edd53, 0x06918548, 0x58cb7e07, 0x3b74ef2e, 0x522fffb1, 0xd24708cc, 0x1c7e27cd, 0xa4eb215b, 0x3cf1d2e2, 0x19b47a38, 0x424f7618, 0x35856039, 0x9d17dee7, 0x27eb35e6, 0xc9aff67b, 0x36baf5b8, 0x09c467cd, 0xc18910b1, 0xe11dbf7b, 0x06cd1af8, 0x7170c608, 0x2d5e3354, 0xd4de495a, 0x64c6d006, 0xbcc0c62c, 0x3dd00db3, 0x708f8f34, 0x77d51b42, 0x264f620f, 0x24b8d2bf, 0x15c1b79e, 0x46a52564, 0xf8d7e54e, 0x3e378160, 0x7895cda5, 0x859c15a5, 0xe6459788, 0xc37bc75f, 0xdb07ba0c, 0x0676a3ab, 0x7f229b1e, 0x31842e7b, 0x24259fd7, 0xf8bef472, 0x835ffcb8, 0x6df4c1f2, 0x96f5b195, 0xfd0af0fc, 0xb0fe134c, 0xe2506d3d, 0x4f9b12ea, 0xf215f225, 0xa223736f, 0x9fb4c428, 0x25d04979, 0x34c713f8, 0xc4618187, 0xea7a6e98, 0x7cd16efc, 0x1436876c, 0xf1544107, 0xbedeee14, 0x56e9af27, 0xa04aa441, 0x3cf7c899, 0x92ecbae6, 0xdd67016d, 0x151682eb, 0xa842eedf, 0xfdba60b4, 0xf1907b75, 0x20e3030f, 0x24d8c29e, 0xe139673b, 0xefa63fb8, 0x71873054, 0xb6f2cf3b, 0x9f326442, 0xcb15a4cc, 0xb01a4504, 0xf1e47d8d, 0x844a1be5, 0xbae7dfdc, 0x42cbda70, 0xcd7dae0a, 0x57e85b7a, 0xd53f5af6, 0x20cf4d8c, 0xcea4d428, 0x79d130a4, 0x3486ebfb, 0x33d3cddc, 0x77853b53, 0x37effcb5, 0xc5068778, 0xe580b3e6, 0x4e68b8f4, 0xc5c8b37e, 0x0d809ea2, 0x398feb7c, 0x132a4f94, 0x43b7950e, 0x2fee7d1c, 0x223613bd, 0xdd06caa2, 0x37df932b, 0xc4248289, 0xacf3ebc3, 0x5715f6b7, 0xef3478dd, 0xf267616f, 0xc148cbe4, 0x9052815e, 0x5e410fab, 0xb48a2465, 0x2eda7fa4, 0xe87b40e4, 0xe98ea084, 0x5889e9e1, 0xefd390fc, 0xdd07d35b, 0xdb485694, 0x38d7e5b2, 0x57720101, 0x730edebc, 0x5b643113, 0x94917e4f, 0x503c2fba, 0x646f1282, 0x7523d24a, 0xe0779695, 0xf9c17a8f, 0x7a5b2121, 0xd187b896, 0x29263a4d, 0xba510cdf, 0x81f47c9f, 0xad1163ed, 0xea7b5965, 0x1a00726e, 0x11403092, 0x00da6d77, 0x4a0cdd61, 0xad1f4603, 0x605bdfb0, 0x9eedc364, 0x22ebe6a8, 0xcee7d28a, 0xa0e736a0, 0x5564a6b9, 0x10853209, 0xc7eb8f37, 0x2de705ca, 0x8951570f, 0xdf09822b, 0xbd691a6c, 0xaa12e4f2, 0x87451c0f, 0xe0f6a27a, 0x3ada4819, 0x4cf1764f, 0x0d771c2b, 0x67cdb156, 0x350d8384, 0x5938fa0f, 0x42399ef3, 0x36997b07, 0x0e84093d, 0x4aa93e61, 0x8360d87b, 0x1fa98b0c, 0x1149382c, 0xe97625a5, 0x0614d1b7, 0x0e25244b, 0x0c768347, 0x589e8d82, 0x0d2059d1, 0xa466bb1e, 0xf8da0a82, 0x04f19130, 0xba6e4ec0, 0x99265164, 0x1ee7230d, 0x50b2ad80, 0xeaee6801, 0x8db2a283, 0xea8bf59e, }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/c_skey.c0000644000000000000000000001054513176625656015762 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "cast_lcl.h" #include "cast_s.h" #define CAST_exp(l,A,a,n) \ A[n/4]=l; \ a[n+3]=(l )&0xff; \ a[n+2]=(l>> 8)&0xff; \ a[n+1]=(l>>16)&0xff; \ a[n+0]=(l>>24)&0xff; #define S4 CAST_S_table4 #define S5 CAST_S_table5 #define S6 CAST_S_table6 #define S7 CAST_S_table7 void CAST_set_key(CAST_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data) { CAST_LONG x[16]; CAST_LONG z[16]; CAST_LONG k[32]; CAST_LONG X[4], Z[4]; CAST_LONG l, *K; int i; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) x[i] = 0; if (len > 16) len = 16; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) x[i] = data[i]; if (len <= 10) key->short_key = 1; else key->short_key = 0; K = &k[0]; X[0] = ((x[0] << 24) | (x[1] << 16) | (x[2] << 8) | x[3]) & 0xffffffffL; X[1] = ((x[4] << 24) | (x[5] << 16) | (x[6] << 8) | x[7]) & 0xffffffffL; X[2] = ((x[8] << 24) | (x[9] << 16) | (x[10] << 8) | x[11]) & 0xffffffffL; X[3] = ((x[12] << 24) | (x[13] << 16) | (x[14] << 8) | x[15]) & 0xffffffffL; for (;;) { l = X[0] ^ S4[x[13]] ^ S5[x[15]] ^ S6[x[12]] ^ S7[x[14]] ^ S6[x[8]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 0); l = X[2] ^ S4[z[0]] ^ S5[z[2]] ^ S6[z[1]] ^ S7[z[3]] ^ S7[x[10]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 4); l = X[3] ^ S4[z[7]] ^ S5[z[6]] ^ S6[z[5]] ^ S7[z[4]] ^ S4[x[9]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 8); l = X[1] ^ S4[z[10]] ^ S5[z[9]] ^ S6[z[11]] ^ S7[z[8]] ^ S5[x[11]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 12); K[0] = S4[z[8]] ^ S5[z[9]] ^ S6[z[7]] ^ S7[z[6]] ^ S4[z[2]]; K[1] = S4[z[10]] ^ S5[z[11]] ^ S6[z[5]] ^ S7[z[4]] ^ S5[z[6]]; K[2] = S4[z[12]] ^ S5[z[13]] ^ S6[z[3]] ^ S7[z[2]] ^ S6[z[9]]; K[3] = S4[z[14]] ^ S5[z[15]] ^ S6[z[1]] ^ S7[z[0]] ^ S7[z[12]]; l = Z[2] ^ S4[z[5]] ^ S5[z[7]] ^ S6[z[4]] ^ S7[z[6]] ^ S6[z[0]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 0); l = Z[0] ^ S4[x[0]] ^ S5[x[2]] ^ S6[x[1]] ^ S7[x[3]] ^ S7[z[2]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 4); l = Z[1] ^ S4[x[7]] ^ S5[x[6]] ^ S6[x[5]] ^ S7[x[4]] ^ S4[z[1]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 8); l = Z[3] ^ S4[x[10]] ^ S5[x[9]] ^ S6[x[11]] ^ S7[x[8]] ^ S5[z[3]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 12); K[4] = S4[x[3]] ^ S5[x[2]] ^ S6[x[12]] ^ S7[x[13]] ^ S4[x[8]]; K[5] = S4[x[1]] ^ S5[x[0]] ^ S6[x[14]] ^ S7[x[15]] ^ S5[x[13]]; K[6] = S4[x[7]] ^ S5[x[6]] ^ S6[x[8]] ^ S7[x[9]] ^ S6[x[3]]; K[7] = S4[x[5]] ^ S5[x[4]] ^ S6[x[10]] ^ S7[x[11]] ^ S7[x[7]]; l = X[0] ^ S4[x[13]] ^ S5[x[15]] ^ S6[x[12]] ^ S7[x[14]] ^ S6[x[8]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 0); l = X[2] ^ S4[z[0]] ^ S5[z[2]] ^ S6[z[1]] ^ S7[z[3]] ^ S7[x[10]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 4); l = X[3] ^ S4[z[7]] ^ S5[z[6]] ^ S6[z[5]] ^ S7[z[4]] ^ S4[x[9]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 8); l = X[1] ^ S4[z[10]] ^ S5[z[9]] ^ S6[z[11]] ^ S7[z[8]] ^ S5[x[11]]; CAST_exp(l, Z, z, 12); K[8] = S4[z[3]] ^ S5[z[2]] ^ S6[z[12]] ^ S7[z[13]] ^ S4[z[9]]; K[9] = S4[z[1]] ^ S5[z[0]] ^ S6[z[14]] ^ S7[z[15]] ^ S5[z[12]]; K[10] = S4[z[7]] ^ S5[z[6]] ^ S6[z[8]] ^ S7[z[9]] ^ S6[z[2]]; K[11] = S4[z[5]] ^ S5[z[4]] ^ S6[z[10]] ^ S7[z[11]] ^ S7[z[6]]; l = Z[2] ^ S4[z[5]] ^ S5[z[7]] ^ S6[z[4]] ^ S7[z[6]] ^ S6[z[0]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 0); l = Z[0] ^ S4[x[0]] ^ S5[x[2]] ^ S6[x[1]] ^ S7[x[3]] ^ S7[z[2]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 4); l = Z[1] ^ S4[x[7]] ^ S5[x[6]] ^ S6[x[5]] ^ S7[x[4]] ^ S4[z[1]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 8); l = Z[3] ^ S4[x[10]] ^ S5[x[9]] ^ S6[x[11]] ^ S7[x[8]] ^ S5[z[3]]; CAST_exp(l, X, x, 12); K[12] = S4[x[8]] ^ S5[x[9]] ^ S6[x[7]] ^ S7[x[6]] ^ S4[x[3]]; K[13] = S4[x[10]] ^ S5[x[11]] ^ S6[x[5]] ^ S7[x[4]] ^ S5[x[7]]; K[14] = S4[x[12]] ^ S5[x[13]] ^ S6[x[3]] ^ S7[x[2]] ^ S6[x[8]]; K[15] = S4[x[14]] ^ S5[x[15]] ^ S6[x[1]] ^ S7[x[0]] ^ S7[x[13]]; if (K != k) break; K += 16; } for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { key->data[i * 2] = k[i]; key->data[i * 2 + 1] = ((k[i + 16]) + 16) & 0x1f; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/c_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000773313176625656015561 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "cast_lcl.h" void CAST_encrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key) { CAST_LONG l, r, t; const CAST_LONG *k; k = &(key->data[0]); l = data[0]; r = data[1]; E_CAST(0, k, l, r, +, ^, -); E_CAST(1, k, r, l, ^, -, +); E_CAST(2, k, l, r, -, +, ^); E_CAST(3, k, r, l, +, ^, -); E_CAST(4, k, l, r, ^, -, +); E_CAST(5, k, r, l, -, +, ^); E_CAST(6, k, l, r, +, ^, -); E_CAST(7, k, r, l, ^, -, +); E_CAST(8, k, l, r, -, +, ^); E_CAST(9, k, r, l, +, ^, -); E_CAST(10, k, l, r, ^, -, +); E_CAST(11, k, r, l, -, +, ^); if (!key->short_key) { E_CAST(12, k, l, r, +, ^, -); E_CAST(13, k, r, l, ^, -, +); E_CAST(14, k, l, r, -, +, ^); E_CAST(15, k, r, l, +, ^, -); } data[1] = l & 0xffffffffL; data[0] = r & 0xffffffffL; } void CAST_decrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key) { CAST_LONG l, r, t; const CAST_LONG *k; k = &(key->data[0]); l = data[0]; r = data[1]; if (!key->short_key) { E_CAST(15, k, l, r, +, ^, -); E_CAST(14, k, r, l, -, +, ^); E_CAST(13, k, l, r, ^, -, +); E_CAST(12, k, r, l, +, ^, -); } E_CAST(11, k, l, r, -, +, ^); E_CAST(10, k, r, l, ^, -, +); E_CAST(9, k, l, r, +, ^, -); E_CAST(8, k, r, l, -, +, ^); E_CAST(7, k, l, r, ^, -, +); E_CAST(6, k, r, l, +, ^, -); E_CAST(5, k, l, r, -, +, ^); E_CAST(4, k, r, l, ^, -, +); E_CAST(3, k, l, r, +, ^, -); E_CAST(2, k, r, l, -, +, ^); E_CAST(1, k, l, r, ^, -, +); E_CAST(0, k, r, l, +, ^, -); data[1] = l & 0xffffffffL; data[0] = r & 0xffffffffL; } void CAST_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const CAST_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int enc) { register CAST_LONG tin0, tin1; register CAST_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register long l = length; CAST_LONG tin[2]; if (enc) { n2l(iv, tout0); n2l(iv, tout1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; CAST_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; CAST_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); } l2n(tout0, iv); l2n(tout1, iv); } else { n2l(iv, xor0); n2l(iv, xor1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; CAST_decrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; CAST_decrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } l2n(xor0, iv); l2n(xor1, iv); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/c_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000142213176625656015532 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "cast_lcl.h" #include void CAST_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAST_KEY *ks, int enc) { CAST_LONG l, d[2]; n2l(in, l); d[0] = l; n2l(in, l); d[1] = l; if (enc) CAST_encrypt(d, ks); else CAST_decrypt(d, ks); l = d[0]; l2n(l, out); l = d[1]; l2n(l, out); l = d[0] = d[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/cast/cast_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000002026313176625656016274 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "e_os.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 # include #endif #undef c2l #define c2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ #undef c2ln #define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } #undef l2c #define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ #undef l2cn #define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */ #define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */ #define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ } \ } #undef n2l #define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) #undef l2n #define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && defined(_MSC_VER) # define ROTL(a,n) (_lrotl(a,n)) #else # define ROTL(a,n) ((((a)<<(n))&0xffffffffL)|((a)>>((32-(n))&31))) #endif #define C_M 0x3fc #define C_0 22L #define C_1 14L #define C_2 6L #define C_3 2L /* left shift */ /* The rotate has an extra 16 added to it to help the x86 asm */ #if defined(CAST_PTR) # define E_CAST(n,key,L,R,OP1,OP2,OP3) \ { \ int i; \ t=(key[n*2] OP1 R)&0xffffffffL; \ i=key[n*2+1]; \ t=ROTL(t,i); \ L^= (((((*(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *) \ CAST_S_table0+((t>>C_2)&C_M)) OP2 \ *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *) \ CAST_S_table1+((t<>C_0)&C_M)))&0xffffffffL) OP1 \ *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *) \ CAST_S_table3+((t>>C_1)&C_M)))&0xffffffffL; \ } #elif defined(CAST_PTR2) # define E_CAST(n,key,L,R,OP1,OP2,OP3) \ { \ int i; \ CAST_LONG u,v,w; \ w=(key[n*2] OP1 R)&0xffffffffL; \ i=key[n*2+1]; \ w=ROTL(w,i); \ u=w>>C_2; \ v=w<>C_0; \ t=(t OP2 *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *)CAST_S_table1+v))&0xffffffffL;\ v=w>>C_1; \ u&=C_M; \ v&=C_M; \ t=(t OP3 *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *)CAST_S_table2+u)&0xffffffffL);\ t=(t OP1 *(CAST_LONG *)((unsigned char *)CAST_S_table3+v)&0xffffffffL);\ L^=(t&0xffffffff); \ } #else # define E_CAST(n,key,L,R,OP1,OP2,OP3) \ { \ CAST_LONG a,b,c,d; \ t=(key[n*2] OP1 R)&0xffffffff; \ t=ROTL(t,(key[n*2+1])); \ a=CAST_S_table0[(t>> 8)&0xff]; \ b=CAST_S_table1[(t )&0xff]; \ c=CAST_S_table2[(t>>24)&0xff]; \ d=CAST_S_table3[(t>>16)&0xff]; \ L^=(((((a OP2 b)&0xffffffffL) OP3 c)&0xffffffffL) OP1 d)&0xffffffffL; \ } #endif extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table0[256]; extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table1[256]; extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table2[256]; extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table3[256]; extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table4[256]; extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table5[256]; extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table6[256]; extern const CAST_LONG CAST_S_table7[256]; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/LPdir_win.c0000644000000000000000000001545713176625656015451 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include #include "internal/numbers.h" #ifndef LPDIR_H # include "LPdir.h" #endif /* * We're most likely overcautious here, but let's reserve for broken WinCE * headers and explicitly opt for UNICODE call. Keep in mind that our WinCE * builds are compiled with -DUNICODE [as well as -D_UNICODE]. */ #if defined(LP_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(FindFirstFile) # define FindFirstFile FindFirstFileW #endif #if defined(LP_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(FindNextFile) # define FindNextFile FindNextFileW #endif #ifndef NAME_MAX # define NAME_MAX 255 #endif #ifdef CP_UTF8 # define CP_DEFAULT CP_UTF8 #else # define CP_DEFAULT CP_ACP #endif struct LP_dir_context_st { WIN32_FIND_DATA ctx; HANDLE handle; char entry_name[NAME_MAX + 1]; }; const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory) { if (ctx == NULL || directory == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } errno = 0; if (*ctx == NULL) { size_t dirlen = strlen(directory); if (dirlen == 0 || dirlen > INT_MAX - 3) { errno = ENOENT; return 0; } *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx)); if (*ctx == NULL) { errno = ENOMEM; return 0; } memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char)) { TCHAR *wdir = NULL; /* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */ size_t index = 0, len_0 = dirlen + 1; #ifdef LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE int sz = 0; UINT cp; do { # ifdef CP_UTF8 if ((sz = MultiByteToWideChar((cp = CP_UTF8), 0, directory, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0 || GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION) break; # endif sz = MultiByteToWideChar((cp = CP_ACP), 0, directory, len_0, NULL, 0); } while (0); if (sz > 0) { /* * allocate two additional characters in case we need to * concatenate asterisk, |sz| covers trailing '\0'! */ wdir = _alloca((sz + 2) * sizeof(TCHAR)); if (!MultiByteToWideChar(cp, 0, directory, len_0, (WCHAR *)wdir, sz)) { free(*ctx); *ctx = NULL; errno = EINVAL; return 0; } } else #endif { sz = len_0; /* * allocate two additional characters in case we need to * concatenate asterisk, |sz| covers trailing '\0'! */ wdir = _alloca((sz + 2) * sizeof(TCHAR)); for (index = 0; index < len_0; index++) wdir[index] = (TCHAR)directory[index]; } sz--; /* wdir[sz] is trailing '\0' now */ if (wdir[sz - 1] != TEXT('*')) { if (wdir[sz - 1] != TEXT('/') && wdir[sz - 1] != TEXT('\\')) _tcscpy(wdir + sz, TEXT("/*")); else _tcscpy(wdir + sz, TEXT("*")); } (*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile(wdir, &(*ctx)->ctx); } else { if (directory[dirlen - 1] != '*') { char *buf = _alloca(dirlen + 3); strcpy(buf, directory); if (buf[dirlen - 1] != '/' && buf[dirlen - 1] != '\\') strcpy(buf + dirlen, "/*"); else strcpy(buf + dirlen, "*"); directory = buf; } (*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)directory, &(*ctx)->ctx); } if ((*ctx)->handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { free(*ctx); *ctx = NULL; errno = EINVAL; return 0; } } else { if (FindNextFile((*ctx)->handle, &(*ctx)->ctx) == FALSE) { return 0; } } if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char)) { TCHAR *wdir = (*ctx)->ctx.cFileName; size_t index, len_0 = 0; while (wdir[len_0] && len_0 < (sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1)) len_0++; len_0++; #ifdef LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE if (!WideCharToMultiByte(CP_DEFAULT, 0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0, (*ctx)->entry_name, sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name), NULL, 0)) #endif for (index = 0; index < len_0; index++) (*ctx)->entry_name[index] = (char)wdir[index]; } else strncpy((*ctx)->entry_name, (const char *)(*ctx)->ctx.cFileName, sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1); (*ctx)->entry_name[sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1] = '\0'; return (*ctx)->entry_name; } int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx) { if (ctx != NULL && *ctx != NULL) { FindClose((*ctx)->handle); free(*ctx); *ctx = NULL; return 1; } errno = EINVAL; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014542 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/build.info0000644000000000000000000000014313176625656016514 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ blake2b.c blake2s.c m_blake2b.c m_blake2s.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/blake2b.c0000644000000000000000000002024713176625656016215 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves. * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations * can be found at https://blake2.net. */ #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include "blake2_locl.h" #include "blake2_impl.h" static const uint64_t blake2b_IV[8] = { 0x6a09e667f3bcc908U, 0xbb67ae8584caa73bU, 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bU, 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1U, 0x510e527fade682d1U, 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fU, 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bU, 0x5be0cd19137e2179U }; static const uint8_t blake2b_sigma[12][16] = { { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 } , { 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 } , { 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 } , { 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 } , { 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 } , { 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 } , { 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 } , { 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 } , { 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 } , { 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13 , 0 } , { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 } , { 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 } }; /* Set that it's the last block we'll compress */ static ossl_inline void blake2b_set_lastblock(BLAKE2B_CTX *S) { S->f[0] = -1; } /* Initialize the hashing state. */ static ossl_inline void blake2b_init0(BLAKE2B_CTX *S) { int i; memset(S, 0, sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX)); for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { S->h[i] = blake2b_IV[i]; } } /* init xors IV with input parameter block */ static void blake2b_init_param(BLAKE2B_CTX *S, const BLAKE2B_PARAM *P) { size_t i; const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)(P); blake2b_init0(S); /* The param struct is carefully hand packed, and should be 64 bytes on * every platform. */ assert(sizeof(BLAKE2B_PARAM) == 64); /* IV XOR ParamBlock */ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { S->h[i] ^= load64(p + sizeof(S->h[i]) * i); } } /* Initialize the hashing context. Always returns 1. */ int BLAKE2b_Init(BLAKE2B_CTX *c) { BLAKE2B_PARAM P[1]; P->digest_length = BLAKE2B_DIGEST_LENGTH; P->key_length = 0; P->fanout = 1; P->depth = 1; store32(P->leaf_length, 0); store64(P->node_offset, 0); P->node_depth = 0; P->inner_length = 0; memset(P->reserved, 0, sizeof(P->reserved)); memset(P->salt, 0, sizeof(P->salt)); memset(P->personal, 0, sizeof(P->personal)); blake2b_init_param(c, P); return 1; } /* Permute the state while xoring in the block of data. */ static void blake2b_compress(BLAKE2B_CTX *S, const uint8_t *blocks, size_t len) { uint64_t m[16]; uint64_t v[16]; int i; size_t increment; /* * There are two distinct usage vectors for this function: * * a) BLAKE2b_Update uses it to process complete blocks, * possibly more than one at a time; * * b) BLAK2b_Final uses it to process last block, always * single but possibly incomplete, in which case caller * pads input with zeros. */ assert(len < BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES || len % BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES == 0); /* * Since last block is always processed with separate call, * |len| not being multiple of complete blocks can be observed * only with |len| being less than BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ("less" * including even zero), which is why following assignment doesn't * have to reside inside the main loop below. */ increment = len < BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ? len : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { v[i] = S->h[i]; } do { for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { m[i] = load64(blocks + i * sizeof(m[i])); } /* blake2b_increment_counter */ S->t[0] += increment; S->t[1] += (S->t[0] < increment); v[8] = blake2b_IV[0]; v[9] = blake2b_IV[1]; v[10] = blake2b_IV[2]; v[11] = blake2b_IV[3]; v[12] = S->t[0] ^ blake2b_IV[4]; v[13] = S->t[1] ^ blake2b_IV[5]; v[14] = S->f[0] ^ blake2b_IV[6]; v[15] = S->f[1] ^ blake2b_IV[7]; #define G(r,i,a,b,c,d) \ do { \ a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2*i+0]]; \ d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32); \ c = c + d; \ b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24); \ a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2*i+1]]; \ d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16); \ c = c + d; \ b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63); \ } while (0) #define ROUND(r) \ do { \ G(r,0,v[ 0],v[ 4],v[ 8],v[12]); \ G(r,1,v[ 1],v[ 5],v[ 9],v[13]); \ G(r,2,v[ 2],v[ 6],v[10],v[14]); \ G(r,3,v[ 3],v[ 7],v[11],v[15]); \ G(r,4,v[ 0],v[ 5],v[10],v[15]); \ G(r,5,v[ 1],v[ 6],v[11],v[12]); \ G(r,6,v[ 2],v[ 7],v[ 8],v[13]); \ G(r,7,v[ 3],v[ 4],v[ 9],v[14]); \ } while (0) #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) /* 3x size reduction on x86_64, almost 7x on ARMv8, 9x on ARMv4 */ for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) { ROUND(i); } #else ROUND(0); ROUND(1); ROUND(2); ROUND(3); ROUND(4); ROUND(5); ROUND(6); ROUND(7); ROUND(8); ROUND(9); ROUND(10); ROUND(11); #endif for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { S->h[i] = v[i] ^= v[i + 8] ^ S->h[i]; } #undef G #undef ROUND blocks += increment; len -= increment; } while (len); } /* Absorb the input data into the hash state. Always returns 1. */ int BLAKE2b_Update(BLAKE2B_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen) { const uint8_t *in = data; size_t fill; /* * Intuitively one would expect intermediate buffer, c->buf, to * store incomplete blocks. But in this case we are interested to * temporarily stash even complete blocks, because last one in the * stream has to be treated in special way, and at this point we * don't know if last block in *this* call is last one "ever". This * is the reason for why |datalen| is compared as >, and not >=. */ fill = sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen; if (datalen > fill) { if (c->buflen) { memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, fill); /* Fill buffer */ blake2b_compress(c, c->buf, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES); c->buflen = 0; in += fill; datalen -= fill; } if (datalen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) { size_t stashlen = datalen % BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; /* * If |datalen| is a multiple of the blocksize, stash * last complete block, it can be final one... */ stashlen = stashlen ? stashlen : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; datalen -= stashlen; blake2b_compress(c, in, datalen); in += datalen; datalen = stashlen; } } assert(datalen <= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES); memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, datalen); c->buflen += datalen; /* Be lazy, do not compress */ return 1; } /* * Calculate the final hash and save it in md. * Always returns 1. */ int BLAKE2b_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2B_CTX *c) { int i; blake2b_set_lastblock(c); /* Padding */ memset(c->buf + c->buflen, 0, sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen); blake2b_compress(c, c->buf, c->buflen); /* Output full hash to message digest */ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { store64(md + sizeof(c->h[i]) * i, c->h[i]); } OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX)); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/m_blake2s.c0000644000000000000000000000254713176625656016555 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves. * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations * can be found at https://blake2.net. */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 # include # include # include "blake2_locl.h" # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return BLAKE2s_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return BLAKE2s_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return BLAKE2s_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD blake2s_md = { NID_blake2s256, 0, BLAKE2S_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(BLAKE2S_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2s256(void) { return (&blake2s_md); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/blake2_impl.h0000644000000000000000000000627513176625656017106 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves. * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations * can be found at https://blake2.net. */ #include #include "e_os.h" static ossl_inline uint32_t load32(const uint8_t *src) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (is_endian.little) { uint32_t w; memcpy(&w, src, sizeof(w)); return w; } else { uint32_t w = ((uint32_t)src[0]) | ((uint32_t)src[1] << 8) | ((uint32_t)src[2] << 16) | ((uint32_t)src[3] << 24); return w; } } static ossl_inline uint64_t load64(const uint8_t *src) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (is_endian.little) { uint64_t w; memcpy(&w, src, sizeof(w)); return w; } else { uint64_t w = ((uint64_t)src[0]) | ((uint64_t)src[1] << 8) | ((uint64_t)src[2] << 16) | ((uint64_t)src[3] << 24) | ((uint64_t)src[4] << 32) | ((uint64_t)src[5] << 40) | ((uint64_t)src[6] << 48) | ((uint64_t)src[7] << 56); return w; } } static ossl_inline void store32(uint8_t *dst, uint32_t w) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (is_endian.little) { memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof(w)); } else { uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst; int i; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) p[i] = (uint8_t)(w >> (8 * i)); } } static ossl_inline void store64(uint8_t *dst, uint64_t w) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (is_endian.little) { memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof(w)); } else { uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst; int i; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) p[i] = (uint8_t)(w >> (8 * i)); } } static ossl_inline uint64_t load48(const uint8_t *src) { uint64_t w = ((uint64_t)src[0]) | ((uint64_t)src[1] << 8) | ((uint64_t)src[2] << 16) | ((uint64_t)src[3] << 24) | ((uint64_t)src[4] << 32) | ((uint64_t)src[5] << 40); return w; } static ossl_inline void store48(uint8_t *dst, uint64_t w) { uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst; p[0] = (uint8_t)w; p[1] = (uint8_t)(w>>8); p[2] = (uint8_t)(w>>16); p[3] = (uint8_t)(w>>24); p[4] = (uint8_t)(w>>32); p[5] = (uint8_t)(w>>40); } static ossl_inline uint32_t rotr32(const uint32_t w, const unsigned int c) { return (w >> c) | (w << (32 - c)); } static ossl_inline uint64_t rotr64(const uint64_t w, const unsigned int c) { return (w >> c) | (w << (64 - c)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/blake2s.c0000644000000000000000000001754613176625656016246 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves. * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations * can be found at https://blake2.net. */ #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include "blake2_locl.h" #include "blake2_impl.h" static const uint32_t blake2s_IV[8] = { 0x6A09E667U, 0xBB67AE85U, 0x3C6EF372U, 0xA54FF53AU, 0x510E527FU, 0x9B05688CU, 0x1F83D9ABU, 0x5BE0CD19U }; static const uint8_t blake2s_sigma[10][16] = { { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 } , { 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 } , { 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 } , { 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 } , { 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 } , { 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 } , { 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 } , { 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 } , { 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 } , { 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13 , 0 } , }; /* Set that it's the last block we'll compress */ static ossl_inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(BLAKE2S_CTX *S) { S->f[0] = -1; } /* Initialize the hashing state. */ static ossl_inline void blake2s_init0(BLAKE2S_CTX *S) { int i; memset(S, 0, sizeof(BLAKE2S_CTX)); for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { S->h[i] = blake2s_IV[i]; } } /* init2 xors IV with input parameter block */ static void blake2s_init_param(BLAKE2S_CTX *S, const BLAKE2S_PARAM *P) { const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)(P); size_t i; /* The param struct is carefully hand packed, and should be 32 bytes on * every platform. */ assert(sizeof(BLAKE2S_PARAM) == 32); blake2s_init0(S); /* IV XOR ParamBlock */ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { S->h[i] ^= load32(&p[i*4]); } } /* Initialize the hashing context. Always returns 1. */ int BLAKE2s_Init(BLAKE2S_CTX *c) { BLAKE2S_PARAM P[1]; P->digest_length = BLAKE2S_DIGEST_LENGTH; P->key_length = 0; P->fanout = 1; P->depth = 1; store32(P->leaf_length, 0); store48(P->node_offset, 0); P->node_depth = 0; P->inner_length = 0; memset(P->salt, 0, sizeof(P->salt)); memset(P->personal, 0, sizeof(P->personal)); blake2s_init_param(c, P); return 1; } /* Permute the state while xoring in the block of data. */ static void blake2s_compress(BLAKE2S_CTX *S, const uint8_t *blocks, size_t len) { uint32_t m[16]; uint32_t v[16]; size_t i; size_t increment; /* * There are two distinct usage vectors for this function: * * a) BLAKE2s_Update uses it to process complete blocks, * possibly more than one at a time; * * b) BLAK2s_Final uses it to process last block, always * single but possibly incomplete, in which case caller * pads input with zeros. */ assert(len < BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES || len % BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES == 0); /* * Since last block is always processed with separate call, * |len| not being multiple of complete blocks can be observed * only with |len| being less than BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ("less" * including even zero), which is why following assignment doesn't * have to reside inside the main loop below. */ increment = len < BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ? len : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { v[i] = S->h[i]; } do { for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { m[i] = load32(blocks + i * sizeof(m[i])); } /* blake2s_increment_counter */ S->t[0] += increment; S->t[1] += (S->t[0] < increment); v[ 8] = blake2s_IV[0]; v[ 9] = blake2s_IV[1]; v[10] = blake2s_IV[2]; v[11] = blake2s_IV[3]; v[12] = S->t[0] ^ blake2s_IV[4]; v[13] = S->t[1] ^ blake2s_IV[5]; v[14] = S->f[0] ^ blake2s_IV[6]; v[15] = S->f[1] ^ blake2s_IV[7]; #define G(r,i,a,b,c,d) \ do { \ a = a + b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2*i+0]]; \ d = rotr32(d ^ a, 16); \ c = c + d; \ b = rotr32(b ^ c, 12); \ a = a + b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2*i+1]]; \ d = rotr32(d ^ a, 8); \ c = c + d; \ b = rotr32(b ^ c, 7); \ } while (0) #define ROUND(r) \ do { \ G(r,0,v[ 0],v[ 4],v[ 8],v[12]); \ G(r,1,v[ 1],v[ 5],v[ 9],v[13]); \ G(r,2,v[ 2],v[ 6],v[10],v[14]); \ G(r,3,v[ 3],v[ 7],v[11],v[15]); \ G(r,4,v[ 0],v[ 5],v[10],v[15]); \ G(r,5,v[ 1],v[ 6],v[11],v[12]); \ G(r,6,v[ 2],v[ 7],v[ 8],v[13]); \ G(r,7,v[ 3],v[ 4],v[ 9],v[14]); \ } while (0) #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) /* almost 3x reduction on x86_64, 4.5x on ARMv8, 4x on ARMv4 */ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { ROUND(i); } #else ROUND(0); ROUND(1); ROUND(2); ROUND(3); ROUND(4); ROUND(5); ROUND(6); ROUND(7); ROUND(8); ROUND(9); #endif for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { S->h[i] = v[i] ^= v[i + 8] ^ S->h[i]; } #undef G #undef ROUND blocks += increment; len -= increment; } while (len); } /* Absorb the input data into the hash state. Always returns 1. */ int BLAKE2s_Update(BLAKE2S_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen) { const uint8_t *in = data; size_t fill; /* * Intuitively one would expect intermediate buffer, c->buf, to * store incomplete blocks. But in this case we are interested to * temporarily stash even complete blocks, because last one in the * stream has to be treated in special way, and at this point we * don't know if last block in *this* call is last one "ever". This * is the reason for why |datalen| is compared as >, and not >=. */ fill = sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen; if (datalen > fill) { if (c->buflen) { memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, fill); /* Fill buffer */ blake2s_compress(c, c->buf, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES); c->buflen = 0; in += fill; datalen -= fill; } if (datalen > BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES) { size_t stashlen = datalen % BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; /* * If |datalen| is a multiple of the blocksize, stash * last complete block, it can be final one... */ stashlen = stashlen ? stashlen : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; datalen -= stashlen; blake2s_compress(c, in, datalen); in += datalen; datalen = stashlen; } } assert(datalen <= BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES); memcpy(c->buf + c->buflen, in, datalen); c->buflen += datalen; /* Be lazy, do not compress */ return 1; } /* * Calculate the final hash and save it in md. * Always returns 1. */ int BLAKE2s_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2S_CTX *c) { int i; blake2s_set_lastblock(c); /* Padding */ memset(c->buf + c->buflen, 0, sizeof(c->buf) - c->buflen); blake2s_compress(c, c->buf, c->buflen); /* Output full hash to temp buffer */ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { store32(md + sizeof(c->h[i]) * i, c->h[i]); } OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(BLAKE2S_CTX)); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/blake2_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000520113176625656017062 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves. * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations * can be found at https://blake2.net. */ #include #include "e_os.h" #define BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES 64 #define BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES 32 #define BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES 32 #define BLAKE2S_SALTBYTES 8 #define BLAKE2S_PERSONALBYTES 8 #define BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES 128 #define BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES 64 #define BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES 64 #define BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES 16 #define BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES 16 struct blake2s_param_st { uint8_t digest_length; /* 1 */ uint8_t key_length; /* 2 */ uint8_t fanout; /* 3 */ uint8_t depth; /* 4 */ uint8_t leaf_length[4];/* 8 */ uint8_t node_offset[6];/* 14 */ uint8_t node_depth; /* 15 */ uint8_t inner_length; /* 16 */ uint8_t salt[BLAKE2S_SALTBYTES]; /* 24 */ uint8_t personal[BLAKE2S_PERSONALBYTES]; /* 32 */ }; typedef struct blake2s_param_st BLAKE2S_PARAM; struct blake2s_ctx_st { uint32_t h[8]; uint32_t t[2]; uint32_t f[2]; uint8_t buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES]; size_t buflen; }; struct blake2b_param_st { uint8_t digest_length; /* 1 */ uint8_t key_length; /* 2 */ uint8_t fanout; /* 3 */ uint8_t depth; /* 4 */ uint8_t leaf_length[4];/* 8 */ uint8_t node_offset[8];/* 16 */ uint8_t node_depth; /* 17 */ uint8_t inner_length; /* 18 */ uint8_t reserved[14]; /* 32 */ uint8_t salt[BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES]; /* 48 */ uint8_t personal[BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES]; /* 64 */ }; typedef struct blake2b_param_st BLAKE2B_PARAM; struct blake2b_ctx_st { uint64_t h[8]; uint64_t t[2]; uint64_t f[2]; uint8_t buf[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES]; size_t buflen; }; #define BLAKE2B_DIGEST_LENGTH 64 #define BLAKE2S_DIGEST_LENGTH 32 typedef struct blake2s_ctx_st BLAKE2S_CTX; typedef struct blake2b_ctx_st BLAKE2B_CTX; int BLAKE2b_Init(BLAKE2B_CTX *c); int BLAKE2b_Update(BLAKE2B_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen); int BLAKE2b_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2B_CTX *c); int BLAKE2s_Init(BLAKE2S_CTX *c); int BLAKE2s_Update(BLAKE2S_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t datalen); int BLAKE2s_Final(unsigned char *md, BLAKE2S_CTX *c); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/blake2/m_blake2b.c0000644000000000000000000000254713176625656016534 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Derived from the BLAKE2 reference implementation written by Samuel Neves. * Copyright 2012, Samuel Neves * More information about the BLAKE2 hash function and its implementations * can be found at https://blake2.net. */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 # include # include # include "blake2_locl.h" # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return BLAKE2b_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return BLAKE2b_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return BLAKE2b_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD blake2b_md = { NID_blake2b512, 0, BLAKE2B_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b512(void) { return (&blake2b_md); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/o_str.c0000644000000000000000000001343313176625657014701 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/o_str.h" int OPENSSL_memcmp(const void *v1, const void *v2, size_t n) { const unsigned char *c1 = v1, *c2 = v2; int ret = 0; while (n && (ret = *c1 - *c2) == 0) n--, c1++, c2++; return ret; } char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char* file, int line) { char *ret; size_t size; if (str == NULL) return NULL; size = strlen(str) + 1; ret = CRYPTO_malloc(size, file, line); if (ret != NULL) memcpy(ret, str, size); return ret; } char *CRYPTO_strndup(const char *str, size_t s, const char* file, int line) { size_t maxlen; char *ret; if (str == NULL) return NULL; maxlen = OPENSSL_strnlen(str, s); ret = CRYPTO_malloc(maxlen + 1, file, line); if (ret) { memcpy(ret, str, maxlen); ret[maxlen] = '\0'; } return ret; } void *CRYPTO_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz, const char* file, int line) { void *ret; if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX) return NULL; ret = CRYPTO_malloc(siz, file, line); if (ret == NULL) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } return memcpy(ret, data, siz); } size_t OPENSSL_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen) { const char *p; for (p = str; maxlen-- != 0 && *p != '\0'; ++p) ; return p - str; } size_t OPENSSL_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size) { size_t l = 0; for (; size > 1 && *src; size--) { *dst++ = *src++; l++; } if (size) *dst = '\0'; return l + strlen(src); } size_t OPENSSL_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size) { size_t l = 0; for (; size > 0 && *dst; size--, dst++) l++; return l + OPENSSL_strlcpy(dst, src, size); } int OPENSSL_hexchar2int(unsigned char c) { #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC c = os_toebcdic[c]; #endif switch (c) { case '0': return 0; case '1': return 1; case '2': return 2; case '3': return 3; case '4': return 4; case '5': return 5; case '6': return 6; case '7': return 7; case '8': return 8; case '9': return 9; case 'a': case 'A': return 0x0A; case 'b': case 'B': return 0x0B; case 'c': case 'C': return 0x0C; case 'd': case 'D': return 0x0D; case 'e': case 'E': return 0x0E; case 'f': case 'F': return 0x0F; } return -1; } /* * Give a string of hex digits convert to a buffer */ unsigned char *OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(const char *str, long *len) { unsigned char *hexbuf, *q; unsigned char ch, cl; int chi, cli; const unsigned char *p; size_t s; s = strlen(str); if ((hexbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(s >> 1)) == NULL) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (p = (const unsigned char *)str, q = hexbuf; *p; ) { ch = *p++; if (ch == ':') continue; cl = *p++; if (!cl) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF, CRYPTO_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS); OPENSSL_free(hexbuf); return NULL; } cli = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(cl); chi = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(ch); if (cli < 0 || chi < 0) { OPENSSL_free(hexbuf); CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF, CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT); return NULL; } *q++ = (unsigned char)((chi << 4) | cli); } if (len) *len = q - hexbuf; return hexbuf; } /* * Given a buffer of length 'len' return a OPENSSL_malloc'ed string with its * hex representation @@@ (Contents of buffer are always kept in ASCII, also * on EBCDIC machines) */ char *OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(const unsigned char *buffer, long len) { static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; char *tmp, *q; const unsigned char *p; int i; if (len == 0) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(1); } if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len * 3)) == NULL) { CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_BUF2HEXSTR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } q = tmp; for (i = 0, p = buffer; i < len; i++, p++) { *q++ = hexdig[(*p >> 4) & 0xf]; *q++ = hexdig[*p & 0xf]; *q++ = ':'; } q[-1] = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(tmp, tmp, q - tmp - 1); #endif return tmp; } int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char *buf, size_t buflen) { #if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400 return !strerror_s(buf, buflen, errnum); #elif defined(_GNU_SOURCE) return strerror_r(errnum, buf, buflen) != NULL; #elif (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L) || \ (defined(_XOPEN_SOURCE) && _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 600) /* * We can use "real" strerror_r. The OpenSSL version differs in that it * gives 1 on success and 0 on failure for consistency with other OpenSSL * functions. Real strerror_r does it the other way around */ return !strerror_r(errnum, buf, buflen); #else char *err; /* Fall back to non-thread safe strerror()...its all we can do */ if (buflen < 2) return 0; err = strerror(errnum); /* Can this ever happen? */ if (err == NULL) return 0; strncpy(buf, err, buflen - 1); buf[buflen - 1] = '\0'; return 1; #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/o_dir.c0000644000000000000000000000207013176625657014642 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include /* * The routines really come from the Levitte Programming, so to make life * simple, let's just use the raw files and hack the symbols to fit our * namespace. */ #define LP_DIR_CTX OPENSSL_DIR_CTX #define LP_dir_context_st OPENSSL_dir_context_st #define LP_find_file OPENSSL_DIR_read #define LP_find_file_end OPENSSL_DIR_end #include "internal/o_dir.h" #define LPDIR_H #if defined OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX || defined DJGPP \ || (defined __VMS_VER && __VMS_VER >= 70000000) # include "LPdir_unix.c" #elif defined OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include "LPdir_vms.c" #elif defined OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 # include "LPdir_win32.c" #elif defined OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE # include "LPdir_wince.c" #else # include "LPdir_nyi.c" #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/err/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014173 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/err/build.info0000644000000000000000000000012113176625657016141 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ err.c err_all.c err_prn.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/err/err.c0000644000000000000000000005150613176625657015136 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void err_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str); static void ERR_STATE_free(ERR_STATE *s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_libraries[] = { {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_NONE, 0, 0), "unknown library"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SYS, 0, 0), "system library"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, 0, 0), "bignum routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, 0), "rsa routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, 0), "Diffie-Hellman routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, 0), "digital envelope routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BUF, 0, 0), "memory buffer routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OBJ, 0, 0), "object identifier routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, 0, 0), "PEM routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, 0), "dsa routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, 0), "x509 certificate routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, 0), "asn1 encoding routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, 0), "configuration file routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, 0), "common libcrypto routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, 0), "elliptic curve routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECDSA, 0, 0), "ECDSA routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECDH, 0, 0), "ECDH routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, 0), "SSL routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BIO, 0, 0), "BIO routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, 0, 0), "PKCS7 routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509V3, 0, 0), "X509 V3 routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, 0, 0), "PKCS12 routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, 0), "random number generator"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSO, 0, 0), "DSO support routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_TS, 0, 0), "time stamp routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, 0, 0), "engine routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OCSP, 0, 0), "OCSP routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI, 0, 0), "UI routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_FIPS, 0, 0), "FIPS routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, 0), "CMS routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_HMAC, 0, 0), "HMAC routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT, 0, 0), "CT routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC, 0, 0), "ASYNC routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, 0), "KDF routines"}, {0, NULL}, }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_functs[] = { {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FOPEN, 0), "fopen"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_CONNECT, 0), "connect"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, 0), "getservbyname"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SOCKET, 0), "socket"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET, 0), "ioctlsocket"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_BIND, 0), "bind"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_LISTEN, 0), "listen"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_ACCEPT, 0), "accept"}, # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, 0), "WSAstartup"}, # endif {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_OPENDIR, 0), "opendir"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FREAD, 0), "fread"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETADDRINFO, 0), "getaddrinfo"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO, 0), "getnameinfo"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, 0), "setsockopt"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT, 0), "getsockopt"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME, 0), "getsockname"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 0), "gethostbyname"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FFLUSH, 0), "fflush"}, {0, NULL}, }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_R_SYS_LIB, "system lib"}, {ERR_R_BN_LIB, "BN lib"}, {ERR_R_RSA_LIB, "RSA lib"}, {ERR_R_DH_LIB, "DH lib"}, {ERR_R_EVP_LIB, "EVP lib"}, {ERR_R_BUF_LIB, "BUF lib"}, {ERR_R_OBJ_LIB, "OBJ lib"}, {ERR_R_PEM_LIB, "PEM lib"}, {ERR_R_DSA_LIB, "DSA lib"}, {ERR_R_X509_LIB, "X509 lib"}, {ERR_R_ASN1_LIB, "ASN1 lib"}, {ERR_R_EC_LIB, "EC lib"}, {ERR_R_BIO_LIB, "BIO lib"}, {ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB, "PKCS7 lib"}, {ERR_R_X509V3_LIB, "X509V3 lib"}, {ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB, "ENGINE lib"}, {ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB, "ECDSA lib"}, {ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR, "nested asn1 error"}, {ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS, "missing asn1 eos"}, {ERR_R_FATAL, "fatal"}, {ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, {ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED, "called a function you should not call"}, {ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "passed a null parameter"}, {ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, "internal error"}, {ERR_R_DISABLED, "called a function that was disabled at compile-time"}, {ERR_R_INIT_FAIL, "init fail"}, {0, NULL}, }; #endif static CRYPTO_ONCE err_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int set_err_thread_local; static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL err_thread_local; static CRYPTO_ONCE err_string_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *err_string_lock; static ERR_STRING_DATA *int_err_get_item(const ERR_STRING_DATA *); /* * The internal state */ static LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA) *int_error_hash = NULL; static int int_err_library_number = ERR_LIB_USER; static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); static unsigned long err_string_data_hash(const ERR_STRING_DATA *a) { unsigned long ret, l; l = a->error; ret = l ^ ERR_GET_LIB(l) ^ ERR_GET_FUNC(l); return (ret ^ ret % 19 * 13); } static int err_string_data_cmp(const ERR_STRING_DATA *a, const ERR_STRING_DATA *b) { return (int)(a->error - b->error); } static ERR_STRING_DATA *int_err_get_item(const ERR_STRING_DATA *d) { ERR_STRING_DATA *p = NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(err_string_lock); if (int_error_hash != NULL) p = lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_retrieve(int_error_hash, d); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return p; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS 127 # define LEN_SYS_STR_REASON 32 static ERR_STRING_DATA SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS + 1]; /* * SYS_str_reasons is filled with copies of strerror() results at * initialization. 'errno' values up to 127 should cover all usual errors, * others will be displayed numerically by ERR_error_string. It is crucial * that we have something for each reason code that occurs in * ERR_str_reasons, or bogus reason strings will be returned for SYSerr(), * which always gets an errno value and never one of those 'standard' reason * codes. */ static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void) { /* OPENSSL_malloc cannot be used here, use static storage instead */ static char strerror_tab[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS][LEN_SYS_STR_REASON]; static int init = 1; int i; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); if (!init) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return; } for (i = 1; i <= NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS; i++) { ERR_STRING_DATA *str = &SYS_str_reasons[i - 1]; str->error = (unsigned long)i; if (str->string == NULL) { char (*dest)[LEN_SYS_STR_REASON] = &(strerror_tab[i - 1]); if (openssl_strerror_r(i, *dest, sizeof(*dest))) str->string = *dest; } if (str->string == NULL) str->string = "unknown"; } /* * Now we still have SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS] = {0, NULL}, as * required by ERR_load_strings. */ init = 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); } #endif #define err_clear_data(p,i) \ do { \ if ((p)->err_data_flags[i] & ERR_TXT_MALLOCED) \ { \ OPENSSL_free((p)->err_data[i]); \ (p)->err_data[i]=NULL; \ } \ (p)->err_data_flags[i]=0; \ } while(0) #define err_clear(p,i) \ do { \ (p)->err_flags[i]=0; \ (p)->err_buffer[i]=0; \ err_clear_data(p,i); \ (p)->err_file[i]=NULL; \ (p)->err_line[i]= -1; \ } while(0) static void ERR_STATE_free(ERR_STATE *s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) { err_clear_data(s, i); } OPENSSL_free(s); } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_err_strings_init) { OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); err_string_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return err_string_lock != NULL; } void err_cleanup(void) { if (set_err_thread_local != 0) CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&err_thread_local); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(err_string_lock); err_string_lock = NULL; } int ERR_load_ERR_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) return 0; err_load_strings(0, ERR_str_libraries); err_load_strings(0, ERR_str_reasons); err_load_strings(ERR_LIB_SYS, ERR_str_functs); build_SYS_str_reasons(); err_load_strings(ERR_LIB_SYS, SYS_str_reasons); #endif return 1; } static void err_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); if (int_error_hash == NULL) int_error_hash = lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_new(err_string_data_hash, err_string_data_cmp); if (int_error_hash != NULL) { for (; str->error; str++) { if (lib) str->error |= ERR_PACK(lib, 0, 0); (void)lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_insert(int_error_hash, str); } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); } int ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { if (ERR_load_ERR_strings() == 0) return 0; err_load_strings(lib, str); return 1; } int ERR_unload_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); if (int_error_hash != NULL) { for (; str->error; str++) { if (lib) str->error |= ERR_PACK(lib, 0, 0); (void)lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_delete(int_error_hash, str); } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return 1; } void err_free_strings_int(void) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) return; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_free(int_error_hash); int_error_hash = NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); } /********************************************************/ void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line) { ERR_STATE *es; #ifdef _OSD_POSIX /* * In the BS2000-OSD POSIX subsystem, the compiler generates path names * in the form "*POSIX(/etc/passwd)". This dirty hack strips them to * something sensible. @@@ We shouldn't modify a const string, though. */ if (strncmp(file, "*POSIX(", sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1) == 0) { char *end; /* Skip the "*POSIX(" prefix */ file += sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1; end = &file[strlen(file) - 1]; if (*end == ')') *end = '\0'; /* Optional: use the basename of the path only. */ if ((end = strrchr(file, '/')) != NULL) file = &end[1]; } #endif es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return; es->top = (es->top + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; if (es->top == es->bottom) es->bottom = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; es->err_flags[es->top] = 0; es->err_buffer[es->top] = ERR_PACK(lib, func, reason); es->err_file[es->top] = file; es->err_line[es->top] = line; err_clear_data(es, es->top); } void ERR_clear_error(void) { int i; ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) { err_clear(es, i); } es->top = es->bottom = 0; } unsigned long ERR_get_error(void) { return (get_error_values(1, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); } unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line) { return (get_error_values(1, 0, file, line, NULL, NULL)); } unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { return (get_error_values(1, 0, file, line, data, flags)); } unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void) { return (get_error_values(0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); } unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line) { return (get_error_values(0, 0, file, line, NULL, NULL)); } unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { return (get_error_values(0, 0, file, line, data, flags)); } unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void) { return (get_error_values(0, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); } unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line) { return (get_error_values(0, 1, file, line, NULL, NULL)); } unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { return (get_error_values(0, 1, file, line, data, flags)); } static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { int i = 0; ERR_STATE *es; unsigned long ret; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; if (inc && top) { if (file) *file = ""; if (line) *line = 0; if (data) *data = ""; if (flags) *flags = 0; return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if (es->bottom == es->top) return 0; if (top) i = es->top; /* last error */ else i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; /* first error */ ret = es->err_buffer[i]; if (inc) { es->bottom = i; es->err_buffer[i] = 0; } if ((file != NULL) && (line != NULL)) { if (es->err_file[i] == NULL) { *file = "NA"; if (line != NULL) *line = 0; } else { *file = es->err_file[i]; if (line != NULL) *line = es->err_line[i]; } } if (data == NULL) { if (inc) { err_clear_data(es, i); } } else { if (es->err_data[i] == NULL) { *data = ""; if (flags != NULL) *flags = 0; } else { *data = es->err_data[i]; if (flags != NULL) *flags = es->err_data_flags[i]; } } return ret; } void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len) { char lsbuf[64], fsbuf[64], rsbuf[64]; const char *ls, *fs, *rs; unsigned long l, f, r; if (len == 0) return; l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e); r = ERR_GET_REASON(e); ls = ERR_lib_error_string(e); fs = ERR_func_error_string(e); rs = ERR_reason_error_string(e); if (ls == NULL) BIO_snprintf(lsbuf, sizeof(lsbuf), "lib(%lu)", l); if (fs == NULL) BIO_snprintf(fsbuf, sizeof(fsbuf), "func(%lu)", f); if (rs == NULL) BIO_snprintf(rsbuf, sizeof(rsbuf), "reason(%lu)", r); BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "error:%08lX:%s:%s:%s", e, ls ? ls : lsbuf, fs ? fs : fsbuf, rs ? rs : rsbuf); if (strlen(buf) == len - 1) { /* * output may be truncated; make sure we always have 5 * colon-separated fields, i.e. 4 colons ... */ #define NUM_COLONS 4 if (len > NUM_COLONS) { /* ... if possible */ int i; char *s = buf; for (i = 0; i < NUM_COLONS; i++) { char *colon = strchr(s, ':'); if (colon == NULL || colon > &buf[len - 1] - NUM_COLONS + i) { /* * set colon no. i at last possible position (buf[len-1] * is the terminating 0) */ colon = &buf[len - 1] - NUM_COLONS + i; *colon = ':'; } s = colon + 1; } } } } /* * ERR_error_string_n should be used instead for ret != NULL as * ERR_error_string cannot know how large the buffer is */ char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *ret) { static char buf[256]; if (ret == NULL) ret = buf; ERR_error_string_n(e, ret, 256); return ret; } const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e) { ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p; unsigned long l; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) { return NULL; } l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); d.error = ERR_PACK(l, 0, 0); p = int_err_get_item(&d); return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string); } const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e) { ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p; unsigned long l, f; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) { return NULL; } l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e); d.error = ERR_PACK(l, f, 0); p = int_err_get_item(&d); return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string); } const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e) { ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p = NULL; unsigned long l, r; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) { return NULL; } l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); r = ERR_GET_REASON(e); d.error = ERR_PACK(l, 0, r); p = int_err_get_item(&d); if (!p) { d.error = ERR_PACK(0, 0, r); p = int_err_get_item(&d); } return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string); } void err_delete_thread_state(void) { ERR_STATE *state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local); if (state == NULL) return; CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, NULL); ERR_STATE_free(state); } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *dummy) { } #endif #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid) { } #endif DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(err_do_init) { set_err_thread_local = 1; return CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&err_thread_local, NULL); } ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void) { ERR_STATE *state = NULL; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_init, err_do_init)) return NULL; state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local); if (state == NULL) { state = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*state)); if (state == NULL) return NULL; if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE) || !CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, state)) { ERR_STATE_free(state); return NULL; } /* Ignore failures from these */ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL); } return state; } int ERR_get_next_error_library(void) { int ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) { return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); ret = int_err_library_number++; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return ret; } void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags) { ERR_STATE *es; int i; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return; i = es->top; err_clear_data(es, i); es->err_data[i] = data; es->err_data_flags[i] = flags; } void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, num); ERR_add_error_vdata(num, args); va_end(args); } void ERR_add_error_vdata(int num, va_list args) { int i, n, s; char *str, *p, *a; s = 80; str = OPENSSL_malloc(s + 1); if (str == NULL) return; str[0] = '\0'; n = 0; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { a = va_arg(args, char *); /* ignore NULLs, thanks to Bob Beck */ if (a != NULL) { n += strlen(a); if (n > s) { s = n + 20; p = OPENSSL_realloc(str, s + 1); if (p == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(str); return; } str = p; } OPENSSL_strlcat(str, a, (size_t)s + 1); } } ERR_set_error_data(str, ERR_TXT_MALLOCED | ERR_TXT_STRING); } int ERR_set_mark(void) { ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; if (es->bottom == es->top) return 0; es->err_flags[es->top] |= ERR_FLAG_MARK; return 1; } int ERR_pop_to_mark(void) { ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; while (es->bottom != es->top && (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) { err_clear(es, es->top); es->top -= 1; if (es->top == -1) es->top = ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1; } if (es->bottom == es->top) return 0; es->err_flags[es->top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/err/err_all.c0000644000000000000000000000573113176625657015765 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/err_int.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/dso.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include int err_load_crypto_strings_int(void) { if ( #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS FIPS_set_error_callbacks(ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_vdata) == 0 || #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR ERR_load_ERR_strings() == 0 || /* include error strings for SYSerr */ ERR_load_BN_strings() == 0 || # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ERR_load_RSA_strings() == 0 || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ERR_load_DH_strings() == 0 || # endif ERR_load_EVP_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_BUF_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_OBJ_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_PEM_strings() == 0 || # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ERR_load_DSA_strings() == 0 || # endif ERR_load_X509_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_ASN1_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_CONF_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings() == 0 || # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP ERR_load_COMP_strings() == 0 || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ERR_load_EC_strings() == 0 || # endif /* skip ERR_load_SSL_strings() because it is not in this library */ ERR_load_BIO_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_PKCS7_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_X509V3_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_PKCS12_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_RAND_strings() == 0 || ERR_load_DSO_strings() == 0 || # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TS ERR_load_TS_strings() == 0 || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ERR_load_ENGINE_strings() == 0 || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP ERR_load_OCSP_strings() == 0 || # endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI ERR_load_UI_strings() == 0 || #endif # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS ERR_load_FIPS_strings() == 0 || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS ERR_load_CMS_strings() == 0 || # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT ERR_load_CT_strings() == 0 || # endif ERR_load_ASYNC_strings() == 0 || #endif ERR_load_KDF_strings() == 0) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/err/README0000644000000000000000000000256413176625657015062 0ustar rootrootAdding new libraries -------------------- When adding a new sub-library to OpenSSL, assign it a library number ERR_LIB_XXX, define a macro XXXerr() (both in err.h), add its name to ERR_str_libraries[] (in crypto/err/err.c), and add ERR_load_XXX_strings() to the ERR_load_crypto_strings() function (in crypto/err/err_all.c). Finally, add an entry: L XXX xxx.h xxx_err.c to crypto/err/openssl.ec, and add xxx_err.c to the Makefile. Running make errors will then generate a file xxx_err.c, and add all error codes used in the library to xxx.h. Additionally the library include file must have a certain form. Typically it will initially look like this: #ifndef HEADER_XXX_H #define HEADER_XXX_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Include files */ #include #include /* Macros, structures and function prototypes */ /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ The BEGIN ERROR CODES sequence is used by the error code generation script as the point to place new error codes, any text after this point will be overwritten when make errors is run. The closing #endif etc will be automatically added by the script. The generated C error code file xxx_err.c will load the header files stdio.h, openssl/err.h and openssl/xxx.h so the header file must load any additional header files containing any definitions it uses. openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/err/err_prn.c0000644000000000000000000000342213176625657016007 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include void ERR_print_errors_cb(int (*cb) (const char *str, size_t len, void *u), void *u) { unsigned long l; char buf[256]; char buf2[4096]; const char *file, *data; int line, flags; /* * We don't know what kind of thing CRYPTO_THREAD_ID is. Here is our best * attempt to convert it into something we can print. */ union { CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; unsigned long ltid; } tid; tid.ltid = 0; tid.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) { ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof buf); BIO_snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%lu:%s:%s:%d:%s\n", tid.ltid, buf, file, line, (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) ? data : ""); if (cb(buf2, strlen(buf2), u) <= 0) break; /* abort outputting the error report */ } } static int print_bio(const char *str, size_t len, void *bp) { return BIO_write((BIO *)bp, str, len); } void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp) { ERR_print_errors_cb(print_bio, bp); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp) { BIO *bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (bio == NULL) return; ERR_print_errors_cb(print_bio, bio); BIO_free(bio); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/err/openssl.ec0000644000000000000000000001023613176625657016171 0ustar rootroot# crypto/err/openssl.ec # configuration file for util/mkerr.pl # files that may have to be rewritten by util/mkerr.pl L ERR NONE NONE L BN include/openssl/bn.h crypto/bn/bn_err.c L RSA include/openssl/rsa.h crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c L DH include/openssl/dh.h crypto/dh/dh_err.c L EVP include/openssl/evp.h crypto/evp/evp_err.c L BUF include/openssl/buffer.h crypto/buffer/buf_err.c L OBJ include/openssl/objects.h crypto/objects/obj_err.c L PEM include/openssl/pem.h crypto/pem/pem_err.c L DSA include/openssl/dsa.h crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c L X509 include/openssl/x509.h crypto/x509/x509_err.c L ASN1 include/openssl/asn1.h crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c L CONF include/openssl/conf.h crypto/conf/conf_err.c L CRYPTO include/openssl/crypto.h crypto/cpt_err.c L EC include/openssl/ec.h crypto/ec/ec_err.c L SSL include/openssl/ssl.h ssl/ssl_err.c L BIO include/openssl/bio.h crypto/bio/bio_err.c L PKCS7 include/openssl/pkcs7.h crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c L X509V3 include/openssl/x509v3.h crypto/x509v3/v3err.c L PKCS12 include/openssl/pkcs12.h crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c L RAND include/openssl/rand.h crypto/rand/rand_err.c L DSO include/internal/dso.h crypto/dso/dso_err.c L ENGINE include/openssl/engine.h crypto/engine/eng_err.c L OCSP include/openssl/ocsp.h crypto/ocsp/ocsp_err.c L UI include/openssl/ui.h crypto/ui/ui_err.c L COMP include/openssl/comp.h crypto/comp/comp_err.c L TS include/openssl/ts.h crypto/ts/ts_err.c #L HMAC include/openssl/hmac.h crypto/hmac/hmac_err.c L CMS include/openssl/cms.h crypto/cms/cms_err.c #L FIPS include/openssl/fips.h crypto/fips_err.h L CT include/openssl/ct.h crypto/ct/ct_err.c L ASYNC include/openssl/async.h crypto/async/async_err.c L KDF include/openssl/kdf.h crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c # additional header files to be scanned for function names L NONE include/openssl/x509_vfy.h NONE L NONE crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h NONE L NONE crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h NONE L NONE crypto/ct/ct_locl.h NONE #L NONE fips/rand/fips_rand.h NONE L NONE ssl/ssl_locl.h NONE F RSAREF_F_RSA_BN2BIN F RSAREF_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT F RSAREF_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT F RSAREF_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT F RSAREF_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046 R SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 R SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111 R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113 R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114 R TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1115 R TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 1120 R RSAREF_R_CONTENT_ENCODING 0x0400 R RSAREF_R_DATA 0x0401 R RSAREF_R_DIGEST_ALGORITHM 0x0402 R RSAREF_R_ENCODING 0x0403 R RSAREF_R_KEY 0x0404 R RSAREF_R_KEY_ENCODING 0x0405 R RSAREF_R_LEN 0x0406 R RSAREF_R_MODULUS_LEN 0x0407 R RSAREF_R_NEED_RANDOM 0x0408 R RSAREF_R_PRIVATE_KEY 0x0409 R RSAREF_R_PUBLIC_KEY 0x040a R RSAREF_R_SIGNATURE 0x040b R RSAREF_R_SIGNATURE_ENCODING 0x040c R RSAREF_R_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM 0x040d openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ppccpuid.pl0000755000000000000000000001231413176625657015553 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $flavour = shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; if ($flavour=~/64/) { $CMPLI="cmpldi"; $SHRLI="srdi"; $SIGNX="extsw"; } else { $CMPLI="cmplwi"; $SHRLI="srwi"; $SIGNX="mr"; } $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .OPENSSL_fpu_probe .align 4 .OPENSSL_fpu_probe: fmr f0,f0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .OPENSSL_fpu_probe,.-.OPENSSL_fpu_probe .globl .OPENSSL_ppc64_probe .align 4 .OPENSSL_ppc64_probe: fcfid f1,f1 extrdi r0,r0,32,0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .OPENSSL_ppc64_probe,.-.OPENSSL_ppc64_probe .globl .OPENSSL_altivec_probe .align 4 .OPENSSL_altivec_probe: .long 0x10000484 # vor v0,v0,v0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .OPENSSL_altivec_probe,.-..OPENSSL_altivec_probe .globl .OPENSSL_crypto207_probe .align 4 .OPENSSL_crypto207_probe: lvx_u v0,0,r1 vcipher v0,v0,v0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .OPENSSL_crypto207_probe,.-.OPENSSL_crypto207_probe .globl .OPENSSL_madd300_probe .align 4 .OPENSSL_madd300_probe: xor r0,r0,r0 maddld r3,r0,r0,r0 maddhdu r3,r0,r0,r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .globl .OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .align 4 .OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: xor r0,r0,r0 fmr f0,f31 fmr f1,f31 fmr f2,f31 mr r3,r1 fmr f3,f31 xor r4,r4,r4 fmr f4,f31 xor r5,r5,r5 fmr f5,f31 xor r6,r6,r6 fmr f6,f31 xor r7,r7,r7 fmr f7,f31 xor r8,r8,r8 fmr f8,f31 xor r9,r9,r9 fmr f9,f31 xor r10,r10,r10 fmr f10,f31 xor r11,r11,r11 fmr f11,f31 xor r12,r12,r12 fmr f12,f31 fmr f13,f31 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-.OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .globl .OPENSSL_atomic_add .align 4 .OPENSSL_atomic_add: Ladd: lwarx r5,0,r3 add r0,r4,r5 stwcx. r0,0,r3 bne- Ladd $SIGNX r3,r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-.OPENSSL_atomic_add .globl .OPENSSL_rdtsc .align 4 .OPENSSL_rdtsc: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); mftb r3 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/); Loop_rdtsc: mftbu r5 mftb r3 mftbu r4 cmplw r4,r5 bne Loop_rdtsc ___ $code.=<<___; blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .size .OPENSSL_rdtsc,.-.OPENSSL_rdtsc .globl .OPENSSL_cleanse .align 4 .OPENSSL_cleanse: $CMPLI r4,7 li r0,0 bge Lot $CMPLI r4,0 beqlr- Little: mtctr r4 stb r0,0(r3) addi r3,r3,1 bdnz \$-8 blr Lot: andi. r5,r3,3 beq Laligned stb r0,0(r3) subi r4,r4,1 addi r3,r3,1 b Lot Laligned: $SHRLI r5,r4,2 mtctr r5 stw r0,0(r3) addi r3,r3,4 bdnz \$-8 andi. r4,r4,3 bne Little blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .OPENSSL_cleanse,.-.OPENSSL_cleanse globl .CRYPTO_memcmp .align 4 .CRYPTO_memcmp: $CMPLI r5,0 li r0,0 beq Lno_data mtctr r5 Loop_cmp: lbz r6,0(r3) addi r3,r3,1 lbz r7,0(r4) addi r4,r4,1 xor r6,r6,r7 or r0,r0,r6 bdnz Loop_cmp Lno_data: li r3,0 sub r3,r3,r0 extrwi r3,r3,1,0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .CRYPTO_memcmp,.-.CRYPTO_memcmp ___ { my ($out,$cnt,$max)=("r3","r4","r5"); my ($tick,$lasttick)=("r6","r7"); my ($diff,$lastdiff)=("r8","r9"); $code.=<<___; .globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus .align 4 .OPENSSL_instrument_bus: mtctr $cnt mftb $lasttick # collect 1st tick li $diff,0 dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock add $tick,$tick,$diff stwcx. $tick,0,$out stwx $tick,0,$out Loop: mftb $tick sub $diff,$tick,$lasttick mr $lasttick,$tick dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock add $tick,$tick,$diff stwcx. $tick,0,$out stwx $tick,0,$out addi $out,$out,4 # ++$out bdnz Loop mr r3,$cnt blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus .globl .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .align 4 .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2: mr r0,$cnt slwi $cnt,$cnt,2 mftb $lasttick # collect 1st tick li $diff,0 dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock add $tick,$tick,$diff stwcx. $tick,0,$out stwx $tick,0,$out mftb $tick # collect 1st diff sub $diff,$tick,$lasttick mr $lasttick,$tick mr $lastdiff,$diff Loop2: dcbf 0,$out # flush cache line lwarx $tick,0,$out # load and lock add $tick,$tick,$diff stwcx. $tick,0,$out stwx $tick,0,$out addic. $max,$max,-1 beq Ldone2 mftb $tick sub $diff,$tick,$lasttick mr $lasttick,$tick cmplw 7,$diff,$lastdiff mr $lastdiff,$diff mfcr $tick # pull cr not $tick,$tick # flip bits rlwinm $tick,$tick,1,29,29 # isolate flipped eq bit and scale sub. $cnt,$cnt,$tick # conditional --$cnt add $out,$out,$tick # conditional ++$out bne Loop2 Ldone2: srwi $cnt,$cnt,2 sub r3,r0,$cnt blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0 .long 0 .size .OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,.-.OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 ___ } $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014164 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c0000644000000000000000000001561413176625657016150 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix); EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { char *nm = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; int slen; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY, bp, cb, u)) return NULL; p = data; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, len); if (!p8inf) goto p8err; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); if (x) { EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x); *x = ret; } PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); } else if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) == 0) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; X509_SIG *p8; int klen; char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; p8 = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, len); if (!p8) goto p8err; if (cb) klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); if (klen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); X509_SIG_free(p8); goto err; } p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen); X509_SIG_free(p8); OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen); if (!p8inf) goto p8err; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); if (x) { EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x); *x = ret; } PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); } else if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PRIVATE KEY")) > 0) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, nm, slen); if (!ameth || !ameth->old_priv_decode) goto p8err; ret = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, x, &p, len); } p8err: if (ret == NULL) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); err: OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_clear_free(data, len); return (ret); } int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { if (x->ameth == NULL || x->ameth->priv_encode != NULL) return PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, x, enc, (char *)kstr, klen, cb, u); return PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(bp, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { char pem_str[80]; BIO_snprintf(pem_str, 80, "%s PRIVATE KEY", x->ameth->pem_str); return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_PrivateKey, pem_str, bp, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x) { char *nm = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; int slen; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS, bp, 0, NULL)) return NULL; p = data; if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PARAMETERS")) > 0) { ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(ret, nm, slen) || !ret->ameth->param_decode || !ret->ameth->param_decode(ret, &p, len)) { EVP_PKEY_free(ret); ret = NULL; goto err; } if (x) { EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *)*x); *x = ret; } } err: if (ret == NULL) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(data); return (ret); } int PEM_write_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x) { char pem_str[80]; if (!x->ameth || !x->ameth->param_encode) return 0; BIO_snprintf(pem_str, 80, "%s PARAMETERS", x->ameth->pem_str); return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)x->ameth->param_encode, pem_str, bp, x, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; EVP_PKEY *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, x, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } int PEM_write_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(b, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* Transparently read in PKCS#3 or X9.42 DH parameters */ DH *PEM_read_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { char *nm = NULL; const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; DH *ret = NULL; if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, &nm, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS, bp, cb, u)) return NULL; p = data; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS) == 0) ret = d2i_DHxparams(x, &p, len); else ret = d2i_DHparams(x, &p, len); if (ret == NULL) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(data); return ret; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO DH *PEM_read_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; DH *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(b, x, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/build.info0000644000000000000000000000026313176625657016141 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ pem_sign.c pem_info.c pem_lib.c pem_all.c pem_err.c \ pem_x509.c pem_xaux.c pem_oth.c pem_pk8.c pem_pkey.c pvkfmt.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_x509.c0000644000000000000000000000106513176625657015700 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509, X509, PEM_STRING_X509, X509) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_err.c0000644000000000000000000001200313176625657015755 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA PEM_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_B2I_DSS), "b2i_dss"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO), "b2i_PVK_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_B2I_RSA), "b2i_rsa"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA), "check_bitlen_dsa"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA), "check_bitlen_rsa"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO), "d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP), "d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_B2I), "do_b2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO), "do_b2i_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER), "do_blob_header"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY), "do_pk8pkey"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP), "do_pk8pkey_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY), "do_PVK_body"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER), "do_PVK_header"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_I2B_PVK), "i2b_PVK"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO), "i2b_PVK_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_LOAD_IV), "load_iv"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ), "PEM_ASN1_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO), "PEM_ASN1_read_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE), "PEM_ASN1_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO), "PEM_ASN1_write_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK), "PEM_def_callback"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER), "PEM_do_header"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO), "PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ), "PEM_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO), "PEM_read_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS), "PEM_read_bio_DHparams"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS), "PEM_read_bio_Parameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY), "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS), "PEM_read_DHparams"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY), "PEM_read_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL), "PEM_SignFinal"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE), "PEM_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO), "PEM_write_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY), "PEM_write_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ), "PEM_X509_INFO_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO), "PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO), "PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA PEM_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE), "bad base64 decode"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT), "bad decrypt"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE), "bad end line"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS), "bad iv chars"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER), "bad magic number"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ), "bad password read"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER), "bad version number"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE), "bio write failure"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL), "cipher is null"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY), "error converting private key"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB), "expecting private key blob"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB), "expecting public key blob"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG), "header too long"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER), "inconsistent header"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR), "keyblob header parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT), "keyblob too short"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_MISSING_DEK_IV), "missing dek iv"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO), "not dek info"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED), "not encrypted"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE), "not proc type"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_NO_START_LINE), "no start line"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD), "problems getting password"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT), "pvk data too short"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT), "pvk too short"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_READ_KEY), "read key"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER), "short header"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNEXPECTED_DEK_IV), "unexpected dek iv"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER), "unsupported cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION), "unsupported encryption"}, {ERR_REASON(PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS), "unsupported key components"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_PEM_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(PEM_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, PEM_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, PEM_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c0000644000000000000000000005607013176625657015647 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Support for PVK format keys and related structures (such a PUBLICKEYBLOB * and PRIVATEKEYBLOB). */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) # include # include /* * Utility function: read a DWORD (4 byte unsigned integer) in little endian * format */ static unsigned int read_ledword(const unsigned char **in) { const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int ret; ret = *p++; ret |= (*p++ << 8); ret |= (*p++ << 16); ret |= (*p++ << 24); *in = p; return ret; } /* * Read a BIGNUM in little endian format. The docs say that this should take * up bitlen/8 bytes. */ static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r) { *r = BN_lebin2bn(*in, nbyte, NULL); if (*r == NULL) return 0; *in += nbyte; return 1; } /* Convert private key blob to EVP_PKEY: RSA and DSA keys supported */ # define MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB 0x6 # define MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB 0x7 # define MS_RSA1MAGIC 0x31415352L # define MS_RSA2MAGIC 0x32415352L # define MS_DSS1MAGIC 0x31535344L # define MS_DSS2MAGIC 0x32535344L # define MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX 0xa400 # define MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN 0x2200 # define MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX 0x1 # define MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN 0x2 /* Maximum length of a blob after header */ # define BLOB_MAX_LENGTH 102400 /* The PVK file magic number: seems to spell out "bobsfile", who is Bob? */ # define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL /* Salt length for PVK files */ # define PVK_SALTLEN 0x10 /* Maximum length in PVK header */ # define PVK_MAX_KEYLEN 102400 /* Maximum salt length */ # define PVK_MAX_SALTLEN 10240 static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub); static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub); static int do_blob_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, unsigned int *pmagic, unsigned int *pbitlen, int *pisdss, int *pispub) { const unsigned char *p = *in; if (length < 16) return 0; /* bType */ if (*p == MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB) { if (*pispub == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } *pispub = 1; } else if (*p == MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB) { if (*pispub == 1) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } *pispub = 0; } else return 0; p++; /* Version */ if (*p++ != 0x2) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER); return 0; } /* Ignore reserved, aiKeyAlg */ p += 6; *pmagic = read_ledword(&p); *pbitlen = read_ledword(&p); *pisdss = 0; switch (*pmagic) { case MS_DSS1MAGIC: *pisdss = 1; /* fall thru */ case MS_RSA1MAGIC: if (*pispub == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } break; case MS_DSS2MAGIC: *pisdss = 1; /* fall thru */ case MS_RSA2MAGIC: if (*pispub == 1) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB); return 0; } break; default: PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER); return -1; } *in = p; return 1; } static unsigned int blob_length(unsigned bitlen, int isdss, int ispub) { unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte; nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3; hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4; if (isdss) { /* * Expected length: 20 for q + 3 components bitlen each + 24 for seed * structure. */ if (ispub) return 44 + 3 * nbyte; /* * Expected length: 20 for q, priv, 2 bitlen components + 24 for seed * structure. */ else return 64 + 2 * nbyte; } else { /* Expected length: 4 for 'e' + 'n' */ if (ispub) return 4 + nbyte; else /* * Expected length: 4 for 'e' and 7 other components. 2 * components are bitlen size, 5 are bitlen/2 */ return 4 + 2 * nbyte + 5 * hnbyte; } } static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, int ispub) { const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int bitlen, magic; int isdss; if (do_blob_header(&p, length, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR); return NULL; } length -= 16; if (length < blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT); return NULL; } if (isdss) return b2i_dss(&p, bitlen, ispub); else return b2i_rsa(&p, bitlen, ispub); } static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i_bio(BIO *in, int ispub) { const unsigned char *p; unsigned char hdr_buf[16], *buf = NULL; unsigned int bitlen, magic, length; int isdss; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; if (BIO_read(in, hdr_buf, 16) != 16) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT); return NULL; } p = hdr_buf; if (do_blob_header(&p, 16, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0) return NULL; length = blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub); if (length > BLOB_MAX_LENGTH) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); return NULL; } buf = OPENSSL_malloc(length); if (buf == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = buf; if (BIO_read(in, buf, length) != (int)length) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } if (isdss) ret = b2i_dss(&p, bitlen, ispub); else ret = b2i_rsa(&p, bitlen, ispub); err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub) { const unsigned char *p = *in; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; DSA *dsa = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned int nbyte; BIGNUM *pbn = NULL, *qbn = NULL, *gbn = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL; nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3; dsa = DSA_new(); ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (dsa == NULL || ret == NULL) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &pbn)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &qbn)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &gbn)) goto memerr; if (ispub) { if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &pub_key)) goto memerr; } else { if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &priv_key)) goto memerr; /* Calculate public key */ pub_key = BN_new(); if (pub_key == NULL) goto memerr; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto memerr; if (!BN_mod_exp(pub_key, gbn, priv_key, pbn, ctx)) goto memerr; BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, pbn, qbn, gbn)) goto memerr; pbn = qbn = gbn = NULL; if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key)) goto memerr; EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(ret, dsa); DSA_free(dsa); *in = p; return ret; memerr: PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_DSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); DSA_free(dsa); BN_free(pbn); BN_free(qbn); BN_free(gbn); BN_free(pub_key); BN_free(priv_key); EVP_PKEY_free(ret); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return NULL; } static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int bitlen, int ispub) { const unsigned char *pin = *in; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL, *d = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL; RSA *rsa = NULL; unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte; nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3; hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4; rsa = RSA_new(); ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (rsa == NULL || ret == NULL) goto memerr; e = BN_new(); if (e == NULL) goto memerr; if (!BN_set_word(e, read_ledword(&pin))) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&pin, nbyte, &n)) goto memerr; if (!ispub) { if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &p)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &q)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &dmp1)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &dmq1)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&pin, hnbyte, &iqmp)) goto memerr; if (!read_lebn(&pin, nbyte, &d)) goto memerr; RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q); RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp); } RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d); EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(ret, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); *in = pin; return ret; memerr: PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BN_free(e); BN_free(n); BN_free(p); BN_free(q); BN_free(dmp1); BN_free(dmq1); BN_free(iqmp); BN_free(d); RSA_free(rsa); EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length) { return do_b2i(in, length, 0); } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length) { return do_b2i(in, length, 1); } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in) { return do_b2i_bio(in, 0); } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in) { return do_b2i_bio(in, 1); } static void write_ledword(unsigned char **out, unsigned int dw) { unsigned char *p = *out; *p++ = dw & 0xff; *p++ = (dw >> 8) & 0xff; *p++ = (dw >> 16) & 0xff; *p++ = (dw >> 24) & 0xff; *out = p; } static void write_lebn(unsigned char **out, const BIGNUM *bn, int len) { BN_bn2lebinpad(bn, *out, len); *out += len; } static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic); static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic); static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub); static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub); static int do_i2b(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub) { unsigned char *p; unsigned int bitlen, magic = 0, keyalg; int outlen, noinc = 0; int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pk); if (pktype == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { bitlen = check_bitlen_dsa(EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pk), ispub, &magic); keyalg = MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN; } else if (pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { bitlen = check_bitlen_rsa(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk), ispub, &magic); keyalg = MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX; } else return -1; if (bitlen == 0) return -1; outlen = 16 + blob_length(bitlen, keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN ? 1 : 0, ispub); if (out == NULL) return outlen; if (*out) p = *out; else { p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (p == NULL) return -1; *out = p; noinc = 1; } if (ispub) *p++ = MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB; else *p++ = MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB; *p++ = 0x2; *p++ = 0; *p++ = 0; write_ledword(&p, keyalg); write_ledword(&p, magic); write_ledword(&p, bitlen); if (keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN) write_dsa(&p, EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pk), ispub); else write_rsa(&p, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk), ispub); if (!noinc) *out += outlen; return outlen; } static int do_i2b_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub) { unsigned char *tmp = NULL; int outlen, wrlen; outlen = do_i2b(&tmp, pk, ispub); if (outlen < 0) return -1; wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen); OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (wrlen == outlen) return outlen; return -1; } static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic) { int bitlen; const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key); bitlen = BN_num_bits(p); if ((bitlen & 7) || (BN_num_bits(q) != 160) || (BN_num_bits(g) > bitlen)) goto badkey; if (ispub) { if (BN_num_bits(pub_key) > bitlen) goto badkey; *pmagic = MS_DSS1MAGIC; } else { if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) > 160) goto badkey; *pmagic = MS_DSS2MAGIC; } return bitlen; badkey: PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS); return 0; } static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic) { int nbyte, hnbyte, bitlen; const BIGNUM *e; RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, &e, NULL); if (BN_num_bits(e) > 32) goto badkey; bitlen = RSA_bits(rsa); nbyte = RSA_size(rsa); hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4; if (ispub) { *pmagic = MS_RSA1MAGIC; return bitlen; } else { const BIGNUM *d, *p, *q, *iqmp, *dmp1, *dmq1; *pmagic = MS_RSA2MAGIC; /* * For private key each component must fit within nbyte or hnbyte. */ RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); if (BN_num_bytes(d) > nbyte) goto badkey; RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q); RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp); if ((BN_num_bytes(iqmp) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(p) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(q) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(dmp1) > hnbyte) || (BN_num_bytes(dmq1) > hnbyte)) goto badkey; } return bitlen; badkey: PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS); return 0; } static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub) { int nbyte, hnbyte; const BIGNUM *n, *d, *e, *p, *q, *iqmp, *dmp1, *dmq1; nbyte = RSA_size(rsa); hnbyte = (RSA_bits(rsa) + 15) >> 4; RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d); write_lebn(out, e, 4); write_lebn(out, n, nbyte); if (ispub) return; RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q); RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp); write_lebn(out, p, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, q, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, dmp1, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, dmq1, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, iqmp, hnbyte); write_lebn(out, d, nbyte); } static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub) { int nbyte; const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key); nbyte = BN_num_bytes(p); write_lebn(out, p, nbyte); write_lebn(out, q, 20); write_lebn(out, g, nbyte); if (ispub) write_lebn(out, pub_key, nbyte); else write_lebn(out, priv_key, 20); /* Set "invalid" for seed structure values */ memset(*out, 0xff, 24); *out += 24; return; } int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk) { return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 0); } int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk) { return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 1); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length, int skip_magic, unsigned int *psaltlen, unsigned int *pkeylen) { const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int pvk_magic, is_encrypted; if (skip_magic) { if (length < 20) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } } else { if (length < 24) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p); if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER); return 0; } } /* Skip reserved */ p += 4; /* * keytype = */ read_ledword(&p); is_encrypted = read_ledword(&p); *psaltlen = read_ledword(&p); *pkeylen = read_ledword(&p); if (*pkeylen > PVK_MAX_KEYLEN || *psaltlen > PVK_MAX_SALTLEN) return 0; if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER); return 0; } *in = p; return 1; } static int derive_pvk_key(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *salt, unsigned int saltlen, const unsigned char *pass, int passlen) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); int rv = 1; if (mctx == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, salt, saltlen) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, pass, passlen) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, key, NULL)) rv = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return rv; } static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int saltlen, unsigned int keylen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int magic; unsigned char *enctmp = NULL, *q; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (saltlen) { char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char keybuf[20]; int enctmplen, inlen; if (cb) inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); if (inlen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); goto err; } enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8); if (enctmp == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen, (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen)) goto err; p += saltlen; /* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */ memcpy(enctmp, p, 8); p += 8; if (keylen < 8) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } inlen = keylen - 8; q = enctmp + 8; if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen)) goto err; if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen)) goto err; magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q); if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) { q = enctmp + 8; memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11); if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL)) goto err; OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20); if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen)) goto err; if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen)) goto err; magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q); if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT); goto err; } } else OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20); p = enctmp; } ret = b2i_PrivateKey(&p, keylen); err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cctx); OPENSSL_free(enctmp); return ret; } EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { unsigned char pvk_hdr[24], *buf = NULL; const unsigned char *p; int buflen; EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; unsigned int saltlen, keylen; if (BIO_read(in, pvk_hdr, 24) != 24) { PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT); return NULL; } p = pvk_hdr; if (!do_PVK_header(&p, 24, 0, &saltlen, &keylen)) return 0; buflen = (int)keylen + saltlen; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen); if (buf == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } p = buf; if (BIO_read(in, buf, buflen) != buflen) { PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } ret = do_PVK_body(&p, saltlen, keylen, cb, u); err: OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, buflen); return ret; } static int i2b_PVK(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { int outlen = 24, pklen; unsigned char *p = NULL, *start = NULL, *salt = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = NULL; if (enclevel) outlen += PVK_SALTLEN; pklen = do_i2b(NULL, pk, 0); if (pklen < 0) return -1; outlen += pklen; if (out == NULL) return outlen; if (*out != NULL) { p = *out; } else { start = p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (p == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } } cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (cctx == NULL) goto error; write_ledword(&p, MS_PVKMAGIC); write_ledword(&p, 0); if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN); else write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX); write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? 1 : 0); write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? PVK_SALTLEN : 0); write_ledword(&p, pklen); if (enclevel) { if (RAND_bytes(p, PVK_SALTLEN) <= 0) goto error; salt = p; p += PVK_SALTLEN; } do_i2b(&p, pk, 0); if (enclevel != 0) { char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char keybuf[20]; int enctmplen, inlen; if (cb) inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); else inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); if (inlen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); goto error; } if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, salt, PVK_SALTLEN, (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen)) goto error; if (enclevel == 1) memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11); p = salt + PVK_SALTLEN + 8; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL)) goto error; OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20); if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cctx, p, &enctmplen, p, pklen - 8)) goto error; if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cctx, p + enctmplen, &enctmplen)) goto error; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cctx); if (*out == NULL) *out = start; return outlen; error: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cctx); if (*out == NULL) OPENSSL_free(start); return -1; } int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { unsigned char *tmp = NULL; int outlen, wrlen; outlen = i2b_PVK(&tmp, pk, enclevel, cb, u); if (outlen < 0) return -1; wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen); OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (wrlen == outlen) { PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE); return outlen; } return -1; } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_all.c0000644000000000000000000001203113176625657015736 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static RSA *pkey_get_rsa(EVP_PKEY *key, RSA **rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static DSA *pkey_get_dsa(EVP_PKEY *key, DSA **dsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static EC_KEY *pkey_get_eckey(EVP_PKEY *key, EC_KEY **eckey); #endif IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509_REQ, X509_REQ, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ, X509_REQ) IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(X509_REQ_NEW, X509_REQ, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD, X509_REQ) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509_CRL, X509_CRL, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL, X509_CRL) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS7, PKCS7, PEM_STRING_PKCS7, PKCS7) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_STRING_X509, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA /* * We treat RSA or DSA private keys as a special case. For private keys we * read in an EVP_PKEY structure with PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() and extract * the relevant private key: this means can handle "traditional" and PKCS#8 * formats transparently. */ static RSA *pkey_get_rsa(EVP_PKEY *key, RSA **rsa) { RSA *rtmp; if (!key) return NULL; rtmp = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(key); EVP_PKEY_free(key); if (!rtmp) return NULL; if (rsa) { RSA_free(*rsa); *rsa = rtmp; } return rtmp; } RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, cb, u); return pkey_get_rsa(pktmp, rsa); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO RSA *PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, cb, u); return pkey_get_rsa(pktmp, rsa); } # endif IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(RSAPrivateKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA, RSAPrivateKey) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC, RSAPublicKey) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, RSA_PUBKEY) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static DSA *pkey_get_dsa(EVP_PKEY *key, DSA **dsa) { DSA *dtmp; if (!key) return NULL; dtmp = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(key); EVP_PKEY_free(key); if (!dtmp) return NULL; if (dsa) { DSA_free(*dsa); *dsa = dtmp; } return dtmp; } DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, cb, u); return pkey_get_dsa(pktmp, dsa); /* will free pktmp */ } IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(DSAPrivateKey, DSA, PEM_STRING_DSA, DSAPrivateKey) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, DSA_PUBKEY) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO DSA *PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, cb, u); return pkey_get_dsa(pktmp, dsa); /* will free pktmp */ } # endif IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(DSAparams, DSA, PEM_STRING_DSAPARAMS, DSAparams) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static EC_KEY *pkey_get_eckey(EVP_PKEY *key, EC_KEY **eckey) { EC_KEY *dtmp; if (!key) return NULL; dtmp = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key); EVP_PKEY_free(key); if (!dtmp) return NULL; if (eckey) { EC_KEY_free(*eckey); *eckey = dtmp; } return dtmp; } EC_KEY *PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **key, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, cb, u); return pkey_get_eckey(pktmp, key); /* will free pktmp */ } IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP, PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS, ECPKParameters) IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY, ECPrivateKey) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, EC_PUBKEY) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO EC_KEY *PEM_read_ECPrivateKey(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, cb, u); return pkey_get_eckey(pktmp, eckey); /* will free pktmp */ } # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(DHparams, DH, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS, DHparams) IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(DHxparams, DH, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS, DHxparams) #endif IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PUBKEY, EVP_PKEY, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, PUBKEY) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c0000644000000000000000000001505013176625657015674 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO static int do_pk8pkey_fp(FILE *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); #endif /* * These functions write a private key in PKCS#8 format: it is a "drop in" * replacement for PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() and friends. As usual if 'enc' * is NULL then it uses the unencrypted private key form. The 'nid' versions * uses PKCS#5 v1.5 PBE algorithms whereas the others use PKCS#5 v2.0. */ int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 0, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 0, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 1, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey(bp, x, 1, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { X509_SIG *p8; PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; int ret; if ((p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(x)) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY, PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; } if (enc || (nid != -1)) { if (!kstr) { if (!cb) klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); else klen = cb(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); if (klen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY, PEM_R_READ_KEY); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return 0; } kstr = buf; } p8 = PKCS8_encrypt(nid, enc, kstr, klen, NULL, 0, 0, p8inf); if (kstr == buf) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, klen); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); if (p8 == NULL) return 0; if (isder) ret = i2d_PKCS8_bio(bp, p8); else ret = PEM_write_bio_PKCS8(bp, p8); X509_SIG_free(p8); return ret; } else { if (isder) ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bp, p8inf); else ret = PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(bp, p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return ret; } } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL; X509_SIG *p8 = NULL; int klen; EVP_PKEY *ret; char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; p8 = d2i_PKCS8_bio(bp, NULL); if (!p8) return NULL; if (cb) klen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else klen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); if (klen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); X509_SIG_free(p8); return NULL; } p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen); X509_SIG_free(p8); OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen); if (!p8inf) return NULL; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); if (!ret) return NULL; if (x) { EVP_PKEY_free(*x); *x = ret; } return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 1, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 1, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 0, nid, NULL, kstr, klen, cb, u); } int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return do_pk8pkey_fp(fp, x, 0, -1, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); } static int do_pk8pkey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *bp; int ret; if ((bp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } ret = do_pk8pkey(bp, x, isder, nid, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); BIO_free(bp); return ret; } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *bp; EVP_PKEY *ret; if ((bp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE)) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return NULL; } ret = d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(bp, x, cb, u); BIO_free(bp); return ret; } #endif IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS8, X509_SIG, PEM_STRING_PKCS8, X509_SIG) IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_oth.c0000644000000000000000000000203313176625657015761 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include /* Handle 'other' PEMs: not private keys */ void *PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, BIO *bp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { const unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; char *ret = NULL; if (!PEM_bytes_read_bio(&data, &len, NULL, name, bp, cb, u)) return NULL; p = data; ret = d2i(x, &p, len); if (ret == NULL) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); OPENSSL_free(data); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c0000644000000000000000000005704113176625657015746 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include #include #define MIN_LENGTH 4 static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num); static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name); int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix); int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key) { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI) int i; #else int i, j; const char *prompt; #endif if (key) { i = strlen(key); i = (i > num) ? num : i; memcpy(buf, key, i); return i; } #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; #else prompt = EVP_get_pw_prompt(); if (prompt == NULL) prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:"; for (;;) { /* * We assume that w == 0 means decryption, * while w == 1 means encryption */ int min_len = w ? MIN_LENGTH : 0; i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, w); if (i != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD); memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num); return -1; } j = strlen(buf); if (min_len && j < min_len) { fprintf(stderr, "phrase is too short, needs to be at least %d chars\n", min_len); } else break; } return j; #endif } void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type) { const char *str; if (type == PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED) str = "ENCRYPTED"; else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_CLEAR) str = "MIC-CLEAR"; else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_ONLY) str = "MIC-ONLY"; else str = "BAD-TYPE"; OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "Proc-Type: 4,", PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, str, PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", PEM_BUFSIZE); } void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str) { static const unsigned char map[17] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; long i; int j; OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "DEK-Info: ", PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, type, PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, ",", PEM_BUFSIZE); j = strlen(buf); if (j + (len * 2) + 1 > PEM_BUFSIZE) return; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { buf[j + i * 2] = map[(str[i] >> 4) & 0x0f]; buf[j + i * 2 + 1] = map[(str[i]) & 0x0f]; } buf[j + i * 2] = '\n'; buf[j + i * 2 + 1] = '\0'; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void *PEM_ASN1_read(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, FILE *fp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; void *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i, name, b, x, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name) { /* Normal matching nm and name */ if (strcmp(nm, name) == 0) return 1; /* Make PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY match any private key */ if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY) == 0) { int slen; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0) return 1; slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PRIVATE KEY"); if (slen > 0) { /* * NB: ENGINE implementations won't contain a deprecated old * private key decode function so don't look for them. */ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, nm, slen); if (ameth && ameth->old_priv_decode) return 1; } return 0; } if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS) == 0) { int slen; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PARAMETERS"); if (slen > 0) { ENGINE *e; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, nm, slen); if (ameth) { int r; if (ameth->param_decode) r = 1; else r = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(e); #endif return r; } } return 0; } /* If reading DH parameters handle X9.42 DH format too */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS) == 0) return 1; /* Permit older strings */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ) == 0) return 1; /* Allow normal certs to be read as trusted certs */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0) return 1; /* Some CAs use PKCS#7 with CERTIFICATE headers */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7_SIGNED) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0) return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS) == 0) return 1; /* Allow CMS to be read from PKCS#7 headers */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS) == 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher; char *nm = NULL, *header = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len; int ret = 0; for (;;) { if (!PEM_read_bio(bp, &nm, &header, &data, &len)) { if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) ERR_add_error_data(2, "Expecting: ", name); return 0; } if (check_pem(nm, name)) break; OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(header); OPENSSL_free(data); } if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher)) goto err; if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u)) goto err; *pdata = data; *plen = len; if (pnm) *pnm = nm; ret = 1; err: if (!ret || !pnm) OPENSSL_free(nm); OPENSSL_free(header); if (!ret) OPENSSL_free(data); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int PEM_ASN1_write(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, FILE *fp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d, name, b, x, enc, kstr, klen, callback, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; int dsize = 0, i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0; unsigned char *p, *data = NULL; const char *objstr = NULL; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; if (enc != NULL) { objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc)); if (objstr == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto err; } } if ((dsize = i2d(x, NULL)) < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); dsize = 0; goto err; } /* dsize + 8 bytes are needed */ /* actually it needs the cipher block size extra... */ data = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)dsize + 20); if (data == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = data; i = i2d(x, &p); if (enc != NULL) { if (kstr == NULL) { if (callback == NULL) klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); else klen = (*callback) (buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); if (klen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_READ_KEY); goto err; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */ ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, klen); #endif kstr = (unsigned char *)buf; } RAND_add(data, i, 0); /* put in the RSA key. */ OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) <= (int)sizeof(iv)); if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc)) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */ goto err; /* * The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is NOT taken from * the BytesToKey function */ if (!EVP_BytesToKey(enc, EVP_md5(), iv, kstr, klen, 1, key, NULL)) goto err; if (kstr == (unsigned char *)buf) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) + 13 <= sizeof buf); buf[0] = '\0'; PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED); PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc), (char *)iv); /* k=strlen(buf); */ ret = 1; if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, enc, NULL, key, iv) || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &j, data, i) || !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, &(data[j]), &i)) ret = 0; if (ret == 0) goto err; i += j; } else { ret = 1; buf[0] = '\0'; } i = PEM_write_bio(bp, name, buf, data, i); if (i <= 0) ret = 0; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof(iv)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_clear_free(data, (unsigned int)dsize); return (ret); } int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { int ok; int keylen; long len = *plen; int ilen = (int) len; /* EVP_DecryptUpdate etc. take int lengths */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; #if LONG_MAX > INT_MAX /* Check that we did not truncate the length */ if (len > INT_MAX) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); return 0; } #endif if (cipher->cipher == NULL) return 1; if (callback == NULL) keylen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else keylen = callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); if (keylen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); return 0; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */ ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, keylen); #endif if (!EVP_BytesToKey(cipher->cipher, EVP_md5(), &(cipher->iv[0]), (unsigned char *)buf, keylen, 1, key, NULL)) return 0; ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; ok = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, &(cipher->iv[0])); if (ok) ok = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &ilen, data, ilen); if (ok) { /* Squirrel away the length of data decrypted so far. */ *plen = ilen; ok = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, &(data[ilen]), &ilen); } if (ok) *plen += ilen; else PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)buf, sizeof(buf)); OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)key, sizeof(key)); return ok; } /* * This implements a very limited PEM header parser that does not support the * full grammar of rfc1421. In particular, folded headers are not supported, * nor is additional whitespace. * * A robust implementation would make use of a library that turns the headers * into a BIO from which one folded line is read at a time, and is then split * into a header label and content. We would then parse the content of the * headers we care about. This is overkill for just this limited use-case, but * presumably we also parse rfc822-style headers for S/MIME, so a common * abstraction might well be more generally useful. */ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher) { static const char ProcType[] = "Proc-Type:"; static const char ENCRYPTED[] = "ENCRYPTED"; static const char DEKInfo[] = "DEK-Info:"; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; int ivlen; char *dekinfostart, c; cipher->cipher = NULL; if ((header == NULL) || (*header == '\0') || (*header == '\n')) return 1; if (strncmp(header, ProcType, sizeof(ProcType)-1) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE); return 0; } header += sizeof(ProcType)-1; header += strspn(header, " \t"); if (*header++ != '4' || *header++ != ',') return 0; header += strspn(header, " \t"); /* We expect "ENCRYPTED" followed by optional white-space + line break */ if (strncmp(header, ENCRYPTED, sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1) != 0 || strspn(header+sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1, " \t\r\n") == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED); return 0; } header += sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1; header += strspn(header, " \t\r"); if (*header++ != '\n') { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER); return 0; } /*- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1421#section-4.6.1.3 * We expect "DEK-Info: algo[,hex-parameters]" */ if (strncmp(header, DEKInfo, sizeof(DEKInfo)-1) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO); return 0; } header += sizeof(DEKInfo)-1; header += strspn(header, " \t"); /* * DEK-INFO is a comma-separated combination of algorithm name and optional * parameters. */ dekinfostart = header; header += strcspn(header, " \t,"); c = *header; *header = '\0'; cipher->cipher = enc = EVP_get_cipherbyname(dekinfostart); *header = c; header += strspn(header, " \t"); if (enc == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION); return 0; } ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); if (ivlen > 0 && *header++ != ',') { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_MISSING_DEK_IV); return 0; } else if (ivlen == 0 && *header == ',') { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_UNEXPECTED_DEK_IV); return 0; } if (!load_iv(&header, cipher->iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc))) return 0; return 1; } static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num) { int v, i; char *from; from = *fromp; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) to[i] = 0; num *= 2; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { v = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*from); if (v < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_LOAD_IV, PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS); return (0); } from++; to[i / 2] |= v << (long)((!(i & 1)) * 4); } *fromp = from; return (1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_write_bio(b, name, header, data, len); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) { int nlen, n, i, j, outl; unsigned char *buf = NULL; EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB; if (ctx == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } EVP_EncodeInit(ctx); nlen = strlen(name); if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----BEGIN ", 11) != 11) || (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) || (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6)) goto err; i = strlen(header); if (i > 0) { if ((BIO_write(bp, header, i) != i) || (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)) goto err; } buf = OPENSSL_malloc(PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); if (buf == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } i = j = 0; while (len > 0) { n = (int)((len > (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5)) ? (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5) : len); if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, &(data[j]), n)) goto err; if ((outl) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl)) goto err; i += outl; len -= n; j += n; } EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, buf, &outl); if ((outl > 0) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl)) goto err; if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----END ", 9) != 9) || (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) || (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6)) goto err; OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); return (i + outl); err: OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO, reason); return (0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_read_bio(b, name, header, data, len); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len) { EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); int end = 0, i, k, bl = 0, hl = 0, nohead = 0; char buf[256]; BUF_MEM *nameB; BUF_MEM *headerB; BUF_MEM *dataB, *tmpB; if (ctx == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } nameB = BUF_MEM_new(); headerB = BUF_MEM_new(); dataB = BUF_MEM_new(); if ((nameB == NULL) || (headerB == NULL) || (dataB == NULL)) { goto err; } buf[254] = '\0'; for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_NO_START_LINE); goto err; } while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; if (strncmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ", 11) == 0) { i = strlen(&(buf[11])); if (strncmp(&(buf[11 + i - 6]), "-----\n", 6) != 0) continue; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(nameB, i + 9)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(nameB->data, &(buf[11]), i - 6); nameB->data[i - 6] = '\0'; break; } } hl = 0; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(headerB, 256)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } headerB->data[0] = '\0'; for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) break; while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; if (buf[0] == '\n') break; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(headerB, hl + i + 9)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) == 0) { nohead = 1; break; } memcpy(&(headerB->data[hl]), buf, i); headerB->data[hl + i] = '\0'; hl += i; } bl = 0; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(dataB, 1024)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } dataB->data[0] = '\0'; if (!nohead) { for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) break; while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; if (i != 65) end = 1; if (strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) == 0) break; if (i > 65) break; if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(dataB, i + bl + 9)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(&(dataB->data[bl]), buf, i); dataB->data[bl + i] = '\0'; bl += i; if (end) { buf[0] = '\0'; i = BIO_gets(bp, buf, 254); if (i <= 0) break; while ((i >= 0) && (buf[i] <= ' ')) i--; buf[++i] = '\n'; buf[++i] = '\0'; break; } } } else { tmpB = headerB; headerB = dataB; dataB = tmpB; bl = hl; } i = strlen(nameB->data); if ((strncmp(buf, "-----END ", 9) != 0) || (strncmp(nameB->data, &(buf[9]), i) != 0) || (strncmp(&(buf[9 + i]), "-----\n", 6) != 0)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); goto err; } EVP_DecodeInit(ctx); i = EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dataB->data, &bl, (unsigned char *)dataB->data, bl); if (i < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE); goto err; } i = EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)&(dataB->data[bl]), &k); if (i < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO, PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE); goto err; } bl += k; if (bl == 0) goto err; *name = nameB->data; *header = headerB->data; *data = (unsigned char *)dataB->data; *len = bl; OPENSSL_free(nameB); OPENSSL_free(headerB); OPENSSL_free(dataB); EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); return (1); err: BUF_MEM_free(nameB); BUF_MEM_free(headerB); BUF_MEM_free(dataB); EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); return (0); } /* * Check pem string and return prefix length. If for example the pem_str == * "RSA PRIVATE KEY" and suffix = "PRIVATE KEY" the return value is 3 for the * string "RSA". */ int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix) { int pem_len = strlen(pem_str); int suffix_len = strlen(suffix); const char *p; if (suffix_len + 1 >= pem_len) return 0; p = pem_str + pem_len - suffix_len; if (strcmp(p, suffix)) return 0; p--; if (*p != ' ') return 0; return p - pem_str; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_sign.c0000644000000000000000000000241613176625657016134 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include int PEM_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD *type) { return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL); } int PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *data, unsigned int count) { return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, count); } int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { unsigned char *m; int i, ret = 0; unsigned int m_len; m = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) + 2); if (m == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_SignFinal(ctx, m, &m_len, pkey) <= 0) goto err; i = EVP_EncodeBlock(sigret, m, m_len); *siglen = i; ret = 1; err: /* ctx has been zeroed by EVP_SignFinal() */ OPENSSL_free(m); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_info.c0000644000000000000000000002446113176625657016133 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(b, sk, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { X509_INFO *xi = NULL; char *name = NULL, *header = NULL; void *pp; unsigned char *data = NULL; const unsigned char *p; long len, error = 0; int ok = 0; STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret = NULL; unsigned int i, raw, ptype; d2i_of_void *d2i = 0; if (sk == NULL) { if ((ret = sk_X509_INFO_new_null()) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else ret = sk; if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; for (;;) { raw = 0; ptype = 0; i = PEM_read_bio(bp, &name, &header, &data, &len); if (i == 0) { error = ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()); if (error == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) { ERR_clear_error(); break; } goto err; } start: if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0) || (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0)) { d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509; if (xi->x509 != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi)) goto err; if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; goto start; } pp = &(xi->x509); } else if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)) { d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_AUX; if (xi->x509 != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi)) goto err; if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; goto start; } pp = &(xi->x509); } else if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) == 0) { d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_CRL; if (xi->crl != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi)) goto err; if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; goto start; } pp = &(xi->crl); } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0) { d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_RSAPrivateKey; if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi)) goto err; if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; goto start; } xi->enc_data = NULL; xi->enc_len = 0; xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new(); if (xi->x_pkey == NULL) goto err; ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA; pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey; if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */ raw = 1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DSA) == 0) { d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_DSAPrivateKey; if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi)) goto err; if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; goto start; } xi->enc_data = NULL; xi->enc_len = 0; xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new(); if (xi->x_pkey == NULL) goto err; ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA; pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey; if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */ raw = 1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY) == 0) { d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_ECPrivateKey; if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi)) goto err; if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; goto start; } xi->enc_data = NULL; xi->enc_len = 0; xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new(); if (xi->x_pkey == NULL) goto err; ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC; pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey; if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */ raw = 1; } else #endif { d2i = NULL; pp = NULL; } if (d2i != NULL) { if (!raw) { EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher; if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher)) goto err; if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u)) goto err; p = data; if (ptype) { if (!d2i_PrivateKey(ptype, pp, &p, len)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else if (d2i(pp, &p, len) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else { /* encrypted RSA data */ if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &xi->enc_cipher)) goto err; xi->enc_data = (char *)data; xi->enc_len = (int)len; data = NULL; } } else { /* unknown */ } OPENSSL_free(name); name = NULL; OPENSSL_free(header); header = NULL; OPENSSL_free(data); data = NULL; } /* * if the last one hasn't been pushed yet and there is anything in it * then add it to the stack ... */ if ((xi->x509 != NULL) || (xi->crl != NULL) || (xi->x_pkey != NULL) || (xi->enc_data != NULL)) { if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi)) goto err; xi = NULL; } ok = 1; err: X509_INFO_free(xi); if (!ok) { for (i = 0; ((int)i) < sk_X509_INFO_num(ret); i++) { xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(ret, i); X509_INFO_free(xi); } if (ret != sk) sk_X509_INFO_free(ret); ret = NULL; } OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(header); OPENSSL_free(data); return (ret); } /* A TJH addition */ int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { int i, ret = 0; unsigned char *data = NULL; const char *objstr = NULL; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char *iv = NULL; if (enc != NULL) { objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc)); if (objstr == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto err; } } /* * now for the fun part ... if we have a private key then we have to be * able to handle a not-yet-decrypted key being written out correctly ... * if it is decrypted or it is non-encrypted then we use the base code */ if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) { if ((xi->enc_data != NULL) && (xi->enc_len > 0)) { if (enc == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL); goto err; } /* copy from weirdo names into more normal things */ iv = xi->enc_cipher.iv; data = (unsigned char *)xi->enc_data; i = xi->enc_len; /* * we take the encryption data from the internal stuff rather * than what the user has passed us ... as we have to match * exactly for some strange reason */ objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(xi->enc_cipher.cipher)); if (objstr == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto err; } /* create the right magic header stuff */ OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) + 13 <= sizeof buf); buf[0] = '\0'; PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED); PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc), (char *)iv); /* use the normal code to write things out */ i = PEM_write_bio(bp, PEM_STRING_RSA, buf, data, i); if (i <= 0) goto err; } else { /* Add DSA/DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA /* normal optionally encrypted stuff */ if (PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey), enc, kstr, klen, cb, u) <= 0) goto err; #endif } } /* if we have a certificate then write it out now */ if ((xi->x509 != NULL) && (PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, xi->x509) <= 0)) goto err; /* * we are ignoring anything else that is loaded into the X509_INFO * structure for the moment ... as I don't need it so I'm not coding it * here and Eric can do it when this makes it into the base library --tjh */ ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/pem/pem_xaux.c0000644000000000000000000000110513176625657016153 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(X509_AUX, X509, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED, X509_AUX) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dllmain.c0000644000000000000000000000340313176625657015167 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib_int.h" #if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__) # ifdef __CYGWIN__ /* pick DLL_[PROCESS|THREAD]_[ATTACH|DETACH] definitions */ # include /* * this has side-effect of _WIN32 getting defined, which otherwise is * mutually exclusive with __CYGWIN__... */ # endif /* * All we really need to do is remove the 'error' state when a thread * detaches */ BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved); BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved) { switch (fdwReason) { case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(); # if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) { IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos_header = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) hinstDLL; IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *nt_headers; if (dos_header->e_magic == IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) { nt_headers = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *) ((char *)dos_header + dos_header->e_lfanew); if (nt_headers->Signature == IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE && hinstDLL != (HINSTANCE) (nt_headers->OptionalHeader.ImageBase)) OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 1; } } # endif break; case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH: break; case DLL_THREAD_DETACH: OPENSSL_thread_stop(); break; case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: break; } return (TRUE); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/srp/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014201 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c0000644000000000000000000004211013176625660016033 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20 # define MAX_LEN 2500 static char b64table[] = "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./"; /* * the following two conversion routines have been inspired by code from * Stanford */ /* * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation. */ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src) { char *loc; int i, j; int size; if (alen == 0 || alen > INT_MAX) return -1; while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')) ++src; size = strlen(src); if (size < 0 || size >= (int)alen) return -1; i = 0; while (i < size) { loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]); if (loc == (char *)0) break; else a[i] = loc - b64table; ++i; } /* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */ if (i == 0) return 0; size = i; i = size - 1; j = size; while (1) { a[j] = a[i]; if (--i < 0) break; a[j] |= (a[i] & 3) << 6; --j; a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x3c) >> 2); if (--i < 0) break; a[j] |= (a[i] & 0xf) << 4; --j; a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x30) >> 4); if (--i < 0) break; a[j] |= (a[i] << 2); a[--j] = 0; if (--i < 0) break; } while (j <= size && a[j] == 0) ++j; i = 0; while (j <= size) a[i++] = a[j++]; return i; } /* * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string. */ static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size) { int c, pos = size % 3; unsigned char b0 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, notleading = 0; char *olddst = dst; switch (pos) { case 1: b2 = src[0]; break; case 2: b1 = src[0]; b2 = src[1]; break; } while (1) { c = (b0 & 0xfc) >> 2; if (notleading || c != 0) { *dst++ = b64table[c]; notleading = 1; } c = ((b0 & 3) << 4) | ((b1 & 0xf0) >> 4); if (notleading || c != 0) { *dst++ = b64table[c]; notleading = 1; } c = ((b1 & 0xf) << 2) | ((b2 & 0xc0) >> 6); if (notleading || c != 0) { *dst++ = b64table[c]; notleading = 1; } c = b2 & 0x3f; if (notleading || c != 0) { *dst++ = b64table[c]; notleading = 1; } if (pos >= size) break; else { b0 = src[pos++]; b1 = src[pos++]; b2 = src[pos++]; } } *dst++ = '\0'; return olddst; } void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd) { if (user_pwd == NULL) return; BN_free(user_pwd->s); BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v); OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id); OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info); OPENSSL_free(user_pwd); } static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void) { SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; ret->N = NULL; ret->g = NULL; ret->s = NULL; ret->v = NULL; ret->id = NULL; ret->info = NULL; return ret; } static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *N) { vinfo->N = N; vinfo->g = g; } static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id, const char *info) { if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id))) return 0; return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info))); } static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s, const char *v) { unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; int len; vinfo->v = NULL; vinfo->s = NULL; len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v); if (len < 0) return 0; if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL))) return 0; len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s); if (len < 0) goto err; vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); if (vinfo->s == NULL) goto err; return 1; err: BN_free(vinfo->v); vinfo->v = NULL; return 0; } static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v) { vinfo->v = v; vinfo->s = s; return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL); } static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src) { SRP_user_pwd *ret; if (src == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) return NULL; SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N); if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info) || !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) { SRP_user_pwd_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key) { SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb)); if (vb == NULL) return NULL; if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL || (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(vb); return NULL; } vb->default_g = NULL; vb->default_N = NULL; vb->seed_key = NULL; if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) { sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd); sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache); OPENSSL_free(vb); return NULL; } return vb; } void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb) { if (!vb) return; sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free); sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache); OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key); OPENSSL_free(vb); } static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch) { unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; int len; SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN)); if (newgN == NULL) return NULL; len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch); if (len < 0) goto err; if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL) goto err; if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL))) return newgN; OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn); err: OPENSSL_free(newgN); return NULL; } static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache) { if (gN_cache == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn); BN_free(gN_cache->bn); OPENSSL_free(gN_cache); } static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab) { int i; SRP_gN *gN; if (gN_tab != NULL) for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) { gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i); if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0)) return gN; } return SRP_get_default_gN(id); } static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch) { int i; if (gN_cache == NULL) return NULL; /* search if we have already one... */ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) { SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i); if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0) return cache->bn; } { /* it is the first time that we find it */ SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch); if (newgN) { if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0) return newgN->bn; SRP_gN_free(newgN); } } return NULL; } /* * this function parses verifier file. Format is: * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0 * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index) */ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file) { int error_code; STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null(); char *last_index = NULL; int i; char **pp; SRP_gN *gN = NULL; SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL; TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL; BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE; if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0) goto err; error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE; if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL) goto err; error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY; if (vb->seed_key) { last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id; } for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i); if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) { /* * we add this couple in the internal Stack */ if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL) goto err; if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL || (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier])) == NULL || (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt])) == NULL || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0) goto err; gN = NULL; if (vb->seed_key != NULL) { last_index = pp[DB_srpid]; } } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) { /* it is a user .... */ const SRP_gN *lgN; if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) { error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY; if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) goto err; SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N); if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo])) goto err; error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB; if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier])) goto err; if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0) goto err; user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */ } } } if (last_index != NULL) { /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */ if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) { error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB; goto err; } vb->default_g = gN->g; vb->default_N = gN->N; gN = NULL; } error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR; err: /* * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application * terminates most likely */ if (gN != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(gN->id); OPENSSL_free(gN); } SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd); TXT_DB_free(tmpdb); BIO_free_all(in); sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab); return error_code; } static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) { int i; SRP_user_pwd *user; if (vb == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) { user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i); if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0) return user; } return NULL; } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller. * In other words, caller must not free the result. */ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) { return find_user(vb, username); } #endif /* * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller. * In other words, caller must free the result once done. */ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) { SRP_user_pwd *user; unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL; if (vb == NULL) return NULL; if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL) return srp_user_pwd_dup(user); if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) || (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL)) return NULL; /* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */ if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) return NULL; SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N); if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL)) goto err; if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0) goto err; ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctxt == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key)) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username)) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL)) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt); ctxt = NULL; if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user, BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL), BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL))) return user; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt); SRP_user_pwd_free(user); return NULL; } /* * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64) */ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g) { int len; char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL; const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL; BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL; unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN]; unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; char *defgNid = NULL; int vfsize = 0; if ((user == NULL) || (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL)) goto err; if (N) { if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0) goto err; N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); N_bn = N_bn_alloc; if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0) goto err; g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL); g_bn = g_bn_alloc; defgNid = "*"; } else { SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL); if (gN == NULL) goto err; N_bn = gN->N; g_bn = gN->g; defgNid = gN->id; } if (*salt == NULL) { if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) goto err; s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); } else { if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0) goto err; s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL); } if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn)) goto err; BN_bn2bin(v, tmp); vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2; if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL)) goto err; t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v)); if (*salt == NULL) { char *tmp_salt; if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) { goto err; } t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN); *salt = tmp_salt; } *verifier = vf; vf = NULL; result = defgNid; err: BN_free(N_bn_alloc); BN_free(g_bn_alloc); OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize); BN_clear_free(s); BN_clear_free(v); return result; } /* * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a * random salt. * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier * BIGNUMS. */ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g) { int result = 0; BIGNUM *x = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN]; BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL; if ((user == NULL) || (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) goto err; if (*salt == NULL) { if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) goto err; salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); } else { salttmp = *salt; } x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass); *verifier = BN_new(); if (*verifier == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mod_exp(*verifier, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) { BN_clear_free(*verifier); goto err; } result = 1; *salt = salttmp; err: if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp) BN_clear_free(salttmp); BN_clear_free(x); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return result; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/srp/build.info0000644000000000000000000000010113176625660016145 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=srp_lib.c srp_vfy.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001620613176625660016004 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include "internal/bn_srp.h" /* calculate = SHA1(PAD(x) || PAD(y)) */ static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_xy(const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *N) { unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char *tmp = NULL; int numN = BN_num_bytes(N); BIGNUM *res = NULL; if (x != N && BN_ucmp(x, N) >= 0) return NULL; if (y != N && BN_ucmp(y, N) >= 0) return NULL; if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(numN * 2)) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_bn2binpad(x, tmp, numN) < 0 || BN_bn2binpad(y, tmp + numN, numN) < 0 || !EVP_Digest(tmp, numN * 2, digest, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) goto err; res = BN_bin2bn(digest, sizeof(digest), NULL); err: OPENSSL_free(tmp); return res; } static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g) { /* k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) -- tls-srp draft 8 */ return srp_Calc_xy(N, g, N); } BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N) { /* k = SHA1(PAD(A) || PAD(B) ) -- tls-srp draft 8 */ return srp_Calc_xy(A, B, N); } BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *v, const BIGNUM *u, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N) { BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *S = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx; if (u == NULL || A == NULL || v == NULL || b == NULL || N == NULL) return NULL; if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* S = (A*v**u) ** b */ if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, v, u, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, A, tmp, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; S = BN_new(); if (S != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(S, tmp, b, N, bn_ctx)) { BN_free(S); S = NULL; } err: BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); BN_clear_free(tmp); return S; } BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_B(const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *v) { BIGNUM *kv = NULL, *gb = NULL; BIGNUM *B = NULL, *k = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx; if (b == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || v == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if ((kv = BN_new()) == NULL || (gb = BN_new()) == NULL || (B = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* B = g**b + k*v */ if (!BN_mod_exp(gb, g, b, N, bn_ctx) || (k = srp_Calc_k(N, g)) == NULL || !BN_mod_mul(kv, v, k, N, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_add(B, gb, kv, N, bn_ctx)) { BN_free(B); B = NULL; } err: BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); BN_clear_free(kv); BN_clear_free(gb); BN_free(k); return B; } BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_x(const BIGNUM *s, const char *user, const char *pass) { unsigned char dig[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt; unsigned char *cs = NULL; BIGNUM *res = NULL; if ((s == NULL) || (user == NULL) || (pass == NULL)) return NULL; ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctxt == NULL) return NULL; if ((cs = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(s))) == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, user, strlen(user)) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, ":", 1) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, pass, strlen(pass)) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, dig, NULL) || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) goto err; BN_bn2bin(s, cs); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, cs, BN_num_bytes(s))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, dig, sizeof(dig)) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, dig, NULL)) goto err; res = BN_bin2bn(dig, sizeof(dig), NULL); err: OPENSSL_free(cs); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt); return res; } BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_A(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g) { BN_CTX *bn_ctx; BIGNUM *A = NULL; if (a == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if ((A = BN_new()) != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(A, g, a, N, bn_ctx)) { BN_free(A); A = NULL; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return A; } BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_client_key(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *u) { BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *tmp3 = NULL, *k = NULL, *K = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx; if (u == NULL || B == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || x == NULL || a == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp2 = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp3 = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; if ((k = srp_Calc_k(N, g)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp, k, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub(tmp, B, tmp2, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(tmp3, u, x, bn_ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(tmp2, a, tmp3)) goto err; K = BN_new(); if (K != NULL && !BN_mod_exp(K, tmp, tmp2, N, bn_ctx)) { BN_free(K); K = NULL; } err: BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); BN_clear_free(tmp); BN_clear_free(tmp2); BN_clear_free(tmp3); BN_free(k); return K; } int SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N) { BIGNUM *r; BN_CTX *bn_ctx; int ret = 0; if (B == NULL || N == NULL || (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* Checks if B % N == 0 */ if (!BN_nnmod(r, B, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; ret = !BN_is_zero(r); err: BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); BN_free(r); return ret; } int SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *N) { /* Checks if A % N == 0 */ return SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(A, N); } static SRP_gN knowngN[] = { {"8192", &bn_generator_19, &bn_group_8192}, {"6144", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_6144}, {"4096", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_4096}, {"3072", &bn_generator_5, &bn_group_3072}, {"2048", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_2048}, {"1536", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_1536}, {"1024", &bn_generator_2, &bn_group_1024}, }; # define KNOWN_GN_NUMBER sizeof(knowngN) / sizeof(SRP_gN) /* * Check if G and N are known parameters. The values have been generated * from the ietf-tls-srp draft version 8 */ char *SRP_check_known_gN_param(const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *N) { size_t i; if ((g == NULL) || (N == NULL)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < KNOWN_GN_NUMBER; i++) { if (BN_cmp(knowngN[i].g, g) == 0 && BN_cmp(knowngN[i].N, N) == 0) return knowngN[i].id; } return NULL; } SRP_gN *SRP_get_default_gN(const char *id) { size_t i; if (id == NULL) return knowngN; for (i = 0; i < KNOWN_GN_NUMBER; i++) { if (strcmp(knowngN[i].id, id) == 0) return knowngN + i; } return NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/c64xpluscpuid.pl0000644000000000000000000001242213176625656016455 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .asg OPENSSL_rdtsc,_OPENSSL_rdtsc .asg OPENSSL_cleanse,_OPENSSL_cleanse .asg CRYPTO_memcmp,_CRYPTO_memcmp .asg OPENSSL_atomic_add,_OPENSSL_atomic_add .asg OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,_OPENSSL_wipe_cpu .asg OPENSSL_instrument_bus,_OPENSSL_instrument_bus .asg OPENSSL_instrument_bus2,_OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 .endif .asg B3,RA .global _OPENSSL_rdtsc _OPENSSL_rdtsc: .asmfunc B RA MVC TSCL,B0 MVC TSCH,B1 [!B0] MVC B0,TSCL ; start TSC MV B0,A4 MV B1,A5 .endasmfunc .global _OPENSSL_cleanse _OPENSSL_cleanse: .asmfunc ZERO A3:A2 || ZERO B2 || SHRU B4,3,B0 ; is length >= 8 || ADD 1,A4,B6 [!B0] BNOP RA || ZERO A1 || ZERO B1 [B0] MVC B0,ILC ||[!B0] CMPLT 0,B4,A1 ||[!B0] CMPLT 1,B4,B1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] || [B1] STB B2,*B6++[2] ||[!B0] CMPLT 2,B4,A1 ||[!B0] CMPLT 3,B4,B1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] || [B1] STB B2,*B6++[2] ||[!B0] CMPLT 4,B4,A1 ||[!B0] CMPLT 5,B4,B1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] || [B1] STB B2,*B6++[2] ||[!B0] CMPLT 6,B4,A1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] SPLOOP 1 STNDW A3:A2,*A4++ || SUB B4,8,B4 SPKERNEL MV B4,B0 ; remaining bytes || ADD 1,A4,B6 || BNOP RA [B0] CMPLT 0,B0,A1 || [B0] CMPLT 1,B0,B1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] || [B1] STB B2,*B6++[2] || [B0] CMPLT 2,B0,A1 || [B0] CMPLT 3,B0,B1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] || [B1] STB B2,*B6++[2] || [B0] CMPLT 4,B0,A1 || [B0] CMPLT 5,B0,B1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] || [B1] STB B2,*B6++[2] || [B0] CMPLT 6,B0,A1 [A1] STB A2,*A4++[2] .endasmfunc .global _CRYPTO_memcmp _CRYPTO_memcmp: .asmfunc MV A6,B0 [!B0] BNOP RA ||[!B0] ZERO A4 [B0] MVC B0,ILC || [B0] ZERO A0 NOP 4 SPLOOP 1 LDBU *A4++,A1 || LDBU *B4++,B1 NOP 4 XOR.L B1,A1,A2 SPKERNEL 1,0 || OR.S A2,A0,A0 BNOP RA,3 ZERO.L A4 [A0] MVK 1,A4 .endasmfunc .global _OPENSSL_atomic_add _OPENSSL_atomic_add: .asmfunc MV A4,B0 atomic_add?: LL *B0,B5 NOP 4 ADD B4,B5,B5 SL B5,*B0 CMTL *B0,B1 NOP 4 [!B1] B atomic_add? [B1] BNOP RA,4 MV B5,A4 .endasmfunc .global _OPENSSL_wipe_cpu _OPENSSL_wipe_cpu: .asmfunc ZERO A0 || ZERO B0 || ZERO A1 || ZERO B1 ZERO A3:A2 || MVD B0,B2 || ZERO A4 || ZERO B4 || ZERO A5 || ZERO B5 || BNOP RA ZERO A7:A6 || ZERO B7:B6 || ZERO A8 || ZERO B8 || ZERO A9 || ZERO B9 ZERO A17:A16 || ZERO B17:B16 || ZERO A18 || ZERO B18 || ZERO A19 || ZERO B19 ZERO A21:A20 || ZERO B21:B20 || ZERO A22 || ZERO B22 || ZERO A23 || ZERO B23 ZERO A25:A24 || ZERO B25:B24 || ZERO A26 || ZERO B26 || ZERO A27 || ZERO B27 ZERO A29:A28 || ZERO B29:B28 || ZERO A30 || ZERO B30 || ZERO A31 || ZERO B31 .endasmfunc CLFLUSH .macro CONTROL,ADDR,LEN B passthrough? || STW ADDR,*CONTROL[0] STW LEN,*CONTROL[1] spinlock?: LDW *CONTROL[1],A0 NOP 3 passthrough?: NOP [A0] BNOP spinlock?,5 .endm .global _OPENSSL_instrument_bus _OPENSSL_instrument_bus: .asmfunc MV B4,B0 ; reassign sizeof(output) || MV A4,B4 ; reassign output || MVK 0x00004030,A3 MV B0,A4 ; return value || MVK 1,A1 || MVKH 0x01840000,A3 ; L1DWIBAR MVC TSCL,B8 ; collect 1st tick || MVK 0x00004010,A5 MV B8,B9 ; lasttick = tick || MVK 0,B7 ; lastdiff = 0 || MVKH 0x01840000,A5 ; L2WIBAR CLFLUSH A3,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L1D line CLFLUSH A5,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L2 line LL *B4,B5 NOP 4 ADD B7,B5,B5 SL B5,*B4 CMTL *B4,B1 NOP 4 STW B5,*B4 bus_loop1?: MVC TSCL,B8 || [B0] SUB B0,1,B0 SUB B8,B9,B7 ; lastdiff = tick - lasttick || MV B8,B9 ; lasttick = tick CLFLUSH A3,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L1D line CLFLUSH A5,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L2 line LL *B4,B5 NOP 4 ADD B7,B5,B5 SL B5,*B4 CMTL *B4,B1 STW B5,*B4 ; [!B1] is removed to flatten samples || ADDK 4,B4 || [B0] BNOP bus_loop1?,5 BNOP RA,5 .endasmfunc .global _OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 _OPENSSL_instrument_bus2: .asmfunc MV A6,B0 ; reassign max || MV B4,A6 ; reassing sizeof(output) || MVK 0x00004030,A3 MV A4,B4 ; reassign output || MVK 0,A4 ; return value || MVK 1,A1 || MVKH 0x01840000,A3 ; L1DWIBAR MVC TSCL,B8 ; collect 1st tick || MVK 0x00004010,A5 MV B8,B9 ; lasttick = tick || MVK 0,B7 ; lastdiff = 0 || MVKH 0x01840000,A5 ; L2WIBAR CLFLUSH A3,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L1D line CLFLUSH A5,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L2 line LL *B4,B5 NOP 4 ADD B7,B5,B5 SL B5,*B4 CMTL *B4,B1 NOP 4 STW B5,*B4 MVC TSCL,B8 ; collect 1st diff SUB B8,B9,B7 ; lastdiff = tick - lasttick || MV B8,B9 ; lasttick = tick || SUB B0,1,B0 bus_loop2?: CLFLUSH A3,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L1D line CLFLUSH A5,B4,A1 ; write-back and invalidate L2 line LL *B4,B5 NOP 4 ADD B7,B5,B5 SL B5,*B4 CMTL *B4,B1 STW B5,*B4 ; [!B1] is removed to flatten samples ||[!B0] BNOP bus_loop2_done?,2 || SUB B0,1,B0 MVC TSCL,B8 SUB B8,B9,B8 || MV B8,B9 CMPEQ B8,B7,B2 || MV B8,B7 [!B2] ADDAW B4,1,B4 ||[!B2] ADDK 1,A4 CMPEQ A4,A6,A2 [!A2] BNOP bus_loop2?,5 bus_loop2_done?: BNOP RA,5 .endasmfunc ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657015046 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/x86nasm.pl0000644000000000000000000001064313176625657016713 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html package x86nasm; *out=\@::out; $::lbdecor="L\$"; # local label decoration $nmdecor=$::netware?"":"_"; # external name decoration $drdecor=$::mwerks?".":""; # directive decoration $initseg=""; sub ::generic { my $opcode=shift; my $tmp; if (!$::mwerks) { if ($opcode =~ m/^j/o && $#_==0) # optimize jumps { $_[0] = "NEAR $_[0]"; } elsif ($opcode eq "lea" && $#_==1) # wipe storage qualifier from lea { $_[1] =~ s/^[^\[]*\[/\[/o; } elsif ($opcode eq "clflush" && $#_==0) { $_[0] =~ s/^[^\[]*\[/\[/o; } } &::emit($opcode,@_); 1; } # # opcodes not covered by ::generic above, mostly inconsistent namings... # sub ::call { &::emit("call",(&::islabel($_[0]) or "$nmdecor$_[0]")); } sub ::call_ptr { &::emit("call",@_); } sub ::jmp_ptr { &::emit("jmp",@_); } sub get_mem { my($size,$addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_; my($post,$ret); if (!defined($idx) && 1*$reg2) { $idx=$reg2; $reg2=$reg1; undef $reg1; } if ($size ne "") { $ret .= "$size"; $ret .= " PTR" if ($::mwerks); $ret .= " "; } $ret .= "["; $addr =~ s/^\s+//; # prepend global references with optional underscore $addr =~ s/^([^\+\-0-9][^\+\-]*)/::islabel($1) or "$nmdecor$1"/ige; # put address arithmetic expression in parenthesis $addr="($addr)" if ($addr =~ /^.+[\-\+].+$/); if (($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0)) { if ($addr !~ /^-/) { $ret .= "$addr+"; } else { $post=$addr; } } if ($reg2 ne "") { $idx!=0 or $idx=1; $ret .= "$reg2*$idx"; $ret .= "+$reg1" if ($reg1 ne ""); } else { $ret .= "$reg1"; } $ret .= "$post]"; $ret =~ s/\+\]/]/; # in case $addr was the only argument $ret; } sub ::BP { &get_mem("BYTE",@_); } sub ::DWP { &get_mem("DWORD",@_); } sub ::WP { &get_mem("WORD",@_); } sub ::QWP { &get_mem("",@_); } sub ::BC { (($::mwerks)?"":"BYTE ")."@_"; } sub ::DWC { (($::mwerks)?"":"DWORD ")."@_"; } sub ::file { if ($::mwerks) { push(@out,".section\t.text,64\n"); } else { my $tmp=<<___; %ifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,obj section code use32 class=code align=64 %elifidn __OUTPUT_FORMAT__,win32 \$\@feat.00 equ 1 section .text code align=64 %else section .text code %endif ___ push(@out,$tmp); } } sub ::function_begin_B { my $func=shift; my $global=($func !~ /^_/); my $begin="${::lbdecor}_${func}_begin"; $begin =~ s/^\@/./ if ($::mwerks); # the torture never stops &::LABEL($func,$global?"$begin":"$nmdecor$func"); $func=$nmdecor.$func; push(@out,"${drdecor}global $func\n") if ($global); push(@out,"${drdecor}align 16\n"); push(@out,"$func:\n"); push(@out,"$begin:\n") if ($global); $::stack=4; } sub ::function_end_B { $::stack=0; &::wipe_labels(); } sub ::file_end { if (grep {/\b${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P\b/i} @out) { my $comm=<<___; ${drdecor}segment .bss ${drdecor}common ${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P 16 ___ # comment out OPENSSL_ia32cap_P declarations grep {s/(^extern\s+${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P)/\;$1/} @out; push (@out,$comm) } push (@out,$initseg) if ($initseg); } sub ::comment { foreach (@_) { push(@out,"\t; $_\n"); } } sub ::external_label { foreach(@_) { push(@out,"${drdecor}extern\t".&::LABEL($_,$nmdecor.$_)."\n"); } } sub ::public_label { push(@out,"${drdecor}global\t".&::LABEL($_[0],$nmdecor.$_[0])."\n"); } sub ::data_byte { push(@out,(($::mwerks)?".byte\t":"db\t").join(',',@_)."\n"); } sub ::data_short { push(@out,(($::mwerks)?".word\t":"dw\t").join(',',@_)."\n"); } sub ::data_word { push(@out,(($::mwerks)?".long\t":"dd\t").join(',',@_)."\n"); } sub ::align { push(@out,"${drdecor}align\t$_[0]\n"); } sub ::picmeup { my($dst,$sym)=@_; &::lea($dst,&::DWP($sym)); } sub ::initseg { my $f=$nmdecor.shift; if ($::win32) { $initseg=<<___; segment .CRT\$XCU data align=4 extern $f dd $f ___ } } sub ::dataseg { if ($mwerks) { push(@out,".section\t.data,4\n"); } else { push(@out,"section\t.data align=4\n"); } } sub ::safeseh { my $nm=shift; push(@out,"%if __NASM_VERSION_ID__ >= 0x02030000\n"); push(@out,"safeseh ".&::LABEL($nm,$nmdecor.$nm)."\n"); push(@out,"%endif\n"); } 1; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/x86gas.pl0000644000000000000000000001447213176625657016533 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html package x86gas; *out=\@::out; $::lbdecor=$::aout?"L":".L"; # local label decoration $nmdecor=($::aout or $::coff)?"_":""; # external name decoration $initseg=""; $align=16; $align=log($align)/log(2) if ($::aout); $com_start="#" if ($::aout or $::coff); sub opsize() { my $reg=shift; if ($reg =~ m/^%e/o) { "l"; } elsif ($reg =~ m/^%[a-d][hl]$/o) { "b"; } elsif ($reg =~ m/^%[yxm]/o) { undef; } else { "w"; } } # swap arguments; # expand opcode with size suffix; # prefix numeric constants with $; sub ::generic { my($opcode,@arg)=@_; my($suffix,$dst,$src); @arg=reverse(@arg); for (@arg) { s/^(\*?)(e?[a-dsixphl]{2})$/$1%$2/o; # gp registers s/^([xy]?mm[0-7])$/%$1/o; # xmm/mmx registers s/^(\-?[0-9]+)$/\$$1/o; # constants s/^(\-?0x[0-9a-f]+)$/\$$1/o; # constants } $dst = $arg[$#arg] if ($#arg>=0); $src = $arg[$#arg-1] if ($#arg>=1); if ($dst =~ m/^%/o) { $suffix=&opsize($dst); } elsif ($src =~ m/^%/o) { $suffix=&opsize($src); } else { $suffix="l"; } undef $suffix if ($dst =~ m/^%[xm]/o || $src =~ m/^%[xm]/o); if ($#_==0) { &::emit($opcode); } elsif ($#_==1 && $opcode =~ m/^(call|clflush|j|loop|set)/o) { &::emit($opcode,@arg); } else { &::emit($opcode.$suffix,@arg);} 1; } # # opcodes not covered by ::generic above, mostly inconsistent namings... # sub ::movzx { &::movzb(@_); } sub ::pushfd { &::pushfl; } sub ::popfd { &::popfl; } sub ::cpuid { &::emit(".byte\t0x0f,0xa2"); } sub ::rdtsc { &::emit(".byte\t0x0f,0x31"); } sub ::call { &::emit("call",(&::islabel($_[0]) or "$nmdecor$_[0]")); } sub ::call_ptr { &::generic("call","*$_[0]"); } sub ::jmp_ptr { &::generic("jmp","*$_[0]"); } *::bswap = sub { &::emit("bswap","%$_[0]"); } if (!$::i386); sub ::DWP { my($addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_; my $ret=""; if (!defined($idx) && 1*$reg2) { $idx=$reg2; $reg2=$reg1; undef $reg1; } $addr =~ s/^\s+//; # prepend global references with optional underscore $addr =~ s/^([^\+\-0-9][^\+\-]*)/&::islabel($1) or "$nmdecor$1"/ige; $reg1 = "%$reg1" if ($reg1); $reg2 = "%$reg2" if ($reg2); $ret .= $addr if (($addr ne "") && ($addr ne 0)); if ($reg2) { $idx!= 0 or $idx=1; $ret .= "($reg1,$reg2,$idx)"; } elsif ($reg1) { $ret .= "($reg1)"; } $ret; } sub ::QWP { &::DWP(@_); } sub ::BP { &::DWP(@_); } sub ::WP { &::DWP(@_); } sub ::BC { @_; } sub ::DWC { @_; } sub ::file { push(@out,".file\t\"$_[0].s\"\n.text\n"); } sub ::function_begin_B { my $func=shift; my $global=($func !~ /^_/); my $begin="${::lbdecor}_${func}_begin"; &::LABEL($func,$global?"$begin":"$nmdecor$func"); $func=$nmdecor.$func; push(@out,".globl\t$func\n") if ($global); if ($::coff) { push(@out,".def\t$func;\t.scl\t".(3-$global).";\t.type\t32;\t.endef\n"); } elsif (($::aout and !$::pic) or $::macosx) { } else { push(@out,".type $func,\@function\n"); } push(@out,".align\t$align\n"); push(@out,"$func:\n"); push(@out,"$begin:\n") if ($global); $::stack=4; } sub ::function_end_B { my $func=shift; push(@out,".size\t$nmdecor$func,.-".&::LABEL($func)."\n") if ($::elf); $::stack=0; &::wipe_labels(); } sub ::comment { if (!defined($com_start) or $::elf) { # Regarding $::elf above... # GNU and SVR4 as'es use different comment delimiters, push(@out,"\n"); # so we just skip ELF comments... return; } foreach (@_) { if (/^\s*$/) { push(@out,"\n"); } else { push(@out,"\t$com_start $_ $com_end\n"); } } } sub ::external_label { foreach(@_) { &::LABEL($_,$nmdecor.$_); } } sub ::public_label { push(@out,".globl\t".&::LABEL($_[0],$nmdecor.$_[0])."\n"); } sub ::file_end { if ($::macosx) { if (%non_lazy_ptr) { push(@out,".section __IMPORT,__pointers,non_lazy_symbol_pointers\n"); foreach $i (keys %non_lazy_ptr) { push(@out,"$non_lazy_ptr{$i}:\n.indirect_symbol\t$i\n.long\t0\n"); } } } if (grep {/\b${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P\b/i} @out) { my $tmp=".comm\t${nmdecor}OPENSSL_ia32cap_P,16"; if ($::macosx) { push (@out,"$tmp,2\n"); } elsif ($::elf) { push (@out,"$tmp,4\n"); } else { push (@out,"$tmp\n"); } } push(@out,$initseg) if ($initseg); } sub ::data_byte { push(@out,".byte\t".join(',',@_)."\n"); } sub ::data_short{ push(@out,".value\t".join(',',@_)."\n"); } sub ::data_word { push(@out,".long\t".join(',',@_)."\n"); } sub ::align { my $val=$_[0]; if ($::aout) { $val=int(log($val)/log(2)); $val.=",0x90"; } push(@out,".align\t$val\n"); } sub ::picmeup { my($dst,$sym,$base,$reflabel)=@_; if (($::pic && ($::elf || $::aout)) || $::macosx) { if (!defined($base)) { &::call(&::label("PIC_me_up")); &::set_label("PIC_me_up"); &::blindpop($dst); $base=$dst; $reflabel=&::label("PIC_me_up"); } if ($::macosx) { my $indirect=&::static_label("$nmdecor$sym\$non_lazy_ptr"); &::mov($dst,&::DWP("$indirect-$reflabel",$base)); $non_lazy_ptr{"$nmdecor$sym"}=$indirect; } elsif ($sym eq "OPENSSL_ia32cap_P" && $::elf>0) { &::lea($dst,&::DWP("$sym-$reflabel",$base)); } else { &::lea($dst,&::DWP("_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+[.-$reflabel]", $base)); &::mov($dst,&::DWP("$sym\@GOT",$dst)); } } else { &::lea($dst,&::DWP($sym)); } } sub ::initseg { my $f=$nmdecor.shift; if ($::android) { $initseg.=<<___; .section .init_array .align 4 .long $f ___ } elsif ($::elf) { $initseg.=<<___; .section .init call $f ___ } elsif ($::coff) { $initseg.=<<___; # applies to both Cygwin and Mingw .section .ctors .long $f ___ } elsif ($::macosx) { $initseg.=<<___; .mod_init_func .align 2 .long $f ___ } elsif ($::aout) { my $ctor="${nmdecor}_GLOBAL_\$I\$$f"; $initseg.=".text\n"; $initseg.=".type $ctor,\@function\n" if ($::pic); $initseg.=<<___; # OpenBSD way... .globl $ctor .align 2 $ctor: jmp $f ___ } } sub ::dataseg { push(@out,".data\n"); } *::hidden = sub { push(@out,".hidden\t$nmdecor$_[0]\n"); } if ($::elf); 1; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl0000644000000000000000000001126413176625657016712 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html package x86masm; *out=\@::out; $::lbdecor="\$L"; # local label decoration $nmdecor="_"; # external name decoration $initseg=""; $segment=""; sub ::generic { my ($opcode,@arg)=@_; # fix hexadecimal constants for (@arg) { s/(? 0); $data_off+=4 if ($p2 > 0); $data_off+=4 if ($p3 > 0); &mov($count, &wparam(2)); # length &comment("getting iv ptr from parameter $iv_off"); &mov("ebx", &wparam($iv_off)); # Get iv ptr &mov($in, &DWP(0,"ebx","",0));# iv[0] &mov($out, &DWP(4,"ebx","",0));# iv[1] &push($out); &push($in); &push($out); # used in decrypt for iv[1] &push($in); # used in decrypt for iv[0] &mov("ebx", "esp"); # This is the address of tin[2] &mov($in, &wparam(0)); # in &mov($out, &wparam(1)); # out # We have loaded them all, how lets push things &comment("getting encrypt flag from parameter $enc_off"); &mov("ecx", &wparam($enc_off)); # Get enc flag if ($p3 > 0) { &comment("get and push parameter $p3"); if ($enc_off != $p3) { &mov("eax", &wparam($p3)); &push("eax"); } else { &push("ecx"); } } if ($p2 > 0) { &comment("get and push parameter $p2"); if ($enc_off != $p2) { &mov("eax", &wparam($p2)); &push("eax"); } else { &push("ecx"); } } if ($p1 > 0) { &comment("get and push parameter $p1"); if ($enc_off != $p1) { &mov("eax", &wparam($p1)); &push("eax"); } else { &push("ecx"); } } &push("ebx"); # push data/iv &cmp("ecx",0); &jz(&label("decrypt")); &and($count,0xfffffff8); &mov("eax", &DWP($data_off,"esp","",0)); # load iv[0] &mov("ebx", &DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0)); # load iv[1] &jz(&label("encrypt_finish")); ############################################################# &set_label("encrypt_loop"); # encrypt start # "eax" and "ebx" hold iv (or the last cipher text) &mov("ecx", &DWP(0,$in,"",0)); # load first 4 bytes &mov("edx", &DWP(4,$in,"",0)); # second 4 bytes &xor("eax", "ecx"); &xor("ebx", "edx"); &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0), "eax"); # put in array for call &mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0), "ebx"); # &call($enc_func); &mov("eax", &DWP($data_off,"esp","",0)); &mov("ebx", &DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0)); &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0),"eax"); &mov(&DWP(4,$out,"",0),"ebx"); # eax and ebx are the next iv. &add($in, 8); &add($out, 8); &sub($count, 8); &jnz(&label("encrypt_loop")); ###################################################################3 &set_label("encrypt_finish"); &mov($count, &wparam(2)); # length &and($count, 7); &jz(&label("finish")); &call(&label("PIC_point")); &set_label("PIC_point"); &blindpop("edx"); &lea("ecx",&DWP(&label("cbc_enc_jmp_table")."-".&label("PIC_point"),"edx")); &mov($count,&DWP(0,"ecx",$count,4)); &add($count,"edx"); &xor("ecx","ecx"); &xor("edx","edx"); #&mov($count,&DWP(&label("cbc_enc_jmp_table"),"",$count,4)); &jmp_ptr($count); &set_label("ej7"); &movb(&HB("edx"), &BP(6,$in,"",0)); &shl("edx",8); &set_label("ej6"); &movb(&HB("edx"), &BP(5,$in,"",0)); &set_label("ej5"); &movb(&LB("edx"), &BP(4,$in,"",0)); &set_label("ej4"); &mov("ecx", &DWP(0,$in,"",0)); &jmp(&label("ejend")); &set_label("ej3"); &movb(&HB("ecx"), &BP(2,$in,"",0)); &shl("ecx",8); &set_label("ej2"); &movb(&HB("ecx"), &BP(1,$in,"",0)); &set_label("ej1"); &movb(&LB("ecx"), &BP(0,$in,"",0)); &set_label("ejend"); &xor("eax", "ecx"); &xor("ebx", "edx"); &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0), "eax"); # put in array for call &mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0), "ebx"); # &call($enc_func); &mov("eax", &DWP($data_off,"esp","",0)); &mov("ebx", &DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0)); &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0),"eax"); &mov(&DWP(4,$out,"",0),"ebx"); &jmp(&label("finish")); ############################################################# ############################################################# &set_label("decrypt",1); # decrypt start &and($count,0xfffffff8); # The next 2 instructions are only for if the jz is taken &mov("eax", &DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0)); # get iv[0] &mov("ebx", &DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0)); # get iv[1] &jz(&label("decrypt_finish")); &set_label("decrypt_loop"); &mov("eax", &DWP(0,$in,"",0)); # load first 4 bytes &mov("ebx", &DWP(4,$in,"",0)); # second 4 bytes &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0), "eax"); # put back &mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0), "ebx"); # &call($dec_func); &mov("eax", &DWP($data_off,"esp","",0)); # get return &mov("ebx", &DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0)); # &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov("ecx", &DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0)); # get iv[0] &mov("edx", &DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0)); # get iv[1] &xor("ecx", "eax"); &xor("edx", "ebx"); &mov("eax", &DWP(0,$in,"",0)); # get old cipher text, &mov("ebx", &DWP(4,$in,"",0)); # next iv actually &mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0),"ecx"); &mov(&DWP(4,$out,"",0),"edx"); &mov(&DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0), "eax"); # save iv &mov(&DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0), "ebx"); # &add($in, 8); &add($out, 8); &sub($count, 8); &jnz(&label("decrypt_loop")); ############################ ENDIT #######################3 &set_label("decrypt_finish"); &mov($count, &wparam(2)); # length &and($count, 7); &jz(&label("finish")); &mov("eax", &DWP(0,$in,"",0)); # load first 4 bytes &mov("ebx", &DWP(4,$in,"",0)); # second 4 bytes &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov(&DWP($data_off,"esp","",0), "eax"); # put back &mov(&DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0), "ebx"); # &call($dec_func); &mov("eax", &DWP($data_off,"esp","",0)); # get return &mov("ebx", &DWP($data_off+4,"esp","",0)); # &bswap("eax") if $swap; &bswap("ebx") if $swap; &mov("ecx", &DWP($data_off+8,"esp","",0)); # get iv[0] &mov("edx", &DWP($data_off+12,"esp","",0)); # get iv[1] &xor("ecx", "eax"); &xor("edx", "ebx"); # this is for when we exit &mov("eax", &DWP(0,$in,"",0)); # get old cipher text, &mov("ebx", &DWP(4,$in,"",0)); # next iv actually &set_label("dj7"); &rotr("edx", 16); &movb(&BP(6,$out,"",0), &LB("edx")); &shr("edx",16); &set_label("dj6"); &movb(&BP(5,$out,"",0), &HB("edx")); &set_label("dj5"); &movb(&BP(4,$out,"",0), &LB("edx")); &set_label("dj4"); &mov(&DWP(0,$out,"",0), "ecx"); &jmp(&label("djend")); &set_label("dj3"); &rotr("ecx", 16); &movb(&BP(2,$out,"",0), &LB("ecx")); &shl("ecx",16); &set_label("dj2"); &movb(&BP(1,$in,"",0), &HB("ecx")); &set_label("dj1"); &movb(&BP(0,$in,"",0), &LB("ecx")); &set_label("djend"); # final iv is still in eax:ebx &jmp(&label("finish")); ############################ FINISH #######################3 &set_label("finish",1); &mov("ecx", &wparam($iv_off)); # Get iv ptr ################################################# $total=16+4; $total+=4 if ($p1 > 0); $total+=4 if ($p2 > 0); $total+=4 if ($p3 > 0); &add("esp",$total); &mov(&DWP(0,"ecx","",0), "eax"); # save iv &mov(&DWP(4,"ecx","",0), "ebx"); # save iv &function_end_A($name); &align(64); &set_label("cbc_enc_jmp_table"); &data_word("0"); &data_word(&label("ej1")."-".&label("PIC_point")); &data_word(&label("ej2")."-".&label("PIC_point")); &data_word(&label("ej3")."-".&label("PIC_point")); &data_word(&label("ej4")."-".&label("PIC_point")); &data_word(&label("ej5")."-".&label("PIC_point")); &data_word(&label("ej6")."-".&label("PIC_point")); &data_word(&label("ej7")."-".&label("PIC_point")); # not used #&set_label("cbc_dec_jmp_table",1); #&data_word("0"); #&data_word(&label("dj1")."-".&label("PIC_point")); #&data_word(&label("dj2")."-".&label("PIC_point")); #&data_word(&label("dj3")."-".&label("PIC_point")); #&data_word(&label("dj4")."-".&label("PIC_point")); #&data_word(&label("dj5")."-".&label("PIC_point")); #&data_word(&label("dj6")."-".&label("PIC_point")); #&data_word(&label("dj7")."-".&label("PIC_point")); &align(64); &function_end_B($name); } 1; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/README0000644000000000000000000000653713176625657015741 0ustar rootrootThe perl scripts in this directory are my 'hack' to generate multiple different assembler formats via the one original script. The way to use this library is to start with adding the path to this directory and then include it. push(@INC,"perlasm","../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; The first thing we do is setup the file and type of assembler &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); The first argument is the 'type'. Currently 'cpp', 'sol', 'a.out', 'elf' or 'win32'. Argument 2 is the file name. The reciprocal function is &asm_finish() which should be called at the end. There are 2 main 'packages'. x86ms.pl, which is the Microsoft assembler, and x86unix.pl which is the unix (gas) version. Functions of interest are: &external_label("des_SPtrans"); declare and external variable &LB(reg); Low byte for a register &HB(reg); High byte for a register &BP(off,base,index,scale) Byte pointer addressing &DWP(off,base,index,scale) Word pointer addressing &stack_push(num) Basically a 'sub esp, num*4' with extra &stack_pop(num) inverse of stack_push &function_begin(name,extra) Start a function with pushing of edi, esi, ebx and ebp. extra is extra win32 external info that may be required. &function_begin_B(name,extra) Same as normal function_begin but no pushing. &function_end(name) Call at end of function. &function_end_A(name) Standard pop and ret, for use inside functions &function_end_B(name) Call at end but with poping or 'ret'. &swtmp(num) Address on stack temp word. &wparam(num) Parameter number num, that was push in C convention. This all works over pushes and pops. &comment("hello there") Put in a comment. &label("loop") Refer to a label, normally a jmp target. &set_label("loop") Set a label at this point. &data_word(word) Put in a word of data. So how does this all hold together? Given int calc(int len, int *data) { int i,j=0; for (i=0; i$output" || die "can't open $output: $!"; my %GLOBALS; my $dotinlocallabels=($flavour=~/linux/)?1:0; ################################################################ # directives which need special treatment on different platforms ################################################################ my $globl = sub { my $junk = shift; my $name = shift; my $global = \$GLOBALS{$name}; my $ret; $name =~ s|^[\.\_]||; SWITCH: for ($flavour) { /aix/ && do { $name = ".$name"; last; }; /osx/ && do { $name = "_$name"; last; }; /linux.*(32|64le)/ && do { $ret .= ".globl $name\n"; $ret .= ".type $name,\@function"; last; }; /linux.*64/ && do { $ret .= ".globl $name\n"; $ret .= ".type $name,\@function\n"; $ret .= ".section \".opd\",\"aw\"\n"; $ret .= ".align 3\n"; $ret .= "$name:\n"; $ret .= ".quad .$name,.TOC.\@tocbase,0\n"; $ret .= ".previous\n"; $name = ".$name"; last; }; } $ret = ".globl $name" if (!$ret); $$global = $name; $ret; }; my $text = sub { my $ret = ($flavour =~ /aix/) ? ".csect\t.text[PR],7" : ".text"; $ret = ".abiversion 2\n".$ret if ($flavour =~ /linux.*64le/); $ret; }; my $machine = sub { my $junk = shift; my $arch = shift; if ($flavour =~ /osx/) { $arch =~ s/\"//g; $arch = ($flavour=~/64/) ? "ppc970-64" : "ppc970" if ($arch eq "any"); } ".machine $arch"; }; my $size = sub { if ($flavour =~ /linux/) { shift; my $name = shift; $name =~ s|^[\.\_]||; my $ret = ".size $name,.-".($flavour=~/64$/?".":"").$name; $ret .= "\n.size .$name,.-.$name" if ($flavour=~/64$/); $ret; } else { ""; } }; my $asciz = sub { shift; my $line = join(",",@_); if ($line =~ /^"(.*)"$/) { ".byte " . join(",",unpack("C*",$1),0) . "\n.align 2"; } else { ""; } }; my $quad = sub { shift; my @ret; my ($hi,$lo); for (@_) { if (/^0x([0-9a-f]*?)([0-9a-f]{1,8})$/io) { $hi=$1?"0x$1":"0"; $lo="0x$2"; } elsif (/^([0-9]+)$/o) { $hi=$1>>32; $lo=$1&0xffffffff; } # error-prone with 32-bit perl else { $hi=undef; $lo=$_; } if (defined($hi)) { push(@ret,$flavour=~/le$/o?".long\t$lo,$hi":".long\t$hi,$lo"); } else { push(@ret,".quad $lo"); } } join("\n",@ret); }; ################################################################ # simplified mnemonics not handled by at least one assembler ################################################################ my $cmplw = sub { my $f = shift; my $cr = 0; $cr = shift if ($#_>1); # Some out-of-date 32-bit GNU assembler just can't handle cmplw... ($flavour =~ /linux.*32/) ? " .long ".sprintf "0x%x",31<<26|$cr<<23|$_[0]<<16|$_[1]<<11|64 : " cmplw ".join(',',$cr,@_); }; my $bdnz = sub { my $f = shift; my $bo = $f=~/[\+\-]/ ? 16+9 : 16; # optional "to be taken" hint " bc $bo,0,".shift; } if ($flavour!~/linux/); my $bltlr = sub { my $f = shift; my $bo = $f=~/\-/ ? 12+2 : 12; # optional "not to be taken" hint ($flavour =~ /linux/) ? # GNU as doesn't allow most recent hints " .long ".sprintf "0x%x",19<<26|$bo<<21|16<<1 : " bclr $bo,0"; }; my $bnelr = sub { my $f = shift; my $bo = $f=~/\-/ ? 4+2 : 4; # optional "not to be taken" hint ($flavour =~ /linux/) ? # GNU as doesn't allow most recent hints " .long ".sprintf "0x%x",19<<26|$bo<<21|2<<16|16<<1 : " bclr $bo,2"; }; my $beqlr = sub { my $f = shift; my $bo = $f=~/-/ ? 12+2 : 12; # optional "not to be taken" hint ($flavour =~ /linux/) ? # GNU as doesn't allow most recent hints " .long ".sprintf "0x%X",19<<26|$bo<<21|2<<16|16<<1 : " bclr $bo,2"; }; # GNU assembler can't handle extrdi rA,rS,16,48, or when sum of last two # arguments is 64, with "operand out of range" error. my $extrdi = sub { my ($f,$ra,$rs,$n,$b) = @_; $b = ($b+$n)&63; $n = 64-$n; " rldicl $ra,$rs,$b,$n"; }; my $vmr = sub { my ($f,$vx,$vy) = @_; " vor $vx,$vy,$vy"; }; # Some ABIs specify vrsave, special-purpose register #256, as reserved # for system use. my $no_vrsave = ($flavour =~ /aix|linux64le/); my $mtspr = sub { my ($f,$idx,$ra) = @_; if ($idx == 256 && $no_vrsave) { " or $ra,$ra,$ra"; } else { " mtspr $idx,$ra"; } }; my $mfspr = sub { my ($f,$rd,$idx) = @_; if ($idx == 256 && $no_vrsave) { " li $rd,-1"; } else { " mfspr $rd,$idx"; } }; # PowerISA 2.06 stuff sub vsxmem_op { my ($f, $vrt, $ra, $rb, $op) = @_; " .long ".sprintf "0x%X",(31<<26)|($vrt<<21)|($ra<<16)|($rb<<11)|($op*2+1); } # made-up unaligned memory reference AltiVec/VMX instructions my $lvx_u = sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 844); }; # lxvd2x my $stvx_u = sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 972); }; # stxvd2x my $lvdx_u = sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 588); }; # lxsdx my $stvdx_u = sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 716); }; # stxsdx my $lvx_4w = sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 780); }; # lxvw4x my $stvx_4w = sub { vsxmem_op(@_, 908); }; # stxvw4x # PowerISA 2.07 stuff sub vcrypto_op { my ($f, $vrt, $vra, $vrb, $op) = @_; " .long ".sprintf "0x%X",(4<<26)|($vrt<<21)|($vra<<16)|($vrb<<11)|$op; } my $vcipher = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1288); }; my $vcipherlast = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1289); }; my $vncipher = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1352); }; my $vncipherlast= sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1353); }; my $vsbox = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 0, 1480); }; my $vshasigmad = sub { my ($st,$six)=splice(@_,-2); vcrypto_op(@_, $st<<4|$six, 1730); }; my $vshasigmaw = sub { my ($st,$six)=splice(@_,-2); vcrypto_op(@_, $st<<4|$six, 1666); }; my $vpmsumb = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1032); }; my $vpmsumd = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1224); }; my $vpmsubh = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1096); }; my $vpmsumw = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 1160); }; my $vaddudm = sub { vcrypto_op(@_, 192); }; my $mtsle = sub { my ($f, $arg) = @_; " .long ".sprintf "0x%X",(31<<26)|($arg<<21)|(147*2); }; # PowerISA 3.0 stuff my $maddhdu = sub { my ($f, $rt, $ra, $rb, $rc) = @_; " .long ".sprintf "0x%X",(4<<26)|($rt<<21)|($ra<<16)|($rb<<11)|($rc<<6)|49; }; my $maddld = sub { my ($f, $rt, $ra, $rb, $rc) = @_; " .long ".sprintf "0x%X",(4<<26)|($rt<<21)|($ra<<16)|($rb<<11)|($rc<<6)|51; }; my $darn = sub { my ($f, $rt, $l) = @_; " .long ".sprintf "0x%X",(31<<26)|($rt<<21)|($l<<16)|(755<<1); }; while($line=<>) { $line =~ s|[#!;].*$||; # get rid of asm-style comments... $line =~ s|/\*.*\*/||; # ... and C-style comments... $line =~ s|^\s+||; # ... and skip white spaces in beginning... $line =~ s|\s+$||; # ... and at the end { $line =~ s|\b\.L(\w+)|L$1|g; # common denominator for Locallabel $line =~ s|\bL(\w+)|\.L$1|g if ($dotinlocallabels); } { $line =~ s|(^[\.\w]+)\:\s*||; my $label = $1; if ($label) { printf "%s:",($GLOBALS{$label} or $label); printf "\n.localentry\t$GLOBALS{$label},0" if ($GLOBALS{$label} && $flavour =~ /linux.*64le/); } } { $line =~ s|^\s*(\.?)(\w+)([\.\+\-]?)\s*||; my $c = $1; $c = "\t" if ($c eq ""); my $mnemonic = $2; my $f = $3; my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic"); $line =~ s/\b(c?[rf]|v|vs)([0-9]+)\b/$2/g if ($c ne "." and $flavour !~ /osx/); if (ref($opcode) eq 'CODE') { $line = &$opcode($f,split(',',$line)); } elsif ($mnemonic) { $line = $c.$mnemonic.$f."\t".$line; } } print $line if ($line); print "\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl0000755000000000000000000001005513176625657017301 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; my $flavour = shift; my $output = shift; open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!"; $flavour = "linux32" if (!$flavour or $flavour eq "void"); my %GLOBALS; my $dotinlocallabels=($flavour=~/linux/)?1:0; ################################################################ # directives which need special treatment on different platforms ################################################################ my $arch = sub { if ($flavour =~ /linux/) { ".arch\t".join(',',@_); } else { ""; } }; my $fpu = sub { if ($flavour =~ /linux/) { ".fpu\t".join(',',@_); } else { ""; } }; my $hidden = sub { if ($flavour =~ /ios/) { ".private_extern\t".join(',',@_); } else { ".hidden\t".join(',',@_); } }; my $comm = sub { my @args = split(/,\s*/,shift); my $name = @args[0]; my $global = \$GLOBALS{$name}; my $ret; if ($flavour =~ /ios32/) { $ret = ".comm\t_$name,@args[1]\n"; $ret .= ".non_lazy_symbol_pointer\n"; $ret .= "$name:\n"; $ret .= ".indirect_symbol\t_$name\n"; $ret .= ".long\t0"; $name = "_$name"; } else { $ret = ".comm\t".join(',',@args); } $$global = $name; $ret; }; my $globl = sub { my $name = shift; my $global = \$GLOBALS{$name}; my $ret; SWITCH: for ($flavour) { /ios/ && do { $name = "_$name"; last; }; } $ret = ".globl $name" if (!$ret); $$global = $name; $ret; }; my $global = $globl; my $extern = sub { &$globl(@_); return; # return nothing }; my $type = sub { if ($flavour =~ /linux/) { ".type\t".join(',',@_); } elsif ($flavour =~ /ios32/) { if (join(',',@_) =~ /(\w+),%function/) { "#ifdef __thumb2__\n". ".thumb_func $1\n". "#endif"; } } else { ""; } }; my $size = sub { if ($flavour =~ /linux/) { ".size\t".join(',',@_); } else { ""; } }; my $inst = sub { if ($flavour =~ /linux/) { ".inst\t".join(',',@_); } else { ".long\t".join(',',@_); } }; my $asciz = sub { my $line = join(",",@_); if ($line =~ /^"(.*)"$/) { ".byte " . join(",",unpack("C*",$1),0) . "\n.align 2"; } else { ""; } }; sub range { my ($r,$sfx,$start,$end) = @_; join(",",map("$r$_$sfx",($start..$end))); } sub expand_line { my $line = shift; my @ret = (); pos($line)=0; while ($line =~ m/\G[^@\/\{\"]*/g) { if ($line =~ m/\G(@|\/\/|$)/gc) { last; } elsif ($line =~ m/\G\{/gc) { my $saved_pos = pos($line); $line =~ s/\G([rdqv])([0-9]+)([^\-]*)\-\1([0-9]+)\3/range($1,$3,$2,$4)/e; pos($line) = $saved_pos; $line =~ m/\G[^\}]*\}/g; } elsif ($line =~ m/\G\"/gc) { $line =~ m/\G[^\"]*\"/g; } } $line =~ s/\b(\w+)/$GLOBALS{$1} or $1/ge; return $line; } while(my $line=<>) { if ($line =~ m/^\s*(#|@|\/\/)/) { print $line; next; } $line =~ s|/\*.*\*/||; # get rid of C-style comments... $line =~ s|^\s+||; # ... and skip white spaces in beginning... $line =~ s|\s+$||; # ... and at the end { $line =~ s|[\b\.]L(\w{2,})|L$1|g; # common denominator for Locallabel $line =~ s|\bL(\w{2,})|\.L$1|g if ($dotinlocallabels); } { $line =~ s|(^[\.\w]+)\:\s*||; my $label = $1; if ($label) { printf "%s:",($GLOBALS{$label} or $label); } } if ($line !~ m/^[#@]/) { $line =~ s|^\s*(\.?)(\S+)\s*||; my $c = $1; $c = "\t" if ($c eq ""); my $mnemonic = $2; my $opcode; if ($mnemonic =~ m/([^\.]+)\.([^\.]+)/) { $opcode = eval("\$$1_$2"); } else { $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic"); } my $arg=expand_line($line); if (ref($opcode) eq 'CODE') { $line = &$opcode($arg); } elsif ($mnemonic) { $line = $c.$mnemonic; $line.= "\t$arg" if ($arg ne ""); } } print $line if ($line); print "\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl0000755000000000000000000011021713176625657017461 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Ascetic x86_64 AT&T to MASM/NASM assembler translator by . # # Why AT&T to MASM and not vice versa? Several reasons. Because AT&T # format is way easier to parse. Because it's simpler to "gear" from # Unix ABI to Windows one [see cross-reference "card" at the end of # file]. Because Linux targets were available first... # # In addition the script also "distills" code suitable for GNU # assembler, so that it can be compiled with more rigid assemblers, # such as Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as. # # This translator is not designed to convert *arbitrary* assembler # code from AT&T format to MASM one. It's designed to convert just # enough to provide for dual-ABI OpenSSL modules development... # There *are* limitations and you might have to modify your assembler # code or this script to achieve the desired result... # # Currently recognized limitations: # # - can't use multiple ops per line; # # Dual-ABI styling rules. # # 1. Adhere to Unix register and stack layout [see cross-reference # ABI "card" at the end for explanation]. # 2. Forget about "red zone," stick to more traditional blended # stack frame allocation. If volatile storage is actually required # that is. If not, just leave the stack as is. # 3. Functions tagged with ".type name,@function" get crafted with # unified Win64 prologue and epilogue automatically. If you want # to take care of ABI differences yourself, tag functions as # ".type name,@abi-omnipotent" instead. # 4. To optimize the Win64 prologue you can specify number of input # arguments as ".type name,@function,N." Keep in mind that if N is # larger than 6, then you *have to* write "abi-omnipotent" code, # because >6 cases can't be addressed with unified prologue. # 5. Name local labels as .L*, do *not* use dynamic labels such as 1: # (sorry about latter). # 6. Don't use [or hand-code with .byte] "rep ret." "ret" mnemonic is # required to identify the spots, where to inject Win64 epilogue! # But on the pros, it's then prefixed with rep automatically:-) # 7. Stick to explicit ip-relative addressing. If you have to use # GOTPCREL addressing, stick to mov symbol@GOTPCREL(%rip),%r??. # Both are recognized and translated to proper Win64 addressing # modes. To support legacy code a synthetic directive, .picmeup, # is implemented. It puts address of the *next* instruction into # target register, e.g.: # # .picmeup %rax # lea .Label-.(%rax),%rax # # 8. In order to provide for structured exception handling unified # Win64 prologue copies %rsp value to %rax. For further details # see SEH paragraph at the end. # 9. .init segment is allowed to contain calls to functions only. # a. If function accepts more than 4 arguments *and* >4th argument # is declared as non 64-bit value, do clear its upper part. use strict; my $flavour = shift; my $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } open STDOUT,">$output" || die "can't open $output: $!" if (defined($output)); my $gas=1; $gas=0 if ($output =~ /\.asm$/); my $elf=1; $elf=0 if (!$gas); my $win64=0; my $prefix=""; my $decor=".L"; my $masmref=8 + 50727*2**-32; # 8.00.50727 shipped with VS2005 my $masm=0; my $PTR=" PTR"; my $nasmref=2.03; my $nasm=0; if ($flavour eq "mingw64") { $gas=1; $elf=0; $win64=1; $prefix=`echo __USER_LABEL_PREFIX__ | $ENV{CC} -E -P -`; $prefix =~ s|\R$||; # Better chomp } elsif ($flavour eq "macosx") { $gas=1; $elf=0; $prefix="_"; $decor="L\$"; } elsif ($flavour eq "masm") { $gas=0; $elf=0; $masm=$masmref; $win64=1; $decor="\$L\$"; } elsif ($flavour eq "nasm") { $gas=0; $elf=0; $nasm=$nasmref; $win64=1; $decor="\$L\$"; $PTR=""; } elsif (!$gas) { if ($ENV{ASM} =~ m/nasm/ && `nasm -v` =~ m/version ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/i) { $nasm = $1 + $2*0.01; $PTR=""; } elsif (`ml64 2>&1` =~ m/Version ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)(\.([0-9]+))?/) { $masm = $1 + $2*2**-16 + $4*2**-32; } die "no assembler found on %PATH" if (!($nasm || $masm)); $win64=1; $elf=0; $decor="\$L\$"; } my $current_segment; my $current_function; my %globals; { package opcode; # pick up opcodes sub re { my ($class, $line) = @_; my $self = {}; my $ret; if ($$line =~ /^([a-z][a-z0-9]*)/i) { bless $self,$class; $self->{op} = $1; $ret = $self; $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//; undef $self->{sz}; if ($self->{op} =~ /^(movz)x?([bw]).*/) { # movz is pain... $self->{op} = $1; $self->{sz} = $2; } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /call|jmp/) { $self->{sz} = ""; } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^p/ && $' !~ /^(ush|op|insrw)/) { # SSEn $self->{sz} = ""; } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^v/) { # VEX $self->{sz} = ""; } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /mov[dq]/ && $$line =~ /%xmm/) { $self->{sz} = ""; } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /([a-z]{3,})([qlwb])$/) { $self->{op} = $1; $self->{sz} = $2; } } $ret; } sub size { my ($self, $sz) = @_; $self->{sz} = $sz if (defined($sz) && !defined($self->{sz})); $self->{sz}; } sub out { my $self = shift; if ($gas) { if ($self->{op} eq "movz") { # movz is pain... sprintf "%s%s%s",$self->{op},$self->{sz},shift; } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^set/) { "$self->{op}"; } elsif ($self->{op} eq "ret") { my $epilogue = ""; if ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") { $epilogue = "movq 8(%rsp),%rdi\n\t" . "movq 16(%rsp),%rsi\n\t"; } $epilogue . ".byte 0xf3,0xc3"; } elsif ($self->{op} eq "call" && !$elf && $current_segment eq ".init") { ".p2align\t3\n\t.quad"; } else { "$self->{op}$self->{sz}"; } } else { $self->{op} =~ s/^movz/movzx/; if ($self->{op} eq "ret") { $self->{op} = ""; if ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") { $self->{op} = "mov rdi,QWORD$PTR\[8+rsp\]\t;WIN64 epilogue\n\t". "mov rsi,QWORD$PTR\[16+rsp\]\n\t"; } $self->{op} .= "DB\t0F3h,0C3h\t\t;repret"; } elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^(pop|push)f/) { $self->{op} .= $self->{sz}; } elsif ($self->{op} eq "call" && $current_segment eq ".CRT\$XCU") { $self->{op} = "\tDQ"; } $self->{op}; } } sub mnemonic { my ($self, $op) = @_; $self->{op}=$op if (defined($op)); $self->{op}; } } { package const; # pick up constants, which start with $ sub re { my ($class, $line) = @_; my $self = {}; my $ret; if ($$line =~ /^\$([^,]+)/) { bless $self, $class; $self->{value} = $1; $ret = $self; $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//; } $ret; } sub out { my $self = shift; $self->{value} =~ s/\b(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig; if ($gas) { # Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as can't handle multiplications # in $self->{value} my $value = $self->{value}; no warnings; # oct might complain about overflow, ignore here... $value =~ s/(?{value} = $value; } sprintf "\$%s",$self->{value}; } else { my $value = $self->{value}; $value =~ s/0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig if ($masm); sprintf "%s",$value; } } } { package ea; # pick up effective addresses: expr(%reg,%reg,scale) sub re { my ($class, $line, $opcode) = @_; my $self = {}; my $ret; # optional * ----vvv--- appears in indirect jmp/call if ($$line =~ /^(\*?)([^\(,]*)\(([%\w,]+)\)/) { bless $self, $class; $self->{asterisk} = $1; $self->{label} = $2; ($self->{base},$self->{index},$self->{scale})=split(/,/,$3); $self->{scale} = 1 if (!defined($self->{scale})); $ret = $self; $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//; if ($win64 && $self->{label} =~ s/\@GOTPCREL//) { die if ($opcode->mnemonic() ne "mov"); $opcode->mnemonic("lea"); } $self->{base} =~ s/^%//; $self->{index} =~ s/^%// if (defined($self->{index})); $self->{opcode} = $opcode; } $ret; } sub size {} sub out { my ($self, $sz) = @_; $self->{label} =~ s/([_a-z][_a-z0-9]*)/$globals{$1} or $1/gei; $self->{label} =~ s/\.L/$decor/g; # Silently convert all EAs to 64-bit. This is required for # elder GNU assembler and results in more compact code, # *but* most importantly AES module depends on this feature! $self->{index} =~ s/^[er](.?[0-9xpi])[d]?$/r\1/; $self->{base} =~ s/^[er](.?[0-9xpi])[d]?$/r\1/; # Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as can't handle multiplications # in $self->{label}... use integer; $self->{label} =~ s/(?{label} =~ s/\b([0-9]+\s*[\*\/\%]\s*[0-9]+)\b/eval($1)/eg; # Some assemblers insist on signed presentation of 32-bit # offsets, but sign extension is a tricky business in perl... if ((1<<31)<<1) { $self->{label} =~ s/\b([0-9]+)\b/$1<<32>>32/eg; } else { $self->{label} =~ s/\b([0-9]+)\b/$1>>0/eg; } if (!$self->{label} && $self->{index} && $self->{scale}==1 && $self->{base} =~ /(rbp|r13)/) { $self->{base} = $self->{index}; $self->{index} = $1; } if ($gas) { $self->{label} =~ s/^___imp_/__imp__/ if ($flavour eq "mingw64"); if (defined($self->{index})) { sprintf "%s%s(%s,%%%s,%d)",$self->{asterisk}, $self->{label}, $self->{base}?"%$self->{base}":"", $self->{index},$self->{scale}; } else { sprintf "%s%s(%%%s)", $self->{asterisk},$self->{label},$self->{base}; } } else { my %szmap = ( b=>"BYTE$PTR", w=>"WORD$PTR", l=>"DWORD$PTR", d=>"DWORD$PTR", q=>"QWORD$PTR", o=>"OWORD$PTR", x=>"XMMWORD$PTR", y=>"YMMWORD$PTR", z=>"ZMMWORD$PTR" ); $self->{label} =~ s/\./\$/g; $self->{label} =~ s/(?{label} = "($self->{label})" if ($self->{label} =~ /[\*\+\-\/]/); my $mnemonic = $self->{opcode}->mnemonic(); ($self->{asterisk}) && ($sz="q") || ($mnemonic =~ /^v?mov([qd])$/) && ($sz=$1) || ($mnemonic =~ /^v?pinsr([qdwb])$/) && ($sz=$1) || ($mnemonic =~ /^vpbroadcast([qdwb])$/) && ($sz=$1) || ($mnemonic =~ /^v(?!perm)[a-z]+[fi]128$/) && ($sz="x"); if (defined($self->{index})) { sprintf "%s[%s%s*%d%s]",$szmap{$sz}, $self->{label}?"$self->{label}+":"", $self->{index},$self->{scale}, $self->{base}?"+$self->{base}":""; } elsif ($self->{base} eq "rip") { sprintf "%s[%s]",$szmap{$sz},$self->{label}; } else { sprintf "%s[%s%s]",$szmap{$sz}, $self->{label}?"$self->{label}+":"", $self->{base}; } } } } { package register; # pick up registers, which start with %. sub re { my ($class, $line, $opcode) = @_; my $self = {}; my $ret; # optional * ----vvv--- appears in indirect jmp/call if ($$line =~ /^(\*?)%(\w+)/) { bless $self,$class; $self->{asterisk} = $1; $self->{value} = $2; $opcode->size($self->size()); $ret = $self; $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//; } $ret; } sub size { my $self = shift; my $ret; if ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\d]+b$/i) { $ret="b"; } elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\d]+w$/i) { $ret="w"; } elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\d]+d$/i) { $ret="l"; } elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^r[\w]+$/i) { $ret="q"; } elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^[a-d][hl]$/i){ $ret="b"; } elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^[\w]{2}l$/i) { $ret="b"; } elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^[\w]{2}$/i) { $ret="w"; } elsif ($self->{value} =~ /^e[a-z]{2}$/i){ $ret="l"; } $ret; } sub out { my $self = shift; if ($gas) { sprintf "%s%%%s",$self->{asterisk},$self->{value}; } else { $self->{value}; } } } { package label; # pick up labels, which end with : sub re { my ($class, $line) = @_; my $self = {}; my $ret; if ($$line =~ /(^[\.\w]+)\:/) { bless $self,$class; $self->{value} = $1; $ret = $self; $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//; $self->{value} =~ s/^\.L/$decor/; } $ret; } sub out { my $self = shift; if ($gas) { my $func = ($globals{$self->{value}} or $self->{value}) . ":"; if ($win64 && $current_function->{name} eq $self->{value} && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") { $func .= "\n"; $func .= " movq %rdi,8(%rsp)\n"; $func .= " movq %rsi,16(%rsp)\n"; $func .= " movq %rsp,%rax\n"; $func .= "${decor}SEH_begin_$current_function->{name}:\n"; my $narg = $current_function->{narg}; $narg=6 if (!defined($narg)); $func .= " movq %rcx,%rdi\n" if ($narg>0); $func .= " movq %rdx,%rsi\n" if ($narg>1); $func .= " movq %r8,%rdx\n" if ($narg>2); $func .= " movq %r9,%rcx\n" if ($narg>3); $func .= " movq 40(%rsp),%r8\n" if ($narg>4); $func .= " movq 48(%rsp),%r9\n" if ($narg>5); } $func; } elsif ($self->{value} ne "$current_function->{name}") { # Make all labels in masm global. $self->{value} .= ":" if ($masm); $self->{value} . ":"; } elsif ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") { my $func = "$current_function->{name}" . ($nasm ? ":" : "\tPROC $current_function->{scope}") . "\n"; $func .= " mov QWORD$PTR\[8+rsp\],rdi\t;WIN64 prologue\n"; $func .= " mov QWORD$PTR\[16+rsp\],rsi\n"; $func .= " mov rax,rsp\n"; $func .= "${decor}SEH_begin_$current_function->{name}:"; $func .= ":" if ($masm); $func .= "\n"; my $narg = $current_function->{narg}; $narg=6 if (!defined($narg)); $func .= " mov rdi,rcx\n" if ($narg>0); $func .= " mov rsi,rdx\n" if ($narg>1); $func .= " mov rdx,r8\n" if ($narg>2); $func .= " mov rcx,r9\n" if ($narg>3); $func .= " mov r8,QWORD$PTR\[40+rsp\]\n" if ($narg>4); $func .= " mov r9,QWORD$PTR\[48+rsp\]\n" if ($narg>5); $func .= "\n"; } else { "$current_function->{name}". ($nasm ? ":" : "\tPROC $current_function->{scope}"); } } } { package expr; # pick up expressions sub re { my ($class, $line, $opcode) = @_; my $self = {}; my $ret; if ($$line =~ /(^[^,]+)/) { bless $self,$class; $self->{value} = $1; $ret = $self; $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//; $self->{value} =~ s/\@PLT// if (!$elf); $self->{value} =~ s/([_a-z][_a-z0-9]*)/$globals{$1} or $1/gei; $self->{value} =~ s/\.L/$decor/g; $self->{opcode} = $opcode; } $ret; } sub out { my $self = shift; if ($nasm && $self->{opcode}->mnemonic()=~m/^j(?![re]cxz)/) { "NEAR ".$self->{value}; } else { $self->{value}; } } } { package directive; # pick up directives, which start with . sub re { my ($class, $line) = @_; my $self = {}; my $ret; my $dir; my %opcode = # lea 2f-1f(%rip),%dst; 1: nop; 2: ( "%rax"=>0x01058d48, "%rcx"=>0x010d8d48, "%rdx"=>0x01158d48, "%rbx"=>0x011d8d48, "%rsp"=>0x01258d48, "%rbp"=>0x012d8d48, "%rsi"=>0x01358d48, "%rdi"=>0x013d8d48, "%r8" =>0x01058d4c, "%r9" =>0x010d8d4c, "%r10"=>0x01158d4c, "%r11"=>0x011d8d4c, "%r12"=>0x01258d4c, "%r13"=>0x012d8d4c, "%r14"=>0x01358d4c, "%r15"=>0x013d8d4c ); if ($$line =~ /^\s*(\.\w+)/) { bless $self,$class; $dir = $1; $ret = $self; undef $self->{value}; $$line = substr($$line,@+[0]); $$line =~ s/^\s+//; SWITCH: for ($dir) { /\.picmeup/ && do { if ($$line =~ /(%r[\w]+)/i) { $dir="\t.long"; $$line=sprintf "0x%x,0x90000000",$opcode{$1}; } last; }; /\.global|\.globl|\.extern/ && do { $globals{$$line} = $prefix . $$line; $$line = $globals{$$line} if ($prefix); last; }; /\.type/ && do { my ($sym,$type,$narg) = split(',',$$line); if ($type eq "\@function") { undef $current_function; $current_function->{name} = $sym; $current_function->{abi} = "svr4"; $current_function->{narg} = $narg; $current_function->{scope} = defined($globals{$sym})?"PUBLIC":"PRIVATE"; } elsif ($type eq "\@abi-omnipotent") { undef $current_function; $current_function->{name} = $sym; $current_function->{scope} = defined($globals{$sym})?"PUBLIC":"PRIVATE"; } $$line =~ s/\@abi\-omnipotent/\@function/; $$line =~ s/\@function.*/\@function/; last; }; /\.asciz/ && do { if ($$line =~ /^"(.*)"$/) { $dir = ".byte"; $$line = join(",",unpack("C*",$1),0); } last; }; /\.rva|\.long|\.quad/ && do { $$line =~ s/([_a-z][_a-z0-9]*)/$globals{$1} or $1/gei; $$line =~ s/\.L/$decor/g; last; }; } if ($gas) { $self->{value} = $dir . "\t" . $$line; if ($dir =~ /\.extern/) { $self->{value} = ""; # swallow extern } elsif (!$elf && $dir =~ /\.type/) { $self->{value} = ""; $self->{value} = ".def\t" . ($globals{$1} or $1) . ";\t" . (defined($globals{$1})?".scl 2;":".scl 3;") . "\t.type 32;\t.endef" if ($win64 && $$line =~ /([^,]+),\@function/); } elsif (!$elf && $dir =~ /\.size/) { $self->{value} = ""; if (defined($current_function)) { $self->{value} .= "${decor}SEH_end_$current_function->{name}:" if ($win64 && $current_function->{abi} eq "svr4"); undef $current_function; } } elsif (!$elf && $dir =~ /\.align/) { $self->{value} = ".p2align\t" . (log($$line)/log(2)); } elsif ($dir eq ".section") { $current_segment=$$line; if (!$elf && $current_segment eq ".init") { if ($flavour eq "macosx") { $self->{value} = ".mod_init_func"; } elsif ($flavour eq "mingw64") { $self->{value} = ".section\t.ctors"; } } } elsif ($dir =~ /\.(text|data)/) { $current_segment=".$1"; } elsif ($dir =~ /\.hidden/) { if ($flavour eq "macosx") { $self->{value} = ".private_extern\t$prefix$$line"; } elsif ($flavour eq "mingw64") { $self->{value} = ""; } } elsif ($dir =~ /\.comm/) { $self->{value} = "$dir\t$prefix$$line"; $self->{value} =~ s|,([0-9]+),([0-9]+)$|",$1,".log($2)/log(2)|e if ($flavour eq "macosx"); } $$line = ""; return $self; } # non-gas case or nasm/masm SWITCH: for ($dir) { /\.text/ && do { my $v=undef; if ($nasm) { $v="section .text code align=64\n"; } else { $v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment); $current_segment = ".text\$"; $v.="$current_segment\tSEGMENT "; $v.=$masm>=$masmref ? "ALIGN(256)" : "PAGE"; $v.=" 'CODE'"; } $self->{value} = $v; last; }; /\.data/ && do { my $v=undef; if ($nasm) { $v="section .data data align=8\n"; } else { $v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment); $current_segment = "_DATA"; $v.="$current_segment\tSEGMENT"; } $self->{value} = $v; last; }; /\.section/ && do { my $v=undef; $$line =~ s/([^,]*).*/$1/; $$line = ".CRT\$XCU" if ($$line eq ".init"); if ($nasm) { $v="section $$line"; if ($$line=~/\.([px])data/) { $v.=" rdata align="; $v.=$1 eq "p"? 4 : 8; } elsif ($$line=~/\.CRT\$/i) { $v.=" rdata align=8"; } } else { $v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment); $v.="$$line\tSEGMENT"; if ($$line=~/\.([px])data/) { $v.=" READONLY"; $v.=" ALIGN(".($1 eq "p" ? 4 : 8).")" if ($masm>=$masmref); } elsif ($$line=~/\.CRT\$/i) { $v.=" READONLY "; $v.=$masm>=$masmref ? "ALIGN(8)" : "DWORD"; } } $current_segment = $$line; $self->{value} = $v; last; }; /\.extern/ && do { $self->{value} = "EXTERN\t".$$line; $self->{value} .= ":NEAR" if ($masm); last; }; /\.globl|.global/ && do { $self->{value} = $masm?"PUBLIC":"global"; $self->{value} .= "\t".$$line; last; }; /\.size/ && do { if (defined($current_function)) { undef $self->{value}; if ($current_function->{abi} eq "svr4") { $self->{value}="${decor}SEH_end_$current_function->{name}:"; $self->{value}.=":\n" if($masm); } $self->{value}.="$current_function->{name}\tENDP" if($masm && $current_function->{name}); undef $current_function; } last; }; /\.align/ && do { my $max = ($masm && $masm>=$masmref) ? 256 : 4096; $self->{value} = "ALIGN\t".($$line>$max?$max:$$line); last; }; /\.(value|long|rva|quad)/ && do { my $sz = substr($1,0,1); my @arr = split(/,\s*/,$$line); my $last = pop(@arr); my $conv = sub { my $var=shift; $var=~s/^(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig; $var=~s/^0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig if ($masm); if ($sz eq "D" && ($current_segment=~/.[px]data/ || $dir eq ".rva")) { $var=~s/([_a-z\$\@][_a-z0-9\$\@]*)/$nasm?"$1 wrt ..imagebase":"imagerel $1"/egi; } $var; }; $sz =~ tr/bvlrq/BWDDQ/; $self->{value} = "\tD$sz\t"; for (@arr) { $self->{value} .= &$conv($_).","; } $self->{value} .= &$conv($last); last; }; /\.byte/ && do { my @str=split(/,\s*/,$$line); map(s/(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig,@str); map(s/0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/ig,@str) if ($masm); while ($#str>15) { $self->{value}.="DB\t" .join(",",@str[0..15])."\n"; foreach (0..15) { shift @str; } } $self->{value}.="DB\t" .join(",",@str) if (@str); last; }; /\.comm/ && do { my @str=split(/,\s*/,$$line); my $v=undef; if ($nasm) { $v.="common $prefix@str[0] @str[1]"; } else { $v="$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment); $current_segment = "_DATA"; $v.="$current_segment\tSEGMENT\n"; $v.="COMM @str[0]:DWORD:".@str[1]/4; } $self->{value} = $v; last; }; } $$line = ""; } $ret; } sub out { my $self = shift; $self->{value}; } } sub rex { my $opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src,$rex)=@_; $rex|=0x04 if($dst>=8); $rex|=0x01 if($src>=8); push @$opcode,($rex|0x40) if ($rex); } # Upon initial x86_64 introduction SSE>2 extensions were not introduced # yet. In order not to be bothered by tracing exact assembler versions, # but at the same time to provide a bare security minimum of AES-NI, we # hard-code some instructions. Extensions past AES-NI on the other hand # are traced by examining assembler version in individual perlasm # modules... my %regrm = ( "%eax"=>0, "%ecx"=>1, "%edx"=>2, "%ebx"=>3, "%esp"=>4, "%ebp"=>5, "%esi"=>6, "%edi"=>7 ); my $movq = sub { # elderly gas can't handle inter-register movq my $arg = shift; my @opcode=(0x66); if ($arg =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%r(\w+)/) { my ($src,$dst)=($1,$2); if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/) { $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; } rex(\@opcode,$src,$dst,0x8); push @opcode,0x0f,0x7e; push @opcode,0xc0|(($src&7)<<3)|($dst&7); # ModR/M @opcode; } elsif ($arg =~ /%r(\w+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my ($src,$dst)=($2,$1); if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/) { $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; } rex(\@opcode,$src,$dst,0x8); push @opcode,0x0f,0x6e; push @opcode,0xc0|(($src&7)<<3)|($dst&7); # ModR/M @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $pextrd = sub { if (shift =~ /\$([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*(%\w+)/) { my @opcode=(0x66); my $imm=$1; my $src=$2; my $dst=$3; if ($dst =~ /%r([0-9]+)d/) { $dst = $1; } elsif ($dst =~ /%e/) { $dst = $regrm{$dst}; } rex(\@opcode,$src,$dst); push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x16; push @opcode,0xc0|(($src&7)<<3)|($dst&7); # ModR/M push @opcode,$imm; @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $pinsrd = sub { if (shift =~ /\$([0-9]+),\s*(%\w+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x66); my $imm=$1; my $src=$2; my $dst=$3; if ($src =~ /%r([0-9]+)/) { $src = $1; } elsif ($src =~ /%e/) { $src = $regrm{$src}; } rex(\@opcode,$dst,$src); push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x22; push @opcode,0xc0|(($dst&7)<<3)|($src&7); # ModR/M push @opcode,$imm; @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $pshufb = sub { if (shift =~ /%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x66); rex(\@opcode,$2,$1); push @opcode,0x0f,0x38,0x00; push @opcode,0xc0|($1&7)|(($2&7)<<3); # ModR/M @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $palignr = sub { if (shift =~ /\$([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x66); rex(\@opcode,$3,$2); push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x0f; push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M push @opcode,$1; @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $pclmulqdq = sub { if (shift =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x66); rex(\@opcode,$3,$2); push @opcode,0x0f,0x3a,0x44; push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$1; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $rdrand = sub { if (shift =~ /%[er](\w+)/) { my @opcode=(); my $dst=$1; if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/) { $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; } rex(\@opcode,0,$dst,8); push @opcode,0x0f,0xc7,0xf0|($dst&7); @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $rdseed = sub { if (shift =~ /%[er](\w+)/) { my @opcode=(); my $dst=$1; if ($dst !~ /[0-9]+/) { $dst = $regrm{"%e$dst"}; } rex(\@opcode,0,$dst,8); push @opcode,0x0f,0xc7,0xf8|($dst&7); @opcode; } else { (); } }; sub rxb { my $opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src1,$src2,$rxb)=@_; $rxb|=0x7<<5; $rxb&=~(0x04<<5) if($dst>=8); $rxb&=~(0x01<<5) if($src1>=8); $rxb&=~(0x02<<5) if($src2>=8); push @$opcode,$rxb; } my $vprotd = sub { if (shift =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x8f); rxb(\@opcode,$3,$2,-1,0x08); push @opcode,0x78,0xc2; push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$1; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $vprotq = sub { if (shift =~ /\$([x0-9a-f]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+),\s*%xmm([0-9]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x8f); rxb(\@opcode,$3,$2,-1,0x08); push @opcode,0x78,0xc3; push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($3&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$1; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; @opcode; } else { (); } }; my $endbranch = sub { (0xf3,0x0f,0x1e,0xfa); }; if ($nasm) { print <<___; default rel %define XMMWORD %define YMMWORD %define ZMMWORD ___ } elsif ($masm) { print <<___; OPTION DOTNAME ___ } while(defined(my $line=<>)) { $line =~ s|\R$||; # Better chomp $line =~ s|[#!].*$||; # get rid of asm-style comments... $line =~ s|/\*.*\*/||; # ... and C-style comments... $line =~ s|^\s+||; # ... and skip white spaces in beginning $line =~ s|\s+$||; # ... and at the end if (my $label=label->re(\$line)) { print $label->out(); } if (my $directive=directive->re(\$line)) { printf "%s",$directive->out(); } elsif (my $opcode=opcode->re(\$line)) { my $asm = eval("\$".$opcode->mnemonic()); if ((ref($asm) eq 'CODE') && scalar(my @bytes=&$asm($line))) { print $gas?".byte\t":"DB\t",join(',',@bytes),"\n"; next; } my @args; ARGUMENT: while (1) { my $arg; ($arg=register->re(\$line, $opcode))|| ($arg=const->re(\$line)) || ($arg=ea->re(\$line, $opcode)) || ($arg=expr->re(\$line, $opcode)) || last ARGUMENT; push @args,$arg; last ARGUMENT if ($line !~ /^,/); $line =~ s/^,\s*//; } # ARGUMENT: if ($#args>=0) { my $insn; my $sz=$opcode->size(); if ($gas) { $insn = $opcode->out($#args>=1?$args[$#args]->size():$sz); @args = map($_->out($sz),@args); printf "\t%s\t%s",$insn,join(",",@args); } else { $insn = $opcode->out(); foreach (@args) { my $arg = $_->out(); # $insn.=$sz compensates for movq, pinsrw, ... if ($arg =~ /^xmm[0-9]+$/) { $insn.=$sz; $sz="x" if(!$sz); last; } if ($arg =~ /^ymm[0-9]+$/) { $insn.=$sz; $sz="y" if(!$sz); last; } if ($arg =~ /^zmm[0-9]+$/) { $insn.=$sz; $sz="z" if(!$sz); last; } if ($arg =~ /^mm[0-9]+$/) { $insn.=$sz; $sz="q" if(!$sz); last; } } @args = reverse(@args); undef $sz if ($nasm && $opcode->mnemonic() eq "lea"); printf "\t%s\t%s",$insn,join(",",map($_->out($sz),@args)); } } else { printf "\t%s",$opcode->out(); } } print $line,"\n"; } print "\n$current_segment\tENDS\n" if ($current_segment && $masm); print "END\n" if ($masm); close STDOUT; ################################################# # Cross-reference x86_64 ABI "card" # # Unix Win64 # %rax * * # %rbx - - # %rcx #4 #1 # %rdx #3 #2 # %rsi #2 - # %rdi #1 - # %rbp - - # %rsp - - # %r8 #5 #3 # %r9 #6 #4 # %r10 * * # %r11 * * # %r12 - - # %r13 - - # %r14 - - # %r15 - - # # (*) volatile register # (-) preserved by callee # (#) Nth argument, volatile # # In Unix terms top of stack is argument transfer area for arguments # which could not be accommodated in registers. Or in other words 7th # [integer] argument resides at 8(%rsp) upon function entry point. # 128 bytes above %rsp constitute a "red zone" which is not touched # by signal handlers and can be used as temporal storage without # allocating a frame. # # In Win64 terms N*8 bytes on top of stack is argument transfer area, # which belongs to/can be overwritten by callee. N is the number of # arguments passed to callee, *but* not less than 4! This means that # upon function entry point 5th argument resides at 40(%rsp), as well # as that 32 bytes from 8(%rsp) can always be used as temporal # storage [without allocating a frame]. One can actually argue that # one can assume a "red zone" above stack pointer under Win64 as well. # Point is that at apparently no occasion Windows kernel would alter # the area above user stack pointer in true asynchronous manner... # # All the above means that if assembler programmer adheres to Unix # register and stack layout, but disregards the "red zone" existence, # it's possible to use following prologue and epilogue to "gear" from # Unix to Win64 ABI in leaf functions with not more than 6 arguments. # # omnipotent_function: # ifdef WIN64 # movq %rdi,8(%rsp) # movq %rsi,16(%rsp) # movq %rcx,%rdi ; if 1st argument is actually present # movq %rdx,%rsi ; if 2nd argument is actually ... # movq %r8,%rdx ; if 3rd argument is ... # movq %r9,%rcx ; if 4th argument ... # movq 40(%rsp),%r8 ; if 5th ... # movq 48(%rsp),%r9 ; if 6th ... # endif # ... # ifdef WIN64 # movq 8(%rsp),%rdi # movq 16(%rsp),%rsi # endif # ret # ################################################# # Win64 SEH, Structured Exception Handling. # # Unlike on Unix systems(*) lack of Win64 stack unwinding information # has undesired side-effect at run-time: if an exception is raised in # assembler subroutine such as those in question (basically we're # referring to segmentation violations caused by malformed input # parameters), the application is briskly terminated without invoking # any exception handlers, most notably without generating memory dump # or any user notification whatsoever. This poses a problem. It's # possible to address it by registering custom language-specific # handler that would restore processor context to the state at # subroutine entry point and return "exception is not handled, keep # unwinding" code. Writing such handler can be a challenge... But it's # doable, though requires certain coding convention. Consider following # snippet: # # .type function,@function # function: # movq %rsp,%rax # copy rsp to volatile register # pushq %r15 # save non-volatile registers # pushq %rbx # pushq %rbp # movq %rsp,%r11 # subq %rdi,%r11 # prepare [variable] stack frame # andq $-64,%r11 # movq %rax,0(%r11) # check for exceptions # movq %r11,%rsp # allocate [variable] stack frame # movq %rax,0(%rsp) # save original rsp value # magic_point: # ... # movq 0(%rsp),%rcx # pull original rsp value # movq -24(%rcx),%rbp # restore non-volatile registers # movq -16(%rcx),%rbx # movq -8(%rcx),%r15 # movq %rcx,%rsp # restore original rsp # ret # .size function,.-function # # The key is that up to magic_point copy of original rsp value remains # in chosen volatile register and no non-volatile register, except for # rsp, is modified. While past magic_point rsp remains constant till # the very end of the function. In this case custom language-specific # exception handler would look like this: # # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) # { ULONG64 *rsp = (ULONG64 *)context->Rax; # if (context->Rip >= magic_point) # { rsp = ((ULONG64 **)context->Rsp)[0]; # context->Rbp = rsp[-3]; # context->Rbx = rsp[-2]; # context->R15 = rsp[-1]; # } # context->Rsp = (ULONG64)rsp; # context->Rdi = rsp[1]; # context->Rsi = rsp[2]; # # memcpy (disp->ContextRecord,context,sizeof(CONTEXT)); # RtlVirtualUnwind(UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER,disp->ImageBase, # dips->ControlPc,disp->FunctionEntry,disp->ContextRecord, # &disp->HandlerData,&disp->EstablisherFrame,NULL); # return ExceptionContinueSearch; # } # # It's appropriate to implement this handler in assembler, directly in # function's module. In order to do that one has to know members' # offsets in CONTEXT and DISPATCHER_CONTEXT structures and some constant # values. Here they are: # # CONTEXT.Rax 120 # CONTEXT.Rcx 128 # CONTEXT.Rdx 136 # CONTEXT.Rbx 144 # CONTEXT.Rsp 152 # CONTEXT.Rbp 160 # CONTEXT.Rsi 168 # CONTEXT.Rdi 176 # CONTEXT.R8 184 # CONTEXT.R9 192 # CONTEXT.R10 200 # CONTEXT.R11 208 # CONTEXT.R12 216 # CONTEXT.R13 224 # CONTEXT.R14 232 # CONTEXT.R15 240 # CONTEXT.Rip 248 # CONTEXT.Xmm6 512 # sizeof(CONTEXT) 1232 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.ControlPc 0 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.ImageBase 8 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.FunctionEntry 16 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.EstablisherFrame 24 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.TargetIp 32 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.ContextRecord 40 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.LanguageHandler 48 # DISPATCHER_CONTEXT.HandlerData 56 # UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER 0 # ExceptionContinueSearch 1 # # In order to tie the handler to the function one has to compose # couple of structures: one for .xdata segment and one for .pdata. # # UNWIND_INFO structure for .xdata segment would be # # function_unwind_info: # .byte 9,0,0,0 # .rva handler # # This structure designates exception handler for a function with # zero-length prologue, no stack frame or frame register. # # To facilitate composing of .pdata structures, auto-generated "gear" # prologue copies rsp value to rax and denotes next instruction with # .LSEH_begin_{function_name} label. This essentially defines the SEH # styling rule mentioned in the beginning. Position of this label is # chosen in such manner that possible exceptions raised in the "gear" # prologue would be accounted to caller and unwound from latter's frame. # End of function is marked with respective .LSEH_end_{function_name} # label. To summarize, .pdata segment would contain # # .rva .LSEH_begin_function # .rva .LSEH_end_function # .rva function_unwind_info # # Reference to function_unwind_info from .xdata segment is the anchor. # In case you wonder why references are 32-bit .rvas and not 64-bit # .quads. References put into these two segments are required to be # *relative* to the base address of the current binary module, a.k.a. # image base. No Win64 module, be it .exe or .dll, can be larger than # 2GB and thus such relative references can be and are accommodated in # 32 bits. # # Having reviewed the example function code, one can argue that "movq # %rsp,%rax" above is redundant. It is not! Keep in mind that on Unix # rax would contain an undefined value. If this "offends" you, use # another register and refrain from modifying rax till magic_point is # reached, i.e. as if it was a non-volatile register. If more registers # are required prior [variable] frame setup is completed, note that # nobody says that you can have only one "magic point." You can # "liberate" non-volatile registers by denoting last stack off-load # instruction and reflecting it in finer grade unwind logic in handler. # After all, isn't it why it's called *language-specific* handler... # # Attentive reader can notice that exceptions would be mishandled in # auto-generated "gear" epilogue. Well, exception effectively can't # occur there, because if memory area used by it was subject to # segmentation violation, then it would be raised upon call to the # function (and as already mentioned be accounted to caller, which is # not a problem). If you're still not comfortable, then define tail # "magic point" just prior ret instruction and have handler treat it... # # (*) Note that we're talking about run-time, not debug-time. Lack of # unwind information makes debugging hard on both Windows and # Unix. "Unlike" referes to the fact that on Unix signal handler # will always be invoked, core dumped and appropriate exit code # returned to parent (for user notification). openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl0000644000000000000000000011473113176625657020170 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Specific modes implementations for SPARC Architecture 2011. There # is T4 dependency though, an ASI value that is not specified in the # Architecture Manual. But as SPARC universe is rather monocultural, # we imply that processor capable of executing crypto instructions # can handle the ASI in question as well. This means that we ought to # keep eyes open when new processors emerge... # # As for above mentioned ASI. It's so called "block initializing # store" which cancels "read" in "read-update-write" on cache lines. # This is "cooperative" optimization, as it reduces overall pressure # on memory interface. Benefits can't be observed/quantified with # usual benchmarks, on the contrary you can notice that single-thread # performance for parallelizable modes is ~1.5% worse for largest # block sizes [though few percent better for not so long ones]. All # this based on suggestions from David Miller. $::bias="STACK_BIAS"; $::frame="STACK_FRAME"; $::size_t_cc="SIZE_T_CC"; sub asm_init { # to be called with @ARGV as argument for (@_) { $::abibits=64 if (/\-m64/ || /\-xarch\=v9/); } if ($::abibits==64) { $::bias=2047; $::frame=192; $::size_t_cc="%xcc"; } else { $::bias=0; $::frame=112; $::size_t_cc="%icc"; } } # unified interface my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); # local variables my ($ileft,$iright,$ooff,$omask,$ivoff,$blk_init)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); sub alg_cbc_encrypt_implement { my ($alg,$bits) = @_; $::code.=<<___; .globl ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt .align 32 ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt: save %sp, -$::frame, %sp cmp $len, 0 be,pn $::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_abort srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 sub $inp, $out, $blk_init ! $inp!=$out ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); andcc $ivec, 7, $ivoff alignaddr $ivec, %g0, $ivec ldd [$ivec + 0], %f0 ! load ivec bz,pt %icc, 1f ldd [$ivec + 8], %f2 ldd [$ivec + 16], %f4 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 1: ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); ld [$ivec + 0], %f0 ld [$ivec + 4], %f1 ld [$ivec + 8], %f2 ld [$ivec + 12], %f3 ___ $::code.=<<___; prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_load_enckey and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 64, $iright mov 0xff, $omask sub $iright, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, $ooff cmp $len, 127 movrnz $ooff, 0, $blk_init ! if ( $out&7 || movleu $::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init ! $len<128 || brnz,pn $blk_init, .L${bits}cbc_enc_blk ! $inp==$out) srl $omask, $ooff, $omask alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out srlx $len, 4, $len prefetch [$out], 22 .L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 brz,pt $ileft, 4f ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 4: xor %g4, %o0, %o0 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o1 movxtod %o0, %f12 movxtod %o1, %f14 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 prefetch [$out + 63], 22 prefetch [$inp + 16+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_encrypt_1x add $inp, 16, $inp brnz,pn $ooff, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop add $out, 16, $out ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f0, [$ivec + 0] st %f1, [$ivec + 4] st %f2, [$ivec + 8] st %f3, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, 3f nop std %f0, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f2, [$ivec + 8] ___ $::code.=<<___; .L${bits}_cbc_enc_abort: ret restore .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %o0 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 ! handle unaligned output faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f0, [$ivec + 0] st %f1, [$ivec + 4] st %f2, [$ivec + 8] st %f3, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, 3f nop std %f0, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f2, [$ivec + 8] ret restore .align 16 3: alignaddrl $ivec, $ivoff, %g0 ! handle unaligned ivec mov 0xff, $omask srl $omask, $ivoff, $omask faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0 std %f6, [$ivec + 8] add $ivec, 16, $ivec orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f8, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0 ___ $::code.=<<___; ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .align 32 .L${bits}cbc_enc_blk: add $out, $len, $blk_init and $blk_init, 63, $blk_init ! tail sub $len, $blk_init, $len add $blk_init, 15, $blk_init ! round up to 16n srlx $len, 4, $len srl $blk_init, 4, $blk_init .L${bits}_cbc_enc_blk_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 brz,pt $ileft, 5f ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 5: xor %g4, %o0, %o0 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o1 movxtod %o0, %f12 movxtod %o1, %f14 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 prefetch [$inp + 16+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_encrypt_1x add $inp, 16, $inp sub $len, 1, $len stda %f0, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f2, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_blk_loop add $out, 8, $out membar #StoreLoad|#StoreStore brnz,pt $blk_init, .L${bits}_cbc_enc_loop mov $blk_init, $len ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f0, [$ivec + 0] st %f1, [$ivec + 4] st %f2, [$ivec + 8] st %f3, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, 3b nop std %f0, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f2, [$ivec + 8] ___ $::code.=<<___; ret restore .type ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt,#function .size ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_encrypt ___ } sub alg_cbc_decrypt_implement { my ($alg,$bits) = @_; $::code.=<<___; .globl ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt .align 32 ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt: save %sp, -$::frame, %sp cmp $len, 0 be,pn $::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_abort srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 sub $inp, $out, $blk_init ! $inp!=$out ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); andcc $ivec, 7, $ivoff alignaddr $ivec, %g0, $ivec ldd [$ivec + 0], %f12 ! load ivec bz,pt %icc, 1f ldd [$ivec + 8], %f14 ldd [$ivec + 16], %f0 faligndata %f12, %f14, %f12 faligndata %f14, %f0, %f14 1: ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); ld [$ivec + 0], %f12 ! load ivec ld [$ivec + 4], %f13 ld [$ivec + 8], %f14 ld [$ivec + 12], %f15 ___ $::code.=<<___; prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_load_deckey and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 64, $iright mov 0xff, $omask sub $iright, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, $ooff cmp $len, 255 movrnz $ooff, 0, $blk_init ! if ( $out&7 || movleu $::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init ! $len<256 || brnz,pn $blk_init, .L${bits}cbc_dec_blk ! $inp==$out) srl $omask, $ooff, $omask andcc $len, 16, %g0 ! is number of blocks even? srlx $len, 4, $len alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out bz %icc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x prefetch [$out], 22 .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 brz,pt $ileft, 4f ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 4: xor %g4, %o0, %o2 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o3 movxtod %o2, %f0 movxtod %o3, %f2 prefetch [$out + 63], 22 prefetch [$inp + 16+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_decrypt_1x add $inp, 16, $inp fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 movxtod %o0, %f12 movxtod %o1, %f14 brnz,pn $ooff, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x add $out, 16, $out ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f12, [$ivec + 0] st %f13, [$ivec + 4] st %f14, [$ivec + 8] st %f15, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec nop std %f12, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f14, [$ivec + 8] ___ $::code.=<<___; .L${bits}_cbc_dec_abort: ret restore .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %o0 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 ! handle unaligned output faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f12, [$ivec + 0] st %f13, [$ivec + 4] st %f14, [$ivec + 8] st %f15, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec nop std %f12, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f14, [$ivec + 8] ___ $::code.=<<___; ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .align 32 .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 brz,pt $ileft, 4f ldx [$inp + 24], %o3 ldx [$inp + 32], %o4 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 srlx %o2, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o1, %o1 sllx %o2, $ileft, %o2 srlx %o3, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o2, %o2 sllx %o3, $ileft, %o3 srlx %o4, $iright, %o4 or %o4, %o3, %o3 4: xor %g4, %o0, %o4 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o5 movxtod %o4, %f0 movxtod %o5, %f2 xor %g4, %o2, %o4 xor %g5, %o3, %o5 movxtod %o4, %f4 movxtod %o5, %f6 prefetch [$out + 63], 22 prefetch [$inp + 32+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_decrypt_2x add $inp, 32, $inp movxtod %o0, %f8 movxtod %o1, %f10 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 movxtod %o2, %f12 movxtod %o3, %f14 fxor %f8, %f4, %f4 fxor %f10, %f6, %f6 brnz,pn $ooff, 2f sub $len, 2, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] std %f4, [$out + 16] std %f6, [$out + 24] brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x add $out, 32, $out ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f12, [$ivec + 0] st %f13, [$ivec + 4] st %f14, [$ivec + 8] st %f15, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec nop std %f12, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f14, [$ivec + 8] ___ $::code.=<<___; ret restore .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %o0 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f8 ! handle unaligned output faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4 faligndata %f6, %f6, %f6 stda %f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f0, [$out + 8] std %f2, [$out + 16] std %f4, [$out + 24] add $out, 32, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f6, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f12, [$ivec + 0] st %f13, [$ivec + 4] st %f14, [$ivec + 8] st %f15, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec nop std %f12, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f14, [$ivec + 8] ret restore .align 16 .L${bits}_cbc_dec_unaligned_ivec: alignaddrl $ivec, $ivoff, %g0 ! handle unaligned ivec mov 0xff, $omask srl $omask, $ivoff, $omask faligndata %f12, %f12, %f0 faligndata %f12, %f14, %f2 faligndata %f14, %f14, %f4 stda %f0, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0 std %f2, [$ivec + 8] add $ivec, 16, $ivec orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f4, [$ivec + $omask]0xc0 ___ $::code.=<<___; ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .align 32 .L${bits}cbc_dec_blk: add $out, $len, $blk_init and $blk_init, 63, $blk_init ! tail sub $len, $blk_init, $len add $blk_init, 15, $blk_init ! round up to 16n srlx $len, 4, $len srl $blk_init, 4, $blk_init sub $len, 1, $len add $blk_init, 1, $blk_init .L${bits}_cbc_dec_blk_loop2x: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 brz,pt $ileft, 5f ldx [$inp + 24], %o3 ldx [$inp + 32], %o4 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 srlx %o2, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o1, %o1 sllx %o2, $ileft, %o2 srlx %o3, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o2, %o2 sllx %o3, $ileft, %o3 srlx %o4, $iright, %o4 or %o4, %o3, %o3 5: xor %g4, %o0, %o4 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o5 movxtod %o4, %f0 movxtod %o5, %f2 xor %g4, %o2, %o4 xor %g5, %o3, %o5 movxtod %o4, %f4 movxtod %o5, %f6 prefetch [$inp + 32+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_decrypt_2x add $inp, 32, $inp subcc $len, 2, $len movxtod %o0, %f8 movxtod %o1, %f10 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= ivec fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 movxtod %o2, %f12 movxtod %o3, %f14 fxor %f8, %f4, %f4 fxor %f10, %f6, %f6 stda %f0, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f2, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f4, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f6, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific bgu,pt $::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_blk_loop2x add $out, 8, $out add $blk_init, $len, $len andcc $len, 1, %g0 ! is number of blocks even? membar #StoreLoad|#StoreStore bnz,pt %icc, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop srl $len, 0, $len brnz,pn $len, .L${bits}_cbc_dec_loop2x nop ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($::evp); st %f12, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec st %f13, [$ivec + 4] st %f14, [$ivec + 8] st %f15, [$ivec + 12] ___ $::code.=<<___ if (!$::evp); brnz,pn $ivoff, 3b nop std %f12, [$ivec + 0] ! write out ivec std %f14, [$ivec + 8] ___ $::code.=<<___; ret restore .type ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt,#function .size ${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_cbc_decrypt ___ } sub alg_ctr32_implement { my ($alg,$bits) = @_; $::code.=<<___; .globl ${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt .align 32 ${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt: save %sp, -$::frame, %sp srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_load_enckey sllx $len, 4, $len ld [$ivec + 0], %l4 ! counter ld [$ivec + 4], %l5 ld [$ivec + 8], %l6 ld [$ivec + 12], %l7 sllx %l4, 32, %o5 or %l5, %o5, %o5 sllx %l6, 32, %g1 xor %o5, %g4, %g4 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g1, %g5, %g5 movxtod %g4, %f14 ! most significant 64 bits sub $inp, $out, $blk_init ! $inp!=$out and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 64, $iright mov 0xff, $omask sub $iright, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, $ooff cmp $len, 255 movrnz $ooff, 0, $blk_init ! if ( $out&7 || movleu $::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init ! $len<256 || brnz,pn $blk_init, .L${bits}_ctr32_blk ! $inp==$out) srl $omask, $ooff, $omask andcc $len, 16, %g0 ! is number of blocks even? alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out bz %icc, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x srlx $len, 4, $len .L${bits}_ctr32_loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 brz,pt $ileft, 4f ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 4: xor %g5, %l7, %g1 ! ^= rk[0] add %l7, 1, %l7 movxtod %g1, %f2 srl %l7, 0, %l7 ! clruw prefetch [$out + 63], 22 prefetch [$inp + 16+63], 20 ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "aes"); aes_eround01 %f16, %f14, %f2, %f4 aes_eround23 %f18, %f14, %f2, %f2 ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "cmll"); camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f14, %f2 camellia_f %f18, %f14, %f2, %f0 ___ $::code.=<<___; call _${alg}${bits}_encrypt_1x+8 add $inp, 16, $inp movxtod %o0, %f10 movxtod %o1, %f12 fxor %f10, %f0, %f0 ! ^= inp fxor %f12, %f2, %f2 brnz,pn $ooff, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x add $out, 16, $out ret restore .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %o0 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 ! handle unaligned output faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .align 32 .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 brz,pt $ileft, 4f ldx [$inp + 24], %o3 ldx [$inp + 32], %o4 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 srlx %o2, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o1, %o1 sllx %o2, $ileft, %o2 srlx %o3, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o2, %o2 sllx %o3, $ileft, %o3 srlx %o4, $iright, %o4 or %o4, %o3, %o3 4: xor %g5, %l7, %g1 ! ^= rk[0] add %l7, 1, %l7 movxtod %g1, %f2 srl %l7, 0, %l7 ! clruw xor %g5, %l7, %g1 add %l7, 1, %l7 movxtod %g1, %f6 srl %l7, 0, %l7 ! clruw prefetch [$out + 63], 22 prefetch [$inp + 32+63], 20 ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "aes"); aes_eround01 %f16, %f14, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f18, %f14, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f16, %f14, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f18, %f14, %f6, %f6 ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "cmll"); camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f14, %f2 camellia_f %f16, %f6, %f14, %f6 camellia_f %f18, %f14, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f18, %f14, %f6, %f4 ___ $::code.=<<___; call _${alg}${bits}_encrypt_2x+16 add $inp, 32, $inp movxtod %o0, %f8 movxtod %o1, %f10 movxtod %o2, %f12 fxor %f8, %f0, %f0 ! ^= inp movxtod %o3, %f8 fxor %f10, %f2, %f2 fxor %f12, %f4, %f4 fxor %f8, %f6, %f6 brnz,pn $ooff, 2f sub $len, 2, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] std %f4, [$out + 16] std %f6, [$out + 24] brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x add $out, 32, $out ret restore .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %o0 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f8 ! handle unaligned output faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2 faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4 faligndata %f6, %f6, %f6 stda %f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f0, [$out + 8] std %f2, [$out + 16] std %f4, [$out + 24] add $out, 32, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f6, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .align 32 .L${bits}_ctr32_blk: add $out, $len, $blk_init and $blk_init, 63, $blk_init ! tail sub $len, $blk_init, $len add $blk_init, 15, $blk_init ! round up to 16n srlx $len, 4, $len srl $blk_init, 4, $blk_init sub $len, 1, $len add $blk_init, 1, $blk_init .L${bits}_ctr32_blk_loop2x: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 brz,pt $ileft, 5f ldx [$inp + 24], %o3 ldx [$inp + 32], %o4 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 srlx %o2, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o1, %o1 sllx %o2, $ileft, %o2 srlx %o3, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o2, %o2 sllx %o3, $ileft, %o3 srlx %o4, $iright, %o4 or %o4, %o3, %o3 5: xor %g5, %l7, %g1 ! ^= rk[0] add %l7, 1, %l7 movxtod %g1, %f2 srl %l7, 0, %l7 ! clruw xor %g5, %l7, %g1 add %l7, 1, %l7 movxtod %g1, %f6 srl %l7, 0, %l7 ! clruw prefetch [$inp + 32+63], 20 ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "aes"); aes_eround01 %f16, %f14, %f2, %f8 aes_eround23 %f18, %f14, %f2, %f2 aes_eround01 %f16, %f14, %f6, %f10 aes_eround23 %f18, %f14, %f6, %f6 ___ $::code.=<<___ if ($alg eq "cmll"); camellia_f %f16, %f2, %f14, %f2 camellia_f %f16, %f6, %f14, %f6 camellia_f %f18, %f14, %f2, %f0 camellia_f %f18, %f14, %f6, %f4 ___ $::code.=<<___; call _${alg}${bits}_encrypt_2x+16 add $inp, 32, $inp subcc $len, 2, $len movxtod %o0, %f8 movxtod %o1, %f10 movxtod %o2, %f12 fxor %f8, %f0, %f0 ! ^= inp movxtod %o3, %f8 fxor %f10, %f2, %f2 fxor %f12, %f4, %f4 fxor %f8, %f6, %f6 stda %f0, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f2, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f4, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f6, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific bgu,pt $::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_ctr32_blk_loop2x add $out, 8, $out add $blk_init, $len, $len andcc $len, 1, %g0 ! is number of blocks even? membar #StoreLoad|#StoreStore bnz,pt %icc, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop srl $len, 0, $len brnz,pn $len, .L${bits}_ctr32_loop2x nop ret restore .type ${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt,#function .size ${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_ctr32_encrypt ___ } sub alg_xts_implement { my ($alg,$bits,$dir) = @_; my ($inp,$out,$len,$key1,$key2,$ivec)=map("%i$_",(0..5)); my $rem=$ivec; $::code.=<<___; .globl ${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt .align 32 ${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt: save %sp, -$::frame-16, %sp srln $len, 0, $len ! needed on v8+, "nop" on v9 mov $ivec, %o0 add %fp, $::bias-16, %o1 call ${alg}_t4_encrypt mov $key2, %o2 add %fp, $::bias-16, %l7 ldxa [%l7]0x88, %g2 add %fp, $::bias-8, %l7 ldxa [%l7]0x88, %g3 ! %g3:%g2 is tweak sethi %hi(0x76543210), %l7 or %l7, %lo(0x76543210), %l7 bmask %l7, %g0, %g0 ! byte swap mask prefetch [$inp], 20 prefetch [$inp + 63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_load_${dir}ckey and $len, 15, $rem and $len, -16, $len ___ $code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "de"); mov 0, %l7 movrnz $rem, 16, %l7 sub $len, %l7, $len ___ $code.=<<___; sub $inp, $out, $blk_init ! $inp!=$out and $inp, 7, $ileft andn $inp, 7, $inp sll $ileft, 3, $ileft mov 64, $iright mov 0xff, $omask sub $iright, $ileft, $iright and $out, 7, $ooff cmp $len, 255 movrnz $ooff, 0, $blk_init ! if ( $out&7 || movleu $::size_t_cc, 0, $blk_init ! $len<256 || brnz,pn $blk_init, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk ! $inp==$out) srl $omask, $ooff, $omask andcc $len, 16, %g0 ! is number of blocks even? ___ $code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "de"); brz,pn $len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal ___ $code.=<<___; alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out bz %icc, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x srlx $len, 4, $len .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 brz,pt $ileft, 4f ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 4: movxtod %g2, %f12 movxtod %g3, %f14 bshuffle %f12, %f12, %f12 bshuffle %f14, %f14, %f14 xor %g4, %o0, %o0 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o1 movxtod %o0, %f0 movxtod %o1, %f2 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 prefetch [$out + 63], 22 prefetch [$inp + 16+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_1x add $inp, 16, $inp fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 srax %g3, 63, %l7 ! next tweak value addcc %g2, %g2, %g2 and %l7, 0x87, %l7 addxc %g3, %g3, %g3 xor %l7, %g2, %g2 brnz,pn $ooff, 2f sub $len, 1, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x add $out, 16, $out brnz,pn $rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal nop ret restore .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %o0 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4 ! handle unaligned output faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6 faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8 stda %f4, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f6, [$out + 8] add $out, 16, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask brnz,pn $rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal nop ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .align 32 .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 brz,pt $ileft, 4f ldx [$inp + 24], %o3 ldx [$inp + 32], %o4 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 srlx %o2, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o1, %o1 sllx %o2, $ileft, %o2 srlx %o3, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o2, %o2 sllx %o3, $ileft, %o3 srlx %o4, $iright, %o4 or %o4, %o3, %o3 4: movxtod %g2, %f12 movxtod %g3, %f14 bshuffle %f12, %f12, %f12 bshuffle %f14, %f14, %f14 srax %g3, 63, %l7 ! next tweak value addcc %g2, %g2, %g2 and %l7, 0x87, %l7 addxc %g3, %g3, %g3 xor %l7, %g2, %g2 movxtod %g2, %f8 movxtod %g3, %f10 bshuffle %f8, %f8, %f8 bshuffle %f10, %f10, %f10 xor %g4, %o0, %o0 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o1 xor %g4, %o2, %o2 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o3, %o3 movxtod %o0, %f0 movxtod %o1, %f2 movxtod %o2, %f4 movxtod %o3, %f6 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 fxor %f8, %f4, %f4 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f10, %f6, %f6 prefetch [$out + 63], 22 prefetch [$inp + 32+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_2x add $inp, 32, $inp movxtod %g2, %f8 movxtod %g3, %f10 srax %g3, 63, %l7 ! next tweak value addcc %g2, %g2, %g2 and %l7, 0x87, %l7 addxc %g3, %g3, %g3 xor %l7, %g2, %g2 bshuffle %f8, %f8, %f8 bshuffle %f10, %f10, %f10 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 fxor %f8, %f4, %f4 fxor %f10, %f6, %f6 brnz,pn $ooff, 2f sub $len, 2, $len std %f0, [$out + 0] std %f2, [$out + 8] std %f4, [$out + 16] std %f6, [$out + 24] brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x add $out, 32, $out fsrc2 %f4, %f0 fsrc2 %f6, %f2 brnz,pn $rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal nop ret restore .align 16 2: ldxa [$inp]0x82, %o0 ! avoid read-after-write hazard ! and ~3x deterioration ! in inp==out case faligndata %f0, %f0, %f8 ! handle unaligned output faligndata %f0, %f2, %f10 faligndata %f2, %f4, %f12 faligndata %f4, %f6, %f14 faligndata %f6, %f6, %f0 stda %f8, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store std %f10, [$out + 8] std %f12, [$out + 16] std %f14, [$out + 24] add $out, 32, $out orn %g0, $omask, $omask stda %f0, [$out + $omask]0xc0 ! partial store brnz,pt $len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x+4 orn %g0, $omask, $omask fsrc2 %f4, %f0 fsrc2 %f6, %f2 brnz,pn $rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal nop ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .align 32 .L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk: add $out, $len, $blk_init and $blk_init, 63, $blk_init ! tail sub $len, $blk_init, $len add $blk_init, 15, $blk_init ! round up to 16n srlx $len, 4, $len srl $blk_init, 4, $blk_init sub $len, 1, $len add $blk_init, 1, $blk_init .L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk2x: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 brz,pt $ileft, 5f ldx [$inp + 24], %o3 ldx [$inp + 32], %o4 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 srlx %o2, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o1, %o1 sllx %o2, $ileft, %o2 srlx %o3, $iright, %g1 or %g1, %o2, %o2 sllx %o3, $ileft, %o3 srlx %o4, $iright, %o4 or %o4, %o3, %o3 5: movxtod %g2, %f12 movxtod %g3, %f14 bshuffle %f12, %f12, %f12 bshuffle %f14, %f14, %f14 srax %g3, 63, %l7 ! next tweak value addcc %g2, %g2, %g2 and %l7, 0x87, %l7 addxc %g3, %g3, %g3 xor %l7, %g2, %g2 movxtod %g2, %f8 movxtod %g3, %f10 bshuffle %f8, %f8, %f8 bshuffle %f10, %f10, %f10 xor %g4, %o0, %o0 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o1 xor %g4, %o2, %o2 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o3, %o3 movxtod %o0, %f0 movxtod %o1, %f2 movxtod %o2, %f4 movxtod %o3, %f6 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 fxor %f8, %f4, %f4 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f10, %f6, %f6 prefetch [$inp + 32+63], 20 call _${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_2x add $inp, 32, $inp movxtod %g2, %f8 movxtod %g3, %f10 srax %g3, 63, %l7 ! next tweak value addcc %g2, %g2, %g2 and %l7, 0x87, %l7 addxc %g3, %g3, %g3 xor %l7, %g2, %g2 bshuffle %f8, %f8, %f8 bshuffle %f10, %f10, %f10 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 fxor %f8, %f4, %f4 fxor %f10, %f6, %f6 subcc $len, 2, $len stda %f0, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f2, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f4, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific add $out, 8, $out stda %f6, [$out]0xe2 ! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific bgu,pt $::size_t_cc, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}blk2x add $out, 8, $out add $blk_init, $len, $len andcc $len, 1, %g0 ! is number of blocks even? membar #StoreLoad|#StoreStore bnz,pt %icc, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop srl $len, 0, $len brnz,pn $len, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop2x nop fsrc2 %f4, %f0 fsrc2 %f6, %f2 brnz,pn $rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal nop ret restore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ___ $code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "en"); .align 32 .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal: std %f0, [%fp + $::bias-16] ! copy of output std %f2, [%fp + $::bias-8] srl $ileft, 3, $ileft add %fp, $::bias-16, %l7 add $inp, $ileft, $inp ! original $inp+$len&-15 add $out, $ooff, $out ! original $out+$len&-15 mov 0, $ileft nop ! align .L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing: ldub [$inp + $ileft], %o0 ldub [%l7 + $ileft], %o1 dec $rem stb %o0, [%l7 + $ileft] stb %o1, [$out + $ileft] brnz $rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing inc $ileft mov %l7, $inp sub $out, 16, $out mov 0, $ileft sub $out, $ooff, $out ba .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop ! one more time mov 1, $len ! $rem is 0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($dir eq "de"); .align 32 .L${bits}_xts_${dir}steal: ldx [$inp + 0], %o0 brz,pt $ileft, 8f ldx [$inp + 8], %o1 ldx [$inp + 16], %o2 sllx %o0, $ileft, %o0 srlx %o1, $iright, %g1 sllx %o1, $ileft, %o1 or %g1, %o0, %o0 srlx %o2, $iright, %o2 or %o2, %o1, %o1 8: srax %g3, 63, %l7 ! next tweak value addcc %g2, %g2, %o2 and %l7, 0x87, %l7 addxc %g3, %g3, %o3 xor %l7, %o2, %o2 movxtod %o2, %f12 movxtod %o3, %f14 bshuffle %f12, %f12, %f12 bshuffle %f14, %f14, %f14 xor %g4, %o0, %o0 ! ^= rk[0] xor %g5, %o1, %o1 movxtod %o0, %f0 movxtod %o1, %f2 fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 call _${alg}${bits}_${dir}crypt_1x add $inp, 16, $inp fxor %f12, %f0, %f0 ! ^= tweak[0] fxor %f14, %f2, %f2 std %f0, [%fp + $::bias-16] std %f2, [%fp + $::bias-8] srl $ileft, 3, $ileft add %fp, $::bias-16, %l7 add $inp, $ileft, $inp ! original $inp+$len&-15 add $out, $ooff, $out ! original $out+$len&-15 mov 0, $ileft add $out, 16, $out nop ! align .L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing: ldub [$inp + $ileft], %o0 ldub [%l7 + $ileft], %o1 dec $rem stb %o0, [%l7 + $ileft] stb %o1, [$out + $ileft] brnz $rem, .L${bits}_xts_${dir}stealing inc $ileft mov %l7, $inp sub $out, 16, $out mov 0, $ileft sub $out, $ooff, $out ba .L${bits}_xts_${dir}loop ! one more time mov 1, $len ! $rem is 0 ___ $code.=<<___; ret restore .type ${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt,#function .size ${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt,.-${alg}${bits}_t4_xts_${dir}crypt ___ } # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "faligndata" => 0x048, "bshuffle" => 0x04c, "fnot2" => 0x066, "fxor" => 0x06c, "fsrc2" => 0x078 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unvis3 { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "addxc" => 0x011, "addxccc" => 0x013, "umulxhi" => 0x016, "alignaddr" => 0x018, "bmask" => 0x019, "alignaddrl" => 0x01a ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unaes_round { # 4-argument instructions my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %aesopf = ( "aes_eround01" => 0, "aes_eround23" => 1, "aes_dround01" => 2, "aes_dround23" => 3, "aes_eround01_l"=> 4, "aes_eround23_l"=> 5, "aes_dround01_l"=> 6, "aes_dround23_l"=> 7, "aes_kexpand1" => 8 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd"; if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) { $rs3 = ($rs3 =~ /%f([0-6]*[02468])/) ? (($1|$1>>5)&31) : $rs3; foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|$rd<<25|0x19<<19|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unaes_kexpand { # 3-argument instructions my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %aesopf = ( "aes_kexpand0" => 0x130, "aes_kexpand2" => 0x131 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if (defined($opf=$aesopf{$mnemonic})) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub uncamellia_f { # 4-argument instructions my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rs3,$rd"; if (1) { $rs3 = ($rs3 =~ /%f([0-6]*[02468])/) ? (($1|$1>>5)&31) : $rs3; foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|$rd<<25|0x19<<19|$rs1<<14|$rs3<<9|0xc<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub uncamellia3 { # 3-argument instructions my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %cmllopf = ( "camellia_fl" => 0x13c, "camellia_fli" => 0x13d ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if (defined($opf=$cmllopf{$mnemonic})) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unmovxtox { # 2-argument instructions my ($mnemonic,$rs,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24, "f" => 0 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %movxopf = ( "movdtox" => 0x110, "movstouw" => 0x111, "movstosw" => 0x113, "movxtod" => 0x118, "movwtos" => 0x119 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs,$rd"; if (defined($opf=$movxopf{$mnemonic})) { foreach ($rs,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([fgoli])([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; if ($2>=32) { return $ref if ($2&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($2|$2>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|$rd<<25|0x36<<19|$opf<<5|$rs, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub undes { my ($mnemonic)=shift; my @args=@_; my ($ref,$opf); my %desopf = ( "des_round" => 0b1001, "des_ip" => 0b100110100, "des_iip" => 0b100110101, "des_kexpand" => 0b100110110 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t".join(",",@_); if (defined($opf=$desopf{$mnemonic})) { # 4-arg if ($mnemonic eq "des_round") { foreach (@args[0..3]) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|0b011001<<19|$opf<<5|$args[0]<<14|$args[1]|$args[2]<<9|$args[3]<<25, $ref; } elsif ($mnemonic eq "des_kexpand") { # 3-arg foreach (@args[0..2]) { return $ref if (!/(%f)?([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$2; if ($2>=32) { return $ref if ($2&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($2|$2>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|0b110110<<19|$opf<<5|$args[0]<<14|$args[1]|$args[2]<<25, $ref; } else { # 2-arg foreach (@args[0..1]) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($2&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 2<<30|0b110110<<19|$opf<<5|$args[0]<<14|$args[1]<<25, $ref; } } else { return $ref; } } sub emit_assembler { foreach (split("\n",$::code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(f[a-z]+2[sd]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})\s*$/$1\t%f0,$2,$3/go; s/\b(aes_[edk][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unaes_round($1,$2,$3,$4,$5) /geo or s/\b(aes_kexpand[02])\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unaes_kexpand($1,$2,$3,$4) /geo or s/\b(camellia_f)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &uncamellia_f($1,$2,$3,$4,$5) /geo or s/\b(camellia_[^s]+)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &uncamellia3($1,$2,$3,$4) /geo or s/\b(des_\w+)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*([%fx0-9]+)(?:,\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})(?:,\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}))?)?/ &undes($1,$2,$3,$4,$5) /geo or s/\b(mov[ds]to\w+)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unmovxtox($1,$2,$3) /geo or s/\b(mov[xw]to[ds])\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unmovxtox($1,$2,$3) /geo or s/\b([fb][^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unvis($1,$2,$3,$4) /geo or s/\b(umulxhi|bmask|addxc[c]{0,2}|alignaddr[l]*)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4) /geo; print $_,"\n"; } } 1; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl0000644000000000000000000001642713176625657016543 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # require 'x86asm.pl'; # &asm_init(,"des-586.pl"[,$i386only]); # &function_begin("foo"); # ... # &function_end("foo"); # &asm_finish $out=(); $i386=0; # AUTOLOAD is this context has quite unpleasant side effect, namely # that typos in function calls effectively go to assembler output, # but on the pros side we don't have to implement one subroutine per # each opcode... sub ::AUTOLOAD { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; die "more than 4 arguments passed to $opcode" if ($#_>3); $opcode =~ s/.*:://; if ($opcode =~ /^push/) { $stack+=4; } elsif ($opcode =~ /^pop/) { $stack-=4; } &generic($opcode,@_) or die "undefined subroutine \&$AUTOLOAD"; } sub ::emit { my $opcode=shift; if ($#_==-1) { push(@out,"\t$opcode\n"); } else { push(@out,"\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_)."\n"); } } sub ::LB { $_[0] =~ m/^e?([a-d])x$/o or die "$_[0] does not have a 'low byte'"; $1."l"; } sub ::HB { $_[0] =~ m/^e?([a-d])x$/o or die "$_[0] does not have a 'high byte'"; $1."h"; } sub ::stack_push{ my $num=$_[0]*4; $stack+=$num; &sub("esp",$num); } sub ::stack_pop { my $num=$_[0]*4; $stack-=$num; &add("esp",$num); } sub ::blindpop { &pop($_[0]); $stack+=4; } sub ::wparam { &DWP($stack+4*$_[0],"esp"); } sub ::swtmp { &DWP(4*$_[0],"esp"); } sub ::bswap { if ($i386) # emulate bswap for i386 { &comment("bswap @_"); &xchg(&HB(@_),&LB(@_)); &ror (@_,16); &xchg(&HB(@_),&LB(@_)); } else { &generic("bswap",@_); } } # These are made-up opcodes introduced over the years essentially # by ignorance, just alias them to real ones... sub ::movb { &mov(@_); } sub ::xorb { &xor(@_); } sub ::rotl { &rol(@_); } sub ::rotr { &ror(@_); } sub ::exch { &xchg(@_); } sub ::halt { &hlt; } sub ::movz { &movzx(@_); } sub ::pushf { &pushfd; } sub ::popf { &popfd; } # 3 argument instructions sub ::movq { my($p1,$p2,$optimize)=@_; if ($optimize && $p1=~/^mm[0-7]$/ && $p2=~/^mm[0-7]$/) # movq between mmx registers can sink Intel CPUs { &::pshufw($p1,$p2,0xe4); } else { &::generic("movq",@_); } } # SSE>2 instructions my %regrm = ( "eax"=>0, "ecx"=>1, "edx"=>2, "ebx"=>3, "esp"=>4, "ebp"=>5, "esi"=>6, "edi"=>7 ); sub ::pextrd { my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /(e[a-dsd][ixp]):xmm([0-7])/) { &::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x16,0xc0|($2<<3)|$regrm{$1},$imm); } else { &::generic("pextrd",@_); } } sub ::pinsrd { my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):(e[a-dsd][ixp])/) { &::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x22,0xc0|($1<<3)|$regrm{$2},$imm); } else { &::generic("pinsrd",@_); } } sub ::pshufb { my($dst,$src)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x38,0x00,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2); } else { &::generic("pshufb",@_); } } sub ::palignr { my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x0f,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm); } else { &::generic("palignr",@_); } } sub ::pclmulqdq { my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_; if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/) { &::data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0x44,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm); } else { &::generic("pclmulqdq",@_); } } sub ::rdrand { my ($dst)=@_; if ($dst =~ /(e[a-dsd][ixp])/) { &::data_byte(0x0f,0xc7,0xf0|$regrm{$dst}); } else { &::generic("rdrand",@_); } } sub ::rdseed { my ($dst)=@_; if ($dst =~ /(e[a-dsd][ixp])/) { &::data_byte(0x0f,0xc7,0xf8|$regrm{$dst}); } else { &::generic("rdrand",@_); } } sub rxb { local *opcode=shift; my ($dst,$src1,$src2,$rxb)=@_; $rxb|=0x7<<5; $rxb&=~(0x04<<5) if($dst>=8); $rxb&=~(0x01<<5) if($src1>=8); $rxb&=~(0x02<<5) if($src2>=8); push @opcode,$rxb; } sub ::vprotd { my $args=join(',',@_); if ($args =~ /xmm([0-7]),xmm([0-7]),([x0-9a-f]+)/) { my @opcode=(0x8f); rxb(\@opcode,$1,$2,-1,0x08); push @opcode,0x78,0xc2; push @opcode,0xc0|($2&7)|(($1&7)<<3); # ModR/M my $c=$3; push @opcode,$c=~/^0/?oct($c):$c; &::data_byte(@opcode); } else { &::generic("vprotd",@_); } } sub ::endbranch { &::data_byte(0xf3,0x0f,0x1e,0xfb); } # label management $lbdecor="L"; # local label decoration, set by package $label="000"; sub ::islabel # see is argument is a known label { my $i; foreach $i (values %label) { return $i if ($i eq $_[0]); } $label{$_[0]}; # can be undef } sub ::label # instantiate a function-scope label { if (!defined($label{$_[0]})) { $label{$_[0]}="${lbdecor}${label}${_[0]}"; $label++; } $label{$_[0]}; } sub ::LABEL # instantiate a file-scope label { $label{$_[0]}=$_[1] if (!defined($label{$_[0]})); $label{$_[0]}; } sub ::static_label { &::LABEL($_[0],$lbdecor.$_[0]); } sub ::set_label_B { push(@out,"@_:\n"); } sub ::set_label { my $label=&::label($_[0]); &::align($_[1]) if ($_[1]>1); &::set_label_B($label); $label; } sub ::wipe_labels # wipes function-scope labels { foreach $i (keys %label) { delete $label{$i} if ($label{$i} =~ /^\Q${lbdecor}\E[0-9]{3}/); } } # subroutine management sub ::function_begin { &function_begin_B(@_); $stack=4; &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); } sub ::function_end { &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &pop("ebx"); &pop("ebp"); &ret(); &function_end_B(@_); $stack=0; &wipe_labels(); } sub ::function_end_A { &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &pop("ebx"); &pop("ebp"); &ret(); $stack+=16; # readjust esp as if we didn't pop anything } sub ::asciz { my @str=unpack("C*",shift); push @str,0; while ($#str>15) { &data_byte(@str[0..15]); foreach (0..15) { shift @str; } } &data_byte(@str) if (@str); } sub ::asm_finish { &file_end(); print @out; } sub ::asm_init { my ($type,$fn,$cpu)=@_; $filename=$fn; $i386=$cpu; $elf=$cpp=$coff=$aout=$macosx=$win32=$netware=$mwerks=$android=0; if (($type eq "elf")) { $elf=1; require "x86gas.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "elf-1")) { $elf=-1; require "x86gas.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "a\.out")) { $aout=1; require "x86gas.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "coff" or $type eq "gaswin")) { $coff=1; require "x86gas.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "win32n")) { $win32=1; require "x86nasm.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "nw-nasm")) { $netware=1; require "x86nasm.pl"; } #elsif (($type eq "nw-mwasm")) #{ $netware=1; $mwerks=1; require "x86nasm.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "win32")) { $win32=1; require "x86masm.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "macosx")) { $aout=1; $macosx=1; require "x86gas.pl"; } elsif (($type eq "android")) { $elf=1; $android=1; require "x86gas.pl"; } else { print STDERR <<"EOF"; Pick one target type from elf - Linux, FreeBSD, Solaris x86, etc. a.out - DJGPP, elder OpenBSD, etc. coff - GAS/COFF such as Win32 targets win32n - Windows 95/Windows NT NASM format nw-nasm - NetWare NASM format macosx - Mac OS X EOF exit(1); } $pic=0; for (@ARGV) { $pic=1 if (/\-[fK]PIC/i); } $filename =~ s/\.pl$//; &file($filename); } sub ::hidden {} 1; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014244 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000634013176625656016273 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Internal ASN1 structures and functions: not for application use */ int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d); int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d); /* ASN1 scan context structure */ struct asn1_sctx_st { /* The ASN1_ITEM associated with this field */ const ASN1_ITEM *it; /* If ASN1_TEMPLATE associated with this field */ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt; /* Various flags associated with field and context */ unsigned long flags; /* If SEQUENCE OF or SET OF, field index */ int skidx; /* ASN1 depth of field */ int depth; /* Structure and field name */ const char *sname, *fname; /* If a primitive type the type of underlying field */ int prim_type; /* The field value itself */ ASN1_VALUE **field; /* Callback to pass information to */ int (*scan_cb) (ASN1_SCTX *ctx); /* Context specific application data */ void *app_data; } /* ASN1_SCTX */ ; typedef struct mime_param_st MIME_PARAM; DEFINE_STACK_OF(MIME_PARAM) typedef struct mime_header_st MIME_HEADER; DEFINE_STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) /* Month values for printing out times */ extern const char *_asn1_mon[12]; void asn1_string_embed_free(ASN1_STRING *a, int embed); int asn1_get_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE **asn1_get_field_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt); const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int nullerr); int asn1_do_lock(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int op, const ASN1_ITEM *it); void asn1_enc_init(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); void asn1_enc_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int asn1_enc_restore(int *len, unsigned char **out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int asn1_enc_save(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, const ASN1_ITEM *it); void asn1_item_embed_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed); void asn1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed); void asn1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt); ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp); ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp); ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); /* Internal functions used by x_int64.c */ int c2i_uint64_int(uint64_t *ret, int *neg, const unsigned char **pp, long len); int i2c_uint64_int(unsigned char *p, uint64_t r, int neg); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/f_string.c0000644000000000000000000000770613176625656016235 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *a, int type) { int i, n = 0; static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF"; char buf[2]; if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->length == 0) { if (BIO_write(bp, "0", 1) != 1) goto err; n = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++) { if ((i != 0) && (i % 35 == 0)) { if (BIO_write(bp, "\\\n", 2) != 2) goto err; n += 2; } buf[0] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i] >> 4) & 0x0f]; buf[1] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i]) & 0x0f]; if (BIO_write(bp, buf, 2) != 2) goto err; n += 2; } } return (n); err: return (-1); } int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *bs, char *buf, int size) { int i, j, k, m, n, again, bufsize, spec_char; unsigned char *s = NULL, *sp; unsigned char *bufp; int num = 0, slen = 0, first = 1; bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size); for (;;) { if (bufsize < 1) { if (first) break; else goto err; } first = 0; i = bufsize; if (buf[i - 1] == '\n') buf[--i] = '\0'; if (i == 0) goto err; if (buf[i - 1] == '\r') buf[--i] = '\0'; if (i == 0) goto err; again = (buf[i - 1] == '\\'); for (j = i - 1; j > 0; j--) { #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC spec_char = (!(((buf[j] >= '0') && (buf[j] <= '9')) || ((buf[j] >= 'a') && (buf[j] <= 'f')) || ((buf[j] >= 'A') && (buf[j] <= 'F')))); #else /* * This #ifdef is not strictly necessary, since the characters * A...F a...f 0...9 are contiguous (yes, even in EBCDIC - but * not the whole alphabet). Nevertheless, isxdigit() is faster. */ spec_char = (!isxdigit(buf[j])); #endif if (spec_char) { i = j; break; } } buf[i] = '\0'; /* * We have now cleared all the crap off the end of the line */ if (i < 2) goto err; bufp = (unsigned char *)buf; k = 0; i -= again; if (i % 2 != 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS); OPENSSL_free(s); return 0; } i /= 2; if (num + i > slen) { sp = OPENSSL_realloc(s, (unsigned int)num + i * 2); if (sp == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(s); return 0; } s = sp; slen = num + i * 2; } for (j = 0; j < i; j++, k += 2) { for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { m = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(bufp[k + n]); if (m < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS); OPENSSL_free(s); return 0; } s[num + j] <<= 4; s[num + j] |= m; } } num += i; if (again) bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size); else break; } bs->length = num; bs->data = s; return 1; err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING, ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE); OPENSSL_free(s); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c0000644000000000000000000007006313176625656016206 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "internal/bio.h" #include "asn1_locl.h" /* * Generalised MIME like utilities for streaming ASN1. Although many have a * PKCS7/CMS like flavour others are more general purpose. */ /* * MIME format structures Note that all are translated to lower case apart * from parameter values. Quotes are stripped off */ struct mime_param_st { char *param_name; /* Param name e.g. "micalg" */ char *param_value; /* Param value e.g. "sha1" */ }; struct mime_header_st { char *name; /* Name of line e.g. "content-type" */ char *value; /* Value of line e.g. "text/plain" */ STACK_OF(MIME_PARAM) *params; /* Zero or more parameters */ }; static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static char *strip_ends(char *name); static char *strip_start(char *name); static char *strip_end(char *name); static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(const char *name, const char *value); static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, const char *name, const char *value); static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio); static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER *const *a, const MIME_HEADER *const *b); static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM *const *a, const MIME_PARAM *const *b); static void mime_param_free(MIME_PARAM *param); static int mime_bound_check(char *line, int linelen, const char *bound, int blen); static int multi_split(BIO *bio, const char *bound, STACK_OF(BIO) **ret); static int strip_eol(char *linebuf, int *plen, int flags); static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_find(STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *hdrs, const char *name); static MIME_PARAM *mime_param_find(MIME_HEADER *hdr, const char *name); static void mime_hdr_free(MIME_HEADER *hdr); #define MAX_SMLEN 1024 #define mime_debug(x) /* x */ /* Output an ASN1 structure in BER format streaming if necessary */ int i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { /* If streaming create stream BIO and copy all content through it */ if (flags & SMIME_STREAM) { BIO *bio, *tbio; bio = BIO_new_NDEF(out, val, it); if (!bio) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } SMIME_crlf_copy(in, bio, flags); (void)BIO_flush(bio); /* Free up successive BIOs until we hit the old output BIO */ do { tbio = BIO_pop(bio); BIO_free(bio); bio = tbio; } while (bio != out); } /* * else just write out ASN1 structure which will have all content stored * internally */ else ASN1_item_i2d_bio(it, out, val); return 1; } /* Base 64 read and write of ASN1 structure */ static int B64_write_ASN1(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { BIO *b64; int r; b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); if (b64 == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * prepend the b64 BIO so all data is base64 encoded. */ out = BIO_push(b64, out); r = i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(out, val, in, flags, it); (void)BIO_flush(out); BIO_pop(out); BIO_free(b64); return r; } /* Streaming ASN1 PEM write */ int PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags, const char *hdr, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { int r; BIO_printf(out, "-----BEGIN %s-----\n", hdr); r = B64_write_ASN1(out, val, in, flags, it); BIO_printf(out, "-----END %s-----\n", hdr); return r; } static ASN1_VALUE *b64_read_asn1(BIO *bio, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { BIO *b64; ASN1_VALUE *val; if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } bio = BIO_push(b64, bio); val = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(it, bio, NULL); if (!val) ASN1err(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR); (void)BIO_flush(bio); BIO_pop(bio); BIO_free(b64); return val; } /* Generate the MIME "micalg" parameter from RFC3851, RFC4490 */ static int asn1_write_micalg(BIO *out, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs) { const EVP_MD *md; int i, have_unknown = 0, write_comma, ret = 0, md_nid; have_unknown = 0; write_comma = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(mdalgs); i++) { if (write_comma) BIO_write(out, ",", 1); write_comma = 1; md_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(sk_X509_ALGOR_value(mdalgs, i)->algorithm); md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid); if (md && md->md_ctrl) { int rv; char *micstr; rv = md->md_ctrl(NULL, EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG, 0, &micstr); if (rv > 0) { BIO_puts(out, micstr); OPENSSL_free(micstr); continue; } if (rv != -2) goto err; } switch (md_nid) { case NID_sha1: BIO_puts(out, "sha1"); break; case NID_md5: BIO_puts(out, "md5"); break; case NID_sha256: BIO_puts(out, "sha-256"); break; case NID_sha384: BIO_puts(out, "sha-384"); break; case NID_sha512: BIO_puts(out, "sha-512"); break; case NID_id_GostR3411_94: BIO_puts(out, "gostr3411-94"); goto err; default: if (have_unknown) write_comma = 0; else { BIO_puts(out, "unknown"); have_unknown = 1; } break; } } ret = 1; err: return ret; } /* SMIME sender */ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags, int ctype_nid, int econt_nid, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { char bound[33], c; int i; const char *mime_prefix, *mime_eol, *cname = "smime.p7m"; const char *msg_type = NULL; if (flags & SMIME_OLDMIME) mime_prefix = "application/x-pkcs7-"; else mime_prefix = "application/pkcs7-"; if (flags & SMIME_CRLFEOL) mime_eol = "\r\n"; else mime_eol = "\n"; if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) { /* We want multipart/signed */ /* Generate a random boundary */ if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) <= 0) return 0; for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { c = bound[i] & 0xf; if (c < 10) c += '0'; else c += 'A' - 10; bound[i] = c; } bound[32] = 0; BIO_printf(bio, "MIME-Version: 1.0%s", mime_eol); BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Type: multipart/signed;"); BIO_printf(bio, " protocol=\"%ssignature\";", mime_prefix); BIO_puts(bio, " micalg=\""); asn1_write_micalg(bio, mdalgs); BIO_printf(bio, "\"; boundary=\"----%s\"%s%s", bound, mime_eol, mime_eol); BIO_printf(bio, "This is an S/MIME signed message%s%s", mime_eol, mime_eol); /* Now write out the first part */ BIO_printf(bio, "------%s%s", bound, mime_eol); if (!asn1_output_data(bio, data, val, flags, it)) return 0; BIO_printf(bio, "%s------%s%s", mime_eol, bound, mime_eol); /* Headers for signature */ BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Type: %ssignature;", mime_prefix); BIO_printf(bio, " name=\"smime.p7s\"%s", mime_eol); BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64%s", mime_eol); BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Disposition: attachment;"); BIO_printf(bio, " filename=\"smime.p7s\"%s%s", mime_eol, mime_eol); B64_write_ASN1(bio, val, NULL, 0, it); BIO_printf(bio, "%s------%s--%s%s", mime_eol, bound, mime_eol, mime_eol); return 1; } /* Determine smime-type header */ if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_enveloped) msg_type = "enveloped-data"; else if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) { if (econt_nid == NID_id_smime_ct_receipt) msg_type = "signed-receipt"; else if (sk_X509_ALGOR_num(mdalgs) >= 0) msg_type = "signed-data"; else msg_type = "certs-only"; } else if (ctype_nid == NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) { msg_type = "compressed-data"; cname = "smime.p7z"; } /* MIME headers */ BIO_printf(bio, "MIME-Version: 1.0%s", mime_eol); BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Disposition: attachment;"); BIO_printf(bio, " filename=\"%s\"%s", cname, mime_eol); BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Type: %smime;", mime_prefix); if (msg_type) BIO_printf(bio, " smime-type=%s;", msg_type); BIO_printf(bio, " name=\"%s\"%s", cname, mime_eol); BIO_printf(bio, "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64%s%s", mime_eol, mime_eol); if (!B64_write_ASN1(bio, val, data, flags, it)) return 0; BIO_printf(bio, "%s", mime_eol); return 1; } /* Handle output of ASN1 data */ static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { BIO *tmpbio; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg; int rv = 1; /* * If data is not detached or resigning then the output BIO is already * set up to finalise when it is written through. */ if (!(flags & SMIME_DETACHED) || (flags & PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST)) { SMIME_crlf_copy(data, out, flags); return 1; } if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } sarg.out = out; sarg.ndef_bio = NULL; sarg.boundary = NULL; /* Let ASN1 code prepend any needed BIOs */ if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0) return 0; /* Copy data across, passing through filter BIOs for processing */ SMIME_crlf_copy(data, sarg.ndef_bio, flags); /* Finalize structure */ if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0) rv = 0; /* Now remove any digests prepended to the BIO */ while (sarg.ndef_bio != out) { tmpbio = BIO_pop(sarg.ndef_bio); BIO_free(sarg.ndef_bio); sarg.ndef_bio = tmpbio; } return rv; } /* * SMIME reader: handle multipart/signed and opaque signing. in multipart * case the content is placed in a memory BIO pointed to by "bcont". In * opaque this is set to NULL */ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { BIO *asnin; STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *headers = NULL; STACK_OF(BIO) *parts = NULL; MIME_HEADER *hdr; MIME_PARAM *prm; ASN1_VALUE *val; int ret; if (bcont) *bcont = NULL; if ((headers = mime_parse_hdr(bio)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR); return NULL; } if ((hdr = mime_hdr_find(headers, "content-type")) == NULL || hdr->value == NULL) { sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE); return NULL; } /* Handle multipart/signed */ if (strcmp(hdr->value, "multipart/signed") == 0) { /* Split into two parts */ prm = mime_param_find(hdr, "boundary"); if (!prm || !prm->param_value) { sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY); return NULL; } ret = multi_split(bio, prm->param_value, &parts); sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); if (!ret || (sk_BIO_num(parts) != 2)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE); sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree); return NULL; } /* Parse the signature piece */ asnin = sk_BIO_value(parts, 1); if ((headers = mime_parse_hdr(asnin)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR); sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree); return NULL; } /* Get content type */ if ((hdr = mime_hdr_find(headers, "content-type")) == NULL || hdr->value == NULL) { sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE); return NULL; } if (strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") && strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value); sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree); return NULL; } sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); /* Read in ASN1 */ if ((val = b64_read_asn1(asnin, it)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR); sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree); return NULL; } if (bcont) { *bcont = sk_BIO_value(parts, 0); BIO_free(asnin); sk_BIO_free(parts); } else sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree); return val; } /* OK, if not multipart/signed try opaque signature */ if (strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-mime") && strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-mime")) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value); sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); return NULL; } sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); if ((val = b64_read_asn1(bio, it)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1, ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR); return NULL; } return val; } /* Copy text from one BIO to another making the output CRLF at EOL */ int SMIME_crlf_copy(BIO *in, BIO *out, int flags) { BIO *bf; char eol; int len; char linebuf[MAX_SMLEN]; /* * Buffer output so we don't write one line at a time. This is useful * when streaming as we don't end up with one OCTET STRING per line. */ bf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bf == NULL) return 0; out = BIO_push(bf, out); if (flags & SMIME_BINARY) { while ((len = BIO_read(in, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) BIO_write(out, linebuf, len); } else { int eolcnt = 0; if (flags & SMIME_TEXT) BIO_printf(out, "Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"); while ((len = BIO_gets(in, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) { eol = strip_eol(linebuf, &len, flags); if (len) { /* Not EOF: write out all CRLF */ if (flags & SMIME_ASCIICRLF) { int i; for (i = 0; i < eolcnt; i++) BIO_write(out, "\r\n", 2); eolcnt = 0; } BIO_write(out, linebuf, len); if (eol) BIO_write(out, "\r\n", 2); } else if (flags & SMIME_ASCIICRLF) eolcnt++; else if (eol) BIO_write(out, "\r\n", 2); } } (void)BIO_flush(out); BIO_pop(out); BIO_free(bf); return 1; } /* Strip off headers if they are text/plain */ int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out) { char iobuf[4096]; int len; STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *headers; MIME_HEADER *hdr; if ((headers = mime_parse_hdr(in)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT, ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR); return 0; } if ((hdr = mime_hdr_find(headers, "content-type")) == NULL || hdr->value == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT, ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE); sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); return 0; } if (strcmp(hdr->value, "text/plain")) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT, ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value); sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); return 0; } sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); while ((len = BIO_read(in, iobuf, sizeof(iobuf))) > 0) BIO_write(out, iobuf, len); if (len < 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Split a multipart/XXX message body into component parts: result is * canonical parts in a STACK of bios */ static int multi_split(BIO *bio, const char *bound, STACK_OF(BIO) **ret) { char linebuf[MAX_SMLEN]; int len, blen; int eol = 0, next_eol = 0; BIO *bpart = NULL; STACK_OF(BIO) *parts; char state, part, first; blen = strlen(bound); part = 0; state = 0; first = 1; parts = sk_BIO_new_null(); *ret = parts; if (*ret == NULL) return 0; while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) { state = mime_bound_check(linebuf, len, bound, blen); if (state == 1) { first = 1; part++; } else if (state == 2) { if (!sk_BIO_push(parts, bpart)) { BIO_free(bpart); return 0; } return 1; } else if (part) { /* Strip CR+LF from linebuf */ next_eol = strip_eol(linebuf, &len, 0); if (first) { first = 0; if (bpart) if (!sk_BIO_push(parts, bpart)) { BIO_free(bpart); return 0; } bpart = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (bpart == NULL) return 0; BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bpart, 0); } else if (eol) BIO_write(bpart, "\r\n", 2); eol = next_eol; if (len) BIO_write(bpart, linebuf, len); } } BIO_free(bpart); return 0; } /* This is the big one: parse MIME header lines up to message body */ #define MIME_INVALID 0 #define MIME_START 1 #define MIME_TYPE 2 #define MIME_NAME 3 #define MIME_VALUE 4 #define MIME_QUOTE 5 #define MIME_COMMENT 6 static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio) { char *p, *q, c; char *ntmp; char linebuf[MAX_SMLEN]; MIME_HEADER *mhdr = NULL, *new_hdr = NULL; STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *headers; int len, state, save_state = 0; headers = sk_MIME_HEADER_new(mime_hdr_cmp); if (headers == NULL) return NULL; while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) { /* If whitespace at line start then continuation line */ if (mhdr && isspace((unsigned char)linebuf[0])) state = MIME_NAME; else state = MIME_START; ntmp = NULL; /* Go through all characters */ for (p = linebuf, q = linebuf; (c = *p) && (c != '\r') && (c != '\n'); p++) { /* * State machine to handle MIME headers if this looks horrible * that's because it *is* */ switch (state) { case MIME_START: if (c == ':') { state = MIME_TYPE; *p = 0; ntmp = strip_ends(q); q = p + 1; } break; case MIME_TYPE: if (c == ';') { mime_debug("Found End Value\n"); *p = 0; new_hdr = mime_hdr_new(ntmp, strip_ends(q)); if (new_hdr == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_MIME_HEADER_push(headers, new_hdr)) goto err; mhdr = new_hdr; new_hdr = NULL; ntmp = NULL; q = p + 1; state = MIME_NAME; } else if (c == '(') { save_state = state; state = MIME_COMMENT; } break; case MIME_COMMENT: if (c == ')') { state = save_state; } break; case MIME_NAME: if (c == '=') { state = MIME_VALUE; *p = 0; ntmp = strip_ends(q); q = p + 1; } break; case MIME_VALUE: if (c == ';') { state = MIME_NAME; *p = 0; mime_hdr_addparam(mhdr, ntmp, strip_ends(q)); ntmp = NULL; q = p + 1; } else if (c == '"') { mime_debug("Found Quote\n"); state = MIME_QUOTE; } else if (c == '(') { save_state = state; state = MIME_COMMENT; } break; case MIME_QUOTE: if (c == '"') { mime_debug("Found Match Quote\n"); state = MIME_VALUE; } break; } } if (state == MIME_TYPE) { new_hdr = mime_hdr_new(ntmp, strip_ends(q)); if (new_hdr == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_MIME_HEADER_push(headers, new_hdr)) goto err; mhdr = new_hdr; new_hdr = NULL; } else if (state == MIME_VALUE) mime_hdr_addparam(mhdr, ntmp, strip_ends(q)); if (p == linebuf) break; /* Blank line means end of headers */ } return headers; err: mime_hdr_free(new_hdr); sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free); return NULL; } static char *strip_ends(char *name) { return strip_end(strip_start(name)); } /* Strip a parameter of whitespace from start of param */ static char *strip_start(char *name) { char *p, c; /* Look for first non white space or quote */ for (p = name; (c = *p); p++) { if (c == '"') { /* Next char is start of string if non null */ if (p[1]) return p + 1; /* Else null string */ return NULL; } if (!isspace((unsigned char)c)) return p; } return NULL; } /* As above but strip from end of string : maybe should handle brackets? */ static char *strip_end(char *name) { char *p, c; if (!name) return NULL; /* Look for first non white space or quote */ for (p = name + strlen(name) - 1; p >= name; p--) { c = *p; if (c == '"') { if (p - 1 == name) return NULL; *p = 0; return name; } if (isspace((unsigned char)c)) *p = 0; else return name; } return NULL; } static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(const char *name, const char *value) { MIME_HEADER *mhdr = NULL; char *tmpname = NULL, *tmpval = NULL, *p; int c; if (name) { if ((tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) return NULL; for (p = tmpname; *p; p++) { c = (unsigned char)*p; if (isupper(c)) { c = tolower(c); *p = c; } } } if (value) { if ((tmpval = OPENSSL_strdup(value)) == NULL) goto err; for (p = tmpval; *p; p++) { c = (unsigned char)*p; if (isupper(c)) { c = tolower(c); *p = c; } } } mhdr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mhdr)); if (mhdr == NULL) goto err; mhdr->name = tmpname; mhdr->value = tmpval; if ((mhdr->params = sk_MIME_PARAM_new(mime_param_cmp)) == NULL) goto err; return mhdr; err: OPENSSL_free(tmpname); OPENSSL_free(tmpval); OPENSSL_free(mhdr); return NULL; } static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, const char *name, const char *value) { char *tmpname = NULL, *tmpval = NULL, *p; int c; MIME_PARAM *mparam = NULL; if (name) { tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (!tmpname) goto err; for (p = tmpname; *p; p++) { c = (unsigned char)*p; if (isupper(c)) { c = tolower(c); *p = c; } } } if (value) { tmpval = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (!tmpval) goto err; } /* Parameter values are case sensitive so leave as is */ mparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*mparam)); if (mparam == NULL) goto err; mparam->param_name = tmpname; mparam->param_value = tmpval; if (!sk_MIME_PARAM_push(mhdr->params, mparam)) goto err; return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(tmpname); OPENSSL_free(tmpval); OPENSSL_free(mparam); return 0; } static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER *const *a, const MIME_HEADER *const *b) { if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name) return ! !(*a)->name - ! !(*b)->name; return (strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name)); } static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM *const *a, const MIME_PARAM *const *b) { if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name) return ! !(*a)->param_name - ! !(*b)->param_name; return (strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name)); } /* Find a header with a given name (if possible) */ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_find(STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *hdrs, const char *name) { MIME_HEADER htmp; int idx; htmp.name = (char *)name; htmp.value = NULL; htmp.params = NULL; idx = sk_MIME_HEADER_find(hdrs, &htmp); if (idx < 0) return NULL; return sk_MIME_HEADER_value(hdrs, idx); } static MIME_PARAM *mime_param_find(MIME_HEADER *hdr, const char *name) { MIME_PARAM param; int idx; param.param_name = (char *)name; param.param_value = NULL; idx = sk_MIME_PARAM_find(hdr->params, ¶m); if (idx < 0) return NULL; return sk_MIME_PARAM_value(hdr->params, idx); } static void mime_hdr_free(MIME_HEADER *hdr) { if (hdr == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(hdr->name); OPENSSL_free(hdr->value); if (hdr->params) sk_MIME_PARAM_pop_free(hdr->params, mime_param_free); OPENSSL_free(hdr); } static void mime_param_free(MIME_PARAM *param) { OPENSSL_free(param->param_name); OPENSSL_free(param->param_value); OPENSSL_free(param); } /*- * Check for a multipart boundary. Returns: * 0 : no boundary * 1 : part boundary * 2 : final boundary */ static int mime_bound_check(char *line, int linelen, const char *bound, int blen) { if (linelen == -1) linelen = strlen(line); if (blen == -1) blen = strlen(bound); /* Quickly eliminate if line length too short */ if (blen + 2 > linelen) return 0; /* Check for part boundary */ if ((strncmp(line, "--", 2) == 0) && strncmp(line + 2, bound, blen) == 0) { if (strncmp(line + blen + 2, "--", 2) == 0) return 2; else return 1; } return 0; } static int strip_eol(char *linebuf, int *plen, int flags) { int len = *plen; char *p, c; int is_eol = 0; p = linebuf + len - 1; for (p = linebuf + len - 1; len > 0; len--, p--) { c = *p; if (c == '\n') is_eol = 1; else if (is_eol && flags & SMIME_ASCIICRLF && c < 33) continue; else if (c != '\r') break; } *plen = len; return is_eol; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c0000644000000000000000000002110313176625656016210 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include static STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) *stable = NULL; static void st_free(ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tbl); static int sk_table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *a, const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *b); /* * This is the global mask for the mbstring functions: this is use to mask * out certain types (such as BMPString and UTF8String) because certain * software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them. */ static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING; void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask) { global_mask = mask; } unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void) { return global_mask; } /*- * This function sets the default to various "flavours" of configuration. * based on an ASCII string. Currently this is: * MASK:XXXX : a numerical mask value. * nobmp : Don't use BMPStrings (just Printable, T61). * pkix : PKIX recommendation in RFC2459. * utf8only : only use UTF8Strings (RFC2459 recommendation for 2004). * default: the default value, Printable, T61, BMP. */ int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p) { unsigned long mask; char *end; if (strncmp(p, "MASK:", 5) == 0) { if (!p[5]) return 0; mask = strtoul(p + 5, &end, 0); if (*end) return 0; } else if (strcmp(p, "nombstr") == 0) mask = ~((unsigned long)(B_ASN1_BMPSTRING | B_ASN1_UTF8STRING)); else if (strcmp(p, "pkix") == 0) mask = ~((unsigned long)B_ASN1_T61STRING); else if (strcmp(p, "utf8only") == 0) mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING; else if (strcmp(p, "default") == 0) mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL; else return 0; ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(mask); return 1; } /* * The following function generates an ASN1_STRING based on limits in a * table. Frequently the types and length of an ASN1_STRING are restricted by * a corresponding OID. For example certificates and certificate requests. */ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, int inform, int nid) { ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tbl; ASN1_STRING *str = NULL; unsigned long mask; int ret; if (!out) out = &str; tbl = ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(nid); if (tbl) { mask = tbl->mask; if (!(tbl->flags & STABLE_NO_MASK)) mask &= global_mask; ret = ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(out, in, inlen, inform, mask, tbl->minsize, tbl->maxsize); } else ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(out, in, inlen, inform, DIRSTRING_TYPE & global_mask); if (ret <= 0) return NULL; return *out; } /* * Now the tables and helper functions for the string table: */ /* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC3280 */ #define ub_name 32768 #define ub_common_name 64 #define ub_locality_name 128 #define ub_state_name 128 #define ub_organization_name 64 #define ub_organization_unit_name 64 #define ub_title 64 #define ub_email_address 128 #define ub_serial_number 64 /* From RFC4524 */ #define ub_rfc822_mailbox 256 /* This table must be kept in NID order */ static const ASN1_STRING_TABLE tbl_standard[] = { {NID_commonName, 1, ub_common_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_countryName, 2, 2, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_localityName, 1, ub_locality_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_stateOrProvinceName, 1, ub_state_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_organizationName, 1, ub_organization_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_organizationalUnitName, 1, ub_organization_unit_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, 1, ub_email_address, B_ASN1_IA5STRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName, 1, -1, PKCS9STRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_pkcs9_challengePassword, 1, -1, PKCS9STRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress, 1, -1, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_givenName, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_surname, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_initials, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_serialNumber, 1, ub_serial_number, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_friendlyName, -1, -1, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_name, 1, ub_name, DIRSTRING_TYPE, 0}, {NID_dnQualifier, -1, -1, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_domainComponent, 1, -1, B_ASN1_IA5STRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_ms_csp_name, -1, -1, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_rfc822Mailbox, 1, ub_rfc822_mailbox, B_ASN1_IA5STRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_jurisdictionCountryName, 2, 2, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_INN, 1, 12, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_OGRN, 1, 13, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK}, {NID_SNILS, 1, 11, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, STABLE_NO_MASK} }; static int sk_table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *a, const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *const *b) { return (*a)->nid - (*b)->nid; } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(ASN1_STRING_TABLE, ASN1_STRING_TABLE, table); static int table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *a, const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *b) { return a->nid - b->nid; } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(ASN1_STRING_TABLE, ASN1_STRING_TABLE, table); ASN1_STRING_TABLE *ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(int nid) { int idx; ASN1_STRING_TABLE fnd; fnd.nid = nid; if (stable) { idx = sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_find(stable, &fnd); if (idx >= 0) return sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_value(stable, idx); } return OBJ_bsearch_table(&fnd, tbl_standard, OSSL_NELEM(tbl_standard)); } /* * Return a string table pointer which can be modified: either directly from * table or a copy of an internal value added to the table. */ static ASN1_STRING_TABLE *stable_get(int nid) { ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tmp, *rv; /* Always need a string table so allocate one if NULL */ if (stable == NULL) { stable = sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_new(sk_table_cmp); if (stable == NULL) return NULL; } tmp = ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(nid); if (tmp && tmp->flags & STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC) return tmp; rv = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rv)); if (rv == NULL) return NULL; if (!sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_push(stable, rv)) { OPENSSL_free(rv); return NULL; } if (tmp) { rv->nid = tmp->nid; rv->minsize = tmp->minsize; rv->maxsize = tmp->maxsize; rv->mask = tmp->mask; rv->flags = tmp->flags | STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC; } else { rv->nid = nid; rv->minsize = -1; rv->maxsize = -1; rv->flags = STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC; } return rv; } int ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(int nid, long minsize, long maxsize, unsigned long mask, unsigned long flags) { ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tmp; tmp = stable_get(nid); if (!tmp) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (minsize >= 0) tmp->minsize = minsize; if (maxsize >= 0) tmp->maxsize = maxsize; if (mask) tmp->mask = mask; if (flags) tmp->flags = STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC | flags; return 1; } void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void) { STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) *tmp; tmp = stable; if (!tmp) return; stable = NULL; sk_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_pop_free(tmp, st_free); } static void st_free(ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tbl) { if (tbl->flags & STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC) OPENSSL_free(tbl); } #ifdef STRING_TABLE_TEST main() { ASN1_STRING_TABLE *tmp; int i, last_nid = -1; for (tmp = tbl_standard, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tbl_standard); i++, tmp++) { if (tmp->nid < last_nid) { last_nid = 0; break; } last_nid = tmp->nid; } if (last_nid != 0) { printf("Table order OK\n"); exit(0); } for (tmp = tbl_standard, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tbl_standard); i++, tmp++) printf("Index %d, NID %d, Name=%s\n", i, tmp->nid, OBJ_nid2ln(tmp->nid)); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c0000644000000000000000000001460513176625656016061 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include #include static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb); #ifndef NO_OLD_ASN1 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void *ASN1_d2i_fp(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, FILE *in, void **x) { BIO *b; void *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (NULL); } BIO_set_fp(b, in, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = ASN1_d2i_bio(xnew, d2i, b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } # endif void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x) { BUF_MEM *b = NULL; const unsigned char *p; void *ret = NULL; int len; len = asn1_d2i_read_bio(in, &b); if (len < 0) goto err; p = (unsigned char *)b->data; ret = d2i(x, &p, len); err: BUF_MEM_free(b); return (ret); } #endif void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x) { BUF_MEM *b = NULL; const unsigned char *p; void *ret = NULL; int len; len = asn1_d2i_read_bio(in, &b); if (len < 0) goto err; p = (const unsigned char *)b->data; ret = ASN1_item_d2i(x, &p, len, it); err: BUF_MEM_free(b); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x) { BIO *b; char *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (NULL); } BIO_set_fp(b, in, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(it, b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif #define HEADER_SIZE 8 #define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024) static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb) { BUF_MEM *b; unsigned char *p; int i; size_t want = HEADER_SIZE; uint32_t eos = 0; size_t off = 0; size_t len = 0; const unsigned char *q; long slen; int inf, tag, xclass; b = BUF_MEM_new(); if (b == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } ERR_clear_error(); for (;;) { if (want >= (len - off)) { want -= (len - off); if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want); if ((i < 0) && ((len - off) == 0)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA); goto err; } if (i > 0) { if (len + i < len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); goto err; } len += i; } } /* else data already loaded */ p = (unsigned char *)&(b->data[off]); q = p; inf = ASN1_get_object(&q, &slen, &tag, &xclass, len - off); if (inf & 0x80) { unsigned long e; e = ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()); if (e != ASN1_R_TOO_LONG) goto err; else ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error */ } i = q - p; /* header length */ off += i; /* end of data */ if (inf & 1) { /* no data body so go round again */ if (eos == UINT32_MAX) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); goto err; } eos++; want = HEADER_SIZE; } else if (eos && (slen == 0) && (tag == V_ASN1_EOC)) { /* eos value, so go back and read another header */ eos--; if (eos == 0) break; else want = HEADER_SIZE; } else { /* suck in slen bytes of data */ want = slen; if (want > (len - off)) { size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE; want -= (len - off); if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ || len + want < len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); goto err; } while (want > 0) { /* * Read content in chunks of increasing size * so we can return an error for EOF without * having to allocate the entire content length * in one go. */ size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want; if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } want -= chunk; while (chunk > 0) { i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk); if (i <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA); goto err; } /* * This can't overflow because |len+want| didn't * overflow. */ len += i; chunk -= i; } if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2) chunk_max *= 2; } } if (off + slen < off) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); goto err; } off += slen; if (eos == 0) { break; } else want = HEADER_SIZE; } } if (off > INT_MAX) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); goto err; } *pb = b; return off; err: BUF_MEM_free(b); return -1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c0000644000000000000000000010726513176625656016203 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/numbers.h" #include "asn1_locl.h" static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len); static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf); static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth); static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen); static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass, char *inf, char *cst, const unsigned char **in, long len, int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); /* Table to convert tags to bit values, used for MSTRING type */ static const unsigned long tag2bit[32] = { /* tags 0 - 3 */ 0, 0, 0, B_ASN1_BIT_STRING, /* tags 4- 7 */ B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, /* tags 8-11 */ B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, /* tags 12-15 */ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, /* tags 16-19 */ B_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, /* tags 20-22 */ B_ASN1_T61STRING, B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING, B_ASN1_IA5STRING, /* tags 23-24 */ B_ASN1_UTCTIME, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, /* tags 25-27 */ B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING, B_ASN1_ISO64STRING, B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING, /* tags 28-31 */ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, }; unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag) { if ((tag < 0) || (tag > 30)) return 0; return tag2bit[tag]; } /* Macro to initialize and invalidate the cache */ #define asn1_tlc_clear(c) if (c) (c)->valid = 0 /* Version to avoid compiler warning about 'c' always non-NULL */ #define asn1_tlc_clear_nc(c) (c)->valid = 0 /* * Decode an ASN1 item, this currently behaves just like a standard 'd2i' * function. 'in' points to a buffer to read the data from, in future we * will have more advanced versions that can input data a piece at a time and * this will simply be a special case. */ ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_TLC c; ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL; if (!pval) pval = &ptmpval; asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c); if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) return *pval; return NULL; } int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int rv; rv = asn1_item_embed_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (rv <= 0) ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); return rv; } /* * Decode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging, if any. If 'opt' set and * tag mismatch return -1 to handle OPTIONAL */ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q; unsigned char oclass; char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt; long tmplen; int i; int otag; int ret = 0; ASN1_VALUE **pchptr; if (!pval) return 0; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; else asn1_cb = 0; switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) { /* * tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template * because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this * isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item * template in the template itself. */ if ((tag != -1) || opt) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE); goto err; } return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it->templates, opt, ctx); } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: p = *in; /* Just read in tag and class */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL, &p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Must be UNIVERSAL class */ if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL); goto err; } /* Check tag matches bit map */ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG); goto err; } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: /* Use new style d2i */ ef = it->funcs; return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; if (*pval) { /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { tt = it->templates + i; pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); asn1_template_free(pchptr, tt); asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); } } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */ p = *in; for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); /* * We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised. */ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx); /* If field not present, try the next one */ if (ret == -1) continue; /* If positive return, read OK, break loop */ if (ret > 0) break; /* * Must be an ASN1 parsing error. * Free up any partial choice value */ asn1_template_free(pchptr, tt); errtt = tt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */ if (i == it->tcount) { /* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */ if (opt) { /* Free and zero it */ ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); return -1; } ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE); goto err; } asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it); if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; *in = p; return 1; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: p = *in; tmplen = len; /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */ if (tag == -1) { tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } /* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst, &p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) { len = tmplen - (p - *in); seq_nolen = 1; } /* If indefinite we don't do a length check */ else seq_nolen = seq_eoc; if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); goto err; } if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; /* Free up and zero any ADB found */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 0); if (seqtt == NULL) continue; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); } } /* Get each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (seqtt == NULL) goto err; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); /* Have we ran out of data? */ if (!len) break; q = p; if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { if (!seq_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC); goto err; } len -= p - q; seq_eoc = 0; q = p; break; } /* * This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be * omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still * data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it * increases efficiency in some cases. */ if (i == (it->tcount - 1)) isopt = 0; else isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL); /* * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL */ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx); if (!ret) { errtt = seqtt; goto err; } else if (ret == -1) { /* * OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field. */ asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); continue; } /* Update length */ len -= p - q; } /* Check for EOC if expecting one */ if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } /* Check all data read */ if (!seq_nolen && len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* * If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we * may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL * and clear any that are. */ for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (seqtt == NULL) goto err; if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) { ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); } else { errtt = seqtt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING); goto err; } } /* Save encoding */ if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it)) goto auxerr; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; *in = p; return 1; default: return 0; } auxerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR); err: if (errtt) ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name, ", Type=", it->sname); else ERR_add_error_data(2, "Type=", it->sname); return 0; } /* * Templates are handled with two separate functions. One handles any * EXPLICIT tag and the other handles the rest. */ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long inlen, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int flags, aclass; int ret; long len; const unsigned char *p, *q; char exp_eoc; if (!val) return 0; flags = tt->flags; aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; p = *in; /* Check if EXPLICIT tag expected */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) { char cst; /* * Need to work out amount of data available to the inner content and * where it starts: so read in EXPLICIT header to get the info. */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &exp_eoc, &cst, &p, inlen, tt->tag, aclass, opt, ctx); q = p; if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); return 0; } /* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */ ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } /* We read the field in OK so update length */ len -= p - q; if (exp_eoc) { /* If NDEF we must have an EOC here */ if (!asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } } else { /* * Otherwise we must hit the EXPLICIT tag end or its an error */ if (len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } } } else return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx); *in = p; return 1; err: return 0; } static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int flags, aclass; int ret; ASN1_VALUE *tval; const unsigned char *p, *q; if (!val) return 0; flags = tt->flags; aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; p = *in; q = p; /* * If field is embedded then val needs fixing so it is a pointer to * a pointer to a field. */ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) { tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)val; val = &tval; } if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) { /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */ int sktag, skaclass; char sk_eoc; /* First work out expected inner tag value */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) { sktag = tt->tag; skaclass = aclass; } else { skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) sktag = V_ASN1_SET; else sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } /* Get the tag */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &sk_eoc, NULL, &p, len, sktag, skaclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (!*val) *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)OPENSSL_sk_new_null(); else { /* * We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present */ STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sktmp = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val; ASN1_VALUE *vtmp; while (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sktmp) > 0) { vtmp = sk_ASN1_VALUE_pop(sktmp); ASN1_item_ex_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item)); } } if (!*val) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Read as many items as we can */ while (len > 0) { ASN1_VALUE *skfield; q = p; /* See if EOC found */ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { if (!sk_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC); goto err; } len -= p - q; sk_eoc = 0; break; } skfield = NULL; if (!asn1_item_embed_d2i(&skfield, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); /* |skfield| may be partially allocated despite failure. */ ASN1_item_free(skfield, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item)); goto err; } len -= p - q; if (!sk_ASN1_VALUE_push((STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val, skfield)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_item_free(skfield, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item)); goto err; } } if (sk_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } } else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) { /* IMPLICIT tagging */ ret = asn1_item_embed_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; } else { /* Nothing special */ ret = asn1_item_embed_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; } *in = p; return 1; err: return 0; } static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long inlen, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int ret = 0, utype; long plen; char cst, inf, free_cont = 0; const unsigned char *p; BUF_MEM buf = { 0, NULL, 0, 0 }; const unsigned char *cont = NULL; long len; if (!pval) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL); return 0; /* Should never happen */ } if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) { utype = tag; tag = -1; } else utype = it->utype; if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) { /* If type is ANY need to figure out type from tag */ unsigned char oclass; if (tag >= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY); return 0; } if (opt) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY); return 0; } p = *in; ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &utype, &oclass, NULL, NULL, &p, inlen, -1, 0, 0, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) utype = V_ASN1_OTHER; } if (tag == -1) { tag = utype; aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } p = *in; /* Check header */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, &cst, &p, inlen, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; ret = 0; /* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */ if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) { /* * Clear context cache for type OTHER because the auto clear when we * have a exact match won't work */ if (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER) { asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); } /* SEQUENCE and SET must be constructed */ else if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); return 0; } cont = *in; /* If indefinite length constructed find the real end */ if (inf) { if (!asn1_find_end(&p, plen, inf)) goto err; len = p - cont; } else { len = p - cont + plen; p += plen; } } else if (cst) { if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN || utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER || utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE); return 0; } /* Free any returned 'buf' content */ free_cont = 1; /* * Should really check the internal tags are correct but some things * may get this wrong. The relevant specs say that constructed string * types should be OCTET STRINGs internally irrespective of the type. * So instead just check for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag. */ if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) { goto err; } len = buf.length; /* Append a final null to string */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } buf.data[len] = 0; cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data; } else { cont = p; len = plen; p += plen; } /* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */ /* asn1_ex_c2i may reuse allocated buffer, and so sets free_cont to 0 */ if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it)) goto err; *in = p; ret = 1; err: if (free_cont) OPENSSL_free(buf.data); return ret; } /* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */ static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL; ASN1_STRING *stmp; ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL; int ret = 0; const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf; ASN1_INTEGER **tint; pf = it->funcs; if (pf && pf->prim_c2i) return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it); /* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */ if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) { if (!*pval) { typ = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (typ == NULL) goto err; *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ; } else typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval; if (utype != typ->type) ASN1_TYPE_set(typ, utype, NULL); opval = pval; pval = &typ->value.asn1_value; } switch (utype) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: if (!c2i_ASN1_OBJECT((ASN1_OBJECT **)pval, &cont, len)) goto err; break; case V_ASN1_NULL: if (len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)1; break; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: if (len != 1) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } else { ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool; tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval; *tbool = *cont; } break; case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: if (!c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING **)pval, &cont, len)) goto err; break; case V_ASN1_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval; if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len)) goto err; /* Fixup type to match the expected form */ (*tint)->type = utype | ((*tint)->type & V_ASN1_NEG); break; case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: case V_ASN1_T61STRING: case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING: case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING: case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: case V_ASN1_OTHER: case V_ASN1_SET: case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: default: if (utype == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING && (len & 1)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } if (utype == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING && (len & 3)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */ if (!*pval) { stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype); if (stmp == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)stmp; } else { stmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval; stmp->type = utype; } /* If we've already allocated a buffer use it */ if (*free_cont) { OPENSSL_free(stmp->data); stmp->data = (unsigned char *)cont; /* UGLY CAST! RL */ stmp->length = len; *free_cont = 0; } else { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, cont, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_STRING_free(stmp); *pval = NULL; goto err; } } break; } /* If ASN1_ANY and NULL type fix up value */ if (typ && (utype == V_ASN1_NULL)) typ->value.ptr = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { ASN1_TYPE_free(typ); if (opval) *opval = NULL; } return ret; } /* * This function finds the end of an ASN1 structure when passed its maximum * length, whether it is indefinite length and a pointer to the content. This * is more efficient than calling asn1_collect because it does not recurse on * each indefinite length header. */ static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf) { uint32_t expected_eoc; long plen; const unsigned char *p = *in, *q; /* If not indefinite length constructed just add length */ if (inf == 0) { *in += len; return 1; } expected_eoc = 1; /* * Indefinite length constructed form. Find the end when enough EOCs are * found. If more indefinite length constructed headers are encountered * increment the expected eoc count otherwise just skip to the end of the * data. */ while (len > 0) { if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { expected_eoc--; if (expected_eoc == 0) break; len -= 2; continue; } q = p; /* Just read in a header: only care about the length */ if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, NULL, &p, len, -1, 0, 0, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } if (inf) { if (expected_eoc == UINT32_MAX) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } expected_eoc++; } else { p += plen; } len -= p - q; } if (expected_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); return 0; } *in = p; return 1; } /* * This function collects the asn1 data from a constructed string type into * a buffer. The values of 'in' and 'len' should refer to the contents of the * constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length. */ #ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST /* * This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string * types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no * recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples * exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough. */ # define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5 #endif static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth) { const unsigned char *p, *q; long plen; char cst, ininf; p = *in; inf &= 1; /* * If no buffer and not indefinite length constructed just pass over the * encoded data */ if (!buf && !inf) { *in += len; return 1; } while (len > 0) { q = p; /* Check for EOC */ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { /* * EOC is illegal outside indefinite length constructed form */ if (!inf) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC); return 0; } inf = 0; break; } if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &ininf, &cst, &p, len, tag, aclass, 0, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } /* If indefinite length constructed update max length */ if (cst) { if (depth >= ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING); return 0; } if (!asn1_collect(buf, &p, plen, ininf, tag, aclass, depth + 1)) return 0; } else if (plen && !collect_data(buf, &p, plen)) return 0; len -= p - q; } if (inf) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); return 0; } *in = p; return 1; } static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen) { int len; if (buf) { len = buf->length; if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, len + plen)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(buf->data + len, *p, plen); } *p += plen; return 1; } /* Check for ASN1 EOC and swallow it if found */ static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len) { const unsigned char *p; if (len < 2) return 0; p = *in; if (!p[0] && !p[1]) { *in += 2; return 1; } return 0; } /* * Check an ASN1 tag and length: a bit like ASN1_get_object but it sets the * length for indefinite length constructed form, we don't know the exact * length but we can set an upper bound to the amount of data available minus * the header length just read. */ static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass, char *inf, char *cst, const unsigned char **in, long len, int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int i; int ptag, pclass; long plen; const unsigned char *p, *q; p = *in; q = p; if (ctx && ctx->valid) { i = ctx->ret; plen = ctx->plen; pclass = ctx->pclass; ptag = ctx->ptag; p += ctx->hdrlen; } else { i = ASN1_get_object(&p, &plen, &ptag, &pclass, len); if (ctx) { ctx->ret = i; ctx->plen = plen; ctx->pclass = pclass; ctx->ptag = ptag; ctx->hdrlen = p - q; ctx->valid = 1; /* * If definite length, and no error, length + header can't exceed * total amount of data available. */ if (!(i & 0x81) && ((plen + ctx->hdrlen) > len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); return 0; } } } if (i & 0x80) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER); asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); return 0; } if (exptag >= 0) { if ((exptag != ptag) || (expclass != pclass)) { /* * If type is OPTIONAL, not an error: indicate missing type. */ if (opt) return -1; asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG); return 0; } /* * We have a tag and class match: assume we are going to do something * with it */ asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); } if (i & 1) plen = len - (p - q); if (inf) *inf = i & 1; if (cst) *cst = i & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; if (olen) *olen = plen; if (oclass) *oclass = pclass; if (otag) *otag = ptag; *in = p; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_moid.c0000644000000000000000000000500713176625656016203 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/objects.h" /* Simple ASN1 OID module: add all objects in a given section */ static int do_create(const char *value, const char *name); static int oid_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf) { int i; const char *oid_section; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp; CONF_VALUE *oval; oid_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md); if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, oid_section)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) { oval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i); if (!do_create(oval->value, oval->name)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT); return 0; } } return 1; } static void oid_module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *md) { } void ASN1_add_oid_module(void) { CONF_module_add("oid_section", oid_module_init, oid_module_finish); } /*- * Create an OID based on a name value pair. Accept two formats. * shortname = 1.2.3.4 * shortname = some long name, 1.2.3.4 */ static int do_create(const char *value, const char *name) { int nid; ASN1_OBJECT *oid; const char *ln, *ostr, *p; char *lntmp; p = strrchr(value, ','); if (!p) { ln = name; ostr = value; } else { ln = NULL; ostr = p + 1; if (!*ostr) return 0; while (isspace((unsigned char)*ostr)) ostr++; } nid = OBJ_create(ostr, name, ln); if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; if (p) { ln = value; while (isspace((unsigned char)*ln)) ln++; p--; while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) { if (p == ln) return 0; p--; } p++; lntmp = OPENSSL_malloc((p - ln) + 1); if (lntmp == NULL) return 0; memcpy(lntmp, ln, p - ln); lntmp[p - ln] = 0; oid = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); oid->ln = lntmp; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/i2d_pr.c0000644000000000000000000000177213176625656015576 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" int i2d_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp) { if (a->ameth && a->ameth->old_priv_encode) { return a->ameth->old_priv_encode(a, pp); } if (a->ameth && a->ameth->priv_encode) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(a); int ret = 0; if (p8 != NULL) { ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, pp); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); } return ret; } ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); return -1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/build.info0000644000000000000000000000146413176625656016225 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ a_object.c a_bitstr.c a_utctm.c a_gentm.c a_time.c a_int.c a_octet.c \ a_print.c a_type.c a_dup.c a_d2i_fp.c a_i2d_fp.c \ a_utf8.c a_sign.c a_digest.c a_verify.c a_mbstr.c a_strex.c \ x_algor.c x_val.c x_sig.c x_bignum.c \ x_long.c x_int64.c x_info.c x_spki.c nsseq.c \ d2i_pu.c d2i_pr.c i2d_pu.c i2d_pr.c\ t_pkey.c t_spki.c t_bitst.c \ tasn_new.c tasn_fre.c tasn_enc.c tasn_dec.c tasn_utl.c tasn_typ.c \ tasn_prn.c tasn_scn.c ameth_lib.c \ f_int.c f_string.c n_pkey.c \ x_pkey.c bio_asn1.c bio_ndef.c asn_mime.c \ asn1_gen.c asn1_par.c asn1_lib.c asn1_err.c a_strnid.c \ evp_asn1.c asn_pack.c p5_pbe.c p5_pbev2.c p5_scrypt.c p8_pkey.c \ asn_moid.c asn_mstbl.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/i2d_pu.c0000644000000000000000000000205713176625656015576 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include int i2d_PublicKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp) { switch (EVP_PKEY_id(a)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case EVP_PKEY_RSA: return i2d_RSAPublicKey(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(a), pp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case EVP_PKEY_DSA: return i2d_DSAPublicKey(EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(a), pp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: return i2o_ECPublicKey(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(a), pp); #endif default: ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); return -1; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c0000644000000000000000000001377213176625656016044 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include /* PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption structures */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBE2PARAM) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, keyfunc, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, encryption, X509_ALGOR) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBE2PARAM) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBE2PARAM) ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBKDF2PARAM) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, salt, ASN1_ANY), ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, iter, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, keylength, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, prf, X509_ALGOR) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBKDF2PARAM) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBKDF2PARAM) /* * Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithm: yes I know * this is horrible! Extended version to allow application supplied PRF NID * and IV. */ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, unsigned char *aiv, int prf_nid) { X509_ALGOR *scheme = NULL, *ret = NULL; int alg_nid, keylen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; alg_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher); if (alg_nid == NID_undef) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV, ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); goto err; } if ((pbe2 = PBE2PARAM_new()) == NULL) goto merr; /* Setup the AlgorithmIdentifier for the encryption scheme */ scheme = pbe2->encryption; scheme->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(alg_nid); if ((scheme->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto merr; /* Create random IV */ if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) { if (aiv) memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)); else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) <= 0) goto err; } ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto merr; /* Dummy cipherinit to just setup the IV, and PRF */ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, iv, 0)) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, scheme->parameter) < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV, ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS); goto err; } /* * If prf NID unspecified see if cipher has a preference. An error is OK * here: just means use default PRF. */ if ((prf_nid == -1) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID, 0, &prf_nid) <= 0) { ERR_clear_error(); prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA256; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; /* If its RC2 then we'd better setup the key length */ if (alg_nid == NID_rc2_cbc) keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); else keylen = -1; /* Setup keyfunc */ X509_ALGOR_free(pbe2->keyfunc); pbe2->keyfunc = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, salt, saltlen, prf_nid, keylen); if (!pbe2->keyfunc) goto merr; /* Now set up top level AlgorithmIdentifier */ if ((ret = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL) goto merr; ret->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pbes2); /* Encode PBE2PARAM into parameter */ if (!ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), pbe2, &ret->parameter)) goto merr; PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); pbe2 = NULL; return ret; merr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); /* Note 'scheme' is freed as part of pbe2 */ X509_ALGOR_free(ret); return NULL; } X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen) { return PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(cipher, iter, salt, saltlen, NULL, -1); } X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int prf_nid, int keylen) { X509_ALGOR *keyfunc = NULL; PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *osalt = NULL; if ((kdf = PBKDF2PARAM_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if ((osalt = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto merr; kdf->salt->value.octet_string = osalt; kdf->salt->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; if (saltlen == 0) saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN; if ((osalt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) goto merr; osalt->length = saltlen; if (salt) memcpy(osalt->data, salt, saltlen); else if (RAND_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) <= 0) goto merr; if (iter <= 0) iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(kdf->iter, iter)) goto merr; /* If have a key len set it up */ if (keylen > 0) { if ((kdf->keylength = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) goto merr; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(kdf->keylength, keylen)) goto merr; } /* prf can stay NULL if we are using hmacWithSHA1 */ if (prf_nid > 0 && prf_nid != NID_hmacWithSHA1) { kdf->prf = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (kdf->prf == NULL) goto merr; X509_ALGOR_set0(kdf->prf, OBJ_nid2obj(prf_nid), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL); } /* Finally setup the keyfunc structure */ keyfunc = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (keyfunc == NULL) goto merr; keyfunc->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_pbkdf2); /* Encode PBKDF2PARAM into parameter of pbe2 */ if (!ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM), kdf, &keyfunc->parameter)) goto merr; PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); return keyfunc; merr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); X509_ALGOR_free(keyfunc); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c0000644000000000000000000003160413176625656016120 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH #define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128 #endif static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed, int indent); static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump); static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed, int indent) { static const char fmt[] = "%-18s"; char str[128]; const char *p; if (constructed & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) p = "cons: "; else p = "prim: "; if (BIO_write(bp, p, 6) < 6) goto err; BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128); p = str; if ((xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE) == V_ASN1_PRIVATE) BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "priv [ %d ] ", tag); else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) == V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "cont [ %d ]", tag); else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_APPLICATION) == V_ASN1_APPLICATION) BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "appl [ %d ]", tag); else if (tag > 30) BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "", tag); else p = ASN1_tag2str(tag); if (BIO_printf(bp, fmt, p) <= 0) goto err; return (1); err: return (0); } int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent) { return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, 0)); } int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent, int dump) { return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, dump)); } static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump) { const unsigned char *p, *ep, *tot, *op, *opp; long len; int tag, xclass, ret = 0; int nl, hl, j, r; ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; /* ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmp=NULL; */ int dump_indent, dump_cont = 0; if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) { BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n"); return 0; } dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */ p = *pp; tot = p + length; while (length > 0) { op = p; j = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length); if (j & 0x80) { if (BIO_write(bp, "Error in encoding\n", 18) <= 0) goto end; ret = 0; goto end; } hl = (p - op); length -= hl; /* * if j == 0x21 it is a constructed indefinite length object */ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%5ld:", (long)offset + (long)(op - *pp)) <= 0) goto end; if (j != (V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=%4ld ", depth, (long)hl, len) <= 0) goto end; } else { if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=inf ", depth, (long)hl) <= 0) goto end; } if (!asn1_print_info(bp, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0)) goto end; if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) { const unsigned char *sp = p; ep = p + len; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto end; if (len > length) { BIO_printf(bp, "length is greater than %ld\n", length); ret = 0; goto end; } if ((j == 0x21) && (len == 0)) { for (;;) { r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)(tot - p), offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1, indent, dump); if (r == 0) { ret = 0; goto end; } if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot)) { len = p - sp; break; } } } else { long tmp = len; while (p < ep) { sp = p; r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, tmp, offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1, indent, dump); if (r == 0) { ret = 0; goto end; } tmp -= p - sp; } } } else if (xclass != 0) { p += len; if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto end; } else { nl = 0; if ((tag == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) || (tag == V_ASN1_T61STRING) || (tag == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) || (tag == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) || (tag == V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) || (tag == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) || (tag == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) || (tag == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) { if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0) goto end; if ((len > 0) && BIO_write(bp, (const char *)p, (int)len) != (int)len) goto end; } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT) { opp = op; if (d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(&o, &opp, len + hl) != NULL) { if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0) goto end; i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, o); } else { if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD OBJECT") <= 0) goto end; dump_cont = 1; } } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) { if (len != 1) { if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD BOOLEAN") <= 0) goto end; dump_cont = 1; } if (len > 0) BIO_printf(bp, ":%u", p[0]); } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) { /* do the BMP thang */ } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { int i, printable = 1; opp = op; os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &opp, len + hl); if (os != NULL && os->length > 0) { opp = os->data; /* * testing whether the octet string is printable */ for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) { if (((opp[i] < ' ') && (opp[i] != '\n') && (opp[i] != '\r') && (opp[i] != '\t')) || (opp[i] > '~')) { printable = 0; break; } } if (printable) /* printable string */ { if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0) goto end; if (BIO_write(bp, (const char *)opp, os->length) <= 0) goto end; } else if (!dump) /* * not printable => print octet string as hex dump */ { if (BIO_write(bp, "[HEX DUMP]:", 11) <= 0) goto end; for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", opp[i]) <= 0) goto end; } } else /* print the normal dump */ { if (!nl) { if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto end; } if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (const char *)opp, ((dump == -1 || dump > os-> length) ? os->length : dump), dump_indent) <= 0) goto end; nl = 1; } } ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); os = NULL; } else if (tag == V_ASN1_INTEGER) { ASN1_INTEGER *bs; int i; opp = op; bs = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &opp, len + hl); if (bs != NULL) { if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0) goto end; if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0) goto end; for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0) goto end; } if (bs->length == 0) { if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0) goto end; } } else { if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD INTEGER") <= 0) goto end; dump_cont = 1; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(bs); } else if (tag == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) { ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs; int i; opp = op; bs = d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(NULL, &opp, len + hl); if (bs != NULL) { if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0) goto end; if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED) if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0) goto end; for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0) goto end; } if (bs->length == 0) { if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0) goto end; } } else { if (BIO_puts(bp, ":BAD ENUMERATED") <= 0) goto end; dump_cont = 1; } ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs); } else if (len > 0 && dump) { if (!nl) { if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto end; } if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (const char *)p, ((dump == -1 || dump > len) ? len : dump), dump_indent) <= 0) goto end; nl = 1; } if (dump_cont) { int i; const unsigned char *tmp = op + hl; if (BIO_puts(bp, ":[") <= 0) goto end; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", tmp[i]) <= 0) goto end; } if (BIO_puts(bp, "]") <= 0) goto end; } if (!nl) { if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) goto end; } p += len; if ((tag == V_ASN1_EOC) && (xclass == 0)) { ret = 2; /* End of sequence */ goto end; } } length -= len; } ret = 1; end: ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); *pp = p; return (ret); } const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag) { static const char *const tag2str[] = { /* 0-4 */ "EOC", "BOOLEAN", "INTEGER", "BIT STRING", "OCTET STRING", /* 5-9 */ "NULL", "OBJECT", "OBJECT DESCRIPTOR", "EXTERNAL", "REAL", /* 10-13 */ "ENUMERATED", "", "UTF8STRING", "", /* 15-17 */ "", "", "SEQUENCE", "SET", /* 18-20 */ "NUMERICSTRING", "PRINTABLESTRING", "T61STRING", /* 21-24 */ "VIDEOTEXSTRING", "IA5STRING", "UTCTIME", "GENERALIZEDTIME", /* 25-27 */ "GRAPHICSTRING", "VISIBLESTRING", "GENERALSTRING", /* 28-30 */ "UNIVERSALSTRING", "", "BMPSTRING" }; if ((tag == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || (tag == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED)) tag &= ~0x100; if (tag < 0 || tag > 30) return "(unknown)"; return tag2str[tag]; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c0000644000000000000000000000435013176625656016055 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #ifndef NO_OLD_ASN1 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d, FILE *out, void *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, out, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d, b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } # endif int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x) { char *b; unsigned char *p; int i, j = 0, n, ret = 1; n = i2d(x, NULL); b = OPENSSL_malloc(n); if (b == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } p = (unsigned char *)b; i2d(x, &p); for (;;) { i = BIO_write(out, &(b[j]), n); if (i == n) break; if (i <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } j += i; n -= i; } OPENSSL_free(b); return (ret); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int ASN1_item_i2d_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *out, void *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, out, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = ASN1_item_i2d_bio(it, b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int ASN1_item_i2d_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *out, void *x) { unsigned char *b = NULL; int i, j = 0, n, ret = 1; n = ASN1_item_i2d(x, &b, it); if (b == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } for (;;) { i = BIO_write(out, &(b[j]), n); if (i == n) break; if (i <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } j += i; n -= i; } OPENSSL_free(b); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c0000644000000000000000000001157713176625656016227 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); const EVP_MD *type; unsigned char *p, *buf_in = NULL; int ret = -1, i, inl; if (ctx == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } i = OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm); type = EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i)); if (type == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT); goto err; } inl = i2d(data, NULL); buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl); if (buf_in == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = buf_in; i2d(data, &p); ret = EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL) && EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf_in, inl); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, (unsigned int)inl); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } ret = -1; if (EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)signature->data, (unsigned int)signature->length, pkey) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret = 0; goto err; } ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (ret); } #endif int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned char *buf_in = NULL; int ret = -1, inl; int mdnid, pknid; if (!pkey) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return -1; } if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT); return -1; } ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (mdnid == NID_undef) { if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); goto err; } ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(ctx, it, asn, a, signature, pkey); /* * Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we exit * straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying verification * routine handles all verification. */ if (ret != 2) goto err; ret = -1; } else { const EVP_MD *type; type = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid); if (type == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } /* Check public key OID matches public key type */ if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret = 0; goto err; } } inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it); if (buf_in == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ret = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, buf_in, inl); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf_in, (unsigned int)inl); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } ret = -1; if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, signature->data, (size_t)signature->length) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret = 0; goto err; } ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/p5_scrypt.c0000644000000000000000000002000713176625656016337 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT /* PKCS#5 scrypt password based encryption structures */ typedef struct { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt; ASN1_INTEGER *costParameter; ASN1_INTEGER *blockSize; ASN1_INTEGER *parallelizationParameter; ASN1_INTEGER *keyLength; } SCRYPT_PARAMS; ASN1_SEQUENCE(SCRYPT_PARAMS) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, costParameter, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, blockSize, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(SCRYPT_PARAMS, parallelizationParameter, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(SCRYPT_PARAMS, keyLength, ASN1_INTEGER), } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SCRYPT_PARAMS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(SCRYPT_PARAMS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(SCRYPT_PARAMS) static X509_ALGOR *pkcs5_scrypt_set(const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, size_t keylen, uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p); /* * Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithm using scrypt */ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, unsigned char *aiv, uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p) { X509_ALGOR *scheme = NULL, *ret = NULL; int alg_nid; size_t keylen = 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; if (!cipher) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if (EVP_PBE_scrypt(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, N, r, p, 0, NULL, 0) == 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT, ASN1_R_INVALID_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS); goto err; } alg_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher); if (alg_nid == NID_undef) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT, ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER); goto err; } pbe2 = PBE2PARAM_new(); if (pbe2 == NULL) goto merr; /* Setup the AlgorithmIdentifier for the encryption scheme */ scheme = pbe2->encryption; scheme->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(alg_nid); scheme->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (scheme->parameter == NULL) goto merr; /* Create random IV */ if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) { if (aiv) memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)); else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) < 0) goto err; } ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto merr; /* Dummy cipherinit to just setup the IV */ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, iv, 0) == 0) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, scheme->parameter) < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT, ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS); goto err; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; /* If its RC2 then we'd better setup the key length */ if (alg_nid == NID_rc2_cbc) keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); /* Setup keyfunc */ X509_ALGOR_free(pbe2->keyfunc); pbe2->keyfunc = pkcs5_scrypt_set(salt, saltlen, keylen, N, r, p); if (pbe2->keyfunc == NULL) goto merr; /* Now set up top level AlgorithmIdentifier */ ret = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto merr; ret->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pbes2); /* Encode PBE2PARAM into parameter */ if (ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), pbe2, &ret->parameter) == NULL) goto merr; PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); pbe2 = NULL; return ret; merr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); X509_ALGOR_free(ret); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return NULL; } static X509_ALGOR *pkcs5_scrypt_set(const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, size_t keylen, uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p) { X509_ALGOR *keyfunc = NULL; SCRYPT_PARAMS *sparam = SCRYPT_PARAMS_new(); if (sparam == NULL) goto merr; if (!saltlen) saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN; /* This will either copy salt or grow the buffer */ if (ASN1_STRING_set(sparam->salt, salt, saltlen) == 0) goto merr; if (salt == NULL && RAND_bytes(sparam->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0) goto err; if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(sparam->costParameter, N) == 0) goto merr; if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(sparam->blockSize, r) == 0) goto merr; if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(sparam->parallelizationParameter, p) == 0) goto merr; /* If have a key len set it up */ if (keylen > 0) { sparam->keyLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (sparam->keyLength == NULL) goto merr; if (ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(sparam->keyLength, keylen) == 0) goto merr; } /* Finally setup the keyfunc structure */ keyfunc = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (keyfunc == NULL) goto merr; keyfunc->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_scrypt); /* Encode SCRYPT_PARAMS into parameter of pbe2 */ if (ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(SCRYPT_PARAMS), sparam, &keyfunc->parameter) == NULL) goto merr; SCRYPT_PARAMS_free(sparam); return keyfunc; merr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_SCRYPT_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: SCRYPT_PARAMS_free(sparam); X509_ALGOR_free(keyfunc); return NULL; } int PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) { unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; uint64_t p, r, N; size_t saltlen; size_t keylen = 0; int rv = 0; SCRYPT_PARAMS *sparam = NULL; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); goto err; } /* Decode parameter */ sparam = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(SCRYPT_PARAMS), param); if (sparam == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Now check the parameters of sparam */ if (sparam->keyLength) { uint64_t spkeylen; if ((ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&spkeylen, sparam->keyLength) == 0) || (spkeylen != keylen)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH); goto err; } } /* Check all parameters fit in uint64_t and are acceptable to scrypt */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&N, sparam->costParameter) == 0 || ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&r, sparam->blockSize) == 0 || ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&p, sparam->parallelizationParameter) == 0 || EVP_PBE_scrypt(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, N, r, p, 0, NULL, 0) == 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_ILLEGAL_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS); goto err; } /* it seems that its all OK */ salt = sparam->salt->data; saltlen = sparam->salt->length; if (EVP_PBE_scrypt(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, N, r, p, 0, key, keylen) == 0) goto err; rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de); err: if (keylen) OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); SCRYPT_PARAMS_free(sparam); return rv; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c0000644000000000000000000000505213176625656016045 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_ALGOR) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_ALGOR, algorithm, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(X509_ALGOR, parameter, ASN1_ANY) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_ALGOR) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_ALGORS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, algorithms, X509_ALGOR) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_ALGORS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGOR) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_ALGOR) int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval) { if (!alg) return 0; if (ptype != V_ASN1_UNDEF) { if (alg->parameter == NULL) alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (alg->parameter == NULL) return 0; } if (alg) { ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm); alg->algorithm = aobj; } if (ptype == 0) return 1; if (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) { ASN1_TYPE_free(alg->parameter); alg->parameter = NULL; } else ASN1_TYPE_set(alg->parameter, ptype, pval); return 1; } void X509_ALGOR_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *algor) { if (paobj) *paobj = algor->algorithm; if (pptype) { if (algor->parameter == NULL) { *pptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF; return; } else *pptype = algor->parameter->type; if (ppval) *ppval = algor->parameter->value.ptr; } } /* Set up an X509_ALGOR DigestAlgorithmIdentifier from an EVP_MD */ void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md) { int param_type; if (md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT) param_type = V_ASN1_UNDEF; else param_type = V_ASN1_NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md)), param_type, NULL); } int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b) { int rv; rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm); if (rv) return rv; if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter) return 0; return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_int64.c0000644000000000000000000001611613176625656015710 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/asn1t.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include #include "asn1_locl.h" /* * Custom primitive types for handling int32_t, int64_t, uint32_t, uint64_t. * This converts between an ASN1_INTEGER and those types directly. * This is preferred to using the LONG / ZLONG primitives. */ /* * We abuse the ASN1_ITEM fields |size| as a flags field */ #define INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT (1<<0) #define INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED (1<<1) static int uint64_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(uint64_t)); if (*pval == NULL) return 0; return 1; } static void uint64_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { OPENSSL_free(*pval); *pval = NULL; } static void uint64_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { **(uint64_t **)pval = 0; } static int uint64_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { uint64_t utmp; int neg = 0; /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */ char *cp = (char *)*pval; /* use memcpy, because we may not be uint64_t aligned */ memcpy(&utmp, cp, sizeof(utmp)); if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT) == INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT && utmp == 0) return -1; if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED && (int64_t)utmp < 0) { /* i2c_uint64_int() assumes positive values */ utmp = 0 - utmp; neg = 1; } return i2c_uint64_int(cont, utmp, neg); } static int uint64_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { uint64_t utmp = 0; char *cp; int neg = 0; if (*pval == NULL && !uint64_new(pval, it)) return 0; cp = (char *)*pval; if (!c2i_uint64_int(&utmp, &neg, &cont, len)) return 0; if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == 0 && neg) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE); return 0; } if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED && !neg && utmp > INT64_MAX) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if (neg) /* c2i_uint64_int() returns positive values */ utmp = 0 - utmp; memcpy(cp, &utmp, sizeof(utmp)); return 1; } static int uint64_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) return BIO_printf(out, "%"BIO_PRI64"d\n", **(int64_t **)pval); return BIO_printf(out, "%"BIO_PRI64"u\n", **(uint64_t **)pval); } /* 32-bit variants */ static int uint32_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(uint32_t)); if (*pval == NULL) return 0; return 1; } static void uint32_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { OPENSSL_free(*pval); *pval = NULL; } static void uint32_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { **(uint32_t **)pval = 0; } static int uint32_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { uint32_t utmp; int neg = 0; /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */ char *cp = (char *)*pval; /* use memcpy, because we may not be uint32_t aligned */ memcpy(&utmp, cp, sizeof(utmp)); if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT) == INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT && utmp == 0) return -1; if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED && (int32_t)utmp < 0) { /* i2c_uint64_int() assumes positive values */ utmp = 0 - utmp; neg = 1; } return i2c_uint64_int(cont, (uint64_t)utmp, neg); } /* * Absolute value of INT32_MIN: we can't just use -INT32_MIN as it produces * overflow warnings. */ #define ABS_INT32_MIN ((uint32_t)INT32_MAX + 1) static int uint32_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { uint64_t utmp = 0; uint32_t utmp2 = 0; char *cp; int neg = 0; if (*pval == NULL && !uint64_new(pval, it)) return 0; cp = (char *)*pval; if (!c2i_uint64_int(&utmp, &neg, &cont, len)) return 0; if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == 0 && neg) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE); return 0; } if (neg) { if (utmp > ABS_INT32_MIN) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I, ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } utmp = 0 - utmp; } else { if (((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) != 0 && utmp > INT32_MAX) || ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == 0 && utmp > UINT32_MAX)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } } utmp2 = (uint32_t)utmp; memcpy(cp, &utmp2, sizeof(utmp2)); return 1; } static int uint32_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if ((it->size & INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) == INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED) return BIO_printf(out, "%d\n", **(int32_t **)pval); return BIO_printf(out, "%u\n", **(uint32_t **)pval); } /* Define the primitives themselves */ static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS uint32_pf = { NULL, 0, uint32_new, uint32_free, uint32_clear, uint32_c2i, uint32_i2c, uint32_print }; static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS uint64_pf = { NULL, 0, uint64_new, uint64_free, uint64_clear, uint64_c2i, uint64_i2c, uint64_print }; ASN1_ITEM_start(INT32) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf, INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "INT32" ASN1_ITEM_end(INT32) ASN1_ITEM_start(UINT32) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf, 0, "UINT32" ASN1_ITEM_end(UINT32) ASN1_ITEM_start(INT64) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf, INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "INT64" ASN1_ITEM_end(INT64) ASN1_ITEM_start(UINT64) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf, 0, "UINT64" ASN1_ITEM_end(UINT64) ASN1_ITEM_start(ZINT32) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf, INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT|INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "ZINT32" ASN1_ITEM_end(ZINT32) ASN1_ITEM_start(ZUINT32) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint32_pf, INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT, "ZUINT32" ASN1_ITEM_end(ZUINT32) ASN1_ITEM_start(ZINT64) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf, INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT|INTxx_FLAG_SIGNED, "ZINT64" ASN1_ITEM_end(ZINT64) ASN1_ITEM_start(ZUINT64) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &uint64_pf, INTxx_FLAG_ZERO_DEFAULT, "ZUINT64" ASN1_ITEM_end(ZUINT64) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_utl.c0000644000000000000000000001457313176625656016253 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" /* Utility functions for manipulating fields and offsets */ /* Add 'offset' to 'addr' */ #define offset2ptr(addr, offset) (void *)(((char *) addr) + offset) /* * Given an ASN1_ITEM CHOICE type return the selector value */ int asn1_get_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { int *sel = offset2ptr(*pval, it->utype); return *sel; } /* * Given an ASN1_ITEM CHOICE type set the selector value, return old value. */ int asn1_set_choice_selector(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int value, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { int *sel, ret; sel = offset2ptr(*pval, it->utype); ret = *sel; *sel = value; return ret; } /* * Do atomic reference counting. The value 'op' decides what to do. * If it is +1 then the count is incremented. * If |op| is 0, lock is initialised and count is set to 1. * If |op| is -1, count is decremented and the return value is the current * reference count or 0 if no reference count is active. * It returns -1 on initialisation error. * Used by ASN1_SEQUENCE construct of X509, X509_REQ, X509_CRL objects */ int asn1_do_lock(ASN1_VALUE **pval, int op, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { const ASN1_AUX *aux; int *lck, ret; CRYPTO_RWLOCK **lock; if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE) && (it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE)) return 0; aux = it->funcs; if (!aux || !(aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_REFCOUNT)) return 0; lck = offset2ptr(*pval, aux->ref_offset); lock = offset2ptr(*pval, aux->ref_lock); if (op == 0) { *lck = 1; *lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (*lock == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } return 1; } if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(lck, op, &ret, *lock) < 0) return -1; /* failed */ #ifdef REF_PRINT fprintf(stderr, "%p:%4d:%s\n", it, *lck, it->sname); #endif REF_ASSERT_ISNT(ret < 0); if (ret == 0) { CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(*lock); *lock = NULL; } return ret; } static ASN1_ENCODING *asn1_get_enc_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { const ASN1_AUX *aux; if (!pval || !*pval) return NULL; aux = it->funcs; if (!aux || !(aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_ENCODING)) return NULL; return offset2ptr(*pval, aux->enc_offset); } void asn1_enc_init(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_ENCODING *enc; enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it); if (enc) { enc->enc = NULL; enc->len = 0; enc->modified = 1; } } void asn1_enc_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_ENCODING *enc; enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it); if (enc) { OPENSSL_free(enc->enc); enc->enc = NULL; enc->len = 0; enc->modified = 1; } } int asn1_enc_save(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_ENCODING *enc; enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it); if (!enc) return 1; OPENSSL_free(enc->enc); enc->enc = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen); if (enc->enc == NULL) return 0; memcpy(enc->enc, in, inlen); enc->len = inlen; enc->modified = 0; return 1; } int asn1_enc_restore(int *len, unsigned char **out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_ENCODING *enc; enc = asn1_get_enc_ptr(pval, it); if (!enc || enc->modified) return 0; if (out) { memcpy(*out, enc->enc, enc->len); *out += enc->len; } if (len) *len = enc->len; return 1; } /* Given an ASN1_TEMPLATE get a pointer to a field */ ASN1_VALUE **asn1_get_field_ptr(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) { ASN1_VALUE **pvaltmp; pvaltmp = offset2ptr(*pval, tt->offset); /* * NOTE for BOOLEAN types the field is just a plain int so we can't * return int **, so settle for (int *). */ return pvaltmp; } /* * Handle ANY DEFINED BY template, find the selector, look up the relevant * ASN1_TEMPLATE in the table and return it. */ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *asn1_do_adb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int nullerr) { const ASN1_ADB *adb; const ASN1_ADB_TABLE *atbl; long selector; ASN1_VALUE **sfld; int i; if (!(tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK)) return tt; /* Else ANY DEFINED BY ... get the table */ adb = ASN1_ADB_ptr(tt->item); /* Get the selector field */ sfld = offset2ptr(*pval, adb->offset); /* Check if NULL */ if (*sfld == NULL) { if (!adb->null_tt) goto err; return adb->null_tt; } /* * Convert type to a long: NB: don't check for NID_undef here because it * might be a legitimate value in the table */ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID) selector = OBJ_obj2nid((ASN1_OBJECT *)*sfld); else selector = ASN1_INTEGER_get((ASN1_INTEGER *)*sfld); /* Let application callback translate value */ if (adb->adb_cb != NULL && adb->adb_cb(&selector) == 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE); return NULL; } /* * Try to find matching entry in table Maybe should check application * types first to allow application override? Might also be useful to * have a flag which indicates table is sorted and we can do a binary * search. For now stick to a linear search. */ for (atbl = adb->tbl, i = 0; i < adb->tblcount; i++, atbl++) if (atbl->value == selector) return &atbl->tt; /* FIXME: need to search application table too */ /* No match, return default type */ if (!adb->default_tt) goto err; return adb->default_tt; err: /* FIXME: should log the value or OID of unsupported type */ if (nullerr) ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000000562113176625656016130 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len) { ASN1_STRING *os; if ((os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) return (0); if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, data, len)) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); return 0; } ASN1_TYPE_set(a, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, os); return (1); } /* int max_len: for returned value */ int ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int max_len) { int ret, num; const unsigned char *p; if ((a->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) || (a->value.octet_string == NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING, ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG); return (-1); } p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(a->value.octet_string); ret = ASN1_STRING_length(a->value.octet_string); if (ret < max_len) num = ret; else num = max_len; memcpy(data, p, num); return (ret); } typedef struct { long num; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct; } asn1_int_oct; ASN1_SEQUENCE(asn1_int_oct) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(asn1_int_oct, num, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(asn1_int_oct, oct, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(asn1_int_oct) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(asn1_int_oct) int ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num, unsigned char *data, int len) { asn1_int_oct atmp; ASN1_OCTET_STRING oct; atmp.num = num; atmp.oct = &oct; oct.data = data; oct.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; oct.length = len; oct.flags = 0; if (ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(asn1_int_oct), &atmp, &a)) return 1; return 0; } /* * we return the actual length... */ /* int max_len: for returned value */ int ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num, unsigned char *data, int max_len) { asn1_int_oct *atmp = NULL; int ret = -1, n; if ((a->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (a->value.sequence == NULL)) { goto err; } atmp = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(asn1_int_oct), a); if (atmp == NULL) goto err; if (num != NULL) *num = atmp->num; ret = ASN1_STRING_length(atmp->oct); if (max_len > ret) n = ret; else n = max_len; if (data != NULL) memcpy(data, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(atmp->oct), n); if (ret == -1) { err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING, ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG); } M_ASN1_free_of(atmp, asn1_int_oct); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c0000644000000000000000000001220413176625656016154 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include /* Experimental NDEF ASN1 BIO support routines */ /* * The usage is quite simple, initialize an ASN1 structure, get a BIO from it * then any data written through the BIO will end up translated to * appropriate format on the fly. The data is streamed out and does *not* * need to be all held in memory at once. When the BIO is flushed the output * is finalized and any signatures etc written out. The BIO is a 'proper' * BIO and can handle non blocking I/O correctly. The usage is simple. The * implementation is *not*... */ /* BIO support data stored in the ASN1 BIO ex_arg */ typedef struct ndef_aux_st { /* ASN1 structure this BIO refers to */ ASN1_VALUE *val; const ASN1_ITEM *it; /* Top of the BIO chain */ BIO *ndef_bio; /* Output BIO */ BIO *out; /* Boundary where content is inserted */ unsigned char **boundary; /* DER buffer start */ unsigned char *derbuf; } NDEF_SUPPORT; static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg); static int ndef_prefix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg); static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg); static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg); BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux = NULL; BIO *asn_bio = NULL; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg; if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED); return NULL; } ndef_aux = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ndef_aux)); asn_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_asn1()); if (ndef_aux == NULL || asn_bio == NULL) goto err; /* ASN1 bio needs to be next to output BIO */ out = BIO_push(asn_bio, out); if (out == NULL) goto err; BIO_asn1_set_prefix(asn_bio, ndef_prefix, ndef_prefix_free); BIO_asn1_set_suffix(asn_bio, ndef_suffix, ndef_suffix_free); /* * Now let callback prepends any digest, cipher etc BIOs ASN1 structure * needs. */ sarg.out = out; sarg.ndef_bio = NULL; sarg.boundary = NULL; if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0) goto err; ndef_aux->val = val; ndef_aux->it = it; ndef_aux->ndef_bio = sarg.ndef_bio; ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary; ndef_aux->out = out; BIO_ctrl(asn_bio, BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG, 0, ndef_aux); return sarg.ndef_bio; err: BIO_free(asn_bio); OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux); return NULL; } static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) { NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux; unsigned char *p; int derlen; if (!parg) return 0; ndef_aux = *(NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg; derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it); p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen); if (p == NULL) return 0; ndef_aux->derbuf = p; *pbuf = p; derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it); if (!*ndef_aux->boundary) return 0; *plen = *ndef_aux->boundary - *pbuf; return 1; } static int ndef_prefix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) { NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux; if (!parg) return 0; ndef_aux = *(NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg; OPENSSL_free(ndef_aux->derbuf); ndef_aux->derbuf = NULL; *pbuf = NULL; *plen = 0; return 1; } static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) { NDEF_SUPPORT **pndef_aux = (NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg; if (!ndef_prefix_free(b, pbuf, plen, parg)) return 0; OPENSSL_free(*pndef_aux); *pndef_aux = NULL; return 1; } static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg) { NDEF_SUPPORT *ndef_aux; unsigned char *p; int derlen; const ASN1_AUX *aux; ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg; if (!parg) return 0; ndef_aux = *(NDEF_SUPPORT **)parg; aux = ndef_aux->it->funcs; /* Finalize structures */ sarg.ndef_bio = ndef_aux->ndef_bio; sarg.out = ndef_aux->out; sarg.boundary = ndef_aux->boundary; if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST, &ndef_aux->val, ndef_aux->it, &sarg) <= 0) return 0; derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it); p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen); if (p == NULL) return 0; ndef_aux->derbuf = p; *pbuf = p; derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it); if (!*ndef_aux->boundary) return 0; *pbuf = *ndef_aux->boundary; *plen = derlen - (*ndef_aux->boundary - ndef_aux->derbuf); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_sig.c0000644000000000000000000000207213176625656015522 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_SIG) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_SIG, algor, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_SIG, digest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_SIG) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_SIG) void X509_SIG_get0(const X509_SIG *sig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest) { if (palg) *palg = sig->algor; if (pdigest) *pdigest = sig->digest; } void X509_SIG_getm(X509_SIG *sig, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest) { if (palg) *palg = sig->algor; if (pdigest) *pdigest = sig->digest; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c0000644000000000000000000000567713176625656016270 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* Declarations for string types */ #define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(sname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(sname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(sname, sname, sname) \ sname *sname##_new(void) \ { \ return ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_##sname); \ } \ void sname##_free(sname *x) \ { \ ASN1_STRING_free(x); \ } IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_OCTET_STRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_INTEGER) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_ENUMERATED) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BIT_STRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTF8STRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_STRING_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BMPSTRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_NULL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_NULL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_OBJECT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_ANY) /* Just swallow an ASN1_SEQUENCE in an ASN1_STRING */ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_SEQUENCE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE) /* Multistring types */ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(ASN1_PRINTABLE, B_ASN1_PRINTABLE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, ASN1_PRINTABLE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(DISPLAYTEXT, B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DISPLAYTEXT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(DIRECTORYSTRING, B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DIRECTORYSTRING) /* Three separate BOOLEAN type: normal, DEFAULT TRUE and DEFAULT FALSE */ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_BOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, -1) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_TBOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 1) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_FBOOLEAN, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 0) /* Special, OCTET STRING with indefinite length constructed support */ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_ANY) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(ASN1_SET_ANY) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, ASN1_SET_ANY, ASN1_ANY) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(ASN1_SET_ANY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c0000644000000000000000000001253113176625656016213 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" /* Free up an ASN1 structure */ void ASN1_item_free(ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { asn1_item_embed_free(&val, it, 0); } void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { asn1_item_embed_free(pval, it, 0); } void asn1_item_embed_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; int i; if (!pval) return; if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) && !*pval) return; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; else asn1_cb = 0; switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) asn1_template_free(pval, it->templates); else asn1_primitive_free(pval, it, embed); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: asn1_primitive_free(pval, it, embed); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb) { i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE, pval, it, NULL); if (i == 2) return; } i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { ASN1_VALUE **pchval; tt = it->templates + i; pchval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); asn1_template_free(pchval, tt); } if (asn1_cb) asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_POST, pval, it, NULL); if (embed == 0) { OPENSSL_free(*pval); *pval = NULL; } break; case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: ef = it->funcs; if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_free) ef->asn1_ex_free(pval, it); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: if (asn1_do_lock(pval, -1, it) != 0) /* if error or ref-counter > 0 */ return; if (asn1_cb) { i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE, pval, it, NULL); if (i == 2) return; } asn1_enc_free(pval, it); /* * If we free up as normal we will invalidate any ANY DEFINED BY * field and we won't be able to determine the type of the field it * defines. So free up in reverse order. */ tt = it->templates + it->tcount; for (i = 0; i < it->tcount; i++) { ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; tt--; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 0); if (!seqtt) continue; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); asn1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); } if (asn1_cb) asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_FREE_POST, pval, it, NULL); if (embed == 0) { OPENSSL_free(*pval); *pval = NULL; } break; } } void asn1_template_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) { int embed = tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED; ASN1_VALUE *tval; if (embed) { tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)pval; pval = &tval; } if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) { STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) { ASN1_VALUE *vtmp = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i); asn1_item_embed_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), embed); } sk_ASN1_VALUE_free(sk); *pval = NULL; } else { asn1_item_embed_free(pval, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), embed); } } void asn1_primitive_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed) { int utype; /* Special case: if 'it' is a primitive with a free_func, use that. */ if (it) { const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs; if (embed) { if (pf && pf->prim_clear) { pf->prim_clear(pval, it); return; } } else if (pf && pf->prim_free) { pf->prim_free(pval, it); return; } } /* Special case: if 'it' is NULL, free contents of ASN1_TYPE */ if (!it) { ASN1_TYPE *typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval; utype = typ->type; pval = &typ->value.asn1_value; if (!*pval) return; } else if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) { utype = -1; if (!*pval) return; } else { utype = it->utype; if ((utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) && !*pval) return; } switch (utype) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: ASN1_OBJECT_free((ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval); break; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: if (it) *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = it->size; else *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = -1; return; case V_ASN1_NULL: break; case V_ASN1_ANY: asn1_primitive_free(pval, NULL, 0); OPENSSL_free(*pval); break; default: asn1_string_embed_free((ASN1_STRING *)*pval, embed); break; } *pval = NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_octet.c0000644000000000000000000000145513176625656016033 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x) { return ASN1_STRING_dup(x); } int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b) { return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a, b); } int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *x, const unsigned char *d, int len) { return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c0000644000000000000000000000502713176625656015566 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include /* PKCS#5 password based encryption structure */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBEPARAM) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PBEPARAM, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(PBEPARAM, iter, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBEPARAM) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBEPARAM) /* Set an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 PBE algorithm */ int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen) { PBEPARAM *pbe = NULL; ASN1_STRING *pbe_str = NULL; unsigned char *sstr = NULL; pbe = PBEPARAM_new(); if (pbe == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (iter <= 0) iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pbe->iter, iter)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!saltlen) saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN; sstr = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen); if (sstr == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (salt) memcpy(sstr, salt, saltlen); else if (RAND_bytes(sstr, saltlen) <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(pbe->salt, sstr, saltlen); sstr = NULL; if (!ASN1_item_pack(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), &pbe_str)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } PBEPARAM_free(pbe); pbe = NULL; if (X509_ALGOR_set0(algor, OBJ_nid2obj(alg), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbe_str)) return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(sstr); PBEPARAM_free(pbe); ASN1_STRING_free(pbe_str); return 0; } /* Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 PBE algorithm */ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe_set(int alg, int iter, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen) { X509_ALGOR *ret; ret = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(ret, alg, iter, salt, saltlen)) return ret; X509_ALGOR_free(ret); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_int.c0000644000000000000000000004107713176625656015513 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x) { return ASN1_STRING_dup(x); } int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y) { int neg, ret; /* Compare signs */ neg = x->type & V_ASN1_NEG; if (neg != (y->type & V_ASN1_NEG)) { if (neg) return -1; else return 1; } ret = ASN1_STRING_cmp(x, y); if (neg) return -ret; else return ret; } /*- * This converts a big endian buffer and sign into its content encoding. * This is used for INTEGER and ENUMERATED types. * The internal representation is an ASN1_STRING whose data is a big endian * representation of the value, ignoring the sign. The sign is determined by * the type: if type & V_ASN1_NEG is true it is negative, otherwise positive. * * Positive integers are no problem: they are almost the same as the DER * encoding, except if the first byte is >= 0x80 we need to add a zero pad. * * Negative integers are a bit trickier... * The DER representation of negative integers is in 2s complement form. * The internal form is converted by complementing each octet and finally * adding one to the result. This can be done less messily with a little trick. * If the internal form has trailing zeroes then they will become FF by the * complement and 0 by the add one (due to carry) so just copy as many trailing * zeros to the destination as there are in the source. The carry will add one * to the last none zero octet: so complement this octet and add one and finally * complement any left over until you get to the start of the string. * * Padding is a little trickier too. If the first bytes is > 0x80 then we pad * with 0xff. However if the first byte is 0x80 and one of the following bytes * is non-zero we pad with 0xff. The reason for this distinction is that 0x80 * followed by optional zeros isn't padded. */ /* * If |pad| is zero, the operation is effectively reduced to memcpy, * and if |pad| is 0xff, then it performs two's complement, ~dst + 1. * Note that in latter case sequence of zeros yields itself, and so * does 0x80 followed by any number of zeros. These properties are * used elsewhere below... */ static void twos_complement(unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src, size_t len, unsigned char pad) { unsigned int carry = pad & 1; /* Begin at the end of the encoding */ dst += len; src += len; /* two's complement value: ~value + 1 */ while (len-- != 0) { *(--dst) = (unsigned char)(carry += *(--src) ^ pad); carry >>= 8; } } static size_t i2c_ibuf(const unsigned char *b, size_t blen, int neg, unsigned char **pp) { unsigned int pad = 0; size_t ret, i; unsigned char *p, pb = 0; if (b != NULL && blen) { ret = blen; i = b[0]; if (!neg && (i > 127)) { pad = 1; pb = 0; } else if (neg) { pb = 0xFF; if (i > 128) { pad = 1; } else if (i == 128) { /* * Special case [of minimal negative for given length]: * if any other bytes non zero we pad, otherwise we don't. */ for (pad = 0, i = 1; i < blen; i++) pad |= b[i]; pb = pad != 0 ? 0xffU : 0; pad = pb & 1; } } ret += pad; } else { ret = 1; blen = 0; /* reduce '(b == NULL || blen == 0)' to '(blen == 0)' */ } if (pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL) return ret; /* * This magically handles all corner cases, such as '(b == NULL || * blen == 0)', non-negative value, "negative" zero, 0x80 followed * by any number of zeros... */ *p = pb; p += pad; /* yes, p[0] can be written twice, but it's little * price to pay for eliminated branches */ twos_complement(p, b, blen, pb); *pp += ret; return ret; } /* * convert content octets into a big endian buffer. Returns the length * of buffer or 0 on error: for malformed INTEGER. If output buffer is * NULL just return length. */ static size_t c2i_ibuf(unsigned char *b, int *pneg, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen) { int neg, pad; /* Zero content length is illegal */ if (plen == 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_ZERO_CONTENT); return 0; } neg = p[0] & 0x80; if (pneg) *pneg = neg; /* Handle common case where length is 1 octet separately */ if (plen == 1) { if (b != NULL) { if (neg) b[0] = (p[0] ^ 0xFF) + 1; else b[0] = p[0]; } return 1; } pad = 0; if (p[0] == 0) { pad = 1; } else if (p[0] == 0xFF) { size_t i; /* * Special case [of "one less minimal negative" for given length]: * if any other bytes non zero it was padded, otherwise not. */ for (pad = 0, i = 1; i < plen; i++) pad |= p[i]; pad = pad != 0 ? 1 : 0; } /* reject illegal padding: first two octets MSB can't match */ if (pad && (neg == (p[1] & 0x80))) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING); return 0; } /* skip over pad */ p += pad; plen -= pad; if (b != NULL) twos_complement(b, p, plen, neg ? 0xffU : 0); return plen; } int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp) { return i2c_ibuf(a->data, a->length, a->type & V_ASN1_NEG, pp); } /* Convert big endian buffer into uint64_t, return 0 on error */ static int asn1_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const unsigned char *b, size_t blen) { size_t i; uint64_t r; if (blen > sizeof(*pr)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_UINT64, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if (b == NULL) return 0; for (r = 0, i = 0; i < blen; i++) { r <<= 8; r |= b[i]; } *pr = r; return 1; } /* * Write uint64_t to big endian buffer and return offset to first * written octet. In other words it returns offset in range from 0 * to 7, with 0 denoting 8 written octets and 7 - one. */ static size_t asn1_put_uint64(unsigned char b[sizeof(uint64_t)], uint64_t r) { size_t off = sizeof(uint64_t); do { b[--off] = (unsigned char)r; } while (r >>= 8); return off; } /* * Absolute value of INT64_MIN: we can't just use -INT64_MIN as gcc produces * overflow warnings. */ #define ABS_INT64_MIN ((uint64_t)INT64_MAX + (-(INT64_MIN + INT64_MAX))) /* signed version of asn1_get_uint64 */ static int asn1_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const unsigned char *b, size_t blen, int neg) { uint64_t r; if (asn1_get_uint64(&r, b, blen) == 0) return 0; if (neg) { if (r <= INT64_MAX) { /* Most significant bit is guaranteed to be clear, negation * is guaranteed to be meaningful in platform-neutral sense. */ *pr = -(int64_t)r; } else if (r == ABS_INT64_MIN) { /* This never happens if INT64_MAX == ABS_INT64_MIN, e.g. * on ones'-complement system. */ *pr = (int64_t)(0 - r); } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } } else { if (r <= INT64_MAX) { *pr = (int64_t)r; } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } } return 1; } /* Convert ASN1 INTEGER content octets to ASN1_INTEGER structure */ ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { ASN1_INTEGER *ret = NULL; size_t r; int neg; r = c2i_ibuf(NULL, NULL, *pp, len); if (r == 0) return NULL; if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) { ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; } else ret = *a; if (ASN1_STRING_set(ret, NULL, r) == 0) goto err; c2i_ibuf(ret->data, &neg, *pp, len); if (neg) ret->type |= V_ASN1_NEG; *pp += len; if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; return ret; err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)) ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret); return NULL; } static int asn1_string_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_STRING *a, int itype) { if (a == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if ((a->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != itype) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE); return 0; } return asn1_get_int64(pr, a->data, a->length, a->type & V_ASN1_NEG); } static int asn1_string_set_int64(ASN1_STRING *a, int64_t r, int itype) { unsigned char tbuf[sizeof(r)]; size_t off; a->type = itype; if (r < 0) { /* Most obvious '-r' triggers undefined behaviour for most * common INT64_MIN. Even though below '0 - (uint64_t)r' can * appear two's-complement centric, it does produce correct/ * expected result even on one's-complement. This is because * cast to unsigned has to change bit pattern... */ off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, 0 - (uint64_t)r); a->type |= V_ASN1_NEG; } else { off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, r); a->type &= ~V_ASN1_NEG; } return ASN1_STRING_set(a, tbuf + off, sizeof(tbuf) - off); } static int asn1_string_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const ASN1_STRING *a, int itype) { if (a == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if ((a->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != itype) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64, ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE); return 0; } if (a->type & V_ASN1_NEG) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE); return 0; } return asn1_get_uint64(pr, a->data, a->length); } static int asn1_string_set_uint64(ASN1_STRING *a, uint64_t r, int itype) { unsigned char tbuf[sizeof(r)]; size_t off; a->type = itype; off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, r); return ASN1_STRING_set(a, tbuf + off, sizeof(tbuf) - off); } /* * This is a version of d2i_ASN1_INTEGER that ignores the sign bit of ASN1 * integers: some broken software can encode a positive INTEGER with its MSB * set as negative (it doesn't add a padding zero). */ ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { ASN1_INTEGER *ret = NULL; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *s; long len; int inf, tag, xclass; int i; if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) { if ((ret = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; } else ret = (*a); p = *pp; inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length); if (inf & 0x80) { i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER; goto err; } if (tag != V_ASN1_INTEGER) { i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER; goto err; } /* * We must OPENSSL_malloc stuff, even for 0 bytes otherwise it signifies * a missing NULL parameter. */ s = OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1); if (s == NULL) { i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; if (len) { if ((*p == 0) && (len != 1)) { p++; len--; } memcpy(s, p, (int)len); p += len; } OPENSSL_free(ret->data); ret->data = s; ret->length = (int)len; if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; *pp = p; return (ret); err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER, i); if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)) ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret); return (NULL); } static ASN1_STRING *bn_to_asn1_string(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_STRING *ai, int atype) { ASN1_INTEGER *ret; int len; if (ai == NULL) { ret = ASN1_STRING_type_new(atype); } else { ret = ai; ret->type = atype; } if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn)) ret->type |= V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER; len = BN_num_bytes(bn); if (len == 0) len = 1; if (ASN1_STRING_set(ret, NULL, len) == 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Correct zero case */ if (BN_is_zero(bn)) ret->data[0] = 0; else len = BN_bn2bin(bn, ret->data); ret->length = len; return ret; err: if (ret != ai) ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret); return (NULL); } static BIGNUM *asn1_string_to_bn(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn, int itype) { BIGNUM *ret; if ((ai->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != itype) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN, ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE); return NULL; } ret = BN_bin2bn(ai->data, ai->length, bn); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN, ASN1_R_BN_LIB); return NULL; } if (ai->type & V_ASN1_NEG) BN_set_negative(ret, 1); return ret; } int ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a) { return asn1_string_get_int64(pr, a, V_ASN1_INTEGER); } int ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, int64_t r) { return asn1_string_set_int64(a, r, V_ASN1_INTEGER); } int ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a) { return asn1_string_get_uint64(pr, a, V_ASN1_INTEGER); } int ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, uint64_t r) { return asn1_string_set_uint64(a, r, V_ASN1_INTEGER); } int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v) { return ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(a, v); } long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a) { int i; int64_t r; if (a == NULL) return 0; i = ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&r, a); if (i == 0) return -1; if (r > LONG_MAX || r < LONG_MIN) return -1; return (long)r; } ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai) { return bn_to_asn1_string(bn, ai, V_ASN1_INTEGER); } BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn) { return asn1_string_to_bn(ai, bn, V_ASN1_INTEGER); } int ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a) { return asn1_string_get_int64(pr, a, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED); } int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, int64_t r) { return asn1_string_set_int64(a, r, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED); } int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v) { return ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(a, v); } long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a) { int i; int64_t r; if (a == NULL) return 0; if ((a->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG) != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) return -1; if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long)) return 0xffffffffL; i = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(&r, a); if (i == 0) return -1; if (r > LONG_MAX || r < LONG_MIN) return -1; return (long)r; } ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai) { return bn_to_asn1_string(bn, ai, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED); } BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn) { return asn1_string_to_bn(ai, bn, V_ASN1_ENUMERATED); } /* Internal functions used by x_int64.c */ int c2i_uint64_int(uint64_t *ret, int *neg, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { unsigned char buf[sizeof(uint64_t)]; size_t buflen; buflen = c2i_ibuf(NULL, NULL, *pp, len); if (buflen == 0) return 0; if (buflen > sizeof(uint64_t)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_UINT64_INT, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } (void)c2i_ibuf(buf, neg, *pp, len); return asn1_get_uint64(ret, buf, buflen); } int i2c_uint64_int(unsigned char *p, uint64_t r, int neg) { unsigned char buf[sizeof(uint64_t)]; size_t off; off = asn1_put_uint64(buf, r); return i2c_ibuf(buf + off, sizeof(buf) - off, neg, &p); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c0000644000000000000000000000751313176625656016226 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include /* * Custom primitive type for BIGNUM handling. This reads in an ASN1_INTEGER * as a BIGNUM directly. Currently it ignores the sign which isn't a problem * since all BIGNUMs used are non negative and anything that looks negative * is normally due to an encoding error. */ #define BN_SENSITIVE 1 static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int bn_secure_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int bn_secure_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int bn_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = { NULL, 0, bn_new, bn_free, 0, bn_c2i, bn_i2c, bn_print }; static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS cbignum_pf = { NULL, 0, bn_secure_new, bn_free, 0, bn_secure_c2i, bn_i2c, bn_print }; ASN1_ITEM_start(BIGNUM) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, 0, "BIGNUM" ASN1_ITEM_end(BIGNUM) ASN1_ITEM_start(CBIGNUM) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &cbignum_pf, BN_SENSITIVE, "CBIGNUM" ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM) static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new(); if (*pval != NULL) return 1; else return 0; } static int bn_secure_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_secure_new(); if (*pval != NULL) return 1; else return 0; } static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { if (!*pval) return; if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE) BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval); else BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval); *pval = NULL; } static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { BIGNUM *bn; int pad; if (!*pval) return -1; bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */ if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7) pad = 0; else pad = 1; if (cont) { if (pad) *cont++ = 0; BN_bn2bin(bn, cont); } return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn); } static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { BIGNUM *bn; if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it)) return 0; bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) { bn_free(pval, it); return 0; } return 1; } static int bn_secure_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { if (!*pval) bn_secure_new(pval, it); return bn_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it); } static int bn_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (!BN_print(out, *(BIGNUM **)pval)) return 0; if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/f_int.c0000644000000000000000000001061613176625656015513 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, const ASN1_INTEGER *a) { int i, n = 0; static const char *h = "0123456789ABCDEF"; char buf[2]; if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->type & V_ASN1_NEG) { if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) != 1) goto err; n = 1; } if (a->length == 0) { if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) != 2) goto err; n += 2; } else { for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++) { if ((i != 0) && (i % 35 == 0)) { if (BIO_write(bp, "\\\n", 2) != 2) goto err; n += 2; } buf[0] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i] >> 4) & 0x0f]; buf[1] = h[((unsigned char)a->data[i]) & 0x0f]; if (BIO_write(bp, buf, 2) != 2) goto err; n += 2; } } return (n); err: return (-1); } int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *bs, char *buf, int size) { int i, j, k, m, n, again, bufsize; unsigned char *s = NULL, *sp; unsigned char *bufp; int num = 0, slen = 0, first = 1; bs->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size); for (;;) { if (bufsize < 1) goto err; i = bufsize; if (buf[i - 1] == '\n') buf[--i] = '\0'; if (i == 0) goto err; if (buf[i - 1] == '\r') buf[--i] = '\0'; if (i == 0) goto err; again = (buf[i - 1] == '\\'); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if (!(((buf[j] >= '0') && (buf[j] <= '9')) || ((buf[j] >= 'a') && (buf[j] <= 'f')) || ((buf[j] >= 'A') && (buf[j] <= 'F')))) #else /* * This #ifdef is not strictly necessary, since the characters * A...F a...f 0...9 are contiguous (yes, even in EBCDIC - but * not the whole alphabet). Nevertheless, isxdigit() is faster. */ if (!isxdigit(buf[j])) #endif { i = j; break; } } buf[i] = '\0'; /* * We have now cleared all the crap off the end of the line */ if (i < 2) goto err; bufp = (unsigned char *)buf; if (first) { first = 0; if ((bufp[0] == '0') && (bufp[1] == '0')) { bufp += 2; i -= 2; } } k = 0; i -= again; if (i % 2 != 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS); OPENSSL_free(s); return 0; } i /= 2; if (num + i > slen) { sp = OPENSSL_clear_realloc(s, slen, num + i * 2); if (sp == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(s); return 0; } s = sp; slen = num + i * 2; } for (j = 0; j < i; j++, k += 2) { for (n = 0; n < 2; n++) { m = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(bufp[k + n]); if (m < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS); goto err; } s[num + j] <<= 4; s[num + j] |= m; } } num += i; if (again) bufsize = BIO_gets(bp, buf, size); else break; } bs->length = num; bs->data = s; return 1; err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE); OPENSSL_free(s); return 0; } int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a) { return i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, a); } int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs, char *buf, int size) { int rv = a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, bs, buf, size); if (rv == 1) bs->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER | (bs->type & V_ASN1_NEG); return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c0000644000000000000000000002161113176625656016227 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" static int asn1_item_embed_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed); static int asn1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed); static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int asn1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt); static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt); static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_VALUE *ret = NULL; if (ASN1_item_ex_new(&ret, it) > 0) return ret; return NULL; } /* Allocate an ASN1 structure */ int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { return asn1_item_embed_new(pval, it, 0); } int asn1_item_embed_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; int i; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; else asn1_cb = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(it->sname ? it->sname : "asn1_item_embed_new"); #endif switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: ef = it->funcs; if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_new) { if (!ef->asn1_ex_new(pval, it)) goto memerr; } break; case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) { if (!asn1_template_new(pval, it->templates)) goto memerr; } else if (!asn1_primitive_new(pval, it, embed)) goto memerr; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: if (!asn1_primitive_new(pval, it, embed)) goto memerr; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb) { i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL); if (!i) goto auxerr; if (i == 2) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(); #endif return 1; } } if (embed) { memset(*pval, 0, it->size); } else { *pval = OPENSSL_zalloc(it->size); if (*pval == NULL) goto memerr; } asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr2; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: if (asn1_cb) { i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL); if (!i) goto auxerr; if (i == 2) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(); #endif return 1; } } if (embed) { memset(*pval, 0, it->size); } else { *pval = OPENSSL_zalloc(it->size); if (*pval == NULL) goto memerr; } /* 0 : init. lock */ if (asn1_do_lock(pval, 0, it) < 0) { if (!embed) { OPENSSL_free(*pval); *pval = NULL; } goto memerr; } asn1_enc_init(pval, it); for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); if (!asn1_template_new(pseqval, tt)) goto memerr2; } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_POST, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr2; break; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(); #endif return 1; memerr2: asn1_item_embed_free(pval, it, embed); memerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(); #endif return 0; auxerr2: asn1_item_embed_free(pval, it, embed); auxerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(); #endif return 0; } static void asn1_item_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: ef = it->funcs; if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_clear) ef->asn1_ex_clear(pval, it); else *pval = NULL; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) asn1_template_clear(pval, it->templates); else asn1_primitive_clear(pval, it); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: asn1_primitive_clear(pval, it); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: *pval = NULL; break; } } static int asn1_template_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) { const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item); int embed = tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED; ASN1_VALUE *tval; int ret; if (embed) { tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)pval; pval = &tval; } if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) { asn1_template_clear(pval, tt); return 1; } /* If ANY DEFINED BY nothing to do */ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) { *pval = NULL; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(tt->field_name ? tt->field_name : "asn1_template_new"); #endif /* If SET OF or SEQUENCE OF, its a STACK */ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) { STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *skval; skval = sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null(); if (!skval) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; goto done; } *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)skval; ret = 1; goto done; } /* Otherwise pass it back to the item routine */ ret = asn1_item_embed_new(pval, it, embed); done: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(); #endif return ret; } static void asn1_template_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) { /* If ADB or STACK just NULL the field */ if (tt->flags & (ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK | ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK)) *pval = NULL; else asn1_item_clear(pval, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item)); } /* * NB: could probably combine most of the real XXX_new() behaviour and junk * all the old functions. */ static int asn1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed) { ASN1_TYPE *typ; ASN1_STRING *str; int utype; if (!it) return 0; if (it->funcs) { const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs; if (embed) { if (pf->prim_clear) { pf->prim_clear(pval, it); return 1; } } else if (pf->prim_new) { return pf->prim_new(pval, it); } } if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) utype = -1; else utype = it->utype; switch (utype) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef); return 1; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = it->size; return 1; case V_ASN1_NULL: *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)1; return 1; case V_ASN1_ANY: typ = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*typ)); if (typ == NULL) return 0; typ->value.ptr = NULL; typ->type = -1; *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ; break; default: if (embed) { str = *(ASN1_STRING **)pval; memset(str, 0, sizeof(*str)); str->type = utype; str->flags = ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED; } else { str = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype); *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)str; } if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING && str) str->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING; break; } if (*pval) return 1; return 0; } static void asn1_primitive_clear(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { int utype; if (it && it->funcs) { const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs; if (pf->prim_clear) pf->prim_clear(pval, it); else *pval = NULL; return; } if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)) utype = -1; else utype = it->utype; if (utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) *(ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval = it->size; else *pval = NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c0000644000000000000000000000711513176625656015573 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { EVP_PKEY *ret; const unsigned char *p = *pp; if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) { if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return (NULL); } } else { ret = *a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(ret->engine); ret->engine = NULL; #endif } if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode || !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) { if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) { EVP_PKEY *tmp; PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL; p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length); if (!p8) goto err; tmp = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; EVP_PKEY_free(ret); ret = tmp; } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } *pp = p; if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; return (ret); err: if (a == NULL || *a != ret) EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return (NULL); } /* * This works like d2i_PrivateKey() except it automatically works out the * type */ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *inkey; const unsigned char *p; int keytype; p = *pp; /* * Dirty trick: read in the ASN1 data into a STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE): by * analyzing it we can determine the passed structure: this assumes the * input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE. */ inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length); p = *pp; /* * Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we * can just count the elements. */ if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 6) keytype = EVP_PKEY_DSA; else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 4) keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC; else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not * traditional format */ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length); EVP_PKEY *ret; sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free); if (!p8) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); return NULL; } ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; *pp = p; if (a) { *a = ret; } return ret; } else keytype = EVP_PKEY_RSA; sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free); return d2i_PrivateKey(keytype, a, pp, length); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mstbl.c0000644000000000000000000000672013176625656016377 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include /* Multi string module: add table entries from a given section */ static int do_tcreate(const char *value, const char *name); static int stbl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf) { int i; const char *stbl_section; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp; CONF_VALUE *mval; stbl_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md); if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, stbl_section)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) { mval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i); if (!do_tcreate(mval->value, mval->name)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT, ASN1_R_INVALID_VALUE); return 0; } } return 1; } static void stbl_module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *md) { ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(); } void ASN1_add_stable_module(void) { CONF_module_add("stbl_section", stbl_module_init, stbl_module_finish); } /* * Create an table entry based on a name value pair. format is oid_name = * n1:v1, n2:v2,... where name is "min", "max", "mask" or "flags". */ static int do_tcreate(const char *value, const char *name) { char *eptr; int nid, i, rv = 0; long tbl_min = -1, tbl_max = -1; unsigned long tbl_mask = 0, tbl_flags = 0; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *lst = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf = NULL; nid = OBJ_sn2nid(name); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_ln2nid(name); if (nid == NID_undef) goto err; lst = X509V3_parse_list(value); if (!lst) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(lst); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(lst, i); if (strcmp(cnf->name, "min") == 0) { tbl_min = strtoul(cnf->value, &eptr, 0); if (*eptr) goto err; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "max") == 0) { tbl_max = strtoul(cnf->value, &eptr, 0); if (*eptr) goto err; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "mask") == 0) { if (!ASN1_str2mask(cnf->value, &tbl_mask) || !tbl_mask) goto err; } else if (strcmp(cnf->name, "flags") == 0) { if (strcmp(cnf->value, "nomask") == 0) tbl_flags = STABLE_NO_MASK; else if (strcmp(cnf->value, "none") == 0) tbl_flags = STABLE_FLAGS_CLEAR; else goto err; } else goto err; } rv = 1; err: if (rv == 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE, ASN1_R_INVALID_STRING_TABLE_VALUE); if (cnf) ERR_add_error_data(4, "field=", cnf->name, ", value=", cnf->value); else ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", name, ", value=", value); } else { rv = ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(nid, tbl_min, tbl_max, tbl_mask, tbl_flags); if (!rv) ASN1err(ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); } sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(lst, X509V3_conf_free); return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_spki.c0000644000000000000000000000211113176625656015700 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This module was send to me my Pat Richards who wrote it. * It is under my Copyright with his permission */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include ASN1_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_SPKAC) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKAC, pubkey, X509_PUBKEY), ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKAC, challenge, ASN1_IA5STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_SPKAC) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKAC) ASN1_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_SPKI) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKI, spkac, NETSCAPE_SPKAC), ASN1_EMBED(NETSCAPE_SPKI, sig_algor, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_SPKI, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_SPKI) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKI) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/t_bitst.c0000644000000000000000000000307113176625656016061 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include int ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print(BIO *out, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl, int indent) { BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam; char first = 1; BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); for (bnam = tbl; bnam->lname; bnam++) { if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(bs, bnam->bitnum)) { if (!first) BIO_puts(out, ", "); BIO_puts(out, bnam->lname); first = 0; } } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc(ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, const char *name, int value, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl) { int bitnum; bitnum = ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(name, tbl); if (bitnum < 0) return 0; if (bs) { if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(bs, bitnum, value)) return 0; } return 1; } int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(const char *name, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl) { BIT_STRING_BITNAME *bnam; for (bnam = tbl; bnam->lname; bnam++) { if ((strcmp(bnam->sname, name) == 0) || (strcmp(bnam->lname, name) == 0)) return bnam->bitnum; } return -1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c0000644000000000000000000002073613176625656016110 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "asn1_locl.h" static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, long max); static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length); static int _asn1_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len) { /* * If there is 0 or 1 byte left, the length check should pick things up */ if (len <= 0) return (1); else if ((len >= 2) && ((*p)[0] == 0) && ((*p)[1] == 0)) { (*p) += 2; return (1); } return (0); } int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p, long len) { return _asn1_check_infinite_end((const unsigned char **)p, len); } int ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len) { return _asn1_check_infinite_end(p, len); } int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass, long omax) { int i, ret; long l; const unsigned char *p = *pp; int tag, xclass, inf; long max = omax; if (!max) goto err; ret = (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED); xclass = (*p & V_ASN1_PRIVATE); i = *p & V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG; if (i == V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG) { /* high-tag */ p++; if (--max == 0) goto err; l = 0; while (*p & 0x80) { l <<= 7L; l |= *(p++) & 0x7f; if (--max == 0) goto err; if (l > (INT_MAX >> 7L)) goto err; } l <<= 7L; l |= *(p++) & 0x7f; tag = (int)l; if (--max == 0) goto err; } else { tag = i; p++; if (--max == 0) goto err; } *ptag = tag; *pclass = xclass; if (!asn1_get_length(&p, &inf, plength, max)) goto err; if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) goto err; if (*plength > (omax - (p - *pp))) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); /* * Set this so that even if things are not long enough the values are * set correctly */ ret |= 0x80; } *pp = p; return (ret | inf); err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); return (0x80); } static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, long max) { const unsigned char *p = *pp; unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned long i; if (max-- < 1) return 0; if (*p == 0x80) { *inf = 1; ret = 0; p++; } else { *inf = 0; i = *p & 0x7f; if (*(p++) & 0x80) { if (max < (long)i + 1) return 0; /* Skip leading zeroes */ while (i && *p == 0) { p++; i--; } if (i > sizeof(long)) return 0; while (i-- > 0) { ret <<= 8L; ret |= *(p++); } } else ret = i; } if (ret > LONG_MAX) return 0; *pp = p; *rl = (long)ret; return 1; } /* * class 0 is constructed constructed == 2 for indefinite length constructed */ void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag, int xclass) { unsigned char *p = *pp; int i, ttag; i = (constructed) ? V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED : 0; i |= (xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE); if (tag < 31) *(p++) = i | (tag & V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG); else { *(p++) = i | V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG; for (i = 0, ttag = tag; ttag > 0; i++) ttag >>= 7; ttag = i; while (i-- > 0) { p[i] = tag & 0x7f; if (i != (ttag - 1)) p[i] |= 0x80; tag >>= 7; } p += ttag; } if (constructed == 2) *(p++) = 0x80; else asn1_put_length(&p, length); *pp = p; } int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp) { unsigned char *p = *pp; *p++ = 0; *p++ = 0; *pp = p; return 2; } static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length) { unsigned char *p = *pp; int i, l; if (length <= 127) *(p++) = (unsigned char)length; else { l = length; for (i = 0; l > 0; i++) l >>= 8; *(p++) = i | 0x80; l = i; while (i-- > 0) { p[i] = length & 0xff; length >>= 8; } p += l; } *pp = p; } int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag) { int ret = 1; if (length < 0) return -1; if (tag >= 31) { while (tag > 0) { tag >>= 7; ret++; } } if (constructed == 2) { ret += 3; } else { ret++; if (length > 127) { int tmplen = length; while (tmplen > 0) { tmplen >>= 8; ret++; } } } if (ret >= INT_MAX - length) return -1; return ret + length; } int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str) { if (str == NULL) return 0; dst->type = str->type; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dst, str->data, str->length)) return 0; /* Copy flags but preserve embed value */ dst->flags &= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED; dst->flags |= str->flags & ~ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED; return 1; } ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *str) { ASN1_STRING *ret; if (!str) return NULL; ret = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(ret, str)) { ASN1_STRING_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len) { unsigned char *c; const char *data = _data; if (len < 0) { if (data == NULL) return (0); else len = strlen(data); } if ((str->length <= len) || (str->data == NULL)) { c = str->data; str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len + 1); if (str->data == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); str->data = c; return (0); } } str->length = len; if (data != NULL) { memcpy(str->data, data, len); /* an allowance for strings :-) */ str->data[len] = '\0'; } return (1); } void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len) { OPENSSL_free(str->data); str->data = data; str->length = len; } ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void) { return (ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); } ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type) { ASN1_STRING *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } ret->type = type; return (ret); } void asn1_string_embed_free(ASN1_STRING *a, int embed) { if (a == NULL) return; if (!(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) OPENSSL_free(a->data); if (embed == 0) OPENSSL_free(a); } void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a) { if (a == NULL) return; asn1_string_embed_free(a, a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED); } void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a) { if (a == NULL) return; if (a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->length); ASN1_STRING_free(a); } int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b) { int i; i = (a->length - b->length); if (i == 0) { i = memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length); if (i == 0) return (a->type - b->type); else return (i); } else return (i); } int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->length; } void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int len) { x->length = len; } int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->type; } const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->data; } # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->data; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c0000644000000000000000000004423013176625656016205 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "asn1_locl.h" static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass); static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out, int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item, int do_sort, int iclass); static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int aclass); static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags); static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it); /* * Top level i2d equivalents: the 'ndef' variant instructs the encoder to use * indefinite length constructed encoding, where appropriate */ int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF); } int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { return asn1_item_flags_i2d(val, out, it, 0); } /* * Encode an ASN1 item, this is use by the standard 'i2d' function. 'out' * points to a buffer to output the data to. The new i2d has one additional * feature. If the output buffer is NULL (i.e. *out == NULL) then a buffer is * allocated and populated with the encoding. */ static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags) { if (out && !*out) { unsigned char *p, *buf; int len; len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, NULL, it, -1, flags); if (len <= 0) return len; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (buf == NULL) return -1; p = buf; ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, &p, it, -1, flags); *out = buf; return len; } return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, out, it, -1, flags); } /* * Encode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging (if any). This function * performs the normal item handling: it can be used in external types. */ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL; int i, seqcontlen, seqlen, ndef = 1; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb = 0; if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) && !*pval) return 0; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pval, out, it->templates, tag, aclass); return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, tag, aclass); case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass); case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { ASN1_VALUE **pchval; const ASN1_TEMPLATE *chtt; chtt = it->templates + i; pchval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, chtt); return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pchval, out, chtt, -1, aclass); } /* Fixme: error condition if selector out of range */ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: /* If new style i2d it does all the work */ ef = it->funcs; return ef->asn1_ex_i2d(pval, out, it, tag, aclass); case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: /* Use indefinite length constructed if requested */ if (aclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) ndef = 2; /* fall through */ case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: i = asn1_enc_restore(&seqcontlen, out, pval, it); /* An error occurred */ if (i < 0) return 0; /* We have a valid cached encoding... */ if (i > 0) return seqcontlen; /* Otherwise carry on */ seqcontlen = 0; /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */ if (tag == -1) { tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; /* Retain any other flags in aclass */ aclass = (aclass & ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS) | V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; /* First work out sequence content length */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; int tmplen; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) return 0; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); tmplen = asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, NULL, seqtt, -1, aclass); if (tmplen == -1 || (tmplen > INT_MAX - seqcontlen)) return -1; seqcontlen += tmplen; } seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag); if (!out || seqlen == -1) return seqlen; /* Output SEQUENCE header */ ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass); for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) return 0; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); /* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */ asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, out, seqtt, -1, aclass); } if (ndef == 2) ASN1_put_eoc(out); if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; return seqlen; default: return 0; } return 0; } static int asn1_template_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, int tag, int iclass) { int i, ret, flags, ttag, tclass, ndef; ASN1_VALUE *tval; flags = tt->flags; /* * If field is embedded then val needs fixing so it is a pointer to * a pointer to a field. */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) { tval = (ASN1_VALUE *)pval; pval = &tval; } /* * Work out tag and class to use: tagging may come either from the * template or the arguments, not both because this would create * ambiguity. Additionally the iclass argument may contain some * additional flags which should be noted and passed down to other * levels. */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_MASK) { /* Error if argument and template tagging */ if (tag != -1) /* FIXME: error code here */ return -1; /* Get tagging from template */ ttag = tt->tag; tclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; } else if (tag != -1) { /* No template tagging, get from arguments */ ttag = tag; tclass = iclass & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; } else { ttag = -1; tclass = 0; } /* * Remove any class mask from iflag. */ iclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; /* * At this point 'ttag' contains the outer tag to use, 'tclass' is the * class and iclass is any flags passed to this function. */ /* if template and arguments require ndef, use it */ if ((flags & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (iclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)) ndef = 2; else ndef = 1; if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) { /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */ STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*pval; int isset, sktag, skaclass; int skcontlen, sklen; ASN1_VALUE *skitem; if (!*pval) return 0; if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) { isset = 1; /* 2 means we reorder */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF) isset = 2; } else isset = 0; /* * Work out inner tag value: if EXPLICIT or no tagging use underlying * type. */ if ((ttag != -1) && !(flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG)) { sktag = ttag; skaclass = tclass; } else { skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; if (isset) sktag = V_ASN1_SET; else sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } /* Determine total length of items */ skcontlen = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) { int tmplen; skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i); tmplen = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass); if (tmplen == -1 || (skcontlen > INT_MAX - tmplen)) return -1; skcontlen += tmplen; } sklen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, skcontlen, sktag); if (sklen == -1) return -1; /* If EXPLICIT need length of surrounding tag */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, sklen, ttag); else ret = sklen; if (!out || ret == -1) return ret; /* Now encode this lot... */ /* EXPLICIT tag */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, sklen, ttag, tclass); /* SET or SEQUENCE and IMPLICIT tag */ ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, skcontlen, sktag, skaclass); /* And the stuff itself */ asn1_set_seq_out(sk, out, skcontlen, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), isset, iclass); if (ndef == 2) { ASN1_put_eoc(out); if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) ASN1_put_eoc(out); } return ret; } if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) { /* EXPLICIT tagging */ /* Find length of tagged item */ i = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass); if (!i) return 0; /* Find length of EXPLICIT tag */ ret = ASN1_object_size(ndef, i, ttag); if (out && ret != -1) { /* Output tag and item */ ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, i, ttag, tclass); ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, iclass); if (ndef == 2) ASN1_put_eoc(out); } return ret; } /* Either normal or IMPLICIT tagging: combine class and flags */ return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(pval, out, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), ttag, tclass | iclass); } /* Temporary structure used to hold DER encoding of items for SET OF */ typedef struct { unsigned char *data; int length; ASN1_VALUE *field; } DER_ENC; static int der_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) { const DER_ENC *d1 = a, *d2 = b; int cmplen, i; cmplen = (d1->length < d2->length) ? d1->length : d2->length; i = memcmp(d1->data, d2->data, cmplen); if (i) return i; return d1->length - d2->length; } /* Output the content octets of SET OF or SEQUENCE OF */ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out, int skcontlen, const ASN1_ITEM *item, int do_sort, int iclass) { int i; ASN1_VALUE *skitem; unsigned char *tmpdat = NULL, *p = NULL; DER_ENC *derlst = NULL, *tder; if (do_sort) { /* Don't need to sort less than 2 items */ if (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk) < 2) do_sort = 0; else { derlst = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk) * sizeof(*derlst)); if (derlst == NULL) return 0; tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen); if (tmpdat == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(derlst); return 0; } } } /* If not sorting just output each item */ if (!do_sort) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++) { skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i); ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, out, item, -1, iclass); } return 1; } p = tmpdat; /* Doing sort: build up a list of each member's DER encoding */ for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) { skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(sk, i); tder->data = p; tder->length = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&skitem, &p, item, -1, iclass); tder->field = skitem; } /* Now sort them */ qsort(derlst, sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk), sizeof(*derlst), der_cmp); /* Output sorted DER encoding */ p = *out; for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) { memcpy(p, tder->data, tder->length); p += tder->length; } *out = p; /* If do_sort is 2 then reorder the STACK */ if (do_sort == 2) { for (i = 0, tder = derlst; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk); i++, tder++) (void)sk_ASN1_VALUE_set(sk, i, tder->field); } OPENSSL_free(derlst); OPENSSL_free(tmpdat); return 1; } static int asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass) { int len; int utype; int usetag; int ndef = 0; utype = it->utype; /* * Get length of content octets and maybe find out the underlying type. */ len = asn1_ex_i2c(pval, NULL, &utype, it); /* * If SEQUENCE, SET or OTHER then header is included in pseudo content * octets so don't include tag+length. We need to check here because the * call to asn1_ex_i2c() could change utype. */ if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) usetag = 0; else usetag = 1; /* -1 means omit type */ if (len == -1) return 0; /* -2 return is special meaning use ndef */ if (len == -2) { ndef = 2; len = 0; } /* If not implicitly tagged get tag from underlying type */ if (tag == -1) tag = utype; /* Output tag+length followed by content octets */ if (out) { if (usetag) ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, len, tag, aclass); asn1_ex_i2c(pval, *out, &utype, it); if (ndef) ASN1_put_eoc(out); else *out += len; } if (usetag) return ASN1_object_size(ndef, len, tag); return len; } /* Produce content octets from a structure */ static int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cout, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool = NULL; ASN1_STRING *strtmp; ASN1_OBJECT *otmp; int utype; const unsigned char *cont; unsigned char c; int len; const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf; pf = it->funcs; if (pf && pf->prim_i2c) return pf->prim_i2c(pval, cout, putype, it); /* Should type be omitted? */ if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) || (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) { if (!*pval) return -1; } if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) { /* If MSTRING type set the underlying type */ strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval; utype = strtmp->type; *putype = utype; } else if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) { /* If ANY set type and pointer to value */ ASN1_TYPE *typ; typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval; utype = typ->type; *putype = utype; pval = &typ->value.asn1_value; } else utype = *putype; switch (utype) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: otmp = (ASN1_OBJECT *)*pval; cont = otmp->data; len = otmp->length; break; case V_ASN1_NULL: cont = NULL; len = 0; break; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval; if (*tbool == -1) return -1; if (it->utype != V_ASN1_ANY) { /* * Default handling if value == size field then omit */ if (*tbool && (it->size > 0)) return -1; if (!*tbool && !it->size) return -1; } c = (unsigned char)*tbool; cont = &c; len = 1; break; case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: return i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL); case V_ASN1_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: /* * These are all have the same content format as ASN1_INTEGER */ return i2c_ASN1_INTEGER((ASN1_INTEGER *)*pval, cout ? &cout : NULL); case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: case V_ASN1_T61STRING: case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING: case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING: case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: case V_ASN1_SET: default: /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */ strtmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval; /* Special handling for NDEF */ if ((it->size == ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) && (strtmp->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) { if (cout) { strtmp->data = cout; strtmp->length = 0; } /* Special return code */ return -2; } cont = strtmp->data; len = strtmp->length; break; } if (cout && len) memcpy(cout, cont, len); return len; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c0000644000000000000000000000361213176625656015677 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "openssl/opensslconf.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 typedef struct netscape_pkey_st { long version; X509_ALGOR *algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *private_key; } NETSCAPE_PKEY; typedef struct netscape_encrypted_pkey_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os; /* * This is the same structure as DigestInfo so use it: although this * isn't really anything to do with digests. */ X509_SIG *enckey; } NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY; ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY, os, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY, enckey, X509_SIG) } static_ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY,NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY) ASN1_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_PKEY) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_PKEY, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_PKEY, algor, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_PKEY, private_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_PKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY,NETSCAPE_PKEY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY) # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */ #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c0000644000000000000000000004411513176625656016062 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include #include #include #include "charmap.h" /* * ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex(). Enhanced string and name * printing routines handling multibyte characters, RFC2253 and a host of * other options. */ #define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253) #define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB) /* * Three IO functions for sending data to memory, a BIO and and a FILE * pointer. */ static int send_bio_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len) { if (!arg) return 1; if (BIO_write(arg, buf, len) != len) return 0; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO static int send_fp_chars(void *arg, const void *buf, int len) { if (!arg) return 1; if (fwrite(buf, 1, len, arg) != (unsigned int)len) return 0; return 1; } #endif typedef int char_io (void *arg, const void *buf, int len); /* * This function handles display of strings, one character at a time. It is * passed an unsigned long for each character because it could come from 2 or * even 4 byte forms. */ static int do_esc_char(unsigned long c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes, char_io *io_ch, void *arg) { unsigned short chflgs; unsigned char chtmp; char tmphex[HEX_SIZE(long) + 3]; if (c > 0xffffffffL) return -1; if (c > 0xffff) { BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof tmphex, "\\W%08lX", c); if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 10)) return -1; return 10; } if (c > 0xff) { BIO_snprintf(tmphex, sizeof tmphex, "\\U%04lX", c); if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 6)) return -1; return 6; } chtmp = (unsigned char)c; if (chtmp > 0x7f) chflgs = flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB; else chflgs = char_type[chtmp] & flags; if (chflgs & CHARTYPE_BS_ESC) { /* If we don't escape with quotes, signal we need quotes */ if (chflgs & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE) { if (do_quotes) *do_quotes = 1; if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1; return 1; } if (!io_ch(arg, "\\", 1)) return -1; if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1; return 2; } if (chflgs & (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254)) { BIO_snprintf(tmphex, 11, "\\%02X", chtmp); if (!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3)) return -1; return 3; } /* * If we get this far and do any escaping at all must escape the escape * character itself: backslash. */ if (chtmp == '\\' && flags & ESC_FLAGS) { if (!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2)) return -1; return 2; } if (!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1; return 1; } #define BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK 0x7 #define BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8 0x8 /* * This function sends each character in a buffer to do_esc_char(). It * interprets the content formats and converts to or from UTF8 as * appropriate. */ static int do_buf(unsigned char *buf, int buflen, int type, unsigned short flags, char *quotes, char_io *io_ch, void *arg) { int i, outlen, len; unsigned short orflags; unsigned char *p, *q; unsigned long c; p = buf; q = buf + buflen; outlen = 0; while (p != q) { if (p == buf && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253) orflags = CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253; else orflags = 0; switch (type & BUF_TYPE_WIDTH_MASK) { case 4: c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 24; c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 16; c |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 8; c |= *p++; break; case 2: c = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 8; c |= *p++; break; case 1: c = *p++; break; case 0: i = UTF8_getc(p, buflen, &c); if (i < 0) return -1; /* Invalid UTF8String */ p += i; break; default: return -1; /* invalid width */ } if (p == q && flags & ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253) orflags = CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253; if (type & BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8) { unsigned char utfbuf[6]; int utflen; utflen = UTF8_putc(utfbuf, sizeof utfbuf, c); for (i = 0; i < utflen; i++) { /* * We don't need to worry about setting orflags correctly * because if utflen==1 its value will be correct anyway * otherwise each character will be > 0x7f and so the * character will never be escaped on first and last. */ len = do_esc_char(utfbuf[i], (unsigned short)(flags | orflags), quotes, io_ch, arg); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; } } else { len = do_esc_char(c, (unsigned short)(flags | orflags), quotes, io_ch, arg); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; } } return outlen; } /* This function hex dumps a buffer of characters */ static int do_hex_dump(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned char *buf, int buflen) { static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; unsigned char *p, *q; char hextmp[2]; if (arg) { p = buf; q = buf + buflen; while (p != q) { hextmp[0] = hexdig[*p >> 4]; hextmp[1] = hexdig[*p & 0xf]; if (!io_ch(arg, hextmp, 2)) return -1; p++; } } return buflen << 1; } /* * "dump" a string. This is done when the type is unknown, or the flags * request it. We can either dump the content octets or the entire DER * encoding. This uses the RFC2253 #01234 format. */ static int do_dump(unsigned long lflags, char_io *io_ch, void *arg, const ASN1_STRING *str) { /* * Placing the ASN1_STRING in a temp ASN1_TYPE allows the DER encoding to * readily obtained */ ASN1_TYPE t; unsigned char *der_buf, *p; int outlen, der_len; if (!io_ch(arg, "#", 1)) return -1; /* If we don't dump DER encoding just dump content octets */ if (!(lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER)) { outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, str->data, str->length); if (outlen < 0) return -1; return outlen + 1; } t.type = str->type; t.value.ptr = (char *)str; der_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, NULL); der_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(der_len); if (der_buf == NULL) return -1; p = der_buf; i2d_ASN1_TYPE(&t, &p); outlen = do_hex_dump(io_ch, arg, der_buf, der_len); OPENSSL_free(der_buf); if (outlen < 0) return -1; return outlen + 1; } /* * Lookup table to convert tags to character widths, 0 = UTF8 encoded, -1 is * used for non string types otherwise it is the number of bytes per * character */ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 0-4 */ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 5-9 */ -1, -1, 0, -1, /* 10-13 */ -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 15-17 */ 1, 1, 1, /* 18-20 */ -1, 1, 1, 1, /* 21-24 */ -1, 1, -1, /* 25-27 */ 4, -1, 2 /* 28-30 */ }; /* * This is the main function, print out an ASN1_STRING taking note of various * escape and display options. Returns number of characters written or -1 if * an error occurred. */ static int do_print_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, unsigned long lflags, const ASN1_STRING *str) { int outlen, len; int type; char quotes; unsigned short flags; quotes = 0; /* Keep a copy of escape flags */ flags = (unsigned short)(lflags & ESC_FLAGS); type = str->type; outlen = 0; if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE) { const char *tagname; tagname = ASN1_tag2str(type); outlen += strlen(tagname); if (!io_ch(arg, tagname, outlen) || !io_ch(arg, ":", 1)) return -1; outlen++; } /* Decide what to do with type, either dump content or display it */ /* Dump everything */ if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL) type = -1; /* Ignore the string type */ else if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE) type = 1; else { /* Else determine width based on type */ if ((type > 0) && (type < 31)) type = tag2nbyte[type]; else type = -1; if ((type == -1) && !(lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN)) type = 1; } if (type == -1) { len = do_dump(lflags, io_ch, arg, str); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; return outlen; } if (lflags & ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT) { /* * Note: if string is UTF8 and we want to convert to UTF8 then we * just interpret it as 1 byte per character to avoid converting * twice. */ if (!type) type = 1; else type |= BUF_TYPE_CONVUTF8; } len = do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, "es, io_ch, NULL); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; if (quotes) outlen += 2; if (!arg) return outlen; if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1)) return -1; if (do_buf(str->data, str->length, type, flags, NULL, io_ch, arg) < 0) return -1; if (quotes && !io_ch(arg, "\"", 1)) return -1; return outlen; } /* Used for line indenting: print 'indent' spaces */ static int do_indent(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, int indent) { int i; for (i = 0; i < indent; i++) if (!io_ch(arg, " ", 1)) return 0; return 1; } #define FN_WIDTH_LN 25 #define FN_WIDTH_SN 10 static int do_name_ex(char_io *io_ch, void *arg, const X509_NAME *n, int indent, unsigned long flags) { int i, prev = -1, orflags, cnt; int fn_opt, fn_nid; ASN1_OBJECT *fn; const ASN1_STRING *val; const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent; char objtmp[80]; const char *objbuf; int outlen, len; char *sep_dn, *sep_mv, *sep_eq; int sep_dn_len, sep_mv_len, sep_eq_len; if (indent < 0) indent = 0; outlen = indent; if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent)) return -1; switch (flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) { case XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE: sep_dn = "\n"; sep_dn_len = 1; sep_mv = " + "; sep_mv_len = 3; break; case XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS: sep_dn = ","; sep_dn_len = 1; sep_mv = "+"; sep_mv_len = 1; indent = 0; break; case XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC: sep_dn = ", "; sep_dn_len = 2; sep_mv = " + "; sep_mv_len = 3; indent = 0; break; case XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC: sep_dn = "; "; sep_dn_len = 2; sep_mv = " + "; sep_mv_len = 3; indent = 0; break; default: return -1; } if (flags & XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ) { sep_eq = " = "; sep_eq_len = 3; } else { sep_eq = "="; sep_eq_len = 1; } fn_opt = flags & XN_FLAG_FN_MASK; cnt = X509_NAME_entry_count(n); for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { if (flags & XN_FLAG_DN_REV) ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, cnt - i - 1); else ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(n, i); if (prev != -1) { if (prev == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(ent)) { if (!io_ch(arg, sep_mv, sep_mv_len)) return -1; outlen += sep_mv_len; } else { if (!io_ch(arg, sep_dn, sep_dn_len)) return -1; outlen += sep_dn_len; if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, indent)) return -1; outlen += indent; } } prev = X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(ent); fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ent); val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ent); fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(fn); if (fn_opt != XN_FLAG_FN_NONE) { int objlen, fld_len; if ((fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_OID) || (fn_nid == NID_undef)) { OBJ_obj2txt(objtmp, sizeof objtmp, fn, 1); fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */ objbuf = objtmp; } else { if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_SN) { fld_len = FN_WIDTH_SN; objbuf = OBJ_nid2sn(fn_nid); } else if (fn_opt == XN_FLAG_FN_LN) { fld_len = FN_WIDTH_LN; objbuf = OBJ_nid2ln(fn_nid); } else { fld_len = 0; /* XXX: what should this be? */ objbuf = ""; } } objlen = strlen(objbuf); if (!io_ch(arg, objbuf, objlen)) return -1; if ((objlen < fld_len) && (flags & XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN)) { if (!do_indent(io_ch, arg, fld_len - objlen)) return -1; outlen += fld_len - objlen; } if (!io_ch(arg, sep_eq, sep_eq_len)) return -1; outlen += objlen + sep_eq_len; } /* * If the field name is unknown then fix up the DER dump flag. We * might want to limit this further so it will DER dump on anything * other than a few 'standard' fields. */ if ((fn_nid == NID_undef) && (flags & XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS)) orflags = ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL; else orflags = 0; len = do_print_ex(io_ch, arg, flags | orflags, val); if (len < 0) return -1; outlen += len; } return outlen; } /* Wrappers round the main functions */ int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags) { if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) return X509_NAME_print(out, nm, indent); return do_name_ex(send_bio_chars, out, nm, indent, flags); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags) { if (flags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) { BIO *btmp; int ret; btmp = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!btmp) return -1; ret = X509_NAME_print(btmp, nm, indent); BIO_free(btmp); return ret; } return do_name_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, nm, indent, flags); } #endif int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags) { return do_print_ex(send_bio_chars, out, flags, str); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags) { return do_print_ex(send_fp_chars, fp, flags, str); } #endif /* * Utility function: convert any string type to UTF8, returns number of bytes * in output string or a negative error code */ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, const ASN1_STRING *in) { ASN1_STRING stmp, *str = &stmp; int mbflag, type, ret; if (!in) return -1; type = in->type; if ((type < 0) || (type > 30)) return -1; mbflag = tag2nbyte[type]; if (mbflag == -1) return -1; mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG; stmp.data = NULL; stmp.length = 0; stmp.flags = 0; ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING); if (ret < 0) return ret; *out = stmp.data; return stmp.length; } /* Return 1 if host is a valid hostname and 0 otherwise */ int asn1_valid_host(const ASN1_STRING *host) { int hostlen = host->length; const unsigned char *hostptr = host->data; int type = host->type; int i; signed char width = -1; unsigned short chflags = 0, prevchflags; if (type > 0 && type < 31) width = tag2nbyte[type]; if (width == -1 || hostlen == 0) return 0; /* Treat UTF8String as width 1 as any MSB set is invalid */ if (width == 0) width = 1; for (i = 0 ; i < hostlen; i+= width) { prevchflags = chflags; /* Value must be <= 0x7F: check upper bytes are all zeroes */ if (width == 4) { if (*hostptr++ != 0 || *hostptr++ != 0 || *hostptr++ != 0) return 0; } else if (width == 2) { if (*hostptr++ != 0) return 0; } if (*hostptr > 0x7f) return 0; chflags = char_type[*hostptr++]; if (!(chflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_ANY | CHARTYPE_HOST_WILD))) { /* Nothing else allowed at start or end of string */ if (i == 0 || i == hostlen - 1) return 0; /* Otherwise invalid if not dot or hyphen */ if (!(chflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT | CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN))) return 0; /* * If previous is dot or hyphen then illegal unless both * are hyphens: as .- -. .. are all illegal */ if (prevchflags & (CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT | CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN) && ((prevchflags & CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT) || (chflags & CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT))) return 0; } } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_info.c0000644000000000000000000000157713176625656015704 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include X509_INFO *X509_INFO_new(void) { X509_INFO *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } return ret; } void X509_INFO_free(X509_INFO *x) { if (x == NULL) return; X509_free(x->x509); X509_CRL_free(x->crl); X509_PKEY_free(x->x_pkey); OPENSSL_free(x->enc_data); OPENSSL_free(x); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/charmap.h0000644000000000000000000000264013176625656016032 0ustar rootroot/* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/asn1/charmap.pl * * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define CHARTYPE_HOST_ANY 4096 #define CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT 8192 #define CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN 16384 #define CHARTYPE_HOST_WILD 32768 /* * Mask of various character properties */ static const unsigned short char_type[] = { 1026, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 120, 0, 1, 40, 0, 0, 0, 16, 1040, 1040, 33792, 25, 25, 16400, 8208, 16, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 16, 9, 9, 16, 9, 16, 0, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 0, 1025, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2 }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c0000644000000000000000000000504513176625656015773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" /* Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data */ static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */ if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval; if (key->pkey) OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->data, key->pkey->length); } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) int PKCS8_pkey_set0(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *priv, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int version, int ptype, void *pval, unsigned char *penc, int penclen) { if (version >= 0) { if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(priv->version, version)) return 0; } if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(priv->pkeyalg, aobj, ptype, pval)) return 0; if (penc) ASN1_STRING_set0(priv->pkey, penc, penclen); return 1; } int PKCS8_pkey_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg, const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen, const X509_ALGOR **pa, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { if (ppkalg) *ppkalg = p8->pkeyalg->algorithm; if (pk) { *pk = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(p8->pkey); *ppklen = ASN1_STRING_length(p8->pkey); } if (pa) *pa = p8->pkeyalg; return 1; } const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { return p8->attributes; } int PKCS8_pkey_add1_attr_by_NID(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&p8->attributes, nid, type, bytes, len) != NULL) return 1; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c0000644000000000000000000001543413176625656015657 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned char *p, *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL; int i, inl = 0, outl = 0, outll = 0; X509_ALGOR *a; if (ctx == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if (i == 0) a = algor1; else a = algor2; if (a == NULL) continue; if (type->pkey_type == NID_dsaWithSHA1) { /* * special case: RFC 2459 tells us to omit 'parameters' with * id-dsa-with-sha1 */ ASN1_TYPE_free(a->parameter); a->parameter = NULL; } else if ((a->parameter == NULL) || (a->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL)) { ASN1_TYPE_free(a->parameter); if ((a->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; a->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; } ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->algorithm); a->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type->pkey_type); if (a->algorithm == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE); goto err; } if (a->algorithm->length == 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD); goto err; } } inl = i2d(data, NULL); buf_in = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl); outll = outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl); if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) { outl = 0; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = buf_in; i2d(data, &p); if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL) || !EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf_in, inl) || !EVP_SignFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf_out, (unsigned int *)&outl, pkey)) { outl = 0; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(signature->data); signature->data = buf_out; buf_out = NULL; signature->length = outl; /* * In the interests of compatibility, I'll make sure that the bit string * has a 'not-used bits' value of 0 */ signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, (unsigned int)inl); OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_out, outll); return (outl); } #endif int ASN1_item_sign(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type) { int rv; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return 0; } rv = ASN1_item_sign_ctx(it, algor1, algor2, signature, asn, ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return rv; } int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { const EVP_MD *type; EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL; size_t inl = 0, outl = 0, outll = 0; int signid, paramtype; int rv; type = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx); pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)); if (type == NULL || pkey == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED); goto err; } if (pkey->ameth == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } if (pkey->ameth->item_sign) { rv = pkey->ameth->item_sign(ctx, it, asn, algor1, algor2, signature); if (rv == 1) outl = signature->length; /*- * Return value meanings: * <=0: error. * 1: method does everything. * 2: carry on as normal. * 3: ASN1 method sets algorithm identifiers: just sign. */ if (rv <= 0) ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); if (rv <= 1) goto err; } else rv = 2; if (rv == 2) { if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&signid, EVP_MD_nid(type), pkey->ameth->pkey_id)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } if (pkey->ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL) paramtype = V_ASN1_NULL; else paramtype = V_ASN1_UNDEF; if (algor1) X509_ALGOR_set0(algor1, OBJ_nid2obj(signid), paramtype, NULL); if (algor2) X509_ALGOR_set0(algor2, OBJ_nid2obj(signid), paramtype, NULL); } inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it); outll = outl = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)outl); if ((buf_in == NULL) || (buf_out == NULL)) { outl = 0; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, buf_in, inl) || !EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, buf_out, &outl)) { outl = 0; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(signature->data); signature->data = buf_out; buf_out = NULL; signature->length = outl; /* * In the interests of compatibility, I'll make sure that the bit string * has a 'not-used bits' value of 0 */ signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; err: OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_in, (unsigned int)inl); OPENSSL_clear_free((char *)buf_out, outll); return (outl); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c0000644000000000000000000000217413176625656015713 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void) { X509_PKEY *ret = NULL; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ret->enc_algor = X509_ALGOR_new(); ret->enc_pkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (ret->enc_algor == NULL || ret->enc_pkey == NULL) goto err; return ret; err: X509_PKEY_free(ret); ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *x) { if (x == NULL) return; X509_ALGOR_free(x->enc_algor); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->enc_pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(x->dec_pkey); if (x->key_free) OPENSSL_free(x->key_data); OPENSSL_free(x); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_scn.c0000644000000000000000000000256613176625656016231 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" /* * General ASN1 structure recursive scanner: iterate through all fields * passing details to a callback. */ ASN1_SCTX *ASN1_SCTX_new(int (*scan_cb) (ASN1_SCTX *ctx)) { ASN1_SCTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_SCTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->scan_cb = scan_cb; return ret; } void ASN1_SCTX_free(ASN1_SCTX *p) { OPENSSL_free(p); } const ASN1_ITEM *ASN1_SCTX_get_item(ASN1_SCTX *p) { return p->it; } const ASN1_TEMPLATE *ASN1_SCTX_get_template(ASN1_SCTX *p) { return p->tt; } unsigned long ASN1_SCTX_get_flags(ASN1_SCTX *p) { return p->flags; } void ASN1_SCTX_set_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p, void *data) { p->app_data = data; } void *ASN1_SCTX_get_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p) { return p->app_data; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/charmap.pl0000644000000000000000000000675413176625656016230 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; my ($i, @arr); # Set up an array with the type of ASCII characters # Each set bit represents a character property. # RFC2253 character properties my $RFC2253_ESC = 1; # Character escaped with \ my $ESC_CTRL = 2; # Escaped control character # These are used with RFC1779 quoting using " my $NOESC_QUOTE = 8; # Not escaped if quoted my $PSTRING_CHAR = 0x10; # Valid PrintableString character my $RFC2253_FIRST_ESC = 0x20; # Escaped with \ if first character my $RFC2253_LAST_ESC = 0x40; # Escaped with \ if last character my $RFC2254_ESC = 0x400; # Character escaped \XX my $HOST_ANY = 0x1000; # Valid hostname character anywhere in label my $HOST_DOT = 0x2000; # Dot: hostname label separator my $HOST_HYPHEN = 0x4000; # Hyphen: not valid at start or end. my $HOST_WILD = 0x8000; # Wildcard character for($i = 0; $i < 128; $i++) { # Set the RFC2253 escape characters (control) $arr[$i] = 0; if(($i < 32) || ($i > 126)) { $arr[$i] |= $ESC_CTRL; } # Some PrintableString characters if( ( ( $i >= ord("a")) && ( $i <= ord("z")) ) || ( ( $i >= ord("A")) && ( $i <= ord("Z")) ) || ( ( $i >= ord("0")) && ( $i <= ord("9")) ) ) { $arr[$i] |= $PSTRING_CHAR | $HOST_ANY; } } # Now setup the rest # Remaining RFC2253 escaped characters $arr[ord(" ")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_FIRST_ESC | $RFC2253_LAST_ESC; $arr[ord("#")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_FIRST_ESC; $arr[ord(",")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC; $arr[ord("+")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC; $arr[ord("\"")] |= $RFC2253_ESC; $arr[ord("\\")] |= $RFC2253_ESC; $arr[ord("<")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC; $arr[ord(">")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC; $arr[ord(";")] |= $NOESC_QUOTE | $RFC2253_ESC; # Remaining RFC2254 characters $arr[0] |= $RFC2254_ESC; $arr[ord("(")] |= $RFC2254_ESC; $arr[ord(")")] |= $RFC2254_ESC; $arr[ord("*")] |= $RFC2254_ESC | $HOST_WILD; $arr[ord("\\")] |= $RFC2254_ESC; # Remaining PrintableString characters $arr[ord(" ")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord("'")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord("(")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord(")")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord("+")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord(",")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord("-")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR | $HOST_HYPHEN; $arr[ord(".")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR | $HOST_DOT; $arr[ord("/")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord(":")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord("=")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; $arr[ord("?")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR; # Now generate the C code print < #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "asn1_locl.h" IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(ASN1_TIME, B_ASN1_TIME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME) ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t) { return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, 0, 0); } ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec) { struct tm *ts; struct tm data; ts = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data); if (ts == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ, ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME); return NULL; } if (offset_day || offset_sec) { if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec)) return NULL; } if ((ts->tm_year >= 50) && (ts->tm_year < 150)) return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t) { if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(t); else if (t->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_check(t); return 0; } /* Convert an ASN1_TIME structure to GeneralizedTime */ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(const ASN1_TIME *t, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out) { ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ret = NULL; char *str; int newlen; if (!ASN1_TIME_check(t)) return NULL; if (out == NULL || *out == NULL) { if ((ret = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else ret = *out; /* If already GeneralizedTime just copy across */ if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(ret, t->data, t->length)) goto err; goto done; } /* grow the string */ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(ret, NULL, t->length + 2)) goto err; /* ASN1_STRING_set() allocated 'len + 1' bytes. */ newlen = t->length + 2 + 1; str = (char *)ret->data; /* Work out the century and prepend */ if (t->data[0] >= '5') OPENSSL_strlcpy(str, "19", newlen); else OPENSSL_strlcpy(str, "20", newlen); OPENSSL_strlcat(str, (const char *)t->data, newlen); done: if (out != NULL && *out == NULL) *out = ret; return ret; err: if (out == NULL || *out != ret) ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(ret); return NULL; } int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str) { ASN1_TIME t; t.length = strlen(str); t.data = (unsigned char *)str; t.flags = 0; t.type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME; if (!ASN1_TIME_check(&t)) { t.type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME; if (!ASN1_TIME_check(&t)) return 0; } if (s && !ASN1_STRING_copy((ASN1_STRING *)s, (ASN1_STRING *)&t)) return 0; return 1; } static int asn1_time_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_TIME *t) { if (t == NULL) { time_t now_t; time(&now_t); if (OPENSSL_gmtime(&now_t, tm)) return 1; return 0; } if (t->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return asn1_utctime_to_tm(tm, t); else if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(tm, t); return 0; } int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec, const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to) { struct tm tm_from, tm_to; if (!asn1_time_to_tm(&tm_from, from)) return 0; if (!asn1_time_to_tm(&tm_to, to)) return 0; return OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(pday, psec, &tm_from, &tm_to); } int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_TIME *tm) { if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bp, tm); if (tm->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, tm); BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14); return (0); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_long.c0000644000000000000000000001250613176625656015702 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* * Custom primitive type for long handling. This converts between an * ASN1_INTEGER and a long directly. */ static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS long_pf = { NULL, 0, long_new, long_free, long_free, /* Clear should set to initial value */ long_c2i, long_i2c, long_print }; ASN1_ITEM_start(LONG) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &long_pf, ASN1_LONG_UNDEF, "LONG" ASN1_ITEM_end(LONG) ASN1_ITEM_start(ZLONG) ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &long_pf, 0, "ZLONG" ASN1_ITEM_end(ZLONG) static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { *(long *)pval = it->size; return 1; } static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { *(long *)pval = it->size; } /* * Originally BN_num_bits_word was called to perform this operation, but * trouble is that there is no guarantee that sizeof(long) equals to * sizeof(BN_ULONG). BN_ULONG is a configurable type that can be as wide * as long, but also double or half... */ static int num_bits_ulong(unsigned long value) { size_t i; unsigned long ret = 0; /* * It is argued that *on average* constant counter loop performs * not worse [if not better] than one with conditional break or * mask-n-table-lookup-style, because of branch misprediction * penalties. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(value) * 8; i++) { ret += (value != 0); value >>= 1; } return (int)ret; } static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { long ltmp; unsigned long utmp, sign; int clen, pad, i; /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */ char *cp = (char *)pval; /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */ memcpy(<mp, cp, sizeof(long)); if (ltmp == it->size) return -1; /* * Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so we can * cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading octet is * set. */ if (ltmp < 0) { sign = 0xff; utmp = 0 - (unsigned long)ltmp - 1; } else { sign = 0; utmp = ltmp; } clen = num_bits_ulong(utmp); /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */ if (!(clen & 0x7)) pad = 1; else pad = 0; /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */ clen = (clen + 7) >> 3; if (cont != NULL) { if (pad) *cont++ = (unsigned char)sign; for (i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp ^ sign); utmp >>= 8; } } return clen + pad; } static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { int i; long ltmp; unsigned long utmp = 0, sign = 0x100; char *cp = (char *)pval; if (len > 1) { /* * Check possible pad byte. Worst case, we're skipping past actual * content, but since that's only with 0x00 and 0xff and we set neg * accordingly, the result will be correct in the end anyway. */ switch (cont[0]) { case 0xff: cont++; len--; sign = 0xff; break; case 0: cont++; len--; sign = 0; break; } } if (len > (int)sizeof(long)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG); return 0; } if (sign == 0x100) { /* Is it negative? */ if (len && (cont[0] & 0x80)) sign = 0xff; else sign = 0; } else if (((sign ^ cont[0]) & 0x80) == 0) { /* same sign bit? */ ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING); return 0; } utmp = 0; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { utmp <<= 8; utmp |= cont[i] ^ sign; } ltmp = (long)utmp; if (ltmp < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG); return 0; } if (sign) ltmp = -ltmp - 1; if (ltmp == it->size) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG); return 0; } memcpy(cp, <mp, sizeof(long)); return 1; } static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c0000644000000000000000000000313513176625656016171 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* ASN1 packing and unpacking functions */ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_STRING **oct) { ASN1_STRING *octmp; if (oct == NULL || *oct == NULL) { if ((octmp = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } else { octmp = *oct; } OPENSSL_free(octmp->data); octmp->data = NULL; if ((octmp->length = ASN1_item_i2d(obj, &octmp->data, it)) == 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK, ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR); goto err; } if (octmp->data == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (oct != NULL && *oct == NULL) *oct = octmp; return octmp; err: if (oct == NULL || *oct == NULL) ASN1_STRING_free(octmp); return NULL; } /* Extract an ASN1 object from an ASN1_STRING */ void *ASN1_item_unpack(const ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { const unsigned char *p; void *ret; p = oct->data; if ((ret = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, oct->length, it)) == NULL) ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c0000644000000000000000000003510013176625656016233 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "asn1_locl.h" /* * Print routines. */ /* ASN1_PCTX routines */ static ASN1_PCTX default_pctx = { ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT, /* flags */ 0, /* nm_flags */ 0, /* cert_flags */ 0, /* oid_flags */ 0 /* str_flags */ }; ASN1_PCTX *ASN1_PCTX_new(void) { ASN1_PCTX *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } return ret; } void ASN1_PCTX_free(ASN1_PCTX *p) { OPENSSL_free(p); } unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p) { return p->flags; } void ASN1_PCTX_set_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags) { p->flags = flags; } unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_nm_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p) { return p->nm_flags; } void ASN1_PCTX_set_nm_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags) { p->nm_flags = flags; } unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_cert_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p) { return p->cert_flags; } void ASN1_PCTX_set_cert_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags) { p->cert_flags = flags; } unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_oid_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p) { return p->oid_flags; } void ASN1_PCTX_set_oid_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags) { p->oid_flags = flags; } unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_str_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p) { return p->str_flags; } void ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags) { p->str_flags = flags; } /* Main print routines */ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const char *fname, const char *sname, int nohdr, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); static int asn1_template_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const char *fname, const char *sname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); static int asn1_print_fsname(BIO *out, int indent, const char *fname, const char *sname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); int ASN1_item_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *ifld, int indent, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { const char *sname; if (pctx == NULL) pctx = &default_pctx; if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_STRUCT_NAME) sname = NULL; else sname = it->sname; return asn1_item_print_ctx(out, &ifld, indent, it, NULL, sname, 0, pctx); } static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const char *fname, const char *sname, int nohdr, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; ASN1_VALUE **tmpfld; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; ASN1_PRINT_ARG parg; int i; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) { parg.out = out; parg.indent = indent; parg.pctx = pctx; asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; } else asn1_cb = 0; if (((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) || (it->utype != V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) && *fld == NULL) { if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT) { if (!nohdr && !asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx)) return 0; if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0) return 0; } return 1; } switch (it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) { if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, fld, indent, it->templates, pctx)) return 0; break; } /* fall through */ case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: if (!asn1_primitive_print(out, fld, it, indent, fname, sname, pctx)) return 0; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: if (!nohdr && !asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx)) return 0; /* Use new style print routine if possible */ ef = it->funcs; if (ef && ef->asn1_ex_print) { i = ef->asn1_ex_print(out, fld, indent, "", pctx); if (!i) return 0; if ((i == 2) && (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)) return 0; return 1; } else if (sname && BIO_printf(out, ":EXTERNAL TYPE %s\n", sname) <= 0) return 0; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: /* CHOICE type, get selector */ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(fld, it); /* This should never happen... */ if ((i < 0) || (i >= it->tcount)) { if (BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: selector [%d] invalid\n", i) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } tt = it->templates + i; tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, tt); if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld, indent, tt, pctx)) return 0; break; case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: if (!nohdr && !asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx)) return 0; if (fname || sname) { if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE) { if (BIO_puts(out, " {\n") <= 0) return 0; } else { if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0) return 0; } } if (asn1_cb) { i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_PRINT_PRE, fld, it, &parg); if (i == 0) return 0; if (i == 2) return 1; } /* Print each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) return 0; tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt); if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld, indent + 2, seqtt, pctx)) return 0; } if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE) { if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s}\n", indent, "") < 0) return 0; } if (asn1_cb) { i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_PRINT_POST, fld, it, &parg); if (i == 0) return 0; } break; default: BIO_printf(out, "Unprocessed type %d\n", it->itype); return 0; } return 1; } static int asn1_template_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { int i, flags; const char *sname, *fname; ASN1_VALUE *tfld; flags = tt->flags; if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_FIELD_STRUCT_NAME) sname = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item)->sname; else sname = NULL; if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_FIELD_NAME) fname = NULL; else fname = tt->field_name; /* * If field is embedded then fld needs fixing so it is a pointer to * a pointer to a field. */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) { tfld = (ASN1_VALUE *)fld; fld = &tfld; } if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) { char *tname; ASN1_VALUE *skitem; STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *stack; /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */ if (fname) { if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SSOF) { if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) tname = "SET"; else tname = "SEQUENCE"; if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s OF %s {\n", indent, "", tname, tt->field_name) <= 0) return 0; } else if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s:\n", indent, "", fname) <= 0) return 0; } stack = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*fld; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(stack); i++) { if ((i > 0) && (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0)) return 0; skitem = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(stack, i); if (!asn1_item_print_ctx(out, &skitem, indent + 2, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), NULL, NULL, 1, pctx)) return 0; } if (!i && BIO_printf(out, "%*s\n", indent + 2, "") <= 0) return 0; if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE) { if (BIO_printf(out, "%*s}\n", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; } return 1; } return asn1_item_print_ctx(out, fld, indent, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), fname, sname, 0, pctx); } static int asn1_print_fsname(BIO *out, int indent, const char *fname, const char *sname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { static const char spaces[] = " "; static const int nspaces = sizeof(spaces) - 1; while (indent > nspaces) { if (BIO_write(out, spaces, nspaces) != nspaces) return 0; indent -= nspaces; } if (BIO_write(out, spaces, indent) != indent) return 0; if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_STRUCT_NAME) sname = NULL; if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_FIELD_NAME) fname = NULL; if (!sname && !fname) return 1; if (fname) { if (BIO_puts(out, fname) <= 0) return 0; } if (sname) { if (fname) { if (BIO_printf(out, " (%s)", sname) <= 0) return 0; } else { if (BIO_puts(out, sname) <= 0) return 0; } } if (BIO_write(out, ": ", 2) != 2) return 0; return 1; } static int asn1_print_boolean(BIO *out, int boolval) { const char *str; switch (boolval) { case -1: str = "BOOL ABSENT"; break; case 0: str = "FALSE"; break; default: str = "TRUE"; break; } if (BIO_puts(out, str) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } static int asn1_print_integer(BIO *out, const ASN1_INTEGER *str) { char *s; int ret = 1; s = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, str); if (s == NULL) return 0; if (BIO_puts(out, s) <= 0) ret = 0; OPENSSL_free(s); return ret; } static int asn1_print_oid(BIO *out, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid) { char objbuf[80]; const char *ln; ln = OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(oid)); if (!ln) ln = ""; OBJ_obj2txt(objbuf, sizeof objbuf, oid, 1); if (BIO_printf(out, "%s (%s)", ln, objbuf) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } static int asn1_print_obstring(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, int indent) { if (str->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) { if (BIO_printf(out, " (%ld unused bits)\n", str->flags & 0x7) <= 0) return 0; } else if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0) return 0; if ((str->length > 0) && BIO_dump_indent(out, (const char *)str->data, str->length, indent + 2) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const char *fname, const char *sname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { long utype; ASN1_STRING *str; int ret = 1, needlf = 1; const char *pname; const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf; pf = it->funcs; if (!asn1_print_fsname(out, indent, fname, sname, pctx)) return 0; if (pf && pf->prim_print) return pf->prim_print(out, fld, it, indent, pctx); if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) { str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld; utype = str->type & ~V_ASN1_NEG; } else { utype = it->utype; if (utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) str = NULL; else str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld; } if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) { ASN1_TYPE *atype = (ASN1_TYPE *)*fld; utype = atype->type; fld = &atype->value.asn1_value; str = (ASN1_STRING *)*fld; if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_ANY_TYPE) pname = NULL; else pname = ASN1_tag2str(utype); } else { if (pctx->flags & ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_TYPE) pname = ASN1_tag2str(utype); else pname = NULL; } if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL) { if (BIO_puts(out, "NULL\n") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (pname) { if (BIO_puts(out, pname) <= 0) return 0; if (BIO_puts(out, ":") <= 0) return 0; } switch (utype) { case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: { int boolval = *(int *)fld; if (boolval == -1) boolval = it->size; ret = asn1_print_boolean(out, boolval); } break; case V_ASN1_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: ret = asn1_print_integer(out, str); break; case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: ret = ASN1_UTCTIME_print(out, str); break; case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: ret = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, str); break; case V_ASN1_OBJECT: ret = asn1_print_oid(out, (const ASN1_OBJECT *)*fld); break; case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: ret = asn1_print_obstring(out, str, indent); needlf = 0; break; case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: case V_ASN1_SET: case V_ASN1_OTHER: if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0) return 0; if (ASN1_parse_dump(out, str->data, str->length, indent, 0) <= 0) ret = 0; needlf = 0; break; default: ret = ASN1_STRING_print_ex(out, str, pctx->str_flags); } if (!ret) return 0; if (needlf && BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_gentm.c0000644000000000000000000001640113176625656016024 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * GENERALIZEDTIME implementation. Based on UTCTIME */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "asn1_locl.h" int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d) { static const int min[9] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; static const int max[9] = { 99, 99, 12, 31, 23, 59, 59, 12, 59 }; char *a; int n, i, l, o; if (d->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return (0); l = d->length; a = (char *)d->data; o = 0; /* * GENERALIZEDTIME is similar to UTCTIME except the year is represented * as YYYY. This stuff treats everything as a two digit field so make * first two fields 00 to 99 */ if (l < 13) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { if ((i == 6) && ((a[o] == 'Z') || (a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-'))) { i++; if (tm) tm->tm_sec = 0; break; } if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = a[o] - '0'; if (++o > l) goto err; if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0'; if (++o > l) goto err; if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err; if (tm) { switch (i) { case 0: tm->tm_year = n * 100 - 1900; break; case 1: tm->tm_year += n; break; case 2: tm->tm_mon = n - 1; break; case 3: tm->tm_mday = n; break; case 4: tm->tm_hour = n; break; case 5: tm->tm_min = n; break; case 6: tm->tm_sec = n; break; } } } /* * Optional fractional seconds: decimal point followed by one or more * digits. */ if (a[o] == '.') { if (++o > l) goto err; i = o; while ((a[o] >= '0') && (a[o] <= '9') && (o <= l)) o++; /* Must have at least one digit after decimal point */ if (i == o) goto err; } if (a[o] == 'Z') o++; else if ((a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-')) { int offsign = a[o] == '-' ? 1 : -1, offset = 0; o++; if (o + 4 > l) goto err; for (i = 7; i < 9; i++) { if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = a[o] - '0'; o++; if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0'; if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err; if (tm) { if (i == 7) offset = n * 3600; else if (i == 8) offset += n * 60; } o++; } if (offset && !OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(tm, 0, offset * offsign)) return 0; } else if (a[o]) { /* Missing time zone information. */ goto err; } return (o == l); err: return (0); } int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d) { return asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(NULL, d); } int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str) { ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME t; t.type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME; t.length = strlen(str); t.data = (unsigned char *)str; if (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(&t)) { if (s != NULL) { if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)s, str, t.length)) return 0; s->type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME; } return (1); } else return (0); } ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, time_t t) { return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, 0, 0); } ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec) { char *p; struct tm *ts; struct tm data; size_t len = 20; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *tmps = NULL; if (s == NULL) tmps = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new(); else tmps = s; if (tmps == NULL) return NULL; ts = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data); if (ts == NULL) goto err; if (offset_day || offset_sec) { if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec)) goto err; } p = (char *)tmps->data; if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)tmps->length < len)) { p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (p == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(tmps->data); tmps->data = (unsigned char *)p; } BIO_snprintf(p, len, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", ts->tm_year + 1900, ts->tm_mon + 1, ts->tm_mday, ts->tm_hour, ts->tm_min, ts->tm_sec); tmps->length = strlen(p); tmps->type = V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC_not ebcdic2ascii(tmps->data, tmps->data, tmps->length); #endif return tmps; err: if (s == NULL) ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(tmps); return NULL; } const char *_asn1_mon[12] = { "Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun", "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec" }; int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *tm) { char *v; int gmt = 0; int i; int y = 0, M = 0, d = 0, h = 0, m = 0, s = 0; char *f = NULL; int f_len = 0; i = tm->length; v = (char *)tm->data; if (i < 12) goto err; if (v[i - 1] == 'Z') gmt = 1; for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) if ((v[i] > '9') || (v[i] < '0')) goto err; y = (v[0] - '0') * 1000 + (v[1] - '0') * 100 + (v[2] - '0') * 10 + (v[3] - '0'); M = (v[4] - '0') * 10 + (v[5] - '0'); if ((M > 12) || (M < 1)) goto err; d = (v[6] - '0') * 10 + (v[7] - '0'); h = (v[8] - '0') * 10 + (v[9] - '0'); m = (v[10] - '0') * 10 + (v[11] - '0'); if (tm->length >= 14 && (v[12] >= '0') && (v[12] <= '9') && (v[13] >= '0') && (v[13] <= '9')) { s = (v[12] - '0') * 10 + (v[13] - '0'); /* Check for fractions of seconds. */ if (tm->length >= 15 && v[14] == '.') { int l = tm->length; f = &v[14]; /* The decimal point. */ f_len = 1; while (14 + f_len < l && f[f_len] >= '0' && f[f_len] <= '9') ++f_len; } } if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d%.*s %d%s", _asn1_mon[M - 1], d, h, m, s, f_len, f, y, (gmt) ? " GMT" : "") <= 0) return (0); else return (1); err: BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14); return (0); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_type.c0000644000000000000000000000662113176625656015676 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "asn1_locl.h" int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a) { if ((a->value.ptr != NULL) || (a->type == V_ASN1_NULL)) return (a->type); else return (0); } void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value) { if (a->value.ptr != NULL) { ASN1_TYPE **tmp_a = &a; asn1_primitive_free((ASN1_VALUE **)tmp_a, NULL, 0); } a->type = type; if (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) a->value.boolean = value ? 0xff : 0; else a->value.ptr = value; } int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value) { if (!value || (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) { void *p = (void *)value; ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, p); } else if (type == V_ASN1_OBJECT) { ASN1_OBJECT *odup; odup = OBJ_dup(value); if (!odup) return 0; ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, odup); } else { ASN1_STRING *sdup; sdup = ASN1_STRING_dup(value); if (!sdup) return 0; ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, sdup); } return 1; } /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b) { int result = -1; if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type) return -1; switch (a->type) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); break; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean; break; case V_ASN1_NULL: result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ break; case V_ASN1_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: case V_ASN1_SET: case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: case V_ASN1_T61STRING: case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING: case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING: case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: case V_ASN1_OTHER: default: result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr, (ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr); break; } return result; } ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *s, ASN1_TYPE **t) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct; ASN1_TYPE *rt; oct = ASN1_item_pack(s, it, NULL); if (oct == NULL) return NULL; if (t && *t) { rt = *t; } else { rt = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (rt == NULL) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct); return NULL; } if (t) *t = rt; } ASN1_TYPE_set(rt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, oct); return rt; } void *ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_TYPE *t) { if (t == NULL || t->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || t->value.sequence == NULL) return NULL; return ASN1_item_unpack(t->value.sequence, it); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c0000644000000000000000000002560513176625656016047 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include static int traverse_string(const unsigned char *p, int len, int inform, int (*rfunc) (unsigned long value, void *in), void *arg); static int in_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg); static int out_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg); static int type_str(unsigned long value, void *arg); static int cpy_asc(unsigned long value, void *arg); static int cpy_bmp(unsigned long value, void *arg); static int cpy_univ(unsigned long value, void *arg); static int cpy_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg); static int is_numeric(unsigned long value); static int is_printable(unsigned long value); /* * These functions take a string in UTF8, ASCII or multibyte form and a mask * of permissible ASN1 string types. It then works out the minimal type * (using the order Numeric < Printable < IA5 < T61 < BMP < Universal < UTF8) * and creates a string of the correct type with the supplied data. Yes this is * horrible: it has to be :-( The 'ncopy' form checks minimum and maximum * size limits too. */ int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask) { return ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(out, in, len, inform, mask, 0, 0); } int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask, long minsize, long maxsize) { int str_type; int ret; char free_out; int outform, outlen = 0; ASN1_STRING *dest; unsigned char *p; int nchar; char strbuf[32]; int (*cpyfunc) (unsigned long, void *) = NULL; if (len == -1) len = strlen((const char *)in); if (!mask) mask = DIRSTRING_TYPE; /* First do a string check and work out the number of characters */ switch (inform) { case MBSTRING_BMP: if (len & 1) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH); return -1; } nchar = len >> 1; break; case MBSTRING_UNIV: if (len & 3) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH); return -1; } nchar = len >> 2; break; case MBSTRING_UTF8: nchar = 0; /* This counts the characters and does utf8 syntax checking */ ret = traverse_string(in, len, MBSTRING_UTF8, in_utf8, &nchar); if (ret < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING); return -1; } break; case MBSTRING_ASC: nchar = len; break; default: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT); return -1; } if ((minsize > 0) && (nchar < minsize)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT); BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof strbuf, "%ld", minsize); ERR_add_error_data(2, "minsize=", strbuf); return -1; } if ((maxsize > 0) && (nchar > maxsize)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG); BIO_snprintf(strbuf, sizeof strbuf, "%ld", maxsize); ERR_add_error_data(2, "maxsize=", strbuf); return -1; } /* Now work out minimal type (if any) */ if (traverse_string(in, len, inform, type_str, &mask) < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS); return -1; } /* Now work out output format and string type */ outform = MBSTRING_ASC; if (mask & B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) str_type = V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING; else if (mask & B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) str_type = V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING; else if (mask & B_ASN1_IA5STRING) str_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; else if (mask & B_ASN1_T61STRING) str_type = V_ASN1_T61STRING; else if (mask & B_ASN1_BMPSTRING) { str_type = V_ASN1_BMPSTRING; outform = MBSTRING_BMP; } else if (mask & B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) { str_type = V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING; outform = MBSTRING_UNIV; } else { str_type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING; outform = MBSTRING_UTF8; } if (!out) return str_type; if (*out) { free_out = 0; dest = *out; OPENSSL_free(dest->data); dest->data = NULL; dest->length = 0; dest->type = str_type; } else { free_out = 1; dest = ASN1_STRING_type_new(str_type); if (dest == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } *out = dest; } /* If both the same type just copy across */ if (inform == outform) { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dest, in, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } return str_type; } /* Work out how much space the destination will need */ switch (outform) { case MBSTRING_ASC: outlen = nchar; cpyfunc = cpy_asc; break; case MBSTRING_BMP: outlen = nchar << 1; cpyfunc = cpy_bmp; break; case MBSTRING_UNIV: outlen = nchar << 2; cpyfunc = cpy_univ; break; case MBSTRING_UTF8: outlen = 0; traverse_string(in, len, inform, out_utf8, &outlen); cpyfunc = cpy_utf8; break; } if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen + 1)) == NULL) { if (free_out) ASN1_STRING_free(dest); ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } dest->length = outlen; dest->data = p; p[outlen] = 0; traverse_string(in, len, inform, cpyfunc, &p); return str_type; } /* * This function traverses a string and passes the value of each character to * an optional function along with a void * argument. */ static int traverse_string(const unsigned char *p, int len, int inform, int (*rfunc) (unsigned long value, void *in), void *arg) { unsigned long value; int ret; while (len) { if (inform == MBSTRING_ASC) { value = *p++; len--; } else if (inform == MBSTRING_BMP) { value = *p++ << 8; value |= *p++; len -= 2; } else if (inform == MBSTRING_UNIV) { value = ((unsigned long)*p++) << 24; value |= ((unsigned long)*p++) << 16; value |= *p++ << 8; value |= *p++; len -= 4; } else { ret = UTF8_getc(p, len, &value); if (ret < 0) return -1; len -= ret; p += ret; } if (rfunc) { ret = rfunc(value, arg); if (ret <= 0) return ret; } } return 1; } /* Various utility functions for traverse_string */ /* Just count number of characters */ static int in_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg) { int *nchar; nchar = arg; (*nchar)++; return 1; } /* Determine size of output as a UTF8 String */ static int out_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg) { int *outlen; outlen = arg; *outlen += UTF8_putc(NULL, -1, value); return 1; } /* * Determine the "type" of a string: check each character against a supplied * "mask". */ static int type_str(unsigned long value, void *arg) { unsigned long types; types = *((unsigned long *)arg); if ((types & B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) && !is_numeric(value)) types &= ~B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING; if ((types & B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) && !is_printable(value)) types &= ~B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING; if ((types & B_ASN1_IA5STRING) && (value > 127)) types &= ~B_ASN1_IA5STRING; if ((types & B_ASN1_T61STRING) && (value > 0xff)) types &= ~B_ASN1_T61STRING; if ((types & B_ASN1_BMPSTRING) && (value > 0xffff)) types &= ~B_ASN1_BMPSTRING; if (!types) return -1; *((unsigned long *)arg) = types; return 1; } /* Copy one byte per character ASCII like strings */ static int cpy_asc(unsigned long value, void *arg) { unsigned char **p, *q; p = arg; q = *p; *q = (unsigned char)value; (*p)++; return 1; } /* Copy two byte per character BMPStrings */ static int cpy_bmp(unsigned long value, void *arg) { unsigned char **p, *q; p = arg; q = *p; *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 8) & 0xff); *q = (unsigned char)(value & 0xff); *p += 2; return 1; } /* Copy four byte per character UniversalStrings */ static int cpy_univ(unsigned long value, void *arg) { unsigned char **p, *q; p = arg; q = *p; *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 24) & 0xff); *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 16) & 0xff); *q++ = (unsigned char)((value >> 8) & 0xff); *q = (unsigned char)(value & 0xff); *p += 4; return 1; } /* Copy to a UTF8String */ static int cpy_utf8(unsigned long value, void *arg) { unsigned char **p; int ret; p = arg; /* We already know there is enough room so pass 0xff as the length */ ret = UTF8_putc(*p, 0xff, value); *p += ret; return 1; } /* Return 1 if the character is permitted in a PrintableString */ static int is_printable(unsigned long value) { int ch; if (value > 0x7f) return 0; ch = (int)value; /* * Note: we can't use 'isalnum' because certain accented characters may * count as alphanumeric in some environments. */ #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) return 1; if ((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) return 1; if ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) return 1; if ((ch == ' ') || strchr("'()+,-./:=?", ch)) return 1; #else /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ if ((ch >= os_toascii['a']) && (ch <= os_toascii['z'])) return 1; if ((ch >= os_toascii['A']) && (ch <= os_toascii['Z'])) return 1; if ((ch >= os_toascii['0']) && (ch <= os_toascii['9'])) return 1; if ((ch == os_toascii[' ']) || strchr("'()+,-./:=?", os_toebcdic[ch])) return 1; #endif /* CHARSET_EBCDIC */ return 0; } /* Return 1 if the character is a digit or space */ static int is_numeric(unsigned long value) { int ch; if (value > 0x7f) return 0; ch = (int)value; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if (!isdigit(ch) && ch != ' ') return 0; #else if (ch > os_toascii['9']) return 0; if (ch < os_toascii['0'] && ch != os_toascii[' ']) return 0; #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c0000644000000000000000000001260513176625656016223 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "asn1_locl.h" int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, unsigned char *d, int len) { return ASN1_STRING_set(x, d, len); } int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp) { int ret, j, bits, len; unsigned char *p, *d; if (a == NULL) return (0); len = a->length; if (len > 0) { if (a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) { bits = (int)a->flags & 0x07; } else { for (; len > 0; len--) { if (a->data[len - 1]) break; } j = a->data[len - 1]; if (j & 0x01) bits = 0; else if (j & 0x02) bits = 1; else if (j & 0x04) bits = 2; else if (j & 0x08) bits = 3; else if (j & 0x10) bits = 4; else if (j & 0x20) bits = 5; else if (j & 0x40) bits = 6; else if (j & 0x80) bits = 7; else bits = 0; /* should not happen */ } } else bits = 0; ret = 1 + len; if (pp == NULL) return (ret); p = *pp; *(p++) = (unsigned char)bits; d = a->data; if (len > 0) { memcpy(p, d, len); p += len; p[-1] &= (0xff << bits); } *pp = p; return (ret); } ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { ASN1_BIT_STRING *ret = NULL; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *s; int i; if (len < 1) { i = ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT; goto err; } if (len > INT_MAX) { i = ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG; goto err; } if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) { if ((ret = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); } else ret = (*a); p = *pp; i = *(p++); if (i > 7) { i = ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT; goto err; } /* * We do this to preserve the settings. If we modify the settings, via * the _set_bit function, we will recalculate on output */ ret->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); /* clear */ ret->flags |= (ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | i); /* set */ if (len-- > 1) { /* using one because of the bits left byte */ s = OPENSSL_malloc((int)len); if (s == NULL) { i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } memcpy(s, p, (int)len); s[len - 1] &= (0xff << i); p += len; } else s = NULL; ret->length = (int)len; OPENSSL_free(ret->data); ret->data = s; ret->type = V_ASN1_BIT_STRING; if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; *pp = p; return (ret); err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING, i); if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)) ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret); return (NULL); } /* * These next 2 functions from Goetz Babin-Ebell */ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value) { int w, v, iv; unsigned char *c; w = n / 8; v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07)); iv = ~v; if (!value) v = 0; if (a == NULL) return 0; a->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); /* clear, set on write */ if ((a->length < (w + 1)) || (a->data == NULL)) { if (!value) return (1); /* Don't need to set */ c = OPENSSL_clear_realloc(a->data, a->length, w + 1); if (c == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (w + 1 - a->length > 0) memset(c + a->length, 0, w + 1 - a->length); a->data = c; a->length = w + 1; } a->data[w] = ((a->data[w]) & iv) | v; while ((a->length > 0) && (a->data[a->length - 1] == 0)) a->length--; return (1); } int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n) { int w, v; w = n / 8; v = 1 << (7 - (n & 0x07)); if ((a == NULL) || (a->length < (w + 1)) || (a->data == NULL)) return (0); return ((a->data[w] & v) != 0); } /* * Checks if the given bit string contains only bits specified by * the flags vector. Returns 0 if there is at least one bit set in 'a' * which is not specified in 'flags', 1 otherwise. * 'len' is the length of 'flags'. */ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, const unsigned char *flags, int flags_len) { int i, ok; /* Check if there is one bit set at all. */ if (!a || !a->data) return 1; /* * Check each byte of the internal representation of the bit string. */ ok = 1; for (i = 0; i < a->length && ok; ++i) { unsigned char mask = i < flags_len ? ~flags[i] : 0xff; /* We are done if there is an unneeded bit set. */ ok = (a->data[i] & mask) == 0; } return ok; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c0000644000000000000000000000503313176625656015704 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/bn_int.h" /* Number of octets per line */ #define ASN1_BUF_PRINT_WIDTH 15 /* Maximum indent */ #define ASN1_PRINT_MAX_INDENT 128 int ASN1_buf_print(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int indent) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) { if ((i % ASN1_BUF_PRINT_WIDTH) == 0) { if (i > 0 && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) return 0; if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, ASN1_PRINT_MAX_INDENT)) return 0; } /* * Use colon separators for each octet for compatibility as * this function is used to print out key components. */ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", buf[i], (i == buflen - 1) ? "" : ":") <= 0) return 0; } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } int ASN1_bn_print(BIO *bp, const char *number, const BIGNUM *num, unsigned char *ign, int indent) { int n, rv = 0; const char *neg; unsigned char *buf = NULL, *tmp = NULL; int buflen; if (num == NULL) return 1; neg = BN_is_negative(num) ? "-" : ""; if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, ASN1_PRINT_MAX_INDENT)) return 0; if (BN_is_zero(num)) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s 0\n", number) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (BN_num_bytes(num) <= BN_BYTES) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s %s%lu (%s0x%lx)\n", number, neg, (unsigned long)bn_get_words(num)[0], neg, (unsigned long)bn_get_words(num)[0]) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } buflen = BN_num_bytes(num) + 1; buf = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen); if (buf == NULL) goto err; buf[0] = 0; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s%s\n", number, (neg[0] == '-') ? " (Negative)" : "") <= 0) goto err; n = BN_bn2bin(num, buf + 1); if (buf[1] & 0x80) n++; else tmp++; if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, tmp, n, indent + 4) == 0) goto err; rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, buflen); return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c0000644000000000000000000005520413176625656016111 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG 0x10000 #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|1) #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|2) #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_TAG (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|3) #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_BITWRAP (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|4) #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_OCTWRAP (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|5) #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SEQWRAP (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|6) #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SETWRAP (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|7) #define ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT (ASN1_GEN_FLAG|8) #define ASN1_GEN_STR(str,val) {str, sizeof(str) - 1, val} #define ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX 20 /* Maximum number of nested sequences */ #define ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH 50 /* Input formats */ /* ASCII: default */ #define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII 1 /* UTF8 */ #define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8 2 /* Hex */ #define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX 3 /* List of bits */ #define ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST 4 struct tag_name_st { const char *strnam; int len; int tag; }; typedef struct { int exp_tag; int exp_class; int exp_constructed; int exp_pad; long exp_len; } tag_exp_type; typedef struct { int imp_tag; int imp_class; int utype; int format; const char *str; tag_exp_type exp_list[ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX]; int exp_count; } tag_exp_arg; static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth, int *perr); static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr); static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr); static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class, int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok); static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass); static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth, int *perr); static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype); static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(const char *str, CONF *nconf) { X509V3_CTX cnf; if (!nconf) return ASN1_generate_v3(str, NULL); X509V3_set_nconf(&cnf, nconf); return ASN1_generate_v3(str, &cnf); } ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf) { int err = 0; ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err); if (err) ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, err); return ret; } static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth, int *perr) { ASN1_TYPE *ret; tag_exp_arg asn1_tags; tag_exp_type *etmp; int i, len; unsigned char *orig_der = NULL, *new_der = NULL; const unsigned char *cpy_start; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *cp; int cpy_len; long hdr_len = 0; int hdr_constructed = 0, hdr_tag, hdr_class; int r; asn1_tags.imp_tag = -1; asn1_tags.imp_class = -1; asn1_tags.format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII; asn1_tags.exp_count = 0; if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) { *perr = ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG; return NULL; } if ((asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SET)) { if (!cnf) { *perr = ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG; return NULL; } if (depth >= ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH) { *perr = ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING; return NULL; } ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf, depth, perr); } else ret = asn1_str2type(asn1_tags.str, asn1_tags.format, asn1_tags.utype); if (!ret) return NULL; /* If no tagging return base type */ if ((asn1_tags.imp_tag == -1) && (asn1_tags.exp_count == 0)) return ret; /* Generate the encoding */ cpy_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(ret, &orig_der); ASN1_TYPE_free(ret); ret = NULL; /* Set point to start copying for modified encoding */ cpy_start = orig_der; /* Do we need IMPLICIT tagging? */ if (asn1_tags.imp_tag != -1) { /* If IMPLICIT we will replace the underlying tag */ /* Skip existing tag+len */ r = ASN1_get_object(&cpy_start, &hdr_len, &hdr_tag, &hdr_class, cpy_len); if (r & 0x80) goto err; /* Update copy length */ cpy_len -= cpy_start - orig_der; /* * For IMPLICIT tagging the length should match the original length * and constructed flag should be consistent. */ if (r & 0x1) { /* Indefinite length constructed */ hdr_constructed = 2; hdr_len = 0; } else /* Just retain constructed flag */ hdr_constructed = r & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; /* * Work out new length with IMPLICIT tag: ignore constructed because * it will mess up if indefinite length */ len = ASN1_object_size(0, hdr_len, asn1_tags.imp_tag); } else len = cpy_len; /* Work out length in any EXPLICIT, starting from end */ for (i = 0, etmp = asn1_tags.exp_list + asn1_tags.exp_count - 1; i < asn1_tags.exp_count; i++, etmp--) { /* Content length: number of content octets + any padding */ len += etmp->exp_pad; etmp->exp_len = len; /* Total object length: length including new header */ len = ASN1_object_size(0, len, etmp->exp_tag); } /* Allocate buffer for new encoding */ new_der = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (new_der == NULL) goto err; /* Generate tagged encoding */ p = new_der; /* Output explicit tags first */ for (i = 0, etmp = asn1_tags.exp_list; i < asn1_tags.exp_count; i++, etmp++) { ASN1_put_object(&p, etmp->exp_constructed, etmp->exp_len, etmp->exp_tag, etmp->exp_class); if (etmp->exp_pad) *p++ = 0; } /* If IMPLICIT, output tag */ if (asn1_tags.imp_tag != -1) { if (asn1_tags.imp_class == V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL && (asn1_tags.imp_tag == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || asn1_tags.imp_tag == V_ASN1_SET)) hdr_constructed = V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; ASN1_put_object(&p, hdr_constructed, hdr_len, asn1_tags.imp_tag, asn1_tags.imp_class); } /* Copy across original encoding */ memcpy(p, cpy_start, cpy_len); cp = new_der; /* Obtain new ASN1_TYPE structure */ ret = d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &cp, len); err: OPENSSL_free(orig_der); OPENSSL_free(new_der); return ret; } static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr) { tag_exp_arg *arg = bitstr; int i; int utype; int vlen = 0; const char *p, *vstart = NULL; int tmp_tag, tmp_class; if (elem == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) { /* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */ if (*p == ':') { vstart = p + 1; vlen = len - (vstart - elem); len = p - elem; break; } } utype = asn1_str2tag(elem, len); if (utype == -1) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG); ERR_add_error_data(2, "tag=", elem); return -1; } /* If this is not a modifier mark end of string and exit */ if (!(utype & ASN1_GEN_FLAG)) { arg->utype = utype; arg->str = vstart; /* If no value and not end of string, error */ if (!vstart && elem[len]) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE); return -1; } return 0; } switch (utype) { case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP: /* Check for illegal multiple IMPLICIT tagging */ if (arg->imp_tag != -1) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING); return -1; } if (!parse_tagging(vstart, vlen, &arg->imp_tag, &arg->imp_class)) return -1; break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP: if (!parse_tagging(vstart, vlen, &tmp_tag, &tmp_class)) return -1; if (!append_exp(arg, tmp_tag, tmp_class, 1, 0, 0)) return -1; break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SEQWRAP: if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 1, 0, 1)) return -1; break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SETWRAP: if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_SET, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 1, 0, 1)) return -1; break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_BITWRAP: if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_BIT_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0, 1, 1)) return -1; break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_OCTWRAP: if (!append_exp(arg, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0, 0, 1)) return -1; break; case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT: if (!vstart) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT); return -1; } if (strncmp(vstart, "ASCII", 5) == 0) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII; else if (strncmp(vstart, "UTF8", 4) == 0) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8; else if (strncmp(vstart, "HEX", 3) == 0) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX; else if (strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 7) == 0) arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST; else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT); return -1; } break; } return 1; } static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass) { char erch[2]; long tag_num; char *eptr; if (!vstart) return 0; tag_num = strtoul(vstart, &eptr, 10); /* Check we haven't gone past max length: should be impossible */ if (eptr && *eptr && (eptr > vstart + vlen)) return 0; if (tag_num < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING, ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER); return 0; } *ptag = tag_num; /* If we have non numeric characters, parse them */ if (eptr) vlen -= eptr - vstart; else vlen = 0; if (vlen) { switch (*eptr) { case 'U': *pclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; break; case 'A': *pclass = V_ASN1_APPLICATION; break; case 'P': *pclass = V_ASN1_PRIVATE; break; case 'C': *pclass = V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC; break; default: erch[0] = *eptr; erch[1] = 0; ASN1err(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING, ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Char=", erch); return 0; } } else *pclass = V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC; return 1; } /* Handle multiple types: SET and SEQUENCE */ static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth, int *perr) { ASN1_TYPE *ret = NULL; STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *sk = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect = NULL; unsigned char *der = NULL; int derlen; int i; sk = sk_ASN1_TYPE_new_null(); if (!sk) goto bad; if (section) { if (!cnf) goto bad; sect = X509V3_get_section(cnf, (char *)section); if (!sect) goto bad; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) { ASN1_TYPE *typ = generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf, depth + 1, perr); if (!typ) goto bad; if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(sk, typ)) goto bad; } } /* * Now we has a STACK of the components, convert to the correct form */ if (utype == V_ASN1_SET) derlen = i2d_ASN1_SET_ANY(sk, &der); else derlen = i2d_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(sk, &der); if (derlen < 0) goto bad; if ((ret = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto bad; if ((ret->value.asn1_string = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype)) == NULL) goto bad; ret->type = utype; ret->value.asn1_string->data = der; ret->value.asn1_string->length = derlen; der = NULL; bad: OPENSSL_free(der); sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(sk, ASN1_TYPE_free); X509V3_section_free(cnf, sect); return ret; } static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class, int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok) { tag_exp_type *exp_tmp; /* Can only have IMPLICIT if permitted */ if ((arg->imp_tag != -1) && !imp_ok) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG); return 0; } if (arg->exp_count == ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP, ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED); return 0; } exp_tmp = &arg->exp_list[arg->exp_count++]; /* * If IMPLICIT set tag to implicit value then reset implicit tag since it * has been used. */ if (arg->imp_tag != -1) { exp_tmp->exp_tag = arg->imp_tag; exp_tmp->exp_class = arg->imp_class; arg->imp_tag = -1; arg->imp_class = -1; } else { exp_tmp->exp_tag = exp_tag; exp_tmp->exp_class = exp_class; } exp_tmp->exp_constructed = exp_constructed; exp_tmp->exp_pad = exp_pad; return 1; } static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len) { unsigned int i; static const struct tag_name_st *tntmp, tnst[] = { ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOL", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN), ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOLEAN", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN), ASN1_GEN_STR("NULL", V_ASN1_NULL), ASN1_GEN_STR("INT", V_ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_GEN_STR("INTEGER", V_ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_GEN_STR("ENUM", V_ASN1_ENUMERATED), ASN1_GEN_STR("ENUMERATED", V_ASN1_ENUMERATED), ASN1_GEN_STR("OID", V_ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_GEN_STR("OBJECT", V_ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_GEN_STR("UTCTIME", V_ASN1_UTCTIME), ASN1_GEN_STR("UTC", V_ASN1_UTCTIME), ASN1_GEN_STR("GENERALIZEDTIME", V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_GEN_STR("GENTIME", V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_GEN_STR("OCT", V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("OCTETSTRING", V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("BITSTR", V_ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("BITSTRING", V_ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("UNIVERSALSTRING", V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("UNIV", V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("IA5", V_ASN1_IA5STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("IA5STRING", V_ASN1_IA5STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("UTF8", V_ASN1_UTF8STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("UTF8String", V_ASN1_UTF8STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("BMP", V_ASN1_BMPSTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("BMPSTRING", V_ASN1_BMPSTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("VISIBLESTRING", V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("VISIBLE", V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("PRINTABLESTRING", V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("PRINTABLE", V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("T61", V_ASN1_T61STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("T61STRING", V_ASN1_T61STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("TELETEXSTRING", V_ASN1_T61STRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("GeneralString", V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("GENSTR", V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("NUMERIC", V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING), ASN1_GEN_STR("NUMERICSTRING", V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING), /* Special cases */ ASN1_GEN_STR("SEQUENCE", V_ASN1_SEQUENCE), ASN1_GEN_STR("SEQ", V_ASN1_SEQUENCE), ASN1_GEN_STR("SET", V_ASN1_SET), /* type modifiers */ /* Explicit tag */ ASN1_GEN_STR("EXP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP), ASN1_GEN_STR("EXPLICIT", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_EXP), /* Implicit tag */ ASN1_GEN_STR("IMP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP), ASN1_GEN_STR("IMPLICIT", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_IMP), /* OCTET STRING wrapper */ ASN1_GEN_STR("OCTWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_OCTWRAP), /* SEQUENCE wrapper */ ASN1_GEN_STR("SEQWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SEQWRAP), /* SET wrapper */ ASN1_GEN_STR("SETWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_SETWRAP), /* BIT STRING wrapper */ ASN1_GEN_STR("BITWRAP", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_BITWRAP), ASN1_GEN_STR("FORM", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT), ASN1_GEN_STR("FORMAT", ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT), }; if (len == -1) len = strlen(tagstr); tntmp = tnst; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tnst); i++, tntmp++) { if ((len == tntmp->len) && (strncmp(tntmp->strnam, tagstr, len) == 0)) return tntmp->tag; } return -1; } static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype) { ASN1_TYPE *atmp = NULL; CONF_VALUE vtmp; unsigned char *rdata; long rdlen; int no_unused = 1; if ((atmp = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (!str) str = ""; switch (utype) { case V_ASN1_NULL: if (str && *str) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE); goto bad_form; } break; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT); goto bad_form; } vtmp.name = NULL; vtmp.section = NULL; vtmp.value = (char *)str; if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(&vtmp, &atmp->value.boolean)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN); goto bad_str; } break; case V_ASN1_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT); goto bad_form; } if ((atmp->value.integer = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, str)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER); goto bad_str; } break; case V_ASN1_OBJECT: if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT); goto bad_form; } if ((atmp->value.object = OBJ_txt2obj(str, 0)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT); goto bad_str; } break; case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: if (format != ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT); goto bad_form; } if ((atmp->value.asn1_string = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto bad_str; } if (!ASN1_STRING_set(atmp->value.asn1_string, str, -1)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto bad_str; } atmp->value.asn1_string->type = utype; if (!ASN1_TIME_check(atmp->value.asn1_string)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE); goto bad_str; } break; case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: case V_ASN1_T61STRING: case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) format = MBSTRING_ASC; else if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8) format = MBSTRING_UTF8; else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT); goto bad_form; } if (ASN1_mbstring_copy(&atmp->value.asn1_string, (unsigned char *)str, -1, format, ASN1_tag2bit(utype)) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto bad_str; } break; case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: if ((atmp->value.asn1_string = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto bad_form; } if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX) { if ((rdata = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(str, &rdlen)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX); goto bad_str; } atmp->value.asn1_string->data = rdata; atmp->value.asn1_string->length = rdlen; atmp->value.asn1_string->type = utype; } else if (format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII) ASN1_STRING_set(atmp->value.asn1_string, str, -1); else if ((format == ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST) && (utype == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) { if (!CONF_parse_list (str, ',', 1, bitstr_cb, atmp->value.bit_string)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR); goto bad_str; } no_unused = 0; } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT); goto bad_form; } if ((utype == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) && no_unused) { atmp->value.asn1_string->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); atmp->value.asn1_string->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; } break; default: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE); goto bad_str; } atmp->type = utype; return atmp; bad_str: ERR_add_error_data(2, "string=", str); bad_form: ASN1_TYPE_free(atmp); return NULL; } static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr) { long bitnum; char *eptr; if (!elem) return 0; bitnum = strtoul(elem, &eptr, 10); if (eptr && *eptr && (eptr != elem + len)) return 0; if (bitnum < 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB, ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER); return 0; } if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(bitstr, bitnum, 1)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } static int mask_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) { unsigned long *pmask = arg, tmpmask; int tag; if (elem == NULL) return 0; if ((len == 3) && (strncmp(elem, "DIR", 3) == 0)) { *pmask |= B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING; return 1; } tag = asn1_str2tag(elem, len); if (!tag || (tag & ASN1_GEN_FLAG)) return 0; tmpmask = ASN1_tag2bit(tag); if (!tmpmask) return 0; *pmask |= tmpmask; return 1; } int ASN1_str2mask(const char *str, unsigned long *pmask) { *pmask = 0; return CONF_parse_list(str, '|', 1, mask_cb, pmask); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c0000644000000000000000000000336413176625656015707 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include /* Print out an SPKI */ int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; ASN1_IA5STRING *chal; ASN1_OBJECT *spkioid; int i, n; char *s; BIO_printf(out, "Netscape SPKI:\n"); X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&spkioid, NULL, NULL, NULL, spki->spkac->pubkey); i = OBJ_obj2nid(spkioid); BIO_printf(out, " Public Key Algorithm: %s\n", (i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i)); pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(spki->spkac->pubkey); if (!pkey) BIO_printf(out, " Unable to load public key\n"); else { EVP_PKEY_print_public(out, pkey, 4, NULL); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } chal = spki->spkac->challenge; if (chal->length) BIO_printf(out, " Challenge String: %s\n", chal->data); i = OBJ_obj2nid(spki->sig_algor.algorithm); BIO_printf(out, " Signature Algorithm: %s", (i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i)); n = spki->signature->length; s = (char *)spki->signature->data; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if ((i % 18) == 0) BIO_write(out, "\n ", 7); BIO_printf(out, "%02x%s", (unsigned char)s[i], ((i + 1) == n) ? "" : ":"); } BIO_write(out, "\n", 1); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c0000644000000000000000000003443113176625656016127 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT), "a2d_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "a2i_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING), "a2i_ASN1_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP), "append_exp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT), "ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB), "asn1_cb"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN), "asn1_check_tlen"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT), "asn1_collect"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE), "asn1_d2i_ex_primitive"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP), "ASN1_d2i_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO), "asn1_d2i_read_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST), "ASN1_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB), "asn1_do_adb"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_LOCK), "asn1_do_lock"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP), "ASN1_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I), "asn1_ex_c2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END), "asn1_find_end"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ), "ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3), "ASN1_generate_v3"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64), "asn1_get_int64"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT), "ASN1_get_object"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_UINT64), "asn1_get_uint64"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_i2d_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP), "ASN1_i2d_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP), "ASN1_item_d2i_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP), "ASN1_item_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I), "asn1_item_embed_d2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW), "asn1_item_embed_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP), "ASN1_item_i2d_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK), "ASN1_item_pack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN), "ASN1_item_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX), "ASN1_item_sign_ctx"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK), "ASN1_item_unpack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY), "ASN1_item_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY), "ASN1_mbstring_ncopy"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW), "ASN1_OBJECT_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA), "asn1_output_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW), "ASN1_PCTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SCTX_NEW), "ASN1_SCTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN), "ASN1_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE), "asn1_str2type"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64), "asn1_string_get_int64"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64), "asn1_string_get_uint64"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET), "ASN1_STRING_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD), "ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN), "asn1_string_to_bn"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW), "ASN1_STRING_type_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I), "asn1_template_ex_d2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW), "asn1_template_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I), "asn1_template_noexp_d2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ), "ASN1_TIME_adj"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING), "ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING), "ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ), "ASN1_UTCTIME_adj"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY), "ASN1_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1), "b64_read_asn1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1), "B64_write_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF), "BIO_new_NDEF"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB), "bitstr_cb"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING), "bn_to_asn1_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "c2i_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "c2i_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF), "c2i_ibuf"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_UINT64_INT), "c2i_uint64_int"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA), "collect_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "d2i_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER), "d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY), "d2i_AutoPrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY), "d2i_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY), "d2i_PublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE), "do_tcreate"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM), "i2d_ASN1_bio_stream"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_DSA_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY), "i2d_EC_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY), "i2d_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY), "i2d_PublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_RSA_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I), "long_c2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT), "oid_module_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING), "parse_tagging"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV), "PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT), "PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET), "PKCS5_pbe_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR), "PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET), "PKCS5_pbkdf2_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_SCRYPT_SET), "pkcs5_scrypt_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1), "SMIME_read_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT), "SMIME_text"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT), "stbl_module_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I), "uint32_c2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I), "uint64_c2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED), "X509_CRL_add0_revoked"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW), "X509_INFO_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE), "x509_name_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I), "x509_name_ex_d2i"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW), "x509_name_ex_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW), "X509_PKEY_new"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT), "adding object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR), "asn1 parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR), "asn1 sig parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR), "aux error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER), "bad object header"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "bmpstring is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "boolean is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER), "cipher has no object identifier"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED), "context not initialised"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG), "data is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED), "depth exceeded"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED), "digest and key type not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR), "encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME), "error getting time"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION), "error loading section"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS), "error setting cipher params"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER), "expecting an integer"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT), "expecting an object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "explicit length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "explicit tag not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING), "field missing"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE), "first num too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG), "header too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT), "illegal bitstring format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN), "illegal boolean"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS), "illegal characters"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT), "illegal format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX), "illegal hex"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG), "illegal implicit tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER), "illegal integer"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE), "illegal negative value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING), "illegal nested tagging"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL), "illegal null"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE), "illegal null value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT), "illegal object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY), "illegal optional any"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE), "illegal options on item template"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING), "illegal padding"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY), "illegal tagged any"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE), "illegal time value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_ZERO_CONTENT), "illegal zero content"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "integer not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG), "integer too large for long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT), "invalid bit string bits left"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH), "invalid bmpstring length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT), "invalid digit"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE), "invalid mime type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER), "invalid modifier"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER), "invalid number"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING), "invalid object encoding"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS), "invalid scrypt parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR), "invalid separator"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_STRING_TABLE_VALUE), "invalid string table value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH), "invalid universalstring length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING), "invalid utf8string"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_VALUE), "invalid value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR), "list error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "mime no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR), "mime parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR), "mime sig parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC), "missing eoc"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER), "missing second number"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE), "missing value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL), "mstring not universal"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG), "mstring wrong tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING), "nested asn1 string"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS), "non hex characters"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA), "not enough data"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE), "no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE), "no matching choice type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE), "no multipart body failure"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY), "no multipart boundary"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE), "no sig content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "null is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "object not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS), "odd number of chars"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE), "second number too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "sequence length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "sequence not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG), "sequence or set needs config"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE), "short line"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE), "sig invalid mime type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED), "streaming not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG), "string too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT), "string too short"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD), "the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "time not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE), "too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LONG), "too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL), "too small"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), "type not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE), "type not primitive"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC), "unexpected eoc"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "universalstring is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT), "unknown format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM), "unknown message digest algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE), "unknown object type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "unknown public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM), "unknown signature algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG), "unknown tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE), "unsupported any defined by type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "unsupported public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE), "unsupported type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE), "wrong integer type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), "wrong public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG), "wrong tag"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(ASN1_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, ASN1_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, ASN1_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c0000644000000000000000000001361413176625656015603 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* UTF8 utilities */ /*- * This parses a UTF8 string one character at a time. It is passed a pointer * to the string and the length of the string. It sets 'value' to the value of * the current character. It returns the number of characters read or a * negative error code: * -1 = string too short * -2 = illegal character * -3 = subsequent characters not of the form 10xxxxxx * -4 = character encoded incorrectly (not minimal length). */ int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long *val) { const unsigned char *p; unsigned long value; int ret; if (len <= 0) return 0; p = str; /* Check syntax and work out the encoded value (if correct) */ if ((*p & 0x80) == 0) { value = *p++ & 0x7f; ret = 1; } else if ((*p & 0xe0) == 0xc0) { if (len < 2) return -1; if ((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80) return -3; value = (*p++ & 0x1f) << 6; value |= *p++ & 0x3f; if (value < 0x80) return -4; ret = 2; } else if ((*p & 0xf0) == 0xe0) { if (len < 3) return -1; if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80)) return -3; value = (*p++ & 0xf) << 12; value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6; value |= *p++ & 0x3f; if (value < 0x800) return -4; ret = 3; } else if ((*p & 0xf8) == 0xf0) { if (len < 4) return -1; if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80)) return -3; value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x7)) << 18; value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 12; value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6; value |= *p++ & 0x3f; if (value < 0x10000) return -4; ret = 4; } else if ((*p & 0xfc) == 0xf8) { if (len < 5) return -1; if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[4] & 0xc0) != 0x80)) return -3; value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3)) << 24; value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 18; value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 12; value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6; value |= *p++ & 0x3f; if (value < 0x200000) return -4; ret = 5; } else if ((*p & 0xfe) == 0xfc) { if (len < 6) return -1; if (((p[1] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[2] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[3] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[4] & 0xc0) != 0x80) || ((p[5] & 0xc0) != 0x80)) return -3; value = ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x1)) << 30; value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 24; value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 18; value |= ((unsigned long)(*p++ & 0x3f)) << 12; value |= (*p++ & 0x3f) << 6; value |= *p++ & 0x3f; if (value < 0x4000000) return -4; ret = 6; } else return -2; *val = value; return ret; } /* * This takes a character 'value' and writes the UTF8 encoded value in 'str' * where 'str' is a buffer containing 'len' characters. Returns the number of * characters written or -1 if 'len' is too small. 'str' can be set to NULL * in which case it just returns the number of characters. It will need at * most 6 characters. */ int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long value) { if (!str) len = 6; /* Maximum we will need */ else if (len <= 0) return -1; if (value < 0x80) { if (str) *str = (unsigned char)value; return 1; } if (value < 0x800) { if (len < 2) return -1; if (str) { *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x1f) | 0xc0); *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80); } return 2; } if (value < 0x10000) { if (len < 3) return -1; if (str) { *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0xf) | 0xe0); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80); } return 3; } if (value < 0x200000) { if (len < 4) return -1; if (str) { *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x7) | 0xf0); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80); } return 4; } if (value < 0x4000000) { if (len < 5) return -1; if (str) { *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 24) & 0x3) | 0xf8); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80); } return 5; } if (len < 6) return -1; if (str) { *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 30) & 0x1) | 0xfc); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 24) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 18) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 12) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str++ = (unsigned char)(((value >> 6) & 0x3f) | 0x80); *str = (unsigned char)((value & 0x3f) | 0x80); } return 6; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_print.c0000644000000000000000000000524713176625656016054 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int len) { int c; int ia5 = 0; int t61 = 0; if (len <= 0) len = -1; if (s == NULL) return (V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING); while ((*s) && (len-- != 0)) { c = *(s++); #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC if (!(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) || ((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) || ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) || (c == ' ') || (c == '\'') || (c == '(') || (c == ')') || (c == '+') || (c == ',') || (c == '-') || (c == '.') || (c == '/') || (c == ':') || (c == '=') || (c == '?'))) ia5 = 1; if (c & 0x80) t61 = 1; #else if (!isalnum(c) && (c != ' ') && strchr("'()+,-./:=?", c) == NULL) ia5 = 1; if (os_toascii[c] & 0x80) t61 = 1; #endif } if (t61) return (V_ASN1_T61STRING); if (ia5) return (V_ASN1_IA5STRING); return (V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING); } int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s) { int i; unsigned char *p; if (s->type != V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) return (0); if ((s->length % 4) != 0) return (0); p = s->data; for (i = 0; i < s->length; i += 4) { if ((p[0] != '\0') || (p[1] != '\0') || (p[2] != '\0')) break; else p += 4; } if (i < s->length) return (0); p = s->data; for (i = 3; i < s->length; i += 4) { *(p++) = s->data[i]; } *(p) = '\0'; s->length /= 4; s->type = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(s->data, s->length); return (1); } int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *v) { int i, n; char buf[80]; const char *p; if (v == NULL) return (0); n = 0; p = (const char *)v->data; for (i = 0; i < v->length; i++) { if ((p[i] > '~') || ((p[i] < ' ') && (p[i] != '\n') && (p[i] != '\r'))) buf[n] = '.'; else buf[n] = p[i]; n++; if (n >= 80) { if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0) return (0); n = 0; } } if (n > 0) if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0) return (0); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c0000644000000000000000000000401513176625656015572 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { EVP_PKEY *ret; if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) { if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return (NULL); } } else ret = *a; if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } switch (EVP_PKEY_id(ret)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case EVP_PKEY_RSA: if ((ret->pkey.rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, pp, length)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case EVP_PKEY_DSA: /* TMP UGLY CAST */ if (!d2i_DSAPublicKey(&ret->pkey.dsa, pp, length)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&ret->pkey.ec, pp, length)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } break; #endif default: ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); goto err; /* break; */ } if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; return (ret); err: if (a == NULL || *a != ret) EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return (NULL); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c0000644000000000000000000003056113176625656016341 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" /* Keep this sorted in type order !! */ static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *standard_methods[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA &rsa_asn1_meths[0], &rsa_asn1_meths[1], #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH &dh_asn1_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA &dsa_asn1_meths[0], &dsa_asn1_meths[1], &dsa_asn1_meths[2], &dsa_asn1_meths[3], &dsa_asn1_meths[4], #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC &eckey_asn1_meth, #endif &hmac_asn1_meth, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC &cmac_asn1_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH &dhx_asn1_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC &ecx25519_asn1_meth #endif }; typedef int sk_cmp_fn_type(const char *const *a, const char *const *b); static STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD) *app_methods = NULL; #ifdef TEST void main() { int i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods); i++) fprintf(stderr, "Number %d id=%d (%s)\n", i, standard_methods[i]->pkey_id, OBJ_nid2sn(standard_methods[i]->pkey_id)); } #endif DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, ameth); static int ameth_cmp(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const *a, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *const *b) { return ((*a)->pkey_id - (*b)->pkey_id); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *, ameth); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void) { int num = OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods); if (app_methods) num += sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_num(app_methods); return num; } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx) { int num = OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods); if (idx < 0) return NULL; if (idx < num) return standard_methods[idx]; idx -= num; return sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_value(app_methods, idx); } static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *pkey_asn1_find(int type) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD tmp; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *t = &tmp, **ret; tmp.pkey_id = type; if (app_methods) { int idx; idx = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_find(app_methods, &tmp); if (idx >= 0) return sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_value(app_methods, idx); } ret = OBJ_bsearch_ameth(&t, standard_methods, OSSL_NELEM(standard_methods)); if (!ret || !*ret) return NULL; return *ret; } /* * Find an implementation of an ASN1 algorithm. If 'pe' is not NULL also * search through engines and set *pe to a functional reference to the engine * implementing 'type' or NULL if no engine implements it. */ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(ENGINE **pe, int type) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *t; for (;;) { t = pkey_asn1_find(type); if (!t || !(t->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS)) break; type = t->pkey_base_id; } if (pe) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *e; /* type will contain the final unaliased type */ e = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(type); if (e) { *pe = e; return ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(e, type); } #endif *pe = NULL; } return t; } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len) { int i; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (len == -1) len = strlen(str); if (pe) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *e; ameth = ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len); if (ameth) { /* * Convert structural into functional reference */ if (!ENGINE_init(e)) ameth = NULL; ENGINE_free(e); *pe = e; return ameth; } #endif *pe = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) { ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i); if (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) continue; if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == len) && (strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, str, len) == 0)) return ameth; } return NULL; } int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth) { if (pkey_asn1_find(ameth->pkey_id) != NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_ADD0, EVP_R_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED); return 0; } if (app_methods == NULL) { app_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_new(ameth_cmp); if (app_methods == NULL) return 0; } if (!sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_push(app_methods, ameth)) return 0; sk_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_sort(app_methods); return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(from, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS, NULL, NULL); if (ameth == NULL) return 0; ameth->pkey_base_id = to; if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth)) { EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth); return 0; } return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *ppkey_base_id, int *ppkey_flags, const char **pinfo, const char **ppem_str, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth) { if (!ameth) return 0; if (ppkey_id) *ppkey_id = ameth->pkey_id; if (ppkey_base_id) *ppkey_base_id = ameth->pkey_base_id; if (ppkey_flags) *ppkey_flags = ameth->pkey_flags; if (pinfo) *pinfo = ameth->info; if (ppem_str) *ppem_str = ameth->pem_str; return 1; } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return pkey->ameth; } EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags, const char *pem_str, const char *info) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ameth)); if (ameth == NULL) return NULL; ameth->pkey_id = id; ameth->pkey_base_id = id; ameth->pkey_flags = flags | ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC; if (info) { ameth->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info); if (!ameth->info) goto err; } if (pem_str) { ameth->pem_str = OPENSSL_strdup(pem_str); if (!ameth->pem_str) goto err; } return ameth; err: EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth); return NULL; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *src) { dst->pub_decode = src->pub_decode; dst->pub_encode = src->pub_encode; dst->pub_cmp = src->pub_cmp; dst->pub_print = src->pub_print; dst->priv_decode = src->priv_decode; dst->priv_encode = src->priv_encode; dst->priv_print = src->priv_print; dst->old_priv_encode = src->old_priv_encode; dst->old_priv_decode = src->old_priv_decode; dst->pkey_size = src->pkey_size; dst->pkey_bits = src->pkey_bits; dst->param_decode = src->param_decode; dst->param_encode = src->param_encode; dst->param_missing = src->param_missing; dst->param_copy = src->param_copy; dst->param_cmp = src->param_cmp; dst->param_print = src->param_print; dst->pkey_free = src->pkey_free; dst->pkey_ctrl = src->pkey_ctrl; dst->item_sign = src->item_sign; dst->item_verify = src->item_verify; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth) { if (ameth && (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC)) { OPENSSL_free(ameth->pem_str); OPENSSL_free(ameth->info); OPENSSL_free(ameth); } } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub), int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx), int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk)) { ameth->pub_decode = pub_decode; ameth->pub_encode = pub_encode; ameth->pub_cmp = pub_cmp; ameth->pub_print = pub_print; ameth->pkey_size = pkey_size; ameth->pkey_bits = pkey_bits; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf), int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)) { ameth->priv_decode = priv_decode; ameth->priv_encode = priv_encode; ameth->priv_print = priv_print; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen), int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder), int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from), int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)) { ameth->param_decode = param_decode; ameth->param_encode = param_encode; ameth->param_missing = param_missing; ameth->param_copy = param_copy; ameth->param_cmp = param_cmp; ameth->param_print = param_print; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { ameth->pkey_free = pkey_free; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)) { ameth->pkey_ctrl = pkey_ctrl; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk)) { ameth->pkey_security_bits = pkey_security_bits; } void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey), int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)) { ameth->item_sign = item_sign; ameth->item_verify = item_verify; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/x_val.c0000644000000000000000000000117413176625656015524 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_VAL) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_VAL, notBefore, ASN1_TIME), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_VAL, notAfter, ASN1_TIME) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_VAL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_VAL) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_dup.c0000644000000000000000000000302713176625656015502 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #ifndef NO_OLD_ASN1 void *ASN1_dup(i2d_of_void *i2d, d2i_of_void *d2i, void *x) { unsigned char *b, *p; const unsigned char *p2; int i; char *ret; if (x == NULL) return (NULL); i = i2d(x, NULL); b = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 10); if (b == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } p = b; i = i2d(x, &p); p2 = b; ret = d2i(NULL, &p2, i); OPENSSL_free(b); return (ret); } #endif /* * ASN1_ITEM version of dup: this follows the model above except we don't * need to allocate the buffer. At some point this could be rewritten to * directly dup the underlying structure instead of doing and encode and * decode. */ void *ASN1_item_dup(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *x) { unsigned char *b = NULL; const unsigned char *p; long i; void *ret; if (x == NULL) return (NULL); i = ASN1_item_i2d(x, &b, it); if (b == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } p = b; ret = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, i, it); OPENSSL_free(b); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c0000644000000000000000000001420613176625656016047 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "asn1_locl.h" int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d) { static const int min[8] = { 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; static const int max[8] = { 99, 12, 31, 23, 59, 59, 12, 59 }; char *a; int n, i, l, o; if (d->type != V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return (0); l = d->length; a = (char *)d->data; o = 0; if (l < 11) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { if ((i == 5) && ((a[o] == 'Z') || (a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-'))) { i++; if (tm) tm->tm_sec = 0; break; } if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = a[o] - '0'; if (++o > l) goto err; if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0'; if (++o > l) goto err; if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err; if (tm) { switch (i) { case 0: tm->tm_year = n < 50 ? n + 100 : n; break; case 1: tm->tm_mon = n - 1; break; case 2: tm->tm_mday = n; break; case 3: tm->tm_hour = n; break; case 4: tm->tm_min = n; break; case 5: tm->tm_sec = n; break; } } } if (a[o] == 'Z') o++; else if ((a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-')) { int offsign = a[o] == '-' ? 1 : -1, offset = 0; o++; if (o + 4 > l) goto err; for (i = 6; i < 8; i++) { if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = a[o] - '0'; o++; if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err; n = (n * 10) + a[o] - '0'; if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err; if (tm) { if (i == 6) offset = n * 3600; else if (i == 7) offset += n * 60; } o++; } if (offset && !OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(tm, 0, offset * offsign)) return 0; } return o == l; err: return 0; } int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(const ASN1_UTCTIME *d) { return asn1_utctime_to_tm(NULL, d); } int ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, const char *str) { ASN1_UTCTIME t; t.type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME; t.length = strlen(str); t.data = (unsigned char *)str; if (ASN1_UTCTIME_check(&t)) { if (s != NULL) { if (!ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)s, str, t.length)) return 0; s->type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME; } return (1); } else return (0); } ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_set(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t) { return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, 0, 0); } ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec) { char *p; struct tm *ts; struct tm data; size_t len = 20; int free_s = 0; if (s == NULL) { s = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); if (s == NULL) goto err; free_s = 1; } ts = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data); if (ts == NULL) goto err; if (offset_day || offset_sec) { if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec)) goto err; } if ((ts->tm_year < 50) || (ts->tm_year >= 150)) goto err; p = (char *)s->data; if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)s->length < len)) { p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (p == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s->data); s->data = (unsigned char *)p; } BIO_snprintf(p, len, "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", ts->tm_year % 100, ts->tm_mon + 1, ts->tm_mday, ts->tm_hour, ts->tm_min, ts->tm_sec); s->length = strlen(p); s->type = V_ASN1_UTCTIME; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC_not ebcdic2ascii(s->data, s->data, s->length); #endif return (s); err: if (free_s) ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s); return NULL; } int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t) { struct tm stm, ttm; int day, sec; if (!asn1_utctime_to_tm(&stm, s)) return -2; if (!OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &ttm)) return -2; if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &ttm, &stm)) return -2; if (day > 0) return 1; if (day < 0) return -1; if (sec > 0) return 1; if (sec < 0) return -1; return 0; } int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm) { const char *v; int gmt = 0; int i; int y = 0, M = 0, d = 0, h = 0, m = 0, s = 0; i = tm->length; v = (const char *)tm->data; if (i < 10) goto err; if (v[i - 1] == 'Z') gmt = 1; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) if ((v[i] > '9') || (v[i] < '0')) goto err; y = (v[0] - '0') * 10 + (v[1] - '0'); if (y < 50) y += 100; M = (v[2] - '0') * 10 + (v[3] - '0'); if ((M > 12) || (M < 1)) goto err; d = (v[4] - '0') * 10 + (v[5] - '0'); h = (v[6] - '0') * 10 + (v[7] - '0'); m = (v[8] - '0') * 10 + (v[9] - '0'); if (tm->length >= 12 && (v[10] >= '0') && (v[10] <= '9') && (v[11] >= '0') && (v[11] <= '9')) s = (v[10] - '0') * 10 + (v[11] - '0'); if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d %d%s", _asn1_mon[M - 1], d, h, m, s, y + 1900, (gmt) ? " GMT" : "") <= 0) return (0); else return (1); err: BIO_write(bp, "Bad time value", 14); return (0); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000002546113176625656016113 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Experimental ASN1 BIO. When written through the data is converted to an * ASN1 string type: default is OCTET STRING. Additional functions can be * provided to add prefix and suffix data. */ #include #include #include /* Must be large enough for biggest tag+length */ #define DEFAULT_ASN1_BUF_SIZE 20 typedef enum { ASN1_STATE_START, ASN1_STATE_PRE_COPY, ASN1_STATE_HEADER, ASN1_STATE_HEADER_COPY, ASN1_STATE_DATA_COPY, ASN1_STATE_POST_COPY, ASN1_STATE_DONE } asn1_bio_state_t; typedef struct BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS_st { asn1_ps_func *ex_func; asn1_ps_func *ex_free_func; } BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS; typedef struct BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX_t { /* Internal state */ asn1_bio_state_t state; /* Internal buffer */ unsigned char *buf; /* Size of buffer */ int bufsize; /* Current position in buffer */ int bufpos; /* Current buffer length */ int buflen; /* Amount of data to copy */ int copylen; /* Class and tag to use */ int asn1_class, asn1_tag; asn1_ps_func *prefix, *prefix_free, *suffix, *suffix_free; /* Extra buffer for prefix and suffix data */ unsigned char *ex_buf; int ex_len; int ex_pos; void *ex_arg; } BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX; static int asn1_bio_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int asn1_bio_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int asn1_bio_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int asn1_bio_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long asn1_bio_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int asn1_bio_new(BIO *h); static int asn1_bio_free(BIO *data); static long asn1_bio_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); static int asn1_bio_init(BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, int size); static int asn1_bio_flush_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, asn1_ps_func *cleanup, asn1_bio_state_t next); static int asn1_bio_setup_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, asn1_ps_func *setup, asn1_bio_state_t ex_state, asn1_bio_state_t other_state); static const BIO_METHOD methods_asn1 = { BIO_TYPE_ASN1, "asn1", asn1_bio_write, asn1_bio_read, asn1_bio_puts, asn1_bio_gets, asn1_bio_ctrl, asn1_bio_new, asn1_bio_free, asn1_bio_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_asn1(void) { return (&methods_asn1); } static int asn1_bio_new(BIO *b) { BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; if (!asn1_bio_init(ctx, DEFAULT_ASN1_BUF_SIZE)) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return 0; } BIO_set_data(b, ctx); BIO_set_init(b, 1); return 1; } static int asn1_bio_init(BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, int size) { ctx->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size); if (ctx->buf == NULL) return 0; ctx->bufsize = size; ctx->asn1_class = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; ctx->asn1_tag = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_START; return 1; } static int asn1_bio_free(BIO *b) { BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx; if (b == NULL) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; OPENSSL_free(ctx->buf); OPENSSL_free(ctx); BIO_set_data(b, NULL); BIO_set_init(b, 0); return 1; } static int asn1_bio_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx; int wrmax, wrlen, ret; unsigned char *p; BIO *next; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if (in == NULL || inl < 0 || ctx == NULL || next == NULL) return 0; wrlen = 0; ret = -1; for (;;) { switch (ctx->state) { /* Setup prefix data, call it */ case ASN1_STATE_START: if (!asn1_bio_setup_ex(b, ctx, ctx->prefix, ASN1_STATE_PRE_COPY, ASN1_STATE_HEADER)) return 0; break; /* Copy any pre data first */ case ASN1_STATE_PRE_COPY: ret = asn1_bio_flush_ex(b, ctx, ctx->prefix_free, ASN1_STATE_HEADER); if (ret <= 0) goto done; break; case ASN1_STATE_HEADER: ctx->buflen = ASN1_object_size(0, inl, ctx->asn1_tag) - inl; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buflen <= ctx->bufsize); p = ctx->buf; ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, inl, ctx->asn1_tag, ctx->asn1_class); ctx->copylen = inl; ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_HEADER_COPY; break; case ASN1_STATE_HEADER_COPY: ret = BIO_write(next, ctx->buf + ctx->bufpos, ctx->buflen); if (ret <= 0) goto done; ctx->buflen -= ret; if (ctx->buflen) ctx->bufpos += ret; else { ctx->bufpos = 0; ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_DATA_COPY; } break; case ASN1_STATE_DATA_COPY: if (inl > ctx->copylen) wrmax = ctx->copylen; else wrmax = inl; ret = BIO_write(next, in, wrmax); if (ret <= 0) goto done; wrlen += ret; ctx->copylen -= ret; in += ret; inl -= ret; if (ctx->copylen == 0) ctx->state = ASN1_STATE_HEADER; if (inl == 0) goto done; break; default: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } } done: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (wrlen > 0) ? wrlen : ret; } static int asn1_bio_flush_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, asn1_ps_func *cleanup, asn1_bio_state_t next) { int ret; if (ctx->ex_len <= 0) return 1; for (;;) { ret = BIO_write(BIO_next(b), ctx->ex_buf + ctx->ex_pos, ctx->ex_len); if (ret <= 0) break; ctx->ex_len -= ret; if (ctx->ex_len > 0) ctx->ex_pos += ret; else { if (cleanup) cleanup(b, &ctx->ex_buf, &ctx->ex_len, &ctx->ex_arg); ctx->state = next; ctx->ex_pos = 0; break; } } return ret; } static int asn1_bio_setup_ex(BIO *b, BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx, asn1_ps_func *setup, asn1_bio_state_t ex_state, asn1_bio_state_t other_state) { if (setup && !setup(b, &ctx->ex_buf, &ctx->ex_len, &ctx->ex_arg)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } if (ctx->ex_len > 0) ctx->state = ex_state; else ctx->state = other_state; return 1; } static int asn1_bio_read(BIO *b, char *in, int inl) { BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; return BIO_read(next, in, inl); } static int asn1_bio_puts(BIO *b, const char *str) { return asn1_bio_write(b, str, strlen(str)); } static int asn1_bio_gets(BIO *b, char *str, int size) { BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; return BIO_gets(next, str, size); } static long asn1_bio_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; return BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp); } static long asn1_bio_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2) { BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX *ctx; BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS *ex_func; long ret = 1; BIO *next; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; next = BIO_next(b); switch (cmd) { case BIO_C_SET_PREFIX: ex_func = arg2; ctx->prefix = ex_func->ex_func; ctx->prefix_free = ex_func->ex_free_func; break; case BIO_C_GET_PREFIX: ex_func = arg2; ex_func->ex_func = ctx->prefix; ex_func->ex_free_func = ctx->prefix_free; break; case BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX: ex_func = arg2; ctx->suffix = ex_func->ex_func; ctx->suffix_free = ex_func->ex_free_func; break; case BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX: ex_func = arg2; ex_func->ex_func = ctx->suffix; ex_func->ex_free_func = ctx->suffix_free; break; case BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG: ctx->ex_arg = arg2; break; case BIO_C_GET_EX_ARG: *(void **)arg2 = ctx->ex_arg; break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: if (next == NULL) return 0; /* Call post function if possible */ if (ctx->state == ASN1_STATE_HEADER) { if (!asn1_bio_setup_ex(b, ctx, ctx->suffix, ASN1_STATE_POST_COPY, ASN1_STATE_DONE)) return 0; } if (ctx->state == ASN1_STATE_POST_COPY) { ret = asn1_bio_flush_ex(b, ctx, ctx->suffix_free, ASN1_STATE_DONE); if (ret <= 0) return ret; } if (ctx->state == ASN1_STATE_DONE) return BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, arg1, arg2); else { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } default: if (next == NULL) return 0; return BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, arg1, arg2); } return ret; } static int asn1_bio_set_ex(BIO *b, int cmd, asn1_ps_func *ex_func, asn1_ps_func *ex_free_func) { BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS extmp; extmp.ex_func = ex_func; extmp.ex_free_func = ex_free_func; return BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, 0, &extmp); } static int asn1_bio_get_ex(BIO *b, int cmd, asn1_ps_func **ex_func, asn1_ps_func **ex_free_func) { BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS extmp; int ret; ret = BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, 0, &extmp); if (ret > 0) { *ex_func = extmp.ex_func; *ex_free_func = extmp.ex_free_func; } return ret; } int BIO_asn1_set_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *prefix, asn1_ps_func *prefix_free) { return asn1_bio_set_ex(b, BIO_C_SET_PREFIX, prefix, prefix_free); } int BIO_asn1_get_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **pprefix, asn1_ps_func **pprefix_free) { return asn1_bio_get_ex(b, BIO_C_GET_PREFIX, pprefix, pprefix_free); } int BIO_asn1_set_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *suffix, asn1_ps_func *suffix_free) { return asn1_bio_set_ex(b, BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX, suffix, suffix_free); } int BIO_asn1_get_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **psuffix, asn1_ps_func **psuffix_free) { return asn1_bio_get_ex(b, BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX, psuffix, psuffix_free); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_digest.c0000644000000000000000000000265213176625656016174 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD int ASN1_digest(i2d_of_void *i2d, const EVP_MD *type, char *data, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { int i; unsigned char *str, *p; i = i2d(data, NULL); if ((str = OPENSSL_malloc(i)) == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } p = str; i2d(data, &p); if (!EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL)) { OPENSSL_free(str); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(str); return (1); } #endif int ASN1_item_digest(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const EVP_MD *type, void *asn, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { int i; unsigned char *str = NULL; i = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &str, it); if (!str) return (0); if (!EVP_Digest(str, i, md, len, type, NULL)) { OPENSSL_free(str); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(str); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/a_object.c0000644000000000000000000002335013176625656016161 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "asn1_locl.h" int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp) { unsigned char *p; int objsize; if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return (0); objsize = ASN1_object_size(0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT); if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1) return objsize; p = *pp; ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); memcpy(p, a->data, a->length); p += a->length; *pp = p; return (objsize); } int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num) { int i, first, len = 0, c, use_bn; char ftmp[24], *tmp = ftmp; int tmpsize = sizeof ftmp; const char *p; unsigned long l; BIGNUM *bl = NULL; if (num == 0) return (0); else if (num == -1) num = strlen(buf); p = buf; c = *(p++); num--; if ((c >= '0') && (c <= '2')) { first = c - '0'; } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if (num <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER); goto err; } c = *(p++); num--; for (;;) { if (num <= 0) break; if ((c != '.') && (c != ' ')) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR); goto err; } l = 0; use_bn = 0; for (;;) { if (num <= 0) break; num--; c = *(p++); if ((c == ' ') || (c == '.')) break; if ((c < '0') || (c > '9')) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT); goto err; } if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L)) { use_bn = 1; if (bl == NULL) bl = BN_new(); if (bl == NULL || !BN_set_word(bl, l)) goto err; } if (use_bn) { if (!BN_mul_word(bl, 10L) || !BN_add_word(bl, c - '0')) goto err; } else l = l * 10L + (long)(c - '0'); } if (len == 0) { if ((first < 2) && (l >= 40)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if (use_bn) { if (!BN_add_word(bl, first * 40)) goto err; } else l += (long)first *40; } i = 0; if (use_bn) { int blsize; blsize = BN_num_bits(bl); blsize = (blsize + 6) / 7; if (blsize > tmpsize) { if (tmp != ftmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); tmpsize = blsize + 32; tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmpsize); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; } while (blsize--) { BN_ULONG t = BN_div_word(bl, 0x80L); if (t == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)t; } } else { for (;;) { tmp[i++] = (unsigned char)l & 0x7f; l >>= 7L; if (l == 0L) break; } } if (out != NULL) { if (len + i > olen) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } while (--i > 0) out[len++] = tmp[i] | 0x80; out[len++] = tmp[0]; } else len += i; } if (tmp != ftmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); BN_free(bl); return (len); err: if (tmp != ftmp) OPENSSL_free(tmp); BN_free(bl); return (0); } int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a) { return OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, 0); } int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a) { char buf[80], *p = buf; int i; if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return (BIO_write(bp, "NULL", 4)); i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, sizeof buf, a); if (i > (int)(sizeof(buf) - 1)) { p = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1); if (p == NULL) return -1; i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i + 1, a); } if (i <= 0) { i = BIO_write(bp, "", 9); i += BIO_dump(bp, (const char *)a->data, a->length); return i; } BIO_write(bp, p, i); if (p != buf) OPENSSL_free(p); return (i); } ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { const unsigned char *p; long len; int tag, xclass; int inf, i; ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL; p = *pp; inf = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length); if (inf & 0x80) { i = ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER; goto err; } if (tag != V_ASN1_OBJECT) { i = ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT; goto err; } ret = c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(a, &p, len); if (ret) *pp = p; return ret; err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT, i); return (NULL); } ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { ASN1_OBJECT *ret = NULL, tobj; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *data; int i, length; /* * Sanity check OID encoding. Need at least one content octet. MSB must * be clear in the last octet. can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, * see: X.690 8.19.2 */ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL || p[len - 1] & 0x80) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); return NULL; } /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */ length = (int)len; /* * Try to lookup OID in table: these are all valid encodings so if we get * a match we know the OID is valid. */ tobj.nid = NID_undef; tobj.data = p; tobj.length = length; tobj.flags = 0; i = OBJ_obj2nid(&tobj); if (i != NID_undef) { /* * Return shared registered OID object: this improves efficiency * because we don't have to return a dynamically allocated OID * and NID lookups can use the cached value. */ ret = OBJ_nid2obj(i); if (a) { ASN1_OBJECT_free(*a); *a = ret; } *pp += len; return ret; } for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) { if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); return NULL; } } /* * only the ASN1_OBJECTs from the 'table' will have values for ->sn or * ->ln */ if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL) || !((*a)->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) { if ((ret = ASN1_OBJECT_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); } else ret = (*a); p = *pp; /* detach data from object */ data = (unsigned char *)ret->data; ret->data = NULL; /* once detached we can change it */ if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) { ret->length = 0; OPENSSL_free(data); data = OPENSSL_malloc(length); if (data == NULL) { i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } ret->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; } memcpy(data, p, length); /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */ ret->data = data; ret->length = length; ret->sn = NULL; ret->ln = NULL; /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */ p += length; if (a != NULL) (*a) = ret; *pp = p; return (ret); err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT, i); if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)) ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret); return (NULL); } ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void) { ASN1_OBJECT *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } ret->flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; return (ret); } void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a) { if (a == NULL) return; if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS) { #ifndef CONST_STRICT /* disable purely for compile-time strict * const checking. Doing this on a "real" * compile will cause memory leaks */ OPENSSL_free((void*)a->sn); OPENSSL_free((void*)a->ln); #endif a->sn = a->ln = NULL; } if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA) { OPENSSL_free((void*)a->data); a->data = NULL; a->length = 0; } if (a->flags & ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC) OPENSSL_free(a); } ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len, const char *sn, const char *ln) { ASN1_OBJECT o; o.sn = sn; o.ln = ln; o.data = data; o.nid = nid; o.length = len; o.flags = ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; return (OBJ_dup(&o)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/asn1/nsseq.c0000644000000000000000000000216513176625656015545 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include static int nsseq_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) { NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *nsseq; nsseq = (NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *)*pval; nsseq->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_netscape_cert_sequence); } return 1; } /* Netscape certificate sequence structure */ ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, nsseq_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, certs, X509, 0) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014071 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/rc2_skey.c0000644000000000000000000000675513176625657015773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc2_locl.h" static const unsigned char key_table[256] = { 0xd9, 0x78, 0xf9, 0xc4, 0x19, 0xdd, 0xb5, 0xed, 0x28, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0x79, 0x4a, 0xa0, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0xc6, 0x7e, 0x37, 0x83, 0x2b, 0x76, 0x53, 0x8e, 0x62, 0x4c, 0x64, 0x88, 0x44, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0xa2, 0x17, 0x9a, 0x59, 0xf5, 0x87, 0xb3, 0x4f, 0x13, 0x61, 0x45, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0x09, 0x81, 0x7d, 0x32, 0xbd, 0x8f, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x86, 0xb7, 0x7b, 0x0b, 0xf0, 0x95, 0x21, 0x22, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0x4e, 0x82, 0x54, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x93, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb2, 0x1c, 0x73, 0x56, 0xc0, 0x14, 0xa7, 0x8c, 0xf1, 0xdc, 0x12, 0x75, 0xca, 0x1f, 0x3b, 0xbe, 0xe4, 0xd1, 0x42, 0x3d, 0xd4, 0x30, 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xb6, 0x26, 0x6f, 0xbf, 0x0e, 0xda, 0x46, 0x69, 0x07, 0x57, 0x27, 0xf2, 0x1d, 0x9b, 0xbc, 0x94, 0x43, 0x03, 0xf8, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf6, 0x90, 0xef, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0x06, 0xc3, 0xd5, 0x2f, 0xc8, 0x66, 0x1e, 0xd7, 0x08, 0xe8, 0xea, 0xde, 0x80, 0x52, 0xee, 0xf7, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x72, 0xac, 0x35, 0x4d, 0x6a, 0x2a, 0x96, 0x1a, 0xd2, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x15, 0x49, 0x74, 0x4b, 0x9f, 0xd0, 0x5e, 0x04, 0x18, 0xa4, 0xec, 0xc2, 0xe0, 0x41, 0x6e, 0x0f, 0x51, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x24, 0x91, 0xaf, 0x50, 0xa1, 0xf4, 0x70, 0x39, 0x99, 0x7c, 0x3a, 0x85, 0x23, 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0x02, 0x36, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x55, 0x97, 0x31, 0x2d, 0x5d, 0xfa, 0x98, 0xe3, 0x8a, 0x92, 0xae, 0x05, 0xdf, 0x29, 0x10, 0x67, 0x6c, 0xba, 0xc9, 0xd3, 0x00, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0xe1, 0x9e, 0xa8, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x16, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xe2, 0x89, 0xa9, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x34, 0x1b, 0xab, 0x33, 0xff, 0xb0, 0xbb, 0x48, 0x0c, 0x5f, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0xc5, 0xf3, 0xdb, 0x47, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x9c, 0x77, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x20, 0x68, 0xfe, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0xad, }; #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_) # pragma optimize("g",off) #endif /* * It has come to my attention that there are 2 versions of the RC2 key * schedule. One which is normal, and anther which has a hook to use a * reduced key length. BSAFE uses the 'retarded' version. What I previously * shipped is the same as specifying 1024 for the 'bits' parameter. Bsafe * uses a version where the bits parameter is the same as len*8 */ void RC2_set_key(RC2_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data, int bits) { int i, j; unsigned char *k; RC2_INT *ki; unsigned int c, d; k = (unsigned char *)&(key->data[0]); *k = 0; /* for if there is a zero length key */ if (len > 128) len = 128; if (bits <= 0) bits = 1024; if (bits > 1024) bits = 1024; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) k[i] = data[i]; /* expand table */ d = k[len - 1]; j = 0; for (i = len; i < 128; i++, j++) { d = key_table[(k[j] + d) & 0xff]; k[i] = d; } /* hmm.... key reduction to 'bits' bits */ j = (bits + 7) >> 3; i = 128 - j; c = (0xff >> (-bits & 0x07)); d = key_table[k[i] & c]; k[i] = d; while (i--) { d = key_table[k[i + j] ^ d]; k[i] = d; } /* copy from bytes into RC2_INT's */ ki = &(key->data[63]); for (i = 127; i >= 0; i -= 2) *(ki--) = ((k[i] << 8) | k[i - 1]) & 0xffff; } #if defined(_MSC_VER) # pragma optimize("",on) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/rc2_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000203013176625657015527 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc2_locl.h" #include /*- * RC2 as implemented frm a posting from * Newsgroups: sci.crypt * Sender: pgut01@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) * Subject: Specification for Ron Rivests Cipher No.2 * Message-ID: <4fk39f$f70@net.auckland.ac.nz> * Date: 11 Feb 1996 06:45:03 GMT */ void RC2_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, RC2_KEY *ks, int encrypt) { unsigned long l, d[2]; c2l(in, l); d[0] = l; c2l(in, l); d[1] = l; if (encrypt) RC2_encrypt(d, ks); else RC2_decrypt(d, ks); l = d[0]; l2c(l, out); l = d[1]; l2c(l, out); l = d[0] = d[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/build.info0000644000000000000000000000015413176625657016045 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ rc2_ecb.c rc2_skey.c rc2_cbc.c rc2cfb64.c rc2ofb64.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/rc2_cbc.c0000644000000000000000000001153513176625657015537 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc2_locl.h" void RC2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC2_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int encrypt) { register unsigned long tin0, tin1; register unsigned long tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register long l = length; unsigned long tin[2]; if (encrypt) { c2l(iv, tout0); c2l(iv, tout1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); c2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; RC2_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { c2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; RC2_encrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0]; l2c(tout0, out); tout1 = tin[1]; l2c(tout1, out); } l2c(tout0, iv); l2c(tout1, iv); } else { c2l(iv, xor0); c2l(iv, xor1); iv -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; RC2_decrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2c(tout0, out); l2c(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { c2l(in, tin0); tin[0] = tin0; c2l(in, tin1); tin[1] = tin1; RC2_decrypt(tin, ks); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2cn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } l2c(xor0, iv); l2c(xor1, iv); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } void RC2_encrypt(unsigned long *d, RC2_KEY *key) { int i, n; register RC2_INT *p0, *p1; register RC2_INT x0, x1, x2, x3, t; unsigned long l; l = d[0]; x0 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff; x1 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L); l = d[1]; x2 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff; x3 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L); n = 3; i = 5; p0 = p1 = &(key->data[0]); for (;;) { t = (x0 + (x1 & ~x3) + (x2 & x3) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff; x0 = (t << 1) | (t >> 15); t = (x1 + (x2 & ~x0) + (x3 & x0) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff; x1 = (t << 2) | (t >> 14); t = (x2 + (x3 & ~x1) + (x0 & x1) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff; x2 = (t << 3) | (t >> 13); t = (x3 + (x0 & ~x2) + (x1 & x2) + *(p0++)) & 0xffff; x3 = (t << 5) | (t >> 11); if (--i == 0) { if (--n == 0) break; i = (n == 2) ? 6 : 5; x0 += p1[x3 & 0x3f]; x1 += p1[x0 & 0x3f]; x2 += p1[x1 & 0x3f]; x3 += p1[x2 & 0x3f]; } } d[0] = (unsigned long)(x0 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x1 & 0xffff) << 16L); d[1] = (unsigned long)(x2 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x3 & 0xffff) << 16L); } void RC2_decrypt(unsigned long *d, RC2_KEY *key) { int i, n; register RC2_INT *p0, *p1; register RC2_INT x0, x1, x2, x3, t; unsigned long l; l = d[0]; x0 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff; x1 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L); l = d[1]; x2 = (RC2_INT) l & 0xffff; x3 = (RC2_INT) (l >> 16L); n = 3; i = 5; p0 = &(key->data[63]); p1 = &(key->data[0]); for (;;) { t = ((x3 << 11) | (x3 >> 5)) & 0xffff; x3 = (t - (x0 & ~x2) - (x1 & x2) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff; t = ((x2 << 13) | (x2 >> 3)) & 0xffff; x2 = (t - (x3 & ~x1) - (x0 & x1) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff; t = ((x1 << 14) | (x1 >> 2)) & 0xffff; x1 = (t - (x2 & ~x0) - (x3 & x0) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff; t = ((x0 << 15) | (x0 >> 1)) & 0xffff; x0 = (t - (x1 & ~x3) - (x2 & x3) - *(p0--)) & 0xffff; if (--i == 0) { if (--n == 0) break; i = (n == 2) ? 6 : 5; x3 = (x3 - p1[x2 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff; x2 = (x2 - p1[x1 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff; x1 = (x1 - p1[x0 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff; x0 = (x0 - p1[x3 & 0x3f]) & 0xffff; } } d[0] = (unsigned long)(x0 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x1 & 0xffff) << 16L); d[1] = (unsigned long)(x2 & 0xffff) | ((unsigned long)(x3 & 0xffff) << 16L); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/tab.c0000644000000000000000000000760713176625657015015 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include unsigned char ebits_to_num[256] = { 0xbd, 0x56, 0xea, 0xf2, 0xa2, 0xf1, 0xac, 0x2a, 0xb0, 0x93, 0xd1, 0x9c, 0x1b, 0x33, 0xfd, 0xd0, 0x30, 0x04, 0xb6, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x32, 0x4b, 0xf7, 0xcb, 0x45, 0x9b, 0x31, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x5a, 0x41, 0x9f, 0xe1, 0xd9, 0x4a, 0x4d, 0x9e, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x68, 0x2c, 0xc3, 0x27, 0x5f, 0x80, 0x36, 0x3e, 0xee, 0xfb, 0x95, 0x1a, 0xfe, 0xce, 0xa8, 0x34, 0xa9, 0x13, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x3f, 0xd8, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x23, 0x52, 0xc1, 0x67, 0x17, 0xf5, 0x66, 0x90, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0x07, 0xb8, 0x60, 0x48, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x53, 0xf3, 0x92, 0xa4, 0x72, 0x8c, 0x08, 0x15, 0x6e, 0x86, 0x00, 0x84, 0xfa, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x8a, 0x42, 0x19, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0xcd, 0x14, 0x8d, 0x50, 0x12, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x4e, 0xec, 0xb3, 0x35, 0x11, 0xa1, 0x88, 0x8e, 0x2b, 0x94, 0x99, 0xb7, 0x71, 0x74, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0xbf, 0x3a, 0xde, 0x96, 0x0e, 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xed, 0x77, 0xfc, 0x37, 0x6b, 0x03, 0x79, 0x89, 0x62, 0xc6, 0xd7, 0xc0, 0xd2, 0x7c, 0x6a, 0x8b, 0x22, 0xa3, 0x5b, 0x05, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x75, 0xd5, 0x61, 0xe3, 0x18, 0x8f, 0x55, 0x51, 0xad, 0x1f, 0x0b, 0x5e, 0x85, 0xe5, 0xc2, 0x57, 0x63, 0xca, 0x3d, 0x6c, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0xcc, 0x70, 0xb2, 0x91, 0x59, 0x0d, 0x47, 0x20, 0xc8, 0x4f, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x01, 0xe2, 0x16, 0x38, 0xc4, 0x6f, 0x3b, 0x0f, 0x65, 0x46, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0x2d, 0x7b, 0x82, 0xf9, 0x40, 0xb5, 0x1d, 0x73, 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x26, 0xc7, 0x87, 0x97, 0x25, 0x54, 0xb1, 0x28, 0xaa, 0x98, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x64, 0x6d, 0x7a, 0xd4, 0x10, 0x81, 0x44, 0xef, 0x49, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x2e, 0xdd, 0x76, 0x5c, 0x2f, 0xa7, 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x09, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x83, 0xcf, 0x29, 0x39, 0xb9, 0xe9, 0x4c, 0xff, 0x43, 0xab, }; unsigned char num_to_ebits[256] = { 0x5d, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x8b, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6e, 0x4d, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x85, 0xa6, 0x3f, 0xb7, 0x83, 0xc5, 0xe4, 0x73, 0x6b, 0x3a, 0x68, 0x5a, 0xc0, 0x47, 0xa0, 0x64, 0x34, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0xd0, 0x52, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0x1e, 0x96, 0x43, 0x41, 0xd8, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xdb, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x77, 0x2a, 0xca, 0xeb, 0xef, 0x10, 0x1c, 0x16, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x72, 0x2f, 0x89, 0xc1, 0xf9, 0x80, 0xc4, 0x6d, 0xae, 0x30, 0x3d, 0xce, 0x20, 0x63, 0xfe, 0xe6, 0x1a, 0xc7, 0xb8, 0x50, 0xe8, 0x24, 0x17, 0xfc, 0x25, 0x6f, 0xbb, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0x44, 0x53, 0xd9, 0xa2, 0x01, 0xab, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0x1f, 0x98, 0xee, 0x9a, 0xa7, 0x2d, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x8e, 0xac, 0xe0, 0xc6, 0x49, 0x46, 0x29, 0xf4, 0x94, 0x8a, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0x5b, 0xc3, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0x57, 0xd1, 0x7c, 0x9c, 0xed, 0x87, 0x40, 0x8c, 0xe2, 0xcb, 0x93, 0x14, 0xc9, 0x61, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xcc, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa8, 0x5c, 0xd6, 0x75, 0x8d, 0x62, 0x95, 0x58, 0x69, 0x76, 0xa1, 0x4a, 0xb5, 0x55, 0x09, 0x78, 0x33, 0x82, 0xd7, 0xdd, 0x79, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x0b, 0xde, 0x26, 0x21, 0x28, 0x74, 0x04, 0x97, 0x56, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x39, 0xdc, 0xff, 0x06, 0xa4, 0xea, 0x42, 0x08, 0xda, 0xb4, 0x71, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x12, 0x7a, 0x4e, 0xfa, 0x6c, 0x1d, 0x84, 0x00, 0xc8, 0x7f, 0x91, 0x45, 0xaa, 0x2b, 0xc2, 0xb1, 0x8f, 0xd5, 0xba, 0xf2, 0xad, 0x19, 0xb2, 0x67, 0x36, 0xf7, 0x0f, 0x0a, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xe3, 0x9d, 0xe9, 0x90, 0x3e, 0x23, 0x27, 0x66, 0x13, 0xec, 0x81, 0x15, 0xbd, 0x22, 0xbf, 0x9f, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x51, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x02, 0xd3, 0x70, 0x86, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x05, 0x03, 0x54, 0x60, 0x48, 0x65, 0x18, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x5f, 0x32, 0x88, 0x0e, 0x35, 0xfd, }; main() { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 256; j++) if (ebits_to_num[j] == i) { printf("0x%02x,", j); break; } } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/rc2ofb64.c0000644000000000000000000000312413176625657015564 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc2_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void RC2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num) { register unsigned long v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned char d[8]; register char *dp; unsigned long ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; int save = 0; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; c2l(iv, v0); c2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; dp = (char *)d; l2c(v0, dp); l2c(v1, dp); while (l--) { if (n == 0) { RC2_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); dp = (char *)d; t = ti[0]; l2c(t, dp); t = ti[1]; l2c(t, dp); save++; } *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n]; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } if (save) { v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; l2c(v0, iv); l2c(v1, iv); } t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/rc2_locl.h0000644000000000000000000001600513176625657015743 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #undef c2l #define c2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ #undef c2ln #define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8L; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } #undef l2c #define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ #undef l2cn #define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8L)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */ #define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */ #define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ } \ } #undef n2l #define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) #undef l2n #define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) #define C_RC2(n) \ t=(x0+(x1& ~x3)+(x2&x3)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \ x0=(t<<1)|(t>>15); \ t=(x1+(x2& ~x0)+(x3&x0)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \ x1=(t<<2)|(t>>14); \ t=(x2+(x3& ~x1)+(x0&x1)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \ x2=(t<<3)|(t>>13); \ t=(x3+(x0& ~x2)+(x1&x2)+ *(p0++))&0xffff; \ x3=(t<<5)|(t>>11); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rc2/rc2cfb64.c0000644000000000000000000000421013176625657015545 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rc2_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void RC2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int encrypt) { register unsigned long v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned long ti[2]; unsigned char *iv, c, cc; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; if (encrypt) { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; c2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; RC2_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2c(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2c(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } c = *(in++) ^ iv[n]; *(out++) = c; iv[n] = c; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } else { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { c2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; c2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; RC2_encrypt((unsigned long *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2c(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2c(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } cc = *(in++); c = iv[n]; iv[n] = cc; *(out++) = c ^ cc; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/x86cpuid.pl0000644000000000000000000003302013176625660015402 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC, "${dir}perlasm", "perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output = pop; open OUT,">$output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"x86cpuid"); for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } &function_begin("OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &pushf (); &pop ("eax"); &mov ("ecx","eax"); &xor ("eax",1<<21); &push ("eax"); &popf (); &pushf (); &pop ("eax"); &xor ("ecx","eax"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(0)); &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"eax"); # clear extended feature flags &bt ("ecx",21); &jnc (&label("nocpuid")); &cpuid (); &mov ("edi","eax"); # max value for standard query level &xor ("eax","eax"); &cmp ("ebx",0x756e6547); # "Genu" &setne (&LB("eax")); &mov ("ebp","eax"); &cmp ("edx",0x49656e69); # "ineI" &setne (&LB("eax")); &or ("ebp","eax"); &cmp ("ecx",0x6c65746e); # "ntel" &setne (&LB("eax")); &or ("ebp","eax"); # 0 indicates Intel CPU &jz (&label("intel")); &cmp ("ebx",0x68747541); # "Auth" &setne (&LB("eax")); &mov ("esi","eax"); &cmp ("edx",0x69746E65); # "enti" &setne (&LB("eax")); &or ("esi","eax"); &cmp ("ecx",0x444D4163); # "cAMD" &setne (&LB("eax")); &or ("esi","eax"); # 0 indicates AMD CPU &jnz (&label("intel")); # AMD specific &mov ("eax",0x80000000); &cpuid (); &cmp ("eax",0x80000001); &jb (&label("intel")); &mov ("esi","eax"); &mov ("eax",0x80000001); &cpuid (); &or ("ebp","ecx"); &and ("ebp",1<<11|1); # isolate XOP bit &cmp ("esi",0x80000008); &jb (&label("intel")); &mov ("eax",0x80000008); &cpuid (); &movz ("esi",&LB("ecx")); # number of cores - 1 &inc ("esi"); # number of cores &mov ("eax",1); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &cpuid (); &bt ("edx",28); &jnc (&label("generic")); &shr ("ebx",16); &and ("ebx",0xff); &cmp ("ebx","esi"); &ja (&label("generic")); &and ("edx",0xefffffff); # clear hyper-threading bit &jmp (&label("generic")); &set_label("intel"); &cmp ("edi",4); &mov ("esi",-1); &jb (&label("nocacheinfo")); &mov ("eax",4); &mov ("ecx",0); # query L1D &cpuid (); &mov ("esi","eax"); &shr ("esi",14); &and ("esi",0xfff); # number of cores -1 per L1D &set_label("nocacheinfo"); &mov ("eax",1); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &cpuid (); &and ("edx",0xbfefffff); # force reserved bits #20, #30 to 0 &cmp ("ebp",0); &jne (&label("notintel")); &or ("edx",1<<30); # set reserved bit#30 on Intel CPUs &and (&HB("eax"),15); # familiy ID &cmp (&HB("eax"),15); # P4? &jne (&label("notintel")); &or ("edx",1<<20); # set reserved bit#20 to engage RC4_CHAR &set_label("notintel"); &bt ("edx",28); # test hyper-threading bit &jnc (&label("generic")); &and ("edx",0xefffffff); &cmp ("esi",0); &je (&label("generic")); &or ("edx",0x10000000); &shr ("ebx",16); &cmp (&LB("ebx"),1); &ja (&label("generic")); &and ("edx",0xefffffff); # clear hyper-threading bit if not &set_label("generic"); &and ("ebp",1<<11); # isolate AMD XOP flag &and ("ecx",0xfffff7ff); # force 11th bit to 0 &mov ("esi","edx"); # %ebp:%esi is copy of %ecx:%edx &or ("ebp","ecx"); # merge AMD XOP flag &cmp ("edi",7); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &jb (&label("no_extended_info")); &mov ("eax",7); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &cpuid (); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ebx"); # save extended feature flag &set_label("no_extended_info"); &bt ("ebp",27); # check OSXSAVE bit &jnc (&label("clear_avx")); &xor ("ecx","ecx"); &data_byte(0x0f,0x01,0xd0); # xgetbv &and ("eax",6); &cmp ("eax",6); &je (&label("done")); &cmp ("eax",2); &je (&label("clear_avx")); &set_label("clear_xmm"); &and ("ebp",0xfdfffffd); # clear AESNI and PCLMULQDQ bits &and ("esi",0xfeffffff); # clear FXSR &set_label("clear_avx"); &and ("ebp",0xefffe7ff); # clear AVX, FMA and AMD XOP bits &and (&DWP(8,"edi"),0xffffffdf); # clear AVX2 &set_label("done"); &mov ("eax","esi"); &mov ("edx","ebp"); &set_label("nocpuid"); &function_end("OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid"); &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_rdtsc","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt (&DWP(0,"ecx"),4); &jnc (&label("notsc")); &rdtsc (); &set_label("notsc"); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_rdtsc"); # This works in Ring 0 only [read DJGPP+MS-DOS+privileged DPMI host], # but it's safe to call it on any [supported] 32-bit platform... # Just check for [non-]zero return value... &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_instrument_halt","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD"); &picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt (&DWP(0,"ecx"),4); &jnc (&label("nohalt")); # no TSC &data_word(0x9058900e); # push %cs; pop %eax &and ("eax",3); &jnz (&label("nohalt")); # not enough privileges &pushf (); &pop ("eax"); &bt ("eax",9); &jnc (&label("nohalt")); # interrupts are disabled &rdtsc (); &push ("edx"); &push ("eax"); &halt (); &rdtsc (); &sub ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &sbb ("edx",&DWP(4,"esp")); &add ("esp",8); &ret (); &set_label("nohalt"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_instrument_halt"); # Essentially there is only one use for this function. Under DJGPP: # # #include # ... # i=OPENSSL_far_spin(_dos_ds,0x46c); # ... # to obtain the number of spins till closest timer interrupt. &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_far_spin"); &pushf (); &pop ("eax"); &bt ("eax",9); &jnc (&label("nospin")); # interrupts are disabled &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esp")); &data_word (0x90d88e1e); # push %ds, mov %eax,%ds &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("edx",&DWP(0,"ecx")); &jmp (&label("spin")); &align (16); &set_label("spin"); &inc ("eax"); &cmp ("edx",&DWP(0,"ecx")); &je (&label("spin")); &data_word (0x1f909090); # pop %ds &ret (); &set_label("nospin"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_far_spin"); &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_wipe_cpu","EXTRN\t_OPENSSL_ia32cap_P:DWORD"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &picmeup("ecx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"ecx")); &bt (&DWP(0,"ecx"),1); &jnc (&label("no_x87")); if ($sse2) { &and ("ecx",1<<26|1<<24); # check SSE2 and FXSR bits &cmp ("ecx",1<<26|1<<24); &jne (&label("no_sse2")); &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1"); &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2"); &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3"); &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4"); &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5"); &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6"); &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7"); &set_label("no_sse2"); } # just a bunch of fldz to zap the fp/mm bank followed by finit... &data_word(0xeed9eed9,0xeed9eed9,0xeed9eed9,0xeed9eed9,0x90e3db9b); &set_label("no_x87"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(4,"esp")); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_wipe_cpu"); &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_atomic_add"); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"esp")); # fetch the pointer, 1st arg &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esp")); # fetch the increment, 2nd arg &push ("ebx"); &nop (); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edx")); &set_label("spin"); &lea ("ebx",&DWP(0,"eax","ecx")); &nop (); &data_word(0x1ab10ff0); # lock; cmpxchg %ebx,(%edx) # %eax is involved and is always reloaded &jne (&label("spin")); &mov ("eax","ebx"); # OpenSSL expects the new value &pop ("ebx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_atomic_add"); # This function can become handy under Win32 in situations when # we don't know which calling convention, __stdcall or __cdecl(*), # indirect callee is using. In C it can be deployed as # #ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ # type OPENSSL_indirect_call(void *f,...); # ... # OPENSSL_indirect_call(func,[up to $max arguments]); #endif # # (*) it's designed to work even for __fastcall if number of # arguments is 1 or 2! &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_indirect_call"); { my ($max,$i)=(7,); # $max has to be chosen as 4*n-1 # in order to preserve eventual # stack alignment &push ("ebp"); &mov ("ebp","esp"); &sub ("esp",$max*4); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(12,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov ("edx",&DWP(16,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edx"); for($i=2;$i<$max;$i++) { # Some copies will be redundant/bogus... &mov ("eax",&DWP(12+$i*4,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(0+$i*4,"esp"),"eax"); } &call_ptr (&DWP(8,"ebp"));# make the call... &mov ("esp","ebp"); # ... and just restore the stack pointer # without paying attention to what we called, # (__cdecl *func) or (__stdcall *one). &pop ("ebp"); &ret (); } &function_end_B("OPENSSL_indirect_call"); &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_cleanse"); &mov ("edx",&wparam(0)); &mov ("ecx",&wparam(1)); &xor ("eax","eax"); &cmp ("ecx",7); &jae (&label("lot")); &cmp ("ecx",0); &je (&label("ret")); &set_label("little"); &mov (&BP(0,"edx"),"al"); &sub ("ecx",1); &lea ("edx",&DWP(1,"edx")); &jnz (&label("little")); &set_label("ret"); &ret (); &set_label("lot",16); &test ("edx",3); &jz (&label("aligned")); &mov (&BP(0,"edx"),"al"); &lea ("ecx",&DWP(-1,"ecx")); &lea ("edx",&DWP(1,"edx")); &jmp (&label("lot")); &set_label("aligned"); &mov (&DWP(0,"edx"),"eax"); &lea ("ecx",&DWP(-4,"ecx")); &test ("ecx",-4); &lea ("edx",&DWP(4,"edx")); &jnz (&label("aligned")); &cmp ("ecx",0); &jne (&label("little")); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_cleanse"); &function_begin_B("CRYPTO_memcmp"); &push ("esi"); &push ("edi"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("edi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &cmp ("ecx",0); &je (&label("no_data")); &set_label("loop"); &mov ("dl",&BP(0,"esi")); &lea ("esi",&DWP(1,"esi")); &xor ("dl",&BP(0,"edi")); &lea ("edi",&DWP(1,"edi")); &or ("al","dl"); &dec ("ecx"); &jnz (&label("loop")); &neg ("eax"); &shr ("eax",31); &set_label("no_data"); &pop ("edi"); &pop ("esi"); &ret (); &function_end_B("CRYPTO_memcmp"); { my $lasttick = "esi"; my $lastdiff = "ebx"; my $out = "edi"; my $cnt = "ecx"; my $max = "ebp"; &function_begin("OPENSSL_instrument_bus"); &mov ("eax",0); if ($sse2) { &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt (&DWP(0,"edx"),4); &jnc (&label("nogo")); # no TSC &bt (&DWP(0,"edx"),19); &jnc (&label("nogo")); # no CLFLUSH &mov ($out,&wparam(0)); # load arguments &mov ($cnt,&wparam(1)); # collect 1st tick &rdtsc (); &mov ($lasttick,"eax"); # lasttick = tick &mov ($lastdiff,0); # lastdiff = 0 &clflush(&DWP(0,$out)); &data_byte(0xf0); # lock &add (&DWP(0,$out),$lastdiff); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("loop",16); &rdtsc (); &mov ("edx","eax"); # put aside tick (yes, I neglect edx) &sub ("eax",$lasttick); # diff &mov ($lasttick,"edx"); # lasttick = tick &mov ($lastdiff,"eax"); # lastdiff = diff &clflush(&DWP(0,$out)); &data_byte(0xf0); # lock &add (&DWP(0,$out),"eax"); # accumulate diff &lea ($out,&DWP(4,$out)); # ++$out &sub ($cnt,1); # --$cnt &jnz (&label("loop")); &mov ("eax",&wparam(1)); &set_label("nogo"); } &function_end("OPENSSL_instrument_bus"); &function_begin("OPENSSL_instrument_bus2"); &mov ("eax",0); if ($sse2) { &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &bt (&DWP(0,"edx"),4); &jnc (&label("nogo")); # no TSC &bt (&DWP(0,"edx"),19); &jnc (&label("nogo")); # no CLFLUSH &mov ($out,&wparam(0)); # load arguments &mov ($cnt,&wparam(1)); &mov ($max,&wparam(2)); &rdtsc (); # collect 1st tick &mov ($lasttick,"eax"); # lasttick = tick &mov ($lastdiff,0); # lastdiff = 0 &clflush(&DWP(0,$out)); &data_byte(0xf0); # lock &add (&DWP(0,$out),$lastdiff); &rdtsc (); # collect 1st diff &mov ("edx","eax"); # put aside tick (yes, I neglect edx) &sub ("eax",$lasttick); # diff &mov ($lasttick,"edx"); # lasttick = tick &mov ($lastdiff,"eax"); # lastdiff = diff &jmp (&label("loop2")); &set_label("loop2",16); &clflush(&DWP(0,$out)); &data_byte(0xf0); # lock &add (&DWP(0,$out),"eax"); # accumulate diff &sub ($max,1); &jz (&label("done2")); &rdtsc (); &mov ("edx","eax"); # put aside tick (yes, I neglect edx) &sub ("eax",$lasttick); # diff &mov ($lasttick,"edx"); # lasttick = tick &cmp ("eax",$lastdiff); &mov ($lastdiff,"eax"); # lastdiff = diff &mov ("edx",0); &setne ("dl"); &sub ($cnt,"edx"); # conditional --$cnt &lea ($out,&DWP(0,$out,"edx",4)); # conditional ++$out &jnz (&label("loop2")); &set_label("done2"); &mov ("eax",&wparam(1)); &sub ("eax",$cnt); &set_label("nogo"); } &function_end("OPENSSL_instrument_bus2"); } sub gen_random { my $rdop = shift; &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}"); &mov ("ecx",8); &set_label("loop"); &${rdop}("eax"); &jc (&label("break")); &loop (&label("loop")); &set_label("break"); &cmp ("eax",0); &cmove ("eax","ecx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}"); &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes"); &push ("edi"); &push ("ebx"); &xor ("eax","eax"); # return value &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("ebx",&wparam(1)); &cmp ("ebx",0); &je (&label("done")); &mov ("ecx",8); &set_label("loop"); &${rdop}("edx"); &jc (&label("break")); &loop (&label("loop")); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("break",16); &cmp ("ebx",4); &jb (&label("tail")); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"edx"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(4,"edi")); &add ("eax",4); &sub ("ebx",4); &jz (&label("done")); &mov ("ecx",8); &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("tail",16); &mov (&BP(0,"edi"),"dl"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(1,"edi")); &inc ("eax"); &shr ("edx",8); &dec ("ebx"); &jnz (&label("tail")); &set_label("done"); &pop ("ebx"); &pop ("edi"); &ret (); &function_end_B("OPENSSL_ia32_${rdop}_bytes"); } &gen_random("rdrand"); &gen_random("rdseed"); &initseg("OPENSSL_cpuid_setup"); &hidden("OPENSSL_cpuid_setup"); &hidden("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/LPdir_vms.c0000644000000000000000000001414613176625656015453 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef LPDIR_H # include "LPdir.h" #endif #include "vms_rms.h" /* Some compiler options hide EVMSERR. */ #ifndef EVMSERR # define EVMSERR 65535 /* error for non-translatable VMS errors */ #endif struct LP_dir_context_st { unsigned long VMS_context; char filespec[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; char result[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; struct dsc$descriptor_d filespec_dsc; struct dsc$descriptor_d result_dsc; }; const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory) { int status; char *p, *r; size_t l; unsigned long flags = 0; /* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */ #if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 char *ctx_filespec_32p; # pragma pointer_size restore char ctx_filespec_32[NAMX_MAXRSS + 1]; #endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ #ifdef NAML$C_MAXRSS flags |= LIB$M_FIL_LONG_NAMES; #endif if (ctx == NULL || directory == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } errno = 0; if (*ctx == NULL) { size_t filespeclen = strlen(directory); char *filespec = NULL; if (filespeclen == 0) { errno = ENOENT; return 0; } /* MUST be a VMS directory specification! Let's estimate if it is. */ if (directory[filespeclen - 1] != ']' && directory[filespeclen - 1] != '>' && directory[filespeclen - 1] != ':') { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } filespeclen += 4; /* "*.*;" */ if (filespeclen > NAMX_MAXRSS) { errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return 0; } *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx)); if (*ctx == NULL) { errno = ENOMEM; return 0; } memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); strcpy((*ctx)->filespec, directory); strcat((*ctx)->filespec, "*.*;"); /* Arrange 32-bit pointer to (copied) string storage, if needed. */ #if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define CTX_FILESPEC ctx_filespec_32p /* Copy the file name to storage with a 32-bit pointer. */ ctx_filespec_32p = ctx_filespec_32; strcpy(ctx_filespec_32p, (*ctx)->filespec); #else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define CTX_FILESPEC (*ctx)->filespec #endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$w_length = filespeclen; (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; (*ctx)->filespec_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = CTX_FILESPEC; } (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$w_length = 0; (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_D; (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = 0; status = lib$find_file(&(*ctx)->filespec_dsc, &(*ctx)->result_dsc, &(*ctx)->VMS_context, 0, 0, 0, &flags); if (status == RMS$_NMF) { errno = 0; vaxc$errno = status; return NULL; } if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) { errno = EVMSERR; vaxc$errno = status; return NULL; } /* * Quick, cheap and dirty way to discard any device and directory, since * we only want file names */ l = (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$w_length; p = (*ctx)->result_dsc.dsc$a_pointer; r = p; for (; *p; p++) { if (*p == '^' && p[1] != '\0') { /* Take care of ODS-5 escapes */ p++; } else if (*p == ':' || *p == '>' || *p == ']') { l -= p + 1 - r; r = p + 1; } else if (*p == ';') { l = p - r; break; } } strncpy((*ctx)->result, r, l); (*ctx)->result[l] = '\0'; str$free1_dx(&(*ctx)->result_dsc); return (*ctx)->result; } int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx) { if (ctx != NULL && *ctx != NULL) { int status = lib$find_file_end(&(*ctx)->VMS_context); free(*ctx); if (!$VMS_STATUS_SUCCESS(status)) { errno = EVMSERR; vaxc$errno = status; return 0; } return 1; } errno = EINVAL; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014175 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_mdc2.c0000644000000000000000000000223613176625657015505 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return MDC2_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return MDC2_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return MDC2_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD mdc2_md = { NID_mdc2, NID_mdc2WithRSA, MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, MDC2_BLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MDC2_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void) { return (&mdc2_md); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_wp.c0000644000000000000000000000226613176625657015311 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return WHIRLPOOL_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return WHIRLPOOL_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return WHIRLPOOL_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD whirlpool_md = { NID_whirlpool, 0, WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(WHIRLPOOL_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_whirlpool(void) { return (&whirlpool_md); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_idea.c0000644000000000000000000000416413176625657015554 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include /* Can't use IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER because IDEA_ecb_encrypt is different */ typedef struct { IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE ks; } EVP_IDEA_KEY; static int idea_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); /* * NB IDEA_ecb_encrypt doesn't take an 'encrypt' argument so we treat it as a * special case */ static int idea_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop() IDEA_ecb_encrypt(in + i, out + i, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_IDEA_KEY,ctx)->ks); return 1; } BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cbc(idea, IDEA, EVP_IDEA_KEY, ks) BLOCK_CIPHER_func_ofb(idea, IDEA, 64, EVP_IDEA_KEY, ks) BLOCK_CIPHER_func_cfb(idea, IDEA, 64, EVP_IDEA_KEY, ks) BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(idea, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE, NID_idea, 8, 16, 8, 64, 0, idea_init_key, NULL, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL) static int idea_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { if (!enc) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE) enc = 1; else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE) enc = 1; } if (enc) IDEA_set_encrypt_key(key, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_IDEA_KEY,ctx)->ks); else { IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE tmp; IDEA_set_encrypt_key(key, &tmp); IDEA_set_decrypt_key(&tmp, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_IDEA_KEY,ctx)->ks); OPENSSL_cleanse((unsigned char *)&tmp, sizeof(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE)); } return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_seed.c0000644000000000000000000000221613176625657015566 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SEED NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int seed_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); typedef struct { SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE ks; } EVP_SEED_KEY; IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(seed, ks, SEED, EVP_SEED_KEY, NID_seed, 16, 16, 16, 128, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, seed_init_key, 0, 0, 0, 0) static int seed_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { SEED_set_key(key, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SEED_KEY,ctx)->ks); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p_verify.c0000644000000000000000000000314013176625657016162 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int m_len = 0; int i = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL; if (EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE)) { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, m, &m_len)) goto err; } else { int rv = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } rv = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx); if (rv) rv = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, m, &m_len); EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx); if (!rv) return 0; } i = -1; pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (pkctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)) <= 0) goto err; i = EVP_PKEY_verify(pkctx, sigbuf, siglen, m, m_len); err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkctx); return i; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/build.info0000644000000000000000000000167213176625657016157 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_cnf.c \ e_des.c e_bf.c e_idea.c e_des3.c e_camellia.c\ e_rc4.c e_aes.c names.c e_seed.c \ e_xcbc_d.c e_rc2.c e_cast.c e_rc5.c \ m_null.c m_md2.c m_md4.c m_md5.c m_sha1.c m_wp.c \ m_md5_sha1.c m_mdc2.c m_ripemd.c \ p_open.c p_seal.c p_sign.c p_verify.c p_lib.c p_enc.c p_dec.c \ bio_md.c bio_b64.c bio_enc.c evp_err.c e_null.c \ c_allc.c c_alld.c evp_lib.c bio_ok.c \ evp_pkey.c evp_pbe.c p5_crpt.c p5_crpt2.c scrypt.c \ e_old.c pmeth_lib.c pmeth_fn.c pmeth_gn.c m_sigver.c \ e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c \ e_chacha20_poly1305.c cmeth_lib.c INCLUDE[e_aes.o]=.. ../modes INCLUDE[e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o]=../modes INCLUDE[e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o]=../modes INCLUDE[e_camellia.o]=.. ../modes INCLUDE[e_des.o]=.. INCLUDE[e_des3.o]=.. openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p_seal.c0000644000000000000000000000351113176625657015604 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk) { unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; int i; if (type) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return 0; } if ((npubk <= 0) || !pubk) return 1; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) && RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) <= 0) return 0; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < npubk; i++) { ekl[i] = EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old(ek[i], key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), pubk[i]); if (ekl[i] <= 0) return (-1); } return (npubk); } /*- MACRO void EVP_SealUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; unsigned char *out; int *outl; unsigned char *in; int inl; { EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl); } */ int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int i; i = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); if (i) i = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); return i; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c0000644000000000000000000004445613176625657015775 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "evp_locl.h" int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) { if (c == NULL) return 1; if (c->cipher != NULL) { if (c->cipher->cleanup && !c->cipher->cleanup(c)) return 0; /* Cleanse cipher context data */ if (c->cipher_data && c->cipher->ctx_size) OPENSSL_cleanse(c->cipher_data, c->cipher->ctx_size); } OPENSSL_free(c->cipher_data); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(c->engine); #endif memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); return 1; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)); } void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { if (cipher != NULL) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, enc); } int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { if (enc == -1) enc = ctx->encrypt; else { if (enc) enc = 1; ctx->encrypt = enc; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so * this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the * previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a * reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary. */ if (ctx->engine && ctx->cipher && (cipher == NULL || cipher->nid == ctx->cipher->nid)) goto skip_to_init; #endif if (cipher) { /* * Ensure a context left lying around from last time is cleared (the * previous check attempted to avoid this if the same ENGINE and * EVP_CIPHER could be used). */ if (ctx->cipher) { unsigned long flags = ctx->flags; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); /* Restore encrypt and flags */ ctx->encrypt = enc; ctx->flags = flags; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (impl) { if (!ENGINE_init(impl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } } else /* Ask if an ENGINE is reserved for this job */ impl = ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(cipher->nid); if (impl) { /* There's an ENGINE for this job ... (apparently) */ const EVP_CIPHER *c = ENGINE_get_cipher(impl, cipher->nid); if (!c) { /* * One positive side-effect of US's export control history, * is that we should at least be able to avoid using US * misspellings of "initialisation"? */ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } /* We'll use the ENGINE's private cipher definition */ cipher = c; /* * Store the ENGINE functional reference so we know 'cipher' came * from an ENGINE and we need to release it when done. */ ctx->engine = impl; } else ctx->engine = NULL; #endif ctx->cipher = cipher; if (ctx->cipher->ctx_size) { ctx->cipher_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(ctx->cipher->ctx_size); if (ctx->cipher_data == NULL) { ctx->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } else { ctx->cipher_data = NULL; } ctx->key_len = cipher->key_len; /* Preserve wrap enable flag, zero everything else */ ctx->flags &= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW; if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT) { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_INIT, 0, NULL)) { ctx->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } } } else if (!ctx->cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE skip_to_init: #endif /* we assume block size is a power of 2 in *cryptUpdate */ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->block_size == 1 || ctx->cipher->block_size == 8 || ctx->cipher->block_size == 16); if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED); return 0; } if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV)) { switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) { case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER: case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE: break; case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE: ctx->num = 0; /* fall-through */ case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE: OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= (int)sizeof(ctx->iv)); if (iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); break; case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE: ctx->num = 0; /* Don't reuse IV for CTR mode */ if (iv) memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); break; default: return 0; } } if (key || (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT)) { if (!ctx->cipher->init(ctx, key, iv, enc)) return 0; } ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->final_used = 0; ctx->block_mask = ctx->cipher->block_size - 1; return 1; } int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); else return EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); } int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); else return EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); } int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, out, outl); else return EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, out, outl); } int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 1); } int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 1); } int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 0); } int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0); } /* * According to the letter of standard difference between pointers * is specified to be valid only within same object. This makes * it formally challenging to determine if input and output buffers * are not partially overlapping with standard pointer arithmetic. */ #ifdef PTRDIFF_T # undef PTRDIFF_T #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE==64 /* * Then we have VMS that distinguishes itself by adhering to * sizeof(size_t)==4 even in 64-bit builds, which means that * difference between two pointers might be truncated to 32 bits. * In the context one can even wonder how comparison for * equality is implemented. To be on the safe side we adhere to * PTRDIFF_T even for comparison for equality. */ # define PTRDIFF_T uint64_t #else # define PTRDIFF_T size_t #endif int is_partially_overlapping(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2, int len) { PTRDIFF_T diff = (PTRDIFF_T)ptr1-(PTRDIFF_T)ptr2; /* * Check for partially overlapping buffers. [Binary logical * operations are used instead of boolean to minimize number * of conditional branches.] */ int overlapped = (len > 0) & (diff != 0) & ((diff < (PTRDIFF_T)len) | (diff > (0 - (PTRDIFF_T)len))); return overlapped; } int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int i, j, bl, cmpl = inl; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) cmpl = (cmpl + 7) / 8; bl = ctx->cipher->block_size; if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { /* If block size > 1 then the cipher will have to do this check */ if (bl == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl); if (i < 0) return 0; else *outl = i; return 1; } if (inl <= 0) { *outl = 0; return inl == 0; } if (is_partially_overlapping(out + ctx->buf_len, in, cmpl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (inl & (ctx->block_mask)) == 0) { if (ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) { *outl = inl; return 1; } else { *outl = 0; return 0; } } i = ctx->buf_len; OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); if (i != 0) { if (bl - i > inl) { memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl); ctx->buf_len += inl; *outl = 0; return 1; } else { j = bl - i; memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j); inl -= j; in += j; if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl)) return 0; out += bl; *outl = bl; } } else *outl = 0; i = inl & (bl - 1); inl -= i; if (inl > 0) { if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) return 0; *outl += inl; } if (i != 0) memcpy(ctx->buf, &(in[inl]), i); ctx->buf_len = i; return 1; } int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int ret; ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); return ret; } int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int n, ret; unsigned int i, b, bl; if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0); if (ret < 0) return 0; else *outl = ret; return 1; } b = ctx->cipher->block_size; OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf); if (b == 1) { *outl = 0; return 1; } bl = ctx->buf_len; if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) { if (bl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH); return 0; } *outl = 0; return 1; } n = b - bl; for (i = bl; i < b; i++) ctx->buf[i] = n; ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, b); if (ret) *outl = b; return ret; } int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int fix_len, cmpl = inl; unsigned int b; b = ctx->cipher->block_size; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) cmpl = (cmpl + 7) / 8; if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { if (b == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } fix_len = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl); if (fix_len < 0) { *outl = 0; return 0; } else *outl = fix_len; return 1; } if (inl <= 0) { *outl = 0; return inl == 0; } if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final); if (ctx->final_used) { /* see comment about PTRDIFF_T comparison above */ if (((PTRDIFF_T)out == (PTRDIFF_T)in) || is_partially_overlapping(out, in, b)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } memcpy(out, ctx->final, b); out += b; fix_len = 1; } else fix_len = 0; if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl)) return 0; /* * if we have 'decrypted' a multiple of block size, make sure we have a * copy of this last block */ if (b > 1 && !ctx->buf_len) { *outl -= b; ctx->final_used = 1; memcpy(ctx->final, &out[*outl], b); } else ctx->final_used = 0; if (fix_len) *outl += b; return 1; } int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int ret; ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); return ret; } int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int i, n; unsigned int b; *outl = 0; if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0); if (i < 0) return 0; else *outl = i; return 1; } b = ctx->cipher->block_size; if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) { if (ctx->buf_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH); return 0; } *outl = 0; return 1; } if (b > 1) { if (ctx->buf_len || !ctx->final_used) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH); return (0); } OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final); /* * The following assumes that the ciphertext has been authenticated. * Otherwise it provides a padding oracle. */ n = ctx->final[b - 1]; if (n == 0 || n > (int)b) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return (0); } for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (ctx->final[--b] != n) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return (0); } } n = ctx->cipher->block_size - n; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) out[i] = ctx->final[i]; *outl = n; } else *outl = 0; return (1); } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int keylen) { if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH) return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH, keylen, NULL); if (c->key_len == keylen) return 1; if ((keylen > 0) && (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)) { c->key_len = keylen; return 1; } EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int pad) { if (pad) ctx->flags &= ~EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING; else ctx->flags |= EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { int ret; if (!ctx->cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); return 0; } if (!ctx->cipher->ctrl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } ret = ctx->cipher->ctrl(ctx, type, arg, ptr); if (ret == -1) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } return ret; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key) { if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY) return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY, 0, key); if (RAND_bytes(key, ctx->key_len) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in) { if ((in == NULL) || (in->cipher == NULL)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Make sure it's safe to copy a cipher context using an ENGINE */ if (in->engine && !ENGINE_init(in->engine)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } #endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(out); memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out)); if (in->cipher_data && in->cipher->ctx_size) { out->cipher_data = OPENSSL_malloc(in->cipher->ctx_size); if (out->cipher_data == NULL) { out->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(out->cipher_data, in->cipher_data, in->cipher->ctx_size); } if (in->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) if (!in->cipher->ctrl((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)in, EVP_CTRL_COPY, 0, out)) { out->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c0000644000000000000000000001024413176625657016143 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN; if (!ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } if (ppkey == NULL) return -1; if (*ppkey == NULL) *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (*ppkey == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey); if (ret <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey); *ppkey = NULL; } return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN; if (!ctx->pmeth->keygen_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } if (ppkey == NULL) return -1; if (*ppkey == NULL) *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (*ppkey == NULL) return -1; ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen(ctx, *ppkey); if (ret <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey); *ppkey = NULL; } return ret; } void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb) { ctx->pkey_gencb = cb; } EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->pkey_gencb; } /* * "translation callback" to call EVP_PKEY_CTX callbacks using BN_GENCB style * callbacks. */ static int trans_cb(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *gcb) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = BN_GENCB_get_arg(gcb); ctx->keygen_info[0] = a; ctx->keygen_info[1] = b; return ctx->pkey_gencb(ctx); } void evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(BN_GENCB *cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { BN_GENCB_set(cb, trans_cb, ctx); } int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx) { if (idx == -1) return ctx->keygen_info_count; if (idx < 0 || idx > ctx->keygen_info_count) return 0; return ctx->keygen_info[idx]; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *key, int keylen) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL; mac_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(type, e); if (!mac_ctx) return NULL; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(mac_ctx) <= 0) goto merr; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key(mac_ctx, key, keylen) <= 0) goto merr; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(mac_ctx, &mac_key) <= 0) goto merr; merr: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(mac_ctx); return mac_key; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/bio_md.c0000644000000000000000000001162613176625657015600 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "evp_locl.h" #include "internal/bio.h" /* * BIO_put and BIO_get both add to the digest, BIO_gets returns the digest */ static int md_write(BIO *h, char const *buf, int num); static int md_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); /* * static int md_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); */ static int md_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long md_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int md_new(BIO *h); static int md_free(BIO *data); static long md_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); static const BIO_METHOD methods_md = { BIO_TYPE_MD, "message digest", md_write, md_read, NULL, /* md_puts, */ md_gets, md_ctrl, md_new, md_free, md_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void) { return (&methods_md); } static int md_new(BIO *bi) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return (0); BIO_set_init(bi, 1); BIO_set_data(bi, ctx); return 1; } static int md_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); EVP_MD_CTX_free(BIO_get_data(a)); BIO_set_data(a, NULL); BIO_set_init(a, 0); return 1; } static int md_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; BIO *next; if (out == NULL) return (0); ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL)) return (0); ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl); if (BIO_get_init(b)) { if (ret > 0) { if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned int)ret) <= 0) return (-1); } } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static int md_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; BIO *next; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx != NULL) && (next != NULL)) ret = BIO_write(next, in, inl); if (BIO_get_init(b)) { if (ret > 0) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (const unsigned char *)in, (unsigned int)ret)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } } } if (next != NULL) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); } return ret; } static long md_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, *dctx, **pctx; const EVP_MD **ppmd; EVP_MD *md; long ret = 1; BIO *dbio, *next; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: if (BIO_get_init(b)) ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, ctx->digest, NULL); else ret = 0; if (ret > 0) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_C_GET_MD: if (BIO_get_init(b)) { ppmd = ptr; *ppmd = ctx->digest; } else ret = 0; break; case BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX: pctx = ptr; *pctx = ctx; BIO_set_init(b, 1); break; case BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX: if (BIO_get_init(b)) BIO_set_data(b, ptr); else ret = 0; break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_C_SET_MD: md = ptr; ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL); if (ret > 0) BIO_set_init(b, 1); break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: dbio = ptr; dctx = BIO_get_data(dbio); if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dctx, ctx)) return 0; BIO_set_init(b, 1); break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); } static long md_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; BIO *next; next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } static int md_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; unsigned int ret; ctx = BIO_get_data(bp); if (size < ctx->digest->md_size) return 0; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)buf, &ret) <= 0) return -1; return ((int)ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c0000644000000000000000000003666213176625657015602 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/bio.h" static int b64_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int b64_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int b64_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); /* * static int b64_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); */ static long b64_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int b64_new(BIO *h); static int b64_free(BIO *data); static long b64_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); #define B64_BLOCK_SIZE 1024 #define B64_BLOCK_SIZE2 768 #define B64_NONE 0 #define B64_ENCODE 1 #define B64_DECODE 2 typedef struct b64_struct { /* * BIO *bio; moved to the BIO structure */ int buf_len; int buf_off; int tmp_len; /* used to find the start when decoding */ int tmp_nl; /* If true, scan until '\n' */ int encode; int start; /* have we started decoding yet? */ int cont; /* <= 0 when finished */ EVP_ENCODE_CTX *base64; char buf[EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(B64_BLOCK_SIZE) + 10]; char tmp[B64_BLOCK_SIZE]; } BIO_B64_CTX; static const BIO_METHOD methods_b64 = { BIO_TYPE_BASE64, "base64 encoding", b64_write, b64_read, b64_puts, NULL, /* b64_gets, */ b64_ctrl, b64_new, b64_free, b64_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void) { return &methods_b64; } static int b64_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_B64_CTX *ctx; ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; ctx->cont = 1; ctx->start = 1; ctx->base64 = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); if (ctx->base64 == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return 0; } BIO_set_data(bi, ctx); BIO_set_init(bi, 1); return 1; } static int b64_free(BIO *a) { BIO_B64_CTX *ctx; if (a == NULL) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(a); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx->base64); OPENSSL_free(ctx); BIO_set_data(a, NULL); BIO_set_init(a, 0); return 1; } static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0, i, ii, j, k, x, n, num, ret_code = 0; BIO_B64_CTX *ctx; unsigned char *p, *q; BIO *next; if (out == NULL) return (0); ctx = (BIO_B64_CTX *)BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL)) return 0; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ctx->encode != B64_DECODE) { ctx->encode = B64_DECODE; ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; ctx->tmp_len = 0; EVP_DecodeInit(ctx->base64); } /* First check if there are bytes decoded/encoded */ if (ctx->buf_len > 0) { OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); i = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; if (i > outl) i = outl; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off + i < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); memcpy(out, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), i); ret = i; out += i; outl -= i; ctx->buf_off += i; if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) { ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; } } /* * At this point, we have room of outl bytes and an empty buffer, so we * should read in some more. */ ret_code = 0; while (outl > 0) { if (ctx->cont <= 0) break; i = BIO_read(next, &(ctx->tmp[ctx->tmp_len]), B64_BLOCK_SIZE - ctx->tmp_len); if (i <= 0) { ret_code = i; /* Should we continue next time we are called? */ if (!BIO_should_retry(next)) { ctx->cont = i; /* If buffer empty break */ if (ctx->tmp_len == 0) break; /* Fall through and process what we have */ else i = 0; } /* else we retry and add more data to buffer */ else break; } i += ctx->tmp_len; ctx->tmp_len = i; /* * We need to scan, a line at a time until we have a valid line if we * are starting. */ if (ctx->start && (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL)) { /* ctx->start=1; */ ctx->tmp_len = 0; } else if (ctx->start) { q = p = (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp; num = 0; for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { if (*(q++) != '\n') continue; /* * due to a previous very long line, we need to keep on * scanning for a '\n' before we even start looking for * base64 encoded stuff. */ if (ctx->tmp_nl) { p = q; ctx->tmp_nl = 0; continue; } k = EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx->base64, (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &num, p, q - p); if ((k <= 0) && (num == 0) && (ctx->start)) EVP_DecodeInit(ctx->base64); else { if (p != (unsigned char *) &(ctx->tmp[0])) { i -= (p - (unsigned char *) &(ctx->tmp[0])); for (x = 0; x < i; x++) ctx->tmp[x] = p[x]; } EVP_DecodeInit(ctx->base64); ctx->start = 0; break; } p = q; } /* we fell off the end without starting */ if ((j == i) && (num == 0)) { /* * Is this is one long chunk?, if so, keep on reading until a * new line. */ if (p == (unsigned char *)&(ctx->tmp[0])) { /* Check buffer full */ if (i == B64_BLOCK_SIZE) { ctx->tmp_nl = 1; ctx->tmp_len = 0; } } else if (p != q) { /* finished on a '\n' */ n = q - p; for (ii = 0; ii < n; ii++) ctx->tmp[ii] = p[ii]; ctx->tmp_len = n; } /* else finished on a '\n' */ continue; } else { ctx->tmp_len = 0; } } else if ((i < B64_BLOCK_SIZE) && (ctx->cont > 0)) { /* * If buffer isn't full and we can retry then restart to read in * more data. */ continue; } if (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL) { int z, jj; jj = i & ~3; /* process per 4 */ z = EVP_DecodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf, (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, jj); if (jj > 2) { if (ctx->tmp[jj - 1] == '=') { z--; if (ctx->tmp[jj - 2] == '=') z--; } } /* * z is now number of output bytes and jj is the number consumed */ if (jj != i) { memmove(ctx->tmp, &ctx->tmp[jj], i - jj); ctx->tmp_len = i - jj; } ctx->buf_len = 0; if (z > 0) { ctx->buf_len = z; } i = z; } else { i = EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx->base64, (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len, (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, i); ctx->tmp_len = 0; } ctx->buf_off = 0; if (i < 0) { ret_code = 0; ctx->buf_len = 0; break; } if (ctx->buf_len <= outl) i = ctx->buf_len; else i = outl; memcpy(out, ctx->buf, i); ret += i; ctx->buf_off = i; if (ctx->buf_off == ctx->buf_len) { ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; } outl -= i; out += i; } /* BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); */ BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return ((ret == 0) ? ret_code : ret); } static int b64_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = 0; int n; int i; BIO_B64_CTX *ctx; BIO *next; ctx = (BIO_B64_CTX *)BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL)) return 0; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ctx->encode != B64_ENCODE) { ctx->encode = B64_ENCODE; ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; ctx->tmp_len = 0; EVP_EncodeInit(ctx->base64); } OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); n = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; while (n > 0) { i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (i); } OPENSSL_assert(i <= n); ctx->buf_off += i; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); n -= i; } /* at this point all pending data has been written */ ctx->buf_off = 0; ctx->buf_len = 0; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); while (inl > 0) { n = (inl > B64_BLOCK_SIZE) ? B64_BLOCK_SIZE : inl; if (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL) { if (ctx->tmp_len > 0) { OPENSSL_assert(ctx->tmp_len <= 3); n = 3 - ctx->tmp_len; /* * There's a theoretical possibility for this */ if (n > inl) n = inl; memcpy(&(ctx->tmp[ctx->tmp_len]), in, n); ctx->tmp_len += n; ret += n; if (ctx->tmp_len < 3) break; ctx->buf_len = EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf, (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, ctx->tmp_len); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); /* * Since we're now done using the temporary buffer, the * length should be 0'd */ ctx->tmp_len = 0; } else { if (n < 3) { memcpy(ctx->tmp, in, n); ctx->tmp_len = n; ret += n; break; } n -= n % 3; ctx->buf_len = EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf, (const unsigned char *)in, n); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); ret += n; } } else { if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx->base64, (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len, (unsigned char *)in, n)) return ((ret == 0) ? -1 : ret); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); ret += n; } inl -= n; in += n; ctx->buf_off = 0; n = ctx->buf_len; while (n > 0) { i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return ((ret == 0) ? i : ret); } OPENSSL_assert(i <= n); n -= i; ctx->buf_off += i; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); } ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; } return (ret); } static long b64_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { BIO_B64_CTX *ctx; long ret = 1; int i; BIO *next; ctx = (BIO_B64_CTX *)BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL)) return 0; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ctx->cont = 1; ctx->start = 1; ctx->encode = B64_NONE; ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: /* More to read */ if (ctx->cont <= 0) ret = 1; else ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: /* More to write in buffer */ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; if ((ret == 0) && (ctx->encode != B64_NONE) && (EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(ctx->base64) != 0)) ret = 1; else if (ret <= 0) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: /* More to read in buffer */ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_len >= ctx->buf_off); ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; if (ret <= 0) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: /* do a final write */ again: while (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off) { i = b64_write(b, NULL, 0); if (i < 0) return i; } if (BIO_get_flags(b) & BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL) { if (ctx->tmp_len != 0) { ctx->buf_len = EVP_EncodeBlock((unsigned char *)ctx->buf, (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, ctx->tmp_len); ctx->buf_off = 0; ctx->tmp_len = 0; goto again; } } else if (ctx->encode != B64_NONE && EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(ctx->base64) != 0) { ctx->buf_off = 0; EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx->base64, (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf_len)); /* push out the bytes */ goto again; } /* Finally flush the underlying BIO */ ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: case BIO_CTRL_GET: case BIO_CTRL_SET: default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static long b64_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } static int b64_puts(BIO *b, const char *str) { return b64_write(b, str, strlen(str)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c0000644000000000000000000003734613176625657015620 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- From: Arne Ansper Why BIO_f_reliable? I wrote function which took BIO* as argument, read data from it and processed it. Then I wanted to store the input file in encrypted form. OK I pushed BIO_f_cipher to the BIO stack and everything was OK. BUT if user types wrong password BIO_f_cipher outputs only garbage and my function crashes. Yes I can and I should fix my function, but BIO_f_cipher is easy way to add encryption support to many existing applications and it's hard to debug and fix them all. So I wanted another BIO which would catch the incorrect passwords and file damages which cause garbage on BIO_f_cipher's output. The easy way is to push the BIO_f_md and save the checksum at the end of the file. However there are several problems with this approach: 1) you must somehow separate checksum from actual data. 2) you need lot's of memory when reading the file, because you must read to the end of the file and verify the checksum before letting the application to read the data. BIO_f_reliable tries to solve both problems, so that you can read and write arbitrary long streams using only fixed amount of memory. BIO_f_reliable splits data stream into blocks. Each block is prefixed with it's length and suffixed with it's digest. So you need only several Kbytes of memory to buffer single block before verifying it's digest. BIO_f_reliable goes further and adds several important capabilities: 1) the digest of the block is computed over the whole stream -- so nobody can rearrange the blocks or remove or replace them. 2) to detect invalid passwords right at the start BIO_f_reliable adds special prefix to the stream. In order to avoid known plain-text attacks this prefix is generated as follows: *) digest is initialized with random seed instead of standardized one. *) same seed is written to output *) well-known text is then hashed and the output of the digest is also written to output. reader can now read the seed from stream, hash the same string and then compare the digest output. Bad things: BIO_f_reliable knows what's going on in EVP_Digest. I initially wrote and tested this code on x86 machine and wrote the digests out in machine-dependent order :( There are people using this code and I cannot change this easily without making existing data files unreadable. */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/bio.h" #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" static int ok_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int ok_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static long ok_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int ok_new(BIO *h); static int ok_free(BIO *data); static long ok_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); static __owur int sig_out(BIO *b); static __owur int sig_in(BIO *b); static __owur int block_out(BIO *b); static __owur int block_in(BIO *b); #define OK_BLOCK_SIZE (1024*4) #define OK_BLOCK_BLOCK 4 #define IOBS (OK_BLOCK_SIZE+ OK_BLOCK_BLOCK+ 3*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) #define WELLKNOWN "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog's back." typedef struct ok_struct { size_t buf_len; size_t buf_off; size_t buf_len_save; size_t buf_off_save; int cont; /* <= 0 when finished */ int finished; EVP_MD_CTX *md; int blockout; /* output block is ready */ int sigio; /* must process signature */ unsigned char buf[IOBS]; } BIO_OK_CTX; static const BIO_METHOD methods_ok = { BIO_TYPE_CIPHER, "reliable", ok_write, ok_read, NULL, /* ok_puts, */ NULL, /* ok_gets, */ ok_ctrl, ok_new, ok_free, ok_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_reliable(void) { return (&methods_ok); } static int ok_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; ctx->cont = 1; ctx->sigio = 1; ctx->md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx->md == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return 0; } BIO_set_init(bi, 0); BIO_set_data(bi, ctx); return 1; } static int ok_free(BIO *a) { BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; if (a == NULL) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(a); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(BIO_OK_CTX)); BIO_set_data(a, NULL); BIO_set_init(a, 0); return 1; } static int ok_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0, i, n; BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; BIO *next; if (out == NULL) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL) || (BIO_get_init(b) == 0)) return 0; while (outl > 0) { /* copy clean bytes to output buffer */ if (ctx->blockout) { i = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; if (i > outl) i = outl; memcpy(out, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), i); ret += i; out += i; outl -= i; ctx->buf_off += i; /* all clean bytes are out */ if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) { ctx->buf_off = 0; /* * copy start of the next block into proper place */ if (ctx->buf_len_save - ctx->buf_off_save > 0) { ctx->buf_len = ctx->buf_len_save - ctx->buf_off_save; memmove(ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off_save]), ctx->buf_len); } else { ctx->buf_len = 0; } ctx->blockout = 0; } } /* output buffer full -- cancel */ if (outl == 0) break; /* no clean bytes in buffer -- fill it */ n = IOBS - ctx->buf_len; i = BIO_read(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), n); if (i <= 0) break; /* nothing new */ ctx->buf_len += i; /* no signature yet -- check if we got one */ if (ctx->sigio == 1) { if (!sig_in(b)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } } /* signature ok -- check if we got block */ if (ctx->sigio == 0) { if (!block_in(b)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } } /* invalid block -- cancel */ if (ctx->cont <= 0) break; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return ret; } static int ok_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = 0, n, i; BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; BIO *next; if (inl <= 0) return inl; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); ret = inl; if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL) || (BIO_get_init(b) == 0)) return (0); if (ctx->sigio && !sig_out(b)) return 0; do { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); n = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; while (ctx->blockout && n > 0) { i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (!BIO_should_retry(b)) ctx->cont = 0; return (i); } ctx->buf_off += i; n -= i; } /* at this point all pending data has been written */ ctx->blockout = 0; if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) { ctx->buf_len = OK_BLOCK_BLOCK; ctx->buf_off = 0; } if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); n = (inl + ctx->buf_len > OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK) ? (int)(OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK - ctx->buf_len) : inl; memcpy(&ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len], in, n); ctx->buf_len += n; inl -= n; in += n; if (ctx->buf_len >= OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK) { if (!block_out(b)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } } } while (inl > 0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static long ok_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; EVP_MD *md; const EVP_MD **ppmd; long ret = 1; int i; BIO *next; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; ctx->buf_len_save = 0; ctx->buf_off_save = 0; ctx->cont = 1; ctx->finished = 0; ctx->blockout = 0; ctx->sigio = 1; ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: /* More to read */ if (ctx->cont <= 0) ret = 1; else ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: /* More to read in buffer */ case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: /* More to read in buffer */ ret = ctx->blockout ? ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off : 0; if (ret <= 0) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: /* do a final write */ if (ctx->blockout == 0) if (!block_out(b)) return 0; while (ctx->blockout) { i = ok_write(b, NULL, 0); if (i < 0) { ret = i; break; } } ctx->finished = 1; ctx->buf_off = ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->cont = (int)ret; /* Finally flush the underlying BIO */ ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = (long)ctx->cont; break; case BIO_C_SET_MD: md = ptr; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md, md, NULL)) return 0; BIO_set_init(b, 1); break; case BIO_C_GET_MD: if (BIO_get_init(b)) { ppmd = ptr; *ppmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx->md); } else ret = 0; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static long ok_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; BIO *next; next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp); break; } return ret; } static void longswap(void *_ptr, size_t len) { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; if (is_endian.little) { size_t i; unsigned char *p = _ptr, c; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 4) { c = p[0], p[0] = p[3], p[3] = c; c = p[1], p[1] = p[2], p[2] = c; } } } static int sig_out(BIO *b) { BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; EVP_MD_CTX *md; const EVP_MD *digest; int md_size; void *md_data; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); md = ctx->md; digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(md); md_size = EVP_MD_size(digest); md_data = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(md); if (ctx->buf_len + 2 * md_size > OK_BLOCK_SIZE) return 1; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, digest, NULL)) goto berr; /* * FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all, * particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured. */ if (RAND_bytes(md_data, md_size) <= 0) goto berr; memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md_data, md_size); longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md_size); ctx->buf_len += md_size; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, WELLKNOWN, strlen(WELLKNOWN))) goto berr; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), NULL)) goto berr; ctx->buf_len += md_size; ctx->blockout = 1; ctx->sigio = 0; return 1; berr: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } static int sig_in(BIO *b) { BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; EVP_MD_CTX *md; unsigned char tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int ret = 0; const EVP_MD *digest; int md_size; void *md_data; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); md = ctx->md; digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(md); md_size = EVP_MD_size(digest); md_data = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(md); if ((int)(ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off) < 2 * md_size) return 1; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, digest, NULL)) goto berr; memcpy(md_data, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), md_size); longswap(md_data, md_size); ctx->buf_off += md_size; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, WELLKNOWN, strlen(WELLKNOWN))) goto berr; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, tmp, NULL)) goto berr; ret = memcmp(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), tmp, md_size) == 0; ctx->buf_off += md_size; if (ret == 1) { ctx->sigio = 0; if (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off) { memmove(ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off); } ctx->buf_len -= ctx->buf_off; ctx->buf_off = 0; } else { ctx->cont = 0; } return 1; berr: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } static int block_out(BIO *b) { BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; EVP_MD_CTX *md; unsigned long tl; const EVP_MD *digest; int md_size; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); md = ctx->md; digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(md); md_size = EVP_MD_size(digest); tl = ctx->buf_len - OK_BLOCK_BLOCK; ctx->buf[0] = (unsigned char)(tl >> 24); ctx->buf[1] = (unsigned char)(tl >> 16); ctx->buf[2] = (unsigned char)(tl >> 8); ctx->buf[3] = (unsigned char)(tl); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, (unsigned char *)&(ctx->buf[OK_BLOCK_BLOCK]), tl)) goto berr; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), NULL)) goto berr; ctx->buf_len += md_size; ctx->blockout = 1; return 1; berr: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } static int block_in(BIO *b) { BIO_OK_CTX *ctx; EVP_MD_CTX *md; unsigned long tl = 0; unsigned char tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int md_size; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); md = ctx->md; md_size = EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(md)); assert(sizeof(tl) >= OK_BLOCK_BLOCK); /* always true */ tl = ctx->buf[0]; tl <<= 8; tl |= ctx->buf[1]; tl <<= 8; tl |= ctx->buf[2]; tl <<= 8; tl |= ctx->buf[3]; if (ctx->buf_len < tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK + md_size) return 1; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, (unsigned char *)&(ctx->buf[OK_BLOCK_BLOCK]), tl)) goto berr; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, tmp, NULL)) goto berr; if (memcmp(&(ctx->buf[tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK]), tmp, md_size) == 0) { /* there might be parts from next block lurking around ! */ ctx->buf_off_save = tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK + md_size; ctx->buf_len_save = ctx->buf_len; ctx->buf_off = OK_BLOCK_BLOCK; ctx->buf_len = tl + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK; ctx->blockout = 1; } else { ctx->cont = 0; } return 1; berr: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_md2.c0000644000000000000000000000223113176625657015335 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 # include # include # include # include # include #include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return MD2_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return MD2_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return MD2_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD md2_md = { NID_md2, NID_md2WithRSAEncryption, MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, MD2_BLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD2_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void) { return &md2_md; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_md5.c0000644000000000000000000000223413176625657015343 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return MD5_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return MD5_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return MD5_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD md5_md = { NID_md5, NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, MD5_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD5_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void) { return (&md5_md); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c0000644000000000000000000001644513176625657015773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "evp_locl.h" /* Password based encryption (PBE) functions */ /* Setup a cipher context from a PBE algorithm */ struct evp_pbe_st { int pbe_type; int pbe_nid; int cipher_nid; int md_nid; EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen; }; static STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL) *pbe_algs; static const EVP_PBE_CTL builtin_pbe[] = { {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC, NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_id_pbkdf2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, NID_rc4, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4, NID_rc4_40, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC, NID_des_ede_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC, NID_rc2_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC, NID_rc2_40_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbes2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC, NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC, NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA1, -1, NID_sha1, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithMD5, -1, NID_md5, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA224, -1, NID_sha224, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA256, -1, NID_sha256, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA384, -1, NID_sha384, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA512, -1, NID_sha512, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94, -1, NID_id_GostR3411_94, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256, -1, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512, -1, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 0}, {EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, NID_id_pbkdf2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT {EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, NID_id_scrypt, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen} #endif }; int EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int en_de) { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; const EVP_MD *md; int cipher_nid, md_nid; EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen; if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe_obj), &cipher_nid, &md_nid, &keygen)) { char obj_tmp[80]; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM); if (!pbe_obj) OPENSSL_strlcpy(obj_tmp, "NULL", sizeof obj_tmp); else i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, sizeof obj_tmp, pbe_obj); ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp); return 0; } if (!pass) passlen = 0; else if (passlen == -1) passlen = strlen(pass); if (cipher_nid == -1) cipher = NULL; else { cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid); if (!cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER); return 0; } } if (md_nid == -1) md = NULL; else { md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid); if (!md) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); return 0; } } if (!keygen(ctx, pass, passlen, param, cipher, md, en_de)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2); static int pbe2_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe1, const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe2) { int ret = pbe1->pbe_type - pbe2->pbe_type; if (ret) return ret; else return pbe1->pbe_nid - pbe2->pbe_nid; } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2); static int pbe_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *a, const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *b) { int ret = (*a)->pbe_type - (*b)->pbe_type; if (ret) return ret; else return (*a)->pbe_nid - (*b)->pbe_nid; } /* Add a PBE algorithm */ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid, int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen) { EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp; if (pbe_algs == NULL) { pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp); if (pbe_algs == NULL) goto err; } if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL) goto err; pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type; pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid; pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid; pbe_tmp->md_nid = md_nid; pbe_tmp->keygen = keygen; if (!sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp)) { OPENSSL_free(pbe_tmp); goto err; } return 1; err: EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen) { int cipher_nid, md_nid; if (cipher) cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher); else cipher_nid = -1; if (md) md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md); else md_nid = -1; return EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, nid, cipher_nid, md_nid, keygen); } int EVP_PBE_find(int type, int pbe_nid, int *pcnid, int *pmnid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN **pkeygen) { EVP_PBE_CTL *pbetmp = NULL, pbelu; int i; if (pbe_nid == NID_undef) return 0; pbelu.pbe_type = type; pbelu.pbe_nid = pbe_nid; if (pbe_algs) { i = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_find(pbe_algs, &pbelu); if (i != -1) pbetmp = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_value(pbe_algs, i); } if (pbetmp == NULL) { pbetmp = OBJ_bsearch_pbe2(&pbelu, builtin_pbe, OSSL_NELEM(builtin_pbe)); } if (pbetmp == NULL) return 0; if (pcnid) *pcnid = pbetmp->cipher_nid; if (pmnid) *pmnid = pbetmp->md_nid; if (pkeygen) *pkeygen = pbetmp->keygen; return 1; } static void free_evp_pbe_ctl(EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe) { OPENSSL_free(pbe); } void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void) { sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_pop_free(pbe_algs, free_evp_pbe_ctl); pbe_algs = NULL; } int EVP_PBE_get(int *ptype, int *ppbe_nid, size_t num) { const EVP_PBE_CTL *tpbe; if (num >= OSSL_NELEM(builtin_pbe)) return 0; tpbe = builtin_pbe + num; if (ptype) *ptype = tpbe->pbe_type; if (ppbe_nid) *ppbe_nid = tpbe->pbe_nid; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c0000644000000000000000000007556413176625657020325 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" typedef struct { AES_KEY ks; SHA256_CTX head, tail, md; size_t payload_length; /* AAD length in decrypt case */ union { unsigned int tls_ver; unsigned char tls_aad[16]; /* 13 used */ } aux; } EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256; # define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ((size_t)-1) #if defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; # define AESNI_CAPABLE (1<<(57-32)) int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc); int aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(const void *inp, void *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16], SHA256_CTX *ctx, const void *in0); # define data(ctx) ((EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)) static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *inkey, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key = data(ctx); int ret; if (enc) ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(inkey, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &key->ks); else ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(inkey, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &key->ks); SHA256_Init(&key->head); /* handy when benchmarking */ key->tail = key->head; key->md = key->head; key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; return ret < 0 ? 0 : 1; } # define STITCHED_CALL # if !defined(STITCHED_CALL) # define aes_off 0 # endif void sha256_block_data_order(void *c, const void *p, size_t len); static void sha256_update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len) { const unsigned char *ptr = data; size_t res; if ((res = c->num)) { res = SHA256_CBLOCK - res; if (len < res) res = len; SHA256_Update(c, ptr, res); ptr += res; len -= res; } res = len % SHA256_CBLOCK; len -= res; if (len) { sha256_block_data_order(c, ptr, len / SHA256_CBLOCK); ptr += len; c->Nh += len >> 29; c->Nl += len <<= 3; if (c->Nl < (unsigned int)len) c->Nh++; } if (res) SHA256_Update(c, ptr, res); } # ifdef SHA256_Update # undef SHA256_Update # endif # define SHA256_Update sha256_update # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) typedef struct { unsigned int A[8], B[8], C[8], D[8], E[8], F[8], G[8], H[8]; } SHA256_MB_CTX; typedef struct { const unsigned char *ptr; int blocks; } HASH_DESC; void sha256_multi_block(SHA256_MB_CTX *, const HASH_DESC *, int); typedef struct { const unsigned char *inp; unsigned char *out; int blocks; u64 iv[2]; } CIPH_DESC; void aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(CIPH_DESC *, void *, int); static size_t tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t inp_len, int n4x) { /* n4x is 1 or 2 */ HASH_DESC hash_d[8], edges[8]; CIPH_DESC ciph_d[8]; unsigned char storage[sizeof(SHA256_MB_CTX) + 32]; union { u64 q[16]; u32 d[32]; u8 c[128]; } blocks[8]; SHA256_MB_CTX *ctx; unsigned int frag, last, packlen, i, x4 = 4 * n4x, minblocks, processed = 0; size_t ret = 0; u8 *IVs; # if defined(BSWAP8) u64 seqnum; # endif /* ask for IVs in bulk */ if (RAND_bytes((IVs = blocks[0].c), 16 * x4) <= 0) return 0; /* align */ ctx = (SHA256_MB_CTX *) (storage + 32 - ((size_t)storage % 32)); frag = (unsigned int)inp_len >> (1 + n4x); last = (unsigned int)inp_len + frag - (frag << (1 + n4x)); if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64) < (x4 - 1)) { frag++; last -= x4 - 1; } packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 32 + 16) & -16); /* populate descriptors with pointers and IVs */ hash_d[0].ptr = inp; ciph_d[0].inp = inp; /* 5+16 is place for header and explicit IV */ ciph_d[0].out = out + 5 + 16; memcpy(ciph_d[0].out - 16, IVs, 16); memcpy(ciph_d[0].iv, IVs, 16); IVs += 16; for (i = 1; i < x4; i++) { ciph_d[i].inp = hash_d[i].ptr = hash_d[i - 1].ptr + frag; ciph_d[i].out = ciph_d[i - 1].out + packlen; memcpy(ciph_d[i].out - 16, IVs, 16); memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, IVs, 16); IVs += 16; } # if defined(BSWAP8) memcpy(blocks[0].c, key->md.data, 8); seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]); # endif for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag); # if !defined(BSWAP8) unsigned int carry, j; # endif ctx->A[i] = key->md.h[0]; ctx->B[i] = key->md.h[1]; ctx->C[i] = key->md.h[2]; ctx->D[i] = key->md.h[3]; ctx->E[i] = key->md.h[4]; ctx->F[i] = key->md.h[5]; ctx->G[i] = key->md.h[6]; ctx->H[i] = key->md.h[7]; /* fix seqnum */ # if defined(BSWAP8) blocks[i].q[0] = BSWAP8(seqnum + i); # else for (carry = i, j = 8; j--;) { blocks[i].c[j] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[j] + carry; carry = (blocks[i].c[j] - carry) >> (sizeof(carry) * 8 - 1); } # endif blocks[i].c[8] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8]; blocks[i].c[9] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9]; blocks[i].c[10] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10]; /* fix length */ blocks[i].c[11] = (u8)(len >> 8); blocks[i].c[12] = (u8)(len); memcpy(blocks[i].c + 13, hash_d[i].ptr, 64 - 13); hash_d[i].ptr += 64 - 13; hash_d[i].blocks = (len - (64 - 13)) / 64; edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c; edges[i].blocks = 1; } /* hash 13-byte headers and first 64-13 bytes of inputs */ sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); /* hash bulk inputs */ # define MAXCHUNKSIZE 2048 # if MAXCHUNKSIZE%64 # error "MAXCHUNKSIZE is not divisible by 64" # elif MAXCHUNKSIZE /* * goal is to minimize pressure on L1 cache by moving in shorter steps, * so that hashed data is still in the cache by the time we encrypt it */ minblocks = ((frag <= last ? frag : last) - (64 - 13)) / 64; if (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64) { for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr; edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16; } do { sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr += MAXCHUNKSIZE; hash_d[i].blocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; ciph_d[i].inp += MAXCHUNKSIZE; ciph_d[i].out += MAXCHUNKSIZE; ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16; memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, ciph_d[i].out - 16, 16); } processed += MAXCHUNKSIZE; minblocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; } while (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64); } # endif # undef MAXCHUNKSIZE sha256_multi_block(ctx, hash_d, n4x); memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks)); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag), off = hash_d[i].blocks * 64; const unsigned char *ptr = hash_d[i].ptr + off; off = (len - processed) - (64 - 13) - off; /* remainder actually */ memcpy(blocks[i].c, ptr, off); blocks[i].c[off] = 0x80; len += 64 + 13; /* 64 is HMAC header */ len *= 8; /* convert to bits */ if (off < (64 - 8)) { # ifdef BSWAP4 blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4(len); # else PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, len); # endif edges[i].blocks = 1; } else { # ifdef BSWAP4 blocks[i].d[31] = BSWAP4(len); # else PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 124, len); # endif edges[i].blocks = 2; } edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c; } /* hash input tails and finalize */ sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks)); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { # ifdef BSWAP4 blocks[i].d[0] = BSWAP4(ctx->A[i]); ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h[0]; blocks[i].d[1] = BSWAP4(ctx->B[i]); ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h[1]; blocks[i].d[2] = BSWAP4(ctx->C[i]); ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h[2]; blocks[i].d[3] = BSWAP4(ctx->D[i]); ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h[3]; blocks[i].d[4] = BSWAP4(ctx->E[i]); ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h[4]; blocks[i].d[5] = BSWAP4(ctx->F[i]); ctx->F[i] = key->tail.h[5]; blocks[i].d[6] = BSWAP4(ctx->G[i]); ctx->G[i] = key->tail.h[6]; blocks[i].d[7] = BSWAP4(ctx->H[i]); ctx->H[i] = key->tail.h[7]; blocks[i].c[32] = 0x80; blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4((64 + 32) * 8); # else PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 0, ctx->A[i]); ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h[0]; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 4, ctx->B[i]); ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h[1]; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 8, ctx->C[i]); ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h[2]; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 12, ctx->D[i]); ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h[3]; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 16, ctx->E[i]); ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h[4]; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 20, ctx->F[i]); ctx->F[i] = key->tail.h[5]; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 24, ctx->G[i]); ctx->G[i] = key->tail.h[6]; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 28, ctx->H[i]); ctx->H[i] = key->tail.h[7]; blocks[i].c[32] = 0x80; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, (64 + 32) * 8); # endif edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c; edges[i].blocks = 1; } /* finalize MACs */ sha256_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag), pad, j; unsigned char *out0 = out; memcpy(ciph_d[i].out, ciph_d[i].inp, len - processed); ciph_d[i].inp = ciph_d[i].out; out += 5 + 16 + len; /* write MAC */ PUTU32(out + 0, ctx->A[i]); PUTU32(out + 4, ctx->B[i]); PUTU32(out + 8, ctx->C[i]); PUTU32(out + 12, ctx->D[i]); PUTU32(out + 16, ctx->E[i]); PUTU32(out + 20, ctx->F[i]); PUTU32(out + 24, ctx->G[i]); PUTU32(out + 28, ctx->H[i]); out += 32; len += 32; /* pad */ pad = 15 - len % 16; for (j = 0; j <= pad; j++) *(out++) = pad; len += pad + 1; ciph_d[i].blocks = (len - processed) / 16; len += 16; /* account for explicit iv */ /* arrange header */ out0[0] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8]; out0[1] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9]; out0[2] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10]; out0[3] = (u8)(len >> 8); out0[4] = (u8)(len); ret += len + 5; inp += frag; } aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x); OPENSSL_cleanse(blocks, sizeof(blocks)); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); return ret; } # endif static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key = data(ctx); unsigned int l; size_t plen = key->payload_length, iv = 0, /* explicit IV in TLS 1.1 and * later */ sha_off = 0; # if defined(STITCHED_CALL) size_t aes_off = 0, blocks; sha_off = SHA256_CBLOCK - key->md.num; # endif key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (plen == NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) plen = len; else if (len != ((plen + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) return 0; else if (key->aux.tls_ver >= TLS1_1_VERSION) iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; # if defined(STITCHED_CALL) /* * Assembly stitch handles AVX-capable processors, but its * performance is not optimal on AMD Jaguar, ~40% worse, for * unknown reasons. Incidentally processor in question supports * AVX, but not AMD-specific XOP extension, which can be used * to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we * establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's * either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one. * But SHAEXT-capable go ahead... */ if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 29)) || /* SHAEXT? */ ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32))) && /* AVX? */ ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */ | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 30))))) && /* "Intel CPU"? */ plen > (sha_off + iv) && (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) { SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off); (void)aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(in, out, blocks, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &key->md, in + iv + sha_off); blocks *= SHA256_CBLOCK; aes_off += blocks; sha_off += blocks; key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29; key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3; if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks) key->md.Nh++; } else { sha_off = 0; } # endif sha_off += iv; SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + sha_off, plen - sha_off); if (plen != len) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ if (in != out) memcpy(out + aes_off, in + aes_off, plen - aes_off); /* calculate HMAC and append it to payload */ SHA256_Final(out + plen, &key->md); key->md = key->tail; SHA256_Update(&key->md, out + plen, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); SHA256_Final(out + plen, &key->md); /* pad the payload|hmac */ plen += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; for (l = len - plen - 1; plen < len; plen++) out[plen] = l; /* encrypt HMAC|padding at once */ aesni_cbc_encrypt(out + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1); } else { aesni_cbc_encrypt(in + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1); } } else { union { unsigned int u[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(unsigned int)]; unsigned char c[64 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } mac, *pmac; /* arrange cache line alignment */ pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c + 63) & ((size_t)0 - 64)); /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */ aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 0); if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ size_t inp_len, mask, j, i; unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen; int ret = 1; union { unsigned int u[SHA_LBLOCK]; unsigned char c[SHA256_CBLOCK]; } *data = (void *)key->md.data; if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 4] << 8 | key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; if (len < (iv + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)) return 0; /* omit explicit iv */ out += iv; len -= iv; /* figure out payload length */ pad = out[len - 1]; maxpad = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1); maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8); maxpad &= 255; mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad); ret &= mask; /* * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However, * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic. */ pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad); inp_len = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1); key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8; key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len; /* calculate HMAC */ key->md = key->head; SHA256_Update(&key->md, key->aux.tls_aad, plen); # if 1 len -= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* amend mac */ if (len >= (256 + SHA256_CBLOCK)) { j = (len - (256 + SHA256_CBLOCK)) & (0 - SHA256_CBLOCK); j += SHA256_CBLOCK - key->md.num; SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, j); out += j; len -= j; inp_len -= j; } /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */ bitlen = key->md.Nl + (inp_len << 3); /* at most 18 bits */ # ifdef BSWAP4 bitlen = BSWAP4(bitlen); # else mac.c[0] = 0; mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 16); mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 8); mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen; bitlen = mac.u[0]; # endif pmac->u[0] = 0; pmac->u[1] = 0; pmac->u[2] = 0; pmac->u[3] = 0; pmac->u[4] = 0; pmac->u[5] = 0; pmac->u[6] = 0; pmac->u[7] = 0; for (res = key->md.num, j = 0; j < len; j++) { size_t c = out[j]; mask = (j - inp_len) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8); c &= mask; c |= 0x80 & ~mask & ~((inp_len - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8)); data->c[res++] = (unsigned char)c; if (res != SHA256_CBLOCK) continue; /* j is not incremented yet */ mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 7 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask; sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 72) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask; pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask; pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask; pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask; pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask; pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask; pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask; pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask; res = 0; } for (i = res; i < SHA256_CBLOCK; i++, j++) data->c[i] = 0; if (res > SHA256_CBLOCK - 8) { mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 8 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask; sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask; pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask; pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask; pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask; pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask; pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask; pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask; pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask; memset(data, 0, SHA256_CBLOCK); j += 64; } data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] = bitlen; sha256_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); mask = 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h[0] & mask; pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h[1] & mask; pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h[2] & mask; pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h[3] & mask; pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h[4] & mask; pmac->u[5] |= key->md.h[5] & mask; pmac->u[6] |= key->md.h[6] & mask; pmac->u[7] |= key->md.h[7] & mask; # ifdef BSWAP4 pmac->u[0] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[0]); pmac->u[1] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[1]); pmac->u[2] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[2]); pmac->u[3] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[3]); pmac->u[4] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[4]); pmac->u[5] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[5]); pmac->u[6] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[6]); pmac->u[7] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[7]); # else for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { res = pmac->u[i]; pmac->c[4 * i + 0] = (unsigned char)(res >> 24); pmac->c[4 * i + 1] = (unsigned char)(res >> 16); pmac->c[4 * i + 2] = (unsigned char)(res >> 8); pmac->c[4 * i + 3] = (unsigned char)res; } # endif len += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; # else SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, inp_len); res = key->md.num; SHA256_Final(pmac->c, &key->md); { unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks; /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */ inp_blocks = 1 + ((SHA256_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); res += (unsigned int)(len - inp_len); pad_blocks = res / SHA256_CBLOCK; res %= SHA256_CBLOCK; pad_blocks += 1 + ((SHA256_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); for (; inp_blocks < pad_blocks; inp_blocks++) sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); } # endif key->md = key->tail; SHA256_Update(&key->md, pmac->c, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); SHA256_Final(pmac->c, &key->md); /* verify HMAC */ out += inp_len; len -= inp_len; # if 1 { unsigned char *p = out + len - 1 - maxpad - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; size_t off = out - p; unsigned int c, cmask; maxpad += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; for (res = 0, i = 0, j = 0; j < maxpad; j++) { c = p[j]; cmask = ((int)(j - off - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1); res |= (c ^ pad) & ~cmask; /* ... and padding */ cmask &= ((int)(off - 1 - j)) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1); res |= (c ^ pmac->c[i]) & cmask; i += 1 & cmask; } maxpad -= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); ret &= (int)~res; } # else for (res = 0, i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) res |= out[i] ^ pmac->c[i]; res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); ret &= (int)~res; /* verify padding */ pad = (pad & ~res) | (maxpad & res); out = out + len - 1 - pad; for (res = 0, i = 0; i < pad; i++) res |= out[i] ^ pad; res = (0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1); ret &= (int)~res; # endif return ret; } else { SHA256_Update(&key->md, out, len); } } return 1; } static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256 *key = data(ctx); unsigned int u_arg = (unsigned int)arg; switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY: { unsigned int i; unsigned char hmac_key[64]; memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key)); if (arg < 0) return -1; if (u_arg > sizeof(hmac_key)) { SHA256_Init(&key->head); SHA256_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg); SHA256_Final(hmac_key, &key->head); } else { memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg); } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */ SHA256_Init(&key->head); SHA256_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */ SHA256_Init(&key->tail); SHA256_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); return 1; } case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: { unsigned char *p = ptr; unsigned int len; if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return -1; len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { key->payload_length = len; if ((key->aux.tls_ver = p[arg - 4] << 8 | p[arg - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { if (len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; p[arg - 2] = len >> 8; p[arg - 1] = len; } key->md = key->head; SHA256_Update(&key->md, p, arg); return (int)(((len + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - len); } else { memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg); key->payload_length = arg; return SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; } } # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE: return (int)(5 + 16 + ((arg + 32 + 16) & -16)); case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD: { EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param = (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr; unsigned int n4x = 1, x4; unsigned int frag, last, packlen, inp_len; if (arg < 0) return -1; if (u_arg < sizeof(EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM)) return -1; inp_len = param->inp[11] << 8 | param->inp[12]; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if ((param->inp[9] << 8 | param->inp[10]) < TLS1_1_VERSION) return -1; if (inp_len) { if (inp_len < 4096) return 0; /* too short */ if (inp_len >= 8192 && OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 5)) n4x = 2; /* AVX2 */ } else if ((n4x = param->interleave / 4) && n4x <= 2) inp_len = param->len; else return -1; key->md = key->head; SHA256_Update(&key->md, param->inp, 13); x4 = 4 * n4x; n4x += 1; frag = inp_len >> n4x; last = inp_len + frag - (frag << n4x); if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64 < (x4 - 1))) { frag++; last -= x4 - 1; } packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 32 + 16) & -16); packlen = (packlen << n4x) - packlen; packlen += 5 + 16 + ((last + 32 + 16) & -16); param->interleave = x4; return (int)packlen; } else return -1; /* not yet */ } case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT: { EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param = (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr; return (int)tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(key, param->out, param->inp, param->len, param->interleave / 4); } case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT: # endif default: return -1; } } static EVP_CIPHER aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher = { # ifdef NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256, # else NID_undef, # endif AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_init_key, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256), EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl, NULL }; static EVP_CIPHER aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher = { # ifdef NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256, # else NID_undef, # endif AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 32, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_init_key, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256), EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256(void) { return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) && aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ? &aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL); } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void) { return ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE) && aesni_cbc_sha256_enc(NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ? &aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher : NULL); } #else const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256(void) { return NULL; } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void) { return NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c0000644000000000000000000001304713176625657016161 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "evp_locl.h" static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int ver) { if (ctx->pctx == NULL) ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e); if (ctx->pctx == NULL) return 0; if (!(ctx->pctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM)) { if (type == NULL) { int def_nid; if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) > 0) type = EVP_get_digestbynid(def_nid); } if (type == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_DO_SIGVER_INIT, EVP_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST); return 0; } } if (ver) { if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx_init) { if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx_init(ctx->pctx, ctx) <= 0) return 0; ctx->pctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX; } else if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx->pctx) <= 0) return 0; } else { if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx_init) { if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx_init(ctx->pctx, ctx) <= 0) return 0; ctx->pctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX; } else if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx->pctx) <= 0) return 0; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx->pctx, type) <= 0) return 0; if (pctx) *pctx = ctx->pctx; if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM) return 1; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, e)) return 0; return 1; } int EVP_DigestSignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, e, pkey, 0); } int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, e, pkey, 1); } int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen) { int sctx = 0, r = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx; if (pctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM) { if (!sigret) return pctx->pmeth->signctx(pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx); if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) r = pctx->pmeth->signctx(pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx); else { EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(ctx->pctx); if (!dctx) return 0; r = dctx->pmeth->signctx(dctx, sigret, siglen, ctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx); } return r; } if (pctx->pmeth->signctx) sctx = 1; else sctx = 0; if (sigret) { unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int mdlen = 0; if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) { if (sctx) r = ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx); else r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, &mdlen); } else { EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) return 0; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx); return 0; } if (sctx) r = tmp_ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(tmp_ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, tmp_ctx); else r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, md, &mdlen); EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx); } if (sctx || !r) return r; if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0) return 0; } else { if (sctx) { if (pctx->pmeth->signctx(pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0) return 0; } else { int s = EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest); if (s < 0 || EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL, s) <= 0) return 0; } } return 1; } int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) { unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int r = 0; unsigned int mdlen = 0; int vctx = 0; if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx) vctx = 1; else vctx = 0; if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) { if (vctx) { r = ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx(ctx->pctx, sig, siglen, ctx); } else r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, &mdlen); } else { EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) return -1; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx); return -1; } if (vctx) { r = tmp_ctx->pctx->pmeth->verifyctx(tmp_ctx->pctx, sig, siglen, tmp_ctx); } else r = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, md, &mdlen); EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx); } if (vctx || !r) return r; return EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx->pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/digest.c0000644000000000000000000001754313176625657015632 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "evp_locl.h" /* This call frees resources associated with the context */ int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return 1; /* * Don't assume ctx->md_data was cleaned in EVP_Digest_Final, because * sometimes only copies of the context are ever finalised. */ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED)) ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx); if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE)) { OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx->pctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine); #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); return 1; } EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); } void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL); } int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) { EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so * this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the * previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a * reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary. */ if (ctx->engine && ctx->digest && (type == NULL || (type->type == ctx->digest->type))) goto skip_to_init; if (type) { /* * Ensure an ENGINE left lying around from last time is cleared (the * previous check attempted to avoid this if the same ENGINE and * EVP_MD could be used). */ ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine); if (impl != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_init(impl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } } else { /* Ask if an ENGINE is reserved for this job */ impl = ENGINE_get_digest_engine(type->type); } if (impl != NULL) { /* There's an ENGINE for this job ... (apparently) */ const EVP_MD *d = ENGINE_get_digest(impl, type->type); if (d == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); ENGINE_finish(impl); return 0; } /* We'll use the ENGINE's private digest definition */ type = d; /* * Store the ENGINE functional reference so we know 'type' came * from an ENGINE and we need to release it when done. */ ctx->engine = impl; } else ctx->engine = NULL; } else { if (!ctx->digest) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET); return 0; } type = ctx->digest; } #endif if (ctx->digest != type) { if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size) { OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); ctx->md_data = NULL; } ctx->digest = type; if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT) && type->ctx_size) { ctx->update = type->update; ctx->md_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(type->ctx_size); if (ctx->md_data == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE skip_to_init: #endif if (ctx->pctx) { int r; r = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx->pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT, 0, ctx); if (r <= 0 && (r != -2)) return 0; } if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT) return 1; return ctx->digest->init(ctx); } int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return ctx->update(ctx, data, count); } /* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */ int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size) { int ret; ret = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size); EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); return ret; } /* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */ int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size) { int ret; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); ret = ctx->digest->final(ctx, md); if (size != NULL) *size = ctx->digest->md_size; if (ctx->digest->cleanup) { ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED); } OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); return ret; } int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out); return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(out, in); } int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) { unsigned char *tmp_buf; if ((in == NULL) || (in->digest == NULL)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Make sure it's safe to copy a digest context using an ENGINE */ if (in->engine && !ENGINE_init(in->engine)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } #endif if (out->digest == in->digest) { tmp_buf = out->md_data; EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(out, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE); } else tmp_buf = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out); memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out)); /* Null these variables, since they are getting fixed up * properly below. Anything else may cause a memleak and/or * double free if any of the memory allocations below fail */ out->md_data = NULL; out->pctx = NULL; if (in->md_data && out->digest->ctx_size) { if (tmp_buf) out->md_data = tmp_buf; else { out->md_data = OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size); if (out->md_data == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } memcpy(out->md_data, in->md_data, out->digest->ctx_size); } out->update = in->update; if (in->pctx) { out->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(in->pctx); if (!out->pctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out); return 0; } } if (out->digest->copy) return out->digest->copy(out, in); return 1; } int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); int ret; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT); ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, impl) && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, count) && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) { if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->md_ctrl) { int ret = ctx->digest->md_ctrl(ctx, cmd, p1, p2); if (ret <= 0) return 0; return 1; } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/pmeth_fn.c0000644000000000000000000002317013176625657016144 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #define M_check_autoarg(ctx, arg, arglen, err) \ if (ctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN) { \ size_t pksize = (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey); \ \ if (pksize == 0) { \ EVPerr(err, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY); /*ckerr_ignore*/ \ return 0; \ } \ if (!arg) { \ *arglen = pksize; \ return 1; \ } \ if (*arglen < pksize) { \ EVPerr(err, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); /*ckerr_ignore*/ \ return 0; \ } \ } int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->sign) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN; if (!ctx->pmeth->sign_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->sign_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->sign) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } M_check_autoarg(ctx, sig, siglen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN) return ctx->pmeth->sign(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen); } int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY; if (!ctx->pmeth->verify_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->verify_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } return ctx->pmeth->verify(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen); } int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify_recover) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER; if (!ctx->pmeth->verify_recover_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->verify_recover_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) { if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->verify_recover) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } M_check_autoarg(ctx, rout, routlen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER) return ctx->pmeth->verify_recover(ctx, rout, routlen, sig, siglen); } int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->encrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT; if (!ctx->pmeth->encrypt_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->encrypt_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) { if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->encrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } M_check_autoarg(ctx, out, outlen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT) return ctx->pmeth->encrypt(ctx, out, outlen, in, inlen); } int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->decrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT; if (!ctx->pmeth->decrypt_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->decrypt_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) { if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->decrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } M_check_autoarg(ctx, out, outlen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT) return ctx->pmeth->decrypt(ctx, out, outlen, in, inlen); } int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->derive) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE; if (!ctx->pmeth->derive_init) return 1; ret = ctx->pmeth->derive_init(ctx); if (ret <= 0) ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !(ctx->pmeth->derive || ctx->pmeth->encrypt || ctx->pmeth->decrypt) || !ctx->pmeth->ctrl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE && ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT && ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 0, peer); if (ret <= 0) return ret; if (ret == 2) return 1; if (!ctx->pkey) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET); return -1; } if (ctx->pkey->type != peer->type) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES); return -1; } /* * ran@cryptocom.ru: For clarity. The error is if parameters in peer are * present (!missing) but don't match. EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters may return * 1 (match), 0 (don't match) and -2 (comparison is not defined). -1 * (different key types) is impossible here because it is checked earlier. * -2 is OK for us here, as well as 1, so we can check for 0 only. */ if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(peer) && !EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(ctx->pkey, peer)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS); return -1; } EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->peerkey); ctx->peerkey = peer; ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 1, peer); if (ret <= 0) { ctx->peerkey = NULL; return ret; } EVP_PKEY_up_ref(peer); return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *pkeylen) { if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->derive) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; } if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED); return -1; } M_check_autoarg(ctx, key, pkeylen, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE) return ctx->pmeth->derive(ctx, key, pkeylen); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_aes.c0000644000000000000000000030001713176625657015416 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "modes_lcl.h" #include #include "evp_locl.h" typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; block128_f block; union { cbc128_f cbc; ctr128_f ctr; } stream; } EVP_AES_KEY; typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ int ivlen; /* IV length */ int taglen; int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */ int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ ctr128_f ctr; } EVP_AES_GCM_CTX; typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */ XTS128_CONTEXT xts; void (*stream) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); } EVP_AES_XTS_CTX; typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ int tag_set; /* Set if tag is valid */ int len_set; /* Set if message length set */ int L, M; /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */ int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ CCM128_CONTEXT ccm; ccm128_f str; } EVP_AES_CCM_CTX; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ksenc; /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */ union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ksdec; /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */ int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ OCB128_CONTEXT ocb; unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ unsigned char tag[16]; unsigned char data_buf[16]; /* Store partial data blocks */ unsigned char aad_buf[16]; /* Store partial AAD blocks */ int data_buf_len; int aad_buf_len; int ivlen; /* IV length */ int taglen; } EVP_AES_OCB_CTX; #endif #define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4)) #ifdef VPAES_ASM int vpaes_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); int vpaes_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); void vpaes_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void vpaes_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc); #endif #ifdef BSAES_ASM void bsaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int enc); void bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char ivec[16]); void bsaes_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); void bsaes_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); #endif #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); #endif #ifdef AES_XTS_ASM void AES_xts_encrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC)) # include "ppc_arch.h" # ifdef VPAES_ASM # define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_ALTIVEC) # endif # define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_CRYPTO207) # define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_p8_set_encrypt_key # define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_p8_set_decrypt_key # define HWAES_encrypt aes_p8_encrypt # define HWAES_decrypt aes_p8_decrypt # define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_p8_cbc_encrypt # define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_p8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks # define HWAES_xts_encrypt aes_p8_xts_encrypt # define HWAES_xts_decrypt aes_p8_xts_decrypt #endif #if defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) && ( \ ((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \ defined(_M_IX86)) && defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2))|| \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; # ifdef VPAES_ASM # define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32))) # endif # ifdef BSAES_ASM # define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32))) # endif /* * AES-NI section */ # define AESNI_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(57-32))) int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); void aesni_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void aesni_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void aesni_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, int enc); void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc); void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, const unsigned char *ivec); void aesni_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); void aesni_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); void aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, const unsigned char ivec[16], unsigned char cmac[16]); void aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, const unsigned char ivec[16], unsigned char cmac[16]); # if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) size_t aesni_gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], u64 *Xi); # define AES_gcm_encrypt aesni_gcm_encrypt size_t aesni_gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], u64 *Xi); # define AES_gcm_decrypt aesni_gcm_decrypt void gcm_ghash_avx(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const u8 *in, size_t len); # define AES_GCM_ASM(gctx) (gctx->ctr==aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks && \ gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx) # define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx) (gctx->gcm.block==(block128_f)aesni_encrypt && \ gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx) # undef AES_GCM_ASM2 /* minor size optimization */ # endif static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { int ret, mode; EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) { ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL; } else { ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt; if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; else dat->stream.cbc = NULL; } if (ret < 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx); if (len < bl) return 1; aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } # define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt); gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; /* * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. */ if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) iv = gctx->iv; if (iv) { CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; } gctx->key_set = 1; } else { /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ if (gctx->key_set) CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); else memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; gctx->iv_gen = 0; } return 1; } # define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { /* key_len is two AES keys */ if (enc) { aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt; xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt; } else { aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt; xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt; } aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks); xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt; xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; } if (iv) { xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16); } return 1; } # define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &cctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt); cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks : (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks; cctx->key_set = 1; } if (iv) { memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L); cctx->iv_set = 1; } return 1; } # define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB void aesni_ocb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, size_t start_block_num, unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16], unsigned char checksum[16]); void aesni_ocb_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, size_t start_block_num, unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16], unsigned char checksum[16]); static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { do { /* * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the * decrypt for an encryption operation. */ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks); aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks); if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt, (block128_f) aesni_decrypt, enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt : aesni_ocb_decrypt)) return 0; } while (0); /* * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. */ if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) iv = octx->iv; if (iv) { if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) != 1) return 0; octx->iv_set = 1; } octx->key_set = 1; } else { /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ if (octx->key_set) CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); else memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); octx->iv_set = 1; } return 1; } # define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher static int aesni_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aesni_init_key, \ aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \ keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_init_key, \ aes_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } # define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aesni_##mode##_init_key, \ aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_##mode##_init_key, \ aes_##mode##_cipher, \ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } #elif defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__)) # include "sparc_arch.h" extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[]; /* * Initial Fujitsu SPARC64 X support */ # define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_FJAESX) # define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_fx_set_encrypt_key # define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_fx_set_decrypt_key # define HWAES_encrypt aes_fx_encrypt # define HWAES_decrypt aes_fx_decrypt # define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_fx_cbc_encrypt # define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_fx_ctr32_encrypt_blocks # define SPARC_AES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_AES) void aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, AES_KEY *ks); void aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, AES_KEY *ks); void aes_t4_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void aes_t4_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); /* * Key-length specific subroutines were chosen for following reason. * Each SPARC T4 core can execute up to 8 threads which share core's * resources. Loading as much key material to registers allows to * minimize references to shared memory interface, as well as amount * of instructions in inner loops [much needed on T4]. But then having * non-key-length specific routines would require conditional branches * either in inner loops or on subroutines' entries. Former is hardly * acceptable, while latter means code size increase to size occupied * by multiple key-length specific subroutines, so why fight? */ void aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void aes128_t4_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec); void aes128_t4_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec); void aes256_t4_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec); void aes256_t4_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec); static int aes_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { int ret, mode, bits; EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8; if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) { ret = 0; aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt; switch (bits) { case 128: dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; break; case 192: dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; break; case 256: dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; break; default: ret = -1; } } else { ret = 0; aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt; switch (bits) { case 128: if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; else dat->stream.cbc = NULL; break; case 192: if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; else dat->stream.cbc = NULL; break; case 256: if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; else dat->stream.cbc = NULL; break; default: ret = -1; } } if (ret < 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } # define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher static int aes_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher static int aes_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher static int aes_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher static int aes_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher static int aes_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher static int aes_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher static int aes_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); static int aes_t4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8; aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt); switch (bits) { case 128: gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; break; case 192: gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; break; case 256: gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; break; default: return 0; } /* * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. */ if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) iv = gctx->iv; if (iv) { CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; } gctx->key_set = 1; } else { /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ if (gctx->key_set) CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); else memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; gctx->iv_gen = 0; } return 1; } # define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher static int aes_t4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4; xctx->stream = NULL; /* key_len is two AES keys */ if (enc) { aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt; switch (bits) { case 128: xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_encrypt; break; case 256: xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_encrypt; break; default: return 0; } } else { aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt; switch (bits) { case 128: xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_decrypt; break; case 256: xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_decrypt; break; default: return 0; } } aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks); xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt; xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; } if (iv) { xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16); } return 1; } # define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher static int aes_t4_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8; aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &cctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt); cctx->str = NULL; cctx->key_set = 1; } if (iv) { memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L); cctx->iv_set = 1; } return 1; } # define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher static int aes_t4_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { do { /* * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the * decrypt for an encryption operation. */ aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks); aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks); if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt, (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt, NULL)) return 0; } while (0); /* * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. */ if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) iv = octx->iv; if (iv) { if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) != 1) return 0; octx->iv_set = 1; } octx->key_set = 1; } else { /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ if (octx->key_set) CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); else memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); octx->iv_set = 1; } return 1; } # define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher static int aes_t4_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_t4_init_key, \ aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \ keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_init_key, \ aes_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } # define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \ aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_##mode##_init_key, \ aes_##mode##_cipher, \ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } #else # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_init_key, \ aes_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; } # define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ aes_##mode##_init_key, \ aes_##mode##_cipher, \ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; } #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm) || defined(__aarch64__)) # include "arm_arch.h" # if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 # if defined(BSAES_ASM) # define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON) # endif # if defined(VPAES_ASM) # define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON) # endif # define HWAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES) # define HWAES_set_encrypt_key aes_v8_set_encrypt_key # define HWAES_set_decrypt_key aes_v8_set_decrypt_key # define HWAES_encrypt aes_v8_encrypt # define HWAES_decrypt aes_v8_decrypt # define HWAES_cbc_encrypt aes_v8_cbc_encrypt # define HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks aes_v8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks # endif #endif #if defined(HWAES_CAPABLE) int HWAES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key); int HWAES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key); void HWAES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void HWAES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void HWAES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, const int enc); void HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char ivec[16]); void HWAES_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); void HWAES_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]); #endif #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ctr,ctr,CTR,flags) static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { int ret, mode; EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) { #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; # ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt; # endif } else #endif #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) bsaes_cbc_encrypt; } else #endif #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; } else #endif { ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; } } else #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; # ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt; else # endif # ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; else # endif (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ } else #endif #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) { ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } else #endif #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt; dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; } else #endif { ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt; #endif } if (ret < 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); if (dat->stream.cbc) (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block); else CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block); return 1; } static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx); size_t i; EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); if (len < bl) return 1; for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl) (*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks); return 1; } static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); len -= MAXBITCHUNK; } if (len) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); } return 1; } static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { unsigned int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); if (dat->stream.ctr) CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->stream.ctr); else CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, 0) BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, 0) BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, 0) static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c); if (gctx == NULL) return 0; OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm)); if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c)) OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); return 1; } /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) { int n = 8; unsigned char c; do { --n; c = counter[n]; ++c; counter[n] = c; if (c) return; } while (n); } static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c); switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_INIT: gctx->key_set = 0; gctx->iv_set = 0; gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c); gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c); gctx->taglen = -1; gctx->iv_gen = 0; gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: if (arg <= 0) return 0; /* Allocate memory for IV if needed */ if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) { if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c)) OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg); if (gctx->iv == NULL) return 0; } gctx->ivlen = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) return 0; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); gctx->taglen = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) || gctx->taglen < 0) return 0; memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg); return 1; case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED: /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ if (arg == -1) { memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_gen = 1; return 1; } /* * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least * 8. */ if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) return 0; if (arg) memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0) return 0; gctx->iv_gen = 1; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) return 0; CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) arg = gctx->ivlen; memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); /* * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. */ ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8); gctx->iv_set = 1; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) return 0; memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: /* Save the AAD for later use */ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return 0; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; { unsigned int len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1]; /* Correct length for explicit IV */ if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) return 0; len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) { if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) return 0; len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; } /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; case EVP_CTRL_COPY: { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,out); if (gctx->gcm.key) { if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks) return 0; gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks; } if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c)) gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out); else { gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen); if (gctx_out->iv == NULL) return 0; memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); } return 1; } default: return -1; } } static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { do { #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt); # ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; # else gctx->ctr = NULL; # endif break; } else #endif #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE if (BSAES_CAPABLE) { AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; break; } else #endif #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt); gctx->ctr = NULL; break; } else #endif (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt; #else gctx->ctr = NULL; #endif } while (0); /* * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. */ if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) iv = gctx->iv; if (iv) { CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; } gctx->key_set = 1; } else { /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ if (gctx->key_set) CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); else memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; gctx->iv_gen = 0; } return 1; } /* * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload * and verify tag. */ static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); int rv = -1; /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) return -1; /* * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of * buffer. */ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0) goto err; /* Use saved AAD */ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), gctx->tls_aad_len)) goto err; /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { /* Encrypt payload */ if (gctx->ctr) { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) goto err; } else { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) goto err; } out += len; /* Finally write tag */ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; } else { /* Decrypt */ if (gctx->ctr) { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) goto err; } else { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) goto err; } /* Retrieve tag */ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); goto err; } rv = len; } err: gctx->iv_set = 0; gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; return rv; } static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); /* If not set up, return error */ if (!gctx->key_set) return -1; if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); if (!gctx->iv_set) return -1; if (in) { if (out == NULL) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len)) return -1; } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (gctx->ctr) { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; bulk += res; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) return -1; } else { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; bulk += res; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) return -1; } } else { if (gctx->ctr) { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; bulk += res; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) return -1; } else { size_t bulk = 0; #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) return -1; bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; bulk += res; } #endif if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) return -1; } } return len; } else { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (gctx->taglen < 0) return -1; if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), gctx->taglen) != 0) return -1; gctx->iv_set = 0; return 0; } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16); gctx->taglen = 16; /* Don't reuse the IV */ gctx->iv_set = 0; return 0; } } #define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,c); if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out); if (xctx->xts.key1) { if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1) return 0; xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1; } if (xctx->xts.key2) { if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2) return 0; xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2; } return 1; } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT) return -1; /* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */ xctx->xts.key1 = NULL; xctx->xts.key2 = NULL; return 1; } static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) do { #ifdef AES_XTS_ASM xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt; #else xctx->stream = NULL; #endif /* key_len is two AES keys */ #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { if (enc) { HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt; # ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt; # endif } else { HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt; # ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt; #endif } HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks); xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt; xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; break; } else #endif #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE if (BSAES_CAPABLE) xctx->stream = enc ? bsaes_xts_encrypt : bsaes_xts_decrypt; else #endif #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { if (enc) { vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt; } else { vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt; } vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks); xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt; xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; break; } else #endif (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ if (enc) { AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; } else { AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt; } AES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks); xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; } while (0); if (iv) { xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 16); } return 1; } static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2) return 0; if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; if (xctx->stream) (*xctx->stream) (in, out, len, xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx)); else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), in, out, len, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))) return 0; return 1; } #define aes_xts_cleanup NULL #define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,c); switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_INIT: cctx->key_set = 0; cctx->iv_set = 0; cctx->L = 8; cctx->M = 12; cctx->tag_set = 0; cctx->len_set = 0; cctx->tls_aad_len = -1; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: /* Save the AAD for later use */ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return 0; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); cctx->tls_aad_len = arg; { uint16_t len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1]; /* Correct length for explicit IV */ if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) return 0; len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) { if (len < cctx->M) return 0; len -= cctx->M; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; } /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ return cctx->M; case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: /* Sanity check length */ if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) return 0; /* Just copy to first part of IV */ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c), ptr, arg); return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: arg = 15 - arg; /* fall thru */ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) return 0; cctx->L = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) && ptr) return 0; if (ptr) { cctx->tag_set = 1; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); } cctx->M = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set) return 0; if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg)) return 0; cctx->tag_set = 0; cctx->iv_set = 0; cctx->len_set = 0; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_COPY: { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,out); if (cctx->ccm.key) { if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks) return 0; cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks; } return 1; } default: return -1; } } static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) do { #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &cctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, &cctx->ks, (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt); cctx->str = NULL; cctx->key_set = 1; break; } else #endif #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &cctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, &cctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt); cctx->str = NULL; cctx->key_set = 1; break; } #endif AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &cctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, &cctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); cctx->str = NULL; cctx->key_set = 1; } while (0); if (iv) { memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 15 - cctx->L); cctx->iv_set = 1; } return 1; } static int aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ if (out != in || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->M)) return -1; /* If encrypting set explicit IV from sequence number (start of AAD) */ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); /* Get rest of IV from explicit IV */ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx) + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); /* Correct length value */ len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M; if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 15 - cctx->L, len)) return -1; /* Use saved AAD */ CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), cctx->tls_aad_len); /* Fix buffer to point to payload */ in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, cctx->str) : CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) return -1; if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, out + len, cctx->M)) return -1; return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M; } else { if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, cctx->str) : !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { unsigned char tag[16]; if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + len, cctx->M)) return len; } } OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); return -1; } } static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; /* If not set up, return error */ if (!cctx->key_set) return -1; if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); if (!cctx->iv_set) return -1; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set) return -1; if (!out) { if (!in) { if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 15 - cctx->L, len)) return -1; cctx->len_set = 1; return len; } /* If have AAD need message length */ if (!cctx->len_set && len) return -1; CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len); return len; } /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */ if (!in) return 0; /* If not set length yet do it */ if (!cctx->len_set) { if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 15 - cctx->L, len)) return -1; cctx->len_set = 1; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, cctx->str) : CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) return -1; cctx->tag_set = 1; return len; } else { int rv = -1; if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, cctx->str) : !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { unsigned char tag[16]; if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), cctx->M)) rv = len; } } if (rv == -1) OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); cctx->iv_set = 0; cctx->tag_set = 0; cctx->len_set = 0; return rv; } } #define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; /* Indicates if IV has been set */ unsigned char *iv; } EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX; static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &wctx->ks.ks); else AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &wctx->ks.ks); if (!iv) wctx->iv = NULL; } if (iv) { memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); wctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); } return 1; } static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) { EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx); size_t rv; /* AES wrap with padding has IV length of 4, without padding 8 */ int pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) == 4; /* No final operation so always return zero length */ if (!in) return 0; /* Input length must always be non-zero */ if (!inlen) return -1; /* If decrypting need at least 16 bytes and multiple of 8 */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7)) return -1; /* If not padding input must be multiple of 8 */ if (!pad && inlen & 0x7) return -1; if (is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inlen)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } if (!out) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { /* If padding round up to multiple of 8 */ if (pad) inlen = (inlen + 7) / 8 * 8; /* 8 byte prefix */ return inlen + 8; } else { /* * If not padding output will be exactly 8 bytes smaller than * input. If padding it will be at least 8 bytes smaller but we * don't know how much. */ return inlen - 8; } } if (pad) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); else rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_decrypt); } else { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); else rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_decrypt); } return rv ? (int)rv : -1; } #define WRAP_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap = { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 8, 16, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void) { return &aes_128_wrap; } static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap = { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 8, 24, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void) { return &aes_192_wrap; } static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap = { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 8, 32, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void) { return &aes_256_wrap; } static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap_pad = { NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad, 8, 16, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void) { return &aes_128_wrap_pad; } static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap_pad = { NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad, 8, 24, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void) { return &aes_192_wrap_pad; } static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap_pad = { NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad, 8, 32, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void) { return &aes_256_wrap_pad; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c); EVP_CIPHER_CTX *newc; EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *new_octx; switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_INIT: octx->key_set = 0; octx->iv_set = 0; octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c); octx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c); octx->taglen = 16; octx->data_buf_len = 0; octx->aad_buf_len = 0; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: /* IV len must be 1 to 15 */ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15) return 0; octx->ivlen = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: if (!ptr) { /* Tag len must be 0 to 16 */ if (arg < 0 || arg > 16) return 0; octx->taglen = arg; return 1; } if (arg != octx->taglen || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) return 0; memcpy(octx->tag, ptr, arg); return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: if (arg != octx->taglen || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) return 0; memcpy(ptr, octx->tag, arg); return 1; case EVP_CTRL_COPY: newc = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr; new_octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,newc); return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&new_octx->ocb, &octx->ocb, &new_octx->ksenc.ks, &new_octx->ksdec.ks); default: return -1; } } # ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE # ifdef HWAES_ocb_encrypt void HWAES_ocb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, size_t start_block_num, unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16], unsigned char checksum[16]); # else # define HWAES_ocb_encrypt ((ocb128_f)NULL) # endif # ifdef HWAES_ocb_decrypt void HWAES_ocb_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, size_t start_block_num, unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16], unsigned char checksum[16]); # else # define HWAES_ocb_decrypt ((ocb128_f)NULL) # endif # endif static int aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { do { /* * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the * decrypt for an encryption operation. */ # ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks); HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks); if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt, (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt, enc ? HWAES_ocb_encrypt : HWAES_ocb_decrypt)) return 0; break; } # endif # ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks); vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks); if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt, (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt, NULL)) return 0; break; } # endif AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksenc.ks); AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &octx->ksdec.ks); if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt, (block128_f) AES_decrypt, NULL)) return 0; } while (0); /* * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. */ if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) iv = octx->iv; if (iv) { if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) != 1) return 0; octx->iv_set = 1; } octx->key_set = 1; } else { /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ if (octx->key_set) CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); else memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); octx->iv_set = 1; } return 1; } static int aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { unsigned char *buf; int *buf_len; int written_len = 0; size_t trailing_len; EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); /* If IV or Key not set then return error */ if (!octx->iv_set) return -1; if (!octx->key_set) return -1; if (in != NULL) { /* * Need to ensure we are only passing full blocks to low level OCB * routines. We do it here rather than in EVP_EncryptUpdate/ * EVP_DecryptUpdate because we need to pass full blocks of AAD too * and those routines don't support that */ /* Are we dealing with AAD or normal data here? */ if (out == NULL) { buf = octx->aad_buf; buf_len = &(octx->aad_buf_len); } else { buf = octx->data_buf; buf_len = &(octx->data_buf_len); if (is_partially_overlapping(out + *buf_len, in, len)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } } /* * If we've got a partially filled buffer from a previous call then * use that data first */ if (*buf_len > 0) { unsigned int remaining; remaining = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (*buf_len); if (remaining > len) { memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, len); *(buf_len) += len; return 0; } memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, remaining); /* * If we get here we've filled the buffer, so process it */ len -= remaining; in += remaining; if (out == NULL) { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) return -1; } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) return -1; } else { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) return -1; } written_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; *buf_len = 0; if (out != NULL) out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } /* Do we have a partial block to handle at the end? */ trailing_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; /* * If we've got some full blocks to handle, then process these first */ if (len != trailing_len) { if (out == NULL) { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, in, len - trailing_len)) return -1; } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt (&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) return -1; } else { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt (&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) return -1; } written_len += len - trailing_len; in += len - trailing_len; } /* Handle any trailing partial block */ if (trailing_len > 0) { memcpy(buf, in, trailing_len); *buf_len = trailing_len; } return written_len; } else { /* * First of all empty the buffer of any partial block that we might * have been provided - both for data and AAD */ if (octx->data_buf_len > 0) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, octx->data_buf_len)) return -1; } else { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, octx->data_buf_len)) return -1; } written_len = octx->data_buf_len; octx->data_buf_len = 0; } if (octx->aad_buf_len > 0) { if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad (&octx->ocb, octx->aad_buf, octx->aad_buf_len)) return -1; octx->aad_buf_len = 0; } /* If decrypting then verify */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (octx->taglen < 0) return -1; if (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&octx->ocb, octx->tag, octx->taglen) != 0) return -1; octx->iv_set = 0; return written_len; } /* If encrypting then just get the tag */ if (CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(&octx->ocb, octx->tag, 16) != 1) return -1; /* Don't reuse the IV */ octx->iv_set = 0; return written_len; } } static int aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) { EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c); CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&octx->ocb); return 1; } BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c0000644000000000000000000001733113176625657017077 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" typedef struct { RC4_KEY ks; MD5_CTX head, tail, md; size_t payload_length; } EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5; # define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ((size_t)-1) void rc4_md5_enc(RC4_KEY *key, const void *in0, void *out, MD5_CTX *ctx, const void *inp, size_t blocks); # define data(ctx) ((EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)) static int rc4_hmac_md5_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *inkey, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *key = data(ctx); RC4_set_key(&key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), inkey); MD5_Init(&key->head); /* handy when benchmarking */ key->tail = key->head; key->md = key->head; key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; return 1; } # if defined(RC4_ASM) && defined(MD5_ASM) && ( \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) # define STITCHED_CALL # endif # if !defined(STITCHED_CALL) # define rc4_off 0 # define md5_off 0 # endif static int rc4_hmac_md5_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *key = data(ctx); # if defined(STITCHED_CALL) size_t rc4_off = 32 - 1 - (key->ks.x & (32 - 1)), /* 32 is $MOD from * rc4_md5-x86_64.pl */ md5_off = MD5_CBLOCK - key->md.num, blocks; unsigned int l; extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; # endif size_t plen = key->payload_length; if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH && len != (plen + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (plen == NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) plen = len; # if defined(STITCHED_CALL) /* cipher has to "fall behind" */ if (rc4_off > md5_off) md5_off += MD5_CBLOCK; if (plen > md5_off && (blocks = (plen - md5_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) && (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) { MD5_Update(&key->md, in, md5_off); RC4(&key->ks, rc4_off, in, out); rc4_md5_enc(&key->ks, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off, &key->md, in + md5_off, blocks); blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK; rc4_off += blocks; md5_off += blocks; key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29; key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3; if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks) key->md.Nh++; } else { rc4_off = 0; md5_off = 0; } # endif MD5_Update(&key->md, in + md5_off, plen - md5_off); if (plen != len) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ if (in != out) memcpy(out + rc4_off, in + rc4_off, plen - rc4_off); /* calculate HMAC and append it to payload */ MD5_Final(out + plen, &key->md); key->md = key->tail; MD5_Update(&key->md, out + plen, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); MD5_Final(out + plen, &key->md); /* encrypt HMAC at once */ RC4(&key->ks, len - rc4_off, out + rc4_off, out + rc4_off); } else { RC4(&key->ks, len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off); } } else { unsigned char mac[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; # if defined(STITCHED_CALL) /* digest has to "fall behind" */ if (md5_off > rc4_off) rc4_off += 2 * MD5_CBLOCK; else rc4_off += MD5_CBLOCK; if (len > rc4_off && (blocks = (len - rc4_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) && (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) { RC4(&key->ks, rc4_off, in, out); MD5_Update(&key->md, out, md5_off); rc4_md5_enc(&key->ks, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off, &key->md, out + md5_off, blocks); blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK; rc4_off += blocks; md5_off += blocks; l = (key->md.Nl + (blocks << 3)) & 0xffffffffU; if (l < key->md.Nl) key->md.Nh++; key->md.Nl = l; key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29; } else { md5_off = 0; rc4_off = 0; } # endif /* decrypt HMAC at once */ RC4(&key->ks, len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off); if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ MD5_Update(&key->md, out + md5_off, plen - md5_off); /* calculate HMAC and verify it */ MD5_Final(mac, &key->md); key->md = key->tail; MD5_Update(&key->md, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); MD5_Final(mac, &key->md); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + plen, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)) return 0; } else { MD5_Update(&key->md, out + md5_off, len - md5_off); } } key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; return 1; } static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5 *key = data(ctx); switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY: { unsigned int i; unsigned char hmac_key[64]; memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key)); if (arg > (int)sizeof(hmac_key)) { MD5_Init(&key->head); MD5_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg); MD5_Final(hmac_key, &key->head); } else { memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg); } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */ MD5_Init(&key->head); MD5_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */ MD5_Init(&key->tail); MD5_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); return 1; } case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: { unsigned char *p = ptr; unsigned int len; if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return -1; len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (len < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) return -1; len -= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; p[arg - 2] = len >> 8; p[arg - 1] = len; } key->payload_length = len; key->md = key->head; MD5_Update(&key->md, p, arg); return MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; } default: return -1; } } static EVP_CIPHER r4_hmac_md5_cipher = { # ifdef NID_rc4_hmac_md5 NID_rc4_hmac_md5, # else NID_undef, # endif 1, EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE, 0, EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER, rc4_hmac_md5_init_key, rc4_hmac_md5_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5), NULL, NULL, rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_hmac_md5(void) { return (&r4_hmac_md5_cipher); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_md4.c0000644000000000000000000000223413176625657015342 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return MD4_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return MD4_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return MD4_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD md4_md = { NID_md4, NID_md4WithRSAEncryption, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, MD4_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(MD4_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_md4(void) { return (&md4_md); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p_sign.c0000644000000000000000000000332313176625657015621 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int m_len = 0; int i = 0; size_t sltmp; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL; *siglen = 0; if (EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE)) { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, m, &m_len)) goto err; } else { int rv = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *tmp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } rv = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(tmp_ctx, ctx); if (rv) rv = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(tmp_ctx, m, &m_len); EVP_MD_CTX_free(tmp_ctx); if (!rv) return 0; } sltmp = (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); i = 0; pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (pkctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pkctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx)) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pkctx, sigret, &sltmp, m, m_len) <= 0) goto err; *siglen = sltmp; i = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkctx); return i; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_cast.c0000644000000000000000000000234613176625657015604 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include static int cast_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); typedef struct { CAST_KEY ks; } EVP_CAST_KEY; # define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAST_KEY,ctx) IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(cast5, ks, CAST, EVP_CAST_KEY, NID_cast5, 8, CAST_KEY_LENGTH, 8, 64, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, cast_init_key, NULL, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL) static int cast_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { CAST_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_rc5.c0000644000000000000000000000412013176625657015333 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 # include # include # include # include "evp_locl.h" # include static int r_32_12_16_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int rc5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr); typedef struct { int rounds; /* number of rounds */ RC5_32_KEY ks; /* key schedule */ } EVP_RC5_KEY; # define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(EVP_RC5_KEY,ctx) IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(rc5_32_12_16, ks, RC5_32, EVP_RC5_KEY, NID_rc5, 8, RC5_32_KEY_LENGTH, 8, 64, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT, r_32_12_16_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, rc5_ctrl) static int rc5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_INIT: data(c)->rounds = RC5_12_ROUNDS; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_GET_RC5_ROUNDS: *(int *)ptr = data(c)->rounds; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_SET_RC5_ROUNDS: switch (arg) { case RC5_8_ROUNDS: case RC5_12_ROUNDS: case RC5_16_ROUNDS: data(c)->rounds = arg; return 1; default: EVPerr(EVP_F_RC5_CTRL, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS); return 0; } default: return -1; } } static int r_32_12_16_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { RC5_32_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key, data(ctx)->rounds); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/encode.c0000644000000000000000000002550113176625657015601 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "evp_locl.h" static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a); #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC # define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f]) #else /* * We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text * files). Convert them here while decoding. When encoding, output is EBCDIC * (text) format again. (No need for conversion in the conv_bin2ascii macro, * as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC) */ # define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f]) #endif /*- * 64 char lines * pad input with 0 * left over chars are set to = * 1 byte => xx== * 2 bytes => xxx= * 3 bytes => xxxx */ #define BIN_PER_LINE (64/4*3) #define CHUNKS_PER_LINE (64/4) #define CHAR_PER_LINE (64+1) static const unsigned char data_bin2ascii[65] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; /*- * 0xF0 is a EOLN * 0xF1 is ignore but next needs to be 0xF0 (for \r\n processing). * 0xF2 is EOF * 0xE0 is ignore at start of line. * 0xFF is error */ #define B64_EOLN 0xF0 #define B64_CR 0xF1 #define B64_EOF 0xF2 #define B64_WS 0xE0 #define B64_ERROR 0xFF #define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3) #define B64_BASE64(a) (!B64_NOT_BASE64(a)) static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF1, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3E, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xFF, 0x3F, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a) { if (a & 0x80) return B64_ERROR; return data_ascii2bin[a]; } #else static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a) { a = os_toascii[a]; if (a & 0x80) return B64_ERROR; return data_ascii2bin[a]; } #endif EVP_ENCODE_CTX *EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX)); } void EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *dctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX *sctx) { memcpy(dctx, sctx, sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX)); return 1; } int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->num; } void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) { ctx->length = 48; ctx->num = 0; ctx->line_num = 0; } int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int i, j; size_t total = 0; *outl = 0; if (inl <= 0) return 0; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data)); if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl) { memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl); ctx->num += inl; return 1; } if (ctx->num != 0) { i = ctx->length - ctx->num; memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i); in += i; inl -= i; j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length); ctx->num = 0; out += j; *(out++) = '\n'; *out = '\0'; total = j + 1; } while (inl >= ctx->length && total <= INT_MAX) { j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length); in += ctx->length; inl -= ctx->length; out += j; *(out++) = '\n'; *out = '\0'; total += j + 1; } if (total > INT_MAX) { /* Too much output data! */ *outl = 0; return 0; } if (inl != 0) memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl); ctx->num = inl; *outl = total; return 1; } void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { unsigned int ret = 0; if (ctx->num != 0) { ret = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num); out[ret++] = '\n'; out[ret] = '\0'; ctx->num = 0; } *outl = ret; } int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen) { int i, ret = 0; unsigned long l; for (i = dlen; i > 0; i -= 3) { if (i >= 3) { l = (((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L) | (((unsigned long)f[1]) << 8L) | f[2]; *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L); *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L); *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L); *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l); } else { l = ((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L; if (i == 2) l |= ((unsigned long)f[1] << 8L); *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L); *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L); *(t++) = (i == 1) ? '=' : conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L); *(t++) = '='; } ret += 4; f += 3; } *t = '\0'; return (ret); } void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) { /* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */ ctx->num = 0; ctx->length = 0; ctx->line_num = 0; ctx->expect_nl = 0; } /*- * -1 for error * 0 for last line * 1 for full line * * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of * content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data * in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and * rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content. * * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of * content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore, * we now return 0 when one of the following is true: * - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete. * - Input has zero-length. * -1 is returned if: * - Invalid characters are detected. * - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding. * - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block. */ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len; unsigned char *d; n = ctx->num; d = ctx->enc_data; if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') { eof++; if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=') eof++; } /* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */ if (inl == 0) { rv = 0; goto end; } for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) { tmp = *(in++); v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp); if (v == B64_ERROR) { rv = -1; goto end; } if (tmp == '=') { eof++; } else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) { /* More data after padding. */ rv = -1; goto end; } if (eof > 2) { rv = -1; goto end; } if (v == B64_EOF) { seof = 1; goto tail; } /* Only save valid base64 characters. */ if (B64_BASE64(v)) { if (n >= 64) { /* * We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as * we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's * manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data. */ rv = -1; goto end; } OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data)); d[n++] = tmp; } if (n == 64) { decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n); n = 0; if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) { rv = -1; goto end; } ret += decoded_len - eof; out += decoded_len - eof; } } /* * Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has * 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this * behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly. */ tail: if (n > 0) { if ((n & 3) == 0) { decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n); n = 0; if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) { rv = -1; goto end; } ret += (decoded_len - eof); } else if (seof) { /* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */ rv = -1; goto end; } } rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1; end: /* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */ *outl = ret; ctx->num = n; return (rv); } int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n) { int i, ret = 0, a, b, c, d; unsigned long l; /* trim white space from the start of the line. */ while ((conv_ascii2bin(*f) == B64_WS) && (n > 0)) { f++; n--; } /* * strip off stuff at the end of the line ascii2bin values B64_WS, * B64_EOLN, B64_EOLN and B64_EOF */ while ((n > 3) && (B64_NOT_BASE64(conv_ascii2bin(f[n - 1])))) n--; if (n % 4 != 0) return (-1); for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) { a = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++)); b = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++)); c = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++)); d = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++)); if ((a & 0x80) || (b & 0x80) || (c & 0x80) || (d & 0x80)) return (-1); l = ((((unsigned long)a) << 18L) | (((unsigned long)b) << 12L) | (((unsigned long)c) << 6L) | (((unsigned long)d))); *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 16L) & 0xff; *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 8L) & 0xff; *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l) & 0xff; ret += 3; } return (ret); } int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int i; *outl = 0; if (ctx->num != 0) { i = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num); if (i < 0) return (-1); ctx->num = 0; *outl = i; return (1); } else return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_rc4.c0000644000000000000000000000357213176625657015344 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" typedef struct { RC4_KEY ks; /* working key */ } EVP_RC4_KEY; # define data(ctx) ((EVP_RC4_KEY *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)) static int rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); static const EVP_CIPHER r4_cipher = { NID_rc4, 1, EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE, 0, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, rc4_init_key, rc4_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_RC4_KEY), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; static const EVP_CIPHER r4_40_cipher = { NID_rc4_40, 1, 5 /* 40 bit */ , 0, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, rc4_init_key, rc4_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_RC4_KEY), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void) { return (&r4_cipher); } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_40(void) { return (&r4_40_cipher); } static int rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { RC4_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key); return 1; } static int rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { RC4(&data(ctx)->ks, inl, in, out); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p_lib.c0000644000000000000000000002756613176625657015446 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x); int EVP_PKEY_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_bits) return pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey); return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey == NULL) return 0; if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits) return -2; return pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits(pkey); } int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_size) return pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey); return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { int ret = pkey->save_parameters; if (mode >= 0) pkey->save_parameters = mode; return (ret); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { int ret = pkey->save_parameters; if (mode >= 0) pkey->save_parameters = mode; return (ret); } #endif return (0); } int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) { if (to->type == EVP_PKEY_NONE) { if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(to, from->type) == 0) return 0; } else if (to->type != from->type) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); goto err; } if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(to)) { if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(to, from) == 1) return 1; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if (from->ameth && from->ameth->param_copy) return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from); err: return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_missing) return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey); return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (a->type != b->type) return -1; if (a->ameth && a->ameth->param_cmp) return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b); return -2; } int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (a->type != b->type) return -1; if (a->ameth) { int ret; /* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */ if (a->ameth->param_cmp) { ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b); if (ret <= 0) return ret; } if (a->ameth->pub_cmp) return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b); } return -2; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void) { EVP_PKEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE; ret->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE; ret->references = 1; ret->save_parameters = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pkey->references, 1, &i, pkey->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", pkey); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } /* * Setup a public key ASN1 method and ENGINE from a NID or a string. If pkey * is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the algorithm exists. */ static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, const char *str, int len) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *e = NULL; if (pkey) { if (pkey->pkey.ptr) EVP_PKEY_free_it(pkey); /* * If key type matches and a method exists then this lookup has * succeeded once so just indicate success. */ if ((type == pkey->save_type) && pkey->ameth) return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* If we have ENGINEs release them */ ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine); pkey->engine = NULL; ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine); pkey->pmeth_engine = NULL; #endif } if (str) ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len); else ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (pkey == NULL) ENGINE_finish(e); #endif if (ameth == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); return 0; } if (pkey) { pkey->ameth = ameth; pkey->engine = e; pkey->type = pkey->ameth->pkey_id; pkey->save_type = type; } return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type) { return pkey_set_type(pkey, type, NULL, -1); } int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len) { return pkey_set_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e) { if (e != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } if (ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(e, pkey->type) == NULL) { ENGINE_finish(e); EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); return 0; } } ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine); pkey->pmeth_engine = e; return 1; } #endif int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key) { if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type)) return 0; pkey->pkey.ptr = key; return (key != NULL); } void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return pkey->pkey.ptr; } const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_HMAC) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY); return NULL; } os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey); *len = os->length; return os->data; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key) { int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key); if (ret) RSA_up_ref(key); return ret; } RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.rsa; } RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { RSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); if (ret != NULL) RSA_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key) { int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key); if (ret) DSA_up_ref(key); return ret; } DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.dsa; } DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey); if (ret != NULL) DSA_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key) { int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key); if (ret) EC_KEY_up_ref(key); return ret; } EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.ec; } EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); if (ret != NULL) EC_KEY_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key) { int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, key); if (ret) DH_up_ref(key); return ret; } DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.dh; } DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey); if (ret != NULL) DH_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif int EVP_PKEY_type(int type) { int ret; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *e; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type); if (ameth) ret = ameth->pkey_id; else ret = NID_undef; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(e); #endif return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return pkey->type; } int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type); } void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x) { int i; if (x == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&x->references, -1, &i, x->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", x); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); EVP_PKEY_free_it(x); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(x->lock); sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free); OPENSSL_free(x); } static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x) { /* internal function; x is never NULL */ if (x->ameth && x->ameth->pkey_free) { x->ameth->pkey_free(x); x->pkey.ptr = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(x->engine); x->engine = NULL; ENGINE_finish(x->pmeth_engine); x->pmeth_engine = NULL; #endif } static int unsup_alg(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, const char *kstr) { BIO_indent(out, indent, 128); BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n", kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type)); return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pub_print) return pkey->ameth->pub_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx); return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Public Key"); } int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->priv_print) return pkey->ameth->priv_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx); return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Private Key"); } int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_print) return pkey->ameth->param_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx); return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Parameters"); } static int evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, int arg1, void *arg2) { if (pkey->ameth == NULL || pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl == NULL) return -2; return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, op, arg1, arg2); } int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid) { return evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID, 0, pnid); } int EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char *pt, size_t ptlen) { if (ptlen > INT_MAX) return 0; if (evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT, ptlen, (void *)pt) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppt) { int rv; rv = evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT, 0, ppt); if (rv <= 0) return 0; return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/c_allc.c0000644000000000000000000001716113176625657015564 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include void openssl_add_all_ciphers_int(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_desx_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_desx_cbc, "DESX"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_desx_cbc, "desx"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_cbc, "DES"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_cbc, "des"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc, "DES3"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc, "des3"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede_ecb, "DES-EDE-ECB"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede_ecb, "des-ede-ecb"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_ecb, "DES-EDE3-ECB"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_ecb, "des-ede3-ecb"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_wrap()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, "des3-wrap"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_40()); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5()); # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_idea_cbc, "IDEA"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_idea_cbc, "idea"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_seed_cbc, "SEED"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_seed_cbc, "seed"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_64_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc, "RC2"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc, "rc2"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_cbc, "rc2-128"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_64_cbc, "rc2-64"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc2_40_cbc, "rc2-40"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_bf_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc, "BF"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc, "bf"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_bf_cbc, "blowfish"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_cast5_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "CAST"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "cast"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "CAST-cbc"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_cast5_cbc, "cast-cbc"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc5_cbc, "rc5"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_rc5_cbc, "RC5"); #endif EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ctr()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ocb()); #endif EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_xts()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ccm()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_wrap()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_aes128_wrap, "aes128-wrap"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_128_cbc, "AES128"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_128_cbc, "aes128"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ctr()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_gcm()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ocb()); #endif EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ccm()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_wrap()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_aes192_wrap, "aes192-wrap"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_192_cbc, "AES192"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_192_cbc, "aes192"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ctr()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ocb()); #endif EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_xts()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ccm()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_wrap()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_id_aes256_wrap, "aes256-wrap"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_256_cbc, "AES256"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_aes_256_cbc, "aes256"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_128_cbc, "CAMELLIA128"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_128_cbc, "camellia128"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_192_cbc, "CAMELLIA192"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_192_cbc, "camellia192"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ecb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cfb8()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ofb()); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_256_cbc, "CAMELLIA256"); EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_camellia_256_cbc, "camellia256"); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_ctr()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_192_ctr()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_ctr()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA EVP_add_cipher(EVP_chacha20()); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_chacha20_poly1305()); # endif #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_camellia.c0000644000000000000000000003313213176625657016416 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include "modes_lcl.h" static int camellia_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); /* Camellia subkey Structure */ typedef struct { CAMELLIA_KEY ks; block128_f block; union { cbc128_f cbc; ctr128_f ctr; } stream; } EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY; # define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4)) /* Attribute operation for Camellia */ # define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx) # if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__)) /* ---------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that * assembler support was in general requested... */ # include "sparc_arch.h" extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[]; # define SPARC_CMLL_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_CAMELLIA) void cmll_t4_set_key(const unsigned char *key, int bits, CAMELLIA_KEY *ks); void cmll_t4_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key); void cmll_t4_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key); void cmll128_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void cmll128_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void cmll256_t4_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void cmll256_t4_cbc_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void cmll128_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); void cmll256_t4_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec); static int cmll_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { int ret, mode, bits; EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = (EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8; cmll_t4_set_key(key, bits, &dat->ks); if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) { ret = 0; dat->block = (block128_f) cmll_t4_decrypt; switch (bits) { case 128: dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) cmll128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; break; case 192: case 256: dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) cmll256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; break; default: ret = -1; } } else { ret = 0; dat->block = (block128_f) cmll_t4_encrypt; switch (bits) { case 128: if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) cmll128_t4_cbc_encrypt; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) cmll128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; else dat->stream.cbc = NULL; break; case 192: case 256: if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) cmll256_t4_cbc_encrypt; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) cmll256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; else dat->stream.cbc = NULL; break; default: ret = -1; } } if (ret < 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_CMLL_T4_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } # define cmll_t4_cbc_cipher camellia_cbc_cipher static int cmll_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define cmll_t4_ecb_cipher camellia_ecb_cipher static int cmll_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define cmll_t4_ofb_cipher camellia_ofb_cipher static int cmll_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define cmll_t4_cfb_cipher camellia_cfb_cipher static int cmll_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define cmll_t4_cfb8_cipher camellia_cfb8_cipher static int cmll_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define cmll_t4_cfb1_cipher camellia_cfb1_cipher static int cmll_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define cmll_t4_ctr_cipher camellia_ctr_cipher static int cmll_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER cmll_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ cmll_t4_init_key, \ cmll_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ static const EVP_CIPHER camellia_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \ keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ camellia_init_key, \ camellia_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return SPARC_CMLL_CAPABLE?&cmll_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&camellia_##keylen##_##mode; } # else # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER camellia_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ camellia_init_key, \ camellia_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ sizeof(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY), \ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { return &camellia_##keylen##_##mode; } # endif # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags) \ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ctr, ctr, CTR, flags) /* The subkey for Camellia is generated. */ static int camellia_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { int ret, mode; EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); ret = Camellia_set_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks); if (ret < 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); return 0; } mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) { dat->block = (block128_f) Camellia_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) Camellia_cbc_encrypt : NULL; } else { dat->block = (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt; dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) Camellia_cbc_encrypt : NULL; } return 1; } static int camellia_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); if (dat->stream.cbc) (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block); else CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), dat->block); return 1; } static int camellia_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx); size_t i; EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); if (len < bl) return 1; for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl) (*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks); return 1; } static int camellia_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } static int camellia_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } static int camellia_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } static int camellia_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); len -= MAXBITCHUNK; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); } if (len) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); } return 1; } static int camellia_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { unsigned int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx); if (dat->stream.ctr) CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->stream.ctr); else CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num, dat->block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); return 1; } BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_camellia, 128, 0) BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_camellia, 192, 0) BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_camellia, 256, 0) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/cmeth_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001110413176625657016264 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "evp_locl.h" EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); if (cipher != NULL) { cipher->nid = cipher_type; cipher->block_size = block_size; cipher->key_len = key_len; } return cipher; } EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { EVP_CIPHER *to = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(cipher->nid, cipher->block_size, cipher->key_len); if (to != NULL) memcpy(to, cipher, sizeof(*to)); return to; } void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { OPENSSL_free(cipher); } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len) { cipher->iv_len = iv_len; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags) { cipher->flags = flags; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int ctx_size) { cipher->ctx_size = ctx_size; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc)) { cipher->init = init; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)) { cipher->do_cipher = do_cipher; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)) { cipher->cleanup = cleanup; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *)) { cipher->set_asn1_parameters = set_asn1_parameters; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *)) { cipher->get_asn1_parameters = get_asn1_parameters; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr)) { cipher->ctrl = ctrl; return 1; } int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { return cipher->init; } int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { return cipher->do_cipher; } int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *) { return cipher->cleanup; } int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *) { return cipher->set_asn1_parameters; } int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *) { return cipher->get_asn1_parameters; } int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { return cipher->ctrl; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c0000644000000000000000000000632113176625657016260 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include struct md5_sha1_ctx { MD5_CTX md5; SHA_CTX sha1; }; static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); if (!MD5_Init(&mctx->md5)) return 0; return SHA1_Init(&mctx->sha1); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, data, count)) return 0; return SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); if (!MD5_Final(md, &mctx->md5)) return 0; return SHA1_Final(md + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, &mctx->sha1); } static int ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms) { unsigned char padtmp[48]; unsigned char md5tmp[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx; if (cmd != EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET) return -2; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); /* SSLv3 client auth handling: see RFC-6101 5.6.8 */ if (mslen != 48) return 0; /* At this point hash contains all handshake messages, update * with master secret and pad_1. */ if (update(ctx, ms, mslen) <= 0) return 0; /* Set padtmp to pad_1 value */ memset(padtmp, 0x36, sizeof(padtmp)); if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp))) return 0; if (!MD5_Final(md5tmp, &mctx->md5)) return 0; if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, padtmp, 40)) return 0; if (!SHA1_Final(sha1tmp, &mctx->sha1)) return 0; /* Reinitialise context */ if (!init(ctx)) return 0; if (update(ctx, ms, mslen) <= 0) return 0; /* Set padtmp to pad_2 value */ memset(padtmp, 0x5c, sizeof(padtmp)); if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp))) return 0; if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, md5tmp, sizeof(md5tmp))) return 0; if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, padtmp, 40)) return 0; if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp))) return 0; /* Now when ctx is finalised it will return the SSL v3 hash value */ OPENSSL_cleanse(md5tmp, sizeof(md5tmp)); OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp)); return 1; } static const EVP_MD md5_sha1_md = { NID_md5_sha1, NID_md5_sha1, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, MD5_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(struct md5_sha1_ctx), ctrl }; const EVP_MD *EVP_md5_sha1(void) { return &md5_sha1_md; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c0000644000000000000000000000563713176625657015730 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include /* * Doesn't do anything now: Builtin PBE algorithms in static table. */ void PKCS5_PBE_add(void) { } int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; unsigned char md_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; int i; PBEPARAM *pbe; int saltlen, iter; unsigned char *salt; int mdsize; int rv = 0; /* Extract useful info from parameter */ if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || param->value.sequence == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } pbe = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), param); if (pbe == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } if (!pbe->iter) iter = 1; else iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter); salt = pbe->salt->data; saltlen = pbe->salt->length; if (!pass) passlen = 0; else if (passlen == -1) passlen = strlen(pass); ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pass, passlen)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, saltlen)) goto err; PBEPARAM_free(pbe); if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md_tmp, NULL)) goto err; mdsize = EVP_MD_size(md); if (mdsize < 0) return 0; for (i = 1; i < iter; i++) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, md_tmp, mdsize)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md_tmp, NULL)) goto err; } OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= (int)sizeof(md_tmp)); memcpy(key, md_tmp, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher)); OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) <= 16); memcpy(iv, md_tmp + (16 - EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)), EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)); if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(cctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de)) goto err; OPENSSL_cleanse(md_tmp, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); rv = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_des3.c0000644000000000000000000003427613176625657015517 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include # include # include "evp_locl.h" typedef struct { union { double align; DES_key_schedule ks[3]; } ks; union { void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t, const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *); } stream; } DES_EDE_KEY; # define ks1 ks.ks[0] # define ks2 ks.ks[1] # define ks3 ks.ks[2] # if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__)) /* ---------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that * assembler support was in general requested... */ # include "sparc_arch.h" extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[]; # define SPARC_DES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_DES) void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks); void des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len, const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]); void des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len, const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]); # endif static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr); # define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(DES_EDE_KEY,ctx) /* * Because of various casts and different args can't use * IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER */ static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop() DES_ecb3_encrypt((const_DES_cblock *)(in + i), (DES_cblock *)(out + i), &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } static int des_ede_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); } return 1; } static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { DES_EDE_KEY *dat = data(ctx); if (dat->stream.cbc != NULL) { (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, dat->ks.ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx)); return 1; } while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &dat->ks1, &dat->ks2, &dat->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &dat->ks1, &dat->ks2, &dat->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } static int des_ede_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); } return 1; } /* * Although we have a CFB-r implementation for 3-DES, it doesn't pack the * right way, so wrap it here */ static int des_ede3_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { size_t n; unsigned char c[1], d[1]; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) inl *= 8; for (n = 0; n < inl; ++n) { c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0; DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(c, d, 1, 1, &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); out[n / 8] = (out[n / 8] & ~(0x80 >> (unsigned int)(n % 8))) | ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8)); } return 1; } static int des_ede3_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)inl, &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2, &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede, 8, 16, 8, 64, EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, des_ede_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl) # define des_ede3_cfb64_cipher des_ede_cfb64_cipher # define des_ede3_ofb_cipher des_ede_ofb_cipher # define des_ede3_cbc_cipher des_ede_cbc_cipher # define des_ede3_ecb_cipher des_ede_ecb_cipher BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 8, 24, 8, 64, EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, des_ede3_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl) BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 1, EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, des_ede3_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl) BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 8, EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, des_ede3_init_key, NULL, NULL, NULL, des3_ctrl) static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key; DES_EDE_KEY *dat = data(ctx); dat->stream.cbc = NULL; # if defined(SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) if (SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1); des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2); memcpy(&dat->ks3, &dat->ks1, sizeof(dat->ks1)); dat->stream.cbc = enc ? des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt : des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt; return 1; } } # endif DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1); DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2); memcpy(&dat->ks3, &dat->ks1, sizeof(dat->ks1)); return 1; } static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key; DES_EDE_KEY *dat = data(ctx); dat->stream.cbc = NULL; # if defined(SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) if (SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1); des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2); des_t4_key_expand(&deskey[2], &dat->ks3); dat->stream.cbc = enc ? des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt : des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt; return 1; } } # endif DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1); DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2); DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[2], &dat->ks3); return 1; } static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { DES_cblock *deskey = ptr; switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY: if (RAND_bytes(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)) <= 0) return 0; DES_set_odd_parity(deskey); if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16) DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 1); if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 24) DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 2); return 1; default: return -1; } } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void) { return &des_ede_ecb; } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void) { return &des_ede3_ecb; } # include static const unsigned char wrap_iv[8] = { 0x4a, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x21, 0x05 }; static int des_ede3_unwrap(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { unsigned char icv[8], iv[8], sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int rv = -1; if (inl < 24) return -1; if (out == NULL) return inl - 16; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), wrap_iv, 8); /* Decrypt first block which will end up as icv */ des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, icv, in, 8); /* Decrypt central blocks */ /* * If decrypting in place move whole output along a block so the next * des_ede_cbc_cipher is in place. */ if (out == in) { memmove(out, out + 8, inl - 8); in -= 8; } des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out, in + 8, inl - 16); /* Decrypt final block which will be IV */ des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, iv, in + inl - 8, 8); /* Reverse order of everything */ BUF_reverse(icv, NULL, 8); BUF_reverse(out, NULL, inl - 16); BUF_reverse(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, 8); /* Decrypt again using new IV */ des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out, out, inl - 16); des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, icv, icv, 8); /* Work out SHA1 hash of first portion */ SHA1(out, inl - 16, sha1tmp); if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(sha1tmp, icv, 8)) rv = inl - 16; OPENSSL_cleanse(icv, 8); OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, 8); OPENSSL_cleanse(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 8); if (rv == -1) OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inl - 16); return rv; } static int des_ede3_wrap(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (out == NULL) return inl + 16; /* Copy input to output buffer + 8 so we have space for IV */ memmove(out + 8, in, inl); /* Work out ICV */ SHA1(in, inl, sha1tmp); memcpy(out + inl + 8, sha1tmp, 8); OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* Generate random IV */ if (RAND_bytes(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 8) <= 0) return -1; memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 8); /* Encrypt everything after IV in place */ des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out + 8, out + 8, inl + 8); BUF_reverse(out, NULL, inl + 16); memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), wrap_iv, 8); des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out, out, inl + 16); return inl + 16; } static int des_ede3_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { /* * Sanity check input length: we typically only wrap keys so EVP_MAXCHUNK * is more than will ever be needed. Also input length must be a multiple * of 8 bits. */ if (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK || inl % 8) return -1; if (is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_DES_EDE3_WRAP_CIPHER, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) return des_ede3_wrap(ctx, out, in, inl); else return des_ede3_unwrap(ctx, out, in, inl); } static const EVP_CIPHER des3_wrap = { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 8, 24, 0, EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1, des_ede3_init_key, des_ede3_wrap_cipher, NULL, sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_wrap(void) { return &des3_wrap; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/names.c0000644000000000000000000001136113176625657015446 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" int EVP_add_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *c) { int r; if (c == NULL) return 0; r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2sn(c->nid), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH, (const char *)c); if (r == 0) return (0); r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2ln(c->nid), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH, (const char *)c); return (r); } int EVP_add_digest(const EVP_MD *md) { int r; const char *name; name = OBJ_nid2sn(md->type); r = OBJ_NAME_add(name, OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, (const char *)md); if (r == 0) return (0); r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2ln(md->type), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, (const char *)md); if (r == 0) return (0); if (md->pkey_type && md->type != md->pkey_type) { r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2sn(md->pkey_type), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH | OBJ_NAME_ALIAS, name); if (r == 0) return (0); r = OBJ_NAME_add(OBJ_nid2ln(md->pkey_type), OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH | OBJ_NAME_ALIAS, name); } return (r); } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name) { const EVP_CIPHER *cp; if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL)) return NULL; cp = (const EVP_CIPHER *)OBJ_NAME_get(name, OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH); return (cp); } const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name) { const EVP_MD *cp; if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL)) return NULL; cp = (const EVP_MD *)OBJ_NAME_get(name, OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH); return (cp); } void evp_cleanup_int(void) { OBJ_NAME_cleanup(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH); OBJ_NAME_cleanup(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH); /* * The above calls will only clean out the contents of the name hash * table, but not the hash table itself. The following line does that * part. -- Richard Levitte */ OBJ_NAME_cleanup(-1); EVP_PBE_cleanup(); OBJ_sigid_free(); } struct doall_cipher { void *arg; void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *arg); }; static void do_all_cipher_fn(const OBJ_NAME *nm, void *arg) { struct doall_cipher *dc = arg; if (nm->alias) dc->fn(NULL, nm->name, nm->data, dc->arg); else dc->fn((const EVP_CIPHER *)nm->data, nm->name, NULL, dc->arg); } void EVP_CIPHER_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg) { struct doall_cipher dc; /* Ignore errors */ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL); dc.fn = fn; dc.arg = arg; OBJ_NAME_do_all(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH, do_all_cipher_fn, &dc); } void EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg) { struct doall_cipher dc; /* Ignore errors */ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL); dc.fn = fn; dc.arg = arg; OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH, do_all_cipher_fn, &dc); } struct doall_md { void *arg; void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *arg); }; static void do_all_md_fn(const OBJ_NAME *nm, void *arg) { struct doall_md *dc = arg; if (nm->alias) dc->fn(NULL, nm->name, nm->data, dc->arg); else dc->fn((const EVP_MD *)nm->data, nm->name, NULL, dc->arg); } void EVP_MD_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *md, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg) { struct doall_md dc; /* Ignore errors */ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL); dc.fn = fn; dc.arg = arg; OBJ_NAME_do_all(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, do_all_md_fn, &dc); } void EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *md, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg) { struct doall_md dc; OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL); dc.fn = fn; dc.arg = arg; OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, do_all_md_fn, &dc); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_des.c0000644000000000000000000002020413176625657015416 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include # include typedef struct { union { double align; DES_key_schedule ks; } ks; union { void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t, const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *); } stream; } EVP_DES_KEY; # if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__)) /* ----------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that * assembler support was in general requested... */ # include "sparc_arch.h" extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[]; # define SPARC_DES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & CFR_DES) void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks); void des_t4_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len, const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]); void des_t4_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len, const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]); # endif static int des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int des_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr); /* * Because of various casts and different names can't use * IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER */ static int des_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop() DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)(in + i), (DES_cblock *)(out + i), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } static int des_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); } return 1; } static int des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); if (dat->stream.cbc != NULL) { (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, &dat->ks.ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx)); return 1; } while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { DES_ncbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) DES_ncbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } static int des_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) { int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx); DES_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); } return 1; } /* * Although we have a CFB-r implementation for DES, it doesn't pack the right * way, so wrap it here */ static int des_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { size_t n, chunk = EVP_MAXCHUNK / 8; unsigned char c[1], d[1]; if (inl < chunk) chunk = inl; while (inl && inl >= chunk) { for (n = 0; n < chunk * 8; ++n) { c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0; DES_cfb_encrypt(c, d, 1, 1, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); out[n / 8] = (out[n / 8] & ~(0x80 >> (unsigned int)(n % 8))) | ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8)); } inl -= chunk; in += chunk; out += chunk; if (inl < chunk) chunk = inl; } return 1; } static int des_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { DES_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) DES_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)inl, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx), (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des, EVP_DES_KEY, NID_des, 8, 8, 8, 64, EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_init_key, NULL, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des_ctrl) BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des, EVP_DES_KEY, NID_des, 8, 8, 1, EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_init_key, NULL, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des_ctrl) BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des, EVP_DES_KEY, NID_des, 8, 8, 8, EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_init_key, NULL, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des_ctrl) static int des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key; EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); dat->stream.cbc = NULL; # if defined(SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) if (SPARC_DES_CAPABLE) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { des_t4_key_expand(key, &dat->ks.ks); dat->stream.cbc = enc ? des_t4_cbc_encrypt : des_t4_cbc_decrypt; return 1; } } # endif DES_set_key_unchecked(deskey, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)); return 1; } static int des_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY: if (RAND_bytes(ptr, 8) <= 0) return 0; DES_set_odd_parity((DES_cblock *)ptr); return 1; default: return -1; } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_null.c0000644000000000000000000000163613176625657015635 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return 1; } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return 1; } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return 1; } static const EVP_MD null_md = { NID_undef, NID_undef, 0, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, 0, sizeof(EVP_MD *), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_md_null(void) { return (&null_md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c0000644000000000000000000002027613176625657016006 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include # include # include "evp_locl.h" /* set this to print out info about the keygen algorithm */ /* #define OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2 */ # ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2 static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len); # endif /* * This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key * derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors * posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG * mailing list. */ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out) { const char *empty = ""; unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4]; int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen; unsigned long i = 1; HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest); if (mdlen < 0) return 0; hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (hctx_tpl == NULL) return 0; p = out; tkeylen = keylen; if (pass == NULL) { pass = empty; passlen = 0; } else if (passlen == -1) { passlen = strlen(pass); } if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl); return 0; } hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (hctx == NULL) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl); return 0; } while (tkeylen) { if (tkeylen > mdlen) cplen = mdlen; else cplen = tkeylen; /* * We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but * just in case... */ itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff); itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff); itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff); itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff); if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl)) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl); return 0; } if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen) || !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4) || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL)) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl); return 0; } HMAC_CTX_reset(hctx); memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen); for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) { if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl)) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl); return 0; } if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen) || !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL)) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl); return 0; } HMAC_CTX_reset(hctx); for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++) p[k] ^= digtmp[k]; } tkeylen -= cplen; i++; p += cplen; } HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl); # ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2 fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n"); h__dump(pass, passlen); fprintf(stderr, "Salt:\n"); h__dump(salt, saltlen); fprintf(stderr, "Iteration count %d\n", iter); fprintf(stderr, "Key:\n"); h__dump(out, keylen); # endif return 1; } int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *out) { return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, EVP_sha1(), keylen, out); } # ifdef DO_TEST main() { unsigned char out[4]; unsigned char salt[] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78 }; PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1("password", -1, salt, 4, 5, 4, out); fprintf(stderr, "Out %02X %02X %02X %02X\n", out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3]); } # endif /* * Now the key derivation function itself. This is a bit evil because it has * to check the ASN1 parameters are valid: and there are quite a few of * them... */ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) { PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *kdf; int rv = 0; pbe2 = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM), param); if (pbe2 == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } /* See if we recognise the key derivation function */ if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm), NULL, NULL, &kdf)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION); goto err; } /* * lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm. */ cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm); if (!cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto err; } /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de)) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR); goto err; } rv = kdf(ctx, pass, passlen, pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, NULL, NULL, en_de); err: PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); return rv; } int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) { unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; int saltlen, iter; int rv = 0; unsigned int keylen = 0; int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid; PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; const EVP_MD *prfmd; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); goto err; } keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof key); /* Decode parameter */ kdf = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM), param); if (kdf == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Now check the parameters of the kdf */ if (kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH); goto err; } if (kdf->prf) prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm); else prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1; if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); goto err; } prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid); if (prfmd == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); goto err; } if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE); goto err; } /* it seems that its all OK */ salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data; saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length; iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter); if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd, keylen, key)) goto err; rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de); err: OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); return rv; } # ifdef OPENSSL_DEBUG_PKCS5V2 static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len) { for (; len--; p++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", *p); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } # endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/scrypt.c0000644000000000000000000001535213176625657015673 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT #define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b)))) static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16]) { int i; uint32_t x[16]; memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x)); for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) { x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7); x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9); x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13); x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18); x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7); x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9); x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13); x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18); x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7); x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9); x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13); x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18); x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7); x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9); x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13); x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18); x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7); x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9); x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13); x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18); x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7); x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9); x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13); x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18); x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7); x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9); x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13); x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18); x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7); x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9); x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13); x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18); } for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) inout[i] += x[i]; OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x)); } static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r) { uint64_t i, j; uint32_t X[16], *pB; memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X)); pB = B; for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) X[j] ^= *pB++; salsa208_word_specification(X); memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X)); } OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X)); } static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N, uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V) { unsigned char *pB; uint32_t *pV; uint64_t i, k; /* Convert from little endian input */ for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) { *pV = *pB++; *pV |= *pB++ << 8; *pV |= *pB++ << 16; *pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24; } for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r) scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r); scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r); for (i = 0; i < N; i++) { uint32_t j; j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N; pV = V + 32 * r * j; for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++) T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++; scryptBlockMix(X, T, r); } /* Convert output to little endian */ for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) { uint32_t xtmp = X[i]; *pB++ = xtmp & 0xff; *pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff; *pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff; *pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff; } } #ifndef SIZE_MAX # define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1) #endif /* * Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on * most (all?) platforms. */ #define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1) /* * Maximum value of p * r: * p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen => * p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) => * p * r <= (2^30-1) * */ #define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1) /* * Maximum permitted memory allow this to be overridden with Configuration * option: e.g. -DSCRYPT_MAX_MEM=0 for maximum possible. */ #ifdef SCRYPT_MAX_MEM # if SCRYPT_MAX_MEM == 0 # undef SCRYPT_MAX_MEM /* * Although we could theoretically allocate SIZE_MAX memory that would leave * no memory available for anything else so set limit as half that. */ # define SCRYPT_MAX_MEM (SIZE_MAX/2) # endif #else /* Default memory limit: 32 MB */ # define SCRYPT_MAX_MEM (1024 * 1024 * 32) #endif int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { int rv = 0; unsigned char *B; uint32_t *X, *V, *T; uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen; size_t allocsize; /* Sanity check parameters */ /* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */ if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1))) return 0; /* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */ if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) return 0; /* * Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is * automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX. */ if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) { if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) return 0; } /* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */ /* * B size in section 5 step 1.S * Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked * p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX */ Blen = p * 128 * r; /* * Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in * uint64_t and also size_t (their sizes are unrelated). * This is combined size V, X and T (section 4) */ i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t)); if (N + 2 > i / r) return 0; Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t); /* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */ if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) return 0; /* check total allocated size fits in size_t */ if (Blen > SIZE_MAX - Vlen) return 0; allocsize = (size_t)(Blen + Vlen); if (maxmem == 0) maxmem = SCRYPT_MAX_MEM; if (allocsize > maxmem) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED); return 0; } /* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */ if (key == NULL) return 1; B = OPENSSL_malloc(allocsize); if (B == NULL) return 0; X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen); T = X + 32 * r; V = T + 32 * r; if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(), Blen, B) == 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < p; i++) scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V); if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(), keylen, key) == 0) goto err; rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(B, allocsize); return rv; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c0000644000000000000000000002726513176625657015753 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/bio.h" static int enc_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int enc_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); /* * static int enc_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); */ /* * static int enc_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); */ static long enc_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int enc_new(BIO *h); static int enc_free(BIO *data); static long enc_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fps); #define ENC_BLOCK_SIZE (1024*4) #define ENC_MIN_CHUNK (256) #define BUF_OFFSET (ENC_MIN_CHUNK + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH) typedef struct enc_struct { int buf_len; int buf_off; int cont; /* <= 0 when finished */ int finished; int ok; /* bad decrypt */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher; unsigned char *read_start, *read_end; /* * buf is larger than ENC_BLOCK_SIZE because EVP_DecryptUpdate can return * up to a block more data than is presented to it */ unsigned char buf[BUF_OFFSET + ENC_BLOCK_SIZE]; } BIO_ENC_CTX; static const BIO_METHOD methods_enc = { BIO_TYPE_CIPHER, "cipher", enc_write, enc_read, NULL, /* enc_puts, */ NULL, /* enc_gets, */ enc_ctrl, enc_new, enc_free, enc_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void) { return (&methods_enc); } static int enc_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx; ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; ctx->cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx->cipher == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return 0; } ctx->cont = 1; ctx->ok = 1; ctx->read_end = ctx->read_start = &(ctx->buf[BUF_OFFSET]); BIO_set_data(bi, ctx); BIO_set_init(bi, 1); return 1; } static int enc_free(BIO *a) { BIO_ENC_CTX *b; if (a == NULL) return 0; b = BIO_get_data(a); if (b == NULL) return 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(b->cipher); OPENSSL_clear_free(b, sizeof(BIO_ENC_CTX)); BIO_set_data(a, NULL); BIO_set_init(a, 0); return 1; } static int enc_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0, i, blocksize; BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx; BIO *next; if (out == NULL) return (0); ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL)) return 0; /* First check if there are bytes decoded/encoded */ if (ctx->buf_len > 0) { i = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; if (i > outl) i = outl; memcpy(out, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), i); ret = i; out += i; outl -= i; ctx->buf_off += i; if (ctx->buf_len == ctx->buf_off) { ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; } } blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cipher); if (blocksize == 1) blocksize = 0; /* * At this point, we have room of outl bytes and an empty buffer, so we * should read in some more. */ while (outl > 0) { if (ctx->cont <= 0) break; if (ctx->read_start == ctx->read_end) { /* time to read more data */ ctx->read_end = ctx->read_start = &(ctx->buf[BUF_OFFSET]); i = BIO_read(next, ctx->read_start, ENC_BLOCK_SIZE); if (i > 0) ctx->read_end += i; } else { i = ctx->read_end - ctx->read_start; } if (i <= 0) { /* Should be continue next time we are called? */ if (!BIO_should_retry(next)) { ctx->cont = i; i = EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->cipher, ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf_len)); ctx->ok = i; ctx->buf_off = 0; } else { ret = (ret == 0) ? i : ret; break; } } else { if (outl > ENC_MIN_CHUNK) { /* * Depending on flags block cipher decrypt can write * one extra block and then back off, i.e. output buffer * has to accommodate extra block... */ int j = outl - blocksize, buf_len; if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->cipher, (unsigned char *)out, &buf_len, ctx->read_start, i > j ? j : i)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); return 0; } ret += buf_len; out += buf_len; outl -= buf_len; if ((i -= j) <= 0) { ctx->read_start = ctx->read_end; continue; } ctx->read_start += j; } if (i > ENC_MIN_CHUNK) i = ENC_MIN_CHUNK; if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->cipher, ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len, ctx->read_start, i)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ctx->ok = 0; return 0; } ctx->read_start += i; ctx->cont = 1; /* * Note: it is possible for EVP_CipherUpdate to decrypt zero * bytes because this is or looks like the final block: if this * happens we should retry and either read more data or decrypt * the final block */ if (ctx->buf_len == 0) continue; } if (ctx->buf_len <= outl) i = ctx->buf_len; else i = outl; if (i <= 0) break; memcpy(out, ctx->buf, i); ret += i; ctx->buf_off = i; outl -= i; out += i; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return ((ret == 0) ? ctx->cont : ret); } static int enc_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = 0, n, i; BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx; BIO *next; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if ((ctx == NULL) || (next == NULL)) return 0; ret = inl; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); n = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; while (n > 0) { i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (i); } ctx->buf_off += i; n -= i; } /* at this point all pending data has been written */ if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); ctx->buf_off = 0; while (inl > 0) { n = (inl > ENC_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ENC_BLOCK_SIZE : inl; if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->cipher, ctx->buf, &ctx->buf_len, (const unsigned char *)in, n)) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ctx->ok = 0; return 0; } inl -= n; in += n; ctx->buf_off = 0; n = ctx->buf_len; while (n > 0) { i = BIO_write(next, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]), n); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret == inl) ? i : ret - inl; } n -= i; ctx->buf_off += i; } ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->buf_off = 0; } BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static long enc_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { BIO *dbio; BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx, *dctx; long ret = 1; int i; EVP_CIPHER_CTX **c_ctx; BIO *next; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ctx->ok = 1; ctx->finished = 0; if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx->cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx->cipher))) return 0; ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: /* More to read */ if (ctx->cont <= 0) ret = 1; else ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; if (ret <= 0) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: /* More to read in buffer */ ret = ctx->buf_len - ctx->buf_off; if (ret <= 0) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: /* do a final write */ again: while (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off) { i = enc_write(b, NULL, 0); if (i < 0) return i; } if (!ctx->finished) { ctx->finished = 1; ctx->buf_off = 0; ret = EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->cipher, (unsigned char *)ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf_len)); ctx->ok = (int)ret; if (ret <= 0) break; /* push out the bytes */ goto again; } /* Finally flush the underlying BIO */ ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS: ret = (long)ctx->ok; break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX: c_ctx = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX **)ptr; *c_ctx = ctx->cipher; BIO_set_init(b, 1); break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: dbio = (BIO *)ptr; dctx = BIO_get_data(dbio); dctx->cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (dctx->cipher == NULL) return 0; ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(dctx->cipher, ctx->cipher); if (ret) BIO_set_init(dbio, 1); break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); } static long enc_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } /*- void BIO_set_cipher_ctx(b,c) BIO *b; EVP_CIPHER_ctx *c; { if (b == NULL) return; if ((b->callback != NULL) && (b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,0L) <= 0)) return; b->init=1; ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr; memcpy(ctx->cipher,c,sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)); if (b->callback != NULL) b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,1L); } */ int BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const unsigned char *k, const unsigned char *i, int e) { BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx; long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long); ctx = BIO_get_data(b); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; callback = BIO_get_callback(b); if ((callback != NULL) && (callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, (const char *)c, BIO_CTRL_SET, e, 0L) <= 0)) return 0; BIO_set_init(b, 1); if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx->cipher, c, NULL, k, i, e)) return 0; if (callback != NULL) return callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, (const char *)c, BIO_CTRL_SET, e, 1L); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c0000644000000000000000000002511113176625657015761 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "evp_locl.h" int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) { int ret; if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL) ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type); else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) { switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) { case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE: if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(c) == NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap) ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL); ret = 1; break; case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE: ret = -1; break; default: ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type); } } else ret = -1; return (ret); } int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) { int ret; if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL) ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type); else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) { switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) { case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE: ret = 1; break; case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE: ret = -1; break; default: ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type); break; } } else ret = -1; return (ret); } int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) { int i = 0; unsigned int l; if (type != NULL) { l = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c); OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv)); i = ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type, c->oiv, l); if (i != (int)l) return (-1); else if (i > 0) memcpy(c->iv, c->oiv, l); } return (i); } int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) { int i = 0; unsigned int j; if (type != NULL) { j = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c); OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv)); i = ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type, c->oiv, j); } return (i); } /* Convert the various cipher NIDs and dummies to a proper OID NID */ int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx) { int nid; ASN1_OBJECT *otmp; nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(ctx); switch (nid) { case NID_rc2_cbc: case NID_rc2_64_cbc: case NID_rc2_40_cbc: return NID_rc2_cbc; case NID_rc4: case NID_rc4_40: return NID_rc4; case NID_aes_128_cfb128: case NID_aes_128_cfb8: case NID_aes_128_cfb1: return NID_aes_128_cfb128; case NID_aes_192_cfb128: case NID_aes_192_cfb8: case NID_aes_192_cfb1: return NID_aes_192_cfb128; case NID_aes_256_cfb128: case NID_aes_256_cfb8: case NID_aes_256_cfb1: return NID_aes_256_cfb128; case NID_des_cfb64: case NID_des_cfb8: case NID_des_cfb1: return NID_des_cfb64; case NID_des_ede3_cfb64: case NID_des_ede3_cfb8: case NID_des_ede3_cfb1: return NID_des_cfb64; default: /* Check it has an OID and it is valid */ otmp = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); if (OBJ_get0_data(otmp) == NULL) nid = NID_undef; ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp); return nid; } } int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e) { return e->block_size; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cipher->block_size; } int EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e) { return e->ctx_size; } int EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) { return ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl); } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cipher; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->encrypt; } unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->flags; } void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->app_data; } void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data) { ctx->app_data = data; } void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cipher_data; } void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *cipher_data) { void *old_cipher_data; old_cipher_data = ctx->cipher_data; ctx->cipher_data = cipher_data; return old_cipher_data; } int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->iv_len; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cipher->iv_len; } const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->oiv; } const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->iv; } unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->iv; } unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->buf; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->num; } void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int num) { ctx->num = num; } int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->key_len; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->key_len; } int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->nid; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cipher->nid; } int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->block_size; } int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->type; } int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->pkey_type; } int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md) { if (!md) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL); return -1; } return md->md_size; } unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->flags; } EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_new(int md_type, int pkey_type) { EVP_MD *md = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*md)); if (md != NULL) { md->type = md_type; md->pkey_type = pkey_type; } return md; } EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_dup(const EVP_MD *md) { EVP_MD *to = EVP_MD_meth_new(md->type, md->pkey_type); if (to != NULL) memcpy(to, md, sizeof(*to)); return to; } void EVP_MD_meth_free(EVP_MD *md) { OPENSSL_free(md); } int EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(EVP_MD *md, int blocksize) { md->block_size = blocksize; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(EVP_MD *md, int resultsize) { md->md_size = resultsize; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(EVP_MD *md, int datasize) { md->ctx_size = datasize; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(EVP_MD *md, unsigned long flags) { md->flags = flags; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_init(EVP_MD *md, int (*init)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)) { md->init = init; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_update(EVP_MD *md, int (*update)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)) { md->update = update; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_final(EVP_MD *md, int (*final)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)) { md->final = final; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(EVP_MD *md, int (*copy)(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)) { md->copy = copy; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_MD *md, int (*cleanup)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)) { md->cleanup = cleanup; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_MD *md, int (*ctrl)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)) { md->md_ctrl = ctrl; return 1; } int EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->block_size; } int EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->md_size; } int EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->ctx_size; } unsigned long EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->flags; } int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_init(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return md->init; } int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_update(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return md->update; } int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_final(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return md->final; } int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) { return md->copy; } int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return md->cleanup; } int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) { return md->md_ctrl; } const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return NULL; return ctx->digest; } EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->pctx; } void *EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->md_data; } int (*EVP_MD_CTX_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return ctx->update; } void EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)) { ctx->update = update; } void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) { ctx->flags |= flags; } void EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) { ctx->flags &= ~flags; } int EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) { return (ctx->flags & flags); } void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags) { ctx->flags |= flags; } void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags) { ctx->flags &= ~flags; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags) { return (ctx->flags & flags); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c0000644000000000000000000000364413176625657015770 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include /* Algorithm configuration module. */ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf) { int i; const char *oid_section; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp; CONF_VALUE *oval; oid_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md); if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, oid_section)) == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) { oval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i); if (strcmp(oval->name, "fips_mode") == 0) { int m; if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE); return 0; } if (m > 0) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (!FIPS_mode() && !FIPS_mode_set(1)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE); return 0; } #else EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; #endif } } else { EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION); ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", oval->name, ", value=", oval->value); } } return 1; } void EVP_add_alg_module(void) { CONF_module_add("alg_section", alg_module_init, 0); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/c_alld.c0000644000000000000000000000270513176625657015563 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include void openssl_add_all_digests_int(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 EVP_add_digest(EVP_md4()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5()); EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5, "ssl3-md5"); EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5_sha1()); #endif EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1, "ssl3-sha1"); EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption, SN_sha1WithRSA); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) EVP_add_digest(EVP_mdc2()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 EVP_add_digest(EVP_ripemd160()); EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_ripemd160, "ripemd"); EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_ripemd160, "rmd160"); #endif EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL EVP_add_digest(EVP_whirlpool()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 EVP_add_digest(EVP_blake2b512()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_blake2s256()); #endif } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p_dec.c0000644000000000000000000000172613176625657015421 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *ek, int ekl, EVP_PKEY *priv) { int ret = -1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (EVP_PKEY_id(priv) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { #endif EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_OLD, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA goto err; } ret = RSA_private_decrypt(ekl, ek, key, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(priv), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); err: #endif return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c0000644000000000000000000001137313176625657015516 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return SHA1_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return SHA1_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return SHA1_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms) { unsigned char padtmp[40]; unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; SHA_CTX *sha1; if (cmd != EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET) return -2; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; sha1 = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); /* SSLv3 client auth handling: see RFC-6101 5.6.8 */ if (mslen != 48) return 0; /* At this point hash contains all handshake messages, update * with master secret and pad_1. */ if (SHA1_Update(sha1, ms, mslen) <= 0) return 0; /* Set padtmp to pad_1 value */ memset(padtmp, 0x36, sizeof(padtmp)); if (!SHA1_Update(sha1, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp))) return 0; if (!SHA1_Final(sha1tmp, sha1)) return 0; /* Reinitialise context */ if (!SHA1_Init(sha1)) return 0; if (SHA1_Update(sha1, ms, mslen) <= 0) return 0; /* Set padtmp to pad_2 value */ memset(padtmp, 0x5c, sizeof(padtmp)); if (!SHA1_Update(sha1, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp))) return 0; if (!SHA1_Update(sha1, sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp))) return 0; /* Now when ctx is finalised it will return the SSL v3 hash value */ OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp)); return 1; } static const EVP_MD sha1_md = { NID_sha1, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, SHA_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX), ctrl }; const EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void) { return (&sha1_md); } static int init224(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return SHA224_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int init256(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return SHA256_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } /* * Even though there're separate SHA224_[Update|Final], we call * SHA256 functions even in SHA224 context. This is what happens * there anyway, so we can spare few CPU cycles:-) */ static int update256(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return SHA256_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final256(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return SHA256_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD sha224_md = { NID_sha224, NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, init224, update256, final256, NULL, NULL, SHA256_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA256_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_sha224(void) { return (&sha224_md); } static const EVP_MD sha256_md = { NID_sha256, NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, init256, update256, final256, NULL, NULL, SHA256_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA256_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_sha256(void) { return (&sha256_md); } static int init384(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return SHA384_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int init512(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return SHA512_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } /* See comment in SHA224/256 section */ static int update512(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return SHA512_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final512(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return SHA512_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD sha384_md = { NID_sha384, NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, init384, update512, final512, NULL, NULL, SHA512_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA512_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_sha384(void) { return (&sha384_md); } static const EVP_MD sha512_md = { NID_sha512, NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, init512, update512, final512, NULL, NULL, SHA512_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA512_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_sha512(void) { return (&sha512_md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p_open.c0000644000000000000000000000343313176625657015624 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, const unsigned char *ek, int ekl, const unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY *priv) { unsigned char *key = NULL; int i, size = 0, ret = 0; if (type) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return 0; } if (!priv) return 1; if (EVP_PKEY_id(priv) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA); goto err; } size = EVP_PKEY_size(priv); key = OPENSSL_malloc(size + 2); if (key == NULL) { /* ERROR */ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } i = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(key, ek, ekl, priv); if ((i <= 0) || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, i)) { /* ERROR */ goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv)) goto err; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(key, size); return (ret); } int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int i; i = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); if (i) i = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); return (i); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/m_ripemd.c0000644000000000000000000000233213176625657016135 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return RIPEMD160_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { return RIPEMD160_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { return RIPEMD160_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static const EVP_MD ripemd160_md = { NID_ripemd160, NID_ripemd160WithRSA, RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, init, update, final, NULL, NULL, RIPEMD160_CBLOCK, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(RIPEMD160_CTX), }; const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void) { return (&ripemd160_md); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_xcbc_d.c0000644000000000000000000000462113176625657016072 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include static int desx_cbc_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int desx_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); typedef struct { DES_key_schedule ks; /* key schedule */ DES_cblock inw; DES_cblock outw; } DESX_CBC_KEY; # define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(DESX_CBC_KEY,ctx) static const EVP_CIPHER d_xcbc_cipher = { NID_desx_cbc, 8, 24, 8, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, desx_cbc_init_key, desx_cbc_cipher, NULL, sizeof(DESX_CBC_KEY), EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_desx_cbc(void) { return (&d_xcbc_cipher); } static int desx_cbc_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key; DES_set_key_unchecked(deskey, &data(ctx)->ks); memcpy(&data(ctx)->inw[0], &key[8], 8); memcpy(&data(ctx)->outw[0], &key[16], 8); return 1; } static int desx_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) { DES_xcbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK, &data(ctx)->ks, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &data(ctx)->inw, &data(ctx)->outw, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK; in += EVP_MAXCHUNK; out += EVP_MAXCHUNK; } if (inl) DES_xcbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl, &data(ctx)->ks, (DES_cblock *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &data(ctx)->inw, &data(ctx)->outw, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c0000644000000000000000000001170313176625657015335 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 # include # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include static int rc2_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int rc2_meth_to_magic(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); static int rc2_magic_to_meth(int i); static int rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); static int rc2_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr); typedef struct { int key_bits; /* effective key bits */ RC2_KEY ks; /* key schedule */ } EVP_RC2_KEY; # define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(EVP_RC2_KEY,ctx) IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(rc2, ks, RC2, EVP_RC2_KEY, NID_rc2, 8, RC2_KEY_LENGTH, 8, 64, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT, rc2_init_key, NULL, rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv, rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv, rc2_ctrl) # define RC2_40_MAGIC 0xa0 # define RC2_64_MAGIC 0x78 # define RC2_128_MAGIC 0x3a static const EVP_CIPHER r2_64_cbc_cipher = { NID_rc2_64_cbc, 8, 8 /* 64 bit */ , 8, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT, rc2_init_key, rc2_cbc_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY), rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv, rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv, rc2_ctrl, NULL }; static const EVP_CIPHER r2_40_cbc_cipher = { NID_rc2_40_cbc, 8, 5 /* 40 bit */ , 8, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT, rc2_init_key, rc2_cbc_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_RC2_KEY), rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv, rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv, rc2_ctrl, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_64_cbc(void) { return (&r2_64_cbc_cipher); } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void) { return (&r2_40_cbc_cipher); } static int rc2_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { RC2_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key, data(ctx)->key_bits); return 1; } static int rc2_meth_to_magic(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *e) { int i; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(e, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS, 0, &i); if (i == 128) return (RC2_128_MAGIC); else if (i == 64) return (RC2_64_MAGIC); else if (i == 40) return (RC2_40_MAGIC); else return (0); } static int rc2_magic_to_meth(int i) { if (i == RC2_128_MAGIC) return 128; else if (i == RC2_64_MAGIC) return 64; else if (i == RC2_40_MAGIC) return 40; else { EVPerr(EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } } static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) { long num = 0; int i = 0; int key_bits; unsigned int l; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; if (type != NULL) { l = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c); OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(iv)); i = ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(type, &num, iv, l); if (i != (int)l) return -1; key_bits = rc2_magic_to_meth((int)num); if (!key_bits) return -1; if (i > 0 && !EVP_CipherInit_ex(c, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, -1)) return -1; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, NULL); if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(c, key_bits / 8) <= 0) return -1; } return i; } static int rc2_set_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type) { long num; int i = 0, j; if (type != NULL) { num = rc2_meth_to_magic(c); j = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c); i = ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(type, num, (unsigned char *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(c), j); } return (i); } static int rc2_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_INIT: data(c)->key_bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(c) * 8; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS: *(int *)ptr = data(c)->key_bits; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS: if (arg > 0) { data(c)->key_bits = arg; return 1; } return 0; # ifdef PBE_PRF_TEST case EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID: *(int *)ptr = NID_hmacWithMD5; return 1; # endif default: return -1; } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c0000644000000000000000000007607113176625657020143 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "modes_lcl.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" typedef struct { AES_KEY ks; SHA_CTX head, tail, md; size_t payload_length; /* AAD length in decrypt case */ union { unsigned int tls_ver; unsigned char tls_aad[16]; /* 13 used */ } aux; } EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1; #define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ((size_t)-1) #if defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; # define AESNI_CAPABLE (1<<(57-32)) int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key); void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc); void aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(const void *inp, void *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16], SHA_CTX *ctx, const void *in0); void aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec(const void *inp, void *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char iv[16], SHA_CTX *ctx, const void *in0); # define data(ctx) ((EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)) static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *inkey, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key = data(ctx); int ret; if (enc) ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(inkey, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &key->ks); else ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(inkey, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &key->ks); SHA1_Init(&key->head); /* handy when benchmarking */ key->tail = key->head; key->md = key->head; key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; return ret < 0 ? 0 : 1; } # define STITCHED_CALL # undef STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL # if !defined(STITCHED_CALL) # define aes_off 0 # endif void sha1_block_data_order(void *c, const void *p, size_t len); static void sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len) { const unsigned char *ptr = data; size_t res; if ((res = c->num)) { res = SHA_CBLOCK - res; if (len < res) res = len; SHA1_Update(c, ptr, res); ptr += res; len -= res; } res = len % SHA_CBLOCK; len -= res; if (len) { sha1_block_data_order(c, ptr, len / SHA_CBLOCK); ptr += len; c->Nh += len >> 29; c->Nl += len <<= 3; if (c->Nl < (unsigned int)len) c->Nh++; } if (res) SHA1_Update(c, ptr, res); } # ifdef SHA1_Update # undef SHA1_Update # endif # define SHA1_Update sha1_update # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) typedef struct { unsigned int A[8], B[8], C[8], D[8], E[8]; } SHA1_MB_CTX; typedef struct { const unsigned char *ptr; int blocks; } HASH_DESC; void sha1_multi_block(SHA1_MB_CTX *, const HASH_DESC *, int); typedef struct { const unsigned char *inp; unsigned char *out; int blocks; u64 iv[2]; } CIPH_DESC; void aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(CIPH_DESC *, void *, int); static size_t tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t inp_len, int n4x) { /* n4x is 1 or 2 */ HASH_DESC hash_d[8], edges[8]; CIPH_DESC ciph_d[8]; unsigned char storage[sizeof(SHA1_MB_CTX) + 32]; union { u64 q[16]; u32 d[32]; u8 c[128]; } blocks[8]; SHA1_MB_CTX *ctx; unsigned int frag, last, packlen, i, x4 = 4 * n4x, minblocks, processed = 0; size_t ret = 0; u8 *IVs; # if defined(BSWAP8) u64 seqnum; # endif /* ask for IVs in bulk */ if (RAND_bytes((IVs = blocks[0].c), 16 * x4) <= 0) return 0; ctx = (SHA1_MB_CTX *) (storage + 32 - ((size_t)storage % 32)); /* align */ frag = (unsigned int)inp_len >> (1 + n4x); last = (unsigned int)inp_len + frag - (frag << (1 + n4x)); if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64) < (x4 - 1)) { frag++; last -= x4 - 1; } packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 20 + 16) & -16); /* populate descriptors with pointers and IVs */ hash_d[0].ptr = inp; ciph_d[0].inp = inp; /* 5+16 is place for header and explicit IV */ ciph_d[0].out = out + 5 + 16; memcpy(ciph_d[0].out - 16, IVs, 16); memcpy(ciph_d[0].iv, IVs, 16); IVs += 16; for (i = 1; i < x4; i++) { ciph_d[i].inp = hash_d[i].ptr = hash_d[i - 1].ptr + frag; ciph_d[i].out = ciph_d[i - 1].out + packlen; memcpy(ciph_d[i].out - 16, IVs, 16); memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, IVs, 16); IVs += 16; } # if defined(BSWAP8) memcpy(blocks[0].c, key->md.data, 8); seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]); # endif for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag); # if !defined(BSWAP8) unsigned int carry, j; # endif ctx->A[i] = key->md.h0; ctx->B[i] = key->md.h1; ctx->C[i] = key->md.h2; ctx->D[i] = key->md.h3; ctx->E[i] = key->md.h4; /* fix seqnum */ # if defined(BSWAP8) blocks[i].q[0] = BSWAP8(seqnum + i); # else for (carry = i, j = 8; j--;) { blocks[i].c[j] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[j] + carry; carry = (blocks[i].c[j] - carry) >> (sizeof(carry) * 8 - 1); } # endif blocks[i].c[8] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8]; blocks[i].c[9] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9]; blocks[i].c[10] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10]; /* fix length */ blocks[i].c[11] = (u8)(len >> 8); blocks[i].c[12] = (u8)(len); memcpy(blocks[i].c + 13, hash_d[i].ptr, 64 - 13); hash_d[i].ptr += 64 - 13; hash_d[i].blocks = (len - (64 - 13)) / 64; edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c; edges[i].blocks = 1; } /* hash 13-byte headers and first 64-13 bytes of inputs */ sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); /* hash bulk inputs */ # define MAXCHUNKSIZE 2048 # if MAXCHUNKSIZE%64 # error "MAXCHUNKSIZE is not divisible by 64" # elif MAXCHUNKSIZE /* * goal is to minimize pressure on L1 cache by moving in shorter steps, * so that hashed data is still in the cache by the time we encrypt it */ minblocks = ((frag <= last ? frag : last) - (64 - 13)) / 64; if (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64) { for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr; edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16; } do { sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { edges[i].ptr = hash_d[i].ptr += MAXCHUNKSIZE; hash_d[i].blocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; edges[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; ciph_d[i].inp += MAXCHUNKSIZE; ciph_d[i].out += MAXCHUNKSIZE; ciph_d[i].blocks = MAXCHUNKSIZE / 16; memcpy(ciph_d[i].iv, ciph_d[i].out - 16, 16); } processed += MAXCHUNKSIZE; minblocks -= MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64; } while (minblocks > MAXCHUNKSIZE / 64); } # endif # undef MAXCHUNKSIZE sha1_multi_block(ctx, hash_d, n4x); memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks)); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag), off = hash_d[i].blocks * 64; const unsigned char *ptr = hash_d[i].ptr + off; off = (len - processed) - (64 - 13) - off; /* remainder actually */ memcpy(blocks[i].c, ptr, off); blocks[i].c[off] = 0x80; len += 64 + 13; /* 64 is HMAC header */ len *= 8; /* convert to bits */ if (off < (64 - 8)) { # ifdef BSWAP4 blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4(len); # else PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, len); # endif edges[i].blocks = 1; } else { # ifdef BSWAP4 blocks[i].d[31] = BSWAP4(len); # else PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 124, len); # endif edges[i].blocks = 2; } edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c; } /* hash input tails and finalize */ sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); memset(blocks, 0, sizeof(blocks)); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { # ifdef BSWAP4 blocks[i].d[0] = BSWAP4(ctx->A[i]); ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h0; blocks[i].d[1] = BSWAP4(ctx->B[i]); ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h1; blocks[i].d[2] = BSWAP4(ctx->C[i]); ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h2; blocks[i].d[3] = BSWAP4(ctx->D[i]); ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h3; blocks[i].d[4] = BSWAP4(ctx->E[i]); ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h4; blocks[i].c[20] = 0x80; blocks[i].d[15] = BSWAP4((64 + 20) * 8); # else PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 0, ctx->A[i]); ctx->A[i] = key->tail.h0; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 4, ctx->B[i]); ctx->B[i] = key->tail.h1; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 8, ctx->C[i]); ctx->C[i] = key->tail.h2; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 12, ctx->D[i]); ctx->D[i] = key->tail.h3; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 16, ctx->E[i]); ctx->E[i] = key->tail.h4; blocks[i].c[20] = 0x80; PUTU32(blocks[i].c + 60, (64 + 20) * 8); # endif edges[i].ptr = blocks[i].c; edges[i].blocks = 1; } /* finalize MACs */ sha1_multi_block(ctx, edges, n4x); for (i = 0; i < x4; i++) { unsigned int len = (i == (x4 - 1) ? last : frag), pad, j; unsigned char *out0 = out; memcpy(ciph_d[i].out, ciph_d[i].inp, len - processed); ciph_d[i].inp = ciph_d[i].out; out += 5 + 16 + len; /* write MAC */ PUTU32(out + 0, ctx->A[i]); PUTU32(out + 4, ctx->B[i]); PUTU32(out + 8, ctx->C[i]); PUTU32(out + 12, ctx->D[i]); PUTU32(out + 16, ctx->E[i]); out += 20; len += 20; /* pad */ pad = 15 - len % 16; for (j = 0; j <= pad; j++) *(out++) = pad; len += pad + 1; ciph_d[i].blocks = (len - processed) / 16; len += 16; /* account for explicit iv */ /* arrange header */ out0[0] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[8]; out0[1] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[9]; out0[2] = ((u8 *)key->md.data)[10]; out0[3] = (u8)(len >> 8); out0[4] = (u8)(len); ret += len + 5; inp += frag; } aesni_multi_cbc_encrypt(ciph_d, &key->ks, n4x); OPENSSL_cleanse(blocks, sizeof(blocks)); OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); return ret; } # endif static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key = data(ctx); unsigned int l; size_t plen = key->payload_length, iv = 0, /* explicit IV in TLS 1.1 and * later */ sha_off = 0; # if defined(STITCHED_CALL) size_t aes_off = 0, blocks; sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK - key->md.num; # endif key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if (plen == NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) plen = len; else if (len != ((plen + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) return 0; else if (key->aux.tls_ver >= TLS1_1_VERSION) iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; # if defined(STITCHED_CALL) if (plen > (sha_off + iv) && (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA_CBLOCK)) { SHA1_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off); aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(in, out, blocks, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &key->md, in + iv + sha_off); blocks *= SHA_CBLOCK; aes_off += blocks; sha_off += blocks; key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29; key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3; if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks) key->md.Nh++; } else { sha_off = 0; } # endif sha_off += iv; SHA1_Update(&key->md, in + sha_off, plen - sha_off); if (plen != len) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ if (in != out) memcpy(out + aes_off, in + aes_off, plen - aes_off); /* calculate HMAC and append it to payload */ SHA1_Final(out + plen, &key->md); key->md = key->tail; SHA1_Update(&key->md, out + plen, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); SHA1_Final(out + plen, &key->md); /* pad the payload|hmac */ plen += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; for (l = len - plen - 1; plen < len; plen++) out[plen] = l; /* encrypt HMAC|padding at once */ aesni_cbc_encrypt(out + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1); } else { aesni_cbc_encrypt(in + aes_off, out + aes_off, len - aes_off, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 1); } } else { union { unsigned int u[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(unsigned int)]; unsigned char c[32 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } mac, *pmac; /* arrange cache line alignment */ pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c + 31) & ((size_t)0 - 32)); if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ size_t inp_len, mask, j, i; unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen; int ret = 1; union { unsigned int u[SHA_LBLOCK]; unsigned char c[SHA_CBLOCK]; } *data = (void *)key->md.data; # if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL) unsigned char tail_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; int stitch = 0; # endif if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 4] << 8 | key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { if (len < (AES_BLOCK_SIZE + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)) return 0; /* omit explicit iv */ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } else if (len < (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)) return 0; # if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL) if (len >= 1024 && ctx->key_len == 32) { /* decrypt last block */ memcpy(tail_iv, in + len - 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); aesni_cbc_encrypt(in + len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, out + len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, &key->ks, tail_iv, 0); stitch = 1; } else # endif /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */ aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 0); /* figure out payload length */ pad = out[len - 1]; maxpad = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1); maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8); maxpad &= 255; mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad); ret &= mask; /* * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However, * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic. */ pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad); inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1); key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8; key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len; /* calculate HMAC */ key->md = key->head; SHA1_Update(&key->md, key->aux.tls_aad, plen); # if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL) if (stitch) { blocks = (len - (256 + 32 + SHA_CBLOCK)) / SHA_CBLOCK; aes_off = len - AES_BLOCK_SIZE - blocks * SHA_CBLOCK; sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK - plen; aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, aes_off, &key->ks, ctx->iv, 0); SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, sha_off); aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec(in + aes_off, out + aes_off, blocks, &key->ks, ctx->iv, &key->md, out + sha_off); sha_off += blocks *= SHA_CBLOCK; out += sha_off; len -= sha_off; inp_len -= sha_off; key->md.Nl += (blocks << 3); /* at most 18 bits */ memcpy(ctx->iv, tail_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } # endif # if 1 len -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* amend mac */ if (len >= (256 + SHA_CBLOCK)) { j = (len - (256 + SHA_CBLOCK)) & (0 - SHA_CBLOCK); j += SHA_CBLOCK - key->md.num; SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, j); out += j; len -= j; inp_len -= j; } /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */ bitlen = key->md.Nl + (inp_len << 3); /* at most 18 bits */ # ifdef BSWAP4 bitlen = BSWAP4(bitlen); # else mac.c[0] = 0; mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 16); mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen >> 8); mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen; bitlen = mac.u[0]; # endif pmac->u[0] = 0; pmac->u[1] = 0; pmac->u[2] = 0; pmac->u[3] = 0; pmac->u[4] = 0; for (res = key->md.num, j = 0; j < len; j++) { size_t c = out[j]; mask = (j - inp_len) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8); c &= mask; c |= 0x80 & ~mask & ~((inp_len - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 8)); data->c[res++] = (unsigned char)c; if (res != SHA_CBLOCK) continue; /* j is not incremented yet */ mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 7 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask; sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 72) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask; pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask; pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask; pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask; pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask; res = 0; } for (i = res; i < SHA_CBLOCK; i++, j++) data->c[i] = 0; if (res > SHA_CBLOCK - 8) { mask = 0 - ((inp_len + 8 - j) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] |= bitlen & mask; sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); mask &= 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask; pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask; pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask; pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask; pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask; memset(data, 0, SHA_CBLOCK); j += 64; } data->u[SHA_LBLOCK - 1] = bitlen; sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); mask = 0 - ((j - inp_len - 73) >> (sizeof(j) * 8 - 1)); pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask; pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask; pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask; pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask; pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask; # ifdef BSWAP4 pmac->u[0] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[0]); pmac->u[1] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[1]); pmac->u[2] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[2]); pmac->u[3] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[3]); pmac->u[4] = BSWAP4(pmac->u[4]); # else for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { res = pmac->u[i]; pmac->c[4 * i + 0] = (unsigned char)(res >> 24); pmac->c[4 * i + 1] = (unsigned char)(res >> 16); pmac->c[4 * i + 2] = (unsigned char)(res >> 8); pmac->c[4 * i + 3] = (unsigned char)res; } # endif len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; # else SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, inp_len); res = key->md.num; SHA1_Final(pmac->c, &key->md); { unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks; /* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */ inp_blocks = 1 + ((SHA_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); res += (unsigned int)(len - inp_len); pad_blocks = res / SHA_CBLOCK; res %= SHA_CBLOCK; pad_blocks += 1 + ((SHA_CBLOCK - 9 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); for (; inp_blocks < pad_blocks; inp_blocks++) sha1_block_data_order(&key->md, data, 1); } # endif key->md = key->tail; SHA1_Update(&key->md, pmac->c, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); SHA1_Final(pmac->c, &key->md); /* verify HMAC */ out += inp_len; len -= inp_len; # if 1 { unsigned char *p = out + len - 1 - maxpad - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; size_t off = out - p; unsigned int c, cmask; maxpad += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; for (res = 0, i = 0, j = 0; j < maxpad; j++) { c = p[j]; cmask = ((int)(j - off - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1); res |= (c ^ pad) & ~cmask; /* ... and padding */ cmask &= ((int)(off - 1 - j)) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1); res |= (c ^ pmac->c[i]) & cmask; i += 1 & cmask; } maxpad -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); ret &= (int)~res; } # else for (res = 0, i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) res |= out[i] ^ pmac->c[i]; res = 0 - ((0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1)); ret &= (int)~res; /* verify padding */ pad = (pad & ~res) | (maxpad & res); out = out + len - 1 - pad; for (res = 0, i = 0; i < pad; i++) res |= out[i] ^ pad; res = (0 - res) >> (sizeof(res) * 8 - 1); ret &= (int)~res; # endif return ret; } else { # if defined(STITCHED_DECRYPT_CALL) if (len >= 1024 && ctx->key_len == 32) { if (sha_off %= SHA_CBLOCK) blocks = (len - 3 * SHA_CBLOCK) / SHA_CBLOCK; else blocks = (len - 2 * SHA_CBLOCK) / SHA_CBLOCK; aes_off = len - blocks * SHA_CBLOCK; aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, aes_off, &key->ks, ctx->iv, 0); SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, sha_off); aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec(in + aes_off, out + aes_off, blocks, &key->ks, ctx->iv, &key->md, out + sha_off); sha_off += blocks *= SHA_CBLOCK; out += sha_off; len -= sha_off; key->md.Nh += blocks >> 29; key->md.Nl += blocks <<= 3; if (key->md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks) key->md.Nh++; } else # endif /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */ aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), 0); SHA1_Update(&key->md, out, len); } } return 1; } static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key = data(ctx); switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY: { unsigned int i; unsigned char hmac_key[64]; memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key)); if (arg > (int)sizeof(hmac_key)) { SHA1_Init(&key->head); SHA1_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg); SHA1_Final(hmac_key, &key->head); } else { memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg); } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */ SHA1_Init(&key->head); SHA1_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */ SHA1_Init(&key->tail); SHA1_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key)); return 1; } case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: { unsigned char *p = ptr; unsigned int len; if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return -1; len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { key->payload_length = len; if ((key->aux.tls_ver = p[arg - 4] << 8 | p[arg - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { if (len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; p[arg - 2] = len >> 8; p[arg - 1] = len; } key->md = key->head; SHA1_Update(&key->md, p, arg); return (int)(((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - len); } else { memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg); key->payload_length = arg; return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; } } # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE: return (int)(5 + 16 + ((arg + 20 + 16) & -16)); case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD: { EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param = (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr; unsigned int n4x = 1, x4; unsigned int frag, last, packlen, inp_len; if (arg < (int)sizeof(EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM)) return -1; inp_len = param->inp[11] << 8 | param->inp[12]; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if ((param->inp[9] << 8 | param->inp[10]) < TLS1_1_VERSION) return -1; if (inp_len) { if (inp_len < 4096) return 0; /* too short */ if (inp_len >= 8192 && OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 5)) n4x = 2; /* AVX2 */ } else if ((n4x = param->interleave / 4) && n4x <= 2) inp_len = param->len; else return -1; key->md = key->head; SHA1_Update(&key->md, param->inp, 13); x4 = 4 * n4x; n4x += 1; frag = inp_len >> n4x; last = inp_len + frag - (frag << n4x); if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64 < (x4 - 1))) { frag++; last -= x4 - 1; } packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 20 + 16) & -16); packlen = (packlen << n4x) - packlen; packlen += 5 + 16 + ((last + 20 + 16) & -16); param->interleave = x4; return (int)packlen; } else return -1; /* not yet */ } case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT: { EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param = (EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr; return (int)tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(key, param->out, param->inp, param->len, param->interleave / 4); } case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT: # endif default: return -1; } } static EVP_CIPHER aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher = { # ifdef NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, # else NID_undef, # endif AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1), EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl, NULL }; static EVP_CIPHER aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher = { # ifdef NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1, # else NID_undef, # endif AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 32, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1), EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 ? NULL : EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void) { return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher : NULL); } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void) { return (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_256_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher : NULL); } #else const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void) { return NULL; } const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void) { return NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_null.c0000644000000000000000000000242113176625657015616 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" static int null_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int null_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); static const EVP_CIPHER n_cipher = { NID_undef, 1, 0, 0, 0, null_init_key, null_cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_enc_null(void) { return (&n_cipher); } static int null_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { return 1; } static int null_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { if (in != out) memcpy(out, in, inl); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c0000644000000000000000000005440613176625657016315 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" typedef int sk_cmp_fn_type(const char *const *a, const char *const *b); static STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY_METHOD) *app_pkey_methods = NULL; static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *standard_methods[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA &rsa_pkey_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH &dh_pkey_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA &dsa_pkey_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC &ec_pkey_meth, #endif &hmac_pkey_meth, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC &cmac_pkey_meth, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH &dhx_pkey_meth, #endif &tls1_prf_pkey_meth, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC &ecx25519_pkey_meth, #endif &hkdf_pkey_meth }; DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *, pmeth); static int pmeth_cmp(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *const *a, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *const *b) { return ((*a)->pkey_id - (*b)->pkey_id); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *, pmeth); const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_find(int type) { EVP_PKEY_METHOD tmp; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *t = &tmp, **ret; tmp.pkey_id = type; if (app_pkey_methods) { int idx; idx = sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_find(app_pkey_methods, &tmp); if (idx >= 0) return sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_value(app_pkey_methods, idx); } ret = OBJ_bsearch_pmeth(&t, standard_methods, sizeof(standard_methods) / sizeof(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *)); if (!ret || !*ret) return NULL; return *ret; } static EVP_PKEY_CTX *int_ctx_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int id) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *ret; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth; if (id == -1) { if (!pkey || !pkey->ameth) return NULL; id = pkey->ameth->pkey_id; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (e == NULL && pkey != NULL) e = pkey->pmeth_engine != NULL ? pkey->pmeth_engine : pkey->engine; /* Try to find an ENGINE which implements this method */ if (e) { if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return NULL; } } else { e = ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(id); } /* * If an ENGINE handled this method look it up. Otherwise use internal * tables. */ if (e) pmeth = ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(e, id); else #endif pmeth = EVP_PKEY_meth_find(id); if (pmeth == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(e); #endif EVPerr(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); return NULL; } ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(e); #endif EVPerr(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->engine = e; ret->pmeth = pmeth; ret->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED; ret->pkey = pkey; if (pkey) EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey); if (pmeth->init) { if (pmeth->init(ret) <= 0) { ret->pmeth = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } } return ret; } EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_new(int id, int flags) { EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth; pmeth = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pmeth)); if (pmeth == NULL) return NULL; pmeth->pkey_id = id; pmeth->flags = flags | EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC; return pmeth; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pflags, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *meth) { if (ppkey_id) *ppkey_id = meth->pkey_id; if (pflags) *pflags = meth->flags; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *src) { dst->init = src->init; dst->copy = src->copy; dst->cleanup = src->cleanup; dst->paramgen_init = src->paramgen_init; dst->paramgen = src->paramgen; dst->keygen_init = src->keygen_init; dst->keygen = src->keygen; dst->sign_init = src->sign_init; dst->sign = src->sign; dst->verify_init = src->verify_init; dst->verify = src->verify; dst->verify_recover_init = src->verify_recover_init; dst->verify_recover = src->verify_recover; dst->signctx_init = src->signctx_init; dst->signctx = src->signctx; dst->verifyctx_init = src->verifyctx_init; dst->verifyctx = src->verifyctx; dst->encrypt_init = src->encrypt_init; dst->encrypt = src->encrypt; dst->decrypt_init = src->decrypt_init; dst->decrypt = src->decrypt; dst->derive_init = src->derive_init; dst->derive = src->derive; dst->ctrl = src->ctrl; dst->ctrl_str = src->ctrl_str; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_free(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth) { if (pmeth && (pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC)) OPENSSL_free(pmeth); } EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e) { return int_ctx_new(pkey, e, -1); } EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(int id, ENGINE *e) { return int_ctx_new(NULL, e, id); } EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *rctx; if (!pctx->pmeth || !pctx->pmeth->copy) return NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Make sure it's safe to copy a pkey context using an ENGINE */ if (pctx->engine && !ENGINE_init(pctx->engine)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_DUP, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } #endif rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rctx)); if (rctx == NULL) return NULL; rctx->pmeth = pctx->pmeth; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE rctx->engine = pctx->engine; #endif if (pctx->pkey) EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pctx->pkey); rctx->pkey = pctx->pkey; if (pctx->peerkey) EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pctx->peerkey); rctx->peerkey = pctx->peerkey; rctx->data = NULL; rctx->app_data = NULL; rctx->operation = pctx->operation; if (pctx->pmeth->copy(rctx, pctx) > 0) return rctx; rctx->pmeth = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(rctx); return NULL; } int EVP_PKEY_meth_add0(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth) { if (app_pkey_methods == NULL) { app_pkey_methods = sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_new(pmeth_cmp); if (app_pkey_methods == NULL) return 0; } if (!sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_push(app_pkey_methods, pmeth)) return 0; sk_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_sort(app_pkey_methods); return 1; } void EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; if (ctx->pmeth && ctx->pmeth->cleanup) ctx->pmeth->cleanup(ctx); EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->peerkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine); #endif OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) { int ret; if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->ctrl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); return -2; } if ((keytype != -1) && (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != keytype)) return -1; if (ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET); return -1; } if ((optype != -1) && !(ctx->operation & optype)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION); return -1; } ret = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, cmd, p1, p2); if (ret == -2) EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *value) { if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->ctrl_str) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); return -2; } if (strcmp(name, "digest") == 0) { const EVP_MD *md; if (value == NULL || (md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST); return 0; } return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, md); } return ctx->pmeth->ctrl_str(ctx, name, value); } /* Utility functions to send a string of hex string to a ctrl */ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *str) { size_t len; len = strlen(str); if (len > INT_MAX) return -1; return ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, cmd, len, (void *)str); } int EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *hex) { unsigned char *bin; long binlen; int rv = -1; bin = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(hex, &binlen); if (bin == NULL) return 0; if (binlen <= INT_MAX) rv = ctx->pmeth->ctrl(ctx, cmd, binlen, bin); OPENSSL_free(bin); return rv; } int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_operation(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->operation; } void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *dat, int datlen) { ctx->keygen_info = dat; ctx->keygen_info_count = datlen; } void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data) { ctx->data = data; } void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->data; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->pkey; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->peerkey; } void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data) { ctx->app_data = data; } void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->app_data; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)) { pmeth->init = init; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)) { pmeth->copy = copy; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)) { pmeth->cleanup = cleanup; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { pmeth->paramgen_init = paramgen_init; pmeth->paramgen = paramgen; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { pmeth->keygen_init = keygen_init; pmeth->keygen = keygen; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) { pmeth->sign_init = sign_init; pmeth->sign = sign; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) { pmeth->verify_init = verify_init; pmeth->verify = verify; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) { pmeth->verify_recover_init = verify_recover_init; pmeth->verify_recover = verify_recover; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)) { pmeth->signctx_init = signctx_init; pmeth->signctx = signctx; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)) { pmeth->verifyctx_init = verifyctx_init; pmeth->verifyctx = verifyctx; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*encryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)) { pmeth->encrypt_init = encrypt_init; pmeth->encrypt = encryptfn; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)) { pmeth->decrypt_init = decrypt_init; pmeth->decrypt = decrypt; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)) { pmeth->derive_init = derive_init; pmeth->derive = derive; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2), int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)) { pmeth->ctrl = ctrl; pmeth->ctrl_str = ctrl_str; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)) { *pinit = pmeth->init; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)) { *pcopy = pmeth->copy; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)) { *pcleanup = pmeth->cleanup; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { if (pparamgen_init) *pparamgen_init = pmeth->paramgen_init; if (pparamgen) *pparamgen = pmeth->paramgen; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)) { if (pkeygen_init) *pkeygen_init = pmeth->keygen_init; if (pkeygen) *pkeygen = pmeth->keygen; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) { if (psign_init) *psign_init = pmeth->sign_init; if (psign) *psign = pmeth->sign; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) { if (pverify_init) *pverify_init = pmeth->verify_init; if (pverify) *pverify = pmeth->verify; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)) { if (pverify_recover_init) *pverify_recover_init = pmeth->verify_recover_init; if (pverify_recover) *pverify_recover = pmeth->verify_recover; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)) { if (psignctx_init) *psignctx_init = pmeth->signctx_init; if (psignctx) *psignctx = pmeth->signctx; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)) { if (pverifyctx_init) *pverifyctx_init = pmeth->verifyctx_init; if (pverifyctx) *pverifyctx = pmeth->verifyctx; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)) { if (pencrypt_init) *pencrypt_init = pmeth->encrypt_init; if (pencryptfn) *pencryptfn = pmeth->encrypt; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)) { if (pdecrypt_init) *pdecrypt_init = pmeth->decrypt_init; if (pdecrypt) *pdecrypt = pmeth->decrypt; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)) { if (pderive_init) *pderive_init = pmeth->derive_init; if (pderive) *pderive = pmeth->derive; } void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2), int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)) { if (pctrl) *pctrl = pmeth->ctrl; if (pctrl_str) *pctrl_str = pmeth->ctrl_str; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c0000644000000000000000000003474513176625657017607 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA # include # include # include "evp_locl.h" # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include "internal/chacha.h" typedef struct { union { double align; /* this ensures even sizeof(EVP_CHACHA_KEY)%8==0 */ unsigned int d[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE / 4]; } key; unsigned int counter[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE / 4]; unsigned char buf[CHACHA_BLK_SIZE]; unsigned int partial_len; } EVP_CHACHA_KEY; #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data) static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc) { EVP_CHACHA_KEY *key = data(ctx); unsigned int i; if (user_key) for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; i+=4) { key->key.d[i/4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(user_key+i); } if (iv) for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_CTR_SIZE; i+=4) { key->counter[i/4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(iv+i); } key->partial_len = 0; return 1; } static int chacha_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len) { EVP_CHACHA_KEY *key = data(ctx); unsigned int n, rem, ctr32; if ((n = key->partial_len)) { while (len && n < CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) { *out++ = *inp++ ^ key->buf[n++]; len--; } key->partial_len = n; if (len == 0) return 1; if (n == CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) { key->partial_len = 0; key->counter[0]++; if (key->counter[0] == 0) key->counter[1]++; } } rem = (unsigned int)(len % CHACHA_BLK_SIZE); len -= rem; ctr32 = key->counter[0]; while (len >= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) { size_t blocks = len / CHACHA_BLK_SIZE; /* * 1<<28 is just a not-so-small yet not-so-large number... * Below condition is practically never met, but it has to * be checked for code correctness. */ if (sizeof(size_t)>sizeof(unsigned int) && blocks>(1U<<28)) blocks = (1U<<28); /* * As ChaCha20_ctr32 operates on 32-bit counter, caller * has to handle overflow. 'if' below detects the * overflow, which is then handled by limiting the * amount of blocks to the exact overflow point... */ ctr32 += (unsigned int)blocks; if (ctr32 < blocks) { blocks -= ctr32; ctr32 = 0; } blocks *= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE; ChaCha20_ctr32(out, inp, blocks, key->key.d, key->counter); len -= blocks; inp += blocks; out += blocks; key->counter[0] = ctr32; if (ctr32 == 0) key->counter[1]++; } if (rem) { memset(key->buf, 0, sizeof(key->buf)); ChaCha20_ctr32(key->buf, key->buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE, key->key.d, key->counter); for (n = 0; n < rem; n++) out[n] = inp[n] ^ key->buf[n]; key->partial_len = rem; } return 1; } static const EVP_CIPHER chacha20 = { NID_chacha20, 1, /* block_size */ CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, /* key_len */ CHACHA_CTR_SIZE, /* iv_len, 128-bit counter in the context */ EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT, chacha_init_key, chacha_cipher, NULL, sizeof(EVP_CHACHA_KEY), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20(void) { return (&chacha20); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 # include "internal/poly1305.h" typedef struct { EVP_CHACHA_KEY key; unsigned int nonce[12/4]; unsigned char tag[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]; struct { uint64_t aad, text; } len; int aad, mac_inited, tag_len, nonce_len; size_t tls_payload_length; } EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX; # define NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ((size_t)-1) # define aead_data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *)(ctx)->cipher_data) # define POLY1305_ctx(actx) ((POLY1305 *)(actx + 1)) static int chacha20_poly1305_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *inkey, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx); if (!inkey && !iv) return 1; actx->len.aad = 0; actx->len.text = 0; actx->aad = 0; actx->mac_inited = 0; actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; if (iv != NULL) { unsigned char temp[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE] = { 0 }; /* pad on the left */ if (actx->nonce_len <= CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) memcpy(temp + CHACHA_CTR_SIZE - actx->nonce_len, iv, actx->nonce_len); chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, temp, enc); actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1]; actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2]; actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3]; } else { chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, NULL, enc); } return 1; } static int chacha20_poly1305_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx); size_t rem, plen = actx->tls_payload_length; static const unsigned char zero[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; if (!actx->mac_inited) { actx->key.counter[0] = 0; memset(actx->key.buf, 0, sizeof(actx->key.buf)); ChaCha20_ctr32(actx->key.buf, actx->key.buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE, actx->key.key.d, actx->key.counter); Poly1305_Init(POLY1305_ctx(actx), actx->key.buf); actx->key.counter[0] = 1; actx->key.partial_len = 0; actx->len.aad = actx->len.text = 0; actx->mac_inited = 1; } if (in) { /* aad or text */ if (out == NULL) { /* aad */ Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), in, len); actx->len.aad += len; actx->aad = 1; return len; } else { /* plain- or ciphertext */ if (actx->aad) { /* wrap up aad */ if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.aad % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem); actx->aad = 0; } actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; if (plen == NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) plen = len; else if (len != plen + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) return -1; if (ctx->encrypt) { /* plaintext */ chacha_cipher(ctx, out, in, plen); Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), out, plen); in += plen; out += plen; actx->len.text += plen; } else { /* ciphertext */ Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), in, plen); chacha_cipher(ctx, out, in, plen); in += plen; out += plen; actx->len.text += plen; } } } if (in == NULL /* explicit final */ || plen != len) { /* or tls mode */ const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; unsigned char temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (actx->aad) { /* wrap up aad */ if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.aad % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem); actx->aad = 0; } if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.text % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem); if (is_endian.little) { Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), (unsigned char *)&actx->len, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE); } else { temp[0] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad); temp[1] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>8); temp[2] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>16); temp[3] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>24); temp[4] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>32); temp[5] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>40); temp[6] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>48); temp[7] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>56); temp[8] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text); temp[9] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>8); temp[10] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>16); temp[11] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>24); temp[12] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>32); temp[13] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>40); temp[14] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>48); temp[15] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>56); Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), temp, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE); } Poly1305_Final(POLY1305_ctx(actx), ctx->encrypt ? actx->tag : temp); actx->mac_inited = 0; if (in != NULL && len != plen) { /* tls mode */ if (ctx->encrypt) { memcpy(out, actx->tag, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE); } else { if (CRYPTO_memcmp(temp, in, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) { memset(out - plen, 0, plen); return -1; } } } else if (!ctx->encrypt) { if (CRYPTO_memcmp(temp, actx->tag, actx->tag_len)) return -1; } } return len; } static int chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx); if (actx) OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->cipher_data, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size()); return 1; } static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx); switch(type) { case EVP_CTRL_INIT: if (actx == NULL) actx = ctx->cipher_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size()); if (actx == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } actx->len.aad = 0; actx->len.text = 0; actx->aad = 0; actx->mac_inited = 0; actx->tag_len = 0; actx->nonce_len = 12; actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_COPY: if (actx) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dst = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr; dst->cipher_data = OPENSSL_memdup(actx, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size()); if (dst->cipher_data == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_COPY_ERROR); return 0; } } return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) return 0; actx->nonce_len = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED: if (arg != 12) return 0; actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1] = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr); actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2] = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+4); actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3] = CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+8); return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; if (ptr != NULL) { memcpy(actx->tag, ptr, arg); actx->tag_len = arg; } return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE || !ctx->encrypt) return 0; memcpy(ptr, actx->tag, arg); return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return 0; { unsigned int len; unsigned char *aad = ptr, temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]; len = aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] << 8 | aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1]; if (!ctx->encrypt) { if (len < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* discount attached tag */ memcpy(temp, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2); aad = temp; temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8); temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1] = (unsigned char)len; } actx->tls_payload_length = len; /* * merge record sequence number as per RFC7905 */ actx->key.counter[1] = actx->nonce[0]; actx->key.counter[2] = actx->nonce[1] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad); actx->key.counter[3] = actx->nonce[2] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad+4); actx->mac_inited = 0; chacha20_poly1305_cipher(ctx, NULL, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN); return POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* tag length */ } case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY: /* no-op */ return 1; default: return -1; } } static EVP_CIPHER chacha20_poly1305 = { NID_chacha20_poly1305, 1, /* block_size */ CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, /* key_len */ 12, /* iv_len, 96-bit nonce in the context */ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER, chacha20_poly1305_init_key, chacha20_poly1305_cipher, chacha20_poly1305_cleanup, 0, /* 0 moves context-specific structure allocation to ctrl */ NULL, /* set_asn1_parameters */ NULL, /* get_asn1_parameters */ chacha20_poly1305_ctrl, NULL /* app_data */ }; const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void) { return(&chacha20_poly1305); } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_key.c0000644000000000000000000001021513176625657016002 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI /* should be init to zeros. */ static char prompt_string[80]; void EVP_set_pw_prompt(const char *prompt) { if (prompt == NULL) prompt_string[0] = '\0'; else { strncpy(prompt_string, prompt, 79); prompt_string[79] = '\0'; } } char *EVP_get_pw_prompt(void) { if (prompt_string[0] == '\0') return (NULL); else return (prompt_string); } /* * For historical reasons, the standard function for reading passwords is in * the DES library -- if someone ever wants to disable DES, this function * will fail */ int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify) { return EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, 0, len, prompt, verify); } int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt, int verify) { int ret = -1; char buff[BUFSIZ]; UI *ui; if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0')) prompt = prompt_string; ui = UI_new(); if (ui == NULL) return ret; if (UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len) < 0 || (verify && UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, buff, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len, buf) < 0)) goto end; ret = UI_process(ui); OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ); end: UI_free(ui); return ret; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_UI */ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *salt, const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv) { EVP_MD_CTX *c; unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int niv, nkey, addmd = 0; unsigned int mds = 0, i; int rv = 0; nkey = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type); niv = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type); OPENSSL_assert(nkey <= EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH); OPENSSL_assert(niv <= EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); if (data == NULL) return (nkey); c = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (c == NULL) goto err; for (;;) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, md, NULL)) goto err; if (addmd++) if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, &(md_buf[0]), mds)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, data, datal)) goto err; if (salt != NULL) if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, salt, PKCS5_SALT_LEN)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds)) goto err; for (i = 1; i < (unsigned int)count; i++) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, md, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c, &(md_buf[0]), mds)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds)) goto err; } i = 0; if (nkey) { for (;;) { if (nkey == 0) break; if (i == mds) break; if (key != NULL) *(key++) = md_buf[i]; nkey--; i++; } } if (niv && (i != mds)) { for (;;) { if (niv == 0) break; if (i == mds) break; if (iv != NULL) *(iv++) = md_buf[i]; niv--; i++; } } if ((nkey == 0) && (niv == 0)) break; } rv = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type); err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(c); OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf)); return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_err.c0000644000000000000000000002304513176625657016007 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY), "aesni_init_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY), "aes_init_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER), "aes_ocb_cipher"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY), "aes_t4_init_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER), "aes_wrap_cipher"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT), "alg_module_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY), "camellia_init_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL), "chacha20_poly1305_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CMLL_T4_INIT_KEY), "cmll_t4_init_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_DES_EDE3_WRAP_CIPHER), "des_ede3_wrap_cipher"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_DO_SIGVER_INIT), "do_sigver_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX), "EVP_CipherInit_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_size"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD), "EVP_PBE_alg_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE), "EVP_PBE_alg_add_type"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT), "EVP_PBE_CipherInit"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT), "EVP_PBE_scrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY), "EVP_PKCS82PKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8), "EVP_PKEY2PKCS8"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_ADD0), "EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS), "EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL), "EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR), "EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_DUP), "EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT), "EVP_PKEY_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_OLD), "EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE), "EVP_PKEY_derive"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_derive_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER), "EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT), "EVP_PKEY_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_OLD), "EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH), "EVP_PKEY_get0_DH"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA), "EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY), "EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC), "EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA), "EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN), "EVP_PKEY_keygen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_keygen_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW), "EVP_PKEY_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN), "EVP_PKEY_paramgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE), "EVP_PKEY_set1_engine"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN), "EVP_PKEY_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_sign_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY), "EVP_PKEY_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_verify_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER), "EVP_PKEY_verify_recover"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT), "EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL), "EVP_SignFinal"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL), "EVP_VerifyFinal"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW), "int_ctx_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE), "pkey_set_type"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH), "rc2_magic_to_meth"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_RC5_CTRL), "rc5_ctrl"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED), "aes key setup failed"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT), "bad decrypt"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED), "camellia key setup failed"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR), "cipher parameter error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED), "command not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_COPY_ERROR), "copy error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED), "ctrl not implemented"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED), "ctrl operation not implemented"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH), "data not multiple of block length"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES), "different key types"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS), "different parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION), "error loading section"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE), "error setting fips mode"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY), "expecting an hmac key"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY), "expecting an rsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY), "expecting a dh key"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY), "expecting a dsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY), "expecting a ec key"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED), "fips mode not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ILLEGAL_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS), "illegal scrypt parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR), "initialization error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED), "input not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE), "invalid fips mode"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_KEY), "invalid key"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH), "invalid key length"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION), "invalid operation"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE), "keygen failure"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), "memory limit exceeded"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL), "message digest is null"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED), "method not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET), "no cipher set"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST), "no default digest"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET), "no digest set"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET), "no key set"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET), "no operation set"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE), "operation not supported for this keytype"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED), "operaton not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING), "partially overlapping buffers"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED), "pkey asn1 method already registered"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR), "private key decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR), "private key encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA), "public key not rsa"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER), "unknown cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION), "unknown option"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM), "unknown pbe algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM), "unsupported algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER), "unsupported cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH), "unsupported keylength"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION), "unsupported key derivation function"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE), "unsupported key size"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS), "unsupported number of rounds"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF), "unsupported prf"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM), "unsupported private key algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE), "unsupported salt type"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED), "wrap mode not allowed"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH), "wrong final block length"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(EVP_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, EVP_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, EVP_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_bf.c0000644000000000000000000000224713176625657015241 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF # include # include "internal/evp_int.h" # include # include static int bf_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); typedef struct { BF_KEY ks; } EVP_BF_KEY; # define data(ctx) EVP_C_DATA(EVP_BF_KEY,ctx) IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER(bf, ks, BF, EVP_BF_KEY, NID_bf, 8, 16, 8, 64, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, bf_init_key, NULL, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, NULL) static int bf_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { BF_set_key(&data(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/p_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000173213176625657015430 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old(unsigned char *ek, const unsigned char *key, int key_len, EVP_PKEY *pubk) { int ret = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (EVP_PKEY_id(pubk) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { #endif EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_OLD, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA goto err; } ret = RSA_public_encrypt(key_len, key, ek, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubk), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); err: #endif return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c0000644000000000000000000001010213176625657016155 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "internal/x509_int.h" /* Extract a private key from a PKCS8 structure */ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid; char obj_tmp[80]; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(&algoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, p8)) return NULL; if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, OBJ_obj2nid(algoid))) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM); i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, 80, algoid); ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp); goto error; } if (pkey->ameth->priv_decode) { if (!pkey->ameth->priv_decode(pkey, p8)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR); goto error; } } else { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY, EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto error; } return pkey; error: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return NULL; } /* Turn a private key into a PKCS8 structure */ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new(); if (p8 == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (pkey->ameth) { if (pkey->ameth->priv_encode) { if (!pkey->ameth->priv_encode(p8, pkey)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR); goto error; } } else { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto error; } } else { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM); goto error; } RAND_add(p8->pkey->data, p8->pkey->length, 0.0); return p8; error: PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); return NULL; } /* EVP_PKEY attribute functions */ int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_count(const EVP_PKEY *key) { return X509at_get_attr_count(key->attributes); } int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID(const EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_NID(key->attributes, nid, lastpos); } int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_OBJ(const EVP_PKEY *key, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(key->attributes, obj, lastpos); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_get_attr(const EVP_PKEY *key, int loc) { return X509at_get_attr(key->attributes, loc); } X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_delete_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, int loc) { return X509at_delete_attr(key->attributes, loc); } int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr) { if (X509at_add1_attr(&key->attributes, attr)) return 1; return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_OBJ(EVP_PKEY *key, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(&key->attributes, obj, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(&key->attributes, nid, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_txt(EVP_PKEY *key, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len) { if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&key->attributes, attrname, type, bytes, len)) return 1; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/e_old.c0000644000000000000000000000461513176625657015431 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include /* * Define some deprecated functions, so older programs don't crash and burn * too quickly. On Windows and VMS, these will never be used, since * functions and variables in shared libraries are selected by entry point * location, not by name. */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF # undef EVP_bf_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb(void) { return EVP_bf_cfb64(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # undef EVP_des_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb(void) { return EVP_des_cfb64(); } # undef EVP_des_ede3_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb(void) { return EVP_des_ede3_cfb64(); } # undef EVP_des_ede_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb(void) { return EVP_des_ede_cfb64(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA # undef EVP_idea_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb(void) { return EVP_idea_cfb64(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 # undef EVP_rc2_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb(void) { return EVP_rc2_cfb64(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST # undef EVP_cast5_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cfb(void) { return EVP_cast5_cfb64(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 # undef EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(void) { return EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64(); } # endif # undef EVP_aes_128_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb(void) { return EVP_aes_128_cfb128(); } # undef EVP_aes_192_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb(void) { return EVP_aes_192_cfb128(); } # undef EVP_aes_256_cfb const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb(void) { return EVP_aes_256_cfb128(); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000511013176625657016146 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* EVP_MD_CTX related stuff */ struct evp_md_ctx_st { const EVP_MD *digest; ENGINE *engine; /* functional reference if 'digest' is * ENGINE-provided */ unsigned long flags; void *md_data; /* Public key context for sign/verify */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; /* Update function: usually copied from EVP_MD */ int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count); } /* EVP_MD_CTX */ ; struct evp_cipher_ctx_st { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; ENGINE *engine; /* functional reference if 'cipher' is * ENGINE-provided */ int encrypt; /* encrypt or decrypt */ int buf_len; /* number we have left */ unsigned char oiv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* original iv */ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* working iv */ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* saved partial block */ int num; /* used by cfb/ofb/ctr mode */ /* FIXME: Should this even exist? It appears unused */ void *app_data; /* application stuff */ int key_len; /* May change for variable length cipher */ unsigned long flags; /* Various flags */ void *cipher_data; /* per EVP data */ int final_used; int block_mask; unsigned char final[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* possible final block */ } /* EVP_CIPHER_CTX */ ; int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de); struct evp_Encode_Ctx_st { /* number saved in a partial encode/decode */ int num; /* * The length is either the output line length (in input bytes) or the * shortest input line length that is ok. Once decoding begins, the * length is adjusted up each time a longer line is decoded */ int length; /* data to encode */ unsigned char enc_data[80]; /* number read on current line */ int line_num; int expect_nl; }; typedef struct evp_pbe_st EVP_PBE_CTL; DEFINE_STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL) int is_partially_overlapping(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2, int len); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014011 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/build.info0000644000000000000000000000025513176625657015767 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= ct_b64.c ct_err.c ct_log.c ct_oct.c ct_policy.c \ ct_prn.c ct_sct.c ct_sct_ctx.c ct_vfy.c ct_x509v3.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_oct.c0000644000000000000000000002306213176625657015433 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT # error "CT is disabled" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ct_locl.h" int o2i_SCT_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len) { size_t siglen; size_t len_remaining = len; const unsigned char *p; if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); return -1; } /* * digitally-signed struct header: (1 byte) Hash algorithm (1 byte) * Signature algorithm (2 bytes + ?) Signature * * This explicitly rejects empty signatures: they're invalid for * all supported algorithms. */ if (len <= 4) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE); return -1; } p = *in; /* Get hash and signature algorithm */ sct->hash_alg = *p++; sct->sig_alg = *p++; if (SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) == NID_undef) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE); return -1; } /* Retrieve signature and check it is consistent with the buffer length */ n2s(p, siglen); len_remaining -= (p - *in); if (siglen > len_remaining) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE); return -1; } if (SCT_set1_signature(sct, p, siglen) != 1) return -1; len_remaining -= siglen; *in = p + siglen; return len - len_remaining; } SCT *o2i_SCT(SCT **psct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len) { SCT *sct = NULL; const unsigned char *p; if (len == 0 || len > MAX_SCT_SIZE) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID); goto err; } if ((sct = SCT_new()) == NULL) goto err; p = *in; sct->version = *p; if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) { int sig_len; size_t len2; /*- * Fixed-length header: * struct { * Version sct_version; (1 byte) * log_id id; (32 bytes) * uint64 timestamp; (8 bytes) * CtExtensions extensions; (2 bytes + ?) * } */ if (len < 43) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID); goto err; } len -= 43; p++; sct->log_id = BUF_memdup(p, CT_V1_HASHLEN); if (sct->log_id == NULL) goto err; sct->log_id_len = CT_V1_HASHLEN; p += CT_V1_HASHLEN; n2l8(p, sct->timestamp); n2s(p, len2); if (len < len2) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID); goto err; } if (len2 > 0) { sct->ext = BUF_memdup(p, len2); if (sct->ext == NULL) goto err; } sct->ext_len = len2; p += len2; len -= len2; sig_len = o2i_SCT_signature(sct, &p, len); if (sig_len <= 0) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT, CT_R_SCT_INVALID); goto err; } len -= sig_len; *in = p + len; } else { /* If not V1 just cache encoding */ sct->sct = BUF_memdup(p, len); if (sct->sct == NULL) goto err; sct->sct_len = len; *in = p + len; } if (psct != NULL) { SCT_free(*psct); *psct = sct; } return sct; err: SCT_free(sct); return NULL; } int i2o_SCT_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out) { size_t len; unsigned char *p = NULL, *pstart = NULL; if (!SCT_signature_is_complete(sct)) { CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE); goto err; } if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); goto err; } /* * (1 byte) Hash algorithm * (1 byte) Signature algorithm * (2 bytes + ?) Signature */ len = 4 + sct->sig_len; if (out != NULL) { if (*out != NULL) { p = *out; *out += len; } else { pstart = p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (p == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } *out = p; } *p++ = sct->hash_alg; *p++ = sct->sig_alg; s2n(sct->sig_len, p); memcpy(p, sct->sig, sct->sig_len); } return len; err: OPENSSL_free(pstart); return -1; } int i2o_SCT(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out) { size_t len; unsigned char *p = NULL, *pstart = NULL; if (!SCT_is_complete(sct)) { CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT, CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET); goto err; } /* * Fixed-length header: struct { (1 byte) Version sct_version; (32 bytes) * log_id id; (8 bytes) uint64 timestamp; (2 bytes + ?) CtExtensions * extensions; (1 byte) Hash algorithm (1 byte) Signature algorithm (2 * bytes + ?) Signature */ if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) len = 43 + sct->ext_len + 4 + sct->sig_len; else len = sct->sct_len; if (out == NULL) return len; if (*out != NULL) { p = *out; *out += len; } else { pstart = p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (p == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } *out = p; } if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) { *p++ = sct->version; memcpy(p, sct->log_id, CT_V1_HASHLEN); p += CT_V1_HASHLEN; l2n8(sct->timestamp, p); s2n(sct->ext_len, p); if (sct->ext_len > 0) { memcpy(p, sct->ext, sct->ext_len); p += sct->ext_len; } if (i2o_SCT_signature(sct, &p) <= 0) goto err; } else { memcpy(p, sct->sct, len); } return len; err: OPENSSL_free(pstart); return -1; } STACK_OF(SCT) *o2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, size_t len) { STACK_OF(SCT) *sk = NULL; size_t list_len, sct_len; if (len < 2 || len > MAX_SCT_LIST_SIZE) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID); return NULL; } n2s(*pp, list_len); if (list_len != len - 2) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID); return NULL; } if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) { sk = sk_SCT_new_null(); if (sk == NULL) return NULL; } else { SCT *sct; /* Use the given stack, but empty it first. */ sk = *a; while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(sk)) != NULL) SCT_free(sct); } while (list_len > 0) { SCT *sct; if (list_len < 2) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID); goto err; } n2s(*pp, sct_len); list_len -= 2; if (sct_len == 0 || sct_len > list_len) { CTerr(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID); goto err; } list_len -= sct_len; if ((sct = o2i_SCT(NULL, pp, sct_len)) == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_SCT_push(sk, sct)) { SCT_free(sct); goto err; } } if (a != NULL && *a == NULL) *a = sk; return sk; err: if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) SCT_LIST_free(sk); return NULL; } int i2o_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp) { int len, sct_len, i, is_pp_new = 0; size_t len2; unsigned char *p = NULL, *p2; if (pp != NULL) { if (*pp == NULL) { if ((len = i2o_SCT_LIST(a, NULL)) == -1) { CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST, CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID); return -1; } if ((*pp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } is_pp_new = 1; } p = *pp + 2; } len2 = 2; for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(a); i++) { if (pp != NULL) { p2 = p; p += 2; if ((sct_len = i2o_SCT(sk_SCT_value(a, i), &p)) == -1) goto err; s2n(sct_len, p2); } else { if ((sct_len = i2o_SCT(sk_SCT_value(a, i), NULL)) == -1) goto err; } len2 += 2 + sct_len; } if (len2 > MAX_SCT_LIST_SIZE) goto err; if (pp != NULL) { p = *pp; s2n(len2 - 2, p); if (!is_pp_new) *pp += len2; } return len2; err: if (is_pp_new) { OPENSSL_free(*pp); *pp = NULL; } return -1; } STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL; STACK_OF(SCT) *sk = NULL; const unsigned char *p; p = *pp; if (d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, &p, len) == NULL) return NULL; p = oct->data; if ((sk = o2i_SCT_LIST(a, &p, oct->length)) != NULL) *pp += len; ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct); return sk; } int i2d_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **out) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING oct; int len; oct.data = NULL; if ((oct.length = i2o_SCT_LIST(a, &oct.data)) == -1) return -1; len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, out); OPENSSL_free(oct.data); return len; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c0000644000000000000000000000463513176625657016152 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT # error "CT is disabled" #endif #include #include #include #include "ct_locl.h" /* * Number of seconds in the future that an SCT timestamp can be, by default, * without being considered invalid. This is added to time() when setting a * default value for CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.epoch_time_in_ms. * It can be overridden by calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(). */ static const time_t SCT_CLOCK_DRIFT_TOLERANCE = 300; CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void) { CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX)); if (ctx == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* time(NULL) shouldn't ever fail, so don't bother checking for -1. */ ctx->epoch_time_in_ms = (uint64_t)(time(NULL) + SCT_CLOCK_DRIFT_TOLERANCE) * 1000; return ctx; } void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; X509_free(ctx->cert); X509_free(ctx->issuer); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { if (!X509_up_ref(cert)) return 0; ctx->cert = cert; return 1; } int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer) { if (!X509_up_ref(issuer)) return 0; ctx->issuer = issuer; return 1; } void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *log_store) { ctx->log_store = log_store; } void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms) { ctx->epoch_time_in_ms = time_in_ms; } X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert; } X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->issuer; } const CTLOG_STORE *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->log_store; } uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->epoch_time_in_ms; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_sct_ctx.c0000644000000000000000000001561613176625657016323 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT # error "CT is disabled" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "ct_locl.h" SCT_CTX *SCT_CTX_new(void) { SCT_CTX *sctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sctx)); if (sctx == NULL) CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return sctx; } void SCT_CTX_free(SCT_CTX *sctx) { if (sctx == NULL) return; EVP_PKEY_free(sctx->pkey); OPENSSL_free(sctx->pkeyhash); OPENSSL_free(sctx->ihash); OPENSSL_free(sctx->certder); OPENSSL_free(sctx->preder); OPENSSL_free(sctx); } /* * Finds the index of the first extension with the given NID in cert. * If there is more than one extension with that NID, *is_duplicated is set to * 1, otherwise 0 (unless it is NULL). */ static int ct_x509_get_ext(X509 *cert, int nid, int *is_duplicated) { int ret = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, nid, -1); if (is_duplicated != NULL) *is_duplicated = ret >= 0 && X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, nid, ret) >= 0; return ret; } /* * Modifies a certificate by deleting extensions and copying the issuer and * AKID from the presigner certificate, if necessary. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur static int ct_x509_cert_fixup(X509 *cert, X509 *presigner) { int preidx, certidx; int pre_akid_ext_is_dup, cert_akid_ext_is_dup; if (presigner == NULL) return 1; preidx = ct_x509_get_ext(presigner, NID_authority_key_identifier, &pre_akid_ext_is_dup); certidx = ct_x509_get_ext(cert, NID_authority_key_identifier, &cert_akid_ext_is_dup); /* An error occurred whilst searching for the extension */ if (preidx < -1 || certidx < -1) return 0; /* Invalid certificate if they contain duplicate extensions */ if (pre_akid_ext_is_dup || cert_akid_ext_is_dup) return 0; /* AKID must be present in both certificate or absent in both */ if (preidx >= 0 && certidx == -1) return 0; if (preidx == -1 && certidx >= 0) return 0; /* Copy issuer name */ if (!X509_set_issuer_name(cert, X509_get_issuer_name(presigner))) return 0; if (preidx != -1) { /* Retrieve and copy AKID encoding */ X509_EXTENSION *preext = X509_get_ext(presigner, preidx); X509_EXTENSION *certext = X509_get_ext(cert, certidx); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *preextdata; /* Should never happen */ if (preext == NULL || certext == NULL) return 0; preextdata = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(preext); if (preextdata == NULL || !X509_EXTENSION_set_data(certext, preextdata)) return 0; } return 1; } int SCT_CTX_set1_cert(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509 *cert, X509 *presigner) { unsigned char *certder = NULL, *preder = NULL; X509 *pretmp = NULL; int certderlen = 0, prederlen = 0; int idx = -1; int poison_ext_is_dup, sct_ext_is_dup; int poison_idx = ct_x509_get_ext(cert, NID_ct_precert_poison, &poison_ext_is_dup); /* Duplicate poison extensions are present - error */ if (poison_ext_is_dup) goto err; /* If *cert doesn't have a poison extension, it isn't a precert */ if (poison_idx == -1) { /* cert isn't a precert, so we shouldn't have a presigner */ if (presigner != NULL) goto err; certderlen = i2d_X509(cert, &certder); if (certderlen < 0) goto err; } /* See if cert has a precert SCTs extension */ idx = ct_x509_get_ext(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, &sct_ext_is_dup); /* Duplicate SCT extensions are present - error */ if (sct_ext_is_dup) goto err; if (idx >= 0 && poison_idx >= 0) { /* * cert can't both contain SCTs (i.e. have an SCT extension) and be a * precert (i.e. have a poison extension). */ goto err; } if (idx == -1) { idx = poison_idx; } /* * If either a poison or SCT extension is present, remove it before encoding * cert. This, along with ct_x509_cert_fixup(), gets a TBSCertificate (see * RFC5280) from cert, which is what the CT log signed when it produced the * SCT. */ if (idx >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *ext; /* Take a copy of certificate so we don't modify passed version */ pretmp = X509_dup(cert); if (pretmp == NULL) goto err; ext = X509_delete_ext(pretmp, idx); X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); if (!ct_x509_cert_fixup(pretmp, presigner)) goto err; prederlen = i2d_re_X509_tbs(pretmp, &preder); if (prederlen <= 0) goto err; } X509_free(pretmp); OPENSSL_free(sctx->certder); sctx->certder = certder; sctx->certderlen = certderlen; OPENSSL_free(sctx->preder); sctx->preder = preder; sctx->prederlen = prederlen; return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(certder); OPENSSL_free(preder); X509_free(pretmp); return 0; } __owur static int ct_public_key_hash(X509_PUBKEY *pkey, unsigned char **hash, size_t *hash_len) { int ret = 0; unsigned char *md = NULL, *der = NULL; int der_len; unsigned int md_len; /* Reuse buffer if possible */ if (*hash != NULL && *hash_len >= SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { md = *hash; } else { md = OPENSSL_malloc(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (md == NULL) goto err; } /* Calculate key hash */ der_len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(pkey, &der); if (der_len <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_Digest(der, der_len, md, &md_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto err; if (md != *hash) { OPENSSL_free(*hash); *hash = md; *hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; } md = NULL; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(md); OPENSSL_free(der); return ret; } int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer(SCT_CTX *sctx, const X509 *issuer) { return SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(issuer)); } int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { return ct_public_key_hash(pubkey, &sctx->ihash, &sctx->ihashlen); } int SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(pubkey); if (pkey == NULL) return 0; if (!ct_public_key_hash(pubkey, &sctx->pkeyhash, &sctx->pkeyhashlen)) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_free(sctx->pkey); sctx->pkey = pkey; return 1; } void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms) { sctx->epoch_time_in_ms = time_in_ms; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_err.c0000644000000000000000000000722613176625657015442 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA CT_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW), "CTLOG_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64), "CTLOG_new_from_base64"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF), "ctlog_new_from_conf"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX_NEW), "ctlog_store_load_ctx_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE), "CTLOG_STORE_load_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_LOG), "ctlog_store_load_log"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_NEW), "CTLOG_STORE_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE), "ct_base64_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_NEW), "CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_CT_V1_LOG_ID_FROM_PKEY), "ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_I2O_SCT), "i2o_SCT"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST), "i2o_SCT_LIST"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE), "i2o_SCT_signature"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT), "o2i_SCT"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST), "o2i_SCT_LIST"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE), "o2i_SCT_signature"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW), "SCT_CTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY), "SCT_CTX_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_NEW), "SCT_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64), "SCT_new_from_base64"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID), "SCT_set0_log_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS), "SCT_set1_extensions"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID), "SCT_set1_log_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE), "SCT_set1_signature"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE), "SCT_set_log_entry_type"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID), "SCT_set_signature_nid"}, {ERR_FUNC(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION), "SCT_set_version"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA CT_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR), "base64 decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH), "invalid log id length"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID), "log conf invalid"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY), "log conf invalid key"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_DESCRIPTION), "log conf missing description"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY), "log conf missing key"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID), "log key invalid"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP), "sct future timestamp"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_INVALID), "sct invalid"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE), "sct invalid signature"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID), "sct list invalid"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_LOG_ID_MISMATCH), "sct log id mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET), "sct not set"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION), "sct unsupported version"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID), "unrecognized signature nid"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE), "unsupported entry type"}, {ERR_REASON(CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION), "unsupported version"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_CT_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(CT_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, CT_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, CT_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_prn.c0000644000000000000000000000754213176625657015452 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT # error "CT is disabled" #endif #include #include #include "ct_locl.h" static void SCT_signature_algorithms_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out) { int nid = SCT_get_signature_nid(sct); if (nid == NID_undef) BIO_printf(out, "%02X%02X", sct->hash_alg, sct->sig_alg); else BIO_printf(out, "%s", OBJ_nid2ln(nid)); } static void timestamp_print(uint64_t timestamp, BIO *out) { ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gen = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new(); char genstr[20]; if (gen == NULL) return; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(gen, (time_t)0, (int)(timestamp / 86400000), (timestamp % 86400000) / 1000); /* * Note GeneralizedTime from ASN1_GENERALIZETIME_adj is always 15 * characters long with a final Z. Update it with fractional seconds. */ BIO_snprintf(genstr, sizeof(genstr), "%.14s.%03dZ", ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gen), (unsigned int)(timestamp % 1000)); if (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(gen, genstr)) ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, gen); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(gen); } const char *SCT_validation_status_string(const SCT *sct) { switch (SCT_get_validation_status(sct)) { case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET: return "not set"; case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION: return "unknown version"; case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG: return "unknown log"; case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED: return "unverified"; case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID: return "invalid"; case SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID: return "valid"; } return "unknown status"; } void SCT_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out, int indent, const CTLOG_STORE *log_store) { const CTLOG *log = NULL; if (log_store != NULL) { log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(log_store, sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len); } BIO_printf(out, "%*sSigned Certificate Timestamp:", indent, ""); BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sVersion : ", indent + 4, ""); if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { BIO_printf(out, "unknown\n%*s", indent + 16, ""); BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->sct, sct->sct_len); return; } BIO_printf(out, "v1 (0x0)"); if (log != NULL) { BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sLog : %s", indent + 4, "", CTLOG_get0_name(log)); } BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sLog ID : ", indent + 4, ""); BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len); BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sTimestamp : ", indent + 4, ""); timestamp_print(sct->timestamp, out); BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sExtensions: ", indent + 4, ""); if (sct->ext_len == 0) BIO_printf(out, "none"); else BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->ext, sct->ext_len); BIO_printf(out, "\n%*sSignature : ", indent + 4, ""); SCT_signature_algorithms_print(sct, out); BIO_printf(out, "\n%*s ", indent + 4, ""); BIO_hex_string(out, indent + 16, 16, sct->sig, sct->sig_len); } void SCT_LIST_print(const STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, BIO *out, int indent, const char *separator, const CTLOG_STORE *log_store) { int sct_count = sk_SCT_num(sct_list); int i; for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(sct_list, i); SCT_print(sct, out, indent, log_store); if (i < sk_SCT_num(sct_list) - 1) BIO_printf(out, "%s", separator); } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_vfy.c0000644000000000000000000000746413176625657015462 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "ct_locl.h" typedef enum sct_signature_type_t { SIGNATURE_TYPE_NOT_SET = -1, SIGNATURE_TYPE_CERT_TIMESTAMP, SIGNATURE_TYPE_TREE_HASH } SCT_SIGNATURE_TYPE; /* * Update encoding for SCT signature verification/generation to supplied * EVP_MD_CTX. */ static int sct_ctx_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const SCT_CTX *sctx, const SCT *sct) { unsigned char tmpbuf[12]; unsigned char *p, *der; size_t derlen; /*+ * digitally-signed struct { * (1 byte) Version sct_version; * (1 byte) SignatureType signature_type = certificate_timestamp; * (8 bytes) uint64 timestamp; * (2 bytes) LogEntryType entry_type; * (? bytes) select(entry_type) { * case x509_entry: ASN.1Cert; * case precert_entry: PreCert; * } signed_entry; * (2 bytes + sct->ext_len) CtExtensions extensions; * } */ if (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET) return 0; if (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT && sctx->ihash == NULL) return 0; p = tmpbuf; *p++ = sct->version; *p++ = SIGNATURE_TYPE_CERT_TIMESTAMP; l2n8(sct->timestamp, p); s2n(sct->entry_type, p); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmpbuf, p - tmpbuf)) return 0; if (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509) { der = sctx->certder; derlen = sctx->certderlen; } else { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sctx->ihash, sctx->ihashlen)) return 0; der = sctx->preder; derlen = sctx->prederlen; } /* If no encoding available, fatal error */ if (der == NULL) return 0; /* Include length first */ p = tmpbuf; l2n3(derlen, p); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmpbuf, 3)) return 0; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, der, derlen)) return 0; /* Add any extensions */ p = tmpbuf; s2n(sct->ext_len, p); if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, tmpbuf, 2)) return 0; if (sct->ext_len && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sct->ext, sct->ext_len)) return 0; return 1; } int SCT_CTX_verify(const SCT_CTX *sctx, const SCT *sct) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; int ret = 0; if (!SCT_is_complete(sct) || sctx->pkey == NULL || sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET || (sct->entry_type == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT && sctx->ihash == NULL)) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET); return 0; } if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); return 0; } if (sct->log_id_len != sctx->pkeyhashlen || memcmp(sct->log_id, sctx->pkeyhash, sctx->pkeyhashlen) != 0) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_LOG_ID_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (sct->timestamp > sctx->epoch_time_in_ms) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP); return 0; } ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto end; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, sctx->pkey)) goto end; if (!sct_ctx_update(ctx, sctx, sct)) goto end; /* Verify signature */ ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sct->sig, sct->sig_len); /* If ret < 0 some other error: fall through without setting error */ if (ret == 0) CTerr(CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY, CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE); end: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c0000644000000000000000000002505113176625657015437 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT # error "CT disabled" #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "ct_locl.h" SCT *SCT_new(void) { SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct)); if (sct == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET; sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET; return sct; } void SCT_free(SCT *sct) { if (sct == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); OPENSSL_free(sct->sct); OPENSSL_free(sct); } void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a) { sk_SCT_pop_free(a, SCT_free); } int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version) { if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); return 0; } sct->version = version; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; return 1; } int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type) { sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; switch (entry_type) { case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509: case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT: sct->entry_type = entry_type; return 1; default: CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE); return 0; } } int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) { if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); sct->log_id = log_id; sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; return 1; } int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) { if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); sct->log_id = NULL; sct->log_id_len = 0; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) { sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len); if (sct->log_id == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; } return 1; } void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp) { sct->timestamp = timestamp; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; } int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256; sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; return 1; case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256: sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256; sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; return 1; default: CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID); return 0; } } void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) { OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); sct->ext = ext; sct->ext_len = ext_len; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; } int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) { OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); sct->ext = NULL; sct->ext_len = 0; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) { sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len); if (sct->ext == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } sct->ext_len = ext_len; } return 1; } void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); sct->sig = sig; sct->sig_len = sig_len; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; } int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); sct->sig = NULL; sct->sig_len = 0; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) { sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len); if (sct->sig == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } sct->sig_len = sig_len; } return 1; } sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct) { return sct->version; } ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct) { return sct->entry_type; } size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id) { *log_id = sct->log_id; return sct->log_id_len; } uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct) { return sct->timestamp; } int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct) { if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) { if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { switch (sct->sig_alg) { case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption; default: return NID_undef; } } } return NID_undef; } size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext) { *ext = sct->ext; return sct->ext_len; } size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig) { *sig = sct->sig; return sct->sig_len; } int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct) { switch (sct->version) { case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET: return 0; case SCT_VERSION_V1: return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct); default: return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */ } } int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct) { return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef && sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0; } sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct) { return sct->source; } int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source) { sct->source = source; sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; switch (source) { case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION: case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE: return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509); case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION: return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT); default: /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */ return 1; } } sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct) { return sct->validation_status; } int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) { int is_sct_valid = -1; SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL; X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL; const CTLOG *log; /* * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means, * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0). */ if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION; return 0; } log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store, sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len); /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */ if (log == NULL) { sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG; return 0; } sctx = SCT_CTX_new(); if (sctx == NULL) goto err; if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1) goto err; if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1) goto err; if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) { EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey; if (ctx->issuer == NULL) { sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; goto end; } issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer); if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1) goto err; if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1) goto err; } SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms); /* * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is * processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx. * * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or * application decide what to do. */ if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1) sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; else sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ? SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID; end: is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID; err: X509_PUBKEY_free(pub); X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey); SCT_CTX_free(sctx); return is_sct_valid; } int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) { int are_scts_valid = 1; int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { int is_sct_valid = -1; SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); if (sct == NULL) continue; is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx); if (is_sct_valid < 0) return is_sct_valid; are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid; } return are_scts_valid; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h0000644000000000000000000001732513176625657015611 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * From RFC6962: opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1>; struct { SerializedSCT * sct_list <1..2^16-1>; } SignedCertificateTimestampList; */ # define MAX_SCT_SIZE 65535 # define MAX_SCT_LIST_SIZE MAX_SCT_SIZE /* * Macros to read and write integers in network-byte order. */ #define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)((c)[0]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned int)((c)[1])) )),c+=2) #define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2) #define l2n3(l,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3) #define n2l8(c,l) (l =((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<56, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<48, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))) #define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) /* Signed Certificate Timestamp */ struct sct_st { sct_version_t version; /* If version is not SCT_VERSION_V1, this contains the encoded SCT */ unsigned char *sct; size_t sct_len; /* If version is SCT_VERSION_V1, fields below contain components of the SCT */ unsigned char *log_id; size_t log_id_len; /* * Note, we cannot distinguish between an unset timestamp, and one * that is set to 0. However since CT didn't exist in 1970, no real * SCT should ever be set as such. */ uint64_t timestamp; unsigned char *ext; size_t ext_len; unsigned char hash_alg; unsigned char sig_alg; unsigned char *sig; size_t sig_len; /* Log entry type */ ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type; /* Where this SCT was found, e.g. certificate, OCSP response, etc. */ sct_source_t source; /* The result of the last attempt to validate this SCT. */ sct_validation_status_t validation_status; }; /* Miscellaneous data that is useful when verifying an SCT */ struct sct_ctx_st { /* Public key */ EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* Hash of public key */ unsigned char *pkeyhash; size_t pkeyhashlen; /* For pre-certificate: issuer public key hash */ unsigned char *ihash; size_t ihashlen; /* certificate encoding */ unsigned char *certder; size_t certderlen; /* pre-certificate encoding */ unsigned char *preder; size_t prederlen; /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that the SCT isn't from the future) */ uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms; }; /* Context when evaluating whether a Certificate Transparency policy is met */ struct ct_policy_eval_ctx_st { X509 *cert; X509 *issuer; CTLOG_STORE *log_store; /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that SCTs aren't from the future) */ uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms; }; /* * Creates a new context for verifying an SCT. */ SCT_CTX *SCT_CTX_new(void); /* * Deletes an SCT verification context. */ void SCT_CTX_free(SCT_CTX *sctx); /* * Sets the certificate that the SCT was created for. * If *cert does not have a poison extension, presigner must be NULL. * If *cert does not have a poison extension, it may have a single SCT * (NID_ct_precert_scts) extension. * If either *cert or *presigner have an AKID (NID_authority_key_identifier) * extension, both must have one. * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_cert(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509 *cert, X509 *presigner); /* * Sets the issuer of the certificate that the SCT was created for. * This is just a convenience method to save extracting the public key and * calling SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(). * Issuer must not be NULL. * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer(SCT_CTX *sctx, const X509 *issuer); /* * Sets the public key of the issuer of the certificate that the SCT was created * for. * The public key must not be NULL. * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey); /* * Sets the public key of the CT log that the SCT is from. * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey); /* * Sets the time to evaluate the SCT against, in milliseconds since the Unix * epoch. If the SCT's timestamp is after this time, it will be interpreted as * having been issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST * reject SCTs whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate * in this case. */ void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms); /* * Verifies an SCT with the given context. * Returns 1 if the SCT verifies successfully; any other value indicates * failure. See EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() for the meaning of those values. */ __owur int SCT_CTX_verify(const SCT_CTX *sctx, const SCT *sct); /* * Does this SCT have the minimum fields populated to be usable? * Returns 1 if so, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct); /* * Does this SCT have the signature-related fields populated? * Returns 1 if so, 0 otherwise. * This checks that the signature and hash algorithms are set to supported * values and that the signature field is set. */ __owur int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct); /* * TODO(RJPercival): Create an SCT_signature struct and make i2o_SCT_signature * and o2i_SCT_signature conform to the i2d/d2i conventions. */ /* * Serialize (to TLS format) an |sct| signature and write it to |out|. * If |out| is null, no signature will be output but the length will be returned. * If |out| points to a null pointer, a string will be allocated to hold the * TLS-format signature. It is the responsibility of the caller to free it. * If |out| points to an allocated string, the signature will be written to it. * The length of the signature in TLS format will be returned. */ __owur int i2o_SCT_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out); /* * Parses an SCT signature in TLS format and populates the |sct| with it. * |in| should be a pointer to a string containing the TLS-format signature. * |in| will be advanced to the end of the signature if parsing succeeds. * |len| should be the length of the signature in |in|. * Returns the number of bytes parsed, or a negative integer if an error occurs. * If an error occurs, the SCT's signature NID may be updated whilst the * signature field itself remains unset. */ __owur int o2i_SCT_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len); /* * Handlers for Certificate Transparency X509v3/OCSP extensions */ extern const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ct_scts[3]; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_b64.c0000644000000000000000000001014513176625657015237 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "ct_locl.h" /* * Decodes the base64 string |in| into |out|. * A new string will be malloc'd and assigned to |out|. This will be owned by * the caller. Do not provide a pre-allocated string in |out|. */ static int ct_base64_decode(const char *in, unsigned char **out) { size_t inlen = strlen(in); int outlen; unsigned char *outbuf = NULL; if (inlen == 0) { *out = NULL; return 0; } outlen = (inlen / 4) * 3; outbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (outbuf == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } outlen = EVP_DecodeBlock(outbuf, (unsigned char *)in, inlen); if (outlen < 0) { CTerr(CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE, CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } /* Subtract padding bytes from |outlen| */ while (in[--inlen] == '=') { --outlen; } *out = outbuf; return outlen; err: OPENSSL_free(outbuf); return -1; } SCT *SCT_new_from_base64(unsigned char version, const char *logid_base64, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type, uint64_t timestamp, const char *extensions_base64, const char *signature_base64) { SCT *sct = SCT_new(); unsigned char *dec = NULL; const unsigned char* p = NULL; int declen; if (sct == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* * RFC6962 section 4.1 says we "MUST NOT expect this to be 0", but we * can only construct SCT versions that have been defined. */ if (!SCT_set_version(sct, version)) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); goto err; } declen = ct_base64_decode(logid_base64, &dec); if (declen < 0) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if (!SCT_set0_log_id(sct, dec, declen)) goto err; dec = NULL; declen = ct_base64_decode(extensions_base64, &dec); if (declen < 0) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } SCT_set0_extensions(sct, dec, declen); dec = NULL; declen = ct_base64_decode(signature_base64, &dec); if (declen < 0) { CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64, X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } p = dec; if (o2i_SCT_signature(sct, &p, declen) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_free(dec); dec = NULL; SCT_set_timestamp(sct, timestamp); if (!SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, entry_type)) goto err; return sct; err: OPENSSL_free(dec); SCT_free(sct); return NULL; } /* * Allocate, build and returns a new |ct_log| from input |pkey_base64| * It returns 1 on success, * 0 on decoding failure, or invalid parameter if any * -1 on internal (malloc) failure */ int CTLOG_new_from_base64(CTLOG **ct_log, const char *pkey_base64, const char *name) { unsigned char *pkey_der = NULL; int pkey_der_len = ct_base64_decode(pkey_base64, &pkey_der); const unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if (ct_log == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } if (pkey_der_len <= 0) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY); return 0; } p = pkey_der; pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &p, pkey_der_len); OPENSSL_free(pkey_der); if (pkey == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY); return 0; } *ct_log = CTLOG_new(pkey, name); if (*ct_log == NULL) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_x509v3.c0000644000000000000000000000546013176625657015626 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT # error "CT is disabled" #endif #include "ct_locl.h" static char *i2s_poison(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *val) { return OPENSSL_strdup("NULL"); } static void *s2i_poison(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { return ASN1_NULL_new(); } static int i2r_SCT_LIST(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, BIO *out, int indent) { SCT_LIST_print(sct_list, out, indent, "\n", NULL); return 1; } static int set_sct_list_source(STACK_OF(SCT) *s, sct_source_t source) { if (s != NULL) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(s); i++) { int res = SCT_set_source(sk_SCT_value(s, i), source); if (res != 1) { return 0; } } } return 1; } static STACK_OF(SCT) *x509_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { STACK_OF(SCT) *s = d2i_SCT_LIST(a, pp, len); if (set_sct_list_source(s, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION) != 1) { SCT_LIST_free(s); *a = NULL; return NULL; } return s; } static STACK_OF(SCT) *ocsp_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { STACK_OF(SCT) *s = d2i_SCT_LIST(a, pp, len); if (set_sct_list_source(s, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE) != 1) { SCT_LIST_free(s); *a = NULL; return NULL; } return s; } /* Handlers for X509v3/OCSP Certificate Transparency extensions */ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_ct_scts[3] = { /* X509v3 extension in certificates that contains SCTs */ { NID_ct_precert_scts, 0, NULL, NULL, (X509V3_EXT_FREE)SCT_LIST_free, (X509V3_EXT_D2I)x509_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST, (X509V3_EXT_I2D)i2d_SCT_LIST, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_SCT_LIST, NULL, NULL }, /* X509v3 extension to mark a certificate as a pre-certificate */ { NID_ct_precert_poison, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_NULL), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, i2s_poison, s2i_poison, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, /* OCSP extension that contains SCTs */ { NID_ct_cert_scts, 0, NULL, 0, (X509V3_EXT_FREE)SCT_LIST_free, (X509V3_EXT_D2I)ocsp_ext_d2i_SCT_LIST, (X509V3_EXT_I2D)i2d_SCT_LIST, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_SCT_LIST, NULL, NULL }, }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ct/ct_log.c0000644000000000000000000001640613176625657015433 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" /* * Information about a CT log server. */ struct ctlog_st { char *name; uint8_t log_id[CT_V1_HASHLEN]; EVP_PKEY *public_key; }; /* * A store for multiple CTLOG instances. * It takes ownership of any CTLOG instances added to it. */ struct ctlog_store_st { STACK_OF(CTLOG) *logs; }; /* The context when loading a CT log list from a CONF file. */ typedef struct ctlog_store_load_ctx_st { CTLOG_STORE *log_store; CONF *conf; size_t invalid_log_entries; } CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX; /* * Creates an empty context for loading a CT log store. * It should be populated before use. */ static CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *ctlog_store_load_ctx_new(); /* * Deletes a CT log store load context. * Does not delete any of the fields. */ static void ctlog_store_load_ctx_free(CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX* ctx); static CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *ctlog_store_load_ctx_new() { CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ctx; } static void ctlog_store_load_ctx_free(CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX* ctx) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); } /* Converts a log's public key into a SHA256 log ID */ static int ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char log_id[CT_V1_HASHLEN]) { int ret = 0; unsigned char *pkey_der = NULL; int pkey_der_len = i2d_PUBKEY(pkey, &pkey_der); if (pkey_der_len <= 0) { CTerr(CT_F_CT_V1_LOG_ID_FROM_PKEY, CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID); goto err; } SHA256(pkey_der, pkey_der_len, log_id); ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(pkey_der); return ret; } CTLOG_STORE *CTLOG_STORE_new(void) { CTLOG_STORE *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->logs = sk_CTLOG_new_null(); if (ret->logs == NULL) goto err; return ret; err: OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } void CTLOG_STORE_free(CTLOG_STORE *store) { if (store != NULL) { sk_CTLOG_pop_free(store->logs, CTLOG_free); OPENSSL_free(store); } } static int ctlog_new_from_conf(CTLOG **ct_log, const CONF *conf, const char *section) { const char *description = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, "description"); char *pkey_base64; if (description == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF, CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_DESCRIPTION); return 0; } pkey_base64 = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, "key"); if (pkey_base64 == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF, CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY); return 0; } return CTLOG_new_from_base64(ct_log, pkey_base64, description); } int CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(CTLOG_STORE *store) { const char *fpath = getenv(CTLOG_FILE_EVP); if (fpath == NULL) fpath = CTLOG_FILE; return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(store, fpath); } /* * Called by CONF_parse_list, which stops if this returns <= 0, * Otherwise, one bad log entry would stop loading of any of * the following log entries. * It may stop parsing and returns -1 on any internal (malloc) error. */ static int ctlog_store_load_log(const char *log_name, int log_name_len, void *arg) { CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX *load_ctx = arg; CTLOG *ct_log = NULL; /* log_name may not be null-terminated, so fix that before using it */ char *tmp; int ret = 0; /* log_name will be NULL for empty list entries */ if (log_name == NULL) return 1; tmp = OPENSSL_strndup(log_name, log_name_len); if (tmp == NULL) goto mem_err; ret = ctlog_new_from_conf(&ct_log, load_ctx->conf, tmp); OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (ret < 0) { /* Propagate any internal error */ return ret; } if (ret == 0) { /* If we can't load this log, record that fact and skip it */ ++load_ctx->invalid_log_entries; return 1; } if (!sk_CTLOG_push(load_ctx->log_store->logs, ct_log)) { goto mem_err; } return 1; mem_err: CTLOG_free(ct_log); CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_LOG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } int CTLOG_STORE_load_file(CTLOG_STORE *store, const char *file) { int ret = 0; char *enabled_logs; CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX* load_ctx = ctlog_store_load_ctx_new(); if (load_ctx == NULL) return 0; load_ctx->log_store = store; load_ctx->conf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (load_ctx->conf == NULL) goto end; if (NCONF_load(load_ctx->conf, file, NULL) <= 0) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID); goto end; } enabled_logs = NCONF_get_string(load_ctx->conf, NULL, "enabled_logs"); if (enabled_logs == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID); goto end; } if (!CONF_parse_list(enabled_logs, ',', 1, ctlog_store_load_log, load_ctx) || load_ctx->invalid_log_entries > 0) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE, CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID); goto end; } ret = 1; end: NCONF_free(load_ctx->conf); ctlog_store_load_ctx_free(load_ctx); return ret; } /* * Initialize a new CTLOG object. * Takes ownership of the public key. * Copies the name. */ CTLOG *CTLOG_new(EVP_PKEY *public_key, const char *name) { CTLOG *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (ret->name == NULL) { CTerr(CT_F_CTLOG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey(public_key, ret->log_id) != 1) goto err; ret->public_key = public_key; return ret; err: CTLOG_free(ret); return NULL; } /* Frees CT log and associated structures */ void CTLOG_free(CTLOG *log) { if (log != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(log->name); EVP_PKEY_free(log->public_key); OPENSSL_free(log); } } const char *CTLOG_get0_name(const CTLOG *log) { return log->name; } void CTLOG_get0_log_id(const CTLOG *log, const uint8_t **log_id, size_t *log_id_len) { *log_id = log->log_id; *log_id_len = CT_V1_HASHLEN; } EVP_PKEY *CTLOG_get0_public_key(const CTLOG *log) { return log->public_key; } /* * Given a log ID, finds the matching log. * Returns NULL if no match found. */ const CTLOG *CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(const CTLOG_STORE *store, const uint8_t *log_id, size_t log_id_len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_CTLOG_num(store->logs); ++i) { const CTLOG *log = sk_CTLOG_value(store->logs, i); if (memcmp(log->log_id, log_id, log_id_len) == 0) return log; } return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657013776 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh2048.pem0000644000000000000000000000152013176625657015410 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBCAKCAQEA7ZKJNYJFVcs7+6J2WmkEYb8h86tT0s0h2v94GRFS8Q7B4lW9aG9o AFO5Imov5Jo0H2XMWTKKvbHbSe3fpxJmw/0hBHAY8H/W91hRGXKCeyKpNBgdL8sh z22SrkO2qCnHJ6PLAMXy5fsKpFmFor2tRfCzrfnggTXu2YOzzK7q62bmqVdmufEo pT8igNcLpvZxk5uBDvhakObMym9mX3rAEBoe8PwttggMYiiw7NuJKO4MqD1llGkW aVM8U2ATsCun1IKHrRxynkE1/MJ86VHeYYX8GZt2YA8z+GuzylIOKcMH6JAWzMwA Gbatw6QwizOhr9iMjZ0B26TE3X8LvW84wwIBAg== -----END DH PARAMETERS----- -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBCAKCAQEArtA3w73zP6Lu3EOQtwogiXt3AXXpuS6yD4BhzNS1pZFyPHk0/an5 8ydEkPhQZHKDW+BZJxxPLANaTudWo2YT8TgtvUdN6KSgMiEi6McwqDw+SADuvW+F SKUYFxG6VFIxyEP6xBdf+vhJxEDbRG2EYsHDRRtJ76gp9cSKTHusf2R+4AAVGqnt gRAbNqtcOar/7FSj+Pl8G3v0Bty0LcCSpbqgYlnv6z+rErQmmC6PPvSz97TDMCok yKpCE9hFA1zkqK3TH4FmFvGeIaXJUIBZf4mArWuBTjWFW3nmhESRUn1VK3K3x42N a5k6c2+EhrMFiLjxuH6JZoqL0/E93FF9SwIBAg== -----END DH PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_depr.c0000644000000000000000000000223213176625657015546 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* This file contains deprecated functions as wrappers to the new ones */ #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg) { BN_GENCB *cb; DH *ret = NULL; if ((ret = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; cb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (cb == NULL) { DH_free(ret); return NULL; } BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg); if (DH_generate_parameters_ex(ret, prime_len, generator, cb)) { BN_GENCB_free(cb); return ret; } BN_GENCB_free(cb); DH_free(ret); return NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_key.c0000644000000000000000000001254513176625657015414 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "dh_locl.h" #include "internal/bn_int.h" static int generate_key(DH *dh); static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); static int dh_init(DH *dh); static int dh_finish(DH *dh); int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) { return dh->meth->generate_key(dh); } int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { return dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh); } int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { int rv, pad; rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh); if (rv <= 0) return rv; pad = BN_num_bytes(dh->p) - rv; if (pad > 0) { memmove(key + pad, key, rv); memset(key, 0, pad); } return rv + pad; } static DH_METHOD dh_ossl = { "OpenSSL DH Method", generate_key, compute_key, dh_bn_mod_exp, dh_init, dh_finish, DH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, NULL, NULL }; static const DH_METHOD *default_DH_method = &dh_ossl; const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void) { return &dh_ossl; } void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth) { default_DH_method = meth; } const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void) { return default_DH_method; } static int generate_key(DH *dh) { int ok = 0; int generate_new_key = 0; unsigned l; BN_CTX *ctx; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { priv_key = BN_secure_new(); if (priv_key == NULL) goto err; generate_new_key = 1; } else priv_key = dh->priv_key; if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { pub_key = BN_new(); if (pub_key == NULL) goto err; } else pub_key = dh->pub_key; if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, dh->lock, dh->p, ctx); if (!mont) goto err; } if (generate_new_key) { if (dh->q) { do { if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q)) goto err; } while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key)); } else { /* secret exponent length */ l = dh->length ? dh->length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1; if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto err; } } { BIGNUM *prk = BN_new(); if (prk == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, pub_key, dh->g, prk, dh->p, ctx, mont)) { BN_free(prk); goto err; } /* We MUST free prk before any further use of priv_key */ BN_free(prk); } dh->pub_key = pub_key; dh->priv_key = priv_key; ok = 1; err: if (ok != 1) DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (pub_key != dh->pub_key) BN_free(pub_key); if (priv_key != dh->priv_key) BN_free(priv_key); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return (ok); } static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp; int ret = -1; int check_result; if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; if (dh->priv_key == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE); goto err; } if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, dh->lock, dh->p, ctx); BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!mont) goto err; } if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY); goto err; } if (!dh-> meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, tmp, pub_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p, ctx, mont)) { DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, key); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return (ret); } static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx); } static int dh_init(DH *dh) { dh->flags |= DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; return (1); } static int dh_finish(DH *dh) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/build.info0000644000000000000000000000030313176625657015746 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ dh_asn1.c dh_gen.c dh_key.c dh_lib.c dh_check.c dh_err.c dh_depr.c \ dh_ameth.c dh_pmeth.c dh_prn.c dh_rfc5114.c dh_kdf.c dh_meth.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c0000644000000000000000000001035313176625657015363 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS #include #include #include #include #include /* Key derivation from X9.42/RFC2631 */ /* Uses CMS functions, hence the #ifdef wrapper. */ #define DH_KDF_MAX (1L << 30) /* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */ static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag) { const unsigned char *q = *pp; int i, tag, xclass; long tmplen; i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen); if (i & 0x80) return 0; if (tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) return 0; if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT) q += tmplen; *plen -= q - *pp; *pp = (unsigned char *)q; return 1; } /* * Encode the DH shared info structure, return an offset to the counter value * so we can update the structure without reencoding it. */ static int dh_sharedinfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, unsigned char **pctr, ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen) { unsigned char *p; int derlen; long tlen; /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */ static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0xF3, 0x17, 0x22, 0x53 }; X509_ALGOR atmp; ASN1_OCTET_STRING ctr_oct, ukm_oct, *pukm_oct; ASN1_TYPE ctr_atype; if (ukmlen > DH_KDF_MAX || outlen > DH_KDF_MAX) return 0; ctr_oct.data = ctr; ctr_oct.length = 4; ctr_oct.flags = 0; ctr_oct.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; ctr_atype.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; ctr_atype.value.octet_string = &ctr_oct; atmp.algorithm = key_oid; atmp.parameter = &ctr_atype; if (ukm) { ukm_oct.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; ukm_oct.flags = 0; ukm_oct.data = (unsigned char *)ukm; ukm_oct.length = ukmlen; pukm_oct = &ukm_oct; } else pukm_oct = NULL; derlen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(pder, &atmp, pukm_oct, outlen); if (derlen <= 0) return 0; p = *pder; tlen = derlen; if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) return 0; if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) return 0; if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)) return 0; if (!skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) return 0; if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4)) return 0; *pctr = p; return derlen; } int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid, const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen, const EVP_MD *md) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; int rv = 0; unsigned int i; size_t mdlen; unsigned char *der = NULL, *ctr; int derlen; if (Zlen > DH_KDF_MAX) return 0; mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) return 0; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); derlen = dh_sharedinfo_encode(&der, &ctr, key_oid, outlen, ukm, ukmlen); if (derlen == 0) goto err; for (i = 1;; i++) { unsigned char mtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, Z, Zlen)) goto err; ctr[3] = i & 0xFF; ctr[2] = (i >> 8) & 0xFF; ctr[1] = (i >> 16) & 0xFF; ctr[0] = (i >> 24) & 0xFF; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, der, derlen)) goto err; if (outlen >= mdlen) { if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, out, NULL)) goto err; outlen -= mdlen; if (outlen == 0) break; out += mdlen; } else { if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, mtmp, NULL)) goto err; memcpy(out, mtmp, outlen); OPENSSL_cleanse(mtmp, mdlen); break; } } rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(der); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return rv; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c0000644000000000000000000002736413176625657015746 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "dh_locl.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" /* DH pkey context structure */ typedef struct { /* Parameter gen parameters */ int prime_len; int generator; int use_dsa; int subprime_len; /* message digest used for parameter generation */ const EVP_MD *md; int rfc5114_param; /* Keygen callback info */ int gentmp[2]; /* KDF (if any) to use for DH */ char kdf_type; /* OID to use for KDF */ ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_oid; /* Message digest to use for key derivation */ const EVP_MD *kdf_md; /* User key material */ unsigned char *kdf_ukm; size_t kdf_ukmlen; /* KDF output length */ size_t kdf_outlen; } DH_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_dh_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx; dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx)); if (dctx == NULL) return 0; dctx->prime_len = 1024; dctx->subprime_len = -1; dctx->generator = 2; dctx->kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE; ctx->data = dctx; ctx->keygen_info = dctx->gentmp; ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; return 1; } static void pkey_dh_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; if (dctx != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm); ASN1_OBJECT_free(dctx->kdf_oid); OPENSSL_free(dctx); } } static int pkey_dh_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; if (!pkey_dh_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = src->data; dctx = dst->data; dctx->prime_len = sctx->prime_len; dctx->subprime_len = sctx->subprime_len; dctx->generator = sctx->generator; dctx->use_dsa = sctx->use_dsa; dctx->md = sctx->md; dctx->rfc5114_param = sctx->rfc5114_param; dctx->kdf_type = sctx->kdf_type; dctx->kdf_oid = OBJ_dup(sctx->kdf_oid); if (dctx->kdf_oid == NULL) return 0; dctx->kdf_md = sctx->kdf_md; if (sctx->kdf_ukm != NULL) { dctx->kdf_ukm = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->kdf_ukm, sctx->kdf_ukmlen); if (dctx->kdf_ukm == NULL) return 0; dctx->kdf_ukmlen = sctx->kdf_ukmlen; } dctx->kdf_outlen = sctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; } static int pkey_dh_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_PRIME_LEN: if (p1 < 256) return -2; dctx->prime_len = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_SUBPRIME_LEN: if (dctx->use_dsa == 0) return -2; dctx->subprime_len = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_GENERATOR: if (dctx->use_dsa) return -2; dctx->generator = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE: #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (p1 != 0) return -2; #else if (p1 < 0 || p1 > 2) return -2; #endif dctx->use_dsa = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114: if (p1 < 1 || p1 > 3) return -2; dctx->rfc5114_param = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: /* Default behaviour is OK */ return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE: if (p1 == -2) return dctx->kdf_type; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) #else if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) #endif return -2; dctx->kdf_type = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_MD: dctx->kdf_md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_MD: *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->kdf_md; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OUTLEN: if (p1 <= 0) return -2; dctx->kdf_outlen = (size_t)p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OUTLEN: *(int *)p2 = dctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_UKM: OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm); dctx->kdf_ukm = p2; if (p2) dctx->kdf_ukmlen = p1; else dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_UKM: *(unsigned char **)p2 = dctx->kdf_ukm; return dctx->kdf_ukmlen; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OID: ASN1_OBJECT_free(dctx->kdf_oid); dctx->kdf_oid = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OID: *(ASN1_OBJECT **)p2 = dctx->kdf_oid; return 1; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_dh_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_prime_len") == 0) { int len; len = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len); } if (strcmp(type, "dh_rfc5114") == 0) { DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; int len; len = atoi(value); if (len < 0 || len > 3) return -2; dctx->rfc5114_param = len; return 1; } if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_generator") == 0) { int len; len = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(ctx, len); } if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_subprime_len") == 0) { int len; len = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_subprime_len(ctx, len); } if (strcmp(type, "dh_paramgen_type") == 0) { int typ; typ = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_type(ctx, typ); } return -2; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA extern int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); extern int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in, size_t seed_len, int idx, unsigned char *seed_out, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); static DSA *dsa_dh_generate(DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx, BN_GENCB *pcb) { DSA *ret; int rv = 0; int prime_len = dctx->prime_len; int subprime_len = dctx->subprime_len; const EVP_MD *md = dctx->md; if (dctx->use_dsa > 2) return NULL; ret = DSA_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (subprime_len == -1) { if (prime_len >= 2048) subprime_len = 256; else subprime_len = 160; } if (md == NULL) { if (prime_len >= 2048) md = EVP_sha256(); else md = EVP_sha1(); } if (dctx->use_dsa == 1) rv = dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, prime_len, subprime_len, md, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb); else if (dctx->use_dsa == 2) rv = dsa_builtin_paramgen2(ret, prime_len, subprime_len, md, NULL, 0, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, pcb); if (rv <= 0) { DSA_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } #endif static int pkey_dh_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh = NULL; DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; BN_GENCB *pcb; int ret; if (dctx->rfc5114_param) { switch (dctx->rfc5114_param) { case 1: dh = DH_get_1024_160(); break; case 2: dh = DH_get_2048_224(); break; case 3: dh = DH_get_2048_256(); break; default: return -2; } EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_DHX, dh); return 1; } if (ctx->pkey_gencb) { pcb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (pcb == NULL) return 0; evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); } else pcb = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dctx->use_dsa) { DSA *dsa_dh; dsa_dh = dsa_dh_generate(dctx, pcb); BN_GENCB_free(pcb); if (dsa_dh == NULL) return 0; dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa_dh); DSA_free(dsa_dh); if (!dh) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_DHX, dh); return 1; } #endif dh = DH_new(); if (dh == NULL) { BN_GENCB_free(pcb); return 0; } ret = DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, dctx->prime_len, dctx->generator, pcb); BN_GENCB_free(pcb); if (ret) EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, dh); else DH_free(dh); return ret; } static int pkey_dh_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh = NULL; if (ctx->pkey == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_PKEY_DH_KEYGEN, DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET); return 0; } dh = DH_new(); if (dh == NULL) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, dh); /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */ if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) return 0; return DH_generate_key(pkey->pkey.dh); } static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { int ret; DH *dh; DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; BIGNUM *dhpub; if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey) { DHerr(DH_F_PKEY_DH_DERIVE, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET); return 0; } dh = ctx->pkey->pkey.dh; dhpub = ctx->peerkey->pkey.dh->pub_key; if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) { if (key == NULL) { *keylen = DH_size(dh); return 1; } ret = DH_compute_key(key, dhpub, dh); if (ret < 0) return ret; *keylen = ret; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) { unsigned char *Z = NULL; size_t Zlen = 0; if (!dctx->kdf_outlen || !dctx->kdf_oid) return 0; if (key == NULL) { *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; } if (*keylen != dctx->kdf_outlen) return 0; ret = 0; Zlen = DH_size(dh); Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen); if (Z == NULL) { goto err; } if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0) goto err; if (!DH_KDF_X9_42(key, *keylen, Z, Zlen, dctx->kdf_oid, dctx->kdf_ukm, dctx->kdf_ukmlen, dctx->kdf_md)) goto err; *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(Z, Zlen); return ret; } #endif return 0; } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dh_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DH, 0, pkey_dh_init, pkey_dh_copy, pkey_dh_cleanup, 0, pkey_dh_paramgen, 0, pkey_dh_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_dh_derive, pkey_dh_ctrl, pkey_dh_ctrl_str }; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD dhx_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DHX, 0, pkey_dh_init, pkey_dh_copy, pkey_dh_cleanup, 0, pkey_dh_paramgen, 0, pkey_dh_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_dh_derive, pkey_dh_ctrl, pkey_dh_ctrl_str }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000000715613176625657015470 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "dh_locl.h" #include #include /* Override the default free and new methods */ static int dh_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)DH_new(); if (*pval != NULL) return 2; return 0; } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) { DH_free((DH *)*pval); *pval = NULL; return 2; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DHparams, dh_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DH, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DH, g, BIGNUM), ASN1_OPT(DH, length, ZLONG), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DH, DHparams) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DH, DHparams, DHparams) /* * Internal only structures for handling X9.42 DH: this gets translated to or * from a DH structure straight away. */ typedef struct { ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed; BIGNUM *counter; } int_dhvparams; typedef struct { BIGNUM *p; BIGNUM *q; BIGNUM *g; BIGNUM *j; int_dhvparams *vparams; } int_dhx942_dh; ASN1_SEQUENCE(DHvparams) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhvparams, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhvparams, counter, BIGNUM) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(int_dhvparams, DHvparams) ASN1_SEQUENCE(DHxparams) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, g, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, q, BIGNUM), ASN1_OPT(int_dhx942_dh, j, BIGNUM), ASN1_OPT(int_dhx942_dh, vparams, DHvparams), } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(int_dhx942_dh, DHxparams) int_dhx942_dh *d2i_int_dhx(int_dhx942_dh **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_int_dhx(const int_dhx942_dh *a, unsigned char **pp); IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(int_dhx942_dh, DHxparams, int_dhx) /* Application public function: read in X9.42 DH parameters into DH structure */ DH *d2i_DHxparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { int_dhx942_dh *dhx = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; dh = DH_new(); if (dh == NULL) return NULL; dhx = d2i_int_dhx(NULL, pp, length); if (dhx == NULL) { DH_free(dh); return NULL; } if (a) { DH_free(*a); *a = dh; } dh->p = dhx->p; dh->q = dhx->q; dh->g = dhx->g; dh->j = dhx->j; if (dhx->vparams) { dh->seed = dhx->vparams->seed->data; dh->seedlen = dhx->vparams->seed->length; dh->counter = dhx->vparams->counter; dhx->vparams->seed->data = NULL; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(dhx->vparams->seed); OPENSSL_free(dhx->vparams); dhx->vparams = NULL; } OPENSSL_free(dhx); return dh; } int i2d_DHxparams(const DH *dh, unsigned char **pp) { int_dhx942_dh dhx; int_dhvparams dhv; ASN1_BIT_STRING bs; dhx.p = dh->p; dhx.g = dh->g; dhx.q = dh->q; dhx.j = dh->j; if (dh->counter && dh->seed && dh->seedlen > 0) { bs.flags = ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; bs.data = dh->seed; bs.length = dh->seedlen; dhv.seed = &bs; dhv.counter = dh->counter; dhx.vparams = &dhv; } else dhx.vparams = NULL; return i2d_int_dhx(&dhx, pp); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_meth.c0000644000000000000000000000704113176625657015554 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "dh_locl.h" #include #include DH_METHOD *DH_meth_new(const char *name, int flags) { DH_METHOD *dhm = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dhm)); if (dhm != NULL) { dhm->flags = flags; dhm->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (dhm->name != NULL) return dhm; OPENSSL_free(dhm); } DHerr(DH_F_DH_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } void DH_meth_free(DH_METHOD *dhm) { if (dhm != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(dhm->name); OPENSSL_free(dhm); } } DH_METHOD *DH_meth_dup(const DH_METHOD *dhm) { DH_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret != NULL) { memcpy(ret, dhm, sizeof(*dhm)); ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(dhm->name); if (ret->name != NULL) return ret; OPENSSL_free(ret); } DHerr(DH_F_DH_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } const char *DH_meth_get0_name(const DH_METHOD *dhm) { return dhm->name; } int DH_meth_set1_name(DH_METHOD *dhm, const char *name) { char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (tmpname == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(dhm->name); dhm->name = tmpname; return 1; } int DH_meth_get_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm) { return dhm->flags; } int DH_meth_set_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm, int flags) { dhm->flags = flags; return 1; } void *DH_meth_get0_app_data(const DH_METHOD *dhm) { return dhm->app_data; } int DH_meth_set0_app_data(DH_METHOD *dhm, void *app_data) { dhm->app_data = app_data; return 1; } int (*DH_meth_get_generate_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *) { return dhm->generate_key; } int DH_meth_set_generate_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_key) (DH *)) { dhm->generate_key = generate_key; return 1; } int (*DH_meth_get_compute_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { return dhm->compute_key; } int DH_meth_set_compute_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)) { dhm->compute_key = compute_key; return 1; } int (*DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *) { return dhm->bn_mod_exp; } int DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)) { dhm->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp; return 1; } int (*DH_meth_get_init(const DH_METHOD *dhm))(DH *) { return dhm->init; } int DH_meth_set_init(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*init)(DH *)) { dhm->init = init; return 1; } int (*DH_meth_get_finish(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *) { return dhm->finish; } int DH_meth_set_finish(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*finish) (DH *)) { dhm->finish = finish; return 1; } int (*DH_meth_get_generate_params(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *) { return dhm->generate_params; } int DH_meth_set_generate_params(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_params) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *)) { dhm->generate_params = generate_params; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c0000644000000000000000000005317413176625657015725 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "dh_locl.h" #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include /* * i2d/d2i like DH parameter functions which use the appropriate routine for * PKCS#3 DH or X9.42 DH. */ static DH *d2i_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth) return d2i_DHxparams(NULL, pp, length); return d2i_DHparams(NULL, pp, length); } static int i2d_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const DH *a, unsigned char **pp) { if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth) return i2d_DHxparams(a, pp); return i2d_DHparams(a, pp); } static void int_dh_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH_free(pkey->pkey.dh); } static int dh_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p, *pm; int pklen, pmlen; int ptype; const void *pval; const ASN1_STRING *pstr; X509_ALGOR *palg; ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR); goto err; } pstr = pval; pm = pstr->data; pmlen = pstr->length; if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ if ((dh->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh); return 1; err: ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); DH_free(dh); return 0; } static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; ASN1_STRING *str; ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL; dh = pkey->pkey.dh; str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (str == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } str->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, dh, &str->data); if (str->length <= 0) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh->pub_key, NULL); if (!pub_key) goto err; penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &penc); ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); if (penclen <= 0) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), ptype, str, penc, penclen)) return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(penc); ASN1_STRING_free(str); return 0; } /* * PKCS#8 DH is defined in PKCS#11 of all places. It is similar to DH in that * the AlgorithmIdentifier contains the parameters, the private key is * explicitly included and the pubkey must be recalculated. */ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p, *pm; int pklen, pmlen; int ptype; const void *pval; const ASN1_STRING *pstr; const X509_ALGOR *palg; ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) goto decerr; if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) goto decerr; pstr = pval; pm = pstr->data; pmlen = pstr->length; if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) goto decerr; /* We have parameters now set private key */ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dh->priv_key)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR); goto dherr; } /* Calculate public key */ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) goto dherr; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return 1; decerr: DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); dherr: DH_free(dh); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return 0; } static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { ASN1_STRING *params = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL; unsigned char *dp = NULL; int dplen; params = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (params == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } params->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, ¶ms->data); if (params->length <= 0) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; /* Get private key into integer */ prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->priv_key, NULL); if (!prkey) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR); goto err; } dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); prkey = NULL; if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen)) goto err; return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(dp); ASN1_STRING_free(params); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); return 0; } static int dh_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { DH *dh; if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh); return 1; } static int dh_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, pder); } static int do_dh_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x, int indent, int ptype) { int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB; const char *ktype = NULL; BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key; if (ptype == 2) priv_key = x->priv_key; else priv_key = NULL; if (ptype > 0) pub_key = x->pub_key; else pub_key = NULL; if (x->p == NULL || (ptype == 2 && priv_key == NULL) || (ptype > 0 && pub_key == NULL)) { reason = ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER; goto err; } if (ptype == 2) ktype = "DH Private-Key"; else if (ptype == 1) ktype = "DH Public-Key"; else ktype = "DH Parameters"; BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128); if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p)) <= 0) goto err; indent += 4; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "private-key:", priv_key, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "public-key:", pub_key, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime:", x->p, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "generator:", x->g, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->q && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "subgroup order:", x->q, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->j && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "subgroup factor:", x->j, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->seed) { int i; BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128); BIO_puts(bp, "seed:"); for (i = 0; i < x->seedlen; i++) { if ((i % 15) == 0) { if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0 || !BIO_indent(bp, indent + 4, 128)) goto err; } if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", x->seed[i], ((i + 1) == x->seedlen) ? "" : ":") <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) return (0); } if (x->counter && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "counter:", x->counter, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->length != 0) { BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128); if (BIO_printf(bp, "recommended-private-length: %d bits\n", (int)x->length) <= 0) goto err; } return 1; err: DHerr(DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT, reason); return 0; } static int int_dh_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return (DH_size(pkey->pkey.dh)); } static int dh_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dh->p); } static int dh_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return DH_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dh); } static int dh_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->p, b->pkey.dh->p) || BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->g, b->pkey.dh->g)) return 0; else if (a->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth) { if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->q, b->pkey.dh->q)) return 0; } return 1; } static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) { BIGNUM *a; if (src) { a = BN_dup(src); if (!a) return 0; } else a = NULL; BN_free(*dst); *dst = a; return 1; } static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) { if (is_x942 == -1) is_x942 = ! !from->q; if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p)) return 0; if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) return 0; if (is_x942) { if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q)) return 0; if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) return 0; OPENSSL_free(to->seed); to->seed = NULL; to->seedlen = 0; if (from->seed) { to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen); if (!to->seed) return 0; to->seedlen = from->seedlen; } } else to->length = from->length; return 1; } DH *DHparams_dup(DH *dh) { DH *ret; ret = DH_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) { DH_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } static int dh_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) { if (to->pkey.dh == NULL) { to->pkey.dh = DH_new(); if (to->pkey.dh == NULL) return 0; } return int_dh_param_copy(to->pkey.dh, from->pkey.dh, from->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth); } static int dh_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a) { if (a->pkey.dh == NULL || a->pkey.dh->p == NULL || a->pkey.dh->g == NULL) return 1; return 0; } static int dh_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (dh_cmp_parameters(a, b) == 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dh->pub_key, a->pkey.dh->pub_key) != 0) return 0; else return 1; } static int dh_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 0); } static int dh_public_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 1); } static int dh_private_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 2); } int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x) { return do_dh_print(bp, x, 4, 0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); #endif static int dh_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { switch (op) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE: if (arg1 == 1) return dh_cms_decrypt(arg2); else if (arg1 == 0) return dh_cms_encrypt(arg2); return -2; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE: *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; return 1; #endif default: return -2; } } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_DH, 0, "DH", "OpenSSL PKCS#3 DH method", dh_pub_decode, dh_pub_encode, dh_pub_cmp, dh_public_print, dh_priv_decode, dh_priv_encode, dh_private_print, int_dh_size, dh_bits, dh_security_bits, dh_param_decode, dh_param_encode, dh_missing_parameters, dh_copy_parameters, dh_cmp_parameters, dh_param_print, 0, int_dh_free, 0 }; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DHX, EVP_PKEY_DHX, 0, "X9.42 DH", "OpenSSL X9.42 DH method", dh_pub_decode, dh_pub_encode, dh_pub_cmp, dh_public_print, dh_priv_decode, dh_priv_encode, dh_private_print, int_dh_size, dh_bits, dh_security_bits, dh_param_decode, dh_param_encode, dh_missing_parameters, dh_copy_parameters, dh_cmp_parameters, dh_param_print, 0, int_dh_free, dh_pkey_ctrl }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int dh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey) { const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; int atype; const void *aval; ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL; int rv = 0; EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL, *pk = NULL; DH *dhpeer = NULL; const unsigned char *p; int plen; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg); if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_dhpublicnumber) goto err; /* Only absent parameters allowed in RFC XXXX */ if (atype != V_ASN1_UNDEF && atype == V_ASN1_NULL) goto err; pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!pk) goto err; if (pk->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) goto err; /* Get parameters from parent key */ dhpeer = DHparams_dup(pk->pkey.dh); /* We have parameters now set public key */ plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey); p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pubkey); if (!p || !plen) goto err; if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, plen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ if ((dhpeer->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkpeer == NULL) goto err; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkpeer, pk->ameth->pkey_id, dhpeer); dhpeer = NULL; if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0) rv = 1; err: ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer); DH_free(dhpeer); return rv; } static int dh_cms_set_shared_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { int rv = 0; X509_ALGOR *alg, *kekalg = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *dukm = NULL; size_t dukmlen = 0; int keylen, plen; const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &alg, &ukm)) goto err; /* * For DH we only have one OID permissible. If ever any more get defined * we will need something cleverer. */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO, DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) <= 0) goto err; if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) goto err; p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); if (!kekalg) goto err; kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); if (!kekctx) goto err; kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm); if (!kekcipher || EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kekctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; /* Use OBJ_nid2obj to ensure we use built in OID that isn't freed */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(kekcipher))) <= 0) goto err; if (ukm) { dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm); dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen); if (!dukm) goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0) goto err; dukm = NULL; rv = 1; err: X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg); OPENSSL_free(dukm); return rv; } static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* See if we need to set peer key */ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx)) { X509_ALGOR *alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &alg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return 0; if (!alg || !pubkey) return 0; if (!dh_cms_set_peerkey(pctx, alg, pubkey)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR); return 0; } } /* Set DH derivation parameters and initialise unwrap context */ if (!dh_cms_set_shared_info(pctx, ri)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int keylen; X509_ALGOR *talg, *wrap_alg = NULL; const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; ASN1_STRING *wrap_str; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; unsigned char *penc = NULL, *dukm = NULL; int penclen; size_t dukmlen = 0; int rv = 0; int kdf_type, wrap_nid; const EVP_MD *kdf_md; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* Get ephemeral key */ pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &talg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, talg); /* Is everything uninitialised? */ if (aoid == OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef)) { ASN1_INTEGER *pubk = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->pub_key, NULL); if (!pubk) goto err; /* Set the key */ penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubk, &penc); ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubk); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(pubkey, penc, penclen); pubkey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); pubkey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dhpublicnumber), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); } /* See if custom parameters set */ kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(pctx); if (kdf_type <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md(pctx, &kdf_md)) goto err; if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) { kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0) goto err; } else if (kdf_type != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) /* Unknown KDF */ goto err; if (kdf_md == NULL) { /* Only SHA1 supported */ kdf_md = EVP_sha1(); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0) goto err; } else if (EVP_MD_type(kdf_md) != NID_sha1) /* Unsupported digest */ goto err; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &talg, &ukm)) goto err; /* Get wrap NID */ ctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx, OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid)) <= 0) goto err; keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */ wrap_alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (wrap_alg == NULL) goto err; wrap_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid); wrap_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (wrap_alg->parameter == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, wrap_alg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap_alg->parameter) == NID_undef) { ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap_alg->parameter); wrap_alg->parameter = NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; if (ukm) { dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm); dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen); if (!dukm) goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0) goto err; dukm = NULL; /* * Now need to wrap encoding of wrap AlgorithmIdentifier into parameter * of another AlgorithmIdentifier. */ penc = NULL; penclen = i2d_X509_ALGOR(wrap_alg, &penc); if (!penc || !penclen) goto err; wrap_str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (wrap_str == NULL) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(wrap_str, penc, penclen); penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, wrap_str); rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(penc); X509_ALGOR_free(wrap_alg); return rv; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh192.pem0000644000000000000000000000014713176625657015332 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MB4CGQDUoLoCULb9LsYm5+/WN992xxbiLQlEuIsCAQM= -----END DH PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh512.pem0000644000000000000000000000023413176625657015323 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MEYCQQDaWDwW2YUiidDkr3VvTMqS3UvlM7gE+w/tlO+cikQD7VdGUNNpmdsp13Yn a6LT1BLiGPTdHghM9tgAPnxHdOgzAgEC -----END DH PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_err.c0000644000000000000000000000537413176625657015416 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY), "compute_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP), "DHparams_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS), "dh_builtin_genparams"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT), "dh_cms_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY), "dh_cms_set_peerkey"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO), "dh_cms_set_shared_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_METH_DUP), "DH_meth_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_METH_NEW), "DH_meth_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_METH_SET1_NAME), "DH_meth_set1_name"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD), "DH_new_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE), "dh_param_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE), "dh_priv_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE), "dh_priv_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE), "dh_pub_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE), "dh_pub_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT), "do_dh_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY), "generate_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_PKEY_DH_DERIVE), "pkey_dh_derive"}, {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_PKEY_DH_KEYGEN), "pkey_dh_keygen"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR), "bad generator"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR), "bn decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BN_ERROR), "bn error"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY), "invalid public key"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR), "kdf parameter error"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET), "keys not set"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE), "no private value"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR), "parameter encoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"}, {ERR_REASON(DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_DH_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(DH_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, DH_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, DH_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000314213176625657015553 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include struct dh_st { /* * This first argument is used to pick up errors when a DH is passed * instead of a EVP_PKEY */ int pad; int version; BIGNUM *p; BIGNUM *g; long length; /* optional */ BIGNUM *pub_key; /* g^x % p */ BIGNUM *priv_key; /* x */ int flags; BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p; /* Place holders if we want to do X9.42 DH */ BIGNUM *q; BIGNUM *j; unsigned char *seed; int seedlen; BIGNUM *counter; int references; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const DH_METHOD *meth; ENGINE *engine; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct dh_method { char *name; /* Methods here */ int (*generate_key) (DH *dh); int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); /* Can be null */ int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int (*init) (DH *dh); int (*finish) (DH *dh); int flags; char *app_data; /* If this is non-NULL, it will be used to generate parameters */ int (*generate_params) (DH *dh, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb); }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_check.c0000644000000000000000000001076513176625657015703 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "dh_locl.h" /*- * Check that p and g are suitable enough * * p is odd * 1 < g < p - 1 */ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret) { int ok = 0; BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; *ret = 0; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_is_odd(dh->p)) *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME; if (BN_is_negative(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_one(dh->g)) *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(dh->g, tmp) >= 0) *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; ok = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return (ok); } /*- * Check that p is a safe prime and * if g is 2, 3 or 5, check that it is a suitable generator * where * for 2, p mod 24 == 11 * for 3, p mod 12 == 5 * for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7 * should hold. */ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) { int ok = 0, r; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BN_ULONG l; BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL; *ret = 0; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL) goto err; t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t2 == NULL) goto err; if (dh->q) { if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0) *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; else { /* Check g^q == 1 mod p */ if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->g, dh->q, dh->p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(t1)) *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; } r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL); if (r < 0) goto err; if (!r) *ret |= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME; /* Check p == 1 mod q i.e. q divides p - 1 */ if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->p, dh->q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(t2)) *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE; if (dh->j && BN_cmp(dh->j, t1)) *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE; } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) { l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 24); if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; if (l != 11) *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_5)) { l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 10); if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; if ((l != 3) && (l != 7)) *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; } else *ret |= DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR; r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL); if (r < 0) goto err; if (!r) *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME; else if (!dh->q) { if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->p)) goto err; r = BN_is_prime_ex(t1, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL); if (r < 0) goto err; if (!r) *ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME; } ok = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return (ok); } int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret) { int ok = 0; BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; *ret = 0; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0) *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL; if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0) *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE; if (dh->q != NULL) { /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */ if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_is_one(tmp)) *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID; } ok = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return (ok); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh1024.pem0000644000000000000000000000036513176625657015407 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIGHAoGBAJf2QmHKtQXdKCjhPx1ottPb0PMTBH9A6FbaWMsTuKG/K3g6TG1Z1fkq /Gz/PWk/eLI9TzFgqVAuPvr3q14a1aZeVUMTgo2oO5/y2UHe6VaJ+trqCTat3xlx /mNbIK9HA2RgPC3gWfVLZQrY+gz3ASHHR5nXWHEyvpuZm7m3h+irAgEC -----END DH PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_rfc5114.c0000644000000000000000000000214213176625657015701 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "dh_locl.h" #include #include "internal/bn_dh.h" /* * Macro to make a DH structure from BIGNUM data. NB: although just copying * the BIGNUM static pointers would be more efficient, we can't do that * because they get wiped using BN_clear_free() when DH_free() is called. */ #define make_dh(x) \ DH *DH_get_##x(void) \ { \ DH *dh = DH_new(); \ \ if (dh == NULL) \ return NULL; \ dh->p = BN_dup(&_bignum_dh##x##_p); \ dh->g = BN_dup(&_bignum_dh##x##_g); \ dh->q = BN_dup(&_bignum_dh##x##_q); \ if (dh->p == NULL || dh->q == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {\ DH_free(dh); \ return NULL; \ } \ return dh; \ } make_dh(1024_160) make_dh(2048_224) make_dh(2048_256) openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh4096.pem0000644000000000000000000000140213176625657015414 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIICCAKCAgEA/urRnb6vkPYc/KEGXWnbCIOaKitq7ySIq9dTH7s+Ri59zs77zty7 vfVlSe6VFTBWgYjD2XKUFmtqq6CqXMhVX5ElUDoYDpAyTH85xqNFLzFC7nKrff/H TFKNttp22cZE9V0IPpzedPfnQkE7aUdmF9JnDyv21Z/818O93u1B4r0szdnmEvEF bKuIxEHX+bp0ZR7RqE1AeifXGJX3d6tsd2PMAObxwwsv55RGkn50vHO4QxtTARr1 rRUV5j3B3oPMgC7Offxx+98Xn45B1/G0Prp11anDsR1PGwtaCYipqsvMwQUSJtyE EOQWk+yFkeMe4vWv367eEi0Sd/wnC+TSXBE3pYvpYerJ8n1MceI5GQTdarJ77OW9 bGTHmxRsLSCM1jpLdPja5jjb4siAa6EHc4qN9c/iFKS3PQPJEnX7pXKBRs5f7AF3 W3RIGt+G9IVNZfXaS7Z/iCpgzgvKCs0VeqN38QsJGtC1aIkwOeyjPNy2G6jJ4yqH ovXYt/0mc00vCWeSNS1wren0pR2EiLxX0ypjjgsU1mk/Z3b/+zVf7fZSIB+nDLjb NPtUlJCVGnAeBK1J1nG3TQicqowOXoM6ISkdaXj5GPJdXHab2+S7cqhKGv5qC7rR jT6sx7RUr0CNTxzLI7muV2/a4tGmj0PSdXQdsZ7tw7gbXlaWT1+MM2MCAQI= -----END DH PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_prn.c0000644000000000000000000000140313176625657015412 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DH *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = DHparams_print(b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c0000644000000000000000000000751313176625657015374 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * NB: These functions have been upgraded - the previous prototypes are in * dh_depr.c as wrappers to these ones. - Geoff */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "dh_locl.h" static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb); int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) { if (ret->meth->generate_params) return ret->meth->generate_params(ret, prime_len, generator, cb); return dh_builtin_genparams(ret, prime_len, generator, cb); } /*- * We generate DH parameters as follows * find a prime q which is prime_len/2 bits long. * p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q * For this case, g is a generator if * g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1. * Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check * g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1. * * Having said all that, * there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5. * for 2, p mod 24 == 11 * for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes. * for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7 * * Thanks to Phil Karn for the pointers about the * special generators and for answering some of my questions. * * I've implemented the second simple method :-). * Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime), * this generator function can take a very very long time to run. */ /* * Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator. * It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the * order-q subgroup. */ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *t1, *t2; int g, ok = -1; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err; /* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */ if (!ret->p && ((ret->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!ret->g && ((ret->g = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (generator <= 1) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR); goto err; } if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) { if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) goto err; g = 2; } else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) { if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) goto err; /* * BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss out on these ones :-( */ g = 5; } else { /* * in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a generator or * not: since we are using safe primes, it will generate either an * order-q or an order-2q group, which both is OK */ if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) goto err; g = generator; } if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->p, prime_len, 1, t1, t2, cb)) goto err; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(ret->g, g)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (ok == -1) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, ERR_R_BN_LIB); ok = 0; } if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return ok; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/dh/dh_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001237713176625657015375 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "dh_locl.h" #include int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth) { /* * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. */ const DH_METHOD *mtmp; mtmp = dh->meth; if (mtmp->finish) mtmp->finish(dh); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(dh->engine); dh->engine = NULL; #endif dh->meth = meth; if (meth->init) meth->init(dh); return 1; } DH *DH_new(void) { return DH_new_method(NULL); } DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine) { DH *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } ret->meth = DH_get_default_method(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->flags = ret->meth->flags; /* early default init */ if (engine) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } ret->engine = engine; } else ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_DH(); if (ret->engine) { ret->meth = ENGINE_get_DH(ret->engine); if (ret->meth == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } } #endif ret->flags = ret->meth->flags; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH, ret, &ret->ex_data)) goto err; if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); err: DH_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return ret; } void DH_free(DH *r) { int i; if (r == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("DH", r); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); if (r->meth->finish) r->meth->finish(r); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(r->engine); #endif CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH, r, &r->ex_data); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); BN_clear_free(r->p); BN_clear_free(r->g); BN_clear_free(r->q); BN_clear_free(r->j); OPENSSL_free(r->seed); BN_clear_free(r->counter); BN_clear_free(r->pub_key); BN_clear_free(r->priv_key); OPENSSL_free(r); } int DH_up_ref(DH *r) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("DH", r); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx)); } int DH_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); } int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return (BN_num_bytes(dh->p)); } int DH_security_bits(const DH *dh) { int N; if (dh->q) N = BN_num_bits(dh->q); else if (dh->length) N = dh->length; else N = -1; return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(dh->p), N); } void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) { if (p != NULL) *p = dh->p; if (q != NULL) *q = dh->q; if (g != NULL) *g = dh->g; } int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) { /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input * parameters MUST be non-NULL. q may remain NULL. */ if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(dh->p); dh->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(dh->q); dh->q = q; } if (g != NULL) { BN_free(dh->g); dh->g = g; } if (q != NULL) { dh->length = BN_num_bits(q); } return 1; } long DH_get_length(const DH *dh) { return dh->length; } int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length) { dh->length = length; return 1; } void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) *pub_key = dh->pub_key; if (priv_key != NULL) *priv_key = dh->priv_key; } int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) { if (pub_key != NULL) { BN_free(dh->pub_key); dh->pub_key = pub_key; } if (priv_key != NULL) { BN_free(dh->priv_key); dh->priv_key = priv_key; } return 1; } void DH_clear_flags(DH *dh, int flags) { dh->flags &= ~flags; } int DH_test_flags(const DH *dh, int flags) { return dh->flags & flags; } void DH_set_flags(DH *dh, int flags) { dh->flags |= flags; } ENGINE *DH_get0_engine(DH *dh) { return dh->engine; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mdc2/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014230 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mdc2/build.info0000644000000000000000000000011513176625657016201 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ mdc2dgst.c mdc2_one.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c0000644000000000000000000000715313176625657016111 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #undef c2l #define c2l(c,l) (l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))<<24L) #undef l2c #define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff)) static void mdc2_body(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len); int MDC2_Init(MDC2_CTX *c) { c->num = 0; c->pad_type = 1; memset(&(c->h[0]), 0x52, MDC2_BLOCK); memset(&(c->hh[0]), 0x25, MDC2_BLOCK); return 1; } int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { size_t i, j; i = c->num; if (i != 0) { if (len < MDC2_BLOCK - i) { /* partial block */ memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, len); c->num += (int)len; return 1; } else { /* filled one */ j = MDC2_BLOCK - i; memcpy(&(c->data[i]), in, j); len -= j; in += j; c->num = 0; mdc2_body(c, &(c->data[0]), MDC2_BLOCK); } } i = len & ~((size_t)MDC2_BLOCK - 1); if (i > 0) mdc2_body(c, in, i); j = len - i; if (j > 0) { memcpy(&(c->data[0]), &(in[i]), j); c->num = (int)j; } return 1; } static void mdc2_body(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { register DES_LONG tin0, tin1; register DES_LONG ttin0, ttin1; DES_LONG d[2], dd[2]; DES_key_schedule k; unsigned char *p; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) { c2l(in, tin0); d[0] = dd[0] = tin0; c2l(in, tin1); d[1] = dd[1] = tin1; c->h[0] = (c->h[0] & 0x9f) | 0x40; c->hh[0] = (c->hh[0] & 0x9f) | 0x20; DES_set_odd_parity(&c->h); DES_set_key_unchecked(&c->h, &k); DES_encrypt1(d, &k, 1); DES_set_odd_parity(&c->hh); DES_set_key_unchecked(&c->hh, &k); DES_encrypt1(dd, &k, 1); ttin0 = tin0 ^ dd[0]; ttin1 = tin1 ^ dd[1]; tin0 ^= d[0]; tin1 ^= d[1]; p = c->h; l2c(tin0, p); l2c(ttin1, p); p = c->hh; l2c(ttin0, p); l2c(tin1, p); } } int MDC2_Final(unsigned char *md, MDC2_CTX *c) { unsigned int i; int j; i = c->num; j = c->pad_type; if ((i > 0) || (j == 2)) { if (j == 2) c->data[i++] = 0x80; memset(&(c->data[i]), 0, MDC2_BLOCK - i); mdc2_body(c, c->data, MDC2_BLOCK); } memcpy(md, (char *)c->h, MDC2_BLOCK); memcpy(&(md[MDC2_BLOCK]), (char *)c->hh, MDC2_BLOCK); return 1; } #undef TEST #ifdef TEST main() { unsigned char md[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int i; MDC2_CTX c; static char *text = "Now is the time for all "; MDC2_Init(&c); MDC2_Update(&c, text, strlen(text)); MDC2_Final(&(md[0]), &c); for (i = 0; i < MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) printf("%02X", md[i]); printf("\n"); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/mdc2/mdc2_one.c0000644000000000000000000000137713176625657016072 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include unsigned char *MDC2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { MDC2_CTX c; static unsigned char m[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; if (!MDC2_Init(&c)) return NULL; MDC2_Update(&c, d, n); MDC2_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */ return (md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014023 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_print.c0000644000000000000000000001262013176625660016716 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" struct status_map_st { int bit; const char *text; }; static int ts_status_map_print(BIO *bio, const struct status_map_st *a, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *v); static int ts_ACCURACY_print_bio(BIO *bio, const TS_ACCURACY *accuracy); int TS_RESP_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP *a) { BIO_printf(bio, "Status info:\n"); TS_STATUS_INFO_print_bio(bio, a->status_info); BIO_printf(bio, "\nTST info:\n"); if (a->tst_info != NULL) TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(bio, a->tst_info); else BIO_printf(bio, "Not included.\n"); return 1; } int TS_STATUS_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_STATUS_INFO *a) { static const char *status_map[] = { "Granted.", "Granted with modifications.", "Rejected.", "Waiting.", "Revocation warning.", "Revoked." }; static const struct status_map_st failure_map[] = { {TS_INFO_BAD_ALG, "unrecognized or unsupported algorithm identifier"}, {TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST, "transaction not permitted or supported"}, {TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT, "the data submitted has the wrong format"}, {TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE, "the TSA's time source is not available"}, {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY, "the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA"}, {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION, "the requested extension is not supported by the TSA"}, {TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE, "the additional information requested could not be understood " "or is not available"}, {TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE, "the request cannot be handled due to system failure"}, {-1, NULL} }; long status; int i, lines = 0; BIO_printf(bio, "Status: "); status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->status); if (0 <= status && status < (long)OSSL_NELEM(status_map)) BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", status_map[status]); else BIO_printf(bio, "out of bounds\n"); BIO_printf(bio, "Status description: "); for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(a->text); ++i) { if (i > 0) BIO_puts(bio, "\t"); ASN1_STRING_print_ex(bio, sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(a->text, i), 0); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } if (i == 0) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified\n"); BIO_printf(bio, "Failure info: "); if (a->failure_info != NULL) lines = ts_status_map_print(bio, failure_map, a->failure_info); if (lines == 0) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); return 1; } static int ts_status_map_print(BIO *bio, const struct status_map_st *a, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *v) { int lines = 0; for (; a->bit >= 0; ++a) { if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(v, a->bit)) { if (++lines > 1) BIO_printf(bio, ", "); BIO_printf(bio, "%s", a->text); } } return lines; } int TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO *a) { int v; if (a == NULL) return 0; v = ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->version); BIO_printf(bio, "Version: %d\n", v); BIO_printf(bio, "Policy OID: "); TS_OBJ_print_bio(bio, a->policy_id); TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(bio, a->msg_imprint); BIO_printf(bio, "Serial number: "); if (a->serial == NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); else TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->serial); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); BIO_printf(bio, "Time stamp: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio, a->time); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); BIO_printf(bio, "Accuracy: "); if (a->accuracy == NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); else ts_ACCURACY_print_bio(bio, a->accuracy); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); BIO_printf(bio, "Ordering: %s\n", a->ordering ? "yes" : "no"); BIO_printf(bio, "Nonce: "); if (a->nonce == NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); else TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->nonce); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); BIO_printf(bio, "TSA: "); if (a->tsa == NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); else { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval; if ((nval = i2v_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, a->tsa, NULL))) X509V3_EXT_val_prn(bio, nval, 0, 0); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free); } BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); TS_ext_print_bio(bio, a->extensions); return 1; } static int ts_ACCURACY_print_bio(BIO *bio, const TS_ACCURACY *a) { if (a->seconds != NULL) TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->seconds); else BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); BIO_printf(bio, " seconds, "); if (a->millis != NULL) TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->millis); else BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); BIO_printf(bio, " millis, "); if (a->micros != NULL) TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->micros); else BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); BIO_printf(bio, " micros"); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c0000644000000000000000000004707713176625660017104 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain); static int ts_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si); static int ts_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert); static int ts_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509 *cert); static int int_ts_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info); static int ts_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response); static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text); static int ts_check_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid, const TS_TST_INFO *tst_info); static int ts_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info, X509_ALGOR **md_alg, unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len); static int ts_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a, const unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info); static int ts_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info); static int ts_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer); static int ts_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names, GENERAL_NAME *name); /* * This must be large enough to hold all values in ts_status_text (with * comma separator) or all text fields in ts_failure_info (also with comma). */ #define TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE 256 /* * Local mapping between response codes and descriptions. */ static const char *ts_status_text[] = { "granted", "grantedWithMods", "rejection", "waiting", "revocationWarning", "revocationNotification" }; #define TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text) static struct { int code; const char *text; } ts_failure_info[] = { {TS_INFO_BAD_ALG, "badAlg"}, {TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST, "badRequest"}, {TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT, "badDataFormat"}, {TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE, "timeNotAvailable"}, {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY, "unacceptedPolicy"}, {TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION, "unacceptedExtension"}, {TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE, "addInfoNotAvailable"}, {TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE, "systemFailure"} }; /*- * This function carries out the following tasks: * - Checks if there is one and only one signer. * - Search for the signing certificate in 'certs' and in the response. * - Check the extended key usage and key usage fields of the signer * certificate (done by the path validation). * - Build and validate the certificate path. * - Check if the certificate path meets the requirements of the * SigningCertificate ESS signed attribute. * - Verify the signature value. * - Returns the signer certificate in 'signer', if 'signer' is not NULL. */ int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, X509 **signer_out) { STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = NULL; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si; STACK_OF(X509) *signers = NULL; X509 *signer; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; char buf[4096]; int i, j = 0, ret = 0; BIO *p7bio = NULL; /* Some sanity checks first. */ if (!token) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); goto err; } if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE); goto err; } sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(token); if (!sinfos || sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) != 1) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER); goto err; } si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, 0); if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_NO_CONTENT); goto err; } /* * Get hold of the signer certificate, search only internal certificates * if it was requested. */ signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(token, certs, 0); if (!signers || sk_X509_num(signers) != 1) goto err; signer = sk_X509_value(signers, 0); if (!ts_verify_cert(store, certs, signer, &chain)) goto err; if (!ts_check_signing_certs(si, chain)) goto err; p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(token, NULL); /* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */ while ((i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) continue; j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, token, si, signer); if (j <= 0) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); goto err; } if (signer_out) { *signer_out = signer; X509_up_ref(signer); } ret = 1; err: BIO_free_all(p7bio); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); sk_X509_free(signers); return ret; } /* * The certificate chain is returned in chain. Caller is responsible for * freeing the vector. */ static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain) { X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx = NULL; int i; int ret = 0; *chain = NULL; cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (cert_ctx == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted)) goto end; X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN); i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) { int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx); TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(j)); goto err; } *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(cert_ctx); ret = 1; goto end; err: ret = 0; end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx); return ret; } static int ts_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ss = ess_get_signing_cert(si); STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids = NULL; X509 *cert; int i = 0; int ret = 0; if (!ss) goto err; cert_ids = ss->cert_ids; cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) != 0) goto err; /* * Check the other certificates of the chain if there are more than one * certificate ids in cert_ids. */ if (sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids) > 1) { for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain); ++i) { cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) < 0) goto err; } } ret = 1; err: if (!ret) TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS, TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR); ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(ss); return ret; } static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) { ASN1_TYPE *attr; const unsigned char *p; attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate); if (!attr) return NULL; p = attr->value.sequence->data; return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length); } /* Returns < 0 if certificate is not found, certificate index otherwise. */ static int ts_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert) { int i; unsigned char cert_sha1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (!cert_ids || !cert) return -1; X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), cert_sha1, NULL); /* Recompute SHA1 hash of certificate if necessary (side effect). */ X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0); /* Look for cert in the cert_ids vector. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids); ++i) { ESS_CERT_ID *cid = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_value(cert_ids, i); if (cid->hash->length == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert_sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) { ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is = cid->issuer_serial; if (!is || !ts_issuer_serial_cmp(is, cert)) return i; } } return -1; } static int ts_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509 *cert) { GENERAL_NAME *issuer; if (!is || !cert || sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(is->issuer) != 1) return -1; issuer = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(is->issuer, 0); if (issuer->type != GEN_DIRNAME || X509_NAME_cmp(issuer->d.dirn, X509_get_issuer_name(cert))) return -1; if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(is->serial, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) return -1; return 0; } /*- * Verifies whether 'response' contains a valid response with regards * to the settings of the context: * - Gives an error message if the TS_TST_INFO is not present. * - Calls _TS_RESP_verify_token to verify the token content. */ int TS_RESP_verify_response(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, TS_RESP *response) { PKCS7 *token = response->token; TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = response->tst_info; int ret = 0; if (!ts_check_status_info(response)) goto err; if (!int_ts_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info)) goto err; ret = 1; err: return ret; } /* * Tries to extract a TS_TST_INFO structure from the PKCS7 token and * calls the internal int_TS_RESP_verify_token function for verifying it. */ int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token) { TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(token); int ret = 0; if (tst_info) { ret = int_ts_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info); TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info); } return ret; } /*- * Verifies whether the 'token' contains a valid time stamp token * with regards to the settings of the context. Only those checks are * carried out that are specified in the context: * - Verifies the signature of the TS_TST_INFO. * - Checks the version number of the response. * - Check if the requested and returned policies math. * - Check if the message imprints are the same. * - Check if the nonces are the same. * - Check if the TSA name matches the signer. * - Check if the TSA name is the expected TSA. */ static int int_ts_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info) { X509 *signer = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name = tst_info->tsa; X509_ALGOR *md_alg = NULL; unsigned char *imprint = NULL; unsigned imprint_len = 0; int ret = 0; int flags = ctx->flags; /* Some options require us to also check the signature */ if (((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER) && tsa_name != NULL) || (flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)) { flags |= TS_VFY_SIGNATURE; } if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE) && !TS_RESP_verify_signature(token, ctx->certs, ctx->store, &signer)) goto err; if ((flags & TS_VFY_VERSION) && TS_TST_INFO_get_version(tst_info) != 1) { TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); goto err; } if ((flags & TS_VFY_POLICY) && !ts_check_policy(ctx->policy, tst_info)) goto err; if ((flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT) && !ts_check_imprints(ctx->md_alg, ctx->imprint, ctx->imprint_len, tst_info)) goto err; if ((flags & TS_VFY_DATA) && (!ts_compute_imprint(ctx->data, tst_info, &md_alg, &imprint, &imprint_len) || !ts_check_imprints(md_alg, imprint, imprint_len, tst_info))) goto err; if ((flags & TS_VFY_NONCE) && !ts_check_nonces(ctx->nonce, tst_info)) goto err; if ((flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER) && tsa_name && !ts_check_signer_name(tsa_name, signer)) { TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH); goto err; } if ((flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME) && !ts_check_signer_name(ctx->tsa_name, signer)) { TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED); goto err; } ret = 1; err: X509_free(signer); X509_ALGOR_free(md_alg); OPENSSL_free(imprint); return ret; } static int ts_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response) { TS_STATUS_INFO *info = response->status_info; long status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(info->status); const char *status_text = NULL; char *embedded_status_text = NULL; char failure_text[TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE] = ""; if (status == 0 || status == 1) return 1; /* There was an error, get the description in status_text. */ if (0 <= status && status < (long) OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text)) status_text = ts_status_text[status]; else status_text = "unknown code"; if (sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(info->text) > 0 && (embedded_status_text = ts_get_status_text(info->text)) == NULL) return 0; /* Fill in failure_text with the failure information. */ if (info->failure_info) { int i; int first = 1; for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(ts_failure_info); ++i) { if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info, ts_failure_info[i].code)) { if (!first) strcat(failure_text, ","); else first = 0; strcat(failure_text, ts_failure_info[i].text); } } } if (failure_text[0] == '\0') strcpy(failure_text, "unspecified"); TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO, TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN); ERR_add_error_data(6, "status code: ", status_text, ", status text: ", embedded_status_text ? embedded_status_text : "unspecified", ", failure codes: ", failure_text); OPENSSL_free(embedded_status_text); return 0; } static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text) { int i; int length = 0; char *result = NULL; char *p; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) { ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i); if (ASN1_STRING_length(current) > TS_MAX_STATUS_LENGTH - length - 1) return NULL; length += ASN1_STRING_length(current); length += 1; /* separator character */ } if ((result = OPENSSL_malloc(length)) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) { ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i); length = ASN1_STRING_length(current); if (i > 0) *p++ = '/'; strncpy(p, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(current), length); p += length; } *p = '\0'; return result; } static int ts_check_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid, const TS_TST_INFO *tst_info) { const ASN1_OBJECT *resp_oid = tst_info->policy_id; if (OBJ_cmp(req_oid, resp_oid) != 0) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY, TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH); return 0; } return 1; } static int ts_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info, X509_ALGOR **md_alg, unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len) { TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = tst_info->msg_imprint; X509_ALGOR *md_alg_resp = msg_imprint->hash_algo; const EVP_MD *md; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; unsigned char buffer[4096]; int length; *md_alg = NULL; *imprint = NULL; if ((*md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg_resp)) == NULL) goto err; if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyobj((*md_alg)->algorithm)) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM); goto err; } length = EVP_MD_size(md); if (length < 0) goto err; *imprint_len = length; if ((*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len)) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, md)) goto err; while ((length = BIO_read(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buffer, length)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, *imprint, NULL)) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg); OPENSSL_free(*imprint); *imprint_len = 0; *imprint = 0; return 0; } static int ts_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a, const unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info) { TS_MSG_IMPRINT *b = tst_info->msg_imprint; X509_ALGOR *algor_b = b->hash_algo; int ret = 0; if (algor_a) { if (OBJ_cmp(algor_a->algorithm, algor_b->algorithm)) goto err; /* The parameter must be NULL in both. */ if ((algor_a->parameter && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_a->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) || (algor_b->parameter && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_b->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)) goto err; } ret = len_a == (unsigned)ASN1_STRING_length(b->hashed_msg) && memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0; err: if (!ret) TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS, TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH); return ret; } static int ts_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info) { const ASN1_INTEGER *b = tst_info->nonce; if (!b) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED); return 0; } /* No error if a nonce is returned without being requested. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a, b) != 0) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /* * Check if the specified TSA name matches either the subject or one of the * subject alternative names of the TSA certificate. */ static int ts_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer) { STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names = NULL; int idx = -1; int found = 0; if (tsa_name->type == GEN_DIRNAME && X509_name_cmp(tsa_name->d.dirn, X509_get_subject_name(signer)) == 0) return 1; gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx); while (gen_names != NULL) { found = ts_find_name(gen_names, tsa_name) >= 0; if (found) break; /* * Get the next subject alternative name, although there should be no * more than one. */ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names); gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx); } GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names); return found; } /* Returns 1 if name is in gen_names, 0 otherwise. */ static int ts_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names, GENERAL_NAME *name) { int i, found; for (i = 0, found = 0; !found && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gen_names); ++i) { GENERAL_NAME *current = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gen_names, i); found = GENERAL_NAME_cmp(current, name) == 0; } return found ? i - 1 : -1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000002013713176625660015542 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_MSG_IMPRINT) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, hash_algo, X509_ALGOR), ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, hashed_msg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_MSG_IMPRINT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_MSG_IMPRINT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_MSG_IMPRINT) TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, bp, a); } int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, bp, a); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, fp, a); } int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_MSG_IMPRINT, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, fp, a); } #endif ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_REQ) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_REQ, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_REQ, msg_imprint, TS_MSG_IMPRINT), ASN1_OPT(TS_REQ, policy_id, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(TS_REQ, nonce, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(TS_REQ, cert_req, ASN1_FBOOLEAN), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TS_REQ, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_REQ) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_REQ) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_REQ) TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, TS_REQ **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_REQ, TS_REQ_new, d2i_TS_REQ, bp, a); } int i2d_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, TS_REQ *a) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_REQ, i2d_TS_REQ, bp, a); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_REQ, TS_REQ_new, d2i_TS_REQ, fp, a); } int i2d_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ *a) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_REQ, i2d_TS_REQ, fp, a); } #endif ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_ACCURACY) = { ASN1_OPT(TS_ACCURACY, seconds, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_IMP_OPT(TS_ACCURACY, millis, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(TS_ACCURACY, micros, ASN1_INTEGER, 1) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_ACCURACY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_ACCURACY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_ACCURACY) ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_TST_INFO) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, policy_id, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, msg_imprint, TS_MSG_IMPRINT), ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, serial, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_TST_INFO, time, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, accuracy, TS_ACCURACY), ASN1_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, ordering, ASN1_FBOOLEAN), ASN1_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, nonce, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_EXP_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, tsa, GENERAL_NAME, 0), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TS_TST_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 1) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_TST_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_TST_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_TST_INFO) TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, TS_TST_INFO **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_TST_INFO, TS_TST_INFO_new, d2i_TS_TST_INFO, bp, a); } int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, TS_TST_INFO *a) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_TST_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO, bp, a); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_TST_INFO, TS_TST_INFO_new, d2i_TS_TST_INFO, fp, a); } int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO *a) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_TST_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO, fp, a); } #endif ASN1_SEQUENCE(TS_STATUS_INFO) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_STATUS_INFO, status, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TS_STATUS_INFO, text, ASN1_UTF8STRING), ASN1_OPT(TS_STATUS_INFO, failure_info, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TS_STATUS_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_STATUS_INFO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_STATUS_INFO) static int ts_resp_set_tst_info(TS_RESP *a) { long status; status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->status_info->status); if (a->token) { if (status != 0 && status != 1) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO, TS_R_TOKEN_PRESENT); return 0; } TS_TST_INFO_free(a->tst_info); a->tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(a->token); if (!a->tst_info) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO, TS_R_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO_FAILED); return 0; } } else if (status == 0 || status == 1) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO, TS_R_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT); return 0; } return 1; } static int ts_resp_cb(int op, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { TS_RESP *ts_resp = (TS_RESP *)*pval; if (op == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) { ts_resp->tst_info = NULL; } else if (op == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) { TS_TST_INFO_free(ts_resp->tst_info); } else if (op == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) { if (ts_resp_set_tst_info(ts_resp) == 0) return 0; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(TS_RESP, ts_resp_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(TS_RESP, status_info, TS_STATUS_INFO), ASN1_OPT(TS_RESP, token, PKCS7), } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(TS_RESP, TS_RESP) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(TS_RESP) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(TS_RESP) TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bp, TS_RESP **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(TS_RESP, TS_RESP_new, d2i_TS_RESP, bp, a); } int i2d_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bp, TS_RESP *a) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(TS_RESP, i2d_TS_RESP, bp, a); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(TS_RESP, TS_RESP_new, d2i_TS_RESP, fp, a); } int i2d_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP *a) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(TS_RESP, i2d_TS_RESP, fp, a); } #endif ASN1_SEQUENCE(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL) = { ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, issuer, GENERAL_NAME), ASN1_SIMPLE(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, serial, ASN1_INTEGER) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL) ASN1_SEQUENCE(ESS_CERT_ID) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ESS_CERT_ID, hash, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_OPT(ESS_CERT_ID, issuer_serial, ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ESS_CERT_ID) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ESS_CERT_ID) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ESS_CERT_ID) ASN1_SEQUENCE(ESS_SIGNING_CERT) = { ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(ESS_SIGNING_CERT, cert_ids, ESS_CERT_ID), ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(ESS_SIGNING_CERT, policy_info, POLICYINFO) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ESS_SIGNING_CERT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ESS_SIGNING_CERT) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ESS_SIGNING_CERT) /* Getting encapsulated TS_TST_INFO object from PKCS7. */ TS_TST_INFO *PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(PKCS7 *token) { PKCS7_SIGNED *pkcs7_signed; PKCS7 *enveloped; ASN1_TYPE *tst_info_wrapper; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tst_info_der; const unsigned char *p; if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) { TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE); return NULL; } if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) { TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_DETACHED_CONTENT); return NULL; } pkcs7_signed = token->d.sign; enveloped = pkcs7_signed->contents; if (OBJ_obj2nid(enveloped->type) != NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo) { TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE); return NULL; } tst_info_wrapper = enveloped->d.other; if (tst_info_wrapper->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { TSerr(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO, TS_R_BAD_TYPE); return NULL; } tst_info_der = tst_info_wrapper->value.octet_string; p = tst_info_der->data; return d2i_TS_TST_INFO(NULL, &p, tst_info_der->length); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/build.info0000644000000000000000000000033313176625660015776 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ ts_err.c ts_req_utils.c ts_req_print.c ts_rsp_utils.c ts_rsp_print.c \ ts_rsp_sign.c ts_rsp_verify.c ts_verify_ctx.c ts_lib.c ts_conf.c \ ts_asn1.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000001360713176625660015463 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE { * hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * hashedMessage OCTET STRING } */ struct TS_msg_imprint_st { X509_ALGOR *hash_algo; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hashed_msg; }; /*- * TimeStampResp ::= SEQUENCE { * status PKIStatusInfo, * timeStampToken TimeStampToken OPTIONAL } */ struct TS_resp_st { TS_STATUS_INFO *status_info; PKCS7 *token; TS_TST_INFO *tst_info; }; /*- * TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER { v1(1) }, * messageImprint MessageImprint, * --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be * --time-stamped * reqPolicy TSAPolicyId OPTIONAL, * nonce INTEGER OPTIONAL, * certReq BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, * extensions [0] IMPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } */ struct TS_req_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint; ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id; ASN1_INTEGER *nonce; ASN1_BOOLEAN cert_req; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; }; /*- * Accuracy ::= SEQUENCE { * seconds INTEGER OPTIONAL, * millis [0] INTEGER (1..999) OPTIONAL, * micros [1] INTEGER (1..999) OPTIONAL } */ struct TS_accuracy_st { ASN1_INTEGER *seconds; ASN1_INTEGER *millis; ASN1_INTEGER *micros; }; /*- * TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER { v1(1) }, * policy TSAPolicyId, * messageImprint MessageImprint, * -- MUST have the same value as the similar field in * -- TimeStampReq * serialNumber INTEGER, * -- Time-Stamping users MUST be ready to accommodate integers * -- up to 160 bits. * genTime GeneralizedTime, * accuracy Accuracy OPTIONAL, * ordering BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, * nonce INTEGER OPTIONAL, * -- MUST be present if the similar field was present * -- in TimeStampReq. In that case it MUST have the same value. * tsa [0] GeneralName OPTIONAL, * extensions [1] IMPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } */ struct TS_tst_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id; TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint; ASN1_INTEGER *serial; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *time; TS_ACCURACY *accuracy; ASN1_BOOLEAN ordering; ASN1_INTEGER *nonce; GENERAL_NAME *tsa; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; }; struct TS_status_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *status; STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text; ASN1_BIT_STRING *failure_info; }; /*- * IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE { * issuer GeneralNames, * serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber * } */ struct ESS_issuer_serial { STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *issuer; ASN1_INTEGER *serial; }; /*- * ESSCertID ::= SEQUENCE { * certHash Hash, * issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL * } */ struct ESS_cert_id { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hash; /* Always SHA-1 digest. */ ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *issuer_serial; }; /*- * SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { * certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID, * policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL * } */ struct ESS_signing_cert { STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids; STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *policy_info; }; struct TS_resp_ctx { X509 *signer_cert; EVP_PKEY *signer_key; const EVP_MD *signer_md; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; /* Certs to include in signed data. */ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies; /* Acceptable policies. */ ASN1_OBJECT *default_policy; /* It may appear in policies, too. */ STACK_OF(EVP_MD) *mds; /* Acceptable message digests. */ ASN1_INTEGER *seconds; /* accuracy, 0 means not specified. */ ASN1_INTEGER *millis; /* accuracy, 0 means not specified. */ ASN1_INTEGER *micros; /* accuracy, 0 means not specified. */ unsigned clock_precision_digits; /* fraction of seconds in time stamp * token. */ unsigned flags; /* Optional info, see values above. */ /* Callback functions. */ TS_serial_cb serial_cb; void *serial_cb_data; /* User data for serial_cb. */ TS_time_cb time_cb; void *time_cb_data; /* User data for time_cb. */ TS_extension_cb extension_cb; void *extension_cb_data; /* User data for extension_cb. */ /* These members are used only while creating the response. */ TS_REQ *request; TS_RESP *response; TS_TST_INFO *tst_info; }; struct TS_verify_ctx { /* Set this to the union of TS_VFY_... flags you want to carry out. */ unsigned flags; /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_SIGNATURE. certs is optional. */ X509_STORE *store; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_POLICY. */ ASN1_OBJECT *policy; /* * Must be set only with TS_VFY_IMPRINT. If md_alg is NULL, the * algorithm from the response is used. */ X509_ALGOR *md_alg; unsigned char *imprint; unsigned imprint_len; /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_DATA. */ BIO *data; /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_TSA_NAME. */ ASN1_INTEGER *nonce; /* Must be set only with TS_VFY_TSA_NAME. */ GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name; }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_conf.c0000644000000000000000000003164413176625660015632 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include /* Macro definitions for the configuration file. */ #define BASE_SECTION "tsa" #define ENV_DEFAULT_TSA "default_tsa" #define ENV_SERIAL "serial" #define ENV_CRYPTO_DEVICE "crypto_device" #define ENV_SIGNER_CERT "signer_cert" #define ENV_CERTS "certs" #define ENV_SIGNER_KEY "signer_key" #define ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST "signer_digest" #define ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY "default_policy" #define ENV_OTHER_POLICIES "other_policies" #define ENV_DIGESTS "digests" #define ENV_ACCURACY "accuracy" #define ENV_ORDERING "ordering" #define ENV_TSA_NAME "tsa_name" #define ENV_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN "ess_cert_id_chain" #define ENV_VALUE_SECS "secs" #define ENV_VALUE_MILLISECS "millisecs" #define ENV_VALUE_MICROSECS "microsecs" #define ENV_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS "clock_precision_digits" #define ENV_VALUE_YES "yes" #define ENV_VALUE_NO "no" /* Function definitions for certificate and key loading. */ X509 *TS_CONF_load_cert(const char *file) { BIO *cert = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; if ((cert = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) goto end; x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL, NULL, NULL); end: if (x == NULL) TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERT, TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT); BIO_free(cert); return x; } STACK_OF(X509) *TS_CONF_load_certs(const char *file) { BIO *certs = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *othercerts = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *allcerts = NULL; int i; if ((certs = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) goto end; if ((othercerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; allcerts = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(certs, NULL, NULL, NULL); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(allcerts); i++) { X509_INFO *xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(allcerts, i); if (xi->x509) { sk_X509_push(othercerts, xi->x509); xi->x509 = NULL; } } end: if (othercerts == NULL) TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERTS, TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT); sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(allcerts, X509_INFO_free); BIO_free(certs); return othercerts; } EVP_PKEY *TS_CONF_load_key(const char *file, const char *pass) { BIO *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if ((key = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) goto end; pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL, NULL, (char *)pass); end: if (pkey == NULL) TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_KEY, TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_KEY); BIO_free(key); return pkey; } /* Function definitions for handling configuration options. */ static void ts_CONF_lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOOKUP_FAIL, TS_R_VAR_LOOKUP_FAILURE); ERR_add_error_data(3, name, "::", tag); } static void ts_CONF_invalid(const char *name, const char *tag) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_INVALID, TS_R_VAR_BAD_VALUE); ERR_add_error_data(3, name, "::", tag); } const char *TS_CONF_get_tsa_section(CONF *conf, const char *section) { if (!section) { section = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_TSA); if (!section) ts_CONF_lookup_fail(BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_TSA); } return section; } int TS_CONF_set_serial(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_serial_cb cb, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; char *serial = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SERIAL); if (!serial) { ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SERIAL); goto err; } TS_RESP_CTX_set_serial_cb(ctx, cb, serial); ret = 1; err: return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int TS_CONF_set_crypto_device(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *device) { int ret = 0; if (device == NULL) device = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRYPTO_DEVICE); if (device && !TS_CONF_set_default_engine(device)) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_CRYPTO_DEVICE); goto err; } ret = 1; err: return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_default_engine(const char *name) { ENGINE *e = NULL; int ret = 0; if (strcmp(name, "builtin") == 0) return 1; if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(name)) == NULL) goto err; if (strcmp(name, "chil") == 0) ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK, 1, 0, 0); if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_CONF_SET_DEFAULT_ENGINE, TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_ENGINE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "engine:", name); } ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } #endif int TS_CONF_set_signer_cert(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *cert, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; X509 *cert_obj = NULL; if (cert == NULL) { cert = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SIGNER_CERT); if (cert == NULL) { ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SIGNER_CERT); goto err; } } if ((cert_obj = TS_CONF_load_cert(cert)) == NULL) goto err; if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert(ctx, cert_obj)) goto err; ret = 1; err: X509_free(cert_obj); return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_certs(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *certs, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; STACK_OF(X509) *certs_obj = NULL; if (certs == NULL) { /* Certificate chain is optional. */ if ((certs = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTS)) == NULL) goto end; } if ((certs_obj = TS_CONF_load_certs(certs)) == NULL) goto err; if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(ctx, certs_obj)) goto err; end: ret = 1; err: sk_X509_pop_free(certs_obj, X509_free); return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_signer_key(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *key, const char *pass, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY *key_obj = NULL; if (!key) key = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SIGNER_KEY); if (!key) { ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SIGNER_KEY); goto err; } if ((key_obj = TS_CONF_load_key(key, pass)) == NULL) goto err; if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_key(ctx, key_obj)) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(key_obj); return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_signer_digest(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *md, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const EVP_MD *sign_md = NULL; if (md == NULL) md = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST); if (md == NULL) { ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST); goto err; } sign_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(md); if (sign_md == NULL) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_SIGNER_DIGEST); goto err; } if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(ctx, sign_md)) goto err; ret = 1; err: return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_def_policy(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *policy, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *policy_obj = NULL; if (!policy) policy = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY); if (!policy) { ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY); goto err; } if ((policy_obj = OBJ_txt2obj(policy, 0)) == NULL) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DEFAULT_POLICY); goto err; } if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy(ctx, policy_obj)) goto err; ret = 1; err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(policy_obj); return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_policies(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; int i; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *list = NULL; char *policies = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_OTHER_POLICIES); /* If no other policy is specified, that's fine. */ if (policies && (list = X509V3_parse_list(policies)) == NULL) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_OTHER_POLICIES); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list); ++i) { CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(list, i); const char *extval = val->value ? val->value : val->name; ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp; if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(extval, 0)) == NULL) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_OTHER_POLICIES); goto err; } if (!TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy(ctx, objtmp)) goto err; ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp); } ret = 1; err: sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(list, X509V3_conf_free); return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_digests(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; int i; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *list = NULL; char *digests = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DIGESTS); if (digests == NULL) { ts_CONF_lookup_fail(section, ENV_DIGESTS); goto err; } if ((list = X509V3_parse_list(digests)) == NULL) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DIGESTS); goto err; } if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list) == 0) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DIGESTS); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list); ++i) { CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(list, i); const char *extval = val->value ? val->value : val->name; const EVP_MD *md; if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(extval)) == NULL) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_DIGESTS); goto err; } if (!TS_RESP_CTX_add_md(ctx, md)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(list, X509V3_conf_free); return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_accuracy(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; int i; int secs = 0, millis = 0, micros = 0; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *list = NULL; char *accuracy = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_ACCURACY); if (accuracy && (list = X509V3_parse_list(accuracy)) == NULL) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_ACCURACY); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(list); ++i) { CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(list, i); if (strcmp(val->name, ENV_VALUE_SECS) == 0) { if (val->value) secs = atoi(val->value); } else if (strcmp(val->name, ENV_VALUE_MILLISECS) == 0) { if (val->value) millis = atoi(val->value); } else if (strcmp(val->name, ENV_VALUE_MICROSECS) == 0) { if (val->value) micros = atoi(val->value); } else { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_ACCURACY); goto err; } } if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy(ctx, secs, millis, micros)) goto err; ret = 1; err: sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(list, X509V3_conf_free); return ret; } int TS_CONF_set_clock_precision_digits(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; long digits = 0; /* * If not specified, set the default value to 0, i.e. sec precision */ if (!NCONF_get_number_e(conf, section, ENV_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS, &digits)) digits = 0; if (digits < 0 || digits > TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, ENV_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS); goto err; } if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits(ctx, digits)) goto err; return 1; err: return ret; } static int ts_CONF_add_flag(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *field, int flag, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { const char *value = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, field); if (value) { if (strcmp(value, ENV_VALUE_YES) == 0) TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags(ctx, flag); else if (strcmp(value, ENV_VALUE_NO) != 0) { ts_CONF_invalid(section, field); return 0; } } return 1; } int TS_CONF_set_ordering(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { return ts_CONF_add_flag(conf, section, ENV_ORDERING, TS_ORDERING, ctx); } int TS_CONF_set_tsa_name(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { return ts_CONF_add_flag(conf, section, ENV_TSA_NAME, TS_TSA_NAME, ctx); } int TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_chain(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { return ts_CONF_add_flag(conf, section, ENV_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN, TS_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN, ctx); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_lib.c0000644000000000000000000000466513176625660015456 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" int TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_INTEGER *num) { BIGNUM *num_bn; int result = 0; char *hex; num_bn = BN_new(); if (num_bn == NULL) return -1; ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(num, num_bn); if ((hex = BN_bn2hex(num_bn))) { result = BIO_write(bio, "0x", 2) > 0; result = result && BIO_write(bio, hex, strlen(hex)) > 0; OPENSSL_free(hex); } BN_free(num_bn); return result; } int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { char obj_txt[128]; OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0); BIO_printf(bio, "%s\n", obj_txt); return 1; } int TS_ext_print_bio(BIO *bio, const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions) { int i, critical, n; X509_EXTENSION *ex; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; BIO_printf(bio, "Extensions:\n"); n = X509v3_get_ext_count(extensions); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { ex = X509v3_get_ext(extensions, i); obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex); if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio, obj) < 0) return 0; critical = X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex); BIO_printf(bio, ":%s\n", critical ? " critical" : ""); if (!X509V3_EXT_print(bio, ex, 0, 4)) { BIO_printf(bio, "%4s", ""); ASN1_STRING_print(bio, X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ex)); } BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } return 1; } int TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio(BIO *bio, const X509_ALGOR *alg) { int i = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm); return BIO_printf(bio, "Hash Algorithm: %s\n", (i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i)); } int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg; TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio(bio, a->hash_algo); BIO_printf(bio, "Message data:\n"); msg = a->hashed_msg; BIO_dump_indent(bio, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(msg), ASN1_STRING_length(msg), 4); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_err.c0000644000000000000000000001617113176625660015473 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_TS,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_TS,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA TS_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_DEF_SERIAL_CB), "def_serial_cb"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB), "def_time_cb"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT), "ESS_add_signing_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_ESS_CERT_ID_NEW_INIT), "ess_CERT_ID_new_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_NEW_INIT), "ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN), "int_ts_RESP_verify_token"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO), "PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MICROS), "TS_ACCURACY_set_micros"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MILLIS), "TS_ACCURACY_set_millis"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_SECONDS), "TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS), "ts_check_imprints"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES), "ts_check_nonces"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY), "ts_check_policy"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS), "ts_check_signing_certs"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO), "ts_check_status_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT), "ts_compute_imprint"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_INVALID), "ts_CONF_invalid"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERT), "TS_CONF_load_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERTS), "TS_CONF_load_certs"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_KEY), "TS_CONF_load_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_LOOKUP_FAIL), "ts_CONF_lookup_fail"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_CONF_SET_DEFAULT_ENGINE), "TS_CONF_set_default_engine"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT), "ts_get_status_text"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_SET_ALGO), "TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_MSG_IMPRINT), "TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_NONCE), "TS_REQ_set_nonce"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_POLICY_ID), "TS_REQ_set_policy_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE), "TS_RESP_create_response"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_TST_INFO), "ts_RESP_create_tst_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_FAILURE_INFO), "TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_MD), "TS_RESP_CTX_add_md"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_POLICY), "TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW), "TS_RESP_CTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_ACCURACY), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_CERTS), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_DEF_POLICY), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_SIGNER_CERT), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_STATUS_INFO), "TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY), "ts_RESP_get_policy"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_GENTIME_WITH_PRECISION), "TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_STATUS_INFO), "TS_RESP_set_status_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO), "TS_RESP_set_tst_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN), "ts_RESP_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE), "TS_RESP_verify_signature"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_ACCURACY), "TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_MSG_IMPRINT), "TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_NONCE), "TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_POLICY_ID), "TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_SERIAL), "TS_TST_INFO_set_serial"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TIME), "TS_TST_INFO_set_time"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TSA), "TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_VERIFY), "TS_VERIFY"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT), "ts_verify_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW), "TS_VERIFY_CTX_new"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA TS_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE), "bad pkcs7 type"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_BAD_TYPE), "bad type"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT), "cannot load certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_KEY), "cannot load private key"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR), "certificate verify error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_ENGINE), "could not set engine"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_TIME), "could not set time"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_DETACHED_CONTENT), "detached content"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT_ERROR), "ess add signing cert error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR), "ess signing certificate error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER), "invalid null pointer"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_INVALID_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_PURPOSE), "invalid signer certificate purpose"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH), "message imprint mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH), "nonce mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED), "nonce not returned"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NO_CONTENT), "no content"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN), "no time stamp token"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR), "pkcs7 add signature error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNED_ATTR_ERROR), "pkcs7 add signed attr error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO_FAILED), "pkcs7 to ts tst info failed"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH), "policy mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE), "private key does not match certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_RESPONSE_SETUP_ERROR), "response setup error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE), "signature failure"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER), "there must be one signer"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR), "time syscall error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT), "token not present"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TOKEN_PRESENT), "token present"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH), "tsa name mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED), "tsa untrusted"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TST_INFO_SETUP_ERROR), "tst info setup error"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_TS_DATASIGN), "ts datasign"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_UNACCEPTABLE_POLICY), "unacceptable policy"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM), "unsupported md algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION), "unsupported version"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_VAR_BAD_VALUE), "var bad value"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_VAR_LOOKUP_FAILURE), "cannot find config variable"}, {ERR_REASON(TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE), "wrong content type"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_TS_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(TS_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, TS_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, TS_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_utils.c0000644000000000000000000002050613176625660016724 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" int TS_RESP_set_status_info(TS_RESP *a, TS_STATUS_INFO *status_info) { TS_STATUS_INFO *new_status_info; if (a->status_info == status_info) return 1; new_status_info = TS_STATUS_INFO_dup(status_info); if (new_status_info == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_STATUS_INFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } TS_STATUS_INFO_free(a->status_info); a->status_info = new_status_info; return 1; } TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_RESP_get_status_info(TS_RESP *a) { return a->status_info; } /* Caller loses ownership of PKCS7 and TS_TST_INFO objects. */ void TS_RESP_set_tst_info(TS_RESP *a, PKCS7 *p7, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info) { PKCS7_free(a->token); a->token = p7; TS_TST_INFO_free(a->tst_info); a->tst_info = tst_info; } PKCS7 *TS_RESP_get_token(TS_RESP *a) { return a->token; } TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_get_tst_info(TS_RESP *a) { return a->tst_info; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_version(TS_TST_INFO *a, long version) { return ASN1_INTEGER_set(a->version, version); } long TS_TST_INFO_get_version(const TS_TST_INFO *a) { return ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->version); } int TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a, ASN1_OBJECT *policy) { ASN1_OBJECT *new_policy; if (a->policy_id == policy) return 1; new_policy = OBJ_dup(policy); if (new_policy == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_POLICY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->policy_id); a->policy_id = new_policy; return 1; } ASN1_OBJECT *TS_TST_INFO_get_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->policy_id; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint) { TS_MSG_IMPRINT *new_msg_imprint; if (a->msg_imprint == msg_imprint) return 1; new_msg_imprint = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup(msg_imprint); if (new_msg_imprint == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_MSG_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(a->msg_imprint); a->msg_imprint = new_msg_imprint; return 1; } TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->msg_imprint; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_serial(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { ASN1_INTEGER *new_serial; if (a->serial == serial) return 1; new_serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(serial); if (new_serial == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_SERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->serial); a->serial = new_serial; return 1; } const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_serial(const TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->serial; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_time(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime) { ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *new_time; if (a->time == gtime) return 1; new_time = ASN1_STRING_dup(gtime); if (new_time == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TIME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(a->time); a->time = new_time; return 1; } const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *TS_TST_INFO_get_time(const TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->time; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_ACCURACY *accuracy) { TS_ACCURACY *new_accuracy; if (a->accuracy == accuracy) return 1; new_accuracy = TS_ACCURACY_dup(accuracy); if (new_accuracy == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_ACCURACY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } TS_ACCURACY_free(a->accuracy); a->accuracy = new_accuracy; return 1; } TS_ACCURACY *TS_TST_INFO_get_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->accuracy; } int TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *seconds) { ASN1_INTEGER *new_seconds; if (a->seconds == seconds) return 1; new_seconds = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(seconds); if (new_seconds == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_SECONDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->seconds); a->seconds = new_seconds; return 1; } const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_seconds(const TS_ACCURACY *a) { return a->seconds; } int TS_ACCURACY_set_millis(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *millis) { ASN1_INTEGER *new_millis = NULL; if (a->millis == millis) return 1; if (millis != NULL) { new_millis = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(millis); if (new_millis == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MILLIS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->millis); a->millis = new_millis; return 1; } const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_millis(const TS_ACCURACY *a) { return a->millis; } int TS_ACCURACY_set_micros(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *micros) { ASN1_INTEGER *new_micros = NULL; if (a->micros == micros) return 1; if (micros != NULL) { new_micros = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(micros); if (new_micros == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MICROS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->micros); a->micros = new_micros; return 1; } const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_micros(const TS_ACCURACY *a) { return a->micros; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_ordering(TS_TST_INFO *a, int ordering) { a->ordering = ordering ? 0xFF : 0x00; return 1; } int TS_TST_INFO_get_ordering(const TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->ordering ? 1 : 0; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce) { ASN1_INTEGER *new_nonce; if (a->nonce == nonce) return 1; new_nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce); if (new_nonce == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_NONCE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->nonce); a->nonce = new_nonce; return 1; } const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce(const TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->nonce; } int TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a, GENERAL_NAME *tsa) { GENERAL_NAME *new_tsa; if (a->tsa == tsa) return 1; new_tsa = GENERAL_NAME_dup(tsa); if (new_tsa == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } GENERAL_NAME_free(a->tsa); a->tsa = new_tsa; return 1; } GENERAL_NAME *TS_TST_INFO_get_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->tsa; } STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_TST_INFO_get_exts(TS_TST_INFO *a) { return a->extensions; } void TS_TST_INFO_ext_free(TS_TST_INFO *a) { if (!a) return; sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(a->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free); a->extensions = NULL; } int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_count(TS_TST_INFO *a) { return X509v3_get_ext_count(a->extensions); } int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_NID(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int lastpos) { return X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(a->extensions, nid, lastpos); } int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(a->extensions, obj, lastpos); } int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_critical(TS_TST_INFO *a, int crit, int lastpos) { return X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(a->extensions, crit, lastpos); } X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc) { return X509v3_get_ext(a->extensions, loc); } X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_delete_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc) { return X509v3_delete_ext(a->extensions, loc); } int TS_TST_INFO_add_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return X509v3_add_ext(&a->extensions, ex, loc) != NULL; } void *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_d2i(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(a->extensions, nid, crit, idx); } int TS_STATUS_INFO_set_status(TS_STATUS_INFO *a, int i) { return ASN1_INTEGER_set(a->status, i); } const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_status(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a) { return a->status; } const STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) * TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_text(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a) { return a->text; } const ASN1_BIT_STRING *TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_failure_info(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a) { return a->failure_info; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_req_print.c0000644000000000000000000000242113176625660016677 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" int TS_REQ_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_REQ *a) { int v; ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id; if (a == NULL) return 0; v = TS_REQ_get_version(a); BIO_printf(bio, "Version: %d\n", v); TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(bio, a->msg_imprint); BIO_printf(bio, "Policy OID: "); policy_id = TS_REQ_get_policy_id(a); if (policy_id == NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified\n"); else TS_OBJ_print_bio(bio, policy_id); BIO_printf(bio, "Nonce: "); if (a->nonce == NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "unspecified"); else TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(bio, a->nonce); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); BIO_printf(bio, "Certificate required: %s\n", a->cert_req ? "yes" : "no"); TS_ext_print_bio(bio, a->extensions); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_req_utils.c0000644000000000000000000001012013176625660016676 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" int TS_REQ_set_version(TS_REQ *a, long version) { return ASN1_INTEGER_set(a->version, version); } long TS_REQ_get_version(const TS_REQ *a) { return ASN1_INTEGER_get(a->version); } int TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint) { TS_MSG_IMPRINT *new_msg_imprint; if (a->msg_imprint == msg_imprint) return 1; new_msg_imprint = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup(msg_imprint); if (new_msg_imprint == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_MSG_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(a->msg_imprint); a->msg_imprint = new_msg_imprint; return 1; } TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_REQ_get_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a) { return a->msg_imprint; } int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, X509_ALGOR *alg) { X509_ALGOR *new_alg; if (a->hash_algo == alg) return 1; new_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(alg); if (new_alg == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_SET_ALGO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } X509_ALGOR_free(a->hash_algo); a->hash_algo = new_alg; return 1; } X509_ALGOR *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a) { return a->hash_algo; } int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, unsigned char *d, int len) { return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(a->hashed_msg, d, len); } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a) { return a->hashed_msg; } int TS_REQ_set_policy_id(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) { ASN1_OBJECT *new_policy; if (a->policy_id == policy) return 1; new_policy = OBJ_dup(policy); if (new_policy == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_POLICY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->policy_id); a->policy_id = new_policy; return 1; } ASN1_OBJECT *TS_REQ_get_policy_id(TS_REQ *a) { return a->policy_id; } int TS_REQ_set_nonce(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce) { ASN1_INTEGER *new_nonce; if (a->nonce == nonce) return 1; new_nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce); if (new_nonce == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_NONCE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->nonce); a->nonce = new_nonce; return 1; } const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_REQ_get_nonce(const TS_REQ *a) { return a->nonce; } int TS_REQ_set_cert_req(TS_REQ *a, int cert_req) { a->cert_req = cert_req ? 0xFF : 0x00; return 1; } int TS_REQ_get_cert_req(const TS_REQ *a) { return a->cert_req ? 1 : 0; } STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_REQ_get_exts(TS_REQ *a) { return a->extensions; } void TS_REQ_ext_free(TS_REQ *a) { if (!a) return; sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(a->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free); a->extensions = NULL; } int TS_REQ_get_ext_count(TS_REQ *a) { return X509v3_get_ext_count(a->extensions); } int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_NID(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int lastpos) { return X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(a->extensions, nid, lastpos); } int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos) { return X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(a->extensions, obj, lastpos); } int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_critical(TS_REQ *a, int crit, int lastpos) { return X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(a->extensions, crit, lastpos); } X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_get_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc) { return X509v3_get_ext(a->extensions, loc); } X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_delete_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc) { return X509v3_delete_ext(a->extensions, loc); } int TS_REQ_add_ext(TS_REQ *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc) { return X509v3_add_ext(&a->extensions, ex, loc) != NULL; } void *TS_REQ_get_ext_d2i(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx) { return X509V3_get_d2i(a->extensions, nid, crit, idx); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c0000644000000000000000000006670413176625660016536 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) # include #endif #include #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" static ASN1_INTEGER *def_serial_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *); static int def_time_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *, long *sec, long *usec); static int def_extension_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *, X509_EXTENSION *, void *); static void ts_RESP_CTX_init(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); static void ts_RESP_CTX_cleanup(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); static int ts_RESP_check_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); static ASN1_OBJECT *ts_RESP_get_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); static TS_TST_INFO *ts_RESP_create_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, ASN1_OBJECT *policy); static int ts_RESP_process_extensions(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); static int ts_RESP_sign(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init(X509 *signcert, STACK_OF(X509) *certs); static ESS_CERT_ID *ess_CERT_ID_new_init(X509 *cert, int issuer_needed); static int ts_TST_INFO_content_new(PKCS7 *p7); static int ESS_add_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc); static ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *, long, long, unsigned); /* Default callback for response generation. */ static ASN1_INTEGER *def_serial_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, void *data) { ASN1_INTEGER *serial = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (serial == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(serial, 1)) goto err; return serial; err: TSerr(TS_F_DEF_SERIAL_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Error during serial number generation."); return NULL; } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) static int def_time_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, void *data, long *sec, long *usec) { struct timeval tv; if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) != 0) { TSerr(TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB, TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR); TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Time is not available."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE); return 0; } *sec = tv.tv_sec; *usec = tv.tv_usec; return 1; } #else static int def_time_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, void *data, long *sec, long *usec) { time_t t; if (time(&t) == (time_t)-1) { TSerr(TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB, TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR); TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Time is not available."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE); return 0; } *sec = (long)t; *usec = 0; return 1; } #endif static int def_extension_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, X509_EXTENSION *ext, void *data) { TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Unsupported extension."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* TS_RESP_CTX management functions. */ TS_RESP_CTX *TS_RESP_CTX_new() { TS_RESP_CTX *ctx; if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ctx->signer_md = EVP_sha256(); ctx->serial_cb = def_serial_cb; ctx->time_cb = def_time_cb; ctx->extension_cb = def_extension_cb; return ctx; } void TS_RESP_CTX_free(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; X509_free(ctx->signer_cert); EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->signer_key); sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free); sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(ctx->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free); ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->default_policy); sk_EVP_MD_free(ctx->mds); /* No EVP_MD_free method exists. */ ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->seconds); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->millis); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->micros); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, X509 *signer) { if (X509_check_purpose(signer, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, 0) != 1) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_SIGNER_CERT, TS_R_INVALID_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_PURPOSE); return 0; } X509_free(ctx->signer_cert); ctx->signer_cert = signer; X509_up_ref(ctx->signer_cert); return 1; } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_key(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *key) { EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->signer_key); ctx->signer_key = key; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ctx->signer_key); return 1; } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) { ctx->signer_md = md; return 1; } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *def_policy) { ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->default_policy); if ((ctx->default_policy = OBJ_dup(def_policy)) == NULL) goto err; return 1; err: TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_DEF_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs) { sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free); ctx->certs = NULL; if (!certs) return 1; if ((ctx->certs = X509_chain_up_ref(certs)) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_CERTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } int TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) { ASN1_OBJECT *copy = NULL; if (ctx->policies == NULL && (ctx->policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((copy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(ctx->policies, copy)) goto err; return 1; err: TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_OBJECT_free(copy); return 0; } int TS_RESP_CTX_add_md(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) { if (ctx->mds == NULL && (ctx->mds = sk_EVP_MD_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_EVP_MD_push(ctx->mds, md)) goto err; return 1; err: TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_MD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } #define TS_RESP_CTX_accuracy_free(ctx) \ ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->seconds); \ ctx->seconds = NULL; \ ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->millis); \ ctx->millis = NULL; \ ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->micros); \ ctx->micros = NULL; int TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int secs, int millis, int micros) { TS_RESP_CTX_accuracy_free(ctx); if (secs && ((ctx->seconds = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(ctx->seconds, secs))) goto err; if (millis && ((ctx->millis = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(ctx->millis, millis))) goto err; if (micros && ((ctx->micros = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(ctx->micros, micros))) goto err; return 1; err: TS_RESP_CTX_accuracy_free(ctx); TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_ACCURACY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } void TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int flags) { ctx->flags |= flags; } void TS_RESP_CTX_set_serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_serial_cb cb, void *data) { ctx->serial_cb = cb; ctx->serial_cb_data = data; } void TS_RESP_CTX_set_time_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_time_cb cb, void *data) { ctx->time_cb = cb; ctx->time_cb_data = data; } void TS_RESP_CTX_set_extension_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_extension_cb cb, void *data) { ctx->extension_cb = cb; ctx->extension_cb_data = data; } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int status, const char *text) { TS_STATUS_INFO *si = NULL; ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8_text = NULL; int ret = 0; if ((si = TS_STATUS_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(si->status, status)) goto err; if (text) { if ((utf8_text = ASN1_UTF8STRING_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_STRING_set(utf8_text, text, strlen(text))) goto err; if (si->text == NULL && (si->text = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push(si->text, utf8_text)) goto err; utf8_text = NULL; /* Ownership is lost. */ } if (!TS_RESP_set_status_info(ctx->response, si)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_STATUS_INFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); TS_STATUS_INFO_free(si); ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(utf8_text); return ret; } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int status, const char *text) { int ret = 1; TS_STATUS_INFO *si = ctx->response->status_info; if (ASN1_INTEGER_get(si->status) == TS_STATUS_GRANTED) { ret = TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, status, text); } return ret; } int TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int failure) { TS_STATUS_INFO *si = ctx->response->status_info; if (si->failure_info == NULL && (si->failure_info = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(si->failure_info, failure, 1)) goto err; return 1; err: TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_FAILURE_INFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } TS_REQ *TS_RESP_CTX_get_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->request; } TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_CTX_get_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->tst_info; } int TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, unsigned precision) { if (precision > TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS) return 0; ctx->clock_precision_digits = precision; return 1; } /* Main entry method of the response generation. */ TS_RESP *TS_RESP_create_response(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, BIO *req_bio) { ASN1_OBJECT *policy; TS_RESP *response; int result = 0; ts_RESP_CTX_init(ctx); if ((ctx->response = TS_RESP_new()) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } if ((ctx->request = d2i_TS_REQ_bio(req_bio, NULL)) == NULL) { TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Bad request format or system error."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT); goto end; } if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_GRANTED, NULL)) goto end; if (!ts_RESP_check_request(ctx)) goto end; if ((policy = ts_RESP_get_policy(ctx)) == NULL) goto end; if ((ctx->tst_info = ts_RESP_create_tst_info(ctx, policy)) == NULL) goto end; if (!ts_RESP_process_extensions(ctx)) goto end; if (!ts_RESP_sign(ctx)) goto end; result = 1; end: if (!result) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE, TS_R_RESPONSE_SETUP_ERROR); if (ctx->response != NULL) { if (TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Error during response " "generation.") == 0) { TS_RESP_free(ctx->response); ctx->response = NULL; } } } response = ctx->response; ctx->response = NULL; /* Ownership will be returned to caller. */ ts_RESP_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return response; } /* Initializes the variable part of the context. */ static void ts_RESP_CTX_init(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { ctx->request = NULL; ctx->response = NULL; ctx->tst_info = NULL; } /* Cleans up the variable part of the context. */ static void ts_RESP_CTX_cleanup(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { TS_REQ_free(ctx->request); ctx->request = NULL; TS_RESP_free(ctx->response); ctx->response = NULL; TS_TST_INFO_free(ctx->tst_info); ctx->tst_info = NULL; } /* Checks the format and content of the request. */ static int ts_RESP_check_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { TS_REQ *request = ctx->request; TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint; X509_ALGOR *md_alg; int md_alg_id; const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; int i; if (TS_REQ_get_version(request) != 1) { TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Bad request version."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST); return 0; } msg_imprint = request->msg_imprint; md_alg = msg_imprint->hash_algo; md_alg_id = OBJ_obj2nid(md_alg->algorithm); for (i = 0; !md && i < sk_EVP_MD_num(ctx->mds); ++i) { const EVP_MD *current_md = sk_EVP_MD_value(ctx->mds, i); if (md_alg_id == EVP_MD_type(current_md)) md = current_md; } if (!md) { TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Message digest algorithm is " "not supported."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_ALG); return 0; } if (md_alg->parameter && ASN1_TYPE_get(md_alg->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) { TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Superfluous message digest " "parameter."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_ALG); return 0; } digest = msg_imprint->hashed_msg; if (digest->length != EVP_MD_size(md)) { TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Bad message digest."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT); return 0; } return 1; } /* Returns the TSA policy based on the requested and acceptable policies. */ static ASN1_OBJECT *ts_RESP_get_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { ASN1_OBJECT *requested = ctx->request->policy_id; ASN1_OBJECT *policy = NULL; int i; if (ctx->default_policy == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); return NULL; } if (!requested || !OBJ_cmp(requested, ctx->default_policy)) policy = ctx->default_policy; /* Check if the policy is acceptable. */ for (i = 0; !policy && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ctx->policies); ++i) { ASN1_OBJECT *current = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ctx->policies, i); if (!OBJ_cmp(requested, current)) policy = current; } if (!policy) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY, TS_R_UNACCEPTABLE_POLICY); TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Requested policy is not " "supported."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY); } return policy; } /* Creates the TS_TST_INFO object based on the settings of the context. */ static TS_TST_INFO *ts_RESP_create_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, ASN1_OBJECT *policy) { int result = 0; TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *asn1_time = NULL; long sec, usec; TS_ACCURACY *accuracy = NULL; const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce; GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name = NULL; if ((tst_info = TS_TST_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto end; if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_version(tst_info, 1)) goto end; if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id(tst_info, policy)) goto end; if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint(tst_info, ctx->request->msg_imprint)) goto end; if ((serial = ctx->serial_cb(ctx, ctx->serial_cb_data)) == NULL || !TS_TST_INFO_set_serial(tst_info, serial)) goto end; if (!ctx->time_cb(ctx, ctx->time_cb_data, &sec, &usec) || (asn1_time = TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision(NULL, sec, usec, ctx->clock_precision_digits)) == NULL || !TS_TST_INFO_set_time(tst_info, asn1_time)) goto end; if ((ctx->seconds || ctx->millis || ctx->micros) && (accuracy = TS_ACCURACY_new()) == NULL) goto end; if (ctx->seconds && !TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds(accuracy, ctx->seconds)) goto end; if (ctx->millis && !TS_ACCURACY_set_millis(accuracy, ctx->millis)) goto end; if (ctx->micros && !TS_ACCURACY_set_micros(accuracy, ctx->micros)) goto end; if (accuracy && !TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy(tst_info, accuracy)) goto end; if ((ctx->flags & TS_ORDERING) && !TS_TST_INFO_set_ordering(tst_info, 1)) goto end; if ((nonce = ctx->request->nonce) != NULL && !TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce(tst_info, nonce)) goto end; if (ctx->flags & TS_TSA_NAME) { if ((tsa_name = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL) goto end; tsa_name->type = GEN_DIRNAME; tsa_name->d.dirn = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->signer_cert)); if (!tsa_name->d.dirn) goto end; if (!TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa(tst_info, tsa_name)) goto end; } result = 1; end: if (!result) { TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info); tst_info = NULL; TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_TST_INFO, TS_R_TST_INFO_SETUP_ERROR); TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Error during TSTInfo " "generation."); } GENERAL_NAME_free(tsa_name); TS_ACCURACY_free(accuracy); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(asn1_time); ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial); return tst_info; } /* Processing the extensions of the request. */ static int ts_RESP_process_extensions(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = ctx->request->extensions; int i; int ok = 1; for (i = 0; ok && i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); ++i) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); /* * The last argument was previously (void *)ctx->extension_cb, * but ISO C doesn't permit converting a function pointer to void *. * For lack of better information, I'm placing a NULL there instead. * The callback can pick its own address out from the ctx anyway... */ ok = (*ctx->extension_cb) (ctx, ext, NULL); } return ok; } /* Functions for signing the TS_TST_INFO structure of the context. */ static int ts_RESP_sign(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; /* Certificates to include in sc. */ ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *oid; BIO *p7bio = NULL; int i; if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->signer_cert, ctx->signer_key)) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_signed)) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7->d.sign->version, 3)) goto err; if (ctx->request->cert_req) { PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, ctx->signer_cert); if (ctx->certs) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->certs); ++i) { X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->certs, i); PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, cert); } } } if ((si = PKCS7_add_signature(p7, ctx->signer_cert, ctx->signer_key, ctx->signer_md)) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR); goto err; } oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo); if (!PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid)) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNED_ATTR_ERROR); goto err; } certs = ctx->flags & TS_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN ? ctx->certs : NULL; if ((sc = ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init(ctx->signer_cert, certs)) == NULL) goto err; if (!ESS_add_signing_cert(si, sc)) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ts_TST_INFO_content_new(p7)) goto err; if ((p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(p7, NULL)) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio(p7bio, ctx->tst_info)) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_TS_DATASIGN); goto err; } if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7, p7bio)) { TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN, TS_R_TS_DATASIGN); goto err; } TS_RESP_set_tst_info(ctx->response, p7, ctx->tst_info); p7 = NULL; /* Ownership is lost. */ ctx->tst_info = NULL; /* Ownership is lost. */ ret = 1; err: if (!ret) TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Error during signature " "generation."); BIO_free_all(p7bio); ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(sc); PKCS7_free(p7); return ret; } static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ess_SIGNING_CERT_new_init(X509 *signcert, STACK_OF(X509) *certs) { ESS_CERT_ID *cid; ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc = NULL; int i; if ((sc = ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (sc->cert_ids == NULL && (sc->cert_ids = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((cid = ess_CERT_ID_new_init(signcert, 0)) == NULL || !sk_ESS_CERT_ID_push(sc->cert_ids, cid)) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); ++i) { X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if ((cid = ess_CERT_ID_new_init(cert, 1)) == NULL || !sk_ESS_CERT_ID_push(sc->cert_ids, cid)) goto err; } return sc; err: ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(sc); TSerr(TS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_NEW_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } static ESS_CERT_ID *ess_CERT_ID_new_init(X509 *cert, int issuer_needed) { ESS_CERT_ID *cid = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *name = NULL; unsigned char cert_sha1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0); if ((cid = ESS_CERT_ID_new()) == NULL) goto err; X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), cert_sha1, NULL); if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cid->hash, cert_sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; /* Setting the issuer/serial if requested. */ if (issuer_needed) { if (cid->issuer_serial == NULL && (cid->issuer_serial = ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((name = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL) goto err; name->type = GEN_DIRNAME; if ((name->d.dirn = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_issuer_name(cert))) == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(cid->issuer_serial->issuer, name)) goto err; name = NULL; /* Ownership is lost. */ ASN1_INTEGER_free(cid->issuer_serial->serial); if (!(cid->issuer_serial->serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))) goto err; } return cid; err: GENERAL_NAME_free(name); ESS_CERT_ID_free(cid); TSerr(TS_F_ESS_CERT_ID_NEW_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } static int ts_TST_INFO_content_new(PKCS7 *p7) { PKCS7 *ret = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet_string = NULL; /* Create new encapsulated NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo content. */ if ((ret = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->d.other = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo); if ((octet_string = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto err; ASN1_TYPE_set(ret->d.other, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, octet_string); octet_string = NULL; /* Add encapsulated content to signed PKCS7 structure. */ if (!PKCS7_set_content(p7, ret)) goto err; return 1; err: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet_string); PKCS7_free(ret); return 0; } static int ESS_add_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ESS_SIGNING_CERT *sc) { ASN1_STRING *seq = NULL; unsigned char *p, *pp = NULL; int len; len = i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(sc, NULL); if ((pp = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { TSerr(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = pp; i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(sc, &p); if ((seq = ASN1_STRING_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_STRING_set(seq, pp, len)) { TSerr(TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(pp); pp = NULL; return PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, seq); err: ASN1_STRING_free(seq); OPENSSL_free(pp); return 0; } static ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *TS_RESP_set_genTime_with_precision(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *asn1_time, long sec, long usec, unsigned precision) { time_t time_sec = (time_t)sec; struct tm *tm = NULL; char genTime_str[17 + TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS]; char *p = genTime_str; char *p_end = genTime_str + sizeof(genTime_str); if (precision > TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS) goto err; if ((tm = gmtime(&time_sec)) == NULL) goto err; /* * Put "genTime_str" in GeneralizedTime format. We work around the * restrictions imposed by rfc3280 (i.e. "GeneralizedTime values MUST * NOT include fractional seconds") and OpenSSL related functions to * meet the rfc3161 requirement: "GeneralizedTime syntax can include * fraction-of-second details". */ p += BIO_snprintf(p, p_end - p, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", tm->tm_year + 1900, tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, tm->tm_sec); if (precision > 0) { BIO_snprintf(p, 2 + precision, ".%06ld", usec); p += strlen(p); /* * To make things a bit harder, X.690 | ISO/IEC 8825-1 provides the * following restrictions for a DER-encoding, which OpenSSL * (specifically ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() function) doesn't * support: "The encoding MUST terminate with a "Z" (which means * "Zulu" time). The decimal point element, if present, MUST be the * point option ".". The fractional-seconds elements, if present, * MUST omit all trailing 0's; if the elements correspond to 0, they * MUST be wholly omitted, and the decimal point element also MUST be * omitted." */ /* * Remove trailing zeros. The dot guarantees the exit condition of * this loop even if all the digits are zero. */ while (*--p == '0') continue; if (*p != '.') ++p; } *p++ = 'Z'; *p++ = '\0'; if (asn1_time == NULL && (asn1_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(asn1_time, genTime_str)) { ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(asn1_time); goto err; } return asn1_time; err: TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_GENTIME_WITH_PRECISION, TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_TIME); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c0000644000000000000000000000655113176625660017066 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "ts_lcl.h" TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void) { TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ctx; } void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f) { ctx->flags |= f; return ctx->flags; } int TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f) { ctx->flags = f; return ctx->flags; } BIO *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, BIO *b) { ctx->data = b; return ctx->data; } X509_STORE *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *s) { ctx->store = s; return ctx->store; } STACK_OF(X509) *TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs) { ctx->certs = certs; return ctx->certs; } unsigned char *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *hexstr, long len) { ctx->imprint = hexstr; ctx->imprint_len = len; return ctx->imprint; } void TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; X509_STORE_free(ctx->store); sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free); ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->policy); X509_ALGOR_free(ctx->md_alg); OPENSSL_free(ctx->imprint); BIO_free_all(ctx->data); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->nonce); GENERAL_NAME_free(ctx->tsa_name); TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(ctx); } TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(TS_REQ *req, TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { TS_VERIFY_CTX *ret = ctx; ASN1_OBJECT *policy; TS_MSG_IMPRINT *imprint; X509_ALGOR *md_alg; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg; const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce; OPENSSL_assert(req != NULL); if (ret) TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ret); else if ((ret = TS_VERIFY_CTX_new()) == NULL) return NULL; ret->flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE); if ((policy = req->policy_id) != NULL) { if ((ret->policy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL) goto err; } else ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_POLICY; imprint = req->msg_imprint; md_alg = imprint->hash_algo; if ((ret->md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg)) == NULL) goto err; msg = imprint->hashed_msg; ret->imprint_len = ASN1_STRING_length(msg); if ((ret->imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(ret->imprint_len)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->imprint, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(msg), ret->imprint_len); if ((nonce = req->nonce) != NULL) { if ((ret->nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce)) == NULL) goto err; } else ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_NONCE; return ret; err: if (ctx) TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx); else TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014650 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_ctrl.c0000644000000000000000000002661213176625657016620 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" /* * When querying a ENGINE-specific control command's 'description', this * string is used if the ENGINE_CMD_DEFN has cmd_desc set to NULL. */ static const char *int_no_description = ""; /* * These internal functions handle 'CMD'-related control commands when the * ENGINE in question has asked us to take care of it (ie. the ENGINE did not * set the ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag. */ static int int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defn) { if ((defn->cmd_num == 0) || (defn->cmd_name == NULL)) return 1; return 0; } static int int_ctrl_cmd_by_name(const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defn, const char *s) { int idx = 0; while (!int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(defn) && (strcmp(defn->cmd_name, s) != 0)) { idx++; defn++; } if (int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(defn)) /* The given name wasn't found */ return -1; return idx; } static int int_ctrl_cmd_by_num(const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defn, unsigned int num) { int idx = 0; /* * NB: It is stipulated that 'cmd_defn' lists are ordered by cmd_num. So * our searches don't need to take any longer than necessary. */ while (!int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(defn) && (defn->cmd_num < num)) { idx++; defn++; } if (defn->cmd_num == num) return idx; /* The given cmd_num wasn't found */ return -1; } static int int_ctrl_helper(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) { int idx; char *s = (char *)p; /* Take care of the easy one first (eg. it requires no searches) */ if (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE) { if ((e->cmd_defns == NULL) || int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(e->cmd_defns)) return 0; return e->cmd_defns->cmd_num; } /* One or two commands require that "p" be a valid string buffer */ if ((cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME) || (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD) || (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD)) { if (s == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return -1; } } /* Now handle cmd_name -> cmd_num conversion */ if (cmd == ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME) { if ((e->cmd_defns == NULL) || ((idx = int_ctrl_cmd_by_name(e->cmd_defns, s)) < 0)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME); return -1; } return e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_num; } /* * For the rest of the commands, the 'long' argument must specify a valid * command number - so we need to conduct a search. */ if ((e->cmd_defns == NULL) || ((idx = int_ctrl_cmd_by_num(e->cmd_defns, (unsigned int) i)) < 0)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER); return -1; } /* Now the logic splits depending on command type */ switch (cmd) { case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE: idx++; if (int_ctrl_cmd_is_null(e->cmd_defns + idx)) /* end-of-list */ return 0; else return e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_num; case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD: return strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_name); case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD: return BIO_snprintf(s, strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_name) + 1, "%s", e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_name); case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD: if (e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc) return strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc); return strlen(int_no_description); case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD: if (e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc) return BIO_snprintf(s, strlen(e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc) + 1, "%s", e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_desc); return BIO_snprintf(s, strlen(int_no_description) + 1, "%s", int_no_description); case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS: return e->cmd_defns[idx].cmd_flags; } /* Shouldn't really be here ... */ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return -1; } int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) { int ctrl_exists, ref_exists; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ref_exists = ((e->struct_ref > 0) ? 1 : 0); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); ctrl_exists = ((e->ctrl == NULL) ? 0 : 1); if (!ref_exists) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NO_REFERENCE); return 0; } /* * Intercept any "root-level" commands before trying to hand them on to * ctrl() handlers. */ switch (cmd) { case ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION: return ctrl_exists; case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE: case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE: case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME: case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD: case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD: case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD: case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD: case ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS: if (ctrl_exists && !(e->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL)) return int_ctrl_helper(e, cmd, i, p, f); if (!ctrl_exists) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION); /* * For these cmd-related functions, failure is indicated by a -1 * return value (because 0 is used as a valid return in some * places). */ return -1; } default: break; } /* Anything else requires a ctrl() handler to exist. */ if (!ctrl_exists) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION); return 0; } return e->ctrl(e, cmd, i, p, f); } int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd) { int flags; if ((flags = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, cmd, NULL, NULL)) < 0) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CMD_IS_EXECUTABLE, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER); return 0; } if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) && !(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC) && !(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING)) return 0; return 1; } int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void), int cmd_optional) { int num; if (e == NULL || cmd_name == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (e->ctrl == NULL || (num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME, 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) <= 0) { /* * If the command didn't *have* to be supported, we fake success. * This allows certain settings to be specified for multiple ENGINEs * and only require a change of ENGINE id (without having to * selectively apply settings). Eg. changing from a hardware device * back to the regular software ENGINE without editing the config * file, etc. */ if (cmd_optional) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME); return 0; } /* * Force the result of the control command to 0 or 1, for the reasons * mentioned before. */ if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, i, p, f) > 0) return 1; return 0; } int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg, int cmd_optional) { int num, flags; long l; char *ptr; if (e == NULL || cmd_name == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (e->ctrl == NULL || (num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME, 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) <= 0) { /* * If the command didn't *have* to be supported, we fake success. * This allows certain settings to be specified for multiple ENGINEs * and only require a change of ENGINE id (without having to * selectively apply settings). Eg. changing from a hardware device * back to the regular software ENGINE without editing the config * file, etc. */ if (cmd_optional) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME); return 0; } if (!ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(e, num)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_CMD_NOT_EXECUTABLE); return 0; } flags = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, num, NULL, NULL); if (flags < 0) { /* * Shouldn't happen, given that ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() returned * success. */ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } /* * If the command takes no input, there must be no input. And vice versa. */ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) { if (arg != NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_NO_INPUT); return 0; } /* * We deliberately force the result of ENGINE_ctrl() to 0 or 1 rather * than returning it as "return data". This is to ensure usage of * these commands is consistent across applications and that certain * applications don't understand it one way, and others another. */ if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, 0, (void *)arg, NULL) > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* So, we require input */ if (arg == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_INPUT); return 0; } /* If it takes string input, that's easy */ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING) { /* Same explanation as above */ if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, 0, (void *)arg, NULL) > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * If it doesn't take numeric either, then it is unsupported for use in a * config-setting situation, which is what this function is for. This * should never happen though, because ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() was * used. */ if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } l = strtol(arg, &ptr, 10); if ((arg == ptr) || (*ptr != '\0')) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING, ENGINE_R_ARGUMENT_IS_NOT_A_NUMBER); return 0; } /* * Force the result of the control command to 0 or 1, for the reasons * mentioned before. */ if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, num, l, NULL, NULL) > 0) return 1; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_digest.c0000644000000000000000000000463613176625657016771 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" static ENGINE_TABLE *digest_table = NULL; void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&digest_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_digests(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&digest_table); } int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e) { if (e->digests) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->digests(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&digest_table, engine_unregister_all_digests, e, nids, num_nids, 0); } return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_digests() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_digests(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e) { if (e->digests) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->digests(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&digest_table, engine_unregister_all_digests, e, nids, num_nids, 1); } return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references) for a given digest 'nid' */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid) { return engine_table_select(&digest_table, nid); } /* Obtains a digest implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid) { const EVP_MD *ret; ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_digests(e); if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_DIGEST, ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_DIGEST); return NULL; } return ret; } /* Gets the digest callback from an ENGINE structure */ ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e) { return e->digests; } /* Sets the digest callback in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f) { e->digests = f; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_int.h0000644000000000000000000001446013176625657016451 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_ENGINE_INT_H # define HEADER_ENGINE_INT_H # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *global_engine_lock; /* * If we compile with this symbol defined, then both reference counts in the * ENGINE structure will be monitored with a line of output on stderr for * each change. This prints the engine's pointer address (truncated to * unsigned int), "struct" or "funct" to indicate the reference type, the * before and after reference count, and the file:line-number pair. The * "engine_ref_debug" statements must come *after* the change. */ # ifdef ENGINE_REF_COUNT_DEBUG # define engine_ref_debug(e, isfunct, diff) \ fprintf(stderr, "engine: %08x %s from %d to %d (%s:%d)\n", \ (unsigned int)(e), (isfunct ? "funct" : "struct"), \ ((isfunct) ? ((e)->funct_ref - (diff)) : ((e)->struct_ref - (diff))), \ ((isfunct) ? (e)->funct_ref : (e)->struct_ref), \ (OPENSSL_FILE), (OPENSSL_LINE)) # else # define engine_ref_debug(e, isfunct, diff) # endif /* * Any code that will need cleanup operations should use these functions to * register callbacks. engine_cleanup_int() will call all registered * callbacks in order. NB: both the "add" functions assume the engine lock to * already be held (in "write" mode). */ typedef void (ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB) (void); typedef struct st_engine_cleanup_item { ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb; } ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM; DEFINE_STACK_OF(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM) void engine_cleanup_add_first(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb); void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb); /* We need stacks of ENGINEs for use in eng_table.c */ DEFINE_STACK_OF(ENGINE) /* * If this symbol is defined then engine_table_select(), the function that is * used by RSA, DSA (etc) code to select registered ENGINEs, cache defaults * and functional references (etc), will display debugging summaries to * stderr. */ /* #define ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG */ /* * This represents an implementation table. Dependent code should instantiate * it as a (ENGINE_TABLE *) pointer value set initially to NULL. */ typedef struct st_engine_table ENGINE_TABLE; int engine_table_register(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cleanup, ENGINE *e, const int *nids, int num_nids, int setdefault); void engine_table_unregister(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE *e); void engine_table_cleanup(ENGINE_TABLE **table); # ifndef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG ENGINE *engine_table_select(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid); # else ENGINE *engine_table_select_tmp(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid, const char *f, int l); # define engine_table_select(t,n) engine_table_select_tmp(t,n,OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # endif typedef void (engine_table_doall_cb) (int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk, ENGINE *def, void *arg); void engine_table_doall(ENGINE_TABLE *table, engine_table_doall_cb *cb, void *arg); /* * Internal versions of API functions that have control over locking. These * are used between C files when functionality needs to be shared but the * caller may already be controlling of the engine lock. */ int engine_unlocked_init(ENGINE *e); int engine_unlocked_finish(ENGINE *e, int unlock_for_handlers); int engine_free_util(ENGINE *e, int locked); /* * This function will reset all "set"able values in an ENGINE to NULL. This * won't touch reference counts or ex_data, but is equivalent to calling all * the ENGINE_set_***() functions with a NULL value. */ void engine_set_all_null(ENGINE *e); /* * NB: Bitwise OR-able values for the "flags" variable in ENGINE are now * exposed in engine.h. */ /* Free up dynamically allocated public key methods associated with ENGINE */ void engine_pkey_meths_free(ENGINE *e); void engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(ENGINE *e); /* Once initialisation function */ extern CRYPTO_ONCE engine_lock_init; DECLARE_RUN_ONCE(do_engine_lock_init) /* * This is a structure for storing implementations of various crypto * algorithms and functions. */ struct engine_st { const char *id; const char *name; const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth; const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth; const DH_METHOD *dh_meth; const EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth; const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth; /* Cipher handling is via this callback */ ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ciphers; /* Digest handling is via this callback */ ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR digests; /* Public key handling via this callback */ ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR pkey_meths; /* ASN1 public key handling via this callback */ ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR pkey_asn1_meths; ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy; ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init; ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish; ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl; ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR load_privkey; ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR load_pubkey; ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR load_ssl_client_cert; const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *cmd_defns; int flags; /* reference count on the structure itself */ int struct_ref; /* * reference count on usability of the engine type. NB: This controls the * loading and initialisation of any functionality required by this * engine, whereas the previous count is simply to cope with * (de)allocation of this structure. Hence, running_ref <= struct_ref at * all times. */ int funct_ref; /* A place to store per-ENGINE data */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* Used to maintain the linked-list of engines. */ struct engine_st *prev; struct engine_st *next; }; typedef struct st_engine_pile ENGINE_PILE; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(ENGINE_PILE); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_ENGINE_INT_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_err.c0000644000000000000000000001345413176625657016444 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ENGINE,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ENGINE,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA ENGINE_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL), "dynamic_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX), "dynamic_get_data_ctx"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD), "dynamic_load"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX), "dynamic_set_data_ctx"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD), "ENGINE_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID), "ENGINE_by_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CMD_IS_EXECUTABLE), "ENGINE_cmd_is_executable"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL), "ENGINE_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD), "ENGINE_ctrl_cmd"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING), "ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_FINISH), "ENGINE_finish"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_CIPHER), "ENGINE_get_cipher"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_DIGEST), "ENGINE_get_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_FIRST), "ENGINE_get_first"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_LAST), "ENGINE_get_last"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT), "ENGINE_get_next"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_ASN1_METH), "ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_METH), "ENGINE_get_pkey_meth"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV), "ENGINE_get_prev"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT), "ENGINE_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD), "engine_list_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE), "engine_list_remove"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY), "ENGINE_load_private_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY), "ENGINE_load_public_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT), "ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW), "ENGINE_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_FIND_STR), "ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE), "ENGINE_remove"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_DEFAULT_STRING), "ENGINE_set_default_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID), "ENGINE_set_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME), "ENGINE_set_name"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_TABLE_REGISTER), "engine_table_register"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UNLOCKED_FINISH), "engine_unlocked_finish"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF), "ENGINE_up_ref"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER), "int_ctrl_helper"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE), "int_engine_configure"}, {ERR_FUNC(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT), "int_engine_module_init"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ENGINE_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED), "already loaded"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ARGUMENT_IS_NOT_A_NUMBER), "argument is not a number"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_CMD_NOT_EXECUTABLE), "cmd not executable"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_INPUT), "command takes input"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_NO_INPUT), "command takes no input"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID), "conflicting engine id"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED), "ctrl command not implemented"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE), "DSO failure"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND), "dso not found"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINES_SECTION_ERROR), "engines section error"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINE_CONFIGURATION_ERROR), "engine configuration error"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST), "engine is not in the list"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ENGINE_SECTION_ERROR), "engine section error"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY), "failed loading private key"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY), "failed loading public key"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED), "finish failed"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING), "'id' or 'name' missing"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED), "init failed"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR), "internal list error"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT), "invalid argument"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME), "invalid cmd name"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER), "invalid cmd number"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_INIT_VALUE), "invalid init value"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_INVALID_STRING), "invalid string"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED), "not initialised"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED), "not loaded"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION), "no control function"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX), "no index"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION), "no load function"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_REFERENCE), "no reference"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE), "no such engine"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_CIPHER), "unimplemented cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_DIGEST), "unimplemented digest"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD), "unimplemented public key method"}, {ERR_REASON(ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY), "version incompatibility"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_ENGINE_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(ENGINE_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, ENGINE_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, ENGINE_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/build.info0000644000000000000000000000054713176625657016632 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ eng_err.c eng_lib.c eng_list.c eng_init.c eng_ctrl.c \ eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \ tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_dh.c tb_rand.c \ tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c tb_eckey.c \ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ eng_rdrand.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_rsa.c0000644000000000000000000000344313176625657016272 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" static ENGINE_TABLE *rsa_table = NULL; static const int dummy_nid = 1; void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&rsa_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_RSA(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&rsa_table); } int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e) { if (e->rsa_meth) return engine_table_register(&rsa_table, engine_unregister_all_RSA, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 0); return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_RSA() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_RSA(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e) { if (e->rsa_meth) return engine_table_register(&rsa_table, engine_unregister_all_RSA, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 1); return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void) { return engine_table_select(&rsa_table, dummy_nid); } /* Obtains an RSA implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e) { return e->rsa_meth; } /* Sets an RSA implementation in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth) { e->rsa_meth = rsa_meth; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_rdrand.c0000644000000000000000000000474113176625657017125 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void); static int get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { size_t rnd; while (num >= (int)sizeof(size_t)) { if ((rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand()) == 0) return 0; *((size_t *)buf) = rnd; buf += sizeof(size_t); num -= sizeof(size_t); } if (num) { if ((rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand()) == 0) return 0; memcpy(buf, &rnd, num); } return 1; } static int random_status(void) { return 1; } static RAND_METHOD rdrand_meth = { NULL, /* seed */ get_random_bytes, NULL, /* cleanup */ NULL, /* add */ get_random_bytes, random_status, }; static int rdrand_init(ENGINE *e) { return 1; } static const char *engine_e_rdrand_id = "rdrand"; static const char *engine_e_rdrand_name = "Intel RDRAND engine"; static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e) { if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rdrand_id) || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rdrand_name) || !ENGINE_set_flags(e, ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL) || !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, rdrand_init) || !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &rdrand_meth)) return 0; return 1; } static ENGINE *ENGINE_rdrand(void) { ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!bind_helper(ret)) { ENGINE_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void engine_load_rdrand_int(void) { extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) { ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rdrand(); if (!toadd) return; ENGINE_add(toadd); ENGINE_free(toadd); ERR_clear_error(); } } #else void engine_load_rdrand_int(void) { } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_dh.c0000644000000000000000000000341013176625657016072 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" static ENGINE_TABLE *dh_table = NULL; static const int dummy_nid = 1; void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&dh_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_DH(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&dh_table); } int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e) { if (e->dh_meth) return engine_table_register(&dh_table, engine_unregister_all_DH, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 0); return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_DH() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_DH(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e) { if (e->dh_meth) return engine_table_register(&dh_table, engine_unregister_all_DH, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 1); return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void) { return engine_table_select(&dh_table, dummy_nid); } /* Obtains an DH implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e) { return e->dh_meth; } /* Sets an DH implementation in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth) { e->dh_meth = dh_meth; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_rand.c0000644000000000000000000000347613176625657016437 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" static ENGINE_TABLE *rand_table = NULL; static const int dummy_nid = 1; void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&rand_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_RAND(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&rand_table); } int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e) { if (e->rand_meth) return engine_table_register(&rand_table, engine_unregister_all_RAND, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 0); return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_RAND() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_RAND(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e) { if (e->rand_meth) return engine_table_register(&rand_table, engine_unregister_all_RAND, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 1); return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void) { return engine_table_select(&rand_table, dummy_nid); } /* Obtains an RAND implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e) { return e->rand_meth; } /* Sets an RAND implementation in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth) { e->rand_meth = rand_meth; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_all.c0000644000000000000000000000167613176625657016427 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "eng_int.h" void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void) { /* Some ENGINEs need this */ OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(); OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN, NULL); } #if (defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED) void ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev(void) { static int bsd_cryptodev_default_loaded = 0; if (!bsd_cryptodev_default_loaded) { OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV, NULL); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); } bsd_cryptodev_default_loaded = 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c0000644000000000000000000004226613176625657016451 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" #include "internal/dso.h" #include /* * Shared libraries implementing ENGINEs for use by the "dynamic" ENGINE * loader should implement the hook-up functions with the following * prototypes. */ /* Our ENGINE handlers */ static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e); static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e); static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); /* Predeclare our context type */ typedef struct st_dynamic_data_ctx dynamic_data_ctx; /* The implementation for the important control command */ static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx); #define DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE #define DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_ID (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 5) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 6) /* The constants used when creating the ENGINE */ static const char *engine_dynamic_id = "dynamic"; static const char *engine_dynamic_name = "Dynamic engine loading support"; static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN dynamic_cmd_defns[] = { {DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH, "SO_PATH", "Specifies the path to the new ENGINE shared library", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK, "NO_VCHECK", "Specifies to continue even if version checking fails (boolean)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_ID, "ID", "Specifies an ENGINE id name for loading", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD, "LIST_ADD", "Whether to add a loaded ENGINE to the internal list (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD, "DIR_LOAD", "Specifies whether to load from 'DIR_ADD' directories (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD, "DIR_ADD", "Adds a directory from which ENGINEs can be loaded", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD, "LOAD", "Load up the ENGINE specified by other settings", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT}, {0, NULL, NULL, 0} }; /* * Loading code stores state inside the ENGINE structure via the "ex_data" * element. We load all our state into a single structure and use that as a * single context in the "ex_data" stack. */ struct st_dynamic_data_ctx { /* The DSO object we load that supplies the ENGINE code */ DSO *dynamic_dso; /* * The function pointer to the version checking shared library function */ dynamic_v_check_fn v_check; /* * The function pointer to the engine-binding shared library function */ dynamic_bind_engine bind_engine; /* The default name/path for loading the shared library */ char *DYNAMIC_LIBNAME; /* Whether to continue loading on a version check failure */ int no_vcheck; /* If non-NULL, stipulates the 'id' of the ENGINE to be loaded */ char *engine_id; /* * If non-zero, a successfully loaded ENGINE should be added to the * internal ENGINE list. If 2, the add must succeed or the entire load * should fail. */ int list_add_value; /* The symbol name for the version checking function */ const char *DYNAMIC_F1; /* The symbol name for the "initialise ENGINE structure" function */ const char *DYNAMIC_F2; /* * Whether to never use 'dirs', use 'dirs' as a fallback, or only use * 'dirs' for loading. Default is to use 'dirs' as a fallback. */ int dir_load; /* A stack of directories from which ENGINEs could be loaded */ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dirs; }; /* * This is the "ex_data" index we obtain and reserve for use with our context * structure. */ static int dynamic_ex_data_idx = -1; static void int_free_str(char *s) { OPENSSL_free(s); } /* * Because our ex_data element may or may not get allocated depending on * whether a "first-use" occurs before the ENGINE is freed, we have a memory * leak problem to solve. We can't declare a "new" handler for the ex_data as * we don't want a dynamic_data_ctx in *all* ENGINE structures of all types * (this is a bug in the design of CRYPTO_EX_DATA). As such, we just declare * a "free" handler and that will get called if an ENGINE is being destroyed * and there was an ex_data element corresponding to our context type. */ static void dynamic_data_ctx_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { if (ptr) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ptr; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME); OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(ctx->dirs, int_free_str); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } } /* * Construct the per-ENGINE context. We create it blindly and then use a lock * to check for a race - if so, all but one of the threads "racing" will have * wasted their time. The alternative involves creating everything inside the * lock which is far worse. */ static int dynamic_set_data_ctx(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx **ctx) { dynamic_data_ctx *c = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*c)); int ret = 1; if (c == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } c->dirs = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (c->dirs == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(c); return 0; } c->DYNAMIC_F1 = "v_check"; c->DYNAMIC_F2 = "bind_engine"; c->dir_load = 1; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if ((*ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx)) == NULL) { /* Good, we're the first */ ret = ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx, c); if (ret) { *ctx = c; c = NULL; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* * If we lost the race to set the context, c is non-NULL and *ctx is the * context of the thread that won. */ if (c) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(c->dirs); OPENSSL_free(c); return ret; } /* * This function retrieves the context structure from an ENGINE's "ex_data", * or if it doesn't exist yet, sets it up. */ static dynamic_data_ctx *dynamic_get_data_ctx(ENGINE *e) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx; if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) { /* * Create and register the ENGINE ex_data, and associate our "free" * function with it to ensure any allocated contexts get freed when * an ENGINE goes underground. */ int new_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, dynamic_data_ctx_free_func); if (new_idx == -1) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX, ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); /* Avoid a race by checking again inside this lock */ if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) { /* Good, someone didn't beat us to it */ dynamic_ex_data_idx = new_idx; new_idx = -1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* * In theory we could "give back" the index here if (new_idx>-1), but * it's not possible and wouldn't gain us much if it were. */ } ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx); /* Check if the context needs to be created */ if ((ctx == NULL) && !dynamic_set_data_ctx(e, &ctx)) /* "set_data" will set errors if necessary */ return NULL; return ctx; } static ENGINE *engine_dynamic(void) { ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!ENGINE_set_id(ret, engine_dynamic_id) || !ENGINE_set_name(ret, engine_dynamic_name) || !ENGINE_set_init_function(ret, dynamic_init) || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(ret, dynamic_finish) || !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ret, dynamic_ctrl) || !ENGINE_set_flags(ret, ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) || !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ret, dynamic_cmd_defns)) { ENGINE_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void engine_load_dynamic_int(void) { ENGINE *toadd = engine_dynamic(); if (!toadd) return; ENGINE_add(toadd); /* * If the "add" worked, it gets a structural reference. So either way, we * release our just-created reference. */ ENGINE_free(toadd); /* * If the "add" didn't work, it was probably a conflict because it was * already added (eg. someone calling ENGINE_load_blah then calling * ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() perhaps). */ ERR_clear_error(); } static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e) { /* * We always return failure - the "dynamic" engine itself can't be used * for anything. */ return 0; } static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e) { /* * This should never be called on account of "dynamic_init" always * failing. */ return 0; } static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = dynamic_get_data_ctx(e); int initialised; if (!ctx) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED); return 0; } initialised = ((ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); /* All our control commands require the ENGINE to be uninitialised */ if (initialised) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED); return 0; } switch (cmd) { case DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) p = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME); if (p) ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = OPENSSL_strdup(p); else ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = NULL; return (ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME ? 1 : 0); case DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK: ctx->no_vcheck = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1); return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_ID: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) p = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id); if (p) ctx->engine_id = OPENSSL_strdup(p); else ctx->engine_id = NULL; return (ctx->engine_id ? 1 : 0); case DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD: if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } ctx->list_add_value = (int)i; return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD: return dynamic_load(e, ctx); case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD: if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } ctx->dir_load = (int)i; return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (!p || (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } { char *tmp_str = OPENSSL_strdup(p); if (tmp_str == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ctx->dirs, tmp_str)) { OPENSSL_free(tmp_str); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } return 1; default: break; } ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } static int int_load(dynamic_data_ctx *ctx) { int num, loop; /* Unless told not to, try a direct load */ if ((ctx->dir_load != 2) && (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, NULL, 0)) != NULL) return 1; /* If we're not allowed to use 'dirs' or we have none, fail */ if (!ctx->dir_load || (num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(ctx->dirs)) < 1) return 0; for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) { const char *s = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(ctx->dirs, loop); char *merge = DSO_merge(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, s); if (!merge) return 0; if (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso, merge, NULL, 0)) { /* Found what we're looking for */ OPENSSL_free(merge); return 1; } OPENSSL_free(merge); } return 0; } static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx) { ENGINE cpy; dynamic_fns fns; if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) ctx->dynamic_dso = DSO_new(); if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) return 0; if (!ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME) { if (!ctx->engine_id) return 0; DSO_ctrl(ctx->dynamic_dso, DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY, NULL); ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = DSO_convert_filename(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->engine_id); } if (!int_load(ctx)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND); DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; return 0; } /* We have to find a bind function otherwise it'll always end badly */ if (! (ctx->bind_engine = (dynamic_bind_engine) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_F2))) { ctx->bind_engine = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Do we perform version checking? */ if (!ctx->no_vcheck) { unsigned long vcheck_res = 0; /* * Now we try to find a version checking function and decide how to * cope with failure if/when it fails. */ ctx->v_check = (dynamic_v_check_fn) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_F1); if (ctx->v_check) vcheck_res = ctx->v_check(OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION); /* * We fail if the version checker veto'd the load *or* if it is * deferring to us (by returning its version) and we think it is too * old. */ if (vcheck_res < OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST) { /* Fail */ ctx->bind_engine = NULL; ctx->v_check = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY); return 0; } } /* * First binary copy the ENGINE structure so that we can roll back if the * hand-over fails */ memcpy(&cpy, e, sizeof(ENGINE)); /* * Provide the ERR, "ex_data", memory, and locking callbacks so the * loaded library uses our state rather than its own. FIXME: As noted in * engine.h, much of this would be simplified if each area of code * provided its own "summary" structure of all related callbacks. It * would also increase opaqueness. */ fns.static_state = ENGINE_get_static_state(); CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(&fns.mem_fns.malloc_fn, &fns.mem_fns.realloc_fn, &fns.mem_fns.free_fn); /* * Now that we've loaded the dynamic engine, make sure no "dynamic" * ENGINE elements will show through. */ engine_set_all_null(e); /* Try to bind the ENGINE onto our own ENGINE structure */ if (!ctx->bind_engine(e, ctx->engine_id, &fns)) { ctx->bind_engine = NULL; ctx->v_check = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED); /* Copy the original ENGINE structure back */ memcpy(e, &cpy, sizeof(ENGINE)); return 0; } /* Do we try to add this ENGINE to the internal list too? */ if (ctx->list_add_value > 0) { if (!ENGINE_add(e)) { /* Do we tolerate this or fail? */ if (ctx->list_add_value > 1) { /* * Fail - NB: By this time, it's too late to rollback, and * trying to do so allows the bind_engine() code to have * created leaks. We just have to fail where we are, after * the ENGINE has changed. */ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID); return 0; } /* Tolerate */ ERR_clear_error(); } } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_asnmth.c0000644000000000000000000001374113176625657017001 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" /* * If this symbol is defined then ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(), the * function that is used by EVP to hook in pkey_asn1_meth code and cache * defaults (etc), will display brief debugging summaries to stderr with the * 'nid'. */ /* #define ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METH_DEBUG */ static ENGINE_TABLE *pkey_asn1_meth_table = NULL; void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&pkey_asn1_meth_table); } int ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e) { if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths, e, nids, num_nids, 0); } return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void) { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e) { if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, engine_unregister_all_pkey_asn1_meths, e, nids, num_nids, 1); } return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references) for a given pkey_asn1_meth 'nid' */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(int nid) { return engine_table_select(&pkey_asn1_meth_table, nid); } /* * Obtains a pkey_asn1_meth implementation from an ENGINE functional * reference */ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid) { EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ret; ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(e); if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_ASN1_METH, ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD); return NULL; } return ret; } /* Gets the pkey_asn1_meth callback from an ENGINE structure */ ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(const ENGINE *e) { return e->pkey_asn1_meths; } /* Sets the pkey_asn1_meth callback in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR f) { e->pkey_asn1_meths = f; return 1; } /* * Internal function to free up EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structures before an * ENGINE is destroyed */ void engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(ENGINE *e) { int i; EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *pkm; if (e->pkey_asn1_meths) { const int *pknids; int npknids; npknids = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &pknids, 0); for (i = 0; i < npknids; i++) { if (e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &pkm, NULL, pknids[i])) { EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(pkm); } } } } /* * Find a method based on a string. This does a linear search through all * implemented algorithms. This is OK in practice because only a small number * of algorithms are likely to be implemented in an engine and it is not used * for speed critical operations. */ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(ENGINE *e, const char *str, int len) { int i, nidcount; const int *nids; EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (!e->pkey_asn1_meths) return NULL; if (len == -1) len = strlen(str); nidcount = e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); for (i = 0; i < nidcount; i++) { e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nids[i]); if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == len) && strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, str, len) == 0) return ameth; } return NULL; } typedef struct { ENGINE *e; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; const char *str; int len; } ENGINE_FIND_STR; static void look_str_cb(int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk, ENGINE *def, void *arg) { ENGINE_FIND_STR *lk = arg; int i; if (lk->ameth) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_ENGINE_num(sk); i++) { ENGINE *e = sk_ENGINE_value(sk, i); EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; e->pkey_asn1_meths(e, &ameth, NULL, nid); if (((int)strlen(ameth->pem_str) == lk->len) && strncasecmp(ameth->pem_str, lk->str, lk->len) == 0) { lk->e = e; lk->ameth = ameth; return; } } } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len) { ENGINE_FIND_STR fstr; fstr.e = NULL; fstr.ameth = NULL; fstr.str = str; fstr.len = len; if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_FIND_STR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); engine_table_doall(pkey_asn1_meth_table, look_str_cb, &fstr); /* If found obtain a structural reference to engine */ if (fstr.e) { fstr.e->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(fstr.e, 0, 1); } *pe = fstr.e; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return fstr.ameth; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001470713176625657016424 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" #include CRYPTO_RWLOCK *global_engine_lock; CRYPTO_ONCE engine_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; /* The "new"/"free" stuff first */ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE(do_engine_lock_init) { OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); global_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return global_engine_lock != NULL; } ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void) { ENGINE *ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init) || (ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->struct_ref = 1; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } /* * Placed here (close proximity to ENGINE_new) so that modifications to the * elements of the ENGINE structure are more likely to be caught and changed * here. */ void engine_set_all_null(ENGINE *e) { e->id = NULL; e->name = NULL; e->rsa_meth = NULL; e->dsa_meth = NULL; e->dh_meth = NULL; e->rand_meth = NULL; e->ciphers = NULL; e->digests = NULL; e->destroy = NULL; e->init = NULL; e->finish = NULL; e->ctrl = NULL; e->load_privkey = NULL; e->load_pubkey = NULL; e->cmd_defns = NULL; e->flags = 0; } int engine_free_util(ENGINE *e, int locked) { int i; if (e == NULL) return 1; if (locked) CRYPTO_atomic_add(&e->struct_ref, -1, &i, global_engine_lock); else i = --e->struct_ref; engine_ref_debug(e, 0, -1) if (i > 0) return 1; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); /* Free up any dynamically allocated public key methods */ engine_pkey_meths_free(e); engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(e); /* * Give the ENGINE a chance to do any structural cleanup corresponding to * allocation it did in its constructor (eg. unload error strings) */ if (e->destroy) e->destroy(e); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, e, &e->ex_data); OPENSSL_free(e); return 1; } int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e) { return engine_free_util(e, 1); } /* Cleanup stuff */ /* * engine_cleanup_int() is coded such that anything that does work that will * need cleanup can register a "cleanup" callback here. That way we don't get * linker bloat by referring to all *possible* cleanups, but any linker bloat * into code "X" will cause X's cleanup function to end up here. */ static STACK_OF(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM) *cleanup_stack = NULL; static int int_cleanup_check(int create) { if (cleanup_stack) return 1; if (!create) return 0; cleanup_stack = sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_new_null(); return (cleanup_stack ? 1 : 0); } static ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *int_cleanup_item(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item)); if (item == NULL) return NULL; item->cb = cb; return item; } void engine_cleanup_add_first(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item; if (!int_cleanup_check(1)) return; item = int_cleanup_item(cb); if (item) sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_insert(cleanup_stack, item, 0); } void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item; if (!int_cleanup_check(1)) return; item = int_cleanup_item(cb); if (item) sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item); } /* The API function that performs all cleanup */ static void engine_cleanup_cb_free(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item) { (*(item->cb)) (); OPENSSL_free(item); } void engine_cleanup_int(void) { if (int_cleanup_check(0)) { sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_pop_free(cleanup_stack, engine_cleanup_cb_free); cleanup_stack = NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(global_engine_lock); } /* Now the "ex_data" support */ int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx)); } /* * Functions to get/set an ENGINE's elements - mainly to avoid exposing the * ENGINE structure itself. */ int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id) { if (id == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } e->id = id; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name) { if (name == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } e->name = name; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f) { e->destroy = destroy_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f) { e->init = init_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f) { e->finish = finish_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f) { e->ctrl = ctrl_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags) { e->flags = flags; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns) { e->cmd_defns = defns; return 1; } const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e) { return e->id; } const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e) { return e->name; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->destroy; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->init; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->finish; } ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->ctrl; } int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e) { return e->flags; } const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e) { return e->cmd_defns; } /* * eng_lib.o is pretty much linked into anything that touches ENGINE already, * so put the "static_state" hack here. */ static int internal_static_hack = 0; void *ENGINE_get_static_state(void) { return &internal_static_hack; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c0000644000000000000000000000745713176625657016434 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include "eng_int.h" #include int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags) { if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS) && !ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(e)) return 0; if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS) && !ENGINE_set_default_digests(e)) return 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_RSA) && !ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e)) return 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_DSA) && !ENGINE_set_default_DSA(e)) return 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_DH) && !ENGINE_set_default_DH(e)) return 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_EC) && !ENGINE_set_default_EC(e)) return 0; #endif if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_RAND) && !ENGINE_set_default_RAND(e)) return 0; if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS) && !ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths(e)) return 0; if ((flags & ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS) && !ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(e)) return 0; return 1; } /* Set default algorithms using a string */ static int int_def_cb(const char *alg, int len, void *arg) { unsigned int *pflags = arg; if (alg == NULL) return 0; if (strncmp(alg, "ALL", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_ALL; else if (strncmp(alg, "RSA", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_RSA; else if (strncmp(alg, "DSA", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_DSA; else if (strncmp(alg, "DH", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_DH; else if (strncmp(alg, "EC", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_EC; else if (strncmp(alg, "RAND", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_RAND; else if (strncmp(alg, "CIPHERS", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS; else if (strncmp(alg, "DIGESTS", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS; else if (strncmp(alg, "PKEY", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS | ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS; else if (strncmp(alg, "PKEY_CRYPTO", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS; else if (strncmp(alg, "PKEY_ASN1", len) == 0) *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS; else return 0; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *def_list) { unsigned int flags = 0; if (!CONF_parse_list(def_list, ',', 1, int_def_cb, &flags)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_DEFAULT_STRING, ENGINE_R_INVALID_STRING); ERR_add_error_data(2, "str=", def_list); return 0; } return ENGINE_set_default(e, flags); } int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE_register_ciphers(e); ENGINE_register_digests(e); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ENGINE_register_RSA(e); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ENGINE_register_DSA(e); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ENGINE_register_DH(e); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ENGINE_register_EC(e); #endif ENGINE_register_RAND(e); ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(e); return 1; } int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void) { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) if (!(e->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL)) ENGINE_register_complete(e); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_list.c0000644000000000000000000002457513176625657016635 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include "eng_int.h" /* * The linked-list of pointers to engine types. engine_list_head incorporates * an implicit structural reference but engine_list_tail does not - the * latter is a computational niceity and only points to something that is * already pointed to by its predecessor in the list (or engine_list_head * itself). In the same way, the use of the "prev" pointer in each ENGINE is * to save excessive list iteration, it doesn't correspond to an extra * structural reference. Hence, engine_list_head, and each non-null "next" * pointer account for the list itself assuming exactly 1 structural * reference on each list member. */ static ENGINE *engine_list_head = NULL; static ENGINE *engine_list_tail = NULL; /* * This cleanup function is only needed internally. If it should be called, * we register it with the "engine_cleanup_int()" stack to be called during * cleanup. */ static void engine_list_cleanup(void) { ENGINE *iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator != NULL) { ENGINE_remove(iterator); iterator = engine_list_head; } return; } /* * These static functions starting with a lower case "engine_" always take * place when global_engine_lock has been locked up. */ static int engine_list_add(ENGINE *e) { int conflict = 0; ENGINE *iterator = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && !conflict) { conflict = (strcmp(iterator->id, e->id) == 0); iterator = iterator->next; } if (conflict) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID); return 0; } if (engine_list_head == NULL) { /* We are adding to an empty list. */ if (engine_list_tail) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } engine_list_head = e; e->prev = NULL; /* * The first time the list allocates, we should register the cleanup. */ engine_cleanup_add_last(engine_list_cleanup); } else { /* We are adding to the tail of an existing list. */ if ((engine_list_tail == NULL) || (engine_list_tail->next != NULL)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } engine_list_tail->next = e; e->prev = engine_list_tail; } /* * Having the engine in the list assumes a structural reference. */ e->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1); /* However it came to be, e is the last item in the list. */ engine_list_tail = e; e->next = NULL; return 1; } static int engine_list_remove(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *iterator; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } /* We need to check that e is in our linked list! */ iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && (iterator != e)) iterator = iterator->next; if (iterator == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST); return 0; } /* un-link e from the chain. */ if (e->next) e->next->prev = e->prev; if (e->prev) e->prev->next = e->next; /* Correct our head/tail if necessary. */ if (engine_list_head == e) engine_list_head = e->next; if (engine_list_tail == e) engine_list_tail = e->prev; engine_free_util(e, 0); return 1; } /* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void) { ENGINE *ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_FIRST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = engine_list_head; if (ret) { ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return ret; } ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void) { ENGINE *ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_LAST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = engine_list_tail; if (ret) { ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return ret; } /* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *ret = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = e->next; if (ret) { /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */ ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */ ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *ret = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = e->prev; if (ret) { /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */ ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */ ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } /* Add another "ENGINE" type into the list. */ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (!engine_list_add(e)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); to_return = 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return to_return; } /* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */ int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (!engine_list_remove(e)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); to_return = 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return to_return; } static void engine_cpy(ENGINE *dest, const ENGINE *src) { dest->id = src->id; dest->name = src->name; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA dest->rsa_meth = src->rsa_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA dest->dsa_meth = src->dsa_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dest->dh_meth = src->dh_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC dest->ec_meth = src->ec_meth; #endif dest->rand_meth = src->rand_meth; dest->ciphers = src->ciphers; dest->digests = src->digests; dest->pkey_meths = src->pkey_meths; dest->destroy = src->destroy; dest->init = src->init; dest->finish = src->finish; dest->ctrl = src->ctrl; dest->load_privkey = src->load_privkey; dest->load_pubkey = src->load_pubkey; dest->cmd_defns = src->cmd_defns; dest->flags = src->flags; } ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id) { ENGINE *iterator; char *load_dir = NULL; if (id == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && (strcmp(id, iterator->id) != 0)) iterator = iterator->next; if (iterator != NULL) { /* * We need to return a structural reference. If this is an ENGINE * type that returns copies, make a duplicate - otherwise increment * the existing ENGINE's reference count. */ if (iterator->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) { ENGINE *cp = ENGINE_new(); if (cp == NULL) iterator = NULL; else { engine_cpy(cp, iterator); iterator = cp; } } else { iterator->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(iterator, 0, 1); } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); if (iterator != NULL) return iterator; /* * Prevent infinite recursion if we're looking for the dynamic engine. */ if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) { if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0) load_dir = ENGINESDIR; iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD", load_dir, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) goto notfound; return iterator; } notfound: ENGINE_free(iterator); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id); return NULL; /* EEK! Experimental code ends */ } int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e) { int i; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_atomic_add(&e->struct_ref, 1, &i, global_engine_lock); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/README0000644000000000000000000003320513176625657015533 0ustar rootrootNotes: 2001-09-24 ----------------- This "description" (if one chooses to call it that) needed some major updating so here goes. This update addresses a change being made at the same time to OpenSSL, and it pretty much completely restructures the underlying mechanics of the "ENGINE" code. So it serves a double purpose of being a "ENGINE internals for masochists" document *and* a rather extensive commit log message. (I'd get lynched for sticking all this in CHANGES or the commit mails :-). ENGINE_TABLE underlies this restructuring, as described in the internal header "eng_int.h", implemented in eng_table.c, and used in each of the "class" files; tb_rsa.c, tb_dsa.c, etc. However, "EVP_CIPHER" underlies the motivation and design of ENGINE_TABLE so I'll mention a bit about that first. EVP_CIPHER (and most of this applies equally to EVP_MD for digests) is both a "method" and a algorithm/mode identifier that, in the current API, "lingers". These cipher description + implementation structures can be defined or obtained directly by applications, or can be loaded "en masse" into EVP storage so that they can be catalogued and searched in various ways, ie. two ways of encrypting with the "des_cbc" algorithm/mode pair are; (i) directly; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_des_cbc(); EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, cipher, key, iv); [ ... use EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal() ...] (ii) indirectly; OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(); cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname("des_cbc"); EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, cipher, key, iv); [ ... etc ... ] The latter is more generally used because it also allows ciphers/digests to be looked up based on other identifiers which can be useful for automatic cipher selection, eg. in SSL/TLS, or by user-controllable configuration. The important point about this is that EVP_CIPHER definitions and structures are passed around with impunity and there is no safe way, without requiring massive rewrites of many applications, to assume that EVP_CIPHERs can be reference counted. One an EVP_CIPHER is exposed to the caller, neither it nor anything it comes from can "safely" be destroyed. Unless of course the way of getting to such ciphers is via entirely distinct API calls that didn't exist before. However existing API usage cannot be made to understand when an EVP_CIPHER pointer, that has been passed to the caller, is no longer being used. The other problem with the existing API w.r.t. to hooking EVP_CIPHER support into ENGINE is storage - the OBJ_NAME-based storage used by EVP to register ciphers simultaneously registers cipher *types* and cipher *implementations* - they are effectively the same thing, an "EVP_CIPHER" pointer. The problem with hooking in ENGINEs is that multiple ENGINEs may implement the same ciphers. The solution is necessarily that ENGINE-provided ciphers simply are not registered, stored, or exposed to the caller in the same manner as existing ciphers. This is especially necessary considering the fact ENGINE uses reference counts to allow for cleanup, modularity, and DSO support - yet EVP_CIPHERs, as exposed to callers in the current API, support no such controls. Another sticking point for integrating cipher support into ENGINE is linkage. Already there is a problem with the way ENGINE supports RSA, DSA, etc whereby they are available *because* they're part of a giant ENGINE called "openssl". Ie. all implementations *have* to come from an ENGINE, but we get round that by having a giant ENGINE with all the software support encapsulated. This creates linker hassles if nothing else - linking a 1-line application that calls 2 basic RSA functions (eg. "RSA_free(RSA_new());") will result in large quantities of ENGINE code being linked in *and* because of that DSA, DH, and RAND also. If we continue with this approach for EVP_CIPHER support (even if it *was* possible) we would lose our ability to link selectively by selectively loading certain implementations of certain functionality. Touching any part of any kind of crypto would result in massive static linkage of everything else. So the solution is to change the way ENGINE feeds existing "classes", ie. how the hooking to ENGINE works from RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, as well as adding new hooking for EVP_CIPHER, and EVP_MD. The way this is now being done is by mostly reverting back to how things used to work prior to ENGINE :-). Ie. RSA now has a "RSA_METHOD" pointer again - this was previously replaced by an "ENGINE" pointer and all RSA code that required the RSA_METHOD would call ENGINE_get_RSA() each time on its ENGINE handle to temporarily get and use the ENGINE's RSA implementation. Apart from being more efficient, switching back to each RSA having an RSA_METHOD pointer also allows us to conceivably operate with *no* ENGINE. As we'll see, this removes any need for a fallback ENGINE that encapsulates default implementations - we can simply have our RSA structure pointing its RSA_METHOD pointer to the software implementation and have its ENGINE pointer set to NULL. A look at the EVP_CIPHER hooking is most explanatory, the RSA, DSA (etc) cases turn out to be degenerate forms of the same thing. The EVP storage of ciphers, and the existing EVP API functions that return "software" implementations and descriptions remain untouched. However, the storage takes more meaning in terms of "cipher description" and less meaning in terms of "implementation". When an EVP_CIPHER_CTX is actually initialised with an EVP_CIPHER method and is about to begin en/decryption, the hooking to ENGINE comes into play. What happens is that cipher-specific ENGINE code is asked for an ENGINE pointer (a functional reference) for any ENGINE that is registered to perform the algo/mode that the provided EVP_CIPHER structure represents. Under normal circumstances, that ENGINE code will return NULL because no ENGINEs will have had any cipher implementations *registered*. As such, a NULL ENGINE pointer is stored in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX context, and the EVP_CIPHER structure is left hooked into the context and so is used as the implementation. Pretty much how things work now except we'd have a redundant ENGINE pointer set to NULL and doing nothing. Conversely, if an ENGINE *has* been registered to perform the algorithm/mode combination represented by the provided EVP_CIPHER, then a functional reference to that ENGINE will be returned to the EVP_CIPHER_CTX during initialisation. That functional reference will be stored in the context (and released on cleanup) - and having that reference provides a *safe* way to use an EVP_CIPHER definition that is private to the ENGINE. Ie. the EVP_CIPHER provided by the application will actually be replaced by an EVP_CIPHER from the registered ENGINE - it will support the same algorithm/mode as the original but will be a completely different implementation. Because this EVP_CIPHER isn't stored in the EVP storage, nor is it returned to applications from traditional API functions, there is no associated problem with it not having reference counts. And of course, when one of these "private" cipher implementations is hooked into EVP_CIPHER_CTX, it is done whilst the EVP_CIPHER_CTX holds a functional reference to the ENGINE that owns it, thus the use of the ENGINE's EVP_CIPHER is safe. The "cipher-specific ENGINE code" I mentioned is implemented in tb_cipher.c but in essence it is simply an instantiation of "ENGINE_TABLE" code for use by EVP_CIPHER code. tb_digest.c is virtually identical but, of course, it is for use by EVP_MD code. Ditto for tb_rsa.c, tb_dsa.c, etc. These instantiations of ENGINE_TABLE essentially provide linker-separation of the classes so that even if ENGINEs implement *all* possible algorithms, an application using only EVP_CIPHER code will link at most code relating to EVP_CIPHER, tb_cipher.c, core ENGINE code that is independent of class, and of course the ENGINE implementation that the application loaded. It will *not* however link any class-specific ENGINE code for digests, RSA, etc nor will it bleed over into other APIs, such as the RSA/DSA/etc library code. ENGINE_TABLE is a little more complicated than may seem necessary but this is mostly to avoid a lot of "init()"-thrashing on ENGINEs (that may have to load DSOs, and other expensive setup that shouldn't be thrashed unnecessarily) *and* to duplicate "default" behaviour. Basically an ENGINE_TABLE instantiation, for example tb_cipher.c, implements a hash-table keyed by integer "nid" values. These nids provide the uniquenness of an algorithm/mode - and each nid will hash to a potentially NULL "ENGINE_PILE". An ENGINE_PILE is essentially a list of pointers to ENGINEs that implement that particular 'nid'. Each "pile" uses some caching tricks such that requests on that 'nid' will be cached and all future requests will return immediately (well, at least with minimal operation) unless a change is made to the pile, eg. perhaps an ENGINE was unloaded. The reason is that an application could have support for 10 ENGINEs statically linked in, and the machine in question may not have any of the hardware those 10 ENGINEs support. If each of those ENGINEs has a "des_cbc" implementation, we want to avoid every EVP_CIPHER_CTX setup from trying (and failing) to initialise each of those 10 ENGINEs. Instead, the first such request will try to do that and will either return (and cache) a NULL ENGINE pointer or will return a functional reference to the first that successfully initialised. In the latter case it will also cache an extra functional reference to the ENGINE as a "default" for that 'nid'. The caching is acknowledged by a 'uptodate' variable that is unset only if un/registration takes place on that pile. Ie. if implementations of "des_cbc" are added or removed. This behaviour can be tweaked; the ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT value can be passed to ENGINE_set_table_flags(), in which case the only ENGINEs that tb_cipher.c will try to initialise from the "pile" will be those that are already initialised (ie. it's simply an increment of the functional reference count, and no real "initialisation" will take place). RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND all have their own ENGINE_TABLE code as well, and the difference is that they all use an implicit 'nid' of 1. Whereas EVP_CIPHERs are actually qualitatively different depending on 'nid' (the "des_cbc" EVP_CIPHER is not an interoperable implementation of "aes_256_cbc"), RSA_METHODs are necessarily interoperable and don't have different flavours, only different implementations. In other words, the ENGINE_TABLE for RSA will either be empty, or will have a single ENGING_PILE hashed to by the 'nid' 1 and that pile represents ENGINEs that implement the single "type" of RSA there is. Cleanup - the registration and unregistration may pose questions about how cleanup works with the ENGINE_PILE doing all this caching nonsense (ie. when the application or EVP_CIPHER code releases its last reference to an ENGINE, the ENGINE_PILE code may still have references and thus those ENGINEs will stay hooked in forever). The way this is handled is via "unregistration". With these new ENGINE changes, an abstract ENGINE can be loaded and initialised, but that is an algorithm-agnostic process. Even if initialised, it will not have registered any of its implementations (to do so would link all class "table" code despite the fact the application may use only ciphers, for example). This is deliberately a distinct step. Moreover, registration and unregistration has nothing to do with whether an ENGINE is *functional* or not (ie. you can even register an ENGINE and its implementations without it being operational, you may not even have the drivers to make it operate). What actually happens with respect to cleanup is managed inside eng_lib.c with the "engine_cleanup_***" functions. These functions are internal-only and each part of ENGINE code that could require cleanup will, upon performing its first allocation, register a callback with the "engine_cleanup" code. The other part of this that makes it tick is that the ENGINE_TABLE instantiations (tb_***.c) use NULL as their initialised state. So if RSA code asks for an ENGINE and no ENGINE has registered an implementation, the code will simply return NULL and the tb_rsa.c state will be unchanged. Thus, no cleanup is required unless registration takes place. ENGINE_cleanup() will simply iterate across a list of registered cleanup callbacks calling each in turn, and will then internally delete its own storage (a STACK). When a cleanup callback is next registered (eg. if the cleanup() is part of a gracefull restart and the application wants to cleanup all state then start again), the internal STACK storage will be freshly allocated. This is much the same as the situation in the ENGINE_TABLE instantiations ... NULL is the initialised state, so only modification operations (not queries) will cause that code to have to register a cleanup. What else? The bignum callbacks and associated ENGINE functions have been removed for two obvious reasons; (i) there was no way to generalise them to the mechanism now used by RSA/DSA/..., because there's no such thing as a BIGNUM method, and (ii) because of (i), there was no meaningful way for library or application code to automatically hook and use ENGINE supplied bignum functions anyway. Also, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed (although an internal-only version exists) - the idea of providing an ENGINE_cpy() function probably wasn't a good one and now certainly doesn't make sense in any generalised way. Some of the RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were fiddled during the original ENGINE changes have now, as a consequence, been reverted back. This is because the hooking of ENGINE is now automatic (and passive, it can interally use a NULL ENGINE pointer to simply ignore ENGINE from then on). Hell, that should be enough for now ... comments welcome: geoff@openssl.org openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_eckey.c0000644000000000000000000000345013176625657016603 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" static ENGINE_TABLE *dh_table = NULL; static const int dummy_nid = 1; void ENGINE_unregister_EC(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&dh_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_EC(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&dh_table); } int ENGINE_register_EC(ENGINE *e) { if (e->ec_meth != NULL) return engine_table_register(&dh_table, engine_unregister_all_EC, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 0); return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_EC() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_EC(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_EC(ENGINE *e) { if (e->ec_meth != NULL) return engine_table_register(&dh_table, engine_unregister_all_EC, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 1); return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_EC(void) { return engine_table_select(&dh_table, dummy_nid); } /* Obtains an EC_KEY implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const EC_KEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_EC(const ENGINE *e) { return e->ec_meth; } /* Sets an EC_KEY implementation in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_EC(ENGINE *e, const EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth) { e->ec_meth = ec_meth; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_pkmeth.c0000644000000000000000000000604113176625657016772 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" #include static ENGINE_TABLE *pkey_meth_table = NULL; void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&pkey_meth_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_pkey_meths(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&pkey_meth_table); } int ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e) { if (e->pkey_meths) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->pkey_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&pkey_meth_table, engine_unregister_all_pkey_meths, e, nids, num_nids, 0); } return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_meths() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e) { if (e->pkey_meths) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->pkey_meths(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&pkey_meth_table, engine_unregister_all_pkey_meths, e, nids, num_nids, 1); } return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references) for a given pkey_meth 'nid' */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(int nid) { return engine_table_select(&pkey_meth_table, nid); } /* Obtains a pkey_meth implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid) { EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ret; ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(e); if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_METH, ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD); return NULL; } return ret; } /* Gets the pkey_meth callback from an ENGINE structure */ ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(const ENGINE *e) { return e->pkey_meths; } /* Sets the pkey_meth callback in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR f) { e->pkey_meths = f; return 1; } /* * Internal function to free up EVP_PKEY_METHOD structures before an ENGINE * is destroyed */ void engine_pkey_meths_free(ENGINE *e) { int i; EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pkm; if (e->pkey_meths) { const int *pknids; int npknids; npknids = e->pkey_meths(e, NULL, &pknids, 0); for (i = 0; i < npknids; i++) { if (e->pkey_meths(e, &pkm, NULL, pknids[i])) { EVP_PKEY_meth_free(pkm); } } } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_openssl.c0000644000000000000000000004416013176625657017335 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * This testing gunk is implemented (and explained) lower down. It also * assumes the application explicitly calls "ENGINE_load_openssl()" because * this is no longer automatic in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(). */ #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY #endif /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC */ /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC_INIT */ /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS */ #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER */ #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_OTHERS */ /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_INIT */ /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_UPDATE */ /* #define TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_FINAL */ /* Now check what of those algorithms are actually enabled */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 # undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 # undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS # undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT # undef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER #endif static int openssl_destroy(ENGINE *e); #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 static int openssl_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid); #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA static int openssl_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid); #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY static EVP_PKEY *openssl_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC static int ossl_register_hmac_meth(void); static int ossl_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **nids, int nid); #endif /* The constants used when creating the ENGINE */ static const char *engine_openssl_id = "openssl"; static const char *engine_openssl_name = "Software engine support"; /* * This internal function is used by ENGINE_openssl() and possibly by the * "dynamic" ENGINE support too */ static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e) { if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_openssl_id) || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_openssl_name) || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, openssl_destroy) #ifndef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_NO_ALGORITHMS # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA || !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, RSA_get_default_method()) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA || !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, DSA_get_default_method()) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC || !ENGINE_set_EC(e, EC_KEY_OpenSSL()) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH || !ENGINE_set_DH(e, DH_get_default_method()) # endif || !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, RAND_OpenSSL()) # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 || !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, openssl_ciphers) # endif # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA || !ENGINE_set_digests(e, openssl_digests) # endif #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY || !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, openssl_load_privkey) #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC || !ossl_register_hmac_meth() || !ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, ossl_pkey_meths) #endif ) return 0; /* * If we add errors to this ENGINE, ensure the error handling is setup * here */ /* openssl_load_error_strings(); */ return 1; } static ENGINE *engine_openssl(void) { ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!bind_helper(ret)) { ENGINE_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void engine_load_openssl_int(void) { ENGINE *toadd = engine_openssl(); if (!toadd) return; ENGINE_add(toadd); /* * If the "add" worked, it gets a structural reference. So either way, we * release our just-created reference. */ ENGINE_free(toadd); ERR_clear_error(); } /* * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a * self-contained shared-library. */ #ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id) { if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_openssl_id) != 0)) return 0; if (!bind_helper(e)) return 0; return 1; } IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn) #endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 /*- * This section of code compiles an "alternative implementation" of two modes of * RC4 into this ENGINE. The result is that EVP_CIPHER operation for "rc4" * should under normal circumstances go via this support rather than the default * EVP support. There are other symbols to tweak the testing; * TEST_ENC_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS - print a one line message to stderr each time * we're asked for a cipher we don't support (should not happen). * TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT - print a one line message to stderr each time * the "init_key" handler is called. * TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER - ditto for the "cipher" handler. */ # include # define TEST_RC4_KEY_SIZE 16 typedef struct { unsigned char key[TEST_RC4_KEY_SIZE]; RC4_KEY ks; } TEST_RC4_KEY; # define test(ctx) ((TEST_RC4_KEY *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx)) static int test_rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4) test_init_key() called\n"); # endif memcpy(&test(ctx)->key[0], key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)); RC4_set_key(&test(ctx)->ks, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), test(ctx)->key); return 1; } static int test_rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_CIPHER fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4) test_cipher() called\n"); # endif RC4(&test(ctx)->ks, inl, in, out); return 1; } static EVP_CIPHER *r4_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *test_r4_cipher(void) { if (r4_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_rc4, 1, TEST_RC4_KEY_SIZE)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 0) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, test_rc4_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, test_rc4_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(TEST_RC4_KEY))) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } r4_cipher = cipher; } return r4_cipher; } static void test_r4_cipher_destroy(void) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(r4_cipher); r4_cipher = NULL; } static EVP_CIPHER *r4_40_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *test_r4_40_cipher(void) { if (r4_40_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_rc4, 1, 5 /* 40 bits */)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 0) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, test_rc4_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, test_rc4_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(TEST_RC4_KEY))) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } r4_40_cipher = cipher; } return r4_40_cipher; } static void test_r4_40_cipher_destroy(void) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(r4_40_cipher); r4_40_cipher = NULL; } static int test_cipher_nids(const int **nids) { static int cipher_nids[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; static int pos = 0; static int init = 0; if (!init) { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = test_r4_cipher()) != NULL) cipher_nids[pos++] = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher); if ((cipher = test_r4_40_cipher()) != NULL) cipher_nids[pos++] = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher); cipher_nids[pos] = 0; init = 1; } *nids = cipher_nids; return pos; } static int openssl_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid) { if (!cipher) { /* We are returning a list of supported nids */ return test_cipher_nids(nids); } /* We are being asked for a specific cipher */ if (nid == NID_rc4) *cipher = test_r4_cipher(); else if (nid == NID_rc4_40) *cipher = test_r4_40_cipher(); else { # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_OTHERS fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4) returning NULL for " "nid %d\n", nid); # endif *cipher = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA /* Much the same sort of comment as for TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 */ # include static int test_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_INIT fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) test_sha1_init() called\n"); # endif return SHA1_Init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static int test_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_UPDATE fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) test_sha1_update() called\n"); # endif return SHA1_Update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count); } static int test_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_P_FINAL fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) test_sha1_final() called\n"); # endif return SHA1_Final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)); } static EVP_MD *sha1_md = NULL; static const EVP_MD *test_sha_md(void) { if (sha1_md == NULL) { EVP_MD *md; if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha1, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption)) == NULL || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA_CBLOCK) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX)) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, 0) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, test_sha1_init) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, test_sha1_update) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, test_sha1_final)) { EVP_MD_meth_free(md); md = NULL; } sha1_md = md; } return sha1_md; } static void test_sha_md_destroy(void) { EVP_MD_meth_free(sha1_md); sha1_md = NULL; } static int test_digest_nids(const int **nids) { static int digest_nids[2] = { 0, 0 }; static int pos = 0; static int init = 0; if (!init) { const EVP_MD *md; if ((md = test_sha_md()) != NULL) digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md); digest_nids[pos] = 0; init = 1; } *nids = digest_nids; return pos; } static int openssl_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid) { if (!digest) { /* We are returning a list of supported nids */ return test_digest_nids(nids); } /* We are being asked for a specific digest */ if (nid == NID_sha1) *digest = test_sha_md(); else { # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA_OTHERS fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_SHA) returning NULL for " "nid %d\n", nid); # endif *digest = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY static EVP_PKEY *openssl_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) { BIO *in; EVP_PKEY *key; fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY)Loading Private key %s\n", key_id); in = BIO_new_file(key_id, "r"); if (!in) return NULL; key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(in); return key; } #endif #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC /* * Experimental HMAC redirection implementation: mainly copied from * hm_pmeth.c */ /* HMAC pkey context structure */ typedef struct { const EVP_MD *md; /* MD for HMAC use */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING ktmp; /* Temp storage for key */ HMAC_CTX *ctx; } OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX; static int ossl_hmac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx; hctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*hctx)); if (hctx == NULL) return 0; hctx->ktmp.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; hctx->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (hctx->ctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(hctx); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, hctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info(ctx, NULL, 0); # ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC_INIT fprintf(stderr, "(TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_HMAC) ossl_hmac_init() called\n"); # endif return 1; } static void ossl_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); static int ossl_hmac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx; /* allocate memory for dst->data and a new HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx */ if (!ossl_hmac_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src); dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(dst); dctx->md = sctx->md; if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(dctx->ctx, sctx->ctx)) goto err; if (sctx->ktmp.data) { if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&dctx->ktmp, sctx->ktmp.data, sctx->ktmp.length)) goto err; } return 1; err: /* release HMAC_CTX in dst->data->ctx and memory allocated for dst->data */ ossl_hmac_cleanup(dst); return 0; } static void ossl_hmac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); if (hctx) { HMAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->ktmp.data, hctx->ktmp.length); OPENSSL_free(hctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL); } } static int ossl_hmac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hkey = NULL; OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); if (!hctx->ktmp.data) return 0; hkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(&hctx->ktmp); if (!hkey) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, hkey); return 1; } static int ossl_int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)); if (!HMAC_Update(hctx->ctx, data, count)) return 0; return 1; } static int ossl_hmac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT); EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, ossl_int_update); return 1; } static int ossl_hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { unsigned int hlen; OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx); if (l < 0) return 0; *siglen = l; if (!sig) return 1; if (!HMAC_Final(hctx->ctx, sig, &hlen)) return 0; *siglen = (size_t)hlen; return 1; } static int ossl_hmac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { OSSL_HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); EVP_PKEY *pk; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY: if ((!p2 && p1 > 0) || (p1 < -1)) return 0; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&hctx->ktmp, p2, p1)) return 0; break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: hctx->md = p2; break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx); key = EVP_PKEY_get0(pk); if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx->ctx, key->data, key->length, hctx->md, NULL)) return 0; break; default: return -2; } return 1; } static int ossl_hmac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (!value) { return 0; } if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0) { void *p = (void *)value; return ossl_hmac_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, -1, p); } if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0) { unsigned char *key; int r; long keylen; key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &keylen); if (!key) return 0; r = ossl_hmac_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, keylen, key); OPENSSL_free(key); return r; } return -2; } static EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_hmac_meth; static int ossl_register_hmac_meth(void) { EVP_PKEY_METHOD *meth; meth = EVP_PKEY_meth_new(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, 0); if (meth == NULL) return 0; EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init(meth, ossl_hmac_init); EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy(meth, ossl_hmac_copy); EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup(meth, ossl_hmac_cleanup); EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen(meth, 0, ossl_hmac_keygen); EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx(meth, ossl_hmac_signctx_init, ossl_hmac_signctx); EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(meth, ossl_hmac_ctrl, ossl_hmac_ctrl_str); ossl_hmac_meth = meth; return 1; } static int ossl_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **pmeth, const int **nids, int nid) { static int ossl_pkey_nids[] = { EVP_PKEY_HMAC, 0 }; if (!pmeth) { *nids = ossl_pkey_nids; return 1; } if (nid == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) { *pmeth = ossl_hmac_meth; return 1; } *pmeth = NULL; return 0; } #endif int openssl_destroy(ENGINE *e) { test_sha_md_destroy(); #ifdef TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4 test_r4_cipher_destroy(); test_r4_40_cipher_destroy(); #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_dsa.c0000644000000000000000000000344313176625657016254 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" static ENGINE_TABLE *dsa_table = NULL; static const int dummy_nid = 1; void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&dsa_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_DSA(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&dsa_table); } int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e) { if (e->dsa_meth) return engine_table_register(&dsa_table, engine_unregister_all_DSA, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 0); return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_DSA() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_DSA(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e) { if (e->dsa_meth) return engine_table_register(&dsa_table, engine_unregister_all_DSA, e, &dummy_nid, 1, 1); return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void) { return engine_table_select(&dsa_table, dummy_nid); } /* Obtains an DSA implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e) { return e->dsa_meth; } /* Sets an DSA implementation in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth) { e->dsa_meth = dsa_meth; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_init.c0000644000000000000000000000620313176625657016611 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" /* * Initialise a engine type for use (or up its functional reference count if * it's already in use). This version is only used internally. */ int engine_unlocked_init(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if ((e->funct_ref == 0) && e->init) /* * This is the first functional reference and the engine requires * initialisation so we do it now. */ to_return = e->init(e); if (to_return) { /* * OK, we return a functional reference which is also a structural * reference. */ e->struct_ref++; e->funct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1); engine_ref_debug(e, 1, 1); } return to_return; } /* * Free a functional reference to a engine type. This version is only used * internally. */ int engine_unlocked_finish(ENGINE *e, int unlock_for_handlers) { int to_return = 1; /* * Reduce the functional reference count here so if it's the terminating * case, we can release the lock safely and call the finish() handler * without risk of a race. We get a race if we leave the count until * after and something else is calling "finish" at the same time - * there's a chance that both threads will together take the count from 2 * to 0 without either calling finish(). */ e->funct_ref--; engine_ref_debug(e, 1, -1); if ((e->funct_ref == 0) && e->finish) { if (unlock_for_handlers) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); to_return = e->finish(e); if (unlock_for_handlers) CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (!to_return) return 0; } REF_ASSERT_ISNT(e->funct_ref < 0); /* Release the structural reference too */ if (!engine_free_util(e, 0)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UNLOCKED_FINISH, ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED); return 0; } return to_return; } /* The API (locked) version of "init" */ int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e) { int ret; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = engine_unlocked_init(e); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return ret; } /* The API (locked) version of "finish" */ int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if (e == NULL) return 1; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); to_return = engine_unlocked_finish(e, 1); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); if (!to_return) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_FINISH, ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED); return 0; } return to_return; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c0000644000000000000000000015071213176625657017672 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Bob Beck * Copyright (c) 2002 Theo de Raadt * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include #include #include #include #include #if (defined(__unix__) || defined(unix)) && !defined(USG) && \ (defined(OpenBSD) || defined(__FreeBSD__)) # include # if (OpenBSD >= 200112) || ((__FreeBSD_version >= 470101 && __FreeBSD_version < 500000) || __FreeBSD_version >= 500041) # define HAVE_CRYPTODEV # endif # if (OpenBSD >= 200110) # define HAVE_SYSLOG_R # endif #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_CRYPTODEV # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifndef HAVE_CRYPTODEV void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void) { /* This is a NOP on platforms without /dev/crypto */ return; } #else struct dev_crypto_state { struct session_op d_sess; int d_fd; # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS char dummy_mac_key[HASH_MAX_LEN]; unsigned char digest_res[HASH_MAX_LEN]; char *mac_data; int mac_len; # endif }; static u_int32_t cryptodev_asymfeat = 0; static RSA_METHOD *cryptodev_rsa; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static DSA_METHOD *cryptodev_dsa = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH_METHOD *cryptodev_dh; #endif static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void); static int open_dev_crypto(void); static int get_dev_crypto(void); static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids); # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids); # endif static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids); static int cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); static int cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); static int cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid); static int cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid); static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp); static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a); static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop); static int cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r, int slen, BIGNUM *s); static int cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); static int cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); static int cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static int cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); static int cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *u1, const BIGNUM *pub_key, const BIGNUM *u2, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont); static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); static int cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static int cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); static int cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); #endif static int cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void); static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN cryptodev_defns[] = { {0, NULL, NULL, 0} }; static struct { int id; int nid; int ivmax; int keylen; } ciphers[] = { { CRYPTO_ARC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, }, { CRYPTO_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, }, { CRYPTO_3DES_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, }, { CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, }, { CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, }, { CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, }, # ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR { CRYPTO_AES_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 14, 16, }, { CRYPTO_AES_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 14, 24, }, { CRYPTO_AES_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 14, 32, }, # endif { CRYPTO_BLF_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, }, { CRYPTO_CAST_CBC, NID_cast5_cbc, 8, 16, }, { CRYPTO_SKIPJACK_CBC, NID_undef, 0, 0, }, { 0, NID_undef, 0, 0, }, }; # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS static struct { int id; int nid; int keylen; } digests[] = { { CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC, NID_hmacWithMD5, 16 }, { CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, NID_hmacWithSHA1, 20 }, { CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC, NID_ripemd160, 16 /* ? */ }, { CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK, NID_undef, 0 }, { CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK, NID_undef, 0 }, { CRYPTO_MD5, NID_md5, 16 }, { CRYPTO_SHA1, NID_sha1, 20 }, { 0, NID_undef, 0 }, }; # endif /* * Return a fd if /dev/crypto seems usable, 0 otherwise. */ static int open_dev_crypto(void) { static int fd = -1; if (fd == -1) { if ((fd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) == -1) return (-1); /* close on exec */ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) { close(fd); fd = -1; return (-1); } } return (fd); } static int get_dev_crypto(void) { int fd, retfd; if ((fd = open_dev_crypto()) == -1) return (-1); # ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED if (ioctl(fd, CRIOGET, &retfd) == -1) return (-1); /* close on exec */ if (fcntl(retfd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) { close(retfd); return (-1); } # else retfd = fd; # endif return (retfd); } static void put_dev_crypto(int fd) { # ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED close(fd); # endif } /* Caching version for asym operations */ static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void) { static int fd = -1; if (fd == -1) fd = get_dev_crypto(); return fd; } /* * Find out what ciphers /dev/crypto will let us have a session for. * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet! * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_ciphers routine */ static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids) { static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX]; struct session_op sess; int fd, i, count = 0; if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) { *cnids = NULL; return (0); } memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess)); sess.key = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno"; for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) { if (ciphers[i].nid == NID_undef) continue; sess.cipher = ciphers[i].id; sess.keylen = ciphers[i].keylen; sess.mac = 0; if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 && ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1) nids[count++] = ciphers[i].nid; } put_dev_crypto(fd); if (count > 0) *cnids = nids; else *cnids = NULL; return (count); } # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS /* * Find out what digests /dev/crypto will let us have a session for. * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet! * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_digests routine */ static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids) { static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX]; struct session_op sess; int fd, i, count = 0; if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) { *cnids = NULL; return (0); } memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess)); sess.mackey = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno"; for (i = 0; digests[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) { if (digests[i].nid == NID_undef) continue; sess.mac = digests[i].id; sess.mackeylen = digests[i].keylen; sess.cipher = 0; if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 && ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1) nids[count++] = digests[i].nid; } put_dev_crypto(fd); if (count > 0) *cnids = nids; else *cnids = NULL; return (count); } # endif /* 0 */ /* * Find the useable ciphers|digests from dev/crypto - this is the first * thing called by the engine init crud which determines what it * can use for ciphers from this engine. We want to return * only what we can do, anything else is handled by software. * * If we can't initialize the device to do anything useful for * any reason, we want to return a NULL array, and 0 length, * which forces everything to be done is software. By putting * the initialization of the device in here, we ensure we can * use this engine as the default, and if for whatever reason * /dev/crypto won't do what we want it will just be done in * software * * This can (should) be greatly expanded to perhaps take into * account speed of the device, and what we want to do. * (although the disabling of particular alg's could be controlled * by the device driver with sysctl's.) - this is where we * want most of the decisions made about what we actually want * to use from /dev/crypto. */ static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) { return (get_cryptodev_ciphers(nids)); } static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids) { # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS return (get_cryptodev_digests(nids)); # else /* * XXXX just disable all digests for now, because it sucks. * we need a better way to decide this - i.e. I may not * want digests on slow cards like hifn on fast machines, * but might want them on slow or loaded machines, etc. * will also want them when using crypto cards that don't * suck moose gonads - would be nice to be able to decide something * as reasonable default without having hackery that's card dependent. * of course, the default should probably be just do everything, * with perhaps a sysctl to turn algorithms off (or have them off * by default) on cards that generally suck like the hifn. */ *nids = NULL; return (0); # endif } static int cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { struct crypt_op cryp; struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess; const void *iiv; unsigned char save_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; if (state->d_fd < 0) return (0); if (!inl) return (1); if ((inl % EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx)) != 0) return (0); memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp)); cryp.ses = sess->ses; cryp.flags = 0; cryp.len = inl; cryp.src = (caddr_t) in; cryp.dst = (caddr_t) out; cryp.mac = 0; cryp.op = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ? COP_ENCRYPT : COP_DECRYPT; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) > 0) { cryp.iv = (caddr_t) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx); if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { iiv = in + inl - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); memcpy(save_iv, iiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); } } else cryp.iv = NULL; if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) == -1) { /* * XXX need better error handling this can fail for a number of * different reasons. */ return (0); } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) > 0) { if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) iiv = out + inl - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); else iiv = save_iv; memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); } return (1); } static int cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess; int cipher = -1, i; for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id; i++) if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx) == ciphers[i].nid && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= ciphers[i].ivmax && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) == ciphers[i].keylen) { cipher = ciphers[i].id; break; } if (!ciphers[i].id) { state->d_fd = -1; return (0); } memset(sess, 0, sizeof(*sess)); if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) return (0); sess->key = (caddr_t) key; sess->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); sess->cipher = cipher; if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) == -1) { put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd); state->d_fd = -1; return (0); } return (1); } /* * free anything we allocated earlier when initing a * session, and close the session. */ static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess; if (state->d_fd < 0) return (0); /* * XXX if this ioctl fails, something's wrong. the invoker may have called * us with a bogus ctx, or we could have a device that for whatever * reason just doesn't want to play ball - it's not clear what's right * here - should this be an error? should it just increase a counter, * hmm. For right now, we return 0 - I don't believe that to be "right". * we could call the gorpy openssl lib error handlers that print messages * to users of the library. hmm.. */ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) == -1) { ret = 0; } else { ret = 1; } put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd); state->d_fd = -1; return (ret); } /* * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine * gets called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. */ /* RC4 */ static EVP_CIPHER *rc4_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_rc4(void) { if (rc4_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_rc4, 1, 16)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 0) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state))) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } rc4_cipher = cipher; } return rc4_cipher; } /* DES CBC EVP */ static EVP_CIPHER *des_cbc_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_des_cbc(void) { if (des_cbc_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_des_cbc, 8, 8)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } des_cbc_cipher = cipher; } return des_cbc_cipher; } /* 3DES CBC EVP */ static EVP_CIPHER *des3_cbc_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_3des_cbc(void) { if (des3_cbc_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } des3_cbc_cipher = cipher; } return des3_cbc_cipher; } static EVP_CIPHER *bf_cbc_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_bf_cbc(void) { if (bf_cbc_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } bf_cbc_cipher = cipher; } return bf_cbc_cipher; } static EVP_CIPHER *cast_cbc_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_cast_cbc(void) { if (cast_cbc_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_cast5_cbc, 8, 16)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 8) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } cast_cbc_cipher = cipher; } return cast_cbc_cipher; } static EVP_CIPHER *aes_cbc_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_cbc(void) { if (aes_cbc_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 16) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } aes_cbc_cipher = cipher; } return aes_cbc_cipher; } static EVP_CIPHER *aes_192_cbc_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_192_cbc(void) { if (aes_192_cbc_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 16) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } aes_192_cbc_cipher = cipher; } return aes_192_cbc_cipher; } static EVP_CIPHER *aes_256_cbc_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_256_cbc(void) { if (aes_256_cbc_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 16) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } aes_256_cbc_cipher = cipher; } return aes_256_cbc_cipher; } # ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR static EVP_CIPHER *aes_ctr_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_ctr(void) { if (aes_ctr_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 14) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } aes_ctr_cipher = cipher; } return aes_ctr_cipher; } static EVP_CIPHER *aes_192_ctr_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_192_ctr(void) { if (aes_192_ctr_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 14) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } aes_192_ctr_cipher = cipher; } return aes_192_ctr_cipher; } static EVP_CIPHER *aes_256_ctr_cipher = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *cryptodev_aes_256_ctr(void) { if (aes_256_ctr_cipher == NULL) { EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher, 14) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher, cryptodev_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher, cryptodev_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher, cryptodev_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(cipher, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv)) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher); cipher = NULL; } aes_256_ctr_cipher = cipher; } return aes_256_ctr_cipher; } # endif /* * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with * a particular NID in the ENGINE. this says what we'll do at the * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with */ static int cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid) { if (!cipher) return (cryptodev_usable_ciphers(nids)); switch (nid) { case NID_rc4: *cipher = cryptodev_rc4(); break; case NID_des_ede3_cbc: *cipher = cryptodev_3des_cbc(); break; case NID_des_cbc: *cipher = cryptodev_des_cbc(); break; case NID_bf_cbc: *cipher = cryptodev_bf_cbc(); break; case NID_cast5_cbc: *cipher = cryptodev_cast_cbc(); break; case NID_aes_128_cbc: *cipher = cryptodev_aes_cbc(); break; case NID_aes_192_cbc: *cipher = cryptodev_aes_192_cbc(); break; case NID_aes_256_cbc: *cipher = cryptodev_aes_256_cbc(); break; # ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR case NID_aes_128_ctr: *cipher = cryptodev_aes_ctr(); break; case NID_aes_192_ctr: *cipher = cryptodev_aes_192_ctr(); break; case NID_aes_256_ctr: *cipher = cryptodev_aes_256_ctr(); break; # endif default: *cipher = NULL; break; } return (*cipher != NULL); } # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS /* convert digest type to cryptodev */ static int digest_nid_to_cryptodev(int nid) { int i; for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++) if (digests[i].nid == nid) return (digests[i].id); return (0); } static int digest_key_length(int nid) { int i; for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++) if (digests[i].nid == nid) return digests[i].keylen; return (0); } static int cryptodev_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess; int digest; if ((digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))) == NID_undef) { printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get digest \n"); return (0); } memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state)); if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get Dev \n"); return (0); } sess->mackey = state->dummy_mac_key; sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)); sess->mac = digest; if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) { put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd); state->d_fd = -1; printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n"); return (0); } return (1); } static int cryptodev_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { struct crypt_op cryp; struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess; char *new_mac_data; if (!data || state->d_fd < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs \n"); return (0); } if (!count) { return (0); } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) { /* if application doesn't support one buffer */ new_mac_data = OPENSSL_realloc(state->mac_data, state->mac_len + count); if (!new_mac_data) { printf("cryptodev_digest_update: realloc failed\n"); return (0); } state->mac_data = new_mac_data; memcpy(state->mac_data + state->mac_len, data, count); state->mac_len += count; return (1); } memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp)); cryp.ses = sess->ses; cryp.flags = 0; cryp.len = count; cryp.src = (caddr_t) data; cryp.dst = NULL; cryp.mac = (caddr_t) state->digest_res; if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_update: digest failed\n"); return (0); } return (1); } static int cryptodev_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { struct crypt_op cryp; struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess; int ret = 1; if (!md || state->d_fd < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_final: illegal input\n"); return (0); } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) { /* if application doesn't support one buffer */ memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp)); cryp.ses = sess->ses; cryp.flags = 0; cryp.len = state->mac_len; cryp.src = state->mac_data; cryp.dst = NULL; cryp.mac = (caddr_t) md; if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_final: digest failed\n"); return (0); } return 1; } memcpy(md, state->digest_res, EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx)); return (ret); } static int cryptodev_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 1; struct dev_crypto_state *state = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx); struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess; if (state == NULL) return 0; if (state->d_fd < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: illegal input\n"); return (0); } OPENSSL_free(state->mac_data); state->mac_data = NULL; state->mac_len = 0; if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: failed to close session\n"); ret = 0; } else { ret = 1; } put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd); state->d_fd = -1; return (ret); } static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) { struct dev_crypto_state *fstate = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(from); struct dev_crypto_state *dstate = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(to); struct session_op *sess; int digest; if (dstate == NULL || fstate == NULL) return 1; memcpy(dstate, fstate, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)); sess = &dstate->d_sess; digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(EVP_MD_CTX_type(to)); sess->mackey = dstate->dummy_mac_key; sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(EVP_MD_CTX_type(to)); sess->mac = digest; dstate->d_fd = get_dev_crypto(); if (ioctl(dstate->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) { put_dev_crypto(dstate->d_fd); dstate->d_fd = -1; printf("cryptodev_digest_copy: Open session failed\n"); return (0); } if (fstate->mac_len != 0) { if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) { dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len); if (dstate->mac_data == NULL) { printf("cryptodev_digest_copy: mac_data allocation failed\n"); return (0); } memcpy(dstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_len); dstate->mac_len = fstate->mac_len; } } return 1; } static EVP_MD *sha1_md = NULL; static const EVP_MD *cryptodev_sha1(void) { if (sha1_md == NULL) { EVP_MD *md; if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha1, NID_undef)) == NULL || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, SHA_CBLOCK) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, cryptodev_digest_init) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, cryptodev_digest_update) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, cryptodev_digest_final) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(md, cryptodev_digest_copy) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(md, cryptodev_digest_cleanup)) { EVP_MD_meth_free(md); md = NULL; } sha1_md = md; } return sha1_md; } static EVP_MD *md5_md = NULL; static const EVP_MD *cryptodev_md5(void) { if (md5_md == NULL) { EVP_MD *md; if ((md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_md5, NID_undef)) == NULL || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(md, 16 /* MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH */) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(md, EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(md, 64 /* MD5_CBLOCK */) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(md, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(md, cryptodev_digest_init) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(md, cryptodev_digest_update) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(md, cryptodev_digest_final) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(md, cryptodev_digest_copy) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(md, cryptodev_digest_cleanup)) { EVP_MD_meth_free(md); md = NULL; } md5_md = md; } return md5_md; } # endif /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */ static int cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid) { if (!digest) return (cryptodev_usable_digests(nids)); switch (nid) { # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS case NID_md5: *digest = cryptodev_md5(); break; case NID_sha1: *digest = cryptodev_sha1(); break; default: # endif /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */ *digest = NULL; break; } return (*digest != NULL); } static int cryptodev_engine_destroy(ENGINE *e) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(rc4_cipher); rc4_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(des_cbc_cipher); des_cbc_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(des3_cbc_cipher); des3_cbc_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(bf_cbc_cipher); bf_cbc_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cast_cbc_cipher); cast_cbc_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_cbc_cipher); aes_cbc_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_192_cbc_cipher); aes_192_cbc_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_256_cbc_cipher); aes_256_cbc_cipher = NULL; # ifdef CRYPTO_AES_CTR EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_ctr_cipher); aes_ctr_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_192_ctr_cipher); aes_192_ctr_cipher = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(aes_256_ctr_cipher); aes_256_ctr_cipher = NULL; # endif # ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS EVP_MD_meth_free(sha1_md); sha1_md = NULL; EVP_MD_meth_free(md5_md); md5_md = NULL; # endif RSA_meth_free(cryptodev_rsa); cryptodev_rsa = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA_meth_free(cryptodev_dsa); cryptodev_dsa = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH_meth_free(cryptodev_dh); cryptodev_dh = NULL; #endif return 1; } /* * Convert a BIGNUM to the representation that /dev/crypto needs. * Upon completion of use, the caller is responsible for freeing * crp->crp_p. */ static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp) { ssize_t bytes, bits; u_char *b; crp->crp_p = NULL; crp->crp_nbits = 0; bits = BN_num_bits(a); bytes = BN_num_bytes(a); b = OPENSSL_zalloc(bytes); if (b == NULL) return (1); crp->crp_p = (caddr_t) b; crp->crp_nbits = bits; BN_bn2bin(a, b); return (0); } /* Convert a /dev/crypto parameter to a BIGNUM */ static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a) { u_int8_t *pd; int i, bytes; bytes = (crp->crp_nbits + 7) / 8; if (bytes == 0) return (-1); if ((pd = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes)) == NULL) return (-1); for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) pd[i] = crp->crp_p[bytes - i - 1]; BN_bin2bn(pd, bytes, a); free(pd); return (0); } static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop) { int i; for (i = 0; i < kop->crk_iparams + kop->crk_oparams; i++) { OPENSSL_free(kop->crk_param[i].crp_p); kop->crk_param[i].crp_p = NULL; kop->crk_param[i].crp_nbits = 0; } } static int cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r, int slen, BIGNUM *s) { int fd, ret = -1; if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0) return ret; if (r) { kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p = OPENSSL_zalloc(rlen); if (kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p == NULL) return ret; kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_nbits = rlen * 8; kop->crk_oparams++; } if (s) { kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_p = OPENSSL_zalloc(slen); /* No need to free the kop->crk_iparams parameter if it was allocated, * callers of this routine have to free allocated parameters through * zapparams both in case of success and failure */ if (kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams+1].crp_p == NULL) return ret; kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_nbits = slen * 8; kop->crk_oparams++; } if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, kop) == 0) { if (r) crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams], r); if (s) crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1], s); ret = 0; } return ret; } static int cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { struct crypt_kop kop; int ret = 1; /* * Currently, we know we can do mod exp iff we can do any asymmetric * operations at all. */ if (cryptodev_asymfeat == 0) { ret = BN_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx); return (ret); } memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP; /* inputs: a^p % m */ if (bn2crparam(a, &kop.crk_param[0])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[1])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(m, &kop.crk_param[2])) goto err; kop.crk_iparams = 3; if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(m), r, 0, NULL)) { const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(); printf("OCF asym process failed, Running in software\n"); ret = RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(meth)(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont); } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) { const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(); printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n"); ret = RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(meth)(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont); } /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */ err: zapparams(&kop); return (ret); } static int cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { int r; const BIGNUM *n = NULL; const BIGNUM *d = NULL; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, &d); r = cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, n, ctx, NULL); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return (r); } static int cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { struct crypt_kop kop; int ret = 1; const BIGNUM *p = NULL; const BIGNUM *q = NULL; const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL; const BIGNUM *dmq1 = NULL; const BIGNUM *iqmp = NULL; const BIGNUM *n = NULL; RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q); RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp); RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL); if (!p || !q || !dmp1 || !dmq1 || !iqmp) { /* XXX 0 means failure?? */ return (0); } memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT; /* inputs: rsa->p rsa->q I rsa->dmp1 rsa->dmq1 rsa->iqmp */ if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[0])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(q, &kop.crk_param[1])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(I, &kop.crk_param[2])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(dmp1, &kop.crk_param[3])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(dmq1, &kop.crk_param[4])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(iqmp, &kop.crk_param[5])) goto err; kop.crk_iparams = 6; if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(n), r0, 0, NULL)) { const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(); printf("OCF asym process failed, running in Software\n"); ret = RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(meth)(r0, I, rsa, ctx); } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) { const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(); printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n"); ret = RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(meth)(r0, I, rsa, ctx); } /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */ err: zapparams(&kop); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static int cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { return cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx); } static int cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *u1, const BIGNUM *pub_key, const BIGNUM *u2, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont) { const BIGNUM *dsag, *dsap, *dsapub_key; BIGNUM *t2; int ret = 0; const DSA_METHOD *meth; int (*bn_mod_exp)(DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *); t2 = BN_new(); if (t2 == NULL) goto err; /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */ /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */ ret = 0; DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &dsap, NULL, &dsag); DSA_get0_key(dsa, &dsapub_key, NULL); meth = DSA_get_method(dsa); if (meth == NULL) goto err; bn_mod_exp = DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(meth); if (bn_mod_exp == NULL) goto err; if (!bn_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsag, u1, dsap, ctx, mont)) goto err; /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */ if (!bn_mod_exp(dsa, t2, dsapub_key, u2, dsap, ctx, mont)) goto err; /* let t1 = t1 * t2 mod p */ if (!BN_mod_mul(t1, t1, t2, dsap, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_free(t2); return (ret); } static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) { struct crypt_kop kop; BIGNUM *r, *s; const BIGNUM *dsap = NULL, *dsaq = NULL, *dsag = NULL; const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL; DSA_SIG *dsasig, *dsaret = NULL; dsasig = DSA_SIG_new(); if (dsasig == NULL) goto err; memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_SIGN; /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->priv_key */ kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst; kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8; DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &dsap, &dsaq, &dsag); DSA_get0_key(dsa, NULL, &priv_key); if (bn2crparam(dsap, &kop.crk_param[1])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(dsaq, &kop.crk_param[2])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(dsag, &kop.crk_param[3])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(priv_key, &kop.crk_param[4])) goto err; kop.crk_iparams = 5; r = BN_new(); if (r == NULL) goto err; s = BN_new(); if (s == NULL) goto err; if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsaq), r, BN_num_bytes(dsaq), s) == 0) { DSA_SIG_set0(dsasig, r, s); dsaret = dsasig; } else { dsaret = DSA_meth_get_sign(DSA_OpenSSL())(dgst, dlen, dsa); } err: if (dsaret != dsasig) DSA_SIG_free(dsasig); kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL; zapparams(&kop); return dsaret; } static int cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) { struct crypt_kop kop; int dsaret = 1; const BIGNUM *pr, *ps, *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub_key = NULL; memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_VERIFY; /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->pub_key sig->r sig->s */ kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst; kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8; DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[1])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(q, &kop.crk_param[2])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(g, &kop.crk_param[3])) goto err; DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL); if (bn2crparam(pub_key, &kop.crk_param[4])) goto err; DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &pr, &ps); if (bn2crparam(pr, &kop.crk_param[5])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(ps, &kop.crk_param[6])) goto err; kop.crk_iparams = 7; if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, 0, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0) { /* * OCF success value is 0, if not zero, change dsaret to fail */ if (0 != kop.crk_status) dsaret = 0; } else { dsaret = DSA_meth_get_verify(DSA_OpenSSL())(dgst, dlen, sig, dsa); } err: kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL; zapparams(&kop); return (dsaret); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static int cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { return (cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx)); } static int cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { struct crypt_kop kop; int dhret = 1; int fd, keylen; const BIGNUM *p = NULL; const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL; if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0) { const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL(); return DH_meth_get_compute_key(meth)(key, pub_key, dh); } DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL); DH_get0_key(dh, NULL, &priv_key); keylen = BN_num_bits(p); memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY; /* inputs: dh->priv_key pub_key dh->p key */ if (bn2crparam(priv_key, &kop.crk_param[0])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(pub_key, &kop.crk_param[1])) goto err; if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[2])) goto err; kop.crk_iparams = 3; kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = (caddr_t) key; kop.crk_param[3].crp_nbits = keylen * 8; kop.crk_oparams = 1; if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, &kop) == -1) { const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL(); dhret = DH_meth_get_compute_key(meth)(key, pub_key, dh); } err: kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = NULL; zapparams(&kop); return (dhret); } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_DH */ /* * ctrl right now is just a wrapper that doesn't do much * but I expect we'll want some options soon. */ static int cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) { # ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R struct syslog_data sd = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; # endif switch (cmd) { default: # ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R syslog_r(LOG_ERR, &sd, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd); # else syslog(LOG_ERR, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd); # endif break; } return (1); } void engine_load_cryptodev_int(void) { ENGINE *engine = ENGINE_new(); int fd; if (engine == NULL) return; if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) { ENGINE_free(engine); return; } /* * find out what asymmetric crypto algorithms we support */ if (ioctl(fd, CIOCASYMFEAT, &cryptodev_asymfeat) == -1) { put_dev_crypto(fd); ENGINE_free(engine); return; } put_dev_crypto(fd); if (!ENGINE_set_id(engine, "cryptodev") || !ENGINE_set_name(engine, "BSD cryptodev engine") || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(engine, cryptodev_engine_destroy) || !ENGINE_set_ciphers(engine, cryptodev_engine_ciphers) || !ENGINE_set_digests(engine, cryptodev_engine_digests) || !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(engine, cryptodev_ctrl) || !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(engine, cryptodev_defns)) { ENGINE_free(engine); return; } cryptodev_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()); if (cryptodev_rsa != NULL) { RSA_meth_set1_name(cryptodev_rsa, "cryptodev RSA method"); RSA_meth_set_flags(cryptodev_rsa, 0); if (ENGINE_set_RSA(engine, cryptodev_rsa)) { if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) { RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(cryptodev_rsa, cryptodev_bn_mod_exp); if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP_CRT) RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(cryptodev_rsa, cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp); else RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(cryptodev_rsa, cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp); } } } else { ENGINE_free(engine); return; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA cryptodev_dsa = DSA_meth_dup(DSA_OpenSSL()); if (cryptodev_dsa != NULL) { DSA_meth_set1_name(cryptodev_dsa, "cryptodev DSA method"); DSA_meth_set_flags(cryptodev_dsa, 0); if (ENGINE_set_DSA(engine, cryptodev_dsa)) { if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_SIGN) DSA_meth_set_sign(cryptodev_dsa, cryptodev_dsa_do_sign); if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) { DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(cryptodev_dsa, cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp); DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(cryptodev_dsa, cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp); } if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_VERIFY) DSA_meth_set_verify(cryptodev_dsa, cryptodev_dsa_verify); } } else { ENGINE_free(engine); return; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH cryptodev_dh = DH_meth_dup(DH_OpenSSL()); if (cryptodev_dh != NULL) { DH_meth_set1_name(cryptodev_dh, "cryptodev DH method"); DH_meth_set_flags(cryptodev_dh, 0); if (ENGINE_set_DH(engine, cryptodev_dh)) { if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) { DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(cryptodev_dh, cryptodev_mod_exp_dh); if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DH_COMPUTE_KEY) DH_meth_set_compute_key(cryptodev_dh, cryptodev_dh_compute_key); } } } else { ENGINE_free(engine); return; } #endif ENGINE_add(engine); ENGINE_free(engine); ERR_clear_error(); } #endif /* HAVE_CRYPTODEV */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_cnf.c0000644000000000000000000001307113176625657016415 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" #include /* #define ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG */ /* ENGINE config module */ static const char *skip_dot(const char *name) { const char *p = strchr(name, '.'); if (p != NULL) return p + 1; return name; } static STACK_OF(ENGINE) *initialized_engines = NULL; static int int_engine_init(ENGINE *e) { if (!ENGINE_init(e)) return 0; if (!initialized_engines) initialized_engines = sk_ENGINE_new_null(); if (!initialized_engines || !sk_ENGINE_push(initialized_engines, e)) { ENGINE_finish(e); return 0; } return 1; } static int int_engine_configure(const char *name, const char *value, const CONF *cnf) { int i; int ret = 0; long do_init = -1; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds; CONF_VALUE *ecmd = NULL; const char *ctrlname, *ctrlvalue; ENGINE *e = NULL; int soft = 0; name = skip_dot(name); #ifdef ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Configuring engine %s\n", name); #endif /* Value is a section containing ENGINE commands */ ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value); if (!ecmds) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE, ENGINE_R_ENGINE_SECTION_ERROR); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) { ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i); ctrlname = skip_dot(ecmd->name); ctrlvalue = ecmd->value; #ifdef ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "ENGINE conf: doing ctrl(%s,%s)\n", ctrlname, ctrlvalue); #endif /* First handle some special pseudo ctrls */ /* Override engine name to use */ if (strcmp(ctrlname, "engine_id") == 0) name = ctrlvalue; else if (strcmp(ctrlname, "soft_load") == 0) soft = 1; /* Load a dynamic ENGINE */ else if (strcmp(ctrlname, "dynamic_path") == 0) { e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (!e) goto err; if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", ctrlvalue, 0)) goto err; if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LIST_ADD", "2", 0)) goto err; if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) goto err; } /* ... add other pseudos here ... */ else { /* * At this point we need an ENGINE structural reference if we * don't already have one. */ if (!e) { e = ENGINE_by_id(name); if (!e && soft) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } if (!e) goto err; } /* * Allow "EMPTY" to mean no value: this allows a valid "value" to * be passed to ctrls of type NO_INPUT */ if (strcmp(ctrlvalue, "EMPTY") == 0) ctrlvalue = NULL; if (strcmp(ctrlname, "init") == 0) { if (!NCONF_get_number_e(cnf, value, "init", &do_init)) goto err; if (do_init == 1) { if (!int_engine_init(e)) goto err; } else if (do_init != 0) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE, ENGINE_R_INVALID_INIT_VALUE); goto err; } } else if (strcmp(ctrlname, "default_algorithms") == 0) { if (!ENGINE_set_default_string(e, ctrlvalue)) goto err; } else if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, ctrlname, ctrlvalue, 0)) goto err; } } if (e && (do_init == -1) && !int_engine_init(e)) { ecmd = NULL; goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ret != 1) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE, ENGINE_R_ENGINE_CONFIGURATION_ERROR); if (ecmd) ERR_add_error_data(6, "section=", ecmd->section, ", name=", ecmd->name, ", value=", ecmd->value); } ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } static int int_engine_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *elist; CONF_VALUE *cval; int i; #ifdef ENGINE_CONF_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Called engine module: name %s, value %s\n", CONF_imodule_get_name(md), CONF_imodule_get_value(md)); #endif /* Value is a section containing ENGINEs to configure */ elist = NCONF_get_section(cnf, CONF_imodule_get_value(md)); if (!elist) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT, ENGINE_R_ENGINES_SECTION_ERROR); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(elist); i++) { cval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(elist, i); if (!int_engine_configure(cval->name, cval->value, cnf)) return 0; } return 1; } static void int_engine_module_finish(CONF_IMODULE *md) { ENGINE *e; while ((e = sk_ENGINE_pop(initialized_engines))) ENGINE_finish(e); sk_ENGINE_free(initialized_engines); initialized_engines = NULL; } void ENGINE_add_conf_module(void) { CONF_module_add("engines", int_engine_module_init, int_engine_module_finish); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_table.c0000644000000000000000000002102113176625657016730 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "eng_int.h" /* The type of the items in the table */ struct st_engine_pile { /* The 'nid' of this algorithm/mode */ int nid; /* ENGINEs that implement this algorithm/mode. */ STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk; /* The default ENGINE to perform this algorithm/mode. */ ENGINE *funct; /* * Zero if 'sk' is newer than the cached 'funct', non-zero otherwise */ int uptodate; }; /* The type exposed in eng_int.h */ struct st_engine_table { LHASH_OF(ENGINE_PILE) piles; }; /* ENGINE_TABLE */ typedef struct st_engine_pile_doall { engine_table_doall_cb *cb; void *arg; } ENGINE_PILE_DOALL; /* Global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***). */ static unsigned int table_flags = 0; /* API function manipulating 'table_flags' */ unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void) { return table_flags; } void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags) { table_flags = flags; } /* Internal functions for the "piles" hash table */ static unsigned long engine_pile_hash(const ENGINE_PILE *c) { return c->nid; } static int engine_pile_cmp(const ENGINE_PILE *a, const ENGINE_PILE *b) { return a->nid - b->nid; } static int int_table_check(ENGINE_TABLE **t, int create) { LHASH_OF(ENGINE_PILE) *lh; if (*t) return 1; if (!create) return 0; if ((lh = lh_ENGINE_PILE_new(engine_pile_hash, engine_pile_cmp)) == NULL) return 0; *t = (ENGINE_TABLE *)lh; return 1; } /* * Privately exposed (via eng_int.h) functions for adding and/or removing * ENGINEs from the implementation table */ int engine_table_register(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cleanup, ENGINE *e, const int *nids, int num_nids, int setdefault) { int ret = 0, added = 0; ENGINE_PILE tmplate, *fnd; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (!(*table)) added = 1; if (!int_table_check(table, 1)) goto end; if (added) /* The cleanup callback needs to be added */ engine_cleanup_add_first(cleanup); while (num_nids--) { tmplate.nid = *nids; fnd = lh_ENGINE_PILE_retrieve(&(*table)->piles, &tmplate); if (!fnd) { fnd = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*fnd)); if (fnd == NULL) goto end; fnd->uptodate = 1; fnd->nid = *nids; fnd->sk = sk_ENGINE_new_null(); if (!fnd->sk) { OPENSSL_free(fnd); goto end; } fnd->funct = NULL; (void)lh_ENGINE_PILE_insert(&(*table)->piles, fnd); } /* A registration shouldn't add duplicate entries */ (void)sk_ENGINE_delete_ptr(fnd->sk, e); /* * if 'setdefault', this ENGINE goes to the head of the list */ if (!sk_ENGINE_push(fnd->sk, e)) goto end; /* "touch" this ENGINE_PILE */ fnd->uptodate = 0; if (setdefault) { if (!engine_unlocked_init(e)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_TABLE_REGISTER, ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED); goto end; } if (fnd->funct) engine_unlocked_finish(fnd->funct, 0); fnd->funct = e; fnd->uptodate = 1; } nids++; } ret = 1; end: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return ret; } static void int_unregister_cb(ENGINE_PILE *pile, ENGINE *e) { int n; /* Iterate the 'c->sk' stack removing any occurrence of 'e' */ while ((n = sk_ENGINE_find(pile->sk, e)) >= 0) { (void)sk_ENGINE_delete(pile->sk, n); pile->uptodate = 0; } if (pile->funct == e) { engine_unlocked_finish(e, 0); pile->funct = NULL; } } IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(ENGINE_PILE, ENGINE); void engine_table_unregister(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE *e) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (int_table_check(table, 0)) lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall_ENGINE(&(*table)->piles, int_unregister_cb, e); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); } static void int_cleanup_cb_doall(ENGINE_PILE *p) { if (!p) return; sk_ENGINE_free(p->sk); if (p->funct) engine_unlocked_finish(p->funct, 0); OPENSSL_free(p); } void engine_table_cleanup(ENGINE_TABLE **table) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (*table) { lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall(&(*table)->piles, int_cleanup_cb_doall); lh_ENGINE_PILE_free(&(*table)->piles); *table = NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); } /* return a functional reference for a given 'nid' */ #ifndef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG ENGINE *engine_table_select(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid) #else ENGINE *engine_table_select_tmp(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid, const char *f, int l) #endif { ENGINE *ret = NULL; ENGINE_PILE tmplate, *fnd = NULL; int initres, loop = 0; if (!(*table)) { #ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, nothing " "registered!\n", f, l, nid); #endif return NULL; } ERR_set_mark(); CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); /* * Check again inside the lock otherwise we could race against cleanup * operations. But don't worry about a fprintf(stderr). */ if (!int_table_check(table, 0)) goto end; tmplate.nid = nid; fnd = lh_ENGINE_PILE_retrieve(&(*table)->piles, &tmplate); if (!fnd) goto end; if (fnd->funct && engine_unlocked_init(fnd->funct)) { #ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, using " "ENGINE '%s' cached\n", f, l, nid, fnd->funct->id); #endif ret = fnd->funct; goto end; } if (fnd->uptodate) { ret = fnd->funct; goto end; } trynext: ret = sk_ENGINE_value(fnd->sk, loop++); if (!ret) { #ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, no " "registered implementations would initialise\n", f, l, nid); #endif goto end; } /* Try to initialise the ENGINE? */ if ((ret->funct_ref > 0) || !(table_flags & ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT)) initres = engine_unlocked_init(ret); else initres = 0; if (initres) { /* Update 'funct' */ if ((fnd->funct != ret) && engine_unlocked_init(ret)) { /* If there was a previous default we release it. */ if (fnd->funct) engine_unlocked_finish(fnd->funct, 0); fnd->funct = ret; #ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, " "setting default to '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id); #endif } #ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, using " "newly initialised '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id); #endif goto end; } goto trynext; end: /* * If it failed, it is unlikely to succeed again until some future * registrations have taken place. In all cases, we cache. */ if (fnd) fnd->uptodate = 1; #ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG if (ret) fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, caching " "ENGINE '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id); else fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, caching " "'no matching ENGINE'\n", f, l, nid); #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* * Whatever happened, any failed init()s are not failures in this * context, so clear our error state. */ ERR_pop_to_mark(); return ret; } /* Table enumeration */ static void int_dall(const ENGINE_PILE *pile, ENGINE_PILE_DOALL *dall) { dall->cb(pile->nid, pile->sk, pile->funct, dall->arg); } IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(ENGINE_PILE, ENGINE_PILE_DOALL); void engine_table_doall(ENGINE_TABLE *table, engine_table_doall_cb *cb, void *arg) { ENGINE_PILE_DOALL dall; dall.cb = cb; dall.arg = arg; if (table) lh_ENGINE_PILE_doall_ENGINE_PILE_DOALL(&table->piles, int_dall, &dall); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c0000644000000000000000000001031713176625657016617 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" /* Basic get/set stuff */ int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f) { e->load_privkey = loadpriv_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f) { e->load_pubkey = loadpub_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR loadssl_f) { e->load_ssl_client_cert = loadssl_f; return 1; } ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->load_privkey; } ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->load_pubkey; } ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->load_ssl_client_cert; } /* API functions to load public/private keys */ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (e->funct_ref == 0) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); if (!e->load_privkey) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY, ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION); return 0; } pkey = e->load_privkey(e, key_id, ui_method, callback_data); if (!pkey) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; } return pkey; } EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (e->funct_ref == 0) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); if (!e->load_pubkey) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY, ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION); return 0; } pkey = e->load_pubkey(e, key_id, ui_method, callback_data); if (!pkey) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY, ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } return pkey; } int ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(ENGINE *e, SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **ppkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) { if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (e->funct_ref == 0) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); if (!e->load_ssl_client_cert) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT, ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION); return 0; } return e->load_ssl_client_cert(e, s, ca_dn, pcert, ppkey, pother, ui_method, callback_data); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/engine/tb_cipher.c0000644000000000000000000000464613176625657016765 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_int.h" static ENGINE_TABLE *cipher_table = NULL; void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e) { engine_table_unregister(&cipher_table, e); } static void engine_unregister_all_ciphers(void) { engine_table_cleanup(&cipher_table); } int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e) { if (e->ciphers) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->ciphers(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&cipher_table, engine_unregister_all_ciphers, e, nids, num_nids, 0); } return 1; } void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers() { ENGINE *e; for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) ENGINE_register_ciphers(e); } int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e) { if (e->ciphers) { const int *nids; int num_nids = e->ciphers(e, NULL, &nids, 0); if (num_nids > 0) return engine_table_register(&cipher_table, engine_unregister_all_ciphers, e, nids, num_nids, 1); } return 1; } /* * Exposed API function to get a functional reference from the implementation * table (ie. try to get a functional reference from the tabled structural * references) for a given cipher 'nid' */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid) { return engine_table_select(&cipher_table, nid); } /* Obtains a cipher implementation from an ENGINE functional reference */ const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid) { const EVP_CIPHER *ret; ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR fn = ENGINE_get_ciphers(e); if (!fn || !fn(e, &ret, NULL, nid)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_CIPHER, ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_CIPHER); return NULL; } return ret; } /* Gets the cipher callback from an ENGINE structure */ ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e) { return e->ciphers; } /* Sets the cipher callback in an ENGINE structure */ int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f) { e->ciphers = f; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md2/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014065 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md2/build.info0000644000000000000000000000011413176625657016035 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ md2_dgst.c md2_one.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c0000644000000000000000000001176013176625657015741 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Implemented from RFC1319 The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm */ #define UCHAR unsigned char static void md2_block(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *d); /* * The magic S table - I have converted it to hex since it is basically just * a random byte string. */ static const MD2_INT S[256] = { 0x29, 0x2E, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0x7C, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x36, 0x54, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x06, 0x13, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x05, 0xF3, 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x73, 0x8C, 0x98, 0x93, 0x2B, 0xD9, 0xBC, 0x4C, 0x82, 0xCA, 0x1E, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3C, 0xFD, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x16, 0x67, 0x42, 0x6F, 0x18, 0x8A, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x4E, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0x9E, 0xDE, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xFB, 0xF5, 0x8E, 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xEE, 0x7A, 0xA9, 0x68, 0x79, 0x91, 0x15, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x3F, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x10, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x80, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x90, 0x32, 0x27, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xCC, 0xE7, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x97, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x30, 0xB3, 0x48, 0xA5, 0xB5, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x92, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xAA, 0xC6, 0x4F, 0xB8, 0x38, 0xD2, 0x96, 0xA4, 0x7D, 0xB6, 0x76, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0xE2, 0x9C, 0x74, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x45, 0x9D, 0x70, 0x59, 0x64, 0x71, 0x87, 0x20, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xCF, 0x65, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0xA8, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x60, 0x25, 0xAD, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0xB9, 0xF6, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x61, 0x69, 0x34, 0x40, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x55, 0x47, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xAF, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0xC5, 0xEA, 0x26, 0x2C, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x28, 0x84, 0x09, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x52, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x6C, 0xC1, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x24, 0xE1, 0x7B, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0xB1, 0x4A, 0x78, 0x88, 0x95, 0x8B, 0xE3, 0x63, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0xD5, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xF2, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x66, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xA6, 0x77, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x75, 0x4B, 0x0A, 0x31, 0x44, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x8F, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0x99, 0x8D, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x11, 0x83, 0x14, }; const char *MD2_options(void) { if (sizeof(MD2_INT) == 1) return ("md2(char)"); else return ("md2(int)"); } int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c) { c->num = 0; memset(c->state, 0, sizeof(c->state)); memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof(c->cksm)); memset(c->data, 0, sizeof(c->data)); return 1; } int MD2_Update(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) { register UCHAR *p; if (len == 0) return 1; p = c->data; if (c->num != 0) { if ((c->num + len) >= MD2_BLOCK) { memcpy(&(p[c->num]), data, MD2_BLOCK - c->num); md2_block(c, c->data); data += (MD2_BLOCK - c->num); len -= (MD2_BLOCK - c->num); c->num = 0; /* drop through and do the rest */ } else { memcpy(&(p[c->num]), data, len); /* data+=len; */ c->num += (int)len; return 1; } } /* * we now can process the input data in blocks of MD2_BLOCK chars and * save the leftovers to c->data. */ while (len >= MD2_BLOCK) { md2_block(c, data); data += MD2_BLOCK; len -= MD2_BLOCK; } memcpy(p, data, len); c->num = (int)len; return 1; } static void md2_block(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *d) { register MD2_INT t, *sp1, *sp2; register int i, j; MD2_INT state[48]; sp1 = c->state; sp2 = c->cksm; j = sp2[MD2_BLOCK - 1]; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { state[i] = sp1[i]; state[i + 16] = t = d[i]; state[i + 32] = (t ^ sp1[i]); j = sp2[i] ^= S[t ^ j]; } t = 0; for (i = 0; i < 18; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 48; j += 8) { t = state[j + 0] ^= S[t]; t = state[j + 1] ^= S[t]; t = state[j + 2] ^= S[t]; t = state[j + 3] ^= S[t]; t = state[j + 4] ^= S[t]; t = state[j + 5] ^= S[t]; t = state[j + 6] ^= S[t]; t = state[j + 7] ^= S[t]; } t = (t + i) & 0xff; } memcpy(sp1, state, 16 * sizeof(MD2_INT)); OPENSSL_cleanse(state, 48 * sizeof(MD2_INT)); } int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c) { int i, v; register UCHAR *cp; register MD2_INT *p1, *p2; cp = c->data; p1 = c->state; p2 = c->cksm; v = MD2_BLOCK - c->num; for (i = c->num; i < MD2_BLOCK; i++) cp[i] = (UCHAR) v; md2_block(c, cp); for (i = 0; i < MD2_BLOCK; i++) cp[i] = (UCHAR) p2[i]; md2_block(c, cp); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) md[i] = (UCHAR) (p1[i] & 0xff); OPENSSL_cleanse(c, sizeof(*c)); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md2/md2_one.c0000644000000000000000000000225713176625657015562 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* * This is a separate file so that #defines in cryptlib.h can map my MD * functions to different names */ unsigned char *MD2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { MD2_CTX c; static unsigned char m[MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; if (!MD2_Init(&c)) return NULL; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC MD2_Update(&c, d, n); #else { char temp[1024]; unsigned long chunk; while (n > 0) { chunk = (n > sizeof(temp)) ? sizeof(temp) : n; ebcdic2ascii(temp, d, chunk); MD2_Update(&c, temp, chunk); n -= chunk; d += chunk; } } #endif MD2_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* Security consideration */ return (md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014153 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c0000644000000000000000000000617713176625656015547 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret) { BIO *b; char buf[256]; char *p; long r = 1; int len; size_t p_maxlen; if (BIO_CB_RETURN & cmd) r = ret; len = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "BIO[%p]: ", (void *)bio); /* Ignore errors and continue printing the other information. */ if (len < 0) len = 0; p = buf + len; p_maxlen = sizeof(buf) - len; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CB_FREE: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "Free - %s\n", bio->method->name); break; case BIO_CB_READ: if (bio->method->type & BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "read(%d,%lu) - %s fd=%d\n", bio->num, (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name, bio->num); else BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "read(%d,%lu) - %s\n", bio->num, (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name); break; case BIO_CB_WRITE: if (bio->method->type & BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "write(%d,%lu) - %s fd=%d\n", bio->num, (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name, bio->num); else BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "write(%d,%lu) - %s\n", bio->num, (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name); break; case BIO_CB_PUTS: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "puts() - %s\n", bio->method->name); break; case BIO_CB_GETS: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "gets(%lu) - %s\n", (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name); break; case BIO_CB_CTRL: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "ctrl(%lu) - %s\n", (unsigned long)argi, bio->method->name); break; case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_READ: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "read return %ld\n", ret); break; case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_WRITE: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "write return %ld\n", ret); break; case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_GETS: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "gets return %ld\n", ret); break; case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_PUTS: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "puts return %ld\n", ret); break; case BIO_CB_RETURN | BIO_CB_CTRL: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "ctrl return %ld\n", ret); break; default: BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "bio callback - unknown type (%d)\n", cmd); break; } b = (BIO *)bio->cb_arg; if (b != NULL) BIO_write(b, buf, strlen(buf)); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) else fputs(buf, stderr); #endif return (r); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_null.c0000644000000000000000000000375713176625656016154 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" static int null_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int null_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int null_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int null_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long null_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int null_new(BIO *h); static int null_free(BIO *data); static const BIO_METHOD null_method = { BIO_TYPE_NULL, "NULL", null_write, null_read, null_puts, null_gets, null_ctrl, null_new, null_free, NULL, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void) { return (&null_method); } static int null_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 1; bi->num = 0; bi->ptr = (NULL); return (1); } static int null_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); return (1); } static int null_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { return (0); } static int null_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { return (inl); } static long null_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: case BIO_CTRL_EOF: case BIO_CTRL_SET: case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: case BIO_CTRL_INFO: case BIO_CTRL_GET: case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int null_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { return (0); } static int null_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { if (str == NULL) return (0); return (strlen(str)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bf_buff.c0000644000000000000000000002744113176625656015720 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" static int buffer_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int buffer_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int buffer_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int buffer_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int buffer_new(BIO *h); static int buffer_free(BIO *data); static long buffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 4096 static const BIO_METHOD methods_buffer = { BIO_TYPE_BUFFER, "buffer", buffer_write, buffer_read, buffer_puts, buffer_gets, buffer_ctrl, buffer_new, buffer_free, buffer_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void) { return (&methods_buffer); } static int buffer_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return (0); ctx->ibuf_size = DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; ctx->ibuf = OPENSSL_malloc(DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE); if (ctx->ibuf == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return (0); } ctx->obuf_size = DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE); if (ctx->obuf == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf); OPENSSL_free(ctx); return (0); } bi->init = 1; bi->ptr = (char *)ctx; bi->flags = 0; return (1); } static int buffer_free(BIO *a) { BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *b; if (a == NULL) return (0); b = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)a->ptr; OPENSSL_free(b->ibuf); OPENSSL_free(b->obuf); OPENSSL_free(a->ptr); a->ptr = NULL; a->init = 0; a->flags = 0; return (1); } static int buffer_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int i, num = 0; BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx; if (out == NULL) return (0); ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr; if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL)) return (0); num = 0; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); start: i = ctx->ibuf_len; /* If there is stuff left over, grab it */ if (i != 0) { if (i > outl) i = outl; memcpy(out, &(ctx->ibuf[ctx->ibuf_off]), i); ctx->ibuf_off += i; ctx->ibuf_len -= i; num += i; if (outl == i) return (num); outl -= i; out += i; } /* * We may have done a partial read. try to do more. We have nothing in * the buffer. If we get an error and have read some data, just return it * and let them retry to get the error again. copy direct to parent * address space */ if (outl > ctx->ibuf_size) { for (;;) { i = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (i < 0) return ((num > 0) ? num : i); if (i == 0) return (num); } num += i; if (outl == i) return (num); out += i; outl -= i; } } /* else */ /* we are going to be doing some buffering */ i = BIO_read(b->next_bio, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibuf_size); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (i < 0) return ((num > 0) ? num : i); if (i == 0) return (num); } ctx->ibuf_off = 0; ctx->ibuf_len = i; /* Lets re-read using ourselves :-) */ goto start; } static int buffer_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int i, num = 0; BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr; if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL)) return (0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); start: i = ctx->obuf_size - (ctx->obuf_len + ctx->obuf_off); /* add to buffer and return */ if (i >= inl) { memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off + ctx->obuf_len]), in, inl); ctx->obuf_len += inl; return (num + inl); } /* else */ /* stuff already in buffer, so add to it first, then flush */ if (ctx->obuf_len != 0) { if (i > 0) { /* lets fill it up if we can */ memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off + ctx->obuf_len]), in, i); in += i; inl -= i; num += i; ctx->obuf_len += i; } /* we now have a full buffer needing flushing */ for (;;) { i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]), ctx->obuf_len); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (i < 0) return ((num > 0) ? num : i); if (i == 0) return (num); } ctx->obuf_off += i; ctx->obuf_len -= i; if (ctx->obuf_len == 0) break; } } /* * we only get here if the buffer has been flushed and we still have * stuff to write */ ctx->obuf_off = 0; /* we now have inl bytes to write */ while (inl >= ctx->obuf_size) { i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (i < 0) return ((num > 0) ? num : i); if (i == 0) return (num); } num += i; in += i; inl -= i; if (inl == 0) return (num); } /* * copy the rest into the buffer since we have only a small amount left */ goto start; } static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { BIO *dbio; BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx; long ret = 1; char *p1, *p2; int r, i, *ip; int ibs, obs; ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ctx->ibuf_off = 0; ctx->ibuf_len = 0; ctx->obuf_off = 0; ctx->obuf_len = 0; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len; break; case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES: ret = 0; p1 = ctx->ibuf; for (i = 0; i < ctx->ibuf_len; i++) { if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++; } break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len; if (ret == 0) { if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); } break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: ret = (long)ctx->ibuf_len; if (ret == 0) { if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); } break; case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA: if (num > ctx->ibuf_size) { p1 = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num); if (p1 == NULL) goto malloc_error; OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf); ctx->ibuf = p1; } ctx->ibuf_off = 0; ctx->ibuf_len = (int)num; memcpy(ctx->ibuf, ptr, (int)num); ret = 1; break; case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE: if (ptr != NULL) { ip = (int *)ptr; if (*ip == 0) { ibs = (int)num; obs = ctx->obuf_size; } else { /* if (*ip == 1) */ ibs = ctx->ibuf_size; obs = (int)num; } } else { ibs = (int)num; obs = (int)num; } p1 = ctx->ibuf; p2 = ctx->obuf; if ((ibs > DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE) && (ibs != ctx->ibuf_size)) { p1 = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num); if (p1 == NULL) goto malloc_error; } if ((obs > DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE) && (obs != ctx->obuf_size)) { p2 = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num); if (p2 == NULL) { if (p1 != ctx->ibuf) OPENSSL_free(p1); goto malloc_error; } } if (ctx->ibuf != p1) { OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf); ctx->ibuf = p1; ctx->ibuf_off = 0; ctx->ibuf_len = 0; ctx->ibuf_size = ibs; } if (ctx->obuf != p2) { OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf); ctx->obuf = p2; ctx->obuf_off = 0; ctx->obuf_len = 0; ctx->obuf_size = obs; } break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); if (ctx->obuf_len <= 0) { ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } for (;;) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ctx->obuf_len > 0) { r = BIO_write(b->next_bio, &(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]), ctx->obuf_len); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (r <= 0) return ((long)r); ctx->obuf_off += r; ctx->obuf_len -= r; } else { ctx->obuf_len = 0; ctx->obuf_off = 0; break; } } ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: dbio = (BIO *)ptr; if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(dbio, ctx->ibuf_size) || !BIO_set_write_buffer_size(dbio, ctx->obuf_size)) ret = 0; break; default: if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); malloc_error: BIOerr(BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } static long buffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } static int buffer_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size) { BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *ctx; int num = 0, i, flag; char *p; ctx = (BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr; size--; /* reserve space for a '\0' */ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); for (;;) { if (ctx->ibuf_len > 0) { p = &(ctx->ibuf[ctx->ibuf_off]); flag = 0; for (i = 0; (i < ctx->ibuf_len) && (i < size); i++) { *(buf++) = p[i]; if (p[i] == '\n') { flag = 1; i++; break; } } num += i; size -= i; ctx->ibuf_len -= i; ctx->ibuf_off += i; if (flag || size == 0) { *buf = '\0'; return (num); } } else { /* read another chunk */ i = BIO_read(b->next_bio, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibuf_size); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); *buf = '\0'; if (i < 0) return ((num > 0) ? num : i); if (i == 0) return (num); } ctx->ibuf_len = i; ctx->ibuf_off = 0; } } } static int buffer_puts(BIO *b, const char *str) { return (buffer_write(b, str, strlen(str))); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c0000644000000000000000000001772113176625656015754 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" static int mem_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int mem_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int mem_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int mem_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long mem_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int mem_new(BIO *h); static int secmem_new(BIO *h); static int mem_free(BIO *data); static int mem_buf_free(BIO *data, int free_all); static int mem_buf_sync(BIO *h); static const BIO_METHOD mem_method = { BIO_TYPE_MEM, "memory buffer", mem_write, mem_read, mem_puts, mem_gets, mem_ctrl, mem_new, mem_free, NULL, }; static const BIO_METHOD secmem_method = { BIO_TYPE_MEM, "secure memory buffer", mem_write, mem_read, mem_puts, mem_gets, mem_ctrl, secmem_new, mem_free, NULL, }; /* BIO memory stores buffer and read pointer */ typedef struct bio_buf_mem_st { struct buf_mem_st *buf; /* allocated buffer */ struct buf_mem_st *readp; /* read pointer */ } BIO_BUF_MEM; /* * bio->num is used to hold the value to return on 'empty', if it is 0, * should_retry is not set */ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void) { return (&mem_method); } const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_secmem(void) { return(&secmem_method); } BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len) { BIO *ret; BUF_MEM *b; BIO_BUF_MEM *bb; size_t sz; if (buf == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } sz = (len < 0) ? strlen(buf) : (size_t)len; if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) return NULL; bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)ret->ptr; b = bb->buf; /* Cast away const and trust in the MEM_RDONLY flag. */ b->data = (void *)buf; b->length = sz; b->max = sz; *bb->readp = *bb->buf; ret->flags |= BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY; /* Since this is static data retrying won't help */ ret->num = 0; return ret; } static int mem_init(BIO *bi, unsigned long flags) { BIO_BUF_MEM *bb = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bb)); if (bb == NULL) return 0; if ((bb->buf = BUF_MEM_new_ex(flags)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(bb); return 0; } if ((bb->readp = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bb->readp))) == NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(bb->buf); OPENSSL_free(bb); return 0; } *bb->readp = *bb->buf; bi->shutdown = 1; bi->init = 1; bi->num = -1; bi->ptr = (char *)bb; return 1; } static int mem_new(BIO *bi) { return (mem_init(bi, 0L)); } static int secmem_new(BIO *bi) { return (mem_init(bi, BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE)); } static int mem_free(BIO *a) { return (mem_buf_free(a, 1)); } static int mem_buf_free(BIO *a, int free_all) { if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->shutdown) { if ((a->init) && (a->ptr != NULL)) { BUF_MEM *b; BIO_BUF_MEM *bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)a->ptr; if (bb != NULL) { b = bb->buf; if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) b->data = NULL; BUF_MEM_free(b); if (free_all) { OPENSSL_free(bb->readp); OPENSSL_free(bb); } } a->ptr = NULL; } } return (1); } /* * Reallocate memory buffer if read pointer differs */ static int mem_buf_sync(BIO *b) { if (b != NULL && b->init != 0 && b->ptr != NULL) { BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; if (bbm->readp->data != bbm->buf->data) { memmove(bbm->buf->data, bbm->readp->data, bbm->readp->length); bbm->buf->length = bbm->readp->length; bbm->readp->data = bbm->buf->data; } } return (0); } static int mem_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = -1; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; BUF_MEM *bm = bbm->readp; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = (outl >= 0 && (size_t)outl > bm->length) ? (int)bm->length : outl; if ((out != NULL) && (ret > 0)) { memcpy(out, bm->data, ret); bm->length -= ret; bm->data += ret; } else if (bm->length == 0) { ret = b->num; if (ret != 0) BIO_set_retry_read(b); } return (ret); } static int mem_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = -1; int blen; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; if (in == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER); goto end; } if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) { BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO); goto end; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); blen = bbm->readp->length; mem_buf_sync(b); if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(bbm->buf, blen + inl) == 0) goto end; memcpy(bbm->buf->data + blen, in, inl); *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf; ret = inl; end: return (ret); } static long mem_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; char **pptr; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; BUF_MEM *bm; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: bm = bbm->buf; if (bm->data != NULL) { /* For read only case reset to the start again */ if ((b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) || (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST)) { bm->length = bm->max; } else { memset(bm->data, 0, bm->max); bm->length = 0; } *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf; } break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: bm = bbm->readp; ret = (long)(bm->length == 0); break; case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN: b->num = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: bm = bbm->readp; ret = (long)bm->length; if (ptr != NULL) { pptr = (char **)ptr; *pptr = (char *)&(bm->data[0]); } break; case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM: mem_buf_free(b, 0); b->shutdown = (int)num; bbm->buf = ptr; *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf; b->ptr = bbm; break; case BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR: if (ptr != NULL) { mem_buf_sync(b); bm = bbm->readp; pptr = (char **)ptr; *pptr = (char *)bm; } break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = (long)b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0L; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: bm = bbm->readp; ret = (long)bm->length; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: case BIO_CTRL_POP: default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int mem_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int i, j; int ret = -1; char *p; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)bp->ptr; BUF_MEM *bm = bbm->readp; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bp); j = bm->length; if ((size - 1) < j) j = size - 1; if (j <= 0) { *buf = '\0'; return 0; } p = bm->data; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (p[i] == '\n') { i++; break; } } /* * i is now the max num of bytes to copy, either j or up to * and including the first newline */ i = mem_read(bp, buf, i); if (i > 0) buf[i] = '\0'; ret = i; return (ret); } static int mem_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = mem_write(bp, str, n); /* memory semantics is that it will always work */ return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/b_addr.c0000644000000000000000000006025713176625656015544 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK #include #include #include #include CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_lookup_lock; static CRYPTO_ONCE bio_lookup_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; /* * Throughout this file and bio_lcl.h, the existence of the macro * AI_PASSIVE is used to detect the availability of struct addrinfo, * getnameinfo() and getaddrinfo(). If that macro doesn't exist, * we use our own implementation instead, using gethostbyname, * getservbyname and a few other. */ /********************************************************************** * * Address structure * */ BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDR_new(void) { BIO_ADDR *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ADDR_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->sa.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC; return ret; } void BIO_ADDR_free(BIO_ADDR *ap) { OPENSSL_free(ap); } void BIO_ADDR_clear(BIO_ADDR *ap) { memset(ap, 0, sizeof(*ap)); ap->sa.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC; } /* * BIO_ADDR_make - non-public routine to fill a BIO_ADDR with the contents * of a struct sockaddr. */ int BIO_ADDR_make(BIO_ADDR *ap, const struct sockaddr *sa) { if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) { ap->s_in = *(const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; return 1; } #ifdef AF_INET6 if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) { ap->s_in6 = *(const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; return 1; } #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX if (sa->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { ap->s_un = *(const struct sockaddr_un *)sa; return 1; } #endif return 0; } int BIO_ADDR_rawmake(BIO_ADDR *ap, int family, const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port) { #ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) { if (wherelen + 1 > sizeof(ap->s_un.sun_path)) return 0; memset(&ap->s_un, 0, sizeof(ap->s_un)); ap->s_un.sun_family = family; strncpy(ap->s_un.sun_path, where, sizeof(ap->s_un.sun_path) - 1); return 1; } #endif if (family == AF_INET) { if (wherelen != sizeof(struct in_addr)) return 0; memset(&ap->s_in, 0, sizeof(ap->s_in)); ap->s_in.sin_family = family; ap->s_in.sin_port = port; ap->s_in.sin_addr = *(struct in_addr *)where; return 1; } #ifdef AF_INET6 if (family == AF_INET6) { if (wherelen != sizeof(struct in6_addr)) return 0; memset(&ap->s_in6, 0, sizeof(ap->s_in6)); ap->s_in6.sin6_family = family; ap->s_in6.sin6_port = port; ap->s_in6.sin6_addr = *(struct in6_addr *)where; return 1; } #endif return 0; } int BIO_ADDR_family(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { return ap->sa.sa_family; } int BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(const BIO_ADDR *ap, void *p, size_t *l) { size_t len = 0; const void *addrptr = NULL; if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) { len = sizeof(ap->s_in.sin_addr); addrptr = &ap->s_in.sin_addr; } #ifdef AF_INET6 else if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { len = sizeof(ap->s_in6.sin6_addr); addrptr = &ap->s_in6.sin6_addr; } #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX else if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX) { len = strlen(ap->s_un.sun_path); addrptr = &ap->s_un.sun_path; } #endif if (addrptr == NULL) return 0; if (p != NULL) { memcpy(p, addrptr, len); } if (l != NULL) *l = len; return 1; } unsigned short BIO_ADDR_rawport(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) return ap->s_in.sin_port; #ifdef AF_INET6 if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) return ap->s_in6.sin6_port; #endif return 0; } /*- * addr_strings - helper function to get host and service names * @ap: the BIO_ADDR that has the input info * @numeric: 0 if actual names should be returned, 1 if the numeric * representation should be returned. * @hostname: a pointer to a pointer to a memory area to store the * host name or numeric representation. Unused if NULL. * @service: a pointer to a pointer to a memory area to store the * service name or numeric representation. Unused if NULL. * * The return value is 0 on failure, with the error code in the error * stack, and 1 on success. */ static int addr_strings(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric, char **hostname, char **service) { if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; if (1) { #ifdef AI_PASSIVE int ret = 0; char host[NI_MAXHOST] = "", serv[NI_MAXSERV] = ""; int flags = 0; if (numeric) flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV; if ((ret = getnameinfo(BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(ap), BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(ap), host, sizeof(host), serv, sizeof(serv), flags)) != 0) { # ifdef EAI_SYSTEM if (ret == EAI_SYSTEM) { SYSerr(SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); } else # endif { BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(ret)); } return 0; } /* VMS getnameinfo() has a bug, it doesn't fill in serv, which * leaves it with whatever garbage that happens to be there. * However, we initialise serv with the empty string (serv[0] * is therefore NUL), so it gets real easy to detect when things * didn't go the way one might expect. */ if (serv[0] == '\0') { BIO_snprintf(serv, sizeof(serv), "%d", ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(ap))); } if (hostname != NULL) *hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(host); if (service != NULL) *service = OPENSSL_strdup(serv); } else { #endif if (hostname != NULL) *hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(inet_ntoa(ap->s_in.sin_addr)); if (service != NULL) { char serv[6]; /* port is 16 bits => max 5 decimal digits */ BIO_snprintf(serv, sizeof(serv), "%d", ntohs(ap->s_in.sin_port)); *service = OPENSSL_strdup(serv); } } if ((hostname != NULL && *hostname == NULL) || (service != NULL && *service == NULL)) { if (hostname != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(*hostname); *hostname = NULL; } if (service != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(*service); *service = NULL; } BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } char *BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric) { char *hostname = NULL; if (addr_strings(ap, numeric, &hostname, NULL)) return hostname; return NULL; } char *BIO_ADDR_service_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric) { char *service = NULL; if (addr_strings(ap, numeric, NULL, &service)) return service; return NULL; } char *BIO_ADDR_path_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { #ifdef AF_UNIX if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX) return OPENSSL_strdup(ap->s_un.sun_path); #endif return NULL; } /* * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr - non-public routine to return the struct sockaddr * for a given BIO_ADDR. In reality, this is simply a type safe cast. * The returned struct sockaddr is const, so it can't be tampered with. */ const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { return &(ap->sa); } /* * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst - non-public function that does the same * as BIO_ADDR_sockaddr, but returns a non-const. USE WITH CARE, as * it allows you to tamper with the data (and thereby the contents * of the input BIO_ADDR). */ struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(BIO_ADDR *ap) { return &(ap->sa); } /* * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size - non-public function that returns the size * of the struct sockaddr the BIO_ADDR is using. If the protocol family * isn't set or is something other than AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNIX, * the size of the BIO_ADDR type is returned. */ socklen_t BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) return sizeof(ap->s_in); #ifdef AF_INET6 if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) return sizeof(ap->s_in6); #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX) return sizeof(ap->s_un); #endif return sizeof(*ap); } /********************************************************************** * * Address info database * */ const BIO_ADDRINFO *BIO_ADDRINFO_next(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_next; return NULL; } int BIO_ADDRINFO_family(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_family; return 0; } int BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_socktype; return 0; } int BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) { if (bai->bai_protocol != 0) return bai->bai_protocol; #ifdef AF_UNIX if (bai->bai_family == AF_UNIX) return 0; #endif switch (bai->bai_socktype) { case SOCK_STREAM: return IPPROTO_TCP; case SOCK_DGRAM: return IPPROTO_UDP; default: break; } } return 0; } /* * BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size - non-public function that returns the size * of the struct sockaddr inside the BIO_ADDRINFO. */ socklen_t BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_addrlen; return 0; } /* * BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr - non-public function that returns bai_addr * as the struct sockaddr it is. */ const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_addr; return NULL; } const BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDRINFO_address(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return (BIO_ADDR *)bai->bai_addr; return NULL; } void BIO_ADDRINFO_free(BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai == NULL) return; #ifdef AI_PASSIVE # ifdef AF_UNIX # define _cond bai->bai_family != AF_UNIX # else # define _cond 1 # endif if (_cond) { freeaddrinfo(bai); return; } #endif /* Free manually when we know that addrinfo_wrap() was used. * See further comment above addrinfo_wrap() */ while (bai != NULL) { BIO_ADDRINFO *next = bai->bai_next; OPENSSL_free(bai->bai_addr); OPENSSL_free(bai); bai = next; } } /********************************************************************** * * Service functions * */ /*- * The specs in hostserv can take these forms: * * host:service => *host = "host", *service = "service" * host:* => *host = "host", *service = NULL * host: => *host = "host", *service = NULL * :service => *host = NULL, *service = "service" * *:service => *host = NULL, *service = "service" * * in case no : is present in the string, the result depends on * hostserv_prio, as follows: * * when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST * host => *host = "host", *service untouched * * when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV * service => *host untouched, *service = "service" * */ int BIO_parse_hostserv(const char *hostserv, char **host, char **service, enum BIO_hostserv_priorities hostserv_prio) { const char *h = NULL; size_t hl = 0; const char *p = NULL; size_t pl = 0; if (*hostserv == '[') { if ((p = strchr(hostserv, ']')) == NULL) goto spec_err; h = hostserv + 1; hl = p - h; p++; if (*p == '\0') p = NULL; else if (*p != ':') goto spec_err; else { p++; pl = strlen(p); } } else { const char *p2 = strrchr(hostserv, ':'); p = strchr(hostserv, ':'); /*- * Check for more than one colon. There are three possible * interpretations: * 1. IPv6 address with port number, last colon being separator. * 2. IPv6 address only. * 3. IPv6 address only if hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST, * IPv6 address and port number if hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV * Because of this ambiguity, we currently choose to make it an * error. */ if (p != p2) goto amb_err; if (p != NULL) { h = hostserv; hl = p - h; p++; pl = strlen(p); } else if (hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST) { h = hostserv; hl = strlen(h); } else { p = hostserv; pl = strlen(p); } } if (p != NULL && strchr(p, ':')) goto spec_err; if (h != NULL && host != NULL) { if (hl == 0 || (hl == 1 && h[0] == '*')) { *host = NULL; } else { *host = OPENSSL_strndup(h, hl); if (*host == NULL) goto memerr; } } if (p != NULL && service != NULL) { if (pl == 0 || (pl == 1 && p[0] == '*')) { *service = NULL; } else { *service = OPENSSL_strndup(p, pl); if (*service == NULL) goto memerr; } } return 1; amb_err: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, BIO_R_AMBIGUOUS_HOST_OR_SERVICE); return 0; spec_err: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE); return 0; memerr: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* addrinfo_wrap is used to build our own addrinfo "chain". * (it has only one entry, so calling it a chain may be a stretch) * It should ONLY be called when getaddrinfo() and friends * aren't available, OR when dealing with a non IP protocol * family, such as AF_UNIX * * the return value is 1 on success, or 0 on failure, which * only happens if a memory allocation error occurred. */ static int addrinfo_wrap(int family, int socktype, const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port, BIO_ADDRINFO **bai) { OPENSSL_assert(bai != NULL); *bai = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(**bai)); if (*bai == NULL) return 0; (*bai)->bai_family = family; (*bai)->bai_socktype = socktype; if (socktype == SOCK_STREAM) (*bai)->bai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; if (socktype == SOCK_DGRAM) (*bai)->bai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; #ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) (*bai)->bai_protocol = 0; #endif { /* Magic: We know that BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst is really just an advanced cast of BIO_ADDR* to struct sockaddr * by the power of union, so while it may seem that we're creating a memory leak here, we are not. It will be all right. */ BIO_ADDR *addr = BIO_ADDR_new(); if (addr != NULL) { BIO_ADDR_rawmake(addr, family, where, wherelen, port); (*bai)->bai_addr = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(addr); } } (*bai)->bai_next = NULL; if ((*bai)->bai_addr == NULL) { BIO_ADDRINFO_free(*bai); *bai = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_bio_lookup_init) { OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); bio_lookup_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return bio_lookup_lock != NULL; } /*- * BIO_lookup - look up the node and service you want to connect to. * @node: the node you want to connect to. * @service: the service you want to connect to. * @lookup_type: declare intent with the result, client or server. * @family: the address family you want to use. Use AF_UNSPEC for any, or * AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNIX. * @socktype: The socket type you want to use. Can be SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_DGRAM * or 0 for all. * @res: Storage place for the resulting list of returned addresses * * This will do a lookup of the node and service that you want to connect to. * It returns a linked list of different addresses you can try to connect to. * * When no longer needed you should call BIO_ADDRINFO_free() to free the result. * * The return value is 1 on success or 0 in case of error. */ int BIO_lookup(const char *host, const char *service, enum BIO_lookup_type lookup_type, int family, int socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO **res) { int ret = 0; /* Assume failure */ switch(family) { case AF_INET: #ifdef AF_INET6 case AF_INET6: #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX case AF_UNIX: #endif #ifdef AF_UNSPEC case AF_UNSPEC: #endif break; default: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FAMILY); return 0; } #ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) { if (addrinfo_wrap(family, socktype, host, strlen(host), 0, res)) return 1; else BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } #endif if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; if (1) { #ifdef AI_PASSIVE int gai_ret = 0; struct addrinfo hints; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints); hints.ai_family = family; hints.ai_socktype = socktype; if (lookup_type == BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER) hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE; /* Note that |res| SHOULD be a 'struct addrinfo **' thanks to * macro magic in bio_lcl.h */ switch ((gai_ret = getaddrinfo(host, service, &hints, res))) { # ifdef EAI_SYSTEM case EAI_SYSTEM: SYSerr(SYS_F_GETADDRINFO, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); break; # endif case 0: ret = 1; /* Success */ break; default: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(gai_ret)); break; } } else { #endif const struct hostent *he; /* * Because struct hostent is defined for 32-bit pointers only with * VMS C, we need to make sure that '&he_fallback_address' and * '&he_fallback_addresses' are 32-bit pointers */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 #endif /* Windows doesn't seem to have in_addr_t */ #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS static uint32_t he_fallback_address; static const char *he_fallback_addresses[] = { (char *)&he_fallback_address, NULL }; #else static in_addr_t he_fallback_address; static const char *he_fallback_addresses[] = { (char *)&he_fallback_address, NULL }; #endif static const struct hostent he_fallback = { NULL, NULL, AF_INET, sizeof(he_fallback_address), (char **)&he_fallback_addresses }; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size restore #endif struct servent *se; /* Apparently, on WIN64, s_proto and s_port have traded places... */ #ifdef _WIN64 struct servent se_fallback = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; #else struct servent se_fallback = { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL }; #endif if (!RUN_ONCE(&bio_lookup_init, do_bio_lookup_init)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; goto err; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(bio_lookup_lock); he_fallback_address = INADDR_ANY; if (host == NULL) { he = &he_fallback; switch(lookup_type) { case BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT: he_fallback_address = INADDR_LOOPBACK; break; case BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER: he_fallback_address = INADDR_ANY; break; default: OPENSSL_assert(("We forgot to handle a lookup type!" == 0)); break; } } else { he = gethostbyname(host); if (he == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS /* * This might be misleading, because h_errno is used as if * it was errno. To minimize mixup add 1000. Underlying * reason for this is that hstrerror is declared obsolete, * not to mention that a) h_errno is not always guaranteed * to be meaningless; b) hstrerror can reside in yet another * library, linking for sake of hstrerror is an overkill; * c) this path is not executed on contemporary systems * anyway [above getaddrinfo/gai_strerror is]. We just let * system administrator figure this out... */ SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 1000 + h_errno); #else SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, WSAGetLastError()); #endif ret = 0; goto err; } } if (service == NULL) { se_fallback.s_port = 0; se_fallback.s_proto = NULL; se = &se_fallback; } else { char *endp = NULL; long portnum = strtol(service, &endp, 10); /* * Because struct servent is defined for 32-bit pointers only with * VMS C, we need to make sure that 'proto' is a 32-bit pointer. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 #endif char *proto = NULL; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size restore #endif switch (socktype) { case SOCK_STREAM: proto = "tcp"; break; case SOCK_DGRAM: proto = "udp"; break; } if (endp != service && *endp == '\0' && portnum > 0 && portnum < 65536) { se_fallback.s_port = htons(portnum); se_fallback.s_proto = proto; se = &se_fallback; } else if (endp == service) { se = getservbyname(service, proto); if (se == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, errno); #else SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, WSAGetLastError()); #endif goto err; } } else { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE); goto err; } } *res = NULL; { /* * Because hostent::h_addr_list is an array of 32-bit pointers with VMS C, * we must make sure our iterator designates the same element type, hence * the pointer size dance. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 #endif char **addrlistp; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size restore #endif size_t addresses; BIO_ADDRINFO *tmp_bai = NULL; /* The easiest way to create a linked list from an array is to start from the back */ for(addrlistp = he->h_addr_list; *addrlistp != NULL; addrlistp++) ; for(addresses = addrlistp - he->h_addr_list; addrlistp--, addresses-- > 0; ) { if (!addrinfo_wrap(he->h_addrtype, socktype, *addrlistp, he->h_length, se->s_port, &tmp_bai)) goto addrinfo_malloc_err; tmp_bai->bai_next = *res; *res = tmp_bai; continue; addrinfo_malloc_err: BIO_ADDRINFO_free(*res); *res = NULL; BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; goto err; } ret = 1; } err: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(bio_lookup_lock); } return ret; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/build.info0000644000000000000000000000052213176625656016126 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ bio_lib.c bio_cb.c bio_err.c \ bss_mem.c bss_null.c bss_fd.c \ bss_file.c bss_sock.c bss_conn.c \ bf_null.c bf_buff.c b_print.c b_dump.c b_addr.c \ b_sock.c b_sock2.c bss_acpt.c bf_nbio.c bss_log.c bss_bio.c \ bss_dgram.c bio_meth.c bf_lbuf.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c0000644000000000000000000016007613176625656016272 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM # if !(defined(_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)) # include # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # include # include # define OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE 0x00 # define OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE 0xc0 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && !defined(IP_MTU) # define IP_MTU 14 /* linux is lame */ # endif # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && !defined(IPPROTO_IPV6) # define IPPROTO_IPV6 41 /* windows is lame */ # endif # if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) /* Standard definition causes type-punning problems. */ # undef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED # define s6_addr32 __u6_addr.__u6_addr32 # define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ (((a)->s6_addr32[0] == 0) && \ ((a)->s6_addr32[1] == 0) && \ ((a)->s6_addr32[2] == htonl(0x0000ffff))) # endif static int dgram_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int dgram_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int dgram_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int dgram_new(BIO *h); static int dgram_free(BIO *data); static int dgram_clear(BIO *bio); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int dgram_sctp_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int dgram_sctp_new(BIO *h); static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *data); # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT static void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp); # endif # endif static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int s); static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t); static const BIO_METHOD methods_dgramp = { BIO_TYPE_DGRAM, "datagram socket", dgram_write, dgram_read, dgram_puts, NULL, /* dgram_gets, */ dgram_ctrl, dgram_new, dgram_free, NULL, }; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP static const BIO_METHOD methods_dgramp_sctp = { BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP, "datagram sctp socket", dgram_sctp_write, dgram_sctp_read, dgram_sctp_puts, NULL, /* dgram_gets, */ dgram_sctp_ctrl, dgram_sctp_new, dgram_sctp_free, NULL, }; # endif typedef struct bio_dgram_data_st { BIO_ADDR peer; unsigned int connected; unsigned int _errno; unsigned int mtu; struct timeval next_timeout; struct timeval socket_timeout; unsigned int peekmode; } bio_dgram_data; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP typedef struct bio_dgram_sctp_save_message_st { BIO *bio; char *data; int length; } bio_dgram_sctp_save_message; typedef struct bio_dgram_sctp_data_st { BIO_ADDR peer; unsigned int connected; unsigned int _errno; unsigned int mtu; struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo sndinfo; struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo rcvinfo; struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo prinfo; void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio, void *context, void *buf); void *notification_context; int in_handshake; int ccs_rcvd; int ccs_sent; int save_shutdown; int peer_auth_tested; } bio_dgram_sctp_data; # endif const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void) { return (&methods_dgramp); } BIO *BIO_new_dgram(int fd, int close_flag) { BIO *ret; ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_datagram()); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); BIO_set_fd(ret, fd, close_flag); return (ret); } static int dgram_new(BIO *bi) { bio_dgram_data *data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*data)); if (data == NULL) return 0; bi->ptr = data; return (1); } static int dgram_free(BIO *a) { bio_dgram_data *data; if (a == NULL) return (0); if (!dgram_clear(a)) return 0; data = (bio_dgram_data *)a->ptr; OPENSSL_free(data); return (1); } static int dgram_clear(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->shutdown) { if (a->init) { BIO_closesocket(a->num); } a->init = 0; a->flags = 0; } return (1); } static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b) { # if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO) bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; union { size_t s; int i; } sz = { 0 }; /* Is a timer active? */ if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0) { struct timeval timenow, timeleft; /* Read current socket timeout */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout; sz.i = sizeof(timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); } else { data->socket_timeout.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; data->socket_timeout.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; } # else sz.i = sizeof(data->socket_timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &(data->socket_timeout), (void *)&sz) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(data->socket_timeout)); # endif /* Get current time */ get_current_time(&timenow); /* Calculate time left until timer expires */ memcpy(&timeleft, &(data->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval)); if (timeleft.tv_usec < timenow.tv_usec) { timeleft.tv_usec = 1000000 - timenow.tv_usec + timeleft.tv_usec; timeleft.tv_sec--; } else { timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec; } if (timeleft.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec) { timeleft.tv_sec = 0; timeleft.tv_usec = 1; } else { timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec; } /* * Adjust socket timeout if next handshake message timer will expire * earlier. */ if ((data->socket_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && data->socket_timeout.tv_usec == 0) || (data->socket_timeout.tv_sec > timeleft.tv_sec) || (data->socket_timeout.tv_sec == timeleft.tv_sec && data->socket_timeout.tv_usec >= timeleft.tv_usec)) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS timeout = timeleft.tv_sec * 1000 + timeleft.tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # else if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &timeleft, sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # endif } } # endif } static void dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(BIO *b) { # if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO) bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; /* Is a timer active? */ if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout = data->socket_timeout.tv_sec * 1000 + data->socket_timeout.tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # else if (setsockopt (b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &(data->socket_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # endif } # endif } static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; int flags = 0; BIO_ADDR peer; socklen_t len = sizeof(peer); if (out != NULL) { clear_socket_error(); memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer)); dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b); if (data->peekmode) flags = MSG_PEEK; ret = recvfrom(b->num, out, outl, flags, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(&peer), &len); if (!data->connected && ret >= 0) BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret < 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_read(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b); } return (ret); } static int dgram_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; clear_socket_error(); if (data->connected) ret = writesocket(b->num, in, inl); else { int peerlen = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(&data->peer); # if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) && defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) ret = sendto(b->num, (char *)in, inl, 0, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(&data->peer), peerlen); # else ret = sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(&data->peer), peerlen); # endif } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_write(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } return (ret); } static long dgram_get_mtu_overhead(bio_dgram_data *data) { long ret; switch (BIO_ADDR_family(&data->peer)) { case AF_INET: /* * Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */ ret = 28; break; # ifdef AF_INET6 case AF_INET6: { # ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED struct in6_addr tmp_addr; if (BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(&data->peer, &tmp_addr, NULL) && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&tmp_addr)) /* * Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */ ret = 28; else # endif /* * Assume this is UDP - 40 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */ ret = 48; } break; # endif default: /* We don't know. Go with the historical default */ ret = 28; break; } return ret; } static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; int *ip; bio_dgram_data *data = NULL; int sockopt_val = 0; int d_errno; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && (defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU)) socklen_t sockopt_len; /* assume that system supporting IP_MTU is * modern enough to define socklen_t */ socklen_t addr_len; BIO_ADDR addr; # endif data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: num = 0; ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = 0; break; case BIO_C_SET_FD: dgram_clear(b); b->num = *((int *)ptr); b->shutdown = (int)num; b->init = 1; break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: if (b->init) { ip = (int *)ptr; if (ip != NULL) *ip = b->num; ret = b->num; } else ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT: BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr)); break; /* (Linux)kernel sets DF bit on outgoing IP packets */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER: # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO) addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) { ret = 0; break; } switch (addr.sa.sa_family) { case AF_INET: sockopt_val = IP_PMTUDISC_DO; if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) perror("setsockopt"); break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO) case AF_INET6: sockopt_val = IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO; if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) perror("setsockopt"); break; # endif default: ret = -1; break; } # else ret = -1; # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU: # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU) addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) { ret = 0; break; } sockopt_len = sizeof(sockopt_val); switch (addr.sa.sa_family) { case AF_INET: if ((ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU, (void *)&sockopt_val, &sockopt_len)) < 0 || sockopt_val < 0) { ret = 0; } else { /* * we assume that the transport protocol is UDP and no IP * options are used. */ data->mtu = sockopt_val - 8 - 20; ret = data->mtu; } break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU) case AF_INET6: if ((ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU, (void *)&sockopt_val, &sockopt_len)) < 0 || sockopt_val < 0) { ret = 0; } else { /* * we assume that the transport protocol is UDP and no IPV6 * options are used. */ data->mtu = sockopt_val - 8 - 40; ret = data->mtu; } break; # endif default: ret = 0; break; } # else ret = 0; # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU: ret = -dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data); switch (BIO_ADDR_family(&data->peer)) { case AF_INET: ret += 576; break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: { # ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED struct in6_addr tmp_addr; if (BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(&data->peer, &tmp_addr, NULL) && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&tmp_addr)) ret += 576; else # endif ret += 1280; } break; # endif default: ret += 576; break; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU: return data->mtu; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU: data->mtu = num; ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED: if (ptr != NULL) { data->connected = 1; BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr)); } else { data->connected = 0; memset(&data->peer, 0, sizeof(data->peer)); } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER: ret = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(&data->peer); /* FIXME: if num < ret, we will only return part of an address. That should bee an error, no? */ if (num == 0 || num > ret) num = ret; memcpy(ptr, &data->peer, (ret = num)); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER: BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr)); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT: memcpy(&(data->next_timeout), ptr, sizeof(struct timeval)); break; # if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO) case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT: # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS { struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; int timeout = tv->tv_sec * 1000 + tv->tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } } # else if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, ptr, sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT: { union { size_t s; int i; } sz = { 0 }; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout; struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; sz.i = sizeof(timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else { tv->tv_sec = timeout / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; ret = sizeof(*tv); } # else sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) { OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(struct timeval)); ret = (int)sz.s; } else ret = sz.i; # endif } break; # endif # if defined(SO_SNDTIMEO) case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT: # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS { struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; int timeout = tv->tv_sec * 1000 + tv->tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } } # else if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, ptr, sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT: { union { size_t s; int i; } sz = { 0 }; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout; struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; sz.i = sizeof(timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else { tv->tv_sec = timeout / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; ret = sizeof(*tv); } # else sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) { OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(struct timeval)); ret = (int)sz.s; } else ret = sz.i; # endif } break; # endif case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP: /* fall-through */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP: # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS d_errno = (data->_errno == WSAETIMEDOUT); # else d_errno = (data->_errno == EAGAIN); # endif if (d_errno) { ret = 1; data->_errno = 0; } else ret = 0; break; # ifdef EMSGSIZE case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED: if (data->_errno == EMSGSIZE) { ret = 1; data->_errno = 0; } else ret = 0; break; # endif case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG: sockopt_val = num ? 1 : 0; switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family) { case AF_INET: # if defined(IP_DONTFRAG) if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAG, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined (IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE) if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT), (ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(IP_DONTFRAGMENT) if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAGMENT, (const char *)&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # else ret = -1; # endif break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: # if defined(IPV6_DONTFRAG) if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_DONTFRAG, (const void *)&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IPV6_MTUDISCOVER) if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT), (ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # else ret = -1; # endif break; # endif default: ret = -1; break; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD: ret = dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data); break; /* * BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE is used here for compatibility * reasons. When BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was first defined its value * was incorrectly clashing with BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. The * value has been updated to a non-clashing value. However to preserve * binary compatiblity we now respond to both the old value and the new one */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE: case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE: data->peekmode = (unsigned int)num; break; default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int dgram_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = dgram_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram_sctp(void) { return (&methods_dgramp_sctp); } BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag) { BIO *bio; int ret, optval = 20000; int auth_data = 0, auth_forward = 0; unsigned char *p; struct sctp_authchunk auth; struct sctp_authchunks *authchunks; socklen_t sockopt_len; # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT # ifdef SCTP_EVENT struct sctp_event event; # else struct sctp_event_subscribe event; # endif # endif bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_datagram_sctp()); if (bio == NULL) return (NULL); BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, close_flag); /* Activate SCTP-AUTH for DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks */ auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } /* * Test if activation was successful. When using accept(), SCTP-AUTH has * to be activated for the listening socket already, otherwise the * connected socket won't use it. */ sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_zalloc(sockopt_len); if (authchunks == NULL) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) { OPENSSL_free(authchunks); BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } for (p = (unsigned char *)authchunks->gauth_chunks; p < (unsigned char *)authchunks + sockopt_len; p += sizeof(uint8_t)) { if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_data = 1; if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_forward = 1; } OPENSSL_free(authchunks); OPENSSL_assert(auth_data); OPENSSL_assert(auth_forward); # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT; event.se_on = 1; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } # else sockopt_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } event.sctp_authentication_event = 1; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } # endif # endif /* * Disable partial delivery by setting the min size larger than the max * record size of 2^14 + 2048 + 13 */ ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT, &optval, sizeof(optval)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return (NULL); } return (bio); } int BIO_dgram_is_sctp(BIO *bio) { return (BIO_method_type(bio) == BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP); } static int dgram_sctp_new(BIO *bi) { bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL; bi->init = 0; bi->num = 0; data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*data)); if (data == NULL) return 0; # ifdef SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE data->prinfo.pr_policy = SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE; # endif bi->ptr = data; bi->flags = 0; return (1); } static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *a) { bio_dgram_sctp_data *data; if (a == NULL) return (0); if (!dgram_clear(a)) return 0; data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) a->ptr; if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data); return (1); } # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp) { int ret; struct sctp_authkey_event *authkeyevent = &snp->sn_auth_event; if (authkeyevent->auth_indication == SCTP_AUTH_FREE_KEY) { struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid; /* delete key */ authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyevent->auth_keynumber; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); } } # endif static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0, n = 0, i, optval; socklen_t optlen; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; union sctp_notification *snp; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; char cmsgbuf[512]; if (out != NULL) { clear_socket_error(); do { memset(&data->rcvinfo, 0, sizeof(data->rcvinfo)); iov.iov_base = out; iov.iov_len = outl; msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = cmsgbuf; msg.msg_controllen = 512; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); if (n <= 0) { if (n < 0) ret = n; break; } if (msg.msg_controllen > 0) { for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg)) { if (cmsg->cmsg_level != IPPROTO_SCTP) continue; # ifdef SCTP_RCVINFO if (cmsg->cmsg_type == SCTP_RCVINFO) { struct sctp_rcvinfo *rcvinfo; rcvinfo = (struct sctp_rcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); data->rcvinfo.rcv_sid = rcvinfo->rcv_sid; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ssn = rcvinfo->rcv_ssn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_flags = rcvinfo->rcv_flags; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ppid = rcvinfo->rcv_ppid; data->rcvinfo.rcv_tsn = rcvinfo->rcv_tsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_cumtsn = rcvinfo->rcv_cumtsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_context = rcvinfo->rcv_context; } # endif # ifdef SCTP_SNDRCV if (cmsg->cmsg_type == SCTP_SNDRCV) { struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sndrcvinfo; sndrcvinfo = (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); data->rcvinfo.rcv_sid = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ssn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ssn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_flags = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ppid = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ppid; data->rcvinfo.rcv_tsn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_tsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_cumtsn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_cumtsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_context = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_context; } # endif } } if (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) { snp = (union sctp_notification *)out; if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) { # ifdef SCTP_EVENT struct sctp_event event; # else struct sctp_event_subscribe event; socklen_t eventsize; # endif /* disable sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 0; i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); if (i < 0) { ret = i; break; } # else eventsize = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); i = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize); if (i < 0) { ret = i; break; } event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 0; i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); if (i < 0) { ret = i; break; } # endif } # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT) dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, snp); # endif if (data->handle_notifications != NULL) data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context, (void *)out); memset(out, 0, outl); } else ret += n; } while ((msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR) && (ret < outl)); if (ret > 0 && !(msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR)) { /* Partial message read, this should never happen! */ /* * The buffer was too small, this means the peer sent a message * that was larger than allowed. */ if (ret == outl) return -1; /* * Test if socket buffer can handle max record size (2^14 + 2048 * + 13) */ optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int); ret = getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optlen); if (ret >= 0) OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445); /* * Test if SCTP doesn't partially deliver below max record size * (2^14 + 2048 + 13) */ optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT, &optval, &optlen); if (ret >= 0) OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445); /* * Partially delivered notification??? Probably a bug.... */ OPENSSL_assert(!(msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)); /* * Everything seems ok till now, so it's most likely a message * dropped by PR-SCTP. */ memset(out, 0, outl); BIO_set_retry_read(b); return -1; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret < 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_read(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } /* Test if peer uses SCTP-AUTH before continuing */ if (!data->peer_auth_tested) { int ii, auth_data = 0, auth_forward = 0; unsigned char *p; struct sctp_authchunks *authchunks; optlen = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen); if (authchunks == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } memset(authchunks, 0, optlen); ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen); if (ii >= 0) for (p = (unsigned char *)authchunks->gauth_chunks; p < (unsigned char *)authchunks + optlen; p += sizeof(uint8_t)) { if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_data = 1; if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_forward = 1; } OPENSSL_free(authchunks); if (!auth_data || !auth_forward) { BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR); return -1; } data->peer_auth_tested = 1; } } return (ret); } /* * dgram_sctp_write - send message on SCTP socket * @b: BIO to write to * @in: data to send * @inl: amount of bytes in @in to send * * Returns -1 on error or the sent amount of bytes on success */ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo *sinfo = &(data->sndinfo); struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo *pinfo = &(data->prinfo); struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo handshake_sinfo; struct iovec iov[1]; struct msghdr msg; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; # if defined(SCTP_SNDINFO) && defined(SCTP_PRINFO) char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)) + CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo))]; struct sctp_sndinfo *sndinfo; struct sctp_prinfo *prinfo; # else char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))]; struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sndrcvinfo; # endif clear_socket_error(); /* * If we're send anything else than application data, disable all user * parameters and flags. */ if (in[0] != 23) { memset(&handshake_sinfo, 0, sizeof(handshake_sinfo)); # ifdef SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY handshake_sinfo.snd_flags = SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY; # endif sinfo = &handshake_sinfo; } /* We can only send a shutdown alert if the socket is dry */ if (data->save_shutdown) { ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (ret == 0) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_set_retry_write(b); return -1; } } iov[0].iov_base = (char *)in; iov[0].iov_len = inl; msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = (caddr_t) cmsgbuf; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; # if defined(SCTP_SNDINFO) && defined(SCTP_PRINFO) cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)cmsgbuf; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDINFO; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)); sndinfo = (struct sctp_sndinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); memset(sndinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndinfo)); sndinfo->snd_sid = sinfo->snd_sid; sndinfo->snd_flags = sinfo->snd_flags; sndinfo->snd_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid; sndinfo->snd_context = sinfo->snd_context; msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)); cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)&cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo))]; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_PRINFO; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo)); prinfo = (struct sctp_prinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); memset(prinfo, 0, sizeof(*prinfo)); prinfo->pr_policy = pinfo->pr_policy; prinfo->pr_value = pinfo->pr_value; msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo)); # else cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)cmsgbuf; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDRCV; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)); sndrcvinfo = (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); memset(sndrcvinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndrcvinfo)); sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream = sinfo->snd_sid; sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags = sinfo->snd_flags; # ifdef __FreeBSD__ sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags |= pinfo->pr_policy; # endif sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid; sndrcvinfo->sinfo_context = sinfo->snd_context; sndrcvinfo->sinfo_timetolive = pinfo->pr_value; msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)); # endif ret = sendmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_write(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } return (ret); } static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL; socklen_t sockopt_len = 0; struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid; struct sctp_authkey *authkey = NULL; data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU: /* * Set to maximum (2^14) and ignore user input to enable transport * protocol fragmentation. Returns always 2^14. */ data->mtu = 16384; ret = data->mtu; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU: /* * Set to maximum (2^14) and ignore input to enable transport * protocol fragmentation. Returns always 2^14. */ data->mtu = 16384; ret = data->mtu; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED: case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT: /* Returns always -1. */ ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT: /* * SCTP doesn't need the DTLS timer Returns always 1. */ break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD: /* * We allow transport protocol fragmentation so this is irrelevant */ ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE: if (num > 0) data->in_handshake = 1; else data->in_handshake = 0; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_NODELAY, &data->in_handshake, sizeof(int)); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY: /* * New shared key for SCTP AUTH. Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */ /* Get active key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; /* Add new key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkey) + 64 * sizeof(uint8_t); authkey = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len); if (authkey == NULL) { ret = -1; break; } memset(authkey, 0, sockopt_len); authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1; # ifndef __FreeBSD__ /* * This field is missing in FreeBSD 8.2 and earlier, and FreeBSD 8.3 * and higher work without it. */ authkey->sca_keylength = 64; # endif memcpy(&authkey->sca_key[0], ptr, 64 * sizeof(uint8_t)); ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_KEY, authkey, sockopt_len); OPENSSL_free(authkey); authkey = NULL; if (ret < 0) break; /* Reset active key */ ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); if (ret < 0) break; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY: /* Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */ /* Get active key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; /* Set active key */ authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); if (ret < 0) break; /* * CCS has been sent, so remember that and fall through to check if * we need to deactivate an old key */ data->ccs_sent = 1; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD: /* Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */ /* * Has this command really been called or is this just a * fall-through? */ if (cmd == BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD) data->ccs_rcvd = 1; /* * CSS has been both, received and sent, so deactivate an old key */ if (data->ccs_rcvd == 1 && data->ccs_sent == 1) { /* Get active key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; /* * Deactivate key or delete second last key if * SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT is not available. */ authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber - 1; # ifdef SCTP_AUTH_DEACTIVATE_KEY sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DEACTIVATE_KEY, &authkeyid, sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; # endif # ifndef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (authkeyid.scact_keynumber > 0) { authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber - 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); if (ret < 0) break; } # endif data->ccs_rcvd = 0; data->ccs_sent = 0; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_SNDINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo); memcpy(ptr, &(data->sndinfo), num); ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_SNDINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo); memcpy(&(data->sndinfo), ptr, num); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo); memcpy(ptr, &data->rcvinfo, num); ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo); memcpy(&(data->rcvinfo), ptr, num); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_PRINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo); memcpy(ptr, &(data->prinfo), num); ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_PRINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo); memcpy(&(data->prinfo), ptr, num); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN: /* Returns always 1. */ if (num > 0) data->save_shutdown = 1; else data->save_shutdown = 0; break; default: /* * Pass to default ctrl function to process SCTP unspecific commands */ ret = dgram_ctrl(b, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); } int BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb(BIO *b, void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio, void *context, void *buf), void *context) { bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; if (handle_notifications != NULL) { data->handle_notifications = handle_notifications; data->notification_context = context; } else return -1; return 0; } /* * BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry - Wait for SCTP SENDER_DRY event * @b: The BIO to check for the dry event * * Wait until the peer confirms all packets have been received, and so that * our kernel doesn't have anything to send anymore. This is only received by * the peer's kernel, not the application. * * Returns: * -1 on error * 0 when not dry yet * 1 when dry */ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b) { int is_dry = 0; int sockflags = 0; int n, ret; union sctp_notification snp; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; # ifdef SCTP_EVENT struct sctp_event event; # else struct sctp_event_subscribe event; socklen_t eventsize; # endif bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; /* set sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); # else eventsize = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize); if (ret < 0) return -1; event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); # endif if (ret < 0) return -1; /* peek for notification */ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK); if (n <= 0) { if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN) && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK)) return -1; else return 0; } /* if we find a notification, process it and try again if necessary */ while (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) { memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); if (n <= 0) { if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN) && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK)) return -1; else return is_dry; } if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) { is_dry = 1; /* disable sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 0; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); # else eventsize = (socklen_t) sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize); if (ret < 0) return -1; event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 0; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); # endif if (ret < 0) return -1; } # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT) dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp); # endif if (data->handle_notifications != NULL) data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context, (void *)&snp); /* found notification, peek again */ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; /* if we have seen the dry already, don't wait */ if (is_dry) { sockflags = fcntl(b->num, F_GETFL, 0); fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); } n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK); if (is_dry) { fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, sockflags); } if (n <= 0) { if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN) && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK)) return -1; else return is_dry; } } /* read anything else */ return is_dry; } int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b) { int n, sockflags; union sctp_notification snp; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; /* Check if there are any messages waiting to be read */ do { memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; sockflags = fcntl(b->num, F_GETFL, 0); fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK); fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, sockflags); /* if notification, process and try again */ if (n > 0 && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)) { # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT) dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp); # endif memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); if (data->handle_notifications != NULL) data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context, (void *)&snp); } } while (n > 0 && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)); /* Return 1 if there is a message to be read, return 0 otherwise. */ if (n > 0) return 1; else return 0; } static int dgram_sctp_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = dgram_sctp_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } # endif static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int i) { int err; if ((i == 0) || (i == -1)) { err = get_last_socket_error(); # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) /* * If the socket return value (i) is -1 and err is unexpectedly 0 at * this point, the error code was overwritten by another system call * before this error handling is called. */ # endif return (BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(err)); } return (0); } int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err) { switch (err) { # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # if defined(WSAEWOULDBLOCK) case WSAEWOULDBLOCK: # endif # endif # ifdef EWOULDBLOCK # ifdef WSAEWOULDBLOCK # if WSAEWOULDBLOCK != EWOULDBLOCK case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # else case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # endif # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN # if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif # endif # ifdef EPROTO case EPROTO: # endif # ifdef EINPROGRESS case EINPROGRESS: # endif # ifdef EALREADY case EALREADY: # endif return (1); /* break; */ default: break; } return (0); } static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) { # if defined(_WIN32) SYSTEMTIME st; union { unsigned __int64 ul; FILETIME ft; } now; GetSystemTime(&st); SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft); # ifdef __MINGW32__ now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL; # else now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */ # endif t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000); t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10; # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) struct timeb tb; ftime(&tb); t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time; t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000; # else gettimeofday(t, NULL); # endif } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c0000644000000000000000000003704713176625656016136 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK typedef struct bio_connect_st { int state; int connect_family; char *param_hostname; char *param_service; int connect_mode; BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_first; const BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_iter; /* * int socket; this will be kept in bio->num so that it is compatible * with the bss_sock bio */ /* * called when the connection is initially made callback(BIO,state,ret); * The callback should return 'ret'. state is for compatibility with the * ssl info_callback */ int (*info_callback) (const BIO *bio, int state, int ret); } BIO_CONNECT; static int conn_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int conn_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int conn_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long conn_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int conn_new(BIO *h); static int conn_free(BIO *data); static long conn_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *); static int conn_state(BIO *b, BIO_CONNECT *c); static void conn_close_socket(BIO *data); BIO_CONNECT *BIO_CONNECT_new(void); void BIO_CONNECT_free(BIO_CONNECT *a); #define BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE 1 #define BIO_CONN_S_GET_ADDR 2 #define BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET 3 #define BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT 4 #define BIO_CONN_S_OK 5 #define BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT 6 static const BIO_METHOD methods_connectp = { BIO_TYPE_CONNECT, "socket connect", conn_write, conn_read, conn_puts, NULL, /* connect_gets, */ conn_ctrl, conn_new, conn_free, conn_callback_ctrl, }; static int conn_state(BIO *b, BIO_CONNECT *c) { int ret = -1, i; int (*cb) (const BIO *, int, int) = NULL; if (c->info_callback != NULL) cb = c->info_callback; for (;;) { switch (c->state) { case BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE: if (c->param_hostname == NULL && c->param_service == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_hostname, " service=", c->param_service); goto exit_loop; } c->state = BIO_CONN_S_GET_ADDR; break; case BIO_CONN_S_GET_ADDR: { int family = AF_UNSPEC; switch (c->connect_family) { case BIO_FAMILY_IPV6: if (1) { /* This is a trick we use to avoid bit rot. * at least the "else" part will always be * compiled. */ #ifdef AF_INET6 family = AF_INET6; } else { #endif BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY); goto exit_loop; } break; case BIO_FAMILY_IPV4: family = AF_INET; break; case BIO_FAMILY_IPANY: family = AF_UNSPEC; break; default: BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY); goto exit_loop; } if (BIO_lookup(c->param_hostname, c->param_service, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, family, SOCK_STREAM, &c->addr_first) == 0) goto exit_loop; } if (c->addr_first == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING); goto exit_loop; } c->addr_iter = c->addr_first; c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET; break; case BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET: ret = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(c->addr_iter), BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(c->addr_iter), 0); if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error()); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_hostname, " service=", c->param_service); BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET); goto exit_loop; } b->num = ret; c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT; break; case BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_connect(b->num, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(c->addr_iter), BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE | c->connect_mode); b->retry_reason = 0; if (ret == 0) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_special(b); c->state = BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT; b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT; ERR_clear_error(); } else if ((c->addr_iter = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(c->addr_iter)) != NULL) { /* * if there are more addresses to try, do that first */ BIO_closesocket(b->num); c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET; ERR_clear_error(); break; } else { SYSerr(SYS_F_CONNECT, get_last_socket_error()); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_hostname, " service=", c->param_service); BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR); } goto exit_loop; } else { c->state = BIO_CONN_S_OK; } break; case BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT: i = BIO_sock_error(b->num); if (i) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); SYSerr(SYS_F_CONNECT, i); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_hostname, " service=", c->param_service); BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR); ret = 0; goto exit_loop; } else c->state = BIO_CONN_S_OK; break; case BIO_CONN_S_OK: ret = 1; goto exit_loop; default: /* abort(); */ goto exit_loop; } if (cb != NULL) { if ((ret = cb((BIO *)b, c->state, ret)) == 0) goto end; } } /* Loop does not exit */ exit_loop: if (cb != NULL) ret = cb((BIO *)b, c->state, ret); end: return (ret); } BIO_CONNECT *BIO_CONNECT_new(void) { BIO_CONNECT *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->state = BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE; ret->connect_family = BIO_FAMILY_IPANY; return (ret); } void BIO_CONNECT_free(BIO_CONNECT *a) { if (a == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(a->param_hostname); OPENSSL_free(a->param_service); BIO_ADDRINFO_free(a->addr_first); OPENSSL_free(a); } const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void) { return (&methods_connectp); } static int conn_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 0; bi->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; bi->flags = 0; if ((bi->ptr = (char *)BIO_CONNECT_new()) == NULL) return (0); else return (1); } static void conn_close_socket(BIO *bio) { BIO_CONNECT *c; c = (BIO_CONNECT *)bio->ptr; if (bio->num != (int)INVALID_SOCKET) { /* Only do a shutdown if things were established */ if (c->state == BIO_CONN_S_OK) shutdown(bio->num, 2); BIO_closesocket(bio->num); bio->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; } } static int conn_free(BIO *a) { BIO_CONNECT *data; if (a == NULL) return (0); data = (BIO_CONNECT *)a->ptr; if (a->shutdown) { conn_close_socket(a); BIO_CONNECT_free(data); a->ptr = NULL; a->flags = 0; a->init = 0; } return (1); } static int conn_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; BIO_CONNECT *data; data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr; if (data->state != BIO_CONN_S_OK) { ret = conn_state(b, data); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } if (out != NULL) { clear_socket_error(); ret = readsocket(b->num, out, outl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) BIO_set_retry_read(b); } } return (ret); } static int conn_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; BIO_CONNECT *data; data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr; if (data->state != BIO_CONN_S_OK) { ret = conn_state(b, data); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } clear_socket_error(); ret = writesocket(b->num, in, inl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) BIO_set_retry_write(b); } return (ret); } static long conn_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { BIO *dbio; int *ip; const char **pptr = NULL; long ret = 1; BIO_CONNECT *data; data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ret = 0; data->state = BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE; conn_close_socket(b); BIO_ADDRINFO_free(data->addr_first); data->addr_first = NULL; b->flags = 0; break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: /* use this one to start the connection */ if (data->state != BIO_CONN_S_OK) ret = (long)conn_state(b, data); else ret = 1; break; case BIO_C_GET_CONNECT: if (ptr != NULL) { pptr = (const char **)ptr; if (num == 0) { *pptr = data->param_hostname; } else if (num == 1) { *pptr = data->param_service; } else if (num == 2) { *pptr = (const char *)BIO_ADDRINFO_address(data->addr_iter); } else if (num == 3) { switch (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(data->addr_iter)) { # ifdef AF_INET6 case AF_INET6: ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV6; break; # endif case AF_INET: ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV4; break; case 0: ret = data->connect_family; break; default: ret = -1; break; } } else { ret = 0; } } else { ret = 0; } break; case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT: if (ptr != NULL) { b->init = 1; if (num == 0) { char *hold_service = data->param_service; /* We affect the hostname regardless. However, the input * string might contain a host:service spec, so we must * parse it, which might or might not affect the service */ OPENSSL_free(data->param_hostname); data->param_hostname = NULL; ret = BIO_parse_hostserv(ptr, &data->param_hostname, &data->param_service, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (hold_service != data->param_service) OPENSSL_free(hold_service); } else if (num == 1) { OPENSSL_free(data->param_service); data->param_service = BUF_strdup(ptr); } else if (num == 2) { const BIO_ADDR *addr = (const BIO_ADDR *)ptr; if (ret) { data->param_hostname = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(addr, 1); data->param_service = BIO_ADDR_service_string(addr, 1); BIO_ADDRINFO_free(data->addr_first); data->addr_first = NULL; data->addr_iter = NULL; } } else if (num == 3) { data->connect_family = *(int *)ptr; } else { ret = 0; } } break; case BIO_C_SET_NBIO: if (num != 0) data->connect_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK; else data->connect_mode &= ~BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK; break; case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT_MODE: data->connect_mode = (int)num; break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: if (b->init) { ip = (int *)ptr; if (ip != NULL) *ip = b->num; ret = b->num; } else ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: { dbio = (BIO *)ptr; if (data->param_hostname) BIO_set_conn_hostname(dbio, data->param_hostname); if (data->param_service) BIO_set_conn_port(dbio, data->param_service); BIO_set_conn_ip_family(dbio, data->connect_family); BIO_set_conn_mode(dbio, data->connect_mode); /* * FIXME: the cast of the function seems unlikely to be a good * idea */ (void)BIO_set_info_callback(dbio, (bio_info_cb *)data->info_callback); } break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK: { # if 0 /* FIXME: Should this be used? -- Richard * Levitte */ BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); ret = -1; # else ret = 0; # endif } break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK: { int (**fptr) (const BIO *bio, int state, int xret); fptr = (int (**)(const BIO *bio, int state, int xret))ptr; *fptr = data->info_callback; } break; default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static long conn_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; BIO_CONNECT *data; data = (BIO_CONNECT *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK: { data->info_callback = (int (*)(const struct bio_st *, int, int))fp; } break; default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int conn_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = conn_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } BIO *BIO_new_connect(const char *str) { BIO *ret; ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect()); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); if (BIO_set_conn_hostname(ret, str)) return (ret); BIO_free(ret); return (NULL); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/b_sock.c0000644000000000000000000002360013176625656015560 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) # include NETDB_DEFINE_CONTEXT #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # define SOCKET_PROTOCOL IPPROTO_TCP # ifdef SO_MAXCONN # define MAX_LISTEN SO_MAXCONN # elif defined(SOMAXCONN) # define MAX_LISTEN SOMAXCONN # else # define MAX_LISTEN 32 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) static int wsa_init_done = 0; # endif # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip) { BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL; int ret = 0; if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; /* don't generate another error code here */ if (BIO_lookup(str, NULL, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, &res)) { size_t l; if (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res) != AF_INET) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP, BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET); } else { BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res), NULL, &l); /* Because only AF_INET addresses will reach this far, we can assert that l should be 4 */ OPENSSL_assert(l == 4); BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res), ip, &l); ret = 1; } BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); } else { ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", str); } return ret; } int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr) { BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL; int ret = 0; if (str == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT, BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED); return (0); } if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; /* don't generate another error code here */ if (BIO_lookup(NULL, str, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, &res)) { if (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res) != AF_INET) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT, BIO_R_ADDRINFO_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET); } else { *port_ptr = ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res))); ret = 1; } BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); } else { ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", str); } return ret; } # endif int BIO_sock_error(int sock) { int j = 0, i; socklen_t size = sizeof(j); /* * Note: under Windows the third parameter is of type (char *) whereas * under other systems it is (void *) if you don't have a cast it will * choke the compiler: if you do have a cast then you can either go for * (char *) or (void *). */ i = getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (void *)&j, &size); if (i < 0) return (get_last_socket_error()); else return (j); } # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name) { /* * Caching gethostbyname() results forever is wrong, so we have to let * the true gethostbyname() worry about this */ # if (defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) && !defined(__NOVELL_LIBC__)) return gethostbyname((char *)name); # else return gethostbyname(name); # endif } # endif int BIO_sock_init(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS static struct WSAData wsa_state; if (!wsa_init_done) { int err; wsa_init_done = 1; memset(&wsa_state, 0, sizeof(wsa_state)); /* * Not making wsa_state available to the rest of the code is formally * wrong. But the structures we use are [believed to be] invariable * among Winsock DLLs, while API availability is [expected to be] * probed at run-time with DSO_global_lookup. */ if (WSAStartup(0x0202, &wsa_state) != 0) { err = WSAGetLastError(); SYSerr(SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, err); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT, BIO_R_WSASTARTUP); return (-1); } } # endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */ # ifdef WATT32 extern int _watt_do_exit; _watt_do_exit = 0; /* don't make sock_init() call exit() */ if (sock_init()) return (-1); # endif return (1); } void bio_sock_cleanup_int(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS if (wsa_init_done) { wsa_init_done = 0; WSACleanup(); } # endif } int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg) { int i; # ifdef __DJGPP__ i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, (char *)arg); # else # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /*- * 2011-02-18 SMS. * VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we * observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *", * so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use * that, instead. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define ARG arg_32p # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 unsigned long arg_32; unsigned long *arg_32p; # pragma pointer_size restore arg_32p = &arg_32; arg_32 = *((unsigned long *)arg); # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define ARG arg # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ # else /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) */ # define ARG arg # endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) [else] */ i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, ARG); # endif /* __DJGPP__ */ if (i < 0) SYSerr(SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET, get_last_socket_error()); return (i); } # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, int bind_mode) { int s = INVALID_SOCKET; char *h = NULL, *p = NULL; BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL; if (!BIO_parse_hostserv(host, &h, &p, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV)) return INVALID_SOCKET; if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return INVALID_SOCKET; if (BIO_lookup(h, p, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER, AF_UNSPEC, SOCK_STREAM, &res) != 0) goto err; if ((s = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res), BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(res), 0)) == INVALID_SOCKET) { s = INVALID_SOCKET; goto err; } if (!BIO_listen(s, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res), bind_mode ? BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR : 0)) { BIO_closesocket(s); s = INVALID_SOCKET; } err: BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); OPENSSL_free(h); OPENSSL_free(p); return s; } int BIO_accept(int sock, char **ip_port) { BIO_ADDR res; int ret = -1; ret = BIO_accept_ex(sock, &res, 0); if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) { ret = -2; goto end; } SYSerr(SYS_F_ACCEPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT, BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR); goto end; } if (ip_port != NULL) { char *host = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(&res, 1); char *port = BIO_ADDR_service_string(&res, 1); if (host != NULL && port != NULL) *ip_port = OPENSSL_zalloc(strlen(host) + strlen(port) + 2); else *ip_port = NULL; if (*ip_port == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BIO_closesocket(ret); ret = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; } else { strcpy(*ip_port, host); strcat(*ip_port, ":"); strcat(*ip_port, port); } OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(port); } end: return ret; } # endif int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int s, int on) { int ret = 0; # if defined(TCP_NODELAY) && (defined(IPPROTO_TCP) || defined(SOL_TCP)) int opt; # ifdef SOL_TCP opt = SOL_TCP; # else # ifdef IPPROTO_TCP opt = IPPROTO_TCP; # endif # endif ret = setsockopt(s, opt, TCP_NODELAY, (char *)&on, sizeof(on)); # endif return (ret == 0); } int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode) { int ret = -1; int l; l = mode; # ifdef FIONBIO l = mode; ret = BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &l); # elif defined(F_GETFL) && defined(F_SETFL) && (defined(O_NONBLOCK) || defined(FNDELAY)) /* make sure this call always pushes an error level; BIO_socket_ioctl() does so, so we do too. */ l = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0); if (l == -1) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FCNTL, get_last_rtl_error()); ret = -1; } else { # if defined(O_NONBLOCK) l &= ~O_NONBLOCK; # else l &= ~FNDELAY; /* BSD4.x */ # endif if (mode) { # if defined(O_NONBLOCK) l |= O_NONBLOCK; # else l |= FNDELAY; /* BSD4.x */ # endif } ret = fcntl(s, F_SETFL, l); if (ret < 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FCNTL, get_last_rtl_error()); } } # else /* make sure this call always pushes an error level; BIO_socket_ioctl() does so, so we do too. */ BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET_NBIO, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); # endif return (ret == 0); } int BIO_sock_info(int sock, enum BIO_sock_info_type type, union BIO_sock_info_u *info) { switch (type) { case BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS: { socklen_t addr_len; int ret = 0; addr_len = sizeof(*info->addr); ret = getsockname(sock, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(info->addr), &addr_len); if (ret == -1) { SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO, BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_ERROR); return 0; } if ((size_t)addr_len > sizeof(*info->addr)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO, BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_TRUNCATED_ADDRESS); return 0; } } break; default: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO, BIO_R_UNKNOWN_INFO_TYPE); return 0; } return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c0000644000000000000000000003060213176625656015717 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" BIO *BIO_new(const BIO_METHOD *method) { BIO *bio = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bio)); if (bio == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } bio->method = method; bio->shutdown = 1; bio->references = 1; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data)) goto err; bio->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (bio->lock == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data); goto err; } if (method->create != NULL && !method->create(bio)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(bio->lock); goto err; } return bio; err: OPENSSL_free(bio); return NULL; } int BIO_free(BIO *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return 0; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, -1, &i, a->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("BIO", a); if (i > 0) return 1; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); if ((a->callback != NULL) && ((i = (int)a->callback(a, BIO_CB_FREE, NULL, 0, 0L, 1L)) <= 0)) return i; if ((a->method != NULL) && (a->method->destroy != NULL)) a->method->destroy(a); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, a, &a->ex_data); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock); OPENSSL_free(a); return 1; } void BIO_set_data(BIO *a, void *ptr) { a->ptr = ptr; } void *BIO_get_data(BIO *a) { return a->ptr; } void BIO_set_init(BIO *a, int init) { a->init = init; } int BIO_get_init(BIO *a) { return a->init; } void BIO_set_shutdown(BIO *a, int shut) { a->shutdown = shut; } int BIO_get_shutdown(BIO *a) { return a->shutdown; } void BIO_vfree(BIO *a) { BIO_free(a); } int BIO_up_ref(BIO *a) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, 1, &i, a->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("BIO", a); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags) { b->flags &= ~flags; } int BIO_test_flags(const BIO *b, int flags) { return (b->flags & flags); } void BIO_set_flags(BIO *b, int flags) { b->flags |= flags; } long (*BIO_get_callback(const BIO *b)) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long) { return b->callback; } void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b, long (*cb) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long)) { b->callback = cb; } void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg) { b->cb_arg = arg; } char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b) { return b->cb_arg; } const char *BIO_method_name(const BIO *b) { return b->method->name; } int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b) { return b->method->type; } int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *out, int outl) { int i; long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long); if ((b == NULL) || (b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bread == NULL)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_READ, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD); return (-2); } cb = b->callback; if ((cb != NULL) && ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_READ, out, outl, 0L, 1L)) <= 0)) return (i); if (!b->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_READ, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-2); } i = b->method->bread(b, out, outl); if (i > 0) b->num_read += (uint64_t)i; if (cb != NULL) i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN, out, outl, 0L, (long)i); return (i); } int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *in, int inl) { int i; long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long); if (b == NULL) return (0); cb = b->callback; if ((b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bwrite == NULL)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD); return (-2); } if ((cb != NULL) && ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, in, inl, 0L, 1L)) <= 0)) return (i); if (!b->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-2); } i = b->method->bwrite(b, in, inl); if (i > 0) b->num_write += (uint64_t)i; if (cb != NULL) i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN, in, inl, 0L, (long)i); return (i); } int BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *in) { int i; long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long); if ((b == NULL) || (b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bputs == NULL)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PUTS, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD); return (-2); } cb = b->callback; if ((cb != NULL) && ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_PUTS, in, 0, 0L, 1L)) <= 0)) return (i); if (!b->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PUTS, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-2); } i = b->method->bputs(b, in); if (i > 0) b->num_write += (uint64_t)i; if (cb != NULL) i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_PUTS | BIO_CB_RETURN, in, 0, 0L, (long)i); return (i); } int BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *in, int inl) { int i; long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long); if ((b == NULL) || (b->method == NULL) || (b->method->bgets == NULL)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GETS, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD); return (-2); } cb = b->callback; if ((cb != NULL) && ((i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_GETS, in, inl, 0L, 1L)) <= 0)) return (i); if (!b->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GETS, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return (-2); } i = b->method->bgets(b, in, inl); if (cb != NULL) i = (int)cb(b, BIO_CB_GETS | BIO_CB_RETURN, in, inl, 0L, (long)i); return (i); } int BIO_indent(BIO *b, int indent, int max) { if (indent < 0) indent = 0; if (indent > max) indent = max; while (indent--) if (BIO_puts(b, " ") != 1) return 0; return 1; } long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg, int iarg) { int i; i = iarg; return (BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, larg, (char *)&i)); } void *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg) { void *p = NULL; if (BIO_ctrl(b, cmd, larg, (char *)&p) <= 0) return (NULL); else return (p); } long BIO_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long ret; long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long); if (b == NULL) return (0); if ((b->method == NULL) || (b->method->ctrl == NULL)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD); return (-2); } cb = b->callback; if ((cb != NULL) && ((ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, parg, cmd, larg, 1L)) <= 0)) return (ret); ret = b->method->ctrl(b, cmd, larg, parg); if (cb != NULL) ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL | BIO_CB_RETURN, parg, cmd, larg, ret); return (ret); } long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, void (*fp) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long)) { long ret; long (*cb) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long); if (b == NULL) return (0); if ((b->method == NULL) || (b->method->callback_ctrl == NULL)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD); return (-2); } cb = b->callback; if ((cb != NULL) && ((ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, (void *)&fp, cmd, 0, 1L)) <= 0)) return (ret); ret = b->method->callback_ctrl(b, cmd, fp); if (cb != NULL) ret = cb(b, BIO_CB_CTRL | BIO_CB_RETURN, (void *)&fp, cmd, 0, ret); return (ret); } /* * It is unfortunate to duplicate in functions what the BIO_(w)pending macros * do; but those macros have inappropriate return type, and for interfacing * from other programming languages, C macros aren't much of a help anyway. */ size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *bio) { return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_CTRL_PENDING, 0, NULL); } size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *bio) { return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_CTRL_WPENDING, 0, NULL); } /* put the 'bio' on the end of b's list of operators */ BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *bio) { BIO *lb; if (b == NULL) return (bio); lb = b; while (lb->next_bio != NULL) lb = lb->next_bio; lb->next_bio = bio; if (bio != NULL) bio->prev_bio = lb; /* called to do internal processing */ BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_PUSH, 0, lb); return (b); } /* Remove the first and return the rest */ BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b) { BIO *ret; if (b == NULL) return (NULL); ret = b->next_bio; BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_POP, 0, b); if (b->prev_bio != NULL) b->prev_bio->next_bio = b->next_bio; if (b->next_bio != NULL) b->next_bio->prev_bio = b->prev_bio; b->next_bio = NULL; b->prev_bio = NULL; return (ret); } BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason) { BIO *b, *last; b = last = bio; for (;;) { if (!BIO_should_retry(b)) break; last = b; b = b->next_bio; if (b == NULL) break; } if (reason != NULL) *reason = last->retry_reason; return (last); } int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio) { return (bio->retry_reason); } void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason) { bio->retry_reason = reason; } BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *bio, int type) { int mt, mask; if (bio == NULL) return NULL; mask = type & 0xff; do { if (bio->method != NULL) { mt = bio->method->type; if (!mask) { if (mt & type) return (bio); } else if (mt == type) return (bio); } bio = bio->next_bio; } while (bio != NULL); return (NULL); } BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b) { if (b == NULL) return NULL; return b->next_bio; } void BIO_set_next(BIO *b, BIO *next) { b->next_bio = next; } void BIO_free_all(BIO *bio) { BIO *b; int ref; while (bio != NULL) { b = bio; ref = b->references; bio = bio->next_bio; BIO_free(b); /* Since ref count > 1, don't free anyone else. */ if (ref > 1) break; } } BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in) { BIO *ret = NULL, *eoc = NULL, *bio, *new_bio; for (bio = in; bio != NULL; bio = bio->next_bio) { if ((new_bio = BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL) goto err; new_bio->callback = bio->callback; new_bio->cb_arg = bio->cb_arg; new_bio->init = bio->init; new_bio->shutdown = bio->shutdown; new_bio->flags = bio->flags; /* This will let SSL_s_sock() work with stdin/stdout */ new_bio->num = bio->num; if (!BIO_dup_state(bio, (char *)new_bio)) { BIO_free(new_bio); goto err; } /* copy app data */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data, &bio->ex_data)) { BIO_free(new_bio); goto err; } if (ret == NULL) { eoc = new_bio; ret = eoc; } else { BIO_push(eoc, new_bio); eoc = new_bio; } } return (ret); err: BIO_free_all(ret); return (NULL); } void BIO_copy_next_retry(BIO *b) { BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_get_retry_flags(b->next_bio)); b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason; } int BIO_set_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx, void *data) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&(bio->ex_data), idx, data)); } void *BIO_get_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&(bio->ex_data), idx)); } uint64_t BIO_number_read(BIO *bio) { if (bio) return bio->num_read; return 0; } uint64_t BIO_number_written(BIO *bio) { if (bio) return bio->num_write; return 0; } void bio_free_ex_data(BIO *bio) { CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, bio, &bio->ex_data); } void bio_cleanup(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK bio_sock_cleanup_int(); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(bio_lookup_lock); bio_lookup_lock = NULL; #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(bio_type_lock); bio_type_lock = NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/b_dump.c0000644000000000000000000001051613176625656015570 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Stolen from tjh's ssl/ssl_trc.c stuff. */ #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #define TRUNCATE #define DUMP_WIDTH 16 #define DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(i) (DUMP_WIDTH-((i-(i>6?6:i)+3)/4)) int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u), void *u, const char *s, int len) { return BIO_dump_indent_cb(cb, u, s, len, 0); } int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u), void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent) { int ret = 0; char buf[288 + 1], tmp[20], str[128 + 1]; int i, j, rows, trc; unsigned char ch; int dump_width; trc = 0; #ifdef TRUNCATE for (; (len > 0) && ((s[len - 1] == ' ') || (s[len - 1] == '\0')); len--) trc++; #endif if (indent < 0) indent = 0; if (indent) { if (indent > 128) indent = 128; memset(str, ' ', indent); } str[indent] = '\0'; dump_width = DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(indent); rows = (len / dump_width); if ((rows * dump_width) < len) rows++; for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf); for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) { if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len) { OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf); } else { ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff; BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%02x%c", ch, j == 7 ? '-' : ' '); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf); } } OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf); for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) { if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len) break; ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c", ((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.'); #else BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c", ((ch >= os_toascii[' ']) && (ch <= os_toascii['~'])) ? os_toebcdic[ch] : '.'); #endif OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf); } OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf); /* * if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that we * will move the selection point in the debug window */ ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u); } #ifdef TRUNCATE if (trc > 0) { BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%04x - \n", str, len + trc); ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u); } #endif return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO static int write_fp(const void *data, size_t len, void *fp) { return UP_fwrite(data, len, 1, fp); } int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len) { return BIO_dump_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len); } int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent) { return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len, indent); } #endif static int write_bio(const void *data, size_t len, void *bp) { return BIO_write((BIO *)bp, (const char *)data, len); } int BIO_dump(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len) { return BIO_dump_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len); } int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len, int indent) { return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len, indent); } int BIO_hex_string(BIO *out, int indent, int width, unsigned char *data, int datalen) { int i, j = 0; if (datalen < 1) return 1; for (i = 0; i < datalen - 1; i++) { if (i && !j) BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); BIO_printf(out, "%02X:", data[i]); j = (j + 1) % width; if (!j) BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } if (i && !j) BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, ""); BIO_printf(out, "%02X", data[datalen - 1]); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c0000644000000000000000000001260213176625656015560 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) /* * Dummy placeholder for BIO_s_fd... */ BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag) { return NULL; } int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int err) { return 0; } int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i) { return 0; } const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void) { return NULL; } #else /* * As for unconditional usage of "UPLINK" interface in this module. * Trouble is that unlike Unix file descriptors [which are indexes * in kernel-side per-process table], corresponding descriptors on * platforms which require "UPLINK" interface seem to be indexes * in a user-land, non-global table. Well, in fact they are indexes * in stdio _iob[], and recall that _iob[] was the very reason why * "UPLINK" interface was introduced in first place. But one way on * another. Neither libcrypto or libssl use this BIO meaning that * file descriptors can only be provided by application. Therefore * "UPLINK" calls are due... */ static int fd_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int fd_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int fd_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int fd_gets(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static long fd_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int fd_new(BIO *h); static int fd_free(BIO *data); int BIO_fd_should_retry(int s); static const BIO_METHOD methods_fdp = { BIO_TYPE_FD, "file descriptor", fd_write, fd_read, fd_puts, fd_gets, fd_ctrl, fd_new, fd_free, NULL, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void) { return (&methods_fdp); } BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag) { BIO *ret; ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_fd()); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); BIO_set_fd(ret, fd, close_flag); return (ret); } static int fd_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 0; bi->num = -1; bi->ptr = NULL; bi->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; /* essentially redundant */ return (1); } static int fd_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->shutdown) { if (a->init) { UP_close(a->num); } a->init = 0; a->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; } return (1); } static int fd_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; if (out != NULL) { clear_sys_error(); ret = UP_read(b->num, out, outl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_fd_should_retry(ret)) BIO_set_retry_read(b); } } return (ret); } static int fd_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; clear_sys_error(); ret = UP_write(b->num, in, inl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_fd_should_retry(ret)) BIO_set_retry_write(b); } return (ret); } static long fd_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; int *ip; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: num = 0; /* fall thru */ case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK: ret = (long)UP_lseek(b->num, num, 0); break; case BIO_C_FILE_TELL: case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = (long)UP_lseek(b->num, 0, 1); break; case BIO_C_SET_FD: fd_free(b); b->num = *((int *)ptr); b->shutdown = (int)num; b->init = 1; break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: if (b->init) { ip = (int *)ptr; if (ip != NULL) *ip = b->num; ret = b->num; } else ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int fd_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = fd_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } static int fd_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int ret = 0; char *ptr = buf; char *end = buf + size - 1; while ((ptr < end) && (fd_read(bp, ptr, 1) > 0) && (ptr[0] != '\n')) ptr++; ptr[0] = '\0'; if (buf[0] != '\0') ret = strlen(buf); return (ret); } int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i) { int err; if ((i == 0) || (i == -1)) { err = get_last_sys_error(); return (BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(err)); } return (0); } int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int err) { switch (err) { # ifdef EWOULDBLOCK # ifdef WSAEWOULDBLOCK # if WSAEWOULDBLOCK != EWOULDBLOCK case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # else case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # endif # if defined(ENOTCONN) case ENOTCONN: # endif # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN # if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif # endif # ifdef EPROTO case EPROTO: # endif # ifdef EINPROGRESS case EINPROGRESS: # endif # ifdef EALREADY case EALREADY: # endif return (1); /* break; */ default: break; } return (0); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_log.c0000644000000000000000000002220313176625656015746 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Why BIO_s_log? * * BIO_s_log is useful for system daemons (or services under NT). It is * one-way BIO, it sends all stuff to syslogd (on system that commonly use * that), or event log (on NT), or OPCOM (on OpenVMS). * */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include # include # include # include /* Some compiler options may mask the declaration of "_malloc32". */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined _ANSI_C_SOURCE # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 void *_malloc32(__size_t); # pragma pointer_size restore # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE && defined * _ANSI_C_SOURCE */ #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # define NO_SYSLOG #elif (!defined(MSDOS) || defined(WATT32)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(NO_SYSLOG) # include #endif #include #include #ifndef NO_SYSLOG # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # define LOG_EMERG 0 # define LOG_ALERT 1 # define LOG_CRIT 2 # define LOG_ERR 3 # define LOG_WARNING 4 # define LOG_NOTICE 5 # define LOG_INFO 6 # define LOG_DEBUG 7 # define LOG_DAEMON (3<<3) # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* On VMS, we don't really care about these, but we need them to compile */ # define LOG_EMERG 0 # define LOG_ALERT 1 # define LOG_CRIT 2 # define LOG_ERR 3 # define LOG_WARNING 4 # define LOG_NOTICE 5 # define LOG_INFO 6 # define LOG_DEBUG 7 # define LOG_DAEMON OPC$M_NM_NTWORK # endif static int slg_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int slg_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long slg_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int slg_new(BIO *h); static int slg_free(BIO *data); static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level); static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string); static void xcloselog(BIO *bp); static const BIO_METHOD methods_slg = { BIO_TYPE_MEM, "syslog", slg_write, NULL, slg_puts, NULL, slg_ctrl, slg_new, slg_free, NULL, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void) { return (&methods_slg); } static int slg_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 1; bi->num = 0; bi->ptr = NULL; xopenlog(bi, "application", LOG_DAEMON); return (1); } static int slg_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); xcloselog(a); return (1); } static int slg_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = inl; char *buf; char *pp; int priority, i; static const struct { int strl; char str[10]; int log_level; } mapping[] = { { 6, "PANIC ", LOG_EMERG }, { 6, "EMERG ", LOG_EMERG }, { 4, "EMR ", LOG_EMERG }, { 6, "ALERT ", LOG_ALERT }, { 4, "ALR ", LOG_ALERT }, { 5, "CRIT ", LOG_CRIT }, { 4, "CRI ", LOG_CRIT }, { 6, "ERROR ", LOG_ERR }, { 4, "ERR ", LOG_ERR }, { 8, "WARNING ", LOG_WARNING }, { 5, "WARN ", LOG_WARNING }, { 4, "WAR ", LOG_WARNING }, { 7, "NOTICE ", LOG_NOTICE }, { 5, "NOTE ", LOG_NOTICE }, { 4, "NOT ", LOG_NOTICE }, { 5, "INFO ", LOG_INFO }, { 4, "INF ", LOG_INFO }, { 6, "DEBUG ", LOG_DEBUG }, { 4, "DBG ", LOG_DEBUG }, { 0, "", LOG_ERR } /* The default */ }; if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(inl + 1)) == NULL) { return (0); } strncpy(buf, in, inl); buf[inl] = '\0'; i = 0; while (strncmp(buf, mapping[i].str, mapping[i].strl) != 0) i++; priority = mapping[i].log_level; pp = buf + mapping[i].strl; xsyslog(b, priority, pp); OPENSSL_free(buf); return (ret); } static long slg_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_SET: xcloselog(b); xopenlog(b, ptr, num); break; default: break; } return (0); } static int slg_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = slg_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level) { if (check_winnt()) bp->ptr = RegisterEventSourceA(NULL, name); else bp->ptr = NULL; } static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string) { LPCSTR lpszStrings[2]; WORD evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE; char pidbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(DWORD) + 4]; if (bp->ptr == NULL) return; switch (priority) { case LOG_EMERG: case LOG_ALERT: case LOG_CRIT: case LOG_ERR: evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE; break; case LOG_WARNING: evtype = EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE; break; case LOG_NOTICE: case LOG_INFO: case LOG_DEBUG: evtype = EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE; break; default: /* * Should never happen, but set it * as error anyway. */ evtype = EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE; break; } sprintf(pidbuf, "[%lu] ", GetCurrentProcessId()); lpszStrings[0] = pidbuf; lpszStrings[1] = string; ReportEventA(bp->ptr, evtype, 0, 1024, NULL, 2, 0, lpszStrings, NULL); } static void xcloselog(BIO *bp) { if (bp->ptr) DeregisterEventSource((HANDLE) (bp->ptr)); bp->ptr = NULL; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) static int VMS_OPC_target = LOG_DAEMON; static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level) { VMS_OPC_target = level; } static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string) { struct dsc$descriptor_s opc_dsc; /* Arrange 32-bit pointer to opcdef buffer and malloc(), if needed. */ # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 # define OPCDEF_TYPE __char_ptr32 # define OPCDEF_MALLOC _malloc32 # else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ # define OPCDEF_TYPE char * # define OPCDEF_MALLOC OPENSSL_malloc # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */ struct opcdef *opcdef_p; # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # pragma pointer_size restore # endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */ char buf[10240]; unsigned int len; struct dsc$descriptor_s buf_dsc; $DESCRIPTOR(fao_cmd, "!AZ: !AZ"); char *priority_tag; switch (priority) { case LOG_EMERG: priority_tag = "Emergency"; break; case LOG_ALERT: priority_tag = "Alert"; break; case LOG_CRIT: priority_tag = "Critical"; break; case LOG_ERR: priority_tag = "Error"; break; case LOG_WARNING: priority_tag = "Warning"; break; case LOG_NOTICE: priority_tag = "Notice"; break; case LOG_INFO: priority_tag = "Info"; break; case LOG_DEBUG: priority_tag = "DEBUG"; break; } buf_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; buf_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; buf_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = buf; buf_dsc.dsc$w_length = sizeof(buf) - 1; lib$sys_fao(&fao_cmd, &len, &buf_dsc, priority_tag, string); /* We know there's an 8-byte header. That's documented. */ opcdef_p = OPCDEF_MALLOC(8 + len); opcdef_p->opc$b_ms_type = OPC$_RQ_RQST; memcpy(opcdef_p->opc$z_ms_target_classes, &VMS_OPC_target, 3); opcdef_p->opc$l_ms_rqstid = 0; memcpy(&opcdef_p->opc$l_ms_text, buf, len); opc_dsc.dsc$b_dtype = DSC$K_DTYPE_T; opc_dsc.dsc$b_class = DSC$K_CLASS_S; opc_dsc.dsc$a_pointer = (OPCDEF_TYPE) opcdef_p; opc_dsc.dsc$w_length = len + 8; sys$sndopr(opc_dsc, 0); OPENSSL_free(opcdef_p); } static void xcloselog(BIO *bp) { } # else /* Unix/Watt32 */ static void xopenlog(BIO *bp, char *name, int level) { # ifdef WATT32 /* djgpp/DOS */ openlog(name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NDELAY, level); # else openlog(name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, level); # endif } static void xsyslog(BIO *bp, int priority, const char *string) { syslog(priority, "%s", string); } static void xcloselog(BIO *bp) { closelog(); } # endif /* Unix */ #endif /* NO_SYSLOG */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bf_null.c0000644000000000000000000000601213176625656015737 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" /* * BIO_put and BIO_get both add to the digest, BIO_gets returns the digest */ static int nullf_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int nullf_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int nullf_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int nullf_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long nullf_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int nullf_new(BIO *h); static int nullf_free(BIO *data); static long nullf_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); static const BIO_METHOD methods_nullf = { BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER, "NULL filter", nullf_write, nullf_read, nullf_puts, nullf_gets, nullf_ctrl, nullf_new, nullf_free, nullf_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_null(void) { return (&methods_nullf); } static int nullf_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 1; bi->ptr = NULL; bi->flags = 0; return (1); } static int nullf_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); /*- a->ptr=NULL; a->init=0; a->flags=0; */ return (1); } static int nullf_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; if (out == NULL) return (0); if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static int nullf_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = 0; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static long nullf_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); } return (ret); } static long nullf_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } static int nullf_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { if (bp->next_bio == NULL) return (0); return (BIO_gets(bp->next_bio, buf, size)); } static int nullf_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { if (bp->next_bio == NULL) return (0); return (BIO_puts(bp->next_bio, str)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c0000644000000000000000000004467213176625656015754 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Special method for a BIO where the other endpoint is also a BIO of this * kind, handled by the same thread (i.e. the "peer" is actually ourselves, * wearing a different hat). Such "BIO pairs" are mainly for using the SSL * library with I/O interfaces for which no specific BIO method is available. * See ssl/ssltest.c for some hints on how this can be used. */ #include #include #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include #include #include "e_os.h" static int bio_new(BIO *bio); static int bio_free(BIO *bio); static int bio_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size); static int bio_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int num); static long bio_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static int bio_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str); static int bio_make_pair(BIO *bio1, BIO *bio2); static void bio_destroy_pair(BIO *bio); static const BIO_METHOD methods_biop = { BIO_TYPE_BIO, "BIO pair", bio_write, bio_read, bio_puts, NULL /* no bio_gets */ , bio_ctrl, bio_new, bio_free, NULL /* no bio_callback_ctrl */ }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void) { return &methods_biop; } struct bio_bio_st { BIO *peer; /* NULL if buf == NULL. If peer != NULL, then * peer->ptr is also a bio_bio_st, and its * "peer" member points back to us. peer != * NULL iff init != 0 in the BIO. */ /* This is for what we write (i.e. reading uses peer's struct): */ int closed; /* valid iff peer != NULL */ size_t len; /* valid iff buf != NULL; 0 if peer == NULL */ size_t offset; /* valid iff buf != NULL; 0 if len == 0 */ size_t size; char *buf; /* "size" elements (if != NULL) */ size_t request; /* valid iff peer != NULL; 0 if len != 0, * otherwise set by peer to number of bytes * it (unsuccessfully) tried to read, never * more than buffer space (size-len) * warrants. */ }; static int bio_new(BIO *bio) { struct bio_bio_st *b = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*b)); if (b == NULL) return 0; /* enough for one TLS record (just a default) */ b->size = 17 * 1024; bio->ptr = b; return 1; } static int bio_free(BIO *bio) { struct bio_bio_st *b; if (bio == NULL) return 0; b = bio->ptr; assert(b != NULL); if (b->peer) bio_destroy_pair(bio); OPENSSL_free(b->buf); OPENSSL_free(b); return 1; } static int bio_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size_) { size_t size = size_; size_t rest; struct bio_bio_st *b, *peer_b; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); if (!bio->init) return 0; b = bio->ptr; assert(b != NULL); assert(b->peer != NULL); peer_b = b->peer->ptr; assert(peer_b != NULL); assert(peer_b->buf != NULL); peer_b->request = 0; /* will be set in "retry_read" situation */ if (buf == NULL || size == 0) return 0; if (peer_b->len == 0) { if (peer_b->closed) return 0; /* writer has closed, and no data is left */ else { BIO_set_retry_read(bio); /* buffer is empty */ if (size <= peer_b->size) peer_b->request = size; else /* * don't ask for more than the peer can deliver in one write */ peer_b->request = peer_b->size; return -1; } } /* we can read */ if (peer_b->len < size) size = peer_b->len; /* now read "size" bytes */ rest = size; assert(rest > 0); do { /* one or two iterations */ size_t chunk; assert(rest <= peer_b->len); if (peer_b->offset + rest <= peer_b->size) chunk = rest; else /* wrap around ring buffer */ chunk = peer_b->size - peer_b->offset; assert(peer_b->offset + chunk <= peer_b->size); memcpy(buf, peer_b->buf + peer_b->offset, chunk); peer_b->len -= chunk; if (peer_b->len) { peer_b->offset += chunk; assert(peer_b->offset <= peer_b->size); if (peer_b->offset == peer_b->size) peer_b->offset = 0; buf += chunk; } else { /* buffer now empty, no need to advance "buf" */ assert(chunk == rest); peer_b->offset = 0; } rest -= chunk; } while (rest); return size; } /*- * non-copying interface: provide pointer to available data in buffer * bio_nread0: return number of available bytes * bio_nread: also advance index * (example usage: bio_nread0(), read from buffer, bio_nread() * or just bio_nread(), read from buffer) */ /* * WARNING: The non-copying interface is largely untested as of yet and may * contain bugs. */ static ossl_ssize_t bio_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf) { struct bio_bio_st *b, *peer_b; ossl_ssize_t num; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); if (!bio->init) return 0; b = bio->ptr; assert(b != NULL); assert(b->peer != NULL); peer_b = b->peer->ptr; assert(peer_b != NULL); assert(peer_b->buf != NULL); peer_b->request = 0; if (peer_b->len == 0) { char dummy; /* avoid code duplication -- nothing available for reading */ return bio_read(bio, &dummy, 1); /* returns 0 or -1 */ } num = peer_b->len; if (peer_b->size < peer_b->offset + num) /* no ring buffer wrap-around for non-copying interface */ num = peer_b->size - peer_b->offset; assert(num > 0); if (buf != NULL) *buf = peer_b->buf + peer_b->offset; return num; } static ossl_ssize_t bio_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, size_t num_) { struct bio_bio_st *b, *peer_b; ossl_ssize_t num, available; if (num_ > OSSL_SSIZE_MAX) num = OSSL_SSIZE_MAX; else num = (ossl_ssize_t) num_; available = bio_nread0(bio, buf); if (num > available) num = available; if (num <= 0) return num; b = bio->ptr; peer_b = b->peer->ptr; peer_b->len -= num; if (peer_b->len) { peer_b->offset += num; assert(peer_b->offset <= peer_b->size); if (peer_b->offset == peer_b->size) peer_b->offset = 0; } else peer_b->offset = 0; return num; } static int bio_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int num_) { size_t num = num_; size_t rest; struct bio_bio_st *b; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); if (!bio->init || buf == NULL || num == 0) return 0; b = bio->ptr; assert(b != NULL); assert(b->peer != NULL); assert(b->buf != NULL); b->request = 0; if (b->closed) { /* we already closed */ BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE, BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE); return -1; } assert(b->len <= b->size); if (b->len == b->size) { BIO_set_retry_write(bio); /* buffer is full */ return -1; } /* we can write */ if (num > b->size - b->len) num = b->size - b->len; /* now write "num" bytes */ rest = num; assert(rest > 0); do { /* one or two iterations */ size_t write_offset; size_t chunk; assert(b->len + rest <= b->size); write_offset = b->offset + b->len; if (write_offset >= b->size) write_offset -= b->size; /* b->buf[write_offset] is the first byte we can write to. */ if (write_offset + rest <= b->size) chunk = rest; else /* wrap around ring buffer */ chunk = b->size - write_offset; memcpy(b->buf + write_offset, buf, chunk); b->len += chunk; assert(b->len <= b->size); rest -= chunk; buf += chunk; } while (rest); return num; } /*- * non-copying interface: provide pointer to region to write to * bio_nwrite0: check how much space is available * bio_nwrite: also increase length * (example usage: bio_nwrite0(), write to buffer, bio_nwrite() * or just bio_nwrite(), write to buffer) */ static ossl_ssize_t bio_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf) { struct bio_bio_st *b; size_t num; size_t write_offset; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); if (!bio->init) return 0; b = bio->ptr; assert(b != NULL); assert(b->peer != NULL); assert(b->buf != NULL); b->request = 0; if (b->closed) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0, BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE); return -1; } assert(b->len <= b->size); if (b->len == b->size) { BIO_set_retry_write(bio); return -1; } num = b->size - b->len; write_offset = b->offset + b->len; if (write_offset >= b->size) write_offset -= b->size; if (write_offset + num > b->size) /* * no ring buffer wrap-around for non-copying interface (to fulfil * the promise by BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee, BIO_nwrite may have * to be called twice) */ num = b->size - write_offset; if (buf != NULL) *buf = b->buf + write_offset; assert(write_offset + num <= b->size); return num; } static ossl_ssize_t bio_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, size_t num_) { struct bio_bio_st *b; ossl_ssize_t num, space; if (num_ > OSSL_SSIZE_MAX) num = OSSL_SSIZE_MAX; else num = (ossl_ssize_t) num_; space = bio_nwrite0(bio, buf); if (num > space) num = space; if (num <= 0) return num; b = bio->ptr; assert(b != NULL); b->len += num; assert(b->len <= b->size); return num; } static long bio_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; struct bio_bio_st *b = bio->ptr; assert(b != NULL); switch (cmd) { /* specific CTRL codes */ case BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE: if (b->peer) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL, BIO_R_IN_USE); ret = 0; } else if (num == 0) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL, BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ret = 0; } else { size_t new_size = num; if (b->size != new_size) { OPENSSL_free(b->buf); b->buf = NULL; b->size = new_size; } ret = 1; } break; case BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE: ret = (long)b->size; break; case BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR: { BIO *other_bio = ptr; if (bio_make_pair(bio, other_bio)) ret = 1; else ret = 0; } break; case BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR: /* * Affects both BIOs in the pair -- call just once! Or let * BIO_free(bio1); BIO_free(bio2); do the job. */ bio_destroy_pair(bio); ret = 1; break; case BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE: /* * How many bytes can the caller feed to the next write without * having to keep any? */ if (b->peer == NULL || b->closed) ret = 0; else ret = (long)b->size - b->len; break; case BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST: /* * If the peer unsuccessfully tried to read, how many bytes were * requested? (As with BIO_CTRL_PENDING, that number can usually be * treated as boolean.) */ ret = (long)b->request; break; case BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST: /* * Reset request. (Can be useful after read attempts at the other * side that are meant to be non-blocking, e.g. when probing SSL_read * to see if any data is available.) */ b->request = 0; ret = 1; break; case BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR: /* similar to shutdown(..., SHUT_WR) */ b->closed = 1; ret = 1; break; case BIO_C_NREAD0: /* prepare for non-copying read */ ret = (long)bio_nread0(bio, ptr); break; case BIO_C_NREAD: /* non-copying read */ ret = (long)bio_nread(bio, ptr, (size_t)num); break; case BIO_C_NWRITE0: /* prepare for non-copying write */ ret = (long)bio_nwrite0(bio, ptr); break; case BIO_C_NWRITE: /* non-copying write */ ret = (long)bio_nwrite(bio, ptr, (size_t)num); break; /* standard CTRL codes follow */ case BIO_CTRL_RESET: if (b->buf != NULL) { b->len = 0; b->offset = 0; } ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = bio->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: bio->shutdown = (int)num; ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: if (b->peer != NULL) { struct bio_bio_st *peer_b = b->peer->ptr; ret = (long)peer_b->len; } else ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: if (b->buf != NULL) ret = (long)b->len; else ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: /* See BIO_dup_chain for circumstances we have to expect. */ { BIO *other_bio = ptr; struct bio_bio_st *other_b; assert(other_bio != NULL); other_b = other_bio->ptr; assert(other_b != NULL); assert(other_b->buf == NULL); /* other_bio is always fresh */ other_b->size = b->size; } ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: if (b->peer != NULL) { struct bio_bio_st *peer_b = b->peer->ptr; if (peer_b->len == 0 && peer_b->closed) ret = 1; else ret = 0; } else { ret = 1; } break; default: ret = 0; } return ret; } static int bio_puts(BIO *bio, const char *str) { return bio_write(bio, str, strlen(str)); } static int bio_make_pair(BIO *bio1, BIO *bio2) { struct bio_bio_st *b1, *b2; assert(bio1 != NULL); assert(bio2 != NULL); b1 = bio1->ptr; b2 = bio2->ptr; if (b1->peer != NULL || b2->peer != NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR, BIO_R_IN_USE); return 0; } if (b1->buf == NULL) { b1->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(b1->size); if (b1->buf == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } b1->len = 0; b1->offset = 0; } if (b2->buf == NULL) { b2->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(b2->size); if (b2->buf == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } b2->len = 0; b2->offset = 0; } b1->peer = bio2; b1->closed = 0; b1->request = 0; b2->peer = bio1; b2->closed = 0; b2->request = 0; bio1->init = 1; bio2->init = 1; return 1; } static void bio_destroy_pair(BIO *bio) { struct bio_bio_st *b = bio->ptr; if (b != NULL) { BIO *peer_bio = b->peer; if (peer_bio != NULL) { struct bio_bio_st *peer_b = peer_bio->ptr; assert(peer_b != NULL); assert(peer_b->peer == bio); peer_b->peer = NULL; peer_bio->init = 0; assert(peer_b->buf != NULL); peer_b->len = 0; peer_b->offset = 0; b->peer = NULL; bio->init = 0; assert(b->buf != NULL); b->len = 0; b->offset = 0; } } } /* Exported convenience functions */ int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1_p, size_t writebuf1, BIO **bio2_p, size_t writebuf2) { BIO *bio1 = NULL, *bio2 = NULL; long r; int ret = 0; bio1 = BIO_new(BIO_s_bio()); if (bio1 == NULL) goto err; bio2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_bio()); if (bio2 == NULL) goto err; if (writebuf1) { r = BIO_set_write_buf_size(bio1, writebuf1); if (!r) goto err; } if (writebuf2) { r = BIO_set_write_buf_size(bio2, writebuf2); if (!r) goto err; } r = BIO_make_bio_pair(bio1, bio2); if (!r) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (ret == 0) { BIO_free(bio1); bio1 = NULL; BIO_free(bio2); bio2 = NULL; } *bio1_p = bio1; *bio2_p = bio2; return ret; } size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *bio) { return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE, 0, NULL); } size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *bio) { return BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST, 0, NULL); } int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *bio) { return (BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST, 0, NULL) != 0); } /* * BIO_nread0/nread/nwrite0/nwrite are available only for BIO pairs for now * (conceivably some other BIOs could allow non-copying reads and writes * too.) */ int BIO_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf) { long ret; if (!bio->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -2; } ret = BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NREAD0, 0, buf); if (ret > INT_MAX) return INT_MAX; else return (int)ret; } int BIO_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num) { int ret; if (!bio->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -2; } ret = (int)BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NREAD, num, buf); if (ret > 0) bio->num_read += ret; return ret; } int BIO_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf) { long ret; if (!bio->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -2; } ret = BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NWRITE0, 0, buf); if (ret > INT_MAX) return INT_MAX; else return (int)ret; } int BIO_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num) { int ret; if (!bio->init) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE, BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -2; } ret = BIO_ctrl(bio, BIO_C_NWRITE, num, buf); if (ret > 0) bio->num_write += ret; return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_file.c0000644000000000000000000002632213176625656016112 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * 03-Dec-1997 rdenny@dc3.com Fix bug preventing use of stdin/stdout * with binary data (e.g. asn1parse -inform DER < xxx) under * Windows */ #ifndef HEADER_BSS_FILE_C # define HEADER_BSS_FILE_C # if defined(__linux) || defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux) /* * Following definition aliases fopen to fopen64 on above mentioned * platforms. This makes it possible to open and sequentially access files * larger than 2GB from 32-bit application. It does not allow to traverse * them beyond 2GB with fseek/ftell, but on the other hand *no* 32-bit * platform permits that, not with fseek/ftell. Not to mention that breaking * 2GB limit for seeking would require surgery to *our* API. But sequential * access suffices for practical cases when you can run into large files, * such as fingerprinting, so we can let API alone. For reference, the list * of 32-bit platforms which allow for sequential access of large files * without extra "magic" comprise *BSD, Darwin, IRIX... */ # ifndef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS # define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64 # endif # endif # include # include # include "bio_lcl.h" # include # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) static int file_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int file_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int file_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int file_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long file_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int file_new(BIO *h); static int file_free(BIO *data); static const BIO_METHOD methods_filep = { BIO_TYPE_FILE, "FILE pointer", file_write, file_read, file_puts, file_gets, file_ctrl, file_new, file_free, NULL, }; BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode) { BIO *ret; FILE *file = openssl_fopen(filename, mode); int fp_flags = BIO_CLOSE; if (strchr(mode, 'b') == NULL) fp_flags |= BIO_FP_TEXT; if (file == NULL) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')"); if (errno == ENOENT # ifdef ENXIO || errno == ENXIO # endif ) BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE); else BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); return (NULL); } if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { fclose(file); return (NULL); } BIO_clear_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage * UPLINK */ BIO_set_fp(ret, file, fp_flags); return (ret); } BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag) { BIO *ret; if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) return (NULL); /* redundant flag, left for documentation purposes */ BIO_set_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); BIO_set_fp(ret, stream, close_flag); return (ret); } const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void) { return (&methods_filep); } static int file_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 0; bi->num = 0; bi->ptr = NULL; bi->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; /* default to UPLINK */ return (1); } static int file_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->shutdown) { if ((a->init) && (a->ptr != NULL)) { if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) UP_fclose(a->ptr); else fclose(a->ptr); a->ptr = NULL; a->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; } a->init = 0; } return (1); } static int file_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; if (b->init && (out != NULL)) { if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ret = UP_fread(out, 1, (int)outl, b->ptr); else ret = fread(out, 1, (int)outl, (FILE *)b->ptr); if (ret == 0 && (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ? UP_ferror((FILE *)b->ptr) : ferror((FILE *)b->ptr)) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FREAD, get_last_sys_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_READ, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ret = -1; } } return (ret); } static int file_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = 0; if (b->init && (in != NULL)) { if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ret = UP_fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, b->ptr); else ret = fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, (FILE *)b->ptr); if (ret) ret = inl; /* ret=fwrite(in,1,(int)inl,(FILE *)b->ptr); */ /* * according to Tim Hudson , the commented out * version above can cause 'inl' write calls under some stupid stdio * implementations (VMS) */ } return (ret); } static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; FILE *fp = (FILE *)b->ptr; FILE **fpp; char p[4]; int st; switch (cmd) { case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK: case BIO_CTRL_RESET: if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ret = (long)UP_fseek(b->ptr, num, 0); else ret = (long)fseek(fp, num, 0); break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ret = (long)UP_feof(fp); else ret = (long)feof(fp); break; case BIO_C_FILE_TELL: case BIO_CTRL_INFO: if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ret = UP_ftell(b->ptr); else ret = ftell(fp); break; case BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR: file_free(b); b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE; b->ptr = ptr; b->init = 1; # if BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK!=0 # if defined(__MINGW32__) && defined(__MSVCRT__) && !defined(_IOB_ENTRIES) # define _IOB_ENTRIES 20 # endif /* Safety net to catch purely internal BIO_set_fp calls */ # if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1900 if (ptr == stdin || ptr == stdout || ptr == stderr) BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); # elif defined(_IOB_ENTRIES) if ((size_t)ptr >= (size_t)stdin && (size_t)ptr < (size_t)(stdin + _IOB_ENTRIES)) BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); # endif # endif # ifdef UP_fsetmod if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) UP_fsetmod(b->ptr, (char)((num & BIO_FP_TEXT) ? 't' : 'b')); else # endif { # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) int fd = _fileno((FILE *)ptr); if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT) _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT); else _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY); # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr); /* Set correct text/binary mode */ if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT) _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT); /* Dangerous to set stdin/stdout to raw (unless redirected) */ else { if (fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) { if (isatty(fd) <= 0) _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY); } else _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY); } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN) int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr); if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT) setmode(fd, O_TEXT); else setmode(fd, O_BINARY); # endif } break; case BIO_C_SET_FILENAME: file_free(b); b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE; if (num & BIO_FP_APPEND) { if (num & BIO_FP_READ) OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "a+", sizeof p); else OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "a", sizeof p); } else if ((num & BIO_FP_READ) && (num & BIO_FP_WRITE)) OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "r+", sizeof p); else if (num & BIO_FP_WRITE) OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "w", sizeof p); else if (num & BIO_FP_READ) OPENSSL_strlcpy(p, "r", sizeof p); else { BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE); ret = 0; break; } # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN) if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT)) strcat(p, "b"); else strcat(p, "t"); # endif fp = openssl_fopen(ptr, p); if (fp == NULL) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')"); BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ret = 0; break; } b->ptr = fp; b->init = 1; BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage * UPLINK */ break; case BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR: /* the ptr parameter is actually a FILE ** in this case. */ if (ptr != NULL) { fpp = (FILE **)ptr; *fpp = (FILE *)b->ptr; } break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = (long)b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: st = b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK ? UP_fflush(b->ptr) : fflush((FILE *)b->ptr); if (st == EOF) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FFLUSH, get_last_sys_error()); ERR_add_error_data(1, "fflush()"); BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ret = 0; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: case BIO_CTRL_POP: default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int file_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int ret = 0; buf[0] = '\0'; if (bp->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) { if (!UP_fgets(buf, size, bp->ptr)) goto err; } else { if (!fgets(buf, size, (FILE *)bp->ptr)) goto err; } if (buf[0] != '\0') ret = strlen(buf); err: return (ret); } static int file_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = file_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } #else static int file_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { return -1; } static int file_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { return -1; } static int file_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { return -1; } static int file_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { return 0; } static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { return 0; } static int file_new(BIO *bi) { return 0; } static int file_free(BIO *a) { return 0; } static const BIO_METHOD methods_filep = { BIO_TYPE_FILE, "FILE pointer", file_write, file_read, file_puts, file_gets, file_ctrl, file_new, file_free, NULL, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void) { return (&methods_filep); } BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode) { return NULL; } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */ #endif /* HEADER_BSS_FILE_C */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/b_print.c0000644000000000000000000006301613176625656015762 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/numbers.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995 * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact * on all source code distributions. */ #ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE # define LDOUBLE long double #else # define LDOUBLE double #endif static int fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, const char *, int, int, int); static int fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int64_t, int, int, int, int); static int fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, LDOUBLE, int, int, int, int); static int doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int); static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer, size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated, const char *format, va_list args); /* format read states */ #define DP_S_DEFAULT 0 #define DP_S_FLAGS 1 #define DP_S_MIN 2 #define DP_S_DOT 3 #define DP_S_MAX 4 #define DP_S_MOD 5 #define DP_S_CONV 6 #define DP_S_DONE 7 /* format flags - Bits */ /* left-aligned padding */ #define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0) /* print an explicit '+' for a value with positive sign */ #define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1) /* print an explicit ' ' for a value with positive sign */ #define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2) /* print 0/0x prefix for octal/hex and decimal point for floating point */ #define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3) /* print leading zeroes */ #define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4) /* print HEX in UPPPERcase */ #define DP_F_UP (1 << 5) /* treat value as unsigned */ #define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6) /* conversion flags */ #define DP_C_SHORT 1 #define DP_C_LONG 2 #define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3 #define DP_C_LLONG 4 /* Floating point formats */ #define F_FORMAT 0 #define E_FORMAT 1 #define G_FORMAT 2 /* some handy macros */ #define char_to_int(p) (p - '0') #define OSSL_MAX(p,q) ((p >= q) ? p : q) static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer, size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated, const char *format, va_list args) { char ch; int64_t value; LDOUBLE fvalue; char *strvalue; int min; int max; int state; int flags; int cflags; size_t currlen; state = DP_S_DEFAULT; flags = currlen = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; ch = *format++; while (state != DP_S_DONE) { if (ch == '\0' || (buffer == NULL && currlen >= *maxlen)) state = DP_S_DONE; switch (state) { case DP_S_DEFAULT: if (ch == '%') state = DP_S_FLAGS; else if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch)) return 0; ch = *format++; break; case DP_S_FLAGS: switch (ch) { case '-': flags |= DP_F_MINUS; ch = *format++; break; case '+': flags |= DP_F_PLUS; ch = *format++; break; case ' ': flags |= DP_F_SPACE; ch = *format++; break; case '#': flags |= DP_F_NUM; ch = *format++; break; case '0': flags |= DP_F_ZERO; ch = *format++; break; default: state = DP_S_MIN; break; } break; case DP_S_MIN: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { min = 10 * min + char_to_int(ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { min = va_arg(args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DOT; } else state = DP_S_DOT; break; case DP_S_DOT: if (ch == '.') { state = DP_S_MAX; ch = *format++; } else state = DP_S_MOD; break; case DP_S_MAX: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { if (max < 0) max = 0; max = 10 * max + char_to_int(ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { max = va_arg(args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_MOD; } else state = DP_S_MOD; break; case DP_S_MOD: switch (ch) { case 'h': cflags = DP_C_SHORT; ch = *format++; break; case 'l': if (*format == 'l') { cflags = DP_C_LLONG; format++; } else cflags = DP_C_LONG; ch = *format++; break; case 'q': cflags = DP_C_LLONG; ch = *format++; break; case 'L': cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE; ch = *format++; break; default: break; } state = DP_S_CONV; break; case DP_S_CONV: switch (ch) { case 'd': case 'i': switch (cflags) { case DP_C_SHORT: value = (short int)va_arg(args, int); break; case DP_C_LONG: value = va_arg(args, long int); break; case DP_C_LLONG: value = va_arg(args, int64_t); break; default: value = va_arg(args, int); break; } if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags)) return 0; break; case 'X': flags |= DP_F_UP; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'x': case 'o': case 'u': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; switch (cflags) { case DP_C_SHORT: value = (unsigned short int)va_arg(args, unsigned int); break; case DP_C_LONG: value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int); break; case DP_C_LLONG: value = va_arg(args, uint64_t); break; default: value = va_arg(args, unsigned int); break; } if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16), min, max, flags)) return 0; break; case 'f': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg(args, double); if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags, F_FORMAT)) return 0; break; case 'E': flags |= DP_F_UP; /* fall thru */ case 'e': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg(args, double); if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags, E_FORMAT)) return 0; break; case 'G': flags |= DP_F_UP; /* fall thru */ case 'g': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg(args, double); if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags, G_FORMAT)) return 0; break; case 'c': if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, va_arg(args, int))) return 0; break; case 's': strvalue = va_arg(args, char *); if (max < 0) { if (buffer) max = INT_MAX; else max = *maxlen; } if (!fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue, flags, min, max)) return 0; break; case 'p': value = (size_t)va_arg(args, void *); if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM)) return 0; break; case 'n': /* XXX */ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) { short int *num; num = va_arg(args, short int *); *num = currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { /* XXX */ long int *num; num = va_arg(args, long int *); *num = (long int)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { /* XXX */ int64_t *num; num = va_arg(args, int64_t *); *num = (int64_t)currlen; } else { int *num; num = va_arg(args, int *); *num = currlen; } break; case '%': if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch)) return 0; break; case 'w': /* not supported yet, treat as next char */ ch = *format++; break; default: /* unknown, skip */ break; } ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DEFAULT; flags = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; break; case DP_S_DONE: break; default: break; } } /* * We have to truncate if there is no dynamic buffer and we have filled the * static buffer. */ if (buffer == NULL) { *truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1); if (*truncated) currlen = *maxlen - 1; } if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0')) return 0; *retlen = currlen - 1; return 1; } static int fmtstr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, const char *value, int flags, int min, int max) { int padlen; size_t strln; int cnt = 0; if (value == 0) value = ""; strln = OPENSSL_strnlen(value, max < 0 ? SIZE_MAX : (size_t)max); padlen = min - strln; if (min < 0 || padlen < 0) padlen = 0; if (max >= 0) { /* * Calculate the maximum output including padding. * Make sure max doesn't overflow into negativity */ if (max < INT_MAX - padlen) max += padlen; else max = INT_MAX; } if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; while ((padlen > 0) && (max < 0 || cnt < max)) { if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ')) return 0; --padlen; ++cnt; } while (strln > 0 && (max < 0 || cnt < max)) { if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++)) return 0; --strln; ++cnt; } while ((padlen < 0) && (max < 0 || cnt < max)) { if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ')) return 0; ++padlen; ++cnt; } return 1; } static int fmtint(char **sbuffer, char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, int64_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags) { int signvalue = 0; const char *prefix = ""; uint64_t uvalue; char convert[DECIMAL_SIZE(value) + 3]; int place = 0; int spadlen = 0; int zpadlen = 0; int caps = 0; if (max < 0) max = 0; uvalue = value; if (!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) { if (value < 0) { signvalue = '-'; uvalue = 0 - (uint64_t)value; } else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) signvalue = '+'; else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; } if (flags & DP_F_NUM) { if (base == 8) prefix = "0"; if (base == 16) prefix = "0x"; } if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; do { convert[place++] = (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef") [uvalue % (unsigned)base]; uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base); } while (uvalue && (place < (int)sizeof(convert))); if (place == sizeof(convert)) place--; convert[place] = 0; zpadlen = max - place; spadlen = min - OSSL_MAX(max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0) - strlen(prefix); if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) { zpadlen = OSSL_MAX(zpadlen, spadlen); spadlen = 0; } if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) spadlen = -spadlen; /* spaces */ while (spadlen > 0) { if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ')) return 0; --spadlen; } /* sign */ if (signvalue) if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue)) return 0; /* prefix */ while (*prefix) { if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix)) return 0; prefix++; } /* zeros */ if (zpadlen > 0) { while (zpadlen > 0) { if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0')) return 0; --zpadlen; } } /* digits */ while (place > 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place])) return 0; } /* left justified spaces */ while (spadlen < 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ')) return 0; ++spadlen; } return 1; } static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value) { LDOUBLE result = value; if (value < 0) result = -value; return result; } static LDOUBLE pow_10(int in_exp) { LDOUBLE result = 1; while (in_exp) { result *= 10; in_exp--; } return result; } static long roundv(LDOUBLE value) { long intpart; intpart = (long)value; value = value - intpart; if (value >= 0.5) intpart++; return intpart; } static int fmtfp(char **sbuffer, char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags, int style) { int signvalue = 0; LDOUBLE ufvalue; LDOUBLE tmpvalue; char iconvert[20]; char fconvert[20]; char econvert[20]; int iplace = 0; int fplace = 0; int eplace = 0; int padlen = 0; int zpadlen = 0; long exp = 0; unsigned long intpart; unsigned long fracpart; unsigned long max10; int realstyle; if (max < 0) max = 6; if (fvalue < 0) signvalue = '-'; else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) signvalue = '+'; else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; /* * G_FORMAT sometimes prints like E_FORMAT and sometimes like F_FORMAT * depending on the number to be printed. Work out which one it is and use * that from here on. */ if (style == G_FORMAT) { if (fvalue == 0.0) { realstyle = F_FORMAT; } else if (fvalue < 0.0001) { realstyle = E_FORMAT; } else if ((max == 0 && fvalue >= 10) || (max > 0 && fvalue >= pow_10(max))) { realstyle = E_FORMAT; } else { realstyle = F_FORMAT; } } else { realstyle = style; } if (style != F_FORMAT) { tmpvalue = fvalue; /* Calculate the exponent */ if (fvalue != 0.0) { while (tmpvalue < 1) { tmpvalue *= 10; exp--; } while (tmpvalue > 10) { tmpvalue /= 10; exp++; } } if (style == G_FORMAT) { /* * In G_FORMAT the "precision" represents significant digits. We * always have at least 1 significant digit. */ if (max == 0) max = 1; /* Now convert significant digits to decimal places */ if (realstyle == F_FORMAT) { max -= (exp + 1); if (max < 0) { /* * Should not happen. If we're in F_FORMAT then exp < max? */ return 0; } } else { /* * In E_FORMAT there is always one significant digit in front * of the decimal point, so: * significant digits == 1 + decimal places */ max--; } } if (realstyle == E_FORMAT) fvalue = tmpvalue; } ufvalue = abs_val(fvalue); if (ufvalue > ULONG_MAX) { /* Number too big */ return 0; } intpart = (unsigned long)ufvalue; /* * sorry, we only support 9 digits past the decimal because of our * conversion method */ if (max > 9) max = 9; /* * we "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by multiplying * by a factor of 10 */ max10 = roundv(pow_10(max)); fracpart = roundv(pow_10(max) * (ufvalue - intpart)); if (fracpart >= max10) { intpart++; fracpart -= max10; } /* convert integer part */ do { iconvert[iplace++] = "0123456789"[intpart % 10]; intpart = (intpart / 10); } while (intpart && (iplace < (int)sizeof(iconvert))); if (iplace == sizeof iconvert) iplace--; iconvert[iplace] = 0; /* convert fractional part */ while (fplace < max) { if (style == G_FORMAT && fplace == 0 && (fracpart % 10) == 0) { /* We strip trailing zeros in G_FORMAT */ max--; fracpart = fracpart / 10; if (fplace < max) continue; break; } fconvert[fplace++] = "0123456789"[fracpart % 10]; fracpart = (fracpart / 10); } if (fplace == sizeof fconvert) fplace--; fconvert[fplace] = 0; /* convert exponent part */ if (realstyle == E_FORMAT) { int tmpexp; if (exp < 0) tmpexp = -exp; else tmpexp = exp; do { econvert[eplace++] = "0123456789"[tmpexp % 10]; tmpexp = (tmpexp / 10); } while (tmpexp > 0 && eplace < (int)sizeof(econvert)); /* Exponent is huge!! Too big to print */ if (tmpexp > 0) return 0; /* Add a leading 0 for single digit exponents */ if (eplace == 1) econvert[eplace++] = '0'; } /* * -1 for decimal point (if we have one, i.e. max > 0), * another -1 if we are printing a sign */ padlen = min - iplace - max - (max > 0 ? 1 : 0) - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); /* Take some off for exponent prefix "+e" and exponent */ if (realstyle == E_FORMAT) padlen -= 2 + eplace; zpadlen = max - fplace; if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; if (padlen < 0) padlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) { if (signvalue) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue)) return 0; --padlen; signvalue = 0; } while (padlen > 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0')) return 0; --padlen; } } while (padlen > 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ')) return 0; --padlen; } if (signvalue && !doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue)) return 0; while (iplace > 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace])) return 0; } /* * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct * char to print out. */ if (max > 0 || (flags & DP_F_NUM)) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.')) return 0; while (fplace > 0) { if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace])) return 0; } } while (zpadlen > 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0')) return 0; --zpadlen; } if (realstyle == E_FORMAT) { char ech; if ((flags & DP_F_UP) == 0) ech = 'e'; else ech = 'E'; if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ech)) return 0; if (exp < 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '-')) return 0; } else { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '+')) return 0; } while (eplace > 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, econvert[--eplace])) return 0; } } while (padlen < 0) { if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ')) return 0; ++padlen; } return 1; } #define BUFFER_INC 1024 static int doapr_outch(char **sbuffer, char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, int c) { /* If we haven't at least one buffer, someone has doe a big booboo */ OPENSSL_assert(*sbuffer != NULL || buffer != NULL); /* |currlen| must always be <= |*maxlen| */ OPENSSL_assert(*currlen <= *maxlen); if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) { if (*maxlen > INT_MAX - BUFFER_INC) return 0; *maxlen += BUFFER_INC; if (*buffer == NULL) { *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen); if (*buffer == NULL) return 0; if (*currlen > 0) { OPENSSL_assert(*sbuffer != NULL); memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen); } *sbuffer = NULL; } else { char *tmpbuf; tmpbuf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen); if (tmpbuf == NULL) return 0; *buffer = tmpbuf; } } if (*currlen < *maxlen) { if (*sbuffer) (*sbuffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c; else (*buffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c; } return 1; } /***************************************************************************/ int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...) { va_list args; int ret; va_start(args, format); ret = BIO_vprintf(bio, format, args); va_end(args); return (ret); } int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args) { int ret; size_t retlen; char hugebuf[1024 * 2]; /* Was previously 10k, which is unreasonable * in small-stack environments, like threads * or DOS programs. */ char *hugebufp = hugebuf; size_t hugebufsize = sizeof(hugebuf); char *dynbuf = NULL; int ignored; dynbuf = NULL; if (!_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format, args)) { OPENSSL_free(dynbuf); return -1; } if (dynbuf) { ret = BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen); OPENSSL_free(dynbuf); } else { ret = BIO_write(bio, hugebuf, (int)retlen); } return (ret); } /* * As snprintf is not available everywhere, we provide our own * implementation. This function has nothing to do with BIOs, but it's * closely related to BIO_printf, and we need *some* name prefix ... (XXX the * function should be renamed, but to what?) */ int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...) { va_list args; int ret; va_start(args, format); ret = BIO_vsnprintf(buf, n, format, args); va_end(args); return (ret); } int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args) { size_t retlen; int truncated; if(!_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args)) return -1; if (truncated) /* * In case of truncation, return -1 like traditional snprintf. * (Current drafts for ISO/IEC 9899 say snprintf should return the * number of characters that would have been written, had the buffer * been large enough.) */ return -1; else return (retlen <= INT_MAX) ? (int)retlen : -1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/b_sock2.c0000644000000000000000000002107213176625656015643 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # ifdef SO_MAXCONN # define MAX_LISTEN SO_MAXCONN # elif defined(SOMAXCONN) # define MAX_LISTEN SOMAXCONN # else # define MAX_LISTEN 32 # endif /*- * BIO_socket - create a socket * @domain: the socket domain (AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX, ...) * @socktype: the socket type (SOCK_STEAM, SOCK_DGRAM) * @protocol: the protocol to use (IPPROTO_TCP, IPPROTO_UDP) * @options: BIO socket options (currently unused) * * Creates a socket. This should be called before calling any * of BIO_connect and BIO_listen. * * Returns the file descriptor on success or INVALID_SOCKET on failure. On * failure errno is set, and a status is added to the OpenSSL error stack. */ int BIO_socket(int domain, int socktype, int protocol, int options) { int sock = -1; if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return INVALID_SOCKET; sock = socket(domain, socktype, protocol); if (sock == -1) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET); return INVALID_SOCKET; } return sock; } /*- * BIO_connect - connect to an address * @sock: the socket to connect with * @addr: the address to connect to * @options: BIO socket options * * Connects to the address using the given socket and options. * * Options can be a combination of the following: * - BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE: enable regularly sending keep-alive messages. * - BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK: Make the socket non-blocking. * - BIO_SOCK_NODELAY: don't delay small messages. * * options holds BIO socket options that can be used * You should call this for every address returned by BIO_lookup * until the connection is successful. * * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure errno is set * and an error status is added to the OpenSSL error stack. */ int BIO_connect(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options) { int on = 1; if (sock == -1) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET); return 0; } if (!BIO_socket_nbio(sock, (options & BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK) != 0)) return 0; if (options & BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE) { if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE); return 0; } } if (options & BIO_SOCK_NODELAY) { if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY); return 0; } } if (connect(sock, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(addr), BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(addr)) == -1) { if (!BIO_sock_should_retry(-1)) { SYSerr(SYS_F_CONNECT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR); } return 0; } return 1; } /*- * BIO_listen - Creates a listen socket * @sock: the socket to listen with * @addr: local address to bind to * @options: BIO socket options * * Binds to the address using the given socket and options, then * starts listening for incoming connections. * * Options can be a combination of the following: * - BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE: enable regularly sending keep-alive messages. * - BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK: Make the socket non-blocking. * - BIO_SOCK_NODELAY: don't delay small messages. * - BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR: Try to reuse the address and port combination * for a recently closed port. * - BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY: When creating an IPv6 socket, make it listen only * for IPv6 addresses and not IPv4 addresses mapped to IPv6. * * It's recommended that you set up both an IPv6 and IPv4 listen socket, and * then check both for new clients that connect to it. You want to set up * the socket as non-blocking in that case since else it could hang. * * Not all operating systems support IPv4 addresses on an IPv6 socket, and for * others it's an option. If you pass the BIO_LISTEN_V6_ONLY it will try to * create the IPv6 sockets to only listen for IPv6 connection. * * It could be that the first BIO_listen() call will listen to all the IPv6 * and IPv4 addresses and that then trying to bind to the IPv4 address will * fail. We can't tell the difference between already listening ourself to * it and someone else listening to it when failing and errno is EADDRINUSE, so * it's recommended to not give an error in that case if the first call was * successful. * * When restarting the program it could be that the port is still in use. If * you set to BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR option it will try to reuse the port anyway. * It's recommended that you use this. */ int BIO_listen(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options) { int on = 1; int socktype; socklen_t socktype_len = sizeof(socktype); if (sock == -1) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET); return 0; } if (getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE, &socktype, &socktype_len) != 0 || socktype_len != sizeof(socktype)) { SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_GETTING_SOCKTYPE); return 0; } if (!BIO_socket_nbio(sock, (options & BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK) != 0)) return 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS /* SO_REUSEADDR has different behavior on Windows than on * other operating systems, don't set it there. */ if (options & BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR) { if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_REUSEADDR); return 0; } } # endif if (options & BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE) { if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE); return 0; } } if (options & BIO_SOCK_NODELAY) { if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY); return 0; } } # ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY if ((options & BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY) && BIO_ADDR_family(addr) == AF_INET6) { if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_LISTEN_V6_ONLY); return 0; } } # endif if (bind(sock, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(addr), BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(addr)) != 0) { SYSerr(SYS_F_BIND, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET); return 0; } if (socktype != SOCK_DGRAM && listen(sock, MAX_LISTEN) == -1) { SYSerr(SYS_F_LISTEN, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET); return 0; } return 1; } /*- * BIO_accept_ex - Accept new incoming connections * @sock: the listening socket * @addr: the BIO_ADDR to store the peer address in * @options: BIO socket options, applied on the accepted socket. * */ int BIO_accept_ex(int accept_sock, BIO_ADDR *addr_, int options) { socklen_t len; int accepted_sock; BIO_ADDR locaddr; BIO_ADDR *addr = addr_ == NULL ? &locaddr : addr_; len = sizeof(*addr); accepted_sock = accept(accept_sock, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(addr), &len); if (accepted_sock == -1) { if (!BIO_sock_should_retry(accepted_sock)) { SYSerr(SYS_F_ACCEPT, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT_EX, BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR); } return INVALID_SOCKET; } if (!BIO_socket_nbio(accepted_sock, (options & BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK) != 0)) { closesocket(accepted_sock); return INVALID_SOCKET; } return accepted_sock; } /*- * BIO_closesocket - Close a socket * @sock: the socket to close */ int BIO_closesocket(int sock) { if (closesocket(sock) < 0) return 0; return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c0000644000000000000000000003734313176625656016127 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK typedef struct bio_accept_st { int state; int accept_family; int bind_mode; /* Socket mode for BIO_listen */ int accepted_mode; /* Socket mode for BIO_accept (set on accepted sock) */ char *param_addr; char *param_serv; int accept_sock; BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_first; const BIO_ADDRINFO *addr_iter; BIO_ADDR cache_accepting_addr; /* Useful if we asked for port 0 */ char *cache_accepting_name, *cache_accepting_serv; BIO_ADDR cache_peer_addr; char *cache_peer_name, *cache_peer_serv; BIO *bio_chain; } BIO_ACCEPT; static int acpt_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int acpt_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int acpt_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int acpt_new(BIO *h); static int acpt_free(BIO *data); static int acpt_state(BIO *b, BIO_ACCEPT *c); static void acpt_close_socket(BIO *data); static BIO_ACCEPT *BIO_ACCEPT_new(void); static void BIO_ACCEPT_free(BIO_ACCEPT *a); # define ACPT_S_BEFORE 1 # define ACPT_S_GET_ADDR 2 # define ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET 3 # define ACPT_S_LISTEN 4 # define ACPT_S_ACCEPT 5 # define ACPT_S_OK 6 static const BIO_METHOD methods_acceptp = { BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT, "socket accept", acpt_write, acpt_read, acpt_puts, NULL, /* connect_gets, */ acpt_ctrl, acpt_new, acpt_free, NULL, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void) { return (&methods_acceptp); } static int acpt_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_ACCEPT *ba; bi->init = 0; bi->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; bi->flags = 0; if ((ba = BIO_ACCEPT_new()) == NULL) return (0); bi->ptr = (char *)ba; ba->state = ACPT_S_BEFORE; bi->shutdown = 1; return (1); } static BIO_ACCEPT *BIO_ACCEPT_new(void) { BIO_ACCEPT *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->accept_family = BIO_FAMILY_IPANY; ret->accept_sock = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; return (ret); } static void BIO_ACCEPT_free(BIO_ACCEPT *a) { if (a == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(a->param_addr); OPENSSL_free(a->param_serv); BIO_ADDRINFO_free(a->addr_first); OPENSSL_free(a->cache_accepting_name); OPENSSL_free(a->cache_accepting_serv); OPENSSL_free(a->cache_peer_name); OPENSSL_free(a->cache_peer_serv); BIO_free(a->bio_chain); OPENSSL_free(a); } static void acpt_close_socket(BIO *bio) { BIO_ACCEPT *c; c = (BIO_ACCEPT *)bio->ptr; if (c->accept_sock != (int)INVALID_SOCKET) { shutdown(c->accept_sock, 2); closesocket(c->accept_sock); c->accept_sock = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; bio->num = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; } } static int acpt_free(BIO *a) { BIO_ACCEPT *data; if (a == NULL) return (0); data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)a->ptr; if (a->shutdown) { acpt_close_socket(a); BIO_ACCEPT_free(data); a->ptr = NULL; a->flags = 0; a->init = 0; } return (1); } static int acpt_state(BIO *b, BIO_ACCEPT *c) { BIO *bio = NULL, *dbio; int s = -1, ret = -1; for (;;) { switch (c->state) { case ACPT_S_BEFORE: if (c->param_addr == NULL && c->param_serv == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_ADDR_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_addr, " service=", c->param_serv); goto exit_loop; } /* Because we're starting a new bind, any cached name and serv * are now obsolete and need to be cleaned out. * QUESTION: should this be done in acpt_close_socket() instead? */ OPENSSL_free(c->cache_accepting_name); c->cache_accepting_name = NULL; OPENSSL_free(c->cache_accepting_serv); c->cache_accepting_serv = NULL; OPENSSL_free(c->cache_peer_name); c->cache_peer_name = NULL; OPENSSL_free(c->cache_peer_serv); c->cache_peer_serv = NULL; c->state = ACPT_S_GET_ADDR; break; case ACPT_S_GET_ADDR: { int family = AF_UNSPEC; switch (c->accept_family) { case BIO_FAMILY_IPV6: if (1) { /* This is a trick we use to avoid bit rot. * at least the "else" part will always be * compiled. */ #ifdef AF_INET6 family = AF_INET6; } else { #endif BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY); goto exit_loop; } break; case BIO_FAMILY_IPV4: family = AF_INET; break; case BIO_FAMILY_IPANY: family = AF_UNSPEC; break; default: BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY); goto exit_loop; } if (BIO_lookup(c->param_addr, c->param_serv, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER, family, SOCK_STREAM, &c->addr_first) == 0) goto exit_loop; } if (c->addr_first == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING); goto exit_loop; } /* We're currently not iterating, but set this as preparation * for possible future development in that regard */ c->addr_iter = c->addr_first; c->state = ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET; break; case ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET: ret = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(c->addr_iter), BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(c->addr_iter), 0); if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error()); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_addr, " service=", c->param_serv); BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET); goto exit_loop; } c->accept_sock = ret; b->num = ret; c->state = ACPT_S_LISTEN; break; case ACPT_S_LISTEN: { if (!BIO_listen(c->accept_sock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(c->addr_iter), c->bind_mode)) { BIO_closesocket(c->accept_sock); goto exit_loop; } } { union BIO_sock_info_u info; info.addr = &c->cache_accepting_addr; if (!BIO_sock_info(c->accept_sock, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &info)) { BIO_closesocket(c->accept_sock); goto exit_loop; } } c->cache_accepting_name = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(&c->cache_accepting_addr, 1); c->cache_accepting_serv = BIO_ADDR_service_string(&c->cache_accepting_addr, 1); c->state = ACPT_S_ACCEPT; s = -1; ret = 1; goto end; case ACPT_S_ACCEPT: if (b->next_bio != NULL) { c->state = ACPT_S_OK; break; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); b->retry_reason = 0; s = BIO_accept_ex(c->accept_sock, &c->cache_peer_addr, c->accepted_mode); /* If the returned socket is invalid, this might still be * retryable */ if (s < 0) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(s)) { BIO_set_retry_special(b); b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT; goto end; } } /* If it wasn't retryable, we fail */ if (s < 0) { ret = s; goto exit_loop; } bio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_CLOSE); if (bio == NULL) goto exit_loop; BIO_set_callback(bio, BIO_get_callback(b)); BIO_set_callback_arg(bio, BIO_get_callback_arg(b)); /* * If the accept BIO has an bio_chain, we dup it and put the new * socket at the end. */ if (c->bio_chain != NULL) { if ((dbio = BIO_dup_chain(c->bio_chain)) == NULL) goto exit_loop; if (!BIO_push(dbio, bio)) goto exit_loop; bio = dbio; } if (BIO_push(b, bio) == NULL) goto exit_loop; c->cache_peer_name = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(&c->cache_peer_addr, 1); c->cache_peer_serv = BIO_ADDR_service_string(&c->cache_peer_addr, 1); c->state = ACPT_S_OK; bio = NULL; ret = 1; goto end; case ACPT_S_OK: if (b->next_bio == NULL) { c->state = ACPT_S_ACCEPT; break; } ret = 1; goto end; default: ret = 0; goto end; } } exit_loop: if (bio != NULL) BIO_free(bio); else if (s >= 0) BIO_closesocket(s); end: return ret; } static int acpt_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; BIO_ACCEPT *data; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)b->ptr; while (b->next_bio == NULL) { ret = acpt_state(b, data); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static int acpt_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; BIO_ACCEPT *data; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)b->ptr; while (b->next_bio == NULL) { ret = acpt_state(b, data); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { int *ip; long ret = 1; BIO_ACCEPT *data; char **pp; data = (BIO_ACCEPT *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ret = 0; data->state = ACPT_S_BEFORE; acpt_close_socket(b); BIO_ADDRINFO_free(data->addr_first); data->addr_first = NULL; b->flags = 0; break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: /* use this one to start the connection */ ret = (long)acpt_state(b, data); break; case BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT: if (ptr != NULL) { if (num == 0) { char *hold_serv = data->param_serv; /* We affect the hostname regardless. However, the input * string might contain a host:service spec, so we must * parse it, which might or might not affect the service */ OPENSSL_free(data->param_addr); data->param_addr = NULL; ret = BIO_parse_hostserv(ptr, &data->param_addr, &data->param_serv, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV); if (hold_serv != data->param_serv) OPENSSL_free(hold_serv); b->init = 1; } else if (num == 1) { OPENSSL_free(data->param_serv); data->param_serv = BUF_strdup(ptr); b->init = 1; } else if (num == 2) { data->bind_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK; } else if (num == 3) { BIO_free(data->bio_chain); data->bio_chain = (BIO *)ptr; } else if (num == 4) { data->accept_family = *(int *)ptr; } } else { if (num == 2) { data->bind_mode &= ~BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK; } } break; case BIO_C_SET_NBIO: if (num != 0) data->accepted_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK; else data->accepted_mode &= ~BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK; break; case BIO_C_SET_FD: b->init = 1; b->num = *((int *)ptr); data->accept_sock = b->num; data->state = ACPT_S_ACCEPT; b->shutdown = (int)num; b->init = 1; break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: if (b->init) { ip = (int *)ptr; if (ip != NULL) *ip = data->accept_sock; ret = data->accept_sock; } else ret = -1; break; case BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT: if (b->init) { if (num == 0 && ptr != NULL) { pp = (char **)ptr; *pp = data->cache_accepting_name; } else if (num == 1 && ptr != NULL) { pp = (char **)ptr; *pp = data->cache_accepting_serv; } else if (num == 2 && ptr != NULL) { pp = (char **)ptr; *pp = data->cache_peer_name; } else if (num == 3 && ptr != NULL) { pp = (char **)ptr; *pp = data->cache_peer_serv; } else if (num == 4) { switch (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(data->addr_iter)) { #ifdef AF_INET6 case AF_INET6: ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV6; break; #endif case AF_INET: ret = BIO_FAMILY_IPV4; break; case 0: ret = data->accept_family; break; default: ret = -1; break; } } else ret = -1; } else ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: break; case BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE: data->bind_mode = (int)num; break; case BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE: ret = (long)data->bind_mode; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: /*- dbio=(BIO *)ptr; if (data->param_port) EAY EAY BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port); if (data->param_hostname) BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname); BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */ break; default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int acpt_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = acpt_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } BIO *BIO_new_accept(const char *str) { BIO *ret; ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_accept()); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); if (BIO_set_accept_name(ret, str)) return (ret); BIO_free(ret); return (NULL); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000001272213176625656015733 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define USE_SOCKETS #include "e_os.h" /* BEGIN BIO_ADDRINFO/BIO_ADDR stuff. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * Throughout this file and b_addr.c, the existence of the macro * AI_PASSIVE is used to detect the availability of struct addrinfo, * getnameinfo() and getaddrinfo(). If that macro doesn't exist, * we use our own implementation instead. */ /* * It's imperative that these macros get defined before openssl/bio.h gets * included. Otherwise, the AI_PASSIVE hack will not work properly. * For clarity, we check for internal/cryptlib.h since it's a common header * that also includes bio.h. */ # ifdef HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H # error internal/cryptlib.h included before bio_lcl.h # endif # ifdef HEADER_BIO_H # error openssl/bio.h included before bio_lcl.h # endif /* * Undefine AF_UNIX on systems that define it but don't support it. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # undef AF_UNIX # endif # ifdef AI_PASSIVE /* * There's a bug in VMS C header file netdb.h, where struct addrinfo * always is the P32 variant, but the functions that handle that structure, * such as getaddrinfo() and freeaddrinfo() adapt to the initial pointer * size. The easiest workaround is to force struct addrinfo to be the * 64-bit variant when compiling in P64 mode. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define addrinfo __addrinfo64 # endif # define bio_addrinfo_st addrinfo # define bai_family ai_family # define bai_socktype ai_socktype # define bai_protocol ai_protocol # define bai_addrlen ai_addrlen # define bai_addr ai_addr # define bai_next ai_next # else struct bio_addrinfo_st { int bai_family; int bai_socktype; int bai_protocol; size_t bai_addrlen; struct sockaddr *bai_addr; struct bio_addrinfo_st *bai_next; }; # endif union bio_addr_st { struct sockaddr sa; # ifdef AF_INET6 struct sockaddr_in6 s_in6; # endif struct sockaddr_in s_in; # ifdef AF_UNIX struct sockaddr_un s_un; # endif }; #endif /* END BIO_ADDRINFO/BIO_ADDR stuff. */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct { /*- * Buffers are setup like this: * * <---------------------- size -----------------------> * +---------------------------------------------------+ * | consumed | remaining | free space | * +---------------------------------------------------+ * <-- off --><------- len -------> */ /*- BIO *bio; *//* * this is now in the BIO struct */ int ibuf_size; /* how big is the input buffer */ int obuf_size; /* how big is the output buffer */ char *ibuf; /* the char array */ int ibuf_len; /* how many bytes are in it */ int ibuf_off; /* write/read offset */ char *obuf; /* the char array */ int obuf_len; /* how many bytes are in it */ int obuf_off; /* write/read offset */ } BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX; struct bio_st { const BIO_METHOD *method; /* bio, mode, argp, argi, argl, ret */ long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long); char *cb_arg; /* first argument for the callback */ int init; int shutdown; int flags; /* extra storage */ int retry_reason; int num; void *ptr; struct bio_st *next_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */ struct bio_st *prev_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */ int references; uint64_t num_read; uint64_t num_write; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS typedef unsigned int socklen_t; # endif extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_lookup_lock; int BIO_ADDR_make(BIO_ADDR *ap, const struct sockaddr *sa); const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDR *ap); struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(BIO_ADDR *ap); socklen_t BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDR *ap); socklen_t BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); #endif extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_type_lock; void bio_sock_cleanup_int(void); #if BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK==0 /* Shortcut UPLINK calls on most platforms... */ # define UP_stdin stdin # define UP_stdout stdout # define UP_stderr stderr # define UP_fprintf fprintf # define UP_fgets fgets # define UP_fread fread # define UP_fwrite fwrite # undef UP_fsetmod # define UP_feof feof # define UP_fclose fclose # define UP_fopen fopen # define UP_fseek fseek # define UP_ftell ftell # define UP_fflush fflush # define UP_ferror ferror # ifdef _WIN32 # define UP_fileno _fileno # define UP_open _open # define UP_read _read # define UP_write _write # define UP_lseek _lseek # define UP_close _close # else # define UP_fileno fileno # define UP_open open # define UP_read read # define UP_write write # define UP_lseek lseek # define UP_close close # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bf_lbuf.c0000644000000000000000000002070213176625656015717 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include static int linebuffer_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int linebuffer_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int linebuffer_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int linebuffer_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long linebuffer_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int linebuffer_new(BIO *h); static int linebuffer_free(BIO *data); static long linebuffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); /* A 10k maximum should be enough for most purposes */ #define DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE 1024*10 /* #define DEBUG */ static const BIO_METHOD methods_linebuffer = { BIO_TYPE_LINEBUFFER, "linebuffer", linebuffer_write, linebuffer_read, linebuffer_puts, linebuffer_gets, linebuffer_ctrl, linebuffer_new, linebuffer_free, linebuffer_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_linebuffer(void) { return (&methods_linebuffer); } typedef struct bio_linebuffer_ctx_struct { char *obuf; /* the output char array */ int obuf_size; /* how big is the output buffer */ int obuf_len; /* how many bytes are in it */ } BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX; static int linebuffer_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *ctx; ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return (0); ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE); if (ctx->obuf == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); return (0); } ctx->obuf_size = DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE; ctx->obuf_len = 0; bi->init = 1; bi->ptr = (char *)ctx; bi->flags = 0; return (1); } static int linebuffer_free(BIO *a) { BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *b; if (a == NULL) return (0); b = (BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *)a->ptr; OPENSSL_free(b->obuf); OPENSSL_free(a->ptr); a->ptr = NULL; a->init = 0; a->flags = 0; return (1); } static int linebuffer_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; if (out == NULL) return (0); if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return (ret); } static int linebuffer_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int i, num = 0, foundnl; BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *ctx; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); ctx = (BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr; if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL)) return (0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); do { const char *p; for (p = in; p < in + inl && *p != '\n'; p++) ; if (*p == '\n') { p++; foundnl = 1; } else foundnl = 0; /* * If a NL was found and we already have text in the save buffer, * concatenate them and write */ while ((foundnl || p - in > ctx->obuf_size - ctx->obuf_len) && ctx->obuf_len > 0) { int orig_olen = ctx->obuf_len; i = ctx->obuf_size - ctx->obuf_len; if (p - in > 0) { if (i >= p - in) { memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, p - in); ctx->obuf_len += p - in; inl -= p - in; num += p - in; in = p; } else { memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, i); ctx->obuf_len += i; inl -= i; in += i; num += i; } } i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf_len); if (i <= 0) { ctx->obuf_len = orig_olen; BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (i < 0) return ((num > 0) ? num : i); if (i == 0) return (num); } if (i < ctx->obuf_len) memmove(ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf + i, ctx->obuf_len - i); ctx->obuf_len -= i; } /* * Now that the save buffer is emptied, let's write the input buffer * if a NL was found and there is anything to write. */ if ((foundnl || p - in > ctx->obuf_size) && p - in > 0) { i = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, p - in); if (i <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (i < 0) return ((num > 0) ? num : i); if (i == 0) return (num); } num += i; in += i; inl -= i; } } while (foundnl && inl > 0); /* * We've written as much as we can. The rest of the input buffer, if * any, is text that doesn't and with a NL and therefore needs to be * saved for the next trip. */ if (inl > 0) { memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]), in, inl); ctx->obuf_len += inl; num += inl; } return num; } static long linebuffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { BIO *dbio; BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *ctx; long ret = 1; char *p; int r; int obs; ctx = (BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ctx->obuf_len = 0; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len; break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = (long)ctx->obuf_len; if (ret == 0) { if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); } break; case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE: obs = (int)num; p = ctx->obuf; if ((obs > DEFAULT_LINEBUFFER_SIZE) && (obs != ctx->obuf_size)) { p = OPENSSL_malloc((int)num); if (p == NULL) goto malloc_error; } if (ctx->obuf != p) { if (ctx->obuf_len > obs) { ctx->obuf_len = obs; } memcpy(p, ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf_len); OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf); ctx->obuf = p; ctx->obuf_size = obs; } break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); if (ctx->obuf_len <= 0) { ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } for (;;) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ctx->obuf_len > 0) { r = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf_len); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (r <= 0) return ((long)r); if (r < ctx->obuf_len) memmove(ctx->obuf, ctx->obuf + r, ctx->obuf_len - r); ctx->obuf_len -= r; } else { ctx->obuf_len = 0; break; } } ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: dbio = (BIO *)ptr; if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(dbio, ctx->obuf_size)) ret = 0; break; default: if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); malloc_error: BIOerr(BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } static long linebuffer_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } static int linebuffer_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size) { if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); return (BIO_gets(b->next_bio, buf, size)); } static int linebuffer_puts(BIO *b, const char *str) { return (linebuffer_write(b, str, strlen(str))); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bio_meth.c0000644000000000000000000000616413176625656016114 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "bio_lcl.h" #include CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_type_lock = NULL; static CRYPTO_ONCE bio_type_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_bio_type_init) { bio_type_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return bio_type_lock != NULL; } int BIO_get_new_index() { static int bio_count = BIO_TYPE_START; int newval; if (!RUN_ONCE(&bio_type_init, do_bio_type_init)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_GET_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } if (!CRYPTO_atomic_add(&bio_count, 1, &newval, bio_type_lock)) return -1; return newval; } BIO_METHOD *BIO_meth_new(int type, const char *name) { BIO_METHOD *biom = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(BIO_METHOD)); if (biom != NULL) { biom->type = type; biom->name = name; } return biom; } void BIO_meth_free(BIO_METHOD *biom) { OPENSSL_free(biom); } int (*BIO_meth_get_write(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *, int) { return biom->bwrite; } int BIO_meth_set_write(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*bwrite) (BIO *, const char *, int)) { biom->bwrite = bwrite; return 1; } int (*BIO_meth_get_read(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int) { return biom->bread; } int BIO_meth_set_read(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*bread) (BIO *, char *, int)) { biom->bread = bread; return 1; } int (*BIO_meth_get_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *) { return biom->bputs; } int BIO_meth_set_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*bputs) (BIO *, const char *)) { biom->bputs = bputs; return 1; } int (*BIO_meth_get_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int) { return biom->bgets; } int BIO_meth_set_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*bgets) (BIO *, char *, int)) { biom->bgets = bgets; return 1; } long (*BIO_meth_get_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, long, void *) { return biom->ctrl; } int BIO_meth_set_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom, long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *)) { biom->ctrl = ctrl; return 1; } int (*BIO_meth_get_create(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *) { return biom->create; } int BIO_meth_set_create(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*create) (BIO *)) { biom->create = create; return 1; } int (*BIO_meth_get_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *) { return biom->destroy; } int BIO_meth_set_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*destroy) (BIO *)) { biom->destroy = destroy; return 1; } long (*BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *) { return biom->callback_ctrl; } int BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom, long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *)) { biom->callback_ctrl = callback_ctrl; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bio_err.c0000644000000000000000000001262113176625656015742 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BIO,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BIO,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA BIO_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE), "acpt_state"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS), "addr_strings"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT), "BIO_accept"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT_EX), "BIO_accept_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_ADDR_NEW), "BIO_ADDR_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL), "BIO_callback_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT), "BIO_connect"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_CTRL), "BIO_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GETS), "BIO_gets"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP), "BIO_get_host_ip"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GET_NEW_INDEX), "BIO_get_new_index"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT), "BIO_get_port"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN), "BIO_listen"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP), "BIO_lookup"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR), "bio_make_pair"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NEW), "BIO_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE), "BIO_new_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF), "BIO_new_mem_buf"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD), "BIO_nread"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0), "BIO_nread0"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE), "BIO_nwrite"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0), "BIO_nwrite0"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV), "BIO_parse_hostserv"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_PUTS), "BIO_puts"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_READ), "BIO_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET), "BIO_socket"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET_NBIO), "BIO_socket_nbio"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO), "BIO_sock_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT), "BIO_sock_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BIO_WRITE), "BIO_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL), "buffer_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_CTRL), "conn_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_STATE), "conn_state"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ), "dgram_sctp_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE), "dgram_sctp_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL), "file_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_READ), "file_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL), "linebuffer_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE), "mem_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA BIO_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR), "accept error"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_ADDRINFO_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET), "addrinfo addr is not af inet"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_AMBIGUOUS_HOST_OR_SERVICE), "ambiguous host or service"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE), "bad fopen mode"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE), "broken pipe"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR), "connect error"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET), "gethostbyname addr is not af inet"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_ERROR), "getsockname error"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_TRUNCATED_ADDRESS), "getsockname truncated address"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_GETTING_SOCKTYPE), "getting socktype"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT), "invalid argument"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET), "invalid socket"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_IN_USE), "in use"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_LISTEN_V6_ONLY), "listen v6 only"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING), "lookup returned nothing"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE), "malformed host or service"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR), "nbio connect error"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_ADDR_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED), "no accept addr or service specified"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED), "no hostname or service specified"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED), "no port defined"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE), "no such file"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER), "null parameter"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET), "unable to bind socket"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET), "unable to create socket"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE), "unable to keepalive"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET), "unable to listen socket"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY), "unable to nodelay"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_REUSEADDR), "unable to reuseaddr"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY), "unavailable ip family"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED), "uninitialized"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNKNOWN_INFO_TYPE), "unknown info type"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY), "unsupported ip family"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD), "unsupported method"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FAMILY), "unsupported protocol family"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO), "write to read only BIO"}, {ERR_REASON(BIO_R_WSASTARTUP), "WSAStartup"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_BIO_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(BIO_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, BIO_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, BIO_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c0000644000000000000000000001003213176625656015711 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include /* * BIO_put and BIO_get both add to the digest, BIO_gets returns the digest */ static int nbiof_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int nbiof_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int nbiof_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int nbiof_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long nbiof_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int nbiof_new(BIO *h); static int nbiof_free(BIO *data); static long nbiof_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); typedef struct nbio_test_st { /* only set if we sent a 'should retry' error */ int lrn; int lwn; } NBIO_TEST; static const BIO_METHOD methods_nbiof = { BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST, "non-blocking IO test filter", nbiof_write, nbiof_read, nbiof_puts, nbiof_gets, nbiof_ctrl, nbiof_new, nbiof_free, nbiof_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_nbio_test(void) { return (&methods_nbiof); } static int nbiof_new(BIO *bi) { NBIO_TEST *nt; if ((nt = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*nt))) == NULL) return (0); nt->lrn = -1; nt->lwn = -1; bi->ptr = (char *)nt; bi->init = 1; return (1); } static int nbiof_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); OPENSSL_free(a->ptr); a->ptr = NULL; a->init = 0; a->flags = 0; return (1); } static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; int num; unsigned char n; if (out == NULL) return (0); if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0) return -1; num = (n & 0x07); if (outl > num) outl = num; if (num == 0) { ret = -1; BIO_set_retry_read(b); } else { ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl); if (ret < 0) BIO_copy_next_retry(b); } return (ret); } static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { NBIO_TEST *nt; int ret = 0; int num; unsigned char n; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); nt = (NBIO_TEST *)b->ptr; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (nt->lwn > 0) { num = nt->lwn; nt->lwn = 0; } else { if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0) return -1; num = (n & 7); } if (inl > num) inl = num; if (num == 0) { ret = -1; BIO_set_retry_write(b); } else { ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, in, inl); if (ret < 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); nt->lwn = inl; } } return (ret); } static long nbiof_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); } static long nbiof_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { long ret = 1; if (b->next_bio == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } static int nbiof_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { if (bp->next_bio == NULL) return (0); return (BIO_gets(bp->next_bio, buf, size)); } static int nbiof_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { if (bp->next_bio == NULL) return (0); return (BIO_puts(bp->next_bio, str)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bio/bss_sock.c0000644000000000000000000001045513176625656016132 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "bio_lcl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # include # ifdef WATT32 /* Watt-32 uses same names */ # undef sock_write # undef sock_read # undef sock_puts # define sock_write SockWrite # define sock_read SockRead # define sock_puts SockPuts # endif static int sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int sock_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long sock_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int sock_new(BIO *h); static int sock_free(BIO *data); int BIO_sock_should_retry(int s); static const BIO_METHOD methods_sockp = { BIO_TYPE_SOCKET, "socket", sock_write, sock_read, sock_puts, NULL, /* sock_gets, */ sock_ctrl, sock_new, sock_free, NULL, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void) { return (&methods_sockp); } BIO *BIO_new_socket(int fd, int close_flag) { BIO *ret; ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (ret == NULL) return (NULL); BIO_set_fd(ret, fd, close_flag); return (ret); } static int sock_new(BIO *bi) { bi->init = 0; bi->num = 0; bi->ptr = NULL; bi->flags = 0; return (1); } static int sock_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return (0); if (a->shutdown) { if (a->init) { BIO_closesocket(a->num); } a->init = 0; a->flags = 0; } return (1); } static int sock_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; if (out != NULL) { clear_socket_error(); ret = readsocket(b->num, out, outl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) BIO_set_retry_read(b); } } return (ret); } static int sock_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; clear_socket_error(); ret = writesocket(b->num, in, inl); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) BIO_set_retry_write(b); } return (ret); } static long sock_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; int *ip; switch (cmd) { case BIO_C_SET_FD: sock_free(b); b->num = *((int *)ptr); b->shutdown = (int)num; b->init = 1; break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: if (b->init) { ip = (int *)ptr; if (ip != NULL) *ip = b->num; ret = b->num; } else ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; default: ret = 0; break; } return (ret); } static int sock_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = sock_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } int BIO_sock_should_retry(int i) { int err; if ((i == 0) || (i == -1)) { err = get_last_socket_error(); return (BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(err)); } return (0); } int BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(int err) { switch (err) { # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # if defined(WSAEWOULDBLOCK) case WSAEWOULDBLOCK: # endif # endif # ifdef EWOULDBLOCK # ifdef WSAEWOULDBLOCK # if WSAEWOULDBLOCK != EWOULDBLOCK case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # else case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # endif # if defined(ENOTCONN) case ENOTCONN: # endif # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN # if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif # endif # ifdef EPROTO case EPROTO: # endif # ifdef EINPROGRESS case EINPROGRESS: # endif # ifdef EALREADY case EALREADY: # endif return (1); /* break; */ default: break; } return (0); } #endif /* #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/LPdir_unix.c0000644000000000000000000000776713176625656015644 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef LPDIR_H # include "LPdir.h" #endif /* * The POSIXly macro for the maximum number of characters in a file path is * NAME_MAX. However, some operating systems use PATH_MAX instead. * Therefore, it seems natural to first check for PATH_MAX and use that, and * if it doesn't exist, use NAME_MAX. */ #if defined(PATH_MAX) # define LP_ENTRY_SIZE PATH_MAX #elif defined(NAME_MAX) # define LP_ENTRY_SIZE NAME_MAX #endif /* * Of course, there's the possibility that neither PATH_MAX nor NAME_MAX * exist. It's also possible that NAME_MAX exists but is define to a very * small value (HP-UX offers 14), so we need to check if we got a result, and * if it meets a minimum standard, and create or change it if not. */ #if !defined(LP_ENTRY_SIZE) || LP_ENTRY_SIZE<255 # undef LP_ENTRY_SIZE # define LP_ENTRY_SIZE 255 #endif struct LP_dir_context_st { DIR *dir; char entry_name[LP_ENTRY_SIZE + 1]; }; const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory) { struct dirent *direntry = NULL; if (ctx == NULL || directory == NULL) { errno = EINVAL; return 0; } errno = 0; if (*ctx == NULL) { *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx)); if (*ctx == NULL) { errno = ENOMEM; return 0; } memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); (*ctx)->dir = opendir(directory); if ((*ctx)->dir == NULL) { int save_errno = errno; /* Probably not needed, but I'm paranoid */ free(*ctx); *ctx = NULL; errno = save_errno; return 0; } } direntry = readdir((*ctx)->dir); if (direntry == NULL) { return 0; } strncpy((*ctx)->entry_name, direntry->d_name, sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1); (*ctx)->entry_name[sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1] = '\0'; return (*ctx)->entry_name; } int LP_find_file_end(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx) { if (ctx != NULL && *ctx != NULL) { int ret = closedir((*ctx)->dir); free(*ctx); switch (ret) { case 0: return 1; case -1: return 0; default: break; } } errno = EINVAL; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/LPdir_wince.c0000644000000000000000000000357213176625656015754 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #define LP_SYS_WINCE /* * We might want to define LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE here. It's currently under * investigation what the exact conditions would be */ #include "LPdir_win.c" openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014517 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/async_err.c0000644000000000000000000000312713176625656016653 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA ASYNC_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_CTX_NEW), "async_ctx_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD), "ASYNC_init_thread"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_JOB_NEW), "async_job_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_PAUSE_JOB), "ASYNC_pause_job"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_FUNC), "async_start_func"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB), "ASYNC_start_job"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ASYNC_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SET_POOL), "failed to set pool"}, {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT), "failed to swap context"}, {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED), "init failed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASYNC_R_INVALID_POOL_SIZE), "invalid pool size"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_ASYNC_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(ASYNC_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, ASYNC_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, ASYNC_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/build.info0000644000000000000000000000023013176625656016466 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ async.c async_wait.c async_err.c arch/async_posix.c arch/async_win.c \ arch/async_null.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/async_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000344613176625656017025 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Must do this before including any header files, because on MacOS/X * includes which includes */ #if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__) && !defined(_XOPEN_SOURCE) # define _XOPEN_SOURCE /* Otherwise incomplete ucontext_t structure */ # pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" #endif #if defined(_WIN32) # include #endif #include #include typedef struct async_ctx_st async_ctx; typedef struct async_pool_st async_pool; #include "arch/async_win.h" #include "arch/async_posix.h" #include "arch/async_null.h" struct async_ctx_st { async_fibre dispatcher; ASYNC_JOB *currjob; unsigned int blocked; }; struct async_job_st { async_fibre fibrectx; int (*func) (void *); void *funcargs; int ret; int status; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx; }; struct fd_lookup_st { const void *key; OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd; void *custom_data; void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *, OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *); int add; int del; struct fd_lookup_st *next; }; struct async_wait_ctx_st { struct fd_lookup_st *fds; size_t numadd; size_t numdel; }; DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASYNC_JOB) struct async_pool_st { STACK_OF(ASYNC_JOB) *jobs; size_t curr_size; size_t max_size; }; void async_local_cleanup(void); void async_start_func(void); async_ctx *async_get_ctx(void); void async_wait_ctx_reset_counts(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/async_wait.c0000644000000000000000000001260413176625656017027 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* This must be the first #include file */ #include "async_locl.h" #include ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX)); } void ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx) { struct fd_lookup_st *curr; struct fd_lookup_st *next; if (ctx == NULL) return; curr = ctx->fds; while (curr != NULL) { if (!curr->del) { /* Only try and cleanup if it hasn't been marked deleted */ if (curr->cleanup != NULL) curr->cleanup(ctx, curr->key, curr->fd, curr->custom_data); } /* Always free the fd_lookup_st */ next = curr->next; OPENSSL_free(curr); curr = next; } OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd, void *custom_data, void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *, OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *)) { struct fd_lookup_st *fdlookup; fdlookup = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof *fdlookup); if (fdlookup == NULL) return 0; fdlookup->key = key; fdlookup->fd = fd; fdlookup->custom_data = custom_data; fdlookup->cleanup = cleanup; fdlookup->add = 1; fdlookup->next = ctx->fds; ctx->fds = fdlookup; ctx->numadd++; return 1; } int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, void **custom_data) { struct fd_lookup_st *curr; curr = ctx->fds; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->del) { /* This one has been marked deleted so do nothing */ curr = curr->next; continue; } if (curr->key == key) { *fd = curr->fd; *custom_data = curr->custom_data; return 1; } curr = curr->next; } return 0; } int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, size_t *numfds) { struct fd_lookup_st *curr; curr = ctx->fds; *numfds = 0; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->del) { /* This one has been marked deleted so do nothing */ curr = curr->next; continue; } if (fd != NULL) { *fd = curr->fd; fd++; } (*numfds)++; curr = curr->next; } return 1; } int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds) { struct fd_lookup_st *curr; *numaddfds = ctx->numadd; *numdelfds = ctx->numdel; if (addfd == NULL && delfd == NULL) return 1; curr = ctx->fds; while (curr != NULL) { /* We ignore fds that have been marked as both added and deleted */ if (curr->del && !curr->add && (delfd != NULL)) { *delfd = curr->fd; delfd++; } if (curr->add && !curr->del && (addfd != NULL)) { *addfd = curr->fd; addfd++; } curr = curr->next; } return 1; } int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key) { struct fd_lookup_st *curr, *prev; curr = ctx->fds; prev = NULL; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->del == 1) { /* This one has been marked deleted already so do nothing */ curr = curr->next; continue; } if (curr->key == key) { /* If fd has just been added, remove it from the list */ if (curr->add == 1) { if (ctx->fds == curr) { ctx->fds = curr->next; } else { prev->next = curr->next; } /* It is responsibility of the caller to cleanup before calling * ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd */ OPENSSL_free(curr); ctx->numadd--; return 1; } /* * Mark it as deleted. We don't call cleanup if explicitly asked * to clear an fd. We assume the caller is going to do that (if * appropriate). */ curr->del = 1; ctx->numdel++; return 1; } prev = curr; curr = curr->next; } return 0; } void async_wait_ctx_reset_counts(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx) { struct fd_lookup_st *curr, *prev = NULL; ctx->numadd = 0; ctx->numdel = 0; curr = ctx->fds; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->del) { if (prev == NULL) ctx->fds = curr->next; else prev->next = curr->next; OPENSSL_free(curr); if (prev == NULL) curr = ctx->fds; else curr = prev->next; continue; } if (curr->add) { curr->add = 0; } prev = curr; curr = curr->next; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/async.c0000644000000000000000000002474713176625656016016 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Without this we start getting longjmp crashes because it thinks we're jumping * up the stack when in fact we are jumping to an entirely different stack. The * cost of this is not having certain buffer overrun/underrun checks etc for * this source file :-( */ #undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE /* This must be the first #include file */ #include "async_locl.h" #include #include #include #define ASYNC_JOB_RUNNING 0 #define ASYNC_JOB_PAUSING 1 #define ASYNC_JOB_PAUSED 2 #define ASYNC_JOB_STOPPING 3 static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL ctxkey; static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL poolkey; static void async_free_pool_internal(async_pool *pool); static async_ctx *async_ctx_new(void) { async_ctx *nctx = NULL; nctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (async_ctx)); if (nctx == NULL) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } async_fibre_init_dispatcher(&nctx->dispatcher); nctx->currjob = NULL; nctx->blocked = 0; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&ctxkey, nctx)) goto err; return nctx; err: OPENSSL_free(nctx); return NULL; } async_ctx *async_get_ctx(void) { if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC, NULL)) return NULL; return (async_ctx *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&ctxkey); } static int async_ctx_free(void) { async_ctx *ctx; ctx = async_get_ctx(); if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&ctxkey, NULL)) return 0; OPENSSL_free(ctx); return 1; } static ASYNC_JOB *async_job_new(void) { ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL; job = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof (ASYNC_JOB)); if (job == NULL) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_JOB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } job->status = ASYNC_JOB_RUNNING; return job; } static void async_job_free(ASYNC_JOB *job) { if (job != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(job->funcargs); async_fibre_free(&job->fibrectx); OPENSSL_free(job); } } static ASYNC_JOB *async_get_pool_job(void) { ASYNC_JOB *job; async_pool *pool; pool = (async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey); if (pool == NULL) { /* * Pool has not been initialised, so init with the defaults, i.e. * no max size and no pre-created jobs */ if (ASYNC_init_thread(0, 0) == 0) return NULL; pool = (async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey); } job = sk_ASYNC_JOB_pop(pool->jobs); if (job == NULL) { /* Pool is empty */ if ((pool->max_size != 0) && (pool->curr_size >= pool->max_size)) return NULL; job = async_job_new(); if (job != NULL) { if (! async_fibre_makecontext(&job->fibrectx)) { async_job_free(job); return NULL; } pool->curr_size++; } } return job; } static void async_release_job(ASYNC_JOB *job) { async_pool *pool; pool = (async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey); OPENSSL_free(job->funcargs); job->funcargs = NULL; sk_ASYNC_JOB_push(pool->jobs, job); } void async_start_func(void) { ASYNC_JOB *job; async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx(); while (1) { /* Run the job */ job = ctx->currjob; job->ret = job->func(job->funcargs); /* Stop the job */ job->status = ASYNC_JOB_STOPPING; if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&job->fibrectx, &ctx->dispatcher, 1)) { /* * Should not happen. Getting here will close the thread...can't do * much about it */ ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_FUNC, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT); } } } int ASYNC_start_job(ASYNC_JOB **job, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *wctx, int *ret, int (*func)(void *), void *args, size_t size) { async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx(); if (ctx == NULL) ctx = async_ctx_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { return ASYNC_ERR; } if (*job) { ctx->currjob = *job; } for (;;) { if (ctx->currjob != NULL) { if (ctx->currjob->status == ASYNC_JOB_STOPPING) { *ret = ctx->currjob->ret; ctx->currjob->waitctx = NULL; async_release_job(ctx->currjob); ctx->currjob = NULL; *job = NULL; return ASYNC_FINISH; } if (ctx->currjob->status == ASYNC_JOB_PAUSING) { *job = ctx->currjob; ctx->currjob->status = ASYNC_JOB_PAUSED; ctx->currjob = NULL; return ASYNC_PAUSE; } if (ctx->currjob->status == ASYNC_JOB_PAUSED) { ctx->currjob = *job; /* Resume previous job */ if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&ctx->dispatcher, &ctx->currjob->fibrectx, 1)) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT); goto err; } continue; } /* Should not happen */ ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); async_release_job(ctx->currjob); ctx->currjob = NULL; *job = NULL; return ASYNC_ERR; } /* Start a new job */ if ((ctx->currjob = async_get_pool_job()) == NULL) { return ASYNC_NO_JOBS; } if (args != NULL) { ctx->currjob->funcargs = OPENSSL_malloc(size); if (ctx->currjob->funcargs == NULL) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); async_release_job(ctx->currjob); ctx->currjob = NULL; return ASYNC_ERR; } memcpy(ctx->currjob->funcargs, args, size); } else { ctx->currjob->funcargs = NULL; } ctx->currjob->func = func; ctx->currjob->waitctx = wctx; if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&ctx->dispatcher, &ctx->currjob->fibrectx, 1)) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT); goto err; } } err: async_release_job(ctx->currjob); ctx->currjob = NULL; *job = NULL; return ASYNC_ERR; } int ASYNC_pause_job(void) { ASYNC_JOB *job; async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx(); if (ctx == NULL || ctx->currjob == NULL || ctx->blocked) { /* * Could be we've deliberately not been started within a job so this is * counted as success. */ return 1; } job = ctx->currjob; job->status = ASYNC_JOB_PAUSING; if (!async_fibre_swapcontext(&job->fibrectx, &ctx->dispatcher, 1)) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_PAUSE_JOB, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT); return 0; } /* Reset counts of added and deleted fds */ async_wait_ctx_reset_counts(job->waitctx); return 1; } static void async_empty_pool(async_pool *pool) { ASYNC_JOB *job; if (!pool || !pool->jobs) return; do { job = sk_ASYNC_JOB_pop(pool->jobs); async_job_free(job); } while (job); } int async_init(void) { if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&ctxkey, NULL)) return 0; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&poolkey, NULL)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&ctxkey); return 0; } return 1; } void async_deinit(void) { CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&ctxkey); CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&poolkey); } int ASYNC_init_thread(size_t max_size, size_t init_size) { async_pool *pool; size_t curr_size = 0; if (init_size > max_size) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ASYNC_R_INVALID_POOL_SIZE); return 0; } if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC, NULL)) { return 0; } if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ASYNC)) { return 0; } pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof *pool); if (pool == NULL) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } pool->jobs = sk_ASYNC_JOB_new_null(); if (pool->jobs == NULL) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(pool); return 0; } pool->max_size = max_size; /* Pre-create jobs as required */ while (init_size--) { ASYNC_JOB *job; job = async_job_new(); if (job == NULL || !async_fibre_makecontext(&job->fibrectx)) { /* * Not actually fatal because we already created the pool, just * skip creation of any more jobs */ async_job_free(job); break; } job->funcargs = NULL; sk_ASYNC_JOB_push(pool->jobs, job); curr_size++; } pool->curr_size = curr_size; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&poolkey, pool)) { ASYNCerr(ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD, ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SET_POOL); goto err; } return 1; err: async_free_pool_internal(pool); return 0; } static void async_free_pool_internal(async_pool *pool) { if (pool == NULL) return; async_empty_pool(pool); sk_ASYNC_JOB_free(pool->jobs); OPENSSL_free(pool); CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&poolkey, NULL); async_local_cleanup(); async_ctx_free(); } void ASYNC_cleanup_thread(void) { async_free_pool_internal((async_pool *)CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&poolkey)); } ASYNC_JOB *ASYNC_get_current_job(void) { async_ctx *ctx; ctx = async_get_ctx(); if (ctx == NULL) return NULL; return ctx->currjob; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(ASYNC_JOB *job) { return job->waitctx; } void ASYNC_block_pause(void) { async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx(); if (ctx == NULL || ctx->currjob == NULL) { /* * We're not in a job anyway so ignore this */ return; } ctx->blocked++; } void ASYNC_unblock_pause(void) { async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx(); if (ctx == NULL || ctx->currjob == NULL) { /* * We're not in a job anyway so ignore this */ return; } if (ctx->blocked > 0) ctx->blocked--; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/arch/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656015434 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/arch/async_null.c0000644000000000000000000000100013176625656017736 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* This must be the first #include file */ #include "../async_locl.h" #ifdef ASYNC_NULL int ASYNC_is_capable(void) { return 0; } void async_local_cleanup(void) { } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/arch/async_null.h0000644000000000000000000000137213176625656017757 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include /* * If we haven't managed to detect any other async architecture then we default * to NULL. */ #ifndef ASYNC_ARCH # define ASYNC_NULL # define ASYNC_ARCH typedef struct async_fibre_st { int dummy; } async_fibre; # define async_fibre_swapcontext(o,n,r) 0 # define async_fibre_makecontext(c) 0 # define async_fibre_free(f) # define async_fibre_init_dispatcher(f) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/arch/async_win.c0000644000000000000000000000232713176625656017576 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* This must be the first #include file */ #include "../async_locl.h" #ifdef ASYNC_WIN # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" int ASYNC_is_capable(void) { return 1; } void async_local_cleanup(void) { async_ctx *ctx = async_get_ctx(); if (ctx != NULL) { async_fibre *fibre = &ctx->dispatcher; if (fibre != NULL && fibre->fibre != NULL && fibre->converted) { ConvertFiberToThread(); fibre->fibre = NULL; } } } int async_fibre_init_dispatcher(async_fibre *fibre) { fibre->fibre = ConvertThreadToFiber(NULL); if (fibre->fibre == NULL) { fibre->converted = 0; fibre->fibre = GetCurrentFiber(); if (fibre->fibre == NULL) return 0; } else { fibre->converted = 1; } return 1; } VOID CALLBACK async_start_func_win(PVOID unused) { async_start_func(); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.c0000644000000000000000000000260113176625656020136 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* This must be the first #include file */ #include "../async_locl.h" #ifdef ASYNC_POSIX # include # include #define STACKSIZE 32768 int ASYNC_is_capable(void) { ucontext_t ctx; /* * Some platforms provide getcontext() but it does not work (notably * MacOSX PPC64). Check for a working getcontext(); */ return getcontext(&ctx) == 0; } void async_local_cleanup(void) { } int async_fibre_makecontext(async_fibre *fibre) { fibre->env_init = 0; if (getcontext(&fibre->fibre) == 0) { fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp = OPENSSL_malloc(STACKSIZE); if (fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp != NULL) { fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_size = STACKSIZE; fibre->fibre.uc_link = NULL; makecontext(&fibre->fibre, async_start_func, 0); return 1; } } else { fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp = NULL; } return 0; } void async_fibre_free(async_fibre *fibre) { OPENSSL_free(fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp); fibre->fibre.uc_stack.ss_sp = NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h0000644000000000000000000000255713176625656020155 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OPENSSL_ASYNC_ARCH_ASYNC_POSIX_H #define OPENSSL_ASYNC_ARCH_ASYNC_POSIX_H #include #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_CYGWIN)) \ && defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) \ && !defined(__ANDROID__) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) # include # if _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L # include # define ASYNC_POSIX # define ASYNC_ARCH # include # include # include "e_os.h" typedef struct async_fibre_st { ucontext_t fibre; jmp_buf env; int env_init; } async_fibre; static ossl_inline int async_fibre_swapcontext(async_fibre *o, async_fibre *n, int r) { o->env_init = 1; if (!r || !_setjmp(o->env)) { if (n->env_init) _longjmp(n->env, 1); else setcontext(&n->fibre); } return 1; } # define async_fibre_init_dispatcher(d) int async_fibre_makecontext(async_fibre *fibre); void async_fibre_free(async_fibre *fibre); # endif #endif #endif /* OPENSSL_ASYNC_ARCH_ASYNC_POSIX_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/async/arch/async_win.h0000644000000000000000000000207113176625656017577 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This is the same detection used in cryptlib to set up the thread local * storage that we depend on, so just copy that */ #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC) #include # define ASYNC_WIN # define ASYNC_ARCH # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" typedef struct async_fibre_st { LPVOID fibre; int converted; } async_fibre; # define async_fibre_swapcontext(o,n,r) \ (SwitchToFiber((n)->fibre), 1) # define async_fibre_makecontext(c) \ ((c)->fibre = CreateFiber(0, async_start_func_win, 0)) # define async_fibre_free(f) (DeleteFiber((f)->fibre)) int async_fibre_init_dispatcher(async_fibre *fibre); VOID CALLBACK async_start_func_win(PVOID unused); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014170 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c0000644000000000000000000001552413176625657016145 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "rsa_locl.h" #include RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags) { RSA_METHOD *meth = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*meth)); if (meth != NULL) { meth->flags = flags; meth->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (meth->name != NULL) return meth; OPENSSL_free(meth); } RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth) { if (meth != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(meth->name); OPENSSL_free(meth); } } RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth) { RSA_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret != NULL) { memcpy(ret, meth, sizeof(*meth)); ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(meth->name); if (ret->name != NULL) return ret; OPENSSL_free(ret); } RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } const char *RSA_meth_get0_name(const RSA_METHOD *meth) { return meth->name; } int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name) { char *tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name); if (tmpname == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(meth->name); meth->name = tmpname; return 1; } int RSA_meth_get_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth) { return meth->flags; } int RSA_meth_set_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth, int flags) { meth->flags = flags; return 1; } void *RSA_meth_get0_app_data(const RSA_METHOD *meth) { return meth->app_data; } int RSA_meth_set0_app_data(RSA_METHOD *meth, void *app_data) { meth->app_data = app_data; return 1; } int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return meth->rsa_pub_enc; } int RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_pub_enc = pub_enc; return 1; } int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return meth->rsa_pub_dec; } int RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_pub_dec = pub_dec; return 1; } int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return meth->rsa_priv_enc; } int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc; return 1; } int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return meth->rsa_priv_dec; } int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) { meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec; return 1; } /* Can be null */ int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { return meth->rsa_mod_exp; } int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)) { meth->rsa_mod_exp = mod_exp; return 1; } /* Can be null */ int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { return meth->bn_mod_exp; } int RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)) { meth->bn_mod_exp = bn_mod_exp; return 1; } /* called at new */ int (*RSA_meth_get_init(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa) { return meth->init; } int RSA_meth_set_init(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*init) (RSA *rsa)) { meth->init = init; return 1; } /* called at free */ int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa) { return meth->finish; } int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa)) { meth->finish = finish; return 1; } int (*RSA_meth_get_sign(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) { return meth->rsa_sign; } int RSA_meth_set_sign(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)) { meth->rsa_sign = sign; return 1; } int (*RSA_meth_get_verify(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa) { return meth->rsa_verify; } int RSA_meth_set_verify(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa)) { meth->rsa_verify = verify; return 1; } int (*RSA_meth_get_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb) { return meth->rsa_keygen; } int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)) { meth->rsa_keygen = keygen; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/build.info0000644000000000000000000000050213176625657016141 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \ rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c rsa_null.c \ rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \ rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c0000644000000000000000000002171313176625657016131 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */ /* * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, for problems with the security * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, . The new proof has stronger requirements * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of * one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion. */ #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "rsa_locl.h" int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen) { return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, param, plen, NULL, NULL); } int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) { int i, emlen = tlen - 1; unsigned char *db, *seed; unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; if (md == NULL) md = EVP_sha1(); if (mgf1md == NULL) mgf1md = md; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return 0; } if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } to[0] = 0; seed = to + 1; db = to + mdlen + 1; if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL)) return 0; memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1); db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01; memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen); if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0) return 0; #ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT memcpy(seed, "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f", 20); #endif dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen); if (dbmask == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++) db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; OPENSSL_free(dbmask); return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(dbmask); return 0; } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, int plen) { return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num, param, plen, NULL, NULL); } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, int plen, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) { int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; unsigned int good, found_one_byte; const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb; /* * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em = * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB */ unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; if (md == NULL) md = EVP_sha1(); if (mgf1md == NULL) mgf1md = md; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) return -1; /* * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. * This does not leak any side-channel information. */ if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) goto decoding_err; dblen = num - mdlen - 1; db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen); em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (db == NULL || em == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto cleanup; } /* * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. * * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. */ memset(em, 0, num); memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); /* * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). */ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); maskedseed = em + 1; maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) goto cleanup; for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md)) goto cleanup; for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL)) goto cleanup; good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen)); found_one_byte = 0; for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) { /* * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. */ unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]); one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1, i, one_index); found_one_byte |= equals1; good &= (found_one_byte | equals0); } good &= found_one_byte; /* * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid, * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a * concern. */ if (!good) goto decoding_err; msg_index = one_index + 1; mlen = dblen - msg_index; if (tlen < mlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); mlen = -1; } else { memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen); goto cleanup; } decoding_err: /* * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not * reveal which kind of decoding error happened. */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); cleanup: OPENSSL_clear_free(db, dblen); OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); return mlen; } int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst) { long i, outlen = 0; unsigned char cnt[4]; EVP_MD_CTX *c = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; int rv = -1; if (c == NULL) goto err; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); if (mdlen < 0) goto err; for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255); cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255); cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255; cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, dgst, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, seed, seedlen) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(c, cnt, 4)) goto err; if (outlen + mdlen <= len) { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, mask + outlen, NULL)) goto err; outlen += mdlen; } else { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c, md, NULL)) goto err; memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen); outlen = len; } } rv = 0; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(c); return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.c0000644000000000000000000000505713176625657015714 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int j; unsigned char *p; /* * Absolute minimum amount of padding is 1 header nibble, 1 padding * nibble and 2 trailer bytes: but 1 hash if is already in 'from'. */ j = tlen - flen - 2; if (j < 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return -1; } p = (unsigned char *)to; /* If no padding start and end nibbles are in one byte */ if (j == 0) *p++ = 0x6A; else { *p++ = 0x6B; if (j > 1) { memset(p, 0xBB, j - 1); p += j - 1; } *p++ = 0xBA; } memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); p += flen; *p = 0xCC; return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i = 0, j; const unsigned char *p; p = from; if ((num != flen) || ((*p != 0x6A) && (*p != 0x6B))) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER); return -1; } if (*p++ == 0x6B) { j = flen - 3; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { unsigned char c = *p++; if (c == 0xBA) break; if (c != 0xBB) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING); return -1; } } j -= i; if (i == 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING); return -1; } } else j = flen - 2; if (p[j] != 0xCC) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER); return -1; } memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j); return (j); } /* Translate between X931 hash ids and NIDs */ int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_sha1: return 0x33; case NID_sha256: return 0x34; case NID_sha384: return 0x36; case NID_sha512: return 0x35; } return -1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c0000644000000000000000000000744513176625657015760 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "rsa_locl.h" int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) { return RSA_check_key_ex(key, NULL); } int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m; BN_CTX *ctx; int ret = 1; if (key->p == NULL || key->q == NULL || key->n == NULL || key->e == NULL || key->d == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); return 0; } i = BN_new(); j = BN_new(); k = BN_new(); l = BN_new(); m = BN_new(); ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL || ctx == NULL) { ret = -1; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (BN_is_one(key->e)) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); } if (!BN_is_odd(key->e)) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); } /* p prime? */ if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME); } /* q prime? */ if (BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME); } /* n = p*q? */ if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q); } /* d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */ if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (!BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one())) { ret = -1; goto err; } /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */ if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (!BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */ ret = -1; goto err; } if (!BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (!BN_is_one(i)) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1); } if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) { /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */ if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D); } /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */ if (!BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one())) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D); } /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx)) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0) { ret = 0; RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q); } } err: BN_free(i); BN_free(j); BN_free(k); BN_free(l); BN_free(m); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_null.c0000644000000000000000000000561713176625657016164 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "rsa_locl.h" /* * This is a dummy RSA implementation that just returns errors when called. * It is designed to allow some RSA functions to work while stopping those * covered by the RSA patent. That is RSA, encryption, decryption, signing * and verify is not allowed but RSA key generation, key checking and other * operations (like storing RSA keys) are permitted. */ static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa); static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa); static RSA_METHOD rsa_null_meth = { "Null RSA", RSA_null_public_encrypt, RSA_null_public_decrypt, RSA_null_private_encrypt, RSA_null_private_decrypt, NULL, NULL, RSA_null_init, RSA_null_finish, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void) { return (&rsa_null_meth); } static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED); return -1; } static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED); return -1; } static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED); return -1; } static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED); return -1; } static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa) { return (1); } static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa) { return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c0000644000000000000000000004706713176625657016334 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "rsa_locl.h" /* RSA pkey context structure */ typedef struct { /* Key gen parameters */ int nbits; BIGNUM *pub_exp; /* Keygen callback info */ int gentmp[2]; /* RSA padding mode */ int pad_mode; /* message digest */ const EVP_MD *md; /* message digest for MGF1 */ const EVP_MD *mgf1md; /* PSS salt length */ int saltlen; /* Temp buffer */ unsigned char *tbuf; /* OAEP label */ unsigned char *oaep_label; size_t oaep_labellen; } RSA_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx; rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx)); if (rctx == NULL) return 0; rctx->nbits = 1024; rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; rctx->saltlen = -2; ctx->data = rctx; ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp; ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; return 1; } static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = src->data; dctx = dst->data; dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits; if (sctx->pub_exp) { dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp); if (!dctx->pub_exp) return 0; } dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode; dctx->md = sctx->md; dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md; if (sctx->oaep_label) { OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label); dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen); if (!dctx->oaep_label) return 0; dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen; } return 1; } static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) { if (ctx->tbuf) return 1; ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey)); if (ctx->tbuf == NULL) return 0; return 1; } static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; if (rctx) { BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf); OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label); OPENSSL_free(rctx); } } static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; if (rctx->md) { if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); return -1; } if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) { unsigned int sltmp; if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return -1; ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; ret = sltmp; } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)); ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { unsigned int sltmp; ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; ret = sltmp; } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen)) return -1; ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf, sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); } else return -1; } else ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, rctx->pad_mode); if (ret < 0) return ret; *siglen = ret; return 1; } static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; if (rctx->md) { if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); if (ret < 1) return 0; ret--; if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); return 0; } if (rout) memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret); } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { size_t sltmp; ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); if (ret <= 0) return 0; ret = sltmp; } else return -1; } else ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, rctx->pad_mode); if (ret < 0) return ret; *routlen = ret; return 1; } static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; size_t rslen; if (rctx->md) { if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, rsa); if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); return -1; } if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0) return 0; } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { int ret; if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); if (ret <= 0) return 0; ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen); if (ret <= 0) return 0; return 1; } else return -1; } else { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); if (rslen == 0) return 0; } if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen)) return 0; return 1; } static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen, in, inlen, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) return -1; ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); } else ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, rctx->pad_mode); if (ret < 0) return ret; *outlen = ret; return 1; } static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); if (ret <= 0) return ret; ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf, ret, ret, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md); } else ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, rctx->pad_mode); if (ret < 0) return ret; *outlen = ret; return 1; } static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) { int mdnid; if (!md) return 1; mdnid = EVP_MD_type(md); if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); return 0; } if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); return 0; } } else { switch(mdnid) { /* List of all supported RSA digests */ case NID_sha1: case NID_sha224: case NID_sha256: case NID_sha384: case NID_sha512: case NID_md5: case NID_md5_sha1: case NID_md2: case NID_md4: case NID_mdc2: case NID_ripemd160: return 1; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST); return 0; } } return 1; } static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING: if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) { if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1)) return 0; if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { if (!(ctx->operation & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) goto bad_pad; if (!rctx->md) rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); } if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT)) goto bad_pad; if (!rctx->md) rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); } rctx->pad_mode = p1; return 1; } bad_pad: RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); return -2; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING: *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); return -2; } if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen; else { if (p1 < -2) return -2; rctx->saltlen = p1; } return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS: if (p1 < 512) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return -2; } rctx->nbits = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP: if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -2; } BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); rctx->pub_exp = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD: if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); return -2; } if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; else rctx->md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) return 0; rctx->md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD: if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); return -2; } if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) { if (rctx->mgf1md) *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md; else *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; } else rctx->mgf1md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); return -2; } OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label); if (p2 && p1 > 0) { rctx->oaep_label = p2; rctx->oaep_labellen = p1; } else { rctx->oaep_label = NULL; rctx->oaep_labellen = 0; } return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); return -2; } *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label; return rctx->oaep_labellen; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: return 1; #endif case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return -2; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (!value) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); return 0; } if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) { int pm; if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING; else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) pm = RSA_NO_PADDING; else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) pm = RSA_X931_PADDING; else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; else { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); return -2; } return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm); } if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) { int saltlen; saltlen = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); } if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) { int nbits; nbits = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits); } if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) { int ret; BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL; if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value)) return 0; ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp); if (ret <= 0) BN_free(pubexp); return ret; } if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) { const EVP_MD *md; if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST); return 0; } return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md); } if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) { const EVP_MD *md; if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST); return 0; } return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md); } if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) { unsigned char *lab; long lablen; int ret; lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen); if (!lab) return 0; ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen); if (ret <= 0) OPENSSL_free(lab); return ret; } return -2; } static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { RSA *rsa = NULL; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; BN_GENCB *pcb; int ret; if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) { rctx->pub_exp = BN_new(); if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) return 0; } rsa = RSA_new(); if (rsa == NULL) return 0; if (ctx->pkey_gencb) { pcb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (pcb == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); return 0; } evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); } else pcb = NULL; ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb); BN_GENCB_free(pcb); if (ret > 0) EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); else RSA_free(rsa); return ret; } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, pkey_rsa_init, pkey_rsa_copy, pkey_rsa_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, pkey_rsa_keygen, 0, pkey_rsa_sign, 0, pkey_rsa_verify, 0, pkey_rsa_verifyrecover, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_rsa_encrypt, 0, pkey_rsa_decrypt, 0, 0, pkey_rsa_ctrl, pkey_rsa_ctrl_str }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000700313176625657016137 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include struct rsa_st { /* * The first parameter is used to pickup errors where this is passed * instead of aEVP_PKEY, it is set to 0 */ int pad; long version; const RSA_METHOD *meth; /* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */ ENGINE *engine; BIGNUM *n; BIGNUM *e; BIGNUM *d; BIGNUM *p; BIGNUM *q; BIGNUM *dmp1; BIGNUM *dmq1; BIGNUM *iqmp; /* be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; int references; int flags; /* Used to cache montgomery values */ BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_n; BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_p; BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_q; /* * all BIGNUM values are actually in the following data, if it is not * NULL */ char *bignum_data; BN_BLINDING *blinding; BN_BLINDING *mt_blinding; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct rsa_meth_st { char *name; int (*rsa_pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int (*rsa_pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int (*rsa_priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int (*rsa_priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); /* Can be null */ int (*rsa_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); /* Can be null */ int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); /* called at new */ int (*init) (RSA *rsa); /* called at free */ int (*finish) (RSA *rsa); /* RSA_METHOD_FLAG_* things */ int flags; /* may be needed! */ char *app_data; /* * New sign and verify functions: some libraries don't allow arbitrary * data to be signed/verified: this allows them to be used. Note: for * this to work the RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should * *NOT* be used RSA_sign(), RSA_verify() should be used instead. */ int (*rsa_sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); int (*rsa_verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa); /* * If this callback is NULL, the builtin software RSA key-gen will be * used. This is for behavioural compatibility whilst the code gets * rewired, but one day it would be nice to assume there are no such * things as "builtin software" implementations. */ int (*rsa_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); }; extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c0000644000000000000000000000527513176625657016157 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING sig; int i, j, ret = 1; unsigned char *p, *s; sig.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; sig.length = m_len; sig.data = (unsigned char *)m; i = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, NULL); j = RSA_size(rsa); if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); return (0); } s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1); if (s == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } p = s; i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, &p); i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (i <= 0) ret = 0; else *siglen = i; OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)j + 1); return (ret); } int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa) { int i, ret = 0; unsigned char *s; const unsigned char *p; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sig = NULL; if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); return (0); } s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen); if (s == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (i <= 0) goto err; p = s; sig = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p, (long)i); if (sig == NULL) goto err; if (((unsigned int)sig->length != m_len) || (memcmp(m, sig->data, m_len) != 0)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); } else ret = 1; err: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(sig); OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)siglen); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c0000644000000000000000000000476313176625657016014 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int i, j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen - 11)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } p = (unsigned char *)to; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with non-zero random data */ j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen; if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (*p == '\0') do { if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0) return (0); } while (*p == '\0'); p++; } memset(p, 3, 8); p += 8; *(p++) = '\0'; memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i, j, k; const unsigned char *p; p = from; if (flen < 10) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); return (-1); } if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02); return (-1); } /* scan over padding data */ j = flen - 1; /* one for type */ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) if (*(p++) == 0) break; if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); return (-1); } for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) { if (p[k] != 0x03) break; } if (k == -1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK); return (-1); } i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */ j -= i; if (j > tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); return (-1); } memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j); return (j); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c0000644000000000000000000001423613176625657015755 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include #include "rsa_locl.h" RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); } const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->meth; } int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) { /* * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. */ const RSA_METHOD *mtmp; mtmp = rsa->meth; if (mtmp->finish) mtmp->finish(rsa); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); rsa->engine = NULL; #endif rsa->meth = meth; if (meth->init) meth->init(rsa); return 1; } RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) { RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; if (engine) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } ret->engine = engine; } else ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA(); if (ret->engine) { ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); if (ret->meth == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } } #endif ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { goto err; } if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); goto err; } return ret; err: RSA_free(ret); return NULL; } void RSA_free(RSA *r) { int i; if (r == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); if (r->meth->finish) r->meth->finish(r); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(r->engine); #endif CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); BN_clear_free(r->n); BN_clear_free(r->e); BN_clear_free(r->d); BN_clear_free(r->p); BN_clear_free(r->q); BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data); OPENSSL_free(r); } int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx)); } int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) { return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(rsa->n), -1); } int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) { /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). */ if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) return 0; if (n != NULL) { BN_free(r->n); r->n = n; } if (e != NULL) { BN_free(r->e); r->e = e; } if (d != NULL) { BN_free(r->d); r->d = d; } return 1; } int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) { /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input * parameters MUST be non-NULL. */ if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) return 0; if (p != NULL) { BN_free(r->p); r->p = p; } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(r->q); r->q = q; } return 1; } int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) { /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input * parameters MUST be non-NULL. */ if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) return 0; if (dmp1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmp1); r->dmp1 = dmp1; } if (dmq1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmq1); r->dmq1 = dmq1; } if (iqmp != NULL) { BN_free(r->iqmp); r->iqmp = iqmp; } return 1; } void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) { if (n != NULL) *n = r->n; if (e != NULL) *e = r->e; if (d != NULL) *d = r->d; } void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) { if (p != NULL) *p = r->p; if (q != NULL) *q = r->q; } void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp) { if (dmp1 != NULL) *dmp1 = r->dmp1; if (dmq1 != NULL) *dmq1 = r->dmq1; if (iqmp != NULL) *iqmp = r->iqmp; } void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) { r->flags &= ~flags; } int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags) { return r->flags & flags; } void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags) { r->flags |= flags; } ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) { return r->engine; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c0000644000000000000000000001554513176625657016020 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "rsa_locl.h" static const unsigned char zeroes[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_) # pragma optimize("g", off) #endif int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM, int sLen) { return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen); } int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, const unsigned char *EM, int sLen) { int i; int ret = 0; int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen; const unsigned char *H; unsigned char *DB = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (ctx == NULL) goto err; if (mgf1Hash == NULL) mgf1Hash = Hash; hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash); if (hLen < 0) goto err; /*- * Negative sLen has special meanings: * -1 sLen == hLen * -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature * -N reserved */ if (sLen == -1) sLen = hLen; else if (sLen == -2) sLen = -2; else if (sLen < -2) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED); goto err; } MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7; emLen = RSA_size(rsa); if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID); goto err; } if (MSBits == 0) { EM++; emLen--; } if (emLen < hLen + 2) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID); goto err; } maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1; H = EM + maskedDBLen; DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen); if (DB == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++) DB[i] ^= EM[i]; if (MSBits) DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits); for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) ; if (DB[i++] != 0x1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED); goto err; } if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen)) goto err; if (maskedDBLen - i) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H_, NULL)) goto err; if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ret = 0; } else ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(DB); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen) { return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen); } int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, int sLen) { int i; int ret = 0; int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen; unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (mgf1Hash == NULL) mgf1Hash = Hash; hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash); if (hLen < 0) goto err; /*- * Negative sLen has special meanings: * -1 sLen == hLen * -2 salt length is maximized * -N reserved */ if (sLen == -1) sLen = hLen; else if (sLen == -2) sLen = -2; else if (sLen < -2) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED); goto err; } MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7; emLen = RSA_size(rsa); if (MSBits == 0) { *EM++ = 0; emLen--; } if (emLen < hLen + 2) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); goto err; } if (sLen == -2) { sLen = emLen - hLen - 2; } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); goto err; } if (sLen > 0) { salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen); if (salt == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (RAND_bytes(salt, sLen) <= 0) goto err; } maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1; H = EM + maskedDBLen; ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen)) goto err; if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, sLen)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H, NULL)) goto err; /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */ if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash)) goto err; p = EM; /* * Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update pointer. * Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to be non-negative. */ p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2; *p++ ^= 0x1; if (sLen > 0) { for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++) *p++ ^= salt[i]; } if (MSBits) EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits); /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */ EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(salt); return ret; } #if defined(_MSC_VER) # pragma optimize("",on) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_x931g.c0000644000000000000000000001123013176625657016051 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "rsa_locl.h" /* X9.31 RSA key derivation and generation */ int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1, BIGNUM *q2, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xq1, const BIGNUM *Xq2, const BIGNUM *Xq, const BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx2 = NULL; int ret = 0; if (!rsa) goto err; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (r3 == NULL) goto err; if (!rsa->e) { rsa->e = BN_dup(e); if (!rsa->e) goto err; } else e = rsa->e; /* * If not all parameters present only calculate what we can. This allows * test programs to output selective parameters. */ if (Xp && rsa->p == NULL) { rsa->p = BN_new(); if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(rsa->p, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb)) goto err; } if (Xq && rsa->q == NULL) { rsa->q = BN_new(); if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(rsa->q, q1, q2, Xq, Xq1, Xq2, e, ctx, cb)) goto err; } if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return 2; } /* * Since both primes are set we can now calculate all remaining * components. */ /* calculate n */ rsa->n = BN_new(); if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* calculate d */ if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ if (!BN_gcd(r3, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, r0, r3, ctx)) goto err; /* LCM((p-1)(q-1)) */ ctx2 = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err; rsa->d = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, rsa->e, r0, ctx2); /* d */ if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err; /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ rsa->dmp1 = BN_new(); if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, r1, ctx)) goto err; /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ rsa->dmq1 = BN_new(); if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, r2, ctx)) goto err; /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ rsa->iqmp = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx2); ret = 1; err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx2); return ret; } int RSA_X931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb) { int ok = 0; BIGNUM *Xp = NULL, *Xq = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto error; BN_CTX_start(ctx); Xp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Xq = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Xq == NULL) goto error; if (!BN_X931_generate_Xpq(Xp, Xq, bits, ctx)) goto error; rsa->p = BN_new(); rsa->q = BN_new(); if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL) goto error; /* Generate two primes from Xp, Xq */ if (!BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, Xp, e, ctx, cb)) goto error; if (!BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, Xq, e, ctx, cb)) goto error; /* * Since rsa->p and rsa->q are valid this call will just derive remaining * RSA components. */ if (!RSA_X931_derive_ex(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, cb)) goto error; ok = 1; error: if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (ok) return 1; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c0000644000000000000000000002226213176625657015775 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD), "check_padding_md"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1), "encode_pkcs1"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY), "int_rsa_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "old_rsa_priv_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL), "pkey_rsa_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR), "pkey_rsa_ctrl_str"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN), "pkey_rsa_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY), "pkey_rsa_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER), "pkey_rsa_verifyrecover"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD), "rsa_algor_to_md"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN), "rsa_builtin_keygen"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX), "RSA_check_key_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT), "rsa_cms_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "rsa_item_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP), "RSA_meth_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW), "RSA_meth_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME), "RSA_meth_set1_name"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD), "rsa_mgf1_to_md"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD), "RSA_new_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL), "RSA_NULL"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_null_private_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_private_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_null_public_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_public_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_encrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931), "RSA_padding_add_X931"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE), "RSA_padding_check_none"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931), "RSA_padding_check_X931"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT), "RSA_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP), "RSA_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "rsa_priv_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX), "rsa_pss_to_ctx"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "rsa_pub_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH), "algorithm mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE), "bad e value"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT), "bad fixed header decrypt"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT), "bad pad byte count"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01), "block type is not 01"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02), "block type is not 02"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN), "data greater than mod len"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE), "data too large for key size"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS), "data too large for modulus"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL), "data too small"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE), "data too small for key size"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH), "digest does not match"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY), "digest too big for rsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmp1 not congruent to d"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmq1 not congruent to d"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1), "d e not congruent to 1"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID), "first octet invalid"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE), "illegal or unsupported padding mode"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH), "invalid digest length"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER), "invalid header"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL), "invalid label"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH), "invalid message length"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS), "invalid oaep parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE), "invalid padding mode"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS), "invalid pss parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN), "invalid pss saltlen"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH), "invalid salt length"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER), "invalid trailer"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST), "invalid x931 digest"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q), "iqmp not inverse of q"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING), "null before block missing"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q), "n does not equal p q"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR), "oaep decoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE), "operation not supported for this keytype"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED), "padding check failed"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR), "pkcs decoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME), "p not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED), "rsa operations not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED), "salt length check failed"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED), "salt length recovery failed"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK), "sslv3 rollback attack"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD), "the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE), "unknown algorithm type"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST), "unknown mask digest"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE), "unknown padding type"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE), "unsupported encryption type"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE), "unsupported label source"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM), "unsupported mask algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER), "unsupported mask parameter"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE), "unsupported signature type"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_RSA_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(RSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c0000644000000000000000000001737213176625657016153 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/x509_int.h" #include "rsa_locl.h" /* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ #define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 /* * encode_pkcs1 encodes a DigestInfo prefix of hash |type| and digest |m|, as * described in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE, RFC 3447 section 9.2 step 2. This * encodes the DigestInfo (T and tLen) but does not add the padding. * * On success, it returns one and sets |*out| to a newly allocated buffer * containing the result and |*out_len| to its length. The caller must free * |*out| with |OPENSSL_free|. Otherwise, it returns zero. */ static int encode_pkcs1(unsigned char **out, int *out_len, int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len) { X509_SIG sig; X509_ALGOR algor; ASN1_TYPE parameter; ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; uint8_t *der = NULL; int len; sig.algor = &algor; sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); return 0; } if (OBJ_length(sig.algor->algorithm) == 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD); return 0; } parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; parameter.value.ptr = NULL; sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; sig.digest = &digest; sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; sig.digest->length = m_len; len = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &der); if (len < 0) return 0; *out = der; *out_len = len; return 1; } int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa) { int encrypt_len, encoded_len = 0, ret = 0; unsigned char *tmps = NULL; const unsigned char *encoded = NULL; if (rsa->meth->rsa_sign) { return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa); } /* Compute the encoded digest. */ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) { /* * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. */ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); return 0; } encoded_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; encoded = m; } else { if (!encode_pkcs1(&tmps, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len)) goto err; encoded = tmps; } if (encoded_len > RSA_size(rsa) - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); goto err; } encrypt_len = RSA_private_encrypt(encoded_len, encoded, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (encrypt_len <= 0) goto err; *siglen = encrypt_len; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(tmps, (size_t)encoded_len); return ret; } /* * int_rsa_verify verifies an RSA signature in |sigbuf| using |rsa|. It may be * called in two modes. If |rm| is NULL, it verifies the signature for digest * |m|. Otherwise, it recovers the digest from the signature, writing the digest * to |rm| and the length to |*prm_len|. |type| is the NID of the digest * algorithm to use. It returns one on successful verification and zero * otherwise. */ int int_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) { int decrypt_len, ret = 0, encoded_len = 0; unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL, *encoded = NULL; if (siglen != (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); return 0; } /* Recover the encoded digest. */ decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (decrypt_buf == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } decrypt_len = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, decrypt_buf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (decrypt_len <= 0) goto err; if (type == NID_md5_sha1) { /* * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. */ if (decrypt_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } if (rm != NULL) { memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf, SSL_SIG_LENGTH); *prm_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; } else { if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); goto err; } if (memcmp(decrypt_buf, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH) != 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } } } else if (type == NID_mdc2 && decrypt_len == 2 + 16 && decrypt_buf[0] == 0x04 && decrypt_buf[1] == 0x10) { /* * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct * tag and length octets. */ if (rm != NULL) { memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf + 2, 16); *prm_len = 16; } else { if (m_len != 16) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); goto err; } if (memcmp(m, decrypt_buf + 2, 16) != 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } } } else { /* * If recovering the digest, extract a digest-sized output from the end * of |decrypt_buf| for |encode_pkcs1|, then compare the decryption * output as in a standard verification. */ if (rm != NULL) { const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(type); if (md == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); goto err; } m_len = EVP_MD_size(md); if (m_len > (size_t)decrypt_len) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto err; } m = decrypt_buf + decrypt_len - m_len; } /* Construct the encoded digest and ensure it matches. */ if (!encode_pkcs1(&encoded, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len)) goto err; if (encoded_len != decrypt_len || memcmp(encoded, decrypt_buf, encoded_len) != 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } /* Output the recovered digest. */ if (rm != NULL) { memcpy(rm, m, m_len); *prm_len = m_len; } } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(encoded, (size_t)encoded_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(decrypt_buf, siglen); return ret; } int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa) { if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify) { return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa); } return int_rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_prn.c0000644000000000000000000000202713176625657016001 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *x, int off) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = RSA_print(b, x, off); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off) { EVP_PKEY *pk; int ret; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pk == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, (RSA *)x)) return 0; ret = EVP_PKEY_print_private(bp, pk, off, NULL); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_depr.c0000644000000000000000000000273213176625657016137 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * NB: This file contains deprecated functions (compatibility wrappers to the * "new" versions). */ #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include # include RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg) { int i; BN_GENCB *cb = BN_GENCB_new(); RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); BIGNUM *e = BN_new(); if (cb == NULL || rsa == NULL || e == NULL) goto err; /* * The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG, unsigned long * can be larger */ for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(unsigned long) * 8; i++) { if (e_value & (1UL << i)) if (BN_set_bit(e, i) == 0) goto err; } BN_GENCB_set_old(cb, callback, cb_arg); if (RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e, cb)) { BN_free(e); BN_GENCB_free(cb); return rsa; } err: BN_free(e); RSA_free(rsa); BN_GENCB_free(cb); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c0000644000000000000000000001464713176625657015710 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } p = (unsigned char *)to; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with 0xff data */ j = tlen - 3 - flen; memset(p, 0xff, j); p += j; *(p++) = '\0'; memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i, j; const unsigned char *p; p = from; /* * The format is * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF * D - data. */ if (num < 11) return -1; /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */ if (num == flen) { if ((*p++) != 0x00) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING); return -1; } flen--; } if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 0x01)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01); return (-1); } /* scan over padding data */ j = flen - 1; /* one for type. */ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (*p != 0xff) { /* should decrypt to 0xff */ if (*p == 0) { p++; break; } else { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT); return (-1); } } p++; } if (i == j) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); return (-1); } if (i < 8) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT); return (-1); } i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */ j -= i; if (j > tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); return (-1); } memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j); return (j); } int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int i, j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen - 11)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } p = (unsigned char *)to; *(p++) = 0; *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with non-zero random data */ j = tlen - 3 - flen; if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (*p == '\0') do { if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0) return (0); } while (*p == '\0'); p++; } *(p++) = '\0'; memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen); return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i; /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */ unsigned char *em = NULL; unsigned int good, found_zero_byte; int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1; if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0) return -1; /* * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard", * section 7.2.2. */ if (flen > num) goto err; if (num < 11) goto err; em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num); if (em == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } /* * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. * * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. */ memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); found_zero_byte = 0; for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); found_zero_byte |= equals0; } /* * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check * also fails. */ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8); /* * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. */ msg_index = zero_index + 1; mlen = num - msg_index; /* * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding. */ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen)); /* * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing * information at the API boundary. */ if (!good) { mlen = -1; goto err; } memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen); err: OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); if (mlen == -1) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR); return mlen; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c0000644000000000000000000001304013176625657015750 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. - * Geoff */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "rsa_locl.h" static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb); /* * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD. */ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen) return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); } static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp; int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; /* * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck * continually regenerating the same prime values. */ if (bits < 16) { ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (r3 == NULL) goto err; bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2; bitsq = bits - bitsp; /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) goto err; /* generate p and q */ for (;;) { if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_one(r1)) break; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; for (;;) { do { if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) goto err; } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0); if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_one(r1)) break; if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) { tmp = rsa->p; rsa->p = rsa->q; rsa->q = tmp; } /* calculate n */ if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* calculate d */ if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ { BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new(); if (pr0 == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) { BN_free(pr0); goto err; /* d */ } /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */ BN_free(pr0); } { BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); if (d == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if ( /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx) /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) { BN_free(d); goto err; } /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ BN_free(d); } { BIGNUM *p = BN_new(); if (p == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) { BN_free(p); goto err; } /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */ BN_free(p); } ok = 1; err: if (ok == -1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN); ok = 0; } if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ok; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c0000644000000000000000000001043613176625657016155 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include #include "rsa_locl.h" int RSA_bits(const RSA *r) { return (BN_num_bits(r->n)); } int RSA_size(const RSA *r) { return (BN_num_bytes(r->n)); } int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)); } int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)); } int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)); } int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)); } int RSA_flags(const RSA *r) { return ((r == NULL) ? 0 : r->meth->flags); } void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa) { BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding); rsa->blinding = NULL; rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING; rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING; } int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; if (rsa->blinding != NULL) RSA_blinding_off(rsa); rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); if (rsa->blinding == NULL) goto err; rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING; rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING; ret = 1; err: return (ret); } static BIGNUM *rsa_get_public_exp(const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *ret = NULL, *r0, *r1, *r2; if (d == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL) return NULL; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (r2 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one())) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err; ret = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, d, r0, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx) { BIGNUM *e; BN_CTX *ctx; BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; if (in_ctx == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; } else ctx = in_ctx; BN_CTX_start(ctx); e = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (e == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (rsa->e == NULL) { e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx); if (e == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); goto err; } } else e = rsa->e; if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && bn_get_words(rsa->d) != NULL) { /* * if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as * unpredictable seed */ RAND_add(bn_get_words(rsa->d), bn_get_dmax(rsa->d) * sizeof(BN_ULONG), 0.0); } { BIGNUM *n = BN_new(); if (n == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx, rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n); /* We MUST free n before any further use of rsa->n */ BN_free(n); } if (ret == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(ret); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx != in_ctx) BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (e != rsa->e) BN_free(e); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c0000644000000000000000000005574513176625657016201 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include "rsa_locl.h" static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa); static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa); static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = { "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA", rsa_ossl_public_encrypt, rsa_ossl_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ rsa_ossl_private_encrypt, /* signing */ rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, rsa_ossl_mod_exp, BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery * if e == 3 */ rsa_ossl_init, rsa_ossl_finish, RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */ NULL, 0, /* rsa_sign */ 0, /* rsa_verify */ NULL /* rsa_keygen */ }; static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth; void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth) { default_RSA_meth = meth; } const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void) { return default_RSA_meth; } const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void) { return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth; } static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); break; case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) goto err; if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; /* * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the * modulus */ j = BN_num_bytes(ret); i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) to[k] = 0; r = num; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); return (r); } static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_BLINDING *ret; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rsa->lock); if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); } ret = rsa->blinding; if (ret == NULL) goto err; if (BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(ret)) { /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ *local = 1; } else { /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ /* * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING */ *local = 0; if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); } ret = rsa->mt_blinding; } err: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rsa->lock); return ret; } static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (unblind == NULL) /* * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. */ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); else { /* * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. */ int ret; BN_BLINDING_lock(b); ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); BN_BLINDING_unlock(b); return ret; } } static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe * to access the blinding without a lock. */ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); } /* signing */ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) goto err; if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); if (d == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) { BN_free(d); goto err; } if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { BN_free(d); goto err; } /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ BN_free(d); } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) res = f; else res = ret; } else res = ret; /* * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the * modulus */ j = BN_num_bytes(res); i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) to[k] = 0; r = num; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); return (r); } static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int j, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } /* make data into a big number */ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } /* do the decrypt */ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); if (d == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) { BN_free(d); goto err; } if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { BN_free(d); goto err; } /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ BN_free(d); } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; p = buf; j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); break; case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); break; case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); return (r); } /* signature verification */ static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int i, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12)) if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err; p = buf; i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); return (r); } static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; int ret = 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (vrfy == NULL) goto err; { BIGNUM *p = BN_new(), *q = BN_new(); /* * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ if (p == NULL || q == NULL) { BN_free(p); BN_free(q); goto err; } BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_p, rsa->lock, p, ctx) || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, rsa->lock, q, ctx)) { BN_free(p); BN_free(q); goto err; } } /* * We MUST free p and q before any further use of rsa->p and rsa->q */ BN_free(p); BN_free(q); } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; /* compute I mod q */ { BIGNUM *c = BN_new(); if (c == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) { BN_free(c); goto err; } { BIGNUM *dmq1 = BN_new(); if (dmq1 == NULL) { BN_free(c); goto err; } BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) { BN_free(c); BN_free(dmq1); goto err; } /* We MUST free dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */ BN_free(dmq1); } /* compute I mod p */ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) { BN_free(c); goto err; } /* We MUST free c before any further use of I */ BN_free(c); } { BIGNUM *dmp1 = BN_new(); if (dmp1 == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) { BN_free(dmp1); goto err; } /* We MUST free dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */ BN_free(dmp1); } if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) goto err; /* * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) goto err; { BIGNUM *pr1 = BN_new(); if (pr1 == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) { BN_free(pr1); goto err; } /* We MUST free pr1 before any further use of r1 */ BN_free(pr1); } /* * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can * break the private key operations: the following second correction * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) goto err; if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; /* * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for * absolute equality, just congruency. */ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { /* * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and * return that instead. */ BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); if (d == NULL) goto err; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { BN_free(d); goto err; } /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ BN_free(d); } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); } static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa) { rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; return (1); } static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000000502513176625657016045 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "rsa_locl.h" /* Override the default free and new methods */ static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg) { if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)RSA_new(); if (*pval != NULL) return 2; return 0; } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) { RSA_free((RSA *)*pval); *pval = NULL; return 2; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, d, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, p, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPrivateKey) ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPublicKey, rsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPublicKey) ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, maskGenAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,1), ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, saltLength, ASN1_INTEGER,2), ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, trailerField, ASN1_INTEGER,3) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS) = { ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, hashFunc, X509_ALGOR, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, maskGenFunc, X509_ALGOR, 1), ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, pSourceFunc, X509_ALGOR, 2), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPrivateKey, RSAPrivateKey) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPublicKey, RSAPublicKey) RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), rsa); } RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), rsa); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c0000644000000000000000000005664313176625657016315 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "rsa_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si); static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si); static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); #endif static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc); if (penclen <= 0) return 0; if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen)) return 1; OPENSSL_free(penc); return 0; } static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p; int pklen; RSA *rsa = NULL; if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey)) return 0; if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); return 1; } static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0 || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { RSA *rsa; if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); return 1; } static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder); } static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { unsigned char *rk = NULL; int rklen; rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk); if (rklen <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p; int pklen; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8)) return 0; return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen); } static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa); } static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n); } static int rsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return RSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa); } static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa); } static int do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv) { char *str; const char *s; int ret = 0, mod_len = 0; if (x->n != NULL) mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n); if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; if (priv && x->d) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) goto err; str = "modulus:"; s = "publicExponent:"; } else { if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) goto err; str = "Modulus:"; s = "Exponent:"; } if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off)) goto err; if (priv) { if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, NULL, off)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: return (ret); } static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0); } static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1); } /* Given an MGF1 Algorithm ID decode to an Algorithm Identifier */ static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg) { if (alg == NULL) return NULL; if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) return NULL; return ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), alg->parameter); } static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) { RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; *pmaskHash = NULL; pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), alg->parameter); if (!pss) return NULL; *pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); return pss; } static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent) { int rv = 0; if (!pss) { if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0) goto err; if (pss->hashAlgorithm) { if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) goto err; } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0) goto err; if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) { if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0) goto err; if (maskHash) { if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0) goto err; } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) goto err; } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) goto err; BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0) goto err; if (pss->saltLength) { if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0) goto err; } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) goto err; BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0) goto err; if (pss->trailerField) { if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0) goto err; } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) goto err; BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); rv = 1; err: return rv; } static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) { int rv; RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; X509_ALGOR *maskHash; pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent); RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); if (!rv) return 0; } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) return 0; if (sig) return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent); return 1; } static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL; switch (op) { case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg); break; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: if (arg1 == 0) PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) return rsa_cms_sign(arg2); else if (arg1 == 1) return rsa_cms_verify(arg2); break; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE: if (arg1 == 0) return rsa_cms_encrypt(arg2); else if (arg1 == 1) return rsa_cms_decrypt(arg2); break; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE: *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS; return 1; #endif case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; return 1; default: return -2; } if (alg) X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0); return 1; } /* allocate and set algorithm ID from EVP_MD, default SHA1 */ static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md) { if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1) return 1; *palg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (*palg == NULL) return 0; X509_ALGOR_set_md(*palg, md); return 1; } /* Allocate and set MGF1 algorithm ID from EVP_MD */ static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) { X509_ALGOR *algtmp = NULL; ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL; *palg = NULL; if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1) return 1; /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */ if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&algtmp, mgf1md)) goto err; if (!ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp)) goto err; *palg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (*palg == NULL) goto err; X509_ALGOR_set0(*palg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp); stmp = NULL; err: ASN1_STRING_free(stmp); X509_ALGOR_free(algtmp); if (*palg) return 1; return 0; } /* convert algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */ static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg) { const EVP_MD *md; if (!alg) return EVP_sha1(); md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm); if (md == NULL) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); return md; } /* convert MGF1 algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */ static const EVP_MD *rsa_mgf1_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR *maskHash) { const EVP_MD *md; if (!alg) return EVP_sha1(); /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM); return NULL; } if (!maskHash) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER); return NULL; } md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm); if (md == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST); return NULL; } return md; } /* * Convert EVP_PKEY_CTX is PSS mode into corresponding algorithm parameter, * suitable for setting an AlgorithmIdentifier. */ static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) { const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md; RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL; ASN1_STRING *os = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx); int saltlen, rv = 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen)) goto err; if (saltlen == -1) saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd); else if (saltlen == -2) { saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2; if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0) saltlen--; } pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new(); if (pss == NULL) goto err; if (saltlen != 20) { pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (pss->saltLength == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen)) goto err; } if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd)) goto err; if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&pss->maskGenAlgorithm, mgf1md)) goto err; /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */ if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os)) goto err; rv = 1; err: RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); if (rv) return os; ASN1_STRING_free(os); return NULL; } /* * From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. If pkey isn't NULL * then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initialised. If it is NULL parameters are * passed to pkctx instead. */ static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx, X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { int rv = -1; int saltlen; const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL; RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; X509_ALGOR *maskHash; /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return -1; } /* Decode PSS parameters */ pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash); if (pss == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); goto err; } mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, maskHash); if (!mgf1md) goto err; md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm); if (!md) goto err; if (pss->saltLength) { saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); /* * Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA * routines will trap other invalid values anyway. */ if (saltlen < 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); goto err; } } else saltlen = 20; /* * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway. */ if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER); goto err; } /* We have all parameters now set up context */ if (pkey) { if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey)) goto err; } else { const EVP_MD *checkmd; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &checkmd) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_MD_type(md) != EVP_MD_type(checkmd)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH); goto err; } } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0) goto err; /* Carry on */ rv = 1; err: RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); return rv; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { int nid, nid2; X509_ALGOR *alg; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si); CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg); nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm); if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption) return 1; if (nid == NID_rsassaPss) return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL); /* Workaround for some implementation that use a signature OID */ if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, NULL, &nid2)) { if (nid2 == NID_rsaEncryption) return 1; } return 0; } #endif /* * Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS. */ static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return -1; } if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) { /* Carry on */ return 2; } return -1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si) { int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; X509_ALGOR *alg; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si); ASN1_STRING *os = NULL; CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg); if (pkctx) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) return 0; } if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0); return 1; } /* We don't support it */ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) return 0; os = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx); if (!os) return 0; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os); return 1; } #endif static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig) { int pad_mode; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) return 0; if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return 2; if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL; os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx); if (!os1) return 0; /* Duplicate parameters if we have to */ if (alg2) { ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1); if (!os2) { ASN1_STRING_free(os1); return 0; } X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2); } X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1); return 3; } return 2; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) { RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *pss; *pmaskHash = NULL; pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS), alg->parameter); if (!pss) return NULL; *pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenFunc); return pss; } static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx; X509_ALGOR *cmsalg; int nid; int rv = -1; unsigned char *label = NULL; int labellen = 0; const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL; RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep; X509_ALGOR *maskHash; pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pkctx) return 0; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &cmsalg)) return -1; nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cmsalg->algorithm); if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption) return 1; if (nid != NID_rsaesOaep) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE); return -1; } /* Decode OAEP parameters */ oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg, &maskHash); if (oaep == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS); goto err; } mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(oaep->maskGenFunc, maskHash); if (!mgf1md) goto err; md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->hashFunc); if (!md) goto err; if (oaep->pSourceFunc) { X509_ALGOR *plab = oaep->pSourceFunc; if (OBJ_obj2nid(plab->algorithm) != NID_pSpecified) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE); goto err; } if (plab->parameter->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL); goto err; } label = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data; /* Stop label being freed when OAEP parameters are freed */ plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data = NULL; labellen = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->length; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, md) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0) goto err; /* Carry on */ rv = 1; err: RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep); X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash); return rv; } static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { const EVP_MD *md, *mgf1md; RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep = NULL; ASN1_STRING *os = NULL; X509_ALGOR *alg; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, rv = 0, labellen; unsigned char *label; CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &alg); if (pkctx) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0) return 0; } if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0); return 1; } /* Not supported */ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, &md) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0) goto err; labellen = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, &label); if (labellen < 0) goto err; oaep = RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new(); if (oaep == NULL) goto err; if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&oaep->hashFunc, md)) goto err; if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&oaep->maskGenFunc, mgf1md)) goto err; if (labellen > 0) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *los; oaep->pSourceFunc = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (oaep->pSourceFunc == NULL) goto err; los = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (los == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(los, label, labellen)) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(los); goto err; } X509_ALGOR_set0(oaep->pSourceFunc, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pSpecified), V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, los); } /* create string with pss parameter encoding. */ if (!ASN1_item_pack(oaep, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS), &os)) goto err; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaesOaep), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os); os = NULL; rv = 1; err: RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep); ASN1_STRING_free(os); return rv; } #endif const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2] = { { EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_RSA, ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL, "RSA", "OpenSSL RSA method", rsa_pub_decode, rsa_pub_encode, rsa_pub_cmp, rsa_pub_print, rsa_priv_decode, rsa_priv_encode, rsa_priv_print, int_rsa_size, rsa_bits, rsa_security_bits, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, rsa_sig_print, int_rsa_free, rsa_pkey_ctrl, old_rsa_priv_decode, old_rsa_priv_encode, rsa_item_verify, rsa_item_sign}, { EVP_PKEY_RSA2, EVP_PKEY_RSA, ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS} }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/rsa/rsa_none.c0000644000000000000000000000225613176625657016145 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { if (flen > tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } if (flen < tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return (0); } memcpy(to, from, (unsigned int)flen); return (1); } int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { if (flen > tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); return (-1); } memset(to, 0, tlen - flen); memcpy(to + tlen - flen, from, flen); return (tlen); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014611 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/chacha_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000716613176625656017023 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Adapted from the public domain code by D. Bernstein from SUPERCOP. */ #include #include "internal/chacha.h" typedef unsigned int u32; typedef unsigned char u8; typedef union { u32 u[16]; u8 c[64]; } chacha_buf; # define ROTATE(v, n) (((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n)))) # define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) do { \ (p)[0] = (u8)(v >> 0); \ (p)[1] = (u8)(v >> 8); \ (p)[2] = (u8)(v >> 16); \ (p)[3] = (u8)(v >> 24); \ } while(0) /* QUARTERROUND updates a, b, c, d with a ChaCha "quarter" round. */ # define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) ( \ x[a] += x[b], x[d] = ROTATE((x[d] ^ x[a]),16), \ x[c] += x[d], x[b] = ROTATE((x[b] ^ x[c]),12), \ x[a] += x[b], x[d] = ROTATE((x[d] ^ x[a]), 8), \ x[c] += x[d], x[b] = ROTATE((x[b] ^ x[c]), 7) ) /* chacha_core performs 20 rounds of ChaCha on the input words in * |input| and writes the 64 output bytes to |output|. */ static void chacha20_core(chacha_buf *output, const u32 input[16]) { u32 x[16]; int i; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = { 1 }; memcpy(x, input, sizeof(x)); for (i = 20; i > 0; i -= 2) { QUARTERROUND(0, 4, 8, 12); QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13); QUARTERROUND(2, 6, 10, 14); QUARTERROUND(3, 7, 11, 15); QUARTERROUND(0, 5, 10, 15); QUARTERROUND(1, 6, 11, 12); QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13); QUARTERROUND(3, 4, 9, 14); } if (is_endian.little) { for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) output->u[i] = x[i] + input[i]; } else { for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) U32TO8_LITTLE(output->c + 4 * i, (x[i] + input[i])); } } void ChaCha20_ctr32(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp, size_t len, const unsigned int key[8], const unsigned int counter[4]) { u32 input[16]; chacha_buf buf; size_t todo, i; /* sigma constant "expand 32-byte k" in little-endian encoding */ input[0] = ((u32)'e') | ((u32)'x'<<8) | ((u32)'p'<<16) | ((u32)'a'<<24); input[1] = ((u32)'n') | ((u32)'d'<<8) | ((u32)' '<<16) | ((u32)'3'<<24); input[2] = ((u32)'2') | ((u32)'-'<<8) | ((u32)'b'<<16) | ((u32)'y'<<24); input[3] = ((u32)'t') | ((u32)'e'<<8) | ((u32)' '<<16) | ((u32)'k'<<24); input[4] = key[0]; input[5] = key[1]; input[6] = key[2]; input[7] = key[3]; input[8] = key[4]; input[9] = key[5]; input[10] = key[6]; input[11] = key[7]; input[12] = counter[0]; input[13] = counter[1]; input[14] = counter[2]; input[15] = counter[3]; while (len > 0) { todo = sizeof(buf); if (len < todo) todo = len; chacha20_core(&buf, input); for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) out[i] = inp[i] ^ buf.c[i]; out += todo; inp += todo; len -= todo; /* * Advance 32-bit counter. Note that as subroutine is so to * say nonce-agnostic, this limited counter width doesn't * prevent caller from implementing wider counter. It would * simply take two calls split on counter overflow... */ input[12]++; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/build.info0000644000000000000000000000123613176625656016567 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]={- $target{chacha_asm_src} -} GENERATE[chacha-x86.s]=asm/chacha-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) GENERATE[chacha-x86_64.s]=asm/chacha-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[chacha-ppc.s]=asm/chacha-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[chacha-armv4.S]=asm/chacha-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[chacha-armv4.o]=.. GENERATE[chacha-armv8.S]=asm/chacha-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[chacha-armv8.o]=.. BEGINRAW[Makefile(unix)] ##### CHACHA assembler implementations {- $builddir -}/chacha-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/chacha-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ENDRAW[Makefile(unix)] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656015371 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-c64xplus.pl0000755000000000000000000006245313176625656020640 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # ChaCha20 for C64x+. # # October 2015 # # Performance is 3.54 cycles per processed byte, which is ~4.3 times # faster than code generated by TI compiler. Compiler also disables # interrupts for some reason, thus making interrupt response time # dependent on input length. This module on the other hand is free # from such limiation. $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; ($OUT,$INP,$LEN,$KEYB,$COUNTERA)=("A4","B4","A6","B6","A8"); ($KEYA,$COUNTERB,$STEP)=("A7","B7","A3"); @X= ("A16","B16","A17","B17","A18","B18","A19","B19", "A20","B20","A21","B21","A22","B22","A23","B23"); @Y= ("A24","B24","A25","B25","A26","B26","A27","B27", "A28","B28","A29","B29","A30","B30","A31","B31"); @DAT=("A6", "A7", "B6", "B7", "A8", "A9", "B8", "B9", "A10","A11","B10","B11","A12","A13","B12","B13"); # yes, overlaps with @DAT, used only in 2x interleave code path... @K2x=("A6", "B6", "A7", "B7", "A8", "B8", "A9", "B9", "A10","B10","A11","B11","A2", "B2", "A13","B13"); $code.=<<___; .text .if .ASSEMBLER_VERSION<7000000 .asg 0,__TI_EABI__ .endif .if __TI_EABI__ .asg ChaCha20_ctr32,_ChaCha20_ctr32 .endif .asg B3,RA .asg A15,FP .asg B15,SP .global _ChaCha20_ctr32 .align 32 _ChaCha20_ctr32: .asmfunc stack_usage(40+64) MV $LEN,A0 ; reassign [!A0] BNOP RA ; no data || [A0] STW FP,*SP--(40+64) ; save frame pointer and alloca(40+64) || [A0] MV SP,FP [A0] STDW B13:B12,*SP[4+8] ; ABI says so || [A0] MV $KEYB,$KEYA || [A0] MV $COUNTERA,$COUNTERB [A0] STDW B11:B10,*SP[3+8] || [A0] STDW A13:A12,*FP[-3] [A0] STDW A11:A10,*FP[-4] || [A0] MVK 128,$STEP ; 2 * input block size [A0] LDW *${KEYA}[0],@Y[4] ; load key || [A0] LDW *${KEYB}[1],@Y[5] || [A0] MVK 0x00007865,@Y[0] ; synthesize sigma || [A0] MVK 0x0000646e,@Y[1] [A0] LDW *${KEYA}[2],@Y[6] || [A0] LDW *${KEYB}[3],@Y[7] || [A0] MVKH 0x61700000,@Y[0] || [A0] MVKH 0x33200000,@Y[1] LDW *${KEYA}[4],@Y[8] || LDW *${KEYB}[5],@Y[9] || MVK 0x00002d32,@Y[2] || MVK 0x00006574,@Y[3] LDW *${KEYA}[6],@Y[10] || LDW *${KEYB}[7],@Y[11] || MVKH 0x79620000,@Y[2] || MVKH 0x6b200000,@Y[3] LDW *${COUNTERA}[0],@Y[12] ; load counter||nonce || LDW *${COUNTERB}[1],@Y[13] || CMPLTU A0,$STEP,A1 ; is length < 2*blocks? LDW *${COUNTERA}[2],@Y[14] || LDW *${COUNTERB}[3],@Y[15] || [A1] BNOP top1x? [A1] MVK 64,$STEP ; input block size || MVK 10,B0 ; inner loop counter DMV @Y[2],@Y[0],@X[2]:@X[0] ; copy block || DMV @Y[3],@Y[1],@X[3]:@X[1] ||[!A1] STDW @Y[2]:@Y[0],*FP[-12] ; offload key material to stack ||[!A1] STDW @Y[3]:@Y[1],*SP[2] DMV @Y[6],@Y[4],@X[6]:@X[4] || DMV @Y[7],@Y[5],@X[7]:@X[5] ||[!A1] STDW @Y[6]:@Y[4],*FP[-10] ||[!A1] STDW @Y[7]:@Y[5],*SP[4] DMV @Y[10],@Y[8],@X[10]:@X[8] || DMV @Y[11],@Y[9],@X[11]:@X[9] ||[!A1] STDW @Y[10]:@Y[8],*FP[-8] ||[!A1] STDW @Y[11]:@Y[9],*SP[6] DMV @Y[14],@Y[12],@X[14]:@X[12] || DMV @Y[15],@Y[13],@X[15]:@X[13] ||[!A1] MV @Y[12],@K2x[12] ; counter ||[!A1] MV @Y[13],@K2x[13] ||[!A1] STW @Y[14],*FP[-6*2] ||[!A1] STW @Y[15],*SP[8*2] ___ { ################################################################ # 2x interleave gives 50% performance improvement # my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = (0..3); my ($b0,$b1,$b2,$b3) = (4..7); my ($c0,$c1,$c2,$c3) = (8..11); my ($d0,$d1,$d2,$d3) = (12..15); $code.=<<___; outer2x?: ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] || ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] || ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || DMV @Y[2],@Y[0],@K2x[2]:@K2x[0] || DMV @Y[3],@Y[1],@K2x[3]:@K2x[1] XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] || XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] || XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || DMV @Y[6],@Y[4],@K2x[6]:@K2x[4] || DMV @Y[7],@Y[5],@K2x[7]:@K2x[5] SWAP2 @X[$d1],@X[$d1] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 @X[$d2],@X[$d2] || SWAP2 @X[$d0],@X[$d0] || SWAP2 @X[$d3],@X[$d3] ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] || ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] || DMV @Y[10],@Y[8],@K2x[10]:@K2x[8] || DMV @Y[11],@Y[9],@K2x[11]:@K2x[9] XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] || ADD 1,@Y[12],@Y[12] ; adjust counter for 2nd block ROTL @X[$b1],12,@X[$b1] || ROTL @X[$b2],12,@X[$b2] || MV @Y[14],@K2x[14] || MV @Y[15],@K2x[15] top2x?: ROTL @X[$b0],12,@X[$b0] || ROTL @X[$b3],12,@X[$b3] || ADD @Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1] || ADD @Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2] ADD @Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0] || ADD @Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3] || ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] || ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] || XOR @Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1] || XOR @Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2] XOR @Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0] || XOR @Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3] || ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] || XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ROTL @X[$d1],8,@X[$d1] || ROTL @X[$d2],8,@X[$d2] || SWAP2 @Y[$d1],@Y[$d1] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 @Y[$d2],@Y[$d2] || SWAP2 @Y[$d0],@Y[$d0] || SWAP2 @Y[$d3],@Y[$d3] ROTL @X[$d0],8,@X[$d0] || ROTL @X[$d3],8,@X[$d3] || ADD @Y[$d1],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1] || ADD @Y[$d2],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2] || ADD @Y[$d0],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0] || ADD @Y[$d3],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3] || BNOP middle2x1? ; protect from interrupt ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] || XOR @Y[$c1],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1] || XOR @Y[$c2],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2] || XOR @Y[$c0],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0] || XOR @Y[$c3],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3] ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] || XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || ROTL @X[$d1],0,@X[$d2] ; moved to avoid cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$d2],0,@X[$d3] XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] || MV @X[$d0],@X[$d1] || MV @X[$d3],@X[$d0] || ROTL @Y[$b1],12,@Y[$b1] || ROTL @Y[$b2],12,@Y[$b2] ROTL @X[$b1],7,@X[$b0] ; avoided cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$b2],7,@X[$b1] ROTL @X[$b0],7,@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$b3],7,@X[$b2] middle2x1?: ROTL @Y[$b0],12,@Y[$b0] || ROTL @Y[$b3],12,@Y[$b3] || ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || ADD @Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1] || ADD @Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2] || XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ADD @Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0] || ADD @Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3] || XOR @Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1] || XOR @Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2] XOR @Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0] || XOR @Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3] || ROTL @Y[$d1],8,@Y[$d1] || ROTL @Y[$d2],8,@Y[$d2] || SWAP2 @X[$d0],@X[$d0] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 @X[$d1],@X[$d1] || SWAP2 @X[$d2],@X[$d2] || SWAP2 @X[$d3],@X[$d3] ROTL @Y[$d0],8,@Y[$d0] || ROTL @Y[$d3],8,@Y[$d3] || ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] || ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] || ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || BNOP middle2x2? ; protect from interrupt ADD @Y[$d1],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1] || ADD @Y[$d2],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] ADD @Y[$d0],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0] || ADD @Y[$d3],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3] || XOR @Y[$c1],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1] || XOR @Y[$c2],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2] || ROTL @Y[$d1],0,@Y[$d2] ; moved to avoid cross-path stall || ROTL @Y[$d2],0,@Y[$d3] XOR @Y[$c0],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0] || XOR @Y[$c3],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3] || MV @Y[$d0],@Y[$d1] || MV @Y[$d3],@Y[$d0] || ROTL @X[$b0],12,@X[$b0] || ROTL @X[$b1],12,@X[$b1] ROTL @Y[$b1],7,@Y[$b0] ; avoided cross-path stall || ROTL @Y[$b2],7,@Y[$b1] ROTL @Y[$b0],7,@Y[$b3] || ROTL @Y[$b3],7,@Y[$b2] middle2x2?: ROTL @X[$b2],12,@X[$b2] || ROTL @X[$b3],12,@X[$b3] || ADD @Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0] || ADD @Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1] ADD @Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2] || ADD @Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3] || ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] || XOR @Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0] || XOR @Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1] XOR @Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2] || XOR @Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3] || ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ROTL @X[$d0],8,@X[$d0] || ROTL @X[$d1],8,@X[$d1] || SWAP2 @Y[$d0],@Y[$d0] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 @Y[$d1],@Y[$d1] || SWAP2 @Y[$d2],@Y[$d2] || SWAP2 @Y[$d3],@Y[$d3] ROTL @X[$d2],8,@X[$d2] || ROTL @X[$d3],8,@X[$d3] || ADD @Y[$d0],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2] || ADD @Y[$d1],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3] || ADD @Y[$d2],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0] || ADD @Y[$d3],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1] || BNOP bottom2x1? ; protect from interrupt ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] || ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] || XOR @Y[$c2],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0] || XOR @Y[$c3],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1] || XOR @Y[$c0],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2] || XOR @Y[$c1],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3] ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || ROTL @X[$d0],0,@X[$d3] ; moved to avoid cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$d1],0,@X[$d0] XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] || MV @X[$d2],@X[$d1] || MV @X[$d3],@X[$d2] || ROTL @Y[$b0],12,@Y[$b0] || ROTL @Y[$b1],12,@Y[$b1] ROTL @X[$b0],7,@X[$b1] ; avoided cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$b1],7,@X[$b2] ROTL @X[$b2],7,@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$b3],7,@X[$b0] || [B0] SUB B0,1,B0 ; decrement inner loop counter bottom2x1?: ROTL @Y[$b2],12,@Y[$b2] || ROTL @Y[$b3],12,@Y[$b3] || [B0] ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] ; modulo-scheduled || [B0] ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] [B0] ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || [B0] ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || ADD @Y[$b0],@Y[$a0],@Y[$a0] || ADD @Y[$b1],@Y[$a1],@Y[$a1] || [B0] XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] || [B0] XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] [B0] XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || [B0] XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ADD @Y[$b2],@Y[$a2],@Y[$a2] || ADD @Y[$b3],@Y[$a3],@Y[$a3] || XOR @Y[$a0],@Y[$d0],@Y[$d0] || XOR @Y[$a1],@Y[$d1],@Y[$d1] XOR @Y[$a2],@Y[$d2],@Y[$d2] || XOR @Y[$a3],@Y[$d3],@Y[$d3] || ROTL @Y[$d0],8,@Y[$d0] || ROTL @Y[$d1],8,@Y[$d1] || [B0] SWAP2 @X[$d1],@X[$d1] ; rotate by 16 || [B0] SWAP2 @X[$d2],@X[$d2] || [B0] SWAP2 @X[$d0],@X[$d0] || [B0] SWAP2 @X[$d3],@X[$d3] ROTL @Y[$d2],8,@Y[$d2] || ROTL @Y[$d3],8,@Y[$d3] || [B0] ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || [B0] ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] || [B0] ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || [B0] ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] || [B0] BNOP top2x? ; even protects from interrupt ADD @Y[$d0],@Y[$c2],@Y[$c2] || ADD @Y[$d1],@Y[$c3],@Y[$c3] || [B0] XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || [B0] XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || [B0] XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || [B0] XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] ADD @Y[$d2],@Y[$c0],@Y[$c0] || ADD @Y[$d3],@Y[$c1],@Y[$c1] || XOR @Y[$c2],@Y[$b0],@Y[$b0] || XOR @Y[$c3],@Y[$b1],@Y[$b1] || ROTL @Y[$d0],0,@Y[$d3] ; moved to avoid cross-path stall || ROTL @Y[$d1],0,@Y[$d0] XOR @Y[$c0],@Y[$b2],@Y[$b2] || XOR @Y[$c1],@Y[$b3],@Y[$b3] || MV @Y[$d2],@Y[$d1] || MV @Y[$d3],@Y[$d2] || [B0] ROTL @X[$b1],12,@X[$b1] || [B0] ROTL @X[$b2],12,@X[$b2] ROTL @Y[$b0],7,@Y[$b1] ; avoided cross-path stall || ROTL @Y[$b1],7,@Y[$b2] ROTL @Y[$b2],7,@Y[$b3] || ROTL @Y[$b3],7,@Y[$b0] bottom2x2?: ___ } $code.=<<___; ADD @K2x[0],@X[0],@X[0] ; accumulate key material || ADD @K2x[1],@X[1],@X[1] || ADD @K2x[2],@X[2],@X[2] || ADD @K2x[3],@X[3],@X[3] ADD @K2x[0],@Y[0],@Y[0] || ADD @K2x[1],@Y[1],@Y[1] || ADD @K2x[2],@Y[2],@Y[2] || ADD @K2x[3],@Y[3],@Y[3] || LDNDW *${INP}++[8],@DAT[1]:@DAT[0] ADD @K2x[4],@X[4],@X[4] || ADD @K2x[5],@X[5],@X[5] || ADD @K2x[6],@X[6],@X[6] || ADD @K2x[7],@X[7],@X[7] || LDNDW *${INP}[-7],@DAT[3]:@DAT[2] ADD @K2x[4],@Y[4],@Y[4] || ADD @K2x[5],@Y[5],@Y[5] || ADD @K2x[6],@Y[6],@Y[6] || ADD @K2x[7],@Y[7],@Y[7] || LDNDW *${INP}[-6],@DAT[5]:@DAT[4] ADD @K2x[8],@X[8],@X[8] || ADD @K2x[9],@X[9],@X[9] || ADD @K2x[10],@X[10],@X[10] || ADD @K2x[11],@X[11],@X[11] || LDNDW *${INP}[-5],@DAT[7]:@DAT[6] ADD @K2x[8],@Y[8],@Y[8] || ADD @K2x[9],@Y[9],@Y[9] || ADD @K2x[10],@Y[10],@Y[10] || ADD @K2x[11],@Y[11],@Y[11] || LDNDW *${INP}[-4],@DAT[9]:@DAT[8] ADD @K2x[12],@X[12],@X[12] || ADD @K2x[13],@X[13],@X[13] || ADD @K2x[14],@X[14],@X[14] || ADD @K2x[15],@X[15],@X[15] || LDNDW *${INP}[-3],@DAT[11]:@DAT[10] ADD @K2x[12],@Y[12],@Y[12] || ADD @K2x[13],@Y[13],@Y[13] || ADD @K2x[14],@Y[14],@Y[14] || ADD @K2x[15],@Y[15],@Y[15] || LDNDW *${INP}[-2],@DAT[13]:@DAT[12] ADD 1,@Y[12],@Y[12] ; adjust counter for 2nd block || ADD 2,@K2x[12],@K2x[12] ; increment counter || LDNDW *${INP}[-1],@DAT[15]:@DAT[14] .if .BIG_ENDIAN SWAP2 @X[0],@X[0] || SWAP2 @X[1],@X[1] || SWAP2 @X[2],@X[2] || SWAP2 @X[3],@X[3] SWAP2 @X[4],@X[4] || SWAP2 @X[5],@X[5] || SWAP2 @X[6],@X[6] || SWAP2 @X[7],@X[7] SWAP2 @X[8],@X[8] || SWAP2 @X[9],@X[9] || SWAP4 @X[0],@X[1] || SWAP4 @X[1],@X[0] SWAP2 @X[10],@X[10] || SWAP2 @X[11],@X[11] || SWAP4 @X[2],@X[3] || SWAP4 @X[3],@X[2] SWAP2 @X[12],@X[12] || SWAP2 @X[13],@X[13] || SWAP4 @X[4],@X[5] || SWAP4 @X[5],@X[4] SWAP2 @X[14],@X[14] || SWAP2 @X[15],@X[15] || SWAP4 @X[6],@X[7] || SWAP4 @X[7],@X[6] SWAP4 @X[8],@X[9] || SWAP4 @X[9],@X[8] || SWAP2 @Y[0],@Y[0] || SWAP2 @Y[1],@Y[1] SWAP4 @X[10],@X[11] || SWAP4 @X[11],@X[10] || SWAP2 @Y[2],@Y[2] || SWAP2 @Y[3],@Y[3] SWAP4 @X[12],@X[13] || SWAP4 @X[13],@X[12] || SWAP2 @Y[4],@Y[4] || SWAP2 @Y[5],@Y[5] SWAP4 @X[14],@X[15] || SWAP4 @X[15],@X[14] || SWAP2 @Y[6],@Y[6] || SWAP2 @Y[7],@Y[7] SWAP2 @Y[8],@Y[8] || SWAP2 @Y[9],@Y[9] || SWAP4 @Y[0],@Y[1] || SWAP4 @Y[1],@Y[0] SWAP2 @Y[10],@Y[10] || SWAP2 @Y[11],@Y[11] || SWAP4 @Y[2],@Y[3] || SWAP4 @Y[3],@Y[2] SWAP2 @Y[12],@Y[12] || SWAP2 @Y[13],@Y[13] || SWAP4 @Y[4],@Y[5] || SWAP4 @Y[5],@Y[4] SWAP2 @Y[14],@Y[14] || SWAP2 @Y[15],@Y[15] || SWAP4 @Y[6],@Y[7] || SWAP4 @Y[7],@Y[6] SWAP4 @Y[8],@Y[9] || SWAP4 @Y[9],@Y[8] SWAP4 @Y[10],@Y[11] || SWAP4 @Y[11],@Y[10] SWAP4 @Y[12],@Y[13] || SWAP4 @Y[13],@Y[12] SWAP4 @Y[14],@Y[15] || SWAP4 @Y[15],@Y[14] .endif XOR @DAT[0],@X[0],@X[0] ; xor 1st block || XOR @DAT[3],@X[3],@X[3] || XOR @DAT[2],@X[2],@X[1] || XOR @DAT[1],@X[1],@X[2] || LDNDW *${INP}++[8],@DAT[1]:@DAT[0] XOR @DAT[4],@X[4],@X[4] || XOR @DAT[7],@X[7],@X[7] || LDNDW *${INP}[-7],@DAT[3]:@DAT[2] XOR @DAT[6],@X[6],@X[5] || XOR @DAT[5],@X[5],@X[6] || LDNDW *${INP}[-6],@DAT[5]:@DAT[4] XOR @DAT[8],@X[8],@X[8] || XOR @DAT[11],@X[11],@X[11] || LDNDW *${INP}[-5],@DAT[7]:@DAT[6] XOR @DAT[10],@X[10],@X[9] || XOR @DAT[9],@X[9],@X[10] || LDNDW *${INP}[-4],@DAT[9]:@DAT[8] XOR @DAT[12],@X[12],@X[12] || XOR @DAT[15],@X[15],@X[15] || LDNDW *${INP}[-3],@DAT[11]:@DAT[10] XOR @DAT[14],@X[14],@X[13] || XOR @DAT[13],@X[13],@X[14] || LDNDW *${INP}[-2],@DAT[13]:@DAT[12] [A0] SUB A0,$STEP,A0 ; SUB A0,128,A0 || LDNDW *${INP}[-1],@DAT[15]:@DAT[14] XOR @Y[0],@DAT[0],@DAT[0] ; xor 2nd block || XOR @Y[1],@DAT[1],@DAT[1] || STNDW @X[2]:@X[0],*${OUT}++[8] XOR @Y[2],@DAT[2],@DAT[2] || XOR @Y[3],@DAT[3],@DAT[3] || STNDW @X[3]:@X[1],*${OUT}[-7] XOR @Y[4],@DAT[4],@DAT[4] || [A0] LDDW *FP[-12],@X[2]:@X[0] ; re-load key material from stack || [A0] LDDW *SP[2], @X[3]:@X[1] XOR @Y[5],@DAT[5],@DAT[5] || STNDW @X[6]:@X[4],*${OUT}[-6] XOR @Y[6],@DAT[6],@DAT[6] || XOR @Y[7],@DAT[7],@DAT[7] || STNDW @X[7]:@X[5],*${OUT}[-5] XOR @Y[8],@DAT[8],@DAT[8] || [A0] LDDW *FP[-10],@X[6]:@X[4] || [A0] LDDW *SP[4], @X[7]:@X[5] XOR @Y[9],@DAT[9],@DAT[9] || STNDW @X[10]:@X[8],*${OUT}[-4] XOR @Y[10],@DAT[10],@DAT[10] || XOR @Y[11],@DAT[11],@DAT[11] || STNDW @X[11]:@X[9],*${OUT}[-3] XOR @Y[12],@DAT[12],@DAT[12] || [A0] LDDW *FP[-8], @X[10]:@X[8] || [A0] LDDW *SP[6], @X[11]:@X[9] XOR @Y[13],@DAT[13],@DAT[13] || STNDW @X[14]:@X[12],*${OUT}[-2] XOR @Y[14],@DAT[14],@DAT[14] || XOR @Y[15],@DAT[15],@DAT[15] || STNDW @X[15]:@X[13],*${OUT}[-1] [A0] MV @K2x[12],@X[12] || [A0] MV @K2x[13],@X[13] || [A0] LDW *FP[-6*2], @X[14] || [A0] LDW *SP[8*2], @X[15] [A0] DMV @X[2],@X[0],@Y[2]:@Y[0] ; duplicate key material || STNDW @DAT[1]:@DAT[0],*${OUT}++[8] [A0] DMV @X[3],@X[1],@Y[3]:@Y[1] || STNDW @DAT[3]:@DAT[2],*${OUT}[-7] [A0] DMV @X[6],@X[4],@Y[6]:@Y[4] || STNDW @DAT[5]:@DAT[4],*${OUT}[-6] || CMPLTU A0,$STEP,A1 ; is remaining length < 2*blocks? ||[!A0] BNOP epilogue? [A0] DMV @X[7],@X[5],@Y[7]:@Y[5] || STNDW @DAT[7]:@DAT[6],*${OUT}[-5] ||[!A1] BNOP outer2x? [A0] DMV @X[10],@X[8],@Y[10]:@Y[8] || STNDW @DAT[9]:@DAT[8],*${OUT}[-4] [A0] DMV @X[11],@X[9],@Y[11]:@Y[9] || STNDW @DAT[11]:@DAT[10],*${OUT}[-3] [A0] DMV @X[14],@X[12],@Y[14]:@Y[12] || STNDW @DAT[13]:@DAT[12],*${OUT}[-2] [A0] DMV @X[15],@X[13],@Y[15]:@Y[13] || STNDW @DAT[15]:@DAT[14],*${OUT}[-1] ;;===== branch to epilogue? is taken here [A1] MVK 64,$STEP || [A0] MVK 10,B0 ; inner loop counter ;;===== branch to outer2x? is taken here ___ { my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3) = (0..3); my ($b0,$b1,$b2,$b3) = (4..7); my ($c0,$c1,$c2,$c3) = (8..11); my ($d0,$d1,$d2,$d3) = (12..15); $code.=<<___; top1x?: ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] || ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] || XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || SWAP2 @X[$d1],@X[$d1] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 @X[$d2],@X[$d2] SWAP2 @X[$d0],@X[$d0] || SWAP2 @X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] || XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$b1],12,@X[$b1] || ROTL @X[$b2],12,@X[$b2] ROTL @X[$b0],12,@X[$b0] || ROTL @X[$b3],12,@X[$b3] ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] || ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] || XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ROTL @X[$d1],8,@X[$d1] || ROTL @X[$d2],8,@X[$d2] ROTL @X[$d0],8,@X[$d0] || ROTL @X[$d3],8,@X[$d3] || BNOP middle1x? ; protect from interrupt ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] || XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || ROTL @X[$d1],0,@X[$d2] ; moved to avoid cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$d2],0,@X[$d3] XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$d0],0,@X[$d1] || ROTL @X[$d3],0,@X[$d0] ROTL @X[$b1],7,@X[$b0] ; avoided cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$b2],7,@X[$b1] ROTL @X[$b0],7,@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$b3],7,@X[$b2] middle1x?: ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || SWAP2 @X[$d0],@X[$d0] ; rotate by 16 || SWAP2 @X[$d1],@X[$d1] SWAP2 @X[$d2],@X[$d2] || SWAP2 @X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] || ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$b0],12,@X[$b0] || ROTL @X[$b1],12,@X[$b1] ROTL @X[$b2],12,@X[$b2] || ROTL @X[$b3],12,@X[$b3] ADD @X[$b0],@X[$a0],@X[$a0] || ADD @X[$b1],@X[$a1],@X[$a1] || [B0] SUB B0,1,B0 ; decrement inner loop counter ADD @X[$b2],@X[$a2],@X[$a2] || ADD @X[$b3],@X[$a3],@X[$a3] || XOR @X[$a0],@X[$d0],@X[$d0] || XOR @X[$a1],@X[$d1],@X[$d1] XOR @X[$a2],@X[$d2],@X[$d2] || XOR @X[$a3],@X[$d3],@X[$d3] || ROTL @X[$d0],8,@X[$d0] || ROTL @X[$d1],8,@X[$d1] ROTL @X[$d2],8,@X[$d2] || ROTL @X[$d3],8,@X[$d3] || [B0] BNOP top1x? ; even protects from interrupt ADD @X[$d0],@X[$c2],@X[$c2] || ADD @X[$d1],@X[$c3],@X[$c3] ADD @X[$d2],@X[$c0],@X[$c0] || ADD @X[$d3],@X[$c1],@X[$c1] || XOR @X[$c2],@X[$b0],@X[$b0] || XOR @X[$c3],@X[$b1],@X[$b1] || ROTL @X[$d0],0,@X[$d3] ; moved to avoid cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$d1],0,@X[$d0] XOR @X[$c0],@X[$b2],@X[$b2] || XOR @X[$c1],@X[$b3],@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$d2],0,@X[$d1] || ROTL @X[$d3],0,@X[$d2] ROTL @X[$b0],7,@X[$b1] ; avoided cross-path stall || ROTL @X[$b1],7,@X[$b2] ROTL @X[$b2],7,@X[$b3] || ROTL @X[$b3],7,@X[$b0] ||[!B0] CMPLTU A0,$STEP,A1 ; less than 64 bytes left? bottom1x?: ___ } $code.=<<___; ADD @Y[0],@X[0],@X[0] ; accumulate key material || ADD @Y[1],@X[1],@X[1] || ADD @Y[2],@X[2],@X[2] || ADD @Y[3],@X[3],@X[3] ||[!A1] LDNDW *${INP}++[8],@DAT[1]:@DAT[0] || [A1] BNOP tail? ADD @Y[4],@X[4],@X[4] || ADD @Y[5],@X[5],@X[5] || ADD @Y[6],@X[6],@X[6] || ADD @Y[7],@X[7],@X[7] ||[!A1] LDNDW *${INP}[-7],@DAT[3]:@DAT[2] ADD @Y[8],@X[8],@X[8] || ADD @Y[9],@X[9],@X[9] || ADD @Y[10],@X[10],@X[10] || ADD @Y[11],@X[11],@X[11] ||[!A1] LDNDW *${INP}[-6],@DAT[5]:@DAT[4] ADD @Y[12],@X[12],@X[12] || ADD @Y[13],@X[13],@X[13] || ADD @Y[14],@X[14],@X[14] || ADD @Y[15],@X[15],@X[15] ||[!A1] LDNDW *${INP}[-5],@DAT[7]:@DAT[6] [!A1] LDNDW *${INP}[-4],@DAT[9]:@DAT[8] [!A1] LDNDW *${INP}[-3],@DAT[11]:@DAT[10] LDNDW *${INP}[-2],@DAT[13]:@DAT[12] LDNDW *${INP}[-1],@DAT[15]:@DAT[14] .if .BIG_ENDIAN SWAP2 @X[0],@X[0] || SWAP2 @X[1],@X[1] || SWAP2 @X[2],@X[2] || SWAP2 @X[3],@X[3] SWAP2 @X[4],@X[4] || SWAP2 @X[5],@X[5] || SWAP2 @X[6],@X[6] || SWAP2 @X[7],@X[7] SWAP2 @X[8],@X[8] || SWAP2 @X[9],@X[9] || SWAP4 @X[0],@X[1] || SWAP4 @X[1],@X[0] SWAP2 @X[10],@X[10] || SWAP2 @X[11],@X[11] || SWAP4 @X[2],@X[3] || SWAP4 @X[3],@X[2] SWAP2 @X[12],@X[12] || SWAP2 @X[13],@X[13] || SWAP4 @X[4],@X[5] || SWAP4 @X[5],@X[4] SWAP2 @X[14],@X[14] || SWAP2 @X[15],@X[15] || SWAP4 @X[6],@X[7] || SWAP4 @X[7],@X[6] SWAP4 @X[8],@X[9] || SWAP4 @X[9],@X[8] SWAP4 @X[10],@X[11] || SWAP4 @X[11],@X[10] SWAP4 @X[12],@X[13] || SWAP4 @X[13],@X[12] SWAP4 @X[14],@X[15] || SWAP4 @X[15],@X[14] .else NOP 1 .endif XOR @X[0],@DAT[0],@DAT[0] ; xor with input || XOR @X[1],@DAT[1],@DAT[1] || XOR @X[2],@DAT[2],@DAT[2] || XOR @X[3],@DAT[3],@DAT[3] || [A0] SUB A0,$STEP,A0 ; SUB A0,64,A0 XOR @X[4],@DAT[4],@DAT[4] || XOR @X[5],@DAT[5],@DAT[5] || XOR @X[6],@DAT[6],@DAT[6] || XOR @X[7],@DAT[7],@DAT[7] || STNDW @DAT[1]:@DAT[0],*${OUT}++[8] XOR @X[8],@DAT[8],@DAT[8] || XOR @X[9],@DAT[9],@DAT[9] || XOR @X[10],@DAT[10],@DAT[10] || XOR @X[11],@DAT[11],@DAT[11] || STNDW @DAT[3]:@DAT[2],*${OUT}[-7] XOR @X[12],@DAT[12],@DAT[12] || XOR @X[13],@DAT[13],@DAT[13] || XOR @X[14],@DAT[14],@DAT[14] || XOR @X[15],@DAT[15],@DAT[15] || STNDW @DAT[5]:@DAT[4],*${OUT}[-6] || [A0] BNOP top1x? [A0] DMV @Y[2],@Y[0],@X[2]:@X[0] ; duplicate key material || [A0] DMV @Y[3],@Y[1],@X[3]:@X[1] || STNDW @DAT[7]:@DAT[6],*${OUT}[-5] [A0] DMV @Y[6],@Y[4],@X[6]:@X[4] || [A0] DMV @Y[7],@Y[5],@X[7]:@X[5] || STNDW @DAT[9]:@DAT[8],*${OUT}[-4] [A0] DMV @Y[10],@Y[8],@X[10]:@X[8] || [A0] DMV @Y[11],@Y[9],@X[11]:@X[9] || [A0] ADD 1,@Y[12],@Y[12] ; increment counter || STNDW @DAT[11]:@DAT[10],*${OUT}[-3] [A0] DMV @Y[14],@Y[12],@X[14]:@X[12] || [A0] DMV @Y[15],@Y[13],@X[15]:@X[13] || STNDW @DAT[13]:@DAT[12],*${OUT}[-2] [A0] MVK 10,B0 ; inner loop counter || STNDW @DAT[15]:@DAT[14],*${OUT}[-1] ;;===== branch to top1x? is taken here epilogue?: LDDW *FP[-4],A11:A10 ; ABI says so LDDW *FP[-3],A13:A12 || LDDW *SP[3+8],B11:B10 LDDW *SP[4+8],B13:B12 || BNOP RA LDW *++SP(40+64),FP ; restore frame pointer NOP 4 tail?: LDBU *${INP}++[1],B24 ; load byte by byte || SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB A0,1,B1 [!B1] BNOP epilogue? ; interrupts are disabled for whole time || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],B24 || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 [!B1] BNOP epilogue? || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],B24 || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 [!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL @X[0],0,A24 || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],B24 || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 [!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL @X[0],24,A24 || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],A24 || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 [!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL @X[0],16,A24 || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],A24 || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 || XOR A24,B24,B25 STB B25,*${OUT}++[1] ; store byte by byte ||[!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL @X[0],8,A24 || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],A24 || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 || XOR A24,B24,B25 STB B25,*${OUT}++[1] ___ sub TAIL_STEP { my $Xi= shift; my $T = ($Xi=~/^B/?"B24":"A24"); # match @X[i] to avoid cross path my $D = $T; $D=~tr/AB/BA/; my $O = $D; $O=~s/24/25/; $code.=<<___; ||[!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL $Xi,0,$T || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],$D || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 || XOR A24,B24,$O STB $O,*${OUT}++[1] ||[!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL $Xi,24,$T || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],$T || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 || XOR A24,B24,$O STB $O,*${OUT}++[1] ||[!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL $Xi,16,$T || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],$T || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 || XOR A24,B24,$O STB $O,*${OUT}++[1] ||[!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL $Xi,8,$T || [A0] LDBU *${INP}++[1],$T || [A0] SUB A0,1,A0 || SUB B1,1,B1 || XOR A24,B24,$O STB $O,*${OUT}++[1] ___ } foreach (1..14) { TAIL_STEP(@X[$_]); } $code.=<<___; ||[!B1] BNOP epilogue? || ROTL @X[15],0,B24 || XOR A24,B24,A25 STB A25,*${OUT}++[1] || ROTL @X[15],24,B24 || XOR A24,B24,A25 STB A25,*${OUT}++[1] || ROTL @X[15],16,B24 || XOR A24,B24,A25 STB A25,*${OUT}++[1] || XOR A24,B24,A25 STB A25,*${OUT}++[1] || XOR A24,B24,B25 STB B25,*${OUT}++[1] .endasmfunc .sect .const .cstring "ChaCha20 for C64x+, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-s390x.pl0000755000000000000000000001751613176625656020036 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # December 2015 # # ChaCha20 for s390x. # # 3 times faster than compiler-generated code. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { $SIZE_T=4; $g=""; } else { $SIZE_T=8; $g="g"; } while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_)."\n"; } my $sp="%r15"; my $stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8; my $frame=$stdframe+4*20; my ($out,$inp,$len,$key,$counter)=map("%r$_",(2..6)); my @x=map("%r$_",(0..7,"x","x","x","x",(10..13))); my @t=map("%r$_",(8,9)); sub ROUND { my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); my ($xc,$xc_)=map("\"$_\"",@t); my @x=map("\"$_\"",@x); # Consider order in which variables are addressed by their # index: # # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 # # 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers, # @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If # you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is # invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload # them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see # 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in the beginning # or end. ( "&alr (@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", # Q1 "&alr (@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", # Q2 "&xr (@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&xr (@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&rll (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)", "&rll (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)", "&alr ($xc,@x[$d0])", "&alr ($xc_,@x[$d1])", "&xr (@x[$b0],$xc)", "&xr (@x[$b1],$xc_)", "&rll (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],12)", "&rll (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],12)", "&alr (@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&alr (@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&xr (@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&xr (@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&rll (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],8)", "&rll (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],8)", "&alr ($xc,@x[$d0])", "&alr ($xc_,@x[$d1])", "&xr (@x[$b0],$xc)", "&xr (@x[$b1],$xc_)", "&rll (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],7)", "&rll (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],7)", "&stm ($xc,$xc_,'$stdframe+4*8+4*$c0($sp)')", # reload pair of 'c's "&lm ($xc,$xc_,'$stdframe+4*8+4*$c2($sp)')", "&alr (@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", # Q3 "&alr (@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", # Q4 "&xr (@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&xr (@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&rll (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)", "&rll (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)", "&alr ($xc,@x[$d2])", "&alr ($xc_,@x[$d3])", "&xr (@x[$b2],$xc)", "&xr (@x[$b3],$xc_)", "&rll (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],12)", "&rll (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],12)", "&alr (@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&alr (@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&xr (@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&xr (@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&rll (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],8)", "&rll (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],8)", "&alr ($xc,@x[$d2])", "&alr ($xc_,@x[$d3])", "&xr (@x[$b2],$xc)", "&xr (@x[$b3],$xc_)", "&rll (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],7)", "&rll (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],7)" ); } $code.=<<___; .text .globl ChaCha20_ctr32 .type ChaCha20_ctr32,\@function .align 32 ChaCha20_ctr32: lt${g}r $len,$len # $len==0? bzr %r14 a${g}hi $len,-64 l${g}hi %r1,-$frame stm${g} %r6,%r15,`6*$SIZE_T`($sp) sl${g}r $out,$inp # difference la $len,0($inp,$len) # end of input minus 64 larl %r7,.Lsigma lgr %r0,$sp la $sp,0(%r1,$sp) st${g} %r0,0($sp) lmg %r8,%r11,0($key) # load key lmg %r12,%r13,0($counter) # load counter lmg %r6,%r7,0(%r7) # load sigma constant la %r14,0($inp) st${g} $out,$frame+3*$SIZE_T($sp) st${g} $len,$frame+4*$SIZE_T($sp) stmg %r6,%r13,$stdframe($sp) # copy key schedule to stack srlg @x[12],%r12,32 # 32-bit counter value j .Loop_outer .align 16 .Loop_outer: lm @x[0],@x[7],$stdframe+4*0($sp) # load x[0]-x[7] lm @t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*10($sp) # load x[10]-x[11] lm @x[13],@x[15],$stdframe+4*13($sp) # load x[13]-x[15] stm @t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*8+4*10($sp) # offload x[10]-x[11] lm @t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*8($sp) # load x[8]-x[9] st @x[12],$stdframe+4*12($sp) # save counter st${g} %r14,$frame+2*$SIZE_T($sp) # save input pointer lhi %r14,10 j .Loop .align 4 .Loop: ___ foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } $code.=<<___; brct %r14,.Loop l${g} %r14,$frame+2*$SIZE_T($sp) # pull input pointer stm @t[0],@t[1],$stdframe+4*8+4*8($sp) # offload x[8]-x[9] lm${g} @t[0],@t[1],$frame+3*$SIZE_T($sp) al @x[0],$stdframe+4*0($sp) # accumulate key schedule al @x[1],$stdframe+4*1($sp) al @x[2],$stdframe+4*2($sp) al @x[3],$stdframe+4*3($sp) al @x[4],$stdframe+4*4($sp) al @x[5],$stdframe+4*5($sp) al @x[6],$stdframe+4*6($sp) al @x[7],$stdframe+4*7($sp) lrvr @x[0],@x[0] lrvr @x[1],@x[1] lrvr @x[2],@x[2] lrvr @x[3],@x[3] lrvr @x[4],@x[4] lrvr @x[5],@x[5] lrvr @x[6],@x[6] lrvr @x[7],@x[7] al @x[12],$stdframe+4*12($sp) al @x[13],$stdframe+4*13($sp) al @x[14],$stdframe+4*14($sp) al @x[15],$stdframe+4*15($sp) lrvr @x[12],@x[12] lrvr @x[13],@x[13] lrvr @x[14],@x[14] lrvr @x[15],@x[15] la @t[0],0(@t[0],%r14) # reconstruct output pointer cl${g}r %r14,@t[1] jh .Ltail x @x[0],4*0(%r14) # xor with input x @x[1],4*1(%r14) st @x[0],4*0(@t[0]) # store output x @x[2],4*2(%r14) st @x[1],4*1(@t[0]) x @x[3],4*3(%r14) st @x[2],4*2(@t[0]) x @x[4],4*4(%r14) st @x[3],4*3(@t[0]) lm @x[0],@x[3],$stdframe+4*8+4*8($sp) # load x[8]-x[11] x @x[5],4*5(%r14) st @x[4],4*4(@t[0]) x @x[6],4*6(%r14) al @x[0],$stdframe+4*8($sp) st @x[5],4*5(@t[0]) x @x[7],4*7(%r14) al @x[1],$stdframe+4*9($sp) st @x[6],4*6(@t[0]) x @x[12],4*12(%r14) al @x[2],$stdframe+4*10($sp) st @x[7],4*7(@t[0]) x @x[13],4*13(%r14) al @x[3],$stdframe+4*11($sp) st @x[12],4*12(@t[0]) x @x[14],4*14(%r14) st @x[13],4*13(@t[0]) x @x[15],4*15(%r14) st @x[14],4*14(@t[0]) lrvr @x[0],@x[0] st @x[15],4*15(@t[0]) lrvr @x[1],@x[1] lrvr @x[2],@x[2] lrvr @x[3],@x[3] lhi @x[12],1 x @x[0],4*8(%r14) al @x[12],$stdframe+4*12($sp) # increment counter x @x[1],4*9(%r14) st @x[0],4*8(@t[0]) x @x[2],4*10(%r14) st @x[1],4*9(@t[0]) x @x[3],4*11(%r14) st @x[2],4*10(@t[0]) st @x[3],4*11(@t[0]) cl${g}r %r14,@t[1] # done yet? la %r14,64(%r14) jl .Loop_outer .Ldone: xgr %r0,%r0 xgr %r1,%r1 xgr %r2,%r2 xgr %r3,%r3 stmg %r0,%r3,$stdframe+4*4($sp) # wipe key copy stmg %r0,%r3,$stdframe+4*12($sp) lm${g} %r6,%r15,`$frame+6*$SIZE_T`($sp) br %r14 .align 16 .Ltail: la @t[1],64($t[1]) stm @x[0],@x[7],$stdframe+4*0($sp) sl${g}r @t[1],%r14 lm @x[0],@x[3],$stdframe+4*8+4*8($sp) l${g}hi @x[6],0 stm @x[12],@x[15],$stdframe+4*12($sp) al @x[0],$stdframe+4*8($sp) al @x[1],$stdframe+4*9($sp) al @x[2],$stdframe+4*10($sp) al @x[3],$stdframe+4*11($sp) lrvr @x[0],@x[0] lrvr @x[1],@x[1] lrvr @x[2],@x[2] lrvr @x[3],@x[3] stm @x[0],@x[3],$stdframe+4*8($sp) .Loop_tail: llgc @x[4],0(@x[6],%r14) llgc @x[5],$stdframe(@x[6],$sp) xr @x[5],@x[4] stc @x[5],0(@x[6],@t[0]) la @x[6],1(@x[6]) brct @t[1],.Loop_tail j .Ldone .size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32 .align 32 .Lsigma: .long 0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574 # endian-neutral .asciz "ChaCha20 for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000015675313176625656020115 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # November 2014 # # ChaCha20 for x86_64. # # Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer. # # IALU/gcc 4.8(i) 1xSSSE3/SSE2 4xSSSE3 8xAVX2 # # P4 9.48/+99% -/22.7(ii) - # Core2 7.83/+55% 7.90/8.08 4.35 # Westmere 7.19/+50% 5.60/6.70 3.00 # Sandy Bridge 8.31/+42% 5.45/6.76 2.72 # Ivy Bridge 6.71/+46% 5.40/6.49 2.41 # Haswell 5.92/+43% 5.20/6.45 2.42 1.23 # Silvermont 12.0/+33% 7.75/7.40 7.03(iii) # Goldmont 10.6/+17% 5.10/- 3.28 # Sledgehammer 7.28/+52% -/14.2(ii) - # Bulldozer 9.66/+28% 9.85/11.1 3.06(iv) # VIA Nano 10.5/+46% 6.72/8.60 6.05 # # (i) compared to older gcc 3.x one can observe >2x improvement on # most platforms; # (ii) as it can be seen, SSE2 performance is too low on legacy # processors; NxSSE2 results are naturally better, but not # impressively better than IALU ones, which is why you won't # find SSE2 code below; # (iii) this is not optimal result for Atom because of MSROM # limitations, SSE2 can do better, but gain is considered too # low to justify the [maintenance] effort; # (iv) Bulldozer actually executes 4xXOP code path that delivers 2.20; $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; # input parameter block ($out,$inp,$len,$key,$counter)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8"); $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .align 64 .Lzero: .long 0,0,0,0 .Lone: .long 1,0,0,0 .Linc: .long 0,1,2,3 .Lfour: .long 4,4,4,4 .Lincy: .long 0,2,4,6,1,3,5,7 .Leight: .long 8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8 .Lrot16: .byte 0x2,0x3,0x0,0x1, 0x6,0x7,0x4,0x5, 0xa,0xb,0x8,0x9, 0xe,0xf,0xc,0xd .Lrot24: .byte 0x3,0x0,0x1,0x2, 0x7,0x4,0x5,0x6, 0xb,0x8,0x9,0xa, 0xf,0xc,0xd,0xe .Lsigma: .asciz "expand 32-byte k" .asciz "ChaCha20 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by " ___ sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; my $arg = pop; $arg = "\$$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n"; } @x=("%eax","%ebx","%ecx","%edx",map("%r${_}d",(8..11)), "%nox","%nox","%nox","%nox",map("%r${_}d",(12..15))); @t=("%esi","%edi"); sub ROUND { # critical path is 24 cycles per round my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); my ($xc,$xc_)=map("\"$_\"",@t); my @x=map("\"$_\"",@x); # Consider order in which variables are addressed by their # index: # # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 # # 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers, # @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If # you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is # invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload # them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see # bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in # the beginning or end. # Normally instructions would be interleaved to favour in-order # execution. Generally out-of-order cores manage it gracefully, # but not this time for some reason. As in-order execution # cores are dying breed, old Atom is the only one around, # instructions are left uninterleaved. Besides, Atom is better # off executing 1xSSSE3 code anyway... ( "&add (@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", # Q1 "&xor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&rol (@x[$d0],16)", "&add (@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", # Q2 "&xor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&rol (@x[$d1],16)", "&add ($xc,@x[$d0])", "&xor (@x[$b0],$xc)", "&rol (@x[$b0],12)", "&add ($xc_,@x[$d1])", "&xor (@x[$b1],$xc_)", "&rol (@x[$b1],12)", "&add (@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&xor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&rol (@x[$d0],8)", "&add (@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&xor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&rol (@x[$d1],8)", "&add ($xc,@x[$d0])", "&xor (@x[$b0],$xc)", "&rol (@x[$b0],7)", "&add ($xc_,@x[$d1])", "&xor (@x[$b1],$xc_)", "&rol (@x[$b1],7)", "&mov (\"4*$c0(%rsp)\",$xc)", # reload pair of 'c's "&mov (\"4*$c1(%rsp)\",$xc_)", "&mov ($xc,\"4*$c2(%rsp)\")", "&mov ($xc_,\"4*$c3(%rsp)\")", "&add (@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", # Q3 "&xor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&rol (@x[$d2],16)", "&add (@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", # Q4 "&xor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&rol (@x[$d3],16)", "&add ($xc,@x[$d2])", "&xor (@x[$b2],$xc)", "&rol (@x[$b2],12)", "&add ($xc_,@x[$d3])", "&xor (@x[$b3],$xc_)", "&rol (@x[$b3],12)", "&add (@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&xor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&rol (@x[$d2],8)", "&add (@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&xor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&rol (@x[$d3],8)", "&add ($xc,@x[$d2])", "&xor (@x[$b2],$xc)", "&rol (@x[$b2],7)", "&add ($xc_,@x[$d3])", "&xor (@x[$b3],$xc_)", "&rol (@x[$b3],7)" ); } ######################################################################## # Generic code path that handles all lengths on pre-SSSE3 processors. $code.=<<___; .globl ChaCha20_ctr32 .type ChaCha20_ctr32,\@function,5 .align 64 ChaCha20_ctr32: cmp \$0,$len je .Lno_data mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r10 test \$`1<<(41-32)`,%r10d jnz .LChaCha20_ssse3 push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 sub \$64+24,%rsp #movdqa .Lsigma(%rip),%xmm0 movdqu ($key),%xmm1 movdqu 16($key),%xmm2 movdqu ($counter),%xmm3 movdqa .Lone(%rip),%xmm4 #movdqa %xmm0,4*0(%rsp) # key[0] movdqa %xmm1,4*4(%rsp) # key[1] movdqa %xmm2,4*8(%rsp) # key[2] movdqa %xmm3,4*12(%rsp) # key[3] mov $len,%rbp # reassign $len jmp .Loop_outer .align 32 .Loop_outer: mov \$0x61707865,@x[0] # 'expa' mov \$0x3320646e,@x[1] # 'nd 3' mov \$0x79622d32,@x[2] # '2-by' mov \$0x6b206574,@x[3] # 'te k' mov 4*4(%rsp),@x[4] mov 4*5(%rsp),@x[5] mov 4*6(%rsp),@x[6] mov 4*7(%rsp),@x[7] movd %xmm3,@x[12] mov 4*13(%rsp),@x[13] mov 4*14(%rsp),@x[14] mov 4*15(%rsp),@x[15] mov %rbp,64+0(%rsp) # save len mov \$10,%ebp mov $inp,64+8(%rsp) # save inp movq %xmm2,%rsi # "@x[8]" mov $out,64+16(%rsp) # save out mov %rsi,%rdi shr \$32,%rdi # "@x[9]" jmp .Loop .align 32 .Loop: ___ foreach (&ROUND (0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&ROUND (0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } &dec ("%ebp"); &jnz (".Loop"); $code.=<<___; mov @t[1],4*9(%rsp) # modulo-scheduled mov @t[0],4*8(%rsp) mov 64(%rsp),%rbp # load len movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1 mov 64+8(%rsp),$inp # load inp paddd %xmm4,%xmm3 # increment counter mov 64+16(%rsp),$out # load out add \$0x61707865,@x[0] # 'expa' add \$0x3320646e,@x[1] # 'nd 3' add \$0x79622d32,@x[2] # '2-by' add \$0x6b206574,@x[3] # 'te k' add 4*4(%rsp),@x[4] add 4*5(%rsp),@x[5] add 4*6(%rsp),@x[6] add 4*7(%rsp),@x[7] add 4*12(%rsp),@x[12] add 4*13(%rsp),@x[13] add 4*14(%rsp),@x[14] add 4*15(%rsp),@x[15] paddd 4*8(%rsp),%xmm1 cmp \$64,%rbp jb .Ltail xor 4*0($inp),@x[0] # xor with input xor 4*1($inp),@x[1] xor 4*2($inp),@x[2] xor 4*3($inp),@x[3] xor 4*4($inp),@x[4] xor 4*5($inp),@x[5] xor 4*6($inp),@x[6] xor 4*7($inp),@x[7] movdqu 4*8($inp),%xmm0 xor 4*12($inp),@x[12] xor 4*13($inp),@x[13] xor 4*14($inp),@x[14] xor 4*15($inp),@x[15] lea 4*16($inp),$inp # inp+=64 pxor %xmm1,%xmm0 movdqa %xmm2,4*8(%rsp) movd %xmm3,4*12(%rsp) mov @x[0],4*0($out) # write output mov @x[1],4*1($out) mov @x[2],4*2($out) mov @x[3],4*3($out) mov @x[4],4*4($out) mov @x[5],4*5($out) mov @x[6],4*6($out) mov @x[7],4*7($out) movdqu %xmm0,4*8($out) mov @x[12],4*12($out) mov @x[13],4*13($out) mov @x[14],4*14($out) mov @x[15],4*15($out) lea 4*16($out),$out # out+=64 sub \$64,%rbp jnz .Loop_outer jmp .Ldone .align 16 .Ltail: mov @x[0],4*0(%rsp) mov @x[1],4*1(%rsp) xor %rbx,%rbx mov @x[2],4*2(%rsp) mov @x[3],4*3(%rsp) mov @x[4],4*4(%rsp) mov @x[5],4*5(%rsp) mov @x[6],4*6(%rsp) mov @x[7],4*7(%rsp) movdqa %xmm1,4*8(%rsp) mov @x[12],4*12(%rsp) mov @x[13],4*13(%rsp) mov @x[14],4*14(%rsp) mov @x[15],4*15(%rsp) .Loop_tail: movzb ($inp,%rbx),%eax movzb (%rsp,%rbx),%edx lea 1(%rbx),%rbx xor %edx,%eax mov %al,-1($out,%rbx) dec %rbp jnz .Loop_tail .Ldone: add \$64+24,%rsp pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx .Lno_data: ret .size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32 ___ ######################################################################## # SSSE3 code path that handles shorter lengths { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t,$t1,$rot16,$rot24)=map("%xmm$_",(0..7)); sub SSSE3ROUND { # critical path is 20 "SIMD ticks" per round &paddd ($a,$b); &pxor ($d,$a); &pshufb ($d,$rot16); &paddd ($c,$d); &pxor ($b,$c); &movdqa ($t,$b); &psrld ($b,20); &pslld ($t,12); &por ($b,$t); &paddd ($a,$b); &pxor ($d,$a); &pshufb ($d,$rot24); &paddd ($c,$d); &pxor ($b,$c); &movdqa ($t,$b); &psrld ($b,25); &pslld ($t,7); &por ($b,$t); } my $xframe = $win64 ? 32+32+8 : 24; $code.=<<___; .type ChaCha20_ssse3,\@function,5 .align 32 ChaCha20_ssse3: .LChaCha20_ssse3: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx); test \$`1<<(43-32)`,%r10d jnz .LChaCha20_4xop # XOP is fastest even if we use 1/4 ___ $code.=<<___; cmp \$128,$len # we might throw away some data, ja .LChaCha20_4x # but overall it won't be slower .Ldo_sse3_after_all: push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 sub \$64+$xframe,%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,64+32(%rsp) movaps %xmm7,64+48(%rsp) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa .Lsigma(%rip),$a movdqu ($key),$b movdqu 16($key),$c movdqu ($counter),$d movdqa .Lrot16(%rip),$rot16 movdqa .Lrot24(%rip),$rot24 movdqa $a,0x00(%rsp) movdqa $b,0x10(%rsp) movdqa $c,0x20(%rsp) movdqa $d,0x30(%rsp) mov \$10,%ebp jmp .Loop_ssse3 .align 32 .Loop_outer_ssse3: movdqa .Lone(%rip),$d movdqa 0x00(%rsp),$a movdqa 0x10(%rsp),$b movdqa 0x20(%rsp),$c paddd 0x30(%rsp),$d mov \$10,%ebp movdqa $d,0x30(%rsp) jmp .Loop_ssse3 .align 32 .Loop_ssse3: ___ &SSSE3ROUND(); &pshufd ($c,$c,0b01001110); &pshufd ($b,$b,0b00111001); &pshufd ($d,$d,0b10010011); &nop (); &SSSE3ROUND(); &pshufd ($c,$c,0b01001110); &pshufd ($b,$b,0b10010011); &pshufd ($d,$d,0b00111001); &dec ("%ebp"); &jnz (".Loop_ssse3"); $code.=<<___; paddd 0x00(%rsp),$a paddd 0x10(%rsp),$b paddd 0x20(%rsp),$c paddd 0x30(%rsp),$d cmp \$64,$len jb .Ltail_ssse3 movdqu 0x00($inp),$t movdqu 0x10($inp),$t1 pxor $t,$a # xor with input movdqu 0x20($inp),$t pxor $t1,$b movdqu 0x30($inp),$t1 lea 0x40($inp),$inp # inp+=64 pxor $t,$c pxor $t1,$d movdqu $a,0x00($out) # write output movdqu $b,0x10($out) movdqu $c,0x20($out) movdqu $d,0x30($out) lea 0x40($out),$out # out+=64 sub \$64,$len jnz .Loop_outer_ssse3 jmp .Ldone_ssse3 .align 16 .Ltail_ssse3: movdqa $a,0x00(%rsp) movdqa $b,0x10(%rsp) movdqa $c,0x20(%rsp) movdqa $d,0x30(%rsp) xor %rbx,%rbx .Loop_tail_ssse3: movzb ($inp,%rbx),%eax movzb (%rsp,%rbx),%ecx lea 1(%rbx),%rbx xor %ecx,%eax mov %al,-1($out,%rbx) dec $len jnz .Loop_tail_ssse3 .Ldone_ssse3: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 64+32(%rsp),%xmm6 movaps 64+48(%rsp),%xmm7 ___ $code.=<<___; add \$64+$xframe,%rsp pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx ret .size ChaCha20_ssse3,.-ChaCha20_ssse3 ___ } ######################################################################## # SSSE3 code path that handles longer messages. { # assign variables to favor Atom front-end my ($xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3, $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3, $xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3)=map("%xmm$_",(0..15)); my @xx=($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3, "%nox","%nox","%nox","%nox", $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3); sub SSSE3_lane_ROUND { my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); my ($xc,$xc_,$t0,$t1)=map("\"$_\"",$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3); my @x=map("\"$_\"",@xx); # Consider order in which variables are addressed by their # index: # # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 # # 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers, # @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If # you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is # invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload # them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see # bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in # the beginning or end. ( "&paddd (@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", # Q1 "&paddd (@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", # Q2 "&pxor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&pxor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&pshufb (@x[$d0],$t1)", "&pshufb (@x[$d1],$t1)", "&paddd ($xc,@x[$d0])", "&paddd ($xc_,@x[$d1])", "&pxor (@x[$b0],$xc)", "&pxor (@x[$b1],$xc_)", "&movdqa ($t0,@x[$b0])", "&pslld (@x[$b0],12)", "&psrld ($t0,20)", "&movdqa ($t1,@x[$b1])", "&pslld (@x[$b1],12)", "&por (@x[$b0],$t0)", "&psrld ($t1,20)", "&movdqa ($t0,'(%r11)')", # .Lrot24(%rip) "&por (@x[$b1],$t1)", "&paddd (@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&paddd (@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&pxor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&pxor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&pshufb (@x[$d0],$t0)", "&pshufb (@x[$d1],$t0)", "&paddd ($xc,@x[$d0])", "&paddd ($xc_,@x[$d1])", "&pxor (@x[$b0],$xc)", "&pxor (@x[$b1],$xc_)", "&movdqa ($t1,@x[$b0])", "&pslld (@x[$b0],7)", "&psrld ($t1,25)", "&movdqa ($t0,@x[$b1])", "&pslld (@x[$b1],7)", "&por (@x[$b0],$t1)", "&psrld ($t0,25)", "&movdqa ($t1,'(%r10)')", # .Lrot16(%rip) "&por (@x[$b1],$t0)", "&movdqa (\"`16*($c0-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc)", # reload pair of 'c's "&movdqa (\"`16*($c1-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc_)", "&movdqa ($xc,\"`16*($c2-8)`(%rsp)\")", "&movdqa ($xc_,\"`16*($c3-8)`(%rsp)\")", "&paddd (@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", # Q3 "&paddd (@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", # Q4 "&pxor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&pxor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&pshufb (@x[$d2],$t1)", "&pshufb (@x[$d3],$t1)", "&paddd ($xc,@x[$d2])", "&paddd ($xc_,@x[$d3])", "&pxor (@x[$b2],$xc)", "&pxor (@x[$b3],$xc_)", "&movdqa ($t0,@x[$b2])", "&pslld (@x[$b2],12)", "&psrld ($t0,20)", "&movdqa ($t1,@x[$b3])", "&pslld (@x[$b3],12)", "&por (@x[$b2],$t0)", "&psrld ($t1,20)", "&movdqa ($t0,'(%r11)')", # .Lrot24(%rip) "&por (@x[$b3],$t1)", "&paddd (@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&paddd (@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&pxor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&pxor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&pshufb (@x[$d2],$t0)", "&pshufb (@x[$d3],$t0)", "&paddd ($xc,@x[$d2])", "&paddd ($xc_,@x[$d3])", "&pxor (@x[$b2],$xc)", "&pxor (@x[$b3],$xc_)", "&movdqa ($t1,@x[$b2])", "&pslld (@x[$b2],7)", "&psrld ($t1,25)", "&movdqa ($t0,@x[$b3])", "&pslld (@x[$b3],7)", "&por (@x[$b2],$t1)", "&psrld ($t0,25)", "&movdqa ($t1,'(%r10)')", # .Lrot16(%rip) "&por (@x[$b3],$t0)" ); } my $xframe = $win64 ? 0xa0 : 0; $code.=<<___; .type ChaCha20_4x,\@function,5 .align 32 ChaCha20_4x: .LChaCha20_4x: mov %r10,%r11 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); shr \$32,%r10 # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8 test \$`1<<5`,%r10 # test AVX2 jnz .LChaCha20_8x ___ $code.=<<___; cmp \$192,$len ja .Lproceed4x and \$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r11 # isolate XSAVE+MOVBE cmp \$`1<<22`,%r11 # check for MOVBE without XSAVE je .Ldo_sse3_after_all # to detect Atom .Lproceed4x: lea -0x78(%rsp),%r11 sub \$0x148+$xframe,%rsp ___ ################ stack layout # +0x00 SIMD equivalent of @x[8-12] # ... # +0x40 constant copy of key[0-2] smashed by lanes # ... # +0x100 SIMD counters (with nonce smashed by lanes) # ... # +0x140 $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,-0x30(%r11) movaps %xmm7,-0x20(%r11) movaps %xmm8,-0x10(%r11) movaps %xmm9,0x00(%r11) movaps %xmm10,0x10(%r11) movaps %xmm11,0x20(%r11) movaps %xmm12,0x30(%r11) movaps %xmm13,0x40(%r11) movaps %xmm14,0x50(%r11) movaps %xmm15,0x60(%r11) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa .Lsigma(%rip),$xa3 # key[0] movdqu ($key),$xb3 # key[1] movdqu 16($key),$xt3 # key[2] movdqu ($counter),$xd3 # key[3] lea 0x100(%rsp),%rcx # size optimization lea .Lrot16(%rip),%r10 lea .Lrot24(%rip),%r11 pshufd \$0x00,$xa3,$xa0 # smash key by lanes... pshufd \$0x55,$xa3,$xa1 movdqa $xa0,0x40(%rsp) # ... and offload pshufd \$0xaa,$xa3,$xa2 movdqa $xa1,0x50(%rsp) pshufd \$0xff,$xa3,$xa3 movdqa $xa2,0x60(%rsp) movdqa $xa3,0x70(%rsp) pshufd \$0x00,$xb3,$xb0 pshufd \$0x55,$xb3,$xb1 movdqa $xb0,0x80-0x100(%rcx) pshufd \$0xaa,$xb3,$xb2 movdqa $xb1,0x90-0x100(%rcx) pshufd \$0xff,$xb3,$xb3 movdqa $xb2,0xa0-0x100(%rcx) movdqa $xb3,0xb0-0x100(%rcx) pshufd \$0x00,$xt3,$xt0 # "$xc0" pshufd \$0x55,$xt3,$xt1 # "$xc1" movdqa $xt0,0xc0-0x100(%rcx) pshufd \$0xaa,$xt3,$xt2 # "$xc2" movdqa $xt1,0xd0-0x100(%rcx) pshufd \$0xff,$xt3,$xt3 # "$xc3" movdqa $xt2,0xe0-0x100(%rcx) movdqa $xt3,0xf0-0x100(%rcx) pshufd \$0x00,$xd3,$xd0 pshufd \$0x55,$xd3,$xd1 paddd .Linc(%rip),$xd0 # don't save counters yet pshufd \$0xaa,$xd3,$xd2 movdqa $xd1,0x110-0x100(%rcx) pshufd \$0xff,$xd3,$xd3 movdqa $xd2,0x120-0x100(%rcx) movdqa $xd3,0x130-0x100(%rcx) jmp .Loop_enter4x .align 32 .Loop_outer4x: movdqa 0x40(%rsp),$xa0 # re-load smashed key movdqa 0x50(%rsp),$xa1 movdqa 0x60(%rsp),$xa2 movdqa 0x70(%rsp),$xa3 movdqa 0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0 movdqa 0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1 movdqa 0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2 movdqa 0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3 movdqa 0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xt0 # "$xc0" movdqa 0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xt1 # "$xc1" movdqa 0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xt2 # "$xc2" movdqa 0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xt3 # "$xc3" movdqa 0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0 movdqa 0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1 movdqa 0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2 movdqa 0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3 paddd .Lfour(%rip),$xd0 # next SIMD counters .Loop_enter4x: movdqa $xt2,0x20(%rsp) # SIMD equivalent of "@x[10]" movdqa $xt3,0x30(%rsp) # SIMD equivalent of "@x[11]" movdqa (%r10),$xt3 # .Lrot16(%rip) mov \$10,%eax movdqa $xd0,0x100-0x100(%rcx) # save SIMD counters jmp .Loop4x .align 32 .Loop4x: ___ foreach (&SSSE3_lane_ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&SSSE3_lane_ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } $code.=<<___; dec %eax jnz .Loop4x paddd 0x40(%rsp),$xa0 # accumulate key material paddd 0x50(%rsp),$xa1 paddd 0x60(%rsp),$xa2 paddd 0x70(%rsp),$xa3 movdqa $xa0,$xt2 # "de-interlace" data punpckldq $xa1,$xa0 movdqa $xa2,$xt3 punpckldq $xa3,$xa2 punpckhdq $xa1,$xt2 punpckhdq $xa3,$xt3 movdqa $xa0,$xa1 punpcklqdq $xa2,$xa0 # "a0" movdqa $xt2,$xa3 punpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2 # "a2" punpckhqdq $xa2,$xa1 # "a1" punpckhqdq $xt3,$xa3 # "a3" ___ ($xa2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xa2); $code.=<<___; paddd 0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0 paddd 0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1 paddd 0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2 paddd 0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3 movdqa $xa0,0x00(%rsp) # offload $xaN movdqa $xa1,0x10(%rsp) movdqa 0x20(%rsp),$xa0 # "xc2" movdqa 0x30(%rsp),$xa1 # "xc3" movdqa $xb0,$xt2 punpckldq $xb1,$xb0 movdqa $xb2,$xt3 punpckldq $xb3,$xb2 punpckhdq $xb1,$xt2 punpckhdq $xb3,$xt3 movdqa $xb0,$xb1 punpcklqdq $xb2,$xb0 # "b0" movdqa $xt2,$xb3 punpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2 # "b2" punpckhqdq $xb2,$xb1 # "b1" punpckhqdq $xt3,$xb3 # "b3" ___ ($xb2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xb2); my ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)=($xt0,$xt1,$xa0,$xa1); $code.=<<___; paddd 0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xc0 paddd 0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xc1 paddd 0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xc2 paddd 0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xc3 movdqa $xa2,0x20(%rsp) # keep offloading $xaN movdqa $xa3,0x30(%rsp) movdqa $xc0,$xt2 punpckldq $xc1,$xc0 movdqa $xc2,$xt3 punpckldq $xc3,$xc2 punpckhdq $xc1,$xt2 punpckhdq $xc3,$xt3 movdqa $xc0,$xc1 punpcklqdq $xc2,$xc0 # "c0" movdqa $xt2,$xc3 punpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2 # "c2" punpckhqdq $xc2,$xc1 # "c1" punpckhqdq $xt3,$xc3 # "c3" ___ ($xc2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xc2); ($xt0,$xt1)=($xa2,$xa3); # use $xaN as temporary $code.=<<___; paddd 0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0 paddd 0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1 paddd 0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2 paddd 0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3 movdqa $xd0,$xt2 punpckldq $xd1,$xd0 movdqa $xd2,$xt3 punpckldq $xd3,$xd2 punpckhdq $xd1,$xt2 punpckhdq $xd3,$xt3 movdqa $xd0,$xd1 punpcklqdq $xd2,$xd0 # "d0" movdqa $xt2,$xd3 punpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2 # "d2" punpckhqdq $xd2,$xd1 # "d1" punpckhqdq $xt3,$xd3 # "d3" ___ ($xd2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xd2); $code.=<<___; cmp \$64*4,$len jb .Ltail4x movdqu 0x00($inp),$xt0 # xor with input movdqu 0x10($inp),$xt1 movdqu 0x20($inp),$xt2 movdqu 0x30($inp),$xt3 pxor 0x00(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaN is offloaded, remember? pxor $xb0,$xt1 pxor $xc0,$xt2 pxor $xd0,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x00($out) movdqu 0x40($inp),$xt0 movdqu $xt1,0x10($out) movdqu 0x50($inp),$xt1 movdqu $xt2,0x20($out) movdqu 0x60($inp),$xt2 movdqu $xt3,0x30($out) movdqu 0x70($inp),$xt3 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization pxor 0x10(%rsp),$xt0 pxor $xb1,$xt1 pxor $xc1,$xt2 pxor $xd1,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x40($out) movdqu 0x00($inp),$xt0 movdqu $xt1,0x50($out) movdqu 0x10($inp),$xt1 movdqu $xt2,0x60($out) movdqu 0x20($inp),$xt2 movdqu $xt3,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization movdqu 0x30($inp),$xt3 pxor 0x20(%rsp),$xt0 pxor $xb2,$xt1 pxor $xc2,$xt2 pxor $xd2,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x00($out) movdqu 0x40($inp),$xt0 movdqu $xt1,0x10($out) movdqu 0x50($inp),$xt1 movdqu $xt2,0x20($out) movdqu 0x60($inp),$xt2 movdqu $xt3,0x30($out) movdqu 0x70($inp),$xt3 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # inp+=64*4 pxor 0x30(%rsp),$xt0 pxor $xb3,$xt1 pxor $xc3,$xt2 pxor $xd3,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x40($out) movdqu $xt1,0x50($out) movdqu $xt2,0x60($out) movdqu $xt3,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # out+=64*4 sub \$64*4,$len jnz .Loop_outer4x jmp .Ldone4x .Ltail4x: cmp \$192,$len jae .L192_or_more4x cmp \$128,$len jae .L128_or_more4x cmp \$64,$len jae .L64_or_more4x #movdqa 0x00(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaN is offloaded, remember? xor %r10,%r10 #movdqa $xt0,0x00(%rsp) movdqa $xb0,0x10(%rsp) movdqa $xc0,0x20(%rsp) movdqa $xd0,0x30(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail4x .align 32 .L64_or_more4x: movdqu 0x00($inp),$xt0 # xor with input movdqu 0x10($inp),$xt1 movdqu 0x20($inp),$xt2 movdqu 0x30($inp),$xt3 pxor 0x00(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaxN is offloaded, remember? pxor $xb0,$xt1 pxor $xc0,$xt2 pxor $xd0,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x00($out) movdqu $xt1,0x10($out) movdqu $xt2,0x20($out) movdqu $xt3,0x30($out) je .Ldone4x movdqa 0x10(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaN is offloaded, remember? lea 0x40($inp),$inp # inp+=64*1 xor %r10,%r10 movdqa $xt0,0x00(%rsp) movdqa $xb1,0x10(%rsp) lea 0x40($out),$out # out+=64*1 movdqa $xc1,0x20(%rsp) sub \$64,$len # len-=64*1 movdqa $xd1,0x30(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail4x .align 32 .L128_or_more4x: movdqu 0x00($inp),$xt0 # xor with input movdqu 0x10($inp),$xt1 movdqu 0x20($inp),$xt2 movdqu 0x30($inp),$xt3 pxor 0x00(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaN is offloaded, remember? pxor $xb0,$xt1 pxor $xc0,$xt2 pxor $xd0,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x00($out) movdqu 0x40($inp),$xt0 movdqu $xt1,0x10($out) movdqu 0x50($inp),$xt1 movdqu $xt2,0x20($out) movdqu 0x60($inp),$xt2 movdqu $xt3,0x30($out) movdqu 0x70($inp),$xt3 pxor 0x10(%rsp),$xt0 pxor $xb1,$xt1 pxor $xc1,$xt2 pxor $xd1,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x40($out) movdqu $xt1,0x50($out) movdqu $xt2,0x60($out) movdqu $xt3,0x70($out) je .Ldone4x movdqa 0x20(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaN is offloaded, remember? lea 0x80($inp),$inp # inp+=64*2 xor %r10,%r10 movdqa $xt0,0x00(%rsp) movdqa $xb2,0x10(%rsp) lea 0x80($out),$out # out+=64*2 movdqa $xc2,0x20(%rsp) sub \$128,$len # len-=64*2 movdqa $xd2,0x30(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail4x .align 32 .L192_or_more4x: movdqu 0x00($inp),$xt0 # xor with input movdqu 0x10($inp),$xt1 movdqu 0x20($inp),$xt2 movdqu 0x30($inp),$xt3 pxor 0x00(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaN is offloaded, remember? pxor $xb0,$xt1 pxor $xc0,$xt2 pxor $xd0,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x00($out) movdqu 0x40($inp),$xt0 movdqu $xt1,0x10($out) movdqu 0x50($inp),$xt1 movdqu $xt2,0x20($out) movdqu 0x60($inp),$xt2 movdqu $xt3,0x30($out) movdqu 0x70($inp),$xt3 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization pxor 0x10(%rsp),$xt0 pxor $xb1,$xt1 pxor $xc1,$xt2 pxor $xd1,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x40($out) movdqu 0x00($inp),$xt0 movdqu $xt1,0x50($out) movdqu 0x10($inp),$xt1 movdqu $xt2,0x60($out) movdqu 0x20($inp),$xt2 movdqu $xt3,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization movdqu 0x30($inp),$xt3 pxor 0x20(%rsp),$xt0 pxor $xb2,$xt1 pxor $xc2,$xt2 pxor $xd2,$xt3 movdqu $xt0,0x00($out) movdqu $xt1,0x10($out) movdqu $xt2,0x20($out) movdqu $xt3,0x30($out) je .Ldone4x movdqa 0x30(%rsp),$xt0 # $xaN is offloaded, remember? lea 0x40($inp),$inp # inp+=64*3 xor %r10,%r10 movdqa $xt0,0x00(%rsp) movdqa $xb3,0x10(%rsp) lea 0x40($out),$out # out+=64*3 movdqa $xc3,0x20(%rsp) sub \$192,$len # len-=64*3 movdqa $xd3,0x30(%rsp) .Loop_tail4x: movzb ($inp,%r10),%eax movzb (%rsp,%r10),%ecx lea 1(%r10),%r10 xor %ecx,%eax mov %al,-1($out,%r10) dec $len jnz .Loop_tail4x .Ldone4x: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea 0x140+0x30(%rsp),%r11 movaps -0x30(%r11),%xmm6 movaps -0x20(%r11),%xmm7 movaps -0x10(%r11),%xmm8 movaps 0x00(%r11),%xmm9 movaps 0x10(%r11),%xmm10 movaps 0x20(%r11),%xmm11 movaps 0x30(%r11),%xmm12 movaps 0x40(%r11),%xmm13 movaps 0x50(%r11),%xmm14 movaps 0x60(%r11),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; add \$0x148+$xframe,%rsp ret .size ChaCha20_4x,.-ChaCha20_4x ___ } ######################################################################## # XOP code path that handles all lengths. if ($avx) { # There is some "anomaly" observed depending on instructions' size or # alignment. If you look closely at below code you'll notice that # sometimes argument order varies. The order affects instruction # encoding by making it larger, and such fiddling gives 5% performance # improvement. This is on FX-4100... my ($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3, $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3, $xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("%xmm$_",(0..15)); my @xx=($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3, $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3, $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3); sub XOP_lane_ROUND { my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); my @x=map("\"$_\"",@xx); ( "&vpaddd (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", # Q1 "&vpaddd (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", # Q2 "&vpaddd (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", # Q3 "&vpaddd (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", # Q4 "&vpxor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])", "&vpxor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])", "&vpxor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])", "&vpxor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])", "&vprotd (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)", "&vprotd (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)", "&vprotd (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)", "&vprotd (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)", "&vpaddd (@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])", "&vpaddd (@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])", "&vpaddd (@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])", "&vpaddd (@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])", "&vpxor (@x[$b0],@x[$c0],@x[$b0])", "&vpxor (@x[$b1],@x[$c1],@x[$b1])", "&vpxor (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])", # flip "&vpxor (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])", # flip "&vprotd (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],12)", "&vprotd (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],12)", "&vprotd (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],12)", "&vprotd (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],12)", "&vpaddd (@x[$a0],@x[$b0],@x[$a0])", # flip "&vpaddd (@x[$a1],@x[$b1],@x[$a1])", # flip "&vpaddd (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&vpaddd (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&vpxor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])", "&vpxor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])", "&vpxor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])", "&vpxor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])", "&vprotd (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],8)", "&vprotd (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],8)", "&vprotd (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],8)", "&vprotd (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],8)", "&vpaddd (@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])", "&vpaddd (@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])", "&vpaddd (@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])", "&vpaddd (@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])", "&vpxor (@x[$b0],@x[$c0],@x[$b0])", "&vpxor (@x[$b1],@x[$c1],@x[$b1])", "&vpxor (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])", # flip "&vpxor (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])", # flip "&vprotd (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],7)", "&vprotd (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],7)", "&vprotd (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],7)", "&vprotd (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],7)" ); } my $xframe = $win64 ? 0xa0 : 0; $code.=<<___; .type ChaCha20_4xop,\@function,5 .align 32 ChaCha20_4xop: .LChaCha20_4xop: lea -0x78(%rsp),%r11 sub \$0x148+$xframe,%rsp ___ ################ stack layout # +0x00 SIMD equivalent of @x[8-12] # ... # +0x40 constant copy of key[0-2] smashed by lanes # ... # +0x100 SIMD counters (with nonce smashed by lanes) # ... # +0x140 $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6,-0x30(%r11) movaps %xmm7,-0x20(%r11) movaps %xmm8,-0x10(%r11) movaps %xmm9,0x00(%r11) movaps %xmm10,0x10(%r11) movaps %xmm11,0x20(%r11) movaps %xmm12,0x30(%r11) movaps %xmm13,0x40(%r11) movaps %xmm14,0x50(%r11) movaps %xmm15,0x60(%r11) ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper vmovdqa .Lsigma(%rip),$xa3 # key[0] vmovdqu ($key),$xb3 # key[1] vmovdqu 16($key),$xt3 # key[2] vmovdqu ($counter),$xd3 # key[3] lea 0x100(%rsp),%rcx # size optimization vpshufd \$0x00,$xa3,$xa0 # smash key by lanes... vpshufd \$0x55,$xa3,$xa1 vmovdqa $xa0,0x40(%rsp) # ... and offload vpshufd \$0xaa,$xa3,$xa2 vmovdqa $xa1,0x50(%rsp) vpshufd \$0xff,$xa3,$xa3 vmovdqa $xa2,0x60(%rsp) vmovdqa $xa3,0x70(%rsp) vpshufd \$0x00,$xb3,$xb0 vpshufd \$0x55,$xb3,$xb1 vmovdqa $xb0,0x80-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xaa,$xb3,$xb2 vmovdqa $xb1,0x90-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xff,$xb3,$xb3 vmovdqa $xb2,0xa0-0x100(%rcx) vmovdqa $xb3,0xb0-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0x00,$xt3,$xt0 # "$xc0" vpshufd \$0x55,$xt3,$xt1 # "$xc1" vmovdqa $xt0,0xc0-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xaa,$xt3,$xt2 # "$xc2" vmovdqa $xt1,0xd0-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xff,$xt3,$xt3 # "$xc3" vmovdqa $xt2,0xe0-0x100(%rcx) vmovdqa $xt3,0xf0-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0x00,$xd3,$xd0 vpshufd \$0x55,$xd3,$xd1 vpaddd .Linc(%rip),$xd0,$xd0 # don't save counters yet vpshufd \$0xaa,$xd3,$xd2 vmovdqa $xd1,0x110-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xff,$xd3,$xd3 vmovdqa $xd2,0x120-0x100(%rcx) vmovdqa $xd3,0x130-0x100(%rcx) jmp .Loop_enter4xop .align 32 .Loop_outer4xop: vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),$xa0 # re-load smashed key vmovdqa 0x50(%rsp),$xa1 vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),$xa2 vmovdqa 0x70(%rsp),$xa3 vmovdqa 0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0 vmovdqa 0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1 vmovdqa 0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2 vmovdqa 0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3 vmovdqa 0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xt0 # "$xc0" vmovdqa 0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xt1 # "$xc1" vmovdqa 0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xt2 # "$xc2" vmovdqa 0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xt3 # "$xc3" vmovdqa 0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0 vmovdqa 0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1 vmovdqa 0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2 vmovdqa 0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3 vpaddd .Lfour(%rip),$xd0,$xd0 # next SIMD counters .Loop_enter4xop: mov \$10,%eax vmovdqa $xd0,0x100-0x100(%rcx) # save SIMD counters jmp .Loop4xop .align 32 .Loop4xop: ___ foreach (&XOP_lane_ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&XOP_lane_ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } $code.=<<___; dec %eax jnz .Loop4xop vpaddd 0x40(%rsp),$xa0,$xa0 # accumulate key material vpaddd 0x50(%rsp),$xa1,$xa1 vpaddd 0x60(%rsp),$xa2,$xa2 vpaddd 0x70(%rsp),$xa3,$xa3 vmovdqa $xt2,0x20(%rsp) # offload $xc2,3 vmovdqa $xt3,0x30(%rsp) vpunpckldq $xa1,$xa0,$xt2 # "de-interlace" data vpunpckldq $xa3,$xa2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xa1,$xa0,$xa0 vpunpckhdq $xa3,$xa2,$xa2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xa1 # "a0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "a1" vpunpcklqdq $xa2,$xa0,$xa3 # "a2" vpunpckhqdq $xa2,$xa0,$xa0 # "a3" ___ ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt2)=($xa1,$xt2,$xa3,$xa0,$xa2); $code.=<<___; vpaddd 0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xb0,$xb0 vpaddd 0x90-0x100(%rcx),$xb1,$xb1 vpaddd 0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xb2,$xb2 vpaddd 0xb0-0x100(%rcx),$xb3,$xb3 vmovdqa $xa0,0x00(%rsp) # offload $xa0,1 vmovdqa $xa1,0x10(%rsp) vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),$xa0 # "xc2" vmovdqa 0x30(%rsp),$xa1 # "xc3" vpunpckldq $xb1,$xb0,$xt2 vpunpckldq $xb3,$xb2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xb1,$xb0,$xb0 vpunpckhdq $xb3,$xb2,$xb2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xb1 # "b0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "b1" vpunpcklqdq $xb2,$xb0,$xb3 # "b2" vpunpckhqdq $xb2,$xb0,$xb0 # "b3" ___ ($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,$xt2)=($xb1,$xt2,$xb3,$xb0,$xb2); my ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)=($xt0,$xt1,$xa0,$xa1); $code.=<<___; vpaddd 0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xc0,$xc0 vpaddd 0xd0-0x100(%rcx),$xc1,$xc1 vpaddd 0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xc2,$xc2 vpaddd 0xf0-0x100(%rcx),$xc3,$xc3 vpunpckldq $xc1,$xc0,$xt2 vpunpckldq $xc3,$xc2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xc1,$xc0,$xc0 vpunpckhdq $xc3,$xc2,$xc2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xc1 # "c0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "c1" vpunpcklqdq $xc2,$xc0,$xc3 # "c2" vpunpckhqdq $xc2,$xc0,$xc0 # "c3" ___ ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xt2)=($xc1,$xt2,$xc3,$xc0,$xc2); $code.=<<___; vpaddd 0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xd0,$xd0 vpaddd 0x110-0x100(%rcx),$xd1,$xd1 vpaddd 0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xd2,$xd2 vpaddd 0x130-0x100(%rcx),$xd3,$xd3 vpunpckldq $xd1,$xd0,$xt2 vpunpckldq $xd3,$xd2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xd1,$xd0,$xd0 vpunpckhdq $xd3,$xd2,$xd2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xd1 # "d0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "d1" vpunpcklqdq $xd2,$xd0,$xd3 # "d2" vpunpckhqdq $xd2,$xd0,$xd0 # "d3" ___ ($xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3,$xt2)=($xd1,$xt2,$xd3,$xd0,$xd2); ($xa0,$xa1)=($xt2,$xt3); $code.=<<___; vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),$xa0 # restore $xa0,1 vmovdqa 0x10(%rsp),$xa1 cmp \$64*4,$len jb .Ltail4xop vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0x50($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0x70($inp),$xd1,$xd1 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa2,$xa2 vpxor 0x10($inp),$xb2,$xb2 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xc2,$xc2 vpxor 0x30($inp),$xd2,$xd2 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xa3,$xa3 vpxor 0x50($inp),$xb3,$xb3 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xc3,$xc3 vpxor 0x70($inp),$xd3,$xd3 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # inp+=64*4 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x10($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x30($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0x50($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization vmovdqu $xa2,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb2,0x10($out) vmovdqu $xc2,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xd2,0x30($out) vmovdqu $xa3,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xb3,0x50($out) vmovdqu $xc3,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xd3,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # out+=64*4 sub \$64*4,$len jnz .Loop_outer4xop jmp .Ldone4xop .align 32 .Ltail4xop: cmp \$192,$len jae .L192_or_more4xop cmp \$128,$len jae .L128_or_more4xop cmp \$64,$len jae .L64_or_more4xop xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xa0,0x00(%rsp) vmovdqa $xb0,0x10(%rsp) vmovdqa $xc0,0x20(%rsp) vmovdqa $xd0,0x30(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail4xop .align 32 .L64_or_more4xop: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x10($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x30($out) je .Ldone4xop lea 0x40($inp),$inp # inp+=64*1 vmovdqa $xa1,0x00(%rsp) xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xb1,0x10(%rsp) lea 0x40($out),$out # out+=64*1 vmovdqa $xc1,0x20(%rsp) sub \$64,$len # len-=64*1 vmovdqa $xd1,0x30(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail4xop .align 32 .L128_or_more4xop: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0x50($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0x70($inp),$xd1,$xd1 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x10($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x30($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0x50($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0x70($out) je .Ldone4xop lea 0x80($inp),$inp # inp+=64*2 vmovdqa $xa2,0x00(%rsp) xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xb2,0x10(%rsp) lea 0x80($out),$out # out+=64*2 vmovdqa $xc2,0x20(%rsp) sub \$128,$len # len-=64*2 vmovdqa $xd2,0x30(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail4xop .align 32 .L192_or_more4xop: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x10($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x30($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0x50($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0x70($inp),$xd1,$xd1 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa2,$xa2 vpxor 0x10($inp),$xb2,$xb2 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xc2,$xc2 vpxor 0x30($inp),$xd2,$xd2 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x10($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x30($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0x50($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0x70($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization vmovdqu $xa2,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb2,0x10($out) vmovdqu $xc2,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xd2,0x30($out) je .Ldone4xop lea 0x40($inp),$inp # inp+=64*3 vmovdqa $xa3,0x00(%rsp) xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xb3,0x10(%rsp) lea 0x40($out),$out # out+=64*3 vmovdqa $xc3,0x20(%rsp) sub \$192,$len # len-=64*3 vmovdqa $xd3,0x30(%rsp) .Loop_tail4xop: movzb ($inp,%r10),%eax movzb (%rsp,%r10),%ecx lea 1(%r10),%r10 xor %ecx,%eax mov %al,-1($out,%r10) dec $len jnz .Loop_tail4xop .Ldone4xop: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea 0x140+0x30(%rsp),%r11 movaps -0x30(%r11),%xmm6 movaps -0x20(%r11),%xmm7 movaps -0x10(%r11),%xmm8 movaps 0x00(%r11),%xmm9 movaps 0x10(%r11),%xmm10 movaps 0x20(%r11),%xmm11 movaps 0x30(%r11),%xmm12 movaps 0x40(%r11),%xmm13 movaps 0x50(%r11),%xmm14 movaps 0x60(%r11),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; add \$0x148+$xframe,%rsp ret .size ChaCha20_4xop,.-ChaCha20_4xop ___ } ######################################################################## # AVX2 code path if ($avx>1) { my ($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3, $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3, $xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("%ymm$_",(0..15)); my @xx=($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3, $xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3, "%nox","%nox","%nox","%nox", $xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3); sub AVX2_lane_ROUND { my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); my ($xc,$xc_,$t0,$t1)=map("\"$_\"",$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3); my @x=map("\"$_\"",@xx); # Consider order in which variables are addressed by their # index: # # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 # # 'a', 'b' and 'd's are permanently allocated in registers, # @x[0..7,12..15], while 'c's are maintained in memory. If # you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is # invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload # them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see # bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in # the beginning or end. ( "&vpaddd (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", # Q1 "&vpxor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],$t1)", "&vpaddd (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", # Q2 "&vpxor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],$t1)", "&vpaddd ($xc,$xc,@x[$d0])", "&vpxor (@x[$b0],$xc,@x[$b0])", "&vpslld ($t0,@x[$b0],12)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],20)", "&vpor (@x[$b0],$t0,@x[$b0])", "&vbroadcasti128($t0,'(%r11)')", # .Lrot24(%rip) "&vpaddd ($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d1])", "&vpxor (@x[$b1],$xc_,@x[$b1])", "&vpslld ($t1,@x[$b1],12)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],20)", "&vpor (@x[$b1],$t1,@x[$b1])", "&vpaddd (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&vpxor (@x[$d0],@x[$a0],@x[$d0])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],$t0)", "&vpaddd (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&vpxor (@x[$d1],@x[$a1],@x[$d1])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],$t0)", "&vpaddd ($xc,$xc,@x[$d0])", "&vpxor (@x[$b0],$xc,@x[$b0])", "&vpslld ($t1,@x[$b0],7)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],25)", "&vpor (@x[$b0],$t1,@x[$b0])", "&vbroadcasti128($t1,'(%r10)')", # .Lrot16(%rip) "&vpaddd ($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d1])", "&vpxor (@x[$b1],$xc_,@x[$b1])", "&vpslld ($t0,@x[$b1],7)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],25)", "&vpor (@x[$b1],$t0,@x[$b1])", "&vmovdqa (\"`32*($c0-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc)", # reload pair of 'c's "&vmovdqa (\"`32*($c1-8)`(%rsp)\",$xc_)", "&vmovdqa ($xc,\"`32*($c2-8)`(%rsp)\")", "&vmovdqa ($xc_,\"`32*($c3-8)`(%rsp)\")", "&vpaddd (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", # Q3 "&vpxor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],$t1)", "&vpaddd (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", # Q4 "&vpxor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],$t1)", "&vpaddd ($xc,$xc,@x[$d2])", "&vpxor (@x[$b2],$xc,@x[$b2])", "&vpslld ($t0,@x[$b2],12)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],20)", "&vpor (@x[$b2],$t0,@x[$b2])", "&vbroadcasti128($t0,'(%r11)')", # .Lrot24(%rip) "&vpaddd ($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d3])", "&vpxor (@x[$b3],$xc_,@x[$b3])", "&vpslld ($t1,@x[$b3],12)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],20)", "&vpor (@x[$b3],$t1,@x[$b3])", "&vpaddd (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&vpxor (@x[$d2],@x[$a2],@x[$d2])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],$t0)", "&vpaddd (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&vpxor (@x[$d3],@x[$a3],@x[$d3])", "&vpshufb (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],$t0)", "&vpaddd ($xc,$xc,@x[$d2])", "&vpxor (@x[$b2],$xc,@x[$b2])", "&vpslld ($t1,@x[$b2],7)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],25)", "&vpor (@x[$b2],$t1,@x[$b2])", "&vbroadcasti128($t1,'(%r10)')", # .Lrot16(%rip) "&vpaddd ($xc_,$xc_,@x[$d3])", "&vpxor (@x[$b3],$xc_,@x[$b3])", "&vpslld ($t0,@x[$b3],7)", "&vpsrld (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],25)", "&vpor (@x[$b3],$t0,@x[$b3])" ); } my $xframe = $win64 ? 0xb0 : 8; $code.=<<___; .type ChaCha20_8x,\@function,5 .align 32 ChaCha20_8x: .LChaCha20_8x: mov %rsp,%r10 sub \$0x280+$xframe,%rsp and \$-32,%rsp ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea 0x290+0x30(%rsp),%r11 movaps %xmm6,-0x30(%r11) movaps %xmm7,-0x20(%r11) movaps %xmm8,-0x10(%r11) movaps %xmm9,0x00(%r11) movaps %xmm10,0x10(%r11) movaps %xmm11,0x20(%r11) movaps %xmm12,0x30(%r11) movaps %xmm13,0x40(%r11) movaps %xmm14,0x50(%r11) movaps %xmm15,0x60(%r11) ___ $code.=<<___; vzeroupper mov %r10,0x280(%rsp) ################ stack layout # +0x00 SIMD equivalent of @x[8-12] # ... # +0x80 constant copy of key[0-2] smashed by lanes # ... # +0x200 SIMD counters (with nonce smashed by lanes) # ... # +0x280 saved %rsp vbroadcasti128 .Lsigma(%rip),$xa3 # key[0] vbroadcasti128 ($key),$xb3 # key[1] vbroadcasti128 16($key),$xt3 # key[2] vbroadcasti128 ($counter),$xd3 # key[3] lea 0x100(%rsp),%rcx # size optimization lea 0x200(%rsp),%rax # size optimization lea .Lrot16(%rip),%r10 lea .Lrot24(%rip),%r11 vpshufd \$0x00,$xa3,$xa0 # smash key by lanes... vpshufd \$0x55,$xa3,$xa1 vmovdqa $xa0,0x80-0x100(%rcx) # ... and offload vpshufd \$0xaa,$xa3,$xa2 vmovdqa $xa1,0xa0-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xff,$xa3,$xa3 vmovdqa $xa2,0xc0-0x100(%rcx) vmovdqa $xa3,0xe0-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0x00,$xb3,$xb0 vpshufd \$0x55,$xb3,$xb1 vmovdqa $xb0,0x100-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xaa,$xb3,$xb2 vmovdqa $xb1,0x120-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0xff,$xb3,$xb3 vmovdqa $xb2,0x140-0x100(%rcx) vmovdqa $xb3,0x160-0x100(%rcx) vpshufd \$0x00,$xt3,$xt0 # "xc0" vpshufd \$0x55,$xt3,$xt1 # "xc1" vmovdqa $xt0,0x180-0x200(%rax) vpshufd \$0xaa,$xt3,$xt2 # "xc2" vmovdqa $xt1,0x1a0-0x200(%rax) vpshufd \$0xff,$xt3,$xt3 # "xc3" vmovdqa $xt2,0x1c0-0x200(%rax) vmovdqa $xt3,0x1e0-0x200(%rax) vpshufd \$0x00,$xd3,$xd0 vpshufd \$0x55,$xd3,$xd1 vpaddd .Lincy(%rip),$xd0,$xd0 # don't save counters yet vpshufd \$0xaa,$xd3,$xd2 vmovdqa $xd1,0x220-0x200(%rax) vpshufd \$0xff,$xd3,$xd3 vmovdqa $xd2,0x240-0x200(%rax) vmovdqa $xd3,0x260-0x200(%rax) jmp .Loop_enter8x .align 32 .Loop_outer8x: vmovdqa 0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xa0 # re-load smashed key vmovdqa 0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xa1 vmovdqa 0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xa2 vmovdqa 0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xa3 vmovdqa 0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xb0 vmovdqa 0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xb1 vmovdqa 0x140-0x100(%rcx),$xb2 vmovdqa 0x160-0x100(%rcx),$xb3 vmovdqa 0x180-0x200(%rax),$xt0 # "xc0" vmovdqa 0x1a0-0x200(%rax),$xt1 # "xc1" vmovdqa 0x1c0-0x200(%rax),$xt2 # "xc2" vmovdqa 0x1e0-0x200(%rax),$xt3 # "xc3" vmovdqa 0x200-0x200(%rax),$xd0 vmovdqa 0x220-0x200(%rax),$xd1 vmovdqa 0x240-0x200(%rax),$xd2 vmovdqa 0x260-0x200(%rax),$xd3 vpaddd .Leight(%rip),$xd0,$xd0 # next SIMD counters .Loop_enter8x: vmovdqa $xt2,0x40(%rsp) # SIMD equivalent of "@x[10]" vmovdqa $xt3,0x60(%rsp) # SIMD equivalent of "@x[11]" vbroadcasti128 (%r10),$xt3 vmovdqa $xd0,0x200-0x200(%rax) # save SIMD counters mov \$10,%eax jmp .Loop8x .align 32 .Loop8x: ___ foreach (&AVX2_lane_ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&AVX2_lane_ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } $code.=<<___; dec %eax jnz .Loop8x lea 0x200(%rsp),%rax # size optimization vpaddd 0x80-0x100(%rcx),$xa0,$xa0 # accumulate key vpaddd 0xa0-0x100(%rcx),$xa1,$xa1 vpaddd 0xc0-0x100(%rcx),$xa2,$xa2 vpaddd 0xe0-0x100(%rcx),$xa3,$xa3 vpunpckldq $xa1,$xa0,$xt2 # "de-interlace" data vpunpckldq $xa3,$xa2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xa1,$xa0,$xa0 vpunpckhdq $xa3,$xa2,$xa2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xa1 # "a0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "a1" vpunpcklqdq $xa2,$xa0,$xa3 # "a2" vpunpckhqdq $xa2,$xa0,$xa0 # "a3" ___ ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt2)=($xa1,$xt2,$xa3,$xa0,$xa2); $code.=<<___; vpaddd 0x100-0x100(%rcx),$xb0,$xb0 vpaddd 0x120-0x100(%rcx),$xb1,$xb1 vpaddd 0x140-0x100(%rcx),$xb2,$xb2 vpaddd 0x160-0x100(%rcx),$xb3,$xb3 vpunpckldq $xb1,$xb0,$xt2 vpunpckldq $xb3,$xb2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xb1,$xb0,$xb0 vpunpckhdq $xb3,$xb2,$xb2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xb1 # "b0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "b1" vpunpcklqdq $xb2,$xb0,$xb3 # "b2" vpunpckhqdq $xb2,$xb0,$xb0 # "b3" ___ ($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,$xt2)=($xb1,$xt2,$xb3,$xb0,$xb2); $code.=<<___; vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xb0,$xa0,$xt3 # "de-interlace" further vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xb0,$xa0,$xb0 vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xb1,$xa1,$xa0 vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xb1,$xa1,$xb1 vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xb2,$xa2,$xa1 vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xb2,$xa2,$xb2 vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xb3,$xa3,$xa2 vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xb3,$xa3,$xb3 ___ ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt3)=($xt3,$xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3); my ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)=($xt0,$xt1,$xa0,$xa1); $code.=<<___; vmovdqa $xa0,0x00(%rsp) # offload $xaN vmovdqa $xa1,0x20(%rsp) vmovdqa 0x40(%rsp),$xc2 # $xa0 vmovdqa 0x60(%rsp),$xc3 # $xa1 vpaddd 0x180-0x200(%rax),$xc0,$xc0 vpaddd 0x1a0-0x200(%rax),$xc1,$xc1 vpaddd 0x1c0-0x200(%rax),$xc2,$xc2 vpaddd 0x1e0-0x200(%rax),$xc3,$xc3 vpunpckldq $xc1,$xc0,$xt2 vpunpckldq $xc3,$xc2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xc1,$xc0,$xc0 vpunpckhdq $xc3,$xc2,$xc2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xc1 # "c0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "c1" vpunpcklqdq $xc2,$xc0,$xc3 # "c2" vpunpckhqdq $xc2,$xc0,$xc0 # "c3" ___ ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xt2)=($xc1,$xt2,$xc3,$xc0,$xc2); $code.=<<___; vpaddd 0x200-0x200(%rax),$xd0,$xd0 vpaddd 0x220-0x200(%rax),$xd1,$xd1 vpaddd 0x240-0x200(%rax),$xd2,$xd2 vpaddd 0x260-0x200(%rax),$xd3,$xd3 vpunpckldq $xd1,$xd0,$xt2 vpunpckldq $xd3,$xd2,$xt3 vpunpckhdq $xd1,$xd0,$xd0 vpunpckhdq $xd3,$xd2,$xd2 vpunpcklqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xd1 # "d0" vpunpckhqdq $xt3,$xt2,$xt2 # "d1" vpunpcklqdq $xd2,$xd0,$xd3 # "d2" vpunpckhqdq $xd2,$xd0,$xd0 # "d3" ___ ($xd0,$xd1,$xd2,$xd3,$xt2)=($xd1,$xt2,$xd3,$xd0,$xd2); $code.=<<___; vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xd0,$xc0,$xt3 # "de-interlace" further vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xd0,$xc0,$xd0 vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xd1,$xc1,$xc0 vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xd1,$xc1,$xd1 vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xd2,$xc2,$xc1 vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xd2,$xc2,$xd2 vperm2i128 \$0x20,$xd3,$xc3,$xc2 vperm2i128 \$0x31,$xd3,$xc3,$xd3 ___ ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xt3)=($xt3,$xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3); ($xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3,$xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3)= ($xc0,$xc1,$xc2,$xc3,$xb0,$xb1,$xb2,$xb3); ($xa0,$xa1)=($xt2,$xt3); $code.=<<___; vmovdqa 0x00(%rsp),$xa0 # $xaN was offloaded, remember? vmovdqa 0x20(%rsp),$xa1 cmp \$64*8,$len jb .Ltail8x vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x60($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd1,$xd1 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization vmovdqu $xa1,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0x60($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa2,$xa2 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb2,$xb2 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc2,$xc2 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd2,$xd2 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization vmovdqu $xa2,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb2,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc2,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd2,0x60($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa3,$xa3 vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb3,$xb3 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc3,$xc3 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd3,$xd3 lea 0x80($inp),$inp # size optimization vmovdqu $xa3,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb3,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc3,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd3,0x60($out) lea 0x80($out),$out # size optimization sub \$64*8,$len jnz .Loop_outer8x jmp .Ldone8x .Ltail8x: cmp \$448,$len jae .L448_or_more8x cmp \$384,$len jae .L384_or_more8x cmp \$320,$len jae .L320_or_more8x cmp \$256,$len jae .L256_or_more8x cmp \$192,$len jae .L192_or_more8x cmp \$128,$len jae .L128_or_more8x cmp \$64,$len jae .L64_or_more8x xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xa0,0x00(%rsp) vmovdqa $xb0,0x20(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail8x .align 32 .L64_or_more8x: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) je .Ldone8x lea 0x40($inp),$inp # inp+=64*1 xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xc0,0x00(%rsp) lea 0x40($out),$out # out+=64*1 sub \$64,$len # len-=64*1 vmovdqa $xd0,0x20(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail8x .align 32 .L128_or_more8x: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x60($out) je .Ldone8x lea 0x80($inp),$inp # inp+=64*2 xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xa1,0x00(%rsp) lea 0x80($out),$out # out+=64*2 sub \$128,$len # len-=64*2 vmovdqa $xb1,0x20(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail8x .align 32 .L192_or_more8x: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x80($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0xa0($out) je .Ldone8x lea 0xc0($inp),$inp # inp+=64*3 xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xc1,0x00(%rsp) lea 0xc0($out),$out # out+=64*3 sub \$192,$len # len-=64*3 vmovdqa $xd1,0x20(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail8x .align 32 .L256_or_more8x: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x80($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0xa0($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0xc0($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0xe0($out) je .Ldone8x lea 0x100($inp),$inp # inp+=64*4 xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xa2,0x00(%rsp) lea 0x100($out),$out # out+=64*4 sub \$256,$len # len-=64*4 vmovdqa $xb2,0x20(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail8x .align 32 .L320_or_more8x: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1 vpxor 0x100($inp),$xa2,$xa2 vpxor 0x120($inp),$xb2,$xb2 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x80($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0xa0($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0xc0($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0xe0($out) vmovdqu $xa2,0x100($out) vmovdqu $xb2,0x120($out) je .Ldone8x lea 0x140($inp),$inp # inp+=64*5 xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xc2,0x00(%rsp) lea 0x140($out),$out # out+=64*5 sub \$320,$len # len-=64*5 vmovdqa $xd2,0x20(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail8x .align 32 .L384_or_more8x: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1 vpxor 0x100($inp),$xa2,$xa2 vpxor 0x120($inp),$xb2,$xb2 vpxor 0x140($inp),$xc2,$xc2 vpxor 0x160($inp),$xd2,$xd2 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x80($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0xa0($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0xc0($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0xe0($out) vmovdqu $xa2,0x100($out) vmovdqu $xb2,0x120($out) vmovdqu $xc2,0x140($out) vmovdqu $xd2,0x160($out) je .Ldone8x lea 0x180($inp),$inp # inp+=64*6 xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xa3,0x00(%rsp) lea 0x180($out),$out # out+=64*6 sub \$384,$len # len-=64*6 vmovdqa $xb3,0x20(%rsp) jmp .Loop_tail8x .align 32 .L448_or_more8x: vpxor 0x00($inp),$xa0,$xa0 # xor with input vpxor 0x20($inp),$xb0,$xb0 vpxor 0x40($inp),$xc0,$xc0 vpxor 0x60($inp),$xd0,$xd0 vpxor 0x80($inp),$xa1,$xa1 vpxor 0xa0($inp),$xb1,$xb1 vpxor 0xc0($inp),$xc1,$xc1 vpxor 0xe0($inp),$xd1,$xd1 vpxor 0x100($inp),$xa2,$xa2 vpxor 0x120($inp),$xb2,$xb2 vpxor 0x140($inp),$xc2,$xc2 vpxor 0x160($inp),$xd2,$xd2 vpxor 0x180($inp),$xa3,$xa3 vpxor 0x1a0($inp),$xb3,$xb3 vmovdqu $xa0,0x00($out) vmovdqu $xb0,0x20($out) vmovdqu $xc0,0x40($out) vmovdqu $xd0,0x60($out) vmovdqu $xa1,0x80($out) vmovdqu $xb1,0xa0($out) vmovdqu $xc1,0xc0($out) vmovdqu $xd1,0xe0($out) vmovdqu $xa2,0x100($out) vmovdqu $xb2,0x120($out) vmovdqu $xc2,0x140($out) vmovdqu $xd2,0x160($out) vmovdqu $xa3,0x180($out) vmovdqu $xb3,0x1a0($out) je .Ldone8x lea 0x1c0($inp),$inp # inp+=64*7 xor %r10,%r10 vmovdqa $xc3,0x00(%rsp) lea 0x1c0($out),$out # out+=64*7 sub \$448,$len # len-=64*7 vmovdqa $xd3,0x20(%rsp) .Loop_tail8x: movzb ($inp,%r10),%eax movzb (%rsp,%r10),%ecx lea 1(%r10),%r10 xor %ecx,%eax mov %al,-1($out,%r10) dec $len jnz .Loop_tail8x .Ldone8x: vzeroall ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea 0x290+0x30(%rsp),%r11 movaps -0x30(%r11),%xmm6 movaps -0x20(%r11),%xmm7 movaps -0x10(%r11),%xmm8 movaps 0x00(%r11),%xmm9 movaps 0x10(%r11),%xmm10 movaps 0x20(%r11),%xmm11 movaps 0x30(%r11),%xmm12 movaps 0x40(%r11),%xmm13 movaps 0x50(%r11),%xmm14 movaps 0x60(%r11),%xmm15 ___ $code.=<<___; mov 0x280(%rsp),%rsp ret .size ChaCha20_8x,.-ChaCha20_8x ___ } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/%x#%y/%x/go; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl0000755000000000000000000006432413176625656020204 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # June 2015 # # ChaCha20 for ARMv8. # # Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer. # # IALU/gcc-4.9 3xNEON+1xIALU 6xNEON+2xIALU # # Apple A7 5.50/+49% 3.33 1.70 # Cortex-A53 8.40/+80% 4.72 4.72(*) # Cortex-A57 8.06/+43% 4.90 4.43(**) # Denver 4.50/+82% 2.63 2.67(*) # X-Gene 9.50/+46% 8.82 8.89(*) # Mongoose 8.00/+44% 3.64 3.25 # # (*) it's expected that doubling interleave factor doesn't help # all processors, only those with higher NEON latency and # higher instruction issue rate; # (**) expected improvement was actually higher; $flavour=shift; $output=shift; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./; my $arg = pop; $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n"; } my ($out,$inp,$len,$key,$ctr) = map("x$_",(0..4)); my @x=map("x$_",(5..17,19..21)); my @d=map("x$_",(22..28,30)); sub ROUND { my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); ( "&add_32 (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&add_32 (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&add_32 (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&add_32 (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&ror_32 (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)", "&ror_32 (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)", "&ror_32 (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)", "&ror_32 (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)", "&add_32 (@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])", "&add_32 (@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])", "&add_32 (@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])", "&add_32 (@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])", "&ror_32 (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],20)", "&ror_32 (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],20)", "&ror_32 (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],20)", "&ror_32 (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],20)", "&add_32 (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&add_32 (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&add_32 (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&add_32 (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&eor_32 (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&ror_32 (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],24)", "&ror_32 (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],24)", "&ror_32 (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],24)", "&ror_32 (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],24)", "&add_32 (@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])", "&add_32 (@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])", "&add_32 (@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])", "&add_32 (@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])", "&eor_32 (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])", "&ror_32 (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],25)", "&ror_32 (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],25)", "&ror_32 (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],25)", "&ror_32 (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],25)" ); } $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P .align 5 .Lsigma: .quad 0x3320646e61707865,0x6b20657479622d32 // endian-neutral .Lone: .long 1,0,0,0 .LOPENSSL_armcap_P: #ifdef __ILP32__ .long OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #else .quad OPENSSL_armcap_P-. #endif .asciz "ChaCha20 for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .globl ChaCha20_ctr32 .type ChaCha20_ctr32,%function .align 5 ChaCha20_ctr32: cbz $len,.Labort adr @x[0],.LOPENSSL_armcap_P cmp $len,#192 b.lo .Lshort #ifdef __ILP32__ ldrsw @x[1],[@x[0]] #else ldr @x[1],[@x[0]] #endif ldr w17,[@x[1],@x[0]] tst w17,#ARMV7_NEON b.ne ChaCha20_neon .Lshort: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]! add x29,sp,#0 adr @x[0],.Lsigma stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] stp x27,x28,[sp,#80] sub sp,sp,#64 ldp @d[0],@d[1],[@x[0]] // load sigma ldp @d[2],@d[3],[$key] // load key ldp @d[4],@d[5],[$key,#16] ldp @d[6],@d[7],[$ctr] // load counter #ifdef __ARMEB__ ror @d[2],@d[2],#32 ror @d[3],@d[3],#32 ror @d[4],@d[4],#32 ror @d[5],@d[5],#32 ror @d[6],@d[6],#32 ror @d[7],@d[7],#32 #endif .Loop_outer: mov.32 @x[0],@d[0] // unpack key block lsr @x[1],@d[0],#32 mov.32 @x[2],@d[1] lsr @x[3],@d[1],#32 mov.32 @x[4],@d[2] lsr @x[5],@d[2],#32 mov.32 @x[6],@d[3] lsr @x[7],@d[3],#32 mov.32 @x[8],@d[4] lsr @x[9],@d[4],#32 mov.32 @x[10],@d[5] lsr @x[11],@d[5],#32 mov.32 @x[12],@d[6] lsr @x[13],@d[6],#32 mov.32 @x[14],@d[7] lsr @x[15],@d[7],#32 mov $ctr,#10 subs $len,$len,#64 .Loop: sub $ctr,$ctr,#1 ___ foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } $code.=<<___; cbnz $ctr,.Loop add.32 @x[0],@x[0],@d[0] // accumulate key block add @x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32 add.32 @x[2],@x[2],@d[1] add @x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32 add.32 @x[4],@x[4],@d[2] add @x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32 add.32 @x[6],@x[6],@d[3] add @x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32 add.32 @x[8],@x[8],@d[4] add @x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32 add.32 @x[10],@x[10],@d[5] add @x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32 add.32 @x[12],@x[12],@d[6] add @x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32 add.32 @x[14],@x[14],@d[7] add @x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32 b.lo .Ltail add @x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32 // pack add @x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32 ldp @x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0] // load input add @x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32 add @x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32 ldp @x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16] add @x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32 add @x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32 ldp @x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32] add @x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32 add @x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32 ldp @x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48] add $inp,$inp,#64 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[8],@x[8] rev @x[10],@x[10] rev @x[12],@x[12] rev @x[14],@x[14] #endif eor @x[0],@x[0],@x[1] eor @x[2],@x[2],@x[3] eor @x[4],@x[4],@x[5] eor @x[6],@x[6],@x[7] eor @x[8],@x[8],@x[9] eor @x[10],@x[10],@x[11] eor @x[12],@x[12],@x[13] eor @x[14],@x[14],@x[15] stp @x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0] // store output add @d[6],@d[6],#1 // increment counter stp @x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16] stp @x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32] stp @x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48] add $out,$out,#64 b.hi .Loop_outer ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] add sp,sp,#64 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96 .Labort: ret .align 4 .Ltail: add $len,$len,#64 .Less_than_64: sub $out,$out,#1 add $inp,$inp,$len add $out,$out,$len add $ctr,sp,$len neg $len,$len add @x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32 // pack add @x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32 add @x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32 add @x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32 add @x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32 add @x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32 add @x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32 add @x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[8],@x[8] rev @x[10],@x[10] rev @x[12],@x[12] rev @x[14],@x[14] #endif stp @x[0],@x[2],[sp,#0] stp @x[4],@x[6],[sp,#16] stp @x[8],@x[10],[sp,#32] stp @x[12],@x[14],[sp,#48] .Loop_tail: ldrb w10,[$inp,$len] ldrb w11,[$ctr,$len] add $len,$len,#1 eor w10,w10,w11 strb w10,[$out,$len] cbnz $len,.Loop_tail stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#0] stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#16] stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#32] stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#48] ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] add sp,sp,#64 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96 ret .size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32 ___ {{{ my ($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T0,$T1,$T2,$T3) = map("v$_.4s",(0..7,16..23)); my (@K)=map("v$_.4s",(24..30)); my $ONE="v31.4s"; sub NEONROUND { my $odd = pop; my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t)=@_; ( "&add ('$a','$a','$b')", "&eor ('$d','$d','$a')", "&rev32_16 ('$d','$d')", # vrot ($d,16) "&add ('$c','$c','$d')", "&eor ('$t','$b','$c')", "&ushr ('$b','$t',20)", "&sli ('$b','$t',12)", "&add ('$a','$a','$b')", "&eor ('$t','$d','$a')", "&ushr ('$d','$t',24)", "&sli ('$d','$t',8)", "&add ('$c','$c','$d')", "&eor ('$t','$b','$c')", "&ushr ('$b','$t',25)", "&sli ('$b','$t',7)", "&ext ('$c','$c','$c',8)", "&ext ('$d','$d','$d',$odd?4:12)", "&ext ('$b','$b','$b',$odd?12:4)" ); } $code.=<<___; .type ChaCha20_neon,%function .align 5 ChaCha20_neon: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]! add x29,sp,#0 adr @x[0],.Lsigma stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] stp x27,x28,[sp,#80] cmp $len,#512 b.hs .L512_or_more_neon sub sp,sp,#64 ldp @d[0],@d[1],[@x[0]] // load sigma ld1 {@K[0]},[@x[0]],#16 ldp @d[2],@d[3],[$key] // load key ldp @d[4],@d[5],[$key,#16] ld1 {@K[1],@K[2]},[$key] ldp @d[6],@d[7],[$ctr] // load counter ld1 {@K[3]},[$ctr] ld1 {$ONE},[@x[0]] #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev64 @K[0],@K[0] ror @d[2],@d[2],#32 ror @d[3],@d[3],#32 ror @d[4],@d[4],#32 ror @d[5],@d[5],#32 ror @d[6],@d[6],#32 ror @d[7],@d[7],#32 #endif add @K[3],@K[3],$ONE // += 1 add @K[4],@K[3],$ONE add @K[5],@K[4],$ONE shl $ONE,$ONE,#2 // 1 -> 4 .Loop_outer_neon: mov.32 @x[0],@d[0] // unpack key block lsr @x[1],@d[0],#32 mov $A0,@K[0] mov.32 @x[2],@d[1] lsr @x[3],@d[1],#32 mov $A1,@K[0] mov.32 @x[4],@d[2] lsr @x[5],@d[2],#32 mov $A2,@K[0] mov.32 @x[6],@d[3] mov $B0,@K[1] lsr @x[7],@d[3],#32 mov $B1,@K[1] mov.32 @x[8],@d[4] mov $B2,@K[1] lsr @x[9],@d[4],#32 mov $D0,@K[3] mov.32 @x[10],@d[5] mov $D1,@K[4] lsr @x[11],@d[5],#32 mov $D2,@K[5] mov.32 @x[12],@d[6] mov $C0,@K[2] lsr @x[13],@d[6],#32 mov $C1,@K[2] mov.32 @x[14],@d[7] mov $C2,@K[2] lsr @x[15],@d[7],#32 mov $ctr,#10 subs $len,$len,#256 .Loop_neon: sub $ctr,$ctr,#1 ___ my @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0); my @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0); my @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0); my @thread3=&ROUND(0,4,8,12); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread3)); } @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1); @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1); @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1); @thread3=&ROUND(0,5,10,15); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread3)); } $code.=<<___; cbnz $ctr,.Loop_neon add.32 @x[0],@x[0],@d[0] // accumulate key block add $A0,$A0,@K[0] add @x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32 add $A1,$A1,@K[0] add.32 @x[2],@x[2],@d[1] add $A2,$A2,@K[0] add @x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32 add $C0,$C0,@K[2] add.32 @x[4],@x[4],@d[2] add $C1,$C1,@K[2] add @x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32 add $C2,$C2,@K[2] add.32 @x[6],@x[6],@d[3] add $D0,$D0,@K[3] add @x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32 add.32 @x[8],@x[8],@d[4] add $D1,$D1,@K[4] add @x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32 add.32 @x[10],@x[10],@d[5] add $D2,$D2,@K[5] add @x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32 add.32 @x[12],@x[12],@d[6] add $B0,$B0,@K[1] add @x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32 add.32 @x[14],@x[14],@d[7] add $B1,$B1,@K[1] add @x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32 add $B2,$B2,@K[1] b.lo .Ltail_neon add @x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32 // pack add @x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32 ldp @x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0] // load input add @x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32 add @x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32 ldp @x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16] add @x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32 add @x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32 ldp @x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32] add @x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32 add @x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32 ldp @x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48] add $inp,$inp,#64 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[8],@x[8] rev @x[10],@x[10] rev @x[12],@x[12] rev @x[14],@x[14] #endif ld1.8 {$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64 eor @x[0],@x[0],@x[1] eor @x[2],@x[2],@x[3] eor @x[4],@x[4],@x[5] eor @x[6],@x[6],@x[7] eor @x[8],@x[8],@x[9] eor $A0,$A0,$T0 eor @x[10],@x[10],@x[11] eor $B0,$B0,$T1 eor @x[12],@x[12],@x[13] eor $C0,$C0,$T2 eor @x[14],@x[14],@x[15] eor $D0,$D0,$T3 ld1.8 {$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64 stp @x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0] // store output add @d[6],@d[6],#4 // increment counter stp @x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16] add @K[3],@K[3],$ONE // += 4 stp @x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32] add @K[4],@K[4],$ONE stp @x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48] add @K[5],@K[5],$ONE add $out,$out,#64 st1.8 {$A0-$D0},[$out],#64 ld1.8 {$A0-$D0},[$inp],#64 eor $A1,$A1,$T0 eor $B1,$B1,$T1 eor $C1,$C1,$T2 eor $D1,$D1,$T3 st1.8 {$A1-$D1},[$out],#64 eor $A2,$A2,$A0 eor $B2,$B2,$B0 eor $C2,$C2,$C0 eor $D2,$D2,$D0 st1.8 {$A2-$D2},[$out],#64 b.hi .Loop_outer_neon ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] add sp,sp,#64 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96 ret .Ltail_neon: add $len,$len,#256 cmp $len,#64 b.lo .Less_than_64 add @x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32 // pack add @x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32 ldp @x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0] // load input add @x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32 add @x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32 ldp @x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16] add @x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32 add @x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32 ldp @x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32] add @x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32 add @x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32 ldp @x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48] add $inp,$inp,#64 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[8],@x[8] rev @x[10],@x[10] rev @x[12],@x[12] rev @x[14],@x[14] #endif eor @x[0],@x[0],@x[1] eor @x[2],@x[2],@x[3] eor @x[4],@x[4],@x[5] eor @x[6],@x[6],@x[7] eor @x[8],@x[8],@x[9] eor @x[10],@x[10],@x[11] eor @x[12],@x[12],@x[13] eor @x[14],@x[14],@x[15] stp @x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0] // store output add @d[6],@d[6],#4 // increment counter stp @x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16] stp @x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32] stp @x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48] add $out,$out,#64 b.eq .Ldone_neon sub $len,$len,#64 cmp $len,#64 b.lo .Less_than_128 ld1.8 {$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64 eor $A0,$A0,$T0 eor $B0,$B0,$T1 eor $C0,$C0,$T2 eor $D0,$D0,$T3 st1.8 {$A0-$D0},[$out],#64 b.eq .Ldone_neon sub $len,$len,#64 cmp $len,#64 b.lo .Less_than_192 ld1.8 {$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64 eor $A1,$A1,$T0 eor $B1,$B1,$T1 eor $C1,$C1,$T2 eor $D1,$D1,$T3 st1.8 {$A1-$D1},[$out],#64 b.eq .Ldone_neon sub $len,$len,#64 st1.8 {$A2-$D2},[sp] b .Last_neon .Less_than_128: st1.8 {$A0-$D0},[sp] b .Last_neon .Less_than_192: st1.8 {$A1-$D1},[sp] b .Last_neon .align 4 .Last_neon: sub $out,$out,#1 add $inp,$inp,$len add $out,$out,$len add $ctr,sp,$len neg $len,$len .Loop_tail_neon: ldrb w10,[$inp,$len] ldrb w11,[$ctr,$len] add $len,$len,#1 eor w10,w10,w11 strb w10,[$out,$len] cbnz $len,.Loop_tail_neon stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#0] stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#16] stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#32] stp xzr,xzr,[sp,#48] .Ldone_neon: ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] add sp,sp,#64 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96 ret .size ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon ___ { my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3,$T4,$T5)=@K; my ($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$A2,$B2,$C2,$D2, $A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$A5,$B5,$C5,$D5) = map("v$_.4s",(0..23)); $code.=<<___; .type ChaCha20_512_neon,%function .align 5 ChaCha20_512_neon: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-96]! add x29,sp,#0 adr @x[0],.Lsigma stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] stp x27,x28,[sp,#80] .L512_or_more_neon: sub sp,sp,#128+64 ldp @d[0],@d[1],[@x[0]] // load sigma ld1 {@K[0]},[@x[0]],#16 ldp @d[2],@d[3],[$key] // load key ldp @d[4],@d[5],[$key,#16] ld1 {@K[1],@K[2]},[$key] ldp @d[6],@d[7],[$ctr] // load counter ld1 {@K[3]},[$ctr] ld1 {$ONE},[@x[0]] #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev64 @K[0],@K[0] ror @d[2],@d[2],#32 ror @d[3],@d[3],#32 ror @d[4],@d[4],#32 ror @d[5],@d[5],#32 ror @d[6],@d[6],#32 ror @d[7],@d[7],#32 #endif add @K[3],@K[3],$ONE // += 1 stp @K[0],@K[1],[sp,#0] // off-load key block, invariant part add @K[3],@K[3],$ONE // not typo str @K[2],[sp,#32] add @K[4],@K[3],$ONE add @K[5],@K[4],$ONE add @K[6],@K[5],$ONE shl $ONE,$ONE,#2 // 1 -> 4 stp d8,d9,[sp,#128+0] // meet ABI requirements stp d10,d11,[sp,#128+16] stp d12,d13,[sp,#128+32] stp d14,d15,[sp,#128+48] sub $len,$len,#512 // not typo .Loop_outer_512_neon: mov $A0,@K[0] mov $A1,@K[0] mov $A2,@K[0] mov $A3,@K[0] mov $A4,@K[0] mov $A5,@K[0] mov $B0,@K[1] mov.32 @x[0],@d[0] // unpack key block mov $B1,@K[1] lsr @x[1],@d[0],#32 mov $B2,@K[1] mov.32 @x[2],@d[1] mov $B3,@K[1] lsr @x[3],@d[1],#32 mov $B4,@K[1] mov.32 @x[4],@d[2] mov $B5,@K[1] lsr @x[5],@d[2],#32 mov $D0,@K[3] mov.32 @x[6],@d[3] mov $D1,@K[4] lsr @x[7],@d[3],#32 mov $D2,@K[5] mov.32 @x[8],@d[4] mov $D3,@K[6] lsr @x[9],@d[4],#32 mov $C0,@K[2] mov.32 @x[10],@d[5] mov $C1,@K[2] lsr @x[11],@d[5],#32 add $D4,$D0,$ONE // +4 mov.32 @x[12],@d[6] add $D5,$D1,$ONE // +4 lsr @x[13],@d[6],#32 mov $C2,@K[2] mov.32 @x[14],@d[7] mov $C3,@K[2] lsr @x[15],@d[7],#32 mov $C4,@K[2] stp @K[3],@K[4],[sp,#48] // off-load key block, variable part mov $C5,@K[2] str @K[5],[sp,#80] mov $ctr,#5 subs $len,$len,#512 .Loop_upper_neon: sub $ctr,$ctr,#1 ___ my @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0); my @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0); my @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0); my @thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,0); my @thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,0); my @thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,0); my @thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15)); my $diff = ($#thread0+1)*6 - $#thread67 - 1; my $i = 0; foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread4)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread5)); eval(shift(@thread67)); } @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1); @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1); @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1); @thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,1); @thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,1); @thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,1); @thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15)); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread4)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread5)); eval(shift(@thread67)); } $code.=<<___; cbnz $ctr,.Loop_upper_neon add.32 @x[0],@x[0],@d[0] // accumulate key block add @x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32 add.32 @x[2],@x[2],@d[1] add @x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32 add.32 @x[4],@x[4],@d[2] add @x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32 add.32 @x[6],@x[6],@d[3] add @x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32 add.32 @x[8],@x[8],@d[4] add @x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32 add.32 @x[10],@x[10],@d[5] add @x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32 add.32 @x[12],@x[12],@d[6] add @x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32 add.32 @x[14],@x[14],@d[7] add @x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32 add @x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32 // pack add @x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32 ldp @x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0] // load input add @x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32 add @x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32 ldp @x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16] add @x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32 add @x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32 ldp @x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32] add @x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32 add @x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32 ldp @x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48] add $inp,$inp,#64 #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[8],@x[8] rev @x[10],@x[10] rev @x[12],@x[12] rev @x[14],@x[14] #endif eor @x[0],@x[0],@x[1] eor @x[2],@x[2],@x[3] eor @x[4],@x[4],@x[5] eor @x[6],@x[6],@x[7] eor @x[8],@x[8],@x[9] eor @x[10],@x[10],@x[11] eor @x[12],@x[12],@x[13] eor @x[14],@x[14],@x[15] stp @x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0] // store output add @d[6],@d[6],#1 // increment counter mov.32 @x[0],@d[0] // unpack key block lsr @x[1],@d[0],#32 stp @x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16] mov.32 @x[2],@d[1] lsr @x[3],@d[1],#32 stp @x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32] mov.32 @x[4],@d[2] lsr @x[5],@d[2],#32 stp @x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48] add $out,$out,#64 mov.32 @x[6],@d[3] lsr @x[7],@d[3],#32 mov.32 @x[8],@d[4] lsr @x[9],@d[4],#32 mov.32 @x[10],@d[5] lsr @x[11],@d[5],#32 mov.32 @x[12],@d[6] lsr @x[13],@d[6],#32 mov.32 @x[14],@d[7] lsr @x[15],@d[7],#32 mov $ctr,#5 .Loop_lower_neon: sub $ctr,$ctr,#1 ___ @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0); @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0); @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0); @thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,0); @thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,0); @thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,0); @thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15)); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread4)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread5)); eval(shift(@thread67)); } @thread0=&NEONROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1); @thread1=&NEONROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1); @thread2=&NEONROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1); @thread3=&NEONROUND($A3,$B3,$C3,$D3,$T3,1); @thread4=&NEONROUND($A4,$B4,$C4,$D4,$T4,1); @thread5=&NEONROUND($A5,$B5,$C5,$D5,$T5,1); @thread67=(&ROUND(0,4,8,12),&ROUND(0,5,10,15)); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread4)); eval(shift(@thread67)); eval(shift(@thread5)); eval(shift(@thread67)); } $code.=<<___; cbnz $ctr,.Loop_lower_neon add.32 @x[0],@x[0],@d[0] // accumulate key block ldp @K[0],@K[1],[sp,#0] add @x[1],@x[1],@d[0],lsr#32 ldp @K[2],@K[3],[sp,#32] add.32 @x[2],@x[2],@d[1] ldp @K[4],@K[5],[sp,#64] add @x[3],@x[3],@d[1],lsr#32 add $A0,$A0,@K[0] add.32 @x[4],@x[4],@d[2] add $A1,$A1,@K[0] add @x[5],@x[5],@d[2],lsr#32 add $A2,$A2,@K[0] add.32 @x[6],@x[6],@d[3] add $A3,$A3,@K[0] add @x[7],@x[7],@d[3],lsr#32 add $A4,$A4,@K[0] add.32 @x[8],@x[8],@d[4] add $A5,$A5,@K[0] add @x[9],@x[9],@d[4],lsr#32 add $C0,$C0,@K[2] add.32 @x[10],@x[10],@d[5] add $C1,$C1,@K[2] add @x[11],@x[11],@d[5],lsr#32 add $C2,$C2,@K[2] add.32 @x[12],@x[12],@d[6] add $C3,$C3,@K[2] add @x[13],@x[13],@d[6],lsr#32 add $C4,$C4,@K[2] add.32 @x[14],@x[14],@d[7] add $C5,$C5,@K[2] add @x[15],@x[15],@d[7],lsr#32 add $D4,$D4,$ONE // +4 add @x[0],@x[0],@x[1],lsl#32 // pack add $D5,$D5,$ONE // +4 add @x[2],@x[2],@x[3],lsl#32 add $D0,$D0,@K[3] ldp @x[1],@x[3],[$inp,#0] // load input add $D1,$D1,@K[4] add @x[4],@x[4],@x[5],lsl#32 add $D2,$D2,@K[5] add @x[6],@x[6],@x[7],lsl#32 add $D3,$D3,@K[6] ldp @x[5],@x[7],[$inp,#16] add $D4,$D4,@K[3] add @x[8],@x[8],@x[9],lsl#32 add $D5,$D5,@K[4] add @x[10],@x[10],@x[11],lsl#32 add $B0,$B0,@K[1] ldp @x[9],@x[11],[$inp,#32] add $B1,$B1,@K[1] add @x[12],@x[12],@x[13],lsl#32 add $B2,$B2,@K[1] add @x[14],@x[14],@x[15],lsl#32 add $B3,$B3,@K[1] ldp @x[13],@x[15],[$inp,#48] add $B4,$B4,@K[1] add $inp,$inp,#64 add $B5,$B5,@K[1] #ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[8],@x[8] rev @x[10],@x[10] rev @x[12],@x[12] rev @x[14],@x[14] #endif ld1.8 {$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64 eor @x[0],@x[0],@x[1] eor @x[2],@x[2],@x[3] eor @x[4],@x[4],@x[5] eor @x[6],@x[6],@x[7] eor @x[8],@x[8],@x[9] eor $A0,$A0,$T0 eor @x[10],@x[10],@x[11] eor $B0,$B0,$T1 eor @x[12],@x[12],@x[13] eor $C0,$C0,$T2 eor @x[14],@x[14],@x[15] eor $D0,$D0,$T3 ld1.8 {$T0-$T3},[$inp],#64 stp @x[0],@x[2],[$out,#0] // store output add @d[6],@d[6],#7 // increment counter stp @x[4],@x[6],[$out,#16] stp @x[8],@x[10],[$out,#32] stp @x[12],@x[14],[$out,#48] add $out,$out,#64 st1.8 {$A0-$D0},[$out],#64 ld1.8 {$A0-$D0},[$inp],#64 eor $A1,$A1,$T0 eor $B1,$B1,$T1 eor $C1,$C1,$T2 eor $D1,$D1,$T3 st1.8 {$A1-$D1},[$out],#64 ld1.8 {$A1-$D1},[$inp],#64 eor $A2,$A2,$A0 ldp @K[0],@K[1],[sp,#0] eor $B2,$B2,$B0 ldp @K[2],@K[3],[sp,#32] eor $C2,$C2,$C0 eor $D2,$D2,$D0 st1.8 {$A2-$D2},[$out],#64 ld1.8 {$A2-$D2},[$inp],#64 eor $A3,$A3,$A1 eor $B3,$B3,$B1 eor $C3,$C3,$C1 eor $D3,$D3,$D1 st1.8 {$A3-$D3},[$out],#64 ld1.8 {$A3-$D3},[$inp],#64 eor $A4,$A4,$A2 eor $B4,$B4,$B2 eor $C4,$C4,$C2 eor $D4,$D4,$D2 st1.8 {$A4-$D4},[$out],#64 shl $A0,$ONE,#1 // 4 -> 8 eor $A5,$A5,$A3 eor $B5,$B5,$B3 eor $C5,$C5,$C3 eor $D5,$D5,$D3 st1.8 {$A5-$D5},[$out],#64 add @K[3],@K[3],$A0 // += 8 add @K[4],@K[4],$A0 add @K[5],@K[5],$A0 add @K[6],@K[6],$A0 b.hs .Loop_outer_512_neon adds $len,$len,#512 ushr $A0,$ONE,#2 // 4 -> 1 ldp d8,d9,[sp,#128+0] // meet ABI requirements ldp d10,d11,[sp,#128+16] ldp d12,d13,[sp,#128+32] ldp d14,d15,[sp,#128+48] stp @K[0],$ONE,[sp,#0] // wipe off-load area stp @K[0],$ONE,[sp,#32] stp @K[0],$ONE,[sp,#64] b.eq .Ldone_512_neon cmp $len,#192 sub @K[3],@K[3],$A0 // -= 1 sub @K[4],@K[4],$A0 sub @K[5],@K[5],$A0 add sp,sp,#128 b.hs .Loop_outer_neon eor @K[1],@K[1],@K[1] eor @K[2],@K[2],@K[2] eor @K[3],@K[3],@K[3] eor @K[4],@K[4],@K[4] eor @K[5],@K[5],@K[5] eor @K[6],@K[6],@K[6] b .Loop_outer .Ldone_512_neon: ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] add sp,sp,#128+64 ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x27,x28,[x29,#80] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#96 ret .size ChaCha20_512_neon,.-ChaCha20_512_neon ___ } }}} foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; (s/\b([a-z]+)\.32\b/$1/ and (s/x([0-9]+)/w$1/g or 1)) or (m/\b(eor|ext|mov)\b/ and (s/\.4s/\.16b/g or 1)) or (s/\b((?:ld|st)1)\.8\b/$1/ and (s/\.4s/\.16b/g or 1)) or (m/\b(ld|st)[rp]\b/ and (s/v([0-9]+)\.4s/q$1/g or 1)) or (s/\brev32\.16\b/rev32/ and (s/\.4s/\.8h/g or 1)); #s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl0000755000000000000000000010177613176625656017577 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # January 2015 # # ChaCha20 for x86. # # Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer. # # 1xIALU/gcc 4xSSSE3 # Pentium 17.5/+80% # PIII 14.2/+60% # P4 18.6/+84% # Core2 9.56/+89% 4.83 # Westmere 9.50/+45% 3.35 # Sandy Bridge 10.5/+47% 3.20 # Haswell 8.15/+50% 2.83 # Silvermont 17.4/+36% 8.35 # Goldmont 13.4/+40% 4.36 # Sledgehammer 10.2/+54% # Bulldozer 13.4/+50% 4.38(*) # # (*) Bulldozer actually executes 4xXOP code path that delivers 3.55; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"chacha-x86.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $xmm=$ymm=0; for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } $ymm=1 if ($xmm && `$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && ($gasver=$1)>=2.19); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $1>=2.03); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" && `ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=10); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); # first version supporting AVX $a="eax"; ($b,$b_)=("ebx","ebp"); ($c,$c_)=("ecx","esi"); ($d,$d_)=("edx","edi"); sub QUARTERROUND { my ($ai,$bi,$ci,$di,$i)=@_; my ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di)); # next my ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di)); # previous # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 if ($i==0) { my $j=4; ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)); } elsif ($i==3) { my $j=0; ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)); } elsif ($i==4) { my $j=4; ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)); } elsif ($i==7) { my $j=0; ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)); } #&add ($a,$b); # see elsewhere &xor ($d,$a); &mov (&DWP(4*$cp,"esp"),$c_) if ($ai>0 && $ai<3); &rol ($d,16); &mov (&DWP(4*$bp,"esp"),$b_) if ($i!=0); &add ($c,$d); &mov ($c_,&DWP(4*$cn,"esp")) if ($ai>0 && $ai<3); &xor ($b,$c); &mov ($d_,&DWP(4*$dn,"esp")) if ($di!=$dn); &rol ($b,12); &mov ($b_,&DWP(4*$bn,"esp")) if ($i<7); &mov ($b_,&DWP(128,"esp")) if ($i==7); # loop counter &add ($a,$b); &xor ($d,$a); &mov (&DWP(4*$ai,"esp"),$a); &rol ($d,8); &mov ($a,&DWP(4*$an,"esp")); &add ($c,$d); &mov (&DWP(4*$di,"esp"),$d) if ($di!=$dn); &mov ($d_,$d) if ($di==$dn); &xor ($b,$c); &add ($a,$b_) if ($i<7); # elsewhere &rol ($b,7); ($b,$b_)=($b_,$b); ($c,$c_)=($c_,$c); ($d,$d_)=($d_,$d); } &static_label("ssse3_shortcut"); &static_label("xop_shortcut"); &static_label("ssse3_data"); &static_label("pic_point"); &function_begin("ChaCha20_ctr32"); &xor ("eax","eax"); &cmp ("eax",&wparam(2)); # len==0? &je (&label("no_data")); if ($xmm) { &call (&label("pic_point")); &set_label("pic_point"); &blindpop("eax"); &picmeup("ebp","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic_point")); &test (&DWP(0,"ebp"),1<<24); # test FXSR bit &jz (&label("x86")); &test (&DWP(4,"ebp"),1<<9); # test SSSE3 bit &jz (&label("x86")); &jmp (&label("ssse3_shortcut")); &set_label("x86"); } &mov ("esi",&wparam(3)); # key &mov ("edi",&wparam(4)); # counter and nonce &stack_push(33); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"esi")); # copy key &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(64+4*4,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*5,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*6,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*7,"esp"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*4,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*5,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*6,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*7,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(64+4*8,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*9,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*10,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*11,"esp"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*0,"edi")); # copy counter and nonce &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4*1,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*2,"edi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(4*3,"edi")); &sub ("eax",1); &mov (&DWP(64+4*12,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*13,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*14,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(64+4*15,"esp"),"edx"); &jmp (&label("entry")); &set_label("outer_loop",16); &mov (&wparam(1),$b); # save input &mov (&wparam(0),$a); # save output &mov (&wparam(2),$c); # save len &set_label("entry"); &mov ($a,0x61707865); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"esp"),0x3320646e); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"esp"),0x79622d32); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"esp"),0x6b206574); &mov ($b, &DWP(64+4*5,"esp")); # copy key material &mov ($b_,&DWP(64+4*6,"esp")); &mov ($c, &DWP(64+4*10,"esp")); &mov ($c_,&DWP(64+4*11,"esp")); &mov ($d, &DWP(64+4*13,"esp")); &mov ($d_,&DWP(64+4*14,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(4*5,"esp"),$b); &mov (&DWP(4*6,"esp"),$b_); &mov (&DWP(4*10,"esp"),$c); &mov (&DWP(4*11,"esp"),$c_); &mov (&DWP(4*13,"esp"),$d); &mov (&DWP(4*14,"esp"),$d_); &mov ($b, &DWP(64+4*7,"esp")); &mov ($d_,&DWP(64+4*15,"esp")); &mov ($d, &DWP(64+4*12,"esp")); &mov ($b_,&DWP(64+4*4,"esp")); &mov ($c, &DWP(64+4*8,"esp")); &mov ($c_,&DWP(64+4*9,"esp")); &add ($d,1); # counter value &mov (&DWP(4*7,"esp"),$b); &mov (&DWP(4*15,"esp"),$d_); &mov (&DWP(64+4*12,"esp"),$d); # save counter value &mov ($b,10); # loop counter &jmp (&label("loop")); &set_label("loop",16); &add ($a,$b_); # elsewhere &mov (&DWP(128,"esp"),$b); # save loop counter &mov ($b,$b_); &QUARTERROUND(0, 4, 8, 12, 0); &QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13, 1); &QUARTERROUND(2, 6,10, 14, 2); &QUARTERROUND(3, 7,11, 15, 3); &QUARTERROUND(0, 5,10, 15, 4); &QUARTERROUND(1, 6,11, 12, 5); &QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13, 6); &QUARTERROUND(3, 4, 9, 14, 7); &dec ($b); &jnz (&label("loop")); &mov ($b,&wparam(2)); # load len &add ($a,0x61707865); # accumulate key material &add ($b_,&DWP(64+4*4,"esp")); &add ($c, &DWP(64+4*8,"esp")); &add ($c_,&DWP(64+4*9,"esp")); &cmp ($b,64); &jb (&label("tail")); &mov ($b,&wparam(1)); # load input pointer &add ($d, &DWP(64+4*12,"esp")); &add ($d_,&DWP(64+4*14,"esp")); &xor ($a, &DWP(4*0,$b)); # xor with input &xor ($b_,&DWP(4*4,$b)); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"esp"),$a); &mov ($a,&wparam(0)); # load output pointer &xor ($c, &DWP(4*8,$b)); &xor ($c_,&DWP(4*9,$b)); &xor ($d, &DWP(4*12,$b)); &xor ($d_,&DWP(4*14,$b)); &mov (&DWP(4*4,$a),$b_); # write output &mov (&DWP(4*8,$a),$c); &mov (&DWP(4*9,$a),$c_); &mov (&DWP(4*12,$a),$d); &mov (&DWP(4*14,$a),$d_); &mov ($b_,&DWP(4*1,"esp")); &mov ($c, &DWP(4*2,"esp")); &mov ($c_,&DWP(4*3,"esp")); &mov ($d, &DWP(4*5,"esp")); &mov ($d_,&DWP(4*6,"esp")); &add ($b_,0x3320646e); # accumulate key material &add ($c, 0x79622d32); &add ($c_,0x6b206574); &add ($d, &DWP(64+4*5,"esp")); &add ($d_,&DWP(64+4*6,"esp")); &xor ($b_,&DWP(4*1,$b)); &xor ($c, &DWP(4*2,$b)); &xor ($c_,&DWP(4*3,$b)); &xor ($d, &DWP(4*5,$b)); &xor ($d_,&DWP(4*6,$b)); &mov (&DWP(4*1,$a),$b_); &mov (&DWP(4*2,$a),$c); &mov (&DWP(4*3,$a),$c_); &mov (&DWP(4*5,$a),$d); &mov (&DWP(4*6,$a),$d_); &mov ($b_,&DWP(4*7,"esp")); &mov ($c, &DWP(4*10,"esp")); &mov ($c_,&DWP(4*11,"esp")); &mov ($d, &DWP(4*13,"esp")); &mov ($d_,&DWP(4*15,"esp")); &add ($b_,&DWP(64+4*7,"esp")); &add ($c, &DWP(64+4*10,"esp")); &add ($c_,&DWP(64+4*11,"esp")); &add ($d, &DWP(64+4*13,"esp")); &add ($d_,&DWP(64+4*15,"esp")); &xor ($b_,&DWP(4*7,$b)); &xor ($c, &DWP(4*10,$b)); &xor ($c_,&DWP(4*11,$b)); &xor ($d, &DWP(4*13,$b)); &xor ($d_,&DWP(4*15,$b)); &lea ($b,&DWP(4*16,$b)); &mov (&DWP(4*7,$a),$b_); &mov ($b_,&DWP(4*0,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(4*10,$a),$c); &mov ($c,&wparam(2)); # len &mov (&DWP(4*11,$a),$c_); &mov (&DWP(4*13,$a),$d); &mov (&DWP(4*15,$a),$d_); &mov (&DWP(4*0,$a),$b_); &lea ($a,&DWP(4*16,$a)); &sub ($c,64); &jnz (&label("outer_loop")); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("tail"); &add ($d, &DWP(64+4*12,"esp")); &add ($d_,&DWP(64+4*14,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"esp"),$a); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$b_); &mov (&DWP(4*8,"esp"),$c); &mov (&DWP(4*9,"esp"),$c_); &mov (&DWP(4*12,"esp"),$d); &mov (&DWP(4*14,"esp"),$d_); &mov ($b_,&DWP(4*1,"esp")); &mov ($c, &DWP(4*2,"esp")); &mov ($c_,&DWP(4*3,"esp")); &mov ($d, &DWP(4*5,"esp")); &mov ($d_,&DWP(4*6,"esp")); &add ($b_,0x3320646e); # accumulate key material &add ($c, 0x79622d32); &add ($c_,0x6b206574); &add ($d, &DWP(64+4*5,"esp")); &add ($d_,&DWP(64+4*6,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"esp"),$b_); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"esp"),$c); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"esp"),$c_); &mov (&DWP(4*5,"esp"),$d); &mov (&DWP(4*6,"esp"),$d_); &mov ($b_,&DWP(4*7,"esp")); &mov ($c, &DWP(4*10,"esp")); &mov ($c_,&DWP(4*11,"esp")); &mov ($d, &DWP(4*13,"esp")); &mov ($d_,&DWP(4*15,"esp")); &add ($b_,&DWP(64+4*7,"esp")); &add ($c, &DWP(64+4*10,"esp")); &add ($c_,&DWP(64+4*11,"esp")); &add ($d, &DWP(64+4*13,"esp")); &add ($d_,&DWP(64+4*15,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(4*7,"esp"),$b_); &mov ($b_,&wparam(1)); # load input &mov (&DWP(4*10,"esp"),$c); &mov ($c,&wparam(0)); # load output &mov (&DWP(4*11,"esp"),$c_); &xor ($c_,$c_); &mov (&DWP(4*13,"esp"),$d); &mov (&DWP(4*15,"esp"),$d_); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &set_label("tail_loop"); &movb ("al",&BP(0,$c_,$b_)); &movb ("dl",&BP(0,"esp",$c_)); &lea ($c_,&DWP(1,$c_)); &xor ("al","dl"); &mov (&BP(-1,$c,$c_),"al"); &dec ($b); &jnz (&label("tail_loop")); &set_label("done"); &stack_pop(33); &set_label("no_data"); &function_end("ChaCha20_ctr32"); if ($xmm) { my ($xa,$xa_,$xb,$xb_,$xc,$xc_,$xd,$xd_)=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); my ($out,$inp,$len)=("edi","esi","ecx"); sub QUARTERROUND_SSSE3 { my ($ai,$bi,$ci,$di,$i)=@_; my ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di)); # next my ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di)); # previous # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 if ($i==0) { my $j=4; ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)); } elsif ($i==3) { my $j=0; ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)); } elsif ($i==4) { my $j=4; ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)); } elsif ($i==7) { my $j=0; ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)); } #&paddd ($xa,$xb); # see elsewhere #&pxor ($xd,$xa); # see elsewhere &movdqa(&QWP(16*$cp-128,"ebx"),$xc_) if ($ai>0 && $ai<3); &pshufb ($xd,&QWP(0,"eax")); # rot16 &movdqa(&QWP(16*$bp-128,"ebx"),$xb_) if ($i!=0); &paddd ($xc,$xd); &movdqa($xc_,&QWP(16*$cn-128,"ebx")) if ($ai>0 && $ai<3); &pxor ($xb,$xc); &movdqa($xb_,&QWP(16*$bn-128,"ebx")) if ($i<7); &movdqa ($xa_,$xb); # borrow as temporary &pslld ($xb,12); &psrld ($xa_,20); &por ($xb,$xa_); &movdqa($xa_,&QWP(16*$an-128,"ebx")); &paddd ($xa,$xb); &movdqa($xd_,&QWP(16*$dn-128,"ebx")) if ($di!=$dn); &pxor ($xd,$xa); &movdqa (&QWP(16*$ai-128,"ebx"),$xa); &pshufb ($xd,&QWP(16,"eax")); # rot8 &paddd ($xc,$xd); &movdqa (&QWP(16*$di-128,"ebx"),$xd) if ($di!=$dn); &movdqa ($xd_,$xd) if ($di==$dn); &pxor ($xb,$xc); &paddd ($xa_,$xb_) if ($i<7); # elsewhere &movdqa ($xa,$xb); # borrow as temporary &pslld ($xb,7); &psrld ($xa,25); &pxor ($xd_,$xa_) if ($i<7); # elsewhere &por ($xb,$xa); ($xa,$xa_)=($xa_,$xa); ($xb,$xb_)=($xb_,$xb); ($xc,$xc_)=($xc_,$xc); ($xd,$xd_)=($xd_,$xd); } &function_begin("ChaCha20_ssse3"); &set_label("ssse3_shortcut"); if ($ymm) { &test (&DWP(4,"ebp"),1<<11); # test XOP bit &jnz (&label("xop_shortcut")); } &mov ($out,&wparam(0)); &mov ($inp,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ("edx",&wparam(3)); # key &mov ("ebx",&wparam(4)); # counter and nonce &mov ("ebp","esp"); &stack_push (131); &and ("esp",-64); &mov (&DWP(512,"esp"),"ebp"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("ssse3_data")."-". &label("pic_point"),"eax")); &movdqu ("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx")); # counter and nonce if (defined($gasver) && $gasver>=2.17) { # even though we encode # pshufb manually, we # handle only register # operands, while this # segment uses memory # operand... &cmp ($len,64*4); &jb (&label("1x")); &mov (&DWP(512+4,"esp"),"edx"); # offload pointers &mov (&DWP(512+8,"esp"),"ebx"); &sub ($len,64*4); # bias len &lea ("ebp",&DWP(256+128,"esp")); # size optimization &movdqu ("xmm7",&QWP(0,"edx")); # key &pshufd ("xmm0","xmm3",0x00); &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm3",0x55); &pshufd ("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa); &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm3",0xff); &paddd ("xmm0",&QWP(16*3,"eax")); # fix counters &pshufd ("xmm4","xmm7",0x00); &pshufd ("xmm5","xmm7",0x55); &psubd ("xmm0",&QWP(16*4,"eax")); &pshufd ("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa); &pshufd ("xmm7","xmm7",0xff); &movdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm0"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp"),"xmm1"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp"),"xmm2"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp"),"xmm3"); &movdqu ("xmm3",&QWP(16,"edx")); # key &movdqa (&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"),"xmm4"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp"),"xmm5"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp"),"xmm6"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp"),"xmm7"); &movdqa ("xmm7",&QWP(16*2,"eax")); # sigma &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp")); # size optimization &pshufd ("xmm0","xmm3",0x00); &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm3",0x55); &pshufd ("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa); &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm3",0xff); &pshufd ("xmm4","xmm7",0x00); &pshufd ("xmm5","xmm7",0x55); &pshufd ("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa); &pshufd ("xmm7","xmm7",0xff); &movdqa (&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"),"xmm0"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"),"xmm1"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp"),"xmm2"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp"),"xmm3"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"),"xmm4"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp"),"xmm5"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp"),"xmm6"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp"),"xmm7"); &lea ($inp,&DWP(128,$inp)); # size optimization &lea ($out,&DWP(128,$out)); # size optimization &jmp (&label("outer_loop")); &set_label("outer_loop",16); #&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp")); # copy key material &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp")); #&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm6",&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm7",&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp")); #&movdqa (&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx"),"xmm0"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx"),"xmm1"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx"),"xmm2"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx"),"xmm3"); #&movdqa (&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),"xmm4"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*5-128,"ebx"),"xmm5"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*6-128,"ebx"),"xmm6"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*7-128,"ebx"),"xmm7"); #&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp")); #&movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm6",&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ("xmm7",&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp")); &paddd ("xmm4",&QWP(16*4,"eax")); # counter value #&movdqa (&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),"xmm0"); #&movdqa (&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),"xmm1"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*10-128,"ebx"),"xmm2"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*11-128,"ebx"),"xmm3"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),"xmm4"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*13-128,"ebx"),"xmm5"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),"xmm6"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*15-128,"ebx"),"xmm7"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm4"); # save counter value &movdqa ($xa, &QWP(16*0-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ($xd, "xmm4"); &movdqa ($xb_,&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ($xc, &QWP(16*8-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ($xc_,&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",10); # loop counter &nop (); &set_label("loop",16); &paddd ($xa,$xb_); # elsewhere &movdqa ($xb,$xb_); &pxor ($xd,$xa); # elsewhere &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(0, 4, 8, 12, 0); &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(1, 5, 9, 13, 1); &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(2, 6,10, 14, 2); &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(3, 7,11, 15, 3); &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(0, 5,10, 15, 4); &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(1, 6,11, 12, 5); &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(2, 7, 8, 13, 6); &QUARTERROUND_SSSE3(3, 4, 9, 14, 7); &dec ("edx"); &jnz (&label("loop")); &movdqa (&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),$xb_); &movdqa (&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),$xc); &movdqa (&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),$xc_); &movdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),$xd); &movdqa (&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),$xd_); my ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); #&movdqa ($xa0,&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx")); # it's there &movdqa ($xa1,&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx")); &movdqa ($xa2,&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx")); &movdqa ($xa3,&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx")); for($i=0;$i<256;$i+=64) { &paddd ($xa0,&QWP($i+16*0-128,"ebp")); # accumulate key material &paddd ($xa1,&QWP($i+16*1-128,"ebp")); &paddd ($xa2,&QWP($i+16*2-128,"ebp")); &paddd ($xa3,&QWP($i+16*3-128,"ebp")); &movdqa ($xt2,$xa0); # "de-interlace" data &punpckldq ($xa0,$xa1); &movdqa ($xt3,$xa2); &punpckldq ($xa2,$xa3); &punpckhdq ($xt2,$xa1); &punpckhdq ($xt3,$xa3); &movdqa ($xa1,$xa0); &punpcklqdq ($xa0,$xa2); # "a0" &movdqa ($xa3,$xt2); &punpcklqdq ($xt2,$xt3); # "a2" &punpckhqdq ($xa1,$xa2); # "a1" &punpckhqdq ($xa3,$xt3); # "a3" #($xa2,$xt2)=($xt2,$xa2); &movdqu ($xt0,&QWP(64*0-128,$inp)); # load input &movdqu ($xt1,&QWP(64*1-128,$inp)); &movdqu ($xa2,&QWP(64*2-128,$inp)); &movdqu ($xt3,&QWP(64*3-128,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$inp)); &pxor ($xt0,$xa0); &movdqa ($xa0,&QWP($i+16*4-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &pxor ($xt1,$xa1); &movdqa ($xa1,&QWP($i+16*5-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &pxor ($xt2,$xa2); &movdqa ($xa2,&QWP($i+16*6-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &pxor ($xt3,$xa3); &movdqa ($xa3,&QWP($i+16*7-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &movdqu (&QWP(64*0-128,$out),$xt0); # store output &movdqu (&QWP(64*1-128,$out),$xt1); &movdqu (&QWP(64*2-128,$out),$xt2); &movdqu (&QWP(64*3-128,$out),$xt3); &lea ($out,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$out)); } &sub ($len,64*4); &jnc (&label("outer_loop")); &add ($len,64*4); &jz (&label("done")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(512+8,"esp")); # restore pointers &lea ($inp,&DWP(-128,$inp)); &mov ("edx",&DWP(512+4,"esp")); &lea ($out,&DWP(-128,$out)); &movd ("xmm2",&DWP(16*12-128,"ebp")); # counter value &movdqu ("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx")); &paddd ("xmm2",&QWP(16*6,"eax")); # +four &pand ("xmm3",&QWP(16*7,"eax")); &por ("xmm3","xmm2"); # counter value } { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t,$t1,$rot16,$rot24)=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); sub SSSE3ROUND { # critical path is 20 "SIMD ticks" per round &paddd ($a,$b); &pxor ($d,$a); &pshufb ($d,$rot16); &paddd ($c,$d); &pxor ($b,$c); &movdqa ($t,$b); &psrld ($b,20); &pslld ($t,12); &por ($b,$t); &paddd ($a,$b); &pxor ($d,$a); &pshufb ($d,$rot24); &paddd ($c,$d); &pxor ($b,$c); &movdqa ($t,$b); &psrld ($b,25); &pslld ($t,7); &por ($b,$t); } &set_label("1x"); &movdqa ($a,&QWP(16*2,"eax")); # sigma &movdqu ($b,&QWP(0,"edx")); &movdqu ($c,&QWP(16,"edx")); #&movdqu ($d,&QWP(0,"ebx")); # already loaded &movdqa ($rot16,&QWP(0,"eax")); &movdqa ($rot24,&QWP(16,"eax")); &mov (&DWP(16*3,"esp"),"ebp"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d); &mov ("edx",10); &jmp (&label("loop1x")); &set_label("outer1x",16); &movdqa ($d,&QWP(16*5,"eax")); # one &movdqa ($a,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); &movdqa ($b,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &movdqa ($c,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &paddd ($d,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &mov ("edx",10); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d); &jmp (&label("loop1x")); &set_label("loop1x",16); &SSSE3ROUND(); &pshufd ($c,$c,0b01001110); &pshufd ($b,$b,0b00111001); &pshufd ($d,$d,0b10010011); &nop (); &SSSE3ROUND(); &pshufd ($c,$c,0b01001110); &pshufd ($b,$b,0b10010011); &pshufd ($d,$d,0b00111001); &dec ("edx"); &jnz (&label("loop1x")); &paddd ($a,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); &paddd ($b,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &paddd ($c,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &paddd ($d,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &cmp ($len,64); &jb (&label("tail")); &movdqu ($t,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); &movdqu ($t1,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &pxor ($a,$t); # xor with input &movdqu ($t,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &pxor ($b,$t1); &movdqu ($t1,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &pxor ($c,$t); &pxor ($d,$t1); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp)); # inp+=64 &movdqu (&QWP(16*0,$out),$a); # write output &movdqu (&QWP(16*1,$out),$b); &movdqu (&QWP(16*2,$out),$c); &movdqu (&QWP(16*3,$out),$d); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out)); # inp+=64 &sub ($len,64); &jnz (&label("outer1x")); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("tail"); &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a); &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b); &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c); &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &xor ("ebp","ebp"); &set_label("tail_loop"); &movb ("al",&BP(0,"esp","ebp")); &movb ("dl",&BP(0,$inp,"ebp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(1,"ebp")); &xor ("al","dl"); &movb (&BP(-1,$out,"ebp"),"al"); &dec ($len); &jnz (&label("tail_loop")); } &set_label("done"); &mov ("esp",&DWP(512,"esp")); &function_end("ChaCha20_ssse3"); &align (64); &set_label("ssse3_data"); &data_byte(0x2,0x3,0x0,0x1, 0x6,0x7,0x4,0x5, 0xa,0xb,0x8,0x9, 0xe,0xf,0xc,0xd); &data_byte(0x3,0x0,0x1,0x2, 0x7,0x4,0x5,0x6, 0xb,0x8,0x9,0xa, 0xf,0xc,0xd,0xe); &data_word(0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574); &data_word(0,1,2,3); &data_word(4,4,4,4); &data_word(1,0,0,0); &data_word(4,0,0,0); &data_word(0,-1,-1,-1); &align (64); } &asciz ("ChaCha20 for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by "); if ($ymm) { my ($xa,$xa_,$xb,$xb_,$xc,$xc_,$xd,$xd_)=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); my ($out,$inp,$len)=("edi","esi","ecx"); sub QUARTERROUND_XOP { my ($ai,$bi,$ci,$di,$i)=@_; my ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di)); # next my ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-1)&3),($ai,$bi,$ci,$di)); # previous # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 if ($i==0) { my $j=4; ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)); } elsif ($i==3) { my $j=0; ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)); } elsif ($i==4) { my $j=4; ($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+$j--)&3),($ap,$bp,$cp,$dp)); } elsif ($i==7) { my $j=0; ($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)=map(($_&~3)+(($_-$j++)&3),($an,$bn,$cn,$dn)); } #&vpaddd ($xa,$xa,$xb); # see elsewhere #&vpxor ($xd,$xd,$xa); # see elsewhere &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*$cp-128,"ebx"),$xc_) if ($ai>0 && $ai<3); &vprotd ($xd,$xd,16); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*$bp-128,"ebx"),$xb_) if ($i!=0); &vpaddd ($xc,$xc,$xd); &vmovdqa ($xc_,&QWP(16*$cn-128,"ebx")) if ($ai>0 && $ai<3); &vpxor ($xb,$i!=0?$xb:$xb_,$xc); &vmovdqa ($xa_,&QWP(16*$an-128,"ebx")); &vprotd ($xb,$xb,12); &vmovdqa ($xb_,&QWP(16*$bn-128,"ebx")) if ($i<7); &vpaddd ($xa,$xa,$xb); &vmovdqa ($xd_,&QWP(16*$dn-128,"ebx")) if ($di!=$dn); &vpxor ($xd,$xd,$xa); &vpaddd ($xa_,$xa_,$xb_) if ($i<7); # elsewhere &vprotd ($xd,$xd,8); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*$ai-128,"ebx"),$xa); &vpaddd ($xc,$xc,$xd); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*$di-128,"ebx"),$xd) if ($di!=$dn); &vpxor ($xb,$xb,$xc); &vpxor ($xd_,$di==$dn?$xd:$xd_,$xa_) if ($i<7); # elsewhere &vprotd ($xb,$xb,7); ($xa,$xa_)=($xa_,$xa); ($xb,$xb_)=($xb_,$xb); ($xc,$xc_)=($xc_,$xc); ($xd,$xd_)=($xd_,$xd); } &function_begin("ChaCha20_xop"); &set_label("xop_shortcut"); &mov ($out,&wparam(0)); &mov ($inp,&wparam(1)); &mov ($len,&wparam(2)); &mov ("edx",&wparam(3)); # key &mov ("ebx",&wparam(4)); # counter and nonce &vzeroupper (); &mov ("ebp","esp"); &stack_push (131); &and ("esp",-64); &mov (&DWP(512,"esp"),"ebp"); &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("ssse3_data")."-". &label("pic_point"),"eax")); &vmovdqu ("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx")); # counter and nonce &cmp ($len,64*4); &jb (&label("1x")); &mov (&DWP(512+4,"esp"),"edx"); # offload pointers &mov (&DWP(512+8,"esp"),"ebx"); &sub ($len,64*4); # bias len &lea ("ebp",&DWP(256+128,"esp")); # size optimization &vmovdqu ("xmm7",&QWP(0,"edx")); # key &vpshufd ("xmm0","xmm3",0x00); &vpshufd ("xmm1","xmm3",0x55); &vpshufd ("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa); &vpshufd ("xmm3","xmm3",0xff); &vpaddd ("xmm0","xmm0",&QWP(16*3,"eax")); # fix counters &vpshufd ("xmm4","xmm7",0x00); &vpshufd ("xmm5","xmm7",0x55); &vpsubd ("xmm0","xmm0",&QWP(16*4,"eax")); &vpshufd ("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa); &vpshufd ("xmm7","xmm7",0xff); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm0"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp"),"xmm1"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp"),"xmm2"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp"),"xmm3"); &vmovdqu ("xmm3",&QWP(16,"edx")); # key &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp"),"xmm4"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp"),"xmm5"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp"),"xmm6"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp"),"xmm7"); &vmovdqa ("xmm7",&QWP(16*2,"eax")); # sigma &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp")); # size optimization &vpshufd ("xmm0","xmm3",0x00); &vpshufd ("xmm1","xmm3",0x55); &vpshufd ("xmm2","xmm3",0xaa); &vpshufd ("xmm3","xmm3",0xff); &vpshufd ("xmm4","xmm7",0x00); &vpshufd ("xmm5","xmm7",0x55); &vpshufd ("xmm6","xmm7",0xaa); &vpshufd ("xmm7","xmm7",0xff); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp"),"xmm0"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp"),"xmm1"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp"),"xmm2"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp"),"xmm3"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp"),"xmm4"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp"),"xmm5"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp"),"xmm6"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp"),"xmm7"); &lea ($inp,&DWP(128,$inp)); # size optimization &lea ($out,&DWP(128,$out)); # size optimization &jmp (&label("outer_loop")); &set_label("outer_loop",32); #&vmovdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(16*0-128,"ebp")); # copy key material &vmovdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(16*1-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(16*2-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(16*3-128,"ebp")); #&vmovdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(16*5-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm6",&QWP(16*6-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm7",&QWP(16*7-128,"ebp")); #&vmovdqa (&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx"),"xmm0"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx"),"xmm1"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx"),"xmm2"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx"),"xmm3"); #&vmovdqa (&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),"xmm4"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*5-128,"ebx"),"xmm5"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*6-128,"ebx"),"xmm6"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*7-128,"ebx"),"xmm7"); #&vmovdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(16*8-128,"ebp")); #&vmovdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(16*10-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(16*11-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(16*13-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm6",&QWP(16*14-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ("xmm7",&QWP(16*15-128,"ebp")); &vpaddd ("xmm4","xmm4",&QWP(16*4,"eax")); # counter value #&vmovdqa (&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),"xmm0"); #&vmovdqa (&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),"xmm1"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*10-128,"ebx"),"xmm2"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*11-128,"ebx"),"xmm3"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),"xmm4"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*13-128,"ebx"),"xmm5"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),"xmm6"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*15-128,"ebx"),"xmm7"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebp"),"xmm4"); # save counter value &vmovdqa ($xa, &QWP(16*0-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ($xd, "xmm4"); &vmovdqa ($xb_,&QWP(16*4-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ($xc, &QWP(16*8-128,"ebp")); &vmovdqa ($xc_,&QWP(16*9-128,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",10); # loop counter &nop (); &set_label("loop",32); &vpaddd ($xa,$xa,$xb_); # elsewhere &vpxor ($xd,$xd,$xa); # elsewhere &QUARTERROUND_XOP(0, 4, 8, 12, 0); &QUARTERROUND_XOP(1, 5, 9, 13, 1); &QUARTERROUND_XOP(2, 6,10, 14, 2); &QUARTERROUND_XOP(3, 7,11, 15, 3); &QUARTERROUND_XOP(0, 5,10, 15, 4); &QUARTERROUND_XOP(1, 6,11, 12, 5); &QUARTERROUND_XOP(2, 7, 8, 13, 6); &QUARTERROUND_XOP(3, 4, 9, 14, 7); &dec ("edx"); &jnz (&label("loop")); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*4-128,"ebx"),$xb_); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*8-128,"ebx"),$xc); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*9-128,"ebx"),$xc_); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*12-128,"ebx"),$xd); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*14-128,"ebx"),$xd_); my ($xa0,$xa1,$xa2,$xa3,$xt0,$xt1,$xt2,$xt3)=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); #&vmovdqa ($xa0,&QWP(16*0-128,"ebx")); # it's there &vmovdqa ($xa1,&QWP(16*1-128,"ebx")); &vmovdqa ($xa2,&QWP(16*2-128,"ebx")); &vmovdqa ($xa3,&QWP(16*3-128,"ebx")); for($i=0;$i<256;$i+=64) { &vpaddd ($xa0,$xa0,&QWP($i+16*0-128,"ebp")); # accumulate key material &vpaddd ($xa1,$xa1,&QWP($i+16*1-128,"ebp")); &vpaddd ($xa2,$xa2,&QWP($i+16*2-128,"ebp")); &vpaddd ($xa3,$xa3,&QWP($i+16*3-128,"ebp")); &vpunpckldq ($xt2,$xa0,$xa1); # "de-interlace" data &vpunpckldq ($xt3,$xa2,$xa3); &vpunpckhdq ($xa0,$xa0,$xa1); &vpunpckhdq ($xa2,$xa2,$xa3); &vpunpcklqdq ($xa1,$xt2,$xt3); # "a0" &vpunpckhqdq ($xt2,$xt2,$xt3); # "a1" &vpunpcklqdq ($xt3,$xa0,$xa2); # "a2" &vpunpckhqdq ($xa3,$xa0,$xa2); # "a3" &vpxor ($xt0,$xa1,&QWP(64*0-128,$inp)); &vpxor ($xt1,$xt2,&QWP(64*1-128,$inp)); &vpxor ($xt2,$xt3,&QWP(64*2-128,$inp)); &vpxor ($xt3,$xa3,&QWP(64*3-128,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$inp)); &vmovdqa ($xa0,&QWP($i+16*4-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &vmovdqa ($xa1,&QWP($i+16*5-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &vmovdqa ($xa2,&QWP($i+16*6-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &vmovdqa ($xa3,&QWP($i+16*7-128,"ebx")) if ($i<192); &vmovdqu (&QWP(64*0-128,$out),$xt0); # store output &vmovdqu (&QWP(64*1-128,$out),$xt1); &vmovdqu (&QWP(64*2-128,$out),$xt2); &vmovdqu (&QWP(64*3-128,$out),$xt3); &lea ($out,&QWP($i<192?16:(64*4-16*3),$out)); } &sub ($len,64*4); &jnc (&label("outer_loop")); &add ($len,64*4); &jz (&label("done")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(512+8,"esp")); # restore pointers &lea ($inp,&DWP(-128,$inp)); &mov ("edx",&DWP(512+4,"esp")); &lea ($out,&DWP(-128,$out)); &vmovd ("xmm2",&DWP(16*12-128,"ebp")); # counter value &vmovdqu ("xmm3",&QWP(0,"ebx")); &vpaddd ("xmm2","xmm2",&QWP(16*6,"eax"));# +four &vpand ("xmm3","xmm3",&QWP(16*7,"eax")); &vpor ("xmm3","xmm3","xmm2"); # counter value { my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t,$t1,$rot16,$rot24)=map("xmm$_",(0..7)); sub XOPROUND { &vpaddd ($a,$a,$b); &vpxor ($d,$d,$a); &vprotd ($d,$d,16); &vpaddd ($c,$c,$d); &vpxor ($b,$b,$c); &vprotd ($b,$b,12); &vpaddd ($a,$a,$b); &vpxor ($d,$d,$a); &vprotd ($d,$d,8); &vpaddd ($c,$c,$d); &vpxor ($b,$b,$c); &vprotd ($b,$b,7); } &set_label("1x"); &vmovdqa ($a,&QWP(16*2,"eax")); # sigma &vmovdqu ($b,&QWP(0,"edx")); &vmovdqu ($c,&QWP(16,"edx")); #&vmovdqu ($d,&QWP(0,"ebx")); # already loaded &vmovdqa ($rot16,&QWP(0,"eax")); &vmovdqa ($rot24,&QWP(16,"eax")); &mov (&DWP(16*3,"esp"),"ebp"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d); &mov ("edx",10); &jmp (&label("loop1x")); &set_label("outer1x",16); &vmovdqa ($d,&QWP(16*5,"eax")); # one &vmovdqa ($a,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); &vmovdqa ($b,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &vmovdqa ($c,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &vpaddd ($d,$d,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &mov ("edx",10); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d); &jmp (&label("loop1x")); &set_label("loop1x",16); &XOPROUND(); &vpshufd ($c,$c,0b01001110); &vpshufd ($b,$b,0b00111001); &vpshufd ($d,$d,0b10010011); &XOPROUND(); &vpshufd ($c,$c,0b01001110); &vpshufd ($b,$b,0b10010011); &vpshufd ($d,$d,0b00111001); &dec ("edx"); &jnz (&label("loop1x")); &vpaddd ($a,$a,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); &vpaddd ($b,$b,&QWP(16*1,"esp")); &vpaddd ($c,$c,&QWP(16*2,"esp")); &vpaddd ($d,$d,&QWP(16*3,"esp")); &cmp ($len,64); &jb (&label("tail")); &vpxor ($a,$a,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # xor with input &vpxor ($b,$b,&QWP(16*1,$inp)); &vpxor ($c,$c,&QWP(16*2,$inp)); &vpxor ($d,$d,&QWP(16*3,$inp)); &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp)); # inp+=64 &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*0,$out),$a); # write output &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*1,$out),$b); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*2,$out),$c); &vmovdqu (&QWP(16*3,$out),$d); &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out)); # inp+=64 &sub ($len,64); &jnz (&label("outer1x")); &jmp (&label("done")); &set_label("tail"); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$a); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$b); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$c); &vmovdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$d); &xor ("eax","eax"); &xor ("edx","edx"); &xor ("ebp","ebp"); &set_label("tail_loop"); &movb ("al",&BP(0,"esp","ebp")); &movb ("dl",&BP(0,$inp,"ebp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(1,"ebp")); &xor ("al","dl"); &movb (&BP(-1,$out,"ebp"),"al"); &dec ($len); &jnz (&label("tail_loop")); } &set_label("done"); &vzeroupper (); &mov ("esp",&DWP(512,"esp")); &function_end("ChaCha20_xop"); } &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-ppc.pl0000755000000000000000000005532513176625656017732 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # October 2015 # # ChaCha20 for PowerPC/AltiVec. # # Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer. # # IALU/gcc-4.x 3xAltiVec+1xIALU # # Freescale e300 13.6/+115% - # PPC74x0/G4e 6.81/+310% 4.66 # PPC970/G5 9.29/+160% 4.60 # POWER7 8.62/+61% 4.27 # POWER8 8.70/+51% 3.96 $flavour = shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T =8; $LRSAVE =2*$SIZE_T; $STU ="stdu"; $POP ="ld"; $PUSH ="std"; $UCMP ="cmpld"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T =4; $LRSAVE =$SIZE_T; $STU ="stwu"; $POP ="lwz"; $PUSH ="stw"; $UCMP ="cmplw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 1 : 0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour ".shift || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; $LOCALS=6*$SIZE_T; $FRAME=$LOCALS+64+18*$SIZE_T; # 64 is for local variables sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./; $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_)."\n"; } my $sp = "r1"; my ($out,$inp,$len,$key,$ctr) = map("r$_",(3..7)); my @x=map("r$_",(16..31)); my @d=map("r$_",(11,12,14,15)); my @t=map("r$_",(7..10)); sub ROUND { my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); ( "&add (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&add (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&add (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&add (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&xor (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&xor (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&xor (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&xor (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&rotlwi (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],16)", "&rotlwi (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],16)", "&rotlwi (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],16)", "&rotlwi (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],16)", "&add (@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])", "&add (@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])", "&add (@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])", "&add (@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])", "&xor (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])", "&xor (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])", "&xor (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])", "&xor (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])", "&rotlwi (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],12)", "&rotlwi (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],12)", "&rotlwi (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],12)", "&rotlwi (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],12)", "&add (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&add (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&add (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&add (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&xor (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],@x[$a0])", "&xor (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],@x[$a1])", "&xor (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],@x[$a2])", "&xor (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],@x[$a3])", "&rotlwi (@x[$d0],@x[$d0],8)", "&rotlwi (@x[$d1],@x[$d1],8)", "&rotlwi (@x[$d2],@x[$d2],8)", "&rotlwi (@x[$d3],@x[$d3],8)", "&add (@x[$c0],@x[$c0],@x[$d0])", "&add (@x[$c1],@x[$c1],@x[$d1])", "&add (@x[$c2],@x[$c2],@x[$d2])", "&add (@x[$c3],@x[$c3],@x[$d3])", "&xor (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],@x[$c0])", "&xor (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],@x[$c1])", "&xor (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],@x[$c2])", "&xor (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],@x[$c3])", "&rotlwi (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],7)", "&rotlwi (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],7)", "&rotlwi (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],7)", "&rotlwi (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],7)" ); } $code.=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .ChaCha20_ctr32_int .align 5 .ChaCha20_ctr32_int: __ChaCha20_ctr32_int: ${UCMP}i $len,0 beqlr- $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 $PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $PUSH r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $PUSH r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $PUSH r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $PUSH r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $PUSH r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $PUSH r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $PUSH r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $PUSH r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $PUSH r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) $PUSH r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) lwz @d[0],0($ctr) # load counter lwz @d[1],4($ctr) lwz @d[2],8($ctr) lwz @d[3],12($ctr) bl __ChaCha20_1x $POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) $POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $POP r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $POP r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $POP r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $POP r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $POP r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $POP r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $POP r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $POP r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $POP r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $POP r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) mtlr r0 addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,4,1,0x80,18,5,0 .long 0 .size .ChaCha20_ctr32_int,.-.ChaCha20_ctr32_int .align 5 __ChaCha20_1x: Loop_outer: lis @x[0],0x6170 # synthesize sigma lis @x[1],0x3320 lis @x[2],0x7962 lis @x[3],0x6b20 ori @x[0],@x[0],0x7865 ori @x[1],@x[1],0x646e ori @x[2],@x[2],0x2d32 ori @x[3],@x[3],0x6574 li r0,10 # inner loop counter lwz @x[4],0($key) # load key lwz @x[5],4($key) lwz @x[6],8($key) lwz @x[7],12($key) lwz @x[8],16($key) mr @x[12],@d[0] # copy counter lwz @x[9],20($key) mr @x[13],@d[1] lwz @x[10],24($key) mr @x[14],@d[2] lwz @x[11],28($key) mr @x[15],@d[3] mr @t[0],@x[4] mr @t[1],@x[5] mr @t[2],@x[6] mr @t[3],@x[7] mtctr r0 Loop: ___ foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } $code.=<<___; bdnz Loop subic $len,$len,64 # $len-=64 addi @x[0],@x[0],0x7865 # accumulate key block addi @x[1],@x[1],0x646e addi @x[2],@x[2],0x2d32 addi @x[3],@x[3],0x6574 addis @x[0],@x[0],0x6170 addis @x[1],@x[1],0x3320 addis @x[2],@x[2],0x7962 addis @x[3],@x[3],0x6b20 subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] lwz @t[0],16($key) add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] lwz @t[1],20($key) add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] lwz @t[2],24($key) add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] lwz @t[3],28($key) add @x[8],@x[8],@t[0] add @x[9],@x[9],@t[1] add @x[10],@x[10],@t[2] add @x[11],@x[11],@t[3] add @x[12],@x[12],@d[0] add @x[13],@x[13],@d[1] add @x[14],@x[14],@d[2] add @x[15],@x[15],@d[3] addi @d[0],@d[0],1 # increment counter ___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN) { for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { # flip byte order $code.=<<___; mr @t[$i&3],@x[$i] rotlwi @x[$i],@x[$i],8 rlwimi @x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,0,7 rlwimi @x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,16,23 ___ } } $code.=<<___; bne Ltail # $len-=64 borrowed lwz @t[0],0($inp) # load input, aligned or not lwz @t[1],4($inp) ${UCMP}i $len,0 # done already? lwz @t[2],8($inp) lwz @t[3],12($inp) xor @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] # xor with input lwz @t[0],16($inp) xor @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] lwz @t[1],20($inp) xor @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] lwz @t[2],24($inp) xor @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] lwz @t[3],28($inp) xor @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] lwz @t[0],32($inp) xor @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] lwz @t[1],36($inp) xor @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] lwz @t[2],40($inp) xor @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] lwz @t[3],44($inp) xor @x[8],@x[8],@t[0] lwz @t[0],48($inp) xor @x[9],@x[9],@t[1] lwz @t[1],52($inp) xor @x[10],@x[10],@t[2] lwz @t[2],56($inp) xor @x[11],@x[11],@t[3] lwz @t[3],60($inp) xor @x[12],@x[12],@t[0] stw @x[0],0($out) # store output, aligned or not xor @x[13],@x[13],@t[1] stw @x[1],4($out) xor @x[14],@x[14],@t[2] stw @x[2],8($out) xor @x[15],@x[15],@t[3] stw @x[3],12($out) stw @x[4],16($out) stw @x[5],20($out) stw @x[6],24($out) stw @x[7],28($out) stw @x[8],32($out) stw @x[9],36($out) stw @x[10],40($out) stw @x[11],44($out) stw @x[12],48($out) stw @x[13],52($out) stw @x[14],56($out) addi $inp,$inp,64 stw @x[15],60($out) addi $out,$out,64 bne Loop_outer blr .align 4 Ltail: addi $len,$len,64 # restore tail length subi $inp,$inp,1 # prepare for *++ptr subi $out,$out,1 addi @t[0],$sp,$LOCALS-1 mtctr $len stw @x[0],`$LOCALS+0`($sp) # save whole block to stack stw @x[1],`$LOCALS+4`($sp) stw @x[2],`$LOCALS+8`($sp) stw @x[3],`$LOCALS+12`($sp) stw @x[4],`$LOCALS+16`($sp) stw @x[5],`$LOCALS+20`($sp) stw @x[6],`$LOCALS+24`($sp) stw @x[7],`$LOCALS+28`($sp) stw @x[8],`$LOCALS+32`($sp) stw @x[9],`$LOCALS+36`($sp) stw @x[10],`$LOCALS+40`($sp) stw @x[11],`$LOCALS+44`($sp) stw @x[12],`$LOCALS+48`($sp) stw @x[13],`$LOCALS+52`($sp) stw @x[14],`$LOCALS+56`($sp) stw @x[15],`$LOCALS+60`($sp) Loop_tail: # byte-by-byte loop lbzu @d[0],1($inp) lbzu @x[0],1(@t[0]) xor @d[1],@d[0],@x[0] stbu @d[1],1($out) bdnz Loop_tail stw $sp,`$LOCALS+0`($sp) # wipe block on stack stw $sp,`$LOCALS+4`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+8`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+12`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+16`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+20`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+24`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+28`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+32`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+36`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+40`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+44`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+48`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+52`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+56`($sp) stw $sp,`$LOCALS+60`($sp) blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 ___ {{{ my ($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T0,$T1,$T2) = map("v$_",(0..14)); my (@K)=map("v$_",(15..20)); my ($FOUR,$sixteen,$twenty4,$twenty,$twelve,$twenty5,$seven) = map("v$_",(21..27)); my ($inpperm,$outperm,$outmask) = map("v$_",(28..30)); my @D=("v31",$seven,$T0,$T1,$T2); my $FRAME=$LOCALS+64+13*16+18*$SIZE_T; # 13*16 is for v20-v31 offload sub VMXROUND { my $odd = pop; my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t)=@_; ( "&vadduwm ('$a','$a','$b')", "&vxor ('$d','$d','$a')", "&vperm ('$d','$d','$d','$sixteen')", "&vadduwm ('$c','$c','$d')", "&vxor ('$t','$b','$c')", "&vsrw ('$b','$t','$twenty')", "&vslw ('$t','$t','$twelve')", "&vor ('$b','$b','$t')", "&vadduwm ('$a','$a','$b')", "&vxor ('$d','$d','$a')", "&vperm ('$d','$d','$d','$twenty4')", "&vadduwm ('$c','$c','$d')", "&vxor ('$t','$b','$c')", "&vsrw ('$b','$t','$twenty5')", "&vslw ('$t','$t','$seven')", "&vor ('$b','$b','$t')", "&vsldoi ('$c','$c','$c',8)", "&vsldoi ('$b','$b','$b',$odd?4:12)", "&vsldoi ('$d','$d','$d',$odd?12:4)" ); } $code.=<<___; .globl .ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx .align 5 .ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx: ${UCMP}i $len,256 blt __ChaCha20_ctr32_int $STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp) mflr r0 li r10,`15+$LOCALS+64` li r11,`31+$LOCALS+64` mfspr r12,256 stvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 stvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 stvx v30,r10,$sp stvx v31,r11,$sp stw r12,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18-4`($sp) # save vrsave $PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $PUSH r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $PUSH r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $PUSH r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $PUSH r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $PUSH r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $PUSH r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $PUSH r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $PUSH r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $PUSH r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $PUSH r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $PUSH r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $PUSH r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $PUSH r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $PUSH r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $PUSH r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) li r12,-1 $PUSH r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) mtspr 256,r12 # preserve all AltiVec registers bl Lconsts # returns pointer Lsigma in r12 li @x[0],16 li @x[1],32 li @x[2],48 li @x[3],64 li @x[4],31 # 31 is not a typo li @x[5],15 # nor is 15 lvx @K[1],0,$key # load key ?lvsr $T0,0,$key # prepare unaligned load lvx @K[2],@x[0],$key lvx @D[0],@x[4],$key lvx @K[3],0,$ctr # load counter ?lvsr $T1,0,$ctr # prepare unaligned load lvx @D[1],@x[5],$ctr lvx @K[0],0,r12 # load constants lvx @K[5],@x[0],r12 # one lvx $FOUR,@x[1],r12 lvx $sixteen,@x[2],r12 lvx $twenty4,@x[3],r12 ?vperm @K[1],@K[2],@K[1],$T0 # align key ?vperm @K[2],@D[0],@K[2],$T0 ?vperm @K[3],@D[1],@K[3],$T1 # align counter lwz @d[0],0($ctr) # load counter to GPR lwz @d[1],4($ctr) vadduwm @K[3],@K[3],@K[5] # adjust AltiVec counter lwz @d[2],8($ctr) vadduwm @K[4],@K[3],@K[5] lwz @d[3],12($ctr) vadduwm @K[5],@K[4],@K[5] vspltisw $twenty,-12 # synthesize constants vspltisw $twelve,12 vspltisw $twenty5,-7 #vspltisw $seven,7 # synthesized in the loop vxor $T0,$T0,$T0 # 0x00..00 vspltisw $outmask,-1 # 0xff..ff ?lvsr $inpperm,0,$inp # prepare for unaligned load ?lvsl $outperm,0,$out # prepare for unaligned store ?vperm $outmask,$outmask,$T0,$outperm be?lvsl $T0,0,@x[0] # 0x00..0f be?vspltisb $T1,3 # 0x03..03 be?vxor $T0,$T0,$T1 # swap bytes within words be?vxor $outperm,$outperm,$T1 be?vperm $inpperm,$inpperm,$inpperm,$T0 b Loop_outer_vmx .align 4 Loop_outer_vmx: lis @x[0],0x6170 # synthesize sigma lis @x[1],0x3320 vmr $A0,@K[0] lis @x[2],0x7962 lis @x[3],0x6b20 vmr $A1,@K[0] ori @x[0],@x[0],0x7865 ori @x[1],@x[1],0x646e vmr $A2,@K[0] ori @x[2],@x[2],0x2d32 ori @x[3],@x[3],0x6574 vmr $B0,@K[1] li r0,10 # inner loop counter lwz @x[4],0($key) # load key to GPR vmr $B1,@K[1] lwz @x[5],4($key) vmr $B2,@K[1] lwz @x[6],8($key) vmr $C0,@K[2] lwz @x[7],12($key) vmr $C1,@K[2] lwz @x[8],16($key) vmr $C2,@K[2] mr @x[12],@d[0] # copy GPR counter lwz @x[9],20($key) vmr $D0,@K[3] mr @x[13],@d[1] lwz @x[10],24($key) vmr $D1,@K[4] mr @x[14],@d[2] lwz @x[11],28($key) vmr $D2,@K[5] mr @x[15],@d[3] mr @t[0],@x[4] mr @t[1],@x[5] mr @t[2],@x[6] mr @t[3],@x[7] vspltisw $seven,7 mtctr r0 nop Loop_vmx: ___ my @thread0=&VMXROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,0); my @thread1=&VMXROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,0); my @thread2=&VMXROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,0); my @thread3=&ROUND(0,4,8,12); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread3)); } @thread0=&VMXROUND($A0,$B0,$C0,$D0,$T0,1); @thread1=&VMXROUND($A1,$B1,$C1,$D1,$T1,1); @thread2=&VMXROUND($A2,$B2,$C2,$D2,$T2,1); @thread3=&ROUND(0,5,10,15); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread3)); } $code.=<<___; bdnz Loop_vmx subi $len,$len,256 # $len-=256 addi @x[0],@x[0],0x7865 # accumulate key block addi @x[1],@x[1],0x646e addi @x[2],@x[2],0x2d32 addi @x[3],@x[3],0x6574 addis @x[0],@x[0],0x6170 addis @x[1],@x[1],0x3320 addis @x[2],@x[2],0x7962 addis @x[3],@x[3],0x6b20 add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] lwz @t[0],16($key) add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] lwz @t[1],20($key) add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] lwz @t[2],24($key) add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] lwz @t[3],28($key) add @x[8],@x[8],@t[0] add @x[9],@x[9],@t[1] add @x[10],@x[10],@t[2] add @x[11],@x[11],@t[3] add @x[12],@x[12],@d[0] add @x[13],@x[13],@d[1] add @x[14],@x[14],@d[2] add @x[15],@x[15],@d[3] vadduwm $A0,$A0,@K[0] # accumulate key block vadduwm $A1,$A1,@K[0] vadduwm $A2,$A2,@K[0] vadduwm $B0,$B0,@K[1] vadduwm $B1,$B1,@K[1] vadduwm $B2,$B2,@K[1] vadduwm $C0,$C0,@K[2] vadduwm $C1,$C1,@K[2] vadduwm $C2,$C2,@K[2] vadduwm $D0,$D0,@K[3] vadduwm $D1,$D1,@K[4] vadduwm $D2,$D2,@K[5] addi @d[0],@d[0],4 # increment counter vadduwm @K[3],@K[3],$FOUR vadduwm @K[4],@K[4],$FOUR vadduwm @K[5],@K[5],$FOUR ___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN) { for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { # flip byte order $code.=<<___; mr @t[$i&3],@x[$i] rotlwi @x[$i],@x[$i],8 rlwimi @x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,0,7 rlwimi @x[$i],@t[$i&3],24,16,23 ___ } } $code.=<<___; lwz @t[0],0($inp) # load input, aligned or not lwz @t[1],4($inp) lwz @t[2],8($inp) lwz @t[3],12($inp) xor @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] # xor with input lwz @t[0],16($inp) xor @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] lwz @t[1],20($inp) xor @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] lwz @t[2],24($inp) xor @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] lwz @t[3],28($inp) xor @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] lwz @t[0],32($inp) xor @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] lwz @t[1],36($inp) xor @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] lwz @t[2],40($inp) xor @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] lwz @t[3],44($inp) xor @x[8],@x[8],@t[0] lwz @t[0],48($inp) xor @x[9],@x[9],@t[1] lwz @t[1],52($inp) xor @x[10],@x[10],@t[2] lwz @t[2],56($inp) xor @x[11],@x[11],@t[3] lwz @t[3],60($inp) xor @x[12],@x[12],@t[0] stw @x[0],0($out) # store output, aligned or not xor @x[13],@x[13],@t[1] stw @x[1],4($out) xor @x[14],@x[14],@t[2] stw @x[2],8($out) xor @x[15],@x[15],@t[3] stw @x[3],12($out) addi $inp,$inp,64 stw @x[4],16($out) li @t[0],16 stw @x[5],20($out) li @t[1],32 stw @x[6],24($out) li @t[2],48 stw @x[7],28($out) li @t[3],64 stw @x[8],32($out) stw @x[9],36($out) stw @x[10],40($out) stw @x[11],44($out) stw @x[12],48($out) stw @x[13],52($out) stw @x[14],56($out) stw @x[15],60($out) addi $out,$out,64 lvx @D[0],0,$inp # load input lvx @D[1],@t[0],$inp lvx @D[2],@t[1],$inp lvx @D[3],@t[2],$inp lvx @D[4],@t[3],$inp addi $inp,$inp,64 ?vperm @D[0],@D[1],@D[0],$inpperm # align input ?vperm @D[1],@D[2],@D[1],$inpperm ?vperm @D[2],@D[3],@D[2],$inpperm ?vperm @D[3],@D[4],@D[3],$inpperm vxor $A0,$A0,@D[0] # xor with input vxor $B0,$B0,@D[1] lvx @D[1],@t[0],$inp # keep loading input vxor $C0,$C0,@D[2] lvx @D[2],@t[1],$inp vxor $D0,$D0,@D[3] lvx @D[3],@t[2],$inp lvx @D[0],@t[3],$inp addi $inp,$inp,64 li @t[3],63 # 63 is not a typo vperm $A0,$A0,$A0,$outperm # pre-misalign output vperm $B0,$B0,$B0,$outperm vperm $C0,$C0,$C0,$outperm vperm $D0,$D0,$D0,$outperm ?vperm @D[4],@D[1],@D[4],$inpperm # align input ?vperm @D[1],@D[2],@D[1],$inpperm ?vperm @D[2],@D[3],@D[2],$inpperm ?vperm @D[3],@D[0],@D[3],$inpperm vxor $A1,$A1,@D[4] vxor $B1,$B1,@D[1] lvx @D[1],@t[0],$inp # keep loading input vxor $C1,$C1,@D[2] lvx @D[2],@t[1],$inp vxor $D1,$D1,@D[3] lvx @D[3],@t[2],$inp lvx @D[4],@t[3],$inp # redundant in aligned case addi $inp,$inp,64 vperm $A1,$A1,$A1,$outperm # pre-misalign output vperm $B1,$B1,$B1,$outperm vperm $C1,$C1,$C1,$outperm vperm $D1,$D1,$D1,$outperm ?vperm @D[0],@D[1],@D[0],$inpperm # align input ?vperm @D[1],@D[2],@D[1],$inpperm ?vperm @D[2],@D[3],@D[2],$inpperm ?vperm @D[3],@D[4],@D[3],$inpperm vxor $A2,$A2,@D[0] vxor $B2,$B2,@D[1] vxor $C2,$C2,@D[2] vxor $D2,$D2,@D[3] vperm $A2,$A2,$A2,$outperm # pre-misalign output vperm $B2,$B2,$B2,$outperm vperm $C2,$C2,$C2,$outperm vperm $D2,$D2,$D2,$outperm andi. @x[1],$out,15 # is $out aligned? mr @x[0],$out vsel @D[0],$A0,$B0,$outmask # collect pre-misaligned output vsel @D[1],$B0,$C0,$outmask vsel @D[2],$C0,$D0,$outmask vsel @D[3],$D0,$A1,$outmask vsel $B0,$A1,$B1,$outmask vsel $C0,$B1,$C1,$outmask vsel $D0,$C1,$D1,$outmask vsel $A1,$D1,$A2,$outmask vsel $B1,$A2,$B2,$outmask vsel $C1,$B2,$C2,$outmask vsel $D1,$C2,$D2,$outmask #stvx $A0,0,$out # take it easy on the edges stvx @D[0],@t[0],$out # store output stvx @D[1],@t[1],$out stvx @D[2],@t[2],$out addi $out,$out,64 stvx @D[3],0,$out stvx $B0,@t[0],$out stvx $C0,@t[1],$out stvx $D0,@t[2],$out addi $out,$out,64 stvx $A1,0,$out stvx $B1,@t[0],$out stvx $C1,@t[1],$out stvx $D1,@t[2],$out addi $out,$out,64 beq Laligned_vmx sub @x[2],$out,@x[1] # in misaligned case edges li @x[3],0 # are written byte-by-byte Lunaligned_tail_vmx: stvebx $D2,@x[3],@x[2] addi @x[3],@x[3],1 cmpw @x[3],@x[1] bne Lunaligned_tail_vmx sub @x[2],@x[0],@x[1] Lunaligned_head_vmx: stvebx $A0,@x[1],@x[2] cmpwi @x[1],15 addi @x[1],@x[1],1 bne Lunaligned_head_vmx ${UCMP}i $len,255 # done with 256-byte blocks yet? bgt Loop_outer_vmx b Ldone_vmx .align 4 Laligned_vmx: stvx $A0,0,@x[0] # head hexaword was not stored ${UCMP}i $len,255 # done with 256-byte blocks yet? bgt Loop_outer_vmx nop Ldone_vmx: ${UCMP}i $len,0 # done yet? bnel __ChaCha20_1x lwz r12,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18-4`($sp) # pull vrsave li r10,`15+$LOCALS+64` li r11,`31+$LOCALS+64` mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave lvx v20,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v21,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v22,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v23,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v24,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v25,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v26,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v27,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v28,r10,$sp addi r10,r10,32 lvx v29,r11,$sp addi r11,r11,32 lvx v30,r10,$sp lvx v31,r11,$sp $POP r0, `$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp) $POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp) $POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp) $POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp) $POP r17,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*15`($sp) $POP r18,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*14`($sp) $POP r19,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*13`($sp) $POP r20,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*12`($sp) $POP r21,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*11`($sp) $POP r22,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*10`($sp) $POP r23,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*9`($sp) $POP r24,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*8`($sp) $POP r25,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*7`($sp) $POP r26,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*6`($sp) $POP r27,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp) $POP r28,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp) $POP r29,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp) $POP r30,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*2`($sp) $POP r31,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*1`($sp) mtlr r0 addi $sp,$sp,$FRAME blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,18,5,0 .long 0 .size .ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx,.-.ChaCha20_ctr32_vmx .align 5 Lconsts: mflr r0 bcl 20,31,\$+4 mflr r12 #vvvvv "distance between . and _vpaes_consts addi r12,r12,`64-8` mtlr r0 blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0 .space `64-9*4` Lsigma: .long 0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574 .long 1,0,0,0 .long 4,0,0,0 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN); .long 0x0e0f0c0d,0x0a0b0809,0x06070405,0x02030001 .long 0x0d0e0f0c,0x090a0b08,0x05060704,0x01020300 ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN); # flipped words .long 0x02030001,0x06070405,0x0a0b0809,0x0e0f0c0d .long 0x01020300,0x05060704,0x090a0b08,0x0d0e0f0c ___ $code.=<<___; .asciz "ChaCha20 for PowerPC/AltiVec, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 ___ }}} foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; # instructions prefixed with '?' are endian-specific and need # to be adjusted accordingly... if ($flavour !~ /le$/) { # big-endian s/be\?// or s/le\?/#le#/ or s/\?lvsr/lvsl/ or s/\?lvsl/lvsr/ or s/\?(vperm\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+)/$1$3$2$4/ or s/(vsldoi\s+v[0-9]+,\s*)(v[0-9]+,)\s*(v[0-9]+,\s*)([0-9]+)/$1$3$2 16-$4/; } else { # little-endian s/le\?// or s/be\?/#be#/ or s/\?([a-z]+)/$1/; } print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv4.pl0000755000000000000000000006564713176625656020211 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # December 2014 # # ChaCha20 for ARMv4. # # Performance in cycles per byte out of large buffer. # # IALU/gcc-4.4 1xNEON 3xNEON+1xIALU # # Cortex-A5 19.3(*)/+95% 21.8 14.1 # Cortex-A8 10.5(*)/+160% 13.9 6.35 # Cortex-A9 12.9(**)/+110% 14.3 6.50 # Cortex-A15 11.0/+40% 16.0 5.00 # Snapdragon S4 11.5/+125% 13.6 4.90 # # (*) most "favourable" result for aligned data on little-endian # processor, result for misaligned data is 10-15% lower; # (**) this result is a trade-off: it can be improved by 20%, # but then Snapdragon S4 and Cortex-A8 results get # 20-25% worse; $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] x86-style perlasm { my $opcode = $AUTOLOAD; $opcode =~ s/.*:://; $opcode =~ s/_/\./; my $arg = pop; $arg = "#$arg" if ($arg*1 eq $arg); $code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',@_,$arg)."\n"; } my @x=map("r$_",(0..7,"x","x","x","x",12,"x",14,"x")); my @t=map("r$_",(8..11)); sub ROUND { my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)=@_; my ($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0)); my ($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1)); my ($a3,$b3,$c3,$d3)=map(($_&~3)+(($_+1)&3),($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2)); my $odd = $d0&1; my ($xc,$xc_) = (@t[0..1]); my ($xd,$xd_) = $odd ? (@t[2],@x[$d1]) : (@x[$d0],@t[2]); my @ret; # Consider order in which variables are addressed by their # index: # # a b c d # # 0 4 8 12 < even round # 1 5 9 13 # 2 6 10 14 # 3 7 11 15 # 0 5 10 15 < odd round # 1 6 11 12 # 2 7 8 13 # 3 4 9 14 # # 'a', 'b' are permanently allocated in registers, @x[0..7], # while 'c's and pair of 'd's are maintained in memory. If # you observe 'c' column, you'll notice that pair of 'c's is # invariant between rounds. This means that we have to reload # them once per round, in the middle. This is why you'll see # bunch of 'c' stores and loads in the middle, but none in # the beginning or end. If you observe 'd' column, you'll # notice that 15 and 13 are reused in next pair of rounds. # This is why these two are chosen for offloading to memory, # to make loads count more. push @ret,( "&add (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&mov ($xd,$xd,'ror#16')", "&add (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&mov ($xd_,$xd_,'ror#16')", "&eor ($xd,$xd,@x[$a0],'ror#16')", "&eor ($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a1],'ror#16')", "&add ($xc,$xc,$xd)", "&mov (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],'ror#20')", "&add ($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)", "&mov (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],'ror#20')", "&eor (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],$xc,'ror#20')", "&eor (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],$xc_,'ror#20')", "&add (@x[$a0],@x[$a0],@x[$b0])", "&mov ($xd,$xd,'ror#24')", "&add (@x[$a1],@x[$a1],@x[$b1])", "&mov ($xd_,$xd_,'ror#24')", "&eor ($xd,$xd,@x[$a0],'ror#24')", "&eor ($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a1],'ror#24')", "&add ($xc,$xc,$xd)", "&mov (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],'ror#25')" ); push @ret,( "&str ($xd,'[sp,#4*(16+$d0)]')", "&ldr ($xd,'[sp,#4*(16+$d2)]')" ) if ($odd); push @ret,( "&add ($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)", "&mov (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],'ror#25')" ); push @ret,( "&str ($xd_,'[sp,#4*(16+$d1)]')", "&ldr ($xd_,'[sp,#4*(16+$d3)]')" ) if (!$odd); push @ret,( "&eor (@x[$b0],@x[$b0],$xc,'ror#25')", "&eor (@x[$b1],@x[$b1],$xc_,'ror#25')" ); $xd=@x[$d2] if (!$odd); $xd_=@x[$d3] if ($odd); push @ret,( "&str ($xc,'[sp,#4*(16+$c0)]')", "&ldr ($xc,'[sp,#4*(16+$c2)]')", "&add (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&mov ($xd,$xd,'ror#16')", "&str ($xc_,'[sp,#4*(16+$c1)]')", "&ldr ($xc_,'[sp,#4*(16+$c3)]')", "&add (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&mov ($xd_,$xd_,'ror#16')", "&eor ($xd,$xd,@x[$a2],'ror#16')", "&eor ($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a3],'ror#16')", "&add ($xc,$xc,$xd)", "&mov (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],'ror#20')", "&add ($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)", "&mov (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],'ror#20')", "&eor (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],$xc,'ror#20')", "&eor (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],$xc_,'ror#20')", "&add (@x[$a2],@x[$a2],@x[$b2])", "&mov ($xd,$xd,'ror#24')", "&add (@x[$a3],@x[$a3],@x[$b3])", "&mov ($xd_,$xd_,'ror#24')", "&eor ($xd,$xd,@x[$a2],'ror#24')", "&eor ($xd_,$xd_,@x[$a3],'ror#24')", "&add ($xc,$xc,$xd)", "&mov (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],'ror#25')", "&add ($xc_,$xc_,$xd_)", "&mov (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],'ror#25')", "&eor (@x[$b2],@x[$b2],$xc,'ror#25')", "&eor (@x[$b3],@x[$b3],$xc_,'ror#25')" ); @ret; } $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #endif #if defined(__thumb2__) || defined(__clang__) #define ldrhsb ldrbhs #endif .align 5 .Lsigma: .long 0x61707865,0x3320646e,0x79622d32,0x6b206574 @ endian-neutral .Lone: .long 1,0,0,0 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .LOPENSSL_armcap: .word OPENSSL_armcap_P-.LChaCha20_ctr32 #else .word -1 #endif .globl ChaCha20_ctr32 .type ChaCha20_ctr32,%function .align 5 ChaCha20_ctr32: .LChaCha20_ctr32: ldr r12,[sp,#0] @ pull pointer to counter and nonce stmdb sp!,{r0-r2,r4-r11,lr} #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 && !defined(__thumb2__) sub r14,pc,#16 @ ChaCha20_ctr32 #else adr r14,.LChaCha20_ctr32 #endif cmp r2,#0 @ len==0? #ifdef __thumb2__ itt eq #endif addeq sp,sp,#4*3 beq .Lno_data #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 cmp r2,#192 @ test len bls .Lshort ldr r4,[r14,#-32] ldr r4,[r14,r4] # ifdef __APPLE__ ldr r4,[r4] # endif tst r4,#ARMV7_NEON bne .LChaCha20_neon .Lshort: #endif ldmia r12,{r4-r7} @ load counter and nonce sub sp,sp,#4*(16) @ off-load area sub r14,r14,#64 @ .Lsigma stmdb sp!,{r4-r7} @ copy counter and nonce ldmia r3,{r4-r11} @ load key ldmia r14,{r0-r3} @ load sigma stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} @ copy key stmdb sp!,{r0-r3} @ copy sigma str r10,[sp,#4*(16+10)] @ off-load "@x[10]" str r11,[sp,#4*(16+11)] @ off-load "@x[11]" b .Loop_outer_enter .align 4 .Loop_outer: ldmia sp,{r0-r9} @ load key material str @t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ save len str r12, [sp,#4*(32+1)] @ save inp str r14, [sp,#4*(32+0)] @ save out .Loop_outer_enter: ldr @t[3], [sp,#4*(15)] ldr @x[12],[sp,#4*(12)] @ modulo-scheduled load ldr @t[2], [sp,#4*(13)] ldr @x[14],[sp,#4*(14)] str @t[3], [sp,#4*(16+15)] mov @t[3],#10 b .Loop .align 4 .Loop: subs @t[3],@t[3],#1 ___ foreach (&ROUND(0, 4, 8,12)) { eval; } foreach (&ROUND(0, 5,10,15)) { eval; } $code.=<<___; bne .Loop ldr @t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ load len str @t[0], [sp,#4*(16+8)] @ modulo-scheduled store str @t[1], [sp,#4*(16+9)] str @x[12],[sp,#4*(16+12)] str @t[2], [sp,#4*(16+13)] str @x[14],[sp,#4*(16+14)] @ at this point we have first half of 512-bit result in @ @x[0-7] and second half at sp+4*(16+8) cmp @t[3],#64 @ done yet? #ifdef __thumb2__ itete lo #endif addlo r12,sp,#4*(0) @ shortcut or ... ldrhs r12,[sp,#4*(32+1)] @ ... load inp addlo r14,sp,#4*(0) @ shortcut or ... ldrhs r14,[sp,#4*(32+0)] @ ... load out ldr @t[0],[sp,#4*(0)] @ load key material ldr @t[1],[sp,#4*(1)] #if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 || !defined(__ARMEB__) # if __ARM_ARCH__<7 orr @t[2],r12,r14 tst @t[2],#3 @ are input and output aligned? ldr @t[2],[sp,#4*(2)] bne .Lunaligned cmp @t[3],#64 @ restore flags # else ldr @t[2],[sp,#4*(2)] # endif ldr @t[3],[sp,#4*(3)] add @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input ldrhs @t[1],[r12,#-12] add @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] add @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[2],[r12,#-8] ldrhs @t[3],[r12,#-4] # if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__) rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[1],@x[1] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[3],@x[3] # endif # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ xor with input eorhs @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] add @t[0],sp,#4*(4) str @x[0],[r14],#16 @ store output # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] eorhs @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material str @x[1],[r14,#-12] str @x[2],[r14,#-8] str @x[3],[r14,#-4] add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input ldrhs @t[1],[r12,#-12] add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[2],[r12,#-8] ldrhs @t[3],[r12,#-4] # if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__) rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[5],@x[5] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[7],@x[7] # endif # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] eorhs @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] add @t[0],sp,#4*(8) str @x[4],[r14],#16 @ store output # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] eorhs @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] str @x[5],[r14,#-12] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material str @x[6],[r14,#-8] add @x[0],sp,#4*(16+8) str @x[7],[r14,#-4] ldmia @x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]} @ load second half add @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input ldrhs @t[1],[r12,#-12] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hi # endif strhi @t[2],[sp,#4*(16+10)] @ copy "@x[10]" while at it strhi @t[3],[sp,#4*(16+11)] @ copy "@x[11]" while at it add @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] add @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[2],[r12,#-8] ldrhs @t[3],[r12,#-4] # if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__) rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[1],@x[1] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[3],@x[3] # endif # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] eorhs @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] add @t[0],sp,#4*(12) str @x[0],[r14],#16 @ store output # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] eorhs @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] str @x[1],[r14,#-12] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material str @x[2],[r14,#-8] str @x[3],[r14,#-4] add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hi # endif addhi @t[0],@t[0],#1 @ next counter value strhi @t[0],[sp,#4*(12)] @ save next counter value # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input ldrhs @t[1],[r12,#-12] add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhs @t[2],[r12,#-8] ldrhs @t[3],[r12,#-4] # if __ARM_ARCH__>=6 && defined(__ARMEB__) rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[5],@x[5] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[7],@x[7] # endif # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] eorhs @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] # ifdef __thumb2__ it ne # endif ldrne @t[0],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ re-load len # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif eorhs @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] eorhs @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] str @x[4],[r14],#16 @ store output str @x[5],[r14,#-12] # ifdef __thumb2__ it hs # endif subhs @t[3],@t[0],#64 @ len-=64 str @x[6],[r14,#-8] str @x[7],[r14,#-4] bhi .Loop_outer beq .Ldone # if __ARM_ARCH__<7 b .Ltail .align 4 .Lunaligned: @ unaligned endian-neutral path cmp @t[3],#64 @ restore flags # endif #endif #if __ARM_ARCH__<7 ldr @t[3],[sp,#4*(3)] ___ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i+=4) { my $j=$i&0x7; $code.=<<___ if ($i==4); add @x[0],sp,#4*(16+8) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==8); ldmia @x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]} @ load second half # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hi # endif strhi @t[2],[sp,#4*(16+10)] @ copy "@x[10]" strhi @t[3],[sp,#4*(16+11)] @ copy "@x[11]" ___ $code.=<<___; add @x[$j+0],@x[$j+0],@t[0] @ accumulate key material ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i==12); # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hi # endif addhi @t[0],@t[0],#1 @ next counter value strhi @t[0],[sp,#4*(12)] @ save next counter value ___ $code.=<<___; add @x[$j+1],@x[$j+1],@t[1] add @x[$j+2],@x[$j+2],@t[2] # ifdef __thumb2__ itete lo # endif eorlo @t[0],@t[0],@t[0] @ zero or ... ldrhsb @t[0],[r12],#16 @ ... load input eorlo @t[1],@t[1],@t[1] ldrhsb @t[1],[r12,#-12] add @x[$j+3],@x[$j+3],@t[3] # ifdef __thumb2__ itete lo # endif eorlo @t[2],@t[2],@t[2] ldrhsb @t[2],[r12,#-8] eorlo @t[3],@t[3],@t[3] ldrhsb @t[3],[r12,#-4] eor @x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0] @ xor with input (or zero) eor @x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhsb @t[0],[r12,#-15] @ load more input ldrhsb @t[1],[r12,#-11] eor @x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2] strb @x[$j+0],[r14],#16 @ store output eor @x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3] # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhsb @t[2],[r12,#-7] ldrhsb @t[3],[r12,#-3] strb @x[$j+1],[r14,#-12] eor @x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+2],[r14,#-8] eor @x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1],lsr#8 # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhsb @t[0],[r12,#-14] @ load more input ldrhsb @t[1],[r12,#-10] strb @x[$j+3],[r14,#-4] eor @x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+0],[r14,#-15] eor @x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3],lsr#8 # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhsb @t[2],[r12,#-6] ldrhsb @t[3],[r12,#-2] strb @x[$j+1],[r14,#-11] eor @x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+2],[r14,#-7] eor @x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1],lsr#8 # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhsb @t[0],[r12,#-13] @ load more input ldrhsb @t[1],[r12,#-9] strb @x[$j+3],[r14,#-3] eor @x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+0],[r14,#-14] eor @x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3],lsr#8 # ifdef __thumb2__ itt hs # endif ldrhsb @t[2],[r12,#-5] ldrhsb @t[3],[r12,#-1] strb @x[$j+1],[r14,#-10] strb @x[$j+2],[r14,#-6] eor @x[$j+0],@t[0],@x[$j+0],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+3],[r14,#-2] eor @x[$j+1],@t[1],@x[$j+1],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+0],[r14,#-13] eor @x[$j+2],@t[2],@x[$j+2],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+1],[r14,#-9] eor @x[$j+3],@t[3],@x[$j+3],lsr#8 strb @x[$j+2],[r14,#-5] strb @x[$j+3],[r14,#-1] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<12); add @t[0],sp,#4*(4+$i) ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material ___ } $code.=<<___; # ifdef __thumb2__ it ne # endif ldrne @t[0],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ re-load len # ifdef __thumb2__ it hs # endif subhs @t[3],@t[0],#64 @ len-=64 bhi .Loop_outer beq .Ldone #endif .Ltail: ldr r12,[sp,#4*(32+1)] @ load inp add @t[1],sp,#4*(0) ldr r14,[sp,#4*(32+0)] @ load out .Loop_tail: ldrb @t[2],[@t[1]],#1 @ read buffer on stack ldrb @t[3],[r12],#1 @ read input subs @t[0],@t[0],#1 eor @t[3],@t[3],@t[2] strb @t[3],[r14],#1 @ store output bne .Loop_tail .Ldone: add sp,sp,#4*(32+3) .Lno_data: ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc} .size ChaCha20_ctr32,.-ChaCha20_ctr32 ___ {{{ my ($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0,$a1,$b1,$c1,$d1,$a2,$b2,$c2,$d2,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3) = map("q$_",(0..15)); sub NEONROUND { my $odd = pop; my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$t)=@_; ( "&vadd_i32 ($a,$a,$b)", "&veor ($d,$d,$a)", "&vrev32_16 ($d,$d)", # vrot ($d,16) "&vadd_i32 ($c,$c,$d)", "&veor ($t,$b,$c)", "&vshr_u32 ($b,$t,20)", "&vsli_32 ($b,$t,12)", "&vadd_i32 ($a,$a,$b)", "&veor ($t,$d,$a)", "&vshr_u32 ($d,$t,24)", "&vsli_32 ($d,$t,8)", "&vadd_i32 ($c,$c,$d)", "&veor ($t,$b,$c)", "&vshr_u32 ($b,$t,25)", "&vsli_32 ($b,$t,7)", "&vext_8 ($c,$c,$c,8)", "&vext_8 ($b,$b,$b,$odd?12:4)", "&vext_8 ($d,$d,$d,$odd?4:12)" ); } $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 .arch armv7-a .fpu neon .type ChaCha20_neon,%function .align 5 ChaCha20_neon: ldr r12,[sp,#0] @ pull pointer to counter and nonce stmdb sp!,{r0-r2,r4-r11,lr} .LChaCha20_neon: adr r14,.Lsigma vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI spec says so stmdb sp!,{r0-r3} vld1.32 {$b0-$c0},[r3] @ load key ldmia r3,{r4-r11} @ load key sub sp,sp,#4*(16+16) vld1.32 {$d0},[r12] @ load counter and nonce add r12,sp,#4*8 ldmia r14,{r0-r3} @ load sigma vld1.32 {$a0},[r14]! @ load sigma vld1.32 {$t0},[r14] @ one vst1.32 {$c0-$d0},[r12] @ copy 1/2key|counter|nonce vst1.32 {$a0-$b0},[sp] @ copy sigma|1/2key str r10,[sp,#4*(16+10)] @ off-load "@x[10]" str r11,[sp,#4*(16+11)] @ off-load "@x[11]" vshl.i32 $t1#lo,$t0#lo,#1 @ two vstr $t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+0)] vshl.i32 $t2#lo,$t0#lo,#2 @ four vstr $t1#lo,[sp,#4*(16+2)] vmov $a1,$a0 vstr $t2#lo,[sp,#4*(16+4)] vmov $a2,$a0 vmov $b1,$b0 vmov $b2,$b0 b .Loop_neon_enter .align 4 .Loop_neon_outer: ldmia sp,{r0-r9} @ load key material cmp @t[3],#64*2 @ if len<=64*2 bls .Lbreak_neon @ switch to integer-only vmov $a1,$a0 str @t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ save len vmov $a2,$a0 str r12, [sp,#4*(32+1)] @ save inp vmov $b1,$b0 str r14, [sp,#4*(32+0)] @ save out vmov $b2,$b0 .Loop_neon_enter: ldr @t[3], [sp,#4*(15)] vadd.i32 $d1,$d0,$t0 @ counter+1 ldr @x[12],[sp,#4*(12)] @ modulo-scheduled load vmov $c1,$c0 ldr @t[2], [sp,#4*(13)] vmov $c2,$c0 ldr @x[14],[sp,#4*(14)] vadd.i32 $d2,$d1,$t0 @ counter+2 str @t[3], [sp,#4*(16+15)] mov @t[3],#10 add @x[12],@x[12],#3 @ counter+3 b .Loop_neon .align 4 .Loop_neon: subs @t[3],@t[3],#1 ___ my @thread0=&NEONROUND($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0,$t0,0); my @thread1=&NEONROUND($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1,$t1,0); my @thread2=&NEONROUND($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2,$t2,0); my @thread3=&ROUND(0,4,8,12); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread3)); } @thread0=&NEONROUND($a0,$b0,$c0,$d0,$t0,1); @thread1=&NEONROUND($a1,$b1,$c1,$d1,$t1,1); @thread2=&NEONROUND($a2,$b2,$c2,$d2,$t2,1); @thread3=&ROUND(0,5,10,15); foreach (@thread0) { eval; eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread1)); eval(shift(@thread3)); eval(shift(@thread2)); eval(shift(@thread3)); } $code.=<<___; bne .Loop_neon add @t[3],sp,#32 vld1.32 {$t0-$t1},[sp] @ load key material vld1.32 {$t2-$t3},[@t[3]] ldr @t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ load len str @t[0], [sp,#4*(16+8)] @ modulo-scheduled store str @t[1], [sp,#4*(16+9)] str @x[12],[sp,#4*(16+12)] str @t[2], [sp,#4*(16+13)] str @x[14],[sp,#4*(16+14)] @ at this point we have first half of 512-bit result in @ @x[0-7] and second half at sp+4*(16+8) ldr r12,[sp,#4*(32+1)] @ load inp ldr r14,[sp,#4*(32+0)] @ load out vadd.i32 $a0,$a0,$t0 @ accumulate key material vadd.i32 $a1,$a1,$t0 vadd.i32 $a2,$a2,$t0 vldr $t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+0)] @ one vadd.i32 $b0,$b0,$t1 vadd.i32 $b1,$b1,$t1 vadd.i32 $b2,$b2,$t1 vldr $t1#lo,[sp,#4*(16+2)] @ two vadd.i32 $c0,$c0,$t2 vadd.i32 $c1,$c1,$t2 vadd.i32 $c2,$c2,$t2 vadd.i32 $d1#lo,$d1#lo,$t0#lo @ counter+1 vadd.i32 $d2#lo,$d2#lo,$t1#lo @ counter+2 vadd.i32 $d0,$d0,$t3 vadd.i32 $d1,$d1,$t3 vadd.i32 $d2,$d2,$t3 cmp @t[3],#64*4 blo .Ltail_neon vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! @ load input mov @t[3],sp vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a0,$a0,$t0 @ xor with input veor $b0,$b0,$t1 vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! veor $c0,$c0,$t2 veor $d0,$d0,$t3 vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a1,$a1,$t0 vst1.8 {$a0-$b0},[r14]! @ store output veor $b1,$b1,$t1 vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! veor $c1,$c1,$t2 vst1.8 {$c0-$d0},[r14]! veor $d1,$d1,$t3 vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a2,$a2,$t0 vld1.32 {$a0-$b0},[@t[3]]! @ load for next iteration veor $t0#hi,$t0#hi,$t0#hi vldr $t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+4)] @ four veor $b2,$b2,$t1 vld1.32 {$c0-$d0},[@t[3]] veor $c2,$c2,$t2 vst1.8 {$a1-$b1},[r14]! veor $d2,$d2,$t3 vst1.8 {$c1-$d1},[r14]! vadd.i32 $d0#lo,$d0#lo,$t0#lo @ next counter value vldr $t0#lo,[sp,#4*(16+0)] @ one ldmia sp,{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material add @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ accumulate key material ldr @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input vst1.8 {$a2-$b2},[r14]! add @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] ldr @t[1],[r12,#-12] vst1.8 {$c2-$d2},[r14]! add @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] ldr @t[2],[r12,#-8] add @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] ldr @t[3],[r12,#-4] # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[1],@x[1] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[3],@x[3] # endif eor @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ xor with input add @t[0],sp,#4*(4) eor @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] str @x[0],[r14],#16 @ store output eor @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] str @x[1],[r14,#-12] eor @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material str @x[2],[r14,#-8] str @x[3],[r14,#-4] add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] @ accumulate key material ldr @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] ldr @t[1],[r12,#-12] add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] ldr @t[2],[r12,#-8] add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] ldr @t[3],[r12,#-4] # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[5],@x[5] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[7],@x[7] # endif eor @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] add @t[0],sp,#4*(8) eor @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] str @x[4],[r14],#16 @ store output eor @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] str @x[5],[r14,#-12] eor @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material str @x[6],[r14,#-8] add @x[0],sp,#4*(16+8) str @x[7],[r14,#-4] ldmia @x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]} @ load second half add @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ accumulate key material ldr @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input add @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] ldr @t[1],[r12,#-12] # ifdef __thumb2__ it hi # endif strhi @t[2],[sp,#4*(16+10)] @ copy "@x[10]" while at it add @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] ldr @t[2],[r12,#-8] # ifdef __thumb2__ it hi # endif strhi @t[3],[sp,#4*(16+11)] @ copy "@x[11]" while at it add @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] ldr @t[3],[r12,#-4] # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[1],@x[1] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[3],@x[3] # endif eor @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] add @t[0],sp,#4*(12) eor @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] str @x[0],[r14],#16 @ store output eor @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] str @x[1],[r14,#-12] eor @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material str @x[2],[r14,#-8] str @x[3],[r14,#-4] add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @t[0],@t[0],#4 @ next counter value add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] str @t[0],[sp,#4*(12)] @ save next counter value ldr @t[0],[r12],#16 @ load input add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] add @x[4],@x[4],#3 @ counter+3 ldr @t[1],[r12,#-12] add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] ldr @t[2],[r12,#-8] ldr @t[3],[r12,#-4] # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[5],@x[5] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[7],@x[7] # endif eor @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] # ifdef __thumb2__ it hi # endif ldrhi @t[0],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ re-load len eor @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] eor @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] str @x[4],[r14],#16 @ store output eor @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] str @x[5],[r14,#-12] sub @t[3],@t[0],#64*4 @ len-=64*4 str @x[6],[r14,#-8] str @x[7],[r14,#-4] bhi .Loop_neon_outer b .Ldone_neon .align 4 .Lbreak_neon: @ harmonize NEON and integer-only stack frames: load data @ from NEON frame, but save to integer-only one; distance @ between the two is 4*(32+4+16-32)=4*(20). str @t[3], [sp,#4*(20+32+2)] @ save len add @t[3],sp,#4*(32+4) str r12, [sp,#4*(20+32+1)] @ save inp str r14, [sp,#4*(20+32+0)] @ save out ldr @x[12],[sp,#4*(16+10)] ldr @x[14],[sp,#4*(16+11)] vldmia @t[3],{d8-d15} @ fulfill ABI requirement str @x[12],[sp,#4*(20+16+10)] @ copy "@x[10]" str @x[14],[sp,#4*(20+16+11)] @ copy "@x[11]" ldr @t[3], [sp,#4*(15)] ldr @x[12],[sp,#4*(12)] @ modulo-scheduled load ldr @t[2], [sp,#4*(13)] ldr @x[14],[sp,#4*(14)] str @t[3], [sp,#4*(20+16+15)] add @t[3],sp,#4*(20) vst1.32 {$a0-$b0},[@t[3]]! @ copy key add sp,sp,#4*(20) @ switch frame vst1.32 {$c0-$d0},[@t[3]] mov @t[3],#10 b .Loop @ go integer-only .align 4 .Ltail_neon: cmp @t[3],#64*3 bhs .L192_or_more_neon cmp @t[3],#64*2 bhs .L128_or_more_neon cmp @t[3],#64*1 bhs .L64_or_more_neon add @t[0],sp,#4*(8) vst1.8 {$a0-$b0},[sp] add @t[2],sp,#4*(0) vst1.8 {$c0-$d0},[@t[0]] b .Loop_tail_neon .align 4 .L64_or_more_neon: vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a0,$a0,$t0 veor $b0,$b0,$t1 veor $c0,$c0,$t2 veor $d0,$d0,$t3 vst1.8 {$a0-$b0},[r14]! vst1.8 {$c0-$d0},[r14]! beq .Ldone_neon add @t[0],sp,#4*(8) vst1.8 {$a1-$b1},[sp] add @t[2],sp,#4*(0) vst1.8 {$c1-$d1},[@t[0]] sub @t[3],@t[3],#64*1 @ len-=64*1 b .Loop_tail_neon .align 4 .L128_or_more_neon: vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a0,$a0,$t0 veor $b0,$b0,$t1 vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! veor $c0,$c0,$t2 veor $d0,$d0,$t3 vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a1,$a1,$t0 veor $b1,$b1,$t1 vst1.8 {$a0-$b0},[r14]! veor $c1,$c1,$t2 vst1.8 {$c0-$d0},[r14]! veor $d1,$d1,$t3 vst1.8 {$a1-$b1},[r14]! vst1.8 {$c1-$d1},[r14]! beq .Ldone_neon add @t[0],sp,#4*(8) vst1.8 {$a2-$b2},[sp] add @t[2],sp,#4*(0) vst1.8 {$c2-$d2},[@t[0]] sub @t[3],@t[3],#64*2 @ len-=64*2 b .Loop_tail_neon .align 4 .L192_or_more_neon: vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a0,$a0,$t0 veor $b0,$b0,$t1 vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! veor $c0,$c0,$t2 veor $d0,$d0,$t3 vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a1,$a1,$t0 veor $b1,$b1,$t1 vld1.8 {$t0-$t1},[r12]! veor $c1,$c1,$t2 vst1.8 {$a0-$b0},[r14]! veor $d1,$d1,$t3 vld1.8 {$t2-$t3},[r12]! veor $a2,$a2,$t0 vst1.8 {$c0-$d0},[r14]! veor $b2,$b2,$t1 vst1.8 {$a1-$b1},[r14]! veor $c2,$c2,$t2 vst1.8 {$c1-$d1},[r14]! veor $d2,$d2,$t3 vst1.8 {$a2-$b2},[r14]! vst1.8 {$c2-$d2},[r14]! beq .Ldone_neon ldmia sp,{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material add @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @t[0],sp,#4*(4) add @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] add @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] add @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @t[0],sp,#4*(8) add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[1],@x[1] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[3],@x[3] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[5],@x[5] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[7],@x[7] # endif stmia sp,{@x[0]-@x[7]} add @x[0],sp,#4*(16+8) ldmia @x[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]} @ load second half add @x[0],@x[0],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @t[0],sp,#4*(12) add @x[1],@x[1],@t[1] add @x[2],@x[2],@t[2] add @x[3],@x[3],@t[3] ldmia @t[0],{@t[0]-@t[3]} @ load key material add @x[4],@x[4],@t[0] @ accumulate key material add @t[0],sp,#4*(8) add @x[5],@x[5],@t[1] add @x[4],@x[4],#3 @ counter+3 add @x[6],@x[6],@t[2] add @x[7],@x[7],@t[3] ldr @t[3],[sp,#4*(32+2)] @ re-load len # ifdef __ARMEB__ rev @x[0],@x[0] rev @x[1],@x[1] rev @x[2],@x[2] rev @x[3],@x[3] rev @x[4],@x[4] rev @x[5],@x[5] rev @x[6],@x[6] rev @x[7],@x[7] # endif stmia @t[0],{@x[0]-@x[7]} add @t[2],sp,#4*(0) sub @t[3],@t[3],#64*3 @ len-=64*3 .Loop_tail_neon: ldrb @t[0],[@t[2]],#1 @ read buffer on stack ldrb @t[1],[r12],#1 @ read input subs @t[3],@t[3],#1 eor @t[0],@t[0],@t[1] strb @t[0],[r14],#1 @ store output bne .Loop_tail_neon .Ldone_neon: add sp,sp,#4*(32+4) vldmia sp,{d8-d15} add sp,sp,#4*(16+3) ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc} .size ChaCha20_neon,.-ChaCha20_neon .comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 #endif ___ }}} foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656013771 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_pi.h0000644000000000000000000007323613176625656015234 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ static const BF_KEY bf_init = { { 0x243f6a88L, 0x85a308d3L, 0x13198a2eL, 0x03707344L, 0xa4093822L, 0x299f31d0L, 0x082efa98L, 0xec4e6c89L, 0x452821e6L, 0x38d01377L, 0xbe5466cfL, 0x34e90c6cL, 0xc0ac29b7L, 0xc97c50ddL, 0x3f84d5b5L, 0xb5470917L, 0x9216d5d9L, 0x8979fb1b}, { 0xd1310ba6L, 0x98dfb5acL, 0x2ffd72dbL, 0xd01adfb7L, 0xb8e1afedL, 0x6a267e96L, 0xba7c9045L, 0xf12c7f99L, 0x24a19947L, 0xb3916cf7L, 0x0801f2e2L, 0x858efc16L, 0x636920d8L, 0x71574e69L, 0xa458fea3L, 0xf4933d7eL, 0x0d95748fL, 0x728eb658L, 0x718bcd58L, 0x82154aeeL, 0x7b54a41dL, 0xc25a59b5L, 0x9c30d539L, 0x2af26013L, 0xc5d1b023L, 0x286085f0L, 0xca417918L, 0xb8db38efL, 0x8e79dcb0L, 0x603a180eL, 0x6c9e0e8bL, 0xb01e8a3eL, 0xd71577c1L, 0xbd314b27L, 0x78af2fdaL, 0x55605c60L, 0xe65525f3L, 0xaa55ab94L, 0x57489862L, 0x63e81440L, 0x55ca396aL, 0x2aab10b6L, 0xb4cc5c34L, 0x1141e8ceL, 0xa15486afL, 0x7c72e993L, 0xb3ee1411L, 0x636fbc2aL, 0x2ba9c55dL, 0x741831f6L, 0xce5c3e16L, 0x9b87931eL, 0xafd6ba33L, 0x6c24cf5cL, 0x7a325381L, 0x28958677L, 0x3b8f4898L, 0x6b4bb9afL, 0xc4bfe81bL, 0x66282193L, 0x61d809ccL, 0xfb21a991L, 0x487cac60L, 0x5dec8032L, 0xef845d5dL, 0xe98575b1L, 0xdc262302L, 0xeb651b88L, 0x23893e81L, 0xd396acc5L, 0x0f6d6ff3L, 0x83f44239L, 0x2e0b4482L, 0xa4842004L, 0x69c8f04aL, 0x9e1f9b5eL, 0x21c66842L, 0xf6e96c9aL, 0x670c9c61L, 0xabd388f0L, 0x6a51a0d2L, 0xd8542f68L, 0x960fa728L, 0xab5133a3L, 0x6eef0b6cL, 0x137a3be4L, 0xba3bf050L, 0x7efb2a98L, 0xa1f1651dL, 0x39af0176L, 0x66ca593eL, 0x82430e88L, 0x8cee8619L, 0x456f9fb4L, 0x7d84a5c3L, 0x3b8b5ebeL, 0xe06f75d8L, 0x85c12073L, 0x401a449fL, 0x56c16aa6L, 0x4ed3aa62L, 0x363f7706L, 0x1bfedf72L, 0x429b023dL, 0x37d0d724L, 0xd00a1248L, 0xdb0fead3L, 0x49f1c09bL, 0x075372c9L, 0x80991b7bL, 0x25d479d8L, 0xf6e8def7L, 0xe3fe501aL, 0xb6794c3bL, 0x976ce0bdL, 0x04c006baL, 0xc1a94fb6L, 0x409f60c4L, 0x5e5c9ec2L, 0x196a2463L, 0x68fb6fafL, 0x3e6c53b5L, 0x1339b2ebL, 0x3b52ec6fL, 0x6dfc511fL, 0x9b30952cL, 0xcc814544L, 0xaf5ebd09L, 0xbee3d004L, 0xde334afdL, 0x660f2807L, 0x192e4bb3L, 0xc0cba857L, 0x45c8740fL, 0xd20b5f39L, 0xb9d3fbdbL, 0x5579c0bdL, 0x1a60320aL, 0xd6a100c6L, 0x402c7279L, 0x679f25feL, 0xfb1fa3ccL, 0x8ea5e9f8L, 0xdb3222f8L, 0x3c7516dfL, 0xfd616b15L, 0x2f501ec8L, 0xad0552abL, 0x323db5faL, 0xfd238760L, 0x53317b48L, 0x3e00df82L, 0x9e5c57bbL, 0xca6f8ca0L, 0x1a87562eL, 0xdf1769dbL, 0xd542a8f6L, 0x287effc3L, 0xac6732c6L, 0x8c4f5573L, 0x695b27b0L, 0xbbca58c8L, 0xe1ffa35dL, 0xb8f011a0L, 0x10fa3d98L, 0xfd2183b8L, 0x4afcb56cL, 0x2dd1d35bL, 0x9a53e479L, 0xb6f84565L, 0xd28e49bcL, 0x4bfb9790L, 0xe1ddf2daL, 0xa4cb7e33L, 0x62fb1341L, 0xcee4c6e8L, 0xef20cadaL, 0x36774c01L, 0xd07e9efeL, 0x2bf11fb4L, 0x95dbda4dL, 0xae909198L, 0xeaad8e71L, 0x6b93d5a0L, 0xd08ed1d0L, 0xafc725e0L, 0x8e3c5b2fL, 0x8e7594b7L, 0x8ff6e2fbL, 0xf2122b64L, 0x8888b812L, 0x900df01cL, 0x4fad5ea0L, 0x688fc31cL, 0xd1cff191L, 0xb3a8c1adL, 0x2f2f2218L, 0xbe0e1777L, 0xea752dfeL, 0x8b021fa1L, 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0xce6279cfL, 0xcd3e7e6fL, 0x1618b166L, 0xfd2c1d05L, 0x848fd2c5L, 0xf6fb2299L, 0xf523f357L, 0xa6327623L, 0x93a83531L, 0x56cccd02L, 0xacf08162L, 0x5a75ebb5L, 0x6e163697L, 0x88d273ccL, 0xde966292L, 0x81b949d0L, 0x4c50901bL, 0x71c65614L, 0xe6c6c7bdL, 0x327a140aL, 0x45e1d006L, 0xc3f27b9aL, 0xc9aa53fdL, 0x62a80f00L, 0xbb25bfe2L, 0x35bdd2f6L, 0x71126905L, 0xb2040222L, 0xb6cbcf7cL, 0xcd769c2bL, 0x53113ec0L, 0x1640e3d3L, 0x38abbd60L, 0x2547adf0L, 0xba38209cL, 0xf746ce76L, 0x77afa1c5L, 0x20756060L, 0x85cbfe4eL, 0x8ae88dd8L, 0x7aaaf9b0L, 0x4cf9aa7eL, 0x1948c25cL, 0x02fb8a8cL, 0x01c36ae4L, 0xd6ebe1f9L, 0x90d4f869L, 0xa65cdea0L, 0x3f09252dL, 0xc208e69fL, 0xb74e6132L, 0xce77e25bL, 0x578fdfe3L, 0x3ac372e6L, } }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_cfb64.c0000644000000000000000000000416413176625656015515 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "bf_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int encrypt) { register BF_LONG v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; BF_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv, c, cc; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; if (encrypt) { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { n2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; n2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; BF_encrypt((BF_LONG *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } c = *(in++) ^ iv[n]; *(out++) = c; iv[n] = c; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } else { while (l--) { if (n == 0) { n2l(iv, v0); ti[0] = v0; n2l(iv, v1); ti[1] = v1; BF_encrypt((BF_LONG *)ti, schedule); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, iv); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, iv); iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; } cc = *(in++); c = iv[n]; iv[n] = cc; *(out++) = c ^ cc; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } } v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = t = c = cc = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/build.info0000644000000000000000000000041313176625656015743 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=bf_skey.c bf_ecb.c bf_cfb64.c bf_ofb64.c \ {- $target{bf_asm_src} -} GENERATE[bf-586.s]=asm/bf-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) DEPEND[bf-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl ../perlasm/cbc.pl openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000765113176625656015553 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_BF_LOCL_H # define HEADER_BF_LOCL_H # include /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per n2l */ # define n2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))) ; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ } \ } /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2n */ # define l2nn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ /* fall thru */ \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ } \ } # undef n2l # define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8L, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) # undef l2n # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8L)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) /* * This is actually a big endian algorithm, the most significant byte is used * to lookup array 0 */ # define BF_ENC(LL,R,S,P) ( \ LL^=P, \ LL^=((( S[ ((R>>24)&0xff)] + \ S[0x0100+((R>>16)&0xff)])^ \ S[0x0200+((R>> 8)&0xff)])+ \ S[0x0300+((R )&0xff)])&0xffffffffU \ ) #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014551 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/asm/bf-586.pl0000644000000000000000000000574013176625656016023 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; require "cbc.pl"; $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"bf-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $BF_ROUNDS=16; $BF_OFF=($BF_ROUNDS+2)*4; $L="edi"; $R="esi"; $P="ebp"; $tmp1="eax"; $tmp2="ebx"; $tmp3="ecx"; $tmp4="edx"; &BF_encrypt("BF_encrypt",1); &BF_encrypt("BF_decrypt",0); &cbc("BF_cbc_encrypt","BF_encrypt","BF_decrypt",1,4,5,3,-1,-1); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub BF_encrypt { local($name,$enc)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,""); &comment(""); &push("ebp"); &push("ebx"); &mov($tmp2,&wparam(0)); &mov($P,&wparam(1)); &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &comment("Load the 2 words"); &mov($L,&DWP(0,$tmp2,"",0)); &mov($R,&DWP(4,$tmp2,"",0)); &xor( $tmp1, $tmp1); # encrypting part if ($enc) { &mov($tmp2,&DWP(0,$P,"",0)); &xor( $tmp3, $tmp3); &xor($L,$tmp2); for ($i=0; $i<$BF_ROUNDS; $i+=2) { &comment(""); &comment("Round $i"); &BF_ENCRYPT($i+1,$R,$L,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,1); &comment(""); &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i+1)); &BF_ENCRYPT($i+2,$L,$R,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,1); } # &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); In last loop &mov($tmp4,&DWP(($BF_ROUNDS+1)*4,$P,"",0)); } else { &mov($tmp2,&DWP(($BF_ROUNDS+1)*4,$P,"",0)); &xor( $tmp3, $tmp3); &xor($L,$tmp2); for ($i=$BF_ROUNDS; $i>0; $i-=2) { &comment(""); &comment("Round $i"); &BF_ENCRYPT($i,$R,$L,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,0); &comment(""); &comment("Round ".sprintf("%d",$i-1)); &BF_ENCRYPT($i-1,$L,$R,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,0); } # &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); In last loop &mov($tmp4,&DWP(0,$P,"",0)); } &xor($R,$tmp4); &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp1,"",0),$L); &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp1,"",0),$R); &function_end($name); } sub BF_ENCRYPT { local($i,$L,$R,$P,$tmp1,$tmp2,$tmp3,$tmp4,$enc)=@_; &mov( $tmp4, &DWP(&n2a($i*4),$P,"",0)); # for next round &mov( $tmp2, $R); &xor( $L, $tmp4); &shr( $tmp2, 16); &mov( $tmp4, $R); &movb( &LB($tmp1), &HB($tmp2)); # A &and( $tmp2, 0xff); # B &movb( &LB($tmp3), &HB($tmp4)); # C &and( $tmp4, 0xff); # D &mov( $tmp1, &DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0000),$P,$tmp1,4)); &mov( $tmp2, &DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0400),$P,$tmp2,4)); &add( $tmp2, $tmp1); &mov( $tmp1, &DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0800),$P,$tmp3,4)); &xor( $tmp2, $tmp1); &mov( $tmp4, &DWP(&n2a($BF_OFF+0x0C00),$P,$tmp4,4)); &add( $tmp2, $tmp4); if (($enc && ($i != 16)) || ((!$enc) && ($i != 1))) { &xor( $tmp1, $tmp1); } else { &comment("Load parameter 0 ($i) enc=$enc"); &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); } # In last loop &xor( $L, $tmp2); # delay } sub n2a { sprintf("%d",$_[0]); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_ofb64.c0000644000000000000000000000310713176625656015525 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "bf_locl.h" /* * The input and output encrypted as though 64bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 64bit block we have * used is contained in *num; */ void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num) { register BF_LONG v0, v1, t; register int n = *num; register long l = length; unsigned char d[8]; register char *dp; BF_LONG ti[2]; unsigned char *iv; int save = 0; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; n2l(iv, v0); n2l(iv, v1); ti[0] = v0; ti[1] = v1; dp = (char *)d; l2n(v0, dp); l2n(v1, dp); while (l--) { if (n == 0) { BF_encrypt((BF_LONG *)ti, schedule); dp = (char *)d; t = ti[0]; l2n(t, dp); t = ti[1]; l2n(t, dp); save++; } *(out++) = *(in++) ^ d[n]; n = (n + 1) & 0x07; } if (save) { v0 = ti[0]; v1 = ti[1]; iv = (unsigned char *)ivec; l2n(v0, iv); l2n(v1, iv); } t = v0 = v1 = ti[0] = ti[1] = 0; *num = n; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_enc.c0000644000000000000000000001100113176625656015342 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "bf_locl.h" /* * Blowfish as implemented from 'Blowfish: Springer-Verlag paper' (From * LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 809, FAST SOFTWARE ENCRYPTION, CAMBRIDGE * SECURITY WORKSHOP, CAMBRIDGE, U.K., DECEMBER 9-11, 1993) */ #if (BF_ROUNDS != 16) && (BF_ROUNDS != 20) # error If you set BF_ROUNDS to some value other than 16 or 20, you will have \ to modify the code. #endif void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key) { register BF_LONG l, r; register const BF_LONG *p, *s; p = key->P; s = &(key->S[0]); l = data[0]; r = data[1]; l ^= p[0]; BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[1]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[2]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[3]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[4]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[5]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[6]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[7]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[8]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[9]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[10]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[11]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[12]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[13]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[14]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[15]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[16]); # if BF_ROUNDS == 20 BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[17]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[18]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[19]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[20]); # endif r ^= p[BF_ROUNDS + 1]; data[1] = l & 0xffffffffU; data[0] = r & 0xffffffffU; } #ifndef BF_DEFAULT_OPTIONS void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key) { register BF_LONG l, r; register const BF_LONG *p, *s; p = key->P; s = &(key->S[0]); l = data[0]; r = data[1]; l ^= p[BF_ROUNDS + 1]; # if BF_ROUNDS == 20 BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[20]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[19]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[18]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[17]); # endif BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[16]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[15]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[14]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[13]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[12]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[11]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[10]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[9]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[8]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[7]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[6]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[5]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[4]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[3]); BF_ENC(r, l, s, p[2]); BF_ENC(l, r, s, p[1]); r ^= p[0]; data[1] = l & 0xffffffffU; data[0] = r & 0xffffffffU; } void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int encrypt) { register BF_LONG tin0, tin1; register BF_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register long l = length; BF_LONG tin[2]; if (encrypt) { n2l(ivec, tout0); n2l(ivec, tout1); ivec -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_encrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_encrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); } l2n(tout0, ivec); l2n(tout1, ivec); } else { n2l(ivec, xor0); n2l(ivec, xor1); ivec -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_decrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_decrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } l2n(xor0, ivec); l2n(xor1, ivec); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_cbc.c0000644000000000000000000000462213176625656015337 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "bf_locl.h" void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int encrypt) { register BF_LONG tin0, tin1; register BF_LONG tout0, tout1, xor0, xor1; register long l = length; BF_LONG tin[2]; if (encrypt) { n2l(ivec, tout0); n2l(ivec, tout1); ivec -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_encrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); } if (l != -8) { n2ln(in, tin0, tin1, l + 8); tin0 ^= tout0; tin1 ^= tout1; tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_encrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0]; tout1 = tin[1]; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); } l2n(tout0, ivec); l2n(tout1, ivec); } else { n2l(ivec, xor0); n2l(ivec, xor1); ivec -= 8; for (l -= 8; l >= 0; l -= 8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_decrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2n(tout0, out); l2n(tout1, out); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } if (l != -8) { n2l(in, tin0); n2l(in, tin1); tin[0] = tin0; tin[1] = tin1; BF_decrypt(tin, schedule); tout0 = tin[0] ^ xor0; tout1 = tin[1] ^ xor1; l2nn(tout0, tout1, out, l + 8); xor0 = tin0; xor1 = tin1; } l2n(xor0, ivec); l2n(xor1, ivec); } tin0 = tin1 = tout0 = tout1 = xor0 = xor1 = 0; tin[0] = tin[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_ecb.c0000644000000000000000000000205613176625656015340 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "bf_locl.h" #include /* * Blowfish as implemented from 'Blowfish: Springer-Verlag paper' (From * LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 809, FAST SOFTWARE ENCRYPTION, CAMBRIDGE * SECURITY WORKSHOP, CAMBRIDGE, U.K., DECEMBER 9-11, 1993) */ const char *BF_options(void) { return ("blowfish(ptr)"); } void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const BF_KEY *key, int encrypt) { BF_LONG l, d[2]; n2l(in, l); d[0] = l; n2l(in, l); d[1] = l; if (encrypt) BF_encrypt(d, key); else BF_decrypt(d, key); l = d[0]; l2n(l, out); l = d[1]; l2n(l, out); l = d[0] = d[1] = 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/bf/bf_skey.c0000644000000000000000000000265213176625656015564 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "bf_locl.h" #include "bf_pi.h" void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data) { int i; BF_LONG *p, ri, in[2]; const unsigned char *d, *end; memcpy(key, &bf_init, sizeof(BF_KEY)); p = key->P; if (len > ((BF_ROUNDS + 2) * 4)) len = (BF_ROUNDS + 2) * 4; d = data; end = &(data[len]); for (i = 0; i < (BF_ROUNDS + 2); i++) { ri = *(d++); if (d >= end) d = data; ri <<= 8; ri |= *(d++); if (d >= end) d = data; ri <<= 8; ri |= *(d++); if (d >= end) d = data; ri <<= 8; ri |= *(d++); if (d >= end) d = data; p[i] ^= ri; } in[0] = 0L; in[1] = 0L; for (i = 0; i < (BF_ROUNDS + 2); i += 2) { BF_encrypt(in, key); p[i] = in[0]; p[i + 1] = in[1]; } p = key->S; for (i = 0; i < 4 * 256; i += 2) { BF_encrypt(in, key); p[i] = in[0]; p[i + 1] = in[1]; } } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/lhash/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014502 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/lhash/build.info0000644000000000000000000000011213176625657016450 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ lhash.c lh_stats.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/lhash/num.pl0000644000000000000000000000106413176625657015637 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html #node 10 -> 4 while (<>) { next unless /^node/; s|\R$||; # Better chomp @a=split; $num{$a[3]}++; } @a=sort {$a <=> $b } keys %num; foreach (0 .. $a[$#a]) { printf "%4d:%4d\n",$_,$num{$_}; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/lhash/lhash.c0000644000000000000000000002245513176625657015755 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "lhash_lcl.h" /* * A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing * alogrithm: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing * * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212–223 * http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf * * From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley * database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as * OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first * published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt." * * The CACM paper is available here: * https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff4d/1c5deca6269cc316bfd952172284dbf610ee.pdf */ #undef MIN_NODES #define MIN_NODES 16 #define UP_LOAD (2*LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 2) */ #define DOWN_LOAD (LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 1) */ static int expand(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); static void contract(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); static OPENSSL_LH_NODE **getrn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash); OPENSSL_LHASH *OPENSSL_LH_new(OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC h, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC c) { OPENSSL_LHASH *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret->b = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->b) * MIN_NODES)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->retrieve_stats_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->comp = ((c == NULL) ? (OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC)strcmp : c); ret->hash = ((h == NULL) ? (OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC)OPENSSL_LH_strhash : h); ret->num_nodes = MIN_NODES / 2; ret->num_alloc_nodes = MIN_NODES; ret->pmax = MIN_NODES / 2; ret->up_load = UP_LOAD; ret->down_load = DOWN_LOAD; return (ret); err: OPENSSL_free(ret->b); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } void OPENSSL_LH_free(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { unsigned int i; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n, *nn; if (lh == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) { n = lh->b[i]; while (n != NULL) { nn = n->next; OPENSSL_free(n); n = nn; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(lh->retrieve_stats_lock); OPENSSL_free(lh->b); OPENSSL_free(lh); } void *OPENSSL_LH_insert(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, void *data) { unsigned long hash; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn; void *ret; lh->error = 0; if ((lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)) && !expand(lh)) return NULL; /* 'lh->error++' already done in 'expand' */ rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash); if (*rn == NULL) { if ((nn = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*nn))) == NULL) { lh->error++; return (NULL); } nn->data = data; nn->next = NULL; nn->hash = hash; *rn = nn; ret = NULL; lh->num_insert++; lh->num_items++; } else { /* replace same key */ ret = (*rn)->data; (*rn)->data = data; lh->num_replace++; } return (ret); } void *OPENSSL_LH_delete(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data) { unsigned long hash; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn; void *ret; lh->error = 0; rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash); if (*rn == NULL) { lh->num_no_delete++; return (NULL); } else { nn = *rn; *rn = nn->next; ret = nn->data; OPENSSL_free(nn); lh->num_delete++; } lh->num_items--; if ((lh->num_nodes > MIN_NODES) && (lh->down_load >= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes))) contract(lh); return (ret); } void *OPENSSL_LH_retrieve(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data) { unsigned long hash; OPENSSL_LH_NODE **rn; void *ret; int scratch; lh->error = 0; rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash); if (*rn == NULL) { CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_retrieve_miss, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); return NULL; } else { ret = (*rn)->data; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_retrieve, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); } return ret; } static void doall_util_fn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, int use_arg, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func_arg, void *arg) { int i; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *a, *n; if (lh == NULL) return; /* * reverse the order so we search from 'top to bottom' We were having * memory leaks otherwise */ for (i = lh->num_nodes - 1; i >= 0; i--) { a = lh->b[i]; while (a != NULL) { n = a->next; if (use_arg) func_arg(a->data, arg); else func(a->data); a = n; } } } void OPENSSL_LH_doall(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func) { doall_util_fn(lh, 0, func, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG)0, NULL); } void OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func, void *arg) { doall_util_fn(lh, 1, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)0, func, arg); } static int expand(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, **n1, **n2, *np; unsigned int p, pmax, nni, j; unsigned long hash; nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes; p = lh->p; pmax = lh->pmax; if (p + 1 >= pmax) { j = nni * 2; n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) * j); if (n == NULL) { lh->error++; return 0; } lh->b = n; memset(n + nni, 0, sizeof(*n) * (j - nni)); lh->pmax = nni; lh->num_alloc_nodes = j; lh->num_expand_reallocs++; lh->p = 0; } else { lh->p++; } lh->num_nodes++; lh->num_expands++; n1 = &(lh->b[p]); n2 = &(lh->b[p + pmax]); *n2 = NULL; for (np = *n1; np != NULL;) { hash = np->hash; if ((hash % nni) != p) { /* move it */ *n1 = (*n1)->next; np->next = *n2; *n2 = np; } else n1 = &((*n1)->next); np = *n1; } return 1; } static void contract(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, *n1, *np; np = lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1]; lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1] = NULL; /* 24/07-92 - eay - weird but :-( */ if (lh->p == 0) { n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, (unsigned int)(sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) * lh->pmax)); if (n == NULL) { /* fputs("realloc error in lhash",stderr); */ lh->error++; return; } lh->num_contract_reallocs++; lh->num_alloc_nodes /= 2; lh->pmax /= 2; lh->p = lh->pmax - 1; lh->b = n; } else lh->p--; lh->num_nodes--; lh->num_contracts++; n1 = lh->b[(int)lh->p]; if (n1 == NULL) lh->b[(int)lh->p] = np; else { while (n1->next != NULL) n1 = n1->next; n1->next = np; } } static OPENSSL_LH_NODE **getrn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE **ret, *n1; unsigned long hash, nn; OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cf; int scratch; hash = (*(lh->hash)) (data); CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_hash_calls, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); *rhash = hash; nn = hash % lh->pmax; if (nn < lh->p) nn = hash % lh->num_alloc_nodes; cf = lh->comp; ret = &(lh->b[(int)nn]); for (n1 = *ret; n1 != NULL; n1 = n1->next) { CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_hash_comps, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); if (n1->hash != hash) { ret = &(n1->next); continue; } CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh->num_comp_calls, 1, &scratch, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); if (cf(n1->data, data) == 0) break; ret = &(n1->next); } return (ret); } /* * The following hash seems to work very well on normal text strings no * collisions on /usr/dict/words and it distributes on %2^n quite well, not * as good as MD5, but still good. */ unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_strhash(const char *c) { unsigned long ret = 0; long n; unsigned long v; int r; if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0')) return (ret); /*- unsigned char b[16]; MD5(c,strlen(c),b); return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24)); */ n = 0x100; while (*c) { v = n | (*c); n += 0x100; r = (int)((v >> 2) ^ v) & 0x0f; ret = (ret << r) | (ret >> (32 - r)); ret &= 0xFFFFFFFFL; ret ^= v * v; c++; } return ((ret >> 16) ^ ret); } unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_num_items(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { return lh ? lh->num_items : 0; } unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { return lh->down_load; } void OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, unsigned long down_load) { lh->down_load = down_load; } int OPENSSL_LH_error(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { return lh->error; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/lhash/lh_stats.c0000644000000000000000000001017713176625657016475 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* * If you wish to build this outside of OpenSSL, remove the following lines * and things should work as expected */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "lhash_lcl.h" # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void OPENSSL_LH_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp) { BIO *bp; bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (bp == NULL) return; BIO_set_fp(bp, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(lh, bp); BIO_free(bp); } void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp) { BIO *bp; bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (bp == NULL) return; BIO_set_fp(bp, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(lh, bp); BIO_free(bp); } void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp) { BIO *bp; bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (bp == NULL) return; BIO_set_fp(bp, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(lh, bp); BIO_free(bp); } # endif void OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out) { OPENSSL_LHASH *lh_mut = (OPENSSL_LHASH *) lh; int ret; BIO_printf(out, "num_items = %lu\n", lh->num_items); BIO_printf(out, "num_nodes = %u\n", lh->num_nodes); BIO_printf(out, "num_alloc_nodes = %u\n", lh->num_alloc_nodes); BIO_printf(out, "num_expands = %lu\n", lh->num_expands); BIO_printf(out, "num_expand_reallocs = %lu\n", lh->num_expand_reallocs); BIO_printf(out, "num_contracts = %lu\n", lh->num_contracts); BIO_printf(out, "num_contract_reallocs = %lu\n", lh->num_contract_reallocs); CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_hash_calls, 0, &ret, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); BIO_printf(out, "num_hash_calls = %d\n", ret); CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_comp_calls, 0, &ret, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); BIO_printf(out, "num_comp_calls = %d\n", ret); BIO_printf(out, "num_insert = %lu\n", lh->num_insert); BIO_printf(out, "num_replace = %lu\n", lh->num_replace); BIO_printf(out, "num_delete = %lu\n", lh->num_delete); BIO_printf(out, "num_no_delete = %lu\n", lh->num_no_delete); CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_retrieve, 0, &ret, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); BIO_printf(out, "num_retrieve = %d\n", ret); CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_retrieve_miss, 0, &ret, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); BIO_printf(out, "num_retrieve_miss = %d\n", ret); CRYPTO_atomic_add(&lh_mut->num_hash_comps, 0, &ret, lh->retrieve_stats_lock); BIO_printf(out, "num_hash_comps = %d\n", ret); } void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n; unsigned int i, num; for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) { for (n = lh->b[i], num = 0; n != NULL; n = n->next) num++; BIO_printf(out, "node %6u -> %3u\n", i, num); } } void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n; unsigned long num; unsigned int i; unsigned long total = 0, n_used = 0; for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) { for (n = lh->b[i], num = 0; n != NULL; n = n->next) num++; if (num != 0) { n_used++; total += num; } } BIO_printf(out, "%lu nodes used out of %u\n", n_used, lh->num_nodes); BIO_printf(out, "%lu items\n", total); if (n_used == 0) return; BIO_printf(out, "load %d.%02d actual load %d.%02d\n", (int)(total / lh->num_nodes), (int)((total % lh->num_nodes) * 100 / lh->num_nodes), (int)(total / n_used), (int)((total % n_used) * 100 / n_used)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/lhash/lhash_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000000303013176625657016600 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include struct lhash_node_st { void *data; struct lhash_node_st *next; unsigned long hash; }; struct lhash_st { OPENSSL_LH_NODE **b; OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC comp; OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC hash; /* * some stats are updated on lookup, which callers aren't expecting to have * to take an exclusive lock around. This lock protects them on platforms * without atomics, and their types are int rather than unsigned long below * so they can be adjusted with CRYPTO_atomic_add. */ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *retrieve_stats_lock; unsigned int num_nodes; unsigned int num_alloc_nodes; unsigned int p; unsigned int pmax; unsigned long up_load; /* load times 256 */ unsigned long down_load; /* load times 256 */ unsigned long num_items; unsigned long num_expands; unsigned long num_expand_reallocs; unsigned long num_contracts; unsigned long num_contract_reallocs; int num_hash_calls; int num_comp_calls; unsigned long num_insert; unsigned long num_replace; unsigned long num_delete; unsigned long num_no_delete; int num_retrieve; int num_retrieve_miss; int num_hash_comps; int error; }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/stack/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014502 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/stack/build.info0000644000000000000000000000006513176625660016457 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=stack.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/stack/stack.c0000644000000000000000000001610313176625660015754 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include #include struct stack_st { int num; const char **data; int sorted; size_t num_alloc; OPENSSL_sk_compfunc comp; }; #undef MIN_NODES #define MIN_NODES 4 #include OPENSSL_sk_compfunc OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_compfunc c) { OPENSSL_sk_compfunc old = sk->comp; if (sk->comp != c) sk->sorted = 0; sk->comp = c; return old; } OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { OPENSSL_STACK *ret; if (sk->num < 0) return NULL; if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; /* direct structure assignment */ *ret = *sk; if ((ret->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret->data) * sk->num_alloc)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->data, sk->data, sizeof(char *) * sk->num); return ret; err: OPENSSL_sk_free(ret); return NULL; } OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc copy_func, OPENSSL_sk_freefunc free_func) { OPENSSL_STACK *ret; int i; if (sk->num < 0) return NULL; if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; /* direct structure assignment */ *ret = *sk; ret->num_alloc = sk->num > MIN_NODES ? (size_t)sk->num : MIN_NODES; ret->data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->data) * ret->num_alloc); if (ret->data == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < ret->num; ++i) { if (sk->data[i] == NULL) continue; if ((ret->data[i] = copy_func(sk->data[i])) == NULL) { while (--i >= 0) if (ret->data[i] != NULL) free_func((void *)ret->data[i]); OPENSSL_sk_free(ret); return NULL; } } return ret; } OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new_null(void) { return OPENSSL_sk_new((OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)NULL); } OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_compfunc c) { OPENSSL_STACK *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->data) * MIN_NODES)) == NULL) goto err; ret->comp = c; ret->num_alloc = MIN_NODES; return (ret); err: OPENSSL_free(ret); return (NULL); } int OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data, int loc) { if (st == NULL || st->num < 0 || st->num == INT_MAX) { return 0; } if (st->num_alloc <= (size_t)(st->num + 1)) { size_t doub_num_alloc = st->num_alloc * 2; const char **tmpdata; /* Overflow checks */ if (doub_num_alloc < st->num_alloc) return 0; /* Avoid overflow due to multiplication by sizeof(char *) */ if (doub_num_alloc > SIZE_MAX / sizeof(char *)) return 0; tmpdata = OPENSSL_realloc((char *)st->data, sizeof(char *) * doub_num_alloc); if (tmpdata == NULL) return 0; st->data = tmpdata; st->num_alloc = doub_num_alloc; } if ((loc >= st->num) || (loc < 0)) { st->data[st->num] = data; } else { memmove(&st->data[loc + 1], &st->data[loc], sizeof(st->data[0]) * (st->num - loc)); st->data[loc] = data; } st->num++; st->sorted = 0; return st->num; } void *OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *p) { int i; for (i = 0; i < st->num; i++) if (st->data[i] == p) return OPENSSL_sk_delete(st, i); return NULL; } void *OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int loc) { const char *ret; if (st == NULL || loc < 0 || loc >= st->num) return NULL; ret = st->data[loc]; if (loc != st->num - 1) memmove(&st->data[loc], &st->data[loc + 1], sizeof(st->data[0]) * (st->num - loc - 1)); st->num--; return (void *)ret; } static int internal_find(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data, int ret_val_options) { const void *r; int i; if (st == NULL) return -1; if (st->comp == NULL) { for (i = 0; i < st->num; i++) if (st->data[i] == data) return (i); return (-1); } OPENSSL_sk_sort(st); if (data == NULL) return (-1); r = OBJ_bsearch_ex_(&data, st->data, st->num, sizeof(void *), st->comp, ret_val_options); if (r == NULL) return (-1); return (int)((const char **)r - st->data); } int OPENSSL_sk_find(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data) { return internal_find(st, data, OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH); } int OPENSSL_sk_find_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data) { return internal_find(st, data, OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH); } int OPENSSL_sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data) { return (OPENSSL_sk_insert(st, data, st->num)); } int OPENSSL_sk_unshift(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data) { return (OPENSSL_sk_insert(st, data, 0)); } void *OPENSSL_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STACK *st) { if (st == NULL) return (NULL); if (st->num <= 0) return (NULL); return (OPENSSL_sk_delete(st, 0)); } void *OPENSSL_sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *st) { if (st == NULL) return (NULL); if (st->num <= 0) return (NULL); return (OPENSSL_sk_delete(st, st->num - 1)); } void OPENSSL_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STACK *st) { if (st == NULL) return; if (st->num <= 0) return; memset(st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num); st->num = 0; } void OPENSSL_sk_pop_free(OPENSSL_STACK *st, OPENSSL_sk_freefunc func) { int i; if (st == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < st->num; i++) if (st->data[i] != NULL) func((char *)st->data[i]); OPENSSL_sk_free(st); } void OPENSSL_sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *st) { if (st == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(st->data); OPENSSL_free(st); } int OPENSSL_sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *st) { if (st == NULL) return -1; return st->num; } void *OPENSSL_sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *st, int i) { if (st == NULL || i < 0 || i >= st->num) return NULL; return (void *)st->data[i]; } void *OPENSSL_sk_set(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int i, const void *data) { if (st == NULL || i < 0 || i >= st->num) return NULL; st->data[i] = data; return (void *)st->data[i]; } void OPENSSL_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STACK *st) { if (st && !st->sorted && st->comp != NULL) { qsort(st->data, st->num, sizeof(char *), st->comp); st->sorted = 1; } } int OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(const OPENSSL_STACK *st) { if (st == NULL) return 1; return st->sorted; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014070 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h0000644000000000000000000000507513176625657015746 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #ifdef MD5_ASM # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) # define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order # elif defined(__ia64) || defined(__ia64__) || defined(_M_IA64) # define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order # elif defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__) # define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order # endif #endif void md5_block_data_order(MD5_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num); #define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN #define HASH_LONG MD5_LONG #define HASH_CTX MD5_CTX #define HASH_CBLOCK MD5_CBLOCK #define HASH_UPDATE MD5_Update #define HASH_TRANSFORM MD5_Transform #define HASH_FINAL MD5_Final #define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s) do { \ unsigned long ll; \ ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s)); \ } while (0) #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER md5_block_data_order #include "internal/md32_common.h" /*- #define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) #define G(x,y,z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~(z)))) */ /* * As pointed out by Wei Dai , the above can be simplified * to the code below. Wei attributes these optimizations to Peter Gutmann's * SHS code, and he attributes it to Rich Schroeppel. */ #define F(b,c,d) ((((c) ^ (d)) & (b)) ^ (d)) #define G(b,c,d) ((((b) ^ (c)) & (d)) ^ (c)) #define H(b,c,d) ((b) ^ (c) ^ (d)) #define I(b,c,d) (((~(d)) | (b)) ^ (c)) #define R0(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \ a+=((k)+(t)+F((b),(c),(d))); \ a=ROTATE(a,s); \ a+=b; };\ #define R1(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \ a+=((k)+(t)+G((b),(c),(d))); \ a=ROTATE(a,s); \ a+=b; }; #define R2(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \ a+=((k)+(t)+H((b),(c),(d))); \ a=ROTATE(a,s); \ a+=b; }; #define R3(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) { \ a+=((k)+(t)+I((b),(c),(d))); \ a=ROTATE(a,s); \ a+=b; }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/build.info0000644000000000000000000000132013176625657016040 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ md5_dgst.c md5_one.c {- $target{md5_asm_src} -} GENERATE[md5-586.s]=asm/md5-586.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) GENERATE[md5-x86_64.s]=asm/md5-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[md5-sparcv9.S]=asm/md5-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[md5-sparcv9.o]=.. BEGINRAW[makefile(windows)] {- $builddir -}\md5-ia64.asm: {- $sourcedir -}\asm\md5-ia64.S $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -EP {- $sourcedir -}\asm\md5-ia64.S > $@.i && move /Y $@.i $@ ENDRAW[makefile(windows)] BEGINRAW[Makefile] {- $builddir -}/md5-ia64.s: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/md5-ia64.S $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E {- $sourcedir -}/asm/md5-ia64.S | \ $(PERL) -ne 's/;\s+/;\n/g; print;' > $@ ENDRAW[Makefile] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014650 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl0000644000000000000000000001746013176625657016222 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Normal is the # md5_block_x86(MD5_CTX *c, ULONG *X); # version, non-normal is the # md5_block_x86(MD5_CTX *c, ULONG *X,int blocks); $normal=0; $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],$0); $A="eax"; $B="ebx"; $C="ecx"; $D="edx"; $tmp1="edi"; $tmp2="ebp"; $X="esi"; # What we need to load into $tmp for the next round %Ltmp1=("R0",&Np($C), "R1",&Np($C), "R2",&Np($C), "R3",&Np($D)); @xo=( 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, # R0 1, 6, 11, 0, 5, 10, 15, 4, 9, 14, 3, 8, 13, 2, 7, 12, # R1 5, 8, 11, 14, 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 2, # R2 0, 7, 14, 5, 12, 3, 10, 1, 8, 15, 6, 13, 4, 11, 2, 9, # R3 ); &md5_block("md5_block_asm_data_order"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; sub Np { local($p)=@_; local(%n)=($A,$D,$B,$A,$C,$B,$D,$C); return($n{$p}); } sub R0 { local($pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_; &mov($tmp1,$C) if $pos < 0; &mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki]*4,$K,"",0)) if $pos < 0; # very first one # body proper &comment("R0 $ki"); &xor($tmp1,$d); # F function - part 2 &and($tmp1,$b); # F function - part 3 &lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1)); &xor($tmp1,$d); # F function - part 4 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)) if ($pos != 2); &add($a,$tmp1); &rotl($a,$s); &mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos < 1; # next tmp1 for R0 &mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos == 1; # next tmp1 for R1 &add($a,$b); } sub R1 { local($pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_; &comment("R1 $ki"); &xor($tmp1,$b); # G function - part 2 &and($tmp1,$d); # G function - part 3 &lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1)); &xor($tmp1,$c); # G function - part 4 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)) if ($pos != 2); &add($a,$tmp1); &mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos < 1; # G function - part 1 &mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos == 1; # G function - part 1 &rotl($a,$s); &add($a,$b); } sub R2 { local($n,$pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_; # This one is different, only 3 logical operations if (($n & 1) == 0) { &comment("R2 $ki"); # make sure to do 'D' first, not 'B', else we clash with # the last add from the previous round. &xor($tmp1,$d); # H function - part 2 &xor($tmp1,$b); # H function - part 3 &lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1)); &add($a,$tmp1); &mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)); &rotl($a,$s); &mov($tmp1,&Np($c)); } else { &comment("R2 $ki"); # make sure to do 'D' first, not 'B', else we clash with # the last add from the previous round. &add($b,$c); # MOVED FORWARD &xor($tmp1,$d); # H function - part 2 &lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1)); &xor($tmp1,$b); # H function - part 3 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)) if ($pos != 2); &add($a,$tmp1); &mov($tmp1,&Np($c)) if $pos < 1; # H function - part 1 &mov($tmp1,-1) if $pos == 1; # I function - part 1 &rotl($a,$s); &add($a,$b); } } sub R3 { local($pos,$a,$b,$c,$d,$K,$ki,$s,$t)=@_; &comment("R3 $ki"); # ¬($tmp1) &xor($tmp1,$d) if $pos < 0; # I function - part 2 &or($tmp1,$b); # I function - part 3 &lea($a,&DWP($t,$a,$tmp2,1)); &xor($tmp1,$c); # I function - part 4 &mov($tmp2,&DWP($xo[$ki+1]*4,$K,"",0)) if $pos != 2; # load X/k value &mov($tmp2,&wparam(0)) if $pos == 2; &add($a,$tmp1); &mov($tmp1,-1) if $pos < 1; # H function - part 1 &add($K,64) if $pos >=1 && !$normal; &rotl($a,$s); &xor($tmp1,&Np($d)) if $pos <= 0; # I function - part = first time &mov($tmp1,&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0)) if $pos > 0; &add($a,$b); } sub md5_block { local($name)=@_; &function_begin_B($name,"",3); # parameter 1 is the MD5_CTX structure. # A 0 # B 4 # C 8 # D 12 &push("esi"); &push("edi"); &mov($tmp1, &wparam(0)); # edi &mov($X, &wparam(1)); # esi &mov($C, &wparam(2)); &push("ebp"); &shl($C, 6); &push("ebx"); &add($C, $X); # offset we end at &sub($C, 64); &mov($A, &DWP( 0,$tmp1,"",0)); &push($C); # Put on the TOS &mov($B, &DWP( 4,$tmp1,"",0)); &mov($C, &DWP( 8,$tmp1,"",0)); &mov($D, &DWP(12,$tmp1,"",0)); &set_label("start") unless $normal; &comment(""); &comment("R0 section"); &R0(-2,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X, 0, 7,0xd76aa478); &R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X, 1,12,0xe8c7b756); &R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X, 2,17,0x242070db); &R0( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X, 3,22,0xc1bdceee); &R0( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X, 4, 7,0xf57c0faf); &R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X, 5,12,0x4787c62a); &R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X, 6,17,0xa8304613); &R0( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X, 7,22,0xfd469501); &R0( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X, 8, 7,0x698098d8); &R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X, 9,12,0x8b44f7af); &R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,10,17,0xffff5bb1); &R0( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,11,22,0x895cd7be); &R0( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,12, 7,0x6b901122); &R0( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,13,12,0xfd987193); &R0( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,14,17,0xa679438e); &R0( 1,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,15,22,0x49b40821); &comment(""); &comment("R1 section"); &R1(-1,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,16, 5,0xf61e2562); &R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,17, 9,0xc040b340); &R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,18,14,0x265e5a51); &R1( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,19,20,0xe9b6c7aa); &R1( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,20, 5,0xd62f105d); &R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,21, 9,0x02441453); &R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,22,14,0xd8a1e681); &R1( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,23,20,0xe7d3fbc8); &R1( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,24, 5,0x21e1cde6); &R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,25, 9,0xc33707d6); &R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,26,14,0xf4d50d87); &R1( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,27,20,0x455a14ed); &R1( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,28, 5,0xa9e3e905); &R1( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,29, 9,0xfcefa3f8); &R1( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,30,14,0x676f02d9); &R1( 1,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,31,20,0x8d2a4c8a); &comment(""); &comment("R2 section"); &R2( 0,-1,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,32, 4,0xfffa3942); &R2( 1, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,33,11,0x8771f681); &R2( 2, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,34,16,0x6d9d6122); &R2( 3, 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,35,23,0xfde5380c); &R2( 4, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,36, 4,0xa4beea44); &R2( 5, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,37,11,0x4bdecfa9); &R2( 6, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,38,16,0xf6bb4b60); &R2( 7, 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,39,23,0xbebfbc70); &R2( 8, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,40, 4,0x289b7ec6); &R2( 9, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,41,11,0xeaa127fa); &R2(10, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,42,16,0xd4ef3085); &R2(11, 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,43,23,0x04881d05); &R2(12, 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,44, 4,0xd9d4d039); &R2(13, 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,45,11,0xe6db99e5); &R2(14, 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,46,16,0x1fa27cf8); &R2(15, 1,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,47,23,0xc4ac5665); &comment(""); &comment("R3 section"); &R3(-1,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,48, 6,0xf4292244); &R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,49,10,0x432aff97); &R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,50,15,0xab9423a7); &R3( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,51,21,0xfc93a039); &R3( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,52, 6,0x655b59c3); &R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,53,10,0x8f0ccc92); &R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,54,15,0xffeff47d); &R3( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,55,21,0x85845dd1); &R3( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,56, 6,0x6fa87e4f); &R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,57,10,0xfe2ce6e0); &R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,58,15,0xa3014314); &R3( 0,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,59,21,0x4e0811a1); &R3( 0,$A,$B,$C,$D,$X,60, 6,0xf7537e82); &R3( 0,$D,$A,$B,$C,$X,61,10,0xbd3af235); &R3( 0,$C,$D,$A,$B,$X,62,15,0x2ad7d2bb); &R3( 2,$B,$C,$D,$A,$X,63,21,0xeb86d391); # &mov($tmp2,&wparam(0)); # done in the last R3 # &mov($tmp1, &DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0)); # done is the last R3 &add($A,$tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0)); &add($B,$tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0)); &add($C,$tmp1); &mov($tmp1, &DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0)); &add($D,$tmp1); &mov(&DWP( 0,$tmp2,"",0),$A); &mov(&DWP( 4,$tmp2,"",0),$B); &mov($tmp1,&swtmp(0)) unless $normal; &mov(&DWP( 8,$tmp2,"",0),$C); &mov(&DWP(12,$tmp2,"",0),$D); &cmp($tmp1,$X) unless $normal; # check count &jae(&label("start")) unless $normal; &pop("eax"); # pop the temp variable off the stack &pop("ebx"); &pop("ebp"); &pop("edi"); &pop("esi"); &ret(); &function_end_B($name); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000003060213176625657016632 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Author: Marc Bevand # Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # MD5 optimized for AMD64. use strict; my $code; # round1_step() does: # dst = x + ((dst + F(x,y,z) + X[k] + T_i) <<< s) # %r10d = X[k_next] # %r11d = z' (copy of z for the next step) # Each round1_step() takes about 5.3 clocks (9 instructions, 1.7 IPC) sub round1_step { my ($pos, $dst, $x, $y, $z, $k_next, $T_i, $s) = @_; $code .= " mov 0*4(%rsi), %r10d /* (NEXT STEP) X[0] */\n" if ($pos == -1); $code .= " mov %edx, %r11d /* (NEXT STEP) z' = %edx */\n" if ($pos == -1); $code .= <A mov 1*4(%rbp), %ebx # ebx = ctx->B mov 2*4(%rbp), %ecx # ecx = ctx->C mov 3*4(%rbp), %edx # edx = ctx->D # end is 'rdi' # ptr is 'rsi' # A is 'eax' # B is 'ebx' # C is 'ecx' # D is 'edx' cmp %rdi, %rsi # cmp end with ptr je .Lend # jmp if ptr == end # BEGIN of loop over 16-word blocks .Lloop: # save old values of A, B, C, D mov %eax, %r8d mov %ebx, %r9d mov %ecx, %r14d mov %edx, %r15d EOF round1_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '1','0xd76aa478', '7'); round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '2','0xe8c7b756','12'); round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '3','0x242070db','17'); round1_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '4','0xc1bdceee','22'); round1_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '5','0xf57c0faf', '7'); round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '6','0x4787c62a','12'); round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '7','0xa8304613','17'); round1_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '8','0xfd469501','22'); round1_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '9','0x698098d8', '7'); round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','10','0x8b44f7af','12'); round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','11','0xffff5bb1','17'); round1_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','12','0x895cd7be','22'); round1_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','13','0x6b901122', '7'); round1_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','14','0xfd987193','12'); round1_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','15','0xa679438e','17'); round1_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '1','0x49b40821','22'); round2_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '6','0xf61e2562', '5'); round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','11','0xc040b340', '9'); round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '0','0x265e5a51','14'); round2_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '5','0xe9b6c7aa','20'); round2_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','10','0xd62f105d', '5'); round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','15', '0x2441453', '9'); round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '4','0xd8a1e681','14'); round2_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '9','0xe7d3fbc8','20'); round2_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','14','0x21e1cde6', '5'); round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '3','0xc33707d6', '9'); round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '8','0xf4d50d87','14'); round2_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','13','0x455a14ed','20'); round2_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '2','0xa9e3e905', '5'); round2_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '7','0xfcefa3f8', '9'); round2_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','12','0x676f02d9','14'); round2_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '5','0x8d2a4c8a','20'); round3_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '8','0xfffa3942', '4'); round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','11','0x8771f681','11'); round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','14','0x6d9d6122','16'); round3_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '1','0xfde5380c','23'); round3_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '4','0xa4beea44', '4'); round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '7','0x4bdecfa9','11'); round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','10','0xf6bb4b60','16'); round3_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','13','0xbebfbc70','23'); round3_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '0','0x289b7ec6', '4'); round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '3','0xeaa127fa','11'); round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '6','0xd4ef3085','16'); round3_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '9', '0x4881d05','23'); round3_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','12','0xd9d4d039', '4'); round3_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','15','0xe6db99e5','11'); round3_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '2','0x1fa27cf8','16'); round3_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '0','0xc4ac5665','23'); round4_step(-1,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '7','0xf4292244', '6'); round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','14','0x432aff97','10'); round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '5','0xab9423a7','15'); round4_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax','12','0xfc93a039','21'); round4_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx', '3','0x655b59c3', '6'); round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx','10','0x8f0ccc92','10'); round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '1','0xffeff47d','15'); round4_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '8','0x85845dd1','21'); round4_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','15','0x6fa87e4f', '6'); round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '6','0xfe2ce6e0','10'); round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx','13','0xa3014314','15'); round4_step( 0,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '4','0x4e0811a1','21'); round4_step( 0,'%eax','%ebx','%ecx','%edx','11','0xf7537e82', '6'); round4_step( 0,'%edx','%eax','%ebx','%ecx', '2','0xbd3af235','10'); round4_step( 0,'%ecx','%edx','%eax','%ebx', '9','0x2ad7d2bb','15'); round4_step( 1,'%ebx','%ecx','%edx','%eax', '0','0xeb86d391','21'); $code .= <A = A mov %ebx, 1*4(%rbp) # ctx->B = B mov %ecx, 2*4(%rbp) # ctx->C = C mov %edx, 3*4(%rbp) # ctx->D = D mov (%rsp),%r15 mov 8(%rsp),%r14 mov 16(%rsp),%r12 mov 24(%rsp),%rbx mov 32(%rsp),%rbp add \$40,%rsp .Lepilogue: ret .size md5_block_asm_data_order,.-md5_block_asm_data_order EOF # EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame, # CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp) if ($win64) { my $rec="%rcx"; my $frame="%rdx"; my $context="%r8"; my $disp="%r9"; $code.=<<___; .extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind .type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent .align 16 se_handler: push %rsi push %rdi push %rbx push %rbp push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 pushfq sub \$64,%rsp mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip lea .Lprologue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<.Lprologue jb .Lin_prologue mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10 cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=.Lepilogue jae .Lin_prologue lea 40(%rax),%rax mov -8(%rax),%rbp mov -16(%rax),%rbx mov -24(%rax),%r12 mov -32(%rax),%r14 mov -40(%rax),%r15 mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12 mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14 mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15 .Lin_prologue: mov 8(%rax),%rdi mov 16(%rax),%rsi mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord mov $context,%rsi # context mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT) .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq mov $disp,%rsi xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5 mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6 mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7 mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL) call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip) mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch add \$64,%rsp popfq pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbp pop %rbx pop %rdi pop %rsi ret .size se_handler,.-se_handler .section .pdata .align 4 .rva .LSEH_begin_md5_block_asm_data_order .rva .LSEH_end_md5_block_asm_data_order .rva .LSEH_info_md5_block_asm_data_order .section .xdata .align 8 .LSEH_info_md5_block_asm_data_order: .byte 9,0,0,0 .rva se_handler ___ } print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl0000644000000000000000000002360613176625657017266 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # # Hardware SPARC T4 support by David S. Miller . # ==================================================================== # MD5 for SPARCv9, 6.9 cycles per byte on UltraSPARC, >40% faster than # code generated by Sun C 5.2. # SPARC T4 MD5 hardware achieves 3.20 cycles per byte, which is 2.1x # faster than software. Multi-process benchmark saturates at 12x # single-process result on 8-core processor, or ~11GBps per 2.85GHz # socket. $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; use integer; ($ctx,$inp,$len)=("%i0","%i1","%i2"); # input arguments # 64-bit values @X=("%o0","%o1","%o2","%o3","%o4","%o5","%o7","%g1","%g2"); $tx="%g3"; ($AB,$CD)=("%g4","%g5"); # 32-bit values @V=($A,$B,$C,$D)=map("%l$_",(0..3)); ($t1,$t2,$t3,$saved_asi)=map("%l$_",(4..7)); ($shr,$shl1,$shl2)=("%i3","%i4","%i5"); my @K=( 0xd76aa478,0xe8c7b756,0x242070db,0xc1bdceee, 0xf57c0faf,0x4787c62a,0xa8304613,0xfd469501, 0x698098d8,0x8b44f7af,0xffff5bb1,0x895cd7be, 0x6b901122,0xfd987193,0xa679438e,0x49b40821, 0xf61e2562,0xc040b340,0x265e5a51,0xe9b6c7aa, 0xd62f105d,0x02441453,0xd8a1e681,0xe7d3fbc8, 0x21e1cde6,0xc33707d6,0xf4d50d87,0x455a14ed, 0xa9e3e905,0xfcefa3f8,0x676f02d9,0x8d2a4c8a, 0xfffa3942,0x8771f681,0x6d9d6122,0xfde5380c, 0xa4beea44,0x4bdecfa9,0xf6bb4b60,0xbebfbc70, 0x289b7ec6,0xeaa127fa,0xd4ef3085,0x04881d05, 0xd9d4d039,0xe6db99e5,0x1fa27cf8,0xc4ac5665, 0xf4292244,0x432aff97,0xab9423a7,0xfc93a039, 0x655b59c3,0x8f0ccc92,0xffeff47d,0x85845dd1, 0x6fa87e4f,0xfe2ce6e0,0xa3014314,0x4e0811a1, 0xf7537e82,0xbd3af235,0x2ad7d2bb,0xeb86d391, 0 ); sub R0 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_; my $rot = (7,12,17,22)[$i%4]; my $j = ($i+1)/2; if ($i&1) { $code.=<<___; srlx @X[$j],$shr,@X[$j] ! align X[`$i+1`] and $b,$t1,$t1 ! round $i sllx @X[$j+1],$shl1,$tx add $t2,$a,$a sllx $tx,$shl2,$tx xor $d,$t1,$t1 or $tx,@X[$j],@X[$j] sethi %hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2 add $t1,$a,$a or $t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2 sll $a,$rot,$t3 add @X[$j],$t2,$t2 ! X[`$i+1`]+K[`$i+1`] srl $a,32-$rot,$a add $b,$t3,$t3 xor $b,$c,$t1 add $t3,$a,$a ___ } else { $code.=<<___; srlx @X[$j],32,$tx ! extract X[`2*$j+1`] and $b,$t1,$t1 ! round $i add $t2,$a,$a xor $d,$t1,$t1 sethi %hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2 add $t1,$a,$a or $t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2 sll $a,$rot,$t3 add $tx,$t2,$t2 ! X[`2*$j+1`]+K[`$i+1`] srl $a,32-$rot,$a add $b,$t3,$t3 xor $b,$c,$t1 add $t3,$a,$a ___ } } sub R0_1 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_; my $rot = (7,12,17,22)[$i%4]; $code.=<<___; srlx @X[0],32,$tx ! extract X[1] and $b,$t1,$t1 ! round $i add $t2,$a,$a xor $d,$t1,$t1 sethi %hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2 add $t1,$a,$a or $t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2 sll $a,$rot,$t3 add $tx,$t2,$t2 ! X[1]+K[`$i+1`] srl $a,32-$rot,$a add $b,$t3,$t3 andn $b,$c,$t1 add $t3,$a,$a ___ } sub R1 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_; my $rot = (5,9,14,20)[$i%4]; my $j = $i<31 ? (1+5*($i+1))%16 : (5+3*($i+1))%16; my $xi = @X[$j/2]; $code.=<<___ if ($j&1 && ($xi=$tx)); srlx @X[$j/2],32,$xi ! extract X[$j] ___ $code.=<<___; and $b,$d,$t3 ! round $i add $t2,$a,$a or $t3,$t1,$t1 sethi %hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2 add $t1,$a,$a or $t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2 sll $a,$rot,$t3 add $xi,$t2,$t2 ! X[$j]+K[`$i+1`] srl $a,32-$rot,$a add $b,$t3,$t3 `$i<31?"andn":"xor"` $b,$c,$t1 add $t3,$a,$a ___ } sub R2 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_; my $rot = (4,11,16,23)[$i%4]; my $j = $i<47 ? (5+3*($i+1))%16 : (0+7*($i+1))%16; my $xi = @X[$j/2]; $code.=<<___ if ($j&1 && ($xi=$tx)); srlx @X[$j/2],32,$xi ! extract X[$j] ___ $code.=<<___; add $t2,$a,$a ! round $i xor $b,$t1,$t1 sethi %hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2 add $t1,$a,$a or $t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2 sll $a,$rot,$t3 add $xi,$t2,$t2 ! X[$j]+K[`$i+1`] srl $a,32-$rot,$a add $b,$t3,$t3 xor $b,$c,$t1 add $t3,$a,$a ___ } sub R3 { my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d) = @_; my $rot = (6,10,15,21)[$i%4]; my $j = (0+7*($i+1))%16; my $xi = @X[$j/2]; $code.=<<___; add $t2,$a,$a ! round $i ___ $code.=<<___ if ($j&1 && ($xi=$tx)); srlx @X[$j/2],32,$xi ! extract X[$j] ___ $code.=<<___; orn $b,$d,$t1 sethi %hi(@K[$i+1]),$t2 xor $c,$t1,$t1 or $t2,%lo(@K[$i+1]),$t2 add $t1,$a,$a sll $a,$rot,$t3 add $xi,$t2,$t2 ! X[$j]+K[`$i+1`] srl $a,32-$rot,$a add $b,$t3,$t3 add $t3,$a,$a ___ } $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif .globl md5_block_asm_data_order .align 32 md5_block_asm_data_order: SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1+4],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] andcc %g1, CFR_MD5, %g0 be .Lsoftware nop mov 4, %g1 andcc %o1, 0x7, %g0 lda [%o0 + %g0]0x88, %f0 ! load context lda [%o0 + %g1]0x88, %f1 add %o0, 8, %o0 lda [%o0 + %g0]0x88, %f2 lda [%o0 + %g1]0x88, %f3 bne,pn %icc, .Lhwunaligned sub %o0, 8, %o0 .Lhw_loop: ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f8 ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f10 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f12 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f14 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f16 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f18 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f20 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f22 add %o1, 0x40, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 .word 0x81b02800 ! MD5 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhw_loop nop .Lhwfinish: sta %f0, [%o0 + %g0]0x88 ! store context sta %f1, [%o0 + %g1]0x88 add %o0, 8, %o0 sta %f2, [%o0 + %g0]0x88 sta %f3, [%o0 + %g1]0x88 retl nop .align 8 .Lhwunaligned: alignaddr %o1, %g0, %o1 ldd [%o1 + 0x00], %f10 .Lhwunaligned_loop: ldd [%o1 + 0x08], %f12 ldd [%o1 + 0x10], %f14 ldd [%o1 + 0x18], %f16 ldd [%o1 + 0x20], %f18 ldd [%o1 + 0x28], %f20 ldd [%o1 + 0x30], %f22 ldd [%o1 + 0x38], %f24 subcc %o2, 1, %o2 ! done yet? ldd [%o1 + 0x40], %f26 add %o1, 0x40, %o1 prefetch [%o1 + 63], 20 faligndata %f10, %f12, %f8 faligndata %f12, %f14, %f10 faligndata %f14, %f16, %f12 faligndata %f16, %f18, %f14 faligndata %f18, %f20, %f16 faligndata %f20, %f22, %f18 faligndata %f22, %f24, %f20 faligndata %f24, %f26, %f22 .word 0x81b02800 ! MD5 bne,pt SIZE_T_CC, .Lhwunaligned_loop for %f26, %f26, %f10 ! %f10=%f26 ba .Lhwfinish nop .align 16 .Lsoftware: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp rd %asi,$saved_asi wr %g0,0x88,%asi ! ASI_PRIMARY_LITTLE and $inp,7,$shr andn $inp,7,$inp sll $shr,3,$shr ! *=8 mov 56,$shl2 ld [$ctx+0],$A sub $shl2,$shr,$shl2 ld [$ctx+4],$B and $shl2,32,$shl1 add $shl2,8,$shl2 ld [$ctx+8],$C sub $shl2,$shl1,$shl2 ! shr+shl1+shl2==64 ld [$ctx+12],$D nop .Loop: cmp $shr,0 ! was inp aligned? ldxa [$inp+0]%asi,@X[0] ! load little-endian input ldxa [$inp+8]%asi,@X[1] ldxa [$inp+16]%asi,@X[2] ldxa [$inp+24]%asi,@X[3] ldxa [$inp+32]%asi,@X[4] sllx $A,32,$AB ! pack A,B ldxa [$inp+40]%asi,@X[5] sllx $C,32,$CD ! pack C,D ldxa [$inp+48]%asi,@X[6] or $B,$AB,$AB ldxa [$inp+56]%asi,@X[7] or $D,$CD,$CD bnz,a,pn %icc,.+8 ldxa [$inp+64]%asi,@X[8] srlx @X[0],$shr,@X[0] ! align X[0] sllx @X[1],$shl1,$tx sethi %hi(@K[0]),$t2 sllx $tx,$shl2,$tx or $t2,%lo(@K[0]),$t2 or $tx,@X[0],@X[0] xor $C,$D,$t1 add @X[0],$t2,$t2 ! X[0]+K[0] ___ for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) { &R0($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<16;$i++) { &R0_1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<32;$i++) { &R1($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<48;$i++) { &R2($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } for (;$i<64;$i++) { &R3($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); } $code.=<<___; srlx $AB,32,$t1 ! unpack A,B,C,D and accumulate add $inp,64,$inp ! advance inp srlx $CD,32,$t2 add $t1,$A,$A subcc $len,1,$len ! done yet? add $AB,$B,$B add $t2,$C,$C add $CD,$D,$D srl $B,0,$B ! clruw $B bne SIZE_T_CC,.Loop srl $D,0,$D ! clruw $D st $A,[$ctx+0] ! write out ctx st $B,[$ctx+4] st $C,[$ctx+8] st $D,[$ctx+12] wr %g0,$saved_asi,%asi ret restore .type md5_block_asm_data_order,#function .size md5_block_asm_data_order,(.-md5_block_asm_data_order) .asciz "MD5 block transform for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 4 ___ # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my $ref,$opf; my %visopf = ( "faligndata" => 0x048, "for" => 0x07c ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%f([0-9]{1,2})/); $_=$1; if ($1>=32) { return $ref if ($1&1); # re-encode for upper double register addressing $_=($1|$1>>5)&31; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } sub unalignaddr { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my $ref="$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { if (/%([goli])([0-7])/) { $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } else { return $ref; } } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00300|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$rs2, $ref; } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(f[^\s]*)\s+(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2}),\s*(%f[0-9]{1,2})/ &unvis($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; s/\b(alignaddr)\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unalignaddr($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/asm/md5-ia64.S0000644000000000000000000005257113176625657016234 0ustar rootroot/* * * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Copyright (c) 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. */ // Common registers are assigned as follows: // // COMMON // // t0 Const Tbl Ptr TPtr // t1 Round Constant TRound // t4 Block residual LenResid // t5 Residual Data DTmp // // {in,out}0 Block 0 Cycle RotateM0 // {in,out}1 Block Value 12 M12 // {in,out}2 Block Value 8 M8 // {in,out}3 Block Value 4 M4 // {in,out}4 Block Value 0 M0 // {in,out}5 Block 1 Cycle RotateM1 // {in,out}6 Block Value 13 M13 // {in,out}7 Block Value 9 M9 // {in,out}8 Block Value 5 M5 // {in,out}9 Block Value 1 M1 // {in,out}10 Block 2 Cycle RotateM2 // {in,out}11 Block Value 14 M14 // {in,out}12 Block Value 10 M10 // {in,out}13 Block Value 6 M6 // {in,out}14 Block Value 2 M2 // {in,out}15 Block 3 Cycle RotateM3 // {in,out}16 Block Value 15 M15 // {in,out}17 Block Value 11 M11 // {in,out}18 Block Value 7 M7 // {in,out}19 Block Value 3 M3 // {in,out}20 Scratch Z // {in,out}21 Scratch Y // {in,out}22 Scratch X // {in,out}23 Scratch W // {in,out}24 Digest A A // {in,out}25 Digest B B // {in,out}26 Digest C C // {in,out}27 Digest D D // {in,out}28 Active Data Ptr DPtr // in28 Dummy Value - // out28 Dummy Value - // bt0 Coroutine Link QUICK_RTN // /// These predicates are used for computing the padding block(s) and /// are shared between the driver and digest co-routines // // pt0 Extra Pad Block pExtra // pt1 Load next word pLoad // pt2 Skip next word pSkip // pt3 Search for Pad pNoPad // pt4 Pad Word 0 pPad0 // pt5 Pad Word 1 pPad1 // pt6 Pad Word 2 pPad2 // pt7 Pad Word 3 pPad3 #define DTmp r19 #define LenResid r18 #define QUICK_RTN b6 #define TPtr r14 #define TRound r15 #define pExtra p6 #define pLoad p7 #define pNoPad p9 #define pPad0 p10 #define pPad1 p11 #define pPad2 p12 #define pPad3 p13 #define pSkip p8 #define A_ out24 #define B_ out25 #define C_ out26 #define D_ out27 #define DPtr_ out28 #define M0_ out4 #define M1_ out9 #define M10_ out12 #define M11_ out17 #define M12_ out1 #define M13_ out6 #define M14_ out11 #define M15_ out16 #define M2_ out14 #define M3_ out19 #define M4_ out3 #define M5_ out8 #define M6_ out13 #define M7_ out18 #define M8_ out2 #define M9_ out7 #define RotateM0_ out0 #define RotateM1_ out5 #define RotateM2_ out10 #define RotateM3_ out15 #define W_ out23 #define X_ out22 #define Y_ out21 #define Z_ out20 #define A in24 #define B in25 #define C in26 #define D in27 #define DPtr in28 #define M0 in4 #define M1 in9 #define M10 in12 #define M11 in17 #define M12 in1 #define M13 in6 #define M14 in11 #define M15 in16 #define M2 in14 #define M3 in19 #define M4 in3 #define M5 in8 #define M6 in13 #define M7 in18 #define M8 in2 #define M9 in7 #define RotateM0 in0 #define RotateM1 in5 #define RotateM2 in10 #define RotateM3 in15 #define W in23 #define X in22 #define Y in21 #define Z in20 /* register stack configuration for md5_block_asm_data_order(): */ #define MD5_NINP 3 #define MD5_NLOC 0 #define MD5_NOUT 29 #define MD5_NROT 0 /* register stack configuration for helpers: */ #define _NINPUTS MD5_NOUT #define _NLOCALS 0 #define _NOUTPUT 0 #define _NROTATE 24 /* this must be <= _NINPUTS */ #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64) #define ADDP addp4 #else #define ADDP add #endif #if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) || defined(B_ENDIAN) #define HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN #endif // Macros for getting the left and right portions of little-endian words #define GETLW(dst, src, align) dep.z dst = src, 32 - 8 * align, 8 * align #define GETRW(dst, src, align) extr.u dst = src, 8 * align, 32 - 8 * align // MD5 driver // // Reads an input block, then calls the digest block // subroutine and adds the results to the accumulated // digest. It allocates 32 outs which the subroutine // uses as it's inputs and rotating // registers. Initializes the round constant pointer and // takes care of saving/restoring ar.lc // /// INPUT // // in0 Context Ptr CtxPtr0 // in1 Input Data Ptr DPtrIn // in2 Integral Blocks BlockCount // rp Return Address - // /// CODE // // v2 Input Align InAlign // t0 Shared w/digest - // t1 Shared w/digest - // t2 Shared w/digest - // t3 Shared w/digest - // t4 Shared w/digest - // t5 Shared w/digest - // t6 PFS Save PFSSave // t7 ar.lc Save LCSave // t8 Saved PR PRSave // t9 2nd CtxPtr CtxPtr1 // t10 Table Base CTable // t11 Table[0] CTable0 // t13 Accumulator A AccumA // t14 Accumulator B AccumB // t15 Accumulator C AccumC // t16 Accumulator D AccumD // pt0 Shared w/digest - // pt1 Shared w/digest - // pt2 Shared w/digest - // pt3 Shared w/digest - // pt4 Shared w/digest - // pt5 Shared w/digest - // pt6 Shared w/digest - // pt7 Shared w/digest - // pt8 Not Aligned pOff // pt8 Blocks Left pAgain #define AccumA r27 #define AccumB r28 #define AccumC r29 #define AccumD r30 #define CTable r24 #define CTable0 r25 #define CtxPtr0 in0 #define CtxPtr1 r23 #define DPtrIn in1 #define BlockCount in2 #define InAlign r10 #define LCSave r21 #define PFSSave r20 #define PRSave r22 #define pAgain p63 #define pOff p63 .text /* md5_block_asm_data_order(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t num) where: c: a pointer to a structure of this type: typedef struct MD5state_st { MD5_LONG A,B,C,D; MD5_LONG Nl,Nh; MD5_LONG data[MD5_LBLOCK]; unsigned int num; } MD5_CTX; data: a pointer to the input data (may be misaligned) num: the number of 16-byte blocks to hash (i.e., the length of DATA is 16*NUM. */ .type md5_block_asm_data_order, @function .global md5_block_asm_data_order .align 32 .proc md5_block_asm_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order: .md5_block: .prologue { .mmi .save ar.pfs, PFSSave alloc PFSSave = ar.pfs, MD5_NINP, MD5_NLOC, MD5_NOUT, MD5_NROT ADDP CtxPtr1 = 8, CtxPtr0 mov CTable = ip } { .mmi ADDP DPtrIn = 0, DPtrIn ADDP CtxPtr0 = 0, CtxPtr0 .save ar.lc, LCSave mov LCSave = ar.lc } ;; { .mmi add CTable = .md5_tbl_data_order#-.md5_block#, CTable and InAlign = 0x3, DPtrIn } { .mmi ld4 AccumA = [CtxPtr0], 4 ld4 AccumC = [CtxPtr1], 4 .save pr, PRSave mov PRSave = pr .body } ;; { .mmi ld4 AccumB = [CtxPtr0] ld4 AccumD = [CtxPtr1] dep DPtr_ = 0, DPtrIn, 0, 2 } ;; #ifdef HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN rum psr.be;; // switch to little-endian #endif { .mmb ld4 CTable0 = [CTable], 4 cmp.ne pOff, p0 = 0, InAlign (pOff) br.cond.spnt.many .md5_unaligned } ;; // The FF load/compute loop rotates values three times, so that // loading into M12 here produces the M0 value, M13 -> M1, etc. .md5_block_loop0: { .mmi ld4 M12_ = [DPtr_], 4 mov TPtr = CTable mov TRound = CTable0 } ;; { .mmi ld4 M13_ = [DPtr_], 4 mov A_ = AccumA mov B_ = AccumB } ;; { .mmi ld4 M14_ = [DPtr_], 4 mov C_ = AccumC mov D_ = AccumD } ;; { .mmb ld4 M15_ = [DPtr_], 4 add BlockCount = -1, BlockCount br.call.sptk.many QUICK_RTN = md5_digest_block0 } ;; // Now, we add the new digest values and do some clean-up // before checking if there's another full block to process { .mmi add AccumA = AccumA, A_ add AccumB = AccumB, B_ cmp.ne pAgain, p0 = 0, BlockCount } { .mib add AccumC = AccumC, C_ add AccumD = AccumD, D_ (pAgain) br.cond.dptk.many .md5_block_loop0 } ;; .md5_exit: #ifdef HOST_IS_BIG_ENDIAN sum psr.be;; // switch back to big-endian mode #endif { .mmi st4 [CtxPtr0] = AccumB, -4 st4 [CtxPtr1] = AccumD, -4 mov pr = PRSave, 0x1ffff ;; } { .mmi st4 [CtxPtr0] = AccumA st4 [CtxPtr1] = AccumC mov ar.lc = LCSave } ;; { .mib mov ar.pfs = PFSSave br.ret.sptk.few rp } ;; #define MD5UNALIGNED(offset) \ .md5_process##offset: \ { .mib ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ GETRW(DTmp, DTmp, offset) ; \ } ;; \ .md5_block_loop##offset: \ { .mmi ; \ ld4 Y_ = [DPtr_], 4 ; \ mov TPtr = CTable ; \ mov TRound = CTable0 ; \ } ;; \ { .mmi ; \ ld4 M13_ = [DPtr_], 4 ; \ mov A_ = AccumA ; \ mov B_ = AccumB ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ ld4 M14_ = [DPtr_], 4 ; \ GETLW(W_, Y_, offset) ; \ mov C_ = AccumC ; \ } \ { .mmi ; \ mov D_ = AccumD ;; \ or M12_ = W_, DTmp ; \ GETRW(DTmp, Y_, offset) ; \ } \ { .mib ; \ ld4 M15_ = [DPtr_], 4 ; \ add BlockCount = -1, BlockCount ; \ br.call.sptk.many QUICK_RTN = md5_digest_block##offset; \ } ;; \ { .mmi ; \ add AccumA = AccumA, A_ ; \ add AccumB = AccumB, B_ ; \ cmp.ne pAgain, p0 = 0, BlockCount ; \ } \ { .mib ; \ add AccumC = AccumC, C_ ; \ add AccumD = AccumD, D_ ; \ (pAgain) br.cond.dptk.many .md5_block_loop##offset ; \ } ;; \ { .mib ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ br.cond.sptk.many .md5_exit ; \ } ;; .align 32 .md5_unaligned: // // Because variable shifts are expensive, we special case each of // the four alignements. In practice, this won't hurt too much // since only one working set of code will be loaded. // { .mib ld4 DTmp = [DPtr_], 4 cmp.eq pOff, p0 = 1, InAlign (pOff) br.cond.dpnt.many .md5_process1 } ;; { .mib cmp.eq pOff, p0 = 2, InAlign nop 0x0 (pOff) br.cond.dpnt.many .md5_process2 } ;; MD5UNALIGNED(3) MD5UNALIGNED(1) MD5UNALIGNED(2) .endp md5_block_asm_data_order // MD5 Perform the F function and load // // Passed the first 4 words (M0 - M3) and initial (A, B, C, D) values, // computes the FF() round of functions, then branches to the common // digest code to finish up with GG(), HH, and II(). // // INPUT // // rp Return Address - // // CODE // // v0 PFS bit bucket PFS // v1 Loop Trip Count LTrip // pt0 Load next word pMore /* For F round: */ #define LTrip r9 #define PFS r8 #define pMore p6 /* For GHI rounds: */ #define T r9 #define U r10 #define V r11 #define COMPUTE(a, b, s, M, R) \ { \ .mii ; \ ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ; \ dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;; \ shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ; \ } ;; \ { \ .mmi ; \ add a = Z, b ; \ mov R = M ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ } ;; #define LOOP(a, b, s, M, R, label) \ { .mii ; \ ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ; \ dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;; \ shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ; \ } ;; \ { .mib ; \ add a = Z, b ; \ mov R = M ; \ br.ctop.sptk.many label ; \ } ;; // G(B, C, D) = (B & D) | (C & ~D) #define G(a, b, c, d, M) \ { .mmi ; \ add Z = M, TRound ; \ and Y = b, d ; \ andcm X = c, d ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ add Z = Z, a ; \ or Y = Y, X ;; \ add Z = Z, Y ; \ } ;; // H(B, C, D) = B ^ C ^ D #define H(a, b, c, d, M) \ { .mmi ; \ add Z = M, TRound ; \ xor Y = b, c ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ add Z = Z, a ; \ xor Y = Y, d ;; \ add Z = Z, Y ; \ } ;; // I(B, C, D) = C ^ (B | ~D) // // However, since we have an andcm operator, we use the fact that // // Y ^ Z == ~Y ^ ~Z // // to rewrite the expression as // // I(B, C, D) = ~C ^ (~B & D) #define I(a, b, c, d, M) \ { .mmi ; \ add Z = M, TRound ; \ andcm Y = d, b ; \ andcm X = -1, c ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ add Z = Z, a ; \ xor Y = Y, X ;; \ add Z = Z, Y ; \ } ;; #define GG4(label) \ G(A, B, C, D, M0) \ COMPUTE(A, B, 5, M0, RotateM0) \ G(D, A, B, C, M1) \ COMPUTE(D, A, 9, M1, RotateM1) \ G(C, D, A, B, M2) \ COMPUTE(C, D, 14, M2, RotateM2) \ G(B, C, D, A, M3) \ LOOP(B, C, 20, M3, RotateM3, label) #define HH4(label) \ H(A, B, C, D, M0) \ COMPUTE(A, B, 4, M0, RotateM0) \ H(D, A, B, C, M1) \ COMPUTE(D, A, 11, M1, RotateM1) \ H(C, D, A, B, M2) \ COMPUTE(C, D, 16, M2, RotateM2) \ H(B, C, D, A, M3) \ LOOP(B, C, 23, M3, RotateM3, label) #define II4(label) \ I(A, B, C, D, M0) \ COMPUTE(A, B, 6, M0, RotateM0) \ I(D, A, B, C, M1) \ COMPUTE(D, A, 10, M1, RotateM1) \ I(C, D, A, B, M2) \ COMPUTE(C, D, 15, M2, RotateM2) \ I(B, C, D, A, M3) \ LOOP(B, C, 21, M3, RotateM3, label) #define FFLOAD(a, b, c, d, M, N, s) \ { .mii ; \ (pMore) ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ; \ add Z = M, TRound ; \ and Y = c, b ; \ } \ { .mmi ; \ andcm X = d, b ;; \ add Z = Z, a ; \ or Y = Y, X ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ; \ add Z = Z, Y ;; \ dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;; \ add a = Z, b ; \ } ;; #define FFLOOP(a, b, c, d, M, N, s, dest) \ { .mii ; \ (pMore) ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ; \ add Z = M, TRound ; \ and Y = c, b ; \ } \ { .mmi ; \ andcm X = d, b ;; \ add Z = Z, a ; \ or Y = Y, X ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ; \ add Z = Z, Y ;; \ dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ;; \ add a = Z, b ; \ } \ { .mib ; \ cmp.ne pMore, p0 = 0, LTrip ; \ add LTrip = -1, LTrip ; \ br.ctop.dptk.many dest ; \ } ;; .type md5_digest_block0, @function .align 32 .proc md5_digest_block0 .prologue md5_digest_block0: .altrp QUICK_RTN .body { .mmi alloc PFS = ar.pfs, _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE mov LTrip = 2 mov ar.lc = 3 } ;; { .mii cmp.eq pMore, p0 = r0, r0 mov ar.ec = 0 nop 0x0 } ;; .md5_FF_round0: FFLOAD(A, B, C, D, M12, RotateM0, 7) FFLOAD(D, A, B, C, M13, RotateM1, 12) FFLOAD(C, D, A, B, M14, RotateM2, 17) FFLOOP(B, C, D, A, M15, RotateM3, 22, .md5_FF_round0) // // !!! Fall through to md5_digest_GHI // .endp md5_digest_block0 .type md5_digest_GHI, @function .align 32 .proc md5_digest_GHI .prologue .regstk _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE md5_digest_GHI: .altrp QUICK_RTN .body // // The following sequence shuffles the block counstants round for the // next round: // // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 // 1 6 11 0 5 10 14 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12 // { .mmi mov Z = M0 mov Y = M15 mov ar.lc = 3 } { .mmi mov X = M2 mov W = M9 mov V = M4 } ;; { .mmi mov M0 = M1 mov M15 = M12 mov ar.ec = 1 } { .mmi mov M2 = M11 mov M9 = M14 mov M4 = M5 } ;; { .mmi mov M1 = M6 mov M12 = M13 mov U = M3 } { .mmi mov M11 = M8 mov M14 = M7 mov M5 = M10 } ;; { .mmi mov M6 = Y mov M13 = X mov M3 = Z } { .mmi mov M8 = W mov M7 = V mov M10 = U } ;; .md5_GG_round: GG4(.md5_GG_round) // The following sequence shuffles the block constants round for the // next round: // // 1 6 11 0 5 10 14 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12 // 5 8 11 14 1 4 7 10 13 0 3 6 9 12 15 2 { .mmi mov Z = M0 mov Y = M1 mov ar.lc = 3 } { .mmi mov X = M3 mov W = M5 mov V = M6 } ;; { .mmi mov M0 = M4 mov M1 = M11 mov ar.ec = 1 } { .mmi mov M3 = M9 mov U = M8 mov T = M13 } ;; { .mmi mov M4 = Z mov M11 = Y mov M5 = M7 } { .mmi mov M6 = M14 mov M8 = M12 mov M13 = M15 } ;; { .mmi mov M7 = W mov M14 = V nop 0x0 } { .mmi mov M9 = X mov M12 = U mov M15 = T } ;; .md5_HH_round: HH4(.md5_HH_round) // The following sequence shuffles the block constants round for the // next round: // // 5 8 11 14 1 4 7 10 13 0 3 6 9 12 15 2 // 0 7 14 5 12 3 10 1 8 15 6 13 4 11 2 9 { .mmi mov Z = M0 mov Y = M15 mov ar.lc = 3 } { .mmi mov X = M10 mov W = M1 mov V = M4 } ;; { .mmi mov M0 = M9 mov M15 = M12 mov ar.ec = 1 } { .mmi mov M10 = M11 mov M1 = M6 mov M4 = M13 } ;; { .mmi mov M9 = M14 mov M12 = M5 mov U = M3 } { .mmi mov M11 = M8 mov M6 = M7 mov M13 = M2 } ;; { .mmi mov M14 = Y mov M5 = X mov M3 = Z } { .mmi mov M8 = W mov M7 = V mov M2 = U } ;; .md5_II_round: II4(.md5_II_round) { .mib nop 0x0 nop 0x0 br.ret.sptk.many QUICK_RTN } ;; .endp md5_digest_GHI #define FFLOADU(a, b, c, d, M, P, N, s, offset) \ { .mii ; \ (pMore) ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ; \ add Z = M, TRound ; \ and Y = c, b ; \ } \ { .mmi ; \ andcm X = d, b ;; \ add Z = Z, a ; \ or Y = Y, X ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ; \ GETLW(W, P, offset) ; \ add Z = Z, Y ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ or W = W, DTmp ; \ dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;; \ shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ add a = Z, b ; \ GETRW(DTmp, P, offset) ; \ mov P = W ; \ } ;; #define FFLOOPU(a, b, c, d, M, P, N, s, offset) \ { .mii ; \ (pMore) ld4 N = [DPtr], 4 ; \ add Z = M, TRound ; \ and Y = c, b ; \ } \ { .mmi ; \ andcm X = d, b ;; \ add Z = Z, a ; \ or Y = Y, X ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ ld4 TRound = [TPtr], 4 ; \ (pMore) GETLW(W, P, offset) ; \ add Z = Z, Y ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ (pMore) or W = W, DTmp ; \ dep.z Y = Z, 32, 32 ;; \ shrp Z = Z, Y, 64 - s ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ add a = Z, b ; \ (pMore) GETRW(DTmp, P, offset) ; \ (pMore) mov P = W ; \ } \ { .mib ; \ cmp.ne pMore, p0 = 0, LTrip ; \ add LTrip = -1, LTrip ; \ br.ctop.sptk.many .md5_FF_round##offset ; \ } ;; #define MD5FBLOCK(offset) \ .type md5_digest_block##offset, @function ; \ \ .align 32 ; \ .proc md5_digest_block##offset ; \ .prologue ; \ .altrp QUICK_RTN ; \ .body ; \ md5_digest_block##offset: \ { .mmi ; \ alloc PFS = ar.pfs, _NINPUTS, _NLOCALS, _NOUTPUT, _NROTATE ; \ mov LTrip = 2 ; \ mov ar.lc = 3 ; \ } ;; \ { .mii ; \ cmp.eq pMore, p0 = r0, r0 ; \ mov ar.ec = 0 ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ } ;; \ \ .pred.rel "mutex", pLoad, pSkip ; \ .md5_FF_round##offset: \ FFLOADU(A, B, C, D, M12, M13, RotateM0, 7, offset) \ FFLOADU(D, A, B, C, M13, M14, RotateM1, 12, offset) \ FFLOADU(C, D, A, B, M14, M15, RotateM2, 17, offset) \ FFLOOPU(B, C, D, A, M15, RotateM0, RotateM3, 22, offset) \ \ { .mib ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ nop 0x0 ; \ br.cond.sptk.many md5_digest_GHI ; \ } ;; \ .endp md5_digest_block##offset MD5FBLOCK(1) MD5FBLOCK(2) MD5FBLOCK(3) .align 64 .type md5_constants, @object md5_constants: .md5_tbl_data_order: // To ensure little-endian data // order, code as bytes. data1 0x78, 0xa4, 0x6a, 0xd7 // 0 data1 0x56, 0xb7, 0xc7, 0xe8 // 1 data1 0xdb, 0x70, 0x20, 0x24 // 2 data1 0xee, 0xce, 0xbd, 0xc1 // 3 data1 0xaf, 0x0f, 0x7c, 0xf5 // 4 data1 0x2a, 0xc6, 0x87, 0x47 // 5 data1 0x13, 0x46, 0x30, 0xa8 // 6 data1 0x01, 0x95, 0x46, 0xfd // 7 data1 0xd8, 0x98, 0x80, 0x69 // 8 data1 0xaf, 0xf7, 0x44, 0x8b // 9 data1 0xb1, 0x5b, 0xff, 0xff // 10 data1 0xbe, 0xd7, 0x5c, 0x89 // 11 data1 0x22, 0x11, 0x90, 0x6b // 12 data1 0x93, 0x71, 0x98, 0xfd // 13 data1 0x8e, 0x43, 0x79, 0xa6 // 14 data1 0x21, 0x08, 0xb4, 0x49 // 15 data1 0x62, 0x25, 0x1e, 0xf6 // 16 data1 0x40, 0xb3, 0x40, 0xc0 // 17 data1 0x51, 0x5a, 0x5e, 0x26 // 18 data1 0xaa, 0xc7, 0xb6, 0xe9 // 19 data1 0x5d, 0x10, 0x2f, 0xd6 // 20 data1 0x53, 0x14, 0x44, 0x02 // 21 data1 0x81, 0xe6, 0xa1, 0xd8 // 22 data1 0xc8, 0xfb, 0xd3, 0xe7 // 23 data1 0xe6, 0xcd, 0xe1, 0x21 // 24 data1 0xd6, 0x07, 0x37, 0xc3 // 25 data1 0x87, 0x0d, 0xd5, 0xf4 // 26 data1 0xed, 0x14, 0x5a, 0x45 // 27 data1 0x05, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0xa9 // 28 data1 0xf8, 0xa3, 0xef, 0xfc // 29 data1 0xd9, 0x02, 0x6f, 0x67 // 30 data1 0x8a, 0x4c, 0x2a, 0x8d // 31 data1 0x42, 0x39, 0xfa, 0xff // 32 data1 0x81, 0xf6, 0x71, 0x87 // 33 data1 0x22, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x6d // 34 data1 0x0c, 0x38, 0xe5, 0xfd // 35 data1 0x44, 0xea, 0xbe, 0xa4 // 36 data1 0xa9, 0xcf, 0xde, 0x4b // 37 data1 0x60, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0xf6 // 38 data1 0x70, 0xbc, 0xbf, 0xbe // 39 data1 0xc6, 0x7e, 0x9b, 0x28 // 40 data1 0xfa, 0x27, 0xa1, 0xea // 41 data1 0x85, 0x30, 0xef, 0xd4 // 42 data1 0x05, 0x1d, 0x88, 0x04 // 43 data1 0x39, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0xd9 // 44 data1 0xe5, 0x99, 0xdb, 0xe6 // 45 data1 0xf8, 0x7c, 0xa2, 0x1f // 46 data1 0x65, 0x56, 0xac, 0xc4 // 47 data1 0x44, 0x22, 0x29, 0xf4 // 48 data1 0x97, 0xff, 0x2a, 0x43 // 49 data1 0xa7, 0x23, 0x94, 0xab // 50 data1 0x39, 0xa0, 0x93, 0xfc // 51 data1 0xc3, 0x59, 0x5b, 0x65 // 52 data1 0x92, 0xcc, 0x0c, 0x8f // 53 data1 0x7d, 0xf4, 0xef, 0xff // 54 data1 0xd1, 0x5d, 0x84, 0x85 // 55 data1 0x4f, 0x7e, 0xa8, 0x6f // 56 data1 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x2c, 0xfe // 57 data1 0x14, 0x43, 0x01, 0xa3 // 58 data1 0xa1, 0x11, 0x08, 0x4e // 59 data1 0x82, 0x7e, 0x53, 0xf7 // 60 data1 0x35, 0xf2, 0x3a, 0xbd // 61 data1 0xbb, 0xd2, 0xd7, 0x2a // 62 data1 0x91, 0xd3, 0x86, 0xeb // 63 .size md5_constants#,64*4 openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/md5_one.c0000644000000000000000000000221313176625657015560 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include #endif unsigned char *MD5(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md) { MD5_CTX c; static unsigned char m[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (md == NULL) md = m; if (!MD5_Init(&c)) return NULL; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC MD5_Update(&c, d, n); #else { char temp[1024]; unsigned long chunk; while (n > 0) { chunk = (n > sizeof(temp)) ? sizeof(temp) : n; ebcdic2ascii(temp, d, chunk); MD5_Update(&c, temp, chunk); n -= chunk; d += chunk; } } #endif MD5_Final(md, &c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&c, sizeof(c)); /* security consideration */ return (md); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/md5/md5_dgst.c0000644000000000000000000001251013176625657015741 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "md5_locl.h" #include /* * Implemented from RFC1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm */ #define INIT_DATA_A (unsigned long)0x67452301L #define INIT_DATA_B (unsigned long)0xefcdab89L #define INIT_DATA_C (unsigned long)0x98badcfeL #define INIT_DATA_D (unsigned long)0x10325476L int MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *c) { memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); c->A = INIT_DATA_A; c->B = INIT_DATA_B; c->C = INIT_DATA_C; c->D = INIT_DATA_D; return 1; } #ifndef md5_block_data_order # ifdef X # undef X # endif void md5_block_data_order(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t num) { const unsigned char *data = data_; register unsigned MD32_REG_T A, B, C, D, l; # ifndef MD32_XARRAY /* See comment in crypto/sha/sha_locl.h for details. */ unsigned MD32_REG_T XX0, XX1, XX2, XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6, XX7, XX8, XX9, XX10, XX11, XX12, XX13, XX14, XX15; # define X(i) XX##i # else MD5_LONG XX[MD5_LBLOCK]; # define X(i) XX[i] # endif A = c->A; B = c->B; C = c->C; D = c->D; for (; num--;) { (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(0) = l; (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(1) = l; /* Round 0 */ R0(A, B, C, D, X(0), 7, 0xd76aa478L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(2) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(1), 12, 0xe8c7b756L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(3) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(2), 17, 0x242070dbL); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(4) = l; R0(B, C, D, A, X(3), 22, 0xc1bdceeeL); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(5) = l; R0(A, B, C, D, X(4), 7, 0xf57c0fafL); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(6) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(5), 12, 0x4787c62aL); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(7) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(6), 17, 0xa8304613L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(8) = l; R0(B, C, D, A, X(7), 22, 0xfd469501L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(9) = l; R0(A, B, C, D, X(8), 7, 0x698098d8L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(10) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(9), 12, 0x8b44f7afL); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(11) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(10), 17, 0xffff5bb1L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(12) = l; R0(B, C, D, A, X(11), 22, 0x895cd7beL); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(13) = l; R0(A, B, C, D, X(12), 7, 0x6b901122L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(14) = l; R0(D, A, B, C, X(13), 12, 0xfd987193L); (void)HOST_c2l(data, l); X(15) = l; R0(C, D, A, B, X(14), 17, 0xa679438eL); R0(B, C, D, A, X(15), 22, 0x49b40821L); /* Round 1 */ R1(A, B, C, D, X(1), 5, 0xf61e2562L); R1(D, A, B, C, X(6), 9, 0xc040b340L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(11), 14, 0x265e5a51L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(0), 20, 0xe9b6c7aaL); R1(A, B, C, D, X(5), 5, 0xd62f105dL); R1(D, A, B, C, X(10), 9, 0x02441453L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(15), 14, 0xd8a1e681L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(4), 20, 0xe7d3fbc8L); R1(A, B, C, D, X(9), 5, 0x21e1cde6L); R1(D, A, B, C, X(14), 9, 0xc33707d6L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(3), 14, 0xf4d50d87L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(8), 20, 0x455a14edL); R1(A, B, C, D, X(13), 5, 0xa9e3e905L); R1(D, A, B, C, X(2), 9, 0xfcefa3f8L); R1(C, D, A, B, X(7), 14, 0x676f02d9L); R1(B, C, D, A, X(12), 20, 0x8d2a4c8aL); /* Round 2 */ R2(A, B, C, D, X(5), 4, 0xfffa3942L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(8), 11, 0x8771f681L); R2(C, D, A, B, X(11), 16, 0x6d9d6122L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(14), 23, 0xfde5380cL); R2(A, B, C, D, X(1), 4, 0xa4beea44L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(4), 11, 0x4bdecfa9L); R2(C, D, A, B, X(7), 16, 0xf6bb4b60L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(10), 23, 0xbebfbc70L); R2(A, B, C, D, X(13), 4, 0x289b7ec6L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(0), 11, 0xeaa127faL); R2(C, D, A, B, X(3), 16, 0xd4ef3085L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(6), 23, 0x04881d05L); R2(A, B, C, D, X(9), 4, 0xd9d4d039L); R2(D, A, B, C, X(12), 11, 0xe6db99e5L); R2(C, D, A, B, X(15), 16, 0x1fa27cf8L); R2(B, C, D, A, X(2), 23, 0xc4ac5665L); /* Round 3 */ R3(A, B, C, D, X(0), 6, 0xf4292244L); R3(D, A, B, C, X(7), 10, 0x432aff97L); R3(C, D, A, B, X(14), 15, 0xab9423a7L); R3(B, C, D, A, X(5), 21, 0xfc93a039L); R3(A, B, C, D, X(12), 6, 0x655b59c3L); R3(D, A, B, C, X(3), 10, 0x8f0ccc92L); R3(C, D, A, B, X(10), 15, 0xffeff47dL); R3(B, C, D, A, X(1), 21, 0x85845dd1L); R3(A, B, C, D, X(8), 6, 0x6fa87e4fL); R3(D, A, B, C, X(15), 10, 0xfe2ce6e0L); R3(C, D, A, B, X(6), 15, 0xa3014314L); R3(B, C, D, A, X(13), 21, 0x4e0811a1L); R3(A, B, C, D, X(4), 6, 0xf7537e82L); R3(D, A, B, C, X(11), 10, 0xbd3af235L); R3(C, D, A, B, X(2), 15, 0x2ad7d2bbL); R3(B, C, D, A, X(9), 21, 0xeb86d391L); A = c->A += A; B = c->B += B; C = c->C += C; D = c->D += D; } } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657013772 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_check.c0000644000000000000000000000362113176625657015664 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "ec_lcl.h" #include int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; const BIGNUM *order; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT *point = NULL; /* Custom curves assumed to be correct */ if ((group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) != 0) return 1; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } /* check the discriminant */ if (!EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(group, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO); goto err; } /* check the generator */ if (group->generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); goto err; } /* check the order of the generator */ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) goto err; order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (order == NULL) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(order)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, order, NULL, NULL, ctx)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); EC_POINT_free(point); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecdh_ossl.c0000644000000000000000000001010613176625657016077 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. * * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided below. * * The ECDH software is originally written by Douglas Stebila of * Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" int ossl_ecdh_compute_key(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh) { if (ecdh->group->meth->ecdh_compute_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH); return 0; } return ecdh->group->meth->ecdh_compute_key(psec, pseclen, pub_key, ecdh); } /*- * This implementation is based on the following primitives in the IEEE 1363 standard: * - ECKAS-DH1 * - ECSVDP-DH */ int ecdh_simple_compute_key(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh) { BN_CTX *ctx; EC_POINT *tmp = NULL; BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL; const BIGNUM *priv_key; const EC_GROUP *group; int ret = 0; size_t buflen, len; unsigned char *buf = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh); if (priv_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE); goto err; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); if (EC_KEY_get_flags(ecdh) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) { if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, x, NULL) || !BN_mul(x, x, priv_key, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } priv_key = x; } if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp, NULL, pub_key, priv_key, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp, x, y, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, tmp, x, y, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE); goto err; } } #endif buflen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; len = BN_num_bytes(x); if (len > buflen) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memset(buf, 0, buflen - len); if (len != (size_t)BN_bn2bin(x, buf + buflen - len)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } *pout = buf; *poutlen = buflen; buf = NULL; ret = 1; err: EC_POINT_free(tmp); if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_print.c0000644000000000000000000000542013176625657015742 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *ret, BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t buf_len = 0; unsigned char *buf; buf_len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buf, ctx); if (buf_len == 0) return NULL; ret = BN_bin2bn(buf, buf_len, ret); OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *bn, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t buf_len = 0; unsigned char *buf; EC_POINT *ret; if ((buf_len = BN_num_bytes(bn)) == 0) return NULL; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len); if (buf == NULL) return NULL; if (!BN_bn2bin(bn, buf)) { OPENSSL_free(buf); return NULL; } if (point == NULL) { if ((ret = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(buf); return NULL; } } else ret = point; if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, ret, buf, buf_len, ctx)) { if (ret != point) EC_POINT_clear_free(ret); OPENSSL_free(buf); return NULL; } OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } static const char *HEX_DIGITS = "0123456789ABCDEF"; /* the return value must be freed (using OPENSSL_free()) */ char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *ctx) { char *ret, *p; size_t buf_len = 0, i; unsigned char *buf = NULL, *pbuf; buf_len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buf, ctx); if (buf_len == 0) return NULL; ret = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len * 2 + 2); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(buf); return NULL; } p = ret; pbuf = buf; for (i = buf_len; i > 0; i--) { int v = (int)*(pbuf++); *(p++) = HEX_DIGITS[v >> 4]; *(p++) = HEX_DIGITS[v & 0x0F]; } *p = '\0'; OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *group, const char *buf, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { EC_POINT *ret = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp_bn = NULL; if (!BN_hex2bn(&tmp_bn, buf)) return NULL; ret = EC_POINT_bn2point(group, tmp_bn, point, ctx); BN_clear_free(tmp_bn); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c0000644000000000000000000001137413176625657015750 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., * and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_simple_group_init, ec_GFp_simple_group_finish, ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_nist_group_copy, ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates, 0, 0, 0, ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, 0 /* mul */ , 0 /* precompute_mult */ , 0 /* have_precompute_mult */ , ec_GFp_nist_field_mul, ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr, 0 /* field_div */ , 0 /* field_encode */ , 0 /* field_decode */ , 0, /* field_set_to_one */ ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { dest->field_mod_func = src->field_mod_func; return ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(dest, src); } int ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_192(), p) == 0) group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_192; else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_224(), p) == 0) group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_224; else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_256(), p) == 0) group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_256; else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_384(), p) == 0) group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_384; else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_521(), p) == 0) group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_521; else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME); goto err; } ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nist_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL; if (!group || !r || !a || !b) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if (!ctx) if ((ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r, a, b, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->field_mod_func(r, r, group->field, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(ctx_new); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL; if (!group || !r || !a) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR, EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if (!ctx) if ((ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->field_mod_func(r, r, group->field, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(ctx_new); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c0000644000000000000000000001352013176625657015373 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Binary polynomial ECC support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates == 0 && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) { if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) return ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx); else #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } #else return ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx); #endif } return group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates == 0 && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) { if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) return ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx); else return ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx); } return group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx); } #endif size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point2oct == 0 && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) { if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) return ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx); else #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } #else return ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx); #endif } return group->meth->point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx); } int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->oct2point == 0 && !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) { if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) return ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx); else #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } #else return ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx); #endif } return group->meth->oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx); } size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t len; unsigned char *buf; len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, NULL, 0, NULL); if (len == 0) return 0; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (buf == NULL) return 0; len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx); if (len == 0) { OPENSSL_free(buf); return 0; } *pbuf = buf; return len; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c0000644000000000000000000041223613176625657015741 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" typedef struct { int field_type, /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ seed_len, param_len; unsigned int cofactor; /* promoted to BN_ULONG */ } EC_CURVE_DATA; /* the nist prime curves */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_192 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x30, 0x45, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0x42, 0x2F, 0x64, 0xED, 0x57, 0x95, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x20, 0xEA, 0xE1, 0x21, 0x96, 0xD5, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x64, 0x21, 0x05, 0x19, 0xE5, 0x9C, 0x80, 0xE7, 0x0F, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xAB, 0x72, 0x24, 0x30, 0x49, 0xFE, 0xB8, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0xB9, 0xB1, /* x */ 0x18, 0x8D, 0xA8, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x90, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0xBF, 0x20, 0xEB, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x88, 0x00, 0xF4, 0xFF, 0x0A, 0xFD, 0x82, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x12, /* y */ 0x07, 0x19, 0x2b, 0x95, 0xff, 0xc8, 0xda, 0x78, 0x63, 0x10, 0x11, 0xed, 0x6b, 0x24, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x48, 0x11, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xF8, 0x36, 0x14, 0x6B, 0xC9, 0xB1, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x28, 0x31 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 28, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xBD, 0x71, 0x34, 0x47, 0x99, 0xD5, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xDC, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x9F, 0xA3, 0xB9, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0x94, 0x8B, 0xC5, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, /* b */ 0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56, 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43, 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4, /* x */ 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9, 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6, 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21, /* y */ 0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99, 0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 48 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 48, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xA3, 0x35, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x89, 0x6A, 0x67, 0x73, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x7A, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x73, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B, 0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12, 0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF, /* x */ 0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E, 0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98, 0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D, 0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7, /* y */ 0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c, 0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 66 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 66, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xD0, 0x9E, 0x88, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1C, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x96, 0xCC, 0x67, 0x17, 0x39, 0x32, 0x84, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x64, 0xBA, /* p */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3, 0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19, 0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00, /* x */ 0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E, 0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F, 0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF, 0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66, /* y */ 0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b, 0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee, 0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad, 0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe, 0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50, /* order */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86, 0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09 } }; /* the x9.62 prime curves (minus the nist prime curves) */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x31, 0xA9, 0x2E, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x9F, 0xD1, 0x0D, 0x90, 0x1B, 0x11, 0x3E, 0x99, 0x07, 0x10, 0xF0, 0xD2, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0xB6, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0xCC, 0x22, 0xD6, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x5C, 0x6B, 0x25, 0xE4, 0x9C, 0x0D, 0x63, 0x64, 0xA4, 0xE5, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x39, 0x3A, 0xA2, 0x16, 0x68, 0xD9, 0x53, /* x */ 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0xE1, 0x49, 0x78, 0x42, 0xF2, 0xDE, 0x77, 0x69, 0xCF, 0xE9, 0xC9, 0x89, 0xC0, 0x72, 0xAD, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x48, 0x03, 0x4A, /* y */ 0x65, 0x74, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0x69, 0xb6, 0xec, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xb8, 0x2a, 0x08, 0x3d, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x84, 0x7d, 0xe9, 0x70, 0xb2, 0xde, 0x15, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0xB1, 0xA7, 0x24, 0xDC, 0x80, 0x41, 0x86, 0x48, 0xD8, 0xDD, 0x31 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V3 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xC4, 0x69, 0x68, 0x44, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xB3, 0x78, 0xC4, 0xB6, 0x5C, 0xA9, 0x59, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x57, 0x63, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x2E, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x22, 0x12, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5A, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xA7, 0x42, 0x3D, 0xAE, 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x47, 0x60, 0xA7, 0xD4, 0x62, 0x25, 0x6B, 0xD5, 0x69, 0x16, /* x */ 0x7D, 0x29, 0x77, 0x81, 0x00, 0xC6, 0x5A, 0x1D, 0xA1, 0x78, 0x37, 0x16, 0x58, 0x8D, 0xCE, 0x2B, 0x8B, 0x4A, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0x22, 0x8F, 0x18, 0x96, /* y */ 0x38, 0xa9, 0x0f, 0x22, 0x63, 0x73, 0x37, 0x33, 0x4b, 0x49, 0xdc, 0xb6, 0x6a, 0x6d, 0xc8, 0xf9, 0x97, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x76, 0x48, 0xa9, 0x43, 0xb0, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x31, 0xC8, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x40, 0xEC, 0x13 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xE4, 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x60, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0x75, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x80, 0x60, 0xF8, 0x32, 0x1B, 0x7D, /* p */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x6B, 0x01, 0x6C, 0x3B, 0xDC, 0xF1, 0x89, 0x41, 0xD0, 0xD6, 0x54, 0x92, 0x14, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xDB, 0x2F, 0xB2, 0x7D, 0x1D, 0x37, 0x79, 0x61, 0x85, 0xC2, 0x94, 0x2C, 0x0A, /* x */ 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0xA8, 0x81, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x64, 0x2B, 0xED, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xC3, 0xD3, 0x58, 0x57, 0x3D, 0x3F, 0x27, 0xFB, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xB9, 0xAA, 0xAF, /* y */ 0x7d, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x6e, 0x40, 0x54, 0xca, 0x53, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x46, 0x54, 0xb3, 0x68, 0x18, 0xce, 0x22, 0x6b, 0x39, 0xfc, 0xcb, 0x7b, 0x02, 0xf1, 0xae, /* order */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x5E, 0x9A, 0x9F, 0x5D, 0x90, 0x71, 0xFB, 0xD1, 0x52, 0x26, 0x88, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x0B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xE8, 0xB4, 0x01, 0x16, 0x04, 0x09, 0x53, 0x03, 0xCA, 0x3B, 0x80, 0x99, 0x98, 0x2B, 0xE0, 0x9F, 0xCB, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0x16, /* p */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x61, 0x7F, 0xAB, 0x68, 0x32, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0xFE, 0xD5, 0x0D, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xEE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x4B, 0xA0, 0x03, 0x8C, 0x7A, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x83, 0x2F, 0x2C, /* x */ 0x38, 0xAF, 0x09, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x27, 0x70, 0x51, 0x20, 0xC9, 0x21, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x26, 0x29, 0x6A, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x57, 0x57, 0xA0, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x30, 0xE7, /* y */ 0x5b, 0x01, 0x25, 0xe4, 0xdb, 0xea, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0x20, 0x6d, 0xa0, 0xfc, 0x01, 0xd9, 0xb0, 0x81, 0x32, 0x9f, 0xb5, 0x55, 0xde, 0x6e, 0xf4, 0x60, 0x23, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x8b, 0xe4, 0xba, /* order */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0xCF, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x59, 0x43, 0x77, 0xD4, 0x14, 0xC0, 0x38, 0x21, 0xBC, 0x58, 0x20, 0x63 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V3 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x7D, 0x73, 0x74, 0x16, 0x8F, 0xFE, 0x34, 0x71, 0xB6, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x76, 0x86, 0xA1, 0x94, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0xFF, /* p */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x25, 0x57, 0x05, 0xFA, 0x2A, 0x30, 0x66, 0x54, 0xB1, 0xF4, 0xCB, 0x03, 0xD6, 0xA7, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x01, 0x02, 0xD4, 0x98, 0x87, 0x17, 0xD9, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x3E, /* x */ 0x67, 0x68, 0xAE, 0x8E, 0x18, 0xBB, 0x92, 0xCF, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x5C, 0x94, 0x9A, 0xA2, 0xC6, 0xD9, 0x48, 0x53, 0xD0, 0xE6, 0x60, 0xBB, 0xF8, 0x54, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x50, 0x5F, 0xE9, 0x5A, /* y */ 0x16, 0x07, 0xe6, 0x89, 0x8f, 0x39, 0x0c, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x2b, 0xad, 0x22, 0x6f, 0x3b, 0x6f, 0xcf, 0xe4, 0x8b, 0x6e, 0x81, 0x84, 0x99, 0xaf, 0x18, 0xe3, 0xed, 0x6c, 0xf3, /* order */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x97, 0x5D, 0xEB, 0x41, 0xB3, 0xA6, 0x05, 0x7C, 0x3C, 0x43, 0x21, 0x46, 0x52, 0x65, 0x51 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 32, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xC4, 0x9D, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xE7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x78, 0xE1, 0x13, 0x9D, 0x26, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x9F, 0x7E, 0x90, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B, /* x */ 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96, /* y */ 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51 } }; /* the secg prime curves (minus the nist and x9.62 prime curves) */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 14 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 14, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0xF5, 0x0B, 0x02, 0x8E, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x29, 0x04, 0x72, 0x78, 0x3F, 0xB1, /* p */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x8B, /* a */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x88, /* b */ 0x65, 0x9E, 0xF8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x39, 0x16, 0xEE, 0xDE, 0x89, 0x11, 0x70, 0x2B, 0x22, /* x */ 0x09, 0x48, 0x72, 0x39, 0x99, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x6B, 0x55, 0xF9, 0xC2, 0xF0, 0x98, /* y */ 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xaf, 0x87, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x3e, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xf7, 0x75, 0x00, /* order */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x76, 0x28, 0xDF, 0xAC, 0x65, 0x61, 0xC5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 14 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_112R2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 14, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0x27, 0x57, 0xA1, 0x11, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x53, 0x16, 0xC0, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xD4, /* p */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x8B, /* a */ 0x61, 0x27, 0xC2, 0x4C, 0x05, 0xF3, 0x8A, 0x0A, 0xAA, 0xF6, 0x5C, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x2C, /* b */ 0x51, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0x81, 0x5D, 0xB5, 0xED, 0x74, 0xFC, 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x85, 0xD7, 0x09, /* x */ 0x4B, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0xB5, 0xE8, 0x92, 0xB4, 0xE1, 0x64, 0x9D, 0xD0, 0x92, 0x86, 0x43, /* y */ 0xad, 0xcd, 0x46, 0xf5, 0x88, 0x2e, 0x37, 0x47, 0xde, 0xf3, 0x6e, 0x95, 0x6e, 0x97, /* order */ 0x36, 0xDF, 0x0A, 0xAF, 0xD8, 0xB8, 0xD7, 0x59, 0x7C, 0xA1, 0x05, 0x20, 0xD0, 0x4B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 16 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_128R1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 16, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0x0E, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0x3A, 0x44, 0x73, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x79, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0xE8, 0x75, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x79, 0xF4, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x24, 0x99, 0x3C, 0x2C, 0xEE, 0x5E, 0xD3, /* x */ 0x16, 0x1F, 0xF7, 0x52, 0x8B, 0x89, 0x9B, 0x2D, 0x0C, 0x28, 0x60, 0x7C, 0xA5, 0x2C, 0x5B, 0x86, /* y */ 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xc8, 0x39, 0x5b, 0xaf, 0xeb, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x2d, 0xa2, 0x92, 0xdd, 0xed, 0x7a, 0x83, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x1B, 0x90, 0x38, 0xA1, 0x15 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 16 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_128R2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 16, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x12, 0xD8, 0xF0, 0x34, 0x31, 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x88, 0xF4, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xD6, 0x03, 0x19, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0x59, 0xCC, 0x9B, 0xBF, 0xF9, 0xAE, 0xE1, /* b */ 0x5E, 0xEE, 0xFC, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x29, 0x19, 0xDC, 0x2C, 0x65, 0x58, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x8A, 0x5D, /* x */ 0x7B, 0x6A, 0xA5, 0xD8, 0x5E, 0x57, 0x29, 0x83, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x32, 0xA7, 0xCD, 0xEB, 0xC1, 0x40, /* y */ 0x27, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x6a, 0x89, 0x4d, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x71, 0x06, 0xfe, 0x80, 0x5f, 0xc3, 0x4b, 0x44, /* order */ 0x3F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBE, 0x00, 0x24, 0x72, 0x06, 0x13, 0xB5, 0xA3 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_160K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 21, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x73, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* x */ 0x00, 0x3B, 0x4C, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xE3, 0x7A, 0xA1, 0x92, 0xA4, 0x01, 0x9E, 0x76, 0x30, 0x36, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xDD, 0x4D, 0x7E, 0xBB, /* y */ 0x00, 0x93, 0x8c, 0xf9, 0x35, 0x31, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xed, 0x6b, 0xc2, 0x82, 0x86, 0x53, 0x17, 0x33, 0xc3, 0xf0, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0xee, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB8, 0xFA, 0x16, 0xDF, 0xAB, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0x16, 0xB6, 0xB3 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_160R1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 21, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0x53, 0xCD, 0xE4, 0x2C, 0x14, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x53, 0x3B, 0xF3, 0xF8, 0x33, 0x45, /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x00, 0x1C, 0x97, 0xBE, 0xFC, 0x54, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x8B, 0x65, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x9F, 0x81, 0xD4, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0xC5, 0x65, 0xFA, 0x45, /* x */ 0x00, 0x4A, 0x96, 0xB5, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xF5, 0x73, 0x28, 0x46, 0x64, 0x69, 0x89, 0x68, 0xC3, 0x8B, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xCB, 0xFC, 0x82, /* y */ 0x00, 0x23, 0xa6, 0x28, 0x55, 0x31, 0x68, 0x94, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xc9, 0x12, 0x04, 0x23, 0x51, 0x37, 0x7a, 0xc5, 0xfb, 0x32, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xF4, 0xC8, 0xF9, 0x27, 0xAE, 0xD3, 0xCA, 0x75, 0x22, 0x57 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 21, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x99, 0xB0, 0x99, 0xB3, 0x23, 0xE0, 0x27, 0x09, 0xA4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x51, /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x73, /* a */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x70, /* b */ 0x00, 0xB4, 0xE1, 0x34, 0xD3, 0xFB, 0x59, 0xEB, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x57, 0x27, 0x49, 0x04, 0x66, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xF5, 0x03, 0x88, 0xBA, /* x */ 0x00, 0x52, 0xDC, 0xB0, 0x34, 0x29, 0x3A, 0x11, 0x7E, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x1B, 0x30, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x6D, /* y */ 0x00, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xfe, 0xf2, 0xe3, 0x31, 0xf2, 0x96, 0xe0, 0x71, 0xfa, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x98, 0x2c, 0xfe, 0xa7, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x2e, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x35, 0x1E, 0xE7, 0x86, 0xA8, 0x18, 0xF3, 0xA1, 0xA1, 0x6B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_192K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEE, 0x37, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, /* x */ 0xDB, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0x57, 0xE9, 0xAE, 0x26, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x02, 0x80, 0xB7, 0xF4, 0x34, 0x1D, 0xA5, 0xD1, 0xB1, 0xEA, 0xE0, 0x6C, 0x7D, /* y */ 0x9b, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x6d, 0x9c, 0x56, 0x28, 0xa7, 0x84, 0x41, 0x63, 0xd0, 0x15, 0xbe, 0x86, 0x34, 0x40, 0x82, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xd9, 0x5e, 0x2f, 0x9d, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x26, 0xF2, 0xFC, 0x17, 0x0F, 0x69, 0x46, 0x6A, 0x74, 0xDE, 0xFD, 0x8D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 29 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_224K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 29, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE5, 0x6D, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, /* x */ 0x00, 0xA1, 0x45, 0x5B, 0x33, 0x4D, 0xF0, 0x99, 0xDF, 0x30, 0xFC, 0x28, 0xA1, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x75, 0xA9, 0x0F, 0x7E, 0x65, 0x0E, 0xB6, 0xB7, 0xA4, 0x5C, /* y */ 0x00, 0x7e, 0x08, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x7f, 0xba, 0x34, 0x42, 0x82, 0xca, 0xfb, 0xd6, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x19, 0xf7, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xbd, 0x59, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x4b, 0xdb, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x61, 0xa5, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xDC, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0x61, 0x84, 0xCA, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x71, 0x76, 0x9F, 0xB1, 0xF7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* x */ 0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95, 0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98, /* y */ 0x48, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x77, 0x26, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x08, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x17, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19, 0x9c, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x8f, 0xfb, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xb8, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B, 0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 } }; /* some wap/wtls curves */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_8 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 15, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xE7, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xEC, 0xEA, 0x55, 0x1A, 0xD8, 0x37, 0xE9 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_9 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 21, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x80, 0x8F, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xCD, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0xE0, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x57, 0x4A, 0xBF, 0x33 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_12 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, /* b */ 0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56, 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43, 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4, /* x */ 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9, 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6, 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21, /* y */ 0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99, 0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D } }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* characteristic two curves */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 15, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0xE7, 0x23, 0xAB, 0x14, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0x49, 0xA9, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x30, 0x88, 0x25, 0x0C, 0xA6, 0xE7, 0xC7, 0xFE, 0x64, 0x9C, 0xE8, 0x58, 0x20, 0xF7, /* b */ 0x00, 0xE8, 0xBE, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0xE2, 0x26, 0x07, 0x44, 0x18, 0x8B, 0xE0, 0xE9, 0xC7, 0x23, /* x */ 0x00, 0x9D, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6F, 0x35, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0x14, 0x07, 0xD7, 0x35, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x0F, /* y */ 0x00, 0xA5, 0x28, 0x30, 0x27, 0x79, 0x58, 0xEE, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x18, 0x86, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0xEC, 0x8A, 0x39, 0xE5, 0x6F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 15, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x15, 0x76, 0x08, 0x60, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x5D, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x68, 0x99, 0x18, 0xDB, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0xD6, 0xDF, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x55, 0xC7, /* b */ 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xA9, 0xEC, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x7B, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x59, 0x18, 0x4F, /* x */ 0x01, 0xA5, 0x7A, 0x6A, 0x7B, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x5E, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0xCD, 0xB8, 0x16, 0x47, 0x97, /* y */ 0x00, 0xB3, 0xAD, 0xC9, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x4C, 0x06, 0xE6, 0x95, 0xBA, 0xBA, 0x1D, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x08, 0x78, 0x9B, 0x24, 0x96, 0xAF, 0x93 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 17 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 17, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x98, 0x5B, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0xBA, 0xDA, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x97, 0xE2, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0D, /* a */ 0x07, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x09, 0xA7, 0x6B, 0x56, 0x21, 0x44, 0x41, 0x8F, 0xF3, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x25, 0x70, 0xB8, /* b */ 0x02, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x56, 0x10, 0x88, 0x4B, 0x63, 0xB9, 0xC6, 0xC7, 0x29, 0x16, 0x78, 0xF9, 0xD3, 0x41, /* x */ 0x00, 0x81, 0xBA, 0xF9, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x98, 0x33, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x9C, 0x18, 0x13, 0x43, 0x63, 0x83, 0x99, /* y */ 0x07, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0x8C, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x73, 0xC8, 0x13, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x4E, 0xF9, 0xE1, 0x50, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x31, 0x23, 0x95, 0x3A, 0x94, 0x64, 0xB5, 0x4D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 17 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 17, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x98, 0x5B, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0xBA, 0xD4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x5A, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x97, 0xE3, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0D, /* a */ 0x03, 0xE5, 0xA8, 0x89, 0x19, 0xD7, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0xBF, 0x41, 0x5F, 0x07, 0xC2, 0x17, 0x65, 0x73, 0xB2, /* b */ 0x04, 0xB8, 0x26, 0x6A, 0x46, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x57, 0xAC, 0x73, 0x4C, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x01, 0x8F, 0x21, 0x92, /* x */ 0x03, 0x56, 0xDC, 0xD8, 0xF2, 0xF9, 0x50, 0x31, 0xAD, 0x65, 0x2D, 0x23, 0x95, 0x1B, 0xB3, 0x66, 0xA8, /* y */ 0x06, 0x48, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x86, 0x79, 0x40, 0xA5, 0x36, 0x6D, 0x9E, 0x26, 0x5D, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0x24, 0x0F, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x69, 0x54, 0xA2, 0x33, 0x04, 0x9B, 0xA9, 0x8F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x02, 0xFE, 0x13, 0xC0, 0x53, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0x11, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x07, 0xD7, 0x93, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0x6D, 0x5E, 0x5C, 0x94, 0xEE, 0xE8, /* y */ 0x02, 0x89, 0x07, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xFF, 0x58, 0x32, 0x1F, 0x2E, 0x80, 0x05, 0x36, 0xD5, 0x38, 0xCC, 0xDA, 0xA3, 0xD9, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xCC, 0x0D, 0x99, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0xEF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_163R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2 }, { /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9, /* a */ 0x07, 0xB6, 0x88, 0x2C, 0xAA, 0xEF, 0xA8, 0x4F, 0x95, 0x54, 0xFF, 0x84, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x88, 0xE2, 0x46, 0xD2, 0x78, 0x2A, 0xE2, /* b */ 0x07, 0x13, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xCD, 0xDC, 0xB4, 0x0A, 0xAB, 0x94, 0x6B, 0xDA, 0x29, 0xCA, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x3A, 0xF9, 0x58, 0xAF, 0xD9, /* x */ 0x03, 0x69, 0x97, 0x96, 0x97, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x89, 0x77, 0x89, 0x56, 0x67, 0x89, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x78, 0x76, 0xA6, 0x54, /* y */ 0x00, 0x43, 0x5E, 0xDB, 0x42, 0xEF, 0xAF, 0xB2, 0x98, 0x9D, 0x51, 0xFE, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0xC8, 0x09, 0x88, 0xF4, 0x1F, 0xF8, 0x83, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x48, 0xAA, 0xB6, 0x89, 0xC2, 0x9C, 0xA7, 0x10, 0x27, 0x9B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_163B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2 }, { /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x02, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x19, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0x53, 0xCA, 0x14, 0x81, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x51, 0x2F, 0x78, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x32, 0x05, 0xFD, /* x */ 0x03, 0xF0, 0xEB, 0xA1, 0x62, 0x86, 0xA2, 0xD5, 0x7E, 0xA0, 0x99, 0x11, 0x68, 0xD4, 0x99, 0x46, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x34, 0x3E, 0x36, /* y */ 0x00, 0xD5, 0x1F, 0xBC, 0x6C, 0x71, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x4F, 0xA2, 0xCD, 0xD5, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x1C, 0x5C, 0x0C, 0x79, 0x73, 0x24, 0xF1, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x92, 0xFE, 0x77, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x12, 0xA4, 0x23, 0x4C, 0x33 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 25 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 25, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0x3F, 0xAE, 0xC7, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x77, 0x7F, 0xC5, 0xB1, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x30, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x17, 0x85, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x7A, 0x98, 0x97, 0x51, 0x69, 0xE1, 0x71, 0xF7, 0x7B, 0x40, 0x87, 0xDE, 0x09, 0x8A, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0x11, 0xDF, 0x7B, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x49, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0xC3, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0xAC, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x7A, 0x1E, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x7C, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x47, 0x88, 0x14, /* x */ 0x01, 0xF4, 0x81, 0xBC, 0x5F, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x4A, 0x74, 0xAD, 0x6C, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0xF4, 0xBF, 0x61, 0x79, 0x62, 0x53, 0x72, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xC5, 0xE1, /* y */ 0x00, 0x25, 0xE3, 0x99, 0xF2, 0x90, 0x37, 0x12, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0xEA, 0x9E, 0x3A, 0x1A, 0xD1, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x1B, 0x05, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x77, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xBA, 0x49 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 25 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 25, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0xB7, 0xB4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x51, 0x37, 0xC8, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0xD0, 0xDA, 0x22, 0x11, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, /* a */ 0x01, 0x63, 0xF3, 0x5A, 0x51, 0x37, 0xC2, 0xCE, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xED, 0x86, 0x67, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x0B, 0xC4, 0x3E, 0xCD, 0x69, 0x97, 0x77, 0x02, 0x70, 0x9B, /* b */ 0x00, 0xC9, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0x89, 0x27, 0xD4, 0xD6, 0x4C, 0x37, 0x7E, 0x2A, 0xB2, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xE3, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x16, 0xAE, /* x */ 0x00, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0x7D, 0x19, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x67, 0xC8, 0x03, 0xF3, 0x9E, 0x1A, 0x7E, 0x82, 0xCA, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x51, 0x35, 0x0A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x7E, 0x8F, /* y */ 0x01, 0xCE, 0x94, 0x33, 0x56, 0x07, 0xC3, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x29, 0xE7, 0xDE, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x01, 0xF5, 0x96, 0xF9, 0x27, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xDE, 0xCF, 0x6C, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x5A, 0xAB, 0x56, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x54, 0x13, 0xCC, 0xD4, 0xEE, 0x99, 0xD5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 30, 4 }, { /* no seed */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x01, 0x72, 0x32, 0xBA, 0x85, 0x3A, 0x7E, 0x73, 0x1A, 0xF1, 0x29, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0xF4, 0x14, 0x95, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x19, 0xC2, 0x6B, 0xF5, 0x0A, 0x4C, 0x9D, 0x6E, 0xEF, 0xAD, 0x61, 0x26, /* y */ 0x01, 0xDB, 0x53, 0x7D, 0xEC, 0xE8, 0x19, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x0F, 0x55, 0x5A, 0x67, 0xC4, 0x27, 0xA8, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0xF1, 0x8A, 0xEB, 0x9B, 0x56, 0xE0, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x56, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xA3, /* order */ 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x9D, 0x5B, 0xB9, 0x15, 0xBC, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0xFB, 0x1A, 0xD5, 0xF1, 0x73, 0xAB, 0xDF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x74, 0xD5, 0x9F, 0xF0, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0x41, 0x3D, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0x4B, 0x34, 0x4B, 0x20, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0x9B, 0x50, 0xC3, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x66, 0x64, 0x7E, 0xDE, 0x6C, 0x33, 0x2C, 0x7F, 0x8C, 0x09, 0x23, 0xBB, 0x58, 0x21, 0x3B, 0x33, 0x3B, 0x20, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x11, 0x5F, 0x7D, 0x8F, 0x90, 0xAD, /* x */ 0x00, 0xFA, 0xC9, 0xDF, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x39, 0xF1, 0xBB, 0x75, 0x5F, 0xEF, 0x65, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x1F, 0x8B, 0x36, 0xF8, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x73, 0x71, 0xFD, 0x55, 0x8B, /* y */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x6A, 0x08, 0xA4, 0x19, 0x03, 0x35, 0x06, 0x78, 0xE5, 0x85, 0x28, 0xBE, 0xBF, 0x8A, 0x0B, 0xEF, 0xF8, 0x67, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x36, 0x71, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x01, 0xF8, 0x10, 0x52, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x13, 0xE9, 0x74, 0xE7, 0x2F, 0x8A, 0x69, 0x22, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x03, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_239K1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 30, 4 }, { /* no seed */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x29, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0xA8, 0x87, 0xA9, 0x83, 0xE9, 0x73, 0x09, 0x88, 0xA6, 0x87, 0x27, 0xA8, 0xB2, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x4C, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0x7B, 0x2A, 0x65, 0x55, 0x19, 0x30, 0x35, 0xDC, /* y */ 0x76, 0x31, 0x08, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x54, 0x9B, 0xDB, 0x01, 0x1C, 0x10, 0x30, 0x89, 0xE7, 0x35, 0x10, 0xAC, 0xB2, 0x75, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0xC6, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x53, 0xF0, 0xCA, /* order */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x5A, 0x79, 0xFE, 0xC6, 0x7C, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0x1F, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x78, 0xA5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 36 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_283K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 36, 4 }, { /* no seed */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x05, 0x03, 0x21, 0x3F, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x44, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x81, 0x62, 0xF1, 0x88, 0xE5, 0x53, 0xCD, 0x26, 0x5F, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x56, 0x7A, 0x16, 0x87, 0x69, 0x13, 0xB0, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0x24, 0x58, 0x49, 0x28, 0x36, /* y */ 0x01, 0xCC, 0xDA, 0x38, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x9E, 0x31, 0x8D, 0x90, 0xF9, 0x5D, 0x07, 0xE5, 0x42, 0x6F, 0xE8, 0x7E, 0x45, 0xC0, 0xE8, 0x18, 0x46, 0x98, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x62, 0x36, 0x4E, 0x34, 0x11, 0x61, 0x77, 0xDD, 0x22, 0x59, /* order */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE9, 0xAE, 0x2E, 0xD0, 0x75, 0x77, 0x26, 0x5D, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x94, 0x45, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x1E, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x61 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 36 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_283B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 36, 2 }, { /* no seed */ 0x77, 0xE2, 0xB0, 0x73, 0x70, 0xEB, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0xD5, 0xB6, 0x2D, 0xFC, 0x88, 0xCD, 0x06, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xBE, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x02, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x0A, 0xC8, 0xB8, 0x59, 0x6D, 0xA5, 0xA4, 0xAF, 0x8A, 0x19, 0xA0, 0x30, 0x3F, 0xCA, 0x97, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x45, 0x30, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xA5, 0x81, 0x48, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x26, 0x3E, 0x31, 0x3B, 0x79, 0xA2, 0xF5, /* x */ 0x05, 0xF9, 0x39, 0x25, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0x90, 0xE1, 0x93, 0x4F, 0x8C, 0x70, 0xB0, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2E, 0xED, 0x25, 0xB8, 0x55, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x9C, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xE1, 0x98, 0xF8, 0xCD, 0xBE, 0xCD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0x20, 0x53, /* y */ 0x03, 0x67, 0x68, 0x54, 0xFE, 0x24, 0x14, 0x1C, 0xB9, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x02, 0xB4, 0x51, 0x6F, 0xF7, 0x02, 0x35, 0x0E, 0xDD, 0xB0, 0x82, 0x67, 0x79, 0xC8, 0x13, 0xF0, 0xDF, 0x45, 0xBE, 0x81, 0x12, 0xF4, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEF, 0x90, 0x39, 0x96, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x93, 0x8A, 0x90, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x7C, 0xEF, 0xAD, 0xB3, 0x07 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 52 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_409K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 52, 4 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x00, 0x60, 0xF0, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x8F, 0x49, 0xC1, 0xAD, 0x3A, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x0F, 0x71, 0x84, 0x21, 0x0E, 0xFD, 0x09, 0x87, 0xE3, 0x07, 0xC8, 0x4C, 0x27, 0xAC, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0xF9, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x60, 0x18, 0x9E, 0xB5, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0x62, 0xEE, 0x22, 0x2E, 0xB1, 0xB3, 0x55, 0x40, 0xCF, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x37, 0x46, /* y */ 0x01, 0xE3, 0x69, 0x05, 0x0B, 0x7C, 0x4E, 0x42, 0xAC, 0xBA, 0x1D, 0xAC, 0xBF, 0x04, 0x29, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x60, 0x78, 0x2F, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xA4, 0x27, 0xE6, 0x32, 0x51, 0x65, 0xE9, 0xEA, 0x10, 0xE3, 0xDA, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0x52, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x58, 0x63, 0xEC, 0x48, 0xD8, 0xE0, 0x28, 0x6B, /* order */ 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x83, 0xB2, 0xD4, 0xEA, 0x20, 0x40, 0x0E, 0xC4, 0x55, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0xE7, 0xCA, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x5C, 0x83, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0xCF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 52 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_409B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 52, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x40, 0x99, 0xB5, 0xA4, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x21, 0x3D, 0x09, 0x4C, 0x4B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x42, 0x62, 0x21, 0x0B, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x21, 0xA5, 0xC2, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0xEB, 0x5C, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x75, 0x3B, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xD6, 0x42, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xF3, 0xDD, 0x67, 0x47, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x99, 0xD6, 0xAC, 0x27, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA1, 0x97, 0xB2, 0x72, 0x82, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x55, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0x50, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x13, 0x54, 0x5F, /* x */ 0x01, 0x5D, 0x48, 0x60, 0xD0, 0x88, 0xDD, 0xB3, 0x49, 0x6B, 0x0C, 0x60, 0x64, 0x75, 0x62, 0x60, 0x44, 0x1C, 0xDE, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0x77, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0xB0, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x5B, 0x34, 0xE5, 0x97, 0x03, 0xDC, 0x25, 0x5A, 0x86, 0x8A, 0x11, 0x80, 0x51, 0x56, 0x03, 0xAE, 0xAB, 0x60, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x79, 0x96, 0xA7, /* y */ 0x00, 0x61, 0xB1, 0xCF, 0xAB, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0xBF, 0xA7, 0x83, 0x24, 0xED, 0x10, 0x6A, 0x76, 0x36, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x8D, 0x01, 0x58, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0x54, 0x88, 0xD0, 0x8F, 0x38, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4F, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x36, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x64, 0xBA, 0x02, 0x73, 0xC7, 0x06, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xE2, 0xAA, 0xD6, 0xA6, 0x12, 0xF3, 0x33, 0x07, 0xBE, 0x5F, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0x3C, 0x9E, 0x05, 0x2F, 0x83, 0x81, 0x64, 0xCD, 0x37, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x73 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 72 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_571K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 72, 4 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x25, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x02, 0x6E, 0xB7, 0xA8, 0x59, 0x92, 0x3F, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x18, 0x96, 0x31, 0xF8, 0x10, 0x3F, 0xE4, 0xAC, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x97, 0x00, 0x12, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0x60, 0x24, 0x80, 0x48, 0x01, 0x84, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0x43, 0x70, 0x95, 0x84, 0x93, 0xB2, 0x05, 0xE6, 0x47, 0xDA, 0x30, 0x4D, 0xB4, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x8C, 0xBB, 0xD1, 0xBA, 0x39, 0x49, 0x47, 0x76, 0xFB, 0x98, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x17, 0x4D, 0xCA, 0x88, 0xC7, 0xE2, 0x94, 0x52, 0x83, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x89, 0x72, /* y */ 0x03, 0x49, 0xDC, 0x80, 0x7F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0xDE, 0x3B, 0xCA, 0x95, 0x31, 0x4D, 0xD5, 0x8C, 0xEC, 0x9F, 0x30, 0x7A, 0x54, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x00, 0x6D, 0x8A, 0x2C, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x79, 0xC0, 0xAC, 0x44, 0xAE, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0xBE, 0xBB, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x72, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xB6, 0x20, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA7, 0xAF, 0x1B, 0x32, 0x04, 0x30, 0xC8, 0x59, 0x19, 0x84, 0xF6, 0x01, 0xCD, 0x4C, 0x14, 0x3E, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0xA3, /* order */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x13, 0x18, 0x50, 0xE1, 0xF1, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xE4, 0xB3, 0x91, 0xA8, 0xDB, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x41, 0x38, 0xB6, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0xD6, 0x39, 0x38, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0x5C, 0xFE, 0x77, 0x8F, 0x63, 0x7C, 0x10, 0x01 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 72 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_571B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 72, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x2A, 0xA0, 0x58, 0xF7, 0x3A, 0x0E, 0x33, 0xAB, 0x48, 0x6B, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x04, 0x10, 0xC5, 0x3A, 0x7F, 0x13, 0x23, 0x10, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x25, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x02, 0xF4, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x22, 0x21, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xDE, 0x29, 0x71, 0x17, 0xB7, 0xF3, 0xD6, 0x2F, 0x5C, 0x6A, 0x97, 0xFF, 0xCB, 0x8C, 0xEF, 0xF1, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0xA8, 0xCE, 0x4A, 0x9A, 0x18, 0xAD, 0x84, 0xFF, 0xAB, 0xBD, 0x8E, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x33, 0x2B, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x6E, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xFD, 0x18, 0x5A, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x12, 0xAA, 0x52, 0x0E, 0x4D, 0xE7, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x7F, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x29, 0x55, 0x72, 0x7A, /* x */ 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x34, 0xB8, 0x56, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x16, 0xC0, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x3C, 0xD7, 0x75, 0x0A, 0x93, 0xD1, 0xD2, 0x95, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x0A, 0xA5, 0xF4, 0x0F, 0xC8, 0xDB, 0x7B, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x39, 0x50, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0xD2, 0x93, 0xCD, 0xD7, 0x11, 0xA3, 0x5B, 0x67, 0xFB, 0x14, 0x99, 0xAE, 0x60, 0x03, 0x86, 0x14, 0xF1, 0x39, 0x4A, 0xBF, 0xA3, 0xB4, 0xC8, 0x50, 0xD9, 0x27, 0xE1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0x9C, 0x8E, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x19, /* y */ 0x03, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x42, 0xDA, 0x63, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xCC, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xB7, 0x3D, 0x69, 0xD7, 0x8C, 0x6C, 0x27, 0xA6, 0x00, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCA, 0x19, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x53, 0x39, 0x21, 0xE8, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x43, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x62, 0x91, 0xAF, 0x8F, 0x46, 0x1B, 0xB2, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0x53, 0x1D, 0x2F, 0x04, 0x85, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x16, 0xE2, 0xF1, 0x51, 0x6E, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x48, 0x27, 0xAF, 0x1B, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x5B, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE6, 0x61, 0xCE, 0x18, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x98, 0x73, 0x08, 0x05, 0x9B, 0x18, 0x68, 0x23, 0x85, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x9C, 0xA1, 0x16, 0x1D, 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x51, 0x74, 0xD6, 0x6E, 0x83, 0x82, 0xE9, 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x4E, 0x47 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x15, 0x76, 0x08, 0x60, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x54, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07, /* a */ 0x07, 0x25, 0x46, 0xB5, 0x43, 0x52, 0x34, 0xA4, 0x22, 0xE0, 0x78, 0x96, 0x75, 0xF4, 0x32, 0xC8, 0x94, 0x35, 0xDE, 0x52, 0x42, /* b */ 0x00, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x7D, 0x06, 0xD5, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x3C, 0xFF, 0x38, 0xC7, 0x4B, 0x20, 0xB6, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0xD4, 0xD9, /* x */ 0x07, 0xAF, 0x69, 0x98, 0x95, 0x46, 0x10, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x32, 0x9F, 0xCC, 0x3D, 0x74, 0x88, 0x0F, 0x33, 0xBB, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xCB, /* y */ 0x01, 0xEC, 0x23, 0x21, 0x1B, 0x59, 0x66, 0xAD, 0xEA, 0x1D, 0x3F, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xEA, 0x58, 0x48, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0xB7, 0xCA, 0x9F, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0xC8, 0x82, 0x1C, 0xC7, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0xAF, 0xC1 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x53, 0x81, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x0D, 0x44, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0x0C, 0xA4, 0xE2, 0x9F, 0xFD, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07, /* a */ 0x01, 0x08, 0xB3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0x08, 0xBE, 0xD9, 0x81, 0xED, 0x0E, 0x89, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x1C, 0xF0, 0x72, /* b */ 0x06, 0x67, 0xAC, 0xEB, 0x38, 0xAF, 0x4E, 0x48, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x74, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x1C, 0x81, 0x16, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x20, /* x */ 0x00, 0x24, 0x26, 0x6E, 0x4E, 0xB5, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x0A, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x92, 0xC4, 0x86, 0x0E, 0x26, 0x71, 0xDB, 0x9B, 0x6C, 0xC5, /* y */ 0x07, 0x9F, 0x68, 0x4D, 0xDF, 0x66, 0x84, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x25, 0x8B, 0x38, 0x90, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x86, 0xDF, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0xC5, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xF6, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x15, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xA7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x50, 0xCB, 0xF1, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA9, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x36, 0xA3, 0xB8, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07, /* a */ 0x07, 0xA5, 0x26, 0xC6, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x25, 0xA2, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x07, 0x69, 0x9F, 0x54, 0x47, 0xE3, 0x2A, 0xE4, 0x56, 0xB5, 0x0E, /* b */ 0x03, 0xF7, 0x06, 0x17, 0x98, 0xEB, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x38, 0xFD, 0x6F, 0x1B, 0xF9, 0x5B, 0x48, 0xFE, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x25, 0x2B, /* x */ 0x02, 0xF9, 0xF8, 0x7B, 0x7C, 0x57, 0x4D, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0xCF, 0x8A, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x52, 0x47, 0x75, 0xF9, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xBD, 0xCB, /* y */ 0x05, 0xB9, 0x35, 0x59, 0x0C, 0x15, 0x5E, 0x17, 0xEA, 0x48, 0xEB, 0x3F, 0xF3, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x89, 0x3D, 0xF5, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xD0, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0x14, 0x0F, 0x11, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0x96, 0x13, 0x09 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 23 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_176V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 23, 0xFF6E }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0xE4, 0xE6, 0xDB, 0x29, 0x95, 0x06, 0x5C, 0x40, 0x7D, 0x9D, 0x39, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x96, 0x70, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xE9, 0xC9, 0x0B, /* b */ 0x00, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0x47, 0x0A, 0xBE, 0x64, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xC1, 0x33, 0xAE, 0x28, 0xE9, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0xFC, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xE0, 0xFF, 0xF2, /* x */ 0x00, 0x8D, 0x16, 0xC2, 0x86, 0x67, 0x98, 0xB6, 0x00, 0xF9, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0xB4, 0xA8, 0xE8, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x29, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x57, 0x98, /* y */ 0x00, 0x6F, 0xA4, 0x53, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0xD6, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0x16, 0x7D, 0x61, 0xB4, 0x36, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x2B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x56, 0x2C, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x92, 0x53, 0x73, 0x97, 0xEC, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x14, 0x57, 0x99, 0xD6, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x19, 0xCE, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x26, 0xAD } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x4E, 0x13, 0xCA, 0x54, 0x27, 0x44, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x55, 0x2F, 0x27, 0x9A, 0x8C, 0x84, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x28, 0x66, 0x53, 0x7B, 0x67, 0x67, 0x52, 0x63, 0x6A, 0x68, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x54, 0xE1, 0x26, 0x40, 0x27, 0x6B, 0x64, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0x52, 0x62, 0x67, /* b */ 0x2E, 0x45, 0xEF, 0x57, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x78, 0x6F, 0x67, 0xB0, 0x08, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x95, 0xA3, 0xD9, 0x54, 0x62, 0xF5, 0xDE, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x85, 0xEC, /* x */ 0x36, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0xA2, 0x32, 0x06, 0xF9, 0xC4, 0xF2, 0x99, 0xD7, 0xB2, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x36, 0x91, 0x37, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x4A, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x0D, /* y */ 0x76, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0x34, 0x33, 0xB3, 0xF9, 0x5E, 0x33, 0x29, 0x32, 0xE7, 0x0E, 0xA2, 0x45, 0xCA, 0x24, 0x18, 0xEA, 0x0E, 0xF9, 0x80, 0x18, 0xFB, /* order */ 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x0E, 0x90, 0xC3, 0x90, 0x67, 0xC8, 0x93, 0xBB, 0xB9, 0xA5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0x08, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0x24, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0xBE, 0xE0, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0x15, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x40, 0x10, 0x28, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x77, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x6D, 0x13, 0x66, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x20, 0x71, 0x27, 0x4F, 0x89, 0xFF, 0x01, 0xE7, 0x18, /* b */ 0x06, 0x20, 0x04, 0x8D, 0x28, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x03, 0xB6, 0x24, 0x9C, 0x99, 0x18, 0x2B, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xD1, 0x97, 0x00, 0xC3, 0x62, 0xC4, 0x6A, 0x01, /* x */ 0x38, 0x09, 0xB2, 0xB7, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x28, 0xCC, 0x5A, 0x87, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x83, 0xFD, 0x28, 0x78, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xE2, 0xC9, 0xE3, 0xBF, 0x10, /* y */ 0x17, 0x43, 0x43, 0x86, 0x62, 0x6D, 0x14, 0xF3, 0xDB, 0xF0, 0x17, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x21, 0x3A, 0x3E, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x66, 0x8A, /* order */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0x50, 0x8C, 0xB8, 0x9F, 0x65, 0x28, 0x24, 0xE0, 0x6B, 0x81, 0x73 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 6 }, { /* seed */ 0xE0, 0x53, 0x51, 0x2D, 0xC6, 0x84, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x50, 0x67, 0xAE, 0x78, 0x6D, 0x1F, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x6C, 0x01, 0x07, 0x47, 0x56, 0x09, 0x91, 0x22, 0x22, 0x10, 0x56, 0x91, 0x1C, 0x77, 0xD7, 0x7E, 0x77, 0xA7, 0x77, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0xCB, /* b */ 0x71, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0xF9, 0x26, 0xCF, 0x84, 0x79, 0x89, 0xEF, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0xB4, 0x59, 0xF6, 0x63, 0x94, 0xD9, 0x0F, 0x32, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x15, 0xE8, /* x */ 0x37, 0x5D, 0x4C, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x43, 0x44, 0x89, 0xDE, 0x87, 0x46, 0xE7, 0x17, 0x86, 0x01, 0x50, 0x09, 0xE6, 0x6E, 0x38, 0xA9, 0x26, 0xDD, /* y */ 0x54, 0x5A, 0x39, 0x17, 0x61, 0x96, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x98, 0x59, 0x99, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x6A, 0xD3, 0x4C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0x12, 0x7B, 0x06, 0xBE, /* order */ 0x15, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x61, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0x19, 0x68, 0x12, 0xBF, 0xB6, 0x28, 0x8A, 0x3E, 0xA3 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 27 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_208W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 27, 0xFE48 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0xC8, 0x61, 0x9E, 0xD4, 0x5A, 0x62, 0xE6, 0x21, 0x2E, 0x11, 0x60, 0x34, 0x9E, 0x2B, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x44, 0x39, 0xFA, 0xFC, 0x2A, 0x3F, 0xD1, 0x63, 0x8F, 0x9E, /* x */ 0x00, 0x89, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xE4, 0xAB, 0xE1, 0x93, 0xDF, 0x95, 0x59, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x7A, 0xC0, 0xCE, 0x78, 0x55, 0x4E, 0x27, 0x84, 0xEB, 0x8C, 0x1E, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x7A, /* y */ 0x00, 0x0F, 0x55, 0xB5, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xE7, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x5F, 0xF5, 0x20, 0xD8, 0xB0, 0x17, 0x81, 0xBE, 0xB1, 0xA6, 0xBB, 0x08, 0x61, 0x7D, 0xE3, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0xBA, 0xF9, 0x5C, 0x97, 0x23, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x6C, 0x21, 0xDA, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x2D, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x88, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x71, 0x7E, 0x21, 0x2F, 0x9D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0xD3, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x20, 0xBF, 0xEF, 0xB0, 0x5D, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x32, 0x01, 0x08, 0x57, 0x07, 0x7C, 0x54, 0x31, 0x12, 0x3A, 0x46, 0xB8, 0x08, 0x90, 0x67, 0x56, 0xF5, 0x43, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x8D, 0x27, 0x87, 0x75, 0x78, 0x12, 0x57, 0x78, 0xAC, 0x76, /* b */ 0x79, 0x04, 0x08, 0xF2, 0xEE, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0x92, 0xB0, 0x12, 0xED, 0xEF, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x2F, 0x30, 0xF4, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x0C, 0xA3, 0xF3, 0x1F, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xC4, 0x22, 0xAA, 0x8C, 0x16, /* x */ 0x57, 0x92, 0x70, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x93, 0x2E, 0x7C, 0x0A, 0x96, 0xD3, 0xFD, 0x5B, 0x70, 0x6E, 0xF7, 0xE5, 0xF5, 0xC1, 0x56, 0xE1, 0x6B, 0x7E, 0x7C, 0x86, 0x03, 0x85, 0x52, 0xE9, 0x1D, /* y */ 0x61, 0xD8, 0xEE, 0x50, 0x77, 0xC3, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0xF6, 0xF1, 0xA1, 0x6B, 0x26, 0x8D, 0xE4, 0x69, 0xC3, 0xC7, 0x74, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x71, 0x64, 0x9F, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0x61, 0x63, 0x05, /* order */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x42, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x49, 0x93, 0xF1, 0xCA, 0xD6, 0x66, 0xE4, 0x47 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 6 }, { /* seed */ 0x2A, 0xA6, 0x98, 0x2F, 0xDF, 0xA4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x5D, 0x26, 0x67, 0x27, 0x27, 0x7D, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x42, 0x30, 0x01, 0x77, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xE4, 0x23, 0x98, 0x56, 0x9B, 0x74, 0x63, 0x25, 0xD4, 0x53, 0x13, 0xAF, 0x07, 0x66, 0x26, 0x64, 0x79, 0xB7, 0x56, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x5F, /* b */ 0x50, 0x37, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x41, 0x96, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x82, 0xB2, 0xC1, 0x4A, 0x2F, 0xCF, 0x2E, 0x3F, 0xF8, 0x77, 0x52, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x45, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xEA, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x4B, /* x */ 0x28, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0x4E, 0x90, 0x00, 0x69, 0xC8, 0xDC, 0x47, 0xA0, 0x85, 0x34, 0xFE, 0x76, 0xD2, 0xB9, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xEF, 0x31, 0xF5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0x20, 0x0C, 0x4C, 0xA2, 0x05, /* y */ 0x56, 0x67, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xF3, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x2C, 0x71, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x62, 0x56, 0x7D, 0x54, 0x53, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0x6E, 0x22, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0x33, /* order */ 0x15, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x3C, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x85, 0x25, 0x9C, 0x31, 0xE3, 0xFC, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x46, 0x24, 0x52, 0x2D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 0xA }, { /* seed */ 0x9E, 0x07, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0xE1, 0x1E, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x41, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x01, 0x23, 0x87, 0x74, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x67, 0x76, 0x6D, 0x66, 0x76, 0xF7, 0x78, 0xE6, 0x76, 0xB6, 0x69, 0x99, 0x17, 0x66, 0x66, 0xE6, 0x87, 0x66, 0x6D, 0x87, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x6A, 0x9F, /* b */ 0x6A, 0x94, 0x19, 0x77, 0xBA, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x51, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x06, 0x7E, 0xD5, 0x87, 0xF5, 0x19, 0xC5, 0xEC, 0xB5, 0x41, 0xB8, 0xE4, 0x41, 0x11, 0xDE, 0x1D, 0x40, /* x */ 0x70, 0xF6, 0xE9, 0xD0, 0x4D, 0x28, 0x9C, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x91, 0x3C, 0xE3, 0x53, 0x0B, 0xFD, 0xE9, 0x03, 0x97, 0x7D, 0x42, 0xB1, 0x46, 0xD5, 0x39, 0xBF, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0x9C, 0x92, /* y */ 0x2E, 0x5A, 0x0E, 0xAF, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x13, 0x05, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x4D, 0xCE, 0x5C, 0x0E, 0xD7, 0xFE, 0x59, 0xA3, 0x56, 0x08, 0xF3, 0x38, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x16, 0xD8, 0x0B, 0x79, 0xF4, 0x61, /* order */ 0x0C, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0x49, 0x12, 0xD2, 0xD9, 0xDF, 0x90, 0x3E, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0xFF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 35 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_272W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 35, 0xFF06 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0B, /* a */ 0x00, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x91, 0xF0, 0x3B, 0x5F, 0xBA, 0x4A, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0xF4, 0x9C, 0x4E, 0xDD, 0x22, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x28, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x42, 0xBE, 0x75, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x40, 0x09, 0x4D, 0xBA, 0xCD, 0xB5, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x20, /* b */ 0x00, 0x71, 0x67, 0xEF, 0xC9, 0x2B, 0xB2, 0xE3, 0xCE, 0x7C, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xFF, 0x34, 0xE1, 0x2A, 0x9C, 0x55, 0x70, 0x03, 0xD7, 0xC7, 0x3A, 0x6F, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x3F, 0x99, 0xF6, 0xCC, 0x84, 0x82, 0xE5, 0x40, 0xF7, /* x */ 0x00, 0x61, 0x08, 0xBA, 0xBB, 0x2C, 0xEE, 0xBC, 0xF7, 0x87, 0x05, 0x8A, 0x05, 0x6C, 0xBE, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x62, 0x2D, 0x77, 0x23, 0xA2, 0x89, 0xE0, 0x8A, 0x07, 0xAE, 0x13, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0x10, 0xD1, 0x71, 0xDD, 0x8D, /* y */ 0x00, 0x10, 0xC7, 0x69, 0x57, 0x16, 0x85, 0x1E, 0xEF, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0xF6, 0x87, 0x2E, 0x61, 0x42, 0xFB, 0xD2, 0x41, 0xB8, 0x30, 0xFF, 0x5E, 0xFC, 0xAC, 0xEC, 0xCA, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xDE, 0x9D, 0x23, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x13, 0x54, 0xE0, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x48, 0x92, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x72, 0xC8, 0x16, 0x16, 0x03, 0xFA, 0x45, 0xAA, 0x7B, 0x99, 0x8A, 0x16, 0x7B, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0x62, 0x95, 0x21 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 39 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_304W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 39, 0xFE2E }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0xFD, 0x0D, 0x69, 0x31, 0x49, 0xA1, 0x18, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0x80, 0x20, 0x85, 0x37, 0x7E, 0x5F, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x1B, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x44, 0x16, 0x00, 0x74, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x80, 0x78, 0x36, 0x5A, 0x03, 0x96, 0xC8, 0xE6, 0x81, /* b */ 0x00, 0xBD, 0xDB, 0x97, 0xE5, 0x55, 0xA5, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x8E, 0x43, 0xB0, 0x1C, 0x79, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x4E, 0xFC, 0xF5, 0x71, 0x66, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0x40, 0x39, 0x60, 0x1E, 0x55, 0x82, 0x73, 0x40, 0xBE, /* x */ 0x00, 0x19, 0x7B, 0x07, 0x84, 0x5E, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0xD9, 0x6A, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0x3C, 0x7F, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x3E, 0xB8, 0xB6, 0xFE, 0xC3, 0x5C, 0x7F, 0xD6, 0x7F, 0x26, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x28, 0x5A, 0x64, 0x4F, 0x74, 0x0A, 0x26, 0x14, /* y */ 0x00, 0xE1, 0x9F, 0xBE, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x0D, 0xA1, 0x71, 0x51, 0x7E, 0xCF, 0x40, 0x1B, 0x50, 0x28, 0x9B, 0xF0, 0x14, 0x10, 0x32, 0x88, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x9B, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x10, 0x5E, 0x80, 0x26, 0x0B, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xDC, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xC0, 0x3B, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0xD5, 0x56, 0x57, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0xD5, 0x56, 0x57, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0x80, 0x01, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xDD, 0x17, 0x3F, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xDA, 0x68, 0x99, 0x16, 0x44, 0x43, 0x05, 0x1D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 45 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_359V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 45, 0x4C }, { /* seed */ 0x2B, 0x35, 0x49, 0x20, 0xB7, 0x24, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0x5B, 0xA1, 0x33, 0x2D, 0xC6, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x56, 0x67, 0x67, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x4B, 0x20, 0x75, 0x4F, 0x35, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0x20, 0x17, 0xD9, 0x46, 0x56, 0x7C, 0x46, 0x67, 0x55, 0x56, 0xF1, 0x95, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x46, 0x16, 0xB5, 0x67, 0xD2, 0x23, 0xA5, 0xE0, 0x56, 0x56, 0xFB, 0x54, 0x90, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x66, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x57, /* b */ 0x24, 0x72, 0xE2, 0xD0, 0x19, 0x7C, 0x49, 0x36, 0x3F, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0x07, 0x5D, 0x52, 0xB6, 0x94, 0x7D, 0x13, 0x5D, 0x8C, 0xA4, 0x45, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x39, 0xBC, 0x34, 0x56, 0x26, 0x08, 0x96, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2B, 0x63, 0x29, 0xE7, 0x06, 0x80, 0x23, 0x19, 0x88, /* x */ 0x3C, 0x25, 0x8E, 0xF3, 0x04, 0x77, 0x67, 0xE7, 0xED, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xFD, 0xAA, 0x79, 0xDA, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x41, 0x36, 0x6A, 0x13, 0x2E, 0x16, 0x3A, 0xCE, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x24, 0x01, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xDE, 0x98, 0xE8, 0xE7, 0x07, 0xC0, 0x7A, 0x22, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xB0, 0x97, /* y */ 0x53, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0x85, 0x29, 0x54, 0x70, 0x48, 0x12, 0x1E, 0x9C, 0x95, 0xF3, 0x79, 0x1D, 0xD8, 0x04, 0x96, 0x39, 0x48, 0xF3, 0x4F, 0xAE, 0x7B, 0xF4, 0x4E, 0xA8, 0x23, 0x65, 0xDC, 0x78, 0x68, 0xFE, 0x57, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xE2, 0x11, 0x30, 0x5A, 0x40, 0x71, 0x04, 0xBD, /* order */ 0x01, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0xF2, 0x86, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0xF2, 0x86, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xC9, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x6B, 0x85, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x89, 0x2C, 0x20, 0xA7, 0xEB, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xE7, 0x71, 0x9E, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x75, 0x8D, 0x3B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 47 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_368W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 47, 0xFF70 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0xE0, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x25, 0x09, 0x52, 0x06, 0xF5, 0xE2, 0xA4, 0xF9, 0xED, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x1F, 0x25, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xE2, 0xB4, 0x55, 0x97, 0x0D, 0x8D, 0x0D, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x47, 0x78, 0xC5, 0x76, 0xD6, 0x2F, 0x0A, 0xB7, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xCD, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x6A, 0xE3, 0x0D, /* b */ 0x00, 0xFC, 0x12, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x32, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x45, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x0A, 0x58, 0xED, 0xCD, 0x30, 0xC8, 0xDD, 0x06, 0x9B, 0x3C, 0x34, 0x45, 0x38, 0x37, 0xA3, 0x4E, 0xD5, 0x0C, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x17, 0xE1, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x2D, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x44, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x47, 0x86, 0x04, 0x6A, /* x */ 0x00, 0x10, 0x85, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x53, 0x81, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0xE3, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x7A, 0xFA, 0x10, 0xC2, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0xC2, 0x82, 0x56, 0x46, 0xC5, 0xB3, 0x4A, 0x39, 0x4C, 0xBC, 0xFA, 0x8B, 0xC1, 0x6B, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0x89, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xBE, 0x21, 0x6F, 0x02, 0xE1, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x6A, 0x5F, /* y */ 0x00, 0x7B, 0x3E, 0xB1, 0xBD, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x62, 0xD5, 0xD8, 0xB2, 0x05, 0x9B, 0x52, 0x57, 0x97, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x82, 0x2C, 0x59, 0x05, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x3A, 0x45, 0xFF, 0x38, 0x43, 0xCE, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x7C, 0xD1, 0x85, 0x5A, 0xDA, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x07, 0x50, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0x23, 0x10, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x90, 0x51, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xB0, 0x83, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x5D, 0xD4, 0xC7, 0xB0, 0x53, 0x2E, 0xCA, 0x51, 0xCE, 0x03, 0xE2, 0xD1, 0x0F, 0x3B, 0x7A, 0xC5, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x87, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xAE, 0x40, 0xA6, 0xF1, 0x31, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x67 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 54 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_431R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 54, 0x2760 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x1A, 0x82, 0x7E, 0xF0, 0x0D, 0xD6, 0xFC, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x4C, 0xAF, 0x04, 0x6C, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x85, 0x39, 0x5B, 0x23, 0x6C, 0xC4, 0xAD, 0x2C, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x0C, 0xAD, 0xBD, 0xC9, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x20, 0xB0, 0xEB, 0x99, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x95, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0xEA, 0xCD, 0x61, 0x54, 0x68, 0xDF, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xE2, 0x96, 0xCD, 0x8F, /* b */ 0x10, 0xD9, 0xB4, 0xA3, 0xD9, 0x04, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x15, 0x43, 0x59, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0x1B, 0x7F, 0x54, 0x85, 0xB0, 0x4C, 0xEB, 0x86, 0x82, 0x37, 0xDD, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0xDA, 0x98, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x91, 0x9B, 0x62, 0x6D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x10, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x62, 0x38, 0x1F, 0xB5, 0xD8, 0x07, 0xBF, 0x26, 0x18, /* x */ 0x12, 0x0F, 0xC0, 0x5D, 0x3C, 0x67, 0xA9, 0x9D, 0xE1, 0x61, 0xD2, 0xF4, 0x09, 0x26, 0x22, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x0F, 0x47, 0x58, 0x71, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0x87, 0xBB, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x58, 0xEF, 0x8C, 0x21, 0xE7, 0xC5, 0xEF, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x36, 0x1F, 0x6C, 0x29, 0x99, 0xC0, 0xC2, 0x47, 0xB0, 0xDB, 0xD7, 0x0C, 0xE6, 0xB7, /* y */ 0x20, 0xD0, 0xAF, 0x89, 0x03, 0xA9, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x5F, 0xA2, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x74, 0x5D, 0x3C, 0x45, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2C, 0x93, 0x46, 0xD9, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xE7, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x1F, 0x6B, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0xB0, 0xBC, 0x4C, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x7A, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x9B, 0x62, 0x5D, 0x6A, 0x59, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x60, /* order */ 0x00, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x13, 0xFA, 0xB5, 0x05, 0x89, 0x70, 0x3B, 0x5E, 0xC6, 0x8D, 0x35, 0x87, 0xFE, 0xC6, 0x0D, 0x16, 0x1C, 0xC1, 0x49, 0xC1, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x91 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 15, 2 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x01, 0x66, 0x79, 0x79, 0xA4, 0x0B, 0xA4, 0x97, 0xE5, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0x70, 0x78, 0x06, 0x17, /* y */ 0x00, 0xF4, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xEC, 0xC2, 0x63, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x78, 0x5C, 0xEB, 0xCC, 0x15, /* order */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xBF, 0x91, 0xAF, 0x6D, 0xEA, 0x73 } }; /* IPSec curves */ /* * NOTE: The of curves over a extension field of non prime degree is not * recommended (Weil-descent). As the group order is not a prime this curve * is not suitable for ECDSA. */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6]; } _EC_IPSEC_155_ID3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 20, 3 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x33, 0x8f, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7b, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xc8, /* order */ 0x02, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0xC7, 0x88, 0x1B, 0xD0, 0x86, 0x8F, 0xA8, 0x6C } }; /* * NOTE: The of curves over a extension field of non prime degree is not * recommended (Weil-descent). As the group order is not a prime this curve * is not suitable for ECDSA. */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_IPSEC_185_ID4 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 24, 2 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xe9, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0d, /* order */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xED, 0xF9, 0x7C, 0x44, 0xDB, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x20, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA7, 0x5E } }; #endif /* * These curves were added by Annie Yousar * For the definition of RFC 5639 curves see * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt These curves are generated verifiable * at random, nevertheless the seed is omitted as parameter because the * generation mechanism is different from those defined in ANSI X9.62. */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP160r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 20, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0F, /* a */ 0x34, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0xE2, 0xA2, 0x80, 0xEB, 0x74, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x61, 0xBA, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xE8, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x00, /* b */ 0x1E, 0x58, 0x9A, 0x85, 0x95, 0x42, 0x34, 0x12, 0x13, 0x4F, 0xAA, 0x2D, 0xBD, 0xEC, 0x95, 0xC8, 0xD8, 0x67, 0x5E, 0x58, /* x */ 0xBE, 0xD5, 0xAF, 0x16, 0xEA, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x4F, 0x62, 0x93, 0x8C, 0x46, 0x31, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF7, 0xBD, 0xBC, 0xDB, 0xC3, /* y */ 0x16, 0x67, 0xCB, 0x47, 0x7A, 0x1A, 0x8E, 0xC3, 0x38, 0xF9, 0x47, 0x41, 0x66, 0x9C, 0x97, 0x63, 0x16, 0xDA, 0x63, 0x21, /* order */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0x59, 0x91, 0xD4, 0x50, 0x29, 0x40, 0x9E, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x09 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP160t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 20, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0F, /* a */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0C, /* b */ 0x7A, 0x55, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xAE, 0x53, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xED, 0x2C, 0x4D, 0x7D, 0xAA, 0x7A, 0x0B, 0x5C, 0x55, 0xF3, 0x80, /* x */ 0xB1, 0x99, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x9B, 0x34, 0xEF, 0xC1, 0x39, 0x7E, 0x64, 0xBA, 0xEB, 0x05, 0xAC, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xFF, 0x23, 0x78, /* y */ 0xAD, 0xD6, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x7C, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x61, 0xF0, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x24, 0x43, 0x77, 0x21, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xE0, 0xAD, /* order */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0x59, 0x91, 0xD4, 0x50, 0x29, 0x40, 0x9E, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x09 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP192r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30, 0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x97, /* a */ 0x6A, 0x91, 0x17, 0x40, 0x76, 0xB1, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0x9C, 0x39, 0xC0, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x86, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xCA, 0xE0, 0x40, 0xE5, 0xC6, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xEF, /* b */ 0x46, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0xDC, 0x72, 0x1D, 0x04, 0x4F, 0x44, 0x96, 0xBC, 0xCA, 0x7E, 0xF4, 0x14, 0x6F, 0xBF, 0x25, 0xC9, /* x */ 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x64, 0x7E, 0xAA, 0xB6, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x53, 0xB0, 0x33, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0xB0, 0xF0, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x2F, 0x5C, 0x48, 0x53, 0x37, 0x5F, 0xD6, /* y */ 0x14, 0xB6, 0x90, 0x86, 0x6A, 0xBD, 0x5B, 0xB8, 0x8B, 0x5F, 0x48, 0x28, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x00, 0x02, 0xE6, 0x77, 0x3F, 0xA2, 0xFA, 0x29, 0x9B, 0x8F, /* order */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x6B, 0x5B, 0xE8, 0xF1, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xC1 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP192t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30, 0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x97, /* a */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30, 0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x94, /* b */ 0x13, 0xD5, 0x6F, 0xFA, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x68, 0x1E, 0x68, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x35, 0xBE, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x68, 0x54, 0x2E, 0x27, 0x89, 0x7B, 0x79, /* x */ 0x3A, 0xE9, 0xE5, 0x8C, 0x82, 0xF6, 0x3C, 0x30, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0x44, 0x6A, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x81, 0x29, /* y */ 0x09, 0x7E, 0x2C, 0x56, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x22, 0x3A, 0x90, 0x2A, 0xB5, 0xCA, 0x44, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x84, 0xB7, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0xCC, 0x01, 0xC9, /* order */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x6B, 0x5B, 0xE8, 0xF1, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xC1 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP224r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x68, 0xA5, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0x1C, 0x29, 0x98, 0x03, 0xA6, 0xC1, 0x53, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0xD8, 0xB0, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x59, 0xCA, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0x43, /* b */ 0x25, 0x80, 0xF6, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xE4, 0x41, 0x38, 0x87, 0x07, 0x13, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x69, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x21, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x66, 0xDB, 0xB3, 0x72, 0x38, 0x6C, 0x40, 0x0B, /* x */ 0x0D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xAD, 0x2C, 0x7E, 0x5C, 0xF4, 0x34, 0x08, 0x23, 0xB2, 0xA8, 0x7D, 0xC6, 0x8C, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xE3, 0x17, 0x4C, 0x1E, 0x6E, 0xFD, 0xEE, 0x12, 0xC0, 0x7D, /* y */ 0x58, 0xAA, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x72, 0xC0, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x24, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x24, 0x35, 0x4B, 0x9E, 0x99, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xF6, 0xD3, 0x76, 0x14, 0x02, 0xCD, /* order */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD0, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xD1, 0x16, 0xBC, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0xBC, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0xA7, 0x93, 0x9F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP224t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x4B, 0x33, 0x7D, 0x93, 0x41, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xF6, 0x0C, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0x0D, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xF1, 0x8A, 0x60, 0x88, 0x8D, /* x */ 0x6A, 0xB1, 0xE3, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x25, 0xFF, 0x38, 0x96, 0x42, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xFE, 0x14, 0x76, 0x2E, 0xCB, 0x49, 0xF8, 0x92, 0x8A, 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x60, 0x29, 0xB4, 0xD5, 0x80, /* y */ 0x03, 0x74, 0xE9, 0xF5, 0x14, 0x3E, 0x56, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0x3F, 0x3F, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0x0D, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0x41, 0xC8, 0xCC, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x6A, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xDB, 0x4C, /* order */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD0, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xD1, 0x16, 0xBC, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0xBC, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0xA7, 0x93, 0x9F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP256r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28, 0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x77, /* a */ 0x7D, 0x5A, 0x09, 0x75, 0xFC, 0x2C, 0x30, 0x57, 0xEE, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x30, 0x41, 0x7A, 0xFF, 0xE7, 0xFB, 0x80, 0x55, 0xC1, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x6C, 0xE9, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x30, 0xB5, 0xD9, /* b */ 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x6C, 0xE9, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x30, 0xB5, 0xD9, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x7C, 0xBF, 0x95, 0x84, 0x16, 0x29, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0xCE, 0x6B, 0xCC, 0xDC, 0x18, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x07, 0xB6, /* x */ 0x8B, 0xD2, 0xAE, 0xB9, 0xCB, 0x7E, 0x57, 0xCB, 0x2C, 0x4B, 0x48, 0x2F, 0xFC, 0x81, 0xB7, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xDE, 0x27, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x3A, 0x44, 0x53, 0xBD, 0x9A, 0xCE, 0x32, 0x62, /* y */ 0x54, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x35, 0xC3, 0xDA, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x97, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x1A, 0x14, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xC9, 0xC2, 0x77, 0x45, 0x13, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x8E, 0x54, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x54, 0xC7, 0x2F, 0x04, 0x69, 0x97, /* order */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x71, 0x8C, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xF7, 0x90, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x97, 0x48, 0x56, 0xA7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP256t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28, 0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x77, /* a */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28, 0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x74, /* b */ 0x66, 0x2C, 0x61, 0xC4, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x4E, 0xA4, 0xFE, 0x66, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0x76, 0xB7, 0xBF, 0x93, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x49, 0x25, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x01, 0xFE, 0xE9, 0x2B, 0x04, /* x */ 0xA3, 0xE8, 0xEB, 0x3C, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0xE7, 0xB7, 0x73, 0x22, 0x13, 0xB2, 0x3A, 0x65, 0x61, 0x49, 0xAF, 0xA1, 0x42, 0xC4, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0xBC, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xA1, 0x91, 0x56, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x05, 0xF4, /* y */ 0x2D, 0x99, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x34, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0x22, 0xE1, 0x46, 0x44, 0x41, 0x7E, 0x69, 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDE, 0x39, 0xD0, 0x27, 0x00, 0x1D, 0xAB, 0xE8, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x25, 0xC9, 0xBE, /* order */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x71, 0x8C, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xF7, 0x90, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x97, 0x48, 0x56, 0xA7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 40 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP320r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 40, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x27, /* a */ 0x3E, 0xE3, 0x0B, 0x56, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x83, 0xCC, 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x6D, 0x3F, 0x3B, 0xB8, 0xA2, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x13, 0xF5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0xDA, 0x66, 0x19, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x85, 0xFF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xF3, 0x75, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB4, /* b */ 0x52, 0x08, 0x83, 0x94, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0xBC, 0x42, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0x19, 0x86, 0x40, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x6F, 0xE1, 0x3F, 0x41, 0x34, 0x95, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xCC, 0x31, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0x88, 0x45, 0x39, 0x81, 0x6F, 0x5E, 0xB4, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xA6, /* x */ 0x43, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0x9A, 0xFB, 0x53, 0xD8, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x89, 0xBC, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0xE5, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0xF2, 0x01, 0x37, 0xD1, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x7E, 0xB6, 0xE7, 0x87, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x10, 0xA5, 0x99, 0xC7, 0x10, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x0D, 0x39, 0xE2, 0x06, 0x11, /* y */ 0x14, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x55, 0x45, 0xEC, 0x1C, 0xC8, 0xAB, 0x40, 0x93, 0x24, 0x7F, 0x77, 0x27, 0x5E, 0x07, 0x43, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x11, 0x71, 0x82, 0xEA, 0xA9, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x77, 0xAA, 0xAC, 0x6A, 0xC7, 0xD3, 0x52, 0x45, 0xD1, 0x69, 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xE1, /* order */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA5, 0xB6, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xA3, 0x2D, 0x48, 0x2E, 0xC7, 0xEE, 0x86, 0x58, 0xE9, 0x86, 0x91, 0x55, 0x5B, 0x44, 0xC5, 0x93, 0x11 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 40 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP320t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 40, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x27, /* a */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x24, /* b */ 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x61, 0xE0, 0x38, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0x60, 0xB3, 0xD1, 0x47, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x20, 0x13, 0x06, 0x4C, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x7E, 0xD2, 0x7C, 0x67, 0x80, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0x7F, 0xB8, 0xA5, 0x47, 0xCE, 0xB5, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xF4, 0x22, 0x34, 0x03, 0x53, /* x */ 0x92, 0x5B, 0xE9, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0xFB, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x7D, 0x49, 0x90, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x81, 0x34, 0x08, 0xAB, 0x10, 0x6C, 0x4F, 0x09, 0xCB, 0x7E, 0xE0, 0x78, 0x68, 0xCC, 0x13, 0x6F, 0xFF, 0x33, 0x57, 0xF6, 0x24, 0xA2, 0x1B, 0xED, 0x52, /* y */ 0x63, 0xBA, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x27, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xBF, 0x66, 0x71, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x30, 0xEB, 0xEE, 0x08, 0x4E, 0x58, 0xA0, 0xB0, 0x77, 0xAD, 0x42, 0xA5, 0xA0, 0x98, 0x9D, 0x1E, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xC0, 0x45, 0x5F, 0xB0, 0xD2, 0xC3, /* order */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA5, 0xB6, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xA3, 0x2D, 0x48, 0x2E, 0xC7, 0xEE, 0x86, 0x58, 0xE9, 0x86, 0x91, 0x55, 0x5B, 0x44, 0xC5, 0x93, 0x11 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 48 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP384r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 48, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x53, /* a */ 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x3D, 0x8C, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0x72, 0x08, 0x0A, 0xCE, 0x05, 0xAF, 0xA0, 0xC2, 0xBE, 0xA2, 0x8E, 0x4F, 0xB2, 0x27, 0x87, 0x13, 0x91, 0x65, 0xEF, 0xBA, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x0F, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0x81, 0x4A, 0x50, 0x3A, 0xD4, 0xEB, 0x04, 0xA8, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x22, 0xCE, 0x28, 0x26, /* b */ 0x04, 0xA8, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x22, 0xCE, 0x28, 0x26, 0x8B, 0x39, 0xB5, 0x54, 0x16, 0xF0, 0x44, 0x7C, 0x2F, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0x07, 0xDC, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0x2E, 0x88, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x3E, 0xEB, 0x62, 0xD5, 0x7C, 0xB4, 0x39, 0x02, 0x95, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x94, 0x3A, 0xB7, 0x86, 0x96, 0xFA, 0x50, 0x4C, 0x11, /* x */ 0x1D, 0x1C, 0x64, 0xF0, 0x68, 0xCF, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0xA6, 0x3A, 0x81, 0xB7, 0xC1, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0x88, 0x47, 0xA3, 0xE7, 0x7E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xE3, 0xDB, 0x7F, 0xCA, 0xFE, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x10, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x34, 0x36, 0xD6, 0x46, 0xAA, 0xEF, 0x87, 0xB2, 0xE2, 0x47, 0xD4, 0xAF, 0x1E, /* y */ 0x8A, 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x75, 0x20, 0xF9, 0xC2, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xB1, 0xEB, 0x8E, 0x95, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x62, 0xB7, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x58, 0x64, 0xE1, 0x9C, 0x05, 0x4F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0x29, 0x28, 0x0E, 0x46, 0x46, 0x21, 0x77, 0x91, 0x81, 0x11, 0x42, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x26, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x15, /* order */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB3, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x6E, 0x6C, 0xAC, 0x04, 0x25, 0xA7, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0xAF, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xC3, 0x10, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x32, 0x02, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x65, 0x65 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 48 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP384t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 48, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x53, /* a */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x50, /* b */ 0x7F, 0x51, 0x9E, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x1B, 0xD8, 0x26, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x47, 0x91, 0x0F, 0x8C, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x46, 0xED, 0x8C, 0xCD, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x1A, 0xBD, 0x11, 0x75, 0x6D, 0xCE, 0x1D, 0x20, 0x74, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x80, 0x5C, 0xED, 0x70, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xB4, 0x71, 0xEE, /* x */ 0x18, 0xDE, 0x98, 0xB0, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0xA3, 0x06, 0xF2, 0xAF, 0xCD, 0x72, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x2A, 0x81, 0x9B, 0x80, 0xAB, 0x12, 0xEB, 0xD6, 0x53, 0x17, 0x24, 0x76, 0xFE, 0xCD, 0x46, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xFF, 0xC4, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x6A, 0x5F, 0x54, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0x41, 0x88, 0x08, 0xCC, /* y */ 0x25, 0xAB, 0x05, 0x69, 0x62, 0xD3, 0x06, 0x51, 0xA1, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xD2, 0x75, 0x5A, 0xD3, 0x36, 0x74, 0x7F, 0x93, 0x47, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x3B, 0x88, 0xF2, 0xB6, 0xA2, 0x08, 0xCC, 0xFE, 0x46, 0x94, 0x08, 0x58, 0x4D, 0xC2, 0xB2, 0x91, 0x26, 0x75, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x9E, 0x58, 0x29, 0x28, /* order */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB3, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x6E, 0x6C, 0xAC, 0x04, 0x25, 0xA7, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0xAF, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xC3, 0x10, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x32, 0x02, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x65, 0x65 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 64 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP512r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 64, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6, 0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56, 0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF3, /* a */ 0x78, 0x30, 0xA3, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x3B, 0x89, 0xE2, 0x32, 0x71, 0x45, 0xAC, 0x23, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x94, 0xCB, 0xDD, 0x8D, 0x3D, 0xF9, 0x16, 0x10, 0xA8, 0x34, 0x41, 0xCA, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x63, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x5D, 0x5A, 0xA8, 0x25, 0x3A, 0xA1, 0x0A, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x7F, 0x11, 0x17, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0xF2, 0xC7, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x77, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xCA, /* b */ 0x3D, 0xF9, 0x16, 0x10, 0xA8, 0x34, 0x41, 0xCA, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x63, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x5D, 0x5A, 0xA8, 0x25, 0x3A, 0xA1, 0x0A, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x7F, 0x11, 0x17, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0xF2, 0xC7, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x77, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xCA, 0xDC, 0x08, 0x3E, 0x67, 0x98, 0x40, 0x50, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xBA, 0xE5, 0xDD, 0x28, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x63, 0x80, 0x16, 0xF7, 0x23, /* x */ 0x81, 0xAE, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xD8, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0x64, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x2E, 0x9C, 0x4C, 0x6A, 0x93, 0x85, 0xED, 0x9F, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xD9, 0x16, 0xC1, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x62, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD0, 0x09, 0x8E, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0x1F, 0x78, 0xE2, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xD1, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x93, 0xB9, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x7C, 0x6D, 0x50, 0x47, 0x40, 0x6A, 0x5E, 0x68, 0x8B, 0x35, 0x22, 0x09, 0xBC, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x22, /* y */ 0x7D, 0xDE, 0x38, 0x5D, 0x56, 0x63, 0x32, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0xEA, 0xBF, 0xA9, 0xCF, 0x78, 0x22, 0xFD, 0xF2, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x24, 0xA5, 0x7B, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x00, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x88, 0x1F, 0x81, 0x11, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0xDE, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x48, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xCA, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x27, 0x63, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xCA, 0x2B, 0x2F, 0xA8, 0xF0, 0x54, 0x06, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0x08, 0x92, /* order */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x70, 0x55, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x41, 0x4C, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x86, 0x61, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0x10, 0x47, 0x1D, 0xB1, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x08, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0xDD, 0xB5, 0x87, 0x96, 0x82, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x00, 0x69 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 64 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP512t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 64, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6, 0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56, 0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF3, /* a */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6, 0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56, 0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF0, /* b */ 0x7C, 0xBB, 0xBC, 0xF9, 0x44, 0x1C, 0xFA, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x90, 0xE4, 0x68, 0x84, 0xEA, 0xE3, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0xCB, 0x49, 0x81, 0x52, 0x78, 0x97, 0x50, 0x4B, 0xEC, 0x3E, 0x36, 0xA6, 0x2B, 0xCD, 0xFA, 0x23, 0x04, 0x97, 0x65, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x45, 0x00, 0x85, 0xF2, 0xDA, 0xE1, 0x45, 0xC2, 0x25, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x65, 0x76, 0x36, 0x89, 0x18, 0x0E, 0xA2, 0x57, 0x18, 0x67, 0x42, 0x3E, /* x */ 0x64, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x5C, 0x12, 0x78, 0x87, 0x17, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xBA, 0x06, 0xCB, 0xC2, 0xA6, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0x85, 0x84, 0x24, 0x58, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0x9D, 0xB1, 0x75, 0x8D, 0x39, 0xC0, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x82, 0xBA, 0x51, 0x73, 0x5C, 0xDB, 0x3E, 0xA4, 0x99, 0xAA, 0x77, 0xA7, 0xD6, 0x94, 0x3A, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xA3, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0x6F, 0x06, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x96, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x35, 0xDA, /* y */ 0x5B, 0x53, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x95, 0xF5, 0xAF, 0x0F, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0x92, 0x37, 0x6C, 0x84, 0xAC, 0xE1, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x30, 0x19, 0xB7, 0x16, 0x34, 0xC0, 0x11, 0x31, 0x15, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x03, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0xD9, 0x93, 0x21, 0x84, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0x21, 0x6B, 0xD7, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0xDA, 0xDF, 0x86, 0xA6, 0x27, 0x30, 0x6E, 0xCF, 0xF9, 0x6D, 0xBB, 0x8B, 0xAC, 0xE1, 0x98, 0xB6, 0x1E, 0x00, 0xF8, 0xB3, 0x32, /* order */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x70, 0x55, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x41, 0x4C, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x86, 0x61, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0x10, 0x47, 0x1D, 0xB1, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x08, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0xDD, 0xB5, 0x87, 0x96, 0x82, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x00, 0x69 } }; typedef struct _ec_list_element_st { int nid; const EC_CURVE_DATA *data; const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void); const char *comment; } ec_list_element; static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = { /* prime field curves */ /* secg curves */ {NID_secp112r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp112r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp128r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_128R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 128 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp128r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_128R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 128 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp160k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp160r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp160r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, /* SECG secp192r1 is the same as X9.62 prime192v1 and hence omitted */ {NID_secp192k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_192K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp224k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_224K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method, "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #else {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #endif {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */ {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method, "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"}, #else {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"}, #endif /* X9.62 curves */ {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_192.h, 0, "NIST/X9.62/SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime192v2, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime192v3, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime239v2, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime239v3, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h, #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM) EC_GFp_nistz256_method, #elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) EC_GFp_nistp256_method, #else 0, #endif "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* characteristic two field curves */ /* NIST/SECG curves */ {NID_sect113r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect113r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect131r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R1.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 131 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect131r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 131 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect163k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect163r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_163R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect163r2, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect193r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 193 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect193r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 193 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect233k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect233r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect239k1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_239K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect283k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect283r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect409k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect409r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect571k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect571r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"}, /* X9.62 curves */ {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_176V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 176 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_208W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 208 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_272W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 272 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_304W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 304 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_359V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 359 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_368W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 368 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_431R1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 431 bit binary field"}, /* * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves * from X9.62] */ {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1, &_EC_WTLS_1.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, #endif {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8, &_EC_WTLS_8.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9, &_EC_WTLS_9.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, #endif {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, &_EC_WTLS_12.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* IPSec curves */ {NID_ipsec3, &_EC_IPSEC_155_ID3.h, 0, "\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #3 over a 155 bit binary field.\n" "\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"}, {NID_ipsec4, &_EC_IPSEC_185_ID4.h, 0, "\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #4 over a 185 bit binary field.\n" "\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"}, #endif /* brainpool curves */ {NID_brainpoolP160r1, &_EC_brainpoolP160r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP160t1, &_EC_brainpoolP160t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP192r1, &_EC_brainpoolP192r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP192t1, &_EC_brainpoolP192t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP224r1, &_EC_brainpoolP224r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP224t1, &_EC_brainpoolP224t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP256r1, &_EC_brainpoolP256r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP256t1, &_EC_brainpoolP256t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP320r1, &_EC_brainpoolP320r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 320 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP320t1, &_EC_brainpoolP320t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 320 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP384r1, &_EC_brainpoolP384r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 384 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP384t1, &_EC_brainpoolP384t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 384 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP512r1, &_EC_brainpoolP512r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP512t1, &_EC_brainpoolP512t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"}, }; #define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list) static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve) { EC_GROUP *group = NULL; EC_POINT *P = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *order = NULL; int ok = 0; int seed_len, param_len; const EC_METHOD *meth; const EC_CURVE_DATA *data; const unsigned char *params; /* If no curve data curve method must handle everything */ if (curve.data == NULL) return EC_GROUP_new(curve.meth != NULL ? curve.meth() : NULL); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } data = curve.data; seed_len = data->seed_len; param_len = data->param_len; params = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */ params += seed_len; /* skip seed */ if ((p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || (a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || (b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (curve.meth != 0) { meth = curve.meth(); if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) || (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* field_type == * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if ((x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || (y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if ((order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (seed_len) { if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params - seed_len, seed_len)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { EC_GROUP_free(group); group = NULL; } EC_POINT_free(P); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(order); BN_free(x); BN_free(y); return group; } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid) { size_t i; EC_GROUP *ret = NULL; if (nid <= 0) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) { ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]); break; } if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP); return NULL; } EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(ret, nid); return ret; } size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems) { size_t i, min; if (r == NULL || nitems == 0) return curve_list_length; min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length; for (i = 0; i < min; i++) { r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid; r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment; } return curve_list_length; } /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */ typedef struct { const char *name; /* NIST Name of curve */ int nid; /* Curve NID */ } EC_NIST_NAME; static EC_NIST_NAME nist_curves[] = { {"B-163", NID_sect163r2}, {"B-233", NID_sect233r1}, {"B-283", NID_sect283r1}, {"B-409", NID_sect409r1}, {"B-571", NID_sect571r1}, {"K-163", NID_sect163k1}, {"K-233", NID_sect233k1}, {"K-283", NID_sect283k1}, {"K-409", NID_sect409k1}, {"K-571", NID_sect571k1}, {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1}, {"P-224", NID_secp224r1}, {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1}, {"P-384", NID_secp384r1}, {"P-521", NID_secp521r1} }; const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) { if (nist_curves[i].nid == nid) return nist_curves[i].name; } return NULL; } int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) { if (strcmp(nist_curves[i].name, name) == 0) return nist_curves[i].nid; } return NID_undef; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecdsa_vrf.c0000644000000000000000000000237713176625657016103 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" #include /*- * returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error */ int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) { if (eckey->meth->verify_sig != NULL) return eckey->meth->verify_sig(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey); ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } /*- * returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error */ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey) { if (eckey->meth->verify != NULL) return eckey->meth->verify(type, dgst, dgst_len, sigbuf, sig_len, eckey); ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_VERIFY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/build.info0000644000000000000000000000234213176625657015747 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c \ ec_err.c ec_curve.c ec_check.c ec_print.c ec_asn1.c ec_key.c \ ec2_smpl.c ec2_mult.c ec_ameth.c ec_pmeth.c eck_prn.c \ ecp_nistp224.c ecp_nistp256.c ecp_nistp521.c ecp_nistputil.c \ ecp_oct.c ec2_oct.c ec_oct.c ec_kmeth.c ecdh_ossl.c ecdh_kdf.c \ ecdsa_ossl.c ecdsa_sign.c ecdsa_vrf.c curve25519.c ecx_meth.c \ {- $target{ec_asm_src} -} GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-x86.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-avx2.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.o]=.. GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-armv4.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-armv4.o]=.. GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-armv8.S]=asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) INCLUDE[ecp_nistz256-armv8.o]=.. BEGINRAW[Makefile] {- $builddir -}/ecp_nistz256-%.S: {- $sourcedir -}/asm/ecp_nistz256-%.pl CC="$(CC)" $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@ ENDRAW[Makefile] openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c0000644000000000000000000002256413176625657015743 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" #define X25519_KEYLEN 32 #define X25519_BITS 253 #define X25519_SECURITY_BITS 128 typedef struct { unsigned char pubkey[X25519_KEYLEN]; unsigned char *privkey; } X25519_KEY; typedef enum { X25519_PUBLIC, X25519_PRIVATE, X25519_KEYGEN } ecx_key_op_t; /* Setup EVP_PKEY using public, private or generation */ static int ecx_key_op(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509_ALGOR *palg, const unsigned char *p, int plen, ecx_key_op_t op) { X25519_KEY *xkey; if (op != X25519_KEYGEN) { if (palg != NULL) { int ptype; /* Algorithm parameters must be absent */ X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, NULL, palg); if (ptype != V_ASN1_UNDEF) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } } if (p == NULL || plen != X25519_KEYLEN) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } } xkey = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*xkey)); if (xkey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (op == X25519_PUBLIC) { memcpy(xkey->pubkey, p, plen); } else { xkey->privkey = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(X25519_KEYLEN); if (xkey->privkey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(xkey); return 0; } if (op == X25519_KEYGEN) { if (RAND_bytes(xkey->privkey, X25519_KEYLEN) <= 0) { OPENSSL_secure_free(xkey->privkey); OPENSSL_free(xkey); return 0; } xkey->privkey[0] &= 248; xkey->privkey[31] &= 127; xkey->privkey[31] |= 64; } else { memcpy(xkey->privkey, p, X25519_KEYLEN); } X25519_public_from_private(xkey->pubkey, xkey->privkey); } EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_X25519, xkey); return 1; } static int ecx_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr; unsigned char *penc; if (xkey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE, EC_R_INVALID_KEY); return 0; } penc = OPENSSL_memdup(xkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN); if (penc == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL, penc, X25519_KEYLEN)) { OPENSSL_free(penc); ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } static int ecx_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p; int pklen; X509_ALGOR *palg; if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey)) return 0; return ecx_key_op(pkey, palg, p, pklen, X25519_PUBLIC); } static int ecx_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { const X25519_KEY *akey = a->pkey.ptr; const X25519_KEY *bkey = b->pkey.ptr; if (akey == NULL || bkey == NULL) return -2; return !CRYPTO_memcmp(akey->pubkey, bkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN); } static int ecx_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p; int plen; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct = NULL; const X509_ALGOR *palg; int rv; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &plen, &palg, p8)) return 0; oct = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p, plen); if (oct == NULL) { p = NULL; plen = 0; } else { p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(oct); plen = ASN1_STRING_length(oct); } rv = ecx_key_op(pkey, palg, p, plen, X25519_PRIVATE); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct); return rv; } static int ecx_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr; ASN1_OCTET_STRING oct; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; if (xkey == NULL || xkey->privkey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; } oct.data = xkey->privkey; oct.length = X25519_KEYLEN; oct.flags = 0; penclen = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, &penc); if (penclen < 0) { ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X25519), 0, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL, penc, penclen)) { OPENSSL_clear_free(penc, penclen); ECerr(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } static int ecx_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return X25519_KEYLEN; } static int ecx_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return X25519_BITS; } static int ecx_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return X25519_SECURITY_BITS; } static void ecx_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr; if (xkey) OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(xkey->privkey, X25519_KEYLEN); OPENSSL_free(xkey); } /* "parameters" are always equal */ static int ecx_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { return 1; } static int ecx_key_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx, ecx_key_op_t op) { const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr; if (op == X25519_PRIVATE) { if (xkey == NULL || xkey->privkey == NULL) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s\n", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*sX25519 Private-Key:\n", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spriv:\n", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, xkey->privkey, X25519_KEYLEN, indent + 4) == 0) return 0; } else { if (xkey == NULL) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*s\n", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; return 1; } if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*sX25519 Public-Key:\n", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; } if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spub:\n", indent, "") <= 0) return 0; if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, xkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN, indent + 4) == 0) return 0; return 1; } static int ecx_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return ecx_key_print(bp, pkey, indent, ctx, X25519_PRIVATE); } static int ecx_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return ecx_key_print(bp, pkey, indent, ctx, X25519_PUBLIC); } static int ecx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { switch (op) { case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT: return ecx_key_op(pkey, NULL, arg2, arg1, X25519_PUBLIC); case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT: if (pkey->pkey.ptr != NULL) { const X25519_KEY *xkey = pkey->pkey.ptr; unsigned char **ppt = arg2; *ppt = OPENSSL_memdup(xkey->pubkey, X25519_KEYLEN); if (*ppt != NULL) return X25519_KEYLEN; } return 0; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; return 2; default: return -2; } } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ecx25519_asn1_meth = { NID_X25519, NID_X25519, 0, "X25519", "OpenSSL X25519 algorithm", ecx_pub_decode, ecx_pub_encode, ecx_pub_cmp, ecx_pub_print, ecx_priv_decode, ecx_priv_encode, ecx_priv_print, ecx_size, ecx_bits, ecx_security_bits, 0, 0, 0, 0, ecx_cmp_parameters, 0, 0, ecx_free, ecx_ctrl, NULL, NULL }; static int pkey_ecx_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ecx_key_op(pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, X25519_KEYGEN); } static int pkey_ecx_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { const X25519_KEY *pkey, *peerkey; if (ctx->pkey == NULL || ctx->peerkey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET); return 0; } pkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr; peerkey = ctx->peerkey->pkey.ptr; if (pkey == NULL || pkey->privkey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; } if (peerkey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY); return 0; } *keylen = X25519_KEYLEN; if (key != NULL && X25519(key, pkey->privkey, peerkey->pubkey) == 0) return 0; return 1; } static int pkey_ecx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { /* Only need to handle peer key for derivation */ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY) return 1; return -2; } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ecx25519_pkey_meth = { NID_X25519, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_ecx_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_ecx_derive, pkey_ecx_ctrl, 0 }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c0000644000000000000000000005641313176625657015714 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/asn1_int.h" #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); #endif static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key) { const EC_GROUP *group; int nid; if (ec_key == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group) && (nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) /* we have a 'named curve' => just set the OID */ { *ppval = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); *pptype = V_ASN1_OBJECT; } else { /* explicit parameters */ ASN1_STRING *pstr = NULL; pstr = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (pstr == NULL) return 0; pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters(ec_key, &pstr->data); if (pstr->length <= 0) { ASN1_STRING_free(pstr); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } *ppval = pstr; *pptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } return 1; } static int eckey_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY *ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec; void *pval = NULL; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL, *p; int penclen; if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, ec_key)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, NULL); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; penc = OPENSSL_malloc(penclen); if (penc == NULL) goto err; p = penc; penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, &p); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_EC), ptype, pval, penc, penclen)) return 1; err: if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT) ASN1_OBJECT_free(pval); else ASN1_STRING_free(pval); OPENSSL_free(penc); return 0; } static EC_KEY *eckey_type2param(int ptype, const void *pval) { EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { const ASN1_STRING *pstr = pval; const unsigned char *pm = NULL; int pmlen; pm = pstr->data; pmlen = pstr->length; if ((eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } } else if (ptype == V_ASN1_OBJECT) { const ASN1_OBJECT *poid = pval; EC_GROUP *group; /* * type == V_ASN1_OBJECT => the parameters are given by an asn1 OID */ if ((eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto ecerr; } group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(OBJ_obj2nid(poid)); if (group == NULL) goto ecerr; EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) goto ecerr; EC_GROUP_free(group); } else { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } return eckey; ecerr: EC_KEY_free(eckey); return NULL; } static int eckey_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p = NULL; const void *pval; int ptype, pklen; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; X509_ALGOR *palg; if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); eckey = eckey_type2param(ptype, pval); if (!eckey) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&eckey, &p, pklen)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey); return 1; ecerr: EC_KEY_free(eckey); return 0; } static int eckey_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { int r; const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec); const EC_POINT *pa = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->pkey.ec), *pb = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->pkey.ec); if (group == NULL || pa == NULL || pb == NULL) return -2; r = EC_POINT_cmp(group, pa, pb, NULL); if (r == 0) return 1; if (r == 1) return 0; return -2; } static int eckey_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p = NULL; const void *pval; int ptype, pklen; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; const X509_ALGOR *palg; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); eckey = eckey_type2param(ptype, pval); if (!eckey) goto ecliberr; /* We have parameters now set private key */ if (!d2i_ECPrivateKey(&eckey, &p, pklen)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto ecerr; } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey); return 1; ecliberr: ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); ecerr: EC_KEY_free(eckey); return 0; } static int eckey_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY ec_key = *(pkey->pkey.ec); unsigned char *ep, *p; int eplen, ptype; void *pval; unsigned int old_flags; if (!eckey_param2type(&ptype, &pval, &ec_key)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } /* set the private key */ /* * do not include the parameters in the SEC1 private key see PKCS#11 * 12.11 */ old_flags = EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(&ec_key); EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(&ec_key, old_flags | EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS); eplen = i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, NULL); if (!eplen) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } ep = OPENSSL_malloc(eplen); if (ep == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } p = ep; if (!i2d_ECPrivateKey(&ec_key, &p)) { OPENSSL_free(ep); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey), 0, ptype, pval, ep, eplen)) { OPENSSL_free(ep); return 0; } return 1; } static int int_ec_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ECDSA_size(pkey->pkey.ec); } static int ec_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return EC_GROUP_order_bits(EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec)); } static int ec_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { int ecbits = ec_bits(pkey); if (ecbits >= 512) return 256; if (ecbits >= 384) return 192; if (ecbits >= 256) return 128; if (ecbits >= 224) return 112; if (ecbits >= 160) return 80; return ecbits / 2; } static int ec_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->pkey.ec == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec) == NULL) return 1; return 0; } static int ec_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) { EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_dup(EC_KEY_get0_group(from->pkey.ec)); if (group == NULL) return 0; if (to->pkey.ec == NULL) { to->pkey.ec = EC_KEY_new(); if (to->pkey.ec == NULL) goto err; } if (EC_KEY_set_group(to->pkey.ec, group) == 0) goto err; EC_GROUP_free(group); return 1; err: EC_GROUP_free(group); return 0; } static int ec_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { const EC_GROUP *group_a = EC_KEY_get0_group(a->pkey.ec), *group_b = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->pkey.ec); if (group_a == NULL || group_b == NULL) return -2; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group_a, group_b, NULL)) return 0; else return 1; } static void int_ec_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY_free(pkey->pkey.ec); } typedef enum { EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE, EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC, EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM } ec_print_t; static int do_EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off, ec_print_t ktype) { const char *ecstr; unsigned char *priv = NULL, *pub = NULL; size_t privlen = 0, publen = 0; int ret = 0; const EC_GROUP *group; if (x == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(x)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (ktype != EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM && EC_KEY_get0_public_key(x) != NULL) { publen = EC_KEY_key2buf(x, EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), &pub, NULL); if (publen == 0) goto err; } if (ktype == EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE && EC_KEY_get0_private_key(x) != NULL) { privlen = EC_KEY_priv2buf(x, &priv); if (privlen == 0) goto err; } if (ktype == EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE) ecstr = "Private-Key"; else if (ktype == EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC) ecstr = "Public-Key"; else ecstr = "ECDSA-Parameters"; if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ecstr, EC_GROUP_order_bits(group)) <= 0) goto err; if (privlen != 0) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spriv:\n", off, "") <= 0) goto err; if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, priv, privlen, off + 4) == 0) goto err; } if (publen != 0) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%*spub:\n", off, "") <= 0) goto err; if (ASN1_buf_print(bp, pub, publen, off + 4) == 0) goto err; } if (!ECPKParameters_print(bp, group, off)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) ECerr(EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT, ERR_R_EC_LIB); OPENSSL_clear_free(priv, privlen); OPENSSL_free(pub); return ret; } static int eckey_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { EC_KEY *eckey; if ((eckey = d2i_ECParameters(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey); return 1; } static int eckey_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_ECParameters(pkey->pkey.ec, pder); } static int eckey_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM); } static int eckey_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC); } static int eckey_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, pkey->pkey.ec, indent, EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE); } static int old_ec_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { EC_KEY *ec; if ((ec = d2i_ECPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); return 1; } static int old_ec_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_ECPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.ec, pder); } static int ec_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { switch (op) { case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) { int snid, hnid; X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2); if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL) return -1; hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm); if (hnid == NID_undef) return -1; if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) return -1; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0); } return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: if (arg1 == 0) { int snid, hnid; X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2; CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2); if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL) return -1; hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm); if (hnid == NID_undef) return -1; if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) return -1; X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0); } return 1; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE: if (arg1 == 1) return ecdh_cms_decrypt(arg2); else if (arg1 == 0) return ecdh_cms_encrypt(arg2); return -2; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE: *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; return 1; #endif case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID: *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256; return 2; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT: return EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey), arg2, arg1, NULL); case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT: return EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, arg2, NULL); default: return -2; } } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_EC, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0, "EC", "OpenSSL EC algorithm", eckey_pub_decode, eckey_pub_encode, eckey_pub_cmp, eckey_pub_print, eckey_priv_decode, eckey_priv_encode, eckey_priv_print, int_ec_size, ec_bits, ec_security_bits, eckey_param_decode, eckey_param_encode, ec_missing_parameters, ec_copy_parameters, ec_cmp_parameters, eckey_param_print, 0, int_ec_free, ec_pkey_ctrl, old_ec_priv_decode, old_ec_priv_encode }; int EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off) { int private = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(x) != NULL; return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, x, off, private ? EC_KEY_PRINT_PRIVATE : EC_KEY_PRINT_PUBLIC); } int ECParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x) { return do_EC_KEY_print(bp, x, 4, EC_KEY_PRINT_PARAM); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int ecdh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey) { const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; int atype; const void *aval; int rv = 0; EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL; EC_KEY *ecpeer = NULL; const unsigned char *p; int plen; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg); if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) goto err; /* If absent parameters get group from main key */ if (atype == V_ASN1_UNDEF || atype == V_ASN1_NULL) { const EC_GROUP *grp; EVP_PKEY *pk; pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!pk) goto err; grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pk->pkey.ec); ecpeer = EC_KEY_new(); if (ecpeer == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ecpeer, grp)) goto err; } else { ecpeer = eckey_type2param(atype, aval); if (!ecpeer) goto err; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey); p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pubkey); if (!p || !plen) goto err; if (!o2i_ECPublicKey(&ecpeer, &p, plen)) goto err; pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkpeer == NULL) goto err; EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkpeer, ecpeer); if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0) rv = 1; err: EC_KEY_free(ecpeer); EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer); return rv; } /* Set KDF parameters based on KDF NID */ static int ecdh_cms_set_kdf_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, int eckdf_nid) { int kdf_nid, kdfmd_nid, cofactor; const EVP_MD *kdf_md; if (eckdf_nid == NID_undef) return 0; /* Lookup KDF type, cofactor mode and digest */ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(eckdf_nid, &kdfmd_nid, &kdf_nid)) return 0; if (kdf_nid == NID_dh_std_kdf) cofactor = 0; else if (kdf_nid == NID_dh_cofactor_kdf) cofactor = 1; else return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(pctx, cofactor) <= 0) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62) <= 0) return 0; kdf_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(kdfmd_nid); if (!kdf_md) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } static int ecdh_cms_set_shared_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { int rv = 0; X509_ALGOR *alg, *kekalg = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *der = NULL; int plen, keylen; const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &alg, &ukm)) return 0; if (!ecdh_cms_set_kdf_param(pctx, OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm))) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO, EC_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR); return 0; } if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) return 0; p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); if (!kekalg) goto err; kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); if (!kekctx) goto err; kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm); if (!kekcipher || EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kekctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; plen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&der, kekalg, ukm, keylen); if (!plen) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(pctx, der, plen) <= 0) goto err; der = NULL; rv = 1; err: X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg); OPENSSL_free(der); return rv; } static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* See if we need to set peer key */ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx)) { X509_ALGOR *alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &alg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return 0; if (!alg || !pubkey) return 0; if (!ecdh_cms_set_peerkey(pctx, alg, pubkey)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT, EC_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR); return 0; } } /* Set ECDH derivation parameters and initialise unwrap context */ if (!ecdh_cms_set_shared_info(pctx, ri)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT, EC_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int keylen; X509_ALGOR *talg, *wrap_alg = NULL; const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; ASN1_STRING *wrap_str; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; int rv = 0; int ecdh_nid, kdf_type, kdf_nid, wrap_nid; const EVP_MD *kdf_md; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* Get ephemeral key */ pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &talg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, talg); /* Is everything uninitialised? */ if (aoid == OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef)) { EC_KEY *eckey = pkey->pkey.ec; /* Set the key */ unsigned char *p; penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(eckey, NULL); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; penc = OPENSSL_malloc(penclen); if (penc == NULL) goto err; p = penc; penclen = i2o_ECPublicKey(eckey, &p); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(pubkey, penc, penclen); pubkey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); pubkey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); } /* See if custom parameters set */ kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx); if (kdf_type <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, &kdf_md)) goto err; ecdh_nid = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(pctx); if (ecdh_nid < 0) goto err; else if (ecdh_nid == 0) ecdh_nid = NID_dh_std_kdf; else if (ecdh_nid == 1) ecdh_nid = NID_dh_cofactor_kdf; if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE) { kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0) goto err; } else /* Unknown KDF */ goto err; if (kdf_md == NULL) { /* Fixme later for better MD */ kdf_md = EVP_sha1(); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0) goto err; } if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &talg, &ukm)) goto err; /* Lookup NID for KDF+cofactor+digest */ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&kdf_nid, EVP_MD_type(kdf_md), ecdh_nid)) goto err; /* Get wrap NID */ ctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx); keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */ wrap_alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (wrap_alg == NULL) goto err; wrap_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid); wrap_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (wrap_alg->parameter == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, wrap_alg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap_alg->parameter) == NID_undef) { ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap_alg->parameter); wrap_alg->parameter = NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; penclen = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&penc, wrap_alg, ukm, keylen); if (!penclen) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(pctx, penc, penclen) <= 0) goto err; penc = NULL; /* * Now need to wrap encoding of wrap AlgorithmIdentifier into parameter * of another AlgorithmIdentifier. */ penclen = i2d_X509_ALGOR(wrap_alg, &penc); if (!penc || !penclen) goto err; wrap_str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (wrap_str == NULL) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(wrap_str, penc, penclen); penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(kdf_nid), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, wrap_str); rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(penc); X509_ALGOR_free(wrap_alg); return rv; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c0000644000000000000000000021403013176625657016352 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Copyright 2011 Google Inc. * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * A 64-bit implementation of the NIST P-521 elliptic curve point multiplication * * OpenSSL integration was taken from Emilia Kasper's work in ecp_nistp224.c. * Otherwise based on Emilia's P224 work, which was inspired by my curve25519 * work which got its smarts from Daniel J. Bernstein's work on the same. */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include "ec_lcl.h" # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1)) /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */ typedef __uint128_t uint128_t; /* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit * platforms */ # else # error "Need GCC 3.1 or later to define type uint128_t" # endif typedef uint8_t u8; typedef uint64_t u64; typedef int64_t s64; /* * The underlying field. P521 operates over GF(2^521-1). We can serialise an * element of this field into 66 bytes where the most significant byte * contains only a single bit. We call this an felem_bytearray. */ typedef u8 felem_bytearray[66]; /* * These are the parameters of P521, taken from FIPS 186-3, section D.1.2.5. * These values are big-endian. */ static const felem_bytearray nistp521_curve_params[5] = { {0x01, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, /* p */ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0x01, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, /* a = -3 */ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc}, {0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3e, 0xb9, 0x61, 0x8e, 0x1c, /* b */ 0x9a, 0x1f, 0x92, 0x9a, 0x21, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xee, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x72, 0x5b, 0x99, 0xb3, 0x15, 0xf3, 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x09, 0xe1, 0x56, 0x19, 0x39, 0x51, 0xec, 0x7e, 0x93, 0x7b, 0x16, 0x52, 0xc0, 0xbd, 0x3b, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x2c, 0x34, 0xf1, 0xef, 0x45, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x6b, 0x50, 0x3f, 0x00}, {0x00, 0xc6, 0x85, 0x8e, 0x06, 0xb7, 0x04, 0x04, /* x */ 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x3e, 0xcb, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xb4, 0x42, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3f, 0xb5, 0x21, 0xf8, 0x28, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x4d, 0x3d, 0xba, 0xa1, 0x4b, 0x5e, 0x77, 0xef, 0xe7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xfe, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0x27, 0xa2, 0xff, 0xa8, 0xde, 0x33, 0x48, 0xb3, 0xc1, 0x85, 0x6a, 0x42, 0x9b, 0xf9, 0x7e, 0x7e, 0x31, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0xbd, 0x66}, {0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, /* y */ 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b, 0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee, 0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad, 0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe, 0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50} }; /*- * The representation of field elements. * ------------------------------------ * * We represent field elements with nine values. These values are either 64 or * 128 bits and the field element represented is: * v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^58 + v[2]*2^116 + ... + v[8]*2^464 (mod p) * Each of the nine values is called a 'limb'. Since the limbs are spaced only * 58 bits apart, but are greater than 58 bits in length, the most significant * bits of each limb overlap with the least significant bits of the next. * * A field element with 64-bit limbs is an 'felem'. One with 128-bit limbs is a * 'largefelem' */ # define NLIMBS 9 typedef uint64_t limb; typedef limb felem[NLIMBS]; typedef uint128_t largefelem[NLIMBS]; static const limb bottom57bits = 0x1ffffffffffffff; static const limb bottom58bits = 0x3ffffffffffffff; /* * bin66_to_felem takes a little-endian byte array and converts it into felem * form. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian. */ static void bin66_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[66]) { out[0] = (*((limb *) & in[0])) & bottom58bits; out[1] = (*((limb *) & in[7]) >> 2) & bottom58bits; out[2] = (*((limb *) & in[14]) >> 4) & bottom58bits; out[3] = (*((limb *) & in[21]) >> 6) & bottom58bits; out[4] = (*((limb *) & in[29])) & bottom58bits; out[5] = (*((limb *) & in[36]) >> 2) & bottom58bits; out[6] = (*((limb *) & in[43]) >> 4) & bottom58bits; out[7] = (*((limb *) & in[50]) >> 6) & bottom58bits; out[8] = (*((limb *) & in[58])) & bottom57bits; } /* * felem_to_bin66 takes an felem and serialises into a little endian, 66 byte * array. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian. */ static void felem_to_bin66(u8 out[66], const felem in) { memset(out, 0, 66); (*((limb *) & out[0])) = in[0]; (*((limb *) & out[7])) |= in[1] << 2; (*((limb *) & out[14])) |= in[2] << 4; (*((limb *) & out[21])) |= in[3] << 6; (*((limb *) & out[29])) = in[4]; (*((limb *) & out[36])) |= in[5] << 2; (*((limb *) & out[43])) |= in[6] << 4; (*((limb *) & out[50])) |= in[7] << 6; (*((limb *) & out[58])) = in[8]; } /* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */ static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) out[i] = in[len - 1 - i]; } /* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn) { felem_bytearray b_in; felem_bytearray b_out; unsigned num_bytes; /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out)); num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } if (BN_is_negative(bn)) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in); flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes); bin66_to_felem(out, b_out); return 1; } /* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */ static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in) { felem_bytearray b_in, b_out; felem_to_bin66(b_in, in); flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof b_out); return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof b_out, out); } /*- * Field operations * ---------------- */ static void felem_one(felem out) { out[0] = 1; out[1] = 0; out[2] = 0; out[3] = 0; out[4] = 0; out[5] = 0; out[6] = 0; out[7] = 0; out[8] = 0; } static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) { out[0] = in[0]; out[1] = in[1]; out[2] = in[2]; out[3] = in[3]; out[4] = in[4]; out[5] = in[5]; out[6] = in[6]; out[7] = in[7]; out[8] = in[8]; } /* felem_sum64 sets out = out + in. */ static void felem_sum64(felem out, const felem in) { out[0] += in[0]; out[1] += in[1]; out[2] += in[2]; out[3] += in[3]; out[4] += in[4]; out[5] += in[5]; out[6] += in[6]; out[7] += in[7]; out[8] += in[8]; } /* felem_scalar sets out = in * scalar */ static void felem_scalar(felem out, const felem in, limb scalar) { out[0] = in[0] * scalar; out[1] = in[1] * scalar; out[2] = in[2] * scalar; out[3] = in[3] * scalar; out[4] = in[4] * scalar; out[5] = in[5] * scalar; out[6] = in[6] * scalar; out[7] = in[7] * scalar; out[8] = in[8] * scalar; } /* felem_scalar64 sets out = out * scalar */ static void felem_scalar64(felem out, limb scalar) { out[0] *= scalar; out[1] *= scalar; out[2] *= scalar; out[3] *= scalar; out[4] *= scalar; out[5] *= scalar; out[6] *= scalar; out[7] *= scalar; out[8] *= scalar; } /* felem_scalar128 sets out = out * scalar */ static void felem_scalar128(largefelem out, limb scalar) { out[0] *= scalar; out[1] *= scalar; out[2] *= scalar; out[3] *= scalar; out[4] *= scalar; out[5] *= scalar; out[6] *= scalar; out[7] *= scalar; out[8] *= scalar; } /*- * felem_neg sets |out| to |-in| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 * On exit: * out[i] < 2^62 */ static void felem_neg(felem out, const felem in) { /* In order to prevent underflow, we subtract from 0 mod p. */ static const limb two62m3 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5); static const limb two62m2 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4); out[0] = two62m3 - in[0]; out[1] = two62m2 - in[1]; out[2] = two62m2 - in[2]; out[3] = two62m2 - in[3]; out[4] = two62m2 - in[4]; out[5] = two62m2 - in[5]; out[6] = two62m2 - in[6]; out[7] = two62m2 - in[7]; out[8] = two62m2 - in[8]; } /*- * felem_diff64 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^62 */ static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in) { /* * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting. */ static const limb two62m3 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5); static const limb two62m2 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4); out[0] += two62m3 - in[0]; out[1] += two62m2 - in[1]; out[2] += two62m2 - in[2]; out[3] += two62m2 - in[3]; out[4] += two62m2 - in[4]; out[5] += two62m2 - in[5]; out[6] += two62m2 - in[6]; out[7] += two62m2 - in[7]; out[8] += two62m2 - in[8]; } /*- * felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^62 + 2^17 * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^63 */ static void felem_diff_128_64(largefelem out, const felem in) { /* * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting. */ static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5); static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4); out[0] += two63m6 - in[0]; out[1] += two63m5 - in[1]; out[2] += two63m5 - in[2]; out[3] += two63m5 - in[3]; out[4] += two63m5 - in[4]; out[5] += two63m5 - in[5]; out[6] += two63m5 - in[6]; out[7] += two63m5 - in[7]; out[8] += two63m5 - in[8]; } /*- * felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^126 * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^127 - 2^69 */ static void felem_diff128(largefelem out, const largefelem in) { /* * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting. */ static const uint128_t two127m70 = (((uint128_t) 1) << 127) - (((uint128_t) 1) << 70); static const uint128_t two127m69 = (((uint128_t) 1) << 127) - (((uint128_t) 1) << 69); out[0] += (two127m70 - in[0]); out[1] += (two127m69 - in[1]); out[2] += (two127m69 - in[2]); out[3] += (two127m69 - in[3]); out[4] += (two127m69 - in[4]); out[5] += (two127m69 - in[5]); out[6] += (two127m69 - in[6]); out[7] += (two127m69 - in[7]); out[8] += (two127m69 - in[8]); } /*- * felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2 * On entry: * in[i] < 2^62 * On exit: * out[i] < 17 * max(in[i]) * max(in[i]) */ static void felem_square(largefelem out, const felem in) { felem inx2, inx4; felem_scalar(inx2, in, 2); felem_scalar(inx4, in, 4); /*- * We have many cases were we want to do * in[x] * in[y] + * in[y] * in[x] * This is obviously just * 2 * in[x] * in[y] * However, rather than do the doubling on the 128 bit result, we * double one of the inputs to the multiplication by reading from * |inx2| */ out[0] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * in[0]; out[1] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[1]; out[2] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[2] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * in[1]; out[3] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[3] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[2]; out[4] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[4] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[3] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * in[2]; out[5] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[5] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[4] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[3]; out[6] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[6] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[5] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[4] + ((uint128_t) in[3]) * in[3]; out[7] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[7] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[6] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[5] + ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx2[4]; out[8] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[8] + ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx2[7] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx2[6] + ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx2[5] + ((uint128_t) in[4]) * in[4]; /* * The remaining limbs fall above 2^521, with the first falling at 2^522. * They correspond to locations one bit up from the limbs produced above * so we would have to multiply by two to align them. Again, rather than * operate on the 128-bit result, we double one of the inputs to the * multiplication. If we want to double for both this reason, and the * reason above, then we end up multiplying by four. */ /* 9 */ out[0] += ((uint128_t) in[1]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx4[7] + ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx4[6] + ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[5]; /* 10 */ out[1] += ((uint128_t) in[2]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx4[7] + ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[6] + ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx2[5]; /* 11 */ out[2] += ((uint128_t) in[3]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[7] + ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx4[6]; /* 12 */ out[3] += ((uint128_t) in[4]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx4[7] + ((uint128_t) in[6]) * inx2[6]; /* 13 */ out[4] += ((uint128_t) in[5]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[6]) * inx4[7]; /* 14 */ out[5] += ((uint128_t) in[6]) * inx4[8] + ((uint128_t) in[7]) * inx2[7]; /* 15 */ out[6] += ((uint128_t) in[7]) * inx4[8]; /* 16 */ out[7] += ((uint128_t) in[8]) * inx2[8]; } /*- * felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2| * On entry: * in1[i] < 2^64 * in2[i] < 2^63 * On exit: * out[i] < 17 * max(in1[i]) * max(in2[i]) */ static void felem_mul(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) { felem in2x2; felem_scalar(in2x2, in2, 2); out[0] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[0]; out[1] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[0]; out[2] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[0]; out[3] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[0]; out[4] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[0]; out[5] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[0]; out[6] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2[0]; out[7] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2[0]; out[8] = ((uint128_t) in1[0]) * in2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2[1] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2[0]; /* See comment in felem_square about the use of in2x2 here */ out[0] += ((uint128_t) in1[1]) * in2x2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2x2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2x2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[2] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[1]; out[1] += ((uint128_t) in1[2]) * in2x2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2x2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[3] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[2]; out[2] += ((uint128_t) in1[3]) * in2x2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[4] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[3]; out[3] += ((uint128_t) in1[4]) * in2x2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[5] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[4]; out[4] += ((uint128_t) in1[5]) * in2x2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[6] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[5]; out[5] += ((uint128_t) in1[6]) * in2x2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[7] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[6]; out[6] += ((uint128_t) in1[7]) * in2x2[8] + ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[7]; out[7] += ((uint128_t) in1[8]) * in2x2[8]; } static const limb bottom52bits = 0xfffffffffffff; /*- * felem_reduce converts a largefelem to an felem. * On entry: * in[i] < 2^128 * On exit: * out[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in) { u64 overflow1, overflow2; out[0] = ((limb) in[0]) & bottom58bits; out[1] = ((limb) in[1]) & bottom58bits; out[2] = ((limb) in[2]) & bottom58bits; out[3] = ((limb) in[3]) & bottom58bits; out[4] = ((limb) in[4]) & bottom58bits; out[5] = ((limb) in[5]) & bottom58bits; out[6] = ((limb) in[6]) & bottom58bits; out[7] = ((limb) in[7]) & bottom58bits; out[8] = ((limb) in[8]) & bottom58bits; /* out[i] < 2^58 */ out[1] += ((limb) in[0]) >> 58; out[1] += (((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; /*- * out[1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58 * = 2^59 + 2^6 */ out[2] += ((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) >> 52; out[2] += ((limb) in[1]) >> 58; out[2] += (((limb) (in[1] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; out[3] += ((limb) (in[1] >> 64)) >> 52; out[3] += ((limb) in[2]) >> 58; out[3] += (((limb) (in[2] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; out[4] += ((limb) (in[2] >> 64)) >> 52; out[4] += ((limb) in[3]) >> 58; out[4] += (((limb) (in[3] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; out[5] += ((limb) (in[3] >> 64)) >> 52; out[5] += ((limb) in[4]) >> 58; out[5] += (((limb) (in[4] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; out[6] += ((limb) (in[4] >> 64)) >> 52; out[6] += ((limb) in[5]) >> 58; out[6] += (((limb) (in[5] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; out[7] += ((limb) (in[5] >> 64)) >> 52; out[7] += ((limb) in[6]) >> 58; out[7] += (((limb) (in[6] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; out[8] += ((limb) (in[6] >> 64)) >> 52; out[8] += ((limb) in[7]) >> 58; out[8] += (((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; /*- * out[x > 1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58 + 2^12 * < 2^59 + 2^13 */ overflow1 = ((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) >> 52; overflow1 += ((limb) in[8]) >> 58; overflow1 += (((limb) (in[8] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6; overflow2 = ((limb) (in[8] >> 64)) >> 52; overflow1 <<= 1; /* overflow1 < 2^13 + 2^7 + 2^59 */ overflow2 <<= 1; /* overflow2 < 2^13 */ out[0] += overflow1; /* out[0] < 2^60 */ out[1] += overflow2; /* out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 */ out[1] += out[0] >> 58; out[0] &= bottom58bits; /*- * out[0] < 2^58 * out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 + 2^2 * < 2^59 + 2^14 */ } static void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in) { largefelem tmp; felem_square(tmp, in); felem_reduce(out, tmp); } static void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) { largefelem tmp; felem_mul(tmp, in1, in2); felem_reduce(out, tmp); } /*- * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} * * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem: * a^p = a (mod p) * a^{p-1} = 1 (mod p) * a^{p-2} = a^{-1} (mod p) */ static void felem_inv(felem out, const felem in) { felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4; largefelem tmp; unsigned i; felem_square(tmp, in); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^1 */ felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^2 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp); felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^3 - 2^1 */ felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^3 - 2^0 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^3 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2^2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3); felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^5 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^6 - 2^2 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^7 - 2^3 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^8 - 2^4 */ felem_assign(ftmp4, ftmp3); felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* 2^8 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp4); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* 2^9 - 2^2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^8 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^16 - 2^8 */ } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^16 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^32 - 2^16 */ } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^32 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^64 - 2^32 */ } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^64 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3); for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^128 - 2^64 */ } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^128 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3); for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^256 - 2^128 */ } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^256 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, ftmp3); for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^512 - 2^256 */ } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^512 - 2^0 */ for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^521 - 2^9 */ } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp4); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^512 - 2^2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, in); felem_reduce(out, tmp); /* 2^512 - 3 */ } /* This is 2^521-1, expressed as an felem */ static const felem kPrime = { 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x01ffffffffffffff }; /*- * felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0 * otherwise. * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in) { felem ftmp; limb is_zero, is_p; felem_assign(ftmp, in); ftmp[0] += ftmp[8] >> 57; ftmp[8] &= bottom57bits; /* ftmp[8] < 2^57 */ ftmp[1] += ftmp[0] >> 58; ftmp[0] &= bottom58bits; ftmp[2] += ftmp[1] >> 58; ftmp[1] &= bottom58bits; ftmp[3] += ftmp[2] >> 58; ftmp[2] &= bottom58bits; ftmp[4] += ftmp[3] >> 58; ftmp[3] &= bottom58bits; ftmp[5] += ftmp[4] >> 58; ftmp[4] &= bottom58bits; ftmp[6] += ftmp[5] >> 58; ftmp[5] &= bottom58bits; ftmp[7] += ftmp[6] >> 58; ftmp[6] &= bottom58bits; ftmp[8] += ftmp[7] >> 58; ftmp[7] &= bottom58bits; /* ftmp[8] < 2^57 + 4 */ /* * The ninth limb of 2*(2^521-1) is 0x03ffffffffffffff, which is greater * than our bound for ftmp[8]. Therefore we only have to check if the * zero is zero or 2^521-1. */ is_zero = 0; is_zero |= ftmp[0]; is_zero |= ftmp[1]; is_zero |= ftmp[2]; is_zero |= ftmp[3]; is_zero |= ftmp[4]; is_zero |= ftmp[5]; is_zero |= ftmp[6]; is_zero |= ftmp[7]; is_zero |= ftmp[8]; is_zero--; /* * We know that ftmp[i] < 2^63, therefore the only way that the top bit * can be set is if is_zero was 0 before the decrement. */ is_zero = ((s64) is_zero) >> 63; is_p = ftmp[0] ^ kPrime[0]; is_p |= ftmp[1] ^ kPrime[1]; is_p |= ftmp[2] ^ kPrime[2]; is_p |= ftmp[3] ^ kPrime[3]; is_p |= ftmp[4] ^ kPrime[4]; is_p |= ftmp[5] ^ kPrime[5]; is_p |= ftmp[6] ^ kPrime[6]; is_p |= ftmp[7] ^ kPrime[7]; is_p |= ftmp[8] ^ kPrime[8]; is_p--; is_p = ((s64) is_p) >> 63; is_zero |= is_p; return is_zero; } static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in) { return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1)); } /*- * felem_contract converts |in| to its unique, minimal representation. * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */ static void felem_contract(felem out, const felem in) { limb is_p, is_greater, sign; static const limb two58 = ((limb) 1) << 58; felem_assign(out, in); out[0] += out[8] >> 57; out[8] &= bottom57bits; /* out[8] < 2^57 */ out[1] += out[0] >> 58; out[0] &= bottom58bits; out[2] += out[1] >> 58; out[1] &= bottom58bits; out[3] += out[2] >> 58; out[2] &= bottom58bits; out[4] += out[3] >> 58; out[3] &= bottom58bits; out[5] += out[4] >> 58; out[4] &= bottom58bits; out[6] += out[5] >> 58; out[5] &= bottom58bits; out[7] += out[6] >> 58; out[6] &= bottom58bits; out[8] += out[7] >> 58; out[7] &= bottom58bits; /* out[8] < 2^57 + 4 */ /* * If the value is greater than 2^521-1 then we have to subtract 2^521-1 * out. See the comments in felem_is_zero regarding why we don't test for * other multiples of the prime. */ /* * First, if |out| is equal to 2^521-1, we subtract it out to get zero. */ is_p = out[0] ^ kPrime[0]; is_p |= out[1] ^ kPrime[1]; is_p |= out[2] ^ kPrime[2]; is_p |= out[3] ^ kPrime[3]; is_p |= out[4] ^ kPrime[4]; is_p |= out[5] ^ kPrime[5]; is_p |= out[6] ^ kPrime[6]; is_p |= out[7] ^ kPrime[7]; is_p |= out[8] ^ kPrime[8]; is_p--; is_p &= is_p << 32; is_p &= is_p << 16; is_p &= is_p << 8; is_p &= is_p << 4; is_p &= is_p << 2; is_p &= is_p << 1; is_p = ((s64) is_p) >> 63; is_p = ~is_p; /* is_p is 0 iff |out| == 2^521-1 and all ones otherwise */ out[0] &= is_p; out[1] &= is_p; out[2] &= is_p; out[3] &= is_p; out[4] &= is_p; out[5] &= is_p; out[6] &= is_p; out[7] &= is_p; out[8] &= is_p; /* * In order to test that |out| >= 2^521-1 we need only test if out[8] >> * 57 is greater than zero as (2^521-1) + x >= 2^522 */ is_greater = out[8] >> 57; is_greater |= is_greater << 32; is_greater |= is_greater << 16; is_greater |= is_greater << 8; is_greater |= is_greater << 4; is_greater |= is_greater << 2; is_greater |= is_greater << 1; is_greater = ((s64) is_greater) >> 63; out[0] -= kPrime[0] & is_greater; out[1] -= kPrime[1] & is_greater; out[2] -= kPrime[2] & is_greater; out[3] -= kPrime[3] & is_greater; out[4] -= kPrime[4] & is_greater; out[5] -= kPrime[5] & is_greater; out[6] -= kPrime[6] & is_greater; out[7] -= kPrime[7] & is_greater; out[8] -= kPrime[8] & is_greater; /* Eliminate negative coefficients */ sign = -(out[0] >> 63); out[0] += (two58 & sign); out[1] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[1] >> 63); out[1] += (two58 & sign); out[2] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[2] >> 63); out[2] += (two58 & sign); out[3] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[3] >> 63); out[3] += (two58 & sign); out[4] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[4] >> 63); out[4] += (two58 & sign); out[5] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[0] >> 63); out[5] += (two58 & sign); out[6] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[6] >> 63); out[6] += (two58 & sign); out[7] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[7] >> 63); out[7] += (two58 & sign); out[8] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[5] >> 63); out[5] += (two58 & sign); out[6] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[6] >> 63); out[6] += (two58 & sign); out[7] -= (1 & sign); sign = -(out[7] >> 63); out[7] += (two58 & sign); out[8] -= (1 & sign); } /*- * Group operations * ---------------- * * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian * coordinates */ /*- * point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in) * * The method is taken from: * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b * * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed. * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */ static void point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in) { largefelem tmp, tmp2; felem delta, gamma, beta, alpha, ftmp, ftmp2; felem_assign(ftmp, x_in); felem_assign(ftmp2, x_in); /* delta = z^2 */ felem_square(tmp, z_in); felem_reduce(delta, tmp); /* delta[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */ /* gamma = y^2 */ felem_square(tmp, y_in); felem_reduce(gamma, tmp); /* gamma[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */ /* beta = x*gamma */ felem_mul(tmp, x_in, gamma); felem_reduce(beta, tmp); /* beta[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */ /* alpha = 3*(x-delta)*(x+delta) */ felem_diff64(ftmp, delta); /* ftmp[i] < 2^61 */ felem_sum64(ftmp2, delta); /* ftmp2[i] < 2^60 + 2^15 */ felem_scalar64(ftmp2, 3); /* ftmp2[i] < 3*2^60 + 3*2^15 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2); /*- * tmp[i] < 17(3*2^121 + 3*2^76) * = 61*2^121 + 61*2^76 * < 64*2^121 + 64*2^76 * = 2^127 + 2^82 * < 2^128 */ felem_reduce(alpha, tmp); /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */ felem_square(tmp, alpha); /* * tmp[i] < 17*2^120 < 2^125 */ felem_assign(ftmp, beta); felem_scalar64(ftmp, 8); /* ftmp[i] < 2^62 + 2^17 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp); /* tmp[i] < 2^125 + 2^63 + 2^62 + 2^17 */ felem_reduce(x_out, tmp); /* z' = (y + z)^2 - gamma - delta */ felem_sum64(delta, gamma); /* delta[i] < 2^60 + 2^15 */ felem_assign(ftmp, y_in); felem_sum64(ftmp, z_in); /* ftmp[i] < 2^60 + 2^15 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); /* * tmp[i] < 17(2^122) < 2^127 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, delta); /* tmp[i] < 2^127 + 2^63 */ felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); /* y' = alpha*(4*beta - x') - 8*gamma^2 */ felem_scalar64(beta, 4); /* beta[i] < 2^61 + 2^16 */ felem_diff64(beta, x_out); /* beta[i] < 2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16 */ felem_mul(tmp, alpha, beta); /*- * tmp[i] < 17*((2^59 + 2^14)(2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16)) * = 17*(2^120 + 2^75 + 2^119 + 2^74 + 2^75 + 2^30) * = 17*(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30) * < 2^128 */ felem_square(tmp2, gamma); /*- * tmp2[i] < 17*(2^59 + 2^14)^2 * = 17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28) */ felem_scalar128(tmp2, 8); /*- * tmp2[i] < 8*17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28) * = 2^125 + 2^121 + 2^81 + 2^77 + 2^35 + 2^31 * < 2^126 */ felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2); /*- * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30) * = 2^127 + 2^124 + 2^122 + 2^120 + 2^118 + 2^80 + 2^78 + 2^76 + * 2^74 + 2^69 + 2^34 + 2^30 * < 2^128 */ felem_reduce(y_out, tmp); } /* copy_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */ static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) { const limb tmp = mask & (in[i] ^ out[i]); out[i] ^= tmp; } } /*- * point_add calculates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) * * The method is taken from * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl, * adapted for mixed addition (z2 = 1, or z2 = 0 for the point at infinity). * * This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points * are equal (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for * ECDH or ECDSA signing. */ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1, const int mixed, const felem x2, const felem y2, const felem z2) { felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4, ftmp5, ftmp6, x_out, y_out, z_out; largefelem tmp, tmp2; limb x_equal, y_equal, z1_is_zero, z2_is_zero; z1_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z1); z2_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z2); /* ftmp = z1z1 = z1**2 */ felem_square(tmp, z1); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); if (!mixed) { /* ftmp2 = z2z2 = z2**2 */ felem_square(tmp, z2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */ felem_mul(tmp, x1, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* ftmp5 = z1 + z2 */ felem_assign(ftmp5, z1); felem_sum64(ftmp5, z2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2^61 */ /* ftmp5 = (z1 + z2)**2 - z1z1 - z2z2 = 2*z1z2 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp5); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^63 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp2); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^64 */ felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); /* ftmp2 = z2 * z2z2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, z2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* s1 = ftmp6 = y1 * z2**3 */ felem_mul(tmp, y1, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp6, tmp); } else { /* * We'll assume z2 = 1 (special case z2 = 0 is handled later) */ /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */ felem_assign(ftmp3, x1); /* ftmp5 = 2*z1z2 */ felem_scalar(ftmp5, z1, 2); /* s1 = ftmp6 = y1 * z2**3 */ felem_assign(ftmp6, y1); } /* u2 = x2*z1z1 */ felem_mul(tmp, x2, ftmp); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 */ /* h = ftmp4 = u2 - u1 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp3); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 + 2^63 */ felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); x_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp4); /* z_out = ftmp5 * h */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp5, ftmp4); felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); /* ftmp = z1 * z1z1 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, z1); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* s2 = tmp = y2 * z1**3 */ felem_mul(tmp, y2, ftmp); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 */ /* r = ftmp5 = (s2 - s1)*2 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp6); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^120 + 2^63 */ felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); y_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp5); felem_scalar64(ftmp5, 2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2^61 */ if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) { point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1); return; } /* I = ftmp = (2h)**2 */ felem_assign(ftmp, ftmp4); felem_scalar64(ftmp, 2); /* ftmp[i] < 2^61 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */ felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* J = ftmp2 = h * I */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp4, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* V = ftmp4 = U1 * I */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* x_out = r**2 - J - 2V */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp5); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp2); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^63 */ felem_assign(ftmp3, ftmp4); felem_scalar64(ftmp4, 2); /* ftmp4[i] < 2^61 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp4); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 + 2^64 */ felem_reduce(x_out, tmp); /* y_out = r(V-x_out) - 2 * s1 * J */ felem_diff64(ftmp3, x_out); /* * ftmp3[i] < 2^60 + 2^60 = 2^61 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp5, ftmp3); /* tmp[i] < 17*2^122 */ felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp6, ftmp2); /* tmp2[i] < 17*2^120 */ felem_scalar128(tmp2, 2); /* tmp2[i] < 17*2^121 */ felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2); /*- * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17*2^122 * = 2^126 - 2^122 - 2^6 - 2^2 - 1 * < 2^127 */ felem_reduce(y_out, tmp); copy_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(x_out, x1, z2_is_zero); copy_conditional(y_out, y2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(y_out, y1, z2_is_zero); copy_conditional(z_out, z2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(z_out, z1, z2_is_zero); felem_assign(x3, x_out); felem_assign(y3, y_out); felem_assign(z3, z_out); } /*- * Base point pre computation * -------------------------- * * Two different sorts of precomputed tables are used in the following code. * Each contain various points on the curve, where each point is three field * elements (x, y, z). * * For the base point table, z is usually 1 (0 for the point at infinity). * This table has 16 elements: * index | bits | point * ------+---------+------------------------------ * 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0G * 1 | 0 0 0 1 | 1G * 2 | 0 0 1 0 | 2^130G * 3 | 0 0 1 1 | (2^130 + 1)G * 4 | 0 1 0 0 | 2^260G * 5 | 0 1 0 1 | (2^260 + 1)G * 6 | 0 1 1 0 | (2^260 + 2^130)G * 7 | 0 1 1 1 | (2^260 + 2^130 + 1)G * 8 | 1 0 0 0 | 2^390G * 9 | 1 0 0 1 | (2^390 + 1)G * 10 | 1 0 1 0 | (2^390 + 2^130)G * 11 | 1 0 1 1 | (2^390 + 2^130 + 1)G * 12 | 1 1 0 0 | (2^390 + 2^260)G * 13 | 1 1 0 1 | (2^390 + 2^260 + 1)G * 14 | 1 1 1 0 | (2^390 + 2^260 + 2^130)G * 15 | 1 1 1 1 | (2^390 + 2^260 + 2^130 + 1)G * * The reason for this is so that we can clock bits into four different * locations when doing simple scalar multiplies against the base point. * * Tables for other points have table[i] = iG for i in 0 .. 16. */ /* gmul is the table of precomputed base points */ static const felem gmul[16][3] = { {{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x017e7e31c2e5bd66, 0x022cf0615a90a6fe, 0x00127a2ffa8de334, 0x01dfbf9d64a3f877, 0x006b4d3dbaa14b5e, 0x014fed487e0a2bd8, 0x015b4429c6481390, 0x03a73678fb2d988e, 0x00c6858e06b70404}, {0x00be94769fd16650, 0x031c21a89cb09022, 0x039013fad0761353, 0x02657bd099031542, 0x03273e662c97ee72, 0x01e6d11a05ebef45, 0x03d1bd998f544495, 0x03001172297ed0b1, 0x011839296a789a3b}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x0373faacbc875bae, 0x00f325023721c671, 0x00f666fd3dbde5ad, 0x01a6932363f88ea7, 0x01fc6d9e13f9c47b, 0x03bcbffc2bbf734e, 0x013ee3c3647f3a92, 0x029409fefe75d07d, 0x00ef9199963d85e5}, {0x011173743ad5b178, 0x02499c7c21bf7d46, 0x035beaeabb8b1a58, 0x00f989c4752ea0a3, 0x0101e1de48a9c1a3, 0x01a20076be28ba6c, 0x02f8052e5eb2de95, 0x01bfe8f82dea117c, 0x0160074d3c36ddb7}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x012f3fc373393b3b, 0x03d3d6172f1419fa, 0x02adc943c0b86873, 0x00d475584177952b, 0x012a4d1673750ee2, 0x00512517a0f13b0c, 0x02b184671a7b1734, 0x0315b84236f1a50a, 0x00a4afc472edbdb9}, {0x00152a7077f385c4, 0x03044007d8d1c2ee, 0x0065829d61d52b52, 0x00494ff6b6631d0d, 0x00a11d94d5f06bcf, 0x02d2f89474d9282e, 0x0241c5727c06eeb9, 0x0386928710fbdb9d, 0x01f883f727b0dfbe}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x019b0c3c9185544d, 0x006243a37c9d97db, 0x02ee3cbe030a2ad2, 0x00cfdd946bb51e0d, 0x0271c00932606b91, 0x03f817d1ec68c561, 0x03f37009806a369c, 0x03c1f30baf184fd5, 0x01091022d6d2f065}, {0x0292c583514c45ed, 0x0316fca51f9a286c, 0x00300af507c1489a, 0x0295f69008298cf1, 0x02c0ed8274943d7b, 0x016509b9b47a431e, 0x02bc9de9634868ce, 0x005b34929bffcb09, 0x000c1a0121681524}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x0286abc0292fb9f2, 0x02665eee9805b3f7, 0x01ed7455f17f26d6, 0x0346355b83175d13, 0x006284944cd0a097, 0x0191895bcdec5e51, 0x02e288370afda7d9, 0x03b22312bfefa67a, 0x01d104d3fc0613fe}, {0x0092421a12f7e47f, 0x0077a83fa373c501, 0x03bd25c5f696bd0d, 0x035c41e4d5459761, 0x01ca0d1742b24f53, 0x00aaab27863a509c, 0x018b6de47df73917, 0x025c0b771705cd01, 0x01fd51d566d760a7}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x01dd92ff6b0d1dbd, 0x039c5e2e8f8afa69, 0x0261ed13242c3b27, 0x0382c6e67026e6a0, 0x01d60b10be2089f9, 0x03c15f3dce86723f, 0x03c764a32d2a062d, 0x017307eac0fad056, 0x018207c0b96c5256}, {0x0196a16d60e13154, 0x03e6ce74c0267030, 0x00ddbf2b4e52a5aa, 0x012738241bbf31c8, 0x00ebe8dc04685a28, 0x024c2ad6d380d4a2, 0x035ee062a6e62d0e, 0x0029ed74af7d3a0f, 0x00eef32aec142ebd}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x00c31ec398993b39, 0x03a9f45bcda68253, 0x00ac733c24c70890, 0x00872b111401ff01, 0x01d178c23195eafb, 0x03bca2c816b87f74, 0x0261a9af46fbad7a, 0x0324b2a8dd3d28f9, 0x00918121d8f24e23}, {0x032bc8c1ca983cd7, 0x00d869dfb08fc8c6, 0x01693cb61fce1516, 0x012a5ea68f4e88a8, 0x010869cab88d7ae3, 0x009081ad277ceee1, 0x033a77166d064cdc, 0x03955235a1fb3a95, 0x01251a4a9b25b65e}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x00148a3a1b27f40b, 0x0123186df1b31fdc, 0x00026e7beaad34ce, 0x01db446ac1d3dbba, 0x0299c1a33437eaec, 0x024540610183cbb7, 0x0173bb0e9ce92e46, 0x02b937e43921214b, 0x01ab0436a9bf01b5}, {0x0383381640d46948, 0x008dacbf0e7f330f, 0x03602122bcc3f318, 0x01ee596b200620d6, 0x03bd0585fda430b3, 0x014aed77fd123a83, 0x005ace749e52f742, 0x0390fe041da2b842, 0x0189a8ceb3299242}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x012a19d6b3282473, 0x00c0915918b423ce, 0x023a954eb94405ae, 0x00529f692be26158, 0x0289fa1b6fa4b2aa, 0x0198ae4ceea346ef, 0x0047d8cdfbdedd49, 0x00cc8c8953f0f6b8, 0x001424abbff49203}, {0x0256732a1115a03a, 0x0351bc38665c6733, 0x03f7b950fb4a6447, 0x000afffa94c22155, 0x025763d0a4dab540, 0x000511e92d4fc283, 0x030a7e9eda0ee96c, 0x004c3cd93a28bf0a, 0x017edb3a8719217f}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x011de5675a88e673, 0x031d7d0f5e567fbe, 0x0016b2062c970ae5, 0x03f4a2be49d90aa7, 0x03cef0bd13822866, 0x03f0923dcf774a6c, 0x0284bebc4f322f72, 0x016ab2645302bb2c, 0x01793f95dace0e2a}, {0x010646e13527a28f, 0x01ca1babd59dc5e7, 0x01afedfd9a5595df, 0x01f15785212ea6b1, 0x0324e5d64f6ae3f4, 0x02d680f526d00645, 0x0127920fadf627a7, 0x03b383f75df4f684, 0x0089e0057e783b0a}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x00f334b9eb3c26c6, 0x0298fdaa98568dce, 0x01c2d24843a82292, 0x020bcb24fa1b0711, 0x02cbdb3d2b1875e6, 0x0014907598f89422, 0x03abe3aa43b26664, 0x02cbf47f720bc168, 0x0133b5e73014b79b}, {0x034aab5dab05779d, 0x00cdc5d71fee9abb, 0x0399f16bd4bd9d30, 0x03582fa592d82647, 0x02be1cdfb775b0e9, 0x0034f7cea32e94cb, 0x0335a7f08f56f286, 0x03b707e9565d1c8b, 0x0015c946ea5b614f}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x024676f6cff72255, 0x00d14625cac96378, 0x00532b6008bc3767, 0x01fc16721b985322, 0x023355ea1b091668, 0x029de7afdc0317c3, 0x02fc8a7ca2da037c, 0x02de1217d74a6f30, 0x013f7173175b73bf}, {0x0344913f441490b5, 0x0200f9e272b61eca, 0x0258a246b1dd55d2, 0x03753db9ea496f36, 0x025e02937a09c5ef, 0x030cbd3d14012692, 0x01793a67e70dc72a, 0x03ec1d37048a662e, 0x006550f700c32a8d}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x00d3f48a347eba27, 0x008e636649b61bd8, 0x00d3b93716778fb3, 0x004d1915757bd209, 0x019d5311a3da44e0, 0x016d1afcbbe6aade, 0x0241bf5f73265616, 0x0384672e5d50d39b, 0x005009fee522b684}, {0x029b4fab064435fe, 0x018868ee095bbb07, 0x01ea3d6936cc92b8, 0x000608b00f78a2f3, 0x02db911073d1c20f, 0x018205938470100a, 0x01f1e4964cbe6ff2, 0x021a19a29eed4663, 0x01414485f42afa81}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x01612b3a17f63e34, 0x03813992885428e6, 0x022b3c215b5a9608, 0x029b4057e19f2fcb, 0x0384059a587af7e6, 0x02d6400ace6fe610, 0x029354d896e8e331, 0x00c047ee6dfba65e, 0x0037720542e9d49d}, {0x02ce9eed7c5e9278, 0x0374ed703e79643b, 0x01316c54c4072006, 0x005aaa09054b2ee8, 0x002824000c840d57, 0x03d4eba24771ed86, 0x0189c50aabc3bdae, 0x0338c01541e15510, 0x00466d56e38eed42}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x007efd8330ad8bd6, 0x02465ed48047710b, 0x0034c6606b215e0c, 0x016ae30c53cbf839, 0x01fa17bd37161216, 0x018ead4e61ce8ab9, 0x005482ed5f5dee46, 0x037543755bba1d7f, 0x005e5ac7e70a9d0f}, {0x0117e1bb2fdcb2a2, 0x03deea36249f40c4, 0x028d09b4a6246cb7, 0x03524b8855bcf756, 0x023d7d109d5ceb58, 0x0178e43e3223ef9c, 0x0154536a0c6e966a, 0x037964d1286ee9fe, 0x0199bcd90e125055}, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}} }; /* * select_point selects the |idx|th point from a precomputation table and * copies it to out. */ /* pre_comp below is of the size provided in |size| */ static void select_point(const limb idx, unsigned int size, const felem pre_comp[][3], felem out[3]) { unsigned i, j; limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0]; memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * 3); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0]; limb mask = i ^ idx; mask |= mask >> 4; mask |= mask >> 2; mask |= mask >> 1; mask &= 1; mask--; for (j = 0; j < NLIMBS * 3; j++) outlimbs[j] |= inlimbs[j] & mask; } } /* get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in| */ static char get_bit(const felem_bytearray in, int i) { if (i < 0) return 0; return (in[i >> 3] >> (i & 7)) & 1; } /* * Interleaved point multiplication using precomputed point multiples: The * small point multiples 0*P, 1*P, ..., 16*P are in pre_comp[], the scalars * in scalars[]. If g_scalar is non-NULL, we also add this multiple of the * generator, using certain (large) precomputed multiples in g_pre_comp. * Output point (X, Y, Z) is stored in x_out, y_out, z_out */ static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, const felem_bytearray scalars[], const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar, const int mixed, const felem pre_comp[][17][3], const felem g_pre_comp[16][3]) { int i, skip; unsigned num, gen_mul = (g_scalar != NULL); felem nq[3], tmp[4]; limb bits; u8 sign, digit; /* set nq to the point at infinity */ memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq)); /* * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples * of the generator (last quarter of rounds) and additions of other * points multiples (every 5th round). */ skip = 1; /* save two point operations in the first * round */ for (i = (num_points ? 520 : 130); i >= 0; --i) { /* double */ if (!skip) point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]); /* add multiples of the generator */ if (gen_mul && (i <= 130)) { bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 390) << 3; if (i < 130) { bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 260) << 2; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 130) << 1; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i); } /* select the point to add, in constant time */ select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp, tmp); if (!skip) { /* The 1 argument below is for "mixed" */ point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } else { memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem)); skip = 0; } } /* do other additions every 5 doublings */ if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0)) { /* loop over all scalars */ for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num) { bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1); ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits); /* * select the point to add or subtract, in constant time */ select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp); felem_neg(tmp[3], tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative * point */ copy_conditional(tmp[1], tmp[3], (-(limb) sign)); if (!skip) { point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], mixed, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } else { memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem)); skip = 0; } } } } felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]); felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]); felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]); } /* Precomputation for the group generator. */ struct nistp521_pre_comp_st { felem g_pre_comp[16][3]; int references; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_nistp521_group_init, ec_GFp_simple_group_finish, ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_nist_group_copy, ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates, 0 /* point_set_compressed_coordinates */ , 0 /* point2oct */ , 0 /* oct2point */ , ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul, ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult, ec_GFp_nistp521_have_precompute_mult, ec_GFp_nist_field_mul, ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr, 0 /* field_div */ , 0 /* field_encode */ , 0 /* field_decode */ , 0, /* field_set_to_one */ ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } /******************************************************************************/ /* * FUNCTIONS TO MANAGE PRECOMPUTATION */ static NISTP521_PRE_COMP *nistp521_pre_comp_new() { NISTP521_PRE_COMP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } NISTP521_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *p) { int i; if (p != NULL) CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock); return p; } void EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *p) { int i; if (p == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, -1, &i, p->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistp521", x); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(p->lock); OPENSSL_free(p); } /******************************************************************************/ /* * OPENSSL EC_METHOD FUNCTIONS */ int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { int ret; ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group); group->a_is_minus3 = 1; return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *curve_p, *curve_a, *curve_b; if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p); BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a); BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[2], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_b); if ((BN_cmp(curve_p, p)) || (BN_cmp(curve_a, a)) || (BN_cmp(curve_b, b))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS); goto err; } group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_521; ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* * Takes the Jacobian coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point and returns (X', Y') = * (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */ int ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { felem z1, z2, x_in, y_in, x_out, y_out; largefelem tmp; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); return 0; } if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, point->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(z1, point->Z))) return 0; felem_inv(z2, z1); felem_square(tmp, z2); felem_reduce(z1, tmp); felem_mul(tmp, x_in, z1); felem_reduce(x_in, tmp); felem_contract(x_out, x_in); if (x != NULL) { if (!felem_to_BN(x, x_out)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } } felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2); felem_reduce(z1, tmp); felem_mul(tmp, y_in, z1); felem_reduce(y_in, tmp); felem_contract(y_out, y_in); if (y != NULL) { if (!felem_to_BN(y, y_out)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } } return 1; } /* points below is of size |num|, and tmp_felems is of size |num+1/ */ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[][3], felem tmp_felems[]) { /* * Runs in constant time, unless an input is the point at infinity (which * normally shouldn't happen). */ ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(num, points, sizeof(felem), tmp_felems, (void (*)(void *))felem_one, felem_is_zero_int, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_assign, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_square_reduce, (void (*) (void *, const void *, const void *)) felem_mul_reduce, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_inv, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_contract); } /* * Computes scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i], ignoring NULL * values Result is stored in r (r can equal one of the inputs). */ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; int j; int mixed = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar; felem_bytearray g_secret; felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL; felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; felem *tmp_felems = NULL; felem_bytearray tmp; unsigned i, num_bytes; int have_pre_comp = 0; size_t num_points = num; felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out; NISTP521_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL; felem(*g_pre_comp)[3] = NULL; EC_POINT *generator = NULL; const EC_POINT *p = NULL; const BIGNUM *p_scalar = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; if (scalar != NULL) { pre = group->pre_comp.nistp521; if (pre) /* we have precomputation, try to use it */ g_pre_comp = &pre->g_pre_comp[0]; else /* try to use the standard precomputation */ g_pre_comp = (felem(*)[3]) gmul; generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (generator == NULL) goto err; /* get the generator from precomputation */ if (!felem_to_BN(x, g_pre_comp[1][0]) || !felem_to_BN(y, g_pre_comp[1][1]) || !felem_to_BN(z, g_pre_comp[1][2])) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, z, ctx)) goto err; if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) /* precomputation matches generator */ have_pre_comp = 1; else /* * we don't have valid precomputation: treat the generator as a * random point */ num_points++; } if (num_points > 0) { if (num_points >= 2) { /* * unless we precompute multiples for just one point, converting * those into affine form is time well spent */ mixed = 1; } secrets = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); pre_comp = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); if (mixed) tmp_felems = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_felems) * (num_points * 17 + 1)); if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL) || (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity, * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination */ for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) { if (i == num) /* * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the * generator */ { p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); p_scalar = scalar; } else /* the i^th point */ { p = points[i]; p_scalar = scalars[i]; } if ((p_scalar != NULL) && (p != NULL)) { /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^521 */ if ((BN_num_bits(p_scalar) > 521) || (BN_is_negative(p_scalar))) { /* * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee * constant-timeness */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); } else num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp); flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes); /* precompute multiples */ if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(z_out, p->Z))) goto err; memcpy(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out, sizeof(felem)); memcpy(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out, sizeof(felem)); memcpy(pre_comp[i][1][2], z_out, sizeof(felem)); for (j = 2; j <= 16; ++j) { if (j & 1) { point_add(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][1][0], pre_comp[i][1][1], pre_comp[i][1][2], 0, pre_comp[i][j - 1][0], pre_comp[i][j - 1][1], pre_comp[i][j - 1][2]); } else { point_double(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][j / 2][0], pre_comp[i][j / 2][1], pre_comp[i][j / 2][2]); } } } } if (mixed) make_points_affine(num_points * 17, pre_comp[0], tmp_felems); } /* the scalar for the generator */ if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) { memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret)); /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^521 */ if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 521) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) { /* * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee * constant-timeness */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); } else num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp); flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes); /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */ batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points, g_secret, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, (const felem(*)[3])g_pre_comp); } else /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */ batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points, NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL); /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */ felem_contract(x_in, x_out); felem_contract(y_in, y_out); felem_contract(z_in, z_out); if ((!felem_to_BN(x, x_in)) || (!felem_to_BN(y, y_in)) || (!felem_to_BN(z, z_in))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ret = EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, r, x, y, z, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); EC_POINT_free(generator); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); OPENSSL_free(secrets); OPENSSL_free(pre_comp); OPENSSL_free(tmp_felems); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; NISTP521_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL; int i, j; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y; EC_POINT *generator = NULL; felem tmp_felems[16]; /* throw away old precomputation */ EC_pre_comp_free(group); if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; /* get the generator */ if (group->generator == NULL) goto err; generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (generator == NULL) goto err; BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[3], sizeof(felem_bytearray), x); BN_bin2bn(nistp521_curve_params[4], sizeof(felem_bytearray), y); if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if ((pre = nistp521_pre_comp_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* * if the generator is the standard one, use built-in precomputation */ if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) { memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp)); goto done; } if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][0], group->generator->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][1], group->generator->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][2], group->generator->Z))) goto err; /* compute 2^130*G, 2^260*G, 2^390*G */ for (i = 1; i <= 4; i <<= 1) { point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2]); for (j = 0; j < 129; ++j) { point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2]); } } /* g_pre_comp[0] is the point at infinity */ memset(pre->g_pre_comp[0], 0, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp[0])); /* the remaining multiples */ /* 2^130*G + 2^260*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[6][0], pre->g_pre_comp[6][1], pre->g_pre_comp[6][2], pre->g_pre_comp[4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[4][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2][2]); /* 2^130*G + 2^390*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[10][0], pre->g_pre_comp[10][1], pre->g_pre_comp[10][2], pre->g_pre_comp[8][0], pre->g_pre_comp[8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[8][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2][2]); /* 2^260*G + 2^390*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[12][2], pre->g_pre_comp[8][0], pre->g_pre_comp[8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[8][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[4][2]); /* 2^130*G + 2^260*G + 2^390*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[14][0], pre->g_pre_comp[14][1], pre->g_pre_comp[14][2], pre->g_pre_comp[12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[12][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2][2]); for (i = 1; i < 8; ++i) { /* odd multiples: add G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i + 1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i + 1][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i + 1][2], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[2 * i][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][2]); } make_points_affine(15, &(pre->g_pre_comp[1]), tmp_felems); done: SETPRECOMP(group, nistp521, pre); ret = 1; pre = NULL; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); EC_POINT_free(generator); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(pre); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp521_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistp521); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000010734013176625657015454 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" #include #include #include int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *group) { int i; if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) /* everything else is currently not supported */ return 0; /* Find the last non-zero element of group->poly[] */ for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(group->poly) && group->poly[i] != 0; i++) continue; if (i == 4) return NID_X9_62_ppBasis; else if (i == 2) return NID_X9_62_tpBasis; else /* everything else is currently not supported */ return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k) { if (group == NULL) return 0; if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] == 0))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (k) *k = group->poly[1]; return 1; } int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1, unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3) { if (group == NULL) return 0; if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0) && (group->poly[4] == 0))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (k1) *k1 = group->poly[3]; if (k2) *k2 = group->poly[2]; if (k3) *k3 = group->poly[1]; return 1; } #endif /* some structures needed for the asn1 encoding */ typedef struct x9_62_pentanomial_st { long k1; long k2; long k3; } X9_62_PENTANOMIAL; typedef struct x9_62_characteristic_two_st { long m; ASN1_OBJECT *type; union { char *ptr; /* NID_X9_62_onBasis */ ASN1_NULL *onBasis; /* NID_X9_62_tpBasis */ ASN1_INTEGER *tpBasis; /* NID_X9_62_ppBasis */ X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *ppBasis; /* anything else */ ASN1_TYPE *other; } p; } X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO; typedef struct x9_62_fieldid_st { ASN1_OBJECT *fieldType; union { char *ptr; /* NID_X9_62_prime_field */ ASN1_INTEGER *prime; /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two; /* anything else */ ASN1_TYPE *other; } p; } X9_62_FIELDID; typedef struct x9_62_curve_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b; ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed; } X9_62_CURVE; struct ec_parameters_st { long version; X9_62_FIELDID *fieldID; X9_62_CURVE *curve; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base; ASN1_INTEGER *order; ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor; } /* ECPARAMETERS */ ; struct ecpk_parameters_st { int type; union { ASN1_OBJECT *named_curve; ECPARAMETERS *parameters; ASN1_NULL *implicitlyCA; } value; } /* ECPKPARAMETERS */ ; /* SEC1 ECPrivateKey */ typedef struct ec_privatekey_st { long version; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey; ECPKPARAMETERS *parameters; ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey; } EC_PRIVATEKEY; /* the OpenSSL ASN.1 definitions */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k1, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k2, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k3, LONG) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(char_two_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.other, ASN1_ANY); ASN1_ADB(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_onBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.onBasis, ASN1_NULL)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_tpBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.tpBasis, ASN1_INTEGER)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_ppBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.ppBasis, X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)) } ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, 0, type, 0, &char_two_def_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, m, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(fieldID_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.other, ASN1_ANY); ASN1_ADB(X9_62_FIELDID) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_prime_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.prime, ASN1_INTEGER)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.char_two, X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)) } ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_FIELDID, 0, fieldType, 0, &fieldID_def_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_FIELDID) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, fieldType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_FIELDID) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_FIELDID) ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CURVE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, b, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_OPT(X9_62_CURVE, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CURVE) ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECPARAMETERS) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, fieldID, X9_62_FIELDID), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, curve, X9_62_CURVE), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, base, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, order, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(ECPARAMETERS, cofactor, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS) ASN1_CHOICE(ECPKPARAMETERS) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.named_curve, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.parameters, ECPARAMETERS), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.implicitlyCA, ASN1_NULL) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS, ECPKPARAMETERS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS) ASN1_SEQUENCE(EC_PRIVATEKEY) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, parameters, ECPKPARAMETERS, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EC_PRIVATEKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY, EC_PRIVATEKEY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY) /* some declarations of internal function */ /* ec_asn1_group2field() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */ static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_FIELDID *); /* ec_asn1_group2curve() sets the values in a X9_62_CURVE object */ static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_CURVE *); /* the function definitions */ static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_FIELDID *field) { int ok = 0, nid; BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; if (group == NULL || field == NULL) return 0; /* clear the old values (if necessary) */ ASN1_OBJECT_free(field->fieldType); ASN1_TYPE_free(field->p.other); nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)); /* set OID for the field */ if ((field->fieldType = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB); goto err; } if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* the parameters are specified by the prime number p */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set the prime number */ field->p.prime = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, NULL); if (field->p.prime == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else if (nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } #else { int field_type; X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two; field->p.char_two = X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_new(); char_two = field->p.char_two; if (char_two == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } char_two->m = (long)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); field_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(group); if (field_type == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set base type OID */ if ((char_two->type = OBJ_nid2obj(field_type)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB); goto err; } if (field_type == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) { unsigned int k; if (!EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(group, &k)) goto err; char_two->p.tpBasis = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (char_two->p.tpBasis == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(char_two->p.tpBasis, (long)k)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) { unsigned int k1, k2, k3; if (!EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(group, &k1, &k2, &k3)) goto err; char_two->p.ppBasis = X9_62_PENTANOMIAL_new(); if (char_two->p.ppBasis == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* set k? values */ char_two->p.ppBasis->k1 = (long)k1; char_two->p.ppBasis->k2 = (long)k2; char_two->p.ppBasis->k3 = (long)k3; } else { /* field_type == NID_X9_62_onBasis */ /* for ONB the parameters are (asn1) NULL */ char_two->p.onBasis = ASN1_NULL_new(); if (char_two->p.onBasis == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } #endif else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD); goto err; } ok = 1; err: BN_free(tmp); return (ok); } static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_CURVE *curve) { int ok = 0, nid; BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL; unsigned char *buffer_1 = NULL, *buffer_2 = NULL, *a_buf = NULL, *b_buf = NULL; size_t len_1, len_2; unsigned char char_zero = 0; if (!group || !curve || !curve->a || !curve->b) return 0; if ((tmp_1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp_2 = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)); /* get a and b */ if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif len_1 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_1); len_2 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_2); if (len_1 == 0) { /* len_1 == 0 => a == 0 */ a_buf = &char_zero; len_1 = 1; } else { if ((buffer_1 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_1)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((len_1 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_1, buffer_1)) == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } a_buf = buffer_1; } if (len_2 == 0) { /* len_2 == 0 => b == 0 */ b_buf = &char_zero; len_2 = 1; } else { if ((buffer_2 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_2)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((len_2 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_2, buffer_2)) == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } b_buf = buffer_2; } /* set a and b */ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->a, a_buf, len_1) || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->b, b_buf, len_2)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } /* set the seed (optional) */ if (group->seed) { if (!curve->seed) if ((curve->seed = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } curve->seed->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); curve->seed->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(curve->seed, group->seed, (int)group->seed_len)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else { ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(curve->seed); curve->seed = NULL; } ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(buffer_1); OPENSSL_free(buffer_2); BN_free(tmp_1); BN_free(tmp_2); return (ok); } ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPARAMETERS *params) { size_t len = 0; ECPARAMETERS *ret = NULL; const BIGNUM *tmp; unsigned char *buffer = NULL; const EC_POINT *point = NULL; point_conversion_form_t form; if (params == NULL) { if ((ret = ECPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else ret = params; /* set the version (always one) */ ret->version = (long)0x1; /* set the fieldID */ if (!ec_asn1_group2fieldid(group, ret->fieldID)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set the curve */ if (!ec_asn1_group2curve(group, ret->curve)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set the base point */ if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group); len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buffer, NULL); if (len == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (ret->base == NULL && (ret->base = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(ret->base, buffer, len); /* set the order */ tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (tmp == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->order); if (ret->order == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } /* set the cofactor (optional) */ tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group); if (tmp != NULL) { ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->cofactor); if (ret->cofactor == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } return ret; err: if (params == NULL) ECPARAMETERS_free(ret); return NULL; } ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPKPARAMETERS *params) { int ok = 1, tmp; ECPKPARAMETERS *ret = params; if (ret == NULL) { if ((ret = ECPKPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } else { if (ret->type == 0) ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve); else if (ret->type == 1 && ret->value.parameters) ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters); } if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group)) { /* * use the asn1 OID to describe the the elliptic curve parameters */ tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); if (tmp) { ret->type = 0; if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL) ok = 0; } else /* we don't know the nid => ERROR */ ok = 0; } else { /* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */ ret->type = 1; if ((ret->value.parameters = EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL)) == NULL) ok = 0; } if (!ok) { ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params) { int ok = 0, tmp; EC_GROUP *ret = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL; EC_POINT *point = NULL; long field_bits; if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType || !params->fieldID->p.ptr) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* now extract the curve parameters a and b */ if (!params->curve || !params->curve->a || !params->curve->a->data || !params->curve->b || !params->curve->b->data) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } a = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->a->data, params->curve->a->length, NULL); if (a == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } b = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->b->data, params->curve->b->length, NULL); if (b == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* get the field parameters */ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->fieldID->fieldType); if (tmp == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } #else { X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two; char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two; field_bits = char_two->m; if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the base type */ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(char_two->type); if (tmp == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) { long tmp_long; if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis); if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS); goto err; } /* create the polynomial */ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)tmp_long)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0)) goto err; } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) { X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *penta; penta = char_two->p.ppBasis; if (!penta) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (! (char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2 && penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS); goto err; } /* create the polynomial */ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k2)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k3)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0)) goto err; } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_onBasis) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); goto err; } else { /* error */ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* create the EC_GROUP structure */ ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, NULL); } #endif else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { /* we have a curve over a prime field */ /* extract the prime number */ if (!params->fieldID->p.prime) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->fieldID->p.prime, NULL); if (p == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD); goto err; } field_bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } /* create the EC_GROUP structure */ ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL); } else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD); goto err; } if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* extract seed (optional) */ if (params->curve->seed != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ret->seed); if ((ret->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(params->curve->seed->length)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(ret->seed, params->curve->seed->data, params->curve->seed->length); ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length; } if (!params->order || !params->base || !params->base->data) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if ((point = EC_POINT_new(ret)) == NULL) goto err; /* set the point conversion form */ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(ret, (point_conversion_form_t) (params->base->data[0] & ~0x01)); /* extract the ec point */ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret, point, params->base->data, params->base->length, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* extract the order */ if ((a = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->order, a)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); goto err; } if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) { /* Hasse bound */ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); goto err; } /* extract the cofactor (optional) */ if (params->cofactor == NULL) { BN_free(b); b = NULL; } else if ((b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->cofactor, b)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } /* set the generator, order and cofactor (if present) */ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret, point, a, b)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret); ret = NULL; } BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); EC_POINT_free(point); return (ret); } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params) { EC_GROUP *ret = NULL; int tmp = 0; if (params == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return NULL; } if (params->type == 0) { /* the curve is given by an OID */ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve); if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE); return NULL; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); } else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a * ECPARAMETERS structure */ ret = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(params->value.parameters); if (!ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return NULL; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, 0x0); } else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */ return NULL; } else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); return NULL; } return ret; } /* EC_GROUP <-> DER encoding of ECPKPARAMETERS */ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_GROUP *group = NULL; ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL; const unsigned char *p = *in; if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); return NULL; } if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(params)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE); ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); return NULL; } if (a) { EC_GROUP_clear_free(*a); *a = group; } ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); *in = p; return (group); } int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out) { int ret = 0; ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a, NULL); if (tmp == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); return 0; } if ((ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, out)) == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp); return 0; } ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp); return (ret); } /* some EC_KEY functions */ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_KEY *ret = NULL; EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; const unsigned char *p = *in; if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return NULL; } if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) { if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else ret = *a; if (priv_key->parameters) { EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group); ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(priv_key->parameters); } if (ret->group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret->version = priv_key->version; if (priv_key->privateKey) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkey = priv_key->privateKey; if (EC_KEY_oct2priv(ret, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pkey), ASN1_STRING_length(pkey)) == 0) goto err; } else { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY); goto err; } EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key); ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group); if (ret->pub_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (priv_key->publicKey) { const unsigned char *pub_oct; int pub_oct_len; pub_oct = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(priv_key->publicKey); pub_oct_len = ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey); if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else { if (ret->group->meth->keygenpub == NULL || ret->group->meth->keygenpub(ret) == 0) goto err; /* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */ ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY; } if (a) *a = ret; EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); *in = p; return (ret); err: if (a == NULL || *a != ret) EC_KEY_free(ret); EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); return NULL; } int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) { int ret = 0, ok = 0; unsigned char *priv= NULL, *pub= NULL; size_t privlen = 0, publen = 0; EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } priv_key->version = a->version; privlen = EC_KEY_priv2buf(a, &priv); if (privlen == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->privateKey, priv, privlen); priv = NULL; if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS)) { if ((priv_key->parameters = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a->group, priv_key->parameters)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY)) { priv_key->publicKey = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new(); if (priv_key->publicKey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } publen = EC_KEY_key2buf(a, a->conv_form, &pub, NULL); if (publen == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } priv_key->publicKey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); priv_key->publicKey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->publicKey, pub, publen); pub = NULL; } if ((ret = i2d_EC_PRIVATEKEY(priv_key, out)) == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(priv, privlen); OPENSSL_free(pub); EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); return (ok ? ret : 0); } int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) { if (a == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } return i2d_ECPKParameters(a->group, out); } EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_KEY *ret; if (in == NULL || *in == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) { if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } else ret = *a; if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); if (a == NULL || *a != ret) EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } if (a) *a = ret; return ret; } EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_KEY *ret = NULL; if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) { /* * sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structure is necessary to set the public key */ ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } ret = *a; if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, *in, len, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } *in += len; return ret; } int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) { size_t buf_len = 0; int new_buffer = 0; if (a == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } buf_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL); if (out == NULL || buf_len == 0) /* out == NULL => just return the length of the octet string */ return buf_len; if (*out == NULL) { if ((*out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } new_buffer = 1; } if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form, *out, buf_len, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); if (new_buffer) { OPENSSL_free(*out); *out = NULL; } return 0; } if (!new_buffer) *out += buf_len; return buf_len; } ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECDSA_SIG) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECDSA_SIG) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG) ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void) { ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sig)); if (sig == NULL) ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return sig; } void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig) { if (sig == NULL) return; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); OPENSSL_free(sig); } void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) { if (pr != NULL) *pr = sig->r; if (ps != NULL) *ps = sig->s; } int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { if (r == NULL || s == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); sig->r = r; sig->s = s; return 1; } int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r) { int ret, i; ASN1_INTEGER bs; unsigned char buf[4]; const EC_GROUP *group; if (r == NULL) return 0; group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r); if (group == NULL) return 0; i = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group); if (i == 0) return 0; bs.length = (i + 7) / 8; bs.data = buf; bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; /* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */ buf[0] = 0xff; i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL); i += i; /* r and s */ ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/curve25519.c0000644000000000000000000042476013176625657015705 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* This code is mostly taken from the ref10 version of Ed25519 in SUPERCOP * 20141124 (http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html). * * The field functions are shared by Ed25519 and X25519 where possible. */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" /* fe means field element. Here the field is \Z/(2^255-19). An element t, * entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77 * t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on * context. */ typedef int32_t fe[10]; static const int64_t kBottom25Bits = 0x1ffffffLL; static const int64_t kBottom26Bits = 0x3ffffffLL; static const int64_t kTop39Bits = 0xfffffffffe000000LL; static const int64_t kTop38Bits = 0xfffffffffc000000LL; static uint64_t load_3(const uint8_t *in) { uint64_t result; result = (uint64_t)in[0]; result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8; result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16; return result; } static uint64_t load_4(const uint8_t *in) { uint64_t result; result = (uint64_t)in[0]; result |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 8; result |= ((uint64_t)in[2]) << 16; result |= ((uint64_t)in[3]) << 24; return result; } static void fe_frombytes(fe h, const uint8_t *s) { /* Ignores top bit of h. */ int64_t h0 = load_4(s); int64_t h1 = load_3(s + 4) << 6; int64_t h2 = load_3(s + 7) << 5; int64_t h3 = load_3(s + 10) << 3; int64_t h4 = load_3(s + 13) << 2; int64_t h5 = load_4(s + 16); int64_t h6 = load_3(s + 20) << 7; int64_t h7 = load_3(s + 23) << 5; int64_t h8 = load_3(s + 26) << 4; int64_t h9 = (load_3(s + 29) & 8388607) << 2; int64_t carry0; int64_t carry1; int64_t carry2; int64_t carry3; int64_t carry4; int64_t carry5; int64_t carry6; int64_t carry7; int64_t carry8; int64_t carry9; carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits; carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits; carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits; carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits; carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits; carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits; carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits; carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits; h[0] = h0; h[1] = h1; h[2] = h2; h[3] = h3; h[4] = h4; h[5] = h5; h[6] = h6; h[7] = h7; h[8] = h8; h[9] = h9; } /* Preconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. * * Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p). * Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))). * * Proof: * Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4. * Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^231 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4. * * Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9). * Then 0> 25; q = (h0 + q) >> 26; q = (h1 + q) >> 25; q = (h2 + q) >> 26; q = (h3 + q) >> 25; q = (h4 + q) >> 26; q = (h5 + q) >> 25; q = (h6 + q) >> 26; q = (h7 + q) >> 25; q = (h8 + q) >> 26; q = (h9 + q) >> 25; /* Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */ h0 += 19 * q; /* Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. */ h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 &= kBottom26Bits; h2 += h1 >> 25; h1 &= kBottom25Bits; h3 += h2 >> 26; h2 &= kBottom26Bits; h4 += h3 >> 25; h3 &= kBottom25Bits; h5 += h4 >> 26; h4 &= kBottom26Bits; h6 += h5 >> 25; h5 &= kBottom25Bits; h7 += h6 >> 26; h6 &= kBottom26Bits; h8 += h7 >> 25; h7 &= kBottom25Bits; h9 += h8 >> 26; h8 &= kBottom26Bits; h9 &= kBottom25Bits; /* h10 = carry9 */ /* Goal: Output h0+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. * Have h0+...+2^230 h9 between 0 and 2^255-1; * evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0. * Goal: Output h0+...+2^230 h9. */ s[0] = h0 >> 0; s[1] = h0 >> 8; s[2] = h0 >> 16; s[3] = (h0 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h1) << 2); s[4] = h1 >> 6; s[5] = h1 >> 14; s[6] = (h1 >> 22) | ((uint32_t)(h2) << 3); s[7] = h2 >> 5; s[8] = h2 >> 13; s[9] = (h2 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h3) << 5); s[10] = h3 >> 3; s[11] = h3 >> 11; s[12] = (h3 >> 19) | ((uint32_t)(h4) << 6); s[13] = h4 >> 2; s[14] = h4 >> 10; s[15] = h4 >> 18; s[16] = h5 >> 0; s[17] = h5 >> 8; s[18] = h5 >> 16; s[19] = (h5 >> 24) | ((uint32_t)(h6) << 1); s[20] = h6 >> 7; s[21] = h6 >> 15; s[22] = (h6 >> 23) | ((uint32_t)(h7) << 3); s[23] = h7 >> 5; s[24] = h7 >> 13; s[25] = (h7 >> 21) | ((uint32_t)(h8) << 4); s[26] = h8 >> 4; s[27] = h8 >> 12; s[28] = (h8 >> 20) | ((uint32_t)(h9) << 6); s[29] = h9 >> 2; s[30] = h9 >> 10; s[31] = h9 >> 18; } /* h = f */ static void fe_copy(fe h, const fe f) { memmove(h, f, sizeof(int32_t) * 10); } /* h = 0 */ static void fe_0(fe h) { memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10); } /* h = 1 */ static void fe_1(fe h) { memset(h, 0, sizeof(int32_t) * 10); h[0] = 1; } /* h = f + g * Can overlap h with f or g. * * Preconditions: * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. * |g| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. * * Postconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */ static void fe_add(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { h[i] = f[i] + g[i]; } } /* h = f - g * Can overlap h with f or g. * * Preconditions: * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. * |g| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. * * Postconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. */ static void fe_sub(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { h[i] = f[i] - g[i]; } } /* h = f * g * Can overlap h with f or g. * * Preconditions: * |f| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc. * |g| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc. * * Postconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc. * * Notes on implementation strategy: * * Using schoolbook multiplication. * Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models. * * Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations; * cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations. * * There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain; * one *19 precomputation can be merged into this, * but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean. * * There are 12 carries below. * 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable. * Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper. * * With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32. */ static void fe_mul(fe h, const fe f, const fe g) { int32_t f0 = f[0]; int32_t f1 = f[1]; int32_t f2 = f[2]; int32_t f3 = f[3]; int32_t f4 = f[4]; int32_t f5 = f[5]; int32_t f6 = f[6]; int32_t f7 = f[7]; int32_t f8 = f[8]; int32_t f9 = f[9]; int32_t g0 = g[0]; int32_t g1 = g[1]; int32_t g2 = g[2]; int32_t g3 = g[3]; int32_t g4 = g[4]; int32_t g5 = g[5]; int32_t g6 = g[6]; int32_t g7 = g[7]; int32_t g8 = g[8]; int32_t g9 = g[9]; int32_t g1_19 = 19 * g1; /* 1.959375*2^29 */ int32_t g2_19 = 19 * g2; /* 1.959375*2^30; still ok */ int32_t g3_19 = 19 * g3; int32_t g4_19 = 19 * g4; int32_t g5_19 = 19 * g5; int32_t g6_19 = 19 * g6; int32_t g7_19 = 19 * g7; int32_t g8_19 = 19 * g8; int32_t g9_19 = 19 * g9; int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1; int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3; int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5; int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7; int32_t f9_2 = 2 * f9; int64_t f0g0 = f0 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f0g1 = f0 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f0g2 = f0 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f0g3 = f0 * (int64_t) g3; int64_t f0g4 = f0 * (int64_t) g4; int64_t f0g5 = f0 * (int64_t) g5; int64_t f0g6 = f0 * (int64_t) g6; int64_t f0g7 = f0 * (int64_t) g7; int64_t f0g8 = f0 * (int64_t) g8; int64_t f0g9 = f0 * (int64_t) g9; int64_t f1g0 = f1 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f1g1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f1g2 = f1 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f1g3_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g3; int64_t f1g4 = f1 * (int64_t) g4; int64_t f1g5_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g5; int64_t f1g6 = f1 * (int64_t) g6; int64_t f1g7_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g7; int64_t f1g8 = f1 * (int64_t) g8; int64_t f1g9_38 = f1_2 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f2g0 = f2 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f2g1 = f2 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f2g2 = f2 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f2g3 = f2 * (int64_t) g3; int64_t f2g4 = f2 * (int64_t) g4; int64_t f2g5 = f2 * (int64_t) g5; int64_t f2g6 = f2 * (int64_t) g6; int64_t f2g7 = f2 * (int64_t) g7; int64_t f2g8_19 = f2 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f2g9_19 = f2 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f3g0 = f3 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f3g1_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f3g2 = f3 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f3g3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g3; int64_t f3g4 = f3 * (int64_t) g4; int64_t f3g5_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g5; int64_t f3g6 = f3 * (int64_t) g6; int64_t f3g7_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g7_19; int64_t f3g8_19 = f3 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f3g9_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f4g0 = f4 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f4g1 = f4 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f4g2 = f4 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f4g3 = f4 * (int64_t) g3; int64_t f4g4 = f4 * (int64_t) g4; int64_t f4g5 = f4 * (int64_t) g5; int64_t f4g6_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g6_19; int64_t f4g7_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g7_19; int64_t f4g8_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f4g9_19 = f4 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f5g0 = f5 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f5g1_2 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f5g2 = f5 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f5g3_2 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g3; int64_t f5g4 = f5 * (int64_t) g4; int64_t f5g5_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g5_19; int64_t f5g6_19 = f5 * (int64_t) g6_19; int64_t f5g7_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g7_19; int64_t f5g8_19 = f5 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f5g9_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f6g0 = f6 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f6g1 = f6 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f6g2 = f6 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f6g3 = f6 * (int64_t) g3; int64_t f6g4_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g4_19; int64_t f6g5_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g5_19; int64_t f6g6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g6_19; int64_t f6g7_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g7_19; int64_t f6g8_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f6g9_19 = f6 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f7g0 = f7 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f7g1_2 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f7g2 = f7 * (int64_t) g2; int64_t f7g3_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g3_19; int64_t f7g4_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g4_19; int64_t f7g5_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g5_19; int64_t f7g6_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g6_19; int64_t f7g7_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g7_19; int64_t f7g8_19 = f7 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f7g9_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f8g0 = f8 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f8g1 = f8 * (int64_t) g1; int64_t f8g2_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g2_19; int64_t f8g3_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g3_19; int64_t f8g4_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g4_19; int64_t f8g5_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g5_19; int64_t f8g6_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g6_19; int64_t f8g7_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g7_19; int64_t f8g8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f8g9_19 = f8 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t f9g0 = f9 * (int64_t) g0; int64_t f9g1_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g1_19; int64_t f9g2_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g2_19; int64_t f9g3_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g3_19; int64_t f9g4_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g4_19; int64_t f9g5_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g5_19; int64_t f9g6_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g6_19; int64_t f9g7_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g7_19; int64_t f9g8_19 = f9 * (int64_t) g8_19; int64_t f9g9_38 = f9_2 * (int64_t) g9_19; int64_t h0 = f0g0+f1g9_38+f2g8_19+f3g7_38+f4g6_19+f5g5_38+f6g4_19+f7g3_38+f8g2_19+f9g1_38; int64_t h1 = f0g1+f1g0 +f2g9_19+f3g8_19+f4g7_19+f5g6_19+f6g5_19+f7g4_19+f8g3_19+f9g2_19; int64_t h2 = f0g2+f1g1_2 +f2g0 +f3g9_38+f4g8_19+f5g7_38+f6g6_19+f7g5_38+f8g4_19+f9g3_38; int64_t h3 = f0g3+f1g2 +f2g1 +f3g0 +f4g9_19+f5g8_19+f6g7_19+f7g6_19+f8g5_19+f9g4_19; int64_t h4 = f0g4+f1g3_2 +f2g2 +f3g1_2 +f4g0 +f5g9_38+f6g8_19+f7g7_38+f8g6_19+f9g5_38; int64_t h5 = f0g5+f1g4 +f2g3 +f3g2 +f4g1 +f5g0 +f6g9_19+f7g8_19+f8g7_19+f9g6_19; int64_t h6 = f0g6+f1g5_2 +f2g4 +f3g3_2 +f4g2 +f5g1_2 +f6g0 +f7g9_38+f8g8_19+f9g7_38; int64_t h7 = f0g7+f1g6 +f2g5 +f3g4 +f4g3 +f5g2 +f6g1 +f7g0 +f8g9_19+f9g8_19; int64_t h8 = f0g8+f1g7_2 +f2g6 +f3g5_2 +f4g4 +f5g3_2 +f6g2 +f7g1_2 +f8g0 +f9g9_38; int64_t h9 = f0g9+f1g8 +f2g7 +f3g6 +f4g5 +f5g4 +f6g3 +f7g2 +f8g1 +f9g0 ; int64_t carry0; int64_t carry1; int64_t carry2; int64_t carry3; int64_t carry4; int64_t carry5; int64_t carry6; int64_t carry7; int64_t carry8; int64_t carry9; /* |h0| <= (1.65*1.65*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.65*1.65*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38)) * i.e. |h0| <= 1.4*2^60; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8 * |h1| <= (1.65*1.65*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19)) * i.e. |h1| <= 1.7*2^59; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9 */ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; /* |h0| <= 2^25 */ /* |h4| <= 2^25 */ /* |h1| <= 1.71*2^59 */ /* |h5| <= 1.71*2^59 */ carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits; carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits; /* |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */ /* |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 */ /* |h2| <= 1.41*2^60 */ /* |h6| <= 1.41*2^60 */ carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits; carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits; /* |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h3| <= 1.71*2^59 */ /* |h7| <= 1.71*2^59 */ carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits; carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits; /* |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h4| <= 1.72*2^34 */ /* |h8| <= 1.41*2^60 */ carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits; /* |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h5| <= 1.01*2^24 */ /* |h9| <= 1.71*2^59 */ carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits; /* |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h0| <= 1.1*2^39 */ carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; /* |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged */ /* |h1| <= 1.01*2^24 */ h[0] = h0; h[1] = h1; h[2] = h2; h[3] = h3; h[4] = h4; h[5] = h5; h[6] = h6; h[7] = h7; h[8] = h8; h[9] = h9; } /* h = f * f * Can overlap h with f. * * Preconditions: * |f| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc. * * Postconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc. * * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy. */ static void fe_sq(fe h, const fe f) { int32_t f0 = f[0]; int32_t f1 = f[1]; int32_t f2 = f[2]; int32_t f3 = f[3]; int32_t f4 = f[4]; int32_t f5 = f[5]; int32_t f6 = f[6]; int32_t f7 = f[7]; int32_t f8 = f[8]; int32_t f9 = f[9]; int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0; int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1; int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2; int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3; int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4; int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5; int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6; int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7; int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int64_t f0f0 = f0 * (int64_t) f0; int64_t f0f1_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1; int64_t f0f2_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2; int64_t f0f3_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3; int64_t f0f4_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f0f5_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5; int64_t f0f6_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f0f7_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7; int64_t f0f8_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8; int64_t f0f9_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9; int64_t f1f1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1; int64_t f1f2_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2; int64_t f1f3_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2; int64_t f1f4_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f1f5_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2; int64_t f1f6_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f1f7_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2; int64_t f1f8_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8; int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f2f2 = f2 * (int64_t) f2; int64_t f2f3_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3; int64_t f2f4_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f2f5_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5; int64_t f2f6_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f2f7_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7; int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f2f9_38 = f2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f3f3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3; int64_t f3f4_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f3f5_4 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2; int64_t f3f6_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f4f4 = f4 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f4f5_2 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5; int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19; int64_t f4f7_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f4f9_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f5f5_38 = f5 * (int64_t) f5_38; int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19; int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f6f6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) f6_19; int64_t f6f7_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f6f9_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f7f7_38 = f7 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f8f8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f8f9_38 = f8 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f9f9_38 = f9 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t h0 = f0f0 +f1f9_76+f2f8_38+f3f7_76+f4f6_38+f5f5_38; int64_t h1 = f0f1_2+f2f9_38+f3f8_38+f4f7_38+f5f6_38; int64_t h2 = f0f2_2+f1f1_2 +f3f9_76+f4f8_38+f5f7_76+f6f6_19; int64_t h3 = f0f3_2+f1f2_2 +f4f9_38+f5f8_38+f6f7_38; int64_t h4 = f0f4_2+f1f3_4 +f2f2 +f5f9_76+f6f8_38+f7f7_38; int64_t h5 = f0f5_2+f1f4_2 +f2f3_2 +f6f9_38+f7f8_38; int64_t h6 = f0f6_2+f1f5_4 +f2f4_2 +f3f3_2 +f7f9_76+f8f8_19; int64_t h7 = f0f7_2+f1f6_2 +f2f5_2 +f3f4_2 +f8f9_38; int64_t h8 = f0f8_2+f1f7_4 +f2f6_2 +f3f5_4 +f4f4 +f9f9_38; int64_t h9 = f0f9_2+f1f8_2 +f2f7_2 +f3f6_2 +f4f5_2; int64_t carry0; int64_t carry1; int64_t carry2; int64_t carry3; int64_t carry4; int64_t carry5; int64_t carry6; int64_t carry7; int64_t carry8; int64_t carry9; carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits; carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits; carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits; carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits; carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits; carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits; carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits; carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits; carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; h[0] = h0; h[1] = h1; h[2] = h2; h[3] = h3; h[4] = h4; h[5] = h5; h[6] = h6; h[7] = h7; h[8] = h8; h[9] = h9; } static void fe_invert(fe out, const fe z) { fe t0; fe t1; fe t2; fe t3; int i; /* * Compute z ** -1 = z ** (2 ** 255 - 19 - 2) with the exponent as * 2 ** 255 - 21 = (2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1) + 11. */ /* t0 = z ** 2 */ fe_sq(t0, z); /* t1 = t0 ** (2 ** 2) = z ** 8 */ fe_sq(t1, t0); fe_sq(t1, t1); /* t1 = z * t1 = z ** 9 */ fe_mul(t1, z, t1); /* t0 = t0 * t1 = z ** 11 -- stash t0 away for the end. */ fe_mul(t0, t0, t1); /* t2 = t0 ** 2 = z ** 22 */ fe_sq(t2, t0); /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** (2 ** 5 - 1) */ fe_mul(t1, t1, t2); /* t2 = t1 ** (2 ** 5) = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) */ fe_sq(t2, t1); for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) { fe_sq(t2, t2); } /* t1 = t1 * t2 = z ** ((2 ** 5 + 1) * (2 ** 5 - 1)) = z ** (2 ** 10 - 1) */ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1); /* Continuing similarly... */ /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 20 - 1) */ fe_sq(t2, t1); for (i = 1; i < 10; ++i) { fe_sq(t2, t2); } fe_mul(t2, t2, t1); /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 40 - 1) */ fe_sq(t3, t2); for (i = 1; i < 20; ++i) { fe_sq(t3, t3); } fe_mul(t2, t3, t2); /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 10) * (2 ** 40 - 1) */ for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) { fe_sq(t2, t2); } /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 50 - 1) */ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1); /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 100 - 1) */ fe_sq(t2, t1); for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) { fe_sq(t2, t2); } fe_mul(t2, t2, t1); /* t2 = z ** (2 ** 200 - 1) */ fe_sq(t3, t2); for (i = 1; i < 100; ++i) { fe_sq(t3, t3); } fe_mul(t2, t3, t2); /* t2 = z ** ((2 ** 50) * (2 ** 200 - 1) */ fe_sq(t2, t2); for (i = 1; i < 50; ++i) { fe_sq(t2, t2); } /* t1 = z ** (2 ** 250 - 1) */ fe_mul(t1, t2, t1); /* t1 = z ** ((2 ** 5) * (2 ** 250 - 1)) */ fe_sq(t1, t1); for (i = 1; i < 5; ++i) { fe_sq(t1, t1); } /* Recall t0 = z ** 11; out = z ** (2 ** 255 - 21) */ fe_mul(out, t1, t0); } /* h = -f * * Preconditions: * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. * * Postconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. */ static void fe_neg(fe h, const fe f) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { h[i] = -f[i]; } } /* Replace (f,g) with (g,g) if b == 1; * replace (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0. * * Preconditions: b in {0,1}. */ static void fe_cmov(fe f, const fe g, unsigned b) { size_t i; b = 0-b; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i]; x &= b; f[i] ^= x; } } /* h = 2 * f * f * Can overlap h with f. * * Preconditions: * |f| bounded by 1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,1.65*2^26,1.65*2^25,etc. * * Postconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,1.01*2^25,1.01*2^24,etc. * * See fe_mul.c for discussion of implementation strategy. */ static void fe_sq2(fe h, const fe f) { int32_t f0 = f[0]; int32_t f1 = f[1]; int32_t f2 = f[2]; int32_t f3 = f[3]; int32_t f4 = f[4]; int32_t f5 = f[5]; int32_t f6 = f[6]; int32_t f7 = f[7]; int32_t f8 = f[8]; int32_t f9 = f[9]; int32_t f0_2 = 2 * f0; int32_t f1_2 = 2 * f1; int32_t f2_2 = 2 * f2; int32_t f3_2 = 2 * f3; int32_t f4_2 = 2 * f4; int32_t f5_2 = 2 * f5; int32_t f6_2 = 2 * f6; int32_t f7_2 = 2 * f7; int32_t f5_38 = 38 * f5; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f6_19 = 19 * f6; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f7_38 = 38 * f7; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f8_19 = 19 * f8; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int32_t f9_38 = 38 * f9; /* 1.959375*2^30 */ int64_t f0f0 = f0 * (int64_t) f0; int64_t f0f1_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f1; int64_t f0f2_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f2; int64_t f0f3_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f3; int64_t f0f4_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f0f5_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f5; int64_t f0f6_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f0f7_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f7; int64_t f0f8_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f8; int64_t f0f9_2 = f0_2 * (int64_t) f9; int64_t f1f1_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f1; int64_t f1f2_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f2; int64_t f1f3_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f3_2; int64_t f1f4_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f1f5_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f5_2; int64_t f1f6_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f1f7_4 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f7_2; int64_t f1f8_2 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f8; int64_t f1f9_76 = f1_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f2f2 = f2 * (int64_t) f2; int64_t f2f3_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f3; int64_t f2f4_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f2f5_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f5; int64_t f2f6_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f2f7_2 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f7; int64_t f2f8_38 = f2_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f2f9_38 = f2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f3f3_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f3; int64_t f3f4_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f3f5_4 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f5_2; int64_t f3f6_2 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f6; int64_t f3f7_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f3f8_38 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f3f9_76 = f3_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f4f4 = f4 * (int64_t) f4; int64_t f4f5_2 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f5; int64_t f4f6_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f6_19; int64_t f4f7_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f4f8_38 = f4_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f4f9_38 = f4 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f5f5_38 = f5 * (int64_t) f5_38; int64_t f5f6_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f6_19; int64_t f5f7_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f5f8_38 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f5f9_76 = f5_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f6f6_19 = f6 * (int64_t) f6_19; int64_t f6f7_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f6f8_38 = f6_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f6f9_38 = f6 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f7f7_38 = f7 * (int64_t) f7_38; int64_t f7f8_38 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f7f9_76 = f7_2 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f8f8_19 = f8 * (int64_t) f8_19; int64_t f8f9_38 = f8 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t f9f9_38 = f9 * (int64_t) f9_38; int64_t h0 = f0f0 +f1f9_76+f2f8_38+f3f7_76+f4f6_38+f5f5_38; int64_t h1 = f0f1_2+f2f9_38+f3f8_38+f4f7_38+f5f6_38; int64_t h2 = f0f2_2+f1f1_2 +f3f9_76+f4f8_38+f5f7_76+f6f6_19; int64_t h3 = f0f3_2+f1f2_2 +f4f9_38+f5f8_38+f6f7_38; int64_t h4 = f0f4_2+f1f3_4 +f2f2 +f5f9_76+f6f8_38+f7f7_38; int64_t h5 = f0f5_2+f1f4_2 +f2f3_2 +f6f9_38+f7f8_38; int64_t h6 = f0f6_2+f1f5_4 +f2f4_2 +f3f3_2 +f7f9_76+f8f8_19; int64_t h7 = f0f7_2+f1f6_2 +f2f5_2 +f3f4_2 +f8f9_38; int64_t h8 = f0f8_2+f1f7_4 +f2f6_2 +f3f5_4 +f4f4 +f9f9_38; int64_t h9 = f0f9_2+f1f8_2 +f2f7_2 +f3f6_2 +f4f5_2; int64_t carry0; int64_t carry1; int64_t carry2; int64_t carry3; int64_t carry4; int64_t carry5; int64_t carry6; int64_t carry7; int64_t carry8; int64_t carry9; h0 += h0; h1 += h1; h2 += h2; h3 += h3; h4 += h4; h5 += h5; h6 += h6; h7 += h7; h8 += h8; h9 += h9; carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits; carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits; carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits; carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits; carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits; carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits; carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits; carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits; carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; h[0] = h0; h[1] = h1; h[2] = h2; h[3] = h3; h[4] = h4; h[5] = h5; h[6] = h6; h[7] = h7; h[8] = h8; h[9] = h9; } /* ge means group element. * Here the group is the set of pairs (x,y) of field elements (see fe.h) * satisfying -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d x^2y^2 * where d = -121665/121666. * * Representations: * ge_p2 (projective): (X:Y:Z) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/Z * ge_p3 (extended): (X:Y:Z:T) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/Z, XY=ZT * ge_p1p1 (completed): ((X:Z),(Y:T)) satisfying x=X/Z, y=Y/T * ge_precomp (Duif): (y+x,y-x,2dxy) */ typedef struct { fe X; fe Y; fe Z; } ge_p2; typedef struct { fe X; fe Y; fe Z; fe T; } ge_p3; typedef struct { fe X; fe Y; fe Z; fe T; } ge_p1p1; typedef struct { fe yplusx; fe yminusx; fe xy2d; } ge_precomp; typedef struct { fe YplusX; fe YminusX; fe Z; fe T2d; } ge_cached; static void ge_p3_0(ge_p3 *h) { fe_0(h->X); fe_1(h->Y); fe_1(h->Z); fe_0(h->T); } static void ge_precomp_0(ge_precomp *h) { fe_1(h->yplusx); fe_1(h->yminusx); fe_0(h->xy2d); } /* r = p */ static void ge_p3_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p3 *p) { fe_copy(r->X, p->X); fe_copy(r->Y, p->Y); fe_copy(r->Z, p->Z); } /* r = p */ static void ge_p1p1_to_p2(ge_p2 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p) { fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T); fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z); fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T); } /* r = p */ static void ge_p1p1_to_p3(ge_p3 *r, const ge_p1p1 *p) { fe_mul(r->X, p->X, p->T); fe_mul(r->Y, p->Y, p->Z); fe_mul(r->Z, p->Z, p->T); fe_mul(r->T, p->X, p->Y); } /* r = 2 * p */ static void ge_p2_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p2 *p) { fe t0; fe_sq(r->X, p->X); fe_sq(r->Z, p->Y); fe_sq2(r->T, p->Z); fe_add(r->Y, p->X, p->Y); fe_sq(t0, r->Y); fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->X); fe_sub(r->Z, r->Z, r->X); fe_sub(r->X, t0, r->Y); fe_sub(r->T, r->T, r->Z); } /* r = 2 * p */ static void ge_p3_dbl(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p) { ge_p2 q; ge_p3_to_p2(&q, p); ge_p2_dbl(r, &q); } /* r = p + q */ static void ge_madd(ge_p1p1 *r, const ge_p3 *p, const ge_precomp *q) { fe t0; fe_add(r->X, p->Y, p->X); fe_sub(r->Y, p->Y, p->X); fe_mul(r->Z, r->X, q->yplusx); fe_mul(r->Y, r->Y, q->yminusx); fe_mul(r->T, q->xy2d, p->T); fe_add(t0, p->Z, p->Z); fe_sub(r->X, r->Z, r->Y); fe_add(r->Y, r->Z, r->Y); fe_add(r->Z, t0, r->T); fe_sub(r->T, t0, r->T); } static uint8_t equal(signed char b, signed char c) { uint8_t ub = b; uint8_t uc = c; uint8_t x = ub ^ uc; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */ uint32_t y = x; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */ y -= 1; /* 4294967295: yes; 0..254: no */ y >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ return y; } static void cmov(ge_precomp *t, const ge_precomp *u, uint8_t b) { fe_cmov(t->yplusx, u->yplusx, b); fe_cmov(t->yminusx, u->yminusx, b); fe_cmov(t->xy2d, u->xy2d, b); } /* k25519Precomp[i][j] = (j+1)*256^i*B */ static const ge_precomp k25519Precomp[32][8] = { { { {25967493, -14356035, 29566456, 3660896, -12694345, 4014787, 27544626, -11754271, -6079156, 2047605}, {-12545711, 934262, -2722910, 3049990, -727428, 9406986, 12720692, 5043384, 19500929, -15469378}, {-8738181, 4489570, 9688441, -14785194, 10184609, -12363380, 29287919, 11864899, -24514362, -4438546}, }, { {-12815894, -12976347, -21581243, 11784320, -25355658, -2750717, -11717903, -3814571, -358445, -10211303}, {-21703237, 6903825, 27185491, 6451973, -29577724, -9554005, -15616551, 11189268, -26829678, -5319081}, {26966642, 11152617, 32442495, 15396054, 14353839, -12752335, -3128826, -9541118, -15472047, -4166697}, }, { {15636291, -9688557, 24204773, -7912398, 616977, -16685262, 27787600, -14772189, 28944400, -1550024}, {16568933, 4717097, -11556148, -1102322, 15682896, -11807043, 16354577, -11775962, 7689662, 11199574}, {30464156, -5976125, -11779434, -15670865, 23220365, 15915852, 7512774, 10017326, -17749093, -9920357}, }, { {-17036878, 13921892, 10945806, -6033431, 27105052, -16084379, -28926210, 15006023, 3284568, -6276540}, {23599295, -8306047, -11193664, -7687416, 13236774, 10506355, 7464579, 9656445, 13059162, 10374397}, {7798556, 16710257, 3033922, 2874086, 28997861, 2835604, 32406664, -3839045, -641708, -101325}, }, { {10861363, 11473154, 27284546, 1981175, -30064349, 12577861, 32867885, 14515107, -15438304, 10819380}, {4708026, 6336745, 20377586, 9066809, -11272109, 6594696, -25653668, 12483688, -12668491, 5581306}, {19563160, 16186464, -29386857, 4097519, 10237984, -4348115, 28542350, 13850243, -23678021, -15815942}, }, { {-15371964, -12862754, 32573250, 4720197, -26436522, 5875511, -19188627, -15224819, -9818940, -12085777}, {-8549212, 109983, 15149363, 2178705, 22900618, 4543417, 3044240, -15689887, 1762328, 14866737}, {-18199695, -15951423, -10473290, 1707278, -17185920, 3916101, -28236412, 3959421, 27914454, 4383652}, }, { {5153746, 9909285, 1723747, -2777874, 30523605, 5516873, 19480852, 5230134, -23952439, -15175766}, {-30269007, -3463509, 7665486, 10083793, 28475525, 1649722, 20654025, 16520125, 30598449, 7715701}, {28881845, 14381568, 9657904, 3680757, -20181635, 7843316, -31400660, 1370708, 29794553, -1409300}, }, { {14499471, -2729599, -33191113, -4254652, 28494862, 14271267, 30290735, 10876454, -33154098, 2381726}, {-7195431, -2655363, -14730155, 462251, -27724326, 3941372, -6236617, 3696005, -32300832, 15351955}, {27431194, 8222322, 16448760, -3907995, -18707002, 11938355, -32961401, -2970515, 29551813, 10109425}, }, }, { { {-13657040, -13155431, -31283750, 11777098, 21447386, 6519384, -2378284, -1627556, 10092783, -4764171}, {27939166, 14210322, 4677035, 16277044, -22964462, -12398139, -32508754, 12005538, -17810127, 12803510}, {17228999, -15661624, -1233527, 300140, -1224870, -11714777, 30364213, -9038194, 18016357, 4397660}, }, { {-10958843, -7690207, 4776341, -14954238, 27850028, -15602212, -26619106, 14544525, -17477504, 982639}, {29253598, 15796703, -2863982, -9908884, 10057023, 3163536, 7332899, -4120128, -21047696, 9934963}, {5793303, 16271923, -24131614, -10116404, 29188560, 1206517, -14747930, 4559895, -30123922, -10897950}, }, { {-27643952, -11493006, 16282657, -11036493, 28414021, -15012264, 24191034, 4541697, -13338309, 5500568}, {12650548, -1497113, 9052871, 11355358, -17680037, -8400164, -17430592, 12264343, 10874051, 13524335}, {25556948, -3045990, 714651, 2510400, 23394682, -10415330, 33119038, 5080568, -22528059, 5376628}, }, { {-26088264, -4011052, -17013699, -3537628, -6726793, 1920897, -22321305, -9447443, 4535768, 1569007}, {-2255422, 14606630, -21692440, -8039818, 28430649, 8775819, -30494562, 3044290, 31848280, 12543772}, {-22028579, 2943893, -31857513, 6777306, 13784462, -4292203, -27377195, -2062731, 7718482, 14474653}, }, { {2385315, 2454213, -22631320, 46603, -4437935, -15680415, 656965, -7236665, 24316168, -5253567}, {13741529, 10911568, -33233417, -8603737, -20177830, -1033297, 33040651, -13424532, -20729456, 8321686}, {21060490, -2212744, 15712757, -4336099, 1639040, 10656336, 23845965, -11874838, -9984458, 608372}, }, { {-13672732, -15087586, -10889693, -7557059, -6036909, 11305547, 1123968, -6780577, 27229399, 23887}, {-23244140, -294205, -11744728, 14712571, -29465699, -2029617, 12797024, -6440308, -1633405, 16678954}, {-29500620, 4770662, -16054387, 14001338, 7830047, 9564805, -1508144, -4795045, -17169265, 4904953}, }, { {24059557, 14617003, 19037157, -15039908, 19766093, -14906429, 5169211, 16191880, 2128236, -4326833}, {-16981152, 4124966, -8540610, -10653797, 30336522, -14105247, -29806336, 916033, -6882542, -2986532}, {-22630907, 12419372, -7134229, -7473371, -16478904, 16739175, 285431, 2763829, 15736322, 4143876}, }, { {2379352, 11839345, -4110402, -5988665, 11274298, 794957, 212801, -14594663, 23527084, -16458268}, {33431127, -11130478, -17838966, -15626900, 8909499, 8376530, -32625340, 4087881, -15188911, -14416214}, {1767683, 7197987, -13205226, -2022635, -13091350, 448826, 5799055, 4357868, -4774191, -16323038}, }, }, { { {6721966, 13833823, -23523388, -1551314, 26354293, -11863321, 23365147, -3949732, 7390890, 2759800}, {4409041, 2052381, 23373853, 10530217, 7676779, -12885954, 21302353, -4264057, 1244380, -12919645}, {-4421239, 7169619, 4982368, -2957590, 30256825, -2777540, 14086413, 9208236, 15886429, 16489664}, }, { {1996075, 10375649, 14346367, 13311202, -6874135, -16438411, -13693198, 398369, -30606455, -712933}, {-25307465, 9795880, -2777414, 14878809, -33531835, 14780363, 13348553, 12076947, -30836462, 5113182}, {-17770784, 11797796, 31950843, 13929123, -25888302, 12288344, -30341101, -7336386, 13847711, 5387222}, }, { {-18582163, -3416217, 17824843, -2340966, 22744343, -10442611, 8763061, 3617786, -19600662, 10370991}, {20246567, -14369378, 22358229, -543712, 18507283, -10413996, 14554437, -8746092, 32232924, 16763880}, {9648505, 10094563, 26416693, 14745928, -30374318, -6472621, 11094161, 15689506, 3140038, -16510092}, }, { {-16160072, 5472695, 31895588, 4744994, 8823515, 10365685, -27224800, 9448613, -28774454, 366295}, {19153450, 11523972, -11096490, -6503142, -24647631, 5420647, 28344573, 8041113, 719605, 11671788}, {8678025, 2694440, -6808014, 2517372, 4964326, 11152271, -15432916, -15266516, 27000813, -10195553}, }, { {-15157904, 7134312, 8639287, -2814877, -7235688, 10421742, 564065, 5336097, 6750977, -14521026}, {11836410, -3979488, 26297894, 16080799, 23455045, 15735944, 1695823, -8819122, 8169720, 16220347}, {-18115838, 8653647, 17578566, -6092619, -8025777, -16012763, -11144307, -2627664, -5990708, -14166033}, }, { {-23308498, -10968312, 15213228, -10081214, -30853605, -11050004, 27884329, 2847284, 2655861, 1738395}, {-27537433, -14253021, -25336301, -8002780, -9370762, 8129821, 21651608, 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{-8081308, -8464597, -8223311, 9719710, 19259459, -15348212, 23994942, -5281555, -9468848, 4763278}, {-21699244, 9220969, -15730624, 1084137, -25476107, -2852390, 31088447, -7764523, -11356529, 728112}, }, { {26047220, -11751471, -6900323, -16521798, 24092068, 9158119, -4273545, -12555558, -29365436, -5498272}, {17510331, -322857, 5854289, 8403524, 17133918, -3112612, -28111007, 12327945, 10750447, 10014012}, {-10312768, 3936952, 9156313, -8897683, 16498692, -994647, -27481051, -666732, 3424691, 7540221}, }, { {30322361, -6964110, 11361005, -4143317, 7433304, 4989748, -7071422, -16317219, -9244265, 15258046}, {13054562, -2779497, 19155474, 469045, -12482797, 4566042, 5631406, 2711395, 1062915, -5136345}, {-19240248, -11254599, -29509029, -7499965, -5835763, 13005411, -6066489, 12194497, 32960380, 1459310}, }, }, { { {19852034, 7027924, 23669353, 10020366, 8586503, -6657907, 394197, -6101885, 18638003, -11174937}, {31395534, 15098109, 26581030, 8030562, -16527914, -5007134, 9012486, -7584354, -6643087, -5442636}, {-9192165, -2347377, -1997099, 4529534, 25766844, 607986, -13222, 9677543, -32294889, -6456008}, }, { {-2444496, -149937, 29348902, 8186665, 1873760, 12489863, -30934579, -7839692, -7852844, -8138429}, {-15236356, -15433509, 7766470, 746860, 26346930, -10221762, -27333451, 10754588, -9431476, 5203576}, {31834314, 14135496, -770007, 5159118, 20917671, -16768096, -7467973, -7337524, 31809243, 7347066}, }, { {-9606723, -11874240, 20414459, 13033986, 13716524, -11691881, 19797970, -12211255, 15192876, -2087490}, {-12663563, -2181719, 1168162, -3804809, 26747877, -14138091, 10609330, 12694420, 33473243, -13382104}, {33184999, 11180355, 15832085, -11385430, -1633671, 225884, 15089336, -11023903, -6135662, 14480053}, }, { {31308717, -5619998, 31030840, -1897099, 15674547, -6582883, 5496208, 13685227, 27595050, 8737275}, {-20318852, -15150239, 10933843, -16178022, 8335352, -7546022, -31008351, -12610604, 26498114, 66511}, {22644454, -8761729, -16671776, 4884562, -3105614, -13559366, 30540766, -4286747, -13327787, -7515095}, }, { {-28017847, 9834845, 18617207, -2681312, -3401956, -13307506, 8205540, 13585437, -17127465, 15115439}, {23711543, -672915, 31206561, -8362711, 6164647, -9709987, -33535882, -1426096, 8236921, 16492939}, {-23910559, -13515526, -26299483, -4503841, 25005590, -7687270, 19574902, 10071562, 6708380, -6222424}, }, { {2101391, -4930054, 19702731, 2367575, -15427167, 1047675, 5301017, 9328700, 29955601, -11678310}, {3096359, 9271816, -21620864, -15521844, -14847996, -7592937, -25892142, -12635595, -9917575, 6216608}, {-32615849, 338663, -25195611, 2510422, -29213566, -13820213, 24822830, -6146567, -26767480, 7525079}, }, { {-23066649, -13985623, 16133487, -7896178, -3389565, 778788, -910336, -2782495, -19386633, 11994101}, {21691500, -13624626, -641331, -14367021, 3285881, -3483596, -25064666, 9718258, -7477437, 13381418}, {18445390, -4202236, 14979846, 11622458, -1727110, -3582980, 23111648, -6375247, 28535282, 15779576}, }, { {30098053, 3089662, -9234387, 16662135, -21306940, 11308411, -14068454, 12021730, 9955285, -16303356}, {9734894, -14576830, -7473633, -9138735, 2060392, 11313496, -18426029, 9924399, 20194861, 13380996}, {-26378102, -7965207, -22167821, 15789297, -18055342, -6168792, -1984914, 15707771, 26342023, 10146099}, }, }, { { {-26016874, -219943, 21339191, -41388, 19745256, -2878700, -29637280, 2227040, 21612326, -545728}, {-13077387, 1184228, 23562814, -5970442, -20351244, -6348714, 25764461, 12243797, -20856566, 11649658}, {-10031494, 11262626, 27384172, 2271902, 26947504, -15997771, 39944, 6114064, 33514190, 2333242}, }, { {-21433588, -12421821, 8119782, 7219913, -21830522, -9016134, -6679750, -12670638, 24350578, -13450001}, {-4116307, -11271533, -23886186, 4843615, -30088339, 690623, -31536088, -10406836, 8317860, 12352766}, {18200138, -14475911, -33087759, -2696619, -23702521, -9102511, -23552096, -2287550, 20712163, 6719373}, }, { {26656208, 6075253, -7858556, 1886072, -28344043, 4262326, 11117530, -3763210, 26224235, -3297458}, {-17168938, -14854097, -3395676, -16369877, -19954045, 14050420, 21728352, 9493610, 18620611, -16428628}, {-13323321, 13325349, 11432106, 5964811, 18609221, 6062965, -5269471, -9725556, -30701573, -16479657}, }, { {-23860538, -11233159, 26961357, 1640861, -32413112, -16737940, 12248509, -5240639, 13735342, 1934062}, {25089769, 6742589, 17081145, -13406266, 21909293, -16067981, -15136294, -3765346, -21277997, 5473616}, {31883677, -7961101, 1083432, -11572403, 22828471, 13290673, -7125085, 12469656, 29111212, -5451014}, }, { {24244947, -15050407, -26262976, 2791540, -14997599, 16666678, 24367466, 6388839, -10295587, 452383}, {-25640782, -3417841, 5217916, 16224624, 19987036, -4082269, -24236251, -5915248, 15766062, 8407814}, {-20406999, 13990231, 15495425, 16395525, 5377168, 15166495, -8917023, -4388953, -8067909, 2276718}, }, { {30157918, 12924066, -17712050, 9245753, 19895028, 3368142, -23827587, 5096219, 22740376, -7303417}, {2041139, 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14150565, 15970762, 4099461}, {29262576, 16756590, 26350592, -8793563, 8529671, -11208050, 13617293, -9937143, 11465739, 8317062}, }, { {-25493081, -6962928, 32500200, -9419051, -23038724, -2302222, 14898637, 3848455, 20969334, -5157516}, {-20384450, -14347713, -18336405, 13884722, -33039454, 2842114, -21610826, -3649888, 11177095, 14989547}, {-24496721, -11716016, 16959896, 2278463, 12066309, 10137771, 13515641, 2581286, -28487508, 9930240}, }, { {-17751622, -2097826, 16544300, -13009300, -15914807, -14949081, 18345767, -13403753, 16291481, -5314038}, {-33229194, 2553288, 32678213, 9875984, 8534129, 6889387, -9676774, 6957617, 4368891, 9788741}, {16660756, 7281060, -10830758, 12911820, 20108584, -8101676, -21722536, -8613148, 16250552, -11111103}, }, { {-19765507, 2390526, -16551031, 14161980, 1905286, 6414907, 4689584, 10604807, -30190403, 4782747}, {-1354539, 14736941, -7367442, -13292886, 7710542, -14155590, -9981571, 4383045, 22546403, 437323}, {31665577, -12180464, -16186830, 1491339, -18368625, 3294682, 27343084, 2786261, -30633590, -14097016}, }, { {-14467279, -683715, -33374107, 7448552, 19294360, 14334329, -19690631, 2355319, -19284671, -6114373}, {15121312, -15796162, 6377020, -6031361, -10798111, -12957845, 18952177, 15496498, -29380133, 11754228}, {-2637277, -13483075, 8488727, -14303896, 12728761, -1622493, 7141596, 11724556, 22761615, -10134141}, }, { {16918416, 11729663, -18083579, 3022987, -31015732, -13339659, -28741185, -12227393, 32851222, 11717399}, {11166634, 7338049, -6722523, 4531520, -29468672, -7302055, 31474879, 3483633, -1193175, -4030831}, {-185635, 9921305, 31456609, -13536438, -12013818, 13348923, 33142652, 6546660, -19985279, -3948376}, }, { {-32460596, 11266712, -11197107, -7899103, 31703694, 3855903, -8537131, -12833048, -30772034, -15486313}, {-18006477, 12709068, 3991746, -6479188, -21491523, -10550425, -31135347, -16049879, 10928917, 3011958}, {-6957757, -15594337, 31696059, 334240, 29576716, 14796075, -30831056, -12805180, 18008031, 10258577}, }, { {-22448644, 15655569, 7018479, -4410003, -30314266, -1201591, -1853465, 1367120, 25127874, 6671743}, {29701166, -14373934, -10878120, 9279288, -17568, 13127210, 21382910, 11042292, 25838796, 4642684}, {-20430234, 14955537, -24126347, 8124619, -5369288, -5990470, 30468147, -13900640, 18423289, 4177476}, }, }, }; static uint8_t negative(signed char b) { uint32_t x = b; x >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ return x; } static void table_select(ge_precomp *t, int pos, signed char b) { ge_precomp minust; uint8_t bnegative = negative(b); uint8_t babs = b - ((uint8_t)((-bnegative) & b) << 1); ge_precomp_0(t); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][0], equal(babs, 1)); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][1], equal(babs, 2)); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][2], equal(babs, 3)); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][3], equal(babs, 4)); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][4], equal(babs, 5)); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][5], equal(babs, 6)); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][6], equal(babs, 7)); cmov(t, &k25519Precomp[pos][7], equal(babs, 8)); fe_copy(minust.yplusx, t->yminusx); fe_copy(minust.yminusx, t->yplusx); fe_neg(minust.xy2d, t->xy2d); cmov(t, &minust, bnegative); } /* h = a * B * where a = a[0]+256*a[1]+...+256^31 a[31] * B is the Ed25519 base point (x,4/5) with x positive. * * Preconditions: * a[31] <= 127 */ static void ge_scalarmult_base(ge_p3 *h, const uint8_t *a) { signed char e[64]; signed char carry; ge_p1p1 r; ge_p2 s; ge_precomp t; int i; for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) { e[2 * i + 0] = (a[i] >> 0) & 15; e[2 * i + 1] = (a[i] >> 4) & 15; } /* each e[i] is between 0 and 15 */ /* e[63] is between 0 and 7 */ carry = 0; for (i = 0; i < 63; ++i) { e[i] += carry; carry = e[i] + 8; carry >>= 4; e[i] -= carry << 4; } e[63] += carry; /* each e[i] is between -8 and 8 */ ge_p3_0(h); for (i = 1; i < 64; i += 2) { table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]); ge_madd(&r, h, &t); ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r); } ge_p3_dbl(&r, h); ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r); ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s); ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r); ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s); ge_p1p1_to_p2(&s, &r); ge_p2_dbl(&r, &s); ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r); for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 2) { table_select(&t, i / 2, e[i]); ge_madd(&r, h, &t); ge_p1p1_to_p3(h, &r); } OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e)); } /* Replace (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; * replace (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0. * * Preconditions: b in {0,1}. */ static void fe_cswap(fe f, fe g, unsigned int b) { size_t i; b = 0-b; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { int32_t x = f[i] ^ g[i]; x &= b; f[i] ^= x; g[i] ^= x; } } /* h = f * 121666 * Can overlap h with f. * * Preconditions: * |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. * * Postconditions: * |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. */ static void fe_mul121666(fe h, fe f) { int32_t f0 = f[0]; int32_t f1 = f[1]; int32_t f2 = f[2]; int32_t f3 = f[3]; int32_t f4 = f[4]; int32_t f5 = f[5]; int32_t f6 = f[6]; int32_t f7 = f[7]; int32_t f8 = f[8]; int32_t f9 = f[9]; int64_t h0 = f0 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h1 = f1 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h2 = f2 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h3 = f3 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h4 = f4 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h5 = f5 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h6 = f6 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h7 = f7 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h8 = f8 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t h9 = f9 * (int64_t) 121666; int64_t carry0; int64_t carry1; int64_t carry2; int64_t carry3; int64_t carry4; int64_t carry5; int64_t carry6; int64_t carry7; int64_t carry8; int64_t carry9; carry9 = h9 + (1 << 24); h0 += (carry9 >> 25) * 19; h9 -= carry9 & kTop39Bits; carry1 = h1 + (1 << 24); h2 += carry1 >> 25; h1 -= carry1 & kTop39Bits; carry3 = h3 + (1 << 24); h4 += carry3 >> 25; h3 -= carry3 & kTop39Bits; carry5 = h5 + (1 << 24); h6 += carry5 >> 25; h5 -= carry5 & kTop39Bits; carry7 = h7 + (1 << 24); h8 += carry7 >> 25; h7 -= carry7 & kTop39Bits; carry0 = h0 + (1 << 25); h1 += carry0 >> 26; h0 -= carry0 & kTop38Bits; carry2 = h2 + (1 << 25); h3 += carry2 >> 26; h2 -= carry2 & kTop38Bits; carry4 = h4 + (1 << 25); h5 += carry4 >> 26; h4 -= carry4 & kTop38Bits; carry6 = h6 + (1 << 25); h7 += carry6 >> 26; h6 -= carry6 & kTop38Bits; carry8 = h8 + (1 << 25); h9 += carry8 >> 26; h8 -= carry8 & kTop38Bits; h[0] = h0; h[1] = h1; h[2] = h2; h[3] = h3; h[4] = h4; h[5] = h5; h[6] = h6; h[7] = h7; h[8] = h8; h[9] = h9; } static void x25519_scalar_mult_generic(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32], const uint8_t point[32]) { fe x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1; uint8_t e[32]; unsigned swap = 0; int pos; memcpy(e, scalar, 32); e[0] &= 248; e[31] &= 127; e[31] |= 64; fe_frombytes(x1, point); fe_1(x2); fe_0(z2); fe_copy(x3, x1); fe_1(z3); for (pos = 254; pos >= 0; --pos) { unsigned b = 1 & (e[pos / 8] >> (pos & 7)); swap ^= b; fe_cswap(x2, x3, swap); fe_cswap(z2, z3, swap); swap = b; fe_sub(tmp0, x3, z3); fe_sub(tmp1, x2, z2); fe_add(x2, x2, z2); fe_add(z2, x3, z3); fe_mul(z3, tmp0, x2); fe_mul(z2, z2, tmp1); fe_sq(tmp0, tmp1); fe_sq(tmp1, x2); fe_add(x3, z3, z2); fe_sub(z2, z3, z2); fe_mul(x2, tmp1, tmp0); fe_sub(tmp1, tmp1, tmp0); fe_sq(z2, z2); fe_mul121666(z3, tmp1); fe_sq(x3, x3); fe_add(tmp0, tmp0, z3); fe_mul(z3, x1, z2); fe_mul(z2, tmp1, tmp0); } fe_cswap(x2, x3, swap); fe_cswap(z2, z3, swap); fe_invert(z2, z2); fe_mul(x2, x2, z2); fe_tobytes(out, x2); OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e)); } static void x25519_scalar_mult(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32], const uint8_t point[32]) { x25519_scalar_mult_generic(out, scalar, point); } int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32], const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]) { static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0}; x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value); /* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */ return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0; } void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32], const uint8_t private_key[32]) { uint8_t e[32]; ge_p3 A; fe zplusy, zminusy, zminusy_inv; memcpy(e, private_key, 32); e[0] &= 248; e[31] &= 127; e[31] |= 64; ge_scalarmult_base(&A, e); /* We only need the u-coordinate of the curve25519 point. The map is * u=(y+1)/(1-y). Since y=Y/Z, this gives u=(Z+Y)/(Z-Y). */ fe_add(zplusy, A.Z, A.Y); fe_sub(zminusy, A.Z, A.Y); fe_invert(zminusy_inv, zminusy); fe_mul(zplusy, zplusy, zminusy_inv); fe_tobytes(out_public_value, zplusy); OPENSSL_cleanse(e, sizeof(e)); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c0000644000000000000000000015114213176625657016375 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /****************************************************************************** * * * Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation * * * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * * limitations under the License. * * * ****************************************************************************** * * * Developers and authors: * * Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) * * (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center * * (2) University of Haifa * * Reference: * * S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with * * 256 Bit Primes" * * * ******************************************************************************/ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" #if BN_BITS2 != 64 # define TOBN(hi,lo) lo,hi #else # define TOBN(hi,lo) ((BN_ULONG)hi<<32|lo) #endif #if defined(__GNUC__) # define ALIGN32 __attribute((aligned(32))) #elif defined(_MSC_VER) # define ALIGN32 __declspec(align(32)) #else # define ALIGN32 #endif #define ALIGNPTR(p,N) ((unsigned char *)p+N-(size_t)p%N) #define P256_LIMBS (256/BN_BITS2) typedef unsigned short u16; typedef struct { BN_ULONG X[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Y[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z[P256_LIMBS]; } P256_POINT; typedef struct { BN_ULONG X[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Y[P256_LIMBS]; } P256_POINT_AFFINE; typedef P256_POINT_AFFINE PRECOMP256_ROW[64]; /* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */ struct nistz256_pre_comp_st { const EC_GROUP *group; /* Parent EC_GROUP object */ size_t w; /* Window size */ /* * Constant time access to the X and Y coordinates of the pre-computed, * generator multiplies, in the Montgomery domain. Pre-calculated * multiplies are stored in affine form. */ PRECOMP256_ROW *precomp; void *precomp_storage; int references; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; /* Functions implemented in assembly */ /* * Most of below mentioned functions *preserve* the property of inputs * being fully reduced, i.e. being in [0, modulus) range. Simply put if * inputs are fully reduced, then output is too. Note that reverse is * not true, in sense that given partially reduced inputs output can be * either, not unlikely reduced. And "most" in first sentence refers to * the fact that given the calculations flow one can tolerate that * addition, 1st function below, produces partially reduced result *if* * multiplications by 2 and 3, which customarily use addition, fully * reduce it. This effectively gives two options: a) addition produces * fully reduced result [as long as inputs are, just like remaining * functions]; b) addition is allowed to produce partially reduced * result, but multiplications by 2 and 3 perform additional reduction * step. Choice between the two can be platform-specific, but it was a) * in all cases so far... */ /* Modular add: res = a+b mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular mul by 2: res = 2*a mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular mul by 3: res = 3*a mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular div by 2: res = a/2 mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular sub: res = a-b mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]); /* Modular neg: res = -a mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Montgomery mul: res = a*b*2^-256 mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]); /* Montgomery sqr: res = a*a*2^-256 mod P */ void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS]); /* Convert a number from Montgomery domain, by multiplying with 1 */ void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]); /* Convert a number to Montgomery domain, by multiplying with 2^512 mod P*/ void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]); /* Functions that perform constant time access to the precomputed tables */ void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(P256_POINT *val, const P256_POINT *in_t, int idx); void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *val, const P256_POINT *in_t, int idx); void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *val, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in_t, int idx); void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *val, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in_t, int idx); /* One converted into the Montgomery domain */ static const BN_ULONG ONE[P256_LIMBS] = { TOBN(0x00000000, 0x00000001), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0x00000000), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x00000000, 0xfffffffe) }; static NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group); /* Precomputed tables for the default generator */ extern const PRECOMP256_ROW ecp_nistz256_precomputed[37]; /* Recode window to a signed digit, see ecp_nistputil.c for details */ static unsigned int _booth_recode_w5(unsigned int in) { unsigned int s, d; s = ~((in >> 5) - 1); d = (1 << 6) - in - 1; d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); return (d << 1) + (s & 1); } static unsigned int _booth_recode_w7(unsigned int in) { unsigned int s, d; s = ~((in >> 7) - 1); d = (1 << 8) - in - 1; d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); return (d << 1) + (s & 1); } static void copy_conditional(BN_ULONG dst[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG src[P256_LIMBS], BN_ULONG move) { BN_ULONG mask1 = 0-move; BN_ULONG mask2 = ~mask1; dst[0] = (src[0] & mask1) ^ (dst[0] & mask2); dst[1] = (src[1] & mask1) ^ (dst[1] & mask2); dst[2] = (src[2] & mask1) ^ (dst[2] & mask2); dst[3] = (src[3] & mask1) ^ (dst[3] & mask2); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { dst[4] = (src[4] & mask1) ^ (dst[4] & mask2); dst[5] = (src[5] & mask1) ^ (dst[5] & mask2); dst[6] = (src[6] & mask1) ^ (dst[6] & mask2); dst[7] = (src[7] & mask1) ^ (dst[7] & mask2); } } static BN_ULONG is_zero(BN_ULONG in) { in |= (0 - in); in = ~in; in >>= BN_BITS2 - 1; return in; } static BN_ULONG is_equal(const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG b[P256_LIMBS]) { BN_ULONG res; res = a[0] ^ b[0]; res |= a[1] ^ b[1]; res |= a[2] ^ b[2]; res |= a[3] ^ b[3]; if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { res |= a[4] ^ b[4]; res |= a[5] ^ b[5]; res |= a[6] ^ b[6]; res |= a[7] ^ b[7]; } return is_zero(res); } static BN_ULONG is_one(const BIGNUM *z) { BN_ULONG res = 0; BN_ULONG *a = bn_get_words(z); if (bn_get_top(z) == (P256_LIMBS - P256_LIMBS / 8)) { res = a[0] ^ ONE[0]; res |= a[1] ^ ONE[1]; res |= a[2] ^ ONE[2]; res |= a[3] ^ ONE[3]; if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { res |= a[4] ^ ONE[4]; res |= a[5] ^ ONE[5]; res |= a[6] ^ ONE[6]; /* * no check for a[7] (being zero) on 32-bit platforms, * because value of "one" takes only 7 limbs. */ } res = is_zero(res); } return res; } #ifndef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a); void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT *b); void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *b); #else /* Point double: r = 2*a */ static void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a) { BN_ULONG S[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG M[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Zsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG tmp0[P256_LIMBS]; const BN_ULONG *in_x = a->X; const BN_ULONG *in_y = a->Y; const BN_ULONG *in_z = a->Z; BN_ULONG *res_x = r->X; BN_ULONG *res_y = r->Y; BN_ULONG *res_z = r->Z; ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(S, S); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, in_z, in_y); ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(res_z, res_z); ecp_nistz256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr); ecp_nistz256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res_y, S); ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(res_y, res_y); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(M, M); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); ecp_nistz256_sub(S, S, res_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S, S, M); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); } /* Point addition: r = a+b */ static void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT *b) { BN_ULONG U2[P256_LIMBS], S2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG U1[P256_LIMBS], S1[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z1sqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z2sqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG H[P256_LIMBS], R[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Rsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hcub[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_x[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_y[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_z[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG in1infty, in2infty; const BN_ULONG *in1_x = a->X; const BN_ULONG *in1_y = a->Y; const BN_ULONG *in1_z = a->Z; const BN_ULONG *in2_x = b->X; const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y; const BN_ULONG *in2_z = b->Z; /* * Infinity in encoded as (,,0) */ in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]); in2infty = (in2_z[0] | in2_z[1] | in2_z[2] | in2_z[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in2infty |= (in2_z[4] | in2_z[5] | in2_z[6] | in2_z[7]); in1infty = is_zero(in1infty); in2infty = is_zero(in2infty); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); /* Z2^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); /* Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); /* S1 = Z2^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); /* S2 = Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); /* S1 = Y1*Z2^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); /* S2 = Y2*Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(R, S2, S1); /* R = S2 - S1 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); /* U1 = X1*Z2^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); /* U2 = X2*Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, U1); /* H = U2 - U1 */ /* * This should not happen during sign/ecdh, so no constant time violation */ if (is_equal(U1, U2) && !in1infty && !in2infty) { if (is_equal(S1, S2)) { ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, a); return; } else { memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); return; } } ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); /* R^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); /* H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); /* H^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); /* U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); /* 2*U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_y, R, res_y); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_z, in2_z, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty); memcpy(r->X, res_x, sizeof(res_x)); memcpy(r->Y, res_y, sizeof(res_y)); memcpy(r->Z, res_z, sizeof(res_z)); } /* Point addition when b is known to be affine: r = a+b */ static void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *b) { BN_ULONG U2[P256_LIMBS], S2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Z1sqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG H[P256_LIMBS], R[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Rsqr[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG Hcub[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_x[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_y[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res_z[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG in1infty, in2infty; const BN_ULONG *in1_x = a->X; const BN_ULONG *in1_y = a->Y; const BN_ULONG *in1_z = a->Z; const BN_ULONG *in2_x = b->X; const BN_ULONG *in2_y = b->Y; /* * Infinity in encoded as (,,0) */ in1infty = (in1_z[0] | in1_z[1] | in1_z[2] | in1_z[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in1infty |= (in1_z[4] | in1_z[5] | in1_z[6] | in1_z[7]); /* * In affine representation we encode infinity as (0,0), which is * not on the curve, so it is OK */ in2infty = (in2_x[0] | in2_x[1] | in2_x[2] | in2_x[3] | in2_y[0] | in2_y[1] | in2_y[2] | in2_y[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) in2infty |= (in2_x[4] | in2_x[5] | in2_x[6] | in2_x[7] | in2_y[4] | in2_y[5] | in2_y[6] | in2_y[7]); in1infty = is_zero(in1infty); in2infty = is_zero(in2infty); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); /* Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); /* U2 = X2*Z1^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); /* H = U2 - U1 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); /* S2 = Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); /* Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); /* S2 = Y2*Z1^3 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); /* R = S2 - S1 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); /* H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); /* R^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); /* H^3 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); /* U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); /* 2*U1*H^2 */ ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_sub(H, U2, res_x); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(H, H, R); ecp_nistz256_sub(res_y, H, S2); copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty); copy_conditional(res_z, ONE, in1infty); copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty); memcpy(r->X, res_x, sizeof(res_x)); memcpy(r->Y, res_y, sizeof(res_y)); memcpy(r->Z, res_z, sizeof(res_z)); } #endif /* r = in^-1 mod p */ static void ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse(BN_ULONG r[P256_LIMBS], const BN_ULONG in[P256_LIMBS]) { /* * The poly is ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff * ffffffff ffffffff We use FLT and used poly-2 as exponent */ BN_ULONG p2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p4[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p8[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p16[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG p32[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG res[P256_LIMBS]; int i; ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, in); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p2, res, in); /* 3*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p2); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p4, res, p2); /* f*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p4); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p8, res, p4); /* ff*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p8); for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p16, res, p8); /* ffff*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p16); for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(p32, res, p16); /* ffffffff*p */ ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, p32); for (i = 0; i < 31; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, in); for (i = 0; i < 32 * 4; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p32); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p16); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p8); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p4); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, p2); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(res, res); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(res, res, in); memcpy(r, res, sizeof(res)); } /* * ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem copies the contents of |in| to |out| and * returns one if it fits. Otherwise it returns zero. */ __owur static int ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(BN_ULONG out[P256_LIMBS], const BIGNUM *in) { return bn_copy_words(out, in, P256_LIMBS); } /* r = sum(scalar[i]*point[i]) */ __owur static int ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, P256_POINT *r, const BIGNUM **scalar, const EC_POINT **point, size_t num, BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t i; int j, ret = 0; unsigned int idx; unsigned char (*p_str)[33] = NULL; const unsigned int window_size = 5; const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1; unsigned int wvalue; P256_POINT *temp; /* place for 5 temporary points */ const BIGNUM **scalars = NULL; P256_POINT (*table)[16] = NULL; void *table_storage = NULL; if ((num * 16 + 6) > OPENSSL_MALLOC_MAX_NELEMS(P256_POINT) || (table_storage = OPENSSL_malloc((num * 16 + 5) * sizeof(P256_POINT) + 64)) == NULL || (p_str = OPENSSL_malloc(num * 33 * sizeof(unsigned char))) == NULL || (scalars = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof(BIGNUM *))) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } table = (void *)ALIGNPTR(table_storage, 64); temp = (P256_POINT *)(table + num); for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { P256_POINT *row = table[i]; /* This is an unusual input, we don't guarantee constant-timeness. */ if ((BN_num_bits(scalar[i]) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar[i])) { BIGNUM *mod; if ((mod = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(mod, scalar[i], group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } scalars[i] = mod; } else scalars[i] = scalar[i]; for (j = 0; j < bn_get_top(scalars[i]) * BN_BYTES; j += BN_BYTES) { BN_ULONG d = bn_get_words(scalars[i])[j / BN_BYTES]; p_str[i][j + 0] = (unsigned char)d; p_str[i][j + 1] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8); p_str[i][j + 2] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16); p_str[i][j + 3] = (unsigned char)(d >>= 24); if (BN_BYTES == 8) { d >>= 8; p_str[i][j + 4] = (unsigned char)d; p_str[i][j + 5] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8); p_str[i][j + 6] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16); p_str[i][j + 7] = (unsigned char)(d >> 24); } } for (; j < 33; j++) p_str[i][j] = 0; if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp[0].X, point[i]->X) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp[0].Y, point[i]->Y) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp[0].Z, point[i]->Z)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); goto err; } /* * row[0] is implicitly (0,0,0) (the point at infinity), therefore it * is not stored. All other values are actually stored with an offset * of -1 in table. */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[0], 1); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[0]); /*1+1=2 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[1], 2); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&temp[2], &temp[1], &temp[0]); /*2+1=3 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[2], 3); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[1]); /*2*2=4 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[1], 4); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[2], &temp[2]); /*2*3=6 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[2], 6); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&temp[3], &temp[1], &temp[0]); /*4+1=5 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[3], 5); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&temp[4], &temp[2], &temp[0]); /*6+1=7 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[4], 7); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[1]); /*2*4=8 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[1], 8); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[2], &temp[2]); /*2*6=12 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[2], 12); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[3], &temp[3]); /*2*5=10 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[3], 10); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[4], &temp[4]); /*2*7=14 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[4], 14); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&temp[2], &temp[2], &temp[0]); /*12+1=13*/ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[2], 13); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&temp[3], &temp[3], &temp[0]); /*10+1=11*/ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[3], 11); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&temp[4], &temp[4], &temp[0]); /*14+1=15*/ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[4], 15); ecp_nistz256_point_add (&temp[2], &temp[1], &temp[0]); /*8+1=9 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[2], 9); ecp_nistz256_point_double(&temp[1], &temp[1]); /*2*8=16 */ ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 (row, &temp[1], 16); } idx = 255; wvalue = p_str[0][(idx - 1) / 8]; wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; /* * We gather to temp[0], because we know it's position relative * to table */ ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(&temp[0], table[0], _booth_recode_w5(wvalue) >> 1); memcpy(r, &temp[0], sizeof(temp[0])); while (idx >= 5) { for (i = (idx == 255 ? 1 : 0); i < num; i++) { unsigned int off = (idx - 1) / 8; wvalue = p_str[i][off] | p_str[i][off + 1] << 8; wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; wvalue = _booth_recode_w5(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(&temp[0], table[i], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(temp[1].Y, temp[0].Y); copy_conditional(temp[0].Y, temp[1].Y, (wvalue & 1)); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &temp[0]); } idx -= window_size; ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); ecp_nistz256_point_double(r, r); } /* Final window */ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { wvalue = p_str[i][0]; wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & mask; wvalue = _booth_recode_w5(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(&temp[0], table[i], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(temp[1].Y, temp[0].Y); copy_conditional(temp[0].Y, temp[1].Y, wvalue & 1); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &temp[0]); } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(table_storage); OPENSSL_free(p_str); OPENSSL_free(scalars); return ret; } /* Coordinates of G, for which we have precomputed tables */ static const BN_ULONG def_xG[P256_LIMBS] = { TOBN(0x79e730d4, 0x18a9143c), TOBN(0x75ba95fc, 0x5fedb601), TOBN(0x79fb732b, 0x77622510), TOBN(0x18905f76, 0xa53755c6) }; static const BN_ULONG def_yG[P256_LIMBS] = { TOBN(0xddf25357, 0xce95560a), TOBN(0x8b4ab8e4, 0xba19e45c), TOBN(0xd2e88688, 0xdd21f325), TOBN(0x8571ff18, 0x25885d85) }; /* * ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G returns one if |generator| is the standard, P-256 * generator. */ static int ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(const EC_POINT *generator) { return (bn_get_top(generator->X) == P256_LIMBS) && (bn_get_top(generator->Y) == P256_LIMBS) && is_equal(bn_get_words(generator->X), def_xG) && is_equal(bn_get_words(generator->Y), def_yG) && is_one(generator->Z); } __owur static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* * We precompute a table for a Booth encoded exponent (wNAF) based * computation. Each table holds 64 values for safe access, with an * implicit value of infinity at index zero. We use window of size 7, and * therefore require ceil(256/7) = 37 tables. */ const BIGNUM *order; EC_POINT *P = NULL, *T = NULL; const EC_POINT *generator; NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *pre_comp; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int i, j, k, ret = 0; size_t w; PRECOMP256_ROW *preComputedTable = NULL; unsigned char *precomp_storage = NULL; /* if there is an old NISTZ256_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */ EC_pre_comp_free(group); generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); return 0; } if (ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) { /* * No need to calculate tables for the standard generator because we * have them statically. */ return 1; } if ((pre_comp = ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL) return 0; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (order == NULL) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(order)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); goto err; } w = 7; if ((precomp_storage = OPENSSL_malloc(37 * 64 * sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) + 64)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } preComputedTable = (void *)ALIGNPTR(precomp_storage, 64); P = EC_POINT_new(group); T = EC_POINT_new(group); if (P == NULL || T == NULL) goto err; /* * The zero entry is implicitly infinity, and we skip it, storing other * values with -1 offset. */ if (!EC_POINT_copy(T, generator)) goto err; for (k = 0; k < 64; k++) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(P, T)) goto err; for (j = 0; j < 37; j++) { P256_POINT_AFFINE temp; /* * It would be faster to use EC_POINTs_make_affine and * make multiple points affine at the same time. */ if (!EC_POINT_make_affine(group, P, ctx)) goto err; if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp.X, P->X) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(temp.Y, P->Y)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); goto err; } ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(preComputedTable[j], &temp, k); for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx)) goto err; } } if (!EC_POINT_add(group, T, T, generator, ctx)) goto err; } pre_comp->group = group; pre_comp->w = w; pre_comp->precomp = preComputedTable; pre_comp->precomp_storage = precomp_storage; precomp_storage = NULL; SETPRECOMP(group, nistz256, pre_comp); pre_comp = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(pre_comp); OPENSSL_free(precomp_storage); EC_POINT_free(P); EC_POINT_free(T); return ret; } /* * Note that by default ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is undefined. While it's great * code processing 4 points in parallel, corresponding serial operation * is several times slower, because it uses 29x29=58-bit multiplication * as opposite to 64x64=128-bit in integer-only scalar case. As result * it doesn't provide *significant* performance improvement. Note that * just defining ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is not sufficient to make it work, * you'd need to compile even asm/ecp_nistz256-avx.pl module. */ #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2) # if !(defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_MX64)) || \ !(defined(__GNUC__) || defined(_MSC_VER)) /* this is for ALIGN32 */ # undef ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 # else /* Constant time access, loading four values, from four consecutive tables */ void ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(void *result, const void *in, int index0, int index1, int index2, int index3); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(void *RESULTx4, const void *in); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(void *result, const void *Ax4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4, const void *Bx4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4, const void *Bx4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4); void ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(void *RESULTx4); int ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible(void); static void booth_recode_w7(unsigned char *sign, unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in) { unsigned char s, d; s = ~((in >> 7) - 1); d = (1 << 8) - in - 1; d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); *sign = s & 1; *digit = d; } /* * ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g performs multiplication by G, using only the * precomputed table. It does 4 affine point additions in parallel, * significantly speeding up point multiplication for a fixed value. */ static void ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(P256_POINT *r, unsigned char p_str[33], const P256_POINT_AFFINE(*preComputedTable)[64]) { const unsigned int window_size = 7; const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1; unsigned int wvalue; /* Using 4 windows at a time */ unsigned char sign0, digit0; unsigned char sign1, digit1; unsigned char sign2, digit2; unsigned char sign3, digit3; unsigned int idx = 0; BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS]; int i; ALIGN32 BN_ULONG aX4[4 * 9 * 3] = { 0 }; ALIGN32 BN_ULONG bX4[4 * 9 * 2] = { 0 }; ALIGN32 P256_POINT_AFFINE point_arr[4]; ALIGN32 P256_POINT res_point_arr[4]; /* Initial four windows */ wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[0]); wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[0], digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(aX4, point_arr); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(aX4, aX4); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&aX4[4 * 9], &aX4[4 * 9]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2]); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[4 * 1], digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]); /* Optimized when both inputs are affine */ ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4); for (i = 2; i < 9; i++) { wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[4 * i], digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4); ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4); } ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 0], &aX4[4 * 9 * 0]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 1], &aX4[4 * 9 * 1]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2], &aX4[4 * 9 * 2]); ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(res_point_arr, aX4); /* Last window is performed serially */ wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); ecp_nistz256_gather_w7((P256_POINT_AFFINE *)r, preComputedTable[36], digit0); ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, r->Y); copy_conditional(r->Y, tmp, sign0); memcpy(r->Z, ONE, sizeof(ONE)); /* Sum the four windows */ ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[0]); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[1]); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[2]); ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[3]); } # endif #endif __owur static int ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(EC_POINT *out, const EC_GROUP *group, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *x, *y; BN_ULONG d_x[P256_LIMBS], d_y[P256_LIMBS]; int ret = 0; x = BN_new(); if (x == NULL) return 0; y = BN_new(); if (y == NULL) { BN_free(x); return 0; } memcpy(d_x, in->X, sizeof(d_x)); bn_set_static_words(x, d_x, P256_LIMBS); memcpy(d_y, in->Y, sizeof(d_y)); bn_set_static_words(y, d_y, P256_LIMBS); ret = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, out, x, y, ctx); BN_free(x); BN_free(y); return ret; } /* r = scalar*G + sum(scalars[i]*points[i]) */ __owur static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int i = 0, ret = 0, no_precomp_for_generator = 0, p_is_infinity = 0; size_t j; unsigned char p_str[33] = { 0 }; const PRECOMP256_ROW *preComputedTable = NULL; const NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL; const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; const BIGNUM **new_scalars = NULL; const EC_POINT **new_points = NULL; unsigned int idx = 0; const unsigned int window_size = 7; const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1; unsigned int wvalue; ALIGN32 union { P256_POINT p; P256_POINT_AFFINE a; } t, p; BIGNUM *tmp_scalar; if ((num + 1) == 0 || (num + 1) > OPENSSL_MALLOC_MAX_NELEMS(void *)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (group->meth != r->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) { if (group->meth != points[j]->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (scalar) { generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */ pre_comp = group->pre_comp.nistz256; if (pre_comp) { /* * If there is a precomputed table for the generator, check that * it was generated with the same generator. */ EC_POINT *pre_comp_generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (pre_comp_generator == NULL) goto err; if (!ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(pre_comp_generator, group, pre_comp->precomp[0], ctx)) { EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator); goto err; } if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp_generator, ctx)) preComputedTable = (const PRECOMP256_ROW *)pre_comp->precomp; EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator); } if (preComputedTable == NULL && ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) { /* * If there is no precomputed data, but the generator is the * default, a hardcoded table of precomputed data is used. This * is because applications, such as Apache, do not use * EC_KEY_precompute_mult. */ preComputedTable = ecp_nistz256_precomputed; } if (preComputedTable) { if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar)) { if ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } scalar = tmp_scalar; } for (i = 0; i < bn_get_top(scalar) * BN_BYTES; i += BN_BYTES) { BN_ULONG d = bn_get_words(scalar)[i / BN_BYTES]; p_str[i + 0] = (unsigned char)d; p_str[i + 1] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8); p_str[i + 2] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16); p_str[i + 3] = (unsigned char)(d >>= 24); if (BN_BYTES == 8) { d >>= 8; p_str[i + 4] = (unsigned char)d; p_str[i + 5] = (unsigned char)(d >> 8); p_str[i + 6] = (unsigned char)(d >> 16); p_str[i + 7] = (unsigned char)(d >> 24); } } for (; i < 33; i++) p_str[i] = 0; #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2) if (ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible()) { ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(&p.p, p_str, preComputedTable); } else #endif { BN_ULONG infty; /* First window */ wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & mask; idx += window_size; wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&p.a, preComputedTable[0], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y); copy_conditional(p.p.Y, p.p.Z, wvalue & 1); /* * Since affine infinity is encoded as (0,0) and * Jacobian ias (,,0), we need to harmonize them * by assigning "one" or zero to Z. */ infty = (p.p.X[0] | p.p.X[1] | p.p.X[2] | p.p.X[3] | p.p.Y[0] | p.p.Y[1] | p.p.Y[2] | p.p.Y[3]); if (P256_LIMBS == 8) infty |= (p.p.X[4] | p.p.X[5] | p.p.X[6] | p.p.X[7] | p.p.Y[4] | p.p.Y[5] | p.p.Y[6] | p.p.Y[7]); infty = 0 - is_zero(infty); infty = ~infty; p.p.Z[0] = ONE[0] & infty; p.p.Z[1] = ONE[1] & infty; p.p.Z[2] = ONE[2] & infty; p.p.Z[3] = ONE[3] & infty; if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { p.p.Z[4] = ONE[4] & infty; p.p.Z[5] = ONE[5] & infty; p.p.Z[6] = ONE[6] & infty; p.p.Z[7] = ONE[7] & infty; } for (i = 1; i < 37; i++) { unsigned int off = (idx - 1) / 8; wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8; wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; idx += window_size; wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&t.a, preComputedTable[i], wvalue >> 1); ecp_nistz256_neg(t.p.Z, t.a.Y); copy_conditional(t.a.Y, t.p.Z, wvalue & 1); ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(&p.p, &p.p, &t.a); } } } else { p_is_infinity = 1; no_precomp_for_generator = 1; } } else p_is_infinity = 1; if (no_precomp_for_generator) { /* * Without a precomputed table for the generator, it has to be * handled like a normal point. */ new_scalars = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(BIGNUM *)); if (new_scalars == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } new_points = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(EC_POINT *)); if (new_points == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(new_scalars, scalars, num * sizeof(BIGNUM *)); new_scalars[num] = scalar; memcpy(new_points, points, num * sizeof(EC_POINT *)); new_points[num] = generator; scalars = new_scalars; points = new_points; num++; } if (num) { P256_POINT *out = &t.p; if (p_is_infinity) out = &p.p; if (!ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, scalars, points, num, ctx)) goto err; if (!p_is_infinity) ecp_nistz256_point_add(&p.p, &p.p, out); } /* Not constant-time, but we're only operating on the public output. */ if (!bn_set_words(r->X, p.p.X, P256_LIMBS) || !bn_set_words(r->Y, p.p.Y, P256_LIMBS) || !bn_set_words(r->Z, p.p.Z, P256_LIMBS)) { goto err; } r->Z_is_one = is_one(r->Z) & 1; ret = 1; err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); OPENSSL_free(new_points); OPENSSL_free(new_scalars); return ret; } __owur static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_ULONG z_inv2[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG z_inv3[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG x_aff[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG y_aff[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG point_x[P256_LIMBS], point_y[P256_LIMBS], point_z[P256_LIMBS]; BN_ULONG x_ret[P256_LIMBS], y_ret[P256_LIMBS]; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); return 0; } if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_x, point->X) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_y, point->Y) || !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(point_z, point->Z)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } ecp_nistz256_mod_inverse(z_inv3, point_z); ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(z_inv2, z_inv3); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(x_aff, z_inv2, point_x); if (x != NULL) { ecp_nistz256_from_mont(x_ret, x_aff); if (!bn_set_words(x, x_ret, P256_LIMBS)) return 0; } if (y != NULL) { ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(z_inv3, z_inv3, z_inv2); ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(y_aff, z_inv3, point_y); ecp_nistz256_from_mont(y_ret, y_aff); if (!bn_set_words(y, y_ret, P256_LIMBS)) return 0; } return 1; } static NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL; if (!group) return NULL; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } ret->group = group; ret->w = 6; /* default */ ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *p) { int i; if (p != NULL) CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock); return p; } void EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *pre) { int i; if (pre == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, -1, &i, pre->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistz256", x); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); OPENSSL_free(pre->precomp_storage); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock); OPENSSL_free(pre); } static int ecp_nistz256_window_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { /* There is a hard-coded table for the default generator. */ const EC_POINT *generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator != NULL && ecp_nistz256_is_affine_G(generator)) { /* There is a hard-coded table for the default generator. */ return 1; } return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistz256); } const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_mont_group_init, ec_GFp_mont_group_finish, ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_mont_group_copy, ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ecp_nistz256_get_affine, 0, 0, 0, ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, ecp_nistz256_points_mul, /* mul */ ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute, /* precompute_mult */ ecp_nistz256_window_have_precompute_mult, /* have_precompute_mult */ ec_GFp_mont_field_mul, ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr, 0, /* field_div */ ec_GFp_mont_field_encode, ec_GFp_mont_field_decode, ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one, ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c0000644000000000000000000004701113176625657015645 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. * * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided below. * * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, ec_GF2m_simple_group_init, ec_GF2m_simple_group_finish, ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish, ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy, ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve, ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GF2m_simple_point_init, ec_GF2m_simple_point_finish, ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy, ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity, 0 /* set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp */ , 0 /* get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp */ , ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates, 0, 0, 0, ec_GF2m_simple_add, ec_GF2m_simple_dbl, ec_GF2m_simple_invert, ec_GF2m_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GF2m_simple_cmp, ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine, ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine, /* * the following three method functions are defined in ec2_mult.c */ ec_GF2m_simple_mul, ec_GF2m_precompute_mult, ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult, ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul, ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr, ec_GF2m_simple_field_div, 0 /* field_encode */ , 0 /* field_decode */ , 0, /* field_set_to_one */ ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } /* * Initialize a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other members * are handled by EC_GROUP_new. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { group->field = BN_new(); group->a = BN_new(); group->b = BN_new(); if (group->field == NULL || group->a == NULL || group->b == NULL) { BN_free(group->field); BN_free(group->a); BN_free(group->b); return 0; } return 1; } /* * Free a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other members are * handled by EC_GROUP_free. */ void ec_GF2m_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_free(group->field); BN_free(group->a); BN_free(group->b); } /* * Clear and free a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other * members are handled by EC_GROUP_clear_free. */ void ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_clear_free(group->field); BN_clear_free(group->a); BN_clear_free(group->b); group->poly[0] = 0; group->poly[1] = 0; group->poly[2] = 0; group->poly[3] = 0; group->poly[4] = 0; group->poly[5] = -1; } /* * Copy a GF(2^m)-based EC_GROUP structure. Note that all other members are * handled by EC_GROUP_copy. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { if (!BN_copy(dest->field, src->field)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->a, src->a)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->b, src->b)) return 0; dest->poly[0] = src->poly[0]; dest->poly[1] = src->poly[1]; dest->poly[2] = src->poly[2]; dest->poly[3] = src->poly[3]; dest->poly[4] = src->poly[4]; dest->poly[5] = src->poly[5]; if (bn_wexpand(dest->a, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL) return 0; if (bn_wexpand(dest->b, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL) return 0; bn_set_all_zero(dest->a); bn_set_all_zero(dest->b); return 1; } /* Set the curve parameters of an EC_GROUP structure. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0, i; /* group->field */ if (!BN_copy(group->field, p)) goto err; i = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(group->field, group->poly, 6) - 1; if ((i != 5) && (i != 3)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD); goto err; } /* group->a */ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(group->a, a, group->poly)) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(group->a, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL) goto err; bn_set_all_zero(group->a); /* group->b */ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(group->b, b, group->poly)) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(group->b, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL) goto err; bn_set_all_zero(group->b); ret = 1; err: return ret; } /* * Get the curve parameters of an EC_GROUP structure. If p, a, or b are NULL * then there values will not be set but the method will return with success. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; if (p != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(p, group->field)) return 0; } if (a != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(a, group->a)) goto err; } if (b != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(b, group->b)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: return ret; } /* * Gets the degree of the field. For a curve over GF(2^m) this is the value * m. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) { return BN_num_bits(group->field) - 1; } /* * Checks the discriminant of the curve. y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b is an * elliptic curve <=> b != 0 (mod p) */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *b; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } BN_CTX_start(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (b == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(b, group->b, group->poly)) goto err; /* * check the discriminant: y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b is an elliptic * curve <=> b != 0 (mod p) */ if (BN_is_zero(b)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* Initializes an EC_POINT. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *point) { point->X = BN_new(); point->Y = BN_new(); point->Z = BN_new(); if (point->X == NULL || point->Y == NULL || point->Z == NULL) { BN_free(point->X); BN_free(point->Y); BN_free(point->Z); return 0; } return 1; } /* Frees an EC_POINT. */ void ec_GF2m_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *point) { BN_free(point->X); BN_free(point->Y); BN_free(point->Z); } /* Clears and frees an EC_POINT. */ void ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *point) { BN_clear_free(point->X); BN_clear_free(point->Y); BN_clear_free(point->Z); point->Z_is_one = 0; } /* * Copy the contents of one EC_POINT into another. Assumes dest is * initialized. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) { if (!BN_copy(dest->X, src->X)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->Y, src->Y)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z)) return 0; dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one; return 1; } /* * Set an EC_POINT to the point at infinity. A point at infinity is * represented by having Z=0. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point) { point->Z_is_one = 0; BN_zero(point->Z); return 1; } /* * Set the coordinates of an EC_POINT using affine coordinates. Note that * the simple implementation only uses affine coordinates. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; if (x == NULL || y == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (!BN_copy(point->X, x)) goto err; BN_set_negative(point->X, 0); if (!BN_copy(point->Y, y)) goto err; BN_set_negative(point->Y, 0); if (!BN_copy(point->Z, BN_value_one())) goto err; BN_set_negative(point->Z, 0); point->Z_is_one = 1; ret = 1; err: return ret; } /* * Gets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT. Note that the simple * implementation only uses affine coordinates. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); return 0; } if (BN_cmp(point->Z, BN_value_one())) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (x != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(x, point->X)) goto err; BN_set_negative(x, 0); } if (y != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(y, point->Y)) goto err; BN_set_negative(y, 0); } ret = 1; err: return ret; } /* * Computes a + b and stores the result in r. r could be a or b, a could be * b. Uses algorithm A.10.2 of IEEE P1363. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x0, *y0, *x1, *y1, *x2, *y2, *s, *t; int ret = 0; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, b)) return 0; return 1; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, a)) return 0; return 1; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); x0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); x1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); x2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); s = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t == NULL) goto err; if (a->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(x0, a->X)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(y0, a->Y)) goto err; } else { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, a, x0, y0, ctx)) goto err; } if (b->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(x1, b->X)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(y1, b->Y)) goto err; } else { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, b, x1, y1, ctx)) goto err; } if (BN_GF2m_cmp(x0, x1)) { if (!BN_GF2m_add(t, x0, x1)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(s, y0, y1)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_div(group, s, s, t, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, s, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, group->a)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, s)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, t)) goto err; } else { if (BN_GF2m_cmp(y0, y1) || BN_is_zero(x1)) { if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) goto err; ret = 1; goto err; } if (!group->meth->field_div(group, s, y1, x1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(s, s, x1)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, s, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, s)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, group->a)) goto err; } if (!BN_GF2m_add(y2, x1, x2)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y2, y2, s, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(y2, y2, x2)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(y2, y2, y1)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, r, x2, y2, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* * Computes 2 * a and stores the result in r. r could be a. Uses algorithm * A.10.2 of IEEE P1363. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { return ec_GF2m_simple_add(group, r, a, a, ctx); } int ec_GF2m_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) || BN_is_zero(point->Y)) /* point is its own inverse */ return 1; if (!EC_POINT_make_affine(group, point, ctx)) return 0; return BN_GF2m_add(point->Y, point->X, point->Y); } /* Indicates whether the given point is the point at infinity. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { return BN_is_zero(point->Z); } /*- * Determines whether the given EC_POINT is an actual point on the curve defined * in the EC_GROUP. A point is valid if it satisfies the Weierstrass equation: * y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = -1; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *lh, *y2; int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) return 1; field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; /* only support affine coordinates */ if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return -1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); y2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); lh = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (lh == NULL) goto err; /*- * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation * y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b. * <=> x^3 + a*x^2 + x*y + b + y^2 = 0 * <=> ((x + a) * x + y ) * x + b + y^2 = 0 */ if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, point->X, group->a)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, lh, lh, point->X, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, lh, point->Y)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, lh, lh, point->X, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, lh, group->b)) goto err; if (!field_sqr(group, y2, point->Y, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, lh, y2)) goto err; ret = BN_is_zero(lh); err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /*- * Indicates whether two points are equal. * Return values: * -1 error * 0 equal (in affine coordinates) * 1 not equal */ int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *aX, *aY, *bX, *bY; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int ret = -1; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) { return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) return 1; if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) { return ((BN_cmp(a->X, b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp(a->Y, b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return -1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); aX = BN_CTX_get(ctx); aY = BN_CTX_get(ctx); bX = BN_CTX_get(ctx); bY = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (bY == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, a, aX, aY, ctx)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, b, bX, bY, ctx)) goto err; ret = ((BN_cmp(aX, bX) == 0) && BN_cmp(aY, bY) == 0) ? 0 : 1; err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* Forces the given EC_POINT to internally use affine coordinates. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y; int ret = 0; if (point->Z_is_one || EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) return 1; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(point->X, x)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(point->Y, y)) goto err; if (!BN_one(point->Z)) goto err; point->Z_is_one = 1; ret = 1; err: if (ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* * Forces each of the EC_POINTs in the given array to use affine coordinates. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (!group->meth->make_affine(group, points[i], ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } /* Wrapper to simple binary polynomial field multiplication implementation. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, group->poly, ctx); } /* Wrapper to simple binary polynomial field squaring implementation. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, group->poly, ctx); } /* Wrapper to simple binary polynomial field division implementation. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_field_div(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_GF2m_mod_div(r, a, b, group->field, ctx); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c0000644000000000000000000011064213176625657015744 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., * and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_simple_group_init, ec_GFp_simple_group_finish, ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_group_copy, ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates, 0, 0, 0, ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, 0 /* mul */ , 0 /* precompute_mult */ , 0 /* have_precompute_mult */ , ec_GFp_simple_field_mul, ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr, 0 /* field_div */ , 0 /* field_encode */ , 0 /* field_decode */ , 0, /* field_set_to_one */ ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } /* * Most method functions in this file are designed to work with * non-trivial representations of field elements if necessary * (see ecp_mont.c): while standard modular addition and subtraction * are used, the field_mul and field_sqr methods will be used for * multiplication, and field_encode and field_decode (if defined) * will be used for converting between representations. * * Functions ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine() and * ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates() specifically assume * that if a non-trivial representation is used, it is a Montgomery * representation (i.e. 'encoding' means multiplying by some factor R). */ int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { group->field = BN_new(); group->a = BN_new(); group->b = BN_new(); if (group->field == NULL || group->a == NULL || group->b == NULL) { BN_free(group->field); BN_free(group->a); BN_free(group->b); return 0; } group->a_is_minus3 = 0; return 1; } void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_free(group->field); BN_free(group->a); BN_free(group->b); } void ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_clear_free(group->field); BN_clear_free(group->a); BN_clear_free(group->b); } int ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { if (!BN_copy(dest->field, src->field)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->a, src->a)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->b, src->b)) return 0; dest->a_is_minus3 = src->a_is_minus3; return 1; } int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp_a; /* p must be a prime > 3 */ if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD); return 0; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp_a == NULL) goto err; /* group->field */ if (!BN_copy(group->field, p)) goto err; BN_set_negative(group->field, 0); /* group->a */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_encode) { if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, group->a, tmp_a, ctx)) goto err; } else if (!BN_copy(group->a, tmp_a)) goto err; /* group->b */ if (!BN_nnmod(group->b, b, p, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_encode) if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, group->b, group->b, ctx)) goto err; /* group->a_is_minus3 */ if (!BN_add_word(tmp_a, 3)) goto err; group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp_a, group->field)); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; if (p != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(p, group->field)) return 0; } if (a != NULL || b != NULL) { if (group->meth->field_decode) { if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } if (a != NULL) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, a, group->a, ctx)) goto err; } if (b != NULL) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, b, group->b, ctx)) goto err; } } else { if (a != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(a, group->a)) goto err; } if (b != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(b, group->b)) goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) { return BN_num_bits(group->field); } int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *a, *b, *order, *tmp_1, *tmp_2; const BIGNUM *p = group->field; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } BN_CTX_start(ctx); a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (order == NULL) goto err; if (group->meth->field_decode) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, a, group->a, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, b, group->b, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_copy(a, group->a)) goto err; if (!BN_copy(b, group->b)) goto err; } /*- * check the discriminant: * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p) * 0 =< a, b < p */ if (BN_is_zero(a)) { if (BN_is_zero(b)) goto err; } else if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp_1, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp_2, tmp_1, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift(tmp_1, tmp_2, 2)) goto err; /* tmp_1 = 4*a^3 */ if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp_2, b, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul_word(tmp_2, 27)) goto err; /* tmp_2 = 27*b^2 */ if (!BN_mod_add(a, tmp_1, tmp_2, p, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(a)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *point) { point->X = BN_new(); point->Y = BN_new(); point->Z = BN_new(); point->Z_is_one = 0; if (point->X == NULL || point->Y == NULL || point->Z == NULL) { BN_free(point->X); BN_free(point->Y); BN_free(point->Z); return 0; } return 1; } void ec_GFp_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *point) { BN_free(point->X); BN_free(point->Y); BN_free(point->Z); } void ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *point) { BN_clear_free(point->X); BN_clear_free(point->Y); BN_clear_free(point->Z); point->Z_is_one = 0; } int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) { if (!BN_copy(dest->X, src->X)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->Y, src->Y)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z)) return 0; dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one; return 1; } int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point) { point->Z_is_one = 0; BN_zero(point->Z); return 1; } int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int ret = 0; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } if (x != NULL) { if (!BN_nnmod(point->X, x, group->field, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_encode) { if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, point->X, point->X, ctx)) goto err; } } if (y != NULL) { if (!BN_nnmod(point->Y, y, group->field, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_encode) { if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, point->Y, point->Y, ctx)) goto err; } } if (z != NULL) { int Z_is_one; if (!BN_nnmod(point->Z, z, group->field, ctx)) goto err; Z_is_one = BN_is_one(point->Z); if (group->meth->field_encode) { if (Z_is_one && (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)) { if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, point->Z, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!group-> meth->field_encode(group, point->Z, point->Z, ctx)) goto err; } } point->Z_is_one = Z_is_one; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int ret = 0; if (group->meth->field_decode != 0) { if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } if (x != NULL) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, x, point->X, ctx)) goto err; } if (y != NULL) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, y, point->Y, ctx)) goto err; } if (z != NULL) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, z, point->Z, ctx)) goto err; } } else { if (x != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(x, point->X)) goto err; } if (y != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(y, point->Y)) goto err; } if (z != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(z, point->Z)) goto err; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (x == NULL || y == NULL) { /* * unlike for projective coordinates, we do not tolerate this */ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } return EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, BN_value_one(), ctx); } int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *Z, *Z_1, *Z_2, *Z_3; const BIGNUM *Z_; int ret = 0; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); return 0; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Z_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Z_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Z_3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Z_3 == NULL) goto err; /* transform (X, Y, Z) into (x, y) := (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */ if (group->meth->field_decode) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, Z, point->Z, ctx)) goto err; Z_ = Z; } else { Z_ = point->Z; } if (BN_is_one(Z_)) { if (group->meth->field_decode) { if (x != NULL) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, x, point->X, ctx)) goto err; } if (y != NULL) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, y, point->Y, ctx)) goto err; } } else { if (x != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(x, point->X)) goto err; } if (y != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(y, point->Y)) goto err; } } } else { if (!BN_mod_inverse(Z_1, Z_, group->field, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) { /* field_sqr works on standard representation */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, Z_2, Z_1, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_sqr(Z_2, Z_1, group->field, ctx)) goto err; } if (x != NULL) { /* * in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out Montgomery * factor in X: */ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x, point->X, Z_2, ctx)) goto err; } if (y != NULL) { if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) { /* * field_mul works on standard representation */ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_mul(Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, group->field, ctx)) goto err; } /* * in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out Montgomery * factor in Y: */ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y, point->Y, Z_3, ctx)) goto err; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); const BIGNUM *p; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3, *n4, *n5, *n6; int ret = 0; if (a == b) return EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, a, ctx); if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) return EC_POINT_copy(r, b); if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) return EC_POINT_copy(r, a); field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; p = group->field; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (n6 == NULL) goto end; /* * Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a' or 'b' * once we have written the corresponding components of 'r'. ('r' might * be one of 'a' or 'b'.) */ /* n1, n2 */ if (b->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(n1, a->X)) goto end; if (!BN_copy(n2, a->Y)) goto end; /* n1 = X_a */ /* n2 = Y_a */ } else { if (!field_sqr(group, n0, b->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, n1, a->X, n0, ctx)) goto end; /* n1 = X_a * Z_b^2 */ if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, b->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, n2, a->Y, n0, ctx)) goto end; /* n2 = Y_a * Z_b^3 */ } /* n3, n4 */ if (a->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(n3, b->X)) goto end; if (!BN_copy(n4, b->Y)) goto end; /* n3 = X_b */ /* n4 = Y_b */ } else { if (!field_sqr(group, n0, a->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, n3, b->X, n0, ctx)) goto end; /* n3 = X_b * Z_a^2 */ if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, a->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, n4, b->Y, n0, ctx)) goto end; /* n4 = Y_b * Z_a^3 */ } /* n5, n6 */ if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n5, n1, n3, p)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n6, n2, n4, p)) goto end; /* n5 = n1 - n3 */ /* n6 = n2 - n4 */ if (BN_is_zero(n5)) { if (BN_is_zero(n6)) { /* a is the same point as b */ BN_CTX_end(ctx); ret = EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, a, ctx); ctx = NULL; goto end; } else { /* a is the inverse of b */ BN_zero(r->Z); r->Z_is_one = 0; ret = 1; goto end; } } /* 'n7', 'n8' */ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n3, p)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n2, n2, n4, p)) goto end; /* 'n7' = n1 + n3 */ /* 'n8' = n2 + n4 */ /* Z_r */ if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(r->Z, n5)) goto end; } else { if (a->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(n0, b->Z)) goto end; } else if (b->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(n0, a->Z)) goto end; } else { if (!field_mul(group, n0, a->Z, b->Z, ctx)) goto end; } if (!field_mul(group, r->Z, n0, n5, ctx)) goto end; } r->Z_is_one = 0; /* Z_r = Z_a * Z_b * n5 */ /* X_r */ if (!field_sqr(group, n0, n6, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_sqr(group, n4, n5, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, n3, n1, n4, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, n0, n3, p)) goto end; /* X_r = n6^2 - n5^2 * 'n7' */ /* 'n9' */ if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, r->X, p)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n3, n0, p)) goto end; /* n9 = n5^2 * 'n7' - 2 * X_r */ /* Y_r */ if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, n6, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, n5, n4, n5, ctx)) goto end; /* now n5 is n5^3 */ if (!field_mul(group, n1, n2, n5, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n0, n1, p)) goto end; if (BN_is_odd(n0)) if (!BN_add(n0, n0, p)) goto end; /* now 0 <= n0 < 2*p, and n0 is even */ if (!BN_rshift1(r->Y, n0)) goto end; /* Y_r = (n6 * 'n9' - 'n8' * 'n5^3') / 2 */ ret = 1; end: if (ctx) /* otherwise we already called BN_CTX_end */ BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); const BIGNUM *p; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3; int ret = 0; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) { BN_zero(r->Z); r->Z_is_one = 0; return 1; } field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; p = group->field; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (n3 == NULL) goto err; /* * Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a' once we * have written the corresponding components of 'r'. ('r' might the same * as 'a'.) */ /* n1 */ if (a->Z_is_one) { if (!field_sqr(group, n0, a->X, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, group->a, p)) goto err; /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve */ } else if (group->a_is_minus3) { if (!field_sqr(group, n1, a->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, a->X, n1, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n2, a->X, n1, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, n1, n0, n2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n1, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p)) goto err; /*- * n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2) * = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4 */ } else { if (!field_sqr(group, n0, a->X, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p)) goto err; if (!field_sqr(group, n1, a->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!field_sqr(group, n1, n1, ctx)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, n1, n1, group->a, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n0, p)) goto err; /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve * Z_a^4 */ } /* Z_r */ if (a->Z_is_one) { if (!BN_copy(n0, a->Y)) goto err; } else { if (!field_mul(group, n0, a->Y, a->Z, ctx)) goto err; } if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(r->Z, n0, p)) goto err; r->Z_is_one = 0; /* Z_r = 2 * Y_a * Z_a */ /* n2 */ if (!field_sqr(group, n3, a->Y, ctx)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, n2, a->X, n3, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_lshift_quick(n2, n2, 2, p)) goto err; /* n2 = 4 * X_a * Y_a^2 */ /* X_r */ if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n2, p)) goto err; if (!field_sqr(group, r->X, n1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, r->X, n0, p)) goto err; /* X_r = n1^2 - 2 * n2 */ /* n3 */ if (!field_sqr(group, n0, n3, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_lshift_quick(n3, n0, 3, p)) goto err; /* n3 = 8 * Y_a^4 */ /* Y_r */ if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n2, r->X, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, n0, n1, n0, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(r->Y, n0, n3, p)) goto err; /* Y_r = n1 * (n2 - X_r) - n3 */ ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) || BN_is_zero(point->Y)) /* point is its own inverse */ return 1; return BN_usub(point->Y, group->field, point->Y); } int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { return BN_is_zero(point->Z); } int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); const BIGNUM *p; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *rh, *tmp, *Z4, *Z6; int ret = -1; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) return 1; field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; p = group->field; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return -1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); rh = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Z4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Z6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Z6 == NULL) goto err; /*- * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b. * The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates * where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3). * Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation into * Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6. * To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'. */ /* rh := X^2 */ if (!field_sqr(group, rh, point->X, ctx)) goto err; if (!point->Z_is_one) { if (!field_sqr(group, tmp, point->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!field_sqr(group, Z4, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, Z6, Z4, tmp, ctx)) goto err; /* rh := (rh + a*Z^4)*X */ if (group->a_is_minus3) { if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(tmp, Z4, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp, tmp, Z4, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, rh, rh, point->X, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!field_mul(group, tmp, Z4, group->a, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, rh, rh, point->X, ctx)) goto err; } /* rh := rh + b*Z^6 */ if (!field_mul(group, tmp, group->b, Z6, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p)) goto err; } else { /* point->Z_is_one */ /* rh := (rh + a)*X */ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, group->a, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul(group, rh, rh, point->X, ctx)) goto err; /* rh := rh + b */ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, group->b, p)) goto err; } /* 'lh' := Y^2 */ if (!field_sqr(group, tmp, point->Y, ctx)) goto err; ret = (0 == BN_ucmp(tmp, rh)); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { /*- * return values: * -1 error * 0 equal (in affine coordinates) * 1 not equal */ int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *Za23, *Zb23; const BIGNUM *tmp1_, *tmp2_; int ret = -1; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) { return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) return 1; if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) { return ((BN_cmp(a->X, b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp(a->Y, b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1; } field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return -1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Za23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); Zb23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Zb23 == NULL) goto end; /*- * We have to decide whether * (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3), * or equivalently, whether * (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3). */ if (!b->Z_is_one) { if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, b->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, tmp1, a->X, Zb23, ctx)) goto end; tmp1_ = tmp1; } else tmp1_ = a->X; if (!a->Z_is_one) { if (!field_sqr(group, Za23, a->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, tmp2, b->X, Za23, ctx)) goto end; tmp2_ = tmp2; } else tmp2_ = b->X; /* compare X_a*Z_b^2 with X_b*Z_a^2 */ if (BN_cmp(tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) { ret = 1; /* points differ */ goto end; } if (!b->Z_is_one) { if (!field_mul(group, Zb23, Zb23, b->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, tmp1, a->Y, Zb23, ctx)) goto end; /* tmp1_ = tmp1 */ } else tmp1_ = a->Y; if (!a->Z_is_one) { if (!field_mul(group, Za23, Za23, a->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul(group, tmp2, b->Y, Za23, ctx)) goto end; /* tmp2_ = tmp2 */ } else tmp2_ = b->Y; /* compare Y_a*Z_b^3 with Y_b*Z_a^3 */ if (BN_cmp(tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) { ret = 1; /* points differ */ goto end; } /* points are equal */ ret = 0; end: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y; int ret = 0; if (point->Z_is_one || EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) return 1; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if (!point->Z_is_one) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z; BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL; size_t i; int ret = 0; if (num == 0) return 1; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err; prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]); if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { prod_Z[i] = BN_new(); if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err; } /* * Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z, * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */ if (!BN_is_zero(points[0]->Z)) { if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], points[0]->Z)) goto err; } else { if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) goto err; } } for (i = 1; i < num; i++) { if (!BN_is_zero(points[i]->Z)) { if (!group-> meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err; } } /* * Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every non-zero * points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], group->field, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (group->meth->field_encode != 0) { /* * In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) into * 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H); i.e. we need to * multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */ if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; } for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i) { /* * Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of points[0]->Z * .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */ if (!BN_is_zero(points[i]->Z)) { /* * Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product of Z * inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */ if (!group-> meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err; /* * Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; /* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ if (!BN_copy(points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err; } } if (!BN_is_zero(points[0]->Z)) { /* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */ if (!BN_copy(points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err; } /* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { EC_POINT *p = points[i]; if (!BN_is_zero(p->Z)) { /* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, p->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, p->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Y, p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, p->Z, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one(p->Z)) goto err; } p->Z_is_one = 1; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); if (prod_Z != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) break; BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]); } OPENSSL_free(prod_Z); } return ret; } int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_mod_mul(r, a, b, group->field, ctx); } int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { return BN_mod_sqr(r, a, group->field, ctx); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c0000644000000000000000000001510713176625657015746 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., * and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_mont_group_init, ec_GFp_mont_group_finish, ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_mont_group_copy, ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates, 0, 0, 0, ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, 0 /* mul */ , 0 /* precompute_mult */ , 0 /* have_precompute_mult */ , ec_GFp_mont_field_mul, ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr, 0 /* field_div */ , ec_GFp_mont_field_encode, ec_GFp_mont_field_decode, ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one, ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { int ok; ok = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group); group->field_data1 = NULL; group->field_data2 = NULL; return ok; } void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1); group->field_data1 = NULL; BN_free(group->field_data2); group->field_data2 = NULL; ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(group); } void ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1); group->field_data1 = NULL; BN_clear_free(group->field_data2); group->field_data2 = NULL; ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(group); } int ec_GFp_mont_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->field_data1); dest->field_data1 = NULL; BN_clear_free(dest->field_data2); dest->field_data2 = NULL; if (!ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(dest, src)) return 0; if (src->field_data1 != NULL) { dest->field_data1 = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (dest->field_data1 == NULL) return 0; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->field_data1, src->field_data1)) goto err; } if (src->field_data2 != NULL) { dest->field_data2 = BN_dup(src->field_data2); if (dest->field_data2 == NULL) goto err; } return 1; err: BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->field_data1); dest->field_data1 = NULL; return 0; } int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; BIGNUM *one = NULL; int ret = 0; BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1); group->field_data1 = NULL; BN_free(group->field_data2); group->field_data2 = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (mont == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } one = BN_new(); if (one == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_to_montgomery(one, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) goto err; group->field_data1 = mont; mont = NULL; group->field_data2 = one; one = NULL; ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); if (!ret) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->field_data1); group->field_data1 = NULL; BN_free(group->field_data2); group->field_data2 = NULL; } err: BN_free(one); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); return ret; } int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->field_data1 == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, b, group->field_data1, ctx); } int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->field_data1 == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, a, group->field_data1, ctx); } int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->field_data1 == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } return BN_to_montgomery(r, a, (BN_MONT_CTX *)group->field_data1, ctx); } int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->field_data1 == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } return BN_from_montgomery(r, a, group->field_data1, ctx); } int ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->field_data2 == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } if (!BN_copy(r, group->field_data2)) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c0000644000000000000000000002711413176625657015655 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. * * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided below. * * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /*- * Compute the x-coordinate x/z for the point 2*(x/z) in Montgomery projective * coordinates. * Uses algorithm Mdouble in appendix of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717). * modified to not require precomputation of c=b^{2^{m-1}}. */ static int gf2m_Mdouble(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t1; int ret = 0; /* Since Mdouble is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */ BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, z, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z, x, t1, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, group->b, t1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x, x, t1)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /*- * Compute the x-coordinate x1/z1 for the point (x1/z1)+(x2/x2) in Montgomery * projective coordinates. * Uses algorithm Madd in appendix of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717). */ static int gf2m_Madd(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *x1, BIGNUM *z1, const BIGNUM *x2, const BIGNUM *z2, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t1, *t2; int ret = 0; /* Since Madd is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */ BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t2 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_copy(t1, x)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, x1, z2, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z1, z1, x2, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z1, z1, x1)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z1, z1, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, z1, t1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x1, x1, t2)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /*- * Compute the x, y affine coordinates from the point (x1, z1) (x2, z2) * using Montgomery point multiplication algorithm Mxy() in appendix of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717). * Returns: * 0 on error * 1 if return value should be the point at infinity * 2 otherwise */ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *x1, BIGNUM *z1, BIGNUM *x2, BIGNUM *z2, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t3, *t4, *t5; int ret = 0; if (BN_is_zero(z1)) { BN_zero(x2); BN_zero(z2); return 1; } if (BN_is_zero(z2)) { if (!BN_copy(x2, x)) return 0; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x, y)) return 0; return 2; } /* Since Mxy is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */ BN_CTX_start(ctx); t3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t5 == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_one(t5)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, z1, z2, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z1, z1, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z1, z1, x1)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, x2)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, z1, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, y)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t3, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, z2)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t3, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_div(group, t3, t5, t3, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t3, t4, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x2, x1, t3, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x2, x)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, t4, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, y)) goto err; ret = 2; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /*- * Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r. * point can not equal r. * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717). * * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap, * avoiding conditional branches. */ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *x1, *x2, *z1, *z2; int ret = 0, i, group_top; BN_ULONG mask, word; if (r == point) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY, EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } /* if result should be point at infinity */ if ((scalar == NULL) || BN_is_zero(scalar) || (point == NULL) || EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); } /* only support affine coordinates */ if (!point->Z_is_one) return 0; /* * Since point_multiply is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */ BN_CTX_start(ctx); x1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); z1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (z1 == NULL) goto err; x2 = r->X; z2 = r->Y; group_top = bn_get_top(group->field); if (bn_wexpand(x1, group_top) == NULL || bn_wexpand(z1, group_top) == NULL || bn_wexpand(x2, group_top) == NULL || bn_wexpand(z2, group_top) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */ if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, group->b)) goto err; /* x2 = x^4 + b */ /* find top most bit and go one past it */ i = bn_get_top(scalar) - 1; mask = BN_TBIT; word = bn_get_words(scalar)[i]; while (!(word & mask)) mask >>= 1; mask >>= 1; /* if top most bit was at word break, go to next word */ if (!mask) { i--; mask = BN_TBIT; } for (; i >= 0; i--) { word = bn_get_words(scalar)[i]; while (mask) { BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group_top); BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group_top); if (!gf2m_Madd(group, point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group_top); BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group_top); mask >>= 1; } mask = BN_TBIT; } /* convert out of "projective" coordinates */ i = gf2m_Mxy(group, point->X, point->Y, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx); if (i == 0) goto err; else if (i == 1) { if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one(r->Z)) goto err; r->Z_is_one = 1; } /* GF(2^m) field elements should always have BIGNUM::neg = 0 */ BN_set_negative(r->X, 0); BN_set_negative(r->Y, 0); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /*- * Computes the sum * scalar*group->generator + scalars[0]*points[0] + ... + scalars[num-1]*points[num-1] * gracefully ignoring NULL scalar values. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int ret = 0; size_t i; EC_POINT *p = NULL; EC_POINT *acc = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } /* * This implementation is more efficient than the wNAF implementation for * 2 or fewer points. Use the ec_wNAF_mul implementation for 3 or more * points, or if we can perform a fast multiplication based on * precomputation. */ if ((scalar && (num > 1)) || (num > 2) || (num == 0 && EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(group))) { ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); goto err; } if ((p = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) goto err; if ((acc = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, acc)) goto err; if (scalar) { if (!ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply (group, p, scalar, group->generator, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_negative(scalar)) if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->add(group, acc, acc, p, ctx)) goto err; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (!ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply (group, p, scalars[i], points[i], ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_negative(scalars[i])) if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->add(group, acc, acc, p, ctx)) goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, acc)) goto err; ret = 1; err: EC_POINT_free(p); EC_POINT_free(acc); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* * Precomputation for point multiplication: fall back to wNAF methods because * ec_GF2m_simple_mul() uses ec_wNAF_mul() if appropriate */ int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx); } int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c0000644000000000000000000016531513176625657016365 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Copyright 2011 Google Inc. * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * A 64-bit implementation of the NIST P-224 elliptic curve point multiplication * * Inspired by Daniel J. Bernstein's public domain nistp224 implementation * and Adam Langley's public domain 64-bit C implementation of curve25519 */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include "ec_lcl.h" # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1)) /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */ typedef __uint128_t uint128_t; /* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit * platforms */ # else # error "Need GCC 3.1 or later to define type uint128_t" # endif typedef uint8_t u8; typedef uint64_t u64; typedef int64_t s64; /******************************************************************************/ /*- * INTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF FIELD ELEMENTS * * Field elements are represented as a_0 + 2^56*a_1 + 2^112*a_2 + 2^168*a_3 * using 64-bit coefficients called 'limbs', * and sometimes (for multiplication results) as * b_0 + 2^56*b_1 + 2^112*b_2 + 2^168*b_3 + 2^224*b_4 + 2^280*b_5 + 2^336*b_6 * using 128-bit coefficients called 'widelimbs'. * A 4-limb representation is an 'felem'; * a 7-widelimb representation is a 'widefelem'. * Even within felems, bits of adjacent limbs overlap, and we don't always * reduce the representations: we ensure that inputs to each felem * multiplication satisfy a_i < 2^60, so outputs satisfy b_i < 4*2^60*2^60, * and fit into a 128-bit word without overflow. The coefficients are then * again partially reduced to obtain an felem satisfying a_i < 2^57. * We only reduce to the unique minimal representation at the end of the * computation. */ typedef uint64_t limb; typedef uint128_t widelimb; typedef limb felem[4]; typedef widelimb widefelem[7]; /* * Field element represented as a byte arrary. 28*8 = 224 bits is also the * group order size for the elliptic curve, and we also use this type for * scalars for point multiplication. */ typedef u8 felem_bytearray[28]; static const felem_bytearray nistp224_curve_params[5] = { {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}, {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE}, {0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, /* b */ 0x32, 0x56, 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43, 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4}, {0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, /* x */ 0x90, 0xB9, 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6, 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21}, {0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, /* y */ 0xdf, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99, 0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34} }; /*- * Precomputed multiples of the standard generator * Points are given in coordinates (X, Y, Z) where Z normally is 1 * (0 for the point at infinity). * For each field element, slice a_0 is word 0, etc. * * The table has 2 * 16 elements, starting with the following: * index | bits | point * ------+---------+------------------------------ * 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0G * 1 | 0 0 0 1 | 1G * 2 | 0 0 1 0 | 2^56G * 3 | 0 0 1 1 | (2^56 + 1)G * 4 | 0 1 0 0 | 2^112G * 5 | 0 1 0 1 | (2^112 + 1)G * 6 | 0 1 1 0 | (2^112 + 2^56)G * 7 | 0 1 1 1 | (2^112 + 2^56 + 1)G * 8 | 1 0 0 0 | 2^168G * 9 | 1 0 0 1 | (2^168 + 1)G * 10 | 1 0 1 0 | (2^168 + 2^56)G * 11 | 1 0 1 1 | (2^168 + 2^56 + 1)G * 12 | 1 1 0 0 | (2^168 + 2^112)G * 13 | 1 1 0 1 | (2^168 + 2^112 + 1)G * 14 | 1 1 1 0 | (2^168 + 2^112 + 2^56)G * 15 | 1 1 1 1 | (2^168 + 2^112 + 2^56 + 1)G * followed by a copy of this with each element multiplied by 2^28. * * The reason for this is so that we can clock bits into four different * locations when doing simple scalar multiplies against the base point, * and then another four locations using the second 16 elements. */ static const felem gmul[2][16][3] = { {{{0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x3280d6115c1d21, 0xc1d356c2112234, 0x7f321390b94a03, 0xb70e0cbd6bb4bf}, {0xd5819985007e34, 0x75a05a07476444, 0xfb4c22dfe6cd43, 0xbd376388b5f723}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xfd9675666ebbe9, 0xbca7664d40ce5e, 0x2242df8d8a2a43, 0x1f49bbb0f99bc5}, {0x29e0b892dc9c43, 0xece8608436e662, 0xdc858f185310d0, 0x9812dd4eb8d321}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x6d3e678d5d8eb8, 0x559eed1cb362f1, 0x16e9a3bbce8a3f, 0xeedcccd8c2a748}, {0xf19f90ed50266d, 0xabf2b4bf65f9df, 0x313865468fafec, 0x5cb379ba910a17}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x0641966cab26e3, 0x91fb2991fab0a0, 0xefec27a4e13a0b, 0x0499aa8a5f8ebe}, {0x7510407766af5d, 0x84d929610d5450, 0x81d77aae82f706, 0x6916f6d4338c5b}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xea95ac3b1f15c6, 0x086000905e82d4, 0xdd323ae4d1c8b1, 0x932b56be7685a3}, {0x9ef93dea25dbbf, 0x41665960f390f0, 0xfdec76dbe2a8a7, 0x523e80f019062a}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x822fdd26732c73, 0xa01c83531b5d0f, 0x363f37347c1ba4, 0xc391b45c84725c}, {0xbbd5e1b2d6ad24, 0xddfbcde19dfaec, 0xc393da7e222a7f, 0x1efb7890ede244}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x4c9e90ca217da1, 0xd11beca79159bb, 0xff8d33c2c98b7c, 0x2610b39409f849}, {0x44d1352ac64da0, 0xcdbb7b2c46b4fb, 0x966c079b753c89, 0xfe67e4e820b112}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xe28cae2df5312d, 0xc71b61d16f5c6e, 0x79b7619a3e7c4c, 0x05c73240899b47}, {0x9f7f6382c73e3a, 0x18615165c56bda, 0x641fab2116fd56, 0x72855882b08394}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x0469182f161c09, 0x74a98ca8d00fb5, 0xb89da93489a3e0, 0x41c98768fb0c1d}, {0xe5ea05fb32da81, 0x3dce9ffbca6855, 0x1cfe2d3fbf59e6, 0x0e5e03408738a7}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xdab22b2333e87f, 0x4430137a5dd2f6, 0xe03ab9f738beb8, 0xcb0c5d0dc34f24}, {0x764a7df0c8fda5, 0x185ba5c3fa2044, 0x9281d688bcbe50, 0xc40331df893881}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xb89530796f0f60, 0xade92bd26909a3, 0x1a0c83fb4884da, 0x1765bf22a5a984}, {0x772a9ee75db09e, 0x23bc6c67cec16f, 0x4c1edba8b14e2f, 0xe2a215d9611369}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x571e509fb5efb3, 0xade88696410552, 0xc8ae85fada74fe, 0x6c7e4be83bbde3}, {0xff9f51160f4652, 0xb47ce2495a6539, 0xa2946c53b582f4, 0x286d2db3ee9a60}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x40bbd5081a44af, 0x0995183b13926c, 0xbcefba6f47f6d0, 0x215619e9cc0057}, {0x8bc94d3b0df45e, 0xf11c54a3694f6f, 0x8631b93cdfe8b5, 0xe7e3f4b0982db9}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xb17048ab3e1c7b, 0xac38f36ff8a1d8, 0x1c29819435d2c6, 0xc813132f4c07e9}, {0x2891425503b11f, 0x08781030579fea, 0xf5426ba5cc9674, 0x1e28ebf18562bc}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x9f31997cc864eb, 0x06cd91d28b5e4c, 0xff17036691a973, 0xf1aef351497c58}, {0xdd1f2d600564ff, 0xdead073b1402db, 0x74a684435bd693, 0xeea7471f962558}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}}, {{{0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x9665266dddf554, 0x9613d78b60ef2d, 0xce27a34cdba417, 0xd35ab74d6afc31}, {0x85ccdd22deb15e, 0x2137e5783a6aab, 0xa141cffd8c93c6, 0x355a1830e90f2d}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x1a494eadaade65, 0xd6da4da77fe53c, 0xe7992996abec86, 0x65c3553c6090e3}, {0xfa610b1fb09346, 0xf1c6540b8a4aaf, 0xc51a13ccd3cbab, 0x02995b1b18c28a}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x7874568e7295ef, 0x86b419fbe38d04, 0xdc0690a7550d9a, 0xd3966a44beac33}, {0x2b7280ec29132f, 0xbeaa3b6a032df3, 0xdc7dd88ae41200, 0xd25e2513e3a100}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x924857eb2efafd, 0xac2bce41223190, 0x8edaa1445553fc, 0x825800fd3562d5}, {0x8d79148ea96621, 0x23a01c3dd9ed8d, 0xaf8b219f9416b5, 0xd8db0cc277daea}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x76a9c3b1a700f0, 0xe9acd29bc7e691, 0x69212d1a6b0327, 0x6322e97fe154be}, {0x469fc5465d62aa, 0x8d41ed18883b05, 0x1f8eae66c52b88, 0xe4fcbe9325be51}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x825fdf583cac16, 0x020b857c7b023a, 0x683c17744b0165, 0x14ffd0a2daf2f1}, {0x323b36184218f9, 0x4944ec4e3b47d4, 0xc15b3080841acf, 0x0bced4b01a28bb}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x92ac22230df5c4, 0x52f33b4063eda8, 0xcb3f19870c0c93, 0x40064f2ba65233}, {0xfe16f0924f8992, 0x012da25af5b517, 0x1a57bb24f723a6, 0x06f8bc76760def}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x4a7084f7817cb9, 0xbcab0738ee9a78, 0x3ec11e11d9c326, 0xdc0fe90e0f1aae}, {0xcf639ea5f98390, 0x5c350aa22ffb74, 0x9afae98a4047b7, 0x956ec2d617fc45}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x4306d648c1be6a, 0x9247cd8bc9a462, 0xf5595e377d2f2e, 0xbd1c3caff1a52e}, {0x045e14472409d0, 0x29f3e17078f773, 0x745a602b2d4f7d, 0x191837685cdfbb}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x5b6ee254a8cb79, 0x4953433f5e7026, 0xe21faeb1d1def4, 0xc4c225785c09de}, {0x307ce7bba1e518, 0x31b125b1036db8, 0x47e91868839e8f, 0xc765866e33b9f3}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x3bfece24f96906, 0x4794da641e5093, 0xde5df64f95db26, 0x297ecd89714b05}, {0x701bd3ebb2c3aa, 0x7073b4f53cb1d5, 0x13c5665658af16, 0x9895089d66fe58}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x0fef05f78c4790, 0x2d773633b05d2e, 0x94229c3a951c94, 0xbbbd70df4911bb}, {0xb2c6963d2c1168, 0x105f47a72b0d73, 0x9fdf6111614080, 0x7b7e94b39e67b0}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xad1a7d6efbe2b3, 0xf012482c0da69d, 0x6b3bdf12438345, 0x40d7558d7aa4d9}, {0x8a09fffb5c6d3d, 0x9a356e5d9ffd38, 0x5973f15f4f9b1c, 0xdcd5f59f63c3ea}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xacf39f4c5ca7ab, 0x4c8071cc5fd737, 0xc64e3602cd1184, 0x0acd4644c9abba}, {0x6c011a36d8bf6e, 0xfecd87ba24e32a, 0x19f6f56574fad8, 0x050b204ced9405}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xed4f1cae7d9a96, 0x5ceef7ad94c40a, 0x778e4a3bf3ef9b, 0x7405783dc3b55e}, {0x32477c61b6e8c6, 0xb46a97570f018b, 0x91176d0a7e95d1, 0x3df90fbc4c7d0e}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}} }; /* Precomputation for the group generator. */ struct nistp224_pre_comp_st { felem g_pre_comp[2][16][3]; int references; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init, ec_GFp_simple_group_finish, ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_nist_group_copy, ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates, 0 /* point_set_compressed_coordinates */ , 0 /* point2oct */ , 0 /* oct2point */ , ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul, ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult, ec_GFp_nistp224_have_precompute_mult, ec_GFp_nist_field_mul, ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr, 0 /* field_div */ , 0 /* field_encode */ , 0 /* field_decode */ , 0, /* field_set_to_one */ ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } /* * Helper functions to convert field elements to/from internal representation */ static void bin28_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[28]) { out[0] = *((const uint64_t *)(in)) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; out[1] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 7))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; out[2] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 14))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; out[3] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in+20))) >> 8; } static void felem_to_bin28(u8 out[28], const felem in) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 7; ++i) { out[i] = in[0] >> (8 * i); out[i + 7] = in[1] >> (8 * i); out[i + 14] = in[2] >> (8 * i); out[i + 21] = in[3] >> (8 * i); } } /* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */ static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) out[i] = in[len - 1 - i]; } /* From OpenSSL BIGNUM to internal representation */ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn) { felem_bytearray b_in; felem_bytearray b_out; unsigned num_bytes; /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out)); num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } if (BN_is_negative(bn)) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in); flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes); bin28_to_felem(out, b_out); return 1; } /* From internal representation to OpenSSL BIGNUM */ static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in) { felem_bytearray b_in, b_out; felem_to_bin28(b_in, in); flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof b_out); return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof b_out, out); } /******************************************************************************/ /*- * FIELD OPERATIONS * * Field operations, using the internal representation of field elements. * NB! These operations are specific to our point multiplication and cannot be * expected to be correct in general - e.g., multiplication with a large scalar * will cause an overflow. * */ static void felem_one(felem out) { out[0] = 1; out[1] = 0; out[2] = 0; out[3] = 0; } static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) { out[0] = in[0]; out[1] = in[1]; out[2] = in[2]; out[3] = in[3]; } /* Sum two field elements: out += in */ static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in) { out[0] += in[0]; out[1] += in[1]; out[2] += in[2]; out[3] += in[3]; } /* Get negative value: out = -in */ /* Assumes in[i] < 2^57 */ static void felem_neg(felem out, const felem in) { static const limb two58p2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) + (((limb) 1) << 2); static const limb two58m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) - (((limb) 1) << 2); static const limb two58m42m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) - (((limb) 1) << 42) - (((limb) 1) << 2); /* Set to 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */ out[0] = two58p2 - in[0]; out[1] = two58m42m2 - in[1]; out[2] = two58m2 - in[2]; out[3] = two58m2 - in[3]; } /* Subtract field elements: out -= in */ /* Assumes in[i] < 2^57 */ static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in) { static const limb two58p2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) + (((limb) 1) << 2); static const limb two58m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) - (((limb) 1) << 2); static const limb two58m42m2 = (((limb) 1) << 58) - (((limb) 1) << 42) - (((limb) 1) << 2); /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */ out[0] += two58p2; out[1] += two58m42m2; out[2] += two58m2; out[3] += two58m2; out[0] -= in[0]; out[1] -= in[1]; out[2] -= in[2]; out[3] -= in[3]; } /* Subtract in unreduced 128-bit mode: out -= in */ /* Assumes in[i] < 2^119 */ static void widefelem_diff(widefelem out, const widefelem in) { static const widelimb two120 = ((widelimb) 1) << 120; static const widelimb two120m64 = (((widelimb) 1) << 120) - (((widelimb) 1) << 64); static const widelimb two120m104m64 = (((widelimb) 1) << 120) - (((widelimb) 1) << 104) - (((widelimb) 1) << 64); /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */ out[0] += two120; out[1] += two120m64; out[2] += two120m64; out[3] += two120; out[4] += two120m104m64; out[5] += two120m64; out[6] += two120m64; out[0] -= in[0]; out[1] -= in[1]; out[2] -= in[2]; out[3] -= in[3]; out[4] -= in[4]; out[5] -= in[5]; out[6] -= in[6]; } /* Subtract in mixed mode: out128 -= in64 */ /* in[i] < 2^63 */ static void felem_diff_128_64(widefelem out, const felem in) { static const widelimb two64p8 = (((widelimb) 1) << 64) + (((widelimb) 1) << 8); static const widelimb two64m8 = (((widelimb) 1) << 64) - (((widelimb) 1) << 8); static const widelimb two64m48m8 = (((widelimb) 1) << 64) - (((widelimb) 1) << 48) - (((widelimb) 1) << 8); /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure out > in */ out[0] += two64p8; out[1] += two64m48m8; out[2] += two64m8; out[3] += two64m8; out[0] -= in[0]; out[1] -= in[1]; out[2] -= in[2]; out[3] -= in[3]; } /* * Multiply a field element by a scalar: out = out * scalar The scalars we * actually use are small, so results fit without overflow */ static void felem_scalar(felem out, const limb scalar) { out[0] *= scalar; out[1] *= scalar; out[2] *= scalar; out[3] *= scalar; } /* * Multiply an unreduced field element by a scalar: out = out * scalar The * scalars we actually use are small, so results fit without overflow */ static void widefelem_scalar(widefelem out, const widelimb scalar) { out[0] *= scalar; out[1] *= scalar; out[2] *= scalar; out[3] *= scalar; out[4] *= scalar; out[5] *= scalar; out[6] *= scalar; } /* Square a field element: out = in^2 */ static void felem_square(widefelem out, const felem in) { limb tmp0, tmp1, tmp2; tmp0 = 2 * in[0]; tmp1 = 2 * in[1]; tmp2 = 2 * in[2]; out[0] = ((widelimb) in[0]) * in[0]; out[1] = ((widelimb) in[0]) * tmp1; out[2] = ((widelimb) in[0]) * tmp2 + ((widelimb) in[1]) * in[1]; out[3] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * tmp0 + ((widelimb) in[1]) * tmp2; out[4] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * tmp1 + ((widelimb) in[2]) * in[2]; out[5] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * tmp2; out[6] = ((widelimb) in[3]) * in[3]; } /* Multiply two field elements: out = in1 * in2 */ static void felem_mul(widefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) { out[0] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[0]; out[1] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[1] + ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[0]; out[2] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[2] + ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[1] + ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[0]; out[3] = ((widelimb) in1[0]) * in2[3] + ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[2] + ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[1] + ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[0]; out[4] = ((widelimb) in1[1]) * in2[3] + ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[2] + ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[1]; out[5] = ((widelimb) in1[2]) * in2[3] + ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[2]; out[6] = ((widelimb) in1[3]) * in2[3]; } /*- * Reduce seven 128-bit coefficients to four 64-bit coefficients. * Requires in[i] < 2^126, * ensures out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56, out[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 */ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in) { static const widelimb two127p15 = (((widelimb) 1) << 127) + (((widelimb) 1) << 15); static const widelimb two127m71 = (((widelimb) 1) << 127) - (((widelimb) 1) << 71); static const widelimb two127m71m55 = (((widelimb) 1) << 127) - (((widelimb) 1) << 71) - (((widelimb) 1) << 55); widelimb output[5]; /* Add 0 mod 2^224-2^96+1 to ensure all differences are positive */ output[0] = in[0] + two127p15; output[1] = in[1] + two127m71m55; output[2] = in[2] + two127m71; output[3] = in[3]; output[4] = in[4]; /* Eliminate in[4], in[5], in[6] */ output[4] += in[6] >> 16; output[3] += (in[6] & 0xffff) << 40; output[2] -= in[6]; output[3] += in[5] >> 16; output[2] += (in[5] & 0xffff) << 40; output[1] -= in[5]; output[2] += output[4] >> 16; output[1] += (output[4] & 0xffff) << 40; output[0] -= output[4]; /* Carry 2 -> 3 -> 4 */ output[3] += output[2] >> 56; output[2] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; output[4] = output[3] >> 56; output[3] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; /* Now output[2] < 2^56, output[3] < 2^56, output[4] < 2^72 */ /* Eliminate output[4] */ output[2] += output[4] >> 16; /* output[2] < 2^56 + 2^56 = 2^57 */ output[1] += (output[4] & 0xffff) << 40; output[0] -= output[4]; /* Carry 0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 */ output[1] += output[0] >> 56; out[0] = output[0] & 0x00ffffffffffffff; output[2] += output[1] >> 56; /* output[2] < 2^57 + 2^72 */ out[1] = output[1] & 0x00ffffffffffffff; output[3] += output[2] >> 56; /* output[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 */ out[2] = output[2] & 0x00ffffffffffffff; /*- * out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56, * out[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 (due to final carry), * so out < 2*p */ out[3] = output[3]; } static void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in) { widefelem tmp; felem_square(tmp, in); felem_reduce(out, tmp); } static void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) { widefelem tmp; felem_mul(tmp, in1, in2); felem_reduce(out, tmp); } /* * Reduce to unique minimal representation. Requires 0 <= in < 2*p (always * call felem_reduce first) */ static void felem_contract(felem out, const felem in) { static const int64_t two56 = ((limb) 1) << 56; /* 0 <= in < 2*p, p = 2^224 - 2^96 + 1 */ /* if in > p , reduce in = in - 2^224 + 2^96 - 1 */ int64_t tmp[4], a; tmp[0] = in[0]; tmp[1] = in[1]; tmp[2] = in[2]; tmp[3] = in[3]; /* Case 1: a = 1 iff in >= 2^224 */ a = (in[3] >> 56); tmp[0] -= a; tmp[1] += a << 40; tmp[3] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; /* * Case 2: a = 0 iff p <= in < 2^224, i.e., the high 128 bits are all 1 * and the lower part is non-zero */ a = ((in[3] & in[2] & (in[1] | 0x000000ffffffffff)) + 1) | (((int64_t) (in[0] + (in[1] & 0x000000ffffffffff)) - 1) >> 63); a &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; /* turn a into an all-one mask (if a = 0) or an all-zero mask */ a = (a - 1) >> 63; /* subtract 2^224 - 2^96 + 1 if a is all-one */ tmp[3] &= a ^ 0xffffffffffffffff; tmp[2] &= a ^ 0xffffffffffffffff; tmp[1] &= (a ^ 0xffffffffffffffff) | 0x000000ffffffffff; tmp[0] -= 1 & a; /* * eliminate negative coefficients: if tmp[0] is negative, tmp[1] must be * non-zero, so we only need one step */ a = tmp[0] >> 63; tmp[0] += two56 & a; tmp[1] -= 1 & a; /* carry 1 -> 2 -> 3 */ tmp[2] += tmp[1] >> 56; tmp[1] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; tmp[3] += tmp[2] >> 56; tmp[2] &= 0x00ffffffffffffff; /* Now 0 <= out < p */ out[0] = tmp[0]; out[1] = tmp[1]; out[2] = tmp[2]; out[3] = tmp[3]; } /* * Zero-check: returns 1 if input is 0, and 0 otherwise. We know that field * elements are reduced to in < 2^225, so we only need to check three cases: * 0, 2^224 - 2^96 + 1, and 2^225 - 2^97 + 2 */ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in) { limb zero, two224m96p1, two225m97p2; zero = in[0] | in[1] | in[2] | in[3]; zero = (((int64_t) (zero) - 1) >> 63) & 1; two224m96p1 = (in[0] ^ 1) | (in[1] ^ 0x00ffff0000000000) | (in[2] ^ 0x00ffffffffffffff) | (in[3] ^ 0x00ffffffffffffff); two224m96p1 = (((int64_t) (two224m96p1) - 1) >> 63) & 1; two225m97p2 = (in[0] ^ 2) | (in[1] ^ 0x00fffe0000000000) | (in[2] ^ 0x00ffffffffffffff) | (in[3] ^ 0x01ffffffffffffff); two225m97p2 = (((int64_t) (two225m97p2) - 1) >> 63) & 1; return (zero | two224m96p1 | two225m97p2); } static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in) { return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1)); } /* Invert a field element */ /* Computation chain copied from djb's code */ static void felem_inv(felem out, const felem in) { felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4; widefelem tmp; unsigned i; felem_square(tmp, in); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2 */ felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^2 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^3 - 2 */ felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^3 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^5 - 4 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^6 - 8 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^6 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^7 - 2 */ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) { /* 2^12 - 2^6 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^12 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^13 - 2 */ for (i = 0; i < 11; ++i) { /* 2^24 - 2^12 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^24 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^25 - 2 */ for (i = 0; i < 23; ++i) { /* 2^48 - 2^24 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^48 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* 2^49 - 2 */ for (i = 0; i < 47; ++i) { /* 2^96 - 2^48 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp4); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp4); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* 2^96 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* 2^97 - 2 */ for (i = 0; i < 23; ++i) { /* 2^120 - 2^24 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp4); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp4); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^120 - 1 */ for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) { /* 2^126 - 2^6 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^126 - 1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^127 - 2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, in); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^127 - 1 */ for (i = 0; i < 97; ++i) { /* 2^224 - 2^97 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); } felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp3); felem_reduce(out, tmp); /* 2^224 - 2^96 - 1 */ } /* * Copy in constant time: if icopy == 1, copy in to out, if icopy == 0, copy * out to itself. */ static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb icopy) { unsigned i; /* * icopy is a (64-bit) 0 or 1, so copy is either all-zero or all-one */ const limb copy = -icopy; for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { const limb tmp = copy & (in[i] ^ out[i]); out[i] ^= tmp; } } /******************************************************************************/ /*- * ELLIPTIC CURVE POINT OPERATIONS * * Points are represented in Jacobian projective coordinates: * (X, Y, Z) corresponds to the affine point (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3), * or to the point at infinity if Z == 0. * */ /*- * Double an elliptic curve point: * (X', Y', Z') = 2 * (X, Y, Z), where * X' = (3 * (X - Z^2) * (X + Z^2))^2 - 8 * X * Y^2 * Y' = 3 * (X - Z^2) * (X + Z^2) * (4 * X * Y^2 - X') - 8 * Y^2 * Z' = (Y + Z)^2 - Y^2 - Z^2 = 2 * Y * Z * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed, * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */ static void point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in) { widefelem tmp, tmp2; felem delta, gamma, beta, alpha, ftmp, ftmp2; felem_assign(ftmp, x_in); felem_assign(ftmp2, x_in); /* delta = z^2 */ felem_square(tmp, z_in); felem_reduce(delta, tmp); /* gamma = y^2 */ felem_square(tmp, y_in); felem_reduce(gamma, tmp); /* beta = x*gamma */ felem_mul(tmp, x_in, gamma); felem_reduce(beta, tmp); /* alpha = 3*(x-delta)*(x+delta) */ felem_diff(ftmp, delta); /* ftmp[i] < 2^57 + 2^58 + 2 < 2^59 */ felem_sum(ftmp2, delta); /* ftmp2[i] < 2^57 + 2^57 = 2^58 */ felem_scalar(ftmp2, 3); /* ftmp2[i] < 3 * 2^58 < 2^60 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2); /* tmp[i] < 2^60 * 2^59 * 4 = 2^121 */ felem_reduce(alpha, tmp); /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */ felem_square(tmp, alpha); /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */ felem_assign(ftmp, beta); felem_scalar(ftmp, 8); /* ftmp[i] < 8 * 2^57 = 2^60 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp); /* tmp[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */ felem_reduce(x_out, tmp); /* z' = (y + z)^2 - gamma - delta */ felem_sum(delta, gamma); /* delta[i] < 2^57 + 2^57 = 2^58 */ felem_assign(ftmp, y_in); felem_sum(ftmp, z_in); /* ftmp[i] < 2^57 + 2^57 = 2^58 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^58 * 2^58 = 2^118 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, delta); /* tmp[i] < 2^118 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^119 */ felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); /* y' = alpha*(4*beta - x') - 8*gamma^2 */ felem_scalar(beta, 4); /* beta[i] < 4 * 2^57 = 2^59 */ felem_diff(beta, x_out); /* beta[i] < 2^59 + 2^58 + 2 < 2^60 */ felem_mul(tmp, alpha, beta); /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^60 = 2^119 */ felem_square(tmp2, gamma); /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */ widefelem_scalar(tmp2, 8); /* tmp2[i] < 8 * 2^116 = 2^119 */ widefelem_diff(tmp, tmp2); /* tmp[i] < 2^119 + 2^120 < 2^121 */ felem_reduce(y_out, tmp); } /*- * Add two elliptic curve points: * (X_1, Y_1, Z_1) + (X_2, Y_2, Z_2) = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3), where * X_3 = (Z_1^3 * Y_2 - Z_2^3 * Y_1)^2 - (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^3 - * 2 * Z_2^2 * X_1 * (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^2 * Y_3 = (Z_1^3 * Y_2 - Z_2^3 * Y_1) * (Z_2^2 * X_1 * (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^2 - X_3) - * Z_2^3 * Y_1 * (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^3 * Z_3 = (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1) * (Z_1 * Z_2) * * This runs faster if 'mixed' is set, which requires Z_2 = 1 or Z_2 = 0. */ /* * This function is not entirely constant-time: it includes a branch for * checking whether the two input points are equal, (while not equal to the * point at infinity). This case never happens during single point * multiplication, so there is no timing leak for ECDH or ECDSA signing. */ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1, const int mixed, const felem x2, const felem y2, const felem z2) { felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4, ftmp5, x_out, y_out, z_out; widefelem tmp, tmp2; limb z1_is_zero, z2_is_zero, x_equal, y_equal; if (!mixed) { /* ftmp2 = z2^2 */ felem_square(tmp, z2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* ftmp4 = z2^3 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, z2); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* ftmp4 = z2^3*y1 */ felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp4, y1); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp2); /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1 */ felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp2, x1); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp2); } else { /* * We'll assume z2 = 1 (special case z2 = 0 is handled later) */ /* ftmp4 = z2^3*y1 */ felem_assign(ftmp4, y1); /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, x1); } /* ftmp = z1^2 */ felem_square(tmp, z1); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* ftmp3 = z1^3 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, z1); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* tmp = z1^3*y2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, y2); /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */ /* ftmp3 = z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp4); /* tmp[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */ felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* tmp = z1^2*x2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, x2); /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */ /* ftmp = z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp, ftmp2); /* tmp[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */ felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* * the formulae are incorrect if the points are equal so we check for * this and do doubling if this happens */ x_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp); y_equal = felem_is_zero(ftmp3); z1_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z1); z2_is_zero = felem_is_zero(z2); /* In affine coordinates, (X_1, Y_1) == (X_2, Y_2) */ if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) { point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1); return; } /* ftmp5 = z1*z2 */ if (!mixed) { felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2); felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); } else { /* special case z2 = 0 is handled later */ felem_assign(ftmp5, z1); } /* z_out = (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)*(z1*z2) */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp5); felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); /* ftmp = (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */ felem_assign(ftmp5, ftmp); felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* ftmp5 = (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp5); felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* tmp = z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp4, ftmp5); /* tmp[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 = 2^116 */ /* tmp2 = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 */ felem_square(tmp2, ftmp3); /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^57 < 2^116 */ /* tmp2 = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp2, ftmp5); /* tmp2[i] < 2^116 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^117 */ /* ftmp5 = 2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */ felem_assign(ftmp5, ftmp2); felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2 * 2^57 = 2^58 */ /*- * x_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 - * 2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp2, ftmp5); /* tmp2[i] < 2^117 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^118 */ felem_reduce(x_out, tmp2); /* ftmp2 = z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out */ felem_diff(ftmp2, x_out); /* ftmp2[i] < 2^57 + 2^58 + 2 < 2^59 */ /* * tmp2 = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out) */ felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp3, ftmp2); /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^59 = 2^118 */ /*- * y_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out) - * z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */ widefelem_diff(tmp2, tmp); /* tmp2[i] < 2^118 + 2^120 < 2^121 */ felem_reduce(y_out, tmp2); /* * the result (x_out, y_out, z_out) is incorrect if one of the inputs is * the point at infinity, so we need to check for this separately */ /* * if point 1 is at infinity, copy point 2 to output, and vice versa */ copy_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(x_out, x1, z2_is_zero); copy_conditional(y_out, y2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(y_out, y1, z2_is_zero); copy_conditional(z_out, z2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(z_out, z1, z2_is_zero); felem_assign(x3, x_out); felem_assign(y3, y_out); felem_assign(z3, z_out); } /* * select_point selects the |idx|th point from a precomputation table and * copies it to out. * The pre_comp array argument should be size of |size| argument */ static void select_point(const u64 idx, unsigned int size, const felem pre_comp[][3], felem out[3]) { unsigned i, j; limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0]; memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * 3); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0]; u64 mask = i ^ idx; mask |= mask >> 4; mask |= mask >> 2; mask |= mask >> 1; mask &= 1; mask--; for (j = 0; j < 4 * 3; j++) outlimbs[j] |= inlimbs[j] & mask; } } /* get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in| */ static char get_bit(const felem_bytearray in, unsigned i) { if (i >= 224) return 0; return (in[i >> 3] >> (i & 7)) & 1; } /* * Interleaved point multiplication using precomputed point multiples: The * small point multiples 0*P, 1*P, ..., 16*P are in pre_comp[], the scalars * in scalars[]. If g_scalar is non-NULL, we also add this multiple of the * generator, using certain (large) precomputed multiples in g_pre_comp. * Output point (X, Y, Z) is stored in x_out, y_out, z_out */ static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, const felem_bytearray scalars[], const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar, const int mixed, const felem pre_comp[][17][3], const felem g_pre_comp[2][16][3]) { int i, skip; unsigned num; unsigned gen_mul = (g_scalar != NULL); felem nq[3], tmp[4]; u64 bits; u8 sign, digit; /* set nq to the point at infinity */ memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq)); /* * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples * of the generator (two in each of the last 28 rounds) and additions of * other points multiples (every 5th round). */ skip = 1; /* save two point operations in the first * round */ for (i = (num_points ? 220 : 27); i >= 0; --i) { /* double */ if (!skip) point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]); /* add multiples of the generator */ if (gen_mul && (i <= 27)) { /* first, look 28 bits upwards */ bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 196) << 3; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 140) << 2; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 84) << 1; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 28); /* select the point to add, in constant time */ select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[1], tmp); if (!skip) { /* value 1 below is argument for "mixed" */ point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } else { memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem)); skip = 0; } /* second, look at the current position */ bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 168) << 3; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 112) << 2; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 56) << 1; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i); /* select the point to add, in constant time */ select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[0], tmp); point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1 /* mixed */ , tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } /* do other additions every 5 doublings */ if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0)) { /* loop over all scalars */ for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num) { bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1); ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits); /* select the point to add or subtract */ select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp); felem_neg(tmp[3], tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative * point */ copy_conditional(tmp[1], tmp[3], sign); if (!skip) { point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], mixed, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } else { memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem)); skip = 0; } } } } felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]); felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]); felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]); } /******************************************************************************/ /* * FUNCTIONS TO MANAGE PRECOMPUTATION */ static NISTP224_PRE_COMP *nistp224_pre_comp_new() { NISTP224_PRE_COMP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (!ret) { ECerr(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *p) { int i; if (p != NULL) CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock); return p; } void EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *p) { int i; if (p == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, -1, &i, p->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistp224", x); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(p->lock); OPENSSL_free(p); } /******************************************************************************/ /* * OPENSSL EC_METHOD FUNCTIONS */ int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { int ret; ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group); group->a_is_minus3 = 1; return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *curve_p, *curve_a, *curve_b; if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p); BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a); BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[2], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_b); if ((BN_cmp(curve_p, p)) || (BN_cmp(curve_a, a)) || (BN_cmp(curve_b, b))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS); goto err; } group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_224; ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* * Takes the Jacobian coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point and returns (X', Y') = * (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */ int ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { felem z1, z2, x_in, y_in, x_out, y_out; widefelem tmp; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); return 0; } if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, point->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(z1, point->Z))) return 0; felem_inv(z2, z1); felem_square(tmp, z2); felem_reduce(z1, tmp); felem_mul(tmp, x_in, z1); felem_reduce(x_in, tmp); felem_contract(x_out, x_in); if (x != NULL) { if (!felem_to_BN(x, x_out)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } } felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2); felem_reduce(z1, tmp); felem_mul(tmp, y_in, z1); felem_reduce(y_in, tmp); felem_contract(y_out, y_in); if (y != NULL) { if (!felem_to_BN(y, y_out)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } } return 1; } static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[ /* num */ ][3], felem tmp_felems[ /* num+1 */ ]) { /* * Runs in constant time, unless an input is the point at infinity (which * normally shouldn't happen). */ ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(num, points, sizeof(felem), tmp_felems, (void (*)(void *))felem_one, felem_is_zero_int, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_assign, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_square_reduce, (void (*) (void *, const void *, const void *)) felem_mul_reduce, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_inv, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_contract); } /* * Computes scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i], ignoring NULL * values Result is stored in r (r can equal one of the inputs). */ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; int j; unsigned i; int mixed = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar; felem_bytearray g_secret; felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL; felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; felem *tmp_felems = NULL; felem_bytearray tmp; unsigned num_bytes; int have_pre_comp = 0; size_t num_points = num; felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out; NISTP224_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL; const felem(*g_pre_comp)[16][3] = NULL; EC_POINT *generator = NULL; const EC_POINT *p = NULL; const BIGNUM *p_scalar = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; if (scalar != NULL) { pre = group->pre_comp.nistp224; if (pre) /* we have precomputation, try to use it */ g_pre_comp = (const felem(*)[16][3])pre->g_pre_comp; else /* try to use the standard precomputation */ g_pre_comp = &gmul[0]; generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (generator == NULL) goto err; /* get the generator from precomputation */ if (!felem_to_BN(x, g_pre_comp[0][1][0]) || !felem_to_BN(y, g_pre_comp[0][1][1]) || !felem_to_BN(z, g_pre_comp[0][1][2])) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, z, ctx)) goto err; if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) /* precomputation matches generator */ have_pre_comp = 1; else /* * we don't have valid precomputation: treat the generator as a * random point */ num_points = num_points + 1; } if (num_points > 0) { if (num_points >= 3) { /* * unless we precompute multiples for just one or two points, * converting those into affine form is time well spent */ mixed = 1; } secrets = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); pre_comp = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); if (mixed) tmp_felems = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(felem) * (num_points * 17 + 1)); if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL) || (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity, * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination */ for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) { if (i == num) /* the generator */ { p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); p_scalar = scalar; } else /* the i^th point */ { p = points[i]; p_scalar = scalars[i]; } if ((p_scalar != NULL) && (p != NULL)) { /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^224 */ if ((BN_num_bits(p_scalar) > 224) || (BN_is_negative(p_scalar))) { /* * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee * constant-timeness */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); } else num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp); flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes); /* precompute multiples */ if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(z_out, p->Z))) goto err; felem_assign(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out); felem_assign(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out); felem_assign(pre_comp[i][1][2], z_out); for (j = 2; j <= 16; ++j) { if (j & 1) { point_add(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][1][0], pre_comp[i][1][1], pre_comp[i][1][2], 0, pre_comp[i][j - 1][0], pre_comp[i][j - 1][1], pre_comp[i][j - 1][2]); } else { point_double(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][j / 2][0], pre_comp[i][j / 2][1], pre_comp[i][j / 2][2]); } } } } if (mixed) make_points_affine(num_points * 17, pre_comp[0], tmp_felems); } /* the scalar for the generator */ if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) { memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret)); /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^224 */ if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 224) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) { /* * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee * constant-timeness */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); } else num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp); flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes); /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */ batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points, g_secret, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp); } else /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */ batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points, NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL); /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */ felem_contract(x_in, x_out); felem_contract(y_in, y_out); felem_contract(z_in, z_out); if ((!felem_to_BN(x, x_in)) || (!felem_to_BN(y, y_in)) || (!felem_to_BN(z, z_in))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ret = EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, r, x, y, z, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); EC_POINT_free(generator); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); OPENSSL_free(secrets); OPENSSL_free(pre_comp); OPENSSL_free(tmp_felems); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; NISTP224_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL; int i, j; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y; EC_POINT *generator = NULL; felem tmp_felems[32]; /* throw away old precomputation */ EC_pre_comp_free(group); if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; /* get the generator */ if (group->generator == NULL) goto err; generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (generator == NULL) goto err; BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[3], sizeof(felem_bytearray), x); BN_bin2bn(nistp224_curve_params[4], sizeof(felem_bytearray), y); if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if ((pre = nistp224_pre_comp_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* * if the generator is the standard one, use built-in precomputation */ if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) { memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp)); goto done; } if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][0], group->generator->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][1], group->generator->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][2], group->generator->Z))) goto err; /* * compute 2^56*G, 2^112*G, 2^168*G for the first table, 2^28*G, 2^84*G, * 2^140*G, 2^196*G for the second one */ for (i = 1; i <= 8; i <<= 1) { point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][2]); for (j = 0; j < 27; ++j) { point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]); } if (i == 8) break; point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]); for (j = 0; j < 27; ++j) { point_double(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2]); } } for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { /* g_pre_comp[i][0] is the point at infinity */ memset(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0], 0, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0])); /* the remaining multiples */ /* 2^56*G + 2^112*G resp. 2^84*G + 2^140*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]); /* 2^56*G + 2^168*G resp. 2^84*G + 2^196*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]); /* 2^112*G + 2^168*G resp. 2^140*G + 2^196*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2]); /* * 2^56*G + 2^112*G + 2^168*G resp. 2^84*G + 2^140*G + 2^196*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]); for (j = 1; j < 8; ++j) { /* odd multiples: add G resp. 2^28*G */ point_add(pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][2], 0, pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][2]); } } make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_felems); done: SETPRECOMP(group, nistp224, pre); pre = NULL; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); EC_POINT_free(generator); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(pre); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp224_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistp224); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/asm/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625657014552 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86.pl0000755000000000000000000015776313176625657020013 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # ECP_NISTZ256 module for x86/SSE2. # # October 2014. # # Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in # http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. In the process of adaptation # original .c module was made 32-bit savvy in order to make this # implementation possible. # # with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM # Pentium +66-163% # PIII +72-172% # P4 +65-132% # Core2 +90-215% # Sandy Bridge +105-265% (contemporary i[57]-* are all close to this) # Atom +65-155% # Opteron +54-110% # Bulldozer +99-240% # VIA Nano +93-290% # # Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending # on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side # operation. Keep in mind that +200% means 3x improvement. $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm"); require "x86asm.pl"; $output=pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; &asm_init($ARGV[0],"ecp_nistz256-x86.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386"); $sse2=0; for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); } &external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2); ######################################################################## # Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7 # open TABLE,") { s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo; } close TABLE; # See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37. # 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not # amount of elements. die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1); &public_label("ecp_nistz256_precomputed"); &align(4096); &set_label("ecp_nistz256_precomputed"); ######################################################################## # this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with # 64 byte interval, similar to # 1111222233334444 # 1234123412341234 for(1..37) { @tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16); for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) { undef @line; for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) { push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff; } &data_byte(join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line)); } } ######################################################################## # Keep in mind that constants are stored least to most significant word &static_label("RR"); &set_label("RR",64); &data_word(3,0,-1,-5,-2,-1,-3,4); # 2^512 mod P-256 &static_label("ONE_mont"); &set_label("ONE_mont"); &data_word(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0); &static_label("ONE"); &set_label("ONE"); &data_word(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0); &asciz("ECP_NISZ256 for x86/SSE2, CRYPTOGAMS by "); &align(64); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("ebp","esi"); ######################################################################## # common pattern for internal functions is that %edi is result pointer, # %esi and %ebp are input ones, %ebp being optional. %edi is preserved. &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # multiplication by 3 is performed # as 2*n+n, but we can't use output # to store 2*n, because if output # pointer equals to input, then # we'll get 2*n+2*n. &stack_push(8); # therefore we need to allocate # 256-bit intermediate buffer. &mov ("edi","esp"); &mov ("ebp","esi"); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); &lea ("esi",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(1)); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); &stack_pop(8); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_div_by_2"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_div_by_2"); &function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2"); # tmp = a is odd ? a+mod : a # # note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of # 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by # assigning least significant bit of input to one register, # %ebp, and its negative to another, %edx. &mov ("ebp",&DWP(0,"esi")); &xor ("edx","edx"); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("eax","ebp"); &and ("ebp",1); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &sub ("edx","ebp"); &add ("eax","edx"); &adc ("ebx","edx"); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx","edx"); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(16,"esi")); &adc ("eax",0); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &adc ("ebx",0); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx",0); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &adc ("eax","ebp"); &adc ("ebx","edx"); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax"); &sbb ("esi","esi"); # broadcast carry bit &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"ebx"); # ret = tmp >> 1 &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); &shr ("eax",1); &mov ("ebp","ebx"); &shl ("ebx",31); &or ("eax","ebx"); &shr ("ebp",1); &mov ("ebx","ecx"); &shl ("ecx",31); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &or ("ebp","ecx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); &shr ("ebx",1); &mov ("ecx","edx"); &shl ("edx",31); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebp"); &or ("ebx","edx"); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(20,"edi")); &shr ("ecx",1); &mov ("edx","eax"); &shl ("eax",31); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ebx"); &or ("ecx","eax"); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(24,"edi")); &shr ("edx",1); &mov ("eax","ebp"); &shl ("ebp",31); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"ecx"); &or ("edx","ebp"); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(28,"edi")); &shr ("eax",1); &mov ("ebp","ebx"); &shl ("ebx",31); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"edx"); &or ("eax","ebx"); &shr ("ebp",1); &mov ("ebx","ecx"); &shl ("ecx",31); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"eax"); &or ("ebp","ecx"); &shr ("ebx",1); &shl ("esi",31); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ebp"); &or ("ebx","esi"); # handle top-most carry bit &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"ebx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8], # const BN_ULONG ebp[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_add"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_add"); &function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_add"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &add ("eax",&DWP(0,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &adc ("ebx",&DWP(4,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx",&DWP(8,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &adc ("edx",&DWP(12,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &adc ("eax",&DWP(16,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &adc ("ebx",&DWP(20,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx",&DWP(24,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov ("esi",0); &adc ("edx",&DWP(28,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx"); &adc ("esi",0); &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx"); # if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus. # # But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract modulus # to see if it borrows, and then subtract it for real if # subtraction didn't borrow. &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi")); &sub ("eax",-1); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); &sbb ("ebx",-1); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); &sbb ("ecx",-1); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"edi")); &sbb ("edx",0); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"edi")); &sbb ("eax",0); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"edi")); &sbb ("ebx",0); &sbb ("ecx",1); &sbb ("edx",-1); &sbb ("esi",0); # Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of # 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by # by using borrow. ¬ ("esi"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ebp","esi"); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &shr ("ebp",31); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi")); &sub ("eax","esi"); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); &sbb ("ebx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &sbb ("ecx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &sbb ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"edi")); &sbb ("eax",0); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"edi")); &sbb ("ebx",0); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); &sbb ("ecx","ebp"); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx"); &sbb ("edx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_add"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8], # const BN_ULONG ebp[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_sub"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_sub"); &function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &sub ("eax",&DWP(0,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &sbb ("ebx",&DWP(4,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &sbb ("ecx",&DWP(8,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &sbb ("edx",&DWP(12,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &sbb ("eax",&DWP(16,"ebp")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &sbb ("ebx",&DWP(20,"ebp")); &sbb ("ecx",&DWP(24,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); &sbb ("edx",&DWP(28,"ebp")); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx"); &sbb ("esi","esi"); # broadcast borrow bit &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx"); # if a-b borrows, add modulus. # # Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of # 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by # assigning borrow bit to one register, %ebp, and its negative # to another, %esi. But we started by calculating %esi... &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &mov ("ebp","esi"); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &shr ("ebp",31); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi")); &add ("eax","esi"); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); &adc ("ebx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"edi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"edi")); &adc ("eax",0); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"edi")); &adc ("ebx",0); &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx","ebp"); &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx"); &adc ("edx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx"); &ret (); &function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_neg"); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(1)); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &xor ("eax","eax"); &stack_push(8); &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"eax"); &mov ("esi","esp"); &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),"eax"); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); &stack_pop(8); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_neg"); &function_begin_B("_picup_eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp")); &ret (); &function_end_B("_picup_eax"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_to_mont"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &call ("_picup_eax"); &set_label("pic"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(&label("RR")."-".&label("pic"),"eax")); if ($sse2) { &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"eax")); } &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_to_mont"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_from_mont"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &call ("_picup_eax"); &set_label("pic"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(&label("ONE")."-".&label("pic"),"eax")); if ($sse2) { &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"eax")); } &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_from_mont"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8], # const BN_ULONG ebp[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); if ($sse2) { &call ("_picup_eax"); &set_label("pic"); &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"eax")); } &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG edi[8],const BN_ULONG esi[8]); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); if ($sse2) { &call ("_picup_eax"); &set_label("pic"); &picmeup("eax","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic")); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"eax")); } &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("ebp","esi"); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont"); &function_begin_B("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); if ($sse2) { &and ("eax",1<<24|1<<26); &cmp ("eax",1<<24|1<<26); # see if XMM+SSE2 is on &jne (&label("mul_mont_ialu")); ######################################## # SSE2 code path featuring 32x16-bit # multiplications is ~2x faster than # IALU counterpart (except on Atom)... ######################################## # stack layout: # +------------------------------------+< %esp # | 7 16-byte temporary XMM words, | # | "sliding" toward lower address | # . . # +------------------------------------+ # | unused XMM word | # +------------------------------------+< +128,%ebx # | 8 16-byte XMM words holding copies | # | of a[i]<<64|a[i] | # . . # . . # +------------------------------------+< +256 &mov ("edx","esp"); &sub ("esp",0x100); &movd ("xmm7",&DWP(0,"ebp")); # b[0] -> 0000.00xy &lea ("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp")); &pcmpeqd("xmm6","xmm6"); &psrlq ("xmm6",48); # compose 0xffff<<64|0xffff &pshuflw("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100); # 0000.00xy -> 0000.0x0y &and ("esp",-64); &pshufd ("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100); # 0000.0x0y -> 000x.000y &lea ("ebx",&DWP(0x80,"esp")); &movd ("xmm0",&DWP(4*0,"esi")); # a[0] -> 0000.00xy &pshufd ("xmm0","xmm0",0b11001100); # 0000.00xy -> 00xy.00xy &movd ("xmm1",&DWP(4*1,"esi")); # a[1] -> ... &movdqa (&QWP(0x00,"ebx"),"xmm0"); # offload converted a[0] &pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7"); # a[0]*b[0] &movd ("xmm2",&DWP(4*2,"esi")); &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11001100); &movdqa (&QWP(0x10,"ebx"),"xmm1"); &pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7"); # a[1]*b[0] &movq ("xmm4","xmm0"); # clear upper 64 bits &pslldq("xmm4",6); &paddq ("xmm4","xmm0"); &movdqa("xmm5","xmm4"); &psrldq("xmm4",10); # upper 32 bits of a[0]*b[0] &pand ("xmm5","xmm6"); # lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[0] # Upper half of a[0]*b[i] is carried into next multiplication # iteration, while lower one "participates" in actual reduction. # Normally latter is done by accumulating result of multiplication # of modulus by "magic" digit, but thanks to special form of modulus # and "magic" digit it can be performed only with additions and # subtractions (see note in IALU section below). Note that we are # not bothered with carry bits, they are accumulated in "flatten" # phase after all multiplications and reductions. &movd ("xmm3",&DWP(4*3,"esi")); &pshufd ("xmm2","xmm2",0b11001100); &movdqa (&QWP(0x20,"ebx"),"xmm2"); &pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7"); # a[2]*b[0] &paddq ("xmm1","xmm4"); # a[1]*b[0]+hw(a[0]*b[0]), carry &movdqa (&QWP(0x00,"esp"),"xmm1"); # t[0] &movd ("xmm0",&DWP(4*4,"esi")); &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm3",0b11001100); &movdqa (&QWP(0x30,"ebx"),"xmm3"); &pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7"); # a[3]*b[0] &movdqa (&QWP(0x10,"esp"),"xmm2"); &movd ("xmm1",&DWP(4*5,"esi")); &pshufd ("xmm0","xmm0",0b11001100); &movdqa (&QWP(0x40,"ebx"),"xmm0"); &pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7"); # a[4]*b[0] &paddq ("xmm3","xmm5"); # a[3]*b[0]+lw(a[0]*b[0]), reduction step &movdqa (&QWP(0x20,"esp"),"xmm3"); &movd ("xmm2",&DWP(4*6,"esi")); &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11001100); &movdqa (&QWP(0x50,"ebx"),"xmm1"); &pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7"); # a[5]*b[0] &movdqa (&QWP(0x30,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pshufd("xmm4","xmm5",0b10110001); # xmm4 = xmm5<<32, reduction step &movd ("xmm3",&DWP(4*7,"esi")); &pshufd ("xmm2","xmm2",0b11001100); &movdqa (&QWP(0x60,"ebx"),"xmm2"); &pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7"); # a[6]*b[0] &movdqa (&QWP(0x40,"esp"),"xmm1"); &psubq ("xmm4","xmm5"); # xmm4 = xmm5*0xffffffff, reduction step &movd ("xmm0",&DWP(0,"ebp")); # b[1] -> 0000.00xy &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm3",0b11001100); &movdqa (&QWP(0x70,"ebx"),"xmm3"); &pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7"); # a[7]*b[0] &pshuflw("xmm7","xmm0",0b11011100); # 0000.00xy -> 0000.0x0y &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"ebx")); # pre-load converted a[0] &pshufd ("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100); # 0000.0x0y -> 000x.000y &mov ("ecx",6); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp")); &jmp (&label("madd_sse2")); &set_label("madd_sse2",16); &paddq ("xmm2","xmm5"); # a[6]*b[i-1]+lw(a[0]*b[i-1]), reduction step [modulo-scheduled] &paddq ("xmm3","xmm4"); # a[7]*b[i-1]+lw(a[0]*b[i-1])*0xffffffff, reduction step [modulo-scheduled] &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7"); # a[0]*b[i] &movdqa(&QWP(0x50,"esp"),"xmm2"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7"); # a[1]*b[i] &movdqa(&QWP(0x60,"esp"),"xmm3"); &paddq ("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"esp")); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7"); # a[2]*b[i] &movq ("xmm4","xmm0"); # clear upper 64 bits &pslldq("xmm4",6); &paddq ("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"esp")); &paddq ("xmm4","xmm0"); &movdqa("xmm5","xmm4"); &psrldq("xmm4",10); # upper 33 bits of a[0]*b[i]+t[0] &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7"); # a[3]*b[i] &paddq ("xmm1","xmm4"); # a[1]*b[i]+hw(a[0]*b[i]), carry &paddq ("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(0x00,"esp"),"xmm1"); &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7"); # a[4]*b[i] &paddq ("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(0x10,"esp"),"xmm2"); &pand ("xmm5","xmm6"); # lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[i] &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7"); # a[5]*b[i] &paddq ("xmm3","xmm5"); # a[3]*b[i]+lw(a[0]*b[i]), reduction step &paddq ("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(0x20,"esp"),"xmm3"); &pshufd("xmm4","xmm5",0b10110001); # xmm4 = xmm5<<32, reduction step &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); &pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7"); # a[6]*b[i] &movd ("xmm7",&DWP(0,"ebp")); # b[i++] -> 0000.00xy &lea ("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp")); &paddq ("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"esp")); &psubq ("xmm4","xmm5"); # xmm4 = xmm5*0xffffffff, reduction step &movdqa (&QWP(0x30,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pshuflw("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100); # 0000.00xy -> 0000.0x0y &pmuludq("xmm3",&QWP(0x70,"ebx")); # a[7]*b[i] &pshufd("xmm7","xmm7",0b11011100); # 0000.0x0y -> 000x.000y &movdqa("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"ebx")); # pre-load converted a[0] &movdqa (&QWP(0x40,"esp"),"xmm1"); &paddq ("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"esp")); &dec ("ecx"); &jnz (&label("madd_sse2")); &paddq ("xmm2","xmm5"); # a[6]*b[6]+lw(a[0]*b[6]), reduction step [modulo-scheduled] &paddq ("xmm3","xmm4"); # a[7]*b[6]+lw(a[0]*b[6])*0xffffffff, reduction step [modulo-scheduled] &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7"); # a[0]*b[7] &movdqa(&QWP(0x50,"esp"),"xmm2"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7"); # a[1]*b[7] &movdqa(&QWP(0x60,"esp"),"xmm3"); &paddq ("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"esp")); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7"); # a[2]*b[7] &movq ("xmm4","xmm0"); # clear upper 64 bits &pslldq("xmm4",6); &paddq ("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"esp")); &paddq ("xmm4","xmm0"); &movdqa("xmm5","xmm4"); &psrldq("xmm4",10); # upper 33 bits of a[0]*b[i]+t[0] &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7"); # a[3]*b[7] &paddq ("xmm1","xmm4"); # a[1]*b[7]+hw(a[0]*b[7]), carry &paddq ("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(0x00,"esp"),"xmm1"); &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm0","xmm7"); # a[4]*b[7] &paddq ("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(0x10,"esp"),"xmm2"); &pand ("xmm5","xmm6"); # lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[i] &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm1","xmm7"); # a[5]*b[7] &paddq ("xmm3","xmm5"); # reduction step &paddq ("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"esp")); &movdqa (&QWP(0x20,"esp"),"xmm3"); &pshufd("xmm4","xmm5",0b10110001); # xmm4 = xmm5<<32, reduction step &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x70,"ebx")); &pmuludq("xmm2","xmm7"); # a[6]*b[7] &paddq ("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"esp")); &psubq ("xmm4","xmm5"); # xmm4 = xmm5*0xffffffff, reduction step &movdqa (&QWP(0x30,"esp"),"xmm0"); &pmuludq("xmm3","xmm7"); # a[7]*b[7] &pcmpeqd("xmm7","xmm7"); &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x00,"esp")); &pslldq ("xmm7",8); &movdqa (&QWP(0x40,"esp"),"xmm1"); &paddq ("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"esp")); &paddq ("xmm2","xmm5"); # a[6]*b[7]+lw(a[0]*b[7]), reduction step &paddq ("xmm3","xmm4"); # a[6]*b[7]+lw(a[0]*b[7])*0xffffffff, reduction step &movdqa(&QWP(0x50,"esp"),"xmm2"); &movdqa(&QWP(0x60,"esp"),"xmm3"); &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,"esp")); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x20,"esp")); &movdqa ("xmm3",&QWP(0x30,"esp")); &movq ("xmm4","xmm0"); # "flatten" &pand ("xmm0","xmm7"); &xor ("ebp","ebp"); &pslldq ("xmm4",6); &movq ("xmm5","xmm1"); &paddq ("xmm0","xmm4"); &pand ("xmm1","xmm7"); &psrldq ("xmm0",6); &movd ("eax","xmm0"); &psrldq ("xmm0",4); &paddq ("xmm5","xmm0"); &movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x40,"esp")); &sub ("eax",-1); # start subtracting modulus, # this is used to determine # if result is larger/smaller # than modulus (see below) &pslldq ("xmm5",6); &movq ("xmm4","xmm2"); &paddq ("xmm1","xmm5"); &pand ("xmm2","xmm7"); &psrldq ("xmm1",6); &mov (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"eax"); &movd ("eax","xmm1"); &psrldq ("xmm1",4); &paddq ("xmm4","xmm1"); &movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,"esp")); &sbb ("eax",-1); &pslldq ("xmm4",6); &movq ("xmm5","xmm3"); &paddq ("xmm2","xmm4"); &pand ("xmm3","xmm7"); &psrldq ("xmm2",6); &mov (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"eax"); &movd ("eax","xmm2"); &psrldq ("xmm2",4); &paddq ("xmm5","xmm2"); &movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP(0x60,"esp")); &sbb ("eax",-1); &pslldq ("xmm5",6); &movq ("xmm4","xmm0"); &paddq ("xmm3","xmm5"); &pand ("xmm0","xmm7"); &psrldq ("xmm3",6); &mov (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"eax"); &movd ("eax","xmm3"); &psrldq ("xmm3",4); &paddq ("xmm4","xmm3"); &sbb ("eax",0); &pslldq ("xmm4",6); &movq ("xmm5","xmm1"); &paddq ("xmm0","xmm4"); &pand ("xmm1","xmm7"); &psrldq ("xmm0",6); &mov (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),"eax"); &movd ("eax","xmm0"); &psrldq ("xmm0",4); &paddq ("xmm5","xmm0"); &sbb ("eax",0); &pslldq ("xmm5",6); &movq ("xmm4","xmm2"); &paddq ("xmm1","xmm5"); &pand ("xmm2","xmm7"); &psrldq ("xmm1",6); &movd ("ebx","xmm1"); &psrldq ("xmm1",4); &mov ("esp","edx"); &paddq ("xmm4","xmm1"); &pslldq ("xmm4",6); &paddq ("xmm2","xmm4"); &psrldq ("xmm2",6); &movd ("ecx","xmm2"); &psrldq ("xmm2",4); &sbb ("ebx",0); &movd ("edx","xmm2"); &pextrw ("esi","xmm2",2); # top-most overflow bit &sbb ("ecx",1); &sbb ("edx",-1); &sbb ("esi",0); # borrow from subtraction # Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", and at this point # we have result - mod written to output buffer, as well as borrow # bit from this subtraction, and if borrow bit is set, we add # modulus back. # # Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of # 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by # assigning borrow bit to one register, %ebp, and its negative # to another, %esi. But we started by calculating %esi... &sub ("ebp","esi"); &add (&DWP(4*0,"edi"),"esi"); # add modulus or zero &adc (&DWP(4*1,"edi"),"esi"); &adc (&DWP(4*2,"edi"),"esi"); &adc (&DWP(4*3,"edi"),0); &adc ("eax",0); &adc ("ebx",0); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"edi"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx","ebp"); &mov (&DWP(4*5,"edi"),"ebx"); &adc ("edx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(4*6,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*7,"edi"),"edx"); &ret (); &set_label("mul_mont_ialu",16); } ######################################## # IALU code path suitable for all CPUs. ######################################## # stack layout: # +------------------------------------+< %esp # | 8 32-bit temporary words, accessed | # | as circular buffer | # . . # . . # +------------------------------------+< +32 # | offloaded destination pointer | # +------------------------------------+ # | unused | # +------------------------------------+< +40 &sub ("esp",10*4); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi")); # a[0] &mov ("ebx",&DWP(0*4,"ebp")); # b[0] &mov (&DWP(8*4,"esp"),"edi"); # off-load dst ptr &mul ("ebx"); # a[0]*b[0] &mov (&DWP(0*4,"esp"),"eax"); # t[0] &mov ("eax",&DWP(1*4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx","edx") &mul ("ebx"); # a[1]*b[0] &add ("ecx","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(2*4,"esi")); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(1*4,"esp"),"ecx"); # t[1] &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[2]*b[0] &add ("ecx","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(3*4,"esi")); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(2*4,"esp"),"ecx"); # t[2] &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[3]*b[0] &add ("ecx","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*4,"esi")); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(3*4,"esp"),"ecx"); # t[3] &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[4]*b[0] &add ("ecx","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(5*4,"esi")); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),"ecx"); # t[4] &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[5]*b[0] &add ("ecx","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(6*4,"esi")); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),"ecx"); # t[5] &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[6]*b[0] &add ("ecx","eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(7*4,"esi")); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),"ecx"); # t[6] &mov ("ecx","edx"); &xor ("edi","edi"); # initial top-most carry &mul ("ebx"); # a[7]*b[0] &add ("ecx","eax"); # t[7] &mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esp")); # t[0] &adc ("edx",0); # t[8] for ($i=0;$i<7;$i++) { my $j=$i+1; # Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating # result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and # omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to # be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic" # digit being equal to least significant word, it can be # performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed: # # ffff.0001.0000.0000.0000.ffff.ffff.ffff # * abcd # + xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd # # Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we # rewrite above as: # # xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd # + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.0000.0000.0000 # - abcd.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.abcd # # or marking redundant operations: # # xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.---- # + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.----.----.---- # - abcd.----.----.----.----.----.----.---- &add (&DWP((($i+3)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax"); # t[3]+=t[0] &adc (&DWP((($i+4)%8)*4,"esp"),0); # t[4]+=0 &adc (&DWP((($i+5)%8)*4,"esp"),0); # t[5]+=0 &adc (&DWP((($i+6)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax"); # t[6]+=t[0] &adc ("ecx",0); # t[7]+=0 &adc ("edx","eax"); # t[8]+=t[0] &adc ("edi",0); # top-most carry &mov ("ebx",&DWP($j*4,"ebp")); # b[i] &sub ("ecx","eax"); # t[7]-=t[0] &mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi")); # a[0] &sbb ("edx",0); # t[8]-=0 &mov (&DWP((($i+7)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &sbb ("edi",0); # top-most carry, # keep in mind that # netto result is # *addition* of value # with (abcd<<32)-abcd # on top, so that # underflow is # impossible, because # (abcd<<32)-abcd # doesn't underflow &mov (&DWP((($i+8)%8)*4,"esp"),"edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[0]*b[i] &add ("eax",&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(1*4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx","edx") &mul ("ebx"); # a[1]*b[i] &add ("ecx",&DWP((($j+1)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &add ("ecx","eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(2*4,"esi")); &mov (&DWP((($j+1)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[2]*b[i] &add ("ecx",&DWP((($j+2)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &add ("ecx","eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(3*4,"esi")); &mov (&DWP((($j+2)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[3]*b[i] &add ("ecx",&DWP((($j+3)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &add ("ecx","eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(4*4,"esi")); &mov (&DWP((($j+3)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[4]*b[i] &add ("ecx",&DWP((($j+4)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &add ("ecx","eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(5*4,"esi")); &mov (&DWP((($j+4)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[5]*b[i] &add ("ecx",&DWP((($j+5)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &add ("ecx","eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(6*4,"esi")); &mov (&DWP((($j+5)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[6]*b[i] &add ("ecx",&DWP((($j+6)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &add ("ecx","eax"); &adc ("edx",0); &mov ("eax",&DWP(7*4,"esi")); &mov (&DWP((($j+6)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov ("ecx","edx"); &mul ("ebx"); # a[7]*b[i] &add ("ecx",&DWP((($j+7)%8)*4,"esp")); &adc ("edx",0); &add ("ecx","eax"); # t[7] &mov ("eax",&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp")); # t[0] &adc ("edx","edi"); # t[8] &mov ("edi",0); &adc ("edi",0); # top-most carry } &mov ("ebp",&DWP(8*4,"esp")); # restore dst ptr &xor ("esi","esi"); my $j=$i+1; # last multiplication-less reduction &add (&DWP((($i+3)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax"); # t[3]+=t[0] &adc (&DWP((($i+4)%8)*4,"esp"),0); # t[4]+=0 &adc (&DWP((($i+5)%8)*4,"esp"),0); # t[5]+=0 &adc (&DWP((($i+6)%8)*4,"esp"),"eax"); # t[6]+=t[0] &adc ("ecx",0); # t[7]+=0 &adc ("edx","eax"); # t[8]+=t[0] &adc ("edi",0); # top-most carry &mov ("ebx",&DWP((($j+1)%8)*4,"esp")); &sub ("ecx","eax"); # t[7]-=t[0] &mov ("eax",&DWP((($j+0)%8)*4,"esp")); &sbb ("edx",0); # t[8]-=0 &mov (&DWP((($i+7)%8)*4,"esp"),"ecx"); &sbb ("edi",0); # top-most carry &mov (&DWP((($i+8)%8)*4,"esp"),"edx"); # Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but we do it # "other way around", namely write result - mod to output buffer # and if subtraction borrowed, add modulus back. &mov ("ecx",&DWP((($j+2)%8)*4,"esp")); &sub ("eax",-1); &mov ("edx",&DWP((($j+3)%8)*4,"esp")); &sbb ("ebx",-1); &mov (&DWP(0*4,"ebp"),"eax"); &sbb ("ecx",-1); &mov (&DWP(1*4,"ebp"),"ebx"); &sbb ("edx",0); &mov (&DWP(2*4,"ebp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(3*4,"ebp"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP((($j+4)%8)*4,"esp")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP((($j+5)%8)*4,"esp")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP((($j+6)%8)*4,"esp")); &sbb ("eax",0); &mov ("edx",&DWP((($j+7)%8)*4,"esp")); &sbb ("ebx",0); &sbb ("ecx",1); &sbb ("edx",-1); &sbb ("edi",0); # Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of # 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by # assigning borrow bit to one register, %ebp, and its negative # to another, %esi. But we started by calculating %esi... &sub ("esi","edi"); &add (&DWP(0*4,"ebp"),"edi"); # add modulus or zero &adc (&DWP(1*4,"ebp"),"edi"); &adc (&DWP(2*4,"ebp"),"edi"); &adc (&DWP(3*4,"ebp"),0); &adc ("eax",0); &adc ("ebx",0); &mov (&DWP(4*4,"ebp"),"eax"); &adc ("ecx","esi"); &mov (&DWP(5*4,"ebp"),"ebx"); &adc ("edx","edi"); &mov (&DWP(6*4,"ebp"),"ecx"); &mov ("edi","ebp"); # fulfill contract &mov (&DWP(7*4,"ebp"),"edx"); &add ("esp",10*4); &ret (); &function_end_B("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *edi,const P256_POINT *esi, # int ebp); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); &lea ("edi",&DWP(128-4,"edi","ebp",4)); &mov ("ebp",96/16); &set_label("scatter_w5_loop"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &lea ("esi",&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov (&DWP(64*0-128,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(64*1-128,"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(64*2-128,"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(64*3-128,"edi"),"edx"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(64*4,"edi")); &dec ("ebp"); &jnz (&label("scatter_w5_loop")); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *edi,const void *esi, # int ebp); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_gather_w5"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); &lea ("esi",&DWP(0,"esi","ebp",4)); &neg ("ebp"); &sar ("ebp",31); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &lea ("esi",&DWP(0,"esi","ebp",4)); for($i=0;$i<24;$i+=4) { &mov ("eax",&DWP(64*($i+0),"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(64*($i+1),"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(64*($i+2),"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(64*($i+3),"esi")); &and ("eax","ebp"); &and ("ebx","ebp"); &and ("ecx","ebp"); &and ("edx","ebp"); &mov (&DWP(4*($i+0),"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(4*($i+1),"edi"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP(4*($i+2),"edi"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP(4*($i+3),"edi"),"edx"); } &function_end("ecp_nistz256_gather_w5"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *edi,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *esi, # int ebp); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7"); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); &lea ("edi",&DWP(-1,"edi","ebp")); &mov ("ebp",64/4); &set_label("scatter_w7_loop"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); &lea ("esi",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov (&BP(64*0,"edi"),"al"); &mov (&BP(64*1,"edi"),"ah"); &shr ("eax",16); &mov (&BP(64*2,"edi"),"al"); &mov (&BP(64*3,"edi"),"ah"); &lea ("edi",&DWP(64*4,"edi")); &dec ("ebp"); &jnz (&label("scatter_w7_loop")); &function_end("ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *edi,const void *esi, # int ebp); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_gather_w7"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); &add ("esi","ebp"); &neg ("ebp"), &sar ("ebp",31); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &lea ("esi",&DWP(0,"esi","ebp")); for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=4) { &movz ("eax",&BP(64*($i+0),"esi")); &movz ("ebx",&BP(64*($i+1),"esi")); &movz ("ecx",&BP(64*($i+2),"esi")); &and ("eax","ebp"); &movz ("edx",&BP(64*($i+3),"esi")); &and ("ebx","ebp"); &mov (&BP($i+0,"edi"),"al"); &and ("ecx","ebp"); &mov (&BP($i+1,"edi"),"bl"); &and ("edx","ebp"); &mov (&BP($i+2,"edi"),"cl"); &mov (&BP($i+3,"edi"),"dl"); } &function_end("ecp_nistz256_gather_w7"); ######################################################################## # following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in # ecp_nistz256.c # ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp); # &static_label("point_double_shortcut"); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_point_double"); { my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$in_x,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..4)); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # above map() describes stack layout with 5 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top, then we take extra word for # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy. &stack_push(8*5+1); if ($sse2) { &call ("_picup_eax"); &set_label("pic"); &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic")); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(0,"edx")); } &set_label("point_double_shortcut"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy in_x &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP($in_x+0,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP($in_x+4,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP($in_x+8,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP($in_x+12,"esp"),"edx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"esi")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"esi")); &mov (&DWP($in_x+16,"esp"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP($in_x+20,"esp"),"ebx"); &mov (&DWP($in_x+24,"esp"),"ecx"); &mov (&DWP($in_x+28,"esp"),"edx"); &mov (&DWP(32*5,"esp"),"ebp"); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("ebp",&DWP(32,"esi")); &lea ("esi",&DWP(32,"esi")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &mov ("esi",64); &add ("esi",&wparam(1)); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp")); &mov ("ebp","esi"); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(S, S); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &mov ("ebp",&wparam(1)); &lea ("esi",&DWP(32,"ebp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP(64,"ebp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y); &lea ("esi",&DWP($in_x,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($M,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # p256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr); &mov ("edi",64); &lea ("esi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &add ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0); &lea ("esi",&DWP($in_x,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($M,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Zsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($M,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); &mov ("edi",32); &lea ("esi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &add ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_div_by_2"); # p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0); &lea ("esi",&DWP($M,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # 1/2 p256_mul_by_3(M, M); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in_x,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); &lea ("esi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($M,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # 2/2 p256_mul_by_3(M, M); &lea ("esi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($M,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp")); &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); &mov ("esi","edi"); # %edi is still res_x here &lea ("ebp",&DWP($tmp0,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); &lea ("esi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &mov ("ebp","edi"); # %edi is still res_x &lea ("edi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(S, S, res_x); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*5,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &mov ("esi","edi"); # %edi is still &S &lea ("ebp",&DWP($M,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S, S, M); &mov ("ebp",32); &lea ("esi",&DWP($S,"esp")); &add ("ebp",&wparam(0)); &mov ("edi","ebp"); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); &stack_pop(8*5+1); } &function_end("ecp_nistz256_point_double"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT *in2); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_point_add"); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z, $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub, $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..17)); my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr); &mov ("esi",&wparam(2)); # above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top, then we take extra words for # !in1infty, !in2infty, result of check for zero and # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy. [one unused word for padding] &stack_push(8*18+5); if ($sse2) { &call ("_picup_eax"); &set_label("pic"); &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic")); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(0,"edx")); } &lea ("edi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp")); for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi")); # copy in2 &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(32*18+12,"esp"),"ebp") if ($i==0); &mov ("ebp","eax") if ($i==64); &or ("ebp","eax") if ($i>64); &mov (&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx"); &or ("ebp","ebx") if ($i>=64); &mov (&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx"); &or ("ebp","ecx") if ($i>=64); &mov (&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx"); &or ("ebp","edx") if ($i>=64); } &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &sub ("eax","ebp"); &or ("ebp","eax"); &sar ("ebp",31); &mov (&DWP(32*18+4,"esp"),"ebp"); # !in2infty &lea ("edi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp")); for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi")); # copy in1 &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov ("ebp","eax") if ($i==64); &or ("ebp","eax") if ($i>64); &mov (&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx"); &or ("ebp","ebx") if ($i>=64); &mov (&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx"); &or ("ebp","ecx") if ($i>=64); &mov (&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx"); &or ("ebp","edx") if ($i>=64); } &xor ("eax","eax"); &sub ("eax","ebp"); &or ("ebp","eax"); &sar ("ebp",31); &mov (&DWP(32*18+0,"esp"),"ebp"); # !in1infty &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in2_z,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in2_z,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Z2sqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($Z2sqr,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in2_z,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S1,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in1_y,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S1,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S1,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in2_y,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); &lea ("esi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S1,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($R,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(R, S2, S1); &or ("ebx","eax"); # see if result is zero &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &or ("ebx","ecx"); &or ("ebx","edx"); &or ("ebx",&DWP(0,"edi")); &or ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi")); &lea ("esi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp")); &or ("ebx",&DWP(8,"edi")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Z2sqr,"esp")); &or ("ebx",&DWP(12,"edi")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($U1,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(32*18+8,"esp"),"ebx"); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); &lea ("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($U1,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($H,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(H, U2, U1); &or ("eax","ebx"); # see if result is zero &or ("eax","ecx"); &or ("eax","edx"); &or ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); &or ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi")); &or ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi")); &or ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi")); &data_byte(0x3e); # predict taken &jnz (&label("add_proceed")); # is_equal(U1,U2)? &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+0,"esp")); &and ("eax",&DWP(32*18+4,"esp")); &mov ("ebx",&DWP(32*18+8,"esp")); &jz (&label("add_proceed")); # (in1infty || in2infty)? &test ("ebx","ebx"); &jz (&label("add_double")); # is_equal(S1,S2)? &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("ecx",96/4); &data_byte(0xfc,0xf3,0xab); # cld; stosd &jmp (&label("add_done")); &set_label("add_double",16); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &add ("esp",4*((8*18+5)-(8*5+1))); # difference in frame sizes &jmp (&label("point_double_shortcut")); &set_label("add_proceed",16); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($R,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($R,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_z,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in2_z,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($res_z,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_z,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($U1,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); &lea ("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); &lea ("esi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); &lea ("esi",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Hcub,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); &lea ("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S1,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*18+12,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($R,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(res_y, R, res_y); &lea ("esi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(32*18+0,"esp")); # !in1infty &mov ("esi",&DWP(32*18+4,"esp")); # !in2infty &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("edx","ebp"); ¬ ("ebp"); &and ("edx","esi"); &and ("ebp","esi"); ¬ ("esi"); ######################################## # conditional moves for($i=64;$i<96;$i+=4) { &mov ("eax","edx"); &and ("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp")); &mov ("ebx","ebp"); &and ("ebx",&DWP($in2_x+$i,"esp")); &mov ("ecx","esi"); &and ("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp")); &or ("eax","ebx"); &or ("eax","ecx"); &mov (&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax"); } for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=4) { &mov ("eax","edx"); &and ("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp")); &mov ("ebx","ebp"); &and ("ebx",&DWP($in2_x+$i,"esp")); &mov ("ecx","esi"); &and ("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp")); &or ("eax","ebx"); &or ("eax","ecx"); &mov (&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax"); } &set_label("add_done"); &stack_pop(8*18+5); } &function_end("ecp_nistz256_point_add"); ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out, # const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2); &function_begin("ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine"); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y, $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..14)); my $Z1sqr = $S2; my @ONE_mont=(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0); &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # above map() describes stack layout with 15 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top, then we take extra words for # !in1infty, !in2infty, and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy. &stack_push(8*15+3); if ($sse2) { &call ("_picup_eax"); &set_label("pic"); &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","eax",&label("pic")); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(0,"edx")); } &lea ("edi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp")); for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi")); # copy in1 &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov (&DWP(32*15+8,"esp"),"ebp") if ($i==0); &mov ("ebp","eax") if ($i==64); &or ("ebp","eax") if ($i>64); &mov (&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx"); &or ("ebp","ebx") if ($i>=64); &mov (&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx"); &or ("ebp","ecx") if ($i>=64); &mov (&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx"); &or ("ebp","edx") if ($i>=64); } &xor ("eax","eax"); &mov ("esi",&wparam(2)); &sub ("eax","ebp"); &or ("ebp","eax"); &sar ("ebp",31); &mov (&DWP(32*15+0,"esp"),"ebp"); # !in1infty &lea ("edi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp")); for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=16) { &mov ("eax",&DWP($i+0,"esi")); # copy in2 &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i+4,"esi")); &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i+8,"esi")); &mov ("edx",&DWP($i+12,"esi")); &mov (&DWP($i+0,"edi"),"eax"); &mov ("ebp","eax") if ($i==0); &or ("ebp","eax") if ($i!=0); &mov (&DWP($i+4,"edi"),"ebx"); &or ("ebp","ebx"); &mov (&DWP($i+8,"edi"),"ecx"); &or ("ebp","ecx"); &mov (&DWP($i+12,"edi"),"edx"); &or ("ebp","edx"); } &xor ("ebx","ebx"); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &sub ("ebx","ebp"); &lea ("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &or ("ebx","ebp"); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &sar ("ebx",31); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp")); &mov (&DWP(32*15+4,"esp"),"ebx"); # !in2infty &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in2_x,"esp")); &mov ("ebp","edi"); # %esi is stull &Z1sqr &lea ("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Z1sqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); &lea ("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in1_x,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($H,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in2_y,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in1_z,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_z,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); &lea ("esi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in1_y,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($R,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($R,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($R,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($in1_x,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($H,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); &lea ("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_add"); # p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); &lea ("esi",&DWP($Rsqr,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Hsqr,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); &lea ("esi",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($Hcub,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); &lea ("esi",&DWP($U2,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($res_x,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($Hcub,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($in1_y,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(S2, Hcub, in1_y); &mov ("eax",&DWP(32*15+8,"esp")); # OPENSSL_ia32cap_P copy &lea ("esi",&DWP($R,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_mul_mont"); # p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); &lea ("esi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &lea ("ebp",&DWP($S2,"esp")); &lea ("edi",&DWP($res_y,"esp")); &call ("_ecp_nistz256_sub"); # p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); &mov ("ebp",&DWP(32*15+0,"esp")); # !in1infty &mov ("esi",&DWP(32*15+4,"esp")); # !in2infty &mov ("edi",&wparam(0)); &mov ("edx","ebp"); ¬ ("ebp"); &and ("edx","esi"); &and ("ebp","esi"); ¬ ("esi"); ######################################## # conditional moves for($i=64;$i<96;$i+=4) { my $one=@ONE_mont[($i-64)/4]; &mov ("eax","edx"); &and ("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp")); &mov ("ebx","ebp") if ($one && $one!=-1); &and ("ebx",$one) if ($one && $one!=-1); &mov ("ecx","esi"); &and ("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp")); &or ("eax",$one==-1?"ebp":"ebx") if ($one); &or ("eax","ecx"); &mov (&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax"); } for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=4) { &mov ("eax","edx"); &and ("eax",&DWP($res_x+$i,"esp")); &mov ("ebx","ebp"); &and ("ebx",&DWP($in2_x+$i,"esp")); &mov ("ecx","esi"); &and ("ecx",&DWP($in1_x+$i,"esp")); &or ("eax","ebx"); &or ("eax","ecx"); &mov (&DWP($i,"edi"),"eax"); } &stack_pop(8*15+3); } &function_end("ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine"); &asm_finish(); close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv8.pl0000644000000000000000000011350513176625657020402 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # ECP_NISTZ256 module for ARMv8. # # February 2015. # # Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in # http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. # # with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM # Apple A7 +120-360% # Cortex-A53 +120-400% # Cortex-A57 +120-350% # X-Gene +200-330% # Denver +140-400% # # Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending # on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side # operation. Keep in mind that +400% means 5x improvement. $flavour = shift; while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; { my ($rp,$ap,$bp,$bi,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$poly1,$poly3, $acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5) = map("x$_",(0..17,19,20)); my ($acc6,$acc7)=($ap,$bp); # used in __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text ___ ######################################################################## # Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7 # $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; open TABLE,") { s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo; } close TABLE; # See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37. # 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not # amount of elements. die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_precomputed .type ecp_nistz256_precomputed,%object .align 12 ecp_nistz256_precomputed: ___ ######################################################################## # this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with # 64 byte interval, similar to # 1111222233334444 # 1234123412341234 for(1..37) { @tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16); for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) { undef @line; for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) { push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff; } $code.=".byte\t"; $code.=join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line); $code.="\n"; } } $code.=<<___; .size ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed .align 5 .Lpoly: .quad 0xffffffffffffffff,0x00000000ffffffff,0x0000000000000000,0xffffffff00000001 .LRR: // 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial .quad 0x0000000000000003,0xfffffffbffffffff,0xfffffffffffffffe,0x00000004fffffffd .Lone_mont: .quad 0x0000000000000001,0xffffffff00000000,0xffffffffffffffff,0x00000000fffffffe .Lone: .quad 1,0,0,0 .asciz "ECP_NISTZ256 for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " // void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_to_mont .type ecp_nistz256_to_mont,%function .align 6 ecp_nistz256_to_mont: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldr $bi,.LRR // bp[0] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 adr $bp,.LRR // &bp[0] bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32 ret .size ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont // void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_from_mont .type ecp_nistz256_from_mont,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_from_mont: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] mov $bi,#1 // bp[0] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 adr $bp,.Lone // &bp[0] bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32 ret .size ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont // void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4], // const BN_ULONG x2[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_mont .type ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_mul_mont: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldr $bi,[$bp] // bp[0] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32 ret .size ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont .type ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-32]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont ldp x19,x20,[sp,#16] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#32 ret .size ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4], // const BN_ULONG x2[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_add .type ecp_nistz256_add,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_add: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap] ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16] ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 bl __ecp_nistz256_add ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add // void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 .type ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_div_by_2: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 bl __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 // void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 mov $t0,$acc0 mov $t1,$acc1 mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 bl __ecp_nistz256_add // ret = a+a // 2*a ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 // void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 mov $t0,$acc0 mov $t1,$acc1 mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 mov $a0,$acc0 mov $a1,$acc1 mov $a2,$acc2 mov $a3,$acc3 bl __ecp_nistz256_add // ret = a+a // 2*a mov $t0,$a0 mov $t1,$a1 mov $t2,$a2 mov $t3,$a3 bl __ecp_nistz256_add // ret += a // 2*a+a=3*a ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 // void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4], // const BN_ULONG x2[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_sub .type ecp_nistz256_sub,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_sub: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap] ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#16] ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub // void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG x0[4],const BN_ULONG x1[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_neg .type ecp_nistz256_neg,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_neg: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 mov $bp,$ap mov $acc0,xzr // a = 0 mov $acc1,xzr mov $acc2,xzr mov $acc3,xzr ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ldp x29,x30,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg // note that __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont expects a[0-3] input pre-loaded // to $a0-$a3 and b[0] - to $bi .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont: mul $acc0,$a0,$bi // a[0]*b[0] umulh $t0,$a0,$bi mul $acc1,$a1,$bi // a[1]*b[0] umulh $t1,$a1,$bi mul $acc2,$a2,$bi // a[2]*b[0] umulh $t2,$a2,$bi mul $acc3,$a3,$bi // a[3]*b[0] umulh $t3,$a3,$bi ldr $bi,[$bp,#8] // b[1] adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 // accumulate high parts of multiplication lsl $t0,$acc0,#32 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 lsr $t1,$acc0,#32 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 adc $acc4,xzr,$t3 mov $acc5,xzr ___ for($i=1;$i<4;$i++) { # Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating # result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and # omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to # be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic" # digit being equal to least significant word, it can be # performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed: # # ffff0001.00000000.0000ffff.ffffffff # * abcdefgh # + xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh # # Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we # rewrite above as: # # xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh # + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000 # - 0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000.00000000.abcdefgh # # or marking redundant operations: # # xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.-------- # + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.-------- # - 0000abcd.efgh0000.--------.--------.-------- $code.=<<___; subs $t2,$acc0,$t0 // "*0xffff0001" sbc $t3,$acc0,$t1 adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 // +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] mul $t0,$a0,$bi // lo(a[0]*b[i]) adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 mul $t1,$a1,$bi // lo(a[1]*b[i]) adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 // +=acc[0]*0xffff0001 mul $t2,$a2,$bi // lo(a[2]*b[i]) adcs $acc3,$acc4,$t3 mul $t3,$a3,$bi // lo(a[3]*b[i]) adc $acc4,$acc5,xzr adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 // accumulate low parts of multiplication umulh $t0,$a0,$bi // hi(a[0]*b[i]) adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 umulh $t1,$a1,$bi // hi(a[1]*b[i]) adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 umulh $t2,$a2,$bi // hi(a[2]*b[i]) adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 umulh $t3,$a3,$bi // hi(a[3]*b[i]) adc $acc4,$acc4,xzr ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<3); ldr $bi,[$bp,#8*($i+1)] // b[$i+1] ___ $code.=<<___; adds $acc1,$acc1,$t0 // accumulate high parts of multiplication lsl $t0,$acc0,#32 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 lsr $t1,$acc0,#32 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t3 adc $acc5,xzr,xzr ___ } $code.=<<___; // last reduction subs $t2,$acc0,$t0 // "*0xffff0001" sbc $t3,$acc0,$t1 adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 // +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 // +=acc[0]*0xffff0001 adcs $acc3,$acc4,$t3 adc $acc4,$acc5,xzr adds $t0,$acc0,#1 // subs $t0,$acc0,#-1 // tmp = ret-modulus sbcs $t1,$acc1,$poly1 sbcs $t2,$acc2,xzr sbcs $t3,$acc3,$poly3 sbcs xzr,$acc4,xzr // did it borrow? csel $acc0,$acc0,$t0,lo // ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus csel $acc1,$acc1,$t1,lo csel $acc2,$acc2,$t2,lo stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp] csel $acc3,$acc3,$t3,lo stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16] ret .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // note that __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont expects a[0-3] input pre-loaded // to $a0-$a3 .type __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont: // | | | | | |a1*a0| | // | | | | |a2*a0| | | // | |a3*a2|a3*a0| | | | // | | | |a2*a1| | | | // | | |a3*a1| | | | | // *| | | | | | | | 2| // +|a3*a3|a2*a2|a1*a1|a0*a0| // |--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--| // |A7|A6|A5|A4|A3|A2|A1|A0|, where Ax is $accx, i.e. follow $accx // // "can't overflow" below mark carrying into high part of // multiplication result, which can't overflow, because it // can never be all ones. mul $acc1,$a1,$a0 // a[1]*a[0] umulh $t1,$a1,$a0 mul $acc2,$a2,$a0 // a[2]*a[0] umulh $t2,$a2,$a0 mul $acc3,$a3,$a0 // a[3]*a[0] umulh $acc4,$a3,$a0 adds $acc2,$acc2,$t1 // accumulate high parts of multiplication mul $t0,$a2,$a1 // a[2]*a[1] umulh $t1,$a2,$a1 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t2 mul $t2,$a3,$a1 // a[3]*a[1] umulh $t3,$a3,$a1 adc $acc4,$acc4,xzr // can't overflow mul $acc5,$a3,$a2 // a[3]*a[2] umulh $acc6,$a3,$a2 adds $t1,$t1,$t2 // accumulate high parts of multiplication mul $acc0,$a0,$a0 // a[0]*a[0] adc $t2,$t3,xzr // can't overflow adds $acc3,$acc3,$t0 // accumulate low parts of multiplication umulh $a0,$a0,$a0 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t1 mul $t1,$a1,$a1 // a[1]*a[1] adcs $acc5,$acc5,$t2 umulh $a1,$a1,$a1 adc $acc6,$acc6,xzr // can't overflow adds $acc1,$acc1,$acc1 // acc[1-6]*=2 mul $t2,$a2,$a2 // a[2]*a[2] adcs $acc2,$acc2,$acc2 umulh $a2,$a2,$a2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$acc3 mul $t3,$a3,$a3 // a[3]*a[3] adcs $acc4,$acc4,$acc4 umulh $a3,$a3,$a3 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$acc5 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$acc6 adc $acc7,xzr,xzr adds $acc1,$acc1,$a0 // +a[i]*a[i] adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t1 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$a1 adcs $acc4,$acc4,$t2 adcs $acc5,$acc5,$a2 lsl $t0,$acc0,#32 adcs $acc6,$acc6,$t3 lsr $t1,$acc0,#32 adc $acc7,$acc7,$a3 ___ for($i=0;$i<3;$i++) { # reductions, see commentary in # multiplication for details $code.=<<___; subs $t2,$acc0,$t0 // "*0xffff0001" sbc $t3,$acc0,$t1 adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 // +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 lsl $t0,$acc0,#32 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 // +=acc[0]*0xffff0001 lsr $t1,$acc0,#32 adc $acc3,$t3,xzr // can't overflow ___ } $code.=<<___; subs $t2,$acc0,$t0 // "*0xffff0001" sbc $t3,$acc0,$t1 adds $acc0,$acc1,$t0 // +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] adcs $acc1,$acc2,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc3,$t2 // +=acc[0]*0xffff0001 adc $acc3,$t3,xzr // can't overflow adds $acc0,$acc0,$acc4 // accumulate upper half adcs $acc1,$acc1,$acc5 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$acc6 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$acc7 adc $acc4,xzr,xzr adds $t0,$acc0,#1 // subs $t0,$acc0,#-1 // tmp = ret-modulus sbcs $t1,$acc1,$poly1 sbcs $t2,$acc2,xzr sbcs $t3,$acc3,$poly3 sbcs xzr,$acc4,xzr // did it borrow? csel $acc0,$acc0,$t0,lo // ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus csel $acc1,$acc1,$t1,lo csel $acc2,$acc2,$t2,lo stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp] csel $acc3,$acc3,$t3,lo stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16] ret .size __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // Note that __ecp_nistz256_add expects both input vectors pre-loaded to // $a0-$a3 and $t0-$t3. This is done because it's used in multiple // contexts, e.g. in multiplication by 2 and 3... .type __ecp_nistz256_add,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_add: adds $acc0,$acc0,$t0 // ret = a+b adcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 adcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 adcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 adc $ap,xzr,xzr // zap $ap adds $t0,$acc0,#1 // subs $t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = ret-modulus sbcs $t1,$acc1,$poly1 sbcs $t2,$acc2,xzr sbcs $t3,$acc3,$poly3 sbcs xzr,$ap,xzr // did subtraction borrow? csel $acc0,$acc0,$t0,lo // ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus csel $acc1,$acc1,$t1,lo csel $acc2,$acc2,$t2,lo stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp] csel $acc3,$acc3,$t3,lo stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16] ret .size __ecp_nistz256_add,.-__ecp_nistz256_add .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_from,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_sub_from: ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp] ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp,#16] subs $acc0,$acc0,$t0 // ret = a-b sbcs $acc1,$acc1,$t1 sbcs $acc2,$acc2,$t2 sbcs $acc3,$acc3,$t3 sbc $ap,xzr,xzr // zap $ap subs $t0,$acc0,#1 // adds $t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = ret+modulus adcs $t1,$acc1,$poly1 adcs $t2,$acc2,xzr adc $t3,$acc3,$poly3 cmp $ap,xzr // did subtraction borrow? csel $acc0,$acc0,$t0,eq // ret = borrow ? ret+modulus : ret csel $acc1,$acc1,$t1,eq csel $acc2,$acc2,$t2,eq stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp] csel $acc3,$acc3,$t3,eq stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16] ret .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_from,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf: ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp] ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp,#16] subs $acc0,$t0,$acc0 // ret = b-a sbcs $acc1,$t1,$acc1 sbcs $acc2,$t2,$acc2 sbcs $acc3,$t3,$acc3 sbc $ap,xzr,xzr // zap $ap subs $t0,$acc0,#1 // adds $t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = ret+modulus adcs $t1,$acc1,$poly1 adcs $t2,$acc2,xzr adc $t3,$acc3,$poly3 cmp $ap,xzr // did subtraction borrow? csel $acc0,$acc0,$t0,eq // ret = borrow ? ret+modulus : ret csel $acc1,$acc1,$t1,eq csel $acc2,$acc2,$t2,eq stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp] csel $acc3,$acc3,$t3,eq stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16] ret .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf .type __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2: subs $t0,$acc0,#1 // adds $t0,$a0,#-1 // tmp = a+modulus adcs $t1,$acc1,$poly1 adcs $t2,$acc2,xzr adcs $t3,$acc3,$poly3 adc $ap,xzr,xzr // zap $ap tst $acc0,#1 // is a even? csel $acc0,$acc0,$t0,eq // ret = even ? a : a+modulus csel $acc1,$acc1,$t1,eq csel $acc2,$acc2,$t2,eq csel $acc3,$acc3,$t3,eq csel $ap,xzr,$ap,eq lsr $acc0,$acc0,#1 // ret >>= 1 orr $acc0,$acc0,$acc1,lsl#63 lsr $acc1,$acc1,#1 orr $acc1,$acc1,$acc2,lsl#63 lsr $acc2,$acc2,#1 orr $acc2,$acc2,$acc3,lsl#63 lsr $acc3,$acc3,#1 stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp] orr $acc3,$acc3,$ap,lsl#63 stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp,#16] ret .size __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 ___ ######################################################################## # following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in # ecp_nistz256.c # ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp); # { my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..3)); # above map() describes stack layout with 4 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. my ($rp_real,$ap_real) = map("x$_",(21,22)); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_double .type ecp_nistz256_point_double,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_point_double: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] sub sp,sp,#32*4 .Ldouble_shortcut: ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap,#32] mov $rp_real,$rp ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap,#48] mov $ap_real,$ap ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 mov $t0,$acc0 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 mov $t1,$acc1 ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_real,#64] // forward load for p256_sqr_mont mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#64+16] add $rp,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_add // p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); add $rp,sp,#$Zsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); ldp $t0,$t1,[$ap_real] ldp $t2,$t3,[$ap_real,#16] mov $a0,$acc0 // put Zsqr aside for p256_sub mov $a1,$acc1 mov $a2,$acc2 mov $a3,$acc3 add $rp,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_add // p256_add(M, Zsqr, in_x); add $bp,$ap_real,#0 mov $acc0,$a0 // restore Zsqr mov $acc1,$a1 ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$S] // forward load for p256_sqr_mont mov $acc2,$a2 mov $acc3,$a3 ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$S+16] add $rp,sp,#$Zsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf // p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); add $rp,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(S, S); ldr $bi,[$ap_real,#32] ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_real,#64] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#64+16] add $bp,$ap_real,#32 add $rp,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y); mov $t0,$acc0 mov $t1,$acc1 ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$S] // forward load for p256_sqr_mont mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$S+16] add $rp,$rp_real,#64 bl __ecp_nistz256_add // p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0); add $rp,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S); ldr $bi,[sp,#$Zsqr] // forward load for p256_mul_mont ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$M] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$M+16] add $rp,$rp_real,#32 bl __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 // p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0); add $bp,sp,#$Zsqr add $rp,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); mov $t0,$acc0 // duplicate M mov $t1,$acc1 mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 mov $a0,$acc0 // put M aside mov $a1,$acc1 mov $a2,$acc2 mov $a3,$acc3 add $rp,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_add mov $t0,$a0 // restore M mov $t1,$a1 ldr $bi,[$ap_real] // forward load for p256_mul_mont mov $t2,$a2 ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$S] mov $t3,$a3 ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$S+16] bl __ecp_nistz256_add // p256_mul_by_3(M, M); add $bp,$ap_real,#0 add $rp,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); mov $t0,$acc0 mov $t1,$acc1 ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$M] // forward load for p256_sqr_mont mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$M+16] add $rp,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_add // p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); add $rp,$rp_real,#0 bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); add $bp,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); add $bp,sp,#$S add $rp,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf // p256_sub(S, S, res_x); ldr $bi,[sp,#$M] mov $a0,$acc0 // copy S mov $a1,$acc1 mov $a2,$acc2 mov $a3,$acc3 add $bp,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S, S, M); add $bp,$rp_real,#32 add $rp,$rp_real,#32 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); add sp,x29,#0 // destroy frame ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#80 ret .size ecp_nistz256_point_double,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub, $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..11)); my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr); # above map() describes stack layout with 12 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. my ($rp_real,$ap_real,$bp_real,$in1infty,$in2infty,$temp)=map("x$_",(21..26)); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add .type ecp_nistz256_point_add,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_point_add: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] sub sp,sp,#32*12 ldp $a0,$a1,[$bp,#64] // in2_z ldp $a2,$a3,[$bp,#64+16] mov $rp_real,$rp mov $ap_real,$ap mov $bp_real,$bp ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 orr $t0,$a0,$a1 orr $t2,$a2,$a3 orr $in2infty,$t0,$t2 cmp $in2infty,#0 csetm $in2infty,ne // !in2infty add $rp,sp,#$Z2sqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_real,#64] // in1_z ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#64+16] orr $t0,$a0,$a1 orr $t2,$a2,$a3 orr $in1infty,$t0,$t2 cmp $in1infty,#0 csetm $in1infty,ne // !in1infty add $rp,sp,#$Z1sqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); ldr $bi,[$bp_real,#64] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$Z2sqr] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$Z2sqr+16] add $bp,$bp_real,#64 add $rp,sp,#$S1 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); ldr $bi,[$ap_real,#64] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$Z1sqr] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$Z1sqr+16] add $bp,$ap_real,#64 add $rp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); ldr $bi,[$ap_real,#32] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$S1] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$S1+16] add $bp,$ap_real,#32 add $rp,sp,#$S1 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); ldr $bi,[$bp_real,#32] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$S2] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$S2+16] add $bp,$bp_real,#32 add $rp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add $bp,sp,#$S1 ldr $bi,[sp,#$Z2sqr] // forward load for p256_mul_mont ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap_real] ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap_real,#16] add $rp,sp,#$R bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(R, S2, S1); orr $acc0,$acc0,$acc1 // see if result is zero orr $acc2,$acc2,$acc3 orr $temp,$acc0,$acc2 add $bp,sp,#$Z2sqr add $rp,sp,#$U1 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); ldr $bi,[sp,#$Z1sqr] ldp $a0,$a1,[$bp_real] ldp $a2,$a3,[$bp_real,#16] add $bp,sp,#$Z1sqr add $rp,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); add $bp,sp,#$U1 ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$R] // forward load for p256_sqr_mont ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$R+16] add $rp,sp,#$H bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(H, U2, U1); orr $acc0,$acc0,$acc1 // see if result is zero orr $acc2,$acc2,$acc3 orr $acc0,$acc0,$acc2 tst $acc0,$acc0 b.ne .Ladd_proceed // is_equal(U1,U2)? tst $in1infty,$in2infty b.eq .Ladd_proceed // (in1infty || in2infty)? tst $temp,$temp b.eq .Ladd_double // is_equal(S1,S2)? eor $a0,$a0,$a0 eor $a1,$a1,$a1 stp $a0,$a1,[$rp_real] stp $a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#16] stp $a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#32] stp $a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#48] stp $a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#64] stp $a0,$a1,[$rp_real,#80] b .Ladd_done .align 4 .Ladd_double: mov $ap,$ap_real mov $rp,$rp_real ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] add sp,sp,#32*(12-4) // difference in stack frames b .Ldouble_shortcut .align 4 .Ladd_proceed: add $rp,sp,#$Rsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); ldr $bi,[$ap_real,#64] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$H] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16] add $bp,$ap_real,#64 add $rp,sp,#$res_z bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$H] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16] add $rp,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); ldr $bi,[$bp_real,#64] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_z] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_z+16] add $bp,$bp_real,#64 add $rp,sp,#$res_z bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); ldr $bi,[sp,#$H] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hsqr] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hsqr+16] add $bp,sp,#$H add $rp,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); ldr $bi,[sp,#$Hsqr] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$U1] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$U1+16] add $bp,sp,#$Hsqr add $rp,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); mov $t0,$acc0 mov $t1,$acc1 mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 add $rp,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_add // p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add $bp,sp,#$Rsqr add $rp,sp,#$res_x bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf // p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add $bp,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add $bp,sp,#$U2 ldr $bi,[sp,#$Hcub] // forward load for p256_mul_mont ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$S1] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$S1+16] add $rp,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf // p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add $bp,sp,#$Hcub add $rp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); ldr $bi,[sp,#$R] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_y] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_y+16] add $bp,sp,#$R add $rp,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add $bp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x] // res ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+16] ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp_real] // in2 ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#16] ___ for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=32) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i] // in1 cmp $in1infty,#0 // !$in1intfy, remember? ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16] csel $t0,$a0,$t0,ne csel $t1,$a1,$t1,ne ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x+$i+32] // res csel $t2,$a2,$t2,ne csel $t3,$a3,$t3,ne cmp $in2infty,#0 // !$in2intfy, remember? ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+$i+48] csel $acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne csel $acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp_real,#$i+32] // in2 csel $acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne csel $acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#$i+48] stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i] stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16] ___ } $code.=<<___; ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i] // in1 cmp $in1infty,#0 // !$in1intfy, remember? ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16] csel $t0,$a0,$t0,ne csel $t1,$a1,$t1,ne csel $t2,$a2,$t2,ne csel $t3,$a3,$t3,ne cmp $in2infty,#0 // !$in2intfy, remember? csel $acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne csel $acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne csel $acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne csel $acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i] stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16] .Ladd_done: add sp,x29,#0 // destroy frame ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#80 ret .size ecp_nistz256_point_add,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..9)); my $Z1sqr = $S2; # above map() describes stack layout with 10 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. my ($rp_real,$ap_real,$bp_real,$in1infty,$in2infty,$temp)=map("x$_",(21..26)); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine .type ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-80]! add x29,sp,#0 stp x19,x20,[sp,#16] stp x21,x22,[sp,#32] stp x23,x24,[sp,#48] stp x25,x26,[sp,#64] sub sp,sp,#32*10 mov $rp_real,$rp mov $ap_real,$ap mov $bp_real,$bp ldr $poly1,.Lpoly+8 ldr $poly3,.Lpoly+24 ldp $a0,$a1,[$ap,#64] // in1_z ldp $a2,$a3,[$ap,#64+16] orr $t0,$a0,$a1 orr $t2,$a2,$a3 orr $in1infty,$t0,$t2 cmp $in1infty,#0 csetm $in1infty,ne // !in1infty ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$bp] // in2_x ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$bp,#16] ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp,#32] // in2_y ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp,#48] orr $acc0,$acc0,$acc1 orr $acc2,$acc2,$acc3 orr $t0,$t0,$t1 orr $t2,$t2,$t3 orr $acc0,$acc0,$acc2 orr $t0,$t0,$t2 orr $in2infty,$acc0,$t0 cmp $in2infty,#0 csetm $in2infty,ne // !in2infty add $rp,sp,#$Z1sqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); mov $a0,$acc0 mov $a1,$acc1 mov $a2,$acc2 mov $a3,$acc3 ldr $bi,[$bp_real] add $bp,$bp_real,#0 add $rp,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x); add $bp,$ap_real,#0 ldr $bi,[$ap_real,#64] // forward load for p256_mul_mont ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$Z1sqr] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$Z1sqr+16] add $rp,sp,#$H bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); add $bp,$ap_real,#64 add $rp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); ldr $bi,[$ap_real,#64] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$H] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16] add $bp,$ap_real,#64 add $rp,sp,#$res_z bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); ldr $bi,[$bp_real,#32] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$S2] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$S2+16] add $bp,$bp_real,#32 add $rp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add $bp,$ap_real,#32 ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$H] // forward load for p256_sqr_mont ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$H+16] add $rp,sp,#$R bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); add $rp,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$R] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$R+16] add $rp,sp,#$Rsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont // p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); ldr $bi,[sp,#$H] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hsqr] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hsqr+16] add $bp,sp,#$H add $rp,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); ldr $bi,[$ap_real] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hsqr] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hsqr+16] add $bp,$ap_real,#0 add $rp,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); mov $t0,$acc0 mov $t1,$acc1 mov $t2,$acc2 mov $t3,$acc3 add $rp,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_add // p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add $bp,sp,#$Rsqr add $rp,sp,#$res_x bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf // p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add $bp,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add $bp,sp,#$U2 ldr $bi,[$ap_real,#32] // forward load for p256_mul_mont ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$Hcub] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$Hcub+16] add $rp,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf // p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add $bp,$ap_real,#32 add $rp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub); ldr $bi,[sp,#$R] ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_y] ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_y+16] add $bp,sp,#$R add $rp,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont // p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add $bp,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from // p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x] // res ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+16] ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp_real] // in2 ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#16] ___ for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=32) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i] // in1 cmp $in1infty,#0 // !$in1intfy, remember? ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16] csel $t0,$a0,$t0,ne csel $t1,$a1,$t1,ne ldp $a0,$a1,[sp,#$res_x+$i+32] // res csel $t2,$a2,$t2,ne csel $t3,$a3,$t3,ne cmp $in2infty,#0 // !$in2intfy, remember? ldp $a2,$a3,[sp,#$res_x+$i+48] csel $acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne csel $acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne ldp $t0,$t1,[$bp_real,#$i+32] // in2 csel $acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne csel $acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne ldp $t2,$t3,[$bp_real,#$i+48] stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i] stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16] ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i == 0); adr $bp_real,.Lone_mont-64 ___ } $code.=<<___; ldp $acc0,$acc1,[$ap_real,#$i] // in1 cmp $in1infty,#0 // !$in1intfy, remember? ldp $acc2,$acc3,[$ap_real,#$i+16] csel $t0,$a0,$t0,ne csel $t1,$a1,$t1,ne csel $t2,$a2,$t2,ne csel $t3,$a3,$t3,ne cmp $in2infty,#0 // !$in2intfy, remember? csel $acc0,$t0,$acc0,ne csel $acc1,$t1,$acc1,ne csel $acc2,$t2,$acc2,ne csel $acc3,$t3,$acc3,ne stp $acc0,$acc1,[$rp_real,#$i] stp $acc2,$acc3,[$rp_real,#$i+16] add sp,x29,#0 // destroy frame ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16] ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32] ldp x23,x24,[x29,#48] ldp x25,x26,[x29,#64] ldp x29,x30,[sp],#80 ret .size ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine ___ } } ######################################################################## # scatter-gather subroutines { my ($out,$inp,$index,$mask)=map("x$_",(0..3)); $code.=<<___; // void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *x0,const P256_POINT *x1, // int x2); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 add $out,$out,$index,lsl#2 ldp x4,x5,[$inp] // X ldp x6,x7,[$inp,#16] str w4,[$out,#64*0-4] lsr x4,x4,#32 str w5,[$out,#64*1-4] lsr x5,x5,#32 str w6,[$out,#64*2-4] lsr x6,x6,#32 str w7,[$out,#64*3-4] lsr x7,x7,#32 str w4,[$out,#64*4-4] str w5,[$out,#64*5-4] str w6,[$out,#64*6-4] str w7,[$out,#64*7-4] add $out,$out,#64*8 ldp x4,x5,[$inp,#32] // Y ldp x6,x7,[$inp,#48] str w4,[$out,#64*0-4] lsr x4,x4,#32 str w5,[$out,#64*1-4] lsr x5,x5,#32 str w6,[$out,#64*2-4] lsr x6,x6,#32 str w7,[$out,#64*3-4] lsr x7,x7,#32 str w4,[$out,#64*4-4] str w5,[$out,#64*5-4] str w6,[$out,#64*6-4] str w7,[$out,#64*7-4] add $out,$out,#64*8 ldp x4,x5,[$inp,#64] // Z ldp x6,x7,[$inp,#80] str w4,[$out,#64*0-4] lsr x4,x4,#32 str w5,[$out,#64*1-4] lsr x5,x5,#32 str w6,[$out,#64*2-4] lsr x6,x6,#32 str w7,[$out,#64*3-4] lsr x7,x7,#32 str w4,[$out,#64*4-4] str w5,[$out,#64*5-4] str w6,[$out,#64*6-4] str w7,[$out,#64*7-4] ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 // void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *x0,const void *x1, // int x2); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_gather_w5: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 cmp $index,xzr csetm x3,ne add $index,$index,x3 add $inp,$inp,$index,lsl#2 ldr w4,[$inp,#64*0] ldr w5,[$inp,#64*1] ldr w6,[$inp,#64*2] ldr w7,[$inp,#64*3] ldr w8,[$inp,#64*4] ldr w9,[$inp,#64*5] ldr w10,[$inp,#64*6] ldr w11,[$inp,#64*7] add $inp,$inp,#64*8 orr x4,x4,x8,lsl#32 orr x5,x5,x9,lsl#32 orr x6,x6,x10,lsl#32 orr x7,x7,x11,lsl#32 csel x4,x4,xzr,ne csel x5,x5,xzr,ne csel x6,x6,xzr,ne csel x7,x7,xzr,ne stp x4,x5,[$out] // X stp x6,x7,[$out,#16] ldr w4,[$inp,#64*0] ldr w5,[$inp,#64*1] ldr w6,[$inp,#64*2] ldr w7,[$inp,#64*3] ldr w8,[$inp,#64*4] ldr w9,[$inp,#64*5] ldr w10,[$inp,#64*6] ldr w11,[$inp,#64*7] add $inp,$inp,#64*8 orr x4,x4,x8,lsl#32 orr x5,x5,x9,lsl#32 orr x6,x6,x10,lsl#32 orr x7,x7,x11,lsl#32 csel x4,x4,xzr,ne csel x5,x5,xzr,ne csel x6,x6,xzr,ne csel x7,x7,xzr,ne stp x4,x5,[$out,#32] // Y stp x6,x7,[$out,#48] ldr w4,[$inp,#64*0] ldr w5,[$inp,#64*1] ldr w6,[$inp,#64*2] ldr w7,[$inp,#64*3] ldr w8,[$inp,#64*4] ldr w9,[$inp,#64*5] ldr w10,[$inp,#64*6] ldr w11,[$inp,#64*7] orr x4,x4,x8,lsl#32 orr x5,x5,x9,lsl#32 orr x6,x6,x10,lsl#32 orr x7,x7,x11,lsl#32 csel x4,x4,xzr,ne csel x5,x5,xzr,ne csel x6,x6,xzr,ne csel x7,x7,xzr,ne stp x4,x5,[$out,#64] // Z stp x6,x7,[$out,#80] ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 // void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *x0,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *x1, // int x2); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 add $out,$out,$index mov $index,#64/8 .Loop_scatter_w7: ldr x3,[$inp],#8 subs $index,$index,#1 prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*0] prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*1] prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*2] prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*3] prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*4] prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*5] prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*6] prfm pstl1strm,[$out,#4096+64*7] strb w3,[$out,#64*0-1] lsr x3,x3,#8 strb w3,[$out,#64*1-1] lsr x3,x3,#8 strb w3,[$out,#64*2-1] lsr x3,x3,#8 strb w3,[$out,#64*3-1] lsr x3,x3,#8 strb w3,[$out,#64*4-1] lsr x3,x3,#8 strb w3,[$out,#64*5-1] lsr x3,x3,#8 strb w3,[$out,#64*6-1] lsr x3,x3,#8 strb w3,[$out,#64*7-1] add $out,$out,#64*8 b.ne .Loop_scatter_w7 ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 // void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *x0,const void *x1, // int x2); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_gather_w7: stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]! add x29,sp,#0 cmp $index,xzr csetm x3,ne add $index,$index,x3 add $inp,$inp,$index mov $index,#64/8 nop .Loop_gather_w7: ldrb w4,[$inp,#64*0] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*0] subs $index,$index,#1 ldrb w5,[$inp,#64*1] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*1] ldrb w6,[$inp,#64*2] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*2] ldrb w7,[$inp,#64*3] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*3] ldrb w8,[$inp,#64*4] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*4] ldrb w9,[$inp,#64*5] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*5] ldrb w10,[$inp,#64*6] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*6] ldrb w11,[$inp,#64*7] prfm pldl1strm,[$inp,#4096+64*7] add $inp,$inp,#64*8 orr x4,x4,x5,lsl#8 orr x6,x6,x7,lsl#8 orr x8,x8,x9,lsl#8 orr x4,x4,x6,lsl#16 orr x10,x10,x11,lsl#8 orr x4,x4,x8,lsl#32 orr x4,x4,x10,lsl#48 and x4,x4,x3 str x4,[$out],#8 b.ne .Loop_gather_w7 ldr x29,[sp],#16 ret .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 ___ } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl0000755000000000000000000021212213176625657020301 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ############################################################################## # # # Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation # # # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. # # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, # # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # # limitations under the License. # # # ############################################################################## # # # Developers and authors: # # Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) # # (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center # # (2) University of Haifa # # Reference: # # S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with# # 256 Bit Primes" # # # ############################################################################## # Further optimization by : # # this/original with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM(*) # Opteron +12-49% +110-150% # Bulldozer +14-45% +175-210% # P4 +18-46% n/a :-( # Westmere +12-34% +80-87% # Sandy Bridge +9-35% +110-120% # Ivy Bridge +9-35% +110-125% # Haswell +8-37% +140-160% # Broadwell +18-58% +145-210% # Atom +15-50% +130-180% # VIA Nano +43-160% +300-480% # # (*) "without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM" refers to build with # "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128"; # # Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending # on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, relatively fastest # server-side operation. Keep in mind that +100% means 2x improvement. $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" \"$xlate\" $flavour \"$output\""; *STDOUT=*OUT; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); $addx = ($1>=12); } if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01); $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } $code.=<<___; .text .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P # The polynomial .align 64 .Lpoly: .quad 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x00000000ffffffff, 0x0000000000000000, 0xffffffff00000001 # 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial .LRR: .quad 0x0000000000000003, 0xfffffffbffffffff, 0xfffffffffffffffe, 0x00000004fffffffd .LOne: .long 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 .LTwo: .long 2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2 .LThree: .long 3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3 .LONE_mont: .quad 0x0000000000000001, 0xffffffff00000000, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x00000000fffffffe ___ { ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]); my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=map("%r$_",(8..11)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4)=("%rax","%rdx","%rcx","%r12","%r13"); my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx"); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,\@function,2 .align 64 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2: push %r12 push %r13 mov 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 xor $t4,$t4 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 add $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 adc $a1, $a1 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 lea .Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr mov $a0, $t0 adc $a2, $a2 adc $a3, $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 sbb 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) pop %r13 pop %r12 ret .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 .type ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_div_by_2: push %r12 push %r13 mov 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov $a0, $t0 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 lea .Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr mov $a1, $t1 xor $t4, $t4 add 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 mov $a2, $t2 adc 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 adc 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov $a3, $t3 adc 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 adc \$0, $t4 xor $a_ptr, $a_ptr # borrow $a_ptr test \$1, $t0 cmovz $t0, $a0 cmovz $t1, $a1 cmovz $t2, $a2 cmovz $t3, $a3 cmovz $a_ptr, $t4 mov $a1, $t0 # a0:a3>>1 shr \$1, $a0 shl \$63, $t0 mov $a2, $t1 shr \$1, $a1 or $t0, $a0 shl \$63, $t1 mov $a3, $t2 shr \$1, $a2 or $t1, $a1 shl \$63, $t2 shr \$1, $a3 shl \$63, $t4 or $t2, $a2 or $t4, $a3 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) pop %r13 pop %r12 ret .size ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3: push %r12 push %r13 mov 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 xor $t4, $t4 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 add $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 adc $a1, $a1 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 mov $a0, $t0 adc $a2, $a2 adc $a3, $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a1 sbb \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 cmovc $t2, $a2 cmovc $t3, $a3 xor $t4, $t4 add 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 # a0:a3+=a_ptr[0:3] adc 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 mov $a0, $t0 adc 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 adc 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a1 sbb \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) pop %r13 pop %r12 ret .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_add(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4], uint64_t b[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_add .type ecp_nistz256_add,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_add: push %r12 push %r13 mov 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 xor $t4, $t4 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 lea .Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr add 8*0($b_ptr), $a0 adc 8*1($b_ptr), $a1 mov $a0, $t0 adc 8*2($b_ptr), $a2 adc 8*3($b_ptr), $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 sbb 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) pop %r13 pop %r12 ret .size ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_sub(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4], uint64_t b[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_sub .type ecp_nistz256_sub,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_sub: push %r12 push %r13 mov 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 xor $t4, $t4 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 lea .Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr sub 8*0($b_ptr), $a0 sbb 8*1($b_ptr), $a1 mov $a0, $t0 sbb 8*2($b_ptr), $a2 sbb 8*3($b_ptr), $a3 mov $a1, $t1 sbb \$0, $t4 add 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 mov $a2, $t2 adc 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 adc 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov $a3, $t3 adc 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 test $t4, $t4 cmovz $t0, $a0 cmovz $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovz $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovz $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) pop %r13 pop %r12 ret .size ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_neg(uint64_t res[4], uint64_t a[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_neg .type ecp_nistz256_neg,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_neg: push %r12 push %r13 xor $a0, $a0 xor $a1, $a1 xor $a2, $a2 xor $a3, $a3 xor $t4, $t4 sub 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 sbb 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 sbb 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov $a0, $t0 sbb 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 lea .Lpoly(%rip), $a_ptr mov $a1, $t1 sbb \$0, $t4 add 8*0($a_ptr), $a0 mov $a2, $t2 adc 8*1($a_ptr), $a1 adc 8*2($a_ptr), $a2 mov $a3, $t3 adc 8*3($a_ptr), $a3 test $t4, $t4 cmovz $t0, $a0 cmovz $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovz $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovz $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) pop %r13 pop %r12 ret .size ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg ___ } { my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_org,$b_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rbx"); my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7)=map("%r$_",(8..15)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4)=("%rcx","%rbp","%rbx","%rdx","%rax"); my ($poly1,$poly3)=($acc6,$acc7); $code.=<<___; ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_to_mont( # uint64_t res[4], # uint64_t in[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_to_mont .type ecp_nistz256_to_mont,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_to_mont: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$0x80100, %ecx and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx ___ $code.=<<___; lea .LRR(%rip), $b_org jmp .Lmul_mont .size ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont( # uint64_t res[4], # uint64_t a[4], # uint64_t b[4]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_mont .type ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_mul_mont: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$0x80100, %ecx and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx ___ $code.=<<___; .Lmul_mont: push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); cmp \$0x80100, %ecx je .Lmul_montx ___ $code.=<<___; mov $b_org, $b_ptr mov 8*0($b_org), %rax mov 8*0($a_ptr), $acc1 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $acc2 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $acc3 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $acc4 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_montq ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); jmp .Lmul_mont_done .align 32 .Lmul_montx: mov $b_org, $b_ptr mov 8*0($b_org), %rdx mov 8*0($a_ptr), $acc1 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $acc2 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $acc3 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $acc4 lea -128($a_ptr), $a_ptr # control u-op density call __ecp_nistz256_mul_montx ___ $code.=<<___; .Lmul_mont_done: pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbx pop %rbp ret .size ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_montq,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_montq: ######################################################################## # Multiply a by b[0] mov %rax, $t1 mulq $acc1 mov .Lpoly+8*1(%rip),$poly1 mov %rax, $acc0 mov $t1, %rax mov %rdx, $acc1 mulq $acc2 mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip),$poly3 add %rax, $acc1 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $acc2 mulq $acc3 add %rax, $acc2 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $acc3 mulq $acc4 add %rax, $acc3 mov $acc0, %rax adc \$0, %rdx xor $acc5, $acc5 mov %rdx, $acc4 ######################################################################## # First reduction step # Basically now we want to multiply acc[0] by p256, # and add the result to the acc. # Due to the special form of p256 we do some optimizations # # acc[0] x p256[0..1] = acc[0] x 2^96 - acc[0] # then we add acc[0] and get acc[0] x 2^96 mov $acc0, $t1 shl \$32, $acc0 mulq $poly3 shr \$32, $t1 add $acc0, $acc1 # +=acc[0]<<96 adc $t1, $acc2 adc %rax, $acc3 mov 8*1($b_ptr), %rax adc %rdx, $acc4 adc \$0, $acc5 xor $acc0, $acc0 ######################################################################## # Multiply by b[1] mov %rax, $t1 mulq 8*0($a_ptr) add %rax, $acc1 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*1($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc2 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc2 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*2($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc3 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc3 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*3($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc4 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc4 mov $acc1, %rax adc %rdx, $acc5 adc \$0, $acc0 ######################################################################## # Second reduction step mov $acc1, $t1 shl \$32, $acc1 mulq $poly3 shr \$32, $t1 add $acc1, $acc2 adc $t1, $acc3 adc %rax, $acc4 mov 8*2($b_ptr), %rax adc %rdx, $acc5 adc \$0, $acc0 xor $acc1, $acc1 ######################################################################## # Multiply by b[2] mov %rax, $t1 mulq 8*0($a_ptr) add %rax, $acc2 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*1($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc3 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc3 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*2($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc4 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc4 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*3($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc5 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc5 mov $acc2, %rax adc %rdx, $acc0 adc \$0, $acc1 ######################################################################## # Third reduction step mov $acc2, $t1 shl \$32, $acc2 mulq $poly3 shr \$32, $t1 add $acc2, $acc3 adc $t1, $acc4 adc %rax, $acc5 mov 8*3($b_ptr), %rax adc %rdx, $acc0 adc \$0, $acc1 xor $acc2, $acc2 ######################################################################## # Multiply by b[3] mov %rax, $t1 mulq 8*0($a_ptr) add %rax, $acc3 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*1($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc4 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc4 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*2($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc5 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc5 mov $t1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq 8*3($a_ptr) add $t0, $acc0 adc \$0, %rdx add %rax, $acc0 mov $acc3, %rax adc %rdx, $acc1 adc \$0, $acc2 ######################################################################## # Final reduction step mov $acc3, $t1 shl \$32, $acc3 mulq $poly3 shr \$32, $t1 add $acc3, $acc4 adc $t1, $acc5 mov $acc4, $t0 adc %rax, $acc0 adc %rdx, $acc1 mov $acc5, $t1 adc \$0, $acc2 ######################################################################## # Branch-less conditional subtraction of P sub \$-1, $acc4 # .Lpoly[0] mov $acc0, $t2 sbb $poly1, $acc5 # .Lpoly[1] sbb \$0, $acc0 # .Lpoly[2] mov $acc1, $t3 sbb $poly3, $acc1 # .Lpoly[3] sbb \$0, $acc2 cmovc $t0, $acc4 cmovc $t1, $acc5 mov $acc4, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $acc0 mov $acc5, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $acc1 mov $acc0, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $acc1, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_montq,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_montq ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont( # uint64_t res[4], # uint64_t a[4]); # we optimize the square according to S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, # "Speeding up Big-Number Squaring" .globl ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont .type ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$0x80100, %ecx and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx ___ $code.=<<___; push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); cmp \$0x80100, %ecx je .Lsqr_montx ___ $code.=<<___; mov 8*0($a_ptr), %rax mov 8*1($a_ptr), $acc6 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $acc7 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $acc0 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); jmp .Lsqr_mont_done .align 32 .Lsqr_montx: mov 8*0($a_ptr), %rdx mov 8*1($a_ptr), $acc6 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $acc7 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $acc0 lea -128($a_ptr), $a_ptr # control u-op density call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx ___ $code.=<<___; .Lsqr_mont_done: pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbx pop %rbp ret .size ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont .type __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq: mov %rax, $acc5 mulq $acc6 # a[1]*a[0] mov %rax, $acc1 mov $acc7, %rax mov %rdx, $acc2 mulq $acc5 # a[0]*a[2] add %rax, $acc2 mov $acc0, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $acc3 mulq $acc5 # a[0]*a[3] add %rax, $acc3 mov $acc7, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $acc4 ################################# mulq $acc6 # a[1]*a[2] add %rax, $acc3 mov $acc0, %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t1 mulq $acc6 # a[1]*a[3] add %rax, $acc4 mov $acc0, %rax adc \$0, %rdx add $t1, $acc4 mov %rdx, $acc5 adc \$0, $acc5 ################################# mulq $acc7 # a[2]*a[3] xor $acc7, $acc7 add %rax, $acc5 mov 8*0($a_ptr), %rax mov %rdx, $acc6 adc \$0, $acc6 add $acc1, $acc1 # acc1:6<<1 adc $acc2, $acc2 adc $acc3, $acc3 adc $acc4, $acc4 adc $acc5, $acc5 adc $acc6, $acc6 adc \$0, $acc7 mulq %rax mov %rax, $acc0 mov 8*1($a_ptr), %rax mov %rdx, $t0 mulq %rax add $t0, $acc1 adc %rax, $acc2 mov 8*2($a_ptr), %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq %rax add $t0, $acc3 adc %rax, $acc4 mov 8*3($a_ptr), %rax adc \$0, %rdx mov %rdx, $t0 mulq %rax add $t0, $acc5 adc %rax, $acc6 mov $acc0, %rax adc %rdx, $acc7 mov .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a_ptr mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $t1 ########################################## # Now the reduction # First iteration mov $acc0, $t0 shl \$32, $acc0 mulq $t1 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc0, $acc1 # +=acc[0]<<96 adc $t0, $acc2 adc %rax, $acc3 mov $acc1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx ########################################## # Second iteration mov $acc1, $t0 shl \$32, $acc1 mov %rdx, $acc0 mulq $t1 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc1, $acc2 adc $t0, $acc3 adc %rax, $acc0 mov $acc2, %rax adc \$0, %rdx ########################################## # Third iteration mov $acc2, $t0 shl \$32, $acc2 mov %rdx, $acc1 mulq $t1 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc2, $acc3 adc $t0, $acc0 adc %rax, $acc1 mov $acc3, %rax adc \$0, %rdx ########################################### # Last iteration mov $acc3, $t0 shl \$32, $acc3 mov %rdx, $acc2 mulq $t1 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc3, $acc0 adc $t0, $acc1 adc %rax, $acc2 adc \$0, %rdx xor $acc3, $acc3 ############################################ # Add the rest of the acc add $acc0, $acc4 adc $acc1, $acc5 mov $acc4, $acc0 adc $acc2, $acc6 adc %rdx, $acc7 mov $acc5, $acc1 adc \$0, $acc3 sub \$-1, $acc4 # .Lpoly[0] mov $acc6, $acc2 sbb $a_ptr, $acc5 # .Lpoly[1] sbb \$0, $acc6 # .Lpoly[2] mov $acc7, $t0 sbb $t1, $acc7 # .Lpoly[3] sbb \$0, $acc3 cmovc $acc0, $acc4 cmovc $acc1, $acc5 mov $acc4, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $acc2, $acc6 mov $acc5, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t0, $acc7 mov $acc6, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $acc7, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montq ___ if ($addx) { $code.=<<___; .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_montx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_montx: ######################################################################## # Multiply by b[0] mulx $acc1, $acc0, $acc1 mulx $acc2, $t0, $acc2 mov \$32, $poly1 xor $acc5, $acc5 # cf=0 mulx $acc3, $t1, $acc3 mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $poly3 adc $t0, $acc1 mulx $acc4, $t0, $acc4 mov $acc0, %rdx adc $t1, $acc2 shlx $poly1,$acc0,$t1 adc $t0, $acc3 shrx $poly1,$acc0,$t0 adc \$0, $acc4 ######################################################################## # First reduction step add $t1, $acc1 adc $t0, $acc2 mulx $poly3, $t0, $t1 mov 8*1($b_ptr), %rdx adc $t0, $acc3 adc $t1, $acc4 adc \$0, $acc5 xor $acc0, $acc0 # $acc0=0,cf=0,of=0 ######################################################################## # Multiply by b[1] mulx 8*0+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc1 adox $t1, $acc2 mulx 8*1+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc2 adox $t1, $acc3 mulx 8*2+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc3 adox $t1, $acc4 mulx 8*3+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 mov $acc1, %rdx adcx $t0, $acc4 shlx $poly1, $acc1, $t0 adox $t1, $acc5 shrx $poly1, $acc1, $t1 adcx $acc0, $acc5 adox $acc0, $acc0 adc \$0, $acc0 ######################################################################## # Second reduction step add $t0, $acc2 adc $t1, $acc3 mulx $poly3, $t0, $t1 mov 8*2($b_ptr), %rdx adc $t0, $acc4 adc $t1, $acc5 adc \$0, $acc0 xor $acc1 ,$acc1 # $acc1=0,cf=0,of=0 ######################################################################## # Multiply by b[2] mulx 8*0+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc2 adox $t1, $acc3 mulx 8*1+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc3 adox $t1, $acc4 mulx 8*2+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc4 adox $t1, $acc5 mulx 8*3+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 mov $acc2, %rdx adcx $t0, $acc5 shlx $poly1, $acc2, $t0 adox $t1, $acc0 shrx $poly1, $acc2, $t1 adcx $acc1, $acc0 adox $acc1, $acc1 adc \$0, $acc1 ######################################################################## # Third reduction step add $t0, $acc3 adc $t1, $acc4 mulx $poly3, $t0, $t1 mov 8*3($b_ptr), %rdx adc $t0, $acc5 adc $t1, $acc0 adc \$0, $acc1 xor $acc2, $acc2 # $acc2=0,cf=0,of=0 ######################################################################## # Multiply by b[3] mulx 8*0+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc3 adox $t1, $acc4 mulx 8*1+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc4 adox $t1, $acc5 mulx 8*2+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 adcx $t0, $acc5 adox $t1, $acc0 mulx 8*3+128($a_ptr), $t0, $t1 mov $acc3, %rdx adcx $t0, $acc0 shlx $poly1, $acc3, $t0 adox $t1, $acc1 shrx $poly1, $acc3, $t1 adcx $acc2, $acc1 adox $acc2, $acc2 adc \$0, $acc2 ######################################################################## # Fourth reduction step add $t0, $acc4 adc $t1, $acc5 mulx $poly3, $t0, $t1 mov $acc4, $t2 mov .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $poly1 adc $t0, $acc0 mov $acc5, $t3 adc $t1, $acc1 adc \$0, $acc2 ######################################################################## # Branch-less conditional subtraction of P xor %eax, %eax mov $acc0, $t0 sbb \$-1, $acc4 # .Lpoly[0] sbb $poly1, $acc5 # .Lpoly[1] sbb \$0, $acc0 # .Lpoly[2] mov $acc1, $t1 sbb $poly3, $acc1 # .Lpoly[3] sbb \$0, $acc2 cmovc $t2, $acc4 cmovc $t3, $acc5 mov $acc4, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t0, $acc0 mov $acc5, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t1, $acc1 mov $acc0, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $acc1, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_montx,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_montx .type __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: mulx $acc6, $acc1, $acc2 # a[0]*a[1] mulx $acc7, $t0, $acc3 # a[0]*a[2] xor %eax, %eax adc $t0, $acc2 mulx $acc0, $t1, $acc4 # a[0]*a[3] mov $acc6, %rdx adc $t1, $acc3 adc \$0, $acc4 xor $acc5, $acc5 # $acc5=0,cf=0,of=0 ################################# mulx $acc7, $t0, $t1 # a[1]*a[2] adcx $t0, $acc3 adox $t1, $acc4 mulx $acc0, $t0, $t1 # a[1]*a[3] mov $acc7, %rdx adcx $t0, $acc4 adox $t1, $acc5 adc \$0, $acc5 ################################# mulx $acc0, $t0, $acc6 # a[2]*a[3] mov 8*0+128($a_ptr), %rdx xor $acc7, $acc7 # $acc7=0,cf=0,of=0 adcx $acc1, $acc1 # acc1:6<<1 adox $t0, $acc5 adcx $acc2, $acc2 adox $acc7, $acc6 # of=0 mulx %rdx, $acc0, $t1 mov 8*1+128($a_ptr), %rdx adcx $acc3, $acc3 adox $t1, $acc1 adcx $acc4, $acc4 mulx %rdx, $t0, $t4 mov 8*2+128($a_ptr), %rdx adcx $acc5, $acc5 adox $t0, $acc2 adcx $acc6, $acc6 .byte 0x67 mulx %rdx, $t0, $t1 mov 8*3+128($a_ptr), %rdx adox $t4, $acc3 adcx $acc7, $acc7 adox $t0, $acc4 mov \$32, $a_ptr adox $t1, $acc5 .byte 0x67,0x67 mulx %rdx, $t0, $t4 mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), %rdx adox $t0, $acc6 shlx $a_ptr, $acc0, $t0 adox $t4, $acc7 shrx $a_ptr, $acc0, $t4 mov %rdx,$t1 # reduction step 1 add $t0, $acc1 adc $t4, $acc2 mulx $acc0, $t0, $acc0 adc $t0, $acc3 shlx $a_ptr, $acc1, $t0 adc \$0, $acc0 shrx $a_ptr, $acc1, $t4 # reduction step 2 add $t0, $acc2 adc $t4, $acc3 mulx $acc1, $t0, $acc1 adc $t0, $acc0 shlx $a_ptr, $acc2, $t0 adc \$0, $acc1 shrx $a_ptr, $acc2, $t4 # reduction step 3 add $t0, $acc3 adc $t4, $acc0 mulx $acc2, $t0, $acc2 adc $t0, $acc1 shlx $a_ptr, $acc3, $t0 adc \$0, $acc2 shrx $a_ptr, $acc3, $t4 # reduction step 4 add $t0, $acc0 adc $t4, $acc1 mulx $acc3, $t0, $acc3 adc $t0, $acc2 adc \$0, $acc3 xor $t3, $t3 add $acc0, $acc4 # accumulate upper half mov .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a_ptr adc $acc1, $acc5 mov $acc4, $acc0 adc $acc2, $acc6 adc $acc3, $acc7 mov $acc5, $acc1 adc \$0, $t3 sub \$-1, $acc4 # .Lpoly[0] mov $acc6, $acc2 sbb $a_ptr, $acc5 # .Lpoly[1] sbb \$0, $acc6 # .Lpoly[2] mov $acc7, $acc3 sbb $t1, $acc7 # .Lpoly[3] sbb \$0, $t3 cmovc $acc0, $acc4 cmovc $acc1, $acc5 mov $acc4, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $acc2, $acc6 mov $acc5, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $acc3, $acc7 mov $acc6, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $acc7, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx ___ } } { my ($r_ptr,$in_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi"); my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3)=map("%r$_",(8..11)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2)=("%rcx","%r12","%r13"); $code.=<<___; ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_from_mont( # uint64_t res[4], # uint64_t in[4]); # This one performs Montgomery multiplication by 1, so we only need the reduction .globl ecp_nistz256_from_mont .type ecp_nistz256_from_mont,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_from_mont: push %r12 push %r13 mov 8*0($in_ptr), %rax mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $t2 mov 8*1($in_ptr), $acc1 mov 8*2($in_ptr), $acc2 mov 8*3($in_ptr), $acc3 mov %rax, $acc0 mov .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $t1 ######################################### # First iteration mov %rax, $t0 shl \$32, $acc0 mulq $t2 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc0, $acc1 adc $t0, $acc2 adc %rax, $acc3 mov $acc1, %rax adc \$0, %rdx ######################################### # Second iteration mov $acc1, $t0 shl \$32, $acc1 mov %rdx, $acc0 mulq $t2 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc1, $acc2 adc $t0, $acc3 adc %rax, $acc0 mov $acc2, %rax adc \$0, %rdx ########################################## # Third iteration mov $acc2, $t0 shl \$32, $acc2 mov %rdx, $acc1 mulq $t2 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc2, $acc3 adc $t0, $acc0 adc %rax, $acc1 mov $acc3, %rax adc \$0, %rdx ########################################### # Last iteration mov $acc3, $t0 shl \$32, $acc3 mov %rdx, $acc2 mulq $t2 shr \$32, $t0 add $acc3, $acc0 adc $t0, $acc1 mov $acc0, $t0 adc %rax, $acc2 mov $acc1, $in_ptr adc \$0, %rdx ########################################### # Branch-less conditional subtraction sub \$-1, $acc0 mov $acc2, %rax sbb $t1, $acc1 sbb \$0, $acc2 mov %rdx, $acc3 sbb $t2, %rdx sbb $t2, $t2 cmovnz $t0, $acc0 cmovnz $in_ptr, $acc1 mov $acc0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovnz %rax, $acc2 mov $acc1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovz %rdx, $acc3 mov $acc2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $acc3, 8*3($r_ptr) pop %r13 pop %r12 ret .size ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont ___ } { my ($val,$in_t,$index)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d"):("%rdi","%rsi","%edx"); my ($ONE,$INDEX,$Ra,$Rb,$Rc,$Rd,$Re,$Rf)=map("%xmm$_",(0..7)); my ($M0,$T0a,$T0b,$T0c,$T0d,$T0e,$T0f,$TMP0)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15)); my ($M1,$T2a,$T2b,$TMP2,$M2,$T2a,$T2b,$TMP2)=map("%xmm$_",(8..15)); $code.=<<___; ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5: lea -3($index,$index,2), $index movdqa 0x00($in_t), %xmm0 shl \$5, $index movdqa 0x10($in_t), %xmm1 movdqa 0x20($in_t), %xmm2 movdqa 0x30($in_t), %xmm3 movdqa 0x40($in_t), %xmm4 movdqa 0x50($in_t), %xmm5 movdqa %xmm0, 0x00($val,$index) movdqa %xmm1, 0x10($val,$index) movdqa %xmm2, 0x20($val,$index) movdqa %xmm3, 0x30($val,$index) movdqa %xmm4, 0x40($val,$index) movdqa %xmm5, 0x50($val,$index) ret .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 ecp_nistz256_gather_w5: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %eax test \$`1<<5`, %eax jnz .Lavx2_gather_w5 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp), %rax .LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_gather_w5: .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax), %rsp .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #movaps %xmm6, -0x20(%rax) .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #movaps %xmm7, -0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00 #movaps %xmm8, 0(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10 #movaps %xmm9, 0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20 #movaps %xmm10, 0x20(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30 #movaps %xmm11, 0x30(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40 #movaps %xmm12, 0x40(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50 #movaps %xmm13, 0x50(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60 #movaps %xmm14, 0x60(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70 #movaps %xmm15, 0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa .LOne(%rip), $ONE movd $index, $INDEX pxor $Ra, $Ra pxor $Rb, $Rb pxor $Rc, $Rc pxor $Rd, $Rd pxor $Re, $Re pxor $Rf, $Rf movdqa $ONE, $M0 pshufd \$0, $INDEX, $INDEX mov \$16, %rax .Lselect_loop_sse_w5: movdqa $M0, $TMP0 paddd $ONE, $M0 pcmpeqd $INDEX, $TMP0 movdqa 16*0($in_t), $T0a movdqa 16*1($in_t), $T0b movdqa 16*2($in_t), $T0c movdqa 16*3($in_t), $T0d movdqa 16*4($in_t), $T0e movdqa 16*5($in_t), $T0f lea 16*6($in_t), $in_t pand $TMP0, $T0a pand $TMP0, $T0b por $T0a, $Ra pand $TMP0, $T0c por $T0b, $Rb pand $TMP0, $T0d por $T0c, $Rc pand $TMP0, $T0e por $T0d, $Rd pand $TMP0, $T0f por $T0e, $Re por $T0f, $Rf dec %rax jnz .Lselect_loop_sse_w5 movdqu $Ra, 16*0($val) movdqu $Rb, 16*1($val) movdqu $Rc, 16*2($val) movdqu $Rd, 16*3($val) movdqu $Re, 16*4($val) movdqu $Rf, 16*5($val) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 0x10(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 0x20(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 0x30(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 0x40(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 0x50(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 0x60(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 0x70(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 0x80(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 0x90(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 0xa8(%rsp), %rsp .LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_gather_w5: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7: movdqu 0x00($in_t), %xmm0 shl \$6, $index movdqu 0x10($in_t), %xmm1 movdqu 0x20($in_t), %xmm2 movdqu 0x30($in_t), %xmm3 movdqa %xmm0, 0x00($val,$index) movdqa %xmm1, 0x10($val,$index) movdqa %xmm2, 0x20($val,$index) movdqa %xmm3, 0x30($val,$index) ret .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 ecp_nistz256_gather_w7: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1); mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %eax test \$`1<<5`, %eax jnz .Lavx2_gather_w7 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp), %rax .LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_gather_w7: .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax), %rsp .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #movaps %xmm6, -0x20(%rax) .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #movaps %xmm7, -0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x00 #movaps %xmm8, 0(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x48,0x10 #movaps %xmm9, 0x10(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x50,0x20 #movaps %xmm10, 0x20(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x58,0x30 #movaps %xmm11, 0x30(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x60,0x40 #movaps %xmm12, 0x40(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x68,0x50 #movaps %xmm13, 0x50(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x70,0x60 #movaps %xmm14, 0x60(%rax) .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x78,0x70 #movaps %xmm15, 0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; movdqa .LOne(%rip), $M0 movd $index, $INDEX pxor $Ra, $Ra pxor $Rb, $Rb pxor $Rc, $Rc pxor $Rd, $Rd movdqa $M0, $ONE pshufd \$0, $INDEX, $INDEX mov \$64, %rax .Lselect_loop_sse_w7: movdqa $M0, $TMP0 paddd $ONE, $M0 movdqa 16*0($in_t), $T0a movdqa 16*1($in_t), $T0b pcmpeqd $INDEX, $TMP0 movdqa 16*2($in_t), $T0c movdqa 16*3($in_t), $T0d lea 16*4($in_t), $in_t pand $TMP0, $T0a pand $TMP0, $T0b por $T0a, $Ra pand $TMP0, $T0c por $T0b, $Rb pand $TMP0, $T0d por $T0c, $Rc prefetcht0 255($in_t) por $T0d, $Rd dec %rax jnz .Lselect_loop_sse_w7 movdqu $Ra, 16*0($val) movdqu $Rb, 16*1($val) movdqu $Rc, 16*2($val) movdqu $Rd, 16*3($val) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 0x10(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 0x20(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 0x30(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 0x40(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 0x50(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 0x60(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 0x70(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 0x80(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 0x90(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 0xa8(%rsp), %rsp .LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_gather_w7: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 ___ } if ($avx>1) { my ($val,$in_t,$index)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d"):("%rdi","%rsi","%edx"); my ($TWO,$INDEX,$Ra,$Rb,$Rc)=map("%ymm$_",(0..4)); my ($M0,$T0a,$T0b,$T0c,$TMP0)=map("%ymm$_",(5..9)); my ($M1,$T1a,$T1b,$T1c,$TMP1)=map("%ymm$_",(10..14)); $code.=<<___; ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index); .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5: .Lavx2_gather_w5: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp), %rax .LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5: .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax), %rsp .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #vmovaps %xmm6, -0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #vmovaps %xmm7, -0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 #vmovaps %xmm8, 8(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 #vmovaps %xmm9, 0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 #vmovaps %xmm10, 0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 #vmovaps %xmm11, 0x30(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 #vmovaps %xmm12, 0x40(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 #vmovaps %xmm13, 0x50(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 #vmovaps %xmm14, 0x60(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 #vmovaps %xmm15, 0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; vmovdqa .LTwo(%rip), $TWO vpxor $Ra, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $Rb, $Rb, $Rb vpxor $Rc, $Rc, $Rc vmovdqa .LOne(%rip), $M0 vmovdqa .LTwo(%rip), $M1 vmovd $index, %xmm1 vpermd $INDEX, $Ra, $INDEX mov \$8, %rax .Lselect_loop_avx2_w5: vmovdqa 32*0($in_t), $T0a vmovdqa 32*1($in_t), $T0b vmovdqa 32*2($in_t), $T0c vmovdqa 32*3($in_t), $T1a vmovdqa 32*4($in_t), $T1b vmovdqa 32*5($in_t), $T1c vpcmpeqd $INDEX, $M0, $TMP0 vpcmpeqd $INDEX, $M1, $TMP1 vpaddd $TWO, $M0, $M0 vpaddd $TWO, $M1, $M1 lea 32*6($in_t), $in_t vpand $TMP0, $T0a, $T0a vpand $TMP0, $T0b, $T0b vpand $TMP0, $T0c, $T0c vpand $TMP1, $T1a, $T1a vpand $TMP1, $T1b, $T1b vpand $TMP1, $T1c, $T1c vpxor $T0a, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $T0b, $Rb, $Rb vpxor $T0c, $Rc, $Rc vpxor $T1a, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $T1b, $Rb, $Rb vpxor $T1c, $Rc, $Rc dec %rax jnz .Lselect_loop_avx2_w5 vmovdqu $Ra, 32*0($val) vmovdqu $Rb, 32*1($val) vmovdqu $Rc, 32*2($val) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 0x10(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 0x20(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 0x30(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 0x40(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 0x50(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 0x60(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 0x70(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 0x80(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 0x90(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 0xa8(%rsp), %rsp .LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w5 ___ } if ($avx>1) { my ($val,$in_t,$index)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8d"):("%rdi","%rsi","%edx"); my ($THREE,$INDEX,$Ra,$Rb)=map("%ymm$_",(0..3)); my ($M0,$T0a,$T0b,$TMP0)=map("%ymm$_",(4..7)); my ($M1,$T1a,$T1b,$TMP1)=map("%ymm$_",(8..11)); my ($M2,$T2a,$T2b,$TMP2)=map("%ymm$_",(12..15)); $code.=<<___; ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7(uint64_t *val, uint64_t *in_t, int index); .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7: .Lavx2_gather_w7: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -0x88(%rsp), %rax .LSEH_begin_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7: .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax), %rsp .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #vmovaps %xmm6, -0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #vmovaps %xmm7, -0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 #vmovaps %xmm8, 8(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 #vmovaps %xmm9, 0x10(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 #vmovaps %xmm10, 0x20(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 #vmovaps %xmm11, 0x30(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 #vmovaps %xmm12, 0x40(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 #vmovaps %xmm13, 0x50(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 #vmovaps %xmm14, 0x60(%rax) .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 #vmovaps %xmm15, 0x70(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; vmovdqa .LThree(%rip), $THREE vpxor $Ra, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $Rb, $Rb, $Rb vmovdqa .LOne(%rip), $M0 vmovdqa .LTwo(%rip), $M1 vmovdqa .LThree(%rip), $M2 vmovd $index, %xmm1 vpermd $INDEX, $Ra, $INDEX # Skip index = 0, because it is implicitly the point at infinity mov \$21, %rax .Lselect_loop_avx2_w7: vmovdqa 32*0($in_t), $T0a vmovdqa 32*1($in_t), $T0b vmovdqa 32*2($in_t), $T1a vmovdqa 32*3($in_t), $T1b vmovdqa 32*4($in_t), $T2a vmovdqa 32*5($in_t), $T2b vpcmpeqd $INDEX, $M0, $TMP0 vpcmpeqd $INDEX, $M1, $TMP1 vpcmpeqd $INDEX, $M2, $TMP2 vpaddd $THREE, $M0, $M0 vpaddd $THREE, $M1, $M1 vpaddd $THREE, $M2, $M2 lea 32*6($in_t), $in_t vpand $TMP0, $T0a, $T0a vpand $TMP0, $T0b, $T0b vpand $TMP1, $T1a, $T1a vpand $TMP1, $T1b, $T1b vpand $TMP2, $T2a, $T2a vpand $TMP2, $T2b, $T2b vpxor $T0a, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $T0b, $Rb, $Rb vpxor $T1a, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $T1b, $Rb, $Rb vpxor $T2a, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $T2b, $Rb, $Rb dec %rax jnz .Lselect_loop_avx2_w7 vmovdqa 32*0($in_t), $T0a vmovdqa 32*1($in_t), $T0b vpcmpeqd $INDEX, $M0, $TMP0 vpand $TMP0, $T0a, $T0a vpand $TMP0, $T0b, $T0b vpxor $T0a, $Ra, $Ra vpxor $T0b, $Rb, $Rb vmovdqu $Ra, 32*0($val) vmovdqu $Rb, 32*1($val) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps (%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 0x10(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 0x20(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 0x30(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 0x40(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 0x50(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 0x60(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 0x70(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 0x80(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 0x90(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 0xa8(%rsp), %rsp .LSEH_end_ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7: ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7 ___ } else { $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7: .byte 0x0f,0x0b # ud2 ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_gather_w7 ___ } {{{ ######################################################################## # This block implements higher level point_double, point_add and # point_add_affine. The key to performance in this case is to allow # out-of-order execution logic to overlap computations from next step # with tail processing from current step. By using tailored calling # sequence we minimize inter-step overhead to give processor better # shot at overlapping operations... # # You will notice that input data is copied to stack. Trouble is that # there are no registers to spare for holding original pointers and # reloading them, pointers, would create undesired dependencies on # effective addresses calculation paths. In other words it's too done # to favour out-of-order execution logic. # my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_org,$b_ptr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rbx"); my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7)=map("%r$_",(8..15)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4)=("%rax","%rbp","%rcx",$acc4,$acc4); my ($poly1,$poly3)=($acc6,$acc7); sub load_for_mul () { my ($a,$b,$src0) = @_; my $bias = $src0 eq "%rax" ? 0 : -128; " mov $b, $src0 lea $b, $b_ptr mov 8*0+$a, $acc1 mov 8*1+$a, $acc2 lea $bias+$a, $a_ptr mov 8*2+$a, $acc3 mov 8*3+$a, $acc4" } sub load_for_sqr () { my ($a,$src0) = @_; my $bias = $src0 eq "%rax" ? 0 : -128; " mov 8*0+$a, $src0 mov 8*1+$a, $acc6 lea $bias+$a, $a_ptr mov 8*2+$a, $acc7 mov 8*3+$a, $acc0" } { ######################################################################## # operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output # my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3); $code.=<<___; .type __ecp_nistz256_add_toq,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_add_toq: xor $t4,$t4 add 8*0($b_ptr), $a0 adc 8*1($b_ptr), $a1 mov $a0, $t0 adc 8*2($b_ptr), $a2 adc 8*3($b_ptr), $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb $poly1, $a1 sbb \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb $poly3, $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_add_toq,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_toq .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq: sub 8*0($b_ptr), $a0 sbb 8*1($b_ptr), $a1 mov $a0, $t0 sbb 8*2($b_ptr), $a2 sbb 8*3($b_ptr), $a3 mov $a1, $t1 sbb $t4, $t4 add \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 adc $poly1, $a1 adc \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 adc $poly3, $a3 test $t4, $t4 cmovz $t0, $a0 cmovz $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovz $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovz $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromq .type __ecp_nistz256_subq,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_subq: sub $a0, $t0 sbb $a1, $t1 mov $t0, $a0 sbb $a2, $t2 sbb $a3, $t3 mov $t1, $a1 sbb $t4, $t4 add \$-1, $t0 mov $t2, $a2 adc $poly1, $t1 adc \$0, $t2 mov $t3, $a3 adc $poly3, $t3 test $t4, $t4 cmovnz $t0, $a0 cmovnz $t1, $a1 cmovnz $t2, $a2 cmovnz $t3, $a3 ret .size __ecp_nistz256_subq,.-__ecp_nistz256_subq .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q: xor $t4, $t4 add $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3 adc $a1, $a1 mov $a0, $t0 adc $a2, $a2 adc $a3, $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb $poly1, $a1 sbb \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb $poly3, $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2q ___ } sub gen_double () { my $x = shift; my ($src0,$sfx,$bias); my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$in_x,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..4)); if ($x ne "x") { $src0 = "%rax"; $sfx = ""; $bias = 0; $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_double .type ecp_nistz256_point_double,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_double: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$0x80100, %ecx and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx cmp \$0x80100, %ecx je .Lpoint_doublex ___ } else { $src0 = "%rdx"; $sfx = "x"; $bias = 128; $code.=<<___; .type ecp_nistz256_point_doublex,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_doublex: .Lpoint_doublex: ___ } $code.=<<___; push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 sub \$32*5+8, %rsp .Lpoint_double_shortcut$x: movdqu 0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr.x mov $a_ptr, $b_ptr # backup copy movdqu 0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1 mov 0x20+8*0($a_ptr), $acc4 # load in_y in "5-4-0-1" order mov 0x20+8*1($a_ptr), $acc5 mov 0x20+8*2($a_ptr), $acc0 mov 0x20+8*3($a_ptr), $acc1 mov .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $poly1 mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $poly3 movdqa %xmm0, $in_x(%rsp) movdqa %xmm1, $in_x+0x10(%rsp) lea 0x20($r_ptr), $acc2 lea 0x40($r_ptr), $acc3 movq $r_ptr, %xmm0 movq $acc2, %xmm1 movq $acc3, %xmm2 lea $S(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x # p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); mov 0x40+8*0($a_ptr), $src0 mov 0x40+8*1($a_ptr), $acc6 mov 0x40+8*2($a_ptr), $acc7 mov 0x40+8*3($a_ptr), $acc0 lea 0x40-$bias($a_ptr), $a_ptr lea $Zsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); `&load_for_sqr("$S(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(S, S); mov 0x20($b_ptr), $src0 # $b_ptr is still valid mov 0x40+8*0($b_ptr), $acc1 mov 0x40+8*1($b_ptr), $acc2 mov 0x40+8*2($b_ptr), $acc3 mov 0x40+8*3($b_ptr), $acc4 lea 0x40-$bias($b_ptr), $a_ptr lea 0x20($b_ptr), $b_ptr movq %xmm2, $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(res_z, in_z, in_y); call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x # p256_mul_by_2(res_z, res_z); mov $in_x+8*0(%rsp), $acc4 # "5-4-0-1" order mov $in_x+8*1(%rsp), $acc5 lea $Zsqr(%rsp), $b_ptr mov $in_x+8*2(%rsp), $acc0 mov $in_x+8*3(%rsp), $acc1 lea $M(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_add_to$x # p256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr); mov $in_x+8*0(%rsp), $acc4 # "5-4-0-1" order mov $in_x+8*1(%rsp), $acc5 lea $Zsqr(%rsp), $b_ptr mov $in_x+8*2(%rsp), $acc0 mov $in_x+8*3(%rsp), $acc1 lea $Zsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); `&load_for_sqr("$S(%rsp)", "$src0")` movq %xmm1, $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(res_y, S); ___ { ######## ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(res_y, res_y); ########################## # operate in 4-5-6-7 "name space" that matches squaring output # my ($poly1,$poly3)=($a_ptr,$t1); my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t3,$t4,$t1)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc6,$acc7,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2); $code.=<<___; xor $t4, $t4 mov $a0, $t0 add \$-1, $a0 mov $a1, $t1 adc $poly1, $a1 mov $a2, $t2 adc \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 adc $poly3, $a3 adc \$0, $t4 xor $a_ptr, $a_ptr # borrow $a_ptr test \$1, $t0 cmovz $t0, $a0 cmovz $t1, $a1 cmovz $t2, $a2 cmovz $t3, $a3 cmovz $a_ptr, $t4 mov $a1, $t0 # a0:a3>>1 shr \$1, $a0 shl \$63, $t0 mov $a2, $t1 shr \$1, $a1 or $t0, $a0 shl \$63, $t1 mov $a3, $t2 shr \$1, $a2 or $t1, $a1 shl \$63, $t2 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) shr \$1, $a3 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) shl \$63, $t4 or $t2, $a2 or $t4, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) ___ } $code.=<<___; `&load_for_mul("$M(%rsp)", "$Zsqr(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $M(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); lea $tmp0(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x lea $M(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $M(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_add_to$x # p256_mul_by_3(M, M); `&load_for_mul("$S(%rsp)", "$in_x(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); lea $tmp0(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2$x # p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); `&load_for_sqr("$M(%rsp)", "$src0")` movq %xmm0, $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); lea $tmp0(%rsp), $b_ptr mov $acc6, $acc0 # harmonize sqr output and sub input mov $acc7, $acc1 mov $a_ptr, $poly1 mov $t1, $poly3 call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); mov $S+8*0(%rsp), $t0 mov $S+8*1(%rsp), $t1 mov $S+8*2(%rsp), $t2 mov $S+8*3(%rsp), $acc2 # "4-5-0-1" order lea $S(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub$x # p256_sub(S, S, res_x); mov $M(%rsp), $src0 lea $M(%rsp), $b_ptr mov $acc4, $acc6 # harmonize sub output and mul input xor %ecx, %ecx mov $acc4, $S+8*0(%rsp) # have to save:-( mov $acc5, $acc2 mov $acc5, $S+8*1(%rsp) cmovz $acc0, $acc3 mov $acc0, $S+8*2(%rsp) lea $S-$bias(%rsp), $a_ptr cmovz $acc1, $acc4 mov $acc1, $S+8*3(%rsp) mov $acc6, $acc1 lea $S(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S, S, M); movq %xmm1, $b_ptr movq %xmm1, $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); add \$32*5+8, %rsp pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbx pop %rbp ret .size ecp_nistz256_point_double$sfx,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double$sfx ___ } &gen_double("q"); sub gen_add () { my $x = shift; my ($src0,$sfx,$bias); my ($H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub, $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2, $res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z)=map(32*$_,(0..17)); my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr); if ($x ne "x") { $src0 = "%rax"; $sfx = ""; $bias = 0; $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add .type ecp_nistz256_point_add,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_add: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$0x80100, %ecx and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx cmp \$0x80100, %ecx je .Lpoint_addx ___ } else { $src0 = "%rdx"; $sfx = "x"; $bias = 128; $code.=<<___; .type ecp_nistz256_point_addx,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_addx: .Lpoint_addx: ___ } $code.=<<___; push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 sub \$32*18+8, %rsp movdqu 0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr movdqu 0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1 movdqu 0x20($a_ptr), %xmm2 movdqu 0x30($a_ptr), %xmm3 movdqu 0x40($a_ptr), %xmm4 movdqu 0x50($a_ptr), %xmm5 mov $a_ptr, $b_ptr # reassign mov $b_org, $a_ptr # reassign movdqa %xmm0, $in1_x(%rsp) movdqa %xmm1, $in1_x+0x10(%rsp) movdqa %xmm2, $in1_y(%rsp) movdqa %xmm3, $in1_y+0x10(%rsp) movdqa %xmm4, $in1_z(%rsp) movdqa %xmm5, $in1_z+0x10(%rsp) por %xmm4, %xmm5 movdqu 0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT *)$b_ptr pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm5, %xmm3 movdqu 0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1 movdqu 0x20($a_ptr), %xmm2 por %xmm3, %xmm5 movdqu 0x30($a_ptr), %xmm3 mov 0x40+8*0($a_ptr), $src0 # load original in2_z mov 0x40+8*1($a_ptr), $acc6 mov 0x40+8*2($a_ptr), $acc7 mov 0x40+8*3($a_ptr), $acc0 movdqa %xmm0, $in2_x(%rsp) pshufd \$0x1e, %xmm5, %xmm4 movdqa %xmm1, $in2_x+0x10(%rsp) movdqu 0x40($a_ptr),%xmm0 # in2_z again movdqu 0x50($a_ptr),%xmm1 movdqa %xmm2, $in2_y(%rsp) movdqa %xmm3, $in2_y+0x10(%rsp) por %xmm4, %xmm5 pxor %xmm4, %xmm4 por %xmm0, %xmm1 movq $r_ptr, %xmm0 # save $r_ptr lea 0x40-$bias($a_ptr), $a_ptr # $a_ptr is still valid mov $src0, $in2_z+8*0(%rsp) # make in2_z copy mov $acc6, $in2_z+8*1(%rsp) mov $acc7, $in2_z+8*2(%rsp) mov $acc0, $in2_z+8*3(%rsp) lea $Z2sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z2^2 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); pcmpeqd %xmm4, %xmm5 pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm1, %xmm4 por %xmm1, %xmm4 pshufd \$0, %xmm5, %xmm5 # in1infty pshufd \$0x1e, %xmm4, %xmm3 por %xmm3, %xmm4 pxor %xmm3, %xmm3 pcmpeqd %xmm3, %xmm4 pshufd \$0, %xmm4, %xmm4 # in2infty mov 0x40+8*0($b_ptr), $src0 # load original in1_z mov 0x40+8*1($b_ptr), $acc6 mov 0x40+8*2($b_ptr), $acc7 mov 0x40+8*3($b_ptr), $acc0 movq $b_ptr, %xmm1 lea 0x40-$bias($b_ptr), $a_ptr lea $Z1sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z1^2 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); `&load_for_mul("$Z2sqr(%rsp)", "$in2_z(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S1(%rsp), $r_ptr # S1 = Z2^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); `&load_for_mul("$Z1sqr(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S2(%rsp), $r_ptr # S2 = Z1^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); `&load_for_mul("$S1(%rsp)", "$in1_y(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S1(%rsp), $r_ptr # S1 = Y1*Z2^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); `&load_for_mul("$S2(%rsp)", "$in2_y(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S2(%rsp), $r_ptr # S2 = Y2*Z1^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); lea $S1(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $R(%rsp), $r_ptr # R = S2 - S1 call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(R, S2, S1); or $acc5, $acc4 # see if result is zero movdqa %xmm4, %xmm2 or $acc0, $acc4 or $acc1, $acc4 por %xmm5, %xmm2 # in1infty || in2infty movq $acc4, %xmm3 `&load_for_mul("$Z2sqr(%rsp)", "$in1_x(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $U1(%rsp), $r_ptr # U1 = X1*Z2^2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); `&load_for_mul("$Z1sqr(%rsp)", "$in2_x(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $U2(%rsp), $r_ptr # U2 = X2*Z1^2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); lea $U1(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $H(%rsp), $r_ptr # H = U2 - U1 call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(H, U2, U1); or $acc5, $acc4 # see if result is zero or $acc0, $acc4 or $acc1, $acc4 .byte 0x3e # predict taken jnz .Ladd_proceed$x # is_equal(U1,U2)? movq %xmm2, $acc0 movq %xmm3, $acc1 test $acc0, $acc0 jnz .Ladd_proceed$x # (in1infty || in2infty)? test $acc1, $acc1 jz .Ladd_double$x # is_equal(S1,S2)? movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 movdqu %xmm0, 0x00($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm0, 0x10($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm0, 0x20($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm0, 0x30($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm0, 0x40($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm0, 0x50($r_ptr) jmp .Ladd_done$x .align 32 .Ladd_double$x: movq %xmm1, $a_ptr # restore $a_ptr movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr add \$`32*(18-5)`, %rsp # difference in frame sizes jmp .Lpoint_double_shortcut$x .align 32 .Ladd_proceed$x: `&load_for_sqr("$R(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $Rsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # R^2 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); `&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $res_z(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); `&load_for_sqr("$H(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # H^2 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); `&load_for_mul("$res_z(%rsp)", "$in2_z(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $res_z(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); `&load_for_mul("$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$H(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $Hcub(%rsp), $r_ptr # H^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); `&load_for_mul("$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$U1(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $U2(%rsp), $r_ptr # U1*H^2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); ___ { ####################################################################### # operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output # my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3); my ($poly1, $poly3)=($acc6,$acc7); $code.=<<___; #lea $U2(%rsp), $a_ptr #lea $Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # 2*U1*H^2 #call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 # ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); xor $t4, $t4 add $acc0, $acc0 # a0:a3+a0:a3 lea $Rsqr(%rsp), $a_ptr adc $acc1, $acc1 mov $acc0, $t0 adc $acc2, $acc2 adc $acc3, $acc3 mov $acc1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub \$-1, $acc0 mov $acc2, $t2 sbb $poly1, $acc1 sbb \$0, $acc2 mov $acc3, $t3 sbb $poly3, $acc3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $acc0 mov 8*0($a_ptr), $t0 cmovc $t1, $acc1 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $t1 cmovc $t2, $acc2 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $t2 cmovc $t3, $acc3 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $t3 call __ecp_nistz256_sub$x # p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); lea $Hcub(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $res_x(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); mov $U2+8*0(%rsp), $t0 mov $U2+8*1(%rsp), $t1 mov $U2+8*2(%rsp), $t2 mov $U2+8*3(%rsp), $t3 lea $res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub$x # p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); mov $acc0, 8*0($r_ptr) # save the result, as mov $acc1, 8*1($r_ptr) # __ecp_nistz256_sub doesn't mov $acc2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $acc3, 8*3($r_ptr) ___ } $code.=<<___; `&load_for_mul("$S1(%rsp)", "$Hcub(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S2(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); `&load_for_mul("$R(%rsp)", "$res_y(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(res_y, R, res_y); lea $S2(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr movdqa %xmm5, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_z, in2_z, in1infty); movdqa %xmm5, %xmm1 pandn $res_z(%rsp), %xmm0 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm2 pandn $res_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm3 pand $in2_z(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in2_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty); movdqa %xmm4, %xmm1 pandn %xmm2, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm2 pandn %xmm3, %xmm1 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 pand $in1_z(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in1_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqu %xmm2, 0x40($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm3, 0x50($r_ptr) movdqa %xmm5, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty); movdqa %xmm5, %xmm1 pandn $res_x(%rsp), %xmm0 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm2 pandn $res_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm3 pand $in2_x(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in2_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty); movdqa %xmm4, %xmm1 pandn %xmm2, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm2 pandn %xmm3, %xmm1 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 pand $in1_x(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in1_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqu %xmm2, 0x00($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm3, 0x10($r_ptr) movdqa %xmm5, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty); movdqa %xmm5, %xmm1 pandn $res_y(%rsp), %xmm0 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm2 pandn $res_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm3 pand $in2_y(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in2_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty); movdqa %xmm4, %xmm1 pandn %xmm2, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm2 pandn %xmm3, %xmm1 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 pand $in1_y(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in1_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqu %xmm2, 0x20($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm3, 0x30($r_ptr) .Ladd_done$x: add \$32*18+8, %rsp pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbx pop %rbp ret .size ecp_nistz256_point_add$sfx,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add$sfx ___ } &gen_add("q"); sub gen_add_affine () { my $x = shift; my ($src0,$sfx,$bias); my ($U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr, $res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y)=map(32*$_,(0..14)); my $Z1sqr = $S2; if ($x ne "x") { $src0 = "%rax"; $sfx = ""; $bias = 0; $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine .type ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($addx); mov \$0x80100, %ecx and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip), %ecx cmp \$0x80100, %ecx je .Lpoint_add_affinex ___ } else { $src0 = "%rdx"; $sfx = "x"; $bias = 128; $code.=<<___; .type ecp_nistz256_point_add_affinex,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_add_affinex: .Lpoint_add_affinex: ___ } $code.=<<___; push %rbp push %rbx push %r12 push %r13 push %r14 push %r15 sub \$32*15+8, %rsp movdqu 0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr mov $b_org, $b_ptr # reassign movdqu 0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1 movdqu 0x20($a_ptr), %xmm2 movdqu 0x30($a_ptr), %xmm3 movdqu 0x40($a_ptr), %xmm4 movdqu 0x50($a_ptr), %xmm5 mov 0x40+8*0($a_ptr), $src0 # load original in1_z mov 0x40+8*1($a_ptr), $acc6 mov 0x40+8*2($a_ptr), $acc7 mov 0x40+8*3($a_ptr), $acc0 movdqa %xmm0, $in1_x(%rsp) movdqa %xmm1, $in1_x+0x10(%rsp) movdqa %xmm2, $in1_y(%rsp) movdqa %xmm3, $in1_y+0x10(%rsp) movdqa %xmm4, $in1_z(%rsp) movdqa %xmm5, $in1_z+0x10(%rsp) por %xmm4, %xmm5 movdqu 0x00($b_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT_AFFINE *)$b_ptr pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm5, %xmm3 movdqu 0x10($b_ptr), %xmm1 movdqu 0x20($b_ptr), %xmm2 por %xmm3, %xmm5 movdqu 0x30($b_ptr), %xmm3 movdqa %xmm0, $in2_x(%rsp) pshufd \$0x1e, %xmm5, %xmm4 movdqa %xmm1, $in2_x+0x10(%rsp) por %xmm0, %xmm1 movq $r_ptr, %xmm0 # save $r_ptr movdqa %xmm2, $in2_y(%rsp) movdqa %xmm3, $in2_y+0x10(%rsp) por %xmm2, %xmm3 por %xmm4, %xmm5 pxor %xmm4, %xmm4 por %xmm1, %xmm3 lea 0x40-$bias($a_ptr), $a_ptr # $a_ptr is still valid lea $Z1sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z1^2 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); pcmpeqd %xmm4, %xmm5 pshufd \$0xb1, %xmm3, %xmm4 mov 0x00($b_ptr), $src0 # $b_ptr is still valid #lea 0x00($b_ptr), $b_ptr mov $acc4, $acc1 # harmonize sqr output and mul input por %xmm3, %xmm4 pshufd \$0, %xmm5, %xmm5 # in1infty pshufd \$0x1e, %xmm4, %xmm3 mov $acc5, $acc2 por %xmm3, %xmm4 pxor %xmm3, %xmm3 mov $acc6, $acc3 pcmpeqd %xmm3, %xmm4 pshufd \$0, %xmm4, %xmm4 # in2infty lea $Z1sqr-$bias(%rsp), $a_ptr mov $acc7, $acc4 lea $U2(%rsp), $r_ptr # U2 = X2*Z1^2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x); lea $in1_x(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $H(%rsp), $r_ptr # H = U2 - U1 call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); `&load_for_mul("$Z1sqr(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S2(%rsp), $r_ptr # S2 = Z1^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); `&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$in1_z(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $res_z(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); `&load_for_mul("$S2(%rsp)", "$in2_y(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S2(%rsp), $r_ptr # S2 = Y2*Z1^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); lea $in1_y(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $R(%rsp), $r_ptr # R = S2 - S1 call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); `&load_for_sqr("$H(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # H^2 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); `&load_for_sqr("$R(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $Rsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # R^2 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont$x # p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); `&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $Hcub(%rsp), $r_ptr # H^3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); `&load_for_mul("$Hsqr(%rsp)", "$in1_x(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $U2(%rsp), $r_ptr # U1*H^2 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); ___ { ####################################################################### # operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output # my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3); my ($poly1, $poly3)=($acc6,$acc7); $code.=<<___; #lea $U2(%rsp), $a_ptr #lea $Hsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # 2*U1*H^2 #call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 # ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); xor $t4, $t4 add $acc0, $acc0 # a0:a3+a0:a3 lea $Rsqr(%rsp), $a_ptr adc $acc1, $acc1 mov $acc0, $t0 adc $acc2, $acc2 adc $acc3, $acc3 mov $acc1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 sub \$-1, $acc0 mov $acc2, $t2 sbb $poly1, $acc1 sbb \$0, $acc2 mov $acc3, $t3 sbb $poly3, $acc3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $acc0 mov 8*0($a_ptr), $t0 cmovc $t1, $acc1 mov 8*1($a_ptr), $t1 cmovc $t2, $acc2 mov 8*2($a_ptr), $t2 cmovc $t3, $acc3 mov 8*3($a_ptr), $t3 call __ecp_nistz256_sub$x # p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); lea $Hcub(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $res_x(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); mov $U2+8*0(%rsp), $t0 mov $U2+8*1(%rsp), $t1 mov $U2+8*2(%rsp), $t2 mov $U2+8*3(%rsp), $t3 lea $H(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub$x # p256_sub(H, U2, res_x); mov $acc0, 8*0($r_ptr) # save the result, as mov $acc1, 8*1($r_ptr) # __ecp_nistz256_sub doesn't mov $acc2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $acc3, 8*3($r_ptr) ___ } $code.=<<___; `&load_for_mul("$Hcub(%rsp)", "$in1_y(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $S2(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(S2, Hcub, in1_y); `&load_for_mul("$H(%rsp)", "$R(%rsp)", "$src0")` lea $H(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont$x # p256_mul_mont(H, H, R); lea $S2(%rsp), $b_ptr lea $res_y(%rsp), $r_ptr call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from$x # p256_sub(res_y, H, S2); movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr movdqa %xmm5, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_z, ONE, in1infty); movdqa %xmm5, %xmm1 pandn $res_z(%rsp), %xmm0 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm2 pandn $res_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm3 pand .LONE_mont(%rip), %xmm2 pand .LONE_mont+0x10(%rip), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_z, in1_z, in2infty); movdqa %xmm4, %xmm1 pandn %xmm2, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm2 pandn %xmm3, %xmm1 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 pand $in1_z(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in1_z+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqu %xmm2, 0x40($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm3, 0x50($r_ptr) movdqa %xmm5, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_x, in2_x, in1infty); movdqa %xmm5, %xmm1 pandn $res_x(%rsp), %xmm0 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm2 pandn $res_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm3 pand $in2_x(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in2_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_x, in1_x, in2infty); movdqa %xmm4, %xmm1 pandn %xmm2, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm2 pandn %xmm3, %xmm1 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 pand $in1_x(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in1_x+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqu %xmm2, 0x00($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm3, 0x10($r_ptr) movdqa %xmm5, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_y, in2_y, in1infty); movdqa %xmm5, %xmm1 pandn $res_y(%rsp), %xmm0 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm2 pandn $res_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm1 movdqa %xmm5, %xmm3 pand $in2_y(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in2_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm0 # copy_conditional(res_y, in1_y, in2infty); movdqa %xmm4, %xmm1 pandn %xmm2, %xmm0 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm2 pandn %xmm3, %xmm1 movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 pand $in1_y(%rsp), %xmm2 pand $in1_y+0x10(%rsp), %xmm3 por %xmm0, %xmm2 por %xmm1, %xmm3 movdqu %xmm2, 0x20($r_ptr) movdqu %xmm3, 0x30($r_ptr) add \$32*15+8, %rsp pop %r15 pop %r14 pop %r13 pop %r12 pop %rbx pop %rbp ret .size ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine$sfx,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine$sfx ___ } &gen_add_affine("q"); ######################################################################## # AD*X magic # if ($addx) { { ######################################################################## # operate in 4-5-0-1 "name space" that matches multiplication output # my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t3,$t4)=($acc4,$acc5,$acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3); $code.=<<___; .type __ecp_nistz256_add_tox,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_add_tox: xor $t4, $t4 adc 8*0($b_ptr), $a0 adc 8*1($b_ptr), $a1 mov $a0, $t0 adc 8*2($b_ptr), $a2 adc 8*3($b_ptr), $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 xor $t3, $t3 sbb \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb $poly1, $a1 sbb \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb $poly3, $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_add_tox,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_tox .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx: xor $t4, $t4 sbb 8*0($b_ptr), $a0 sbb 8*1($b_ptr), $a1 mov $a0, $t0 sbb 8*2($b_ptr), $a2 sbb 8*3($b_ptr), $a3 mov $a1, $t1 sbb \$0, $t4 xor $t3, $t3 adc \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 adc $poly1, $a1 adc \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 adc $poly3, $a3 bt \$0, $t4 cmovnc $t0, $a0 cmovnc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovnc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovnc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_fromx .type __ecp_nistz256_subx,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_subx: xor $t4, $t4 sbb $a0, $t0 sbb $a1, $t1 mov $t0, $a0 sbb $a2, $t2 sbb $a3, $t3 mov $t1, $a1 sbb \$0, $t4 xor $a3 ,$a3 adc \$-1, $t0 mov $t2, $a2 adc $poly1, $t1 adc \$0, $t2 mov $t3, $a3 adc $poly3, $t3 bt \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 cmovc $t2, $a2 cmovc $t3, $a3 ret .size __ecp_nistz256_subx,.-__ecp_nistz256_subx .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x: xor $t4, $t4 adc $a0, $a0 # a0:a3+a0:a3 adc $a1, $a1 mov $a0, $t0 adc $a2, $a2 adc $a3, $a3 mov $a1, $t1 adc \$0, $t4 xor $t3, $t3 sbb \$-1, $a0 mov $a2, $t2 sbb $poly1, $a1 sbb \$0, $a2 mov $a3, $t3 sbb $poly3, $a3 sbb \$0, $t4 cmovc $t0, $a0 cmovc $t1, $a1 mov $a0, 8*0($r_ptr) cmovc $t2, $a2 mov $a1, 8*1($r_ptr) cmovc $t3, $a3 mov $a2, 8*2($r_ptr) mov $a3, 8*3($r_ptr) ret .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2x ___ } &gen_double("x"); &gen_add("x"); &gen_add_affine("x"); } }}} ######################################################################## # Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7 # open TABLE,") { s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo; } close TABLE; die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1); print <<___; .text .globl ecp_nistz256_precomputed .type ecp_nistz256_precomputed,\@object .align 4096 ecp_nistz256_precomputed: ___ while (@line=splice(@arr,0,16)) { print ".long\t",join(',',map { sprintf "0x%08x",$_} @line),"\n"; } print <<___; .size ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed ___ $code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; print $code; close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl0000755000000000000000000013121013176625657020372 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # ECP_NISTZ256 module for ARMv4. # # October 2014. # # Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in # http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. In the process of adaptation # original .c module was made 32-bit savvy in order to make this # implementation possible. # # with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM # Cortex-A8 +53-170% # Cortex-A9 +76-205% # Cortex-A15 +100-316% # Snapdragon S4 +66-187% # # Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending # on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side # operation. Keep in mind that +200% means 3x improvement. $flavour = shift; if ($flavour=~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/) { $output=$flavour; undef $flavour; } else { while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} } if ($flavour && $flavour ne "void") { $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/arm-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate arm-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; } else { open STDOUT,">$output"; } $code.=<<___; #include "arm_arch.h" .text #if defined(__thumb2__) .syntax unified .thumb #else .code 32 #endif ___ ######################################################################## # Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7 # $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; open TABLE,") { s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo; } close TABLE; # See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37. # 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not # amount of elements. die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_precomputed .type ecp_nistz256_precomputed,%object .align 12 ecp_nistz256_precomputed: ___ ######################################################################## # this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with # 64 byte interval, similar to # 1111222233334444 # 1234123412341234 for(1..37) { @tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16); for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) { undef @line; for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) { push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff; } $code.=".byte\t"; $code.=join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line); $code.="\n"; } } $code.=<<___; .size ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed .align 5 .LRR: @ 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial .long 0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffb .long 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 0x00000004 .Lone: .long 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .asciz "ECP_NISTZ256 for ARMv4, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 6 ___ ######################################################################## # common register layout, note that $t2 is link register, so that if # internal subroutine uses $t2, then it has to offload lr... ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr,$ff,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$t1,$t2)= map("r$_",(0..12,14)); ($t0,$t3)=($ff,$a_ptr); $code.=<<___; @ void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_to_mont .type ecp_nistz256_to_mont,%function ecp_nistz256_to_mont: adr $b_ptr,.LRR b .Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont .size ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont @ void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_from_mont .type ecp_nistz256_from_mont,%function ecp_nistz256_from_mont: adr $b_ptr,.Lone b .Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont .size ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont @ void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2: ldr $a0,[$a_ptr,#0] ldr $a1,[$a_ptr,#4] ldr $a2,[$a_ptr,#8] adds $a0,$a0,$a0 @ a[0:7]+=a[0:7], i.e. add with itself ldr $a3,[$a_ptr,#12] adcs $a1,$a1,$a1 ldr $a4,[$a_ptr,#16] adcs $a2,$a2,$a2 ldr $a5,[$a_ptr,#20] adcs $a3,$a3,$a3 ldr $a6,[$a_ptr,#24] adcs $a4,$a4,$a4 ldr $a7,[$a_ptr,#28] adcs $a5,$a5,$a5 adcs $a6,$a6,$a6 mov $ff,#0 adcs $a7,$a7,$a7 adc $ff,$ff,#0 b .Lreduce_by_sub .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 @ void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8], @ const BN_ULONG r2[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_add .type ecp_nistz256_add,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_add: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bl __ecp_nistz256_add #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add .type __ecp_nistz256_add,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_add: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr ldr $a0,[$a_ptr,#0] ldr $a1,[$a_ptr,#4] ldr $a2,[$a_ptr,#8] ldr $a3,[$a_ptr,#12] ldr $a4,[$a_ptr,#16] ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#0] ldr $a5,[$a_ptr,#20] ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#4] ldr $a6,[$a_ptr,#24] ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#8] ldr $a7,[$a_ptr,#28] ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#12] adds $a0,$a0,$t0 ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#16] adcs $a1,$a1,$t1 ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#20] adcs $a2,$a2,$t2 ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#24] adcs $a3,$a3,$t3 ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#28] adcs $a4,$a4,$t0 adcs $a5,$a5,$t1 adcs $a6,$a6,$t2 mov $ff,#0 adcs $a7,$a7,$t3 adc $ff,$ff,#0 ldr lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr .Lreduce_by_sub: @ if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus. @ @ But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract @ modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed. subs $a0,$a0,#-1 sbcs $a1,$a1,#-1 sbcs $a2,$a2,#-1 sbcs $a3,$a3,#0 sbcs $a4,$a4,#0 sbcs $a5,$a5,#0 sbcs $a6,$a6,#1 sbcs $a7,$a7,#-1 sbc $ff,$ff,#0 @ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of @ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by @ using value of borrow as a whole or extracting single bit. @ Follow $ff register... adds $a0,$a0,$ff @ add synthesized modulus adcs $a1,$a1,$ff str $a0,[$r_ptr,#0] adcs $a2,$a2,$ff str $a1,[$r_ptr,#4] adcs $a3,$a3,#0 str $a2,[$r_ptr,#8] adcs $a4,$a4,#0 str $a3,[$r_ptr,#12] adcs $a5,$a5,#0 str $a4,[$r_ptr,#16] adcs $a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31 str $a5,[$r_ptr,#20] adcs $a7,$a7,$ff str $a6,[$r_ptr,#24] str $a7,[$r_ptr,#28] mov pc,lr .size __ecp_nistz256_add,.-__ecp_nistz256_add @ void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr @ As multiplication by 3 is performed as 2*n+n, below are inline @ copies of __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 and __ecp_nistz256_add, see @ corresponding subroutines for details. ldr $a0,[$a_ptr,#0] ldr $a1,[$a_ptr,#4] ldr $a2,[$a_ptr,#8] adds $a0,$a0,$a0 @ a[0:7]+=a[0:7] ldr $a3,[$a_ptr,#12] adcs $a1,$a1,$a1 ldr $a4,[$a_ptr,#16] adcs $a2,$a2,$a2 ldr $a5,[$a_ptr,#20] adcs $a3,$a3,$a3 ldr $a6,[$a_ptr,#24] adcs $a4,$a4,$a4 ldr $a7,[$a_ptr,#28] adcs $a5,$a5,$a5 adcs $a6,$a6,$a6 mov $ff,#0 adcs $a7,$a7,$a7 adc $ff,$ff,#0 subs $a0,$a0,#-1 @ .Lreduce_by_sub but without stores sbcs $a1,$a1,#-1 sbcs $a2,$a2,#-1 sbcs $a3,$a3,#0 sbcs $a4,$a4,#0 sbcs $a5,$a5,#0 sbcs $a6,$a6,#1 sbcs $a7,$a7,#-1 sbc $ff,$ff,#0 adds $a0,$a0,$ff @ add synthesized modulus adcs $a1,$a1,$ff adcs $a2,$a2,$ff adcs $a3,$a3,#0 adcs $a4,$a4,#0 ldr $b_ptr,[$a_ptr,#0] adcs $a5,$a5,#0 ldr $t1,[$a_ptr,#4] adcs $a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31 ldr $t2,[$a_ptr,#8] adc $a7,$a7,$ff ldr $t0,[$a_ptr,#12] adds $a0,$a0,$b_ptr @ 2*a[0:7]+=a[0:7] ldr $b_ptr,[$a_ptr,#16] adcs $a1,$a1,$t1 ldr $t1,[$a_ptr,#20] adcs $a2,$a2,$t2 ldr $t2,[$a_ptr,#24] adcs $a3,$a3,$t0 ldr $t3,[$a_ptr,#28] adcs $a4,$a4,$b_ptr adcs $a5,$a5,$t1 adcs $a6,$a6,$t2 mov $ff,#0 adcs $a7,$a7,$t3 adc $ff,$ff,#0 ldr lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr b .Lreduce_by_sub .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 @ void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 .type ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_div_by_2: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bl __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 .type __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2: @ ret = (a is odd ? a+mod : a) >> 1 ldr $a0,[$a_ptr,#0] ldr $a1,[$a_ptr,#4] ldr $a2,[$a_ptr,#8] mov $ff,$a0,lsl#31 @ place least significant bit to most @ significant position, now arithmetic @ right shift by 31 will produce -1 or @ 0, while logical right shift 1 or 0, @ this is how modulus is conditionally @ synthesized in this case... ldr $a3,[$a_ptr,#12] adds $a0,$a0,$ff,asr#31 ldr $a4,[$a_ptr,#16] adcs $a1,$a1,$ff,asr#31 ldr $a5,[$a_ptr,#20] adcs $a2,$a2,$ff,asr#31 ldr $a6,[$a_ptr,#24] adcs $a3,$a3,#0 ldr $a7,[$a_ptr,#28] adcs $a4,$a4,#0 mov $a0,$a0,lsr#1 @ a[0:7]>>=1, we can start early @ because it doesn't affect flags adcs $a5,$a5,#0 orr $a0,$a0,$a1,lsl#31 adcs $a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31 mov $b_ptr,#0 adcs $a7,$a7,$ff,asr#31 mov $a1,$a1,lsr#1 adc $b_ptr,$b_ptr,#0 @ top-most carry bit from addition orr $a1,$a1,$a2,lsl#31 mov $a2,$a2,lsr#1 str $a0,[$r_ptr,#0] orr $a2,$a2,$a3,lsl#31 mov $a3,$a3,lsr#1 str $a1,[$r_ptr,#4] orr $a3,$a3,$a4,lsl#31 mov $a4,$a4,lsr#1 str $a2,[$r_ptr,#8] orr $a4,$a4,$a5,lsl#31 mov $a5,$a5,lsr#1 str $a3,[$r_ptr,#12] orr $a5,$a5,$a6,lsl#31 mov $a6,$a6,lsr#1 str $a4,[$r_ptr,#16] orr $a6,$a6,$a7,lsl#31 mov $a7,$a7,lsr#1 str $a5,[$r_ptr,#20] orr $a7,$a7,$b_ptr,lsl#31 @ don't forget the top-most carry bit str $a6,[$r_ptr,#24] str $a7,[$r_ptr,#28] mov pc,lr .size __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 @ void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8], @ const BN_ULONG r2[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_sub .type ecp_nistz256_sub,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_sub: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bl __ecp_nistz256_sub #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub .type __ecp_nistz256_sub,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_sub: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr ldr $a0,[$a_ptr,#0] ldr $a1,[$a_ptr,#4] ldr $a2,[$a_ptr,#8] ldr $a3,[$a_ptr,#12] ldr $a4,[$a_ptr,#16] ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#0] ldr $a5,[$a_ptr,#20] ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#4] ldr $a6,[$a_ptr,#24] ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#8] ldr $a7,[$a_ptr,#28] ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#12] subs $a0,$a0,$t0 ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#16] sbcs $a1,$a1,$t1 ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#20] sbcs $a2,$a2,$t2 ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#24] sbcs $a3,$a3,$t3 ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#28] sbcs $a4,$a4,$t0 sbcs $a5,$a5,$t1 sbcs $a6,$a6,$t2 sbcs $a7,$a7,$t3 sbc $ff,$ff,$ff @ broadcast borrow bit ldr lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr .Lreduce_by_add: @ if a-b borrows, add modulus. @ @ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of @ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by @ broadcasting borrow bit to a register, $ff, and using it as @ a whole or extracting single bit. adds $a0,$a0,$ff @ add synthesized modulus adcs $a1,$a1,$ff str $a0,[$r_ptr,#0] adcs $a2,$a2,$ff str $a1,[$r_ptr,#4] adcs $a3,$a3,#0 str $a2,[$r_ptr,#8] adcs $a4,$a4,#0 str $a3,[$r_ptr,#12] adcs $a5,$a5,#0 str $a4,[$r_ptr,#16] adcs $a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31 str $a5,[$r_ptr,#20] adcs $a7,$a7,$ff str $a6,[$r_ptr,#24] str $a7,[$r_ptr,#28] mov pc,lr .size __ecp_nistz256_sub,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub @ void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_neg .type ecp_nistz256_neg,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_neg: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bl __ecp_nistz256_neg #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg .type __ecp_nistz256_neg,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_neg: ldr $a0,[$a_ptr,#0] eor $ff,$ff,$ff ldr $a1,[$a_ptr,#4] ldr $a2,[$a_ptr,#8] subs $a0,$ff,$a0 ldr $a3,[$a_ptr,#12] sbcs $a1,$ff,$a1 ldr $a4,[$a_ptr,#16] sbcs $a2,$ff,$a2 ldr $a5,[$a_ptr,#20] sbcs $a3,$ff,$a3 ldr $a6,[$a_ptr,#24] sbcs $a4,$ff,$a4 ldr $a7,[$a_ptr,#28] sbcs $a5,$ff,$a5 sbcs $a6,$ff,$a6 sbcs $a7,$ff,$a7 sbc $ff,$ff,$ff b .Lreduce_by_add .size __ecp_nistz256_neg,.-__ecp_nistz256_neg ___ { my @acc=map("r$_",(3..11)); my ($t0,$t1,$bj,$t2,$t3)=map("r$_",(0,1,2,12,14)); $code.=<<___; @ void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont .type ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont: mov $b_ptr,$a_ptr b .Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont .size ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont @ void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG r0[8],const BN_ULONG r1[8], @ const BN_ULONG r2[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_mont .type ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function .align 4 ecp_nistz256_mul_mont: .Lecp_nistz256_mul_mont: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont: stmdb sp!,{r0-r2,lr} @ make a copy of arguments too ldr $bj,[$b_ptr,#0] @ b[0] ldmia $a_ptr,{@acc[1]-@acc[8]} umull @acc[0],$t3,@acc[1],$bj @ r[0]=a[0]*b[0] stmdb sp!,{$acc[1]-@acc[8]} @ copy a[0-7] to stack, so @ that it can be addressed @ without spending register @ on address umull @acc[1],$t0,@acc[2],$bj @ r[1]=a[1]*b[0] umull @acc[2],$t1,@acc[3],$bj adds @acc[1],@acc[1],$t3 @ accumulate high part of mult umull @acc[3],$t2,@acc[4],$bj adcs @acc[2],@acc[2],$t0 umull @acc[4],$t3,@acc[5],$bj adcs @acc[3],@acc[3],$t1 umull @acc[5],$t0,@acc[6],$bj adcs @acc[4],@acc[4],$t2 umull @acc[6],$t1,@acc[7],$bj adcs @acc[5],@acc[5],$t3 umull @acc[7],$t2,@acc[8],$bj adcs @acc[6],@acc[6],$t0 adcs @acc[7],@acc[7],$t1 eor $t3,$t3,$t3 @ first overflow bit is zero adc @acc[8],$t2,#0 ___ for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) { my $t4=@acc[0]; # Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating # result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and # omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to # be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic" # digit being equal to least significant word, it can be # performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed: # # ffff.0001.0000.0000.0000.ffff.ffff.ffff # * abcd # + xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd # # Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we # rewrite above as: # # xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd # + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.0000.0000.0000 # - abcd.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.abcd # # or marking redundant operations: # # xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.---- # + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.----.----.---- # - abcd.----.----.----.----.----.----.---- $code.=<<___; @ multiplication-less reduction $i adds @acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[0] @ r[3]+=r[0] ldr $bj,[sp,#40] @ restore b_ptr adcs @acc[4],@acc[4],#0 @ r[4]+=0 adcs @acc[5],@acc[5],#0 @ r[5]+=0 adcs @acc[6],@acc[6],@acc[0] @ r[6]+=r[0] ldr $t1,[sp,#0] @ load a[0] adcs @acc[7],@acc[7],#0 @ r[7]+=0 ldr $bj,[$bj,#4*$i] @ load b[i] adcs @acc[8],@acc[8],@acc[0] @ r[8]+=r[0] eor $t0,$t0,$t0 adc $t3,$t3,#0 @ overflow bit subs @acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[0] @ r[7]-=r[0] ldr $t2,[sp,#4] @ a[1] sbcs @acc[8],@acc[8],#0 @ r[8]-=0 umlal @acc[1],$t0,$t1,$bj @ "r[0]"+=a[0]*b[i] eor $t1,$t1,$t1 sbc @acc[0],$t3,#0 @ overflow bit, keep in mind @ that netto result is @ addition of a value which @ makes underflow impossible ldr $t3,[sp,#8] @ a[2] umlal @acc[2],$t1,$t2,$bj @ "r[1]"+=a[1]*b[i] str @acc[0],[sp,#36] @ temporarily offload overflow eor $t2,$t2,$t2 ldr $t4,[sp,#12] @ a[3], $t4 is alias @acc[0] umlal @acc[3],$t2,$t3,$bj @ "r[2]"+=a[2]*b[i] eor $t3,$t3,$t3 adds @acc[2],@acc[2],$t0 @ accumulate high part of mult ldr $t0,[sp,#16] @ a[4] umlal @acc[4],$t3,$t4,$bj @ "r[3]"+=a[3]*b[i] eor $t4,$t4,$t4 adcs @acc[3],@acc[3],$t1 ldr $t1,[sp,#20] @ a[5] umlal @acc[5],$t4,$t0,$bj @ "r[4]"+=a[4]*b[i] eor $t0,$t0,$t0 adcs @acc[4],@acc[4],$t2 ldr $t2,[sp,#24] @ a[6] umlal @acc[6],$t0,$t1,$bj @ "r[5]"+=a[5]*b[i] eor $t1,$t1,$t1 adcs @acc[5],@acc[5],$t3 ldr $t3,[sp,#28] @ a[7] umlal @acc[7],$t1,$t2,$bj @ "r[6]"+=a[6]*b[i] eor $t2,$t2,$t2 adcs @acc[6],@acc[6],$t4 ldr @acc[0],[sp,#36] @ restore overflow bit umlal @acc[8],$t2,$t3,$bj @ "r[7]"+=a[7]*b[i] eor $t3,$t3,$t3 adcs @acc[7],@acc[7],$t0 adcs @acc[8],@acc[8],$t1 adcs @acc[0],$acc[0],$t2 adc $t3,$t3,#0 @ new overflow bit ___ push(@acc,shift(@acc)); # rotate registers, so that # "r[i]" becomes r[i] } $code.=<<___; @ last multiplication-less reduction adds @acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[0] ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32] @ restore r_ptr adcs @acc[4],@acc[4],#0 adcs @acc[5],@acc[5],#0 adcs @acc[6],@acc[6],@acc[0] adcs @acc[7],@acc[7],#0 adcs @acc[8],@acc[8],@acc[0] adc $t3,$t3,#0 subs @acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[0] sbcs @acc[8],@acc[8],#0 sbc @acc[0],$t3,#0 @ overflow bit @ Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but we do it @ "other way around", namely subtract modulus from result @ and if it borrowed, add modulus back. adds @acc[1],@acc[1],#1 @ subs @acc[1],@acc[1],#-1 adcs @acc[2],@acc[2],#0 @ sbcs @acc[2],@acc[2],#-1 adcs @acc[3],@acc[3],#0 @ sbcs @acc[3],@acc[3],#-1 sbcs @acc[4],@acc[4],#0 sbcs @acc[5],@acc[5],#0 sbcs @acc[6],@acc[6],#0 sbcs @acc[7],@acc[7],#1 adcs @acc[8],@acc[8],#0 @ sbcs @acc[8],@acc[8],#-1 ldr lr,[sp,#44] @ restore lr sbc @acc[0],@acc[0],#0 @ broadcast borrow bit add sp,sp,#48 @ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of @ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by @ broadcasting borrow bit to a register, @acc[0], and using it as @ a whole or extracting single bit. adds @acc[1],@acc[1],@acc[0] @ add modulus or zero adcs @acc[2],@acc[2],@acc[0] str @acc[1],[$r_ptr,#0] adcs @acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[0] str @acc[2],[$r_ptr,#4] adcs @acc[4],@acc[4],#0 str @acc[3],[$r_ptr,#8] adcs @acc[5],@acc[5],#0 str @acc[4],[$r_ptr,#12] adcs @acc[6],@acc[6],#0 str @acc[5],[$r_ptr,#16] adcs @acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[0],lsr#31 str @acc[6],[$r_ptr,#20] adc @acc[8],@acc[8],@acc[0] str @acc[7],[$r_ptr,#24] str @acc[8],[$r_ptr,#28] mov pc,lr .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ___ } { my ($out,$inp,$index,$mask)=map("r$_",(0..3)); $code.=<<___; @ void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *r0,const P256_POINT *r1, @ int r2); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5: stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} add $out,$out,$index,lsl#2 ldmia $inp!,{r4-r11} @ X str r4,[$out,#64*0-4] str r5,[$out,#64*1-4] str r6,[$out,#64*2-4] str r7,[$out,#64*3-4] str r8,[$out,#64*4-4] str r9,[$out,#64*5-4] str r10,[$out,#64*6-4] str r11,[$out,#64*7-4] add $out,$out,#64*8 ldmia $inp!,{r4-r11} @ Y str r4,[$out,#64*0-4] str r5,[$out,#64*1-4] str r6,[$out,#64*2-4] str r7,[$out,#64*3-4] str r8,[$out,#64*4-4] str r9,[$out,#64*5-4] str r10,[$out,#64*6-4] str r11,[$out,#64*7-4] add $out,$out,#64*8 ldmia $inp,{r4-r11} @ Z str r4,[$out,#64*0-4] str r5,[$out,#64*1-4] str r6,[$out,#64*2-4] str r7,[$out,#64*3-4] str r8,[$out,#64*4-4] str r9,[$out,#64*5-4] str r10,[$out,#64*6-4] str r11,[$out,#64*7-4] ldmia sp!,{r4-r11} #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__) bx lr #else mov pc,lr #endif .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 @ void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *r0,const void *r1, @ int r2); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_gather_w5: stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} cmp $index,#0 mov $mask,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt ne #endif subne $index,$index,#1 movne $mask,#-1 add $inp,$inp,$index,lsl#2 ldr r4,[$inp,#64*0] ldr r5,[$inp,#64*1] ldr r6,[$inp,#64*2] and r4,r4,$mask ldr r7,[$inp,#64*3] and r5,r5,$mask ldr r8,[$inp,#64*4] and r6,r6,$mask ldr r9,[$inp,#64*5] and r7,r7,$mask ldr r10,[$inp,#64*6] and r8,r8,$mask ldr r11,[$inp,#64*7] add $inp,$inp,#64*8 and r9,r9,$mask and r10,r10,$mask and r11,r11,$mask stmia $out!,{r4-r11} @ X ldr r4,[$inp,#64*0] ldr r5,[$inp,#64*1] ldr r6,[$inp,#64*2] and r4,r4,$mask ldr r7,[$inp,#64*3] and r5,r5,$mask ldr r8,[$inp,#64*4] and r6,r6,$mask ldr r9,[$inp,#64*5] and r7,r7,$mask ldr r10,[$inp,#64*6] and r8,r8,$mask ldr r11,[$inp,#64*7] add $inp,$inp,#64*8 and r9,r9,$mask and r10,r10,$mask and r11,r11,$mask stmia $out!,{r4-r11} @ Y ldr r4,[$inp,#64*0] ldr r5,[$inp,#64*1] ldr r6,[$inp,#64*2] and r4,r4,$mask ldr r7,[$inp,#64*3] and r5,r5,$mask ldr r8,[$inp,#64*4] and r6,r6,$mask ldr r9,[$inp,#64*5] and r7,r7,$mask ldr r10,[$inp,#64*6] and r8,r8,$mask ldr r11,[$inp,#64*7] and r9,r9,$mask and r10,r10,$mask and r11,r11,$mask stmia $out,{r4-r11} @ Z ldmia sp!,{r4-r11} #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__) bx lr #else mov pc,lr #endif .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 @ void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *r0,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *r1, @ int r2); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7: add $out,$out,$index mov $index,#64/4 .Loop_scatter_w7: ldr $mask,[$inp],#4 subs $index,$index,#1 strb $mask,[$out,#64*0-1] mov $mask,$mask,lsr#8 strb $mask,[$out,#64*1-1] mov $mask,$mask,lsr#8 strb $mask,[$out,#64*2-1] mov $mask,$mask,lsr#8 strb $mask,[$out,#64*3-1] add $out,$out,#64*4 bne .Loop_scatter_w7 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__) bx lr #else mov pc,lr #endif .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 @ void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *r0,const void *r1, @ int r2); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_gather_w7: stmdb sp!,{r4-r7} cmp $index,#0 mov $mask,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ itt ne #endif subne $index,$index,#1 movne $mask,#-1 add $inp,$inp,$index mov $index,#64/4 nop .Loop_gather_w7: ldrb r4,[$inp,#64*0] subs $index,$index,#1 ldrb r5,[$inp,#64*1] ldrb r6,[$inp,#64*2] ldrb r7,[$inp,#64*3] add $inp,$inp,#64*4 orr r4,r4,r5,lsl#8 orr r4,r4,r6,lsl#16 orr r4,r4,r7,lsl#24 and r4,r4,$mask str r4,[$out],#4 bne .Loop_gather_w7 ldmia sp!,{r4-r7} #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__) bx lr #else mov pc,lr #endif .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 ___ } if (0) { # In comparison to integer-only equivalent of below subroutine: # # Cortex-A8 +10% # Cortex-A9 -10% # Snapdragon S4 +5% # # As not all time is spent in multiplication, overall impact is deemed # too low to care about. my ($A0,$A1,$A2,$A3,$Bi,$zero,$temp)=map("d$_",(0..7)); my $mask="q4"; my $mult="q5"; my @AxB=map("q$_",(8..15)); my ($rptr,$aptr,$bptr,$toutptr)=map("r$_",(0..3)); $code.=<<___; #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 .fpu neon .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon .type ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon: mov ip,sp stmdb sp!,{r4-r9} vstmdb sp!,{q4-q5} @ ABI specification says so sub $toutptr,sp,#40 vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]! veor $zero,$zero,$zero vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr] @ can't specify :32 :-( vzip.16 $Bi,$zero mov sp,$toutptr @ alloca vmov.i64 $mask,#0xffff vmull.u32 @AxB[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vmull.u32 @AxB[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] vmull.u32 @AxB[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] vmull.u32 @AxB[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[0]#lo,#16 vmull.u32 @AxB[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vadd.u64 @AxB[0]#hi,@AxB[0]#hi,$temp vmull.u32 @AxB[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[0]#hi,#16 @ upper 32 bits of a[0]*b[0] vmull.u32 @AxB[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vand.u64 @AxB[0],@AxB[0],$mask @ lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[0] vmull.u32 @AxB[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] ___ for($i=1;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]},[$bptr,:32]! veor $zero,$zero,$zero vadd.u64 @AxB[1]#lo,@AxB[1]#lo,$temp @ reduction vshl.u64 $mult,@AxB[0],#32 vadd.u64 @AxB[3],@AxB[3],@AxB[0] vsub.u64 $mult,$mult,@AxB[0] vzip.16 $Bi,$zero vadd.u64 @AxB[6],@AxB[6],@AxB[0] vadd.u64 @AxB[7],@AxB[7],$mult ___ push(@AxB,shift(@AxB)); $code.=<<___; vmlal.u32 @AxB[0],$Bi,${A0}[0] vmlal.u32 @AxB[1],$Bi,${A0}[1] vmlal.u32 @AxB[2],$Bi,${A1}[0] vmlal.u32 @AxB[3],$Bi,${A1}[1] vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[0]#lo,#16 vmlal.u32 @AxB[4],$Bi,${A2}[0] vadd.u64 @AxB[0]#hi,@AxB[0]#hi,$temp vmlal.u32 @AxB[5],$Bi,${A2}[1] vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[0]#hi,#16 @ upper 33 bits of a[0]*b[i]+t[0] vmlal.u32 @AxB[6],$Bi,${A3}[0] vand.u64 @AxB[0],@AxB[0],$mask @ lower 32 bits of a[0]*b[0] vmull.u32 @AxB[7],$Bi,${A3}[1] ___ } $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @AxB[1]#lo,@AxB[1]#lo,$temp @ last reduction vshl.u64 $mult,@AxB[0],#32 vadd.u64 @AxB[3],@AxB[3],@AxB[0] vsub.u64 $mult,$mult,@AxB[0] vadd.u64 @AxB[6],@AxB[6],@AxB[0] vadd.u64 @AxB[7],@AxB[7],$mult vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[1]#lo,#16 @ convert vadd.u64 @AxB[1]#hi,@AxB[1]#hi,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[1]#hi,#16 vzip.16 @AxB[1]#lo,@AxB[1]#hi ___ foreach (2..7) { $code.=<<___; vadd.u64 @AxB[$_]#lo,@AxB[$_]#lo,$temp vst1.32 {@AxB[$_-1]#lo[0]},[$toutptr,:32]! vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[$_]#lo,#16 vadd.u64 @AxB[$_]#hi,@AxB[$_]#hi,$temp vshr.u64 $temp,@AxB[$_]#hi,#16 vzip.16 @AxB[$_]#lo,@AxB[$_]#hi ___ } $code.=<<___; vst1.32 {@AxB[7]#lo[0]},[$toutptr,:32]! vst1.32 {$temp},[$toutptr] @ upper 33 bits ldr r1,[sp,#0] ldr r2,[sp,#4] ldr r3,[sp,#8] subs r1,r1,#-1 ldr r4,[sp,#12] sbcs r2,r2,#-1 ldr r5,[sp,#16] sbcs r3,r3,#-1 ldr r6,[sp,#20] sbcs r4,r4,#0 ldr r7,[sp,#24] sbcs r5,r5,#0 ldr r8,[sp,#28] sbcs r6,r6,#0 ldr r9,[sp,#32] @ top-most bit sbcs r7,r7,#1 sub sp,ip,#40+16 sbcs r8,r8,#-1 sbc r9,r9,#0 vldmia sp!,{q4-q5} adds r1,r1,r9 adcs r2,r2,r9 str r1,[$rptr,#0] adcs r3,r3,r9 str r2,[$rptr,#4] adcs r4,r4,#0 str r3,[$rptr,#8] adcs r5,r5,#0 str r4,[$rptr,#12] adcs r6,r6,#0 str r5,[$rptr,#16] adcs r7,r7,r9,lsr#31 str r6,[$rptr,#20] adcs r8,r8,r9 str r7,[$rptr,#24] str r8,[$rptr,#28] ldmia sp!,{r4-r9} bx lr .size ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_neon #endif ___ } {{{ ######################################################################## # Below $aN assignment matches order in which 256-bit result appears in # register bank at return from __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont, so that we can # skip over reloading it from memory. This means that below functions # use custom calling sequence accepting 256-bit input in registers, # output pointer in r0, $r_ptr, and optional pointer in r2, $b_ptr. # # See their "normal" counterparts for insights on calculations. my ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7, $t0,$t1,$t2,$t3)=map("r$_",(11,3..10,12,14,1)); my $ff=$b_ptr; $code.=<<___; .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_from,%function .align 5 __ecp_nistz256_sub_from: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#0] ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#4] ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#8] ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#12] subs $a0,$a0,$t0 ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#16] sbcs $a1,$a1,$t1 ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#20] sbcs $a2,$a2,$t2 ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#24] sbcs $a3,$a3,$t3 ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#28] sbcs $a4,$a4,$t0 sbcs $a5,$a5,$t1 sbcs $a6,$a6,$t2 sbcs $a7,$a7,$t3 sbc $ff,$ff,$ff @ broadcast borrow bit ldr lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr adds $a0,$a0,$ff @ add synthesized modulus adcs $a1,$a1,$ff str $a0,[$r_ptr,#0] adcs $a2,$a2,$ff str $a1,[$r_ptr,#4] adcs $a3,$a3,#0 str $a2,[$r_ptr,#8] adcs $a4,$a4,#0 str $a3,[$r_ptr,#12] adcs $a5,$a5,#0 str $a4,[$r_ptr,#16] adcs $a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31 str $a5,[$r_ptr,#20] adcs $a7,$a7,$ff str $a6,[$r_ptr,#24] str $a7,[$r_ptr,#28] mov pc,lr .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_from,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,%function .align 5 __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf: str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#0] ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#4] ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#8] ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#12] subs $a0,$t0,$a0 ldr $t0,[$b_ptr,#16] sbcs $a1,$t1,$a1 ldr $t1,[$b_ptr,#20] sbcs $a2,$t2,$a2 ldr $t2,[$b_ptr,#24] sbcs $a3,$t3,$a3 ldr $t3,[$b_ptr,#28] sbcs $a4,$t0,$a4 sbcs $a5,$t1,$a5 sbcs $a6,$t2,$a6 sbcs $a7,$t3,$a7 sbc $ff,$ff,$ff @ broadcast borrow bit ldr lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr adds $a0,$a0,$ff @ add synthesized modulus adcs $a1,$a1,$ff str $a0,[$r_ptr,#0] adcs $a2,$a2,$ff str $a1,[$r_ptr,#4] adcs $a3,$a3,#0 str $a2,[$r_ptr,#8] adcs $a4,$a4,#0 str $a3,[$r_ptr,#12] adcs $a5,$a5,#0 str $a4,[$r_ptr,#16] adcs $a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31 str $a5,[$r_ptr,#20] adcs $a7,$a7,$ff str $a6,[$r_ptr,#24] str $a7,[$r_ptr,#28] mov pc,lr .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf .type __ecp_nistz256_add_self,%function .align 4 __ecp_nistz256_add_self: adds $a0,$a0,$a0 @ a[0:7]+=a[0:7] adcs $a1,$a1,$a1 adcs $a2,$a2,$a2 adcs $a3,$a3,$a3 adcs $a4,$a4,$a4 adcs $a5,$a5,$a5 adcs $a6,$a6,$a6 mov $ff,#0 adcs $a7,$a7,$a7 adc $ff,$ff,#0 @ if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus. @ @ But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract @ modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed. subs $a0,$a0,#-1 sbcs $a1,$a1,#-1 sbcs $a2,$a2,#-1 sbcs $a3,$a3,#0 sbcs $a4,$a4,#0 sbcs $a5,$a5,#0 sbcs $a6,$a6,#1 sbcs $a7,$a7,#-1 sbc $ff,$ff,#0 @ Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of @ 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by @ using value of borrow as a whole or extracting single bit. @ Follow $ff register... adds $a0,$a0,$ff @ add synthesized modulus adcs $a1,$a1,$ff str $a0,[$r_ptr,#0] adcs $a2,$a2,$ff str $a1,[$r_ptr,#4] adcs $a3,$a3,#0 str $a2,[$r_ptr,#8] adcs $a4,$a4,#0 str $a3,[$r_ptr,#12] adcs $a5,$a5,#0 str $a4,[$r_ptr,#16] adcs $a6,$a6,$ff,lsr#31 str $a5,[$r_ptr,#20] adcs $a7,$a7,$ff str $a6,[$r_ptr,#24] str $a7,[$r_ptr,#28] mov pc,lr .size __ecp_nistz256_add_self,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_self ___ ######################################################################## # following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in # ecp_nistz256.c # ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp); # { my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$in_x,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..4)); # above map() describes stack layout with 5 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. Then note that we push # starting from r0, which means that we have copy of # input arguments just below these temporary vectors. $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_double .type ecp_nistz256_point_double,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_point_double: stmdb sp!,{r0-r12,lr} @ push from r0, unusual, but intentional sub sp,sp,#32*5 .Lpoint_double_shortcut: add r3,sp,#$in_x ldmia $a_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in_x stmia r3,{r4-r11} add $r_ptr,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 @ p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); add $b_ptr,$a_ptr,#32 add $a_ptr,$a_ptr,#32 add $r_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$S add $b_ptr,sp,#$S add $r_ptr,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(S, S); ldr $b_ptr,[sp,#32*5+4] add $a_ptr,$b_ptr,#32 add $b_ptr,$b_ptr,#64 add $r_ptr,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y); ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32*5] add $r_ptr,$r_ptr,#64 bl __ecp_nistz256_add_self @ p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in_x add $b_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_add @ p256_add(M, in_x, Zsqr); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in_x add $b_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_sub @ p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); add $a_ptr,sp,#$S add $b_ptr,sp,#$S add $r_ptr,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S); add $a_ptr,sp,#$Zsqr add $b_ptr,sp,#$M add $r_ptr,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32*5] add $a_ptr,sp,#$tmp0 add $r_ptr,$r_ptr,#32 bl __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 @ p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0); add $a_ptr,sp,#$M add $r_ptr,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 @ p256_mul_by_3(M, M); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in_x add $b_ptr,sp,#$S add $r_ptr,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); add $r_ptr,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_add_self @ p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32*5] add $a_ptr,sp,#$M add $b_ptr,sp,#$M bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); add $b_ptr,sp,#$tmp0 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); add $b_ptr,sp,#$S add $r_ptr,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf @ p256_sub(S, S, res_x); add $a_ptr,sp,#$M add $b_ptr,sp,#$S bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S, S, M); ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32*5] add $b_ptr,$r_ptr,#32 add $r_ptr,$r_ptr,#32 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); add sp,sp,#32*5+16 @ +16 means "skip even over saved r0-r3" #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_point_double,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z, $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub, $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..17)); my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr); # above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. Then note that we push # starting from r0, which means that we have copy of # input arguments just below these temporary vectors. # We use three of them for !in1infty, !in2intfy and # result of check for zero. $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add .type ecp_nistz256_point_add,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_point_add: stmdb sp!,{r0-r12,lr} @ push from r0, unusual, but intentional sub sp,sp,#32*18+16 ldmia $b_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in2_x add r3,sp,#$in2_x stmia r3!,{r4-r11} ldmia $b_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in2_y stmia r3!,{r4-r11} ldmia $b_ptr,{r4-r11} @ copy in2_z orr r12,r4,r5 orr r12,r12,r6 orr r12,r12,r7 orr r12,r12,r8 orr r12,r12,r9 orr r12,r12,r10 orr r12,r12,r11 cmp r12,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne r12,#-1 stmia r3,{r4-r11} str r12,[sp,#32*18+8] @ !in2infty ldmia $a_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in1_x add r3,sp,#$in1_x stmia r3!,{r4-r11} ldmia $a_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in1_y stmia r3!,{r4-r11} ldmia $a_ptr,{r4-r11} @ copy in1_z orr r12,r4,r5 orr r12,r12,r6 orr r12,r12,r7 orr r12,r12,r8 orr r12,r12,r9 orr r12,r12,r10 orr r12,r12,r11 cmp r12,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne r12,#-1 stmia r3,{r4-r11} str r12,[sp,#32*18+4] @ !in1infty add $a_ptr,sp,#$in2_z add $b_ptr,sp,#$in2_z add $r_ptr,sp,#$Z2sqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $r_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in2_z add $b_ptr,sp,#$Z2sqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$S1 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $b_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in1_y add $b_ptr,sp,#$S1 add $r_ptr,sp,#$S1 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in2_y add $b_ptr,sp,#$S2 add $r_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add $b_ptr,sp,#$S1 add $r_ptr,sp,#$R bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(R, S2, S1); orr $a0,$a0,$a1 @ see if result is zero orr $a2,$a2,$a3 orr $a4,$a4,$a5 orr $a0,$a0,$a2 orr $a4,$a4,$a6 orr $a0,$a0,$a7 add $a_ptr,sp,#$in1_x orr $a0,$a0,$a4 add $b_ptr,sp,#$Z2sqr str $a0,[sp,#32*18+12] add $r_ptr,sp,#$U1 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in2_x add $b_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); add $b_ptr,sp,#$U1 add $r_ptr,sp,#$H bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(H, U2, U1); orr $a0,$a0,$a1 @ see if result is zero orr $a2,$a2,$a3 orr $a4,$a4,$a5 orr $a0,$a0,$a2 orr $a4,$a4,$a6 orr $a0,$a0,$a7 orrs $a0,$a0,$a4 bne .Ladd_proceed @ is_equal(U1,U2)? ldr $t0,[sp,#32*18+4] ldr $t1,[sp,#32*18+8] ldr $t2,[sp,#32*18+12] tst $t0,$t1 beq .Ladd_proceed @ (in1infty || in2infty)? tst $t2,$t2 beq .Ladd_double @ is_equal(S1,S2)? ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32*18+16] eor r4,r4,r4 eor r5,r5,r5 eor r6,r6,r6 eor r7,r7,r7 eor r8,r8,r8 eor r9,r9,r9 eor r10,r10,r10 eor r11,r11,r11 stmia $r_ptr!,{r4-r11} stmia $r_ptr!,{r4-r11} stmia $r_ptr!,{r4-r11} b .Ladd_done .align 4 .Ladd_double: ldr $a_ptr,[sp,#32*18+20] add sp,sp,#32*(18-5)+16 @ difference in frame sizes b .Lpoint_double_shortcut .align 4 .Ladd_proceed: add $a_ptr,sp,#$R add $b_ptr,sp,#$R add $r_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); add $a_ptr,sp,#$H add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_z bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$H add $b_ptr,sp,#$H add $r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in2_z add $b_ptr,sp,#$res_z add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_z bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$H add $b_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); add $a_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr add $b_ptr,sp,#$U1 add $r_ptr,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); add $r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_add_self @ p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add $b_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_x bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf @ p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add $b_ptr,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add $b_ptr,sp,#$U2 add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf @ p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add $a_ptr,sp,#$Hcub add $b_ptr,sp,#$S1 add $r_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); add $a_ptr,sp,#$R add $b_ptr,sp,#$res_y add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add $b_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); ldr r11,[sp,#32*18+4] @ !in1intfy ldr r12,[sp,#32*18+8] @ !in2intfy add r1,sp,#$res_x add r2,sp,#$in2_x and r10,r11,r12 mvn r11,r11 add r3,sp,#$in1_x and r11,r11,r12 mvn r12,r12 ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32*18+16] ___ for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=8) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ldmia r1!,{r4-r5} @ res_x ldmia r2!,{r6-r7} @ in2_x ldmia r3!,{r8-r9} @ in1_x and r4,r4,r10 and r5,r5,r10 and r6,r6,r11 and r7,r7,r11 and r8,r8,r12 and r9,r9,r12 orr r4,r4,r6 orr r5,r5,r7 orr r4,r4,r8 orr r5,r5,r9 stmia $r_ptr!,{r4-r5} ___ } $code.=<<___; .Ladd_done: add sp,sp,#32*18+16+16 @ +16 means "skip even over saved r0-r3" #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_point_add,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y, $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..14)); my $Z1sqr = $S2; # above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. Then note that we push # starting from r0, which means that we have copy of # input arguments just below these temporary vectors. # We use two of them for !in1infty, !in2intfy. my @ONE_mont=(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine .type ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,%function .align 5 ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine: stmdb sp!,{r0-r12,lr} @ push from r0, unusual, but intentional sub sp,sp,#32*15 ldmia $a_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in1_x add r3,sp,#$in1_x stmia r3!,{r4-r11} ldmia $a_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in1_y stmia r3!,{r4-r11} ldmia $a_ptr,{r4-r11} @ copy in1_z orr r12,r4,r5 orr r12,r12,r6 orr r12,r12,r7 orr r12,r12,r8 orr r12,r12,r9 orr r12,r12,r10 orr r12,r12,r11 cmp r12,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne r12,#-1 stmia r3,{r4-r11} str r12,[sp,#32*15+4] @ !in1infty ldmia $b_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in2_x add r3,sp,#$in2_x orr r12,r4,r5 orr r12,r12,r6 orr r12,r12,r7 orr r12,r12,r8 orr r12,r12,r9 orr r12,r12,r10 orr r12,r12,r11 stmia r3!,{r4-r11} ldmia $b_ptr!,{r4-r11} @ copy in2_y orr r12,r12,r4 orr r12,r12,r5 orr r12,r12,r6 orr r12,r12,r7 orr r12,r12,r8 orr r12,r12,r9 orr r12,r12,r10 orr r12,r12,r11 stmia r3!,{r4-r11} cmp r12,#0 #ifdef __thumb2__ it ne #endif movne r12,#-1 str r12,[sp,#32*15+8] @ !in2infty add $a_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $r_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr add $b_ptr,sp,#$in2_x add $r_ptr,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x); add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_x add $r_ptr,sp,#$H bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); add $a_ptr,sp,#$Z1sqr add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $r_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$H add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_z add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_z bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); add $a_ptr,sp,#$in2_y add $b_ptr,sp,#$S2 add $r_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_y add $r_ptr,sp,#$R bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); add $a_ptr,sp,#$H add $b_ptr,sp,#$H add $r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); add $a_ptr,sp,#$R add $b_ptr,sp,#$R add $r_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); add $a_ptr,sp,#$H add $b_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); add $a_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_x add $r_ptr,sp,#$U2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); add $r_ptr,sp,#$Hsqr bl __ecp_nistz256_add_self @ p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add $b_ptr,sp,#$Rsqr add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_x bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf @ p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add $b_ptr,sp,#$Hcub bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add $b_ptr,sp,#$U2 add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf @ p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add $a_ptr,sp,#$Hcub add $b_ptr,sp,#$in1_y add $r_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub); add $a_ptr,sp,#$R add $b_ptr,sp,#$res_y add $r_ptr,sp,#$res_y bl __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont @ p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add $b_ptr,sp,#$S2 bl __ecp_nistz256_sub_from @ p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); ldr r11,[sp,#32*15+4] @ !in1intfy ldr r12,[sp,#32*15+8] @ !in2intfy add r1,sp,#$res_x add r2,sp,#$in2_x and r10,r11,r12 mvn r11,r11 add r3,sp,#$in1_x and r11,r11,r12 mvn r12,r12 ldr $r_ptr,[sp,#32*15] ___ for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=8) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ldmia r1!,{r4-r5} @ res_x ldmia r2!,{r6-r7} @ in2_x ldmia r3!,{r8-r9} @ in1_x and r4,r4,r10 and r5,r5,r10 and r6,r6,r11 and r7,r7,r11 and r8,r8,r12 and r9,r9,r12 orr r4,r4,r6 orr r5,r5,r7 orr r4,r4,r8 orr r5,r5,r9 stmia $r_ptr!,{r4-r5} ___ } for(;$i<96;$i+=8) { my $j=($i-64)/4; $code.=<<___; ldmia r1!,{r4-r5} @ res_z ldmia r3!,{r8-r9} @ in1_z and r4,r4,r10 and r5,r5,r10 and r6,r11,#@ONE_mont[$j] and r7,r11,#@ONE_mont[$j+1] and r8,r8,r12 and r9,r9,r12 orr r4,r4,r6 orr r5,r5,r7 orr r4,r4,r8 orr r5,r5,r9 stmia $r_ptr!,{r4-r5} ___ } $code.=<<___; add sp,sp,#32*15+16 @ +16 means "skip even over saved r0-r3" #if __ARM_ARCH__>=5 || !defined(__thumb__) ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,pc} #else ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr} bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-) #endif .size ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine ___ } }}} foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/geo; s/\bq([0-9]+)#(lo|hi)/sprintf "d%d",2*$1+($2 eq "hi")/geo; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl0000755000000000000000000016100213176625657020223 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ############################################################################## # # # Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation # # # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. # # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, # # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # # limitations under the License. # # # ############################################################################## # # # Developers and authors: # # Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) # # (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center # # (2) University of Haifa # # Reference: # # S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with# # 256 Bit Primes" # # # ############################################################################## $flavour = shift; $output = shift; if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; *STDOUT=*OUT; if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); $addx = ($1>=2.23); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); $addx = ($1>=2.10); } if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); $addx = ($1>=12); } if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01); $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } if ($avx>=2) {{ $digit_size = "\$29"; $n_digits = "\$9"; $code.=<<___; .text .align 64 .LAVX2_AND_MASK: .LAVX2_POLY: .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x00040000, 0x00040000, 0x00040000, 0x00040000 .quad 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000 .quad 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff .LAVX2_POLY_x2: .quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC .quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC .quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC .quad 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC .quad 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE .quad 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE .quad 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE .quad 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE .quad 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC .LAVX2_POLY_x8: .quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8 .quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8 .quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8 .quad 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8 .quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC .quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC .quad 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC .quad 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC .quad 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8 .LONE: .quad 0x00000020, 0x00000020, 0x00000020, 0x00000020 .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000 .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff .quad 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 # RR = 2^266 mod p in AVX2 format, to transform from the native OpenSSL # Montgomery form (*2^256) to our format (*2^261) .LTO_MONT_AVX2: .quad 0x00000400, 0x00000400, 0x00000400, 0x00000400 .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000 .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x00000003, 0x00000003, 0x00000003, 0x00000003 .LFROM_MONT_AVX2: .quad 0x00000001, 0x00000001, 0x00000001, 0x00000001 .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .quad 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00 .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff .quad 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff .quad 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff .quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 .LIntOne: .long 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 ___ { # This function receives a pointer to an array of four affine points # (X, Y, <1>) and rearanges the data for AVX2 execution, while # converting it to 2^29 radix redundant form my ($X0,$X1,$X2,$X3, $Y0,$Y1,$Y2,$Y3, $T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $T4,$T5,$T6,$T7)=map("%ymm$_",(0..15)); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert,\@function,2 .align 64 ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; # Load the data vmovdqa 32*0(%rsi), $X0 lea 112(%rsi), %rax # size optimization vmovdqa 32*1(%rsi), $Y0 lea .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), %rdx vmovdqa 32*2(%rsi), $X1 vmovdqa 32*3(%rsi), $Y1 vmovdqa 32*4-112(%rax), $X2 vmovdqa 32*5-112(%rax), $Y2 vmovdqa 32*6-112(%rax), $X3 vmovdqa 32*7-112(%rax), $Y3 # Transpose X and Y independently vpunpcklqdq $X1, $X0, $T0 # T0 = [B2 A2 B0 A0] vpunpcklqdq $X3, $X2, $T1 # T1 = [D2 C2 D0 C0] vpunpckhqdq $X1, $X0, $T2 # T2 = [B3 A3 B1 A1] vpunpckhqdq $X3, $X2, $T3 # T3 = [D3 C3 D1 C1] vpunpcklqdq $Y1, $Y0, $T4 vpunpcklqdq $Y3, $Y2, $T5 vpunpckhqdq $Y1, $Y0, $T6 vpunpckhqdq $Y3, $Y2, $T7 vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T1, $T0, $X0 # X0 = [D0 C0 B0 A0] vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T3, $T2, $X1 # X1 = [D1 C1 B1 A1] vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T1, $T0, $X2 # X2 = [D2 C2 B2 A2] vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T3, $T2, $X3 # X3 = [D3 C3 B3 A3] vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T5, $T4, $Y0 vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T7, $T6, $Y1 vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T5, $T4, $Y2 vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T7, $T6, $Y3 vmovdqa (%rdx), $T7 vpand (%rdx), $X0, $T0 # out[0] = in[0] & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $X0, $X0 vpand $T7, $X0, $T1 # out[1] = (in[0] >> shift) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $X0, $X0 vpsllq \$6, $X1, $T2 vpxor $X0, $T2, $T2 vpand $T7, $T2, $T2 # out[2] = ((in[0] >> (shift*2)) ^ (in[1] << (64-shift*2))) & mask; vpsrlq \$23, $X1, $X1 vpand $T7, $X1, $T3 # out[3] = (in[1] >> ((shift*3)%64)) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $X1, $X1 vpsllq \$12, $X2, $T4 vpxor $X1, $T4, $T4 vpand $T7, $T4, $T4 # out[4] = ((in[1] >> ((shift*4)%64)) ^ (in[2] << (64*2-shift*4))) & mask; vpsrlq \$17, $X2, $X2 vpand $T7, $X2, $T5 # out[5] = (in[2] >> ((shift*5)%64)) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $X2, $X2 vpsllq \$18, $X3, $T6 vpxor $X2, $T6, $T6 vpand $T7, $T6, $T6 # out[6] = ((in[2] >> ((shift*6)%64)) ^ (in[3] << (64*3-shift*6))) & mask; vpsrlq \$11, $X3, $X3 vmovdqa $T0, 32*0(%rdi) lea 112(%rdi), %rax # size optimization vpand $T7, $X3, $T0 # out[7] = (in[3] >> ((shift*7)%64)) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $X3, $X3 # out[8] = (in[3] >> ((shift*8)%64)) & mask; vmovdqa $T1, 32*1(%rdi) vmovdqa $T2, 32*2(%rdi) vmovdqa $T3, 32*3(%rdi) vmovdqa $T4, 32*4-112(%rax) vmovdqa $T5, 32*5-112(%rax) vmovdqa $T6, 32*6-112(%rax) vmovdqa $T0, 32*7-112(%rax) vmovdqa $X3, 32*8-112(%rax) lea 448(%rdi), %rax # size optimization vpand $T7, $Y0, $T0 # out[0] = in[0] & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $Y0, $Y0 vpand $T7, $Y0, $T1 # out[1] = (in[0] >> shift) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $Y0, $Y0 vpsllq \$6, $Y1, $T2 vpxor $Y0, $T2, $T2 vpand $T7, $T2, $T2 # out[2] = ((in[0] >> (shift*2)) ^ (in[1] << (64-shift*2))) & mask; vpsrlq \$23, $Y1, $Y1 vpand $T7, $Y1, $T3 # out[3] = (in[1] >> ((shift*3)%64)) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $Y1, $Y1 vpsllq \$12, $Y2, $T4 vpxor $Y1, $T4, $T4 vpand $T7, $T4, $T4 # out[4] = ((in[1] >> ((shift*4)%64)) ^ (in[2] << (64*2-shift*4))) & mask; vpsrlq \$17, $Y2, $Y2 vpand $T7, $Y2, $T5 # out[5] = (in[2] >> ((shift*5)%64)) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $Y2, $Y2 vpsllq \$18, $Y3, $T6 vpxor $Y2, $T6, $T6 vpand $T7, $T6, $T6 # out[6] = ((in[2] >> ((shift*6)%64)) ^ (in[3] << (64*3-shift*6))) & mask; vpsrlq \$11, $Y3, $Y3 vmovdqa $T0, 32*9-448(%rax) vpand $T7, $Y3, $T0 # out[7] = (in[3] >> ((shift*7)%64)) & mask; vpsrlq \$29, $Y3, $Y3 # out[8] = (in[3] >> ((shift*8)%64)) & mask; vmovdqa $T1, 32*10-448(%rax) vmovdqa $T2, 32*11-448(%rax) vmovdqa $T3, 32*12-448(%rax) vmovdqa $T4, 32*13-448(%rax) vmovdqa $T5, 32*14-448(%rax) vmovdqa $T6, 32*15-448(%rax) vmovdqa $T0, 32*16-448(%rax) vmovdqa $Y3, 32*17-448(%rax) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert ___ } { ################################################################################ # This function receives a pointer to an array of four AVX2 formatted points # (X, Y, Z) convert the data to normal representation, and rearanges the data my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3, $D4,$D5,$D6,$D7, $D8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8)); my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $T4,$T5,$T6)=map("%ymm$_",(9..15)); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; mov \$3, %ecx .Lconv_loop: vmovdqa 32*0(%rsi), $D0 lea 160(%rsi), %rax # size optimization vmovdqa 32*1(%rsi), $D1 vmovdqa 32*2(%rsi), $D2 vmovdqa 32*3(%rsi), $D3 vmovdqa 32*4-160(%rax), $D4 vmovdqa 32*5-160(%rax), $D5 vmovdqa 32*6-160(%rax), $D6 vmovdqa 32*7-160(%rax), $D7 vmovdqa 32*8-160(%rax), $D8 vpsllq \$29, $D1, $D1 vpsllq \$58, $D2, $T0 vpaddq $D1, $D0, $D0 vpaddq $T0, $D0, $D0 # out[0] = (in[0]) ^ (in[1] << shift*1) ^ (in[2] << shift*2); vpsrlq \$6, $D2, $D2 vpsllq \$23, $D3, $D3 vpsllq \$52, $D4, $T1 vpaddq $D2, $D3, $D3 vpaddq $D3, $T1, $D1 # out[1] = (in[2] >> (64*1-shift*2)) ^ (in[3] << shift*3%64) ^ (in[4] << shift*4%64); vpsrlq \$12, $D4, $D4 vpsllq \$17, $D5, $D5 vpsllq \$46, $D6, $T2 vpaddq $D4, $D5, $D5 vpaddq $D5, $T2, $D2 # out[2] = (in[4] >> (64*2-shift*4)) ^ (in[5] << shift*5%64) ^ (in[6] << shift*6%64); vpsrlq \$18, $D6, $D6 vpsllq \$11, $D7, $D7 vpsllq \$40, $D8, $T3 vpaddq $D6, $D7, $D7 vpaddq $D7, $T3, $D3 # out[3] = (in[6] >> (64*3-shift*6)) ^ (in[7] << shift*7%64) ^ (in[8] << shift*8%64); vpunpcklqdq $D1, $D0, $T0 # T0 = [B2 A2 B0 A0] vpunpcklqdq $D3, $D2, $T1 # T1 = [D2 C2 D0 C0] vpunpckhqdq $D1, $D0, $T2 # T2 = [B3 A3 B1 A1] vpunpckhqdq $D3, $D2, $T3 # T3 = [D3 C3 D1 C1] vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T1, $T0, $D0 # X0 = [D0 C0 B0 A0] vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T3, $T2, $D1 # X1 = [D1 C1 B1 A1] vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T1, $T0, $D2 # X2 = [D2 C2 B2 A2] vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T3, $T2, $D3 # X3 = [D3 C3 B3 A3] vmovdqa $D0, 32*0(%rdi) vmovdqa $D1, 32*3(%rdi) vmovdqa $D2, 32*6(%rdi) vmovdqa $D3, 32*9(%rdi) lea 32*9(%rsi), %rsi lea 32*1(%rdi), %rdi dec %ecx jnz .Lconv_loop vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back ___ } { my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr,$itr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%ecx"); my ($ACC0,$ACC1,$ACC2,$ACC3,$ACC4,$ACC5,$ACC6,$ACC7,$ACC8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8)); my ($B,$Y,$T0,$AND_MASK,$OVERFLOW)=map("%ymm$_",(9..13)); sub NORMALIZE { my $ret=<<___; vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC0, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC1, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC2, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC3, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC4, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC5, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC6, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC7, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 #vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 ___ $ret; } sub STORE { my $ret=<<___; vmovdqa $ACC0, 32*0(%rdi) lea 160(%rdi), %rax # size optimization vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*1(%rdi) vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*2(%rdi) vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*3(%rdi) vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*4-160(%rax) vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*5-160(%rax) vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*6-160(%rax) vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*7-160(%rax) vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*8-160(%rax) ___ $ret; } $code.=<<___; .type avx2_normalize,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_normalize: vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC0, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC1, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC2, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC3, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC4, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC5, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC6, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC7, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 #vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 ret .size avx2_normalize,.-avx2_normalize .type avx2_normalize_n_store,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_normalize_n_store: vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC0, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC1, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 vmovdqa $ACC0, 32*0(%rdi) lea 160(%rdi), %rax # size optimization vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC2, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*1(%rdi) vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC3, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*2(%rdi) vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC4, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*3(%rdi) vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC5, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*4-160(%rax) vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC6, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*5-160(%rax) vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC7, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*6-160(%rax) vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 #vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*7-160(%rax) vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*8-160(%rax) ret .size avx2_normalize_n_store,.-avx2_normalize_n_store ################################################################################ # void avx2_mul_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); .type avx2_mul_x4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_mul_x4: lea .LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax vpxor $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpxor $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpxor $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpxor $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpxor $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpxor $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpxor $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpxor $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqa 32*7(%rax), %ymm14 vmovdqa 32*8(%rax), %ymm15 mov $n_digits, $itr lea -512($a_ptr), $a_ptr # strategic bias to control u-op density jmp .Lavx2_mul_x4_loop .align 32 .Lavx2_mul_x4_loop: vmovdqa 32*0($b_ptr), $B lea 32*1($b_ptr), $b_ptr vpmuludq 32*0+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 vpmuludq 32*1+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW # borrow $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpmuludq 32*2+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpmuludq 32*3+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*4+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*5+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*6+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*7+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 # Skip some multiplications, optimizing for the constant poly vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*8+512($a_ptr), $B, $ACC8 vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 .byte 0x67 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $OVERFLOW .byte 0x67 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC8, $ACC7 dec $itr jnz .Lavx2_mul_x4_loop vpxor $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 ret .size avx2_mul_x4,.-avx2_mul_x4 # Function optimized for the constant 1 ################################################################################ # void avx2_mul_by1_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); .type avx2_mul_by1_x4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_mul_by1_x4: lea .LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax vpxor $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpxor $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpxor $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpxor $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpxor $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpxor $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpxor $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpxor $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpxor $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*3+.LONE(%rip), %ymm14 vmovdqa 32*7+.LONE(%rip), %ymm15 mov $n_digits, $itr jmp .Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop .align 32 .Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop: vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $B .byte 0x48,0x8d,0xb6,0x20,0,0,0 # lea 32*1($a_ptr), $a_ptr vpsllq \$5, $B, $OVERFLOW vpmuludq %ymm14, $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 .byte 0x67 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $B, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsllq \$23, $B, $T0 .byte 0x67,0x67 vpmuludq %ymm15, $B, $OVERFLOW vpsubq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 .byte 0x67,0x67 vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $OVERFLOW vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*7(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpmuludq 32*8(%rax), $Y, $ACC7 dec $itr jnz .Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop ret .size avx2_mul_by1_x4,.-avx2_mul_by1_x4 ################################################################################ # void avx2_sqr_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); .type avx2_sqr_x4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_sqr_x4: lea .LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax vmovdqa 32*7(%rax), %ymm14 vmovdqa 32*8(%rax), %ymm15 vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $B vmovdqa 32*1($a_ptr), $ACC1 vmovdqa 32*2($a_ptr), $ACC2 vmovdqa 32*3($a_ptr), $ACC3 vmovdqa 32*4($a_ptr), $ACC4 vmovdqa 32*5($a_ptr), $ACC5 vmovdqa 32*6($a_ptr), $ACC6 vmovdqa 32*7($a_ptr), $ACC7 vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 # 2*$ACC0..7 vmovdqa 32*8($a_ptr), $ACC8 vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*0(%rcx) vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*1(%rcx) vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*2(%rcx) vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*3(%rcx) vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*4(%rcx) vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*5(%rcx) vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*6(%rcx) vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*7(%rcx) #itr 1 vpmuludq $B, $B, $ACC0 vpmuludq $B, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpmuludq $B, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq $B, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq $B, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq $B, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq $B, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpmuludq $B, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq $B, $ACC8, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*1($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 2 vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpmuludq 32*1(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*2(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*2($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 3 vpmuludq $B, $B, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpmuludq 32*2(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpmuludq 32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*3($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 4 vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW vpmuludq 32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*4($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 5 vpmuludq $B, $B, $T0 vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*5($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3+.LAVX2_POLY(%rip), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 6 vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*6($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 7 vpmuludq $B, $B, $T0 vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*7($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 8 vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 vmovdqa 32*8($a_ptr), $B vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 #itr 9 vpmuludq $B, $B, $ACC8 vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 vpxor $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 ret .size avx2_sqr_x4,.-avx2_sqr_x4 ################################################################################ # void avx2_sub_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); .type avx2_sub_x4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_sub_x4: vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $ACC0 lea 160($a_ptr), $a_ptr lea .LAVX2_POLY_x8+128(%rip), %rax lea 128($b_ptr), $b_ptr vmovdqa 32*1-160($a_ptr), $ACC1 vmovdqa 32*2-160($a_ptr), $ACC2 vmovdqa 32*3-160($a_ptr), $ACC3 vmovdqa 32*4-160($a_ptr), $ACC4 vmovdqa 32*5-160($a_ptr), $ACC5 vmovdqa 32*6-160($a_ptr), $ACC6 vmovdqa 32*7-160($a_ptr), $ACC7 vmovdqa 32*8-160($a_ptr), $ACC8 vpaddq 32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq 32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq 32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq 32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq 32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq 32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq 32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq 32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsubq 32*0-128($b_ptr), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsubq 32*1-128($b_ptr), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsubq 32*2-128($b_ptr), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsubq 32*3-128($b_ptr), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsubq 32*4-128($b_ptr), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsubq 32*5-128($b_ptr), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsubq 32*6-128($b_ptr), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsubq 32*7-128($b_ptr), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsubq 32*8-128($b_ptr), $ACC8, $ACC8 ret .size avx2_sub_x4,.-avx2_sub_x4 .type avx2_select_n_store,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_select_n_store: vmovdqa `8+32*9*8`(%rsp), $Y vpor `8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $Y, $Y vpandn $ACC0, $Y, $ACC0 vpandn $ACC1, $Y, $ACC1 vpandn $ACC2, $Y, $ACC2 vpandn $ACC3, $Y, $ACC3 vpandn $ACC4, $Y, $ACC4 vpandn $ACC5, $Y, $ACC5 vpandn $ACC6, $Y, $ACC6 vmovdqa `8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B vpandn $ACC7, $Y, $ACC7 vpandn `8+32*9*8`(%rsp), $B, $B vpandn $ACC8, $Y, $ACC8 vpand 32*0(%rsi), $B, $T0 lea 160(%rsi), %rax vpand 32*1(%rsi), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpand 32*2(%rsi), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpand 32*3(%rsi), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpand 32*4-160(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpand 32*5-160(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpand 32*6-160(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpand 32*7-160(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpand 32*8-160(%rax), $B, $T0 vmovdqa `8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B vpxor $Y, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpand 32*0(%rdx), $B, $Y lea 160(%rdx), %rax vpxor $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 vpand 32*1(%rdx), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpand 32*2(%rdx), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpand 32*3(%rdx), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpand 32*4-160(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpand 32*5-160(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpand 32*6-160(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpand 32*7-160(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpand 32*8-160(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpxor $Y, $ACC8, $ACC8 `&STORE` ret .size avx2_select_n_store,.-avx2_select_n_store ___ $code.=<<___ if (0); # inlined ################################################################################ # void avx2_mul_by2_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); .type avx2_mul_by2_x4,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 avx2_mul_by2_x4: vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $ACC0 lea 160($a_ptr), %rax vmovdqa 32*1($a_ptr), $ACC1 vmovdqa 32*2($a_ptr), $ACC2 vmovdqa 32*3($a_ptr), $ACC3 vmovdqa 32*4-160(%rax), $ACC4 vmovdqa 32*5-160(%rax), $ACC5 vmovdqa 32*6-160(%rax), $ACC6 vmovdqa 32*7-160(%rax), $ACC7 vmovdqa 32*8-160(%rax), $ACC8 vpaddq $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 ret .size avx2_mul_by2_x4,.-avx2_mul_by2_x4 ___ my ($r_ptr_in,$a_ptr_in,$b_ptr_in)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx"); my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr)=("%r8","%r9","%r10"); $code.=<<___; ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4 .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4: mov %rsp, %rax push %rbp vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -16*10(%rsp), %rsp vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; lea -8(%rax), %rbp # Result + 32*0 = Result.X # Result + 32*9 = Result.Y # Result + 32*18 = Result.Z # A + 32*0 = A.X # A + 32*9 = A.Y # A + 32*18 = A.Z # B + 32*0 = B.X # B + 32*9 = B.Y sub \$`32*9*8+32*2+32*8`, %rsp and \$-64, %rsp mov $r_ptr_in, $r_ptr mov $a_ptr_in, $a_ptr mov $b_ptr_in, $b_ptr vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr_in), %ymm0 vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 lea 256($a_ptr_in), %rax # size optimization vpor 32*1($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*2($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*3($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8`(%rsp) vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 vmovdqa 32*0($b_ptr), %ymm0 lea 256($b_ptr), %rax # size optimization vpor 32*1($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*2($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*3($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8+32`(%rsp) # Z1^2 = Z1*Z1 lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdi lea `32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx # temporary vector call avx2_sqr_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # U2 = X2*Z1^2 lea `32*9*0`($b_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 #call avx2_normalize `&STORE` # S2 = Z1*Z1^2 = Z1^3 lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # S2 = S2*Y2 = Y2*Z1^3 lea `32*9*1`($b_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # H = U2 - U1 = U2 - X1 lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # R = S2 - S1 = S2 - Y1 lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*2`($r_ptr), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize lea .LONE(%rip), %rsi lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rdx call avx2_select_n_store # R^2 = R^2 lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*6`(%rsp), %rdi lea `32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx # temporary vector call avx2_sqr_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # H^2 = H^2 lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sqr_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # H^3 = H^2*H lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # U2 = U1*H^2 lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 #call avx2_normalize `&STORE` # Hsqr = U2*2 #lea 32*9*0(%rsp), %rsi #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rdi #call avx2_mul_by2_x4 vpaddq $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 # inlined avx2_mul_by2_x4 lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 call avx2_normalize_n_store # X3 = R^2 - H^3 #lea 32*9*6(%rsp), %rsi #lea 32*9*7(%rsp), %rdx #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rcx #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi #call avx2_sub_x4 #NORMALIZE #STORE # X3 = X3 - U2*2 #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi #call avx2_sub_x4 #NORMALIZE #STORE lea `32*9*6+128`(%rsp), %rsi lea .LAVX2_POLY_x2+128(%rip), %rax lea `32*9*7+128`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*5+128`(%rsp), %rcx lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdi vmovdqa 32*0-128(%rsi), $ACC0 vmovdqa 32*1-128(%rsi), $ACC1 vmovdqa 32*2-128(%rsi), $ACC2 vmovdqa 32*3-128(%rsi), $ACC3 vmovdqa 32*4-128(%rsi), $ACC4 vmovdqa 32*5-128(%rsi), $ACC5 vmovdqa 32*6-128(%rsi), $ACC6 vmovdqa 32*7-128(%rsi), $ACC7 vmovdqa 32*8-128(%rsi), $ACC8 vpaddq 32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq 32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq 32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq 32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq 32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq 32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq 32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq 32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsubq 32*0-128(%rdx), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsubq 32*1-128(%rdx), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsubq 32*2-128(%rdx), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsubq 32*3-128(%rdx), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsubq 32*4-128(%rdx), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsubq 32*5-128(%rdx), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsubq 32*6-128(%rdx), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsubq 32*7-128(%rdx), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsubq 32*8-128(%rdx), $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsubq 32*0-128(%rcx), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsubq 32*1-128(%rcx), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsubq 32*2-128(%rcx), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsubq 32*3-128(%rcx), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsubq 32*4-128(%rcx), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsubq 32*5-128(%rcx), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsubq 32*6-128(%rcx), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsubq 32*7-128(%rcx), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsubq 32*8-128(%rcx), $ACC8, $ACC8 call avx2_normalize lea 32*0($b_ptr), %rsi lea 32*0($a_ptr), %rdx call avx2_select_n_store # H = U2 - X3 lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize lea 32*9($b_ptr), %rsi lea 32*9($a_ptr), %rdx call avx2_select_n_store #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi #call avx2_mul_by1_x4 #NORMALIZE #STORE lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi call avx2_mul_by1_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6, -16*10(%rbp) movaps %xmm7, -16*9(%rbp) movaps %xmm8, -16*8(%rbp) movaps %xmm9, -16*7(%rbp) movaps %xmm10, -16*6(%rbp) movaps %xmm11, -16*5(%rbp) movaps %xmm12, -16*4(%rbp) movaps %xmm13, -16*3(%rbp) movaps %xmm14, -16*2(%rbp) movaps %xmm15, -16*1(%rbp) ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rbp, %rsp pop %rbp ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4 .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4,\@function,3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4: mov %rsp, %rax push %rbp vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -16*10(%rsp), %rsp vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; lea -8(%rax), %rbp # Result + 32*0 = Result.X # Result + 32*9 = Result.Y # Result + 32*18 = Result.Z # A + 32*0 = A.X # A + 32*9 = A.Y # B + 32*0 = B.X # B + 32*9 = B.Y sub \$`32*9*8+32*2+32*8`, %rsp and \$-64, %rsp mov $r_ptr_in, $r_ptr mov $a_ptr_in, $a_ptr mov $b_ptr_in, $b_ptr vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr_in), %ymm0 vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 lea 256($a_ptr_in), %rax # size optimization vpor 32*1($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*2($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*3($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8`(%rsp) vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 vmovdqa 32*0($b_ptr), %ymm0 lea 256($b_ptr), %rax # size optimization vpor 32*1($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*2($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*3($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8+32`(%rsp) # H = U2 - U1 = X2 - X1 lea `32*9*0`($b_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # R = S2 - S1 = Y2 - Y1 lea `32*9*1`($b_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 = H lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*2`($r_ptr), %rdi call avx2_mul_by1_x4 call avx2_normalize vmovdqa `32*9*8`(%rsp), $B vpor `32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B, $B vpandn $ACC0, $B, $ACC0 lea .LONE+128(%rip), %rax vpandn $ACC1, $B, $ACC1 vpandn $ACC2, $B, $ACC2 vpandn $ACC3, $B, $ACC3 vpandn $ACC4, $B, $ACC4 vpandn $ACC5, $B, $ACC5 vpandn $ACC6, $B, $ACC6 vpandn $ACC7, $B, $ACC7 vpand 32*0-128(%rax), $B, $T0 vpandn $ACC8, $B, $ACC8 vpand 32*1-128(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC0, $ACC0 vpand 32*2-128(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpand 32*3-128(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpand 32*4-128(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpand 32*5-128(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpand 32*6-128(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpand 32*7-128(%rax), $B, $Y vpxor $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpand 32*8-128(%rax), $B, $T0 vpxor $Y, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpxor $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 `&STORE` # R^2 = R^2 lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*6`(%rsp), %rdi lea `32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx # temporary vector call avx2_sqr_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # H^2 = H^2 lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sqr_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # H^3 = H^2*H lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # U2 = U1*H^2 lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 #call avx2_normalize `&STORE` # Hsqr = U2*2 #lea 32*9*0(%rsp), %rsi #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rdi #call avx2_mul_by2_x4 vpaddq $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 # inlined avx2_mul_by2_x4 lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 call avx2_normalize_n_store # X3 = R^2 - H^3 #lea 32*9*6(%rsp), %rsi #lea 32*9*7(%rsp), %rdx #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rcx #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi #call avx2_sub_x4 #NORMALIZE #STORE # X3 = X3 - U2*2 #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi #call avx2_sub_x4 #NORMALIZE #STORE lea `32*9*6+128`(%rsp), %rsi lea .LAVX2_POLY_x2+128(%rip), %rax lea `32*9*7+128`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*5+128`(%rsp), %rcx lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdi vmovdqa 32*0-128(%rsi), $ACC0 vmovdqa 32*1-128(%rsi), $ACC1 vmovdqa 32*2-128(%rsi), $ACC2 vmovdqa 32*3-128(%rsi), $ACC3 vmovdqa 32*4-128(%rsi), $ACC4 vmovdqa 32*5-128(%rsi), $ACC5 vmovdqa 32*6-128(%rsi), $ACC6 vmovdqa 32*7-128(%rsi), $ACC7 vmovdqa 32*8-128(%rsi), $ACC8 vpaddq 32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpaddq 32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpaddq 32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpaddq 32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpaddq 32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpaddq 32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpaddq 32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpaddq 32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpaddq 32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsubq 32*0-128(%rdx), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsubq 32*1-128(%rdx), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsubq 32*2-128(%rdx), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsubq 32*3-128(%rdx), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsubq 32*4-128(%rdx), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsubq 32*5-128(%rdx), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsubq 32*6-128(%rdx), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsubq 32*7-128(%rdx), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsubq 32*8-128(%rdx), $ACC8, $ACC8 vpsubq 32*0-128(%rcx), $ACC0, $ACC0 vpsubq 32*1-128(%rcx), $ACC1, $ACC1 vpsubq 32*2-128(%rcx), $ACC2, $ACC2 vpsubq 32*3-128(%rcx), $ACC3, $ACC3 vpsubq 32*4-128(%rcx), $ACC4, $ACC4 vpsubq 32*5-128(%rcx), $ACC5, $ACC5 vpsubq 32*6-128(%rcx), $ACC6, $ACC6 vpsubq 32*7-128(%rcx), $ACC7, $ACC7 vpsubq 32*8-128(%rcx), $ACC8, $ACC8 call avx2_normalize lea 32*0($b_ptr), %rsi lea 32*0($a_ptr), %rdx call avx2_select_n_store # H = U2 - X3 lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # H = H*R lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # S2 = S1 * H^3 lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store # lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi call avx2_sub_x4 call avx2_normalize lea 32*9($b_ptr), %rsi lea 32*9($a_ptr), %rdx call avx2_select_n_store #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi #call avx2_mul_by1_x4 #NORMALIZE #STORE lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rsi lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi call avx2_mul_by1_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps %xmm6, -16*10(%rbp) movaps %xmm7, -16*9(%rbp) movaps %xmm8, -16*8(%rbp) movaps %xmm9, -16*7(%rbp) movaps %xmm10, -16*6(%rbp) movaps %xmm11, -16*5(%rbp) movaps %xmm12, -16*4(%rbp) movaps %xmm13, -16*3(%rbp) movaps %xmm14, -16*2(%rbp) movaps %xmm15, -16*1(%rbp) ___ $code.=<<___; mov %rbp, %rsp pop %rbp ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4 ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK lea .LTO_MONT_AVX2(%rip), %rdx call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont,\@function,2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK lea .LFROM_MONT_AVX2(%rip), %rdx call avx2_mul_x4 call avx2_normalize_n_store vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(void* RESULTx4); .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1 .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1,\@function,1 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1: lea .LONE+128(%rip), %rax lea 128(%rdi), %rdi vzeroupper vmovdqa 32*0-128(%rax), %ymm0 vmovdqa 32*1-128(%rax), %ymm1 vmovdqa 32*2-128(%rax), %ymm2 vmovdqa 32*3-128(%rax), %ymm3 vmovdqa 32*4-128(%rax), %ymm4 vmovdqa 32*5-128(%rax), %ymm5 vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*0-128(%rdi) vmovdqa 32*6-128(%rax), %ymm0 vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*1-128(%rdi) vmovdqa 32*7-128(%rax), %ymm1 vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*2-128(%rdi) vmovdqa 32*8-128(%rax), %ymm2 vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*3-128(%rdi) vmovdqa %ymm4, 32*4-128(%rdi) vmovdqa %ymm5, 32*5-128(%rdi) vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*6-128(%rdi) vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*7-128(%rdi) vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*8-128(%rdi) vzeroupper ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1 ___ } { ################################################################################ # void ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(void* RESULT, void *in, # int index0, int index1, int index2, int index3); ################################################################################ my ($val,$in_t,$index0,$index1,$index2,$index3)=("%rdi","%rsi","%edx","%ecx","%r8d","%r9d"); my ($INDEX0,$INDEX1,$INDEX2,$INDEX3)=map("%ymm$_",(0..3)); my ($R0a,$R0b,$R1a,$R1b,$R2a,$R2b,$R3a,$R3b)=map("%ymm$_",(4..11)); my ($M0,$T0,$T1,$TMP0)=map("%ymm$_",(12..15)); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,\@function,6 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7: vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) ___ $code.=<<___; lea .LIntOne(%rip), %rax vmovd $index0, %xmm0 vmovd $index1, %xmm1 vmovd $index2, %xmm2 vmovd $index3, %xmm3 vpxor $R0a, $R0a, $R0a vpxor $R0b, $R0b, $R0b vpxor $R1a, $R1a, $R1a vpxor $R1b, $R1b, $R1b vpxor $R2a, $R2a, $R2a vpxor $R2b, $R2b, $R2b vpxor $R3a, $R3a, $R3a vpxor $R3b, $R3b, $R3b vmovdqa (%rax), $M0 vpermd $INDEX0, $R0a, $INDEX0 vpermd $INDEX1, $R0a, $INDEX1 vpermd $INDEX2, $R0a, $INDEX2 vpermd $INDEX3, $R0a, $INDEX3 mov \$64, %ecx lea 112($val), $val # size optimization jmp .Lmulti_select_loop_avx2 # INDEX=0, corresponds to the point at infty (0,0) .align 32 .Lmulti_select_loop_avx2: vpcmpeqd $INDEX0, $M0, $TMP0 vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*0`($in_t), $T0 vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*0`($in_t), $T1 vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 vpxor $T0, $R0a, $R0a vpxor $T1, $R0b, $R0b vpcmpeqd $INDEX1, $M0, $TMP0 vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*1`($in_t), $T0 vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*1`($in_t), $T1 vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 vpxor $T0, $R1a, $R1a vpxor $T1, $R1b, $R1b vpcmpeqd $INDEX2, $M0, $TMP0 vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*2`($in_t), $T0 vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*2`($in_t), $T1 vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 vpxor $T0, $R2a, $R2a vpxor $T1, $R2b, $R2b vpcmpeqd $INDEX3, $M0, $TMP0 vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*3`($in_t), $T0 vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*3`($in_t), $T1 vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 vpxor $T0, $R3a, $R3a vpxor $T1, $R3b, $R3b vpaddd (%rax), $M0, $M0 # increment lea 32*2($in_t), $in_t dec %ecx jnz .Lmulti_select_loop_avx2 vmovdqu $R0a, 32*0-112($val) vmovdqu $R0b, 32*1-112($val) vmovdqu $R1a, 32*2-112($val) vmovdqu $R1b, 32*3-112($val) vmovdqu $R2a, 32*4-112($val) vmovdqu $R2b, 32*5-112($val) vmovdqu $R3a, 32*6-112($val) vmovdqu $R3b, 32*7-112($val) vzeroupper ___ $code.=<<___ if ($win64); movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp ___ $code.=<<___; ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 .extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P .globl ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible .type ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent .align 32 ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible: mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax shr \$5,%eax and \$1,%eax ret .size ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,.-ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible ___ } }} else {{ # assembler is too old $code.=<<___; .text .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4 .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4 .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1 .globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 .type ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert: ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back: ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4: ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4: ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont: ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont: ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1: ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7: .byte 0x0f,0x0b # ud2 ret .size ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 .globl ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible .type ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible: xor %eax,%eax ret .size ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,.-ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible ___ }} foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.pl0000755000000000000000000023070113176625657020735 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # ECP_NISTZ256 module for SPARCv9. # # February 2015. # # Original ECP_NISTZ256 submission targeting x86_64 is detailed in # http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. In the process of adaptation # original .c module was made 32-bit savvy in order to make this # implementation possible. # # with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM # UltraSPARC III +12-18% # SPARC T4 +99-550% (+66-150% on 32-bit Solaris) # # Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending # on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, server-side # operation. Keep in mind that +200% means 3x improvement. $output = pop; open STDOUT,">$output"; $code.=<<___; #include "sparc_arch.h" #define LOCALS (STACK_BIAS+STACK_FRAME) #ifdef __arch64__ .register %g2,#scratch .register %g3,#scratch # define STACK64_FRAME STACK_FRAME # define LOCALS64 LOCALS #else # define STACK64_FRAME (2047+192) # define LOCALS64 STACK64_FRAME #endif .section ".text",#alloc,#execinstr ___ ######################################################################## # Convert ecp_nistz256_table.c to layout expected by ecp_nistz_gather_w7 # $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; open TABLE,") { s/TOBN\(\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+),\s*(0x[0-9a-f]+)\s*\)/push @arr,hex($2),hex($1)/geo; } close TABLE; # See ecp_nistz256_table.c for explanation for why it's 64*16*37. # 64*16*37-1 is because $#arr returns last valid index or @arr, not # amount of elements. die "insane number of elements" if ($#arr != 64*16*37-1); $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_precomputed .align 4096 ecp_nistz256_precomputed: ___ ######################################################################## # this conversion smashes P256_POINT_AFFINE by individual bytes with # 64 byte interval, similar to # 1111222233334444 # 1234123412341234 for(1..37) { @tbl = splice(@arr,0,64*16); for($i=0;$i<64;$i++) { undef @line; for($j=0;$j<64;$j++) { push @line,(@tbl[$j*16+$i/4]>>(($i%4)*8))&0xff; } $code.=".byte\t"; $code.=join(',',map { sprintf "0x%02x",$_} @line); $code.="\n"; } } {{{ my ($rp,$ap,$bp)=map("%i$_",(0..2)); my @acc=map("%l$_",(0..7)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4,$t5,$t6,$t7)=(map("%o$_",(0..5)),"%g4","%g5"); my ($bi,$a0,$mask,$carry)=(map("%i$_",(3..5)),"%g1"); my ($rp_real,$ap_real)=("%g2","%g3"); $code.=<<___; .type ecp_nistz256_precomputed,#object .size ecp_nistz256_precomputed,.-ecp_nistz256_precomputed .align 64 .LRR: ! 2^512 mod P precomputed for NIST P256 polynomial .long 0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffb .long 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 0x00000004 .Lone: .long 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .asciz "ECP_NISTZ256 for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by " ! void ecp_nistz256_to_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_to_mont .align 64 ecp_nistz256_to_mont: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp nop 1: call .+8 add %o7,.LRR-1b,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont nop ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_to_mont,#function .size ecp_nistz256_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_to_mont ! void ecp_nistz256_from_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_from_mont .align 32 ecp_nistz256_from_mont: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp nop 1: call .+8 add %o7,.Lone-1b,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont nop ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_from_mont,#function .size ecp_nistz256_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_from_mont ! void ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8], ! const BN_ULONG %i2[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_mont .align 32 ecp_nistz256_mul_mont: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp nop call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont nop ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,#function .size ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! void ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i2[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont .align 32 ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp mov $ap,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont nop ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,#function .size ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont ___ ######################################################################## # Special thing to keep in mind is that $t0-$t7 hold 64-bit values, # while all others are meant to keep 32. "Meant to" means that additions # to @acc[0-7] do "contaminate" upper bits, but they are cleared before # they can affect outcome (follow 'and' with $mask). Also keep in mind # that addition with carry is addition with 32-bit carry, even though # CPU is 64-bit. [Addition with 64-bit carry was introduced in T3, see # below for VIS3 code paths.] $code.=<<___; .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont: ld [$bp+0],$bi ! b[0] mov -1,$mask ld [$ap+0],$a0 srl $mask,0,$mask ! 0xffffffff ld [$ap+4],$t1 ld [$ap+8],$t2 ld [$ap+12],$t3 ld [$ap+16],$t4 ld [$ap+20],$t5 ld [$ap+24],$t6 ld [$ap+28],$t7 mulx $a0,$bi,$t0 ! a[0-7]*b[0], 64-bit results mulx $t1,$bi,$t1 mulx $t2,$bi,$t2 mulx $t3,$bi,$t3 mulx $t4,$bi,$t4 mulx $t5,$bi,$t5 mulx $t6,$bi,$t6 mulx $t7,$bi,$t7 srlx $t0,32,@acc[1] ! extract high parts srlx $t1,32,@acc[2] srlx $t2,32,@acc[3] srlx $t3,32,@acc[4] srlx $t4,32,@acc[5] srlx $t5,32,@acc[6] srlx $t6,32,@acc[7] srlx $t7,32,@acc[0] ! "@acc[8]" mov 0,$carry ___ for($i=1;$i<8;$i++) { $code.=<<___; addcc @acc[1],$t1,@acc[1] ! accumulate high parts ld [$bp+4*$i],$bi ! b[$i] ld [$ap+4],$t1 ! re-load a[1-7] addccc @acc[2],$t2,@acc[2] addccc @acc[3],$t3,@acc[3] ld [$ap+8],$t2 ld [$ap+12],$t3 addccc @acc[4],$t4,@acc[4] addccc @acc[5],$t5,@acc[5] ld [$ap+16],$t4 ld [$ap+20],$t5 addccc @acc[6],$t6,@acc[6] addccc @acc[7],$t7,@acc[7] ld [$ap+24],$t6 ld [$ap+28],$t7 addccc @acc[0],$carry,@acc[0] ! "@acc[8]" addc %g0,%g0,$carry ___ # Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating # result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and # omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to # be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic" # digit being equal to least significant word, it can be # performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed: # # ffff.0001.0000.0000.0000.ffff.ffff.ffff # * abcd # + xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd # # Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we # rewrite above as: # # xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.abcd # + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.0000.0000.0000 # - abcd.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.abcd # # or marking redundant operations: # # xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxxx.---- # + abcd.0000.abcd.0000.0000.abcd.----.----.---- # - abcd.----.----.----.----.----.----.---- $code.=<<___; ! multiplication-less reduction addcc @acc[3],$t0,@acc[3] ! r[3]+=r[0] addccc @acc[4],%g0,@acc[4] ! r[4]+=0 and @acc[1],$mask,@acc[1] and @acc[2],$mask,@acc[2] addccc @acc[5],%g0,@acc[5] ! r[5]+=0 addccc @acc[6],$t0,@acc[6] ! r[6]+=r[0] and @acc[3],$mask,@acc[3] and @acc[4],$mask,@acc[4] addccc @acc[7],%g0,@acc[7] ! r[7]+=0 addccc @acc[0],$t0,@acc[0] ! r[8]+=r[0] "@acc[8]" and @acc[5],$mask,@acc[5] and @acc[6],$mask,@acc[6] addc $carry,%g0,$carry ! top-most carry subcc @acc[7],$t0,@acc[7] ! r[7]-=r[0] subccc @acc[0],%g0,@acc[0] ! r[8]-=0 "@acc[8]" subc $carry,%g0,$carry ! top-most carry and @acc[7],$mask,@acc[7] and @acc[0],$mask,@acc[0] ! "@acc[8]" ___ push(@acc,shift(@acc)); # rotate registers to "omit" acc[0] $code.=<<___; mulx $a0,$bi,$t0 ! a[0-7]*b[$i], 64-bit results mulx $t1,$bi,$t1 mulx $t2,$bi,$t2 mulx $t3,$bi,$t3 mulx $t4,$bi,$t4 mulx $t5,$bi,$t5 mulx $t6,$bi,$t6 mulx $t7,$bi,$t7 add @acc[0],$t0,$t0 ! accumulate low parts, can't overflow add @acc[1],$t1,$t1 srlx $t0,32,@acc[1] ! extract high parts add @acc[2],$t2,$t2 srlx $t1,32,@acc[2] add @acc[3],$t3,$t3 srlx $t2,32,@acc[3] add @acc[4],$t4,$t4 srlx $t3,32,@acc[4] add @acc[5],$t5,$t5 srlx $t4,32,@acc[5] add @acc[6],$t6,$t6 srlx $t5,32,@acc[6] add @acc[7],$t7,$t7 srlx $t6,32,@acc[7] srlx $t7,32,@acc[0] ! "@acc[8]" ___ } $code.=<<___; addcc @acc[1],$t1,@acc[1] ! accumulate high parts addccc @acc[2],$t2,@acc[2] addccc @acc[3],$t3,@acc[3] addccc @acc[4],$t4,@acc[4] addccc @acc[5],$t5,@acc[5] addccc @acc[6],$t6,@acc[6] addccc @acc[7],$t7,@acc[7] addccc @acc[0],$carry,@acc[0] ! "@acc[8]" addc %g0,%g0,$carry addcc @acc[3],$t0,@acc[3] ! multiplication-less reduction addccc @acc[4],%g0,@acc[4] addccc @acc[5],%g0,@acc[5] addccc @acc[6],$t0,@acc[6] addccc @acc[7],%g0,@acc[7] addccc @acc[0],$t0,@acc[0] ! "@acc[8]" addc $carry,%g0,$carry subcc @acc[7],$t0,@acc[7] subccc @acc[0],%g0,@acc[0] ! "@acc[8]" subc $carry,%g0,$carry ! top-most carry ___ push(@acc,shift(@acc)); # rotate registers to omit acc[0] $code.=<<___; ! Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but we do it ! "other way around", namely subtract modulus from result ! and if it borrowed, add modulus back. subcc @acc[0],-1,@acc[0] ! subtract modulus subccc @acc[1],-1,@acc[1] subccc @acc[2],-1,@acc[2] subccc @acc[3],0,@acc[3] subccc @acc[4],0,@acc[4] subccc @acc[5],0,@acc[5] subccc @acc[6],1,@acc[6] subccc @acc[7],-1,@acc[7] subc $carry,0,$carry ! broadcast borrow bit ! Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of ! 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by ! using value of broadcasted borrow and the borrow bit itself. ! To minimize dependency chain we first broadcast and then ! extract the bit by negating (follow $bi). addcc @acc[0],$carry,@acc[0] ! add modulus or zero addccc @acc[1],$carry,@acc[1] neg $carry,$bi st @acc[0],[$rp] addccc @acc[2],$carry,@acc[2] st @acc[1],[$rp+4] addccc @acc[3],0,@acc[3] st @acc[2],[$rp+8] addccc @acc[4],0,@acc[4] st @acc[3],[$rp+12] addccc @acc[5],0,@acc[5] st @acc[4],[$rp+16] addccc @acc[6],$bi,@acc[6] st @acc[5],[$rp+20] addc @acc[7],$carry,@acc[7] st @acc[6],[$rp+24] retl st @acc[7],[$rp+28] .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! void ecp_nistz256_add(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8], ! const BN_ULONG %i2[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_add .align 32 ecp_nistz256_add: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp ld [$ap],@acc[0] ld [$ap+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap+8],@acc[2] ld [$ap+12],@acc[3] ld [$ap+16],@acc[4] ld [$ap+20],@acc[5] ld [$ap+24],@acc[6] call __ecp_nistz256_add ld [$ap+28],@acc[7] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_add,#function .size ecp_nistz256_add,.-ecp_nistz256_add .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_add: ld [$bp+0],$t0 ! b[0] ld [$bp+4],$t1 ld [$bp+8],$t2 ld [$bp+12],$t3 addcc @acc[0],$t0,@acc[0] ld [$bp+16],$t4 ld [$bp+20],$t5 addccc @acc[1],$t1,@acc[1] ld [$bp+24],$t6 ld [$bp+28],$t7 addccc @acc[2],$t2,@acc[2] addccc @acc[3],$t3,@acc[3] addccc @acc[4],$t4,@acc[4] addccc @acc[5],$t5,@acc[5] addccc @acc[6],$t6,@acc[6] addccc @acc[7],$t7,@acc[7] addc %g0,%g0,$carry .Lreduce_by_sub: ! if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus. ! ! But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract ! modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed. subcc @acc[0],-1,@acc[0] subccc @acc[1],-1,@acc[1] subccc @acc[2],-1,@acc[2] subccc @acc[3], 0,@acc[3] subccc @acc[4], 0,@acc[4] subccc @acc[5], 0,@acc[5] subccc @acc[6], 1,@acc[6] subccc @acc[7],-1,@acc[7] subc $carry,0,$carry ! Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of ! 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by ! using value of borrow and its negative. addcc @acc[0],$carry,@acc[0] ! add synthesized modulus addccc @acc[1],$carry,@acc[1] neg $carry,$bi st @acc[0],[$rp] addccc @acc[2],$carry,@acc[2] st @acc[1],[$rp+4] addccc @acc[3],0,@acc[3] st @acc[2],[$rp+8] addccc @acc[4],0,@acc[4] st @acc[3],[$rp+12] addccc @acc[5],0,@acc[5] st @acc[4],[$rp+16] addccc @acc[6],$bi,@acc[6] st @acc[5],[$rp+20] addc @acc[7],$carry,@acc[7] st @acc[6],[$rp+24] retl st @acc[7],[$rp+28] .type __ecp_nistz256_add,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_add,.-__ecp_nistz256_add ! void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp ld [$ap],@acc[0] ld [$ap+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap+8],@acc[2] ld [$ap+12],@acc[3] ld [$ap+16],@acc[4] ld [$ap+20],@acc[5] ld [$ap+24],@acc[6] call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ld [$ap+28],@acc[7] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,#function .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2: addcc @acc[0],@acc[0],@acc[0] ! a+a=2*a addccc @acc[1],@acc[1],@acc[1] addccc @acc[2],@acc[2],@acc[2] addccc @acc[3],@acc[3],@acc[3] addccc @acc[4],@acc[4],@acc[4] addccc @acc[5],@acc[5],@acc[5] addccc @acc[6],@acc[6],@acc[6] addccc @acc[7],@acc[7],@acc[7] b .Lreduce_by_sub addc %g0,%g0,$carry .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ! void ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp ld [$ap],@acc[0] ld [$ap+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap+8],@acc[2] ld [$ap+12],@acc[3] ld [$ap+16],@acc[4] ld [$ap+20],@acc[5] ld [$ap+24],@acc[6] call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 ld [$ap+28],@acc[7] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,#function .size ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3: addcc @acc[0],@acc[0],$t0 ! a+a=2*a addccc @acc[1],@acc[1],$t1 addccc @acc[2],@acc[2],$t2 addccc @acc[3],@acc[3],$t3 addccc @acc[4],@acc[4],$t4 addccc @acc[5],@acc[5],$t5 addccc @acc[6],@acc[6],$t6 addccc @acc[7],@acc[7],$t7 addc %g0,%g0,$carry subcc $t0,-1,$t0 ! .Lreduce_by_sub but without stores subccc $t1,-1,$t1 subccc $t2,-1,$t2 subccc $t3, 0,$t3 subccc $t4, 0,$t4 subccc $t5, 0,$t5 subccc $t6, 1,$t6 subccc $t7,-1,$t7 subc $carry,0,$carry addcc $t0,$carry,$t0 ! add synthesized modulus addccc $t1,$carry,$t1 neg $carry,$bi addccc $t2,$carry,$t2 addccc $t3,0,$t3 addccc $t4,0,$t4 addccc $t5,0,$t5 addccc $t6,$bi,$t6 addc $t7,$carry,$t7 addcc $t0,@acc[0],@acc[0] ! 2*a+a=3*a addccc $t1,@acc[1],@acc[1] addccc $t2,@acc[2],@acc[2] addccc $t3,@acc[3],@acc[3] addccc $t4,@acc[4],@acc[4] addccc $t5,@acc[5],@acc[5] addccc $t6,@acc[6],@acc[6] addccc $t7,@acc[7],@acc[7] b .Lreduce_by_sub addc %g0,%g0,$carry .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 ! void ecp_nistz256_sub(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8], ! const BN_ULONG %i2[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_sub .align 32 ecp_nistz256_sub: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp ld [$ap],@acc[0] ld [$ap+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap+8],@acc[2] ld [$ap+12],@acc[3] ld [$ap+16],@acc[4] ld [$ap+20],@acc[5] ld [$ap+24],@acc[6] call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ld [$ap+28],@acc[7] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_sub,#function .size ecp_nistz256_sub,.-ecp_nistz256_sub ! void ecp_nistz256_neg(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_neg .align 32 ecp_nistz256_neg: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp mov $ap,$bp mov 0,@acc[0] mov 0,@acc[1] mov 0,@acc[2] mov 0,@acc[3] mov 0,@acc[4] mov 0,@acc[5] mov 0,@acc[6] call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from mov 0,@acc[7] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_neg,#function .size ecp_nistz256_neg,.-ecp_nistz256_neg .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sub_from: ld [$bp+0],$t0 ! b[0] ld [$bp+4],$t1 ld [$bp+8],$t2 ld [$bp+12],$t3 subcc @acc[0],$t0,@acc[0] ld [$bp+16],$t4 ld [$bp+20],$t5 subccc @acc[1],$t1,@acc[1] subccc @acc[2],$t2,@acc[2] ld [$bp+24],$t6 ld [$bp+28],$t7 subccc @acc[3],$t3,@acc[3] subccc @acc[4],$t4,@acc[4] subccc @acc[5],$t5,@acc[5] subccc @acc[6],$t6,@acc[6] subccc @acc[7],$t7,@acc[7] subc %g0,%g0,$carry ! broadcast borrow bit .Lreduce_by_add: ! if a-b borrows, add modulus. ! ! Note that because mod has special form, i.e. consists of ! 0xffffffff, 1 and 0s, we can conditionally synthesize it by ! using value of broadcasted borrow and the borrow bit itself. ! To minimize dependency chain we first broadcast and then ! extract the bit by negating (follow $bi). addcc @acc[0],$carry,@acc[0] ! add synthesized modulus addccc @acc[1],$carry,@acc[1] neg $carry,$bi st @acc[0],[$rp] addccc @acc[2],$carry,@acc[2] st @acc[1],[$rp+4] addccc @acc[3],0,@acc[3] st @acc[2],[$rp+8] addccc @acc[4],0,@acc[4] st @acc[3],[$rp+12] addccc @acc[5],0,@acc[5] st @acc[4],[$rp+16] addccc @acc[6],$bi,@acc[6] st @acc[5],[$rp+20] addc @acc[7],$carry,@acc[7] st @acc[6],[$rp+24] retl st @acc[7],[$rp+28] .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_from,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_from,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf: ld [$bp+0],$t0 ! b[0] ld [$bp+4],$t1 ld [$bp+8],$t2 ld [$bp+12],$t3 subcc $t0,@acc[0],@acc[0] ld [$bp+16],$t4 ld [$bp+20],$t5 subccc $t1,@acc[1],@acc[1] subccc $t2,@acc[2],@acc[2] ld [$bp+24],$t6 ld [$bp+28],$t7 subccc $t3,@acc[3],@acc[3] subccc $t4,@acc[4],@acc[4] subccc $t5,@acc[5],@acc[5] subccc $t6,@acc[6],@acc[6] subccc $t7,@acc[7],@acc[7] b .Lreduce_by_add subc %g0,%g0,$carry ! broadcast borrow bit .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf ! void ecp_nistz256_div_by_2(BN_ULONG %i0[8],const BN_ULONG %i1[8]); .globl ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_div_by_2: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp ld [$ap],@acc[0] ld [$ap+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap+8],@acc[2] ld [$ap+12],@acc[3] ld [$ap+16],@acc[4] ld [$ap+20],@acc[5] ld [$ap+24],@acc[6] call __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 ld [$ap+28],@acc[7] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,#function .size ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2: ! ret = (a is odd ? a+mod : a) >> 1 and @acc[0],1,$bi neg $bi,$carry addcc @acc[0],$carry,@acc[0] addccc @acc[1],$carry,@acc[1] addccc @acc[2],$carry,@acc[2] addccc @acc[3],0,@acc[3] addccc @acc[4],0,@acc[4] addccc @acc[5],0,@acc[5] addccc @acc[6],$bi,@acc[6] addccc @acc[7],$carry,@acc[7] addc %g0,%g0,$carry ! ret >>= 1 srl @acc[0],1,@acc[0] sll @acc[1],31,$t0 srl @acc[1],1,@acc[1] or @acc[0],$t0,@acc[0] sll @acc[2],31,$t1 srl @acc[2],1,@acc[2] or @acc[1],$t1,@acc[1] sll @acc[3],31,$t2 st @acc[0],[$rp] srl @acc[3],1,@acc[3] or @acc[2],$t2,@acc[2] sll @acc[4],31,$t3 st @acc[1],[$rp+4] srl @acc[4],1,@acc[4] or @acc[3],$t3,@acc[3] sll @acc[5],31,$t4 st @acc[2],[$rp+8] srl @acc[5],1,@acc[5] or @acc[4],$t4,@acc[4] sll @acc[6],31,$t5 st @acc[3],[$rp+12] srl @acc[6],1,@acc[6] or @acc[5],$t5,@acc[5] sll @acc[7],31,$t6 st @acc[4],[$rp+16] srl @acc[7],1,@acc[7] or @acc[6],$t6,@acc[6] sll $carry,31,$t7 st @acc[5],[$rp+20] or @acc[7],$t7,@acc[7] st @acc[6],[$rp+24] retl st @acc[7],[$rp+28] .type __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 ___ ######################################################################## # following subroutines are "literal" implementation of those found in # ecp_nistz256.c # ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp); # { my ($S,$M,$Zsqr,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..3)); # above map() describes stack layout with 4 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. $code.=<<___; #ifdef __PIC__ SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1) #endif .globl ecp_nistz256_point_double .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_double: SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] and %g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK),%g1 cmp %g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK) be ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3 nop save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-32*4,%sp mov $rp,$rp_real mov $ap,$ap_real .Lpoint_double_shortcut: ld [$ap+32],@acc[0] ld [$ap+32+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap+32+8],@acc[2] ld [$ap+32+12],@acc[3] ld [$ap+32+16],@acc[4] ld [$ap+32+20],@acc[5] ld [$ap+32+24],@acc[6] ld [$ap+32+28],@acc[7] call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ! p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp add $ap_real,64,$bp add $ap_real,64,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$rp add $ap_real,0,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_add ! p256_add(M, Zsqr, in_x); add %sp,LOCALS+$M,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(S, S); add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp ld [$ap_real],@acc[0] add %sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$bp ld [$ap_real+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap_real+8],@acc[2] ld [$ap_real+12],@acc[3] ld [$ap_real+16],@acc[4] ld [$ap_real+20],@acc[5] ld [$ap_real+24],@acc[6] ld [$ap_real+28],@acc[7] call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$rp add $ap_real,32,$bp add $ap_real,64,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y); add %sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ! p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0); add $rp_real,64,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$Zsqr,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$M,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$M,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_3 ! p256_mul_by_3(M, M); add %sp,LOCALS+$M,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S); add %sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2 ! p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0); add $rp_real,32,$rp add $ap_real,0,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ! p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); add %sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$M,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$M,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); add $rp_real,0,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$tmp0,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); add $rp_real,0,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf ! p256_sub(S, S, res_x); add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$M,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S, S, M); add %sp,LOCALS+$S,$rp add $rp_real,32,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); add $rp_real,32,$rp ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_point_double,#function .size ecp_nistz256_point_double,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub, $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..11)); my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr); # above map() describes stack layout with 12 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for # !in1infty, !in2infty, result of check for zero and return pointer. my $bp_real=$rp_real; $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_add: SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] and %g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK),%g1 cmp %g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK) be ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3 nop save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-32*12-32,%sp stx $rp,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8] ! off-load $rp mov $ap,$ap_real mov $bp,$bp_real ld [$bp+64],$t0 ! in2_z ld [$bp+64+4],$t1 ld [$bp+64+8],$t2 ld [$bp+64+12],$t3 ld [$bp+64+16],$t4 ld [$bp+64+20],$t5 ld [$bp+64+24],$t6 ld [$bp+64+28],$t7 or $t1,$t0,$t0 or $t3,$t2,$t2 or $t5,$t4,$t4 or $t7,$t6,$t6 or $t2,$t0,$t0 or $t6,$t4,$t4 or $t4,$t0,$t0 ! !in2infty movrnz $t0,-1,$t0 st $t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-12] ld [$ap+64],$t0 ! in1_z ld [$ap+64+4],$t1 ld [$ap+64+8],$t2 ld [$ap+64+12],$t3 ld [$ap+64+16],$t4 ld [$ap+64+20],$t5 ld [$ap+64+24],$t6 ld [$ap+64+28],$t7 or $t1,$t0,$t0 or $t3,$t2,$t2 or $t5,$t4,$t4 or $t7,$t6,$t6 or $t2,$t0,$t0 or $t6,$t4,$t4 or $t4,$t0,$t0 ! !in1infty movrnz $t0,-1,$t0 st $t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16] add $bp_real,64,$bp add $bp_real,64,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$Z2sqr,$rp add $ap_real,64,$bp add $ap_real,64,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$rp add $bp_real,64,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Z2sqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$S1,$rp add $ap_real,64,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp add $ap_real,32,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S1,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); add %sp,LOCALS+$S1,$rp add $bp_real,32,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$S1,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(R, S2, S1); add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$rp or @acc[1],@acc[0],@acc[0] ! see if result is zero or @acc[3],@acc[2],@acc[2] or @acc[5],@acc[4],@acc[4] or @acc[7],@acc[6],@acc[6] or @acc[2],@acc[0],@acc[0] or @acc[6],@acc[4],@acc[4] or @acc[4],@acc[0],@acc[0] st @acc[0],[%fp+STACK_BIAS-20] add $ap_real,0,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Z2sqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$U1,$rp add $bp_real,0,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$U1,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(H, U2, U1); add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$rp or @acc[1],@acc[0],@acc[0] ! see if result is zero or @acc[3],@acc[2],@acc[2] or @acc[5],@acc[4],@acc[4] or @acc[7],@acc[6],@acc[6] or @acc[2],@acc[0],@acc[0] or @acc[6],@acc[4],@acc[4] orcc @acc[4],@acc[0],@acc[0] bne,pt %icc,.Ladd_proceed ! is_equal(U1,U2)? nop ld [%fp+STACK_BIAS-12],$t0 ld [%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1 ld [%fp+STACK_BIAS-20],$t2 andcc $t0,$t1,%g0 be,pt %icc,.Ladd_proceed ! (in1infty || in2infty)? nop andcc $t2,$t2,%g0 be,pt %icc,.Ladd_double ! is_equal(S1,S2)? nop ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp st %g0,[$rp] st %g0,[$rp+4] st %g0,[$rp+8] st %g0,[$rp+12] st %g0,[$rp+16] st %g0,[$rp+20] st %g0,[$rp+24] st %g0,[$rp+28] st %g0,[$rp+32] st %g0,[$rp+32+4] st %g0,[$rp+32+8] st %g0,[$rp+32+12] st %g0,[$rp+32+16] st %g0,[$rp+32+20] st %g0,[$rp+32+24] st %g0,[$rp+32+28] st %g0,[$rp+64] st %g0,[$rp+64+4] st %g0,[$rp+64+8] st %g0,[$rp+64+12] st %g0,[$rp+64+16] st %g0,[$rp+64+20] st %g0,[$rp+64+24] st %g0,[$rp+64+28] b .Ladd_done nop .align 16 .Ladd_double: ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp_real mov $ap_real,$ap b .Lpoint_double_shortcut add %sp,32*(12-4)+32,%sp ! difference in frame sizes .align 16 .Ladd_proceed: add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); add %sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$rp add $ap_real,64,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp add $bp_real,64,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$U1,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf ! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$U2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf ! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S1,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp ld [%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1 ! !in1infty ld [%fp+STACK_BIAS-12],$t2 ! !in2infty ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp ___ for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=8) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ld [%sp+LOCALS+$i],@acc[0] ! res ld [%sp+LOCALS+$i+4],@acc[1] ld [$bp_real+$i],@acc[2] ! in2 ld [$bp_real+$i+4],@acc[3] ld [$ap_real+$i],@acc[4] ! in1 ld [$ap_real+$i+4],@acc[5] movrz $t1,@acc[2],@acc[0] movrz $t1,@acc[3],@acc[1] movrz $t2,@acc[4],@acc[0] movrz $t2,@acc[5],@acc[1] st @acc[0],[$rp+$i] st @acc[1],[$rp+$i+4] ___ } $code.=<<___; .Ladd_done: ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_point_add,#function .size ecp_nistz256_point_add,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..9)); my $Z1sqr = $S2; # above map() describes stack layout with 10 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for # !in1infty, !in2infty, result of check for zero and return pointer. my @ONE_mont=(1,0,0,-1,-1,-1,-2,0); my $bp_real=$rp_real; $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine: SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5) ld [%g1],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] and %g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK),%g1 cmp %g1,(SPARCV9_VIS3|SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK) be ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3 nop save %sp,-STACK_FRAME-32*10-32,%sp stx $rp,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8] ! off-load $rp mov $ap,$ap_real mov $bp,$bp_real ld [$ap+64],$t0 ! in1_z ld [$ap+64+4],$t1 ld [$ap+64+8],$t2 ld [$ap+64+12],$t3 ld [$ap+64+16],$t4 ld [$ap+64+20],$t5 ld [$ap+64+24],$t6 ld [$ap+64+28],$t7 or $t1,$t0,$t0 or $t3,$t2,$t2 or $t5,$t4,$t4 or $t7,$t6,$t6 or $t2,$t0,$t0 or $t6,$t4,$t4 or $t4,$t0,$t0 ! !in1infty movrnz $t0,-1,$t0 st $t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16] ld [$bp],@acc[0] ! in2_x ld [$bp+4],@acc[1] ld [$bp+8],@acc[2] ld [$bp+12],@acc[3] ld [$bp+16],@acc[4] ld [$bp+20],@acc[5] ld [$bp+24],@acc[6] ld [$bp+28],@acc[7] ld [$bp+32],$t0 ! in2_y ld [$bp+32+4],$t1 ld [$bp+32+8],$t2 ld [$bp+32+12],$t3 ld [$bp+32+16],$t4 ld [$bp+32+20],$t5 ld [$bp+32+24],$t6 ld [$bp+32+28],$t7 or @acc[1],@acc[0],@acc[0] or @acc[3],@acc[2],@acc[2] or @acc[5],@acc[4],@acc[4] or @acc[7],@acc[6],@acc[6] or @acc[2],@acc[0],@acc[0] or @acc[6],@acc[4],@acc[4] or @acc[4],@acc[0],@acc[0] or $t1,$t0,$t0 or $t3,$t2,$t2 or $t5,$t4,$t4 or $t7,$t6,$t6 or $t2,$t0,$t0 or $t6,$t4,$t4 or $t4,$t0,$t0 or @acc[0],$t0,$t0 ! !in2infty movrnz $t0,-1,$t0 st $t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-12] add $ap_real,64,$bp add $ap_real,64,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$rp add $bp_real,0,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x); add %sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp add $ap_real,0,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$rp add $ap_real,64,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Z1sqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp add $ap_real,64,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_z,$rp add $bp_real,32,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp add $ap_real,32,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); add %sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$H,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$rp add $ap_real,0,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$U2,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2 ! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add %sp,LOCALS+$Hsqr,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$Rsqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf ! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_x,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$U2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf ! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp add $ap_real,32,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$Hcub,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$R,$bp add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$ap call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont ! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS+$S2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from ! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); add %sp,LOCALS+$res_y,$rp ld [%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1 ! !in1infty ld [%fp+STACK_BIAS-12],$t2 ! !in2infty ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$rp ___ for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=8) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ld [%sp+LOCALS+$i],@acc[0] ! res ld [%sp+LOCALS+$i+4],@acc[1] ld [$bp_real+$i],@acc[2] ! in2 ld [$bp_real+$i+4],@acc[3] ld [$ap_real+$i],@acc[4] ! in1 ld [$ap_real+$i+4],@acc[5] movrz $t1,@acc[2],@acc[0] movrz $t1,@acc[3],@acc[1] movrz $t2,@acc[4],@acc[0] movrz $t2,@acc[5],@acc[1] st @acc[0],[$rp+$i] st @acc[1],[$rp+$i+4] ___ } for(;$i<96;$i+=8) { my $j=($i-64)/4; $code.=<<___; ld [%sp+LOCALS+$i],@acc[0] ! res ld [%sp+LOCALS+$i+4],@acc[1] ld [$ap_real+$i],@acc[4] ! in1 ld [$ap_real+$i+4],@acc[5] movrz $t1,@ONE_mont[$j],@acc[0] movrz $t1,@ONE_mont[$j+1],@acc[1] movrz $t2,@acc[4],@acc[0] movrz $t2,@acc[5],@acc[1] st @acc[0],[$rp+$i] st @acc[1],[$rp+$i+4] ___ } $code.=<<___; ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,#function .size ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine ___ } }}} {{{ my ($out,$inp,$index)=map("%i$_",(0..2)); my $mask="%o0"; $code.=<<___; ! void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5(void *%i0,const P256_POINT *%i1, ! int %i2); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp sll $index,2,$index add $out,$index,$out ld [$inp],%l0 ! X ld [$inp+4],%l1 ld [$inp+8],%l2 ld [$inp+12],%l3 ld [$inp+16],%l4 ld [$inp+20],%l5 ld [$inp+24],%l6 ld [$inp+28],%l7 add $inp,32,$inp st %l0,[$out+64*0-4] st %l1,[$out+64*1-4] st %l2,[$out+64*2-4] st %l3,[$out+64*3-4] st %l4,[$out+64*4-4] st %l5,[$out+64*5-4] st %l6,[$out+64*6-4] st %l7,[$out+64*7-4] add $out,64*8,$out ld [$inp],%l0 ! Y ld [$inp+4],%l1 ld [$inp+8],%l2 ld [$inp+12],%l3 ld [$inp+16],%l4 ld [$inp+20],%l5 ld [$inp+24],%l6 ld [$inp+28],%l7 add $inp,32,$inp st %l0,[$out+64*0-4] st %l1,[$out+64*1-4] st %l2,[$out+64*2-4] st %l3,[$out+64*3-4] st %l4,[$out+64*4-4] st %l5,[$out+64*5-4] st %l6,[$out+64*6-4] st %l7,[$out+64*7-4] add $out,64*8,$out ld [$inp],%l0 ! Z ld [$inp+4],%l1 ld [$inp+8],%l2 ld [$inp+12],%l3 ld [$inp+16],%l4 ld [$inp+20],%l5 ld [$inp+24],%l6 ld [$inp+28],%l7 st %l0,[$out+64*0-4] st %l1,[$out+64*1-4] st %l2,[$out+64*2-4] st %l3,[$out+64*3-4] st %l4,[$out+64*4-4] st %l5,[$out+64*5-4] st %l6,[$out+64*6-4] st %l7,[$out+64*7-4] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,#function .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w5 ! void ecp_nistz256_gather_w5(P256_POINT *%i0,const void *%i1, ! int %i2); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_gather_w5: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp neg $index,$mask srax $mask,63,$mask add $index,$mask,$index sll $index,2,$index add $inp,$index,$inp ld [$inp+64*0],%l0 ld [$inp+64*1],%l1 ld [$inp+64*2],%l2 ld [$inp+64*3],%l3 ld [$inp+64*4],%l4 ld [$inp+64*5],%l5 ld [$inp+64*6],%l6 ld [$inp+64*7],%l7 add $inp,64*8,$inp and %l0,$mask,%l0 and %l1,$mask,%l1 st %l0,[$out] ! X and %l2,$mask,%l2 st %l1,[$out+4] and %l3,$mask,%l3 st %l2,[$out+8] and %l4,$mask,%l4 st %l3,[$out+12] and %l5,$mask,%l5 st %l4,[$out+16] and %l6,$mask,%l6 st %l5,[$out+20] and %l7,$mask,%l7 st %l6,[$out+24] st %l7,[$out+28] add $out,32,$out ld [$inp+64*0],%l0 ld [$inp+64*1],%l1 ld [$inp+64*2],%l2 ld [$inp+64*3],%l3 ld [$inp+64*4],%l4 ld [$inp+64*5],%l5 ld [$inp+64*6],%l6 ld [$inp+64*7],%l7 add $inp,64*8,$inp and %l0,$mask,%l0 and %l1,$mask,%l1 st %l0,[$out] ! Y and %l2,$mask,%l2 st %l1,[$out+4] and %l3,$mask,%l3 st %l2,[$out+8] and %l4,$mask,%l4 st %l3,[$out+12] and %l5,$mask,%l5 st %l4,[$out+16] and %l6,$mask,%l6 st %l5,[$out+20] and %l7,$mask,%l7 st %l6,[$out+24] st %l7,[$out+28] add $out,32,$out ld [$inp+64*0],%l0 ld [$inp+64*1],%l1 ld [$inp+64*2],%l2 ld [$inp+64*3],%l3 ld [$inp+64*4],%l4 ld [$inp+64*5],%l5 ld [$inp+64*6],%l6 ld [$inp+64*7],%l7 and %l0,$mask,%l0 and %l1,$mask,%l1 st %l0,[$out] ! Z and %l2,$mask,%l2 st %l1,[$out+4] and %l3,$mask,%l3 st %l2,[$out+8] and %l4,$mask,%l4 st %l3,[$out+12] and %l5,$mask,%l5 st %l4,[$out+16] and %l6,$mask,%l6 st %l5,[$out+20] and %l7,$mask,%l7 st %l6,[$out+24] st %l7,[$out+28] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,#function .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w5,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w5 ! void ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7(void *%i0,const P256_POINT_AFFINE *%i1, ! int %i2); .globl ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp nop add $out,$index,$out mov 64/4,$index .Loop_scatter_w7: ld [$inp],%l0 add $inp,4,$inp subcc $index,1,$index stb %l0,[$out+64*0-1] srl %l0,8,%l1 stb %l1,[$out+64*1-1] srl %l0,16,%l2 stb %l2,[$out+64*2-1] srl %l0,24,%l3 stb %l3,[$out+64*3-1] bne .Loop_scatter_w7 add $out,64*4,$out ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,#function .size ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 ! void ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(P256_POINT_AFFINE *%i0,const void *%i1, ! int %i2); .globl ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_gather_w7: save %sp,-STACK_FRAME,%sp neg $index,$mask srax $mask,63,$mask add $index,$mask,$index add $inp,$index,$inp mov 64/4,$index .Loop_gather_w7: ldub [$inp+64*0],%l0 prefetch [$inp+3840+64*0],1 subcc $index,1,$index ldub [$inp+64*1],%l1 prefetch [$inp+3840+64*1],1 ldub [$inp+64*2],%l2 prefetch [$inp+3840+64*2],1 ldub [$inp+64*3],%l3 prefetch [$inp+3840+64*3],1 add $inp,64*4,$inp sll %l1,8,%l1 sll %l2,16,%l2 or %l0,%l1,%l0 sll %l3,24,%l3 or %l0,%l2,%l0 or %l0,%l3,%l0 and %l0,$mask,%l0 st %l0,[$out] bne .Loop_gather_w7 add $out,4,$out ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,#function .size ecp_nistz256_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_gather_w7 ___ }}} {{{ ######################################################################## # Following subroutines are VIS3 counterparts of those above that # implement ones found in ecp_nistz256.c. Key difference is that they # use 128-bit muliplication and addition with 64-bit carry, and in order # to do that they perform conversion from uin32_t[8] to uint64_t[4] upon # entry and vice versa on return. # my ($rp,$ap,$bp)=map("%i$_",(0..2)); my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3)=map("%l$_",(0..7)); my ($acc0,$acc1,$acc2,$acc3,$acc4,$acc5)=map("%o$_",(0..5)); my ($bi,$poly1,$poly3,$minus1)=(map("%i$_",(3..5)),"%g1"); my ($rp_real,$ap_real)=("%g2","%g3"); my ($acc6,$acc7)=($bp,$bi); # used in squaring $code.=<<___; .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3: addcc $acc0,$acc0,$acc0 addxccc $acc1,$acc1,$acc1 addxccc $acc2,$acc2,$acc2 addxccc $acc3,$acc3,$acc3 b .Lreduce_by_sub_vis3 addxc %g0,%g0,$acc4 ! did it carry? .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3 .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_add_vis3: ldx [$bp+0],$t0 ldx [$bp+8],$t1 ldx [$bp+16],$t2 ldx [$bp+24],$t3 __ecp_nistz256_add_noload_vis3: addcc $t0,$acc0,$acc0 addxccc $t1,$acc1,$acc1 addxccc $t2,$acc2,$acc2 addxccc $t3,$acc3,$acc3 addxc %g0,%g0,$acc4 ! did it carry? .Lreduce_by_sub_vis3: addcc $acc0,1,$t0 ! add -modulus, i.e. subtract addxccc $acc1,$poly1,$t1 addxccc $acc2,$minus1,$t2 addxccc $acc3,$poly3,$t3 addxc $acc4,$minus1,$acc4 movrz $acc4,$t0,$acc0 ! ret = borrow ? ret : ret-modulus movrz $acc4,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[$rp] movrz $acc4,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[$rp+8] movrz $acc4,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[$rp+16] retl stx $acc3,[$rp+24] .type __ecp_nistz256_add_vis3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_add_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_add_vis3 ! Trouble with subtraction is that there is no subtraction with 64-bit ! borrow, only with 32-bit one. For this reason we "decompose" 64-bit ! $acc0-$acc3 to 32-bit values and pick b[4] in 32-bit pieces. But ! recall that SPARC is big-endian, which is why you'll observe that ! b[4] is accessed as 4-0-12-8-20-16-28-24. And prior reduction we ! "collect" result back to 64-bit $acc0-$acc3. .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3: ld [$bp+4],$t0 ld [$bp+0],$t1 ld [$bp+12],$t2 ld [$bp+8],$t3 srlx $acc0,32,$acc4 not $poly1,$poly1 srlx $acc1,32,$acc5 subcc $acc0,$t0,$acc0 ld [$bp+20],$t0 subccc $acc4,$t1,$acc4 ld [$bp+16],$t1 subccc $acc1,$t2,$acc1 ld [$bp+28],$t2 and $acc0,$poly1,$acc0 subccc $acc5,$t3,$acc5 ld [$bp+24],$t3 sllx $acc4,32,$acc4 and $acc1,$poly1,$acc1 sllx $acc5,32,$acc5 or $acc0,$acc4,$acc0 srlx $acc2,32,$acc4 or $acc1,$acc5,$acc1 srlx $acc3,32,$acc5 subccc $acc2,$t0,$acc2 subccc $acc4,$t1,$acc4 subccc $acc3,$t2,$acc3 and $acc2,$poly1,$acc2 subccc $acc5,$t3,$acc5 sllx $acc4,32,$acc4 and $acc3,$poly1,$acc3 sllx $acc5,32,$acc5 or $acc2,$acc4,$acc2 subc %g0,%g0,$acc4 ! did it borrow? b .Lreduce_by_add_vis3 or $acc3,$acc5,$acc3 .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3: ld [$bp+4],$t0 ld [$bp+0],$t1 ld [$bp+12],$t2 ld [$bp+8],$t3 srlx $acc0,32,$acc4 not $poly1,$poly1 srlx $acc1,32,$acc5 subcc $t0,$acc0,$acc0 ld [$bp+20],$t0 subccc $t1,$acc4,$acc4 ld [$bp+16],$t1 subccc $t2,$acc1,$acc1 ld [$bp+28],$t2 and $acc0,$poly1,$acc0 subccc $t3,$acc5,$acc5 ld [$bp+24],$t3 sllx $acc4,32,$acc4 and $acc1,$poly1,$acc1 sllx $acc5,32,$acc5 or $acc0,$acc4,$acc0 srlx $acc2,32,$acc4 or $acc1,$acc5,$acc1 srlx $acc3,32,$acc5 subccc $t0,$acc2,$acc2 subccc $t1,$acc4,$acc4 subccc $t2,$acc3,$acc3 and $acc2,$poly1,$acc2 subccc $t3,$acc5,$acc5 sllx $acc4,32,$acc4 and $acc3,$poly1,$acc3 sllx $acc5,32,$acc5 or $acc2,$acc4,$acc2 subc %g0,%g0,$acc4 ! did it borrow? or $acc3,$acc5,$acc3 .Lreduce_by_add_vis3: addcc $acc0,-1,$t0 ! add modulus not $poly3,$t3 addxccc $acc1,$poly1,$t1 not $poly1,$poly1 ! restore $poly1 addxccc $acc2,%g0,$t2 addxc $acc3,$t3,$t3 movrnz $acc4,$t0,$acc0 ! if a-b borrowed, ret = ret+mod movrnz $acc4,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[$rp] movrnz $acc4,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[$rp+8] movrnz $acc4,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[$rp+16] retl stx $acc3,[$rp+24] .type __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3 .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3: ! ret = (a is odd ? a+mod : a) >> 1 not $poly1,$t1 not $poly3,$t3 and $acc0,1,$acc5 addcc $acc0,-1,$t0 ! add modulus addxccc $acc1,$t1,$t1 addxccc $acc2,%g0,$t2 addxccc $acc3,$t3,$t3 addxc %g0,%g0,$acc4 ! carry bit movrnz $acc5,$t0,$acc0 movrnz $acc5,$t1,$acc1 movrnz $acc5,$t2,$acc2 movrnz $acc5,$t3,$acc3 movrz $acc5,%g0,$acc4 ! ret >>= 1 srlx $acc0,1,$acc0 sllx $acc1,63,$t0 srlx $acc1,1,$acc1 or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 sllx $acc2,63,$t1 srlx $acc2,1,$acc2 or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 sllx $acc3,63,$t2 stx $acc0,[$rp] srlx $acc3,1,$acc3 or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 sllx $acc4,63,$t3 ! don't forget carry bit stx $acc1,[$rp+8] or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[$rp+16] retl stx $acc3,[$rp+24] .type __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3 ! compared to __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont it's almost 4x smaller and ! 4x faster [on T4]... .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3: mulx $a0,$bi,$acc0 not $poly3,$poly3 ! 0xFFFFFFFF00000001 umulxhi $a0,$bi,$t0 mulx $a1,$bi,$acc1 umulxhi $a1,$bi,$t1 mulx $a2,$bi,$acc2 umulxhi $a2,$bi,$t2 mulx $a3,$bi,$acc3 umulxhi $a3,$bi,$t3 ldx [$bp+8],$bi ! b[1] addcc $acc1,$t0,$acc1 ! accumulate high parts of multiplication sllx $acc0,32,$t0 addxccc $acc2,$t1,$acc2 srlx $acc0,32,$t1 addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc3 addxc %g0,$t3,$acc4 mov 0,$acc5 ___ for($i=1;$i<4;$i++) { # Reduction iteration is normally performed by accumulating # result of multiplication of modulus by "magic" digit [and # omitting least significant word, which is guaranteed to # be 0], but thanks to special form of modulus and "magic" # digit being equal to least significant word, it can be # performed with additions and subtractions alone. Indeed: # # ffff0001.00000000.0000ffff.ffffffff # * abcdefgh # + xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh # # Now observing that ff..ff*x = (2^n-1)*x = 2^n*x-x, we # rewrite above as: # # xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.abcdefgh # + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000 # - 0000abcd.efgh0000.00000000.00000000.abcdefgh # # or marking redundant operations: # # xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxx.-------- # + abcdefgh.abcdefgh.0000abcd.efgh0000.-------- # - 0000abcd.efgh0000.--------.--------.-------- # ^^^^^^^^ but this word is calculated with umulxhi, because # there is no subtract with 64-bit borrow:-( $code.=<<___; sub $acc0,$t0,$t2 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part umulxhi $acc0,$poly3,$t3 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part addcc $acc1,$t0,$acc0 ! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] mulx $a0,$bi,$t0 addxccc $acc2,$t1,$acc1 mulx $a1,$bi,$t1 addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc2 ! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001 mulx $a2,$bi,$t2 addxccc $acc4,$t3,$acc3 mulx $a3,$bi,$t3 addxc $acc5,%g0,$acc4 addcc $acc0,$t0,$acc0 ! accumulate low parts of multiplication umulxhi $a0,$bi,$t0 addxccc $acc1,$t1,$acc1 umulxhi $a1,$bi,$t1 addxccc $acc2,$t2,$acc2 umulxhi $a2,$bi,$t2 addxccc $acc3,$t3,$acc3 umulxhi $a3,$bi,$t3 addxc $acc4,%g0,$acc4 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($i<3); ldx [$bp+8*($i+1)],$bi ! bp[$i+1] ___ $code.=<<___; addcc $acc1,$t0,$acc1 ! accumulate high parts of multiplication sllx $acc0,32,$t0 addxccc $acc2,$t1,$acc2 srlx $acc0,32,$t1 addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc3 addxccc $acc4,$t3,$acc4 addxc %g0,%g0,$acc5 ___ } $code.=<<___; sub $acc0,$t0,$t2 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part umulxhi $acc0,$poly3,$t3 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part addcc $acc1,$t0,$acc0 ! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] addxccc $acc2,$t1,$acc1 addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc2 ! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001 addxccc $acc4,$t3,$acc3 b .Lmul_final_vis3 ! see below addxc $acc5,%g0,$acc4 .type __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! compared to above __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 it's 21% less ! instructions, but only 14% faster [on T4]... .align 32 __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3: ! | | | | | |a1*a0| | ! | | | | |a2*a0| | | ! | |a3*a2|a3*a0| | | | ! | | | |a2*a1| | | | ! | | |a3*a1| | | | | ! *| | | | | | | | 2| ! +|a3*a3|a2*a2|a1*a1|a0*a0| ! |--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--| ! |A7|A6|A5|A4|A3|A2|A1|A0|, where Ax is $accx, i.e. follow $accx ! ! "can't overflow" below mark carrying into high part of ! multiplication result, which can't overflow, because it ! can never be all ones. mulx $a1,$a0,$acc1 ! a[1]*a[0] umulxhi $a1,$a0,$t1 mulx $a2,$a0,$acc2 ! a[2]*a[0] umulxhi $a2,$a0,$t2 mulx $a3,$a0,$acc3 ! a[3]*a[0] umulxhi $a3,$a0,$acc4 addcc $acc2,$t1,$acc2 ! accumulate high parts of multiplication mulx $a2,$a1,$t0 ! a[2]*a[1] umulxhi $a2,$a1,$t1 addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc3 mulx $a3,$a1,$t2 ! a[3]*a[1] umulxhi $a3,$a1,$t3 addxc $acc4,%g0,$acc4 ! can't overflow mulx $a3,$a2,$acc5 ! a[3]*a[2] not $poly3,$poly3 ! 0xFFFFFFFF00000001 umulxhi $a3,$a2,$acc6 addcc $t2,$t1,$t1 ! accumulate high parts of multiplication mulx $a0,$a0,$acc0 ! a[0]*a[0] addxc $t3,%g0,$t2 ! can't overflow addcc $acc3,$t0,$acc3 ! accumulate low parts of multiplication umulxhi $a0,$a0,$a0 addxccc $acc4,$t1,$acc4 mulx $a1,$a1,$t1 ! a[1]*a[1] addxccc $acc5,$t2,$acc5 umulxhi $a1,$a1,$a1 addxc $acc6,%g0,$acc6 ! can't overflow addcc $acc1,$acc1,$acc1 ! acc[1-6]*=2 mulx $a2,$a2,$t2 ! a[2]*a[2] addxccc $acc2,$acc2,$acc2 umulxhi $a2,$a2,$a2 addxccc $acc3,$acc3,$acc3 mulx $a3,$a3,$t3 ! a[3]*a[3] addxccc $acc4,$acc4,$acc4 umulxhi $a3,$a3,$a3 addxccc $acc5,$acc5,$acc5 addxccc $acc6,$acc6,$acc6 addxc %g0,%g0,$acc7 addcc $acc1,$a0,$acc1 ! +a[i]*a[i] addxccc $acc2,$t1,$acc2 addxccc $acc3,$a1,$acc3 addxccc $acc4,$t2,$acc4 sllx $acc0,32,$t0 addxccc $acc5,$a2,$acc5 srlx $acc0,32,$t1 addxccc $acc6,$t3,$acc6 sub $acc0,$t0,$t2 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part addxc $acc7,$a3,$acc7 ___ for($i=0;$i<3;$i++) { # reductions, see commentary # in multiplication for details $code.=<<___; umulxhi $acc0,$poly3,$t3 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part addcc $acc1,$t0,$acc0 ! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] sllx $acc0,32,$t0 addxccc $acc2,$t1,$acc1 srlx $acc0,32,$t1 addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc2 ! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001 sub $acc0,$t0,$t2 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part addxc %g0,$t3,$acc3 ! cant't overflow ___ } $code.=<<___; umulxhi $acc0,$poly3,$t3 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, high part addcc $acc1,$t0,$acc0 ! +=acc[0]<<96 and omit acc[0] addxccc $acc2,$t1,$acc1 addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc2 ! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001 addxc %g0,$t3,$acc3 ! can't overflow addcc $acc0,$acc4,$acc0 ! accumulate upper half addxccc $acc1,$acc5,$acc1 addxccc $acc2,$acc6,$acc2 addxccc $acc3,$acc7,$acc3 addxc %g0,%g0,$acc4 .Lmul_final_vis3: ! Final step is "if result > mod, subtract mod", but as comparison ! means subtraction, we do the subtraction and then copy outcome ! if it didn't borrow. But note that as we [have to] replace ! subtraction with addition with negative, carry/borrow logic is ! inverse. addcc $acc0,1,$t0 ! add -modulus, i.e. subtract not $poly3,$poly3 ! restore 0x00000000FFFFFFFE addxccc $acc1,$poly1,$t1 addxccc $acc2,$minus1,$t2 addxccc $acc3,$poly3,$t3 addxccc $acc4,$minus1,%g0 ! did it carry? movcs %xcc,$t0,$acc0 movcs %xcc,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[$rp] movcs %xcc,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[$rp+8] movcs %xcc,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[$rp+16] retl stx $acc3,[$rp+24] .type __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3,#function .size __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3,.-__ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ___ ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *inp); # { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in_x,$in_y,$in_z, $S,$M,$Zsqr,$tmp0)=map(32*$_,(0..9)); # above map() describes stack layout with 10 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. $code.=<<___; .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3: save %sp,-STACK64_FRAME-32*10,%sp mov $rp,$rp_real .Ldouble_shortcut_vis3: mov -1,$minus1 mov -2,$poly3 sllx $minus1,32,$poly1 ! 0xFFFFFFFF00000000 srl $poly3,0,$poly3 ! 0x00000000FFFFFFFE ! convert input to uint64_t[4] ld [$ap],$a0 ! in_x ld [$ap+4],$t0 ld [$ap+8],$a1 ld [$ap+12],$t1 ld [$ap+16],$a2 ld [$ap+20],$t2 ld [$ap+24],$a3 ld [$ap+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 ld [$ap+32],$acc0 ! in_y or $a0,$t0,$a0 ld [$ap+32+4],$t0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 ld [$ap+32+8],$acc1 or $a1,$t1,$a1 ld [$ap+32+12],$t1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 ld [$ap+32+16],$acc2 or $a2,$t2,$a2 ld [$ap+32+20],$t2 or $a3,$t3,$a3 ld [$ap+32+24],$acc3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 ld [$ap+32+28],$t3 sllx $t1,32,$t1 stx $a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x] sllx $t2,32,$t2 stx $a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+8] sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+16] or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 stx $a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+24] or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y] or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+8] or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+16] stx $acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+24] ld [$ap+64],$a0 ! in_z ld [$ap+64+4],$t0 ld [$ap+64+8],$a1 ld [$ap+64+12],$t1 ld [$ap+64+16],$a2 ld [$ap+64+20],$t2 ld [$ap+64+24],$a3 ld [$ap+64+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 or $a0,$t0,$a0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 or $a1,$t1,$a1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 or $a2,$t2,$a2 or $a3,$t3,$a3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 stx $a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z] sllx $t2,32,$t2 stx $a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z+8] sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z+16] stx $a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z+24] ! in_y is still in $acc0-$acc3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3 ! p256_mul_by_2(S, in_y); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp ! in_z is still in $a0-$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Zsqr, in_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Zsqr,$rp mov $acc0,$a0 ! put Zsqr aside mov $acc1,$a1 mov $acc2,$a2 mov $acc3,$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$in_x,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_add_vis3 ! p256_add(M, Zsqr, in_x); add %sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp mov $a0,$acc0 ! restore Zsqr ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S],$a0 ! forward load mov $a1,$acc1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S+8],$a1 mov $a2,$acc2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S+16],$a2 mov $a3,$acc3 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$in_x,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3 ! p256_sub(Zsqr, in_x, Zsqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Zsqr,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(S, S); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_z],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_y+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$in_z,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(tmp0, in_z, in_y); add %sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M],$bi ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Zsqr+24],$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3 ! p256_mul_by_2(res_z, tmp0); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$M,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(M, M, Zsqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp mov $acc0,$a0 ! put aside M mov $acc1,$a1 mov $acc2,$a2 mov $acc3,$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp mov $a0,$t0 ! copy M ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S],$a0 ! forward load mov $a1,$t1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S+8],$a1 mov $a2,$t2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S+16],$a2 mov $a3,$t3 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S+24],$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_add_noload_vis3 ! p256_mul_by_3(M, M); add %sp,LOCALS64+$M,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(tmp0, S); add %sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S],$bi ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in_x+24],$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_div_by_2_vis3 ! p256_div_by_2(res_y, tmp0); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$S,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S, S, in_x); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M],$a0 ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M+24],$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3 ! p256_mul_by_2(tmp0, S); add %sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(res_x, M); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$tmp0,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, tmp0); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M],$a0 ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$M+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$S,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3 ! p256_sub(S, S, res_x); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp mov $acc0,$bi call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S, S, M); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x],$a0 ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_y, S, res_y); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$bp ! convert output to uint_32[8] srlx $a0,32,$t0 srlx $a1,32,$t1 st $a0,[$rp_real] ! res_x srlx $a2,32,$t2 st $t0,[$rp_real+4] srlx $a3,32,$t3 st $a1,[$rp_real+8] st $t1,[$rp_real+12] st $a2,[$rp_real+16] st $t2,[$rp_real+20] st $a3,[$rp_real+24] st $t3,[$rp_real+28] ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z],$a0 ! forward load srlx $acc0,32,$t0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z+8],$a1 srlx $acc1,32,$t1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z+16],$a2 srlx $acc2,32,$t2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z+24],$a3 srlx $acc3,32,$t3 st $acc0,[$rp_real+32] ! res_y st $t0, [$rp_real+32+4] st $acc1,[$rp_real+32+8] st $t1, [$rp_real+32+12] st $acc2,[$rp_real+32+16] st $t2, [$rp_real+32+20] st $acc3,[$rp_real+32+24] st $t3, [$rp_real+32+28] srlx $a0,32,$t0 srlx $a1,32,$t1 st $a0,[$rp_real+64] ! res_z srlx $a2,32,$t2 st $t0,[$rp_real+64+4] srlx $a3,32,$t3 st $a1,[$rp_real+64+8] st $t1,[$rp_real+64+12] st $a2,[$rp_real+64+16] st $t2,[$rp_real+64+20] st $a3,[$rp_real+64+24] st $t3,[$rp_real+64+28] ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3,#function .size ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3,.-ecp_nistz256_point_double_vis3 ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y,$in2_z, $H,$Hsqr,$R,$Rsqr,$Hcub, $U1,$U2,$S1,$S2)=map(32*$_,(0..17)); my ($Z1sqr, $Z2sqr) = ($Hsqr, $Rsqr); # above map() describes stack layout with 18 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for # !in1infty, !in2infty and result of check for zero. $code.=<<___; .globl ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3 .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3: save %sp,-STACK64_FRAME-32*18-32,%sp mov $rp,$rp_real mov -1,$minus1 mov -2,$poly3 sllx $minus1,32,$poly1 ! 0xFFFFFFFF00000000 srl $poly3,0,$poly3 ! 0x00000000FFFFFFFE ! convert input to uint64_t[4] ld [$bp],$a0 ! in2_x ld [$bp+4],$t0 ld [$bp+8],$a1 ld [$bp+12],$t1 ld [$bp+16],$a2 ld [$bp+20],$t2 ld [$bp+24],$a3 ld [$bp+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 ld [$bp+32],$acc0 ! in2_y or $a0,$t0,$a0 ld [$bp+32+4],$t0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 ld [$bp+32+8],$acc1 or $a1,$t1,$a1 ld [$bp+32+12],$t1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 ld [$bp+32+16],$acc2 or $a2,$t2,$a2 ld [$bp+32+20],$t2 or $a3,$t3,$a3 ld [$bp+32+24],$acc3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 ld [$bp+32+28],$t3 sllx $t1,32,$t1 stx $a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x] sllx $t2,32,$t2 stx $a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+8] sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+16] or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 stx $a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+24] or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y] or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8] or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16] stx $acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24] ld [$bp+64],$acc0 ! in2_z ld [$bp+64+4],$t0 ld [$bp+64+8],$acc1 ld [$bp+64+12],$t1 ld [$bp+64+16],$acc2 ld [$bp+64+20],$t2 ld [$bp+64+24],$acc3 ld [$bp+64+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 ld [$ap],$a0 ! in1_x or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 ld [$ap+4],$t0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 ld [$ap+8],$a1 or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 ld [$ap+12],$t1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 ld [$ap+16],$a2 or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 ld [$ap+20],$t2 or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 ld [$ap+24],$a3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 ld [$ap+28],$t3 sllx $t1,32,$t1 stx $acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z] sllx $t2,32,$t2 stx $acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8] sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16] stx $acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24] or $acc1,$acc0,$acc0 or $acc3,$acc2,$acc2 or $acc2,$acc0,$acc0 movrnz $acc0,-1,$acc0 ! !in2infty stx $acc0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8] or $a0,$t0,$a0 ld [$ap+32],$acc0 ! in1_y or $a1,$t1,$a1 ld [$ap+32+4],$t0 or $a2,$t2,$a2 ld [$ap+32+8],$acc1 or $a3,$t3,$a3 ld [$ap+32+12],$t1 ld [$ap+32+16],$acc2 ld [$ap+32+20],$t2 ld [$ap+32+24],$acc3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 ld [$ap+32+28],$t3 sllx $t1,32,$t1 stx $a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x] sllx $t2,32,$t2 stx $a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8] sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16] or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 stx $a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24] or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y] or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8] or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16] stx $acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24] ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z],$a0 ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24],$a3 ld [$ap+64],$acc0 ! in1_z ld [$ap+64+4],$t0 ld [$ap+64+8],$acc1 ld [$ap+64+12],$t1 ld [$ap+64+16],$acc2 ld [$ap+64+20],$t2 ld [$ap+64+24],$acc3 ld [$ap+64+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z] or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8] or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16] stx $acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24] or $acc1,$acc0,$acc0 or $acc3,$acc2,$acc2 or $acc2,$acc0,$acc0 movrnz $acc0,-1,$acc0 ! !in1infty stx $acc0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16] call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Z2sqr, in2_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z2sqr,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Z2sqr],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z2sqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S1, Z2sqr, in2_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Z1sqr],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S1],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S1, S1, in1_y); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S2],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Z2sqr],$bi ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(R, S2, S1); add %sp,LOCALS64+$R,$rp or $acc1,$acc0,$acc0 ! see if result is zero or $acc3,$acc2,$acc2 or $acc2,$acc0,$acc0 stx $acc0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-24] add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z2sqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(U1, in1_x, Z2sqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$U1,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Z1sqr],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(U2, in2_x, Z1sqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$a0 ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$U1,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(H, U2, U1); add %sp,LOCALS64+$H,$rp or $acc1,$acc0,$acc0 ! see if result is zero or $acc3,$acc2,$acc2 orcc $acc2,$acc0,$acc0 bne,pt %xcc,.Ladd_proceed_vis3 ! is_equal(U1,U2)? nop ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$t0 ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1 ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-24],$t2 andcc $t0,$t1,%g0 be,pt %xcc,.Ladd_proceed_vis3 ! (in1infty || in2infty)? nop andcc $t2,$t2,%g0 be,a,pt %xcc,.Ldouble_shortcut_vis3 ! is_equal(S1,S2)? add %sp,32*(12-10)+32,%sp ! difference in frame sizes st %g0,[$rp_real] st %g0,[$rp_real+4] st %g0,[$rp_real+8] st %g0,[$rp_real+12] st %g0,[$rp_real+16] st %g0,[$rp_real+20] st %g0,[$rp_real+24] st %g0,[$rp_real+28] st %g0,[$rp_real+32] st %g0,[$rp_real+32+4] st %g0,[$rp_real+32+8] st %g0,[$rp_real+32+12] st %g0,[$rp_real+32+16] st %g0,[$rp_real+32+20] st %g0,[$rp_real+32+24] st %g0,[$rp_real+32+28] st %g0,[$rp_real+64] st %g0,[$rp_real+64+4] st %g0,[$rp_real+64+8] st %g0,[$rp_real+64+12] st %g0,[$rp_real+64+16] st %g0,[$rp_real+64+20] st %g0,[$rp_real+64+24] st %g0,[$rp_real+64+28] b .Ladd_done_vis3 nop .align 16 .Ladd_proceed_vis3: call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H+24],$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_z],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_z+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(res_z, res_z, in2_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$U1],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$U1,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(U2, U1, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3 ! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S1],$bi ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$S1,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S2, S1, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$R,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1 ! !in1infty ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$t2 ! !in2infty ___ for($i=0;$i<96;$i+=16) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i],$acc0 ! res ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i+8],$acc1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i],$acc2 ! in2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i+8],$acc3 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i],$acc4 ! in1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i+8],$acc5 movrz $t1,$acc2,$acc0 movrz $t1,$acc3,$acc1 movrz $t2,$acc4,$acc0 movrz $t2,$acc5,$acc1 srlx $acc0,32,$acc2 srlx $acc1,32,$acc3 st $acc0,[$rp_real+$i] st $acc2,[$rp_real+$i+4] st $acc1,[$rp_real+$i+8] st $acc3,[$rp_real+$i+12] ___ } $code.=<<___; .Ladd_done_vis3: ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3,#function .size ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_vis3 ___ } ######################################################################## # void ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(P256_POINT *out,const P256_POINT *in1, # const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in2); { my ($res_x,$res_y,$res_z, $in1_x,$in1_y,$in1_z, $in2_x,$in2_y, $U2,$S2,$H,$R,$Hsqr,$Hcub,$Rsqr)=map(32*$_,(0..14)); my $Z1sqr = $S2; # above map() describes stack layout with 15 temporary # 256-bit vectors on top. Then we reserve some space for # !in1infty and !in2infty. $code.=<<___; .align 32 ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3: save %sp,-STACK64_FRAME-32*15-32,%sp mov $rp,$rp_real mov -1,$minus1 mov -2,$poly3 sllx $minus1,32,$poly1 ! 0xFFFFFFFF00000000 srl $poly3,0,$poly3 ! 0x00000000FFFFFFFE ! convert input to uint64_t[4] ld [$bp],$a0 ! in2_x ld [$bp+4],$t0 ld [$bp+8],$a1 ld [$bp+12],$t1 ld [$bp+16],$a2 ld [$bp+20],$t2 ld [$bp+24],$a3 ld [$bp+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 ld [$bp+32],$acc0 ! in2_y or $a0,$t0,$a0 ld [$bp+32+4],$t0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 ld [$bp+32+8],$acc1 or $a1,$t1,$a1 ld [$bp+32+12],$t1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 ld [$bp+32+16],$acc2 or $a2,$t2,$a2 ld [$bp+32+20],$t2 or $a3,$t3,$a3 ld [$bp+32+24],$acc3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 ld [$bp+32+28],$t3 sllx $t1,32,$t1 stx $a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x] sllx $t2,32,$t2 stx $a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+8] sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+16] or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 stx $a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+24] or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y] or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8] or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16] stx $acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24] or $a1,$a0,$a0 or $a3,$a2,$a2 or $acc1,$acc0,$acc0 or $acc3,$acc2,$acc2 or $a2,$a0,$a0 or $acc2,$acc0,$acc0 or $acc0,$a0,$a0 movrnz $a0,-1,$a0 ! !in2infty stx $a0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-8] ld [$ap],$a0 ! in1_x ld [$ap+4],$t0 ld [$ap+8],$a1 ld [$ap+12],$t1 ld [$ap+16],$a2 ld [$ap+20],$t2 ld [$ap+24],$a3 ld [$ap+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 ld [$ap+32],$acc0 ! in1_y or $a0,$t0,$a0 ld [$ap+32+4],$t0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 ld [$ap+32+8],$acc1 or $a1,$t1,$a1 ld [$ap+32+12],$t1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 ld [$ap+32+16],$acc2 or $a2,$t2,$a2 ld [$ap+32+20],$t2 or $a3,$t3,$a3 ld [$ap+32+24],$acc3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 ld [$ap+32+28],$t3 sllx $t1,32,$t1 stx $a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x] sllx $t2,32,$t2 stx $a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8] sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16] or $acc0,$t0,$acc0 stx $a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24] or $acc1,$t1,$acc1 stx $acc0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y] or $acc2,$t2,$acc2 stx $acc1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8] or $acc3,$t3,$acc3 stx $acc2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16] stx $acc3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24] ld [$ap+64],$a0 ! in1_z ld [$ap+64+4],$t0 ld [$ap+64+8],$a1 ld [$ap+64+12],$t1 ld [$ap+64+16],$a2 ld [$ap+64+20],$t2 ld [$ap+64+24],$a3 ld [$ap+64+28],$t3 sllx $t0,32,$t0 sllx $t1,32,$t1 or $a0,$t0,$a0 sllx $t2,32,$t2 or $a1,$t1,$a1 sllx $t3,32,$t3 stx $a0,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z] or $a2,$t2,$a2 stx $a1,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8] or $a3,$t3,$a3 stx $a2,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16] stx $a3,[%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24] or $a1,$a0,$t0 or $a3,$a2,$t2 or $t2,$t0,$t0 movrnz $t0,-1,$t0 ! !in1infty stx $t0,[%fp+STACK_BIAS-16] call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x],$bi mov $acc0,$a0 mov $acc1,$a1 mov $acc2,$a2 mov $acc3,$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$in2_x,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(U2, Z1sqr, in2_x); add %sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Z1sqr],$bi ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$in1_x,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(H, U2, in1_x); add %sp,LOCALS64+$H,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$Z1sqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S2, Z1sqr, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_z+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(res_z, H, in1_z); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_z,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$S2],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_y+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S2, S2, in2_y); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$a0 ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$in1_y,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(R, S2, in1_y); add %sp,LOCALS64+$R,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R+24],$a3 call __ecp_nistz256_sqr_mont_vis3 ! p256_sqr_mont(Rsqr, R); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$H],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$H,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(Hcub, Hsqr, H); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hsqr],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(U2, in1_x, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$rp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_by_2_vis3 ! p256_mul_by_2(Hsqr, U2); add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hsqr,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$Rsqr,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_x, Rsqr, Hsqr); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_x, res_x, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_x,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$Hcub],$bi ! forward load ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_y+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$U2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_morf_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_y, U2, res_x); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$Hcub,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(S2, in1_y, Hcub); add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$rp ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$R],$bi ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y],$a0 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+8],$a1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+16],$a2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_y+24],$a3 add %sp,LOCALS64+$R,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_mul_mont_vis3 ! p256_mul_mont(res_y, res_y, R); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp add %sp,LOCALS64+$S2,$bp call __ecp_nistz256_sub_from_vis3 ! p256_sub(res_y, res_y, S2); add %sp,LOCALS64+$res_y,$rp ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-16],$t1 ! !in1infty ldx [%fp+STACK_BIAS-8],$t2 ! !in2infty 1: call .+8 add %o7,.Lone_mont_vis3-1b,$bp ___ for($i=0;$i<64;$i+=16) { # conditional moves $code.=<<___; ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i],$acc0 ! res ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i+8],$acc1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i],$acc2 ! in2 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in2_x+$i+8],$acc3 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i],$acc4 ! in1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i+8],$acc5 movrz $t1,$acc2,$acc0 movrz $t1,$acc3,$acc1 movrz $t2,$acc4,$acc0 movrz $t2,$acc5,$acc1 srlx $acc0,32,$acc2 srlx $acc1,32,$acc3 st $acc0,[$rp_real+$i] st $acc2,[$rp_real+$i+4] st $acc1,[$rp_real+$i+8] st $acc3,[$rp_real+$i+12] ___ } for(;$i<96;$i+=16) { $code.=<<___; ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i],$acc0 ! res ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$res_x+$i+8],$acc1 ldx [$bp+$i-64],$acc2 ! "in2" ldx [$bp+$i-64+8],$acc3 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i],$acc4 ! in1 ldx [%sp+LOCALS64+$in1_x+$i+8],$acc5 movrz $t1,$acc2,$acc0 movrz $t1,$acc3,$acc1 movrz $t2,$acc4,$acc0 movrz $t2,$acc5,$acc1 srlx $acc0,32,$acc2 srlx $acc1,32,$acc3 st $acc0,[$rp_real+$i] st $acc2,[$rp_real+$i+4] st $acc1,[$rp_real+$i+8] st $acc3,[$rp_real+$i+12] ___ } $code.=<<___; ret restore .type ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3,#function .size ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3,.-ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine_vis3 .align 64 .Lone_mont_vis3: .long 0x00000000,0x00000001, 0xffffffff,0x00000000 .long 0xffffffff,0xffffffff, 0x00000000,0xfffffffe .align 64 ___ } }}} # Purpose of these subroutines is to explicitly encode VIS instructions, # so that one can compile the module without having to specify VIS # extensions on compiler command line, e.g. -xarch=v9 vs. -xarch=v9a. # Idea is to reserve for option to produce "universal" binary and let # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time. sub unvis3 { my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_; my %bias = ( "g" => 0, "o" => 8, "l" => 16, "i" => 24 ); my ($ref,$opf); my %visopf = ( "addxc" => 0x011, "addxccc" => 0x013, "umulxhi" => 0x016 ); $ref = "$mnemonic\t$rs1,$rs2,$rd"; if ($opf=$visopf{$mnemonic}) { foreach ($rs1,$rs2,$rd) { return $ref if (!/%([goli])([0-9])/); $_=$bias{$1}+$2; } return sprintf ".word\t0x%08x !%s", 0x81b00000|$rd<<25|$rs1<<14|$opf<<5|$rs2, $ref; } else { return $ref; } } foreach (split("\n",$code)) { s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge; s/\b(umulxhi|addxc[c]{0,2})\s+(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7]),\s*(%[goli][0-7])/ &unvis3($1,$2,$3,$4) /ge; print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_key.c0000644000000000000000000004132613176625657015403 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and * contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" #include #include EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL); } EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) { EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (ret->group == NULL) { EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) { EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) { int i; if (r == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); if (r->meth->finish != NULL) r->meth->finish(r); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(r->engine); #endif if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish) r->group->meth->keyfinish(r); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); EC_GROUP_free(r->group); EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key); BN_clear_free(r->priv_key); OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY)); } EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src) { if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (src->meth != dest->meth) { if (dest->meth->finish != NULL) dest->meth->finish(dest); if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish) dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0) return 0; dest->engine = NULL; #endif } /* copy the parameters */ if (src->group != NULL) { const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group); /* clear the old group */ EC_GROUP_free(dest->group); dest->group = EC_GROUP_new(meth); if (dest->group == NULL) return NULL; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group)) return NULL; /* copy the public key */ if (src->pub_key != NULL) { EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key); dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group); if (dest->pub_key == NULL) return NULL; if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key)) return NULL; } /* copy the private key */ if (src->priv_key != NULL) { if (dest->priv_key == NULL) { dest->priv_key = BN_new(); if (dest->priv_key == NULL) return NULL; } if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key)) return NULL; if (src->group->meth->keycopy && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0) return NULL; } } /* copy the rest */ dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag; dest->conv_form = src->conv_form; dest->version = src->version; dest->flags = src->flags; if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) return NULL; if (src->meth != dest->meth) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0) return NULL; dest->engine = src->engine; #endif dest->meth = src->meth; } if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0) return NULL; return dest; } EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key) { EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_method(ec_key->engine); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) { EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) { if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) return eckey->meth->keygen(eckey); ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey) { OPENSSL_assert(eckey->group->meth->keygen != NULL); return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey); } int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) { int ok = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL; const BIGNUM *order = NULL; EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { priv_key = BN_new(); if (priv_key == NULL) goto err; } else priv_key = eckey->priv_key; order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group); if (order == NULL) goto err; do if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order)) goto err; while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ; if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) { pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group); if (pub_key == NULL) goto err; } else pub_key = eckey->pub_key; if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) goto err; eckey->priv_key = priv_key; eckey->pub_key = pub_key; ok = 1; err: if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) EC_POINT_free(pub_key); if (eckey->priv_key != priv_key) BN_free(priv_key); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ok; } int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey) { return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL); } int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) { if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey); } int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) { int ok = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; const BIGNUM *order = NULL; EC_POINT *point = NULL; if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); goto err; } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL) goto err; /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); goto err; } /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */ order = eckey->group->order; if (BN_is_zero(order)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); goto err; } /* * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key == * pub_key */ if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) { if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); goto err; } } ok = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(point); return ok; } int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tx, *ty; EC_POINT *point = NULL; int ok = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0; #endif if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); point = EC_POINT_new(key->group); if (point == NULL) goto err; tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (ty == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group)); if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) is_char_two = 1; if (is_char_two) { if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx)) goto err; } else #endif { if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx)) goto err; } /* * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field * order: if not values are out of range. */ if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty) || (BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0) || (BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) goto err; if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0) goto err; ok = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(point); return ok; } const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->group; } int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group) { if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0) return 0; EC_GROUP_free(key->group); key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group); return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1; } const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->priv_key; } int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) { if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL) return 0; if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) return 0; if (key->meth->set_private != NULL && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) return 0; BN_clear_free(key->priv_key); key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key); return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; } const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->pub_key; } int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key) { if (key->meth->set_public != NULL && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0) return 0; EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key); key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group); return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; } unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->enc_flag; } void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags) { key->enc_flag = flags; } point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->conv_form; } void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) { key->conv_form = cform; if (key->group != NULL) EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform); } void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) { if (key->group != NULL) EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag); } int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (key->group == NULL) return 0; return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx); } int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->flags; } void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags) { key->flags |= flags; } void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags) { key->flags &= ~flags; } size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL) return 0; return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx); } int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL) return 0; if (key->pub_key == NULL) key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group); if (key->pub_key == NULL) return 0; if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0) return 0; /* * Save the point conversion form. * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form. * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of * the buffer so we know it is valid. */ if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0) key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01); return 1; } size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL) return 0; if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len); } size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { size_t buf_len; buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8; if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) return 0; if (buf == NULL) return buf_len; else if (len < buf_len) return 0; /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */ if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } return buf_len; } int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL) return 0; if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len); } int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new(); if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key); if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } return 1; } size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf) { size_t len; unsigned char *buf; len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0); if (len == 0) return 0; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (buf == NULL) return 0; len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len); if (len == 0) { OPENSSL_free(buf); return 0; } *pbuf = buf; return len; } int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey) { if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN)) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c0000644000000000000000000002752113176625657015731 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" /* EC pkey context structure */ typedef struct { /* Key and paramgen group */ EC_GROUP *gen_group; /* message digest */ const EVP_MD *md; /* Duplicate key if custom cofactor needed */ EC_KEY *co_key; /* Cofactor mode */ signed char cofactor_mode; /* KDF (if any) to use for ECDH */ char kdf_type; /* Message digest to use for key derivation */ const EVP_MD *kdf_md; /* User key material */ unsigned char *kdf_ukm; size_t kdf_ukmlen; /* KDF output length */ size_t kdf_outlen; } EC_PKEY_CTX; static int pkey_ec_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx; dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx)); if (dctx == NULL) return 0; dctx->cofactor_mode = -1; dctx->kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE; ctx->data = dctx; return 1; } static int pkey_ec_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; if (!pkey_ec_init(dst)) return 0; sctx = src->data; dctx = dst->data; if (sctx->gen_group) { dctx->gen_group = EC_GROUP_dup(sctx->gen_group); if (!dctx->gen_group) return 0; } dctx->md = sctx->md; if (sctx->co_key) { dctx->co_key = EC_KEY_dup(sctx->co_key); if (!dctx->co_key) return 0; } dctx->kdf_type = sctx->kdf_type; dctx->kdf_md = sctx->kdf_md; dctx->kdf_outlen = sctx->kdf_outlen; if (sctx->kdf_ukm) { dctx->kdf_ukm = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->kdf_ukm, sctx->kdf_ukmlen); if (!dctx->kdf_ukm) return 0; } else dctx->kdf_ukm = NULL; dctx->kdf_ukmlen = sctx->kdf_ukmlen; return 1; } static void pkey_ec_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; if (dctx) { EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group); EC_KEY_free(dctx->co_key); OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm); OPENSSL_free(dctx); } } static int pkey_ec_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { int ret, type; unsigned int sltmp; EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; if (!sig) { *siglen = ECDSA_size(ec); return 1; } else if (*siglen < (size_t)ECDSA_size(ec)) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } if (dctx->md) type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md); else type = NID_sha1; ret = ECDSA_sign(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ec); if (ret <= 0) return ret; *siglen = (size_t)sltmp; return 1; } static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { int ret, type; EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; if (dctx->md) type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md); else type = NID_sha1; ret = ECDSA_verify(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ec); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { int ret; size_t outlen; const EC_POINT *pubkey = NULL; EC_KEY *eckey; EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET); return 0; } eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key : ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; if (!key) { const EC_GROUP *group; group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); *keylen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; return 1; } pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ctx->peerkey->pkey.ec); /* * NB: unlike PKCS#3 DH, if *outlen is less than maximum size this is not * an error, the result is truncated. */ outlen = *keylen; ret = ECDH_compute_key(key, outlen, pubkey, eckey, 0); if (ret <= 0) return 0; *keylen = ret; return 1; } static int pkey_ec_kdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen) { EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; unsigned char *ktmp = NULL; size_t ktmplen; int rv = 0; if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE) return pkey_ec_derive(ctx, key, keylen); if (!key) { *keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; } if (*keylen != dctx->kdf_outlen) return 0; if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, NULL, &ktmplen)) return 0; ktmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ktmplen); if (ktmp == NULL) return 0; if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, ktmp, &ktmplen)) goto err; /* Do KDF stuff */ if (!ECDH_KDF_X9_62(key, *keylen, ktmp, ktmplen, dctx->kdf_ukm, dctx->kdf_ukmlen, dctx->kdf_md)) goto err; rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(ktmp, ktmplen); return rv; } #endif static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; EC_GROUP *group; switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID: group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(p1); if (group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_INVALID_CURVE); return 0; } EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group); dctx->gen_group = group; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC: if (!dctx->gen_group) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET); return 0; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(dctx->gen_group, p1); return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR: if (p1 == -2) { if (dctx->cofactor_mode != -1) return dctx->cofactor_mode; else { EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; return EC_KEY_get_flags(ec_key) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH ? 1 : 0; } } else if (p1 < -1 || p1 > 1) return -2; dctx->cofactor_mode = p1; if (p1 != -1) { EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec; if (!ec_key->group) return -2; /* If cofactor is 1 cofactor mode does nothing */ if (BN_is_one(ec_key->group->cofactor)) return 1; if (!dctx->co_key) { dctx->co_key = EC_KEY_dup(ec_key); if (!dctx->co_key) return 0; } if (p1) EC_KEY_set_flags(dctx->co_key, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH); else EC_KEY_clear_flags(dctx->co_key, EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH); } else { EC_KEY_free(dctx->co_key); dctx->co_key = NULL; } return 1; #endif case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE: if (p1 == -2) return dctx->kdf_type; if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62) return -2; dctx->kdf_type = p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD: dctx->kdf_md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD: *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->kdf_md; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN: if (p1 <= 0) return -2; dctx->kdf_outlen = (size_t)p1; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN: *(int *)p2 = dctx->kdf_outlen; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM: OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm); dctx->kdf_ukm = p2; if (p2) dctx->kdf_ukmlen = p1; else dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM: *(unsigned char **)p2 = dctx->kdf_ukm; return dctx->kdf_ukmlen; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 && EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); return 0; } dctx->md = p2; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md; return 1; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: /* Default behaviour is OK */ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: return 1; default: return -2; } } static int pkey_ec_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { if (strcmp(type, "ec_paramgen_curve") == 0) { int nid; nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_ln2nid(value); if (nid == NID_undef) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, EC_R_INVALID_CURVE); return 0; } return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid); } else if (strcmp(type, "ec_param_enc") == 0) { int param_enc; if (strcmp(value, "explicit") == 0) param_enc = 0; else if (strcmp(value, "named_curve") == 0) param_enc = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE; else return -2; return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, param_enc); } else if (strcmp(type, "ecdh_kdf_md") == 0) { const EVP_MD *md; if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST); return 0; } return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, md); } else if (strcmp(type, "ecdh_cofactor_mode") == 0) { int co_mode; co_mode = atoi(value); return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, co_mode); } return -2; } static int pkey_ec_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY *ec = NULL; EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; int ret = 0; if (dctx->gen_group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET); return 0; } ec = EC_KEY_new(); if (ec == NULL) return 0; ret = EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group); if (ret) EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); else EC_KEY_free(ec); return ret; } static int pkey_ec_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY *ec = NULL; EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data; if (ctx->pkey == NULL && dctx->gen_group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET); return 0; } ec = EC_KEY_new(); if (!ec) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec); if (ctx->pkey) { /* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */ if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey)) return 0; } else { if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group)) return 0; } return EC_KEY_generate_key(pkey->pkey.ec); } const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_EC, 0, pkey_ec_init, pkey_ec_copy, pkey_ec_cleanup, 0, pkey_ec_paramgen, 0, pkey_ec_keygen, 0, pkey_ec_sign, 0, pkey_ec_verify, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC pkey_ec_kdf_derive, #else 0, #endif pkey_ec_ctrl, pkey_ec_ctrl_str }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c0000644000000000000000000006617613176625657015373 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Binary polynomial ECC support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" /* functions for EC_GROUP objects */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth) { EC_GROUP *ret; if (meth == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, EC_R_SLOT_FULL); return NULL; } if (meth->group_init == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return NULL; } ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->meth = meth; if ((ret->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0) { ret->order = BN_new(); if (ret->order == NULL) goto err; ret->cofactor = BN_new(); if (ret->cofactor == NULL) goto err; } ret->asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE; ret->asn1_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; if (!meth->group_init(ret)) goto err; return ret; err: BN_free(ret->order); BN_free(ret->cofactor); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } void EC_pre_comp_free(EC_GROUP *group) { switch (group->pre_comp_type) { default: break; #ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION case PCT_nistz256: EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistz256); break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 case PCT_nistp224: EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp224); break; case PCT_nistp256: EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp256); break; case PCT_nistp521: EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp521); break; #endif case PCT_ec: EC_ec_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.ec); break; } group->pre_comp.ec = NULL; } void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group) { if (!group) return; if (group->meth->group_finish != 0) group->meth->group_finish(group); EC_pre_comp_free(group); BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); EC_POINT_free(group->generator); BN_free(group->order); BN_free(group->cofactor); OPENSSL_free(group->seed); OPENSSL_free(group); } void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group) { if (!group) return; if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0) group->meth->group_clear_finish(group); else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0) group->meth->group_finish(group); EC_pre_comp_free(group); BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator); BN_clear_free(group->order); BN_clear_free(group->cofactor); OPENSSL_clear_free(group->seed, group->seed_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(group, sizeof(*group)); } int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (dest->meth != src->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (dest == src) return 1; /* Copy precomputed */ dest->pre_comp_type = src->pre_comp_type; switch (src->pre_comp_type) { default: dest->pre_comp.ec = NULL; break; #ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION case PCT_nistz256: dest->pre_comp.nistz256 = EC_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistz256); break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 case PCT_nistp224: dest->pre_comp.nistp224 = EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp224); break; case PCT_nistp256: dest->pre_comp.nistp256 = EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp256); break; case PCT_nistp521: dest->pre_comp.nistp521 = EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp521); break; #endif case PCT_ec: dest->pre_comp.ec = EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.ec); break; } if (src->mont_data != NULL) { if (dest->mont_data == NULL) { dest->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (dest->mont_data == NULL) return 0; } if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->mont_data, src->mont_data)) return 0; } else { /* src->generator == NULL */ BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont_data); dest->mont_data = NULL; } if (src->generator != NULL) { if (dest->generator == NULL) { dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest); if (dest->generator == NULL) return 0; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator)) return 0; } else { /* src->generator == NULL */ EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator); dest->generator = NULL; } if ((src->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0) { if (!BN_copy(dest->order, src->order)) return 0; if (!BN_copy(dest->cofactor, src->cofactor)) return 0; } dest->curve_name = src->curve_name; dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag; dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form; if (src->seed) { OPENSSL_free(dest->seed); dest->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(src->seed_len); if (dest->seed == NULL) return 0; if (!memcpy(dest->seed, src->seed, src->seed_len)) return 0; dest->seed_len = src->seed_len; } else { OPENSSL_free(dest->seed); dest->seed = NULL; dest->seed_len = 0; } return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src); } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *a) { EC_GROUP *t = NULL; int ok = 0; if (a == NULL) return NULL; if ((t = EC_GROUP_new(a->meth)) == NULL) return (NULL); if (!EC_GROUP_copy(t, a)) goto err; ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { EC_GROUP_free(t); return NULL; } return t; } const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->meth; } int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth) { return meth->field_type; } int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor) { if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (group->generator == NULL) { group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (group->generator == NULL) return 0; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator)) return 0; if (order != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(group->order, order)) return 0; } else BN_zero(group->order); if (cofactor != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(group->cofactor, cofactor)) return 0; } else BN_zero(group->cofactor); /* * Some groups have an order with * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail. * |group->mont_data| will be NULL in this case. */ if (BN_is_odd(group->order)) { return ec_precompute_mont_data(group); } BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); group->mont_data = NULL; return 1; } const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->generator; } BN_MONT_CTX *EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->mont_data; } int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->order == NULL) return 0; if (!BN_copy(order, group->order)) return 0; return !BN_is_zero(order); } const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->order; } int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group) { OPENSSL_assert(group->meth->group_order_bits != NULL); return group->meth->group_order_bits(group); } int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->cofactor == NULL) return 0; if (!BN_copy(cofactor, group->cofactor)) return 0; return !BN_is_zero(group->cofactor); } const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->cofactor; } void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid) { group->curve_name = nid; } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->curve_name; } void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag) { group->asn1_flag = flag; } int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->asn1_flag; } void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form) { group->asn1_form = form; } point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->asn1_form; } size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *group, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { OPENSSL_free(group->seed); group->seed = NULL; group->seed_len = 0; if (!len || !p) return 1; if ((group->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) return 0; memcpy(group->seed, p, len); group->seed_len = len; return len; } unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->seed; } size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->seed_len; } int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_set_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); } #endif int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (group->meth->group_get_degree == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_get_degree(group); } int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->group_check_discriminant == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } return group->meth->group_check_discriminant(group, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int r = 0; BIGNUM *a1, *a2, *a3, *b1, *b2, *b3; BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL; /* compare the field types */ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) != EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b))) return 1; /* compare the curve name (if present in both) */ if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b)) return 1; if (a->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) return 0; if (ctx == NULL) ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return -1; BN_CTX_start(ctx); a1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (b3 == NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx_new); return -1; } /* * XXX This approach assumes that the external representation of curves * over the same field type is the same. */ if (!a->meth->group_get_curve(a, a1, a2, a3, ctx) || !b->meth->group_get_curve(b, b1, b2, b3, ctx)) r = 1; if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2) || BN_cmp(a3, b3)) r = 1; /* XXX EC_POINT_cmp() assumes that the methods are equal */ if (r || EC_POINT_cmp(a, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(a), EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx)) r = 1; if (!r) { const BIGNUM *ao, *bo, *ac, *bc; /* compare the order and cofactor */ ao = EC_GROUP_get0_order(a); bo = EC_GROUP_get0_order(b); ac = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(a); bc = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(b); if (ao == NULL || bo == NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx_new); return -1; } if (BN_cmp(ao, bo) || BN_cmp(ac, bc)) r = 1; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx_new); return r; } /* functions for EC_POINT objects */ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_POINT *ret; if (group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (group->meth->point_init == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return NULL; } ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->meth = group->meth; if (!ret->meth->point_init(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point) { if (!point) return; if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) point->meth->point_finish(point); OPENSSL_free(point); } void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point) { if (!point) return; if (point->meth->point_clear_finish != 0) point->meth->point_clear_finish(point); else if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) point->meth->point_finish(point); OPENSSL_clear_free(point, sizeof(*point)); } int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) { if (dest->meth->point_copy == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (dest->meth != src->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (dest == src) return 1; return dest->meth->point_copy(dest, src); } EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *a, const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_POINT *t; int r; if (a == NULL) return NULL; t = EC_POINT_new(group); if (t == NULL) return (NULL); r = EC_POINT_copy(t, a); if (!r) { EC_POINT_free(t); return NULL; } return t; } const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point) { return point->meth; } int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point) { if (group->meth->point_set_to_infinity == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_to_infinity(group, point); } int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, z, ctx); } int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, z, ctx); } int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx)) return 0; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx)) return 0; if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); return 0; } return 1; } #endif int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); } #endif int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->add == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->add(group, r, a, b, ctx); } int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->dbl == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->dbl(group, r, a, ctx); } int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->invert == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != a->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->invert(group, a, ctx); } int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { if (group->meth->is_at_infinity == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point); } /* * Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return * value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values: * 1: The point is on the curve * 0: The point is not on the curve * -1: An error occurred */ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->is_on_curve == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->is_on_curve(group, point, ctx); } int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; } if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return -1; } return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx); } int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->make_affine == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (group->meth != point->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } return group->meth->make_affine(group, point, ctx); } int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t i; if (group->meth->points_make_affine == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } } return group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx); } /* * Functions for point multiplication. If group->meth->mul is 0, we use the * wNAF-based implementations in ec_mult.c; otherwise we dispatch through * methods. */ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); return group->meth->mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); } int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar, const EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* just a convenient interface to EC_POINTs_mul() */ const EC_POINT *points[1]; const BIGNUM *scalars[1]; points[0] = point; scalars[0] = p_scalar; return EC_POINTs_mul(group, r, g_scalar, (point != NULL && p_scalar != NULL), points, scalars, ctx); } int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx); if (group->meth->precompute_mult != 0) return group->meth->precompute_mult(group, ctx); else return 1; /* nothing to do, so report success */ } int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (group->meth->mul == 0) /* use default */ return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group); if (group->meth->have_precompute_mult != 0) return group->meth->have_precompute_mult(group); else return 0; /* cannot tell whether precomputation has * been performed */ } /* * ec_precompute_mont_data sets |group->mont_data| from |group->order| and * returns one on success. On error it returns zero. */ int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group) { BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); int ret = 0; BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); group->mont_data = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) goto err; group->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); if (group->mont_data == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(group->mont_data, group->order, ctx)) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data); group->mont_data = NULL; goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *key, int idx, void *arg) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&key->ex_data, idx, arg); } void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *key, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&key->ex_data, idx); } int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group) { if (group->order == NULL) return 0; return BN_num_bits(group->order); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_kmeth.c0000644000000000000000000002454713176625657015731 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" static const EC_KEY_METHOD openssl_ec_key_method = { "OpenSSL EC_KEY method", 0, 0,0,0,0,0,0, ossl_ec_key_gen, ossl_ecdh_compute_key, ossl_ecdsa_sign, ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup, ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig, ossl_ecdsa_verify, ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig }; static const EC_KEY_METHOD *default_ec_key_meth = &openssl_ec_key_method; const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_OpenSSL(void) { return &openssl_ec_key_method; } const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_default_method(void) { return default_ec_key_meth; } void EC_KEY_set_default_method(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth) { if (meth == NULL) default_ec_key_meth = &openssl_ec_key_method; else default_ec_key_meth = meth; } const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_method(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->meth; } int EC_KEY_set_method(EC_KEY *key, const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth) { void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key) = key->meth->finish; if (finish != NULL) finish(key); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(key->engine); key->engine = NULL; #endif key->meth = meth; if (meth->init != NULL) return meth->init(key); return 1; } EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(ENGINE *engine) { EC_KEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } ret->meth = EC_KEY_get_default_method(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (engine != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } ret->engine = engine; } else ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_EC(); if (ret->engine != NULL) { ret->meth = ENGINE_get_EC(ret->engine); if (ret->meth == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } } #endif ret->version = 1; ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { goto err; } if (ret->meth->init != NULL && ret->meth->init(ret) == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); goto err; } return ret; err: EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *eckey, void *(*KDF) (const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)) { unsigned char *sec = NULL; size_t seclen; if (eckey->meth->compute_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } if (outlen > INT_MAX) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH); return 0; } if (!eckey->meth->compute_key(&sec, &seclen, pub_key, eckey)) return 0; if (KDF != NULL) { KDF(sec, seclen, out, &outlen); } else { if (outlen > seclen) outlen = seclen; memcpy(out, sec, outlen); } OPENSSL_clear_free(sec, seclen); return outlen; } EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_METHOD_new(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth) { EC_KEY_METHOD *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*meth)); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (meth != NULL) *ret = *meth; ret->flags |= EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC; return ret; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_free(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth) { if (meth->flags & EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC) OPENSSL_free(meth); } void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*init)(EC_KEY *key), void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key), int (*copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src), int (*set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp), int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key), int (*set_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)) { meth->init = init; meth->finish = finish; meth->copy = copy; meth->set_group = set_group; meth->set_private = set_private; meth->set_public = set_public; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_keygen(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *key)) { meth->keygen = keygen; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_compute_key(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*ckey)(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)) { meth->compute_key = ckey; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*sign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey), int (*sign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp), ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey)) { meth->sign = sign; meth->sign_setup = sign_setup; meth->sign_sig = sign_sig; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_verify(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*verify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey), int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)) { meth->verify = verify; meth->verify_sig = verify_sig; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pinit)(EC_KEY *key), void (**pfinish)(EC_KEY *key), int (**pcopy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src), int (**pset_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp), int (**pset_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key), int (**pset_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)) { if (pinit != NULL) *pinit = meth->init; if (pfinish != NULL) *pfinish = meth->finish; if (pcopy != NULL) *pcopy = meth->copy; if (pset_group != NULL) *pset_group = meth->set_group; if (pset_private != NULL) *pset_private = meth->set_private; if (pset_public != NULL) *pset_public = meth->set_public; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_keygen(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pkeygen)(EC_KEY *key)) { if (pkeygen != NULL) *pkeygen = meth->keygen; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_compute_key(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pck)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)) { if (pck != NULL) *pck = meth->compute_key; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**psign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey), int (**psign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp), ECDSA_SIG *(**psign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey)) { if (psign != NULL) *psign = meth->sign; if (psign_setup != NULL) *psign_setup = meth->sign_setup; if (psign_sig != NULL) *psign_sig = meth->sign_sig; } void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pverify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey), int (**pverify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)) { if (pverify != NULL) *pverify = meth->verify; if (pverify_sig != NULL) *pverify_sig = meth->verify_sig; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_err.c0000644000000000000000000003631313176625657015403 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM), "BN_to_felem"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS), "d2i_ECParameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS), "d2i_ECPKParameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY), "d2i_ECPrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT), "do_EC_KEY_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT), "ecdh_cms_decrypt"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO), "ecdh_cms_set_shared_info"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY), "ECDH_compute_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY), "ecdh_simple_compute_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN_EX), "ECDSA_do_sign_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY), "ECDSA_do_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_EX), "ECDSA_sign_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP), "ECDSA_sign_setup"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW), "ECDSA_SIG_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECDSA_VERIFY), "ECDSA_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE), "eckey_param2type"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE), "eckey_param_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE), "eckey_priv_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE), "eckey_priv_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE), "eckey_pub_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE), "eckey_pub_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM), "eckey_type2param"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT), "ECParameters_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECParameters_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT), "ECPKParameters_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECPKParameters_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE), "ecp_nistz256_get_affine"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE), "ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_points_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP), "ecx_key_op"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE), "ecx_priv_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE), "ecx_pub_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE), "ec_asn1_group2curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID), "ec_asn1_group2fieldid"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY), "ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT), "ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE), "ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT), "ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT), "ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES), "ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE), "ec_GFp_mont_field_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE), "ec_GFp_mont_field_encode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL), "ec_GFp_mont_field_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE), "ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR), "ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE), "ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE), "ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL), "ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE), "ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL), "ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE), "ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL), "ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL), "ec_GFp_nist_field_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR), "ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE), "ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT), "ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE), "ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE), "ec_GFp_simple_make_affine"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT), "ec_GFp_simple_oct2point"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT), "ec_GFp_simple_point2oct"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE), "ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES), "ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK), "EC_GROUP_check"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT), "EC_GROUP_check_discriminant"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY), "EC_GROUP_copy"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M), "EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP), "EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE), "EC_GROUP_get_degree"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS), "EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS), "EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS), "EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS), "EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW), "EC_GROUP_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME), "EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA), "ec_group_new_from_data"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS), "EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS), "EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M), "EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP), "EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR), "EC_GROUP_set_generator"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY), "EC_KEY_check_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY), "EC_KEY_copy"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY), "EC_KEY_generate_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW), "EC_KEY_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD), "EC_KEY_new_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV), "EC_KEY_oct2priv"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT), "EC_KEY_print"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP), "EC_KEY_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT), "EC_KEY_priv2oct"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES), "EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY), "ec_key_simple_check_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV), "ec_key_simple_oct2priv"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT), "ec_key_simple_priv2oct"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE), "EC_POINTs_make_affine"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD), "EC_POINT_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP), "EC_POINT_cmp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY), "EC_POINT_copy"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL), "EC_POINT_dbl"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M), "EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP), "EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP), "EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT), "EC_POINT_invert"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY), "EC_POINT_is_at_infinity"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE), "EC_POINT_is_on_curve"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE), "EC_POINT_make_affine"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW), "EC_POINT_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT), "EC_POINT_oct2point"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT), "EC_POINT_point2oct"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M), "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP), "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M), "EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP), "EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP), "EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY), "EC_POINT_set_to_infinity"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ec_pre_comp_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL), "ec_wNAF_mul"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT), "ec_wNAF_precompute_mult"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS), "i2d_ECParameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS), "i2d_ECPKParameters"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY), "i2d_ECPrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY), "i2o_ECPublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW), "nistp224_pre_comp_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "nistp256_pre_comp_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW), "nistp521_pre_comp_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY), "o2i_ECPublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE), "old_ec_priv_decode"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OSSL_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY), "ossl_ecdh_compute_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG), "ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG), "ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE), "pkey_ecx_derive"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL), "pkey_ec_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR), "pkey_ec_ctrl_str"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE), "pkey_ec_derive"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN), "pkey_ec_keygen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN), "pkey_ec_paramgen"}, {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN), "pkey_ec_sign"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(EC_R_ASN1_ERROR), "asn1 error"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE), "bignum out of range"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE), "coordinates out of range"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH), "curve does not support ecdh"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING), "curve does not support signing"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE), "d2i ecpkparameters failure"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_DECODE_ERROR), "decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO), "discriminant is zero"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE), "ec group new by name failure"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE), "field too large"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED), "gf2m not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE), "group2pkparameters failure"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE), "i2d ecpkparameters failure"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS), "incompatible objects"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT), "invalid argument"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT), "invalid compressed point"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT), "invalid compression bit"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_CURVE), "invalid curve"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE), "invalid digest type"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING), "invalid encoding"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_FIELD), "invalid field"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_FORM), "invalid form"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER), "invalid group order"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_KEY), "invalid key"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH), "invalid output length"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY), "invalid peer key"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS), "invalid pentanomial basis"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY), "invalid private key"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS), "invalid trinomial basis"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR), "kdf parameter error"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET), "keys not set"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY), "missing private key"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES), "need new setup values"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME), "not a NIST prime"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED), "not implemented"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET), "no parameters set"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE), "no private value"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED), "operation not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER), "passed null parameter"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE), "pkparameters2group failure"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE), "point arithmetic failure"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY), "point at infinity"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE), "point is not on curve"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED), "random number generation failed"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_SLOT_FULL), "slot full"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR), "undefined generator"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER), "undefined order"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP), "unknown group"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER), "unknown order"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD), "unsupported field"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS), "wrong curve parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(EC_R_WRONG_ORDER), "wrong order"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_EC_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(EC_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c0000644000000000000000000002344613176625657017031 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Copyright 2011 Google Inc. * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else /* * Common utility functions for ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c, ecp_nistp521.c. */ # include # include "ec_lcl.h" /* * Convert an array of points into affine coordinates. (If the point at * infinity is found (Z = 0), it remains unchanged.) This function is * essentially an equivalent to EC_POINTs_make_affine(), but works with the * internal representation of points as used by ecp_nistp###.c rather than * with (BIGNUM-based) EC_POINT data structures. point_array is the * input/output buffer ('num' points in projective form, i.e. three * coordinates each), based on an internal representation of field elements * of size 'felem_size'. tmp_felems needs to point to a temporary array of * 'num'+1 field elements for storage of intermediate values. */ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array, size_t felem_size, void *tmp_felems, void (*felem_one) (void *out), int (*felem_is_zero) (const void *in), void (*felem_assign) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_square) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_mul) (void *out, const void *in1, const void *in2), void (*felem_inv) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_contract) (void *out, const void *in)) { int i = 0; # define tmp_felem(I) (&((char *)tmp_felems)[(I) * felem_size]) # define X(I) (&((char *)point_array)[3*(I) * felem_size]) # define Y(I) (&((char *)point_array)[(3*(I) + 1) * felem_size]) # define Z(I) (&((char *)point_array)[(3*(I) + 2) * felem_size]) if (!felem_is_zero(Z(0))) felem_assign(tmp_felem(0), Z(0)); else felem_one(tmp_felem(0)); for (i = 1; i < (int)num; i++) { if (!felem_is_zero(Z(i))) felem_mul(tmp_felem(i), tmp_felem(i - 1), Z(i)); else felem_assign(tmp_felem(i), tmp_felem(i - 1)); } /* * Now each tmp_felem(i) is the product of Z(0) .. Z(i), skipping any * zero-valued factors: if Z(i) = 0, we essentially pretend that Z(i) = 1 */ felem_inv(tmp_felem(num - 1), tmp_felem(num - 1)); for (i = num - 1; i >= 0; i--) { if (i > 0) /* * tmp_felem(i-1) is the product of Z(0) .. Z(i-1), tmp_felem(i) * is the inverse of the product of Z(0) .. Z(i) */ /* 1/Z(i) */ felem_mul(tmp_felem(num), tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i)); else felem_assign(tmp_felem(num), tmp_felem(0)); /* 1/Z(0) */ if (!felem_is_zero(Z(i))) { if (i > 0) /* * For next iteration, replace tmp_felem(i-1) by its inverse */ felem_mul(tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i), Z(i)); /* * Convert point (X, Y, Z) into affine form (X/(Z^2), Y/(Z^3), 1) */ felem_square(Z(i), tmp_felem(num)); /* 1/(Z^2) */ felem_mul(X(i), X(i), Z(i)); /* X/(Z^2) */ felem_mul(Z(i), Z(i), tmp_felem(num)); /* 1/(Z^3) */ felem_mul(Y(i), Y(i), Z(i)); /* Y/(Z^3) */ felem_contract(X(i), X(i)); felem_contract(Y(i), Y(i)); felem_one(Z(i)); } else { if (i > 0) /* * For next iteration, replace tmp_felem(i-1) by its inverse */ felem_assign(tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i)); } } } /*- * This function looks at 5+1 scalar bits (5 current, 1 adjacent less * significant bit), and recodes them into a signed digit for use in fast point * multiplication: the use of signed rather than unsigned digits means that * fewer points need to be precomputed, given that point inversion is easy * (a precomputed point dP makes -dP available as well). * * BACKGROUND: * * Signed digits for multiplication were introduced by Booth ("A signed binary * multiplication technique", Quart. Journ. Mech. and Applied Math., vol. IV, * pt. 2 (1951), pp. 236-240), in that case for multiplication of integers. * Booth's original encoding did not generally improve the density of nonzero * digits over the binary representation, and was merely meant to simplify the * handling of signed factors given in two's complement; but it has since been * shown to be the basis of various signed-digit representations that do have * further advantages, including the wNAF, using the following general approach: * * (1) Given a binary representation * * b_k ... b_2 b_1 b_0, * * of a nonnegative integer (b_k in {0, 1}), rewrite it in digits 0, 1, -1 * by using bit-wise subtraction as follows: * * b_k b_(k-1) ... b_2 b_1 b_0 * - b_k ... b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 * ------------------------------------- * s_k b_(k-1) ... s_3 s_2 s_1 s_0 * * A left-shift followed by subtraction of the original value yields a new * representation of the same value, using signed bits s_i = b_(i+1) - b_i. * This representation from Booth's paper has since appeared in the * literature under a variety of different names including "reversed binary * form", "alternating greedy expansion", "mutual opposite form", and * "sign-alternating {+-1}-representation". * * An interesting property is that among the nonzero bits, values 1 and -1 * strictly alternate. * * (2) Various window schemes can be applied to the Booth representation of * integers: for example, right-to-left sliding windows yield the wNAF * (a signed-digit encoding independently discovered by various researchers * in the 1990s), and left-to-right sliding windows yield a left-to-right * equivalent of the wNAF (independently discovered by various researchers * around 2004). * * To prevent leaking information through side channels in point multiplication, * we need to recode the given integer into a regular pattern: sliding windows * as in wNAFs won't do, we need their fixed-window equivalent -- which is a few * decades older: we'll be using the so-called "modified Booth encoding" due to * MacSorley ("High-speed arithmetic in binary computers", Proc. IRE, vol. 49 * (1961), pp. 67-91), in a radix-2^5 setting. That is, we always combine five * signed bits into a signed digit: * * s_(4j + 4) s_(4j + 3) s_(4j + 2) s_(4j + 1) s_(4j) * * The sign-alternating property implies that the resulting digit values are * integers from -16 to 16. * * Of course, we don't actually need to compute the signed digits s_i as an * intermediate step (that's just a nice way to see how this scheme relates * to the wNAF): a direct computation obtains the recoded digit from the * six bits b_(4j + 4) ... b_(4j - 1). * * This function takes those five bits as an integer (0 .. 63), writing the * recoded digit to *sign (0 for positive, 1 for negative) and *digit (absolute * value, in the range 0 .. 8). Note that this integer essentially provides the * input bits "shifted to the left" by one position: for example, the input to * compute the least significant recoded digit, given that there's no bit b_-1, * has to be b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 0. * */ void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign, unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in) { unsigned char s, d; s = ~((in >> 5) - 1); /* sets all bits to MSB(in), 'in' seen as * 6-bit value */ d = (1 << 6) - in - 1; d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); *sign = s & 1; *digit = d; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c0000644000000000000000000005152613176625657015577 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., * and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/bn_int.h" #include "ec_lcl.h" /* * This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method * Formerly at: * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp * You might now find it here: * http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45537-X_13 * http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/TI-01-08.multiexp.pdf * For multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting, formerly at: * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp */ /* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */ struct ec_pre_comp_st { const EC_GROUP *group; /* parent EC_GROUP object */ size_t blocksize; /* block size for wNAF splitting */ size_t numblocks; /* max. number of blocks for which we have * precomputation */ size_t w; /* window size */ EC_POINT **points; /* array with pre-calculated multiples of * generator: 'num' pointers to EC_POINT * objects followed by a NULL */ size_t num; /* numblocks * 2^(w-1) */ int references; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { EC_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL; if (!group) return NULL; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } ret->group = group; ret->blocksize = 8; /* default */ ret->w = 4; /* default */ ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) { int i; if (pre != NULL) CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, 1, &i, pre->lock); return pre; } void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) { int i; if (pre == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, -1, &i, pre->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_ec", pre); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); if (pre->points != NULL) { EC_POINT **pts; for (pts = pre->points; *pts != NULL; pts++) EC_POINT_free(*pts); OPENSSL_free(pre->points); } CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock); OPENSSL_free(pre); } /* * TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation, * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the * boundaries should be increased) */ #define EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(b) \ ((size_t) \ ((b) >= 2000 ? 6 : \ (b) >= 800 ? 5 : \ (b) >= 300 ? 4 : \ (b) >= 70 ? 3 : \ (b) >= 20 ? 2 : \ 1)) /*- * Compute * \sum scalars[i]*points[i], * also including * scalar*generator * in the addition if scalar != NULL */ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; EC_POINT *tmp = NULL; size_t totalnum; size_t blocksize = 0, numblocks = 0; /* for wNAF splitting */ size_t pre_points_per_block = 0; size_t i, j; int k; int r_is_inverted = 0; int r_is_at_infinity = 1; size_t *wsize = NULL; /* individual window sizes */ signed char **wNAF = NULL; /* individual wNAFs */ size_t *wNAF_len = NULL; size_t max_len = 0; size_t num_val; EC_POINT **val = NULL; /* precomputation */ EC_POINT **v; EC_POINT ***val_sub = NULL; /* pointers to sub-arrays of 'val' or * 'pre_comp->points' */ const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL; int num_scalar = 0; /* flag: will be set to 1 if 'scalar' must be * treated like other scalars, i.e. * precomputation is not available */ int ret = 0; if (group->meth != r->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) { return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } if (scalar != NULL) { generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */ pre_comp = group->pre_comp.ec; if (pre_comp && pre_comp->numblocks && (EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp->points[0], ctx) == 0)) { blocksize = pre_comp->blocksize; /* * determine maximum number of blocks that wNAF splitting may * yield (NB: maximum wNAF length is bit length plus one) */ numblocks = (BN_num_bits(scalar) / blocksize) + 1; /* * we cannot use more blocks than we have precomputation for */ if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) numblocks = pre_comp->numblocks; pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (pre_comp->w - 1); /* check that pre_comp looks sane */ if (pre_comp->num != (pre_comp->numblocks * pre_points_per_block)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else { /* can't use precomputation */ pre_comp = NULL; numblocks = 1; num_scalar = 1; /* treat 'scalar' like 'num'-th element of * 'scalars' */ } } totalnum = num + numblocks; wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wsize[0]); wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wNAF_len[0]); wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof wNAF[0]); /* includes space * for pivot */ val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof val_sub[0]); /* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */ if (wNAF != NULL) wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */ if (wsize == NULL || wNAF_len == NULL || wNAF == NULL || val_sub == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points */ num_val = 0; for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { size_t bits; bits = i < num ? BN_num_bits(scalars[i]) : BN_num_bits(scalar); wsize[i] = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); num_val += (size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1); wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; /* make sure we always have a pivot */ wNAF[i] = bn_compute_wNAF((i < num ? scalars[i] : scalar), wsize[i], &wNAF_len[i]); if (wNAF[i] == NULL) goto err; if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) max_len = wNAF_len[i]; } if (numblocks) { /* we go here iff scalar != NULL */ if (pre_comp == NULL) { if (num_scalar != 1) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* we have already generated a wNAF for 'scalar' */ } else { signed char *tmp_wNAF = NULL; size_t tmp_len = 0; if (num_scalar != 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * use the window size for which we have precomputation */ wsize[num] = pre_comp->w; tmp_wNAF = bn_compute_wNAF(scalar, wsize[num], &tmp_len); if (!tmp_wNAF) goto err; if (tmp_len <= max_len) { /* * One of the other wNAFs is at least as long as the wNAF * belonging to the generator, so wNAF splitting will not buy * us anything. */ numblocks = 1; totalnum = num + 1; /* don't use wNAF splitting */ wNAF[num] = tmp_wNAF; wNAF[num + 1] = NULL; wNAF_len[num] = tmp_len; /* * pre_comp->points starts with the points that we need here: */ val_sub[num] = pre_comp->points; } else { /* * don't include tmp_wNAF directly into wNAF array - use wNAF * splitting and include the blocks */ signed char *pp; EC_POINT **tmp_points; if (tmp_len < numblocks * blocksize) { /* * possibly we can do with fewer blocks than estimated */ numblocks = (tmp_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); goto err; } totalnum = num + numblocks; } /* split wNAF in 'numblocks' parts */ pp = tmp_wNAF; tmp_points = pre_comp->points; for (i = num; i < totalnum; i++) { if (i < totalnum - 1) { wNAF_len[i] = blocksize; if (tmp_len < blocksize) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); goto err; } tmp_len -= blocksize; } else /* * last block gets whatever is left (this could be * more or less than 'blocksize'!) */ wNAF_len[i] = tmp_len; wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; wNAF[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(wNAF_len[i]); if (wNAF[i] == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); goto err; } memcpy(wNAF[i], pp, wNAF_len[i]); if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) max_len = wNAF_len[i]; if (*tmp_points == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); goto err; } val_sub[i] = tmp_points; tmp_points += pre_points_per_block; pp += blocksize; } OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); } } } /* * All points we precompute now go into a single array 'val'. * 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, or to a * subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation. */ val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof val[0]); if (val == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } val[num_val] = NULL; /* pivot element */ /* allocate points for precomputation */ v = val; for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { val_sub[i] = v; for (j = 0; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { *v = EC_POINT_new(group); if (*v == NULL) goto err; v++; } } if (!(v == val + num_val)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) goto err; /*- * prepare precomputed values: * val_sub[i][0] := points[i] * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i] * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i] * ... */ for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { if (i < num) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i])) goto err; } else { if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], generator)) goto err; } if (wsize[i] > 1) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp, val_sub[i][0], ctx)) goto err; for (j = 1; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { if (!EC_POINT_add (group, val_sub[i][j], val_sub[i][j - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err; } } } if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx)) goto err; r_is_at_infinity = 1; for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) { if (!r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx)) goto err; } for (i = 0; i < totalnum; i++) { if (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) { int digit = wNAF[i][k]; int is_neg; if (digit) { is_neg = digit < 0; if (is_neg) digit = -digit; if (is_neg != r_is_inverted) { if (!r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) goto err; } r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted; } /* digit > 0 */ if (r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1])) goto err; r_is_at_infinity = 0; } else { if (!EC_POINT_add (group, r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1], ctx)) goto err; } } } } } if (r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) goto err; } else { if (r_is_inverted) if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); EC_POINT_free(tmp); OPENSSL_free(wsize); OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len); if (wNAF != NULL) { signed char **w; for (w = wNAF; *w != NULL; w++) OPENSSL_free(*w); OPENSSL_free(wNAF); } if (val != NULL) { for (v = val; *v != NULL; v++) EC_POINT_clear_free(*v); OPENSSL_free(val); } OPENSSL_free(val_sub); return ret; } /*- * ec_wNAF_precompute_mult() * creates an EC_PRE_COMP object with preprecomputed multiples of the generator * for use with wNAF splitting as implemented in ec_wNAF_mul(). * * 'pre_comp->points' is an array of multiples of the generator * of the following form: * points[0] = generator; * points[1] = 3 * generator; * ... * points[2^(w-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)-1) * generator; * points[2^(w-1)] = 2^blocksize * generator; * points[2^(w-1)+1] = 3 * 2^blocksize * generator; * ... * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-2)) * generator * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)] = 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator * ... * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * generator * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks] = NULL */ int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { const EC_POINT *generator; EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL, *base = NULL, **var; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; const BIGNUM *order; size_t i, bits, w, pre_points_per_block, blocksize, numblocks, num; EC_POINT **points = NULL; EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp; int ret = 0; /* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */ EC_pre_comp_free(group); if ((pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL) return 0; generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); if (generator == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (order == NULL) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(order)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); goto err; } bits = BN_num_bits(order); /* * The following parameters mean we precompute (approximately) one point * per bit. TBD: The combination 8, 4 is perfect for 160 bits; for other * bit lengths, other parameter combinations might provide better * efficiency. */ blocksize = 8; w = 4; if (EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits) > w) { /* let's not make the window too small ... */ w = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); } numblocks = (bits + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; /* max. number of blocks * to use for wNAF * splitting */ pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (w - 1); num = pre_points_per_block * numblocks; /* number of points to compute * and store */ points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*points) * (num + 1)); if (points == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } var = points; var[num] = NULL; /* pivot */ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if ((var[i] = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL || (base = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_copy(base, generator)) goto err; /* do the precomputation */ for (i = 0; i < numblocks; i++) { size_t j; if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp_point, base, ctx)) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_copy(*var++, base)) goto err; for (j = 1; j < pre_points_per_block; j++, var++) { /* * calculate odd multiples of the current base point */ if (!EC_POINT_add(group, *var, tmp_point, *(var - 1), ctx)) goto err; } if (i < numblocks - 1) { /* * get the next base (multiply current one by 2^blocksize) */ size_t k; if (blocksize <= 2) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, tmp_point, ctx)) goto err; for (k = 2; k < blocksize; k++) { if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, base, ctx)) goto err; } } } if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx)) goto err; pre_comp->group = group; pre_comp->blocksize = blocksize; pre_comp->numblocks = numblocks; pre_comp->w = w; pre_comp->points = points; points = NULL; pre_comp->num = num; SETPRECOMP(group, ec, pre_comp); pre_comp = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); EC_ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp); if (points) { EC_POINT **p; for (p = points; *p != NULL; p++) EC_POINT_free(*p); OPENSSL_free(points); } EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); EC_POINT_free(base); return ret; } int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { return HAVEPRECOMP(group, ec); } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecdh_kdf.c0000644000000000000000000000375513176625657015677 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* Key derivation function from X9.62/SECG */ /* Way more than we will ever need */ #define ECDH_KDF_MAX (1 << 30) int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen, const EVP_MD *md) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; int rv = 0; unsigned int i; size_t mdlen; unsigned char ctr[4]; if (sinfolen > ECDH_KDF_MAX || outlen > ECDH_KDF_MAX || Zlen > ECDH_KDF_MAX) return 0; mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) return 0; mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); for (i = 1;; i++) { unsigned char mtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)) goto err; ctr[3] = i & 0xFF; ctr[2] = (i >> 8) & 0xFF; ctr[1] = (i >> 16) & 0xFF; ctr[0] = (i >> 24) & 0xFF; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, Z, Zlen)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, ctr, sizeof(ctr))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, sinfo, sinfolen)) goto err; if (outlen >= mdlen) { if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, out, NULL)) goto err; outlen -= mdlen; if (outlen == 0) break; out += mdlen; } else { if (!EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, mtmp, NULL)) goto err; memcpy(out, mtmp, outlen); OPENSSL_cleanse(mtmp, mdlen); break; } } rv = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c0000644000000000000000000226575013176625657017561 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This is the precomputed constant time access table for the code in * ecp_montp256.c, for the default generator. The table consists of 37 * subtables, each subtable contains 64 affine points. The affine points are * encoded as eight uint64's, four for the x coordinate and four for the y. * Both values are in little-endian order. There are 37 tables because a * signed, 6-bit wNAF form of the scalar is used and ceil(256/(6 + 1)) = 37. * Within each table there are 64 values because the 6-bit wNAF value can * take 64 values, ignoring the sign bit, which is implemented by performing * a negation of the affine point when required. We would like to align it * to 2MB in order to increase the chances of using a large page but that * appears to lead to invalid ELF files being produced. */ #if defined(__GNUC__) __attribute((aligned(4096))) #elif defined(_MSC_VER) __declspec(align(4096)) #elif defined(__SUNPRO_C) # pragma align 4096(ecp_nistz256_precomputed) #endif static const BN_ULONG ecp_nistz256_precomputed[37][64 * sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) / sizeof(BN_ULONG)] = { {TOBN(0x79e730d4, 0x18a9143c), TOBN(0x75ba95fc, 0x5fedb601), TOBN(0x79fb732b, 0x77622510), TOBN(0x18905f76, 0xa53755c6), TOBN(0xddf25357, 0xce95560a), TOBN(0x8b4ab8e4, 0xba19e45c), TOBN(0xd2e88688, 0xdd21f325), TOBN(0x8571ff18, 0x25885d85), TOBN(0x850046d4, 0x10ddd64d), TOBN(0xaa6ae3c1, 0xa433827d), TOBN(0x73220503, 0x8d1490d9), TOBN(0xf6bb32e4, 0x3dcf3a3b), TOBN(0x2f3648d3, 0x61bee1a5), TOBN(0x152cd7cb, 0xeb236ff8), TOBN(0x19a8fb0e, 0x92042dbe), TOBN(0x78c57751, 0x0a5b8a3b), TOBN(0xffac3f90, 0x4eebc127), TOBN(0xb027f84a, 0x087d81fb), TOBN(0x66ad77dd, 0x87cbbc98), TOBN(0x26936a3f, 0xb6ff747e), TOBN(0xb04c5c1f, 0xc983a7eb), TOBN(0x583e47ad, 0x0861fe1a), TOBN(0x78820831, 0x1a2ee98e), TOBN(0xd5f06a29, 0xe587cc07), TOBN(0x74b0b50d, 0x46918dcc), TOBN(0x4650a6ed, 0xc623c173), TOBN(0x0cdaacac, 0xe8100af2), TOBN(0x577362f5, 0x41b0176b), TOBN(0x2d96f24c, 0xe4cbaba6), TOBN(0x17628471, 0xfad6f447), TOBN(0x6b6c36de, 0xe5ddd22e), TOBN(0x84b14c39, 0x4c5ab863), TOBN(0xbe1b8aae, 0xc45c61f5), TOBN(0x90ec649a, 0x94b9537d), TOBN(0x941cb5aa, 0xd076c20c), TOBN(0xc9079605, 0x890523c8), TOBN(0xeb309b4a, 0xe7ba4f10), TOBN(0x73c568ef, 0xe5eb882b), TOBN(0x3540a987, 0x7e7a1f68), TOBN(0x73a076bb, 0x2dd1e916), TOBN(0x40394737, 0x3e77664a), TOBN(0x55ae744f, 0x346cee3e), TOBN(0xd50a961a, 0x5b17a3ad), TOBN(0x13074b59, 0x54213673), TOBN(0x93d36220, 0xd377e44b), TOBN(0x299c2b53, 0xadff14b5), TOBN(0xf424d44c, 0xef639f11), TOBN(0xa4c9916d, 0x4a07f75f), TOBN(0x0746354e, 0xa0173b4f), TOBN(0x2bd20213, 0xd23c00f7), TOBN(0xf43eaab5, 0x0c23bb08), TOBN(0x13ba5119, 0xc3123e03), TOBN(0x2847d030, 0x3f5b9d4d), TOBN(0x6742f2f2, 0x5da67bdd), TOBN(0xef933bdc, 0x77c94195), TOBN(0xeaedd915, 0x6e240867), TOBN(0x27f14cd1, 0x9499a78f), TOBN(0x462ab5c5, 0x6f9b3455), TOBN(0x8f90f02a, 0xf02cfc6b), TOBN(0xb763891e, 0xb265230d), TOBN(0xf59da3a9, 0x532d4977), TOBN(0x21e3327d, 0xcf9eba15), TOBN(0x123c7b84, 0xbe60bbf0), TOBN(0x56ec12f2, 0x7706df76), TOBN(0x75c96e8f, 0x264e20e8), TOBN(0xabe6bfed, 0x59a7a841), TOBN(0x2cc09c04, 0x44c8eb00), TOBN(0xe05b3080, 0xf0c4e16b), TOBN(0x1eb7777a, 0xa45f3314), TOBN(0x56af7bed, 0xce5d45e3), TOBN(0x2b6e019a, 0x88b12f1a), TOBN(0x086659cd, 0xfd835f9b), TOBN(0x2c18dbd1, 0x9dc21ec8), TOBN(0x98f9868a, 0x0fcf8139), TOBN(0x737d2cd6, 0x48250b49), TOBN(0xcc61c947, 0x24b3428f), TOBN(0x0c2b4078, 0x80dd9e76), TOBN(0xc43a8991, 0x383fbe08), TOBN(0x5f7d2d65, 0x779be5d2), TOBN(0x78719a54, 0xeb3b4ab5), TOBN(0xea7d260a, 0x6245e404), TOBN(0x9de40795, 0x6e7fdfe0), TOBN(0x1ff3a415, 0x8dac1ab5), TOBN(0x3e7090f1, 0x649c9073), TOBN(0x1a768561, 0x2b944e88), TOBN(0x250f939e, 0xe57f61c8), TOBN(0x0c0daa89, 0x1ead643d), TOBN(0x68930023, 0xe125b88e), TOBN(0x04b71aa7, 0xd2697768), TOBN(0xabdedef5, 0xca345a33), TOBN(0x2409d29d, 0xee37385e), TOBN(0x4ee1df77, 0xcb83e156), TOBN(0x0cac12d9, 0x1cbb5b43), TOBN(0x170ed2f6, 0xca895637), TOBN(0x28228cfa, 0x8ade6d66), TOBN(0x7ff57c95, 0x53238aca), TOBN(0xccc42563, 0x4b2ed709), TOBN(0x0e356769, 0x856fd30d), TOBN(0xbcbcd43f, 0x559e9811), TOBN(0x738477ac, 0x5395b759), TOBN(0x35752b90, 0xc00ee17f), TOBN(0x68748390, 0x742ed2e3), TOBN(0x7cd06422, 0xbd1f5bc1), TOBN(0xfbc08769, 0xc9e7b797), TOBN(0xa242a35b, 0xb0cf664a), TOBN(0x126e48f7, 0x7f9707e3), TOBN(0x1717bf54, 0xc6832660), TOBN(0xfaae7332, 0xfd12c72e), TOBN(0x27b52db7, 0x995d586b), TOBN(0xbe29569e, 0x832237c2), TOBN(0xe8e4193e, 0x2a65e7db), TOBN(0x152706dc, 0x2eaa1bbb), TOBN(0x72bcd8b7, 0xbc60055b), TOBN(0x03cc23ee, 0x56e27e4b), TOBN(0xee337424, 0xe4819370), TOBN(0xe2aa0e43, 0x0ad3da09), TOBN(0x40b8524f, 0x6383c45d), TOBN(0xd7663554, 0x42a41b25), TOBN(0x64efa6de, 0x778a4797), TOBN(0x2042170a, 0x7079adf4), TOBN(0x808b0b65, 0x0bc6fb80), TOBN(0x5882e075, 0x3ffe2e6b), TOBN(0xd5ef2f7c, 0x2c83f549), TOBN(0x54d63c80, 0x9103b723), TOBN(0xf2f11bd6, 0x52a23f9b), TOBN(0x3670c319, 0x4b0b6587), TOBN(0x55c4623b, 0xb1580e9e), TOBN(0x64edf7b2, 0x01efe220), TOBN(0x97091dcb, 0xd53c5c9d), TOBN(0xf17624b6, 0xac0a177b), TOBN(0xb0f13975, 0x2cfe2dff), TOBN(0xc1a35c0a, 0x6c7a574e), TOBN(0x227d3146, 0x93e79987), TOBN(0x0575bf30, 0xe89cb80e), TOBN(0x2f4e247f, 0x0d1883bb), TOBN(0xebd51226, 0x3274c3d0), TOBN(0x5f3e51c8, 0x56ada97a), TOBN(0x4afc964d, 0x8f8b403e), TOBN(0xa6f247ab, 0x412e2979), TOBN(0x675abd1b, 0x6f80ebda), TOBN(0x66a2bd72, 0x5e485a1d), TOBN(0x4b2a5caf, 0x8f4f0b3c), TOBN(0x2626927f, 0x1b847bba), TOBN(0x6c6fc7d9, 0x0502394d), TOBN(0xfea912ba, 0xa5659ae8), TOBN(0x68363aba, 0x25e1a16e), TOBN(0xb8842277, 0x752c41ac), TOBN(0xfe545c28, 0x2897c3fc), TOBN(0x2d36e9e7, 0xdc4c696b), TOBN(0x5806244a, 0xfba977c5), TOBN(0x85665e9b, 0xe39508c1), TOBN(0xf720ee25, 0x6d12597b), TOBN(0x8a979129, 0xd2337a31), TOBN(0x5916868f, 0x0f862bdc), TOBN(0x048099d9, 0x5dd283ba), TOBN(0xe2d1eeb6, 0xfe5bfb4e), TOBN(0x82ef1c41, 0x7884005d), TOBN(0xa2d4ec17, 0xffffcbae), TOBN(0x9161c53f, 0x8aa95e66), TOBN(0x5ee104e1, 0xc5fee0d0), TOBN(0x562e4cec, 0xc135b208), TOBN(0x74e1b265, 0x4783f47d), TOBN(0x6d2a506c, 0x5a3f3b30), TOBN(0xecead9f4, 0xc16762fc), TOBN(0xf29dd4b2, 0xe286e5b9), TOBN(0x1b0fadc0, 0x83bb3c61), TOBN(0x7a75023e, 0x7fac29a4), TOBN(0xc086d5f1, 0xc9477fa3), TOBN(0x0fc61135, 0x2f6f3076), TOBN(0xc99ffa23, 0xe3912a9a), TOBN(0x6a0b0685, 0xd2f8ba3d), TOBN(0xfdc777e8, 0xe93358a4), TOBN(0x94a787bb, 0x35415f04), TOBN(0x640c2d6a, 0x4d23fea4), TOBN(0x9de917da, 0x153a35b5), TOBN(0x793e8d07, 0x5d5cd074), TOBN(0xf4f87653, 0x2de45068), TOBN(0x37c7a7e8, 0x9e2e1f6e), TOBN(0xd0825fa2, 0xa3584069), TOBN(0xaf2cea7c, 0x1727bf42), TOBN(0x0360a4fb, 0x9e4785a9), TOBN(0xe5fda49c, 0x27299f4a), TOBN(0x48068e13, 0x71ac2f71), TOBN(0x83d0687b, 0x9077666f), TOBN(0x6d3883b2, 0x15d02819), TOBN(0x6d0d7550, 0x40dd9a35), TOBN(0x61d7cbf9, 0x1d2b469f), TOBN(0xf97b232f, 0x2efc3115), TOBN(0xa551d750, 0xb24bcbc7), TOBN(0x11ea4949, 0x88a1e356), TOBN(0x7669f031, 0x93cb7501), TOBN(0x595dc55e, 0xca737b8a), TOBN(0xa4a319ac, 0xd837879f), TOBN(0x6fc1b49e, 0xed6b67b0), TOBN(0xe3959933, 0x32f1f3af), TOBN(0x966742eb, 0x65432a2e), TOBN(0x4b8dc9fe, 0xb4966228), TOBN(0x96cc6312, 0x43f43950), TOBN(0x12068859, 0xc9b731ee), TOBN(0x7b948dc3, 0x56f79968), TOBN(0x61e4ad32, 0xed1f8008), TOBN(0xe6c9267a, 0xd8b17538), TOBN(0x1ac7c5eb, 0x857ff6fb), TOBN(0x994baaa8, 0x55f2fb10), TOBN(0x84cf14e1, 0x1d248018), TOBN(0x5a39898b, 0x628ac508), TOBN(0x14fde97b, 0x5fa944f5), TOBN(0xed178030, 0xd12e5ac7), TOBN(0x042c2af4, 0x97e2feb4), TOBN(0xd36a42d7, 0xaebf7313), TOBN(0x49d2c9eb, 0x084ffdd7), TOBN(0x9f8aa54b, 0x2ef7c76a), TOBN(0x9200b7ba, 0x09895e70), TOBN(0x3bd0c66f, 0xddb7fb58), TOBN(0x2d97d108, 0x78eb4cbb), TOBN(0x2d431068, 0xd84bde31), TOBN(0x4b523eb7, 0x172ccd1f), TOBN(0x7323cb28, 0x30a6a892), TOBN(0x97082ec0, 0xcfe153eb), TOBN(0xe97f6b6a, 0xf2aadb97), TOBN(0x1d3d393e, 0xd1a83da1), TOBN(0xa6a7f9c7, 0x804b2a68), TOBN(0x4a688b48, 0x2d0cb71e), TOBN(0xa9b4cc5f, 0x40585278), TOBN(0x5e5db46a, 0xcb66e132), TOBN(0xf1be963a, 0x0d925880), TOBN(0x944a7027, 0x0317b9e2), TOBN(0xe266f959, 0x48603d48), TOBN(0x98db6673, 0x5c208899), TOBN(0x90472447, 0xa2fb18a3), TOBN(0x8a966939, 0x777c619f), TOBN(0x3798142a, 0x2a3be21b), TOBN(0xb4241cb1, 0x3298b343), TOBN(0xa3a14e49, 0xb44f65a1), TOBN(0xc5f4d6cd, 0x3ac77acd), TOBN(0xd0288cb5, 0x52b6fc3c), TOBN(0xd5cc8c2f, 0x1c040abc), TOBN(0xb675511e, 0x06bf9b4a), TOBN(0xd667da37, 0x9b3aa441), TOBN(0x460d45ce, 0x51601f72), TOBN(0xe2f73c69, 0x6755ff89), TOBN(0xdd3cf7e7, 0x473017e6), TOBN(0x8ef5689d, 0x3cf7600d), TOBN(0x948dc4f8, 0xb1fc87b4), TOBN(0xd9e9fe81, 0x4ea53299), TOBN(0x2d921ca2, 0x98eb6028), TOBN(0xfaecedfd, 0x0c9803fc), TOBN(0xf38ae891, 0x4d7b4745), TOBN(0xd8c5fccf, 0xc5e3a3d8), TOBN(0xbefd904c, 0x4079dfbf), TOBN(0xbc6d6a58, 0xfead0197), TOBN(0x39227077, 0x695532a4), TOBN(0x09e23e6d, 0xdbef42f5), TOBN(0x7e449b64, 0x480a9908), TOBN(0x7b969c1a, 0xad9a2e40), TOBN(0x6231d792, 0x9591c2a4), TOBN(0x87151456, 0x0f664534), TOBN(0x85ceae7c, 0x4b68f103), TOBN(0xac09c4ae, 0x65578ab9), TOBN(0x33ec6868, 0xf044b10c), TOBN(0x6ac4832b, 0x3a8ec1f1), TOBN(0x5509d128, 0x5847d5ef), TOBN(0xf909604f, 0x763f1574), TOBN(0xb16c4303, 0xc32f63c4), TOBN(0xb6ab2014, 0x7ca23cd3), TOBN(0xcaa7a5c6, 0xa391849d), TOBN(0x5b0673a3, 0x75678d94), TOBN(0xc982ddd4, 0xdd303e64), TOBN(0xfd7b000b, 0x5db6f971), TOBN(0xbba2cb1f, 0x6f876f92), TOBN(0xc77332a3, 0x3c569426), TOBN(0xa159100c, 0x570d74f8), TOBN(0xfd16847f, 0xdec67ef5), TOBN(0x742ee464, 0x233e76b7), TOBN(0x0b8e4134, 0xefc2b4c8), TOBN(0xca640b86, 0x42a3e521), TOBN(0x653a0190, 0x8ceb6aa9), TOBN(0x313c300c, 0x547852d5), TOBN(0x24e4ab12, 0x6b237af7), TOBN(0x2ba90162, 0x8bb47af8), TOBN(0x3d5e58d6, 0xa8219bb7), TOBN(0xc691d0bd, 0x1b06c57f), TOBN(0x0ae4cb10, 0xd257576e), TOBN(0x3569656c, 0xd54a3dc3), TOBN(0xe5ebaebd, 0x94cda03a), TOBN(0x934e82d3, 0x162bfe13), TOBN(0x450ac0ba, 0xe251a0c6), TOBN(0x480b9e11, 0xdd6da526), TOBN(0x00467bc5, 0x8cce08b5), TOBN(0xb636458c, 0x7f178d55), TOBN(0xc5748bae, 0xa677d806), TOBN(0x2763a387, 0xdfa394eb), TOBN(0xa12b448a, 0x7d3cebb6), TOBN(0xe7adda3e, 0x6f20d850), TOBN(0xf63ebce5, 0x1558462c), TOBN(0x58b36143, 0x620088a8), TOBN(0x8a2cc3ca, 0x4d63c0ee), TOBN(0x51233117, 0x0fe948ce), TOBN(0x7463fd85, 0x222ef33b), TOBN(0xadf0c7dc, 0x7c603d6c), TOBN(0x0ec32d3b, 0xfe7765e5), TOBN(0xccaab359, 0xbf380409), TOBN(0xbdaa84d6, 0x8e59319c), TOBN(0xd9a4c280, 0x9c80c34d), TOBN(0xa9d89488, 0xa059c142), TOBN(0x6f5ae714, 0xff0b9346), TOBN(0x068f237d, 0x16fb3664), TOBN(0x5853e4c4, 0x363186ac), TOBN(0xe2d87d23, 0x63c52f98), TOBN(0x2ec4a766, 0x81828876), TOBN(0x47b864fa, 0xe14e7b1c), TOBN(0x0c0bc0e5, 0x69192408), TOBN(0xe4d7681d, 0xb82e9f3e), TOBN(0x83200f0b, 0xdf25e13c), TOBN(0x8909984c, 0x66f27280), TOBN(0x462d7b00, 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0x730d50da), TOBN(0x0423446c, 0x4b083b7f), TOBN(0x397a247d, 0xd69d3417), TOBN(0xeb629f90, 0x387ba42a), TOBN(0x1ee426cc, 0xd5cd79bf), TOBN(0x0032940b, 0x946c6e18), TOBN(0x1b1e8ae0, 0x57477f58), TOBN(0xe94f7d34, 0x6d823278), TOBN(0xc747cb96, 0x782ba21a), TOBN(0xc5254469, 0xf72b33a5), TOBN(0x772ef6de, 0xc7f80c81), TOBN(0xd73acbfe, 0x2cd9e6b5), TOBN(0x4075b5b1, 0x49ee90d9), TOBN(0x785c339a, 0xa06e9eba), TOBN(0xa1030d5b, 0xabf825e0), TOBN(0xcec684c3, 0xa42931dc), TOBN(0x42ab62c9, 0xc1586e63), TOBN(0x45431d66, 0x5ab43f2b), TOBN(0x57c8b2c0, 0x55f7835d), TOBN(0x033da338, 0xc1b7f865), TOBN(0x283c7513, 0xcaa76097), TOBN(0x0a624fa9, 0x36c83906), TOBN(0x6b20afec, 0x715af2c7), TOBN(0x4b969974, 0xeba78bfd), TOBN(0x220755cc, 0xd921d60e), TOBN(0x9b944e10, 0x7baeca13), TOBN(0x04819d51, 0x5ded93d4), TOBN(0x9bbff86e, 0x6dddfd27), TOBN(0x6b344130, 0x77adc612), TOBN(0xa7496529, 0xbbd803a0), TOBN(0x1a1baaa7, 0x6d8805bd), TOBN(0xc8403902, 0x470343ad), TOBN(0x39f59f66, 0x175adff1), TOBN(0x0b26d7fb, 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0x7217d583), TOBN(0x5061da3d, 0x25e6de5e), TOBN(0x3113940d, 0xec1b4991), TOBN(0xf12195e1, 0x36f485ae), TOBN(0xa7507fb2, 0x731a2ee0), TOBN(0x95057a8e, 0x6e9e196e), TOBN(0xa3c2c911, 0x2e130136), TOBN(0x97dfbb36, 0x33c60d15), TOBN(0xcaf3c581, 0xb300ee2b), TOBN(0x77f25d90, 0xf4bac8b8), TOBN(0xdb1c4f98, 0x6d840cd6), TOBN(0x471d62c0, 0xe634288c), TOBN(0x8ec2f85e, 0xcec8a161), TOBN(0x41f37cbc, 0xfa6f4ae2), TOBN(0x6793a20f, 0x4b709985), TOBN(0x7a7bd33b, 0xefa8985b), TOBN(0x2c6a3fbd, 0x938e6446), TOBN(0x19042619, 0x2a8d47c1), TOBN(0x16848667, 0xcc36975f), TOBN(0x02acf168, 0x9d5f1dfb), TOBN(0x62d41ad4, 0x613baa94), TOBN(0xb56fbb92, 0x9f684670), TOBN(0xce610d0d, 0xe9e40569), TOBN(0x7b99c65f, 0x35489fef), TOBN(0x0c88ad1b, 0x3df18b97), TOBN(0x81b7d9be, 0x5d0e9edb), TOBN(0xd85218c0, 0xc716cc0a), TOBN(0xf4b5ff90, 0x85691c49), TOBN(0xa4fd666b, 0xce356ac6), TOBN(0x17c72895, 0x4b327a7a), TOBN(0xf93d5085, 0xda6be7de), TOBN(0xff71530e, 0x3301d34e), TOBN(0x4cd96442, 0xd8f448e8), TOBN(0x9283d331, 0x2ed18ffa), TOBN(0x4d33dd99, 0x2a849870), TOBN(0xa716964b, 0x41576335), TOBN(0xff5e3a9b, 0x179be0e5), TOBN(0x5b9d6b1b, 0x83b13632), TOBN(0x3b8bd7d4, 0xa52f313b), TOBN(0xc9dd95a0, 0x637a4660), TOBN(0x30035962, 0x0b3e218f), TOBN(0xce1481a3, 0xc7b28a3c), TOBN(0xab41b43a, 0x43228d83), TOBN(0x24ae1c30, 0x4ad63f99), TOBN(0x8e525f1a, 0x46a51229), TOBN(0x14af860f, 0xcd26d2b4), TOBN(0xd6baef61, 0x3f714aa1), TOBN(0xf51865ad, 0xeb78795e), TOBN(0xd3e21fce, 0xe6a9d694), TOBN(0x82ceb1dd, 0x8a37b527)} }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c0000644000000000000000000022220613176625657016363 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Copyright 2011 Google Inc. * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * A 64-bit implementation of the NIST P-256 elliptic curve point multiplication * * OpenSSL integration was taken from Emilia Kasper's work in ecp_nistp224.c. * Otherwise based on Emilia's P224 work, which was inspired by my curve25519 * work which got its smarts from Daniel J. Bernstein's work on the same. */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include "ec_lcl.h" # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1)) /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */ typedef __uint128_t uint128_t; /* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit * platforms */ typedef __int128_t int128_t; # else # error "Need GCC 3.1 or later to define type uint128_t" # endif typedef uint8_t u8; typedef uint32_t u32; typedef uint64_t u64; typedef int64_t s64; /* * The underlying field. P256 operates over GF(2^256-2^224+2^192+2^96-1). We * can serialise an element of this field into 32 bytes. We call this an * felem_bytearray. */ typedef u8 felem_bytearray[32]; /* * These are the parameters of P256, taken from FIPS 186-3, page 86. These * values are big-endian. */ static const felem_bytearray nistp256_curve_params[5] = { {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* p */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a = -3 */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc}, /* b */ {0x5a, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0x93, 0xe7, 0xb3, 0xeb, 0xbd, 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x1d, 0x06, 0xb0, 0xcc, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x3b, 0xce, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x27, 0xd2, 0x60, 0x4b}, {0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, /* x */ 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x63, 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0, 0xf4, 0xa1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96}, {0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, /* y */ 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5} }; /*- * The representation of field elements. * ------------------------------------ * * We represent field elements with either four 128-bit values, eight 128-bit * values, or four 64-bit values. The field element represented is: * v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^64 + v[2]*2^128 + v[3]*2^192 (mod p) * or: * v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^64 + v[2]*2^128 + ... + v[8]*2^512 (mod p) * * 128-bit values are called 'limbs'. Since the limbs are spaced only 64 bits * apart, but are 128-bits wide, the most significant bits of each limb overlap * with the least significant bits of the next. * * A field element with four limbs is an 'felem'. One with eight limbs is a * 'longfelem' * * A field element with four, 64-bit values is called a 'smallfelem'. Small * values are used as intermediate values before multiplication. */ # define NLIMBS 4 typedef uint128_t limb; typedef limb felem[NLIMBS]; typedef limb longfelem[NLIMBS * 2]; typedef u64 smallfelem[NLIMBS]; /* This is the value of the prime as four 64-bit words, little-endian. */ static const u64 kPrime[4] = { 0xfffffffffffffffful, 0xffffffff, 0, 0xffffffff00000001ul }; static const u64 bottom63bits = 0x7ffffffffffffffful; /* * bin32_to_felem takes a little-endian byte array and converts it into felem * form. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian. */ static void bin32_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[32]) { out[0] = *((u64 *)&in[0]); out[1] = *((u64 *)&in[8]); out[2] = *((u64 *)&in[16]); out[3] = *((u64 *)&in[24]); } /* * smallfelem_to_bin32 takes a smallfelem and serialises into a little * endian, 32 byte array. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian. */ static void smallfelem_to_bin32(u8 out[32], const smallfelem in) { *((u64 *)&out[0]) = in[0]; *((u64 *)&out[8]) = in[1]; *((u64 *)&out[16]) = in[2]; *((u64 *)&out[24]) = in[3]; } /* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */ static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) out[i] = in[len - 1 - i]; } /* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn) { felem_bytearray b_in; felem_bytearray b_out; unsigned num_bytes; /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */ memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out)); num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } if (BN_is_negative(bn)) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in); flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes); bin32_to_felem(out, b_out); return 1; } /* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */ static BIGNUM *smallfelem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const smallfelem in) { felem_bytearray b_in, b_out; smallfelem_to_bin32(b_in, in); flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof b_out); return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof b_out, out); } /*- * Field operations * ---------------- */ static void smallfelem_one(smallfelem out) { out[0] = 1; out[1] = 0; out[2] = 0; out[3] = 0; } static void smallfelem_assign(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in) { out[0] = in[0]; out[1] = in[1]; out[2] = in[2]; out[3] = in[3]; } static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) { out[0] = in[0]; out[1] = in[1]; out[2] = in[2]; out[3] = in[3]; } /* felem_sum sets out = out + in. */ static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in) { out[0] += in[0]; out[1] += in[1]; out[2] += in[2]; out[3] += in[3]; } /* felem_small_sum sets out = out + in. */ static void felem_small_sum(felem out, const smallfelem in) { out[0] += in[0]; out[1] += in[1]; out[2] += in[2]; out[3] += in[3]; } /* felem_scalar sets out = out * scalar */ static void felem_scalar(felem out, const u64 scalar) { out[0] *= scalar; out[1] *= scalar; out[2] *= scalar; out[3] *= scalar; } /* longfelem_scalar sets out = out * scalar */ static void longfelem_scalar(longfelem out, const u64 scalar) { out[0] *= scalar; out[1] *= scalar; out[2] *= scalar; out[3] *= scalar; out[4] *= scalar; out[5] *= scalar; out[6] *= scalar; out[7] *= scalar; } # define two105m41m9 (((limb)1) << 105) - (((limb)1) << 41) - (((limb)1) << 9) # define two105 (((limb)1) << 105) # define two105m41p9 (((limb)1) << 105) - (((limb)1) << 41) + (((limb)1) << 9) /* zero105 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero105 = { two105m41m9, two105, two105m41p9, two105m41p9 }; /*- * smallfelem_neg sets |out| to |-small| * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^105 */ static void smallfelem_neg(felem out, const smallfelem small) { /* In order to prevent underflow, we subtract from 0 mod p. */ out[0] = zero105[0] - small[0]; out[1] = zero105[1] - small[1]; out[2] = zero105[2] - small[2]; out[3] = zero105[3] - small[3]; } /*- * felem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^104 * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^105 */ static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in) { /* * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting. */ out[0] += zero105[0]; out[1] += zero105[1]; out[2] += zero105[2]; out[3] += zero105[3]; out[0] -= in[0]; out[1] -= in[1]; out[2] -= in[2]; out[3] -= in[3]; } # define two107m43m11 (((limb)1) << 107) - (((limb)1) << 43) - (((limb)1) << 11) # define two107 (((limb)1) << 107) # define two107m43p11 (((limb)1) << 107) - (((limb)1) << 43) + (((limb)1) << 11) /* zero107 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero107 = { two107m43m11, two107, two107m43p11, two107m43p11 }; /*- * An alternative felem_diff for larger inputs |in| * felem_diff_zero107 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^106 * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^107 */ static void felem_diff_zero107(felem out, const felem in) { /* * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting. */ out[0] += zero107[0]; out[1] += zero107[1]; out[2] += zero107[2]; out[3] += zero107[3]; out[0] -= in[0]; out[1] -= in[1]; out[2] -= in[2]; out[3] -= in[3]; } /*- * longfelem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 7*2^67 * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^70 + 2^40 */ static void longfelem_diff(longfelem out, const longfelem in) { static const limb two70m8p6 = (((limb) 1) << 70) - (((limb) 1) << 8) + (((limb) 1) << 6); static const limb two70p40 = (((limb) 1) << 70) + (((limb) 1) << 40); static const limb two70 = (((limb) 1) << 70); static const limb two70m40m38p6 = (((limb) 1) << 70) - (((limb) 1) << 40) - (((limb) 1) << 38) + (((limb) 1) << 6); static const limb two70m6 = (((limb) 1) << 70) - (((limb) 1) << 6); /* add 0 mod p to avoid underflow */ out[0] += two70m8p6; out[1] += two70p40; out[2] += two70; out[3] += two70m40m38p6; out[4] += two70m6; out[5] += two70m6; out[6] += two70m6; out[7] += two70m6; /* in[i] < 7*2^67 < 2^70 - 2^40 - 2^38 + 2^6 */ out[0] -= in[0]; out[1] -= in[1]; out[2] -= in[2]; out[3] -= in[3]; out[4] -= in[4]; out[5] -= in[5]; out[6] -= in[6]; out[7] -= in[7]; } # define two64m0 (((limb)1) << 64) - 1 # define two110p32m0 (((limb)1) << 110) + (((limb)1) << 32) - 1 # define two64m46 (((limb)1) << 64) - (((limb)1) << 46) # define two64m32 (((limb)1) << 64) - (((limb)1) << 32) /* zero110 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero110 = { two64m0, two110p32m0, two64m46, two64m32 }; /*- * felem_shrink converts an felem into a smallfelem. The result isn't quite * minimal as the value may be greater than p. * * On entry: * in[i] < 2^109 * On exit: * out[i] < 2^64 */ static void felem_shrink(smallfelem out, const felem in) { felem tmp; u64 a, b, mask; s64 high, low; static const u64 kPrime3Test = 0x7fffffff00000001ul; /* 2^63 - 2^32 + 1 */ /* Carry 2->3 */ tmp[3] = zero110[3] + in[3] + ((u64)(in[2] >> 64)); /* tmp[3] < 2^110 */ tmp[2] = zero110[2] + (u64)in[2]; tmp[0] = zero110[0] + in[0]; tmp[1] = zero110[1] + in[1]; /* tmp[0] < 2**110, tmp[1] < 2^111, tmp[2] < 2**65 */ /* * We perform two partial reductions where we eliminate the high-word of * tmp[3]. We don't update the other words till the end. */ a = tmp[3] >> 64; /* a < 2^46 */ tmp[3] = (u64)tmp[3]; tmp[3] -= a; tmp[3] += ((limb) a) << 32; /* tmp[3] < 2^79 */ b = a; a = tmp[3] >> 64; /* a < 2^15 */ b += a; /* b < 2^46 + 2^15 < 2^47 */ tmp[3] = (u64)tmp[3]; tmp[3] -= a; tmp[3] += ((limb) a) << 32; /* tmp[3] < 2^64 + 2^47 */ /* * This adjusts the other two words to complete the two partial * reductions. */ tmp[0] += b; tmp[1] -= (((limb) b) << 32); /* * In order to make space in tmp[3] for the carry from 2 -> 3, we * conditionally subtract kPrime if tmp[3] is large enough. */ high = tmp[3] >> 64; /* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */ high <<= 63; high >>= 63; /*- * high is: * all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1 * all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */ low = tmp[3]; mask = low >> 63; /*- * mask is: * all ones if the MSB of low is 1 * all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */ low &= bottom63bits; low -= kPrime3Test; /* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */ low = ~low; low >>= 63; /*- * low is: * all ones if low was > kPrime3Test * all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */ mask = (mask & low) | high; tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0]; tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1]; /* kPrime[2] is zero, so omitted */ tmp[3] -= mask & kPrime[3]; /* tmp[3] < 2**64 - 2**32 + 1 */ tmp[1] += ((u64)(tmp[0] >> 64)); tmp[0] = (u64)tmp[0]; tmp[2] += ((u64)(tmp[1] >> 64)); tmp[1] = (u64)tmp[1]; tmp[3] += ((u64)(tmp[2] >> 64)); tmp[2] = (u64)tmp[2]; /* tmp[i] < 2^64 */ out[0] = tmp[0]; out[1] = tmp[1]; out[2] = tmp[2]; out[3] = tmp[3]; } /* smallfelem_expand converts a smallfelem to an felem */ static void smallfelem_expand(felem out, const smallfelem in) { out[0] = in[0]; out[1] = in[1]; out[2] = in[2]; out[3] = in[3]; } /*- * smallfelem_square sets |out| = |small|^2 * On entry: * small[i] < 2^64 * On exit: * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ static void smallfelem_square(longfelem out, const smallfelem small) { limb a; u64 high, low; a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[0]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[0] = low; out[1] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[1]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[1] += low; out[1] += low; out[2] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[2]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[2] += low; out[2] *= 2; out[3] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small[0]) * small[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[3] += low; out[4] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small[1]) * small[2]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[3] += low; out[3] *= 2; out[4] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small[1]) * small[1]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[2] += low; out[3] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small[1]) * small[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[4] += low; out[4] *= 2; out[5] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small[2]) * small[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[5] += low; out[5] *= 2; out[6] = high; out[6] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small[2]) * small[2]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[4] += low; out[5] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small[3]) * small[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[6] += low; out[7] = high; } /*- * felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2 * On entry: * in[i] < 2^109 * On exit: * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ static void felem_square(longfelem out, const felem in) { u64 small[4]; felem_shrink(small, in); smallfelem_square(out, small); } /*- * smallfelem_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |small2| * On entry: * small1[i] < 2^64 * small2[i] < 2^64 * On exit: * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ static void smallfelem_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1, const smallfelem small2) { limb a; u64 high, low; a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[0]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[0] = low; out[1] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[1]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[1] += low; out[2] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[0]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[1] += low; out[2] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[2]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[2] += low; out[3] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[1]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[2] += low; out[3] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[0]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[2] += low; out[3] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[0]) * small2[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[3] += low; out[4] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[2]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[3] += low; out[4] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[1]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[3] += low; out[4] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[0]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[3] += low; out[4] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[1]) * small2[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[4] += low; out[5] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[2]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[4] += low; out[5] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[1]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[4] += low; out[5] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[2]) * small2[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[5] += low; out[6] = high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[2]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[5] += low; out[6] += high; a = ((uint128_t) small1[3]) * small2[3]; low = a; high = a >> 64; out[6] += low; out[7] = high; } /*- * felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2| * On entry: * in1[i] < 2^109 * in2[i] < 2^109 * On exit: * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ static void felem_mul(longfelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) { smallfelem small1, small2; felem_shrink(small1, in1); felem_shrink(small2, in2); smallfelem_mul(out, small1, small2); } /*- * felem_small_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |in2| * On entry: * small1[i] < 2^64 * in2[i] < 2^109 * On exit: * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ static void felem_small_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1, const felem in2) { smallfelem small2; felem_shrink(small2, in2); smallfelem_mul(out, small1, small2); } # define two100m36m4 (((limb)1) << 100) - (((limb)1) << 36) - (((limb)1) << 4) # define two100 (((limb)1) << 100) # define two100m36p4 (((limb)1) << 100) - (((limb)1) << 36) + (((limb)1) << 4) /* zero100 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero100 = { two100m36m4, two100, two100m36p4, two100m36p4 }; /*- * Internal function for the different flavours of felem_reduce. * felem_reduce_ reduces the higher coefficients in[4]-in[7]. * On entry: * out[0] >= in[6] + 2^32*in[6] + in[7] + 2^32*in[7] * out[1] >= in[7] + 2^32*in[4] * out[2] >= in[5] + 2^32*in[5] * out[3] >= in[4] + 2^32*in[5] + 2^32*in[6] * On exit: * out[0] <= out[0] + in[4] + 2^32*in[5] * out[1] <= out[1] + in[5] + 2^33*in[6] * out[2] <= out[2] + in[7] + 2*in[6] + 2^33*in[7] * out[3] <= out[3] + 2^32*in[4] + 3*in[7] */ static void felem_reduce_(felem out, const longfelem in) { int128_t c; /* combine common terms from below */ c = in[4] + (in[5] << 32); out[0] += c; out[3] -= c; c = in[5] - in[7]; out[1] += c; out[2] -= c; /* the remaining terms */ /* 256: [(0,1),(96,-1),(192,-1),(224,1)] */ out[1] -= (in[4] << 32); out[3] += (in[4] << 32); /* 320: [(32,1),(64,1),(128,-1),(160,-1),(224,-1)] */ out[2] -= (in[5] << 32); /* 384: [(0,-1),(32,-1),(96,2),(128,2),(224,-1)] */ out[0] -= in[6]; out[0] -= (in[6] << 32); out[1] += (in[6] << 33); out[2] += (in[6] * 2); out[3] -= (in[6] << 32); /* 448: [(0,-1),(32,-1),(64,-1),(128,1),(160,2),(192,3)] */ out[0] -= in[7]; out[0] -= (in[7] << 32); out[2] += (in[7] << 33); out[3] += (in[7] * 3); } /*- * felem_reduce converts a longfelem into an felem. * To be called directly after felem_square or felem_mul. * On entry: * in[0] < 2^64, in[1] < 3*2^64, in[2] < 5*2^64, in[3] < 7*2^64 * in[4] < 7*2^64, in[5] < 5*2^64, in[6] < 3*2^64, in[7] < 2*64 * On exit: * out[i] < 2^101 */ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const longfelem in) { out[0] = zero100[0] + in[0]; out[1] = zero100[1] + in[1]; out[2] = zero100[2] + in[2]; out[3] = zero100[3] + in[3]; felem_reduce_(out, in); /*- * out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0 * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0 * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0 * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0 * * out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101 * out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101 * out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101 * out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101 */ } /*- * felem_reduce_zero105 converts a larger longfelem into an felem. * On entry: * in[0] < 2^71 * On exit: * out[i] < 2^106 */ static void felem_reduce_zero105(felem out, const longfelem in) { out[0] = zero105[0] + in[0]; out[1] = zero105[1] + in[1]; out[2] = zero105[2] + in[2]; out[3] = zero105[3] + in[3]; felem_reduce_(out, in); /*- * out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0 * * out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106 * out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106 * out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106 * out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106 */ } /* * subtract_u64 sets *result = *result - v and *carry to one if the * subtraction underflowed. */ static void subtract_u64(u64 *result, u64 *carry, u64 v) { uint128_t r = *result; r -= v; *carry = (r >> 64) & 1; *result = (u64)r; } /* * felem_contract converts |in| to its unique, minimal representation. On * entry: in[i] < 2^109 */ static void felem_contract(smallfelem out, const felem in) { unsigned i; u64 all_equal_so_far = 0, result = 0, carry; felem_shrink(out, in); /* small is minimal except that the value might be > p */ all_equal_so_far--; /* * We are doing a constant time test if out >= kPrime. We need to compare * each u64, from most-significant to least significant. For each one, if * all words so far have been equal (m is all ones) then a non-equal * result is the answer. Otherwise we continue. */ for (i = 3; i < 4; i--) { u64 equal; uint128_t a = ((uint128_t) kPrime[i]) - out[i]; /* * if out[i] > kPrime[i] then a will underflow and the high 64-bits * will all be set. */ result |= all_equal_so_far & ((u64)(a >> 64)); /* * if kPrime[i] == out[i] then |equal| will be all zeros and the * decrement will make it all ones. */ equal = kPrime[i] ^ out[i]; equal--; equal &= equal << 32; equal &= equal << 16; equal &= equal << 8; equal &= equal << 4; equal &= equal << 2; equal &= equal << 1; equal = ((s64) equal) >> 63; all_equal_so_far &= equal; } /* * if all_equal_so_far is still all ones then the two values are equal * and so out >= kPrime is true. */ result |= all_equal_so_far; /* if out >= kPrime then we subtract kPrime. */ subtract_u64(&out[0], &carry, result & kPrime[0]); subtract_u64(&out[1], &carry, carry); subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, carry); subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry); subtract_u64(&out[1], &carry, result & kPrime[1]); subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, carry); subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry); subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, result & kPrime[2]); subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry); subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, result & kPrime[3]); } static void smallfelem_square_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in) { longfelem longtmp; felem tmp; smallfelem_square(longtmp, in); felem_reduce(tmp, longtmp); felem_contract(out, tmp); } static void smallfelem_mul_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in1, const smallfelem in2) { longfelem longtmp; felem tmp; smallfelem_mul(longtmp, in1, in2); felem_reduce(tmp, longtmp); felem_contract(out, tmp); } /*- * felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0 * otherwise. * On entry: * small[i] < 2^64 */ static limb smallfelem_is_zero(const smallfelem small) { limb result; u64 is_p; u64 is_zero = small[0] | small[1] | small[2] | small[3]; is_zero--; is_zero &= is_zero << 32; is_zero &= is_zero << 16; is_zero &= is_zero << 8; is_zero &= is_zero << 4; is_zero &= is_zero << 2; is_zero &= is_zero << 1; is_zero = ((s64) is_zero) >> 63; is_p = (small[0] ^ kPrime[0]) | (small[1] ^ kPrime[1]) | (small[2] ^ kPrime[2]) | (small[3] ^ kPrime[3]); is_p--; is_p &= is_p << 32; is_p &= is_p << 16; is_p &= is_p << 8; is_p &= is_p << 4; is_p &= is_p << 2; is_p &= is_p << 1; is_p = ((s64) is_p) >> 63; is_zero |= is_p; result = is_zero; result |= ((limb) is_zero) << 64; return result; } static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const void *small) { return (int)(smallfelem_is_zero(small) & ((limb) 1)); } /*- * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} * * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem: * a^p = a (mod p) * a^{p-1} = 1 (mod p) * a^{p-2} = a^{-1} (mod p) */ static void felem_inv(felem out, const felem in) { felem ftmp, ftmp2; /* each e_I will hold |in|^{2^I - 1} */ felem e2, e4, e8, e16, e32, e64; longfelem tmp; unsigned i; felem_square(tmp, in); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^1 */ felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^2 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(e2, ftmp); felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^3 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2^2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e2); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(e4, ftmp); felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^5 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^6 - 2^2 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^7 - 2^3 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^8 - 2^4 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e4); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^8 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(e8, ftmp); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); } /* 2^16 - 2^8 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e8); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^16 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(e16, ftmp); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); } /* 2^32 - 2^16 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e16); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^32 - 2^0 */ felem_assign(e32, ftmp); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); } /* 2^64 - 2^32 */ felem_assign(e64, ftmp); felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, in); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^64 - 2^32 + 2^0 */ for (i = 0; i < 192; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); } /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 */ felem_mul(tmp, e64, e32); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^64 - 2^0 */ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); } /* 2^80 - 2^16 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e16); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^80 - 2^0 */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); } /* 2^88 - 2^8 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e8); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^88 - 2^0 */ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); } /* 2^92 - 2^4 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e4); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^92 - 2^0 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^93 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^94 - 2^2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^94 - 2^0 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^95 - 2^1 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^96 - 2^2 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, in); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^96 - 3 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp); felem_reduce(out, tmp); /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 3 */ } static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in) { felem tmp; smallfelem_expand(tmp, in); felem_inv(tmp, tmp); felem_contract(out, tmp); } /*- * Group operations * ---------------- * * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian * coordinates */ /*- * point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in) * * The method is taken from: * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b * * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed. * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */ static void point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in) { longfelem tmp, tmp2; felem delta, gamma, beta, alpha, ftmp, ftmp2; smallfelem small1, small2; felem_assign(ftmp, x_in); /* ftmp[i] < 2^106 */ felem_assign(ftmp2, x_in); /* ftmp2[i] < 2^106 */ /* delta = z^2 */ felem_square(tmp, z_in); felem_reduce(delta, tmp); /* delta[i] < 2^101 */ /* gamma = y^2 */ felem_square(tmp, y_in); felem_reduce(gamma, tmp); /* gamma[i] < 2^101 */ felem_shrink(small1, gamma); /* beta = x*gamma */ felem_small_mul(tmp, small1, x_in); felem_reduce(beta, tmp); /* beta[i] < 2^101 */ /* alpha = 3*(x-delta)*(x+delta) */ felem_diff(ftmp, delta); /* ftmp[i] < 2^105 + 2^106 < 2^107 */ felem_sum(ftmp2, delta); /* ftmp2[i] < 2^105 + 2^106 < 2^107 */ felem_scalar(ftmp2, 3); /* ftmp2[i] < 3 * 2^107 < 2^109 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2); felem_reduce(alpha, tmp); /* alpha[i] < 2^101 */ felem_shrink(small2, alpha); /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */ smallfelem_square(tmp, small2); felem_reduce(x_out, tmp); felem_assign(ftmp, beta); felem_scalar(ftmp, 8); /* ftmp[i] < 8 * 2^101 = 2^104 */ felem_diff(x_out, ftmp); /* x_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */ /* z' = (y + z)^2 - gamma - delta */ felem_sum(delta, gamma); /* delta[i] < 2^101 + 2^101 = 2^102 */ felem_assign(ftmp, y_in); felem_sum(ftmp, z_in); /* ftmp[i] < 2^106 + 2^106 = 2^107 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); felem_diff(z_out, delta); /* z_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */ /* y' = alpha*(4*beta - x') - 8*gamma^2 */ felem_scalar(beta, 4); /* beta[i] < 4 * 2^101 = 2^103 */ felem_diff_zero107(beta, x_out); /* beta[i] < 2^107 + 2^103 < 2^108 */ felem_small_mul(tmp, small2, beta); /* tmp[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ smallfelem_square(tmp2, small1); /* tmp2[i] < 7 * 2^64 */ longfelem_scalar(tmp2, 8); /* tmp2[i] < 8 * 7 * 2^64 = 7 * 2^67 */ longfelem_diff(tmp, tmp2); /* tmp[i] < 2^67 + 2^70 + 2^40 < 2^71 */ felem_reduce_zero105(y_out, tmp); /* y_out[i] < 2^106 */ } /* * point_double_small is the same as point_double, except that it operates on * smallfelems */ static void point_double_small(smallfelem x_out, smallfelem y_out, smallfelem z_out, const smallfelem x_in, const smallfelem y_in, const smallfelem z_in) { felem felem_x_out, felem_y_out, felem_z_out; felem felem_x_in, felem_y_in, felem_z_in; smallfelem_expand(felem_x_in, x_in); smallfelem_expand(felem_y_in, y_in); smallfelem_expand(felem_z_in, z_in); point_double(felem_x_out, felem_y_out, felem_z_out, felem_x_in, felem_y_in, felem_z_in); felem_shrink(x_out, felem_x_out); felem_shrink(y_out, felem_y_out); felem_shrink(z_out, felem_z_out); } /* copy_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */ static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask) { unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) { const limb tmp = mask & (in[i] ^ out[i]); out[i] ^= tmp; } } /* copy_small_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */ static void copy_small_conditional(felem out, const smallfelem in, limb mask) { unsigned i; const u64 mask64 = mask; for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) { out[i] = ((limb) (in[i] & mask64)) | (out[i] & ~mask); } } /*- * point_add calculates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) * * The method is taken from: * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl, * adapted for mixed addition (z2 = 1, or z2 = 0 for the point at infinity). * * This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points * are equal, (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for * ECDH or ECDSA signing. */ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1, const int mixed, const smallfelem x2, const smallfelem y2, const smallfelem z2) { felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4, ftmp5, ftmp6, x_out, y_out, z_out; longfelem tmp, tmp2; smallfelem small1, small2, small3, small4, small5; limb x_equal, y_equal, z1_is_zero, z2_is_zero; felem_shrink(small3, z1); z1_is_zero = smallfelem_is_zero(small3); z2_is_zero = smallfelem_is_zero(z2); /* ftmp = z1z1 = z1**2 */ smallfelem_square(tmp, small3); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* ftmp[i] < 2^101 */ felem_shrink(small1, ftmp); if (!mixed) { /* ftmp2 = z2z2 = z2**2 */ smallfelem_square(tmp, z2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* ftmp2[i] < 2^101 */ felem_shrink(small2, ftmp2); felem_shrink(small5, x1); /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */ smallfelem_mul(tmp, small5, small2); felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); /* ftmp3[i] < 2^101 */ /* ftmp5 = z1 + z2 */ felem_assign(ftmp5, z1); felem_small_sum(ftmp5, z2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2^107 */ /* ftmp5 = (z1 + z2)**2 - (z1z1 + z2z2) = 2z1z2 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp5); felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); /* ftmp2 = z2z2 + z1z1 */ felem_sum(ftmp2, ftmp); /* ftmp2[i] < 2^101 + 2^101 = 2^102 */ felem_diff(ftmp5, ftmp2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */ /* ftmp2 = z2 * z2z2 */ smallfelem_mul(tmp, small2, z2); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* s1 = ftmp2 = y1 * z2**3 */ felem_mul(tmp, y1, ftmp2); felem_reduce(ftmp6, tmp); /* ftmp6[i] < 2^101 */ } else { /* * We'll assume z2 = 1 (special case z2 = 0 is handled later) */ /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */ felem_assign(ftmp3, x1); /* ftmp3[i] < 2^106 */ /* ftmp5 = 2z1z2 */ felem_assign(ftmp5, z1); felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2*2^106 = 2^107 */ /* s1 = ftmp2 = y1 * z2**3 */ felem_assign(ftmp6, y1); /* ftmp6[i] < 2^106 */ } /* u2 = x2*z1z1 */ smallfelem_mul(tmp, x2, small1); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* h = ftmp4 = u2 - u1 */ felem_diff_zero107(ftmp4, ftmp3); /* ftmp4[i] < 2^107 + 2^101 < 2^108 */ felem_shrink(small4, ftmp4); x_equal = smallfelem_is_zero(small4); /* z_out = ftmp5 * h */ felem_small_mul(tmp, small4, ftmp5); felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); /* z_out[i] < 2^101 */ /* ftmp = z1 * z1z1 */ smallfelem_mul(tmp, small1, small3); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* s2 = tmp = y2 * z1**3 */ felem_small_mul(tmp, y2, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); /* r = ftmp5 = (s2 - s1)*2 */ felem_diff_zero107(ftmp5, ftmp6); /* ftmp5[i] < 2^107 + 2^107 = 2^108 */ felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2^109 */ felem_shrink(small1, ftmp5); y_equal = smallfelem_is_zero(small1); if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) { point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1); return; } /* I = ftmp = (2h)**2 */ felem_assign(ftmp, ftmp4); felem_scalar(ftmp, 2); /* ftmp[i] < 2*2^108 = 2^109 */ felem_square(tmp, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* J = ftmp2 = h * I */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp4, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* V = ftmp4 = U1 * I */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp); felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); /* x_out = r**2 - J - 2V */ smallfelem_square(tmp, small1); felem_reduce(x_out, tmp); felem_assign(ftmp3, ftmp4); felem_scalar(ftmp4, 2); felem_sum(ftmp4, ftmp2); /* ftmp4[i] < 2*2^101 + 2^101 < 2^103 */ felem_diff(x_out, ftmp4); /* x_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 */ /* y_out = r(V-x_out) - 2 * s1 * J */ felem_diff_zero107(ftmp3, x_out); /* ftmp3[i] < 2^107 + 2^101 < 2^108 */ felem_small_mul(tmp, small1, ftmp3); felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp6, ftmp2); longfelem_scalar(tmp2, 2); /* tmp2[i] < 2*2^67 = 2^68 */ longfelem_diff(tmp, tmp2); /* tmp[i] < 2^67 + 2^70 + 2^40 < 2^71 */ felem_reduce_zero105(y_out, tmp); /* y_out[i] < 2^106 */ copy_small_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(x_out, x1, z2_is_zero); copy_small_conditional(y_out, y2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(y_out, y1, z2_is_zero); copy_small_conditional(z_out, z2, z1_is_zero); copy_conditional(z_out, z1, z2_is_zero); felem_assign(x3, x_out); felem_assign(y3, y_out); felem_assign(z3, z_out); } /* * point_add_small is the same as point_add, except that it operates on * smallfelems */ static void point_add_small(smallfelem x3, smallfelem y3, smallfelem z3, smallfelem x1, smallfelem y1, smallfelem z1, smallfelem x2, smallfelem y2, smallfelem z2) { felem felem_x3, felem_y3, felem_z3; felem felem_x1, felem_y1, felem_z1; smallfelem_expand(felem_x1, x1); smallfelem_expand(felem_y1, y1); smallfelem_expand(felem_z1, z1); point_add(felem_x3, felem_y3, felem_z3, felem_x1, felem_y1, felem_z1, 0, x2, y2, z2); felem_shrink(x3, felem_x3); felem_shrink(y3, felem_y3); felem_shrink(z3, felem_z3); } /*- * Base point pre computation * -------------------------- * * Two different sorts of precomputed tables are used in the following code. * Each contain various points on the curve, where each point is three field * elements (x, y, z). * * For the base point table, z is usually 1 (0 for the point at infinity). * This table has 2 * 16 elements, starting with the following: * index | bits | point * ------+---------+------------------------------ * 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0G * 1 | 0 0 0 1 | 1G * 2 | 0 0 1 0 | 2^64G * 3 | 0 0 1 1 | (2^64 + 1)G * 4 | 0 1 0 0 | 2^128G * 5 | 0 1 0 1 | (2^128 + 1)G * 6 | 0 1 1 0 | (2^128 + 2^64)G * 7 | 0 1 1 1 | (2^128 + 2^64 + 1)G * 8 | 1 0 0 0 | 2^192G * 9 | 1 0 0 1 | (2^192 + 1)G * 10 | 1 0 1 0 | (2^192 + 2^64)G * 11 | 1 0 1 1 | (2^192 + 2^64 + 1)G * 12 | 1 1 0 0 | (2^192 + 2^128)G * 13 | 1 1 0 1 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 1)G * 14 | 1 1 1 0 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 2^64)G * 15 | 1 1 1 1 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 2^64 + 1)G * followed by a copy of this with each element multiplied by 2^32. * * The reason for this is so that we can clock bits into four different * locations when doing simple scalar multiplies against the base point, * and then another four locations using the second 16 elements. * * Tables for other points have table[i] = iG for i in 0 .. 16. */ /* gmul is the table of precomputed base points */ static const smallfelem gmul[2][16][3] = { {{{0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xf4a13945d898c296, 0x77037d812deb33a0, 0xf8bce6e563a440f2, 0x6b17d1f2e12c4247}, {0xcbb6406837bf51f5, 0x2bce33576b315ece, 0x8ee7eb4a7c0f9e16, 0x4fe342e2fe1a7f9b}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x90e75cb48e14db63, 0x29493baaad651f7e, 0x8492592e326e25de, 0x0fa822bc2811aaa5}, {0xe41124545f462ee7, 0x34b1a65050fe82f5, 0x6f4ad4bcb3df188b, 0xbff44ae8f5dba80d}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x93391ce2097992af, 0xe96c98fd0d35f1fa, 0xb257c0de95e02789, 0x300a4bbc89d6726f}, {0xaa54a291c08127a0, 0x5bb1eeada9d806a5, 0x7f1ddb25ff1e3c6f, 0x72aac7e0d09b4644}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x57c84fc9d789bd85, 0xfc35ff7dc297eac3, 0xfb982fd588c6766e, 0x447d739beedb5e67}, {0x0c7e33c972e25b32, 0x3d349b95a7fae500, 0xe12e9d953a4aaff7, 0x2d4825ab834131ee}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x13949c932a1d367f, 0xef7fbd2b1a0a11b7, 0xddc6068bb91dfc60, 0xef9519328a9c72ff}, {0x196035a77376d8a8, 0x23183b0895ca1740, 0xc1ee9807022c219c, 0x611e9fc37dbb2c9b}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xcae2b1920b57f4bc, 0x2936df5ec6c9bc36, 0x7dea6482e11238bf, 0x550663797b51f5d8}, {0x44ffe216348a964c, 0x9fb3d576dbdefbe1, 0x0afa40018d9d50e5, 0x157164848aecb851}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xe48ecafffc5cde01, 0x7ccd84e70d715f26, 0xa2e8f483f43e4391, 0xeb5d7745b21141ea}, {0xcac917e2731a3479, 0x85f22cfe2844b645, 0x0990e6a158006cee, 0xeafd72ebdbecc17b}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x6cf20ffb313728be, 0x96439591a3c6b94a, 0x2736ff8344315fc5, 0xa6d39677a7849276}, {0xf2bab833c357f5f4, 0x824a920c2284059b, 0x66b8babd2d27ecdf, 0x674f84749b0b8816}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x2df48c04677c8a3e, 0x74e02f080203a56b, 0x31855f7db8c7fedb, 0x4e769e7672c9ddad}, {0xa4c36165b824bbb0, 0xfb9ae16f3b9122a5, 0x1ec0057206947281, 0x42b99082de830663}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x6ef95150dda868b9, 0xd1f89e799c0ce131, 0x7fdc1ca008a1c478, 0x78878ef61c6ce04d}, {0x9c62b9121fe0d976, 0x6ace570ebde08d4f, 0xde53142c12309def, 0xb6cb3f5d7b72c321}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x7f991ed2c31a3573, 0x5b82dd5bd54fb496, 0x595c5220812ffcae, 0x0c88bc4d716b1287}, {0x3a57bf635f48aca8, 0x7c8181f4df2564f3, 0x18d1b5b39c04e6aa, 0xdd5ddea3f3901dc6}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xe96a79fb3e72ad0c, 0x43a0a28c42ba792f, 0xefe0a423083e49f3, 0x68f344af6b317466}, {0xcdfe17db3fb24d4a, 0x668bfc2271f5c626, 0x604ed93c24d67ff3, 0x31b9c405f8540a20}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xd36b4789a2582e7f, 0x0d1a10144ec39c28, 0x663c62c3edbad7a0, 0x4052bf4b6f461db9}, {0x235a27c3188d25eb, 0xe724f33999bfcc5b, 0x862be6bd71d70cc8, 0xfecf4d5190b0fc61}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x74346c10a1d4cfac, 0xafdf5cc08526a7a4, 0x123202a8f62bff7a, 0x1eddbae2c802e41a}, {0x8fa0af2dd603f844, 0x36e06b7e4c701917, 0x0c45f45273db33a0, 0x43104d86560ebcfc}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x9615b5110d1d78e5, 0x66b0de3225c4744b, 0x0a4a46fb6aaf363a, 0xb48e26b484f7a21c}, {0x06ebb0f621a01b2d, 0xc004e4048b7b0f98, 0x64131bcdfed6f668, 0xfac015404d4d3dab}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}}, {{{0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x3a5a9e22185a5943, 0x1ab919365c65dfb6, 0x21656b32262c71da, 0x7fe36b40af22af89}, {0xd50d152c699ca101, 0x74b3d5867b8af212, 0x9f09f40407dca6f1, 0xe697d45825b63624}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xa84aa9397512218e, 0xe9a521b074ca0141, 0x57880b3a18a2e902, 0x4a5b506612a677a6}, {0x0beada7a4c4f3840, 0x626db15419e26d9d, 0xc42604fbe1627d40, 0xeb13461ceac089f1}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xf9faed0927a43281, 0x5e52c4144103ecbc, 0xc342967aa815c857, 0x0781b8291c6a220a}, {0x5a8343ceeac55f80, 0x88f80eeee54a05e3, 0x97b2a14f12916434, 0x690cde8df0151593}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xaee9c75df7f82f2a, 0x9e4c35874afdf43a, 0xf5622df437371326, 0x8a535f566ec73617}, {0xc5f9a0ac223094b7, 0xcde533864c8c7669, 0x37e02819085a92bf, 0x0455c08468b08bd7}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x0c0a6e2c9477b5d9, 0xf9a4bf62876dc444, 0x5050a949b6cdc279, 0x06bada7ab77f8276}, {0xc8b4aed1ea48dac9, 0xdebd8a4b7ea1070f, 0x427d49101366eb70, 0x5b476dfd0e6cb18a}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x7c5c3e44278c340a, 0x4d54606812d66f3b, 0x29a751b1ae23c5d8, 0x3e29864e8a2ec908}, {0x142d2a6626dbb850, 0xad1744c4765bd780, 0x1f150e68e322d1ed, 0x239b90ea3dc31e7e}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x78c416527a53322a, 0x305dde6709776f8e, 0xdbcab759f8862ed4, 0x820f4dd949f72ff7}, {0x6cc544a62b5debd4, 0x75be5d937b4e8cc4, 0x1b481b1b215c14d3, 0x140406ec783a05ec}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x6a703f10e895df07, 0xfd75f3fa01876bd8, 0xeb5b06e70ce08ffe, 0x68f6b8542783dfee}, {0x90c76f8a78712655, 0xcf5293d2f310bf7f, 0xfbc8044dfda45028, 0xcbe1feba92e40ce6}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xe998ceea4396e4c1, 0xfc82ef0b6acea274, 0x230f729f2250e927, 0xd0b2f94d2f420109}, {0x4305adddb38d4966, 0x10b838f8624c3b45, 0x7db2636658954e7a, 0x971459828b0719e5}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x4bd6b72623369fc9, 0x57f2929e53d0b876, 0xc2d5cba4f2340687, 0x961610004a866aba}, {0x49997bcd2e407a5e, 0x69ab197d92ddcb24, 0x2cf1f2438fe5131c, 0x7acb9fadcee75e44}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x254e839423d2d4c0, 0xf57f0c917aea685b, 0xa60d880f6f75aaea, 0x24eb9acca333bf5b}, {0xe3de4ccb1cda5dea, 0xfeef9341c51a6b4f, 0x743125f88bac4c4d, 0x69f891c5acd079cc}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xeee44b35702476b5, 0x7ed031a0e45c2258, 0xb422d1e7bd6f8514, 0xe51f547c5972a107}, {0xa25bcd6fc9cf343d, 0x8ca922ee097c184e, 0xa62f98b3a9fe9a06, 0x1c309a2b25bb1387}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x9295dbeb1967c459, 0xb00148833472c98e, 0xc504977708011828, 0x20b87b8aa2c4e503}, {0x3063175de057c277, 0x1bd539338fe582dd, 0x0d11adef5f69a044, 0xf5c6fa49919776be}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0x8c944e760fd59e11, 0x3876cba1102fad5f, 0xa454c3fad83faa56, 0x1ed7d1b9332010b9}, {0xa1011a270024b889, 0x05e4d0dcac0cd344, 0x52b520f0eb6a2a24, 0x3a2b03f03217257a}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}, {{0xf20fc2afdf1d043d, 0xf330240db58d5a62, 0xfc7d229ca0058c3b, 0x15fee545c78dd9f6}, {0x501e82885bc98cda, 0x41ef80e5d046ac04, 0x557d9f49461210fb, 0x4ab5b6b2b8753f81}, {1, 0, 0, 0}}} }; /* * select_point selects the |idx|th point from a precomputation table and * copies it to out. */ static void select_point(const u64 idx, unsigned int size, const smallfelem pre_comp[16][3], smallfelem out[3]) { unsigned i, j; u64 *outlimbs = &out[0][0]; memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * 3); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { const u64 *inlimbs = (u64 *)&pre_comp[i][0][0]; u64 mask = i ^ idx; mask |= mask >> 4; mask |= mask >> 2; mask |= mask >> 1; mask &= 1; mask--; for (j = 0; j < NLIMBS * 3; j++) outlimbs[j] |= inlimbs[j] & mask; } } /* get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in| */ static char get_bit(const felem_bytearray in, int i) { if ((i < 0) || (i >= 256)) return 0; return (in[i >> 3] >> (i & 7)) & 1; } /* * Interleaved point multiplication using precomputed point multiples: The * small point multiples 0*P, 1*P, ..., 17*P are in pre_comp[], the scalars * in scalars[]. If g_scalar is non-NULL, we also add this multiple of the * generator, using certain (large) precomputed multiples in g_pre_comp. * Output point (X, Y, Z) is stored in x_out, y_out, z_out */ static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, const felem_bytearray scalars[], const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar, const int mixed, const smallfelem pre_comp[][17][3], const smallfelem g_pre_comp[2][16][3]) { int i, skip; unsigned num, gen_mul = (g_scalar != NULL); felem nq[3], ftmp; smallfelem tmp[3]; u64 bits; u8 sign, digit; /* set nq to the point at infinity */ memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq)); /* * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples * of the generator (two in each of the last 32 rounds) and additions of * other points multiples (every 5th round). */ skip = 1; /* save two point operations in the first * round */ for (i = (num_points ? 255 : 31); i >= 0; --i) { /* double */ if (!skip) point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]); /* add multiples of the generator */ if (gen_mul && (i <= 31)) { /* first, look 32 bits upwards */ bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 224) << 3; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 160) << 2; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 96) << 1; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 32); /* select the point to add, in constant time */ select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[1], tmp); if (!skip) { /* Arg 1 below is for "mixed" */ point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } else { smallfelem_expand(nq[0], tmp[0]); smallfelem_expand(nq[1], tmp[1]); smallfelem_expand(nq[2], tmp[2]); skip = 0; } /* second, look at the current position */ bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 192) << 3; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 128) << 2; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 64) << 1; bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i); /* select the point to add, in constant time */ select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[0], tmp); /* Arg 1 below is for "mixed" */ point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } /* do other additions every 5 doublings */ if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0)) { /* loop over all scalars */ for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num) { bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1; bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1); ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits); /* * select the point to add or subtract, in constant time */ select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp); smallfelem_neg(ftmp, tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative * point */ copy_small_conditional(ftmp, tmp[1], (((limb) sign) - 1)); felem_contract(tmp[1], ftmp); if (!skip) { point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], mixed, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]); } else { smallfelem_expand(nq[0], tmp[0]); smallfelem_expand(nq[1], tmp[1]); smallfelem_expand(nq[2], tmp[2]); skip = 0; } } } } felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]); felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]); felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]); } /* Precomputation for the group generator. */ struct nistp256_pre_comp_st { smallfelem g_pre_comp[2][16][3]; int references; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void) { static const EC_METHOD ret = { EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, NID_X9_62_prime_field, ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init, ec_GFp_simple_group_finish, ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish, ec_GFp_nist_group_copy, ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, ec_group_simple_order_bits, ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates, 0 /* point_set_compressed_coordinates */ , 0 /* point2oct */ , 0 /* oct2point */ , ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul, ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult, ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult, ec_GFp_nist_field_mul, ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr, 0 /* field_div */ , 0 /* field_encode */ , 0 /* field_decode */ , 0, /* field_set_to_one */ ec_key_simple_priv2oct, ec_key_simple_oct2priv, 0, /* set private */ ec_key_simple_generate_key, ec_key_simple_check_key, ec_key_simple_generate_public_key, 0, /* keycopy */ 0, /* keyfinish */ ecdh_simple_compute_key }; return &ret; } /******************************************************************************/ /* * FUNCTIONS TO MANAGE PRECOMPUTATION */ static NISTP256_PRE_COMP *nistp256_pre_comp_new() { NISTP256_PRE_COMP *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ret; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *p) { int i; if (p != NULL) CRYPTO_atomic_add(&p->references, 1, &i, p->lock); return p; } void EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre) { int i; if (pre == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, -1, &i, pre->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_nistp256", x); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock); OPENSSL_free(pre); } /******************************************************************************/ /* * OPENSSL EC_METHOD FUNCTIONS */ int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { int ret; ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group); group->a_is_minus3 = 1; return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *curve_p, *curve_a, *curve_b; if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p); BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a); BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[2], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_b); if ((BN_cmp(curve_p, p)) || (BN_cmp(curve_a, a)) || (BN_cmp(curve_b, b))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS); goto err; } group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_256; ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* * Takes the Jacobian coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point and returns (X', Y') = * (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */ int ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { felem z1, z2, x_in, y_in; smallfelem x_out, y_out; longfelem tmp; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); return 0; } if ((!BN_to_felem(x_in, point->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_in, point->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(z1, point->Z))) return 0; felem_inv(z2, z1); felem_square(tmp, z2); felem_reduce(z1, tmp); felem_mul(tmp, x_in, z1); felem_reduce(x_in, tmp); felem_contract(x_out, x_in); if (x != NULL) { if (!smallfelem_to_BN(x, x_out)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } } felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2); felem_reduce(z1, tmp); felem_mul(tmp, y_in, z1); felem_reduce(y_in, tmp); felem_contract(y_out, y_in); if (y != NULL) { if (!smallfelem_to_BN(y, y_out)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } } return 1; } /* points below is of size |num|, and tmp_smallfelems is of size |num+1| */ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, smallfelem points[][3], smallfelem tmp_smallfelems[]) { /* * Runs in constant time, unless an input is the point at infinity (which * normally shouldn't happen). */ ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(num, points, sizeof(smallfelem), tmp_smallfelems, (void (*)(void *))smallfelem_one, smallfelem_is_zero_int, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) smallfelem_assign, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) smallfelem_square_contract, (void (*) (void *, const void *, const void *)) smallfelem_mul_contract, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) smallfelem_inv_contract, /* nothing to contract */ (void (*)(void *, const void *)) smallfelem_assign); } /* * Computes scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i], ignoring NULL * values Result is stored in r (r can equal one of the inputs). */ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; int j; int mixed = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar; felem_bytearray g_secret; felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL; smallfelem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL; felem_bytearray tmp; unsigned i, num_bytes; int have_pre_comp = 0; size_t num_points = num; smallfelem x_in, y_in, z_in; felem x_out, y_out, z_out; NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL; const smallfelem(*g_pre_comp)[16][3] = NULL; EC_POINT *generator = NULL; const EC_POINT *p = NULL; const BIGNUM *p_scalar = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; if (scalar != NULL) { pre = group->pre_comp.nistp256; if (pre) /* we have precomputation, try to use it */ g_pre_comp = (const smallfelem(*)[16][3])pre->g_pre_comp; else /* try to use the standard precomputation */ g_pre_comp = &gmul[0]; generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (generator == NULL) goto err; /* get the generator from precomputation */ if (!smallfelem_to_BN(x, g_pre_comp[0][1][0]) || !smallfelem_to_BN(y, g_pre_comp[0][1][1]) || !smallfelem_to_BN(z, g_pre_comp[0][1][2])) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, z, ctx)) goto err; if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) /* precomputation matches generator */ have_pre_comp = 1; else /* * we don't have valid precomputation: treat the generator as a * random point */ num_points++; } if (num_points > 0) { if (num_points >= 3) { /* * unless we precompute multiples for just one or two points, * converting those into affine form is time well spent */ mixed = 1; } secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); if (mixed) tmp_smallfelems = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_smallfelems) * (num_points * 17 + 1)); if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL) || (mixed && (tmp_smallfelems == NULL))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity, * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination */ memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); memset(pre_comp, 0, sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) { if (i == num) /* * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the * generator */ { p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); p_scalar = scalar; } else /* the i^th point */ { p = points[i]; p_scalar = scalars[i]; } if ((p_scalar != NULL) && (p != NULL)) { /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^256 */ if ((BN_num_bits(p_scalar) > 256) || (BN_is_negative(p_scalar))) { /* * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee * constant-timeness */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); } else num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp); flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes); /* precompute multiples */ if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, p->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_out, p->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(z_out, p->Z))) goto err; felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out); felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out); felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][2], z_out); for (j = 2; j <= 16; ++j) { if (j & 1) { point_add_small(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][1][0], pre_comp[i][1][1], pre_comp[i][1][2], pre_comp[i][j - 1][0], pre_comp[i][j - 1][1], pre_comp[i][j - 1][2]); } else { point_double_small(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][j / 2][0], pre_comp[i][j / 2][1], pre_comp[i][j / 2][2]); } } } } if (mixed) make_points_affine(num_points * 17, pre_comp[0], tmp_smallfelems); } /* the scalar for the generator */ if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) { memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret)); /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^256 */ if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 256) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) { /* * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee * constant-timeness */ if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, group->order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); } else num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp); flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes); /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */ batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points, g_secret, mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp); } else /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */ batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points, NULL, mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL); /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */ felem_contract(x_in, x_out); felem_contract(y_in, y_out); felem_contract(z_in, z_out); if ((!smallfelem_to_BN(x, x_in)) || (!smallfelem_to_BN(y, y_in)) || (!smallfelem_to_BN(z, z_in))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ret = EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, r, x, y, z, ctx); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); EC_POINT_free(generator); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); OPENSSL_free(secrets); OPENSSL_free(pre_comp); OPENSSL_free(tmp_smallfelems); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; NISTP256_PRE_COMP *pre = NULL; int i, j; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y; EC_POINT *generator = NULL; smallfelem tmp_smallfelems[32]; felem x_tmp, y_tmp, z_tmp; /* throw away old precomputation */ EC_pre_comp_free(group); if (ctx == NULL) if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); if (((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || ((y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) goto err; /* get the generator */ if (group->generator == NULL) goto err; generator = EC_POINT_new(group); if (generator == NULL) goto err; BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[3], sizeof(felem_bytearray), x); BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[4], sizeof(felem_bytearray), y); if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if ((pre = nistp256_pre_comp_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* * if the generator is the standard one, use built-in precomputation */ if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) { memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp)); goto done; } if ((!BN_to_felem(x_tmp, group->generator->X)) || (!BN_to_felem(y_tmp, group->generator->Y)) || (!BN_to_felem(z_tmp, group->generator->Z))) goto err; felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][0], x_tmp); felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][1], y_tmp); felem_shrink(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][2], z_tmp); /* * compute 2^64*G, 2^128*G, 2^192*G for the first table, 2^32*G, 2^96*G, * 2^160*G, 2^224*G for the second one */ for (i = 1; i <= 8; i <<= 1) { point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][i][2]); for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) { point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]); } if (i == 8) break; point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[1][i][2]); for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) { point_double_small(pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][0], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][1], pre->g_pre_comp[0][2 * i][2]); } } for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { /* g_pre_comp[i][0] is the point at infinity */ memset(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0], 0, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp[i][0])); /* the remaining multiples */ /* 2^64*G + 2^128*G resp. 2^96*G + 2^160*G */ point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][6][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]); /* 2^64*G + 2^192*G resp. 2^96*G + 2^224*G */ point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][10][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]); /* 2^128*G + 2^192*G resp. 2^160*G + 2^224*G */ point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][8][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][4][2]); /* * 2^64*G + 2^128*G + 2^192*G resp. 2^96*G + 2^160*G + 2^224*G */ point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][14][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][12][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2][2]); for (j = 1; j < 8; ++j) { /* odd multiples: add G resp. 2^32*G */ point_add_small(pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j + 1][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][2 * j][2], pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][0], pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][1], pre->g_pre_comp[i][1][2]); } } make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_smallfelems); done: SETPRECOMP(group, nistp256, pre); pre = NULL; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); EC_POINT_free(generator); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(pre); return ret; } int ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { return HAVEPRECOMP(group, nistp256); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecdsa_sign.c0000644000000000000000000000342113176625657016235 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" #include ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, NULL, NULL, eckey); } ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey) { if (eckey->meth->sign_sig != NULL) return eckey->meth->sign_sig(dgst, dlen, kinv, rp, eckey); ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN_EX, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); return NULL; } int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ECDSA_sign_ex(type, dgst, dlen, sig, siglen, NULL, NULL, eckey); } int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey) { if (eckey->meth->sign != NULL) return eckey->meth->sign(type, dgst, dlen, sig, siglen, kinv, r, eckey); ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_EX, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { if (eckey->meth->sign_setup != NULL) return eckey->meth->sign_setup(eckey, ctx_in, kinvp, rp); ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c0000644000000000000000000001743513176625657015571 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and * contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = ECPKParameters_print(b, x, off); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *x, int off) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = EC_KEY_print(b, x, off); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } int ECParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BIO_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = ECParameters_print(b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif static int print_bin(BIO *fp, const char *str, const unsigned char *num, size_t len, int off); int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off) { int ret = 0, reason = ERR_R_BIO_LIB; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; const EC_POINT *point = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *gen = NULL; const BIGNUM *order = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; const unsigned char *seed; size_t seed_len = 0; static const char *gen_compressed = "Generator (compressed):"; static const char *gen_uncompressed = "Generator (uncompressed):"; static const char *gen_hybrid = "Generator (hybrid):"; if (!x) { reason = ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER; goto err; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(x)) { /* the curve parameter are given by an asn1 OID */ int nid; const char *nname; if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(x); if (nid == 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "ASN1 OID: %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; nname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (nname) { if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "NIST CURVE: %s\n", nname) <= 0) goto err; } } else { /* explicit parameters */ int is_char_two = 0; point_conversion_form_t form; int tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(x)); if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) is_char_two = 1; if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL || (a = BN_new()) == NULL || (b = BN_new()) == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M if (is_char_two) { if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(x, p, a, b, ctx)) { reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB; goto err; } } else /* prime field */ #endif { if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(x, p, a, b, ctx)) { reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB; goto err; } } if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(x)) == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB; goto err; } order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(x); cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(x); if (order == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB; goto err; } form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(x); if ((gen = EC_POINT_point2bn(x, point, form, NULL, ctx)) == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB; goto err; } if ((seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(x)) != NULL) seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(x); if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; /* print the 'short name' of the field type */ if (BIO_printf(bp, "Field Type: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_nid)) <= 0) goto err; if (is_char_two) { /* print the 'short name' of the base type OID */ int basis_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(x); if (basis_type == 0) goto err; if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128)) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "Basis Type: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(basis_type)) <= 0) goto err; /* print the polynomial */ if ((p != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Polynomial:", p, NULL, off)) goto err; } else { if ((p != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Prime:", p, NULL, off)) goto err; } if ((a != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "A: ", a, NULL, off)) goto err; if ((b != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "B: ", b, NULL, off)) goto err; if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { if ((gen != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, gen_compressed, gen, NULL, off)) goto err; } else if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { if ((gen != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, gen_uncompressed, gen, NULL, off)) goto err; } else { /* form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID */ if ((gen != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, gen_hybrid, gen, NULL, off)) goto err; } if ((order != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Order: ", order, NULL, off)) goto err; if ((cofactor != NULL) && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Cofactor: ", cofactor, NULL, off)) goto err; if (seed && !print_bin(bp, "Seed:", seed, seed_len, off)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (!ret) ECerr(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT, reason); BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(gen); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return (ret); } static int print_bin(BIO *fp, const char *name, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int off) { size_t i; char str[128 + 1 + 4]; if (buf == NULL) return 1; if (off > 0) { if (off > 128) off = 128; memset(str, ' ', off); if (BIO_write(fp, str, off) <= 0) return 0; } else { off = 0; } if (BIO_printf(fp, "%s", name) <= 0) return 0; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if ((i % 15) == 0) { str[0] = '\n'; memset(&(str[1]), ' ', off + 4); if (BIO_write(fp, str, off + 1 + 4) <= 0) return 0; } if (BIO_printf(fp, "%02x%s", buf[i], ((i + 1) == len) ? "" : ":") <= 0) return 0; } if (BIO_write(fp, "\n", 1) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c0000644000000000000000000002457613176625657015570 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., * and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x_, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *x, *y; int ret = 0; /* clear error queue */ ERR_clear_error(); if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } y_bit = (y_bit != 0); BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) goto err; /*- * Recover y. We have a Weierstrass equation * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b, * so y is one of the square roots of x^3 + a*x + b. */ /* tmp1 := x^3 */ if (!BN_nnmod(x, x_, group->field, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_decode == 0) { /* field_{sqr,mul} work on standard representation */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp2, x_, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp2, x_, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp2, x_, group->field, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp1, tmp2, x_, group->field, ctx)) goto err; } /* tmp1 := tmp1 + a*x */ if (group->a_is_minus3) { if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(tmp2, x, group->field)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp2, tmp2, x, group->field)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, group->field)) goto err; } else { if (group->meth->field_decode) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, tmp2, group->a, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp2, x, group->field, ctx)) goto err; } else { /* field_mul works on standard representation */ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp2, group->a, x, ctx)) goto err; } if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, group->field)) goto err; } /* tmp1 := tmp1 + b */ if (group->meth->field_decode) { if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, tmp2, group->b, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, group->field)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, group->b, group->field)) goto err; } if (!BN_mod_sqrt(y, tmp1, group->field, ctx)) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_BN && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE) { ERR_clear_error(); ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT); } else ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) { if (BN_is_zero(y)) { int kron; kron = BN_kronecker(x, group->field, ctx); if (kron == -2) goto err; if (kron == 1) ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT); else /* * BN_mod_sqrt() should have cought this error (not a square) */ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT); goto err; } if (!BN_usub(y, group->field, y)) goto err; } if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } size_t ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t ret; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int used_ctx = 0; BIGNUM *x, *y; size_t field_len, i, skip; if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INVALID_FORM); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { /* encodes to a single 0 octet */ if (buf != NULL) { if (len < 1) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } buf[0] = 0; } return 1; } /* ret := required output buffer length */ field_len = BN_num_bytes(group->field); ret = (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len; /* if 'buf' is NULL, just return required length */ if (buf != NULL) { if (len < ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); used_ctx = 1; x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; if ((form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED || form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) && BN_is_odd(y)) buf[0] = form + 1; else buf[0] = form; i = 1; skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(x); if (skip > field_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } while (skip > 0) { buf[i++] = 0; skip--; } skip = BN_bn2bin(x, buf + i); i += skip; if (i != 1 + field_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED || form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) { skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(y); if (skip > field_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } while (skip > 0) { buf[i++] = 0; skip--; } skip = BN_bn2bin(y, buf + i); i += skip; } if (i != ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (used_ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; err: if (used_ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return 0; } int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { point_conversion_form_t form; int y_bit; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y; size_t field_len, enc_len; int ret = 0; if (len == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } form = buf[0]; y_bit = form & 1; form = form & ~1U; if ((form != 0) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } if ((form == 0 || form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && y_bit) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } if (form == 0) { if (len != 1) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point); } field_len = BN_num_bytes(group->field); enc_len = (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len; if (len != enc_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(x, group->field) >= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); goto err; } if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp (group, point, x, y_bit, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(y, group->field) >= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); goto err; } if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) { if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); goto err; } } /* * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp is responsible for checking that * the point is on the curve. */ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c0000644000000000000000000003452413176625657016265 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ec_lcl.h" int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey) { ECDSA_SIG *s; RAND_seed(dgst, dlen); s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, kinv, r, eckey); if (s == NULL) { *siglen = 0; return 0; } *siglen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &sig); ECDSA_SIG_free(s); return 1; } static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *X = NULL; const BIGNUM *order; EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; int ret = 0; int order_bits; if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING); return 0; } if (ctx_in == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } else ctx = ctx_in; k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */ r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */ X = BN_new(); if (k == NULL || r == NULL || X == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (order == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Preallocate space */ order_bits = BN_num_bits(order); if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits)) goto err; do { /* get random k */ do if (dgst != NULL) { if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce (k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey), dgst, dlen, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED); goto err; } } else { if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED); goto err; } } while (BN_is_zero(k)); /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. * * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is * one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the code * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere. * * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic * conditional copy. */ if (!BN_add(r, k, order) || !BN_add(X, r, order) || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X)) goto err; /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } } while (BN_is_zero(r)); /* compute the inverse of k */ if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) { /* * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead. */ if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime (k, k, X, order, ctx, EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group))) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } } else { if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } } /* clear old values if necessary */ BN_clear_free(*rp); BN_clear_free(*kinvp); /* save the pre-computed values */ *rp = r; *kinvp = k; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { BN_clear_free(k); BN_clear_free(r); } if (ctx != ctx_in) BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); BN_clear_free(X); return (ret); } int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0); } ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey) { int ok = 0, i; BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL; const BIGNUM *order, *ckinv; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; ECDSA_SIG *ret; const BIGNUM *priv_key; group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey); if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING); return NULL; } ret = ECDSA_SIG_new(); if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->r = BN_new(); ret->s = BN_new(); if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } s = ret->s; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (order == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } i = BN_num_bits(order); /* * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. */ if (8 * dgst_len > i) dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } do { if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) { if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dgst_len)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } ckinv = kinv; } else { ckinv = in_kinv; if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(s)) { /* * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to * generate new kinv and r values */ if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES); goto err; } } else /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */ break; } while (1); ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; } BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(m); BN_clear_free(tmp); BN_clear_free(kinv); return ret; } /*- * returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error */ int ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey) { ECDSA_SIG *s; const unsigned char *p = sigbuf; unsigned char *der = NULL; int derlen = -1; int ret = -1; s = ECDSA_SIG_new(); if (s == NULL) return (ret); if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err; /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */ derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der); if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen) != 0) goto err; ret = ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey); err: OPENSSL_clear_free(der, derlen); ECDSA_SIG_free(s); return (ret); } int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) { int ret = -1, i; BN_CTX *ctx; const BIGNUM *order; BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X; EC_POINT *point = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; const EC_POINT *pub_key; /* check input values */ if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL || (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return -1; } if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING); return -1; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (X == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (order == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */ goto err; } /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* digest -> m */ i = BN_num_bits(order); /* * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. */ if (8 * dgst_len > i) dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* u2 = r * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */ ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(point); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c0000644000000000000000000002402613176625657015460 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed * to the OpenSSL project. * * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided below. * * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /*- * Calculates and sets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT from the given * compressed coordinates. Uses algorithm 2.3.4 of SEC 1. * Note that the simple implementation only uses affine coordinates. * * The method is from the following publication: * * Harper, Menezes, Vanstone: * "Public-Key Cryptosystems with Very Small Key Lengths", * EUROCRYPT '92, Springer-Verlag LNCS 658, * published February 1993 * * US Patents 6,141,420 and 6,618,483 (Vanstone, Mullin, Agnew) describe * the same method, but claim no priority date earlier than July 29, 1994 * (and additionally fail to cite the EUROCRYPT '92 publication as prior art). */ int ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x_, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp, *x, *y, *z; int ret = 0, z0; /* clear error queue */ ERR_clear_error(); if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } y_bit = (y_bit != 0) ? 1 : 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (z == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x, x_, group->poly)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero(x)) { if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(y, group->b, group->poly, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_div(group, tmp, group->b, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(tmp, group->a, tmp)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(tmp, x, tmp)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(z, tmp, group->poly, ctx)) { unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_BN && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == BN_R_NO_SOLUTION) { ERR_clear_error(); ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT); } else ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } z0 = (BN_is_odd(z)) ? 1 : 0; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y, x, z, ctx)) goto err; if (z0 != y_bit) { if (!BN_GF2m_add(y, y, x)) goto err; } } if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } /* * Converts an EC_POINT to an octet string. If buf is NULL, the encoded * length will be returned. If the length len of buf is smaller than required * an error will be returned. */ size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { size_t ret; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; int used_ctx = 0; BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi; size_t field_len, i, skip; if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INVALID_FORM); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { /* encodes to a single 0 octet */ if (buf != NULL) { if (len < 1) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } buf[0] = 0; } return 1; } /* ret := required output buffer length */ field_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; ret = (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len; /* if 'buf' is NULL, just return required length */ if (buf != NULL) { if (len < ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); used_ctx = 1; x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); yxi = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (yxi == NULL) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; buf[0] = form; if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && !BN_is_zero(x)) { if (!group->meth->field_div(group, yxi, y, x, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_odd(yxi)) buf[0]++; } i = 1; skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(x); if (skip > field_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } while (skip > 0) { buf[i++] = 0; skip--; } skip = BN_bn2bin(x, buf + i); i += skip; if (i != 1 + field_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED || form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) { skip = field_len - BN_num_bytes(y); if (skip > field_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } while (skip > 0) { buf[i++] = 0; skip--; } skip = BN_bn2bin(y, buf + i); i += skip; } if (i != ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (used_ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; err: if (used_ctx) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return 0; } /* * Converts an octet string representation to an EC_POINT. Note that the * simple implementation only uses affine coordinates. */ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { point_conversion_form_t form; int y_bit; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi; size_t field_len, enc_len; int ret = 0; if (len == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } form = buf[0]; y_bit = form & 1; form = form & ~1U; if ((form != 0) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } if ((form == 0 || form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && y_bit) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } if (form == 0) { if (len != 1) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point); } field_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; enc_len = (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len; if (len != enc_len) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); return 0; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); yxi = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (yxi == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(x, group->field) >= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); goto err; } if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m (group, point, x, y_bit, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y)) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(y, group->field) >= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); goto err; } if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID) { if (!group->meth->field_div(group, yxi, y, x, ctx)) goto err; if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(yxi)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); goto err; } } /* * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m is responsible for checking that * the point is on the curve. */ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); return ret; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000007217113176625657015374 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include #include #include #include "e_os.h" #if defined(__SUNPRO_C) # if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520 # pragma error_messages (off,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE) # endif #endif /* Use default functions for poin2oct, oct2point and compressed coordinates */ #define EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT 0x1 /* Use custom formats for EC_GROUP, EC_POINT and EC_KEY */ #define EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE 0x2 /* Curve does not support signing operations */ #define EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN 0x4 /* * Structure details are not part of the exported interface, so all this may * change in future versions. */ struct ec_method_st { /* Various method flags */ int flags; /* used by EC_METHOD_get_field_type: */ int field_type; /* a NID */ /* * used by EC_GROUP_new, EC_GROUP_free, EC_GROUP_clear_free, * EC_GROUP_copy: */ int (*group_init) (EC_GROUP *); void (*group_finish) (EC_GROUP *); void (*group_clear_finish) (EC_GROUP *); int (*group_copy) (EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); /* used by EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, */ /* EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, and EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m: */ int (*group_set_curve) (EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int (*group_get_curve) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_GROUP_get_degree: */ int (*group_get_degree) (const EC_GROUP *); int (*group_order_bits) (const EC_GROUP *); /* used by EC_GROUP_check: */ int (*group_check_discriminant) (const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); /* * used by EC_POINT_new, EC_POINT_free, EC_POINT_clear_free, * EC_POINT_copy: */ int (*point_init) (EC_POINT *); void (*point_finish) (EC_POINT *); void (*point_clear_finish) (EC_POINT *); int (*point_copy) (EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); /*- * used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity, * EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, * EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m, * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m, * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m: */ int (*point_set_to_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); int (*point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int (*point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int (*point_set_affine_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int (*point_get_affine_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int (*point_set_compressed_coordinates) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_POINT_point2oct, EC_POINT_oct2point: */ size_t (*point2oct) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int (*oct2point) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, ECP_POINT_invert: */ int (*add) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int (*dbl) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *); int (*invert) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); /* * used by EC_POINT_is_at_infinity, EC_POINT_is_on_curve, EC_POINT_cmp: */ int (*is_at_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int (*is_on_curve) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int (*point_cmp) (const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); /* used by EC_POINT_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine: */ int (*make_affine) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int (*points_make_affine) (const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *); /* * used by EC_POINTs_mul, EC_POINT_mul, EC_POINT_precompute_mult, * EC_POINT_have_precompute_mult (default implementations are used if the * 'mul' pointer is 0): */ int (*mul) (const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int (*precompute_mult) (EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *); int (*have_precompute_mult) (const EC_GROUP *group); /* internal functions */ /* * 'field_mul', 'field_sqr', and 'field_div' can be used by 'add' and * 'dbl' so that the same implementations of point operations can be used * with different optimized implementations of expensive field * operations: */ int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /* e.g. to Montgomery */ int (*field_encode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); /* e.g. from Montgomery */ int (*field_decode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int (*field_set_to_one) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *); /* private key operations */ size_t (*priv2oct)(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); int (*oct2priv)(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *eckey, const BIGNUM *priv_key); int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *eckey); int (*keycheck)(const EC_KEY *eckey); int (*keygenpub)(EC_KEY *eckey); int (*keycopy)(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src); void (*keyfinish)(EC_KEY *eckey); /* custom ECDH operation */ int (*ecdh_compute_key)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh); }; /* * Types and functions to manipulate pre-computed values. */ typedef struct nistp224_pre_comp_st NISTP224_PRE_COMP; typedef struct nistp256_pre_comp_st NISTP256_PRE_COMP; typedef struct nistp521_pre_comp_st NISTP521_PRE_COMP; typedef struct nistz256_pre_comp_st NISTZ256_PRE_COMP; typedef struct ec_pre_comp_st EC_PRE_COMP; struct ec_group_st { const EC_METHOD *meth; EC_POINT *generator; /* optional */ BIGNUM *order, *cofactor; int curve_name; /* optional NID for named curve */ int asn1_flag; /* flag to control the asn1 encoding */ point_conversion_form_t asn1_form; unsigned char *seed; /* optional seed for parameters (appears in * ASN1) */ size_t seed_len; /* * The following members are handled by the method functions, even if * they appear generic */ /* * Field specification. For curves over GF(p), this is the modulus; for * curves over GF(2^m), this is the irreducible polynomial defining the * field. */ BIGNUM *field; /* * Field specification for curves over GF(2^m). The irreducible f(t) is * then of the form: t^poly[0] + t^poly[1] + ... + t^poly[k] where m = * poly[0] > poly[1] > ... > poly[k] = 0. The array is terminated with * poly[k+1]=-1. All elliptic curve irreducibles have at most 5 non-zero * terms. */ int poly[6]; /* * Curve coefficients. (Here the assumption is that BIGNUMs can be used * or abused for all kinds of fields, not just GF(p).) For characteristic * > 3, the curve is defined by a Weierstrass equation of the form y^2 = * x^3 + a*x + b. For characteristic 2, the curve is defined by an * equation of the form y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b. */ BIGNUM *a, *b; /* enable optimized point arithmetics for special case */ int a_is_minus3; /* method-specific (e.g., Montgomery structure) */ void *field_data1; /* method-specific */ void *field_data2; /* method-specific */ int (*field_mod_func) (BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); /* data for ECDSA inverse */ BN_MONT_CTX *mont_data; /* * Precomputed values for speed. The PCT_xxx names match the * pre_comp.xxx union names; see the SETPRECOMP and HAVEPRECOMP * macros, below. */ enum { PCT_none, PCT_nistp224, PCT_nistp256, PCT_nistp521, PCT_nistz256, PCT_ec } pre_comp_type; union { NISTP224_PRE_COMP *nistp224; NISTP256_PRE_COMP *nistp256; NISTP521_PRE_COMP *nistp521; NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *nistz256; EC_PRE_COMP *ec; } pre_comp; }; #define SETPRECOMP(g, type, pre) \ g->pre_comp_type = PCT_##type, g->pre_comp.type = pre #define HAVEPRECOMP(g, type) \ g->pre_comp_type == PCT_##type && g->pre_comp.type != NULL struct ec_key_st { const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth; ENGINE *engine; int version; EC_GROUP *group; EC_POINT *pub_key; BIGNUM *priv_key; unsigned int enc_flag; point_conversion_form_t conv_form; int references; int flags; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct ec_point_st { const EC_METHOD *meth; /* * All members except 'meth' are handled by the method functions, even if * they appear generic */ BIGNUM *X; BIGNUM *Y; BIGNUM *Z; /* Jacobian projective coordinates: * (X, Y, * Z) represents (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) if Z != 0 */ int Z_is_one; /* enable optimized point arithmetics for * special case */ }; NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *); NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *); NISTP521_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *); NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *); NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *); EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *); void EC_pre_comp_free(EC_GROUP *group); void EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *); void EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *); void EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *); void EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *); void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *); /* * method functions in ec_mult.c (ec_lib.c uses these as defaults if * group->method->mul is 0) */ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *); int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* method functions in ecp_smpl.c */ int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *); void ec_GFp_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *); void ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *); size_t ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ecp_mont.c */ int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_mont_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ecp_nist.c */ int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src); int ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nist_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ec2_smpl.c */ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GF2m_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); void ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *); int ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *); void ec_GF2m_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *); void ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *); size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_simple_field_div(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); /* method functions in ec2_mult.c */ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp224_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp224_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp224_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* method functions in ecp_nistp256.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp256_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp256_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* method functions in ecp_nistp521.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); int ec_GFp_nistp521_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp521_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp521_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *); int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GFp_nistp521_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /* utility functions in ecp_nistputil.c */ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array, size_t felem_size, void *tmp_felems, void (*felem_one) (void *out), int (*felem_is_zero) (const void *in), void (*felem_assign) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_square) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_mul) (void *out, const void *in1, const void *in2), void (*felem_inv) (void *out, const void *in), void (*felem_contract) (void *out, const void *in)); void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign, unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in); #endif int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *); int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group); #ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM /** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication, with x86-64 optimized * P256. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816. * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void); #endif size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey); int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey); int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey); /* EC_METHOD definitions */ struct ec_key_method_st { const char *name; int32_t flags; int (*init)(EC_KEY *key); void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key); int (*copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src); int (*set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp); int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key); int (*set_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key); int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *key); int (*compute_key)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh); int (*sign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey); int (*sign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey); int (*verify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey); int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey); }; #define EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC 1 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey); int ossl_ecdh_compute_key(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh); int ecdh_simple_compute_key(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh); struct ECDSA_SIG_st { BIGNUM *r; BIGNUM *s; }; int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey); ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey); int ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey); int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey); int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32], const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]); void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32], const uint8_t private_key[32]); openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c0000644000000000000000000000615313176625657015406 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include "ec_lcl.h" EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { const EC_METHOD *meth; EC_GROUP *ret; #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) /* * This might appear controversial, but the fact is that generic * prime method was observed to deliver better performance even * for NIST primes on a range of platforms, e.g.: 60%-15% * improvement on IA-64, ~25% on ARM, 30%-90% on P4, 20%-25% * in 32-bit build and 35%--12% in 64-bit build on Core2... * Coefficients are relative to optimized bn_nist.c for most * intensive ECDSA verify and ECDH operations for 192- and 521- * bit keys respectively. Choice of these boundary values is * arguable, because the dependency of improvement coefficient * from key length is not a "monotone" curve. For example while * 571-bit result is 23% on ARM, 384-bit one is -1%. But it's * generally faster, sometimes "respectfully" faster, sometimes * "tolerably" slower... What effectively happens is that loop * with bn_mul_add_words is put against bn_mul_mont, and the * latter "wins" on short vectors. Correct solution should be * implementing dedicated NxN multiplication subroutines for * small N. But till it materializes, let's stick to generic * prime method... * */ meth = EC_GFp_mont_method(); #else if (BN_nist_mod_func(p)) meth = EC_GFp_nist_method(); else meth = EC_GFp_mont_method(); #endif ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) { EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { const EC_METHOD *meth; EC_GROUP *ret; meth = EC_GF2m_simple_method(); ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) { EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/o_fopen.c0000644000000000000000000000637413176625657015206 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) # include FILE *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode) { FILE *file = NULL; # if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) int sz, len_0 = (int)strlen(filename) + 1; DWORD flags; /* * Basically there are three cases to cover: a) filename is * pure ASCII string; b) actual UTF-8 encoded string and * c) locale-ized string, i.e. one containing 8-bit * characters that are meaningful in current system locale. * If filename is pure ASCII or real UTF-8 encoded string, * MultiByteToWideChar succeeds and _wfopen works. If * filename is locale-ized string, chances are that * MultiByteToWideChar fails reporting * ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION, in which case we fall * back to fopen... */ if ((sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = MB_ERR_INVALID_CHARS), filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0 || (GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_FLAGS && (sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = 0), filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0) ) { WCHAR wmode[8]; WCHAR *wfilename = _alloca(sz * sizeof(WCHAR)); if (MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, flags, filename, len_0, wfilename, sz) && MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, mode, strlen(mode) + 1, wmode, OSSL_NELEM(wmode)) && (file = _wfopen(wfilename, wmode)) == NULL && (errno == ENOENT || errno == EBADF) ) { /* * UTF-8 decode succeeded, but no file, filename * could still have been locale-ized... */ file = fopen(filename, mode); } } else if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION) { file = fopen(filename, mode); } # elif defined(__DJGPP__) { char *newname = NULL; if (!HAS_LFN_SUPPORT(filename)) { char *iterator; char lastchar; newname = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(filename) + 1); if (newname == NULL) return NULL; for (iterator = newname, lastchar = '\0'; *filename; filename++, iterator++) { if (lastchar == '/' && filename[0] == '.' && filename[1] != '.' && filename[1] != '/') { /* Leading dots are not permitted in plain DOS. */ *iterator = '_'; } else { *iterator = *filename; } lastchar = *filename; } *iterator = '\0'; filename = newname; } file = fopen(filename, mode); OPENSSL_free(newname); } # else file = fopen(filename, mode); # endif return file; } #else void *openssl_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode) { return NULL; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/comp/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014340 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/crypto/comp/comp_lcl.h0000644000000000000000000000206213176625656016301 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ struct comp_method_st { int type; /* NID for compression library */ const char *name; /* A text string to identify the library */ int (*init) (COMP_CTX *ctx); void (*finish) (COMP_CTX *ctx); int (*compress) (COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen); int (*expand) (COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen); }; struct comp_ctx_st { struct comp_method_st *meth; unsigned long compress_in; unsigned long compress_out; unsigned long expand_in; unsigned long expand_out; void* data; }; openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/comp/build.info0000644000000000000000000000014113176625656016310 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../../libcrypto SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= \ comp_lib.c comp_err.c \ c_zlib.c openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c0000644000000000000000000000373613176625656016301 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "comp_lcl.h" COMP_CTX *COMP_CTX_new(COMP_METHOD *meth) { COMP_CTX *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->meth = meth; if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return (ret); } const COMP_METHOD *COMP_CTX_get_method(const COMP_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->meth; } int COMP_get_type(const COMP_METHOD *meth) { return meth->type; } const char *COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *meth) { return meth->name; } void COMP_CTX_free(COMP_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; if (ctx->meth->finish != NULL) ctx->meth->finish(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int COMP_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen, unsigned char *in, int ilen) { int ret; if (ctx->meth->compress == NULL) { return (-1); } ret = ctx->meth->compress(ctx, out, olen, in, ilen); if (ret > 0) { ctx->compress_in += ilen; ctx->compress_out += ret; } return (ret); } int COMP_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen, unsigned char *in, int ilen) { int ret; if (ctx->meth->expand == NULL) { return (-1); } ret = ctx->meth->expand(ctx, out, olen, in, ilen); if (ret > 0) { ctx->expand_in += ilen; ctx->expand_out += ret; } return (ret); } int COMP_CTX_get_type(const COMP_CTX* comp) { return comp->meth ? comp->meth->type : NID_undef; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/comp/comp_err.c0000644000000000000000000000260713176625656016317 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_COMP,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_COMP,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA COMP_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH), "bio_zlib_flush"}, {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW), "bio_zlib_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ), "bio_zlib_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE), "bio_zlib_write"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA COMP_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR), "zlib deflate error"}, {ERR_REASON(COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR), "zlib inflate error"}, {ERR_REASON(COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED), "zlib not supported"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_COMP_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(COMP_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, COMP_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, COMP_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c0000644000000000000000000004133213176625656015751 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "internal/comp.h" #include #include "internal/cryptlib_int.h" #include "internal/bio.h" #include "comp_lcl.h" COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void); static COMP_METHOD zlib_method_nozlib = { NID_undef, "(undef)", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, }; #ifndef ZLIB # undef ZLIB_SHARED #else # include static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx); static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx); static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen); static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen); /* memory allocations functions for zlib initialisation */ static void *zlib_zalloc(void *opaque, unsigned int no, unsigned int size) { void *p; p = OPENSSL_zalloc(no * size); return p; } static void zlib_zfree(void *opaque, void *address) { OPENSSL_free(address); } static COMP_METHOD zlib_stateful_method = { NID_zlib_compression, LN_zlib_compression, zlib_stateful_init, zlib_stateful_finish, zlib_stateful_compress_block, zlib_stateful_expand_block }; /* * When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that * the ZLIB.DLL be available in order for the OpenSSL DLLs to * work. Therefore, all ZLIB routines are loaded at run time * and we do not link to a .LIB file when ZLIB_SHARED is set. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # include # endif /* !(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS || * OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) */ # ifdef ZLIB_SHARED # include "internal/dso.h" /* Function pointers */ typedef int (*compress_ft) (Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen, const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen); typedef int (*inflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm); typedef int (*inflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush); typedef int (*inflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm, const char *version, int stream_size); typedef int (*deflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm); typedef int (*deflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush); typedef int (*deflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm, int level, const char *version, int stream_size); typedef const char *(*zError__ft) (int err); static compress_ft p_compress = NULL; static inflateEnd_ft p_inflateEnd = NULL; static inflate_ft p_inflate = NULL; static inflateInit__ft p_inflateInit_ = NULL; static deflateEnd_ft p_deflateEnd = NULL; static deflate_ft p_deflate = NULL; static deflateInit__ft p_deflateInit_ = NULL; static zError__ft p_zError = NULL; static int zlib_loaded = 0; /* only attempt to init func pts once */ static DSO *zlib_dso = NULL; # define compress p_compress # define inflateEnd p_inflateEnd # define inflate p_inflate # define inflateInit_ p_inflateInit_ # define deflateEnd p_deflateEnd # define deflate p_deflate # define deflateInit_ p_deflateInit_ # define zError p_zError # endif /* ZLIB_SHARED */ struct zlib_state { z_stream istream; z_stream ostream; }; static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx) { int err; struct zlib_state *state = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*state)); if (state == NULL) goto err; state->istream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc; state->istream.zfree = zlib_zfree; state->istream.opaque = Z_NULL; state->istream.next_in = Z_NULL; state->istream.next_out = Z_NULL; err = inflateInit_(&state->istream, ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream)); if (err != Z_OK) goto err; state->ostream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc; state->ostream.zfree = zlib_zfree; state->ostream.opaque = Z_NULL; state->ostream.next_in = Z_NULL; state->ostream.next_out = Z_NULL; err = deflateInit_(&state->ostream, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION, ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream)); if (err != Z_OK) goto err; ctx->data = state; return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(state); return 0; } static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx) { struct zlib_state *state = ctx->data; inflateEnd(&state->istream); deflateEnd(&state->ostream); OPENSSL_free(state); } static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen) { int err = Z_OK; struct zlib_state *state = ctx->data; if (state == NULL) return -1; state->ostream.next_in = in; state->ostream.avail_in = ilen; state->ostream.next_out = out; state->ostream.avail_out = olen; if (ilen > 0) err = deflate(&state->ostream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); if (err != Z_OK) return -1; return olen - state->ostream.avail_out; } static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in, unsigned int ilen) { int err = Z_OK; struct zlib_state *state = ctx->data; if (state == NULL) return 0; state->istream.next_in = in; state->istream.avail_in = ilen; state->istream.next_out = out; state->istream.avail_out = olen; if (ilen > 0) err = inflate(&state->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); if (err != Z_OK) return -1; return olen - state->istream.avail_out; } #endif COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void) { COMP_METHOD *meth = &zlib_method_nozlib; #ifdef ZLIB_SHARED /* LIBZ may be externally defined, and we should respect that value */ # ifndef LIBZ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # define LIBZ "ZLIB1" # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # define LIBZ "LIBZ" # else # define LIBZ "z" # endif # endif if (!zlib_loaded) { zlib_dso = DSO_load(NULL, LIBZ, NULL, 0); if (zlib_dso != NULL) { p_compress = (compress_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "compress"); p_inflateEnd = (inflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateEnd"); p_inflate = (inflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflate"); p_inflateInit_ = (inflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateInit_"); p_deflateEnd = (deflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateEnd"); p_deflate = (deflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflate"); p_deflateInit_ = (deflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateInit_"); p_zError = (zError__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "zError"); if (p_compress && p_inflateEnd && p_inflate && p_inflateInit_ && p_deflateEnd && p_deflate && p_deflateInit_ && p_zError) zlib_loaded++; if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ZLIB, NULL)) { comp_zlib_cleanup_int(); return meth; } if (zlib_loaded) meth = &zlib_stateful_method; } } #endif #if defined(ZLIB) meth = &zlib_stateful_method; #endif return (meth); } void comp_zlib_cleanup_int(void) { #ifdef ZLIB_SHARED if (zlib_dso != NULL) DSO_free(zlib_dso); zlib_dso = NULL; #endif } #ifdef ZLIB /* Zlib based compression/decompression filter BIO */ typedef struct { unsigned char *ibuf; /* Input buffer */ int ibufsize; /* Buffer size */ z_stream zin; /* Input decompress context */ unsigned char *obuf; /* Output buffer */ int obufsize; /* Output buffer size */ unsigned char *optr; /* Position in output buffer */ int ocount; /* Amount of data in output buffer */ int odone; /* deflate EOF */ int comp_level; /* Compression level to use */ z_stream zout; /* Output compression context */ } BIO_ZLIB_CTX; # define ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE 1024 static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi); static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi); static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl); static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl); static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); static const BIO_METHOD bio_meth_zlib = { BIO_TYPE_COMP, "zlib", bio_zlib_write, bio_zlib_read, NULL, NULL, bio_zlib_ctrl, bio_zlib_new, bio_zlib_free, bio_zlib_callback_ctrl }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_zlib(void) { return &bio_meth_zlib; } static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx; # ifdef ZLIB_SHARED (void)COMP_zlib(); if (!zlib_loaded) { COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED); return 0; } # endif ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) { COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ctx->ibufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE; ctx->obufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE; ctx->zin.zalloc = Z_NULL; ctx->zin.zfree = Z_NULL; ctx->zout.zalloc = Z_NULL; ctx->zout.zfree = Z_NULL; ctx->comp_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION; BIO_set_init(bi, 1); BIO_set_data(bi, ctx); return 1; } static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi) { BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx; if (!bi) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(bi); if (ctx->ibuf) { /* Destroy decompress context */ inflateEnd(&ctx->zin); OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf); } if (ctx->obuf) { /* Destroy compress context */ deflateEnd(&ctx->zout); OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf); } OPENSSL_free(ctx); BIO_set_data(bi, NULL); BIO_set_init(bi, 0); return 1; } static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx; int ret; z_stream *zin; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (!out || !outl) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); zin = &ctx->zin; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (!ctx->ibuf) { ctx->ibuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->ibufsize); if (ctx->ibuf == NULL) { COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } inflateInit(zin); zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf; zin->avail_in = 0; } /* Copy output data directly to supplied buffer */ zin->next_out = (unsigned char *)out; zin->avail_out = (unsigned int)outl; for (;;) { /* Decompress while data available */ while (zin->avail_in) { ret = inflate(zin, 0); if ((ret != Z_OK) && (ret != Z_STREAM_END)) { COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret)); return 0; } /* If EOF or we've read everything then return */ if ((ret == Z_STREAM_END) || !zin->avail_out) return outl - zin->avail_out; } /* * No data in input buffer try to read some in, if an error then * return the total data read. */ ret = BIO_read(next, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibufsize); if (ret <= 0) { /* Total data read */ int tot = outl - zin->avail_out; BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (ret < 0) return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret; return tot; } zin->avail_in = ret; zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf; } } static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx; int ret; z_stream *zout; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (!in || !inl) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); if (ctx->odone) return 0; zout = &ctx->zout; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (!ctx->obuf) { ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->obufsize); /* Need error here */ if (ctx->obuf == NULL) { COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ctx->optr = ctx->obuf; ctx->ocount = 0; deflateInit(zout, ctx->comp_level); zout->next_out = ctx->obuf; zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize; } /* Obtain input data directly from supplied buffer */ zout->next_in = (void *)in; zout->avail_in = inl; for (;;) { /* If data in output buffer write it first */ while (ctx->ocount) { ret = BIO_write(next, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount); if (ret <= 0) { /* Total data written */ int tot = inl - zout->avail_in; BIO_copy_next_retry(b); if (ret < 0) return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret; return tot; } ctx->optr += ret; ctx->ocount -= ret; } /* Have we consumed all supplied data? */ if (!zout->avail_in) return inl; /* Compress some more */ /* Reset buffer */ ctx->optr = ctx->obuf; zout->next_out = ctx->obuf; zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize; /* Compress some more */ ret = deflate(zout, 0); if (ret != Z_OK) { COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret)); return 0; } ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out; } } static int bio_zlib_flush(BIO *b) { BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx; int ret; z_stream *zout; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); ctx = BIO_get_data(b); /* If no data written or already flush show success */ if (!ctx->obuf || (ctx->odone && !ctx->ocount)) return 1; zout = &ctx->zout; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); /* No more input data */ zout->next_in = NULL; zout->avail_in = 0; for (;;) { /* If data in output buffer write it first */ while (ctx->ocount) { ret = BIO_write(next, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount); if (ret <= 0) { BIO_copy_next_retry(b); return ret; } ctx->optr += ret; ctx->ocount -= ret; } if (ctx->odone) return 1; /* Compress some more */ /* Reset buffer */ ctx->optr = ctx->obuf; zout->next_out = ctx->obuf; zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize; /* Compress some more */ ret = deflate(zout, Z_FINISH); if (ret == Z_STREAM_END) ctx->odone = 1; else if (ret != Z_OK) { COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret)); return 0; } ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out; } } static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx; int ret, *ip; int ibs, obs; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; ctx = BIO_get_data(b); switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: ctx->ocount = 0; ctx->odone = 0; ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = bio_zlib_flush(b); if (ret > 0) ret = BIO_flush(next); break; case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE: ibs = -1; obs = -1; if (ptr != NULL) { ip = ptr; if (*ip == 0) ibs = (int)num; else obs = (int)num; } else { ibs = (int)num; obs = ibs; } if (ibs != -1) { OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf); ctx->ibuf = NULL; ctx->ibufsize = ibs; } if (obs != -1) { OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf); ctx->obuf = NULL; ctx->obufsize = obs; } ret = 1; break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; return BIO_callback_ctrl(next, cmd, fp); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661012657 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/ssl/packet_locl.h0000644000000000000000000003651213176625661015317 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H # define HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H # include # include # include # include # include # include "internal/numbers.h" # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif typedef struct { /* Pointer to where we are currently reading from */ const unsigned char *curr; /* Number of bytes remaining */ size_t remaining; } PACKET; /* Internal unchecked shorthand; don't use outside this file. */ static ossl_inline void packet_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len) { pkt->curr += len; pkt->remaining -= len; } /* * Returns the number of bytes remaining to be read in the PACKET */ static ossl_inline size_t PACKET_remaining(const PACKET *pkt) { return pkt->remaining; } /* * Returns a pointer to the first byte after the packet data. * Useful for integrating with non-PACKET parsing code. * Specifically, we use PACKET_end() to verify that a d2i_... call * has consumed the entire packet contents. */ static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_end(const PACKET *pkt) { return pkt->curr + pkt->remaining; } /* * Returns a pointer to the PACKET's current position. * For use in non-PACKETized APIs. */ static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_data(const PACKET *pkt) { return pkt->curr; } /* * Initialise a PACKET with |len| bytes held in |buf|. This does not make a * copy of the data so |buf| must be present for the whole time that the PACKET * is being used. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_buf_init(PACKET *pkt, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { /* Sanity check for negative values. */ if (len > (size_t)(SIZE_MAX / 2)) return 0; pkt->curr = buf; pkt->remaining = len; return 1; } /* Initialize a PACKET to hold zero bytes. */ static ossl_inline void PACKET_null_init(PACKET *pkt) { pkt->curr = NULL; pkt->remaining = 0; } /* * Returns 1 if the packet has length |num| and its contents equal the |num| * bytes read from |ptr|. Returns 0 otherwise (lengths or contents not equal). * If lengths are equal, performs the comparison in constant time. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_equal(const PACKET *pkt, const void *ptr, size_t num) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != num) return 0; return CRYPTO_memcmp(pkt->curr, ptr, num) == 0; } /* * Peek ahead and initialize |subpkt| with the next |len| bytes read from |pkt|. * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_sub_packet(const PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt, size_t len) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len) return 0; return PACKET_buf_init(subpkt, pkt->curr, len); } /* * Initialize |subpkt| with the next |len| bytes read from |pkt|. Data is not * copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with the * original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_sub_packet(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt, size_t len) { if (!PACKET_peek_sub_packet(pkt, subpkt, len)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, len); return 1; } /* * Peek ahead at 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in * |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_2(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 2) return 0; *data = ((unsigned int)(*pkt->curr)) << 8; *data |= *(pkt->curr + 1); return 1; } /* Equivalent of n2s */ /* Get 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_2(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_net_2(pkt, data)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, 2); return 1; } /* * Peek ahead at 3 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in * |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_3(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 3) return 0; *data = ((unsigned long)(*pkt->curr)) << 16; *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 8; *data |= *(pkt->curr + 2); return 1; } /* Equivalent of n2l3 */ /* Get 3 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_3(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_net_3(pkt, data)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, 3); return 1; } /* * Peek ahead at 4 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in * |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_4(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 4) return 0; *data = ((unsigned long)(*pkt->curr)) << 24; *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 16; *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 2))) << 8; *data |= *(pkt->curr + 3); return 1; } /* Equivalent of n2l */ /* Get 4 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_4(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_net_4(pkt, data)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, 4); return 1; } /* Peek ahead at 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_1(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data) { if (!PACKET_remaining(pkt)) return 0; *data = *pkt->curr; return 1; } /* Get 1 byte from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_1(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_1(pkt, data)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, 1); return 1; } /* * Peek ahead at 4 bytes in reverse network order from |pkt| and store the value * in |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_4(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < 4) return 0; *data = *pkt->curr; *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 1))) << 8; *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 2))) << 16; *data |= ((unsigned long)(*(pkt->curr + 3))) << 24; return 1; } /* Equivalent of c2l */ /* * Get 4 bytes in reverse network order from |pkt| and store the value in * |*data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_4(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_4(pkt, data)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, 4); return 1; } /* * Peek ahead at |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in * |*data|. This just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The * caller should not free this data directly (it will be freed when the * underlying buffer gets freed */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_bytes(const PACKET *pkt, const unsigned char **data, size_t len) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len) return 0; *data = pkt->curr; return 1; } /* * Read |len| bytes from the |pkt| and store a pointer to them in |*data|. This * just points at the underlying buffer that |pkt| is using. The caller should * not free this data directly (it will be freed when the underlying buffer gets * freed */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_bytes(PACKET *pkt, const unsigned char **data, size_t len) { if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, data, len)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, len); return 1; } /* Peek ahead at |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data| */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned char *data, size_t len) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len) return 0; memcpy(data, pkt->curr, len); return 1; } /* * Read |len| bytes from |pkt| and copy them to |data|. * The caller is responsible for ensuring that |data| can hold |len| bytes. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_copy_bytes(PACKET *pkt, unsigned char *data, size_t len) { if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(pkt, data, len)) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, len); return 1; } /* * Copy packet data to |dest|, and set |len| to the number of copied bytes. * If the packet has more than |dest_len| bytes, nothing is copied. * Returns 1 if the packet data fits in |dest_len| bytes, 0 otherwise. * Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing * done with a given PACKET). */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_copy_all(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned char *dest, size_t dest_len, size_t *len) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > dest_len) { *len = 0; return 0; } *len = pkt->remaining; memcpy(dest, pkt->curr, pkt->remaining); return 1; } /* * Copy |pkt| bytes to a newly allocated buffer and store a pointer to the * result in |*data|, and the length in |len|. * If |*data| is not NULL, the old data is OPENSSL_free'd. * If the packet is empty, or malloc fails, |*data| will be set to NULL. * Returns 1 if the malloc succeeds and 0 otherwise. * Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing * done with a given PACKET). */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_memdup(const PACKET *pkt, unsigned char **data, size_t *len) { size_t length; OPENSSL_free(*data); *data = NULL; *len = 0; length = PACKET_remaining(pkt); if (length == 0) return 1; *data = OPENSSL_memdup(pkt->curr, length); if (*data == NULL) return 0; *len = length; return 1; } /* * Read a C string from |pkt| and copy to a newly allocated, NUL-terminated * buffer. Store a pointer to the result in |*data|. * If |*data| is not NULL, the old data is OPENSSL_free'd. * If the data in |pkt| does not contain a NUL-byte, the entire data is * copied and NUL-terminated. * Returns 1 if the malloc succeeds and 0 otherwise. * Does not forward PACKET position (because it is typically the last thing done * with a given PACKET). */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_strndup(const PACKET *pkt, char **data) { OPENSSL_free(*data); /* This will succeed on an empty packet, unless pkt->curr == NULL. */ *data = OPENSSL_strndup((const char *)pkt->curr, PACKET_remaining(pkt)); return (*data != NULL); } /* Returns 1 if |pkt| contains at least one 0-byte, 0 otherwise. */ static ossl_inline int PACKET_contains_zero_byte(const PACKET *pkt) { return memchr(pkt->curr, 0, pkt->remaining) != NULL; } /* Move the current reading position forward |len| bytes */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_forward(PACKET *pkt, size_t len) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len) return 0; packet_forward(pkt, len); return 1; } /* * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a one-byte length, and stores * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|. * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|. * Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) { unsigned int length; const unsigned char *data; PACKET tmp = *pkt; if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) { return 0; } *pkt = tmp; subpkt->curr = data; subpkt->remaining = length; return 1; } /* * Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1, but additionally, fails when there are * leftover bytes in |pkt|. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) { unsigned int length; const unsigned char *data; PACKET tmp = *pkt; if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { return 0; } *pkt = tmp; subpkt->curr = data; subpkt->remaining = length; return 1; } /* * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a two-byte length, and stores * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|. * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|. * Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) { unsigned int length; const unsigned char *data; PACKET tmp = *pkt; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) { return 0; } *pkt = tmp; subpkt->curr = data; subpkt->remaining = length; return 1; } /* * Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2, but additionally, fails when there are * leftover bytes in |pkt|. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) { unsigned int length; const unsigned char *data; PACKET tmp = *pkt; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { return 0; } *pkt = tmp; subpkt->curr = data; subpkt->remaining = length; return 1; } /* * Reads a variable-length vector prefixed with a three-byte length, and stores * the contents in |subpkt|. |pkt| can equal |subpkt|. * Data is not copied: the |subpkt| packet will share its underlying buffer with * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|. * Upon failure, the original |pkt| and |subpkt| are not modified. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) { unsigned long length; const unsigned char *data; PACKET tmp = *pkt; if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&tmp, &length) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length)) { return 0; } *pkt = tmp; subpkt->curr = data; subpkt->remaining = length; return 1; } # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif /* HEADER_PACKET_LOCL_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_lib.c0000644000000000000000000036371013176625661014464 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include const char SSL_version_str[] = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { /* * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library * bug */ (int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned int, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int)) ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *)) ssl_undefined_function, 0, /* finish_mac_length */ NULL, /* client_finished_label */ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ NULL, /* server_finished_label */ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, }; struct ssl_async_args { SSL *s; void *buf; int num; enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC } type; union { int (*func_read) (SSL *, void *, int); int (*func_write) (SSL *, const void *, int); int (*func_other) (SSL *); } f; }; static const struct { uint8_t mtype; uint8_t ord; int nid; } dane_mds[] = { { DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef }, { DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 }, { DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 }, }; static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) { const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST; int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */ size_t i; if (dctx->mdevp != NULL) return 1; mdevp = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdevp)); mdord = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdord)); if (mdord == NULL || mdevp == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(mdord); OPENSSL_free(mdevp); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Install default entries */ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(dane_mds); ++i) { const EVP_MD *md; if (dane_mds[i].nid == NID_undef || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dane_mds[i].nid)) == NULL) continue; mdevp[dane_mds[i].mtype] = md; mdord[dane_mds[i].mtype] = dane_mds[i].ord; } dctx->mdevp = mdevp; dctx->mdord = mdord; dctx->mdmax = mdmax; return 1; } static void dane_ctx_final(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) { OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdevp); dctx->mdevp = NULL; OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdord); dctx->mdord = NULL; dctx->mdmax = 0; } static void tlsa_free(danetls_record *t) { if (t == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(t->data); EVP_PKEY_free(t->spki); OPENSSL_free(t); } static void dane_final(SSL_DANE *dane) { sk_danetls_record_pop_free(dane->trecs, tlsa_free); dane->trecs = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(dane->certs, X509_free); dane->certs = NULL; X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; dane->mtlsa = NULL; dane->mdpth = -1; dane->pdpth = -1; } /* * dane_copy - Copy dane configuration, sans verification state. */ static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from) { int num; int i; if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(&from->dane)) return 1; dane_final(&to->dane); to->dane.flags = from->dane.flags; to->dane.dctx = &to->ctx->dane; to->dane.trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null(); if (to->dane.trecs == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i); if (SSL_dane_tlsa_add(to, t->usage, t->selector, t->mtype, t->data, t->dlen) <= 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) { int i; if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL); return 0; } if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) { const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; int n = ((int)mtype) + 1; mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp)); if (mdevp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } dctx->mdevp = mdevp; mdord = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdord, n * sizeof(*mdord)); if (mdord == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } dctx->mdord = mdord; /* Zero-fill any gaps */ for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) { mdevp[i] = NULL; mdord[i] = 0; } dctx->mdmax = mtype; } dctx->mdevp[mtype] = md; /* Coerce ordinal of disabled matching types to 0 */ dctx->mdord[mtype] = (md == NULL) ? 0 : ord; return 1; } static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype) { if (mtype > dane->dctx->mdmax) return NULL; return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype]; } static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen) { danetls_record *t; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; int ilen = (int)dlen; int i; int num; if (dane->trecs == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED); return -1; } if (ilen < 0 || dlen != (size_t)ilen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); return 0; } if (usage > DANETLS_USAGE_LAST) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE); return 0; } if (selector > DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR); return 0; } if (mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { md = tlsa_md_get(dane, mtype); if (md == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE); return 0; } } if (md != NULL && dlen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); return 0; } if (!data) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA); return 0; } if ((t = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*t))) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } t->usage = usage; t->selector = selector; t->mtype = mtype; t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(ilen); if (t->data == NULL) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } memcpy(t->data, data, ilen); t->dlen = ilen; /* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */ if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { const unsigned char *p = data; X509 *cert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; switch (selector) { case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, dlen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } if (X509_get0_pubkey(cert) == NULL) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_TA_MASK) == 0) { X509_free(cert); break; } /* * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 0 0" TLSA * records that contain full certificates of trust-anchors that are * not present in the wire chain. For usage PKIX-TA(0), we augment * the chain with untrusted Full(0) certificates from DNS, in case * they are missing from the chain. */ if ((dane->certs == NULL && (dane->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || !sk_X509_push(dane->certs, cert)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509_free(cert); tlsa_free(t); return -1; } break; case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, dlen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } /* * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 1 0" TLSA * records that contain full bare keys of trust-anchors that are * not present in the wire chain. */ if (usage == DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA) t->spki = pkey; else EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); break; } } /*- * Find the right insertion point for the new record. * * See crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. We sort DANE-EE(3) records first, so that * they can be processed first, as they require no chain building, and no * expiration or hostname checks. Because DANE-EE(3) is numerically * largest, this is accomplished via descending sort by "usage". * * We also sort in descending order by matching ordinal to simplify * the implementation of digest agility in the verification code. * * The choice of order for the selector is not significant, so we * use the same descending order for consistency. */ num = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { danetls_record *rec = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if (rec->usage > usage) continue; if (rec->usage < usage) break; if (rec->selector > selector) continue; if (rec->selector < selector) break; if (dane->dctx->mdord[rec->mtype] > dane->dctx->mdord[mtype]) continue; break; } if (!sk_danetls_record_insert(dane->trecs, t, i)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } dane->umask |= DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage); return 1; } /* * Return 0 if there is only one version configured and it was disabled * at configure time. Return 1 otherwise. */ static int ssl_check_allowed_versions(int min_version, int max_version) { int minisdtls = 0, maxisdtls = 0; /* Figure out if we're doing DTLS versions or TLS versions */ if (min_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || min_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) minisdtls = 1; if (max_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || max_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) maxisdtls = 1; /* A wildcard version of 0 could be DTLS or TLS. */ if ((minisdtls && !maxisdtls && max_version != 0) || (maxisdtls && !minisdtls && min_version != 0)) { /* Mixing DTLS and TLS versions will lead to sadness; deny it. */ return 0; } if (minisdtls || maxisdtls) { /* Do DTLS version checks. */ if (min_version == 0) /* Ignore DTLS1_BAD_VER */ min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; if (max_version == 0) max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 if (max_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 if (min_version == DTLS1_VERSION) min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; #endif /* Done massaging versions; do the check. */ if (0 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_VERSION, max_version)) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_2_VERSION, max_version)) #endif ) return 0; } else { /* Regular TLS version checks. */ if (min_version == 0) min_version = SSL3_VERSION; if (max_version == 0) max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 if (max_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 if (max_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) max_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 if (max_version == TLS1_VERSION) max_version = SSL3_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if (min_version == SSL3_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 if (min_version == TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 if (min_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; #endif /* Done massaging versions; do the check. */ if (0 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 || (min_version <= SSL3_VERSION && SSL3_VERSION <= max_version) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 || (min_version <= TLS1_VERSION && TLS1_VERSION <= max_version) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 || (min_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION && TLS1_1_VERSION <= max_version) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 || (min_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION && TLS1_2_VERSION <= max_version) #endif ) return 0; } return 1; } static void clear_ciphers(SSL *s) { /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return (0); } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = NULL; } s->error = 0; s->hit = 0; s->shutdown = 0; if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ossl_statem_clear(s); s->version = s->method->version; s->client_version = s->version; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; clear_ciphers(s); s->first_packet = 0; /* Reset DANE verification result state */ s->dane.mdpth = -1; s->dane.pdpth = -1; X509_free(s->dane.mcert); s->dane.mcert = NULL; s->dane.mtlsa = NULL; /* Clear the verification result peername */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, NULL); /* * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert * back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return (0); } else s->method->ssl_clear(s); RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer); return (1); } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method = meth; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list), &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return (0); } return (1); } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return (NULL); } if (ctx->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return (NULL); } s = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s)); if (s == NULL) goto err; s->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (s->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(s); return NULL; } RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s); s->options = ctx->options; s->dane.flags = ctx->dane.flags; s->min_proto_version = ctx->min_proto_version; s->max_proto_version = ctx->max_proto_version; s->mode = ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; s->references = 1; /* * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, ctx->read_ahead); s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; s->not_resumable_session_cb = ctx->not_resumable_session_cb; s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (s->param == NULL) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; s->split_send_fragment = ctx->split_send_fragment; s->max_pipelines = ctx->max_pipelines; if (s->max_pipelines > 1) RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1); if (ctx->default_read_buf_len > 0) SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(s, ctx->default_read_buf_len); SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); s->ctx = ctx; s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = ctx->tlsext_status_type; s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); s->session_ctx = ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) goto err; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) goto err; s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; #endif if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { s->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) goto err; memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; } s->verified_chain = NULL; s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; s->default_passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback; s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata; s->method = ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; if (!SSL_clear(s)) goto err; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; #endif s->job = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ctx->ct_validation_callback, ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg)) goto err; #endif return s; err: SSL_free(s); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s) { return SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? 1 : 0; } int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); return 1; } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ssl->lock); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock); return 1; } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use * by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id) return 0; r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->session_ctx->lock); p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->session_ctx->lock); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, hostname, 0); } int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(s->param, hostname, 0); } void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(s->param, flags); } const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(s->param); } int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane); } unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; ctx->dane.flags |= flags; return orig; } unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; ctx->dane.flags &= ~flags; return orig; } int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; if (s->ctx->dane.mdmax == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED); return 0; } if (dane->trecs != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED); return 0; } /* * Default SNI name. This rejects empty names, while set1_host below * accepts them and disables host name checks. To avoid side-effects with * invalid input, set the SNI name first. */ if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN); return -1; } } /* Primary RFC6125 reference identifier */ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, basedomain, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN); return -1; } dane->mdpth = -1; dane->pdpth = -1; dane->dctx = &s->ctx->dane; dane->trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null(); if (dane->trecs == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } return 1; } unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags; ssl->dane.flags |= flags; return orig; } unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags; ssl->dane.flags &= ~flags; return orig; } int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK) return -1; if (dane->mtlsa) { if (mcert) *mcert = dane->mcert; if (mspki) *mspki = (dane->mcert == NULL) ? dane->mtlsa->spki : NULL; } return dane->mdpth; } int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector, uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK) return -1; if (dane->mtlsa) { if (usage) *usage = dane->mtlsa->usage; if (selector) *selector = dane->mtlsa->selector; if (mtype) *mtype = dane->mtlsa->mtype; if (data) *data = dane->mtlsa->data; if (dlen) *dlen = dane->mtlsa->dlen; } return dane->mdpth; } SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s) { return &s->dane; } int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen) { return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen); } int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) { return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord); } int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); } int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, -1, &i, s->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); dane_final(&s->dane); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); BIO_free_all(s->wbio); BIO_free_all(s->rbio); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } clear_ciphers(s); ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); SSL_CTX_free(s->session_ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT SCT_LIST_free(s->scts); OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); #endif OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); RECORD_LAYER_release(&s->rlayer); SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(s->waitctx); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(s->lock); OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio) { BIO_free_all(s->rbio); s->rbio = rbio; } void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio) { /* * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->wbio = wbio; /* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */ if (s->bbio != NULL) s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { /* * For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in * ownership handling. */ /* If nothing has changed, do nothing */ if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s)) return; /* * If the two arguments are equal then one fewer reference is granted by the * caller than we want to take */ if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) BIO_up_ref(rbio); /* * If only the wbio is changed only adopt one reference. */ if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s)) { SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); return; } /* * There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is * changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only * adopt one reference. */ if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s) && SSL_get_rbio(s) != SSL_get_wbio(s)) { SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); return; } /* Otherwise, adopt both references. */ SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return s->rbio; } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* * If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its * |next_bio|. */ return BIO_next(s->bbio); } return s->wbio; } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return SSL_get_rfd(s); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_rbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_wbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || (int)BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set0_wbio(s, bio); } else { BIO_up_ref(rbio); SSL_set0_wbio(s, rbio); } return 1; } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || ((int)BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd)) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set0_rbio(s, bio); } else { BIO_up_ref(wbio); SSL_set0_rbio(s, wbio); } return 1; } #endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return ret; } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return ret; } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return (s->verify_mode); } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (s->verify_callback); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->verify_mode); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (ctx->default_verify_callback); } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode = mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback = callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) { RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, yes); } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { /* * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) */ return (s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s) { /* * Similar to SSL_pending() but returns a 1 to indicate that we have * unprocessed data available or 0 otherwise (as opposed to the number of * bytes available). Unlike SSL_pending() this will take into account * read_ahead data. A 1 return simply indicates that we have unprocessed * data. That data may not result in any application data, or we may fail * to parse the records for some reason. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) return 1; return RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer); } X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return (r); X509_up_ref(r); return (r); } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->peer_chain; /* * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if * we are a server, it does not. */ return (r); } /* * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) { int i; /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ if (!SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f))) { return 0; } /* * what if we are setup for one protocol version but want to talk another */ if (t->method != f->method) { t->method->ssl_free(t); t->method = f->method; if (t->method->ssl_new(t) == 0) return 0; } CRYPTO_atomic_add(&f->cert->references, 1, &i, f->cert->lock); ssl_cert_free(t->cert); t->cert = f->cert; if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length)) { return 0; } return 1; } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); } int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s) { if (s->job) return 1; return 0; } int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds) { ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, fds, numfds); } int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds) { ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ctx, addfd, numaddfds, delfd, numdelfds); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); } return SSL_do_handshake(s); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_connect_state(s); } return SSL_do_handshake(s); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return (s->method->get_timeout()); } static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args, int (*func) (void *)) { int ret; if (s->waitctx == NULL) { s->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); if (s->waitctx == NULL) return -1; } switch (ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args, sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) { case ASYNC_ERR: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC); return -1; case ASYNC_PAUSE: s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED; return -1; case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS; return -1; case ASYNC_FINISH: s->job = NULL; return ret; default: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); /* Shouldn't happen */ return -1; } } static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs) { struct ssl_async_args *args; SSL *s; void *buf; int num; args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs; s = args->s; buf = args->buf; num = args->num; switch (args->type) { case READFUNC: return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num); case WRITEFUNC: return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num); case OTHERFUNC: return args->f.func_other(s); } return -1; } int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; args.buf = buf; args.num = num; args.type = READFUNC; args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_read; return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); } else { return s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num); } } int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return (0); } if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; args.buf = buf; args.num = num; args.type = READFUNC; args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_peek; return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); } else { return s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num); } } int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return (-1); } if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; args.buf = (void *)buf; args.num = num; args.type = WRITEFUNC; args.f.func_write = s->method->ssl_write; return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); } else { return s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num); } } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used * (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (!SSL_in_init(s)) { if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; args.type = OTHERFUNC; args.f.func_other = s->method->ssl_shutdown; return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); } else { return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s); } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT); return -1; } } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 0; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) { /* * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a * handshake has finished */ return (s->renegotiate != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer)); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer); RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, larg); return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (s->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (s->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; s->max_send_fragment = larg; if (s->max_send_fragment < s->split_send_fragment) s->split_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: if ((unsigned int)larg > s->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) return 0; s->split_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES: if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) return 0; s->max_pipelines = larg; if (larg > 1) RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1); return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: if (s->s3) return s->s3->send_connection_binding; else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST: if (parg) { if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL) return 0; *(unsigned char **)parg = s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw; return (int)s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen; } else { return TLS_CIPHER_LEN; } case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT: if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) return -1; if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) return 1; else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, s->max_proto_version) && ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &s->min_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return s->min_proto_version; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(s->min_proto_version, larg) && ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &s->max_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return s->max_proto_version; default: return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp)); } } LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; /* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */ if (ctx == NULL) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0); default: return 0; } } switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (ctx->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l = ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return (ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l = ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return (ctx->session_cache_mode); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return (ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (ctx->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (ctx->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; if (ctx->max_send_fragment < ctx->split_send_fragment) ctx->split_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: if ((unsigned int)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) return 0; ctx->split_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES: if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) return 0; ctx->max_pipelines = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, ctx->max_proto_version) && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &ctx->min_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return ctx->min_proto_version; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(ctx->min_proto_version, larg) && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &ctx->max_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return ctx->max_proto_version; default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp)); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { if (a->id > b->id) return 1; if (a->id < b->id) return -1; return 0; } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp) { if ((*ap)->id > (*bp)->id) return 1; if ((*ap)->id < (*bp)->id) return -1; return 0; } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list); } } return (NULL); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || !s->server) return NULL; return s->session->ciphers; } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL, *ciphers; int i; ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if (!ciphers) return NULL; ssl_set_client_disabled(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); if (!ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) { if (!sk) sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (!sk) return NULL; if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return NULL; } } } return sk; } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list_by_id); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); } } return (NULL); } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return (NULL); sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) return (NULL); c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); if (c == NULL) return (NULL); return (c->name); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL_CTX and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx != NULL) return ctx->cipher_list; return NULL; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert); /* * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len) { char *p; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2)) return (NULL); p = buf; sk = s->session->ciphers; if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { int n; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); n = strlen(c->name); if (n + 1 > len) { if (p != buf) --p; *p = '\0'; return buf; } memcpy(p, c->name, n + 1); p += n; *(p++) = ':'; len -= n + 1; } p[-1] = '\0'; return (buf); } /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). */ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return NULL; return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session-> tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; return -1; } /* * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is * expected that this function is called from the callback set by * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client * selects the first protocol in its list, but indicates via the API that this * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. */ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; /* * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { if (server[i] == client[j] && memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { /* We found a match */ result = &server[i]; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; goto found; } j += client[j]; j++; } i += server[i]; i++; } /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ result = client; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; found: *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1; *outlen = result[0]; return status; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols * provided by the callback. */ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; if (!*data) { *len = 0; } else { *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; } } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the * ServerHello. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; } #endif /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol * from the client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len) { *data = NULL; if (ssl->s3) *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; if (*data == NULL) *len = 0; else *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) return -1; return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen, use_context); } static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id; unsigned long l; unsigned char tmp_storage[4]; if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) { memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage)); memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length); session_id = tmp_storage; } l = (unsigned long) ((unsigned long)session_id[0]) | ((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L); return (l); } /* * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing * session with a matching session ID. */ static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return (1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return (1); return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length)); } /* * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed * via ssl.h. */ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; if (meth == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return (NULL); } if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL)) return NULL; if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return NULL; } if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ret->method = meth; ret->min_proto_version = 0; ret->max_proto_version = 0; ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; /* We take the system default. */ ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT ret->ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new(); if (ret->ctlog_store == NULL) goto err; #endif if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert) || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (ret->param == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data)) goto err; /* No compression for DTLS */ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS)) ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; /* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */ if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key)) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret)) goto err; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO # define eng_strx(x) #x # define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ { ENGINE *eng; eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); if (!eng) { ERR_clear_error(); ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); } if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) ERR_clear_error(); } # endif #endif /* * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely * deployed might change this. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; /* * Disable compression by default to prevent CRIME. Applications can * re-enable compression by configuring * SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); * or by using the SSL_CONF library. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; ret->tlsext_status_type = -1; return ret; err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: SSL_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ctx->references, 1, &i, ctx->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", ctx); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, -1, &i, a->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", a); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); dane_ctx_final(&a->dane); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT CTLOG_STORE_free(a->ctlog_store); #endif sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); ssl_cert_free(a->cert); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free); a->comp_methods = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); #endif OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock); OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; } pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->default_passwd_callback; } void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata; } void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb) { s->default_passwd_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u) { s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; } pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s) { return s->default_passwd_callback; } void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s) { return s->default_passwd_callback_userdata; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode = mode; ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg); } void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST) CERT_PKEY *cpk; #endif CERT *c = s->cert; uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags; int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign; unsigned long mask_k, mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok; X509 *x = NULL; #endif if (c == NULL) return; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->dh_tmp_auto); #else dh_tmp = 0; #endif rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; dsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC have_ecc_cert = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; #endif mask_k = 0; mask_a = 0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "dht=%d re=%d rs=%d ds=%d\n", dh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dsa_sign); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12; } cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12; } cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; } #endif if (rsa_enc) mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; if (dh_tmp) mask_k |= SSL_kDHE; if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; } if (dsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; } mask_a |= SSL_aNULL; /* * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites * depending on the key usage extension. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (have_ecc_cert) { uint32_t ex_kusage; cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]; x = cpk->x509; ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(x); ecdsa_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; if (!(pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN)) ecdsa_ok = 0; if (ecdsa_ok) mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; if (mask_k & SSL_kRSA) mask_k |= SSL_kRSAPSK; if (mask_k & SSL_kDHE) mask_k |= SSL_kDHEPSK; if (mask_k & SSL_kECDHE) mask_k |= SSL_kECDHEPSK; #endif s->s3->tmp.mask_k = mask_k; s->s3->tmp.mask_a = mask_a; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) { if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ if (!(X509_get_key_usage(x) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return 0; } } return 1; /* all checks are ok */ } #endif static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s) { int idx; idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) { if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; else if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; else if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; else idx = -1; } if (idx == -1) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return idx; } CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s) { CERT *c; int i; c = s->cert; if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) return NULL; ssl_set_masks(s); i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); /* This may or may not be an error. */ if (i < 0) return NULL; /* May be NULL. */ return &c->pkeys[i]; } EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) { unsigned long alg_a; CERT *c; int idx = -1; alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c = s->cert; if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; if (idx == -1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (NULL); } if (pmd) *pmd = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; } int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, size_t *serverinfo_length) { CERT *c = NULL; int i = 0; *serverinfo_length = 0; c = s->cert; i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); if (i == -1) return 0; if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) return 0; *serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo; *serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; return 1; } void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { int i; /* * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session)) && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session); if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); } } } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->method; } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return (s->method); } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { int ret = 1; if (s->method != meth) { const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method; int (*hf) (SSL *) = s->handshake_func; if (sm->version == meth->version) s->method = meth; else { sm->ssl_free(s); s->method = meth; ret = s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (hf == sm->ssl_connect) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; else if (hf == sm->ssl_accept) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; } return (ret); } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return (SSL_ERROR_NONE); /* * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, * where we do encode the error */ if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); else return (SSL_ERROR_SSL); } if (i < 0) { if (SSL_want_read(s)) { bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) /* * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it * might be safer to keep it. */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } } if (SSL_want_write(s)) { /* * Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if * present */ bio = s->wbio; if (BIO_should_write(bio)) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) /* * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); } if (SSL_want_async(s)) { return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC; } if (SSL_want_async_job(s)) { return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB; } } if (i == 0) { if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } static int ssl_do_handshake_intern(void *vargs) { struct ssl_async_args *args; SSL *s; args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs; s = args->s; return s->handshake_func(s); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret = 1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return -1; } s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_do_handshake_intern); } else { ret = s->handshake_func(s); } } return ret; } void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 1; s->shutdown = 0; ossl_statem_clear(s); s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; clear_ciphers(s); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 0; s->shutdown = 0; ossl_statem_clear(s); s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; clear_ciphers(s); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { return (0); } const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (NULL); } const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version) { if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION) return "TLSv1.2"; else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION) return "TLSv1.1"; else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) return "TLSv1"; else if (version == SSL3_VERSION) return "SSLv3"; else if (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) return "DTLSv0.9"; else if (version == DTLS1_VERSION) return "DTLSv1"; else if (version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) return "DTLSv1.2"; else return ("unknown"); } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { return ssl_protocol_to_string(s->version); } SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; X509_NAME *xn; SSL *ret; int i; /* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) { CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock); return s; } /* * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set. */ if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return (NULL); if (s->session != NULL) { /* * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref. This "copies" * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s)) goto err; } else { /* * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both * point to the same object, and thus we can't use * SSL_copy_session_id. */ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ret, s->method)) goto err; if (s->cert != NULL) { ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; } if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) goto err; } if (!ssl_dane_dup(ret, s)) goto err; ret->version = s->version; ret->options = s->options; ret->mode = s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ if (s->rbio != NULL) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio)) goto err; } if (s->wbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio)) goto err; } else { BIO_up_ref(ret->rbio); ret->wbio = ret->rbio; } } ret->server = s->server; if (s->handshake_func) { if (s->server) SSL_set_accept_state(ret); else SSL_set_connect_state(ret); } ret->shutdown = s->shutdown; ret->hit = s->hit; ret->default_passwd_callback = s->default_passwd_callback; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = s->default_passwd_callback_userdata; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) goto err; } if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) == NULL) goto err; /* Dup the client_CA list */ if (s->client_CA != NULL) { if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; ret->client_CA = sk; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) { X509_NAME_free(xn); goto err; } } } return ret; err: SSL_free(ret); return NULL; } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand = NULL; COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress = NULL; #endif } X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->x509); else return (NULL); } EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->privatekey); else return (NULL); } X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->x509; else return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; else return NULL; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return (s->session->cipher); return (NULL); } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return s->compress ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->compress) : NULL; #else return NULL; #endif } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return s->expand ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->expand) : NULL; #else return NULL; #endif } int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* Already buffered. */ return 1; } bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL || !BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { BIO_free(bbio); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } s->bbio = bbio; s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); return 1; } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { /* callers ensure s is never null */ if (s->bbio == NULL) return; s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); assert(s->wbio != NULL); BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return (s->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return s->shutdown; } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return s->version; } int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s) { return s->client_version; } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; } SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) { CERT *new_cert; if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->session_ctx; new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (new_cert == NULL) { return NULL; } if (!custom_exts_copy_flags(&new_cert->srv_ext, &ssl->cert->srv_ext)) { ssl_cert_free(new_cert); return NULL; } ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); ssl->cert = new_cert; /* * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. */ OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); /* * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), * leave it unchanged. */ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) { ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); } SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return ssl->ctx; } int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); } int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx) { X509_LOOKUP *lookup; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) return 0; X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); /* Clear any errors if the default directory does not exist */ ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx) { X509_LOOKUP *lookup; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) return 0; X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); /* Clear any errors if the default file does not exist */ ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath)); } void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { ssl->info_callback = cb; } /* * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function * pointer. */ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ , int /* type */ , int /* val */ ) { return ssl->info_callback; } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) { ssl->verify_result = arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->verify_result); } size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { if (outlen == 0) return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, outlen); return outlen; } size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { if (outlen == 0) return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, outlen); return outlen; } size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { if (session->master_key_length < 0) { /* Should never happen */ return 0; } if (outlen == 0) return session->master_key_length; if (outlen > (size_t)session->master_key_length) outlen = session->master_key_length; memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen); return outlen; } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int ssl_ok(SSL *s) { return (1); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->cert_store); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store = store; } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return (s->rwstate); } /** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint); if (ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) { if (s == NULL) return 0; if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { s->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint); if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else s->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return (s->session->psk_identity_hint); } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return (s->session->psk_identity); } void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_server_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; } #endif void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } /* * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer * variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any. * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this |md|. * Returns the newly allocated ctx; */ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) { ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash); *hash = NULL; return NULL; } return *hash; } void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash); *hash = NULL; } /* Retrieve handshake hashes */ int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst; int ret = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hdgst); if (ret < 0 || ret > outlen) { ret = 0; goto err; } ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ret = 0; goto err; } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, hdgst) || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL) <= 0) ret = 0; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int SSL_session_reused(SSL *s) { return s->hit; } int SSL_is_server(const SSL *s) { return s->server; } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) { /* Old function was do-nothing anyway... */ (void)s; (void)debug; } #endif void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level) { s->cert->sec_level = level; } int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s) { return s->cert->sec_level; } void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s, int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)) { s->cert->sec_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { return s->cert->sec_cb; } void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex) { s->cert->sec_ex = ex; } void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s) { return s->cert->sec_ex; } void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level) { ctx->cert->sec_level = level; } int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert->sec_level; } void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)) { ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { return ctx->cert->sec_cb; } void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex) { ctx->cert->sec_ex = ex; } void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert->sec_ex; } /* * Get/Set/Clear options in SSL_CTX or SSL, formerly macros, now functions that * can return unsigned long, instead of the generic long return value from the * control interface. */ unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL *s) { return s->options; } unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options |= op; } unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options |= op; } unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options &= ~op; } unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options &= ~op; } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s) { return s->verified_chain; } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * Moves SCTs from the |src| stack to the |dst| stack. * The source of each SCT will be set to |origin|. * If |dst| points to a NULL pointer, a new stack will be created and owned by * the caller. * Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs. */ static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, sct_source_t origin) { int scts_moved = 0; SCT *sct = NULL; if (*dst == NULL) { *dst = sk_SCT_new_null(); if (*dst == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(src)) != NULL) { if (SCT_set_source(sct, origin) != 1) goto err; if (sk_SCT_push(*dst, sct) <= 0) goto err; scts_moved += 1; } return scts_moved; err: if (sct != NULL) sk_SCT_push(src, sct); /* Put the SCT back */ return -1; } /* * Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found. * Returns the number of SCTs extracted. */ static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s) { int scts_extracted = 0; if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { const unsigned char *p = s->tlsext_scts; STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_scts_len); scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION); SCT_LIST_free(scts); } return scts_extracted; } /* * Checks for an OCSP response and then attempts to extract any SCTs found if it * contains an SCT X509 extension. They will be stored in |s->scts|. * Returns: * - The number of SCTs extracted, assuming an OCSP response exists. * - 0 if no OCSP response exists or it contains no SCTs. * - A negative integer if an error occurs. */ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int scts_extracted = 0; const unsigned char *p; OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL; int i; if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL || s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen == 0) goto err; p = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp; rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); if (rsp == NULL) goto err; br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp); if (br == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) { OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i); if (single == NULL) continue; scts = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL); scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE); if (scts_extracted < 0) goto err; } err: SCT_LIST_free(scts); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return scts_extracted; # else /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */ return 0; # endif } /* * Attempts to extract SCTs from the peer certificate. * Return the number of SCTs extracted, or a negative integer if an error * occurs. */ static int ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(SSL *s) { int scts_extracted = 0; X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL; if (cert != NULL) { STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, NULL, NULL); scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION); SCT_LIST_free(scts); } return scts_extracted; } /* * Attempts to find all received SCTs by checking TLS extensions, the OCSP * response (if it exists) and X509v3 extensions in the certificate. * Returns NULL if an error occurs. */ const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s) { if (!s->scts_parsed) { if (ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(s) < 0 || ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(s) < 0 || ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(s) < 0) goto err; s->scts_parsed = 1; } return s->scts; err: return NULL; } static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { return 1; } static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); int status = SCT_get_validation_status(sct); if (status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID) return 1; } SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_STRICT, SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS); return 0; } int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg) { /* * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look * for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; } if (callback != NULL) { /* * If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP */ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) return 0; } s->ct_validation_callback = callback; s->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg; return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg) { /* * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for * this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; } ctx->ct_validation_callback = callback; ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg; return 1; } int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s) { return s->ct_validation_callback != NULL; } int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->ct_validation_callback != NULL; } int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) { int ret = 0; X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL; X509 *issuer; SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = NULL; const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts; /* * If no callback is set, the peer is anonymous, or its chain is invalid, * skip SCT validation - just return success. Applications that continue * handshakes without certificates, with unverified chains, or pinned leaf * certificates are outside the scope of the WebPKI and CT. * * The above exclusions notwithstanding the vast majority of peers will * have rather ordinary certificate chains validated by typical * applications that perform certificate verification and therefore will * process SCTs when enabled. */ if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK || s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1) return 1; /* * CT not applicable for chains validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) * trust-anchors. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-4.2 */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mtlsa != NULL) { switch (dane->mtlsa->usage) { case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA: case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE: return 1; } } ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } issuer = sk_X509_value(s->verified_chain, 1); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time( ctx, (uint64_t)SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_get0_session(s)) * 1000); scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s); /* * This function returns success (> 0) only when all the SCTs are valid, 0 * when some are invalid, and < 0 on various internal errors (out of * memory, etc.). Having some, or even all, invalid SCTs is not sufficient * reason to abort the handshake, that decision is up to the callback. * Therefore, we error out only in the unexpected case that the return * value is negative. * * XXX: One might well argue that the return value of this function is an * unfortunate design choice. Its job is only to determine the validation * status of each of the provided SCTs. So long as it correctly separates * the wheat from the chaff it should return success. Failure in this case * ought to correspond to an inability to carry out its duties. */ if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, ctx) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED); goto end; } ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg); if (ret < 0) ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */ end: CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx); /* * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a * failure return code here. Also the application may wish the complete * the handshake, and then disconnect cleanly at a higher layer, after * checking the verification status of the completed connection. * * We therefore force a certificate verification failure which will be * visible via SSL_get_verify_result() and cached as part of any resumed * session. * * Note: the permissive callback is for information gathering only, always * returns success, and does not affect verification status. Only the * strict callback or a custom application-specified callback can trigger * connection failure or record a verification error. */ if (ret <= 0) s->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS; return ret; } int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode) { switch (validation_mode) { default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE); return 0; case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_permissive, NULL); case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_strict, NULL); } } int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode) { switch (validation_mode) { default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE); return 0; case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_permissive, NULL); case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_strict, NULL); } } int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(ctx->ctlog_store); } int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path) { return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path); } void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE * logs) { CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store); ctx->ctlog_store = logs; } const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->ctlog_store; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_ciph.c0000644000000000000000000017067713176625661014651 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" #define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 #define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 #define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 #define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 #define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 #define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 #define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 #define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 #define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 #define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 #define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 #define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 #define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 #define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 #define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 #define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 #define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 #define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 #define SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 #define SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 #define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 20 /* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */ typedef struct { uint32_t mask; int nid; } ssl_cipher_table; /* Table of NIDs for each cipher */ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */ {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */ {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */ {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */ {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */ {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */ {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */ {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */ {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */ {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */ {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */ {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */ {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */ {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */ {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */ {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */ {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */ {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */ {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX */ {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, }; static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; #define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0 #define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1 #define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2 static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_load_builtin_comp_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; #endif /* * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined * in the ssl_locl.h */ #define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST /* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */ {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */ {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */ {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ {0, NID_sha512} /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ }; static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; /* *INDENT-OFF* */ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost} }; static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null} }; /* *INDENT-ON* */ /* Utility function for table lookup */ static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table, size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) { if (table->mask == mask) return i; } return -1; } #define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \ ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x) /* * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is * found */ static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, /* GOST2012_512 */ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, }; static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]; #define CIPHER_ADD 1 #define CIPHER_KILL 2 #define CIPHER_DEL 3 #define CIPHER_ORD 4 #define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 /* * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list. * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API. */ #define CIPHER_BUMP 6 typedef struct cipher_order_st { const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; int active; int dead; struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; } CIPHER_ORDER; static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL}, /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, /* * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in * ALL!) */ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT}, /* * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */ {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, 0, SSL_kDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, 0, SSL_kSRP}, {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, 0, SSL_kGOST}, /* server authentication aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01}, {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12}, {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12}, {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP}, /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_PSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, 0, SSL_kSRP}, /* symmetric encryption aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES}, {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4}, {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2}, {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA}, {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED}, {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128}, {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256}, {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA}, {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20}, /* MAC aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256}, /* protocol version aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION}, {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, {0, "TLSv1.0", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION}, /* strength classes */ {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW}, {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM}, {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH}, /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS}, /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */ {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, }; /* * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if * it is available. Otherwise return 0 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth) > 0) { return pkey_id; } return 0; } #else static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); if (ameth) { if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth) <= 0) pkey_id = 0; } ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); return pkey_id; } #endif /* masks of disabled algorithms */ static uint32_t disabled_enc_mask; static uint32_t disabled_mac_mask; static uint32_t disabled_mkey_mask; static uint32_t disabled_auth_mask; void ssl_load_ciphers(void) { size_t i; const ssl_cipher_table *t; disabled_enc_mask = 0; ssl_sort_cipher_list(); for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { if (t->nid == NID_undef) { ssl_cipher_methods[i] = NULL; } else { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(t->nid); ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher; if (cipher == NULL) disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask; } } #ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL disabled_enc_mask |= SSL_eNULL; #endif disabled_mac_mask = 0; for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(t->nid); ssl_digest_methods[i] = md; if (md == NULL) { disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask; } else { ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = EVP_MD_size(md); OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[i] >= 0); } } /* Make sure we can access MD5 and SHA1 */ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL); OPENSSL_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL); disabled_mkey_mask = 0; disabled_auth_mask = 0; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK; disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aRSA; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHEPSK; disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK; disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP; #endif /* * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange */ ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac"); if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) { ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; } else { disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; } ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12"); if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) { ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; } else { disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12; } if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12; if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_256")) disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_512")) disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; /* * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * */ if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b) { return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id); } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_load_builtin_compressions) { SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; COMP_METHOD *method = COMP_zlib(); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp); if (COMP_get_type(method) != NID_undef && ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); if (comp != NULL) { comp->method = method; comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX; comp->name = COMP_get_name(method); sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp); sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); } } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); return 1; } static int load_builtin_compressions(void) { return RUN_ONCE(&ssl_load_builtin_comp_once, do_load_builtin_compressions); } #endif int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm) { int i; const SSL_CIPHER *c; c = s->cipher; if (c == NULL) return (0); if (comp != NULL) { SSL_COMP ctmp; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (!load_builtin_compressions()) { /* * Currently don't care, since a failure only means that * ssl_comp_methods is NULL, which is perfectly OK */ } #endif *comp = NULL; ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp); if (i >= 0) *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i); else *comp = NULL; } /* If were only interested in comp then return success */ if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL)) return 1; } if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) return 0; i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); if (i == -1) *enc = NULL; else { if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) *enc = EVP_enc_null(); else *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i]; } i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); if (i == -1) { *md = NULL; if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; if (mac_secret_size != NULL) *mac_secret_size = 0; if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) mac_pkey_type = NULL; } else { *md = ssl_digest_methods[i]; if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; if (mac_secret_size != NULL) *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; } if ((*enc != NULL) && (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { const EVP_CIPHER *evp; if (use_etm) return 1; if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR || s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) return 1; if (FIPS_mode()) return 1; if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; return (1); } else return (0); } const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx) { idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) return NULL; return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; } const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s) { return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s)); } const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s) { return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT); } #define ITEM_SEP(a) \ (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, CIPHER_ORDER **tail) { if (curr == *tail) return; if (curr == *head) *head = curr->next; if (curr->prev != NULL) curr->prev->next = curr->next; if (curr->next != NULL) curr->next->prev = curr->prev; (*tail)->next = curr; curr->prev = *tail; curr->next = NULL; *tail = curr; } static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, CIPHER_ORDER **tail) { if (curr == *head) return; if (curr == *tail) *tail = curr->prev; if (curr->next != NULL) curr->next->prev = curr->prev; if (curr->prev != NULL) curr->prev->next = curr->next; (*head)->prev = curr; curr->next = *head; curr->prev = NULL; *head = curr; } static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, int num_of_ciphers, uint32_t disabled_mkey, uint32_t disabled_auth, uint32_t disabled_enc, uint32_t disabled_mac, CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { int i, co_list_num; const SSL_CIPHER *c; /* * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num * entries. */ /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ if (c == NULL || !c->valid) continue; if (FIPS_mode() && (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) continue; if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) || (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) || (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) || (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac)) continue; if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) && c->min_tls == 0) continue; if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) && c->min_dtls == 0) continue; co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; co_list_num++; /* * if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err; */ } /* * Prepare linked list from list entries */ if (co_list_num > 0) { co_list[0].prev = NULL; if (co_list_num > 1) { co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; } co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; } co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; *head_p = &co_list[0]; *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; } } static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, int num_of_group_aliases, uint32_t disabled_mkey, uint32_t disabled_auth, uint32_t disabled_enc, uint32_t disabled_mac, CIPHER_ORDER *head) { CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; int i; uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; /* * First, add the real ciphers as already collected */ ciph_curr = head; ca_curr = ca_list; while (ciph_curr != NULL) { *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; ca_curr++; ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; } /* * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). */ for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; if (algorithm_mkey) if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) continue; if (algorithm_auth) if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) continue; if (algorithm_enc) if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) continue; if (algorithm_mac) if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) continue; *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); ca_curr++; } *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ } static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc, uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls, uint32_t algo_strength, int rule, int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; const SSL_CIPHER *cp; int reverse = 0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n", rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, algo_strength, strength_bits); #endif if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently * deleted ciphers */ head = *head_p; tail = *tail_p; if (reverse) { next = tail; last = head; } else { next = head; last = tail; } curr = NULL; for (;;) { if (curr == last) break; curr = next; if (curr == NULL) break; next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; cp = curr->cipher; /* * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits * or the algorithms used. */ if (strength_bits >= 0) { if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) continue; } else { #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->min_tls, cp->algo_strength); #endif if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) continue; if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) continue; if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) continue; if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) continue; if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls)) continue; if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) continue; if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) continue; } #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule); #endif /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { /* reverse == 0 */ if (!curr->active) { ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); curr->active = 1; } } /* Move the added cipher to this location */ else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { /* reverse == 0 */ if (curr->active) { ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); } } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { /* reverse == 1 */ if (curr->active) { /* * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works * in reverse to maintain the order) */ ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); curr->active = 0; } } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) { if (curr->active) ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { /* reverse == 0 */ if (head == curr) head = curr->next; else curr->prev->next = curr->next; if (tail == curr) tail = curr->prev; curr->active = 0; if (curr->next != NULL) curr->next->prev = curr->prev; if (curr->prev != NULL) curr->prev->next = curr->next; curr->next = NULL; curr->prev = NULL; } } *head_p = head; *tail_p = tail; } static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { int32_t max_strength_bits; int i, *number_uses; CIPHER_ORDER *curr; /* * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. */ max_strength_bits = 0; curr = *head_p; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; curr = curr->next; } number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1)); if (number_uses == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } /* * Now find the strength_bits values actually used */ curr = *head_p; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->active) number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; curr = curr->next; } /* * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending * order. */ for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) if (number_uses[i] > 0) ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, tail_p); OPENSSL_free(number_uses); return (1); } static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c) { uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength; int min_tls; const char *l, *buf; int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; uint32_t cipher_id = 0; char ch; retval = 1; l = rule_str; for (;;) { ch = *l; if (ch == '\0') break; /* done */ if (ch == '-') { rule = CIPHER_DEL; l++; } else if (ch == '+') { rule = CIPHER_ORD; l++; } else if (ch == '!') { rule = CIPHER_KILL; l++; } else if (ch == '@') { rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; l++; } else { rule = CIPHER_ADD; } if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { l++; continue; } alg_mkey = 0; alg_auth = 0; alg_enc = 0; alg_mac = 0; min_tls = 0; algo_strength = 0; for (;;) { ch = *l; buf = l; buflen = 0; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) #else while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) #endif { ch = *(++l); buflen++; } if (buflen == 0) { /* * We hit something we cannot deal with, * it is no command or separator nor * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); retval = found = 0; l++; break; } if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ break; /* special treatment */ } /* check for multi-part specification */ if (ch == '+') { multi = 1; l++; } else multi = 0; /* * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. * So additionally check whether the cipher name found * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) */ j = found = 0; cipher_id = 0; while (ca_list[j]) { if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0 && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { found = 1; break; } else j++; } if (!found) break; /* ignore this entry */ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { if (alg_mkey) { alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; if (!alg_mkey) { found = 0; break; } } else alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; } if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { if (alg_auth) { alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; if (!alg_auth) { found = 0; break; } } else alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; } if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { if (alg_enc) { alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; if (!alg_enc) { found = 0; break; } } else alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; } if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { if (alg_mac) { alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; if (!alg_mac) { found = 0; break; } } else alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; } if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { found = 0; break; } } else algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; } if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) { found = 0; break; } } else algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; } if (ca_list[j]->valid) { /* * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not * become part of the search pattern! */ cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; } else { /* * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern */ if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) { if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) { found = 0; break; } else { min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls; } } } if (!multi) break; } /* * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it */ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ ok = 0; if ((buflen == 8) && strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) == 0) ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); else if (buflen == 10 && strncmp(buf, "SECLEVEL=", 9) == 0) { int level = buf[9] - '0'; if (level < 0 || level > 5) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); } else { c->sec_level = level; ok = 1; } } else SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); if (ok == 0) retval = 0; /* * We do not support any "multi" options * together with "@", so throw away the * rest of the command, if any left, until * end or ':' is found. */ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) l++; } else if (found) { ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, tail_p); } else { while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) l++; } if (*l == '\0') break; /* done */ } return (retval); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, const char **prule_str) { unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) { suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) { suiteb_comb2 = 1; suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) { suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) { suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; } if (suiteb_flags) { c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; } else suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; if (!suiteb_flags) return 1; /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); return 0; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC switch (suiteb_flags) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: if (suiteb_comb2) *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; else *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; break; } return 1; # else SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); return 0; # endif } #endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, const char *rule_str, CERT *c) { int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases; uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list; const char *rule_p; CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; /* * Return with error if nothing to do. */ if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) return NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) return NULL; #endif /* * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. */ disabled_mkey = disabled_mkey_mask; disabled_auth = disabled_auth_mask; disabled_enc = disabled_enc_mask; disabled_mac = disabled_mac_mask; /* * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so * it is used for allocation. */ num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers); if (co_list == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); /* Failure */ } ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ /* * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key * exchange mechanisms. * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client * preference). */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); /* * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by * strength. */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); /* Low priority for MD5 */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); /* * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); /* * ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, * &head, &tail); */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); /* * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains * in force within each class */ if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); return NULL; } /* * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs. * TODO(openssl-team): is there an easier way to accomplish all this? */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); /* * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order: * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest. * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous * preference, i.e., * 1) ECDHE > DHE * 2) GCM > CHACHA * 3) AES > rest * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy * * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in * reverse order of preference. */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); /* * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). */ num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases); num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max); if (ca_list == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); /* Failure */ } ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, head); /* * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. */ ok = 1; rule_p = rule_str; if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); rule_p += 7; if (*rule_p == ':') rule_p++; } if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0)) ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ OPENSSL_free(co_list); return (NULL); } /* * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error * if we cannot get one. */ if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); return (NULL); } /* * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). */ for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { if (curr->active && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); return NULL; } #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); #endif } } OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); return NULL; } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); *cipher_list = cipherstack; if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); return (cipherstack); } char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) { const char *ver; const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; if (buf == NULL) { len = 128; buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (buf == NULL) return NULL; } else if (len < 128) return NULL; alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls); switch (alg_mkey) { case SSL_kRSA: kx = "RSA"; break; case SSL_kDHE: kx = "DH"; break; case SSL_kECDHE: kx = "ECDH"; break; case SSL_kPSK: kx = "PSK"; break; case SSL_kRSAPSK: kx = "RSAPSK"; break; case SSL_kECDHEPSK: kx = "ECDHEPSK"; break; case SSL_kDHEPSK: kx = "DHEPSK"; break; case SSL_kSRP: kx = "SRP"; break; case SSL_kGOST: kx = "GOST"; break; default: kx = "unknown"; } switch (alg_auth) { case SSL_aRSA: au = "RSA"; break; case SSL_aDSS: au = "DSS"; break; case SSL_aNULL: au = "None"; break; case SSL_aECDSA: au = "ECDSA"; break; case SSL_aPSK: au = "PSK"; break; case SSL_aSRP: au = "SRP"; break; case SSL_aGOST01: au = "GOST01"; break; /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */ case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01): au = "GOST12"; break; default: au = "unknown"; break; } switch (alg_enc) { case SSL_DES: enc = "DES(56)"; break; case SSL_3DES: enc = "3DES(168)"; break; case SSL_RC4: enc = "RC4(128)"; break; case SSL_RC2: enc = "RC2(128)"; break; case SSL_IDEA: enc = "IDEA(128)"; break; case SSL_eNULL: enc = "None"; break; case SSL_AES128: enc = "AES(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256: enc = "AES(256)"; break; case SSL_AES128GCM: enc = "AESGCM(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256GCM: enc = "AESGCM(256)"; break; case SSL_AES128CCM: enc = "AESCCM(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256CCM: enc = "AESCCM(256)"; break; case SSL_AES128CCM8: enc = "AESCCM8(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256CCM8: enc = "AESCCM8(256)"; break; case SSL_CAMELLIA128: enc = "Camellia(128)"; break; case SSL_CAMELLIA256: enc = "Camellia(256)"; break; case SSL_SEED: enc = "SEED(128)"; break; case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12: enc = "GOST89(256)"; break; case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)"; break; default: enc = "unknown"; break; } switch (alg_mac) { case SSL_MD5: mac = "MD5"; break; case SSL_SHA1: mac = "SHA1"; break; case SSL_SHA256: mac = "SHA256"; break; case SSL_SHA384: mac = "SHA384"; break; case SSL_AEAD: mac = "AEAD"; break; case SSL_GOST89MAC: case SSL_GOST89MAC12: mac = "GOST89"; break; case SSL_GOST94: mac = "GOST94"; break; case SSL_GOST12_256: case SSL_GOST12_512: mac = "GOST2012"; break; default: mac = "unknown"; break; } BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); return (buf); } const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { if (c == NULL) return "(NONE)"; /* * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0". */ if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION) return "TLSv1.0"; return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls); } /* return the actual cipher being used */ const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { if (c != NULL) return (c->name); return ("(NONE)"); } /* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) { int ret = 0; if (c != NULL) { if (alg_bits != NULL) *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; ret = (int)c->strength_bits; } return ret; } uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return c->id; } SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) { SSL_COMP *ctmp; int i, nn; if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) return (NULL); nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk); for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) { ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); if (ctmp->id == n) return (ctmp); } return (NULL); } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; } STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *meths) { return meths; } int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; } #else STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { load_builtin_compressions(); return (ssl_comp_methods); } STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *meths) { STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; ssl_comp_methods = meths; return old_meths; } static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm) { OPENSSL_free(cm); } void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void) { STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; ssl_comp_methods = NULL; sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free); } int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { SSL_COMP *comp; if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef) return 1; /*- * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the * compression number ranges should be the following: * * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA * 193 to 255: reserved for private use */ if (id < 193 || id > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); return 1; } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); if (comp == NULL) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (1); } comp->id = id; comp->method = cm; load_builtin_compressions(); if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { OPENSSL_free(comp); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); return (1); } if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { OPENSSL_free(comp); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (1); } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); return (0); } #endif const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL; #else return NULL; #endif } const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return comp->name; #else return NULL; #endif } int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return comp->id; #else return -1; #endif } /* For a cipher return the index corresponding to the certificate type */ int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { uint32_t alg_a; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) return SSL_PKEY_ECC; else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) return SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC; else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; return -1; } const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); if (c == NULL || c->valid == 0) return NULL; return c; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) { return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); } int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i; if (c == NULL) return NID_undef; i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid; } int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid; } int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid; } int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid; } int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/t1_enc.c0000644000000000000000000005341313176625661014202 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include /* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out, int olen) { const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s); EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; int ret = 0; size_t outlen = olen; if (md == NULL) { /* Should never happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, slen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, seed1_len) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, seed2_len) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, seed3_len) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed4, seed4_len) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed5, seed5_len) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return ret; } static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num) { int ret; ret = tls1_PRF(s, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, km, num); return ret; } int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) { unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; const EVP_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const SSL_COMP *comp; #endif const EVP_MD *m; int mac_type; int *mac_secret_size; EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; EVP_PKEY *mac_key; int n, i, j, k, cl; int reuse_dd = 0; c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression; #endif if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { if (s->tlsext_use_etm) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; else s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; else s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) reuse_dd = 1; else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; else /* * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx); dd = s->enc_read_ctx; mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); if (mac_ctx == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand = NULL; if (comp != NULL) { s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); if (s->expand == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); goto err2; } } #endif /* * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); } else { if (s->tlsext_use_etm) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; else s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; else s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) reuse_dd = 1; else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; dd = s->enc_write_ctx; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mac_ctx == NULL) goto err; s->write_hash = mac_ctx; } else { mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); if (mac_ctx == NULL) goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress = NULL; if (comp != NULL) { s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); if (s->compress == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); goto err2; } } #endif /* * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); } if (reuse_dd) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd); p = s->s3->tmp.key_block; i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); j = cl; /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) k = EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; else k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { ms = &(p[0]); n = i + i; key = &(p[n]); n += j + j; iv = &(p[n]); n += k + k; } else { n = i; ms = &(p[n]); n += i + j; key = &(p[n]); n += j + k; iv = &(p[n]); n += k; } if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i); if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); if (mac_key == NULL || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which); { int z; for (z = 0; z < i; z++) printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } #endif if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { int taglen; if (s->s3->tmp. new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) taglen = 8; else taglen = 16; if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL) || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL) || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv) || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } } else { if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } } /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which); { int z; for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\niv="); { int z; for (z = 0; z < k; z++) printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2)); return (1); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2)); return (0); } int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; const EVP_CIPHER *c; const EVP_MD *hash; int num; SSL_COMP *comp; int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; int ret = 0; if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) return (1); if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp, s->tlsext_use_etm)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); return (0); } s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c; s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash; s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); num *= 2; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num; s->s3->tmp.key_block = p; #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("client random\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("server random\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("master key\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } #endif if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) goto err; #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("\nkey block\n"); { int z; for (z = 0; z < num; z++) printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } #endif if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { /* * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; #endif } } ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) { int hashlen; unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) return 0; hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash)); if (hashlen == 0) return 0; if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, out, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH)) return 0; OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen); return TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; } int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len) { if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int hashlen; /* * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify) */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) return -1; hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash)); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen); #endif tls1_PRF(s, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen); } else { tls1_PRF(s, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); #endif return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); } int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { unsigned char *val = NULL; size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos; int rv; /* * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label. */ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; if (use_context) { vallen += 2 + contextlen; } val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); if (val == NULL) goto err2; currentvalpos = 0; memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen); currentvalpos += llen; memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; if (use_context) { val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; currentvalpos++; val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; currentvalpos++; if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); } } /* * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow */ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; rv = tls1_PRF(s, val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, out, olen); goto ret; err1: SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); rv = 0; goto ret; err2: SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); rv = 0; ret: OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen); return (rv); } int tls1_alert_code(int code) { switch (code) { case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return (-1); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: return (TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); default: return (-1); } } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_stat.c0000644000000000000000000002577313176625661014675 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) return "error"; switch (SSL_get_state(s)) { case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return "SSLv3/TLS read certificate status"; case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: return "SSLv3/TLS write next proto"; case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: return "SSLv3/TLS read next proto"; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate status"; case TLS_ST_BEFORE: return "before SSL initialization"; case TLS_ST_OK: return "SSL negotiation finished successfully"; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: return "SSLv3/TLS write client hello"; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return "SSLv3/TLS read server hello"; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return "SSLv3/TLS read server certificate"; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return "SSLv3/TLS read server key exchange"; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return "SSLv3/TLS read server certificate request"; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return "SSLv3/TLS read server session ticket"; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return "SSLv3/TLS read server done"; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: return "SSLv3/TLS write client certificate"; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: return "SSLv3/TLS write client key exchange"; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate verify"; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: return "SSLv3/TLS write change cipher spec"; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: return "SSLv3/TLS write finished"; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: return "SSLv3/TLS read change cipher spec"; case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return "SSLv3/TLS read finished"; case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return "SSLv3/TLS read client hello"; case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: return "SSLv3/TLS write hello request"; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: return "SSLv3/TLS write server hello"; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate"; case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: return "SSLv3/TLS write key exchange"; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: return "SSLv3/TLS write certificate request"; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: return "SSLv3/TLS write session ticket"; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: return "SSLv3/TLS write server done"; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return "SSLv3/TLS read client certificate"; case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return "SSLv3/TLS read client key exchange"; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: return "SSLv3/TLS read certificate verify"; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return "DTLS1 read hello verify request"; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return "DTLS1 write hello verify request"; default: return "unknown state"; } } const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) return "SSLERR"; switch (SSL_get_state(s)) { case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: return "TRNP"; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: return "TWST"; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: return "TWCS"; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return "TRCS"; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return "TRST"; case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: return "TWNP"; case TLS_ST_BEFORE: return "PINIT "; case TLS_ST_OK: return "SSLOK "; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: return "TWCH"; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return "TRSH"; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return "TRSC"; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return "TRSKE"; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return "TRCR"; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return "TRSD"; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: return "TWCC"; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: return "TWCKE"; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: return "TWCV"; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: return "TWCCS"; case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: return "TWFIN"; case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: return "TRCCS"; case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return "TRFIN"; case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: return "TWHR"; case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return "TRCH"; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: return "TWSH"; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: return "TWSC"; case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: return "TWSKE"; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: return "TWCR"; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: return "TWSD"; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return "TRCC"; case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return "TRCKE"; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: return "TRCV"; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return "DRCHV"; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return "DWCHV"; default: return "UNKWN "; } } const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value) { switch (value >> 8) { case SSL3_AL_WARNING: return "warning"; case SSL3_AL_FATAL: return "fatal"; default: return "unknown"; } } const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value) { switch (value >> 8) { case SSL3_AL_WARNING: return "W"; case SSL3_AL_FATAL: return "F"; default: return "U"; } } const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value) { switch (value & 0xff) { case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return "CN"; case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return "UM"; case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return "BM"; case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: return "DF"; case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return "HF"; case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return "NC"; case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return "BC"; case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: return "UC"; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: return "CR"; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: return "CE"; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: return "CU"; case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return "IP"; case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return "DC"; case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return "RO"; case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return "CA"; case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return "AD"; case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return "DE"; case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return "CY"; case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return "ER"; case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return "PV"; case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: return "IS"; case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return "IE"; case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return "US"; case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return "NR"; case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return "UE"; case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return "CO"; case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return "UN"; case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return "BR"; case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return "BH"; case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: return "UP"; default: return "UK"; } } const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value) { switch (value & 0xff) { case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return "close notify"; case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return "unexpected_message"; case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return "bad record mac"; case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: return "decompression failure"; case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return "handshake failure"; case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return "no certificate"; case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return "bad certificate"; case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: return "unsupported certificate"; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: return "certificate revoked"; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: return "certificate expired"; case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: return "certificate unknown"; case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return "illegal parameter"; case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return "decryption failed"; case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return "record overflow"; case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return "unknown CA"; case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return "access denied"; case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return "decode error"; case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return "decrypt error"; case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return "export restriction"; case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return "protocol version"; case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: return "insufficient security"; case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return "internal error"; case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return "user canceled"; case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return "no renegotiation"; case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return "unsupported extension"; case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return "certificate unobtainable"; case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return "unrecognized name"; case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return "bad certificate status response"; case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return "bad certificate hash value"; case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: return "unknown PSK identity"; case TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: return "no application protocol"; default: return "unknown"; } } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/build.info0000644000000000000000000000122113176625661014627 0ustar rootrootLIBS=../libssl SOURCE[../libssl]=\ pqueue.c \ statem/statem_srvr.c statem/statem_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c record/rec_layer_s3.c \ statem/statem_lib.c s3_cbc.c s3_msg.c \ methods.c t1_lib.c t1_enc.c t1_ext.c \ d1_lib.c record/rec_layer_d1.c d1_msg.c \ statem/statem_dtls.c d1_srtp.c \ ssl_lib.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \ ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \ ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_init.c ssl_conf.c ssl_mcnf.c \ bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c t1_reneg.c tls_srp.c t1_trce.c ssl_utst.c \ record/ssl3_buffer.c record/ssl3_record.c record/dtls1_bitmap.c \ statem/statem.c openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/t1_lib.c0000644000000000000000000041501013176625661014176 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \ (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val)) static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess); static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, 0, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; long tls1_default_timeout(void) { /* * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for * http, the cache would over fill */ return (60 * 60 * 2); } int tls1_new(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_new(s)) return (0); s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); } void tls1_free(SSL *s) { OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); ssl3_free(s); } void tls1_clear(SSL *s) { ssl3_clear(s); if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION; else s->version = s->method->version; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC typedef struct { int nid; /* Curve NID */ int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */ unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */ } tls_curve_info; /* * Table of curve information. * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id. */ static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */ {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */ {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */ {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */ {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */ {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */ {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */ {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */ {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */ {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */ {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */ {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */ {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */ {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */ {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */ {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */ {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */ {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */ {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */ {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */ {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */ {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */ {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */ {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */ {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */ {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */ }; static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 }; /* The default curves */ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = { 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ }; static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 }; int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags) { const tls_curve_info *cinfo; /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))) return 0; cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1; if (pflags) *pflags = cinfo->flags; return cinfo->nid; } int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) { if (nid_list[i].nid == nid) return i + 1; } return 0; } /* * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise * preferred list. * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such * lists in the first place. * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) */ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves) { size_t pcurveslen = 0; if (sess) { *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } else { /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: *pcurves = suiteb_curves; pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: *pcurves = suiteb_curves; pcurveslen = 2; break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; pcurveslen = 2; break; default: *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } if (!*pcurves) { *pcurves = eccurves_default; pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default); } } /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ if (pcurveslen & 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *num_curves = 0; return 0; } *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; return 1; } /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */ static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op) { const tls_curve_info *cinfo; if (curve[0]) return 1; if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))) return 0; cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1]; # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2) return 0; # endif return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve); } /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { const unsigned char *curves; size_t num_curves, i; unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) return 0; /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ if (suiteb_flags) { unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; if (p[1]) return 0; if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) return 0; } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) return 0; } else /* Should never happen */ return 0; } if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK); } return 0; } /*- * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef * if there is no match. * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. */ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) { const unsigned char *pref, *supp; size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; int k; /* Can't do anything on client side */ if (s->server == 0) return -1; if (nmatch == -2) { if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { /* * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know * these are acceptable due to previous checks. */ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ /* Should never happen */ return NID_undef; } /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ nmatch = 0; } /* * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int * but s->options is a long... */ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, &num_supp)) /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0, &pref, &num_pref)) return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED)) continue; if (nmatch == k) { int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL); } k++; } } } if (nmatch == -1) return k; /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ return NID_undef; } int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, int *curves, size_t ncurves) { unsigned char *clist, *p; size_t i; /* * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve * ids < 32 */ unsigned long dup_list = 0; clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); if (clist == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { unsigned long idmask; int id; id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); idmask = 1L << id; if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { OPENSSL_free(clist); return 0; } dup_list |= idmask; s2n(id, p); } OPENSSL_free(*pext); *pext = clist; *pextlen = ncurves * 2; return 1; } # define MAX_CURVELIST 28 typedef struct { size_t nidcnt; int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; } nid_cb_st; static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) { nid_cb_st *narg = arg; size_t i; int nid; char etmp[20]; if (elem == NULL) return 0; if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) return 0; if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) return 0; memcpy(etmp, elem, len); etmp[len] = 0; nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) return 0; narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; return 1; } /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str) { nid_cb_st ncb; ncb.nidcnt = 0; if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) return 0; if (pext == NULL) return 1; return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); } /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) { int id; const EC_GROUP *grp; if (!ec) return 0; /* Determine if it is a prime field */ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); if (!grp) return 0; /* Determine curve ID */ id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */ if (id == 0) return 0; curve_id[0] = 0; curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; if (comp_id) { if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) return 0; if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; } else { if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME) *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; else *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; } } return 1; } /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) { const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; int j; /* * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is * supported (see RFC4492). */ if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { if (*comp_id == *pformats) break; } if (i == num_formats) return 0; } if (!curve_id) return 1; /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) return 0; if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { /* * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. */ break; } for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) break; } if (i == num_curves) return 0; /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ if (!s->server) break; } return 1; } static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, size_t *num_formats) { /* * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default */ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } else { *pformats = ecformats_default; /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; else *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); } } /* * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC * certificates have compatible curves and compression. */ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) { unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; int rv; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (!pkey) return 0; /* If not EC nothing to do */ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) return 1; rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); if (!rv) return 0; /* * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported * curves extension. */ rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); if (!rv) return 0; /* * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. */ if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { int check_md; size_t i; CERT *c = s->cert; if (curve_id[0]) return 0; /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; else return 0; /* Should never happen */ for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) break; if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) return 0; if (set_ee_md == 2) { if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256(); else s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384(); } } return rv; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility * @s: SSL connection * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using * * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using * is compatible with the client extensions. * * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can. */ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) { /* * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other * curves permitted. */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { unsigned char curve_id[2]; /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; else return 0; curve_id[0] = 0; /* Check this curve is acceptable */ if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) return 0; return 1; } /* Need a shared curve */ if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) return 1; return 0; } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #else static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) { return 1; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, #endif #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 #endif }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) }; #endif size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs) { /* * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other * preferences. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; return 2; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; return 2; } #endif /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; } else { *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); } } /* * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. */ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { const unsigned char *sent_sigs; size_t sent_sigslen, i; int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); /* Should never happen */ if (sigalg == -1) return -1; /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) return 0; if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; } /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { if (curve_id[0]) return 0; if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); return 0; } } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); return 0; } } else return 0; } } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) return 0; #endif /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) break; } /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); if (*pmd == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); return 0; } /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } /* * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. */ s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd; return 1; } /* * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level. * * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported * by the client. * * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not. */ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0; s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ if (!s->psk_client_callback) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; } #endif } /* * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on * @c: cipher to check * @op: Security check that you want to do * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3 * * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled. */ int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe) { if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a) return 1; if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) return 1; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { int min_tls = c->min_tls; /* * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server * in SSLv3 if we are a client */ if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0) min_tls = SSL3_VERSION; if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)) return 1; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) return 1; return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); } static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) return 0; return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); } static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1); unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2); if (u1 < u2) return -1; else if (u1 > u2) return 1; else return 0; } /* * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error * occurred. */ static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { PACKET extensions = *packet; size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; unsigned int *extension_types = NULL; int ret = 0; /* First pass: count the extensions. */ while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { unsigned int type; PACKET extension; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { goto done; } num_extensions++; } if (num_extensions <= 1) return 1; extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions); if (extension_types == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto done; } /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ extensions = *packet; for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { PACKET extension; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { /* This should not happen. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto done; } } if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto done; } /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint); for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) goto done; } ret = 1; done: OPENSSL_free(extension_types); return ret; } unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ int using_ecc = 0; if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { int i; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { using_ecc = 1; break; } } } #endif ret += 2; if (ret >= limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { int el; if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION) goto done; if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ size_t size_str; /*- * check for enough space. * 4 for the servername type and extension length * 2 for servernamelist length * 1 for the hostname type * 2 for hostname length * + hostname length */ size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname); if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit)) return NULL; /* extension type and length */ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); s2n(size_str + 5, ret); /* length of servername list */ s2n(size_str + 3, ret); /* hostname type, length and hostname */ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; s2n(size_str, ret); memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); ret += size_str; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the * Client Hello message */ size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 for the srp type type and extension length * 1 for the srp user identity * + srp user identity length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit)) return NULL; /* fill in the extension */ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); s2n(login_len + 1, ret); (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); ret += login_len; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (using_ecc) { /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; size_t i; unsigned char *etmp; tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); if (num_formats > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length * 1 byte for the length of the formats * + formats length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); ret += num_formats; /* * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) return NULL; if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length * 2 bytes for the curve list length * + curve list length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + (num_curves * 2), limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); etmp = ret + 4; /* Copy curve ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { *etmp++ = pcurves[0]; *etmp++ = pcurves[1]; } } curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4; s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); s2n(curves_list_len, ret); ret += curves_list_len; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (tls_use_ticket(s)) { size_t ticklen; if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; } else ticklen = 0; if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) goto skip_ext; /* * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for * ticket */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); s2n(ticklen, ret); if (ticklen > 0) { memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); ret += ticklen; } } skip_ext: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { int i; size_t extlen, idlen; int lentmp; OCSP_RESPID *id; idlen = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); if (lentmp <= 0) return NULL; idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2; } if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); if (lentmp < 0) return NULL; extlen = (size_t)lentmp; } else extlen = 0; if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) return NULL; /* * 2 bytes for status request type * 2 bytes for status request len * 1 byte for OCSP request type * 2 bytes for length of ids * 2 bytes for length of extensions * + length of ids * + length of extensions */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; s2n(idlen, ret); for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { /* save position of id len */ unsigned char *q = ret; id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); /* skip over id len */ ret += 2; lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); /* write id len */ s2n(lentmp, q); } s2n(extlen, ret); if (extlen > 0) i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Add Heartbeat extension */ /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length * 1 byte for the mode */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /* * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); s2n(0, ret); } #endif /* * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation * (see longer comment below) */ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length * + ALPN protocol list length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { int el; /* Returns 0 on success!! */ if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length * + SRTP profiles length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } #endif custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; /* * In 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c we negotiated EtM with DTLS, then just * silently failed to actually do it. It is fixed in 1.1.1 but to * ease the transition especially from 1.1.0b to 1.1.0c, we just * disable it in 1.1.0. * Also skip if SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC is set. */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); s2n(0, ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the SCT type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret); s2n(0, ret); } #endif /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); s2n(0, ret); /* * WebSphere application server can not handle having the * last extension be 0-length (e.g. EMS, EtM), so keep those * before SigAlgs */ if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { size_t salglen; const unsigned char *salg; unsigned char *etmp; salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length * + sigalg list length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); etmp = ret; /* Skip over lengths for now */ ret += 4; salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen); /* Fill in lengths */ s2n(salglen + 2, etmp); s2n(salglen, etmp); ret += salglen; } /* * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always * appear last. WebSphere 7.x/8.x is intolerant of empty extensions * being last, so minimum length of 1. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { hlen = 0x200 - hlen; if (hlen >= 4) hlen -= 4; else hlen = 1; /*- * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200, * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway. * * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length * + padding length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); s2n(hlen, ret); memset(ret, 0, hlen); ret += hlen; } } done: if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) return orig; s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int next_proto_neg_seen; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); #endif ret += 2; if (ret >= limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { int el; if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length * + reneg data length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) goto done; if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); s2n(0, ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (using_ecc) { const unsigned char *plist; size_t plistlen; /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); if (plistlen > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length * 1 byte for the points format list length * + length of points format list */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); ret += plistlen; } /* * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves * extension */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); s2n(0, ret); } else { /* * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket * later */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); s2n(0, ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { int el; /* Returns 0 on success!! */ if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length * + length of the SRTP profiles list */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); s2n(el, ret); if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return NULL; } ret += el; } #endif if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 }; /* check for enough space. */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit)) return NULL; memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext)); ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length * 1 byte for the mode */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); s2n(1, ret); /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { const unsigned char *npa; unsigned int npalen; int r; r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s-> ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length * + length of protocols list */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); s2n(npalen, ret); memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); ret += npalen; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } } #endif if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; if (s->tlsext_use_etm) { /* * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable * for other cases too. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) s->tlsext_use_etm = 0; else { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); s2n(0, ret); } } if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); s2n(0, ret); } if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; /*- * check for enough space. * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length * 2 bytes for ALPN data length * 1 byte for selected protocol length * + length of the selected protocol */ if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit)) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); s2n(3 + len, ret); s2n(1 + len, ret); *ret++ = len; memcpy(ret, selected, len); ret += len; } done: if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) return orig; s2n(extdatalen, orig); return ret; } /* * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length. * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. */ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { return 0; } save_protocol_list = protocol_list; do { /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { return 0; } } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } /* * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. * returns 1 on success, 0 on error. */ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al) { const unsigned char *selected = NULL; unsigned char selected_len = 0; if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, s->s3->alpn_proposed, s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; #endif } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { /* Behave as if no callback was present. */ return 1; } else { *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; return 0; } } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /*- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|. * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: * SNI, * elliptic_curves * ec_point_formats * * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). */ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) { unsigned int type; PACKET sni, tmppkt; size_t ext_len; static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 0x00, /* uncompressed */ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; tmppkt = *pkt; if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { return; } if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, ext_len); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions. * * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise * ignored. * * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert. */ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { unsigned int type; int renegotiate_seen = 0; PACKET extensions; *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; #endif OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt); #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; s->tlsext_use_etm = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; #endif s->srtp_profile = NULL; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) goto ri_check; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) return 0; if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) return 0; /* * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but, * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon * resumption. */ while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) { PACKET extension; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) return 0; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension), PACKET_remaining(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg); if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { } /*- * The servername extension is treated as follows: * * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, * in which case an fatal alert is generated. * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches * the value of the Host: field. * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername * extension. * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. * */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { unsigned int servname_type; PACKET sni, hostname; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni) /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { return 0; } /* * Although the server_name extension was intended to be * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as * such. * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. * * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->servername_done = 1; } else { /* * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST * fall back to a full handshake. */ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { PACKET srp_I; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I)) return 0; if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) return 0; /* * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. */ if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { PACKET ec_point_format_list; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, &s-> session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { PACKET elliptic_curve_list; /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &s-> session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), PACKET_remaining(&extension), s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { PACKET supported_sig_algs; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs) || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { return 0; } } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { const unsigned char *ext_data; PACKET responder_id_list, exts; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (&extension, &responder_id_list)) return 0; /* * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 */ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else { s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; } while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; PACKET responder_id; const unsigned char *id_data; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { return 0; } id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); if (id == NULL) return 0; if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); return 0; } if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } /* Read in request_extensions */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts)) return 0; if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, PACKET_remaining(&exts)); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { return 0; } } } else #endif { /* * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. */ s->tlsext_status_type = -1; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { unsigned int hbtype; if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } switch (hbtype) { case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { /*- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. * * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing * anything like that, but this might change). * * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new * Finished message could have been computed.) */ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } #endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al)) return 0; } /* session ticket processed earlier */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; } #endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) s->tlsext_use_etm = 1; /* * Note: extended master secret extension handled in * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early() */ /* * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate * ServerHello may be later returned. */ else if (!s->hit) { if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension), PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0) return 0; } } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { /* * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } ri_check: /* Need RI if renegotiating */ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } /* * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly. * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early. * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers. */ return 1; } int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = -1; custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly * fill the length of the block. */ static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) { PACKET tmp_protocol; while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) return 0; } return 1; } #endif static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { unsigned int length, type, size; int tlsext_servername = 0; int renegotiate_seen = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; #endif s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); #endif s->tlsext_use_etm = 0; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length)) goto ri_check; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) { const unsigned char *data; PACKET spkt; if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size) || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } tlsext_servername = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, ecpointformatlist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { /* * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status * request message. */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we * need to let control continue to flow to that. */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp && s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); s->tlsext_scts = NULL; } s->tlsext_scts_len = size; if (size > 0) { s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /* The data must be valid */ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s-> ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } /* * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in * a single Serverhello */ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } #endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { unsigned len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /*- * The extension data consists of: * uint16 list_length * uint8 proto_length; * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { unsigned int hbtype; if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } switch (hbtype) { case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al)) return 0; } #endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) s->tlsext_use_etm = 1; } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; } /* * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback */ else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { if (s->tlsext_hostname) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } } else { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } } } ri_check: /* * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence */ if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); return 0; } if (s->hit) { /* * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with * original session. */ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); return 0; } } return 1; } int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; return 1; } int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; } static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) { int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ /* * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ #endif if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); else if (s->session_ctx != NULL && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s-> session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); return 1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->servername_done = 0; /* fall thru */ default: return 1; } } /* Initialise digests to default values */ void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s) { const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); else pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX); pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX); pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX); pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX); #endif } int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int al; size_t i; /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; } /* If sigalgs received process it. */ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) { if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto err; } } else { ssl_set_default_md(s); } return 1; err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } /* * Upon success, returns 1. * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert. */ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al) { s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; /* * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may * influence which certificate is sent */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; CERT_PKEY *certpkey; certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ if (certpkey != NULL) { /* * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate * et al can pick it up. */ s->cert->key = certpkey; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); switch (ret) { /* We don't want to send a status request response */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; break; /* status request response should be sent */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; break; /* something bad happened */ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: default: *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) { return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it * must contain uncompressed. */ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { /* we are using an ECC cipher */ size_t i; unsigned char *list; int found_uncompressed = 0; list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { found_uncompressed = 1; break; } } if (!found_uncompressed) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); return -1; } } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); else if (s->session_ctx != NULL && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s-> session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); /* * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event * that we don't receive a status message */ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); return 1; case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->servername_done = 0; /* fall thru */ default: return 1; } } int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = -1; if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) return 1; if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); return 0; } return 1; } /*- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions * need to be handled at the same time. * * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master * secret. * * session_id: ClientHello session ID. * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix) * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. * * Returns: * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. * * Side effects: * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. * * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present. * */ int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id, SSL_SESSION **ret) { unsigned int i; PACKET local_ext = *ext; int retv = -1; int have_ticket = 0; int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s); *ret = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; /* * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful * resumption. */ if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)) return 0; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) { retv = 0; goto end; } while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) { unsigned int type, size; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { /* Shouldn't ever happen */ retv = -1; goto end; } if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) { retv = 0; goto end; } if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) { int r; const unsigned char *etick; /* Duplicate extension */ if (have_ticket != 0) { retv = -1; goto end; } have_ticket = 1; if (size == 0) { /* * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have * one. */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; retv = 1; continue; } if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { /* * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than * generating the session from ticket now, trigger * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to * calculate the master secret later. */ retv = 2; continue; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) { /* Shouldn't ever happen */ retv = -1; goto end; } r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id), PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret); switch (r) { case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; retv = 2; break; case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ retv = r; break; case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; retv = 3; break; default: /* fatal error */ retv = -1; break; } continue; } else { if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) { retv = -1; goto end; } } } if (have_ticket == 0) retv = 0; end: return retv; } /*- * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. * * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension. * sess_id: points at the session ID. * sesslen: the length of the session ID. * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * Returns: * -2: fatal error, malloc failure. * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) { SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *sdec; const unsigned char *p; int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1; unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (hctx == NULL) return -2; ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; } if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, ctx, hctx, 0); if (rv < 0) goto err; if (rv == 0) { ret = 2; goto err; } if (rv == 2) renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) { ret = 2; goto err; } if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) { goto err; } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity * checks on ticket. */ mlen = HMAC_size(hctx); if (mlen < 0) { goto err; } /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) { ret = 2; goto err; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { goto err; } HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return 2; } /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return -1; } if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return 2; } slen += mlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; p = sdec; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); slen -= p - sdec; OPENSSL_free(sdec); if (sess) { /* Some additional consistency checks */ if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) { SSL_SESSION_free(sess); return 2; } /* * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by * standard. */ if (sesslen) memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); sess->session_id_length = sesslen; *psess = sess; if (renew_ticket) return 4; else return 3; } ERR_clear_error(); /* * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); return ret; } /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ typedef struct { int nid; int id; } tls12_lookup; static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, }; static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}, {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001}, {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256}, {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512} }; static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { if (table[i].nid == nid) return table[i].id; } return -1; } static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { if ((table[i].id) == id) return table[i].nid; } return NID_undef; } int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) { int sig_id, md_id; if (!md) return 0; md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); if (md_id == -1) return 0; sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); if (sig_id == -1) return 0; p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; return 1; } int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) { return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); } typedef struct { int nid; int secbits; int md_idx; unsigned char tlsext_hash; } tls12_hash_info; static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = { {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, }; static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) { unsigned int i; if (hash_alg == 0) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) { if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg) return tls12_md_info + i; } return NULL; } const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) { const tls12_hash_info *inf; if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode()) return NULL; inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg); if (!inf) return NULL; return ssl_md(inf->md_idx); } static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) { switch (sig_alg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001: return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; #endif } return -1; } /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) { int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) return; if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); if (phash_nid) *phash_nid = hash_nid; } if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); if (psign_nid) *psign_nid = sign_nid; } if (psignhash_nid) { if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp) { /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */ const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]); if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL) return 0; /* See if public key algorithm allowed */ if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) return 0; /* Finally see if security callback allows it */ return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp); } /* * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is * disabled. */ void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) { const unsigned char *sigalgs; size_t i, sigalgslen; int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; /* * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep * down calls to security callback only check if we have to. */ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs); for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { switch (sigalgs[1]) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) have_rsa = 1; break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) have_dsa = 1; break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) have_ecdsa = 1; break; #endif } } if (!have_rsa) *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA; if (!have_dsa) *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS; if (!have_ecdsa) *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; } size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen) { unsigned char *tmpout = out; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) { if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) { *tmpout++ = psig[0]; *tmpout++ = psig[1]; } } return tmpout - out; } /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen) { const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp)) continue; for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { nmatch++; if (shsig) { shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, &shsig->sign_nid, &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); shsig++; } break; } } } return nmatch; } /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) { const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; size_t nmatch; TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; CERT *c = s->cert; unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { conf = c->client_sigalgs; conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { conf = c->conf_sigalgs; conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; } else conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf); if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { pref = conf; preflen = conflen; allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; } else { allow = conf; allowlen = conflen; pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; } nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); if (nmatch) { salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); if (salgs == NULL) return 0; nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); } else { salgs = NULL; } c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; return 1; } /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) { CERT *c = s->cert; /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) return 1; /* Should never happen */ if (!c) return 0; OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) return 0; s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize; memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); return 1; } int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int idx; size_t i; const EVP_MD *md; const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md; uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags; CERT *c = s->cert; TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) return 0; for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) { md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); pmd[idx] = md; pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md; } } } /* * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use * the certificate for signing. */ if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { /* * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not * supported it stays as NULL. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) { pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1(); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1(); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); #endif } return 1; } int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) { const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; if (psig == NULL) return 0; if (idx >= 0) { idx <<= 1; if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen) return 0; psig += idx; if (rhash) *rhash = psig[0]; if (rsig) *rsig = psig[1]; tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); } return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2; } int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) { TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) return 0; shsigalgs += idx; if (phash) *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; if (psign) *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; if (psignhash) *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; if (rsig) *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; if (rhash) *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; } #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) typedef struct { size_t sigalgcnt; int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; } sig_cb_st; static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str) { if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) { *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA; } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) { *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA; } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) { *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC; } else { *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str); if (*phash == NID_undef) *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str); } } static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) { sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; size_t i; char etmp[20], *p; int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef; if (elem == NULL) return 0; if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) return 0; if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) return 0; memcpy(etmp, elem, len); etmp[len] = 0; p = strchr(etmp, '+'); if (!p) return 0; *p = 0; p++; if (!*p) return 0; get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp); get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p); if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) return 0; } sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; return 1; } /* * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) { sig_cb_st sig; sig.sigalgcnt = 0; if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) return 0; if (c == NULL) return 1; return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); } int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client) { unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; int rhash, rsign; size_t i; if (salglen & 1) return 0; sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); if (sigalgs == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) goto err; *sptr++ = rhash; *sptr++ = rsign; } if (client) { OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; } else { OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; } return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); return 0; } static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) { int sig_nid; size_t i; if (default_nid == -1) return 1; sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); if (default_nid) return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) return 1; return 0; } /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) { X509_NAME *nm; int i; nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) return 1; } return 0; } /* * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before * attempting to use them. */ /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */ #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) /* Strict mode flags */ #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx) { int i; int rv = 0; int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; CERT *c = s->cert; uint32_t *pvalid; unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ if (idx != -1) { /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ if (idx == -2) { cpk = c->key; idx = cpk - c->pkeys; } else cpk = c->pkeys + idx; pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; x = cpk->x509; pk = cpk->privatekey; chain = cpk->chain; strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; /* If no cert or key, forget it */ if (!x || !pk) goto end; } else { if (!x || !pk) return 0; idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); if (idx == -1) return 0; pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; else check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; strict_mode = 1; } if (suiteb_flags) { int ok; if (check_flags) check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); if (ok == X509_V_OK) rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; else if (!check_flags) goto end; } /* * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { int default_nid; unsigned char rsign = 0; if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) default_nid = 0; /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ else { switch (idx) { case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; break; case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; break; case SSL_PKEY_ECC: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; break; case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001; default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001; break; case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256; default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256; break; case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512; default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512; break; default: default_nid = -1; break; } } /* * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. */ if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { size_t j; const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) break; } if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { if (check_flags) goto skip_sigs; else goto end; } } /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { if (!check_flags) goto end; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { if (check_flags) { rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; break; } else goto end; } } } /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ else if (check_flags) rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; skip_sigs: /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; else if (!check_flags) goto end; if (!s->server) rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ else if (strict_mode) { rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { if (check_flags) { rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; break; } else goto end; } } } if (!s->server && strict_mode) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; int check_type = 0; switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; break; case EVP_PKEY_EC: check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; break; } if (check_type) { const unsigned char *ctypes; int ctypelen; if (c->ctypes) { ctypes = c->ctypes; ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; } else { ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; } for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; break; } } if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) goto end; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; } if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; break; } } } if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) goto end; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; end: if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL) rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; } else rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; /* * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the * chain is invalid. */ if (!check_flags) { if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) *pvalid = rv; else { /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; return 0; } } return rv; } /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) { tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512); } /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) { int dh_secbits = 80; if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2) return DH_get_1024_160(); if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) { if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256) dh_secbits = 128; else dh_secbits = 80; } else { CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey); } if (dh_secbits >= 128) { DH *dhp = DH_new(); BIGNUM *p, *g; if (dhp == NULL) return NULL; g = BN_new(); if (g != NULL) BN_set_word(g, 2); if (dh_secbits >= 192) p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); else p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dhp); BN_free(p); BN_free(g); return NULL; } return dhp; } if (dh_secbits >= 112) return DH_get_2048_224(); return DH_get_1024_160(); } #endif static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) { int secbits = -1; EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey) { /* * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice. */ secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey); } if (s) return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x); else return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x); } static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) { /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid; /* Don't check signature if self signed */ if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0) return 1; sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) { const EVP_MD *md; if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid))) secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4; } if (s) return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x); else return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x); } int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee) { if (vfy) vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER; if (is_ee) { if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy)) return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL; } else { if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy)) return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL; } if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy)) return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK; return 1; } /* * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use */ int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy) { int rv, start_idx, i; if (x == NULL) { x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); start_idx = 1; } else start_idx = 0; rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1); if (rv != 1) return rv; for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(sk, i); rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0); if (rv != 1) return rv; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/methods.c0000644000000000000000000002005713176625661014472 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" /*- * TLS/SSLv3 methods */ IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, TLS_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, tlsv1_2_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, tlsv1_1_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, tlsv1_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect) #endif /*- * TLS/SSLv3 server methods */ IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, TLS_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, tlsv1_2_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, tlsv1_1_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, tlsv1_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function) #endif /*- * TLS/SSLv3 client methods */ IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, TLS_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, tlsv1_2_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, tlsv1_1_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, tlsv1_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect) #endif /*- * DTLS methods */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtlsv1_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2, dtlsv1_2_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, DTLS_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) /*- * DTLS server methods */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtlsv1_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2, dtlsv1_2_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, DTLS_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) /*- * DTLS client methods */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtlsv1_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data) IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_BAD_VER, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2, dtlsv1_2_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, DTLS_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void) { return tlsv1_2_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void) { return tlsv1_2_server_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void) { return tlsv1_2_client_method(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void) { return tlsv1_1_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void) { return tlsv1_1_server_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void) { return tlsv1_1_client_method(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void) { return tlsv1_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void) { return tlsv1_server_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void) { return tlsv1_client_method(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void) { return sslv3_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void) { return sslv3_server_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void) { return sslv3_client_method(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void) { return dtlsv1_2_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void) { return dtlsv1_2_server_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void) { return dtlsv1_2_client_method(); } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void) { return dtlsv1_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void) { return dtlsv1_server_method(); } const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void) { return dtlsv1_client_method(); } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/s3_lib.c0000644000000000000000000031437013176625661014206 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS OSSL_NELEM(ssl3_ciphers) /* * The list of available ciphers, mostly organized into the following * groups: * Always there * EC * PSK * SRP (within that: RSA EC PSK) * Cipher families: Chacha/poly, Camellila, Gost, IDEA, SEED * Weak ciphers */ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = { { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_MD5, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, #endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && * !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { 1, "GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89", 0x3000081, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_GOST89MAC, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, 256, }, { 1, "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94", 0x3000083, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eNULL, SSL_GOST94, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94, 0, 0, }, { 1, "GOST2012-GOST8912-GOST8912", 0x0300ff85, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, SSL_GOST89MAC12, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, 256, }, { 1, "GOST2012-NULL-GOST12", 0x0300ff87, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eNULL, SSL_GOST12_256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 0, 0, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_GOST */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_IDEA, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_1_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS */ }; static int cipher_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { const SSL_CIPHER *ap = (const SSL_CIPHER *)a; const SSL_CIPHER *bp = (const SSL_CIPHER *)b; if (ap->id == bp->id) return 0; return ap->id < bp->id ? -1 : 1; } void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void) { qsort(ssl3_ciphers, OSSL_NELEM(ssl3_ciphers), sizeof ssl3_ciphers[0], cipher_compare); } const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data = { ssl3_enc, n_ssl3_mac, ssl3_setup_key_block, ssl3_generate_master_secret, ssl3_change_cipher_state, ssl3_final_finish_mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST, 4, SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST, 4, ssl3_alert_code, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, 0, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, ssl3_handshake_write }; long ssl3_default_timeout(void) { /* * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec is way too long for * http, the cache would over fill */ return (60 * 60 * 2); } int ssl3_num_ciphers(void) { return (SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS); } const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u) { if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS) return (&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS - 1 - u])); else return (NULL); } int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *(p++) = htype; l2n3(len, p); s->init_num = (int)len + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s) { return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } int ssl3_new(SSL *s) { SSL3_STATE *s3; if ((s3 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s3))) == NULL) goto err; s->s3 = s3; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s)) goto err; #endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); err: return (0); } void ssl3_free(SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL) return; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; #endif sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); ssl3_free_digest_list(s); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s); #endif OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3, sizeof(*s->s3)); s->s3 = NULL; } void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) { ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ ssl3_free_digest_list(s); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); /* NULL/zero-out everything in the s3 struct */ memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof(*s->s3)); ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->version = SSL3_VERSION; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static char *srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { return OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info); } #endif static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len); long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { int ret = 0; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST: break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations; break; case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations; s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS: ret = (int)(s->s3->flags); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH: { DH *dh = (DH *)parg; EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; if (dh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (ret); } pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dh); if (pkdh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); return ret; } EVP_PKEY_free(s->cert->dh_tmp); s->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh; ret = 1; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (ret); } case SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO: s->cert->dh_tmp_auto = larg; return 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH: { const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; int nid; if (parg == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group((const EC_KEY *)parg); if (group == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; return tls1_set_curves(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, &nid, 1); } break; #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME: if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { size_t len; OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); s->tlsext_hostname = NULL; ret = 1; if (parg == NULL) break; len = strlen((char *)parg); if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME); return 0; } if ((s->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG: s->tlsext_debug_arg = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: ret = s->tlsext_status_type; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: s->tlsext_status_type = larg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: *(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp; return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg; ret = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS case SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ret = dtls1_heartbeat(s); break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ret = s->tlsext_hb_pending; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (larg) s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS; else s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS; ret = 1; } break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN: if (larg) return ssl_cert_set1_chain(s, NULL, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); else return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, NULL, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT: if (larg) return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(s, NULL, (X509 *)parg); else return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, NULL, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS: *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = s->cert->key->chain; break; case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_select_current(s->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT: if (larg == SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; if (!s->server) return 0; cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!cipher) return 0; /* * No certificate for unauthenticated ciphersuites or using SRP * authentication */ if (cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) return 2; cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (!cpk) return 0; s->cert->key = cpk; return 1; } return ssl_cert_set_current(s->cert, larg); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES: { unsigned char *clist; size_t clistlen; if (!s->session) return 0; clist = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; clistlen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; if (parg) { size_t i; int *cptr = parg; unsigned int cid, nid; for (i = 0; i < clistlen; i++) { n2s(clist, cid); nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(cid, NULL); if (nid != 0) cptr[i] = nid; else cptr[i] = TLSEXT_nid_unknown | cid; } } return (int)clistlen; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES: return tls1_set_curves(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE: return tls1_shared_curve(s, larg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: { const unsigned char **pctype = parg; if (s->server || !s->s3->tmp.cert_req) return 0; if (s->cert->ctypes) { if (pctype) *pctype = s->cert->ctypes; return (int)s->cert->ctype_num; } if (pctype) *pctype = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; return s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: if (!s->server) return 0; return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(s->cert, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN: return ssl_build_cert_chain(s, NULL, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 0, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 1, larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID: if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (s->session) { const EVP_MD *sig; sig = s->s3->tmp.peer_md; if (sig) { *(int *)parg = EVP_MD_type(sig); return 1; } } return 0; } /* Might want to do something here for other versions */ else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY: #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if (s->server || s->session == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) { return 0; } else { EVP_PKEY_up_ref(s->s3->peer_tmp); *(EVP_PKEY **)parg = s->s3->peer_tmp; return 1; } #else return 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS: { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; const unsigned char **pformat = parg; if (!sess || !sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) return 0; *pformat = sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; return (int)sess->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } #endif default: break; } return (ret); } long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { int ret = 0; switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB: s->tlsext_debug_cb = (void (*)(SSL *, int, int, const unsigned char *, int, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB: { s->not_resumable_session_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, int))fp; } break; default: break; } return (ret); } long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH: { DH *dh = (DH *)parg; EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; if (dh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dh); if (pkdh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!ssl_ctx_security(ctx, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); return 1; } EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp); ctx->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh; return 1; } /* * break; */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } case SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO: ctx->cert->dh_tmp_auto = larg; return 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH: { const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; int nid; if (parg == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group((const EC_KEY *)parg); if (group == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, &nid, 1); } /* break; */ #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG: ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = parg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: { unsigned char *keys = parg; long tlsext_tick_keylen = (sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key)); if (keys == NULL) return tlsext_tick_keylen; if (larg != tlsext_tick_keylen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); return 0; } if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) { memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys, sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)); memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name), sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)); memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key)); } else { memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)); memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name), ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)); memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key)); } return 1; } case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: return ctx->tlsext_status_type; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: ctx->tlsext_status_type = larg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG: ctx->tlsext_status_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG: *(void**)parg = ctx->tlsext_status_arg; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB: *(int (**)(SSL*, void*))parg = ctx->tlsext_status_cb; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login); ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL; if (parg == NULL) break; if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME); return 0; } if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD: ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = srp_password_from_info_cb; if (ctx->srp_ctx.info != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.info); if ((ctx->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH: ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg; break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES: return tls1_set_curves(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(&ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, &ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(ctx->cert, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN: return ssl_build_cert_chain(NULL, ctx, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 0, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 1, larg); /* A Thawte special :-) */ case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT: if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL) { if ((ctx->extra_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs, (X509 *)parg)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS: if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL && larg == 0) *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain; else *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->extra_certs; break; case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS: sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free); ctx->extra_certs = NULL; break; case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN: if (larg) return ssl_cert_set1_chain(NULL, ctx, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); else return ssl_cert_set0_chain(NULL, ctx, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT: if (larg) return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(NULL, ctx, (X509 *)parg); else return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(NULL, ctx, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS: *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain; break; case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_select_current(ctx->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_set_current(ctx->cert, larg); default: return (0); } return (1); } long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { ctx->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB: ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB: ctx->tlsext_status_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB: ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, HMAC_CTX *, int))fp; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB: { ctx->not_resumable_session_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, int))fp; } break; default: return (0); } return (1); } /* * This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually * available */ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p) { SSL_CIPHER c; const SSL_CIPHER *cp; uint32_t id; id = 0x03000000 | ((uint32_t)p[0] << 8L) | (uint32_t)p[1]; c.id = id; cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS); return cp; } int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p) { long l; if (p != NULL) { l = c->id; if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x03000000) return (0); p[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xFF; p[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xFF; } return (2); } /* * ssl3_choose_cipher - choose a cipher from those offered by the client * @s: SSL connection * @clnt: ciphers offered by the client * @srvr: ciphers enabled on the server? * * Returns the selected cipher or NULL when no common ciphers. */ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr) { const SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; int i, ii, ok; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a; /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */ #if 0 /* * Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering. We may pay * a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(), but would have to * pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(). */ sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(srvr, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(clnt, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); #endif #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr); ++i) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i); fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name); } fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt); ++i) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt, i); fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name); } #endif if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || tls1_suiteb(s)) { prio = srvr; allow = clnt; } else { prio = clnt; allow = srvr; } tls1_set_cert_validity(s); ssl_set_masks(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i); /* Skip ciphers not supported by the protocol version */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((s->version < c->min_tls) || (s->version > c->max_tls))) continue; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, c->min_dtls) || DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, c->max_dtls))) continue; mask_k = s->s3->tmp.mask_k; mask_a = s->s3->tmp.mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP) { mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; } #endif alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be server callback set */ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n", ok, alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, (void *)c, c->name); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral * EC key check it */ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (!ok) continue; ii = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, c); if (ii >= 0) { /* Check security callback permits this cipher */ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c)) continue; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari) { if (!ret) ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii); continue; } #endif ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii); break; } } return (ret); } int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) { int ret = 0; uint32_t alg_k, alg_a = 0; /* If we have custom certificate types set, use them */ if (s->cert->ctypes) { memcpy(p, s->cert->ctypes, s->cert->ctype_num); return (int)s->cert->ctype_num; } /* Get mask of algorithms disabled by signature list */ ssl_set_sig_mask(&alg_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN; p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST12_SIGN; p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST12_512_SIGN; return (ret); } } #endif if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) && (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH; # endif #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (!(alg_a & SSL_aRSA)) p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (!(alg_a & SSL_aDSS)) p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites too so we don't * need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kECDHE */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { if (!(alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; } #endif return (ret); } static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); c->ctypes = NULL; if (!p || !len) return 1; if (len > 0xff) return 0; c->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (c->ctypes == NULL) return 0; memcpy(c->ctypes, p, len); c->ctype_num = len; return 1; } int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s) { int ret; /* * Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or we don't * want to send messages :-) */ if (s->quiet_shutdown || SSL_in_before(s)) { s->shutdown = (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); return (1); } if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); /* * our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) return (-1); /* return WANT_WRITE */ } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { /* resend it if not sent */ ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (ret == -1) { /* * we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invocation, * return WANT_WRITE */ return (ret); } } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { /* * If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0); if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { return (-1); /* return WANT_READ */ } } if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) && !s->s3->alert_dispatch) return (1); else return (0); } int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len) { clear_sys_error(); if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s); return s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len); } static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek) { int ret; clear_sys_error(); if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s); s->s3->in_read_app_data = 1; ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, NULL, buf, len, peek); if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2)) { /* * ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which called * ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data. However, ssl3_read_bytes * actually found application data and thinks that application data * makes sense here; so disable handshake processing and try to read * application data again. */ ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(s, 1); ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, NULL, buf, len, peek); ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(s, 0); } else s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0; return (ret); } int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len) { return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0); } int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len) { return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1); } int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) return (1); if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) return (0); s->s3->renegotiate = 1; return (1); } int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s) { int ret = 0; if (s->s3->renegotiate) { if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer) && !RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer) && !SSL_in_init(s)) { /* * if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE' * message, we need to set the state machine into the renegotiate * state. */ ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(s); s->s3->renegotiate = 0; s->s3->num_renegotiations++; s->s3->total_renegotiations++; ret = 1; } } return (ret); } /* * If we are using default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch to new SHA256 PRF and * handshake macs if required. * * If PSK and using SHA384 for TLS < 1.2 switch to default. */ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s) { long alg2; if (s->s3 == NULL || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return -1; alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2; if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF) { if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF)) return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256; } else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) { if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384)) return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF; } return alg2; } /* * Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0 on * failure, 1 on success. */ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len) { int send_time = 0; if (len < 4) return 0; if (server) send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0; else send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0; if (send_time) { unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); unsigned char *p = result; l2n(Time, p); return RAND_bytes(p, len - 4); } else return RAND_bytes(result, len); } int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen, int free_pms) { unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned char *pskpms, *t; size_t psklen = s->s3->tmp.psklen; size_t pskpmslen; /* create PSK premaster_secret */ /* For plain PSK "other_secret" is psklen zeroes */ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) pmslen = psklen; pskpmslen = 4 + pmslen + psklen; pskpms = OPENSSL_malloc(pskpmslen); if (pskpms == NULL) { s->session->master_key_length = 0; goto err; } t = pskpms; s2n(pmslen, t); if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) memset(t, 0, pmslen); else memcpy(t, pms, pmslen); t += pmslen; s2n(psklen, t); memcpy(t, s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pskpms, pskpmslen); OPENSSL_clear_free(pskpms, pskpmslen); #else /* Should never happen */ s->session->master_key_length = 0; goto err; #endif } else { s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pms, pmslen); } err: if (pms) { if (free_pms) OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); else OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen); } if (s->server == 0) s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; return s->session->master_key_length >= 0; } /* Generate a private key from parameters */ EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if (pm == NULL) return NULL; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pm, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return pkey; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* Generate a private key a curve ID */ EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_curve(int id) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; unsigned int curve_flags; int nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, &curve_flags); if (nid == 0) goto err; if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(nid, NULL); nid = 0; } else { pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); } if (pctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (nid != 0 && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, nid) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return pkey; } #endif /* Derive premaster or master secret for ECDH/DH */ int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey) { int rv = 0; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; if (privkey == NULL || pubkey == NULL) return 0; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(privkey, NULL); if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pubkey) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, NULL, &pmslen) <= 0) { goto err; } pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, pms, &pmslen) <= 0) goto err; if (s->server) { /* For server generate master secret and discard premaster */ rv = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1); pms = NULL; } else { /* For client just save premaster secret */ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; pms = NULL; rv = 1; } err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return rv; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh) { EVP_PKEY *ret; if (dh == NULL) return NULL; ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ret, dh) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_err.c0000644000000000000000000010763413176625661014507 0ustar rootroot/* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,func,0) # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST), "check_suiteb_cipher_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS), "ct_move_scts"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CT_STRICT), "ct_strict"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION), "d2i_SSL_SESSION"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE), "dane_ctx_enable"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET), "dane_mtype_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD), "dane_tlsa_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE), "do_dtls1_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE), "do_ssl3_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD), "dtls1_buffer_record"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM), "dtls1_check_timeout_num"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT), "dtls1_heartbeat"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "dtls1_preprocess_fragment"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS), "dtls1_process_buffered_records"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "dtls1_process_record"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "dtls1_read_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED), "dtls1_read_failed"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE), "dtls1_retransmit_message"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES), "dtls1_write_app_data_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN), "DTLSv1_listen"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST), "dtls_construct_hello_verify_request"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE), "dtls_get_reassembled_message"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY), "dtls_process_hello_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL), "OPENSSL_init_ssl"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION), "ossl_statem_client_read_transition"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION), "ossl_statem_server_read_transition"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE), "read_state_machine"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "ssl3_change_cipher_state"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM), "ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "ssl3_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL), "ssl3_ctx_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS), "ssl3_digest_cached_records"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC), "ssl3_final_finish_mac"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "ssl3_generate_key_block"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET), "ssl3_generate_master_secret"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "ssl3_get_record"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_INIT_FINISHED_MAC), "ssl3_init_finished_mac"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl3_output_cert_chain"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES), "ssl3_read_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N), "ssl3_read_n"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "ssl3_setup_key_block"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_read_buffer"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER), "ssl3_setup_write_buffer"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "ssl3_write_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "ssl3_write_pending"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_add_cert_chain"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "ssl_add_cert_to_buf"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT), "ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT), "ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD), "ssl_bad_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_build_cert_chain"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST), "ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT), "ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP), "ssl_cert_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW), "ssl_cert_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN), "ssl_cert_set0_chain"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_check_private_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG), "ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR), "ssl_cipher_process_rulestr"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT), "ssl_cipher_strength_sort"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR), "SSL_clear"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD), "SSL_COMP_add_compression_method"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD), "SSL_CONF_cmd"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST), "ssl_create_cipher_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL), "SSL_ctrl"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_CTX_check_private_key"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT), "SSL_CTX_enable_ct"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES), "ssl_ctx_make_profiles"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW), "SSL_CTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS), "SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE), "SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK), "SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT), "SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION), "SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT), "SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO), "SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP), "ssl_dane_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE), "SSL_dane_enable"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG), "ssl_do_config"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE), "SSL_do_handshake"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST), "SSL_dup_CA_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT), "SSL_enable_ct"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "ssl_get_new_session"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION), "ssl_get_prev_session"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX), "ssl_get_server_cert_index"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY), "ssl_get_sign_pkey"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "ssl_init_wbio_buffer"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT), "ssl_module_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT), "ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT), "ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK), "SSL_peek"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID), "SSL_SESSION_set1_id"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT), "SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS), "SSL_set_alpn_protos"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT), "ssl_set_cert"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_set_cipher_list"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK), "SSL_set_ct_validation_callback"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD), "SSL_set_fd"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY), "ssl_set_pkey"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD), "SSL_set_rfd"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION), "SSL_set_session"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT), "SSL_set_session_id_context"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT), "SSL_set_session_ticket_ext"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD), "SSL_set_wfd"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN), "SSL_shutdown"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT), "SSL_SRP_CTX_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB), "ssl_start_async_job"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION), "ssl_undefined_function"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION), "ssl_undefined_void_function"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_use_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1), "SSL_use_certificate_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE), "SSL_use_certificate_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT), "SSL_use_psk_identity_hint"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT), "ssl_validate_ct"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN), "ssl_verify_cert_chain"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE), "SSL_write"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE), "state_machine"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG), "tls12_check_peer_sigalg"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "tls1_change_cipher_state"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS), "tls1_check_duplicate_extensions"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC), "tls1_enc"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL), "tls1_export_keying_material"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST), "tls1_get_curvelist"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF), "tls1_PRF"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "tls1_setup_key_block"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS), "tls1_set_server_sigalgs"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK), "tls_client_key_exchange_post_work"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "tls_construct_certificate_request"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE), "tls_construct_cke_dhe"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE), "tls_construct_cke_ecdhe"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST), "tls_construct_cke_gost"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE), "tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA), "tls_construct_cke_rsa"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP), "tls_construct_cke_srp"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "tls_construct_client_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO), "tls_construct_client_hello"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE), "tls_construct_client_key_exchange"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY), "tls_construct_client_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED), "tls_construct_finished"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST), "tls_construct_hello_request"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "tls_construct_new_session_ticket"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "tls_construct_server_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE), "tls_construct_server_done"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO), "tls_construct_server_hello"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE), "tls_construct_server_key_exchange"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY), "tls_get_message_body"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER), "tls_get_message_header"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO), "tls_post_process_client_hello"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE), "tls_post_process_client_key_exchange"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "tls_prepare_client_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "tls_process_certificate_request"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS), "tls_process_cert_status"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY), "tls_process_cert_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "tls_process_change_cipher_spec"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE), "tls_process_cke_dhe"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE), "tls_process_cke_ecdhe"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST), "tls_process_cke_gost"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE), "tls_process_cke_psk_preamble"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA), "tls_process_cke_rsa"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP), "tls_process_cke_srp"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "tls_process_client_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO), "tls_process_client_hello"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE), "tls_process_client_key_exchange"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED), "tls_process_finished"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE), "tls_process_key_exchange"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "tls_process_new_session_ticket"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO), "tls_process_next_proto"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "tls_process_server_certificate"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE), "tls_process_server_done"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO), "tls_process_server_hello"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE), "tls_process_ske_dhe"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE), "tls_process_ske_ecdhe"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE), "tls_process_ske_psk_preamble"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP), "tls_process_ske_srp"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE), "use_certificate_chain_file"}, {0, NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE), "app data in handshake"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT), "attempt to reuse session in different context"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE), "at least TLS 1.0 needed in FIPS mode"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE), "at least (D)TLS 1.2 needed in Suite B mode"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "bad change cipher spec"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA), "bad data"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK), "bad data returned by callback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE), "bad dh value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT), "bad ecpoint"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH), "bad handshake length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST), "bad hello request"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH), "bad packet length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER), "bad protocol version number"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT), "bad rsa encrypt"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH), "bad srp a length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS), "bad srp parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE), "bad srtp mki value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST), "bad srtp protection profile list"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE), "bad ssl filetype"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_VALUE), "bad value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY), "bad write retry"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET), "bio not set"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG), "block cipher pad is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "ca dn length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "ca key too small"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK), "ca md too weak"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY), "ccs received early"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED), "certificate verify failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR), "cert cb error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "cert length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH), "cipher code wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE), "cipher or hash unavailable"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "clienthello tlsext"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "compressed length too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED), "compression disabled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE), "compression failure"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE), "compression id not within private range"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR), "compression library error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET), "connection type not set"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED), "context not dane enabled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE), "cookie gen callback failure"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH), "cookie mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED), "custom ext handler already installed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED), "dane already enabled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL), "dane cannot override mtype full"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED), "dane not enabled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE), "dane tlsa bad certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE), "dane tlsa bad certificate usage"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH), "dane tlsa bad data length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "dane tlsa bad digest length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE), "dane tlsa bad matching type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY), "dane tlsa bad public key"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR), "dane tlsa bad selector"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA), "dane tlsa null data"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED), "data between ccs and finished"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "data length too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC), "decryption failed or bad record mac"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG), "dh public value length is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG), "dtls message too big"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID), "duplicate compression id"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING), "ecc cert not for signing"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE), "ecdh required for suiteb mode"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "ee key too small"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST), "empty srtp protection profile list"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "encrypted length too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST), "error in received cipher list"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN), "error setting tlsa base domain"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE), "exceeds max fragment size"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE), "excessive message size"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE), "extra data in message"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC), "failed to init async"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO), "fragmented client hello"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS), "got a fin before a ccs"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST), "https proxy request"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST), "http request"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST), "illegal Suite B digest"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK), "inappropriate fallback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION), "inconsistent compression"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS), "inconsistent extms"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND), "invalid command"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM), "invalid compression algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME), "invalid configuration name"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE), "invalid ct validation type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME), "invalid null cmd name"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER), "invalid sequence number"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA), "invalid serverinfo data"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME), "invalid srp username"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE), "invalid status response"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH), "invalid ticket keys length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "length too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT), "length too short"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG), "library bug"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS), "library has no ciphers"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing dsa signing cert"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing ecdsa signing cert"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE), "missing rsa certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT), "missing rsa encrypting cert"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing rsa signing cert"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM), "can't find SRP server param"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY), "missing tmp dh key"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY), "missing tmp ecdh key"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED), "no certificates returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED), "no certificate assigned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET), "no certificate set"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE), "no ciphers available"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED), "no ciphers specified"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH), "no cipher match"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD), "no client cert method"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED), "no compression specified"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER), "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED), "no method specified"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS), "no pem extensions"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED), "no private key assigned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE), "no protocols available"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION), "no renegotiation"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST), "no required digest"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER), "no shared cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS), "no shared signature algorithms"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES), "no srtp profiles"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS), "no valid scts"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK), "no verify cookie callback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX), "null ssl ctx"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED), "null ssl method passed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED), "old session cipher not returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED), "old session compression algorithm not returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "packet length too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT), "parse tlsext"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG), "path too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE), "peer did not return a certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX), "pem name bad prefix"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT), "pem name too short"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE), "pipeline failure"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN), "protocol is shutdown"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND), "psk identity not found"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB), "psk no client cb"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB), "psk no server cb"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET), "read bio not set"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED), "read timeout expired"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "record length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL), "record too small"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG), "renegotiate ext too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR), "renegotiation encoding err"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH), "renegotiation mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING), "required cipher missing"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING), "required compression algorithm missing"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING), "scsv received when renegotiating"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED), "sct verification failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "serverhello tlsext"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED), "session id context uninitialized"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT), "shutdown while in init"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR), "signature algorithms error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE), "signature for non signing certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC), "error with the srp params"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES), "srtp could not allocate profiles"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG), "srtp protection profile list too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE), "srtp unknown protection profile"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME), "ssl3 ext invalid servername"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE), "ssl3 ext invalid servername type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG), "ssl3 session id too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE), "sslv3 alert bad certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC), "sslv3 alert bad record mac"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED), "sslv3 alert certificate expired"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED), "sslv3 alert certificate revoked"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN), "sslv3 alert certificate unknown"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE), "sslv3 alert decompression failure"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), "sslv3 alert handshake failure"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER), "sslv3 alert illegal parameter"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE), "sslv3 alert no certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), "sslv3 alert unexpected message"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE), "sslv3 alert unsupported certificate"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY), "ssl command section empty"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND), "ssl command section not found"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION), "ssl ctx has no default ssl version"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), "ssl handshake failure"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS), "ssl library has no ciphers"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH), "ssl negative length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_EMPTY), "ssl section empty"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND), "ssl section not found"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED), "ssl session id callback failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT), "ssl session id conflict"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG), "ssl session id context too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG), "ssl session id too long"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH), "ssl session id has bad length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH), "ssl session version mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED), "tlsv1 alert access denied"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR), "tlsv1 alert decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "tlsv1 alert decryption failed"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR), "tlsv1 alert decrypt error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION), "tlsv1 alert export restriction"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK), "tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY), "tlsv1 alert insufficient security"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR), "tlsv1 alert internal error"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION), "tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION), "tlsv1 alert protocol version"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW), "tlsv1 alert record overflow"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA), "tlsv1 alert unknown ca"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED), "tlsv1 alert user cancelled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE), "tlsv1 bad certificate hash value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE), "tlsv1 bad certificate status response"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE), "tlsv1 certificate unobtainable"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME), "tlsv1 unrecognized name"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION), "tlsv1 unsupported extension"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT), "peer does not accept heartbeats"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING), "heartbeat request already pending"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL), "tls illegal exporter label"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST), "tls invalid ecpointformat list"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS), "too many warn alerts"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS), "unable to find ecdh parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS), "unable to find public key parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES), "unable to load ssl3 md5 routines"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES), "unable to load ssl3 sha1 routines"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), "unexpected message"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD), "unexpected record"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED), "uninitialized"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE), "unknown alert type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE), "unknown certificate type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED), "unknown cipher returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE), "unknown cipher type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME), "unknown cmd name"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND), "unknown command"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE), "unknown key exchange type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE), "unknown pkey type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), "unknown protocol"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION), "unknown ssl version"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE), "unknown state"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED), "unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM), "unsupported compression algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE), "unsupported elliptic curve"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL), "unsupported protocol"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION), "unsupported ssl version"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE), "unsupported status type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED), "use srtp not negotiated"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH), "version too high"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW), "version too low"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE), "wrong certificate type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED), "wrong cipher returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE), "wrong curve"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE), "wrong signature size"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE), "wrong signature type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION), "wrong ssl version"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER), "wrong version number"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_LIB), "x509 lib"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS), "x509 verification setup problems"}, {0, NULL} }; #endif int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(SSL_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_reasons); } #endif return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/pqueue.c0000644000000000000000000000547713176625661014344 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "ssl_locl.h" #include struct pqueue_st { pitem *items; int count; }; pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data) { pitem *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item)); if (item == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(item->priority, prio64be, sizeof(item->priority)); item->data = data; item->next = NULL; return item; } void pitem_free(pitem *item) { OPENSSL_free(item); } pqueue *pqueue_new() { pqueue *pq = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pq)); return pq; } void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq) { OPENSSL_free(pq); } pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item) { pitem *curr, *next; if (pq->items == NULL) { pq->items = item; return item; } for (curr = NULL, next = pq->items; next != NULL; curr = next, next = next->next) { /* * we can compare 64-bit value in big-endian encoding with memcmp:-) */ int cmp = memcmp(next->priority, item->priority, 8); if (cmp > 0) { /* next > item */ item->next = next; if (curr == NULL) pq->items = item; else curr->next = item; return item; } else if (cmp == 0) /* duplicates not allowed */ return NULL; } item->next = NULL; curr->next = item; return item; } pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq) { return pq->items; } pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue *pq) { pitem *item = pq->items; if (pq->items != NULL) pq->items = pq->items->next; return item; } pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue *pq, unsigned char *prio64be) { pitem *next; pitem *found = NULL; if (pq->items == NULL) return NULL; for (next = pq->items; next->next != NULL; next = next->next) { if (memcmp(next->priority, prio64be, 8) == 0) { found = next; break; } } /* check the one last node */ if (memcmp(next->priority, prio64be, 8) == 0) found = next; if (!found) return NULL; return found; } pitem *pqueue_iterator(pqueue *pq) { return pqueue_peek(pq); } pitem *pqueue_next(pitem **item) { pitem *ret; if (item == NULL || *item == NULL) return NULL; /* *item != NULL */ ret = *item; *item = (*item)->next; return ret; } int pqueue_size(pqueue *pq) { pitem *item = pq->items; int count = 0; while (item != NULL) { count++; item = item->next; } return count; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/d1_srtp.c0000644000000000000000000002113213176625661014376 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * DTLS code by Eric Rescorla * * Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc. Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc. */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP static SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE srtp_known_profiles[] = { { "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80, }, { "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32, }, { "SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM, }, { "SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM, }, {0} }; static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name, SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr, unsigned len) { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p; p = srtp_known_profiles; while (p->name) { if ((len == strlen(p->name)) && strncmp(p->name, profile_name, len) == 0) { *pptr = p; return 0; } p++; } return 1; } static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string, STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles; char *col; char *ptr = (char *)profiles_string; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p; if ((profiles = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES, SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES); return 1; } do { col = strchr(ptr, ':'); if (!find_profile_by_name(ptr, &p, col ? col - ptr : (int)strlen(ptr))) { if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles, p) >= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); goto err; } if (!sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles, p)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES, SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES); goto err; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES, SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE); goto err; } if (col) ptr = col + 1; } while (col); sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(*out); *out = profiles; return 0; err: sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles) { return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &ctx->srtp_profiles); } int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *s, const char *profiles) { return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &s->srtp_profiles); } STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->srtp_profiles != NULL) { return s->srtp_profiles; } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->srtp_profiles != NULL)) { return s->ctx->srtp_profiles; } } return NULL; } SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s) { return s->srtp_profile; } /* * Note: this function returns 0 length if there are no profiles specified */ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen) { int ct = 0; int i; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); /* -1 if clnt == 0 */ if (p) { if (ct == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 1; } if ((2 + ct * 2 + 1) > maxlen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG); return 1; } /* Add the length */ s2n(ct * 2, p); for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) { prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); s2n(prof->id, p); } /* Add an empty use_mki value */ *p++ = 0; } *len = 2 + ct * 2 + 1; return 0; } int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; int i, srtp_pref; PACKET subpkt; /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); s->srtp_profile = NULL; /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } /* * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than * current match. * If no profiles have been have been configured then this * does nothing. */ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); if (sprof->id == id) { s->srtp_profile = sprof; srtp_pref = i; break; } } } /* * Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } return 0; } int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen) { if (p) { if (maxlen < 5) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG); return 1; } if (s->srtp_profile == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED); return 1; } s2n(2, p); s2n(s->srtp_profile->id, p); *p++ = 0; } *len = 5; return 0; } int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } if (mki != 0) { /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 1; } clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ if (clnt == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } /* * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and * presumably offered) */ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) { prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); if (prof->id == id) { s->srtp_profile = prof; *al = 0; return 0; } } SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/s3_cbc.c0000644000000000000000000004657513176625661014200 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include /* * MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's * length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */ #define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16 /* * MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support. * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest * supported by TLS.) */ #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 /* * u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */ #define u32toLE(n, p) \ (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24)) /* * These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the * standard "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such * a function typically does. */ static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx; u32toLE(md5->A, md_out); u32toLE(md5->B, md_out); u32toLE(md5->C, md_out); u32toLE(md5->D, md_out); } static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx; l2n(sha1->h0, md_out); l2n(sha1->h1, md_out); l2n(sha1->h2, md_out); l2n(sha1->h3, md_out); l2n(sha1->h4, md_out); } static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx; unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out); } } static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx; unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out); } } #undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX #define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX /* * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (FIPS_mode()) return 0; switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: case NID_sha1: case NID_sha224: case NID_sha256: case NID_sha384: case NID_sha512: return 1; default: return 0; } } /*- * ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS * record. * * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function. * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX. * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written. * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here. * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header. * data: the record data itself, less any preceding explicit IV. * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC * once the padding has been removed. * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole * record, including padding. * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS. * * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the * padding too. ) * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error */ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13], const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size, size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3) { union { double align; unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state; void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out); void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block); unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64; unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks, len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b; unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */ unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES]; /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */ unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; /* * mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that * terminates * the hash. */ unsigned md_length_size = 8; char length_is_big_endian = 1; int ret; /* * This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about * many possible overflows later in this function. */ OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024); switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform; md_size = 16; sslv3_pad_length = 48; length_is_big_endian = 0; break; case NID_sha1: if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform; md_size = 20; break; case NID_sha224: if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; md_size = 224 / 8; break; case NID_sha256: if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; md_size = 32; break; case NID_sha384: if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; md_size = 384 / 8; md_block_size = 128; md_length_size = 16; break; case NID_sha512: if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; md_size = 64; md_block_size = 128; md_length_size = 16; break; default: /* * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to * check that the hash function is supported. */ OPENSSL_assert(0); if (md_out_size) *md_out_size = 0; return 0; } OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES); OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE); OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); header_length = 13; if (is_sslv3) { header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length + 8 /* sequence * number */ + 1 /* record type */ + 2 /* record length */ ; } /* * variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the * padding value. In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of * the plaintext varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively * assume that the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes * of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final * block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding. * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks can * vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is * short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then * variance_blocks can be reduced. */ variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6; /* * From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13 * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes * (SSLv3) */ len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length; /* * max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, * including * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */ max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1; /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */ num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size; /* * In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle the * final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the end * to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we can't * leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can be hashed * right away because no padding value can affect whether they are * plaintext. */ num_starting_blocks = 0; /* * k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where * we start processing. */ k = 0; /* * mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed. */ mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size; /* * c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains * application data. */ c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size; /* * index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating * value. */ index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size; /* * index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length, * in bits. */ index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size; /* * bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash block * for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of SSLv3. */ /* * For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need at * least two because the header is larger than a single block. */ if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) { num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks; k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks; } bits = 8 * mac_end_offset; if (!is_sslv3) { /* * Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and secret * bytes are included in |header| because they take more than a * single block. */ bits += 8 * md_block_size; memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size); OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)); memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36; md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad); } if (length_is_big_endian) { memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4); length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24); length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16); length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8); length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits; } else { memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size); length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24); length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16); length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8); length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits; } if (k > 0) { if (is_sslv3) { unsigned overhang; /* * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just * in case */ if (header_length <= md_block_size) { /* Should never happen */ return 0; } overhang = header_length - md_block_size; md_transform(md_state.c, header); memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang); memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang); md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size - 1; i++) md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - overhang); } else { /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */ memcpy(first_block, header, 13); memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13); md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++) md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13); } } memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out)); /* * We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct it * in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80 * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in * constant time, to |mac_out|. */ for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks; i++) { unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a); unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b); for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) { unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1; if (k < header_length) b = header[k]; else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length) b = data[k - header_length]; k++; is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c); is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1); /* * If this is the block containing the end of the application * data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then * overwrite b with 0x80. */ b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b); /* * If this the the block containing the end of the application * data and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero. */ b = b & ~is_past_cp1; /* * If this is index_b (the final block), but not index_a (the end * of the data), then the 64-bit length didn't fit into index_a * and we're having to add an extra block of zeros. */ b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a; /* * The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length. */ if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) { /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */ b = constant_time_select_8(is_block_b, length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)], b); } block[j] = b; } md_transform(md_state.c, block); md_final_raw(md_state.c, block); /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b; } md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx), NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0) goto err; if (is_sslv3) { /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */ memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) goto err; } else { /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) goto err; } ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); if (ret && md_out_size) *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 0; } /* * Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases by * digesting additional data. */ int tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len) { size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) return 1; block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx); /*- * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA* * digests and TLS to deal with. * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9 * otherwise. * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise. * So we have: * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size * equivalently: * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1 * HMAC adds a constant overhead. * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128 * for SHA384/SHA512 and * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64 * otherwise. */ digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29; blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size; blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size; /* * MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original and * actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a no op. * The "data" pointer should always have enough space to perform this * operation as it is large enough for a maximum length TLS buffer. */ return EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data, (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/s3_msg.c0000644000000000000000000000751513176625661014226 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { int i; const char *sender; int slen; if (s->server) i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; else i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); } s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return (0); } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) return (0); /* * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it * before we read the finished message */ if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; return (1); } int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have * protocol_version alerts */ if (desc < 0) return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL)) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; if (!RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { /* data still being written out? */ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); } /* * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in * the future */ return -1; } int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; unsigned int alertlen; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; alertlen = 2; i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], &alertlen, 1, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; } else { /* * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not * worry too much. */ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_asn1.c0000644000000000000000000002575713176625661014566 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "internal/asn1t.h" #include typedef struct { uint32_t version; int32_t ssl_version; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cipher; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *comp_id; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *master_key; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key_arg; int64_t time; int64_t timeout; X509 *peer; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id_context; int32_t verify_result; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_hostname; int64_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_tick; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity_hint; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ASN1_OCTET_STRING *srp_username; #endif uint64_t flags; } SSL_SESSION_ASN1; ASN1_SEQUENCE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) = { ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, version, UINT32), ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, ssl_version, INT32), ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, cipher, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, master_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_IMP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, key_arg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, time, ZINT64, 1), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, timeout, ZINT64, 2), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, peer, X509, 3), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id_context, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, verify_result, ZINT32, 5), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_hostname, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity_hint, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 7), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8), #endif ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, ZUINT64, 9), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, comp_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, srp_username, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12), #endif ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, flags, ZUINT64, 13) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) /* Utility functions for i2d_SSL_SESSION */ /* Initialise OCTET STRING from buffer and length */ static void ssl_session_oinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os, unsigned char *data, size_t len) { os->data = data; os->length = len; os->flags = 0; *dest = os; } /* Initialise OCTET STRING from string */ static void ssl_session_sinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os, char *data) { if (data != NULL) ssl_session_oinit(dest, os, (unsigned char *)data, strlen(data)); else *dest = NULL; } int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) { SSL_SESSION_ASN1 as; ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher; unsigned char cipher_data[2]; ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key, session_id, sid_ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id; unsigned char comp_id_data; #endif ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname, tlsext_tick; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity, psk_identity_hint; #endif long l; if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0))) return 0; memset(&as, 0, sizeof(as)); as.version = SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION; as.ssl_version = in->ssl_version; if (in->cipher == NULL) l = in->cipher_id; else l = in->cipher->id; cipher_data[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff; cipher_data[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff; ssl_session_oinit(&as.cipher, &cipher, cipher_data, 2); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (in->compress_meth) { comp_id_data = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth; ssl_session_oinit(&as.comp_id, &comp_id, &comp_id_data, 1); } #endif ssl_session_oinit(&as.master_key, &master_key, in->master_key, in->master_key_length); ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id, &session_id, in->session_id, in->session_id_length); ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id_context, &sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length); as.time = in->time; as.timeout = in->timeout; as.verify_result = in->verify_result; as.peer = in->peer; ssl_session_sinit(&as.tlsext_hostname, &tlsext_hostname, in->tlsext_hostname); if (in->tlsext_tick) { ssl_session_oinit(&as.tlsext_tick, &tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_ticklen); } if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) as.tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity_hint, &psk_identity_hint, in->psk_identity_hint); ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity, &psk_identity, in->psk_identity); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ssl_session_sinit(&as.srp_username, &srp_username, in->srp_username); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ as.flags = in->flags; return i2d_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(&as, pp); } /* Utility functions for d2i_SSL_SESSION */ /* OPENSSL_strndup an OCTET STRING */ static int ssl_session_strndup(char **pdst, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src) { OPENSSL_free(*pdst); *pdst = NULL; if (src == NULL) return 1; *pdst = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)src->data, src->length); if (*pdst == NULL) return 0; return 1; } /* Copy an OCTET STRING, return error if it exceeds maximum length */ static int ssl_session_memcpy(unsigned char *dst, unsigned int *pdstlen, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src, int maxlen) { if (src == NULL) { *pdstlen = 0; return 1; } if (src->length > maxlen) return 0; memcpy(dst, src->data, src->length); *pdstlen = src->length; return 1; } SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { long id; unsigned int tmpl; const unsigned char *p = *pp; SSL_SESSION_ASN1 *as = NULL; SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; as = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(NULL, &p, length); /* ASN.1 code returns suitable error */ if (as == NULL) goto err; if (!a || !*a) { ret = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; } else { ret = *a; } if (as->version != SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION); goto err; } if ((as->ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && (as->ssl_version >> 8) != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR && as->ssl_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); goto err; } ret->ssl_version = (int)as->ssl_version; if (as->cipher->length != 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)as->cipher->data[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)as->cipher->data[1]; ret->cipher = NULL; ret->cipher_id = id; if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->session_id, &ret->session_id_length, as->session_id, SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) goto err; if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->master_key, &tmpl, as->master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) goto err; ret->master_key_length = tmpl; if (as->time != 0) ret->time = as->time; else ret->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); if (as->timeout != 0) ret->timeout = as->timeout; else ret->timeout = 3; X509_free(ret->peer); ret->peer = as->peer; as->peer = NULL; if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length, as->session_id_context, SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)) goto err; /* NB: this defaults to zero which is X509_V_OK */ ret->verify_result = as->verify_result; if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->tlsext_hostname, as->tlsext_hostname)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity_hint, as->psk_identity_hint)) goto err; if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity, as->psk_identity)) goto err; #endif ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = as->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; if (as->tlsext_tick) { ret->tlsext_tick = as->tlsext_tick->data; ret->tlsext_ticklen = as->tlsext_tick->length; as->tlsext_tick->data = NULL; } else { ret->tlsext_tick = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (as->comp_id) { if (as->comp_id->length != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto err; } ret->compress_meth = as->comp_id->data[0]; } else { ret->compress_meth = 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->srp_username, as->srp_username)) goto err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ /* Flags defaults to zero which is fine */ ret->flags = as->flags; M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1); if ((a != NULL) && (*a == NULL)) *a = ret; *pp = p; return ret; err: M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1); if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)) SSL_SESSION_free(ret); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_init.c0000644000000000000000000001423613176625661014655 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "e_os.h" #include "internal/err.h" #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" static int stopped; static void ssl_library_stop(void); static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_base = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int ssl_base_inited = 0; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_ssl_base) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: " "Adding SSL ciphers and digests\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4()); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5()); # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc()); /* * Not actually used for SSL/TLS but this makes PKCS#12 work if an * application only calls SSL_library_init(). */ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc()); #endif EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ccm()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ccm()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc()); EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc()); #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) EVP_add_cipher(EVP_chacha20_poly1305()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5()); EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5, "ssl3-md5"); EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5_sha1()); #endif EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); /* RSA with sha1 */ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1, "ssl3-sha1"); EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption, SN_sha1WithRSA); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: " "SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods()\n"); # endif /* * This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms. The value * returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can be discarded safely */ SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); #endif /* initialize cipher/digest methods table */ ssl_load_ciphers(); #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: " "SSL_add_ssl_module()\n"); #endif SSL_add_ssl_module(); /* * We ignore an error return here. Not much we can do - but not that bad * either. We can still safely continue. */ OPENSSL_atexit(ssl_library_stop); ssl_base_inited = 1; return 1; } static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_strings = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int ssl_strings_inited = 0; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_ssl_strings) { /* * OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time * pulling in all the error strings during static linking */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ERR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT) # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_ssl_strings: " "ERR_load_SSL_strings()\n"); # endif ERR_load_SSL_strings(); #endif ssl_strings_inited = 1; return 1; } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings) { /* Do nothing in this case */ return 1; } static void ssl_library_stop(void) { /* Might be explicitly called and also by atexit */ if (stopped) return; stopped = 1; if (ssl_base_inited) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: " "ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int()\n"); # endif ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(); #endif } if (ssl_strings_inited) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: " "err_free_strings_int()\n"); #endif /* * If both crypto and ssl error strings are inited we will end up * calling err_free_strings_int() twice - but that's ok. The second * time will be a no-op. It's easier to do that than to try and track * between the two libraries whether they have both been inited. */ err_free_strings_int(); } } /* * If this function is called with a non NULL settings value then it must be * called prior to any threads making calls to any OpenSSL functions, * i.e. passing a non-null settings value is assumed to be single-threaded. */ int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS * settings) { static int stoperrset = 0; if (stopped) { if (!stoperrset) { /* * We only ever set this once to avoid getting into an infinite * loop where the error system keeps trying to init and fails so * sets an error etc */ stoperrset = 1; SSLerr(SSL_F_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); } return 0; } if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(opts | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, settings)) return 0; if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_base, ossl_init_ssl_base)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS) && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS) && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_load_ssl_strings)) return 0; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_cert.c0000644000000000000000000007500313176625661014646 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include "internal/o_dir.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init) { ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback", NULL, NULL, NULL); return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0; } int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init)) return -1; return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); ret->references = 1; ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback; ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL; ret->sec_ex = NULL; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); int i; if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys]; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp); } ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto; #endif for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 != NULL) { rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; X509_up_ref(rpk->x509); } if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) { rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey); } if (cpk->chain) { rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain); if (!rpk->chain) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) { /* Just copy everything. */ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); } } /* Configured sigalgs copied across */ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) { ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen); if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen); ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen; } else ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL; if (cert->client_sigalgs) { ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen); if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgslen); ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen; } else ret->client_sigalgs = NULL; /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */ ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL; /* Copy any custom client certificate types */ if (cert->ctypes) { ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num); if (ret->ctypes == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num); ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num; } ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags; ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; if (cert->verify_store) { X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; } if (cert->chain_store) { X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store); ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store; } ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb; ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level; ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex; if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext)) goto err; if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (cert->psk_identity_hint) { ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint); if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL) goto err; } #endif return ret; err: ssl_cert_free(ret); return NULL; } /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) { int i; if (c == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; X509_free(cpk->x509); cpk->x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); cpk->privatekey = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = NULL; OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); cpk->serverinfo = NULL; cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; } } void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { int i; if (c == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp); #endif ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext); custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint); #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock); OPENSSL_free(c); } int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int i, r; CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; if (!cpk) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0); if (r != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r); return 0; } } sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; return 1; } int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; if (!chain) return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL); dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); if (!dchain) return 0; if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) { sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { int r; CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; if (!cpk) return 0; r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); if (r != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r); return 0; } if (!cpk->chain) cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) return 0; return 1; } int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x)) return 0; X509_up_ref(x); return 1; } int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) { int i; if (x == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) { c->key = cpk; return 1; } } for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) { c->key = cpk; return 1; } } return 0; } int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op) { int i, idx; if (!c) return 0; if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST) idx = 0; else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) { idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1); if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM) return 0; } else return 0; for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) { c->key = cpk; return 1; } } return 0; } void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { c->cert_cb = cb; c->cert_cb_arg = arg; } int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { X509 *x; int i = 0; X509_STORE *verify_store; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) return 0; if (s->cert->verify_store) verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; else verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto end; } param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx); /* * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto * and PKI authentication. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { goto end; } /* Verify via DANE if enabled */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane)) X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane); /* * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or * vice versa. */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); /* * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param); if (s->verify_callback) X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback); if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); else i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); s->verified_chain = NULL; if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) { s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); if (s->verified_chain == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); i = 0; } } /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param); end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return i; } static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); *ca_list = name_list; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret; X509_NAME *name; ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i)); if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); X509_NAME_free(name); return NULL; } } return (ret); } void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list); } void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->client_CA); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) { if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */ if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL)) return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names); else return (NULL); } else { if (s->client_CA != NULL) return (s->client_CA); else return (s->ctx->client_CA); } } static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x) { X509_NAME *name; if (x == NULL) return (0); if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) return (0); if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL) return (0); if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); return (0); } return (1); } int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) { return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x)); } int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x)); } static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b); } static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a) { return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a); } /** * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert. * \param file the file containing one or more certs. * \return a ::STACK containing the certs. */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) { BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL; LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) goto err; for (;;) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) break; if (ret == NULL) { ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; /* check for duplicates */ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) { /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); xn = NULL; } else { lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn); if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn)) goto err; } } goto done; err: X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); ret = NULL; done: BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash); if (ret != NULL) ERR_clear_error(); return (ret); } /** * Add a file of certs to a stack. * \param stack the stack to add to. * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not * already in the stack will be added. * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some * certs may have been added to \c stack. */ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *file) { BIO *in; X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; int ret = 1; int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) goto err; for (;;) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) break; if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) { /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) { X509_NAME_free(xn); goto err; } } ERR_clear_error(); goto done; err: ret = 0; done: BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp); return ret; } /** * Add a directory of certs to a stack. * \param stack the stack to append to. * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be * included. * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some * certs may have been added to \c stack. */ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *dir) { OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; const char *filename; int ret = 0; /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { char buf[1024]; int r; if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename); #else r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename); #endif if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) goto err; if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf)) goto err; } if (errno) { SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); return ret; } /* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */ static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) { int n; unsigned char *p; n = i2d_X509(x, NULL); if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); l2n3(n, p); n = i2d_X509(x, &p); if (n < 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } *l += n + 3; return 1; } /* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) { BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; int i, chain_count; X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509_STORE *chain_store; /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } if (!cpk || !cpk->x509) return 1; x = cpk->x509; /* * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. */ if (cpk->chain) extra_certs = cpk->chain; else extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) chain_store = NULL; else if (s->cert->chain_store) chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; else chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; if (chain_store) { X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return (0); } /* * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can */ (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); if (i != 1) { #if 0 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); #endif X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); return 0; } chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) { X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return 0; } } X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); } else { i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); if (i != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); return 0; } if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) return 0; } } return 1; } /* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) { CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert; CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; X509 *x; int i, rv = 0; unsigned long error; if (!cpk->x509) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); goto err; } /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) { chain_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (chain_store == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i); if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) { error = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 || ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) goto err; ERR_clear_error(); } } /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) { error = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 || ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) goto err; ERR_clear_error(); } } else { if (c->chain_store) chain_store = c->chain_store; else if (s) chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; else chain_store = ctx->cert_store; if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) untrusted = cpk->chain; } xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) { if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR) ERR_clear_error(); i = 1; rv = 2; } if (i > 0) chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); goto err; } /* Remove EE certificate from chain */ x = sk_X509_shift(chain); X509_free(x); if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) { if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) { /* See if last cert is self signed */ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) { x = sk_X509_pop(chain); X509_free(x); } } } /* * Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been checked * already. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); if (rv != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); rv = 0; goto err; } } sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; if (rv == 0) rv = 1; err: if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) X509_STORE_free(chain_store); X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return rv; } int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) { X509_STORE **pstore; if (chain) pstore = &c->chain_store; else pstore = &c->verify_store; X509_STORE_free(*pstore); *pstore = store; if (ref && store) X509_STORE_up_ref(store); return 1; } static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { int level, minbits; static const int minbits_table[5] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; if (ctx) level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx); else level = SSL_get_security_level(s); if (level <= 0) { /* * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise, * anything goes. */ if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80) return 0; return 1; } if (level > 5) level = 5; minbits = minbits_table[level - 1]; switch (op) { case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED: case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED: case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK: { const SSL_CIPHER *c = other; /* No ciphers below security level */ if (bits < minbits) return 0; /* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */ if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) return 0; /* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */ if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5) return 0; /* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */ if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1) return 0; /* Level 2: no RC4 */ if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) return 0; /* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */ if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH))) return 0; break; } case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */ if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2) return 0; /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */ if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3) return 0; /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4) return 0; } else { /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4) return 0; } break; case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION: if (level >= 2) return 0; break; case SSL_SECOP_TICKET: if (level >= 3) return 0; break; default: if (bits < minbits) return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex); } int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ctx->cert->sec_ex); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_sess.c0000644000000000000000000011007513176625661014665 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ { return (ssl->session); } SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ { SSL_SESSION *sess; /* * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null * and when we up the reference count. */ CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->lock); sess = ssl->session; if (sess) SSL_SESSION_up_ref(sess); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock); return sess; } int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) { SSL_SESSION *ss; ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss)); if (ss == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ ss->references = 1; ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); ss->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ss->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ss); return NULL; } if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); OPENSSL_free(ss); return NULL; } return ss; } /* * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. */ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) { SSL_SESSION *dest; dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src)); if (dest == NULL) { goto err; } memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest)); /* * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL; dest->psk_identity = NULL; #endif dest->ciphers = NULL; dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; #endif dest->tlsext_tick = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP dest->srp_username = NULL; #endif dest->peer_chain = NULL; dest->peer = NULL; memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data)); /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */ dest->prev = NULL; dest->next = NULL; dest->references = 1; dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (dest->lock == NULL) goto err; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data)) goto err; if (src->peer != NULL) { if (!X509_up_ref(src->peer)) goto err; dest->peer = src->peer; } if (src->peer_chain != NULL) { dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain); if (dest->peer_chain == NULL) goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (src->psk_identity_hint) { dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint); if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { goto err; } } if (src->psk_identity) { dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity); if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) { goto err; } } #endif if (src->ciphers != NULL) { dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers); if (dest->ciphers == NULL) goto err; } if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) { goto err; } if (src->tlsext_hostname) { dest->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname); if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) goto err; } if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) goto err; } #endif if (ticket != 0 && src->tlsext_tick != NULL) { dest->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen); if (dest->tlsext_tick == NULL) goto err; } else { dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0; dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (src->srp_username) { dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username); if (dest->srp_username == NULL) { goto err; } } #endif return dest; err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); SSL_SESSION_free(dest); return NULL; } const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { if (len) *len = s->session_id_length; return s->session_id; } const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { if (len != NULL) *len = s->sid_ctx_length; return s->sid_ctx; } unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->compress_meth; } /* * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling * the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to * complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: * understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid * a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the * RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to * 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions * is perhaps a more interesting question ... */ #define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len) { unsigned int retry = 0; do if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ; if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) return 1; /* else - woops a session_id match */ /* * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the * internal cache as well). */ return 0; } int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) { /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ unsigned int tmp; SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL; GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return (0); /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0) ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s); else ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout; SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = NULL; if (session) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION; ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION; ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) { ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) { ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER; ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) { ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION; ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) { ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return (0); } /*- * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). * Note that: * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, statem_srvr.c calls * ssl_get_new_session() in tls_process_client_hello(). * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows * whether a ticket is expected or not. * * (b) statem_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { ss->session_id_length = 0; goto sess_id_done; } /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock); if (s->generate_session_id) cb = s->generate_session_id; else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id) cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); /* Choose a session ID */ memset(ss->session_id, 0, ss->session_id_length); tmp = ss->session_id_length; if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { /* The callback failed */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return (0); } /* * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor * set it higher than it was. */ if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) { /* The callback set an illegal length */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return (0); } ss->session_id_length = tmp; /* Finally, check for a conflict */ if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, ss->session_id_length)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return (0); } sess_id_done: if (s->tlsext_hostname) { ss->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return 0; } } } else { ss->session_id_length = 0; } if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return 0; } memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; s->session = ss; ss->ssl_version = s->version; ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; /* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; return (1); } /*- * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this * connection. It is only called by servers. * * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix) * session_id: ClientHello session ID. * * Returns: * -1: error * 0: a session may have been found. * * Side effects: * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session. * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1 * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). */ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id) { /* This is used only by servers. */ SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; int fatal = 0; int try_session_cache = 1; int r; if (PACKET_remaining(session_id) == 0) try_session_cache = 0; /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected and extended master secret flag */ r = tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(s, ext, session_id, &ret); switch (r) { case -1: /* Error during processing */ fatal = 1; goto err; case 0: /* No ticket found */ case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */ break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */ case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */ case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */ try_session_cache = 0; break; default: abort(); } if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL && !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) { SSL_SESSION data; size_t local_len; data.ssl_version = s->version; memset(data.session_id, 0, sizeof(data.session_id)); if (!PACKET_copy_all(session_id, data.session_id, sizeof(data.session_id), &local_len)) { goto err; } data.session_id_length = local_len; CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock); ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data); if (ret != NULL) { /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); if (ret == NULL) s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++; } if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) { int copy = 1; ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(session_id), PACKET_remaining(session_id), ©); if (ret != NULL) { s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++; /* * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be * thread-safe). */ if (copy) SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); /* * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as * well if and only if we are supposed to. */ if (! (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) { /* * Either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session should not * interrupt the session resumption process. The return * value is intentionally ignored. */ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret); } } } if (ret == NULL) goto err; /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) { /* * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to * use it in this context. */ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ } if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) { /* * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone * noticing). */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); fatal = 1; goto err; } if (ret->cipher == NULL) { unsigned char buf[5], *p; unsigned long l; p = buf; l = ret->cipher_id; l2n(l, p); if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2])); else ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1])); if (ret->cipher == NULL) goto err; } if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++; if (try_session_cache) { /* session was from the cache, so remove it */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret); } goto err; } /* Check extended master secret extension consistency */ if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { /* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); fatal = 1; goto err; } } else if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { /* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */ goto err; } s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++; SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = ret; s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; return 1; err: if (ret != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_free(ret); if (!try_session_cache) { /* * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for * the new session */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; } } if (fatal) return -1; else return 0; } int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { int ret = 0; SSL_SESSION *s; /* * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and * an lhash */ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c); /* * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c); /* * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */ if (s != NULL && s != c) { /* We *are* in trouble ... */ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently * obtain the same session from an external cache) */ s = NULL; } else if (s == NULL && lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c) == NULL) { /* s == NULL can also mean OOM error in lh_SSL_SESSION_insert ... */ /* * ... so take back the extra reference and also don't add * the session to the SSL_SESSION_list at this time */ s = c; } /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ if (s == NULL) SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c); if (s != NULL) { /* * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference * count because it already takes into account the cache */ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ ret = 0; } else { /* * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ ret = 1; if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) break; else ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++; } } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); return ret; } int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); } static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) { SSL_SESSION *r; int ret = 0; if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) { if (lck) CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) { ret = 1; r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c); SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c); } c->not_resumable = 1; if (lck) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); if (ret) SSL_SESSION_free(r); if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, c); } else ret = 0; return (ret); } void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) { int i; if (ss == NULL) return; CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, -1, &i, ss->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key); OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id); X509_free(ss->peer); sk_X509_pop_free(ss->peer_chain, X509_free); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers); OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname); OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint); OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username); #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss)); } int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ss) { int i; if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, 1, &i, ss->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); if (s->ctx->method != s->method) { if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method)) return 0; } if (session != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); s->verify_result = session->verify_result; } SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = session; return 1; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid, unsigned int sid_len) { if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); return 0; } s->session_id_length = sid_len; if (sid != s->session_id) memcpy(s->session_id, sid, sid_len); return 1; } long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { if (s == NULL) return (0); s->timeout = t; return (1); } long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) { if (s == NULL) return (0); return (s->timeout); } long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) { if (s == NULL) return (0); return (s->time); } long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { if (s == NULL) return (0); s->time = t; return (t); } int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->ssl_version; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->cipher; } const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->tlsext_hostname; } int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return (s->tlsext_ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0; } unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; } void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick, size_t *len) { *len = s->tlsext_ticklen; if (tick != NULL) *tick = s->tlsext_tick; } X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->peer; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; if (sid_ctx != s->sid_ctx) memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) { long l; if (s == NULL) return (0); l = s->session_timeout; s->session_timeout = t; return (l); } long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) { if (s == NULL) return (0); return (s->session_timeout); } int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, const SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg) { if (s == NULL) return (0); s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb; s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg; return (1); } int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, void *arg) { if (s == NULL) return (0); s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb; s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg; return (1); } int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len) { if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL; s->tlsext_session_ticket = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len); if (s->tlsext_session_ticket == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (ext_data) { s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len; s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1; memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len); } else { s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0; s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL; } return 1; } return 0; } typedef struct timeout_param_st { SSL_CTX *ctx; long time; LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache; } TIMEOUT_PARAM; static void timeout_cb(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p) { if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */ /* * The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on * locking overhead */ (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s); SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s); s->not_resumable = 1; if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s); SSL_SESSION_free(s); } } IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM); void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) { unsigned long i; TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; tp.ctx = s; tp.cache = s->sessions; if (tp.cache == NULL) return; tp.time = t; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock); i = lh_SSL_SESSION_get_down_load(s->sessions); lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, 0); lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_TIMEOUT_PARAM(tp.cache, timeout_cb, &tp); lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, i); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); } int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) { SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); return (1); } else return (0); } /* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return; if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) { /* last element in list */ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { /* only one element in list */ ctx->session_cache_head = NULL; ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL; } else { ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev; s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); } } else { if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { /* first element in list */ ctx->session_cache_head = s->next; s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); } else { /* middle of list */ s->next->prev = s->prev; s->prev->next = s->next; } } s->prev = s->next = NULL; } static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL)) SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) { ctx->session_cache_head = s; ctx->session_cache_tail = s; s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); } else { s->next = ctx->session_cache_head; s->next->prev = s; s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); ctx->session_cache_head = s; } } void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { ctx->new_session_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { return ctx->new_session_cb; } void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { ctx->remove_session_cb = cb; } void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) { return ctx->remove_session_cb; } void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)) { ctx->get_session_cb = cb; } SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy) { return ctx->get_session_cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { ctx->info_callback = cb; } void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) { return ctx->info_callback; } void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) { ctx->client_cert_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { return ctx->client_cert_cb; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e) { if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD); ENGINE_finish(e); return 0; } ctx->client_cert_engine = e; return 1; } #endif void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)) { ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)) { ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb; } IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/t1_trce.c0000644000000000000000000013326413176625661014375 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE /* Packet trace support for OpenSSL */ typedef struct { int num; const char *name; } ssl_trace_tbl; # define ssl_trace_str(val, tbl) \ do_ssl_trace_str(val, tbl, OSSL_NELEM(tbl)) # define ssl_trace_list(bio, indent, msg, msglen, value, table) \ do_ssl_trace_list(bio, indent, msg, msglen, value, \ table, OSSL_NELEM(table)) static const char *do_ssl_trace_str(int val, ssl_trace_tbl *tbl, size_t ntbl) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < ntbl; i++, tbl++) { if (tbl->num == val) return tbl->name; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static int do_ssl_trace_list(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen, size_t vlen, ssl_trace_tbl *tbl, size_t ntbl) { int val; if (msglen % vlen) return 0; while (msglen) { val = msg[0]; if (vlen == 2) val = (val << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s (%d)\n", do_ssl_trace_str(val, tbl, ntbl), val); msg += vlen; msglen -= vlen; } return 1; } /* Version number */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_version_tbl[] = { {SSL3_VERSION, "SSL 3.0"}, {TLS1_VERSION, "TLS 1.0"}, {TLS1_1_VERSION, "TLS 1.1"}, {TLS1_2_VERSION, "TLS 1.2"}, {DTLS1_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0"}, {DTLS1_2_VERSION, "DTLS 1.2"}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, "DTLS 1.0 (bad)"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_content_tbl[] = { {SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, "ChangeCipherSpec"}, {SSL3_RT_ALERT, "Alert"}, {SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, "Handshake"}, {SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, "ApplicationData"}, {DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, "HeartBeat"} }; /* Handshake types */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_handshake_tbl[] = { {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, "HelloRequest"}, {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, "ClientHello"}, {SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, "ServerHello"}, {DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "HelloVerifyRequest"}, {SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, "NewSessionTicket"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate"}, {SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ServerKeyExchange"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, "CertificateRequest"}, {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ClientKeyExchange"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, "CertificateStatus"}, {SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, "ServerHelloDone"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, "CertificateVerify"}, {SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, "ClientKeyExchange"}, {SSL3_MT_FINISHED, "Finished"}, {SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, "CertificateStatus"} }; /* Cipher suites */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_ciphers_tbl[] = { {0x0000, "SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL"}, {0x0001, "SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5"}, {0x0002, "SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0x0003, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"}, {0x0004, "SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"}, {0x0005, "SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x0006, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5"}, {0x0007, "SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0008, "SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0009, "SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000A, "SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000B, "SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000C, "SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000D, "SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000E, "SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x000F, "SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0010, "SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0011, "SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0012, "SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0013, "SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0014, "SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0015, "SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0016, "SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0017, "SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"}, {0x0018, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"}, {0x0019, "SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001A, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001B, "SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001D, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA"}, {0x001E, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x0021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5"}, {0x0023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5"}, {0x0024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5"}, {0x0025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5"}, {0x0026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA"}, {0x0027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA"}, {0x0028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA"}, {0x0029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5"}, {0x002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5"}, {0x002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5"}, {0x002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0x002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0x002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0x0093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x0099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA"}, {0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0x00AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0x00AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0x00B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x00B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"}, {0x00B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0x00B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x00B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"}, {0x00B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0x00B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0x00B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"}, {0x00BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256"}, {0x00FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"}, {0x5600, "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"}, {0xC001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00A, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00B, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC00C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC00D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC00F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA"}, {0xC034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"}, {0xC037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA"}, {0xC03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256"}, {0xC03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384"}, {0xC03C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC03D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC03E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC03F, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC040, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC041, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC042, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC043, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC044, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC047, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC048, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC049, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC04A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC04B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC04C, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC04D, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC04E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC04F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC050, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC051, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC052, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC053, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC054, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC055, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC056, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC057, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC058, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC059, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC05A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC05B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC05C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC05D, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC05E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC05F, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC060, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC061, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC062, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC063, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC064, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC065, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC066, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC067, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC068, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC069, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC06A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC06B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC06C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC06D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC06E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC06F, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC070, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC071, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC072, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC073, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC074, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC075, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC076, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC077, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC078, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC079, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC07A, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC07B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC07C, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC07D, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC07E, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC07F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC080, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC081, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC082, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC083, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC084, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC085, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC086, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC087, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC088, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC089, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC08A, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC08B, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC08C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC08D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC08E, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC08F, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256"}, {0xC093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384"}, {0xC094, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC095, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC096, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC097, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC098, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC099, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC09A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256"}, {0xC09B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384"}, {0xC09C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM"}, {0xC09D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM"}, {0xC09E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM"}, {0xC09F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM"}, {0xC0A0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"}, {0xC0A1, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"}, {0xC0A2, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"}, {0xC0A3, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"}, {0xC0A4, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM"}, {0xC0A5, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM"}, {0xC0A6, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM"}, {0xC0A7, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM"}, {0xC0A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"}, {0xC0A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"}, {0xC0AA, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"}, {0xC0AB, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"}, {0xC0AC, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM"}, {0xC0AD, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM"}, {0xC0AE, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"}, {0xC0AF, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"}, {0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"}, {0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"}, {0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"}, {0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"}, {0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"}, {0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"}, {0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"}, {0xFEFE, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0xFEFF, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, }; /* Compression methods */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_comp_tbl[] = { {0x0000, "No Compression"}, {0x0001, "Zlib Compression"} }; /* Extensions */ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_exts_tbl[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, "server_name"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length, "max_fragment_length"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url, "client_certificate_url"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys, "trusted_ca_keys"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac, "truncated_hmac"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, "status_request"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping, "user_mapping"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz, "client_authz"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, "server_authz"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type, "cert_type"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, "elliptic_curves"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, "ec_point_formats"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, "srp"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, "signature_algorithms"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, "use_srtp"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, "heartbeat"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, "session_ticket"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, "renegotiate"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, "next_proto_neg"}, # endif {TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, "signed_certificate_timestamps"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, "padding"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, "encrypt_then_mac"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, "extended_master_secret"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_curve_tbl[] = { {1, "sect163k1 (K-163)"}, {2, "sect163r1"}, {3, "sect163r2 (B-163)"}, {4, "sect193r1"}, {5, "sect193r2"}, {6, "sect233k1 (K-233)"}, {7, "sect233r1 (B-233)"}, {8, "sect239k1"}, {9, "sect283k1 (K-283)"}, {10, "sect283r1 (B-283)"}, {11, "sect409k1 (K-409)"}, {12, "sect409r1 (B-409)"}, {13, "sect571k1 (K-571)"}, {14, "sect571r1 (B-571)"}, {15, "secp160k1"}, {16, "secp160r1"}, {17, "secp160r2"}, {18, "secp192k1"}, {19, "secp192r1 (P-192)"}, {20, "secp224k1"}, {21, "secp224r1 (P-224)"}, {22, "secp256k1"}, {23, "secp256r1 (P-256)"}, {24, "secp384r1 (P-384)"}, {25, "secp521r1 (P-521)"}, {26, "brainpoolP256r1"}, {27, "brainpoolP384r1"}, {28, "brainpoolP512r1"}, {29, "ecdh_x25519"}, {0xFF01, "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves"}, {0xFF02, "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_point_tbl[] = { {0, "uncompressed"}, {1, "ansiX962_compressed_prime"}, {2, "ansiX962_compressed_char2"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_md_tbl[] = { {TLSEXT_hash_none, "none"}, {TLSEXT_hash_md5, "md5"}, {TLSEXT_hash_sha1, "sha1"}, {TLSEXT_hash_sha224, "sha224"}, {TLSEXT_hash_sha256, "sha256"}, {TLSEXT_hash_sha384, "sha384"}, {TLSEXT_hash_sha512, "sha512"}, {TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, "md_gost94"}, {TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, "md_gost2012_256"}, {TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, "md_gost2012_512"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_sig_tbl[] = { {TLSEXT_signature_anonymous, "anonymous"}, {TLSEXT_signature_rsa, "rsa"}, {TLSEXT_signature_dsa, "dsa"}, {TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, "ecdsa"}, {TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, "gost2001"}, {TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, "gost2012_256"}, {TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512, "gost2012_512"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_hb_tbl[] = { {1, "peer_allowed_to_send"}, {2, "peer_not_allowed_to_send"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_hb_type_tbl[] = { {1, "heartbeat_request"}, {2, "heartbeat_response"} }; static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_ctype_tbl[] = { {1, "rsa_sign"}, {2, "dss_sign"}, {3, "rsa_fixed_dh"}, {4, "dss_fixed_dh"}, {5, "rsa_ephemeral_dh"}, {6, "dss_ephemeral_dh"}, {20, "fortezza_dms"}, {64, "ecdsa_sign"}, {65, "rsa_fixed_ecdh"}, {66, "ecdsa_fixed_ecdh"} }; static void ssl_print_hex(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t i; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s (len=%d): ", name, (int)msglen); for (i = 0; i < msglen; i++) BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", msg[i]); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } static int ssl_print_hexbuf(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name, size_t nlen, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { size_t blen; const unsigned char *p = *pmsg; if (*pmsglen < nlen) return 0; blen = p[0]; if (nlen > 1) blen = (blen << 8) | p[1]; if (*pmsglen < nlen + blen) return 0; p += nlen; ssl_print_hex(bio, indent, name, p, blen); *pmsg += blen + nlen; *pmsglen -= blen + nlen; return 1; } static int ssl_print_version(BIO *bio, int indent, const char *name, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { int vers; if (*pmsglen < 2) return 0; vers = ((*pmsg)[0] << 8) | (*pmsg)[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s=0x%x (%s)\n", name, vers, ssl_trace_str(vers, ssl_version_tbl)); *pmsg += 2; *pmsglen -= 2; return 1; } static int ssl_print_random(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { unsigned int tm; const unsigned char *p = *pmsg; if (*pmsglen < 32) return 0; tm = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; p += 4; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "Random:\n"); BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "gmt_unix_time=0x%08X\n", tm); ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "random_bytes", p, 28); *pmsg += 32; *pmsglen -= 32; return 1; } static int ssl_print_signature(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { if (*pmsglen < 2) return 0; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *p = *pmsg; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "Signature Algorithm %s+%s (%d+%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(p[0], ssl_md_tbl), ssl_trace_str(p[1], ssl_sig_tbl), p[0], p[1]); *pmsg += 2; *pmsglen -= 2; } return ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "Signature", 2, pmsg, pmsglen); } static int ssl_print_extension(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, int extype, const unsigned char *ext, size_t extlen) { size_t xlen; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "extension_type=%s(%d), length=%d\n", ssl_trace_str(extype, ssl_exts_tbl), extype, (int)extlen); switch (extype) { case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats: if (extlen < 1) return 0; xlen = ext[0]; if (extlen != xlen + 1) return 0; return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 1, xlen, 1, ssl_point_tbl); case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves: if (extlen < 2) return 0; xlen = (ext[0] << 8) | ext[1]; if (extlen != xlen + 2) return 0; return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 2, xlen, 2, ssl_curve_tbl); case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms: if (extlen < 2) return 0; xlen = (ext[0] << 8) | ext[1]; if (extlen != xlen + 2) return 0; if (xlen & 1) return 0; ext += 2; while (xlen > 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s+%s (%d+%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(ext[0], ssl_md_tbl), ssl_trace_str(ext[1], ssl_sig_tbl), ext[0], ext[1]); xlen -= 2; ext += 2; } break; case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: if (extlen < 1) return 0; xlen = ext[0]; if (xlen + 1 != extlen) return 0; ext++; if (xlen) { if (server) { if (xlen & 1) return 0; xlen >>= 1; } ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "client_verify_data", ext, xlen); if (server) { ext += xlen; ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "server_verify_data", ext, xlen); } } else { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 4, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } break; case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat: if (extlen != 1) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "HeartbeatMode: %s\n", ssl_trace_str(ext[0], ssl_hb_tbl)); break; case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket: if (extlen != 0) ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "ticket", ext, extlen); break; default: BIO_dump_indent(bio, (const char *)ext, extlen, indent + 2); } return 1; } static int ssl_print_extensions(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t extslen; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); if (msglen == 0) { BIO_puts(bio, "No Extensions\n"); return 1; } extslen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; if (extslen != msglen - 2) return 0; msg += 2; msglen = extslen; BIO_printf(bio, "extensions, length = %d\n", (int)msglen); while (msglen > 0) { int extype; size_t extlen; if (msglen < 4) return 0; extype = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; extlen = (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; if (msglen < extlen + 4) return 0; msg += 4; if (!ssl_print_extension(bio, indent + 2, server, extype, msg, extlen)) return 0; msg += extlen; msglen -= extlen + 4; } return 1; } static int ssl_print_client_hello(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t len; unsigned int cs; if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "client_version", &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_random(bio, indent, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "session_id", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "cookie", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } if (msglen < 2) return 0; len = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; msg += 2; msglen -= 2; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "cipher_suites (len=%d)\n", (int)len); if (msglen < len || len & 1) return 0; while (len > 0) { cs = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "{0x%02X, 0x%02X} %s\n", msg[0], msg[1], ssl_trace_str(cs, ssl_ciphers_tbl)); msg += 2; msglen -= 2; len -= 2; } if (msglen < 1) return 0; len = msg[0]; msg++; msglen--; if (msglen < len) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "compression_methods (len=%d)\n", (int)len); while (len > 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s (0x%02X)\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_comp_tbl), msg[0]); msg++; msglen--; len--; } if (!ssl_print_extensions(bio, indent, 0, msg, msglen)) return 0; return 1; } static int dtls_print_hello_vfyrequest(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "server_version", &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "cookie", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; return 1; } static int ssl_print_server_hello(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { unsigned int cs; if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "server_version", &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_random(bio, indent, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "session_id", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (msglen < 2) return 0; cs = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "cipher_suite {0x%02X, 0x%02X} %s\n", msg[0], msg[1], ssl_trace_str(cs, ssl_ciphers_tbl)); msg += 2; msglen -= 2; if (msglen < 1) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "compression_method: %s (0x%02X)\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_comp_tbl), msg[0]); msg++; msglen--; if (!ssl_print_extensions(bio, indent, 1, msg, msglen)) return 0; return 1; } static int ssl_get_keyex(const char **pname, SSL *ssl) { unsigned long alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { *pname = "rsa"; return SSL_kRSA; } if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { *pname = "DHE"; return SSL_kDHE; } if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { *pname = "ECDHE"; return SSL_kECDHE; } if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { *pname = "PSK"; return SSL_kPSK; } if (alg_k & SSL_kRSAPSK) { *pname = "RSAPSK"; return SSL_kRSAPSK; } if (alg_k & SSL_kDHEPSK) { *pname = "DHEPSK"; return SSL_kDHEPSK; } if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHEPSK) { *pname = "ECDHEPSK"; return SSL_kECDHEPSK; } if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { *pname = "SRP"; return SSL_kSRP; } if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { *pname = "GOST"; return SSL_kGOST; } *pname = "UNKNOWN"; return 0; } static int ssl_print_client_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { const char *algname; int id; id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl); BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname); if (id & SSL_PSK) { if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "psk_identity", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } switch (id) { case SSL_kRSA: case SSL_kRSAPSK: if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) { ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", msg, msglen); } else { if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } break; case SSL_kDHE: case SSL_kDHEPSK: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_Yc", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL_kECDHE: case SSL_kECDHEPSK: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "ecdh_Yc", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; } return !msglen; } static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { const char *algname; int id; id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl); BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname); if (id & SSL_PSK) { if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "psk_identity_hint", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } switch (id) { case SSL_kRSA: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_modulus", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_exponent", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL_kDHE: case SSL_kDHEPSK: if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_p", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_g", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_Ys", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_kECDHE: case SSL_kECDHEPSK: if (msglen < 1) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); if (msg[0] == EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE) BIO_puts(bio, "explicit_prime\n"); else if (msg[0] == EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE) BIO_puts(bio, "explicit_char2\n"); else if (msg[0] == NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) { int curve; if (msglen < 3) return 0; curve = (msg[1] << 8) | msg[2]; BIO_printf(bio, "named_curve: %s (%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(curve, ssl_curve_tbl), curve); msg += 3; msglen -= 3; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "point", 1, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } else { BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN CURVE PARAMETER TYPE %d\n", msg[0]); return 0; } break; # endif case SSL_kPSK: case SSL_kRSAPSK: break; } if (!(id & SSL_PSK)) ssl_print_signature(bio, indent, ssl, &msg, &msglen); return !msglen; } static int ssl_print_certificate(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char **pmsg, size_t *pmsglen) { size_t msglen = *pmsglen; size_t clen; X509 *x; const unsigned char *p = *pmsg, *q; if (msglen < 3) return 0; clen = (p[0] << 16) | (p[1] << 8) | p[2]; if (msglen < clen + 3) return 0; q = p + 3; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "ASN.1Cert, length=%d", (int)clen); x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, clen); if (!x) BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); else { BIO_puts(bio, "\n------details-----\n"); X509_print_ex(bio, x, XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0); PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, x); /* Print certificate stuff */ BIO_puts(bio, "------------------\n"); X509_free(x); } if (q != p + 3 + clen) { BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } *pmsg += clen + 3; *pmsglen -= clen + 3; return 1; } static int ssl_print_certificates(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t clen; if (msglen < 3) return 0; clen = (msg[0] << 16) | (msg[1] << 8) | msg[2]; if (msglen != clen + 3) return 0; msg += 3; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_list, length=%d\n", (int)clen); while (clen > 0) { if (!ssl_print_certificate(bio, indent + 2, &msg, &clen)) return 0; } return 1; } static int ssl_print_cert_request(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *s, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { size_t xlen; if (msglen < 1) return 0; xlen = msg[0]; if (msglen < xlen + 1) return 0; msg++; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_types (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen); if (!ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, msg, xlen, 1, ssl_ctype_tbl)) return 0; msg += xlen; msglen -= xlen + 1; if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) goto skip_sig; if (msglen < 2) return 0; xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; if (msglen < xlen + 2 || (xlen & 1)) return 0; msg += 2; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "signature_algorithms (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen); while (xlen > 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s+%s (%d+%d)\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_md_tbl), ssl_trace_str(msg[1], ssl_sig_tbl), msg[0], msg[1]); xlen -= 2; msg += 2; } msg += xlen; msglen -= xlen + 2; skip_sig: xlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); if (msglen < xlen + 2) return 0; msg += 2; msglen -= 2; BIO_printf(bio, "certificate_authorities (len=%d)\n", (int)xlen); while (xlen > 0) { size_t dlen; X509_NAME *nm; const unsigned char *p; if (xlen < 2) return 0; dlen = (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1]; if (xlen < dlen + 2) return 0; msg += 2; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "DistinguishedName (len=%d): ", (int)dlen); p = msg; nm = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &p, dlen); if (!nm) { BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } else { X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, nm, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); X509_NAME_free(nm); } xlen -= dlen + 2; msg += dlen; } return 1; } static int ssl_print_ticket(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { unsigned int tick_life; if (msglen == 0) { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "No Ticket\n"); return 1; } if (msglen < 4) return 0; tick_life = (msg[0] << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; msglen -= 4; msg += 4; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "ticket_lifetime_hint=%u\n", tick_life); if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "ticket", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (msglen) return 0; return 1; } static int ssl_print_handshake(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen, int indent) { size_t hlen; unsigned char htype; if (msglen < 4) return 0; htype = msg[0]; hlen = (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Length=%d\n", ssl_trace_str(htype, ssl_handshake_tbl), (int)hlen); msg += 4; msglen -= 4; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { if (msglen < 8) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "message_seq=%d, fragment_offset=%d, " "fragment_length=%d\n", (msg[0] << 8) | msg[1], (msg[2] << 16) | (msg[3] << 8) | msg[4], (msg[5] << 16) | (msg[6] << 8) | msg[7]); msg += 8; msglen -= 8; } if (msglen < hlen) return 0; switch (htype) { case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: if (!ssl_print_client_hello(bio, ssl, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (!dtls_print_hello_vfyrequest(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO: if (!ssl_print_server_hello(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: if (!ssl_print_server_keyex(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: if (!ssl_print_client_keyex(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE: if (!ssl_print_certificates(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: if (!ssl_print_signature(bio, indent + 2, ssl, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: if (!ssl_print_cert_request(bio, indent + 2, ssl, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; case SSL3_MT_FINISHED: ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "verify_data", msg, msglen); break; case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE: if (msglen != 0) ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2, "unexpected value", msg, msglen); break; case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET: if (!ssl_print_ticket(bio, indent + 2, msg, msglen)) return 0; break; default: BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "Unsupported, hex dump follows:\n"); BIO_dump_indent(bio, (const char *)msg, msglen, indent + 4); } return 1; } static int ssl_print_heartbeat(BIO *bio, int indent, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { if (msglen < 3) return 0; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "HeartBeatMessageType: %s\n", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_hb_type_tbl)); msg++; msglen--; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent, "payload", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; ssl_print_hex(bio, indent, "padding", msg, msglen); return 1; } const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return ssl_trace_str(c->id & 0xFFFF, ssl_ciphers_tbl); } void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t msglen, SSL *ssl, void *arg) { const unsigned char *msg = buf; BIO *bio = arg; switch (content_type) { case SSL3_RT_HEADER: { int hvers = msg[1] << 8 | msg[2]; BIO_puts(bio, write_p ? "Sent" : "Received"); BIO_printf(bio, " Record\nHeader:\n Version = %s (0x%x)\n", ssl_trace_str(hvers, ssl_version_tbl), hvers); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { BIO_printf(bio, " epoch=%d, sequence_number=%04x%04x%04x\n", (msg[3] << 8 | msg[4]), (msg[5] << 8 | msg[6]), (msg[7] << 8 | msg[8]), (msg[9] << 8 | msg[10])); } BIO_printf(bio, " Content Type = %s (%d)\n Length = %d", ssl_trace_str(msg[0], ssl_content_tbl), msg[0], msg[msglen - 2] << 8 | msg[msglen - 1]); } break; case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: if (!ssl_print_handshake(bio, ssl, msg, msglen, 4)) BIO_printf(bio, "Message length parse error!\n"); break; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: if (msglen == 1 && msg[0] == 1) BIO_puts(bio, " change_cipher_spec (1)\n"); else ssl_print_hex(bio, 4, "unknown value", msg, msglen); break; case SSL3_RT_ALERT: if (msglen != 2) BIO_puts(bio, " Illegal Alert Length\n"); else { BIO_printf(bio, " Level=%s(%d), description=%s(%d)\n", SSL_alert_type_string_long(msg[0] << 8), msg[0], SSL_alert_desc_string_long(msg[1]), msg[1]); } case DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT: ssl_print_heartbeat(bio, 4, msg, msglen); break; } BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/t1_reneg.c0000644000000000000000000001206713176625661014535 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" /* Add the client's renegotiation binding */ int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen) { if (p) { if ((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1) > maxlen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } /* Length byte */ *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len; p++; memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len); } *len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1; return 1; } /* * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { unsigned int ilen; const unsigned char *d; /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &d, ilen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; } if (memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; return 1; } /* Add the server's renegotiation binding */ int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen) { if (p) { if ((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1) > maxlen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } /* Length byte */ *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; p++; memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len); p += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len; memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len); } *len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1; return 1; } /* * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { unsigned int expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; unsigned int ilen; const unsigned char *data; /* Check for logic errors */ OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len); OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len); /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } /* Consistency check */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != expected_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/tls_srp.c0000644000000000000000000002774513176625661014530 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return 0; OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login); OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.info); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.N); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.g); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.s); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.B); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.A); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.a); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.b); BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.v); memset(&ctx->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx->srp_ctx)); ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N; return (1); } int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_st *s) { if (s == NULL) return 0; OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v); memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx)); s->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N; return (1); } int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_st *s) { SSL_CTX *ctx; if ((s == NULL) || ((ctx = s->ctx) == NULL)) return 0; memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx)); s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg; /* set client Hello login callback */ s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback; /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback; /* set SRP client passwd callback */ s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback; s->srp_ctx.strength = ctx->srp_ctx.strength; if (((ctx->srp_ctx.N != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)) || ((ctx->srp_ctx.g != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.g)) == NULL)) || ((ctx->srp_ctx.s != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.s)) == NULL)) || ((ctx->srp_ctx.B != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.B)) == NULL)) || ((ctx->srp_ctx.A != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.A)) == NULL)) || ((ctx->srp_ctx.a != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.a = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.a)) == NULL)) || ((ctx->srp_ctx.v != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.v)) == NULL)) || ((ctx->srp_ctx.b != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.b = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.b)) == NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.login)) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((ctx->srp_ctx.info != NULL) && ((s->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.info)) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask; return (1); err: OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b); BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v); memset(&s->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(s->srp_ctx)); return (0); } int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return 0; memset(&ctx->srp_ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx->srp_ctx)); ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N; return (1); } /* server side */ int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad) { unsigned char b[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int al; *ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; if ((s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL) && ((al = s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback(s, ad, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg)) != SSL_ERROR_NONE)) return al; *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.v == NULL)) return SSL3_AL_FATAL; if (RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0) return SSL3_AL_FATAL; s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b, sizeof(b), NULL); OPENSSL_cleanse(b, sizeof(b)); /* Calculate: B = (kv + g^b) % N */ return ((s->srp_ctx.B = SRP_Calc_B(s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g, s->srp_ctx.v)) != NULL) ? SSL_ERROR_NONE : SSL3_AL_FATAL; } /* * If the server just has the raw password, make up a verifier entry on the * fly */ int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp) { SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN(grp); if (GN == NULL) return -1; s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(GN->N); s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(GN->g); BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.v); s->srp_ctx.v = NULL; BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.s); s->srp_ctx.s = NULL; if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN (user, pass, &s->srp_ctx.s, &s->srp_ctx.v, GN->N, GN->g)) return -1; return 1; } int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info) { if (N != NULL) { if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.N, N)) { BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N); s->srp_ctx.N = NULL; } } else s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(N); } if (g != NULL) { if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.g, g)) { BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g); s->srp_ctx.g = NULL; } } else s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(g); } if (sa != NULL) { if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.s, sa)) { BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s); s->srp_ctx.s = NULL; } } else s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(sa); } if (v != NULL) { if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL) { if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.v, v)) { BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v); s->srp_ctx.v = NULL; } } else s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(v); } if (info != NULL) { if (s->srp_ctx.info) OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.info); if ((s->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup(info)) == NULL) return -1; } if (!(s->srp_ctx.N) || !(s->srp_ctx.g) || !(s->srp_ctx.s) || !(s->srp_ctx.v)) return -1; return 1; } int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s) { BIGNUM *K = NULL, *u = NULL; int ret = -1, tmp_len = 0; unsigned char *tmp = NULL; if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N)) goto err; if ((u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL) goto err; if ((K = SRP_Calc_server_key(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.v, u, s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL) goto err; tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K); if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) goto err; BN_bn2bin(K, tmp); ret = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, tmp, tmp_len, 1); err: BN_clear_free(K); BN_clear_free(u); return ret; } /* client side */ int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s) { BIGNUM *x = NULL, *u = NULL, *K = NULL; int ret = -1, tmp_len = 0; char *passwd = NULL; unsigned char *tmp = NULL; /* * Checks if b % n == 0 */ if (SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N) == 0) goto err; if ((u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL) goto err; if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback == NULL) goto err; if (! (passwd = s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))) goto err; if ((x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s, s->srp_ctx.login, passwd)) == NULL) goto err; if ((K = SRP_Calc_client_key(s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.g, x, s->srp_ctx.a, u)) == NULL) goto err; tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K); if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) goto err; BN_bn2bin(K, tmp); ret = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, tmp, tmp_len, 1); err: BN_clear_free(K); BN_clear_free(x); if (passwd != NULL) OPENSSL_clear_free(passwd, strlen(passwd)); BN_clear_free(u); return ret; } int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al) { SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx; /* * Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0 by checking B * != 0 since B < N */ if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >= 0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(srp->B)) { *al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength) { *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY; return 0; } if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback) { if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0) { *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY; return 0; } } else if (!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY; return 0; } return 1; } int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s) { unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0) return 0; s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a); OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g))) return 0; return 1; } BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s) { if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL) return s->srp_ctx.g; return s->ctx->srp_ctx.g; } BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s) { if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL) return s->srp_ctx.N; return s->ctx->srp_ctx.N; } char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s) { if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) return s->srp_ctx.login; return s->ctx->srp_ctx.login; } char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s) { if (s->srp_ctx.info != NULL) return s->srp_ctx.info; return s->ctx->srp_ctx.info; } # define tls1_ctx_ctrl ssl3_ctx_ctrl # define tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name) { return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME, 0, name); } int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password) { return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD, 0, password); } int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength) { return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH, strength, NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, void *)) { return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG, 0, arg); } int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *)) { return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *)) { return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/d1_lib.c0000644000000000000000000007714713176625661014175 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # include #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # include #endif static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t); static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len); static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s); static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void); /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 }; const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, dtls1_set_handshake_header, dtls1_handshake_write }; const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, dtls1_set_handshake_header, dtls1_handshake_write }; long dtls1_default_timeout(void) { /* * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for * http, the cache would over fill */ return (60 * 60 * 2); } int dtls1_new(SSL *s) { DTLS1_STATE *d1; if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) { return 0; } if (!ssl3_new(s)) return (0); if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) { ssl3_free(s); return (0); } d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new(); d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new(); if (s->server) { d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie); } d1->link_mtu = 0; d1->mtu = 0; if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) { pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages); pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages); OPENSSL_free(d1); ssl3_free(s); return (0); } s->d1 = d1; s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); } static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s) { dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); } void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s) { pitem *item = NULL; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); pitem_free(item); } } void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s) { pitem *item = NULL; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); pitem_free(item); } } void dtls1_free(SSL *s) { DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer); ssl3_free(s); dtls1_clear_queues(s); pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages); pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages); OPENSSL_free(s->d1); s->d1 = NULL; } void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) { pqueue *buffered_messages; pqueue *sent_messages; unsigned int mtu; unsigned int link_mtu; DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer); if (s->d1) { buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages; sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages; mtu = s->d1->mtu; link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu; dtls1_clear_queues(s); memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1)); if (s->server) { s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie); } if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) { s->d1->mtu = mtu; s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu; } s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages; s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages; } ssl3_clear(s); if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT) s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER; #endif else s->version = s->method->version; } long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { int ret = 0; switch (cmd) { case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT: if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) { ret = 1; } break; case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT: ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s); break; case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU: if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu()) return 0; s->d1->link_mtu = larg; return 1; case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU: return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu(); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: /* * We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu() * We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead */ if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD) return 0; s->d1->mtu = larg; return larg; default: ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg); break; } return (ret); } void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Disable timer for SCTP */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout)); return; } #endif /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */ if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) { s->d1->timeout_duration = 1; } /* Set timeout to current time */ get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout)); /* Add duration to current time */ s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout)); } struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft) { struct timeval timenow; /* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */ if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) { return NULL; } /* Get current time */ get_current_time(&timenow); /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */ if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec || (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) { memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft)); return timeleft; } /* Calculate time left until timer expires */ memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval)); timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec; timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec; if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) { timeleft->tv_sec--; timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000; } /* * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues * because of small divergences with socket timeouts. */ if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) { memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft)); } return timeleft; } int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s) { struct timeval timeleft; /* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */ if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) { return 0; } /* Return false if timer is not expired yet */ if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) { return 0; } /* Timer expired, so return true */ return 1; } void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s) { s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2; if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60) s->d1->timeout_duration = 60; dtls1_start_timer(s); } void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s) { /* Reset everything */ memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout)); memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout)); s->d1->timeout_duration = 1; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout)); /* Clear retransmission buffer */ dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); } int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s) { unsigned int mtu; s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++; /* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */ if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL); if (mtu < s->d1->mtu) s->d1->mtu = mtu; } if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) { /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED); return -1; } return 0; } int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s) { /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */ if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) { return 0; } dtls1_double_timeout(s); if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) return -1; s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++; if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) { s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; return dtls1_heartbeat(s); } #endif dtls1_start_timer(s); return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); } static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) { #if defined(_WIN32) SYSTEMTIME st; union { unsigned __int64 ul; FILETIME ft; } now; GetSystemTime(&st); SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft); /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */ # ifdef __MINGW32__ now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL; # else /* *INDENT-OFF* */ now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* *INDENT-ON* */ # endif t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000); t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10; #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) struct timeb tb; ftime(&tb); t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time; t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000; #else gettimeofday(t, NULL); #endif } #define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2 #define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client) { int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0; unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH]; unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; const unsigned char *data; unsigned char *p, *buf; unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen; unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen; BIO *rbio, *wbio; BUF_MEM *bufm; BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL; PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); } /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ if (!SSL_clear(s)) return -1; ERR_clear_error(); rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (!rbio || !wbio) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); return -1; } /* * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for accept to handle. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL); /* * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via * SSL_accept) */ if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); return -1; } if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { BUF_MEM_free(bufm); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } s->init_buf = bufm; } buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; do { /* Get a packet */ clear_sys_error(); /* * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped * in the record length check below. */ n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); if (n <= 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(rbio)) { /* Non-blocking IO */ goto end; } return -1; } /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */ clearpkt = 1; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting, * length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be * logged for diagnostic purposes." */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto end; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Get the record header */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype) || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto end; } if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto end; } /* * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is * the same. */ if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); goto end; } if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1) /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto end; } /* * We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could * be a second record (but we ignore it) */ /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */ if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto end; } /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */ data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt); /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype) || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen) || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq) || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff) || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen) || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto end; } if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto end; } /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */ if (msgseq > 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER); goto end; } /* * We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst * listening because that would require server side state (which is * against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest * mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment * and require that the cookie must be contained within it. */ if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) { /* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO); goto end; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data, fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto end; } /* * Verify client version is supported */ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto end; } if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) { /* * Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial * ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto end; } /* * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a * HelloVerifyRequest. */ if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) { next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST; } else { /* * We have a cookie, so lets check it. */ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK); /* This is fatal */ return -1; } if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt), PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) == 0) { /* * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as * per RFC6347 */ next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST; } else { /* Cookie verification succeeded */ next = LISTEN_SUCCESS; } } if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) { /* * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying * to resend, we just drop it. */ /* * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return * value */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL); BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL); /* Generate the cookie */ if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 || cookielen > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); /* This is fatal */ return -1; } p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]; msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, cookie, cookielen); *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; /* Message length */ l2n3(msglen, p); /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */ s2n(0, p); /* * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0 * and fragment length is message length */ l2n3(0, p); l2n3(msglen, p); /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */ reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* Add the record header */ p = buf; *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; /* * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. */ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; } else { *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; } /* * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received * ClientHello */ memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); p += SEQ_NUM_SIZE; /* Length */ s2n(reclen, p); /* * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record * header */ reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } /* * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but * maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not * support this. */ if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) { (void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient); } BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient); tmpclient = NULL; if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) { if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) { /* * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just * going to drop this packet. */ goto end; } return -1; } if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) { /* * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just * going to drop this packet. */ goto end; } return -1; } } } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS); /* * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake. */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq); /* * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the * SSL object */ SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); /* * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify * exchange */ ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s); /* * Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address */ if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0) BIO_ADDR_clear(client); ret = 1; clearpkt = 0; end: BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL); if (clearpkt) { /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */ BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); } return ret; } #endif static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) { dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len); s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0)) return 0; return 1; } static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s) { return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding) ( \ 1 /* heartbeat type */ + \ 2 /* heartbeat length */ + \ (payload) + (padding)) # define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16) int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length) { unsigned char *pl; unsigned short hbtype; unsigned int payload; unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Read type and payload length */ if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(0) > length) return 0; /* silently discard */ if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ hbtype = *p++; n2s(p, payload); if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) > length) return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ pl = p; if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { unsigned char *buffer, *bp; unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding); int r; if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; /* Allocate memory for the response. */ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length); if (buffer == NULL) return -1; bp = buffer; /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; s2n(payload, bp); memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length); if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); OPENSSL_free(buffer); if (r < 0) return r; } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { unsigned int seq; /* * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number */ n2s(pl, seq); if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_seq++; s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; } } return 0; } int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf, *p; int ret = -1; unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ unsigned int size; /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); return -1; } /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); return -1; } /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return -1; } /*- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number * as payload to distinguish different messages and add * some random stuff. */ size = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size); if (buf == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } p = buf; /* Message Type */ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ s2n(payload, p); /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 16; /* Random padding */ if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size); if (ret >= 0) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size, s, s->msg_callback_arg); dtls1_start_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; } err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return ret; } #endif int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) { int ret; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP BIO *wbio; wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (ret == 0) BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL); } #endif ret = ssl3_shutdown(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL); #endif return ret; } int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s) { if (s->d1->link_mtu) { s->d1->mtu = s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); s->d1->link_mtu = 0; } /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); /* * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { /* Set to min mtu */ s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, s->d1->mtu, NULL); } } else return 0; } return 1; } static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void) { return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); } unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s) { return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_locl.h0000644000000000000000000024273013176625661014652 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H # include # include # include # include # include "e_os.h" # if defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) # include /* struct timeval for DTLS */ # endif # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include "record/record.h" # include "statem/statem.h" # include "packet_locl.h" # include "internal/dane.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif # undef PKCS1_CHECK # define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ # define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } # define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff)) # define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) # define n2l8(c,l) (l =((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<56, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<48, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))) # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ # define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } # define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)((c)[0]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned int)((c)[1])) )),(c)+=2) # define s2n(s,c) (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \ (c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),(c)+=2) # define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)((c)[0]))<<16)| \ (((unsigned long)((c)[1]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned long)((c)[2])) )),(c)+=3) # define l2n3(l,c) (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ (c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ (c)[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),(c)+=3) /* * DTLS version numbers are strange because they're inverted. Except for * DTLS1_BAD_VER, which should be considered "lower" than the rest. */ # define dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) (((v1) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 0xff00 : (v1)) # define DTLS_VERSION_GT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) < dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) # define DTLS_VERSION_GE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) <= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) # define DTLS_VERSION_LT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) > dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) # define DTLS_VERSION_LE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) >= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) /* LOCAL STUFF */ # define SSL_DECRYPT 0 # define SSL_ENCRYPT 1 # define TWO_BYTE_BIT 0x80 # define SEC_ESC_BIT 0x40 # define TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x7fff # define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff # define INC32(a) ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL) # define DEC32(a) ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL) # define MAX_MAC_SIZE 20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */ /* * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms. * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms * can be publicly accessed. * Use the according functions for cipher management instead. * * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive: * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME. */ /* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */ /* RSA key exchange */ # define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001U /* tmp DH key no DH cert */ # define SSL_kDHE 0x00000002U /* synonym */ # define SSL_kEDH SSL_kDHE /* ephemeral ECDH */ # define SSL_kECDHE 0x00000004U /* synonym */ # define SSL_kEECDH SSL_kECDHE /* PSK */ # define SSL_kPSK 0x00000008U /* GOST key exchange */ # define SSL_kGOST 0x00000010U /* SRP */ # define SSL_kSRP 0x00000020U # define SSL_kRSAPSK 0x00000040U # define SSL_kECDHEPSK 0x00000080U # define SSL_kDHEPSK 0x00000100U /* all PSK */ # define SSL_PSK (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kDHEPSK) /* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */ /* RSA auth */ # define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001U /* DSS auth */ # define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002U /* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */ # define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004U /* ECDSA auth*/ # define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000008U /* PSK auth */ # define SSL_aPSK 0x00000010U /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000020U /* SRP auth */ # define SSL_aSRP 0x00000040U /* GOST R 34.10-2012 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST12 0x00000080U /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */ # define SSL_DES 0x00000001U # define SSL_3DES 0x00000002U # define SSL_RC4 0x00000004U # define SSL_RC2 0x00000008U # define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010U # define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020U # define SSL_AES128 0x00000040U # define SSL_AES256 0x00000080U # define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100U # define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200U # define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400U # define SSL_SEED 0x00000800U # define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00001000U # define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00002000U # define SSL_AES128CCM 0x00004000U # define SSL_AES256CCM 0x00008000U # define SSL_AES128CCM8 0x00010000U # define SSL_AES256CCM8 0x00020000U # define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12 0x00040000U # define SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305 0x00080000U # define SSL_AESGCM (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM) # define SSL_AESCCM (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8) # define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AESGCM|SSL_AESCCM) # define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256) # define SSL_CHACHA20 (SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) /* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */ # define SSL_MD5 0x00000001U # define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002U # define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004U # define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008U # define SSL_SHA256 0x00000010U # define SSL_SHA384 0x00000020U /* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */ # define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040U # define SSL_GOST12_256 0x00000080U # define SSL_GOST89MAC12 0x00000100U # define SSL_GOST12_512 0x00000200U /* * When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSL_MD_NUM_IDX make * sure to update this constant too */ # define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 # define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 # define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 # define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 # define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 # define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 # define SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 # define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 # define SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 # define SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 # define SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 # define SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 # define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 12 /* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */ /* Bits 0-7 are handshake MAC */ # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK 0xFF # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1 SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_512 SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1 /* Bits 8-15 bits are PRF */ # define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 8 # define TLS1_PRF_SHA1_MD5 (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 (SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_512 (SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) /* * Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also * goes into algorithm2) */ # define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x10000 # define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x0000001FU # define SSL_DEFAULT_MASK 0X00000020U # define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000001U # define SSL_LOW 0x00000002U # define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000004U # define SSL_HIGH 0x00000008U # define SSL_FIPS 0x00000010U # define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT 0x00000020U /* we have used 0000003f - 26 bits left to go */ /* Check if an SSL structure is using DTLS */ # define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) /* See if we need explicit IV */ # define SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV) /* * See if we use signature algorithms extension and signature algorithm * before signatures. */ # define SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS) /* * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may * apply to others in future. */ # define SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS) /* * Determine if a client can use TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: can't rely on method * flags because it may not be set to correct version yet. */ # define SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \ ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) || \ (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(s->client_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION))) /* * Determine if a client should send signature algorithms extension: * as with TLS1.2 cipher we can't rely on method flags. */ # define SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s) \ SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) # define SSL_READ_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ) # define SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE) /* Mostly for SSLv3 */ # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0 # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1 # define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2 # define SSL_PKEY_ECC 3 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 4 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 5 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 6 # define SSL_PKEY_NUM 7 /* * Pseudo-constant. GOST cipher suites can use different certs for 1 * SSL_CIPHER. So let's see which one we have in fact. */ # define SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC SSL_PKEY_NUM+1 /*- * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN) * SSL_kDHE <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN */ /*- #define CERT_INVALID 0 #define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2 */ /* CipherSuite length. SSLv3 and all TLS versions. */ # define TLS_CIPHER_LEN 2 /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */ struct ssl_cipher_st { uint32_t valid; const char *name; /* text name */ uint32_t id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ /* * changed in 1.0.0: these four used to be portions of a single value * 'algorithms' */ uint32_t algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */ uint32_t algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */ uint32_t algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */ uint32_t algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */ int min_tls; /* minimum SSL/TLS protocol version */ int max_tls; /* maximum SSL/TLS protocol version */ int min_dtls; /* minimum DTLS protocol version */ int max_dtls; /* maximum DTLS protocol version */ uint32_t algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ uint32_t algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ int32_t strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ uint32_t alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ }; /* Used to hold SSL/TLS functions */ struct ssl_method_st { int version; unsigned flags; unsigned long mask; int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len); int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr); int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *ptr); int (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s); int (*num_ciphers) (void); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher); long (*get_timeout) (void); const struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */ int (*ssl_version) (void); long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); }; /*- * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER, -- structure version number * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number * Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID * Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID * Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer' * HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension * PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint * PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity * Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket * Ticket [10] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only) * Compression_meth [11] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method * SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username * flags [ 13 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER -- optional flags * } * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-). */ struct ssl_session_st { int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being kept * in here? */ int master_key_length; unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; /* session_id - valid? */ unsigned int session_id_length; unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via * SSL_new */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char *psk_identity_hint; char *psk_identity; # endif /* * Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications * can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb * to disable session caching and tickets. */ int not_resumable; /* This is the cert and type for the other end. */ X509 *peer; int peer_type; /* Certificate chain peer sent */ STACK_OF(X509) *peer_chain; /* * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */ long verify_result; /* only for servers */ int references; long timeout; long time; unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used to * load the 'cipher' structure */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */ /* * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to * implement a maximum cache size. */ struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next; char *tlsext_hostname; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* RFC4507 info */ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ unsigned long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in * seconds */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srp_username; # endif uint32_t flags; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; /* Extended master secret support */ # define SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS 0x1 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP typedef struct srp_ctx_st { /* param for all the callbacks */ void *SRP_cb_arg; /* set client Hello login callback */ int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *); /* set SRP client passwd callback */ char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *); char *login; BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A; BIGNUM *a, *b, *v; char *info; int strength; unsigned long srp_Mask; } SRP_CTX; # endif struct ssl_comp_st { int id; const char *name; COMP_METHOD *method; }; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION); /* Needed in ssl_cert.c */ DEFINE_LHASH_OF(X509_NAME); # define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16 struct ssl_ctx_st { const SSL_METHOD *method; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; /* same as above but sorted for lookup */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store; LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions; /* * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */ unsigned long session_cache_size; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail; /* * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT, * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which * means only SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS. */ uint32_t session_cache_mode; /* * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when * SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set * things up */ long session_timeout; /* * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id * is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it. * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is * removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will * SSL_SESSION_free() it. */ int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); struct { int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */ int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */ int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */ int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */ int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */ int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */ int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */ int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in the cache was * passed back via the callback. This * indicates that the application is supplying * session-id's from other processes - spooky * :-) */ } stats; int references; /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */ int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *); void *app_verify_arg; /* * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */ /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* get client cert callback */ int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); /* cookie generate callback */ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); /* verify cookie callback */ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */ /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* what we put in client cert requests */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; /* * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by * SSL_new) */ uint32_t options; uint32_t mode; int min_proto_version; int max_proto_version; long max_cert_list; struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; int read_ahead; /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; uint32_t verify_mode; unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */ int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; int quiet_shutdown; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT CTLOG_STORE *ctlog_store; /* CT Log Store */ /* * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. */ ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback; void *ct_validation_callback_arg; # endif /* * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data * up between the pipes? */ unsigned int split_send_fragment; /* * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads. */ unsigned int max_send_fragment; /* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */ unsigned int max_pipelines; /* The default read buffer length to use (0 means not set) */ size_t default_read_buf_len; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Engine to pass requests for client certs to */ ENGINE *client_cert_engine; # endif /* TLS extensions servername callback */ int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); void *tlsext_servername_arg; /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */ unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[32]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[32]; /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); /* certificate status request info */ /* Callback for status request */ int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *tlsext_status_arg; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* Next protocol negotiation information */ /* * For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of * advertised protocols can be provided. */ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, unsigned int *len, void *arg); void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next * protocol from the list provided by the server. */ int (*next_proto_select_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg); void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; # endif /* * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to * ALPN.) */ /*- * For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the * server to select the protocol for the connection. * out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol * name (without the length prefix). * outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|. * in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in * wire-format. * inlen: the length of |in|. */ int (*alpn_select_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg); void *alpn_select_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire * format. */ unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list; unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len; /* Shared DANE context */ struct dane_ctx_st dane; /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; /* * Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session * basis, depending on the chosen cipher. */ int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* EC extension values inherited by SSL structure */ size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* ext status type used for CSR extension (OCSP Stapling) */ int tlsext_status_type; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; struct ssl_st { /* * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, * DTLS1_VERSION) */ int version; /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *method; /* * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This * is so data can be read and written to different handlers */ /* used by SSL_read */ BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ BIO *wbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */ BIO *bbio; /* * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1 * is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */ int rwstate; int (*handshake_func) (SSL *); /* * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an * "init" member. */ /* are we the server side? */ int server; /* * Generate a new session or reuse an old one. * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously * cached session or even the previous session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ int new_session; /* don't send shutdown packets */ int quiet_shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */ int shutdown; /* where we are */ OSSL_STATEM statem; BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by * ssl3_get_message() */ int init_num; /* amount read/written */ int init_off; /* amount read/written */ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int hit; /* reusing a previous session */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; /* Per connection DANE state */ SSL_DANE dane; /* crypto */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; /* * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to * be 'copied' into these ones */ uint32_t mac_flags; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ /* session info */ /* client cert? */ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; /* * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in * the appropriate context */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */ SSL_SESSION *session; /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; /* Used in SSL3 */ /* * 0 don't care about verify failure. * 1 fail if verify fails */ uint32_t verify_mode; /* fail if callback returns 0 */ int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* optional informational callback */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* error bytes to be written */ int error; /* actual code */ int error_code; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); # endif SSL_CTX *ctx; /* Verified chain of peer */ STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain; long verify_result; /* extra application data */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; int references; /* protocol behaviour */ uint32_t options; /* API behaviour */ uint32_t mode; int min_proto_version; int max_proto_version; long max_cert_list; int first_packet; /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */ int client_version; /* * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data * up between the pipes? */ unsigned int split_send_fragment; /* * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads. */ unsigned int max_send_fragment; /* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */ unsigned int max_pipelines; /* TLS extension debug callback */ void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); void *tlsext_debug_arg; char *tlsext_hostname; /*- * no further mod of servername * 0 : call the servername extension callback. * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback. * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello */ int servername_done; /* certificate status request info */ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ int tlsext_status_type; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. */ ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback; /* User-supplied argument tha tis passed to the ct_validation_callback */ void *ct_validation_callback_arg; /* * Consolidated stack of SCTs from all sources. * Lazily populated by CT_get_peer_scts(SSL*) */ STACK_OF(SCT) *scts; /* Raw extension data, if seen */ unsigned char *tlsext_scts; /* Length of raw extension data, if seen */ uint16_t tlsext_scts_len; /* Have we attempted to find/parse SCTs yet? */ int scts_parsed; # endif /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ int tlsext_status_expected; /* OCSP status request only */ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids; X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts; /* OCSP response received or to be sent */ unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp; int tlsext_ocsp_resplen; /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int tlsext_ticket_expected; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */ TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket; /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */ tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb; void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg; /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */ tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb; void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; SSL_CTX *session_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello * extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before * the Finished message. */ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; # endif /* What we'll do */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; /* What's been chosen */ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile; /*- * Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated? * 0: disabled * 1: enabled * 2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests */ unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat; /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */ unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending; /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */ unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq; /* * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire * format. */ unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list; unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len; /* Set to one if we have negotiated ETM */ int tlsext_use_etm; /*- * 1 if we are renegotiating. * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */ int renegotiate; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* ctx for SRP authentication */ SRP_CTX srp_ctx; # endif /* * Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session * basis, depending on the chosen cipher. */ int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure); RECORD_LAYER rlayer; /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* Async Job info */ ASYNC_JOB *job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; typedef struct ssl3_state_st { long flags; int read_mac_secret_size; unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int write_mac_secret_size; unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */ int need_empty_fragments; int empty_fragment_done; /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */ BIO *handshake_buffer; /* * When handshake digest is determined, buffer is hashed and * freed and MD_CTX for the required digest is stored here. */ EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_dgst; /* * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed. * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received. * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert. */ int change_cipher_spec; int warn_alert; int fatal_alert; /* * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close * alert via the warning alert */ int alert_dispatch; unsigned char send_alert[2]; /* * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there * is no more data in the read or write buffers */ int renegotiate; int total_renegotiations; int num_renegotiations; int in_read_app_data; struct { /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int finish_md_len; unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int peer_finish_md_len; unsigned long message_size; int message_type; /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher; # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */ # endif /* used for certificate requests */ int cert_req; int ctype_num; char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER]; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names; int key_block_length; unsigned char *key_block; const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc; const EVP_MD *new_hash; int new_mac_pkey_type; int new_mac_secret_size; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const SSL_COMP *new_compression; # else char *new_compression; # endif int cert_request; /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */ unsigned char *ciphers_raw; size_t ciphers_rawlen; /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */ unsigned char *pms; size_t pmslen; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Temporary storage for PSK key */ unsigned char *psk; size_t psklen; # endif /* * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate * request for client. */ unsigned char *peer_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t peer_sigalgslen; /* Digest peer uses for signing */ const EVP_MD *peer_md; /* Array of digests used for signing */ const EVP_MD *md[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current * SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc. * If zero it can't be used at all. */ uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of * *disabled* algorithms based on the current session. */ uint32_t mask_k; uint32_t mask_a; /* * The following are used by the client to see if a cipher is allowed or * not. It contains the minimum and maximum version the client's using * based on what it knows so far. */ int min_ver; int max_ver; } tmp; /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char previous_client_finished_len; unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char previous_server_finished_len; int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */ int next_proto_neg_seen; # endif /* * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to * ALPN.) */ /* * In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol * that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed. */ unsigned char *alpn_selected; size_t alpn_selected_len; /* used by the server to know what options were proposed */ unsigned char *alpn_proposed; size_t alpn_proposed_len; /* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */ int alpn_sent; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */ char is_probably_safari; # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* For clients: peer temporary key */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp; # endif } SSL3_STATE; /* DTLS structures */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP" # endif /* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */ # define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD 48 /* * Flag used in message reuse to indicate the buffer contains the record * header as well as the the handshake message header. */ # define DTLS1_SKIP_RECORD_HEADER 2 struct dtls1_retransmit_state { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ SSL_SESSION *session; unsigned short epoch; }; struct hm_header_st { unsigned char type; unsigned long msg_len; unsigned short seq; unsigned long frag_off; unsigned long frag_len; unsigned int is_ccs; struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_retransmit_state; }; struct dtls1_timeout_st { /* Number of read timeouts so far */ unsigned int read_timeouts; /* Number of write timeouts so far */ unsigned int write_timeouts; /* Number of alerts received so far */ unsigned int num_alerts; }; typedef struct hm_fragment_st { struct hm_header_st msg_header; unsigned char *fragment; unsigned char *reassembly; } hm_fragment; typedef struct pqueue_st pqueue; typedef struct pitem_st pitem; struct pitem_st { unsigned char priority[8]; /* 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */ void *data; pitem *next; }; typedef struct pitem_st *piterator; pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data); void pitem_free(pitem *item); pqueue *pqueue_new(void); void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item); pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue *pq, unsigned char *prio64be); pitem *pqueue_iterator(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *iter); int pqueue_size(pqueue *pq); typedef struct dtls1_state_st { unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH]; unsigned int cookie_len; unsigned int cookie_verified; /* handshake message numbers */ unsigned short handshake_write_seq; unsigned short next_handshake_write_seq; unsigned short handshake_read_seq; /* Buffered handshake messages */ pqueue *buffered_messages; /* Buffered (sent) handshake records */ pqueue *sent_messages; unsigned int link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */ unsigned int mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */ struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr; struct hm_header_st r_msg_hdr; struct dtls1_timeout_st timeout; /* * Indicates when the last handshake msg or heartbeat sent will timeout */ struct timeval next_timeout; /* Timeout duration */ unsigned short timeout_duration; unsigned int retransmitting; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int shutdown_received; # endif } DTLS1_STATE; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters */ # define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1 # define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2 # define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ typedef struct cert_pkey_st { X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *privatekey; /* Chain for this certificate */ STACK_OF(X509) *chain; /*- * serverinfo data for this certificate. The data is in TLS Extension * wire format, specifically it's a series of records like: * uint16_t extension_type; // (RFC 5246, 7.4.1.4, Extension) * uint16_t length; * uint8_t data[length]; */ unsigned char *serverinfo; size_t serverinfo_length; } CERT_PKEY; /* Retrieve Suite B flags */ # define tls1_suiteb(s) (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS) /* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \ (SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT) typedef struct { unsigned short ext_type; /* * Per-connection flags relating to this extension type: not used if * part of an SSL_CTX structure. */ uint32_t ext_flags; custom_ext_add_cb add_cb; custom_ext_free_cb free_cb; void *add_arg; custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb; void *parse_arg; } custom_ext_method; /* ext_flags values */ /* * Indicates an extension has been received. Used to check for unsolicited or * duplicate extensions. */ # define SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED 0x1 /* * Indicates an extension has been sent: used to enable sending of * corresponding ServerHello extension. */ # define SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT 0x2 typedef struct { custom_ext_method *meths; size_t meths_count; } custom_ext_methods; typedef struct cert_st { /* Current active set */ /* * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array * Probably it would make more sense to store * an index, not a pointer. */ CERT_PKEY *key; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *dh_tmp; DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); int dh_tmp_auto; # endif /* Flags related to certificates */ uint32_t cert_flags; CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * Certificate types (received or sent) in certificate request message. * On receive this is only set if number of certificate types exceeds * SSL3_CT_NUMBER. */ unsigned char *ctypes; size_t ctype_num; /* * supported signature algorithms. When set on a client this is sent in * the client hello as the supported signature algorithms extension. For * servers it represents the signature algorithms we are willing to use. */ unsigned char *conf_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t conf_sigalgslen; /* * Client authentication signature algorithms, if not set then uses * conf_sigalgs. On servers these will be the signature algorithms sent * to the client in a cerificate request for TLS 1.2. On a client this * represents the signature algortithms we are willing to use for client * authentication. */ unsigned char *client_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t client_sigalgslen; /* * Signature algorithms shared by client and server: cached because these * are used most often. */ TLS_SIGALGS *shared_sigalgs; size_t shared_sigalgslen; /* * Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a certificate * may be required (client or server). the callback can then examine any * appropriate parameters and setup any certificates required. This * allows advanced applications to select certificates on the fly: for * example based on supported signature algorithms or curves. */ int (*cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *cert_cb_arg; /* * Optional X509_STORE for chain building or certificate validation If * NULL the parent SSL_CTX store is used instead. */ X509_STORE *chain_store; X509_STORE *verify_store; /* Custom extension methods for server and client */ custom_ext_methods cli_ext; custom_ext_methods srv_ext; /* Security callback */ int (*sec_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); /* Security level */ int sec_level; void *sec_ex; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* If not NULL psk identity hint to use for servers */ char *psk_identity_hint; # endif int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; } CERT; /* Structure containing decoded values of signature algorithms extension */ struct tls_sigalgs_st { /* NID of hash algorithm */ int hash_nid; /* NID of signature algorithm */ int sign_nid; /* Combined hash and signature NID */ int signandhash_nid; /* Raw values used in extension */ unsigned char rsign; unsigned char rhash; }; # define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *)) /* * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-) */ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method { int (*enc) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned int, int); int (*mac) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int); int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *); int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int); int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int); int (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *); int finish_mac_length; const char *client_finished_label; int client_finished_label_len; const char *server_finished_label; int server_finished_label_len; int (*alert_value) (int); int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context); /* Various flags indicating protocol version requirements */ uint32_t enc_flags; /* Handshake header length */ unsigned int hhlen; /* Set the handshake header */ int (*set_handshake_header) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len); /* Write out handshake message */ int (*do_write) (SSL *s); } SSL3_ENC_METHOD; # define SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) s->method->ssl3_enc->hhlen # define ssl_handshake_start(s) \ (((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) + s->method->ssl3_enc->hhlen) # define ssl_set_handshake_header(s, htype, len) \ s->method->ssl3_enc->set_handshake_header(s, htype, len) # define ssl_do_write(s) s->method->ssl3_enc->do_write(s) /* Values for enc_flags */ /* Uses explicit IV for CBC mode */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV 0x1 /* Uses signature algorithms extension */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS 0x2 /* Uses SHA256 default PRF */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 0x4 /* Is DTLS */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS 0x8 /* * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may * apply to others in future. */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS 0x10 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */ typedef struct ssl3_comp_st { int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression * type */ char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */ COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */ } SSL3_COMP; # endif extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method; __owur const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver); __owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtls_bad_ver_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_client_method(void); extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data; /* * Flags for SSL methods */ # define SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS (1U<<0) # define SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB (1U<<1) # define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \ s_connect, enc_data) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ version, \ flags, \ mask, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ tls1_default_timeout, \ &enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL3_VERSION, \ SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS | SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, \ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, \ ssl3_new, \ ssl3_clear, \ ssl3_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ ssl3_default_timeout, \ &SSLv3_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \ s_connect, enc_data) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ version, \ flags, \ mask, \ dtls1_new, \ dtls1_clear, \ dtls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ dtls1_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ dtls1_read_bytes, \ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \ dtls1_dispatch_alert, \ dtls1_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ dtls1_default_timeout, \ &enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } struct openssl_ssl_test_functions { int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s); int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length); # endif }; const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version); # ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s); int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s); __owur CERT *ssl_cert_new(void); __owur CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert); void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c); void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c); __owur int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session); __owur int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id); __owur SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket); __owur int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); __owur int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted, const char *rule_str, CERT *c); void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode); __owur int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm); __owur int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr); __owur int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); __owur int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); __owur int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long arg); __owur X509 *ssl_cert_get0_next_certificate(CERT *c, int first); void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); __owur int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); __owur int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l); __owur int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags); __owur int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref); __owur int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other); __owur int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other); int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); __owur int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); __owur CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, size_t *serverinfo_length); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd); __owur int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type); void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void); void ssl_load_ciphers(void); __owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len); __owur int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen, int free_pms); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm); __owur int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); __owur int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p); int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc); __owur int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); __owur int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); __owur int ssl3_num_ciphers(void); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl); __owur int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen, unsigned char *p); __owur int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len); void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s); __owur unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr); __owur int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep); __owur int ssl3_new(SSL *s); void ssl3_free(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); __owur int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len); __owur int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len); __owur int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s); void ssl3_clear(SSL *s); __owur long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); __owur long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); __owur long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); __owur long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); __owur int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl); __owur long ssl3_default_timeout(void); __owur int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len); __owur int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version); __owur int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound); __owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version); int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version); __owur long tls1_default_timeout(void); __owur int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type); void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); __owur int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); __owur int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code); __owur int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs); __owur int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found); __owur int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr); __owur long dtls1_default_timeout(void); __owur struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft); __owur int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s); void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s); void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s); void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s); __owur unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned char cookie_len); __owur int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); __owur unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s); void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag); __owur int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_new(SSL *s); void tls1_free(SSL *s); void tls1_clear(SSL *s); long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); __owur int dtls1_new(SSL *s); void dtls1_free(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear(SSL *s); long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); __owur int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); __owur int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p); __owur int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len); __owur int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context); __owur int tls1_alert_code(int code); __owur int ssl3_alert_code(int code); __owur int ssl_ok(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC __owur int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s); # endif SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* Flags values from tls1_ec_curve_id2nid() */ /* Mask for curve type */ # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2 __owur int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags); __owur int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid); __owur int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len); __owur int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch); __owur int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, int *curves, size_t ncurves); __owur int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str); __owur int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_curve(int id); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ __owur int tls1_shared_list(SSL *s, const unsigned char *l1, size_t l1len, const unsigned char *l2, size_t l2len, int nmatch); __owur unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al); __owur unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al); __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al); __owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS __owur int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length); # endif __owur int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id, SSL_SESSION **ret); __owur int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md); __owur int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk); __owur const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg); void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op); __owur int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client); __owur int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen, int client); int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx); void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT __owur int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH __owur DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s); # endif __owur int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee); __owur int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *ex, int vfy); __owur EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md); void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); __owur int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); __owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); __owur int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); __owur long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s); __owur size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen); __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize); __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s); __owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs); __owur int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int echde); __owur int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); __owur int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen); __owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); __owur int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen); __owur const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx); __owur const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s); __owur const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s); /* s3_cbc.c */ __owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); __owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13], const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size, size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); __owur int tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len); __owur int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s); __owur int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s); __owur int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al); /* t1_ext.c */ void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *meths); __owur int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, int server, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, int *al); __owur int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char **pret, unsigned char *limit, int *al); __owur int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src); __owur int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src); void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts); void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void); # else # define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer # define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers # define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_rsa.c0000644000000000000000000006606413176625661014505 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509); static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) { int rv; if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } rv = ssl_security_cert(ssl, NULL, x, 0, 1); if (rv != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, rv); return 0; } return (ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x)); } int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type) { int j; BIO *in; int ret = 0; X509 *x = NULL; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL); } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB; x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ssl->default_passwd_callback, ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE); goto end; } if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j); goto end; } ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x); end: X509_free(x); BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len) { X509 *x; int ret; x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return (0); } ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x); X509_free(x); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; int ret; if (rsa == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return (0); } RSA_up_ref(rsa); if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) { RSA_free(rsa); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return (ret); } #endif static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { int i; i = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); if (i < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return (0); } if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509); if (pktmp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this. */ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey); ERR_clear_error(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA /* * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart * cards. */ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ; else #endif if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509, pkey)) { X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509); c->pkeys[i].x509 = NULL; return 0; } } EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey); EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey); c->pkeys[i].privatekey = pkey; c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]); return (1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type) { int j, ret = 0; BIO *in; RSA *rsa = NULL; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL); } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB; rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL, ssl->default_passwd_callback, ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE); goto end; } if (rsa == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j); goto end; } ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); end: BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len) { int ret; const unsigned char *p; RSA *rsa; p = d; if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return (0); } ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); return (ret); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { int ret; if (pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey); return (ret); } int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type) { int j, ret = 0; BIO *in; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB; pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, ssl->default_passwd_callback, ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata); } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE); goto end; } if (pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j); goto end; } ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); end: BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len) { int ret; const unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey; p = d; if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return (0); } ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return (ret); } int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { int rv; if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } rv = ssl_security_cert(NULL, ctx, x, 0, 1); if (rv != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, rv); return 0; } return (ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x)); } static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; int i; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_X509_LIB); return (0); } i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); if (i < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (i == SSL_PKEY_ECC && !EC_KEY_can_sign(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return 0; } #endif if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) { /* * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this. */ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey); ERR_clear_error(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA /* * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart * cards. */ if (EVP_PKEY_id(c->pkeys[i].privatekey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ; else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ if (!X509_check_private_key(x, c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) { /* * don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private * key (when switching to a different cert & key, first this * function should be used, then ssl_set_pkey */ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey); c->pkeys[i].privatekey = NULL; /* clear error queue */ ERR_clear_error(); } } X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509); X509_up_ref(x); c->pkeys[i].x509 = x; c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type) { int j; BIO *in; int ret = 0; X509 *x = NULL; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL); } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB; x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE); goto end; } if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j); goto end; } ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x); end: X509_free(x); BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d) { X509 *x; int ret; x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return (0); } ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x); X509_free(x); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) { int ret; EVP_PKEY *pkey; if (rsa == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return (0); } RSA_up_ref(rsa); if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) { RSA_free(rsa); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return (ret); } int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type) { int j, ret = 0; BIO *in; RSA *rsa = NULL; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL); } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB; rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE); goto end; } if (rsa == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j); goto end; } ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); end: BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len) { int ret; const unsigned char *p; RSA *rsa; p = d; if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return (0); } ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); return (ret); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } return (ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey)); } int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type) { int j, ret = 0; BIO *in; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB; pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback, ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata); } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE); goto end; } if (pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j); goto end; } ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); end: BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len) { int ret; const unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey; p = d; if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); return (0); } ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return (ret); } /* * Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format, possibly * followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be sent to the peer * in the Certificate message. */ static int use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *ssl, const char *file) { BIO *in; int ret = 0; X509 *x = NULL; pem_password_cb *passwd_callback; void *passwd_callback_userdata; ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for * SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */ if (ctx != NULL) { passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback; passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata; } else { passwd_callback = ssl->default_passwd_callback; passwd_callback_userdata = ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata; } in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, passwd_callback, passwd_callback_userdata); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); goto end; } if (ctx) ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x); else ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x); if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply * ret==0 ... */ if (ret) { /* * If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to the CA * certificates. */ X509 *ca; int r; unsigned long err; if (ctx) r = SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx); else r = SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl); if (r == 0) { ret = 0; goto end; } while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_callback, passwd_callback_userdata)) != NULL) { if (ctx) r = SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca); else r = SSL_add0_chain_cert(ssl, ca); /* * Note that we must not free ca if it was successfully added to * the chain (while we must free the main certificate, since its * reference count is increased by SSL_CTX_use_certificate). */ if (!r) { X509_free(ca); ret = 0; goto end; } } /* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */ err = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) ERR_clear_error(); else ret = 0; /* some real error */ } end: X509_free(x); BIO_free(in); return (ret); } int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file) { return use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, NULL, file); } int SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file) { return use_certificate_chain_file(NULL, ssl, file); } static int serverinfo_find_extension(const unsigned char *serverinfo, size_t serverinfo_length, unsigned int extension_type, const unsigned char **extension_data, size_t *extension_length) { *extension_data = NULL; *extension_length = 0; if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0) return -1; for (;;) { unsigned int type = 0; size_t len = 0; /* end of serverinfo */ if (serverinfo_length == 0) return 0; /* Extension not found */ /* read 2-byte type field */ if (serverinfo_length < 2) return -1; /* Error */ type = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1]; serverinfo += 2; serverinfo_length -= 2; /* read 2-byte len field */ if (serverinfo_length < 2) return -1; /* Error */ len = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1]; serverinfo += 2; serverinfo_length -= 2; if (len > serverinfo_length) return -1; /* Error */ if (type == extension_type) { *extension_data = serverinfo; *extension_length = len; return 1; /* Success */ } serverinfo += len; serverinfo_length -= len; } /* Unreachable */ } static int serverinfo_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { if (inlen != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; } static int serverinfo_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *arg) { const unsigned char *serverinfo = NULL; size_t serverinfo_length = 0; /* Is there serverinfo data for the chosen server cert? */ if ((ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(s, &serverinfo, &serverinfo_length)) != 0) { /* Find the relevant extension from the serverinfo */ int retval = serverinfo_find_extension(serverinfo, serverinfo_length, ext_type, out, outlen); if (retval == -1) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return -1; /* Error */ } if (retval == 0) return 0; /* No extension found, don't send extension */ return 1; /* Send extension */ } return 0; /* No serverinfo data found, don't send * extension */ } /* * With a NULL context, this function just checks that the serverinfo data * parses correctly. With a non-NULL context, it registers callbacks for * the included extensions. */ static int serverinfo_process_buffer(const unsigned char *serverinfo, size_t serverinfo_length, SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0) return 0; for (;;) { unsigned int ext_type = 0; size_t len = 0; /* end of serverinfo */ if (serverinfo_length == 0) return 1; /* read 2-byte type field */ if (serverinfo_length < 2) return 0; /* FIXME: check for types we understand explicitly? */ /* Register callbacks for extensions */ ext_type = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1]; if (ctx) { int have_ext_cbs = 0; size_t i; custom_ext_methods *exts = &ctx->cert->srv_ext; custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths; for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) { if (ext_type == meth->ext_type) { have_ext_cbs = 1; break; } } if (!have_ext_cbs && !SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, ext_type, serverinfo_srv_add_cb, NULL, NULL, serverinfo_srv_parse_cb, NULL)) return 0; } serverinfo += 2; serverinfo_length -= 2; /* read 2-byte len field */ if (serverinfo_length < 2) return 0; len = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1]; serverinfo += 2; serverinfo_length -= 2; if (len > serverinfo_length) return 0; serverinfo += len; serverinfo_length -= len; } } int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo, size_t serverinfo_length) { unsigned char *new_serverinfo; if (ctx == NULL || serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(serverinfo, serverinfo_length, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA); return 0; } if (ctx->cert->key == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } new_serverinfo = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->cert->key->serverinfo, serverinfo_length); if (new_serverinfo == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ctx->cert->key->serverinfo = new_serverinfo; memcpy(ctx->cert->key->serverinfo, serverinfo, serverinfo_length); ctx->cert->key->serverinfo_length = serverinfo_length; /* * Now that the serverinfo is validated and stored, go ahead and * register callbacks. */ if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(serverinfo, serverinfo_length, ctx)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO, SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA); return 0; } return 1; } int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file) { unsigned char *serverinfo = NULL; unsigned char *tmp; size_t serverinfo_length = 0; unsigned char *extension = 0; long extension_length = 0; char *name = NULL; char *header = NULL; char namePrefix[] = "SERVERINFO FOR "; int ret = 0; BIO *bin = NULL; size_t num_extensions = 0; if (ctx == NULL || file == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto end; } bin = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (bin == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto end; } if (BIO_read_filename(bin, file) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto end; } for (num_extensions = 0;; num_extensions++) { if (PEM_read_bio(bin, &name, &header, &extension, &extension_length) == 0) { /* * There must be at least one extension in this file */ if (num_extensions == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS); goto end; } else /* End of file, we're done */ break; } /* Check that PEM name starts with "BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR " */ if (strlen(name) < strlen(namePrefix)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT); goto end; } if (strncmp(name, namePrefix, strlen(namePrefix)) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX); goto end; } /* * Check that the decoded PEM data is plausible (valid length field) */ if (extension_length < 4 || (extension[2] << 8) + extension[3] != extension_length - 4) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_DATA); goto end; } /* Append the decoded extension to the serverinfo buffer */ tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(serverinfo, serverinfo_length + extension_length); if (tmp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } serverinfo = tmp; memcpy(serverinfo + serverinfo_length, extension, extension_length); serverinfo_length += extension_length; OPENSSL_free(name); name = NULL; OPENSSL_free(header); header = NULL; OPENSSL_free(extension); extension = NULL; } ret = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(ctx, serverinfo, serverinfo_length); end: /* SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo makes a local copy of the serverinfo. */ OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(header); OPENSSL_free(extension); OPENSSL_free(serverinfo); BIO_free(bin); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/bio_ssl.c0000644000000000000000000003254013176625661014461 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/bio.h" #include #include "ssl_locl.h" static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int ssl_new(BIO *h); static int ssl_free(BIO *data); static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp); typedef struct bio_ssl_st { SSL *ssl; /* The ssl handle :-) */ /* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */ int num_renegotiates; unsigned long renegotiate_count; unsigned long byte_count; unsigned long renegotiate_timeout; unsigned long last_time; } BIO_SSL; static const BIO_METHOD methods_sslp = { BIO_TYPE_SSL, "ssl", ssl_write, ssl_read, ssl_puts, NULL, /* ssl_gets, */ ssl_ctrl, ssl_new, ssl_free, ssl_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void) { return (&methods_sslp); } static int ssl_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_SSL *bs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bs)); if (bs == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } BIO_set_init(bi, 0); BIO_set_data(bi, bs); /* Clear all flags */ BIO_clear_flags(bi, ~0); return 1; } static int ssl_free(BIO *a) { BIO_SSL *bs; if (a == NULL) return (0); bs = BIO_get_data(a); if (bs->ssl != NULL) SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl); if (BIO_get_shutdown(a)) { if (BIO_get_init(a)) SSL_free(bs->ssl); /* Clear all flags */ BIO_clear_flags(a, ~0); BIO_set_init(a, 0); } OPENSSL_free(bs); return 1; } static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 1; BIO_SSL *sb; SSL *ssl; int retry_reason = 0; int r = 0; if (out == NULL) return (0); sb = BIO_get_data(b); ssl = sb->ssl; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = SSL_read(ssl, out, outl); switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (ret <= 0) break; if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0) { sb->byte_count += ret; if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count) { sb->byte_count = 0; sb->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); r = 1; } } if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) { unsigned long tm; tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL); if (tm > sb->last_time + sb->renegotiate_timeout) { sb->last_time = tm; sb->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); } } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_set_retry_read(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_set_retry_write(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT; break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: default: break; } BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason); return (ret); } static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *out, int outl) { int ret, r = 0; int retry_reason = 0; SSL *ssl; BIO_SSL *bs; if (out == NULL) return (0); bs = BIO_get_data(b); ssl = bs->ssl; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); /* * ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); if (ret > 0) */ ret = SSL_write(ssl, out, outl); switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (ret <= 0) break; if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0) { bs->byte_count += ret; if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count) { bs->byte_count = 0; bs->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); r = 1; } } if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) { unsigned long tm; tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL); if (tm > bs->last_time + bs->renegotiate_timeout) { bs->last_time = tm; bs->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); } } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_set_retry_write(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_set_retry_read(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: default: break; } BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason); return ret; } static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { SSL **sslp, *ssl; BIO_SSL *bs, *dbs; BIO *dbio, *bio; long ret = 1; BIO *next; bs = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); ssl = bs->ssl; if ((ssl == NULL) && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL)) return (0); switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: SSL_shutdown(ssl); if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect) SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept) SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); if (!SSL_clear(ssl)) { ret = 0; break; } if (next != NULL) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); else if (ssl->rbio != NULL) ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr); else ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = 0; break; case BIO_C_SSL_MODE: if (num) /* client mode */ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); else SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); break; case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT: ret = bs->renegotiate_timeout; if (num < 60) num = 5; bs->renegotiate_timeout = (unsigned long)num; bs->last_time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); break; case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES: ret = bs->renegotiate_count; if ((long)num >= 512) bs->renegotiate_count = (unsigned long)num; break; case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES: ret = bs->num_renegotiates; break; case BIO_C_SET_SSL: if (ssl != NULL) { ssl_free(b); if (!ssl_new(b)) return 0; } BIO_set_shutdown(b, num); ssl = (SSL *)ptr; bs->ssl = ssl; bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); if (bio != NULL) { if (next != NULL) BIO_push(bio, next); BIO_set_next(b, bio); BIO_up_ref(bio); } BIO_set_init(b, 1); break; case BIO_C_GET_SSL: if (ptr != NULL) { sslp = (SSL **)ptr; *sslp = ssl; } else ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = BIO_get_shutdown(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: BIO_set_shutdown(b, (int)num); break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: ret = SSL_pending(ssl); if (ret == 0) ret = BIO_pending(ssl->rbio); break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: if ((next != NULL) && (next != ssl->rbio)) { /* * We are going to pass ownership of next to the SSL object...but * we don't own a reference to pass yet - so up ref */ BIO_up_ref(next); SSL_set_bio(ssl, next, next); } break; case BIO_CTRL_POP: /* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */ if (b == ptr) { /* This will clear the reference we obtained during push */ SSL_set_bio(ssl, NULL, NULL); } break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_set_retry_reason(b, 0); ret = (int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl); switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, (int)ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_get_retry_reason(next)); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_set_retry_special(b); BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP); break; default: break; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: dbio = (BIO *)ptr; dbs = BIO_get_data(dbio); SSL_free(dbs->ssl); dbs->ssl = SSL_dup(ssl); dbs->num_renegotiates = bs->num_renegotiates; dbs->renegotiate_count = bs->renegotiate_count; dbs->byte_count = bs->byte_count; dbs->renegotiate_timeout = bs->renegotiate_timeout; dbs->last_time = bs->last_time; ret = (dbs->ssl != NULL); break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK: { #if 0 /* FIXME: Should this be used? -- Richard * Levitte */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); ret = -1; #else ret = 0; #endif } break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK: { void (**fptr) (const SSL *xssl, int type, int val); fptr = (void (**)(const SSL *xssl, int type, int val))ptr; *fptr = SSL_get_info_callback(ssl); } break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); } static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) { SSL *ssl; BIO_SSL *bs; long ret = 1; bs = BIO_get_data(b); ssl = bs->ssl; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK: { /* * FIXME: setting this via a completely different prototype seems * like a crap idea */ SSL_set_info_callback(ssl, (void (*)(const SSL *, int, int))fp); } break; default: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, fp); break; } return (ret); } static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = BIO_write(bp, str, n); return (ret); } BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO *ret = NULL, *buf = NULL, *ssl = NULL; if ((buf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL) return (NULL); if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret = BIO_push(buf, ssl)) == NULL) goto err; return (ret); err: BIO_free(buf); BIO_free(ssl); #endif return (NULL); } BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO *ret = NULL, *con = NULL, *ssl = NULL; if ((con = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL) return (NULL); if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret = BIO_push(ssl, con)) == NULL) goto err; return (ret); err: BIO_free(con); #endif return (NULL); } BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client) { BIO *ret; SSL *ssl; if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL) return (NULL); if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) { BIO_free(ret); return (NULL); } if (client) SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); else SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); BIO_set_ssl(ret, ssl, BIO_CLOSE); return (ret); } int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f) { BIO_SSL *tdata, *fdata; t = BIO_find_type(t, BIO_TYPE_SSL); f = BIO_find_type(f, BIO_TYPE_SSL); if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL)) return 0; tdata = BIO_get_data(t); fdata = BIO_get_data(f); if ((tdata->ssl == NULL) || (fdata->ssl == NULL)) return (0); if (!SSL_copy_session_id(tdata->ssl, (fdata->ssl))) return 0; return (1); } void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b) { BIO_SSL *bdata; for (; b != NULL; b = BIO_next(b)) { if (BIO_method_type(b) != BIO_TYPE_SSL) continue; bdata = BIO_get_data(b); if (bdata != NULL && bdata->ssl != NULL) SSL_shutdown(bdata->ssl); } } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/t1_ext.c0000644000000000000000000002175013176625661014234 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Custom extension utility functions */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" /* Find a custom extension from the list. */ static custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts, unsigned int ext_type) { size_t i; custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths; for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) { if (ext_type == meth->ext_type) return meth; } return NULL; } /* * Initialise custom extensions flags to indicate neither sent nor received. */ void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *exts) { size_t i; custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths; for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) meth->ext_flags = 0; } /* Pass received custom extension data to the application for parsing. */ int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, int server, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, int *al) { custom_ext_methods *exts = server ? &s->cert->srv_ext : &s->cert->cli_ext; custom_ext_method *meth; meth = custom_ext_find(exts, ext_type); /* If not found return success */ if (!meth) return 1; if (!server) { /* * If it's ServerHello we can't have any extensions not sent in * ClientHello. */ if (!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT)) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } } /* If already present it's a duplicate */ if (meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED; /* If no parse function set return success */ if (!meth->parse_cb) return 1; return meth->parse_cb(s, ext_type, ext_data, ext_size, al, meth->parse_arg); } /* * Request custom extension data from the application and add to the return * buffer. */ int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char **pret, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { custom_ext_methods *exts = server ? &s->cert->srv_ext : &s->cert->cli_ext; custom_ext_method *meth; unsigned char *ret = *pret; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++) { const unsigned char *out = NULL; size_t outlen = 0; meth = exts->meths + i; if (server) { /* * For ServerHello only send extensions present in ClientHello. */ if (!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED)) continue; /* If callback absent for server skip it */ if (!meth->add_cb) continue; } if (meth->add_cb) { int cb_retval = 0; cb_retval = meth->add_cb(s, meth->ext_type, &out, &outlen, al, meth->add_arg); if (cb_retval < 0) return 0; /* error */ if (cb_retval == 0) continue; /* skip this extension */ } if (4 > limit - ret || outlen > (size_t)(limit - ret - 4)) return 0; s2n(meth->ext_type, ret); s2n(outlen, ret); if (outlen) { memcpy(ret, out, outlen); ret += outlen; } /* * We can't send duplicates: code logic should prevent this. */ OPENSSL_assert(!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT)); /* * Indicate extension has been sent: this is both a sanity check to * ensure we don't send duplicate extensions and indicates that it is * not an error if the extension is present in ServerHello. */ meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT; if (meth->free_cb) meth->free_cb(s, meth->ext_type, out, meth->add_arg); } *pret = ret; return 1; } /* Copy the flags from src to dst for any extensions that exist in both */ int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src) { size_t i; custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths; for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++, methsrc++) { custom_ext_method *methdst = custom_ext_find(dst, methsrc->ext_type); if (methdst == NULL) continue; methdst->ext_flags = methsrc->ext_flags; } return 1; } /* Copy table of custom extensions */ int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src) { if (src->meths_count) { dst->meths = OPENSSL_memdup(src->meths, sizeof(custom_ext_method) * src->meths_count); if (dst->meths == NULL) return 0; dst->meths_count = src->meths_count; } return 1; } void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts) { OPENSSL_free(exts->meths); } /* Set callbacks for a custom extension. */ static int custom_ext_meth_add(custom_ext_methods *exts, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { custom_ext_method *meth, *tmp; /* * Check application error: if add_cb is not set free_cb will never be * called. */ if (!add_cb && free_cb) return 0; /* * Don't add if extension supported internally, but make exception * for extension types that previously were not supported, but now are. */ if (SSL_extension_supported(ext_type) && ext_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) return 0; /* Extension type must fit in 16 bits */ if (ext_type > 0xffff) return 0; /* Search for duplicate */ if (custom_ext_find(exts, ext_type)) return 0; tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(exts->meths, (exts->meths_count + 1) * sizeof(custom_ext_method)); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; exts->meths = tmp; meth = exts->meths + exts->meths_count; memset(meth, 0, sizeof(*meth)); meth->parse_cb = parse_cb; meth->add_cb = add_cb; meth->free_cb = free_cb; meth->ext_type = ext_type; meth->add_arg = add_arg; meth->parse_arg = parse_arg; exts->meths_count++; return 1; } /* Return true if a client custom extension exists, false otherwise */ int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type) { return custom_ext_find(&ctx->cert->cli_ext, ext_type) != NULL; } /* Application level functions to add custom extension callbacks */ int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * We don't want applications registering callbacks for SCT extensions * whilst simultaneously using the built-in SCT validation features, as * these two things may not play well together. */ if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp && SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(ctx)) return 0; #endif return custom_ext_meth_add(&ctx->cert->cli_ext, ext_type, add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); } int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { return custom_ext_meth_add(&ctx->cert->srv_ext, ext_type, add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); } int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type) { switch (ext_type) { /* Internally supported extensions. */ case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation: case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats: case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves: case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg: #endif case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding: case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name: case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket: case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms: case TLSEXT_TYPE_srp: case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request: case TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp: case TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp: #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac case TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac: #endif return 1; default: return 0; } } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661014135 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/dtls1_bitmap.c0000644000000000000000000000416613176625661016673 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "record_locl.h" /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2) { int64_t ret; uint64_t l1, l2; n2l8(v1, l1); n2l8(v2, l2); ret = l1 - l2; /* We do not permit wrap-around */ if (l1 > l2 && ret < 0) return 128; else if (l2 > l1 && ret > 0) return -128; if (ret > 128) return 128; else if (ret < -128) return -128; else return (int)ret; } int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int cmp; unsigned int shift; const unsigned char *seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence; cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); if (cmp > 0) { SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq); return 1; /* this record in new */ } shift = -cmp; if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift)) return 0; /* record previously received */ SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq); return 1; } void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int cmp; unsigned int shift; const unsigned char *seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); if (cmp > 0) { shift = cmp; if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; else bitmap->map = 1UL; memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); } else { shift = -cmp; if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift; } } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c0000644000000000000000000015602213176625661016531 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include "record_locl.h" static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 }; static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c }; /* * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated */ void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) { unsigned char *comp; unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { comp = r[i].comp; memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); r[i].comp = comp; } } void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) { unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); r[i].comp = NULL; } } void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) { memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); } /* * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting * for us in the buffer. */ static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) { SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; int left, len; unsigned char *p; rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); if (p == NULL) return 0; left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) return 0; p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); /* * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version * etc later */ if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) return 0; p += 3; n2s(p, len); if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) return 0; return 1; } /* * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 /*- * Call this to get new input records. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': * rr[i].type - is the type of record * rr[i].data, - data * rr[i].length, - number of bytes * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= * |max_pipelines| */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; short version; unsigned mac_size; int imac_size; unsigned int num_recs = 0; unsigned int max_recs; unsigned int j; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); max_recs = s->max_pipelines; if (max_recs == 0) max_recs = 1; sess = s->session; do { /* check if we have the header */ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); /* * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. */ if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { /* * SSLv2 style record * * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency */ rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } } else { /* SSLv3+ style record */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ rr[num_recs].type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; rr[num_recs].rec_version = version; n2s(p, rr[num_recs].length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { /* * The record is using an incorrect version number, * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just * end. */ goto err; } /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = (unsigned short)version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes * that we have. */ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); goto err; } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); goto err; } /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } } /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the * record */ if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { i = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { i = rr[num_recs].length; } if (i > 0) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ } /* set state for later operations */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); /* * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length, * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { rr[num_recs].input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); } else { rr[num_recs].input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); } /* * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input; rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length; /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ rr[num_recs].read = 0; num_recs++; /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); } while (num_recs < max_recs && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); /* * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. */ if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); if (imac_size < 0 || imac_size > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); goto f_err; } mac_size = (unsigned)imac_size; for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { if (rr[j].length < mac_size) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } rr[j].length -= mac_size; mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length; i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } } } enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size); rr[j].length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr[j].length -= mac_size; mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } } if (enc_err < 0) { /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr[j].off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * rr[j].type is the type of record * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record * rr[j].off == offset to first valid byte * rr[j].data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). */ /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr[j].length == 0) { RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } } else { RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); } } RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return ret; } int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; if (rr->comp == NULL) { rr->comp = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); } if (rr->comp == NULL) return 0; i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return 0; else rr->length = i; rr->data = rr->comp; #endif return 1; } int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, wr->input, (int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); else wr->length = i; wr->input = wr->data; #endif return (1); } /*- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs| * * Returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too * short etc). * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error * occurred. */ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int sending) { SSL3_RECORD *rec; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; unsigned long l; int bs, i, mac_size = 0; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; rec = inrecs; /* * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case */ if (n_recs != 1) return 0; if (sending) { ds = s->enc_write_ctx; if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); } else { ds = s->enc_read_ctx; if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); } if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); rec->input = rec->data; } else { l = rec->length; bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); /* COMPRESS */ if ((bs != 1) && sending) { i = bs - ((int)l % bs); /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ l += i; /* * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the * padding length. */ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); rec->length += i; rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1); } if (!sending) { if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) return 0; /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ } if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1) return -1; if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if ((bs != 1) && !sending) return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); } return (1); } /*- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. * * Returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too * short etc). * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, * an internal error occurred. */ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int sending) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; unsigned int ctr; if (n_recs == 0) return 0; if (sending) { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); } ds = s->enc_write_ctx; if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else { int ivlen; enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); else ivlen = 0; if (ivlen > 1) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { /* * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever * happen?? (steve) */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } } } } } else { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); } ds = s->enc_read_ctx; if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); } if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; } ret = 1; } else { bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); if (n_recs > 1) { if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { /* * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the * cipher doesn't support pipelining */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return -1; } } for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { unsigned char *seq; seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); } else { memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ ++seq[i]; if (seq[i] != 0) break; } } buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); buf[ctr][11] = recs[ctr].length >> 8; buf[ctr][12] = recs[ctr].length & 0xff; pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); if (pad <= 0) return -1; if (sending) { reclen[ctr] += pad; recs[ctr].length += pad; } } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs); /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ j = i - 1; for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++) recs[ctr].input[k] = j; reclen[ctr] += i; recs[ctr].length += i; } if (!sending) { if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) return 0; } } if (n_recs > 1) { unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; /* Set the output buffers */ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, n_recs, data) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); } /* Set the input buffers */ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, n_recs, data) <= 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return -1; } } i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]); if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ if (sending == 0) { if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } } } ret = 1; if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { int tmpret; for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); /* * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant * time behaviour. */ if (tmpret == 0) return 0; ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), ret, -1); } } if (pad && !sending) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].length -= pad; } } } return ret; } int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; unsigned char *p, rec_char; size_t md_size; int npad; int t; if (sending) { mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; } else { mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->read_hash; } t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); if (t < 0) return -1; md_size = t; npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; if (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { /* * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /*- * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. * * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller * total size. */ unsigned char header[75]; unsigned j = 0; memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); j += md_size; memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); j += npad; memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); j += 8; header[j++] = rec->type; header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, md, &md_size, header, rec->input, rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) return -1; } else { unsigned int md_size_u; /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) return -1; rec_char = rec->type; p = md; s2n(rec->length, p); if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx); return -1; } md_size = md_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); } ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); return (md_size); } int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { unsigned char *seq; EVP_MD_CTX *hash; size_t md_size; int i; EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; unsigned char header[13]; int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); int t; if (sending) { seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; } else { seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->read_hash; } t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); md_size = t; /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ if (stream_mac) { mac_ctx = hash; } else { hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) return -1; mac_ctx = hmac; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); } else memcpy(header, seq, 8); header[8] = rec->type; header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { /* * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, md, &md_size, header, rec->input, rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return -1; } } else { if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return -1; } if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode()) if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, rec->orig_len)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return -1; } } EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "seq="); { int z; for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } fprintf(stderr, "rec="); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { ++seq[i]; if (seq[i] != 0) break; } } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif return (md_size); } /*- * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. * * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. * returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding was valid * -1: otherwise. */ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) { unsigned padding_length, good; const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. */ if (overhead > rec->length) return 0; padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); } /*- * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the * padding was removed. * * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. * returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding was valid * -1: otherwise. */ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) { unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { /* * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant * time. */ if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) return 0; /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ rec->data += block_size; rec->input += block_size; rec->length -= block_size; rec->orig_len -= block_size; } else if (overhead > rec->length) return 0; padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { /* padding is already verified */ rec->length -= padding_length + 1; return 1; } good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); /* * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record * is public information so we can use it.) */ to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ if (to_check > rec->length) to_check = rec->length; for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i); unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; /* * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); } /* * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. */ good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); } /*- * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may * vary within a 256-byte window). * * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to * this function. * * On entry: * rec->orig_len >= md_size * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. */ #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size) { #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *rotated_mac; #else unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; #endif /* * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */ unsigned mac_end = rec->length; unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; unsigned in_mac; /* * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ unsigned scan_start = 0; unsigned i, j; unsigned rotate_offset; OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); #endif /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); in_mac = 0; rotate_offset = 0; memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { unsigned mac_started = constant_time_eq(i, mac_start); unsigned mac_ended = constant_time_lt(i, mac_end); unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; in_mac |= mac_started; in_mac &= mac_ended; rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size); } /* Now rotate the MAC */ #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) j = 0; for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); } #else memset(out, 0, md_size); rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset); rotate_offset++; rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); } #endif } int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int i, al; int enc_err; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned int mac_size; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); sess = s->session; /* * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; rr->orig_len = rr->length; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* Mark receipt of record. */ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (0); } /* * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed */ #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) /*- * Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor; int i, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned short version; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); again: /* * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. * This is a non-blocking operation. */ if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) return -1; /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) return 1; /* get something from the wire */ /* check if we have the header */ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ rr->type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ n2s(p, rr->epoch); memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); p += 6; n2s(p, rr->length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version) { /* unexpected version, silently discard */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } } if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { /* wrong version, silently discard record */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { /* record too long, silently discard it */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i = rr->length; n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1); /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (n != i) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } /* * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ } /* set state for later operations */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { #endif /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ /* * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where * we have no integrity negotiated yet? */ if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP } #endif /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) goto again; /* * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be * processed at this time. */ if (is_next_epoch) { if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), rr->seq_num) < 0) return -1; } rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c0000644000000000000000000014477213176625661016672 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include "record_locl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ ) # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 #endif void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) { rl->s = s; RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); } void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is * that right? */ rl->packet = NULL; rl->packet_length = 0; rl->wnum = 0; memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment)); rl->alert_fragment_len = 0; memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; rl->wpend_tot = 0; rl->wpend_type = 0; rl->wpend_ret = 0; rl->wpend_buf = NULL; SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); rl->numrpipes = 0; SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); if (rl->d) DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); } void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); if (rl->numwpipes > 0) ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); } /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; } /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) { size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) curr_rec++; return curr_rec < num_recs; } int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return (rl->numwpipes > 0) && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; } int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len) { rl->packet_length = len; if (len != 0) { rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s)) return 0; } rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf); SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len); return 1; } void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); } void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) { unsigned int i; int num = 0; if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) return 0; for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) return 0; num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); } return num; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) { ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; } void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) { SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); } const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) { switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: return "read header"; case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: return "read body"; case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: return "read done"; default: return "unknown"; } } const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) { switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: return "RH"; case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: return "RB"; case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: return "RD"; default: return "unknown"; } } /* * Return values are as per SSL_read() */ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold) { /* * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were */ int i, len, left; size_t align = 0; unsigned char *pkt; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; if (n <= 0) return n; rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; if (rb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return -1; left = rb->left; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); #endif if (!extend) { /* start with empty packet ... */ if (left == 0) rb->offset = align; else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload * alignment... */ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { /* * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer * overrun can be triggered. */ memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); rb->offset = align; } } s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ } len = s->rlayer.packet_length; pkt = rb->buf + align; /* * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end */ if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); s->rlayer.packet = pkt; rb->offset = len + align; } /* * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into * the buffer). */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (left == 0 && extend) return 0; if (left > 0 && n > left) n = left; } /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ if (left >= n) { s->rlayer.packet_length += n; rb->left = left - n; rb->offset += n; return (n); } /* else we need to read more data */ if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) /* ignore max parameter */ max = n; else { if (max < n) max = n; if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) max = rb->len - rb->offset; } while (left < n) { /* * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if * possible) */ clear_sys_error(); if (s->rbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i <= 0) { rb->left = left; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) if (len + left == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); return i; } left += i; /* * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to * byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (n > left) n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ } } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ rb->offset += n; rb->left = left - n; s->rlayer.packet_length += n; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (n); } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf = buf_; int tot; unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw; unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len; #endif SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; int i; if (len < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH); return -1; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; tot = s->rlayer.wnum; /* * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and * report the error in a way the user will notice */ if (((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) || ((wb->left != 0) && ((unsigned int)len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return -1; } s->rlayer.wnum = 0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) { i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot); if (i <= 0) { /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK /* * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the * compromise is considered worthy. */ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { unsigned char aad[13]; EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; int packlen; /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) max_send_fragment -= 512; if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, max_send_fragment, NULL); if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8; else packlen *= 4; if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot; } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); break; } if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) { s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } } if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); else nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); aad[8] = type; aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); aad[11] = 0; aad[12] = 0; mb_param.out = NULL; mb_param.inp = aad; mb_param.len = nw; packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); break; } mb_param.out = wb->buf; mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; mb_param.len = nw; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) return -1; s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { int j = 6; while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; } wb->offset = 0; wb->left = packlen; s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); if (i <= 0) { if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); } s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } if (i == (int)n) { /* free jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } else #endif if (tot == len) { /* done? */ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot; } n = (len - tot); split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment; /* * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using * explicit IVs */ maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { /* * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we * shouldn't get here */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if (maxpipes == 0 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) maxpipes = 1; if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment || split_send_fragment == 0) { /* * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send * fragments so we shouldn't get here */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } for (;;) { unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; unsigned int numpipes, j; if (n == 0) numpipes = 1; else numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; if (numpipes > maxpipes) numpipes = maxpipes; if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) { /* * We have enough data to completely fill all available * pipelines */ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment; } } else { /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ tmppipelen = n / numpipes; remain = n % numpipes; for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; if (j < remain) pipelens[j]++; } } i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0); if (i <= 0) { /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->rlayer.wnum = tot; return i; } if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; int eivlen; size_t align = 0; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int totlen = 0; unsigned int j; for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) totlen += pipelens[j]; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen)); /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) return -1; if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ mac_size = 0; } else { mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) goto err; } /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual * payload) */ unsigned int tmppipelen = 0; prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } if (create_empty_fragment) { wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 /* * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. */ align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); #endif outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align; SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); } else if (prefix_len) { wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) + prefix_len; } else { for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); #endif outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align; SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); } } /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else eivlen = 0; } else eivlen = 0; totlen = 0; /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr); for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { /* write the header */ *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff; SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8); /* * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes * and record version number > TLS 1.0 */ if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1; else *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet length */ plen[j] = outbuf[j]; outbuf[j] += 2; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen); SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]); SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); totlen += pipelens[j]; /* * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length); SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); } /* * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the * wb->buf */ if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) goto err; SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size); } SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]); SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); if (eivlen) { /* * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; */ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen); } } if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) goto err; for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0) goto err; SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size); } /* record length after mac and block padding */ s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for * debugging */ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ if (j > 0) { /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr); } /* now let's set up wb */ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j])); } /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen); err: return -1; } /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this * * Return values are as per SSL_write() */ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) { int i; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; unsigned int currbuf = 0; /* XXXX */ if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) && !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return (-1); } for (;;) { /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { currbuf++; continue; } clear_sys_error(); if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i); if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) continue; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret); } else if (i <= 0) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in * using a datagram service */ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); } return i; } SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i); SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i); } } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| * argument is non NULL. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return (-1); } if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; if (recvd_type != NULL) *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; return n; } /* * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] * rr[i].type - is the type of record * rr[i].data, - data * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. */ rr = s->rlayer.rrec; num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); do { /* get new records if necessary */ if (num_recs == 0) { ret = ssl3_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); if (num_recs == 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } } /* Skip over any records we have already read */ for (curr_rec = 0; curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); curr_rec++) ; if (curr_rec == num_recs) { RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); num_recs = 0; curr_rec = 0; } } while (num_recs == 0); rr = &rr[curr_rec]; /* * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty * record that isn't an alert. */ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); goto f_err; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { /* * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } if (recvd_type != NULL) *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); if (len <= 0) return (len); read_bytes = 0; do { if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); else n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); buf += n; if (peek) { /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); } else { SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); } } if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { curr_rec++; rr++; } read_bytes += n; } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len); if (read_bytes == 0) { /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ goto start; } if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); return read_bytes; } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we * were actually expecting a CCS). */ /* * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record */ if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { /* * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { /* * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. */ s->version = rr->rec_version; al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment; dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ while (n-- > 0) { dest[(*dest_len)++] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]; SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1); SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1); } if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) { SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); goto start; /* fragment was too small */ } } } /*- * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } } else { SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); } } else { /* Does this ever happen? */ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); } /* * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } /* * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) */ if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !s->s3->send_connection_binding && (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto start; } if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1]; s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); s->rlayer.alert_count++; if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); goto f_err; } if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } /* * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if * the peer refused it where we carry on. */ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) return (0); #endif } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a * shutdown */ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); return (0); } if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; } i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { default: /* * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised * record types, using up resources processing them. */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but * that should not happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (-1); } void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) { int i; for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { ++seq[i]; if (seq[i] != 0) break; } } /* * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible * format and false otherwise. */ int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); } /* * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec */ unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c0000644000000000000000000011533713176625661016644 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include "record_locl.h" int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) return (0); rl->d = d; d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new(); if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) { pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q); pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q); pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q); OPENSSL_free(d); rl->d = NULL; return (0); } return 1; } void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q); pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q); pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q); OPENSSL_free(rl->d); rl->d = NULL; } void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; pitem *item = NULL; DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; pqueue *unprocessed_rcds; pqueue *processed_rcds; pqueue *buffered_app_data; d = rl->d; while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) { rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q; processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q; buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q; memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds; d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds; d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data; } void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e) { if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) { memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence, rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) { memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence, rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8])); memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } rl->d->w_epoch = e; } void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq) { memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); } static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len); /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf); s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet; s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); return (1); } int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; pitem *item; /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) return 0; rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata)); item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet; rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length; memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); item->data = rdata; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) { BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); } #endif s->rlayer.packet = NULL; s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf)); memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec)); if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return (-1); } /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return (-1); } return (1); } int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); if (item) { dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); return (1); } return (0); } /* * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not * processed yet */ #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds)) int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) { pitem *item; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; SSL3_RECORD *rr; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; int replayok = 1; item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q); if (item) { /* Check if epoch is current. */ if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) return 1; /* Nothing to do. */ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) { /* * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've * finished reading the current packet). */ return 1; } /* Process all the records. */ while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { /* * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot * be the case because we already checked the epoch above */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) #endif { /* * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this * check once already when we first received the record - but * we might have updated the window since then due to * records we subsequently processed. */ replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap); } if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { /* dump this record */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); continue; } if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) return 0; } } /* * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been * processed */ s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch; s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1; return 1; } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| * argument is non NULL. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) { /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) return (-1); } if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */ if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len))) { *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; return ret; } /* * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = s->rlayer.rrec; /* * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered * during the last handshake in advance, if any. */ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); if (item) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); } #endif dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } } /* Check for timeout */ if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) goto start; /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = dtls1_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) { ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ if (ret <= 0) return (ret); else goto start; } } /* * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty * record that isn't an alert. */ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { /* * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. */ if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data), SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); goto start; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { /* * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (recvd_type != NULL) *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); if (len <= 0) return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n); if (!peek) { SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read * anymore, finally set shutdown. */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } #endif return (n); } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment); dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { /* We allow a 0 return */ if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr), SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) { return -1; } /* Exit and notify application to read again */ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); return (-1); } #endif /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again * reading. */ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { BIO *bio; s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { /* * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) { #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE /* * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this * non-existing alert... */ FIX ME; #endif s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); goto start; } /* now move 'n' bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]; SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1); SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1); } *dest_len = dest_maxlen; } } /*- * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } /* * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; s->new_session = 1; ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } } } /* * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1]; s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; s->rlayer.alert_count++; if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); goto f_err; } if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so * that nothing gets discarded. */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); return -1; } #endif s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } #if 0 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ /* now check if it's a missing record */ if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { unsigned short seq; unsigned int frag_off; unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]); n2s(p, seq); n2l3(p, frag_off); dtls1_retransmit_message(s, dtls1_get_queue_priority (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, &found); if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */ /* * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert * ourselves */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); } } #endif } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a * shutdown */ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); return (0); } if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages * are still missing, so just drop it. */ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); goto start; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) { SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); goto start; } /* * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. */ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) return -1; dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); goto start; } if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; } i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { default: /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); goto start; } al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but * that should not happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (-1); } /* * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake * is started. */ static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len) { if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k, n; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } return 0; } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) { int i; OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); return i; } int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p, *pseq; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; int eivlen; SSL3_RECORD wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) { OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); } /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; if (len > s->max_send_fragment) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE); return 0; } sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) clear = 1; if (clear) mac_size = 0; else { mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) goto err; } p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len; /* write the header */ *(p++) = type & 0xff; SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. */ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION && s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; } else { *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; } /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ pseq = p; p += 10; /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ if (s->enc_write_ctx) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else eivlen = 0; } else eivlen = 0; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, (int)len); SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf); /* * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); } /* * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the * wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr, &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]), 1) < 0) goto err; SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size); } /* this is true regardless of mac size */ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p); SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); if (eivlen) SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen); if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1) < 1) goto err; /* record length after mac and block padding */ /* * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! * SSL_in_init(s))) */ /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq); /* XDTLS: ?? */ /* * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */ memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6); pseq += 6; s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0])); if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ return wr.length; } /* now let's set up wb */ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0); /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len; s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; } DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch) { *is_next_epoch = 0; /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap; /* * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last * epoch */ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) && s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch && (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { *is_next_epoch = 1; return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap; } return NULL; } void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) { unsigned char *seq; unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence); if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence; s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++; memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap)); memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap)); /* * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous * epoch */ dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } else { seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence; memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence)); s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++; } memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c0000644000000000000000000000756713176625661016535 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "record_locl.h" void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, int n) { if (d != NULL) memcpy(b->buf, d, n); b->left = n; b->offset = 0; } /* * Clear the contents of an SSL3_BUFFER but retain any memory allocated. Also * retains the default_len setting */ void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b) { b->offset = 0; b->left = 0; } void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b) { OPENSSL_free(b->buf); b->buf = NULL; } int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; size_t len, align = 0, headerlen; SSL3_BUFFER *b; b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; else headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif if (b->buf == NULL) { len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (ssl_allow_compression(s)) len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; #endif if (b->default_len > len) len = b->default_len; if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) goto err; b->buf = p; b->len = len; } RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(&s->rlayer, &(b->buf[0])); return 1; err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, unsigned int numwpipes, size_t len) { unsigned char *p; size_t align = 0, headerlen; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; unsigned int currpipe; s->rlayer.numwpipes = numwpipes; if (len == 0) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; else headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif len = s->max_send_fragment + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (ssl_allow_compression(s)) len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; #endif if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD; } wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer); for (currpipe = 0; currpipe < numwpipes; currpipe++) { SSL3_BUFFER *thiswb = &wb[currpipe]; if (thiswb->buf == NULL) { p = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (p == NULL) { s->rlayer.numwpipes = currpipe; goto err; } memset(thiswb, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); thiswb->buf = p; thiswb->len = len; } } return 1; err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return 0; if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, 0)) return 0; return 1; } int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) { SSL3_BUFFER *wb; unsigned int pipes; pipes = s->rlayer.numwpipes; while (pipes > 0) { wb = &RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)[pipes - 1]; OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); wb->buf = NULL; pipes--; } s->rlayer.numwpipes = 0; return 1; } int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) { SSL3_BUFFER *b; b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); OPENSSL_free(b->buf); b->buf = NULL; return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/README0000644000000000000000000000673013176625661015023 0ustar rootrootRecord Layer Design =================== This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the record layer code to aid future maintenance. The record layer is divided into a number of components. At the time of writing there are four: SSL3_RECORD, SSL3_BUFFER, DLTS1_BITMAP and RECORD_LAYER. Each of these components is defined by: 1) A struct definition of the same name as the component 2) A set of source files that define the functions for that component 3) A set of accessor macros All struct definitions are in record.h. The functions and macros are either defined in record.h or record_locl.h dependent on whether they are intended to be private to the record layer, or whether they form part of the API to the rest of libssl. The source files map to components as follows: dtls1_bitmap.c -> DTLS1_BITMAP component ssl3_buffer.c -> SSL3_BUFFER component ssl3_record.c -> SSL3_RECORD component rec_layer_s3.c, rec_layer_d1.c -> RECORD_LAYER component The RECORD_LAYER component is a facade pattern, i.e. it provides a simplified interface to the record layer for the rest of libssl. The other 3 components are entirely private to the record layer and therefore should never be accessed directly by libssl. Any component can directly access its own members - they are private to that component, e.g. ssl3_buffer.c can access members of the SSL3_BUFFER struct without using a macro. No component can directly access the members of another component, e.g. ssl3_buffer cannot reach inside the RECORD_LAYER component to directly access its members. Instead components use accessor macros, so if code in ssl3_buffer.c wants to access the members of the RECORD_LAYER it uses the RECORD_LAYER_* macros. Conceptually it looks like this: libssl | ---------------------------|-----record.h-------------------------------------- | _______V______________ | | | RECORD_LAYER | | | | rec_layer_s3.c | | ^ | | _________|__________ | || || || DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER || || || || rec_layer_d1.c || ||____________________|| |______________________| record_locl.h ^ ^ ^ _________________| | |_________________ | | | _____V_________ ______V________ _______V________ | | | | | | | SSL3_BUFFER | | SSL3_RECORD | | DTLS1_BITMAP | | |--->| | | | | ssl3_buffer.c | | ssl3_record.c | | dtls1_bitmap.c | |_______________| |_______________| |________________| The two RECORD_LAYER source files build on each other, i.e. the main one is rec_layer_s3.c which provides the core SSL/TLS layer. The second one is rec_layer_d1.c which builds off of the SSL/TLS code to provide DTLS specific capabilities. It uses some DTLS specific RECORD_LAYER component members which should only be accessed from rec_layer_d1.c. These are held in the DTLS1_RECORD_LAYER struct. openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/record_locl.h0000644000000000000000000001413313176625661016577 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /***************************************************************************** * * * The following macros/functions are PRIVATE to the record layer. They * * should NOT be used outside of the record layer. * * * *****************************************************************************/ #define MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT 5 /* Functions/macros provided by the RECORD_LAYER component */ #define RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(rl) (&(rl)->rbuf) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(rl) ((rl)->wbuf) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(rl) ((rl)->rrec) #define RECORD_LAYER_set_packet(rl, p) ((rl)->packet = (p)) #define RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(rl) ((rl)->packet_length = 0) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(rl) ((rl)->rstate) #define RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(rl, st) ((rl)->rstate = (st)) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(rl) ((rl)->read_sequence) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(rl) ((rl)->write_sequence) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl) ((rl)->numrpipes) #define RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(rl, n) ((rl)->numrpipes = (n)) #define RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count++) #define RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(rl) \ ((rl)->empty_record_count = 0) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(rl) ((rl)->empty_record_count) #define RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record) #define RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record = 1) #define RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(rl) ((rl)->is_first_record = 0) #define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(rl) ((rl)->d->r_epoch) __owur int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold); void RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *ws); DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch); int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s); int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue); int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority); void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq); /* Functions provided by the DTLS1_BITMAP component */ int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); /* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_BUFFER component */ #define SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(b) ((b)->buf) #define SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(b, n) ((b)->buf = (n)) #define SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(b) ((b)->len) #define SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(b, l) ((b)->len = (l)) #define SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(b) ((b)->left) #define SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(b, l) ((b)->left = (l)) #define SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(b, l) ((b)->left += (l)) #define SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(b) ((b)->offset) #define SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(b, o) ((b)->offset = (o)) #define SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(b, o) ((b)->offset += (o)) #define SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(b) ((b)->buf != NULL) #define SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(b, l) ((b)->default_len = (l)) void SSL3_BUFFER_clear(SSL3_BUFFER *b); void SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(SSL3_BUFFER *b, const unsigned char *d, int n); void SSL3_BUFFER_release(SSL3_BUFFER *b); __owur int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s, unsigned int numwpipes, size_t len); int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s); /* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_RECORD component */ #define SSL3_RECORD_get_type(r) ((r)->type) #define SSL3_RECORD_set_type(r, t) ((r)->type = (t)) #define SSL3_RECORD_get_length(r) ((r)->length) #define SSL3_RECORD_set_length(r, l) ((r)->length = (l)) #define SSL3_RECORD_add_length(r, l) ((r)->length += (l)) #define SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(r, l) ((r)->length -= (l)) #define SSL3_RECORD_get_data(r) ((r)->data) #define SSL3_RECORD_set_data(r, d) ((r)->data = (d)) #define SSL3_RECORD_get_input(r) ((r)->input) #define SSL3_RECORD_set_input(r, i) ((r)->input = (i)) #define SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(r) ((r)->input = (r)->data) #define SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(r) ((r)->seq_num) #define SSL3_RECORD_get_off(r) ((r)->off) #define SSL3_RECORD_set_off(r, o) ((r)->off = (o)) #define SSL3_RECORD_add_off(r, o) ((r)->off += (o)) #define SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(r) ((r)->epoch) #define SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(r) \ ((r)->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) #define SSL3_RECORD_is_read(r) ((r)->read) #define SSL3_RECORD_set_read(r) ((r)->read = 1) void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs); void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs); void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num); int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr); __owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr); void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size); __owur int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); __owur int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); __owur int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s); openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/record/record.h0000644000000000000000000002330213176625661015564 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /***************************************************************************** * * * These structures should be considered PRIVATE to the record layer. No * * non-record layer code should be using these structures in any way. * * * *****************************************************************************/ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st { /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */ unsigned char *buf; /* default buffer size (or 0 if no default set) */ size_t default_len; /* buffer size */ size_t len; /* where to 'copy from' */ int offset; /* how many bytes left */ int left; } SSL3_BUFFER; #define SEQ_NUM_SIZE 8 typedef struct ssl3_record_st { /* Record layer version */ /* r */ int rec_version; /* type of record */ /* r */ int type; /* How many bytes available */ /* rw */ unsigned int length; /* * How many bytes were available before padding was removed? This is used * to implement the MAC check in constant time for CBC records. */ /* rw */ unsigned int orig_len; /* read/write offset into 'buf' */ /* r */ unsigned int off; /* pointer to the record data */ /* rw */ unsigned char *data; /* where the decode bytes are */ /* rw */ unsigned char *input; /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */ /* r */ unsigned char *comp; /* Whether the data from this record has already been read or not */ /* r */ unsigned int read; /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* r */ unsigned long epoch; /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* r */ unsigned char seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; } SSL3_RECORD; typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st { /* Track 32 packets on 32-bit systems and 64 - on 64-bit systems */ unsigned long map; /* Max record number seen so far, 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */ unsigned char max_seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; } DTLS1_BITMAP; typedef struct record_pqueue_st { unsigned short epoch; struct pqueue_st *q; } record_pqueue; typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st { unsigned char *packet; unsigned int packet_length; SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; SSL3_RECORD rrec; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo; #endif } DTLS1_RECORD_DATA; typedef struct dtls_record_layer_st { /* * The current data and handshake epoch. This is initially * undefined, and starts at zero once the initial handshake is * completed */ unsigned short r_epoch; unsigned short w_epoch; /* records being received in the current epoch */ DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap; /* renegotiation starts a new set of sequence numbers */ DTLS1_BITMAP next_bitmap; /* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */ record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds; record_pqueue processed_rcds; /* * Buffered application records. Only for records between CCS and * Finished to prevent either protocol violation or unnecessary message * loss. */ record_pqueue buffered_app_data; /* * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet * processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */ unsigned char alert_fragment[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned int alert_fragment_len; unsigned char handshake_fragment[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; /* save last and current sequence numbers for retransmissions */ unsigned char last_write_sequence[8]; unsigned char curr_write_sequence[8]; } DTLS_RECORD_LAYER; /***************************************************************************** * * * This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the * * record layer. No non-record layer code should be accessing the members of * * this structure. * * * *****************************************************************************/ typedef struct record_layer_st { /* The parent SSL structure */ SSL *s; /* * Read as many input bytes as possible (for * non-blocking reads) */ int read_ahead; /* where we are when reading */ int rstate; /* How many pipelines can be used to read data */ unsigned int numrpipes; /* How many pipelines can be used to write data */ unsigned int numwpipes; /* read IO goes into here */ SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; /* write IO goes into here */ SSL3_BUFFER wbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; /* each decoded record goes in here */ SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; /* used internally to point at a raw packet */ unsigned char *packet; unsigned int packet_length; /* number of bytes sent so far */ unsigned int wnum; /* * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet * processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */ unsigned char alert_fragment[2]; unsigned int alert_fragment_len; unsigned char handshake_fragment[4]; unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */ unsigned int empty_record_count; /* partial write - check the numbers match */ /* number bytes written */ int wpend_tot; int wpend_type; /* number of bytes submitted */ int wpend_ret; const unsigned char *wpend_buf; unsigned char read_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; unsigned char write_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */ unsigned int is_first_record; /* Count of the number of consecutive warning alerts received */ unsigned int alert_count; DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; } RECORD_LAYER; /***************************************************************************** * * * The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the * * record layer. Any libssl code may call these functions/macros * * * *****************************************************************************/ #define MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN 9 #define RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(rl, ra) ((rl)->read_ahead = (ra)) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(rl) ((rl)->read_ahead) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(rl) ((rl)->packet) #define RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(rl) ((rl)->packet_length) #define RECORD_LAYER_add_packet_length(rl, inc) ((rl)->packet_length += (inc)) #define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(rl) ((rl)->d->w_epoch) #define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(rl) \ ((rl)->d->processed_rcds) #define DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(rl) \ ((rl)->d->unprocessed_rcds) void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s); void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl); void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl); int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl); int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl); int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl); int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len); void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl); void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl); int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl); unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl); __owur int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); __owur int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes, int create_empty_fragment); __owur int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); __owur int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send); __owur int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send); __owur int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len); __owur int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send); __owur int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send); int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl); void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl); void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl); void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e); void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl); void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl); void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq); __owur int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); __owur int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); __owur int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement); void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_conf.c0000644000000000000000000006516213176625661014643 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include /* * structure holding name tables. This is used for permitted elements in lists * such as TLSv1. */ typedef struct { const char *name; int namelen; unsigned int name_flags; unsigned long option_value; } ssl_flag_tbl; /* Switch table: use for single command line switches like no_tls2 */ typedef struct { unsigned long option_value; unsigned int name_flags; } ssl_switch_tbl; /* Sense of name is inverted e.g. "TLSv1" will clear SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 */ #define SSL_TFLAG_INV 0x1 /* Mask for type of flag referred to */ #define SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK 0xf00 /* Flag is for options */ #define SSL_TFLAG_OPTION 0x000 /* Flag is for cert_flags */ #define SSL_TFLAG_CERT 0x100 /* Flag is for verify mode */ #define SSL_TFLAG_VFY 0x200 /* Option can only be used for clients */ #define SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT /* Option can only be used for servers */ #define SSL_TFLAG_SERVER SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER #define SSL_TFLAG_BOTH (SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT|SSL_TFLAG_SERVER) #define SSL_FLAG_TBL(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag} #define SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag} #define SSL_FLAG_TBL_CLI(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT, flag} #define SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_INV|SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag} #define SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV_INV(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_INV|SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag} #define SSL_FLAG_TBL_CERT(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_CERT|SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag} #define SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT, flag} #define SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV(str, flag) \ {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag} /* * Opaque structure containing SSL configuration context. */ struct ssl_conf_ctx_st { /* * Various flags indicating (among other things) which options we will * recognise. */ unsigned int flags; /* Prefix and length of commands */ char *prefix; size_t prefixlen; /* SSL_CTX or SSL structure to perform operations on */ SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX options field or NULL if none */ uint32_t *poptions; /* Certificate filenames for each type */ char *cert_filename[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX cert_flags or NULL if none */ uint32_t *pcert_flags; /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX verify_mode or NULL if none */ uint32_t *pvfy_flags; /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX min_version field or NULL if none */ int *min_version; /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX max_version field or NULL if none */ int *max_version; /* Current flag table being worked on */ const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl; /* Size of table */ size_t ntbl; /* Client CA names */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *canames; }; static void ssl_set_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int name_flags, unsigned long option_value, int onoff) { uint32_t *pflags; if (cctx->poptions == NULL) return; if (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_INV) onoff ^= 1; switch (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK) { case SSL_TFLAG_CERT: pflags = cctx->pcert_flags; break; case SSL_TFLAG_VFY: pflags = cctx->pvfy_flags; break; case SSL_TFLAG_OPTION: pflags = cctx->poptions; break; default: return; } if (onoff) *pflags |= option_value; else *pflags &= ~option_value; } static int ssl_match_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl, const char *name, int namelen, int onoff) { /* If name not relevant for context skip */ if (!(cctx->flags & tbl->name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_BOTH)) return 0; if (namelen == -1) { if (strcmp(tbl->name, name)) return 0; } else if (tbl->namelen != namelen || strncasecmp(tbl->name, name, namelen)) return 0; ssl_set_option(cctx, tbl->name_flags, tbl->option_value, onoff); return 1; } static int ssl_set_option_list(const char *elem, int len, void *usr) { SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = usr; size_t i; const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl; int onoff = 1; /* * len == -1 indicates not being called in list context, just for single * command line switches, so don't allow +, -. */ if (elem == NULL) return 0; if (len != -1) { if (*elem == '+') { elem++; len--; onoff = 1; } else if (*elem == '-') { elem++; len--; onoff = 0; } } for (i = 0, tbl = cctx->tbl; i < cctx->ntbl; i++, tbl++) { if (ssl_match_option(cctx, tbl, elem, len, onoff)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Set supported signature algorithms */ static int cmd_SignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv; if (cctx->ssl) rv = SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx->ssl, value); /* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */ else rv = SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(cctx->ctx, value); return rv > 0; } /* Set supported client signature algorithms */ static int cmd_ClientSignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv; if (cctx->ssl) rv = SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(cctx->ssl, value); /* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */ else rv = SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(cctx->ctx, value); return rv > 0; } static int cmd_Curves(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv; if (cctx->ssl) rv = SSL_set1_curves_list(cctx->ssl, value); /* NB: ctx == NULL performs syntax checking only */ else rv = SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(cctx->ctx, value); return rv > 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* ECDH temporary parameters */ static int cmd_ECDHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv = 1; EC_KEY *ecdh; int nid; /* Ignore values supported by 1.0.2 for the automatic selection */ if ((cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE) && strcasecmp(value, "+automatic") == 0) return 1; if ((cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) && strcmp(value, "auto") == 0) return 1; nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value); if (nid == NID_undef) nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value); if (nid == 0) return 0; ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (!ecdh) return 0; if (cctx->ctx) rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(cctx->ctx, ecdh); else if (cctx->ssl) rv = SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(cctx->ssl, ecdh); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); return rv > 0; } #endif static int cmd_CipherString(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv = 1; if (cctx->ctx) rv = SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx->ctx, value); if (cctx->ssl) rv = SSL_set_cipher_list(cctx->ssl, value); return rv > 0; } static int cmd_Protocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_protocol_list[] = { SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("ALL", SSL_OP_NO_SSL_MASK), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SSLv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SSLv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("DTLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("DTLSv1.2", SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) }; cctx->tbl = ssl_protocol_list; cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_protocol_list); return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx); } /* * protocol_from_string - converts a protocol version string to a number * * Returns -1 on failure or the version on success */ static int protocol_from_string(const char *value) { struct protocol_versions { const char *name; int version; }; static const struct protocol_versions versions[] = { {"None", 0}, {"SSLv3", SSL3_VERSION}, {"TLSv1", TLS1_VERSION}, {"TLSv1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION}, {"TLSv1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION}, {"DTLSv1", DTLS1_VERSION}, {"DTLSv1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION} }; size_t i; size_t n = OSSL_NELEM(versions); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) if (strcmp(versions[i].name, value) == 0) return versions[i].version; return -1; } static int min_max_proto(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value, int *bound) { int method_version; int new_version; if (cctx->ctx != NULL) method_version = cctx->ctx->method->version; else if (cctx->ssl != NULL) method_version = cctx->ssl->ctx->method->version; else return 0; if ((new_version = protocol_from_string(value)) < 0) return 0; return ssl_set_version_bound(method_version, new_version, bound); } /* * cmd_MinProtocol - Set min protocol version * @cctx: config structure to save settings in * @value: The min protocol version in string form * * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ static int cmd_MinProtocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { return min_max_proto(cctx, value, cctx->min_version); } /* * cmd_MaxProtocol - Set max protocol version * @cctx: config structure to save settings in * @value: The max protocol version in string form * * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ static int cmd_MaxProtocol(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { return min_max_proto(cctx, value, cctx->max_version); } static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_option_list[] = { SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("SessionTicket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EmptyFragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS), SSL_FLAG_TBL("Bugs", SSL_OP_ALL), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("Compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION), SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("ServerPreference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("NoResumptionOnRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION), SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("DHSingle", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE), SSL_FLAG_TBL_SRV("ECDHSingle", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE), SSL_FLAG_TBL("UnsafeLegacyRenegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION), SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC), }; if (value == NULL) return -3; cctx->tbl = ssl_option_list; cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_option_list); return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx); } static int cmd_VerifyMode(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_vfy_list[] = { SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI("Peer", SSL_VERIFY_PEER), SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Request", SSL_VERIFY_PEER), SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Require", SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT), SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Once", SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE) }; if (value == NULL) return -3; cctx->tbl = ssl_vfy_list; cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_vfy_list); return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx); } static int cmd_Certificate(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv = 1; CERT *c = NULL; if (cctx->ctx) { rv = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(cctx->ctx, value); c = cctx->ctx->cert; } if (cctx->ssl) { rv = SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(cctx->ssl, value); c = cctx->ssl->cert; } if (rv > 0 && c && cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE) { char **pfilename = &cctx->cert_filename[c->key - c->pkeys]; OPENSSL_free(*pfilename); *pfilename = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (!*pfilename) rv = 0; } return rv > 0; } static int cmd_PrivateKey(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv = 1; if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE)) return -2; if (cctx->ctx) rv = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(cctx->ctx, value, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); if (cctx->ssl) rv = SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(cctx->ssl, value, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); return rv > 0; } static int cmd_ServerInfoFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv = 1; if (cctx->ctx) rv = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(cctx->ctx, value); return rv > 0; } static int do_store(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int verify_store) { CERT *cert; X509_STORE **st; if (cctx->ctx) cert = cctx->ctx->cert; else if (cctx->ssl) cert = cctx->ssl->cert; else return 1; st = verify_store ? &cert->verify_store : &cert->chain_store; if (*st == NULL) { *st = X509_STORE_new(); if (*st == NULL) return 0; } return X509_STORE_load_locations(*st, CAfile, CApath) > 0; } static int cmd_ChainCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 0); } static int cmd_ChainCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 0); } static int cmd_VerifyCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 1); } static int cmd_VerifyCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 1); } static int cmd_ClientCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { if (cctx->canames == NULL) cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (cctx->canames == NULL) return 0; return SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value); } static int cmd_ClientCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { if (cctx->canames == NULL) cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (cctx->canames == NULL) return 0; return SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static int cmd_DHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv = 0; DH *dh = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; if (cctx->ctx || cctx->ssl) { in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (BIO_read_filename(in, value) <= 0) goto end; dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (dh == NULL) goto end; } else return 1; if (cctx->ctx) rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(cctx->ctx, dh); if (cctx->ssl) rv = SSL_set_tmp_dh(cctx->ssl, dh); end: DH_free(dh); BIO_free(in); return rv > 0; } #endif typedef struct { int (*cmd) (SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value); const char *str_file; const char *str_cmdline; unsigned short flags; unsigned short value_type; } ssl_conf_cmd_tbl; /* Table of supported parameters */ #define SSL_CONF_CMD(name, cmdopt, flags, type) \ {cmd_##name, #name, cmdopt, flags, type} #define SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(name, cmdopt, flags) \ SSL_CONF_CMD(name, cmdopt, flags, SSL_CONF_TYPE_STRING) #define SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH(name, flags) \ {0, NULL, name, flags, SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE} /* See apps/apps.h if you change this table. */ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_cmds[] = { SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_ssl3", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1_1", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_tls1_2", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("bugs", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_comp", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("comp", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("ecdh_single", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_ticket", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("serverpref", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("legacy_renegotiation", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("legacy_server_connect", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_resumption_on_reneg", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("no_legacy_server_connect", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER), SSL_CONF_CMD_SWITCH("strict", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(SignatureAlgorithms, "sigalgs", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(ClientSignatureAlgorithms, "client_sigalgs", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Curves, "curves", 0), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(ECDHParameters, "named_curve", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER), #endif SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(CipherString, "cipher", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Protocol, NULL, 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(MinProtocol, "min_protocol", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(MaxProtocol, "max_protocol", 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Options, NULL, 0), SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(VerifyMode, NULL, 0), SSL_CONF_CMD(Certificate, "cert", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), SSL_CONF_CMD(PrivateKey, "key", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), SSL_CONF_CMD(ServerInfoFile, NULL, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAPath, "chainCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR), SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAFile, "chainCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAPath, "verifyCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR), SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAFile, "verifyCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAFile, NULL, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE), SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAPath, NULL, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH SSL_CONF_CMD(DHParameters, "dhparam", SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE) #endif }; /* Supported switches: must match order of switches in ssl_conf_cmds */ static const ssl_switch_tbl ssl_cmd_switches[] = { {SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, 0}, /* no_ssl3 */ {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, 0}, /* no_tls1 */ {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, 0}, /* no_tls1_1 */ {SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, 0}, /* no_tls1_2 */ {SSL_OP_ALL, 0}, /* bugs */ {SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, 0}, /* no_comp */ {SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, SSL_TFLAG_INV}, /* comp */ {SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE, 0}, /* ecdh_single */ {SSL_OP_NO_TICKET, 0}, /* no_ticket */ {SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE, 0}, /* serverpref */ /* legacy_renegotiation */ {SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, 0}, /* legacy_server_connect */ {SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT, 0}, /* no_resumption_on_reneg */ {SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION, 0}, /* no_legacy_server_connect */ {SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT, SSL_TFLAG_INV}, {SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT, SSL_TFLAG_CERT}, /* strict */ }; static int ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char **pcmd) { if (!pcmd || !*pcmd) return 0; /* If a prefix is set, check and skip */ if (cctx->prefix) { if (strlen(*pcmd) <= cctx->prefixlen) return 0; if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE && strncmp(*pcmd, cctx->prefix, cctx->prefixlen)) return 0; if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE && strncasecmp(*pcmd, cctx->prefix, cctx->prefixlen)) return 0; *pcmd += cctx->prefixlen; } else if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) { if (**pcmd != '-' || !(*pcmd)[1]) return 0; *pcmd += 1; } return 1; } /* Determine if a command is allowed according to cctx flags */ static int ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * t) { unsigned int tfl = t->flags; unsigned int cfl = cctx->flags; if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER) && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER)) return 0; if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT) && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT)) return 0; if ((tfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE) && !(cfl & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE)) return 0; return 1; } static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd) { const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *t; size_t i; if (cmd == NULL) return NULL; /* Look for matching parameter name in table */ for (i = 0, t = ssl_conf_cmds; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_conf_cmds); i++, t++) { if (ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(cctx, t)) { if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE) { if (t->str_cmdline && strcmp(t->str_cmdline, cmd) == 0) return t; } if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE) { if (t->str_file && strcasecmp(t->str_file, cmd) == 0) return t; } } } return NULL; } static int ctrl_switch_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * cmd) { /* Find index of command in table */ size_t idx = cmd - ssl_conf_cmds; const ssl_switch_tbl *scmd; /* Sanity check index */ if (idx >= OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cmd_switches)) return 0; /* Obtain switches entry with same index */ scmd = ssl_cmd_switches + idx; ssl_set_option(cctx, scmd->name_flags, scmd->option_value, 1); return 1; } int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value) { const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *runcmd; if (cmd == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME); return 0; } if (!ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(cctx, &cmd)) return -2; runcmd = ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(cctx, cmd); if (runcmd) { int rv; if (runcmd->value_type == SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE) { return ctrl_switch_option(cctx, runcmd); } if (value == NULL) return -3; rv = runcmd->cmd(cctx, value); if (rv > 0) return 2; if (rv == -2) return -2; if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE); ERR_add_error_data(4, "cmd=", cmd, ", value=", value); } return 0; } if (cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME); ERR_add_error_data(2, "cmd=", cmd); } return -2; } int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv) { int rv; const char *arg = NULL, *argn; if (pargc && *pargc == 0) return 0; if (!pargc || *pargc > 0) arg = **pargv; if (arg == NULL) return 0; if (!pargc || *pargc > 1) argn = (*pargv)[1]; else argn = NULL; cctx->flags &= ~SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE; cctx->flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE; rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, arg, argn); if (rv > 0) { /* Success: update pargc, pargv */ (*pargv) += rv; if (pargc) (*pargc) -= rv; return rv; } /* Unknown switch: indicate no arguments processed */ if (rv == -2) return 0; /* Some error occurred processing command, return fatal error */ if (rv == 0) return -1; return rv; } int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd) { if (ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(cctx, &cmd)) { const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *runcmd; runcmd = ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(cctx, cmd); if (runcmd) return runcmd->value_type; } return SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void) { SSL_CONF_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); return ret; } int SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx) { /* See if any certificates are missing private keys */ size_t i; CERT *c = NULL; if (cctx->ctx) c = cctx->ctx->cert; else if (cctx->ssl) c = cctx->ssl->cert; if (c && cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE) { for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { const char *p = cctx->cert_filename[i]; /* * If missing private key try to load one from certificate file */ if (p && !c->pkeys[i].privatekey) { if (!cmd_PrivateKey(cctx, p)) return 0; } } } if (cctx->canames) { if (cctx->ssl) SSL_set_client_CA_list(cctx->ssl, cctx->canames); else if (cctx->ctx) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(cctx->ctx, cctx->canames); else sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free); cctx->canames = NULL; } return 1; } void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx) { if (cctx) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) OPENSSL_free(cctx->cert_filename[i]); OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free); OPENSSL_free(cctx); } } unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags) { cctx->flags |= flags; return cctx->flags; } unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags) { cctx->flags &= ~flags; return cctx->flags; } int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *pre) { char *tmp = NULL; if (pre) { tmp = OPENSSL_strdup(pre); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; } OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix); cctx->prefix = tmp; if (tmp) cctx->prefixlen = strlen(tmp); else cctx->prefixlen = 0; return 1; } void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl) { cctx->ssl = ssl; cctx->ctx = NULL; if (ssl) { cctx->poptions = &ssl->options; cctx->min_version = &ssl->min_proto_version; cctx->max_version = &ssl->max_proto_version; cctx->pcert_flags = &ssl->cert->cert_flags; cctx->pvfy_flags = &ssl->verify_mode; } else { cctx->poptions = NULL; cctx->min_version = NULL; cctx->max_version = NULL; cctx->pcert_flags = NULL; cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL; } } void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx) { cctx->ctx = ctx; cctx->ssl = NULL; if (ctx) { cctx->poptions = &ctx->options; cctx->min_version = &ctx->min_proto_version; cctx->max_version = &ctx->max_proto_version; cctx->pcert_flags = &ctx->cert->cert_flags; cctx->pvfy_flags = &ctx->verify_mode; } else { cctx->poptions = NULL; cctx->min_version = NULL; cctx->max_version = NULL; cctx->pcert_flags = NULL; cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL; } } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/d1_msg.c0000644000000000000000000000460313176625661014200 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { int i; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); return -1; } i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); return i; } int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); } #endif i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ } else { if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE #endif ) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661014154 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/statem.c0000644000000000000000000006211713176625661015624 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" /* * This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines. * * There are two primary state machines: * * 1) Message flow state machine * 2) Handshake state machine * * The Message flow state machine controls the reading and sending of messages * including handling of non-blocking IO events, flushing of the underlying * write BIO, handling unexpected messages, etc. It is itself broken into two * separate sub-state machines which control reading and writing respectively. * * The Handshake state machine keeps track of the current SSL/TLS handshake * state. Transitions of the handshake state are the result of events that * occur within the Message flow state machine. * * Overall it looks like this: * * --------------------------------------------- ------------------- * | | | | * | Message flow state machine | | | * | | | | * | -------------------- -------------------- | Transition | Handshake state | * | | MSG_FLOW_READING | | MSG_FLOW_WRITING | | Event | machine | * | | sub-state | | sub-state | |----------->| | * | | machine for | | machine for | | | | * | | reading messages | | writing messages | | | | * | -------------------- -------------------- | | | * | | | | * --------------------------------------------- ------------------- * */ /* Sub state machine return values */ typedef enum { /* Something bad happened or NBIO */ SUB_STATE_ERROR, /* Sub state finished go to the next sub state */ SUB_STATE_FINISHED, /* Sub state finished and handshake was completed */ SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE } SUB_STATE_RETURN; static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server); static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s); static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s); static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s); static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s); OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->statem.hand_state; } int SSL_in_init(SSL *s) { return s->statem.in_init; } int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s) { return !(s->statem.in_init) && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_OK); } int SSL_in_before(SSL *s) { /* * Historically being "in before" meant before anything had happened. In the * current code though we remain in the "before" state for a while after we * have started the handshake process (e.g. as a server waiting for the * first message to arrive). There "in before" is taken to mean "in before" * and not started any handshake process yet. */ return (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE) && (s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED); } /* * Clear the state machine state and reset back to MSG_FLOW_UNINITED */ void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s) { s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED; s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; s->statem.in_init = 1; s->statem.no_cert_verify = 0; } /* * Set the state machine up ready for a renegotiation handshake */ void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s) { s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE; s->statem.in_init = 1; } /* * Put the state machine into an error state. This is a permanent error for * the current connection. */ void ossl_statem_set_error(SSL *s) { s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR; } /* * Discover whether the current connection is in the error state. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s) { if (s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) return 1; return 0; } void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init) { s->statem.in_init = init; } int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s) { return s->statem.in_handshake; } void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand) { if (inhand) s->statem.in_handshake++; else s->statem.in_handshake--; } void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s) { s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED; s->statem.in_init = 1; /* * This will get reset (briefly) back to TLS_ST_BEFORE when we enter * state_machine() because |state| is MSG_FLOW_UNINITED, but until then any * calls to SSL_in_before() will return false. Also calls to * SSL_state_string() and SSL_state_string_long() will return something * sensible. */ s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; } int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s) { return state_machine(s, 0); } int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s) { return state_machine(s, 1); } typedef void (*info_cb) (const SSL *, int, int); static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s) { if (s->info_callback != NULL) return s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) return s->ctx->info_callback; return NULL; } /* * The main message flow state machine. We start in the MSG_FLOW_UNINITED or * MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and * transitions are as follows: * * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE * | | * +-----------------------+ * v * MSG_FLOW_WRITING <---> MSG_FLOW_READING * | * V * MSG_FLOW_FINISHED * | * V * [SUCCESS] * * We may exit at any point due to an error or NBIO event. If an NBIO event * occurs then we restart at the point we left off when we are recalled. * MSG_FLOW_WRITING and MSG_FLOW_READING have sub-state machines associated with them. * * In addition to the above there is also the MSG_FLOW_ERROR state. We can move * into that state at any point in the event that an irrecoverable error occurs. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * <=0: NBIO or error */ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret = -1; int ssret; if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) { /* Shouldn't have been called if we're already in the error state */ return -1; } RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); cb = get_callback(s); st->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { if (!SSL_clear(s)) return -1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { /* * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream * identifier other than 0. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, st->in_handshake, NULL); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during * handshakes anyway. */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; s->tlsext_hb_seq++; } #endif /* Initialise state machine */ if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { s->renegotiate = 1; if (!server) s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; } if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; } s->server = server; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && (server || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } } else { if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); goto end; } if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; buf = NULL; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { goto end; } s->init_num = 0; /* * Should have been reset by tls_process_finished, too. */ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; /* * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with * SCTP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) #endif if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s)) { goto end; } if (!server || st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); goto end; } } if (server) { if (st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't * support secure renegotiation. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ossl_statem_set_error(s); goto end; } else { /* * st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a * HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; } s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; } else { s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); s->hit = 0; s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { st->use_timer = 1; } } st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING; init_write_state_machine(s); st->read_state_first_init = 1; } while (st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) { if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_READING) { ssret = read_state_machine(s); if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) { st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING; init_write_state_machine(s); } else { /* NBIO or error */ goto end; } } else if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_WRITING) { ssret = write_state_machine(s); if (ssret == SUB_STATE_FINISHED) { st->state = MSG_FLOW_READING; init_read_state_machine(s); } else if (ssret == SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE) { st->state = MSG_FLOW_FINISHED; } else { /* NBIO or error */ goto end; } } else { /* Error */ ossl_statem_set_error(s); goto end; } } st->state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED; ret = 1; end: st->in_handshake--; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { /* * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream * identifier other than 0. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, st->in_handshake, NULL); } #endif BUF_MEM_free(buf); if (cb != NULL) { if (server) cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); else cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); } return ret; } /* * Initialise the MSG_FLOW_READING sub-state machine */ static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER; } static int grow_init_buf(SSL *s, size_t size) { size_t msg_offset = (char *)s->init_msg - s->init_buf->data; if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)size)) return 0; if (size < msg_offset) return 0; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + msg_offset; return 1; } /* * This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in * MSG_FLOW_READING. The valid sub-states and transitions are: * * READ_STATE_HEADER <--+<-------------+ * | | | * v | | * READ_STATE_BODY -----+-->READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS * | | * +----------------------------+ * v * [SUB_STATE_FINISHED] * * READ_STATE_HEADER has the responsibility for reading in the message header * and transitioning the state of the handshake state machine. * * READ_STATE_BODY reads in the rest of the message and then subsequently * processes it. * * READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS is an optional step that may occur if some post * processing activity performed on the message may block. * * Any of the above states could result in an NBIO event occurring in which case * control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we * will resume in the same state where we left off. */ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret, mt; unsigned long len = 0; int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt); PACKET pkt; MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); unsigned long (*max_message_size) (SSL *s); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; cb = get_callback(s); if (s->server) { transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition; process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message; max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size; post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message; } else { transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition; process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message; max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size; post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message; } if (st->read_state_first_init) { s->first_packet = 1; st->read_state_first_init = 0; } while (1) { switch (st->read_state) { case READ_STATE_HEADER: /* Get the state the peer wants to move to */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body */ ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len); } else { ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt); } if (ret == 0) { /* Could be non-blocking IO */ return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } if (cb != NULL) { /* Notify callback of an impending state change */ if (s->server) cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); else cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); } /* * Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move * to that state if so */ if (!transition(s, mt)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } /* dtls_get_message already did this */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.message_size > 0 && !grow_init_buf(s, s->s3->tmp.message_size + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } st->read_state = READ_STATE_BODY; /* Fall through */ case READ_STATE_BODY: if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* We already got this above for DTLS */ ret = tls_get_message_body(s, &len); if (ret == 0) { /* Could be non-blocking IO */ return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } } s->first_packet = 0; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } ret = process_message(s, &pkt); /* Discard the packet data */ s->init_num = 0; switch (ret) { case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); } return SUB_STATE_FINISHED; case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING: st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS; st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A; break; default: st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER; break; } break; case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS: st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work); switch (st->read_state_work) { default: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER; break; case WORK_FINISHED_STOP: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); } return SUB_STATE_FINISHED; } break; default: /* Shouldn't happen */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } } } /* * Send a previously constructed message to the peer. */ static int statem_do_write(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); else return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); } else { return ssl_do_write(s); } } /* * Initialise the MSG_FLOW_WRITING sub-state machine */ static void init_write_state_machine(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION; } /* * This function implements the sub-state machine when the message flow is in * MSG_FLOW_WRITING. The valid sub-states and transitions are: * * +-> WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION ------> [SUB_STATE_FINISHED] * | | * | v * | WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK -----> [SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE] * | | * | v * | WRITE_STATE_SEND * | | * | v * | WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK * | | * +-------------+ * * WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION transitions the state of the handshake state machine * WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK performs any work necessary to prepare the later * sending of the message. This could result in an NBIO event occurring in * which case control returns to the calling application. When this function * is recalled we will resume in the same state where we left off. * * WRITE_STATE_SEND sends the message and performs any work to be done after * sending. * * WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK performs any work necessary after the sending of the * message has been completed. As for WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK this could also * result in an NBIO event. */ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret; WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s); WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); int (*construct_message) (SSL *s); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; cb = get_callback(s); if (s->server) { transition = ossl_statem_server_write_transition; pre_work = ossl_statem_server_pre_work; post_work = ossl_statem_server_post_work; construct_message = ossl_statem_server_construct_message; } else { transition = ossl_statem_client_write_transition; pre_work = ossl_statem_client_pre_work; post_work = ossl_statem_client_post_work; construct_message = ossl_statem_client_construct_message; } while (1) { switch (st->write_state) { case WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION: if (cb != NULL) { /* Notify callback of an impending state change */ if (s->server) cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); else cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); } switch (transition(s)) { case WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE: st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK; st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A; break; case WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED: return SUB_STATE_FINISHED; break; default: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } break; case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK: switch (st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { default: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_SEND; break; case WORK_FINISHED_STOP: return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE; } if (construct_message(s) == 0) return SUB_STATE_ERROR; /* Fall through */ case WRITE_STATE_SEND: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && st->use_timer) { dtls1_start_timer(s); } ret = statem_do_write(s); if (ret <= 0) { return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK; st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A; /* Fall through */ case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK: switch (st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { default: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION; break; case WORK_FINISHED_STOP: return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE; } break; default: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } } } /* * Flush the write BIO */ int statem_flush(SSL *s) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { return 0; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return 1; } /* * Called by the record layer to determine whether application data is * allowed to be sent in the current handshake state or not. * * Return values are: * 1: Yes (application data allowed) * 0: No (application data not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) return 0; if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0)) return 0; if (s->server) { /* * If we're a server and we haven't got as far as writing our * ServerHello yet then we allow app data */ if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) return 1; } else { /* * If we're a client and we haven't read the ServerHello yet then we * allow app data */ if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO) return 1; } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h0000644000000000000000000001327013176625661016636 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /***************************************************************************** * * * The following definitions are PRIVATE to the state machine. They should * * NOT be used outside of the state machine. * * * *****************************************************************************/ /* Max message length definitions */ /* The spec allows for a longer length than this, but we limit it */ #define HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 258 #define SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 20000 #define SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 102400 #define SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH 0 #define CCS_MAX_LENGTH 1 /* Max should actually be 36 but we are generous */ #define FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH 64 /* Message processing return codes */ typedef enum { /* Something bad happened */ MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, /* We've finished reading - swap to writing */ MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING, /* * We've completed the main processing of this message but there is some * post processing to be done. */ MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING, /* We've finished this message - read the next message */ MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN; /* Flush the write BIO */ int statem_flush(SSL *s); /* * TLS/DTLS client state machine functions */ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt); WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s); unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s); MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); /* * TLS/DTLS server state machine functions */ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt); WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s); unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s); MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); /* Functions for getting new message data */ __owur int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt); __owur int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len); __owur int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len); /* Message construction and processing functions */ __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s); __owur int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen); __owur WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); __owur WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s); /* some client-only functions */ __owur int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s); __owur WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); __owur int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); __owur int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); __owur int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG __owur int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s); #endif __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); /* some server-only functions */ __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); __owur int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s); __owur int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); #endif __owur int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c0000644000000000000000000026312413176625661016645 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p); /* * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) { /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) return 0; return 1; } /* * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) { long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral * ciphersuite or for SRP */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSRP)) { return 1; } return 0; } /* * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * * Return values are: * 1: Success (transition allowed) * 0: Error (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; return 1; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } } else { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if * the server is resuming. */ s->hit = 1; st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; } } else { ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } } } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: /* * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if * |tlsext_status_expected| is set */ if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; return 1; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } goto err; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } goto err; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; default: break; } err: /* No valid transition found */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } /* * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_OK: /* Renegotiation - fall through */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: /* * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what * we will be sent */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is * sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #endif return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } default: /* Shouldn't happen */ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } /* * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from * the client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } } break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->hit) { /* * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these * messages unless we need to. */ st->use_timer = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); #endif } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_OK: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); default: /* No pre work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ s->first_packet = 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) return WORK_ERROR; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) s->session->compress_meth = 0; else s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return WORK_ERROR; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) return WORK_ERROR; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); } break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_B; break; default: /* No post work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_construct_client_hello(s); case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: return tls_construct_client_certificate(s); case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s); case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: return tls_construct_client_verify(s); case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); else return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: return tls_construct_next_proto(s); #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: return tls_construct_finished(s, s->method-> ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: /* * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs */ return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) return 3; return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } /* * Process a message that the client has been received from the server. */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message * from the server */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); default: break; } /* Shouldn't happen */ return WORK_ERROR; } int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i; int protverr; unsigned long l; int al = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int j; SSL_COMP *comp; #endif SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); if (protverr != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); goto err; } if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || /* * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared * "ticket" without a session ID. */ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p = s->s3->client_random; /* * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { size_t idx; i = 1; for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { if (p[idx]) { i = 0; break; } } } else i = 1; if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) goto err; /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. */ *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) i = 0; else i = s->session->session_id_length; *(p++) = i; if (i != 0) { if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); p += i; } /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; } /* Ciphers supported */ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2])); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH /* * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we * use TLS v1.2 */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; #endif s2n(i, p); p += i; /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++) = 1; #else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) j = 0; else j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); *(p++) = 1 + j; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); *(p++) = comp->id; } #endif *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ /* TLS extensions */ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } l = p - d; if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return 1; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned int cookie_len; PACKET cookiepkt; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; PACKET session_id; size_t session_id_len; const unsigned char *cipherchars; int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int compression; unsigned int sversion; int protverr; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion); if (protverr != 0) { al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr); goto f_err; } /* load the server hello data */ /* load the server random */ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->hit = 0; /* Get the session-id. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } /* * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the * server wants to resume. */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && s->session->tlsext_tick) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, session_id_len) == 0) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } s->hit = 1; } else { /* * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++; if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { goto f_err; } } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; /* session_id_len could be 0 */ if (session_id_len > 0) memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), session_id_len); } /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed * version. */ s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; /* * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); if (i < 0) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is * set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; /* lets get the compression algorithm */ /* COMPRESSION */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (compression != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #else if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } if (compression == 0) comp = NULL; else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); goto f_err; } else { comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); } if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } else { s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; } #endif /* TLS extensions */ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; X509 *x = NULL; const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } certstart = certbytes; x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); if (x == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; } i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); /* * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was * reverted because at least one application *only* set * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. */ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ if (i > 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } s->session->peer_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); sk = NULL; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); if (i < 0) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { x = NULL; al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } s->session->peer_type = i; X509_free(s->session->peer); X509_up_ref(x); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; x = NULL; ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; goto done; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK PACKET psk_identity_hint; /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK * identity. */ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } return 1; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); return 0; } /* We must check if there is a certificate */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); return 1; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; int check_bits = 0; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); dh = DH_new(); if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL); bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* test non-zero pubkey */ if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p = g = NULL; if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } bnpub_key = NULL; if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; /* * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ return 1; err: BN_free(p); BN_free(g); BN_free(bnpub_key); DH_free(dh); EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); return 0; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC PACKET encoded_pt; const unsigned char *ecparams; int curve_nid; unsigned int curve_flags; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; /* * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. */ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } /* * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. */ if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; } curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags); if (curve_nid == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_PKEY_free(key); return 0; } s->s3->peer_tmp = key; } else { /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } /* * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA * and ECDSA. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ return 1; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = -1; long alg_k; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PACKET save_param_start, signature; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; save_param_start = *pkt; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; #endif if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { PACKET params; int maxsig; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; /* * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference * equals the length of the parameters. */ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *sigalgs; int rv; if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } else if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { md = EVP_md5_sha1(); } else { md = EVP_sha1(); } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (maxsig < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * Check signature length */ if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto err; } md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); } else { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; } goto err; } /* still data left over */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto err; } } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: if (al != -1) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; const unsigned char *data; const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the certificate types */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); s->cert->ctypes = NULL; if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) { /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num); s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; } for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++) s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i]; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; } if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { ssl_set_default_md(s); } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } namestart = namebytes; if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } xn = NULL; } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; ca_sk = NULL; ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; goto done; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return ret; } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned int ticklen; unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ if (ticklen == 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; SSL_SESSION *new_sess; /* * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new * one */ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { /* * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = new_sess; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. */ if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned long resplen; unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } #endif /* * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from * the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise */ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (ret < 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } #endif return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int ret = 0; /* * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating * strnlen. */ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; size_t identitylen = 0; unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; char *tmpidentity = NULL; size_t psklen = 0; if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto err; } else if (psklen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto err; } identitylen = strlen(identity); if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto err; } tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk; s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; tmppsk = NULL; OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; tmpidentity = NULL; s2n(identitylen, *p); memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen); *pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen; *p += identitylen; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); return ret; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; size_t enclen; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; if (s->session->peer == NULL) { /* * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) { goto err; } q = *p; /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) *p += 2; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } *len = enclen; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; # ifdef PKCS1_CHECK if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) (*p)[1]++; if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; # endif /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { s2n(*len, q); *len += 2; } s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh_clnt = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); if (ckey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return 0; } /* send off the data */ DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); s2n(*len, *p); BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p); *len += 2; EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return 1; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encoded_pt_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); if (ckey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } /* Generate encoding of client key */ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); ckey = NULL; *len = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */ **p = *len; *p += 1; /* copy the point */ memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len); /* increment len to account for length field */ *len += 1; OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); return 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return 0; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST /* GOST key exchange message creation */ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; X509 *peer_cert; size_t msglen; unsigned int md_len; unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; /* * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ peer_cert = s->session->peer; if (!peer_cert) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); return 0; } pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key * parameters match those of server certificate, use * certificate key for key exchange */ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ pmslen = 32; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 /* Generate session key */ || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; }; /* * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context * data */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ukm_hash == NULL || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); ukm_hash = NULL; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ /* * Encapsulate it into sequence */ *((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (msglen >= 0x80) { *((*p)++) = 0x81; *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff; *len = msglen + 3; } else { *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff; *len = msglen + 2; } memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; return 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); return 0; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { /* send off the data */ *len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); s2n(*len, *p); BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p); *len += 2; } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; #endif } int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; int len; size_t pskhdrlen = 0; unsigned long alg_k; int al = -1; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al)) goto err; if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { len = 0; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al)) goto err; } else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } len += pskhdrlen; if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return 1; err: if (al != -1) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) { unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Check for SRP */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return 1; } #endif if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ pms = NULL; pmslen = 0; goto err; } pms = NULL; pmslen = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP * used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; return 0; } int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; unsigned u = 0; unsigned long n = 0; long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 2; n = 2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u); } #endif s2n(u, p); n += u + 2; /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) goto err; if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 0; } /* * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) { if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) return 0; /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]) return 0; /* * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. */ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) return 0; return 1; } WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { X509 *x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int i; if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb) { i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_A; } if (i == 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ wst = WORK_MORE_B; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; * return(-1); We then get retied later */ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_B; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) i = 0; if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } } } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* Shouldn't ever get here */ return WORK_ERROR; } int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { int i; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int idx; #endif long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* we don't have a certificate */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) return (1); /* This is the passed certificate */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC idx = s->session->peer_type; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) { /* check failed */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto f_err; } else { return 1; } } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } #endif return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s) { unsigned int len, padding_len; unsigned char *d; len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; d[4] = len; memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); d[5 + len] = padding_len; memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } #endif int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i != 0) return i; } #endif if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); return i; } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p) { int i, j = 0; const SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ ssl_set_client_disabled(s); if (sk == NULL) return (0); q = p; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) continue; j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p); p += j; } /* * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add * applicable SCSVs. */ if (p != q) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); p += j; } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); p += j; } } return (p - q); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/README0000644000000000000000000000643613176625661015045 0ustar rootrootState Machine Design ==================== This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the state machine code to aid future maintenance. The state machine code replaces an older state machine present in OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and below. The new state machine has the following objectives: - Remove duplication of state code between client and server - Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS - Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location so that it is easier to validate - Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions - Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something else) - Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better understand each) - message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc - handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now - Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all the state changes local to the state machine component The message flow state machine is divided into a reading sub-state machine and a writing sub-state machine. See the source comments in statem.c for a more detailed description of the various states and transitions possible. Conceptually the state machine component is designed as follows: libssl | ---------------------------|-----statem.h-------------------------------------- | _______V____________________ | | | statem.c | | | | Core state machine code | |____________________________| statem_locl.h ^ ^ _________| |_______ | | _____________|____________ _____________|____________ | | | | | statem_clnt.c | | statem_srvr.c | | | | | | TLS/DTLS client specific | | TLS/DTLS server specific | | state machine code | | state machine code | |__________________________| |__________________________| | |_______________|__ | | ________________| | | | | | | ____________V_______V________ ________V______V_______________ | | | | | statem_both.c | | statem_dtls.c | | | | | | Non core functions common | | Non core functions common to | | to both servers and clients | | both DTLS servers and clients | |_____________________________| |_______________________________| openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c0000644000000000000000000010220013176625661016436 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include #include #include #include /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num); if (ret < 0) return (-1); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway */ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], ret)) return -1; if (ret == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); return (1); } s->init_off += ret; s->init_num -= ret; return (0); } int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) { unsigned char *p; int i; unsigned long l; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); if (i <= 0) return 0; s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); l = i; /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (!s->server) { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; } else { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; } if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. */ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; int slen; /* * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set * the appropriate error. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return; if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); } #endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; long remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } } else { if (remain != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no * SCTP is used */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); #endif } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al, i; /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); goto f_err; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (s->server) { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; } else { OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; s->init_num = 1; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { unsigned char *p; unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) return 0; l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); p = ssl_handshake_start(s); l2n3(l, p); l += 3; if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); } WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { WORK_STATE ret; ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) return ret; } #endif /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf * in case there are any unexpected retransmits */ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num = 0; if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; if (s->server) { ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; } else { ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; } if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } } return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; unsigned char *p; unsigned long l; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; do { while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur * in the middle of a handshake message. */ if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->init_num = i - 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->init_num += i; } skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' * MAC. */ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { s->init_num = 0; skip_message = 1; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } } while (skip_message); /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ *mt = *p; s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible * ClientHello * * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read */ l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num = 0; } return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) { long n; unsigned char *p; int i; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* We've already read everything in */ *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; return 1; } p = s->init_msg; n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, &p[s->init_num], n, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = 0; return 0; } s->init_num += i; n -= i; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for * Finished verification. */ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ssl3_take_mac(s); #endif /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; return 0; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; return 0; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } /* * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared * unsigned */ if (s->init_num < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; return 0; } *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; return 1; } int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) { if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) return -1; switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { default: return -1; case EVP_PKEY_RSA: return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; #endif } } int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { int al; switch (type) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; break; case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; break; case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; break; case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; break; default: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; break; } return (al); } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) return 0; return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); } static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) { int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); if (a == b) return 0; if (!dtls) return a < b ? -1 : 1; return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; } typedef struct { int version; const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); } version_info; #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. #endif static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, #else {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, #else {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, #else {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, #else {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif {0, NULL, NULL}, }; #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, #else {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, #else {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, #endif {0, NULL, NULL}, }; /* * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. * * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method * @method: the intended method. * * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. */ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) { int version = method->version; if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; return 0; } /* * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by * `SSL *` instance * * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method * @version: Protocol version to test against * * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 */ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; switch (s->method->version) { default: /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; ++vent) { if (vent->cmeth != NULL && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { return 1; } } return 0; } /* * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest * supported protocol version. * * @s server SSL handle. * * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. */ int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; /* * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed * s->method). */ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) return 1; /* * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its * highest protocol version). */ if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) table = tls_version_table; else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) table = dtls_version_table; else { /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ return 0; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) return s->version == vent->version; } return 0; } /* * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. * * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. * @version: the intended limit. * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) { if (version == 0) { *bound = version; return 1; } /*- * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. * * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. */ switch (method_version) { default: /* * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol * versions. */ return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) return 0; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) return 0; break; } *bound = version; return 1; } /* * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and * the version specific method. * * @s: server SSL handle. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) { /*- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: * * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. * * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the * handle version. */ int server_version = s->method->version; int client_version = s->client_version; const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; int disabled = 0; switch (server_version) { default: if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { const SSL_METHOD *method; if (vent->smeth == NULL || version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) continue; method = vent->smeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { s->version = vent->version; s->method = method; return 0; } disabled = 1; } return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; } /* * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and * the version specific method. * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; switch (s->method->version) { default: if (version != s->version) return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { const SSL_METHOD *method; int err; if (version != vent->version) continue; if (vent->cmeth == NULL) break; method = vent->cmeth(); err = ssl_method_error(s, method); if (err != 0) return err; s->method = method; s->version = version; return 0; } return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } /* * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version * * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. * * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) { int version; int hole; const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *method; const version_info *table; const version_info *vent; switch (s->method->version) { default: /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ *min_version = *max_version = s->version; return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } /* * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". * * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. * * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. * * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes * selected, as we start from scratch. */ *min_version = version = 0; hole = 1; for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { /* * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the * "version capability" vector. */ if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { hole = 1; continue; } method = vent->cmeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { hole = 1; } else if (!hole) { single = NULL; *min_version = method->version; } else { version = (single = method)->version; *min_version = version; hole = 0; } } *max_version = version; /* Fail if everything is disabled */ if (version == 0) return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; return 0; } /* * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for * the initial ClientHello. * * @s: client SSL handle. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) { int ver_min, ver_max, ret; ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); if (ret != 0) return ret; s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/statem.h0000644000000000000000000001026113176625661015622 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /***************************************************************************** * * * These enums should be considered PRIVATE to the state machine. No * * non-state machine code should need to use these * * * *****************************************************************************/ /* * Valid return codes used for functions performing work prior to or after * sending or receiving a message */ typedef enum { /* Something went wrong */ WORK_ERROR, /* We're done working and there shouldn't be anything else to do after */ WORK_FINISHED_STOP, /* We're done working move onto the next thing */ WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE, /* We're working on phase A */ WORK_MORE_A, /* We're working on phase B */ WORK_MORE_B } WORK_STATE; /* Write transition return codes */ typedef enum { /* Something went wrong */ WRITE_TRAN_ERROR, /* A transition was successfully completed and we should continue */ WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE, /* There is no more write work to be done */ WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED } WRITE_TRAN; /* Message flow states */ typedef enum { /* No handshake in progress */ MSG_FLOW_UNINITED, /* A permanent error with this connection */ MSG_FLOW_ERROR, /* We are about to renegotiate */ MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE, /* We are reading messages */ MSG_FLOW_READING, /* We are writing messages */ MSG_FLOW_WRITING, /* Handshake has finished */ MSG_FLOW_FINISHED } MSG_FLOW_STATE; /* Read states */ typedef enum { READ_STATE_HEADER, READ_STATE_BODY, READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS } READ_STATE; /* Write states */ typedef enum { WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION, WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK, WRITE_STATE_SEND, WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK } WRITE_STATE; /***************************************************************************** * * * This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the * * state machine. No non-state machine code should be accessing the members * * of this structure. * * * *****************************************************************************/ struct ossl_statem_st { MSG_FLOW_STATE state; WRITE_STATE write_state; WORK_STATE write_state_work; READ_STATE read_state; WORK_STATE read_state_work; OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE hand_state; int in_init; int read_state_first_init; /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */ int in_handshake; /* Should we skip the CertificateVerify message? */ unsigned int no_cert_verify; int use_timer; }; typedef struct ossl_statem_st OSSL_STATEM; /***************************************************************************** * * * The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the * * state machine. Any libssl code may call these functions/macros * * * *****************************************************************************/ __owur int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s); __owur int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_error(SSL *s); int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init); int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand); void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s); __owur int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s); openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c0000644000000000000000000031673013176625661016703 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format, int *al); /* * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state * is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success (transition allowed) * 0: Error (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_BEFORE: case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: /* * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either * 1) We didn't request a Certificate * OR * 2) If we did request one then * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned * AND * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 * list if we requested a certificate) */ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { /* * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just * not going to accept it because we require a client * cert. */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; return 1; } } break; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: /* * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be * set. */ if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses * its key from the certificate for key exchange. */ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; return 1; } } else { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; return 1; } } break; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; return 1; } } else { #endif if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG } #endif break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; #endif case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; default: break; } /* No valid transition found */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } /* * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? * * Valid return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, * the server certificate contains the server's public key for * key exchange. */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) /* * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if * provided */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) /* For other PSK always send SKE */ || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif ) { return 1; } return 0; } /* * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? * * Valid return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER /* * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert * during re-negotiation: */ && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) /* * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in * RFC 2246): */ && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) /* * ... except when the application insists on * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts * this for SSL 3) */ || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) /* * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests * are omitted */ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { return 1; } return 0; } /* * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_BEFORE: /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_OK: /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; } else { /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* normal PSK or SRP */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; } } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: if (send_certificate_request(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; default: /* Shouldn't happen */ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } /* * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from * the server to the client. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); break; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ st->use_timer = 0; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now */ st->use_timer = 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); #endif return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer */ st->use_timer = 0; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. */ st->use_timer = 0; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_OK: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); default: /* No pre work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * server to the client. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } break; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } /* * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to * treat like it was the first packet */ s->first_packet = 1; break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no * SCTP used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif break; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; break; case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif break; default: /* No post work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s); case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: return tls_construct_hello_request(s); case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_construct_server_hello(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: return tls_construct_server_certificate(s); case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: return tls_construct_certificate_request(s); case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: return tls_construct_server_done(s); case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: return tls_construct_cert_status(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); else return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: return tls_construct_finished(s, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } /* * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, * calculated as follows: * * 2 + # client_version * 32 + # only valid length for random * 1 + # length of session_id * 32 + # maximum size for session_id * 2 + # length of cipher suites * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array * 1 + # length of compression_methods * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods * 2 + # length of extensions * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions */ #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; #endif case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } /* * Process a message that the server has received from the client. */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); #endif case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message * from the client */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); default: break; } /* Shouldn't happen */ return WORK_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) { int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { /* * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp * login name */ ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; } else { ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); } } return ret; } #endif int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s) { if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned char cookie_len) { unsigned int msg_len; unsigned char *p; p = buf; /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF; *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len; memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len); p += cookie_len; msg_len = p - buf; return msg_len; } int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) { unsigned int len; unsigned char *buf; buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 || s->d1->cookie_len > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len); len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = len; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int j, complen = 0; unsigned long id; const SSL_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; #endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; int protverr; /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie; int is_v2_record; static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); PACKET_null_init(&cookie); /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */ if (is_v2_record) { unsigned int version; unsigned int mt; /*- * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes * the rest right through. Its format is: * Byte Content * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here * 3-4 version * 5-6 cipher_spec_length * 7-8 session_id_length * 9-10 challenge_length * ... ... */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record * in the first place */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) { /* No protocol version supplied! */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); goto err; } if (version == 0x0002) { /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); goto err; } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { /* SSLv3/TLS */ s->client_version = version; } else { /* No idea what protocol this is */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); goto err; } } else { /* * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } } /* * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) { protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; } else { protverr = 0; } if (protverr) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) { /* * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version * number */ s->version = s->client_version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } /* Parse the message and load client random. */ if (is_v2_record) { /* * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above. */ unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; PACKET challenge; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) /* No extensions. */ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } /* Load the client random and compression list. */ challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - challenge_len, challenge_len) /* Advertise only null compression. */ || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } PACKET_null_init(&extensions); } else { /* Regular ClientHello. */ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. * So check cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0) return 1; } } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Could be empty. */ extensions = *pkt; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie), PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } /* default verification */ } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; } if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); if (protverr != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } } s->hit = 0; /* * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. * * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally * ignore resumption requests with flag * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be * ignored. */ if (is_v2_record || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } else { i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id); /* * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated * version. * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and * will abort the handshake with an error. */ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous session */ s->hit = 1; } else if (i == -1) { goto err; } else { /* i == 0 */ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } } if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers), is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) { goto f_err; } /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ if (s->hit) { j = 0; id = s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); #endif if (c->id == id) { j = 1; break; } } if (j == 0) { /* * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked * to reuse it */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); goto f_err; } } complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression); for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) { if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0) break; } if (j >= complen) { /* no compress */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } /* TLS extensions */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } } /* * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket * processing to use it in key derivation. */ { unsigned char *pos; pos = s->s3->server_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { goto f_err; } } if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->hit = 1; s->session->ciphers = ciphers; s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; ciphers = NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s-> session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers (s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); } } /* * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; unsigned int k; /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ /* Can't disable compression */ if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed compression method */ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); if (comp_id == comp->id) { s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; break; } } if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) { if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id) break; } if (k >= complen) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); goto f_err; } } else if (s->hit) comp = NULL; else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m, nn, v, done = 0; unsigned int o; nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); v = comp->id; for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) { if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) { done = 1; break; } } if (done) break; } if (done) s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; else comp = NULL; } #else /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #endif /* * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; #endif sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers = ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } ciphers = NULL; if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { if (!s->hit) { /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb) { int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (rv < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_A; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (cipher == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); if (s->session->not_resumable) /* do not send a session ticket */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; } if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } /*- * we now have the following setup. * client_random * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. * s->hit - session reuse flag * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. */ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } wst = WORK_MORE_B; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { int ret; if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { /* * callback indicates further work to be done */ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_B; } if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { /* * This is not really an error but the only means to for * a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto f_err; } } #endif s->renegotiate = 2; return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i, sl; int al = 0; unsigned long l; buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in * tls_process_client_hello() */ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /*- * There are several cases for the session ID to send * back in the server hello: * - For session reuse from the session cache, * we send back the old session ID. * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" * (which doesn't actually identify the session). * - If it is a new session, we send back the new * session ID. * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, * we send back a 0-length session ID. * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed * to send back. */ if (s->session->not_resumable || (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit)) s->session->session_id_length = 0; sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } *(p++) = sl; memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); p += sl; /* put the cipher */ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); p += i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++) = 0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++) = 0; else *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } /* do the header */ l = (p - d); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s) { if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); } } return 1; } int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; int j; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *p, *d; int al, i; unsigned long type; int n; const BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4], kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; buf = s->init_buf; r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; n = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_PSK) { /* * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint */ n += 2; if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); } /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { CERT *cert = s->cert; EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; DH *dh; if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { DH_free(dhp); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); pkdhp = pkdh; } else { pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; } if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); if (pkdh == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } pkdhp = pkdh; } if (pkdhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); pkdh = NULL; DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { int nid; if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); if (curve_id == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); /* Generate a new key for this curve */ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto f_err; } /* Encode the public key. */ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, &encodedPoint); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure. */ n += 4 + encodedlen; /* * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we * can set these to NULLs */ r[0] = NULL; r[1] = NULL; r[2] = NULL; r[3] = NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (type & SSL_kSRP) { if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); goto err; } r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; } else #endif { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) n += 1 + nr[i]; else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /*- * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here */ if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) n += 2 + nr[0]; else #endif n += 2 + nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) kn += 2; /* Allow space for signature length */ kn += 2; } else { pkey = NULL; kn = 0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_PSK) { /* copy PSK identity hint */ if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) { size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { /* * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set * the identity hint */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s2n(len, p); memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len); p += len; } else { s2n(0, p); } } #endif for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { *p = nr[i]; p++; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /*- * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length * as the prime */ if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { s2n(nr[0], p); for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { *p = 0; ++p; } } else #endif s2n(nr[i], p); BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); p += nr[i]; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { /* * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p * points to the space at the end. */ if (md) { /* send signature algorithm */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { /* Should never happen */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } p += 2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) n += 2; } else { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p, *d; int i, j, nl, off, n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; buf = s->init_buf; d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); d[0] = n; p += n; n++; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *psigs; unsigned char *etmp = p; nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); /* Skip over length for now */ p += 2; nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl); /* Now fill in length */ s2n(nl, etmp); p += nl; n += nl + 2; } off = n; p += 2; n += 2; sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl = 0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; s2n(j, p); i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); n += 2 + j; nl += 2 + j; } } /* else no CA names */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; s2n(nl, p); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; return 1; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; size_t psklen; PACKET psk_identity; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); return 0; } if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } else if (psklen == 0) { /* * PSK related to the given identity not found */ *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; return 1; #else /* Should never happen */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int decrypt_len; unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; size_t j, padding_len; PACKET enc_premaster; RSA *rsa = NULL; unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; int ret = 0; rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); if (rsa == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { enc_premaster = *pkt; } else { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } } /* * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. */ if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; /* * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of * the timing-sensitive code below. */ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); if (decrypt_len < 0) goto err; /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ /* * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures * PS is at least 8 bytes. */ if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); } decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); /* * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. */ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); /* * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol * version instead if the server does not support the requested * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such * clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { unsigned char workaround_good; workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); version_good |= workaround_good; } /* * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to * remain non-zero (0xff). */ decrypt_good &= version_good; /* * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees * it is still sufficiently large to read from. */ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], rand_premaster_secret[j]); } if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; DH *cdh; unsigned int i; BIGNUM *pub_key; const unsigned char *data; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; int ret = 0; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; if (skey == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto err; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { /* We already checked we have enough data */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); if (pub_key != NULL) BN_free(pub_key); goto err; } if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; int ret = 0; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto err; } else { unsigned int i; const unsigned char *data; /* * Get client's public key from encoded point in the * ClientKeyExchange message. */ /* Get encoded point length */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP unsigned int i; const unsigned char *data; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); return 0; } if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; #else /* Should never happen */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; const unsigned char *start; size_t outlen = 32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; int Ttag, Tclass; long Tlen; long sess_key_len; const unsigned char *data; int ret = 0; /* Get our certificate private key */ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { /* * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too */ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; if (pk == NULL) { pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; } if (pk == NULL) { pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; } } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; } pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a * client certificate for authorization only. */ client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (client_pub_pkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } start = data; inlen = Tlen; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } /* Generate master secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = -1; unsigned long alg_k; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; err: if (al != -1) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP * used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR;; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } } #endif if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { /* * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need * the handshake_buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } /* * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const unsigned char *sig, *data; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; #endif int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; int type = 0, j; unsigned int len; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } peer = s->session->peer; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); if (pkey == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int rv; if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } else if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif } else { /* Use default digest for this key type */ int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); if (idx >= 0) md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; if (md == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); } else #endif if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); data = gost_data; } } #endif if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); } BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST OPENSSL_free(gost_data); #endif return ret; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; X509 *x = NULL; unsigned long l, llen; const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; PACKET spkt; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } certstart = certbytes; x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } x = NULL; } if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { goto f_err; } } else { EVP_PKEY *pkey; i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } if (i > 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); if (pkey == NULL) { al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); s->session->peer_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c */ sk = NULL; ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; goto done; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (cpk == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { unsigned char *senc = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; unsigned char *p, *macstart; const unsigned char *const_p; int len, slen_full, slen; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; int iv_len; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too * long */ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (senc == NULL) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) goto err; /* * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); if (sess == NULL) goto err; sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows handshake_header_length + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length. */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) goto err; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1); if (ret == 0) { l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ s2n(0, p); /* length */ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s))) goto err; OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); return 1; } if (ret < 0) goto err; iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); } else { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto err; memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)); } /* * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. */ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name)); p += sizeof(key_name); /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, iv_len); p += iv_len; /* Encrypt session data */ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) goto err; p += len; if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len)) goto err; p += len; if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen)) goto err; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); ctx = NULL; hctx = NULL; p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; s2n(len - 6, p); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) goto err; OPENSSL_free(senc); return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; size_t msglen; /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows handshake_header_length + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) goto err; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* status type */ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen)) goto err; return 1; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. * It sets the next_proto member in s if found */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET next_proto, padding; size_t next_proto_len; /*- * The payload looks like: * uint8 proto_len; * uint8 proto[proto_len]; * uint8 padding_len; * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) { s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; goto err; } s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #endif #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format, int *al) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int n; /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return NULL; } if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return NULL; } sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (sk == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return NULL; } if (sslv2format) { size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n; PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites; unsigned int leadbyte; unsigned char *raw; /* * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a * problem. */ raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN); s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw; if (raw == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0; raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) { if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte) || (leadbyte == 0 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) || (leadbyte != 0 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL; s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; goto err; } if (leadbyte == 0) s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN; } } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { /* * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. */ if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') continue; /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto err; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; continue; } /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected * downgrade. */ if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; goto err; } continue; } /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher); if (c != NULL) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } } } if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *skp = sk; return sk; err: sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c0000644000000000000000000011323013176625661016643 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8) #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \ if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \ long ii; \ for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \ } else { \ long ii; \ bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \ for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \ bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \ } } #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \ long ii; \ OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \ is_complete = 1; \ if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \ if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \ if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } } static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 }; static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f }; static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len); static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; unsigned char *buf = NULL; unsigned char *bitmask = NULL; frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*frag)); if (frag == NULL) return NULL; if (frag_len) { buf = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); if (buf == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(frag); return NULL; } } /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */ frag->fragment = buf; /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */ if (reassembly) { bitmask = OPENSSL_zalloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); if (bitmask == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(frag); return NULL; } } frag->reassembly = bitmask; return frag; } void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) { if (!frag) return; if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header. saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash); } OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); OPENSSL_free(frag); } /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; unsigned int curr_mtu; int retry = 1; unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len; if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s)) return -1; if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) /* should have something reasonable now */ return -1; if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); if (s->write_hash) { if (s->enc_write_ctx && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) mac_size = 0; else mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); } else mac_size = 0; if (s->enc_write_ctx && (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx); else blocksize = 0; frag_off = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */ while (s->init_num > 0) { if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) { /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */ if (frag_off > 0) { /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */ if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have * contained the message header plus one other byte. * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went * wrong. */ return -1; } /* * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new * message header for this fragment. */ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { /* * We must have been called again after a retry so use the * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because * that should already have been done before the retry. */ frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off; } } used_len = BIO_wpending(s->wbio) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize; if (s->d1->mtu > used_len) curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len; else curr_mtu = 0; if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */ ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (ret <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; return ret; } used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize; if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len; } else { /* Shouldn't happen */ return -1; } } /* * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */ if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu) len = curr_mtu; else len = s->init_num; if (len > s->max_send_fragment) len = s->max_send_fragment; /* * XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible * so fail */ return -1; } dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf-> data[s->init_off]); } ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len); if (ret < 0) { /* * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really * retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit */ if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) { if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s)) return -1; /* Have one more go */ retry = 0; } else return -1; } else { return (-1); } } else { /* * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message * got sent. but why would this happen? */ OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) { /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case * we'll ignore the result anyway */ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; int xlen; if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in * single fragment */ *p++ = msg_hdr->type; l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); l2n3(0, p); l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; xlen = ret; } else { p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen)) return -1; } if (ret == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ s->init_num = 0; return (1); } s->init_off += ret; s->init_num -= ret; ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; frag_off += ret; /* * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be * updated again later. */ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0); } } return (0); } int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr; unsigned char *p; unsigned long msg_len; int ok; long tmplen; msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr; memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); again: ok = dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &tmplen); if (tmplen == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || tmplen == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) { /* bad fragment received */ goto again; } else if (tmplen <= 0 && !ok) { return 0; } *mt = s->s3->tmp.message_type; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (*mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { if (s->msg_callback) { s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, p, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } /* * This isn't a real handshake message so skip the processing below. */ *len = (unsigned long)tmplen; return 1; } msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; /* reconstruct message header */ *(p++) = msg_hdr->type; l2n3(msg_len, p); s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); l2n3(0, p); l2n3(msg_len, p); if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len)) return 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; *len = s->init_num; return 1; } /* * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */ static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) { unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list) return s->max_cert_list; return max_len; } static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len; msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off; frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; /* sanity checking */ if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len || msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */ /* * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against * dtls_max_handshake_message_len(s) above */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len; s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len; s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type; s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type; s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq; } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) { /* * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit * would open possibility for buffer overrun. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } return 0; /* no error */ } static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok) { /*- * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available * if so: * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] * (2) update s->init_num */ pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; int al; *ok = 0; do { item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); if (item == NULL) return 0; frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (frag->msg_header.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) { /* This is a stale message that has been buffered so clear it */ pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); pitem_free(item); item = NULL; frag = NULL; } } while (item == NULL); /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */ if (frag->reassembly != NULL) return 0; if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) { unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len; pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header); if (al == 0) { /* no alert */ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.frag_len); } dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); pitem_free(item); if (al == 0) { *ok = 1; return frag_len; } ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); s->init_num = 0; *ok = 0; return -1; } else return 0; } static int dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; int i = -1, is_complete; unsigned char seq64be[8]; unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len || msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; if (frag_len == 0) return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; /* Try to find item in queue */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq; item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); if (item == NULL) { frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1); if (frag == NULL) goto err; memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len; frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; } else { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) { item = NULL; frag = NULL; goto err; } } /* * If message is already reassembled, this must be a retransmit and can * be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag does not need to be * freed. */ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { unsigned char devnull[256]; while (frag_len) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) : frag_len, 0); if (i <= 0) goto err; frag_len -= i; } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; } /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off, frag_len, 0); if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len) i = -1; if (i <= 0) goto err; RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len)); RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len, is_complete); if (is_complete) { OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); frag->reassembly = NULL; } if (item == NULL) { item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) { i = -1; goto err; } item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); /* * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However, * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above, * would have returned it and control would never have reached this * branch. */ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: if (item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } static int dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) { int i = -1; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; unsigned char seq64be[8]; unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) goto err; /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq; item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); /* * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, don't discard * it and rather try to reassemble it. */ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) item = NULL; /* * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is too far * in the future, already in the queue or if we received a FINISHED * before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale retransmit. */ if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq || msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL || (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) { unsigned char devnull[256]; while (frag_len) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) : frag_len, 0); if (i <= 0) goto err; frag_len -= i; } } else { if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0); if (frag == NULL) goto err; memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); if (frag_len) { /* * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, frag->fragment, frag_len, 0); if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len) i = -1; if (i <= 0) goto err; } item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) goto err; item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); /* * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However, * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above, * would have returned it. Then, either |frag_len| != * |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set to NULL and it will * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or * the record will have been discarded. */ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: if (item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) { unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned long mlen, frag_off, frag_len; int i, al, recvd_type; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; int ok; redo: /* see if we have the required fragment already */ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &ok)) || ok) { if (ok) s->init_num = frag_len; *len = frag_len; return ok; } /* read handshake message header */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = i; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { if (wire[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } memcpy(s->init_buf->data, wire, i); s->init_num = i - 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 1; s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->s3->tmp.message_size = i - 1; *len = i - 1; return 1; } /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */ if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } /* parse the message fragment header */ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); mlen = msg_hdr.msg_len; frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; /* * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read. * Fragments must not span records. */ if (frag_len > RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)) { al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } /* * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie) * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello) */ if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) { *len = dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, &ok); return ok; } if (frag_len && frag_len < mlen) { *len = dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, &ok); return ok; } if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */ if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->init_num = 0; goto redo; } else { /* Incorrectly formatted Hello request */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } } if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr))) goto f_err; if (frag_len > 0) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0); /* * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked * that we have enough data in the record */ if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = i; return 0; } } else i = 0; /* * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake * to fail */ if (i != (int)frag_len) { al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); goto f_err; } /* * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as * soon as they sum up to handshake packet length, we assume we have got * all the fragments. */ *len = s->init_num = frag_len; return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); s->init_num = 0; *len = -1; return 0; } /*- * for these 2 messages, we need to * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init * ssl->rlayer.read_sequence zero * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign * ssl->session->read_compression assign * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p); s->init_num += 2; } s->init_off = 0; dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s) { int ret; /* read app data until dry event */ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); if (ret < 0) return WORK_ERROR; if (ret == 0) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); return WORK_MORE_A; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } #endif int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) { if (code > 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 1; } if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) { /* * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle * this. in fact it's probably an error */ return code; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) #else /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ if (!SSL_in_init(s)) #endif { BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); return code; } return dtls1_handle_timeout(s); } int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs) { /* * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so * using only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the * same index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2. * In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and * Finished, it also maintains the order of the index (important for * priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable. */ return seq * 2 - is_ccs; } int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) { pqueue *sent = s->d1->sent_messages; piterator iter; pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; int found = 0; iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) { frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short) dtls1_get_queue_priority (frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs), &found) <= 0) return -1; } return 1; } int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) { pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; unsigned char seq64be[8]; /* * this function is called immediately after a message has been * serialized */ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0); if (frag == NULL) return 0; memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); if (is_ccs) { /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } else { OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; /* save current state */ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session; frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer); memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs)); item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) { dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); return 0; } pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); return 1; } int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found) { int ret; /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; unsigned long header_length; unsigned char seq64be[8]; struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state; /*- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); */ /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8); seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq; item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be); if (item == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *found = 0; return 0; } *found = 1; frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; else header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, frag->msg_header.frag_len); /* save current state */ saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; saved_state.compress = s->compress; saved_state.session = s->session; saved_state.epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer); s->d1->retransmitting = 1; /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */ s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx; s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash; s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress; s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session; DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(&s->rlayer, frag->msg_header. saved_retransmit_state.epoch); ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); /* restore current state */ s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx; s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash; s->compress = saved_state.compress; s->session = saved_state.session; DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(&s->rlayer, saved_state.epoch); s->d1->retransmitting = 0; (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); return ret; } void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { if (frag_off == 0) { s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; } dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, frag_off, frag_len); } /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; msg_hdr->type = mt; msg_hdr->msg_len = len; msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; } static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; } static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; *p++ = msg_hdr->type; l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); return p; } void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); msg_hdr->type = *(data++); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len); n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/s3_enc.c0000644000000000000000000004111313176625661014175 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num) { EVP_MD_CTX *m5; EVP_MD_CTX *s1; unsigned char buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char c = 'A'; unsigned int i, j, k; int ret = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC c = os_toascii[c]; /* 'A' in ASCII */ #endif k = 0; m5 = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); s1 = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (m5 == NULL || s1 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); for (i = 0; (int)i < num; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) { k++; if (k > sizeof(buf)) { /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } for (j = 0; j < k; j++) buf[j] = c; c++; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(s1, EVP_sha1(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, buf, k) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s1, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(s1, smd, NULL) || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(m5, EVP_md5(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m5, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) goto err; if ((int)(i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num) { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m5, smd, NULL)) goto err; memcpy(km, smd, (num - i)); } else { if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m5, km, NULL)) goto err; } km += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; } OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, sizeof(smd)); ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(m5); EVP_MD_CTX_free(s1); return ret; } int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) { unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; const EVP_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_METHOD *comp; #endif const EVP_MD *m; int n, i, j, k, cl; int reuse_dd = 0; c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; /* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */ OPENSSL_assert(m); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) comp = NULL; else comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method; #endif if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) reuse_dd = 1; else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; else /* * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx); dd = s->enc_read_ctx; if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand = NULL; if (comp != NULL) { s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp); if (s->expand == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); goto err2; } } #endif RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); } else { if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) reuse_dd = 1; else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; else /* * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx); dd = s->enc_write_ctx; if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress = NULL; if (comp != NULL) { s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp); if (s->compress == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); goto err2; } } #endif RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); } if (reuse_dd) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd); p = s->s3->tmp.key_block; i = EVP_MD_size(m); if (i < 0) goto err2; cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); j = cl; k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { ms = &(p[0]); n = i + i; key = &(p[n]); n += j + j; iv = &(p[n]); n += k + k; } else { n = i; ms = &(p[n]); n += i + j; key = &(p[n]); n += j + k; iv = &(p[n]); n += k; } if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; } memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i); if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) goto err2; OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_iv, sizeof(exp_iv)); return (1); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(exp_iv, sizeof(exp_iv)); return (0); } int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; const EVP_CIPHER *c; const EVP_MD *hash; int num; int ret = 0; SSL_COMP *comp; if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) return (1); if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, &comp, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); return (0); } s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c; s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; #else s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; #endif num = EVP_MD_size(hash); if (num < 0) return 0; num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + num + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); num *= 2; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) goto err; s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num; s->s3->tmp.key_block = p; ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s, p, num); if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) { /* * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; #endif } } return ret; err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) { OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block, s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL; s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0; } int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s) { BIO *buf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (buf == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_INIT_FINISHED_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } ssl3_free_digest_list(s); s->s3->handshake_buffer = buf; (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE); return 1; } /* * Free digest list. Also frees handshake buffer since they are always freed * together. */ void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst); s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL; } int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len) { if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) /* Note: this writes to a memory BIO so a failure is a fatal error */ return BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len) == len; else return EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, buf, len); } int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep) { const EVP_MD *md; long hdatalen; void *hdata; if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) { hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); return 0; } s->s3->handshake_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } md = ssl_handshake_md(s); if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, md, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, hdata, hdatalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (keep == 0) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; } return 1; } int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p) { int ret; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) return 0; if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst) != NID_md5_sha1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); return 0; } ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ret = EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx); if (ret < 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); return 0; } if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sender, len) <= 0) || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, p, NULL) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, int len) { static const unsigned char *salt[3] = { #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC (const unsigned char *)"A", (const unsigned char *)"BB", (const unsigned char *)"CCC", #else (const unsigned char *)"\x41", (const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42", (const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43", #endif }; unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); int i, ret = 0; unsigned int n; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt[i], strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &n) <= 0 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, buf, n) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, &n) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = 0; break; } out += n; ret += n; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf)); return (ret); } int ssl3_alert_code(int code) { switch (code) { case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return (SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return (-1); /* Don't send it :-) */ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: return (TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); default: return (-1); } } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_utst.c0000644000000000000000000000132113176625661014700 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST static const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions ssl_test_functions = { ssl_init_wbio_buffer, ssl3_setup_buffers, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # undef dtls1_process_heartbeat dtls1_process_heartbeat # endif }; const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void) { return &ssl_test_functions; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_txt.c0000644000000000000000000001527513176625661014535 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = SSL_SESSION_print(b, x); BIO_free(b); return (ret); } #endif int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x) { unsigned int i; const char *s; if (x == NULL) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "SSL-Session:\n") <= 0) goto err; s = ssl_protocol_to_string(x->ssl_version); if (BIO_printf(bp, " Protocol : %s\n", s) <= 0) goto err; if (x->cipher == NULL) { if (((x->cipher_id) & 0xff000000) == 0x02000000) { if (BIO_printf (bp, " Cipher : %06lX\n", x->cipher_id & 0xffffff) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (BIO_printf (bp, " Cipher : %04lX\n", x->cipher_id & 0xffff) <= 0) goto err; } } else { if (BIO_printf (bp, " Cipher : %s\n", ((x->cipher == NULL) ? "unknown" : x->cipher->name)) <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_puts(bp, " Session-ID: ") <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < x->session_id_length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->session_id[i]) <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Session-ID-ctx: ") <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < x->sid_ctx_length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->sid_ctx[i]) <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n Master-Key: ") <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int)x->master_key_length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0) goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n PSK identity: ") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity ? x->psk_identity : "None") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n PSK identity hint: ") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf (bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0) goto err; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n SRP username: ") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0) goto err; #endif if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n TLS session ticket lifetime hint: %ld (seconds)", x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) <= 0) goto err; } if (x->tlsext_tick) { if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n TLS session ticket:\n") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_dump_indent (bp, (const char *)x->tlsext_tick, x->tlsext_ticklen, 4) <= 0) goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (x->compress_meth != 0) { SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(x, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &comp, 0)) goto err; if (comp == NULL) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Compression: %d", x->compress_meth) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Compression: %d (%s)", comp->id, comp->name) <= 0) goto err; } } #endif if (x->time != 0L) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Start Time: %ld", x->time) <= 0) goto err; } if (x->timeout != 0L) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Timeout : %ld (sec)", x->timeout) <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, " Verify return code: ") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, "%ld (%s)\n", x->verify_result, X509_verify_cert_error_string(x->verify_result)) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_printf(bp, " Extended master secret: %s\n", x->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS ? "yes" : "no") <= 0) goto err; return (1); err: return (0); } /* * print session id and master key in NSS keylog format (RSA * Session-ID: Master-Key:) */ int SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x) { unsigned int i; if (x == NULL) goto err; if (x->session_id_length == 0 || x->master_key_length == 0) goto err; /* * the RSA prefix is required by the format's definition although there's * nothing RSA-specific in the output, therefore, we don't have to check if * the cipher suite is based on RSA */ if (BIO_puts(bp, "RSA ") <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(bp, "Session-ID:") <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < x->session_id_length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->session_id[i]) <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_puts(bp, " Master-Key:") <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int)x->master_key_length; i++) { if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", x->master_key[i]) <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) goto err; return (1); err: return (0); } openssl-1.1.0g/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c0000644000000000000000000001354613176625661014640 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" /* SSL library configuration module. */ struct ssl_conf_name { /* Name of this set of commands */ char *name; /* List of commands */ struct ssl_conf_cmd *cmds; /* Number of commands */ size_t cmd_count; }; struct ssl_conf_cmd { /* Command */ char *cmd; /* Argument */ char *arg; }; static struct ssl_conf_name *ssl_names; static size_t ssl_names_count; static void ssl_module_free(CONF_IMODULE *md) { size_t i, j; if (ssl_names == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ssl_names_count; i++) { struct ssl_conf_name *tname = ssl_names + i; OPENSSL_free(tname->name); for (j = 0; j < tname->cmd_count; j++) { OPENSSL_free(tname->cmds[j].cmd); OPENSSL_free(tname->cmds[j].arg); } OPENSSL_free(tname->cmds); } OPENSSL_free(ssl_names); ssl_names = NULL; ssl_names_count = 0; } static int ssl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf) { size_t i, j, cnt; int rv = 0; const char *ssl_conf_section; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cmd_lists; ssl_conf_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md); cmd_lists = NCONF_get_section(cnf, ssl_conf_section); if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists) <= 0) { if (cmd_lists == NULL) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); else SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_EMPTY); ERR_add_error_data(2, "section=", ssl_conf_section); goto err; } cnt = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists); ssl_names = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ssl_names) * cnt); ssl_names_count = cnt; for (i = 0; i < ssl_names_count; i++) { struct ssl_conf_name *ssl_name = ssl_names + i; CONF_VALUE *sect = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cmd_lists, i); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, sect->value); if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmds) <= 0) { if (cmds == NULL) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); else SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY); ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", sect->name, ", value=", sect->value); goto err; } ssl_name->name = BUF_strdup(sect->name); if (ssl_name->name == NULL) goto err; cnt = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmds); ssl_name->cmds = OPENSSL_zalloc(cnt * sizeof(struct ssl_conf_cmd)); if (ssl_name->cmds == NULL) goto err; ssl_name->cmd_count = cnt; for (j = 0; j < cnt; j++) { const char *name; CONF_VALUE *cmd_conf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(cmds, j); struct ssl_conf_cmd *cmd = ssl_name->cmds + j; /* Skip any initial dot in name */ name = strchr(cmd_conf->name, '.'); if (name != NULL) name++; else name = cmd_conf->name; cmd->cmd = BUF_strdup(name); cmd->arg = BUF_strdup(cmd_conf->value); if (cmd->cmd == NULL || cmd->arg == NULL) goto err; } } rv = 1; err: if (rv == 0) ssl_module_free(md); return rv; } void SSL_add_ssl_module(void) { CONF_module_add("ssl_conf", ssl_module_init, ssl_module_free); } static const struct ssl_conf_name *ssl_name_find(const char *name) { size_t i; const struct ssl_conf_name *nm; if (name == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0, nm = ssl_names; i < ssl_names_count; i++, nm++) { if (strcmp(nm->name, name) == 0) return nm; } return NULL; } static int ssl_do_config(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name) { SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; size_t i; int rv = 0; unsigned int flags; const SSL_METHOD *meth; const struct ssl_conf_name *nm; struct ssl_conf_cmd *cmd; if (s == NULL && ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } nm = ssl_name_find(name); if (nm == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME); ERR_add_error_data(2, "name=", name); goto err; } cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); if (cctx == NULL) goto err; flags = SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE; flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE | SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE; if (s != NULL) { meth = s->method; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(cctx, s); } else { meth = ctx->method; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); } if (meth->ssl_accept != ssl_undefined_function) flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER; if (meth->ssl_connect != ssl_undefined_function) flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, flags); for (i = 0, cmd = nm->cmds; i < nm->cmd_count; i++, cmd++) { rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cmd->cmd, cmd->arg); if (rv <= 0) { if (rv == -2) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND); else SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE); ERR_add_error_data(6, "section=", name, ", cmd=", cmd->cmd, ", arg=", cmd->arg); goto err; } } rv = SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx); err: SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); return rv <= 0 ? 0 : 1; } int SSL_config(SSL *s, const char *name) { return ssl_do_config(s, NULL, name); } int SSL_CTX_config(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name) { return ssl_do_config(NULL, ctx, name); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656013025 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/apps/s_server.c0000644000000000000000000032221113176625656015022 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include #if defined(_WIN32) /* Included before async.h to avoid some warnings */ # include #endif #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC #include #endif static int not_resumable_sess_cb(SSL *s, int is_forward_secure); static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); static void close_accept_socket(void); static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *s); static void print_stats(BIO *bp, SSL_CTX *ctx); static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx); static void free_sessions(void); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile); #endif static const int bufsize = 16 * 1024; static int accept_socket = -1; #define TEST_CERT "server.pem" #define TEST_CERT2 "server2.pem" static int s_nbio = 0; static int s_nbio_test = 0; static int s_crlf = 0; static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; static SSL_CTX *ctx2 = NULL; static int www = 0; static BIO *bio_s_out = NULL; static BIO *bio_s_msg = NULL; static int s_debug = 0; static int s_tlsextdebug = 0; static int s_msg = 0; static int s_quiet = 0; static int s_ign_eof = 0; static int s_brief = 0; static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL; static int keymatexportlen = 20; static int async = 0; static const char *session_id_prefix = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS static int enable_timeouts = 0; static long socket_mtu; #endif /* * We define this but make it always be 0 in no-dtls builds to simplify the * code. */ static int dtlslisten = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static const char psk_identity[] = "Client_identity"; char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */ static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { long key_len = 0; unsigned char *key; if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "psk_server_cb\n"); if (!identity) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: client did not send PSK identity\n"); goto out_err; } if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n", (int)strlen(identity), identity); /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */ if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK error: client identity not found" " (got '%s' expected '%s')\n", identity, psk_identity); goto out_err; } if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK client identity found\n"); /* convert the PSK key to binary */ key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } if (key_len > (int)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n", max_psk_len, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } memcpy(psk, key, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "fetched PSK len=%ld\n", key_len); return key_len; out_err: if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK server callback\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); return 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct srpsrvparm_st { char *login; SRP_VBASE *vb; SRP_user_pwd *user; } srpsrvparm; /* * This callback pretends to require some asynchronous logic in order to * obtain a verifier. When the callback is called for a new connection we * return with a negative value. This will provoke the accept etc to return * with an LOOKUP_X509. The main logic of the reinvokes the suspended call * (which would normally occur after a worker has finished) and we set the * user parameters. */ static int ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg; int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) { p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s); BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login); return (-1); } if (p->user == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login); goto err; } if (SSL_set_srp_server_param (s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v, p->user->info) < 0) { *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n", p->login, p->user->info); ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; err: SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user); p->user = NULL; p->login = NULL; return ret; } #endif static int local_argc = 0; static char **local_argv; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi); static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a); static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl); static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl); static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size); static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str); # define BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER (18|0x0200) static BIO_METHOD *methods_ebcdic = NULL; /* This struct is "unwarranted chumminess with the compiler." */ typedef struct { size_t alloced; char buff[1]; } EBCDIC_OUTBUFF; static const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ebcdic_filter() { if (methods_ebcdic == NULL) { methods_ebcdic = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER, "EBCDIC/ASCII filter"); if (methods_ebcdic == NULL || !BIO_meth_set_write(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_write) || !BIO_meth_set_read(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_read) || !BIO_meth_set_puts(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_puts) || !BIO_meth_set_gets(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_gets) || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_ctrl) || !BIO_meth_set_create(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_new) || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_free)) return NULL; } return methods_ebcdic; } static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; wbuf = app_malloc(sizeof(*wbuf) + 1024, "ebcdic wbuf"); wbuf->alloced = 1024; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; BIO_set_data(bi, wbuf); BIO_set_init(bi, 1); return 1; } static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; if (a == NULL) return 0; wbuf = BIO_get_data(a); OPENSSL_free(wbuf); BIO_set_data(a, NULL); BIO_set_init(a, 0); return 1; } static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (out == NULL || outl == 0) return (0); if (next == NULL) return (0); ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl); if (ret > 0) ascii2ebcdic(out, out, ret); return ret; } static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); int ret = 0; int num; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return (0); if (next == NULL) return 0; wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) BIO_get_data(b); if (inl > (num = wbuf->alloced)) { num = num + num; /* double the size */ if (num < inl) num = inl; OPENSSL_free(wbuf); wbuf = app_malloc(sizeof(*wbuf) + num, "grow ebcdic wbuf"); wbuf->alloced = num; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; BIO_set_data(b, wbuf); } ebcdic2ascii(wbuf->buff, in, inl); ret = BIO_write(next, wbuf->buff, inl); return (ret); } static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return (0); switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return (ret); } static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int i, ret = 0; BIO *next = BIO_next(bp); if (next == NULL) return 0; /* return(BIO_gets(bp->next_bio,buf,size));*/ for (i = 0; i < size - 1; ++i) { ret = ebcdic_read(bp, &buf[i], 1); if (ret <= 0) break; else if (buf[i] == '\n') { ++i; break; } } if (i < size) buf[i] = '\0'; return (ret < 0 && i == 0) ? ret : i; } static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { if (BIO_next(bp) == NULL) return 0; return ebcdic_write(bp, str, strlen(str)); } #endif /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct tlsextctx_st { char *servername; BIO *biodebug; int extension_error; } tlsextctx; static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg; const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (servername && p->biodebug) BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Hostname in TLS extension: \"%s\"\n", servername); if (!p->servername) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; if (servername) { if (strcasecmp(servername, p->servername)) return p->extension_error; if (ctx2) { BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Switching server context.\n"); SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx2); } } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } /* Structure passed to cert status callback */ typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st { /* Default responder to use */ char *host, *path, *port; int use_ssl; int timeout; int verbose; } tlsextstatusctx; static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, -1, 0 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP /* * Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a * certificate status request extension. This is a simplified version. It * examines certificates each time and makes one OCSP responder query for * each request. A full version would store details such as the OCSP * certificate IDs and minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching them * until they were considered "expired". */ static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg; char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL; int use_ssl; unsigned char *rspder = NULL; int rspderlen; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *aia = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *inctx = NULL; X509_OBJECT *obj; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int i; if (srctx->verbose) BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: callback called\n"); /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */ x = SSL_get_certificate(s); aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x); if (aia) { if (!OCSP_parse_url(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0), &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: can't parse AIA URL\n"); goto err; } if (srctx->verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "cert_status: AIA URL: %s\n", sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0)); } else { if (!srctx->host) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: no AIA and no default responder URL\n"); goto done; } host = srctx->host; path = srctx->path; port = srctx->port; use_ssl = srctx->use_ssl; } inctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (inctx == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(inctx, SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s)), NULL, NULL)) goto err; obj = X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(inctx, X509_LU_X509, X509_get_issuer_name(x)); if (obj == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Can't retrieve issuer certificate.\n"); goto done; } id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, x, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(obj)); X509_OBJECT_free(obj); if (!id) goto err; req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (req == NULL) goto err; if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(req, id)) goto err; id = NULL; /* Add any extensions to the request */ SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1)) goto err; } resp = process_responder(req, host, path, port, use_ssl, NULL, srctx->timeout); if (!resp) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: error querying responder\n"); goto done; } rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder); if (rspderlen <= 0) goto err; SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen); if (srctx->verbose) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bio_err, resp, 2); } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; goto done; err: ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; done: if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (aia) { OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(path); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_email_free(aia); } OCSP_CERTID_free(id); OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); X509_STORE_CTX_free(inctx); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { unsigned char *data; size_t len; } tlsextnextprotoctx; static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) { tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg; *data = next_proto->data; *len = next_proto->len; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ /* This the context that we pass to alpn_cb */ typedef struct tlsextalpnctx_st { unsigned char *data; size_t len; } tlsextalpnctx; static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { tlsextalpnctx *alpn_ctx = arg; if (!s_quiet) { /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ unsigned int i; BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols advertised by the client: "); for (i = 0; i < inlen;) { if (i) BIO_write(bio_s_out, ", ", 2); BIO_write(bio_s_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); i += in[i] + 1; } BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1); } if (SSL_select_next_proto ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in, inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) { return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } if (!s_quiet) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols selected: "); BIO_write(bio_s_out, *out, *outlen); BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1); } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int not_resumable_sess_cb(SSL *s, int is_forward_secure) { /* disable resumption for sessions with forward secure ciphers */ return is_forward_secure; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP static char *srtp_profiles = NULL; #endif typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_4, OPT_6, OPT_ACCEPT, OPT_PORT, OPT_UNIX, OPT_UNLINK, OPT_NACCEPT, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY, OPT_CONTEXT, OPT_CERT, OPT_CRL, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SERVERINFO, OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_KEY, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASS, OPT_CERT_CHAIN, OPT_DHPARAM, OPT_DCERTFORM, OPT_DCERT, OPT_DKEYFORM, OPT_DPASS, OPT_DKEY, OPT_DCERT_CHAIN, OPT_NOCERT, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_CHAINCAPATH, OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, OPT_NO_CACHE, OPT_EXT_CACHE, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_CHAINCAFILE, OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, OPT_NBIO, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE, OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, OPT_STATUS_URL, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_STATE, OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_BRIEF, OPT_NO_DHE, OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL, OPT_PSK_HINT, OPT_PSK, OPT_SRPVFILE, OPT_SRPUSERSEED, OPT_REV, OPT_WWW, OPT_UPPER_WWW, OPT_HTTP, OPT_ASYNC, OPT_SSL_CONFIG, OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, OPT_READ_BUF, OPT_SSL3, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1, OPT_DTLS, OPT_DTLS1, OPT_DTLS1_2, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_MTU, OPT_LISTEN, OPT_ID_PREFIX, OPT_RAND, OPT_SERVERNAME, OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL, OPT_CERT2, OPT_KEY2, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN, OPT_SRTP_PROFILES, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, OPT_S_ENUM, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_X_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS s_server_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "TCP/IP port to listen on for connections (default is " PORT ")"}, {"accept", OPT_ACCEPT, 's', "TCP/IP optional host and port to listen on for connections (default is *:" PORT ")"}, #ifdef AF_UNIX {"unix", OPT_UNIX, 's', "Unix domain socket to accept on"}, #endif {"4", OPT_4, '-', "Use IPv4 only"}, {"6", OPT_6, '-', "Use IPv6 only"}, #ifdef AF_UNIX {"unlink", OPT_UNLINK, '-', "For -unix, unlink existing socket first"}, #endif {"context", OPT_CONTEXT, 's', "Set session ID context"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'n', "Turn on peer certificate verification"}, {"Verify", OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY, 'n', "Turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate file to use; default is " TEST_CERT}, {"naccept", OPT_NACCEPT, 'p', "Terminate after #num connections"}, {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's', "PEM serverinfo file for certificate"}, {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 'F', "Certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private Key if not in -cert; default is " TEST_CERT}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default"}, {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Private key file pass phrase source"}, {"dcert", OPT_DCERT, '<', "Second certificate file to use (usually for DSA)"}, {"dhparam", OPT_DHPARAM, '<', "DH parameters file to use"}, {"dcertform", OPT_DCERTFORM, 'F', "Second certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"}, {"dkey", OPT_DKEY, '<', "Second private key file to use (usually for DSA)"}, {"dkeyform", OPT_DKEYFORM, 'F', "Second key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default"}, {"dpass", OPT_DPASS, 's', "Second private key file pass phrase source"}, {"nbio_test", OPT_NBIO_TEST, '-', "Test with the non-blocking test bio"}, {"crlf", OPT_CRLF, '-', "Convert LF from terminal into CRLF"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print more output"}, {"msg", OPT_MSG, '-', "Show protocol messages"}, {"msgfile", OPT_MSGFILE, '>', "File to send output of -msg or -trace, instead of stdout"}, {"state", OPT_STATE, '-', "Print the SSL states"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"nocert", OPT_NOCERT, '-', "Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)"}, {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No server output"}, {"no_resume_ephemeral", OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL, '-', "Disable caching and tickets if ephemeral (EC)DH is used"}, {"www", OPT_WWW, '-', "Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page"}, {"WWW", OPT_UPPER_WWW, '-', "Respond to a 'GET with the file ./path"}, {"servername", OPT_SERVERNAME, 's', "Servername for HostName TLS extension"}, {"servername_fatal", OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL, '-', "mismatch send fatal alert (default warning alert)"}, {"cert2", OPT_CERT2, '<', "Certificate file to use for servername; default is" TEST_CERT2}, {"key2", OPT_KEY2, '<', "-Private Key file to use for servername if not in -cert2"}, {"tlsextdebug", OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, '-', "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"}, {"HTTP", OPT_HTTP, '-', "Like -WWW but ./path includes HTTP headers"}, {"id_prefix", OPT_ID_PREFIX, 's', "Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by arg"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"keymatexport", OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, 's', "Export keying material using label"}, {"keymatexportlen", OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, 'p', "Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)"}, {"CRL", OPT_CRL, '<', "CRL file to use"}, {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-', "Download CRL from distribution points"}, {"cert_chain", OPT_CERT_CHAIN, '<', "certificate chain file in PEM format"}, {"dcert_chain", OPT_DCERT_CHAIN, '<', "second certificate chain file in PEM format"}, {"chainCApath", OPT_CHAINCAPATH, '/', "use dir as certificate store path to build CA certificate chain"}, {"verifyCApath", OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, '/', "use dir as certificate store path to verify CA certificate"}, {"no_cache", OPT_NO_CACHE, '-', "Disable session cache"}, {"ext_cache", OPT_EXT_CACHE, '-', "Disable internal cache, setup and use external cache"}, {"CRLform", OPT_CRLFORM, 'F', "CRL format (PEM or DER) PEM is default"}, {"verify_return_error", OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, '-', "Close connection on verification error"}, {"verify_quiet", OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, '-', "No verify output except verify errors"}, {"build_chain", OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, '-', "Build certificate chain"}, {"chainCAfile", OPT_CHAINCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate chain (PEM format)"}, {"verifyCAfile", OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate verification (PEM format)"}, {"ign_eof", OPT_IGN_EOF, '-', "ignore input eof (default when -quiet)"}, {"no_ign_eof", OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, '-', "Do not ignore input eof"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"}, {"status_verbose", OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE, '-', "Print more output in certificate status callback"}, {"status_timeout", OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, 'n', "Status request responder timeout"}, {"status_url", OPT_STATUS_URL, 's', "Status request fallback URL"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE {"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "trace protocol messages"}, #endif {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-', "Print output from SSL/TLS security framework"}, {"security_debug_verbose", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, '-', "Print more output from SSL/TLS security framework"}, {"brief", OPT_BRIEF, '-', "Restrict output to brief summary of connection parameters"}, {"rev", OPT_REV, '-', "act as a simple test server which just sends back with the received text reversed"}, {"async", OPT_ASYNC, '-', "Operate in asynchronous mode"}, {"ssl_config", OPT_SSL_CONFIG, 's', "Configure SSL_CTX using the configuration 'val'"}, {"split_send_frag", OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, 'n', "Size used to split data for encrypt pipelines"}, {"max_pipelines", OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, 'n', "Maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used"}, {"read_buf", OPT_READ_BUF, 'n', "Default read buffer size to be used for connections"}, OPT_S_OPTIONS, OPT_V_OPTIONS, OPT_X_OPTIONS, {"nbio", OPT_NBIO, '-', "Use non-blocking IO"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK {"psk_hint", OPT_PSK_HINT, 's', "PSK identity hint to use"}, {"psk", OPT_PSK, 's', "PSK in hex (without 0x)"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP {"srpvfile", OPT_SRPVFILE, '<', "The verifier file for SRP"}, {"srpuserseed", OPT_SRPUSERSEED, 's', "A seed string for a default user salt"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just talk SSLv3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just talk TLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "Just talk TLSv1.1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "just talk TLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS {"dtls", OPT_DTLS, '-', "Use any DTLS version"}, {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, '-', "Enable timeouts"}, {"mtu", OPT_MTU, 'p', "Set link layer MTU"}, {"listen", OPT_LISTEN, '-', "Listen for a DTLS ClientHello with a cookie and then connect"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {"dtls1", OPT_DTLS1, '-', "Just talk DTLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {"dtls1_2", OPT_DTLS1_2, '-', "Just talk DTLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH {"no_dhe", OPT_NO_DHE, '-', "Disable ephemeral DH"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's', "Set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP {"use_srtp", OPT_SRTP_PROFILES, 's', "Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list"}, #endif {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's', "Set the advertised protocols for the ALPN extension (comma-separated list)"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL, OPT_EOF, 0, NULL} }; #define IS_PROT_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_SSL3 || o == OPT_TLS1 || o == OPT_TLS1_1 || o == OPT_TLS1_2 \ || o == OPT_DTLS || o == OPT_DTLS1 || o == OPT_DTLS1_2) int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[]) { ENGINE *engine = NULL; EVP_PKEY *s_key = NULL, *s_dkey = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_server_method(); SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *s_chain = NULL, *s_dchain = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509 *s_cert = NULL, *s_dcert = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL; char *dpassarg = NULL, *dpass = NULL, *inrand = NULL; char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL; char *crl_file = NULL, *prog; #ifdef AF_UNIX int unlink_unix_path = 0; #endif do_server_cb server_cb; int vpmtouched = 0, build_chain = 0, no_cache = 0, ext_cache = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH char *dhfile = NULL; int no_dhe = 0; #endif int nocert = 0, ret = 1; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int s_cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_key_format = FORMAT_PEM; int s_dcert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_dkey_format = FORMAT_PEM; int rev = 0, naccept = -1, sdebug = 0; int socket_family = AF_UNSPEC, socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; int state = 0, crl_format = FORMAT_PEM, crl_download = 0; char *host = NULL; char *port = BUF_strdup(PORT); unsigned char *context = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; EVP_PKEY *s_key2 = NULL; X509 *s_cert2 = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING }; const char *ssl_config = NULL; int read_buf_len = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto = { NULL, 0 }; #endif const char *alpn_in = NULL; tlsextalpnctx alpn_ctx = { NULL, 0 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */ char *psk_identity_hint = NULL; char *p; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srpuserseed = NULL; char *srp_verifier_file = NULL; #endif int min_version = 0, max_version = 0, prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0; int s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; int s_server_session_id_context = 1; /* anything will do */ const char *s_cert_file = TEST_CERT, *s_key_file = NULL, *s_chain_file = NULL; const char *s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2, *s_key_file2 = NULL; char *s_dcert_file = NULL, *s_dkey_file = NULL, *s_dchain_file = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int s_tlsextstatus = 0; #endif int no_resume_ephemeral = 0; unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0, max_pipelines = 0; const char *s_serverinfo_file = NULL; /* Init of few remaining global variables */ local_argc = argc; local_argv = argv; ctx = ctx2 = NULL; s_nbio = s_nbio_test = 0; www = 0; bio_s_out = NULL; s_debug = 0; s_msg = 0; s_quiet = 0; s_brief = 0; async = 0; cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (cctx == NULL || vpm == NULL) goto end; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_server_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { if (IS_PROT_FLAG(o) && ++prot_opt > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n"); goto end; } if (IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o)) no_prot_opt++; if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and '-no_'\n"); goto end; } switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(s_server_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_4: #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; } #endif socket_family = AF_INET; break; case OPT_6: if (1) { #ifdef AF_INET6 #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; } #endif socket_family = AF_INET6; } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: IPv6 domain sockets unsupported\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_PORT: #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { socket_family = AF_UNSPEC; } #endif OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; if (BIO_parse_hostserv(opt_arg(), NULL, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV) < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -port argument malformed or ambiguous\n", port); goto end; } break; case OPT_ACCEPT: #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { socket_family = AF_UNSPEC; } #endif OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; if (BIO_parse_hostserv(opt_arg(), &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV) < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -accept argument malformed or ambiguous\n", port); goto end; } break; #ifdef AF_UNIX case OPT_UNIX: socket_family = AF_UNIX; OPENSSL_free(host); host = BUF_strdup(opt_arg()); OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; break; case OPT_UNLINK: unlink_unix_path = 1; break; #endif case OPT_NACCEPT: naccept = atol(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_VERIFY: s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY: s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d, must return a certificate\n", verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_CONTEXT: context = (unsigned char *)opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT: s_cert_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL: crl_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD: crl_download = 1; break; case OPT_SERVERINFO: s_serverinfo_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_cert_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_KEY: s_key_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &s_key_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASS: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT_CHAIN: s_chain_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DHPARAM: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dhfile = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_DCERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_dcert_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_DCERT: s_dcert_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DKEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_dkey_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_DPASS: dpassarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DKEY: s_dkey_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DCERT_CHAIN: s_dchain_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCERT: nocert = 1; break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_CHAINCAPATH: chCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAPATH: vfyCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NO_CACHE: no_cache = 1; break; case OPT_EXT_CACHE: ext_cache = 1; break; case OPT_CRLFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &crl_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_S_CASES: if (ssl_args == NULL) ssl_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (ssl_args == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_flag()) || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_X_CASES: if (!args_excert(o, &exc)) goto end; break; case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR: verify_args.return_error = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET: verify_args.quiet = 1; break; case OPT_BUILD_CHAIN: build_chain = 1; break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_CHAINCAFILE: chCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAFILE: vfyCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NBIO: s_nbio = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO_TEST: s_nbio = s_nbio_test = 1; break; case OPT_IGN_EOF: s_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NO_IGN_EOF: s_ign_eof = 0; break; case OPT_DEBUG: s_debug = 1; break; case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG: s_tlsextdebug = 1; break; case OPT_STATUS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = 1; #endif break; case OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = tlscstatp.verbose = 1; #endif break; case OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = 1; tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_STATUS_URL: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = 1; if (!OCSP_parse_url(opt_arg(), &tlscstatp.host, &tlscstatp.port, &tlscstatp.path, &tlscstatp.use_ssl)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n"); goto end; } #endif break; case OPT_MSG: s_msg = 1; break; case OPT_MSGFILE: bio_s_msg = BIO_new_file(opt_arg(), "w"); break; case OPT_TRACE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE s_msg = 2; #endif break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG: sdebug = 1; break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE: sdebug = 2; break; case OPT_STATE: state = 1; break; case OPT_CRLF: s_crlf = 1; break; case OPT_QUIET: s_quiet = 1; break; case OPT_BRIEF: s_quiet = s_brief = verify_args.quiet = 1; break; case OPT_NO_DHE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH no_dhe = 1; #endif break; case OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL: no_resume_ephemeral = 1; break; case OPT_PSK_HINT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK psk_identity_hint = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_PSK: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) { if (isxdigit(_UC(*p))) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv); goto end; } #endif break; case OPT_SRPVFILE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP srp_verifier_file = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif break; case OPT_SRPUSERSEED: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP srpuserseed = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif break; case OPT_REV: rev = 1; break; case OPT_WWW: www = 1; break; case OPT_UPPER_WWW: www = 2; break; case OPT_HTTP: www = 3; break; case OPT_SSL_CONFIG: ssl_config = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_DTLS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_server_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_server_method(); min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1_2: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_server_method(); min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS enable_timeouts = 1; #endif break; case OPT_MTU: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS socket_mtu = atol(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_LISTEN: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS dtlslisten = 1; #endif break; case OPT_ID_PREFIX: session_id_prefix = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: engine = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 1); break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SERVERNAME: tlsextcbp.servername = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL: tlsextcbp.extension_error = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; break; case OPT_CERT2: s_cert_file2 = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY2: s_key_file2 = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NEXTPROTONEG: # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_in = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_ALPN: alpn_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SRTP_PROFILES: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP srtp_profiles = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORT: keymatexportlabel = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN: keymatexportlen = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_ASYNC: async = 1; break; case OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG: split_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); if (split_send_fragment == 0) { /* * Not allowed - set to a deliberately bad value so we get an * error message below */ split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 1; } break; case OPT_MAX_PIPELINES: max_pipelines = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_READ_BUF: read_buf_len = atoi(opt_arg()); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n"); goto end; } if (dtlslisten && socket_type != SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can only use -listen with DTLS\n"); goto end; } #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use unix sockets and datagrams together\n"); goto end; } #endif if (split_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad split send fragment size\n"); goto end; } if (max_pipelines > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad max pipelines value\n"); goto end; } if (!app_passwd(passarg, dpassarg, &pass, &dpass)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (s_key_file == NULL) s_key_file = s_cert_file; if (s_key_file2 == NULL) s_key_file2 = s_cert_file2; if (!load_excert(&exc)) goto end; if (nocert == 0) { s_key = load_key(s_key_file, s_key_format, 0, pass, engine, "server certificate private key file"); if (!s_key) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_cert = load_cert(s_cert_file, s_cert_format, "server certificate file"); if (!s_cert) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_chain_file) { if (!load_certs(s_chain_file, &s_chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "server certificate chain")) goto end; } if (tlsextcbp.servername) { s_key2 = load_key(s_key_file2, s_key_format, 0, pass, engine, "second server certificate private key file"); if (!s_key2) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_cert2 = load_cert(s_cert_file2, s_cert_format, "second server certificate file"); if (!s_cert2) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto_neg_in) { next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); if (next_proto.data == NULL) goto end; } #endif alpn_ctx.data = NULL; if (alpn_in) { alpn_ctx.data = next_protos_parse(&alpn_ctx.len, alpn_in); if (alpn_ctx.data == NULL) goto end; } if (crl_file) { X509_CRL *crl; crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format); if (!crl) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!crls || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_CRL_free(crl); goto end; } } if (s_dcert_file) { if (s_dkey_file == NULL) s_dkey_file = s_dcert_file; s_dkey = load_key(s_dkey_file, s_dkey_format, 0, dpass, engine, "second certificate private key file"); if (!s_dkey) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_dcert = load_cert(s_dcert_file, s_dcert_format, "second server certificate file"); if (!s_dcert) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_dchain_file) { if (!load_certs(s_dchain_file, &s_dchain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "second server certificate chain")) goto end; } } if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL && !RAND_status()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n"); } if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); if (bio_s_out == NULL) { if (s_quiet && !s_debug) { bio_s_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); if (s_msg && !bio_s_msg) bio_s_msg = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } else { if (bio_s_out == NULL) bio_s_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if (nocert) #endif { s_cert_file = NULL; s_key_file = NULL; s_dcert_file = NULL; s_dkey_file = NULL; s_cert_file2 = NULL; s_key_file2 = NULL; } ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (sdebug) ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug); if (ssl_config) { if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, ssl_config) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error using configuration \"%s\"\n", ssl_config); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0) goto end; if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (session_id_prefix) { if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n"); if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx, generate_session_id)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix); } SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1); if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); if (no_cache) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); else if (ext_cache) init_session_cache_ctx(ctx); else SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 128); if (async) { SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); } if (split_send_fragment > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx, split_send_fragment); } if (max_pipelines > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx, max_pipelines); } if (read_buf_len > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(ctx, read_buf_len); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (srtp_profiles != NULL) { /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting SRTP profile\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, 0); if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx)) goto end; if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile, crls, crl_download)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_cert2) { ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx2 == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (ctx2) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting secondary ctx parameters\n"); if (sdebug) ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug); if (session_id_prefix) { if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n"); if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx2, generate_session_id)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix); } SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx2, 1); if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx2, exc); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback); if (no_cache) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx2, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); else if (ext_cache) init_session_cache_ctx(ctx2); else SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx2, 128); if (async) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx2, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx2, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx2, crls, 0); if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx2)) goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (next_proto.data) SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); #endif if (alpn_ctx.data) SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, alpn_cb, &alpn_ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (!no_dhe) { DH *dh = NULL; if (dhfile) dh = load_dh_param(dhfile); else if (s_cert_file) dh = load_dh_param(s_cert_file); if (dh != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n"); } (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (dh == NULL) SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1); else if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting temp DH parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); DH_free(dh); goto end; } if (ctx2) { if (!dhfile) { DH *dh2 = load_dh_param(s_cert_file2); if (dh2 != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); DH_free(dh); dh = dh2; } } if (dh == NULL) SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx2, 1); else if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx2, dh)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting temp DH parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); DH_free(dh); goto end; } } DH_free(dh); } #endif if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key, s_chain, build_chain)) goto end; if (s_serverinfo_file != NULL && !SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(ctx, s_serverinfo_file)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2, s_cert2, s_key2, NULL, build_chain)) goto end; if (s_dcert != NULL) { if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey, s_dchain, build_chain)) goto end; } if (no_resume_ephemeral) { SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(ctx, not_resumable_sess_cb); if (ctx2) SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(ctx2, not_resumable_sess_cb); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psk_key != NULL) { if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK key given, setting server callback\n"); SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_cb); } if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(ctx, psk_identity_hint)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #endif SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, s_server_verify, verify_callback); if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context, sizeof s_server_session_id_context)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting session id context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* Set DTLS cookie generation and verification callbacks */ SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_cookie_callback); SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cookie_callback); if (ctx2) { SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2, s_server_verify, verify_callback); if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context, sizeof s_server_session_id_context)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting session id context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx2, &tlsextcbp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_verifier_file != NULL) { srp_callback_parm.vb = SRP_VBASE_new(srpuserseed); srp_callback_parm.user = NULL; srp_callback_parm.login = NULL; if ((ret = SRP_VBASE_init(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_verifier_file)) != SRP_NO_ERROR) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot initialize SRP verifier file \"%s\":ret=%d\n", srp_verifier_file, ret); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_callback_parm); SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb); } else #endif if (CAfile != NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); if (ctx2) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s_tlsextstatus) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp); if (ctx2) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx2, cert_status_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx2, &tlscstatp); } } #endif BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (rev) server_cb = rev_body; else if (www) server_cb = www_body; else server_cb = sv_body; #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && unlink_unix_path) unlink(host); #endif do_server(&accept_socket, host, port, socket_family, socket_type, server_cb, context, naccept); print_stats(bio_s_out, ctx); ret = 0; end: SSL_CTX_free(ctx); X509_free(s_cert); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); X509_free(s_dcert); EVP_PKEY_free(s_key); EVP_PKEY_free(s_dkey); sk_X509_pop_free(s_chain, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(s_dchain, X509_free); OPENSSL_free(pass); OPENSSL_free(dpass); OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); free_sessions(); OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host); OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port); OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path); SSL_CTX_free(ctx2); X509_free(s_cert2); EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data); #endif OPENSSL_free(alpn_ctx.data); ssl_excert_free(exc); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); release_engine(engine); BIO_free(bio_s_out); bio_s_out = NULL; BIO_free(bio_s_msg); bio_s_msg = NULL; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC BIO_meth_free(methods_ebcdic); #endif return (ret); } static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx) { BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld items in the session cache\n", SSL_CTX_sess_number(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects (SSL_connect())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client renegotiates (SSL_connect())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects that finished\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts (SSL_accept())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server renegotiates (SSL_accept())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts that finished\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache misses\n", SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache timeouts\n", SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld callback cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld cache full overflows (%ld allowed)\n", SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ssl_ctx), SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ssl_ctx)); } static int sv_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; fd_set readfds; int ret = 1, width; int k, i; unsigned long l; SSL *con = NULL; BIO *sbio; struct timeval timeout; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) struct timeval tv; #else struct timeval *timeoutp; #endif buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server buffer"); if (s_nbio) { if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); else if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Turned on non blocking io\n"); } if (con == NULL) { con = SSL_new(ctx); if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (context && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting session id context\n"); ret = -1; goto err; } } if (!SSL_clear(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error clearing SSL connection\n"); ret = -1; goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (stype == SOCK_DGRAM) { sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (enable_timeouts) { timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); } if (socket_mtu) { if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n", DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)); ret = -1; BIO_free(sbio); goto err; } SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU); if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n"); ret = -1; BIO_free(sbio); goto err; } } else /* want to do MTU discovery */ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL); /* turn on cookie exchange */ SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); } else #endif sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (s_nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */ if (s_debug) { BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (fileno_stdin() > s) width = fileno_stdin() + 1; else width = s + 1; for (;;) { int read_from_terminal; int read_from_sslcon; read_from_terminal = 0; read_from_sslcon = SSL_has_pending(con) || (async && SSL_waiting_for_async(con)); if (!read_from_sslcon) { FD_ZERO(&readfds); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds); #endif openssl_fdset(s, &readfds); /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or * (void *). */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) /* * Under DOS (non-djgpp) and Windows we can't select on stdin: * only on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient. */ tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv); if (has_stdin_waiting()) read_from_terminal = 1; if ((i < 0) || (!i && !read_from_terminal)) continue; #else if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout)) timeoutp = &timeout; else timeoutp = NULL; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, timeoutp); if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occurred\n"); } if (i <= 0) continue; if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds)) read_from_terminal = 1; #endif if (FD_ISSET(s, &readfds)) read_from_sslcon = 1; } if (read_from_terminal) { if (s_crlf) { int j, lf_num; i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize / 2); lf_num = 0; /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) if (buf[j] == '\n') lf_num++; for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { buf[j + lf_num] = buf[j]; if (buf[j] == '\n') { lf_num--; i++; buf[j + lf_num] = '\r'; } } assert(lf_num == 0); } else i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize); if (!s_quiet && !s_brief) { if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'Q')) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); BIO_closesocket(s); close_accept_socket(); ret = -11; goto err; } if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'q')) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (SSL_version(con) != DTLS1_VERSION) BIO_closesocket(s); /* * close_accept_socket(); ret= -11; */ goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS if ((buf[0] == 'B') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n"); SSL_heartbeat(con); i = 0; continue; } #endif if ((buf[0] == 'r') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_renegotiate(con); i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; /* 13; */ continue; /* * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE\n"); */ } if ((buf[0] == 'R') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_set_verify(con, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, NULL); SSL_renegotiate(con); i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; /* 13; */ continue; /* * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE asking for client * cert\n"); */ } if (buf[0] == 'P') { static const char *str = "Lets print some clear text\n"; BIO_write(SSL_get_wbio(con), str, strlen(str)); } if (buf[0] == 'S') { print_stats(bio_s_out, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con)); } } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif l = k = 0; for (;;) { /* should do a select for the write */ #ifdef RENEG static count = 0; if (++count == 100) { count = 0; SSL_renegotiate(con); } #endif k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK (Async)\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); wait_for_async(con); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* * This shouldn't ever happen in s_server. Treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto err; /* break; */ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ret = 1; goto err; } if (k > 0) { l += k; i -= k; } if (i <= 0) break; } } if (read_from_sslcon) { /* * init_ssl_connection handles all async events itself so if we're * waiting for async then we shouldn't go back into * init_ssl_connection */ if ((!async || !SSL_waiting_for_async(con)) && !SSL_is_init_finished(con)) { i = init_ssl_connection(con); if (i < 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } else if (i == 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } } else { again: i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(buf, buf, i); #endif raw_write_stdout(buf, (unsigned int)i); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (SSL_has_pending(con)) goto again; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK (Async)\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); wait_for_async(con); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* * This shouldn't ever happen in s_server. Treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto err; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ret = 1; goto err; } } } } err: if (con != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "shutting down SSL\n"); SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); SSL_free(con); } BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bufsize); if (ret >= 0) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); return (ret); } static void close_accept_socket(void) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "shutdown accept socket\n"); if (accept_socket >= 0) { BIO_closesocket(accept_socket); } } static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) { int i; const char *str; X509 *peer; long verify_err; char buf[BUFSIZ]; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) const unsigned char *next_proto_neg; unsigned next_proto_neg_len; #endif unsigned char *exportedkeymat; int retry = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (dtlslisten) { BIO_ADDR *client = NULL; if ((client = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR - memory\n"); return 0; } i = DTLSv1_listen(con, client); if (i > 0) { BIO *wbio; int fd = -1; wbio = SSL_get_wbio(con); if (wbio) { BIO_get_fd(wbio, &fd); } if (!wbio || BIO_connect(fd, client, 0) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR - unable to connect\n"); BIO_ADDR_free(client); return 0; } BIO_ADDR_free(client); dtlslisten = 0; i = SSL_accept(con); } else { BIO_ADDR_free(client); } } else #endif do { i = SSL_accept(con); if (i <= 0) retry = BIO_sock_should_retry(i); #ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY { while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP && SSL_get_state(con) == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "LOOKUP from certificate callback during accept\n"); i = SSL_accept(con); if (i <= 0) retry = BIO_sock_should_retry(i); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n", srp_callback_parm.login); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); i = SSL_accept(con); if (i <= 0) retry = BIO_sock_should_retry(i); } #endif } while (i < 0 && SSL_waiting_for_async(con)); if (i <= 0) { if ((dtlslisten && i == 0) || (!dtlslisten && retry)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DELAY\n"); return (1); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n"); verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(con); if (verify_err != X509_V_OK) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err)); } /* Always print any error messages */ ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return (0); } if (s_brief) print_ssl_summary(con); PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con)); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con); if (peer != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n"); PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf); X509_free(peer); peer = NULL; } if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof buf) != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf); str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con)); ssl_print_sigalgs(bio_s_out, con); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ssl_print_point_formats(bio_s_out, con); ssl_print_curves(bio_s_out, con, 0); #endif BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)"); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len); if (next_proto_neg) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is "); BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con); if (srtp_profile) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n", srtp_profile->name); } #endif if (SSL_session_reused(con)) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n"); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT"); if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n"); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen); exportedkeymat = app_malloc(keymatexportlen, "export key"); if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat, keymatexportlen, keymatexportlabel, strlen(keymatexportlabel), NULL, 0, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: "); for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat); } (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); return (1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile) { DH *ret = NULL; BIO *bio; if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhfile, "r")) == NULL) goto err; ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); err: BIO_free(bio); return (ret); } #endif static int www_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; int ret = 1; int i, j, k, dot; SSL *con; const SSL_CIPHER *c; BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio; #ifdef RENEG int total_bytes = 0; #endif int width; fd_set readfds; /* Set width for a select call if needed */ width = s + 1; buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server www buffer"); io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL)) goto err; if (s_nbio) { if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); else if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Turned on non blocking io\n"); } /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */ if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize)) goto err; if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (context && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context))) goto err; sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (s_nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */ BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE); BIO_push(io, ssl_bio); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io); #endif if (s_debug) { BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); if (i < 0) { /* error */ if (!BIO_should_retry(io) && !SSL_waiting_for_async(con)) { if (!s_quiet) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) sleep(1); #endif continue; } } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */ ret = 1; goto end; } /* else we have data */ if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) || ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) { char *p; X509 *peer = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; static const char *space = " "; if (www == 1 && strncmp("GET /reneg", buf, 10) == 0) { if (strncmp("GET /renegcert", buf, 14) == 0) SSL_set_verify(con, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, NULL); i = SSL_renegotiate(con); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SSL_renegotiate -> %d\n", i); /* Send the HelloRequest */ i = SSL_do_handshake(con); if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SSL_do_handshake() Retval %d\n", SSL_get_error(con, i)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } /* Wait for a ClientHello to come back */ FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(s, &readfds); i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i <= 0 || !FD_ISSET(s, &readfds)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Error waiting for client response\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } /* * We're not actually expecting any data here and we ignore * any that is sent. This is just to force the handshake that * we're expecting to come from the client. If they haven't * sent one there's not much we can do. */ BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); } BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n"); BIO_puts(io, "\n"); BIO_puts(io, "

\n");
            /* BIO_puts(io, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); */
            BIO_puts(io, "\n");
            for (i = 0; i < local_argc; i++) {
                const char *myp;
                for (myp = local_argv[i]; *myp; myp++)
                    switch (*myp) {
                    case '<':
                        BIO_puts(io, "<");
                        break;
                    case '>':
                        BIO_puts(io, ">");
                        break;
                    case '&':
                        BIO_puts(io, "&");
                        break;
                    default:
                        BIO_write(io, myp, 1);
                        break;
                    }
                BIO_write(io, " ", 1);
            }
            BIO_puts(io, "\n");

            BIO_printf(io,
                       "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
                       SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
                       "" : " NOT");

            /*
             * The following is evil and should not really be done
             */
            BIO_printf(io, "Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");
            sk = SSL_get_ciphers(con);
            j = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk);
            for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
                c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
                BIO_printf(io, "%-11s:%-25s ",
                           SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
                if ((((i + 1) % 2) == 0) && (i + 1 != j))
                    BIO_puts(io, "\n");
            }
            BIO_puts(io, "\n");
            p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, bufsize);
            if (p != NULL) {
                BIO_printf(io,
                           "---\nCiphers common between both SSL end points:\n");
                j = i = 0;
                while (*p) {
                    if (*p == ':') {
                        BIO_write(io, space, 26 - j);
                        i++;
                        j = 0;
                        BIO_write(io, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
                    } else {
                        BIO_write(io, p, 1);
                        j++;
                    }
                    p++;
                }
                BIO_puts(io, "\n");
            }
            ssl_print_sigalgs(io, con);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
            ssl_print_curves(io, con, 0);
#endif
            BIO_printf(io, (SSL_session_reused(con)
                            ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
            c = SSL_get_current_cipher(con);
            BIO_printf(io, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
                       SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
            SSL_SESSION_print(io, SSL_get_session(con));
            BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
            print_stats(io, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
            BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
            peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
            if (peer != NULL) {
                BIO_printf(io, "Client certificate\n");
                X509_print(io, peer);
                PEM_write_bio_X509(io, peer);
                X509_free(peer);
                peer = NULL;
            } else {
                BIO_puts(io, "no client certificate available\n");
            }
            BIO_puts(io, "
\r\n\r\n"); break; } else if ((www == 2 || www == 3) && (strncmp("GET /", buf, 5) == 0)) { BIO *file; char *p, *e; static const char *text = "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"; /* skip the '/' */ p = &(buf[5]); dot = 1; for (e = p; *e != '\0'; e++) { if (e[0] == ' ') break; switch (dot) { case 1: dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 2 : 0; break; case 2: dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 3 : 0; break; case 3: dot = (e[0] == '/') ? -1 : 0; break; } if (dot == 0) dot = (e[0] == '/') ? 1 : 0; } dot = (dot == 3) || (dot == -1); /* filename contains ".." * component */ if (*e == '\0') { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid file name\r\n", p); break; } *e = '\0'; if (dot) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' contains '..' reference\r\n", p); break; } if (*p == '/') { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid path\r\n", p); break; } /* if a directory, do the index thang */ if (app_isdir(p) > 0) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is a directory\r\n", p); break; } if ((file = BIO_new_file(p, "r")) == NULL) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "Error opening '%s'\r\n", p); ERR_print_errors(io); break; } if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "FILE:%s\n", p); if (www == 2) { i = strlen(p); if (((i > 5) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 5]), ".html") == 0)) || ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".php") == 0)) || ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".htm") == 0))) BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n"); else BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"); } /* send the file */ for (;;) { i = BIO_read(file, buf, bufsize); if (i <= 0) break; #ifdef RENEG total_bytes += i; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d\n", i); if (total_bytes > 3 * 1024) { total_bytes = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATE\n"); SSL_renegotiate(con); } #endif for (j = 0; j < i;) { #ifdef RENEG static count = 0; if (++count == 13) { SSL_renegotiate(con); } #endif k = BIO_write(io, &(buf[j]), i - j); if (k <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(io) && !SSL_waiting_for_async(con)) goto write_error; else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "rwrite W BLOCK\n"); } } else { j += k; } } } write_error: BIO_free(file); break; } } for (;;) { i = (int)BIO_flush(io); if (i <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) break; } else break; } end: /* make sure we re-use sessions */ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); err: if (ret >= 0) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n"); OPENSSL_free(buf); BIO_free_all(io); return (ret); } static int rev_body(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; int i; int ret = 1; SSL *con; BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio; buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server rev buffer"); io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL)) goto err; /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */ if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize)) goto err; if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (context && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context))) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE); BIO_push(io, ssl_bio); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io); #endif if (s_debug) { BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } for (;;) { i = BIO_do_handshake(io); if (i > 0) break; if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION FAILURE\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif } BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n"); print_ssl_summary(con); for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); if (i < 0) { /* error */ if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) { if (!s_quiet) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) sleep(1); #endif continue; } } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */ ret = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); goto end; } else { char *p = buf + i - 1; while (i && (*p == '\n' || *p == '\r')) { p--; i--; } if (!s_ign_eof && (i == 5) && (strncmp(buf, "CLOSE", 5) == 0)) { ret = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); goto end; } BUF_reverse((unsigned char *)buf, NULL, i); buf[i] = '\n'; BIO_write(io, buf, i + 1); for (;;) { i = BIO_flush(io); if (i > 0) break; if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) goto end; } } } end: /* make sure we re-use sessions */ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); err: OPENSSL_free(buf); BIO_free_all(io); return (ret); } #define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len) { unsigned int count = 0; do { if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix * is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg. * the server could only possibly create 1 session ID (ie. the * prefix!) so all future session negotiations will fail due to * conflicts. */ memcpy(id, session_id_prefix, (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ? strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len); } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)); if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS) return 0; return 1; } /* * By default s_server uses an in-memory cache which caches SSL_SESSION * structures without any serialisation. This hides some bugs which only * become apparent in deployed servers. By implementing a basic external * session cache some issues can be debugged using s_server. */ typedef struct simple_ssl_session_st { unsigned char *id; unsigned int idlen; unsigned char *der; int derlen; struct simple_ssl_session_st *next; } simple_ssl_session; static simple_ssl_session *first = NULL; static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) { simple_ssl_session *sess = app_malloc(sizeof(*sess), "get session"); unsigned char *p; SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &sess->idlen); sess->derlen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL); if (sess->derlen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error encoding session\n"); OPENSSL_free(sess); return 0; } sess->id = OPENSSL_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen); sess->der = app_malloc(sess->derlen, "get session buffer"); if (!sess->id) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding to external cache\n"); OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return 0; } p = sess->der; /* Assume it still works. */ if (i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &p) != sess->derlen) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected session encoding length\n"); OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return 0; } sess->next = first; first = sess; BIO_printf(bio_err, "New session added to external cache\n"); return 0; } static SSL_SESSION *get_session(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, int idlen, int *do_copy) { simple_ssl_session *sess; *do_copy = 0; for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) { if (idlen == (int)sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) { const unsigned char *p = sess->der; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache hit\n"); return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sess->derlen); } } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache miss\n"); return NULL; } static void del_session(SSL_CTX *sctx, SSL_SESSION *session) { simple_ssl_session *sess, *prev = NULL; const unsigned char *id; unsigned int idlen; id = SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen); for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) { if (idlen == sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) { if (prev) prev->next = sess->next; else first = sess->next; OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return; } prev = sess; } } static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx) { SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(sctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL | SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(sctx, add_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(sctx, get_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(sctx, del_session); } static void free_sessions(void) { simple_ssl_session *sess, *tsess; for (sess = first; sess;) { OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); tsess = sess; sess = sess->next; OPENSSL_free(tsess); } first = NULL; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ca-req.pem0000644000000000000000000000117313176625656014702 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBmzCCAQQCAQAwWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClF1ZWVuc2xhbmQx GjAYBgNVBAoMEUNyeXB0U29mdCBQdHkgTHRkMRswGQYDVQQDDBJUZXN0IENBICgx MDI0IGJpdCkwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL4tQNyKy4U2zX6l IZvORB1edmwMwIgSB4cgoFECrG5pixzYxKauZkAwKG9/+L4DB8qXRjfXWcvafcOU DlYpRROykJ7wGkiqmqbZyrxY8DWjk5ZZQXiSuhYOAJB+Fyfb11JZV6+CvBQX/1g+ vhJr39Gmp6oAesoYrj90ecozClmnAgMBAAGgADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQCo 2jE7J1SNV7kyRm9m8CoPw8xYsuVcVFxPheBymYp8BlO0/rSdYygRjobpYnLVRUPZ pV792wzT1Rp4sXfZWO10lkFY4yi0pH2cdK2RX7qedibV1Xu9vt/yYANFBKVpA4dy PRyTQwi3In1N8hdfddpYR8f5MIUYRe5poFMIJcf8JA== -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/openssl.cnf0000644000000000000000000002502313176625656015202 0ustar rootroot# # OpenSSL example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't # defined. HOME = . RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd # Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info: #oid_file = $ENV::HOME/.oid oid_section = new_oids # To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the # "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the # X.509v3 extensions to use: # extensions = # (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only # X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.) [ new_oids ] # We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'. # Add a simple OID like this: # testoid1=1.2.3.4 # Or use config file substitution like this: # testoid2=${testoid1}.5.6 # Policies used by the TSA examples. tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1 tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6 tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7 #################################################################### [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section #################################################################### [ CA_default ] dir = ./demoCA # Where everything is kept certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept database = $dir/index.txt # database index file. #unique_subject = no # Set to 'no' to allow creation of # several certs with same subject. new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts # default place for new certs. certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA certificate serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number # must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # private random number file x509_extensions = usr_cert # The extensions to add to the cert # Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional" # (and highly broken) format. name_opt = ca_default # Subject Name options cert_opt = ca_default # Certificate field options # Extension copying option: use with caution. # copy_extensions = copy # Extensions to add to a CRL. Note: Netscape communicator chokes on V2 CRLs # so this is commented out by default to leave a V1 CRL. # crlnumber must also be commented out to leave a V1 CRL. # crl_extensions = crl_ext default_days = 365 # how long to certify for default_crl_days= 30 # how long before next CRL default_md = default # use public key default MD preserve = no # keep passed DN ordering # A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look # For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional # and supplied fields are just that :-) policy = policy_match # For the CA policy [ policy_match ] countryName = match stateOrProvinceName = match organizationName = match organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional # For the 'anything' policy # At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object' # types. [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = privkey.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name attributes = req_attributes x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert # Passwords for private keys if not present they will be prompted for # input_password = secret # output_password = secret # This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options. # default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString. # pkix : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004) # utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004). # nombstr : PrintableString, T61String (no BMPStrings or UTF8Strings). # MASK:XXXX a literal mask value. # WARNING: ancient versions of Netscape crash on BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. string_mask = utf8only # req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = AU countryName_min = 2 countryName_max = 2 stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name) stateOrProvinceName_default = Some-State localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) 0.organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) 0.organizationName_default = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-) #1.organizationName = Second Organization Name (eg, company) #1.organizationName_default = World Wide Web Pty Ltd organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) #organizationalUnitName_default = commonName = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) commonName_max = 64 emailAddress = Email Address emailAddress_max = 64 # SET-ex3 = SET extension number 3 [ req_attributes ] challengePassword = A challenge password challengePassword_min = 4 challengePassword_max = 20 unstructuredName = An optional company name [ usr_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request. # This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software # requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA. basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted # the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing. # This is OK for an SSL server. # nsCertType = server # For an object signing certificate this would be used. # nsCertType = objsign # For normal client use this is typical # nsCertType = client, email # and for everything including object signing: # nsCertType = client, email, objsign # This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate. # keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer # This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname. # Import the email address. # subjectAltName=email:copy # An alternative to produce certificates that aren't # deprecated according to PKIX. # subjectAltName=email:move # Copy subject details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy #nsCaRevocationUrl = http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem #nsBaseUrl #nsRevocationUrl #nsRenewalUrl #nsCaPolicyUrl #nsSslServerName # This is required for TSA certificates. # extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping [ v3_req ] # Extensions to add to a certificate request basicConstraints = CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA # PKIX recommendation. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer basicConstraints = critical,CA:true # Key usage: this is typical for a CA certificate. However since it will # prevent it being used as an test self-signed certificate it is best # left out by default. # keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign # Some might want this also # nsCertType = sslCA, emailCA # Include email address in subject alt name: another PKIX recommendation # subjectAltName=email:copy # Copy issuer details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy # DER hex encoding of an extension: beware experts only! # obj=DER:02:03 # Where 'obj' is a standard or added object # You can even override a supported extension: # basicConstraints= critical, DER:30:03:01:01:FF [ crl_ext ] # CRL extensions. # Only issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in a CRL. # issuerAltName=issuer:copy authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always [ proxy_cert_ext ] # These extensions should be added when creating a proxy certificate # This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software # requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA. basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted # the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing. # This is OK for an SSL server. # nsCertType = server # For an object signing certificate this would be used. # nsCertType = objsign # For normal client use this is typical # nsCertType = client, email # and for everything including object signing: # nsCertType = client, email, objsign # This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate. # keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer # This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname. # Import the email address. # subjectAltName=email:copy # An alternative to produce certificates that aren't # deprecated according to PKIX. # subjectAltName=email:move # Copy subject details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy #nsCaRevocationUrl = http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem #nsBaseUrl #nsRevocationUrl #nsRenewalUrl #nsCaPolicyUrl #nsSslServerName # This really needs to be in place for it to be a proxy certificate. proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:3,policy:foo #################################################################### [ tsa ] default_tsa = tsa_config1 # the default TSA section [ tsa_config1 ] # These are used by the TSA reply generation only. dir = ./demoCA # TSA root directory serial = $dir/tsaserial # The current serial number (mandatory) crypto_device = builtin # OpenSSL engine to use for signing signer_cert = $dir/tsacert.pem # The TSA signing certificate # (optional) certs = $dir/cacert.pem # Certificate chain to include in reply # (optional) signer_key = $dir/private/tsakey.pem # The TSA private key (optional) signer_digest = sha256 # Signing digest to use. (Optional) default_policy = tsa_policy1 # Policy if request did not specify it # (optional) other_policies = tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3 # acceptable policies (optional) digests = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 # Acceptable message digests (mandatory) accuracy = secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100 # (optional) clock_precision_digits = 0 # number of digits after dot. (optional) ordering = yes # Is ordering defined for timestamps? # (optional, default: no) tsa_name = yes # Must the TSA name be included in the reply? # (optional, default: no) ess_cert_id_chain = no # Must the ESS cert id chain be included? # (optional, default: no) openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dh2048.pem0000644000000000000000000000123013176625656014435 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIIBCAKCAQEA///////////JD9qiIWjCNMTGYouA3BzRKQJOCIpnzHQCC76mOxOb IlFKCHmONATd75UZs806QxswKwpt8l8UN0/hNW1tUcJF5IW1dmJefsb0TELppjft awv/XLb0Brft7jhr+1qJn6WunyQRfEsf5kkoZlHs5Fs9wgB8uKFjvwWY2kg2HFXT mmkWP6j9JM9fg2VdI9yjrZYcYvNWIIVSu57VKQdwlpZtZww1Tkq8mATxdGwIyhgh fDKQXkYuNs474553LBgOhgObJ4Oi7Aeij7XFXfBvTFLJ3ivL9pVYFxg5lUl86pVq 5RXSJhiY+gUQFXKOWoqsqmj//////////wIBAg== -----END DH PARAMETERS----- These are the 2048-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)": https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526 See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated. openssl-1.1.0g/apps/apps.c0000644000000000000000000021267113176625656014145 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno(). The * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined. */ # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 #endif #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #include #include #include "s_apps.h" #include "apps.h" #ifdef _WIN32 static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to); # define rename(from,to) WIN32_rename((from),(to)) #endif typedef struct { const char *name; unsigned long flag; unsigned long mask; } NAME_EX_TBL; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) static UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL; #endif static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl); static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl); int app_init(long mesgwin); int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf) { int quoted; char c = '\0', *p = NULL; arg->argc = 0; if (arg->size == 0) { arg->size = 20; arg->argv = app_malloc(sizeof(*arg->argv) * arg->size, "argv space"); } for (p = buf;;) { /* Skip whitespace. */ while (*p && isspace(_UC(*p))) p++; if (!*p) break; /* The start of something good :-) */ if (arg->argc >= arg->size) { char **tmp; arg->size += 20; tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(arg->argv, sizeof(*arg->argv) * arg->size); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; arg->argv = tmp; } quoted = *p == '\'' || *p == '"'; if (quoted) c = *p++; arg->argv[arg->argc++] = p; /* now look for the end of this */ if (quoted) { while (*p && *p != c) p++; *p++ = '\0'; } else { while (*p && !isspace(_UC(*p))) p++; if (*p) *p++ = '\0'; } } arg->argv[arg->argc] = NULL; return (1); } #ifndef APP_INIT int app_init(long mesgwin) { return (1); } #endif int ctx_set_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath) { if (CAfile == NULL && CApath == NULL) { if (!noCAfile && SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(ctx) <= 0) return 0; if (!noCApath && SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(ctx) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } return SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT int ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path) { if (path == NULL) { return SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(ctx); } return SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(ctx, path); } #endif int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x) { char *p; p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), NULL, 0); BIO_puts(out, "subject="); BIO_puts(out, p); OPENSSL_free(p); p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), NULL, 0); BIO_puts(out, "\nissuer="); BIO_puts(out, p); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); OPENSSL_free(p); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI static int ui_open(UI *ui) { return UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL())(ui); } static int ui_read(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: { const char *password = ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password; if (password && password[0] != '\0') { UI_set_result(ui, uis, password); return 1; } } default: break; } } return UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis); } static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: { const char *password = ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password; if (password && password[0] != '\0') return 1; } default: break; } } return UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis); } static int ui_close(UI *ui) { return UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui); } int setup_ui_method(void) { ui_method = UI_create_method("OpenSSL application user interface"); UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open); UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ui_read); UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write); UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close); return 0; } void destroy_ui_method(void) { if (ui_method) { UI_destroy_method(ui_method); ui_method = NULL; } } #endif int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp) { int res = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI UI *ui = NULL; #endif PW_CB_DATA *cb_data = (PW_CB_DATA *)cb_tmp; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_UI if (cb_data != NULL && cb_data->password != NULL) { res = strlen(cb_data->password); if (res > bufsiz) res = bufsiz; memcpy(buf, cb_data->password, res); } #else ui = UI_new_method(ui_method); if (ui) { int ok = 0; char *buff = NULL; int ui_flags = 0; const char *prompt_info = NULL; char *prompt; if (cb_data != NULL && cb_data->prompt_info != NULL) prompt_info = cb_data->prompt_info; prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info); if (!prompt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); UI_free(ui); return 0; } ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD; UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0); /* We know that there is no previous user data to return to us */ (void)UI_add_user_data(ui, cb_data); if (ok >= 0) ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buf, PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1); if (ok >= 0 && verify) { buff = app_malloc(bufsiz, "password buffer"); ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff, PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf); } if (ok >= 0) do { ok = UI_process(ui); } while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0)); OPENSSL_clear_free(buff, (unsigned int)bufsiz); if (ok >= 0) res = strlen(buf); if (ok == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "User interface error\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz); res = 0; } if (ok == -2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "aborted!\n"); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz); res = 0; } UI_free(ui); OPENSSL_free(prompt); } #endif return res; } static char *app_get_pass(const char *arg, int keepbio); int app_passwd(const char *arg1, const char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2) { int same; if (!arg2 || !arg1 || strcmp(arg1, arg2)) same = 0; else same = 1; if (arg1) { *pass1 = app_get_pass(arg1, same); if (!*pass1) return 0; } else if (pass1) *pass1 = NULL; if (arg2) { *pass2 = app_get_pass(arg2, same ? 2 : 0); if (!*pass2) return 0; } else if (pass2) *pass2 = NULL; return 1; } static char *app_get_pass(const char *arg, int keepbio) { char *tmp, tpass[APP_PASS_LEN]; static BIO *pwdbio = NULL; int i; if (strncmp(arg, "pass:", 5) == 0) return OPENSSL_strdup(arg + 5); if (strncmp(arg, "env:", 4) == 0) { tmp = getenv(arg + 4); if (!tmp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read environment variable %s\n", arg + 4); return NULL; } return OPENSSL_strdup(tmp); } if (!keepbio || !pwdbio) { if (strncmp(arg, "file:", 5) == 0) { pwdbio = BIO_new_file(arg + 5, "r"); if (!pwdbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open file %s\n", arg + 5); return NULL; } #if !defined(_WIN32) /* * Under _WIN32, which covers even Win64 and CE, file * descriptors referenced by BIO_s_fd are not inherited * by child process and therefore below is not an option. * It could have been an option if bss_fd.c was operating * on real Windows descriptors, such as those obtained * with CreateFile. */ } else if (strncmp(arg, "fd:", 3) == 0) { BIO *btmp; i = atoi(arg + 3); if (i >= 0) pwdbio = BIO_new_fd(i, BIO_NOCLOSE); if ((i < 0) || !pwdbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't access file descriptor %s\n", arg + 3); return NULL; } /* * Can't do BIO_gets on an fd BIO so add a buffering BIO */ btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); pwdbio = BIO_push(btmp, pwdbio); #endif } else if (strcmp(arg, "stdin") == 0) { pwdbio = dup_bio_in(FORMAT_TEXT); if (!pwdbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open BIO for stdin\n"); return NULL; } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid password argument \"%s\"\n", arg); return NULL; } } i = BIO_gets(pwdbio, tpass, APP_PASS_LEN); if (keepbio != 1) { BIO_free_all(pwdbio); pwdbio = NULL; } if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading password from BIO\n"); return NULL; } tmp = strchr(tpass, '\n'); if (tmp) *tmp = 0; return OPENSSL_strdup(tpass); } static CONF *app_load_config_(BIO *in, const char *filename) { long errorline = -1; CONF *conf; int i; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); i = NCONF_load_bio(conf, in, &errorline); if (i > 0) return conf; if (errorline <= 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't load config file \"%s\"\n", opt_getprog(), filename); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error on line %ld of config file \"%s\"\n", opt_getprog(), errorline, filename); NCONF_free(conf); return NULL; } CONF *app_load_config(const char *filename) { BIO *in; CONF *conf; in = bio_open_default(filename, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) return NULL; conf = app_load_config_(in, filename); BIO_free(in); return conf; } CONF *app_load_config_quiet(const char *filename) { BIO *in; CONF *conf; in = bio_open_default_quiet(filename, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) return NULL; conf = app_load_config_(in, filename); BIO_free(in); return conf; } int app_load_modules(const CONF *config) { CONF *to_free = NULL; if (config == NULL) config = to_free = app_load_config_quiet(default_config_file); if (config == NULL) return 1; if (CONF_modules_load(config, NULL, 0) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error configuring OpenSSL modules\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); NCONF_free(to_free); return 0; } NCONF_free(to_free); return 1; } int add_oid_section(CONF *conf) { char *p; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i; if ((p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_section")) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(conf, p)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "problem loading oid section %s\n", p); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i); if (OBJ_create(cnf->value, cnf->name, cnf->name) == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "problem creating object %s=%s\n", cnf->name, cnf->value); return 0; } } return 1; } static int load_pkcs12(BIO *in, const char *desc, pem_password_cb *pem_cb, void *cb_data, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca) { const char *pass; char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE]; int len, ret = 0; PKCS12 *p12; p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL); if (p12 == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc); goto die; } /* See if an empty password will do */ if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = ""; else { if (!pem_cb) pem_cb = (pem_password_cb *)password_callback; len = pem_cb(tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, cb_data); if (len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Passphrase callback error for %s\n", desc); goto die; } if (len < PEM_BUFSIZE) tpass[len] = 0; if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, tpass, len)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error (wrong password?) in PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc); goto die; } pass = tpass; } ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, pkey, cert, ca); die: PKCS12_free(p12); return ret; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) static int load_cert_crl_http(const char *url, X509 **pcert, X509_CRL **pcrl) { char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = NULL; int use_ssl, rv = 0; if (!OCSP_parse_url(url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) goto err; if (use_ssl) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "https not supported\n"); goto err; } bio = BIO_new_connect(host); if (!bio || !BIO_set_conn_port(bio, port)) goto err; rctx = OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(bio, 1024); if (rctx == NULL) goto err; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(rctx, "GET", path)) goto err; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(rctx, "Host", host)) goto err; if (pcert) { do { rv = X509_http_nbio(rctx, pcert); } while (rv == -1); } else { do { rv = X509_CRL_http_nbio(rctx, pcrl); } while (rv == -1); } err: OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(path); OPENSSL_free(port); if (bio) BIO_free_all(bio); OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx); if (rv != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading %s from %s\n", pcert ? "certificate" : "CRL", url); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return rv; } #endif X509 *load_cert(const char *file, int format, const char *cert_descrip) { X509 *x = NULL; BIO *cert; if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) load_cert_crl_http(file, &x, NULL); #endif return x; } if (file == NULL) { unbuffer(stdin); cert = dup_bio_in(format); } else cert = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format); if (cert == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) x = d2i_X509_bio(cert, NULL); else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, NULL); else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) { if (!load_pkcs12(cert, cert_descrip, NULL, NULL, NULL, &x, NULL)) goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", cert_descrip); goto end; } end: if (x == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load certificate\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } BIO_free(cert); return (x); } X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format) { X509_CRL *x = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) load_cert_crl_http(infile, NULL, &x); #endif return x; } in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', format); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL); else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for input crl\n"); goto end; } if (x == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } end: BIO_free(in); return (x); } EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip) { BIO *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no keyfile specified\n"); goto end; } if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) { if (e == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n"); else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ENGINE_init(e)) { pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data); ENGINE_finish(e); } if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "engines not supported\n"); #endif } goto end; } if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) { unbuffer(stdin); key = dup_bio_in(format); } else key = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format); if (key == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(key, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); } else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) { if (!load_pkcs12(key, key_descrip, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data, &pkey, NULL, NULL)) goto end; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined (OPENSSL_NO_RC4) else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB) pkey = b2i_PrivateKey_bio(key); else if (format == FORMAT_PVK) pkey = b2i_PVK_bio(key, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); #endif else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for key file\n"); goto end; } end: BIO_free(key); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return (pkey); } EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip) { BIO *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no keyfile specified\n"); goto end; } if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) { if (e == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n"); else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE pkey = ENGINE_load_public_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "engines not supported\n"); #endif } goto end; } if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) { unbuffer(stdin); key = dup_bio_in(format); } else key = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format); if (key == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(key, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_ASN1RSA) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(key, NULL); if (rsa) { pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); } else #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA keys not supported\n"); #endif pkey = NULL; } else if (format == FORMAT_PEMRSA) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); if (rsa != NULL) { pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); } else #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA keys not supported\n"); #endif pkey = NULL; } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { pkey = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB) pkey = b2i_PublicKey_bio(key); #endif end: BIO_free(key); if (pkey == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip); return (pkey); } static int load_certs_crls(const char *file, int format, const char *pass, const char *desc, STACK_OF(X509) **pcerts, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **pcrls) { int i; BIO *bio; STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *xis = NULL; X509_INFO *xi; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; int rv = 0; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (format != FORMAT_PEM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", desc); return 0; } bio = bio_open_default(file, 'r', FORMAT_PEM); if (bio == NULL) return 0; xis = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); BIO_free(bio); if (pcerts && *pcerts == NULL) { *pcerts = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!*pcerts) goto end; } if (pcrls && *pcrls == NULL) { *pcrls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!*pcrls) goto end; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(xis); i++) { xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(xis, i); if (xi->x509 && pcerts) { if (!sk_X509_push(*pcerts, xi->x509)) goto end; xi->x509 = NULL; } if (xi->crl && pcrls) { if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*pcrls, xi->crl)) goto end; xi->crl = NULL; } } if (pcerts && sk_X509_num(*pcerts) > 0) rv = 1; if (pcrls && sk_X509_CRL_num(*pcrls) > 0) rv = 1; end: sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(xis, X509_INFO_free); if (rv == 0) { if (pcerts) { sk_X509_pop_free(*pcerts, X509_free); *pcerts = NULL; } if (pcrls) { sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(*pcrls, X509_CRL_free); *pcrls = NULL; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", pcerts ? "certificates" : "CRLs"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return rv; } void* app_malloc(int sz, const char *what) { void *vp = OPENSSL_malloc(sz); if (vp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Could not allocate %d bytes for %s\n", opt_getprog(), sz, what); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } return vp; } /* * Initialize or extend, if *certs != NULL, a certificate stack. */ int load_certs(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs, int format, const char *pass, const char *desc) { return load_certs_crls(file, format, pass, desc, certs, NULL); } /* * Initialize or extend, if *crls != NULL, a certificate stack. */ int load_crls(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls, int format, const char *pass, const char *desc) { return load_certs_crls(file, format, pass, desc, NULL, crls); } #define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK (0xfL << 16) /* Return error for unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT 0 /* Print error for unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN (1L << 16) /* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN (2L << 16) /* BIO_dump unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN (3L << 16) #define X509_FLAG_CA (X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER | X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY | \ X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER | X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION) int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg) { static const NAME_EX_TBL cert_tbl[] = { {"compatible", X509_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffl}, {"ca_default", X509_FLAG_CA, 0xffffffffl}, {"no_header", X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER, 0}, {"no_version", X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION, 0}, {"no_serial", X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL, 0}, {"no_signame", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME, 0}, {"no_validity", X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY, 0}, {"no_subject", X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT, 0}, {"no_issuer", X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER, 0}, {"no_pubkey", X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY, 0}, {"no_extensions", X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS, 0}, {"no_sigdump", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP, 0}, {"no_aux", X509_FLAG_NO_AUX, 0}, {"no_attributes", X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES, 0}, {"ext_default", X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_error", X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_parse", X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_dump", X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {NULL, 0, 0} }; return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, cert_tbl); } int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg) { static const NAME_EX_TBL ex_tbl[] = { {"esc_2253", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253, 0}, {"esc_2254", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254, 0}, {"esc_ctrl", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL, 0}, {"esc_msb", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB, 0}, {"use_quote", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE, 0}, {"utf8", ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT, 0}, {"ignore_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE, 0}, {"show_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE, 0}, {"dump_all", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL, 0}, {"dump_nostr", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN, 0}, {"dump_der", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER, 0}, {"compat", XN_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffL}, {"sep_comma_plus", XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_comma_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_semi_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_multiline", XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"dn_rev", XN_FLAG_DN_REV, 0}, {"nofname", XN_FLAG_FN_NONE, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"sname", XN_FLAG_FN_SN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"lname", XN_FLAG_FN_LN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"align", XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN, 0}, {"oid", XN_FLAG_FN_OID, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"space_eq", XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ, 0}, {"dump_unknown", XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, 0}, {"RFC2253", XN_FLAG_RFC2253, 0xffffffffL}, {"oneline", XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0xffffffffL}, {"multiline", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL}, {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL}, {NULL, 0, 0} }; if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0) return 0; if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0) *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC; return 1; } int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg) { if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_NONE; else if (strcasecmp(arg, "copy") == 0) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ADD; else if (strcasecmp(arg, "copyall") == 0) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ALL; else return 0; return 1; } int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type) { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL; X509_EXTENSION *ext, *tmpext; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; int i, idx, ret = 0; if (!x || !req || (copy_type == EXT_COPY_NONE)) return 1; exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(req); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1); /* Does extension exist? */ if (idx != -1) { /* If normal copy don't override existing extension */ if (copy_type == EXT_COPY_ADD) continue; /* Delete all extensions of same type */ do { tmpext = X509_get_ext(x, idx); X509_delete_ext(x, idx); X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext); idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1); } while (idx != -1); } if (!X509_add_ext(x, ext, -1)) goto end; } ret = 1; end: sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); return ret; } static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals; CONF_VALUE *val; int i, ret = 1; if (!arg) return 0; vals = X509V3_parse_list(arg); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i); if (!set_table_opts(flags, val->name, in_tbl)) ret = 0; } sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free); return ret; } static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl) { char c; const NAME_EX_TBL *ptbl; c = arg[0]; if (c == '-') { c = 0; arg++; } else if (c == '+') { c = 1; arg++; } else c = 1; for (ptbl = in_tbl; ptbl->name; ptbl++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, ptbl->name) == 0) { *flags &= ~ptbl->mask; if (c) *flags |= ptbl->flag; else *flags &= ~ptbl->flag; return 1; } } return 0; } void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm, unsigned long lflags) { char *buf; char mline = 0; int indent = 0; if (title) BIO_puts(out, title); if ((lflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) { mline = 1; indent = 4; } if (lflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) { buf = X509_NAME_oneline(nm, 0, 0); BIO_puts(out, buf); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); OPENSSL_free(buf); } else { if (mline) BIO_puts(out, "\n"); X509_NAME_print_ex(out, nm, indent, lflags); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } } void print_bignum_var(BIO *out, const BIGNUM *in, const char *var, int len, unsigned char *buffer) { BIO_printf(out, " static unsigned char %s_%d[] = {", var, len); if (BN_is_zero(in)) BIO_printf(out, "\n\t0x00"); else { int i, l; l = BN_bn2bin(in, buffer); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { if ((i % 10) == 0) BIO_printf(out, "\n\t"); if (i < l - 1) BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X, ", buffer[i]); else BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", buffer[i]); } } BIO_printf(out, "\n };\n"); } void print_array(BIO *out, const char* title, int len, const unsigned char* d) { int i; BIO_printf(out, "unsigned char %s[%d] = {", title, len); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if ((i % 10) == 0) BIO_printf(out, "\n "); if (i < len - 1) BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X, ", d[i]); else BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", d[i]); } BIO_printf(out, "\n};\n"); } X509_STORE *setup_verify(const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath) { X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new(); X509_LOOKUP *lookup; if (store == NULL) goto end; if (CAfile != NULL || !noCAfile) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) goto end; if (CAfile) { if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile); goto end; } } else X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); } if (CApath != NULL || !noCApath) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) goto end; if (CApath) { if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath); goto end; } } else X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); } ERR_clear_error(); return store; end: X509_STORE_free(store); return NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Try to load an engine in a shareable library */ static ENGINE *try_load_engine(const char *engine) { ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (e) { if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", engine, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) { ENGINE_free(e); e = NULL; } } return e; } #endif ENGINE *setup_engine(const char *engine, int debug) { ENGINE *e = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (engine) { if (strcmp(engine, "auto") == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "enabling auto ENGINE support\n"); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); return NULL; } if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine)) == NULL && (e = try_load_engine(engine)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid engine \"%s\"\n", engine); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return NULL; } if (debug) { ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM, 0, bio_err, 0); } ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "SET_USER_INTERFACE", 0, ui_method, 0, 1); if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "can't use that engine\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ENGINE_free(e); return NULL; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "engine \"%s\" set.\n", ENGINE_get_id(e)); } #endif return e; } void release_engine(ENGINE *e) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (e != NULL) /* Free our "structural" reference. */ ENGINE_free(e); #endif } static unsigned long index_serial_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a) { const char *n; n = a[DB_serial]; while (*n == '0') n++; return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(n); } static int index_serial_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b) { const char *aa, *bb; for (aa = a[DB_serial]; *aa == '0'; aa++) ; for (bb = b[DB_serial]; *bb == '0'; bb++) ; return (strcmp(aa, bb)); } static int index_name_qual(char **a) { return (a[0][0] == 'V'); } static unsigned long index_name_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a) { return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a[DB_name]); } int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b) { return (strcmp(a[DB_name], b[DB_name])); } static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING) #undef BSIZE #define BSIZE 256 BIGNUM *load_serial(const char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai) { BIO *in = NULL; BIGNUM *ret = NULL; char buf[1024]; ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL; ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (ai == NULL) goto err; in = BIO_new_file(serialfile, "r"); if (in == NULL) { if (!create) { perror(serialfile); goto err; } ERR_clear_error(); ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL || !rand_serial(ret, ai)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); } else { if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, ai, buf, 1024)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n", serialfile); goto err; } ret = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ai, NULL); if (ret == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting number from bin to BIGNUM\n"); goto err; } } if (ret && retai) { *retai = ai; ai = NULL; } err: BIO_free(in); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai); return (ret); } int save_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *suffix, const BIGNUM *serial, ASN1_INTEGER **retai) { char buf[1][BSIZE]; BIO *out = NULL; int ret = 0; ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL; int j; if (suffix == NULL) j = strlen(serialfile); else j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(suffix) + 1; if (j >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } if (suffix == NULL) OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf[0], serialfile, BSIZE); else { #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix); #endif } out = BIO_new_file(buf[0], "w"); if (out == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if ((ai = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting serial to ASN.1 format\n"); goto err; } i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ai); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); ret = 1; if (retai) { *retai = ai; ai = NULL; } err: BIO_free_all(out); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai); return (ret); } int rotate_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *new_suffix, const char *old_suffix) { char buf[2][BSIZE]; int i, j; i = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(old_suffix); j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(new_suffix); if (i > j) j = i; if (j + 1 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix); #endif if (rename(serialfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", serialfile, buf[1]); perror("reason"); goto err; } if (rename(buf[0], serialfile) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], serialfile); perror("reason"); rename(buf[1], serialfile); goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai) { BIGNUM *btmp; int ret = 0; if (b) btmp = b; else btmp = BN_new(); if (btmp == NULL) return 0; if (!BN_pseudo_rand(btmp, SERIAL_RAND_BITS, 0, 0)) goto error; if (ai && !BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(btmp, ai)) goto error; ret = 1; error: if (btmp != b) BN_free(btmp); return ret; } CA_DB *load_index(const char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *db_attr) { CA_DB *retdb = NULL; TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL; BIO *in; CONF *dbattr_conf = NULL; char buf[BSIZE]; in = BIO_new_file(dbfile, "r"); if (in == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s.attr", dbfile); #else BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s-attr", dbfile); #endif dbattr_conf = app_load_config(buf); retdb = app_malloc(sizeof(*retdb), "new DB"); retdb->db = tmpdb; tmpdb = NULL; if (db_attr) retdb->attributes = *db_attr; else { retdb->attributes.unique_subject = 1; } if (dbattr_conf) { char *p = NCONF_get_string(dbattr_conf, NULL, "unique_subject"); if (p) { retdb->attributes.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1); } } err: NCONF_free(dbattr_conf); TXT_DB_free(tmpdb); BIO_free_all(in); return retdb; } int index_index(CA_DB *db) { if (!TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_serial, NULL, LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial), LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating serial number index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n", db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2); return 0; } if (db->attributes.unique_subject && !TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_name, index_name_qual, LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name), LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating name index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n", db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2); return 0; } return 1; } int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db) { char buf[3][BSIZE]; BIO *out; int j; j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(suffix); if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix); #endif out = BIO_new_file(buf[0], "w"); if (out == NULL) { perror(dbfile); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile); goto err; } j = TXT_DB_write(out, db->db); BIO_free(out); if (j <= 0) goto err; out = BIO_new_file(buf[1], "w"); if (out == NULL) { perror(buf[2]); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", buf[2]); goto err; } BIO_printf(out, "unique_subject = %s\n", db->attributes.unique_subject ? "yes" : "no"); BIO_free(out); return 1; err: return 0; } int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix, const char *old_suffix) { char buf[5][BSIZE]; int i, j; i = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(old_suffix); j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(new_suffix); if (i > j) j = i; if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s.attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s-attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #endif if (rename(dbfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", dbfile, buf[1]); perror("reason"); goto err; } if (rename(buf[0], dbfile) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], dbfile); perror("reason"); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } if (rename(buf[4], buf[3]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[4], buf[3]); perror("reason"); rename(dbfile, buf[0]); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } if (rename(buf[2], buf[4]) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[2], buf[4]); perror("reason"); rename(buf[3], buf[4]); rename(dbfile, buf[0]); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } void free_index(CA_DB *db) { if (db) { TXT_DB_free(db->db); OPENSSL_free(db); } } int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def) { if (str) { switch (*str) { case 'f': /* false */ case 'F': /* FALSE */ case 'n': /* no */ case 'N': /* NO */ case '0': /* 0 */ return 0; case 't': /* true */ case 'T': /* TRUE */ case 'y': /* yes */ case 'Y': /* YES */ case '1': /* 1 */ return 1; } } return def; } /* * name is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=... * where characters may be escaped by \ */ X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *cp, long chtype, int canmulti) { int nextismulti = 0; char *work; X509_NAME *n; if (*cp++ != '/') return NULL; n = X509_NAME_new(); if (n == NULL) return NULL; work = OPENSSL_strdup(cp); if (work == NULL) goto err; while (*cp) { char *bp = work; char *typestr = bp; unsigned char *valstr; int nid; int ismulti = nextismulti; nextismulti = 0; /* Collect the type */ while (*cp && *cp != '=') *bp++ = *cp++; if (*cp == '\0') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Hit end of string before finding the equals.\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } *bp++ = '\0'; ++cp; /* Collect the value. */ valstr = (unsigned char *)bp; for (; *cp && *cp != '/'; *bp++ = *cp++) { if (canmulti && *cp == '+') { nextismulti = 1; break; } if (*cp == '\\' && *++cp == '\0') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: escape character at end of string\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } } *bp++ = '\0'; /* If not at EOS (must be + or /), move forward. */ if (*cp) ++cp; /* Parse */ nid = OBJ_txt2nid(typestr); if (nid == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Skipping unknown attribute \"%s\"\n", opt_getprog(), typestr); continue; } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype, valstr, strlen((char *)valstr), -1, ismulti ? -1 : 0)) goto err; } OPENSSL_free(work); return n; err: X509_NAME_free(n); OPENSSL_free(work); return NULL; } /* * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer and return * it. */ int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in) { BIO *mem; int len, ret; unsigned char tbuf[1024]; mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (mem == NULL) return -1; for (;;) { if ((maxlen != -1) && maxlen < 1024) len = maxlen; else len = 1024; len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len); if (len < 0) { BIO_free(mem); return -1; } if (len == 0) break; if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) { BIO_free(mem); return -1; } maxlen -= len; if (maxlen == 0) break; } ret = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **)out); BIO_set_flags(mem, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); BIO_free(mem); return ret; } int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value) { int rv; char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL; stmp = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (!stmp) return -1; vtmp = strchr(stmp, ':'); if (vtmp) { *vtmp = 0; vtmp++; } rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, stmp, vtmp); OPENSSL_free(stmp); return rv; } static void nodes_print(const char *name, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes) { X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int i; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s Policies:", name); if (nodes) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); X509_POLICY_NODE_print(bio_err, node, 2); } } else BIO_puts(bio_err, " \n"); } void policies_print(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; int explicit_policy; tree = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(ctx); explicit_policy = X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(ctx); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Require explicit Policy: %s\n", explicit_policy ? "True" : "False"); nodes_print("Authority", X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(tree)); nodes_print("User", X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree)); } /*- * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. * err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO. * in: a NUL terminated string like "abc,def,ghi" * * returns: a malloc'd buffer or NULL on failure. */ unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen, const char *in) { size_t len; unsigned char *out; size_t i, start = 0; len = strlen(in); if (len >= 65535) return NULL; out = app_malloc(strlen(in) + 1, "NPN buffer"); for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || in[i] == ',') { if (i - start > 255) { OPENSSL_free(out); return NULL; } out[start] = i - start; start = i + 1; } else out[i + 1] = in[i]; } *outlen = len + 1; return out; } void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x, const char *checkhost, const char *checkemail, const char *checkip) { if (x == NULL) return; if (checkhost) { BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n", checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) == 1 ? "" : " NOT"); } if (checkemail) { BIO_printf(bio, "Email %s does%s match certificate\n", checkemail, X509_check_email(x, checkemail, 0, 0) ? "" : " NOT"); } if (checkip) { BIO_printf(bio, "IP %s does%s match certificate\n", checkip, X509_check_ip_asc(x, checkip, 0) ? "" : " NOT"); } } /* Get first http URL from a DIST_POINT structure */ static const char *get_dp_url(DIST_POINT *dp) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; GENERAL_NAME *gen; int i, gtype; ASN1_STRING *uri; if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0) return NULL; gens = dp->distpoint->name.fullname; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); uri = GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(gen, >ype); if (gtype == GEN_URI && ASN1_STRING_length(uri) > 6) { const char *uptr = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(uri); if (strncmp(uptr, "http://", 7) == 0) return uptr; } } return NULL; } /* * Look through a CRLDP structure and attempt to find an http URL to * downloads a CRL from. */ static X509_CRL *load_crl_crldp(STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp) { int i; const char *urlptr = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, i); urlptr = get_dp_url(dp); if (urlptr) return load_crl(urlptr, FORMAT_HTTP); } return NULL; } /* * Example of downloading CRLs from CRLDP: not usable for real world as it * always downloads, doesn't support non-blocking I/O and doesn't cache * anything. */ static STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls_http_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509_CRL *crl; STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp; crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!crls) return NULL; x = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp); sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); if (!crl) { sk_X509_CRL_free(crls); return NULL; } sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl); /* Try to download delta CRL */ crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_freshest_crl, NULL, NULL); crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp); sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); if (crl) sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl); return crls; } void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st) { X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(st, crls_http_cb); } /* * Platform-specific sections */ #if defined(_WIN32) # ifdef fileno # undef fileno # define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a) # endif # include # include static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to) { TCHAR *tfrom = NULL, *tto; DWORD err; int ret = 0; if (sizeof(TCHAR) == 1) { tfrom = (TCHAR *)from; tto = (TCHAR *)to; } else { /* UNICODE path */ size_t i, flen = strlen(from) + 1, tlen = strlen(to) + 1; tfrom = malloc(sizeof(*tfrom) * (flen + tlen)); if (tfrom == NULL) goto err; tto = tfrom + flen; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, from, flen, (WCHAR *)tfrom, flen)) # endif for (i = 0; i < flen; i++) tfrom[i] = (TCHAR)from[i]; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, to, tlen, (WCHAR *)tto, tlen)) # endif for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) tto[i] = (TCHAR)to[i]; } if (MoveFile(tfrom, tto)) goto ok; err = GetLastError(); if (err == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS || err == ERROR_FILE_EXISTS) { if (DeleteFile(tto) && MoveFile(tfrom, tto)) goto ok; err = GetLastError(); } if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || err == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND) errno = ENOENT; else if (err == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) errno = EACCES; else errno = EINVAL; /* we could map more codes... */ err: ret = -1; ok: if (tfrom != NULL && tfrom != (TCHAR *)from) free(tfrom); return ret; } #endif /* app_tminterval section */ #if defined(_WIN32) double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { FILETIME now; double ret = 0; static ULARGE_INTEGER tmstart; static int warning = 1; # ifdef _WIN32_WINNT static HANDLE proc = NULL; if (proc == NULL) { if (check_winnt()) proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, GetCurrentProcessId()); if (proc == NULL) proc = (HANDLE) - 1; } if (usertime && proc != (HANDLE) - 1) { FILETIME junk; GetProcessTimes(proc, &junk, &junk, &junk, &now); } else # endif { SYSTEMTIME systime; if (usertime && warning) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run " "this program on idle system.\n"); warning = 0; } GetSystemTime(&systime); SystemTimeToFileTime(&systime, &now); } if (stop == TM_START) { tmstart.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime; tmstart.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime; } else { ULARGE_INTEGER tmstop; tmstop.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime; tmstop.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime; ret = (__int64)(tmstop.QuadPart - tmstart.QuadPart) * 1e-7; } return (ret); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VXWORKS) # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME static struct timespec tmstart; struct timespec now; # else static unsigned long tmstart; unsigned long now; # endif static int warning = 1; if (usertime && warning) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run " "this program on idle system.\n"); warning = 0; } # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_nsec * 1e-9) - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_nsec * 1e-9)); # else now = tickGet(); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)sysClkRateGet(); # endif return (ret); } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VMS) # include # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { static clock_t tmstart; double ret = 0; clock_t now; # ifdef __TMS struct tms rus; now = times(&rus); if (usertime) now = rus.tms_utime; # else if (usertime) now = clock(); /* sum of user and kernel times */ else { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); now = (clock_t)((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec * CLK_TCK + (unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec * (1000000 / CLK_TCK) ); } # endif if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)(CLK_TCK); return (ret); } #elif defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) /* by means of unistd.h */ # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; struct tms rus; clock_t now = times(&rus); static clock_t tmstart; if (usertime) now = rus.tms_utime; if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else { long int tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK); ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)tck; } return (ret); } #else # include # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; struct rusage rus; struct timeval now; static struct timeval tmstart; if (usertime) getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rus), now = rus.ru_utime; else gettimeofday(&now, NULL); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_usec * 1e-6) - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_usec * 1e-6)); return ret; } #endif int app_access(const char* name, int flag) { #ifdef _WIN32 return _access(name, flag); #else return access(name, flag); #endif } /* app_isdir section */ #ifdef _WIN32 int app_isdir(const char *name) { DWORD attr; # if defined(UNICODE) || defined(_UNICODE) size_t i, len_0 = strlen(name) + 1; WCHAR tempname[MAX_PATH]; if (len_0 > MAX_PATH) return -1; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, name, len_0, tempname, MAX_PATH)) # endif for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) tempname[i] = (WCHAR)name[i]; attr = GetFileAttributes(tempname); # else attr = GetFileAttributes(name); # endif if (attr == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) return -1; return ((attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0); } #else # include # ifndef S_ISDIR # if defined(_S_IFMT) && defined(_S_IFDIR) # define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & _S_IFMT) == _S_IFDIR) # else # define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) # endif # endif int app_isdir(const char *name) { # if defined(S_ISDIR) struct stat st; if (stat(name, &st) == 0) return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); else return -1; # else return -1; # endif } #endif /* raw_read|write section */ #if defined(__VMS) # include "vms_term_sock.h" static int stdin_sock = -1; static void close_stdin_sock(void) { TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_DELETE, &stdin_sock); } int fileno_stdin(void) { if (stdin_sock == -1) { TerminalSocket(TERM_SOCK_CREATE, &stdin_sock); atexit(close_stdin_sock); } return stdin_sock; } #else int fileno_stdin(void) { return fileno(stdin); } #endif int fileno_stdout(void) { return fileno(stdout); } #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE) int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { DWORD n; if (ReadFile(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL)) return (n); else return (-1); } #elif defined(__VMS) #include int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { return recv(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz, 0); } #else int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { return read(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz); } #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE) int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz) { DWORD n; if (WriteFile(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL)) return (n); else return (-1); } #else int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz) { return write(fileno_stdout(), buf, siz); } #endif /* * Centralized handling if input and output files with format specification * The format is meant to show what the input and output is supposed to be, * and is therefore a show of intent more than anything else. However, it * does impact behavior on some platform, such as differentiating between * text and binary input/output on non-Unix platforms */ static int istext(int format) { return (format & B_FORMAT_TEXT) == B_FORMAT_TEXT; } BIO *dup_bio_in(int format) { return BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0)); } BIO *dup_bio_out(int format) { BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0)); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (istext(format)) b = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()), b); #endif return b; } BIO *dup_bio_err(int format) { BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0)); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (istext(format)) b = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()), b); #endif return b; } void unbuffer(FILE *fp) { /* * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here. * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning * temporarily. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma environment save # pragma message disable maylosedata2 #endif setbuf(fp, NULL); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma environment restore #endif } static const char *modestr(char mode, int format) { OPENSSL_assert(mode == 'a' || mode == 'r' || mode == 'w'); switch (mode) { case 'a': return istext(format) ? "a" : "ab"; case 'r': return istext(format) ? "r" : "rb"; case 'w': return istext(format) ? "w" : "wb"; } /* The assert above should make sure we never reach this point */ return NULL; } static const char *modeverb(char mode) { switch (mode) { case 'a': return "appending"; case 'r': return "reading"; case 'w': return "writing"; } return "(doing something)"; } /* * Open a file for writing, owner-read-only. */ BIO *bio_open_owner(const char *filename, int format, int private) { FILE *fp = NULL; BIO *b = NULL; int fd = -1, bflags, mode, textmode; if (!private || filename == NULL || strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) return bio_open_default(filename, 'w', format); mode = O_WRONLY; #ifdef O_CREAT mode |= O_CREAT; #endif #ifdef O_TRUNC mode |= O_TRUNC; #endif textmode = istext(format); if (!textmode) { #ifdef O_BINARY mode |= O_BINARY; #elif defined(_O_BINARY) mode |= _O_BINARY; #endif } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* VMS doesn't have O_BINARY, it just doesn't make sense. But, * it still needs to know that we're going binary, or fdopen() * will fail with "invalid argument"... so we tell VMS what the * context is. */ if (!textmode) fd = open(filename, mode, 0600, "ctx=bin"); else #endif fd = open(filename, mode, 0600); if (fd < 0) goto err; fp = fdopen(fd, modestr('w', format)); if (fp == NULL) goto err; bflags = BIO_CLOSE; if (textmode) bflags |= BIO_FP_TEXT; b = BIO_new_fp(fp, bflags); if (b) return b; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't open \"%s\" for writing, %s\n", opt_getprog(), filename, strerror(errno)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); /* If we have fp, then fdopen took over fd, so don't close both. */ if (fp) fclose(fp); else if (fd >= 0) close(fd); return NULL; } static BIO *bio_open_default_(const char *filename, char mode, int format, int quiet) { BIO *ret; if (filename == NULL || strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { ret = mode == 'r' ? dup_bio_in(format) : dup_bio_out(format); if (quiet) { ERR_clear_error(); return ret; } if (ret != NULL) return ret; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open %s, %s\n", mode == 'r' ? "stdin" : "stdout", strerror(errno)); } else { ret = BIO_new_file(filename, modestr(mode, format)); if (quiet) { ERR_clear_error(); return ret; } if (ret != NULL) return ret; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open %s for %s, %s\n", filename, modeverb(mode), strerror(errno)); } ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return NULL; } BIO *bio_open_default(const char *filename, char mode, int format) { return bio_open_default_(filename, mode, format, 0); } BIO *bio_open_default_quiet(const char *filename, char mode, int format) { return bio_open_default_(filename, mode, format, 1); } void wait_for_async(SSL *s) { /* On Windows select only works for sockets, so we simply don't wait */ #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int width = 0; fd_set asyncfds; OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds; size_t numfds; size_t i; if (!SSL_get_all_async_fds(s, NULL, &numfds)) return; if (numfds == 0) return; fds = app_malloc(sizeof(OSSL_ASYNC_FD) * numfds, "allocate async fds"); if (!SSL_get_all_async_fds(s, fds, &numfds)) { OPENSSL_free(fds); return; } FD_ZERO(&asyncfds); for (i = 0; i < numfds; i++) { if (width <= (int)fds[i]) width = (int)fds[i] + 1; openssl_fdset((int)fds[i], &asyncfds); } select(width, (void *)&asyncfds, NULL, NULL, NULL); OPENSSL_free(fds); #endif } /* if OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS is defined then so is OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) int has_stdin_waiting(void) { # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) HANDLE inhand = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); DWORD events = 0; INPUT_RECORD inputrec; DWORD insize = 1; BOOL peeked; if (inhand == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { return 0; } peeked = PeekConsoleInput(inhand, &inputrec, insize, &events); if (!peeked) { /* Probably redirected input? _kbhit() does not work in this case */ if (!feof(stdin)) { return 1; } return 0; } # endif return _kbhit(); } #endif /* Corrupt a signature by modifying final byte */ void corrupt_signature(const ASN1_STRING *signature) { unsigned char *s = signature->data; s[signature->length - 1] ^= 0x1; } int set_cert_times(X509 *x, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, int days) { if (startdate == NULL || strcmp(startdate, "today") == 0) { if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(x), 0) == NULL) return 0; } else { if (!ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_getm_notBefore(x), startdate)) return 0; } if (enddate == NULL) { if (X509_time_adj_ex(X509_getm_notAfter(x), days, 0, NULL) == NULL) return 0; } else if (!ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_getm_notAfter(x), enddate)) { return 0; } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dsa-ca.pem0000644000000000000000000000524313176625656014664 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBugIBAAKBgQCnP26Fv0FqKX3wn0cZMJCaCR3aajMexT2GlrMV4FMuj+BZgnOQ PnUxmUd6UvuF5NmmezibaIqEm4fGHrV+hktTW1nPcWUZiG7OZq5riDb77Cjcwtel u+UsOSZL2ppwGJU3lRBWI/YV7boEXt45T/23Qx+1pGVvzYAR5HCVW1DNSQIVAPcH Me36bAYD1YWKHKycZedQZmVvAoGATd9MA6aRivUZb1BGJZnlaG8w42nh5bNdmLso hkj83pkEP1+IDJxzJA0gXbkqmj8YlifkYofBe3RiU/xhJ6h6kQmdtvFNnFQPWAbu SXQHzlV+I84W9srcWmEBfslxtU323DQph2j2XiCTs9v15AlsQReVkusBtXOlan7Y Mu0OArgCgYAapll6iqz9XrZFlk2GCVcB+KihxWnH7IuHvSLw9YUrJahcBHmbpvt4 94lF4gC5w3WPM+vXJofbusk4GoQEEsQNMDaah4m49uUqAylOVFJJJXuirVJ+o+0T tOFDITEAl+YZZariXOD7tdOSOl9RLMPC6+daHKS9e68u3enxhqnDGQIUB78dhW77 J6zsFbSEHaQGUmfSeoM= -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIICVjCCAhMCAQAwUjELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUx ITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDELMAkGA1UEAwwCQ0Ew ggG2MIIBKwYHKoZIzjgEATCCAR4CgYEApz9uhb9Bail98J9HGTCQmgkd2mozHsU9 hpazFeBTLo/gWYJzkD51MZlHelL7heTZpns4m2iKhJuHxh61foZLU1tZz3FlGYhu zmaua4g2++wo3MLXpbvlLDkmS9qacBiVN5UQViP2Fe26BF7eOU/9t0MftaRlb82A EeRwlVtQzUkCFQD3BzHt+mwGA9WFihysnGXnUGZlbwKBgE3fTAOmkYr1GW9QRiWZ 5WhvMONp4eWzXZi7KIZI/N6ZBD9fiAyccyQNIF25Kpo/GJYn5GKHwXt0YlP8YSeo epEJnbbxTZxUD1gG7kl0B85VfiPOFvbK3FphAX7JcbVN9tw0KYdo9l4gk7Pb9eQJ bEEXlZLrAbVzpWp+2DLtDgK4A4GEAAKBgBqmWXqKrP1etkWWTYYJVwH4qKHFacfs i4e9IvD1hSslqFwEeZum+3j3iUXiALnDdY8z69cmh9u6yTgahAQSxA0wNpqHibj2 5SoDKU5UUkkle6KtUn6j7RO04UMhMQCX5hllquJc4Pu105I6X1Esw8Lr51ocpL17 ry7d6fGGqcMZoAAwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAMCAzAAMC0CFCp7rUwGJNtxK6Aqo6k6US+S KP8sAhUAyfSi8Zs3QAvkJoFG0IMRaq8M03I= -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDMDCCAuygAwIBAgIBAjALBglghkgBZQMEAwIwUzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzAR BgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5 IEx0ZDEMMAoGA1UEAwwDUENBMCAXDTE2MDExMzIxNDE0OVoYDzMwMTUwNTE2MjE0 MTQ5WjBSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UE CgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTCCAbYwggEr BgcqhkjOOAQBMIIBHgKBgQCnP26Fv0FqKX3wn0cZMJCaCR3aajMexT2GlrMV4FMu j+BZgnOQPnUxmUd6UvuF5NmmezibaIqEm4fGHrV+hktTW1nPcWUZiG7OZq5riDb7 7Cjcwtelu+UsOSZL2ppwGJU3lRBWI/YV7boEXt45T/23Qx+1pGVvzYAR5HCVW1DN SQIVAPcHMe36bAYD1YWKHKycZedQZmVvAoGATd9MA6aRivUZb1BGJZnlaG8w42nh 5bNdmLsohkj83pkEP1+IDJxzJA0gXbkqmj8YlifkYofBe3RiU/xhJ6h6kQmdtvFN nFQPWAbuSXQHzlV+I84W9srcWmEBfslxtU323DQph2j2XiCTs9v15AlsQReVkusB tXOlan7YMu0OArgDgYQAAoGAGqZZeoqs/V62RZZNhglXAfioocVpx+yLh70i8PWF KyWoXAR5m6b7ePeJReIAucN1jzPr1yaH27rJOBqEBBLEDTA2moeJuPblKgMpTlRS SSV7oq1SfqPtE7ThQyExAJfmGWWq4lzg+7XTkjpfUSzDwuvnWhykvXuvLt3p8Yap wxmjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTMZcORcBEVlqO/CD4pf4V6N1NM1zAfBgNVHSMEGDAW gBTGjwJ33uvjSa20RNrMKWoGptOLdDAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAsGCWCGSAFlAwQD AgMxADAuAhUA4V6MrHufG8R79E+AtVO02olPxK8CFQDkZyo/TWpavsUBRDJbCeD9 jgjIkA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ec.c0000644000000000000000000002023213176625656013557 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include static OPT_PAIR conv_forms[] = { {"compressed", POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED}, {"uncompressed", POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED}, {"hybrid", POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID}, {NULL} }; static OPT_PAIR param_enc[] = { {"named_curve", OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE}, {"explicit", 0}, {NULL} }; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_PARAM_OUT, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_PUBOUT, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_PARAM_ENC, OPT_CONV_FORM, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_NO_PUBLIC, OPT_CHECK } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS ec_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input file"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format - DER or PEM"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print key out"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the key"}, {"param_out", OPT_PARAM_OUT, '-', "Print the elliptic curve parameters"}, {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Expect a public key in input file"}, {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output public key, not private"}, {"no_public", OPT_NO_PUBLIC, '-', "exclude public key from private key"}, {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "check key consistency"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"param_enc", OPT_PARAM_ENC, 's', "Specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded"}, {"conv_form", OPT_CONV_FORM, 's', "Specifies the point conversion form "}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int ec_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; point_conversion_form_t form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE, new_form = 0, new_asn1_flag = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, noout = 0; int pubin = 0, pubout = 0, param_out = 0, i, ret = 1, private = 0; int no_public = 0, check = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ec_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(ec_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_PARAM_OUT: param_out = 1; break; case OPT_PUBIN: pubin = 1; break; case OPT_PUBOUT: pubout = 1; break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CONV_FORM: if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), conv_forms, &i)) goto opthelp; new_form = 1; form = i; break; case OPT_PARAM_ENC: if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), param_enc, &i)) goto opthelp; new_asn1_flag = 1; asn1_flag = i; break; case OPT_NO_PUBLIC: no_public = 1; break; case OPT_CHECK: check = 1; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = param_out || pubin || pubout ? 0 : 1; if (text && !pubin) private = 1; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } if (informat != FORMAT_ENGINE) { in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "read EC key\n"); if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) { if (pubin) eckey = d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(in, NULL); else eckey = d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL); } else if (informat == FORMAT_ENGINE) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; if (pubin) pkey = load_pubkey(infile, informat , 1, passin, e, "Public Key"); else pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Private Key"); if (pkey != NULL) { eckey = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } } else { if (pubin) eckey = PEM_read_bio_EC_PUBKEY(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else eckey = PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey(in, NULL, NULL, passin); } if (eckey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load Key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); if (new_form) EC_KEY_set_conv_form(eckey, form); if (new_asn1_flag) EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(eckey, asn1_flag); if (no_public) EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(eckey, EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY); if (text) { assert(pubin || private); if (!EC_KEY_print(out, eckey, 0)) { perror(outfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (check) { if (EC_KEY_check_key(eckey) == 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EC Key valid.\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EC Key Invalid!\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } } if (noout) { ret = 0; goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing EC key\n"); if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) { if (param_out) i = i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(out, group); else if (pubin || pubout) i = i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(out, eckey); else { assert(private); i = i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(out, eckey); } } else { if (param_out) i = PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters(out, group); else if (pubin || pubout) i = PEM_write_bio_EC_PUBKEY(out, eckey); else { assert(private); i = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(out, eckey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); } } if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write private key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else ret = 0; end: BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); EC_KEY_free(eckey); release_engine(e); OPENSSL_free(passin); OPENSSL_free(passout); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/server.srl0000644000000000000000000000000313176625656015046 0ustar rootroot01 openssl-1.1.0g/apps/cms.c0000644000000000000000000012714013176625656013760 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* CMS utility function */ #include #include #include "apps.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS # include # include # include # include # include # include static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers); static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static void receipt_request_print(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); static CMS_ReceiptRequest *make_receipt_request(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_to, int rr_allorfirst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_from); static int cms_set_pkey_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param); # define SMIME_OP 0x10 # define SMIME_IP 0x20 # define SMIME_SIGNERS 0x40 # define SMIME_ENCRYPT (1 | SMIME_OP) # define SMIME_DECRYPT (2 | SMIME_IP) # define SMIME_SIGN (3 | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS) # define SMIME_VERIFY (4 | SMIME_IP) # define SMIME_CMSOUT (5 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP) # define SMIME_RESIGN (6 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS) # define SMIME_DATAOUT (7 | SMIME_IP) # define SMIME_DATA_CREATE (8 | SMIME_OP) # define SMIME_DIGEST_VERIFY (9 | SMIME_IP) # define SMIME_DIGEST_CREATE (10 | SMIME_OP) # define SMIME_UNCOMPRESS (11 | SMIME_IP) # define SMIME_COMPRESS (12 | SMIME_OP) # define SMIME_ENCRYPTED_DECRYPT (13 | SMIME_IP) # define SMIME_ENCRYPTED_ENCRYPT (14 | SMIME_OP) # define SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT (15 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP) # define SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT (16 | SMIME_IP) static int verify_err = 0; typedef struct cms_key_param_st cms_key_param; struct cms_key_param_st { int idx; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param; cms_key_param *next; }; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_SIGN, OPT_SIGN_RECEIPT, OPT_RESIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_VERIFY_RETCODE, OPT_VERIFY_RECEIPT, OPT_CMSOUT, OPT_DATA_OUT, OPT_DATA_CREATE, OPT_DIGEST_VERIFY, OPT_DIGEST_CREATE, OPT_COMPRESS, OPT_UNCOMPRESS, OPT_ED_DECRYPT, OPT_ED_ENCRYPT, OPT_DEBUG_DECRYPT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_ASCIICRLF, OPT_NOINTERN, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_NOCERTS, OPT_NOATTR, OPT_NODETACH, OPT_NOSMIMECAP, OPT_BINARY, OPT_KEYID, OPT_NOSIGS, OPT_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY, OPT_NO_ATTR_VERIFY, OPT_INDEF, OPT_NOINDEF, OPT_CRLFEOL, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_RR_PRINT, OPT_RR_ALL, OPT_RR_FIRST, OPT_RCTFORM, OPT_CERTFILE, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE,OPT_CONTENT, OPT_PRINT, OPT_SECRETKEY, OPT_SECRETKEYID, OPT_PWRI_PASSWORD, OPT_ECONTENT_TYPE, OPT_RAND, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_TO, OPT_FROM, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_SIGNER, OPT_RECIP, OPT_CERTSOUT, OPT_MD, OPT_INKEY, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_KEYOPT, OPT_RR_FROM, OPT_RR_TO, OPT_AES128_WRAP, OPT_AES192_WRAP, OPT_AES256_WRAP, OPT_3DES_WRAP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_CIPHER } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS cms_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " cert.pem... recipient certs for encryption\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'c', "Input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'c', "Output format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt message"}, {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt encrypted message"}, {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign message"}, {"sign_receipt", OPT_SIGN_RECEIPT, '-', "Generate a signed receipt for the message"}, {"resign", OPT_RESIGN, '-', "Resign a signed message"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify signed message"}, {"verify_retcode", OPT_VERIFY_RETCODE, '-'}, {"verify_receipt", OPT_VERIFY_RECEIPT, '<'}, {"cmsout", OPT_CMSOUT, '-', "Output CMS structure"}, {"data_out", OPT_DATA_OUT, '-'}, {"data_create", OPT_DATA_CREATE, '-'}, {"digest_verify", OPT_DIGEST_VERIFY, '-'}, {"digest_create", OPT_DIGEST_CREATE, '-'}, {"compress", OPT_COMPRESS, '-'}, {"uncompress", OPT_UNCOMPRESS, '-'}, {"EncryptedData_decrypt", OPT_ED_DECRYPT, '-'}, {"EncryptedData_encrypt", OPT_ED_ENCRYPT, '-'}, {"debug_decrypt", OPT_DEBUG_DECRYPT, '-'}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Include or delete text MIME headers"}, {"asciicrlf", OPT_ASCIICRLF, '-'}, {"nointern", OPT_NOINTERN, '-', "Don't search certificates in message for signer"}, {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Don't verify signers certificate"}, {"nocerts", OPT_NOCERTS, '-', "Don't include signers certificate when signing"}, {"noattr", OPT_NOATTR, '-', "Don't include any signed attributes"}, {"nodetach", OPT_NODETACH, '-', "Use opaque signing"}, {"nosmimecap", OPT_NOSMIMECAP, '-', "Omit the SMIMECapabilities attribute"}, {"binary", OPT_BINARY, '-', "Don't translate message to text"}, {"keyid", OPT_KEYID, '-', "Use subject key identifier"}, {"nosigs", OPT_NOSIGS, '-', "Don't verify message signature"}, {"no_content_verify", OPT_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY, '-'}, {"no_attr_verify", OPT_NO_ATTR_VERIFY, '-'}, {"stream", OPT_INDEF, '-', "Enable CMS streaming"}, {"indef", OPT_INDEF, '-', "Same as -stream"}, {"noindef", OPT_NOINDEF, '-', "Disable CMS streaming"}, {"crlfeol", OPT_CRLFEOL, '-', "Use CRLF as EOL termination instead of CR only" }, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "For the -cmsout operation do not output the parsed CMS structure"}, {"receipt_request_print", OPT_RR_PRINT, '-', "Print CMS Receipt Request" }, {"receipt_request_all", OPT_RR_ALL, '-'}, {"receipt_request_first", OPT_RR_FIRST, '-'}, {"rctform", OPT_RCTFORM, 'F', "Receipt file format"}, {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<', "Other certificates file"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Trusted certificates file"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "trusted certificates directory"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"content", OPT_CONTENT, '<', "Supply or override content for detached signature"}, {"print", OPT_PRINT, '-', "For the -cmsout operation print out all fields of the CMS structure"}, {"secretkey", OPT_SECRETKEY, 's'}, {"secretkeyid", OPT_SECRETKEYID, 's'}, {"pwri_password", OPT_PWRI_PASSWORD, 's'}, {"econtent_type", OPT_ECONTENT_TYPE, 's'}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"to", OPT_TO, 's', "To address"}, {"from", OPT_FROM, 's', "From address"}, {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, 's', "Subject"}, {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, 's', "Signer certificate file"}, {"recip", OPT_RECIP, '<', "Recipient cert file for decryption"}, {"certsout", OPT_CERTSOUT, '>', "Certificate output file"}, {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning"}, {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Input private key (if not signer or recipient)"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Input private key format (PEM or ENGINE)"}, {"keyopt", OPT_KEYOPT, 's', "Set public key parameters as n:v pairs"}, {"receipt_request_from", OPT_RR_FROM, 's'}, {"receipt_request_to", OPT_RR_TO, 's'}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, OPT_V_OPTIONS, {"aes128-wrap", OPT_AES128_WRAP, '-', "Use AES128 to wrap key"}, {"aes192-wrap", OPT_AES192_WRAP, '-', "Use AES192 to wrap key"}, {"aes256-wrap", OPT_AES256_WRAP, '-', "Use AES256 to wrap key"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES {"des3-wrap", OPT_3DES_WRAP, '-', "Use 3DES-EDE to wrap key"}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int cms_main(int argc, char **argv) { ASN1_OBJECT *econtent_type = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *indata = NULL, *rctin = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL, *rcms = NULL; CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL, *wrap_cipher = NULL; const EVP_MD *sign_md = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_to = NULL, *rr_from = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sksigners = NULL, *skkeys = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL, *other = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL, *recip = NULL, *signer = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; char *certfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *contfile = NULL; const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL; char *certsoutfile = NULL; int noCAfile = 0, noCApath = 0; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *rctfile = NULL, *inrand = NULL; char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL, *signerfile = NULL, *recipfile = NULL; char *to = NULL, *from = NULL, *subject = NULL, *prog; cms_key_param *key_first = NULL, *key_param = NULL; int flags = CMS_DETACHED, noout = 0, print = 0, keyidx = -1, vpmtouched = 0; int informat = FORMAT_SMIME, outformat = FORMAT_SMIME; int need_rand = 0, operation = 0, ret = 1, rr_print = 0, rr_allorfirst = -1; int verify_retcode = 0, rctformat = FORMAT_SMIME, keyform = FORMAT_PEM; size_t secret_keylen = 0, secret_keyidlen = 0; unsigned char *pwri_pass = NULL, *pwri_tmp = NULL; unsigned char *secret_key = NULL, *secret_keyid = NULL; long ltmp; const char *mime_eol = "\n"; OPTION_CHOICE o; if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) return 1; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, cms_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(cms_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENCRYPT: operation = SMIME_ENCRYPT; break; case OPT_DECRYPT: operation = SMIME_DECRYPT; break; case OPT_SIGN: operation = SMIME_SIGN; break; case OPT_SIGN_RECEIPT: operation = SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT; break; case OPT_RESIGN: operation = SMIME_RESIGN; break; case OPT_VERIFY: operation = SMIME_VERIFY; break; case OPT_VERIFY_RETCODE: verify_retcode = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY_RECEIPT: operation = SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT; rctfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CMSOUT: operation = SMIME_CMSOUT; break; case OPT_DATA_OUT: operation = SMIME_DATAOUT; break; case OPT_DATA_CREATE: operation = SMIME_DATA_CREATE; break; case OPT_DIGEST_VERIFY: operation = SMIME_DIGEST_VERIFY; break; case OPT_DIGEST_CREATE: operation = SMIME_DIGEST_CREATE; break; case OPT_COMPRESS: operation = SMIME_COMPRESS; break; case OPT_UNCOMPRESS: operation = SMIME_UNCOMPRESS; break; case OPT_ED_DECRYPT: operation = SMIME_ENCRYPTED_DECRYPT; break; case OPT_ED_ENCRYPT: operation = SMIME_ENCRYPTED_ENCRYPT; break; case OPT_DEBUG_DECRYPT: flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT; break; case OPT_TEXT: flags |= CMS_TEXT; break; case OPT_ASCIICRLF: flags |= CMS_ASCIICRLF; break; case OPT_NOINTERN: flags |= CMS_NOINTERN; break; case OPT_NOVERIFY: flags |= CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY; break; case OPT_NOCERTS: flags |= CMS_NOCERTS; break; case OPT_NOATTR: flags |= CMS_NOATTR; break; case OPT_NODETACH: flags &= ~CMS_DETACHED; break; case OPT_NOSMIMECAP: flags |= CMS_NOSMIMECAP; break; case OPT_BINARY: flags |= CMS_BINARY; break; case OPT_KEYID: flags |= CMS_USE_KEYID; break; case OPT_NOSIGS: flags |= CMS_NOSIGS; break; case OPT_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY: flags |= CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY; break; case OPT_NO_ATTR_VERIFY: flags |= CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY; break; case OPT_INDEF: flags |= CMS_STREAM; break; case OPT_NOINDEF: flags &= ~CMS_STREAM; break; case OPT_CRLFEOL: mime_eol = "\r\n"; flags |= CMS_CRLFEOL; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_RR_PRINT: rr_print = 1; break; case OPT_RR_ALL: rr_allorfirst = 0; break; case OPT_RR_FIRST: rr_allorfirst = 1; break; case OPT_RCTFORM: if (rctformat == FORMAT_SMIME) rcms = SMIME_read_CMS(rctin, NULL); else if (rctformat == FORMAT_PEM) rcms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(rctin, NULL, NULL, NULL); else if (rctformat == FORMAT_ASN1) if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_SMIME, &rctformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CERTFILE: certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CONTENT: contfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RR_FROM: if (rr_from == NULL && (rr_from = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(rr_from, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_RR_TO: if (rr_to == NULL && (rr_to = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(rr_to, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PRINT: noout = print = 1; break; case OPT_SECRETKEY: if (secret_key != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid key (supplied twice) %s\n", opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } secret_key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(opt_arg(), <mp); if (secret_key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid key %s\n", opt_arg()); goto end; } secret_keylen = (size_t)ltmp; break; case OPT_SECRETKEYID: if (secret_keyid != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid id (supplied twice) %s\n", opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } secret_keyid = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(opt_arg(), <mp); if (secret_keyid == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid id %s\n", opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } secret_keyidlen = (size_t)ltmp; break; case OPT_PWRI_PASSWORD: pwri_pass = (unsigned char *)opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ECONTENT_TYPE: if (econtent_type != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid OID (supplied twice) %s\n", opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } econtent_type = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0); if (econtent_type == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid OID %s\n", opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TO: to = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_FROM: from = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SUBJECT: subject = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERTSOUT: certsoutfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &sign_md)) goto end; break; case OPT_SIGNER: /* If previous -signer argument add signer to list */ if (signerfile) { if (sksigners == NULL && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile); if (keyfile == NULL) keyfile = signerfile; if (skkeys == NULL && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile); keyfile = NULL; } signerfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_INKEY: /* If previous -inkey argument add signer to list */ if (keyfile) { if (signerfile == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal -inkey without -signer\n"); goto end; } if (sksigners == NULL && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile); signerfile = NULL; if (skkeys == NULL && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile); } keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_RECIP: if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { if (encerts == NULL && (encerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; cert = load_cert(opt_arg(), FORMAT_PEM, "recipient certificate file"); if (cert == NULL) goto end; sk_X509_push(encerts, cert); cert = NULL; } else recipfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher)) goto end; break; case OPT_KEYOPT: keyidx = -1; if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { if (encerts) keyidx += sk_X509_num(encerts); } else { if (keyfile || signerfile) keyidx++; if (skkeys) keyidx += sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(skkeys); } if (keyidx < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No key specified\n"); goto opthelp; } if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) { cms_key_param *nparam; nparam = app_malloc(sizeof(*nparam), "key param buffer"); nparam->idx = keyidx; if ((nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; nparam->next = NULL; if (key_first == NULL) key_first = nparam; else key_param->next = nparam; key_param = nparam; } sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(key_param->param, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_3DES_WRAP: # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES wrap_cipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap(); # endif break; case OPT_AES128_WRAP: wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap(); break; case OPT_AES192_WRAP: wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap(); break; case OPT_AES256_WRAP: wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap(); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (((rr_allorfirst != -1) || rr_from) && !rr_to) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "No Signed Receipts Recipients\n"); goto opthelp; } if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) && (rr_to || rr_from)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Signed receipts only allowed with -sign\n"); goto opthelp; } if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) && (skkeys || sksigners)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Multiple signers or keys not allowed\n"); goto opthelp; } if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) { if (keyfile && !signerfile) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal -inkey without -signer\n"); goto opthelp; } /* Check to see if any final signer needs to be appended */ if (signerfile) { if (!sksigners && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile); if (!skkeys && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; if (!keyfile) keyfile = signerfile; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile); } if (!sksigners) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No signer certificate specified\n"); goto opthelp; } signerfile = NULL; keyfile = NULL; need_rand = 1; } else if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) { if (!recipfile && !keyfile && !secret_key && !pwri_pass) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient certificate or key specified\n"); goto opthelp; } } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { if (*argv == NULL && !secret_key && !pwri_pass && !encerts) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient(s) certificate(s) specified\n"); goto opthelp; } need_rand = 1; } else if (!operation) goto opthelp; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (need_rand) { app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL)); if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); } ret = 2; if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS)) flags &= ~CMS_DETACHED; if (!(operation & SMIME_OP)) { if (flags & CMS_BINARY) outformat = FORMAT_BINARY; } if (!(operation & SMIME_IP)) { if (flags & CMS_BINARY) informat = FORMAT_BINARY; } if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { if (!cipher) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); # else BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n"); goto end; # endif } if (secret_key && !secret_keyid) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No secret key id\n"); goto end; } if (*argv && !encerts) if ((encerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; while (*argv) { if ((cert = load_cert(*argv, FORMAT_PEM, "recipient certificate file")) == NULL) goto end; sk_X509_push(encerts, cert); cert = NULL; argv++; } } if (certfile) { if (!load_certs(certfile, &other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "certificate file")) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (recipfile && (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)) { if ((recip = load_cert(recipfile, FORMAT_PEM, "recipient certificate file")) == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (operation == SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT) { if ((signer = load_cert(signerfile, FORMAT_PEM, "receipt signer certificate file")) == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) { if (!keyfile) keyfile = recipfile; } else if ((operation == SMIME_SIGN) || (operation == SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT)) { if (!keyfile) keyfile = signerfile; } else keyfile = NULL; if (keyfile) { key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file"); if (!key) goto end; } in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (operation & SMIME_IP) { if (informat == FORMAT_SMIME) cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, &indata); else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) cms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) cms = d2i_CMS_bio(in, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad input format for CMS file\n"); goto end; } if (!cms) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading S/MIME message\n"); goto end; } if (contfile) { BIO_free(indata); if ((indata = BIO_new_file(contfile, "rb")) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read content file %s\n", contfile); goto end; } } if (certsoutfile) { STACK_OF(X509) *allcerts; allcerts = CMS_get1_certs(cms); if (!save_certs(certsoutfile, allcerts)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing certs to %s\n", certsoutfile); ret = 5; goto end; } sk_X509_pop_free(allcerts, X509_free); } } if (rctfile) { char *rctmode = (rctformat == FORMAT_ASN1) ? "rb" : "r"; if ((rctin = BIO_new_file(rctfile, rctmode)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open receipt file %s\n", rctfile); goto end; } if (rctformat == FORMAT_SMIME) rcms = SMIME_read_CMS(rctin, NULL); else if (rctformat == FORMAT_PEM) rcms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(rctin, NULL, NULL, NULL); else if (rctformat == FORMAT_ASN1) rcms = d2i_CMS_bio(rctin, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad input format for receipt\n"); goto end; } if (!rcms) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading receipt\n"); goto end; } } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if ((operation == SMIME_VERIFY) || (operation == SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT)) { if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL) goto end; X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, cms_cb); if (vpmtouched) X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm); } ret = 3; if (operation == SMIME_DATA_CREATE) { cms = CMS_data_create(in, flags); } else if (operation == SMIME_DIGEST_CREATE) { cms = CMS_digest_create(in, sign_md, flags); } else if (operation == SMIME_COMPRESS) { cms = CMS_compress(in, -1, flags); } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { int i; flags |= CMS_PARTIAL; cms = CMS_encrypt(NULL, in, cipher, flags); if (!cms) goto end; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(encerts); i++) { CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; cms_key_param *kparam; int tflags = flags; X509 *x = sk_X509_value(encerts, i); for (kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next) { if (kparam->idx == i) { tflags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM; break; } } ri = CMS_add1_recipient_cert(cms, x, tflags); if (!ri) goto end; if (kparam) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!cms_set_pkey_param(pctx, kparam->param)) goto end; } if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE && wrap_cipher) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *wctx; wctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(wctx, wrap_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL); } } if (secret_key) { if (!CMS_add0_recipient_key(cms, NID_undef, secret_key, secret_keylen, secret_keyid, secret_keyidlen, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto end; /* NULL these because call absorbs them */ secret_key = NULL; secret_keyid = NULL; } if (pwri_pass) { pwri_tmp = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_strdup((char *)pwri_pass); if (!pwri_tmp) goto end; if (!CMS_add0_recipient_password(cms, -1, NID_undef, NID_undef, pwri_tmp, -1, NULL)) goto end; pwri_tmp = NULL; } if (!(flags & CMS_STREAM)) { if (!CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags)) goto end; } } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPTED_ENCRYPT) { cms = CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(in, cipher, secret_key, secret_keylen, flags); } else if (operation == SMIME_SIGN_RECEIPT) { CMS_ContentInfo *srcms = NULL; STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sis; CMS_SignerInfo *si; sis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms); if (!sis) goto end; si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sis, 0); srcms = CMS_sign_receipt(si, signer, key, other, flags); if (!srcms) goto end; CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); cms = srcms; } else if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) { int i; /* * If detached data content we enable streaming if S/MIME output * format. */ if (operation == SMIME_SIGN) { if (flags & CMS_DETACHED) { if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME) flags |= CMS_STREAM; } flags |= CMS_PARTIAL; cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, other, in, flags); if (!cms) goto end; if (econtent_type) CMS_set1_eContentType(cms, econtent_type); if (rr_to) { rr = make_receipt_request(rr_to, rr_allorfirst, rr_from); if (!rr) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Signed Receipt Request Creation Error\n"); goto end; } } } else flags |= CMS_REUSE_DIGEST; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sksigners); i++) { CMS_SignerInfo *si; cms_key_param *kparam; int tflags = flags; signerfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sksigners, i); keyfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(skkeys, i); signer = load_cert(signerfile, FORMAT_PEM, "signer certificate"); if (!signer) goto end; key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file"); if (!key) goto end; for (kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next) { if (kparam->idx == i) { tflags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM; break; } } si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signer, key, sign_md, tflags); if (!si) goto end; if (kparam) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; pctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si); if (!cms_set_pkey_param(pctx, kparam->param)) goto end; } if (rr && !CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(si, rr)) goto end; X509_free(signer); signer = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(key); key = NULL; } /* If not streaming or resigning finalize structure */ if ((operation == SMIME_SIGN) && !(flags & CMS_STREAM)) { if (!CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags)) goto end; } } if (!cms) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating CMS structure\n"); goto end; } ret = 4; if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) { if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags); if (secret_key) { if (!CMS_decrypt_set1_key(cms, secret_key, secret_keylen, secret_keyid, secret_keyidlen)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS using secret key\n"); goto end; } } if (key) { if (!CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, key, recip)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS using private key\n"); goto end; } } if (pwri_pass) { if (!CMS_decrypt_set1_password(cms, pwri_pass, -1)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS using password\n"); goto end; } } if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, indata, out, flags)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error decrypting CMS structure\n"); goto end; } } else if (operation == SMIME_DATAOUT) { if (!CMS_data(cms, out, flags)) goto end; } else if (operation == SMIME_UNCOMPRESS) { if (!CMS_uncompress(cms, indata, out, flags)) goto end; } else if (operation == SMIME_DIGEST_VERIFY) { if (CMS_digest_verify(cms, indata, out, flags) > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n"); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n"); goto end; } } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPTED_DECRYPT) { if (!CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(cms, secret_key, secret_keylen, indata, out, flags)) goto end; } else if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY) { if (CMS_verify(cms, other, store, indata, out, flags) > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n"); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n"); if (verify_retcode) ret = verify_err + 32; goto end; } if (signerfile) { STACK_OF(X509) *signers; signers = CMS_get0_signers(cms); if (!save_certs(signerfile, signers)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing signers to %s\n", signerfile); ret = 5; goto end; } sk_X509_free(signers); } if (rr_print) receipt_request_print(cms); } else if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY_RECEIPT) { if (CMS_verify_receipt(rcms, cms, other, store, flags) > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n"); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n"); goto end; } } else { if (noout) { if (print) CMS_ContentInfo_print_ctx(out, cms, 0, NULL); } else if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME) { if (to) BIO_printf(out, "To: %s%s", to, mime_eol); if (from) BIO_printf(out, "From: %s%s", from, mime_eol); if (subject) BIO_printf(out, "Subject: %s%s", subject, mime_eol); if (operation == SMIME_RESIGN) ret = SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, indata, flags); else ret = SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags); } else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) ret = PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(out, cms, in, flags); else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) ret = i2d_CMS_bio_stream(out, cms, in, flags); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad output format for CMS file\n"); goto end; } if (ret <= 0) { ret = 6; goto end; } } ret = 0; end: if (ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (need_rand) app_RAND_write_file(NULL); sk_X509_pop_free(encerts, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(other, X509_free); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sksigners); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(skkeys); OPENSSL_free(secret_key); OPENSSL_free(secret_keyid); OPENSSL_free(pwri_tmp); ASN1_OBJECT_free(econtent_type); CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(rr_to); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(rr_from); for (key_param = key_first; key_param;) { cms_key_param *tparam; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(key_param->param); tparam = key_param->next; OPENSSL_free(key_param); key_param = tparam; } X509_STORE_free(store); X509_free(cert); X509_free(recip); X509_free(signer); EVP_PKEY_free(key); CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); CMS_ContentInfo_free(rcms); release_engine(e); BIO_free(rctin); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(indata); BIO_free_all(out); OPENSSL_free(passin); return (ret); } static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers) { int i; BIO *tmp; if (!signerfile) return 1; tmp = BIO_new_file(signerfile, "w"); if (!tmp) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(signers); i++) PEM_write_bio_X509(tmp, sk_X509_value(signers, i)); BIO_free(tmp); return 1; } /* Minimal callback just to output policy info (if any) */ static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int error; error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); verify_err = error; if ((error != X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY) && ((error != X509_V_OK) || (ok != 2))) return ok; policies_print(ctx); return ok; } static void gnames_stack_print(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *gns) { STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens; GENERAL_NAME *gen; int i, j; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAMES_num(gns); i++) { gens = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_value(gns, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j); BIO_puts(bio_err, " "); GENERAL_NAME_print(bio_err, gen); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } } return; } static void receipt_request_print(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sis; CMS_SignerInfo *si; CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr; int allorfirst; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *rto, *rlist; ASN1_STRING *scid; int i, rv; sis = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms); for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sis); i++) { si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sis, i); rv = CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(si, &rr); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signer %d:\n", i + 1); if (rv == 0) BIO_puts(bio_err, " No Receipt Request\n"); else if (rv < 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, " Receipt Request Parse Error\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else { const char *id; int idlen; CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(rr, &scid, &allorfirst, &rlist, &rto); BIO_puts(bio_err, " Signed Content ID:\n"); idlen = ASN1_STRING_length(scid); id = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(scid); BIO_dump_indent(bio_err, id, idlen, 4); BIO_puts(bio_err, " Receipts From"); if (rlist) { BIO_puts(bio_err, " List:\n"); gnames_stack_print(rlist); } else if (allorfirst == 1) BIO_puts(bio_err, ": First Tier\n"); else if (allorfirst == 0) BIO_puts(bio_err, ": All\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, " Unknown (%d)\n", allorfirst); BIO_puts(bio_err, " Receipts To:\n"); gnames_stack_print(rto); } CMS_ReceiptRequest_free(rr); } } static STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *make_names_stack(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ns) { int i; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *ret; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL; ret = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null(); if (!ret) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(ns); i++) { char *str = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(ns, i); gen = a2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, NULL, NULL, GEN_EMAIL, str, 0); if (!gen) goto err; gens = GENERAL_NAMES_new(); if (gens == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_push(gens, gen)) goto err; gen = NULL; if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(ret, gens)) goto err; gens = NULL; } return ret; err: sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(ret, GENERAL_NAMES_free); GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); GENERAL_NAME_free(gen); return NULL; } static CMS_ReceiptRequest *make_receipt_request(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_to, int rr_allorfirst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_from) { STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *rct_to = NULL, *rct_from = NULL; CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr; rct_to = make_names_stack(rr_to); if (!rct_to) goto err; if (rr_from) { rct_from = make_names_stack(rr_from); if (!rct_from) goto err; } else rct_from = NULL; rr = CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(NULL, -1, rr_allorfirst, rct_from, rct_to); return rr; err: sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(rct_to, GENERAL_NAMES_free); return NULL; } static int cms_set_pkey_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param) { char *keyopt; int i; if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param) <= 0) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param); i++) { keyopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(pctx, keyopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", keyopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } } return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ts.c0000644000000000000000000007525113176625656013631 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TS NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include /* Request nonce length, in bits (must be a multiple of 8). */ # define NONCE_LENGTH 64 /* Name of config entry that defines the OID file. */ # define ENV_OID_FILE "oid_file" /* Is |EXACTLY_ONE| of three pointers set? */ # define EXACTLY_ONE(a, b, c) \ (( a && !b && !c) || \ ( b && !a && !c) || \ ( c && !a && !b)) static ASN1_OBJECT *txt2obj(const char *oid); static CONF *load_config_file(const char *configfile); /* Query related functions. */ static int query_command(const char *data, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md, const char *policy, int no_nonce, int cert, const char *in, const char *out, int text); static TS_REQ *create_query(BIO *data_bio, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md, const char *policy, int no_nonce, int cert); static int create_digest(BIO *input, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned char **md_value); static ASN1_INTEGER *create_nonce(int bits); /* Reply related functions. */ static int reply_command(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine, const char *queryfile, const char *passin, const char *inkey, const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer, const char *chain, const char *policy, const char *in, int token_in, const char *out, int token_out, int text); static TS_RESP *read_PKCS7(BIO *in_bio); static TS_RESP *create_response(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine, const char *queryfile, const char *passin, const char *inkey, const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer, const char *chain, const char *policy); static ASN1_INTEGER *serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, void *data); static ASN1_INTEGER *next_serial(const char *serialfile); static int save_ts_serial(const char *serialfile, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); /* Verify related functions. */ static int verify_command(const char *data, const char *digest, const char *queryfile, const char *in, int token_in, const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, const char *untrusted, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); static TS_VERIFY_CTX *create_verify_ctx(const char *data, const char *digest, const char *queryfile, const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, const char *untrusted, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); static X509_STORE *create_cert_store(const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_SECTION, OPT_QUERY, OPT_DATA, OPT_DIGEST, OPT_RAND, OPT_TSPOLICY, OPT_NO_NONCE, OPT_CERT, OPT_IN, OPT_TOKEN_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TOKEN_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_REPLY, OPT_QUERYFILE, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_INKEY, OPT_SIGNER, OPT_CHAIN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_UNTRUSTED, OPT_MD, OPT_V_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS ts_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"config", OPT_CONFIG, '<', "Configuration file"}, {"section", OPT_SECTION, 's', "Section to use within config file"}, {"query", OPT_QUERY, '-', "Generate a TS query"}, {"data", OPT_DATA, '<', "File to hash"}, {"digest", OPT_DIGEST, 's', "Digest (as a hex string)"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"tspolicy", OPT_TSPOLICY, 's', "Policy OID to use"}, {"no_nonce", OPT_NO_NONCE, '-', "Do not include a nonce"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '-', "Put cert request into query"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"token_in", OPT_TOKEN_IN, '-', "Input is a PKCS#7 file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"token_out", OPT_TOKEN_OUT, '-', "Output is a PKCS#7 file"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Output text (not DER)"}, {"reply", OPT_REPLY, '-', "Generate a TS reply"}, {"queryfile", OPT_QUERYFILE, '<', "File containing a TS query"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "File with private key for reply"}, {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, 's', "Signer certificate file"}, {"chain", OPT_CHAIN, '<', "File with signer CA chain"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify a TS response"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "Path to trusted CA files"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "File with trusted CA certs"}, {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "File with untrusted certs"}, {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "\nOptions specific to 'ts -verify': \n"}, OPT_V_OPTIONS, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "\n"}, {NULL} }; /* * This command is so complex, special help is needed. */ static char* opt_helplist[] = { "Typical uses:", "ts -query [-rand file...] [-config file] [-data file]", " [-digest hexstring] [-tspolicy oid] [-no_nonce] [-cert]", " [-in file] [-out file] [-text]", " or", "ts -reply [-config file] [-section tsa_section]", " [-queryfile file] [-passin password]", " [-signer tsa_cert.pem] [-inkey private_key.pem]", " [-chain certs_file.pem] [-tspolicy oid]", " [-in file] [-token_in] [-out file] [-token_out]", # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE " [-text] [-engine id]", # else " [-text]", # endif " or", "ts -verify -CApath dir -CAfile file.pem -untrusted file.pem", " [-data file] [-digest hexstring]", " [-queryfile file] -in file [-token_in]", " [[options specific to 'ts -verify']]", NULL, }; int ts_main(int argc, char **argv) { CONF *conf = NULL; const char *CAfile = NULL, *untrusted = NULL, *prog; const char *configfile = default_config_file, *engine = NULL; const char *section = NULL; char **helpp; char *password = NULL; char *data = NULL, *digest = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *policy = NULL; char *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *queryfile = NULL, *passin = NULL; char *inkey = NULL, *signer = NULL, *chain = NULL, *CApath = NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o, mode = OPT_ERR; int ret = 1, no_nonce = 0, cert = 0, text = 0; int vpmtouched = 0; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; /* Input is ContentInfo instead of TimeStampResp. */ int token_in = 0; /* Output is ContentInfo instead of TimeStampResp. */ int token_out = 0; if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) goto end; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ts_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(ts_options); for (helpp = opt_helplist; *helpp; ++helpp) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", *helpp); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_CONFIG: configfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SECTION: section = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_QUERY: case OPT_REPLY: case OPT_VERIFY: if (mode != OPT_ERR) goto opthelp; mode = o; break; case OPT_DATA: data = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DIGEST: digest = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RAND: rnd = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TSPOLICY: policy = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NO_NONCE: no_nonce = 1; break; case OPT_CERT: cert = 1; break; case OPT_IN: in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TOKEN_IN: token_in = 1; break; case OPT_OUT: out = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TOKEN_OUT: token_out = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_QUERYFILE: queryfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passin = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_INKEY: inkey = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGNER: signer = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CHAIN: chain = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_UNTRUSTED: untrusted = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: engine = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &md)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; } } if (mode == OPT_ERR || opt_num_rest() != 0) goto opthelp; /* Seed the random number generator if it is going to be used. */ if (mode == OPT_QUERY && !no_nonce) { if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && rnd == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random " "data, consider using the -rand option\n"); if (rnd != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(rnd)); } if (mode == OPT_REPLY && passin && !app_passwd(passin, NULL, &password, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password.\n"); goto end; } conf = load_config_file(configfile); if (configfile != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(conf)) goto end; /* Check parameter consistency and execute the appropriate function. */ switch (mode) { default: case OPT_ERR: goto opthelp; case OPT_QUERY: if (vpmtouched) goto opthelp; if ((data != NULL) && (digest != NULL)) goto opthelp; ret = !query_command(data, digest, md, policy, no_nonce, cert, in, out, text); break; case OPT_REPLY: if (vpmtouched) goto opthelp; if ((in != NULL) && (queryfile != NULL)) goto opthelp; if (in == NULL) { if ((conf == NULL) || (token_in != 0)) goto opthelp; } ret = !reply_command(conf, section, engine, queryfile, password, inkey, md, signer, chain, policy, in, token_in, out, token_out, text); break; case OPT_VERIFY: if ((in == NULL) || !EXACTLY_ONE(queryfile, data, digest)) goto opthelp; ret = !verify_command(data, digest, queryfile, in, token_in, CApath, CAfile, untrusted, vpmtouched ? vpm : NULL); } end: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); app_RAND_write_file(NULL); NCONF_free(conf); OPENSSL_free(password); return (ret); } /* * Configuration file-related function definitions. */ static ASN1_OBJECT *txt2obj(const char *oid) { ASN1_OBJECT *oid_obj = NULL; if ((oid_obj = OBJ_txt2obj(oid, 0)) == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot convert %s to OID\n", oid); return oid_obj; } static CONF *load_config_file(const char *configfile) { CONF *conf = app_load_config(configfile); if (conf != NULL) { const char *p; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile); p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, ENV_OID_FILE); if (p != NULL) { BIO *oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r"); if (!oid_bio) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); else { OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio); BIO_free_all(oid_bio); } } else ERR_clear_error(); if (!add_oid_section(conf)) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return conf; } /* * Query-related method definitions. */ static int query_command(const char *data, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md, const char *policy, int no_nonce, int cert, const char *in, const char *out, int text) { int ret = 0; TS_REQ *query = NULL; BIO *in_bio = NULL; BIO *data_bio = NULL; BIO *out_bio = NULL; /* Build query object. */ if (in != NULL) { if ((in_bio = bio_open_default(in, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL) goto end; query = d2i_TS_REQ_bio(in_bio, NULL); } else { if (digest == NULL && (data_bio = bio_open_default(data, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL) goto end; query = create_query(data_bio, digest, md, policy, no_nonce, cert); } if (query == NULL) goto end; if (text) { if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT)) == NULL) goto end; if (!TS_REQ_print_bio(out_bio, query)) goto end; } else { if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL) goto end; if (!i2d_TS_REQ_bio(out_bio, query)) goto end; } ret = 1; end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_free_all(in_bio); BIO_free_all(data_bio); BIO_free_all(out_bio); TS_REQ_free(query); return ret; } static TS_REQ *create_query(BIO *data_bio, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md, const char *policy, int no_nonce, int cert) { int ret = 0; TS_REQ *ts_req = NULL; int len; TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = NULL; X509_ALGOR *algo = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *policy_obj = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *nonce_asn1 = NULL; if (md == NULL && (md = EVP_get_digestbyname("sha1")) == NULL) goto err; if ((ts_req = TS_REQ_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!TS_REQ_set_version(ts_req, 1)) goto err; if ((msg_imprint = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((algo = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((algo->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md))) == NULL) goto err; if ((algo->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; algo->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL; if (!TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo(msg_imprint, algo)) goto err; if ((len = create_digest(data_bio, digest, md, &data)) == 0) goto err; if (!TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_msg(msg_imprint, data, len)) goto err; if (!TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint(ts_req, msg_imprint)) goto err; if (policy && (policy_obj = txt2obj(policy)) == NULL) goto err; if (policy_obj && !TS_REQ_set_policy_id(ts_req, policy_obj)) goto err; /* Setting nonce if requested. */ if (!no_nonce && (nonce_asn1 = create_nonce(NONCE_LENGTH)) == NULL) goto err; if (nonce_asn1 && !TS_REQ_set_nonce(ts_req, nonce_asn1)) goto err; if (!TS_REQ_set_cert_req(ts_req, cert)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { TS_REQ_free(ts_req); ts_req = NULL; BIO_printf(bio_err, "could not create query\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(msg_imprint); X509_ALGOR_free(algo); OPENSSL_free(data); ASN1_OBJECT_free(policy_obj); ASN1_INTEGER_free(nonce_asn1); return ts_req; } static int create_digest(BIO *input, const char *digest, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned char **md_value) { int md_value_len; int rv = 0; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; md_value_len = EVP_MD_size(md); if (md_value_len < 0) return 0; if (input) { unsigned char buffer[4096]; int length; md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) return 0; *md_value = app_malloc(md_value_len, "digest buffer"); if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, md)) goto err; while ((length = BIO_read(input, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buffer, length)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, *md_value, NULL)) goto err; md_value_len = EVP_MD_size(md); } else { long digest_len; *md_value = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(digest, &digest_len); if (!*md_value || md_value_len != digest_len) { OPENSSL_free(*md_value); *md_value = NULL; BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad digest, %d bytes " "must be specified\n", md_value_len); return 0; } } rv = md_value_len; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return rv; } static ASN1_INTEGER *create_nonce(int bits) { unsigned char buf[20]; ASN1_INTEGER *nonce = NULL; int len = (bits - 1) / 8 + 1; int i; if (len > (int)sizeof(buf)) goto err; if (RAND_bytes(buf, len) <= 0) goto err; /* Find the first non-zero byte and creating ASN1_INTEGER object. */ for (i = 0; i < len && !buf[i]; ++i) continue; if ((nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) goto err; OPENSSL_free(nonce->data); nonce->length = len - i; nonce->data = app_malloc(nonce->length + 1, "nonce buffer"); memcpy(nonce->data, buf + i, nonce->length); return nonce; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "could not create nonce\n"); ASN1_INTEGER_free(nonce); return NULL; } /* * Reply-related method definitions. */ static int reply_command(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine, const char *queryfile, const char *passin, const char *inkey, const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer, const char *chain, const char *policy, const char *in, int token_in, const char *out, int token_out, int text) { int ret = 0; TS_RESP *response = NULL; BIO *in_bio = NULL; BIO *query_bio = NULL; BIO *inkey_bio = NULL; BIO *signer_bio = NULL; BIO *out_bio = NULL; if (in != NULL) { if ((in_bio = BIO_new_file(in, "rb")) == NULL) goto end; if (token_in) { response = read_PKCS7(in_bio); } else { response = d2i_TS_RESP_bio(in_bio, NULL); } } else { response = create_response(conf, section, engine, queryfile, passin, inkey, md, signer, chain, policy); if (response) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response has been generated.\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response is not generated.\n"); } if (response == NULL) goto end; /* Write response. */ if (text) { if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT)) == NULL) goto end; if (token_out) { TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = TS_RESP_get_tst_info(response); if (!TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(out_bio, tst_info)) goto end; } else { if (!TS_RESP_print_bio(out_bio, response)) goto end; } } else { if ((out_bio = bio_open_default(out, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL) goto end; if (token_out) { PKCS7 *token = TS_RESP_get_token(response); if (!i2d_PKCS7_bio(out_bio, token)) goto end; } else { if (!i2d_TS_RESP_bio(out_bio, response)) goto end; } } ret = 1; end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_free_all(in_bio); BIO_free_all(query_bio); BIO_free_all(inkey_bio); BIO_free_all(signer_bio); BIO_free_all(out_bio); TS_RESP_free(response); return ret; } /* Reads a PKCS7 token and adds default 'granted' status info to it. */ static TS_RESP *read_PKCS7(BIO *in_bio) { int ret = 0; PKCS7 *token = NULL; TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = NULL; TS_RESP *resp = NULL; TS_STATUS_INFO *si = NULL; if ((token = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in_bio, NULL)) == NULL) goto end; if ((tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(token)) == NULL) goto end; if ((resp = TS_RESP_new()) == NULL) goto end; if ((si = TS_STATUS_INFO_new()) == NULL) goto end; if (!TS_STATUS_INFO_set_status(si, TS_STATUS_GRANTED)) goto end; if (!TS_RESP_set_status_info(resp, si)) goto end; TS_RESP_set_tst_info(resp, token, tst_info); token = NULL; /* Ownership is lost. */ tst_info = NULL; /* Ownership is lost. */ ret = 1; end: PKCS7_free(token); TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info); if (!ret) { TS_RESP_free(resp); resp = NULL; } TS_STATUS_INFO_free(si); return resp; } static TS_RESP *create_response(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *engine, const char *queryfile, const char *passin, const char *inkey, const EVP_MD *md, const char *signer, const char *chain, const char *policy) { int ret = 0; TS_RESP *response = NULL; BIO *query_bio = NULL; TS_RESP_CTX *resp_ctx = NULL; if ((query_bio = BIO_new_file(queryfile, "rb")) == NULL) goto end; if ((section = TS_CONF_get_tsa_section(conf, section)) == NULL) goto end; if ((resp_ctx = TS_RESP_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_serial(conf, section, serial_cb, resp_ctx)) goto end; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (!TS_CONF_set_crypto_device(conf, section, engine)) goto end; # endif if (!TS_CONF_set_signer_cert(conf, section, signer, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_certs(conf, section, chain, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_signer_key(conf, section, inkey, passin, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (md) { if (!TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(resp_ctx, md)) goto end; } else if (!TS_CONF_set_signer_digest(conf, section, NULL, resp_ctx)) { goto end; } if (!TS_CONF_set_def_policy(conf, section, policy, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_policies(conf, section, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_digests(conf, section, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_accuracy(conf, section, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_clock_precision_digits(conf, section, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_ordering(conf, section, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_tsa_name(conf, section, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_chain(conf, section, resp_ctx)) goto end; if ((response = TS_RESP_create_response(resp_ctx, query_bio)) == NULL) goto end; ret = 1; end: if (!ret) { TS_RESP_free(response); response = NULL; } TS_RESP_CTX_free(resp_ctx); BIO_free_all(query_bio); return response; } static ASN1_INTEGER *serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, void *data) { const char *serial_file = (const char *)data; ASN1_INTEGER *serial = next_serial(serial_file); if (!serial) { TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Error during serial number " "generation."); TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(ctx, TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE); } else save_ts_serial(serial_file, serial); return serial; } static ASN1_INTEGER *next_serial(const char *serialfile) { int ret = 0; BIO *in = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; if ((serial = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((in = BIO_new_file(serialfile, "r")) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: could not open file %s for " "reading, using serial number: 1\n", serialfile); if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(serial, 1)) goto err; } else { char buf[1024]; if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, serial, buf, sizeof(buf))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n", serialfile); goto err; } if ((bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL)) == NULL) goto err; ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial); serial = NULL; if (!BN_add_word(bn, 1)) goto err; if ((serial = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, NULL)) == NULL) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial); serial = NULL; } BIO_free_all(in); BN_free(bn); return serial; } static int save_ts_serial(const char *serialfile, ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { int ret = 0; BIO *out = NULL; if ((out = BIO_new_file(serialfile, "w")) == NULL) goto err; if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, serial) <= 0) goto err; if (BIO_puts(out, "\n") <= 0) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) BIO_printf(bio_err, "could not save serial number to %s\n", serialfile); BIO_free_all(out); return ret; } /* * Verify-related method definitions. */ static int verify_command(const char *data, const char *digest, const char *queryfile, const char *in, int token_in, const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, const char *untrusted, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { BIO *in_bio = NULL; PKCS7 *token = NULL; TS_RESP *response = NULL; TS_VERIFY_CTX *verify_ctx = NULL; int ret = 0; if ((in_bio = BIO_new_file(in, "rb")) == NULL) goto end; if (token_in) { if ((token = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in_bio, NULL)) == NULL) goto end; } else { if ((response = d2i_TS_RESP_bio(in_bio, NULL)) == NULL) goto end; } if ((verify_ctx = create_verify_ctx(data, digest, queryfile, CApath, CAfile, untrusted, vpm)) == NULL) goto end; ret = token_in ? TS_RESP_verify_token(verify_ctx, token) : TS_RESP_verify_response(verify_ctx, response); end: printf("Verification: "); if (ret) printf("OK\n"); else { printf("FAILED\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } BIO_free_all(in_bio); PKCS7_free(token); TS_RESP_free(response); TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(verify_ctx); return ret; } static TS_VERIFY_CTX *create_verify_ctx(const char *data, const char *digest, const char *queryfile, const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, const char *untrusted, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIO *input = NULL; TS_REQ *request = NULL; int ret = 0; int f = 0; if (data != NULL || digest != NULL) { if ((ctx = TS_VERIFY_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; f = TS_VFY_VERSION | TS_VFY_SIGNER; if (data != NULL) { BIO *out = NULL; f |= TS_VFY_DATA; if ((out = BIO_new_file(data, "rb")) == NULL) goto err; if (TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(ctx, out) == NULL) { BIO_free_all(out); goto err; } } else if (digest != NULL) { long imprint_len; unsigned char *hexstr = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(digest, &imprint_len); f |= TS_VFY_IMPRINT; if (TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(ctx, hexstr, imprint_len) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid digest string\n"); goto err; } } } else if (queryfile != NULL) { if ((input = BIO_new_file(queryfile, "rb")) == NULL) goto err; if ((request = d2i_TS_REQ_bio(input, NULL)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ctx = TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(request, NULL)) == NULL) goto err; } else return NULL; /* Add the signature verification flag and arguments. */ TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(ctx, f | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE); /* Initialising the X509_STORE object. */ if (TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, create_cert_store(CApath, CAfile, vpm)) == NULL) goto err; /* Loading untrusted certificates. */ if (untrusted && TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(ctx, TS_CONF_load_certs(untrusted)) == NULL) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; } BIO_free_all(input); TS_REQ_free(request); return ctx; } static X509_STORE *create_cert_store(const char *CApath, const char *CAfile, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { X509_STORE *cert_ctx = NULL; X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL; int i; cert_ctx = X509_STORE_new(); X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(cert_ctx, verify_cb); if (CApath != NULL) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } i = X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath); goto err; } } if (CAfile != NULL) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto err; } i = X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile); goto err; } } if (vpm != NULL) X509_STORE_set1_param(cert_ctx, vpm); return cert_ctx; err: X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx); return NULL; } static int verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ok; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TS */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/openssl-vms.cnf0000644000000000000000000002505613176625656016013 0ustar rootroot# # OpenSSL example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't # defined. HOME = . RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd # Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info: #oid_file = $ENV::HOME/.oid oid_section = new_oids # To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the # "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the # X.509v3 extensions to use: # extensions = # (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only # X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.) [ new_oids ] # We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'. # Add a simple OID like this: # testoid1=1.2.3.4 # Or use config file substitution like this: # testoid2=${testoid1}.5.6 # Policies used by the TSA examples. tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1 tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6 tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7 #################################################################### [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section #################################################################### [ CA_default ] dir = sys\$disk:[.demoCA # Where everything is kept certs = $dir.certs] # Where the issued certs are kept crl_dir = $dir.crl] # Where the issued crl are kept database = $dir]index.txt # database index file. #unique_subject = no # Set to 'no' to allow creation of # several certs with same subject. new_certs_dir = $dir.newcerts] # default place for new certs. certificate = $dir]cacert.pem # The CA certificate serial = $dir]serial. # The current serial number crlnumber = $dir]crlnumber. # the current crl number # must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL crl = $dir]crl.pem # The current CRL private_key = $dir.private]cakey.pem# The private key RANDFILE = $dir.private].rand # private random number file x509_extensions = usr_cert # The extensions to add to the cert # Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional" # (and highly broken) format. name_opt = ca_default # Subject Name options cert_opt = ca_default # Certificate field options # Extension copying option: use with caution. # copy_extensions = copy # Extensions to add to a CRL. Note: Netscape communicator chokes on V2 CRLs # so this is commented out by default to leave a V1 CRL. # crlnumber must also be commented out to leave a V1 CRL. # crl_extensions = crl_ext default_days = 365 # how long to certify for default_crl_days= 30 # how long before next CRL default_md = default # use public key default MD preserve = no # keep passed DN ordering # A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look # For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional # and supplied fields are just that :-) policy = policy_match # For the CA policy [ policy_match ] countryName = match stateOrProvinceName = match organizationName = match organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional # For the 'anything' policy # At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object' # types. [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = privkey.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name attributes = req_attributes x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert # Passwords for private keys if not present they will be prompted for # input_password = secret # output_password = secret # This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options. # default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString. # pkix : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004) # utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004). # nombstr : PrintableString, T61String (no BMPStrings or UTF8Strings). # MASK:XXXX a literal mask value. # WARNING: ancient versions of Netscape crash on BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. string_mask = utf8only # req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = AU countryName_min = 2 countryName_max = 2 stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name) stateOrProvinceName_default = Some-State localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) 0.organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) 0.organizationName_default = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-) #1.organizationName = Second Organization Name (eg, company) #1.organizationName_default = World Wide Web Pty Ltd organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) #organizationalUnitName_default = commonName = Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) commonName_max = 64 emailAddress = Email Address emailAddress_max = 64 # SET-ex3 = SET extension number 3 [ req_attributes ] challengePassword = A challenge password challengePassword_min = 4 challengePassword_max = 20 unstructuredName = An optional company name [ usr_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request. # This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software # requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA. basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted # the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing. # This is OK for an SSL server. # nsCertType = server # For an object signing certificate this would be used. # nsCertType = objsign # For normal client use this is typical # nsCertType = client, email # and for everything including object signing: # nsCertType = client, email, objsign # This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate. # keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer # This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname. # Import the email address. # subjectAltName=email:copy # An alternative to produce certificates that aren't # deprecated according to PKIX. # subjectAltName=email:move # Copy subject details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy #nsCaRevocationUrl = http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem #nsBaseUrl #nsRevocationUrl #nsRenewalUrl #nsCaPolicyUrl #nsSslServerName # This is required for TSA certificates. # extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping [ v3_req ] # Extensions to add to a certificate request basicConstraints = CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA # PKIX recommendation. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer basicConstraints = critical,CA:true # Key usage: this is typical for a CA certificate. However since it will # prevent it being used as an test self-signed certificate it is best # left out by default. # keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign # Some might want this also # nsCertType = sslCA, emailCA # Include email address in subject alt name: another PKIX recommendation # subjectAltName=email:copy # Copy issuer details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy # DER hex encoding of an extension: beware experts only! # obj=DER:02:03 # Where 'obj' is a standard or added object # You can even override a supported extension: # basicConstraints= critical, DER:30:03:01:01:FF [ crl_ext ] # CRL extensions. # Only issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in a CRL. # issuerAltName=issuer:copy authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always [ proxy_cert_ext ] # These extensions should be added when creating a proxy certificate # This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software # requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA. basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted # the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing. # This is OK for an SSL server. # nsCertType = server # For an object signing certificate this would be used. # nsCertType = objsign # For normal client use this is typical # nsCertType = client, email # and for everything including object signing: # nsCertType = client, email, objsign # This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate. # keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer # This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname. # Import the email address. # subjectAltName=email:copy # An alternative to produce certificates that aren't # deprecated according to PKIX. # subjectAltName=email:move # Copy subject details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy #nsCaRevocationUrl = http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem #nsBaseUrl #nsRevocationUrl #nsRenewalUrl #nsCaPolicyUrl #nsSslServerName # This really needs to be in place for it to be a proxy certificate. proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:3,policy:foo #################################################################### [ tsa ] default_tsa = tsa_config1 # the default TSA section [ tsa_config1 ] # These are used by the TSA reply generation only. dir = sys\$disk:[.demoCA # TSA root directory serial = $dir]tsaserial. # The current serial number (mandatory) crypto_device = builtin # OpenSSL engine to use for signing signer_cert = $dir/tsacert.pem # The TSA signing certificate # (optional) certs = $dir.cacert.pem] # Certificate chain to include in reply # (optional) signer_key = $dir/private/tsakey.pem # The TSA private key (optional) signer_digest = sha256 # Signing digest to use. (Optional) default_policy = tsa_policy1 # Policy if request did not specify it # (optional) other_policies = tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3 # acceptable policies (optional) digests = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 # Acceptable message digests (mandatory) accuracy = secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100 # (optional) clock_precision_digits = 0 # number of digits after dot. (optional) ordering = yes # Is ordering defined for timestamps? # (optional, default: no) tsa_name = yes # Must the TSA name be included in the reply? # (optional, default: no) ess_cert_id_chain = no # Must the ESS cert id chain be included? # (optional, default: no) openssl-1.1.0g/apps/testdsa.h0000644000000000000000000003122113176625656014644 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* used by speed.c */ DSA *get_dsa512(void); DSA *get_dsa1024(void); DSA *get_dsa2048(void); static unsigned char dsa512_priv[] = { 0x65, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x38, 0x60, 0x24, 0xb5, 0x89, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x7a, 0x22, 0xbd, 0xd1, 0xc2, 0xd2, }; static unsigned char dsa512_pub[] = { 0x00, 0x95, 0xa7, 0x0d, 0xec, 0x93, 0x68, 0xba, 0x5f, 0xf7, 0x5f, 0x07, 0xf2, 0x3b, 0xad, 0x6b, 0x01, 0xdc, 0xbe, 0xec, 0xde, 0x04, 0x7a, 0x3a, 0x27, 0xb3, 0xec, 0x49, 0xfd, 0x08, 0x43, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0xa8, 0x2c, 0x5e, 0x7b, 0xbb, 0xfc, 0xf4, 0x6e, 0xeb, 0x6c, 0xb0, 0x6e, 0xf8, 0x02, 0x12, 0x8c, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x83, 0x56, 0x7d, 0xee, 0x53, 0x05, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x84, 0xbe, 0xba, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xc8, }; static unsigned char dsa512_p[] = { 0x9D, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x8E, 0x26, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x11, 0x70, 0x19, 0x86, 0xF6, 0x19, 0xC8, 0xF8, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x18, 0x53, 0x94, 0x46, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x62, 0x50, 0x33, 0x4B, 0x02, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x30, 0x03, 0x8B, 0x3B, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x06, 0x4F, 0x7B, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x40, 0x9B, 0xFD, 0x96, 0xE4, 0x37, 0x33, 0xBB, 0x2D, 0x5A, 0xD7, 0x5A, 0x11, 0x40, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x76, 0x7D, 0x31, }; static unsigned char dsa512_q[] = { 0xFB, 0x53, 0xEF, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x40, 0x92, 0x31, 0x56, 0x86, 0x53, 0x7A, 0xE8, 0x8B, 0x22, 0x9A, 0x49, 0xFB, 0x71, 0x8F, }; static unsigned char dsa512_g[] = { 0x83, 0x3E, 0x88, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x89, 0x73, 0xCE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x01, 0x49, 0xBF, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x9F, 0x0A, 0xEA, 0x44, 0x91, 0xE5, 0x30, 0xAA, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x5B, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0x10, 0xD7, 0x89, 0xB7, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x29, 0x1E, 0xEB, 0xA8, 0x2C, 0x54, 0x51, 0xB8, 0x10, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xCE, 0x2F, 0xCC, 0x24, 0x6B, 0x90, 0x77, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0x68, 0xA6, 0x52, 0x12, 0xA2, 0x03, 0x9D, 0x20, }; DSA *get_dsa512() { DSA *dsa; BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key, *p, *q, *g; if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); priv_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_priv, sizeof(dsa512_priv), NULL); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_pub, sizeof(dsa512_pub), NULL); p = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_p, sizeof(dsa512_p), NULL); q = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_q, sizeof(dsa512_q), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(dsa512_g, sizeof(dsa512_g), NULL); if ((priv_key == NULL) || (pub_key == NULL) || (p == NULL) || (q == NULL) || (g == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, p, q, g)) goto err; p = q = g = NULL; if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key)) goto err; return dsa; err: DSA_free(dsa); BN_free(priv_key); BN_free(pub_key); BN_free(p); BN_free(q); BN_free(g); return NULL; } static unsigned char dsa1024_priv[] = { 0x7d, 0x21, 0xda, 0xbb, 0x62, 0x15, 0x47, 0x36, 0x07, 0x67, 0x12, 0xe8, 0x8c, 0xaa, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0x38, 0x12, 0x61, 0x18, }; static unsigned char dsa1024_pub[] = { 0x3c, 0x4e, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x7f, 0x16, 0xc1, 0x25, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x78, 0x63, 0x90, 0x14, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0xf4, 0x68, 0x43, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0xee, 0x65, 0x50, 0x7d, 0x9c, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x8a, 0x51, 0xd6, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x99, 0xaf, 0x1e, 0x90, 0x97, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0xa6, 0x20, 0x25, 0xd6, 0xfe, 0x43, 0x02, 0xd5, 0x91, 0x7d, 0xa7, 0x8c, 0xdb, 0xc9, 0x85, 0xa3, 0x36, 0x48, 0xf7, 0x68, 0xaa, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xf7, 0x05, 0x68, 0x3a, 0xa3, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0x19, 0x82, 0xd8, 0x82, 0x7a, 0x77, 0xfb, 0xef, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x06, 0x04, 0x7f, 0x53, 0x07, 0x0c, 0xbc, 0xcb, 0x2d, 0x83, 0xdb, 0x3e, 0xd1, 0x28, 0xa5, 0xa1, 0x31, 0xe0, 0x67, 0xfa, 0x50, 0xde, 0x9b, 0x07, 0x83, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0x0b, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x50, 0x61, 0xe5, 0xad, 0xbd, 0x36, 0xb8, 0x97, 0x4e, 0x40, 0x7d, 0xe8, 0x83, 0x0d, 0xbc, 0x4b }; static unsigned char dsa1024_p[] = { 0xA7, 0x3F, 0x6E, 0x85, 0xBF, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x7D, 0xF0, 0x9F, 0x47, 0x19, 0x30, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x09, 0x1D, 0xDA, 0x6A, 0x33, 0x1E, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x86, 0x96, 0xB3, 0x15, 0xE0, 0x53, 0x2E, 0x8F, 0xE0, 0x59, 0x82, 0x73, 0x90, 0x3E, 0x75, 0x31, 0x99, 0x47, 0x7A, 0x52, 0xFB, 0x85, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xA6, 0x7B, 0x38, 0x9B, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x84, 0x9B, 0x87, 0xC6, 0x1E, 0xB5, 0x7E, 0x86, 0x4B, 0x53, 0x5B, 0x59, 0xCF, 0x71, 0x65, 0x19, 0x88, 0x6E, 0xCE, 0x66, 0xAE, 0x6B, 0x88, 0x36, 0xFB, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xDC, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0xBB, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0x39, 0x26, 0x4B, 0xDA, 0x9A, 0x70, 0x18, 0x95, 0x37, 0x95, 0x10, 0x56, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x15, 0xED, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x5E, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4F, 0xFD, 0xB7, 0x43, 0x1F, 0xB5, 0xA4, 0x65, 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x11, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x95, 0x5B, 0x50, 0xCD, 0x49, }; static unsigned char dsa1024_q[] = { 0xF7, 0x07, 0x31, 0xED, 0xFA, 0x6C, 0x06, 0x03, 0xD5, 0x85, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0xAC, 0x9C, 0x65, 0xE7, 0x50, 0x66, 0x65, 0x6F, }; static unsigned char dsa1024_g[] = { 0x4D, 0xDF, 0x4C, 0x03, 0xA6, 0x91, 0x8A, 0xF5, 0x19, 0x6F, 0x50, 0x46, 0x25, 0x99, 0xE5, 0x68, 0x6F, 0x30, 0xE3, 0x69, 0xE1, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0x5D, 0x98, 0xBB, 0x28, 0x86, 0x48, 0xFC, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x04, 0x3F, 0x5F, 0x88, 0x0C, 0x9C, 0x73, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xB9, 0x2A, 0x9A, 0x3F, 0x18, 0x96, 0x27, 0xE4, 0x62, 0x87, 0xC1, 0x7B, 0x74, 0x62, 0x53, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x27, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0x91, 0x09, 0x9D, 0xB6, 0xF1, 0x4D, 0x9C, 0x54, 0x0F, 0x58, 0x06, 0xEE, 0x49, 0x74, 0x07, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x7E, 0x23, 0xCE, 0x16, 0xF6, 0xCA, 0xDC, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x01, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x71, 0xB5, 0x4D, 0xF6, 0xDC, 0x34, 0x29, 0x87, 0x68, 0xF6, 0x5E, 0x20, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xDB, 0xF5, 0xE4, 0x09, 0x6C, 0x41, 0x17, 0x95, 0x92, 0xEB, 0x01, 0xB5, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x6A, 0x7E, 0xD8, 0x32, 0xED, 0x0E, 0x02, 0xB8, }; DSA *get_dsa1024() { DSA *dsa; BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key, *p, *q, *g; if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); priv_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_priv, sizeof(dsa1024_priv), NULL); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_pub, sizeof(dsa1024_pub), NULL); p = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_p, sizeof(dsa1024_p), NULL); q = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_q, sizeof(dsa1024_q), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(dsa1024_g, sizeof(dsa1024_g), NULL); if ((priv_key == NULL) || (pub_key == NULL) || (p == NULL) || (q == NULL) || (g == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, p, q, g)) goto err; p = q = g = NULL; if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key)) goto err; return dsa; err: DSA_free(dsa); BN_free(priv_key); BN_free(pub_key); BN_free(p); BN_free(q); BN_free(g); return NULL; } static unsigned char dsa2048_priv[] = { 0x32, 0x67, 0x92, 0xf6, 0xc4, 0xe2, 0xe2, 0xe8, 0xa0, 0x8b, 0x6b, 0x45, 0x0c, 0x8a, 0x76, 0xb0, 0xee, 0xcf, 0x91, 0xa7, }; static unsigned char dsa2048_pub[] = { 0x17, 0x8f, 0xa8, 0x11, 0x84, 0x92, 0xec, 0x83, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x5a, 0x20, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x64, 0x79, 0xd2, 0xd0, 0x3d, 0xcd, 0xe0, 0x61, 0x88, 0x88, 0x21, 0xcc, 0x74, 0x5d, 0xce, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0x5c, 0x4c, 0x82, 0x7a, 0xaf, 0x72, 0xad, 0xb9, 0xe0, 0x53, 0xf2, 0x78, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0x48, 0x7f, 0x8a, 0x3a, 0x18, 0xd1, 0x9f, 0x8b, 0x7d, 0xa5, 0x47, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xab, 0x98, 0xf8, 0x7b, 0x74, 0x50, 0x56, 0x8e, 0x57, 0xf0, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0xba, 0xab, 0x85, 0x86, 0xf9, 0x2b, 0xef, 0x41, 0x56, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0x9f, 0xb7, 0x38, 0x00, 0x46, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x1f, 0xd8, 0x4e, 0x85, 0x44, 0x92, 0x43, 0x21, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0xcc, 0xc2, 0xcb, 0x26, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x21, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0x8d, 0x24, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0x18, 0x19, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0xf1, 0xe7, 0x93, 0x50, 0x48, 0x03, 0x2c, 0xae, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x49, 0x88, 0x5f, 0x93, 0x57, 0x27, 0x99, 0x36, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xab, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xd7, 0xd4, 0x34, 0x9d, 0x96, 0x50, 0x58, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x54, 0xf3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0x63, 0x14, 0xee, 0x85, 0x83, 0x74, 0x76, 0xe1, 0x52, 0x95, 0xc3, 0xf7, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x04, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0x28, 0x1b, 0xcc, 0xea, 0x4a, 0x4e, 0x84, 0xda, 0xd8, 0x9c, 0x79, 0xd8, 0x9b, 0x66, 0x89, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0xac, 0xd7, 0x79, 0xf9, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0x45, 0x13, 0x78, 0xb9, 0x00, 0x14, 0xc9, 0x7e, 0x22, 0x51, 0x86, 0x67, 0xb0, 0x9f, 0x26, 0x11, 0x23, 0xc8, 0x38, 0xd7, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x15, 0x8e, 0x4d, 0x4f, 0x95, 0x97, 0x40, 0xa1, 0xc2, 0x7e, 0x01, 0x18, 0x72, 0xf4, 0x10, 0xe6, 0x8d, 0x52, 0x16, 0x7f, 0xf2, 0xc9, 0xf8, 0x33, 0x8b, 0x33, 0xb7, 0xce, }; static unsigned char dsa2048_p[] = { 0xA0, 0x25, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xF4, 0x8E, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x99, 0xF3, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0x83, 0x34, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xCF, 0x6F, 0xBF, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x81, 0xEB, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x13, 0xD9, 0xA0, 0x5D, 0x8B, 0x5C, 0x8E, 0xDC, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x0B, 0x41, 0x32, 0xB0, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0xEF, 0x0C, 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x5C, 0x28, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xF5, 0xB1, 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x4C, 0x19, 0x4E, 0xFF, 0x02, 0x4B, 0x92, 0xED, 0xD2, 0x07, 0x11, 0x4D, 0x8C, 0x58, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x55, 0x8E, 0xAD, 0xA3, 0x67, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x86, 0x6E, 0x0B, 0xE6, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x40, 0xAE, 0x0E, 0x67, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x12, 0x5B, 0x3C, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x67, 0x86, 0x69, 0xE7, 0x0A, 0x94, 0x40, 0xBF, 0x8B, 0x76, 0xFE, 0x26, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xA1, 0x1A, 0x84, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x56, 0x28, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x5F, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x89, 0x8A, 0x36, 0x2C, 0x51, 0xDF, 0x12, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x57, 0x7B, 0xA0, 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x7F, 0xA1, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x40, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x1A, 0x8F, 0x0D, 0x38, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x5D, 0x18, 0xFC, 0x0F, 0x46, 0xF7, 0xA3, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0x23, 0xC3, 0xD2, 0xC7, 0x72, 0x51, 0x18, 0xDF, 0x46, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD9, 0xBD, 0xB5, 0x19, 0x02, 0x2C, 0x87, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x82, 0x7E, 0xF1, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x3D, 0x00, 0xA5, 0x7B, 0x6B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x91, 0x0F, 0x6A, 0x77, 0xE4, 0xD5, 0x04, 0xE4, 0x12, 0x2C, 0x42, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBB, 0xD3, 0x92, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0xC8, 0x51, 0x64, 0x14, 0x5C, 0xD8, 0xF9, 0x6C, 0x47, 0x82, 0xB4, 0x1C, 0x7F, 0x09, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x25, 0x83, 0x1D, 0x3F, 0x3F, 0x05, 0xB3, 0x21, 0x0A, 0x5D, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xC3, 0x65, 0x7D, 0xC3, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xBF, 0xAE, 0xF8, 0x68, 0xCF, 0x9B, }; static unsigned char dsa2048_q[] = { 0x97, 0xE7, 0x33, 0x4D, 0xD3, 0x94, 0x3E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 0x62, 0x74, 0xC6, 0xA1, 0x08, 0xDD, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x75, 0x17, 0x1B, }; static unsigned char dsa2048_g[] = { 0x2C, 0x78, 0x16, 0x59, 0x34, 0x63, 0xF4, 0xF3, 0x92, 0xFC, 0xB5, 0xA5, 0x4F, 0x13, 0xDE, 0x2F, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0x3C, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x38, 0x3F, 0x7E, 0x90, 0xBF, 0x96, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x25, 0x90, 0x72, 0xF5, 0x8E, 0x80, 0x0C, 0x39, 0x1C, 0xD9, 0xEC, 0xBA, 0x90, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x9E, 0x30, 0x42, 0x37, 0x02, 0x31, 0x82, 0xBC, 0x6A, 0xDF, 0x6A, 0x09, 0x29, 0xE3, 0xC0, 0x46, 0xD1, 0xCB, 0x85, 0xEC, 0x0C, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xEA, 0xC8, 0x39, 0x8E, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x22, 0x10, 0xD2, 0x34, 0x61, 0x68, 0x37, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4A, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0xF5, 0xC1, 0x48, 0xC6, 0xF6, 0xDC, 0x63, 0x1A, 0xD3, 0x96, 0x64, 0xBA, 0x34, 0xC9, 0xD1, 0xA0, 0xD1, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x17, 0x93, 0x14, 0x43, 0xED, 0xF0, 0x21, 0x30, 0x19, 0xC3, 0x1B, 0x5F, 0xDE, 0xA3, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x78, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0x2E, 0x00, 0xA5, 0xE4, 0xB3, 0x17, 0xC8, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x6E, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xB7, 0x46, 0x00, 0x36, 0x4D, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xAA, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x89, 0x40, 0xBF, 0x1D, 0x84, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x75, 0xF3, 0x87, 0x1D, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xA6, 0xD1, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0x1E, 0x12, 0x1E, 0xE1, 0xC7, 0x30, 0x28, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x85, 0x96, 0x2B, 0x6F, 0xDB, 0x80, 0x66, 0x26, 0xAE, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xC7, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x9A, 0xED, 0xE4, 0xCA, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x3B, 0x72, 0xEF, 0xDC, 0x87, 0xED, 0x0D, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x22, 0x64, 0x59, 0x69, 0x4E, 0x8E, 0xBF, 0x43, 0xDC, 0xAB, 0x8E, 0x66, 0xBB, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0x9F, 0x36, 0xC1, 0xA0, 0x29, 0x99, 0xD1, 0x96, 0x70, 0x59, 0x06, 0x78, 0x35, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x55, 0x52, 0x9E, 0xF8, 0xB2, 0xE5, 0x38, }; DSA *get_dsa2048() { DSA *dsa; BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key, *p, *q, *g; if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); priv_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_priv, sizeof(dsa2048_priv), NULL); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_pub, sizeof(dsa2048_pub), NULL); p = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_p, sizeof(dsa2048_p), NULL); q = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_q, sizeof(dsa2048_q), NULL); g = BN_bin2bn(dsa2048_g, sizeof(dsa2048_g), NULL); if ((priv_key == NULL) || (pub_key == NULL) || (p == NULL) || (q == NULL) || (g == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, p, q, g)) goto err; p = q = g = NULL; if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, pub_key, priv_key)) goto err; return dsa; err: DSA_free(dsa); BN_free(priv_key); BN_free(pub_key); BN_free(p); BN_free(q); BN_free(g); return NULL; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/sess_id.c0000644000000000000000000001252013176625656014622 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_CERT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_CONTEXT } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS sess_id_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format - default PEM (PEM, DER or NSS)"}, {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input file - default stdin"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, 's', "Output file - default stdout"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print ssl session id details"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '-', "Output certificate "}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output the encoded session info"}, {"context", OPT_CONTEXT, 's', "Set the session ID context"}, {NULL} }; static SSL_SESSION *load_sess_id(char *file, int format); int sess_id_main(int argc, char **argv) { SSL_SESSION *x = NULL; X509 *peer = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *context = NULL, *prog; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM; int cert = 0, noout = 0, text = 0, ret = 1, i, num = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, sess_id_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(sess_id_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_NSS, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TEXT: text = ++num; break; case OPT_CERT: cert = ++num; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = ++num; break; case OPT_CONTEXT: context = opt_arg(); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; x = load_sess_id(infile, informat); if (x == NULL) { goto end; } peer = SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(x); if (context) { size_t ctx_len = strlen(context); if (ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Context too long\n"); goto end; } if (!SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(x, (unsigned char *)context, ctx_len)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting id context\n"); goto end; } } if (!noout || text) { out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; } if (text) { SSL_SESSION_print(out, x); if (cert) { if (peer == NULL) BIO_puts(out, "No certificate present\n"); else X509_print(out, peer); } } if (!noout && !cert) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(out, x); else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) i = PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(out, x); else if (outformat == FORMAT_NSS) i = SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(out, x); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; } if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write SSL_SESSION\n"); goto end; } } else if (!noout && (peer != NULL)) { /* just print the certificate */ if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = (int)i2d_X509_bio(out, peer); else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, peer); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; } if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509\n"); goto end; } } ret = 0; end: BIO_free_all(out); SSL_SESSION_free(x); return (ret); } static SSL_SESSION *load_sess_id(char *infile, int format) { SSL_SESSION *x = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', format); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) x = d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(in, NULL); else x = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (x == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load SSL_SESSION\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } end: BIO_free(in); return (x); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/build.info0000644000000000000000000000220313176625656014776 0ustar rootroot{- our $tsget_name = $config{target} =~ /^(VC|vms)-/ ? "tsget.pl" : "tsget"; our @apps_openssl_src = ( qw(openssl.c asn1pars.c ca.c ciphers.c cms.c crl.c crl2p7.c dgst.c dhparam.c dsa.c dsaparam.c ec.c ecparam.c enc.c engine.c errstr.c gendsa.c genpkey.c genrsa.c nseq.c ocsp.c passwd.c pkcs12.c pkcs7.c pkcs8.c pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c prime.c rand.c req.c rsa.c rsautl.c s_client.c s_server.c s_time.c sess_id.c smime.c speed.c spkac.c srp.c ts.c verify.c version.c x509.c rehash.c apps.c opt.c s_cb.c s_socket.c app_rand.c), split(/\s+/, $target{apps_aux_src}) ); "" -} IF[{- !$disabled{apps} -}] PROGRAMS=openssl SOURCE[openssl]={- join(" ", @apps_openssl_src) -} INCLUDE[openssl]=.. ../include DEPEND[openssl]=../libssl {- join("\n ", map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.c$|.o|; "DEPEND[$x]=progs.h" } @apps_openssl_src) -} GENERATE[progs.h]=progs.pl $(APPS_OPENSSL) DEPEND[progs.h]=../configdata.pm SCRIPTS=CA.pl {- $tsget_name -} SOURCE[CA.pl]=CA.pl.in SOURCE[{- $tsget_name -}]=tsget.in ENDIF openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pkeyparam.c0000644000000000000000000000520613176625656015165 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_ENGINE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS pkeyparam_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print parameters as text"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output encoded parameters"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int pkeyparam_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int text = 0, noout = 0, ret = 1; OPTION_CHOICE o; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkeyparam_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(pkeyparam_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_PEM); if (in == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_PEM); if (out == NULL) goto end; pkey = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(in, NULL); if (!pkey) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!noout) PEM_write_bio_Parameters(out, pkey); if (text) EVP_PKEY_print_params(out, pkey, 0, NULL); ret = 0; end: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); release_engine(e); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free(in); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/openssl.c0000644000000000000000000004252313176625656014662 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # include #endif #define USE_SOCKETS /* needed for the _O_BINARY defs in the MS world */ #include "s_apps.h" /* Needed to get the other O_xxx flags. */ #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include #endif #define INCLUDE_FUNCTION_TABLE #include "apps.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA # define FORMAT "%-15s" # define COLUMNS 5 #else # define FORMAT "%-18s" # define COLUMNS 4 #endif /* Special sentinel to exit the program. */ #define EXIT_THE_PROGRAM (-1) /* * The LHASH callbacks ("hash" & "cmp") have been replaced by functions with * the base prototypes (we cast each variable inside the function to the * required type of "FUNCTION*"). This removes the necessity for * macro-generated wrapper functions. */ static LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog_init(void); static int do_cmd(LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog, int argc, char *argv[]); static void list_pkey(void); static void list_type(FUNC_TYPE ft); static void list_disabled(void); char *default_config_file = NULL; BIO *bio_in = NULL; BIO *bio_out = NULL; BIO *bio_err = NULL; static int apps_startup() { #ifdef SIGPIPE signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); #endif /* Set non-default library initialisation settings */ if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL)) return 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI setup_ui_method(); #endif return 1; } static void apps_shutdown() { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI destroy_ui_method(); #endif } static char *make_config_name() { const char *t; size_t len; char *p; if ((t = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF")) != NULL) return OPENSSL_strdup(t); t = X509_get_default_cert_area(); len = strlen(t) + 1 + strlen(OPENSSL_CONF) + 1; p = app_malloc(len, "config filename buffer"); strcpy(p, t); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS strcat(p, "/"); #endif strcat(p, OPENSSL_CONF); return p; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { FUNCTION f, *fp; LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog = NULL; char **copied_argv = NULL; char *p, *pname; char buf[1024]; const char *prompt; ARGS arg; int first, n, i, ret = 0; arg.argv = NULL; arg.size = 0; /* Set up some of the environment. */ default_config_file = make_config_name(); bio_in = dup_bio_in(FORMAT_TEXT); bio_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); bio_err = dup_bio_err(FORMAT_TEXT); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) copied_argv = argv = copy_argv(&argc, argv); #elif defined(_WIN32) /* * Replace argv[] with UTF-8 encoded strings. */ win32_utf8argv(&argc, &argv); #endif p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); if (getenv("OPENSSL_FIPS")) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 1; } #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "FIPS mode not supported.\n"); return 1; #endif } if (!apps_startup()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "FATAL: Startup failure (dev note: apps_startup() failed)\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto end; } prog = prog_init(); pname = opt_progname(argv[0]); /* first check the program name */ f.name = pname; fp = lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f); if (fp != NULL) { argv[0] = pname; ret = fp->func(argc, argv); goto end; } /* If there is stuff on the command line, run with that. */ if (argc != 1) { argc--; argv++; ret = do_cmd(prog, argc, argv); if (ret < 0) ret = 0; goto end; } /* ok, lets enter interactive mode */ for (;;) { ret = 0; /* Read a line, continue reading if line ends with \ */ for (p = buf, n = sizeof buf, i = 0, first = 1; n > 0; first = 0) { prompt = first ? "OpenSSL> " : "> "; p[0] = '\0'; #ifndef READLINE fputs(prompt, stdout); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(p, n, stdin)) goto end; if (p[0] == '\0') goto end; i = strlen(p); if (i <= 1) break; if (p[i - 2] != '\\') break; i -= 2; p += i; n -= i; #else { extern char *readline(const char *); extern void add_history(const char *cp); char *text; text = readline(prompt); if (text == NULL) goto end; i = strlen(text); if (i == 0 || i > n) break; if (text[i - 1] != '\\') { p += strlen(strcpy(p, text)); free(text); add_history(buf); break; } text[i - 1] = '\0'; p += strlen(strcpy(p, text)); free(text); n -= i; } #endif } if (!chopup_args(&arg, buf)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse (no memory?)\n"); break; } ret = do_cmd(prog, arg.argc, arg.argv); if (ret == EXIT_THE_PROGRAM) { ret = 0; goto end; } if (ret != 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "error in %s\n", arg.argv[0]); (void)BIO_flush(bio_out); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); } ret = 1; end: OPENSSL_free(copied_argv); OPENSSL_free(default_config_file); lh_FUNCTION_free(prog); OPENSSL_free(arg.argv); BIO_free(bio_in); BIO_free_all(bio_out); apps_shutdown(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0) ret = 1; #endif BIO_free(bio_err); EXIT(ret); } OPTIONS exit_options[] = { {NULL} }; static void list_cipher_fn(const EVP_CIPHER *c, const char *from, const char *to, void *arg) { if (c) BIO_printf(arg, "%s\n", EVP_CIPHER_name(c)); else { if (!from) from = ""; if (!to) to = ""; BIO_printf(arg, "%s => %s\n", from, to); } } static void list_md_fn(const EVP_MD *m, const char *from, const char *to, void *arg) { if (m) BIO_printf(arg, "%s\n", EVP_MD_name(m)); else { if (!from) from = ""; if (!to) to = ""; BIO_printf((BIO *)arg, "%s => %s\n", from, to); } } /* Unified enum for help and list commands. */ typedef enum HELPLIST_CHOICE { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_COMMANDS, OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS, OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS, OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS, OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS, OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS, OPT_DISABLED } HELPLIST_CHOICE; OPTIONS list_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"commands", OPT_COMMANDS, '-', "List of standard commands"}, {"digest-commands", OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS, '-', "List of message digest commands"}, {"digest-algorithms", OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS, '-', "List of message digest algorithms"}, {"cipher-commands", OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS, '-', "List of cipher commands"}, {"cipher-algorithms", OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS, '-', "List of cipher algorithms"}, {"public-key-algorithms", OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS, '-', "List of public key algorithms"}, {"disabled", OPT_DISABLED, '-', "List of disabled features"}, {NULL} }; int list_main(int argc, char **argv) { char *prog; HELPLIST_CHOICE o; int done = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, list_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: /* Never hit, but suppresses warning */ case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); return 1; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(list_options); break; case OPT_COMMANDS: list_type(FT_general); break; case OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS: list_type(FT_md); break; case OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS: EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(list_md_fn, bio_out); break; case OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS: list_type(FT_cipher); break; case OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS: EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(list_cipher_fn, bio_out); break; case OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS: list_pkey(); break; case OPT_DISABLED: list_disabled(); break; } done = 1; } if (!done) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); return 1; } return 0; } OPTIONS help_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {NULL} }; int help_main(int argc, char **argv) { FUNCTION *fp; int i, nl; FUNC_TYPE tp; char *prog; HELPLIST_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, help_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { default: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); return 1; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(help_options); return 0; } } if (opt_num_rest() != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: %s\n", prog); return 1; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nStandard commands"); i = 0; tp = FT_none; for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++) { nl = 0; if (((i++) % COLUMNS) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); nl = 1; } if (fp->type != tp) { tp = fp->type; if (!nl) BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (tp == FT_md) { i = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nMessage Digest commands (see the `dgst' command for more details)\n"); } else if (tp == FT_cipher) { i = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nCipher commands (see the `enc' command for more details)\n"); } } BIO_printf(bio_err, FORMAT, fp->name); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\n"); return 0; } int exit_main(int argc, char **argv) { return EXIT_THE_PROGRAM; } static void list_type(FUNC_TYPE ft) { FUNCTION *fp; int i = 0; for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++) if (fp->type == ft) { if ((i++ % COLUMNS) == 0) BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); BIO_printf(bio_out, FORMAT, fp->name); } BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); } static int do_cmd(LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog, int argc, char *argv[]) { FUNCTION f, *fp; if (argc <= 0 || argv[0] == NULL) return (0); f.name = argv[0]; fp = lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f); if (fp == NULL) { if (EVP_get_digestbyname(argv[0])) { f.type = FT_md; f.func = dgst_main; fp = &f; } else if (EVP_get_cipherbyname(argv[0])) { f.type = FT_cipher; f.func = enc_main; fp = &f; } } if (fp != NULL) { return (fp->func(argc, argv)); } if ((strncmp(argv[0], "no-", 3)) == 0) { /* * User is asking if foo is unsupported, by trying to "run" the * no-foo command. Strange. */ f.name = argv[0] + 3; if (lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", argv[0]); return (0); } BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", argv[0] + 3); return 1; } if (strcmp(argv[0], "quit") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "q") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "exit") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "bye") == 0) /* Special value to mean "exit the program. */ return EXIT_THE_PROGRAM; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid command '%s'; type \"help\" for a list.\n", argv[0]); return (1); } static void list_pkey(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; int pkey_id, pkey_base_id, pkey_flags; const char *pinfo, *pem_str; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i); EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, &pkey_base_id, &pkey_flags, &pinfo, &pem_str, ameth); if (pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "Name: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_id)); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tAlias for: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_base_id)); } else { BIO_printf(bio_out, "Name: %s\n", pinfo); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tType: %s Algorithm\n", pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC ? "External" : "Builtin"); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tOID: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_id)); if (pem_str == NULL) pem_str = "(none)"; BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tPEM string: %s\n", pem_str); } } } static int function_cmp(const FUNCTION * a, const FUNCTION * b) { return strncmp(a->name, b->name, 8); } static unsigned long function_hash(const FUNCTION * a) { return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->name); } static int SortFnByName(const void *_f1, const void *_f2) { const FUNCTION *f1 = _f1; const FUNCTION *f2 = _f2; if (f1->type != f2->type) return f1->type - f2->type; return strcmp(f1->name, f2->name); } static void list_disabled(void) { BIO_puts(bio_out, "Disabled algorithms:\n"); #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BF BIO_puts(bio_out, "BF\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "BLAKE2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA BIO_puts(bio_out, "CAMELLIA\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAST BIO_puts(bio_out, "CAST\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC BIO_puts(bio_out, "CMAC\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS BIO_puts(bio_out, "CMS\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP BIO_puts(bio_out, "COMP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES BIO_puts(bio_out, "DES\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM BIO_puts(bio_out, "DGRAM\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIO_puts(bio_out, "DH\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA BIO_puts(bio_out, "DSA\n"); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS) BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS\n"); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1) BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS1\n"); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2) BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS1_2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC BIO_puts(bio_out, "EC\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M BIO_puts(bio_out, "EC2M\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_puts(bio_out, "ENGINE\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_GOST BIO_puts(bio_out, "GOST\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS BIO_puts(bio_out, "HEARTBEATS\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA BIO_puts(bio_out, "IDEA\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD4\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD5\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MDC2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCB BIO_puts(bio_out, "OCB\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP BIO_puts(bio_out, "OCSP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK BIO_puts(bio_out, "PSK\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC4\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC5\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RMD160\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA BIO_puts(bio_out, "RSA\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT BIO_puts(bio_out, "SCRYPT\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP BIO_puts(bio_out, "SCTP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SEED BIO_puts(bio_out, "SEED\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO_puts(bio_out, "SOCK\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP BIO_puts(bio_out, "SRP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP BIO_puts(bio_out, "SRTP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 BIO_puts(bio_out, "SSL3\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1_1\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1_2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL BIO_puts(bio_out, "WHIRLPOOL\n"); #endif #ifndef ZLIB BIO_puts(bio_out, "ZLIB\n"); #endif } static LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog_init(void) { LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *ret; FUNCTION *f; size_t i; /* Sort alphabetically within category. For nicer help displays. */ for (i = 0, f = functions; f->name != NULL; ++f, ++i) ; qsort(functions, i, sizeof(*functions), SortFnByName); if ((ret = lh_FUNCTION_new(function_hash, function_cmp)) == NULL) return (NULL); for (f = functions; f->name != NULL; f++) (void)lh_FUNCTION_insert(ret, f); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dgst.c0000644000000000000000000003525413176625656014143 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #undef BUFSIZE #define BUFSIZE 1024*8 int do_fp(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, BIO *bp, int sep, int binout, EVP_PKEY *key, unsigned char *sigin, int siglen, const char *sig_name, const char *md_name, const char *file); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_C, OPT_R, OPT_RAND, OPT_OUT, OPT_SIGN, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_PRVERIFY, OPT_SIGNATURE, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, OPT_HEX, OPT_BINARY, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT, OPT_HMAC, OPT_MAC, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_MACOPT, OPT_DIGEST } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS dgst_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] [file...]\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " file... files to digest (default is stdin)\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"c", OPT_C, '-', "Print the digest with separating colons"}, {"r", OPT_R, '-', "Print the digest in coreutils format"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Use file(s) containing random data to seed RNG or an EGD sock"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output to filename rather than stdout"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"sign", OPT_SIGN, 's', "Sign digest using private key"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 's', "Verify a signature using public key"}, {"prverify", OPT_PRVERIFY, 's', "Verify a signature using private key"}, {"signature", OPT_SIGNATURE, '<', "File with signature to verify"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"}, {"hex", OPT_HEX, '-', "Print as hex dump"}, {"binary", OPT_BINARY, '-', "Print in binary form"}, {"d", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"}, {"fips-fingerprint", OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT, '-', "Compute HMAC with the key used in OpenSSL-FIPS fingerprint"}, {"hmac", OPT_HMAC, 's', "Create hashed MAC with key"}, {"mac", OPT_MAC, 's', "Create MAC (not necessarily HMAC)"}, {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"}, {"macopt", OPT_MACOPT, 's', "MAC algorithm parameters in n:v form or key"}, {"", OPT_DIGEST, '-', "Any supported digest"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, {"engine_impl", OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, '-', "Also use engine given by -engine for digest operations"}, #endif {NULL} }; int dgst_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *inp, *bmd = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL, *impl = NULL; EVP_PKEY *sigkey = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL, *macopts = NULL; char *hmac_key = NULL; char *mac_name = NULL; char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *m; const char *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *prog = NULL; const char *sigfile = NULL, *randfile = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int separator = 0, debug = 0, keyform = FORMAT_PEM, siglen = 0; int i, ret = 1, out_bin = -1, want_pub = 0, do_verify = 0; unsigned char *buf = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; int engine_impl = 0; prog = opt_progname(argv[0]); buf = app_malloc(BUFSIZE, "I/O buffer"); md = EVP_get_digestbyname(prog); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dgst_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(dgst_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_C: separator = 1; break; case OPT_R: separator = 2; break; case OPT_RAND: randfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGN: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFY: keyfile = opt_arg(); want_pub = do_verify = 1; break; case OPT_PRVERIFY: keyfile = opt_arg(); do_verify = 1; break; case OPT_SIGNATURE: sigfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_ENGINE_IMPL: engine_impl = 1; break; case OPT_HEX: out_bin = 0; break; case OPT_BINARY: out_bin = 1; break; case OPT_DEBUG: debug = 1; break; case OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT: hmac_key = "etaonrishdlcupfm"; break; case OPT_HMAC: hmac_key = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MAC: mac_name = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGOPT: if (!sigopts) sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_MACOPT: if (!macopts) macopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!macopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(macopts, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_DIGEST: if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &m)) goto opthelp; md = m; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (keyfile != NULL && argc > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can only sign or verify one file.\n", prog); goto end; } if (do_verify && !sigfile) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No signature to verify: use the -signature option\n"); goto end; } if (engine_impl) impl = e; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); bmd = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (debug) { BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback); /* needed for windows 3.1 */ BIO_set_callback_arg(in, (char *)bio_err); } if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (out_bin == -1) { if (keyfile) out_bin = 1; else out_bin = 0; } if (randfile) app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0); out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', out_bin ? FORMAT_BINARY : FORMAT_TEXT); if (out == NULL) goto end; if ((! !mac_name + ! !keyfile + ! !hmac_key) > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC and Signing key cannot both be specified\n"); goto end; } if (keyfile) { if (want_pub) sigkey = load_pubkey(keyfile, keyform, 0, NULL, e, "key file"); else sigkey = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "key file"); if (!sigkey) { /* * load_[pub]key() has already printed an appropriate message */ goto end; } } if (mac_name) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL; int r = 0; if (!init_gen_str(&mac_ctx, mac_name, impl, 0)) goto mac_end; if (macopts) { char *macopt; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(macopts); i++) { macopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(macopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(mac_ctx, macopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC parameter error \"%s\"\n", macopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto mac_end; } } } if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(mac_ctx, &sigkey) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error generating key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto mac_end; } r = 1; mac_end: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(mac_ctx); if (r == 0) goto end; } if (hmac_key) { sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, impl, (unsigned char *)hmac_key, -1); if (!sigkey) goto end; } if (sigkey) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; int r; if (!BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (do_verify) r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey); else r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey); if (!r) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (sigopts) { char *sigopt; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sigopts); i++) { sigopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sigopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(pctx, sigopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", sigopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } } /* we use md as a filter, reading from 'in' */ else { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; if (!BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (md == NULL) md = EVP_sha256(); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, impl)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting digest\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (sigfile && sigkey) { BIO *sigbio = BIO_new_file(sigfile, "rb"); if (!sigbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening signature file %s\n", sigfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(sigkey); sigbuf = app_malloc(siglen, "signature buffer"); siglen = BIO_read(sigbio, sigbuf, siglen); BIO_free(sigbio); if (siglen <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature file %s\n", sigfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } inp = BIO_push(bmd, in); if (md == NULL) { EVP_MD_CTX *tctx; BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &tctx); md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(tctx); } if (argc == 0) { BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = do_fp(out, buf, inp, separator, out_bin, sigkey, sigbuf, siglen, NULL, NULL, "stdin"); } else { const char *md_name = NULL, *sig_name = NULL; if (!out_bin) { if (sigkey) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(sigkey); if (ameth) EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &sig_name, ameth); } if (md) md_name = EVP_MD_name(md); } ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { int r; if (BIO_read_filename(in, argv[i]) <= 0) { perror(argv[i]); ret++; continue; } else r = do_fp(out, buf, inp, separator, out_bin, sigkey, sigbuf, siglen, sig_name, md_name, argv[i]); if (r) ret = r; (void)BIO_reset(bmd); } } end: OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, BUFSIZE); BIO_free(in); OPENSSL_free(passin); BIO_free_all(out); EVP_PKEY_free(sigkey); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(macopts); OPENSSL_free(sigbuf); BIO_free(bmd); release_engine(e); return (ret); } int do_fp(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, BIO *bp, int sep, int binout, EVP_PKEY *key, unsigned char *sigin, int siglen, const char *sig_name, const char *md_name, const char *file) { size_t len; int i; for (;;) { i = BIO_read(bp, (char *)buf, BUFSIZE); if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Read Error in %s\n", file); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 1; } if (i == 0) break; } if (sigin) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; BIO_get_md_ctx(bp, &ctx); i = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigin, (unsigned int)siglen); if (i > 0) BIO_printf(out, "Verified OK\n"); else if (i == 0) { BIO_printf(out, "Verification Failure\n"); return 1; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Verifying Data\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 1; } return 0; } if (key) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; BIO_get_md_ctx(bp, &ctx); len = BUFSIZE; if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, buf, &len)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Signing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 1; } } else { len = BIO_gets(bp, (char *)buf, BUFSIZE); if ((int)len < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 1; } } if (binout) BIO_write(out, buf, len); else if (sep == 2) { for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]); BIO_printf(out, " *%s\n", file); } else { if (sig_name) { BIO_puts(out, sig_name); if (md_name) BIO_printf(out, "-%s", md_name); BIO_printf(out, "(%s)= ", file); } else if (md_name) BIO_printf(out, "%s(%s)= ", md_name, file); else BIO_printf(out, "(%s)= ", file); for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) { if (sep && (i != 0)) BIO_printf(out, ":"); BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]); } BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s_cb.c0000644000000000000000000011632113176625656014103 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* callback functions used by s_client, s_server, and s_time */ #include #include #include /* for memcpy() and strcmp() */ #define USE_SOCKETS #include "apps.h" #undef USE_SOCKETS #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16 VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args = { 0, 0, X509_V_OK, 0 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK static unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH]; static int cookie_initialized = 0; #endif static const char *lookup(int val, const STRINT_PAIR* list, const char* def) { for ( ; list->name; ++list) if (list->retval == val) return list->name; return def; } int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *err_cert; int err, depth; err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); if (!verify_args.quiet || !ok) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d ", depth); if (err_cert) { X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } else BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } if (!ok) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); if (verify_args.depth >= depth) { if (!verify_args.return_error) ok = 1; verify_args.error = err; } else { ok = 0; verify_args.error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; } } switch (err) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: BIO_puts(bio_err, "issuer= "); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: BIO_printf(bio_err, "notBefore="); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notBefore(err_cert)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: BIO_printf(bio_err, "notAfter="); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notAfter(err_cert)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: if (!verify_args.quiet) policies_print(ctx); break; } if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2 && !verify_args.quiet) policies_print(ctx); if (ok && !verify_args.quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify return:%d\n", ok); return (ok); } int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file) { if (cert_file != NULL) { if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get certificate from '%s'\n", cert_file); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return (0); } if (key_file == NULL) key_file = cert_file; if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get private key from '%s'\n", key_file); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return (0); } /* * If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from the private * key */ /* * Now we know that a key and cert have been set against the SSL * context */ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Private key does not match the certificate public key\n"); return (0); } } return (1); } int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain) { int chflags = chain ? SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK : 0; if (cert == NULL) return 1; if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, cert) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting certificate\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, key) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting private key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } /* * Now we know that a key and cert have been set against the SSL context */ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Private key does not match the certificate public key\n"); return 0; } if (chain && !SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx, chain)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting certificate chain\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } if (build_chain && !SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, chflags)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error building certificate chain\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } return 1; } static STRINT_PAIR cert_type_list[] = { {"RSA sign", TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN}, {"DSA sign", TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN}, {"RSA fixed DH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH}, {"DSS fixed DH", TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH}, {"ECDSA sign", TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN}, {"RSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH}, {"ECDSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH}, {"GOST01 Sign", TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN}, {NULL} }; static void ssl_print_client_cert_types(BIO *bio, SSL *s) { const unsigned char *p; int i; int cert_type_num = SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, &p); if (!cert_type_num) return; BIO_puts(bio, "Client Certificate Types: "); for (i = 0; i < cert_type_num; i++) { unsigned char cert_type = p[i]; const char *cname = lookup((int)cert_type, cert_type_list, NULL); if (i) BIO_puts(bio, ", "); if (cname) BIO_puts(bio, cname); else BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN (%d),", cert_type); } BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } static int do_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s, int shared) { int i, nsig, client; client = SSL_is_server(s) ? 0 : 1; if (shared) nsig = SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); else nsig = SSL_get_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (nsig == 0) return 1; if (shared) BIO_puts(out, "Shared "); if (client) BIO_puts(out, "Requested "); BIO_puts(out, "Signature Algorithms: "); for (i = 0; i < nsig; i++) { int hash_nid, sign_nid; unsigned char rhash, rsign; const char *sstr = NULL; if (shared) SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL, &rsign, &rhash); else SSL_get_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL, &rsign, &rhash); if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA) sstr = "RSA"; else if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) sstr = "DSA"; else if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_EC) sstr = "ECDSA"; if (sstr) BIO_printf(out, "%s+", sstr); else BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X+", (int)rsign); if (hash_nid != NID_undef) BIO_printf(out, "%s", OBJ_nid2sn(hash_nid)); else BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", (int)rhash); } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s) { int mdnid; if (!SSL_is_server(s)) ssl_print_client_cert_types(out, s); do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 0); do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 1); if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &mdnid)) BIO_printf(out, "Peer signing digest: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(mdnid)); return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s) { int i, nformats; const char *pformats; nformats = SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, &pformats); if (nformats <= 0) return 1; BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curve Point Formats: "); for (i = 0; i < nformats; i++, pformats++) { if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); switch (*pformats) { case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed: BIO_puts(out, "uncompressed"); break; case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime: BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_prime"); break; case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2: BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_char2"); break; default: BIO_printf(out, "unknown(%d)", (int)*pformats); break; } } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared) { int i, ncurves, *curves, nid; const char *cname; ncurves = SSL_get1_curves(s, NULL); if (ncurves <= 0) return 1; curves = app_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int), "curves to print"); SSL_get1_curves(s, curves); BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: "); for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) { if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); nid = curves[i]; /* If unrecognised print out hex version */ if (nid & TLSEXT_nid_unknown) BIO_printf(out, "0x%04X", nid & 0xFFFF); else { /* Use NIST name for curve if it exists */ cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (!cname) cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname); } } OPENSSL_free(curves); if (noshared) { BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } BIO_puts(out, "\nShared Elliptic curves: "); ncurves = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, -1); for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) { if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); nid = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, i); cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (!cname) cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname); } if (ncurves == 0) BIO_puts(out, "NONE"); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } #endif int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *key; if (!SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, &key)) return 1; BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: "); switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: BIO_printf(out, "RSA, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); break; case EVP_PKEY_DH: BIO_printf(out, "DH, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: { EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key); int nid; const char *cname; nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); EC_KEY_free(ec); cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (!cname) cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_printf(out, "ECDH, %s, %d bits\n", cname, EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); } break; #endif default: BIO_printf(out, "%s, %d bits\n", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(key)), EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); } EVP_PKEY_free(key); return 1; } long bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret) { BIO *out; out = (BIO *)BIO_get_callback_arg(bio); if (out == NULL) return (ret); if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) { BIO_printf(out, "read from %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n", (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret); BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret); return (ret); } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) { BIO_printf(out, "write to %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n", (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret); BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret); } return (ret); } void apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret) { const char *str; int w; w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK; if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT) str = "SSL_connect"; else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) str = "SSL_accept"; else str = "undefined"; if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:%s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n", str, SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) { if (ret == 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:failed in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); else if (ret < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:error in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } } } static STRINT_PAIR ssl_versions[] = { {"SSL 3.0", SSL3_VERSION}, {"TLS 1.0", TLS1_VERSION}, {"TLS 1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION}, {"TLS 1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION}, {"DTLS 1.0", DTLS1_VERSION}, {"DTLS 1.0 (bad)", DTLS1_BAD_VER}, {NULL} }; static STRINT_PAIR alert_types[] = { {" close_notify", 0}, {" unexpected_message", 10}, {" bad_record_mac", 20}, {" decryption_failed", 21}, {" record_overflow", 22}, {" decompression_failure", 30}, {" handshake_failure", 40}, {" bad_certificate", 42}, {" unsupported_certificate", 43}, {" certificate_revoked", 44}, {" certificate_expired", 45}, {" certificate_unknown", 46}, {" illegal_parameter", 47}, {" unknown_ca", 48}, {" access_denied", 49}, {" decode_error", 50}, {" decrypt_error", 51}, {" export_restriction", 60}, {" protocol_version", 70}, {" insufficient_security", 71}, {" internal_error", 80}, {" user_canceled", 90}, {" no_renegotiation", 100}, {" unsupported_extension", 110}, {" certificate_unobtainable", 111}, {" unrecognized_name", 112}, {" bad_certificate_status_response", 113}, {" bad_certificate_hash_value", 114}, {" unknown_psk_identity", 115}, {NULL} }; static STRINT_PAIR handshakes[] = { {", HelloRequest", 0}, {", ClientHello", 1}, {", ServerHello", 2}, {", HelloVerifyRequest", 3}, {", NewSessionTicket", 4}, {", Certificate", 11}, {", ServerKeyExchange", 12}, {", CertificateRequest", 13}, {", ServerHelloDone", 14}, {", CertificateVerify", 15}, {", ClientKeyExchange", 16}, {", Finished", 20}, {", CertificateUrl", 21}, {", CertificateStatus", 22}, {", SupplementalData", 23}, {NULL} }; void msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) { BIO *bio = arg; const char *str_write_p = write_p ? ">>>" : "<<<"; const char *str_version = lookup(version, ssl_versions, "???"); const char *str_content_type = "", *str_details1 = "", *str_details2 = ""; const unsigned char* bp = buf; if (version == SSL3_VERSION || version == TLS1_VERSION || version == TLS1_1_VERSION || version == TLS1_2_VERSION || version == DTLS1_VERSION || version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { switch (content_type) { case 20: str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec"; break; case 21: str_content_type = "Alert"; str_details1 = ", ???"; if (len == 2) { switch (bp[0]) { case 1: str_details1 = ", warning"; break; case 2: str_details1 = ", fatal"; break; } str_details2 = lookup((int)bp[1], alert_types, " ???"); } break; case 22: str_content_type = "Handshake"; str_details1 = "???"; if (len > 0) str_details1 = lookup((int)bp[0], handshakes, "???"); break; case 23: str_content_type = "ApplicationData"; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS case 24: str_details1 = ", Heartbeat"; if (len > 0) { switch (bp[0]) { case 1: str_details1 = ", HeartbeatRequest"; break; case 2: str_details1 = ", HeartbeatResponse"; break; } } break; #endif } } BIO_printf(bio, "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n", str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type, (unsigned long)len, str_details1, str_details2); if (len > 0) { size_t num, i; BIO_printf(bio, " "); num = len; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (i % 16 == 0 && i > 0) BIO_printf(bio, "\n "); BIO_printf(bio, " %02x", ((const unsigned char *)buf)[i]); } if (i < len) BIO_printf(bio, " ..."); BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } (void)BIO_flush(bio); } static STRINT_PAIR tlsext_types[] = { {"server name", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name}, {"max fragment length", TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length}, {"client certificate URL", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url}, {"trusted CA keys", TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys}, {"truncated HMAC", TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac}, {"status request", TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request}, {"user mapping", TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping}, {"client authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz}, {"server authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz}, {"cert type", TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type}, {"elliptic curves", TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves}, {"EC point formats", TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats}, {"SRP", TLSEXT_TYPE_srp}, {"signature algorithms", TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms}, {"use SRTP", TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp}, {"heartbeat", TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat}, {"session ticket", TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket}, {"renegotiation info", TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate}, {"signed certificate timestamps", TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp}, {"TLS padding", TLSEXT_TYPE_padding}, #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg {"next protocol", TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg}, #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac {"encrypt-then-mac", TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac}, #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation {"application layer protocol negotiation", TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation}, #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret {"extended master secret", TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret}, #endif {NULL} }; void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg) { BIO *bio = arg; const char *extname = lookup(type, tlsext_types, "unknown"); BIO_printf(bio, "TLS %s extension \"%s\" (id=%d), len=%d\n", client_server ? "server" : "client", extname, type, len); BIO_dump(bio, (const char *)data, len); (void)BIO_flush(bio); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len) { unsigned char *buffer; size_t length; unsigned short port; BIO_ADDR *peer = NULL; /* Initialize a random secret */ if (!cookie_initialized) { if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n"); return 0; } cookie_initialized = 1; } peer = BIO_ADDR_new(); if (peer == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory full\n"); return 0; } /* Read peer information */ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), peer); /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */ BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, NULL, &length); OPENSSL_assert(length != 0); port = BIO_ADDR_rawport(peer); length += sizeof(port); buffer = app_malloc(length, "cookie generate buffer"); memcpy(buffer, &port, sizeof(port)); BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, buffer + sizeof(port), NULL); /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH, buffer, length, cookie, cookie_len); OPENSSL_free(buffer); BIO_ADDR_free(peer); return 1; } int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len) { unsigned char result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int resultlength; /* Note: we check cookie_initialized because if it's not, * it cannot be valid */ if (cookie_initialized && generate_cookie_callback(ssl, result, &resultlength) && cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0) return 1; return 0; } #endif /* * Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support of * one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application can decide * which certificate(s) to use at runtime based on whatever criteria it deems * appropriate. */ /* Linked list of certificates, keys and chains */ struct ssl_excert_st { int certform; const char *certfile; int keyform; const char *keyfile; const char *chainfile; X509 *cert; EVP_PKEY *key; STACK_OF(X509) *chain; int build_chain; struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev; }; static STRINT_PAIR chain_flags[] = { {"Overall Validity", CERT_PKEY_VALID}, {"Sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_SIGN}, {"EE signature", CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE}, {"CA signature", CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE}, {"EE key parameters", CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM}, {"CA key parameters", CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM}, {"Explicitly sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN}, {"Issuer Name", CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME}, {"Certificate Type", CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE}, {NULL} }; static void print_chain_flags(SSL *s, int flags) { STRINT_PAIR *pp; for (pp = chain_flags; pp->name; ++pp) BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s: %s\n", pp->name, (flags & pp->retval) ? "OK" : "NOT OK"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tSuite B: "); if (SSL_set_cert_flags(s, 0) & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS) BIO_puts(bio_err, flags & CERT_PKEY_SUITEB ? "OK\n" : "NOT OK\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "not tested\n"); } /* * Very basic selection callback: just use any certificate chain reported as * valid. More sophisticated could prioritise according to local policy. */ static int set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { int i, rv; SSL_EXCERT *exc = arg; #ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY static int retry_cnt; if (retry_cnt < 5) { retry_cnt++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n", retry_cnt); return -1; } #endif SSL_certs_clear(ssl); if (!exc) return 1; /* * Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend newer * entries this retains the original order. */ while (exc->next) exc = exc->next; i = 0; while (exc) { i++; rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); print_chain_flags(ssl, rv); if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, exc->cert) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, exc->key)) { return 0; } /* * NB: we wouldn't normally do this as it is not efficient * building chains on each connection better to cache the chain * in advance. */ if (exc->build_chain) { if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0)) return 0; } else if (exc->chain) SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain); } exc = exc->prev; } return 1; } void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc) { SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, set_cert_cb, exc); } static int ssl_excert_prepend(SSL_EXCERT **pexc) { SSL_EXCERT *exc = app_malloc(sizeof(*exc), "prepend cert"); memset(exc, 0, sizeof(*exc)); exc->next = *pexc; *pexc = exc; if (exc->next) { exc->certform = exc->next->certform; exc->keyform = exc->next->keyform; exc->next->prev = exc; } else { exc->certform = FORMAT_PEM; exc->keyform = FORMAT_PEM; } return 1; } void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc) { SSL_EXCERT *curr; if (!exc) return; while (exc) { X509_free(exc->cert); EVP_PKEY_free(exc->key); sk_X509_pop_free(exc->chain, X509_free); curr = exc; exc = exc->next; OPENSSL_free(curr); } } int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc) { SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc; if (!exc) return 1; /* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */ if (!exc->certfile && !exc->next) { ssl_excert_free(exc); *pexc = NULL; return 1; } for (; exc; exc = exc->next) { if (!exc->certfile) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing filename\n"); return 0; } exc->cert = load_cert(exc->certfile, exc->certform, "Server Certificate"); if (!exc->cert) return 0; if (exc->keyfile) { exc->key = load_key(exc->keyfile, exc->keyform, 0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key"); } else { exc->key = load_key(exc->certfile, exc->certform, 0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key"); } if (!exc->key) return 0; if (exc->chainfile) { if (!load_certs(exc->chainfile, &exc->chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "Server Chain")) return 0; } } return 1; } enum range { OPT_X_ENUM }; int args_excert(int opt, SSL_EXCERT **pexc) { SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc; assert(opt > OPT_X__FIRST); assert(opt < OPT_X__LAST); if (exc == NULL) { if (!ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, " %s: Error initialising xcert\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } *pexc = exc; } switch ((enum range)opt) { case OPT_X__FIRST: case OPT_X__LAST: return 0; case OPT_X_CERT: if (exc->certfile && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error adding xcert\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } *pexc = exc; exc->certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_X_KEY: if (exc->keyfile) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Key already specified\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } exc->keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_X_CHAIN: if (exc->chainfile) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Chain already specified\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } exc->chainfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD: exc->build_chain = 1; break; case OPT_X_CERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->certform)) return 0; break; case OPT_X_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->keyform)) return 0; break; } return 1; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ssl_excert_free(exc); *pexc = NULL; return 0; } static void print_raw_cipherlist(SSL *s) { const unsigned char *rlist; static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = { 0, 0xFF }; size_t i, rlistlen, num; if (!SSL_is_server(s)) return; num = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, NULL); OPENSSL_assert(num == 2); rlistlen = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, &rlist); BIO_puts(bio_err, "Client cipher list: "); for (i = 0; i < rlistlen; i += num, rlist += num) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, rlist); if (i) BIO_puts(bio_err, ":"); if (c) BIO_puts(bio_err, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); else if (!memcmp(rlist, scsv_id, num)) BIO_puts(bio_err, "SCSV"); else { size_t j; BIO_puts(bio_err, "0x"); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%02X", rlist[j]); } } BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } /* * Hex encoder for TLSA RRdata, not ':' delimited. */ static char *hexencode(const unsigned char *data, size_t len) { static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef"; char *out; char *cp; size_t outlen = 2 * len + 1; int ilen = (int) outlen; if (outlen < len || ilen < 0 || outlen != (size_t)ilen) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %"BIO_PRI64"u-byte buffer too large to hexencode\n", opt_getprog(), (uint64_t)len); exit(1); } cp = out = app_malloc(ilen, "TLSA hex data buffer"); while (len-- > 0) { *cp++ = hex[(*data >> 4) & 0x0f]; *cp++ = hex[*data++ & 0x0f]; } *cp = '\0'; return out; } void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio) { int mdpth; EVP_PKEY *mspki; long verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(s); if (verify_err == X509_V_OK) { const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Verification: OK\n"); if (peername != NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername); } else { const char *reason = X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err); BIO_printf(bio, "Verification error: %s\n", reason); } if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) { uint8_t usage, selector, mtype; const unsigned char *data = NULL; size_t dlen = 0; char *hexdata; mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, &data, &dlen); /* * The TLSA data field can be quite long when it is a certificate, * public key or even a SHA2-512 digest. Because the initial octets of * ASN.1 certificates and public keys contain mostly boilerplate OIDs * and lengths, we show the last 12 bytes of the data instead, as these * are more likely to distinguish distinct TLSA records. */ #define TLSA_TAIL_SIZE 12 if (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) hexdata = hexencode(data + dlen - TLSA_TAIL_SIZE, TLSA_TAIL_SIZE); else hexdata = hexencode(data, dlen); BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s%s %s at depth %d\n", usage, selector, mtype, (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) ? "..." : "", hexdata, (mspki != NULL) ? "signed the certificate" : mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate", mdpth); OPENSSL_free(hexdata); } } void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; X509 *peer; /* const char *pnam = SSL_is_server(s) ? "client" : "server"; */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Protocol version: %s\n", SSL_get_version(s)); print_raw_cipherlist(s); c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphersuite: %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); do_print_sigalgs(bio_err, s, 0); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s); if (peer) { int nid; BIO_puts(bio_err, "Peer certificate: "); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(peer), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); print_verify_detail(s, bio_err); } else BIO_puts(bio_err, "No peer certificate\n"); X509_free(peer); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ssl_print_point_formats(bio_err, s); if (SSL_is_server(s)) ssl_print_curves(bio_err, s, 1); else ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s); #else if (!SSL_is_server(s)) ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s); #endif } int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, SSL_CTX *ctx) { int i; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(str); i += 2) { const char *flag = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i); const char *arg = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i + 1); if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, flag, arg) <= 0) { if (arg) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n", flag, arg); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s\"\n", flag); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error finishing context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } return 1; } static int add_crls_store(X509_STORE *st, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *crl; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); X509_STORE_add_crl(st, crl); } return 1; } int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download) { X509_STORE *st; st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); add_crls_store(st, crls); if (crl_download) store_setup_crl_download(st); return 1; } int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile, const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download) { X509_STORE *vfy = NULL, *ch = NULL; int rv = 0; if (vfyCApath != NULL || vfyCAfile != NULL) { vfy = X509_STORE_new(); if (vfy == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(vfy, vfyCAfile, vfyCApath)) goto err; add_crls_store(vfy, crls); SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx, vfy); if (crl_download) store_setup_crl_download(vfy); } if (chCApath != NULL || chCAfile != NULL) { ch = X509_STORE_new(); if (ch == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(ch, chCAfile, chCApath)) goto err; SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx, ch); } rv = 1; err: X509_STORE_free(vfy); X509_STORE_free(ch); return rv; } /* Verbose print out of security callback */ typedef struct { BIO *out; int verbose; int (*old_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); } security_debug_ex; static STRINT_PAIR callback_types[] = { {"Supported Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED}, {"Shared Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED}, {"Check Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH {"Temp DH key bits", SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH}, #endif {"Supported Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED}, {"Shared Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED}, {"Check Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK}, {"Supported Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED}, {"Shared Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED}, {"Check Signature Algorithm digest", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK}, {"Signature Algorithm mask", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK}, {"Certificate chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY}, {"Certificate chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY}, {"Peer Chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY}, {"Peer Chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY}, {"Certificate chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_CA_MD}, {"Peer chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD}, {"SSL compression", SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION}, {"Session ticket", SSL_SECOP_TICKET}, {NULL} }; static int security_callback_debug(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { security_debug_ex *sdb = ex; int rv, show_bits = 1, cert_md = 0; const char *nm; rv = sdb->old_cb(s, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ex); if (rv == 1 && sdb->verbose < 2) return 1; BIO_puts(sdb->out, "Security callback: "); nm = lookup(op, callback_types, NULL); switch (op) { case SSL_SECOP_TICKET: case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION: show_bits = 0; nm = NULL; break; case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: BIO_printf(sdb->out, "Version=%s", lookup(nid, ssl_versions, "???")); show_bits = 0; nm = NULL; break; case SSL_SECOP_CA_MD: case SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD: cert_md = 1; break; } if (nm) BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s=", nm); switch (op & SSL_SECOP_OTHER_TYPE) { case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER: BIO_puts(sdb->out, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(other)); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE: { const char *cname; cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (cname == NULL) cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_puts(sdb->out, cname); } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_DH: { DH *dh = other; BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%d", DH_bits(dh)); break; } #endif case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT: { if (cert_md) { int sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(other); BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(sig_nid)); } else { EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(other); const char *algname = ""; EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &algname, EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey)); BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s, bits=%d", algname, EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey)); } break; } case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG: { const unsigned char *salg = other; const char *sname = NULL; switch (salg[1]) { case TLSEXT_signature_anonymous: sname = "anonymous"; break; case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: sname = "RSA"; break; case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: sname = "DSA"; break; case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: sname = "ECDSA"; break; } BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); if (sname) BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algorithm=%s", sname); else BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", algid=%d", salg[1]); break; } } if (show_bits) BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", security bits=%d", bits); BIO_printf(sdb->out, ": %s\n", rv ? "yes" : "no"); return rv; } void ssl_ctx_security_debug(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose) { static security_debug_ex sdb; sdb.out = bio_err; sdb.verbose = verbose; sdb.old_cb = SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(ctx); SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(ctx, security_callback_debug); SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(ctx, &sdb); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoSRP/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014336 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt0000644000000000000000000000054713176625656017604 0ustar rootroot# This is a file that will be filled by the openssl srp routine. # You can initialize the file with additional groups, these are # records starting with a I followed by the g and N values and the id. # The exact values ... you have to dig this out from the source of srp.c # or srp_vfy.c # The last value of an I is used as the default group for new users. openssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoSRP/srp_verifier.txt.attr0000644000000000000000000000002513176625656020544 0ustar rootrootunique_subject = yes openssl-1.1.0g/apps/timeouts.h0000644000000000000000000000105513176625656015050 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef INCLUDED_TIMEOUTS_H # define INCLUDED_TIMEOUTS_H /* numbers in us */ # define DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT 250000 # define DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT 250000 #endif /* ! INCLUDED_TIMEOUTS_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s1024req.pem0000644000000000000000000000120313176625656015005 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBojCCAQsCAQAwZDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgTClF1ZWVuc2xhbmQx GjAYBgNVBAoTEUNyeXB0U29mdCBQdHkgTHRkMSQwIgYDVQQDExtTZXJ2ZXIgdGVz dCBjZXJ0ICgxMDI0IGJpdCkwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALMR 9TwT5kZMa0ddXleG8zYuDfZ9dQiPJ1dvfgEZU9fqg3v5o1VL15ZrK9b/73+9RvRo KqKUmukV6yAi1XZPxWGGM4T75dTPjq42lwxTvAcwQBdS58+nO2kWbxkSTa0Uq9p2 RJKg3yVvXWO69lWRKQ+UHrmkWFJ7hApKnongeuRjAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEE BQADgYEAStHlk4pBbwiNeQ2/PKTPPXzITYC8Gn0XMbrU94e/6JIKiO7aArq9Espq nrBSvC14dHcNl6NNvnkEKdQ7hAkcACfBbnOXA/oQvMBd4GD78cH3k0jVDoVUEjil frLfWlckW6WzpTktt0ZPDdAjJCmKVh0ABHimi7Bo9FC3wIGIe5M= -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dhparam.c0000644000000000000000000002745713176625656014624 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include # endif # define DEFBITS 2048 static int dh_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CHECK, OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_RAND, OPT_DSAPARAM, OPT_C, OPT_2, OPT_5 } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS dhparam_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [flags] [numbits]\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format, DER or PEM"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format, DER or PEM"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Check the DH parameters"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print a text form of the DH parameters"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output any DH parameters"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print C code"}, {"2", OPT_2, '-', "Generate parameters using 2 as the generator value"}, {"5", OPT_5, '-', "Generate parameters using 5 as the generator value"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA {"dsaparam", OPT_DSAPARAM, '-', "Read or generate DSA parameters, convert to DH"}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int dhparam_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog, *inrand = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA int dsaparam = 0; #endif int i, text = 0, C = 0, ret = 1, num = 0, g = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, check = 0, noout = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dhparam_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(dhparam_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_CHECK: check = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_DSAPARAM: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA dsaparam = 1; #endif break; case OPT_C: C = 1; break; case OPT_2: g = 2; break; case OPT_5: g = 5; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (argv[0] && (!opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num <= 0)) goto end; if (g && !num) num = DEFBITS; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dsaparam && g) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "generator may not be chosen for DSA parameters\n"); goto end; } # endif /* DH parameters */ if (num && !g) g = 2; if (num) { BN_GENCB *cb; cb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (cb == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BN_GENCB_set(cb, dh_cb, bio_err); if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n"); } if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dsaparam) { DSA *dsa = DSA_new(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating DSA parameters, %d bit long prime\n", num); if (dsa == NULL || !DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsa, num, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) { DSA_free(dsa); BN_GENCB_free(cb); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa); DSA_free(dsa); if (dh == NULL) { BN_GENCB_free(cb); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else # endif { dh = DH_new(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating DH parameters, %d bit long safe prime, generator %d\n", num, g); BIO_printf(bio_err, "This is going to take a long time\n"); if (dh == NULL || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, cb)) { BN_GENCB_free(cb); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } BN_GENCB_free(cb); app_RAND_write_file(NULL); } else { in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dsaparam) { DSA *dsa; if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) dsa = d2i_DSAparams_bio(in, NULL); else /* informat == FORMAT_PEM */ dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (dsa == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DSA parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa); DSA_free(dsa); if (dh == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else # endif { if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) { /* * We have no PEM header to determine what type of DH params it * is. We'll just try both. */ dh = d2i_DHparams_bio(in, NULL); /* BIO_reset() returns 0 for success for file BIOs only!!! */ if (dh == NULL && BIO_reset(in) == 0) dh = d2i_DHxparams_bio(in, NULL); } else { /* informat == FORMAT_PEM */ dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); } if (dh == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DH parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } /* dh != NULL */ } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (text) { DHparams_print(out, dh); } if (check) { if (!DH_check(dh, &i)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: p value is not prime\n"); if (i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: p value is not a safe prime\n"); if (i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: q value is not a prime\n"); if (i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: q value is invalid\n"); if (i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: j value is invalid\n"); if (i & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: unable to check the generator value\n"); if (i & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: the g value is not a generator\n"); if (i == 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "DH parameters appear to be ok.\n"); if (num != 0 && i != 0) { /* * We have generated parameters but DH_check() indicates they are * invalid! This should never happen! */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: Invalid parameters generated\n"); goto end; } } if (C) { unsigned char *data; int len, bits; const BIGNUM *pbn, *gbn; len = DH_size(dh); bits = DH_bits(dh); DH_get0_pqg(dh, &pbn, NULL, &gbn); data = app_malloc(len, "print a BN"); BIO_printf(out, "#ifndef HEADER_DH_H\n" "# include \n" "#endif\n" "\n"); BIO_printf(out, "DH *get_dh%d()\n{\n", bits); print_bignum_var(out, pbn, "dhp", bits, data); print_bignum_var(out, gbn, "dhg", bits, data); BIO_printf(out, " DH *dh = DH_new();\n" " BIGNUM *dhp_bn, *dhg_bn;\n" "\n" " if (dh == NULL)\n" " return NULL;\n"); BIO_printf(out, " dhp_bn = BN_bin2bn(dhp_%d, sizeof (dhp_%d), NULL);\n", bits, bits); BIO_printf(out, " dhg_bn = BN_bin2bn(dhg_%d, sizeof (dhg_%d), NULL);\n", bits, bits); BIO_printf(out, " if (dhp_bn == NULL || dhg_bn == NULL\n" " || !DH_set0_pqg(dh, dhp_bn, NULL, dhg_bn)) {\n" " DH_free(dh);\n" " BN_free(dhp_bn);\n" " BN_free(dhg_bn);\n" " return NULL;\n" " }\n"); if (DH_get_length(dh) > 0) BIO_printf(out, " if (!DH_set_length(dh, %ld)) {\n" " DH_free(dh);\n" " }\n", DH_get_length(dh)); BIO_printf(out, " return dh;\n}\n"); OPENSSL_free(data); } if (!noout) { const BIGNUM *q; DH_get0_pqg(dh, NULL, &q, NULL); if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) { if (q != NULL) i = i2d_DHxparams_bio(out, dh); else i = i2d_DHparams_bio(out, dh); } else if (q != NULL) i = PEM_write_bio_DHxparams(out, dh); else i = PEM_write_bio_DHparams(out, dh); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write DH parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } ret = 0; end: BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); DH_free(dh); release_engine(e); return (ret); } static int dh_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb) { char c = '*'; if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb), &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb)); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ca.c0000644000000000000000000024504413176625656013565 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* The PPKI stuff has been donated by Jeff Barber */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef W_OK # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # if defined(__DECC) # include # else # include # endif # elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # include # endif #endif #include "apps.h" #ifndef W_OK # define F_OK 0 # define X_OK 1 # define W_OK 2 # define R_OK 4 #endif #undef BSIZE #define BSIZE 256 #define BASE_SECTION "ca" #define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca" #define STRING_MASK "string_mask" #define UTF8_IN "utf8" #define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir" #define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate" #define ENV_SERIAL "serial" #define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber" #define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key" #define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days" #define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate" #define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate" #define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS "default_crl_days" #define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS "default_crl_hours" #define ENV_DEFAULT_MD "default_md" #define ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN "email_in_dn" #define ENV_PRESERVE "preserve" #define ENV_POLICY "policy" #define ENV_EXTENSIONS "x509_extensions" #define ENV_CRLEXT "crl_extensions" #define ENV_MSIE_HACK "msie_hack" #define ENV_NAMEOPT "name_opt" #define ENV_CERTOPT "cert_opt" #define ENV_EXTCOPY "copy_extensions" #define ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT "unique_subject" #define ENV_DATABASE "database" /* Additional revocation information types */ #define REV_NONE 0 /* No additional information */ #define REV_CRL_REASON 1 /* Value is CRL reason code */ #define REV_HOLD 2 /* Value is hold instruction */ #define REV_KEY_COMPROMISE 3 /* Value is cert key compromise time */ #define REV_CA_COMPROMISE 4 /* Value is CA key compromise time */ static char *lookup_conf(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *tag); static int certify(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign); static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy); static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, const char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy); static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der, int notext); static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, const char *ext_sect, CONF *conf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign); static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int ext, char *extval); static int get_certificate_status(const char *ser_status, CA_DB *db); static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db); static int check_time_format(const char *str); char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg); int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str); static int old_entry_print(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, const ASN1_STRING *str); static CONF *extconf = NULL; static int preserve = 0; static int msie_hack = 0; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_VERBOSE, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_NAME, OPT_SUBJ, OPT_UTF8, OPT_CREATE_SERIAL, OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, OPT_STARTDATE, OPT_ENDDATE, OPT_DAYS, OPT_MD, OPT_POLICY, OPT_KEYFILE, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_KEY, OPT_CERT, OPT_SELFSIGN, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_OUTDIR, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_NOTEXT, OPT_BATCH, OPT_PRESERVEDN, OPT_NOEMAILDN, OPT_GENCRL, OPT_MSIE_HACK, OPT_CRLDAYS, OPT_CRLHOURS, OPT_CRLSEC, OPT_INFILES, OPT_SS_CERT, OPT_SPKAC, OPT_REVOKE, OPT_VALID, OPT_EXTENSIONS, OPT_EXTFILE, OPT_STATUS, OPT_UPDATEDB, OPT_CRLEXTS, OPT_CRL_REASON, OPT_CRL_HOLD, OPT_CRL_COMPROMISE, OPT_CRL_CA_COMPROMISE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS ca_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Verbose output during processing"}, {"config", OPT_CONFIG, 's', "A config file"}, {"name", OPT_NAME, 's', "The particular CA definition to use"}, {"subj", OPT_SUBJ, 's', "Use arg instead of request's subject"}, {"utf8", OPT_UTF8, '-', "Input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)"}, {"create_serial", OPT_CREATE_SERIAL, '-', "If reading serial fails, create a new random serial"}, {"multivalue-rdn", OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, '-', "Enable support for multivalued RDNs"}, {"startdate", OPT_STARTDATE, 's', "Cert notBefore, YYMMDDHHMMSSZ"}, {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, 's', "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ cert notAfter (overrides -days)"}, {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days to certify the cert for"}, {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; one of md2, md5, sha or sha1"}, {"policy", OPT_POLICY, 's', "The CA 'policy' to support"}, {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "Private key"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Key to decode the private key if it is encrypted"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "The CA cert"}, {"selfsign", OPT_SELFSIGN, '-', "Sign a cert with the key associated with it"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "The input PEM encoded cert request(s)"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Where to put the output file(s)"}, {"outdir", OPT_OUTDIR, '/', "Where to put output cert"}, {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"}, {"notext", OPT_NOTEXT, '-', "Do not print the generated certificate"}, {"batch", OPT_BATCH, '-', "Don't ask questions"}, {"preserveDN", OPT_PRESERVEDN, '-', "Don't re-order the DN"}, {"noemailDN", OPT_NOEMAILDN, '-', "Don't add the EMAIL field to the DN"}, {"gencrl", OPT_GENCRL, '-', "Generate a new CRL"}, {"msie_hack", OPT_MSIE_HACK, '-', "msie modifications to handle all those universal strings"}, {"crldays", OPT_CRLDAYS, 'p', "Days until the next CRL is due"}, {"crlhours", OPT_CRLHOURS, 'p', "Hours until the next CRL is due"}, {"crlsec", OPT_CRLSEC, 'p', "Seconds until the next CRL is due"}, {"infiles", OPT_INFILES, '-', "The last argument, requests to process"}, {"ss_cert", OPT_SS_CERT, '<', "File contains a self signed cert to sign"}, {"spkac", OPT_SPKAC, '<', "File contains DN and signed public key and challenge"}, {"revoke", OPT_REVOKE, '<', "Revoke a cert (given in file)"}, {"valid", OPT_VALID, 's', "Add a Valid(not-revoked) DB entry about a cert (given in file)"}, {"extensions", OPT_EXTENSIONS, 's', "Extension section (override value in config file)"}, {"extfile", OPT_EXTFILE, '<', "Configuration file with X509v3 extensions to add"}, {"status", OPT_STATUS, 's', "Shows cert status given the serial number"}, {"updatedb", OPT_UPDATEDB, '-', "Updates db for expired cert"}, {"crlexts", OPT_CRLEXTS, 's', "CRL extension section (override value in config file)"}, {"crl_reason", OPT_CRL_REASON, 's', "revocation reason"}, {"crl_hold", OPT_CRL_HOLD, 's', "the hold instruction, an OID. Sets revocation reason to certificateHold"}, {"crl_compromise", OPT_CRL_COMPROMISE, 's', "sets compromise time to val and the revocation reason to keyCompromise"}, {"crl_CA_compromise", OPT_CRL_CA_COMPROMISE, 's', "sets compromise time to val and the revocation reason to CACompromise"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int ca_main(int argc, char **argv) { CONF *conf = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; BIGNUM *crlnumber = NULL, *serial = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *Sout = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *tmpser; ASN1_TIME *tmptm; CA_DB *db = NULL; DB_ATTR db_attr; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attribs = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *cert_sk = NULL; X509_CRL *crl = NULL; const EVP_MD *dgst = NULL; char *configfile = default_config_file, *section = NULL; char *md = NULL, *policy = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; char *certfile = NULL, *crl_ext = NULL, *crlnumberfile = NULL, *key = NULL; const char *infile = NULL, *spkac_file = NULL, *ss_cert_file = NULL; const char *extensions = NULL, *extfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL; char *outdir = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *rev_arg = NULL, *ser_status = NULL; const char *serialfile = NULL, *subj = NULL; char *prog, *startdate = NULL, *enddate = NULL; char *dbfile = NULL, *f, *randfile = NULL; char buf[3][BSIZE]; char *const *pp; const char *p; int create_ser = 0, free_key = 0, total = 0, total_done = 0; int batch = 0, default_op = 1, doupdatedb = 0, ext_copy = EXT_COPY_NONE; int keyformat = FORMAT_PEM, multirdn = 0, notext = 0, output_der = 0; int ret = 1, email_dn = 1, req = 0, verbose = 0, gencrl = 0, dorevoke = 0; int i, j, rev_type = REV_NONE, selfsign = 0; long crldays = 0, crlhours = 0, crlsec = 0, days = 0; unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, nameopt = 0, certopt = 0; X509 *x509 = NULL, *x509p = NULL, *x = NULL; X509_REVOKED *r = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ca_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(ca_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_IN: req = 1; infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERBOSE: verbose = 1; break; case OPT_CONFIG: configfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NAME: section = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SUBJ: subj = opt_arg(); /* preserve=1; */ break; case OPT_UTF8: chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; break; case OPT_CREATE_SERIAL: create_ser = 1; break; case OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN: multirdn = 1; break; case OPT_STARTDATE: startdate = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENDDATE: enddate = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DAYS: days = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_MD: md = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_POLICY: policy = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFILE: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY: key = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT: certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SELFSIGN: selfsign = 1; break; case OPT_OUTDIR: outdir = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGOPT: if (sigopts == NULL) sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (sigopts == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg())) goto end; break; case OPT_NOTEXT: notext = 1; break; case OPT_BATCH: batch = 1; break; case OPT_PRESERVEDN: preserve = 1; break; case OPT_NOEMAILDN: email_dn = 0; break; case OPT_GENCRL: gencrl = 1; break; case OPT_MSIE_HACK: msie_hack = 1; break; case OPT_CRLDAYS: crldays = atol(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_CRLHOURS: crlhours = atol(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_CRLSEC: crlsec = atol(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_INFILES: req = 1; goto end_of_options; case OPT_SS_CERT: ss_cert_file = opt_arg(); req = 1; break; case OPT_SPKAC: spkac_file = opt_arg(); req = 1; break; case OPT_REVOKE: infile = opt_arg(); dorevoke = 1; break; case OPT_VALID: infile = opt_arg(); dorevoke = 2; break; case OPT_EXTENSIONS: extensions = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_EXTFILE: extfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_STATUS: ser_status = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_UPDATEDB: doupdatedb = 1; break; case OPT_CRLEXTS: crl_ext = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL_REASON: rev_arg = opt_arg(); rev_type = REV_CRL_REASON; break; case OPT_CRL_HOLD: rev_arg = opt_arg(); rev_type = REV_HOLD; break; case OPT_CRL_COMPROMISE: rev_arg = opt_arg(); rev_type = REV_KEY_COMPROMISE; break; case OPT_CRL_CA_COMPROMISE: rev_arg = opt_arg(); rev_type = REV_CA_COMPROMISE; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; } } end_of_options: argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile); if ((conf = app_load_config(configfile)) == NULL) goto end; if (configfile != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(conf)) goto end; /* Lets get the config section we are using */ if (section == NULL && (section = lookup_conf(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA)) == NULL) goto end; if (conf != NULL) { p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_file"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if (p != NULL) { BIO *oid_bio; oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r"); if (oid_bio == NULL) { /*- BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); */ ERR_clear_error(); } else { OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio); BIO_free(oid_bio); } } if (!add_oid_section(conf)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } randfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, "RANDFILE"); if (randfile == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0); f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, STRING_MASK); if (!f) ERR_clear_error(); if (f && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", f); goto end; } if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) { f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, UTF8_IN); if (!f) ERR_clear_error(); else if (strcmp(f, "yes") == 0) chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; } db_attr.unique_subject = 1; p = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT); if (p) { db_attr.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1); } else ERR_clear_error(); /*****************************************************************/ /* report status of cert with serial number given on command line */ if (ser_status) { dbfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE); if (dbfile == NULL) goto end; db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr); if (db == NULL) goto end; if (!index_index(db)) goto end; if (get_certificate_status(ser_status, db) != 1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying serial %s!\n", ser_status); goto end; } /*****************************************************************/ /* we definitely need a private key, so let's get it */ if (keyfile == NULL && (keyfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_PRIVATE_KEY)) == NULL) goto end; if (!key) { free_key = 1; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &key, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } } pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, key, e, "CA private key"); if (key) OPENSSL_cleanse(key, strlen(key)); if (pkey == NULL) { /* load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */ goto end; } /*****************************************************************/ /* we need a certificate */ if (!selfsign || spkac_file || ss_cert_file || gencrl) { if (certfile == NULL && (certfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_CERTIFICATE)) == NULL) goto end; x509 = load_cert(certfile, FORMAT_PEM, "CA certificate"); if (x509 == NULL) goto end; if (!X509_check_private_key(x509, pkey)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CA certificate and CA private key do not match\n"); goto end; } } if (!selfsign) x509p = x509; f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_PRESERVE); if (f == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y'))) preserve = 1; f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_MSIE_HACK); if (f == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y'))) msie_hack = 1; f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NAMEOPT); if (f) { if (!set_name_ex(&nameopt, f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid name options: \"%s\"\n", f); goto end; } default_op = 0; } else { nameopt = XN_FLAG_ONELINE; ERR_clear_error(); } f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTOPT); if (f) { if (!set_cert_ex(&certopt, f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid certificate options: \"%s\"\n", f); goto end; } default_op = 0; } else ERR_clear_error(); f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTCOPY); if (f) { if (!set_ext_copy(&ext_copy, f)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid extension copy option: \"%s\"\n", f); goto end; } } else ERR_clear_error(); /*****************************************************************/ /* lookup where to write new certificates */ if ((outdir == NULL) && (req)) { outdir = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR); if (outdir == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "there needs to be defined a directory for new certificate to be placed in\n"); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* * outdir is a directory spec, but access() for VMS demands a * filename. We could use the DEC C routine to convert the * directory syntax to Unixly, and give that to app_isdir, * but for now the fopen will catch the error if it's not a * directory */ if (app_isdir(outdir) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %s is not a directory\n", prog, outdir); perror(outdir); goto end; } #endif } /*****************************************************************/ /* we need to load the database file */ dbfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE); if (dbfile == NULL) goto end; db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr); if (db == NULL) goto end; /* Lets check some fields */ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if ((pp[DB_type][0] != DB_TYPE_REV) && (pp[DB_rev_date][0] != '\0')) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: not revoked yet, but has a revocation date\n", i + 1); goto end; } if ((pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) && !make_revoked(NULL, pp[DB_rev_date])) { BIO_printf(bio_err, " in entry %d\n", i + 1); goto end; } if (!check_time_format((char *)pp[DB_exp_date])) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: invalid expiry date\n", i + 1); goto end; } p = pp[DB_serial]; j = strlen(p); if (*p == '-') { p++; j--; } if ((j & 1) || (j < 2)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: bad serial number length (%d)\n", i + 1, j); goto end; } for ( ; *p; p++) { if (!isxdigit(_UC(*p))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: bad char 0%o '%c' in serial number\n", i + 1, *p, *p); goto end; } } } if (verbose) { TXT_DB_write(bio_out, db->db); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d entries loaded from the database\n", sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "generating index\n"); } if (!index_index(db)) goto end; /*****************************************************************/ /* Update the db file for expired certificates */ if (doupdatedb) { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Updating %s ...\n", dbfile); i = do_updatedb(db); if (i == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n"); goto end; } else if (i == 0) { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "No entries found to mark expired\n"); } else { if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db)) goto end; if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old")) goto end; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Done. %d entries marked as expired\n", i); } } /*****************************************************************/ /* Read extensions config file */ if (extfile) { if ((extconf = app_load_config(extfile)) == NULL) { ret = 1; goto end; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully loaded extensions file %s\n", extfile); /* We can have sections in the ext file */ if (extensions == NULL) { extensions = NCONF_get_string(extconf, "default", "extensions"); if (extensions == NULL) extensions = "default"; } } /*****************************************************************/ if (req || gencrl) { /* FIXME: Is it really always text? */ Sout = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT); if (Sout == NULL) goto end; } if (md == NULL && (md = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD)) == NULL) goto end; if (strcmp(md, "default") == 0) { int def_nid; if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "no default digest\n"); goto end; } md = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(def_nid); } if (!opt_md(md, &dgst)) { goto end; } if (req) { if (email_dn == 1) { char *tmp_email_dn = NULL; tmp_email_dn = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN); if (tmp_email_dn != NULL && strcmp(tmp_email_dn, "no") == 0) email_dn = 0; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "message digest is %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_MD_type(dgst))); if (policy == NULL && (policy = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_POLICY)) == NULL) goto end; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "policy is %s\n", policy); serialfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_SERIAL); if (serialfile == NULL) goto end; if (!extconf) { /* * no '-extfile' option, so we look for extensions in the main * configuration file */ if (!extensions) { extensions = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTENSIONS); if (!extensions) ERR_clear_error(); } if (extensions) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extensions); ret = 1; goto end; } } } if (startdate == NULL) { startdate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE); if (startdate == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if (startdate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, startdate)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "start date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n"); goto end; } if (startdate == NULL) startdate = "today"; if (enddate == NULL) { enddate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE); if (enddate == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if (enddate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, enddate)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "end date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n"); goto end; } if (days == 0) { if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS, &days)) days = 0; } if (!enddate && (days == 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot lookup how many days to certify for\n"); goto end; } if ((serial = load_serial(serialfile, create_ser, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading serial number\n"); goto end; } if (verbose) { if (BN_is_zero(serial)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is 00\n"); else { if ((f = BN_bn2hex(serial)) == NULL) goto end; BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is %s\n", f); OPENSSL_free(f); } } if ((attribs = NCONF_get_section(conf, policy)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find 'section' for %s\n", policy); goto end; } if ((cert_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } if (spkac_file != NULL) { total++; j = certify_spkac(&x, spkac_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy); if (j < 0) goto end; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) goto end; if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } if (outfile) { output_der = 1; batch = 1; } } } if (ss_cert_file != NULL) { total++; j = certify_cert(&x, ss_cert_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy); if (j < 0) goto end; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) goto end; if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } } } if (infile != NULL) { total++; j = certify(&x, infile, pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign); if (j < 0) goto end; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) goto end; if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } } } for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { total++; j = certify(&x, argv[i], pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign); if (j < 0) goto end; if (j > 0) { total_done++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) goto end; if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } } } /* * we have a stack of newly certified certificates and a data base * and serial number that need updating */ if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk) > 0) { if (!batch) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n%d out of %d certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]", total_done, total); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); buf[0][0] = '\0'; if (!fgets(buf[0], 10, stdin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATION CANCELED: I/O error\n"); ret = 0; goto end; } if ((buf[0][0] != 'y') && (buf[0][0] != 'Y')) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATION CANCELED\n"); ret = 0; goto end; } } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Write out database with %d new entries\n", sk_X509_num(cert_sk)); if (!save_serial(serialfile, "new", serial, NULL)) goto end; if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db)) goto end; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new certificates\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cert_sk); i++) { BIO *Cout = NULL; X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(cert_sk, i); ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(xi); int k; char *n; j = ASN1_STRING_length(serialNumber); p = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(serialNumber); if (strlen(outdir) >= (size_t)(j ? BSIZE - j * 2 - 6 : BSIZE - 8)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "certificate file name too long\n"); goto end; } strcpy(buf[2], outdir); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS OPENSSL_strlcat(buf[2], "/", sizeof(buf[2])); #endif n = (char *)&(buf[2][strlen(buf[2])]); if (j > 0) { for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { if (n >= &(buf[2][sizeof(buf[2])])) break; BIO_snprintf(n, &buf[2][0] + sizeof(buf[2]) - n, "%02X", (unsigned char)*(p++)); n += 2; } } else { *(n++) = '0'; *(n++) = '0'; } *(n++) = '.'; *(n++) = 'p'; *(n++) = 'e'; *(n++) = 'm'; *n = '\0'; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing %s\n", buf[2]); Cout = BIO_new_file(buf[2], "w"); if (Cout == NULL) { perror(buf[2]); goto end; } write_new_certificate(Cout, xi, 0, notext); write_new_certificate(Sout, xi, output_der, notext); BIO_free_all(Cout); } if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk)) { /* Rename the database and the serial file */ if (!rotate_serial(serialfile, "new", "old")) goto end; if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old")) goto end; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n"); } } /*****************************************************************/ if (gencrl) { int crl_v2 = 0; if (!crl_ext) { crl_ext = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLEXT); if (!crl_ext) ERR_clear_error(); } if (crl_ext) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, crl_ext, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading CRL extension section %s\n", crl_ext); ret = 1; goto end; } } if ((crlnumberfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLNUMBER)) != NULL) if ((crlnumber = load_serial(crlnumberfile, 0, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading CRL number\n"); goto end; } if (!crldays && !crlhours && !crlsec) { if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS, &crldays)) crldays = 0; if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours)) crlhours = 0; ERR_clear_error(); } if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot lookup how long until the next CRL is issued\n"); goto end; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "making CRL\n"); if ((crl = X509_CRL_new()) == NULL) goto end; if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_get_subject_name(x509))) goto end; tmptm = ASN1_TIME_new(); if (tmptm == NULL) goto end; X509_gmtime_adj(tmptm, 0); X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, tmptm); if (!X509_time_adj_ex(tmptm, crldays, crlhours * 60 * 60 + crlsec, NULL)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "error setting CRL nextUpdate\n"); goto end; } X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, tmptm); ASN1_TIME_free(tmptm); for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) { if ((r = X509_REVOKED_new()) == NULL) goto end; j = make_revoked(r, pp[DB_rev_date]); if (!j) goto end; if (j == 2) crl_v2 = 1; if (!BN_hex2bn(&serial, pp[DB_serial])) goto end; tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL); BN_free(serial); serial = NULL; if (!tmpser) goto end; X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(r, tmpser); ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser); X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, r); } } /* * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order */ X509_CRL_sort(crl); /* we now have a CRL */ if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "signing CRL\n"); /* Add any extensions asked for */ if (crl_ext || crlnumberfile != NULL) { X509V3_CTX crlctx; X509V3_set_ctx(&crlctx, x509, NULL, NULL, crl, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&crlctx, conf); if (crl_ext) if (!X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(conf, &crlctx, crl_ext, crl)) goto end; if (crlnumberfile != NULL) { tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(crlnumber, NULL); if (!tmpser) goto end; X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_crl_number, tmpser, 0, 0); ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser); crl_v2 = 1; if (!BN_add_word(crlnumber, 1)) goto end; } } if (crl_ext || crl_v2) { if (!X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) goto end; /* version 2 CRL */ } /* we have a CRL number that need updating */ if (crlnumberfile != NULL) if (!save_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", crlnumber, NULL)) goto end; BN_free(crlnumber); crlnumber = NULL; if (!do_X509_CRL_sign(crl, pkey, dgst, sigopts)) goto end; PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(Sout, crl); if (crlnumberfile != NULL) /* Rename the crlnumber file */ if (!rotate_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", "old")) goto end; } /*****************************************************************/ if (dorevoke) { if (infile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no input files\n"); goto end; } else { X509 *revcert; revcert = load_cert(infile, FORMAT_PEM, infile); if (revcert == NULL) goto end; if (dorevoke == 2) rev_type = -1; j = do_revoke(revcert, db, rev_type, rev_arg); if (j <= 0) goto end; X509_free(revcert); if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db)) goto end; if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old")) goto end; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n"); } } /*****************************************************************/ ret = 0; end: BIO_free_all(Sout); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free_all(in); sk_X509_pop_free(cert_sk, X509_free); if (ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); app_RAND_write_file(randfile); if (free_key) OPENSSL_free(key); BN_free(serial); BN_free(crlnumber); free_index(db); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x509); X509_CRL_free(crl); NCONF_free(conf); NCONF_free(extconf); release_engine(e); return (ret); } static char *lookup_conf(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *tag) { char *entry = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, tag); if (entry == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "variable lookup failed for %s::%s\n", section, tag); return entry; } static int certify(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign) { X509_REQ *req = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL; int ok = -1, i; in = BIO_new_file(infile, "r"); if (in == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if ((req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading certificate request in %s\n", infile); goto end; } if (verbose) X509_REQ_print(bio_err, req); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n"); if (selfsign && !X509_REQ_check_private_key(req, pkey)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate request and CA private key do not match\n"); ok = 0; goto end; } if ((pktmp = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n"); goto end; } i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pktmp); pktmp = NULL; if (i < 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (i == 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate request\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n"); ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign); end: X509_REQ_free(req); BIO_free(in); return (ok); } static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, int batch, const char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy) { X509 *req = NULL; X509_REQ *rreq = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL; int ok = -1, i; if ((req = load_cert(infile, FORMAT_PEM, infile)) == NULL) goto end; if (verbose) X509_print(bio_err, req); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n"); if ((pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(req)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n"); goto end; } i = X509_verify(req, pktmp); if (i < 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n"); goto end; } if (i == 0) { ok = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate\n"); goto end; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n"); if ((rreq = X509_to_X509_REQ(req, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) goto end; ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch, verbose, rreq, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, 0); end: X509_REQ_free(rreq); X509_free(req); return (ok); } static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, const char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign) { X509_NAME *name = NULL, *CAname = NULL, *subject = NULL, *dn_subject = NULL; const ASN1_TIME *tm; ASN1_STRING *str, *str2; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; X509 *ret = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; X509_NAME_ENTRY *tne, *push; EVP_PKEY *pktmp; int ok = -1, i, j, last, nid; const char *p; CONF_VALUE *cv; OPENSSL_STRING row[DB_NUMBER]; OPENSSL_STRING *irow = NULL; OPENSSL_STRING *rrow = NULL; char buf[25]; for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; if (subj) { X509_NAME *n = parse_name(subj, chtype, multirdn); if (!n) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n); X509_NAME_free(n); } if (default_op) BIO_printf(bio_err, "The Subject's Distinguished Name is as follows\n"); name = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req); for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(name); i++) { ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne); if (msie_hack) { /* assume all type should be strings */ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne)); if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(str); if ((str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) && (nid != NID_pkcs9_emailAddress)) str->type = V_ASN1_T61STRING; if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)) str->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; } /* If no EMAIL is wanted in the subject */ if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (!email_dn)) continue; /* check some things */ if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (str->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nemailAddress type needs to be of type IA5STRING\n"); goto end; } if ((str->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) && (str->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)) { j = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(str->data, str->length); if (((j == V_ASN1_T61STRING) && (str->type != V_ASN1_T61STRING)) || ((j == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) && (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nThe string contains characters that are illegal for the ASN.1 type\n"); goto end; } } if (default_op) old_entry_print(obj, str); } /* Ok, now we check the 'policy' stuff. */ if ((subject = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } /* take a copy of the issuer name before we mess with it. */ if (selfsign) CAname = X509_NAME_dup(name); else CAname = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509)); if (CAname == NULL) goto end; str = str2 = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(policy); i++) { cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(policy, i); /* get the object id */ if ((j = OBJ_txt2nid(cv->name)) == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:unknown object type in 'policy' configuration\n", cv->name); goto end; } obj = OBJ_nid2obj(j); last = -1; for (;;) { /* lookup the object in the supplied name list */ j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, last); if (j < 0) { if (last != -1) break; tne = NULL; } else { tne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, j); } last = j; /* depending on the 'policy', decide what to do. */ push = NULL; if (strcmp(cv->value, "optional") == 0) { if (tne != NULL) push = tne; } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "supplied") == 0) { if (tne == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The %s field needed to be supplied and was missing\n", cv->name); goto end; } else push = tne; } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "match") == 0) { int last2; if (tne == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The mandatory %s field was missing\n", cv->name); goto end; } last2 = -1; again2: j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(CAname, obj, last2); if ((j < 0) && (last2 == -1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The %s field does not exist in the CA certificate,\n" "the 'policy' is misconfigured\n", cv->name); goto end; } if (j >= 0) { push = X509_NAME_get_entry(CAname, j); str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(tne); str2 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(push); last2 = j; if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(str, str2) != 0) goto again2; } if (j < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The %s field is different between\n" "CA certificate (%s) and the request (%s)\n", cv->name, ((str2 == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str2->data), ((str == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str->data)); goto end; } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:invalid type in 'policy' configuration\n", cv->value); goto end; } if (push != NULL) { if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(subject, push, -1, 0)) { X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(push); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } } if (j < 0) break; } } if (preserve) { X509_NAME_free(subject); /* subject=X509_NAME_dup(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)); */ subject = X509_NAME_dup(name); if (subject == NULL) goto end; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "The subject name appears to be ok, checking data base for clashes\n"); /* Build the correct Subject if no e-mail is wanted in the subject */ /* * and add it later on because of the method extensions are added * (altName) */ if (email_dn) dn_subject = subject; else { X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpne; /* * Its best to dup the subject DN and then delete any email addresses * because this retains its structure. */ if ((dn_subject = X509_NAME_dup(subject)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn_subject, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, -1)) >= 0) { tmpne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn_subject, i); X509_NAME_delete_entry(dn_subject, i); X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpne); } } if (BN_is_zero(serial)) row[DB_serial] = OPENSSL_strdup("00"); else row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(serial); if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } if (db->attributes.unique_subject) { OPENSSL_STRING *crow = row; rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_name, crow); if (rrow != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:There is already a certificate for %s\n", row[DB_name]); } } if (rrow == NULL) { rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); if (rrow != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Serial number %s has already been issued,\n", row[DB_serial]); BIO_printf(bio_err, " check the database/serial_file for corruption\n"); } } if (rrow != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "The matching entry has the following details\n"); if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E') p = "Expired"; else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') p = "Revoked"; else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') p = "Valid"; else p = "\ninvalid type, Data base error\n"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Type :%s\n", p);; if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') { p = rrow[DB_exp_date]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Was revoked on:%s\n", p); } p = rrow[DB_exp_date]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Expires on :%s\n", p); p = rrow[DB_serial]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial Number :%s\n", p); p = rrow[DB_file]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "File name :%s\n", p); p = rrow[DB_name]; if (p == NULL) p = "undef"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Name :%s\n", p); ok = -1; /* This is now a 'bad' error. */ goto end; } /* We are now totally happy, lets make and sign the certificate */ if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Everything appears to be ok, creating and signing the certificate\n"); if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL) goto end; #ifdef X509_V3 /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */ if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2)) goto end; #endif if (BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, X509_get_serialNumber(ret)) == NULL) goto end; if (selfsign) { if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, subject)) goto end; } else { if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x509))) goto end; } if (!set_cert_times(ret, startdate, enddate, days)) goto end; if (enddate != NULL) { int tdays; ASN1_TIME_diff(&tdays, NULL, NULL, X509_get0_notAfter(ret)); days = tdays; } if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, subject)) goto end; pktmp = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req); i = X509_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp); if (!i) goto end; /* Lets add the extensions, if there are any */ if (ext_sect) { X509V3_CTX ctx; /* Initialize the context structure */ if (selfsign) X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, ret, ret, req, NULL, 0); else X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x509, ret, req, NULL, 0); if (extconf) { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra configuration file found\n"); /* Use the extconf configuration db LHASH */ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, extconf); /* Test the structure (needed?) */ /* X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); */ /* Adds exts contained in the configuration file */ if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(extconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n", ext_sect); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully added extensions from file.\n"); } else if (ext_sect) { /* We found extensions to be set from config file */ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, lconf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(lconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n", ext_sect); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully added extensions from config\n"); } } /* Copy extensions from request (if any) */ if (!copy_extensions(ret, req, ext_copy)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions from request\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } { const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = X509_get0_extensions(ret); if (exts != NULL && sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) > 0) /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */ if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2)) goto end; } /* Set the right value for the noemailDN option */ if (email_dn == 0) { if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject)) goto end; } if (!default_op) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate Details:\n"); /* * Never print signature details because signature not present */ certopt |= X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP | X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME; X509_print_ex(bio_err, ret, nameopt, certopt); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate is to be certified until "); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notAfter(ret)); if (days) BIO_printf(bio_err, " (%ld days)", days); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (!batch) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Sign the certificate? [y/n]:"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); buf[0] = '\0'; if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, stdin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED: I/O error\n"); ok = 0; goto end; } if (!((buf[0] == 'y') || (buf[0] == 'Y'))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED\n"); ok = 0; goto end; } } pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(ret); if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pktmp) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey); if (!do_X509_sign(ret, pkey, dgst, sigopts)) goto end; /* We now just add it to the database */ row[DB_type] = OPENSSL_strdup("V"); tm = X509_get0_notAfter(ret); row[DB_exp_date] = app_malloc(tm->length + 1, "row expdate"); memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length); row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0'; row[DB_rev_date] = NULL; row[DB_file] = OPENSSL_strdup("unknown"); row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ret), NULL, 0); if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) || (row[DB_file] == NULL) || (row[DB_name] == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } irow = app_malloc(sizeof(*irow) * (DB_NUMBER + 1), "row space"); for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) irow[i] = row[i]; irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL; if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error); goto end; } irow = NULL; ok = 1; end: if (irow != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) OPENSSL_free(row[i]); OPENSSL_free(irow); } X509_NAME_free(CAname); X509_NAME_free(subject); if (dn_subject != subject) X509_NAME_free(dn_subject); if (ok <= 0) X509_free(ret); else *xret = ret; return (ok); } static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der, int notext) { if (output_der) { (void)i2d_X509_bio(bp, x); return; } if (!notext) X509_print(bp, x); PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x); } static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, const char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn, int email_dn, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, long days, const char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL; LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *parms = NULL; X509_REQ *req = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cv = NULL; NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL; char *type, *buf; EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL; X509_NAME *n = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = NULL; int ok = -1, i, j; long errline; int nid; /* * Load input file into a hash table. (This is just an easy * way to read and parse the file, then put it into a convenient * STACK format). */ parms = CONF_load(NULL, infile, &errline); if (parms == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of %s\n", errline, infile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } sk = CONF_get_section(parms, "default"); if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no name/value pairs found in %s\n", infile); goto end; } /* * Now create a dummy X509 request structure. We don't actually * have an X509 request, but we have many of the components * (a public key, various DN components). The idea is that we * put these components into the right X509 request structure * and we can use the same code as if you had a real X509 request. */ req = X509_REQ_new(); if (req == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* * Build up the subject name set. */ n = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req); for (i = 0;; i++) { if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) <= i) break; cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i); type = cv->name; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances */ for (buf = cv->name; *buf; buf++) if ((*buf == ':') || (*buf == ',') || (*buf == '.')) { buf++; if (*buf) type = buf; break; } buf = cv->value; if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) { if (strcmp(type, "SPKAC") == 0) { spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(cv->value, -1); if (spki == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load Netscape SPKAC structure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } continue; } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, 0)) goto end; } if (spki == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Netscape SPKAC structure not found in %s\n", infile); goto end; } /* * Now extract the key from the SPKI structure. */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the SPKAC request matches the signature\n"); if ((pktmp = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking SPKAC public key\n"); goto end; } j = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pktmp); if (j <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); BIO_printf(bio_err, "signature verification failed on SPKAC public key\n"); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n"); X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pktmp); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, 1, verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, 0); end: X509_REQ_free(req); CONF_free(parms); NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki); X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); return (ok); } static int check_time_format(const char *str) { return ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, str); } static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int type, char *value) { const ASN1_TIME *tm = NULL; char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow, **irow; char *rev_str = NULL; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; int ok = -1, i; for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), NULL, 0); bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), NULL); if (!bn) goto end; if (BN_is_zero(bn)) row[DB_serial] = OPENSSL_strdup("00"); else row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(bn); BN_free(bn); if ((row[DB_name] == NULL) || (row[DB_serial] == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } /* * We have to lookup by serial number because name lookup skips revoked * certs */ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); if (rrow == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Adding Entry with serial number %s to DB for %s\n", row[DB_serial], row[DB_name]); /* We now just add it to the database */ row[DB_type] = OPENSSL_strdup("V"); tm = X509_get0_notAfter(x509); row[DB_exp_date] = app_malloc(tm->length + 1, "row exp_data"); memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length); row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0'; row[DB_rev_date] = NULL; row[DB_file] = OPENSSL_strdup("unknown"); if (row[DB_type] == NULL || row[DB_file] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } irow = app_malloc(sizeof(*irow) * (DB_NUMBER + 1), "row ptr"); for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) irow[i] = row[i]; irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL; if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error); OPENSSL_free(irow); goto end; } for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; /* Revoke Certificate */ if (type == -1) ok = 1; else ok = do_revoke(x509, db, type, value); goto end; } else if (index_name_cmp_noconst(row, rrow)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:name does not match %s\n", row[DB_name]); goto end; } else if (type == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already present, serial number %s\n", row[DB_serial]); goto end; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already revoked, serial number %s\n", row[DB_serial]); goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Revoking Certificate %s.\n", rrow[DB_serial]); rev_str = make_revocation_str(type, value); if (!rev_str) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in revocation arguments\n"); goto end; } rrow[DB_type][0] = 'R'; rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; rrow[DB_rev_date] = rev_str; } ok = 1; end: for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) OPENSSL_free(row[i]); return (ok); } static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db) { char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow; int ok = -1, i; size_t serial_len = strlen(serial); /* Free Resources */ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; /* Malloc needed char spaces */ row[DB_serial] = app_malloc(serial_len + 2, "row serial#"); if (serial_len % 2) { /* * Set the first char to 0 */ ; row[DB_serial][0] = '0'; /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */ memcpy(row[DB_serial] + 1, serial, serial_len); row[DB_serial][serial_len + 1] = '\0'; } else { /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */ memcpy(row[DB_serial], serial, serial_len); row[DB_serial][serial_len] = '\0'; } /* Make it Upper Case */ for (i = 0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++) row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]); ok = 1; /* Search for the certificate */ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); if (rrow == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial %s not present in db.\n", row[DB_serial]); ok = -1; goto end; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Valid (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto end; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Revoked (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto end; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto end; } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'S') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Suspended (%c)\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Unknown (%c).\n", row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]); ok = -1; } end: for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) { OPENSSL_free(row[i]); } return (ok); } static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db) { ASN1_UTCTIME *a_tm = NULL; int i, cnt = 0; int db_y2k, a_y2k; /* flags = 1 if y >= 2000 */ char **rrow, *a_tm_s; a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); if (a_tm == NULL) return -1; /* get actual time and make a string */ a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0); a_tm_s = app_malloc(a_tm->length + 1, "time string"); memcpy(a_tm_s, a_tm->data, a_tm->length); a_tm_s[a_tm->length] = '\0'; if (strncmp(a_tm_s, "49", 2) <= 0) a_y2k = 1; else a_y2k = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { rrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') { /* ignore entries that are not valid */ if (strncmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], "49", 2) <= 0) db_y2k = 1; else db_y2k = 0; if (db_y2k == a_y2k) { /* all on the same y2k side */ if (strcmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], a_tm_s) <= 0) { rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E'; rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; cnt++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]); } } else if (db_y2k < a_y2k) { rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E'; rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; cnt++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]); } } } ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm); OPENSSL_free(a_tm_s); return (cnt); } static const char *crl_reasons[] = { /* CRL reason strings */ "unspecified", "keyCompromise", "CACompromise", "affiliationChanged", "superseded", "cessationOfOperation", "certificateHold", "removeFromCRL", /* Additional pseudo reasons */ "holdInstruction", "keyTime", "CAkeyTime" }; #define NUM_REASONS OSSL_NELEM(crl_reasons) /* * Given revocation information convert to a DB string. The format of the * string is: revtime[,reason,extra]. Where 'revtime' is the revocation time * (the current time). 'reason' is the optional CRL reason and 'extra' is any * additional argument */ char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg) { char *str; const char *other = NULL; const char *reason = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *otmp; ASN1_UTCTIME *revtm = NULL; int i; switch (rev_type) { case REV_NONE: break; case REV_CRL_REASON: for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (strcasecmp(rev_arg, crl_reasons[i]) == 0) { reason = crl_reasons[i]; break; } } if (reason == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown CRL reason %s\n", rev_arg); return NULL; } break; case REV_HOLD: /* Argument is an OID */ otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(rev_arg, 0); ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp); if (otmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid object identifier %s\n", rev_arg); return NULL; } reason = "holdInstruction"; other = rev_arg; break; case REV_KEY_COMPROMISE: case REV_CA_COMPROMISE: /* Argument is the key compromise time */ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(NULL, rev_arg)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid time format %s. Need YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n", rev_arg); return NULL; } other = rev_arg; if (rev_type == REV_KEY_COMPROMISE) reason = "keyTime"; else reason = "CAkeyTime"; break; } revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0); if (!revtm) return NULL; i = revtm->length + 1; if (reason) i += strlen(reason) + 1; if (other) i += strlen(other) + 1; str = app_malloc(i, "revocation reason"); OPENSSL_strlcpy(str, (char *)revtm->data, i); if (reason) { OPENSSL_strlcat(str, ",", i); OPENSSL_strlcat(str, reason, i); } if (other) { OPENSSL_strlcat(str, ",", i); OPENSSL_strlcat(str, other, i); } ASN1_UTCTIME_free(revtm); return str; } /*- * Convert revocation field to X509_REVOKED entry * return code: * 0 error * 1 OK * 2 OK and some extensions added (i.e. V2 CRL) */ int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str) { char *tmp = NULL; int reason_code = -1; int i, ret = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL; ASN1_ENUMERATED *rtmp = NULL; ASN1_TIME *revDate = NULL; i = unpack_revinfo(&revDate, &reason_code, &hold, &comp_time, str); if (i == 0) goto end; if (rev && !X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(rev, revDate)) goto end; if (rev && (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)) { rtmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new(); if (rtmp == NULL || !ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rtmp, reason_code)) goto end; if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_crl_reason, rtmp, 0, 0)) goto end; } if (rev && comp_time) { if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d (rev, NID_invalidity_date, comp_time, 0, 0)) goto end; } if (rev && hold) { if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d (rev, NID_hold_instruction_code, hold, 0, 0)) goto end; } if (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) ret = 2; else ret = 1; end: OPENSSL_free(tmp); ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time); ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(rtmp); ASN1_TIME_free(revDate); return ret; } static int old_entry_print(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, const ASN1_STRING *str) { char buf[25], *pbuf; const char *p; int j; j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, obj); pbuf = buf; for (j = 22 - j; j > 0; j--) *(pbuf++) = ' '; *(pbuf++) = ':'; *(pbuf++) = '\0'; BIO_puts(bio_err, buf); if (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) BIO_printf(bio_err, "PRINTABLE:'"); else if (str->type == V_ASN1_T61STRING) BIO_printf(bio_err, "T61STRING:'"); else if (str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) BIO_printf(bio_err, "IA5STRING:'"); else if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) BIO_printf(bio_err, "UNIVERSALSTRING:'"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "ASN.1 %2d:'", str->type); p = (const char *)str->data; for (j = str->length; j > 0; j--) { if ((*p >= ' ') && (*p <= '~')) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%c", *p); else if (*p & 0x80) BIO_printf(bio_err, "\\0x%02X", *p); else if ((unsigned char)*p == 0xf7) BIO_printf(bio_err, "^?"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "^%c", *p + '@'); p++; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "'\n"); return 1; } int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pinvtm, const char *str) { char *tmp; char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p; int reason_code = -1; int ret = 0; unsigned int i; ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL; tmp = OPENSSL_strdup(str); if (!tmp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } p = strchr(tmp, ','); rtime_str = tmp; if (p) { *p = '\0'; p++; reason_str = p; p = strchr(p, ','); if (p) { *p = '\0'; arg_str = p + 1; } } if (prevtm) { *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); if (*prevtm == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str); goto end; } } if (reason_str) { for (i = 0; i < NUM_REASONS; i++) { if (strcasecmp(reason_str, crl_reasons[i]) == 0) { reason_code = i; break; } } if (reason_code == OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid reason code %s\n", reason_str); goto end; } if (reason_code == 7) reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL; else if (reason_code == 8) { /* Hold instruction */ if (!arg_str) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing hold instruction\n"); goto end; } reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD; hold = OBJ_txt2obj(arg_str, 0); if (!hold) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid object identifier %s\n", arg_str); goto end; } if (phold) *phold = hold; else ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold); } else if ((reason_code == 9) || (reason_code == 10)) { if (!arg_str) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing compromised time\n"); goto end; } comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new(); if (comp_time == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str); goto end; } if (reason_code == 9) reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE; else reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE; } } if (preason) *preason = reason_code; if (pinvtm) { *pinvtm = comp_time; comp_time = NULL; } ret = 1; end: OPENSSL_free(tmp); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ciphers.c0000644000000000000000000001454613176625656014640 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_STDNAME, OPT_SSL3, OPT_TLS1, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_PSK, OPT_SRP, OPT_V, OPT_UPPER_V, OPT_S } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS ciphers_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"v", OPT_V, '-', "Verbose listing of the SSL/TLS ciphers"}, {"V", OPT_UPPER_V, '-', "Even more verbose"}, {"s", OPT_S, '-', "Only supported ciphers"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "SSL3 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "TLS1 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "TLS1.1 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "TLS1.2 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE {"stdname", OPT_STDNAME, '-', "Show standard cipher names"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK {"psk", OPT_PSK, '-', "include ciphersuites requiring PSK"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP {"srp", OPT_SRP, '-', "include ciphersuites requiring SRP"}, #endif {NULL} }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static unsigned int dummy_psk(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { return 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static char *dummy_srp(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { return ""; } #endif int ciphers_main(int argc, char **argv) { SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; SSL *ssl = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_server_method(); int ret = 1, i, verbose = 0, Verbose = 0, use_supported = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE int stdname = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int psk = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP int srp = 0; #endif const char *p; char *ciphers = NULL, *prog; char buf[512]; OPTION_CHOICE o; int min_version = 0, max_version = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ciphers_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(ciphers_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_V: verbose = 1; break; case OPT_UPPER_V: verbose = Verbose = 1; break; case OPT_S: use_supported = 1; break; case OPT_STDNAME: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE stdname = verbose = 1; #endif break; case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; break; case OPT_PSK: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK psk = 1; #endif break; case OPT_SRP: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP srp = 1; #endif break; } } argv = opt_rest(); argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc == 1) ciphers = *argv; else if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0) goto err; if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psk) SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, dummy_psk); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp) SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, dummy_srp); #endif if (ciphers != NULL) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, ciphers)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in cipher list\n"); goto err; } } ssl = SSL_new(ctx); if (ssl == NULL) goto err; if (use_supported) sk = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl); else sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); if (!verbose) { for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); p = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c); if (p == NULL) break; if (i != 0) BIO_printf(bio_out, ":"); BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s", p); } BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); } else { for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); if (Verbose) { unsigned long id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c); int id0 = (int)(id >> 24); int id1 = (int)((id >> 16) & 0xffL); int id2 = (int)((id >> 8) & 0xffL); int id3 = (int)(id & 0xffL); if ((id & 0xff000000L) == 0x03000000L) BIO_printf(bio_out, " 0x%02X,0x%02X - ", id2, id3); /* SSL3 * cipher */ else BIO_printf(bio_out, "0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X - ", id0, id1, id2, id3); /* whatever */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (stdname) { const char *nm = SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(c); if (nm == NULL) nm = "UNKNOWN"; BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s - ", nm); } #endif BIO_puts(bio_out, SSL_CIPHER_description(c, buf, sizeof buf)); } } ret = 0; goto end; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); end: if (use_supported) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); SSL_free(ssl); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s512-req.pem0000644000000000000000000000071413176625656015011 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBGzCBxgIBADBjMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKUXVlZW5zbGFuZDEa MBgGA1UEChMRQ3J5cHRTb2Z0IFB0eSBMdGQxIzAhBgNVBAMTGlNlcnZlciB0ZXN0 IGNlcnQgKDUxMiBiaXQpMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAJ+zw4Qnlf8S MVIPFe9GEcStgOY2Ww/dgNdhjeD8ckUJNP5VZkVDTGiXav6ooKXfX3j/7tdkuD8E y2//Kv7+ue0CAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAAB+uQi+qwn6qRSHB8EUTvsm 5TNTHzYDeN39nyIbZNX2s0se3Srn2Bxft5YCwD3moFZ9QoyDHxE0h6qLX5yjD+8= -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/verify.c0000644000000000000000000002407013176625656014500 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain); static int v_verbose = 0, vflags = 0; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_UNTRUSTED, OPT_TRUSTED, OPT_CRLFILE, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SHOW_CHAIN, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_VERBOSE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS verify_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Print extra information about the operations being performed."}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "A directory of trusted certificates"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "A file of untrusted certificates"}, {"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"}, {"CRLfile", OPT_CRLFILE, '<', "File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load"}, {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-', "Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate"}, {"show_chain", OPT_SHOW_CHAIN, '-', "Display information about the certificate chain"}, OPT_V_OPTIONS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int verify_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL, *trusted = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; const char *prog, *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int vpmtouched = 0, crl_download = 0, show_chain = 0, i = 0, ret = 1; OPTION_CHOICE o; if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) goto end; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, verify_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(verify_options); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Recognized usages:\n"); for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n", X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp), X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp)); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Recognized verify names:\n"); for (i = 0; i < X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(); i++) { const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vptmp; vptmp = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(i); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\n", X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(vptmp)); } ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_UNTRUSTED: /* Zero or more times */ if (!load_certs(opt_arg(), &untrusted, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "untrusted certificates")) goto end; break; case OPT_TRUSTED: /* Zero or more times */ noCAfile = 1; noCApath = 1; if (!load_certs(opt_arg(), &trusted, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "trusted certificates")) goto end; break; case OPT_CRLFILE: /* Zero or more times */ if (!load_crls(opt_arg(), &crls, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "other CRLs")) goto end; break; case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD: crl_download = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: if ((e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0)) == NULL) { /* Failure message already displayed */ goto end; } break; case OPT_SHOW_CHAIN: show_chain = 1; break; case OPT_VERBOSE: v_verbose = 1; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (trusted != NULL && (CAfile || CApath)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Cannot use -trusted with -CAfile or -CApath\n", prog); goto end; } if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL) goto end; X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, cb); if (vpmtouched) X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm); ERR_clear_error(); if (crl_download) store_setup_crl_download(store); ret = 0; if (argc < 1) { if (check(store, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, show_chain) != 1) ret = -1; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) if (check(store, argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, show_chain) != 1) ret = -1; } end: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); X509_STORE_free(store); sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); release_engine(e); return (ret < 0 ? 2 : ret); } static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain) { X509 *x = NULL; int i = 0, ret = 0; X509_STORE_CTX *csc; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; int num_untrusted; x = load_cert(file, FORMAT_PEM, "certificate file"); if (x == NULL) goto end; csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (csc == NULL) { printf("error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file); goto end; } X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) { printf("error %s: X.509 store context initialization failed\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file); goto end; } if (tchain) X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(csc, tchain); if (crls) X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls); i = X509_verify_cert(csc); if (i > 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc) == X509_V_OK) { printf("%s: OK\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file); ret = 1; if (show_chain) { int j; chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(csc); num_untrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(csc); printf("Chain:\n"); for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(chain); j++) { X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, j); printf("depth=%d: ", j); X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout, X509_get_subject_name(cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); if (j < num_untrusted) printf(" (untrusted)"); printf("\n"); } sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); } } else { printf("error %s: verification failed\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file); } X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); end: if (i <= 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_free(x); return ret; } static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int cert_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); X509 *current_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); if (!ok) { if (current_cert) { X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "%serror %d at %d depth lookup: %s\n", X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(ctx) ? "[CRL path] " : "", cert_error, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), X509_verify_cert_error_string(cert_error)); switch (cert_error) { case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: policies_print(ctx); /* fall thru */ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: /* * since we are just checking the certificates, it is ok if they * are self signed. But we should still warn the user. */ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: /* Continue after extension errors too */ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA: case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: ok = 1; } return ok; } if (cert_error == X509_V_OK && ok == 2) policies_print(ctx); if (!v_verbose) ERR_clear_error(); return (ok); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/req.pem0000644000000000000000000000116313176625656014320 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBlzCCAVcCAQAwXjELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgTClNvbWUtU3RhdGUx ITAfBgNVBAoTGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDEXMBUGA1UEAxMORXJp YyB0aGUgWW91bmcwge8wgaYGBSsOAwIMMIGcAkEA+ZiKEvZmc9MtnaFZh4NiZ3oZ S4J1PHvPrm9MXj5ntVheDPkdmBDTncyaGAJcMjwsyB/GvLDGd6yGCw/8eF+09wIV AK3VagOxGd/Q4Af5NbxR5FB7CXEjAkA2t/q7HgVLi0KeKvcDG8BRl3wuy7bCvpjg tWiJc/tpvcuzeuAayH89UofjAGueKjXDADiRffvSdhrNw5dkqdqlA0QAAkEAtUSo 84OekjitKGVjxLu0HvXck29pu+foad53vPKXAsuJdACj88BPqZ91Y9PIJf1GUh38 CuiHWi7z3cEDfZCyCKAAMAkGBSsOAwIbBQADLwAwLAIUTg8amKVBE9oqC5B75dDQ Chy3LdQCFHKodGEj3LjuTzdm/RTe2KZL9Uzf -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/crl.c0000644000000000000000000002561413176625656013761 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_OUT, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_KEY, OPT_ISSUER, OPT_LASTUPDATE, OPT_NEXTUPDATE, OPT_FINGERPRINT, OPT_CRLNUMBER, OPT_BADSIG, OPT_GENDELTA, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_TEXT, OPT_HASH, OPT_HASH_OLD, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_MD } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS crl_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format; default PEM"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - default PEM"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "output file - default stdout"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'F', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "CRL signing Private key to use"}, {"issuer", OPT_ISSUER, '-', "Print issuer DN"}, {"lastupdate", OPT_LASTUPDATE, '-', "Set lastUpdate field"}, {"nextupdate", OPT_NEXTUPDATE, '-', "Set nextUpdate field"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "No CRL output"}, {"fingerprint", OPT_FINGERPRINT, '-', "Print the crl fingerprint"}, {"crlnumber", OPT_CRLNUMBER, '-', "Print CRL number"}, {"badsig", OPT_BADSIG, '-', "Corrupt last byte of loaded CRL signature (for test)" }, {"gendelta", OPT_GENDELTA, '<', "Other CRL to compare/diff to the Input one"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "Verify CRL using certificates in dir"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Verify CRL using certificates in file name"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify CRL signature"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print out a text format version"}, {"hash", OPT_HASH, '-', "Print hash value"}, {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"}, {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 {"hash_old", OPT_HASH_OLD, '-', "Print old-style (MD5) hash value"}, #endif {NULL} }; int crl_main(int argc, char **argv) { X509_CRL *x = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL; X509_OBJECT *xobj = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_sha1(); unsigned long nmflag = 0; char nmflag_set = 0; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *crldiff = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL, *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; int hash = 0, issuer = 0, lastupdate = 0, nextupdate = 0, noout = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, keyformat = FORMAT_PEM; int ret = 1, num = 0, badsig = 0, fingerprint = 0, crlnumber = 0; int text = 0, do_ver = 0, noCAfile = 0, noCApath = 0; int i; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 int hash_old = 0; #endif prog = opt_init(argc, argv, crl_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(crl_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &keyformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_KEY: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_GENDELTA: crldiff = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); do_ver = 1; break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); do_ver = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_HASH_OLD: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 hash_old = ++num; #endif break; case OPT_VERIFY: do_ver = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_HASH: hash = ++num; break; case OPT_ISSUER: issuer = ++num; break; case OPT_LASTUPDATE: lastupdate = ++num; break; case OPT_NEXTUPDATE: nextupdate = ++num; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = ++num; break; case OPT_FINGERPRINT: fingerprint = ++num; break; case OPT_CRLNUMBER: crlnumber = ++num; break; case OPT_BADSIG: badsig = 1; break; case OPT_NAMEOPT: nmflag_set = 1; if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &digest)) goto opthelp; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (!nmflag_set) nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE; x = load_crl(infile, informat); if (x == NULL) goto end; if (do_ver) { if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL) goto end; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) goto end; ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, NULL, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error initialising X509 store\n"); goto end; } xobj = X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)); if (xobj == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting CRL issuer certificate\n"); goto end; } pkey = X509_get_pubkey(X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(xobj)); X509_OBJECT_free(xobj); if (!pkey) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting CRL issuer public key\n"); goto end; } i = X509_CRL_verify(x, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i < 0) goto end; if (i == 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify failure\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify OK\n"); } if (crldiff) { X509_CRL *newcrl, *delta; if (!keyfile) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Missing CRL signing key\n"); goto end; } newcrl = load_crl(crldiff, informat); if (!newcrl) goto end; pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, NULL, NULL, "CRL signing key"); if (!pkey) { X509_CRL_free(newcrl); goto end; } delta = X509_CRL_diff(x, newcrl, pkey, digest, 0); X509_CRL_free(newcrl); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (delta) { X509_CRL_free(x); x = delta; } else { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error creating delta CRL\n"); goto end; } } if (badsig) { const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig; X509_CRL_get0_signature(x, &sig, NULL); corrupt_signature(sig); } if (num) { for (i = 1; i <= num; i++) { if (issuer == i) { print_name(bio_out, "issuer=", X509_CRL_get_issuer(x), nmflag); } if (crlnumber == i) { ASN1_INTEGER *crlnum; crlnum = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_number, NULL, NULL); BIO_printf(bio_out, "crlNumber="); if (crlnum) { i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bio_out, crlnum); ASN1_INTEGER_free(crlnum); } else BIO_puts(bio_out, ""); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); } if (hash == i) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "%08lx\n", X509_NAME_hash(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x))); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 if (hash_old == i) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "%08lx\n", X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x))); } #endif if (lastupdate == i) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "lastUpdate="); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_out, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(x)); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); } if (nextupdate == i) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "nextUpdate="); if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x)) ASN1_TIME_print(bio_out, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(x)); else BIO_printf(bio_out, "NONE"); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); } if (fingerprint == i) { int j; unsigned int n; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (!X509_CRL_digest(x, digest, md, &n)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n"); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s Fingerprint=", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(digest))); for (j = 0; j < (int)n; j++) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "%02X%c", md[j], (j + 1 == (int)n) ? '\n' : ':'); } } } } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (text) X509_CRL_print(out, x); if (noout) { ret = 0; goto end; } if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = (int)i2d_X509_CRL_bio(out, x); else i = PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(out, x); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write CRL\n"); goto end; } ret = 0; end: if (ret != 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_free_all(out); X509_CRL_free(x); X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); X509_STORE_free(store); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/cert.pem0000644000000000000000000000115713176625656014471 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBoDCCAUoCAQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwYzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNV BAgTClF1ZWVuc2xhbmQxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUNyeXB0U29mdCBQdHkgTHRkMSMwIQYD VQQDExpTZXJ2ZXIgdGVzdCBjZXJ0ICg1MTIgYml0KTAeFw05NzA5MDkwMzQxMjZa Fw05NzEwMDkwMzQxMjZaMF4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpTb21lLVN0 YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKExhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQxFzAVBgNVBAMT DkVyaWMgdGhlIFlvdW5nMFEwCQYFKw4DAgwFAANEAAJBALVEqPODnpI4rShlY8S7 tB713JNvabvn6Gned7zylwLLiXQAo/PAT6mfdWPTyCX9RlId/Aroh1ou893BA32Q sggwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADQQCU5SSgapJSdRXJoX+CpCvFy+JVh9HpSjCpSNKO 19raHv98hKAUJuP9HyM+SUsffO6mAIgitUaqW8/wDMePhEC3 -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/win32_init.c0000644000000000000000000002063213176625656015161 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #if defined(CP_UTF8) static UINT saved_cp; static int newargc; static char **newargv; static void cleanup(void) { int i; SetConsoleOutputCP(saved_cp); for (i = 0; i < newargc; i++) free(newargv[i]); free(newargv); } /* * Incrementally [re]allocate newargv and keep it NULL-terminated. */ static int validate_argv(int argc) { static int size = 0; if (argc >= size) { char **ptr; while (argc >= size) size += 64; ptr = realloc(newargv, size * sizeof(newargv[0])); if (ptr == NULL) return 0; (newargv = ptr)[argc] = NULL; } else { newargv[argc] = NULL; } return 1; } static int process_glob(WCHAR *wstr, int wlen) { int i, slash, udlen; WCHAR saved_char; WIN32_FIND_DATAW data; HANDLE h; /* * Note that we support wildcard characters only in filename part * of the path, and not in directories. Windows users are used to * this, that's why recursive glob processing is not implemented. */ /* * Start by looking for last slash or backslash, ... */ for (slash = 0, i = 0; i < wlen; i++) if (wstr[i] == L'/' || wstr[i] == L'\\') slash = i + 1; /* * ... then look for asterisk or question mark in the file name. */ for (i = slash; i < wlen; i++) if (wstr[i] == L'*' || wstr[i] == L'?') break; if (i == wlen) return 0; /* definitely not a glob */ saved_char = wstr[wlen]; wstr[wlen] = L'\0'; h = FindFirstFileW(wstr, &data); wstr[wlen] = saved_char; if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 0; /* not a valid glob, just pass... */ if (slash) udlen = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wstr, slash, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); else udlen = 0; do { int uflen; char *arg; /* * skip over . and .. */ if (data.cFileName[0] == L'.') { if ((data.cFileName[1] == L'\0') || (data.cFileName[1] == L'.' && data.cFileName[2] == L'\0')) continue; } if (!validate_argv(newargc + 1)) break; /* * -1 below means "scan for trailing '\0' *and* count it", * so that |uflen| covers even trailing '\0'. */ uflen = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, data.cFileName, -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); arg = malloc(udlen + uflen); if (arg == NULL) break; if (udlen) WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wstr, slash, arg, udlen, NULL, NULL); WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, data.cFileName, -1, arg + udlen, uflen, NULL, NULL); newargv[newargc++] = arg; } while (FindNextFileW(h, &data)); CloseHandle(h); return 1; } void win32_utf8argv(int *argc, char **argv[]) { const WCHAR *wcmdline; WCHAR *warg, *wend, *p; int wlen, ulen, valid = 1; char *arg; if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8", NULL, 0) == 0) return; newargc = 0; newargv = NULL; if (!validate_argv(newargc)) return; wcmdline = GetCommandLineW(); if (wcmdline == NULL) return; /* * make a copy of the command line, since we might have to modify it... */ wlen = wcslen(wcmdline); p = _alloca((wlen + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR)); wcscpy(p, wcmdline); while (*p != L'\0') { int in_quote = 0; if (*p == L' ' || *p == L'\t') { p++; /* skip over white spaces */ continue; } /* * Note: because we may need to fiddle with the number of backslashes, * the argument string is copied into itself. This is safe because * the number of characters will never expand. */ warg = wend = p; while (*p != L'\0' && (in_quote || (*p != L' ' && *p != L'\t'))) { switch (*p) { case L'\\': /* * Microsoft documentation on how backslashes are treated * is: * * + Backslashes are interpreted literally, unless they * immediately precede a double quotation mark. * + If an even number of backslashes is followed by a double * quotation mark, one backslash is placed in the argv array * for every pair of backslashes, and the double quotation * mark is interpreted as a string delimiter. * + If an odd number of backslashes is followed by a double * quotation mark, one backslash is placed in the argv array * for every pair of backslashes, and the double quotation * mark is "escaped" by the remaining backslash, causing a * literal double quotation mark (") to be placed in argv. * * Ref: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/17w5ykft.aspx * * Though referred page doesn't mention it, multiple qouble * quotes are also special. Pair of double quotes in quoted * string is counted as single double quote. */ { const WCHAR *q = p; int i; while (*p == L'\\') p++; if (*p == L'"') { int i; for (i = (p - q) / 2; i > 0; i--) *wend++ = L'\\'; /* * if odd amount of backslashes before the quote, * said quote is part of the argument, not a delimiter */ if ((p - q) % 2 == 1) *wend++ = *p++; } else { for (i = p - q; i > 0; i--) *wend++ = L'\\'; } } break; case L'"': /* * Without the preceding backslash (or when preceded with an * even number of backslashes), the double quote is a simple * string delimiter and just slightly change the parsing state */ if (in_quote && p[1] == L'"') *wend++ = *p++; else in_quote = !in_quote; p++; break; default: /* * Any other non-delimiter character is just taken verbatim */ *wend++ = *p++; } } wlen = wend - warg; if (wlen == 0 || !process_glob(warg, wlen)) { if (!validate_argv(newargc + 1)) { valid = 0; break; } ulen = 0; if (wlen > 0) { ulen = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, warg, wlen, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); if (ulen <= 0) continue; } arg = malloc(ulen + 1); if (arg == NULL) { valid = 0; break; } if (wlen > 0) WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, warg, wlen, arg, ulen, NULL, NULL); arg[ulen] = '\0'; newargv[newargc++] = arg; } } if (valid) { saved_cp = GetConsoleOutputCP(); SetConsoleOutputCP(CP_UTF8); *argc = newargc; *argv = newargv; atexit(cleanup); } else if (newargv != NULL) { int i; for (i = 0; i < newargc; i++) free(newargv[i]); free(newargv); newargc = 0; newargv = NULL; } return; } #else void win32_utf8argv(int &argc, char **argv[]) { return; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/crl2p7.c0000644000000000000000000001422713176625656014310 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include static int add_certs_from_file(STACK_OF(X509) *stack, char *certfile); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_NOCRL, OPT_CERTFILE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS crl2pkcs7_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"nocrl", OPT_NOCRL, '-', "No crl to load, just certs from '-certfile'"}, {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<', "File of chain of certs to a trusted CA; can be repeated"}, {NULL} }; int crl2pkcs7_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *certflst = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl_stack = NULL; X509_CRL *crl = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog, *certfile; int i = 0, informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, ret = 1, nocrl = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, crl2pkcs7_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(crl2pkcs7_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCRL: nocrl = 1; break; case OPT_CERTFILE: if ((certflst == NULL) && (certflst = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst, opt_arg())) goto end; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (!nocrl) { in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) crl = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL); else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (crl == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL) goto end; if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL) goto end; p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed); p7->d.sign = p7s; p7s->contents->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 1)) goto end; if ((crl_stack = sk_X509_CRL_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; p7s->crl = crl_stack; if (crl != NULL) { sk_X509_CRL_push(crl_stack, crl); crl = NULL; /* now part of p7 for OPENSSL_freeing */ } if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; p7s->cert = cert_stack; if (certflst) for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(certflst); i++) { certfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(certflst, i); if (add_certs_from_file(cert_stack, certfile) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error loading certificates\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_PKCS7_bio(out, p7); else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) i = PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(out, p7); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write pkcs7 object\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; end: sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(certflst); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); PKCS7_free(p7); X509_CRL_free(crl); return (ret); } /*- *---------------------------------------------------------------------- * int add_certs_from_file * * Read a list of certificates to be checked from a file. * * Results: * number of certs added if successful, -1 if not. *---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int add_certs_from_file(STACK_OF(X509) *stack, char *certfile) { BIO *in = NULL; int count = 0; int ret = -1; STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL; X509_INFO *xi; in = BIO_new_file(certfile, "r"); if (in == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error opening the file, %s\n", certfile); goto end; } /* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */ sk = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (sk == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error reading the file, %s\n", certfile); goto end; } /* scan over it and pull out the CRL's */ while (sk_X509_INFO_num(sk)) { xi = sk_X509_INFO_shift(sk); if (xi->x509 != NULL) { sk_X509_push(stack, xi->x509); xi->x509 = NULL; count++; } X509_INFO_free(xi); } ret = count; end: /* never need to OPENSSL_free x */ BIO_free(in); sk_X509_INFO_free(sk); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/testCA.pem0000644000000000000000000000066013176625656014715 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBBzCBsgIBADBNMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKUXVlZW5zbGFuZDEX MBUGA1UEChMOTWluY29tIFB0eSBMdGQxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1RFU1QgQ0EwXDANBgkq hkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAzW9brgA8efT2ODB+NrsflJZj3KKqKsm4OrXTRqfL VETj1ws/zCXl42XJAxdWQMCP0liKfc9Ut4xi1qCVI7N07wIDAQABoAAwDQYJKoZI hvcNAQEEBQADQQBjZZ42Det9Uw0AFwJy4ufUEy5Cv74pxBp5SZnljgHY+Az0Hs2S uNkIegr2ITX5azKi9nOkg9ZmsmGG13FIjiC/ -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/server2.pem0000644000000000000000000000633013176625656015122 0ustar rootrootsubject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert #2 issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID6jCCAtKgAwIBAgIJALnu1NlVpZ60MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT VElORyBQVVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMSUwIwYDVQQDDBxPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJt ZWRpYXRlIENBMB4XDTExMTIwODE0MDE0OFoXDTIxMTAxNjE0MDE0OFowZzELMAkG A1UEBhMCVUsxFjAUBgNVBAoMDU9wZW5TU0wgR3JvdXAxIjAgBgNVBAsMGUZPUiBU RVNUSU5HIFBVUlBPU0VTIE9OTFkxHDAaBgNVBAMME1Rlc3QgU2VydmVyIENlcnQg IzIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDrdi7j9yctG+L4EjBy gjPmEqZzOJEQba26MoQGzglU7e5Xf59Rb/hgVQuKAoiZe7/R8rK4zJ4W7iXdXw0L qBpyG8B5aGKeI32w+A9TcBApoXXL2CrYQEQjZwUIpLlYBIi2NkJj3nVkq5dgl1gO ALiQ+W8jg3kzg5Ec9rimp9r93N8wsSL3awsafurmYCvOf7leHaMP1WJ/zDRGUNHG /WtDjXc8ZUG1+6EXU9Jc2Fs+2Omf7fcN0l00AK/wPg8OaNS0rKyGq9JdIT9FRGV1 bXe/rx58FaE5CItdwCSYhJvF/O95LWQoxJXye5bCFLmvDTEyVq9FMSCptfsmbXjE ZGsXAgMBAAGjgY8wgYwwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwLAYJ YIZIAYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlMB0GA1Ud DgQWBBR52UaWWTKzZGDH/X4mWNcuqeQVazAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ2w2yI55X+sL3s zj49hqshgYfa2jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEANBW+XYLlHBqVY/31ie+3gRlS LPfy4SIqn0t3RJjagT29MXprblBO2cbMO8VGjkQdKGpmMXjxbht2arOOUXRHX4n/ XTyn/QHEf0bcwIITMReO3DZUPAEw8hSjn9xEOM0IRVOCP+mH5fi74QzzQaZVCyYg 5VtLKdww/+sc0nCbKl2KWgDluriH0nfVx95qgW3mg9dhXRr0zmf1w2zkBHYpARYL Dew6Z8EE4tS3HJu8/qM6meWzNtrfonQ3eiiMxjZBxzV46jchBwa2z9XYhP6AmpPb oeTSzcQNbWsxaGYzWo46oLDUZmJOwSBawbS31bZNMCoPIY6ukoesCzFSsUKZww== -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA63Yu4/cnLRvi+BIwcoIz5hKmcziREG2tujKEBs4JVO3uV3+f UW/4YFULigKImXu/0fKyuMyeFu4l3V8NC6gachvAeWhiniN9sPgPU3AQKaF1y9gq 2EBEI2cFCKS5WASItjZCY951ZKuXYJdYDgC4kPlvI4N5M4ORHPa4pqfa/dzfMLEi 92sLGn7q5mArzn+5Xh2jD9Vif8w0RlDRxv1rQ413PGVBtfuhF1PSXNhbPtjpn+33 DdJdNACv8D4PDmjUtKyshqvSXSE/RURldW13v68efBWhOQiLXcAkmISbxfzveS1k KMSV8nuWwhS5rw0xMlavRTEgqbX7Jm14xGRrFwIDAQABAoIBAHLsTPihIfLnYIE5 x4GsQQ5zXeBw5ITDM37ktwHnQDC+rIzyUl1aLD1AZRBoKinXd4lOTqLZ4/NHKx4A DYr58mZtWyUmqLOMmQVuHXTZBlp7XtYuXMMNovQwjQlp9LicBeoBU6gQ5PVMtubD F4xGF89Sn0cTHW3iMkqTtQ5KcR1j57OcJO0FEb1vPvk2MXI5ZyAatUYE7YacbEzd rg02uIwx3FqNSkuSI79uz4hMdV5TPtuhxx9nTwj9aLUhXFeZ0mn2PVgVzEnnMoJb +znlsZDgzDlJqdaD744YGWh8Z3OEssB35KfzFcdOeO6yH8lmv2Zfznk7pNPT7LTb Lae9VgkCgYEA92p1qnAB3NtJtNcaW53i0S5WJgS1hxWKvUDx3lTB9s8X9fHpqL1a E94fDfWzp/hax6FefUKIvBOukPLQ6bYjTMiFoOHzVirghAIuIUoMI5VtLhwD1hKs Lr7l/dptMgKb1nZHyXoKHRBthsy3K4+udsPi8TzMvYElgEqyQIe/Rk0CgYEA86GL 8HC6zLszzKERDPBxrboRmoFvVUCTQDhsfj1M8aR3nQ8V5LkdIJc7Wqm/Ggfk9QRf rJ8M2WUMlU5CNnCn/KCrKzCNZIReze3fV+HnKdbcXGLvgbHPrhnz8yYehUFG+RGq bVyDWRU94T38izy2s5qMYrMJWZEYyXncSPbfcPMCgYAtaXfxcZ+V5xYPQFARMtiX 5nZfggvDoJuXgx0h3tK/N2HBfcaSdzbaYLG4gTmZggc/jwnl2dl5E++9oSPhUdIG 3ONSFUbxsOsGr9PBvnKd8WZZyUCXAVRjPBzAzF+whzQNWCZy/5htnz9LN7YDI9s0 5113Q96cheDZPFydZY0hHQKBgQDVbEhNukM5xCiNcu+f2SaMnLp9EjQ4h5g3IvaP 5B16daw/Dw8LzcohWboqIxeAsze0GD/D1ZUJAEd0qBjC3g+a9BjefervCjKOzXng 38mEUm+6EwVjJSQcjSmycEs+Sr/kwr/8i5WYvU32+jk4tFgMoC+o6tQe/Uesf68k z/dPVwKBgGbF7Vv1/3SmhlOy+zYyvJ0CrWtKxH9QP6tLIEgEpd8x7YTSuCH94yok kToMXYA3sWNPt22GbRDZ+rcp4c7HkDx6I6vpdP9aQEwJTp0EPy0sgWr2XwYmreIQ NFmkk8Itn9EY2R9VBaP7GLv5kvwxDdLAnmwGmzVtbmaVdxCaBwUk -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ca-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000162413176625656014704 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIICdgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAmAwggJcAgEAAoGBAL4tQNyKy4U2zX6l IZvORB1edmwMwIgSB4cgoFECrG5pixzYxKauZkAwKG9/+L4DB8qXRjfXWcvafcOU DlYpRROykJ7wGkiqmqbZyrxY8DWjk5ZZQXiSuhYOAJB+Fyfb11JZV6+CvBQX/1g+ vhJr39Gmp6oAesoYrj90ecozClmnAgMBAAECgYA3j6sSg+5f9hnldUMzbPjTh8Sb XsJlPrc6UFrmMBzGiUleXSpe9Dbla+x0XvQCN4pwMvAN4nnWp/f0Su5BV/9Y93nb im5ijGNrfN9i6QrnqGCr+MMute+4E8HR2pCScX0mBLDDf40SmDvMzCaxtd21keyr 9DqHgInQZNEi6NKlkQJBAPCbUTFg6iQ6VTCQ8CsEf5q2xHhuTK23fJ999lvWVxN7 QsvWb9RP9Ng34HVtvB7Pl6P7FyHLQYiDJhhvYR0L0+kCQQDKV/09Kt6Wjf5Omp1I wd3A+tFnipdqnPw+qNHGjevv0hYiEIWQOYbx00zXgaX+WN/pzV9eeNN2XAxlNJ++ dxcPAkBrzeuPKFFAcjKBVC+H1rgl5gYZv7Hzk+buv02G0H6rZ+sB0c7BXiHiTwbv Fn/XfkP/YR14Ms3mEH0dLaphjU8hAkEAh3Ar/rRiN04mCcEuRFQXtaNtZSv8PA2G Pf7MI2Y9pdHupLCAZlBLRjTUO2/5hu1AO4QPMPIZQSFN3rRBtMCL+wJAMp/m2hvI TmtbMp/IrKGfma09e3yFiCmoNn7cHLJ7jLvXcacV2XNzpr9YHfBxiZo0g9FqZKvv PZoQ5B2XJ7bhTQ== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/prime.c0000644000000000000000000000661213176625656014312 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "apps.h" #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_HEX, OPT_GENERATE, OPT_BITS, OPT_SAFE, OPT_CHECKS } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS prime_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] [number...]\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " number Number to check for primality\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"hex", OPT_HEX, '-', "Hex output"}, {"generate", OPT_GENERATE, '-', "Generate a prime"}, {"bits", OPT_BITS, 'p', "Size of number in bits"}, {"safe", OPT_SAFE, '-', "When used with -generate, generate a safe prime"}, {"checks", OPT_CHECKS, 'p', "Number of checks"}, {NULL} }; int prime_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIGNUM *bn = NULL; int hex = 0, checks = 20, generate = 0, bits = 0, safe = 0, ret = 1; char *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, prime_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(prime_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_HEX: hex = 1; break; case OPT_GENERATE: generate = 1; break; case OPT_BITS: bits = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_SAFE: safe = 1; break; case OPT_CHECKS: checks = atoi(opt_arg()); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (argc == 0 && !generate) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: No prime specified\n", prog); goto end; } if (generate) { char *s; if (!bits) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Specify the number of bits.\n"); goto end; } bn = BN_new(); if (bn == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory.\n"); goto end; } if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(bn, bits, safe, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to generate prime.\n"); goto end; } s = hex ? BN_bn2hex(bn) : BN_bn2dec(bn); if (s == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory.\n"); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", s); OPENSSL_free(s); } else { for ( ; *argv; argv++) { int r; if (hex) r = BN_hex2bn(&bn, argv[0]); else r = BN_dec2bn(&bn, argv[0]); if(!r) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to process value (%s)\n", argv[0]); goto end; } BN_print(bio_out, bn); BIO_printf(bio_out, " (%s) %s prime\n", argv[0], BN_is_prime_ex(bn, checks, NULL, NULL) ? "is" : "is not"); } } ret = 0; end: BN_free(bn); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ct_log_list.cnf0000644000000000000000000000326613176625656016026 0ustar rootrootenabled_logs=pilot,aviator,rocketeer,digicert,certly,izempe,symantec,venafi [pilot] description = Google Pilot Log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEfahLEimAoz2t01p3uMziiLOl/fHTDM0YDOhBRuiBARsV4UvxG2LdNgoIGLrtCzWE0J5APC2em4JlvR8EEEFMoA== [aviator] description = Google Aviator log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE1/TMabLkDpCjiupacAlP7xNi0I1JYP8bQFAHDG1xhtolSY1l4QgNRzRrvSe8liE+NPWHdjGxfx3JhTsN9x8/6Q== [rocketeer] description = Google Rocketeer log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEIFsYyDzBi7MxCAC/oJBXK7dHjG+1aLCOkHjpoHPqTyghLpzA9BYbqvnV16mAw04vUjyYASVGJCUoI3ctBcJAeg== [digicert] description = DigiCert Log Server key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEAkbFvhu7gkAW6MHSrBlpE1n4+HCFRkC5OLAjgqhkTH+/uzSfSl8ois8ZxAD2NgaTZe1M9akhYlrYkes4JECs6A== [certly] description = Certly.IO log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAECyPLhWKYYUgEc+tUXfPQB4wtGS2MNvXrjwFCCnyYJifBtd2Sk7Cu+Js9DNhMTh35FftHaHu6ZrclnNBKwmbbSA== [izempe] description = Izempe log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJ2Q5DC3cUBj4IQCiDu0s6j51up+TZAkAEcQRF6tczw90rLWXkJMAW7jr9yc92bIKgV8vDXU4lDeZHvYHduDuvg== [symantec] description = Symantec log key = MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEluqsHEYMG1XcDfy1lCdGV0JwOmkY4r87xNuroPS2bMBTP01CEDPwWJePa75y9CrsHEKqAy8afig1dpkIPSEUhg== [venafi] description = Venafi log key = MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAolpIHxdSlTXLo1s6H1OCdpSj/4DyHDc8wLG9wVmLqy1lk9fz4ATVmm+/1iN2Nk8jmctUKK2MFUtlWXZBSpym97M7frGlSaQXUWyA3CqQUEuIJOmlEjKTBEiQAvpfDjCHjlV2Be4qTM6jamkJbiWtgnYPhJL6ONaGTiSPm7Byy57iaz/hbckldSOIoRhYBiMzeNoA0DiRZ9KmfSeXZ1rB8y8X5urSW+iBzf2SaOfzBvDpcoTuAaWx2DPazoOl28fP1hZ+kHUYvxbcMjttjauCFx+JII0dmuZNIwjfeG/GBb9frpSX219k1O4Wi6OEbHEr8at/XQ0y7gTikOxBn/s5wQIDAQAB openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pkcs12.c0000644000000000000000000007257113176625656014310 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # define NOKEYS 0x1 # define NOCERTS 0x2 # define INFO 0x4 # define CLCERTS 0x8 # define CACERTS 0x10 static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain); int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, const PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc); int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc); int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc); int print_attribs(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst, const char *name); void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len); static int alg_print(const X509_ALGOR *alg); int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); static int set_pbe(int *ppbe, const char *str); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_NOKEYS, OPT_KEYEX, OPT_KEYSIG, OPT_NOCERTS, OPT_CLCERTS, OPT_CACERTS, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_INFO, OPT_CHAIN, OPT_TWOPASS, OPT_NOMACVER, OPT_DESCERT, OPT_EXPORT, OPT_NOITER, OPT_MACITER, OPT_NOMACITER, OPT_NOMAC, OPT_LMK, OPT_NODES, OPT_MACALG, OPT_CERTPBE, OPT_KEYPBE, OPT_RAND, OPT_INKEY, OPT_CERTFILE, OPT_NAME, OPT_CSP, OPT_CANAME, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_PASSWORD, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_ENGINE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS pkcs12_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"nokeys", OPT_NOKEYS, '-', "Don't output private keys"}, {"keyex", OPT_KEYEX, '-', "Set MS key exchange type"}, {"keysig", OPT_KEYSIG, '-', "Set MS key signature type"}, {"nocerts", OPT_NOCERTS, '-', "Don't output certificates"}, {"clcerts", OPT_CLCERTS, '-', "Only output client certificates"}, {"cacerts", OPT_CACERTS, '-', "Only output CA certificates"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output anything, just verify"}, {"info", OPT_INFO, '-', "Print info about PKCS#12 structure"}, {"chain", OPT_CHAIN, '-', "Add certificate chain"}, {"twopass", OPT_TWOPASS, '-', "Separate MAC, encryption passwords"}, {"nomacver", OPT_NOMACVER, '-', "Don't verify MAC"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 {"descert", OPT_DESCERT, '-', "Encrypt output with 3DES (default RC2-40)"}, {"certpbe", OPT_CERTPBE, 's', "Certificate PBE algorithm (default RC2-40)"}, # else {"descert", OPT_DESCERT, '-', "Encrypt output with 3DES (the default)"}, {"certpbe", OPT_CERTPBE, 's', "Certificate PBE algorithm (default 3DES)"}, # endif {"export", OPT_EXPORT, '-', "Output PKCS12 file"}, {"noiter", OPT_NOITER, '-', "Don't use encryption iteration"}, {"maciter", OPT_MACITER, '-', "Use MAC iteration"}, {"nomaciter", OPT_NOMACITER, '-', "Don't use MAC iteration"}, {"nomac", OPT_NOMAC, '-', "Don't generate MAC"}, {"LMK", OPT_LMK, '-', "Add local machine keyset attribute to private key"}, {"nodes", OPT_NODES, '-', "Don't encrypt private keys"}, {"macalg", OPT_MACALG, 's', "Digest algorithm used in MAC (default SHA1)"}, {"keypbe", OPT_KEYPBE, 's', "Private key PBE algorithm (default 3DES)"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Private key if not infile"}, {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<', "Load certs from file"}, {"name", OPT_NAME, 's', "Use name as friendly name"}, {"CSP", OPT_CSP, 's', "Microsoft CSP name"}, {"caname", OPT_CANAME, 's', "Use name as CA friendly name (can be repeated)"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input filename"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output filename"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"password", OPT_PASSWORD, 's', "Set import/export password source"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM-format directory of CA's"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM-format file of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv) { char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyname = NULL, *certfile = NULL; char *name = NULL, *csp_name = NULL; char pass[2048] = "", macpass[2048] = ""; int export_cert = 0, options = 0, chain = 0, twopass = 0, keytype = 0; int iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER, maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; # else int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; # endif int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; int ret = 1, macver = 1, add_lmk = 0, private = 0; int noprompt = 0; char *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passarg = NULL; char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *inrand = NULL, *macalg = NULL; char *cpass = NULL, *mpass = NULL, *badpass = NULL; const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *prog; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; ENGINE *e = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; PKCS12 *p12 = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *canames = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkcs12_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(pkcs12_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_NOKEYS: options |= NOKEYS; break; case OPT_KEYEX: keytype = KEY_EX; break; case OPT_KEYSIG: keytype = KEY_SIG; break; case OPT_NOCERTS: options |= NOCERTS; break; case OPT_CLCERTS: options |= CLCERTS; break; case OPT_CACERTS: options |= CACERTS; break; case OPT_NOOUT: options |= (NOKEYS | NOCERTS); break; case OPT_INFO: options |= INFO; break; case OPT_CHAIN: chain = 1; break; case OPT_TWOPASS: twopass = 1; break; case OPT_NOMACVER: macver = 0; break; case OPT_DESCERT: cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; break; case OPT_EXPORT: export_cert = 1; break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_NOITER: iter = 1; break; case OPT_MACITER: maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER; break; case OPT_NOMACITER: maciter = 1; break; case OPT_NOMAC: maciter = -1; break; case OPT_MACALG: macalg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NODES: enc = NULL; break; case OPT_CERTPBE: if (!set_pbe(&cert_pbe, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_KEYPBE: if (!set_pbe(&key_pbe, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_INKEY: keyname = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERTFILE: certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NAME: name = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_LMK: add_lmk = 1; break; case OPT_CSP: csp_name = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CANAME: if (canames == NULL && (canames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(canames, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSWORD: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = 1; if (passarg) { if (export_cert) passoutarg = passarg; else passinarg = passarg; } if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } if (!cpass) { if (export_cert) cpass = passout; else cpass = passin; } if (cpass) { mpass = cpass; noprompt = 1; } else { cpass = pass; mpass = macpass; } if (export_cert || inrand) { app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL)); if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); } if (twopass) { if (1) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI if (EVP_read_pw_string (macpass, sizeof macpass, "Enter MAC Password:", export_cert)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); goto end; } } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unsupported option -twopass\n"); goto end; } } if (export_cert) { EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; X509 *ucert = NULL, *x = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL; const EVP_MD *macmd = NULL; unsigned char *catmp = NULL; int i; if ((options & (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) == (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nothing to do!\n"); goto export_end; } if (options & NOCERTS) chain = 0; if (!(options & NOKEYS)) { key = load_key(keyname ? keyname : infile, FORMAT_PEM, 1, passin, e, "private key"); if (!key) goto export_end; } /* Load in all certs in input file */ if (!(options & NOCERTS)) { if (!load_certs(infile, &certs, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "certificates")) goto export_end; if (key) { /* Look for matching private key */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (X509_check_private_key(x, key)) { ucert = x; /* Zero keyid and alias */ X509_keyid_set1(ucert, NULL, 0); X509_alias_set1(ucert, NULL, 0); /* Remove from list */ (void)sk_X509_delete(certs, i); break; } } if (!ucert) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No certificate matches private key\n"); goto export_end; } } } /* Add any more certificates asked for */ if (certfile) { if (!load_certs(certfile, &certs, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "certificates from certfile")) goto export_end; } /* If chaining get chain from user cert */ if (chain) { int vret; STACK_OF(X509) *chain2; X509_STORE *store; if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL) goto export_end; vret = get_cert_chain(ucert, store, &chain2); X509_STORE_free(store); if (vret == X509_V_OK) { /* Exclude verified certificate */ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain2); i++) sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(chain2, i)); /* Free first certificate */ X509_free(sk_X509_value(chain2, 0)); sk_X509_free(chain2); } else { if (vret != X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error %s getting chain.\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(vret)); else ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto export_end; } } /* Add any CA names */ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(canames); i++) { catmp = (unsigned char *)sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(canames, i); X509_alias_set1(sk_X509_value(certs, i), catmp, -1); } if (csp_name && key) EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_ms_csp_name, MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)csp_name, -1); if (add_lmk && key) EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_LocalKeySet, 0, NULL, -1); if (!noprompt) { if (1) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI if (EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Export Password:", 1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); goto export_end; } } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n"); goto export_end; } } if (!twopass) OPENSSL_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass); p12 = PKCS12_create(cpass, name, key, ucert, certs, key_pbe, cert_pbe, iter, -1, keytype); if (!p12) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto export_end; } if (macalg) { if (!opt_md(macalg, &macmd)) goto opthelp; } if (maciter != -1) PKCS12_set_mac(p12, mpass, -1, NULL, 0, maciter, macmd); assert(private); out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PKCS12, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; i2d_PKCS12_bio(out, p12); ret = 0; export_end: EVP_PKEY_free(key); sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); X509_free(ucert); goto end; } in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_PKCS12); if (in == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PEM, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if ((p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL)) == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!noprompt) { if (1) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI if (EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Import Password:", 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); goto end; } } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n"); goto end; } } if (!twopass) OPENSSL_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass); if ((options & INFO) && PKCS12_mac_present(p12)) { const ASN1_INTEGER *tmaciter; const X509_ALGOR *macalgid; const ASN1_OBJECT *macobj; PKCS12_get0_mac(NULL, &macalgid, NULL, &tmaciter, p12); X509_ALGOR_get0(&macobj, NULL, NULL, macalgid); BIO_puts(bio_err, "MAC:"); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, macobj); BIO_printf(bio_err, " Iteration %ld\n", tmaciter != NULL ? ASN1_INTEGER_get(tmaciter) : 1L); } if (macver) { /* If we enter empty password try no password first */ if (!mpass[0] && PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) { /* If mac and crypto pass the same set it to NULL too */ if (!twopass) cpass = NULL; } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, mpass, -1)) { /* * May be UTF8 from previous version of OpenSSL: * convert to a UTF8 form which will translate * to the same Unicode password. */ unsigned char *utmp; int utmplen; utmp = OPENSSL_asc2uni(mpass, -1, NULL, &utmplen); if (utmp == NULL) goto end; badpass = OPENSSL_uni2utf8(utmp, utmplen); OPENSSL_free(utmp); if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, badpass, -1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error: invalid password?\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: using broken algorithm\n"); if (!twopass) cpass = badpass; } } } assert(private); if (!dump_certs_keys_p12(out, p12, cpass, -1, options, passout, enc)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error outputting keys and certificates\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; end: PKCS12_free(p12); if (export_cert || inrand) app_RAND_write_file(NULL); release_engine(e); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(canames); OPENSSL_free(badpass); OPENSSL_free(passin); OPENSSL_free(passout); return (ret); } int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, const PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc) { STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes = NULL; STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags; int i, bagnid; int ret = 0; PKCS7 *p7; if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) { p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i); bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) { bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7); if (options & INFO) BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Data\n"); } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) { if (options & INFO) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Encrypted data: "); alg_print(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm); } bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen); } else continue; if (!bags) goto err; if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, bags, pass, passlen, options, pempass, enc)) { sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); goto err; } sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free); bags = NULL; } ret = 1; err: sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free); return ret; } int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) { if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bag(out, sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i), pass, passlen, options, pempass, enc)) return 0; } return 1; } int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass, const EVP_CIPHER *enc) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8; const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8c; X509 *x509; const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrs; int ret = 0; attrs = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attrs(bag); switch (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(bag)) { case NID_keyBag: if (options & INFO) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Key bag\n"); if (options & NOKEYS) return 1; print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes"); p8c = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(bag); if ((pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8c)) == NULL) return 0; print_attribs(out, PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(p8c), "Key Attributes"); ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); break; case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag: if (options & INFO) { const X509_SIG *tp8; const X509_ALGOR *tp8alg; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Shrouded Keybag: "); tp8 = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_pkcs8(bag); X509_SIG_get0(tp8, &tp8alg, NULL); alg_print(tp8alg); } if (options & NOKEYS) return 1; print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes"); if ((p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)) == NULL) return 0; if ((pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8)) == NULL) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); return 0; } print_attribs(out, PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(p8), "Key Attributes"); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8); ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); break; case NID_certBag: if (options & INFO) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate bag\n"); if (options & NOCERTS) return 1; if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)) { if (options & CACERTS) return 1; } else if (options & CLCERTS) return 1; print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes"); if (PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(bag) != NID_x509Certificate) return 1; if ((x509 = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(bag)) == NULL) return 0; dump_cert_text(out, x509); ret = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509); X509_free(x509); break; case NID_safeContentsBag: if (options & INFO) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Safe Contents bag\n"); print_attribs(out, attrs, "Bag Attributes"); return dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(bag), pass, passlen, options, pempass, enc); default: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning unsupported bag type: "); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_type(bag)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); return 1; } return ret; } /* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */ static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain) { X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chn = NULL; int i = 0; store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (store_ctx == NULL) { i = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; goto end; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, cert, NULL)) { i = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; goto end; } if (X509_verify_cert(store_ctx) > 0) chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(store_ctx); else if ((i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx)) == 0) i = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx); *chain = chn; return i; } static int alg_print(const X509_ALGOR *alg) { int pbenid, aparamtype; const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; const void *aparam; PBEPARAM *pbe = NULL; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &aparamtype, &aparam, alg); pbenid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", OBJ_nid2ln(pbenid)); /* * If PBE algorithm is PBES2 decode algorithm parameters * for additional details. */ if (pbenid == NID_pbes2) { PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; int encnid; if (aparamtype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) pbe2 = ASN1_item_unpack(aparam, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM)); if (pbe2 == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, ""); goto done; } X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &aparamtype, &aparam, pbe2->keyfunc); pbenid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid); X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, pbe2->encryption); encnid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid); BIO_printf(bio_err, ", %s, %s", OBJ_nid2ln(pbenid), OBJ_nid2sn(encnid)); /* If KDF is PBKDF2 decode parameters */ if (pbenid == NID_id_pbkdf2) { PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; int prfnid; if (aparamtype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) kdf = ASN1_item_unpack(aparam, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM)); if (kdf == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, ""); goto done; } if (kdf->prf == NULL) { prfnid = NID_hmacWithSHA1; } else { X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, kdf->prf); prfnid = OBJ_obj2nid(aoid); } BIO_printf(bio_err, ", Iteration %ld, PRF %s", ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter), OBJ_nid2sn(prfnid)); PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); } PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); } else { if (aparamtype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) pbe = ASN1_item_unpack(aparam, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM)); if (pbe == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, ""); goto done; } BIO_printf(bio_err, ", Iteration %ld", ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter)); PBEPARAM_free(pbe); } done: BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); return 1; } /* Load all certificates from a given file */ int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { int ret; X509 *cert; ret = 0; while ((cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ret = 1; sk_X509_push(sk, cert); } if (ret) ERR_clear_error(); return ret; } /* Generalised attribute print: handle PKCS#8 and bag attributes */ int print_attribs(BIO *out, const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst, const char *name) { X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr; ASN1_TYPE *av; char *value; int i, attr_nid; if (!attrlst) { BIO_printf(out, "%s: \n", name); return 1; } if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst)) { BIO_printf(out, "%s: \n", name); return 1; } BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", name); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *attr_obj; attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(attrlst, i); attr_obj = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(attr); attr_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(attr_obj); BIO_printf(out, " "); if (attr_nid == NID_undef) { i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, attr_obj); BIO_printf(out, ": "); } else BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2ln(attr_nid)); if (X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(attr)) { av = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 0); switch (av->type) { case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: value = OPENSSL_uni2asc(av->value.bmpstring->data, av->value.bmpstring->length); BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", value); OPENSSL_free(value); break; case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: hex_prin(out, av->value.octet_string->data, av->value.octet_string->length); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); break; case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: hex_prin(out, av->value.bit_string->data, av->value.bit_string->length); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); break; default: BIO_printf(out, "\n", av->type); break; } } else BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } return 1; } void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) BIO_printf(out, "%02X ", buf[i]); } static int set_pbe(int *ppbe, const char *str) { if (!str) return 0; if (strcmp(str, "NONE") == 0) { *ppbe = -1; return 1; } *ppbe = OBJ_txt2nid(str); if (*ppbe == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown PBE algorithm %s\n", str); return 0; } return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s_apps.h0000644000000000000000000000752113176625656014470 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # include #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) # define _kbhit kbhit #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(FD_SET) /* * VAX C does not defined fd_set and friends, but it's actually quite simple */ /* These definitions are borrowed from SOCKETSHR. /Richard Levitte */ # define MAX_NOFILE 32 # define NBBY 8 /* number of bits in a byte */ # ifndef FD_SETSIZE # define FD_SETSIZE MAX_NOFILE # endif /* FD_SETSIZE */ /* How many things we'll allow select to use. 0 if unlimited */ # define MAXSELFD MAX_NOFILE typedef int fd_mask; /* int here! VMS prototypes int, not long */ # define NFDBITS (sizeof(fd_mask) * NBBY)/* bits per mask (power of 2!) */ # define NFDSHIFT 5 /* Shift based on above */ typedef fd_mask fd_set; # define FD_SET(n, p) (*(p) |= (1 << ((n) % NFDBITS))) # define FD_CLR(n, p) (*(p) &= ~(1 << ((n) % NFDBITS))) # define FD_ISSET(n, p) (*(p) & (1 << ((n) % NFDBITS))) # define FD_ZERO(p) memset((p), 0, sizeof(*(p))) #endif #define PORT "4433" #define PROTOCOL "tcp" typedef int (*do_server_cb)(int s, int stype, unsigned char *context); int do_server(int *accept_sock, const char *host, const char *port, int family, int type, do_server_cb cb, unsigned char *context, int naccept); #ifdef HEADER_X509_H int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); #endif #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file); int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain); int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s); int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s); int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared); #endif int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s); int init_client(int *sock, const char *host, const char *port, int family, int type); int should_retry(int i); long bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H void apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret); void msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); #endif int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); typedef struct ssl_excert_st SSL_EXCERT; void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc); void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc); int args_excert(int option, SSL_EXCERT **pexc); int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc); void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio); void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s); #ifdef HEADER_SSL_H int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, SSL_CTX *ctx); int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download); int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile, const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download); void ssl_ctx_security_debug(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s_time.c0000644000000000000000000003035713176625656014461 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define NO_SHUTDOWN #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK #define USE_SOCKETS #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include "s_apps.h" #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # include OPENSSL_UNISTD #endif #undef ioctl #define ioctl ioctlsocket #define SSL_CONNECT_NAME "localhost:4433" /* no default cert. */ /* * #define TEST_CERT "client.pem" */ #undef min #undef max #define min(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #define max(a,b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) #undef SECONDS #define SECONDS 30 #define SECONDSSTR "30" static SSL *doConnection(SSL *scon, const char *host, SSL_CTX *ctx); static const char fmt_http_get_cmd[] = "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n"; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_CONNECT, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_CERT, OPT_KEY, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_NEW, OPT_REUSE, OPT_BUGS, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_TIME, OPT_SSL3, OPT_WWW } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS s_time_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"connect", OPT_CONNECT, 's', "Where to connect as post:port (default is " SSL_CONNECT_NAME ")"}, {"cipher", OPT_CIPHER, 's', "Cipher to use, see 'openssl ciphers'"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Cert file to use, PEM format assumed"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "File with key, PEM; default is -cert file"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"}, {"cafile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"new", OPT_NEW, '-', "Just time new connections"}, {"reuse", OPT_REUSE, '-', "Just time connection reuse"}, {"bugs", OPT_BUGS, '-', "Turn on SSL bug compatibility"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'p', "Turn on peer certificate verification, set depth"}, {"time", OPT_TIME, 'p', "Seconds to collect data, default " SECONDSSTR}, {"www", OPT_WWW, 's', "Fetch specified page from the site"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just use SSLv3"}, #endif {NULL} }; #define START 0 #define STOP 1 static double tm_Time_F(int s) { return app_tminterval(s, 1); } int s_time_main(int argc, char **argv) { char buf[1024 * 8]; SSL *scon = NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL; char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *cipher = NULL, *www_path = NULL; char *host = SSL_CONNECT_NAME, *certfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *prog; double totalTime = 0.0; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int maxtime = SECONDS, nConn = 0, perform = 3, ret = 1, i, st_bugs = 0; long bytes_read = 0, finishtime = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; int max_version = 0, ver, buf_len; size_t buf_size; meth = TLS_client_method(); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_time_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(s_time_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_CONNECT: host = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_REUSE: perform = 2; break; case OPT_NEW: perform = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY: if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &verify_args.depth)) goto opthelp; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: verify depth is %d\n", prog, verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_CERT: certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_CIPHER: cipher = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_BUGS: st_bugs = 1; break; case OPT_TIME: if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &maxtime)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_WWW: www_path = opt_arg(); buf_size = strlen(www_path) + sizeof(fmt_http_get_cmd) - 2; /* 2 is for %s */ if (buf_size > sizeof(buf)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -www option is too long\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_SSL3: max_version = SSL3_VERSION; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (cipher == NULL) cipher = getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); if (cipher == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No CIPHER specified\n"); goto end; } if ((ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth)) == NULL) goto end; SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1); if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (st_bugs) SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALL); if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipher)) goto end; if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, certfile, keyfile)) goto end; if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!(perform & 1)) goto next; printf("Collecting connection statistics for %d seconds\n", maxtime); /* Loop and time how long it takes to make connections */ bytes_read = 0; finishtime = (long)time(NULL) + maxtime; tm_Time_F(START); for (;;) { if (finishtime < (long)time(NULL)) break; if ((scon = doConnection(NULL, host, ctx)) == NULL) goto end; if (www_path != NULL) { buf_len = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, fmt_http_get_cmd, www_path); if (SSL_write(scon, buf, buf_len) <= 0) goto end; while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0 || SSL_get_error(scon, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ || SSL_get_error(scon, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) if (i > 0) bytes_read += i; } #ifdef NO_SHUTDOWN SSL_set_shutdown(scon, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); #else SSL_shutdown(scon); #endif BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(scon)); nConn += 1; if (SSL_session_reused(scon)) ver = 'r'; else { ver = SSL_version(scon); if (ver == TLS1_VERSION) ver = 't'; else if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) ver = '3'; else ver = '*'; } fputc(ver, stdout); fflush(stdout); SSL_free(scon); scon = NULL; } totalTime += tm_Time_F(STOP); /* Add the time for this iteration */ i = (int)((long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxtime); printf ("\n\n%d connections in %.2fs; %.2f connections/user sec, bytes read %ld\n", nConn, totalTime, ((double)nConn / totalTime), bytes_read); printf ("%d connections in %ld real seconds, %ld bytes read per connection\n", nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxtime, bytes_read / nConn); /* * Now loop and time connections using the same session id over and over */ next: if (!(perform & 2)) goto end; printf("\n\nNow timing with session id reuse.\n"); /* Get an SSL object so we can reuse the session id */ if ((scon = doConnection(NULL, host, ctx)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to get connection\n"); goto end; } if (www_path != NULL) { buf_len = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, fmt_http_get_cmd, www_path); if (SSL_write(scon, buf, buf_len) <= 0) goto end; while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0 || SSL_get_error(scon, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ || SSL_get_error(scon, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) continue; } #ifdef NO_SHUTDOWN SSL_set_shutdown(scon, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); #else SSL_shutdown(scon); #endif BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(scon)); nConn = 0; totalTime = 0.0; finishtime = (long)time(NULL) + maxtime; printf("starting\n"); bytes_read = 0; tm_Time_F(START); for (;;) { if (finishtime < (long)time(NULL)) break; if ((doConnection(scon, host, ctx)) == NULL) goto end; if (www_path) { BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", www_path); if (SSL_write(scon, buf, strlen(buf)) <= 0) goto end; while ((i = SSL_read(scon, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0 || SSL_get_error(scon, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ || SSL_get_error(scon, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) if (i > 0) bytes_read += i; } #ifdef NO_SHUTDOWN SSL_set_shutdown(scon, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); #else SSL_shutdown(scon); #endif BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(scon)); nConn += 1; if (SSL_session_reused(scon)) ver = 'r'; else { ver = SSL_version(scon); if (ver == TLS1_VERSION) ver = 't'; else if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) ver = '3'; else ver = '*'; } fputc(ver, stdout); fflush(stdout); } totalTime += tm_Time_F(STOP); /* Add the time for this iteration */ printf ("\n\n%d connections in %.2fs; %.2f connections/user sec, bytes read %ld\n", nConn, totalTime, ((double)nConn / totalTime), bytes_read); printf ("%d connections in %ld real seconds, %ld bytes read per connection\n", nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxtime, bytes_read / nConn); ret = 0; end: SSL_free(scon); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); return (ret); } /*- * doConnection - make a connection */ static SSL *doConnection(SSL *scon, const char *host, SSL_CTX *ctx) { BIO *conn; SSL *serverCon; int width, i; fd_set readfds; if ((conn = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL) return (NULL); BIO_set_conn_hostname(conn, host); if (scon == NULL) serverCon = SSL_new(ctx); else { serverCon = scon; SSL_set_connect_state(serverCon); } SSL_set_bio(serverCon, conn, conn); /* ok, lets connect */ for (;;) { i = SSL_connect(serverCon); if (BIO_sock_should_retry(i)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DELAY\n"); i = SSL_get_fd(serverCon); width = i + 1; FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(i, &readfds); /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the 2nd parameter is currently * of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is (void *) if * you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: if you do * have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or (void *). */ select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL); continue; } break; } if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n"); if (verify_args.error != X509_V_OK) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_args.error)); else ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (scon == NULL) SSL_free(serverCon); return NULL; } return serverCon; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ecparam.c0000644000000000000000000003664013176625656014612 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_C, OPT_CHECK, OPT_LIST_CURVES, OPT_NO_SEED, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_NAME, OPT_CONV_FORM, OPT_PARAM_ENC, OPT_GENKEY, OPT_RAND, OPT_ENGINE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS ecparam_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - default PEM"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the ec parameters in text form"}, {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print a 'C' function creating the parameters"}, {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Validate the ec parameters"}, {"list_curves", OPT_LIST_CURVES, '-', "Prints a list of all curve 'short names'"}, {"no_seed", OPT_NO_SEED, '-', "If 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Do not print the ec parameter"}, {"name", OPT_NAME, 's', "Use the ec parameters with specified 'short name'"}, {"conv_form", OPT_CONV_FORM, 's', "Specifies the point conversion form "}, {"param_enc", OPT_PARAM_ENC, 's', "Specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded"}, {"genkey", OPT_GENKEY, '-', "Generate ec key"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Files to use for random number input"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; static OPT_PAIR forms[] = { {"compressed", POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED}, {"uncompressed", POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED}, {"hybrid", POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID}, {NULL} }; static OPT_PAIR encodings[] = { {"named_curve", OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE}, {"explicit", 0}, {NULL} }; int ecparam_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; BIGNUM *ec_gen = NULL, *ec_order = NULL, *ec_cofactor = NULL; BIGNUM *ec_p = NULL, *ec_a = NULL, *ec_b = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; EC_GROUP *group = NULL; point_conversion_form_t form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; char *curve_name = NULL, *inrand = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; unsigned char *buffer = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE, new_asn1_flag = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, noout = 0, C = 0; int ret = 1, private = 0; int list_curves = 0, no_seed = 0, check = 0, new_form = 0; int text = 0, i, need_rand = 0, genkey = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ecparam_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(ecparam_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_C: C = 1; break; case OPT_CHECK: check = 1; break; case OPT_LIST_CURVES: list_curves = 1; break; case OPT_NO_SEED: no_seed = 1; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_NAME: curve_name = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CONV_FORM: if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), forms, &new_form)) goto opthelp; form = new_form; new_form = 1; break; case OPT_PARAM_ENC: if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), encodings, &asn1_flag)) goto opthelp; new_asn1_flag = 1; break; case OPT_GENKEY: genkey = need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = genkey ? 1 : 0; in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (list_curves) { EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL; size_t crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0); size_t n; curves = app_malloc((int)sizeof(*curves) * crv_len, "list curves"); if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) { OPENSSL_free(curves); goto end; } for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) { const char *comment; const char *sname; comment = curves[n].comment; sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid); if (comment == NULL) comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE"; if (sname == NULL) sname = ""; BIO_printf(out, " %-10s: ", sname); BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", comment); } OPENSSL_free(curves); ret = 0; goto end; } if (curve_name != NULL) { int nid; /* * workaround for the SECG curve names secp192r1 and secp256r1 (which * are the same as the curves prime192v1 and prime256v1 defined in * X9.62) */ if (strcmp(curve_name, "secp192r1") == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime192v1 " "instead of secp192r1\n"); nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1; } else if (strcmp(curve_name, "secp256r1") == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime256v1 " "instead of secp256r1\n"); nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; } else nid = OBJ_sn2nid(curve_name); if (nid == 0) nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(curve_name); if (nid == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", curve_name); goto end; } group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); if (group == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (%s)\n", curve_name); goto end; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag); EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form); } else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) group = d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(in, NULL); else group = PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (group == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load elliptic curve parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (new_form) EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form); if (new_asn1_flag) EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag); if (no_seed) { EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, NULL, 0); } if (text) { if (!ECPKParameters_print(out, group, 0)) goto end; } if (check) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: "); if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n"); } if (C) { size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len = 0; const EC_POINT *point; int is_prime, len = 0; const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group); if ((ec_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_a = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_b = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_gen = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_order = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) { perror("Can't allocate BN"); goto end; } is_prime = (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field); if (!is_prime) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can only handle X9.62 prime fields\n"); goto end; } if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, ec_p, ec_a, ec_b, NULL)) goto end; if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL) goto end; if (!EC_POINT_point2bn(group, point, EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group), ec_gen, NULL)) goto end; if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, ec_order, NULL)) goto end; if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, ec_cofactor, NULL)) goto end; if (!ec_p || !ec_a || !ec_b || !ec_gen || !ec_order || !ec_cofactor) goto end; len = BN_num_bits(ec_order); if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_p)) > buf_len) buf_len = tmp_len; if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_a)) > buf_len) buf_len = tmp_len; if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_b)) > buf_len) buf_len = tmp_len; if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_gen)) > buf_len) buf_len = tmp_len; if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_order)) > buf_len) buf_len = tmp_len; if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_cofactor)) > buf_len) buf_len = tmp_len; buffer = app_malloc(buf_len, "BN buffer"); BIO_printf(out, "EC_GROUP *get_ec_group_%d(void)\n{\n", len); print_bignum_var(out, ec_p, "ec_p", len, buffer); print_bignum_var(out, ec_a, "ec_a", len, buffer); print_bignum_var(out, ec_b, "ec_b", len, buffer); print_bignum_var(out, ec_gen, "ec_gen", len, buffer); print_bignum_var(out, ec_order, "ec_order", len, buffer); print_bignum_var(out, ec_cofactor, "ec_cofactor", len, buffer); BIO_printf(out, " int ok = 0;\n" " EC_GROUP *group = NULL;\n" " EC_POINT *point = NULL;\n" " BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL;\n" " BIGNUM *tmp_2 = NULL;\n" " BIGNUM *tmp_3 = NULL;\n" "\n"); BIO_printf(out, " if ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_p_%d, sizeof (ec_p_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n", len, len); BIO_printf(out, " if ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_a_%d, sizeof (ec_a_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n", len, len); BIO_printf(out, " if ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_b_%d, sizeof (ec_b_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n", len, len); BIO_printf(out, " if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(tmp_1, tmp_2, tmp_3, NULL)) == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n" "\n"); BIO_printf(out, " /* build generator */\n"); BIO_printf(out, " if ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_gen_%d, sizeof (ec_gen_%d), tmp_1)) == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n", len, len); BIO_printf(out, " point = EC_POINT_bn2point(group, tmp_1, NULL, NULL);\n"); BIO_printf(out, " if (point == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n"); BIO_printf(out, " if ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_order_%d, sizeof (ec_order_%d), tmp_2)) == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n", len, len); BIO_printf(out, " if ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_cofactor_%d, sizeof (ec_cofactor_%d), tmp_3)) == NULL)\n" " goto err;\n", len, len); BIO_printf(out, " if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, point, tmp_2, tmp_3))\n" " goto err;\n" "ok = 1;" "\n"); BIO_printf(out, "err:\n" " BN_free(tmp_1);\n" " BN_free(tmp_2);\n" " BN_free(tmp_3);\n" " EC_POINT_free(point);\n" " if (!ok) {\n" " EC_GROUP_free(group);\n" " return NULL;\n" " }\n" " return (group);\n" "}\n"); } if (!noout) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(out, group); else i = PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters(out, group); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write elliptic " "curve parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (need_rand) { app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL)); if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); } if (genkey) { EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new(); if (eckey == NULL) goto end; assert(need_rand); if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to set group when generating key\n"); EC_KEY_free(eckey); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to generate key\n"); EC_KEY_free(eckey); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } assert(private); if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(out, eckey); else i = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(out, eckey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); EC_KEY_free(eckey); } if (need_rand) app_RAND_write_file(NULL); ret = 0; end: BN_free(ec_p); BN_free(ec_a); BN_free(ec_b); BN_free(ec_gen); BN_free(ec_order); BN_free(ec_cofactor); OPENSSL_free(buffer); EC_GROUP_free(group); release_engine(e); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/client.pem0000644000000000000000000000632513176625656015014 0ustar rootrootsubject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Client Cert issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID5zCCAs+gAwIBAgIJALnu1NlVpZ6yMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT VElORyBQVVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMSUwIwYDVQQDDBxPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJt ZWRpYXRlIENBMB4XDTExMTIwODE0MDE0OFoXDTIxMTAxNjE0MDE0OFowZDELMAkG A1UEBhMCVUsxFjAUBgNVBAoMDU9wZW5TU0wgR3JvdXAxIjAgBgNVBAsMGUZPUiBU RVNUSU5HIFBVUlBPU0VTIE9OTFkxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFRlc3QgQ2xpZW50IENlcnQw ggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQC0ranbHRLcLVqN+0BzcZpY +yOLqxzDWT1LD9eW1stC4NzXX9/DCtSIVyN7YIHdGLrIPr64IDdXXaMRzgZ2rOKs lmHCAiFpO/ja99gGCJRxH0xwQatqAULfJVHeUhs7OEGOZc2nWifjqKvGfNTilP7D nwi69ipQFq9oS19FmhwVHk2wg7KZGHI1qDyG04UrfCZMRitvS9+UVhPpIPjuiBi2 x3/FZIpL5gXJvvFK6xHY63oq2asyzBATntBgnP4qJFWWcvRx24wF1PnZabxuVoL2 bPnQ/KvONDrw3IdqkKhYNTul7jEcu3OlcZIMw+7DiaKJLAzKb/bBF5gm/pwW6As9 AgMBAAGjgY8wgYwwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwLAYJYIZI AYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlMB0GA1UdDgQW BBSZHKyLoTh7Mb409Zn/mK1ceSDAjDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ2w2yI55X+sL3szj49 hqshgYfa2jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAD0mL7PtPYgCEuDyOQSbLpeND5hVS curxQdGnrJ6Acrhodb7E9ccATokeb0PLx6HBLQUicxhTZIQ9FbO43YkQcOU6C3BB IlwskqmtN6+VmrQzNolHCDzvxNZs9lYL2VbGPGqVRyjZeHpoAlf9cQr8PgDb4d4b vUx2KAhHQvV2nkmYvKyXcgnRuHggumF87mkxidriGAEFwH4qfOqetUg64WyxP7P2 QLipm04SyQa7ONtIApfVXgHcE42Py4/f4arzCzMjKe3VyhGkS7nsT55X/fWgTaRm CQPkO+H94P958WTvQDt77bQ+D3IvYaVvfil8n6HJMOJfFT0LJuSUbpSXJg== -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAtK2p2x0S3C1ajftAc3GaWPsji6scw1k9Sw/XltbLQuDc11/f wwrUiFcje2CB3Ri6yD6+uCA3V12jEc4GdqzirJZhwgIhaTv42vfYBgiUcR9McEGr agFC3yVR3lIbOzhBjmXNp1on46irxnzU4pT+w58IuvYqUBavaEtfRZocFR5NsIOy mRhyNag8htOFK3wmTEYrb0vflFYT6SD47ogYtsd/xWSKS+YFyb7xSusR2Ot6Ktmr MswQE57QYJz+KiRVlnL0cduMBdT52Wm8blaC9mz50PyrzjQ68NyHapCoWDU7pe4x HLtzpXGSDMPuw4miiSwMym/2wReYJv6cFugLPQIDAQABAoIBAAZOyc9MhIwLSU4L p4RgQvM4UVVe8/Id+3XTZ8NsXExJbWxXfIhiqGjaIfL8u4vsgRjcl+v1s/jo2/iT KMab4o4D8gXD7UavQVDjtjb/ta79WL3SjRl2Uc9YjjMkyq6WmDNQeo2NKDdafCTB 1uzSJtLNipB8Z53ELPuHJhxX9QMHrMnuha49riQgXZ7buP9iQrHJFhImBjSzbxJx L+TI6rkyLSf9Wi0Pd3L27Ob3QWNfNRYNSeTE+08eSRChkur5W0RuXAcuAICdQlCl LBvWO/LmmvbzCqiDcgy/TliSb6CGGwgiNG7LJZmlkYNj8laGwalNlYZs3UrVv6NO Br2loAECgYEA2kvCvPGj0Dg/6g7WhXDvAkEbcaL1tSeCxBbNH+6HS2UWMWvyTtCn /bbD519QIdkvayy1QjEf32GV/UjUVmlULMLBcDy0DGjtL3+XpIhLKWDNxN1v1/ai 1oz23ZJCOgnk6K4qtFtlRS1XtynjA+rBetvYvLP9SKeFrnpzCgaA2r0CgYEA0+KX 1ACXDTNH5ySX3kMjSS9xdINf+OOw4CvPHFwbtc9aqk2HePlEsBTz5I/W3rKwXva3 NqZ/bRqVVeZB/hHKFywgdUQk2Uc5z/S7Lw70/w1HubNTXGU06Ngb6zOFAo/o/TwZ zTP1BMIKSOB6PAZPS3l+aLO4FRIRotfFhgRHOoECgYEAmiZbqt8cJaJDB/5YYDzC mp3tSk6gIb936Q6M5VqkMYp9pIKsxhk0N8aDCnTU+kIK6SzWBpr3/d9Ecmqmfyq7 5SvWO3KyVf0WWK9KH0abhOm2BKm2HBQvI0DB5u8sUx2/hsvOnjPYDISbZ11t0MtK u35Zy89yMYcSsIYJjG/ROCUCgYEAgI2P9G5PNxEP5OtMwOsW84Y3Xat/hPAQFlI+ HES+AzbFGWJkeT8zL2nm95tVkFP1sggZ7Kxjz3w7cpx7GX0NkbWSE9O+T51pNASV tN1sQ3p5M+/a+cnlqgfEGJVvc7iAcXQPa3LEi5h2yPR49QYXAgG6cifn3dDSpmwn SUI7PQECgYEApGCIIpSRPLAEHTGmP87RBL1smurhwmy2s/pghkvUkWehtxg0sGHh kuaqDWcskogv+QC0sVdytiLSz8G0DwcEcsHK1Fkyb8A+ayiw6jWJDo2m9+IF4Fww 1Te6jFPYDESnbhq7+TLGgHGhtwcu5cnb4vSuYXGXKupZGzoLOBbv1Zw= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/enc.c0000644000000000000000000004474413176625656013753 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include #endif #include #undef SIZE #undef BSIZE #define SIZE (512) #define BSIZE (8*1024) static int set_hex(char *in, unsigned char *out, int size); static void show_ciphers(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *bio_); struct doall_enc_ciphers { BIO *bio; int n; }; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_LIST, OPT_E, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PASS, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_D, OPT_P, OPT_V, OPT_NOPAD, OPT_SALT, OPT_NOSALT, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_UPPER_P, OPT_UPPER_A, OPT_A, OPT_Z, OPT_BUFSIZE, OPT_K, OPT_KFILE, OPT_UPPER_K, OPT_NONE, OPT_UPPER_S, OPT_IV, OPT_MD, OPT_CIPHER } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS enc_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"ciphers", OPT_LIST, '-', "List ciphers"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Passphrase source"}, {"e", OPT_E, '-', "Encrypt"}, {"d", OPT_D, '-', "Decrypt"}, {"p", OPT_P, '-', "Print the iv/key"}, {"P", OPT_UPPER_P, '-', "Print the iv/key and exit"}, {"v", OPT_V, '-', "Verbose output"}, {"nopad", OPT_NOPAD, '-', "Disable standard block padding"}, {"salt", OPT_SALT, '-', "Use salt in the KDF (default)"}, {"nosalt", OPT_NOSALT, '-', "Do not use salt in the KDF"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"}, {"a", OPT_A, '-', "Base64 encode/decode, depending on encryption flag"}, {"base64", OPT_A, '-', "Same as option -a"}, {"A", OPT_UPPER_A, '-', "Used with -[base64|a] to specify base64 buffer as a single line"}, {"bufsize", OPT_BUFSIZE, 's', "Buffer size"}, {"k", OPT_K, 's', "Passphrase"}, {"kfile", OPT_KFILE, '<', "Read passphrase from file"}, {"K", OPT_UPPER_K, 's', "Raw key, in hex"}, {"S", OPT_UPPER_S, 's', "Salt, in hex"}, {"iv", OPT_IV, 's', "IV in hex"}, {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Use specified digest to create a key from the passphrase"}, {"none", OPT_NONE, '-', "Don't encrypt"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, #ifdef ZLIB {"z", OPT_Z, '-', "Use zlib as the 'encryption'"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int enc_main(int argc, char **argv) { static char buf[128]; static const char magic[] = "Salted__"; ENGINE *e = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *b64 = NULL, *benc = NULL, *rbio = NULL, *wbio = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL, *c; const EVP_MD *dgst = NULL; char *hkey = NULL, *hiv = NULL, *hsalt = NULL, *p; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; char *str = NULL, *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *strbuf = NULL; char mbuf[sizeof magic - 1]; OPTION_CHOICE o; int bsize = BSIZE, verbose = 0, debug = 0, olb64 = 0, nosalt = 0; int enc = 1, printkey = 0, i, k; int base64 = 0, informat = FORMAT_BINARY, outformat = FORMAT_BINARY; int ret = 1, inl, nopad = 0; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char *buff = NULL, salt[PKCS5_SALT_LEN]; long n; struct doall_enc_ciphers dec; #ifdef ZLIB int do_zlib = 0; BIO *bzl = NULL; #endif /* first check the program name */ prog = opt_progname(argv[0]); if (strcmp(prog, "base64") == 0) base64 = 1; #ifdef ZLIB else if (strcmp(prog, "zlib") == 0) do_zlib = 1; #endif else { cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(prog); if (cipher == NULL && strcmp(prog, "enc") != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is not a known cipher\n", prog); goto end; } } prog = opt_init(argc, argv, enc_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(enc_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_LIST: BIO_printf(bio_out, "Supported ciphers:\n"); dec.bio = bio_out; dec.n = 0; OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH, show_ciphers, &dec); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_E: enc = 1; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASS: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_D: enc = 0; break; case OPT_P: printkey = 1; break; case OPT_V: verbose = 1; break; case OPT_NOPAD: nopad = 1; break; case OPT_SALT: nosalt = 0; break; case OPT_NOSALT: nosalt = 1; break; case OPT_DEBUG: debug = 1; break; case OPT_UPPER_P: printkey = 2; break; case OPT_UPPER_A: olb64 = 1; break; case OPT_A: base64 = 1; break; case OPT_Z: #ifdef ZLIB do_zlib = 1; #endif break; case OPT_BUFSIZE: p = opt_arg(); i = (int)strlen(p) - 1; k = i >= 1 && p[i] == 'k'; if (k) p[i] = '\0'; if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &n) || n < 0 || (k && n >= LONG_MAX / 1024)) goto opthelp; if (k) n *= 1024; bsize = (int)n; break; case OPT_K: str = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KFILE: in = bio_open_default(opt_arg(), 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) goto opthelp; i = BIO_gets(in, buf, sizeof buf); BIO_free(in); in = NULL; if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s Can't read key from %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } while (--i > 0 && (buf[i] == '\r' || buf[i] == '\n')) buf[i] = '\0'; if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: zero length password\n", prog); goto opthelp; } str = buf; break; case OPT_UPPER_K: hkey = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_UPPER_S: hsalt = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_IV: hiv = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &dgst)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &c)) goto opthelp; cipher = c; break; case OPT_NONE: cipher = NULL; break; } } if (cipher && EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: AEAD ciphers not supported\n", prog); goto end; } if (cipher && (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s XTS ciphers not supported\n", prog); goto end; } if (dgst == NULL) dgst = EVP_sha256(); /* It must be large enough for a base64 encoded line */ if (base64 && bsize < 80) bsize = 80; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "bufsize=%d\n", bsize); #ifdef ZLIB if (!do_zlib) #endif if (base64) { if (enc) outformat = FORMAT_BASE64; else informat = FORMAT_BASE64; } strbuf = app_malloc(SIZE, "strbuf"); buff = app_malloc(EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(bsize), "evp buffer"); if (infile == NULL) { in = dup_bio_in(informat); } else in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (!str && passarg) { if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } str = pass; } if ((str == NULL) && (cipher != NULL) && (hkey == NULL)) { if (1) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI for (;;) { char prompt[200]; BIO_snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "enter %s %s password:", OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher)), (enc) ? "encryption" : "decryption"); strbuf[0] = '\0'; i = EVP_read_pw_string((char *)strbuf, SIZE, prompt, enc); if (i == 0) { if (strbuf[0] == '\0') { ret = 1; goto end; } str = strbuf; break; } if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad password read\n"); goto end; } } } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "password required\n"); goto end; } } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (debug) { BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback); BIO_set_callback(out, BIO_debug_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(in, (char *)bio_err); BIO_set_callback_arg(out, (char *)bio_err); } rbio = in; wbio = out; #ifdef ZLIB if (do_zlib) { if ((bzl = BIO_new(BIO_f_zlib())) == NULL) goto end; if (debug) { BIO_set_callback(bzl, BIO_debug_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(bzl, (char *)bio_err); } if (enc) wbio = BIO_push(bzl, wbio); else rbio = BIO_push(bzl, rbio); } #endif if (base64) { if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) goto end; if (debug) { BIO_set_callback(b64, BIO_debug_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(b64, (char *)bio_err); } if (olb64) BIO_set_flags(b64, BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL); if (enc) wbio = BIO_push(b64, wbio); else rbio = BIO_push(b64, rbio); } if (cipher != NULL) { /* * Note that str is NULL if a key was passed on the command line, so * we get no salt in that case. Is this a bug? */ if (str != NULL) { /* * Salt handling: if encrypting generate a salt and write to * output BIO. If decrypting read salt from input BIO. */ unsigned char *sptr; size_t str_len = strlen(str); if (nosalt) sptr = NULL; else { if (enc) { if (hsalt) { if (!set_hex(hsalt, salt, sizeof salt)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex salt value\n"); goto end; } } else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) <= 0) goto end; /* * If -P option then don't bother writing */ if ((printkey != 2) && (BIO_write(wbio, magic, sizeof magic - 1) != sizeof magic - 1 || BIO_write(wbio, (char *)salt, sizeof salt) != sizeof salt)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error writing output file\n"); goto end; } } else if (BIO_read(rbio, mbuf, sizeof mbuf) != sizeof mbuf || BIO_read(rbio, (unsigned char *)salt, sizeof salt) != sizeof salt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error reading input file\n"); goto end; } else if (memcmp(mbuf, magic, sizeof magic - 1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad magic number\n"); goto end; } sptr = salt; } if (!EVP_BytesToKey(cipher, dgst, sptr, (unsigned char *)str, str_len, 1, key, iv)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EVP_BytesToKey failed\n"); goto end; } /* * zero the complete buffer or the string passed from the command * line bug picked up by Larry J. Hughes Jr. */ if (str == strbuf) OPENSSL_cleanse(str, SIZE); else OPENSSL_cleanse(str, str_len); } if (hiv != NULL) { int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); if (siz == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n"); } else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n"); goto end; } } if ((hiv == NULL) && (str == NULL) && EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) != 0) { /* * No IV was explicitly set and no IV was generated during * EVP_BytesToKey. Hence the IV is undefined, making correct * decryption impossible. */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "iv undefined\n"); goto end; } if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex key value\n"); goto end; } if ((benc = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) goto end; /* * Since we may be changing parameters work on the encryption context * rather than calling BIO_set_cipher(). */ BIO_get_cipher_ctx(benc, &ctx); if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting cipher %s\n", EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (nopad) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, enc)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting cipher %s\n", EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (debug) { BIO_set_callback(benc, BIO_debug_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(benc, (char *)bio_err); } if (printkey) { if (!nosalt) { printf("salt="); for (i = 0; i < (int)sizeof(salt); i++) printf("%02X", salt[i]); printf("\n"); } if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) > 0) { printf("key="); for (i = 0; i < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); i++) printf("%02X", key[i]); printf("\n"); } if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) > 0) { printf("iv ="); for (i = 0; i < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); i++) printf("%02X", iv[i]); printf("\n"); } if (printkey == 2) { ret = 0; goto end; } } } /* Only encrypt/decrypt as we write the file */ if (benc != NULL) wbio = BIO_push(benc, wbio); for (;;) { inl = BIO_read(rbio, (char *)buff, bsize); if (inl <= 0) break; if (BIO_write(wbio, (char *)buff, inl) != inl) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error writing output file\n"); goto end; } } if (!BIO_flush(wbio)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad decrypt\n"); goto end; } ret = 0; if (verbose) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bytes read :%8"BIO_PRI64"u\n", BIO_number_read(in)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "bytes written:%8"BIO_PRI64"u\n", BIO_number_written(out)); } end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); OPENSSL_free(strbuf); OPENSSL_free(buff); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free(benc); BIO_free(b64); #ifdef ZLIB BIO_free(bzl); #endif release_engine(e); OPENSSL_free(pass); return (ret); } static void show_ciphers(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *arg) { struct doall_enc_ciphers *dec = (struct doall_enc_ciphers *)arg; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; if (!islower((unsigned char)*name->name)) return; /* Filter out ciphers that we cannot use */ cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name->name); if (cipher == NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0 || EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE) return; BIO_printf(dec->bio, "-%-25s", name->name); if (++dec->n == 3) { BIO_printf(dec->bio, "\n"); dec->n = 0; } else BIO_printf(dec->bio, " "); } static int set_hex(char *in, unsigned char *out, int size) { int i, n; unsigned char j; n = strlen(in); if (n > (size * 2)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "hex string is too long\n"); return (0); } memset(out, 0, size); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { j = (unsigned char)*in; *(in++) = '\0'; if (j == 0) break; if (!isxdigit(j)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "non-hex digit\n"); return (0); } j = (unsigned char)OPENSSL_hexchar2int(j); if (i & 1) out[i / 2] |= j; else out[i / 2] = (j << 4); } return (1); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/smime.c0000644000000000000000000005215613176625656014314 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* S/MIME utility function */ #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers); static int smime_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); #define SMIME_OP 0x10 #define SMIME_IP 0x20 #define SMIME_SIGNERS 0x40 #define SMIME_ENCRYPT (1 | SMIME_OP) #define SMIME_DECRYPT (2 | SMIME_IP) #define SMIME_SIGN (3 | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS) #define SMIME_VERIFY (4 | SMIME_IP) #define SMIME_PK7OUT (5 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP) #define SMIME_RESIGN (6 | SMIME_IP | SMIME_OP | SMIME_SIGNERS) typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_SIGN, OPT_RESIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_PK7OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOINTERN, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_NOCHAIN, OPT_NOCERTS, OPT_NOATTR, OPT_NODETACH, OPT_NOSMIMECAP, OPT_BINARY, OPT_NOSIGS, OPT_STREAM, OPT_INDEF, OPT_NOINDEF, OPT_CRLFEOL, OPT_RAND, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_TO, OPT_FROM, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_SIGNER, OPT_RECIP, OPT_MD, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_INKEY, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_CERTFILE, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_IN, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUT, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_CONTENT } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS smime_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " cert.pem... recipient certs for encryption\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt message"}, {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt encrypted message"}, {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign message"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify signed message"}, {"pk7out", OPT_PK7OUT, '-', "Output PKCS#7 structure"}, {"nointern", OPT_NOINTERN, '-', "Don't search certificates in message for signer"}, {"nosigs", OPT_NOSIGS, '-', "Don't verify message signature"}, {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Don't verify signers certificate"}, {"nocerts", OPT_NOCERTS, '-', "Don't include signers certificate when signing"}, {"nodetach", OPT_NODETACH, '-', "Use opaque signing"}, {"noattr", OPT_NOATTR, '-', "Don't include any signed attributes"}, {"binary", OPT_BINARY, '-', "Don't translate message to text"}, {"certfile", OPT_CERTFILE, '<', "Other certificates file"}, {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, 's', "Signer certificate file"}, {"recip", OPT_RECIP, '<', "Recipient certificate file for decryption"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'c', "Input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"}, {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Input private key (if not signer or recipient)"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Input private key format (PEM or ENGINE)"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'c', "Output format SMIME (default), PEM or DER"}, {"content", OPT_CONTENT, '<', "Supply or override content for detached signature"}, {"to", OPT_TO, 's', "To address"}, {"from", OPT_FROM, 's', "From address"}, {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, 's', "Subject"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Include or delete text MIME headers"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "Trusted certificates directory"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Trusted certificates file"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"resign", OPT_RESIGN, '-', "Resign a signed message"}, {"nochain", OPT_NOCHAIN, '-', "set PKCS7_NOCHAIN so certificates contained in the message are not used as untrusted CAs" }, {"nosmimecap", OPT_NOSMIMECAP, '-', "Omit the SMIMECapabilities attribute"}, {"stream", OPT_STREAM, '-', "Enable CMS streaming" }, {"indef", OPT_INDEF, '-', "Same as -stream" }, {"noindef", OPT_NOINDEF, '-', "Disable CMS streaming"}, {"crlfeol", OPT_CRLFEOL, '-', "Use CRLF as EOL termination instead of CR only"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, OPT_V_OPTIONS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int smime_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *indata = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sksigners = NULL, *skkeys = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL, *other = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL, *recip = NULL, *signer = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; const EVP_MD *sign_md = NULL; const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL, *prog = NULL; char *certfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *contfile = NULL, *inrand = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *signerfile = NULL, *recipfile = NULL; char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL, *to = NULL, *from = NULL, *subject = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int flags = PKCS7_DETACHED, operation = 0, ret = 0, need_rand = 0, indef = 0; int informat = FORMAT_SMIME, outformat = FORMAT_SMIME, keyform = FORMAT_PEM; int vpmtouched = 0, rv = 0; ENGINE *e = NULL; const char *mime_eol = "\n"; if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) return 1; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, smime_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(smime_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDS, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENCRYPT: operation = SMIME_ENCRYPT; break; case OPT_DECRYPT: operation = SMIME_DECRYPT; break; case OPT_SIGN: operation = SMIME_SIGN; break; case OPT_RESIGN: operation = SMIME_RESIGN; break; case OPT_VERIFY: operation = SMIME_VERIFY; break; case OPT_PK7OUT: operation = SMIME_PK7OUT; break; case OPT_TEXT: flags |= PKCS7_TEXT; break; case OPT_NOINTERN: flags |= PKCS7_NOINTERN; break; case OPT_NOVERIFY: flags |= PKCS7_NOVERIFY; break; case OPT_NOCHAIN: flags |= PKCS7_NOCHAIN; break; case OPT_NOCERTS: flags |= PKCS7_NOCERTS; break; case OPT_NOATTR: flags |= PKCS7_NOATTR; break; case OPT_NODETACH: flags &= ~PKCS7_DETACHED; break; case OPT_NOSMIMECAP: flags |= PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP; break; case OPT_BINARY: flags |= PKCS7_BINARY; break; case OPT_NOSIGS: flags |= PKCS7_NOSIGS; break; case OPT_STREAM: case OPT_INDEF: indef = 1; break; case OPT_NOINDEF: indef = 0; break; case OPT_CRLFEOL: flags |= PKCS7_CRLFEOL; mime_eol = "\r\n"; break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TO: to = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_FROM: from = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SUBJECT: subject = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGNER: /* If previous -signer argument add signer to list */ if (signerfile) { if (sksigners == NULL && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile); if (keyfile == NULL) keyfile = signerfile; if (skkeys == NULL && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile); keyfile = NULL; } signerfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RECIP: recipfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &sign_md)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_INKEY: /* If previous -inkey argument add signer to list */ if (keyfile) { if (signerfile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Must have -signer before -inkey\n", prog); goto opthelp; } if (sksigners == NULL && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile); signerfile = NULL; if (skkeys == NULL && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile); } keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CERTFILE: certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_CONTENT: contfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto opthelp; vpmtouched++; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) && (skkeys || sksigners)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Multiple signers or keys not allowed\n"); goto opthelp; } if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) { /* Check to see if any final signer needs to be appended */ if (keyfile && !signerfile) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal -inkey without -signer\n"); goto opthelp; } if (signerfile) { if (!sksigners && (sksigners = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sksigners, signerfile); if (!skkeys && (skkeys = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; if (!keyfile) keyfile = signerfile; sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(skkeys, keyfile); } if (!sksigners) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No signer certificate specified\n"); goto opthelp; } signerfile = NULL; keyfile = NULL; need_rand = 1; } else if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) { if (!recipfile && !keyfile) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient certificate or key specified\n"); goto opthelp; } } else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { if (argc == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient(s) certificate(s) specified\n"); goto opthelp; } need_rand = 1; } else if (!operation) goto opthelp; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (need_rand) { app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL)); if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); } ret = 2; if (!(operation & SMIME_SIGNERS)) flags &= ~PKCS7_DETACHED; if (!(operation & SMIME_OP)) { if (flags & PKCS7_BINARY) outformat = FORMAT_BINARY; } if (!(operation & SMIME_IP)) { if (flags & PKCS7_BINARY) informat = FORMAT_BINARY; } if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { if (!cipher) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n"); goto end; #endif } encerts = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!encerts) goto end; while (*argv) { cert = load_cert(*argv, FORMAT_PEM, "recipient certificate file"); if (cert == NULL) goto end; sk_X509_push(encerts, cert); cert = NULL; argv++; } } if (certfile) { if (!load_certs(certfile, &other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "certificate file")) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (recipfile && (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)) { if ((recip = load_cert(recipfile, FORMAT_PEM, "recipient certificate file")) == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) { if (!keyfile) keyfile = recipfile; } else if (operation == SMIME_SIGN) { if (!keyfile) keyfile = signerfile; } else keyfile = NULL; if (keyfile) { key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file"); if (!key) goto end; } in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (operation & SMIME_IP) { if (informat == FORMAT_SMIME) p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &indata); else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) p7 = PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) p7 = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad input format for PKCS#7 file\n"); goto end; } if (!p7) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading S/MIME message\n"); goto end; } if (contfile) { BIO_free(indata); if ((indata = BIO_new_file(contfile, "rb")) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read content file %s\n", contfile); goto end; } } } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY) { if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL) goto end; X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, smime_cb); if (vpmtouched) X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm); } ret = 3; if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) { if (indef) flags |= PKCS7_STREAM; p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags); } else if (operation & SMIME_SIGNERS) { int i; /* * If detached data content we only enable streaming if S/MIME output * format. */ if (operation == SMIME_SIGN) { if (flags & PKCS7_DETACHED) { if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME) flags |= PKCS7_STREAM; } else if (indef) flags |= PKCS7_STREAM; flags |= PKCS7_PARTIAL; p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, other, in, flags); if (!p7) goto end; if (flags & PKCS7_NOCERTS) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(other); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(other, i); PKCS7_add_certificate(p7, x); } } } else flags |= PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sksigners); i++) { signerfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sksigners, i); keyfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(skkeys, i); signer = load_cert(signerfile, FORMAT_PEM, "signer certificate"); if (!signer) goto end; key = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "signing key file"); if (!key) goto end; if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, signer, key, sign_md, flags)) goto end; X509_free(signer); signer = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(key); key = NULL; } /* If not streaming or resigning finalize structure */ if ((operation == SMIME_SIGN) && !(flags & PKCS7_STREAM)) { if (!PKCS7_final(p7, in, flags)) goto end; } } if (!p7) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating PKCS#7 structure\n"); goto end; } ret = 4; if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT) { if (!PKCS7_decrypt(p7, key, recip, out, flags)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error decrypting PKCS#7 structure\n"); goto end; } } else if (operation == SMIME_VERIFY) { STACK_OF(X509) *signers; if (PKCS7_verify(p7, other, store, indata, out, flags)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification successful\n"); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verification failure\n"); goto end; } signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, other, flags); if (!save_certs(signerfile, signers)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing signers to %s\n", signerfile); ret = 5; goto end; } sk_X509_free(signers); } else if (operation == SMIME_PK7OUT) PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(out, p7); else { if (to) BIO_printf(out, "To: %s%s", to, mime_eol); if (from) BIO_printf(out, "From: %s%s", from, mime_eol); if (subject) BIO_printf(out, "Subject: %s%s", subject, mime_eol); if (outformat == FORMAT_SMIME) { if (operation == SMIME_RESIGN) rv = SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, indata, flags); else rv = SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, flags); } else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) rv = PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(out, p7, in, flags); else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) rv = i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(out, p7, in, flags); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad output format for PKCS#7 file\n"); goto end; } if (rv == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing output\n"); ret = 3; goto end; } } ret = 0; end: if (need_rand) app_RAND_write_file(NULL); if (ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); sk_X509_pop_free(encerts, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(other, X509_free); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sksigners); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(skkeys); X509_STORE_free(store); X509_free(cert); X509_free(recip); X509_free(signer); EVP_PKEY_free(key); PKCS7_free(p7); release_engine(e); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(indata); BIO_free_all(out); OPENSSL_free(passin); return (ret); } static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers) { int i; BIO *tmp; if (!signerfile) return 1; tmp = BIO_new_file(signerfile, "w"); if (!tmp) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(signers); i++) PEM_write_bio_X509(tmp, sk_X509_value(signers, i)); BIO_free(tmp); return 1; } /* Minimal callback just to output policy info (if any) */ static int smime_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int error; error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); if ((error != X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY) && ((error != X509_V_OK) || (ok != 2))) return ok; policies_print(ctx); return ok; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dsa.c0000644000000000000000000001704613176625656013750 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENGINE, /* Do not change the order here; see case statements below */ OPT_PVK_NONE, OPT_PVK_WEAK, OPT_PVK_STRONG, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_MODULUS, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_PUBOUT, OPT_CIPHER, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS dsa_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format, DER PEM PVK"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format, DER PEM PVK"}, {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input key"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print key out"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the key in text"}, {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "Print the DSA public value"}, {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Expect a public key in input file"}, {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output public key, not private"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 {"pvk-strong", OPT_PVK_STRONG, '-', "Enable 'Strong' PVK encoding level (default)"}, {"pvk-weak", OPT_PVK_WEAK, '-', "Enable 'Weak' PVK encoding level"}, {"pvk-none", OPT_PVK_NONE, '-', "Don't enforce PVK encoding"}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int dsa_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *out = NULL; DSA *dsa = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, noout = 0; int i, modulus = 0, pubin = 0, pubout = 0, ret = 1; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 int pvk_encr = 2; # endif int private = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dsa_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: ret = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(dsa_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PVK_STRONG: /* pvk_encr:= 2 */ case OPT_PVK_WEAK: /* pvk_encr:= 1 */ case OPT_PVK_NONE: /* pvk_encr:= 0 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 pvk_encr = (o - OPT_PVK_NONE); #endif break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_MODULUS: modulus = 1; break; case OPT_PUBIN: pubin = 1; break; case OPT_PUBOUT: pubout = 1; break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc)) goto end; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = pubin || pubout ? 0 : 1; if (text && !pubin) private = 1; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "read DSA key\n"); { EVP_PKEY *pkey; if (pubin) pkey = load_pubkey(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Public Key"); else pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Private Key"); if (pkey) { dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } } if (dsa == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load Key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (text) { assert(pubin || private); if (!DSA_print(out, dsa, 0)) { perror(outfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (modulus) { const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL; DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL); BIO_printf(out, "Public Key="); BN_print(out, pub_key); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } if (noout) { ret = 0; goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing DSA key\n"); if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) { if (pubin || pubout) i = i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(out, dsa); else { assert(private); i = i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(out, dsa); } } else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) { if (pubin || pubout) i = PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(out, dsa); else { assert(private); i = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, dsa, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { EVP_PKEY *pk; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, dsa); if (outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { if (pubin) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK form impossible with public key input\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); goto end; } assert(private); # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK format not supported\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); goto end; # else i = i2b_PVK_bio(out, pk, pvk_encr, 0, passout); # endif } else if (pubin || pubout) i = i2b_PublicKey_bio(out, pk); else { assert(private); i = i2b_PrivateKey_bio(out, pk); } EVP_PKEY_free(pk); # endif } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; } if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write private key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; end: BIO_free_all(out); DSA_free(dsa); release_engine(e); OPENSSL_free(passin); OPENSSL_free(passout); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pca-req.pem0000644000000000000000000000117313176625656015062 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBnDCCAQUCAQAwXDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClF1ZWVuc2xhbmQx GjAYBgNVBAoMEUNyeXB0U29mdCBQdHkgTHRkMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNUZXN0IFBDQSAo MTAyNCBiaXQpMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC2GI47aS7P5X5D xcQBWeFdx3uZmRW7BGpCvWwNn0Gq8q3kcMn4W12wyR8gVfnOMSOX25plXdrf7rOJ OKzIRrAbS/PUqghB4TyaSxcsIkFZiUwIwDWK1pGSubkf/vmJmcs7i3zxywbrbiun BRil8NzTU6MY2KKDH9Jmndqz193CkwIDAQABoAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEA eJdCB0nHnFK0hek4biAxX0GuJXkknuUy46NKEhv3GBwt4gtO29bfkbQTGOsBBKNs KptlnkItscOXY+0lSva9K3XlwD9do7k2IZFtXJVayZVw1GcKybIY0l7B6kcSxG7T f3CsO+ifdrsJKtyoZNs96lBMrtXyGybt3mgQNdZauQU= -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dsaparam.c0000644000000000000000000002166513176625656014773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef GENCB_TEST static int stop_keygen_flag = 0; static void timebomb_sigalarm(int foo) { stop_keygen_flag = 1; } # endif static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_C, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_GENKEY, OPT_RAND, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_TIMEBOMB } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS dsaparam_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print as text"}, {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Output C code"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "No output"}, {"genkey", OPT_GENKEY, '-', "Generate a DSA key"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Files to use for random number input"}, # ifdef GENCB_TEST {"timebomb", OPT_TIMEBOMB, 'p', "Interrupt keygen after 'pnum' seconds"}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int dsaparam_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; DSA *dsa = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; BN_GENCB *cb = NULL; int numbits = -1, num = 0, genkey = 0, need_rand = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, noout = 0, C = 0; int ret = 1, i, text = 0, private = 0; # ifdef GENCB_TEST int timebomb = 0; # endif char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog, *inrand = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dsaparam_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(dsaparam_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_TIMEBOMB: # ifdef GENCB_TEST timebomb = atoi(opt_arg()); break; # endif case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_C: C = 1; break; case OPT_GENKEY: genkey = need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (argc == 1) { if (!opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num < 0) goto end; /* generate a key */ numbits = num; need_rand = 1; } private = genkey ? 1 : 0; in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (need_rand) { app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL)); if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); } if (numbits > 0) { cb = BN_GENCB_new(); if (cb == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error allocating BN_GENCB object\n"); goto end; } BN_GENCB_set(cb, dsa_cb, bio_err); assert(need_rand); dsa = DSA_new(); if (dsa == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error allocating DSA object\n"); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating DSA parameters, %d bit long prime\n", num); BIO_printf(bio_err, "This could take some time\n"); # ifdef GENCB_TEST if (timebomb > 0) { struct sigaction act; act.sa_handler = timebomb_sigalarm; act.sa_flags = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "(though I'll stop it if not done within %d secs)\n", timebomb); if (sigaction(SIGALRM, &act, NULL) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error, couldn't set SIGALRM handler\n"); goto end; } alarm(timebomb); } # endif if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(dsa, num, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) { # ifdef GENCB_TEST if (stop_keygen_flag) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA key generation time-stopped\n"); /* This is an asked-for behaviour! */ ret = 0; goto end; } # endif ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error, DSA key generation failed\n"); goto end; } } else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) dsa = d2i_DSAparams_bio(in, NULL); else dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (dsa == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DSA parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (text) { DSAparams_print(out, dsa); } if (C) { const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL; unsigned char *data; int len, bits_p; DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); len = BN_num_bytes(p); bits_p = BN_num_bits(p); data = app_malloc(len + 20, "BN space"); BIO_printf(bio_out, "DSA *get_dsa%d()\n{\n", bits_p); print_bignum_var(bio_out, p, "dsap", len, data); print_bignum_var(bio_out, q, "dsaq", len, data); print_bignum_var(bio_out, g, "dsag", len, data); BIO_printf(bio_out, " DSA *dsa = DSA_new();\n" "\n"); BIO_printf(bio_out, " if (dsa == NULL)\n" " return NULL;\n"); BIO_printf(bio_out, " dsa->p = BN_bin2bn(dsap_%d, sizeof (dsap_%d), NULL);\n", bits_p, bits_p); BIO_printf(bio_out, " dsa->q = BN_bin2bn(dsaq_%d, sizeof (dsaq_%d), NULL);\n", bits_p, bits_p); BIO_printf(bio_out, " dsa->g = BN_bin2bn(dsag_%d, sizeof (dsag_%d), NULL);\n", bits_p, bits_p); BIO_printf(bio_out, " if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {\n" " DSA_free(dsa);\n" " return NULL;\n" " }\n" " return(dsa);\n}\n"); OPENSSL_free(data); } if (!noout) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_DSAparams_bio(out, dsa); else i = PEM_write_bio_DSAparams(out, dsa); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write DSA parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (genkey) { DSA *dsakey; assert(need_rand); if ((dsakey = DSAparams_dup(dsa)) == NULL) goto end; if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); DSA_free(dsakey); goto end; } assert(private); if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(out, dsakey); else i = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, dsakey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); DSA_free(dsakey); } if (need_rand) app_RAND_write_file(NULL); ret = 0; end: BN_GENCB_free(cb); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); DSA_free(dsa); release_engine(e); return (ret); } static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb) { char c = '*'; if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb), &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb)); # ifdef GENCB_TEST if (stop_keygen_flag) return 0; # endif return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/progs.pl0000644000000000000000000001133213176625656014514 0ustar rootroot#! /usr/bin/env perl # Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # Generate progs.h file by looking for command mains in list of C files # passed on the command line. use strict; use warnings; use lib '.'; use configdata qw/@disablables %unified_info/; my %commands = (); my $cmdre = qr/^\s*int\s+([a-z_][a-z0-9_]*)_main\(\s*int\s+argc\s*,/; my $apps_openssl = shift @ARGV; # because the program apps/openssl has object files as sources, and # they then have the corresponding C files as source, we need to chain # the lookups in %unified_info my @openssl_source = map { @{$unified_info{sources}->{$_}} } @{$unified_info{sources}->{$apps_openssl}}; foreach my $filename (@openssl_source) { open F, $filename or die "Coudn't open $_: $!\n"; foreach (grep /$cmdre/, ) { my @foo = /$cmdre/; $commands{$1} = 1; } close F; } @ARGV = sort keys %commands; print <<'EOF'; /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by apps/progs.pl * * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ typedef enum FUNC_TYPE { FT_none, FT_general, FT_md, FT_cipher, FT_pkey, FT_md_alg, FT_cipher_alg } FUNC_TYPE; typedef struct function_st { FUNC_TYPE type; const char *name; int (*func)(int argc, char *argv[]); const OPTIONS *help; } FUNCTION; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(FUNCTION); EOF foreach (@ARGV) { printf "extern int %s_main(int argc, char *argv[]);\n", $_; } print "\n"; foreach (@ARGV) { printf "extern OPTIONS %s_options[];\n", $_; } print "\n#ifdef INCLUDE_FUNCTION_TABLE\n"; print "static FUNCTION functions[] = {\n"; my %cmd_disabler = ( ciphers => "sock", genrsa => "rsa", rsautl => "rsa", gendsa => "dsa", dsaparam => "dsa", gendh => "dh", dhparam => "dh", ecparam => "ec", pkcs12 => "des", ); foreach my $cmd (@ARGV) { my $str=" { FT_general, \"$cmd\", ${cmd}_main, ${cmd}_options },\n"; if ($cmd =~ /^s_/) { print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK\n${str}#endif\n"; } elsif (grep { $cmd eq $_ } @disablables) { print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($cmd)."\n${str}#endif\n"; } elsif (my $disabler = $cmd_disabler{$cmd}) { print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($disabler)."\n${str}#endif\n"; } else { print $str; } } my %md_disabler = ( blake2b512 => "blake2", blake2s256 => "blake2", ); foreach my $cmd ( "md2", "md4", "md5", "gost", "sha1", "sha224", "sha256", "sha384", "sha512", "mdc2", "rmd160", "blake2b512", "blake2s256" ) { my $str = " { FT_md, \"".$cmd."\", dgst_main},\n"; if (grep { $cmd eq $_ } @disablables) { print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($cmd)."\n${str}#endif\n"; } elsif (my $disabler = $md_disabler{$cmd}) { print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($disabler)."\n${str}#endif\n"; } else { print $str; } } my %cipher_disabler = ( des3 => "des", desx => "des", cast5 => "cast", ); foreach my $cmd ( "aes-128-cbc", "aes-128-ecb", "aes-192-cbc", "aes-192-ecb", "aes-256-cbc", "aes-256-ecb", "camellia-128-cbc", "camellia-128-ecb", "camellia-192-cbc", "camellia-192-ecb", "camellia-256-cbc", "camellia-256-ecb", "base64", "zlib", "des", "des3", "desx", "idea", "seed", "rc4", "rc4-40", "rc2", "bf", "cast", "rc5", "des-ecb", "des-ede", "des-ede3", "des-cbc", "des-ede-cbc","des-ede3-cbc", "des-cfb", "des-ede-cfb","des-ede3-cfb", "des-ofb", "des-ede-ofb","des-ede3-ofb", "idea-cbc","idea-ecb", "idea-cfb", "idea-ofb", "seed-cbc","seed-ecb", "seed-cfb", "seed-ofb", "rc2-cbc", "rc2-ecb", "rc2-cfb","rc2-ofb", "rc2-64-cbc", "rc2-40-cbc", "bf-cbc", "bf-ecb", "bf-cfb", "bf-ofb", "cast5-cbc","cast5-ecb", "cast5-cfb","cast5-ofb", "cast-cbc", "rc5-cbc", "rc5-ecb", "rc5-cfb", "rc5-ofb" ) { my $str=" { FT_cipher, \"$cmd\", enc_main, enc_options },\n"; (my $algo= $cmd) =~ s/-.*//g; if ($cmd eq "zlib") { print "#ifdef ZLIB\n${str}#endif\n"; } elsif (grep { $algo eq $_ } @disablables) { print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($algo)."\n${str}#endif\n"; } elsif (my $disabler = $cipher_disabler{$algo}) { print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_".uc($disabler)."\n${str}#endif\n"; } else { print $str; } } print " { 0, NULL, NULL}\n};\n"; print "#endif\n"; openssl-1.1.0g/apps/passwd.c0000644000000000000000000003632213176625656014500 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if defined OPENSSL_NO_MD5 || defined CHARSET_EBCDIC # define NO_MD5CRYPT_1 #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) || !defined(NO_MD5CRYPT_1) # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include # endif # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 # include # endif static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = { /* from crypto/des/fcrypt.c */ 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6A, 0x6B, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7A }; static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table, int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, int usecrypt, int use1, int useapr1); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_IN, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_QUIET, OPT_TABLE, OPT_REVERSE, OPT_APR1, OPT_1, OPT_CRYPT, OPT_SALT, OPT_STDIN } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS passwd_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Read passwords from file"}, {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Never verify when reading password from terminal"}, {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No warnings"}, {"table", OPT_TABLE, '-', "Format output as table"}, {"reverse", OPT_REVERSE, '-', "Switch table columns"}, {"salt", OPT_SALT, 's', "Use provided salt"}, {"stdin", OPT_STDIN, '-', "Read passwords from stdin"}, # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 {"apr1", OPT_APR1, '-', "MD5-based password algorithm, Apache variant"}, {"1", OPT_1, '-', "MD5-based password algorithm"}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES {"crypt", OPT_CRYPT, '-', "Standard Unix password algorithm (default)"}, # endif {NULL} }; int passwd_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *salt = NULL, *passwd = NULL, **passwds = NULL; char *salt_malloc = NULL, *passwd_malloc = NULL, *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; int in_stdin = 0, pw_source_defined = 0; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI int in_noverify = 0; # endif int passed_salt = 0, quiet = 0, table = 0, reverse = 0; int ret = 1, usecrypt = 0, use1 = 0, useapr1 = 0; size_t passwd_malloc_size = 0, pw_maxlen = 256; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, passwd_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(passwd_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_IN: if (pw_source_defined) goto opthelp; infile = opt_arg(); pw_source_defined = 1; break; case OPT_NOVERIFY: # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI in_noverify = 1; # endif break; case OPT_QUIET: quiet = 1; break; case OPT_TABLE: table = 1; break; case OPT_REVERSE: reverse = 1; break; case OPT_1: use1 = 1; break; case OPT_APR1: useapr1 = 1; break; case OPT_CRYPT: usecrypt = 1; break; case OPT_SALT: passed_salt = 1; salt = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_STDIN: if (pw_source_defined) goto opthelp; in_stdin = 1; pw_source_defined = 1; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (*argv) { if (pw_source_defined) goto opthelp; pw_source_defined = 1; passwds = argv; } if (!usecrypt && !use1 && !useapr1) { /* use default */ usecrypt = 1; } if (usecrypt + use1 + useapr1 > 1) { /* conflict */ goto opthelp; } # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (usecrypt) goto opthelp; # endif # ifdef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 if (use1 || useapr1) goto opthelp; # endif if (infile != NULL && in_stdin) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't combine -in and -stdin\n", prog); goto end; } if (infile != NULL || in_stdin) { /* * If in_stdin is true, we know that infile is NULL, and that * bio_open_default() will give us back an alias for stdin. */ in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) goto end; } if (usecrypt) pw_maxlen = 8; else if (use1 || useapr1) pw_maxlen = 256; /* arbitrary limit, should be enough for most * passwords */ if (passwds == NULL) { /* no passwords on the command line */ passwd_malloc_size = pw_maxlen + 2; /* longer than necessary so that we can warn about truncation */ passwd = passwd_malloc = app_malloc(passwd_malloc_size, "password buffer"); } if ((in == NULL) && (passwds == NULL)) { /* * we use the following method to make sure what * in the 'else' section is always compiled, to * avoid rot of not-frequently-used code. */ if (1) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI /* build a null-terminated list */ static char *passwds_static[2] = { NULL, NULL }; passwds = passwds_static; if (in == NULL) { if (EVP_read_pw_string (passwd_malloc, passwd_malloc_size, "Password: ", !(passed_salt || in_noverify)) != 0) goto end; } passwds[0] = passwd_malloc; } else { # endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "password required\n"); goto end; } } if (in == NULL) { assert(passwds != NULL); assert(*passwds != NULL); do { /* loop over list of passwords */ passwd = *passwds++; if (!do_passwd(passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, bio_out, quiet, table, reverse, pw_maxlen, usecrypt, use1, useapr1)) goto end; } while (*passwds != NULL); } else { /* in != NULL */ int done; assert(passwd != NULL); do { int r = BIO_gets(in, passwd, pw_maxlen + 1); if (r > 0) { char *c = (strchr(passwd, '\n')); if (c != NULL) { *c = 0; /* truncate at newline */ } else { /* ignore rest of line */ char trash[BUFSIZ]; do r = BIO_gets(in, trash, sizeof trash); while ((r > 0) && (!strchr(trash, '\n'))); } if (!do_passwd (passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, bio_out, quiet, table, reverse, pw_maxlen, usecrypt, use1, useapr1)) goto end; } done = (r <= 0); } while (!done); } ret = 0; end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); OPENSSL_free(salt_malloc); OPENSSL_free(passwd_malloc); BIO_free(in); return (ret); } # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 /* * MD5-based password algorithm (should probably be available as a library * function; then the static buffer would not be acceptable). For magic * string "1", this should be compatible to the MD5-based BSD password * algorithm. For 'magic' string "apr1", this is compatible to the MD5-based * Apache password algorithm. (Apparently, the Apache password algorithm is * identical except that the 'magic' string was changed -- the laziest * application of the NIH principle I've ever encountered.) */ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt) { /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */ static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2]; unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; char *salt_out; int n; unsigned int i; EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL, *md2 = NULL; size_t passwd_len, salt_len, magic_len; passwd_len = strlen(passwd); out_buf[0] = '$'; out_buf[1] = 0; magic_len = strlen(magic); if (magic_len > 4) /* assert it's "1" or "apr1" */ return NULL; OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, magic, sizeof out_buf); OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, "$", sizeof out_buf); OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, salt, sizeof out_buf); if (strlen(out_buf) > 6 + 8) /* assert "$apr1$..salt.." */ return NULL; salt_out = out_buf + 2 + magic_len; salt_len = strlen(salt_out); if (salt_len > 8) return NULL; md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, EVP_md5(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, "$", 1) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, magic, magic_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, "$", 1) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, salt_out, salt_len)) goto err; md2 = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md2 == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, EVP_md5(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, salt_out, salt_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL)) goto err; for (i = passwd_len; i > sizeof buf; i -= sizeof buf) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, sizeof buf)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, i)) goto err; n = passwd_len; while (n) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, (n & 1) ? "\0" : passwd, 1)) goto err; n >>= 1; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, buf, NULL)) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, EVP_md5(), NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, (i & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)passwd : buf, (i & 1) ? passwd_len : sizeof buf)) goto err; if (i % 3) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, salt_out, salt_len)) goto err; } if (i % 7) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, (i & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd, (i & 1) ? sizeof buf : passwd_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL)) goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); md2 = NULL; md = NULL; { /* transform buf into output string */ unsigned char buf_perm[sizeof buf]; int dest, source; char *output; /* silly output permutation */ for (dest = 0, source = 0; dest < 14; dest++, source = (source + 6) % 17) buf_perm[dest] = buf[source]; buf_perm[14] = buf[5]; buf_perm[15] = buf[11]; # ifndef PEDANTIC /* Unfortunately, this generates a "no * effect" warning */ assert(16 == sizeof buf_perm); # endif output = salt_out + salt_len; assert(output == out_buf + strlen(out_buf)); *output++ = '$'; for (i = 0; i < 15; i += 3) { *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i + 2] & 0x3f]; *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i + 1] & 0xf) << 2) | (buf_perm[i + 2] >> 6)]; *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i] & 3) << 4) | (buf_perm[i + 1] >> 4)]; *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 2]; } assert(i == 15); *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] & 0x3f]; *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 6]; *output = 0; assert(strlen(out_buf) < sizeof(out_buf)); } return out_buf; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); return NULL; } # endif static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table, int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, int usecrypt, int use1, int useapr1) { char *hash = NULL; assert(salt_p != NULL); assert(salt_malloc_p != NULL); /* first make sure we have a salt */ if (!passed_salt) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (usecrypt) { if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) *salt_p = *salt_malloc_p = app_malloc(3, "salt buffer"); if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) <= 0) goto end; (*salt_p)[0] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[0] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[1] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[1] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[2] = 0; # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(*salt_p, *salt_p, 2); /* des_crypt will convert back * to ASCII */ # endif } # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DES */ # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 if (use1 || useapr1) { int i; if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) *salt_p = *salt_malloc_p = app_malloc(9, "salt buffer"); if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) <= 0) goto end; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) (*salt_p)[i] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[i] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[8] = 0; } # endif /* !NO_MD5CRYPT_1 */ } assert(*salt_p != NULL); /* truncate password if necessary */ if ((strlen(passwd) > pw_maxlen)) { if (!quiet) /* * XXX: really we should know how to print a size_t, not cast it */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: truncating password to %u characters\n", (unsigned)pw_maxlen); passwd[pw_maxlen] = 0; } assert(strlen(passwd) <= pw_maxlen); /* now compute password hash */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (usecrypt) hash = DES_crypt(passwd, *salt_p); # endif # ifndef NO_MD5CRYPT_1 if (use1 || useapr1) hash = md5crypt(passwd, (use1 ? "1" : "apr1"), *salt_p); # endif assert(hash != NULL); if (table && !reverse) BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", passwd, hash); else if (table && reverse) BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", hash, passwd); else BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", hash); return 1; end: return 0; } #else int passwd_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Program not available.\n"); return (1); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/gendsa.c0000644000000000000000000001004013176625656014425 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_OUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_RAND, OPT_CIPHER } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS gendsa_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [args] dsaparam-file\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output the key to the specified file"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Encrypt the output with any supported cipher"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int gendsa_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; BIO *out = NULL, *in = NULL; DSA *dsa = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; char *inrand = NULL, *dsaparams = NULL; char *outfile = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passout = NULL, *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; int ret = 1, private = 0; const BIGNUM *p = NULL; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, gendsa_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: ret = 0; opt_help(gendsa_options); goto end; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc)) goto end; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); private = 1; if (argc != 1) goto opthelp; dsaparams = *argv; if (!app_passwd(NULL, passoutarg, NULL, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } in = bio_open_default(dsaparams, 'r', FORMAT_PEM); if (in == NULL) goto end2; if ((dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load DSA parameter file\n"); goto end; } BIO_free(in); in = NULL; out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PEM, private); if (out == NULL) goto end2; if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n"); } if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, NULL, NULL); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating DSA key, %d bits\n", BN_num_bits(p)); if (!DSA_generate_key(dsa)) goto end; app_RAND_write_file(NULL); assert(private); if (!PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, dsa, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout)) goto end; ret = 0; end: if (ret != 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); end2: BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); DSA_free(dsa); release_engine(e); OPENSSL_free(passout); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/nseq.c0000644000000000000000000000575313176625656014151 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_TOSEQ, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS nseq_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"toseq", OPT_TOSEQ, '-', "Output NS Sequence file"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {NULL} }; int nseq_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; X509 *x509 = NULL; NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *seq = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int toseq = 0, ret = 1, i; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, nseq_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: ret = 0; opt_help(nseq_options); goto end; case OPT_TOSEQ: toseq = 1; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_PEM); if (in == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_PEM); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (toseq) { seq = NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_new(); if (seq == NULL) goto end; seq->certs = sk_X509_new_null(); if (seq->certs == NULL) goto end; while ((x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) sk_X509_push(seq->certs, x509); if (!sk_X509_num(seq->certs)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error reading certs file %s\n", prog, infile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(out, seq); ret = 0; goto end; } seq = PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (seq == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error reading sequence file %s\n", prog, infile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(seq->certs); i++) { x509 = sk_X509_value(seq->certs, i); dump_cert_text(out, x509); PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509); } ret = 0; end: BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_free(seq); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/engine.c0000644000000000000000000003464413176625656014451 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_C, OPT_T, OPT_TT, OPT_PRE, OPT_POST, OPT_V = 100, OPT_VV, OPT_VVV, OPT_VVVV } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS engine_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] engine...\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " engine... Engines to load\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"v", OPT_V, '-', "List 'control commands' For each specified engine"}, {"vv", OPT_VV, '-', "Also display each command's description"}, {"vvv", OPT_VVV, '-', "Also add the input flags for each command"}, {"vvvv", OPT_VVVV, '-', "Also show internal input flags"}, {"c", OPT_C, '-', "List the capabilities of specified engine"}, {"t", OPT_T, '-', "Check that specified engine is available"}, {"tt", OPT_TT, '-', "Display error trace for unavailable engines"}, {"pre", OPT_PRE, 's', "Run command against the ENGINE before loading it"}, {"post", OPT_POST, 's', "Run command against the ENGINE after loading it"}, {OPT_MORE_STR, OPT_EOF, 1, "Commands are like \"SO_PATH:/lib/libdriver.so\""}, {NULL} }; static int append_buf(char **buf, int *size, const char *s) { if (*buf == NULL) { *size = 256; *buf = app_malloc(*size, "engine buffer"); **buf = '\0'; } if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) { char *tmp; *size += 256; tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size); if (tmp == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(*buf); *buf = NULL; return 0; } *buf = tmp; } if (**buf != '\0') OPENSSL_strlcat(*buf, ", ", *size); OPENSSL_strlcat(*buf, s, *size); return 1; } static int util_flags(BIO *out, unsigned int flags, const char *indent) { int started = 0, err = 0; /* Indent before displaying input flags */ BIO_printf(out, "%s%s(input flags): ", indent, indent); if (flags == 0) { BIO_printf(out, "\n"); return 1; } /* * If the object is internal, mark it in a way that shows instead of * having it part of all the other flags, even if it really is. */ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) { BIO_printf(out, "[Internal] "); } if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC) { BIO_printf(out, "NUMERIC"); started = 1; } /* * Now we check that no combinations of the mutually exclusive NUMERIC, * STRING, and NO_INPUT flags have been used. Future flags that can be * OR'd together with these would need to added after these to preserve * the testing logic. */ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING) { if (started) { BIO_printf(out, "|"); err = 1; } BIO_printf(out, "STRING"); started = 1; } if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) { if (started) { BIO_printf(out, "|"); err = 1; } BIO_printf(out, "NO_INPUT"); started = 1; } /* Check for unknown flags */ flags = flags & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL; if (flags) { if (started) BIO_printf(out, "|"); BIO_printf(out, "<0x%04X>", flags); } if (err) BIO_printf(out, " "); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); return 1; } static int util_verbose(ENGINE *e, int verbose, BIO *out, const char *indent) { static const int line_wrap = 78; int num; int ret = 0; char *name = NULL; char *desc = NULL; int flags; int xpos = 0; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds = NULL; if (!ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION, 0, NULL, NULL) || ((num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE, 0, NULL, NULL)) <= 0)) { return 1; } cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!cmds) goto err; do { int len; /* Get the command input flags */ if ((flags = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, num, NULL, NULL)) < 0) goto err; if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) || verbose >= 4) { /* Get the command name */ if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD, num, NULL, NULL)) <= 0) goto err; name = app_malloc(len + 1, "name buffer"); if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD, num, name, NULL) <= 0) goto err; /* Get the command description */ if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD, num, NULL, NULL)) < 0) goto err; if (len > 0) { desc = app_malloc(len + 1, "description buffer"); if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD, num, desc, NULL) <= 0) goto err; } /* Now decide on the output */ if (xpos == 0) /* Do an indent */ xpos = BIO_puts(out, indent); else /* Otherwise prepend a ", " */ xpos += BIO_printf(out, ", "); if (verbose == 1) { /* * We're just listing names, comma-delimited */ if ((xpos > (int)strlen(indent)) && (xpos + (int)strlen(name) > line_wrap)) { BIO_printf(out, "\n"); xpos = BIO_puts(out, indent); } xpos += BIO_printf(out, "%s", name); } else { /* We're listing names plus descriptions */ BIO_printf(out, "%s: %s\n", name, (desc == NULL) ? "" : desc); /* ... and sometimes input flags */ if ((verbose >= 3) && !util_flags(out, flags, indent)) goto err; xpos = 0; } } OPENSSL_free(name); name = NULL; OPENSSL_free(desc); desc = NULL; /* Move to the next command */ num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE, num, NULL, NULL); } while (num > 0); if (xpos > 0) BIO_printf(out, "\n"); ret = 1; err: sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(cmds); OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(desc); return ret; } static void util_do_cmds(ENGINE *e, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds, BIO *out, const char *indent) { int loop, res, num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(cmds); if (num < 0) { BIO_printf(out, "[Error]: internal stack error\n"); return; } for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) { char buf[256]; const char *cmd, *arg; cmd = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(cmds, loop); res = 1; /* assume success */ /* Check if this command has no ":arg" */ if ((arg = strstr(cmd, ":")) == NULL) { if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, cmd, NULL, 0)) res = 0; } else { if ((int)(arg - cmd) > 254) { BIO_printf(out, "[Error]: command name too long\n"); return; } memcpy(buf, cmd, (int)(arg - cmd)); buf[arg - cmd] = '\0'; arg++; /* Move past the ":" */ /* Call the command with the argument */ if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, buf, arg, 0)) res = 0; } if (res) BIO_printf(out, "[Success]: %s\n", cmd); else { BIO_printf(out, "[Failure]: %s\n", cmd); ERR_print_errors(out); } } } int engine_main(int argc, char **argv) { int ret = 1, i; int verbose = 0, list_cap = 0, test_avail = 0, test_avail_noise = 0; ENGINE *e; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_CSTRING) *engines = sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_new_null(); STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pre_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *post_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); BIO *out; const char *indent = " "; OPTION_CHOICE o; char *prog; char *argv1; out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); if (engines == NULL || pre_cmds == NULL || post_cmds == NULL) goto end; /* Remember the original command name, parse/skip any leading engine * names, and then setup to parse the rest of the line as flags. */ prog = argv[0]; while ((argv1 = argv[1]) != NULL && *argv1 != '-') { sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(engines, argv1); argc--; argv++; } argv[0] = prog; opt_init(argc, argv, engine_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(engine_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_VVVV: case OPT_VVV: case OPT_VV: case OPT_V: /* Convert to an integer from one to four. */ i = (int)(o - OPT_V) + 1; if (verbose < i) verbose = i; break; case OPT_C: list_cap = 1; break; case OPT_TT: test_avail_noise++; /* fall thru */ case OPT_T: test_avail++; break; case OPT_PRE: sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pre_cmds, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_POST: sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(post_cmds, opt_arg()); break; } } /* Allow any trailing parameters as engine names. */ argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); for ( ; *argv; argv++) { if (**argv == '-') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Cannot mix flags and engine names.\n", prog); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; } sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(engines, *argv); } if (sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_num(engines) == 0) { for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e != NULL; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) { sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_push(engines, ENGINE_get_id(e)); } } ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_num(engines); i++) { const char *id = sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_value(engines, i); if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(id)) != NULL) { const char *name = ENGINE_get_name(e); /* * Do "id" first, then "name". Easier to auto-parse. */ BIO_printf(out, "(%s) %s\n", id, name); util_do_cmds(e, pre_cmds, out, indent); if (strcmp(ENGINE_get_id(e), id) != 0) { BIO_printf(out, "Loaded: (%s) %s\n", ENGINE_get_id(e), ENGINE_get_name(e)); } if (list_cap) { int cap_size = 256; char *cap_buf = NULL; int k, n; const int *nids; ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR fn_c; ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR fn_d; ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR fn_pk; if (ENGINE_get_RSA(e) != NULL && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "RSA")) goto end; if (ENGINE_get_DSA(e) != NULL && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "DSA")) goto end; if (ENGINE_get_DH(e) != NULL && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "DH")) goto end; if (ENGINE_get_RAND(e) != NULL && !append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, "RAND")) goto end; fn_c = ENGINE_get_ciphers(e); if (!fn_c) goto skip_ciphers; n = fn_c(e, NULL, &nids, 0); for (k = 0; k < n; ++k) if (!append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]))) goto end; skip_ciphers: fn_d = ENGINE_get_digests(e); if (!fn_d) goto skip_digests; n = fn_d(e, NULL, &nids, 0); for (k = 0; k < n; ++k) if (!append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]))) goto end; skip_digests: fn_pk = ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(e); if (!fn_pk) goto skip_pmeths; n = fn_pk(e, NULL, &nids, 0); for (k = 0; k < n; ++k) if (!append_buf(&cap_buf, &cap_size, OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]))) goto end; skip_pmeths: if (cap_buf && (*cap_buf != '\0')) BIO_printf(out, " [%s]\n", cap_buf); OPENSSL_free(cap_buf); } if (test_avail) { BIO_printf(out, "%s", indent); if (ENGINE_init(e)) { BIO_printf(out, "[ available ]\n"); util_do_cmds(e, post_cmds, out, indent); ENGINE_finish(e); } else { BIO_printf(out, "[ unavailable ]\n"); if (test_avail_noise) ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout); ERR_clear_error(); } } if ((verbose > 0) && !util_verbose(e, verbose, out, indent)) goto end; ENGINE_free(e); } else { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); /* because exit codes above 127 have special meaning on Unix */ if (++ret > 127) ret = 127; } } end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); sk_OPENSSL_CSTRING_free(engines); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pre_cmds); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(post_cmds); BIO_free_all(out); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/testrsa.h0000644000000000000000000036217213176625656014676 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ static unsigned char test512[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x3a, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xd6, 0x33, 0xb9, 0xc8, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0x3c, 0x7d, 0xc0, 0x01, 0x86, 0xd0, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0x55, 0xf2, 0x95, 0x93, 0xcc, 0x4f, 0xb7, 0x5b, 0x67, 0x5b, 0x94, 0x68, 0xc9, 0x34, 0x15, 0xde, 0xa5, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0x33, 0xc2, 0x6e, 0xfc, 0x34, 0x5e, 0x71, 0x13, 0xb7, 0xd6, 0xee, 0xd8, 0xa5, 0x65, 0x05, 0x72, 0x87, 0xa8, 0xb0, 0x77, 0xfe, 0x57, 0xf5, 0xfc, 0x5f, 0x55, 0x83, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x57, 0x49, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xa7, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x57, 0xdc, 0x07, 0xf7, 0x6a, 0x7f, 0x60, 0x52, 0xb3, 0x72, 0xf1, 0x66, 0x1f, 0x7d, 0x97, 0x3b, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x0a, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0xcf, 0x42, 0x23, 0x00, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x28, 0x0e, 0x1c, 0x90, 0xc4, 0x11, 0x25, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x93, 0xa5, 0x2f, 0x70, 0x02, 0xdf, 0x81, 0x9c, 0x49, 0x03, 0xa0, 0xf8, 0x6d, 0x54, 0x2e, 0x26, 0xde, 0xaa, 0x85, 0x59, 0xa8, 0x31, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xeb, 0x47, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0xf6, 0xc3, 0xdd, 0x5a, 0x46, 0xc5, 0xb9, 0x2b, 0x9a, 0xa0, 0x09, 0x8f, 0xa6, 0xfb, 0xf3, 0x78, 0x7a, 0x33, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x0f, 0x42, 0x6b, 0x13, 0x68, 0x24, 0xd3, 0x15, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xe9, 0x10, 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x0d, 0xe2, 0x82, 0x68, 0x77, 0x8a, 0x6e, 0x7c, 0xda, 0xbc, 0x3e, 0x53, 0x83, 0xfb, 0xd6, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xb5, 0xae, 0x6e, 0x80, 0xda, 0x00, 0x55, 0x97, 0xc1, 0xd0, 0x65, 0x02, 0x20, 0x4c, 0xf8, 0x73, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0x49, 0x29, 0x61, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x10, 0x0d, 0xf3, 0xc7, 0xe7, 0x58, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x15, 0x5e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7b, 0xa2, 0x42, 0x58, 0x45, 0x41, 0x0c, 0xcb, 0x01, 0x02, 0x20, 0x12, 0x11, 0xba, 0x31, 0x57, 0x9d, 0x3d, 0x11, 0x0e, 0x5b, 0x8c, 0x2f, 0x5f, 0xe2, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x05, 0x47, 0x8c, 0x15, 0x8e, 0xb3, 0x56, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xfb, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xf4, 0xfc, 0x10, 0xc5, 0x02, 0x20, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x29, 0x99, 0x5b, 0xd9, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0xfc, 0x49, 0x7a, 0x2a, 0x21, 0x2c, 0x49, 0xe4, 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xef, 0x51, 0xf1, 0xab, 0x6d, 0xfb, 0x4b, 0x14, 0xe9, 0x4b, 0x52, 0xb5, 0x82, 0x2c, }; static unsigned char test1024[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdc, 0x98, 0x43, 0xe8, 0x3d, 0x43, 0x5b, 0xe4, 0x05, 0xcd, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x3e, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x75, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xa5, 0x9f, 0x6b, 0xe9, 0x34, 0x41, 0x29, 0x18, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0x55, 0x4d, 0x70, 0xfc, 0xec, 0xae, 0x87, 0x38, 0x0a, 0x20, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x45, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x57, 0x60, 0x57, 0xf4, 0xed, 0x96, 0x22, 0xcb, 0x8f, 0xe1, 0x33, 0x3a, 0x17, 0x1f, 0xed, 0x37, 0xa5, 0x6f, 0xeb, 0xa6, 0xbc, 0x12, 0x80, 0x1d, 0x53, 0xbd, 0x70, 0xeb, 0x21, 0x76, 0x3e, 0xc9, 0x2f, 0x1a, 0x45, 0x24, 0x82, 0xff, 0xcd, 0x59, 0x32, 0x06, 0x2e, 0x12, 0x3b, 0x23, 0x78, 0xed, 0x12, 0x3d, 0xe0, 0x8d, 0xf9, 0x67, 0x4f, 0x37, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x2d, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0x1f, 0xb3, 0x94, 0xe1, 0x41, 0x2e, 0x2d, 0x90, 0x10, 0xfc, 0x82, 0x91, 0x8b, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xd4, 0xf2, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xab, 0x53, 0x55, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0x3f, 0x8f, 0x58, 0xba, 0x8b, 0x00, 0x16, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x3a, 0xf0, 0x30, 0xd0, 0x05, 0x17, 0xda, 0xb0, 0xeb, 0x9a, 0x2d, 0x4f, 0x26, 0xb0, 0xd6, 0x38, 0xc1, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x1f, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0xe2, 0xcf, 0x51, 0x51, 0x79, 0x88, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xfa, 0xba, 0x27, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0xeb, 0x8a, 0x79, 0x52, 0x3c, 0x64, 0x34, 0x7d, 0xc2, 0xcf, 0x28, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0xd5, 0x43, 0x0b, 0xd1, 0xa6, 0xca, 0x6d, 0x03, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x23, 0xbc, 0x6d, 0x05, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x09, 0x2f, 0x2e, 0x5c, 0xb6, 0xee, 0x74, 0xdd, 0xd2, 0x48, 0x8e, 0x36, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xe5, 0x10, 0x82, 0xeb, 0x6a, 0xf3, 0x4b, 0x9f, 0xd6, 0xed, 0x11, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xf4, 0xfe, 0x8e, 0x75, 0x94, 0x20, 0x2f, 0xcb, 0xac, 0x46, 0xf1, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xf9, 0x8c, 0xa3, 0x85, 0xb1, 0xdd, 0x29, 0xaf, 0x65, 0xc1, 0x33, 0xf3, 0x95, 0xc5, 0x52, 0x68, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0xf1, 0xe5, 0x0e, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x77, 0xdc, 0x46, 0x9e, 0xc7, 0xa6, 0xe4, 0x16, 0x29, 0xda, 0xb0, 0x07, 0xcf, 0x5b, 0xa9, 0x12, 0x8a, 0xdd, 0x63, 0x0a, 0xde, 0x2e, 0x8c, 0x66, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0x19, 0xa3, 0x7e, 0xf4, 0x3b, 0xd0, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0xa4, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0xd3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x4c, 0x05, 0xf2, 0x04, 0x86, 0x4e, 0x61, 0x43, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xb9, 0x96, 0x86, 0x52, 0x2c, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x7b, 0xab, 0x0b, 0x13, 0x0d, 0x7e, 0x38, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x7b, 0x0e, 0xe7, 0x19, 0x99, 0x38, 0xe7, 0xf2, 0x21, 0xbd, 0x85, 0x85, 0xe3, 0xfd, 0x28, 0x77, 0x20, 0x31, 0x71, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0xff, 0xfb, 0x2e, 0xaf, 0x85, 0xb4, 0x86, 0xca, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xca, 0xaa, 0x0f, 0x95, 0x37, 0x02, 0x40, 0x0e, 0x41, 0x9a, 0x95, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0x59, 0xce, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xde, 0x35, 0xec, 0x38, 0x79, 0x9c, 0xb8, 0x10, 0x52, 0x41, 0x63, 0xab, 0x82, 0xae, 0x6f, 0x00, 0xa9, 0xf4, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x49, 0x0b, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xa9, 0x0c, 0x8f, 0x8f, 0xf9, 0x1f, 0x35, 0xc6, 0x92, 0xb8, 0x5e, 0xb0, 0x66, 0xab, 0x52, 0x40, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0x36, 0x6a, 0x7d, 0x80, 0x46, 0x04, 0x02, 0xe5, 0x9f, 0x41, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xad, 0xcc, 0x4e, 0x21, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x24, 0x91, 0xfb, 0xa7, 0x80, 0x8d, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0xb3, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0x82, 0xdf, 0x69, 0x18, 0xb4, 0x71, 0xff, 0xa6, 0x65, 0xde, 0xed, 0x84, 0x8d, 0x42, 0xb7, 0xb3, 0x21, 0x69, 0x56, 0x1c, 0x07, 0x60, 0x51, 0x29, 0x04, 0xff, 0x34, 0x06, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x67, 0x2c, 0x7c, 0x04, 0x93, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x2a, 0xb7, 0x1b, 0xe7, 0x87, 0x02, 0x40, 0x78, 0xda, 0x5d, 0x07, 0x51, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x29, 0x20, 0x84, 0x0d, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xd7, 0x00, 0xd8, 0x77, 0x7e, 0xb0, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xd6, 0x5b, 0x53, 0xb8, 0x9b, 0x7a, 0xcd, 0xc7, 0x2b, 0xb8, 0x6a, 0x63, 0xa9, 0xfb, 0x6f, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xbf, 0x4c, 0x5d, 0x00, 0x14, 0xba, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x88, 0xed, 0xe4, 0xe0, 0x8c, 0xa2, 0xec, 0x14, 0x7e, 0x2d, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x46, 0x49, 0x95, 0x45, }; static unsigned char test2048[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0xce, 0x3e, 0x3c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x3f, 0x4f, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0xc2, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0x58, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x52, 0x6a, 0xe8, 0xcf, 0x4a, 0x73, 0x47, 0x8d, 0x25, 0x0f, 0x5f, 0x03, 0x26, 0x78, 0xef, 0xf0, 0x22, 0x12, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x47, 0xb2, 0x1c, 0x0b, 0x38, 0x63, 0x1a, 0x6c, 0x85, 0x7a, 0x80, 0xc6, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x41, 0xaf, 0x62, 0xc4, 0x67, 0x32, 0x88, 0xf8, 0xa6, 0x9c, 0xf5, 0x23, 0x1d, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x3f, 0x29, 0xf9, 0xec, 0xe1, 0x8b, 0x26, 0x03, 0x2c, 0xb2, 0xab, 0xf3, 0x7d, 0xb5, 0xca, 0x49, 0xc0, 0x8f, 0x1c, 0xdf, 0x33, 0x3a, 0x60, 0xda, 0x3c, 0xb0, 0x16, 0xf8, 0xa9, 0x12, 0x8f, 0x64, 0xac, 0x23, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x64, 0x97, 0x5d, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x09, 0x83, 0x9b, 0x61, 0xd3, 0xac, 0xf0, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x5e, 0x9f, 0x44, 0x94, 0xdb, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0x97, 0xe8, 0x52, 0x29, 0xf7, 0xdb, 0x94, 0x07, 0x45, 0x90, 0x78, 0x1e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x80, 0xf7, 0x57, 0xad, 0x1c, 0x79, 0xc5, 0xcb, 0x32, 0xb0, 0xce, 0xcd, 0x74, 0xb3, 0xe2, 0x94, 0xc5, 0x78, 0x2f, 0x34, 0x1a, 0x45, 0xf7, 0x8c, 0x52, 0xa5, 0xbc, 0x8d, 0xec, 0xd1, 0x2f, 0x31, 0x3b, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x59, 0x5e, 0x88, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x92, 0x35, 0x32, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xec, 0x50, 0x48, 0x7c, 0xba, 0x05, 0xf9, 0xf8, 0xf8, 0xa7, 0x8c, 0x83, 0xe8, 0x66, 0x5b, 0xeb, 0xfe, 0xd8, 0x4f, 0xdd, 0x6d, 0x36, 0xc0, 0xb2, 0x90, 0x0f, 0xb8, 0x52, 0xf9, 0x04, 0x9b, 0x40, 0x2c, 0x27, 0xd6, 0x36, 0x8e, 0xc2, 0x1b, 0x44, 0xf3, 0x92, 0xd5, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0x7d, 0x03, 0xd7, 0x02, 0x14, 0x20, 0xe9, 0x10, 0x92, 0xfd, 0xf9, 0xfc, 0x8f, 0xe5, 0x18, 0xe1, 0x95, 0xcc, 0x9e, 0x60, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0x38, 0x4d, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0x0d, 0xb4, 0x27, 0x90, 0x8d, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0xb8, 0x84, 0xaa, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x5d, 0x99, 0xbe, 0x55, 0xf6, 0x3e, 0x7c, 0x49, 0x20, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0x8e, 0x19, 0x0e, 0x66, 0x24, 0xac, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x33, 0x97, 0xeb, 0x95, 0xd5, 0x3b, 0x0f, 0x40, 0x56, 0x04, 0x50, 0xd1, 0xe6, 0xbe, 0x84, 0x0b, 0x25, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0xe2, 0x83, 0x6c, 0xf5, 0x62, 0x5d, 0xba, 0x2b, 0x7d, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0x6c, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0x0e, 0x54, 0x93, 0x80, 0x01, 0x91, 0x51, 0x09, 0xe8, 0x5b, 0x8e, 0x47, 0xbd, 0x64, 0xe4, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x83, 0x55, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0x37, 0xf0, 0x25, 0xb5, 0x7d, 0x21, 0xd7, 0x69, 0xdf, 0x6f, 0xc2, 0xcf, 0x10, 0xc9, 0x8a, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x7a, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0xe6, 0x9a, 0x15, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x4e, 0x46, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x02, 0xc4, 0xf0, 0xab, 0xeb, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x23, 0xfc, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x5d, 0x31, 0x46, 0x99, 0xce, 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x04, 0x75, 0x10, 0x67, 0xc4, 0x53, 0x47, 0x44, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0x25, 0x73, 0x7e, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x59, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0xf4, 0xc7, 0x18, 0x92, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0xb5, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0xc7, 0xb9, 0x1b, 0x9f, 0x48, 0xfa, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x98, 0x4d, 0xca, 0x84, 0x9c, 0x06, 0xca, 0xe7, 0x89, 0x01, 0x04, 0xc4, 0x6c, 0xfd, 0x29, 0x59, 0x35, 0xe7, 0xf3, 0xdd, 0xce, 0x64, 0x59, 0xbf, 0x21, 0x13, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0x0e, 0xc5, 0xff, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x00, 0xec, 0xac, 0x6b, 0x11, 0xef, 0x51, 0x5e, 0xad, 0x07, 0x15, 0xde, 0xb8, 0x5f, 0xc6, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0x22, 0x65, 0x46, 0x83, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xd0, 0xf1, 0x44, 0x8a, 0xe1, 0x9c, 0x23, 0x33, 0xb4, 0x97, 0x33, 0xe6, 0x6b, 0x81, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xec, 0x12, 0xa7, 0x59, 0x74, 0x6a, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xad, 0xd8, 0x36, 0x80, 0x50, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x81, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xd0, 0x91, 0xf2, 0x6c, 0x12, 0x2f, 0x9d, 0x1a, 0x26, 0xf8, 0x30, 0x65, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0x6a, 0x30, 0x98, 0x82, 0x87, 0xec, 0xa2, 0x56, 0x87, 0x62, 0x6f, 0xe7, 0x9f, 0xf6, 0x56, 0xe6, 0x71, 0x8f, 0x49, 0x86, 0x93, 0x5a, 0x4d, 0x34, 0x58, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x04, 0x13, 0xaf, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xad, 0x11, 0xd1, 0x30, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x06, 0xa0, 0xfa, 0xb7, 0x55, 0xdc, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x4c, 0x2c, 0x59, 0x56, 0xf6, 0xe8, 0x9d, 0xaf, 0x0a, 0x78, 0x99, 0x06, 0x06, 0x9e, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x51, 0x55, 0x43, 0xfc, 0x3b, 0x6c, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0x2d, 0x41, 0xa7, 0xaf, 0xb7, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x28, 0x18, 0xb4, 0x13, 0xd1, 0xe6, 0x97, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x6a, 0x80, 0xca, 0xdd, 0x1a, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd1, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x1f, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0xab, 0xd6, 0xca, 0x7c, 0xbc, 0x7d, 0x13, 0x35, 0xce, 0x27, 0xcd, 0xd8, 0x49, 0x51, 0x63, 0x64, 0x0f, 0xca, 0x06, 0x12, 0xfc, 0x07, 0x3e, 0xaf, 0x61, 0x6d, 0xe2, 0x53, 0x39, 0x27, 0xae, 0xc3, 0x11, 0x9e, 0x94, 0x01, 0x4f, 0xe3, 0xf3, 0x67, 0xf9, 0x77, 0xf9, 0xe7, 0x95, 0x3a, 0x6f, 0xe2, 0x20, 0x73, 0x3e, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x28, 0xd4, 0x61, 0x97, 0xf6, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x23, 0x10, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x84, 0x57, 0x7e, 0x25, 0x1f, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0x54, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x94, 0xcc, 0x95, 0x0a, 0xab, 0x30, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x1f, 0x61, 0x8e, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0x4e, 0xb9, 0x83, 0x43, 0x79, 0x85, 0x11, 0xbc, 0x0f, 0xae, 0x25, 0x20, 0x05, 0xbc, 0xd2, 0x48, 0xa1, 0x68, 0x09, 0x84, 0xf6, 0x12, 0x9a, 0x66, 0xb9, 0x2b, 0xbb, 0x76, 0x03, 0x17, 0x46, 0x4e, 0x97, 0x59, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x09, 0x4c, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x48, 0x78, 0x43, 0xb5, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x93, 0x2c, 0xb7, 0x24, 0xe8, 0xc6, 0x7d, 0x5a, 0x70, 0x45, 0x92, 0xc8, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0xcd, 0xe1, 0xf7, 0x29, 0x40, 0xfa, 0x3f, 0x5b, 0x47, 0x44, 0x39, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0x72, 0x9e, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xda, 0xaa, 0xa0, 0x2a, 0x09, 0xfd, 0x54, 0x93, 0x23, 0xaa, 0x37, 0x85, 0x5b, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0xf9, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x0d, 0xbd, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x24, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x40, 0x72, 0xf1, 0x93, 0x09, 0x48, 0x97, 0x6c, 0x84, 0x90, 0xa8, 0x46, 0x14, 0x01, 0x39, 0x11, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x41, 0x27, 0x32, 0x75, 0x24, 0xed, 0xa1, 0xd9, 0x12, 0x29, 0x8a, 0x28, 0x71, 0x89, 0x8d, 0xca, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x01, 0xc4, 0x2f, 0x82, 0x19, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x1c, 0xb8, 0x23, 0x2e, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x49, 0x97, 0x92, 0x97, 0x6b, 0x7a, 0x9d, 0xb9, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf6, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x7c, 0x76, 0xd3, 0x87, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x83, 0x10, 0x88, 0x01, 0x18, 0x14, 0xd1, 0xd3, 0x75, 0x59, 0x24, 0xaa, 0xf5, 0x16, 0xa5, 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xd1, 0xcc, 0xee, 0xf4, 0x15, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0x27, 0xe9, 0x44, 0x49, 0x06, 0x72, 0xb9, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0xc4, 0x2c, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x5a, 0xaa, 0xdc, 0x85, 0xee, 0x6e, 0xad, 0x54, 0xb3, 0xf4, 0xfc, 0x31, 0xa1, 0x06, 0x3a, 0x70, 0x57, 0x0c, 0xf3, 0x95, 0x5b, 0x3e, 0xe8, 0xfd, 0x1a, 0x4f, 0xf6, 0x78, 0x93, 0x46, 0x6a, 0xd7, 0x31, 0xb4, 0x84, 0x64, 0x85, 0x09, 0x38, 0x89, 0x92, 0x94, 0x1c, 0xbf, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0xe0, 0xff, 0x99, 0xa3, 0xf0, 0x2b, 0x31, 0xc2, 0x36, 0xcd, 0x60, 0xbf, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0x74, 0x32, 0xe8, 0x9c, 0x93, 0x6e, 0xbb, 0x91, 0x7b, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xa2, 0x71, 0x25, 0x38, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0xe9, 0x37, 0xcd, 0xfe, 0x44, 0xce, 0x90, 0x3f, 0x52, 0x87, 0x84, 0x52, 0x1b, 0xae, 0x8d, 0x22, 0x94, 0xce, 0x38, 0xe6, 0x04, 0x88, 0x76, 0x85, 0x9a, 0xd3, 0x14, 0x09, 0xe5, 0x69, 0x9a, 0xff, 0x58, 0x92, 0x02, 0x6a, 0x7d, 0x7c, 0x1e, 0x2c, 0xfd, 0xa8, 0xca, 0x32, 0x14, 0x4f, 0x0d, 0x84, 0x0d, 0x37, 0x43, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x12, 0xc8, 0x24, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8d, 0x46, 0xd9, 0x54, 0x53, 0xe7, 0x62, 0x71, 0xa8, 0x2b, 0x71, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x75, 0xf8, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0x61, 0x29, 0x46, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x82, 0xfa, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0x08, 0xfa, 0xfc, 0x63, 0xfd, 0x6b, 0x30, 0xbc, 0xf4, 0x4e, 0x9e, 0x8c, 0x25, 0x0c, 0xb6, 0x55, 0xe7, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0x4e, 0x0b, 0xfd, 0x8b, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x9c, 0x44, 0x57, 0x8f, 0x1f, 0x86, 0xf7, 0xd5, 0x1b, 0xe4, 0x95, }; static unsigned char test3072[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3b, 0x23, 0xc0, 0x33, 0xa7, 0x8b, 0xaa, 0xca, 0xa3, 0x8c, 0x94, 0xf2, 0x4c, 0x52, 0x08, 0x85, 0x80, 0xfc, 0x36, 0x15, 0xfa, 0x03, 0x06, 0xb6, 0xd6, 0x3f, 0x60, 0x8a, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xba, 0x1a, 0x51, 0x0b, 0x12, 0xea, 0x71, 0x77, 0xf6, 0x3a, 0x30, 0x21, 0x3d, 0x24, 0xf8, 0x2e, 0xd0, 0x17, 0x3a, 0x85, 0x94, 0x25, 0x42, 0x89, 0xff, 0x6a, 0x68, 0xdf, 0x1f, 0x86, 0xae, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0x79, 0xf6, 0x69, 0x94, 0xfe, 0xde, 0xfe, 0xce, 0x1b, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x91, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0xf1, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x00, 0x82, 0x51, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0xfd, 0xac, 0xf1, 0x0e, 0x7f, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x85, 0x35, 0xf9, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x5f, 0xd3, 0x58, 0xe3, 0xa1, 0x54, 0x9e, 0x30, 0xb1, 0x8d, 0x01, 0x97, 0x82, 0x06, 0x8e, 0x77, 0xfb, 0xce, 0x50, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0xf1, 0xff, 0x57, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x03, 0xfd, 0x0e, 0xba, 0x1e, 0xca, 0x85, 0xc1, 0x9b, 0xa5, 0x9d, 0x09, 0x0e, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xc5, 0x73, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x39, 0x3c, 0x64, 0x06, 0x9a, 0x79, 0x3f, 0x50, 0x87, 0x9c, 0x18, 0x2d, 0x62, 0x01, 0xfc, 0xed, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x28, 0x21, 0x94, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0x2d, 0x96, 0x4f, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf1, 0xe0, 0x8a, 0xfa, 0x4d, 0xb6, 0x78, 0x4a, 0xde, 0x17, 0x59, 0xb0, 0x22, 0xa0, 0x9a, 0xd3, 0x70, 0xb6, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xbc, 0x96, 0xca, 0x41, 0x5f, 0x58, 0x4e, 0xce, 0xef, 0x64, 0x45, 0xdd, 0x3f, 0x81, 0x92, 0xcc, 0x40, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x19, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x77, 0x2f, 0x43, 0xfb, 0x8e, 0xad, 0x82, 0x4a, 0x0b, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0x09, 0x8a, 0x80, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xef, 0xd2, 0x06, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x0c, 0x7f, 0xae, 0x60, 0x3f, 0x2e, 0x52, 0xb4, 0xe4, 0xc2, 0x5c, 0xa6, 0x71, 0xc0, 0x13, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x0d, 0x13, 0xd7, 0xb7, 0x14, 0x94, 0x3f, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x70, 0x2f, 0x15, 0x82, 0x8d, 0x47, 0x45, 0xa6, 0x00, 0x8a, 0x14, 0x91, 0xde, 0x2f, 0x50, 0x17, 0xe3, 0x1d, 0x34, 0x29, 0x8c, 0xe4, 0x57, 0x74, 0x2a, 0x3a, 0x82, 0x65, 0x26, 0xf7, 0x8d, 0xcc, 0x1b, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0xe5, 0x85, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x85, 0xd6, 0xb7, 0x04, 0xe8, 0xf5, 0xd4, 0x74, 0xe2, 0x54, 0x14, 0xdd, 0x58, 0xcf, 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0xda, 0x7f, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x10, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0xf4, 0x2a, 0x3b, 0x46, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0xef, 0x4a, 0x18, 0x60, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x71, 0xb9, 0xdd, 0xac, 0xa0, 0xc6, 0x8d, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xc3, 0x21, 0x2c, 0xeb, 0x91, 0x8f, 0xc7, 0x43, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x67, 0x9e, 0xab, 0xe6, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x2d, 0x41, 0xca, 0x43, 0xd8, 0xcb, 0x30, 0xfb, 0x3b, 0x40, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x9b, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x93, 0x73, 0x8b, 0x60, 0xef, 0xc0, 0xee, 0xc0, 0xa6, 0x7a, 0x79, 0x90, 0xfd, 0x4c, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0x2b, 0x7d, 0x97, 0x3d, 0xa2, 0x91, 0xa5, 0x06, 0x69, 0xf6, 0x7a, 0xb8, 0x77, 0xe6, 0x70, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0x86, 0x4b, 0xa6, 0xcf, 0x67, 0x1d, 0x33, 0xcf, 0xfe, 0x3e }; static unsigned char test4096[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x09, 0x29, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x71, 0xac, 0x1a, 0x13, 0x88, 0x82, 0x43, 0x3b, 0x51, 0x57, 0x71, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x2b, 0x82, 0x65, 0x21, 0x53, 0x5f, 0x28, 0x29, 0x4f, 0x8d, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x44, 0xb3, 0x28, 0x41, 0x4f, 0xd3, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xf8, 0xb9, 0x28, 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0x79, 0x95, 0x8c, 0x96, 0xba, 0x40, 0x34, 0x11, 0x71, 0x5e, 0xe9, 0x11, 0xf9, 0xc5, 0x4a, 0x5e, 0x91, 0x9d, 0xf5, 0x92, 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xc6, 0x70, 0x02, 0x2d, 0x3d, 0x04, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x8e, 0xd5, 0xa8, 0xad, 0xf7, 0xce, 0x0d, 0x16, 0xb2, 0xec, 0x0a, 0x9c, 0xf5, 0x94, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x8a, 0xfc, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0xcc, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x21, 0x31, 0x74, 0x72, 0x6b, 0x64, 0xae, 0x35, 0x61, 0x8d, 0x0d, 0xcb, 0xe7, 0xda, 0x39, 0xca, 0xf3, 0x21, 0x66, 0x0b, 0x95, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x7c, 0xca, 0xa1, 0xa9, 0x5a, 0xe8, 0xac, 0xe0, 0x71, 0x54, 0xaf, 0x28, 0xcf, 0xd5, 0x70, 0x89, 0xe0, 0xf3, 0x9e, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x8d, 0x7b, 0x99, 0x01, 0x68, 0x4d, 0xa1, 0x45, 0x46, 0x0c, 0x43, 0xbc, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xdd, 0xc5, 0x46, 0xc8, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0xbe, 0xed, 0xb9, 0x26, 0xab, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0xeb, 0x8f, 0xff, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xc6, 0x55, 0xaf, 0xf8, 0x2a, 0x91, 0x9d, 0x50, 0x44, 0x21, 0x17, }; static unsigned char test7680[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x11, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x03, 0xc1, 0x00, 0xe3, 0x27, 0x46, 0x99, 0xb5, 0x17, 0xab, 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0x69, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0xb7, 0xce, 0xe2, 0x6f, 0x03, 0x49, 0x52, 0x67, 0xa0, 0x1b, 0x23, 0x43, 0x92, 0x2c, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x65, 0xe8, 0x61, 0x99, 0xde, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x73, 0x92, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x8b, 0x83, 0x10, 0xb4, 0x06, 0x2c, 0x99, 0x12, 0x73, 0xec, 0x87, 0x92, 0x09, 0x67, 0x96, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9f, 0x35, 0x48, 0x48, 0x3b, 0x44, 0x00, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x59, 0xeb, 0x81, 0x7b, 0xd1, 0xda, 0x76, 0xcf, 0xc2, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0x5b, 0x2f, 0x5f, 0x91, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x08, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xaa, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0x4f, 0x5e, 0x00, 0x16, 0x52 }; openssl-1.1.0g/apps/server.pem0000644000000000000000000000632513176625656015044 0ustar rootrootsubject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIID5zCCAs+gAwIBAgIJALnu1NlVpZ6zMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT 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W2/MA0YV0ug2FYinHcZdvKM6dimH8GLfa3X8xKRfzjGjTiMSwsdjgMa4awY3tEHH 674jhAECgYEA/zqMrc0zsbNk83sjgaYIug5kzEpN4ic020rSZsmQxSCerJTgNhmg utKSCt0Re09Jt3LqG48msahX8ycqDsHNvlEGPQSbMu9IYeO3Wr3fAm75GEtFWePY BhM73I7gkRt4s8bUiUepMG/wY45c5tRF23xi8foReHFFe9MDzh8fJFECgYEA9EFX 4qAik1pOJGNei9BMwmx0I0gfVEIgu0tzeVqT45vcxbxr7RkTEaDoAG6PlbWP6D9a WQNLp4gsgRM90ZXOJ4up5DsAWDluvaF4/omabMA+MJJ5kGZ0gCj5rbZbKqUws7x8 bp+6iBfUPJUbcqNqFmi/08Yt7vrDnMnyMw2A/sECgYEAiiuRMxnuzVm34hQcsbhH 6ymVqf7j0PW2qK0F4H1ocT9qhzWFd+RB3kHWrCjnqODQoI6GbGr/4JepHUpre1ex 4UEN5oSS3G0ru0rC3U4C59dZ5KwDHFm7ffZ1pr52ljfQDUsrjjIMRtuiwNK2OoRa WSsqiaL+SDzSB+nBmpnAizECgYBdt/y6rerWUx4MhDwwtTnel7JwHyo2MDFS6/5g n8qC2Lj6/fMDRE22w+CA2esp7EJNQJGv+b27iFpbJEDh+/Lf5YzIT4MwVskQ5bYB JFcmRxUVmf4e09D7o705U/DjCgMH09iCsbLmqQ38ONIRSHZaJtMDtNTHD1yi+jF+ OT43gQKBgQC/2OHZoko6iRlNOAQ/tMVFNq7fL81GivoQ9F1U0Qr+DH3ZfaH8eIkX xT0ToMPJUzWAn8pZv0snA0um6SIgvkCuxO84OkANCVbttzXImIsL7pFzfcwV/ERK UM6j0ZuSMFOCr/lGPAoOQU0fskidGEHi1/kW+suSr28TqsyYZpwBDQ== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dsap.pem0000644000000000000000000000042413176625656014457 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS----- MIGcAkEA+ZiKEvZmc9MtnaFZh4NiZ3oZS4J1PHvPrm9MXj5ntVheDPkdmBDTncya GAJcMjwsyB/GvLDGd6yGCw/8eF+09wIVAK3VagOxGd/Q4Af5NbxR5FB7CXEjAkA2 t/q7HgVLi0KeKvcDG8BRl3wuy7bCvpjgtWiJc/tpvcuzeuAayH89UofjAGueKjXD ADiRffvSdhrNw5dkqdql -----END DSA PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dsa-pca.pem0000644000000000000000000000525313176625656015045 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBvAIBAAKBgQCnP26Fv0FqKX3wn0cZMJCaCR3aajMexT2GlrMV4FMuj+BZgnOQ PnUxmUd6UvuF5NmmezibaIqEm4fGHrV+hktTW1nPcWUZiG7OZq5riDb77Cjcwtel u+UsOSZL2ppwGJU3lRBWI/YV7boEXt45T/23Qx+1pGVvzYAR5HCVW1DNSQIVAPcH Me36bAYD1YWKHKycZedQZmVvAoGATd9MA6aRivUZb1BGJZnlaG8w42nh5bNdmLso hkj83pkEP1+IDJxzJA0gXbkqmj8YlifkYofBe3RiU/xhJ6h6kQmdtvFNnFQPWAbu SXQHzlV+I84W9srcWmEBfslxtU323DQph2j2XiCTs9v15AlsQReVkusBtXOlan7Y Mu0OArgCgYEApu25HkB1b4gKMIV7aLGNSIknMzYgrB7o1kQxeDf34dDVRM9OZ8tk umz6tl+iUcNe5EoxdsYV1IXSddjOi08LOLsZq7AQlNnKvbtlmMDULpqkZJD0bO7A 29nisJfKy1URqABLw5DgfcPh1ZLXtmDfUgJvmjgTmvTPT2j9TPjq7RUCFQDNvrBz 6TicfImU7UFRn9h00j0lJQ== -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIICWDCCAhUCAQAwUzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUx ITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDEMMAoGA1UEAwwDUENB MIIBtzCCASsGByqGSM44BAEwggEeAoGBAKc/boW/QWopffCfRxkwkJoJHdpqMx7F PYaWsxXgUy6P4FmCc5A+dTGZR3pS+4Xk2aZ7OJtoioSbh8YetX6GS1NbWc9xZRmI bs5mrmuINvvsKNzC16W75Sw5JkvamnAYlTeVEFYj9hXtugRe3jlP/bdDH7WkZW/N gBHkcJVbUM1JAhUA9wcx7fpsBgPVhYocrJxl51BmZW8CgYBN30wDppGK9RlvUEYl meVobzDjaeHls12YuyiGSPzemQQ/X4gMnHMkDSBduSqaPxiWJ+Rih8F7dGJT/GEn qHqRCZ228U2cVA9YBu5JdAfOVX4jzhb2ytxaYQF+yXG1TfbcNCmHaPZeIJOz2/Xk CWxBF5WS6wG1c6Vqftgy7Q4CuAOBhQACgYEApu25HkB1b4gKMIV7aLGNSIknMzYg rB7o1kQxeDf34dDVRM9OZ8tkumz6tl+iUcNe5EoxdsYV1IXSddjOi08LOLsZq7AQ lNnKvbtlmMDULpqkZJD0bO7A29nisJfKy1URqABLw5DgfcPh1ZLXtmDfUgJvmjgT mvTPT2j9TPjq7RWgADALBglghkgBZQMEAwIDMAAwLQIVAPA6/jxCT1D2HgzE4iZR AEup/C7YAhRPLTQvQnAiS5FRrA+8SwBLvDAsaw== -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDMDCCAu6gAwIBAgIBATALBglghkgBZQMEAwIwUzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzAR BgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5 IEx0ZDEMMAoGA1UEAwwDUENBMCAXDTE2MDExMzIxNDE0OVoYDzMwMTUwNTE2MjE0 MTQ5WjBTMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UE CgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMQwwCgYDVQQDDANQQ0EwggG3MIIB KwYHKoZIzjgEATCCAR4CgYEApz9uhb9Bail98J9HGTCQmgkd2mozHsU9hpazFeBT Lo/gWYJzkD51MZlHelL7heTZpns4m2iKhJuHxh61foZLU1tZz3FlGYhuzmaua4g2 ++wo3MLXpbvlLDkmS9qacBiVN5UQViP2Fe26BF7eOU/9t0MftaRlb82AEeRwlVtQ zUkCFQD3BzHt+mwGA9WFihysnGXnUGZlbwKBgE3fTAOmkYr1GW9QRiWZ5WhvMONp 4eWzXZi7KIZI/N6ZBD9fiAyccyQNIF25Kpo/GJYn5GKHwXt0YlP8YSeoepEJnbbx TZxUD1gG7kl0B85VfiPOFvbK3FphAX7JcbVN9tw0KYdo9l4gk7Pb9eQJbEEXlZLr AbVzpWp+2DLtDgK4A4GFAAKBgQCm7bkeQHVviAowhXtosY1IiSczNiCsHujWRDF4 N/fh0NVEz05ny2S6bPq2X6JRw17kSjF2xhXUhdJ12M6LTws4uxmrsBCU2cq9u2WY wNQumqRkkPRs7sDb2eKwl8rLVRGoAEvDkOB9w+HVkte2YN9SAm+aOBOa9M9PaP1M +OrtFaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFMaPAnfe6+NJrbRE2swpagam04t0MB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFMaPAnfe6+NJrbRE2swpagam04t0MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCwYJYIZIAWUD BAMCAy8AMCwCFFhdz4fzQo9BBF20U1CHldYTi/D7AhQydDnDMj21y+U1UhDZJrvh lnt88g== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/errstr.c0000644000000000000000000000352313176625656014515 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS errstr_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] errnum...\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " errnum Error number\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {NULL} }; int errstr_main(int argc, char **argv) { OPTION_CHOICE o; char buf[256], *prog; int ret = 1; unsigned long l; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, errstr_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(errstr_options); ret = 0; goto end; } } ret = 0; for (argv = opt_rest(); *argv; argv++) { if (sscanf(*argv, "%lx", &l) == 0) ret++; else { /* We're not really an SSL application so this won't auto-init, but * we're still interested in SSL error strings */ OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL); ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", buf); } } end: return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dsa512.pem0000644000000000000000000000043013176625656014524 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS----- MIGdAkEAnRtpjibb8isRcBmG9hnI+BnyGFOURgbQYlAzSwI8UjADizv5X9EkBk97 TLqqQJv9luQ3M7stWtdaEUBmonZ9MQIVAPtT71C0QJIxVoZTeuiLIppJ+3GPAkEA gz6I5cWJc847bAFJv7PHnwrqRJHlMKrZvltftxDXibeOdPvPKR7rqCxUUbgQ3qDO L8wka5B33qJoplISogOdIA== -----END DSA PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/rand.c0000644000000000000000000000673013176625656014123 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_RAND, OPT_BASE64, OPT_HEX } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS rand_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [flags] num\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"base64", OPT_BASE64, '-', "Base64 encode output"}, {"hex", OPT_HEX, '-', "Hex encode output"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int rand_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; char *inrand = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; int format = FORMAT_BINARY, i, num = -1, r, ret = 1; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rand_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(rand_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_BASE64: format = FORMAT_BASE64; break; case OPT_HEX: format = FORMAT_TEXT; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (argc != 1 || !opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num < 0) goto opthelp; app_RAND_load_file(NULL, (inrand != NULL)); if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', format); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_BASE64) { BIO *b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); if (b64 == NULL) goto end; out = BIO_push(b64, out); } while (num > 0) { unsigned char buf[4096]; int chunk; chunk = num; if (chunk > (int)sizeof(buf)) chunk = sizeof buf; r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk); if (r <= 0) goto end; if (format != FORMAT_TEXT) { if (BIO_write(out, buf, chunk) != chunk) goto end; } else { for (i = 0; i < chunk; i++) if (BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]) != 2) goto end; } num -= chunk; } if (format == FORMAT_TEXT) BIO_puts(out, "\n"); if (BIO_flush(out) <= 0 || !app_RAND_write_file(NULL)) goto end; ret = 0; end: if (ret != 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); release_engine(e); BIO_free_all(out); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pkcs7.c0000644000000000000000000001253613176625656014227 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_PRINT, OPT_PRINT_CERTS, OPT_ENGINE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS pkcs7_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output encoded data"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print full details of certificates"}, {"print", OPT_PRINT, '-', "Print out all fields of the PKCS7 structure"}, {"print_certs", OPT_PRINT_CERTS, '-', "Print_certs print any certs or crl in the input"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int pkcs7_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; int i, print_certs = 0, text = 0, noout = 0, p7_print = 0, ret = 1; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkcs7_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(pkcs7_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_PRINT: p7_print = 1; break; case OPT_PRINT_CERTS: print_certs = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) p7 = d2i_PKCS7_bio(in, NULL); else p7 = PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (p7 == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load PKCS7 object\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (p7_print) PKCS7_print_ctx(out, p7, 0, NULL); if (print_certs) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); switch (i) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: if (p7->d.sign != NULL) { certs = p7->d.sign->cert; crls = p7->d.sign->crl; } break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped != NULL) { certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert; crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl; } break; default: break; } if (certs != NULL) { X509 *x; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (text) X509_print(out, x); else dump_cert_text(out, x); if (!noout) PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } } if (crls != NULL) { X509_CRL *crl; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); X509_CRL_print(out, crl); if (!noout) PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(out, crl); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } } ret = 0; goto end; } if (!noout) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_PKCS7_bio(out, p7); else i = PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(out, p7); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write pkcs7 object\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } ret = 0; end: PKCS7_free(p7); release_engine(e); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/speed.c0000644000000000000000000030372513176625656014303 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The ECDH and ECDSA speed test software is originally written by * Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #undef SECONDS #define SECONDS 3 #define PRIME_SECONDS 10 #define RSA_SECONDS 10 #define DSA_SECONDS 10 #define ECDSA_SECONDS 10 #define ECDH_SECONDS 10 #include #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # include OPENSSL_UNISTD #endif #if defined(_WIN32) # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 # include #endif #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include # include "./testrsa.h" #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include # include "./testdsa.h" #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # include #endif #include #ifndef HAVE_FORK # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # define HAVE_FORK 0 # else # define HAVE_FORK 1 # endif #endif #if HAVE_FORK # undef NO_FORK #else # define NO_FORK #endif #undef BUFSIZE #define BUFSIZE (1024*16+1) #define MAX_MISALIGNMENT 63 #define ALGOR_NUM 30 #define SIZE_NUM 6 #define PRIME_NUM 3 #define RSA_NUM 7 #define DSA_NUM 3 #define EC_NUM 17 #define MAX_ECDH_SIZE 256 #define MISALIGN 64 static volatile int run = 0; static int mr = 0; static int usertime = 1; typedef void *(*kdf_fn) ( const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *xoutlen); typedef struct loopargs_st { ASYNC_JOB *inprogress_job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *wait_ctx; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *buf2; unsigned char *buf_malloc; unsigned char *buf2_malloc; unsigned int siglen; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa_key[RSA_NUM]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA *dsa_key[DSA_NUM]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *ecdsa[EC_NUM]; EC_KEY *ecdh_a[EC_NUM]; EC_KEY *ecdh_b[EC_NUM]; unsigned char *secret_a; unsigned char *secret_b; size_t outlen; kdf_fn kdf; #endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; HMAC_CTX *hctx; GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx; } loopargs_t; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 static int EVP_Digest_MD2_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 static int EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 static int EVP_Digest_MD4_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 static int MD5_loop(void *args); static int HMAC_loop(void *args); #endif static int SHA1_loop(void *args); static int SHA256_loop(void *args); static int SHA512_loop(void *args); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL static int WHIRLPOOL_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 static int EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 static int RC4_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES static int DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop(void *args); #endif static int AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args); static int EVP_Update_loop(void *args); static int EVP_Digest_loop(void *args); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static int RSA_sign_loop(void *args); static int RSA_verify_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static int DSA_sign_loop(void *args); static int DSA_verify_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int ECDSA_sign_loop(void *args); static int ECDSA_verify_loop(void *args); static int ECDH_compute_key_loop(void *args); #endif static int run_benchmark(int async_jobs, int (*loop_function)(void *), loopargs_t *loopargs); static double Time_F(int s); static void print_message(const char *s, long num, int length); static void pkey_print_message(const char *str, const char *str2, long num, int bits, int sec); static void print_result(int alg, int run_no, int count, double time_used); #ifndef NO_FORK static int do_multi(int multi); #endif static const char *names[ALGOR_NUM] = { "md2", "mdc2", "md4", "md5", "hmac(md5)", "sha1", "rmd160", "rc4", "des cbc", "des ede3", "idea cbc", "seed cbc", "rc2 cbc", "rc5-32/12 cbc", "blowfish cbc", "cast cbc", "aes-128 cbc", "aes-192 cbc", "aes-256 cbc", "camellia-128 cbc", "camellia-192 cbc", "camellia-256 cbc", "evp", "sha256", "sha512", "whirlpool", "aes-128 ige", "aes-192 ige", "aes-256 ige", "ghash" }; static double results[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM]; static const int lengths[SIZE_NUM] = { 16, 64, 256, 1024, 8 * 1024, 16 * 1024 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static double rsa_results[RSA_NUM][2]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static double dsa_results[DSA_NUM][2]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static double ecdsa_results[EC_NUM][2]; static double ecdh_results[EC_NUM][1]; #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; #endif #ifdef SIGALRM # if defined(__STDC__) || defined(sgi) || defined(_AIX) # define SIGRETTYPE void # else # define SIGRETTYPE int # endif static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig); static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig) { signal(SIGALRM, sig_done); run = 0; } #endif #define START 0 #define STOP 1 #if defined(_WIN32) # if !defined(SIGALRM) # define SIGALRM # endif static unsigned int lapse; static volatile unsigned int schlock; static void alarm_win32(unsigned int secs) { lapse = secs * 1000; } # define alarm alarm_win32 static DWORD WINAPI sleepy(VOID * arg) { schlock = 1; Sleep(lapse); run = 0; return 0; } static double Time_F(int s) { double ret; static HANDLE thr; if (s == START) { schlock = 0; thr = CreateThread(NULL, 4096, sleepy, NULL, 0, NULL); if (thr == NULL) { DWORD err = GetLastError(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to CreateThread (%lu)", err); ExitProcess(err); } while (!schlock) Sleep(0); /* scheduler spinlock */ ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime); } else { ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime); if (run) TerminateThread(thr, 0); CloseHandle(thr); } return ret; } #else static double Time_F(int s) { double ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime); if (s == STOP) alarm(0); return ret; } #endif static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher); static int found(const char *name, const OPT_PAIR *pairs, int *result) { for (; pairs->name; pairs++) if (strcmp(name, pairs->name) == 0) { *result = pairs->retval; return 1; } return 0; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ELAPSED, OPT_EVP, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_MULTI, OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS speed_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] ciphers...\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"evp", OPT_EVP, 's', "Use specified EVP cipher"}, {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Time decryption instead of encryption (only EVP)"}, {"mr", OPT_MR, '-', "Produce machine readable output"}, {"mb", OPT_MB, '-', "Enable (tls1.1) multi-block mode on evp_cipher requested with -evp"}, {"misalign", OPT_MISALIGN, 'n', "Amount to mis-align buffers"}, {"elapsed", OPT_ELAPSED, '-', "Measure time in real time instead of CPU user time"}, #ifndef NO_FORK {"multi", OPT_MULTI, 'p', "Run benchmarks in parallel"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC {"async_jobs", OPT_ASYNCJOBS, 'p', "Enable async mode and start pnum jobs"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL}, }; #define D_MD2 0 #define D_MDC2 1 #define D_MD4 2 #define D_MD5 3 #define D_HMAC 4 #define D_SHA1 5 #define D_RMD160 6 #define D_RC4 7 #define D_CBC_DES 8 #define D_EDE3_DES 9 #define D_CBC_IDEA 10 #define D_CBC_SEED 11 #define D_CBC_RC2 12 #define D_CBC_RC5 13 #define D_CBC_BF 14 #define D_CBC_CAST 15 #define D_CBC_128_AES 16 #define D_CBC_192_AES 17 #define D_CBC_256_AES 18 #define D_CBC_128_CML 19 #define D_CBC_192_CML 20 #define D_CBC_256_CML 21 #define D_EVP 22 #define D_SHA256 23 #define D_SHA512 24 #define D_WHIRLPOOL 25 #define D_IGE_128_AES 26 #define D_IGE_192_AES 27 #define D_IGE_256_AES 28 #define D_GHASH 29 static OPT_PAIR doit_choices[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 {"md2", D_MD2}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 {"mdc2", D_MDC2}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 {"md4", D_MD4}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 {"md5", D_MD5}, {"hmac", D_HMAC}, #endif {"sha1", D_SHA1}, {"sha256", D_SHA256}, {"sha512", D_SHA512}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL {"whirlpool", D_WHIRLPOOL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 {"ripemd", D_RMD160}, {"rmd160", D_RMD160}, {"ripemd160", D_RMD160}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 {"rc4", D_RC4}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES {"des-cbc", D_CBC_DES}, {"des-ede3", D_EDE3_DES}, #endif {"aes-128-cbc", D_CBC_128_AES}, {"aes-192-cbc", D_CBC_192_AES}, {"aes-256-cbc", D_CBC_256_AES}, {"aes-128-ige", D_IGE_128_AES}, {"aes-192-ige", D_IGE_192_AES}, {"aes-256-ige", D_IGE_256_AES}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 {"rc2-cbc", D_CBC_RC2}, {"rc2", D_CBC_RC2}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 {"rc5-cbc", D_CBC_RC5}, {"rc5", D_CBC_RC5}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA {"idea-cbc", D_CBC_IDEA}, {"idea", D_CBC_IDEA}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED {"seed-cbc", D_CBC_SEED}, {"seed", D_CBC_SEED}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF {"bf-cbc", D_CBC_BF}, {"blowfish", D_CBC_BF}, {"bf", D_CBC_BF}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST {"cast-cbc", D_CBC_CAST}, {"cast", D_CBC_CAST}, {"cast5", D_CBC_CAST}, #endif {"ghash", D_GHASH}, {NULL} }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # define R_DSA_512 0 # define R_DSA_1024 1 # define R_DSA_2048 2 static OPT_PAIR dsa_choices[] = { {"dsa512", R_DSA_512}, {"dsa1024", R_DSA_1024}, {"dsa2048", R_DSA_2048}, {NULL}, }; #endif #define R_RSA_512 0 #define R_RSA_1024 1 #define R_RSA_2048 2 #define R_RSA_3072 3 #define R_RSA_4096 4 #define R_RSA_7680 5 #define R_RSA_15360 6 static OPT_PAIR rsa_choices[] = { {"rsa512", R_RSA_512}, {"rsa1024", R_RSA_1024}, {"rsa2048", R_RSA_2048}, {"rsa3072", R_RSA_3072}, {"rsa4096", R_RSA_4096}, {"rsa7680", R_RSA_7680}, {"rsa15360", R_RSA_15360}, {NULL} }; #define R_EC_P160 0 #define R_EC_P192 1 #define R_EC_P224 2 #define R_EC_P256 3 #define R_EC_P384 4 #define R_EC_P521 5 #define R_EC_K163 6 #define R_EC_K233 7 #define R_EC_K283 8 #define R_EC_K409 9 #define R_EC_K571 10 #define R_EC_B163 11 #define R_EC_B233 12 #define R_EC_B283 13 #define R_EC_B409 14 #define R_EC_B571 15 #define R_EC_X25519 16 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[] = { {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160}, {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192}, {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224}, {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256}, {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384}, {"ecdsap521", R_EC_P521}, {"ecdsak163", R_EC_K163}, {"ecdsak233", R_EC_K233}, {"ecdsak283", R_EC_K283}, {"ecdsak409", R_EC_K409}, {"ecdsak571", R_EC_K571}, {"ecdsab163", R_EC_B163}, {"ecdsab233", R_EC_B233}, {"ecdsab283", R_EC_B283}, {"ecdsab409", R_EC_B409}, {"ecdsab571", R_EC_B571}, {NULL} }; static OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[] = { {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160}, {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192}, {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224}, {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256}, {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384}, {"ecdhp521", R_EC_P521}, {"ecdhk163", R_EC_K163}, {"ecdhk233", R_EC_K233}, {"ecdhk283", R_EC_K283}, {"ecdhk409", R_EC_K409}, {"ecdhk571", R_EC_K571}, {"ecdhb163", R_EC_B163}, {"ecdhb233", R_EC_B233}, {"ecdhb283", R_EC_B283}, {"ecdhb409", R_EC_B409}, {"ecdhb571", R_EC_B571}, {"ecdhx25519", R_EC_X25519}, {NULL} }; #endif #ifndef SIGALRM # define COND(d) (count < (d)) # define COUNT(d) (d) #else # define COND(unused_cond) (run && count<0x7fffffff) # define COUNT(d) (count) #endif /* SIGALRM */ static int testnum; /* Nb of iterations to do per algorithm and key-size */ static long c[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 static int EVP_Digest_MD2_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md2[MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD2][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], md2, NULL, EVP_md2(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 static int EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char mdc2[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MDC2][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], mdc2, NULL, EVP_mdc2(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 static int EVP_Digest_MD4_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md4[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD4][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], md4, NULL, EVP_md4(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 static int MD5_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD5][testnum]); count++) MD5(buf, lengths[testnum], md5); return count; } static int HMAC_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; HMAC_CTX *hctx = tempargs->hctx; unsigned char hmac[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_HMAC][testnum]); count++) { HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); HMAC_Update(hctx, buf, lengths[testnum]); HMAC_Final(hctx, hmac, NULL); } return count; } #endif static int SHA1_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char sha[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA1][testnum]); count++) SHA1(buf, lengths[testnum], sha); return count; } static int SHA256_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA256][testnum]); count++) SHA256(buf, lengths[testnum], sha256); return count; } static int SHA512_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char sha512[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA512][testnum]); count++) SHA512(buf, lengths[testnum], sha512); return count; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL static int WHIRLPOOL_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char whirlpool[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_WHIRLPOOL][testnum]); count++) WHIRLPOOL(buf, lengths[testnum], whirlpool); return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 static int EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char rmd160[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_RMD160][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &(rmd160[0]), NULL, EVP_ripemd160(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 static RC4_KEY rc4_ks; static int RC4_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_RC4][testnum]); count++) RC4(&rc4_ks, (size_t)lengths[testnum], buf, buf); return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES static unsigned char DES_iv[8]; static DES_key_schedule sch; static DES_key_schedule sch2; static DES_key_schedule sch3; static int DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_DES][testnum]); count++) DES_ncbc_encrypt(buf, buf, lengths[testnum], &sch, &DES_iv, DES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_EDE3_DES][testnum]); count++) DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, lengths[testnum], &sch, &sch2, &sch3, &DES_iv, DES_ENCRYPT); return count; } #endif #define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 static unsigned char iv[2 * MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / 8]; static AES_KEY aes_ks1, aes_ks2, aes_ks3; static int AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_128_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks1, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_192_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks2, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_256_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks3, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_128_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks1, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_192_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks2, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_256_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks3, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx = tempargs->gcm_ctx; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_GHASH][testnum]); count++) CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(gcm_ctx, buf, lengths[testnum]); return count; } static long save_count = 0; static int decrypt = 0; static int EVP_Update_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = tempargs->ctx; int outl, count; #ifndef SIGALRM int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum]; #endif if (decrypt) for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); else for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); if (decrypt) EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl); else EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl); return count; } static const EVP_MD *evp_md = NULL; static int EVP_Digest_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int count; #ifndef SIGALRM int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum]; #endif for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, lengths[testnum], md, NULL, evp_md, NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static long rsa_c[RSA_NUM][2]; /* # RSA iteration test */ static int RSA_sign_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int *rsa_num = &tempargs->siglen; RSA **rsa_key = tempargs->rsa_key; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(rsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ret = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, buf, 36, buf2, rsa_num, rsa_key[testnum]); if (ret == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA sign failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } static int RSA_verify_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int rsa_num = tempargs->siglen; RSA **rsa_key = tempargs->rsa_key; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(rsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) { ret = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, buf, 36, buf2, rsa_num, rsa_key[testnum]); if (ret <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static long dsa_c[DSA_NUM][2]; static int DSA_sign_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; DSA **dsa_key = tempargs->dsa_key; unsigned int *siglen = &tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(dsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ret = DSA_sign(0, buf, 20, buf2, siglen, dsa_key[testnum]); if (ret == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA sign failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } static int DSA_verify_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; DSA **dsa_key = tempargs->dsa_key; unsigned int siglen = tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(dsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) { ret = DSA_verify(0, buf, 20, buf2, siglen, dsa_key[testnum]); if (ret <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static long ecdsa_c[EC_NUM][2]; static int ECDSA_sign_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EC_KEY **ecdsa = tempargs->ecdsa; unsigned char *ecdsasig = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int *ecdsasiglen = &tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(ecdsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ret = ECDSA_sign(0, buf, 20, ecdsasig, ecdsasiglen, ecdsa[testnum]); if (ret == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA sign failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } static int ECDSA_verify_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EC_KEY **ecdsa = tempargs->ecdsa; unsigned char *ecdsasig = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int ecdsasiglen = tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(ecdsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) { ret = ECDSA_verify(0, buf, 20, ecdsasig, ecdsasiglen, ecdsa[testnum]); if (ret != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } /* ******************************************************************** */ static long ecdh_c[EC_NUM][1]; static int ECDH_compute_key_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **)args; EC_KEY **ecdh_a = tempargs->ecdh_a; EC_KEY **ecdh_b = tempargs->ecdh_b; unsigned char *secret_a = tempargs->secret_a; int count; size_t outlen = tempargs->outlen; kdf_fn kdf = tempargs->kdf; for (count = 0; COND(ecdh_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ECDH_compute_key(secret_a, outlen, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh_b[testnum]), ecdh_a[testnum], kdf); } return count; } static const size_t KDF1_SHA1_len = 20; static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen) { if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL; *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; return SHA1(in, inlen, out); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ static int run_benchmark(int async_jobs, int (*loop_function)(void *), loopargs_t *loopargs) { int job_op_count = 0; int total_op_count = 0; int num_inprogress = 0; int error = 0, i = 0, ret = 0; OSSL_ASYNC_FD job_fd = 0; size_t num_job_fds = 0; run = 1; if (async_jobs == 0) { return loop_function((void *)&loopargs); } for (i = 0; i < async_jobs && !error; i++) { loopargs_t *looparg_item = loopargs + i; /* Copy pointer content (looparg_t item address) into async context */ ret = ASYNC_start_job(&loopargs[i].inprogress_job, loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_op_count, loop_function, (void *)&looparg_item, sizeof(looparg_item)); switch (ret) { case ASYNC_PAUSE: ++num_inprogress; break; case ASYNC_FINISH: if (job_op_count == -1) { error = 1; } else { total_op_count += job_op_count; } break; case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: case ASYNC_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the job\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } } while (num_inprogress > 0) { #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) DWORD avail = 0; #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) int select_result = 0; OSSL_ASYNC_FD max_fd = 0; fd_set waitfdset; FD_ZERO(&waitfdset); for (i = 0; i < async_jobs && num_inprogress > 0; i++) { if (loopargs[i].inprogress_job == NULL) continue; if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, NULL, &num_job_fds) || num_job_fds > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Too many fds in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_fd, &num_job_fds); FD_SET(job_fd, &waitfdset); if (job_fd > max_fd) max_fd = job_fd; } if (max_fd >= (OSSL_ASYNC_FD)FD_SETSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: max_fd (%d) must be smaller than FD_SETSIZE (%d). " "Decrease the value of async_jobs\n", max_fd, FD_SETSIZE); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } select_result = select(max_fd + 1, &waitfdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (select_result == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (select_result == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the select\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } if (select_result == 0) continue; #endif for (i = 0; i < async_jobs; i++) { if (loopargs[i].inprogress_job == NULL) continue; if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, NULL, &num_job_fds) || num_job_fds > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Too many fds in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_fd, &num_job_fds); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) if (num_job_fds == 1 && !FD_ISSET(job_fd, &waitfdset)) continue; #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) if (num_job_fds == 1 && !PeekNamedPipe(job_fd, NULL, 0, NULL, &avail, NULL) && avail > 0) continue; #endif ret = ASYNC_start_job(&loopargs[i].inprogress_job, loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_op_count, loop_function, (void *)(loopargs + i), sizeof(loopargs_t)); switch (ret) { case ASYNC_PAUSE: break; case ASYNC_FINISH: if (job_op_count == -1) { error = 1; } else { total_op_count += job_op_count; } --num_inprogress; loopargs[i].inprogress_job = NULL; break; case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: case ASYNC_ERR: --num_inprogress; loopargs[i].inprogress_job = NULL; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the job\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } } } return error ? -1 : total_op_count; } int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; loopargs_t *loopargs = NULL; int async_init = 0; int loopargs_len = 0; char *prog; const char *engine_id = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL; double d = 0.0; OPTION_CHOICE o; int multiblock = 0, pr_header = 0; int doit[ALGOR_NUM] = { 0 }; int ret = 1, i, k, misalign = 0; long count = 0; #ifndef NO_FORK int multi = 0; #endif unsigned int async_jobs = 0; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) \ || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) long rsa_count = 1; #endif /* What follows are the buffers and key material. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 RC5_32_KEY rc5_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 RC2_KEY rc2_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE idea_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE seed_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF BF_KEY bf_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST CAST_KEY cast_ks; #endif static const unsigned char key16[16] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12 }; static const unsigned char key24[24] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34 }; static const unsigned char key32[32] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA static const unsigned char ckey24[24] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34 }; static const unsigned char ckey32[32] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56 }; CAMELLIA_KEY camellia_ks1, camellia_ks2, camellia_ks3; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES static DES_cblock key = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0 }; static DES_cblock key2 = { 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12 }; static DES_cblock key3 = { 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static const unsigned int rsa_bits[RSA_NUM] = { 512, 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096, 7680, 15360 }; static const unsigned char *rsa_data[RSA_NUM] = { test512, test1024, test2048, test3072, test4096, test7680, test15360 }; static const int rsa_data_length[RSA_NUM] = { sizeof(test512), sizeof(test1024), sizeof(test2048), sizeof(test3072), sizeof(test4096), sizeof(test7680), sizeof(test15360) }; int rsa_doit[RSA_NUM] = { 0 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static const unsigned int dsa_bits[DSA_NUM] = { 512, 1024, 2048 }; int dsa_doit[DSA_NUM] = { 0 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * We only test over the following curves as they are representative, To * add tests over more curves, simply add the curve NID and curve name to * the following arrays and increase the EC_NUM value accordingly. */ static const unsigned int test_curves[EC_NUM] = { /* Prime Curves */ NID_secp160r1, NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_secp224r1, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1, NID_secp521r1, /* Binary Curves */ NID_sect163k1, NID_sect233k1, NID_sect283k1, NID_sect409k1, NID_sect571k1, NID_sect163r2, NID_sect233r1, NID_sect283r1, NID_sect409r1, NID_sect571r1, /* Other */ NID_X25519 }; static const char *test_curves_names[EC_NUM] = { /* Prime Curves */ "secp160r1", "nistp192", "nistp224", "nistp256", "nistp384", "nistp521", /* Binary Curves */ "nistk163", "nistk233", "nistk283", "nistk409", "nistk571", "nistb163", "nistb233", "nistb283", "nistb409", "nistb571", /* Other */ "X25519" }; static const int test_curves_bits[EC_NUM] = { 160, 192, 224, 256, 384, 521, 163, 233, 283, 409, 571, 163, 233, 283, 409, 571, 253 /* X25519 */ }; int ecdsa_doit[EC_NUM] = { 0 }; int ecdh_doit[EC_NUM] = { 0 }; #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_EC */ prog = opt_init(argc, argv, speed_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opterr: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(speed_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_ELAPSED: usertime = 0; break; case OPT_EVP: evp_md = NULL; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(opt_arg()); if (evp_cipher == NULL) evp_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(opt_arg()); if (evp_cipher == NULL && evp_md == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %s is an unknown cipher or digest\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto end; } doit[D_EVP] = 1; break; case OPT_DECRYPT: decrypt = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: /* * In a forked execution, an engine might need to be * initialised by each child process, not by the parent. * So store the name here and run setup_engine() later on. */ engine_id = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MULTI: #ifndef NO_FORK multi = atoi(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_ASYNCJOBS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC async_jobs = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!ASYNC_is_capable()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: async_jobs specified but async not supported\n", prog); goto opterr; } if (async_jobs > 99999) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: too many async_jobs\n", prog); goto opterr; } #endif break; case OPT_MISALIGN: if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &misalign)) goto end; if (misalign > MISALIGN) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Maximum offset is %d\n", prog, MISALIGN); goto opterr; } break; case OPT_MR: mr = 1; break; case OPT_MB: multiblock = 1; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -mb specified but multi-block support is disabled\n", prog); goto end; #endif break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); /* Remaining arguments are algorithms. */ for ( ; *argv; argv++) { if (found(*argv, doit_choices, &i)) { doit[i] = 1; continue; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (strcmp(*argv, "des") == 0) { doit[D_CBC_DES] = doit[D_EDE3_DES] = 1; continue; } #endif if (strcmp(*argv, "sha") == 0) { doit[D_SHA1] = doit[D_SHA256] = doit[D_SHA512] = 1; continue; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (strcmp(*argv, "openssl") == 0) continue; if (strcmp(*argv, "rsa") == 0) { rsa_doit[R_RSA_512] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_1024] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_2048] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_3072] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_4096] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_7680] = rsa_doit[R_RSA_15360] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, rsa_choices, &i)) { rsa_doit[i] = 1; continue; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (strcmp(*argv, "dsa") == 0) { dsa_doit[R_DSA_512] = dsa_doit[R_DSA_1024] = dsa_doit[R_DSA_2048] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, dsa_choices, &i)) { dsa_doit[i] = 2; continue; } #endif if (strcmp(*argv, "aes") == 0) { doit[D_CBC_128_AES] = doit[D_CBC_192_AES] = doit[D_CBC_256_AES] = 1; continue; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA if (strcmp(*argv, "camellia") == 0) { doit[D_CBC_128_CML] = doit[D_CBC_192_CML] = doit[D_CBC_256_CML] = 1; continue; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (strcmp(*argv, "ecdsa") == 0) { for (i = 0; i < EC_NUM; i++) ecdsa_doit[i] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, ecdsa_choices, &i)) { ecdsa_doit[i] = 2; continue; } if (strcmp(*argv, "ecdh") == 0) { for (i = 0; i < EC_NUM; i++) ecdh_doit[i] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, ecdh_choices, &i)) { ecdh_doit[i] = 2; continue; } #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown algorithm %s\n", prog, *argv); goto end; } /* Initialize the job pool if async mode is enabled */ if (async_jobs > 0) { async_init = ASYNC_init_thread(async_jobs, async_jobs); if (!async_init) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating the ASYNC job pool\n"); goto end; } } loopargs_len = (async_jobs == 0 ? 1 : async_jobs); loopargs = app_malloc(loopargs_len * sizeof(loopargs_t), "array of loopargs"); memset(loopargs, 0, loopargs_len * sizeof(loopargs_t)); for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { if (async_jobs > 0) { loopargs[i].wait_ctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); if (loopargs[i].wait_ctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n"); goto end; } } loopargs[i].buf_malloc = app_malloc((int)BUFSIZE + MAX_MISALIGNMENT + 1, "input buffer"); loopargs[i].buf2_malloc = app_malloc((int)BUFSIZE + MAX_MISALIGNMENT + 1, "input buffer"); /* Align the start of buffers on a 64 byte boundary */ loopargs[i].buf = loopargs[i].buf_malloc + misalign; loopargs[i].buf2 = loopargs[i].buf2_malloc + misalign; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC loopargs[i].secret_a = app_malloc(MAX_ECDH_SIZE, "ECDH secret a"); loopargs[i].secret_b = app_malloc(MAX_ECDH_SIZE, "ECDH secret b"); #endif } #ifndef NO_FORK if (multi && do_multi(multi)) goto show_res; #endif /* Initialize the engine after the fork */ e = setup_engine(engine_id, 0); /* No parameters; turn on everything. */ if ((argc == 0) && !doit[D_EVP]) { for (i = 0; i < ALGOR_NUM; i++) if (i != D_EVP) doit[i] = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM; i++) rsa_doit[i] = 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA for (i = 0; i < DSA_NUM; i++) dsa_doit[i] = 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC for (i = 0; i < EC_NUM; i++) ecdsa_doit[i] = 1; for (i = 0; i < EC_NUM; i++) ecdh_doit[i] = 1; #endif } for (i = 0; i < ALGOR_NUM; i++) if (doit[i]) pr_header++; if (usertime == 0 && !mr) BIO_printf(bio_err, "You have chosen to measure elapsed time " "instead of user CPU time.\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) { const unsigned char *p; p = rsa_data[k]; loopargs[i].rsa_key[k] = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, rsa_data_length[k]); if (loopargs[i].rsa_key[k] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "internal error loading RSA key number %d\n", k); goto end; } } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].dsa_key[0] = get_dsa512(); loopargs[i].dsa_key[1] = get_dsa1024(); loopargs[i].dsa_key[2] = get_dsa2048(); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES DES_set_key_unchecked(&key, &sch); DES_set_key_unchecked(&key2, &sch2); DES_set_key_unchecked(&key3, &sch3); #endif AES_set_encrypt_key(key16, 128, &aes_ks1); AES_set_encrypt_key(key24, 192, &aes_ks2); AES_set_encrypt_key(key32, 256, &aes_ks3); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA Camellia_set_key(key16, 128, &camellia_ks1); Camellia_set_key(ckey24, 192, &camellia_ks2); Camellia_set_key(ckey32, 256, &camellia_ks3); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA IDEA_set_encrypt_key(key16, &idea_ks); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED SEED_set_key(key16, &seed_ks); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 RC4_set_key(&rc4_ks, 16, key16); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 RC2_set_key(&rc2_ks, 16, key16, 128); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 RC5_32_set_key(&rc5_ks, 16, key16, 12); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF BF_set_key(&bf_ks, 16, key16); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST CAST_set_key(&cast_ks, 16, key16); #endif #ifndef SIGALRM # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES BIO_printf(bio_err, "First we calculate the approximate speed ...\n"); count = 10; do { long it; count *= 2; Time_F(START); for (it = count; it; it--) DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)loopargs[0].buf, (DES_cblock *)loopargs[0].buf, &sch, DES_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); } while (d < 3); save_count = count; c[D_MD2][0] = count / 10; c[D_MDC2][0] = count / 10; c[D_MD4][0] = count; c[D_MD5][0] = count; c[D_HMAC][0] = count; c[D_SHA1][0] = count; c[D_RMD160][0] = count; c[D_RC4][0] = count * 5; c[D_CBC_DES][0] = count; c[D_EDE3_DES][0] = count / 3; c[D_CBC_IDEA][0] = count; c[D_CBC_SEED][0] = count; c[D_CBC_RC2][0] = count; c[D_CBC_RC5][0] = count; c[D_CBC_BF][0] = count; c[D_CBC_CAST][0] = count; c[D_CBC_128_AES][0] = count; c[D_CBC_192_AES][0] = count; c[D_CBC_256_AES][0] = count; c[D_CBC_128_CML][0] = count; c[D_CBC_192_CML][0] = count; c[D_CBC_256_CML][0] = count; c[D_SHA256][0] = count; c[D_SHA512][0] = count; c[D_WHIRLPOOL][0] = count; c[D_IGE_128_AES][0] = count; c[D_IGE_192_AES][0] = count; c[D_IGE_256_AES][0] = count; c[D_GHASH][0] = count; for (i = 1; i < SIZE_NUM; i++) { long l0, l1; l0 = (long)lengths[0]; l1 = (long)lengths[i]; c[D_MD2][i] = c[D_MD2][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_MDC2][i] = c[D_MDC2][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_MD4][i] = c[D_MD4][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_MD5][i] = c[D_MD5][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_HMAC][i] = c[D_HMAC][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_SHA1][i] = c[D_SHA1][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_RMD160][i] = c[D_RMD160][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_SHA256][i] = c[D_SHA256][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_SHA512][i] = c[D_SHA512][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_WHIRLPOOL][i] = c[D_WHIRLPOOL][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_GHASH][i] = c[D_GHASH][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; l0 = (long)lengths[i - 1]; c[D_RC4][i] = c[D_RC4][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_DES][i] = c[D_CBC_DES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_EDE3_DES][i] = c[D_EDE3_DES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_IDEA][i] = c[D_CBC_IDEA][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_SEED][i] = c[D_CBC_SEED][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_RC2][i] = c[D_CBC_RC2][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_RC5][i] = c[D_CBC_RC5][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_BF][i] = c[D_CBC_BF][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_CAST][i] = c[D_CBC_CAST][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_128_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_128_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_192_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_192_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_256_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_256_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_128_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_128_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_192_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_192_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_256_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_256_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_IGE_128_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_128_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_IGE_192_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_192_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_IGE_256_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_256_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_c[R_RSA_512][0] = count / 2000; rsa_c[R_RSA_512][1] = count / 400; for (i = 1; i < RSA_NUM; i++) { rsa_c[i][0] = rsa_c[i - 1][0] / 8; rsa_c[i][1] = rsa_c[i - 1][1] / 4; if (rsa_doit[i] <= 1 && rsa_c[i][0] == 0) rsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (rsa_c[i][0] == 0) { rsa_c[i][0] = 1; /* Set minimum iteration Nb to 1. */ rsa_c[i][1] = 20; } } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA dsa_c[R_DSA_512][0] = count / 1000; dsa_c[R_DSA_512][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = 1; i < DSA_NUM; i++) { dsa_c[i][0] = dsa_c[i - 1][0] / 4; dsa_c[i][1] = dsa_c[i - 1][1] / 4; if (dsa_doit[i] <= 1 && dsa_c[i][0] == 0) dsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (dsa_c[i][0] == 0) { dsa_c[i][0] = 1; /* Set minimum iteration Nb to 1. */ dsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000; ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2; ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2; if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) ecdsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1; ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000; ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2; ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2; if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) ecdsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1; ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } ecdsa_c[R_EC_B163][0] = count / 1000; ecdsa_c[R_EC_B163][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = R_EC_B233; i <= R_EC_B571; i++) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2; ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2; if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) ecdsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1; ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } ecdh_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } ecdh_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } ecdh_c[R_EC_B163][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_B233; i <= R_EC_B571; i++) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } # endif # else /* not worth fixing */ # error "You cannot disable DES on systems without SIGALRM." # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */ #else # ifndef _WIN32 signal(SIGALRM, sig_done); # endif #endif /* SIGALRM */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 if (doit[D_MD2]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MD2], c[D_MD2][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MD2_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MD2, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 if (doit[D_MDC2]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MDC2], c[D_MDC2][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MDC2, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 if (doit[D_MD4]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MD4], c[D_MD4][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MD4_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MD4, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 if (doit[D_MD5]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MD5], c[D_MD5][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, MD5_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MD5, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_HMAC]) { static const char hmac_key[] = "This is a key..."; int len = strlen(hmac_key); for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (loopargs[i].hctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HMAC malloc failure, exiting..."); exit(1); } HMAC_Init_ex(loopargs[i].hctx, hmac_key, len, EVP_md5(), NULL); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_HMAC], c[D_HMAC][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, HMAC_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_HMAC, testnum, count, d); } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { HMAC_CTX_free(loopargs[i].hctx); } } #endif if (doit[D_SHA1]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_SHA1], c[D_SHA1][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA1_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_SHA1, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_SHA256]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_SHA256], c[D_SHA256][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA256_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_SHA256, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_SHA512]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_SHA512], c[D_SHA512][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA512_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_SHA512, testnum, count, d); } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL if (doit[D_WHIRLPOOL]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_WHIRLPOOL], c[D_WHIRLPOOL][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, WHIRLPOOL_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_WHIRLPOOL, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 if (doit[D_RMD160]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_RMD160], c[D_RMD160][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_RMD160, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 if (doit[D_RC4]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_RC4], c[D_RC4][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RC4_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_RC4, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (doit[D_CBC_DES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_DES], c[D_CBC_DES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_DES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_EDE3_DES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_EDE3_DES], c[D_EDE3_DES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_EDE3_DES, testnum, count, d); } } #endif if (doit[D_CBC_128_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_128_AES], c[D_CBC_128_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_128_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_192_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_192_AES], c[D_CBC_192_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_192_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_256_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_256_AES], c[D_CBC_256_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_256_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_IGE_128_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_IGE_128_AES], c[D_IGE_128_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_IGE_128_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_IGE_192_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_IGE_192_AES], c[D_IGE_192_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_IGE_192_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_IGE_256_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_IGE_256_AES], c[D_IGE_256_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_IGE_256_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_GHASH]) { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].gcm_ctx = CRYPTO_gcm128_new(&aes_ks1, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(loopargs[i].gcm_ctx, (unsigned char *)"0123456789ab", 12); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_GHASH], c[D_GHASH][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_GHASH, testnum, count, d); } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) CRYPTO_gcm128_release(loopargs[i].gcm_ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA if (doit[D_CBC_128_CML]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_128_CML]); doit[D_CBC_128_CML] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_128_CML], c[D_CBC_128_CML][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_128_CML][testnum]); count++) Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks1, iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_128_CML, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_192_CML]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_192_CML]); doit[D_CBC_192_CML] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_192_CML], c[D_CBC_192_CML][testnum], lengths[testnum]); if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting..."); exit(1); } Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_192_CML][testnum]); count++) Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks2, iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_192_CML, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_256_CML]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_256_CML]); doit[D_CBC_256_CML] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_256_CML], c[D_CBC_256_CML][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_256_CML][testnum]); count++) Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks3, iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_256_CML, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA if (doit[D_CBC_IDEA]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_IDEA]); doit[D_CBC_IDEA] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_IDEA], c[D_CBC_IDEA][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_IDEA][testnum]); count++) IDEA_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &idea_ks, iv, IDEA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_IDEA, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED if (doit[D_CBC_SEED]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_SEED]); doit[D_CBC_SEED] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_SEED], c[D_CBC_SEED][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_SEED][testnum]); count++) SEED_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &seed_ks, iv, 1); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_SEED, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 if (doit[D_CBC_RC2]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_RC2]); doit[D_CBC_RC2] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_RC2], c[D_CBC_RC2][testnum], lengths[testnum]); if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting..."); exit(1); } Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_RC2][testnum]); count++) RC2_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &rc2_ks, iv, RC2_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_RC2, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 if (doit[D_CBC_RC5]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_RC5]); doit[D_CBC_RC5] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_RC5], c[D_CBC_RC5][testnum], lengths[testnum]); if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting..."); exit(1); } Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_RC5][testnum]); count++) RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &rc5_ks, iv, RC5_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_RC5, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF if (doit[D_CBC_BF]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_BF]); doit[D_CBC_BF] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_BF], c[D_CBC_BF][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_BF][testnum]); count++) BF_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &bf_ks, iv, BF_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_BF, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST if (doit[D_CBC_CAST]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_CAST]); doit[D_CBC_CAST] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_CAST], c[D_CBC_CAST][testnum], lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; COND(c[D_CBC_CAST][testnum]); count++) CAST_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &cast_ks, iv, CAST_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_CAST, testnum, count, d); } } #endif if (doit[D_EVP]) { if (multiblock && evp_cipher) { if (! (EVP_CIPHER_flags(evp_cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is not multi-block capable\n", OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher))); goto end; } if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting..."); exit(1); } multiblock_speed(evp_cipher); ret = 0; goto end; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { if (evp_cipher) { names[D_EVP] = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher)); /* * -O3 -fschedule-insns messes up an optimization here! * names[D_EVP] somehow becomes NULL */ print_message(names[D_EVP], save_count, lengths[testnum]); for (k = 0; k < loopargs_len; k++) { loopargs[k].ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (decrypt) EVP_DecryptInit_ex(loopargs[k].ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, key16, iv); else EVP_EncryptInit_ex(loopargs[k].ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, key16, iv); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(loopargs[k].ctx, 0); } Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Update_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); for (k = 0; k < loopargs_len; k++) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(loopargs[k].ctx); } } if (evp_md) { names[D_EVP] = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_MD_type(evp_md)); print_message(names[D_EVP], save_count, lengths[testnum]); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); } print_result(D_EVP, testnum, count, d); } } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (testnum = 0; testnum < RSA_NUM; testnum++) { int st = 0; if (!rsa_doit[testnum]) continue; for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]); if (st == 0) break; } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA sign failure. No RSA sign will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { pkey_print_message("private", "rsa", rsa_c[testnum][0], rsa_bits[testnum], RSA_SECONDS); /* RSA_blinding_on(rsa_key[testnum],NULL); */ Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RSA_sign_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R1:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %d bit private RSA's in %.2fs\n", count, rsa_bits[testnum], d); rsa_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count; rsa_count = count; } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2, loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]); if (st <= 0) break; } if (st <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA verify failure. No RSA verify will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } else { pkey_print_message("public", "rsa", rsa_c[testnum][1], rsa_bits[testnum], RSA_SECONDS); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RSA_verify_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R2:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %d bit public RSA's in %.2fs\n", count, rsa_bits[testnum], d); rsa_results[testnum][1] = d / (double)count; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < RSA_NUM; testnum++) rsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (RAND_status() != 1) { RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++) { int st = 0; if (!dsa_doit[testnum]) continue; /* DSA_generate_key(dsa_key[testnum]); */ /* DSA_sign_setup(dsa_key[testnum],NULL); */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = DSA_sign(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].dsa_key[testnum]); if (st == 0) break; } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA sign failure. No DSA sign will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { pkey_print_message("sign", "dsa", dsa_c[testnum][0], dsa_bits[testnum], DSA_SECONDS); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DSA_sign_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R3:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %d bit DSA signs in %.2fs\n", count, dsa_bits[testnum], d); dsa_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count; rsa_count = count; } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = DSA_verify(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].dsa_key[testnum]); if (st <= 0) break; } if (st <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA verify failure. No DSA verify will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); dsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } else { pkey_print_message("verify", "dsa", dsa_c[testnum][1], dsa_bits[testnum], DSA_SECONDS); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DSA_verify_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R4:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %d bit DSA verify in %.2fs\n", count, dsa_bits[testnum], d); dsa_results[testnum][1] = d / (double)count; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++) dsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (RAND_status() != 1) { RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) { int st = 1; if (!ecdsa_doit[testnum]) continue; /* Ignore Curve */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum] = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[testnum]); if (loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum] == NULL) { st = 0; break; } } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { EC_KEY_precompute_mult(loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum], NULL); /* Perform ECDSA signature test */ EC_KEY_generate_key(loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]); st = ECDSA_sign(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]); if (st == 0) break; } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA sign failure. No ECDSA sign will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { pkey_print_message("sign", "ecdsa", ecdsa_c[testnum][0], test_curves_bits[testnum], ECDSA_SECONDS); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDSA_sign_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R5:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %d bit ECDSA signs in %.2fs \n", count, test_curves_bits[testnum], d); ecdsa_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count; rsa_count = count; } /* Perform ECDSA verification test */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = ECDSA_verify(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]); if (st != 1) break; } if (st != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA verify failure. No ECDSA verify will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ecdsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } else { pkey_print_message("verify", "ecdsa", ecdsa_c[testnum][1], test_curves_bits[testnum], ECDSA_SECONDS); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDSA_verify_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R6:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %d bit ECDSA verify in %.2fs\n", count, test_curves_bits[testnum], d); ecdsa_results[testnum][1] = d / (double)count; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) ecdsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } } if (RAND_status() != 1) { RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) { int ecdh_checks = 1; if (!ecdh_doit[testnum]) continue; for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum] = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[testnum]); loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum] = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[testnum]); if (loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum] == NULL || loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum] == NULL) { ecdh_checks = 0; break; } } if (ecdh_checks == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { /* generate two ECDH key pairs */ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum]) || !EC_KEY_generate_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum])) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH key generation failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ecdh_checks = 0; rsa_count = 1; } else { int secret_size_a, secret_size_b; /* * If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 * hash of result; otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of * draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt). */ int field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree( EC_KEY_get0_group(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum])); if (field_size <= 24 * 8) { /* 192 bits */ loopargs[i].outlen = KDF1_SHA1_len; loopargs[i].kdf = KDF1_SHA1; } else { loopargs[i].outlen = (field_size + 7) / 8; loopargs[i].kdf = NULL; } secret_size_a = ECDH_compute_key(loopargs[i].secret_a, loopargs[i].outlen, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum]), loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum], loopargs[i].kdf); secret_size_b = ECDH_compute_key(loopargs[i].secret_b, loopargs[i].outlen, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[testnum]), loopargs[i].ecdh_b[testnum], loopargs[i].kdf); if (secret_size_a != secret_size_b) ecdh_checks = 0; else ecdh_checks = 1; for (k = 0; k < secret_size_a && ecdh_checks == 1; k++) { if (loopargs[i].secret_a[k] != loopargs[i].secret_b[k]) ecdh_checks = 0; } if (ecdh_checks == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH computations don't match.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; break; } } } if (ecdh_checks != 0) { pkey_print_message("", "ecdh", ecdh_c[testnum][0], test_curves_bits[testnum], ECDH_SECONDS); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDH_compute_key_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R7:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %d-bit ECDH ops in %.2fs\n", count, test_curves_bits[testnum], d); ecdh_results[testnum][0] = d / (double)count; rsa_count = count; } } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) ecdh_doit[testnum] = 0; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef NO_FORK show_res: #endif if (!mr) { printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_BUILT_ON)); printf("options:"); printf("%s ", BN_options()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 printf("%s ", MD2_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 printf("%s ", RC4_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES printf("%s ", DES_options()); #endif printf("%s ", AES_options()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA printf("%s ", IDEA_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF printf("%s ", BF_options()); #endif printf("\n%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_CFLAGS)); } if (pr_header) { if (mr) printf("+H"); else { printf ("The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.\n"); printf("type "); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) printf(mr ? ":%d" : "%7d bytes", lengths[testnum]); printf("\n"); } for (k = 0; k < ALGOR_NUM; k++) { if (!doit[k]) continue; if (mr) printf("+F:%d:%s", k, names[k]); else printf("%-13s", names[k]); for (testnum = 0; testnum < SIZE_NUM; testnum++) { if (results[k][testnum] > 10000 && !mr) printf(" %11.2fk", results[k][testnum] / 1e3); else printf(mr ? ":%.2f" : " %11.2f ", results[k][testnum]); } printf("\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) { if (!rsa_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%18ssign verify sign/s verify/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F2:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, rsa_bits[k], rsa_results[k][0], rsa_results[k][1]); else printf("rsa %4u bits %8.6fs %8.6fs %8.1f %8.1f\n", rsa_bits[k], rsa_results[k][0], rsa_results[k][1], 1.0 / rsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / rsa_results[k][1]); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < DSA_NUM; k++) { if (!dsa_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%18ssign verify sign/s verify/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F3:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, dsa_bits[k], dsa_results[k][0], dsa_results[k][1]); else printf("dsa %4u bits %8.6fs %8.6fs %8.1f %8.1f\n", dsa_bits[k], dsa_results[k][0], dsa_results[k][1], 1.0 / dsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / dsa_results[k][1]); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) { if (!ecdsa_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%30ssign verify sign/s verify/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F4:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, test_curves_bits[k], ecdsa_results[k][0], ecdsa_results[k][1]); else printf("%4u bit ecdsa (%s) %8.4fs %8.4fs %8.1f %8.1f\n", test_curves_bits[k], test_curves_names[k], ecdsa_results[k][0], ecdsa_results[k][1], 1.0 / ecdsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdsa_results[k][1]); } testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) { if (!ecdh_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%30sop op/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F5:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, test_curves_bits[k], ecdh_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdh_results[k][0]); else printf("%4u bit ecdh (%s) %8.4fs %8.1f\n", test_curves_bits[k], test_curves_names[k], ecdh_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdh_results[k][0]); } #endif ret = 0; end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].buf_malloc); OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].buf2_malloc); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) RSA_free(loopargs[i].rsa_key[k]); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA for (k = 0; k < DSA_NUM; k++) DSA_free(loopargs[i].dsa_key[k]); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) { EC_KEY_free(loopargs[i].ecdsa[k]); EC_KEY_free(loopargs[i].ecdh_a[k]); EC_KEY_free(loopargs[i].ecdh_b[k]); } OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].secret_a); OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].secret_b); #endif } if (async_jobs > 0) { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(loopargs[i].wait_ctx); } if (async_init) { ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); } OPENSSL_free(loopargs); release_engine(e); return (ret); } static void print_message(const char *s, long num, int length) { #ifdef SIGALRM BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DT:%s:%d:%d\n" : "Doing %s for %ds on %d size blocks: ", s, SECONDS, length); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); alarm(SECONDS); #else BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DN:%s:%ld:%d\n" : "Doing %s %ld times on %d size blocks: ", s, num, length); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); #endif } static void pkey_print_message(const char *str, const char *str2, long num, int bits, int tm) { #ifdef SIGALRM BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DTP:%d:%s:%s:%d\n" : "Doing %d bit %s %s's for %ds: ", bits, str, str2, tm); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); alarm(tm); #else BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DNP:%ld:%d:%s:%s\n" : "Doing %ld %d bit %s %s's: ", num, bits, str, str2); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); #endif } static void print_result(int alg, int run_no, int count, double time_used) { if (count == -1) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "EVP error!\n"); exit(1); } BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R:%d:%s:%f\n" : "%d %s's in %.2fs\n", count, names[alg], time_used); results[alg][run_no] = ((double)count) / time_used * lengths[run_no]; } #ifndef NO_FORK static char *sstrsep(char **string, const char *delim) { char isdelim[256]; char *token = *string; if (**string == 0) return NULL; memset(isdelim, 0, sizeof isdelim); isdelim[0] = 1; while (*delim) { isdelim[(unsigned char)(*delim)] = 1; delim++; } while (!isdelim[(unsigned char)(**string)]) { (*string)++; } if (**string) { **string = 0; (*string)++; } return token; } static int do_multi(int multi) { int n; int fd[2]; int *fds; static char sep[] = ":"; fds = malloc(sizeof(*fds) * multi); for (n = 0; n < multi; ++n) { if (pipe(fd) == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "pipe failure\n"); exit(1); } fflush(stdout); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); if (fork()) { close(fd[1]); fds[n] = fd[0]; } else { close(fd[0]); close(1); if (dup(fd[1]) == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "dup failed\n"); exit(1); } close(fd[1]); mr = 1; usertime = 0; free(fds); return 0; } printf("Forked child %d\n", n); } /* for now, assume the pipe is long enough to take all the output */ for (n = 0; n < multi; ++n) { FILE *f; char buf[1024]; char *p; f = fdopen(fds[n], "r"); while (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, f)) { p = strchr(buf, '\n'); if (p) *p = '\0'; if (buf[0] != '+') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Don't understand line '%s' from child %d\n", buf, n); continue; } printf("Got: %s from %d\n", buf, n); if (strncmp(buf, "+F:", 3) == 0) { int alg; int j; p = buf + 3; alg = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); for (j = 0; j < SIZE_NUM; ++j) results[alg][j] += atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); } else if (strncmp(buf, "+F2:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); if (n) rsa_results[k][0] = 1 / (1 / rsa_results[k][0] + 1 / d); else rsa_results[k][0] = d; d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); if (n) rsa_results[k][1] = 1 / (1 / rsa_results[k][1] + 1 / d); else rsa_results[k][1] = d; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if (strncmp(buf, "+F3:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); if (n) dsa_results[k][0] = 1 / (1 / dsa_results[k][0] + 1 / d); else dsa_results[k][0] = d; d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); if (n) dsa_results[k][1] = 1 / (1 / dsa_results[k][1] + 1 / d); else dsa_results[k][1] = d; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (strncmp(buf, "+F4:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); if (n) ecdsa_results[k][0] = 1 / (1 / ecdsa_results[k][0] + 1 / d); else ecdsa_results[k][0] = d; d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); if (n) ecdsa_results[k][1] = 1 / (1 / ecdsa_results[k][1] + 1 / d); else ecdsa_results[k][1] = d; } else if (strncmp(buf, "+F5:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); if (n) ecdh_results[k][0] = 1 / (1 / ecdh_results[k][0] + 1 / d); else ecdh_results[k][0] = d; } # endif else if (strncmp(buf, "+H:", 3) == 0) { ; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown type '%s' from child %d\n", buf, n); } fclose(f); } free(fds); return 1; } #endif static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher) { static int mblengths[] = { 8 * 1024, 2 * 8 * 1024, 4 * 8 * 1024, 8 * 8 * 1024, 8 * 16 * 1024 }; int j, count, num = OSSL_NELEM(mblengths); const char *alg_name; unsigned char *inp, *out, no_key[32], no_iv[16]; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; double d = 0.0; inp = app_malloc(mblengths[num - 1], "multiblock input buffer"); out = app_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024, "multiblock output buffer"); ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, no_key, no_iv); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, sizeof(no_key), no_key); alg_name = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher)); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) { print_message(alg_name, 0, mblengths[j]); Time_F(START); for (count = 0, run = 1; run && count < 0x7fffffff; count++) { unsigned char aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; size_t len = mblengths[j]; int packlen; memset(aad, 0, 8); /* avoid uninitialized values */ aad[8] = 23; /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ aad[9] = 3; /* version */ aad[10] = 2; aad[11] = 0; /* length */ aad[12] = 0; mb_param.out = NULL; mb_param.inp = aad; mb_param.len = len; mb_param.interleave = 8; packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); if (packlen > 0) { mb_param.out = out; mb_param.inp = inp; mb_param.len = len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); } else { int pad; RAND_bytes(out, 16); len += 16; aad[11] = len >> 8; aad[12] = len; pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, aad); EVP_Cipher(ctx, out, inp, len + pad); } } d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R:%d:%s:%f\n" : "%d %s's in %.2fs\n", count, "evp", d); results[D_EVP][j] = ((double)count) / d * mblengths[j]; } if (mr) { fprintf(stdout, "+H"); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) fprintf(stdout, ":%d", mblengths[j]); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); fprintf(stdout, "+F:%d:%s", D_EVP, alg_name); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) fprintf(stdout, ":%.2f", results[D_EVP][j]); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } else { fprintf(stdout, "The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.\n"); fprintf(stdout, "type "); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) fprintf(stdout, "%7d bytes", mblengths[j]); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); fprintf(stdout, "%-24s", alg_name); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) { if (results[D_EVP][j] > 10000) fprintf(stdout, " %11.2fk", results[D_EVP][j] / 1e3); else fprintf(stdout, " %11.2f ", results[D_EVP][j]); } fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(inp); OPENSSL_free(out); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s512-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000076113176625656015014 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBPAIBAAJBAJ+zw4Qnlf8SMVIPFe9GEcStgOY2Ww/dgNdhjeD8ckUJNP5VZkVD TGiXav6ooKXfX3j/7tdkuD8Ey2//Kv7+ue0CAwEAAQJAN6W31vDEP2DjdqhzCDDu OA4NACqoiFqyblo7yc2tM4h4xMbC3Yx5UKMN9ZkCtX0gzrz6DyF47bdKcWBzNWCj gQIhANEoojVt7hq+SQ6MCN6FTAysGgQf56Q3TYoJMoWvdiXVAiEAw3e3rc+VJpOz rHuDo6bgpjUAAXM+v3fcpsfZSNO6V7kCIQCtbVjanpUwvZkMI9by02oUk9taki3b PzPfAfNPYAbCJQIhAJXNQDWyqwn/lGmR11cqY2y9nZ1+5w3yHGatLrcDnQHxAiEA vnlEGo8K85u+KwIOimM48ZG8oTk7iFdkqLJR1utT3aU= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ca-cert.srl0000644000000000000000000000000313176625656015056 0ustar rootroot07 openssl-1.1.0g/apps/asn1pars.c0000644000000000000000000002234013176625656014722 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * A nice addition from Dr Stephen Henson to add the * -strparse option which parses nested binary structures */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_INDENT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_OID, OPT_OFFSET, OPT_LENGTH, OPT_DUMP, OPT_DLIMIT, OPT_STRPARSE, OPT_GENSTR, OPT_GENCONF, OPT_STRICTPEM } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS asn1parse_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "input format - one of DER PEM"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "output file (output format is always DER)"}, {"i", OPT_INDENT, 0, "indents the output"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, 0, "do not produce any output"}, {"offset", OPT_OFFSET, 'p', "offset into file"}, {"length", OPT_LENGTH, 'p', "length of section in file"}, {"oid", OPT_OID, '<', "file of extra oid definitions"}, {"dump", OPT_DUMP, 0, "unknown data in hex form"}, {"dlimit", OPT_DLIMIT, 'p', "dump the first arg bytes of unknown data in hex form"}, {"strparse", OPT_STRPARSE, 's', "offset; a series of these can be used to 'dig'"}, {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0, "into multiple ASN1 blob wrappings"}, {"genstr", OPT_GENSTR, 's', "string to generate ASN1 structure from"}, {"genconf", OPT_GENCONF, 's', "file to generate ASN1 structure from"}, {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0, "(-inform will be ignored)"}, {"strictpem", OPT_STRICTPEM, 0, "do not attempt base64 decode outside PEM markers"}, {NULL} }; static int do_generate(char *genstr, const char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf); int asn1parse_main(int argc, char **argv) { ASN1_TYPE *at = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *b64 = NULL, *derout = NULL; BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *osk = NULL; char *genstr = NULL, *genconf = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *oidfile = NULL, *derfile = NULL; unsigned char *str = NULL; char *name = NULL, *header = NULL, *prog; const unsigned char *ctmpbuf; int indent = 0, noout = 0, dump = 0, strictpem = 0, informat = FORMAT_PEM; int offset = 0, ret = 1, i, j; long num, tmplen; unsigned char *tmpbuf; unsigned int length = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, asn1parse_options); if ((osk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(asn1parse_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: derfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_INDENT: indent = 1; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_OID: oidfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OFFSET: offset = strtol(opt_arg(), NULL, 0); break; case OPT_LENGTH: length = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_DUMP: dump = -1; break; case OPT_DLIMIT: dump = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_STRPARSE: sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(osk, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_GENSTR: genstr = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_GENCONF: genconf = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_STRICTPEM: strictpem = 1; informat = FORMAT_PEM; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (oidfile != NULL) { in = bio_open_default(oidfile, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) goto end; OBJ_create_objects(in); BIO_free(in); } if ((in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat)) == NULL) goto end; if (derfile && (derout = bio_open_default(derfile, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1)) == NULL) goto end; if (strictpem) { if (PEM_read_bio(in, &name, &header, &str, &num) != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading PEM file\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) goto end; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, BUFSIZ * 8)) goto end; /* Pre-allocate :-) */ if (genstr || genconf) { num = do_generate(genstr, genconf, buf); if (num < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else { if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) { BIO *tmp; if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) goto end; BIO_push(b64, in); tmp = in; in = b64; b64 = tmp; } num = 0; for (;;) { if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, (int)num + BUFSIZ)) goto end; i = BIO_read(in, &(buf->data[num]), BUFSIZ); if (i <= 0) break; num += i; } } str = (unsigned char *)buf->data; } /* If any structs to parse go through in sequence */ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk)) { tmpbuf = str; tmplen = num; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk); i++) { ASN1_TYPE *atmp; int typ; j = atoi(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i)); if (j == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "'%s' is an invalid number\n", sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i)); continue; } tmpbuf += j; tmplen -= j; atmp = at; ctmpbuf = tmpbuf; at = d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &ctmpbuf, tmplen); ASN1_TYPE_free(atmp); if (!at) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing structure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at); if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT) || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* hmm... this is a little evil but it works */ tmpbuf = at->value.asn1_string->data; tmplen = at->value.asn1_string->length; } str = tmpbuf; num = tmplen; } if (offset >= num) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset too large\n"); goto end; } num -= offset; if ((length == 0) || ((long)length > num)) length = (unsigned int)num; if (derout) { if (BIO_write(derout, str + offset, length) != (int)length) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing output\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (!noout && !ASN1_parse_dump(bio_out, &(str[offset]), length, indent, dump)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; end: BIO_free(derout); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(b64); if (ret != 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BUF_MEM_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(header); if (strictpem) OPENSSL_free(str); ASN1_TYPE_free(at); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(osk); return (ret); } static int do_generate(char *genstr, const char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf) { CONF *cnf = NULL; int len; unsigned char *p; ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL; if (genconf) { if ((cnf = app_load_config(genconf)) == NULL) goto err; if (!genstr) genstr = NCONF_get_string(cnf, "default", "asn1"); if (!genstr) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't find 'asn1' in '%s'\n", genconf); goto err; } } atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf); NCONF_free(cnf); cnf = NULL; if (!atyp) return -1; len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, NULL); if (len <= 0) goto err; if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len)) goto err; p = (unsigned char *)buf->data; i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, &p); ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp); return len; err: NCONF_free(cnf); ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp); return -1; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s_client.c0000644000000000000000000026012113176625656014773 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #define USE_SOCKETS #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) # include # endif #endif #undef BUFSIZZ #define BUFSIZZ 1024*8 #define S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT 8 static char *prog; static int c_debug = 0; static int c_showcerts = 0; static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL; static int keymatexportlen = 20; static BIO *bio_c_out = NULL; static int c_quiet = 0; static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); #endif static int saved_errno; static void save_errno(void) { saved_errno = errno; errno = 0; } static int restore_errno(void) { int ret = errno; errno = saved_errno; return ret; } static void do_ssl_shutdown(SSL *ssl) { int ret; do { /* We only do unidirectional shutdown */ ret = SSL_shutdown(ssl); if (ret < 0) { switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* We just do busy waiting. Nothing clever */ continue; } ret = 0; } } while (ret < 0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Default PSK identity and key */ static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity"; /* * char *psk_key=NULL; by default PSK is not used */ static unsigned int psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { int ret; long key_len; unsigned char *key; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "psk_client_cb\n"); if (!hint) { /* no ServerKeyExchange message */ if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "NULL received PSK identity hint, continuing anyway\n"); } else if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Received PSK identity hint '%s'\n", hint); /* * lookup PSK identity and PSK key based on the given identity hint here */ ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "%s", psk_identity); if (ret < 0 || (unsigned int)ret > max_identity_len) goto out_err; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity, ret); /* convert the PSK key to binary */ key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } if (max_psk_len > INT_MAX || key_len > (long)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n", max_psk_len, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } memcpy(psk, key, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created PSK len=%ld\n", key_len); return key_len; out_err: if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK client callback\n"); return 0; } #endif /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct tlsextctx_st { BIO *biodebug; int ack; } tlsextctx; static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg; const char *hn = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1) p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL; else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use SSL_get_servername\n"); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */ typedef struct srp_arg_st { char *srppassin; char *srplogin; int msg; /* copy from c_msg */ int debug; /* copy from c_debug */ int amp; /* allow more groups */ int strength; /* minimal size for N */ } SRP_ARG; # define SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 static int srp_Verify_N_and_g(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g) { BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); BIGNUM *p = BN_new(); BIGNUM *r = BN_new(); int ret = g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) && BN_is_prime_ex(N, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 && p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) && /* p = (N-1)/2 */ BN_is_prime_ex(p, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 && r != NULL && /* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */ BN_mod_exp(r, g, p, N, bn_ctx) && BN_add_word(r, 1) && BN_cmp(r, N) == 0; BN_free(r); BN_free(p); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return ret; } /*- * This callback is used here for two purposes: * - extended debugging * - making some primality tests for unknown groups * The callback is only called for a non default group. * * An application does not need the call back at all if * only the standard groups are used. In real life situations, * client and server already share well known groups, * thus there is no need to verify them. * Furthermore, in case that a server actually proposes a group that * is not one of those defined in RFC 5054, it is more appropriate * to add the group to a static list and then compare since * primality tests are rather cpu consuming. */ static int ssl_srp_verify_param_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; BIGNUM *N = NULL, *g = NULL; if (((N = SSL_get_srp_N(s)) == NULL) || ((g = SSL_get_srp_g(s)) == NULL)) return 0; if (srp_arg->debug || srp_arg->msg || srp_arg->amp == 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters:\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tN="); BN_print(bio_err, N); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\tg="); BN_print(bio_err, g); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); } if (SRP_check_known_gN_param(g, N)) return 1; if (srp_arg->amp == 1) { if (srp_arg->debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g are not known params, going to check deeper.\n"); /* * The srp_moregroups is a real debugging feature. Implementors * should rather add the value to the known ones. The minimal size * has already been tested. */ if (BN_num_bits(g) <= BN_BITS && srp_Verify_N_and_g(N, g)) return 1; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g rejected.\n"); return 0; } # define PWD_STRLEN 1024 static char *ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; char *pass = app_malloc(PWD_STRLEN + 1, "SRP password buffer"); PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; int l; cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin; cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user"; if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); OPENSSL_free(pass); return NULL; } *(pass + l) = '\0'; return pass; } #endif static char *srtp_profiles = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { unsigned char *data; size_t len; int status; } tlsextnextprotoctx; static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; if (!c_quiet) { /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ unsigned i; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); for (i = 0; i < inlen;) { if (i) BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); i += in[i] + 1; } BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); } ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { char pem_name[100]; unsigned char ext_buf[4 + 65536]; /* Reconstruct the type/len fields prior to extension data */ ext_buf[0] = ext_type >> 8; ext_buf[1] = ext_type & 0xFF; ext_buf[2] = inlen >> 8; ext_buf[3] = inlen & 0xFF; memcpy(ext_buf + 4, in, inlen); BIO_snprintf(pem_name, sizeof(pem_name), "SERVERINFO FOR EXTENSION %d", ext_type); PEM_write_bio(bio_c_out, pem_name, "", ext_buf, 4 + inlen); return 1; } /* * Hex decoder that tolerates optional whitespace. Returns number of bytes * produced, advances inptr to end of input string. */ static ossl_ssize_t hexdecode(const char **inptr, void *result) { unsigned char **out = (unsigned char **)result; const char *in = *inptr; unsigned char *ret = app_malloc(strlen(in) / 2, "hexdecode"); unsigned char *cp = ret; uint8_t byte; int nibble = 0; if (ret == NULL) return -1; for (byte = 0; *in; ++in) { int x; if (isspace(_UC(*in))) continue; x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*in); if (x < 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } byte |= (char)x; if ((nibble ^= 1) == 0) { *cp++ = byte; byte = 0; } else { byte <<= 4; } } if (nibble != 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } *inptr = in; return cp - (*out = ret); } /* * Decode unsigned 0..255, returns 1 on success, <= 0 on failure. Advances * inptr to next field skipping leading whitespace. */ static ossl_ssize_t checked_uint8(const char **inptr, void *out) { uint8_t *result = (uint8_t *)out; const char *in = *inptr; char *endp; long v; int e; save_errno(); v = strtol(in, &endp, 10); e = restore_errno(); if (((v == LONG_MIN || v == LONG_MAX) && e == ERANGE) || endp == in || !isspace(_UC(*endp)) || v != (*result = (uint8_t) v)) { return -1; } for (in = endp; isspace(_UC(*in)); ++in) continue; *inptr = in; return 1; } struct tlsa_field { void *var; const char *name; ossl_ssize_t (*parser)(const char **, void *); }; static int tlsa_import_rr(SSL *con, const char *rrdata) { /* Not necessary to re-init these values; the "parsers" do that. */ static uint8_t usage; static uint8_t selector; static uint8_t mtype; static unsigned char *data; static struct tlsa_field tlsa_fields[] = { { &usage, "usage", checked_uint8 }, { &selector, "selector", checked_uint8 }, { &mtype, "mtype", checked_uint8 }, { &data, "data", hexdecode }, { NULL, } }; struct tlsa_field *f; int ret; const char *cp = rrdata; ossl_ssize_t len = 0; for (f = tlsa_fields; f->var; ++f) { /* Returns number of bytes produced, advances cp to next field */ if ((len = f->parser(&cp, f->var)) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: bad TLSA %s field in: %s\n", prog, f->name, rrdata); return 0; } } /* The data field is last, so len is its length */ ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(con, usage, selector, mtype, data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); if (ret == 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: unusable TLSA rrdata: %s\n", prog, rrdata); return 0; } if (ret < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: error loading TLSA rrdata: %s\n", prog, rrdata); return 0; } return ret; } static int tlsa_import_rrset(SSL *con, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rrset) { int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(rrset); int count = 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { char *rrdata = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(rrset, i); if (tlsa_import_rr(con, rrdata) > 0) ++count; } return count > 0; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_4, OPT_6, OPT_HOST, OPT_PORT, OPT_CONNECT, OPT_UNIX, OPT_XMPPHOST, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_CERT, OPT_CRL, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SESS_OUT, OPT_SESS_IN, OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, OPT_BRIEF, OPT_PREXIT, OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_NBIO, OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, OPT_RAND, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_WDEBUG, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_SHOWCERTS, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_STATE, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPT_SRPUSER, OPT_SRPPASS, OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, OPT_SRP_LATEUSER, OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, #endif OPT_SSL3, OPT_SSL_CONFIG, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1, OPT_DTLS, OPT_DTLS1, OPT_DTLS1_2, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_MTU, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASS, OPT_CERT_CHAIN, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_CHAINCAPATH, OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, OPT_KEY, OPT_RECONNECT, OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_CHAINCAFILE, OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN, OPT_SERVERINFO, OPT_STARTTLS, OPT_SERVERNAME, OPT_USE_SRTP, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, OPT_SMTPHOST, OPT_ASYNC, OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, OPT_READ_BUF, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_X_ENUM, OPT_S_ENUM, OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, OPT_NOCMDS, OPT_PROXY, OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT OPT_CT, OPT_NOCT, OPT_CTLOG_FILE, #endif OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS s_client_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"host", OPT_HOST, 's', "Use -connect instead"}, {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "Use -connect instead"}, {"connect", OPT_CONNECT, 's', "TCP/IP where to connect (default is :" PORT ")"}, {"proxy", OPT_PROXY, 's', "Connect to via specified proxy to the real server"}, #ifdef AF_UNIX {"unix", OPT_UNIX, 's', "Connect over the specified Unix-domain socket"}, #endif {"4", OPT_4, '-', "Use IPv4 only"}, #ifdef AF_INET6 {"6", OPT_6, '-', "Use IPv6 only"}, #endif {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'p', "Turn on peer certificate verification"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate file to use, PEM format assumed"}, {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 'F', "Certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private key file to use, if not in -cert file"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Key format (PEM, DER or engine) PEM default"}, {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Private key file pass phrase source"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"dane_tlsa_domain", OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN, 's', "DANE TLSA base domain"}, {"dane_tlsa_rrdata", OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, 's', "DANE TLSA rrdata presentation form"}, {"dane_ee_no_namechecks", OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME, '-', "Disable name checks when matching DANE-EE(3) TLSA records"}, {"reconnect", OPT_RECONNECT, '-', "Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID"}, {"showcerts", OPT_SHOWCERTS, '-', "Show all certificates in the chain"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Extra output"}, {"msg", OPT_MSG, '-', "Show protocol messages"}, {"msgfile", OPT_MSGFILE, '>', "File to send output of -msg or -trace, instead of stdout"}, {"nbio_test", OPT_NBIO_TEST, '-', "More ssl protocol testing"}, {"state", OPT_STATE, '-', "Print the ssl states"}, {"crlf", OPT_CRLF, '-', "Convert LF from terminal into CRLF"}, {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No s_client output"}, {"ign_eof", OPT_IGN_EOF, '-', "Ignore input eof (default when -quiet)"}, {"no_ign_eof", OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, '-', "Don't ignore input eof"}, {"starttls", OPT_STARTTLS, 's', "Use the appropriate STARTTLS command before starting TLS"}, {"xmpphost", OPT_XMPPHOST, 's', "Host to use with \"-starttls xmpp[-server]\""}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"sess_out", OPT_SESS_OUT, '>', "File to write SSL session to"}, {"sess_in", OPT_SESS_IN, '<', "File to read SSL session from"}, {"use_srtp", OPT_USE_SRTP, 's', "Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list"}, {"keymatexport", OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, 's', "Export keying material using label"}, {"keymatexportlen", OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, 'p', "Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)"}, {"fallback_scsv", OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, '-', "Send the fallback SCSV"}, {"name", OPT_SMTPHOST, 's', "Hostname to use for \"-starttls smtp\""}, {"CRL", OPT_CRL, '<', "CRL file to use"}, {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-', "Download CRL from distribution points"}, {"CRLform", OPT_CRLFORM, 'F', "CRL format (PEM or DER) PEM is default"}, {"verify_return_error", OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, '-', "Close connection on verification error"}, {"verify_quiet", OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, '-', "Restrict verify output to errors"}, {"brief", OPT_BRIEF, '-', "Restrict output to brief summary of connection parameters"}, {"prexit", OPT_PREXIT, '-', "Print session information when the program exits"}, {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-', "Enable security debug messages"}, {"security_debug_verbose", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, '-', "Output more security debug output"}, {"cert_chain", OPT_CERT_CHAIN, '<', "Certificate chain file (in PEM format)"}, {"chainCApath", OPT_CHAINCAPATH, '/', "Use dir as certificate store path to build CA certificate chain"}, {"verifyCApath", OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, '/', "Use dir as certificate store path to verify CA certificate"}, {"build_chain", OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, '-', "Build certificate chain"}, {"chainCAfile", OPT_CHAINCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate chain (PEM format)"}, {"verifyCAfile", OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate verification (PEM format)"}, {"nocommands", OPT_NOCMDS, '-', "Do not use interactive command letters"}, {"servername", OPT_SERVERNAME, 's', "Set TLS extension servername in ClientHello"}, {"tlsextdebug", OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, '-', "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"}, #endif {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's', "types Send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)"}, {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's', "Enable ALPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"}, {"async", OPT_ASYNC, '-', "Support asynchronous operation"}, {"ssl_config", OPT_SSL_CONFIG, 's', "Use specified configuration file"}, {"split_send_frag", OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, 'n', "Size used to split data for encrypt pipelines"}, {"max_pipelines", OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, 'n', "Maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used"}, {"read_buf", OPT_READ_BUF, 'n', "Default read buffer size to be used for connections"}, OPT_S_OPTIONS, OPT_V_OPTIONS, OPT_X_OPTIONS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just use SSLv3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just use TLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "Just use TLSv1.1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "Just use TLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS {"dtls", OPT_DTLS, '-', "Use any version of DTLS"}, {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, '-', "Enable send/receive timeout on DTLS connections"}, {"mtu", OPT_MTU, 'p', "Set the link layer MTU"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {"dtls1", OPT_DTLS1, '-', "Just use DTLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {"dtls1_2", OPT_DTLS1_2, '-', "Just use DTLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE {"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "Show trace output of protocol messages"}, #endif #ifdef WATT32 {"wdebug", OPT_WDEBUG, '-', "WATT-32 tcp debugging"}, #endif {"nbio", OPT_NBIO, '-', "Use non-blocking IO"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK {"psk_identity", OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, 's', "PSK identity"}, {"psk", OPT_PSK, 's', "PSK in hex (without 0x)"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP {"srpuser", OPT_SRPUSER, 's', "SRP authentication for 'user'"}, {"srppass", OPT_SRPPASS, 's', "Password for 'user'"}, {"srp_lateuser", OPT_SRP_LATEUSER, '-', "SRP username into second ClientHello message"}, {"srp_moregroups", OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, '-', "Tolerate other than the known g N values."}, {"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal length in bits for N"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's', "Enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, {"ssl_client_engine", OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, 's', "Specify engine to be used for client certificate operations"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT {"ct", OPT_CT, '-', "Request and parse SCTs (also enables OCSP stapling)"}, {"noct", OPT_NOCT, '-', "Do not request or parse SCTs (default)"}, {"ctlogfile", OPT_CTLOG_FILE, '<', "CT log list CONF file"}, #endif {NULL, OPT_EOF, 0x00, NULL} }; typedef enum PROTOCOL_choice { PROTO_OFF, PROTO_SMTP, PROTO_POP3, PROTO_IMAP, PROTO_FTP, PROTO_TELNET, PROTO_XMPP, PROTO_XMPP_SERVER, PROTO_CONNECT, PROTO_IRC } PROTOCOL_CHOICE; static const OPT_PAIR services[] = { {"smtp", PROTO_SMTP}, {"pop3", PROTO_POP3}, {"imap", PROTO_IMAP}, {"ftp", PROTO_FTP}, {"xmpp", PROTO_XMPP}, {"xmpp-server", PROTO_XMPP_SERVER}, {"telnet", PROTO_TELNET}, {"irc", PROTO_IRC}, {NULL, 0} }; #define IS_INET_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_4 || o == OPT_6 || o == OPT_HOST || o == OPT_PORT || o == OPT_CONNECT) #define IS_UNIX_FLAG(o) (o == OPT_UNIX) #define IS_PROT_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_SSL3 || o == OPT_TLS1 || o == OPT_TLS1_1 || o == OPT_TLS1_2 \ || o == OPT_DTLS || o == OPT_DTLS1 || o == OPT_DTLS1_2) /* Free |*dest| and optionally set it to a copy of |source|. */ static void freeandcopy(char **dest, const char *source) { OPENSSL_free(*dest); *dest = NULL; if (source != NULL) *dest = OPENSSL_strdup(source); } int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *sbio; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; SSL *con = NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL; char *dane_tlsa_domain = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dane_tlsa_rrset = NULL; int dane_ee_no_name = 0; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_client_method(); const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL; char *mbuf = NULL, *proxystr = NULL, *connectstr = NULL; char *cert_file = NULL, *key_file = NULL, *chain_file = NULL; char *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL, *host = NULL; char *port = OPENSSL_strdup(PORT); char *inrand = NULL; char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL; char *sess_in = NULL, *sess_out = NULL, *crl_file = NULL, *p; char *xmpphost = NULL; const char *ehlo = "mail.example.com"; struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp; fd_set readfds, writefds; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int build_chain = 0, cbuf_len, cbuf_off, cert_format = FORMAT_PEM; int key_format = FORMAT_PEM, crlf = 0, full_log = 1, mbuf_len = 0; int prexit = 0; int sdebug = 0; int reconnect = 0, verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE, vpmtouched = 0; int ret = 1, in_init = 1, i, nbio_test = 0, s = -1, k, width, state = 0; int sbuf_len, sbuf_off, cmdletters = 1; int socket_family = AF_UNSPEC, socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF, crl_format = FORMAT_PEM, crl_download = 0; int write_tty, read_tty, write_ssl, read_ssl, tty_on, ssl_pending; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) int at_eof = 0; #endif int read_buf_len = 0; int fallback_scsv = 0; long randamt = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS int enable_timeouts = 0; long socket_mtu = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *ssl_client_engine = NULL; #endif ENGINE *e = NULL; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) struct timeval tv; #endif char *servername = NULL; const char *alpn_in = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, 0 }; const char *ssl_config = NULL; #define MAX_SI_TYPES 100 unsigned short serverinfo_types[MAX_SI_TYPES]; int serverinfo_count = 0, start = 0, len; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srppass = NULL; int srp_lateuser = 0; SRP_ARG srp_arg = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1024 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT char *ctlog_file = NULL; int ct_validation = 0; #endif int min_version = 0, max_version = 0, prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0; int async = 0; unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0; unsigned int max_pipelines = 0; enum { use_inet, use_unix, use_unknown } connect_type = use_unknown; int count4or6 = 0; int c_nbio = 0, c_msg = 0, c_ign_eof = 0, c_brief = 0; int c_tlsextdebug = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int c_status_req = 0; #endif BIO *bio_c_msg = NULL; FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); /* Known false-positive of MemorySanitizer. */ #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) __msan_unpoison(&readfds, sizeof(readfds)); __msan_unpoison(&writefds, sizeof(writefds)); # endif #endif prog = opt_progname(argv[0]); c_quiet = 0; c_debug = 0; c_showcerts = 0; c_nbio = 0; vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); if (vpm == NULL || cctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: out of memory\n", prog); goto end; } cbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "cbuf"); sbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "sbuf"); mbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "mbuf"); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_client_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { /* Check for intermixing flags. */ if (connect_type == use_unix && IS_INET_FLAG(o)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (unix and internet domains)\n", prog); goto end; } if (connect_type == use_inet && IS_UNIX_FLAG(o)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (internet and unix domains)\n", prog); goto end; } if (IS_PROT_FLAG(o) && ++prot_opt > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n"); goto end; } if (IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o)) no_prot_opt++; if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and '-no_'\n"); goto end; } switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(s_client_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_4: connect_type = use_inet; socket_family = AF_INET; count4or6++; break; #ifdef AF_INET6 case OPT_6: connect_type = use_inet; socket_family = AF_INET6; count4or6++; break; #endif case OPT_HOST: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PORT: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&port, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_CONNECT: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&connectstr, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PROXY: proxystr = opt_arg(); starttls_proto = PROTO_CONNECT; break; #ifdef AF_UNIX case OPT_UNIX: connect_type = use_unix; socket_family = AF_UNIX; freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg()); break; #endif case OPT_XMPPHOST: xmpphost = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SMTPHOST: ehlo = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFY: verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!c_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_CERT: cert_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL: crl_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD: crl_download = 1; break; case OPT_SESS_OUT: sess_out = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SESS_IN: sess_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &cert_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CRLFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &crl_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR: verify_args.return_error = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET: verify_args.quiet = 1; break; case OPT_BRIEF: c_brief = verify_args.quiet = c_quiet = 1; break; case OPT_S_CASES: if (ssl_args == NULL) ssl_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (ssl_args == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_flag()) || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_X_CASES: if (!args_excert(o, &exc)) goto end; break; case OPT_PREXIT: prexit = 1; break; case OPT_CRLF: crlf = 1; break; case OPT_QUIET: c_quiet = c_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO: c_nbio = 1; break; case OPT_NOCMDS: cmdletters = 0; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 1); break; case OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(opt_arg()); if (ssl_client_engine == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting client auth engine\n"); goto opthelp; } #endif break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_IGN_EOF: c_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NO_IGN_EOF: c_ign_eof = 0; break; case OPT_DEBUG: c_debug = 1; break; case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG: c_tlsextdebug = 1; break; case OPT_STATUS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP c_status_req = 1; #endif break; case OPT_WDEBUG: #ifdef WATT32 dbug_init(); #endif break; case OPT_MSG: c_msg = 1; break; case OPT_MSGFILE: bio_c_msg = BIO_new_file(opt_arg(), "w"); break; case OPT_TRACE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE c_msg = 2; #endif break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG: sdebug = 1; break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE: sdebug = 2; break; case OPT_SHOWCERTS: c_showcerts = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO_TEST: nbio_test = 1; break; case OPT_STATE: state = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK case OPT_PSK_IDENTITY: psk_identity = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PSK: for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) { if (isxdigit(_UC(*p))) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", psk_key); goto end; } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case OPT_SRPUSER: srp_arg.srplogin = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRPPASS: srppass = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_STRENGTH: srp_arg.strength = atoi(opt_arg()); BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP minimal length for N is %d\n", srp_arg.strength); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_LATEUSER: srp_lateuser = 1; if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS: srp_arg.amp = 1; if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; #endif case OPT_SSL_CONFIG: ssl_config = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_DTLS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_client_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 meth = DTLS_client_method(); min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1_2: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 meth = DTLS_client_method(); min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS enable_timeouts = 1; #endif break; case OPT_MTU: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS socket_mtu = atol(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_FALLBACKSCSV: fallback_scsv = 1; break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &key_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASS: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT_CHAIN: chain_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY: key_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RECONNECT: reconnect = 5; break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_CHAINCAPATH: chCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAPATH: vfyCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_BUILD_CHAIN: build_chain = 1; break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT case OPT_NOCT: ct_validation = 0; break; case OPT_CT: ct_validation = 1; break; case OPT_CTLOG_FILE: ctlog_file = opt_arg(); break; #endif case OPT_CHAINCAFILE: chCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAFILE: vfyCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN: dane_tlsa_domain = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA: if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL) dane_tlsa_rrset = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(dane_tlsa_rrset, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME: dane_ee_no_name = 1; break; case OPT_NEXTPROTONEG: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_in = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_ALPN: alpn_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SERVERINFO: p = opt_arg(); len = strlen(p); for (start = 0, i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || p[i] == ',') { serverinfo_types[serverinfo_count] = atoi(p + start); if (++serverinfo_count == MAX_SI_TYPES) break; start = i + 1; } } break; case OPT_STARTTLS: if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), services, &starttls_proto)) goto end; break; case OPT_SERVERNAME: servername = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_USE_SRTP: srtp_profiles = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORT: keymatexportlabel = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN: keymatexportlen = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_ASYNC: async = 1; break; case OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG: split_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); if (split_send_fragment == 0) { /* * Not allowed - set to a deliberately bad value so we get an * error message below */ split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 1; } break; case OPT_MAX_PIPELINES: max_pipelines = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_READ_BUF: read_buf_len = atoi(opt_arg()); break; } } if (count4or6 >= 2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use both -4 and -6\n", prog); goto opthelp; } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (proxystr) { int res; char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port; if (connectstr == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -proxy requires use of -connect\n", prog); goto opthelp; } res = BIO_parse_hostserv(proxystr, &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (tmp_host != host) OPENSSL_free(tmp_host); if (tmp_port != port) OPENSSL_free(tmp_port); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -proxy argument malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } } else { int res = 1; char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port; if (connectstr != NULL) res = BIO_parse_hostserv(connectstr, &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (tmp_host != host) OPENSSL_free(tmp_host); if (tmp_port != port) OPENSSL_free(tmp_port); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -connect argument malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } } #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use unix sockets and datagrams together\n"); goto end; } #endif if (split_send_fragment > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad split send fragment size\n"); goto end; } if (max_pipelines > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad max pipelines value\n"); goto end; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) next_proto.status = -1; if (next_proto_neg_in) { next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); if (next_proto.data == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); goto end; } } else next_proto.data = NULL; #endif if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (key_file == NULL) key_file = cert_file; if (key_file) { key = load_key(key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e, "client certificate private key file"); if (key == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (cert_file) { cert = load_cert(cert_file, cert_format, "client certificate file"); if (cert == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (chain_file) { if (!load_certs(chain_file, &chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "client certificate chain")) goto end; } if (crl_file) { X509_CRL *crl; crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format); if (crl == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (crls == NULL || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_CRL_free(crl); goto end; } } if (!load_excert(&exc)) goto end; if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL && !RAND_status()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n"); } if (inrand != NULL) { randamt = app_RAND_load_files(inrand); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", randamt); } if (bio_c_out == NULL) { if (c_quiet && !c_debug) { bio_c_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); if (c_msg && !bio_c_msg) bio_c_msg = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } else if (bio_c_out == NULL) bio_c_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!app_passwd(srppass, NULL, &srp_arg.srppassin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } #endif ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (sdebug) ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug); if (ssl_config) { if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, ssl_config) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error using configuration \"%s\"\n", ssl_config); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0) goto end; if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (async) { SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); } if (split_send_fragment > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx, split_send_fragment); } if (max_pipelines > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx, max_pipelines); } if (read_buf_len > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(ctx, read_buf_len); } if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx)) goto end; if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile, crls, crl_download)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ssl_client_engine) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); goto end; } ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psk_key != NULL) { if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "PSK key given, setting client callback\n"); SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (srtp_profiles != NULL) { /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting SRTP profile\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.data) SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); #endif if (alpn_in) { size_t alpn_len; unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_in); if (alpn == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn argument\n"); goto end; } /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, alpn, alpn_len) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting ALPN\n"); goto end; } OPENSSL_free(alpn); } for (i = 0; i < serverinfo_count; i++) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(ctx, serverinfo_types[i], NULL, NULL, NULL, serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: Unable to add custom extension %u, skipping\n", serverinfo_types[i]); } } if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* Enable SCT processing, without early connection termination */ if (ct_validation && !SSL_CTX_enable_ct(ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(ctx, ctlog_file)) { if (ct_validation) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* * If CT validation is not enabled, the log list isn't needed so don't * show errors or abort. We try to load it regardless because then we * can show the names of the logs any SCTs came from (SCTs may be seen * even with validation disabled). */ ERR_clear_error(); } #endif SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback); if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download); if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key, chain, build_chain)) goto end; if (servername != NULL) { tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_arg.srplogin) { if (!srp_lateuser && !SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(ctx, srp_arg.srplogin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n"); goto end; } srp_arg.msg = c_msg; srp_arg.debug = c_debug; SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_arg); SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb); SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(ctx, srp_arg.strength); if (c_msg || c_debug || srp_arg.amp == 0) SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_verify_param_cb); } # endif if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA authentication.\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } con = SSL_new(ctx); if (sess_in) { SSL_SESSION *sess; BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r"); if (!stmp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(stmp); if (!sess) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't set session\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); } if (fallback_scsv) SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV); if (servername != NULL) { if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { if (SSL_dane_enable(con, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA " "authentication.\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires at " "least one -dane_tlsa_rrdata option.\n", prog); goto end; } if (tlsa_import_rrset(con, dane_tlsa_rrset) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Failed to import any TLSA " "records.\n", prog); goto end; } if (dane_ee_no_name) SSL_dane_set_flags(con, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS); } else if (dane_tlsa_rrset != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires the " "-dane_tlsa_domain option.\n", prog); goto end; } re_start: if (init_client(&s, host, port, socket_family, socket_type) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "connect:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "CONNECTED(%08X)\n", s); if (c_nbio) { if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Turned on non blocking io\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) { union BIO_sock_info_u peer_info; sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if ((peer_info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } if (!BIO_sock_info(s, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &peer_info)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, peer_info.addr); BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr); peer_info.addr = NULL; if (enable_timeouts) { timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); } if (socket_mtu) { if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n", DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU); if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n"); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } } else /* want to do MTU discovery */ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL); } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DTLS */ sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } if (c_debug) { BIO_set_callback(sbio, bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio, (char *)bio_c_out); } if (c_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (c_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_msg ? bio_c_msg : bio_c_out); } if (c_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (c_status_req) { SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out); } #endif SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_connect_state(con); /* ok, lets connect */ if (fileno_stdin() > SSL_get_fd(con)) width = fileno_stdin() + 1; else width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1; read_tty = 1; write_tty = 0; tty_on = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 1; cbuf_len = 0; cbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = 0; sbuf_off = 0; switch ((PROTOCOL_CHOICE) starttls_proto) { case PROTO_OFF: break; case PROTO_SMTP: { /* * This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions. We do * have to handle multi-line responses which may come in a single * packet or not. We therefore have to use BIO_gets() which does * need a buffering BIO. So during the initial chitchat we do * push a buffering BIO into the chain that is removed again * later on to not disturb the rest of the s_client operation. */ int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from SMTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); BIO_printf(fbio, "EHLO %s\r\n", ehlo); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end EHLO SMTP response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "didn't find starttls in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_POP3: { BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); BIO_printf(sbio, "STLS\r\n"); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } } break; case PROTO_IMAP: { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */ BIO_printf(fbio, ". CAPABILITY\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[0] != '.'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, ". STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_FTP: { BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); BIO_printf(sbio, "AUTH TLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_XMPP: case PROTO_XMPP_SERVER: { int seen = 0; BIO_printf(sbio, "", starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP ? "client" : "server", xmpphost ? xmpphost : host); seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); mbuf[seen] = 0; while (!strstr (mbuf, ""); seen = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); sbuf[seen] = 0; if (!strstr(sbuf, " 2); } (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (foundit != success) { goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_IRC: { int numeric; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_printf(fbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1; do { numeric = 0; FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); timeout.tv_sec = S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT; timeout.tv_usec = 0; /* * If the IRCd doesn't respond within * S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT seconds, assume * it doesn't support STARTTLS. Many IRCds * will not give _any_ sort of response to a * STARTTLS command when it's not supported. */ if (!BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(fbio) && !BIO_pending(fbio) && !BIO_pending(sbio) && select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout) < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Timeout waiting for response (%d seconds).\n", S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT); break; } mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 1 || sscanf(mbuf, "%*s %d", &numeric) != 1) break; /* :example.net 451 STARTTLS :You have not registered */ /* :example.net 421 STARTTLS :Unknown command */ if ((numeric == 451 || numeric == 421) && strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS") != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS not supported: %s", mbuf); break; } if (numeric == 691) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS negotiation failed: "); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); break; } } while (numeric != 670); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (numeric != 670) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Server does not support STARTTLS.\n"); ret = 1; goto shut; } } } for (;;) { FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout)) timeoutp = &timeout; else timeoutp = NULL; if (SSL_in_init(con) && !SSL_total_renegotiations(con)) { in_init = 1; tty_on = 0; } else { tty_on = 1; if (in_init) { in_init = 0; if (sess_out) { BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w"); if (stmp) { PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, SSL_get_session(con)); BIO_free(stmp); } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n", sess_out); } if (c_brief) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n"); print_ssl_summary(con); } print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log); if (full_log > 0) full_log--; if (starttls_proto) { BIO_write(bio_err, mbuf, mbuf_len); /* We don't need to know any more */ if (!reconnect) starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF; } if (reconnect) { reconnect--; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "drop connection and then reconnect\n"); do_ssl_shutdown(con); SSL_set_connect_state(con); BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con)); goto re_start; } } } ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_has_pending(con); if (!ssl_pending) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (tty_on) { /* * Note that select() returns when read _would not block_, * and EOF satisfies that. To avoid a CPU-hogging loop, * set the flag so we exit. */ if (read_tty && !at_eof) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (write_tty) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdout(), &writefds); #endif } if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); #else if (!tty_on || !write_tty) { if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); } #endif /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or * (void *). */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) /* * Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can always * write to the tty: therefore if we need to write to the tty we * just fall through. Otherwise we timeout the select every * second and see if there are any keypresses. Note: this is a * hack, in a proper Windows application we wouldn't do this. */ i = 0; if (!write_tty) { if (read_tty) { tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, &tv); if (!i && (!has_stdin_waiting() || !read_tty)) continue; } else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); } #else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); #endif if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad select %d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; /* goto end; */ } } if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occurred\n"); } if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds)) { k = SSL_write(con, &(cbuf[cbuf_off]), (unsigned int)cbuf_len); switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: cbuf_off += k; cbuf_len -= k; if (k <= 0) goto end; /* we have done a write(con,NULL,0); */ if (cbuf_len <= 0) { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } else { /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */ read_tty = 0; write_ssl = 1; } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write A BLOCK\n"); wait_for_async(con); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: if (cbuf_len != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "shutdown\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; } case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "write:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client - treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* Assume Windows/DOS/BeOS can always write */ else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty) #else else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno_stdout(), &writefds)) #endif { #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), &(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); #endif i = raw_write_stdout(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; /* goto end; */ } sbuf_len -= i;; sbuf_off += i; if (sbuf_len <= 0) { read_ssl = 1; write_tty = 0; } } else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds)) { #ifdef RENEG { static int iiii; if (++iiii == 52) { SSL_renegotiate(con); iiii = 0; } } #endif k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ ); switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (k <= 0) goto end; sbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = k; read_ssl = 0; write_tty = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read A BLOCK\n"); wait_for_async(con); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0)) write_ssl = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0)) write_ssl = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: ret = get_last_socket_error(); if (c_brief) BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED BY SERVER\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "read:errno=%d\n", ret); goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "closed\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client. Treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; /* break; */ } } /* OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS includes OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) else if (has_stdin_waiting()) #else else if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds)) #endif { if (crlf) { int j, lf_num; i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ / 2); lf_num = 0; /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) if (cbuf[j] == '\n') lf_num++; for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { cbuf[j + lf_num] = cbuf[j]; if (cbuf[j] == '\n') { lf_num--; i++; cbuf[j + lf_num] = '\r'; } } assert(lf_num == 0); } else i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (i == 0) at_eof = 1; #endif if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q' && cmdletters))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R' && cmdletters)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n"); SSL_renegotiate(con); cbuf_len = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'B' && cmdletters)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n"); SSL_heartbeat(con); cbuf_len = 0; } #endif else { cbuf_len = i; cbuf_off = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i); #endif } write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; } } ret = 0; shut: if (in_init) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log); do_ssl_shutdown(con); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) /* * Give the socket time to send its last data before we close it. * No amount of setting SO_LINGER etc on the socket seems to persuade * Windows to send the data before closing the socket...but sleeping * for a short time seems to do it (units in ms) * TODO: Find a better way to do this */ Sleep(50); #endif BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con)); end: if (con != NULL) { if (prexit != 0) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, 1); SSL_free(con); } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data); #endif SSL_CTX_free(ctx); X509_free(cert); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); EVP_PKEY_free(key); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); OPENSSL_free(pass); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin); #endif OPENSSL_free(connectstr); OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); ssl_excert_free(exc); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(dane_tlsa_rrset); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_clear_free(sbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_clear_free(mbuf, BUFSIZZ); release_engine(e); BIO_free(bio_c_out); bio_c_out = NULL; BIO_free(bio_c_msg); bio_c_msg = NULL; return (ret); } static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) { X509 *peer = NULL; char buf[BUFSIZ]; STACK_OF(X509) *sk; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk2; const SSL_CIPHER *c; X509_NAME *xn; int i; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion; #endif unsigned char *exportedkeymat; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT const SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s); #endif if (full) { int got_a_chain = 0; sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s); if (sk != NULL) { got_a_chain = 1; BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:%s\n", i, buf); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio, " i:%s\n", buf); if (c_showcerts) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i)); } } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s); if (peer != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Server certificate\n"); /* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */ if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain)) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio, "subject=%s\n", buf); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio, "issuer=%s\n", buf); } else BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n"); sk2 = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); if ((sk2 != NULL) && (sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2) > 0)) { BIO_printf(bio, "---\nAcceptable client certificate CA names\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2); i++) { xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk2, i); X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf)); BIO_write(bio, buf, strlen(buf)); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } } else { BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo client certificate CA names sent\n"); } ssl_print_sigalgs(bio, s); ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * When the SSL session is anonymous, or resumed via an abbreviated * handshake, no SCTs are provided as part of the handshake. While in * a resumed session SCTs may be present in the session's certificate, * no callbacks are invoked to revalidate these, and in any case that * set of SCTs may be incomplete. Thus it makes little sense to * attempt to display SCTs from a resumed session's certificate, and of * course none are associated with an anonymous peer. */ if (peer != NULL && !SSL_session_reused(s) && SSL_ct_is_enabled(s)) { const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s); int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSCTs present (%i)\n", sct_count); if (sct_count > 0) { const CTLOG_STORE *log_store = SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(ctx); BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); BIO_printf(bio, "SCT validation status: %s\n", SCT_validation_status_string(sct)); SCT_print(sct, bio, 0, log_store); if (i < sct_count - 1) BIO_printf(bio, "\n---\n"); } BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } } #endif BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSSL handshake has read %"BIO_PRI64"u" " bytes and written %"BIO_PRI64"u bytes\n", BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)), BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s))); } print_verify_detail(s, bio); BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_session_reused(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, ")); c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); if (peer != NULL) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); BIO_printf(bio, "Server public key is %d bit\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp)); } BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP comp = SSL_get_current_compression(s); expansion = SSL_get_current_expansion(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Compression: %s\n", comp ? SSL_COMP_get_name(comp) : "NONE"); BIO_printf(bio, "Expansion: %s\n", expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); #endif #ifdef SSL_DEBUG { /* Print out local port of connection: useful for debugging */ int sock; union BIO_sock_info_u info; sock = SSL_get_fd(s); if ((info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) != NULL && BIO_sock_info(sock, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &info)) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "LOCAL PORT is %u\n", ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(info.addr))); } BIO_ADDR_free(info.addr); } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.status != -1) { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } #endif { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_alpn_selected(s, &proto, &proto_len); if (proto_len > 0) { BIO_printf(bio, "ALPN protocol: "); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } else BIO_printf(bio, "No ALPN negotiated\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s); if (srtp_profile) BIO_printf(bio, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n", srtp_profile->name); } #endif SSL_SESSION_print(bio, SSL_get_session(s)); if (SSL_get_session(s) != NULL && keymatexportlabel != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n"); BIO_printf(bio, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel); BIO_printf(bio, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen); exportedkeymat = app_malloc(keymatexportlen, "export key"); if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat, keymatexportlen, keymatexportlabel, strlen(keymatexportlabel), NULL, 0, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio, " Error\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio, " Keying material: "); for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++) BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]); BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat); } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); X509_free(peer); /* flush, or debugging output gets mixed with http response */ (void)BIO_flush(bio); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { const unsigned char *p; int len; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp; len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p); BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: "); if (!p) { BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n"); return 1; } rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len); if (!rsp) { BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n"); BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4); return 0; } BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0); BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return 1; } # endif #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dh1024.pem0000644000000000000000000000067713176625656014444 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIGHAoGBAP//////////yQ/aoiFowjTExmKLgNwc0SkCTgiKZ8x0Agu+pjsTmyJR Sgh5jjQE3e+VGbPNOkMbMCsKbfJfFDdP4TVtbVHCReSFtXZiXn7G9ExC6aY37WsL /1y29Aa37e44a/taiZ+lrp8kEXxLH+ZJKGZR7OZTgf//////////AgEC -----END DH PARAMETERS----- These are the 1024-bit DH parameters from "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)": https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5996 See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated. openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s_socket.c0000644000000000000000000001621013176625656015003 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* socket-related functions used by s_client and s_server */ #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # define USE_SOCKETS # include "apps.h" # undef USE_SOCKETS # include "s_apps.h" # include # include /* * init_client - helper routine to set up socket communication * @sock: pointer to storage of resulting socket. * @host: the host name or path (for AF_UNIX) to connect to. * @port: the port to connect to (ignored for AF_UNIX). * @family: desired socket family, may be AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX or * AF_UNSPEC * @type: socket type, must be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM * * This will create a socket and use it to connect to a host:port, or if * family == AF_UNIX, to the path found in host. * * If the host has more than one address, it will try them one by one until * a successful connection is established. The resulting socket will be * found in *sock on success, it will be given INVALID_SOCKET otherwise. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int init_client(int *sock, const char *host, const char *port, int family, int type) { BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL; const BIO_ADDRINFO *ai = NULL; int ret; if (!BIO_sock_init()) return 0; ret = BIO_lookup(host, port, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, family, type, &res); if (ret == 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } ret = 0; for (ai = res; ai != NULL; ai = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(ai)) { /* Admittedly, these checks are quite paranoid, we should not get * anything in the BIO_ADDRINFO chain that we haven't * asked for. */ OPENSSL_assert((family == AF_UNSPEC || family == BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai)) && (type == 0 || type == BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(ai))); *sock = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(ai), BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(ai), 0); if (*sock == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* Maybe the kernel doesn't support the socket family, even if * BIO_lookup() added it in the returned result... */ continue; } if (!BIO_connect(*sock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(ai), 0)) { BIO_closesocket(*sock); *sock = INVALID_SOCKET; continue; } /* Success, don't try any more addresses */ break; } if (*sock == INVALID_SOCKET) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else { /* Remove any stale errors from previous connection attempts */ ERR_clear_error(); ret = 1; } BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); return ret; } /* * do_server - helper routine to perform a server operation * @accept_sock: pointer to storage of resulting socket. * @host: the host name or path (for AF_UNIX) to connect to. * @port: the port to connect to (ignored for AF_UNIX). * @family: desired socket family, may be AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX or * AF_UNSPEC * @type: socket type, must be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM * @cb: pointer to a function that receives the accepted socket and * should perform the communication with the connecting client. * @context: pointer to memory that's passed verbatim to the cb function. * @naccept: number of times an incoming connect should be accepted. If -1, * unlimited number. * * This will create a socket and use it to listen to a host:port, or if * family == AF_UNIX, to the path found in host, then start accepting * incoming connections and run cb on the resulting socket. * * 0 on failure, something other on success. */ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const char *host, const char *port, int family, int type, do_server_cb cb, unsigned char *context, int naccept) { int asock = 0; int sock; int i; BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL; int ret = 0; if (!BIO_sock_init()) return 0; if (!BIO_lookup(host, port, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER, family, type, &res)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } /* Admittedly, these checks are quite paranoid, we should not get * anything in the BIO_ADDRINFO chain that we haven't asked for */ OPENSSL_assert((family == AF_UNSPEC || family == BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res)) && (type == 0 || type == BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res))); asock = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res), BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(res), 0); if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET || !BIO_listen(asock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res), BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR)) { BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (asock != INVALID_SOCKET) BIO_closesocket(asock); goto end; } BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); res = NULL; if (accept_sock != NULL) *accept_sock = asock; for (;;) { if (type == SOCK_STREAM) { do { sock = BIO_accept_ex(asock, NULL, 0); } while (sock < 0 && BIO_sock_should_retry(sock)); if (sock < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_closesocket(asock); break; } i = (*cb)(sock, type, context); /* * If we ended with an alert being sent, but still with data in the * network buffer to be read, then calling BIO_closesocket() will * result in a TCP-RST being sent. On some platforms (notably * Windows) then this will result in the peer immediately abandoning * the connection including any buffered alert data before it has * had a chance to be read. Shutting down the sending side first, * and then closing the socket sends TCP-FIN first followed by * TCP-RST. This seems to allow the peer to read the alert data. */ #ifdef _WIN32 # ifdef SD_SEND shutdown(sock, SD_SEND); # endif #elif defined(SHUT_WR) shutdown(sock, SHUT_WR); #endif BIO_closesocket(sock); } else { i = (*cb)(asock, type, context); } if (naccept != -1) naccept--; if (i < 0 || naccept == 0) { BIO_closesocket(asock); ret = i; break; } } end: # ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) unlink(host); # endif return ret; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/vms_term_sock.h0000644000000000000000000000124613176625656016054 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 VMS Software, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef TERM_SOCK_H # define TERM_SOCK_H /* ** Terminal Socket Function Codes */ # define TERM_SOCK_CREATE 1 # define TERM_SOCK_DELETE 2 /* ** Terminal Socket Status Codes */ # define TERM_SOCK_FAILURE 0 # define TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS 1 /* ** Terminal Socket Prototype */ int TerminalSocket (int FunctionCode, int *ReturnSocket); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/genpkey.c0000644000000000000000000002033113176625656014632 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif static int init_keygen_file(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const char *file, ENGINE *e); static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_OUT, OPT_PASS, OPT_PARAMFILE, OPT_ALGORITHM, OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_GENPARAM, OPT_TEXT, OPT_CIPHER } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS genpkey_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "output format (DER or PEM)"}, {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"paramfile", OPT_PARAMFILE, '<', "Parameters file"}, {"algorithm", OPT_ALGORITHM, 's', "The public key algorithm"}, {"pkeyopt", OPT_PKEYOPT, 's', "Set the public key algorithm option as opt:value"}, {"genparam", OPT_GENPARAM, '-', "Generate parameters, not key"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the in text"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Cipher to use to encrypt the key"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif /* This is deliberately last. */ {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, 1, "Order of options may be important! See the documentation.\n"}, {NULL} }; int genpkey_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; char *outfile = NULL, *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *prog; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, ret = 1, rv, do_param = 0; int private = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, genpkey_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: ret = 0; opt_help(genpkey_options); goto end; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASS: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_PARAMFILE: if (do_param == 1) goto opthelp; if (!init_keygen_file(&ctx, opt_arg(), e)) goto end; break; case OPT_ALGORITHM: if (!init_gen_str(&ctx, opt_arg(), e, do_param)) goto end; break; case OPT_PKEYOPT: if (ctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: No keytype specified.\n", prog); goto opthelp; } if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, opt_arg()) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error setting %s parameter:\n", prog, opt_arg()); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } break; case OPT_GENPARAM: if (ctx != NULL) goto opthelp; do_param = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher) || do_param == 1) goto opthelp; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = do_param ? 0 : 1; if (ctx == NULL) goto opthelp; if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(ctx, genpkey_cb); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, bio_err); if (do_param) { if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error generating parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else { if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error generating key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (do_param) rv = PEM_write_bio_Parameters(out, pkey); else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) { assert(private); rv = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, pass); } else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) { assert(private); rv = i2d_PrivateKey_bio(out, pkey); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n"); goto end; } if (rv <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error writing key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } if (text) { if (do_param) rv = EVP_PKEY_print_params(out, pkey, 0, NULL); else rv = EVP_PKEY_print_private(out, pkey, 0, NULL); if (rv <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error printing key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } } ret = 0; end: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free(in); release_engine(e); OPENSSL_free(pass); return ret; } static int init_keygen_file(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const char *file, ENGINE *e) { BIO *pbio; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (*pctx) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Parameters already set!\n"); return 0; } pbio = BIO_new_file(file, "r"); if (!pbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open parameter file %s\n", file); return 0; } pkey = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(pbio, NULL); BIO_free(pbio); if (!pkey) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading parameter file %s\n", file); return 0; } ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) goto err; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); *pctx = ctx; return 1; err: BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 0; } int init_gen_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const char *algname, ENGINE *e, int do_param) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; int pkey_id; if (*pctx) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Algorithm already set!\n"); return 0; } ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, algname, -1); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (!ameth && e) ameth = ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(e, algname, -1); #endif if (!ameth) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Algorithm %s not found\n", algname); return 0; } ERR_clear_error(); EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); #endif ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(pkey_id, e); if (!ctx) goto err; if (do_param) { if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(ctx) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) goto err; } *pctx = ctx; return 1; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error initializing %s context\n", algname); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); return 0; } static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { char c = '*'; BIO *b = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(ctx); int p; p = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(ctx, 0); if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(b, &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(b); return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pkcs8.c0000644000000000000000000002607013176625656014226 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TOPK8, OPT_NOITER, OPT_NOCRYPT, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT OPT_SCRYPT, OPT_SCRYPT_N, OPT_SCRYPT_R, OPT_SCRYPT_P, #endif OPT_V2, OPT_V1, OPT_V2PRF, OPT_ITER, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_TRADITIONAL } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS pkcs8_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format (DER or PEM)"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format (DER or PEM)"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"topk8", OPT_TOPK8, '-', "Output PKCS8 file"}, {"noiter", OPT_NOITER, '-', "Use 1 as iteration count"}, {"nocrypt", OPT_NOCRYPT, '-', "Use or expect unencrypted private key"}, {"v2", OPT_V2, 's', "Use PKCS#5 v2.0 and cipher"}, {"v1", OPT_V1, 's', "Use PKCS#5 v1.5 and cipher"}, {"v2prf", OPT_V2PRF, 's', "Set the PRF algorithm to use with PKCS#5 v2.0"}, {"iter", OPT_ITER, 'p', "Specify the iteration count"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"traditional", OPT_TRADITIONAL, '-', "use traditional format private key"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT {"scrypt", OPT_SCRYPT, '-', "Use scrypt algorithm"}, {"scrypt_N", OPT_SCRYPT_N, 's', "Set scrypt N parameter"}, {"scrypt_r", OPT_SCRYPT_R, 's', "Set scrypt r parameter"}, {"scrypt_p", OPT_SCRYPT_P, 's', "Set scrypt p parameter"}, #endif {NULL} }; int pkcs8_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL; X509_SIG *p8 = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL; char *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *prog; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI char pass[APP_PASS_LEN]; #endif char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *p8pass = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int nocrypt = 0, ret = 1, iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, topk8 = 0, pbe_nid = -1; int private = 0, traditional = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT long scrypt_N = 0, scrypt_r = 0, scrypt_p = 0; #endif prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkcs8_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(pkcs8_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TOPK8: topk8 = 1; break; case OPT_NOITER: iter = 1; break; case OPT_NOCRYPT: nocrypt = 1; break; case OPT_TRADITIONAL: traditional = 1; break; case OPT_V2: if (!opt_cipher(opt_arg(), &cipher)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_V1: pbe_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(opt_arg()); if (pbe_nid == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown PBE algorithm %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } break; case OPT_V2PRF: pbe_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(opt_arg()); if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, pbe_nid, NULL, NULL, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown PRF algorithm %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } if (cipher == NULL) cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); break; case OPT_ITER: if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &iter)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT case OPT_SCRYPT: scrypt_N = 16384; scrypt_r = 8; scrypt_p = 1; if (cipher == NULL) cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); break; case OPT_SCRYPT_N: if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &scrypt_N) || scrypt_N <= 0) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_SCRYPT_R: if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &scrypt_r) || scrypt_r <= 0) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_SCRYPT_P: if (!opt_long(opt_arg(), &scrypt_p) || scrypt_p <= 0) goto opthelp; break; #endif } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = 1; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } if ((pbe_nid == -1) && cipher == NULL) cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (topk8) { pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "key"); if (!pkey) goto end; if ((p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(pkey)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (nocrypt) { assert(private); if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(out, p8inf); else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(out, p8inf); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n"); goto end; } } else { X509_ALGOR *pbe; if (cipher) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT if (scrypt_N && scrypt_r && scrypt_p) pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt(cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, scrypt_N, scrypt_r, scrypt_p); else #endif pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(cipher, iter, NULL, 0, NULL, pbe_nid); } else { pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, NULL, 0); } if (pbe == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting PBE algorithm\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (passout) p8pass = passout; else if (1) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI p8pass = pass; if (EVP_read_pw_string (pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Encryption Password:", 1)) { X509_ALGOR_free(pbe); goto end; } } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n"); goto end; } app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0); p8 = PKCS8_set0_pbe(p8pass, strlen(p8pass), p8inf, pbe); if (p8 == NULL) { X509_ALGOR_free(pbe); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error encrypting key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } app_RAND_write_file(NULL); assert(private); if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) PEM_write_bio_PKCS8(out, p8); else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i2d_PKCS8_bio(out, p8); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n"); goto end; } } ret = 0; goto end; } if (nocrypt) { if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) p8inf = PEM_read_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(in, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n"); goto end; } } else { if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) p8 = PEM_read_bio_PKCS8(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) p8 = d2i_PKCS8_bio(in, NULL); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n"); goto end; } if (!p8) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (passin) p8pass = passin; else if (1) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI p8pass = pass; if (EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Password:", 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); goto end; } } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password required\n"); goto end; } p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, p8pass, strlen(p8pass)); } if (!p8inf) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error decrypting key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if ((pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } assert(private); if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) { if (traditional) PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(out, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); else PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); } else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) { i2d_PrivateKey_bio(out, pkey); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n"); goto end; } ret = 0; end: X509_SIG_free(p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); release_engine(e); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free(in); OPENSSL_free(passin); OPENSSL_free(passout); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/vms_decc_init.c0000644000000000000000000001470513176625656016006 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if defined( __VMS) && !defined( OPENSSL_NO_DECC_INIT) && \ defined( __DECC) && !defined( __VAX) && (__CRTL_VER >= 70301000) # define USE_DECC_INIT 1 #endif #ifdef USE_DECC_INIT /* * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- * decc_init() On non-VAX systems, uses LIB$INITIALIZE to set a collection * of C RTL features without using the DECC$* logical name method. * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ # include # include # include # include "apps.h" /* Global storage. */ /* Flag to sense if decc_init() was called. */ int decc_init_done = -1; /* Structure to hold a DECC$* feature name and its desired value. */ typedef struct { char *name; int value; } decc_feat_t; /* * Array of DECC$* feature names and their desired values. Note: * DECC$ARGV_PARSE_STYLE is the urgent one. */ decc_feat_t decc_feat_array[] = { /* Preserve command-line case with SET PROCESS/PARSE_STYLE=EXTENDED */ {"DECC$ARGV_PARSE_STYLE", 1}, /* Preserve case for file names on ODS5 disks. */ {"DECC$EFS_CASE_PRESERVE", 1}, /* * Enable multiple dots (and most characters) in ODS5 file names, while * preserving VMS-ness of ";version". */ {"DECC$EFS_CHARSET", 1}, /* List terminator. */ {(char *)NULL, 0} }; char **copy_argv(int *argc, char *argv[]) { /*- * The note below is for historical purpose. On VMS now we always * copy argv "safely." * * 2011-03-22 SMS. * If we have 32-bit pointers everywhere, then we're safe, and * we bypass this mess, as on non-VMS systems. * Problem 1: Compaq/HP C before V7.3 always used 32-bit * pointers for argv[]. * Fix 1: For a 32-bit argv[], when we're using 64-bit pointers * everywhere else, we always allocate and use a 64-bit * duplicate of argv[]. * Problem 2: Compaq/HP C V7.3 (Alpha, IA64) before ECO1 failed * to NULL-terminate a 64-bit argv[]. (As this was written, the * compiler ECO was available only on IA64.) * Fix 2: Unless advised not to (VMS_TRUST_ARGV), we test a * 64-bit argv[argc] for NULL, and, if necessary, use a * (properly) NULL-terminated (64-bit) duplicate of argv[]. * The same code is used in either case to duplicate argv[]. * Some of these decisions could be handled in preprocessing, * but the code tends to get even uglier, and the penalty for * deciding at compile- or run-time is tiny. */ int i, count = *argc; char **newargv = app_malloc(sizeof(*newargv) * (count + 1), "argv copy"); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) newargv[i] = argv[i]; newargv[i] = NULL; *argc = i; return newargv; } /* LIB$INITIALIZE initialization function. */ static void decc_init(void) { char *openssl_debug_decc_init; int verbose = 0; int feat_index; int feat_value; int feat_value_max; int feat_value_min; int i; int sts; /* Get debug option. */ openssl_debug_decc_init = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_DECC_INIT"); if (openssl_debug_decc_init != NULL) { verbose = strtol(openssl_debug_decc_init, NULL, 10); if (verbose <= 0) { verbose = 1; } } /* Set the global flag to indicate that LIB$INITIALIZE worked. */ decc_init_done = 1; /* Loop through all items in the decc_feat_array[]. */ for (i = 0; decc_feat_array[i].name != NULL; i++) { /* Get the feature index. */ feat_index = decc$feature_get_index(decc_feat_array[i].name); if (feat_index >= 0) { /* Valid item. Collect its properties. */ feat_value = decc$feature_get_value(feat_index, 1); feat_value_min = decc$feature_get_value(feat_index, 2); feat_value_max = decc$feature_get_value(feat_index, 3); /* Check the validity of our desired value. */ if ((decc_feat_array[i].value >= feat_value_min) && (decc_feat_array[i].value <= feat_value_max)) { /* Valid value. Set it if necessary. */ if (feat_value != decc_feat_array[i].value) { sts = decc$feature_set_value(feat_index, 1, decc_feat_array[i].value); if (verbose > 1) { fprintf(stderr, " %s = %d, sts = %d.\n", decc_feat_array[i].name, decc_feat_array[i].value, sts); } } } else { /* Invalid DECC feature value. */ fprintf(stderr, " INVALID DECC$FEATURE VALUE, %d: %d <= %s <= %d.\n", feat_value, feat_value_min, decc_feat_array[i].name, feat_value_max); } } else { /* Invalid DECC feature name. */ fprintf(stderr, " UNKNOWN DECC$FEATURE: %s.\n", decc_feat_array[i].name); } } if (verbose > 0) { fprintf(stderr, " DECC_INIT complete.\n"); } } /* Get "decc_init()" into a valid, loaded LIB$INITIALIZE PSECT. */ # pragma nostandard /* * Establish the LIB$INITIALIZE PSECTs, with proper alignment and other * attributes. Note that "nopic" is significant only on VAX. */ # pragma extern_model save # if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 # define PSECT_ALIGN 3 # else # define PSECT_ALIGN 2 # endif # pragma extern_model strict_refdef "LIB$INITIALIZ" PSECT_ALIGN, nopic, nowrt const int spare[8] = { 0 }; # pragma extern_model strict_refdef "LIB$INITIALIZE" PSECT_ALIGN, nopic, nowrt void (*const x_decc_init) () = decc_init; # pragma extern_model restore /* Fake reference to ensure loading the LIB$INITIALIZE PSECT. */ # pragma extern_model save int LIB$INITIALIZE(void); # pragma extern_model strict_refdef int dmy_lib$initialize = (int)LIB$INITIALIZE; # pragma extern_model restore # pragma standard #else /* def USE_DECC_INIT */ /* Dummy code to avoid a %CC-W-EMPTYFILE complaint. */ int decc_init_dummy(void); #endif /* def USE_DECC_INIT */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pkeyutl.c0000644000000000000000000003464213176625656014677 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #define KEY_NONE 0 #define KEY_PRIVKEY 1 #define KEY_PUBKEY 2 #define KEY_CERT 3 static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize, const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type, char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e, const int impl); static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file, ENGINE *e); static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op, unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_CERTIN, OPT_ASN1PARSE, OPT_HEXDUMP, OPT_SIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_VERIFYRECOVER, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_DERIVE, OPT_SIGFILE, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PEERKEY, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PEERFORM, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_KDF, OPT_KDFLEN } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS pkeyutl_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"}, {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Input is a public key"}, {"certin", OPT_CERTIN, '-', "Input is a cert with a public key"}, {"asn1parse", OPT_ASN1PARSE, '-', "asn1parse the output data"}, {"hexdump", OPT_HEXDUMP, '-', "Hex dump output"}, {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign input data with private key"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify with public key"}, {"verifyrecover", OPT_VERIFYRECOVER, '-', "Verify with public key, recover original data"}, {"rev", OPT_REV, '-', "Reverse the order of the input buffer"}, {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt input data with public key"}, {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt input data with private key"}, {"derive", OPT_DERIVE, '-', "Derive shared secret"}, {"kdf", OPT_KDF, 's', "Use KDF algorithm"}, {"kdflen", OPT_KDFLEN, 'p', "KDF algorithm output length"}, {"sigfile", OPT_SIGFILE, '<', "Signature file (verify operation only)"}, {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Input private key file"}, {"peerkey", OPT_PEERKEY, 's', "Peer key file used in key derivation"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"peerform", OPT_PEERFORM, 'E', "Peer key format - default PEM"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Private key format - default PEM"}, {"pkeyopt", OPT_PKEYOPT, 's', "Public key options as opt:value"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, {"engine_impl", OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, '-', "Also use engine given by -engine for crypto operations"}, #endif {NULL} }; int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *sigfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL; char hexdump = 0, asn1parse = 0, rev = 0, *prog; unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int buf_inlen = 0, siglen = -1, keyform = FORMAT_PEM, peerform = FORMAT_PEM; int keysize = -1, pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, key_type = KEY_PRIVKEY; int engine_impl = 0; int ret = 1, rv = -1; size_t buf_outlen; const char *inkey = NULL; const char *peerkey = NULL; const char *kdfalg = NULL; int kdflen = 0; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkeyutl_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(pkeyutl_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGFILE: sigfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE_IMPL: engine_impl = 1; break; case OPT_INKEY: inkey = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PEERKEY: peerkey = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PEERFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &peerform)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &keyform)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_PUBIN: key_type = KEY_PUBKEY; break; case OPT_CERTIN: key_type = KEY_CERT; break; case OPT_ASN1PARSE: asn1parse = 1; break; case OPT_HEXDUMP: hexdump = 1; break; case OPT_SIGN: pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN; break; case OPT_VERIFY: pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY; break; case OPT_VERIFYRECOVER: pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER; break; case OPT_ENCRYPT: pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT; break; case OPT_DECRYPT: pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT; break; case OPT_DERIVE: pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE; break; case OPT_KDF: pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE; key_type = KEY_NONE; kdfalg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KDFLEN: kdflen = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_REV: rev = 1; break; case OPT_PKEYOPT: if ((pkeyopts == NULL && (pkeyopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) || sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pkeyopts, opt_arg()) == 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "out of memory\n"); goto end; } break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (kdfalg != NULL) { if (kdflen == 0) goto opthelp; } else if ((inkey == NULL) || (peerkey != NULL && pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE)) { goto opthelp; } ctx = init_ctx(kdfalg, &keysize, inkey, keyform, key_type, passinarg, pkey_op, e, engine_impl); if (ctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error initializing context\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (peerkey != NULL && !setup_peer(ctx, peerform, peerkey, e)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error setting up peer key\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (pkeyopts != NULL) { int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(pkeyopts); int i; for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { const char *opt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(pkeyopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, opt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't set parameter:\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } if (sigfile && (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Signature file specified for non verify\n", prog); goto end; } if (!sigfile && (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: No signature file specified for verify\n", prog); goto end; } /* FIXME: seed PRNG only if needed */ app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0); if (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) { in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_BINARY); if (in == NULL) goto end; } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_BINARY); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (sigfile) { BIO *sigbio = BIO_new_file(sigfile, "rb"); if (!sigbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open signature file %s\n", sigfile); goto end; } siglen = bio_to_mem(&sig, keysize * 10, sigbio); BIO_free(sigbio); if (siglen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature data\n"); goto end; } } if (in) { /* Read the input data */ buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in); if (buf_inlen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n"); exit(1); } if (rev) { size_t i; unsigned char ctmp; size_t l = (size_t)buf_inlen; for (i = 0; i < l / 2; i++) { ctmp = buf_in[i]; buf_in[i] = buf_in[l - 1 - i]; buf_in[l - 1 - i] = ctmp; } } } if (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen, buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen); if (rv == 1) { BIO_puts(out, "Signature Verified Successfully\n"); ret = 0; } else BIO_puts(out, "Signature Verification Failure\n"); goto end; } if (kdflen != 0) { buf_outlen = kdflen; rv = 1; } else { rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen, buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen); } if (rv > 0 && buf_outlen != 0) { buf_out = app_malloc(buf_outlen, "buffer output"); rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, buf_out, (size_t *)&buf_outlen, buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen); } if (rv <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Public Key operation error\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; if (asn1parse) { if (!ASN1_parse_dump(out, buf_out, buf_outlen, 1, -1)) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else if (hexdump) BIO_dump(out, (char *)buf_out, buf_outlen); else BIO_write(out, buf_out, buf_outlen); end: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); release_engine(e); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); OPENSSL_free(buf_in); OPENSSL_free(buf_out); OPENSSL_free(sig); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts); return ret; } static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(const char *kdfalg, int *pkeysize, const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type, char *passinarg, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e, const int engine_impl) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ENGINE *impl = NULL; char *passin = NULL; int rv = -1; X509 *x; if (((pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN) || (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT) || (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE)) && (key_type != KEY_PRIVKEY && kdfalg == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "A private key is needed for this operation\n"); goto end; } if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } switch (key_type) { case KEY_PRIVKEY: pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "Private Key"); break; case KEY_PUBKEY: pkey = load_pubkey(keyfile, keyform, 0, NULL, e, "Public Key"); break; case KEY_CERT: x = load_cert(keyfile, keyform, "Certificate"); if (x) { pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); X509_free(x); } break; case KEY_NONE: break; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (engine_impl) impl = e; #endif if (kdfalg) { int kdfnid = OBJ_sn2nid(kdfalg); if (kdfnid == NID_undef) goto end; ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(kdfnid, impl); } else { if (pkey == NULL) goto end; *pkeysize = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, impl); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } if (ctx == NULL) goto end; switch (pkey_op) { case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN: rv = EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY: rv = EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER: rv = EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT: rv = EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT: rv = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE: rv = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx); break; } if (rv <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; } end: OPENSSL_free(passin); return ctx; } static int setup_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform, const char *file, ENGINE* e) { EVP_PKEY *peer = NULL; ENGINE* engine = NULL; int ret; if (peerform == FORMAT_ENGINE) engine = e; peer = load_pubkey(file, peerform, 0, NULL, engine, "Peer Key"); if (!peer) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading peer key %s\n", file); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peer); EVP_PKEY_free(peer); if (ret <= 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return ret; } static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op, unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) { int rv = 0; switch (pkey_op) { case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER: rv = EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN: rv = EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT: rv = EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT: rv = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, poutlen, in, inlen); break; case EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE: rv = EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, out, poutlen); break; } return rv; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dh4096.pem0000644000000000000000000000176113176625656014453 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- MIICCAKCAgEA///////////JD9qiIWjCNMTGYouA3BzRKQJOCIpnzHQCC76mOxOb IlFKCHmONATd75UZs806QxswKwpt8l8UN0/hNW1tUcJF5IW1dmJefsb0TELppjft awv/XLb0Brft7jhr+1qJn6WunyQRfEsf5kkoZlHs5Fs9wgB8uKFjvwWY2kg2HFXT mmkWP6j9JM9fg2VdI9yjrZYcYvNWIIVSu57VKQdwlpZtZww1Tkq8mATxdGwIyhgh fDKQXkYuNs474553LBgOhgObJ4Oi7Aeij7XFXfBvTFLJ3ivL9pVYFxg5lUl86pVq 5RXSJhiY+gUQFXKOWoqqxC2tMxcNBFB6M6hVIavfHLpk7PuFBFjb7wqK6nFXXQYM fbOXD4Wm4eTHq/WujNsJM9cejJTgSiVhnc7j0iYa0u5r8S/6BtmKCGTYdgJzPshq ZFIfKxgXeyAMu+EXV3phXWx3CYjAutlG4gjiT6B05asxQ9tb/OD9EI5LgtEgqSEI ARpyPBKnh+bXiHGaEL26WyaZwycYavTiPBqUaDS2FQvaJYPpyirUTOjbu8LbBN6O +S6O/BQfvsqmKHxZR05rwF2ZspZPoJDDoiM7oYZRW+ftH2EpcM7i16+4G912IXBI HNAGkSfVsFqpk7TqmI2P3cGG/7fckKbAj030Nck0BjGZ//////////8CAQI= -----END DH PARAMETERS----- These are the 4096-bit DH parameters from "More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)": https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526 See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 for how they were generated. openssl-1.1.0g/apps/app_rand.c0000644000000000000000000000607713176625656014767 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "apps.h" #include #include static int seeded = 0; static int egdsocket = 0; int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, int dont_warn) { int consider_randfile = (file == NULL); char buffer[200]; if (file == NULL) file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof buffer); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD else if (RAND_egd(file) > 0) { /* * we try if the given filename is an EGD socket. if it is, we don't * write anything back to the file. */ egdsocket = 1; return 1; } #endif if (file == NULL || !RAND_load_file(file, -1)) { if (RAND_status() == 0) { if (!dont_warn) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load 'random state'\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "This means that the random number generator has not been seeded\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "with much random data.\n"); if (consider_randfile) { /* explanation does not apply when a * file is explicitly named */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Consider setting the RANDFILE environment variable to point at a file that\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "'random' data can be kept in (the file will be overwritten).\n"); } } return 0; } } seeded = 1; return 1; } long app_RAND_load_files(char *name) { char *p, *n; int last; long tot = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD int egd; #endif for (;;) { last = 0; for (p = name; ((*p != '\0') && (*p != LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR)); p++) ; if (*p == '\0') last = 1; *p = '\0'; n = name; name = p + 1; if (*n == '\0') break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD egd = RAND_egd(n); if (egd > 0) tot += egd; else #endif tot += RAND_load_file(n, -1); if (last) break; } if (tot > 512) app_RAND_allow_write_file(); return (tot); } int app_RAND_write_file(const char *file) { char buffer[200]; if (egdsocket || !seeded) /* * If we did not manage to read the seed file, we should not write a * low-entropy seed file back -- it would suppress a crucial warning * the next time we want to use it. */ return 0; if (file == NULL) file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof buffer); if (file == NULL || !RAND_write_file(file)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write 'random state'\n"); return 0; } return 1; } void app_RAND_allow_write_file(void) { seeded = 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/srp.c0000644000000000000000000005026313176625656014003 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # define BASE_SECTION "srp" # define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf" # define ENV_RANDFILE "RANDFILE" # define ENV_DATABASE "srpvfile" # define ENV_DEFAULT_SRP "default_srp" static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char *id, char type) { char **pp; int i; if (id == NULL) return -1; if (type == DB_SRP_INDEX) { for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX && strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid]) == 0) return i; } } else { for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != DB_SRP_INDEX && strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid]) == 0) return i; } } return -1; } static void print_entry(CA_DB *db, int indx, int verbose, char *s) { if (indx >= 0 && verbose) { int j; char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s \"%s\"\n", s, pp[DB_srpid]); for (j = 0; j < DB_NUMBER; j++) { BIO_printf(bio_err, " %d = \"%s\"\n", j, pp[j]); } } } static void print_index(CA_DB *db, int indexindex, int verbose) { print_entry(db, indexindex, verbose, "g N entry"); } static void print_user(CA_DB *db, int userindex, int verbose) { if (verbose > 0) { char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex); if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != 'I') { print_entry(db, userindex, verbose, "User entry"); print_entry(db, get_index(db, pp[DB_srpgN], 'I'), verbose, "g N entry"); } } } static int update_index(CA_DB *db, char **row) { char **irow; int i; irow = app_malloc(sizeof(*irow) * (DB_NUMBER + 1), "row pointers"); for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) irow[i] = row[i]; irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL; if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update srpvfile\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error); OPENSSL_free(irow); return 0; } return 1; } static char *lookup_conf(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *tag) { char *entry = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, tag); if (entry == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "variable lookup failed for %s::%s\n", section, tag); return entry; } static char *srp_verify_user(const char *user, const char *srp_verifier, char *srp_usersalt, const char *g, const char *N, const char *passin, int verbose) { char password[1025]; PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; char *verifier = NULL; char *gNid = NULL; int len; cb_tmp.prompt_info = user; cb_tmp.password = passin; len = password_callback(password, sizeof(password)-1, 0, &cb_tmp); if (len > 0) { password[len] = 0; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Validating\n user=\"%s\"\n srp_verifier=\"%s\"\n srp_usersalt=\"%s\"\n g=\"%s\"\n N=\"%s\"\n", user, srp_verifier, srp_usersalt, g, N); if (verbose > 1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Pass %s\n", password); OPENSSL_assert(srp_usersalt != NULL); if (!(gNid = SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &srp_usersalt, &verifier, N, g)) ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Internal error validating SRP verifier\n"); } else { if (strcmp(verifier, srp_verifier)) gNid = NULL; OPENSSL_free(verifier); } OPENSSL_cleanse(password, len); } return gNid; } static char *srp_create_user(char *user, char **srp_verifier, char **srp_usersalt, char *g, char *N, char *passout, int verbose) { char password[1025]; PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; char *gNid = NULL; char *salt = NULL; int len; cb_tmp.prompt_info = user; cb_tmp.password = passout; len = password_callback(password, sizeof(password)-1, 1, &cb_tmp); if (len > 0) { password[len] = 0; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Creating\n user=\"%s\"\n g=\"%s\"\n N=\"%s\"\n", user, g, N); if (!(gNid = SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &salt, srp_verifier, N, g)) ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Internal error creating SRP verifier\n"); } else { *srp_usersalt = salt; } OPENSSL_cleanse(password, len); if (verbose > 1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "gNid=%s salt =\"%s\"\n verifier =\"%s\"\n", gNid, salt, *srp_verifier); } return gNid; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_VERBOSE, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_NAME, OPT_SRPVFILE, OPT_ADD, OPT_DELETE, OPT_MODIFY, OPT_LIST, OPT_GN, OPT_USERINFO, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_ENGINE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS srp_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Talk a lot while doing things"}, {"config", OPT_CONFIG, '<', "A config file"}, {"name", OPT_NAME, 's', "The particular srp definition to use"}, {"srpvfile", OPT_SRPVFILE, '<', "The srp verifier file name"}, {"add", OPT_ADD, '-', "Add a user and srp verifier"}, {"modify", OPT_MODIFY, '-', "Modify the srp verifier of an existing user"}, {"delete", OPT_DELETE, '-', "Delete user from verifier file"}, {"list", OPT_LIST, '-', "List users"}, {"gn", OPT_GN, 's', "Set g and N values to be used for new verifier"}, {"userinfo", OPT_USERINFO, 's', "Additional info to be set for user"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int srp_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; CA_DB *db = NULL; CONF *conf = NULL; int gNindex = -1, maxgN = -1, ret = 1, errors = 0, verbose = 0, i; int doupdatedb = 0, mode = OPT_ERR; char *user = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL; char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *gN = NULL, *userinfo = NULL; char *randfile = NULL, *section = NULL; char **gNrow = NULL, *configfile = NULL; char *srpvfile = NULL, **pp, *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, srp_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(srp_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_VERBOSE: verbose++; break; case OPT_CONFIG: configfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NAME: section = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SRPVFILE: srpvfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ADD: case OPT_DELETE: case OPT_MODIFY: case OPT_LIST: if (mode != OPT_ERR) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Only one of -add/-delete/-modify/-list\n", prog); goto opthelp; } mode = o; break; case OPT_GN: gN = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_USERINFO: userinfo = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (srpvfile && configfile) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "-srpvfile and -configfile cannot be specified together.\n"); goto end; } if (mode == OPT_ERR) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Exactly one of the options -add, -delete, -modify -list must be specified.\n"); goto opthelp; } if ((mode == OPT_DELETE || mode == OPT_MODIFY || mode == OPT_ADD) && argc < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need at least one user for options -add, -delete, -modify. \n"); goto opthelp; } if ((passinarg || passoutarg) && argc != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passin, -passout arguments only valid with one user.\n"); goto opthelp; } if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } if (!srpvfile) { if (!configfile) configfile = default_config_file; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile); conf = app_load_config(configfile); if (conf == NULL) goto end; if (configfile != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(conf)) goto end; /* Lets get the config section we are using */ if (section == NULL) { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "trying to read " ENV_DEFAULT_SRP " in " BASE_SECTION "\n"); section = lookup_conf(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_SRP); if (section == NULL) goto end; } if (randfile == NULL) randfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, "RANDFILE"); if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "trying to read " ENV_DATABASE " in section \"%s\"\n", section); srpvfile = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE); if (srpvfile == NULL) goto end; } if (randfile == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); else app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0); if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Trying to read SRP verifier file \"%s\"\n", srpvfile); db = load_index(srpvfile, NULL); if (db == NULL) goto end; /* Lets check some fields */ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) { maxgN = i; if ((gNindex < 0) && (gN != NULL) && strcmp(gN, pp[DB_srpid]) == 0) gNindex = i; print_index(db, i, verbose > 1); } } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Database initialised\n"); if (gNindex >= 0) { gNrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, gNindex); print_entry(db, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N"); } else if (maxgN > 0 && !SRP_get_default_gN(gN)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No g and N value for index \"%s\"\n", gN); goto end; } else { if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Database has no g N information.\n"); gNrow = NULL; } if (verbose > 1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Starting user processing\n"); if (argc > 0) user = *(argv++); while (mode == OPT_LIST || user) { int userindex = -1; if (user != NULL && verbose > 1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Processing user \"%s\"\n", user); if ((userindex = get_index(db, user, 'U')) >= 0) { print_user(db, userindex, (verbose > 0) || mode == OPT_LIST); } if (mode == OPT_LIST) { if (user == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "List all users\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { print_user(db, i, 1); } } else if (userindex < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" does not exist, ignored. t\n", user); errors++; } } else if (mode == OPT_ADD) { if (userindex >= 0) { /* reactivation of a new user */ char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex); BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" reactivated.\n", user); row[DB_srptype][0] = 'V'; doupdatedb = 1; } else { char *row[DB_NUMBER]; char *gNid; row[DB_srpverifier] = NULL; row[DB_srpsalt] = NULL; row[DB_srpinfo] = NULL; if (! (gNid = srp_create_user(user, &(row[DB_srpverifier]), &(row[DB_srpsalt]), gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpsalt] : gN, gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpverifier] : NULL, passout, verbose))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned .\n", user); errors++; goto end; } row[DB_srpid] = OPENSSL_strdup(user); row[DB_srptype] = OPENSSL_strdup("v"); row[DB_srpgN] = OPENSSL_strdup(gNid); if ((row[DB_srpid] == NULL) || (row[DB_srpgN] == NULL) || (row[DB_srptype] == NULL) || (row[DB_srpverifier] == NULL) || (row[DB_srpsalt] == NULL) || (userinfo && ((row[DB_srpinfo] = OPENSSL_strdup(userinfo)) == NULL)) || !update_index(db, row)) { OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpid]); OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpgN]); OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpinfo]); OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srptype]); OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpverifier]); OPENSSL_free(row[DB_srpsalt]); goto end; } doupdatedb = 1; } } else if (mode == OPT_MODIFY) { if (userindex < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" does not exist, operation ignored.\n", user); errors++; } else { char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex); char type = row[DB_srptype][0]; if (type == 'v') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" already updated, operation ignored.\n", user); errors++; } else { char *gNid; if (row[DB_srptype][0] == 'V') { int user_gN; char **irow = NULL; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Verifying password for user \"%s\"\n", user); if ((user_gN = get_index(db, row[DB_srpgN], DB_SRP_INDEX)) >= 0) irow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex); if (!srp_verify_user (user, row[DB_srpverifier], row[DB_srpsalt], irow ? irow[DB_srpsalt] : row[DB_srpgN], irow ? irow[DB_srpverifier] : NULL, passin, verbose)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid password for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user); errors++; goto end; } } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Password for user \"%s\" ok.\n", user); if (! (gNid = srp_create_user(user, &(row[DB_srpverifier]), &(row[DB_srpsalt]), gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpsalt] : NULL, gNrow ? gNrow[DB_srpverifier] : NULL, passout, verbose))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user); errors++; goto end; } row[DB_srptype][0] = 'v'; row[DB_srpgN] = OPENSSL_strdup(gNid); if (row[DB_srpid] == NULL || row[DB_srpgN] == NULL || row[DB_srptype] == NULL || row[DB_srpverifier] == NULL || row[DB_srpsalt] == NULL || (userinfo && ((row[DB_srpinfo] = OPENSSL_strdup(userinfo)) == NULL))) goto end; doupdatedb = 1; } } } else if (mode == OPT_DELETE) { if (userindex < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" does not exist, operation ignored. t\n", user); errors++; } else { char **xpp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex); BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" revoked. t\n", user); xpp[DB_srptype][0] = 'R'; doupdatedb = 1; } } if (--argc > 0) { user = *(argv++); } else { /* no more processing in any mode if no users left */ break; } } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "User procession done.\n"); if (doupdatedb) { /* Lets check some fields */ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == 'v') { pp[DB_srptype][0] = 'V'; print_user(db, i, verbose); } } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Trying to update srpvfile.\n"); if (!save_index(srpvfile, "new", db)) goto end; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Temporary srpvfile created.\n"); if (!rotate_index(srpvfile, "new", "old")) goto end; if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "srpvfile updated.\n"); } ret = (errors != 0); end: if (errors != 0) if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "User errors %d.\n", errors); if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP terminating with code %d.\n", ret); OPENSSL_free(passin); OPENSSL_free(passout); if (ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (randfile) app_RAND_write_file(randfile); NCONF_free(conf); free_index(db); release_engine(e); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/privkey.pem0000644000000000000000000000162413176625656015224 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIICdgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAmAwggJcAgEAAoGBAMo7DFNMqywUA1O/ qvWqCOm6rGrUAcR+dKsSXw6y2qiKO7APDDyotc0b4Mxwqjga98npex2RBIwUoCGJ iEmMXo/a8RbXVUZ+ZwcAX7PC+XeXVC5qoajaBBkd2MvYmib/2PqnNrgvhHsUL5dO xhC7cRqxLM/g45k3Yyw+nGa+WkTdAgMBAAECgYBMBT5w4dVG0I8foGFnz+9hzWab Ee9IKjE5TcKmB93ilXQyjrWO5+zPmbc7ou6aAKk9IaPCTY1kCyzW7pho7Xdt+RFq TgVXGZZfqtixO7f2/5oqZAkd00eOn9ZrhBpVMu4yXbbDvhDyFe4/oy0HGDjRUhxa Lf6ZlBuTherxm4eFkQJBAPBQwRs9UtqaMAQlagA9pV5UsQjV1WT4IxDURMPfXgCd ETNkB6pP0SmxQm5xhv9N2HY1UtoWpug9s0OU5IJB15sCQQDXbfbjiujNbuOxCFNw 68JZaCFVdNovyOWORkpenQLNEjVkmTCS9OayK09ADEYtsdpUGKeF+2EYBNkFr5px CajnAkBMYI4PNz1HBuwt1SpMa0tMoMQnV7bbwVV7usskKbC5pzHZUHhzM6z5gEHp 0iEisT4Ty7zKXZqsgzefSgoaMAzzAkEAoCIaUhtwXzwdPfvNYnOs3J6doJMimECB +lbfcyLM8TimvadtRt+KGEg/OYGmLNM2UiqdY+duzdbUpvhYGcwvYwJAQvaoi9z2 CkiwSs/PFrLaNlfLJmXRsUBzmiWYoh6+IQJJorEXz7ewI72ee9RBO4s746cgUFwH Ri+qO+HhZFUBqQ== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pca-cert.srl0000644000000000000000000000000313176625656015236 0ustar rootroot07 openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pkey.c0000644000000000000000000001320513176625656014142 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_PUBOUT, OPT_TEXT_PUB, OPT_TEXT, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_MD, OPT_TRADITIONAL } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS pkey_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format (DER or PEM)"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format (DER or PEM)"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input key"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Read public key from input (default is private key)"}, {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output public key, not private"}, {"text_pub", OPT_TEXT_PUB, '-', "Only output public key components"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Output in plaintext as well"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't output the key"}, {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, {"traditional", OPT_TRADITIONAL, '-', "Use traditional format for private keys"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int pkey_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL; char *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM; int pubin = 0, pubout = 0, pubtext = 0, text = 0, noout = 0, ret = 1; int private = 0, traditional = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, pkey_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(pkey_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PUBIN: pubin = pubout = pubtext = 1; break; case OPT_PUBOUT: pubout = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT_PUB: pubtext = text = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_TRADITIONAL: traditional = 1; break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &cipher)) goto opthelp; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = !noout && !pubout ? 1 : 0; if (text && !pubtext) private = 1; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (pubin) pkey = load_pubkey(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Public Key"); else pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "key"); if (!pkey) goto end; if (!noout) { if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) { if (pubout) PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey); else { assert(private); if (traditional) PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(out, pkey, cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); else PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); } } else if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) { if (pubout) i2d_PUBKEY_bio(out, pkey); else { assert(private); i2d_PrivateKey_bio(out, pkey); } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Bad format specified for key\n"); goto end; } } if (text) { if (pubtext) EVP_PKEY_print_public(out, pkey, 0, NULL); else { assert(private); EVP_PKEY_print_private(out, pkey, 0, NULL); } } ret = 0; end: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); release_engine(e); BIO_free_all(out); BIO_free(in); OPENSSL_free(passin); OPENSSL_free(passout); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/opt.c0000644000000000000000000006407613176625656014010 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* #define COMPILE_STANDALONE_TEST_DRIVER */ #include "apps.h" #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # include OPENSSL_UNISTD #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #define MAX_OPT_HELP_WIDTH 30 const char OPT_HELP_STR[] = "--"; const char OPT_MORE_STR[] = "---"; /* Our state */ static char **argv; static int argc; static int opt_index; static char *arg; static char *flag; static char *dunno; static const OPTIONS *unknown; static const OPTIONS *opts; static char prog[40]; /* * Return the simple name of the program; removing various platform gunk. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) char *opt_progname(const char *argv0) { size_t i, n; const char *p; char *q; /* find the last '/', '\' or ':' */ for (p = argv0 + strlen(argv0); --p > argv0;) if (*p == '/' || *p == '\\' || *p == ':') { p++; break; } /* Strip off trailing nonsense. */ n = strlen(p); if (n > 4 && (strcmp(&p[n - 4], ".exe") == 0 || strcmp(&p[n - 4], ".EXE") == 0)) n -= 4; /* Copy over the name, in lowercase. */ if (n > sizeof prog - 1) n = sizeof prog - 1; for (q = prog, i = 0; i < n; i++, p++) *q++ = tolower((unsigned char)*p); *q = '\0'; return prog; } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) char *opt_progname(const char *argv0) { const char *p, *q; /* Find last special character sys:[foo.bar]openssl */ for (p = argv0 + strlen(argv0); --p > argv0;) if (*p == ':' || *p == ']' || *p == '>') { p++; break; } q = strrchr(p, '.'); strncpy(prog, p, sizeof prog - 1); prog[sizeof prog - 1] = '\0'; if (q != NULL && q - p < sizeof prog) prog[q - p] = '\0'; return prog; } #else char *opt_progname(const char *argv0) { const char *p; /* Could use strchr, but this is like the ones above. */ for (p = argv0 + strlen(argv0); --p > argv0;) if (*p == '/') { p++; break; } strncpy(prog, p, sizeof prog - 1); prog[sizeof prog - 1] = '\0'; return prog; } #endif char *opt_getprog(void) { return prog; } /* Set up the arg parsing. */ char *opt_init(int ac, char **av, const OPTIONS *o) { /* Store state. */ argc = ac; argv = av; opt_index = 1; opts = o; opt_progname(av[0]); unknown = NULL; for (; o->name; ++o) { #ifndef NDEBUG const OPTIONS *next; int duplicated, i; #endif if (o->name == OPT_HELP_STR || o->name == OPT_MORE_STR) continue; #ifndef NDEBUG i = o->valtype; /* Make sure options are legit. */ assert(o->name[0] != '-'); assert(o->retval > 0); switch (i) { case 0: case '-': case '/': case '<': case '>': case 'E': case 'F': case 'M': case 'U': case 'f': case 'l': case 'n': case 'p': case 's': case 'u': case 'c': break; default: assert(0); } /* Make sure there are no duplicates. */ for (next = o + 1; next->name; ++next) { /* * Some compilers inline strcmp and the assert string is too long. */ duplicated = strcmp(o->name, next->name) == 0; assert(!duplicated); } #endif if (o->name[0] == '\0') { assert(unknown == NULL); unknown = o; assert(unknown->valtype == 0 || unknown->valtype == '-'); } } return prog; } static OPT_PAIR formats[] = { {"PEM/DER", OPT_FMT_PEMDER}, {"pkcs12", OPT_FMT_PKCS12}, {"smime", OPT_FMT_SMIME}, {"engine", OPT_FMT_ENGINE}, {"msblob", OPT_FMT_MSBLOB}, {"netscape", OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE}, {"nss", OPT_FMT_NSS}, {"text", OPT_FMT_TEXT}, {"http", OPT_FMT_HTTP}, {"pvk", OPT_FMT_PVK}, {NULL} }; /* Print an error message about a failed format parse. */ int opt_format_error(const char *s, unsigned long flags) { OPT_PAIR *ap; if (flags == OPT_FMT_PEMDER) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Bad format \"%s\"; must be pem or der\n", prog, s); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Bad format \"%s\"; must be one of:\n", prog, s); for (ap = formats; ap->name; ap++) if (flags & ap->retval) BIO_printf(bio_err, " %s\n", ap->name); } return 0; } /* Parse a format string, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_format(const char *s, unsigned long flags, int *result) { switch (*s) { default: return 0; case 'D': case 'd': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PEMDER) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_ASN1; break; case 'T': case 't': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_TEXT) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_TEXT; break; case 'N': case 'n': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_NSS) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); if (strcmp(s, "NSS") != 0 && strcmp(s, "nss") != 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_NSS; break; case 'S': case 's': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_SMIME) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_SMIME; break; case 'M': case 'm': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_MSBLOB) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_MSBLOB; break; case 'E': case 'e': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_ENGINE) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_ENGINE; break; case 'H': case 'h': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_HTTP) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_HTTP; break; case '1': if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PKCS12) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_PKCS12; break; case 'P': case 'p': if (s[1] == '\0' || strcmp(s, "PEM") == 0 || strcmp(s, "pem") == 0) { if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PEMDER) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_PEM; } else if (strcmp(s, "PVK") == 0 || strcmp(s, "pvk") == 0) { if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PVK) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_PVK; } else if (strcmp(s, "P12") == 0 || strcmp(s, "p12") == 0 || strcmp(s, "PKCS12") == 0 || strcmp(s, "pkcs12") == 0) { if ((flags & OPT_FMT_PKCS12) == 0) return opt_format_error(s, flags); *result = FORMAT_PKCS12; } else return 0; break; } return 1; } /* Parse a cipher name, put it in *EVP_CIPHER; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_cipher(const char *name, const EVP_CIPHER **cipherp) { *cipherp = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name); if (*cipherp) return 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown cipher %s\n", prog, name); return 0; } /* * Parse message digest name, put it in *EVP_MD; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_md(const char *name, const EVP_MD **mdp) { *mdp = EVP_get_digestbyname(name); if (*mdp) return 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown digest %s\n", prog, name); return 0; } /* Look through a list of name/value pairs. */ int opt_pair(const char *name, const OPT_PAIR* pairs, int *result) { const OPT_PAIR *pp; for (pp = pairs; pp->name; pp++) if (strcmp(pp->name, name) == 0) { *result = pp->retval; return 1; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Value must be one of:\n", prog); for (pp = pairs; pp->name; pp++) BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s\n", pp->name); return 0; } /* Parse an int, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_int(const char *value, int *result) { long l; if (!opt_long(value, &l)) return 0; *result = (int)l; if (*result != l) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Value \"%s\" outside integer range\n", prog, value); return 0; } return 1; } /* Parse a long, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_long(const char *value, long *result) { int oerrno = errno; long l; char *endp; errno = 0; l = strtol(value, &endp, 0); if (*endp || endp == value || ((l == LONG_MAX || l == LONG_MIN) && errno == ERANGE) || (l == 0 && errno != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as a number\n", prog, value); errno = oerrno; return 0; } *result = l; errno = oerrno; return 1; } #if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L && \ defined(INTMAX_MAX) && defined(UINTMAX_MAX) /* Parse an intmax_t, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_imax(const char *value, intmax_t *result) { int oerrno = errno; intmax_t m; char *endp; errno = 0; m = strtoimax(value, &endp, 0); if (*endp || endp == value || ((m == INTMAX_MAX || m == INTMAX_MIN) && errno == ERANGE) || (m == 0 && errno != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as a number\n", prog, value); errno = oerrno; return 0; } *result = m; errno = oerrno; return 1; } /* Parse a uintmax_t, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_umax(const char *value, uintmax_t *result) { int oerrno = errno; uintmax_t m; char *endp; errno = 0; m = strtoumax(value, &endp, 0); if (*endp || endp == value || (m == UINTMAX_MAX && errno == ERANGE) || (m == 0 && errno != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as a number\n", prog, value); errno = oerrno; return 0; } *result = m; errno = oerrno; return 1; } #endif /* * Parse an unsigned long, put it into *result; return 0 on failure, else 1. */ int opt_ulong(const char *value, unsigned long *result) { int oerrno = errno; char *endptr; unsigned long l; errno = 0; l = strtoul(value, &endptr, 0); if (*endptr || endptr == value || ((l == ULONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) || (l == 0 && errno != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't parse \"%s\" as an unsigned number\n", prog, value); errno = oerrno; return 0; } *result = l; errno = oerrno; return 1; } /* * We pass opt as an int but cast it to "enum range" so that all the * items in the OPT_V_ENUM enumeration are caught; this makes -Wswitch * in gcc do the right thing. */ enum range { OPT_V_ENUM }; int opt_verify(int opt, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { int i; ossl_intmax_t t = 0; ASN1_OBJECT *otmp; X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vtmp; assert(vpm != NULL); assert(opt > OPT_V__FIRST); assert(opt < OPT_V__LAST); switch ((enum range)opt) { case OPT_V__FIRST: case OPT_V__LAST: return 0; case OPT_V_POLICY: otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0); if (otmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid Policy %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); return 0; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(vpm, otmp); break; case OPT_V_PURPOSE: /* purpose name -> purpose index */ i = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(opt_arg()); if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid purpose %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); return 0; } /* purpose index -> purpose object */ xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); /* purpose object -> purpose value */ i = X509_PURPOSE_get_id(xptmp); if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(vpm, i)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Internal error setting purpose %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); return 0; } break; case OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME: vtmp = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(opt_arg()); if (vtmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid verify name %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); return 0; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(vpm, vtmp); break; case OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH: i = atoi(opt_arg()); if (i >= 0) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(vpm, i); break; case OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL: i = atoi(opt_arg()); if (i >= 0) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(vpm, i); break; case OPT_V_ATTIME: if (!opt_imax(opt_arg(), &t)) return 0; if (t != (time_t)t) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: epoch time out of range %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); return 0; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(vpm, (time_t)t); break; case OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME: if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, opt_arg(), 0)) return 0; break; case OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL: if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(vpm, opt_arg(), 0)) return 0; break; case OPT_V_VERIFY_IP: if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(vpm, opt_arg())) return 0; break; case OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL); break; case OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS: /* NOP, deprecated */ break; case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); break; case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); break; case OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK); break; case OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY); break; case OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY); break; case OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP); break; case OPT_V_X509_STRICT: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT); break; case OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT); break; case OPT_V_USE_DELTAS: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS); break; case OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY); break; case OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE); break; case OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST); break; case OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY); break; case OPT_V_SUITEB_128: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); break; case OPT_V_SUITEB_192: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS); break; case OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN); break; case OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS); break; case OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME); break; case OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); break; } return 1; } /* * Parse the next flag (and value if specified), return 0 if done, -1 on * error, otherwise the flag's retval. */ int opt_next(void) { char *p; const OPTIONS *o; int ival; long lval; unsigned long ulval; ossl_intmax_t imval; ossl_uintmax_t umval; /* Look at current arg; at end of the list? */ arg = NULL; p = argv[opt_index]; if (p == NULL) return 0; /* If word doesn't start with a -, we're done. */ if (*p != '-') return 0; /* Hit "--" ? We're done. */ opt_index++; if (strcmp(p, "--") == 0) return 0; /* Allow -nnn and --nnn */ if (*++p == '-') p++; flag = p - 1; /* If we have --flag=foo, snip it off */ if ((arg = strchr(p, '=')) != NULL) *arg++ = '\0'; for (o = opts; o->name; ++o) { /* If not this option, move on to the next one. */ if (strcmp(p, o->name) != 0) continue; /* If it doesn't take a value, make sure none was given. */ if (o->valtype == 0 || o->valtype == '-') { if (arg) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Option -%s does not take a value\n", prog, p); return -1; } return o->retval; } /* Want a value; get the next param if =foo not used. */ if (arg == NULL) { if (argv[opt_index] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Option -%s needs a value\n", prog, o->name); return -1; } arg = argv[opt_index++]; } /* Syntax-check value. */ switch (o->valtype) { default: case 's': /* Just a string. */ break; case '/': if (app_isdir(arg) >= 0) break; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Not a directory: %s\n", prog, arg); return -1; case '<': /* Input file. */ if (strcmp(arg, "-") == 0 || app_access(arg, R_OK) >= 0) break; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Cannot open input file %s, %s\n", prog, arg, strerror(errno)); return -1; case '>': /* Output file. */ if (strcmp(arg, "-") == 0 || app_access(arg, W_OK) >= 0 || errno == ENOENT) break; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Cannot open output file %s, %s\n", prog, arg, strerror(errno)); return -1; case 'p': case 'n': if (!opt_int(arg, &ival) || (o->valtype == 'p' && ival <= 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Non-positive number \"%s\" for -%s\n", prog, arg, o->name); return -1; } break; case 'M': if (!opt_imax(arg, &imval)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n", prog, arg, o->name); return -1; } break; case 'U': if (!opt_umax(arg, &umval)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n", prog, arg, o->name); return -1; } break; case 'l': if (!opt_long(arg, &lval)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n", prog, arg, o->name); return -1; } break; case 'u': if (!opt_ulong(arg, &ulval)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid number \"%s\" for -%s\n", prog, arg, o->name); return -1; } break; case 'c': case 'E': case 'F': case 'f': if (opt_format(arg, o->valtype == 'c' ? OPT_FMT_PDS : o->valtype == 'E' ? OPT_FMT_PDE : o->valtype == 'F' ? OPT_FMT_PEMDER : OPT_FMT_ANY, &ival)) break; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid format \"%s\" for -%s\n", prog, arg, o->name); return -1; } /* Return the flag value. */ return o->retval; } if (unknown != NULL) { dunno = p; return unknown->retval; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Option unknown option -%s\n", prog, p); return -1; } /* Return the most recent flag parameter. */ char *opt_arg(void) { return arg; } /* Return the most recent flag. */ char *opt_flag(void) { return flag; } /* Return the unknown option. */ char *opt_unknown(void) { return dunno; } /* Return the rest of the arguments after parsing flags. */ char **opt_rest(void) { return &argv[opt_index]; } /* How many items in remaining args? */ int opt_num_rest(void) { int i = 0; char **pp; for (pp = opt_rest(); *pp; pp++, i++) continue; return i; } /* Return a string describing the parameter type. */ static const char *valtype2param(const OPTIONS *o) { switch (o->valtype) { case 0: case '-': return ""; case 's': return "val"; case '/': return "dir"; case '<': return "infile"; case '>': return "outfile"; case 'p': return "+int"; case 'n': return "int"; case 'l': return "long"; case 'u': return "ulong"; case 'E': return "PEM|DER|ENGINE"; case 'F': return "PEM|DER"; case 'f': return "format"; case 'M': return "intmax"; case 'U': return "uintmax"; } return "parm"; } void opt_help(const OPTIONS *list) { const OPTIONS *o; int i; int standard_prolog; int width = 5; char start[80 + 1]; char *p; const char *help; /* Starts with its own help message? */ standard_prolog = list[0].name != OPT_HELP_STR; /* Find the widest help. */ for (o = list; o->name; o++) { if (o->name == OPT_MORE_STR) continue; i = 2 + (int)strlen(o->name); if (o->valtype != '-') i += 1 + strlen(valtype2param(o)); if (i < MAX_OPT_HELP_WIDTH && i > width) width = i; assert(i < (int)sizeof start); } if (standard_prolog) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: %s [options]\nValid options are:\n", prog); /* Now let's print. */ for (o = list; o->name; o++) { help = o->helpstr ? o->helpstr : "(No additional info)"; if (o->name == OPT_HELP_STR) { BIO_printf(bio_err, help, prog); continue; } /* Pad out prefix */ memset(start, ' ', sizeof(start) - 1); start[sizeof start - 1] = '\0'; if (o->name == OPT_MORE_STR) { /* Continuation of previous line; pad and print. */ start[width] = '\0'; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s %s\n", start, help); continue; } /* Build up the "-flag [param]" part. */ p = start; *p++ = ' '; *p++ = '-'; if (o->name[0]) p += strlen(strcpy(p, o->name)); else *p++ = '*'; if (o->valtype != '-') { *p++ = ' '; p += strlen(strcpy(p, valtype2param(o))); } *p = ' '; if ((int)(p - start) >= MAX_OPT_HELP_WIDTH) { *p = '\0'; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", start); memset(start, ' ', sizeof(start)); } start[width] = '\0'; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s %s\n", start, help); } } #ifdef COMPILE_STANDALONE_TEST_DRIVER # include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_IN, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUT, OPT_COUNT, OPT_U, OPT_FLAG, OPT_STR, OPT_NOTUSED } OPTION_CHOICE; static OPTIONS options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s flags\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "input file"}, {OPT_MORE_STR, 1, '-', "more detail about input"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "input file format; defaults to pem"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "output file"}, {"count", OPT_COUNT, 'p', "a counter greater than zero"}, {"u", OPT_U, 'u', "an unsigned number"}, {"flag", OPT_FLAG, 0, "just some flag"}, {"str", OPT_STR, 's', "the magic word"}, {"areallyverylongoption", OPT_HELP, '-', "long way for help"}, {NULL} }; BIO *bio_err; int app_isdir(const char *name) { struct stat sb; return name != NULL && stat(name, &sb) >= 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode); } int main(int ac, char **av) { OPTION_CHOICE o; char **rest; char *prog; bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); prog = opt_init(ac, av, options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (c) { case OPT_NOTUSED: case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: printf("%s: Usage error; try -help.\n", prog); return 1; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(options); return 0; case OPT_IN: printf("in %s\n", opt_arg()); break; case OPT_INFORM: printf("inform %s\n", opt_arg()); break; case OPT_OUT: printf("out %s\n", opt_arg()); break; case OPT_COUNT: printf("count %s\n", opt_arg()); break; case OPT_U: printf("u %s\n", opt_arg()); break; case OPT_FLAG: printf("flag\n"); break; case OPT_STR: printf("str %s\n", opt_arg()); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); printf("args = %d\n", argc); if (argc) while (*argv) printf(" %s\n", *argv++); return 0; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/ocsp.c0000644000000000000000000011763313176625656014150 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined * on OpenVMS */ # endif # define USE_SOCKETS # include # include # include # include # include /* Needs to be included before the openssl headers */ # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) # ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK # include # include # else # include # endif # elif defined(NETWARE_LIBC) # ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK # include # else # include # endif # endif /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */ # define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60) static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids); static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids); static void print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec, long maxage); static void make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req, CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert, EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays, int badsig); static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser); static BIO *init_responder(const char *port); static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio); static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *cbio, const char *host, const char *path, const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout); # endif typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_OUTFILE, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_URL, OPT_HOST, OPT_PORT, OPT_IGNORE_ERR, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_NONCE, OPT_NO_NONCE, OPT_RESP_NO_CERTS, OPT_RESP_KEY_ID, OPT_NO_CERTS, OPT_NO_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OPT_NO_CERT_VERIFY, OPT_NO_CHAIN, OPT_NO_CERT_CHECKS, OPT_NO_EXPLICIT, OPT_TRUST_OTHER, OPT_NO_INTERN, OPT_BADSIG, OPT_TEXT, OPT_REQ_TEXT, OPT_RESP_TEXT, OPT_REQIN, OPT_RESPIN, OPT_SIGNER, OPT_VAFILE, OPT_SIGN_OTHER, OPT_VERIFY_OTHER, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_VALIDITY_PERIOD, OPT_STATUS_AGE, OPT_SIGNKEY, OPT_REQOUT, OPT_RESPOUT, OPT_PATH, OPT_ISSUER, OPT_CERT, OPT_SERIAL, OPT_INDEX, OPT_CA, OPT_NMIN, OPT_REQUEST, OPT_NDAYS, OPT_RSIGNER, OPT_RKEY, OPT_ROTHER, OPT_RMD, OPT_HEADER, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_MD } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS ocsp_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"out", OPT_OUTFILE, '>', "Output filename"}, {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, 'p', "Connection timeout (in seconds) to the OCSP responder"}, {"url", OPT_URL, 's', "Responder URL"}, {"host", OPT_HOST, 's', "TCP/IP hostname:port to connect to"}, {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "Port to run responder on"}, {"ignore_err", OPT_IGNORE_ERR, '-', "Ignore Error response from OCSP responder, and retry "}, {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Don't verify response at all"}, {"nonce", OPT_NONCE, '-', "Add OCSP nonce to request"}, {"no_nonce", OPT_NO_NONCE, '-', "Don't add OCSP nonce to request"}, {"resp_no_certs", OPT_RESP_NO_CERTS, '-', "Don't include any certificates in response"}, {"resp_key_id", OPT_RESP_KEY_ID, '-', "Identify response by signing certificate key ID"}, {"no_certs", OPT_NO_CERTS, '-', "Don't include any certificates in signed request"}, {"no_signature_verify", OPT_NO_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, '-', "Don't check signature on response"}, {"no_cert_verify", OPT_NO_CERT_VERIFY, '-', "Don't check signing certificate"}, {"no_chain", OPT_NO_CHAIN, '-', "Don't chain verify response"}, {"no_cert_checks", OPT_NO_CERT_CHECKS, '-', "Don't do additional checks on signing certificate"}, {"no_explicit", OPT_NO_EXPLICIT, '-', "Do not explicitly check the chain, just verify the root"}, {"trust_other", OPT_TRUST_OTHER, '-', "Don't verify additional certificates"}, {"no_intern", OPT_NO_INTERN, '-', "Don't search certificates contained in response for signer"}, {"badsig", OPT_BADSIG, '-', "Corrupt last byte of loaded OSCP response signature (for test)"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print text form of request and response"}, {"req_text", OPT_REQ_TEXT, '-', "Print text form of request"}, {"resp_text", OPT_RESP_TEXT, '-', "Print text form of response"}, {"reqin", OPT_REQIN, 's', "File with the DER-encoded request"}, {"respin", OPT_RESPIN, 's', "File with the DER-encoded response"}, {"signer", OPT_SIGNER, '<', "Certificate to sign OCSP request with"}, {"VAfile", OPT_VAFILE, '<', "Validator certificates file"}, {"sign_other", OPT_SIGN_OTHER, '<', "Additional certificates to include in signed request"}, {"verify_other", OPT_VERIFY_OTHER, '<', "Additional certificates to search for signer"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "Trusted certificates file"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '<', "Trusted certificates directory"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"validity_period", OPT_VALIDITY_PERIOD, 'u', "Maximum validity discrepancy in seconds"}, {"status_age", OPT_STATUS_AGE, 'p', "Maximum status age in seconds"}, {"signkey", OPT_SIGNKEY, 's', "Private key to sign OCSP request with"}, {"reqout", OPT_REQOUT, 's', "Output file for the DER-encoded request"}, {"respout", OPT_RESPOUT, 's', "Output file for the DER-encoded response"}, {"path", OPT_PATH, 's', "Path to use in OCSP request"}, {"issuer", OPT_ISSUER, '<', "Issuer certificate"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate to check"}, {"serial", OPT_SERIAL, 's', "Serial number to check"}, {"index", OPT_INDEX, '<', "Certificate status index file"}, {"CA", OPT_CA, '<', "CA certificate"}, {"nmin", OPT_NMIN, 'p', "Number of minutes before next update"}, {"nrequest", OPT_REQUEST, 'p', "Number of requests to accept (default unlimited)"}, {"ndays", OPT_NDAYS, 'p', "Number of days before next update"}, {"rsigner", OPT_RSIGNER, '<', "Responder certificate to sign responses with"}, {"rkey", OPT_RKEY, '<', "Responder key to sign responses with"}, {"rother", OPT_ROTHER, '<', "Other certificates to include in response"}, {"rmd", OPT_RMD, 's', "Digest Algorithm to use in signature of OCSP response"}, {"header", OPT_HEADER, 's', "key=value header to add"}, {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest algorithm (sha1,sha256, ... )"}, OPT_V_OPTIONS, {NULL} }; int ocsp_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *acbio = NULL, *cbio = NULL, *derbio = NULL, *out = NULL; const EVP_MD *cert_id_md = NULL, *rsign_md = NULL; int trailing_md = 0; CA_DB *rdb = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL, *rkey = NULL; OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers = NULL; STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *reqnames = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *sign_other = NULL, *verify_other = NULL, *rother = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *issuers = NULL; X509 *issuer = NULL, *cert = NULL, *rca_cert = NULL; X509 *signer = NULL, *rsigner = NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; const char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL; char *header, *value; char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/", *outfile = NULL; char *rca_filename = NULL, *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL; char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL, *ridx_filename = NULL; char *rsignfile = NULL, *rkeyfile = NULL; char *sign_certfile = NULL, *verify_certfile = NULL, *rcertfile = NULL; char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL; int noCAfile = 0, noCApath = 0; int accept_count = -1, add_nonce = 1, noverify = 0, use_ssl = -1; int vpmtouched = 0, badsig = 0, i, ignore_err = 0, nmin = 0, ndays = -1; int req_text = 0, resp_text = 0, ret = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int req_timeout = -1; #endif long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1; unsigned long sign_flags = 0, verify_flags = 0, rflags = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; char *prog; reqnames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!reqnames) goto end; ids = sk_OCSP_CERTID_new_null(); if (!ids) goto end; if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL) return 1; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ocsp_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: ret = 0; opt_help(ocsp_options); goto end; case OPT_OUTFILE: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK req_timeout = atoi(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_URL: OPENSSL_free(thost); OPENSSL_free(tport); OPENSSL_free(tpath); thost = tport = tpath = NULL; if (!OCSP_parse_url(opt_arg(), &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s Error parsing URL\n", prog); goto end; } thost = host; tport = port; tpath = path; break; case OPT_HOST: host = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PORT: port = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_IGNORE_ERR: ignore_err = 1; break; case OPT_NOVERIFY: noverify = 1; break; case OPT_NONCE: add_nonce = 2; break; case OPT_NO_NONCE: add_nonce = 0; break; case OPT_RESP_NO_CERTS: rflags |= OCSP_NOCERTS; break; case OPT_RESP_KEY_ID: rflags |= OCSP_RESPID_KEY; break; case OPT_NO_CERTS: sign_flags |= OCSP_NOCERTS; break; case OPT_NO_SIGNATURE_VERIFY: verify_flags |= OCSP_NOSIGS; break; case OPT_NO_CERT_VERIFY: verify_flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; break; case OPT_NO_CHAIN: verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHAIN; break; case OPT_NO_CERT_CHECKS: verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHECKS; break; case OPT_NO_EXPLICIT: verify_flags |= OCSP_NOEXPLICIT; break; case OPT_TRUST_OTHER: verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER; break; case OPT_NO_INTERN: verify_flags |= OCSP_NOINTERN; break; case OPT_BADSIG: badsig = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: req_text = resp_text = 1; break; case OPT_REQ_TEXT: req_text = 1; break; case OPT_RESP_TEXT: resp_text = 1; break; case OPT_REQIN: reqin = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RESPIN: respin = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGNER: signfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VAFILE: verify_certfile = opt_arg(); verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER; break; case OPT_SIGN_OTHER: sign_certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFY_OTHER: verify_certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_VALIDITY_PERIOD: opt_long(opt_arg(), &nsec); break; case OPT_STATUS_AGE: opt_long(opt_arg(), &maxage); break; case OPT_SIGNKEY: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_REQOUT: reqout = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RESPOUT: respout = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PATH: path = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ISSUER: issuer = load_cert(opt_arg(), FORMAT_PEM, "issuer certificate"); if (issuer == NULL) goto end; if (issuers == NULL) { if ((issuers = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; } sk_X509_push(issuers, issuer); break; case OPT_CERT: X509_free(cert); cert = load_cert(opt_arg(), FORMAT_PEM, "certificate"); if (cert == NULL) goto end; if (cert_id_md == NULL) cert_id_md = EVP_sha1(); if (!add_ocsp_cert(&req, cert, cert_id_md, issuer, ids)) goto end; if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, opt_arg())) goto end; trailing_md = 0; break; case OPT_SERIAL: if (cert_id_md == NULL) cert_id_md = EVP_sha1(); if (!add_ocsp_serial(&req, opt_arg(), cert_id_md, issuer, ids)) goto end; if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, opt_arg())) goto end; trailing_md = 0; break; case OPT_INDEX: ridx_filename = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CA: rca_filename = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NMIN: opt_int(opt_arg(), &nmin); if (ndays == -1) ndays = 0; break; case OPT_REQUEST: opt_int(opt_arg(), &accept_count); break; case OPT_NDAYS: ndays = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_RSIGNER: rsignfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RKEY: rkeyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ROTHER: rcertfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RMD: /* Response MessageDigest */ if (!opt_md(opt_arg(), &rsign_md)) goto end; break; case OPT_HEADER: header = opt_arg(); value = strchr(header, '='); if (value == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing = in header key=value\n"); goto opthelp; } *value++ = '\0'; if (!X509V3_add_value(header, value, &headers)) goto end; break; case OPT_MD: if (trailing_md) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Digest must be before -cert or -serial\n", prog); goto opthelp; } if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &cert_id_md)) goto opthelp; trailing_md = 1; break; } } if (trailing_md) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Digest must be before -cert or -serial\n", prog); goto opthelp; } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; /* Have we anything to do? */ if (!req && !reqin && !respin && !(port && ridx_filename)) goto opthelp; out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (!req && (add_nonce != 2)) add_nonce = 0; if (!req && reqin) { derbio = bio_open_default(reqin, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1); if (derbio == NULL) goto end; req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, NULL); BIO_free(derbio); if (!req) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP request\n"); goto end; } } if (!req && port) { acbio = init_responder(port); if (!acbio) goto end; } if (rsignfile) { if (!rkeyfile) rkeyfile = rsignfile; rsigner = load_cert(rsignfile, FORMAT_PEM, "responder certificate"); if (!rsigner) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading responder certificate\n"); goto end; } rca_cert = load_cert(rca_filename, FORMAT_PEM, "CA certificate"); if (rcertfile) { if (!load_certs(rcertfile, &rother, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "responder other certificates")) goto end; } rkey = load_key(rkeyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL, "responder private key"); if (!rkey) goto end; } if (acbio) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Waiting for OCSP client connections...\n"); redo_accept: if (acbio) { if (!do_responder(&req, &cbio, acbio)) goto end; if (!req) { resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, NULL); send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp); goto done_resp; } } if (!req && (signfile || reqout || host || add_nonce || ridx_filename)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need an OCSP request for this operation!\n"); goto end; } if (req && add_nonce) OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, -1); if (signfile) { if (!keyfile) keyfile = signfile; signer = load_cert(signfile, FORMAT_PEM, "signer certificate"); if (!signer) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading signer certificate\n"); goto end; } if (sign_certfile) { if (!load_certs(sign_certfile, &sign_other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "signer certificates")) goto end; } key = load_key(keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL, "signer private key"); if (!key) goto end; if (!OCSP_request_sign (req, signer, key, NULL, sign_other, sign_flags)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error signing OCSP request\n"); goto end; } } if (req_text && req) OCSP_REQUEST_print(out, req, 0); if (reqout) { derbio = bio_open_default(reqout, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1); if (derbio == NULL) goto end; i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, req); BIO_free(derbio); } if (ridx_filename && (!rkey || !rsigner || !rca_cert)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need a responder certificate, key and CA for this operation!\n"); goto end; } if (ridx_filename && !rdb) { rdb = load_index(ridx_filename, NULL); if (!rdb) goto end; if (!index_index(rdb)) goto end; } if (rdb) { make_ocsp_response(&resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey, rsign_md, rother, rflags, nmin, ndays, badsig); if (cbio) send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp); } else if (host) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK resp = process_responder(req, host, path, port, use_ssl, headers, req_timeout); if (!resp) goto end; # else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating connect BIO - sockets not supported.\n"); goto end; # endif } else if (respin) { derbio = bio_open_default(respin, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1); if (derbio == NULL) goto end; resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL); BIO_free(derbio); if (!resp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP response\n"); goto end; } } else { ret = 0; goto end; } done_resp: if (respout) { derbio = bio_open_default(respout, 'w', FORMAT_ASN1); if (derbio == NULL) goto end; i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, resp); BIO_free(derbio); } i = OCSP_response_status(resp); if (i != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) { BIO_printf(out, "Responder Error: %s (%d)\n", OCSP_response_status_str(i), i); if (ignore_err) goto redo_accept; ret = 0; goto end; } if (resp_text) OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, resp, 0); /* If running as responder don't verify our own response */ if (cbio) { /* If not unlimited, see if we took all we should. */ if (accept_count != -1 && --accept_count <= 0) { ret = 0; goto end; } BIO_free_all(cbio); cbio = NULL; OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); req = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); resp = NULL; goto redo_accept; } if (ridx_filename) { ret = 0; goto end; } if (!store) { store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath); if (!store) goto end; } if (vpmtouched) X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm); if (verify_certfile) { if (!load_certs(verify_certfile, &verify_other, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "validator certificate")) goto end; } bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp); if (!bs) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing response\n"); goto end; } ret = 0; if (!noverify) { if (req && ((i = OCSP_check_nonce(req, bs)) <= 0)) { if (i == -1) BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: no nonce in response\n"); else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nonce Verify error\n"); ret = 1; goto end; } } i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, verify_other, store, verify_flags); if (i <= 0 && issuers) { i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, issuers, store, OCSP_TRUSTOTHER); if (i > 0) ERR_clear_error(); } if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response Verify Failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n"); } print_ocsp_summary(out, bs, req, reqnames, ids, nsec, maxage); end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_free(signer); X509_STORE_free(store); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); EVP_PKEY_free(key); EVP_PKEY_free(rkey); X509_free(cert); sk_X509_pop_free(issuers, X509_free); X509_free(rsigner); X509_free(rca_cert); free_index(rdb); BIO_free_all(cbio); BIO_free_all(acbio); BIO_free(out); OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(reqnames); sk_OCSP_CERTID_free(ids); sk_X509_pop_free(sign_other, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free); OPENSSL_free(thost); OPENSSL_free(tport); OPENSSL_free(tpath); return (ret); } static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids) { OCSP_CERTID *id; if (!issuer) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n"); return 0; } if (*req == NULL) *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (*req == NULL) goto err; id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, cert, issuer); if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id)) goto err; if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id)) goto err; return 1; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n"); return 0; } static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids) { OCSP_CERTID *id; X509_NAME *iname; ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey; ASN1_INTEGER *sno; if (!issuer) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n"); return 0; } if (*req == NULL) *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (*req == NULL) goto err; iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer); ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer); sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, serial); if (!sno) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting serial number %s\n", serial); return 0; } id = OCSP_cert_id_new(cert_id_md, iname, ikey, sno); ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno); if (id == NULL || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id)) goto err; if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id)) goto err; return 1; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n"); return 0; } static void print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names, STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec, long maxage) { OCSP_CERTID *id; const char *name; int i, status, reason; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd; if (!bs || !req || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(names) || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids); i++) { id = sk_OCSP_CERTID_value(ids, i); name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(names, i); BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", name); if (!OCSP_resp_find_status(bs, id, &status, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) { BIO_puts(out, "ERROR: No Status found.\n"); continue; } /* * Check validity: if invalid write to output BIO so we know which * response this refers to. */ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) { BIO_puts(out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); } BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", OCSP_cert_status_str(status)); BIO_puts(out, "\tThis Update: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, thisupd); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); if (nextupd) { BIO_puts(out, "\tNext Update: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, nextupd); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) continue; if (reason != -1) BIO_printf(out, "\tReason: %s\n", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason)); BIO_puts(out, "\tRevocation Time: "); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, rev); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } } static void make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req, CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert, EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *rmd, STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays, int badsig) { ASN1_TIME *thisupd = NULL, *nextupd = NULL; OCSP_CERTID *cid, *ca_id = NULL; OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL; int i, id_count; id_count = OCSP_request_onereq_count(req); if (id_count <= 0) { *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, NULL); goto end; } bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new(); thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0); if (ndays != -1) nextupd = X509_time_adj_ex(NULL, ndays, nmin * 60, NULL); /* Examine each certificate id in the request */ for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) { OCSP_ONEREQ *one; ASN1_INTEGER *serial; char **inf; ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid; const EVP_MD *cert_id_md; one = OCSP_request_onereq_get0(req, i); cid = OCSP_onereq_get0_id(one); OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, &cert_id_md_oid, NULL, NULL, cid); cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cert_id_md_oid); if (!cert_id_md) { *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, NULL); goto end; } OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id); ca_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, NULL, ca); /* Is this request about our CA? */ if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(ca_id, cid)) { OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd); continue; } OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, &serial, cid); inf = lookup_serial(db, serial); if (!inf) OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd); else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_VAL) OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD, 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd); else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) { ASN1_OBJECT *inst = NULL; ASN1_TIME *revtm = NULL; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *invtm = NULL; OCSP_SINGLERESP *single; int reason = -1; unpack_revinfo(&revtm, &reason, &inst, &invtm, inf[DB_rev_date]); single = OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid, V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED, reason, revtm, thisupd, nextupd); if (invtm) OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single, NID_invalidity_date, invtm, 0, 0); else if (inst) OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single, NID_hold_instruction_code, inst, 0, 0); ASN1_OBJECT_free(inst); ASN1_TIME_free(revtm); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(invtm); } } OCSP_copy_nonce(bs, req); OCSP_basic_sign(bs, rcert, rkey, rmd, rother, flags); if (badsig) { const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sig = OCSP_resp_get0_signature(bs); corrupt_signature(sig); } *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, bs); end: ASN1_TIME_free(thisupd); ASN1_TIME_free(nextupd); OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs); } static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser) { int i; BIGNUM *bn = NULL; char *itmp, *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow; for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) row[i] = NULL; bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser, NULL); OPENSSL_assert(bn); /* FIXME: should report an error at this * point and abort */ if (BN_is_zero(bn)) itmp = OPENSSL_strdup("00"); else itmp = BN_bn2hex(bn); row[DB_serial] = itmp; BN_free(bn); rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row); OPENSSL_free(itmp); return rrow; } /* Quick and dirty OCSP server: read in and parse input request */ static BIO *init_responder(const char *port) { # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO - sockets not supported.\n"); return NULL; # else BIO *acbio = NULL, *bufbio = NULL; bufbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bufbio == NULL) goto err; acbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_accept()); if (acbio == NULL || BIO_set_bind_mode(acbio, BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR) < 0 || BIO_set_accept_port(acbio, port) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } BIO_set_accept_bios(acbio, bufbio); bufbio = NULL; if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error starting accept\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } return acbio; err: BIO_free_all(acbio); BIO_free(bufbio); return NULL; # endif } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * Decode %xx URL-decoding in-place. Ignores mal-formed sequences. */ static int urldecode(char *p) { unsigned char *out = (unsigned char *)p; unsigned char *save = out; for (; *p; p++) { if (*p != '%') *out++ = *p; else if (isxdigit(_UC(p[1])) && isxdigit(_UC(p[2]))) { /* Don't check, can't fail because of ixdigit() call. */ *out++ = (OPENSSL_hexchar2int(p[1]) << 4) | OPENSSL_hexchar2int(p[2]); p += 2; } else return -1; } *out = '\0'; return (int)(out - save); } # endif static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio) { # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK return 0; # else int len; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; char inbuf[2048], reqbuf[2048]; char *p, *q; BIO *cbio = NULL, *getbio = NULL, *b64 = NULL; if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error accepting connection\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } cbio = BIO_pop(acbio); *pcbio = cbio; /* Read the request line. */ len = BIO_gets(cbio, reqbuf, sizeof reqbuf); if (len <= 0) return 1; if (strncmp(reqbuf, "GET ", 4) == 0) { /* Expecting GET {sp} /URL {sp} HTTP/1.x */ for (p = reqbuf + 4; *p == ' '; ++p) continue; if (*p != '/') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad URL\n"); return 1; } p++; /* Splice off the HTTP version identifier. */ for (q = p; *q; q++) if (*q == ' ') break; if (strncmp(q, " HTTP/1.", 8) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad HTTP vesion\n"); return 1; } *q = '\0'; len = urldecode(p); if (len <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad URL encoding\n"); return 1; } if ((getbio = BIO_new_mem_buf(p, len)) == NULL || (b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not allocate memory\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 1; } BIO_set_flags(b64, BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL); getbio = BIO_push(b64, getbio); } else if (strncmp(reqbuf, "POST ", 5) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad HTTP verb\n"); return 1; } /* Read and skip past the headers. */ for (;;) { len = BIO_gets(cbio, inbuf, sizeof inbuf); if (len <= 0) return 1; if ((inbuf[0] == '\r') || (inbuf[0] == '\n')) break; } /* Try to read OCSP request */ if (getbio) { req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(getbio, NULL); BIO_free_all(getbio); } else req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(cbio, NULL); if (!req) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing OCSP request\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } *preq = req; return 1; # endif } static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp) { char http_resp[] = "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: application/ocsp-response\r\n" "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n"; if (!cbio) return 0; BIO_printf(cbio, http_resp, i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, NULL)); i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(cbio, resp); (void)BIO_flush(cbio); return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *cbio, const char *host, const char *path, const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout) { int fd; int rv; int i; int add_host = 1; OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; fd_set confds; struct timeval tv; if (req_timeout != -1) BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1); rv = BIO_do_connect(cbio); if ((rv <= 0) && ((req_timeout == -1) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error connecting BIO\n"); return NULL; } if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n"); goto err; } if (req_timeout != -1 && rv <= 0) { FD_ZERO(&confds); openssl_fdset(fd, &confds); tv.tv_usec = 0; tv.tv_sec = req_timeout; rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv); if (rv == 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Timeout on connect\n"); return NULL; } } ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, NULL, -1); if (ctx == NULL) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(headers); i++) { CONF_VALUE *hdr = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(headers, i); if (add_host == 1 && strcasecmp("host", hdr->name) == 0) add_host = 0; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, hdr->name, hdr->value)) goto err; } if (add_host == 1 && OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, "Host", host) == 0) goto err; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(ctx, req)) goto err; for (;;) { rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&rsp, ctx); if (rv != -1) break; if (req_timeout == -1) continue; FD_ZERO(&confds); openssl_fdset(fd, &confds); tv.tv_usec = 0; tv.tv_sec = req_timeout; if (BIO_should_read(cbio)) rv = select(fd + 1, (void *)&confds, NULL, NULL, &tv); else if (BIO_should_write(cbio)) rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv); else { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Unexpected retry condition\n"); goto err; } if (rv == 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Timeout on request\n"); break; } if (rv == -1) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Select error\n"); break; } } err: OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx); return rsp; } OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(OCSP_REQUEST *req, const char *host, const char *path, const char *port, int use_ssl, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, int req_timeout) { BIO *cbio = NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; cbio = BIO_new_connect(host); if (!cbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating connect BIO\n"); goto end; } if (port) BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port); if (use_ssl == 1) { BIO *sbio; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); if (ctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating SSL context.\n"); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1); cbio = BIO_push(sbio, cbio); } resp = query_responder(cbio, host, path, headers, req, req_timeout); if (!resp) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n"); end: BIO_free_all(cbio); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); return resp; } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/req.c0000644000000000000000000013321513176625656013765 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include #endif #define SECTION "req" #define BITS "default_bits" #define KEYFILE "default_keyfile" #define PROMPT "prompt" #define DISTINGUISHED_NAME "distinguished_name" #define ATTRIBUTES "attributes" #define V3_EXTENSIONS "x509_extensions" #define REQ_EXTENSIONS "req_extensions" #define STRING_MASK "string_mask" #define UTF8_IN "utf8" #define DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH 2048 #define MIN_KEY_LENGTH 512 static int make_REQ(X509_REQ *req, EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *dn, int mutlirdn, int attribs, unsigned long chtype); static int build_subject(X509_REQ *req, const char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn); static int prompt_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, const char *dn_sect, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, const char *attr_sect, int attribs, unsigned long chtype); static int auto_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr, int attribs, unsigned long chtype); static int add_attribute_object(X509_REQ *req, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype); static int add_DN_object(X509_NAME *n, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype, int mval); static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); static int req_check_len(int len, int n_min, int n_max); static int check_end(const char *str, const char *end); static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(const char *gstr, int *pkey_type, long *pkeylen, char **palgnam, ENGINE *keygen_engine); static CONF *req_conf = NULL; static int batch = 0; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_KEYGEN_ENGINE, OPT_KEY, OPT_PUBKEY, OPT_NEW, OPT_CONFIG, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_KEYOUT, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_RAND, OPT_NEWKEY, OPT_PKEYOPT, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_BATCH, OPT_NEWHDR, OPT_MODULUS, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_NODES, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_VERBOSE, OPT_UTF8, OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_REQOPT, OPT_SUBJ, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_X509, OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, OPT_DAYS, OPT_SET_SERIAL, OPT_EXTENSIONS, OPT_REQEXTS, OPT_MD } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS req_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'F', "Input format - DER or PEM"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'F', "Output format - DER or PEM"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private key to use"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Key file format"}, {"pubkey", OPT_PUBKEY, '-', "Output public key"}, {"new", OPT_NEW, '-', "New request"}, {"config", OPT_CONFIG, '<', "Request template file"}, {"keyout", OPT_KEYOUT, '>', "File to send the key to"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Private key password source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"newkey", OPT_NEWKEY, 's', "Specify as type:bits"}, {"pkeyopt", OPT_PKEYOPT, 's', "Public key options as opt:value"}, {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"}, {"batch", OPT_BATCH, '-', "Do not ask anything during request generation"}, {"newhdr", OPT_NEWHDR, '-', "Output \"NEW\" in the header lines"}, {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "RSA modulus"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify signature on REQ"}, {"nodes", OPT_NODES, '-', "Don't encrypt the output key"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Do not output REQ"}, {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Verbose output"}, {"utf8", OPT_UTF8, '-', "Input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)"}, {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"}, {"reqopt", OPT_REQOPT, 's', "Various request text options"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Text form of request"}, {"x509", OPT_X509, '-', "Output a x509 structure instead of a cert request"}, {OPT_MORE_STR, 1, 1, "(Required by some CA's)"}, {"subj", OPT_SUBJ, 's', "Set or modify request subject"}, {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, '-', "Output the request's subject"}, {"multivalue-rdn", OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN, '-', "Enable support for multivalued RDNs"}, {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days cert is valid for"}, {"set_serial", OPT_SET_SERIAL, 's', "Serial number to use"}, {"extensions", OPT_EXTENSIONS, 's', "Cert extension section (override value in config file)"}, {"reqexts", OPT_REQEXTS, 's', "Request extension section (override value in config file)"}, {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, {"keygen_engine", OPT_KEYGEN_ENGINE, 's', "Specify engine to be used for key generation operations"}, #endif {NULL} }; int req_main(int argc, char **argv) { ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL; BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL, *gen_eng = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *genctx = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL, *sigopts = NULL; X509 *x509ss = NULL; X509_REQ *req = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; const EVP_MD *md_alg = NULL, *digest = NULL; char *extensions = NULL, *infile = NULL; char *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *inrand = NULL; char *keyalgstr = NULL, *p, *prog, *passargin = NULL, *passargout = NULL; char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL; char *nofree_passin = NULL, *nofree_passout = NULL; char *req_exts = NULL, *subj = NULL; char *template = default_config_file, *keyout = NULL; const char *keyalg = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int ret = 1, x509 = 0, days = 30, i = 0, newreq = 0, verbose = 0; int pkey_type = -1, private = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, keyform = FORMAT_PEM; int modulus = 0, multirdn = 0, verify = 0, noout = 0, text = 0; int nodes = 0, newhdr = 0, subject = 0, pubkey = 0; long newkey = -1; unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, nmflag = 0, reqflag = 0; char nmflag_set = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); #endif prog = opt_init(argc, argv, req_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(req_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_KEYGEN_ENGINE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE gen_eng = ENGINE_by_id(opt_arg()); if (gen_eng == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't find keygen engine %s\n", *argv); goto opthelp; } #endif break; case OPT_KEY: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PUBKEY: pubkey = 1; break; case OPT_NEW: newreq = 1; break; case OPT_CONFIG: template = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYOUT: keyout = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passargin = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passargout = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NEWKEY: keyalg = opt_arg(); newreq = 1; break; case OPT_PKEYOPT: if (!pkeyopts) pkeyopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!pkeyopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pkeyopts, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_SIGOPT: if (!sigopts) sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_BATCH: batch = 1; break; case OPT_NEWHDR: newhdr = 1; break; case OPT_MODULUS: modulus = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY: verify = 1; break; case OPT_NODES: nodes = 1; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_VERBOSE: verbose = 1; break; case OPT_UTF8: chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; break; case OPT_NAMEOPT: nmflag_set = 1; if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_REQOPT: if (!set_cert_ex(&reqflag, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_X509: x509 = 1; break; case OPT_DAYS: days = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_SET_SERIAL: if (serial != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial number supplied twice\n"); goto opthelp; } serial = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, opt_arg()); if (serial == NULL) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_SUBJECT: subject = 1; break; case OPT_SUBJ: subj = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MULTIVALUE_RDN: multirdn = 1; break; case OPT_EXTENSIONS: extensions = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_REQEXTS: req_exts = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &md_alg)) goto opthelp; digest = md_alg; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (x509 && infile == NULL) newreq = 1; if (!nmflag_set) nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE; /* TODO: simplify this as pkey is still always NULL here */ private = newreq && (pkey == NULL) ? 1 : 0; if (!app_passwd(passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", template); req_conf = app_load_config(template); if (template != default_config_file && !app_load_modules(req_conf)) goto end; if (req_conf != NULL) { p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, NULL, "oid_file"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if (p != NULL) { BIO *oid_bio; oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r"); if (oid_bio == NULL) { /*- BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); */ } else { OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio); BIO_free(oid_bio); } } } if (!add_oid_section(req_conf)) goto end; if (md_alg == NULL) { p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "default_md"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); else { if (!opt_md(p, &md_alg)) goto opthelp; digest = md_alg; } } if (!extensions) { extensions = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, V3_EXTENSIONS); if (!extensions) ERR_clear_error(); } if (extensions) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, req_conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extensions); goto end; } } if (passin == NULL) { passin = nofree_passin = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "input_password"); if (passin == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if (passout == NULL) { passout = nofree_passout = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "output_password"); if (passout == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, STRING_MASK); if (!p) ERR_clear_error(); if (p && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(p)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", p); goto end; } if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) { p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, UTF8_IN); if (!p) ERR_clear_error(); else if (strcmp(p, "yes") == 0) chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8; } if (!req_exts) { req_exts = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, REQ_EXTENSIONS); if (!req_exts) ERR_clear_error(); } if (req_exts) { /* Check syntax of file */ X509V3_CTX ctx; X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, req_conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ctx, req_exts, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading request extension section %s\n", req_exts); goto end; } } if (keyfile != NULL) { pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "Private Key"); if (!pkey) { /* load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */ goto end; } else { char *randfile = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "RANDFILE"); if (randfile == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0); } } if (newreq && (pkey == NULL)) { char *randfile = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "RANDFILE"); if (randfile == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); app_RAND_load_file(randfile, 0); if (inrand) app_RAND_load_files(inrand); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, SECTION, BITS, &newkey)) { newkey = DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH; } if (keyalg) { genctx = set_keygen_ctx(keyalg, &pkey_type, &newkey, &keyalgstr, gen_eng); if (!genctx) goto end; } if (newkey < MIN_KEY_LENGTH && (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "private key length is too short,\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "it needs to be at least %d bits, not %ld\n", MIN_KEY_LENGTH, newkey); goto end; } if (!genctx) { genctx = set_keygen_ctx(NULL, &pkey_type, &newkey, &keyalgstr, gen_eng); if (!genctx) goto end; } if (pkeyopts) { char *genopt; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(pkeyopts); i++) { genopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(pkeyopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(genctx, genopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", genopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating an EC private key\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating a %ld bit %s private key\n", newkey, keyalgstr); } EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(genctx, genpkey_cb); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(genctx, bio_err); if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(genctx, &pkey) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error Generating Key\n"); goto end; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx); genctx = NULL; app_RAND_write_file(randfile); if (keyout == NULL) { keyout = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, KEYFILE); if (keyout == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if (keyout == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new private key to stdout\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new private key to '%s'\n", keyout); out = bio_open_owner(keyout, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "encrypt_rsa_key"); if (p == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); p = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, "encrypt_key"); if (p == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); } if ((p != NULL) && (strcmp(p, "no") == 0)) cipher = NULL; if (nodes) cipher = NULL; i = 0; loop: assert(private); if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, cipher, NULL, 0, NULL, passout)) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD) && (i < 3)) { ERR_clear_error(); i++; goto loop; } goto end; } BIO_free(out); out = NULL; BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n"); } if (!newreq) { in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) req = d2i_X509_REQ_bio(in, NULL); else req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (req == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load X509 request\n"); goto end; } } if (newreq || x509) { if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "you need to specify a private key\n"); goto end; } if (req == NULL) { req = X509_REQ_new(); if (req == NULL) { goto end; } i = make_REQ(req, pkey, subj, multirdn, !x509, chtype); subj = NULL; /* done processing '-subj' option */ if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "problems making Certificate Request\n"); goto end; } } if (x509) { EVP_PKEY *tmppkey; X509V3_CTX ext_ctx; if ((x509ss = X509_new()) == NULL) goto end; /* Set version to V3 */ if (extensions && !X509_set_version(x509ss, 2)) goto end; if (serial) { if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x509ss, serial)) goto end; } else { if (!rand_serial(NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x509ss))) goto end; } if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x509ss, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req))) goto end; if (!set_cert_times(x509ss, NULL, NULL, days)) goto end; if (!X509_set_subject_name (x509ss, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req))) goto end; tmppkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req); if (!tmppkey || !X509_set_pubkey(x509ss, tmppkey)) goto end; /* Set up V3 context struct */ X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, x509ss, x509ss, NULL, NULL, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&ext_ctx, req_conf); /* Add extensions */ if (extensions && !X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(req_conf, &ext_ctx, extensions, x509ss)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extensions); goto end; } i = do_X509_sign(x509ss, pkey, digest, sigopts); if (!i) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else { X509V3_CTX ext_ctx; /* Set up V3 context struct */ X509V3_set_ctx(&ext_ctx, NULL, NULL, req, NULL, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&ext_ctx, req_conf); /* Add extensions */ if (req_exts && !X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(req_conf, &ext_ctx, req_exts, req)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", req_exts); goto end; } i = do_X509_REQ_sign(req, pkey, digest, sigopts); if (!i) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } if (subj && x509) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot modify certificate subject\n"); goto end; } if (subj && !x509) { if (verbose) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Modifying Request's Subject\n"); print_name(bio_err, "old subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag); } if (build_subject(req, subj, chtype, multirdn) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: cannot modify subject\n"); ret = 1; goto end; } if (verbose) { print_name(bio_err, "new subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag); } } if (verify && !x509) { EVP_PKEY *tpubkey = pkey; if (tpubkey == NULL) { tpubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req); if (tpubkey == NULL) goto end; } i = X509_REQ_verify(req, tpubkey); if (i < 0) { goto end; } else if (i == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else /* if (i > 0) */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify OK\n"); } if (noout && !text && !modulus && !subject && !pubkey) { ret = 0; goto end; } out = bio_open_default(outfile, keyout != NULL && outfile != NULL && strcmp(keyout, outfile) == 0 ? 'a' : 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (pubkey) { EVP_PKEY *tpubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req); if (tpubkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting public key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, tpubkey); } if (text) { if (x509) X509_print_ex(out, x509ss, nmflag, reqflag); else X509_REQ_print_ex(out, req, nmflag, reqflag); } if (subject) { if (x509) print_name(out, "subject=", X509_get_subject_name(x509ss), nmflag); else print_name(out, "subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag); } if (modulus) { EVP_PKEY *tpubkey; if (x509) tpubkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509ss); else tpubkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req); if (tpubkey == NULL) { fprintf(stdout, "Modulus=unavailable\n"); goto end; } fprintf(stdout, "Modulus="); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(tpubkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { const BIGNUM *n; RSA_get0_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(tpubkey), &n, NULL, NULL); BN_print(out, n); } else #endif fprintf(stdout, "Wrong Algorithm type"); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } if (!noout && !x509) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_X509_REQ_bio(out, req); else if (newhdr) i = PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW(out, req); else i = PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(out, req); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509 request\n"); goto end; } } if (!noout && x509 && (x509ss != NULL)) { if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_X509_bio(out, x509ss); else i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509ss); if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write X509 certificate\n"); goto end; } } ret = 0; end: if (ret) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } NCONF_free(req_conf); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_free(gen_eng); #endif OPENSSL_free(keyalgstr); X509_REQ_free(req); X509_free(x509ss); ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial); release_engine(e); if (passin != nofree_passin) OPENSSL_free(passin); if (passout != nofree_passout) OPENSSL_free(passout); return (ret); } static int make_REQ(X509_REQ *req, EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *subj, int multirdn, int attribs, unsigned long chtype) { int ret = 0, i; char no_prompt = 0; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, *attr_sk = NULL; char *tmp, *dn_sect, *attr_sect; tmp = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, PROMPT); if (tmp == NULL) ERR_clear_error(); if ((tmp != NULL) && strcmp(tmp, "no") == 0) no_prompt = 1; dn_sect = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, DISTINGUISHED_NAME); if (dn_sect == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find '%s' in config\n", DISTINGUISHED_NAME); goto err; } dn_sk = NCONF_get_section(req_conf, dn_sect); if (dn_sk == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get '%s' section\n", dn_sect); goto err; } attr_sect = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, SECTION, ATTRIBUTES); if (attr_sect == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); attr_sk = NULL; } else { attr_sk = NCONF_get_section(req_conf, attr_sect); if (attr_sk == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get '%s' section\n", attr_sect); goto err; } } /* setup version number */ if (!X509_REQ_set_version(req, 0L)) goto err; /* version 1 */ if (subj) i = build_subject(req, subj, chtype, multirdn); else if (no_prompt) i = auto_info(req, dn_sk, attr_sk, attribs, chtype); else i = prompt_info(req, dn_sk, dn_sect, attr_sk, attr_sect, attribs, chtype); if (!i) goto err; if (!X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pkey)) goto err; ret = 1; err: return (ret); } /* * subject is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=... * where characters may be escaped by \ */ static int build_subject(X509_REQ *req, const char *subject, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn) { X509_NAME *n; if ((n = parse_name(subject, chtype, multirdn)) == NULL) return 0; if (!X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n)) { X509_NAME_free(n); return 0; } X509_NAME_free(n); return 1; } static int prompt_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, const char *dn_sect, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, const char *attr_sect, int attribs, unsigned long chtype) { int i; char *p, *q; char buf[100]; int nid, mval; long n_min, n_max; char *type, *value; const char *def; CONF_VALUE *v; X509_NAME *subj; subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req); if (!batch) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "into your certificate request.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "For some fields there will be a default value,\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n"); } if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk)) { i = -1; start:for (;;) { i++; if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk) <= i) break; v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i); p = q = NULL; type = v->name; if (!check_end(type, "_min") || !check_end(type, "_max") || !check_end(type, "_default") || !check_end(type, "_value")) continue; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple * instances */ for (p = v->name; *p; p++) if ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')) { p++; if (*p) type = p; break; } if (*type == '+') { mval = -1; type++; } else mval = 0; /* If OBJ not recognised ignore it */ if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) goto start; if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_default", v->name) >= (int)sizeof(buf)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name); return 0; } if ((def = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, dn_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); def = ""; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_value", v->name); if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, dn_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); value = NULL; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_min", v->name); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_min)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_min = -1; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_max", v->name); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, dn_sect, buf, &n_max)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_max = -1; } if (!add_DN_object(subj, v->value, def, value, nid, n_min, n_max, chtype, mval)) return 0; } if (X509_NAME_entry_count(subj) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error, no objects specified in config file\n"); return 0; } if (attribs) { if ((attr_sk != NULL) && (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk) > 0) && (!batch)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nPlease enter the following 'extra' attributes\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "to be sent with your certificate request\n"); } i = -1; start2: for (;;) { i++; if ((attr_sk == NULL) || (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk) <= i)) break; v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i); type = v->name; if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) goto start2; if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_default", type) >= (int)sizeof(buf)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Name '%s' too long\n", v->name); return 0; } if ((def = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, attr_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); def = ""; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_value", type); if ((value = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, attr_sect, buf)) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); value = NULL; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_min", type); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_min)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_min = -1; } BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s_max", type); if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf, attr_sect, buf, &n_max)) { ERR_clear_error(); n_max = -1; } if (!add_attribute_object(req, v->value, def, value, nid, n_min, n_max, chtype)) return 0; } } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No template, please set one up.\n"); return 0; } return 1; } static int auto_info(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attr_sk, int attribs, unsigned long chtype) { int i, spec_char, plus_char; char *p, *q; char *type; CONF_VALUE *v; X509_NAME *subj; subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) { int mval; v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i); p = q = NULL; type = v->name; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances */ for (p = v->name; *p; p++) { #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC spec_char = ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')); #else spec_char = ((*p == os_toascii[':']) || (*p == os_toascii[',']) || (*p == os_toascii['.'])); #endif if (spec_char) { p++; if (*p) type = p; break; } } #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC plus_char = (*type == '+'); #else plus_char = (*type == os_toascii['+']); #endif if (plus_char) { type++; mval = -1; } else mval = 0; if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(subj, type, chtype, (unsigned char *)v->value, -1, -1, mval)) return 0; } if (!X509_NAME_entry_count(subj)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error, no objects specified in config file\n"); return 0; } if (attribs) { for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk); i++) { v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i); if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(req, v->name, chtype, (unsigned char *)v->value, -1)) return 0; } } return 1; } static int add_DN_object(X509_NAME *n, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype, int mval) { int i, ret = 0; char buf[1024]; start: if (!batch) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); if (value != NULL) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof buf); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value); } else { buf[0] = '\0'; if (!batch) { if (!fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin)) return 0; } else { buf[0] = '\n'; buf[1] = '\0'; } } if (buf[0] == '\0') return (0); else if (buf[0] == '\n') { if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0')) return (1); OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof buf); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf); } else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n')) return (1); i = strlen(buf); if (buf[i - 1] != '\n') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "weird input :-(\n"); return (0); } buf[--i] = '\0'; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif if (!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) { if (batch || value) return 0; goto start; } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, mval)) goto err; ret = 1; err: return (ret); } static int add_attribute_object(X509_REQ *req, char *text, const char *def, char *value, int nid, int n_min, int n_max, unsigned long chtype) { int i; static char buf[1024]; start: if (!batch) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [%s]:", text, def); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); if (value != NULL) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, value, sizeof buf); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s\n", value); } else { buf[0] = '\0'; if (!batch) { if (!fgets(buf, sizeof buf, stdin)) return 0; } else { buf[0] = '\n'; buf[1] = '\0'; } } if (buf[0] == '\0') return (0); else if (buf[0] == '\n') { if ((def == NULL) || (def[0] == '\0')) return (1); OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, def, sizeof buf); OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf); } else if ((buf[0] == '.') && (buf[1] == '\n')) return (1); i = strlen(buf); if (buf[i - 1] != '\n') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "weird input :-(\n"); return (0); } buf[--i] = '\0'; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif if (!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) { if (batch || value) return 0; goto start; } if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)buf, -1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error adding attribute\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } return (1); err: return (0); } static int req_check_len(int len, int n_min, int n_max) { if ((n_min > 0) && (len < n_min)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "string is too short, it needs to be at least %d bytes long\n", n_min); return (0); } if ((n_max >= 0) && (len > n_max)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "string is too long, it needs to be no more than %d bytes long\n", n_max); return (0); } return (1); } /* Check if the end of a string matches 'end' */ static int check_end(const char *str, const char *end) { int elen, slen; const char *tmp; elen = strlen(end); slen = strlen(str); if (elen > slen) return 1; tmp = str + slen - elen; return strcmp(tmp, end); } static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(const char *gstr, int *pkey_type, long *pkeylen, char **palgnam, ENGINE *keygen_engine) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *gctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *param = NULL; long keylen = -1; BIO *pbio = NULL; const char *paramfile = NULL; if (gstr == NULL) { *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA; keylen = *pkeylen; } else if (gstr[0] >= '0' && gstr[0] <= '9') { *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_RSA; keylen = atol(gstr); *pkeylen = keylen; } else if (strncmp(gstr, "param:", 6) == 0) paramfile = gstr + 6; else { const char *p = strchr(gstr, ':'); int len; ENGINE *tmpeng; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (p) len = p - gstr; else len = strlen(gstr); /* * The lookup of a the string will cover all engines so keep a note * of the implementation. */ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, gstr, len); if (!ameth) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown algorithm %.*s\n", len, gstr); return NULL; } EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, pkey_type, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); #endif if (*pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (p) { keylen = atol(p + 1); *pkeylen = keylen; } else keylen = *pkeylen; } else if (p) paramfile = p + 1; } if (paramfile) { pbio = BIO_new_file(paramfile, "r"); if (!pbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open parameter file %s\n", paramfile); return NULL; } param = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(pbio, NULL); if (!param) { X509 *x; (void)BIO_reset(pbio); x = PEM_read_bio_X509(pbio, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (x) { param = X509_get_pubkey(x); X509_free(x); } } BIO_free(pbio); if (!param) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading parameter file %s\n", paramfile); return NULL; } if (*pkey_type == -1) *pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_id(param); else if (*pkey_type != EVP_PKEY_base_id(param)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Key Type does not match parameters\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(param); return NULL; } } if (palgnam) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *tmpeng; const char *anam; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&tmpeng, *pkey_type); if (!ameth) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Internal error: can't find key algorithm\n"); return NULL; } EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &anam, ameth); *palgnam = OPENSSL_strdup(anam); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); #endif } if (param) { gctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(param, keygen_engine); *pkeylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(param); EVP_PKEY_free(param); } else gctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(*pkey_type, keygen_engine); if (gctx == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error allocating keygen context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(gctx) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing keygen context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(gctx); return NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if ((*pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) && (keylen != -1)) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(gctx, keylen) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting RSA keysize\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(gctx); return NULL; } } #endif return gctx; } static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { char c = '*'; BIO *b = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(ctx); int p; p = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(ctx, 0); if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(b, &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(b); return 1; } static int do_sign_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL; int i; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey)) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sigopts); i++) { char *sigopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sigopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(pkctx, sigopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", sigopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } } return 1; } int do_X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { int rv; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts); if (rv > 0) rv = X509_sign_ctx(x, mctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0; } int do_X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { int rv; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts); if (rv > 0) rv = X509_REQ_sign_ctx(x, mctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0; } int do_X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts) { int rv; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); rv = do_sign_init(mctx, pkey, md, sigopts); if (rv > 0) rv = X509_CRL_sign_ctx(x, mctx); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return rv > 0 ? 1 : 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/apps.h0000644000000000000000000005367113176625656014155 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_APPS_H # define HEADER_APPS_H # include "e_os.h" # if defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) # include /* struct timeval for DTLS */ # endif # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) # define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET((unsigned int)a, b) # else # define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET(a, b) # endif /* * quick macro when you need to pass an unsigned char instead of a char. * this is true for some implementations of the is*() functions, for * example. */ #define _UC(c) ((unsigned char)(c)) int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, int dont_warn); int app_RAND_write_file(const char *file); /* * When `file' is NULL, use defaults. `bio_e' is for error messages. */ void app_RAND_allow_write_file(void); long app_RAND_load_files(char *file); /* `file' is a list of files to read, * separated by LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR * (see e_os.h). The string is * destroyed! */ extern char *default_config_file; extern BIO *bio_in; extern BIO *bio_out; extern BIO *bio_err; BIO *dup_bio_in(int format); BIO *dup_bio_out(int format); BIO *dup_bio_err(int format); BIO *bio_open_owner(const char *filename, int format, int private); BIO *bio_open_default(const char *filename, char mode, int format); BIO *bio_open_default_quiet(const char *filename, char mode, int format); CONF *app_load_config(const char *filename); CONF *app_load_config_quiet(const char *filename); int app_load_modules(const CONF *config); void unbuffer(FILE *fp); void wait_for_async(SSL *s); # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) int has_stdin_waiting(void); # endif void corrupt_signature(const ASN1_STRING *signature); int set_cert_times(X509 *x, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, int days); /* * Common verification options. */ # define OPT_V_ENUM \ OPT_V__FIRST=2000, \ OPT_V_POLICY, OPT_V_PURPOSE, OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME, OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH, \ OPT_V_ATTIME, OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME, OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL, \ OPT_V_VERIFY_IP, OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL, OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS, \ OPT_V_CRL_CHECK, OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL, OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK, \ OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY, OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY, OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP, \ OPT_V_X509_STRICT, OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL, OPT_V_USE_DELTAS, \ OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT, OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG, OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST, \ OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY, OPT_V_SUITEB_128, OPT_V_SUITEB_192, \ OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN, OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS, OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME, \ OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL, OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS, \ OPT_V__LAST # define OPT_V_OPTIONS \ { "policy", OPT_V_POLICY, 's', "adds policy to the acceptable policy set"}, \ { "purpose", OPT_V_PURPOSE, 's', \ "certificate chain purpose"}, \ { "verify_name", OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME, 's', "verification policy name"}, \ { "verify_depth", OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH, 'n', \ "chain depth limit" }, \ { "auth_level", OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL, 'n', \ "chain authentication security level" }, \ { "attime", OPT_V_ATTIME, 'M', "verification epoch time" }, \ { "verify_hostname", OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME, 's', \ "expected peer hostname" }, \ { "verify_email", OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL, 's', \ "expected peer email" }, \ { "verify_ip", OPT_V_VERIFY_IP, 's', \ "expected peer IP address" }, \ { "ignore_critical", OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL, '-', \ "permit unhandled critical extensions"}, \ { "issuer_checks", OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS, '-', "(deprecated)"}, \ { "crl_check", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK, '-', "check leaf certificate revocation" }, \ { "crl_check_all", OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL, '-', "check full chain revocation" }, \ { "policy_check", OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK, '-', "perform rfc5280 policy checks"}, \ { "explicit_policy", OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY, '-', \ "set policy variable require-explicit-policy"}, \ { "inhibit_any", OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY, '-', \ "set policy variable inhibit-any-policy"}, \ { "inhibit_map", OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP, '-', \ "set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping"}, \ { "x509_strict", OPT_V_X509_STRICT, '-', \ "disable certificate compatibility work-arounds"}, \ { "extended_crl", OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL, '-', \ "enable extended CRL features"}, \ { "use_deltas", OPT_V_USE_DELTAS, '-', \ "use delta CRLs"}, \ { "policy_print", OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT, '-', \ "print policy processing diagnostics"}, \ { "check_ss_sig", OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG, '-', \ "check root CA self-signatures"}, \ { "trusted_first", OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST, '-', \ "search trust store first (default)" }, \ { "suiteB_128_only", OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY, '-', "Suite B 128-bit-only mode"}, \ { "suiteB_128", OPT_V_SUITEB_128, '-', \ "Suite B 128-bit mode allowing 192-bit algorithms"}, \ { "suiteB_192", OPT_V_SUITEB_192, '-', "Suite B 192-bit-only mode" }, \ { "partial_chain", OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN, '-', \ "accept chains anchored by intermediate trust-store CAs"}, \ { "no_alt_chains", OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS, '-', "(deprecated)" }, \ { "no_check_time", OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME, '-', "ignore certificate validity time" }, \ { "allow_proxy_certs", OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS, '-', "allow the use of proxy certificates" } # define OPT_V_CASES \ OPT_V__FIRST: case OPT_V__LAST: break; \ case OPT_V_POLICY: \ case OPT_V_PURPOSE: \ case OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME: \ case OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH: \ case OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL: \ case OPT_V_ATTIME: \ case OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME: \ case OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL: \ case OPT_V_VERIFY_IP: \ case OPT_V_IGNORE_CRITICAL: \ case OPT_V_ISSUER_CHECKS: \ case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK: \ case OPT_V_CRL_CHECK_ALL: \ case OPT_V_POLICY_CHECK: \ case OPT_V_EXPLICIT_POLICY: \ case OPT_V_INHIBIT_ANY: \ case OPT_V_INHIBIT_MAP: \ case OPT_V_X509_STRICT: \ case OPT_V_EXTENDED_CRL: \ case OPT_V_USE_DELTAS: \ case OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT: \ case OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG: \ case OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST: \ case OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY: \ case OPT_V_SUITEB_128: \ case OPT_V_SUITEB_192: \ case OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN: \ case OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS: \ case OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME: \ case OPT_V_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS /* * Common "extended"? options. */ # define OPT_X_ENUM \ OPT_X__FIRST=1000, \ OPT_X_KEY, OPT_X_CERT, OPT_X_CHAIN, OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD, \ OPT_X_CERTFORM, OPT_X_KEYFORM, \ OPT_X__LAST # define OPT_X_OPTIONS \ { "xkey", OPT_X_KEY, '<', "key for Extended certificates"}, \ { "xcert", OPT_X_CERT, '<', "cert for Extended certificates"}, \ { "xchain", OPT_X_CHAIN, '<', "chain for Extended certificates"}, \ { "xchain_build", OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD, '-', \ "build certificate chain for the extended certificates"}, \ { "xcertform", OPT_X_CERTFORM, 'F', \ "format of Extended certificate (PEM or DER) PEM default " }, \ { "xkeyform", OPT_X_KEYFORM, 'F', \ "format of Extended certificate's key (PEM or DER) PEM default"} # define OPT_X_CASES \ OPT_X__FIRST: case OPT_X__LAST: break; \ case OPT_X_KEY: \ case OPT_X_CERT: \ case OPT_X_CHAIN: \ case OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD: \ case OPT_X_CERTFORM: \ case OPT_X_KEYFORM /* * Common SSL options. * Any changes here must be coordinated with ../ssl/ssl_conf.c */ # define OPT_S_ENUM \ OPT_S__FIRST=3000, \ OPT_S_NOSSL3, OPT_S_NOTLS1, OPT_S_NOTLS1_1, OPT_S_NOTLS1_2, \ OPT_S_BUGS, OPT_S_NO_COMP, OPT_S_NOTICKET, \ OPT_S_SERVERPREF, OPT_S_LEGACYRENEG, OPT_S_LEGACYCONN, \ OPT_S_ONRESUMP, OPT_S_NOLEGACYCONN, OPT_S_STRICT, OPT_S_SIGALGS, \ OPT_S_CLIENTSIGALGS, OPT_S_CURVES, OPT_S_NAMEDCURVE, OPT_S_CIPHER, \ OPT_S_DEBUGBROKE, OPT_S_COMP, \ OPT_S__LAST # define OPT_S_OPTIONS \ {"no_ssl3", OPT_S_NOSSL3, '-',"Just disable SSLv3" }, \ {"no_tls1", OPT_S_NOTLS1, '-', "Just disable TLSv1"}, \ {"no_tls1_1", OPT_S_NOTLS1_1, '-', "Just disable TLSv1.1" }, \ {"no_tls1_2", OPT_S_NOTLS1_2, '-', "Just disable TLSv1.2"}, \ {"bugs", OPT_S_BUGS, '-', "Turn on SSL bug compatibility"}, \ {"no_comp", OPT_S_NO_COMP, '-', "Disable SSL/TLS compression (default)" }, \ {"comp", OPT_S_COMP, '-', "Use SSL/TLS-level compression" }, \ {"no_ticket", OPT_S_NOTICKET, '-', \ "Disable use of TLS session tickets"}, \ {"serverpref", OPT_S_SERVERPREF, '-', "Use server's cipher preferences"}, \ {"legacy_renegotiation", OPT_S_LEGACYRENEG, '-', \ "Enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)"}, \ {"legacy_server_connect", OPT_S_LEGACYCONN, '-', \ "Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI"}, \ {"no_resumption_on_reneg", OPT_S_ONRESUMP, '-', \ "Disallow session resumption on renegotiation"}, \ {"no_legacy_server_connect", OPT_S_NOLEGACYCONN, '-', \ "Disallow initial connection to servers that don't support RI"}, \ {"strict", OPT_S_STRICT, '-', \ "Enforce strict certificate checks as per TLS standard"}, \ {"sigalgs", OPT_S_SIGALGS, 's', \ "Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)" }, \ {"client_sigalgs", OPT_S_CLIENTSIGALGS, 's', \ "Signature algorithms to support for client certificate" \ " authentication (colon-separated list)" }, \ {"curves", OPT_S_CURVES, 's', \ "Elliptic curves to advertise (colon-separated list)" }, \ {"named_curve", OPT_S_NAMEDCURVE, 's', \ "Elliptic curve used for ECDHE (server-side only)" }, \ {"cipher", OPT_S_CIPHER, 's', "Specify cipher list to be used"}, \ {"debug_broken_protocol", OPT_S_DEBUGBROKE, '-', \ "Perform all sorts of protocol violations for testing purposes"} # define OPT_S_CASES \ OPT_S__FIRST: case OPT_S__LAST: break; \ case OPT_S_NOSSL3: \ case OPT_S_NOTLS1: \ case OPT_S_NOTLS1_1: \ case OPT_S_NOTLS1_2: \ case OPT_S_BUGS: \ case OPT_S_NO_COMP: \ case OPT_S_COMP: \ case OPT_S_NOTICKET: \ case OPT_S_SERVERPREF: \ case OPT_S_LEGACYRENEG: \ case OPT_S_LEGACYCONN: \ case OPT_S_ONRESUMP: \ case OPT_S_NOLEGACYCONN: \ case OPT_S_STRICT: \ case OPT_S_SIGALGS: \ case OPT_S_CLIENTSIGALGS: \ case OPT_S_CURVES: \ case OPT_S_NAMEDCURVE: \ case OPT_S_CIPHER: \ case OPT_S_DEBUGBROKE #define IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_S_NOSSL3 || o == OPT_S_NOTLS1 || o == OPT_S_NOTLS1_1 \ || o == OPT_S_NOTLS1_2) /* * Option parsing. */ extern const char OPT_HELP_STR[]; extern const char OPT_MORE_STR[]; typedef struct options_st { const char *name; int retval; /* * value type: - no value (also the value zero), n number, p positive * number, u unsigned, l long, s string, < input file, > output file, * f any format, F der/pem format , E der/pem/engine format identifier. * l, n and u include zero; p does not. */ int valtype; const char *helpstr; } OPTIONS; /* * A string/int pairing; widely use for option value lookup, hence the * name OPT_PAIR. But that name is misleading in s_cb.c, so we also use * the "generic" name STRINT_PAIR. */ typedef struct string_int_pair_st { const char *name; int retval; } OPT_PAIR, STRINT_PAIR; /* Flags to pass into opt_format; see FORMAT_xxx, below. */ # define OPT_FMT_PEMDER (1L << 1) # define OPT_FMT_PKCS12 (1L << 2) # define OPT_FMT_SMIME (1L << 3) # define OPT_FMT_ENGINE (1L << 4) # define OPT_FMT_MSBLOB (1L << 5) # define OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE (1L << 6) # define OPT_FMT_NSS (1L << 7) # define OPT_FMT_TEXT (1L << 8) # define OPT_FMT_HTTP (1L << 9) # define OPT_FMT_PVK (1L << 10) # define OPT_FMT_PDE (OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_ENGINE) # define OPT_FMT_PDS (OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_SMIME) # define OPT_FMT_ANY ( \ OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_PKCS12 | OPT_FMT_SMIME | \ OPT_FMT_ENGINE | OPT_FMT_MSBLOB | OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE | \ OPT_FMT_NSS | OPT_FMT_TEXT | OPT_FMT_HTTP | OPT_FMT_PVK) char *opt_progname(const char *argv0); char *opt_getprog(void); char *opt_init(int ac, char **av, const OPTIONS * o); int opt_next(void); int opt_format(const char *s, unsigned long flags, int *result); int opt_int(const char *arg, int *result); int opt_ulong(const char *arg, unsigned long *result); int opt_long(const char *arg, long *result); #if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L && \ defined(INTMAX_MAX) && defined(UINTMAX_MAX) int opt_imax(const char *arg, intmax_t *result); int opt_umax(const char *arg, uintmax_t *result); #else # define opt_imax opt_long # define opt_umax opt_ulong # define intmax_t long # define uintmax_t unsigned long #endif int opt_pair(const char *arg, const OPT_PAIR * pairs, int *result); int opt_cipher(const char *name, const EVP_CIPHER **cipherp); int opt_md(const char *name, const EVP_MD **mdp); char *opt_arg(void); char *opt_flag(void); char *opt_unknown(void); char *opt_reset(void); char **opt_rest(void); int opt_num_rest(void); int opt_verify(int i, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); void opt_help(const OPTIONS * list); int opt_format_error(const char *s, unsigned long flags); typedef struct args_st { int size; int argc; char **argv; } ARGS; /* * VMS C only for now, implemented in vms_decc_init.c * If other C compilers forget to terminate argv with NULL, this function * can be re-used. */ char **copy_argv(int *argc, char *argv[]); /* * Win32-specific argv initialization that splits OS-supplied UNICODE * command line string to array of UTF8-encoded strings. */ void win32_utf8argv(int *argc, char **argv[]); # define PW_MIN_LENGTH 4 typedef struct pw_cb_data { const void *password; const char *prompt_info; } PW_CB_DATA; int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_data); int setup_ui_method(void); void destroy_ui_method(void); int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf); # ifdef HEADER_X509_H int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x); void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm, unsigned long lflags); # endif void print_bignum_var(BIO *, const BIGNUM *, const char*, int, unsigned char *); void print_array(BIO *, const char *, int, const unsigned char *); int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg); int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg); int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg); int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type); int app_passwd(const char *arg1, const char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2); int add_oid_section(CONF *conf); X509 *load_cert(const char *file, int format, const char *cert_descrip); X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format); EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip); EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip); int load_certs(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs, int format, const char *pass, const char *cert_descrip); int load_crls(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls, int format, const char *pass, const char *cert_descrip); X509_STORE *setup_verify(const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath); __owur int ctx_set_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * Sets the file to load the Certificate Transparency log list from. * If path is NULL, loads from the default file path. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path); #endif ENGINE *setup_engine(const char *engine, int debug); void release_engine(ENGINE *e); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(OCSP_REQUEST *req, const char *host, const char *path, const char *port, int use_ssl, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, int req_timeout); # endif /* Functions defined in ca.c and also used in ocsp.c */ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pinvtm, const char *str); # define DB_type 0 # define DB_exp_date 1 # define DB_rev_date 2 # define DB_serial 3 /* index - unique */ # define DB_file 4 # define DB_name 5 /* index - unique when active and not * disabled */ # define DB_NUMBER 6 # define DB_TYPE_REV 'R' # define DB_TYPE_EXP 'E' # define DB_TYPE_VAL 'V' typedef struct db_attr_st { int unique_subject; } DB_ATTR; typedef struct ca_db_st { DB_ATTR attributes; TXT_DB *db; } CA_DB; void* app_malloc(int sz, const char *what); BIGNUM *load_serial(const char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai); int save_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *suffix, const BIGNUM *serial, ASN1_INTEGER **retai); int rotate_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *new_suffix, const char *old_suffix); int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai); CA_DB *load_index(const char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *dbattr); int index_index(CA_DB *db); int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db); int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix, const char *old_suffix); void free_index(CA_DB *db); # define index_name_cmp_noconst(a, b) \ index_name_cmp((const OPENSSL_CSTRING *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, a), \ (const OPENSSL_CSTRING *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, b)) int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b); int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def); X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *str, long chtype, int multirdn); int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc, int *badarg, X509_VERIFY_PARAM **pm); void policies_print(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in); int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value); int init_gen_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const char *algname, ENGINE *e, int do_param); int do_X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts); int do_X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts); int do_X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK extern char *psk_key; # endif unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen, const char *in); void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x, const char *checkhost, const char *checkemail, const char *checkip); void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st); /* See OPT_FMT_xxx, above. */ /* On some platforms, it's important to distinguish between text and binary * files. On some, there might even be specific file formats for different * contents. The FORMAT_xxx macros are meant to express an intent with the * file being read or created. */ # define B_FORMAT_TEXT 0x8000 # define FORMAT_UNDEF 0 # define FORMAT_TEXT (1 | B_FORMAT_TEXT) /* Generic text */ # define FORMAT_BINARY 2 /* Generic binary */ # define FORMAT_BASE64 (3 | B_FORMAT_TEXT) /* Base64 */ # define FORMAT_ASN1 4 /* ASN.1/DER */ # define FORMAT_PEM (5 | B_FORMAT_TEXT) # define FORMAT_PKCS12 6 # define FORMAT_SMIME (7 | B_FORMAT_TEXT) # define FORMAT_ENGINE 8 /* Not really a file format */ # define FORMAT_PEMRSA (9 | B_FORMAT_TEXT) /* PEM RSAPubicKey format */ # define FORMAT_ASN1RSA 10 /* DER RSAPubicKey format */ # define FORMAT_MSBLOB 11 /* MS Key blob format */ # define FORMAT_PVK 12 /* MS PVK file format */ # define FORMAT_HTTP 13 /* Download using HTTP */ # define FORMAT_NSS 14 /* NSS keylog format */ # define EXT_COPY_NONE 0 # define EXT_COPY_ADD 1 # define EXT_COPY_ALL 2 # define NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR "certificate" # define APP_PASS_LEN 1024 # define SERIAL_RAND_BITS 64 int app_isdir(const char *); int app_access(const char *, int flag); int fileno_stdin(void); int fileno_stdout(void); int raw_read_stdin(void *, int); int raw_write_stdout(const void *, int); # define TM_START 0 # define TM_STOP 1 double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime); typedef struct verify_options_st { int depth; int quiet; int error; int return_error; } VERIFY_CB_ARGS; extern VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args; # include "progs.h" #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/dsa1024.pem0000644000000000000000000000070713176625656014612 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS----- MIIBHgKBgQCnP26Fv0FqKX3wn0cZMJCaCR3aajMexT2GlrMV4FMuj+BZgnOQPnUx mUd6UvuF5NmmezibaIqEm4fGHrV+hktTW1nPcWUZiG7OZq5riDb77Cjcwtelu+Us OSZL2ppwGJU3lRBWI/YV7boEXt45T/23Qx+1pGVvzYAR5HCVW1DNSQIVAPcHMe36 bAYD1YWKHKycZedQZmVvAoGATd9MA6aRivUZb1BGJZnlaG8w42nh5bNdmLsohkj8 3pkEP1+IDJxzJA0gXbkqmj8YlifkYofBe3RiU/xhJ6h6kQmdtvFNnFQPWAbuSXQH zlV+I84W9srcWmEBfslxtU323DQph2j2XiCTs9v15AlsQReVkusBtXOlan7YMu0O Arg= -----END DSA PARAMETERS----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/spkac.c0000644000000000000000000001272413176625656014300 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_PUBKEY, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_KEY, OPT_CHALLENGE, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_SPKAC, OPT_SPKSECT } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS spkac_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "Create SPKAC using private key"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"challenge", OPT_CHALLENGE, 's', "Challenge string"}, {"spkac", OPT_SPKAC, 's', "Alternative SPKAC name"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print SPKAC"}, {"pubkey", OPT_PUBKEY, '-', "Output public key"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify SPKAC signature"}, {"spksect", OPT_SPKSECT, 's', "Specify the name of an SPKAC-dedicated section of configuration"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int spkac_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *out = NULL; CONF *conf = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL; char *challenge = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL; char *spkstr = NULL, *prog; const char *spkac = "SPKAC", *spksect = "default"; int i, ret = 1, verify = 0, noout = 0, pubkey = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, spkac_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(spkac_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_PUBKEY: pubkey = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY: verify = 1; break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CHALLENGE: challenge = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SPKAC: spkac = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SPKSECT: spksect = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (keyfile != NULL) { pkey = load_key(strcmp(keyfile, "-") ? keyfile : NULL, FORMAT_PEM, 1, passin, e, "private key"); if (pkey == NULL) goto end; spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_new(); if (spki == NULL) goto end; if (challenge != NULL) ASN1_STRING_set(spki->spkac->challenge, challenge, (int)strlen(challenge)); NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(spki, pkey); NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(spki, pkey, EVP_md5()); spkstr = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(spki); if (spkstr == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT); if (out == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(spkstr); goto end; } BIO_printf(out, "SPKAC=%s\n", spkstr); OPENSSL_free(spkstr); ret = 0; goto end; } if ((conf = app_load_config(infile)) == NULL) goto end; spkstr = NCONF_get_string(conf, spksect, spkac); if (spkstr == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't find SPKAC called \"%s\"\n", spkac); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(spkstr, -1); if (spki == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading SPKAC\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_TEXT); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (!noout) NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(out, spki); pkey = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki); if (verify) { i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey); if (i > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature Failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (pubkey) PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey); ret = 0; end: NCONF_free(conf); NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki); BIO_free_all(out); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); release_engine(e); OPENSSL_free(passin); return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/x509.c0000644000000000000000000011047513176625656013706 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include #endif #undef POSTFIX #define POSTFIX ".srl" #define DEF_DAYS 30 static int callb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext, const EVP_MD *digest, CONF *conf, const char *section); static int x509_certify(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *CAfile, const EVP_MD *digest, X509 *x, X509 *xca, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, const char *serialfile, int create, int days, int clrext, CONF *conf, const char *section, ASN1_INTEGER *sno, int reqfile); static int purpose_print(BIO *bio, X509 *cert, X509_PURPOSE *pt); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_REQ, OPT_CAFORM, OPT_CAKEYFORM, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_DAYS, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_EXTFILE, OPT_EXTENSIONS, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_SIGNKEY, OPT_CA, OPT_CAKEY, OPT_CASERIAL, OPT_SET_SERIAL, OPT_FORCE_PUBKEY, OPT_ADDTRUST, OPT_ADDREJECT, OPT_SETALIAS, OPT_CERTOPT, OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_C, OPT_EMAIL, OPT_OCSP_URI, OPT_SERIAL, OPT_NEXT_SERIAL, OPT_MODULUS, OPT_PUBKEY, OPT_X509TOREQ, OPT_TEXT, OPT_HASH, OPT_ISSUER_HASH, OPT_SUBJECT, OPT_ISSUER, OPT_FINGERPRINT, OPT_DATES, OPT_PURPOSE, OPT_STARTDATE, OPT_ENDDATE, OPT_CHECKEND, OPT_CHECKHOST, OPT_CHECKEMAIL, OPT_CHECKIP, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TRUSTOUT, OPT_CLRTRUST, OPT_CLRREJECT, OPT_ALIAS, OPT_CACREATESERIAL, OPT_CLREXT, OPT_OCSPID, OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD, OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD, OPT_BADSIG, OPT_MD, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_NOCERT } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS x509_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format - default PEM (one of DER, NET or PEM)"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file - default stdin"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format - default PEM (one of DER, NET or PEM)"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file - default stdout"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'F', "Private key format - default PEM"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Private key password/pass-phrase source"}, {"serial", OPT_SERIAL, '-', "Print serial number value"}, {"subject_hash", OPT_HASH, '-', "Print subject hash value"}, {"issuer_hash", OPT_ISSUER_HASH, '-', "Print issuer hash value"}, {"hash", OPT_HASH, '-', "Synonym for -subject_hash"}, {"subject", OPT_SUBJECT, '-', "Print subject DN"}, {"issuer", OPT_ISSUER, '-', "Print issuer DN"}, {"email", OPT_EMAIL, '-', "Print email address(es)"}, {"startdate", OPT_STARTDATE, '-', "Set notBefore field"}, {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, '-', "Set notAfter field"}, {"purpose", OPT_PURPOSE, '-', "Print out certificate purposes"}, {"dates", OPT_DATES, '-', "Both Before and After dates"}, {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "Print the RSA key modulus"}, {"pubkey", OPT_PUBKEY, '-', "Output the public key"}, {"fingerprint", OPT_FINGERPRINT, '-', "Print the certificate fingerprint"}, {"alias", OPT_ALIAS, '-', "Output certificate alias"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "No output, just status"}, {"nocert", OPT_NOCERT, '-', "No certificate output"}, {"ocspid", OPT_OCSPID, '-', "Print OCSP hash values for the subject name and public key"}, {"ocsp_uri", OPT_OCSP_URI, '-', "Print OCSP Responder URL(s)"}, {"trustout", OPT_TRUSTOUT, '-', "Output a trusted certificate"}, {"clrtrust", OPT_CLRTRUST, '-', "Clear all trusted purposes"}, {"clrext", OPT_CLREXT, '-', "Clear all certificate extensions"}, {"addtrust", OPT_ADDTRUST, 's', "Trust certificate for a given purpose"}, {"addreject", OPT_ADDREJECT, 's', "Reject certificate for a given purpose"}, {"setalias", OPT_SETALIAS, 's', "Set certificate alias"}, {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'n', "How long till expiry of a signed certificate - def 30 days"}, {"checkend", OPT_CHECKEND, 'M', "Check whether the cert expires in the next arg seconds"}, {OPT_MORE_STR, 1, 1, "Exit 1 if so, 0 if not"}, {"signkey", OPT_SIGNKEY, '<', "Self sign cert with arg"}, {"x509toreq", OPT_X509TOREQ, '-', "Output a certification request object"}, {"req", OPT_REQ, '-', "Input is a certificate request, sign and output"}, {"CA", OPT_CA, '<', "Set the CA certificate, must be PEM format"}, {"CAkey", OPT_CAKEY, 's', "The CA key, must be PEM format; if not in CAfile"}, {"CAcreateserial", OPT_CACREATESERIAL, '-', "Create serial number file if it does not exist"}, {"CAserial", OPT_CASERIAL, 's', "Serial file"}, {"set_serial", OPT_SET_SERIAL, 's', "Serial number to use"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the certificate in text form"}, {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print out C code forms"}, {"extfile", OPT_EXTFILE, '<', "File with X509V3 extensions to add"}, {"extensions", OPT_EXTENSIONS, 's', "Section from config file to use"}, {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"}, {"certopt", OPT_CERTOPT, 's', "Various certificate text options"}, {"checkhost", OPT_CHECKHOST, 's', "Check certificate matches host"}, {"checkemail", OPT_CHECKEMAIL, 's', "Check certificate matches email"}, {"checkip", OPT_CHECKIP, 's', "Check certificate matches ipaddr"}, {"CAform", OPT_CAFORM, 'F', "CA format - default PEM"}, {"CAkeyform", OPT_CAKEYFORM, 'f', "CA key format - default PEM"}, {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"}, {"force_pubkey", OPT_FORCE_PUBKEY, '<', "Force the Key to put inside certificate"}, {"next_serial", OPT_NEXT_SERIAL, '-', "Increment current certificate serial number"}, {"clrreject", OPT_CLRREJECT, '-', "Clears all the prohibited or rejected uses of the certificate"}, {"badsig", OPT_BADSIG, '-', "Corrupt last byte of certificate signature (for test)"}, {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 {"subject_hash_old", OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD, '-', "Print old-style (MD5) issuer hash value"}, {"issuer_hash_old", OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD, '-', "Print old-style (MD5) subject hash value"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {NULL} }; int x509_main(int argc, char **argv) { ASN1_INTEGER *sno = NULL; ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; CONF *extconf = NULL; EVP_PKEY *Upkey = NULL, *CApkey = NULL, *fkey = NULL; STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust = NULL, *reject = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL; X509 *x = NULL, *xca = NULL; X509_REQ *req = NULL, *rq = NULL; X509_STORE *ctx = NULL; const EVP_MD *digest = NULL; char *CAkeyfile = NULL, *CAserial = NULL, *fkeyfile = NULL, *alias = NULL; char *checkhost = NULL, *checkemail = NULL, *checkip = NULL; char *extsect = NULL, *extfile = NULL, *passin = NULL, *passinarg = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; char buf[256], *prog; int x509req = 0, days = DEF_DAYS, modulus = 0, pubkey = 0, pprint = 0; int C = 0, CAformat = FORMAT_PEM, CAkeyformat = FORMAT_PEM; int fingerprint = 0, reqfile = 0, need_rand = 0, checkend = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, keyformat = FORMAT_PEM; int next_serial = 0, subject_hash = 0, issuer_hash = 0, ocspid = 0; int noout = 0, sign_flag = 0, CA_flag = 0, CA_createserial = 0, email = 0; int ocsp_uri = 0, trustout = 0, clrtrust = 0, clrreject = 0, aliasout = 0; int ret = 1, i, num = 0, badsig = 0, clrext = 0, nocert = 0; int text = 0, serial = 0, subject = 0, issuer = 0, startdate = 0; int enddate = 0; time_t checkoffset = 0; unsigned long nmflag = 0, certflag = 0; char nmflag_set = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; ENGINE *e = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 int subject_hash_old = 0, issuer_hash_old = 0; #endif ctx = X509_STORE_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto end; X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(ctx, callb); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, x509_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(x509_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &keyformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CAFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &CAformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CAKEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &CAkeyformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_REQ: reqfile = need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_SIGOPT: if (!sigopts) sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_DAYS: days = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_EXTFILE: extfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_EXTENSIONS: extsect = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGNKEY: keyfile = opt_arg(); sign_flag = ++num; need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_CA: CAfile = opt_arg(); CA_flag = ++num; need_rand = 1; break; case OPT_CAKEY: CAkeyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CASERIAL: CAserial = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SET_SERIAL: if (sno != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial number supplied twice\n"); goto opthelp; } if ((sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, opt_arg())) == NULL) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_FORCE_PUBKEY: fkeyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ADDTRUST: if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid trust object value %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } if (trust == NULL && (trust = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(trust, objtmp); objtmp = NULL; trustout = 1; break; case OPT_ADDREJECT: if ((objtmp = OBJ_txt2obj(opt_arg(), 0)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Invalid reject object value %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } if (reject == NULL && (reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL) goto end; sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(reject, objtmp); objtmp = NULL; trustout = 1; break; case OPT_SETALIAS: alias = opt_arg(); trustout = 1; break; case OPT_CERTOPT: if (!set_cert_ex(&certflag, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_NAMEOPT: nmflag_set = 1; if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_C: C = ++num; break; case OPT_EMAIL: email = ++num; break; case OPT_OCSP_URI: ocsp_uri = ++num; break; case OPT_SERIAL: serial = ++num; break; case OPT_NEXT_SERIAL: next_serial = ++num; break; case OPT_MODULUS: modulus = ++num; break; case OPT_PUBKEY: pubkey = ++num; break; case OPT_X509TOREQ: x509req = ++num; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = ++num; break; case OPT_SUBJECT: subject = ++num; break; case OPT_ISSUER: issuer = ++num; break; case OPT_FINGERPRINT: fingerprint = ++num; break; case OPT_HASH: subject_hash = ++num; break; case OPT_ISSUER_HASH: issuer_hash = ++num; break; case OPT_PURPOSE: pprint = ++num; break; case OPT_STARTDATE: startdate = ++num; break; case OPT_ENDDATE: enddate = ++num; break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = ++num; break; case OPT_NOCERT: nocert = 1; break; case OPT_TRUSTOUT: trustout = 1; break; case OPT_CLRTRUST: clrtrust = ++num; break; case OPT_CLRREJECT: clrreject = ++num; break; case OPT_ALIAS: aliasout = ++num; break; case OPT_CACREATESERIAL: CA_createserial = ++num; break; case OPT_CLREXT: clrext = 1; break; case OPT_OCSPID: ocspid = ++num; break; case OPT_BADSIG: badsig = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 case OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD: subject_hash_old = ++num; break; case OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD: issuer_hash_old = ++num; break; #else case OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD: case OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD: break; #endif case OPT_DATES: startdate = ++num; enddate = ++num; break; case OPT_CHECKEND: checkend = 1; { intmax_t temp = 0; if (!opt_imax(opt_arg(), &temp)) goto opthelp; checkoffset = (time_t)temp; if ((intmax_t)checkoffset != temp) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: checkend time out of range %s\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto opthelp; } } break; case OPT_CHECKHOST: checkhost = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CHECKEMAIL: checkemail = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CHECKIP: checkip = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MD: if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &digest)) goto opthelp; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (argc != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown parameter %s\n", prog, argv[0]); goto opthelp; } if (!nmflag_set) nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE; out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (need_rand) app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0); if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (!X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (fkeyfile) { fkey = load_pubkey(fkeyfile, keyformat, 0, NULL, e, "Forced key"); if (fkey == NULL) goto end; } if ((CAkeyfile == NULL) && (CA_flag) && (CAformat == FORMAT_PEM)) { CAkeyfile = CAfile; } else if ((CA_flag) && (CAkeyfile == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "need to specify a CAkey if using the CA command\n"); goto end; } if (extfile) { X509V3_CTX ctx2; if ((extconf = app_load_config(extfile)) == NULL) goto end; if (!extsect) { extsect = NCONF_get_string(extconf, "default", "extensions"); if (!extsect) { ERR_clear_error(); extsect = "default"; } } X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx2); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx2, extconf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(extconf, &ctx2, extsect, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Loading extension section %s\n", extsect); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (reqfile) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; BIO *in; if (!sign_flag && !CA_flag) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "We need a private key to sign with\n"); goto end; } in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', informat); if (in == NULL) goto end; req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(in); if (req == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if ((pkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n"); goto end; } i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pkey); if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification error\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (i == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate request\n"); goto end; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n"); print_name(bio_err, "subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag); if ((x = X509_new()) == NULL) goto end; if (sno == NULL) { sno = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (sno == NULL || !rand_serial(NULL, sno)) goto end; if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x, sno)) goto end; ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno); sno = NULL; } else if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x, sno)) goto end; if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req))) goto end; if (!X509_set_subject_name(x, X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req))) goto end; if (!set_cert_times(x, NULL, NULL, days)) goto end; if (fkey) X509_set_pubkey(x, fkey); else { pkey = X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req); X509_set_pubkey(x, pkey); } } else x = load_cert(infile, informat, "Certificate"); if (x == NULL) goto end; if (CA_flag) { xca = load_cert(CAfile, CAformat, "CA Certificate"); if (xca == NULL) goto end; } if (!noout || text || next_serial) { OBJ_create("2.99999.3", "SET.ex3", "SET x509v3 extension 3"); } if (alias) X509_alias_set1(x, (unsigned char *)alias, -1); if (clrtrust) X509_trust_clear(x); if (clrreject) X509_reject_clear(x); if (trust) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(trust); i++) { objtmp = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(trust, i); X509_add1_trust_object(x, objtmp); } objtmp = NULL; } if (reject) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(reject); i++) { objtmp = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(reject, i); X509_add1_reject_object(x, objtmp); } objtmp = NULL; } if (badsig) { const ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; X509_get0_signature(&signature, NULL, x); corrupt_signature(signature); } if (num) { for (i = 1; i <= num; i++) { if (issuer == i) { print_name(out, "issuer=", X509_get_issuer_name(x), nmflag); } else if (subject == i) { print_name(out, "subject=", X509_get_subject_name(x), nmflag); } else if (serial == i) { BIO_printf(out, "serial="); i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, X509_get_serialNumber(x)); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } else if (next_serial == i) { ASN1_INTEGER *ser = X509_get_serialNumber(x); BIGNUM *bnser = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser, NULL); if (!bnser) goto end; if (!BN_add_word(bnser, 1)) goto end; ser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bnser, NULL); if (!ser) goto end; BN_free(bnser); i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ser); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ser); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } else if ((email == i) || (ocsp_uri == i)) { int j; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *emlst; if (email == i) emlst = X509_get1_email(x); else emlst = X509_get1_ocsp(x); for (j = 0; j < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(emlst); j++) BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(emlst, j)); X509_email_free(emlst); } else if (aliasout == i) { unsigned char *alstr; alstr = X509_alias_get0(x, NULL); if (alstr) BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", alstr); else BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } else if (subject_hash == i) { BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_subject_name_hash(x)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 else if (subject_hash_old == i) { BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_subject_name_hash_old(x)); } #endif else if (issuer_hash == i) { BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_issuer_name_hash(x)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 else if (issuer_hash_old == i) { BIO_printf(out, "%08lx\n", X509_issuer_name_hash_old(x)); } #endif else if (pprint == i) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; int j; BIO_printf(out, "Certificate purposes:\n"); for (j = 0; j < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); j++) { ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(j); purpose_print(out, x, ptmp); } } else if (modulus == i) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Modulus=unavailable\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(out, "Modulus="); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { const BIGNUM *n; RSA_get0_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey), &n, NULL, NULL); BN_print(out, n); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { const BIGNUM *dsapub = NULL; DSA_get0_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey), &dsapub, NULL); BN_print(out, dsapub); } else #endif { BIO_printf(out, "Wrong Algorithm type"); } BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } else if (pubkey == i) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting public key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey); } else if (C == i) { unsigned char *d; char *m; int len; X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(out, "/*\n" " * Subject: %s\n", buf); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), buf, sizeof buf); BIO_printf(out, " * Issuer: %s\n" " */\n", buf); len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); m = app_malloc(len, "x509 name buffer"); d = (unsigned char *)m; len = i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(x), &d); print_array(out, "the_subject_name", len, (unsigned char *)m); d = (unsigned char *)m; len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x), &d); print_array(out, "the_public_key", len, (unsigned char *)m); d = (unsigned char *)m; len = i2d_X509(x, &d); print_array(out, "the_certificate", len, (unsigned char *)m); OPENSSL_free(m); } else if (text == i) { X509_print_ex(out, x, nmflag, certflag); } else if (startdate == i) { BIO_puts(out, "notBefore="); ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_get0_notBefore(x)); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } else if (enddate == i) { BIO_puts(out, "notAfter="); ASN1_TIME_print(out, X509_get0_notAfter(x)); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } else if (fingerprint == i) { int j; unsigned int n; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; const EVP_MD *fdig = digest; if (!fdig) fdig = EVP_sha1(); if (!X509_digest(x, fdig, md, &n)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n"); goto end; } BIO_printf(out, "%s Fingerprint=", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(fdig))); for (j = 0; j < (int)n; j++) { BIO_printf(out, "%02X%c", md[j], (j + 1 == (int)n) ? '\n' : ':'); } } /* should be in the library */ else if ((sign_flag == i) && (x509req == 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Getting Private key\n"); if (Upkey == NULL) { Upkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, passin, e, "Private key"); if (Upkey == NULL) goto end; } assert(need_rand); if (!sign(x, Upkey, days, clrext, digest, extconf, extsect)) goto end; } else if (CA_flag == i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Getting CA Private Key\n"); if (CAkeyfile != NULL) { CApkey = load_key(CAkeyfile, CAkeyformat, 0, passin, e, "CA Private Key"); if (CApkey == NULL) goto end; } assert(need_rand); if (!x509_certify(ctx, CAfile, digest, x, xca, CApkey, sigopts, CAserial, CA_createserial, days, clrext, extconf, extsect, sno, reqfile)) goto end; } else if (x509req == i) { EVP_PKEY *pk; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Getting request Private Key\n"); if (keyfile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no request key file specified\n"); goto end; } else { pk = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, passin, e, "request key"); if (pk == NULL) goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating certificate request\n"); rq = X509_to_X509_REQ(x, pk, digest); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); if (rq == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!noout) { X509_REQ_print(out, rq); PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(out, rq); } noout = 1; } else if (ocspid == i) { X509_ocspid_print(out, x); } } } if (checkend) { time_t tcheck = time(NULL) + checkoffset; if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), &tcheck) < 0) { BIO_printf(out, "Certificate will expire\n"); ret = 1; } else { BIO_printf(out, "Certificate will not expire\n"); ret = 0; } goto end; } print_cert_checks(out, x, checkhost, checkemail, checkip); if (noout || nocert) { ret = 0; goto end; } if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) i = i2d_X509_bio(out, x); else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) { if (trustout) i = PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX(out, x); else i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; } if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write certificate\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; end: if (need_rand) app_RAND_write_file(NULL); NCONF_free(extconf); BIO_free_all(out); X509_STORE_free(ctx); X509_REQ_free(req); X509_free(x); X509_free(xca); EVP_PKEY_free(Upkey); EVP_PKEY_free(CApkey); EVP_PKEY_free(fkey); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts); X509_REQ_free(rq); ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno); sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(trust, ASN1_OBJECT_free); sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(reject, ASN1_OBJECT_free); ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp); release_engine(e); OPENSSL_free(passin); return (ret); } static ASN1_INTEGER *x509_load_serial(const char *CAfile, const char *serialfile, int create) { char *buf = NULL, *p; ASN1_INTEGER *bs = NULL; BIGNUM *serial = NULL; size_t len; len = ((serialfile == NULL) ? (strlen(CAfile) + strlen(POSTFIX) + 1) : (strlen(serialfile))) + 1; buf = app_malloc(len, "serial# buffer"); if (serialfile == NULL) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, CAfile, len); for (p = buf; *p; p++) if (*p == '.') { *p = '\0'; break; } OPENSSL_strlcat(buf, POSTFIX, len); } else OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, serialfile, len); serial = load_serial(buf, create, NULL); if (serial == NULL) goto end; if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "add_word failure\n"); goto end; } if (!save_serial(buf, NULL, serial, &bs)) goto end; end: OPENSSL_free(buf); BN_free(serial); return bs; } static int x509_certify(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *CAfile, const EVP_MD *digest, X509 *x, X509 *xca, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts, const char *serialfile, int create, int days, int clrext, CONF *conf, const char *section, ASN1_INTEGER *sno, int reqfile) { int ret = 0; ASN1_INTEGER *bs = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *xsc = NULL; EVP_PKEY *upkey; upkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xca); if (upkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error obtaining CA X509 public key\n"); goto end; } EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(upkey, pkey); xsc = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xsc == NULL || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(xsc, ctx, x, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error initialising X509 store\n"); goto end; } if (sno) bs = sno; else if ((bs = x509_load_serial(CAfile, serialfile, create)) == NULL) goto end; /* * NOTE: this certificate can/should be self signed, unless it was a * certificate request in which case it is not. */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(xsc, x); X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xsc, X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE); if (!reqfile && X509_verify_cert(xsc) <= 0) goto end; if (!X509_check_private_key(xca, pkey)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "CA certificate and CA private key do not match\n"); goto end; } if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x, X509_get_subject_name(xca))) goto end; if (!X509_set_serialNumber(x, bs)) goto end; if (!set_cert_times(x, NULL, NULL, days)) goto end; if (clrext) { while (X509_get_ext_count(x) > 0) X509_delete_ext(x, 0); } if (conf) { X509V3_CTX ctx2; X509_set_version(x, 2); /* version 3 certificate */ X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx2, xca, x, NULL, NULL, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx2, conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx2, section, x)) goto end; } if (!do_X509_sign(x, pkey, digest, sigopts)) goto end; ret = 1; end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(xsc); if (!ret) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (!sno) ASN1_INTEGER_free(bs); return ret; } static int callb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int err; X509 *err_cert; /* * it is ok to use a self signed certificate This case will catch both * the initial ok == 0 and the final ok == 1 calls to this function */ err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); if (err == X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) return 1; /* * BAD we should have gotten an error. Normally if everything worked * X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) will still be set to * DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_.... */ if (ok) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error with certificate to be certified - should be self signed\n"); return 0; } else { err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); print_name(bio_err, NULL, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), 0); BIO_printf(bio_err, "error with certificate - error %d at depth %d\n%s\n", err, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); return 1; } } /* self sign */ static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext, const EVP_MD *digest, CONF *conf, const char *section) { if (!X509_set_issuer_name(x, X509_get_subject_name(x))) goto err; if (!set_cert_times(x, NULL, NULL, days)) goto err; if (!X509_set_pubkey(x, pkey)) goto err; if (clrext) { while (X509_get_ext_count(x) > 0) X509_delete_ext(x, 0); } if (conf) { X509V3_CTX ctx; X509_set_version(x, 2); /* version 3 certificate */ X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x, x, NULL, NULL, 0); X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf); if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, section, x)) goto err; } if (!X509_sign(x, pkey, digest)) goto err; return 1; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } static int purpose_print(BIO *bio, X509 *cert, X509_PURPOSE *pt) { int id, i, idret; const char *pname; id = X509_PURPOSE_get_id(pt); pname = X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(pt); for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { idret = X509_check_purpose(cert, id, i); BIO_printf(bio, "%s%s : ", pname, i ? " CA" : ""); if (idret == 1) BIO_printf(bio, "Yes\n"); else if (idret == 0) BIO_printf(bio, "No\n"); else BIO_printf(bio, "Yes (WARNING code=%d)\n", idret); } return 1; } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/pca-key.pem0000644000000000000000000000162413176625656015064 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIICdgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAmAwggJcAgEAAoGBALYYjjtpLs/lfkPF xAFZ4V3He5mZFbsEakK9bA2fQaryreRwyfhbXbDJHyBV+c4xI5fbmmVd2t/us4k4 rMhGsBtL89SqCEHhPJpLFywiQVmJTAjANYrWkZK5uR/++YmZyzuLfPHLButuK6cF GKXw3NNToxjYooMf0mad2rPX3cKTAgMBAAECgYBvrJ+Nz/Pli9jjt2V9bqHH4Y7r o/avuwVv6Ltbn0+mhy4d6w3yQhYzVSTBr/iDe59YglUt1WFl8/4nKZrNOIzHJlav Sw4hd3fYBHxbT+DgZMQ9ikjHECWRdDffrnlTLsSJAcxnpMJBPe3dKCRDMUrqWUvB IIKaxyqmXJms5Y/wAQJBAPFL9NMKJcWBftMKXCasxsV0ZGjgqHGZODYjtGFN9jJO 6AbZrxfCcapTWG4RCC2o/EDEMN8aArEhfdrYY3lhXGsCQQDBMRzFevkD7SYXTw5G NA/gJOAsFMYbt7tebcCRsHT7t3ymVfO2QwK7ZF0f/SYvi7cMAPraHvO7s3kFdGTB kDx5AkAHBICASsFCdzurA5gef9PgFjx9WFtNwnkCChPK6KuKVwUkfdw7wqnvnDDs Mo6cVVfQwmPxeR4u7JxuavCprQ01AkEAp5ZGAh1J9Jj9CQ1AMbAp8WOrvzGKJTM9 641Dll4/LLif/d7j2kDJFuvaSMyeGnKVqGkVMq/U+QeYPR4Z5TuM6QJAWK05qFed wYgTZyVN0MY53ZOMAIWwjz0cr24TvDfmsZqIvguGL616GKQZKdKDZQyQHg+dCzqJ HgIoacuFDKz5CA== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/tsget.in0000644000000000000000000001471513176625656014513 0ustar rootroot#!{- $config{hashbangperl} -} # Copyright (c) 2002 The OpenTSA Project. All rights reserved. # Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html use strict; use IO::Handle; use Getopt::Std; use File::Basename; use WWW::Curl::Easy; use vars qw(%options); # Callback for reading the body. sub read_body { my ($maxlength, $state) = @_; my $return_data = ""; my $data_len = length ${$state->{data}}; if ($state->{bytes} < $data_len) { $data_len = $data_len - $state->{bytes}; $data_len = $maxlength if $data_len > $maxlength; $return_data = substr ${$state->{data}}, $state->{bytes}, $data_len; $state->{bytes} += $data_len; } return $return_data; } # Callback for writing the body into a variable. sub write_body { my ($data, $pointer) = @_; ${$pointer} .= $data; return length($data); } # Initialise a new Curl object. sub create_curl { my $url = shift; # Create Curl object. my $curl = WWW::Curl::Easy::new(); # Error-handling related options. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1) if $options{d}; $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, 1); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_USERAGENT, "OpenTSA tsget.pl/openssl-{- $config{version} -}"); # Options for POST method. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_UPLOAD, 1); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST, "POST"); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, ["Content-Type: application/timestamp-query", "Accept: application/timestamp-reply,application/timestamp-response"]); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, \&read_body); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_HEADERFUNCTION, sub { return length($_[0]); }); # Options for getting the result. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, \&write_body); # SSL related options. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLKEYTYPE, "PEM"); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 1); # Verify server's certificate. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 2); # Check server's CN. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLKEY, $options{k}) if defined($options{k}); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLKEYPASSWD, $options{p}) if defined($options{p}); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_SSLCERT, $options{c}) if defined($options{c}); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_CAINFO, $options{C}) if defined($options{C}); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_CAPATH, $options{P}) if defined($options{P}); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_RANDOM_FILE, $options{r}) if defined($options{r}); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_EGDSOCKET, $options{g}) if defined($options{g}); # Setting destination. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_URL, $url); return $curl; } # Send a request and returns the body back. sub get_timestamp { my $curl = shift; my $body = shift; my $ts_body; local $::error_buf; # Error-handling related options. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, "::error_buf"); # Options for POST method. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_INFILE, {data => $body, bytes => 0}); $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, length(${$body})); # Options for getting the result. $curl->setopt(CURLOPT_FILE, \$ts_body); # Send the request... my $error_code = $curl->perform(); my $error_string; if ($error_code != 0) { my $http_code = $curl->getinfo(CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE); $error_string = "could not get timestamp"; $error_string .= ", http code: $http_code" unless $http_code == 0; $error_string .= ", curl code: $error_code"; $error_string .= " ($::error_buf)" if defined($::error_buf); } else { my $ct = $curl->getinfo(CURLINFO_CONTENT_TYPE); if (lc($ct) ne "application/timestamp-reply" && lc($ct) ne "application/timestamp-response") { $error_string = "unexpected content type returned: $ct"; } } return ($ts_body, $error_string); } # Print usage information and exists. sub usage { print STDERR "usage: $0 -h [-e ] [-o ] "; print STDERR "[-v] [-d] [-k ] [-p ] "; print STDERR "[-c ] [-C ] [-P ] "; print STDERR "[-r ] [-g ] []...\n"; exit 1; } # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # Main program # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # Getting command-line options (default comes from TSGET environment variable). my $getopt_arg = "h:e:o:vdk:p:c:C:P:r:g:"; if (exists $ENV{TSGET}) { my @old_argv = @ARGV; @ARGV = split /\s+/, $ENV{TSGET}; getopts($getopt_arg, \%options) or usage; @ARGV = @old_argv; } getopts($getopt_arg, \%options) or usage; # Checking argument consistency. if (!exists($options{h}) || (@ARGV == 0 && !exists($options{o})) || (@ARGV > 1 && exists($options{o}))) { print STDERR "Inconsistent command line options.\n"; usage; } # Setting defaults. @ARGV = ("-") unless @ARGV != 0; $options{e} = ".tsr" unless defined($options{e}); # Processing requests. my $curl = create_curl $options{h}; undef $/; # For reading whole files. REQUEST: foreach (@ARGV) { my $input = $_; my ($base, $path) = fileparse($input, '\.[^.]*'); my $output_base = $base . $options{e}; my $output = defined($options{o}) ? $options{o} : $path . $output_base; STDERR->printflush("$input: ") if $options{v}; # Read request. my $body; if ($input eq "-") { # Read the request from STDIN; $body = ; } else { # Read the request from file. open INPUT, "<" . $input or warn("$input: could not open input file: $!\n"), next REQUEST; $body = ; close INPUT or warn("$input: could not close input file: $!\n"), next REQUEST; } # Send request. STDERR->printflush("sending request") if $options{v}; my ($ts_body, $error) = get_timestamp $curl, \$body; if (defined($error)) { die "$input: fatal error: $error\n"; } STDERR->printflush(", reply received") if $options{v}; # Write response. if ($output eq "-") { # Write to STDOUT. print $ts_body; } else { # Write to file. open OUTPUT, ">", $output or warn("$output: could not open output file: $!\n"), next REQUEST; print OUTPUT $ts_body; close OUTPUT or warn("$output: could not close output file: $!\n"), next REQUEST; } STDERR->printflush(", $output written.\n") if $options{v}; } $curl->cleanup(); openssl-1.1.0g/apps/vms_term_sock.c0000644000000000000000000004245013176625656016051 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 VMS Software, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef __VMS # define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # pragma message disable DOLLARID # include # if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno(). The * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined. */ # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 # endif # include # undef _POSIX_C_SOURCE # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef __alpha # include # else typedef struct _iosb { /* Copied from IOSBDEF.H for Alpha */ # pragma __nomember_alignment __union { __struct { unsigned short int iosb$w_status; /* Final I/O status */ __union { __struct { /* 16-bit byte count variant */ unsigned short int iosb$w_bcnt; /* 16-bit byte count */ __union { unsigned int iosb$l_dev_depend; /* 32-bit device dependent info */ unsigned int iosb$l_pid; /* 32-bit pid */ } iosb$r_l; } iosb$r_bcnt_16; __struct { /* 32-bit byte count variant */ unsigned int iosb$l_bcnt; /* 32-bit byte count (unaligned) */ unsigned short int iosb$w_dev_depend_high; /* 16-bit device dependent info */ } iosb$r_bcnt_32; } iosb$r_devdepend; } iosb$r_io_64; __struct { __union { unsigned int iosb$l_getxxi_status; /* Final GETxxI status */ unsigned int iosb$l_reg_status; /* Final $Registry status */ } iosb$r_l_status; unsigned int iosb$l_reserved; /* Reserved field */ } iosb$r_get_64; } iosb$r_io_get; } IOSB; # if !defined(__VAXC) # define iosb$w_status iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$w_status # define iosb$w_bcnt iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_16.iosb$w_bcnt # define iosb$r_l iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_16.iosb$r_l # define iosb$l_dev_depend iosb$r_l.iosb$l_dev_depend # define iosb$l_pid iosb$r_l.iosb$l_pid # define iosb$l_bcnt iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_32.iosb$l_bcnt # define iosb$w_dev_depend_high iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_io_64.iosb$r_devdepend.iosb$r_bcnt_32.iosb$w_dev_depend_high # define iosb$l_getxxi_status iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_get_64.iosb$r_l_status.iosb$l_getxxi_status # define iosb$l_reg_status iosb$r_io_get.iosb$r_get_64.iosb$r_l_status.iosb$l_reg_status # endif /* #if !defined(__VAXC) */ # endif /* End of IOSBDEF */ # include # include # include # include # include # include # include "vms_term_sock.h" # ifdef __alpha static struct _iosb TerminalDeviceIosb; # else IOSB TerminalDeviceIosb; # endif static char TerminalDeviceBuff[255 + 2]; static int TerminalSocketPair[2] = {0, 0}; static unsigned short TerminalDeviceChan = 0; static int CreateSocketPair (int, int, int, int *); static void SocketPairTimeoutAst (int); static int TerminalDeviceAst (int); static void LogMessage (char *, ...); /* ** Socket Pair Timeout Value (must be 0-59 seconds) */ # define SOCKET_PAIR_TIMEOUT_VALUE 20 /* ** Socket Pair Timeout Block which is passed to timeout AST */ typedef struct _SocketPairTimeoutBlock { unsigned short SockChan1; unsigned short SockChan2; } SPTB; # ifdef TERM_SOCK_TEST /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* */ /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ int main (int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]) { char TermBuff[80]; int TermSock, status, len; LogMessage ("Enter 'q' or 'Q' to quit ..."); while (strcasecmp (TermBuff, "Q")) { /* ** Create the terminal socket */ status = TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_CREATE, &TermSock); if (status != TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS) exit (1); /* ** Process the terminal input */ LogMessage ("Waiting on terminal I/O ...\n"); len = recv (TermSock, TermBuff, sizeof (TermBuff), 0) ; TermBuff[len] = '\0'; LogMessage ("Received terminal I/O [%s]", TermBuff); /* ** Delete the terminal socket */ status = TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_DELETE, &TermSock); if (status != TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS) exit (1); } return 1; } # endif /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* */ /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ int TerminalSocket (int FunctionCode, int *ReturnSocket) { int status; $DESCRIPTOR (TerminalDeviceDesc, "SYS$COMMAND"); /* ** Process the requested function code */ switch (FunctionCode) { case TERM_SOCK_CREATE: /* ** Create a socket pair */ status = CreateSocketPair (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, TerminalSocketPair); if (status == -1) { LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: CreateSocketPair () - %08X", status); if (TerminalSocketPair[0]) close (TerminalSocketPair[0]); if (TerminalSocketPair[1]) close (TerminalSocketPair[1]); return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE); } /* ** Assign a channel to the terminal device */ status = sys$assign (&TerminalDeviceDesc, &TerminalDeviceChan, 0, 0, 0); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$ASSIGN () - %08X", status); close (TerminalSocketPair[0]); close (TerminalSocketPair[1]); return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE); } /* ** Queue an async IO to the terminal device */ status = sys$qio (EFN$C_ENF, TerminalDeviceChan, IO$_READVBLK, &TerminalDeviceIosb, TerminalDeviceAst, 0, TerminalDeviceBuff, sizeof (TerminalDeviceBuff) - 2, 0, 0, 0, 0); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$QIO () - %08X", status); close (TerminalSocketPair[0]); close (TerminalSocketPair[1]); return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE); } /* ** Return the input side of the socket pair */ *ReturnSocket = TerminalSocketPair[1]; break; case TERM_SOCK_DELETE: /* ** Cancel any pending IO on the terminal channel */ status = sys$cancel (TerminalDeviceChan); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$CANCEL () - %08X", status); close (TerminalSocketPair[0]); close (TerminalSocketPair[1]); return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE); } /* ** Deassign the terminal channel */ status = sys$dassgn (TerminalDeviceChan); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: SYS$DASSGN () - %08X", status); close (TerminalSocketPair[0]); close (TerminalSocketPair[1]); return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE); } /* ** Close the terminal socket pair */ close (TerminalSocketPair[0]); close (TerminalSocketPair[1]); /* ** Return the initialized socket */ *ReturnSocket = 0; break; default: /* ** Invalid function code */ LogMessage ("TerminalSocket: Invalid Function Code - %d", FunctionCode); return (TERM_SOCK_FAILURE); break; } /* ** Return success */ return (TERM_SOCK_SUCCESS); } /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* */ /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ static int CreateSocketPair (int SocketFamily, int SocketType, int SocketProtocol, int *SocketPair) { struct dsc$descriptor AscTimeDesc = {0, DSC$K_DTYPE_T, DSC$K_CLASS_S, NULL}; static const char* LocalHostAddr = {"127.0.0.1"}; unsigned short TcpAcceptChan = 0, TcpDeviceChan = 0; unsigned long BinTimeBuff[2]; struct sockaddr_in sin; char AscTimeBuff[32]; short LocalHostPort; int status; unsigned int slen; # ifdef __alpha struct _iosb iosb; # else IOSB iosb; # endif int SockDesc1 = 0, SockDesc2 = 0; SPTB sptb; $DESCRIPTOR (TcpDeviceDesc, "TCPIP$DEVICE"); /* ** Create a socket */ SockDesc1 = socket (SocketFamily, SocketType, 0); if (SockDesc1 < 0) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: socket () - %d", errno); return (-1); } /* ** Initialize the socket information */ slen = sizeof (sin); memset ((char *) &sin, 0, slen); sin.sin_family = SocketFamily; sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr (LocalHostAddr); sin.sin_port = 0; /* ** Bind the socket to the local IP */ status = bind (SockDesc1, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, slen); if (status < 0) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: bind () - %d", errno); close (SockDesc1); return (-1); } /* ** Get the socket name so we can save the port number */ status = getsockname (SockDesc1, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, &slen); if (status < 0) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: getsockname () - %d", errno); close (SockDesc1); return (-1); } else LocalHostPort = sin.sin_port; /* ** Setup a listen for the socket */ listen (SockDesc1, 5); /* ** Get the binary (64-bit) time of the specified timeout value */ sprintf (AscTimeBuff, "0 0:0:%02d.00", SOCKET_PAIR_TIMEOUT_VALUE); AscTimeDesc.dsc$w_length = strlen (AscTimeBuff); AscTimeDesc.dsc$a_pointer = AscTimeBuff; status = sys$bintim (&AscTimeDesc, BinTimeBuff); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$BINTIM () - %08X", status); close (SockDesc1); return (-1); } /* ** Assign another channel to the TCP/IP device for the accept. ** This is the channel that ends up being connected to. */ status = sys$assign (&TcpDeviceDesc, &TcpDeviceChan, 0, 0, 0); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$ASSIGN () - %08X", status); close (SockDesc1); return (-1); } /* ** Get the channel of the first socket for the accept */ TcpAcceptChan = decc$get_sdc (SockDesc1); /* ** Perform the accept using $QIO so we can do this asynchronously */ status = sys$qio (EFN$C_ENF, TcpAcceptChan, IO$_ACCESS | IO$M_ACCEPT, &iosb, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &TcpDeviceChan, 0, 0); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$QIO () - %08X", status); close (SockDesc1); sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan); return (-1); } /* ** Create the second socket to do the connect */ SockDesc2 = socket (SocketFamily, SocketType, 0); if (SockDesc2 < 0) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: socket () - %d", errno); sys$cancel (TcpAcceptChan); close (SockDesc1); sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan); return (-1) ; } /* ** Setup the Socket Pair Timeout Block */ sptb.SockChan1 = TcpAcceptChan; sptb.SockChan2 = decc$get_sdc (SockDesc2); /* ** Before we block on the connect, set a timer that can cancel I/O on our ** two sockets if it never connects. */ status = sys$setimr (EFN$C_ENF, BinTimeBuff, SocketPairTimeoutAst, &sptb, 0); if (! (status & 1)) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$SETIMR () - %08X", status); sys$cancel (TcpAcceptChan); close (SockDesc1); close (SockDesc2); sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan); return (-1); } /* ** Now issue the connect */ memset ((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof (sin)) ; sin.sin_family = SocketFamily; sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr (LocalHostAddr) ; sin.sin_port = LocalHostPort ; status = connect (SockDesc2, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof (sin)); if (status < 0 ) { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: connect () - %d", errno); sys$cantim (&sptb, 0); sys$cancel (TcpAcceptChan); close (SockDesc1); close (SockDesc2); sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan); return (-1); } /* ** Wait for the asynch $QIO to finish. Note that if the I/O was aborted ** (SS$_ABORT), then we probably canceled it from the AST routine - so log ** a timeout. */ status = sys$synch (EFN$C_ENF, &iosb); if (! (iosb.iosb$w_status & 1)) { if (iosb.iosb$w_status == SS$_ABORT) LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$QIO(iosb) timeout"); else { LogMessage ("CreateSocketPair: SYS$QIO(iosb) - %d", iosb.iosb$w_status); sys$cantim (&sptb, 0); } close (SockDesc1); close (SockDesc2); sys$dassgn (TcpDeviceChan); return (-1); } /* ** Here we're successfully connected, so cancel the timer, convert the ** I/O channel to a socket fd, close the listener socket and return the ** connected pair. */ sys$cantim (&sptb, 0); close (SockDesc1) ; SocketPair[0] = SockDesc2 ; SocketPair[1] = socket_fd (TcpDeviceChan); return (0) ; } /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* */ /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ static void SocketPairTimeoutAst (int astparm) { SPTB *sptb = (SPTB *) astparm; sys$cancel (sptb->SockChan2); /* Cancel the connect() */ sys$cancel (sptb->SockChan1); /* Cancel the accept() */ return; } /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* */ /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ static int TerminalDeviceAst (int astparm) { int status; /* ** Terminate the terminal buffer */ TerminalDeviceBuff[TerminalDeviceIosb.iosb$w_bcnt] = '\0'; strcat (TerminalDeviceBuff, "\n"); /* ** Send the data read from the terminal device throught the socket pair */ send (TerminalSocketPair[0], TerminalDeviceBuff, TerminalDeviceIosb.iosb$w_bcnt + 1, 0); /* ** Queue another async IO to the terminal device */ status = sys$qio (EFN$C_ENF, TerminalDeviceChan, IO$_READVBLK, &TerminalDeviceIosb, TerminalDeviceAst, 0, TerminalDeviceBuff, sizeof (TerminalDeviceBuff) - 1, 0, 0, 0, 0); /* ** Return status */ return status; } /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* */ /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ static void LogMessage (char *msg, ...) { char *Month[] = {"Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun", "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"}; static unsigned int pid = 0; va_list args; time_t CurTime; struct tm *LocTime; char MsgBuff[256]; /* ** Get the process pid */ if (pid == 0) pid = getpid (); /* ** Convert the current time into local time */ CurTime = time (NULL); LocTime = localtime (&CurTime); /* ** Format the message buffer */ sprintf (MsgBuff, "%02d-%s-%04d %02d:%02d:%02d [%08X] %s\n", LocTime->tm_mday, Month[LocTime->tm_mon], (LocTime->tm_year + 1900), LocTime->tm_hour, LocTime->tm_min, LocTime->tm_sec, pid, msg); /* ** Get any variable arguments and add them to the print of the message ** buffer */ va_start (args, msg); vfprintf (stderr, MsgBuff, args); va_end (args); /* ** Flush standard error output */ fsync (fileno (stderr)); return; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/rsa8192.pem0000644000000000000000000001433513176625656014647 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIISKAIBAAKCBAEAiQ2f1X6Bte1DKD0OoCBKEikzPW+5w3oXk3WwnE97Wxzy6wJZ ebbZC3CZKKBnJeBMrysPf+lK+9+fP6Vm8bp1wvbcSIA59BDrX6irFSuM/bdnkbuF MFlDjt+uVrxwoyqfPi2IPot1HQg3l5mdyBqcTWvbOnU2L9HZxJfPUCjfzdTMPrMY 55/A20XL7tlV2opEfwhy3uVlveQBM0DnZ3MUQfrk+lRRNWv7yE4ScbOfER9fjvOm yJc3ZbOa3e+AMGGU9OqJ/fyOl0SGYyP2k23omy/idBV4uOs8QWdnAvq8UOzDdua3 tuf5Tn17XBurPJ8juwyPBNispkwwn8BjxAZVPhwUIcxFBg339IxJ9cW0WdVy4nNA LWo/8Ahlf+kZNnFNGCPFytU9gGMLMhab9w/rLrwa9qNe4L8Fmu1JxONn1WfhMOKE aFmycf2olJsYLgUIGYZrjnYu0p/7P3yhTOv8JIhmK+SzmA/I0xiQoF84rpaQzH2d PvxICOA9oQSowou0gLuBSZWm6LiXirg1DZCziU46v33ErQlWM1dSyNaUSzihcV59 mVD0nmzboXH75lGiyiZlp8cLbozzoCwvk9rYqpUGSBzbAy0ECCpabGpzO2Ug+oDi 71e5z4WMpeoR4IS8MaOG/GsJnwaXhiB/gNYfK+8pRADVk5StEAZDE2alSuCbDs0z d9zYr4/em5T9VZsLetxRE7pm/Es9yELuViz8/Tm0/8MVdmNYc/xZU1t6qYYFdyQ2 wlGDTiNPsjR8yXCkmBjKwqnuleu1X6LaZu3VPhEkXGcyFAquQUkSiMv0Yu74qAe0 bQ2v+jjZzP6AM9LUo89cW4Kd8SGD96BdNlAVPNMXoBcIOsZBwsOtETBd4KAyvkXE Ob17u+PLl4UPnSxm9ypKZunUNFRPxtKUyjySYnvlGL+kTjAXrIrZwKJqIn0uhnfa 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nm7d4wqSDwrYxiXZ6f3nYpkhEY1lb0Wbksp1ig8sKSF4nDZRGK1RSfE+6gjBp94H X/Wog6Zb6NC9ZpusTiDLvuIUXcyUJvmHiWjSNqiTv8jurlwEsgSwhziEQfqLrtdV QI3PRMolBkD1iCk+HFE53r05LMf1bp3r4MS+naaQrLbIrl1kgDNGwVdgS+SCM7Bg TwEgE67iOb2iIoUpon/NyP4LesMzvdpsu2JFlfz13PmmQ34mFI7tWvOb3NA5DP3c 46C6SaWI0TD9B11nJbHGTYN3Si9n0EBgoDJEXUKeh3km9O47dgvkSug4WzhYsvrE rMlMLtKfp2w8HlMZpsUlToNCx6CI+tJrohzcs3BAVAbjFAXRKWGijB1rxwyDdHPv I+/wJTNaRNPQ1M0SwtEL/zJd21y3KSPn4eL+GP3efhlDSjtlDvZqkdAUsU8= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/s1024key.pem0000644000000000000000000000157313176625656015020 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXgIBAAKBgQCzEfU8E+ZGTGtHXV5XhvM2Lg32fXUIjydXb34BGVPX6oN7+aNV S9eWayvW/+9/vUb0aCqilJrpFesgItV2T8VhhjOE++XUz46uNpcMU7wHMEAXUufP pztpFm8ZEk2tFKvadkSSoN8lb11juvZVkSkPlB65pFhSe4QKSp6J4HrkYwIDAQAB AoGBAKy8jvb0Lzby8q11yNLf7+78wCVdYi7ugMHcYA1JVFK8+zb1WfSm44FLQo/0 dSChAjgz36TTexeLODPYxleJndjVcOMVzsLJjSM8dLpXsTS4FCeMbhw2s2u+xqKY bbPWfk+HOTyJjfnkcC5Nbg44eOmruq0gSmBeUXVM5UntlTnxAkEA7TGCA3h7kx5E Bl4zl2pc3gPAGt+dyfk5Po9mGJUUXhF5p2zueGmYWW74TmOWB1kzt4QRdYMzFePq zfDNXEa1CwJBAMFErdY0xp0UJ13WwBbUTk8rujqQdHtjw0klhpbuKkjxu2hN0wwM 6p0D9qxF7JHaghqVRI0fAW/EE0OzdHMR9QkCQQDNR26dMFXKsoPu+vItljj/UEGf QG7gERiQ4yxaFBPHgdpGo0kT31eh9x9hQGDkxTe0GNG/YSgCRvm8+C3TMcKXAkBD dhGn36wkUFCddMSAM4NSJ1VN8/Z0y5HzCmI8dM3VwGtGMUQlxKxwOl30LEQzdS5M 0SWojNYXiT2gOBfBwtbhAkEAhafl5QEOIgUz+XazS/IlZ8goNKdDVfYgK3mHHjvv nY5G+AuGebdNkXJr4KSWxDcN+C2i47zuj4QXA16MAOandA== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/genrsa.c0000644000000000000000000001215713176625656014456 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # define DEFBITS 2048 static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_3, OPT_F4, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_OUT, OPT_RAND, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_CIPHER } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS genrsa_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"3", OPT_3, '-', "Use 3 for the E value"}, {"F4", OPT_F4, '-', "Use F4 (0x10001) for the E value"}, {"f4", OPT_F4, '-', "Use F4 (0x10001) for the E value"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, 's', "Output the key to specified file"}, {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's', "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Encrypt the output with any supported cipher"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int genrsa_main(int argc, char **argv) { BN_GENCB *cb = BN_GENCB_new(); PW_CB_DATA cb_data; ENGINE *eng = NULL; BIGNUM *bn = BN_new(); BIO *out = NULL; const BIGNUM *e; RSA *rsa = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; int ret = 1, num = DEFBITS, private = 0; unsigned long f4 = RSA_F4; char *outfile = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passout = NULL; char *inrand = NULL, *prog, *hexe, *dece; OPTION_CHOICE o; if (bn == NULL || cb == NULL) goto end; BN_GENCB_set(cb, genrsa_cb, bio_err); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, genrsa_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: ret = 0; opt_help(genrsa_options); goto end; case OPT_3: f4 = 3; break; case OPT_F4: f4 = RSA_F4; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: eng = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_RAND: inrand = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc)) goto end; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); private = 1; if (argv[0] && (!opt_int(argv[0], &num) || num <= 0)) goto end; if (!app_passwd(NULL, passoutarg, NULL, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } out = bio_open_owner(outfile, FORMAT_PEM, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 1) && inrand == NULL && !RAND_status()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n"); } if (inrand != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n", app_RAND_load_files(inrand)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating RSA private key, %d bit long modulus\n", num); rsa = eng ? RSA_new_method(eng) : RSA_new(); if (rsa == NULL) goto end; if (!BN_set_word(bn, f4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, num, bn, cb)) goto end; app_RAND_write_file(NULL); RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, &e, NULL); hexe = BN_bn2hex(e); dece = BN_bn2dec(e); if (hexe && dece) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "e is %s (0x%s)\n", dece, hexe); } OPENSSL_free(hexe); OPENSSL_free(dece); cb_data.password = passout; cb_data.prompt_info = outfile; assert(private); if (!PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(out, rsa, enc, NULL, 0, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data)) goto end; ret = 0; end: BN_free(bn); BN_GENCB_free(cb); RSA_free(rsa); BIO_free_all(out); release_engine(eng); OPENSSL_free(passout); if (ret != 0) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return (ret); } static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb) { char c = '*'; if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb), &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb)); return 1; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/rehash.c0000644000000000000000000003557713176625656014464 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * C implementation based on the original Perl and shell versions * * Copyright (c) 2013-2014 Timo Teräs */ #include "apps.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__APPLE__) || \ (defined(__VMS) && defined(__DECC) && __CRTL_VER >= 80300000) # include # include # include # include # include # include # include /* * Make sure that the processing of symbol names is treated the same as when * libcrypto is built. This is done automatically for public headers (see * include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H), * but not for internal headers. */ # ifdef __VMS # pragma names save # pragma names as_is,shortened # endif # include "internal/o_dir.h" # ifdef __VMS # pragma names restore # endif # include # include # include # ifndef PATH_MAX # define PATH_MAX 4096 # endif # ifndef NAME_MAX # define NAME_MAX 255 # endif # define MAX_COLLISIONS 256 typedef struct hentry_st { struct hentry_st *next; char *filename; unsigned short old_id; unsigned char need_symlink; unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; } HENTRY; typedef struct bucket_st { struct bucket_st *next; HENTRY *first_entry, *last_entry; unsigned int hash; unsigned short type; unsigned short num_needed; } BUCKET; enum Type { /* Keep in sync with |suffixes|, below. */ TYPE_CERT=0, TYPE_CRL=1 }; enum Hash { HASH_OLD, HASH_NEW, HASH_BOTH }; static int evpmdsize; static const EVP_MD *evpmd; static int remove_links = 1; static int verbose = 0; static BUCKET *hash_table[257]; static const char *suffixes[] = { "", "r" }; static const char *extensions[] = { "pem", "crt", "cer", "crl" }; static void bit_set(unsigned char *set, unsigned int bit) { set[bit >> 3] |= 1 << (bit & 0x7); } static int bit_isset(unsigned char *set, unsigned int bit) { return set[bit >> 3] & (1 << (bit & 0x7)); } /* * Process an entry; return number of errors. */ static int add_entry(enum Type type, unsigned int hash, const char *filename, const unsigned char *digest, int need_symlink, unsigned short old_id) { static BUCKET nilbucket; static HENTRY nilhentry; BUCKET *bp; HENTRY *ep, *found = NULL; unsigned int ndx = (type + hash) % OSSL_NELEM(hash_table); for (bp = hash_table[ndx]; bp; bp = bp->next) if (bp->type == type && bp->hash == hash) break; if (bp == NULL) { bp = app_malloc(sizeof(*bp), "hash bucket"); *bp = nilbucket; bp->next = hash_table[ndx]; bp->type = type; bp->hash = hash; hash_table[ndx] = bp; } for (ep = bp->first_entry; ep; ep = ep->next) { if (digest && memcmp(digest, ep->digest, evpmdsize) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: skipping duplicate %s in %s\n", opt_getprog(), type == TYPE_CERT ? "certificate" : "CRL", filename); return 1; } if (strcmp(filename, ep->filename) == 0) { found = ep; if (digest == NULL) break; } } ep = found; if (ep == NULL) { if (bp->num_needed >= MAX_COLLISIONS) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: hash table overflow for %s\n", opt_getprog(), filename); return 1; } ep = app_malloc(sizeof(*ep), "collision bucket"); *ep = nilhentry; ep->old_id = ~0; ep->filename = OPENSSL_strdup(filename); if (bp->last_entry) bp->last_entry->next = ep; if (bp->first_entry == NULL) bp->first_entry = ep; bp->last_entry = ep; } if (old_id < ep->old_id) ep->old_id = old_id; if (need_symlink && !ep->need_symlink) { ep->need_symlink = 1; bp->num_needed++; memcpy(ep->digest, digest, evpmdsize); } return 0; } /* * Check if a symlink goes to the right spot; return 0 if okay. * This can be -1 if bad filename, or an error count. */ static int handle_symlink(const char *filename, const char *fullpath) { unsigned int hash = 0; int i, type, id; unsigned char ch; char linktarget[PATH_MAX], *endptr; ossl_ssize_t n; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { ch = filename[i]; if (!isxdigit(ch)) return -1; hash <<= 4; hash += OPENSSL_hexchar2int(ch); } if (filename[i++] != '.') return -1; for (type = OSSL_NELEM(suffixes) - 1; type > 0; type--) { const char *suffix = suffixes[type]; if (strncasecmp(suffix, &filename[i], strlen(suffix)) == 0) break; } i += strlen(suffixes[type]); id = strtoul(&filename[i], &endptr, 10); if (*endptr != '\0') return -1; n = readlink(fullpath, linktarget, sizeof(linktarget)); if (n < 0 || n >= (int)sizeof(linktarget)) return -1; linktarget[n] = 0; return add_entry(type, hash, linktarget, NULL, 0, id); } /* * process a file, return number of errors. */ static int do_file(const char *filename, const char *fullpath, enum Hash h) { STACK_OF (X509_INFO) *inf = NULL; X509_INFO *x; X509_NAME *name = NULL; BIO *b; const char *ext; unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int type, errs = 0; size_t i; /* Does it end with a recognized extension? */ if ((ext = strrchr(filename, '.')) == NULL) goto end; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(extensions); i++) { if (strcasecmp(extensions[i], ext + 1) == 0) break; } if (i >= OSSL_NELEM(extensions)) goto end; /* Does it have X.509 data in it? */ if ((b = BIO_new_file(fullpath, "r")) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: skipping %s, cannot open file\n", opt_getprog(), filename); errs++; goto end; } inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(b); if (inf == NULL) goto end; if (sk_X509_INFO_num(inf) != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: skipping %s," "it does not contain exactly one certificate or CRL\n", opt_getprog(), filename); /* This is not an error. */ goto end; } x = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, 0); if (x->x509) { type = TYPE_CERT; name = X509_get_subject_name(x->x509); X509_digest(x->x509, evpmd, digest, NULL); } else if (x->crl) { type = TYPE_CRL; name = X509_CRL_get_issuer(x->crl); X509_CRL_digest(x->crl, evpmd, digest, NULL); } else { ++errs; goto end; } if (name) { if ((h == HASH_NEW) || (h == HASH_BOTH)) errs += add_entry(type, X509_NAME_hash(name), filename, digest, 1, ~0); if ((h == HASH_OLD) || (h == HASH_BOTH)) errs += add_entry(type, X509_NAME_hash_old(name), filename, digest, 1, ~0); } end: sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free); return errs; } static void str_free(char *s) { OPENSSL_free(s); } static int ends_with_dirsep(const char *path) { if (*path != '\0') path += strlen(path) - 1; # if defined __VMS if (*path == ']' || *path == '>' || *path == ':') return 1; # elif defined _WIN32 if (*path == '\\') return 1; # endif return *path == '/'; } static int massage_filename(char *name) { # ifdef __VMS char *p = strchr(name, ';'); char *q = p; if (q != NULL) { for (q++; *q != '\0'; q++) { if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*q)) return 1; } } *p = '\0'; # endif return 1; } /* * Process a directory; return number of errors found. */ static int do_dir(const char *dirname, enum Hash h) { BUCKET *bp, *nextbp; HENTRY *ep, *nextep; OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; struct stat st; unsigned char idmask[MAX_COLLISIONS / 8]; int n, numfiles, nextid, buflen, errs = 0; size_t i; const char *pathsep; const char *filename; char *buf, *copy; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *files = NULL; if (app_access(dirname, W_OK) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Skipping %s, can't write\n", dirname); return 1; } buflen = strlen(dirname); pathsep = (buflen && !ends_with_dirsep(dirname)) ? "/": ""; buflen += NAME_MAX + 1 + 1; buf = app_malloc(buflen, "filename buffer"); if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_out, "Doing %s\n", dirname); if ((files = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Skipping %s, out of memory\n", dirname); exit(1); } while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dirname)) != NULL) { if ((copy = strdup(filename)) == NULL || !massage_filename(copy) || sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(files, copy) == 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "out of memory\n"); exit(1); } } OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_sort(files); numfiles = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(files); for (n = 0; n < numfiles; ++n) { filename = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(files, n); if (BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s%s%s", dirname, pathsep, filename) >= buflen) continue; if (lstat(buf, &st) < 0) continue; if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) && handle_symlink(filename, buf) == 0) continue; errs += do_file(filename, buf, h); } sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(files, str_free); for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(hash_table); i++) { for (bp = hash_table[i]; bp; bp = nextbp) { nextbp = bp->next; nextid = 0; memset(idmask, 0, (bp->num_needed + 7) / 8); for (ep = bp->first_entry; ep; ep = ep->next) if (ep->old_id < bp->num_needed) bit_set(idmask, ep->old_id); for (ep = bp->first_entry; ep; ep = nextep) { nextep = ep->next; if (ep->old_id < bp->num_needed) { /* Link exists, and is used as-is */ BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%08x.%s%d", bp->hash, suffixes[bp->type], ep->old_id); if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_out, "link %s -> %s\n", ep->filename, buf); } else if (ep->need_symlink) { /* New link needed (it may replace something) */ while (bit_isset(idmask, nextid)) nextid++; BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s%s%n%08x.%s%d", dirname, pathsep, &n, bp->hash, suffixes[bp->type], nextid); if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_out, "link %s -> %s\n", ep->filename, &buf[n]); if (unlink(buf) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't unlink %s, %s\n", opt_getprog(), buf, strerror(errno)); errs++; } if (symlink(ep->filename, buf) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't symlink %s, %s\n", opt_getprog(), ep->filename, strerror(errno)); errs++; } bit_set(idmask, nextid); } else if (remove_links) { /* Link to be deleted */ BIO_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s%s%n%08x.%s%d", dirname, pathsep, &n, bp->hash, suffixes[bp->type], ep->old_id); if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_out, "unlink %s\n", &buf[n]); if (unlink(buf) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't unlink %s, %s\n", opt_getprog(), buf, strerror(errno)); errs++; } } OPENSSL_free(ep->filename); OPENSSL_free(ep); } OPENSSL_free(bp); } hash_table[i] = NULL; } OPENSSL_free(buf); return errs; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_COMPAT, OPT_OLD, OPT_N, OPT_VERBOSE } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS rehash_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] [cert-directory...]\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"h", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"compat", OPT_COMPAT, '-', "Create both new- and old-style hash links"}, {"old", OPT_OLD, '-', "Use old-style hash to generate links"}, {"n", OPT_N, '-', "Do not remove existing links"}, {"v", OPT_VERBOSE, '-', "Verbose output"}, {NULL} }; int rehash_main(int argc, char **argv) { const char *env, *prog; char *e, *m; int errs = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; enum Hash h = HASH_NEW; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rehash_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(rehash_options); goto end; case OPT_COMPAT: h = HASH_BOTH; break; case OPT_OLD: h = HASH_OLD; break; case OPT_N: remove_links = 0; break; case OPT_VERBOSE: verbose = 1; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); evpmd = EVP_sha1(); evpmdsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd); if (*argv) { while (*argv) errs += do_dir(*argv++, h); } else if ((env = getenv("SSL_CERT_DIR")) != NULL) { m = OPENSSL_strdup(env); for (e = strtok(m, ":"); e != NULL; e = strtok(NULL, ":")) errs += do_dir(e, h); OPENSSL_free(m); } else { errs += do_dir("/etc/ssl/certs", h); } end: return errs; } #else OPTIONS rehash_options[] = { {NULL} }; int rehash_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not available; use c_rehash script\n"); return (1); } #endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__APPLE__) */ openssl-1.1.0g/apps/CA.pl.in0000644000000000000000000001511613176625656014256 0ustar rootroot#!{- $config{hashbangperl} -} # Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # Wrapper around the ca to make it easier to use # # {- join("\n# ", @autowarntext) -} use strict; use warnings; my $openssl = "openssl"; if(defined $ENV{'OPENSSL'}) { $openssl = $ENV{'OPENSSL'}; } else { $ENV{'OPENSSL'} = $openssl; } my $verbose = 1; my $OPENSSL_CONFIG = $ENV{"OPENSSL_CONFIG"} || ""; my $DAYS = "-days 365"; my $CADAYS = "-days 1095"; # 3 years my $REQ = "$openssl req $OPENSSL_CONFIG"; my $CA = "$openssl ca $OPENSSL_CONFIG"; my $VERIFY = "$openssl verify"; my $X509 = "$openssl x509"; my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12"; # default openssl.cnf file has setup as per the following my $CATOP = "./demoCA"; my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem"; my $CAREQ = "careq.pem"; my $CACERT = "cacert.pem"; my $CACRL = "crl.pem"; my $DIRMODE = 0777; my $NEWKEY = "newkey.pem"; my $NEWREQ = "newreq.pem"; my $NEWCERT = "newcert.pem"; my $NEWP12 = "newcert.p12"; my $RET = 0; my $WHAT = shift @ARGV || ""; my $FILE; # See if reason for a CRL entry is valid; exit if not. sub crl_reason_ok { my $r = shift; if ($r eq 'unspecified' || $r eq 'keyCompromise' || $r eq 'CACompromise' || $r eq 'affiliationChanged' || $r eq 'superseded' || $r eq 'cessationOfOperation' || $r eq 'certificateHold' || $r eq 'removeFromCRL') { return 1; } print STDERR "Invalid CRL reason; must be one of:\n"; print STDERR " unspecified, keyCompromise, CACompromise,\n"; print STDERR " affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation\n"; print STDERR " certificateHold, removeFromCRL"; exit 1; } # Copy a PEM-format file; return like exit status (zero means ok) sub copy_pemfile { my ($infile, $outfile, $bound) = @_; my $found = 0; open IN, $infile || die "Cannot open $infile, $!"; open OUT, ">$outfile" || die "Cannot write to $outfile, $!"; while () { $found = 1 if /^-----BEGIN.*$bound/; print OUT $_ if $found; $found = 2, last if /^-----END.*$bound/; } close IN; close OUT; return $found == 2 ? 0 : 1; } # Wrapper around system; useful for debugging. Returns just the exit status sub run { my $cmd = shift; print "====\n$cmd\n" if $verbose; my $status = system($cmd); print "==> $status\n====\n" if $verbose; return $status >> 8; } if ( $WHAT =~ /^(-\?|-h|-help)$/ ) { print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-signcert|-verify\n"; print STDERR " CA -pkcs12 [certname]\n"; print STDERR " CA -crl|-revoke cert-filename [reason]\n"; exit 0; } if ($WHAT eq '-newcert' ) { # create a certificate $RET = run("$REQ -new -x509 -keyout $NEWKEY -out $NEWCERT $DAYS"); print "Cert is in $NEWCERT, private key is in $NEWKEY\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-newreq' ) { # create a certificate request $RET = run("$REQ -new -keyout $NEWKEY -out $NEWREQ $DAYS"); print "Request is in $NEWREQ, private key is in $NEWKEY\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-newreq-nodes' ) { # create a certificate request $RET = run("$REQ -new -nodes -keyout $NEWKEY -out $NEWREQ $DAYS"); print "Request is in $NEWREQ, private key is in $NEWKEY\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-newca' ) { # create the directory hierarchy mkdir ${CATOP}, $DIRMODE; mkdir "${CATOP}/certs", $DIRMODE; mkdir "${CATOP}/crl", $DIRMODE ; mkdir "${CATOP}/newcerts", $DIRMODE; mkdir "${CATOP}/private", $DIRMODE; open OUT, ">${CATOP}/index.txt"; close OUT; open OUT, ">${CATOP}/crlnumber"; print OUT "01\n"; close OUT; # ask user for existing CA certificate print "CA certificate filename (or enter to create)\n"; $FILE = "" unless defined($FILE = ); $FILE =~ s{\R$}{}; if ($FILE ne "") { copy_pemfile($FILE,"${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY", "PRIVATE"); copy_pemfile($FILE,"${CATOP}/$CACERT", "CERTIFICATE"); } else { print "Making CA certificate ...\n"; $RET = run("$REQ -new -keyout" . " ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY" . " -out ${CATOP}/$CAREQ"); $RET = run("$CA -create_serial" . " -out ${CATOP}/$CACERT $CADAYS -batch" . " -keyfile ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY -selfsign" . " -extensions v3_ca" . " -infiles ${CATOP}/$CAREQ") if $RET == 0; print "CA certificate is in ${CATOP}/$CACERT\n" if $RET == 0; } } elsif ($WHAT eq '-pkcs12' ) { my $cname = $ARGV[1]; $cname = "My Certificate" unless defined $cname; $RET = run("$PKCS12 -in $NEWCERT -inkey $NEWKEY" . " -certfile ${CATOP}/$CACERT" . " -out $NEWP12" . " -export -name \"$cname\""); print "PKCS #12 file is in $NEWP12\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-xsign' ) { $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -infiles $NEWREQ"); } elsif ($WHAT eq '-sign' ) { $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -out $NEWCERT -infiles $NEWREQ"); print "Signed certificate is in $NEWCERT\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-signCA' ) { $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -out $NEWCERT" . " -extensions v3_ca -infiles $NEWREQ"); print "Signed CA certificate is in $NEWCERT\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-signcert' ) { $RET = run("$X509 -x509toreq -in $NEWREQ -signkey $NEWREQ" . " -out tmp.pem"); $RET = run("$CA -policy policy_anything -out $NEWCERT" . " -infiles tmp.pem") if $RET == 0; print "Signed certificate is in $NEWCERT\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-verify' ) { my @files = @ARGV ? @ARGV : ( $NEWCERT ); my $file; foreach $file (@files) { my $status = run("$VERIFY \"-CAfile\" ${CATOP}/$CACERT $file"); $RET = $status if $status != 0; } } elsif ($WHAT eq '-crl' ) { $RET = run("$CA -gencrl -out ${CATOP}/crl/$CACRL"); print "Generated CRL is in ${CATOP}/crl/$CACRL\n" if $RET == 0; } elsif ($WHAT eq '-revoke' ) { my $cname = $ARGV[1]; if (!defined $cname) { print "Certificate filename is required; reason optional.\n"; exit 1; } my $reason = $ARGV[2]; $reason = " -crl_reason $reason" if defined $reason && crl_reason_ok($reason); $RET = run("$CA -revoke \"$cname\"" . $reason); } else { print STDERR "Unknown arg \"$WHAT\"\n"; print STDERR "Use -help for help.\n"; exit 1; } exit $RET; openssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoCA/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656014155 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoCA/serial0000644000000000000000000000000513176625656015352 0ustar rootroot011E openssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoCA/cacert.pem0000644000000000000000000000131413176625656016120 0ustar rootrootsubject=/C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIIBgjCCASwCAQQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwODELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNV BAgTA1FMRDEbMBkGA1UEAxMSU1NMZWF5L3JzYSB0ZXN0IENBMB4XDTk1MTAwOTIz MzIwNVoXDTk4MDcwNTIzMzIwNVowYDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNVBAgTA1FM RDEZMBcGA1UEChMQTWluY29tIFB0eS4gTHRkLjELMAkGA1UECxMCQ1MxGzAZBgNV BAMTElNTTGVheSBkZW1vIHNlcnZlcjBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQC3 LCXcScWua0PFLkHBLm2VejqpA1F4RQ8q0VjRiPafjx/Z/aWH3ipdMVvuJGa/wFXb /nDFLDlfWp+oCPwhBtVPAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADQQArNFsihWIjBzb0 DCsU0BvL2bvSwJrPEqFlkDq3F4M6EGutL9axEcANWgbbEdAvNJD1dmEmoWny27Pn IMs6ZOZB -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoCA/private/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625656015627 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoCA/private/cakey.pem0000644000000000000000000000227613176625656017435 0ustar rootrootissuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA subject=/C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- MIIBgjCCASwCAQQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwODELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNV BAgTA1FMRDEbMBkGA1UEAxMSU1NMZWF5L3JzYSB0ZXN0IENBMB4XDTk1MTAwOTIz MzIwNVoXDTk4MDcwNTIzMzIwNVowYDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxDDAKBgNVBAgTA1FM RDEZMBcGA1UEChMQTWluY29tIFB0eS4gTHRkLjELMAkGA1UECxMCQ1MxGzAZBgNV BAMTElNTTGVheSBkZW1vIHNlcnZlcjBcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA0sAMEgCQQC3 LCXcScWua0PFLkHBLm2VejqpA1F4RQ8q0VjRiPafjx/Z/aWH3ipdMVvuJGa/wFXb /nDFLDlfWp+oCPwhBtVPAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADQQArNFsihWIjBzb0 DCsU0BvL2bvSwJrPEqFlkDq3F4M6EGutL9axEcANWgbbEdAvNJD1dmEmoWny27Pn IMs6ZOZB -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIBPAIBAAJBALcsJdxJxa5rQ8UuQcEubZV6OqkDUXhFDyrRWNGI9p+PH9n9pYfe Kl0xW+4kZr/AVdv+cMUsOV9an6gI/CEG1U8CAwEAAQJAXJMBZ34ZXHd1vtgL/3hZ hexKbVTx/djZO4imXO/dxPGRzG2ylYZpHmG32/T1kaHpZlCHoEPgHoSzmxYXfxjG sQIhAPmZ/bQOjmRUHM/VM2X5zrjjM6z18R1P6l3ObFwt9FGdAiEAu943Yh9SqMRw tL0xHGxKmM/YJueUw1gB6sLkETN71NsCIQCeT3RhoqXfrpXDoEcEU+gwzjI1bpxq agiNTOLfqGoA5QIhAIQFYjgzONxex7FLrsKBm16N2SFl5pXsN9SpRqqL2n63AiEA g9VNIQ3xwpw7og3IbONifeku+J9qGMGQJMKwSTwrFtI= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/apps/demoCA/index.txt0000644000000000000000000000464013176625656016031 0ustar rootrootR 980705233205Z 951009233205Z 01 certs/00000001 /CN=Eric Young E 951009233205Z 02 certs/00000002 /CN=Duncan Young R 980705233205Z 951201010000Z 03 certs/00000003 /CN=Tim Hudson V 980705233205Z 04 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young4 V 980705233205Z 05 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young5 V 980705233205Z 06 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young6 V 980705233205Z 07 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young7 V 980705233205Z 08 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young8 V 980705233205Z 09 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young9 V 980705233205Z 0A certs/00000004 /CN=Eric YoungA V 980705233205Z 0B certs/00000004 /CN=Eric YoungB V 980705233205Z 0C certs/00000004 /CN=Eric YoungC V 980705233205Z 0D certs/00000004 /CN=Eric YoungD V 980705233205Z 0E certs/00000004 /CN=Eric YoungE V 980705233205Z 0F certs/00000004 /CN=Eric YoungF V 980705233205Z 10 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young10 V 980705233205Z 11 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young11 V 980705233205Z 12 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young12 V 980705233205Z 13 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young13 V 980705233205Z 14 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young14 V 980705233205Z 15 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young15 V 980705233205Z 16 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young16 V 980705233205Z 17 certs/00000004 /CN=Eric Young17 V 961206150305Z 010C unknown /C=AU/SP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=MTR/CN=Eric Young/Email=eay@mincom.oz.au V 961206153245Z 010D unknown /C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=Eric Young/Email=eay@mincom.oz.au V 970322074816Z 010E unknown /CN=Eric Young/Email=eay@mincom.oz.au V 970322075152Z 010F unknown /CN=Eric Young V 970322075906Z 0110 unknown /CN=Eric Youngg V 970324092238Z 0111 unknown /C=AU/SP=Queensland/CN=Eric Young V 970324221931Z 0112 unknown /CN=Fred V 970324224934Z 0113 unknown /C=AU/CN=eay V 971001005237Z 0114 unknown /C=AU/SP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=x509v3 test V 971001010331Z 0115 unknown /C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=test again - x509v3 V 971001013945Z 0117 unknown /C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=x509v3 test V 971014225415Z 0118 unknown /C=AU/SP=Queensland/CN=test V 971015004448Z 0119 unknown /C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=test2 V 971016035001Z 011A unknown /C=AU/SP=Queensland/O=Mincom Pty Ltd/OU=MTR/CN=test64 V 971016080129Z 011B unknown /C=FR/O=ALCATEL/OU=Alcatel Mobile Phones/CN=bourque/Email=bourque@art.alcatel.fr V 971016224000Z 011D unknown /L=Bedford/O=Cranfield University/OU=Computer Centre/CN=Peter R Lister/Email=P.Lister@cranfield.ac.uk openssl-1.1.0g/apps/rsautl.c0000644000000000000000000001744413176625656014515 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # define RSA_SIGN 1 # define RSA_VERIFY 2 # define RSA_ENCRYPT 3 # define RSA_DECRYPT 4 # define KEY_PRIVKEY 1 # define KEY_PUBKEY 2 # define KEY_CERT 3 typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ASN1PARSE, OPT_HEXDUMP, OPT_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_SSL, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931, OPT_SIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_CERTIN, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_KEYFORM } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS rsautl_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"inkey", OPT_INKEY, 's', "Input key"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Private key format - default PEM"}, {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Input is an RSA public"}, {"certin", OPT_CERTIN, '-', "Input is a cert carrying an RSA public key"}, {"ssl", OPT_SSL, '-', "Use SSL v2 padding"}, {"raw", OPT_RAW, '-', "Use no padding"}, {"pkcs", OPT_PKCS, '-', "Use PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (default)"}, {"oaep", OPT_OAEP, '-', "Use PKCS#1 OAEP"}, {"sign", OPT_SIGN, '-', "Sign with private key"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, '-', "Verify with public key"}, {"asn1parse", OPT_ASN1PARSE, '-', "Run output through asn1parse; useful with -verify"}, {"hexdump", OPT_HEXDUMP, '-', "Hex dump output"}, {"x931", OPT_X931, '-', "Use ANSI X9.31 padding"}, {"rev", OPT_REV, '-', "Reverse the order of the input buffer"}, {"encrypt", OPT_ENCRYPT, '-', "Encrypt with public key"}, {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt with private key"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int rsautl_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; RSA *rsa = NULL; X509 *x; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL, *prog; char rsa_mode = RSA_VERIFY, key_type = KEY_PRIVKEY; unsigned char *rsa_in = NULL, *rsa_out = NULL, pad = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; int rsa_inlen, keyformat = FORMAT_PEM, keysize, ret = 1; int rsa_outlen = 0, hexdump = 0, asn1parse = 0, need_priv = 0, rev = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rsautl_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(rsautl_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &keyformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_ASN1PARSE: asn1parse = 1; break; case OPT_HEXDUMP: hexdump = 1; break; case OPT_RAW: pad = RSA_NO_PADDING; break; case OPT_OAEP: pad = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; break; case OPT_SSL: pad = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING; break; case OPT_PKCS: pad = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; break; case OPT_X931: pad = RSA_X931_PADDING; break; case OPT_SIGN: rsa_mode = RSA_SIGN; need_priv = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY: rsa_mode = RSA_VERIFY; break; case OPT_REV: rev = 1; break; case OPT_ENCRYPT: rsa_mode = RSA_ENCRYPT; break; case OPT_DECRYPT: rsa_mode = RSA_DECRYPT; need_priv = 1; break; case OPT_PUBIN: key_type = KEY_PUBKEY; break; case OPT_CERTIN: key_type = KEY_CERT; break; case OPT_INKEY: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (need_priv && (key_type != KEY_PRIVKEY)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "A private key is needed for this operation\n"); goto end; } if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } /* FIXME: seed PRNG only if needed */ app_RAND_load_file(NULL, 0); switch (key_type) { case KEY_PRIVKEY: pkey = load_key(keyfile, keyformat, 0, passin, e, "Private Key"); break; case KEY_PUBKEY: pkey = load_pubkey(keyfile, keyformat, 0, NULL, e, "Public Key"); break; case KEY_CERT: x = load_cert(keyfile, keyformat, "Certificate"); if (x) { pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); X509_free(x); } break; } if (!pkey) { return 1; } rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (!rsa) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting RSA key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_BINARY); if (in == NULL) goto end; out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', FORMAT_BINARY); if (out == NULL) goto end; keysize = RSA_size(rsa); rsa_in = app_malloc(keysize * 2, "hold rsa key"); rsa_out = app_malloc(keysize, "output rsa key"); /* Read the input data */ rsa_inlen = BIO_read(in, rsa_in, keysize * 2); if (rsa_inlen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n"); goto end; } if (rev) { int i; unsigned char ctmp; for (i = 0; i < rsa_inlen / 2; i++) { ctmp = rsa_in[i]; rsa_in[i] = rsa_in[rsa_inlen - 1 - i]; rsa_in[rsa_inlen - 1 - i] = ctmp; } } switch (rsa_mode) { case RSA_VERIFY: rsa_outlen = RSA_public_decrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad); break; case RSA_SIGN: rsa_outlen = RSA_private_encrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad); break; case RSA_ENCRYPT: rsa_outlen = RSA_public_encrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad); break; case RSA_DECRYPT: rsa_outlen = RSA_private_decrypt(rsa_inlen, rsa_in, rsa_out, rsa, pad); break; } if (rsa_outlen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA operation error\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; if (asn1parse) { if (!ASN1_parse_dump(out, rsa_out, rsa_outlen, 1, -1)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } } else if (hexdump) BIO_dump(out, (char *)rsa_out, rsa_outlen); else BIO_write(out, rsa_out, rsa_outlen); end: RSA_free(rsa); release_engine(e); BIO_free(in); BIO_free_all(out); OPENSSL_free(rsa_in); OPENSSL_free(rsa_out); OPENSSL_free(passin); return ret; } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/apps/version.c0000644000000000000000000000732013176625656014660 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF # include #endif typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_B, OPT_D, OPT_E, OPT_F, OPT_O, OPT_P, OPT_V, OPT_A } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS version_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"a", OPT_A, '-', "Show all data"}, {"b", OPT_B, '-', "Show build date"}, {"d", OPT_D, '-', "Show configuration directory"}, {"e", OPT_E, '-', "Show engines directory"}, {"f", OPT_F, '-', "Show compiler flags used"}, {"o", OPT_O, '-', "Show some internal datatype options"}, {"p", OPT_P, '-', "Show target build platform"}, {"v", OPT_V, '-', "Show library version"}, {NULL} }; int version_main(int argc, char **argv) { int ret = 1, dirty = 0; int cflags = 0, version = 0, date = 0, options = 0, platform = 0, dir = 0; int engdir = 0; char *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, version_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(version_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_B: dirty = date = 1; break; case OPT_D: dirty = dir = 1; break; case OPT_E: dirty = engdir = 1; break; case OPT_F: dirty = cflags = 1; break; case OPT_O: dirty = options = 1; break; case OPT_P: dirty = platform = 1; break; case OPT_V: dirty = version = 1; break; case OPT_A: cflags = version = date = platform = dir = engdir = 1; break; } } if (!dirty) version = 1; if (version) { if (OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) { printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); } else { printf("%s (Library: %s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); } } if (date) printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_BUILT_ON)); if (platform) printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_PLATFORM)); if (options) { printf("options: "); printf("%s ", BN_options()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 printf("%s ", MD2_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 printf("%s ", RC4_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES printf("%s ", DES_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA printf("%s ", IDEA_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF printf("%s ", BF_options()); #endif printf("\n"); } if (cflags) printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_CFLAGS)); if (dir) printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_DIR)); if (engdir) printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR)); ret = 0; end: return (ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/apps/rsa.c0000644000000000000000000002244613176625656013766 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT #else # include # include # include # include # include "apps.h" # include # include # include # include # include # include # include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_PUBIN, OPT_PUBOUT, OPT_PASSOUT, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_RSAPUBKEY_IN, OPT_RSAPUBKEY_OUT, /* Do not change the order here; see case statements below */ OPT_PVK_NONE, OPT_PVK_WEAK, OPT_PVK_STRONG, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_MODULUS, OPT_CHECK, OPT_CIPHER } OPTION_CHOICE; OPTIONS rsa_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"inform", OPT_INFORM, 'f', "Input format, one of DER NET PEM"}, {"outform", OPT_OUTFORM, 'f', "Output format, one of DER NET PEM PVK"}, {"in", OPT_IN, 's', "Input file"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"}, {"pubin", OPT_PUBIN, '-', "Expect a public key in input file"}, {"pubout", OPT_PUBOUT, '-', "Output a public key"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"RSAPublicKey_in", OPT_RSAPUBKEY_IN, '-', "Input is an RSAPublicKey"}, {"RSAPublicKey_out", OPT_RSAPUBKEY_OUT, '-', "Output is an RSAPublicKey"}, {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "Don't print key out"}, {"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the key in text"}, {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "Print the RSA key modulus"}, {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Verify key consistency"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) {"pvk-strong", OPT_PVK_STRONG, '-', "Enable 'Strong' PVK encoding level (default)"}, {"pvk-weak", OPT_PVK_WEAK, '-', "Enable 'Weak' PVK encoding level"}, {"pvk-none", OPT_PVK_NONE, '-', "Don't enforce PVK encoding"}, # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, # endif {NULL} }; int rsa_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; BIO *out = NULL; RSA *rsa = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog; char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL; int i, private = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, check = 0; int noout = 0, modulus = 0, pubin = 0, pubout = 0, ret = 1; # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) int pvk_encr = 2; # endif OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rsa_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(rsa_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_INFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &informat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_IN: infile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_OUTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &outformat)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSOUT: passoutarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_PUBIN: pubin = 1; break; case OPT_PUBOUT: pubout = 1; break; case OPT_RSAPUBKEY_IN: pubin = 2; break; case OPT_RSAPUBKEY_OUT: pubout = 2; break; case OPT_PVK_STRONG: /* pvk_encr:= 2 */ case OPT_PVK_WEAK: /* pvk_encr:= 1 */ case OPT_PVK_NONE: /* pvk_encr:= 0 */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) pvk_encr = (o - OPT_PVK_NONE); # endif break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; break; case OPT_TEXT: text = 1; break; case OPT_MODULUS: modulus = 1; break; case OPT_CHECK: check = 1; break; case OPT_CIPHER: if (!opt_cipher(opt_unknown(), &enc)) goto opthelp; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; private = (text && !pubin) || (!pubout && !noout) ? 1 : 0; if (!app_passwd(passinarg, passoutarg, &passin, &passout)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n"); goto end; } if (check && pubin) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Only private keys can be checked\n"); goto end; } { EVP_PKEY *pkey; if (pubin) { int tmpformat = -1; if (pubin == 2) { if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) tmpformat = FORMAT_PEMRSA; else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) tmpformat = FORMAT_ASN1RSA; } else tmpformat = informat; pkey = load_pubkey(infile, tmpformat, 1, passin, e, "Public Key"); } else pkey = load_key(infile, informat, 1, passin, e, "Private Key"); if (pkey != NULL) rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } if (rsa == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } out = bio_open_owner(outfile, outformat, private); if (out == NULL) goto end; if (text) { assert(pubin || private); if (!RSA_print(out, rsa, 0)) { perror(outfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (modulus) { const BIGNUM *n; RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL); BIO_printf(out, "Modulus="); BN_print(out, n); BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } if (check) { int r = RSA_check_key_ex(rsa, NULL); if (r == 1) BIO_printf(out, "RSA key ok\n"); else if (r == 0) { unsigned long err; while ((err = ERR_peek_error()) != 0 && ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RSA && ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE) { BIO_printf(out, "RSA key error: %s\n", ERR_reason_error_string(err)); ERR_get_error(); /* remove e from error stack */ } } else if (r == -1) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (noout) { ret = 0; goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing RSA key\n"); if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1) { if (pubout || pubin) { if (pubout == 2) i = i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(out, rsa); else i = i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(out, rsa); } else { assert(private); i = i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(out, rsa); } } else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) { if (pubout || pubin) { if (pubout == 2) i = PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(out, rsa); else i = PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(out, rsa); } else { assert(private); i = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(out, rsa, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { EVP_PKEY *pk; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, rsa); if (outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { if (pubin) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK form impossible with public key input\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); goto end; } assert(private); # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK format not supported\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); goto end; # else i = i2b_PVK_bio(out, pk, pvk_encr, 0, passout); # endif } else if (pubin || pubout) { i = i2b_PublicKey_bio(out, pk); } else { assert(private); i = i2b_PrivateKey_bio(out, pk); } EVP_PKEY_free(pk); # endif } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; } if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else ret = 0; end: release_engine(e); BIO_free_all(out); RSA_free(rsa); OPENSSL_free(passin); OPENSSL_free(passout); return (ret); } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/README.ECC0000644000000000000000000000674013176625656013342 0ustar rootrootNOTE: The OpenSSL Software Foundation has executed a sublicense agreement entitled "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Patent License Agreement" with the National Security Agency/ Central Security Service Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) dated 2010-11-04. That agreement permits implementation and distribution of software containing features covered by any or all of the following patents: 1.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,761,305 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" issued on June 2, 1998; 2.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2176972 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signature and Reduced Bandwidth" filed on May 16, 1996; 3.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,889,865 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" issued on March 30, 1999; 4.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,896,455 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" issued on April 20, 1999; 5.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,933,504 entitled "Strengthened Public Key Protocol" issued on August 3, 1999; 6.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2176866 entitled "Strengthened Public Key Protocol" filed on May 17, 1996; 7.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 96201322.3 entitled "Strengthened Public Key Protocol" filed on May 17, 1996; 8.) U.S. Pat. No. 5,999,626 entitled "Digital Signatures on a Smartcard" issued on December 7, 1999; 9.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2202566 entitled "Digital Signatures on a Smartcard" filed on April 14, 1997; 10.) E.P. Pat. Appl. No. 97106114.8 entitled "Digital Signatures on a Smartcard" filed on April 15, 1997; 11.) U.S Pat. No. 6,122,736 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" issued on September 19, 2000; 12.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2174261 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" filed on April 16, 1996; 13.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 96105920.1 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" filed on April 16, 1996; 14.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,141,420 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption Systems" issued on October 31, 2000; 15.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2155038 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption Systems" filed on July 31, 1995; 16.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 95926348.4 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption Systems" filed on July 31, 1995; 17.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,336,188 entitled "Authenticated Key Agreement" issued on January 1, 2002; 18.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,487,661 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol" issued on November 26, 2002; 19.) Can. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 2174260 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol" filed on April 16, 1996; 20.) E.P. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 96105921.9 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol" filed on April 21, 1996; 21.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,563,928 entitled "Strengthened Public Key Protocol" issued on May 13, 2003; 22.) U.S. Pat. No. 6,618,483 entitled "Elliptic Curve Encryption Systems" issued September 9, 2003; 23.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 09/434,247 entitled "Digital Signatures on a Smartcard" filed on November 5, 1999; 24.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 09/558,256 entitled "Key Agreement and Transport Protocol with Implicit Signatures" filed on April 25, 2000; 25.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 09/942,492 entitled "Digital Signatures on a Smartcard" filed on August 29, 2001 and published on July 18, 2002; and, 26.) U.S. Pat. Appl. Ser. No. 10/185,735 entitled "Strengthened Public Key Protocol" filed on July 1, 2000. openssl-1.1.0g/include/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661013501 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661015315 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/err.h0000644000000000000000000000064213176625661016260 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef INTERNAL_ERR_H # define INTERNAL_ERR_H void err_free_strings_int(void); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/thread_once.h0000644000000000000000000000350413176625661017743 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #define DEFINE_RUN_ONCE(init) \ static int init(void); \ int init##_ossl_ret_ = 0; \ void init##_ossl_(void) \ { \ init##_ossl_ret_ = init(); \ } \ static int init(void) #define DECLARE_RUN_ONCE(init) \ extern int init##_ossl_ret_; \ void init##_ossl_(void); #define DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(init) \ static int init(void); \ static int init##_ossl_ret_ = 0; \ static void init##_ossl_(void) \ { \ init##_ossl_ret_ = init(); \ } \ static int init(void) /* * RUN_ONCE - use CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once, and check if the init succeeded * @once: pointer to static object of type CRYPTO_ONCE * @init: function name that was previously given to DEFINE_RUN_ONCE, * DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC or DECLARE_RUN_ONCE. This function * must return 1 for success or 0 for failure. * * The return value is 1 on success (*) or 0 in case of error. * * (*) by convention, since the init function must return 1 on success. */ #define RUN_ONCE(once, init) \ (CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(once, init##_ossl_) ? init##_ossl_ret_ : 0) openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/o_dir.h0000644000000000000000000000456213176625661016571 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copied from Richard Levitte's (richard@levitte.org) LP library. All * symbol names have been changed, with permission from the author. */ /* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir.h,v 1.1 2004/06/14 08:56:04 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef O_DIR_H # define O_DIR_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct OPENSSL_dir_context_st OPENSSL_DIR_CTX; /* * returns NULL on error or end-of-directory. If it is end-of-directory, * errno will be zero */ const char *OPENSSL_DIR_read(OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory); /* returns 1 on success, 0 on error */ int OPENSSL_DIR_end(OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **ctx); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* LPDIR_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/constant_time_locl.h0000644000000000000000000001420213176625661021345 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H # define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H # include /* For 'ossl_inline' */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true * and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result * of a conditional in constant time. For example, * * if (a < b) { * c = a; * } else { * c = b; * } * * can be written as * * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b); * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b); */ /* * Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other * bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to * replace this with something else on odd CPUs. */ static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise. */ static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise. */ static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise. */ static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise. */ static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Signed integers. */ static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b); /*- * Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b). * * When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above), * the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b| * (if |mask| is zero). */ static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask, unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */ static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b); /* Convenience method for signed integers. */ static ossl_inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b); static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a) { return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1)); } static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))); } static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b)); } static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return ~constant_time_lt(a, b); } static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b)); } static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a) { return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1)); } static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a)); } static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b); } static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b)); } static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b) { return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)); } static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b) { return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)); } static ossl_inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask, unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (mask & a) | (~mask & b); } static ossl_inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b)); } static ossl_inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b) { return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b))); } #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/bio.h0000644000000000000000000000143213176625661016237 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include struct bio_method_st { int type; const char *name; int (*bwrite) (BIO *, const char *, int); int (*bread) (BIO *, char *, int); int (*bputs) (BIO *, const char *); int (*bgets) (BIO *, char *, int); long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *); int (*create) (BIO *); int (*destroy) (BIO *); long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *); }; void bio_free_ex_data(BIO *bio); void bio_cleanup(void); openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/dane.h0000644000000000000000000000677213176625661016411 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H #define HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H #include /*- * Certificate usages: * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.1 */ #define DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_TA 0 #define DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_EE 1 #define DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA 2 #define DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE 3 #define DANETLS_USAGE_LAST DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE /*- * Selectors: * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.2 */ #define DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT 0 #define DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI 1 #define DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI /*- * Matching types: * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.3 */ #define DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL 0 #define DANETLS_MATCHING_2256 1 #define DANETLS_MATCHING_2512 2 #define DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST DANETLS_MATCHING_2512 typedef struct danetls_record_st { uint8_t usage; uint8_t selector; uint8_t mtype; unsigned char *data; size_t dlen; EVP_PKEY *spki; } danetls_record; DEFINE_STACK_OF(danetls_record) /* * Shared DANE context */ struct dane_ctx_st { const EVP_MD **mdevp; /* mtype -> digest */ uint8_t *mdord; /* mtype -> preference */ uint8_t mdmax; /* highest supported mtype */ unsigned long flags; /* feature bitmask */ }; /* * Per connection DANE state */ struct ssl_dane_st { struct dane_ctx_st *dctx; STACK_OF(danetls_record) *trecs; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; /* DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0) certs */ danetls_record *mtlsa; /* Matching TLSA record */ X509 *mcert; /* DANE matched cert */ uint32_t umask; /* Usages present */ int mdpth; /* Depth of matched cert */ int pdpth; /* Depth of PKIX trust */ unsigned long flags; /* feature bitmask */ }; #define DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) \ ((dane) != NULL && sk_danetls_record_num((dane)->trecs) > 0) #define DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(u) (((uint32_t)1) << u) #define DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_TA)) #define DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_PKIX_EE)) #define DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA)) #define DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE)) #define DANETLS_PKIX_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK | DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK) #define DANETLS_DANE_MASK (DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK) #define DANETLS_TA_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK) #define DANETLS_EE_MASK (DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK | DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK) #define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_MASK)) #define DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)) #define DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_TA_MASK)) #define DANETLS_HAS_EE(dane) ((dane) && ((dane)->umask & DANETLS_EE_MASK)) #define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX_TA(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_TA_MASK)) #define DANETLS_HAS_PKIX_EE(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_PKIX_EE_MASK)) #define DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_TA_MASK)) #define DANETLS_HAS_DANE_EE(dane) ((dane)&&((dane)->umask & DANETLS_DANE_EE_MASK)) #endif /* HEADER_INTERNAL_DANE_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/conf.h0000644000000000000000000000123213176625661016411 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_INTERNAL_CONF_H # define HEADER_INTERNAL_CONF_H #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif struct ossl_init_settings_st { char *appname; }; void openssl_config_int(const char *appname); void openssl_no_config_int(void); void conf_modules_free_int(void); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/comp.h0000644000000000000000000000060613176625661016426 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include void comp_zlib_cleanup_int(void); openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/numbers.h0000644000000000000000000000356213176625661017147 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_NUMBERS_H # define HEADER_NUMBERS_H # include # if (-1 & 3) == 0x03 /* Two's complement */ # define __MAXUINT__(T) ((T) -1) # define __MAXINT__(T) ((T) ((((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 1)) ^ __MAXUINT__(T))) # define __MININT__(T) (-__MAXINT__(T) - 1) # elif (-1 & 3) == 0x02 /* One's complement */ # define __MAXUINT__(T) (((T) -1) + 1) # define __MAXINT__(T) ((T) ((((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 1)) ^ __MAXUINT__(T))) # define __MININT__(T) (-__MAXINT__(T)) # elif (-1 & 3) == 0x01 /* Sign/magnitude */ # define __MAXINT__(T) ((T) (((((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 2)) - 1) | (((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 2)))) # define __MAXUINT__(T) ((T) (__MAXINT__(T) | (((T) 1) << ((sizeof(T) * CHAR_BIT) - 1)))) # define __MININT__(T) (-__MAXINT__(T)) # else # error "do not know the integer encoding on this architecture" # endif # ifndef INT8_MAX # define INT8_MIN __MININT__(int8_t) # define INT8_MAX __MAXINT__(int8_t) # define UINT8_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint8_t) # endif # ifndef INT16_MAX # define INT16_MIN __MININT__(int16_t) # define INT16_MAX __MAXINT__(int16_t) # define UINT16_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint16_t) # endif # ifndef INT32_MAX # define INT32_MIN __MININT__(int32_t) # define INT32_MAX __MAXINT__(int32_t) # define UINT32_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint32_t) # endif # ifndef INT64_MAX # define INT64_MIN __MININT__(int64_t) # define INT64_MAX __MAXINT__(int64_t) # define UINT64_MAX __MAXUINT__(uint64_t) # endif # ifndef SIZE_MAX # define SIZE_MAX __MAXUINT__(size_t) # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/dso.h0000644000000000000000000002505013176625661016255 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_DSO_H # define HEADER_DSO_H # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* These values are used as commands to DSO_ctrl() */ # define DSO_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 1 # define DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS 2 # define DSO_CTRL_OR_FLAGS 3 /* * By default, DSO_load() will translate the provided filename into a form * typical for the platform using the dso_name_converter function of the * method. Eg. win32 will transform "blah" into "blah.dll", and dlfcn will * transform it into "libblah.so". This callback could even utilise the * DSO_METHOD's converter too if it only wants to override behaviour for * one or two possible DSO methods. However, the following flag can be * set in a DSO to prevent *any* native name-translation at all - eg. if * the caller has prompted the user for a path to a driver library so the * filename should be interpreted as-is. */ # define DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION 0x01 /* * An extra flag to give if only the extension should be added as * translation. This is obviously only of importance on Unix and other * operating systems where the translation also may prefix the name with * something, like 'lib', and ignored everywhere else. This flag is also * ignored if DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION is used at the same time. */ # define DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY 0x02 /* * Don't unload the DSO when we call DSO_free() */ # define DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE 0x04 /* * The following flag controls the translation of symbol names to upper case. * This is currently only being implemented for OpenVMS. */ # define DSO_FLAG_UPCASE_SYMBOL 0x10 /* * This flag loads the library with public symbols. Meaning: The exported * symbols of this library are public to all libraries loaded after this * library. At the moment only implemented in unix. */ # define DSO_FLAG_GLOBAL_SYMBOLS 0x20 typedef void (*DSO_FUNC_TYPE) (void); typedef struct dso_st DSO; typedef struct dso_meth_st DSO_METHOD; /* * The function prototype used for method functions (or caller-provided * callbacks) that transform filenames. They are passed a DSO structure * pointer (or NULL if they are to be used independently of a DSO object) and * a filename to transform. They should either return NULL (if there is an * error condition) or a newly allocated string containing the transformed * form that the caller will need to free with OPENSSL_free() when done. */ typedef char *(*DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC)(DSO *, const char *); /* * The function prototype used for method functions (or caller-provided * callbacks) that merge two file specifications. They are passed a DSO * structure pointer (or NULL if they are to be used independently of a DSO * object) and two file specifications to merge. They should either return * NULL (if there is an error condition) or a newly allocated string * containing the result of merging that the caller will need to free with * OPENSSL_free() when done. Here, merging means that bits and pieces are * taken from each of the file specifications and added together in whatever * fashion that is sensible for the DSO method in question. The only rule * that really applies is that if the two specification contain pieces of the * same type, the copy from the first string takes priority. One could see * it as the first specification is the one given by the user and the second * being a bunch of defaults to add on if they're missing in the first. */ typedef char *(*DSO_MERGER_FUNC)(DSO *, const char *, const char *); DSO *DSO_new(void); int DSO_free(DSO *dso); int DSO_flags(DSO *dso); int DSO_up_ref(DSO *dso); long DSO_ctrl(DSO *dso, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); /* * These functions can be used to get/set the platform-independent filename * used for a DSO. NB: set will fail if the DSO is already loaded. */ const char *DSO_get_filename(DSO *dso); int DSO_set_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename); /* * This function will invoke the DSO's name_converter callback to translate a * filename, or if the callback isn't set it will instead use the DSO_METHOD's * converter. If "filename" is NULL, the "filename" in the DSO itself will be * used. If the DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION flag is set, then the filename is * simply duplicated. NB: This function is usually called from within a * DSO_METHOD during the processing of a DSO_load() call, and is exposed so * that caller-created DSO_METHODs can do the same thing. A non-NULL return * value will need to be OPENSSL_free()'d. */ char *DSO_convert_filename(DSO *dso, const char *filename); /* * This function will invoke the DSO's merger callback to merge two file * specifications, or if the callback isn't set it will instead use the * DSO_METHOD's merger. A non-NULL return value will need to be * OPENSSL_free()'d. */ char *DSO_merge(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1, const char *filespec2); /* * The all-singing all-dancing load function, you normally pass NULL for the * first and third parameters. Use DSO_up_ref and DSO_free for subsequent * reference count handling. Any flags passed in will be set in the * constructed DSO after its init() function but before the load operation. * If 'dso' is non-NULL, 'flags' is ignored. */ DSO *DSO_load(DSO *dso, const char *filename, DSO_METHOD *meth, int flags); /* This function binds to a function inside a shared library. */ DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname); /* * This method is the default, but will beg, borrow, or steal whatever method * should be the default on any particular platform (including * DSO_METH_null() if necessary). */ DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void); /* * This function writes null-terminated pathname of DSO module containing * 'addr' into 'sz' large caller-provided 'path' and returns the number of * characters [including trailing zero] written to it. If 'sz' is 0 or * negative, 'path' is ignored and required amount of characters [including * trailing zero] to accommodate pathname is returned. If 'addr' is NULL, then * pathname of cryptolib itself is returned. Negative or zero return value * denotes error. */ int DSO_pathbyaddr(void *addr, char *path, int sz); /* * Like DSO_pathbyaddr() but instead returns a handle to the DSO for the symbol * or NULL on error. */ DSO *DSO_dsobyaddr(void *addr, int flags); /* * This function should be used with caution! It looks up symbols in *all* * loaded modules and if module gets unloaded by somebody else attempt to * dereference the pointer is doomed to have fatal consequences. Primary * usage for this function is to probe *core* system functionality, e.g. * check if getnameinfo(3) is available at run-time without bothering about * OS-specific details such as libc.so.versioning or where does it actually * reside: in libc itself or libsocket. */ void *DSO_global_lookup(const char *name); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_DSO_strings(void); /* Error codes for the DSO functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define DSO_F_DLFCN_BIND_FUNC 100 # define DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD 102 # define DSO_F_DLFCN_MERGER 130 # define DSO_F_DLFCN_NAME_CONVERTER 123 # define DSO_F_DLFCN_UNLOAD 103 # define DSO_F_DL_BIND_FUNC 104 # define DSO_F_DL_LOAD 106 # define DSO_F_DL_MERGER 131 # define DSO_F_DL_NAME_CONVERTER 124 # define DSO_F_DL_UNLOAD 107 # define DSO_F_DSO_BIND_FUNC 108 # define DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME 126 # define DSO_F_DSO_CTRL 110 # define DSO_F_DSO_FREE 111 # define DSO_F_DSO_GET_FILENAME 127 # define DSO_F_DSO_GLOBAL_LOOKUP 139 # define DSO_F_DSO_LOAD 112 # define DSO_F_DSO_MERGE 132 # define DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD 113 # define DSO_F_DSO_PATHBYADDR 105 # define DSO_F_DSO_SET_FILENAME 129 # define DSO_F_DSO_UP_REF 114 # define DSO_F_VMS_BIND_SYM 115 # define DSO_F_VMS_LOAD 116 # define DSO_F_VMS_MERGER 133 # define DSO_F_VMS_UNLOAD 117 # define DSO_F_WIN32_BIND_FUNC 101 # define DSO_F_WIN32_GLOBALLOOKUP 142 # define DSO_F_WIN32_JOINER 135 # define DSO_F_WIN32_LOAD 120 # define DSO_F_WIN32_MERGER 134 # define DSO_F_WIN32_NAME_CONVERTER 125 # define DSO_F_WIN32_PATHBYADDR 109 # define DSO_F_WIN32_SPLITTER 136 # define DSO_F_WIN32_UNLOAD 121 /* Reason codes. */ # define DSO_R_CTRL_FAILED 100 # define DSO_R_DSO_ALREADY_LOADED 110 # define DSO_R_EMPTY_FILE_STRUCTURE 113 # define DSO_R_FAILURE 114 # define DSO_R_FILENAME_TOO_BIG 101 # define DSO_R_FINISH_FAILED 102 # define DSO_R_INCORRECT_FILE_SYNTAX 115 # define DSO_R_LOAD_FAILED 103 # define DSO_R_NAME_TRANSLATION_FAILED 109 # define DSO_R_NO_FILENAME 111 # define DSO_R_NULL_HANDLE 104 # define DSO_R_SET_FILENAME_FAILED 112 # define DSO_R_STACK_ERROR 105 # define DSO_R_SYM_FAILURE 106 # define DSO_R_UNLOAD_FAILED 107 # define DSO_R_UNSUPPORTED 108 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/asn1t.h0000644000000000000000000000106513176625661016516 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(INT32) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZINT32) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(UINT32) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZUINT32) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(INT64) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZINT64) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(UINT64) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZUINT64) openssl-1.1.0g/include/internal/o_str.h0000644000000000000000000000077113176625661016621 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2003-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_O_STR_H # define HEADER_O_STR_H # include /* to get size_t */ int OPENSSL_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n); #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661015164 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/des.h0000644000000000000000000001671313176625661016120 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_DES_H # define HEADER_DES_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # include typedef unsigned int DES_LONG; # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif typedef unsigned char DES_cblock[8]; typedef /* const */ unsigned char const_DES_cblock[8]; /* * With "const", gcc 2.8.1 on Solaris thinks that DES_cblock * and * const_DES_cblock * are incompatible pointer types. */ typedef struct DES_ks { union { DES_cblock cblock; /* * make sure things are correct size on machines with 8 byte longs */ DES_LONG deslong[2]; } ks[16]; } DES_key_schedule; # define DES_KEY_SZ (sizeof(DES_cblock)) # define DES_SCHEDULE_SZ (sizeof(DES_key_schedule)) # define DES_ENCRYPT 1 # define DES_DECRYPT 0 # define DES_CBC_MODE 0 # define DES_PCBC_MODE 1 # define DES_ecb2_encrypt(i,o,k1,k2,e) \ DES_ecb3_encrypt((i),(o),(k1),(k2),(k1),(e)) # define DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,e) \ DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(e)) # define DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n,e) \ DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n),(e)) # define DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(i,o,l,k1,k2,iv,n) \ DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt((i),(o),(l),(k1),(k2),(k1),(iv),(n)) OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int, DES_check_key); /* defaults to false */ # define DES_check_key OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(DES_check_key) const char *DES_options(void); void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc); DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, const_DES_cblock *ivec); /* DES_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV! Use DES_ncbc_encrypt instead. */ void DES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, const_DES_cblock *inw, const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc); void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc); /* * This is the DES encryption function that gets called by just about every * other DES routine in the library. You should not use this function except * to implement 'modes' of DES. I say this because the functions that call * this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to long, and this needs to be * done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory access do not occur. The * characters are loaded 'little endian'. Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned * long's and ks is the DES_key_schedule to use. enc, is non zero specifies * encryption, zero if decryption. */ void DES_encrypt1(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc); /* * This functions is the same as DES_encrypt1() except that the DES initial * permutation (IP) and final permutation (FP) have been left out. As for * DES_encrypt1(), you should not use this function. It is used by the * routines in the library that implement triple DES. IP() DES_encrypt2() * DES_encrypt2() DES_encrypt2() FP() is the same as DES_encrypt1() * DES_encrypt1() DES_encrypt1() except faster :-). */ void DES_encrypt2(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc); void DES_encrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3); void DES_decrypt3(DES_LONG *data, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3); void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); void DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num); char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret); char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt); void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec); void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[], long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed); int DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret); void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key); int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key); int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key); /* * DES_set_key (= set_key = DES_key_sched = key_sched) calls * DES_set_key_checked if global variable DES_check_key is set, * DES_set_key_unchecked otherwise. */ int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key); void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1, DES_cblock *key2); void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); void DES_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num); # define DES_fixup_key_parity DES_set_odd_parity # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/dtls1.h0000644000000000000000000000312013176625661016360 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H # define HEADER_DTLS1_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF # define DTLS1_2_VERSION 0xFEFD # define DTLS_MIN_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION # define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_2_VERSION # define DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0xFE # define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100 /* Special value for method supporting multiple versions */ # define DTLS_ANY_VERSION 0x1FFFF /* lengths of messages */ # define DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH 256 # define DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 13 # define DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 12 # define DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT -2 # define DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY -3 # define DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH 1 # ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE # define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH 7 # else # define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH 2 # endif /* Timeout multipliers (timeout slice is defined in apps/timeouts.h */ # define DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT 2 # define DTLS1_TMO_WRITE_COUNT 2 # define DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT 12 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/err.h0000644000000000000000000002461413176625661016134 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_ERR_H # define HEADER_ERR_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # include # include # endif # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR # define ERR_PUT_error(a,b,c,d,e) ERR_put_error(a,b,c,d,e) # else # define ERR_PUT_error(a,b,c,d,e) ERR_put_error(a,b,c,NULL,0) # endif # include # define ERR_TXT_MALLOCED 0x01 # define ERR_TXT_STRING 0x02 # define ERR_FLAG_MARK 0x01 # define ERR_NUM_ERRORS 16 typedef struct err_state_st { int err_flags[ERR_NUM_ERRORS]; unsigned long err_buffer[ERR_NUM_ERRORS]; char *err_data[ERR_NUM_ERRORS]; int err_data_flags[ERR_NUM_ERRORS]; const char *err_file[ERR_NUM_ERRORS]; int err_line[ERR_NUM_ERRORS]; int top, bottom; } ERR_STATE; /* library */ # define ERR_LIB_NONE 1 # define ERR_LIB_SYS 2 # define ERR_LIB_BN 3 # define ERR_LIB_RSA 4 # define ERR_LIB_DH 5 # define ERR_LIB_EVP 6 # define ERR_LIB_BUF 7 # define ERR_LIB_OBJ 8 # define ERR_LIB_PEM 9 # define ERR_LIB_DSA 10 # define ERR_LIB_X509 11 /* #define ERR_LIB_METH 12 */ # define ERR_LIB_ASN1 13 # define ERR_LIB_CONF 14 # define ERR_LIB_CRYPTO 15 # define ERR_LIB_EC 16 # define ERR_LIB_SSL 20 /* #define ERR_LIB_SSL23 21 */ /* #define ERR_LIB_SSL2 22 */ /* #define ERR_LIB_SSL3 23 */ /* #define ERR_LIB_RSAREF 30 */ /* #define ERR_LIB_PROXY 31 */ # define ERR_LIB_BIO 32 # define ERR_LIB_PKCS7 33 # define ERR_LIB_X509V3 34 # define ERR_LIB_PKCS12 35 # define ERR_LIB_RAND 36 # define ERR_LIB_DSO 37 # define ERR_LIB_ENGINE 38 # define ERR_LIB_OCSP 39 # define ERR_LIB_UI 40 # define ERR_LIB_COMP 41 # define ERR_LIB_ECDSA 42 # define ERR_LIB_ECDH 43 # define ERR_LIB_STORE 44 # define ERR_LIB_FIPS 45 # define ERR_LIB_CMS 46 # define ERR_LIB_TS 47 # define ERR_LIB_HMAC 48 /* # define ERR_LIB_JPAKE 49 */ # define ERR_LIB_CT 50 # define ERR_LIB_ASYNC 51 # define ERR_LIB_KDF 52 # define ERR_LIB_USER 128 # define SYSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_SYS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define BNerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_BN,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define RSAerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_RSA,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define DHerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_DH,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define EVPerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_EVP,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define BUFerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_BUF,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define OBJerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_OBJ,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define PEMerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_PEM,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define DSAerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_DSA,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define X509err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_X509,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define ASN1err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ASN1,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define CONFerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CONF,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define CRYPTOerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define ECerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_EC,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define SSLerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_SSL,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define BIOerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_BIO,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define PKCS7err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_PKCS7,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define X509V3err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_X509V3,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define PKCS12err(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_PKCS12,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define RANDerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_RAND,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define DSOerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_DSO,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define ENGINEerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ENGINE,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define OCSPerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_OCSP,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define UIerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_UI,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define COMPerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_COMP,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define ECDSAerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ECDSA,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define ECDHerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ECDH,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define STOREerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_STORE,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define FIPSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_FIPS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define CMSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CMS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define TSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_TS,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define HMACerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_HMAC,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define CTerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CT,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define ASYNCerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ASYNC,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define KDFerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_KDF,(f),(r),OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # define ERR_PACK(l,f,r) ( \ (((unsigned int)(l) & 0x0FF) << 24L) | \ (((unsigned int)(f) & 0xFFF) << 12L) | \ (((unsigned int)(r) & 0xFFF) ) ) # define ERR_GET_LIB(l) (int)(((l) >> 24L) & 0x0FFL) # define ERR_GET_FUNC(l) (int)(((l) >> 12L) & 0xFFFL) # define ERR_GET_REASON(l) (int)( (l) & 0xFFFL) # define ERR_FATAL_ERROR(l) (int)( (l) & ERR_R_FATAL) /* OS functions */ # define SYS_F_FOPEN 1 # define SYS_F_CONNECT 2 # define SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME 3 # define SYS_F_SOCKET 4 # define SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET 5 # define SYS_F_BIND 6 # define SYS_F_LISTEN 7 # define SYS_F_ACCEPT 8 # define SYS_F_WSASTARTUP 9/* Winsock stuff */ # define SYS_F_OPENDIR 10 # define SYS_F_FREAD 11 # define SYS_F_GETADDRINFO 12 # define SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO 13 # define SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT 14 # define SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT 15 # define SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME 16 # define SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME 17 # define SYS_F_FFLUSH 18 /* reasons */ # define ERR_R_SYS_LIB ERR_LIB_SYS/* 2 */ # define ERR_R_BN_LIB ERR_LIB_BN/* 3 */ # define ERR_R_RSA_LIB ERR_LIB_RSA/* 4 */ # define ERR_R_DH_LIB ERR_LIB_DH/* 5 */ # define ERR_R_EVP_LIB ERR_LIB_EVP/* 6 */ # define ERR_R_BUF_LIB ERR_LIB_BUF/* 7 */ # define ERR_R_OBJ_LIB ERR_LIB_OBJ/* 8 */ # define ERR_R_PEM_LIB ERR_LIB_PEM/* 9 */ # define ERR_R_DSA_LIB ERR_LIB_DSA/* 10 */ # define ERR_R_X509_LIB ERR_LIB_X509/* 11 */ # define ERR_R_ASN1_LIB ERR_LIB_ASN1/* 13 */ # define ERR_R_EC_LIB ERR_LIB_EC/* 16 */ # define ERR_R_BIO_LIB ERR_LIB_BIO/* 32 */ # define ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB ERR_LIB_PKCS7/* 33 */ # define ERR_R_X509V3_LIB ERR_LIB_X509V3/* 34 */ # define ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB ERR_LIB_ENGINE/* 38 */ # define ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB ERR_LIB_ECDSA/* 42 */ # define ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR 58 # define ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS 63 /* fatal error */ # define ERR_R_FATAL 64 # define ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE (1|ERR_R_FATAL) # define ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED (2|ERR_R_FATAL) # define ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER (3|ERR_R_FATAL) # define ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR (4|ERR_R_FATAL) # define ERR_R_DISABLED (5|ERR_R_FATAL) # define ERR_R_INIT_FAIL (6|ERR_R_FATAL) # define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT (7) /* * 99 is the maximum possible ERR_R_... code, higher values are reserved for * the individual libraries */ typedef struct ERR_string_data_st { unsigned long error; const char *string; } ERR_STRING_DATA; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA); void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line); void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags); unsigned long ERR_get_error(void); unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line); unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void); unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line); unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void); unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line); unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); void ERR_clear_error(void); char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf); void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len); const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e); const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e); const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e); void ERR_print_errors_cb(int (*cb) (const char *str, size_t len, void *u), void *u); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp); # endif void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp); void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...); void ERR_add_error_vdata(int num, va_list args); int ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]); int ERR_unload_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]); int ERR_load_ERR_strings(void); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define ERR_load_crypto_strings() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL) # define ERR_free_strings() while(0) continue #endif DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0(void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid)) ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void); int ERR_get_next_error_library(void); int ERR_set_mark(void); int ERR_pop_to_mark(void); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h0000644000000000000000000001360713176625661017220 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H # define HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # include # ifdef NO_ASN1_TYPEDEFS # define ASN1_INTEGER ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_ENUMERATED ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_BIT_STRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_OCTET_STRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_T61STRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_IA5STRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_UTCTIME ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_TIME ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_GENERALSTRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_BMPSTRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_VISIBLESTRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_UTF8STRING ASN1_STRING # define ASN1_BOOLEAN int # define ASN1_NULL int # else typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_INTEGER; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_ENUMERATED; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_BIT_STRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_OCTET_STRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_T61STRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_IA5STRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_GENERALSTRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_BMPSTRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_UTCTIME; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_TIME; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_VISIBLESTRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_UTF8STRING; typedef struct asn1_string_st ASN1_STRING; typedef int ASN1_BOOLEAN; typedef int ASN1_NULL; # endif typedef struct asn1_object_st ASN1_OBJECT; typedef struct ASN1_ITEM_st ASN1_ITEM; typedef struct asn1_pctx_st ASN1_PCTX; typedef struct asn1_sctx_st ASN1_SCTX; # ifdef _WIN32 # undef X509_NAME # undef X509_EXTENSIONS # undef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL # undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO # undef OCSP_REQUEST # undef OCSP_RESPONSE # endif # ifdef BIGNUM # undef BIGNUM # endif struct dane_st; typedef struct bio_st BIO; typedef struct bignum_st BIGNUM; typedef struct bignum_ctx BN_CTX; typedef struct bn_blinding_st BN_BLINDING; typedef struct bn_mont_ctx_st BN_MONT_CTX; typedef struct bn_recp_ctx_st BN_RECP_CTX; typedef struct bn_gencb_st BN_GENCB; typedef struct buf_mem_st BUF_MEM; typedef struct evp_cipher_st EVP_CIPHER; typedef struct evp_cipher_ctx_st EVP_CIPHER_CTX; typedef struct evp_md_st EVP_MD; typedef struct evp_md_ctx_st EVP_MD_CTX; typedef struct evp_pkey_st EVP_PKEY; typedef struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD; typedef struct evp_pkey_method_st EVP_PKEY_METHOD; typedef struct evp_pkey_ctx_st EVP_PKEY_CTX; typedef struct evp_Encode_Ctx_st EVP_ENCODE_CTX; typedef struct hmac_ctx_st HMAC_CTX; typedef struct dh_st DH; typedef struct dh_method DH_METHOD; typedef struct dsa_st DSA; typedef struct dsa_method DSA_METHOD; typedef struct rsa_st RSA; typedef struct rsa_meth_st RSA_METHOD; typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY; typedef struct ec_key_method_st EC_KEY_METHOD; typedef struct rand_meth_st RAND_METHOD; typedef struct ssl_dane_st SSL_DANE; typedef struct x509_st X509; typedef struct X509_algor_st X509_ALGOR; typedef struct X509_crl_st X509_CRL; typedef struct x509_crl_method_st X509_CRL_METHOD; typedef struct x509_revoked_st X509_REVOKED; typedef struct X509_name_st X509_NAME; typedef struct X509_pubkey_st X509_PUBKEY; typedef struct x509_store_st X509_STORE; typedef struct x509_store_ctx_st X509_STORE_CTX; typedef struct x509_object_st X509_OBJECT; typedef struct x509_lookup_st X509_LOOKUP; typedef struct x509_lookup_method_st X509_LOOKUP_METHOD; typedef struct X509_VERIFY_PARAM_st X509_VERIFY_PARAM; typedef struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO; typedef struct v3_ext_ctx X509V3_CTX; typedef struct conf_st CONF; typedef struct ossl_init_settings_st OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS; typedef struct ui_st UI; typedef struct ui_method_st UI_METHOD; typedef struct engine_st ENGINE; typedef struct ssl_st SSL; typedef struct ssl_ctx_st SSL_CTX; typedef struct comp_ctx_st COMP_CTX; typedef struct comp_method_st COMP_METHOD; typedef struct X509_POLICY_NODE_st X509_POLICY_NODE; typedef struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st X509_POLICY_LEVEL; typedef struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st X509_POLICY_TREE; typedef struct X509_POLICY_CACHE_st X509_POLICY_CACHE; typedef struct AUTHORITY_KEYID_st AUTHORITY_KEYID; typedef struct DIST_POINT_st DIST_POINT; typedef struct ISSUING_DIST_POINT_st ISSUING_DIST_POINT; typedef struct NAME_CONSTRAINTS_st NAME_CONSTRAINTS; typedef struct crypto_ex_data_st CRYPTO_EX_DATA; typedef struct ocsp_req_ctx_st OCSP_REQ_CTX; typedef struct ocsp_response_st OCSP_RESPONSE; typedef struct ocsp_responder_id_st OCSP_RESPID; typedef struct sct_st SCT; typedef struct sct_ctx_st SCT_CTX; typedef struct ctlog_st CTLOG; typedef struct ctlog_store_st CTLOG_STORE; typedef struct ct_policy_eval_ctx_st CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX; #if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L && \ defined(INTMAX_MAX) && defined(UINTMAX_MAX) typedef intmax_t ossl_intmax_t; typedef uintmax_t ossl_uintmax_t; #else /* * Not long long, because the C-library can only be expected to provide * strtoll(), strtoull() at the same time as intmax_t and strtoimax(), * strtoumax(). Since we use these for parsing arguments, we need the * conversion functions, not just the sizes. */ typedef long ossl_intmax_t; typedef unsigned long ossl_uintmax_t; #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* def HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/conf_api.h0000644000000000000000000000242413176625661017115 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CONF_API_H # define HEADER_CONF_API_H # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was new_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section); /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was get_section */ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section); /* Up until OpenSSL 0.9.5a, this was CONF_get_section */ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *_CONF_get_section_values(const CONF *conf, const char *section); int _CONF_add_string(CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value); char *_CONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *name); long _CONF_get_number(const CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *name); int _CONF_new_data(CONF *conf); void _CONF_free_data(CONF *conf); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/rsa.h0000644000000000000000000006541413176625661016134 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RSA_H # define HEADER_RSA_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include # include # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif /* The types RSA and RSA_METHOD are defined in ossl_typ.h */ # ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS # define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384 # endif # define OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024 # ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS # define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS 3072 # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS /* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */ # define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS 64 # endif # define RSA_3 0x3L # define RSA_F4 0x10001L # define RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK 0x0001/* don't check pub/private * match */ # define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC 0x0002 # define RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE 0x0004 # define RSA_FLAG_BLINDING 0x0008 # define RSA_FLAG_THREAD_SAFE 0x0010 /* * This flag means the private key operations will be handled by rsa_mod_exp * and that they do not depend on the private key components being present: * for example a key stored in external hardware. Without this flag * bn_mod_exp gets called when private key components are absent. */ # define RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY 0x0020 /* * new with 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b; the built-in * RSA implementation now uses blinding by * default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING), * but other engines might not need it */ # define RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING 0x0080 # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * Does nothing. Previously this switched off constant time behaviour. */ # define RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME 0x0000 # endif # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L /* deprecated name for the flag*/ /* * new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA * implementation now uses constant time * modular exponentiation for secret exponents * by default. This flag causes the * faster variable sliding window method to * be used for all exponents. */ # define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME # endif # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pad) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, \ pad, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, ppad) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, ppad) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \ len, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, plen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \ 0, plen) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, pmd) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)pmd) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, pmd) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)pmd) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, l, llen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen, (void *)l) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, l) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, (void *)l) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 11) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 12) # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1 # define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2 # define RSA_NO_PADDING 3 # define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4 # define RSA_X931_PADDING 5 /* EVP_PKEY_ only */ # define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING 6 # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE 11 # define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg) RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg) # define RSA_get_app_data(s) RSA_get_ex_data(s,0) RSA *RSA_new(void); RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); int RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa); int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa); int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa); int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d); int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q); int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r,BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp); void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d); void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q); void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp); void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags); int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags); void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags); ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r); /* Deprecated version */ DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)) /* New version */ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1, BIGNUM *q2, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xq1, const BIGNUM *Xq2, const BIGNUM *Xq, const BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); int RSA_X931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); int RSA_check_key(const RSA *); int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *, BN_GENCB *cb); /* next 4 return -1 on error */ int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); void RSA_free(RSA *r); /* "up" the RSA object's reference count */ int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r); int RSA_flags(const RSA *r); void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth); const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void); const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa); int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth); /* these are the actual RSA functions */ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void); const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void); DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPublicKey) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPrivateKey) typedef struct rsa_pss_params_st { X509_ALGOR *hashAlgorithm; X509_ALGOR *maskGenAlgorithm; ASN1_INTEGER *saltLength; ASN1_INTEGER *trailerField; } RSA_PSS_PARAMS; DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) typedef struct rsa_oaep_params_st { X509_ALGOR *hashFunc; X509_ALGOR *maskGenFunc; X509_ALGOR *pSourceFunc; } RSA_OAEP_PARAMS; DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *r, int offset); # endif int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *r, int offset); /* * The following 2 functions sign and verify a X509_SIG ASN1 object inside * PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption */ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa); int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa); /* * The following 2 function sign and verify a ASN1_OCTET_STRING object inside * PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption */ int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa); int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa); int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa); BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl, const unsigned char *p, int pl); int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len, const unsigned char *p, int pl); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md); int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, int plen, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md); int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int RSA_X931_hash_id(int nid); int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM, int sLen); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen); int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, const unsigned char *EM, int sLen); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, const unsigned char *mHash, const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, int sLen); #define RSA_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg); void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx); RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa); RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa); /* * If this flag is set the RSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used in * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the * result is compliant. */ # define RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD 0x0400 /* * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the * usage is compliant. */ # define RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0400 /* * Application has decided PRNG is good enough to generate a key: don't * check. */ # define RSA_FLAG_CHECKED 0x0800 RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags); void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth); RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth); const char *RSA_meth_get0_name(const RSA_METHOD *meth); int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name); int RSA_meth_get_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth); int RSA_meth_set_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth, int flags); void *RSA_meth_get0_app_data(const RSA_METHOD *meth); int RSA_meth_set0_app_data(RSA_METHOD *meth, void *app_data); int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)); int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)); int (*RSA_meth_get_init(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_init(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*init) (RSA *rsa)); int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa)); int (*RSA_meth_get_sign(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_sign(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)); int (*RSA_meth_get_verify(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_verify(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa)); int (*RSA_meth_get_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_RSA_strings(void); /* Error codes for the RSA functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD 140 # define RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1 146 # define RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY 145 # define RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE 147 # define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL 143 # define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR 144 # define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 142 # define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY 149 # define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER 141 # define RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD 156 # define RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN 129 # define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY 123 # define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX 160 # define RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT 159 # define RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY 148 # define RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP 161 # define RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW 162 # define RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME 163 # define RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD 157 # define RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD 106 # define RSA_F_RSA_NULL 124 # define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 132 # define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 133 # define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 134 # define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 135 # define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 101 # define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 102 # define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103 # define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE 107 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP 121 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1 154 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS 125 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 152 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1 108 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2 109 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23 110 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931 127 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE 111 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP 122 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1 153 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1 112 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2 113 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23 114 # define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931 128 # define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT 115 # define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP 116 # define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE 138 # define RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX 155 # define RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE 139 # define RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING 136 # define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN 117 # define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 118 # define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY 119 # define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 120 # define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 126 /* Reason codes. */ # define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 100 # define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE 101 # define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT 102 # define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT 103 # define RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 104 # define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01 106 # define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02 107 # define RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 108 # define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE 109 # define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 110 # define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 132 # define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL 111 # define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE 122 # define RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH 158 # define RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY 112 # define RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 124 # define RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 125 # define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 123 # define RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID 133 # define RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE 144 # define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST 157 # define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH 143 # define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER 137 # define RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL 160 # define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131 # define RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD 156 # define RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS 161 # define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING 138 # define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE 141 # define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS 149 # define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN 146 # define RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH 150 # define RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER 139 # define RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST 142 # define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q 126 # define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 120 # define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID 134 # define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 105 # define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 140 # define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING 113 # define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127 # define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121 # define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 148 # define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114 # define RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR 159 # define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128 # define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129 # define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130 # define RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED 136 # define RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED 135 # define RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK 115 # define RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 116 # define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 117 # define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 166 # define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST 151 # define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 118 # define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE 162 # define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE 163 # define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM 153 # define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER 154 # define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE 155 # define RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING 147 # define RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 119 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/e_os2.h0000644000000000000000000002136613176625661016354 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_E_OS2_H # define HEADER_E_OS2_H # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /****************************************************************************** * Detect operating systems. This probably needs completing. * The result is that at least one OPENSSL_SYS_os macro should be defined. * However, if none is defined, Unix is assumed. **/ # define OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX /* --------------------- Microsoft operating systems ---------------------- */ /* * Note that MSDOS actually denotes 32-bit environments running on top of * MS-DOS, such as DJGPP one. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # endif /* * For 32 bit environment, there seems to be the CygWin environment and then * all the others that try to do the same thing Microsoft does... */ /* * UEFI lives here because it might be built with a Microsoft toolchain and * we need to avoid the false positive match on Windows. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UWIN) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_UWIN # else # if defined(__CYGWIN__) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_CYGWIN) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN # else # if defined(_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) # define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 # endif # endif # if defined(_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64) # define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64 # endif # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # endif # endif # endif /* Anything that tries to look like Microsoft is "Windows" */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # define OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # endif # endif /* * DLL settings. This part is a bit tough, because it's up to the * application implementor how he or she will link the application, so it * requires some macro to be used. */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS # ifndef OPENSSL_OPT_WINDLL # if defined(_WINDLL) /* This is used when building OpenSSL to * indicate that DLL linkage should be used */ # define OPENSSL_OPT_WINDLL # endif # endif # endif /* ------------------------------- OpenVMS -------------------------------- */ # if defined(__VMS) || defined(VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # endif # define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # if defined(__DECC) # define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC # elif defined(__DECCXX) # define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC # define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECCXX # else # define OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC # endif # endif /* -------------------------------- Unix ---------------------------------- */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX # if defined(linux) || defined(__linux__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) # define OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX # endif # if defined(_AIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_AIX) # define OPENSSL_SYS_AIX # endif # endif /* -------------------------------- VOS ----------------------------------- */ # if defined(__VOS__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) # define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS # ifdef __HPPA__ # define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA # endif # ifdef __IA32__ # define OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 # endif # endif /** * That's it for OS-specific stuff *****************************************************************************/ /* Specials for I/O an exit */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # define OPENSSL_UNISTD_IO # define OPENSSL_DECLARE_EXIT extern void exit(int); # else # define OPENSSL_UNISTD_IO OPENSSL_UNISTD # define OPENSSL_DECLARE_EXIT /* declared in unistd.h */ # endif /*- * Definitions of OPENSSL_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_EXTERN, to define and declare * certain global symbols that, with some compilers under VMS, have to be * defined and declared explicitly with globaldef and globalref. * Definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT and OPENSSL_IMPORT, to define and declare * DLL exports and imports for compilers under Win32. These are a little * more complicated to use. Basically, for any library that exports some * global variables, the following code must be present in the header file * that declares them, before OPENSSL_EXTERN is used: * * #ifdef SOME_BUILD_FLAG_MACRO * # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN * # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT * #endif * * The default is to have OPENSSL_EXPORT, OPENSSL_EXTERN and OPENSSL_GLOBAL * have some generally sensible values. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC) # define OPENSSL_EXPORT globalref # define OPENSSL_EXTERN globalref # define OPENSSL_GLOBAL globaldef # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(OPENSSL_OPT_WINDLL) # define OPENSSL_EXPORT extern __declspec(dllexport) # define OPENSSL_EXTERN extern __declspec(dllimport) # define OPENSSL_GLOBAL # else # define OPENSSL_EXPORT extern # define OPENSSL_EXTERN extern # define OPENSSL_GLOBAL # endif /*- * Macros to allow global variables to be reached through function calls when * required (if a shared library version requires it, for example. * The way it's done allows definitions like this: * * // in foobar.c * OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foobar,0) * // in foobar.h * OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foobar); * #define foobar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foobar) */ # ifdef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION # define OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(type,name,value) \ type *_shadow_##name(void) \ { static type _hide_##name=value; return &_hide_##name; } # define OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(type,name) type *_shadow_##name(void) # define OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(name) (*(_shadow_##name())) # else # define OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(type,name,value) OPENSSL_GLOBAL type _shadow_##name=value; # define OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(type,name) OPENSSL_EXPORT type _shadow_##name # define OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(name) _shadow_##name # endif # ifdef _WIN32 # ifdef _WIN64 # define ossl_ssize_t __int64 # define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX _I64_MAX # else # define ossl_ssize_t int # define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX # endif # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(ossl_ssize_t) # define ossl_ssize_t INTN # define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX MAX_INTN # endif # ifndef ossl_ssize_t # define ossl_ssize_t ssize_t # if defined(SSIZE_MAX) # define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX SSIZE_MAX # elif defined(_POSIX_SSIZE_MAX) # define OSSL_SSIZE_MAX _POSIX_SSIZE_MAX # endif # endif # ifdef DEBUG_UNUSED # define __owur __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__)) # else # define __owur # endif /* Standard integer types */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) typedef INT8 int8_t; typedef UINT8 uint8_t; typedef INT16 int16_t; typedef UINT16 uint16_t; typedef INT32 int32_t; typedef UINT32 uint32_t; typedef INT64 int64_t; typedef UINT64 uint64_t; # elif (defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) || \ defined(__osf__) || defined(__sgi) || defined(__hpux) || \ defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined (__OpenBSD__) # include # elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1500 /* * minimally required typdefs for systems not supporting inttypes.h or * stdint.h: currently just older VC++ */ typedef signed char int8_t; typedef unsigned char uint8_t; typedef short int16_t; typedef unsigned short uint16_t; typedef int int32_t; typedef unsigned int uint32_t; typedef __int64 int64_t; typedef unsigned __int64 uint64_t; # else # include # endif /* ossl_inline: portable inline definition usable in public headers */ # if !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) # if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__>=199901L /* just use inline */ # define ossl_inline inline # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # define ossl_inline __inline__ # elif defined(_MSC_VER) /* * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however * __inline is available for C, see * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx */ # define ossl_inline __inline # else # define ossl_inline # endif # else # define ossl_inline inline # endif # if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L # define ossl_noreturn _Noreturn # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2 # define ossl_noreturn __attribute__((noreturn)) # else # define ossl_noreturn # endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/buffer.h0000644000000000000000000000400713176625661016607 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_BUFFER_H # define HEADER_BUFFER_H # include # ifndef HEADER_CRYPTO_H # include # endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # include # include /* * These names are outdated as of OpenSSL 1.1; a future release * will move them to be deprecated. */ # define BUF_strdup(s) OPENSSL_strdup(s) # define BUF_strndup(s, size) OPENSSL_strndup(s, size) # define BUF_memdup(data, size) OPENSSL_memdup(data, size) # define BUF_strlcpy(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcpy(dst, src, size) # define BUF_strlcat(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcat(dst, src, size) # define BUF_strnlen(str, maxlen) OPENSSL_strnlen(str, maxlen) struct buf_mem_st { size_t length; /* current number of bytes */ char *data; size_t max; /* size of buffer */ unsigned long flags; }; # define BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE 0x01 BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void); BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new_ex(unsigned long flags); void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a); size_t BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len); size_t BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len); void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_BUF_strings(void); /* Error codes for the BUF functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW 100 # define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN 105 # define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW 101 /* Reason codes. */ # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/safestack.h0000644000000000000000000001423413176625661017305 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_SAFESTACK_H # define HEADER_SAFESTACK_H # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define STACK_OF(type) struct stack_st_##type # define SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t1, t2, t3) \ STACK_OF(t1); \ typedef int (*sk_##t1##_compfunc)(const t3 * const *a, const t3 *const *b); \ typedef void (*sk_##t1##_freefunc)(t3 *a); \ typedef t3 * (*sk_##t1##_copyfunc)(const t3 *a); \ static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_num(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ return OPENSSL_sk_num((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_value(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk, int idx) \ { \ return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_value((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, idx); \ } \ static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) *sk_##t1##_new(sk_##t1##_compfunc compare) \ { \ return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_new((OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)compare); \ } \ static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) *sk_##t1##_new_null(void) \ { \ return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_new_null(); \ } \ static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_free(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ OPENSSL_sk_free((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_zero(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ OPENSSL_sk_zero((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_delete(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, int i) \ { \ return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_delete((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, i); \ } \ static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_delete_ptr(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \ { \ return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, \ (const void *)ptr); \ } \ static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_push(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \ { \ return OPENSSL_sk_push((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \ } \ static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_unshift(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \ { \ return OPENSSL_sk_unshift((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \ } \ static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_pop(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_pop((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_shift(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_shift((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_pop_free(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, sk_##t1##_freefunc freefunc) \ { \ OPENSSL_sk_pop_free((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (OPENSSL_sk_freefunc)freefunc); \ } \ static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_insert(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr, int idx) \ { \ return OPENSSL_sk_insert((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr, idx); \ } \ static ossl_inline t2 *sk_##t1##_set(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, int idx, t2 *ptr) \ { \ return (t2 *)OPENSSL_sk_set((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, idx, (const void *)ptr); \ } \ static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_find(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \ { \ return OPENSSL_sk_find((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \ } \ static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_find_ex(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, t2 *ptr) \ { \ return OPENSSL_sk_find_ex((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (const void *)ptr); \ } \ static ossl_inline void sk_##t1##_sort(STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ OPENSSL_sk_sort((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline int sk_##t1##_is_sorted(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ return OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) * sk_##t1##_dup(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk) \ { \ return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_dup((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk); \ } \ static ossl_inline STACK_OF(t1) *sk_##t1##_deep_copy(const STACK_OF(t1) *sk, \ sk_##t1##_copyfunc copyfunc, \ sk_##t1##_freefunc freefunc) \ { \ return (STACK_OF(t1) *)OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy((const OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, \ (OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc)copyfunc, \ (OPENSSL_sk_freefunc)freefunc); \ } \ static ossl_inline sk_##t1##_compfunc sk_##t1##_set_cmp_func(STACK_OF(t1) *sk, sk_##t1##_compfunc compare) \ { \ return (sk_##t1##_compfunc)OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func((OPENSSL_STACK *)sk, (OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)compare); \ } # define DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(t1, t2) SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t1, t2, t2) # define DEFINE_STACK_OF(t) SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t, t, t) # define DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(t1, t2) \ SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t1, const t2, t2) # define DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(t) SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF(t, const t, t) /*- * Strings are special: normally an lhash entry will point to a single * (somewhat) mutable object. In the case of strings: * * a) Instead of a single char, there is an array of chars, NUL-terminated. * b) The string may have be immutable. * * So, they need their own declarations. Especially important for * type-checking tools, such as Deputy. * * In practice, however, it appears to be hard to have a const * string. For now, I'm settling for dealing with the fact it is a * string at all. */ typedef char *OPENSSL_STRING; typedef const char *OPENSSL_CSTRING; /*- * Confusingly, LHASH_OF(STRING) deals with char ** throughout, but * STACK_OF(STRING) is really more like STACK_OF(char), only, as mentioned * above, instead of a single char each entry is a NUL-terminated array of * chars. So, we have to implement STRING specially for STACK_OF. This is * dealt with in the autogenerated macros below. */ DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, char) DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(OPENSSL_CSTRING, char) /* * Similarly, we sometimes use a block of characters, NOT nul-terminated. * These should also be distinguished from "normal" stacks. */ typedef void *OPENSSL_BLOCK; DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, void) # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/sha.h0000644000000000000000000000736713176625661016125 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_SHA_H # define HEADER_SHA_H # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * ! SHA_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide. ! * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! */ # define SHA_LONG unsigned int # define SHA_LBLOCK 16 # define SHA_CBLOCK (SHA_LBLOCK*4)/* SHA treats input data as a * contiguous array of 32 bit wide * big-endian values. */ # define SHA_LAST_BLOCK (SHA_CBLOCK-8) # define SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH 20 typedef struct SHAstate_st { SHA_LONG h0, h1, h2, h3, h4; SHA_LONG Nl, Nh; SHA_LONG data[SHA_LBLOCK]; unsigned int num; } SHA_CTX; int SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c); int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); void SHA1_Transform(SHA_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data); # define SHA256_CBLOCK (SHA_LBLOCK*4)/* SHA-256 treats input data as a * contiguous array of 32 bit wide * big-endian values. */ typedef struct SHA256state_st { SHA_LONG h[8]; SHA_LONG Nl, Nh; SHA_LONG data[SHA_LBLOCK]; unsigned int num, md_len; } SHA256_CTX; int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c); int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c); int SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA256_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); void SHA256_Transform(SHA256_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data); # define SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH 28 # define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32 # define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH 48 # define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH 64 /* * Unlike 32-bit digest algorithms, SHA-512 *relies* on SHA_LONG64 * being exactly 64-bit wide. See Implementation Notes in sha512.c * for further details. */ /* * SHA-512 treats input data as a * contiguous array of 64 bit * wide big-endian values. */ # define SHA512_CBLOCK (SHA_LBLOCK*8) # if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__) # define SHA_LONG64 unsigned __int64 # define U64(C) C##UI64 # elif defined(__arch64__) # define SHA_LONG64 unsigned long # define U64(C) C##UL # else # define SHA_LONG64 unsigned long long # define U64(C) C##ULL # endif typedef struct SHA512state_st { SHA_LONG64 h[8]; SHA_LONG64 Nl, Nh; union { SHA_LONG64 d[SHA_LBLOCK]; unsigned char p[SHA512_CBLOCK]; } u; unsigned int num, md_len; } SHA512_CTX; int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c); int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c); int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); void SHA512_Transform(SHA512_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/symhacks.h0000644000000000000000000000403413176625661017160 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_SYMHACKS_H # define HEADER_SYMHACKS_H # include /* Case insensitive linking causes problems.... */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # undef ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings # define ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings ERR_load_CRYPTOlib_strings # undef OCSP_crlID_new # define OCSP_crlID_new OCSP_crlID2_new # undef d2i_ECPARAMETERS # define d2i_ECPARAMETERS d2i_UC_ECPARAMETERS # undef i2d_ECPARAMETERS # define i2d_ECPARAMETERS i2d_UC_ECPARAMETERS # undef d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS # define d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS d2i_UC_ECPKPARAMETERS # undef i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS # define i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS i2d_UC_ECPKPARAMETERS /* * These functions do not seem to exist! However, I'm paranoid... Original * command in x509v3.h: These functions are being redefined in another * directory, and clash when the linker is case-insensitive, so let's hide * them a little, by giving them an extra 'o' at the beginning of the name... */ # undef X509v3_cleanup_extensions # define X509v3_cleanup_extensions oX509v3_cleanup_extensions # undef X509v3_add_extension # define X509v3_add_extension oX509v3_add_extension # undef X509v3_add_netscape_extensions # define X509v3_add_netscape_extensions oX509v3_add_netscape_extensions # undef X509v3_add_standard_extensions # define X509v3_add_standard_extensions oX509v3_add_standard_extensions /* This one clashes with CMS_data_create */ # undef cms_Data_create # define cms_Data_create priv_cms_Data_create # endif #endif /* ! defined HEADER_VMS_IDHACKS_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ripemd.h0000644000000000000000000000233313176625661016616 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RIPEMD_H # define HEADER_RIPEMD_H # include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # define RIPEMD160_LONG unsigned int # define RIPEMD160_CBLOCK 64 # define RIPEMD160_LBLOCK (RIPEMD160_CBLOCK/4) # define RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH 20 typedef struct RIPEMD160state_st { RIPEMD160_LONG A, B, C, D, E; RIPEMD160_LONG Nl, Nh; RIPEMD160_LONG data[RIPEMD160_LBLOCK]; unsigned int num; } RIPEMD160_CTX; int RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c); int RIPEMD160_Update(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int RIPEMD160_Final(unsigned char *md, RIPEMD160_CTX *c); unsigned char *RIPEMD160(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); void RIPEMD160_Transform(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const unsigned char *b); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/evp.h0000644000000000000000000022217613176625661016141 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_ENVELOPE_H # define HEADER_ENVELOPE_H # include # include # include # include # define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 64/* longest known is SHA512 */ # define EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 # define EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 # define EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 32 # define PKCS5_SALT_LEN 8 /* Default PKCS#5 iteration count */ # define PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER 2048 # include # define EVP_PK_RSA 0x0001 # define EVP_PK_DSA 0x0002 # define EVP_PK_DH 0x0004 # define EVP_PK_EC 0x0008 # define EVP_PKT_SIGN 0x0010 # define EVP_PKT_ENC 0x0020 # define EVP_PKT_EXCH 0x0040 # define EVP_PKS_RSA 0x0100 # define EVP_PKS_DSA 0x0200 # define EVP_PKS_EC 0x0400 # define EVP_PKEY_NONE NID_undef # define EVP_PKEY_RSA NID_rsaEncryption # define EVP_PKEY_RSA2 NID_rsa # define EVP_PKEY_DSA NID_dsa # define EVP_PKEY_DSA1 NID_dsa_2 # define EVP_PKEY_DSA2 NID_dsaWithSHA # define EVP_PKEY_DSA3 NID_dsaWithSHA1 # define EVP_PKEY_DSA4 NID_dsaWithSHA1_2 # define EVP_PKEY_DH NID_dhKeyAgreement # define EVP_PKEY_DHX NID_dhpublicnumber # define EVP_PKEY_EC NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey # define EVP_PKEY_HMAC NID_hmac # define EVP_PKEY_CMAC NID_cmac # define EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF NID_tls1_prf # define EVP_PKEY_HKDF NID_hkdf #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define EVP_PKEY_MO_SIGN 0x0001 # define EVP_PKEY_MO_VERIFY 0x0002 # define EVP_PKEY_MO_ENCRYPT 0x0004 # define EVP_PKEY_MO_DECRYPT 0x0008 # ifndef EVP_MD EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_new(int md_type, int pkey_type); EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_dup(const EVP_MD *md); void EVP_MD_meth_free(EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(EVP_MD *md, int blocksize); int EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(EVP_MD *md, int resultsize); int EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(EVP_MD *md, int datasize); int EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(EVP_MD *md, unsigned long flags); int EVP_MD_meth_set_init(EVP_MD *md, int (*init)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_update(EVP_MD *md, int (*update)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_final(EVP_MD *md, int (*final)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(EVP_MD *md, int (*copy)(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_MD *md, int (*cleanup)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_MD *md, int (*ctrl)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)); int EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(const EVP_MD *md); unsigned long EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_init(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_update(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_final(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2); /* digest can only handle a single block */ # define EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT 0x0001 /* DigestAlgorithmIdentifier flags... */ # define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_MASK 0x0018 /* NULL or absent parameter accepted. Use NULL */ # define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_NULL 0x0000 /* NULL or absent parameter accepted. Use NULL for PKCS#1 otherwise absent */ # define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT 0x0008 /* Custom handling via ctrl */ # define EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_CUSTOM 0x0018 /* Note if suitable for use in FIPS mode */ # define EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS 0x0400 /* Digest ctrls */ # define EVP_MD_CTRL_DIGALGID 0x1 # define EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG 0x2 /* Minimum Algorithm specific ctrl value */ # define EVP_MD_CTRL_ALG_CTRL 0x1000 # endif /* !EVP_MD */ /* values for EVP_MD_CTX flags */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT 0x0001/* digest update will be * called once only */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED 0x0002/* context has already been * cleaned */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE 0x0004/* Don't free up ctx->md_data * in EVP_MD_CTX_reset */ /* * FIPS and pad options are ignored in 1.0.0, definitions are here so we * don't accidentally reuse the values for other purposes. */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0008/* Allow use of non FIPS * digest in FIPS mode */ /* * The following PAD options are also currently ignored in 1.0.0, digest * parameters are handled through EVP_DigestSign*() and EVP_DigestVerify*() * instead. */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_MASK 0xF0/* RSA mode to use */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_PKCS1 0x00/* PKCS#1 v1.5 mode */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_X931 0x10/* X9.31 mode */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PAD_PSS 0x20/* PSS mode */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT 0x0100/* Don't initialize md_data */ /* * Some functions such as EVP_DigestSign only finalise copies of internal * contexts so additional data can be included after the finalisation call. * This is inefficient if this functionality is not required: it is disabled * if the following flag is set. */ # define EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE 0x0200 EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len); EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int ctx_size); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr)); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); /* Values for cipher flags */ /* Modes for ciphers */ # define EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER 0x0 # define EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE 0x1 # define EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE 0x2 # define EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE 0x3 # define EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE 0x4 # define EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE 0x5 # define EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE 0x6 # define EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE 0x7 # define EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE 0x10001 # define EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE 0x10002 # define EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE 0x10003 # define EVP_CIPH_MODE 0xF0007 /* Set if variable length cipher */ # define EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH 0x8 /* Set if the iv handling should be done by the cipher itself */ # define EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV 0x10 /* Set if the cipher's init() function should be called if key is NULL */ # define EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT 0x20 /* Call ctrl() to init cipher parameters */ # define EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT 0x40 /* Don't use standard key length function */ # define EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH 0x80 /* Don't use standard block padding */ # define EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING 0x100 /* cipher handles random key generation */ # define EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY 0x200 /* cipher has its own additional copying logic */ # define EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY 0x400 /* Allow use default ASN1 get/set iv */ # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 0x1000 /* Buffer length in bits not bytes: CFB1 mode only */ # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS 0x2000 /* Note if suitable for use in FIPS mode */ # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS 0x4000 /* Allow non FIPS cipher in FIPS mode */ # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x8000 /* * Cipher handles any and all padding logic as well as finalisation. */ # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER 0x100000 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER 0x200000 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0x400000 /* Cipher can handle pipeline operations */ # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE 0X800000 /* * Cipher context flag to indicate we can handle wrap mode: if allowed in * older applications it could overflow buffers. */ # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW 0x1 /* ctrl() values */ # define EVP_CTRL_INIT 0x0 # define EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH 0x1 # define EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS 0x2 # define EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS 0x3 # define EVP_CTRL_GET_RC5_ROUNDS 0x4 # define EVP_CTRL_SET_RC5_ROUNDS 0x5 # define EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY 0x6 # define EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID 0x7 # define EVP_CTRL_COPY 0x8 # define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN 0x9 # define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG 0x10 # define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG 0x11 # define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED 0x12 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN 0x13 # define EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN # define EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG # define EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG # define EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED # define EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L 0x14 # define EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_MSGLEN 0x15 /* * AEAD cipher deduces payload length and returns number of bytes required to * store MAC and eventual padding. Subsequent call to EVP_Cipher even * appends/verifies MAC. */ # define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD 0x16 /* Used by composite AEAD ciphers, no-op in GCM, CCM... */ # define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY 0x17 /* Set the GCM invocation field, decrypt only */ # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV 0x18 # define EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD 0x19 # define EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT 0x1a # define EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT 0x1b # define EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE 0x1c # define EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET 0x1d /* EVP_CTRL_SET_SBOX takes the char * specifying S-boxes */ # define EVP_CTRL_SET_SBOX 0x1e /* * EVP_CTRL_SBOX_USED takes a 'size_t' and 'char *', pointing at a * pre-allocated buffer with specified size */ # define EVP_CTRL_SBOX_USED 0x1f /* EVP_CTRL_KEY_MESH takes 'size_t' number of bytes to mesh the key after, * 0 switches meshing off */ # define EVP_CTRL_KEY_MESH 0x20 /* EVP_CTRL_BLOCK_PADDING_MODE takes the padding mode */ # define EVP_CTRL_BLOCK_PADDING_MODE 0x21 /* Set the output buffers to use for a pipelined operation */ # define EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS 0x22 /* Set the input buffers to use for a pipelined operation */ # define EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS 0x23 /* Set the input buffer lengths to use for a pipelined operation */ # define EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS 0x24 /* Padding modes */ #define EVP_PADDING_PKCS7 1 #define EVP_PADDING_ISO7816_4 2 #define EVP_PADDING_ANSI923 3 #define EVP_PADDING_ISO10126 4 #define EVP_PADDING_ZERO 5 /* RFC 5246 defines additional data to be 13 bytes in length */ # define EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN 13 typedef struct { unsigned char *out; const unsigned char *inp; size_t len; unsigned int interleave; } EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM; /* GCM TLS constants */ /* Length of fixed part of IV derived from PRF */ # define EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN 4 /* Length of explicit part of IV part of TLS records */ # define EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN 8 /* Length of tag for TLS */ # define EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN 16 /* CCM TLS constants */ /* Length of fixed part of IV derived from PRF */ # define EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN 4 /* Length of explicit part of IV part of TLS records */ # define EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN 8 typedef struct evp_cipher_info_st { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; } EVP_CIPHER_INFO; /* Password based encryption function */ typedef int (EVP_PBE_KEYGEN) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # define EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey,rsa) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_RSA,\ (char *)(rsa)) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # define EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey,dsa) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_DSA,\ (char *)(dsa)) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # define EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey,dh) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_DH,\ (char *)(dh)) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # define EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey,eckey) EVP_PKEY_assign((pkey),EVP_PKEY_EC,\ (char *)(eckey)) # endif /* Add some extra combinations */ # define EVP_get_digestbynid(a) EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a)) # define EVP_get_digestbyobj(a) EVP_get_digestbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a)) # define EVP_get_cipherbynid(a) EVP_get_cipherbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a)) # define EVP_get_cipherbyobj(a) EVP_get_cipherbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a)) int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md); # define EVP_MD_nid(e) EVP_MD_type(e) # define EVP_MD_name(e) OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_nid(e)) int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md); unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md); const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int (*EVP_MD_CTX_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count); void EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int (*update) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)); # define EVP_MD_CTX_size(e) EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e)) # define EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(e) EVP_MD_block_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e)) # define EVP_MD_CTX_type(e) EVP_MD_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e)) EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); void *EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); # define EVP_CIPHER_name(e) OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(e)) int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); int EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); # define EVP_CIPHER_mode(e) (EVP_CIPHER_flags(e) & EVP_CIPH_MODE) const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int num); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in); void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data); void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *cipher_data); # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(c) EVP_CIPHER_type(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c)) # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(c) EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c)) # endif # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) EVP_CIPHER_mode(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c)) # define EVP_ENCODE_LENGTH(l) (((l+2)/3*4)+(l/48+1)*2+80) # define EVP_DECODE_LENGTH(l) ((l+3)/4*3+80) # define EVP_SignInit_ex(a,b,c) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,b,c) # define EVP_SignInit(a,b) EVP_DigestInit(a,b) # define EVP_SignUpdate(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) # define EVP_VerifyInit_ex(a,b,c) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,b,c) # define EVP_VerifyInit(a,b) EVP_DigestInit(a,b) # define EVP_VerifyUpdate(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) # define EVP_OpenUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) EVP_DecryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) # define EVP_SealUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) EVP_EncryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) # define EVP_DigestSignUpdate(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) # define EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) # ifdef CONST_STRICT void BIO_set_md(BIO *, const EVP_MD *md); # else # define BIO_set_md(b,md) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD,0,(char *)md) # endif # define BIO_get_md(b,mdp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_MD,0,(char *)mdp) # define BIO_get_md_ctx(b,mdcp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX,0,(char *)mdcp) # define BIO_set_md_ctx(b,mdcp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX,0,(char *)mdcp) # define BIO_get_cipher_status(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS,0,NULL) # define BIO_get_cipher_ctx(b,c_pp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX,0,(char *)c_pp) /*__owur*/ int EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); # define EVP_add_cipher_alias(n,alias) \ OBJ_NAME_add((alias),OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS,(n)) # define EVP_add_digest_alias(n,alias) \ OBJ_NAME_add((alias),OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS,(n)) # define EVP_delete_cipher_alias(alias) \ OBJ_NAME_remove(alias,OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS); # define EVP_delete_digest_alias(alias) \ OBJ_NAME_remove(alias,OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH|OBJ_NAME_ALIAS); int EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2); EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void); int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); # define EVP_MD_CTX_create() EVP_MD_CTX_new() # define EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_reset((ctx)) # define EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_free((ctx)) __owur int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in); void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags); void EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags); int EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags); __owur int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl); __owur int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt); __owur int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s); __owur int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl); __owur int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in); __owur int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type); __owur int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int length, const char *prompt, int verify); int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int minlen, int maxlen, const char *prompt, int verify); void EVP_set_pw_prompt(const char *prompt); char *EVP_get_pw_prompt(void); #endif __owur int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *salt, const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags); __owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); /*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); /*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); /*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); /*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); __owur int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); /*__owur*/ int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); /*__owur*/ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); __owur int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); /*__owur*/ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); __owur int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); /*__owur*/ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); __owur int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); __owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); __owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); __owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey); /*__owur*/ int EVP_DigestSignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen); __owur int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA __owur int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, const unsigned char *ek, int ekl, const unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY *priv); __owur int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); __owur int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk); __owur int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); # endif EVP_ENCODE_CTX *EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(void); void EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *dctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX *sctx); int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n); void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(c) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c) # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(c) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(c) # endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int pad); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_reliable(void); __owur int BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const unsigned char *k, const unsigned char *i, int enc); const EVP_MD *EVP_md_null(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 const EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 const EVP_MD *EVP_md4(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void); const EVP_MD *EVP_md5_sha1(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b512(void); const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2s256(void); # endif const EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void); const EVP_MD *EVP_sha224(void); const EVP_MD *EVP_sha256(void); const EVP_MD *EVP_sha384(void); const EVP_MD *EVP_sha512(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL const EVP_MD *EVP_whirlpool(void); # endif const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_enc_null(void); /* does nothing :-) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb64(void); # define EVP_des_cfb EVP_des_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb64(void); # define EVP_des_ede_cfb EVP_des_ede_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb64(void); # define EVP_des_ede3_cfb EVP_des_ede3_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_desx_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_wrap(void); /* * This should now be supported through the dev_crypto ENGINE. But also, why * are rc4 and md5 declarations made here inside a "NO_DES" precompiler * branch? */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_40(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_hmac_md5(void); # endif # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb64(void); # define EVP_idea_cfb EVP_idea_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cbc(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_64_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb64(void); # define EVP_rc2_cfb EVP_rc2_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ofb(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb64(void); # define EVP_bf_cfb EVP_bf_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ofb(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_cfb64(void); # define EVP_cast5_cfb EVP_cast5_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_cast5_ofb(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64(void); # define EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb(void); # endif const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb128(void); # define EVP_aes_128_cfb EVP_aes_128_cfb128 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ctr(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ccm(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_gcm(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_xts(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ocb(void); # endif const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb128(void); # define EVP_aes_192_cfb EVP_aes_192_cfb128 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ctr(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ccm(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_gcm(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ocb(void); # endif const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb128(void); # define EVP_aes_256_cfb EVP_aes_256_cfb128 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ctr(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ccm(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_gcm(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_xts(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ocb(void); # endif const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_cfb128(void); # define EVP_camellia_128_cfb EVP_camellia_128_cfb128 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_128_ctr(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_cfb128(void); # define EVP_camellia_192_cfb EVP_camellia_192_cfb128 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_192_ctr(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cfb1(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cfb8(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_cfb128(void); # define EVP_camellia_256_cfb EVP_camellia_256_cfb128 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_ofb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_camellia_256_ctr(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void); # endif # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_ecb(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_cbc(void); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_cfb128(void); # define EVP_seed_cfb EVP_seed_cfb128 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_seed_ofb(void); # endif # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \ | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS \ | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL) # define OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \ | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL) # ifdef OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF # define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \ | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS \ | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL) # else # define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS \ | OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL) # endif # define OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS, NULL) # define OpenSSL_add_all_digests() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL) # define EVP_cleanup() while(0) continue # endif int EVP_add_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); int EVP_add_digest(const EVP_MD *digest); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name); const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name); void EVP_CIPHER_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg); void EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(void (*fn) (const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg); void EVP_MD_do_all(void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg); void EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(void (*fn) (const EVP_MD *ciph, const char *from, const char *to, void *x), void *arg); int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(unsigned char *dec_key, const unsigned char *enc_key, int enc_key_len, EVP_PKEY *private_key); int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old(unsigned char *enc_key, const unsigned char *key, int key_len, EVP_PKEY *pub_key); int EVP_PKEY_type(int type); int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type); int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e); # endif int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key); void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA struct rsa_st; int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct rsa_st *key); struct rsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); struct rsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA struct dsa_st; int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct dsa_st *key); struct dsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); struct dsa_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH struct dh_st; int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct dh_st *key); struct dh_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey); struct dh_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC struct ec_key_st; int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, struct ec_key_st *key); struct ec_key_st *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey); struct ec_key_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey); # endif EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void); int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey); void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_PublicKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp); int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from); int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode); int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid); int EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char *pt, size_t ptlen); size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppt); int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx); /* calls methods */ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); /* These are used by EVP_CIPHER methods */ int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); /* PKCS5 password based encryption */ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de); int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *out); int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out); int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); int PKCS5_v2_scrypt_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de); #endif void PKCS5_PBE_add(void); int EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int en_de); /* PBE type */ /* Can appear as the outermost AlgorithmIdentifier */ # define EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER 0x0 /* Is an PRF type OID */ # define EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF 0x1 /* Is a PKCS#5 v2.0 KDF */ # define EVP_PBE_TYPE_KDF 0x2 int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid, int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen); int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen); int EVP_PBE_find(int type, int pbe_nid, int *pcnid, int *pmnid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN **pkeygen); void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void); int EVP_PBE_get(int *ptype, int *ppbe_nid, size_t num); # define ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS 0x1 # define ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC 0x2 # define ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL 0x4 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN 0x1 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT 0x2 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID 0x3 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN 0x5 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE 0x7 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE 0x8 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT 0x9 # define ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT 0xa int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(ENGINE **pe, int type); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pkey_base_id, int *ppkey_flags, const char **pinfo, const char **ppem_str, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags, const char *pem_str, const char *info); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *src); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub), int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx), int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf), int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen), int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder), int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from), int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey), int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk)); # define EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED 0 # define EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN (1<<1) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN (1<<2) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN (1<<3) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY (1<<4) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER (1<<5) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX (1<<6) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX (1<<7) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT (1<<8) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT (1<<9) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE (1<<10) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG \ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER \ | EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT \ (EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_NOGEN \ (EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_GEN \ (EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN | EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)md) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(ctx, pmd) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD, 0, (void *)pmd) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key(ctx, key, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, len, (void *)key) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD 1 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY 2 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT 3 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT 4 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN 5 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY 6 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT 7 /* Used by GOST key encryption in TLS */ # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV 8 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT 9 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT 10 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN 11 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER 12 # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD 13 # define EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL 0x1000 # define EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN 2 /* * Method handles all operations: don't assume any digest related defaults. */ # define EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM 4 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_find(int type); EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_new(int id, int flags); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pflags, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *meth); void EVP_PKEY_meth_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *src); void EVP_PKEY_meth_free(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth); int EVP_PKEY_meth_add0(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth); EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e); EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(int id, ENGINE *e); EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *str); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cmd, const char *hex); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_operation(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *dat, int datlen); EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *key, int keylen); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data); void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data); void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer); int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen); typedef int EVP_PKEY_gen_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb); EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*encryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2), int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)); void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2), int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)); void EVP_add_alg_module(void); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); /* Error codes for the EVP functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY 165 # define EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY 133 # define EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER 169 # define EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY 178 # define EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER 170 # define EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT 177 # define EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY 159 # define EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL 182 # define EVP_F_CMLL_T4_INIT_KEY 179 # define EVP_F_DES_EDE3_WRAP_CIPHER 171 # define EVP_F_DO_SIGVER_INIT 161 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX 123 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY 163 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 124 # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH 122 # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX 101 # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE 166 # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 128 # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX 127 # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE 167 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 110 # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE 162 # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT 102 # define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD 115 # define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE 160 # define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT 116 # define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT 181 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKCS82PKEY 111 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8 113 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_ADD0 168 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS 103 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL 137 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_CTRL_STR 150 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_CTX_DUP 156 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT 104 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_INIT 138 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DECRYPT_OLD 151 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE 153 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_INIT 154 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_DERIVE_SET_PEER 155 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT 105 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_INIT 139 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_ENCRYPT_OLD 152 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH 119 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA 120 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY 131 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC 183 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA 121 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN 146 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT 147 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW 106 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN 148 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT 149 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE 187 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN 140 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SIGN_INIT 141 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY 142 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_INIT 143 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER 144 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT 145 # define EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL 107 # define EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL 108 # define EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW 157 # define EVP_F_PKCS5_PBE_KEYIVGEN 117 # define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN 118 # define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN 164 # define EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_SCRYPT_KEYIVGEN 180 # define EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE 158 # define EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH 109 # define EVP_F_RC5_CTRL 125 /* Reason codes. */ # define EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED 143 # define EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT 100 # define EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 155 # define EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED 157 # define EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR 122 # define EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED 147 # define EVP_R_COPY_ERROR 173 # define EVP_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 132 # define EVP_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 133 # define EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH 138 # define EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR 114 # define EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES 101 # define EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS 153 # define EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION 165 # define EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE 166 # define EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY 174 # define EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY 127 # define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY 128 # define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY 129 # define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY 142 # define EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED 167 # define EVP_R_ILLEGAL_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS 171 # define EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR 134 # define EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED 111 # define EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST 152 # define EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE 168 # define EVP_R_INVALID_KEY 163 # define EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH 130 # define EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION 148 # define EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE 120 # define EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED 172 # define EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL 159 # define EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED 144 # define EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 103 # define EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET 131 # define EVP_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST 158 # define EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET 139 # define EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET 154 # define EVP_R_NO_OPERATION_SET 149 # define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 150 # define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED 151 # define EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING 162 # define EVP_R_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED 164 # define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR 145 # define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR 146 # define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 106 # define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER 160 # define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 161 # define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION 169 # define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM 121 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM 156 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 107 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH 123 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION 124 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE 108 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS 135 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF 125 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM 118 # define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE 126 # define EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED 170 # define EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH 109 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/whrlpool.h0000644000000000000000000000254113176625661017205 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_WHRLPOOL_H # define HEADER_WHRLPOOL_H #include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # define WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH (512/8) # define WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK 512 # define WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER (256/8) typedef struct { union { unsigned char c[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* double q is here to ensure 64-bit alignment */ double q[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(double)]; } H; unsigned char data[WHIRLPOOL_BBLOCK / 8]; unsigned int bitoff; size_t bitlen[WHIRLPOOL_COUNTER / sizeof(size_t)]; } WHIRLPOOL_CTX; int WHIRLPOOL_Init(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c); int WHIRLPOOL_Update(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *inp, size_t bytes); void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *inp, size_t bits); int WHIRLPOOL_Final(unsigned char *md, WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c); unsigned char *WHIRLPOOL(const void *inp, size_t bytes, unsigned char *md); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/srtp.h0000644000000000000000000000244413176625661016331 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * DTLS code by Eric Rescorla * * Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc. Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc. */ #ifndef HEADER_D1_SRTP_H # define HEADER_D1_SRTP_H # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 0x0001 # define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 0x0002 # define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_80 0x0003 # define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_32 0x0004 # define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80 0x0005 # define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 0x0006 /* AEAD SRTP protection profiles from RFC 7714 */ # define SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM 0x0007 # define SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM 0x0008 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP __owur int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles); __owur int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles); __owur STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl); __owur SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s); # endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/kdf.h0000644000000000000000000000543213176625661016105 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_KDF_H # define HEADER_KDF_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD, 0, (void *)md) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, sec, seclen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, seclen, (void *)sec) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed, seedlen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, seedlen, (void *)seed) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD, 0, (void *)md) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, salt, saltlen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, saltlen, (void *)salt) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, key, keylen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, keylen, (void *)key) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, info, infolen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, infolen, (void *)info) /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void); /* Error codes for the KDF functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR 100 # define KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE 101 /* Reason codes. */ # define KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST 100 # define KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER 101 # define KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING 102 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/objects.h0000644000000000000000000012741313176625661016776 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_OBJECTS_H # define HEADER_OBJECTS_H # define USE_OBJ_MAC # ifdef USE_OBJ_MAC # include # else # define SN_undef "UNDEF" # define LN_undef "undefined" # define NID_undef 0 # define OBJ_undef 0L # define SN_Algorithm "Algorithm" # define LN_algorithm "algorithm" # define NID_algorithm 38 # define OBJ_algorithm 1L,3L,14L,3L,2L # define LN_rsadsi "rsadsi" # define NID_rsadsi 1 # define OBJ_rsadsi 1L,2L,840L,113549L # define LN_pkcs "pkcs" # define NID_pkcs 2 # define OBJ_pkcs OBJ_rsadsi,1L # define SN_md2 "MD2" # define LN_md2 "md2" # define NID_md2 3 # define OBJ_md2 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,2L # define SN_md5 "MD5" # define LN_md5 "md5" # define NID_md5 4 # define OBJ_md5 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,5L # define SN_rc4 "RC4" # define LN_rc4 "rc4" # define NID_rc4 5 # define OBJ_rc4 OBJ_rsadsi,3L,4L # define LN_rsaEncryption "rsaEncryption" # define NID_rsaEncryption 6 # define OBJ_rsaEncryption OBJ_pkcs,1L,1L # define SN_md2WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD2" # define LN_md2WithRSAEncryption "md2WithRSAEncryption" # define NID_md2WithRSAEncryption 7 # define OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs,1L,2L # define SN_md5WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD5" # define LN_md5WithRSAEncryption "md5WithRSAEncryption" # define NID_md5WithRSAEncryption 8 # define OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs,1L,4L # define SN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC "PBE-MD2-DES" # define LN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC" # define NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC 9 # define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs,5L,1L # define SN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC "PBE-MD5-DES" # define LN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC" # define NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC 10 # define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs,5L,3L # define LN_X500 "X500" # define NID_X500 11 # define OBJ_X500 2L,5L # define LN_X509 "X509" # define NID_X509 12 # define OBJ_X509 OBJ_X500,4L # define SN_commonName "CN" # define LN_commonName "commonName" # define NID_commonName 13 # define OBJ_commonName OBJ_X509,3L # define SN_countryName "C" # define LN_countryName "countryName" # define NID_countryName 14 # define OBJ_countryName OBJ_X509,6L # define SN_localityName "L" # define LN_localityName "localityName" # define NID_localityName 15 # define OBJ_localityName OBJ_X509,7L /* Postal Address? PA */ /* should be "ST" (rfc1327) but MS uses 'S' */ # define SN_stateOrProvinceName "ST" # define LN_stateOrProvinceName "stateOrProvinceName" # define NID_stateOrProvinceName 16 # define OBJ_stateOrProvinceName OBJ_X509,8L # define SN_organizationName "O" # define LN_organizationName "organizationName" # define NID_organizationName 17 # define OBJ_organizationName OBJ_X509,10L # define SN_organizationalUnitName "OU" # define LN_organizationalUnitName "organizationalUnitName" # define NID_organizationalUnitName 18 # define OBJ_organizationalUnitName OBJ_X509,11L # define SN_rsa "RSA" # define LN_rsa "rsa" # define NID_rsa 19 # define OBJ_rsa OBJ_X500,8L,1L,1L # define LN_pkcs7 "pkcs7" # define NID_pkcs7 20 # define OBJ_pkcs7 OBJ_pkcs,7L # define LN_pkcs7_data "pkcs7-data" # define NID_pkcs7_data 21 # define OBJ_pkcs7_data OBJ_pkcs7,1L # define LN_pkcs7_signed "pkcs7-signedData" # define NID_pkcs7_signed 22 # define OBJ_pkcs7_signed OBJ_pkcs7,2L # define LN_pkcs7_enveloped "pkcs7-envelopedData" # define NID_pkcs7_enveloped 23 # define OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped OBJ_pkcs7,3L # define LN_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" # define NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped 24 # define OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped OBJ_pkcs7,4L # define LN_pkcs7_digest "pkcs7-digestData" # define NID_pkcs7_digest 25 # define OBJ_pkcs7_digest OBJ_pkcs7,5L # define LN_pkcs7_encrypted "pkcs7-encryptedData" # define NID_pkcs7_encrypted 26 # define OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted OBJ_pkcs7,6L # define LN_pkcs3 "pkcs3" # define NID_pkcs3 27 # define OBJ_pkcs3 OBJ_pkcs,3L # define LN_dhKeyAgreement "dhKeyAgreement" # define NID_dhKeyAgreement 28 # define OBJ_dhKeyAgreement OBJ_pkcs3,1L # define SN_des_ecb "DES-ECB" # define LN_des_ecb "des-ecb" # define NID_des_ecb 29 # define OBJ_des_ecb OBJ_algorithm,6L # define SN_des_cfb64 "DES-CFB" # define LN_des_cfb64 "des-cfb" # define NID_des_cfb64 30 /* IV + num */ # define OBJ_des_cfb64 OBJ_algorithm,9L # define SN_des_cbc "DES-CBC" # define LN_des_cbc "des-cbc" # define NID_des_cbc 31 /* IV */ # define OBJ_des_cbc OBJ_algorithm,7L # define SN_des_ede "DES-EDE" # define LN_des_ede "des-ede" # define NID_des_ede 32 /* ?? */ # define OBJ_des_ede OBJ_algorithm,17L # define SN_des_ede3 "DES-EDE3" # define LN_des_ede3 "des-ede3" # define NID_des_ede3 33 # define SN_idea_cbc "IDEA-CBC" # define LN_idea_cbc "idea-cbc" # define NID_idea_cbc 34 # define OBJ_idea_cbc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,188L,7L,1L,1L,2L # define SN_idea_cfb64 "IDEA-CFB" # define LN_idea_cfb64 "idea-cfb" # define NID_idea_cfb64 35 # define SN_idea_ecb "IDEA-ECB" # define LN_idea_ecb "idea-ecb" # define NID_idea_ecb 36 # define SN_rc2_cbc "RC2-CBC" # define LN_rc2_cbc "rc2-cbc" # define NID_rc2_cbc 37 # define OBJ_rc2_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,2L # define SN_rc2_ecb "RC2-ECB" # define LN_rc2_ecb "rc2-ecb" # define NID_rc2_ecb 38 # define SN_rc2_cfb64 "RC2-CFB" # define LN_rc2_cfb64 "rc2-cfb" # define NID_rc2_cfb64 39 # define SN_rc2_ofb64 "RC2-OFB" # define LN_rc2_ofb64 "rc2-ofb" # define NID_rc2_ofb64 40 # define SN_sha "SHA" # define LN_sha "sha" # define NID_sha 41 # define OBJ_sha OBJ_algorithm,18L # define SN_shaWithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA" # define LN_shaWithRSAEncryption "shaWithRSAEncryption" # define NID_shaWithRSAEncryption 42 # define OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption OBJ_algorithm,15L # define SN_des_ede_cbc "DES-EDE-CBC" # define LN_des_ede_cbc "des-ede-cbc" # define NID_des_ede_cbc 43 # define SN_des_ede3_cbc "DES-EDE3-CBC" # define LN_des_ede3_cbc "des-ede3-cbc" # define NID_des_ede3_cbc 44 # define OBJ_des_ede3_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,7L # define SN_des_ofb64 "DES-OFB" # define LN_des_ofb64 "des-ofb" # define NID_des_ofb64 45 # define OBJ_des_ofb64 OBJ_algorithm,8L # define SN_idea_ofb64 "IDEA-OFB" # define LN_idea_ofb64 "idea-ofb" # define NID_idea_ofb64 46 # define LN_pkcs9 "pkcs9" # define NID_pkcs9 47 # define OBJ_pkcs9 OBJ_pkcs,9L # define SN_pkcs9_emailAddress "Email" # define LN_pkcs9_emailAddress "emailAddress" # define NID_pkcs9_emailAddress 48 # define OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress OBJ_pkcs9,1L # define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredName "unstructuredName" # define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName 49 # define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName OBJ_pkcs9,2L # define LN_pkcs9_contentType "contentType" # define NID_pkcs9_contentType 50 # define OBJ_pkcs9_contentType OBJ_pkcs9,3L # define LN_pkcs9_messageDigest "messageDigest" # define NID_pkcs9_messageDigest 51 # define OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest OBJ_pkcs9,4L # define LN_pkcs9_signingTime "signingTime" # define NID_pkcs9_signingTime 52 # define OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime OBJ_pkcs9,5L # define LN_pkcs9_countersignature "countersignature" # define NID_pkcs9_countersignature 53 # define OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature OBJ_pkcs9,6L # define LN_pkcs9_challengePassword "challengePassword" # define NID_pkcs9_challengePassword 54 # define OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword OBJ_pkcs9,7L # define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress "unstructuredAddress" # define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress 55 # define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress OBJ_pkcs9,8L # define LN_pkcs9_extCertAttributes "extendedCertificateAttributes" # define NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes 56 # define OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes OBJ_pkcs9,9L # define SN_netscape "Netscape" # define LN_netscape "Netscape Communications Corp." # define NID_netscape 57 # define OBJ_netscape 2L,16L,840L,1L,113730L # define SN_netscape_cert_extension "nsCertExt" # define LN_netscape_cert_extension "Netscape Certificate Extension" # define NID_netscape_cert_extension 58 # define OBJ_netscape_cert_extension OBJ_netscape,1L # define SN_netscape_data_type "nsDataType" # define LN_netscape_data_type "Netscape Data Type" # define NID_netscape_data_type 59 # define OBJ_netscape_data_type OBJ_netscape,2L # define SN_des_ede_cfb64 "DES-EDE-CFB" # define LN_des_ede_cfb64 "des-ede-cfb" # define NID_des_ede_cfb64 60 # define SN_des_ede3_cfb64 "DES-EDE3-CFB" # define LN_des_ede3_cfb64 "des-ede3-cfb" # define NID_des_ede3_cfb64 61 # define SN_des_ede_ofb64 "DES-EDE-OFB" # define LN_des_ede_ofb64 "des-ede-ofb" # define NID_des_ede_ofb64 62 # define SN_des_ede3_ofb64 "DES-EDE3-OFB" # define LN_des_ede3_ofb64 "des-ede3-ofb" # define NID_des_ede3_ofb64 63 /* I'm not sure about the object ID */ # define SN_sha1 "SHA1" # define LN_sha1 "sha1" # define NID_sha1 64 # define OBJ_sha1 OBJ_algorithm,26L /* 28 Jun 1996 - eay */ /* #define OBJ_sha1 1L,3L,14L,2L,26L,05L <- wrong */ # define SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA1" # define LN_sha1WithRSAEncryption "sha1WithRSAEncryption" # define NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption 65 # define OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs,1L,5L # define SN_dsaWithSHA "DSA-SHA" # define LN_dsaWithSHA "dsaWithSHA" # define NID_dsaWithSHA 66 # define OBJ_dsaWithSHA OBJ_algorithm,13L # define SN_dsa_2 "DSA-old" # define LN_dsa_2 "dsaEncryption-old" # define NID_dsa_2 67 # define OBJ_dsa_2 OBJ_algorithm,12L /* proposed by microsoft to RSA */ # define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64" # define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC" # define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC 68 # define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs,5L,11L /* * proposed by microsoft to RSA as pbeWithSHA1AndRC4: it is now defined * explicitly in PKCS#5 v2.0 as id-PBKDF2 which is something completely * different. */ # define LN_id_pbkdf2 "PBKDF2" # define NID_id_pbkdf2 69 # define OBJ_id_pbkdf2 OBJ_pkcs,5L,12L # define SN_dsaWithSHA1_2 "DSA-SHA1-old" # define LN_dsaWithSHA1_2 "dsaWithSHA1-old" # define NID_dsaWithSHA1_2 70 /* Got this one from 'sdn706r20.pdf' which is actually an NSA document :-) */ # define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 OBJ_algorithm,27L # define SN_netscape_cert_type "nsCertType" # define LN_netscape_cert_type "Netscape Cert Type" # define NID_netscape_cert_type 71 # define OBJ_netscape_cert_type OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,1L # define SN_netscape_base_url "nsBaseUrl" # define LN_netscape_base_url "Netscape Base Url" # define NID_netscape_base_url 72 # define OBJ_netscape_base_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,2L # define SN_netscape_revocation_url "nsRevocationUrl" # define LN_netscape_revocation_url "Netscape Revocation Url" # define NID_netscape_revocation_url 73 # define OBJ_netscape_revocation_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,3L # define SN_netscape_ca_revocation_url "nsCaRevocationUrl" # define LN_netscape_ca_revocation_url "Netscape CA Revocation Url" # define NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url 74 # define OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,4L # define SN_netscape_renewal_url "nsRenewalUrl" # define LN_netscape_renewal_url "Netscape Renewal Url" # define NID_netscape_renewal_url 75 # define OBJ_netscape_renewal_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,7L # define SN_netscape_ca_policy_url "nsCaPolicyUrl" # define LN_netscape_ca_policy_url "Netscape CA Policy Url" # define NID_netscape_ca_policy_url 76 # define OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,8L # define SN_netscape_ssl_server_name "nsSslServerName" # define LN_netscape_ssl_server_name "Netscape SSL Server Name" # define NID_netscape_ssl_server_name 77 # define OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,12L # define SN_netscape_comment "nsComment" # define LN_netscape_comment "Netscape Comment" # define NID_netscape_comment 78 # define OBJ_netscape_comment OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,13L # define SN_netscape_cert_sequence "nsCertSequence" # define LN_netscape_cert_sequence "Netscape Certificate Sequence" # define NID_netscape_cert_sequence 79 # define OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence OBJ_netscape_data_type,5L # define SN_desx_cbc "DESX-CBC" # define LN_desx_cbc "desx-cbc" # define NID_desx_cbc 80 # define SN_id_ce "id-ce" # define NID_id_ce 81 # define OBJ_id_ce 2L,5L,29L # define SN_subject_key_identifier "subjectKeyIdentifier" # define LN_subject_key_identifier "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" # define NID_subject_key_identifier 82 # define OBJ_subject_key_identifier OBJ_id_ce,14L # define SN_key_usage "keyUsage" # define LN_key_usage "X509v3 Key Usage" # define NID_key_usage 83 # define OBJ_key_usage OBJ_id_ce,15L # define SN_private_key_usage_period "privateKeyUsagePeriod" # define LN_private_key_usage_period "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period" # define NID_private_key_usage_period 84 # define OBJ_private_key_usage_period OBJ_id_ce,16L # define SN_subject_alt_name "subjectAltName" # define LN_subject_alt_name "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name" # define NID_subject_alt_name 85 # define OBJ_subject_alt_name OBJ_id_ce,17L # define SN_issuer_alt_name "issuerAltName" # define LN_issuer_alt_name "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name" # define NID_issuer_alt_name 86 # define OBJ_issuer_alt_name OBJ_id_ce,18L # define SN_basic_constraints "basicConstraints" # define LN_basic_constraints "X509v3 Basic Constraints" # define NID_basic_constraints 87 # define OBJ_basic_constraints OBJ_id_ce,19L # define SN_crl_number "crlNumber" # define LN_crl_number "X509v3 CRL Number" # define NID_crl_number 88 # define OBJ_crl_number OBJ_id_ce,20L # define SN_certificate_policies "certificatePolicies" # define LN_certificate_policies "X509v3 Certificate Policies" # define NID_certificate_policies 89 # define OBJ_certificate_policies OBJ_id_ce,32L # define SN_authority_key_identifier "authorityKeyIdentifier" # define LN_authority_key_identifier "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" # define NID_authority_key_identifier 90 # define OBJ_authority_key_identifier OBJ_id_ce,35L # define SN_bf_cbc "BF-CBC" # define LN_bf_cbc "bf-cbc" # define NID_bf_cbc 91 # define OBJ_bf_cbc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,3029L,1L,2L # define SN_bf_ecb "BF-ECB" # define LN_bf_ecb "bf-ecb" # define NID_bf_ecb 92 # define SN_bf_cfb64 "BF-CFB" # define LN_bf_cfb64 "bf-cfb" # define NID_bf_cfb64 93 # define SN_bf_ofb64 "BF-OFB" # define LN_bf_ofb64 "bf-ofb" # define NID_bf_ofb64 94 # define SN_mdc2 "MDC2" # define LN_mdc2 "mdc2" # define NID_mdc2 95 # define OBJ_mdc2 2L,5L,8L,3L,101L /* An alternative? 1L,3L,14L,3L,2L,19L */ # define SN_mdc2WithRSA "RSA-MDC2" # define LN_mdc2WithRSA "mdc2withRSA" # define NID_mdc2WithRSA 96 # define OBJ_mdc2WithRSA 2L,5L,8L,3L,100L # define SN_rc4_40 "RC4-40" # define LN_rc4_40 "rc4-40" # define NID_rc4_40 97 # define SN_rc2_40_cbc "RC2-40-CBC" # define LN_rc2_40_cbc "rc2-40-cbc" # define NID_rc2_40_cbc 98 # define SN_givenName "G" # define LN_givenName "givenName" # define NID_givenName 99 # define OBJ_givenName OBJ_X509,42L # define SN_surname "S" # define LN_surname "surname" # define NID_surname 100 # define OBJ_surname OBJ_X509,4L # define SN_initials "I" # define LN_initials "initials" # define NID_initials 101 # define OBJ_initials OBJ_X509,43L # define SN_uniqueIdentifier "UID" # define LN_uniqueIdentifier "uniqueIdentifier" # define NID_uniqueIdentifier 102 # define OBJ_uniqueIdentifier OBJ_X509,45L # define SN_crl_distribution_points "crlDistributionPoints" # define LN_crl_distribution_points "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points" # define NID_crl_distribution_points 103 # define OBJ_crl_distribution_points OBJ_id_ce,31L # define SN_md5WithRSA "RSA-NP-MD5" # define LN_md5WithRSA "md5WithRSA" # define NID_md5WithRSA 104 # define OBJ_md5WithRSA OBJ_algorithm,3L # define SN_serialNumber "SN" # define LN_serialNumber "serialNumber" # define NID_serialNumber 105 # define OBJ_serialNumber OBJ_X509,5L # define SN_title "T" # define LN_title "title" # define NID_title 106 # define OBJ_title OBJ_X509,12L # define SN_description "D" # define LN_description "description" # define NID_description 107 # define OBJ_description OBJ_X509,13L /* CAST5 is CAST-128, I'm just sticking with the documentation */ # define SN_cast5_cbc "CAST5-CBC" # define LN_cast5_cbc "cast5-cbc" # define NID_cast5_cbc 108 # define OBJ_cast5_cbc 1L,2L,840L,113533L,7L,66L,10L # define SN_cast5_ecb "CAST5-ECB" # define LN_cast5_ecb "cast5-ecb" # define NID_cast5_ecb 109 # define SN_cast5_cfb64 "CAST5-CFB" # define LN_cast5_cfb64 "cast5-cfb" # define NID_cast5_cfb64 110 # define SN_cast5_ofb64 "CAST5-OFB" # define LN_cast5_ofb64 "cast5-ofb" # define NID_cast5_ofb64 111 # define LN_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" # define NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 112 # define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 1L,2L,840L,113533L,7L,66L,12L /*- * This is one sun will soon be using :-( * id-dsa-with-sha1 ID ::= { * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9cm(4) 3 } */ # define SN_dsaWithSHA1 "DSA-SHA1" # define LN_dsaWithSHA1 "dsaWithSHA1" # define NID_dsaWithSHA1 113 # define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 1L,2L,840L,10040L,4L,3L # define NID_md5_sha1 114 # define SN_md5_sha1 "MD5-SHA1" # define LN_md5_sha1 "md5-sha1" # define SN_sha1WithRSA "RSA-SHA1-2" # define LN_sha1WithRSA "sha1WithRSA" # define NID_sha1WithRSA 115 # define OBJ_sha1WithRSA OBJ_algorithm,29L # define SN_dsa "DSA" # define LN_dsa "dsaEncryption" # define NID_dsa 116 # define OBJ_dsa 1L,2L,840L,10040L,4L,1L # define SN_ripemd160 "RIPEMD160" # define LN_ripemd160 "ripemd160" # define NID_ripemd160 117 # define OBJ_ripemd160 1L,3L,36L,3L,2L,1L /* * The name should actually be rsaSignatureWithripemd160, but I'm going to * continue using the convention I'm using with the other ciphers */ # define SN_ripemd160WithRSA "RSA-RIPEMD160" # define LN_ripemd160WithRSA "ripemd160WithRSA" # define NID_ripemd160WithRSA 119 # define OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,1L,2L /*- * Taken from rfc2040 * RC5_CBC_Parameters ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER (v1_0(16)), * rounds INTEGER (8..127), * blockSizeInBits INTEGER (64, 128), * iv OCTET STRING OPTIONAL * } */ # define SN_rc5_cbc "RC5-CBC" # define LN_rc5_cbc "rc5-cbc" # define NID_rc5_cbc 120 # define OBJ_rc5_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,8L # define SN_rc5_ecb "RC5-ECB" # define LN_rc5_ecb "rc5-ecb" # define NID_rc5_ecb 121 # define SN_rc5_cfb64 "RC5-CFB" # define LN_rc5_cfb64 "rc5-cfb" # define NID_rc5_cfb64 122 # define SN_rc5_ofb64 "RC5-OFB" # define LN_rc5_ofb64 "rc5-ofb" # define NID_rc5_ofb64 123 # define SN_rle_compression "RLE" # define LN_rle_compression "run length compression" # define NID_rle_compression 124 # define OBJ_rle_compression 1L,1L,1L,1L,666L,1L # define SN_zlib_compression "ZLIB" # define LN_zlib_compression "zlib compression" # define NID_zlib_compression 125 # define OBJ_zlib_compression 1L,1L,1L,1L,666L,2L # define SN_ext_key_usage "extendedKeyUsage" # define LN_ext_key_usage "X509v3 Extended Key Usage" # define NID_ext_key_usage 126 # define OBJ_ext_key_usage OBJ_id_ce,37 # define SN_id_pkix "PKIX" # define NID_id_pkix 127 # define OBJ_id_pkix 1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,5L,7L # define SN_id_kp "id-kp" # define NID_id_kp 128 # define OBJ_id_kp OBJ_id_pkix,3L /* PKIX extended key usage OIDs */ # define SN_server_auth "serverAuth" # define LN_server_auth "TLS Web Server Authentication" # define NID_server_auth 129 # define OBJ_server_auth OBJ_id_kp,1L # define SN_client_auth "clientAuth" # define LN_client_auth "TLS Web Client Authentication" # define NID_client_auth 130 # define OBJ_client_auth OBJ_id_kp,2L # define SN_code_sign "codeSigning" # define LN_code_sign "Code Signing" # define NID_code_sign 131 # define OBJ_code_sign OBJ_id_kp,3L # define SN_email_protect "emailProtection" # define LN_email_protect "E-mail Protection" # define NID_email_protect 132 # define OBJ_email_protect OBJ_id_kp,4L # define SN_time_stamp "timeStamping" # define LN_time_stamp "Time Stamping" # define NID_time_stamp 133 # define OBJ_time_stamp OBJ_id_kp,8L /* Additional extended key usage OIDs: Microsoft */ # define SN_ms_code_ind "msCodeInd" # define LN_ms_code_ind "Microsoft Individual Code Signing" # define NID_ms_code_ind 134 # define OBJ_ms_code_ind 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,21L # define SN_ms_code_com "msCodeCom" # define LN_ms_code_com "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing" # define NID_ms_code_com 135 # define OBJ_ms_code_com 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,22L # define SN_ms_ctl_sign "msCTLSign" # define LN_ms_ctl_sign "Microsoft Trust List Signing" # define NID_ms_ctl_sign 136 # define OBJ_ms_ctl_sign 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,1L # define SN_ms_sgc "msSGC" # define LN_ms_sgc "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto" # define NID_ms_sgc 137 # define OBJ_ms_sgc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,3L # define SN_ms_efs "msEFS" # define LN_ms_efs "Microsoft Encrypted File System" # define NID_ms_efs 138 # define OBJ_ms_efs 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,4L /* Additional usage: Netscape */ # define SN_ns_sgc "nsSGC" # define LN_ns_sgc "Netscape Server Gated Crypto" # define NID_ns_sgc 139 # define OBJ_ns_sgc OBJ_netscape,4L,1L # define SN_delta_crl "deltaCRL" # define LN_delta_crl "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator" # define NID_delta_crl 140 # define OBJ_delta_crl OBJ_id_ce,27L # define SN_crl_reason "CRLReason" # define LN_crl_reason "CRL Reason Code" # define NID_crl_reason 141 # define OBJ_crl_reason OBJ_id_ce,21L # define SN_invalidity_date "invalidityDate" # define LN_invalidity_date "Invalidity Date" # define NID_invalidity_date 142 # define OBJ_invalidity_date OBJ_id_ce,24L # define SN_sxnet "SXNetID" # define LN_sxnet "Strong Extranet ID" # define NID_sxnet 143 # define OBJ_sxnet 1L,3L,101L,1L,4L,1L /* PKCS12 and related OBJECT IDENTIFIERS */ # define OBJ_pkcs12 OBJ_pkcs,12L # define OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids OBJ_pkcs12, 1 # define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128" # define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4" # define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 144 # define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 1L # define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40" # define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4" # define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 145 # define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 2L # define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-3DES" # define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC" # define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC 146 # define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 3L # define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-2DES" # define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC" # define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC 147 # define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 4L # define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128" # define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC" # define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC 148 # define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 5L # define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40" # define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC" # define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC 149 # define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids, 6L # define OBJ_pkcs12_Version1 OBJ_pkcs12, 10L # define OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds OBJ_pkcs12_Version1, 1L # define LN_keyBag "keyBag" # define NID_keyBag 150 # define OBJ_keyBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 1L # define LN_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" # define NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 151 # define OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 2L # define LN_certBag "certBag" # define NID_certBag 152 # define OBJ_certBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 3L # define LN_crlBag "crlBag" # define NID_crlBag 153 # define OBJ_crlBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 4L # define LN_secretBag "secretBag" # define NID_secretBag 154 # define OBJ_secretBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 5L # define LN_safeContentsBag "safeContentsBag" # define NID_safeContentsBag 155 # define OBJ_safeContentsBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds, 6L # define LN_friendlyName "friendlyName" # define NID_friendlyName 156 # define OBJ_friendlyName OBJ_pkcs9, 20L # define LN_localKeyID "localKeyID" # define NID_localKeyID 157 # define OBJ_localKeyID OBJ_pkcs9, 21L # define OBJ_certTypes OBJ_pkcs9, 22L # define LN_x509Certificate "x509Certificate" # define NID_x509Certificate 158 # define OBJ_x509Certificate OBJ_certTypes, 1L # define LN_sdsiCertificate "sdsiCertificate" # define NID_sdsiCertificate 159 # define OBJ_sdsiCertificate OBJ_certTypes, 2L # define OBJ_crlTypes OBJ_pkcs9, 23L # define LN_x509Crl "x509Crl" # define NID_x509Crl 160 # define OBJ_x509Crl OBJ_crlTypes, 1L /* PKCS#5 v2 OIDs */ # define LN_pbes2 "PBES2" # define NID_pbes2 161 # define OBJ_pbes2 OBJ_pkcs,5L,13L # define LN_pbmac1 "PBMAC1" # define NID_pbmac1 162 # define OBJ_pbmac1 OBJ_pkcs,5L,14L # define LN_hmacWithSHA1 "hmacWithSHA1" # define NID_hmacWithSHA1 163 # define OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,7L /* Policy Qualifier Ids */ # define LN_id_qt_cps "Policy Qualifier CPS" # define SN_id_qt_cps "id-qt-cps" # define NID_id_qt_cps 164 # define OBJ_id_qt_cps OBJ_id_pkix,2L,1L # define LN_id_qt_unotice "Policy Qualifier User Notice" # define SN_id_qt_unotice "id-qt-unotice" # define NID_id_qt_unotice 165 # define OBJ_id_qt_unotice OBJ_id_pkix,2L,2L # define SN_rc2_64_cbc "RC2-64-CBC" # define LN_rc2_64_cbc "rc2-64-cbc" # define NID_rc2_64_cbc 166 # define SN_SMIMECapabilities "SMIME-CAPS" # define LN_SMIMECapabilities "S/MIME Capabilities" # define NID_SMIMECapabilities 167 # define OBJ_SMIMECapabilities OBJ_pkcs9,15L # define SN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC "PBE-MD2-RC2-64" # define LN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC" # define NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC 168 # define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs,5L,4L # define SN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC "PBE-MD5-RC2-64" # define LN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC" # define NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC 169 # define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs,5L,6L # define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-DES" # define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC" # define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC 170 # define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs,5L,10L /* Extension request OIDs */ # define LN_ms_ext_req "Microsoft Extension Request" # define SN_ms_ext_req "msExtReq" # define NID_ms_ext_req 171 # define OBJ_ms_ext_req 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,14L # define LN_ext_req "Extension Request" # define SN_ext_req "extReq" # define NID_ext_req 172 # define OBJ_ext_req OBJ_pkcs9,14L # define SN_name "name" # define LN_name "name" # define NID_name 173 # define OBJ_name OBJ_X509,41L # define SN_dnQualifier "dnQualifier" # define LN_dnQualifier "dnQualifier" # define NID_dnQualifier 174 # define OBJ_dnQualifier OBJ_X509,46L # define SN_id_pe "id-pe" # define NID_id_pe 175 # define OBJ_id_pe OBJ_id_pkix,1L # define SN_id_ad "id-ad" # define NID_id_ad 176 # define OBJ_id_ad OBJ_id_pkix,48L # define SN_info_access "authorityInfoAccess" # define LN_info_access "Authority Information Access" # define NID_info_access 177 # define OBJ_info_access OBJ_id_pe,1L # define SN_ad_OCSP "OCSP" # define LN_ad_OCSP "OCSP" # define NID_ad_OCSP 178 # define OBJ_ad_OCSP OBJ_id_ad,1L # define SN_ad_ca_issuers "caIssuers" # define LN_ad_ca_issuers "CA Issuers" # define NID_ad_ca_issuers 179 # define OBJ_ad_ca_issuers OBJ_id_ad,2L # define SN_OCSP_sign "OCSPSigning" # define LN_OCSP_sign "OCSP Signing" # define NID_OCSP_sign 180 # define OBJ_OCSP_sign OBJ_id_kp,9L # endif /* USE_OBJ_MAC */ # include # include # define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_UNDEF 0x00 # define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH 0x01 # define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH 0x02 # define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_PKEY_METH 0x03 # define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_COMP_METH 0x04 # define OBJ_NAME_TYPE_NUM 0x05 # define OBJ_NAME_ALIAS 0x8000 # define OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH 0x01 # define OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH 0x02 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct obj_name_st { int type; int alias; const char *name; const char *data; } OBJ_NAME; # define OBJ_create_and_add_object(a,b,c) OBJ_create(a,b,c) int OBJ_NAME_init(void); int OBJ_NAME_new_index(unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *), int (*cmp_func) (const char *, const char *), void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *)); const char *OBJ_NAME_get(const char *name, int type); int OBJ_NAME_add(const char *name, int type, const char *data); int OBJ_NAME_remove(const char *name, int type); void OBJ_NAME_cleanup(int type); /* -1 for everything */ void OBJ_NAME_do_all(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg), void *arg); void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg), void *arg); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n); int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name); int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name); int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s); int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *s); int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *s); int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b); const void *OBJ_bsearch_(const void *key, const void *base, int num, int size, int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *)); const void *OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key, const void *base, int num, int size, int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *), int flags); # define _DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(scope, type1, type2, nm) \ static int nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const void *, const void *); \ static int nm##_cmp(type1 const *, type2 const *); \ scope type2 * OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num) # define DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(type1, type2, cmp) \ _DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(static, type1, type2, cmp) # define DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(type1, type2, nm) \ type2 * OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num) /*- * Unsolved problem: if a type is actually a pointer type, like * nid_triple is, then its impossible to get a const where you need * it. Consider: * * typedef int nid_triple[3]; * const void *a_; * const nid_triple const *a = a_; * * The assignment discards a const because what you really want is: * * const int const * const *a = a_; * * But if you do that, you lose the fact that a is an array of 3 ints, * which breaks comparison functions. * * Thus we end up having to cast, sadly, or unpack the * declarations. Or, as I finally did in this case, declare nid_triple * to be a struct, which it should have been in the first place. * * Ben, August 2008. * * Also, strictly speaking not all types need be const, but handling * the non-constness means a lot of complication, and in practice * comparison routines do always not touch their arguments. */ # define IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(type1, type2, nm) \ static int nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const void *a_, const void *b_) \ { \ type1 const *a = a_; \ type2 const *b = b_; \ return nm##_cmp(a,b); \ } \ static type2 *OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num) \ { \ return (type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_(key, base, num, sizeof(type2), \ nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN); \ } \ extern void dummy_prototype(void) # define IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(type1, type2, nm) \ static int nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const void *a_, const void *b_) \ { \ type1 const *a = a_; \ type2 const *b = b_; \ return nm##_cmp(a,b); \ } \ type2 *OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num) \ { \ return (type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_(key, base, num, sizeof(type2), \ nm##_cmp_BSEARCH_CMP_FN); \ } \ extern void dummy_prototype(void) # define OBJ_bsearch(type1,key,type2,base,num,cmp) \ ((type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,key),CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,base), \ num,sizeof(type2), \ ((void)CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,cmp##_type_1), \ (void)CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,cmp##_type_2), \ cmp##_BSEARCH_CMP_FN))) # define OBJ_bsearch_ex(type1,key,type2,base,num,cmp,flags) \ ((type2 *)OBJ_bsearch_ex_(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,key),CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,base), \ num,sizeof(type2), \ ((void)CHECKED_PTR_OF(type1,cmp##_type_1), \ (void)type_2=CHECKED_PTR_OF(type2,cmp##_type_2), \ cmp##_BSEARCH_CMP_FN)),flags) int OBJ_new_nid(int num); int OBJ_add_object(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define OBJ_cleanup() while(0) continue #endif int OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in); size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int OBJ_find_sigid_algs(int signid, int *pdig_nid, int *ppkey_nid); int OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(int *psignid, int dig_nid, int pkey_nid); int OBJ_add_sigid(int signid, int dig_id, int pkey_id); void OBJ_sigid_free(void); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_OBJ_strings(void); /* Error codes for the OBJ functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT 105 # define OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE 100 # define OBJ_F_OBJ_DUP 101 # define OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX 106 # define OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN 102 # define OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ 103 # define OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN 104 /* Reason codes. */ # define OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS 102 # define OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID 101 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/md2.h0000644000000000000000000000203613176625661016020 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_MD2_H # define HEADER_MD2_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif typedef unsigned char MD2_INT; # define MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 # define MD2_BLOCK 16 typedef struct MD2state_st { unsigned int num; unsigned char data[MD2_BLOCK]; MD2_INT cksm[MD2_BLOCK]; MD2_INT state[MD2_BLOCK]; } MD2_CTX; const char *MD2_options(void); int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c); int MD2_Update(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, size_t len); int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c); unsigned char *MD2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/tls1.h0000644000000000000000000014060413176625661016225 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifndef HEADER_TLS1_H # define HEADER_TLS1_H # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Default security level if not overridden at config time */ # ifndef OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL # define OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL 1 # endif # define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301 # define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302 # define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303 # define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION /* Special value for method supporting multiple versions */ # define TLS_ANY_VERSION 0x10000 # define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 # define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01 # define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 # define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02 # define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 # define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03 # define TLS1_get_version(s) \ ((SSL_version(s) >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? SSL_version(s) : 0) # define TLS1_get_client_version(s) \ ((SSL_client_version(s) >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? SSL_client_version(s) : 0) # define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21 # define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22 # define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA 48/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED 49/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR 50/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR 51 # define TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90 # define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */ # define TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 110 # define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 111 # define TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 # define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113 # define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114 # define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115/* fatal */ # define TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* fatal */ /* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 / RFC6066 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name 0 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length 1 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url 2 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys 3 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac 4 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request 5 /* ExtensionType values from RFC4681 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping 6 /* ExtensionType values from RFC5878 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz 7 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz 8 /* ExtensionType values from RFC6091 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type 9 /* ExtensionType values from RFC4492 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves 10 # define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats 11 /* ExtensionType value from RFC5054 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_srp 12 /* ExtensionType values from RFC5246 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms 13 /* ExtensionType value from RFC5764 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp 14 /* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat 15 /* ExtensionType value from RFC7301 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation 16 /* * Extension type for Certificate Transparency * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp 18 /* * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension. * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21 /* ExtensionType value from RFC7366 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac 22 /* ExtensionType value from RFC7627 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret 23 /* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35 /* Temporary extension type */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ # define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 # endif /* NameType value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 /* status request value from RFC3546 */ # define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1 /* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */ # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2 # define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2 /* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */ # define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous 0 # define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1 # define TLSEXT_signature_dsa 2 # define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa 3 # define TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001 237 # define TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256 238 # define TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 239 /* Total number of different signature algorithms */ # define TLSEXT_signature_num 7 # define TLSEXT_hash_none 0 # define TLSEXT_hash_md5 1 # define TLSEXT_hash_sha1 2 # define TLSEXT_hash_sha224 3 # define TLSEXT_hash_sha256 4 # define TLSEXT_hash_sha384 5 # define TLSEXT_hash_sha512 6 # define TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411 237 # define TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256 238 # define TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512 239 /* Total number of different digest algorithms */ # define TLSEXT_hash_num 10 /* Flag set for unrecognised algorithms */ # define TLSEXT_nid_unknown 0x1000000 /* ECC curves */ # define TLSEXT_curve_P_256 23 # define TLSEXT_curve_P_384 24 # define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255 __owur const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type); __owur int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s); /* * SSL_export_keying_material exports a value derived from the master secret, * as specified in RFC 5705. It writes |olen| bytes to |out| given a label and * optional context. (Since a zero length context is allowed, the |use_context| * flag controls whether a context is included.) It returns 1 on success and * 0 or -1 otherwise. */ __owur int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context); int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash); int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash); __owur int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); # define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name) # define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(ssl, cb) \ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,0, NULL) # define SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,type, NULL) # define SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_set_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen, (void *)arg) # define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0 # define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1 # define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2 # define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3 # define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, arg) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys)) # define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys)) # define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,0, (void (**)(void))cb) # define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg) # define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg) #define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE, type, NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type(ssl) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE, 0, NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, cb) \ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED 0x01 # define SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS 0x02 # define SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS 0x04 # define SSL_get_dtlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_dtlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS,arg,NULL) # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT \ SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING \ SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS \ SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS # define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED \ SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED # define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS \ SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS # define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS \ SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS # define SSL_get_tlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \ SSL_get_dtlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) # define SSL_set_tlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \ SSL_set_dtlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) # endif # endif /* PSK ciphersuites from 4279 */ # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300008A # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300008B # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300008C # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300008D # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300008E # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300008F # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000090 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000091 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000092 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x03000093 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000094 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000095 /* PSK ciphersuites from 5487 */ # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A8 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A9 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000AA # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000AB # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000AC # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000AD # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000AE # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x030000AF # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x030000B0 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0x030000B1 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000B2 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x030000B3 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x030000B4 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0x030000B5 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000B6 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x030000B7 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x030000B8 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0x030000B9 /* NULL PSK ciphersuites from RFC4785 */ # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300002C # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300002D # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300002E /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000032 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000033 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000034 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000035 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000036 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000037 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000038 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000039 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x0300003A /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x0300003B # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003C # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300003D # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003E # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003F # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x03000040 /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000041 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000042 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000043 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000044 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000045 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000046 /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */ # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x03000067 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x03000068 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x03000069 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006A # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006B # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300006C # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006D /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000084 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000085 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000086 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000087 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000088 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000089 /* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000096 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000097 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000098 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000099 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009A # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009B /* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009C # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300009D # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009E # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300009F # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A0 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A1 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A2 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A3 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A4 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A5 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A6 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A7 /* CCM ciphersuites from RFC6655 */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0x0300C09C # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0x0300C09D # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0x0300C09E # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0x0300C09F # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0x0300C0A0 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0x0300C0A1 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0x0300C0A2 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0x0300C0A3 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0x0300C0A4 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0x0300C0A5 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0x0300C0A6 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0x0300C0A7 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0x0300C0A8 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0x0300C0A9 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0x0300C0AA # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0x0300C0AB /* CCM ciphersuites from RFC7251 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0x0300C0AC # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0x0300C0AD # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0x0300C0AE # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0x0300C0AF /* TLS 1.2 Camellia SHA-256 ciphersuites from RFC5932 */ # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000BA # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000BB # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000BC # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000BD # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000BE # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x030000BF # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0x030000C0 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0x030000C1 # define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0x030000C2 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0x030000C3 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0x030000C4 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0x030000C5 /* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C001 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C002 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C003 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C004 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C005 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C006 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C007 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C008 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C009 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00A # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C00B # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C00C # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C00D # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00E # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00F # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C010 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C011 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C012 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C013 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C014 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C015 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C016 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C017 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C018 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C019 /* SRP ciphersuites from RFC 5054 */ # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01A # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01B # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01C # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01D # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01E # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01F # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C020 # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C021 # define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C022 /* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C023 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C024 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C025 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C026 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C027 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C028 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C029 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C02A /* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02B # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C02C # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02D # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C02E # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02F # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C030 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C031 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C032 /* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC5489 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C033 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C034 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C035 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C036 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C037 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C038 /* NULL PSK ciphersuites from RFC4785 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C039 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x0300C03A # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0x0300C03B /* Camellia-CBC ciphersuites from RFC6367 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C072 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C073 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C074 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C075 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C076 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C077 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C078 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C079 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C094 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C095 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C096 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C097 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C098 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C099 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C09A # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C09B /* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-03 */ # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0300CCA8 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0300CCA9 # define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0300CCAA # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0300CCAB # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0300CCAC # define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0300CCAD # define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0300CCAE /* * XXX Backward compatibility alert: Older versions of OpenSSL gave some DHE * ciphers names with "EDH" instead of "DHE". Going forward, we should be * using DHE everywhere, though we may indefinitely maintain aliases for * users or configurations that used "EDH" */ # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA "PSK-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA" /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */ # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA "ADH-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA" /* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA "AECDH-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "AECDH-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES256-SHA" /* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 4279 */ # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "PSK-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "DHE-PSK-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "RSA-PSK-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA" /* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5487 */ # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "RSA-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "RSA-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 "PSK-NULL-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 "PSK-NULL-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 "DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 "DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 "RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 "RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA384" /* SRP ciphersuite from RFC 5054 */ # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA" /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */ # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA" /* TLS 1.2 Camellia SHA-256 ciphersuites from RFC5932 */ # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 "CAMELLIA256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" /* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */ # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "SEED-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-RSA-SEED-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA "ADH-SEED-SHA" /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */ # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 "NULL-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "AES256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "ADH-AES256-SHA256" /* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */ # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384" /* CCM ciphersuites from RFC6655 */ # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM "AES128-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM "AES256-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM "DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM "DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 "AES128-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 "AES256-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 "DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 "DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM "PSK-AES128-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM "PSK-AES256-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM "DHE-PSK-AES128-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM "DHE-PSK-AES256-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 "PSK-AES128-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 "PSK-AES256-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 "DHE-PSK-AES128-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 "DHE-PSK-AES256-CCM8" /* CCM ciphersuites from RFC7251 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8" /* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384" /* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" /* TLS v1.2 PSK GCM ciphersuites from RFC5487 */ # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384" /* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384" /* Camellia-CBC ciphersuites from RFC6367 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" /* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-03 */ # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 "ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 "ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 "DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305" # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 "PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305" # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 "ECDHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305" # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 "DHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305" # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 "RSA-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305" # define TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN 1 # define TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN 2 # define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3 # define TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4 # define TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN 64 # define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH 65 # define TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH 66 # define TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN 22 # define TLS_CT_GOST12_SIGN 238 # define TLS_CT_GOST12_512_SIGN 239 /* * when correcting this number, correct also SSL3_CT_NUMBER in ssl3.h (see * comment there) */ # define TLS_CT_NUMBER 9 # define TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH 12 # define TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE 22 # define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "client finished" # define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15 # define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "server finished" # define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15 # define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "key expansion" # define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE 13 # define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "client write key" # define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16 # define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "server write key" # define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16 # define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "IV block" # define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE 8 # define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "master secret" # define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE 13 # define TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "extended master secret" # define TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE 22 # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST /* * client finished */ # define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64" # undef TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST /* * server finished */ # define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64" # undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST /* * server write key */ # define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79" # undef TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST /* * key expansion */ # define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x65\x78\x70\x61\x6e\x73\x69\x6f\x6e" # undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST /* * client write key */ # define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79" # undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST /* * server write key */ # define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79" # undef TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST /* * IV block */ # define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "\x49\x56\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b" # undef TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST /* * master secret */ # define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74" # undef TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST /* * extended master secret */ # define TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "\x65\x78\x74\x65\x63\x64\x65\x64\x20\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74" # endif /* TLS Session Ticket extension struct */ struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st { unsigned short length; void *data; }; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/rand.h0000644000000000000000000000511213176625661016260 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RAND_H # define HEADER_RAND_H # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */ /* typedef struct rand_meth_st RAND_METHOD; */ struct rand_meth_st { int (*seed) (const void *buf, int num); int (*bytes) (unsigned char *buf, int num); void (*cleanup) (void); int (*add) (const void *buf, int num, double entropy); int (*pseudorand) (unsigned char *buf, int num); int (*status) (void); }; # ifdef BN_DEBUG extern int rand_predictable; # endif int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth); const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine); # endif RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define RAND_cleanup() while(0) continue #endif int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)) void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num); #if defined(__ANDROID__) && defined(__NDK_FPABI__) __NDK_FPABI__ /* __attribute__((pcs("aapcs"))) on ARM */ #endif void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy); int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long max_bytes); int RAND_write_file(const char *file); const char *RAND_file_name(char *file, size_t num); int RAND_status(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes); int RAND_egd(const char *path); int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes); # endif int RAND_poll(void); #if defined(_WIN32) && (defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H)) /* application has to include in order to use these */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void RAND_screen(void)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM)) #endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_RAND_strings(void); /* Error codes for the RAND functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define RAND_F_RAND_BYTES 100 /* Reason codes. */ # define RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED 100 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ssl3.h0000644000000000000000000003132613176625661016226 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H # define HEADER_SSL3_H # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746 * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */ # define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF /* * Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */ # define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000004 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000005 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 0x03000006 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA 0x03000007 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000008 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000009 # define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000A # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000B # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000C # define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000D # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000E # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000F # define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000010 # define SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000011 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000012 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000013 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000014 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA # define SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000015 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA # define SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000016 # define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA # define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000017 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000018 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000019 # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001A # define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA 0x0300001B # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5 "NULL-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA "NULL-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 "RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA "RC4-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA "IDEA-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DHE-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" /* * This next block of six "EDH" labels is for backward compatibility with * older versions of OpenSSL. New code should use the six "DHE" labels above * instead: */ # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 "ADH-RC4-MD5" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA" # define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA" # define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE 48 # define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32 # define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5 # define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 4 # ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD /* * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not * actually true. Point is that malloc has to return at least 64-bit aligned * pointers, meaning that allocating 5 bytes wastes 3 bytes in either case. * Suggested pre-gaping simply moves these wasted bytes from the end of * allocated region to its front, but makes data payload aligned, which * improves performance:-) */ # define SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD 8 # else # if (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1))!=0 # error "insane SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD" # undef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD # endif # endif /* * This is the maximum MAC (digest) size used by the SSL library. Currently * maximum of 20 is used by SHA1, but we reserve for future extension for * 512-bit hashes. */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE 64 /* * Maximum block size used in all ciphersuites. Currently 16 for AES. */ # define SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16 # define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384) /* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384 /* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD 1024 /* * The standards give a maximum encryption overhead of 1024 bytes. In * practice the value is lower than this. The overhead is the maximum number * of padding bytes (256) plus the mac size. */ # define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD (256 + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE) /* * OpenSSL currently only uses a padding length of at most one block so the * send overhead is smaller. */ # define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ (SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE) /* If compression isn't used don't include the compression overhead */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH # else # define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH \ (SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD) # endif # define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH \ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) # define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) # define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54" # define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52" # define SSL3_VERSION 0x0300 # define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 # define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR 0x00 # define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 # define SSL3_RT_ALERT 21 # define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 22 # define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 23 # define DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT 24 /* Pseudo content types to indicate additional parameters */ # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO 0x1000 # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x1) # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x2) # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x3) # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x4) # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_READ 0x0000 # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE 0x0100 # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x5) # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x6) # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x7) # define TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV (TLS1_RT_CRYPTO | 0x8) /* Pseudo content type for SSL/TLS header info */ # define SSL3_RT_HEADER 0x100 # define SSL3_AL_WARNING 1 # define SSL3_AL_FATAL 2 # define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 # define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40/* fatal */ # define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE 41 # define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE 42 # define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 44 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 45 # define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 46 # define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47/* fatal */ # define TLS1_HB_REQUEST 1 # define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE 2 # define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN 1 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN 2 # define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4 # define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH 5 # define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH 6 # define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS 20 /* * SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large enough to * contain all of the cert types defined either for SSLv3 and TLSv1. */ # define SSL3_CT_NUMBER 9 # define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS 0x0001 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0 */ # define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0 # define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010 /* Set if we encrypt then mac instead of usual mac then encrypt */ # define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ 0x0100 # define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ /* Set if extended master secret extension received from peer */ # define TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS 0x0200 # define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE 0x0400 # define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0 # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2 # define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 4 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 11 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE 14 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 # define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 # define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG # define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 # endif # define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 /* Dummy message type for handling CCS like a normal handshake message */ # define SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 0x0101 # define SSL3_MT_CCS 1 /* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */ # define SSL3_CC_READ 0x01 # define SSL3_CC_WRITE 0x02 # define SSL3_CC_CLIENT 0x10 # define SSL3_CC_SERVER 0x20 # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ) # define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE) #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/camellia.h0000644000000000000000000000615313176625661017111 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CAMELLIA_H # define HEADER_CAMELLIA_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1 # define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0 /* * Because array size can't be a const in C, the following two are macros. * Both sizes are in bytes. */ /* This should be a hidden type, but EVP requires that the size be known */ # define CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE 16 # define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272 # define CAMELLIA_TABLE_WORD_LEN (CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN / 4) typedef unsigned int KEY_TABLE_TYPE[CAMELLIA_TABLE_WORD_LEN]; /* to match * with WORD */ struct camellia_key_st { union { double d; /* ensures 64-bit align */ KEY_TABLE_TYPE rd_key; } u; int grand_rounds; }; typedef struct camellia_key_st CAMELLIA_KEY; int Camellia_set_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, CAMELLIA_KEY *key); void Camellia_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key); void Camellia_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key); void Camellia_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, const int enc); void Camellia_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, const int enc); void Camellia_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc); void Camellia_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc); void Camellia_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc); void Camellia_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); void Camellia_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const CAMELLIA_KEY *key, unsigned char ivec[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned char ecount_buf[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned int *num); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/srp.h0000644000000000000000000000713013176625661016142 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_SRP_H # define HEADER_SRP_H #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif typedef struct SRP_gN_cache_st { char *b64_bn; BIGNUM *bn; } SRP_gN_cache; DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) typedef struct SRP_user_pwd_st { /* Owned by us. */ char *id; BIGNUM *s; BIGNUM *v; /* Not owned by us. */ const BIGNUM *g; const BIGNUM *N; /* Owned by us. */ char *info; } SRP_user_pwd; void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd); DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd) typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st { STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd) *users_pwd; STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache; /* to simulate a user */ char *seed_key; const BIGNUM *default_g; const BIGNUM *default_N; } SRP_VBASE; /* * Internal structure storing N and g pair */ typedef struct SRP_gN_st { char *id; const BIGNUM *g; const BIGNUM *N; } SRP_gN; DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN) SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key); void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb); int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file); /* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)) /* NOTE: unlike in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user, caller owns the returned pointer.*/ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username); char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g); int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g); # define SRP_NO_ERROR 0 # define SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE 1 # define SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB 2 # define SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE 3 # define SRP_ERR_MEMORY 4 # define DB_srptype 0 # define DB_srpverifier 1 # define DB_srpsalt 2 # define DB_srpid 3 # define DB_srpgN 4 # define DB_srpinfo 5 # undef DB_NUMBER # define DB_NUMBER 6 # define DB_SRP_INDEX 'I' # define DB_SRP_VALID 'V' # define DB_SRP_REVOKED 'R' # define DB_SRP_MODIF 'v' /* see srp.c */ char *SRP_check_known_gN_param(const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *N); SRP_gN *SRP_get_default_gN(const char *id); /* server side .... */ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_server_key(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *v, const BIGNUM *u, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N); BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_B(const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *v); int SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *N); BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N); /* client side .... */ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_x(const BIGNUM *s, const char *user, const char *pass); BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_A(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g); BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_client_key(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *u); int SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(const BIGNUM *B, const BIGNUM *N); # define SRP_MINIMAL_N 1024 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/async.h0000644000000000000000000000633413176625661016460 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifndef HEADER_ASYNC_H # define HEADER_ASYNC_H #if defined(_WIN32) # if defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H) /* application has to include to use this */ #define OSSL_ASYNC_FD HANDLE #define OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE # endif #else #define OSSL_ASYNC_FD int #define OSSL_BAD_ASYNC_FD -1 #endif # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif typedef struct async_job_st ASYNC_JOB; typedef struct async_wait_ctx_st ASYNC_WAIT_CTX; #define ASYNC_ERR 0 #define ASYNC_NO_JOBS 1 #define ASYNC_PAUSE 2 #define ASYNC_FINISH 3 int ASYNC_init_thread(size_t max_size, size_t init_size); void ASYNC_cleanup_thread(void); #ifdef OSSL_ASYNC_FD ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(void); void ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd, void *custom_data, void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *, OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *)); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, void **custom_data); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, size_t *numfds); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key); #endif int ASYNC_is_capable(void); int ASYNC_start_job(ASYNC_JOB **job, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, int *ret, int (*func)(void *), void *args, size_t size); int ASYNC_pause_job(void); ASYNC_JOB *ASYNC_get_current_job(void); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(ASYNC_JOB *job); void ASYNC_block_pause(void); void ASYNC_unblock_pause(void); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_ASYNC_strings(void); /* Error codes for the ASYNC functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_CTX_NEW 100 # define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_INIT_THREAD 101 # define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_JOB_NEW 102 # define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_PAUSE_JOB 103 # define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_FUNC 104 # define ASYNC_F_ASYNC_START_JOB 105 /* Reason codes. */ # define ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SET_POOL 101 # define ASYNC_R_FAILED_TO_SWAP_CONTEXT 102 # define ASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED 105 # define ASYNC_R_INVALID_POOL_SIZE 103 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/pem2.h0000644000000000000000000000071713176625661016205 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #ifndef HEADER_PEM_H int ERR_load_PEM_strings(void); #endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/blowfish.h0000644000000000000000000000346713176625661017164 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_BLOWFISH_H # define HEADER_BLOWFISH_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # define BF_ENCRYPT 1 # define BF_DECRYPT 0 /*- * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * ! BF_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide. ! * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! */ # define BF_LONG unsigned int # define BF_ROUNDS 16 # define BF_BLOCK 8 typedef struct bf_key_st { BF_LONG P[BF_ROUNDS + 2]; BF_LONG S[4 * 256]; } BF_KEY; void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data); void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key); void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key); void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const BF_KEY *key, int enc); void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int enc); void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc); void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); const char *BF_options(void); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/txt_db.h0000644000000000000000000000317613176625661016630 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_TXT_DB_H # define HEADER_TXT_DB_H # include # include # include # include # define DB_ERROR_OK 0 # define DB_ERROR_MALLOC 1 # define DB_ERROR_INDEX_CLASH 2 # define DB_ERROR_INDEX_OUT_OF_RANGE 3 # define DB_ERROR_NO_INDEX 4 # define DB_ERROR_INSERT_INDEX_CLASH 5 # define DB_ERROR_WRONG_NUM_FIELDS 6 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef OPENSSL_STRING *OPENSSL_PSTRING; DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_PSTRING, OPENSSL_STRING) typedef struct txt_db_st { int num_fields; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_PSTRING) *data; LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **index; int (**qual) (OPENSSL_STRING *); long error; long arg1; long arg2; OPENSSL_STRING *arg_row; } TXT_DB; TXT_DB *TXT_DB_read(BIO *in, int num); long TXT_DB_write(BIO *out, TXT_DB *db); int TXT_DB_create_index(TXT_DB *db, int field, int (*qual) (OPENSSL_STRING *), OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC hash, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cmp); void TXT_DB_free(TXT_DB *db); OPENSSL_STRING *TXT_DB_get_by_index(TXT_DB *db, int idx, OPENSSL_STRING *value); int TXT_DB_insert(TXT_DB *db, OPENSSL_STRING *value); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/x509v3.h0000644000000000000000000011256613176625661016326 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_X509V3_H # define HEADER_X509V3_H # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Forward reference */ struct v3_ext_method; struct v3_ext_ctx; /* Useful typedefs */ typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_NEW)(void); typedef void (*X509V3_EXT_FREE) (void *); typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_D2I)(void *, const unsigned char **, long); typedef int (*X509V3_EXT_I2D) (void *, unsigned char **); typedef STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) * (*X509V3_EXT_I2V) (const struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_V2I)(const struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values); typedef char *(*X509V3_EXT_I2S)(const struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext); typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_S2I)(const struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, const char *str); typedef int (*X509V3_EXT_I2R) (const struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext, BIO *out, int indent); typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_R2I)(const struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, const char *str); /* V3 extension structure */ struct v3_ext_method { int ext_nid; int ext_flags; /* If this is set the following four fields are ignored */ ASN1_ITEM_EXP *it; /* Old style ASN1 calls */ X509V3_EXT_NEW ext_new; X509V3_EXT_FREE ext_free; X509V3_EXT_D2I d2i; X509V3_EXT_I2D i2d; /* The following pair is used for string extensions */ X509V3_EXT_I2S i2s; X509V3_EXT_S2I s2i; /* The following pair is used for multi-valued extensions */ X509V3_EXT_I2V i2v; X509V3_EXT_V2I v2i; /* The following are used for raw extensions */ X509V3_EXT_I2R i2r; X509V3_EXT_R2I r2i; void *usr_data; /* Any extension specific data */ }; typedef struct X509V3_CONF_METHOD_st { char *(*get_string) (void *db, const char *section, const char *value); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *(*get_section) (void *db, const char *section); void (*free_string) (void *db, char *string); void (*free_section) (void *db, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section); } X509V3_CONF_METHOD; /* Context specific info */ struct v3_ext_ctx { # define CTX_TEST 0x1 # define X509V3_CTX_REPLACE 0x2 int flags; X509 *issuer_cert; X509 *subject_cert; X509_REQ *subject_req; X509_CRL *crl; X509V3_CONF_METHOD *db_meth; void *db; /* Maybe more here */ }; typedef struct v3_ext_method X509V3_EXT_METHOD; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509V3_EXT_METHOD) /* ext_flags values */ # define X509V3_EXT_DYNAMIC 0x1 # define X509V3_EXT_CTX_DEP 0x2 # define X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE 0x4 typedef BIT_STRING_BITNAME ENUMERATED_NAMES; typedef struct BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_st { int ca; ASN1_INTEGER *pathlen; } BASIC_CONSTRAINTS; typedef struct PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_st { ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *notBefore; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *notAfter; } PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD; typedef struct otherName_st { ASN1_OBJECT *type_id; ASN1_TYPE *value; } OTHERNAME; typedef struct EDIPartyName_st { ASN1_STRING *nameAssigner; ASN1_STRING *partyName; } EDIPARTYNAME; typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st { # define GEN_OTHERNAME 0 # define GEN_EMAIL 1 # define GEN_DNS 2 # define GEN_X400 3 # define GEN_DIRNAME 4 # define GEN_EDIPARTY 5 # define GEN_URI 6 # define GEN_IPADD 7 # define GEN_RID 8 int type; union { char *ptr; OTHERNAME *otherName; /* otherName */ ASN1_IA5STRING *rfc822Name; ASN1_IA5STRING *dNSName; ASN1_TYPE *x400Address; X509_NAME *directoryName; EDIPARTYNAME *ediPartyName; ASN1_IA5STRING *uniformResourceIdentifier; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *iPAddress; ASN1_OBJECT *registeredID; /* Old names */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip; /* iPAddress */ X509_NAME *dirn; /* dirn */ ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5; /* rfc822Name, dNSName, * uniformResourceIdentifier */ ASN1_OBJECT *rid; /* registeredID */ ASN1_TYPE *other; /* x400Address */ } d; } GENERAL_NAME; typedef struct ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_st { ASN1_OBJECT *method; GENERAL_NAME *location; } ACCESS_DESCRIPTION; typedef STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS; typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE; typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) TLS_FEATURE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) typedef STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) GENERAL_NAMES; DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) DEFINE_STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) typedef struct DIST_POINT_NAME_st { int type; union { GENERAL_NAMES *fullname; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *relativename; } name; /* If relativename then this contains the full distribution point name */ X509_NAME *dpname; } DIST_POINT_NAME; /* All existing reasons */ # define CRLDP_ALL_REASONS 0x807f # define CRL_REASON_NONE -1 # define CRL_REASON_UNSPECIFIED 0 # define CRL_REASON_KEY_COMPROMISE 1 # define CRL_REASON_CA_COMPROMISE 2 # define CRL_REASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED 3 # define CRL_REASON_SUPERSEDED 4 # define CRL_REASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION 5 # define CRL_REASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD 6 # define CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL 8 # define CRL_REASON_PRIVILEGE_WITHDRAWN 9 # define CRL_REASON_AA_COMPROMISE 10 struct DIST_POINT_st { DIST_POINT_NAME *distpoint; ASN1_BIT_STRING *reasons; GENERAL_NAMES *CRLissuer; int dp_reasons; }; typedef STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) CRL_DIST_POINTS; DEFINE_STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) struct AUTHORITY_KEYID_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid; GENERAL_NAMES *issuer; ASN1_INTEGER *serial; }; /* Strong extranet structures */ typedef struct SXNET_ID_st { ASN1_INTEGER *zone; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *user; } SXNETID; DEFINE_STACK_OF(SXNETID) typedef struct SXNET_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; STACK_OF(SXNETID) *ids; } SXNET; typedef struct NOTICEREF_st { ASN1_STRING *organization; STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *noticenos; } NOTICEREF; typedef struct USERNOTICE_st { NOTICEREF *noticeref; ASN1_STRING *exptext; } USERNOTICE; typedef struct POLICYQUALINFO_st { ASN1_OBJECT *pqualid; union { ASN1_IA5STRING *cpsuri; USERNOTICE *usernotice; ASN1_TYPE *other; } d; } POLICYQUALINFO; DEFINE_STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) typedef struct POLICYINFO_st { ASN1_OBJECT *policyid; STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *qualifiers; } POLICYINFO; typedef STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) CERTIFICATEPOLICIES; DEFINE_STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) typedef struct POLICY_MAPPING_st { ASN1_OBJECT *issuerDomainPolicy; ASN1_OBJECT *subjectDomainPolicy; } POLICY_MAPPING; DEFINE_STACK_OF(POLICY_MAPPING) typedef STACK_OF(POLICY_MAPPING) POLICY_MAPPINGS; typedef struct GENERAL_SUBTREE_st { GENERAL_NAME *base; ASN1_INTEGER *minimum; ASN1_INTEGER *maximum; } GENERAL_SUBTREE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) struct NAME_CONSTRAINTS_st { STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *permittedSubtrees; STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *excludedSubtrees; }; typedef struct POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_st { ASN1_INTEGER *requireExplicitPolicy; ASN1_INTEGER *inhibitPolicyMapping; } POLICY_CONSTRAINTS; /* Proxy certificate structures, see RFC 3820 */ typedef struct PROXY_POLICY_st { ASN1_OBJECT *policyLanguage; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *policy; } PROXY_POLICY; typedef struct PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_st { ASN1_INTEGER *pcPathLengthConstraint; PROXY_POLICY *proxyPolicy; } PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION; DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_POLICY) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) struct ISSUING_DIST_POINT_st { DIST_POINT_NAME *distpoint; int onlyuser; int onlyCA; ASN1_BIT_STRING *onlysomereasons; int indirectCRL; int onlyattr; }; /* Values in idp_flags field */ /* IDP present */ # define IDP_PRESENT 0x1 /* IDP values inconsistent */ # define IDP_INVALID 0x2 /* onlyuser true */ # define IDP_ONLYUSER 0x4 /* onlyCA true */ # define IDP_ONLYCA 0x8 /* onlyattr true */ # define IDP_ONLYATTR 0x10 /* indirectCRL true */ # define IDP_INDIRECT 0x20 /* onlysomereasons present */ # define IDP_REASONS 0x40 # define X509V3_conf_err(val) ERR_add_error_data(6, "section:", val->section, \ ",name:", val->name, ",value:", val->value); # define X509V3_set_ctx_test(ctx) \ X509V3_set_ctx(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, CTX_TEST) # define X509V3_set_ctx_nodb(ctx) (ctx)->db = NULL; # define EXT_BITSTRING(nid, table) { nid, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BIT_STRING), \ 0,0,0,0, \ 0,0, \ (X509V3_EXT_I2V)i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING, \ (X509V3_EXT_V2I)v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING, \ NULL, NULL, \ table} # define EXT_IA5STRING(nid) { nid, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_IA5STRING), \ 0,0,0,0, \ (X509V3_EXT_I2S)i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING, \ (X509V3_EXT_S2I)s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING, \ 0,0,0,0, \ NULL} # define EXT_END { -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} /* X509_PURPOSE stuff */ # define EXFLAG_BCONS 0x1 # define EXFLAG_KUSAGE 0x2 # define EXFLAG_XKUSAGE 0x4 # define EXFLAG_NSCERT 0x8 # define EXFLAG_CA 0x10 /* Really self issued not necessarily self signed */ # define EXFLAG_SI 0x20 # define EXFLAG_V1 0x40 # define EXFLAG_INVALID 0x80 /* EXFLAG_SET is set to indicate that some values have been precomputed */ # define EXFLAG_SET 0x100 # define EXFLAG_CRITICAL 0x200 # define EXFLAG_PROXY 0x400 # define EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY 0x800 # define EXFLAG_FRESHEST 0x1000 /* Self signed */ # define EXFLAG_SS 0x2000 # define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 0x0080 # define KU_NON_REPUDIATION 0x0040 # define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0020 # define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0010 # define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT 0x0008 # define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN 0x0004 # define KU_CRL_SIGN 0x0002 # define KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY 0x0001 # define KU_DECIPHER_ONLY 0x8000 # define NS_SSL_CLIENT 0x80 # define NS_SSL_SERVER 0x40 # define NS_SMIME 0x20 # define NS_OBJSIGN 0x10 # define NS_SSL_CA 0x04 # define NS_SMIME_CA 0x02 # define NS_OBJSIGN_CA 0x01 # define NS_ANY_CA (NS_SSL_CA|NS_SMIME_CA|NS_OBJSIGN_CA) # define XKU_SSL_SERVER 0x1 # define XKU_SSL_CLIENT 0x2 # define XKU_SMIME 0x4 # define XKU_CODE_SIGN 0x8 # define XKU_SGC 0x10 # define XKU_OCSP_SIGN 0x20 # define XKU_TIMESTAMP 0x40 # define XKU_DVCS 0x80 # define XKU_ANYEKU 0x100 # define X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC 0x1 # define X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME 0x2 typedef struct x509_purpose_st { int purpose; int trust; /* Default trust ID */ int flags; int (*check_purpose) (const struct x509_purpose_st *, const X509 *, int); char *name; char *sname; void *usr_data; } X509_PURPOSE; # define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT 1 # define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER 2 # define X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER 3 # define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN 4 # define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT 5 # define X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN 6 # define X509_PURPOSE_ANY 7 # define X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER 8 # define X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN 9 # define X509_PURPOSE_MIN 1 # define X509_PURPOSE_MAX 9 /* Flags for X509V3_EXT_print() */ # define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK (0xfL << 16) /* Return error for unknown extensions */ # define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT 0 /* Print error for unknown extensions */ # define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN (1L << 16) /* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */ # define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN (2L << 16) /* BIO_dump unknown extensions */ # define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN (3L << 16) /* Flags for X509V3_add1_i2d */ # define X509V3_ADD_OP_MASK 0xfL # define X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT 0L # define X509V3_ADD_APPEND 1L # define X509V3_ADD_REPLACE 2L # define X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING 3L # define X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING 4L # define X509V3_ADD_DELETE 5L # define X509V3_ADD_SILENT 0x10 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNET) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(SXNETID) int SXNET_add_id_asc(SXNET **psx, const char *zone, const char *user, int userlen); int SXNET_add_id_ulong(SXNET **psx, unsigned long lzone, const char *user, int userlen); int SXNET_add_id_INTEGER(SXNET **psx, ASN1_INTEGER *izone, const char *user, int userlen); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_asc(SXNET *sx, const char *zone); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_ulong(SXNET *sx, unsigned long lzone); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *SXNET_get_id_INTEGER(SXNET *sx, ASN1_INTEGER *zone); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_KEYID) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAME) GENERAL_NAME *GENERAL_NAME_dup(GENERAL_NAME *a); int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b); ASN1_BIT_STRING *v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bits, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); char *i2s_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5); ASN1_IA5STRING *s2i_ASN1_IA5STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAME(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, GENERAL_NAME *gen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret); int GENERAL_NAME_print(BIO *out, GENERAL_NAME *gen); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_NAMES) STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAMES(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, GENERAL_NAMES *gen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *extlist); GENERAL_NAMES *v2i_GENERAL_NAMES(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME) int OTHERNAME_cmp(OTHERNAME *a, OTHERNAME *b); void GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int type, void *value); void *GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int *ptype); int GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, ASN1_OBJECT *oid, ASN1_TYPE *value); int GENERAL_NAME_get0_otherName(GENERAL_NAME *gen, ASN1_OBJECT **poid, ASN1_TYPE **pvalue); char *i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ia5); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *str); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) int i2a_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION(BIO *bp, const ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *a); DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(TLS_FEATURE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYINFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYQUALINFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(USERNOTICE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NOTICEREF) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CRL_DIST_POINTS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(DIST_POINT_NAME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ISSUING_DIST_POINT) int DIST_POINT_set_dpname(DIST_POINT_NAME *dpn, X509_NAME *iname); int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc); int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_MAPPING) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_MAPPING) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_MAPPINGS) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(GENERAL_SUBTREE) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS) GENERAL_NAME *a2i_GENERAL_NAME(GENERAL_NAME *out, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type, const char *value, int is_nc); # ifdef HEADER_CONF_H GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf); GENERAL_NAME *v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(GENERAL_NAME *out, const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF_VALUE *cnf, int is_nc); void X509V3_conf_free(CONF_VALUE *val); X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid, const char *value); X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *value); int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **sk); int X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509 *cert); int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_REQ *req); int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(CONF *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_CRL *crl); X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int ext_nid, const char *value); X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *value); int X509V3_EXT_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509 *cert); int X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_REQ *req); int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_conf(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section, X509_CRL *crl); int X509V3_add_value_bool_nf(const char *name, int asn1_bool, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); int X509V3_get_value_bool(const CONF_VALUE *value, int *asn1_bool); int X509V3_get_value_int(const CONF_VALUE *value, ASN1_INTEGER **aint); void X509V3_set_nconf(X509V3_CTX *ctx, CONF *conf); void X509V3_set_conf_lhash(X509V3_CTX *ctx, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *lhash); # endif char *X509V3_get_string(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *name, const char *section); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_get_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, const char *section); void X509V3_string_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str); void X509V3_section_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section); void X509V3_set_ctx(X509V3_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer, X509 *subject, X509_REQ *req, X509_CRL *crl, int flags); int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); int X509V3_add_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); int X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); int X509V3_add_value_int(const char *name, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); char *i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint); ASN1_INTEGER *s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, const char *value); char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *aint); char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *aint); int X509V3_EXT_add(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext); int X509V3_EXT_add_list(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *extlist); int X509V3_EXT_add_alias(int nid_to, int nid_from); void X509V3_EXT_cleanup(void); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get(X509_EXTENSION *ext); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *X509V3_EXT_get_nid(int nid); int X509V3_add_standard_extensions(void); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_parse_list(const char *line); void *X509V3_EXT_d2i(X509_EXTENSION *ext); void *X509V3_get_d2i(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_i2d(int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc); int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* The new declarations are in crypto.h, but the old ones were here. */ # define hex_to_string OPENSSL_buf2hexstr # define string_to_hex OPENSSL_hexstr2buf #endif void X509V3_EXT_val_prn(BIO *out, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *val, int indent, int ml); int X509V3_EXT_print(BIO *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, unsigned long flag, int indent); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int X509V3_EXT_print_fp(FILE *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, int flag, int indent); #endif int X509V3_extensions_print(BIO *out, const char *title, const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts, unsigned long flag, int indent); int X509_check_ca(X509 *x); int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca); int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex); int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose); int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject); int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid); void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x); void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l); long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x); uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x); uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x); uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x); const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x); int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void); X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx); int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname); int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int id); int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), const char *name, const char *sname, void *arg); char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp); char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp); int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp); void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void); int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *); STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_email(X509 *x); STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_REQ_get1_email(X509_REQ *x); void X509_email_free(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk); STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_ocsp(X509 *x); /* Flags for X509_check_* functions */ /* * Always check subject name for host match even if subject alt names present */ # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT 0x1 /* Disable wildcard matching for dnsName fields and common name. */ # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS 0x2 /* Wildcards must not match a partial label. */ # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0x4 /* Allow (non-partial) wildcards to match multiple labels. */ # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS 0x8 /* Constraint verifier subdomain patterns to match a single labels. */ # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0x10 /* Never check the subject CN */ # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT 0x20 /* * Match reference identifiers starting with "." to any sub-domain. * This is a non-public flag, turned on implicitly when the subject * reference identity is a DNS name. */ # define _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS 0x8000 int X509_check_host(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags, char **peername); int X509_check_email(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags); int X509_check_ip(X509 *x, const unsigned char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags); int X509_check_ip_asc(X509 *x, const char *ipasc, unsigned int flags); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS(const char *ipasc); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc); int X509V3_NAME_from_section(X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, unsigned long chtype); void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent); DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 typedef struct ASRange_st { ASN1_INTEGER *min, *max; } ASRange; # define ASIdOrRange_id 0 # define ASIdOrRange_range 1 typedef struct ASIdOrRange_st { int type; union { ASN1_INTEGER *id; ASRange *range; } u; } ASIdOrRange; typedef STACK_OF(ASIdOrRange) ASIdOrRanges; DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASIdOrRange) # define ASIdentifierChoice_inherit 0 # define ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges 1 typedef struct ASIdentifierChoice_st { int type; union { ASN1_NULL *inherit; ASIdOrRanges *asIdsOrRanges; } u; } ASIdentifierChoice; typedef struct ASIdentifiers_st { ASIdentifierChoice *asnum, *rdi; } ASIdentifiers; DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASRange) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdOrRange) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifierChoice) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASIdentifiers) typedef struct IPAddressRange_st { ASN1_BIT_STRING *min, *max; } IPAddressRange; # define IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix 0 # define IPAddressOrRange_addressRange 1 typedef struct IPAddressOrRange_st { int type; union { ASN1_BIT_STRING *addressPrefix; IPAddressRange *addressRange; } u; } IPAddressOrRange; typedef STACK_OF(IPAddressOrRange) IPAddressOrRanges; DEFINE_STACK_OF(IPAddressOrRange) # define IPAddressChoice_inherit 0 # define IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges 1 typedef struct IPAddressChoice_st { int type; union { ASN1_NULL *inherit; IPAddressOrRanges *addressesOrRanges; } u; } IPAddressChoice; typedef struct IPAddressFamily_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *addressFamily; IPAddressChoice *ipAddressChoice; } IPAddressFamily; typedef STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) IPAddrBlocks; DEFINE_STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressRange) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressOrRange) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressChoice) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(IPAddressFamily) /* * API tag for elements of the ASIdentifer SEQUENCE. */ # define V3_ASID_ASNUM 0 # define V3_ASID_RDI 1 /* * AFI values, assigned by IANA. It'd be nice to make the AFI * handling code totally generic, but there are too many little things * that would need to be defined for other address families for it to * be worth the trouble. */ # define IANA_AFI_IPV4 1 # define IANA_AFI_IPV6 2 /* * Utilities to construct and extract values from RFC3779 extensions, * since some of the encodings (particularly for IP address prefixes * and ranges) are a bit tedious to work with directly. */ int X509v3_asid_add_inherit(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which); int X509v3_asid_add_id_or_range(ASIdentifiers *asid, int which, ASN1_INTEGER *min, ASN1_INTEGER *max); int X509v3_addr_add_inherit(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi); int X509v3_addr_add_prefix(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi, unsigned char *a, const int prefixlen); int X509v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr, const unsigned afi, const unsigned *safi, unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max); unsigned X509v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f); int X509v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor, const unsigned afi, unsigned char *min, unsigned char *max, const int length); /* * Canonical forms. */ int X509v3_asid_is_canonical(ASIdentifiers *asid); int X509v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr); int X509v3_asid_canonize(ASIdentifiers *asid); int X509v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr); /* * Tests for inheritance and containment. */ int X509v3_asid_inherits(ASIdentifiers *asid); int X509v3_addr_inherits(IPAddrBlocks *addr); int X509v3_asid_subset(ASIdentifiers *a, ASIdentifiers *b); int X509v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b); /* * Check whether RFC 3779 extensions nest properly in chains. */ int X509v3_asid_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *); int X509v3_addr_validate_path(X509_STORE_CTX *); int X509v3_asid_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain, ASIdentifiers *ext, int allow_inheritance); int X509v3_addr_validate_resource_set(STACK_OF(X509) *chain, IPAddrBlocks *ext, int allow_inheritance); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 */ /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void); /* Error codes for the X509V3 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define X509V3_F_A2I_GENERAL_NAME 164 # define X509V3_F_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL 166 # define X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE 161 # define X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_IS_CANONICAL 162 # define X509V3_F_COPY_EMAIL 122 # define X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER 123 # define X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME 144 # define X509V3_F_DO_EXT_I2D 135 # define X509V3_F_DO_EXT_NCONF 151 # define X509V3_F_GNAMES_FROM_SECTNAME 156 # define X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_ENUMERATED 121 # define X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_IA5STRING 149 # define X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_INTEGER 120 # define X509V3_F_I2V_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS 138 # define X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION 132 # define X509V3_F_NREF_NOS 133 # define X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION 131 # define X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE 150 # define X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL 130 # define X509V3_F_R2I_PCI 155 # define X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_IA5STRING 100 # define X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER 108 # define X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 112 # define X509V3_F_S2I_SKEY_ID 115 # define X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME 158 # define X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ASC 125 # define X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_INTEGER 126 # define X509V3_F_SXNET_ADD_ID_ULONG 127 # define X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ASC 128 # define X509V3_F_SXNET_GET_ID_ULONG 129 # define X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS 163 # define X509V3_F_V2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING 101 # define X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS 139 # define X509V3_F_V2I_AUTHORITY_KEYID 119 # define X509V3_F_V2I_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 102 # define X509V3_F_V2I_CRLD 134 # define X509V3_F_V2I_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE 103 # define X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAMES 118 # define X509V3_F_V2I_GENERAL_NAME_EX 117 # define X509V3_F_V2I_IDP 157 # define X509V3_F_V2I_IPADDRBLOCKS 159 # define X509V3_F_V2I_ISSUER_ALT 153 # define X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS 147 # define X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS 146 # define X509V3_F_V2I_POLICY_MAPPINGS 145 # define X509V3_F_V2I_SUBJECT_ALT 154 # define X509V3_F_V2I_TLS_FEATURE 165 # define X509V3_F_V3_GENERIC_EXTENSION 116 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D 140 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD_VALUE 105 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD 104 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_ADD_ALIAS 106 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_I2D 136 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_EXT_NCONF 152 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_SECTION 142 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_STRING 143 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_VALUE_BOOL 110 # define X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST 109 # define X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD 137 # define X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET 141 /* Reason codes. */ # define X509V3_R_BAD_IP_ADDRESS 118 # define X509V3_R_BAD_OBJECT 119 # define X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR 100 # define X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR 101 # define X509V3_R_DIRNAME_ERROR 149 # define X509V3_R_DISTPOINT_ALREADY_SET 160 # define X509V3_R_DUPLICATE_ZONE_ID 133 # define X509V3_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_ZONE 131 # define X509V3_R_ERROR_CREATING_EXTENSION 144 # define X509V3_R_ERROR_IN_EXTENSION 128 # define X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME 137 # define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_EXISTS 145 # define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NAME_ERROR 115 # define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND 102 # define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_SETTING_NOT_SUPPORTED 103 # define X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR 116 # define X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION 151 # define X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG 152 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER 162 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE 163 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING 104 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_EXTENSION_STRING 105 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_INHERITANCE 165 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_IPADDRESS 166 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS 161 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_NAME 106 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT 107 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME 108 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE 109 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER 140 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS 141 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER 110 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION 138 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER 134 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING 153 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 146 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_SAFI 164 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION 135 # define X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX 143 # define X509V3_R_ISSUER_DECODE_ERROR 126 # define X509V3_R_MISSING_VALUE 124 # define X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS 142 # define X509V3_R_NO_CONFIG_DATABASE 136 # define X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE 121 # define X509V3_R_NO_ISSUER_DETAILS 127 # define X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER 139 # define X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED 154 # define X509V3_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY 114 # define X509V3_R_NO_SUBJECT_DETAILS 125 # define X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED 148 # define X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR 147 # define X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED 155 # define X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH 156 # define X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED 157 # define X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY 159 # define X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND 150 # define X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_DETAILS 122 # define X509V3_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_KEYID 123 # define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_BIT_STRING_ARGUMENT 111 # define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION 129 # define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION_NAME 130 # define X509V3_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION 120 # define X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION 117 # define X509V3_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE 167 # define X509V3_R_USER_TOO_LONG 132 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/crypto.h0000644000000000000000000004314313176625661016662 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_CRYPTO_H # define HEADER_CRYPTO_H # include # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # include # endif # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC # include # endif /* * Resolve problems on some operating systems with symbol names that clash * one way or another */ # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define SSLeay OpenSSL_version_num # define SSLeay_version OpenSSL_version # define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER # define SSLEAY_VERSION OPENSSL_VERSION # define SSLEAY_CFLAGS OPENSSL_CFLAGS # define SSLEAY_BUILT_ON OPENSSL_BUILT_ON # define SSLEAY_PLATFORM OPENSSL_PLATFORM # define SSLEAY_DIR OPENSSL_DIR /* * Old type for allocating dynamic locks. No longer used. Use the new thread * API instead. */ typedef struct { int dummy; } CRYPTO_dynlock; # endif /* OPENSSL_API_COMPAT */ typedef void CRYPTO_RWLOCK; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void); int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); /* * The following can be used to detect memory leaks in the library. If * used, it turns on malloc checking */ # define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF 0x0 /* Control only */ # define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON 0x1 /* Control and mode bit */ # define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE 0x2 /* Control and mode bit */ # define CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE 0x3 /* Control only */ struct crypto_ex_data_st { STACK_OF(void) *sk; }; DEFINE_STACK_OF(void) /* * Per class, we have a STACK of function pointers. */ # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL 0 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX 1 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION 2 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509 3 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE 4 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX 5 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH 6 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA 7 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY 8 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA 9 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE 10 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI 11 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO 12 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP 13 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT 14 /* * This is the default callbacks, but we can have others as well: this is * needed in Win32 where the application malloc and the library malloc may * not be the same. */ #define OPENSSL_malloc_init() \ CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(CRYPTO_malloc, CRYPTO_realloc, CRYPTO_free) int CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(int mode); # define OPENSSL_malloc(num) \ CRYPTO_malloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_zalloc(num) \ CRYPTO_zalloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_realloc(addr, num) \ CRYPTO_realloc(addr, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_clear_realloc(addr, old_num, num) \ CRYPTO_clear_realloc(addr, old_num, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_clear_free(addr, num) \ CRYPTO_clear_free(addr, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_free(addr) \ CRYPTO_free(addr, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_memdup(str, s) \ CRYPTO_memdup((str), s, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_strdup(str) \ CRYPTO_strdup(str, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_strndup(str, n) \ CRYPTO_strndup(str, n, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_secure_malloc(num) \ CRYPTO_secure_malloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(num) \ CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_secure_free(addr) \ CRYPTO_secure_free(addr, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(addr, num) \ CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(addr, num, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_secure_actual_size(ptr) \ CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(ptr) size_t OPENSSL_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); size_t OPENSSL_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); size_t OPENSSL_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen); char *OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(const unsigned char *buffer, long len); unsigned char *OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(const char *str, long *len); int OPENSSL_hexchar2int(unsigned char c); # define OPENSSL_MALLOC_MAX_NELEMS(type) (((1U<<(sizeof(int)*8-1))-1)/sizeof(type)) unsigned long OpenSSL_version_num(void); const char *OpenSSL_version(int type); # define OPENSSL_VERSION 0 # define OPENSSL_CFLAGS 1 # define OPENSSL_BUILT_ON 2 # define OPENSSL_PLATFORM 3 # define OPENSSL_DIR 4 # define OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR 5 int OPENSSL_issetugid(void); typedef void CRYPTO_EX_new (void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp); typedef void CRYPTO_EX_free (void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp); typedef int CRYPTO_EX_dup (CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp); __owur int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); /* No longer use an index. */ int CRYPTO_free_ex_index(int class_index, int idx); /* * Initialise/duplicate/free CRYPTO_EX_DATA variables corresponding to a * given class (invokes whatever per-class callbacks are applicable) */ int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad); int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from); void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad); /* * Get/set data in a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable corresponding to a particular * index (relative to the class type involved) */ int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, void *val); void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * This function cleans up all "ex_data" state. It mustn't be called under * potential race-conditions. */ # define CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() while(0) continue /* * The old locking functions have been removed completely without compatibility * macros. This is because the old functions either could not properly report * errors, or the returned error values were not clearly documented. * Replacing the locking functions with with no-ops would cause race condition * issues in the affected applications. It is far better for them to fail at * compile time. * On the other hand, the locking callbacks are no longer used. Consequently, * the callback management functions can be safely replaced with no-op macros. */ # define CRYPTO_num_locks() (1) # define CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(func) # define CRYPTO_get_locking_callback() (NULL) # define CRYPTO_set_add_lock_callback(func) # define CRYPTO_get_add_lock_callback() (NULL) /* * These defines where used in combination with the old locking callbacks, * they are not called anymore, but old code that's not called might still * use them. */ # define CRYPTO_LOCK 1 # define CRYPTO_UNLOCK 2 # define CRYPTO_READ 4 # define CRYPTO_WRITE 8 /* This structure is no longer used */ typedef struct crypto_threadid_st { int dummy; } CRYPTO_THREADID; /* Only use CRYPTO_THREADID_set_[numeric|pointer]() within callbacks */ # define CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, val) # define CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(id, ptr) # define CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(threadid_func) (0) # define CRYPTO_THREADID_get_callback() (NULL) # define CRYPTO_THREADID_current(id) # define CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(a, b) (-1) # define CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(dest, src) # define CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(id) (0UL) # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L # define CRYPTO_set_id_callback(func) # define CRYPTO_get_id_callback() (NULL) # define CRYPTO_thread_id() (0UL) # endif /* OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L */ # define CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(dyn_create_function) # define CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(dyn_lock_function) # define CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(dyn_destroy_function) # define CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback() (NULL) # define CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback() (NULL) # define CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback() (NULL) # endif /* OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L */ int CRYPTO_set_mem_functions( void *(*m) (size_t, const char *, int), void *(*r) (void *, size_t, const char *, int), void (*f) (void *, const char *, int)); int CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(int flag); void CRYPTO_get_mem_functions( void *(**m) (size_t, const char *, int), void *(**r) (void *, size_t, const char *, int), void (**f) (void *, const char *, int)); void *CRYPTO_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line); void *CRYPTO_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line); void *CRYPTO_memdup(const void *str, size_t siz, const char *file, int line); char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char *file, int line); char *CRYPTO_strndup(const char *str, size_t s, const char *file, int line); void CRYPTO_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line); void CRYPTO_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, const char *file, int line); void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *addr, size_t num, const char *file, int line); void *CRYPTO_clear_realloc(void *addr, size_t old_num, size_t num, const char *file, int line); int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t sz, int minsize); int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done(void); void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line); void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line); void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line); void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, const char *file, int line); int CRYPTO_secure_allocated(const void *ptr); int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized(void); size_t CRYPTO_secure_actual_size(void *ptr); size_t CRYPTO_secure_used(void); void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG # define OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(info) \ CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(info, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) # define OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop() \ CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop() int CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(const char *info, const char *file, int line); int CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop(void); /*- * Debugging functions (enabled by CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1)) * The flag argument has the following significance: * 0: called before the actual memory allocation has taken place * 1: called after the actual memory allocation has taken place */ void CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(void *addr, size_t num, int flag, const char *file, int line); void CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(void *addr1, void *addr2, size_t num, int flag, const char *file, int line); void CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(void *addr, int flag, const char *file, int line); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *); # endif int CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *bio); # endif /* die if we have to */ ossl_noreturn void OPENSSL_die(const char *assertion, const char *file, int line); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define OpenSSLDie(f,l,a) OPENSSL_die((a),(f),(l)) # endif # define OPENSSL_assert(e) \ (void)((e) ? 0 : (OPENSSL_die("assertion failed: " #e, OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE), 1)) int OPENSSL_isservice(void); int FIPS_mode(void); int FIPS_mode_set(int r); void OPENSSL_init(void); struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result); int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *pday, int *psec, const struct tm *from, const struct tm *to); /* * CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. * It takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the * contents of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements * into a defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other * than to be non-zero. */ int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void * volatile in_a, const volatile void * volatile in_b, size_t len); /* Standard initialisation options */ # define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS 0x00000001L # define OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS 0x00000002L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS 0x00000004L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS 0x00000008L # define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS 0x00000010L # define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS 0x00000020L # define OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG 0x00000040L # define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG 0x00000080L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC 0x00000100L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND 0x00000200L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC 0x00000400L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL 0x00000800L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV 0x00001000L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI 0x00002000L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK 0x00004000L # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG 0x00008000L /* OPENSSL_INIT flag 0x00010000 reserved for internal use */ /* OPENSSL_INIT flag range 0xfff00000 reserved for OPENSSL_init_ssl() */ /* Max OPENSSL_INIT flag value is 0x80000000 */ /* openssl and dasync not counted as builtin */ # define OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN \ (OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC \ | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV | OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI | \ OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK) /* Library initialisation functions */ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void); int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings); int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void)); void OPENSSL_thread_stop(void); /* Low-level control of initialization */ OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_INIT_new(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings, const char *config_file); # endif void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings); # if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) # if defined(_WIN32) # if defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H) /* application has to include in order to use this */ typedef DWORD CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL; typedef DWORD CRYPTO_THREAD_ID; typedef LONG CRYPTO_ONCE; # define CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT 0 # endif # else # include typedef pthread_once_t CRYPTO_ONCE; typedef pthread_key_t CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL; typedef pthread_t CRYPTO_THREAD_ID; # define CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT # endif # endif # if !defined(CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT) typedef unsigned int CRYPTO_ONCE; typedef unsigned int CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL; typedef unsigned int CRYPTO_THREAD_ID; # define CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT 0 # endif int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void)); int CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void (*cleanup)(void *)); void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key); int CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key, void *val); int CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key); CRYPTO_THREAD_ID CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(void); int CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(CRYPTO_THREAD_ID a, CRYPTO_THREAD_ID b); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void); /* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA 110 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA 111 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX 100 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_MEMDUP 115 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA 112 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA 102 # define CRYPTO_F_FIPS_MODE_SET 109 # define CRYPTO_F_GET_AND_LOCK 113 # define CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_BUF2HEXSTR 117 # define CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_HEXSTR2BUF 118 # define CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO 116 /* Reason codes. */ # define CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED 101 # define CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT 102 # define CRYPTO_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS 103 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/hmac.h0000644000000000000000000000302113176625661016241 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_HMAC_H # define HEADER_HMAC_H # include # include # define HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK 128/* largest known is SHA512 */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *e); HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void); int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx); void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx); DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, const EVP_MD *md)) /*__owur*/ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl); /*__owur*/ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len); /*__owur*/ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len, const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *md_len); __owur int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx); void HMAC_CTX_set_flags(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/engine.h0000644000000000000000000011524013176625661016605 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_ENGINE_H # define HEADER_ENGINE_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # endif # include # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif /* * These flags are used to control combinations of algorithm (methods) by * bitwise "OR"ing. */ # define ENGINE_METHOD_RSA (unsigned int)0x0001 # define ENGINE_METHOD_DSA (unsigned int)0x0002 # define ENGINE_METHOD_DH (unsigned int)0x0004 # define ENGINE_METHOD_RAND (unsigned int)0x0008 # define ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS (unsigned int)0x0040 # define ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS (unsigned int)0x0080 # define ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS (unsigned int)0x0200 # define ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS (unsigned int)0x0400 # define ENGINE_METHOD_EC (unsigned int)0x0800 /* Obvious all-or-nothing cases. */ # define ENGINE_METHOD_ALL (unsigned int)0xFFFF # define ENGINE_METHOD_NONE (unsigned int)0x0000 /* * This(ese) flag(s) controls behaviour of the ENGINE_TABLE mechanism used * internally to control registration of ENGINE implementations, and can be * set by ENGINE_set_table_flags(). The "NOINIT" flag prevents attempts to * initialise registered ENGINEs if they are not already initialised. */ # define ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT (unsigned int)0x0001 /* ENGINE flags that can be set by ENGINE_set_flags(). */ /* Not used */ /* #define ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED 0x0001 */ /* * This flag is for ENGINEs that wish to handle the various 'CMD'-related * control commands on their own. Without this flag, ENGINE_ctrl() handles * these control commands on behalf of the ENGINE using their "cmd_defns" * data. */ # define ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL (int)0x0002 /* * This flag is for ENGINEs who return new duplicate structures when found * via "ENGINE_by_id()". When an ENGINE must store state (eg. if * ENGINE_ctrl() commands are called in sequence as part of some stateful * process like key-generation setup and execution), it can set this flag - * then each attempt to obtain the ENGINE will result in it being copied into * a new structure. Normally, ENGINEs don't declare this flag so * ENGINE_by_id() just increments the existing ENGINE's structural reference * count. */ # define ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY (int)0x0004 /* * This flag if for an ENGINE that does not want its methods registered as * part of ENGINE_register_all_complete() for example if the methods are not * usable as default methods. */ # define ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL (int)0x0008 /* * ENGINEs can support their own command types, and these flags are used in * ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS to indicate to the caller what kind of input * each command expects. Currently only numeric and string input is * supported. If a control command supports none of the _NUMERIC, _STRING, or * _NO_INPUT options, then it is regarded as an "internal" control command - * and not for use in config setting situations. As such, they're not * available to the ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() function, only raw ENGINE_ctrl() * access. Changes to this list of 'command types' should be reflected * carefully in ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() and ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). */ /* accepts a 'long' input value (3rd parameter to ENGINE_ctrl) */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC (unsigned int)0x0001 /* * accepts string input (cast from 'void*' to 'const char *', 4th parameter * to ENGINE_ctrl) */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING (unsigned int)0x0002 /* * Indicates that the control command takes *no* input. Ie. the control * command is unparameterised. */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT (unsigned int)0x0004 /* * Indicates that the control command is internal. This control command won't * be shown in any output, and is only usable through the ENGINE_ctrl_cmd() * function. */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL (unsigned int)0x0008 /* * NB: These 3 control commands are deprecated and should not be used. * ENGINEs relying on these commands should compile conditional support for * compatibility (eg. if these symbols are defined) but should also migrate * the same functionality to their own ENGINE-specific control functions that * can be "discovered" by calling applications. The fact these control * commands wouldn't be "executable" (ie. usable by text-based config) * doesn't change the fact that application code can find and use them * without requiring per-ENGINE hacking. */ /* * These flags are used to tell the ctrl function what should be done. All * command numbers are shared between all engines, even if some don't make * sense to some engines. In such a case, they do nothing but return the * error ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM 1 # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_PASSWORD_CALLBACK 2 # define ENGINE_CTRL_HUP 3/* Close and reinitialise * any handles/connections * etc. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_USER_INTERFACE 4/* Alternative to callback */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK_DATA 5/* User-specific data, used * when calling the password * callback and the user * interface */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_LOAD_CONFIGURATION 6/* Load a configuration, * given a string that * represents a file name * or so */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_LOAD_SECTION 7/* Load data from a given * section in the already * loaded configuration */ /* * These control commands allow an application to deal with an arbitrary * engine in a dynamic way. Warn: Negative return values indicate errors FOR * THESE COMMANDS because zero is used to indicate 'end-of-list'. Other * commands, including ENGINE-specific command types, return zero for an * error. An ENGINE can choose to implement these ctrl functions, and can * internally manage things however it chooses - it does so by setting the * ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag (using ENGINE_set_flags()). Otherwise * the ENGINE_ctrl() code handles this on the ENGINE's behalf using the * cmd_defns data (set using ENGINE_set_cmd_defns()). This means an ENGINE's * ctrl() handler need only implement its own commands - the above "meta" * commands will be taken care of. */ /* * Returns non-zero if the supplied ENGINE has a ctrl() handler. If "not", * then all the remaining control commands will return failure, so it is * worth checking this first if the caller is trying to "discover" the * engine's capabilities and doesn't want errors generated unnecessarily. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION 10 /* * Returns a positive command number for the first command supported by the * engine. Returns zero if no ctrl commands are supported. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE 11 /* * The 'long' argument specifies a command implemented by the engine, and the * return value is the next command supported, or zero if there are no more. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE 12 /* * The 'void*' argument is a command name (cast from 'const char *'), and the * return value is the command that corresponds to it. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME 13 /* * The next two allow a command to be converted into its corresponding string * form. In each case, the 'long' argument supplies the command. In the * NAME_LEN case, the return value is the length of the command name (not * counting a trailing EOL). In the NAME case, the 'void*' argument must be a * string buffer large enough, and it will be populated with the name of the * command (WITH a trailing EOL). */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD 14 # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD 15 /* The next two are similar but give a "short description" of a command. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD 16 # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD 17 /* * With this command, the return value is the OR'd combination of * ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_*** values that indicate what kind of input a given * engine-specific ctrl command expects. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS 18 /* * ENGINE implementations should start the numbering of their own control * commands from this value. (ie. ENGINE_CMD_BASE, ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1, etc). */ # define ENGINE_CMD_BASE 200 /* * NB: These 2 nCipher "chil" control commands are deprecated, and their * functionality is now available through ENGINE-specific control commands * (exposed through the above-mentioned 'CMD'-handling). Code using these 2 * commands should be migrated to the more general command handling before * these are removed. */ /* Flags specific to the nCipher "chil" engine */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK 100 /* * Depending on the value of the (long)i argument, this sets or * unsets the SimpleForkCheck flag in the CHIL API to enable or * disable checking and workarounds for applications that fork(). */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING 101 /* * This prevents the initialisation function from providing mutex * callbacks to the nCipher library. */ /* * If an ENGINE supports its own specific control commands and wishes the * framework to handle the above 'ENGINE_CMD_***'-manipulation commands on * its behalf, it should supply a null-terminated array of ENGINE_CMD_DEFN * entries to ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(). It should also implement a ctrl() * handler that supports the stated commands (ie. the "cmd_num" entries as * described by the array). NB: The array must be ordered in increasing order * of cmd_num. "null-terminated" means that the last ENGINE_CMD_DEFN element * has cmd_num set to zero and/or cmd_name set to NULL. */ typedef struct ENGINE_CMD_DEFN_st { unsigned int cmd_num; /* The command number */ const char *cmd_name; /* The command name itself */ const char *cmd_desc; /* A short description of the command */ unsigned int cmd_flags; /* The input the command expects */ } ENGINE_CMD_DEFN; /* Generic function pointer */ typedef int (*ENGINE_GEN_FUNC_PTR) (void); /* Generic function pointer taking no arguments */ typedef int (*ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR) (ENGINE *); /* Specific control function pointer */ typedef int (*ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR) (ENGINE *, int, long, void *, void (*f) (void)); /* Generic load_key function pointer */ typedef EVP_PKEY *(*ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR)(ENGINE *, const char *, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); typedef int (*ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR) (ENGINE *, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); /*- * These callback types are for an ENGINE's handler for cipher and digest logic. * These handlers have these prototypes; * int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid); * int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid); * Looking at how to implement these handlers in the case of cipher support, if * the framework wants the EVP_CIPHER for 'nid', it will call; * foo(e, &p_evp_cipher, NULL, nid); (return zero for failure) * If the framework wants a list of supported 'nid's, it will call; * foo(e, NULL, &p_nids, 0); (returns number of 'nids' or -1 for error) */ /* * Returns to a pointer to the array of supported cipher 'nid's. If the * second parameter is non-NULL it is set to the size of the returned array. */ typedef int (*ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR) (ENGINE *, const EVP_CIPHER **, const int **, int); typedef int (*ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR) (ENGINE *, const EVP_MD **, const int **, int); typedef int (*ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR) (ENGINE *, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **, const int **, int); typedef int (*ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR) (ENGINE *, EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD **, const int **, int); /* * STRUCTURE functions ... all of these functions deal with pointers to * ENGINE structures where the pointers have a "structural reference". This * means that their reference is to allowed access to the structure but it * does not imply that the structure is functional. To simply increment or * decrement the structural reference count, use ENGINE_by_id and * ENGINE_free. NB: This is not required when iterating using ENGINE_get_next * as it will automatically decrement the structural reference count of the * "current" ENGINE and increment the structural reference count of the * ENGINE it returns (unless it is NULL). */ /* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void); /* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e); /* Add another "ENGINE" type into the array. */ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e); /* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */ int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e); /* Retrieve an engine from the list by its unique "id" value. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define ENGINE_load_openssl() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_dynamic() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC, NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE # define ENGINE_load_padlock() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_capi() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_afalg() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG, NULL) # endif # define ENGINE_load_cryptodev() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_rdrand() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND, NULL) #endif void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); /* * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation * "registry" handling. */ unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void); void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags); /*- Manage registration of ENGINEs per "table". For each type, there are 3 * functions; * ENGINE_register_***(e) - registers the implementation from 'e' (if it has one) * ENGINE_unregister_***(e) - unregister the implementation from 'e' * ENGINE_register_all_***() - call ENGINE_register_***() for each 'e' in the list * Cleanup is automatically registered from each table when required. */ int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void); int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void); int ENGINE_register_EC(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_EC(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_EC(void); int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void); int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void); int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void); int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void); int ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_meths(void); int ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void); /* * These functions register all support from the above categories. Note, use * of these functions can result in static linkage of code your application * may not need. If you only need a subset of functionality, consider using * more selective initialisation. */ int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void); /* * Send parametrised control commands to the engine. The possibilities to * send down an integer, a pointer to data or a function pointer are * provided. Any of the parameters may or may not be NULL, depending on the * command number. In actuality, this function only requires a structural * (rather than functional) reference to an engine, but many control commands * may require the engine be functional. The caller should be aware of trying * commands that require an operational ENGINE, and only use functional * references in such situations. */ int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); /* * This function tests if an ENGINE-specific command is usable as a * "setting". Eg. in an application's config file that gets processed through * ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). If this returns zero, it is not available to * ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(), only ENGINE_ctrl(). */ int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd); /* * This function works like ENGINE_ctrl() with the exception of taking a * command name instead of a command number, and can handle optional * commands. See the comment on ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() for an explanation * on how to use the cmd_name and cmd_optional. */ int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void), int cmd_optional); /* * This function passes a command-name and argument to an ENGINE. The * cmd_name is converted to a command number and the control command is * called using 'arg' as an argument (unless the ENGINE doesn't support such * a command, in which case no control command is called). The command is * checked for input flags, and if necessary the argument will be converted * to a numeric value. If cmd_optional is non-zero, then if the ENGINE * doesn't support the given cmd_name the return value will be success * anyway. This function is intended for applications to use so that users * (or config files) can supply engine-specific config data to the ENGINE at * run-time to control behaviour of specific engines. As such, it shouldn't * be used for calling ENGINE_ctrl() functions that return data, deal with * binary data, or that are otherwise supposed to be used directly through * ENGINE_ctrl() in application code. Any "return" data from an ENGINE_ctrl() * operation in this function will be lost - the return value is interpreted * as failure if the return value is zero, success otherwise, and this * function returns a boolean value as a result. In other words, vendors of * 'ENGINE'-enabled devices should write ENGINE implementations with * parameterisations that work in this scheme, so that compliant ENGINE-based * applications can work consistently with the same configuration for the * same ENGINE-enabled devices, across applications. */ int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg, int cmd_optional); /* * These functions are useful for manufacturing new ENGINE structures. They * don't address reference counting at all - one uses them to populate an * ENGINE structure with personalised implementations of things prior to * using it directly or adding it to the builtin ENGINE list in OpenSSL. * These are also here so that the ENGINE structure doesn't have to be * exposed and break binary compatibility! */ ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void); int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id); int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name); int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_EC(ENGINE *e, const EC_KEY_METHOD *ecdsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth); int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth); int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f); int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f); int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f); int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f); int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f); int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f); int ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR loadssl_f); int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags); int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns); /* These functions allow control over any per-structure ENGINE data. */ #define ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg); void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * This function previously cleaned up anything that needs it. Auto-deinit will * now take care of it so it is no longer required to call this function. */ # define ENGINE_cleanup() while(0) continue #endif /* * These return values from within the ENGINE structure. These can be useful * with functional references as well as structural references - it depends * which you obtained. Using the result for functional purposes if you only * obtained a structural reference may be problematic! */ const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e); const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e); const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e); const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e); const EC_KEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_EC(const ENGINE *e); const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e); const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(const ENGINE *e); const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(ENGINE *e, const char *str, int len); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len); const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e); /* * FUNCTIONAL functions. These functions deal with ENGINE structures that * have (or will) be initialised for use. Broadly speaking, the structural * functions are useful for iterating the list of available engine types, * creating new engine types, and other "list" operations. These functions * actually deal with ENGINEs that are to be used. As such these functions * can fail (if applicable) when particular engines are unavailable - eg. if * a hardware accelerator is not attached or not functioning correctly. Each * ENGINE has 2 reference counts; structural and functional. Every time a * functional reference is obtained or released, a corresponding structural * reference is automatically obtained or released too. */ /* * Initialise a engine type for use (or up its reference count if it's * already in use). This will fail if the engine is not currently operational * and cannot initialise. */ int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e); /* * Free a functional reference to a engine type. This does not require a * corresponding call to ENGINE_free as it also releases a structural * reference. */ int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e); /* * The following functions handle keys that are stored in some secondary * location, handled by the engine. The storage may be on a card or * whatever. */ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); int ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(ENGINE *e, SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **ppkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); /* * This returns a pointer for the current ENGINE structure that is (by * default) performing any RSA operations. The value returned is an * incremented reference, so it should be free'd (ENGINE_finish) before it is * discarded. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void); /* Same for the other "methods" */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_EC(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void); /* * These functions can be used to get a functional reference to perform * ciphering or digesting corresponding to "nid". */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(int nid); /* * This sets a new default ENGINE structure for performing RSA operations. If * the result is non-zero (success) then the ENGINE structure will have had * its reference count up'd so the caller should still free their own * reference 'e'. */ int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *def_list); /* Same for the other "methods" */ int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_EC(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e); /* * The combination "set" - the flags are bitwise "OR"d from the * ENGINE_METHOD_*** defines above. As with the "ENGINE_register_complete()" * function, this function can result in unnecessary static linkage. If your * application requires only specific functionality, consider using more * selective functions. */ int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags); void ENGINE_add_conf_module(void); /* Deprecated functions ... */ /* int ENGINE_clear_defaults(void); */ /**************************/ /* DYNAMIC ENGINE SUPPORT */ /**************************/ /* Binary/behaviour compatibility levels */ # define OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION (unsigned long)0x00030000 /* * Binary versions older than this are too old for us (whether we're a loader * or a loadee) */ # define OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST (unsigned long)0x00030000 /* * When compiling an ENGINE entirely as an external shared library, loadable * by the "dynamic" ENGINE, these types are needed. The 'dynamic_fns' * structure type provides the calling application's (or library's) error * functionality and memory management function pointers to the loaded * library. These should be used/set in the loaded library code so that the * loading application's 'state' will be used/changed in all operations. The * 'static_state' pointer allows the loaded library to know if it shares the * same static data as the calling application (or library), and thus whether * these callbacks need to be set or not. */ typedef void *(*dyn_MEM_malloc_fn) (size_t, const char *, int); typedef void *(*dyn_MEM_realloc_fn) (void *, size_t, const char *, int); typedef void (*dyn_MEM_free_fn) (void *, const char *, int); typedef struct st_dynamic_MEM_fns { dyn_MEM_malloc_fn malloc_fn; dyn_MEM_realloc_fn realloc_fn; dyn_MEM_free_fn free_fn; } dynamic_MEM_fns; /* * FIXME: Perhaps the memory and locking code (crypto.h) should declare and * use these types so we (and any other dependent code) can simplify a bit?? */ /* The top-level structure */ typedef struct st_dynamic_fns { void *static_state; dynamic_MEM_fns mem_fns; } dynamic_fns; /* * The version checking function should be of this prototype. NB: The * ossl_version value passed in is the OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION of the loading * code. If this function returns zero, it indicates a (potential) version * incompatibility and the loaded library doesn't believe it can proceed. * Otherwise, the returned value is the (latest) version supported by the * loading library. The loader may still decide that the loaded code's * version is unsatisfactory and could veto the load. The function is * expected to be implemented with the symbol name "v_check", and a default * implementation can be fully instantiated with * IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN(). */ typedef unsigned long (*dynamic_v_check_fn) (unsigned long ossl_version); # define IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() \ OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long v_check(unsigned long v); \ OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long v_check(unsigned long v) { \ if (v >= OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST) return OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION; \ return 0; } /* * This function is passed the ENGINE structure to initialise with its own * function and command settings. It should not adjust the structural or * functional reference counts. If this function returns zero, (a) the load * will be aborted, (b) the previous ENGINE state will be memcpy'd back onto * the structure, and (c) the shared library will be unloaded. So * implementations should do their own internal cleanup in failure * circumstances otherwise they could leak. The 'id' parameter, if non-NULL, * represents the ENGINE id that the loader is looking for. If this is NULL, * the shared library can choose to return failure or to initialise a * 'default' ENGINE. If non-NULL, the shared library must initialise only an * ENGINE matching the passed 'id'. The function is expected to be * implemented with the symbol name "bind_engine". A standard implementation * can be instantiated with IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(fn) where the parameter * 'fn' is a callback function that populates the ENGINE structure and * returns an int value (zero for failure). 'fn' should have prototype; * [static] int fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id); */ typedef int (*dynamic_bind_engine) (ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns); # define IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(fn) \ OPENSSL_EXPORT \ int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns); \ OPENSSL_EXPORT \ int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns) { \ if (ENGINE_get_static_state() == fns->static_state) goto skip_cbs; \ CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(fns->mem_fns.malloc_fn, \ fns->mem_fns.realloc_fn, \ fns->mem_fns.free_fn); \ skip_cbs: \ if (!fn(e, id)) return 0; \ return 1; } /* * If the loading application (or library) and the loaded ENGINE library * share the same static data (eg. they're both dynamically linked to the * same libcrypto.so) we need a way to avoid trying to set system callbacks - * this would fail, and for the same reason that it's unnecessary to try. If * the loaded ENGINE has (or gets from through the loader) its own copy of * the libcrypto static data, we will need to set the callbacks. The easiest * way to detect this is to have a function that returns a pointer to some * static data and let the loading application and loaded ENGINE compare * their respective values. */ void *ENGINE_get_static_state(void); # if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev(void)) # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_ENGINE_strings(void); /* Error codes for the ENGINE functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL 180 # define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX 181 # define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD 182 # define ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX 183 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD 105 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID 106 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CMD_IS_EXECUTABLE 170 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL 142 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD 178 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_CTRL_CMD_STRING 171 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_FINISH 107 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_CIPHER 185 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_DIGEST 186 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_FIRST 195 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_LAST 196 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT 115 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_ASN1_METH 193 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PKEY_METH 192 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV 116 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_INIT 119 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD 120 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE 121 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY 150 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY 151 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LOAD_SSL_CLIENT_CERT 194 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW 122 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_FIND_STR 197 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE 123 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_DEFAULT_STRING 189 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID 129 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME 130 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_TABLE_REGISTER 184 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UNLOCKED_FINISH 191 # define ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF 190 # define ENGINE_F_INT_CTRL_HELPER 172 # define ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_CONFIGURE 188 # define ENGINE_F_INT_ENGINE_MODULE_INIT 187 /* Reason codes. */ # define ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 # define ENGINE_R_ARGUMENT_IS_NOT_A_NUMBER 133 # define ENGINE_R_CMD_NOT_EXECUTABLE 134 # define ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_INPUT 135 # define ENGINE_R_COMMAND_TAKES_NO_INPUT 136 # define ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID 103 # define ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 119 # define ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE 104 # define ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND 132 # define ENGINE_R_ENGINES_SECTION_ERROR 148 # define ENGINE_R_ENGINE_CONFIGURATION_ERROR 102 # define ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST 105 # define ENGINE_R_ENGINE_SECTION_ERROR 149 # define ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY 128 # define ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY 129 # define ENGINE_R_FINISH_FAILED 106 # define ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING 108 # define ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED 109 # define ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR 110 # define ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT 143 # define ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NAME 137 # define ENGINE_R_INVALID_CMD_NUMBER 138 # define ENGINE_R_INVALID_INIT_VALUE 151 # define ENGINE_R_INVALID_STRING 150 # define ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED 117 # define ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED 112 # define ENGINE_R_NO_CONTROL_FUNCTION 120 # define ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX 144 # define ENGINE_R_NO_LOAD_FUNCTION 125 # define ENGINE_R_NO_REFERENCE 130 # define ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE 116 # define ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_CIPHER 146 # define ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_DIGEST 147 # define ENGINE_R_UNIMPLEMENTED_PUBLIC_KEY_METHOD 101 # define ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY 145 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/dsa.h0000644000000000000000000002677513176625661016125 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * The DSS routines are based on patches supplied by * Steven Schoch . */ #ifndef HEADER_DSA_H # define HEADER_DSA_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # include # include # include # include # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS # define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 # endif # define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024 # define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01 # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * Does nothing. Previously this switched off constant time behaviour. */ # define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x00 # endif /* * If this flag is set the DSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used in * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the * result is compliant. */ # define DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD 0x0400 /* * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the * usage is compliant. */ # define DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0400 # define DSA_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED 0x0800 /* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */ /* typedef struct dsa_st DSA; */ /* typedef struct dsa_method DSA_METHOD; */ typedef struct DSA_SIG_st DSA_SIG; # define d2i_DSAparams_fp(fp,x) (DSA *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DSA_new, \ (char *(*)())d2i_DSAparams,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x)) # define i2d_DSAparams_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DSAparams,(fp), \ (unsigned char *)(x)) # define d2i_DSAparams_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSAparams,bp,x) # define i2d_DSAparams_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA,i2d_DSAparams,bp,x) DSA *DSAparams_dup(DSA *x); DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void); void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a); int i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp); DSA_SIG *d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **v, const unsigned char **pp, long length); void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void); void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *); const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void); int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *); const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_method(DSA *d); DSA *DSA_new(void); DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); void DSA_free(DSA *r); /* "up" the DSA object's reference count */ int DSA_up_ref(DSA *r); int DSA_size(const DSA *); int DSA_bits(const DSA *d); int DSA_security_bits(const DSA *d); /* next 4 return -1 on error */ int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa); #define DSA_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg); void *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx); DSA *d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DSA *d2i_DSAparams(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); /* Deprecated version */ DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)) /* New version */ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); int DSA_generate_key(DSA *a); int i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); int i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); int i2d_DSAparams(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x); int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x); int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off); # endif # define DSS_prime_checks 50 /* * Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of * Rabin-Miller */ # define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \ BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* * Convert DSA structure (key or just parameters) into DH structure (be * careful to avoid small subgroup attacks when using this!) */ DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r); # endif # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(ctx, nbits) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS, nbits, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3) void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); void DSA_clear_flags(DSA *d, int flags); int DSA_test_flags(const DSA *d, int flags); void DSA_set_flags(DSA *d, int flags); ENGINE *DSA_get0_engine(DSA *d); DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags); void DSA_meth_free(DSA_METHOD *dsam); DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_dup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam); const char *DSA_meth_get0_name(const DSA_METHOD *dsam); int DSA_meth_set1_name(DSA_METHOD *dsam, const char *name); int DSA_meth_get_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam); int DSA_meth_set_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int flags); void *DSA_meth_get0_app_data(const DSA_METHOD *dsam); int DSA_meth_set0_app_data(DSA_METHOD *dsam, void *app_data); DSA_SIG *(*DSA_meth_get_sign(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_sign(DSA_METHOD *dsam, DSA_SIG *(*sign) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_sign_setup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **); int DSA_meth_set_sign_setup(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*sign_setup) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **)); int (*DSA_meth_get_verify(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (const unsigned char *, int , DSA_SIG *, DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_verify(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*verify) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *); int DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *); int DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_init(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))(DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_init(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*init)(DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_finish(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_finish(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*finish) (DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_paramgen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *); int DSA_meth_set_paramgen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*paramgen) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_keygen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_keygen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*keygen) (DSA *)); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_DSA_strings(void); /* Error codes for the DSA functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT 100 # define DSA_F_DSAPARAMS_PRINT_FP 101 # define DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN 125 # define DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_PARAMGEN2 126 # define DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN 112 # define DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY 113 # define DSA_F_DSA_METH_DUP 127 # define DSA_F_DSA_METH_NEW 128 # define DSA_F_DSA_METH_SET1_NAME 129 # define DSA_F_DSA_NEW_METHOD 103 # define DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE 119 # define DSA_F_DSA_PRINT_FP 105 # define DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE 115 # define DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE 116 # define DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE 117 # define DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE 118 # define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN 106 # define DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP 107 # define DSA_F_DSA_SIG_NEW 102 # define DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE 122 # define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_CTRL 120 # define DSA_F_PKEY_DSA_KEYGEN 121 /* Reason codes. */ # define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE 102 # define DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR 108 # define DSA_R_BN_ERROR 109 # define DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR 104 # define DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE 106 # define DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS 112 # define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 101 # define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 103 # define DSA_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET 107 # define DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR 105 # define DSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 113 # define DSA_R_SEED_LEN_SMALL 110 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/bio.h0000644000000000000000000011151713176625661016114 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_BIO_H # define HEADER_BIO_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # include # endif # include # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # include # endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* There are the classes of BIOs */ # define BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 0x0100 /* socket, fd, connect or accept */ # define BIO_TYPE_FILTER 0x0200 # define BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK 0x0400 /* These are the 'types' of BIOs */ # define BIO_TYPE_NONE 0 # define BIO_TYPE_MEM ( 1|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK) # define BIO_TYPE_FILE ( 2|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK) # define BIO_TYPE_FD ( 4|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) # define BIO_TYPE_SOCKET ( 5|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) # define BIO_TYPE_NULL ( 6|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK) # define BIO_TYPE_SSL ( 7|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_MD ( 8|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_BUFFER ( 9|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_CIPHER (10|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_BASE64 (11|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_CONNECT (12|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) # define BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT (13|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) # define BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST (16|BIO_TYPE_FILTER)/* server proxy BIO */ # define BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER (17|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_BIO (19|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK)/* half a BIO pair */ # define BIO_TYPE_LINEBUFFER (20|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM (21|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) # define BIO_TYPE_ASN1 (22|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # define BIO_TYPE_COMP (23|BIO_TYPE_FILTER) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP (24|BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK|BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) # endif #define BIO_TYPE_START 128 /* * BIO_FILENAME_READ|BIO_CLOSE to open or close on free. * BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE); */ # define BIO_NOCLOSE 0x00 # define BIO_CLOSE 0x01 /* * These are used in the following macros and are passed to BIO_ctrl() */ # define BIO_CTRL_RESET 1/* opt - rewind/zero etc */ # define BIO_CTRL_EOF 2/* opt - are we at the eof */ # define BIO_CTRL_INFO 3/* opt - extra tit-bits */ # define BIO_CTRL_SET 4/* man - set the 'IO' type */ # define BIO_CTRL_GET 5/* man - get the 'IO' type */ # define BIO_CTRL_PUSH 6/* opt - internal, used to signify change */ # define BIO_CTRL_POP 7/* opt - internal, used to signify change */ # define BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE 8/* man - set the 'close' on free */ # define BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE 9/* man - set the 'close' on free */ # define BIO_CTRL_PENDING 10/* opt - is their more data buffered */ # define BIO_CTRL_FLUSH 11/* opt - 'flush' buffered output */ # define BIO_CTRL_DUP 12/* man - extra stuff for 'duped' BIO */ # define BIO_CTRL_WPENDING 13/* opt - number of bytes still to write */ # define BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK 14/* opt - set callback function */ # define BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK 15/* opt - set callback function */ # define BIO_CTRL_SET_FILENAME 30/* BIO_s_file special */ /* dgram BIO stuff */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT 31/* BIO dgram special */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED 32/* allow for an externally connected * socket to be passed in */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT 33/* setsockopt, essentially */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT 34/* getsockopt, essentially */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT 35/* setsockopt, essentially */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT 36/* getsockopt, essentially */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP 37/* flag whether the last */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP 38/* I/O operation tiemd out */ /* #ifdef IP_MTU_DISCOVER */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER 39/* set DF bit on egress packets */ /* #endif */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU 40/* as kernel for current MTU */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU 47 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU 41/* get cached value for MTU */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU 42/* set cached value for MTU. * want to use this if asking * the kernel fails */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED 43/* check whether the MTU was * exceed in the previous write * operation */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER 46 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER 44/* Destination for the data */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT 45/* Next DTLS handshake timeout * to adjust socket timeouts */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG 48 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD 49 /* Deliberately outside of OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - used in bss_dgram.c */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE 50 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* SCTP stuff */ # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY 51 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY 52 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD 53 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_SNDINFO 60 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_SNDINFO 61 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO 62 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO 63 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_PRINFO 64 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_PRINFO 65 # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN 70 # endif # define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE 71 /* modifiers */ # define BIO_FP_READ 0x02 # define BIO_FP_WRITE 0x04 # define BIO_FP_APPEND 0x08 # define BIO_FP_TEXT 0x10 # define BIO_FLAGS_READ 0x01 # define BIO_FLAGS_WRITE 0x02 # define BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL 0x04 # define BIO_FLAGS_RWS (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL) # define BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY 0x08 # ifndef BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK /* * "UPLINK" flag denotes file descriptors provided by application. It * defaults to 0, as most platforms don't require UPLINK interface. */ # define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK 0 # endif # define BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL 0x100 /* * This is used with memory BIOs: * BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY means we shouldn't free up or change the data in any way; * BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST means we shouldn't clear data on reset. */ # define BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY 0x200 # define BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST 0x400 typedef union bio_addr_st BIO_ADDR; typedef struct bio_addrinfo_st BIO_ADDRINFO; int BIO_get_new_index(void); void BIO_set_flags(BIO *b, int flags); int BIO_test_flags(const BIO *b, int flags); void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags); # define BIO_get_flags(b) BIO_test_flags(b, ~(0x0)) # define BIO_set_retry_special(b) \ BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)) # define BIO_set_retry_read(b) \ BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)) # define BIO_set_retry_write(b) \ BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)) /* These are normally used internally in BIOs */ # define BIO_clear_retry_flags(b) \ BIO_clear_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)) # define BIO_get_retry_flags(b) \ BIO_test_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)) /* These should be used by the application to tell why we should retry */ # define BIO_should_read(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_READ) # define BIO_should_write(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE) # define BIO_should_io_special(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL) # define BIO_retry_type(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_RWS) # define BIO_should_retry(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY) /* * The next three are used in conjunction with the BIO_should_io_special() * condition. After this returns true, BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int * *reason); will walk the BIO stack and return the 'reason' for the special * and the offending BIO. Given a BIO, BIO_get_retry_reason(bio) will return * the code. */ /* * Returned from the SSL bio when the certificate retrieval code had an error */ # define BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP 0x01 /* Returned from the connect BIO when a connect would have blocked */ # define BIO_RR_CONNECT 0x02 /* Returned from the accept BIO when an accept would have blocked */ # define BIO_RR_ACCEPT 0x03 /* These are passed by the BIO callback */ # define BIO_CB_FREE 0x01 # define BIO_CB_READ 0x02 # define BIO_CB_WRITE 0x03 # define BIO_CB_PUTS 0x04 # define BIO_CB_GETS 0x05 # define BIO_CB_CTRL 0x06 /* * The callback is called before and after the underling operation, The * BIO_CB_RETURN flag indicates if it is after the call */ # define BIO_CB_RETURN 0x80 # define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN) # define BIO_cb_pre(a) (!((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN)) # define BIO_cb_post(a) ((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN) typedef long (*BIO_callback_fn)(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); BIO_callback_fn BIO_get_callback(const BIO *b); void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b, BIO_callback_fn callback); char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b); void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg); typedef struct bio_method_st BIO_METHOD; const char *BIO_method_name(const BIO *b); int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b); typedef void bio_info_cb(BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long); DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIO) /* Prefix and suffix callback in ASN1 BIO */ typedef int asn1_ps_func (BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* SCTP parameter structs */ struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo { uint16_t snd_sid; uint16_t snd_flags; uint32_t snd_ppid; uint32_t snd_context; }; struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo { uint16_t rcv_sid; uint16_t rcv_ssn; uint16_t rcv_flags; uint32_t rcv_ppid; uint32_t rcv_tsn; uint32_t rcv_cumtsn; uint32_t rcv_context; }; struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo { uint16_t pr_policy; uint32_t pr_value; }; # endif /* * #define BIO_CONN_get_param_hostname BIO_ctrl */ # define BIO_C_SET_CONNECT 100 # define BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE 101 # define BIO_C_SET_NBIO 102 /* # define BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM 103 */ # define BIO_C_SET_FD 104 # define BIO_C_GET_FD 105 # define BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR 106 # define BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR 107 # define BIO_C_SET_FILENAME 108 # define BIO_C_SET_SSL 109 # define BIO_C_GET_SSL 110 # define BIO_C_SET_MD 111 # define BIO_C_GET_MD 112 # define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS 113 # define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM 114 # define BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR 115 # define BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES 116 # define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE 117 # define BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT 118 # define BIO_C_SSL_MODE 119 # define BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX 120 /* # define BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM 121 */ # define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA 122/* data to read first */ # define BIO_C_GET_CONNECT 123 # define BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT 124 # define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES 125 # define BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES 126 # define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT 127 # define BIO_C_FILE_SEEK 128 # define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX 129 # define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN 130/* return end of input * value */ # define BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE 131 # define BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE 132 # define BIO_C_FILE_TELL 133 # define BIO_C_GET_SOCKS 134 # define BIO_C_SET_SOCKS 135 # define BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE 136/* for BIO_s_bio */ # define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE 137 # define BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR 138 # define BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR 139 # define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE 140 # define BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST 141 # define BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR 142 # define BIO_C_NREAD0 143 # define BIO_C_NREAD 144 # define BIO_C_NWRITE0 145 # define BIO_C_NWRITE 146 # define BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST 147 # define BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX 148 # define BIO_C_SET_PREFIX 149 # define BIO_C_GET_PREFIX 150 # define BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX 151 # define BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX 152 # define BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG 153 # define BIO_C_GET_EX_ARG 154 # define BIO_C_SET_CONNECT_MODE 155 # define BIO_set_app_data(s,arg) BIO_set_ex_data(s,0,arg) # define BIO_get_app_data(s) BIO_get_ex_data(s,0) # define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* IP families we support, for BIO_s_connect() and BIO_s_accept() */ /* Note: the underlying operating system may not support some of them */ # define BIO_FAMILY_IPV4 4 # define BIO_FAMILY_IPV6 6 # define BIO_FAMILY_IPANY 256 /* BIO_s_connect() */ # define BIO_set_conn_hostname(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,0,(char *)name) # define BIO_set_conn_port(b,port) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,1,(char *)port) # define BIO_set_conn_address(b,addr) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,2,(char *)addr) # define BIO_set_conn_ip_family(b,f) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,3,f) # define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)) # define BIO_get_conn_port(b) ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)) # define BIO_get_conn_address(b) ((const BIO_ADDR *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)) # define BIO_get_conn_ip_family(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,NULL) # define BIO_set_conn_mode(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT_MODE,(n),NULL) /* BIO_s_accept() */ # define BIO_set_accept_name(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,0,(char *)name) # define BIO_set_accept_port(b,port) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,1,(char *)port) # define BIO_get_accept_name(b) ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,0)) # define BIO_get_accept_port(b) ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,1)) # define BIO_get_peer_name(b) ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,2)) # define BIO_get_peer_port(b) ((const char *)BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,3)) /* #define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) */ # define BIO_set_nbio_accept(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,2,(n)?(void *)"a":NULL) # define BIO_set_accept_bios(b,bio) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,3,(char *)bio) # define BIO_set_accept_ip_family(b,f) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,4,f) # define BIO_get_accept_ip_family(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,4,NULL) /* Aliases kept for backward compatibility */ # define BIO_BIND_NORMAL 0 # define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR # define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR # define BIO_set_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE,mode,NULL) # define BIO_get_bind_mode(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE,0,NULL) /* BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */ # define BIO_do_connect(b) BIO_do_handshake(b) # define BIO_do_accept(b) BIO_do_handshake(b) # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ # define BIO_do_handshake(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL) /* BIO_s_datagram(), BIO_s_fd(), BIO_s_socket(), BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */ # define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd) # define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c) /* BIO_s_file() */ # define BIO_set_fp(b,fp,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR,c,(char *)fp) # define BIO_get_fp(b,fpp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR,0,(char *)fpp) /* BIO_s_fd() and BIO_s_file() */ # define BIO_seek(b,ofs) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_SEEK,ofs,NULL) # define BIO_tell(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_TELL,0,NULL) /* * name is cast to lose const, but might be better to route through a * function so we can do it safely */ # ifdef CONST_STRICT /* * If you are wondering why this isn't defined, its because CONST_STRICT is * purely a compile-time kludge to allow const to be checked. */ int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, const char *name); # else # define BIO_read_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ,(char *)name) # endif # define BIO_write_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_WRITE,name) # define BIO_append_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_APPEND,name) # define BIO_rw_filename(b,name) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ|BIO_FP_WRITE,name) /* * WARNING WARNING, this ups the reference count on the read bio of the SSL * structure. This is because the ssl read BIO is now pointed to by the * next_bio field in the bio. So when you free the BIO, make sure you are * doing a BIO_free_all() to catch the underlying BIO. */ # define BIO_set_ssl(b,ssl,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL,c,(char *)ssl) # define BIO_get_ssl(b,sslp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL,0,(char *)sslp) # define BIO_set_ssl_mode(b,client) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SSL_MODE,client,NULL) # define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL) # define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL) # define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL) /* defined in evp.h */ /* #define BIO_set_md(b,md) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD,1,(char *)md) */ # define BIO_get_mem_data(b,pp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,(char *)pp) # define BIO_set_mem_buf(b,bm,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM,c,(char *)bm) # define BIO_get_mem_ptr(b,pp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR,0,(char *)pp) # define BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b,v) \ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN,v,NULL) /* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */ # define BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES,0,NULL) # define BIO_set_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,NULL) # define BIO_set_read_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,0) # define BIO_set_write_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,1) # define BIO_set_buffer_read_data(b,buf,num) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA,num,buf) /* Don't use the next one unless you know what you are doing :-) */ # define BIO_dup_state(b,ret) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DUP,0,(char *)(ret)) # define BIO_reset(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_RESET,0,NULL) # define BIO_eof(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_EOF,0,NULL) # define BIO_set_close(b,c) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE,(c),NULL) # define BIO_get_close(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE,0,NULL) # define BIO_pending(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_PENDING,0,NULL) # define BIO_wpending(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL) /* ...pending macros have inappropriate return type */ size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b); # define BIO_flush(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_FLUSH,0,NULL) # define BIO_get_info_callback(b,cbp) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK,0, \ cbp) # define BIO_set_info_callback(b,cb) (int)BIO_callback_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK,cb) /* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */ # define BIO_buffer_get_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET,0,NULL) /* For BIO_s_bio() */ # define BIO_set_write_buf_size(b,size) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL) # define BIO_get_write_buf_size(b,size) (size_t)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL) # define BIO_make_bio_pair(b1,b2) (int)BIO_ctrl(b1,BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR,0,b2) # define BIO_destroy_bio_pair(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR,0,NULL) # define BIO_shutdown_wr(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR, 0, NULL) /* macros with inappropriate type -- but ...pending macros use int too: */ # define BIO_get_write_guarantee(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE,0,NULL) # define BIO_get_read_request(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST,0,NULL) size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b); int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b); /* ctrl macros for dgram */ # define BIO_ctrl_dgram_connect(b,peer) \ (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT,0, (char *)peer) # define BIO_ctrl_set_connected(b,peer) \ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED, 0, (char *)peer) # define BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(b) \ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL) # define BIO_dgram_send_timedout(b) \ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL) # define BIO_dgram_get_peer(b,peer) \ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer) # define BIO_dgram_set_peer(b,peer) \ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer) # define BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(b) \ (unsigned int)BIO_ctrl((b), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD, 0, NULL) #define BIO_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int BIO_set_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx, void *data); void *BIO_get_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx); uint64_t BIO_number_read(BIO *bio); uint64_t BIO_number_written(BIO *bio); /* For BIO_f_asn1() */ int BIO_asn1_set_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *prefix, asn1_ps_func *prefix_free); int BIO_asn1_get_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **pprefix, asn1_ps_func **pprefix_free); int BIO_asn1_set_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *suffix, asn1_ps_func *suffix_free); int BIO_asn1_get_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **psuffix, asn1_ps_func **psuffix_free); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void); BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag); # endif BIO *BIO_new(const BIO_METHOD *type); int BIO_free(BIO *a); void BIO_set_data(BIO *a, void *ptr); void *BIO_get_data(BIO *a); void BIO_set_init(BIO *a, int init); int BIO_get_init(BIO *a); void BIO_set_shutdown(BIO *a, int shut); int BIO_get_shutdown(BIO *a); void BIO_vfree(BIO *a); int BIO_up_ref(BIO *a); int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *data, int len); int BIO_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size); int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *data, int len); int BIO_puts(BIO *bp, const char *buf); int BIO_indent(BIO *b, int indent, int max); long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, void (*fp) (BIO *, int, const char *, int, long, long)); void *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg); long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, int iarg); BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append); BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b); void BIO_free_all(BIO *a); BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *b, int bio_type); BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b); void BIO_set_next(BIO *b, BIO *next); BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason); int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio); void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason); BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in); int BIO_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf); int BIO_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num); int BIO_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf); int BIO_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num); long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_secmem(void); BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void); # endif const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_null(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_linebuffer(void); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_nbio_test(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void); int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int error); BIO *BIO_new_dgram(int fd, int close_flag); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram_sctp(void); BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag); int BIO_dgram_is_sctp(BIO *bio); int BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb(BIO *b, void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio, void *context, void *buf), void *context); int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b); int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b); # endif # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int BIO_sock_should_retry(int i); int BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(int error); # endif int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i); int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int error); int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u), void *u, const char *s, int len); int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u), void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent); int BIO_dump(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len); int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len, int indent); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len); int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent); # endif int BIO_hex_string(BIO *out, int indent, int width, unsigned char *data, int datalen); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDR_new(void); int BIO_ADDR_rawmake(BIO_ADDR *ap, int family, const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port); void BIO_ADDR_free(BIO_ADDR *); void BIO_ADDR_clear(BIO_ADDR *ap); int BIO_ADDR_family(const BIO_ADDR *ap); int BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(const BIO_ADDR *ap, void *p, size_t *l); unsigned short BIO_ADDR_rawport(const BIO_ADDR *ap); char *BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric); char *BIO_ADDR_service_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric); char *BIO_ADDR_path_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap); const BIO_ADDRINFO *BIO_ADDRINFO_next(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); int BIO_ADDRINFO_family(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); int BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); int BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); const BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDRINFO_address(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); void BIO_ADDRINFO_free(BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); enum BIO_hostserv_priorities { BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV }; int BIO_parse_hostserv(const char *hostserv, char **host, char **service, enum BIO_hostserv_priorities hostserv_prio); enum BIO_lookup_type { BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER }; int BIO_lookup(const char *host, const char *service, enum BIO_lookup_type lookup_type, int family, int socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO **res); int BIO_sock_error(int sock); int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg); int BIO_socket_nbio(int fd, int mode); int BIO_sock_init(void); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define BIO_sock_cleanup() while(0) continue # endif int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int sock, int turn_on); DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host_port, int mode)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int BIO_accept(int sock, char **ip_port)) union BIO_sock_info_u { BIO_ADDR *addr; }; enum BIO_sock_info_type { BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS }; int BIO_sock_info(int sock, enum BIO_sock_info_type type, union BIO_sock_info_u *info); # define BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR 0x01 # define BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY 0x02 # define BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE 0x04 # define BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK 0x08 # define BIO_SOCK_NODELAY 0x10 int BIO_socket(int domain, int socktype, int protocol, int options); int BIO_connect(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options); int BIO_listen(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options); int BIO_accept_ex(int accept_sock, BIO_ADDR *addr, int options); int BIO_closesocket(int sock); BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag); BIO *BIO_new_connect(const char *host_port); BIO *BIO_new_accept(const char *host_port); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK*/ BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag); int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1, BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2); /* * If successful, returns 1 and in *bio1, *bio2 two BIO pair endpoints. * Otherwise returns 0 and sets *bio1 and *bio2 to NULL. Size 0 uses default * value. */ void BIO_copy_next_retry(BIO *b); /* * long BIO_ghbn_ctrl(int cmd,int iarg,char *parg); */ # ifdef __GNUC__ # define __bio_h__attr__ __attribute__ # else # define __bio_h__attr__(x) # endif int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...) __bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 3))); int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args) __bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 0))); int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...) __bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 4))); int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args) __bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 0))); # undef __bio_h__attr__ BIO_METHOD *BIO_meth_new(int type, const char *name); void BIO_meth_free(BIO_METHOD *biom); int (*BIO_meth_get_write(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *, int); int BIO_meth_set_write(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*write) (BIO *, const char *, int)); int (*BIO_meth_get_read(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int); int BIO_meth_set_read(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*read) (BIO *, char *, int)); int (*BIO_meth_get_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *); int BIO_meth_set_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*puts) (BIO *, const char *)); int (*BIO_meth_get_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int); int BIO_meth_set_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*gets) (BIO *, char *, int)); long (*BIO_meth_get_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, long, void *); int BIO_meth_set_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom, long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *)); int (*BIO_meth_get_create(BIO_METHOD *bion)) (BIO *); int BIO_meth_set_create(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*create) (BIO *)); int (*BIO_meth_get_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *); int BIO_meth_set_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*destroy) (BIO *)); long (*BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *); int BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom, long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *)); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_BIO_strings(void); /* Error codes for the BIO functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define BIO_F_ACPT_STATE 100 # define BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS 134 # define BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT 101 # define BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT_EX 137 # define BIO_F_BIO_ADDR_NEW 144 # define BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL 131 # define BIO_F_BIO_CONNECT 138 # define BIO_F_BIO_CTRL 103 # define BIO_F_BIO_GETS 104 # define BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP 106 # define BIO_F_BIO_GET_NEW_INDEX 102 # define BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT 107 # define BIO_F_BIO_LISTEN 139 # define BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP 135 # define BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR 121 # define BIO_F_BIO_NEW 108 # define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE 109 # define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF 126 # define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD 123 # define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0 124 # define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE 125 # define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0 122 # define BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV 136 # define BIO_F_BIO_PUTS 110 # define BIO_F_BIO_READ 111 # define BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET 140 # define BIO_F_BIO_SOCKET_NBIO 142 # define BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INFO 141 # define BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT 112 # define BIO_F_BIO_WRITE 113 # define BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL 114 # define BIO_F_CONN_CTRL 127 # define BIO_F_CONN_STATE 115 # define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ 132 # define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE 133 # define BIO_F_FILE_CTRL 116 # define BIO_F_FILE_READ 130 # define BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL 129 # define BIO_F_MEM_WRITE 117 # define BIO_F_SSL_NEW 118 /* Reason codes. */ # define BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR 100 # define BIO_R_ADDRINFO_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET 141 # define BIO_R_AMBIGUOUS_HOST_OR_SERVICE 129 # define BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE 101 # define BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE 124 # define BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR 103 # define BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET 107 # define BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_ERROR 132 # define BIO_R_GETSOCKNAME_TRUNCATED_ADDRESS 133 # define BIO_R_GETTING_SOCKTYPE 134 # define BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT 125 # define BIO_R_INVALID_SOCKET 135 # define BIO_R_IN_USE 123 # define BIO_R_LISTEN_V6_ONLY 136 # define BIO_R_LOOKUP_RETURNED_NOTHING 142 # define BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE 130 # define BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR 110 # define BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_ADDR_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED 143 # define BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_OR_SERVICE_SPECIFIED 144 # define BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED 113 # define BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE 128 # define BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER 115 # define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET 117 # define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET 118 # define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_KEEPALIVE 137 # define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET 119 # define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_NODELAY 138 # define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_REUSEADDR 139 # define BIO_R_UNAVAILABLE_IP_FAMILY 145 # define BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED 120 # define BIO_R_UNKNOWN_INFO_TYPE 140 # define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_IP_FAMILY 146 # define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD 121 # define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FAMILY 131 # define BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO 126 # define BIO_R_WSASTARTUP 122 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H0000644000000000000000000000116313176625661020751 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This file is only used by HP C on VMS, and is included automatically * after each header file from this directory */ /* save state */ #pragma names save /* have the compiler shorten symbols larger than 31 chars to 23 chars * followed by a 8 hex char CRC */ #pragma names as_is,shortened openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/conf.h0000644000000000000000000001761113176625661016270 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CONF_H # define HEADER_CONF_H # include # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct { char *section; char *name; char *value; } CONF_VALUE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) DEFINE_LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE); struct conf_st; struct conf_method_st; typedef struct conf_method_st CONF_METHOD; struct conf_method_st { const char *name; CONF *(*create) (CONF_METHOD *meth); int (*init) (CONF *conf); int (*destroy) (CONF *conf); int (*destroy_data) (CONF *conf); int (*load_bio) (CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline); int (*dump) (const CONF *conf, BIO *bp); int (*is_number) (const CONF *conf, char c); int (*to_int) (const CONF *conf, char c); int (*load) (CONF *conf, const char *name, long *eline); }; /* Module definitions */ typedef struct conf_imodule_st CONF_IMODULE; typedef struct conf_module_st CONF_MODULE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(CONF_MODULE) DEFINE_STACK_OF(CONF_IMODULE) /* DSO module function typedefs */ typedef int conf_init_func (CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf); typedef void conf_finish_func (CONF_IMODULE *md); # define CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS 0x1 # define CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES 0x2 # define CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT 0x4 # define CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO 0x8 # define CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE 0x10 # define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x20 int CONF_set_default_method(CONF_METHOD *meth); void CONF_set_nconf(CONF *conf, LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *hash); LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *file, long *eline); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *fp, long *eline); # endif LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_load_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *CONF_get_section(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *section); char *CONF_get_string(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group, const char *name); long CONF_get_number(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, const char *group, const char *name); void CONF_free(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int CONF_dump_fp(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, FILE *out); #endif int CONF_dump_bio(LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *conf, BIO *out); DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)) #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define OPENSSL_no_config() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL) #endif /* * New conf code. The semantics are different from the functions above. If * that wasn't the case, the above functions would have been replaced */ struct conf_st { CONF_METHOD *meth; void *meth_data; LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *data; }; CONF *NCONF_new(CONF_METHOD *meth); CONF_METHOD *NCONF_default(void); CONF_METHOD *NCONF_WIN32(void); void NCONF_free(CONF *conf); void NCONF_free_data(CONF *conf); int NCONF_load(CONF *conf, const char *file, long *eline); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int NCONF_load_fp(CONF *conf, FILE *fp, long *eline); # endif int NCONF_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline); STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *NCONF_get_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section); char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name); int NCONF_get_number_e(const CONF *conf, const char *group, const char *name, long *result); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int NCONF_dump_fp(const CONF *conf, FILE *out); #endif int NCONF_dump_bio(const CONF *conf, BIO *out); #define NCONF_get_number(c,g,n,r) NCONF_get_number_e(c,g,n,r) /* Module functions */ int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname, unsigned long flags); int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname, unsigned long flags); void CONF_modules_unload(int all); void CONF_modules_finish(void); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define CONF_modules_free() while(0) continue #endif int CONF_module_add(const char *name, conf_init_func *ifunc, conf_finish_func *ffunc); const char *CONF_imodule_get_name(const CONF_IMODULE *md); const char *CONF_imodule_get_value(const CONF_IMODULE *md); void *CONF_imodule_get_usr_data(const CONF_IMODULE *md); void CONF_imodule_set_usr_data(CONF_IMODULE *md, void *usr_data); CONF_MODULE *CONF_imodule_get_module(const CONF_IMODULE *md); unsigned long CONF_imodule_get_flags(const CONF_IMODULE *md); void CONF_imodule_set_flags(CONF_IMODULE *md, unsigned long flags); void *CONF_module_get_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod); void CONF_module_set_usr_data(CONF_MODULE *pmod, void *usr_data); char *CONF_get1_default_config_file(void); int CONF_parse_list(const char *list, int sep, int nospc, int (*list_cb) (const char *elem, int len, void *usr), void *arg); void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_CONF_strings(void); /* Error codes for the CONF functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define CONF_F_CONF_DUMP_FP 104 # define CONF_F_CONF_LOAD 100 # define CONF_F_CONF_LOAD_FP 103 # define CONF_F_CONF_PARSE_LIST 119 # define CONF_F_DEF_LOAD 120 # define CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO 121 # define CONF_F_MODULE_INIT 115 # define CONF_F_MODULE_LOAD_DSO 117 # define CONF_F_MODULE_RUN 118 # define CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_BIO 105 # define CONF_F_NCONF_DUMP_FP 106 # define CONF_F_NCONF_GET_NUMBER_E 112 # define CONF_F_NCONF_GET_SECTION 108 # define CONF_F_NCONF_GET_STRING 109 # define CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD 113 # define CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_BIO 110 # define CONF_F_NCONF_LOAD_FP 114 # define CONF_F_NCONF_NEW 111 # define CONF_F_STR_COPY 101 /* Reason codes. */ # define CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO 110 # define CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL 115 # define CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET 100 # define CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN 101 # define CONF_R_MISSING_INIT_FUNCTION 112 # define CONF_R_MODULE_INITIALIZATION_ERROR 109 # define CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE 102 # define CONF_R_NO_CONF 105 # define CONF_R_NO_CONF_OR_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE 106 # define CONF_R_NO_SECTION 107 # define CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE 114 # define CONF_R_NO_VALUE 108 # define CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION 103 # define CONF_R_UNKNOWN_MODULE_NAME 113 # define CONF_R_VARIABLE_EXPANSION_TOO_LONG 116 # define CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE 104 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/dh.h0000644000000000000000000003450513176625661015737 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_DH_H # define HEADER_DH_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include # include # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS # define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 # endif # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024 # define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01 # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * Does nothing. Previously this switched off constant time behaviour. */ # define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x00 # endif /* * If this flag is set the DH method is FIPS compliant and can be used in * FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an application * sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility to ensure the * result is compliant. */ # define DH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD 0x0400 /* * If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the * usage is compliant. */ # define DH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0400 /* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */ /* typedef struct dh_st DH; */ /* typedef struct dh_method DH_METHOD; */ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams) # define DH_GENERATOR_2 2 /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3 3 */ # define DH_GENERATOR_5 5 /* DH_check error codes */ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME 0x01 # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME 0x02 # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 0x04 # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08 # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME 0x10 # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20 # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE 0x40 /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01 # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE 0x02 # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID 0x04 /* * primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for * backward compatibility: */ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_STRONG_PRIME DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME # define d2i_DHparams_fp(fp,x) \ (DH *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DH_new, \ (char *(*)())d2i_DHparams, \ (fp), \ (unsigned char **)(x)) # define i2d_DHparams_fp(fp,x) \ ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DHparams,(fp), (unsigned char *)(x)) # define d2i_DHparams_bio(bp,x) \ ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DH, DH_new, d2i_DHparams, bp, x) # define i2d_DHparams_bio(bp,x) \ ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DH,i2d_DHparams,bp,x) # define d2i_DHxparams_fp(fp,x) \ (DH *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())DH_new, \ (char *(*)())d2i_DHxparams, \ (fp), \ (unsigned char **)(x)) # define i2d_DHxparams_fp(fp,x) \ ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DHxparams,(fp), (unsigned char *)(x)) # define d2i_DHxparams_bio(bp,x) \ ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DH, DH_new, d2i_DHxparams, bp, x) # define i2d_DHxparams_bio(bp,x) \ ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DH, i2d_DHxparams, bp, x) DH *DHparams_dup(DH *); const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void); void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth); const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void); int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth); DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine); DH *DH_new(void); void DH_free(DH *dh); int DH_up_ref(DH *dh); int DH_bits(const DH *dh); int DH_size(const DH *dh); int DH_security_bits(const DH *dh); #define DH_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DH, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg); void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx); /* Deprecated version */ DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)) /* New version */ int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb); int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret); int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *codes); int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *codes); int DH_generate_key(DH *dh); int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_DHparams(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp); DH *d2i_DHxparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_DHxparams(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DH *x); # endif int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x); /* RFC 5114 parameters */ DH *DH_get_1024_160(void); DH *DH_get_2048_224(void); DH *DH_get_2048_256(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS /* RFC2631 KDF */ int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid, const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen, const EVP_MD *md); # endif void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); void DH_clear_flags(DH *dh, int flags); int DH_test_flags(const DH *dh, int flags); void DH_set_flags(DH *dh, int flags); ENGINE *DH_get0_engine(DH *d); long DH_get_length(const DH *dh); int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length); DH_METHOD *DH_meth_new(const char *name, int flags); void DH_meth_free(DH_METHOD *dhm); DH_METHOD *DH_meth_dup(const DH_METHOD *dhm); const char *DH_meth_get0_name(const DH_METHOD *dhm); int DH_meth_set1_name(DH_METHOD *dhm, const char *name); int DH_meth_get_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm); int DH_meth_set_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm, int flags); void *DH_meth_get0_app_data(const DH_METHOD *dhm); int DH_meth_set0_app_data(DH_METHOD *dhm, void *app_data); int (*DH_meth_get_generate_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *); int DH_meth_set_generate_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_key) (DH *)); int (*DH_meth_get_compute_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); int DH_meth_set_compute_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)); int (*DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *); int DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *, BN_MONT_CTX *)); int (*DH_meth_get_init(const DH_METHOD *dhm))(DH *); int DH_meth_set_init(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*init)(DH *)); int (*DH_meth_get_finish(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *); int DH_meth_set_finish(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*finish) (DH *)); int (*DH_meth_get_generate_params(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *); int DH_meth_set_generate_params(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_params) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *)); # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_PRIME_LEN, len, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_subprime_len(ctx, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_SUBPRIME_LEN, len, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_type(ctx, typ) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE, typ, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(ctx, gen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_GENERATOR, gen, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_rfc5114(ctx, gen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114, gen, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dhx_rfc5114(ctx, gen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114, gen, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(ctx, kdf) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE, kdf, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(ctx) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE, -2, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(ctx, oid) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OID, 0, (void *)oid) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_oid(ctx, poid) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OID, 0, (void *)poid) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(ctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)md) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md(ctx, pmd) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)pmd) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(ctx, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OUTLEN, len, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_outlen(ctx, plen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OUTLEN, 0, (void *)plen) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p, plen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_UKM, plen, (void *)p) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DHX, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_UKM, 0, (void *)p) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_PRIME_LEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_GENERATOR (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_RFC5114 (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_SUBPRIME_LEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OUTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OUTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_UKM (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 11) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_UKM (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 12) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_OID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_DH_KDF_OID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 14) /* KDF types */ # define EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE 1 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS # define EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42 2 # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void); /* Error codes for the DH functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY 102 # define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP 101 # define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS 106 # define DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT 114 # define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY 115 # define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO 116 # define DH_F_DH_METH_DUP 117 # define DH_F_DH_METH_NEW 118 # define DH_F_DH_METH_SET1_NAME 119 # define DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD 105 # define DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE 107 # define DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE 110 # define DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE 111 # define DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE 108 # define DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE 109 # define DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT 100 # define DH_F_GENERATE_KEY 103 # define DH_F_PKEY_DH_DERIVE 112 # define DH_F_PKEY_DH_KEYGEN 113 /* Reason codes. */ # define DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR 101 # define DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR 109 # define DH_R_BN_ERROR 106 # define DH_R_DECODE_ERROR 104 # define DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY 102 # define DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR 112 # define DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET 108 # define DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 103 # define DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET 107 # define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE 100 # define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR 105 # define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR 111 # define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR 113 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/bn.h0000644000000000000000000006054413176625661015745 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the Eric Young open source * license provided above. * * The binary polynomial arithmetic software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #ifndef HEADER_BN_H # define HEADER_BN_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # include # endif # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * 64-bit processor with LP64 ABI */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG # define BN_ULONG unsigned long # define BN_BYTES 8 # endif /* * 64-bit processor other than LP64 ABI */ # ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT # define BN_ULONG unsigned long long # define BN_BYTES 8 # endif # ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT # define BN_ULONG unsigned int # define BN_BYTES 4 # endif # define BN_BITS2 (BN_BYTES * 8) # define BN_BITS (BN_BITS2 * 2) # define BN_TBIT ((BN_ULONG)1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1)) # define BN_FLG_MALLOCED 0x01 # define BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA 0x02 /* * avoid leaking exponent information through timing, * BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime, * BN_div() will call BN_div_no_branch, * BN_mod_inverse() will call BN_mod_inverse_no_branch. */ # define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME 0x04 # define BN_FLG_SECURE 0x08 # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L /* deprecated name for the flag */ # define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME BN_FLG_CONSTTIME # define BN_FLG_FREE 0x8000 /* used for debugging */ # endif void BN_set_flags(BIGNUM *b, int n); int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n); /* Values for |top| in BN_rand() */ #define BN_RAND_TOP_ANY -1 #define BN_RAND_TOP_ONE 0 #define BN_RAND_TOP_TWO 1 /* Values for |bottom| in BN_rand() */ #define BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY 0 #define BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD 1 /* * get a clone of a BIGNUM with changed flags, for *temporary* use only (the * two BIGNUMs cannot be used in parallel!). Also only for *read only* use. The * value |dest| should be a newly allocated BIGNUM obtained via BN_new() that * has not been otherwise initialised or used. */ void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags); /* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier */ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b); BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void); void BN_GENCB_free(BN_GENCB *cb); /* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with an "old"-style callback */ void BN_GENCB_set_old(BN_GENCB *gencb, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); /* Populate a BN_GENCB structure with a "new"-style callback */ void BN_GENCB_set(BN_GENCB *gencb, int (*callback) (int, int, BN_GENCB *), void *cb_arg); void *BN_GENCB_get_arg(BN_GENCB *cb); # define BN_prime_checks 0 /* default: select number of iterations based * on the size of the number */ /* * number of Miller-Rabin iterations for an error rate of less than 2^-80 for * random 'b'-bit input, b >= 100 (taken from table 4.4 in the Handbook of * Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996]; * original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error * estimates for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993) * 177-194) */ # define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ? 2 : \ (b) >= 850 ? 3 : \ (b) >= 650 ? 4 : \ (b) >= 550 ? 5 : \ (b) >= 450 ? 6 : \ (b) >= 400 ? 7 : \ (b) >= 350 ? 8 : \ (b) >= 300 ? 9 : \ (b) >= 250 ? 12 : \ (b) >= 200 ? 15 : \ (b) >= 150 ? 18 : \ /* b >= 100 */ 27) # define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8) int BN_abs_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w); int BN_is_zero(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_is_one(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w); int BN_is_odd(const BIGNUM *a); # define BN_one(a) (BN_set_word((a),1)) void BN_zero_ex(BIGNUM *a); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L # define BN_zero(a) BN_zero_ex(a) # else # define BN_zero(a) (BN_set_word((a),0)) # endif const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void); char *BN_options(void); BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void); BN_CTX *BN_CTX_secure_new(void); void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c); void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx); void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, const BIGNUM *range); int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, const BIGNUM *range); int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l); int BN_security_bits(int L, int N); BIGNUM *BN_new(void); BIGNUM *BN_secure_new(void); void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a); BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen); BIGNUM *BN_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen); BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_usub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_uadd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); /** BN_set_negative sets sign of a BIGNUM * \param b pointer to the BIGNUM object * \param n 0 if the BIGNUM b should be positive and a value != 0 otherwise */ void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *b, int n); /** BN_is_negative returns 1 if the BIGNUM is negative * \param b pointer to the BIGNUM object * \return 1 if a < 0 and 0 otherwise */ int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *b); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); # define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx)) int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m); int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m); int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m); int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m); BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); void BN_free(BIGNUM *a); int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a); int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *r, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1, const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a); # endif int BN_print(BIO *bio, const BIGNUM *a); int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a); void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a); BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a); char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns * -2 for * error */ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords); /* Deprecated versions */ DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)) DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg)) DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg, int do_trial_division)) /* Newer versions */ int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1, const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *Xp1, BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void); int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx); BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from); BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx); /* BN_BLINDING flags */ # define BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE 0x00000001 # define BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE 0x00000002 BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod); void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b); int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *); int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *); int BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b); void BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b); int BN_BLINDING_lock(BN_BLINDING *b); int BN_BLINDING_unlock(BN_BLINDING *b); unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *); void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx), BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(void BN_set_params(int mul, int high, int low, int mont)) DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(int BN_get_params(int which)) /* 0, mul, 1 high, 2 low, 3 * mont */ BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void); void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *rdiv, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* * Functions for arithmetic over binary polynomials represented by BIGNUMs. * The BIGNUM::neg property of BIGNUMs representing binary polynomials is * ignored. Note that input arguments are not const so that their bit arrays * can be expanded to the appropriate size if needed. */ /* * r = a + b */ int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); # define BN_GF2m_sub(r, a, b) BN_GF2m_add(r, a, b) /* * r=a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); # define BN_GF2m_cmp(a, b) BN_ucmp((a), (b)) /*- * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials * as an unsigned int[], say p. The irreducible f(t) is then of the form: * t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. */ /* r = a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[]); /* r = (a * b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a * a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (1 / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a / b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = (a ^ b) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r = sqrt(a) mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); /* r^2 + r = a mod p */ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max); int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a); # endif /* * faster mod functions for the 'NIST primes' 0 <= a < p^2 */ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void); const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void); int (*BN_nist_mod_func(const BIGNUM *p)) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message, size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx); /* Primes from RFC 2409 */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(BIGNUM *bn); /* Primes from RFC 3526 */ BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(BIGNUM *bn); BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(BIGNUM *bn); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define get_rfc2409_prime_768 BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768 # define get_rfc2409_prime_1024 BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024 # define get_rfc3526_prime_1536 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536 # define get_rfc3526_prime_2048 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048 # define get_rfc3526_prime_3072 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072 # define get_rfc3526_prime_4096 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096 # define get_rfc3526_prime_6144 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144 # define get_rfc3526_prime_8192 BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192 # endif int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_BN_strings(void); /* Error codes for the BN functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define BN_F_BNRAND 127 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CONVERT_EX 100 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_CREATE_PARAM 128 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX 101 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW 102 # define BN_F_BN_BLINDING_UPDATE 103 # define BN_F_BN_BN2DEC 104 # define BN_F_BN_BN2HEX 105 # define BN_F_BN_COMPUTE_WNAF 142 # define BN_F_BN_CTX_GET 116 # define BN_F_BN_CTX_NEW 106 # define BN_F_BN_CTX_START 129 # define BN_F_BN_DIV 107 # define BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP 130 # define BN_F_BN_EXP 123 # define BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL 120 # define BN_F_BN_GENCB_NEW 143 # define BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE 140 # define BN_F_BN_GENERATE_PRIME_EX 141 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD 131 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP 132 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL 133 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD 134 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR 135 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR 136 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT 137 # define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT 145 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT 118 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT 109 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME 124 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD 117 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP 125 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE 126 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE 110 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH 139 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_LSHIFT_QUICK 119 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT 121 # define BN_F_BN_MPI2BN 112 # define BN_F_BN_NEW 113 # define BN_F_BN_RAND 114 # define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122 # define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT 146 # define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS 144 # define BN_F_BN_USUB 115 /* Reason codes. */ # define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3 100 # define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL 101 # define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG 114 # define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL 118 # define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS 102 # define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO 103 # define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR 104 # define BN_R_EXPAND_ON_STATIC_BIGNUM_DATA 105 # define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110 # define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106 # define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115 # define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT 119 # define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111 # define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107 # define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108 # define BN_R_NO_SOLUTION 116 # define BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE 117 # define BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME 112 # define BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS 113 # define BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES 109 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/comp.h0000644000000000000000000000376113176625661016302 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_COMP_H # define HEADER_COMP_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif COMP_CTX *COMP_CTX_new(COMP_METHOD *meth); const COMP_METHOD *COMP_CTX_get_method(const COMP_CTX *ctx); int COMP_CTX_get_type(const COMP_CTX* comp); int COMP_get_type(const COMP_METHOD *meth); const char *COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *meth); void COMP_CTX_free(COMP_CTX *ctx); int COMP_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen, unsigned char *in, int ilen); int COMP_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int olen, unsigned char *in, int ilen); COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L #define COMP_zlib_cleanup() while(0) continue #endif # ifdef HEADER_BIO_H # ifdef ZLIB const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_zlib(void); # endif # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_COMP_strings(void); /* Error codes for the COMP functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH 99 # define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW 100 # define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ 101 # define COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE 102 /* Reason codes. */ # define COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR 99 # define COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR 100 # define COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED 101 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/asn1.h0000644000000000000000000013251313176625661016204 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_ASN1_H # define HEADER_ASN1_H # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL 0x00 # define V_ASN1_APPLICATION 0x40 # define V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80 # define V_ASN1_PRIVATE 0xc0 # define V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 # define V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG 0x1f # define V_ASN1_PRIMATIVE_TAG 0x1f # define V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE -2/* let the recipient choose */ # define V_ASN1_OTHER -3/* used in ASN1_TYPE */ # define V_ASN1_ANY -4/* used in ASN1 template code */ # define V_ASN1_UNDEF -1 /* ASN.1 tag values */ # define V_ASN1_EOC 0 # define V_ASN1_BOOLEAN 1 /**/ # define V_ASN1_INTEGER 2 # define V_ASN1_BIT_STRING 3 # define V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 4 # define V_ASN1_NULL 5 # define V_ASN1_OBJECT 6 # define V_ASN1_OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR 7 # define V_ASN1_EXTERNAL 8 # define V_ASN1_REAL 9 # define V_ASN1_ENUMERATED 10 # define V_ASN1_UTF8STRING 12 # define V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 16 # define V_ASN1_SET 17 # define V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING 18 /**/ # define V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 19 # define V_ASN1_T61STRING 20 # define V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING 20/* alias */ # define V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING 21 /**/ # define V_ASN1_IA5STRING 22 # define V_ASN1_UTCTIME 23 # define V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 24 /**/ # define V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING 25 /**/ # define V_ASN1_ISO64STRING 26 /**/ # define V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 26/* alias */ # define V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 27 /**/ # define V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 28 /**/ # define V_ASN1_BMPSTRING 30 /* * NB the constants below are used internally by ASN1_INTEGER * and ASN1_ENUMERATED to indicate the sign. They are *not* on * the wire tag values. */ # define V_ASN1_NEG 0x100 # define V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER (2 | V_ASN1_NEG) # define V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED (10 | V_ASN1_NEG) /* For use with d2i_ASN1_type_bytes() */ # define B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING 0x0001 # define B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 0x0002 # define B_ASN1_T61STRING 0x0004 # define B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING 0x0004 # define B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING 0x0008 # define B_ASN1_IA5STRING 0x0010 # define B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING 0x0020 # define B_ASN1_ISO64STRING 0x0040 # define B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 0x0040 # define B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 0x0080 # define B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 0x0100 # define B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x0200 # define B_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x0400 # define B_ASN1_BMPSTRING 0x0800 # define B_ASN1_UNKNOWN 0x1000 # define B_ASN1_UTF8STRING 0x2000 # define B_ASN1_UTCTIME 0x4000 # define B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 0x8000 # define B_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10000 /* For use with ASN1_mbstring_copy() */ # define MBSTRING_FLAG 0x1000 # define MBSTRING_UTF8 (MBSTRING_FLAG) # define MBSTRING_ASC (MBSTRING_FLAG|1) # define MBSTRING_BMP (MBSTRING_FLAG|2) # define MBSTRING_UNIV (MBSTRING_FLAG|4) # define SMIME_OLDMIME 0x400 # define SMIME_CRLFEOL 0x800 # define SMIME_STREAM 0x1000 struct X509_algor_st; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT 0x08/* Set if 0x07 has bits left value */ /* * This indicates that the ASN1_STRING is not a real value but just a place * holder for the location where indefinite length constructed data should be * inserted in the memory buffer */ # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF 0x010 /* * This flag is used by the CMS code to indicate that a string is not * complete and is a place holder for content when it had all been accessed. * The flag will be reset when content has been written to it. */ # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT 0x020 /* * This flag is used by ASN1 code to indicate an ASN1_STRING is an MSTRING * type. */ # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING 0x040 /* String is embedded and only content should be freed */ # define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED 0x080 /* This is the base type that holds just about everything :-) */ struct asn1_string_st { int length; int type; unsigned char *data; /* * The value of the following field depends on the type being held. It * is mostly being used for BIT_STRING so if the input data has a * non-zero 'unused bits' value, it will be handled correctly */ long flags; }; /* * ASN1_ENCODING structure: this is used to save the received encoding of an * ASN1 type. This is useful to get round problems with invalid encodings * which can break signatures. */ typedef struct ASN1_ENCODING_st { unsigned char *enc; /* DER encoding */ long len; /* Length of encoding */ int modified; /* set to 1 if 'enc' is invalid */ } ASN1_ENCODING; /* Used with ASN1 LONG type: if a long is set to this it is omitted */ # define ASN1_LONG_UNDEF 0x7fffffffL # define STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC 0x01 /* * A zero passed to ASN1_STRING_TABLE_new_add for the flags is interpreted * as "don't change" and STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC is always set. By setting * STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC only we can clear the existing value. Use the alias * STABLE_FLAGS_CLEAR to reflect this. */ # define STABLE_FLAGS_CLEAR STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC # define STABLE_NO_MASK 0x02 # define DIRSTRING_TYPE \ (B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING|B_ASN1_T61STRING|B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|B_ASN1_UTF8STRING) # define PKCS9STRING_TYPE (DIRSTRING_TYPE|B_ASN1_IA5STRING) typedef struct asn1_string_table_st { int nid; long minsize; long maxsize; unsigned long mask; unsigned long flags; } ASN1_STRING_TABLE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) /* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC2459 */ # define ub_name 32768 # define ub_common_name 64 # define ub_locality_name 128 # define ub_state_name 128 # define ub_organization_name 64 # define ub_organization_unit_name 64 # define ub_title 64 # define ub_email_address 128 /* * Declarations for template structures: for full definitions see asn1t.h */ typedef struct ASN1_TEMPLATE_st ASN1_TEMPLATE; typedef struct ASN1_TLC_st ASN1_TLC; /* This is just an opaque pointer */ typedef struct ASN1_VALUE_st ASN1_VALUE; /* Declare ASN1 functions: the implement macro in in asn1t.h */ # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(type) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, name, name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(type, itname, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) \ type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \ int i2d_##name(type *a, unsigned char **out); \ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(itname) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(type, name) \ type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \ int i2d_##name(const type *a, unsigned char **out); \ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(name) \ int i2d_##name##_NDEF(name *a, unsigned char **out); # define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(name, name) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ type *name##_new(void); \ void name##_free(type *a); # define DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(stname) \ DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, stname) # define DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, fname) \ int fname##_print_ctx(BIO *out, stname *x, int indent, \ const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); # define D2I_OF(type) type *(*)(type **,const unsigned char **,long) # define I2D_OF(type) int (*)(type *,unsigned char **) # define I2D_OF_const(type) int (*)(const type *,unsigned char **) # define CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i) \ ((d2i_of_void*) (1 ? d2i : ((D2I_OF(type))0))) # define CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d) \ ((i2d_of_void*) (1 ? i2d : ((I2D_OF(type))0))) # define CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew) \ ((void *(*)(void)) (1 ? xnew : ((type *(*)(void))0))) # define CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, p) \ ((void*) (1 ? p : (type*)0)) # define CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, p) \ ((void**) (1 ? p : (type**)0)) # define TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type) typedef type *d2i_of_##type(type **,const unsigned char **,long) # define TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) typedef int i2d_of_##type(type *,unsigned char **) # define TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type); TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(void); /*- * The following macros and typedefs allow an ASN1_ITEM * to be embedded in a structure and referenced. Since * the ASN1_ITEM pointers need to be globally accessible * (possibly from shared libraries) they may exist in * different forms. On platforms that support it the * ASN1_ITEM structure itself will be globally exported. * Other platforms will export a function that returns * an ASN1_ITEM pointer. * * To handle both cases transparently the macros below * should be used instead of hard coding an ASN1_ITEM * pointer in a structure. * * The structure will look like this: * * typedef struct SOMETHING_st { * ... * ASN1_ITEM_EXP *iptr; * ... * } SOMETHING; * * It would be initialised as e.g.: * * SOMETHING somevar = {...,ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509),...}; * * and the actual pointer extracted with: * * const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(somevar.iptr); * * Finally an ASN1_ITEM pointer can be extracted from an * appropriate reference with: ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509). This * would be used when a function takes an ASN1_ITEM * argument. * */ # ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION /* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */ typedef const ASN1_ITEM ASN1_ITEM_EXP; /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr) /* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (&(iptr##_it)) # define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (&(ref##_it)) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \ OPENSSL_EXTERN const ASN1_ITEM name##_it; # else /* * Platforms that can't easily handle shared global variables are declared as * functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers. */ /* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */ typedef const ASN1_ITEM *ASN1_ITEM_EXP (void); /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr()) /* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */ # define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (iptr##_it) # define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (ref##_it()) # define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \ const ASN1_ITEM * name##_it(void); # endif /* Parameters used by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() */ /* * These determine which characters to escape: RFC2253 special characters, * control characters and MSB set characters */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 1 # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL 2 # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB 4 /* * This flag determines how we do escaping: normally RC2253 backslash only, * set this to use backslash and quote. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE 8 /* These three flags are internal use only. */ /* Character is a valid PrintableString character */ # define CHARTYPE_PRINTABLESTRING 0x10 /* Character needs escaping if it is the first character */ # define CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 0x20 /* Character needs escaping if it is the last character */ # define CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253 0x40 /* * NB the internal flags are safely reused below by flags handled at the top * level. */ /* * If this is set we convert all character strings to UTF8 first */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT 0x10 /* * If this is set we don't attempt to interpret content: just assume all * strings are 1 byte per character. This will produce some pretty odd * looking output! */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE 0x20 /* If this is set we include the string type in the output */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE 0x40 /* * This determines which strings to display and which to 'dump' (hex dump of * content octets or DER encoding). We can only dump non character strings or * everything. If we don't dump 'unknown' they are interpreted as character * strings with 1 octet per character and are subject to the usual escaping * options. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL 0x80 # define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN 0x100 /* * These determine what 'dumping' does, we can dump the content octets or the * DER encoding: both use the RFC2253 #XXXXX notation. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER 0x200 /* * This flag specifies that RC2254 escaping shall be performed. */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254 0x400 /* * All the string flags consistent with RFC2253, escaping control characters * isn't essential in RFC2253 but it is advisable anyway. */ # define ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER) DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_GENERALSTRING) DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) typedef struct asn1_type_st { int type; union { char *ptr; ASN1_BOOLEAN boolean; ASN1_STRING *asn1_string; ASN1_OBJECT *object; ASN1_INTEGER *integer; ASN1_ENUMERATED *enumerated; ASN1_BIT_STRING *bit_string; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet_string; ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *printablestring; ASN1_T61STRING *t61string; ASN1_IA5STRING *ia5string; ASN1_GENERALSTRING *generalstring; ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmpstring; ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *universalstring; ASN1_UTCTIME *utctime; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *generalizedtime; ASN1_VISIBLESTRING *visiblestring; ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8string; /* * set and sequence are left complete and still contain the set or * sequence bytes */ ASN1_STRING *set; ASN1_STRING *sequence; ASN1_VALUE *asn1_value; } value; } ASN1_TYPE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY; DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY) /* This is used to contain a list of bit names */ typedef struct BIT_STRING_BITNAME_st { int bitnum; const char *lname; const char *sname; } BIT_STRING_BITNAME; # define B_ASN1_TIME \ B_ASN1_UTCTIME | \ B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME # define B_ASN1_PRINTABLE \ B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING| \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_T61STRING| \ B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \ B_ASN1_BIT_STRING| \ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING|\ B_ASN1_SEQUENCE|\ B_ASN1_UNKNOWN # define B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING|\ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING # define B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT \ B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \ B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE) int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a); void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value); int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value); int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *s, ASN1_TYPE **t); void *ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_TYPE *t); ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void); void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a); int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp); ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OBJECT) DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void); void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a); void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a); int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *a); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type); int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b); /* * Since this is used to store all sorts of things, via macros, for now, * make its data void * */ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len); void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len); int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x); void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int n); int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x); DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x)) const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BIT_STRING) int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char *d, int length); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_check(const ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, const unsigned char *flags, int flags_len); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print(BIO *out, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl, int indent); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(const char *name, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc(ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, const char *name, int value, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_INTEGER) ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x); int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_ENUMERATED) int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(const ASN1_UTCTIME *a); ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_set(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t); ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, const char *str); int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, time_t t); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str); int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec, const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_OCTET_STRING) ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a); int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b); int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *str, const unsigned char *data, int len); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTF8STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_NULL) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BMPSTRING) int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long *val); int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long value); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, ASN1_PRINTABLE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DIRECTORYSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DISPLAYTEXT) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF) ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t); ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(const ASN1_TIME *t, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out); int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str); int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, const ASN1_INTEGER *a); int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *bs, char *buf, int size); int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a); int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs, char *buf, int size); int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, const ASN1_OBJECT *a); int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *bs, char *buf, int size); int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *a, int type); int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a); int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num); ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data, int len, const char *sn, const char *ln); int ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a); int ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, int64_t r); int ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(uint64_t *pr, const ASN1_INTEGER *a); int ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64(ASN1_INTEGER *a, uint64_t r); int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v); long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a); ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai); BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn); int ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a); int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, int64_t r); int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v); long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a); ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai); BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(const ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai, BIGNUM *bn); /* General */ /* given a string, return the correct type, max is the maximum length */ int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int max); unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag); /* SPECIALS */ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass, long omax); int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p, long len); int ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len); void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag, int xclass); int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp); int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag); /* Used to implement other functions */ void *ASN1_dup(i2d_of_void *i2d, d2i_of_void *d2i, void *x); # define ASN1_dup_of(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) # define ASN1_dup_of_const(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) void *ASN1_item_dup(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *x); /* ASN1 alloc/free macros for when a type is only used internally */ # define M_ASN1_new_of(type) (type *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type)) # define M_ASN1_free_of(x, type) \ ASN1_item_free(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type)) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void *ASN1_d2i_fp(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, FILE *in, void **x); # define ASN1_d2i_fp_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_d2i_fp(CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ in, \ CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d, FILE *out, void *x); # define ASN1_i2d_fp_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) # define ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) int ASN1_item_i2d_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *out, void *x); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); # endif int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, const ASN1_STRING *in); void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew) (void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x); # define ASN1_d2i_bio_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_d2i_bio( CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ in, \ CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x); # define ASN1_i2d_bio_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) # define ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) int ASN1_item_i2d_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *out, void *x); int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_UTCTIME *a); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a); int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *fp, const ASN1_TIME *a); int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *v); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); int ASN1_buf_print(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int off); int ASN1_bn_print(BIO *bp, const char *number, const BIGNUM *num, unsigned char *buf, int off); int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent); int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent, int dump); const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag); /* Used to load and write Netscape format cert */ int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s); int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len); int ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int max_len); int ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num, unsigned char *data, int len); int ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(const ASN1_TYPE *a, long *num, unsigned char *data, int max_len); void *ASN1_item_unpack(const ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask); int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p); unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void); int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask); int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask, long minsize, long maxsize); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, int inform, int nid); ASN1_STRING_TABLE *ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(int nid); int ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(int, long, long, unsigned long, unsigned long); void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void); /* ASN1 template functions */ /* Old API compatible functions */ ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it); void ASN1_item_free(ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it); void ASN1_add_oid_module(void); void ASN1_add_stable_module(void); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(const char *str, CONF *nconf); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf); int ASN1_str2mask(const char *str, unsigned long *pmask); /* ASN1 Print flags */ /* Indicate missing OPTIONAL fields */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT 0x001 /* Mark start and end of SEQUENCE */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE 0x002 /* Mark start and end of SEQUENCE/SET OF */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SSOF 0x004 /* Show the ASN1 type of primitives */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_TYPE 0x008 /* Don't show ASN1 type of ANY */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_ANY_TYPE 0x010 /* Don't show ASN1 type of MSTRINGs */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_MSTRING_TYPE 0x020 /* Don't show field names in SEQUENCE */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_FIELD_NAME 0x040 /* Show structure names of each SEQUENCE field */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_FIELD_STRUCT_NAME 0x080 /* Don't show structure name even at top level */ # define ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_NO_STRUCT_NAME 0x100 int ASN1_item_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *ifld, int indent, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); ASN1_PCTX *ASN1_PCTX_new(void); void ASN1_PCTX_free(ASN1_PCTX *p); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_nm_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_nm_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_cert_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_cert_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_oid_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_oid_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); unsigned long ASN1_PCTX_get_str_flags(const ASN1_PCTX *p); void ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags(ASN1_PCTX *p, unsigned long flags); ASN1_SCTX *ASN1_SCTX_new(int (*scan_cb) (ASN1_SCTX *ctx)); void ASN1_SCTX_free(ASN1_SCTX *p); const ASN1_ITEM *ASN1_SCTX_get_item(ASN1_SCTX *p); const ASN1_TEMPLATE *ASN1_SCTX_get_template(ASN1_SCTX *p); unsigned long ASN1_SCTX_get_flags(ASN1_SCTX *p); void ASN1_SCTX_set_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p, void *data); void *ASN1_SCTX_get_app_data(ASN1_SCTX *p); const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_asn1(void); BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int i2d_ASN1_bio_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int PEM_write_bio_ASN1_stream(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *in, int flags, const char *hdr, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags, int ctype_nid, int econt_nid, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int SMIME_crlf_copy(BIO *in, BIO *out, int flags); int SMIME_text(BIO *in, BIO *out); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void); /* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT 100 # define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER 102 # define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING 103 # define ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP 176 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT 183 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_CB 177 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN 104 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT 106 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE 108 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP 109 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO 107 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST 184 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB 110 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_LOCK 233 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP 111 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I 204 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END 190 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_ADJ 216 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3 178 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64 224 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT 114 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_UINT64 225 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO 116 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP 117 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP 206 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP 191 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I 120 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW 121 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO 192 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP 193 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK 198 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN 195 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX 220 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK 199 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY 197 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY 122 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW 123 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA 214 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW 205 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_SCTX_NEW 221 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN 128 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE 179 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_INT64 227 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_GET_UINT64 230 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET 186 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD 129 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN 228 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW 130 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I 132 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW 133 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I 131 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_ADJ 217 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING 134 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING 135 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ 218 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY 137 # define ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1 209 # define ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1 210 # define ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF 208 # define ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB 180 # define ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_STRING 229 # define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING 189 # define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER 194 # define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT 196 # define ASN1_F_C2I_IBUF 226 # define ASN1_F_C2I_UINT64_INT 101 # define ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA 140 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT 147 # define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER 150 # define ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY 207 # define ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY 154 # define ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY 155 # define ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE 222 # define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM 211 # define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY 161 # define ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY 181 # define ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY 163 # define ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY 164 # define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY 165 # define ASN1_F_LONG_C2I 166 # define ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT 174 # define ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING 182 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV 167 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_SCRYPT 231 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET 202 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET0_ALGOR 215 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET 219 # define ASN1_F_PKCS5_SCRYPT_SET 232 # define ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1 212 # define ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT 213 # define ASN1_F_STBL_MODULE_INIT 223 # define ASN1_F_UINT32_C2I 105 # define ASN1_F_UINT64_C2I 112 # define ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED 169 # define ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW 170 # define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE 203 # define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I 158 # define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW 171 # define ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW 173 /* Reason codes. */ # define ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT 171 # define ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR 203 # define ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 204 # define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR 100 # define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER 102 # define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 214 # define ASN1_R_BN_LIB 105 # define ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 106 # define ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 107 # define ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER 108 # define ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED 217 # define ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG 109 # define ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR 110 # define ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED 174 # define ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED 198 # define ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR 112 # define ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME 173 # define ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION 172 # define ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS 114 # define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER 115 # define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT 116 # define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 119 # define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 120 # define ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING 121 # define ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE 122 # define ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG 123 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT 175 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN 176 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS 124 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT 177 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX 178 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG 179 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER 180 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NEGATIVE_VALUE 226 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING 181 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL 125 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE 182 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT 183 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY 126 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE 170 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 221 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY 127 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE 184 # define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_ZERO_CONTENT 222 # define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 185 # define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG 128 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT 220 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH 129 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT 130 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 205 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER 186 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER 187 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING 216 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS 227 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR 131 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_STRING_TABLE_VALUE 218 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH 133 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING 134 # define ASN1_R_INVALID_VALUE 219 # define ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR 188 # define ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 206 # define ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR 207 # define ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 208 # define ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC 137 # define ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER 138 # define ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE 189 # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL 139 # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG 140 # define ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING 197 # define ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS 141 # define ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 190 # define ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA 142 # define ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 209 # define ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE 143 # define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE 210 # define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY 211 # define ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE 212 # define ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 144 # define ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 191 # define ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS 145 # define ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE 147 # define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH 148 # define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 149 # define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG 192 # define ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE 150 # define ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 213 # define ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED 202 # define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG 151 # define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT 152 # define ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 154 # define ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 193 # define ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE 223 # define ASN1_R_TOO_LONG 155 # define ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL 224 # define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 156 # define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE 195 # define ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC 159 # define ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 215 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT 160 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM 161 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE 162 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 163 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 199 # define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG 194 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE 164 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 167 # define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE 196 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_INTEGER_TYPE 225 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 200 # define ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG 168 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ct.h0000644000000000000000000004505113176625661015750 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CT_H # define HEADER_CT_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT # include # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif /* Minimum RSA key size, from RFC6962 */ # define SCT_MIN_RSA_BITS 2048 /* All hashes are SHA256 in v1 of Certificate Transparency */ # define CT_V1_HASHLEN SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH typedef enum { CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET = -1, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509 = 0, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT = 1 } ct_log_entry_type_t; typedef enum { SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET = -1, SCT_VERSION_V1 = 0 } sct_version_t; typedef enum { SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE } sct_source_t; typedef enum { SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION } sct_validation_status_t; DEFINE_STACK_OF(SCT) DEFINE_STACK_OF(CTLOG) /****************************************** * CT policy evaluation context functions * ******************************************/ /* * Creates a new, empty policy evaluation context. * The caller is responsible for calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free when finished * with the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX. */ CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void); /* Deletes a policy evaluation context and anything it owns. */ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /* Gets the peer certificate that the SCTs are for */ X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /* * Sets the certificate associated with the received SCTs. * Increments the reference count of cert. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); /* Gets the issuer of the aforementioned certificate */ X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /* * Sets the issuer of the certificate associated with the received SCTs. * Increments the reference count of issuer. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer); /* Gets the CT logs that are trusted sources of SCTs */ const CTLOG_STORE *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /* Sets the log store that is in use. It must outlive the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX. */ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *log_store); /* * Gets the time, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch, that will be used as the * current time when checking whether an SCT was issued in the future. * Such SCTs will fail validation, as required by RFC6962. */ uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /* * Sets the time to evaluate SCTs against, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch. * If an SCT's timestamp is after this time, it will be interpreted as having * been issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs * whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate in this case. */ void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms); /***************** * SCT functions * *****************/ /* * Creates a new, blank SCT. * The caller is responsible for calling SCT_free when finished with the SCT. */ SCT *SCT_new(void); /* * Creates a new SCT from some base64-encoded strings. * The caller is responsible for calling SCT_free when finished with the SCT. */ SCT *SCT_new_from_base64(unsigned char version, const char *logid_base64, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type, uint64_t timestamp, const char *extensions_base64, const char *signature_base64); /* * Frees the SCT and the underlying data structures. */ void SCT_free(SCT *sct); /* * Free a stack of SCTs, and the underlying SCTs themselves. * Intended to be compatible with X509V3_EXT_FREE. */ void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a); /* * Returns the version of the SCT. */ sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct); /* * Set the version of an SCT. * Returns 1 on success, 0 if the version is unrecognized. */ __owur int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version); /* * Returns the log entry type of the SCT. */ ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct); /* * Set the log entry type of an SCT. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type); /* * Gets the ID of the log that an SCT came from. * Ownership of the log ID remains with the SCT. * Returns the length of the log ID. */ size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id); /* * Set the log ID of an SCT to point directly to the *log_id specified. * The SCT takes ownership of the specified pointer. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len); /* * Set the log ID of an SCT. * This makes a copy of the log_id. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len); /* * Returns the timestamp for the SCT (epoch time in milliseconds). */ uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct); /* * Set the timestamp of an SCT (epoch time in milliseconds). */ void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp); /* * Return the NID for the signature used by the SCT. * For CT v1, this will be either NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption or * NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256 (or NID_undef if incorrect/unset). */ int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct); /* * Set the signature type of an SCT * For CT v1, this should be either NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption or * NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid); /* * Set *ext to point to the extension data for the SCT. ext must not be NULL. * The SCT retains ownership of this pointer. * Returns length of the data pointed to. */ size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext); /* * Set the extensions of an SCT to point directly to the *ext specified. * The SCT takes ownership of the specified pointer. */ void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len); /* * Set the extensions of an SCT. * This takes a copy of the ext. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len); /* * Set *sig to point to the signature for the SCT. sig must not be NULL. * The SCT retains ownership of this pointer. * Returns length of the data pointed to. */ size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig); /* * Set the signature of an SCT to point directly to the *sig specified. * The SCT takes ownership of the specified pointer. */ void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); /* * Set the signature of an SCT to be a copy of the *sig specified. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); /* * The origin of this SCT, e.g. TLS extension, OCSP response, etc. */ sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct); /* * Set the origin of this SCT, e.g. TLS extension, OCSP response, etc. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ __owur int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source); /* * Returns a text string describing the validation status of |sct|. */ const char *SCT_validation_status_string(const SCT *sct); /* * Pretty-prints an |sct| to |out|. * It will be indented by the number of spaces specified by |indent|. * If |logs| is not NULL, it will be used to lookup the CT log that the SCT came * from, so that the log name can be printed. */ void SCT_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out, int indent, const CTLOG_STORE *logs); /* * Pretty-prints an |sct_list| to |out|. * It will be indented by the number of spaces specified by |indent|. * SCTs will be delimited by |separator|. * If |logs| is not NULL, it will be used to lookup the CT log that each SCT * came from, so that the log names can be printed. */ void SCT_LIST_print(const STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, BIO *out, int indent, const char *separator, const CTLOG_STORE *logs); /* * Gets the last result of validating this SCT. * If it has not been validated yet, returns SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET. */ sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct); /* * Validates the given SCT with the provided context. * Sets the "validation_status" field of the SCT. * Returns 1 if the SCT is valid and the signature verifies. * Returns 0 if the SCT is invalid or could not be verified. * Returns -1 if an error occurs. */ __owur int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /* * Validates the given list of SCTs with the provided context. * Sets the "validation_status" field of each SCT. * Returns 1 if there are no invalid SCTs and all signatures verify. * Returns 0 if at least one SCT is invalid or could not be verified. * Returns a negative integer if an error occurs. */ __owur int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); /********************************* * SCT parsing and serialisation * *********************************/ /* * Serialize (to TLS format) a stack of SCTs and return the length. * "a" must not be NULL. * If "pp" is NULL, just return the length of what would have been serialized. * If "pp" is not NULL and "*pp" is null, function will allocate a new pointer * for data that caller is responsible for freeing (only if function returns * successfully). * If "pp" is NULL and "*pp" is not NULL, caller is responsible for ensuring * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serialized data. * Returns < 0 on error, >= 0 indicating bytes written (or would have been) * on success. */ __owur int i2o_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp); /* * Convert TLS format SCT list to a stack of SCTs. * If "a" or "*a" is NULL, a new stack will be created that the caller is * responsible for freeing (by calling SCT_LIST_free). * "**pp" and "*pp" must not be NULL. * Upon success, "*pp" will point to after the last bytes read, and a stack * will be returned. * Upon failure, a NULL pointer will be returned, and the position of "*pp" is * not defined. */ STACK_OF(SCT) *o2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, size_t len); /* * Serialize (to DER format) a stack of SCTs and return the length. * "a" must not be NULL. * If "pp" is NULL, just returns the length of what would have been serialized. * If "pp" is not NULL and "*pp" is null, function will allocate a new pointer * for data that caller is responsible for freeing (only if function returns * successfully). * If "pp" is NULL and "*pp" is not NULL, caller is responsible for ensuring * that "*pp" is large enough to accept all of the serialized data. * Returns < 0 on error, >= 0 indicating bytes written (or would have been) * on success. */ __owur int i2d_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp); /* * Parses an SCT list in DER format and returns it. * If "a" or "*a" is NULL, a new stack will be created that the caller is * responsible for freeing (by calling SCT_LIST_free). * "**pp" and "*pp" must not be NULL. * Upon success, "*pp" will point to after the last bytes read, and a stack * will be returned. * Upon failure, a NULL pointer will be returned, and the position of "*pp" is * not defined. */ STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len); /* * Serialize (to TLS format) an |sct| and write it to |out|. * If |out| is null, no SCT will be output but the length will still be returned. * If |out| points to a null pointer, a string will be allocated to hold the * TLS-format SCT. It is the responsibility of the caller to free it. * If |out| points to an allocated string, the TLS-format SCT will be written * to it. * The length of the SCT in TLS format will be returned. */ __owur int i2o_SCT(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out); /* * Parses an SCT in TLS format and returns it. * If |psct| is not null, it will end up pointing to the parsed SCT. If it * already points to a non-null pointer, the pointer will be free'd. * |in| should be a pointer to a string containing the TLS-format SCT. * |in| will be advanced to the end of the SCT if parsing succeeds. * |len| should be the length of the SCT in |in|. * Returns NULL if an error occurs. * If the SCT is an unsupported version, only the SCT's 'sct' and 'sct_len' * fields will be populated (with |in| and |len| respectively). */ SCT *o2i_SCT(SCT **psct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len); /******************** * CT log functions * ********************/ /* * Creates a new CT log instance with the given |public_key| and |name|. * Takes ownership of |public_key| but copies |name|. * Returns NULL if malloc fails or if |public_key| cannot be converted to DER. * Should be deleted by the caller using CTLOG_free when no longer needed. */ CTLOG *CTLOG_new(EVP_PKEY *public_key, const char *name); /* * Creates a new CTLOG instance with the base64-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER * in |pkey_base64|. The |name| is a string to help users identify this log. * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. * Should be deleted by the caller using CTLOG_free when no longer needed. */ int CTLOG_new_from_base64(CTLOG ** ct_log, const char *pkey_base64, const char *name); /* * Deletes a CT log instance and its fields. */ void CTLOG_free(CTLOG *log); /* Gets the name of the CT log */ const char *CTLOG_get0_name(const CTLOG *log); /* Gets the ID of the CT log */ void CTLOG_get0_log_id(const CTLOG *log, const uint8_t **log_id, size_t *log_id_len); /* Gets the public key of the CT log */ EVP_PKEY *CTLOG_get0_public_key(const CTLOG *log); /************************** * CT log store functions * **************************/ /* * Creates a new CT log store. * Should be deleted by the caller using CTLOG_STORE_free when no longer needed. */ CTLOG_STORE *CTLOG_STORE_new(void); /* * Deletes a CT log store and all of the CT log instances held within. */ void CTLOG_STORE_free(CTLOG_STORE *store); /* * Finds a CT log in the store based on its log ID. * Returns the CT log, or NULL if no match is found. */ const CTLOG *CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(const CTLOG_STORE *store, const uint8_t *log_id, size_t log_id_len); /* * Loads a CT log list into a |store| from a |file|. * Returns 1 if loading is successful, or 0 otherwise. */ __owur int CTLOG_STORE_load_file(CTLOG_STORE *store, const char *file); /* * Loads the default CT log list into a |store|. * See internal/cryptlib.h for the environment variable and file path that are * consulted to find the default file. * Returns 1 if loading is successful, or 0 otherwise. */ __owur int CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(CTLOG_STORE *store); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_CT_strings(void); /* Error codes for the CT functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define CT_F_CTLOG_NEW 117 # define CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_BASE64 118 # define CT_F_CTLOG_NEW_FROM_CONF 119 # define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_CTX_NEW 122 # define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_FILE 123 # define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_LOAD_LOG 130 # define CT_F_CTLOG_STORE_NEW 131 # define CT_F_CT_BASE64_DECODE 124 # define CT_F_CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_NEW 133 # define CT_F_CT_V1_LOG_ID_FROM_PKEY 125 # define CT_F_I2O_SCT 107 # define CT_F_I2O_SCT_LIST 108 # define CT_F_I2O_SCT_SIGNATURE 109 # define CT_F_O2I_SCT 110 # define CT_F_O2I_SCT_LIST 111 # define CT_F_O2I_SCT_SIGNATURE 112 # define CT_F_SCT_CTX_NEW 126 # define CT_F_SCT_CTX_VERIFY 128 # define CT_F_SCT_NEW 100 # define CT_F_SCT_NEW_FROM_BASE64 127 # define CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID 101 # define CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS 114 # define CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID 115 # define CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE 116 # define CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE 102 # define CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID 103 # define CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION 104 /* Reason codes. */ # define CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR 108 # define CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH 100 # define CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID 109 # define CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID_KEY 110 # define CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_DESCRIPTION 111 # define CT_R_LOG_CONF_MISSING_KEY 112 # define CT_R_LOG_KEY_INVALID 113 # define CT_R_SCT_FUTURE_TIMESTAMP 116 # define CT_R_SCT_INVALID 104 # define CT_R_SCT_INVALID_SIGNATURE 107 # define CT_R_SCT_LIST_INVALID 105 # define CT_R_SCT_LOG_ID_MISMATCH 114 # define CT_R_SCT_NOT_SET 106 # define CT_R_SCT_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 115 # define CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID 101 # define CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE 102 # define CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 103 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/mdc2.h0000644000000000000000000000203513176625661016162 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_MDC2_H # define HEADER_MDC2_H # include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # define MDC2_BLOCK 8 # define MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 typedef struct mdc2_ctx_st { unsigned int num; unsigned char data[MDC2_BLOCK]; DES_cblock h, hh; int pad_type; /* either 1 or 2, default 1 */ } MDC2_CTX; int MDC2_Init(MDC2_CTX *c); int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, size_t len); int MDC2_Final(unsigned char *md, MDC2_CTX *c); unsigned char *MDC2(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/opensslv.h0000644000000000000000000001015613176625661017211 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H # define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * Numeric release version identifier: * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that. * For example: * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000 * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001 * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002 * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev) * 0.9.3 0x0090300f * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f * 0.9.4 0x0090400f * 1.2.3z 0x102031af * * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start * with 0x0090600S... * * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.) * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ # define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1010007fL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS # define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.0g-fips 2 Nov 2017" # else # define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.0g 2 Nov 2017" # endif /*- * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this: * * libcrypto.so.0.9 * * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major version number only: * * libcrypto.so.0 * * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the * versions in the version string of the library itself. * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would * give the following versions strings: * * 3.0 * 3.0:3.1 * 3.0:3.1:3.2 * 4.0 * 4.0:4.1 * * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and * therefore give the breach you can see. * * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered. * * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version. * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does. * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER, * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit). * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways, * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. */ # define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" # define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.1" #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/asn1_mac.h0000644000000000000000000000061313176625661017017 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #error "This file is obsolete; please update your software." openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/pkcs7.h0000644000000000000000000003771313176625661016377 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_PKCS7_H # define HEADER_PKCS7_H # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- Encryption_ID DES-CBC Digest_ID MD5 Digest_Encryption_ID rsaEncryption Key_Encryption_ID rsaEncryption */ typedef struct pkcs7_issuer_and_serial_st { X509_NAME *issuer; ASN1_INTEGER *serial; } PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL; typedef struct pkcs7_signer_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version 1 */ PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *issuer_and_serial; X509_ALGOR *digest_alg; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *auth_attr; /* [ 0 ] */ X509_ALGOR *digest_enc_alg; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_digest; STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *unauth_attr; /* [ 1 ] */ /* The private key to sign with */ EVP_PKEY *pkey; } PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO; DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) typedef struct pkcs7_recip_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version 0 */ PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *issuer_and_serial; X509_ALGOR *key_enc_algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_key; X509 *cert; /* get the pub-key from this */ } PKCS7_RECIP_INFO; DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) typedef struct pkcs7_signed_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version 1 */ STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_algs; /* md used */ STACK_OF(X509) *cert; /* [ 0 ] */ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl; /* [ 1 ] */ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *signer_info; struct pkcs7_st *contents; } PKCS7_SIGNED; /* * The above structure is very very similar to PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE. How about * merging the two */ typedef struct pkcs7_enc_content_st { ASN1_OBJECT *content_type; X509_ALGOR *algorithm; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_data; /* [ 0 ] */ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; } PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT; typedef struct pkcs7_enveloped_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version 0 */ STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *recipientinfo; PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *enc_data; } PKCS7_ENVELOPE; typedef struct pkcs7_signedandenveloped_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version 1 */ STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_algs; /* md used */ STACK_OF(X509) *cert; /* [ 0 ] */ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crl; /* [ 1 ] */ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *signer_info; PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *enc_data; STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *recipientinfo; } PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE; typedef struct pkcs7_digest_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version 0 */ X509_ALGOR *md; /* md used */ struct pkcs7_st *contents; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest; } PKCS7_DIGEST; typedef struct pkcs7_encrypted_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* version 0 */ PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT *enc_data; } PKCS7_ENCRYPT; typedef struct pkcs7_st { /* * The following is non NULL if it contains ASN1 encoding of this * structure */ unsigned char *asn1; long length; # define PKCS7_S_HEADER 0 # define PKCS7_S_BODY 1 # define PKCS7_S_TAIL 2 int state; /* used during processing */ int detached; ASN1_OBJECT *type; /* content as defined by the type */ /* * all encryption/message digests are applied to the 'contents', leaving * out the 'type' field. */ union { char *ptr; /* NID_pkcs7_data */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data; /* NID_pkcs7_signed */ PKCS7_SIGNED *sign; /* NID_pkcs7_enveloped */ PKCS7_ENVELOPE *enveloped; /* NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped */ PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE *signed_and_enveloped; /* NID_pkcs7_digest */ PKCS7_DIGEST *digest; /* NID_pkcs7_encrypted */ PKCS7_ENCRYPT *encrypted; /* Anything else */ ASN1_TYPE *other; } d; } PKCS7; DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS7) # define PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE 1 # define PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE 2 # define PKCS7_get_signed_attributes(si) ((si)->auth_attr) # define PKCS7_get_attributes(si) ((si)->unauth_attr) # define PKCS7_type_is_signed(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_signed) # define PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) # define PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_enveloped) # define PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(a) \ (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped) # define PKCS7_type_is_data(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_data) # define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest) # define PKCS7_set_detached(p,v) \ PKCS7_ctrl(p,PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE,v,NULL) # define PKCS7_get_detached(p) \ PKCS7_ctrl(p,PKCS7_OP_GET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE,0,NULL) # define PKCS7_is_detached(p7) (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7) && PKCS7_get_detached(p7)) /* S/MIME related flags */ # define PKCS7_TEXT 0x1 # define PKCS7_NOCERTS 0x2 # define PKCS7_NOSIGS 0x4 # define PKCS7_NOCHAIN 0x8 # define PKCS7_NOINTERN 0x10 # define PKCS7_NOVERIFY 0x20 # define PKCS7_DETACHED 0x40 # define PKCS7_BINARY 0x80 # define PKCS7_NOATTR 0x100 # define PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP 0x200 # define PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE 0x400 # define PKCS7_CRLFEOL 0x800 # define PKCS7_STREAM 0x1000 # define PKCS7_NOCRL 0x2000 # define PKCS7_PARTIAL 0x4000 # define PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST 0x8000 # define PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT 0x10000 /* Flags: for compatibility with older code */ # define SMIME_TEXT PKCS7_TEXT # define SMIME_NOCERTS PKCS7_NOCERTS # define SMIME_NOSIGS PKCS7_NOSIGS # define SMIME_NOCHAIN PKCS7_NOCHAIN # define SMIME_NOINTERN PKCS7_NOINTERN # define SMIME_NOVERIFY PKCS7_NOVERIFY # define SMIME_DETACHED PKCS7_DETACHED # define SMIME_BINARY PKCS7_BINARY # define SMIME_NOATTR PKCS7_NOATTR /* CRLF ASCII canonicalisation */ # define SMIME_ASCIICRLF 0x80000 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL) int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **p7); int i2d_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *p7); # endif PKCS7 *PKCS7_dup(PKCS7 *p7); PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **p7); int i2d_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *p7); int i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags); int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *in, int flags); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGNED) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENVELOPE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_DIGEST) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7_ENCRYPT) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS7) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY) DECLARE_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(PKCS7) DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(PKCS7) long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg); int PKCS7_set_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type); int PKCS7_set0_type_other(PKCS7 *p7, int type, ASN1_TYPE *other); int PKCS7_set_content(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7 *p7_data); int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *dgst); int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si); int PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i); int PKCS7_add_certificate(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509); int PKCS7_add_crl(PKCS7 *p7, X509_CRL *x509); int PKCS7_content_new(PKCS7 *p7, int nid); int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si); int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, X509 *x509); BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio); int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio); BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert); PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *dgst); X509 *PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si); int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md); STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7); PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *PKCS7_add_recipient(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509); void PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509_ALGOR **pdig, X509_ALGOR **psig); void PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509_ALGOR **penc); int PKCS7_add_recipient_info(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri); int PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509); int PKCS7_set_cipher(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); int PKCS7_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, PKCS7 *p7); PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk); int PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int type, void *data); int PKCS7_add_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype, void *value); ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid); ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid); int PKCS7_set_signed_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk); int PKCS7_set_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk); PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, int flags); PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_sign_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, int flags); int PKCS7_final(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags); int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags); STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags); PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int flags); int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags); int PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *cap); STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *PKCS7_get_smimecap(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si); int PKCS7_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *sk, int nid, int arg); int PKCS7_add_attrib_content_type(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_OBJECT *coid); int PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, ASN1_TIME *t); int PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, const unsigned char *md, int mdlen); int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags); PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont); BIO *BIO_new_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void); /* Error codes for the PKCS7 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB 136 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD0_ATTRIB_SIGNING_TIME 135 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_ATTRIB_SMIMECAP 118 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CERTIFICATE 100 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_CRL 101 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_RECIPIENT_INFO 102 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE 131 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER 103 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST 125 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_COPY_EXISTING_DIGEST 138 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_CTRL 104 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE 112 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL 128 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT 105 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY 107 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT 114 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO 133 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO 132 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCRYPT 115 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FINAL 134 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST 127 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_GET0_SIGNERS 124 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_SET 130 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CIPHER 108 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_CONTENT 109 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_DIGEST 126 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SET_TYPE 110 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN 116 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY 113 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SET 129 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN 139 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN_ADD_SIGNER 137 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIMPLE_SMIMECAP 119 # define PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY 117 /* Reason codes. */ # define PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR 117 # define PKCS7_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER 144 # define PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED 116 # define PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT 118 # define PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR 152 # define PKCS7_R_DECRYPT_ERROR 119 # define PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE 101 # define PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_CTRL_FAILURE 149 # define PKCS7_R_ENCRYPTION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE 150 # define PKCS7_R_ERROR_ADDING_RECIPIENT 120 # define PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER 121 # define PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER 143 # define PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE 155 # define PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT 122 # define PKCS7_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST 151 # define PKCS7_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST_TYPE_FOUND 154 # define PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE 115 # define PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNATURES_ON_DATA 123 # define PKCS7_R_NO_SIGNERS 142 # define PKCS7_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_THIS_TYPE 104 # define PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR 124 # define PKCS7_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR 153 # define PKCS7_R_PKCS7_DATASIGN 145 # define PKCS7_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE 127 # define PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE 105 # define PKCS7_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND 128 # define PKCS7_R_SIGNING_CTRL_FAILURE 147 # define PKCS7_R_SIGNING_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE 148 # define PKCS7_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR 129 # define PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE 106 # define PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO 107 # define PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST 108 # define PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE 109 # define PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_OPERATION 110 # define PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE 111 # define PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE 112 # define PKCS7_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE 113 # define PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE 114 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ec.h0000644000000000000000000021141013176625661015723 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #ifndef HEADER_EC_H # define HEADER_EC_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS # define OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS 661 # endif /** Enum for the point conversion form as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA) * for the encoding of a elliptic curve point (x,y) */ typedef enum { /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID = 6 } point_conversion_form_t; typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD; typedef struct ec_group_st EC_GROUP; typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT; typedef struct ecpk_parameters_st ECPKPARAMETERS; typedef struct ec_parameters_st ECPARAMETERS; /********************************************************************/ /* EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p) */ /********************************************************************/ /** Returns the basic GFp ec methods which provides the basis for the * optimized methods. * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void); /** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication. * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void); /** Returns GFp methods using optimized methods for NIST recommended curves * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp224 * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void); /** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp256 * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void); /** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp521 * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /********************************************************************/ /* EC_METHOD for curves over GF(2^m) */ /********************************************************************/ /** Returns the basic GF2m ec method * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void); # endif /********************************************************************/ /* EC_GROUP functions */ /********************************************************************/ /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object * \param meth EC_METHOD to use * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error. */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth); /** Frees a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object to be freed. */ void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group); /** Clears and frees a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object to be cleared and freed. */ void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group); /** Copies EC_GROUP objects. Note: both EC_GROUPs must use the same EC_METHOD. * \param dst destination EC_GROUP object * \param src source EC_GROUP object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dst, const EC_GROUP *src); /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object and copies the copies the content * form src to the newly created EC_KEY object * \param src source EC_GROUP object * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error. */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *src); /** Returns the EC_METHOD of the EC_GROUP object. * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return EC_METHOD used in this EC_GROUP object. */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the field type of the EC_METHOD. * \param meth EC_METHOD object * \return NID of the underlying field type OID. */ int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth); /** Sets the generator and it's order/cofactor of a EC_GROUP object. * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param generator EC_POINT object with the generator. * \param order the order of the group generated by the generator. * \param cofactor the index of the sub-group generated by the generator * in the group of all points on the elliptic curve. * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor); /** Returns the generator of a EC_GROUP object. * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the currently used generator (possibly NULL). */ const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the montgomery data for order(Generator) * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the currently used montgomery data (possibly NULL). */ BN_MONT_CTX *EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Gets the order of a EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param order BIGNUM to which the order is copied * \param ctx unused * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the order of an EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the group order */ const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Gets the number of bits of the order of an EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return number of bits of group order. */ int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Gets the cofactor of a EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param cofactor BIGNUM to which the cofactor is copied * \param ctx unused * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the cofactor of an EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the group cofactor */ const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Sets the name of a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param nid NID of the curve name OID */ void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid); /** Returns the curve name of a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return NID of the curve name OID or 0 if not set. */ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag); int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form); point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *); unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x); size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *); size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len); /** Sets the parameter of a ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the parameter of the ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM for the prime number * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /** Sets the parameter of a ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the parameter of the ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM for the polynomial defining the underlying field * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); # endif /** Returns the number of bits needed to represent a field element * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return number of bits needed to represent a field element */ int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Checks whether the parameter in the EC_GROUP define a valid ec group * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if group is a valid ec group and 0 otherwise */ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Checks whether the discriminant of the elliptic curve is zero or not * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if the discriminant is not zero and 0 otherwise */ int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Compares two EC_GROUP objects * \param a first EC_GROUP object * \param b second EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 0 if the groups are equal, 1 if not, or -1 on error */ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /* * EC_GROUP_new_GF*() calls EC_GROUP_new() and EC_GROUP_set_GF*() after * choosing an appropriate EC_METHOD */ /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined * over GFp (defined by the equation y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b) * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined * over GF2m (defined by the equation y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b) * \param p BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); # endif /** Creates a EC_GROUP object with a curve specified by a NID * \param nid NID of the OID of the curve name * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL * if an error occurred */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid); /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object from an ECPARAMETERS object * \param params pointer to the ECPARAMETERS object * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL * if an error occurred */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params); /** Creates an ECPARAMETERS object for the the given EC_GROUP object. * \param group pointer to the EC_GROUP object * \param params pointer to an existing ECPARAMETERS object or NULL * \return pointer to the new ECPARAMETERS object or NULL * if an error occurred. */ ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPARAMETERS *params); /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object from an ECPKPARAMETERS object * \param params pointer to an existing ECPKPARAMETERS object, or NULL * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve, or NULL * if an error occurred */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params); /** Creates an ECPKPARAMETERS object for the the given EC_GROUP object. * \param group pointer to the EC_GROUP object * \param params pointer to an existing ECPKPARAMETERS object or NULL * \return pointer to the new ECPKPARAMETERS object or NULL * if an error occurred. */ ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPKPARAMETERS *params); /********************************************************************/ /* handling of internal curves */ /********************************************************************/ typedef struct { int nid; const char *comment; } EC_builtin_curve; /* * EC_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t size) returns number of all * available curves or zero if a error occurred. In case r is not zero, * nitems EC_builtin_curve structures are filled with the data of the first * nitems internal groups */ size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems); const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid); int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name); /********************************************************************/ /* EC_POINT functions */ /********************************************************************/ /** Creates a new EC_POINT object for the specified EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP the underlying EC_GROUP object * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred */ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Frees a EC_POINT object * \param point EC_POINT object to be freed */ void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point); /** Clears and frees a EC_POINT object * \param point EC_POINT object to be cleared and freed */ void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point); /** Copies EC_POINT object * \param dst destination EC_POINT object * \param src source EC_POINT object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dst, const EC_POINT *src); /** Creates a new EC_POINT object and copies the content of the supplied * EC_POINT * \param src source EC_POINT object * \param group underlying the EC_GROUP object * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred */ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *src, const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the EC_METHOD used in EC_POINT object * \param point EC_POINT object * \return the EC_METHOD used */ const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point); /** Sets a point to infinity (neutral element) * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param point EC_POINT to set to infinity * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point); /** Sets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate * \param z BIGNUM with the z-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate * \param z BIGNUM for the z-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1) * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1) * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx); # endif /** Encodes a EC_POINT object to a octet string * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param form point conversion form * \param buf memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns * required buffer size. * \param len length of the memory buffer * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Decodes a EC_POINT from a octet string * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded ec point * \param len length of the encoded ec point * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Encodes an EC_POINT object to an allocated octet string * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param point EC_POINT object * \param form point conversion form * \param pbuf returns pointer to allocated buffer * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx); /* other interfaces to point2oct/oct2point: */ BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *); EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *, const char *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); /********************************************************************/ /* functions for doing EC_POINT arithmetic */ /********************************************************************/ /** Computes the sum of two EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = a + b) * \param a EC_POINT object with the first summand * \param b EC_POINT object with the second summand * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes the double of a EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = 2 * a) * \param a EC_POINT object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes the inverse of a EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param a EC_POINT object to be inverted (it's used for the result as well) * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Checks whether the point is the neutral element of the group * \param group the underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \return 1 if the point is the neutral element and 0 otherwise */ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p); /** Checks whether the point is on the curve * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param point EC_POINT object to check * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if not, or -1 on error */ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Compares two EC_POINTs * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param a first EC_POINT object * \param b second EC_POINT object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if the points are not equal, 0 if they are, or -1 on error */ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes r = generator * n + sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i] * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional) * \param num number further summands * \param p array of size num of EC_POINT objects * \param m array of size num of BIGNUM objects * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, size_t num, const EC_POINT *p[], const BIGNUM *m[], BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes r = generator * n + q * m * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional) * \param q EC_POINT object with the first factor of the second summand * \param m BIGNUM with the second factor of the second summand * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, const EC_POINT *q, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Stores multiples of generator for faster point multiplication * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Reports whether a precomputation has been done * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return 1 if a pre-computation has been done and 0 otherwise */ int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /********************************************************************/ /* ASN1 stuff */ /********************************************************************/ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ECPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS) /* * EC_GROUP_get_basis_type() returns the NID of the basis type used to * represent the field elements */ int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k); int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k1, unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3); # endif # define OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE 0x000 # define OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE 0x001 EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **, const unsigned char **in, long len); int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned char **out); # define d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_GROUP,NULL,d2i_ECPKParameters,bp,x) # define i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(EC_GROUP,i2d_ECPKParameters,bp,x) # define d2i_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) (EC_GROUP *)ASN1_d2i_fp(NULL, \ (char *(*)())d2i_ECPKParameters,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x)) # define i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_ECPKParameters,(fp), \ (unsigned char *)(x)) int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off); # endif /********************************************************************/ /* EC_KEY functions */ /********************************************************************/ /* some values for the encoding_flag */ # define EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS 0x001 # define EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY 0x002 /* some values for the flags field */ # define EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x1 # define EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED 0x2 # define EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH 0x1000 /** Creates a new EC_KEY object. * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void); int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags); void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags); /** Creates a new EC_KEY object using a named curve as underlying * EC_GROUP object. * \param nid NID of the named curve. * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid); /** Frees a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object to be freed. */ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *key); /** Copies a EC_KEY object. * \param dst destination EC_KEY object * \param src src EC_KEY object * \return dst or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src); /** Creates a new EC_KEY object and copies the content from src to it. * \param src the source EC_KEY object * \return newly created EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src); /** Increases the internal reference count of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *key); /** Returns the EC_GROUP object of a EC_KEY object * \param key EC_KEY object * \return the EC_GROUP object (possibly NULL). */ const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key); /** Sets the EC_GROUP of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param group EC_GROUP to use in the EC_KEY object (note: the EC_KEY * object will use an own copy of the EC_GROUP). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the private key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \return a BIGNUM with the private key (possibly NULL). */ const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key); /** Sets the private key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param prv BIGNUM with the private key (note: the EC_KEY object * will use an own copy of the BIGNUM). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv); /** Returns the public key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key the EC_KEY object * \return a EC_POINT object with the public key (possibly NULL) */ const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key); /** Sets the public key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param pub EC_POINT object with the public key (note: the EC_KEY object * will use an own copy of the EC_POINT object). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub); unsigned EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags); point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform); #define EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *key, int idx, void *arg); void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *key, int idx); /* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */ void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag); /** Creates a table of pre-computed multiples of the generator to * accelerate further EC_KEY operations. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Creates a new ec private (and optional a new public) key. * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key); /** Verifies that a private and/or public key is valid. * \param key the EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise. */ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key); /** Indicates if an EC_KEY can be used for signing. * \param eckey the EC_KEY object * \return 1 if can can sign and 0 otherwise. */ int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey); /** Sets a public key from affine coordinates performing * necessary NIST PKV tests. * \param key the EC_KEY object * \param x public key x coordinate * \param y public key y coordinate * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise. */ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y); /** Encodes an EC_KEY public key to an allocated octet string * \param key key to encode * \param form point conversion form * \param pbuf returns pointer to allocated buffer * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Decodes a EC_KEY public key from a octet string * \param key key to decode * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded ec point * \param len length of the encoded ec point * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Decodes an EC_KEY private key from an octet string * \param key key to decode * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded private key * \param len length of the encoded key * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); /** Encodes a EC_KEY private key to an octet string * \param key key to encode * \param buf memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns * required buffer size. * \param len length of the memory buffer * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); /** Encodes an EC_KEY private key to an allocated octet string * \param eckey key to encode * \param pbuf returns pointer to allocated buffer * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf); /********************************************************************/ /* de- and encoding functions for SEC1 ECPrivateKey */ /********************************************************************/ /** Decodes a private key from a memory buffer. * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL) * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded private key * \param len length of the DER encoded private key * \return the decoded private key or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len); /** Encodes a private key object and stores the result in a buffer. * \param key the EC_KEY object to encode * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number * of bytes needed). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out); /********************************************************************/ /* de- and encoding functions for EC parameters */ /********************************************************************/ /** Decodes ec parameter from a memory buffer. * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL) * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded ec parameters * \param len length of the DER encoded ec parameters * \return a EC_KEY object with the decoded parameters or NULL if an error * occurred. */ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len); /** Encodes ec parameter and stores the result in a buffer. * \param key the EC_KEY object with ec parameters to encode * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number * of bytes needed). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out); /********************************************************************/ /* de- and encoding functions for EC public key */ /* (octet string, not DER -- hence 'o2i' and 'i2o') */ /********************************************************************/ /** Decodes a ec public key from a octet string. * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used * \param in memory buffer with the encoded public key * \param len length of the encoded public key * \return EC_KEY object with decoded public key or NULL if an error * occurred. */ EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len); /** Encodes a ec public key in an octet string. * \param key the EC_KEY object with the public key * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number * of bytes needed). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out); /** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form. * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int ECParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key); /** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \param off line offset * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key, int off); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO /** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form. * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int ECParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key); /** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \param off line offset * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key, int off); # endif const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_OpenSSL(void); const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_default_method(void); void EC_KEY_set_default_method(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_method(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_method(EC_KEY *key, const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(ENGINE *engine); int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen, const EVP_MD *md); int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh, void *(*KDF) (const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)); typedef struct ECDSA_SIG_st ECDSA_SIG; /** Allocates and initialize a ECDSA_SIG structure * \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred */ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void); /** frees a ECDSA_SIG structure * \param sig pointer to the ECDSA_SIG structure */ void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig); /** DER encode content of ECDSA_SIG object (note: this function modifies *pp * (*pp += length of the DER encoded signature)). * \param sig pointer to the ECDSA_SIG object * \param pp pointer to a unsigned char pointer for the output or NULL * \return the length of the DER encoded ECDSA_SIG object or 0 */ int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, unsigned char **pp); /** Decodes a DER encoded ECDSA signature (note: this function changes *pp * (*pp += len)). * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG pointer (may be NULL) * \param pp memory buffer with the DER encoded signature * \param len length of the buffer * \return pointer to the decoded ECDSA_SIG structure (or NULL) */ ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **sig, const unsigned char **pp, long len); /** Accessor for r and s fields of ECDSA_SIG * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG pointer * \param pr pointer to BIGNUM pointer for r (may be NULL) * \param ps pointer to BIGNUM pointer for s (may be NULL) */ void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); /** Setter for r and s fields of ECDSA_SIG * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG pointer * \param r pointer to BIGNUM for r (may be NULL) * \param s pointer to BIGNUM for s (may be NULL) */ int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); /** Computes the ECDSA signature of the given hash value using * the supplied private key and returns the created signature. * \param dgst pointer to the hash value * \param dgst_len length of the hash value * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred */ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied * private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory). * \param dgst pointer to the hash value to sign * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param kinv BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional) * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional), * see ECDSA_sign_setup * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred */ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Verifies that the supplied signature is a valid ECDSA * signature of the supplied hash value using the supplied public key. * \param dgst pointer to the hash value * \param dgst_len length of the hash value * \param sig ECDSA_SIG structure * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a public EC key * \return 1 if the signature is valid, 0 if the signature is invalid * and -1 on error */ int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Precompute parts of the signing operation * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \param kinv BIGNUM pointer for the inverse of k * \param rp BIGNUM pointer for x coordinate of k * generator * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise */ int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp); /** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied * private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory). * \param type this parameter is ignored * \param dgst pointer to the hash value to sign * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param sig memory for the DER encoded created signature * \param siglen pointer to the length of the returned signature * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise */ int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied * private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory). * \param type this parameter is ignored * \param dgst pointer to the hash value to sign * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param sig buffer to hold the DER encoded signature * \param siglen pointer to the length of the returned signature * \param kinv BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional) * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional), * see ECDSA_sign_setup * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise */ int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Verifies that the given signature is valid ECDSA signature * of the supplied hash value using the specified public key. * \param type this parameter is ignored * \param dgst pointer to the hash value * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param sig pointer to the DER encoded signature * \param siglen length of the DER encoded signature * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a public EC key * \return 1 if the signature is valid, 0 if the signature is invalid * and -1 on error */ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Returns the maximum length of the DER encoded signature * \param eckey EC_KEY object * \return numbers of bytes required for the DER encoded signature */ int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *eckey); /********************************************************************/ /* EC_KEY_METHOD constructors, destructors, writers and accessors */ /********************************************************************/ EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_METHOD_new(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); void EC_KEY_METHOD_free(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*init)(EC_KEY *key), void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key), int (*copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src), int (*set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp), int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key), int (*set_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_keygen(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_compute_key(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*ckey)(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*sign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey), int (*sign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp), ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_verify(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*verify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey), int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pinit)(EC_KEY *key), void (**pfinish)(EC_KEY *key), int (**pcopy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src), int (**pset_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp), int (**pset_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key), int (**pset_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_keygen(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pkeygen)(EC_KEY *key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_compute_key(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pck)(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**psign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey), int (**psign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp), ECDSA_SIG *(**psign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pverify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey), int (**pverify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)); # define ECParameters_dup(x) ASN1_dup_of(EC_KEY,i2d_ECParameters,d2i_ECParameters,x) # ifndef __cplusplus # if defined(__SUNPRO_C) # if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520 # pragma error_messages (default,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE) # endif # endif # endif # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN|EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID, nid, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, flag) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN|EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC, flag, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, flag) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR, flag, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR, -2, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx, kdf) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, kdf, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, -2, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)md) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, pmd) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)pmd) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, len, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, plen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, 0, (void *)plen) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p, plen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM, plen, (void *)p) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM, 0, (void *)p) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10) /* KDF types */ # define EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE 1 # define EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 2 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_EC_strings(void); /* Error codes for the EC functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM 224 # define EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS 144 # define EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS 145 # define EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY 146 # define EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT 221 # define EC_F_ECDH_CMS_DECRYPT 238 # define EC_F_ECDH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO 239 # define EC_F_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY 246 # define EC_F_ECDH_SIMPLE_COMPUTE_KEY 257 # define EC_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN_EX 251 # define EC_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY 252 # define EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_EX 254 # define EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP 248 # define EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW 265 # define EC_F_ECDSA_VERIFY 253 # define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE 223 # define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE 212 # define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE 213 # define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE 214 # define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE 215 # define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE 216 # define EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM 220 # define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT 147 # define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 148 # define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT 149 # define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 150 # define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE 240 # define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE 243 # define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL 241 # define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW 244 # define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL 242 # define EC_F_ECX_KEY_OP 266 # define EC_F_ECX_PRIV_ENCODE 267 # define EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE 268 # define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE 153 # define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID 154 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY 208 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 159 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 195 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT 160 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT 161 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 162 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 163 # define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES 164 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE 133 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE 134 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL 131 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE 209 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR 132 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE 189 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE 225 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL 228 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 226 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE 230 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL 231 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 232 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE 233 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL 234 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 235 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL 200 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR 201 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE 202 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 165 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 166 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE 102 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT 103 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT 104 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE 137 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 167 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 168 # define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES 169 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK 170 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 171 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY 106 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M 172 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP 130 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE 173 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS 261 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS 262 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS 193 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS 194 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW 108 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME 174 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA 175 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS 263 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS 264 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M 176 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP 109 # define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR 111 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY 177 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY 178 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY 179 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW 182 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW_METHOD 245 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV 255 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT 180 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP 181 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT 256 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES 229 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY 258 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV 259 # define EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT 260 # define EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE 136 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD 112 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP 113 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY 114 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL 115 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M 183 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 116 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP 117 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT 210 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY 118 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE 119 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE 120 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW 121 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT 122 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT 123 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M 185 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 124 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M 186 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP 125 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP 126 # define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY 127 # define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW 196 # define EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL 187 # define EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT 188 # define EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS 190 # define EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS 191 # define EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY 192 # define EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY 151 # define EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW 227 # define EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW 236 # define EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW 237 # define EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY 152 # define EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE 222 # define EC_F_OSSL_ECDH_COMPUTE_KEY 247 # define EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG 249 # define EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG 250 # define EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE 269 # define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL 197 # define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR 198 # define EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE 217 # define EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN 199 # define EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN 219 # define EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN 218 /* Reason codes. */ # define EC_R_ASN1_ERROR 115 # define EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 156 # define EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE 144 # define EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 100 # define EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE 146 # define EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH 160 # define EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING 159 # define EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 117 # define EC_R_DECODE_ERROR 142 # define EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO 118 # define EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE 119 # define EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE 143 # define EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED 147 # define EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 120 # define EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 121 # define EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS 101 # define EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT 112 # define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT 110 # define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT 109 # define EC_R_INVALID_CURVE 141 # define EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST 151 # define EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE 138 # define EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING 102 # define EC_R_INVALID_FIELD 103 # define EC_R_INVALID_FORM 104 # define EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER 122 # define EC_R_INVALID_KEY 116 # define EC_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH 161 # define EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY 133 # define EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS 132 # define EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY 123 # define EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS 137 # define EC_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR 148 # define EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET 140 # define EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 124 # define EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY 125 # define EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES 157 # define EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME 135 # define EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 126 # define EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 111 # define EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET 139 # define EC_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE 154 # define EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED 152 # define EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 134 # define EC_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR 149 # define EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE 127 # define EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE 155 # define EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY 106 # define EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE 107 # define EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED 158 # define EC_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR 150 # define EC_R_SLOT_FULL 108 # define EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR 113 # define EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER 128 # define EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP 129 # define EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER 114 # define EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD 131 # define EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS 145 # define EC_R_WRONG_ORDER 130 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/lhash.h0000644000000000000000000001772113176625661016444 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Header for dynamic hash table routines Author - Eric Young */ #ifndef HEADER_LHASH_H # define HEADER_LHASH_H # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct lhash_node_st OPENSSL_LH_NODE; typedef int (*OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC) (const void *, const void *); typedef unsigned long (*OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC) (const void *); typedef void (*OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC) (void *); typedef void (*OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG) (void *, void *); typedef struct lhash_st OPENSSL_LHASH; /* * Macros for declaring and implementing type-safe wrappers for LHASH * callbacks. This way, callbacks can be provided to LHASH structures without * function pointer casting and the macro-defined callbacks provide * per-variable casting before deferring to the underlying type-specific * callbacks. NB: It is possible to place a "static" in front of both the * DECLARE and IMPLEMENT macros if the functions are strictly internal. */ /* First: "hash" functions */ # define DECLARE_LHASH_HASH_FN(name, o_type) \ unsigned long name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *); # define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(name, o_type) \ unsigned long name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *arg) { \ const o_type *a = arg; \ return name##_hash(a); } # define LHASH_HASH_FN(name) name##_LHASH_HASH /* Second: "compare" functions */ # define DECLARE_LHASH_COMP_FN(name, o_type) \ int name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *, const void *); # define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(name, o_type) \ int name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) { \ const o_type *a = arg1; \ const o_type *b = arg2; \ return name##_cmp(a,b); } # define LHASH_COMP_FN(name) name##_LHASH_COMP /* Fourth: "doall_arg" functions */ # define DECLARE_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(name, o_type, a_type) \ void name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(void *, void *); # define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(name, o_type, a_type) \ void name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(void *arg1, void *arg2) { \ o_type *a = arg1; \ a_type *b = arg2; \ name##_doall_arg(a, b); } # define LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(name) name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG # define LH_LOAD_MULT 256 int OPENSSL_LH_error(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); OPENSSL_LHASH *OPENSSL_LH_new(OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC h, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC c); void OPENSSL_LH_free(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); void *OPENSSL_LH_insert(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, void *data); void *OPENSSL_LH_delete(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data); void *OPENSSL_LH_retrieve(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data); void OPENSSL_LH_doall(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func); void OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func, void *arg); unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_strhash(const char *c); unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_num_items(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); void OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, unsigned long down_load); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void OPENSSL_LH_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp); void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp); void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, FILE *fp); # endif void OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out); void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out); void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, BIO *out); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define _LHASH OPENSSL_LHASH # define LHASH_NODE OPENSSL_LH_NODE # define lh_error OPENSSL_LH_error # define lh_new OPENSSL_lh_new # define lh_free OPENSSL_LH_free # define lh_insert OPENSSL_LH_insert # define lh_delete OPENSSL_LH_delete # define lh_retrieve OPENSSL_LH_retrieve # define lh_doall OPENSSL_LH_doall # define lh_doall_arg OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg # define lh_strhash OPENSSL_LH_strhash # define lh_num_items OPENSSL_LH_num_items # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # define lh_stats OPENSSL_LH_stats # define lh_node_stats OPENSSL_LH_node_stats # define lh_node_usage_stats OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats # endif # define lh_stats_bio OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio # define lh_node_stats_bio OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio # define lh_node_usage_stats_bio OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio # endif /* Type checking... */ # define LHASH_OF(type) struct lhash_st_##type # define DEFINE_LHASH_OF(type) \ LHASH_OF(type) { union lh_##type##_dummy { void* d1; unsigned long d2; int d3; } dummy; }; \ static ossl_inline LHASH_OF(type) * \ lh_##type##_new(unsigned long (*hfn)(const type *), \ int (*cfn)(const type *, const type *)) \ { \ return (LHASH_OF(type) *) \ OPENSSL_LH_new((OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC)hfn, (OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC)cfn); \ } \ static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_free(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \ { \ OPENSSL_LH_free((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \ } \ static ossl_inline type *lh_##type##_insert(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, type *d) \ { \ return (type *)OPENSSL_LH_insert((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, d); \ } \ static ossl_inline type *lh_##type##_delete(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, const type *d) \ { \ return (type *)OPENSSL_LH_delete((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, d); \ } \ static ossl_inline type *lh_##type##_retrieve(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, const type *d) \ { \ return (type *)OPENSSL_LH_retrieve((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, d); \ } \ static ossl_inline int lh_##type##_error(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \ { \ return OPENSSL_LH_error((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \ } \ static ossl_inline unsigned long lh_##type##_num_items(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \ { \ return OPENSSL_LH_num_items((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \ } \ static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_node_stats_bio(const LHASH_OF(type) *lh, BIO *out) \ { \ OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio((const OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, out); \ } \ static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_node_usage_stats_bio(const LHASH_OF(type) *lh, BIO *out) \ { \ OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio((const OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, out); \ } \ static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_stats_bio(const LHASH_OF(type) *lh, BIO *out) \ { \ OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio((const OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, out); \ } \ static ossl_inline unsigned long lh_##type##_get_down_load(LHASH_OF(type) *lh) \ { \ return OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh); \ } \ static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_set_down_load(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, unsigned long dl) \ { \ OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, dl); \ } \ static ossl_inline void lh_##type##_doall(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, \ void (*doall)(type *)) \ { \ OPENSSL_LH_doall((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)doall); \ } \ LHASH_OF(type) #define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(type, argtype) \ int_implement_lhash_doall(type, argtype, const type) #define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(type, argtype) \ int_implement_lhash_doall(type, argtype, type) #define int_implement_lhash_doall(type, argtype, cbargtype) \ static ossl_inline void \ lh_##type##_doall_##argtype(LHASH_OF(type) *lh, \ void (*fn)(cbargtype *, argtype *), \ argtype *arg) \ { \ OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg((OPENSSL_LHASH *)lh, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG)fn, (void *)arg); \ } \ LHASH_OF(type) DEFINE_LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING); # ifdef _MSC_VER /* * push and pop this warning: * warning C4090: 'function': different 'const' qualifiers */ # pragma warning (push) # pragma warning (disable: 4090) # endif DEFINE_LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_CSTRING); # ifdef _MSC_VER # pragma warning (pop) # endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/pem.h0000644000000000000000000005031013176625661016115 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_PEM_H # define HEADER_PEM_H # include # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define PEM_BUFSIZE 1024 # define PEM_STRING_X509_OLD "X509 CERTIFICATE" # define PEM_STRING_X509 "CERTIFICATE" # define PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" # define PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD "NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST" # define PEM_STRING_X509_REQ "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" # define PEM_STRING_X509_CRL "X509 CRL" # define PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY "ANY PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PUBLIC "PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_RSA "RSA PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC "RSA PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_DSA "DSA PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_DSA_PUBLIC "DSA PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS7 "PKCS7" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS7_SIGNED "PKCS #7 SIGNED DATA" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS8 "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF "PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS "DH PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS "X9.42 DH PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION "SSL SESSION PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_DSAPARAMS "DSA PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_ECDSA_PUBLIC "ECDSA PUBLIC KEY" # define PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS "EC PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY "EC PRIVATE KEY" # define PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS "PARAMETERS" # define PEM_STRING_CMS "CMS" # define PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED 10 # define PEM_TYPE_MIC_ONLY 20 # define PEM_TYPE_MIC_CLEAR 30 # define PEM_TYPE_CLEAR 40 typedef struct pem_recip_st { char *name; X509_NAME *dn; int cipher; int key_enc; /* char iv[8]; unused and wrong size */ } PEM_USER; typedef struct pem_ctx_st { int type; /* what type of object */ struct { int version; int mode; } proc_type; char *domain; struct { int cipher; /*- unused, and wrong size unsigned char iv[8]; */ } DEK_info; PEM_USER *originator; int num_recipient; PEM_USER **recipient; /*- XXX(ben): don#t think this is used! STACK *x509_chain; / * certificate chain */ EVP_MD *md; /* signature type */ int md_enc; /* is the md encrypted or not? */ int md_len; /* length of md_data */ char *md_data; /* message digest, could be pkey encrypted */ EVP_CIPHER *dec; /* date encryption cipher */ int key_len; /* key length */ unsigned char *key; /* key */ /*- unused, and wrong size unsigned char iv[8]; */ int data_enc; /* is the data encrypted */ int data_len; unsigned char *data; } PEM_CTX; /* * These macros make the PEM_read/PEM_write functions easier to maintain and * write. Now they are all implemented with either: IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(...) or * IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_cb(...) */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) /**/ # else # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ type *PEM_read_##name(FILE *fp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\ { \ return PEM_ASN1_read((d2i_of_void *)d2i_##asn1, str,fp,(void **)x,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, const type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,(void *)x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \ void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, \ void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # endif # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ type *PEM_read_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)\ { \ return PEM_ASN1_read_bio((d2i_of_void *)d2i_##asn1, str,bp,(void **)x,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, const type *x) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,(void *)x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) \ { \ return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_##asn1,str,bp,(void *)x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_bio_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_fp_const(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_fp(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_const(name, type, str, asn1) # define IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_cb(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_read(name, type, str, asn1) \ IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(name, type, str, asn1) /* These are the same except they are for the declarations */ # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) # define DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type) /**/ # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) /**/ # else # define DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) \ type *PEM_read_##name(FILE *fp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, const type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) \ int PEM_write_##name(FILE *fp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # endif # define DECLARE_PEM_read_bio(name, type) \ type *PEM_read_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(name, type) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, const type *x); # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type) \ int PEM_write_bio_##name(BIO *bp, type *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, \ unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # define DECLARE_PEM_write(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_fp(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_write_const(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_bio_const(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_write_cb(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_bio(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_cb_fp(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read_bio(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read_fp(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_rw(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_const(name, type) # define DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_read(name, type) \ DECLARE_PEM_write_cb(name, type) typedef int pem_password_cb (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher); int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *len, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u); int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len); int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *hdr, const unsigned char *data, long len); int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); void *PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, BIO *bp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cd, void *u); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len); int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *hdr, const unsigned char *data, long len); void *PEM_ASN1_read(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, FILE *fp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_ASN1_write(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, FILE *fp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u); STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); #endif int PEM_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD *type); int PEM_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, unsigned int cnt); int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key); void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type); void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str); # include DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509, X509) DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_AUX, X509) DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_REQ, X509_REQ) DECLARE_PEM_write(X509_REQ_NEW, X509_REQ) DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_CRL, X509_CRL) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS7, PKCS7) DECLARE_PEM_rw(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8, X509_SIG) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(RSAPrivateKey, RSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(DSAPrivateKey, DSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DSAparams, DSA) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP) DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY) DECLARE_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY) # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DHparams, DH) DECLARE_PEM_write_const(DHxparams, DH) # endif DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(PrivateKey, EVP_PKEY) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PUBKEY, EVP_PKEY) int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *, EVP_PKEY *, const EVP_CIPHER *, char *, int, pem_password_cb *, void *); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cd, void *u); # endif EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x); int PEM_write_bio_Parameters(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length); EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length); EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in); EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in); int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk); int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); # endif # endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_PEM_strings(void); /* Error codes for the PEM functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define PEM_F_B2I_DSS 127 # define PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO 128 # define PEM_F_B2I_RSA 129 # define PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA 130 # define PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA 131 # define PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_BIO 120 # define PEM_F_D2I_PKCS8PRIVATEKEY_FP 121 # define PEM_F_DO_B2I 132 # define PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO 133 # define PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER 134 # define PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY 126 # define PEM_F_DO_PK8PKEY_FP 125 # define PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY 135 # define PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER 136 # define PEM_F_I2B_PVK 137 # define PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO 138 # define PEM_F_LOAD_IV 101 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ 102 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ_BIO 103 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE 104 # define PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO 105 # define PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK 100 # define PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER 106 # define PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO 107 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ 108 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO 109 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_DHPARAMS 141 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PARAMETERS 140 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_PRIVATEKEY 123 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_DHPARAMS 142 # define PEM_F_PEM_READ_PRIVATEKEY 124 # define PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL 112 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE 113 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO 114 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY 139 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ 115 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO 116 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO 117 /* Reason codes. */ # define PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE 100 # define PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT 101 # define PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE 102 # define PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS 103 # define PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER 116 # define PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ 104 # define PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER 117 # define PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE 118 # define PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL 127 # define PEM_R_ERROR_CONVERTING_PRIVATE_KEY 115 # define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB 119 # define PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB 120 # define PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG 128 # define PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER 121 # define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR 122 # define PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT 123 # define PEM_R_MISSING_DEK_IV 129 # define PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO 105 # define PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED 106 # define PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE 107 # define PEM_R_NO_START_LINE 108 # define PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD 109 # define PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT 124 # define PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT 125 # define PEM_R_READ_KEY 111 # define PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER 112 # define PEM_R_UNEXPECTED_DEK_IV 130 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 113 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION 114 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS 126 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/pkcs12.h0000644000000000000000000003130713176625661016444 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_PKCS12_H # define HEADER_PKCS12_H # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define PKCS12_KEY_ID 1 # define PKCS12_IV_ID 2 # define PKCS12_MAC_ID 3 /* Default iteration count */ # ifndef PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER # define PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER # endif # define PKCS12_MAC_KEY_LENGTH 20 # define PKCS12_SALT_LEN 8 /* It's not clear if these are actually needed... */ # define PKCS12_key_gen PKCS12_key_gen_utf8 # define PKCS12_add_friendlyname PKCS12_add_friendlyname_utf8 /* MS key usage constants */ # define KEY_EX 0x10 # define KEY_SIG 0x80 typedef struct PKCS12_MAC_DATA_st PKCS12_MAC_DATA; typedef struct PKCS12_st PKCS12; typedef struct PKCS12_SAFEBAG_st PKCS12_SAFEBAG; DEFINE_STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) typedef struct pkcs12_bag_st PKCS12_BAGS; # define PKCS12_ERROR 0 # define PKCS12_OK 1 /* Compatibility macros */ #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define M_PKCS12_bag_type PKCS12_bag_type # define M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type PKCS12_cert_bag_type # define M_PKCS12_crl_bag_type PKCS12_cert_bag_type # define PKCS12_certbag2x509 PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert # define PKCS12_certbag2scrl PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_crl # define PKCS12_bag_type PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid # define PKCS12_cert_bag_type PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid # define PKCS12_x5092certbag PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert # define PKCS12_x509crl2certbag PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_crl # define PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf # define PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt #endif DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, int attr_nid)) ASN1_TYPE *PKCS8_get_attr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int attr_nid); int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12); void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac, const X509_ALGOR **pmacalg, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **psalt, const ASN1_INTEGER **piter, const PKCS12 *p12); const ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attr(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, int attr_nid); const ASN1_OBJECT *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_type(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); int PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get_bag_nid(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); X509 *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_cert(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); X509_CRL *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get1_crl(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); const STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) * PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_safes(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_p8inf(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); const X509_SIG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_pkcs8(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_cert(X509 *x509); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_crl(X509_CRL *crl); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_p8inf(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create0_pkcs8(X509_SIG *p8); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_SAFEBAG_create_pkcs8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int nid1, int nid2); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(const X509_SIG *p8, const char *pass, int passlen); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_decrypt_skey(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen); X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8); X509_SIG *PKCS8_set0_pbe(const char *pass, int passlen, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, X509_ALGOR *pbe); PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk); STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7); PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags); STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass, int passlen); int PKCS12_pack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12, STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes); STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12); int PKCS12_add_localkeyid(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *name, int namelen); int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name, int namelen); int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_utf8(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name, int namelen); int PKCS12_add_CSPName_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name, int namelen); int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const unsigned char *name, int namelen); int PKCS8_add_keyusage(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int usage); ASN1_TYPE *PKCS12_get_attr_gen(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrs, int attr_nid); char *PKCS12_get_friendlyname(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * PKCS12_SAFEBAG_get0_attrs(const PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag); unsigned char *PKCS12_pbe_crypt(const X509_ALGOR *algor, const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, unsigned char **data, int *datalen, int en_de); void *PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(const X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const char *pass, int passlen, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct, int zbuf); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const char *pass, int passlen, void *obj, int zbuf); PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode); int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type); int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type); int PKCS12_key_gen_utf8(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int id, int iter, int n, unsigned char *out, const EVP_MD *md_type); int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md_type, int en_de); int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen); int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen); int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, const EVP_MD *md_type); int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, const EVP_MD *md_type); unsigned char *OPENSSL_asc2uni(const char *asc, int asclen, unsigned char **uni, int *unilen); char *OPENSSL_uni2asc(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen); unsigned char *OPENSSL_utf82uni(const char *asc, int asclen, unsigned char **uni, int *unilen); char *OPENSSL_uni2utf8(const unsigned char *uni, int unilen); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_MAC_DATA) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS12_BAGS) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES) void PKCS12_PBE_add(void); int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca); PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_cert(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, X509 *cert); PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_key(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, EVP_PKEY *key, int key_usage, int iter, int key_nid, const char *pass); int PKCS12_add_safe(STACK_OF(PKCS7) **psafes, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, int safe_nid, int iter, const char *pass); PKCS12 *PKCS12_add_safes(STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes, int p7_nid); int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 *p12); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int i2d_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 *p12); # endif PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS12 **p12); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **p12); # endif int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_PKCS12_strings(void); /* Error codes for the PKCS12 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_CREATE 105 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC 107 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT 109 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I 106 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT 108 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG 117 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC 110 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI 111 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UTF8 116 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS 128 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA 114 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA 115 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE 118 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT 119 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN 120 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_P8INF 112 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE0_PKCS8 113 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_CREATE_PKCS8_ENCRYPT 133 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC 122 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC 123 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES 130 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA 131 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC 126 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ENCRYPT 125 # define PKCS12_F_PKCS8_SET0_PBE 132 /* Reason codes. */ # define PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE 100 # define PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA 121 # define PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR 101 # define PKCS12_R_ENCODE_ERROR 102 # define PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR 103 # define PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE 120 # define PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT 104 # define PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER 105 # define PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR 106 # define PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR 107 # define PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT 108 # define PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR 109 # define PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR 110 # define PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR 111 # define PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE 113 # define PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR 114 # define PKCS12_R_PKCS12_ALGOR_CIPHERINIT_ERROR 115 # define PKCS12_R_PKCS12_CIPHERFINAL_ERROR 116 # define PKCS12_R_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT_ERROR 117 # define PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM 118 # define PKCS12_R_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS12_MODE 119 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/stack.h0000644000000000000000000000545413176625661016452 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_STACK_H # define HEADER_STACK_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct stack_st OPENSSL_STACK; /* Use STACK_OF(...) instead */ typedef int (*OPENSSL_sk_compfunc)(const void *, const void *); typedef void (*OPENSSL_sk_freefunc)(void *); typedef void *(*OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc)(const void *); int OPENSSL_sk_num(const OPENSSL_STACK *); void *OPENSSL_sk_value(const OPENSSL_STACK *, int); void *OPENSSL_sk_set(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int i, const void *data); OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_compfunc cmp); OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new_null(void); void OPENSSL_sk_free(OPENSSL_STACK *); void OPENSSL_sk_pop_free(OPENSSL_STACK *st, void (*func) (void *)); OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK *, OPENSSL_sk_copyfunc c, OPENSSL_sk_freefunc f); int OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, const void *data, int where); void *OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int loc); void *OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *p); int OPENSSL_sk_find(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data); int OPENSSL_sk_find_ex(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data); int OPENSSL_sk_push(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data); int OPENSSL_sk_unshift(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data); void *OPENSSL_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STACK *st); void *OPENSSL_sk_pop(OPENSSL_STACK *st); void OPENSSL_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STACK *st); OPENSSL_sk_compfunc OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_compfunc cmp); OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK *st); void OPENSSL_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STACK *st); int OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(const OPENSSL_STACK *st); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define _STACK OPENSSL_STACK # define sk_num OPENSSL_sk_num # define sk_value OPENSSL_sk_value # define sk_set OPENSSL_sk_set # define sk_new OPENSSL_sk_new # define sk_new_null OPENSSL_sk_new_null # define sk_free OPENSSL_sk_free # define sk_pop_free OPENSSL_sk_pop_free # define sk_deep_copy OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy # define sk_insert OPENSSL_sk_insert # define sk_delete OPENSSL_sk_delete # define sk_delete_ptr OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr # define sk_find OPENSSL_sk_find # define sk_find_ex OPENSSL_sk_find_ex # define sk_push OPENSSL_sk_push # define sk_unshift OPENSSL_sk_unshift # define sk_shift OPENSSL_sk_shift # define sk_pop OPENSSL_sk_pop # define sk_zero OPENSSL_sk_zero # define sk_set_cmp_func OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func # define sk_dup OPENSSL_sk_dup # define sk_sort OPENSSL_sk_sort # define sk_is_sorted OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted # endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/obj_mac.h0000644000000000000000000056534113176625661016745 0ustar rootroot/* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/objects.pl * * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define SN_undef "UNDEF" #define LN_undef "undefined" #define NID_undef 0 #define OBJ_undef 0L #define SN_itu_t "ITU-T" #define LN_itu_t "itu-t" #define NID_itu_t 645 #define OBJ_itu_t 0L #define NID_ccitt 404 #define OBJ_ccitt OBJ_itu_t #define SN_iso "ISO" #define LN_iso "iso" #define NID_iso 181 #define OBJ_iso 1L #define SN_joint_iso_itu_t "JOINT-ISO-ITU-T" #define LN_joint_iso_itu_t "joint-iso-itu-t" #define NID_joint_iso_itu_t 646 #define OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t 2L #define NID_joint_iso_ccitt 393 #define OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t #define SN_member_body "member-body" #define LN_member_body "ISO Member Body" #define NID_member_body 182 #define OBJ_member_body OBJ_iso,2L #define SN_identified_organization "identified-organization" #define NID_identified_organization 676 #define OBJ_identified_organization OBJ_iso,3L #define SN_hmac_md5 "HMAC-MD5" #define LN_hmac_md5 "hmac-md5" #define NID_hmac_md5 780 #define OBJ_hmac_md5 OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,1L #define SN_hmac_sha1 "HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_hmac_sha1 "hmac-sha1" #define NID_hmac_sha1 781 #define OBJ_hmac_sha1 OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,2L #define SN_certicom_arc "certicom-arc" #define NID_certicom_arc 677 #define OBJ_certicom_arc OBJ_identified_organization,132L #define SN_international_organizations "international-organizations" #define LN_international_organizations "International Organizations" #define NID_international_organizations 647 #define OBJ_international_organizations OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t,23L #define SN_wap "wap" #define NID_wap 678 #define OBJ_wap OBJ_international_organizations,43L #define SN_wap_wsg "wap-wsg" #define NID_wap_wsg 679 #define OBJ_wap_wsg OBJ_wap,1L #define SN_selected_attribute_types "selected-attribute-types" #define LN_selected_attribute_types "Selected Attribute Types" #define NID_selected_attribute_types 394 #define OBJ_selected_attribute_types OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t,5L,1L,5L #define SN_clearance "clearance" #define NID_clearance 395 #define OBJ_clearance OBJ_selected_attribute_types,55L #define SN_ISO_US "ISO-US" #define LN_ISO_US "ISO US Member Body" #define NID_ISO_US 183 #define OBJ_ISO_US OBJ_member_body,840L #define SN_X9_57 "X9-57" #define LN_X9_57 "X9.57" #define NID_X9_57 184 #define OBJ_X9_57 OBJ_ISO_US,10040L #define SN_X9cm "X9cm" #define LN_X9cm "X9.57 CM ?" #define NID_X9cm 185 #define OBJ_X9cm OBJ_X9_57,4L #define SN_dsa "DSA" #define LN_dsa "dsaEncryption" #define NID_dsa 116 #define OBJ_dsa OBJ_X9cm,1L #define SN_dsaWithSHA1 "DSA-SHA1" #define LN_dsaWithSHA1 "dsaWithSHA1" #define NID_dsaWithSHA1 113 #define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 OBJ_X9cm,3L #define SN_ansi_X9_62 "ansi-X9-62" #define LN_ansi_X9_62 "ANSI X9.62" #define NID_ansi_X9_62 405 #define OBJ_ansi_X9_62 OBJ_ISO_US,10045L #define OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType OBJ_ansi_X9_62,1L #define SN_X9_62_prime_field "prime-field" #define NID_X9_62_prime_field 406 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime_field OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType,1L #define SN_X9_62_characteristic_two_field "characteristic-two-field" #define NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field 407 #define OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType,2L #define SN_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis "id-characteristic-two-basis" #define NID_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis 680 #define OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field,3L #define SN_X9_62_onBasis "onBasis" #define NID_X9_62_onBasis 681 #define OBJ_X9_62_onBasis OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,1L #define SN_X9_62_tpBasis "tpBasis" #define NID_X9_62_tpBasis 682 #define OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,2L #define SN_X9_62_ppBasis "ppBasis" #define NID_X9_62_ppBasis 683 #define OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,3L #define OBJ_X9_62_id_publicKeyType OBJ_ansi_X9_62,2L #define SN_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey "id-ecPublicKey" #define NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey 408 #define OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey OBJ_X9_62_id_publicKeyType,1L #define OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve OBJ_ansi_X9_62,3L #define OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve,0L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 "c2pnb163v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 684 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,1L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 "c2pnb163v2" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 685 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,2L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 "c2pnb163v3" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 686 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,3L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 "c2pnb176v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 687 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,4L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 "c2tnb191v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 688 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,5L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 "c2tnb191v2" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 689 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,6L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 "c2tnb191v3" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 690 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,7L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb191v4 "c2onb191v4" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb191v4 691 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,8L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb191v5 "c2onb191v5" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb191v5 692 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,9L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 "c2pnb208w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 693 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,10L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 "c2tnb239v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 694 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,11L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 "c2tnb239v2" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 695 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,12L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 "c2tnb239v3" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 696 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,13L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb239v4 "c2onb239v4" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb239v4 697 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,14L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb239v5 "c2onb239v5" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb239v5 698 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,15L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 "c2pnb272w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 699 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,16L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 "c2pnb304w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 700 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,17L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 "c2tnb359v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 701 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,18L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 "c2pnb368w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 702 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,19L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 "c2tnb431r1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 703 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,20L #define OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve,1L #define SN_X9_62_prime192v1 "prime192v1" #define NID_X9_62_prime192v1 409 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,1L #define SN_X9_62_prime192v2 "prime192v2" #define NID_X9_62_prime192v2 410 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,2L #define SN_X9_62_prime192v3 "prime192v3" #define NID_X9_62_prime192v3 411 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,3L #define SN_X9_62_prime239v1 "prime239v1" #define NID_X9_62_prime239v1 412 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,4L #define SN_X9_62_prime239v2 "prime239v2" #define NID_X9_62_prime239v2 413 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,5L #define SN_X9_62_prime239v3 "prime239v3" #define NID_X9_62_prime239v3 414 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,6L #define SN_X9_62_prime256v1 "prime256v1" #define NID_X9_62_prime256v1 415 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,7L #define OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType OBJ_ansi_X9_62,4L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA1 "ecdsa-with-SHA1" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1 416 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1 OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,1L #define SN_ecdsa_with_Recommended "ecdsa-with-Recommended" #define NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended 791 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,2L #define SN_ecdsa_with_Specified "ecdsa-with-Specified" #define NID_ecdsa_with_Specified 792 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,3L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA224 "ecdsa-with-SHA224" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224 793 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,1L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA256 "ecdsa-with-SHA256" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256 794 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,2L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA384 "ecdsa-with-SHA384" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384 795 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,3L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA512 "ecdsa-with-SHA512" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512 796 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,4L #define OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve OBJ_certicom_arc,0L #define SN_secp112r1 "secp112r1" #define NID_secp112r1 704 #define OBJ_secp112r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,6L #define SN_secp112r2 "secp112r2" #define NID_secp112r2 705 #define OBJ_secp112r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,7L #define SN_secp128r1 "secp128r1" #define NID_secp128r1 706 #define OBJ_secp128r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,28L #define SN_secp128r2 "secp128r2" #define NID_secp128r2 707 #define OBJ_secp128r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,29L #define SN_secp160k1 "secp160k1" #define NID_secp160k1 708 #define OBJ_secp160k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,9L #define SN_secp160r1 "secp160r1" #define NID_secp160r1 709 #define OBJ_secp160r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,8L #define SN_secp160r2 "secp160r2" #define NID_secp160r2 710 #define OBJ_secp160r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,30L #define SN_secp192k1 "secp192k1" #define NID_secp192k1 711 #define OBJ_secp192k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,31L #define SN_secp224k1 "secp224k1" #define NID_secp224k1 712 #define OBJ_secp224k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,32L #define SN_secp224r1 "secp224r1" #define NID_secp224r1 713 #define OBJ_secp224r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,33L #define SN_secp256k1 "secp256k1" #define NID_secp256k1 714 #define OBJ_secp256k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,10L #define SN_secp384r1 "secp384r1" #define NID_secp384r1 715 #define OBJ_secp384r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,34L #define SN_secp521r1 "secp521r1" #define NID_secp521r1 716 #define OBJ_secp521r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,35L #define SN_sect113r1 "sect113r1" #define NID_sect113r1 717 #define OBJ_sect113r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,4L #define SN_sect113r2 "sect113r2" #define NID_sect113r2 718 #define OBJ_sect113r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,5L #define SN_sect131r1 "sect131r1" #define NID_sect131r1 719 #define OBJ_sect131r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,22L #define SN_sect131r2 "sect131r2" #define NID_sect131r2 720 #define OBJ_sect131r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,23L #define SN_sect163k1 "sect163k1" #define NID_sect163k1 721 #define OBJ_sect163k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,1L #define SN_sect163r1 "sect163r1" #define NID_sect163r1 722 #define OBJ_sect163r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,2L #define SN_sect163r2 "sect163r2" #define NID_sect163r2 723 #define OBJ_sect163r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,15L #define SN_sect193r1 "sect193r1" #define NID_sect193r1 724 #define OBJ_sect193r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,24L #define SN_sect193r2 "sect193r2" #define NID_sect193r2 725 #define OBJ_sect193r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,25L #define SN_sect233k1 "sect233k1" #define NID_sect233k1 726 #define OBJ_sect233k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,26L #define SN_sect233r1 "sect233r1" #define NID_sect233r1 727 #define OBJ_sect233r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,27L #define SN_sect239k1 "sect239k1" #define NID_sect239k1 728 #define OBJ_sect239k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,3L #define SN_sect283k1 "sect283k1" #define NID_sect283k1 729 #define OBJ_sect283k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,16L #define SN_sect283r1 "sect283r1" #define NID_sect283r1 730 #define OBJ_sect283r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,17L #define SN_sect409k1 "sect409k1" #define NID_sect409k1 731 #define OBJ_sect409k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,36L #define SN_sect409r1 "sect409r1" #define NID_sect409r1 732 #define OBJ_sect409r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,37L #define SN_sect571k1 "sect571k1" #define NID_sect571k1 733 #define OBJ_sect571k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,38L #define SN_sect571r1 "sect571r1" #define NID_sect571r1 734 #define OBJ_sect571r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,39L #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid OBJ_wap_wsg,4L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 735 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,1L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 736 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,3L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 737 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,4L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 738 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,5L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 739 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,6L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 740 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,7L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 741 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,8L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 742 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,9L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 743 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,10L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 744 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,11L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 745 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,12L #define SN_cast5_cbc "CAST5-CBC" #define LN_cast5_cbc "cast5-cbc" #define NID_cast5_cbc 108 #define OBJ_cast5_cbc OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,10L #define SN_cast5_ecb "CAST5-ECB" #define LN_cast5_ecb "cast5-ecb" #define NID_cast5_ecb 109 #define SN_cast5_cfb64 "CAST5-CFB" #define LN_cast5_cfb64 "cast5-cfb" #define NID_cast5_cfb64 110 #define SN_cast5_ofb64 "CAST5-OFB" #define LN_cast5_ofb64 "cast5-ofb" #define NID_cast5_ofb64 111 #define LN_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 112 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,12L #define SN_id_PasswordBasedMAC "id-PasswordBasedMAC" #define LN_id_PasswordBasedMAC "password based MAC" #define NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC 782 #define OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,13L #define SN_id_DHBasedMac "id-DHBasedMac" #define LN_id_DHBasedMac "Diffie-Hellman based MAC" #define NID_id_DHBasedMac 783 #define OBJ_id_DHBasedMac OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,30L #define SN_rsadsi "rsadsi" #define LN_rsadsi "RSA Data Security, Inc." #define NID_rsadsi 1 #define OBJ_rsadsi OBJ_ISO_US,113549L #define SN_pkcs "pkcs" #define LN_pkcs "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS" #define NID_pkcs 2 #define OBJ_pkcs OBJ_rsadsi,1L #define SN_pkcs1 "pkcs1" #define NID_pkcs1 186 #define OBJ_pkcs1 OBJ_pkcs,1L #define LN_rsaEncryption "rsaEncryption" #define NID_rsaEncryption 6 #define OBJ_rsaEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,1L #define SN_md2WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD2" #define LN_md2WithRSAEncryption "md2WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_md2WithRSAEncryption 7 #define OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,2L #define SN_md4WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD4" #define LN_md4WithRSAEncryption "md4WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_md4WithRSAEncryption 396 #define OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,3L #define SN_md5WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD5" #define LN_md5WithRSAEncryption "md5WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_md5WithRSAEncryption 8 #define OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,4L #define SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA1" #define LN_sha1WithRSAEncryption "sha1WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption 65 #define OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,5L #define SN_rsaesOaep "RSAES-OAEP" #define LN_rsaesOaep "rsaesOaep" #define NID_rsaesOaep 919 #define OBJ_rsaesOaep OBJ_pkcs1,7L #define SN_mgf1 "MGF1" #define LN_mgf1 "mgf1" #define NID_mgf1 911 #define OBJ_mgf1 OBJ_pkcs1,8L #define SN_pSpecified "PSPECIFIED" #define LN_pSpecified "pSpecified" #define NID_pSpecified 935 #define OBJ_pSpecified OBJ_pkcs1,9L #define SN_rsassaPss "RSASSA-PSS" #define LN_rsassaPss "rsassaPss" #define NID_rsassaPss 912 #define OBJ_rsassaPss OBJ_pkcs1,10L #define SN_sha256WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA256" #define LN_sha256WithRSAEncryption "sha256WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption 668 #define OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,11L #define SN_sha384WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA384" #define LN_sha384WithRSAEncryption "sha384WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption 669 #define OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,12L #define SN_sha512WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA512" #define LN_sha512WithRSAEncryption "sha512WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption 670 #define OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,13L #define SN_sha224WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA224" #define LN_sha224WithRSAEncryption "sha224WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption 671 #define OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,14L #define SN_pkcs3 "pkcs3" #define NID_pkcs3 27 #define OBJ_pkcs3 OBJ_pkcs,3L #define LN_dhKeyAgreement "dhKeyAgreement" #define NID_dhKeyAgreement 28 #define OBJ_dhKeyAgreement OBJ_pkcs3,1L #define SN_pkcs5 "pkcs5" #define NID_pkcs5 187 #define OBJ_pkcs5 OBJ_pkcs,5L #define SN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC "PBE-MD2-DES" #define LN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC 9 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,1L #define SN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC "PBE-MD5-DES" #define LN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC 10 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,3L #define SN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC "PBE-MD2-RC2-64" #define LN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC 168 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,4L #define SN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC "PBE-MD5-RC2-64" #define LN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC 169 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,6L #define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-DES" #define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC 170 #define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,10L #define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64" #define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC 68 #define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,11L #define LN_id_pbkdf2 "PBKDF2" #define NID_id_pbkdf2 69 #define OBJ_id_pbkdf2 OBJ_pkcs5,12L #define LN_pbes2 "PBES2" #define NID_pbes2 161 #define OBJ_pbes2 OBJ_pkcs5,13L #define LN_pbmac1 "PBMAC1" #define NID_pbmac1 162 #define OBJ_pbmac1 OBJ_pkcs5,14L #define SN_pkcs7 "pkcs7" #define NID_pkcs7 20 #define OBJ_pkcs7 OBJ_pkcs,7L #define LN_pkcs7_data "pkcs7-data" #define NID_pkcs7_data 21 #define OBJ_pkcs7_data OBJ_pkcs7,1L #define LN_pkcs7_signed "pkcs7-signedData" #define NID_pkcs7_signed 22 #define OBJ_pkcs7_signed OBJ_pkcs7,2L #define LN_pkcs7_enveloped "pkcs7-envelopedData" #define NID_pkcs7_enveloped 23 #define OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped OBJ_pkcs7,3L #define LN_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" #define NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped 24 #define OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped OBJ_pkcs7,4L #define LN_pkcs7_digest "pkcs7-digestData" #define NID_pkcs7_digest 25 #define OBJ_pkcs7_digest OBJ_pkcs7,5L #define LN_pkcs7_encrypted "pkcs7-encryptedData" #define NID_pkcs7_encrypted 26 #define OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted OBJ_pkcs7,6L #define SN_pkcs9 "pkcs9" #define NID_pkcs9 47 #define OBJ_pkcs9 OBJ_pkcs,9L #define LN_pkcs9_emailAddress "emailAddress" #define NID_pkcs9_emailAddress 48 #define OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress OBJ_pkcs9,1L #define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredName "unstructuredName" #define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName 49 #define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName OBJ_pkcs9,2L #define LN_pkcs9_contentType "contentType" #define NID_pkcs9_contentType 50 #define OBJ_pkcs9_contentType OBJ_pkcs9,3L #define LN_pkcs9_messageDigest "messageDigest" #define NID_pkcs9_messageDigest 51 #define OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest OBJ_pkcs9,4L #define LN_pkcs9_signingTime "signingTime" #define NID_pkcs9_signingTime 52 #define OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime OBJ_pkcs9,5L #define LN_pkcs9_countersignature "countersignature" #define NID_pkcs9_countersignature 53 #define OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature OBJ_pkcs9,6L #define LN_pkcs9_challengePassword "challengePassword" #define NID_pkcs9_challengePassword 54 #define OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword OBJ_pkcs9,7L #define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress "unstructuredAddress" #define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress 55 #define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress OBJ_pkcs9,8L #define LN_pkcs9_extCertAttributes "extendedCertificateAttributes" #define NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes 56 #define OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes OBJ_pkcs9,9L #define SN_ext_req "extReq" #define LN_ext_req "Extension Request" #define NID_ext_req 172 #define OBJ_ext_req OBJ_pkcs9,14L #define SN_SMIMECapabilities "SMIME-CAPS" #define LN_SMIMECapabilities "S/MIME Capabilities" #define NID_SMIMECapabilities 167 #define OBJ_SMIMECapabilities OBJ_pkcs9,15L #define SN_SMIME "SMIME" #define LN_SMIME "S/MIME" #define NID_SMIME 188 #define OBJ_SMIME OBJ_pkcs9,16L #define SN_id_smime_mod "id-smime-mod" #define NID_id_smime_mod 189 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod OBJ_SMIME,0L #define SN_id_smime_ct "id-smime-ct" #define NID_id_smime_ct 190 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct OBJ_SMIME,1L #define SN_id_smime_aa "id-smime-aa" #define NID_id_smime_aa 191 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa OBJ_SMIME,2L #define SN_id_smime_alg "id-smime-alg" #define NID_id_smime_alg 192 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg OBJ_SMIME,3L #define SN_id_smime_cd "id-smime-cd" #define NID_id_smime_cd 193 #define OBJ_id_smime_cd OBJ_SMIME,4L #define SN_id_smime_spq "id-smime-spq" #define NID_id_smime_spq 194 #define OBJ_id_smime_spq OBJ_SMIME,5L #define SN_id_smime_cti "id-smime-cti" #define NID_id_smime_cti 195 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti OBJ_SMIME,6L #define SN_id_smime_mod_cms "id-smime-mod-cms" #define NID_id_smime_mod_cms 196 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms OBJ_id_smime_mod,1L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ess "id-smime-mod-ess" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ess 197 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess OBJ_id_smime_mod,2L #define SN_id_smime_mod_oid "id-smime-mod-oid" #define NID_id_smime_mod_oid 198 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid OBJ_id_smime_mod,3L #define SN_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" #define NID_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 199 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 OBJ_id_smime_mod,4L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 200 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 OBJ_id_smime_mod,5L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 201 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 OBJ_id_smime_mod,6L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 202 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 OBJ_id_smime_mod,7L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 203 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 OBJ_id_smime_mod,8L #define SN_id_smime_ct_receipt "id-smime-ct-receipt" #define NID_id_smime_ct_receipt 204 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt OBJ_id_smime_ct,1L #define SN_id_smime_ct_authData "id-smime-ct-authData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_authData 205 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData OBJ_id_smime_ct,2L #define SN_id_smime_ct_publishCert "id-smime-ct-publishCert" #define NID_id_smime_ct_publishCert 206 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert OBJ_id_smime_ct,3L #define SN_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" #define NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo 207 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo OBJ_id_smime_ct,4L #define SN_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" #define NID_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo 208 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo OBJ_id_smime_ct,5L #define SN_id_smime_ct_contentInfo "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" #define NID_id_smime_ct_contentInfo 209 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo OBJ_id_smime_ct,6L #define SN_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData 210 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData OBJ_id_smime_ct,7L #define SN_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData 211 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData OBJ_id_smime_ct,8L #define SN_id_smime_ct_compressedData "id-smime-ct-compressedData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData 786 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData OBJ_id_smime_ct,9L #define SN_id_smime_ct_contentCollection "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" #define NID_id_smime_ct_contentCollection 1058 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection OBJ_id_smime_ct,19L #define SN_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData 1059 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData OBJ_id_smime_ct,23L #define SN_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" #define NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF 787 #define OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF OBJ_id_smime_ct,27L #define SN_id_ct_xml "id-ct-xml" #define NID_id_ct_xml 1060 #define OBJ_id_ct_xml OBJ_id_smime_ct,28L #define SN_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" #define NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest 212 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest OBJ_id_smime_aa,1L #define SN_id_smime_aa_securityLabel "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" #define NID_id_smime_aa_securityLabel 213 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel OBJ_id_smime_aa,2L #define SN_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" #define NID_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory 214 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory OBJ_id_smime_aa,3L #define SN_id_smime_aa_contentHint "id-smime-aa-contentHint" #define NID_id_smime_aa_contentHint 215 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint OBJ_id_smime_aa,4L #define SN_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" #define NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest 216 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest OBJ_id_smime_aa,5L #define SN_id_smime_aa_encapContentType "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" #define NID_id_smime_aa_encapContentType 217 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType OBJ_id_smime_aa,6L #define SN_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" #define NID_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier 218 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier OBJ_id_smime_aa,7L #define SN_id_smime_aa_macValue "id-smime-aa-macValue" #define NID_id_smime_aa_macValue 219 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue OBJ_id_smime_aa,8L #define SN_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" #define NID_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels 220 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels OBJ_id_smime_aa,9L #define SN_id_smime_aa_contentReference "id-smime-aa-contentReference" #define NID_id_smime_aa_contentReference 221 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference OBJ_id_smime_aa,10L #define SN_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" #define NID_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref 222 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref OBJ_id_smime_aa,11L #define SN_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" #define NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate 223 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate OBJ_id_smime_aa,12L #define SN_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" #define NID_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts 224 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts OBJ_id_smime_aa,13L #define SN_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" #define NID_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken 225 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken OBJ_id_smime_aa,14L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId 226 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId OBJ_id_smime_aa,15L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType 227 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType OBJ_id_smime_aa,16L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation 228 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation OBJ_id_smime_aa,17L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr 229 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr OBJ_id_smime_aa,18L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert 230 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert OBJ_id_smime_aa,19L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp 231 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,20L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs 232 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs OBJ_id_smime_aa,21L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs 233 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs OBJ_id_smime_aa,22L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues 234 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues OBJ_id_smime_aa,23L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues 235 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues OBJ_id_smime_aa,24L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp 236 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,25L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp 237 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,26L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp 238 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,27L #define SN_id_smime_aa_signatureType "id-smime-aa-signatureType" #define NID_id_smime_aa_signatureType 239 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType OBJ_id_smime_aa,28L #define SN_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" #define NID_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc 240 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc OBJ_id_smime_aa,29L #define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" #define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES 241 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES OBJ_id_smime_alg,1L #define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" #define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 242 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 OBJ_id_smime_alg,2L #define SN_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap 243 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,3L #define SN_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap 244 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,4L #define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDH "id-smime-alg-ESDH" #define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH 245 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH OBJ_id_smime_alg,5L #define SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap 246 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,6L #define SN_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap 247 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,7L #define SN_id_alg_PWRI_KEK "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" #define NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK 893 #define OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK OBJ_id_smime_alg,9L #define SN_id_smime_cd_ldap "id-smime-cd-ldap" #define NID_id_smime_cd_ldap 248 #define OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap OBJ_id_smime_cd,1L #define SN_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" #define NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri 249 #define OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri OBJ_id_smime_spq,1L #define SN_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" #define NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice 250 #define OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice OBJ_id_smime_spq,2L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin 251 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin OBJ_id_smime_cti,1L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt 252 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt OBJ_id_smime_cti,2L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery 253 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery OBJ_id_smime_cti,3L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender 254 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender OBJ_id_smime_cti,4L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval 255 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval OBJ_id_smime_cti,5L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation 256 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation OBJ_id_smime_cti,6L #define LN_friendlyName "friendlyName" #define NID_friendlyName 156 #define OBJ_friendlyName OBJ_pkcs9,20L #define LN_localKeyID "localKeyID" #define NID_localKeyID 157 #define OBJ_localKeyID OBJ_pkcs9,21L #define SN_ms_csp_name "CSPName" #define LN_ms_csp_name "Microsoft CSP Name" #define NID_ms_csp_name 417 #define OBJ_ms_csp_name 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,17L,1L #define SN_LocalKeySet "LocalKeySet" #define LN_LocalKeySet "Microsoft Local Key set" #define NID_LocalKeySet 856 #define OBJ_LocalKeySet 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,17L,2L #define OBJ_certTypes OBJ_pkcs9,22L #define LN_x509Certificate "x509Certificate" #define NID_x509Certificate 158 #define OBJ_x509Certificate OBJ_certTypes,1L #define LN_sdsiCertificate "sdsiCertificate" #define NID_sdsiCertificate 159 #define OBJ_sdsiCertificate OBJ_certTypes,2L #define OBJ_crlTypes OBJ_pkcs9,23L #define LN_x509Crl "x509Crl" #define NID_x509Crl 160 #define OBJ_x509Crl OBJ_crlTypes,1L #define OBJ_pkcs12 OBJ_pkcs,12L #define OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids OBJ_pkcs12,1L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 144 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,1L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 145 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,2L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-3DES" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC 146 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,3L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-2DES" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC 147 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,4L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC 148 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,5L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC 149 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,6L #define OBJ_pkcs12_Version1 OBJ_pkcs12,10L #define OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds OBJ_pkcs12_Version1,1L #define LN_keyBag "keyBag" #define NID_keyBag 150 #define OBJ_keyBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,1L #define LN_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" #define NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 151 #define OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,2L #define LN_certBag "certBag" #define NID_certBag 152 #define OBJ_certBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,3L #define LN_crlBag "crlBag" #define NID_crlBag 153 #define OBJ_crlBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,4L #define LN_secretBag "secretBag" #define NID_secretBag 154 #define OBJ_secretBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,5L #define LN_safeContentsBag "safeContentsBag" #define NID_safeContentsBag 155 #define OBJ_safeContentsBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,6L #define SN_md2 "MD2" #define LN_md2 "md2" #define NID_md2 3 #define OBJ_md2 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,2L #define SN_md4 "MD4" #define LN_md4 "md4" #define NID_md4 257 #define OBJ_md4 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,4L #define SN_md5 "MD5" #define LN_md5 "md5" #define NID_md5 4 #define OBJ_md5 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,5L #define SN_md5_sha1 "MD5-SHA1" #define LN_md5_sha1 "md5-sha1" #define NID_md5_sha1 114 #define LN_hmacWithMD5 "hmacWithMD5" #define NID_hmacWithMD5 797 #define OBJ_hmacWithMD5 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,6L #define LN_hmacWithSHA1 "hmacWithSHA1" #define NID_hmacWithSHA1 163 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,7L #define LN_hmacWithSHA224 "hmacWithSHA224" #define NID_hmacWithSHA224 798 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA224 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,8L #define LN_hmacWithSHA256 "hmacWithSHA256" #define NID_hmacWithSHA256 799 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA256 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,9L #define LN_hmacWithSHA384 "hmacWithSHA384" #define NID_hmacWithSHA384 800 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA384 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,10L #define LN_hmacWithSHA512 "hmacWithSHA512" #define NID_hmacWithSHA512 801 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA512 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,11L #define SN_rc2_cbc "RC2-CBC" #define LN_rc2_cbc "rc2-cbc" #define NID_rc2_cbc 37 #define OBJ_rc2_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,2L #define SN_rc2_ecb "RC2-ECB" #define LN_rc2_ecb "rc2-ecb" #define NID_rc2_ecb 38 #define SN_rc2_cfb64 "RC2-CFB" #define LN_rc2_cfb64 "rc2-cfb" #define NID_rc2_cfb64 39 #define SN_rc2_ofb64 "RC2-OFB" #define LN_rc2_ofb64 "rc2-ofb" #define NID_rc2_ofb64 40 #define SN_rc2_40_cbc "RC2-40-CBC" #define LN_rc2_40_cbc "rc2-40-cbc" #define NID_rc2_40_cbc 98 #define SN_rc2_64_cbc "RC2-64-CBC" #define LN_rc2_64_cbc "rc2-64-cbc" #define NID_rc2_64_cbc 166 #define SN_rc4 "RC4" #define LN_rc4 "rc4" #define NID_rc4 5 #define OBJ_rc4 OBJ_rsadsi,3L,4L #define SN_rc4_40 "RC4-40" #define LN_rc4_40 "rc4-40" #define NID_rc4_40 97 #define SN_des_ede3_cbc "DES-EDE3-CBC" #define LN_des_ede3_cbc "des-ede3-cbc" #define NID_des_ede3_cbc 44 #define OBJ_des_ede3_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,7L #define SN_rc5_cbc "RC5-CBC" #define LN_rc5_cbc "rc5-cbc" #define NID_rc5_cbc 120 #define OBJ_rc5_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,8L #define SN_rc5_ecb "RC5-ECB" #define LN_rc5_ecb "rc5-ecb" #define NID_rc5_ecb 121 #define SN_rc5_cfb64 "RC5-CFB" #define LN_rc5_cfb64 "rc5-cfb" #define NID_rc5_cfb64 122 #define SN_rc5_ofb64 "RC5-OFB" #define LN_rc5_ofb64 "rc5-ofb" #define NID_rc5_ofb64 123 #define SN_ms_ext_req "msExtReq" #define LN_ms_ext_req "Microsoft Extension Request" #define NID_ms_ext_req 171 #define OBJ_ms_ext_req 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,14L #define SN_ms_code_ind "msCodeInd" #define LN_ms_code_ind "Microsoft Individual Code Signing" #define NID_ms_code_ind 134 #define OBJ_ms_code_ind 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,21L #define SN_ms_code_com "msCodeCom" #define LN_ms_code_com "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing" #define NID_ms_code_com 135 #define OBJ_ms_code_com 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,22L #define SN_ms_ctl_sign "msCTLSign" #define LN_ms_ctl_sign "Microsoft Trust List Signing" #define NID_ms_ctl_sign 136 #define OBJ_ms_ctl_sign 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,1L #define SN_ms_sgc "msSGC" #define LN_ms_sgc "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto" #define NID_ms_sgc 137 #define OBJ_ms_sgc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,3L #define SN_ms_efs "msEFS" #define LN_ms_efs "Microsoft Encrypted File System" #define NID_ms_efs 138 #define OBJ_ms_efs 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,4L #define SN_ms_smartcard_login "msSmartcardLogin" #define LN_ms_smartcard_login "Microsoft Smartcardlogin" #define NID_ms_smartcard_login 648 #define OBJ_ms_smartcard_login 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,20L,2L,2L #define SN_ms_upn "msUPN" #define LN_ms_upn "Microsoft Universal Principal Name" #define NID_ms_upn 649 #define OBJ_ms_upn 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,20L,2L,3L #define SN_idea_cbc "IDEA-CBC" #define LN_idea_cbc "idea-cbc" #define NID_idea_cbc 34 #define OBJ_idea_cbc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,188L,7L,1L,1L,2L #define SN_idea_ecb "IDEA-ECB" #define LN_idea_ecb "idea-ecb" #define NID_idea_ecb 36 #define SN_idea_cfb64 "IDEA-CFB" #define LN_idea_cfb64 "idea-cfb" #define NID_idea_cfb64 35 #define SN_idea_ofb64 "IDEA-OFB" #define LN_idea_ofb64 "idea-ofb" #define NID_idea_ofb64 46 #define SN_bf_cbc "BF-CBC" #define LN_bf_cbc "bf-cbc" #define NID_bf_cbc 91 #define OBJ_bf_cbc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,3029L,1L,2L #define SN_bf_ecb "BF-ECB" #define LN_bf_ecb "bf-ecb" #define NID_bf_ecb 92 #define SN_bf_cfb64 "BF-CFB" #define LN_bf_cfb64 "bf-cfb" #define NID_bf_cfb64 93 #define SN_bf_ofb64 "BF-OFB" #define LN_bf_ofb64 "bf-ofb" #define NID_bf_ofb64 94 #define SN_id_pkix "PKIX" #define NID_id_pkix 127 #define OBJ_id_pkix 1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,5L,7L #define SN_id_pkix_mod "id-pkix-mod" #define NID_id_pkix_mod 258 #define OBJ_id_pkix_mod OBJ_id_pkix,0L #define SN_id_pe "id-pe" #define NID_id_pe 175 #define OBJ_id_pe OBJ_id_pkix,1L #define SN_id_qt "id-qt" #define NID_id_qt 259 #define OBJ_id_qt OBJ_id_pkix,2L #define SN_id_kp "id-kp" #define NID_id_kp 128 #define OBJ_id_kp OBJ_id_pkix,3L #define SN_id_it "id-it" #define NID_id_it 260 #define OBJ_id_it OBJ_id_pkix,4L #define SN_id_pkip "id-pkip" #define NID_id_pkip 261 #define OBJ_id_pkip OBJ_id_pkix,5L #define SN_id_alg "id-alg" #define NID_id_alg 262 #define OBJ_id_alg OBJ_id_pkix,6L #define SN_id_cmc "id-cmc" #define NID_id_cmc 263 #define OBJ_id_cmc OBJ_id_pkix,7L #define SN_id_on "id-on" #define NID_id_on 264 #define OBJ_id_on OBJ_id_pkix,8L #define SN_id_pda "id-pda" #define NID_id_pda 265 #define OBJ_id_pda OBJ_id_pkix,9L #define SN_id_aca "id-aca" #define NID_id_aca 266 #define OBJ_id_aca OBJ_id_pkix,10L #define SN_id_qcs "id-qcs" #define NID_id_qcs 267 #define OBJ_id_qcs OBJ_id_pkix,11L #define SN_id_cct "id-cct" #define NID_id_cct 268 #define OBJ_id_cct OBJ_id_pkix,12L #define SN_id_ppl "id-ppl" #define NID_id_ppl 662 #define OBJ_id_ppl OBJ_id_pkix,21L #define SN_id_ad "id-ad" #define NID_id_ad 176 #define OBJ_id_ad OBJ_id_pkix,48L #define SN_id_pkix1_explicit_88 "id-pkix1-explicit-88" #define NID_id_pkix1_explicit_88 269 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,1L #define SN_id_pkix1_implicit_88 "id-pkix1-implicit-88" #define NID_id_pkix1_implicit_88 270 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,2L #define SN_id_pkix1_explicit_93 "id-pkix1-explicit-93" #define NID_id_pkix1_explicit_93 271 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,3L #define SN_id_pkix1_implicit_93 "id-pkix1-implicit-93" #define NID_id_pkix1_implicit_93 272 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,4L #define SN_id_mod_crmf "id-mod-crmf" #define NID_id_mod_crmf 273 #define OBJ_id_mod_crmf OBJ_id_pkix_mod,5L #define SN_id_mod_cmc "id-mod-cmc" #define NID_id_mod_cmc 274 #define OBJ_id_mod_cmc OBJ_id_pkix_mod,6L #define SN_id_mod_kea_profile_88 "id-mod-kea-profile-88" #define NID_id_mod_kea_profile_88 275 #define OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,7L #define SN_id_mod_kea_profile_93 "id-mod-kea-profile-93" #define NID_id_mod_kea_profile_93 276 #define OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,8L #define SN_id_mod_cmp "id-mod-cmp" #define NID_id_mod_cmp 277 #define OBJ_id_mod_cmp OBJ_id_pkix_mod,9L #define SN_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" #define NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 278 #define OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,10L #define SN_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" #define NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 279 #define OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,11L #define SN_id_mod_attribute_cert "id-mod-attribute-cert" #define NID_id_mod_attribute_cert 280 #define OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert OBJ_id_pkix_mod,12L #define SN_id_mod_timestamp_protocol "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" #define NID_id_mod_timestamp_protocol 281 #define OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol OBJ_id_pkix_mod,13L #define SN_id_mod_ocsp "id-mod-ocsp" #define NID_id_mod_ocsp 282 #define OBJ_id_mod_ocsp OBJ_id_pkix_mod,14L #define SN_id_mod_dvcs "id-mod-dvcs" #define NID_id_mod_dvcs 283 #define OBJ_id_mod_dvcs OBJ_id_pkix_mod,15L #define SN_id_mod_cmp2000 "id-mod-cmp2000" #define NID_id_mod_cmp2000 284 #define OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,16L #define SN_info_access "authorityInfoAccess" #define LN_info_access "Authority Information Access" #define NID_info_access 177 #define OBJ_info_access OBJ_id_pe,1L #define SN_biometricInfo "biometricInfo" #define LN_biometricInfo "Biometric Info" #define NID_biometricInfo 285 #define OBJ_biometricInfo OBJ_id_pe,2L #define SN_qcStatements "qcStatements" #define NID_qcStatements 286 #define OBJ_qcStatements OBJ_id_pe,3L #define SN_ac_auditEntity "ac-auditEntity" #define NID_ac_auditEntity 287 #define OBJ_ac_auditEntity OBJ_id_pe,4L #define SN_ac_targeting "ac-targeting" #define NID_ac_targeting 288 #define OBJ_ac_targeting OBJ_id_pe,5L #define SN_aaControls "aaControls" #define NID_aaControls 289 #define OBJ_aaControls OBJ_id_pe,6L #define SN_sbgp_ipAddrBlock "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" #define NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock 290 #define OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock OBJ_id_pe,7L #define SN_sbgp_autonomousSysNum "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" #define NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum 291 #define OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum OBJ_id_pe,8L #define SN_sbgp_routerIdentifier "sbgp-routerIdentifier" #define NID_sbgp_routerIdentifier 292 #define OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier OBJ_id_pe,9L #define SN_ac_proxying "ac-proxying" #define NID_ac_proxying 397 #define OBJ_ac_proxying OBJ_id_pe,10L #define SN_sinfo_access "subjectInfoAccess" #define LN_sinfo_access "Subject Information Access" #define NID_sinfo_access 398 #define OBJ_sinfo_access OBJ_id_pe,11L #define SN_proxyCertInfo "proxyCertInfo" #define LN_proxyCertInfo "Proxy Certificate Information" #define NID_proxyCertInfo 663 #define OBJ_proxyCertInfo OBJ_id_pe,14L #define SN_tlsfeature "tlsfeature" #define LN_tlsfeature "TLS Feature" #define NID_tlsfeature 1020 #define OBJ_tlsfeature OBJ_id_pe,24L #define SN_id_qt_cps "id-qt-cps" #define LN_id_qt_cps "Policy Qualifier CPS" #define NID_id_qt_cps 164 #define OBJ_id_qt_cps OBJ_id_qt,1L #define SN_id_qt_unotice "id-qt-unotice" #define LN_id_qt_unotice "Policy Qualifier User Notice" #define NID_id_qt_unotice 165 #define OBJ_id_qt_unotice OBJ_id_qt,2L #define SN_textNotice "textNotice" #define NID_textNotice 293 #define OBJ_textNotice OBJ_id_qt,3L #define SN_server_auth "serverAuth" #define LN_server_auth "TLS Web Server Authentication" #define NID_server_auth 129 #define OBJ_server_auth OBJ_id_kp,1L #define SN_client_auth "clientAuth" #define LN_client_auth "TLS Web Client Authentication" #define NID_client_auth 130 #define OBJ_client_auth OBJ_id_kp,2L #define SN_code_sign "codeSigning" #define LN_code_sign "Code Signing" #define NID_code_sign 131 #define OBJ_code_sign OBJ_id_kp,3L #define SN_email_protect "emailProtection" #define LN_email_protect "E-mail Protection" #define NID_email_protect 132 #define OBJ_email_protect OBJ_id_kp,4L #define SN_ipsecEndSystem "ipsecEndSystem" #define LN_ipsecEndSystem "IPSec End System" #define NID_ipsecEndSystem 294 #define OBJ_ipsecEndSystem OBJ_id_kp,5L #define SN_ipsecTunnel "ipsecTunnel" #define LN_ipsecTunnel "IPSec Tunnel" #define NID_ipsecTunnel 295 #define OBJ_ipsecTunnel OBJ_id_kp,6L #define SN_ipsecUser "ipsecUser" #define LN_ipsecUser "IPSec User" #define NID_ipsecUser 296 #define OBJ_ipsecUser OBJ_id_kp,7L #define SN_time_stamp "timeStamping" #define LN_time_stamp "Time Stamping" #define NID_time_stamp 133 #define OBJ_time_stamp OBJ_id_kp,8L #define SN_OCSP_sign "OCSPSigning" #define LN_OCSP_sign "OCSP Signing" #define NID_OCSP_sign 180 #define OBJ_OCSP_sign OBJ_id_kp,9L #define SN_dvcs "DVCS" #define LN_dvcs "dvcs" #define NID_dvcs 297 #define OBJ_dvcs OBJ_id_kp,10L #define SN_ipsec_IKE "ipsecIKE" #define LN_ipsec_IKE "ipsec Internet Key Exchange" #define NID_ipsec_IKE 1022 #define OBJ_ipsec_IKE OBJ_id_kp,17L #define SN_capwapAC "capwapAC" #define LN_capwapAC "Ctrl/provision WAP Access" #define NID_capwapAC 1023 #define OBJ_capwapAC OBJ_id_kp,18L #define SN_capwapWTP "capwapWTP" #define LN_capwapWTP "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination" #define NID_capwapWTP 1024 #define OBJ_capwapWTP OBJ_id_kp,19L #define SN_sshClient "secureShellClient" #define LN_sshClient "SSH Client" #define NID_sshClient 1025 #define OBJ_sshClient OBJ_id_kp,21L #define SN_sshServer "secureShellServer" #define LN_sshServer "SSH Server" #define NID_sshServer 1026 #define OBJ_sshServer OBJ_id_kp,22L #define SN_sendRouter "sendRouter" #define LN_sendRouter "Send Router" #define NID_sendRouter 1027 #define OBJ_sendRouter OBJ_id_kp,23L #define SN_sendProxiedRouter "sendProxiedRouter" #define LN_sendProxiedRouter "Send Proxied Router" #define NID_sendProxiedRouter 1028 #define OBJ_sendProxiedRouter OBJ_id_kp,24L #define SN_sendOwner "sendOwner" #define LN_sendOwner "Send Owner" #define NID_sendOwner 1029 #define OBJ_sendOwner OBJ_id_kp,25L #define SN_sendProxiedOwner "sendProxiedOwner" #define LN_sendProxiedOwner "Send Proxied Owner" #define NID_sendProxiedOwner 1030 #define OBJ_sendProxiedOwner OBJ_id_kp,26L #define SN_id_it_caProtEncCert "id-it-caProtEncCert" #define NID_id_it_caProtEncCert 298 #define OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert OBJ_id_it,1L #define SN_id_it_signKeyPairTypes "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" #define NID_id_it_signKeyPairTypes 299 #define OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes OBJ_id_it,2L #define SN_id_it_encKeyPairTypes "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" #define NID_id_it_encKeyPairTypes 300 #define OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes OBJ_id_it,3L #define SN_id_it_preferredSymmAlg "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" #define NID_id_it_preferredSymmAlg 301 #define OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg OBJ_id_it,4L #define SN_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" #define NID_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo 302 #define OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo OBJ_id_it,5L #define SN_id_it_currentCRL "id-it-currentCRL" #define NID_id_it_currentCRL 303 #define OBJ_id_it_currentCRL OBJ_id_it,6L #define SN_id_it_unsupportedOIDs "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" #define NID_id_it_unsupportedOIDs 304 #define OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs OBJ_id_it,7L #define SN_id_it_subscriptionRequest "id-it-subscriptionRequest" #define NID_id_it_subscriptionRequest 305 #define OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest OBJ_id_it,8L #define SN_id_it_subscriptionResponse "id-it-subscriptionResponse" #define NID_id_it_subscriptionResponse 306 #define OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse OBJ_id_it,9L #define SN_id_it_keyPairParamReq "id-it-keyPairParamReq" #define NID_id_it_keyPairParamReq 307 #define OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq OBJ_id_it,10L #define SN_id_it_keyPairParamRep "id-it-keyPairParamRep" #define NID_id_it_keyPairParamRep 308 #define OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep OBJ_id_it,11L #define SN_id_it_revPassphrase "id-it-revPassphrase" #define NID_id_it_revPassphrase 309 #define OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase OBJ_id_it,12L #define SN_id_it_implicitConfirm "id-it-implicitConfirm" #define NID_id_it_implicitConfirm 310 #define OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm OBJ_id_it,13L #define SN_id_it_confirmWaitTime "id-it-confirmWaitTime" #define NID_id_it_confirmWaitTime 311 #define OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime OBJ_id_it,14L #define SN_id_it_origPKIMessage "id-it-origPKIMessage" #define NID_id_it_origPKIMessage 312 #define OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage OBJ_id_it,15L #define SN_id_it_suppLangTags "id-it-suppLangTags" #define NID_id_it_suppLangTags 784 #define OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags OBJ_id_it,16L #define SN_id_regCtrl "id-regCtrl" #define NID_id_regCtrl 313 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl OBJ_id_pkip,1L #define SN_id_regInfo "id-regInfo" #define NID_id_regInfo 314 #define OBJ_id_regInfo OBJ_id_pkip,2L #define SN_id_regCtrl_regToken "id-regCtrl-regToken" #define NID_id_regCtrl_regToken 315 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken OBJ_id_regCtrl,1L #define SN_id_regCtrl_authenticator "id-regCtrl-authenticator" #define NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator 316 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator OBJ_id_regCtrl,2L #define SN_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" #define NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo 317 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo OBJ_id_regCtrl,3L #define SN_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" #define NID_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions 318 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions OBJ_id_regCtrl,4L #define SN_id_regCtrl_oldCertID "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" #define NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID 319 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID OBJ_id_regCtrl,5L #define SN_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" #define NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey 320 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey OBJ_id_regCtrl,6L #define SN_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" #define NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs 321 #define OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs OBJ_id_regInfo,1L #define SN_id_regInfo_certReq "id-regInfo-certReq" #define NID_id_regInfo_certReq 322 #define OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq OBJ_id_regInfo,2L #define SN_id_alg_des40 "id-alg-des40" #define NID_id_alg_des40 323 #define OBJ_id_alg_des40 OBJ_id_alg,1L #define SN_id_alg_noSignature "id-alg-noSignature" #define NID_id_alg_noSignature 324 #define OBJ_id_alg_noSignature OBJ_id_alg,2L #define SN_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" #define NID_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 325 #define OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 OBJ_id_alg,3L #define SN_id_alg_dh_pop "id-alg-dh-pop" #define NID_id_alg_dh_pop 326 #define OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop OBJ_id_alg,4L #define SN_id_cmc_statusInfo "id-cmc-statusInfo" #define NID_id_cmc_statusInfo 327 #define OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo OBJ_id_cmc,1L #define SN_id_cmc_identification "id-cmc-identification" #define NID_id_cmc_identification 328 #define OBJ_id_cmc_identification OBJ_id_cmc,2L #define SN_id_cmc_identityProof "id-cmc-identityProof" #define NID_id_cmc_identityProof 329 #define OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof OBJ_id_cmc,3L #define SN_id_cmc_dataReturn "id-cmc-dataReturn" #define NID_id_cmc_dataReturn 330 #define OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn OBJ_id_cmc,4L #define SN_id_cmc_transactionId "id-cmc-transactionId" #define NID_id_cmc_transactionId 331 #define OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId OBJ_id_cmc,5L #define SN_id_cmc_senderNonce "id-cmc-senderNonce" #define NID_id_cmc_senderNonce 332 #define OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce OBJ_id_cmc,6L #define SN_id_cmc_recipientNonce "id-cmc-recipientNonce" #define NID_id_cmc_recipientNonce 333 #define OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce OBJ_id_cmc,7L #define SN_id_cmc_addExtensions "id-cmc-addExtensions" #define NID_id_cmc_addExtensions 334 #define OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions OBJ_id_cmc,8L #define SN_id_cmc_encryptedPOP "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" #define NID_id_cmc_encryptedPOP 335 #define OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP OBJ_id_cmc,9L #define SN_id_cmc_decryptedPOP "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" #define NID_id_cmc_decryptedPOP 336 #define OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP OBJ_id_cmc,10L #define SN_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" #define NID_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness 337 #define OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness OBJ_id_cmc,11L #define SN_id_cmc_getCert "id-cmc-getCert" #define NID_id_cmc_getCert 338 #define OBJ_id_cmc_getCert OBJ_id_cmc,15L #define SN_id_cmc_getCRL "id-cmc-getCRL" #define NID_id_cmc_getCRL 339 #define OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL OBJ_id_cmc,16L #define SN_id_cmc_revokeRequest "id-cmc-revokeRequest" #define NID_id_cmc_revokeRequest 340 #define OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest OBJ_id_cmc,17L #define SN_id_cmc_regInfo "id-cmc-regInfo" #define NID_id_cmc_regInfo 341 #define OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo OBJ_id_cmc,18L #define SN_id_cmc_responseInfo "id-cmc-responseInfo" #define NID_id_cmc_responseInfo 342 #define OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo OBJ_id_cmc,19L #define SN_id_cmc_queryPending "id-cmc-queryPending" #define NID_id_cmc_queryPending 343 #define OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending OBJ_id_cmc,21L #define SN_id_cmc_popLinkRandom "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" #define NID_id_cmc_popLinkRandom 344 #define OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom OBJ_id_cmc,22L #define SN_id_cmc_popLinkWitness "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" #define NID_id_cmc_popLinkWitness 345 #define OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness OBJ_id_cmc,23L #define SN_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" #define NID_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance 346 #define OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance OBJ_id_cmc,24L #define SN_id_on_personalData "id-on-personalData" #define NID_id_on_personalData 347 #define OBJ_id_on_personalData OBJ_id_on,1L #define SN_id_on_permanentIdentifier "id-on-permanentIdentifier" #define LN_id_on_permanentIdentifier "Permanent Identifier" #define NID_id_on_permanentIdentifier 858 #define OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier OBJ_id_on,3L #define SN_id_pda_dateOfBirth "id-pda-dateOfBirth" #define NID_id_pda_dateOfBirth 348 #define OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth OBJ_id_pda,1L #define SN_id_pda_placeOfBirth "id-pda-placeOfBirth" #define NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth 349 #define OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth OBJ_id_pda,2L #define SN_id_pda_gender "id-pda-gender" #define NID_id_pda_gender 351 #define OBJ_id_pda_gender OBJ_id_pda,3L #define SN_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" #define NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship 352 #define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship OBJ_id_pda,4L #define SN_id_pda_countryOfResidence "id-pda-countryOfResidence" #define NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence 353 #define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence OBJ_id_pda,5L #define SN_id_aca_authenticationInfo "id-aca-authenticationInfo" #define NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo 354 #define OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo OBJ_id_aca,1L #define SN_id_aca_accessIdentity "id-aca-accessIdentity" #define NID_id_aca_accessIdentity 355 #define OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity OBJ_id_aca,2L #define SN_id_aca_chargingIdentity "id-aca-chargingIdentity" #define NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity 356 #define OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity OBJ_id_aca,3L #define SN_id_aca_group "id-aca-group" #define NID_id_aca_group 357 #define OBJ_id_aca_group OBJ_id_aca,4L #define SN_id_aca_role "id-aca-role" #define NID_id_aca_role 358 #define OBJ_id_aca_role OBJ_id_aca,5L #define SN_id_aca_encAttrs "id-aca-encAttrs" #define NID_id_aca_encAttrs 399 #define OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs OBJ_id_aca,6L #define SN_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" #define NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 359 #define OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 OBJ_id_qcs,1L #define SN_id_cct_crs "id-cct-crs" #define NID_id_cct_crs 360 #define OBJ_id_cct_crs OBJ_id_cct,1L #define SN_id_cct_PKIData "id-cct-PKIData" #define NID_id_cct_PKIData 361 #define OBJ_id_cct_PKIData OBJ_id_cct,2L #define SN_id_cct_PKIResponse "id-cct-PKIResponse" #define NID_id_cct_PKIResponse 362 #define OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse OBJ_id_cct,3L #define SN_id_ppl_anyLanguage "id-ppl-anyLanguage" #define LN_id_ppl_anyLanguage "Any language" #define NID_id_ppl_anyLanguage 664 #define OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage OBJ_id_ppl,0L #define SN_id_ppl_inheritAll "id-ppl-inheritAll" #define LN_id_ppl_inheritAll "Inherit all" #define NID_id_ppl_inheritAll 665 #define OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll OBJ_id_ppl,1L #define SN_Independent "id-ppl-independent" #define LN_Independent "Independent" #define NID_Independent 667 #define OBJ_Independent OBJ_id_ppl,2L #define SN_ad_OCSP "OCSP" #define LN_ad_OCSP "OCSP" #define NID_ad_OCSP 178 #define OBJ_ad_OCSP OBJ_id_ad,1L #define SN_ad_ca_issuers "caIssuers" #define LN_ad_ca_issuers "CA Issuers" #define NID_ad_ca_issuers 179 #define OBJ_ad_ca_issuers OBJ_id_ad,2L #define SN_ad_timeStamping "ad_timestamping" #define LN_ad_timeStamping "AD Time Stamping" #define NID_ad_timeStamping 363 #define OBJ_ad_timeStamping OBJ_id_ad,3L #define SN_ad_dvcs "AD_DVCS" #define LN_ad_dvcs "ad dvcs" #define NID_ad_dvcs 364 #define OBJ_ad_dvcs OBJ_id_ad,4L #define SN_caRepository "caRepository" #define LN_caRepository "CA Repository" #define NID_caRepository 785 #define OBJ_caRepository OBJ_id_ad,5L #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP OBJ_ad_OCSP #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_basic "basicOCSPResponse" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_basic "Basic OCSP Response" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic 365 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,1L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce "Nonce" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce "OCSP Nonce" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce 366 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,2L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID "CrlID" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID "OCSP CRL ID" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID 367 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,3L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses "acceptableResponses" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses "Acceptable OCSP Responses" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses 368 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,4L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck "noCheck" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck "OCSP No Check" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck 369 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,5L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff "archiveCutoff" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff "OCSP Archive Cutoff" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff 370 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,6L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator "serviceLocator" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator "OCSP Service Locator" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator 371 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,7L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus "extendedStatus" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus "Extended OCSP Status" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus 372 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,8L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_valid "valid" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid 373 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,9L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_path "path" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path 374 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,10L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot "trustRoot" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot "Trust Root" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot 375 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,11L #define SN_algorithm "algorithm" #define LN_algorithm "algorithm" #define NID_algorithm 376 #define OBJ_algorithm 1L,3L,14L,3L,2L #define SN_md5WithRSA "RSA-NP-MD5" #define LN_md5WithRSA "md5WithRSA" #define NID_md5WithRSA 104 #define OBJ_md5WithRSA OBJ_algorithm,3L #define SN_des_ecb "DES-ECB" #define LN_des_ecb "des-ecb" #define NID_des_ecb 29 #define OBJ_des_ecb OBJ_algorithm,6L #define SN_des_cbc "DES-CBC" #define LN_des_cbc "des-cbc" #define NID_des_cbc 31 #define OBJ_des_cbc OBJ_algorithm,7L #define SN_des_ofb64 "DES-OFB" #define LN_des_ofb64 "des-ofb" #define NID_des_ofb64 45 #define OBJ_des_ofb64 OBJ_algorithm,8L #define SN_des_cfb64 "DES-CFB" #define LN_des_cfb64 "des-cfb" #define NID_des_cfb64 30 #define OBJ_des_cfb64 OBJ_algorithm,9L #define SN_rsaSignature "rsaSignature" #define NID_rsaSignature 377 #define OBJ_rsaSignature OBJ_algorithm,11L #define SN_dsa_2 "DSA-old" #define LN_dsa_2 "dsaEncryption-old" #define NID_dsa_2 67 #define OBJ_dsa_2 OBJ_algorithm,12L #define SN_dsaWithSHA "DSA-SHA" #define LN_dsaWithSHA "dsaWithSHA" #define NID_dsaWithSHA 66 #define OBJ_dsaWithSHA OBJ_algorithm,13L #define SN_shaWithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA" #define LN_shaWithRSAEncryption "shaWithRSAEncryption" #define NID_shaWithRSAEncryption 42 #define OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption OBJ_algorithm,15L #define SN_des_ede_ecb "DES-EDE" #define LN_des_ede_ecb "des-ede" #define NID_des_ede_ecb 32 #define OBJ_des_ede_ecb OBJ_algorithm,17L #define SN_des_ede3_ecb "DES-EDE3" #define LN_des_ede3_ecb "des-ede3" #define NID_des_ede3_ecb 33 #define SN_des_ede_cbc "DES-EDE-CBC" #define LN_des_ede_cbc "des-ede-cbc" #define NID_des_ede_cbc 43 #define SN_des_ede_cfb64 "DES-EDE-CFB" #define LN_des_ede_cfb64 "des-ede-cfb" #define NID_des_ede_cfb64 60 #define SN_des_ede3_cfb64 "DES-EDE3-CFB" #define LN_des_ede3_cfb64 "des-ede3-cfb" #define NID_des_ede3_cfb64 61 #define SN_des_ede_ofb64 "DES-EDE-OFB" #define LN_des_ede_ofb64 "des-ede-ofb" #define NID_des_ede_ofb64 62 #define SN_des_ede3_ofb64 "DES-EDE3-OFB" #define LN_des_ede3_ofb64 "des-ede3-ofb" #define NID_des_ede3_ofb64 63 #define SN_desx_cbc "DESX-CBC" #define LN_desx_cbc "desx-cbc" #define NID_desx_cbc 80 #define SN_sha "SHA" #define LN_sha "sha" #define NID_sha 41 #define OBJ_sha OBJ_algorithm,18L #define SN_sha1 "SHA1" #define LN_sha1 "sha1" #define NID_sha1 64 #define OBJ_sha1 OBJ_algorithm,26L #define SN_dsaWithSHA1_2 "DSA-SHA1-old" #define LN_dsaWithSHA1_2 "dsaWithSHA1-old" #define NID_dsaWithSHA1_2 70 #define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 OBJ_algorithm,27L #define SN_sha1WithRSA "RSA-SHA1-2" #define LN_sha1WithRSA "sha1WithRSA" #define NID_sha1WithRSA 115 #define OBJ_sha1WithRSA OBJ_algorithm,29L #define SN_ripemd160 "RIPEMD160" #define LN_ripemd160 "ripemd160" #define NID_ripemd160 117 #define OBJ_ripemd160 1L,3L,36L,3L,2L,1L #define SN_ripemd160WithRSA "RSA-RIPEMD160" #define LN_ripemd160WithRSA "ripemd160WithRSA" #define NID_ripemd160WithRSA 119 #define OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,1L,2L #define SN_blake2b512 "BLAKE2b512" #define LN_blake2b512 "blake2b512" #define NID_blake2b512 1056 #define OBJ_blake2b512 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,1722L,12L,2L,1L,16L #define SN_blake2s256 "BLAKE2s256" #define LN_blake2s256 "blake2s256" #define NID_blake2s256 1057 #define OBJ_blake2s256 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,1722L,12L,2L,2L,8L #define SN_sxnet "SXNetID" #define LN_sxnet "Strong Extranet ID" #define NID_sxnet 143 #define OBJ_sxnet 1L,3L,101L,1L,4L,1L #define SN_X500 "X500" #define LN_X500 "directory services (X.500)" #define NID_X500 11 #define OBJ_X500 2L,5L #define SN_X509 "X509" #define NID_X509 12 #define OBJ_X509 OBJ_X500,4L #define SN_commonName "CN" #define LN_commonName "commonName" #define NID_commonName 13 #define OBJ_commonName OBJ_X509,3L #define SN_surname "SN" #define LN_surname "surname" #define NID_surname 100 #define OBJ_surname OBJ_X509,4L #define LN_serialNumber "serialNumber" #define NID_serialNumber 105 #define OBJ_serialNumber OBJ_X509,5L #define SN_countryName "C" #define LN_countryName "countryName" #define NID_countryName 14 #define OBJ_countryName OBJ_X509,6L #define SN_localityName "L" #define LN_localityName "localityName" #define NID_localityName 15 #define OBJ_localityName OBJ_X509,7L #define SN_stateOrProvinceName "ST" #define LN_stateOrProvinceName "stateOrProvinceName" #define NID_stateOrProvinceName 16 #define OBJ_stateOrProvinceName OBJ_X509,8L #define SN_streetAddress "street" #define LN_streetAddress "streetAddress" #define NID_streetAddress 660 #define OBJ_streetAddress OBJ_X509,9L #define SN_organizationName "O" #define LN_organizationName "organizationName" #define NID_organizationName 17 #define OBJ_organizationName OBJ_X509,10L #define SN_organizationalUnitName "OU" #define LN_organizationalUnitName "organizationalUnitName" #define NID_organizationalUnitName 18 #define OBJ_organizationalUnitName OBJ_X509,11L #define SN_title "title" #define LN_title "title" #define NID_title 106 #define OBJ_title OBJ_X509,12L #define LN_description "description" #define NID_description 107 #define OBJ_description OBJ_X509,13L #define LN_searchGuide "searchGuide" #define NID_searchGuide 859 #define OBJ_searchGuide OBJ_X509,14L #define LN_businessCategory "businessCategory" #define NID_businessCategory 860 #define OBJ_businessCategory OBJ_X509,15L #define LN_postalAddress "postalAddress" #define NID_postalAddress 861 #define OBJ_postalAddress OBJ_X509,16L #define LN_postalCode "postalCode" #define NID_postalCode 661 #define OBJ_postalCode OBJ_X509,17L #define LN_postOfficeBox "postOfficeBox" #define NID_postOfficeBox 862 #define OBJ_postOfficeBox OBJ_X509,18L #define LN_physicalDeliveryOfficeName "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" #define NID_physicalDeliveryOfficeName 863 #define OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName OBJ_X509,19L #define LN_telephoneNumber "telephoneNumber" #define NID_telephoneNumber 864 #define OBJ_telephoneNumber OBJ_X509,20L #define LN_telexNumber "telexNumber" #define NID_telexNumber 865 #define OBJ_telexNumber OBJ_X509,21L #define LN_teletexTerminalIdentifier "teletexTerminalIdentifier" #define NID_teletexTerminalIdentifier 866 #define OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier OBJ_X509,22L #define LN_facsimileTelephoneNumber "facsimileTelephoneNumber" #define NID_facsimileTelephoneNumber 867 #define OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber OBJ_X509,23L #define LN_x121Address "x121Address" #define NID_x121Address 868 #define OBJ_x121Address OBJ_X509,24L #define LN_internationaliSDNNumber "internationaliSDNNumber" #define NID_internationaliSDNNumber 869 #define OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber OBJ_X509,25L #define LN_registeredAddress "registeredAddress" #define NID_registeredAddress 870 #define OBJ_registeredAddress OBJ_X509,26L #define LN_destinationIndicator "destinationIndicator" #define NID_destinationIndicator 871 #define OBJ_destinationIndicator OBJ_X509,27L #define LN_preferredDeliveryMethod "preferredDeliveryMethod" #define NID_preferredDeliveryMethod 872 #define OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod OBJ_X509,28L #define LN_presentationAddress "presentationAddress" #define NID_presentationAddress 873 #define OBJ_presentationAddress OBJ_X509,29L #define LN_supportedApplicationContext "supportedApplicationContext" #define NID_supportedApplicationContext 874 #define OBJ_supportedApplicationContext OBJ_X509,30L #define SN_member "member" #define NID_member 875 #define OBJ_member OBJ_X509,31L #define SN_owner "owner" #define NID_owner 876 #define OBJ_owner OBJ_X509,32L #define LN_roleOccupant "roleOccupant" #define NID_roleOccupant 877 #define OBJ_roleOccupant OBJ_X509,33L #define SN_seeAlso "seeAlso" #define NID_seeAlso 878 #define OBJ_seeAlso OBJ_X509,34L #define LN_userPassword "userPassword" #define NID_userPassword 879 #define OBJ_userPassword OBJ_X509,35L #define LN_userCertificate "userCertificate" #define NID_userCertificate 880 #define OBJ_userCertificate OBJ_X509,36L #define LN_cACertificate "cACertificate" #define NID_cACertificate 881 #define OBJ_cACertificate OBJ_X509,37L #define LN_authorityRevocationList "authorityRevocationList" #define NID_authorityRevocationList 882 #define OBJ_authorityRevocationList OBJ_X509,38L #define LN_certificateRevocationList "certificateRevocationList" #define NID_certificateRevocationList 883 #define OBJ_certificateRevocationList OBJ_X509,39L #define LN_crossCertificatePair "crossCertificatePair" #define NID_crossCertificatePair 884 #define OBJ_crossCertificatePair OBJ_X509,40L #define SN_name "name" #define LN_name "name" #define NID_name 173 #define OBJ_name OBJ_X509,41L #define SN_givenName "GN" #define LN_givenName "givenName" #define NID_givenName 99 #define OBJ_givenName OBJ_X509,42L #define SN_initials "initials" #define LN_initials "initials" #define NID_initials 101 #define OBJ_initials OBJ_X509,43L #define LN_generationQualifier "generationQualifier" #define NID_generationQualifier 509 #define OBJ_generationQualifier OBJ_X509,44L #define LN_x500UniqueIdentifier "x500UniqueIdentifier" #define NID_x500UniqueIdentifier 503 #define OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier OBJ_X509,45L #define SN_dnQualifier "dnQualifier" #define LN_dnQualifier "dnQualifier" #define NID_dnQualifier 174 #define OBJ_dnQualifier OBJ_X509,46L #define LN_enhancedSearchGuide "enhancedSearchGuide" #define NID_enhancedSearchGuide 885 #define OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide OBJ_X509,47L #define LN_protocolInformation "protocolInformation" #define NID_protocolInformation 886 #define OBJ_protocolInformation OBJ_X509,48L #define LN_distinguishedName "distinguishedName" #define NID_distinguishedName 887 #define OBJ_distinguishedName OBJ_X509,49L #define LN_uniqueMember "uniqueMember" #define NID_uniqueMember 888 #define OBJ_uniqueMember OBJ_X509,50L #define LN_houseIdentifier "houseIdentifier" #define NID_houseIdentifier 889 #define OBJ_houseIdentifier OBJ_X509,51L #define LN_supportedAlgorithms "supportedAlgorithms" #define NID_supportedAlgorithms 890 #define OBJ_supportedAlgorithms OBJ_X509,52L #define LN_deltaRevocationList "deltaRevocationList" #define NID_deltaRevocationList 891 #define OBJ_deltaRevocationList OBJ_X509,53L #define SN_dmdName "dmdName" #define NID_dmdName 892 #define OBJ_dmdName OBJ_X509,54L #define LN_pseudonym "pseudonym" #define NID_pseudonym 510 #define OBJ_pseudonym OBJ_X509,65L #define SN_role "role" #define LN_role "role" #define NID_role 400 #define OBJ_role OBJ_X509,72L #define SN_X500algorithms "X500algorithms" #define LN_X500algorithms "directory services - algorithms" #define NID_X500algorithms 378 #define OBJ_X500algorithms OBJ_X500,8L #define SN_rsa "RSA" #define LN_rsa "rsa" #define NID_rsa 19 #define OBJ_rsa OBJ_X500algorithms,1L,1L #define SN_mdc2WithRSA "RSA-MDC2" #define LN_mdc2WithRSA "mdc2WithRSA" #define NID_mdc2WithRSA 96 #define OBJ_mdc2WithRSA OBJ_X500algorithms,3L,100L #define SN_mdc2 "MDC2" #define LN_mdc2 "mdc2" #define NID_mdc2 95 #define OBJ_mdc2 OBJ_X500algorithms,3L,101L #define SN_id_ce "id-ce" #define NID_id_ce 81 #define OBJ_id_ce OBJ_X500,29L #define SN_subject_directory_attributes "subjectDirectoryAttributes" #define LN_subject_directory_attributes "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes" #define NID_subject_directory_attributes 769 #define OBJ_subject_directory_attributes OBJ_id_ce,9L #define SN_subject_key_identifier "subjectKeyIdentifier" #define LN_subject_key_identifier "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" #define NID_subject_key_identifier 82 #define OBJ_subject_key_identifier OBJ_id_ce,14L #define SN_key_usage "keyUsage" #define LN_key_usage "X509v3 Key Usage" #define NID_key_usage 83 #define OBJ_key_usage OBJ_id_ce,15L #define SN_private_key_usage_period "privateKeyUsagePeriod" #define LN_private_key_usage_period "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period" #define NID_private_key_usage_period 84 #define OBJ_private_key_usage_period OBJ_id_ce,16L #define SN_subject_alt_name "subjectAltName" #define LN_subject_alt_name "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name" #define NID_subject_alt_name 85 #define OBJ_subject_alt_name OBJ_id_ce,17L #define SN_issuer_alt_name "issuerAltName" #define LN_issuer_alt_name "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name" #define NID_issuer_alt_name 86 #define OBJ_issuer_alt_name OBJ_id_ce,18L #define SN_basic_constraints "basicConstraints" #define LN_basic_constraints "X509v3 Basic Constraints" #define NID_basic_constraints 87 #define OBJ_basic_constraints OBJ_id_ce,19L #define SN_crl_number "crlNumber" #define LN_crl_number "X509v3 CRL Number" #define NID_crl_number 88 #define OBJ_crl_number OBJ_id_ce,20L #define SN_crl_reason "CRLReason" #define LN_crl_reason "X509v3 CRL Reason Code" #define NID_crl_reason 141 #define OBJ_crl_reason OBJ_id_ce,21L #define SN_invalidity_date "invalidityDate" #define LN_invalidity_date "Invalidity Date" #define NID_invalidity_date 142 #define OBJ_invalidity_date OBJ_id_ce,24L #define SN_delta_crl "deltaCRL" #define LN_delta_crl "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator" #define NID_delta_crl 140 #define OBJ_delta_crl OBJ_id_ce,27L #define SN_issuing_distribution_point "issuingDistributionPoint" #define LN_issuing_distribution_point "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point" #define NID_issuing_distribution_point 770 #define OBJ_issuing_distribution_point OBJ_id_ce,28L #define SN_certificate_issuer "certificateIssuer" #define LN_certificate_issuer "X509v3 Certificate Issuer" #define NID_certificate_issuer 771 #define OBJ_certificate_issuer OBJ_id_ce,29L #define SN_name_constraints "nameConstraints" #define LN_name_constraints "X509v3 Name Constraints" #define NID_name_constraints 666 #define OBJ_name_constraints OBJ_id_ce,30L #define SN_crl_distribution_points "crlDistributionPoints" #define LN_crl_distribution_points "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points" #define NID_crl_distribution_points 103 #define OBJ_crl_distribution_points OBJ_id_ce,31L #define SN_certificate_policies "certificatePolicies" #define LN_certificate_policies "X509v3 Certificate Policies" #define NID_certificate_policies 89 #define OBJ_certificate_policies OBJ_id_ce,32L #define SN_any_policy "anyPolicy" #define LN_any_policy "X509v3 Any Policy" #define NID_any_policy 746 #define OBJ_any_policy OBJ_certificate_policies,0L #define SN_policy_mappings "policyMappings" #define LN_policy_mappings "X509v3 Policy Mappings" #define NID_policy_mappings 747 #define OBJ_policy_mappings OBJ_id_ce,33L #define SN_authority_key_identifier "authorityKeyIdentifier" #define LN_authority_key_identifier "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" #define NID_authority_key_identifier 90 #define OBJ_authority_key_identifier OBJ_id_ce,35L #define SN_policy_constraints "policyConstraints" #define LN_policy_constraints "X509v3 Policy Constraints" #define NID_policy_constraints 401 #define OBJ_policy_constraints OBJ_id_ce,36L #define SN_ext_key_usage "extendedKeyUsage" #define LN_ext_key_usage "X509v3 Extended Key Usage" #define NID_ext_key_usage 126 #define OBJ_ext_key_usage OBJ_id_ce,37L #define SN_freshest_crl "freshestCRL" #define LN_freshest_crl "X509v3 Freshest CRL" #define NID_freshest_crl 857 #define OBJ_freshest_crl OBJ_id_ce,46L #define SN_inhibit_any_policy "inhibitAnyPolicy" #define LN_inhibit_any_policy "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy" #define NID_inhibit_any_policy 748 #define OBJ_inhibit_any_policy OBJ_id_ce,54L #define SN_target_information "targetInformation" #define LN_target_information "X509v3 AC Targeting" #define NID_target_information 402 #define OBJ_target_information OBJ_id_ce,55L #define SN_no_rev_avail "noRevAvail" #define LN_no_rev_avail "X509v3 No Revocation Available" #define NID_no_rev_avail 403 #define OBJ_no_rev_avail OBJ_id_ce,56L #define SN_anyExtendedKeyUsage "anyExtendedKeyUsage" #define LN_anyExtendedKeyUsage "Any Extended Key Usage" #define NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage 910 #define OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJ_ext_key_usage,0L #define SN_netscape "Netscape" #define LN_netscape "Netscape Communications Corp." #define NID_netscape 57 #define OBJ_netscape 2L,16L,840L,1L,113730L #define SN_netscape_cert_extension "nsCertExt" #define LN_netscape_cert_extension "Netscape Certificate Extension" #define NID_netscape_cert_extension 58 #define OBJ_netscape_cert_extension OBJ_netscape,1L #define SN_netscape_data_type "nsDataType" #define LN_netscape_data_type "Netscape Data Type" #define NID_netscape_data_type 59 #define OBJ_netscape_data_type OBJ_netscape,2L #define SN_netscape_cert_type "nsCertType" #define LN_netscape_cert_type "Netscape Cert Type" #define NID_netscape_cert_type 71 #define OBJ_netscape_cert_type OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,1L #define SN_netscape_base_url "nsBaseUrl" #define LN_netscape_base_url "Netscape Base Url" #define NID_netscape_base_url 72 #define OBJ_netscape_base_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,2L #define SN_netscape_revocation_url "nsRevocationUrl" #define LN_netscape_revocation_url "Netscape Revocation Url" #define NID_netscape_revocation_url 73 #define OBJ_netscape_revocation_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,3L #define SN_netscape_ca_revocation_url "nsCaRevocationUrl" #define LN_netscape_ca_revocation_url "Netscape CA Revocation Url" #define NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url 74 #define OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,4L #define SN_netscape_renewal_url "nsRenewalUrl" #define LN_netscape_renewal_url "Netscape Renewal Url" #define NID_netscape_renewal_url 75 #define OBJ_netscape_renewal_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,7L #define SN_netscape_ca_policy_url "nsCaPolicyUrl" #define LN_netscape_ca_policy_url "Netscape CA Policy Url" #define NID_netscape_ca_policy_url 76 #define OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,8L #define SN_netscape_ssl_server_name "nsSslServerName" #define LN_netscape_ssl_server_name "Netscape SSL Server Name" #define NID_netscape_ssl_server_name 77 #define OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,12L #define SN_netscape_comment "nsComment" #define LN_netscape_comment "Netscape Comment" #define NID_netscape_comment 78 #define OBJ_netscape_comment OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,13L #define SN_netscape_cert_sequence "nsCertSequence" #define LN_netscape_cert_sequence "Netscape Certificate Sequence" #define NID_netscape_cert_sequence 79 #define OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence OBJ_netscape_data_type,5L #define SN_ns_sgc "nsSGC" #define LN_ns_sgc "Netscape Server Gated Crypto" #define NID_ns_sgc 139 #define OBJ_ns_sgc OBJ_netscape,4L,1L #define SN_org "ORG" #define LN_org "org" #define NID_org 379 #define OBJ_org OBJ_iso,3L #define SN_dod "DOD" #define LN_dod "dod" #define NID_dod 380 #define OBJ_dod OBJ_org,6L #define SN_iana "IANA" #define LN_iana "iana" #define NID_iana 381 #define OBJ_iana OBJ_dod,1L #define OBJ_internet OBJ_iana #define SN_Directory "directory" #define LN_Directory "Directory" #define NID_Directory 382 #define OBJ_Directory OBJ_internet,1L #define SN_Management "mgmt" #define LN_Management "Management" #define NID_Management 383 #define OBJ_Management OBJ_internet,2L #define SN_Experimental "experimental" #define LN_Experimental "Experimental" #define NID_Experimental 384 #define OBJ_Experimental OBJ_internet,3L #define SN_Private "private" #define LN_Private "Private" #define NID_Private 385 #define OBJ_Private OBJ_internet,4L #define SN_Security "security" #define LN_Security "Security" #define NID_Security 386 #define OBJ_Security OBJ_internet,5L #define SN_SNMPv2 "snmpv2" #define LN_SNMPv2 "SNMPv2" #define NID_SNMPv2 387 #define OBJ_SNMPv2 OBJ_internet,6L #define LN_Mail "Mail" #define NID_Mail 388 #define OBJ_Mail OBJ_internet,7L #define SN_Enterprises "enterprises" #define LN_Enterprises "Enterprises" #define NID_Enterprises 389 #define OBJ_Enterprises OBJ_Private,1L #define SN_dcObject "dcobject" #define LN_dcObject "dcObject" #define NID_dcObject 390 #define OBJ_dcObject OBJ_Enterprises,1466L,344L #define SN_mime_mhs "mime-mhs" #define LN_mime_mhs "MIME MHS" #define NID_mime_mhs 504 #define OBJ_mime_mhs OBJ_Mail,1L #define SN_mime_mhs_headings "mime-mhs-headings" #define LN_mime_mhs_headings "mime-mhs-headings" #define NID_mime_mhs_headings 505 #define OBJ_mime_mhs_headings OBJ_mime_mhs,1L #define SN_mime_mhs_bodies "mime-mhs-bodies" #define LN_mime_mhs_bodies "mime-mhs-bodies" #define NID_mime_mhs_bodies 506 #define OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies OBJ_mime_mhs,2L #define SN_id_hex_partial_message "id-hex-partial-message" #define LN_id_hex_partial_message "id-hex-partial-message" #define NID_id_hex_partial_message 507 #define OBJ_id_hex_partial_message OBJ_mime_mhs_headings,1L #define SN_id_hex_multipart_message "id-hex-multipart-message" #define LN_id_hex_multipart_message "id-hex-multipart-message" #define NID_id_hex_multipart_message 508 #define OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message OBJ_mime_mhs_headings,2L #define SN_zlib_compression "ZLIB" #define LN_zlib_compression "zlib compression" #define NID_zlib_compression 125 #define OBJ_zlib_compression OBJ_id_smime_alg,8L #define OBJ_csor 2L,16L,840L,1L,101L,3L #define OBJ_nistAlgorithms OBJ_csor,4L #define OBJ_aes OBJ_nistAlgorithms,1L #define SN_aes_128_ecb "AES-128-ECB" #define LN_aes_128_ecb "aes-128-ecb" #define NID_aes_128_ecb 418 #define OBJ_aes_128_ecb OBJ_aes,1L #define SN_aes_128_cbc "AES-128-CBC" #define LN_aes_128_cbc "aes-128-cbc" #define NID_aes_128_cbc 419 #define OBJ_aes_128_cbc OBJ_aes,2L #define SN_aes_128_ofb128 "AES-128-OFB" #define LN_aes_128_ofb128 "aes-128-ofb" #define NID_aes_128_ofb128 420 #define OBJ_aes_128_ofb128 OBJ_aes,3L #define SN_aes_128_cfb128 "AES-128-CFB" #define LN_aes_128_cfb128 "aes-128-cfb" #define NID_aes_128_cfb128 421 #define OBJ_aes_128_cfb128 OBJ_aes,4L #define SN_id_aes128_wrap "id-aes128-wrap" #define NID_id_aes128_wrap 788 #define OBJ_id_aes128_wrap OBJ_aes,5L #define SN_aes_128_gcm "id-aes128-GCM" #define LN_aes_128_gcm "aes-128-gcm" #define NID_aes_128_gcm 895 #define OBJ_aes_128_gcm OBJ_aes,6L #define SN_aes_128_ccm "id-aes128-CCM" #define LN_aes_128_ccm "aes-128-ccm" #define NID_aes_128_ccm 896 #define OBJ_aes_128_ccm OBJ_aes,7L #define SN_id_aes128_wrap_pad "id-aes128-wrap-pad" #define NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad 897 #define OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad OBJ_aes,8L #define SN_aes_192_ecb "AES-192-ECB" #define LN_aes_192_ecb "aes-192-ecb" #define NID_aes_192_ecb 422 #define OBJ_aes_192_ecb OBJ_aes,21L #define SN_aes_192_cbc "AES-192-CBC" #define LN_aes_192_cbc "aes-192-cbc" #define NID_aes_192_cbc 423 #define OBJ_aes_192_cbc OBJ_aes,22L #define SN_aes_192_ofb128 "AES-192-OFB" #define LN_aes_192_ofb128 "aes-192-ofb" #define NID_aes_192_ofb128 424 #define OBJ_aes_192_ofb128 OBJ_aes,23L #define SN_aes_192_cfb128 "AES-192-CFB" #define LN_aes_192_cfb128 "aes-192-cfb" #define NID_aes_192_cfb128 425 #define OBJ_aes_192_cfb128 OBJ_aes,24L #define SN_id_aes192_wrap "id-aes192-wrap" #define NID_id_aes192_wrap 789 #define OBJ_id_aes192_wrap OBJ_aes,25L #define SN_aes_192_gcm "id-aes192-GCM" #define LN_aes_192_gcm "aes-192-gcm" #define NID_aes_192_gcm 898 #define OBJ_aes_192_gcm OBJ_aes,26L #define SN_aes_192_ccm "id-aes192-CCM" #define LN_aes_192_ccm "aes-192-ccm" #define NID_aes_192_ccm 899 #define OBJ_aes_192_ccm OBJ_aes,27L #define SN_id_aes192_wrap_pad "id-aes192-wrap-pad" #define NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad 900 #define OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad OBJ_aes,28L #define SN_aes_256_ecb "AES-256-ECB" #define LN_aes_256_ecb "aes-256-ecb" #define NID_aes_256_ecb 426 #define OBJ_aes_256_ecb OBJ_aes,41L #define SN_aes_256_cbc "AES-256-CBC" #define LN_aes_256_cbc "aes-256-cbc" #define NID_aes_256_cbc 427 #define OBJ_aes_256_cbc OBJ_aes,42L #define SN_aes_256_ofb128 "AES-256-OFB" #define LN_aes_256_ofb128 "aes-256-ofb" #define NID_aes_256_ofb128 428 #define OBJ_aes_256_ofb128 OBJ_aes,43L #define SN_aes_256_cfb128 "AES-256-CFB" #define LN_aes_256_cfb128 "aes-256-cfb" #define NID_aes_256_cfb128 429 #define OBJ_aes_256_cfb128 OBJ_aes,44L #define SN_id_aes256_wrap "id-aes256-wrap" #define NID_id_aes256_wrap 790 #define OBJ_id_aes256_wrap OBJ_aes,45L #define SN_aes_256_gcm "id-aes256-GCM" #define LN_aes_256_gcm "aes-256-gcm" #define NID_aes_256_gcm 901 #define OBJ_aes_256_gcm OBJ_aes,46L #define SN_aes_256_ccm "id-aes256-CCM" #define LN_aes_256_ccm "aes-256-ccm" #define NID_aes_256_ccm 902 #define OBJ_aes_256_ccm OBJ_aes,47L #define SN_id_aes256_wrap_pad "id-aes256-wrap-pad" #define NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad 903 #define OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad OBJ_aes,48L #define SN_aes_128_cfb1 "AES-128-CFB1" #define LN_aes_128_cfb1 "aes-128-cfb1" #define NID_aes_128_cfb1 650 #define SN_aes_192_cfb1 "AES-192-CFB1" #define LN_aes_192_cfb1 "aes-192-cfb1" #define NID_aes_192_cfb1 651 #define SN_aes_256_cfb1 "AES-256-CFB1" #define LN_aes_256_cfb1 "aes-256-cfb1" #define NID_aes_256_cfb1 652 #define SN_aes_128_cfb8 "AES-128-CFB8" #define LN_aes_128_cfb8 "aes-128-cfb8" #define NID_aes_128_cfb8 653 #define SN_aes_192_cfb8 "AES-192-CFB8" #define LN_aes_192_cfb8 "aes-192-cfb8" #define NID_aes_192_cfb8 654 #define SN_aes_256_cfb8 "AES-256-CFB8" #define LN_aes_256_cfb8 "aes-256-cfb8" #define NID_aes_256_cfb8 655 #define SN_aes_128_ctr "AES-128-CTR" #define LN_aes_128_ctr "aes-128-ctr" #define NID_aes_128_ctr 904 #define SN_aes_192_ctr "AES-192-CTR" #define LN_aes_192_ctr "aes-192-ctr" #define NID_aes_192_ctr 905 #define SN_aes_256_ctr "AES-256-CTR" #define LN_aes_256_ctr "aes-256-ctr" #define NID_aes_256_ctr 906 #define SN_aes_128_ocb "AES-128-OCB" #define LN_aes_128_ocb "aes-128-ocb" #define NID_aes_128_ocb 958 #define SN_aes_192_ocb "AES-192-OCB" #define LN_aes_192_ocb "aes-192-ocb" #define NID_aes_192_ocb 959 #define SN_aes_256_ocb "AES-256-OCB" #define LN_aes_256_ocb "aes-256-ocb" #define NID_aes_256_ocb 960 #define SN_aes_128_xts "AES-128-XTS" #define LN_aes_128_xts "aes-128-xts" #define NID_aes_128_xts 913 #define SN_aes_256_xts "AES-256-XTS" #define LN_aes_256_xts "aes-256-xts" #define NID_aes_256_xts 914 #define SN_des_cfb1 "DES-CFB1" #define LN_des_cfb1 "des-cfb1" #define NID_des_cfb1 656 #define SN_des_cfb8 "DES-CFB8" #define LN_des_cfb8 "des-cfb8" #define NID_des_cfb8 657 #define SN_des_ede3_cfb1 "DES-EDE3-CFB1" #define LN_des_ede3_cfb1 "des-ede3-cfb1" #define NID_des_ede3_cfb1 658 #define SN_des_ede3_cfb8 "DES-EDE3-CFB8" #define LN_des_ede3_cfb8 "des-ede3-cfb8" #define NID_des_ede3_cfb8 659 #define OBJ_nist_hashalgs OBJ_nistAlgorithms,2L #define SN_sha256 "SHA256" #define LN_sha256 "sha256" #define NID_sha256 672 #define OBJ_sha256 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,1L #define SN_sha384 "SHA384" #define LN_sha384 "sha384" #define NID_sha384 673 #define OBJ_sha384 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,2L #define SN_sha512 "SHA512" #define LN_sha512 "sha512" #define NID_sha512 674 #define OBJ_sha512 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,3L #define SN_sha224 "SHA224" #define LN_sha224 "sha224" #define NID_sha224 675 #define OBJ_sha224 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,4L #define OBJ_dsa_with_sha2 OBJ_nistAlgorithms,3L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA224 "dsa_with_SHA224" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA224 802 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224 OBJ_dsa_with_sha2,1L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA256 "dsa_with_SHA256" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA256 803 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256 OBJ_dsa_with_sha2,2L #define SN_hold_instruction_code "holdInstructionCode" #define LN_hold_instruction_code "Hold Instruction Code" #define NID_hold_instruction_code 430 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_code OBJ_id_ce,23L #define OBJ_holdInstruction OBJ_X9_57,2L #define SN_hold_instruction_none "holdInstructionNone" #define LN_hold_instruction_none "Hold Instruction None" #define NID_hold_instruction_none 431 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_none OBJ_holdInstruction,1L #define SN_hold_instruction_call_issuer "holdInstructionCallIssuer" #define LN_hold_instruction_call_issuer "Hold Instruction Call Issuer" #define NID_hold_instruction_call_issuer 432 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer OBJ_holdInstruction,2L #define SN_hold_instruction_reject "holdInstructionReject" #define LN_hold_instruction_reject "Hold Instruction Reject" #define NID_hold_instruction_reject 433 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_reject OBJ_holdInstruction,3L #define SN_data "data" #define NID_data 434 #define OBJ_data OBJ_itu_t,9L #define SN_pss "pss" #define NID_pss 435 #define OBJ_pss OBJ_data,2342L #define SN_ucl "ucl" #define NID_ucl 436 #define OBJ_ucl OBJ_pss,19200300L #define SN_pilot "pilot" #define NID_pilot 437 #define OBJ_pilot OBJ_ucl,100L #define LN_pilotAttributeType "pilotAttributeType" #define NID_pilotAttributeType 438 #define OBJ_pilotAttributeType OBJ_pilot,1L #define LN_pilotAttributeSyntax "pilotAttributeSyntax" #define NID_pilotAttributeSyntax 439 #define OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax OBJ_pilot,3L #define LN_pilotObjectClass "pilotObjectClass" #define NID_pilotObjectClass 440 #define OBJ_pilotObjectClass OBJ_pilot,4L #define LN_pilotGroups "pilotGroups" #define NID_pilotGroups 441 #define OBJ_pilotGroups OBJ_pilot,10L #define LN_iA5StringSyntax "iA5StringSyntax" #define NID_iA5StringSyntax 442 #define OBJ_iA5StringSyntax OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax,4L #define LN_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" #define NID_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax 443 #define OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax,5L #define LN_pilotObject "pilotObject" #define NID_pilotObject 444 #define OBJ_pilotObject OBJ_pilotObjectClass,3L #define LN_pilotPerson "pilotPerson" #define NID_pilotPerson 445 #define OBJ_pilotPerson OBJ_pilotObjectClass,4L #define SN_account "account" #define NID_account 446 #define OBJ_account OBJ_pilotObjectClass,5L #define SN_document "document" #define NID_document 447 #define OBJ_document OBJ_pilotObjectClass,6L #define SN_room "room" #define NID_room 448 #define OBJ_room OBJ_pilotObjectClass,7L #define LN_documentSeries "documentSeries" #define NID_documentSeries 449 #define OBJ_documentSeries OBJ_pilotObjectClass,9L #define SN_Domain "domain" #define LN_Domain "Domain" #define NID_Domain 392 #define OBJ_Domain OBJ_pilotObjectClass,13L #define LN_rFC822localPart "rFC822localPart" #define NID_rFC822localPart 450 #define OBJ_rFC822localPart OBJ_pilotObjectClass,14L #define LN_dNSDomain "dNSDomain" #define NID_dNSDomain 451 #define OBJ_dNSDomain OBJ_pilotObjectClass,15L #define LN_domainRelatedObject "domainRelatedObject" #define NID_domainRelatedObject 452 #define OBJ_domainRelatedObject OBJ_pilotObjectClass,17L #define LN_friendlyCountry "friendlyCountry" #define NID_friendlyCountry 453 #define OBJ_friendlyCountry OBJ_pilotObjectClass,18L #define LN_simpleSecurityObject "simpleSecurityObject" #define NID_simpleSecurityObject 454 #define OBJ_simpleSecurityObject OBJ_pilotObjectClass,19L #define LN_pilotOrganization "pilotOrganization" #define NID_pilotOrganization 455 #define OBJ_pilotOrganization OBJ_pilotObjectClass,20L #define LN_pilotDSA "pilotDSA" #define NID_pilotDSA 456 #define OBJ_pilotDSA OBJ_pilotObjectClass,21L #define LN_qualityLabelledData "qualityLabelledData" #define NID_qualityLabelledData 457 #define OBJ_qualityLabelledData OBJ_pilotObjectClass,22L #define SN_userId "UID" #define LN_userId "userId" #define NID_userId 458 #define OBJ_userId OBJ_pilotAttributeType,1L #define LN_textEncodedORAddress "textEncodedORAddress" #define NID_textEncodedORAddress 459 #define OBJ_textEncodedORAddress OBJ_pilotAttributeType,2L #define SN_rfc822Mailbox "mail" #define LN_rfc822Mailbox "rfc822Mailbox" #define NID_rfc822Mailbox 460 #define OBJ_rfc822Mailbox OBJ_pilotAttributeType,3L #define SN_info "info" #define NID_info 461 #define OBJ_info OBJ_pilotAttributeType,4L #define LN_favouriteDrink "favouriteDrink" #define NID_favouriteDrink 462 #define OBJ_favouriteDrink OBJ_pilotAttributeType,5L #define LN_roomNumber "roomNumber" #define NID_roomNumber 463 #define OBJ_roomNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,6L #define SN_photo "photo" #define NID_photo 464 #define OBJ_photo OBJ_pilotAttributeType,7L #define LN_userClass "userClass" #define NID_userClass 465 #define OBJ_userClass OBJ_pilotAttributeType,8L #define SN_host "host" #define NID_host 466 #define OBJ_host OBJ_pilotAttributeType,9L #define SN_manager "manager" #define NID_manager 467 #define OBJ_manager OBJ_pilotAttributeType,10L #define LN_documentIdentifier "documentIdentifier" #define NID_documentIdentifier 468 #define OBJ_documentIdentifier OBJ_pilotAttributeType,11L #define LN_documentTitle "documentTitle" #define NID_documentTitle 469 #define OBJ_documentTitle OBJ_pilotAttributeType,12L #define LN_documentVersion "documentVersion" #define NID_documentVersion 470 #define OBJ_documentVersion OBJ_pilotAttributeType,13L #define LN_documentAuthor "documentAuthor" #define NID_documentAuthor 471 #define OBJ_documentAuthor OBJ_pilotAttributeType,14L #define LN_documentLocation "documentLocation" #define NID_documentLocation 472 #define OBJ_documentLocation OBJ_pilotAttributeType,15L #define LN_homeTelephoneNumber "homeTelephoneNumber" #define NID_homeTelephoneNumber 473 #define OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,20L #define SN_secretary "secretary" #define NID_secretary 474 #define OBJ_secretary OBJ_pilotAttributeType,21L #define LN_otherMailbox "otherMailbox" #define NID_otherMailbox 475 #define OBJ_otherMailbox OBJ_pilotAttributeType,22L #define LN_lastModifiedTime "lastModifiedTime" #define NID_lastModifiedTime 476 #define OBJ_lastModifiedTime OBJ_pilotAttributeType,23L #define LN_lastModifiedBy "lastModifiedBy" #define NID_lastModifiedBy 477 #define OBJ_lastModifiedBy OBJ_pilotAttributeType,24L #define SN_domainComponent "DC" #define LN_domainComponent "domainComponent" #define NID_domainComponent 391 #define OBJ_domainComponent OBJ_pilotAttributeType,25L #define LN_aRecord "aRecord" #define NID_aRecord 478 #define OBJ_aRecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,26L #define LN_pilotAttributeType27 "pilotAttributeType27" #define NID_pilotAttributeType27 479 #define OBJ_pilotAttributeType27 OBJ_pilotAttributeType,27L #define LN_mXRecord "mXRecord" #define NID_mXRecord 480 #define OBJ_mXRecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,28L #define LN_nSRecord "nSRecord" #define NID_nSRecord 481 #define OBJ_nSRecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,29L #define LN_sOARecord "sOARecord" #define NID_sOARecord 482 #define OBJ_sOARecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,30L #define LN_cNAMERecord "cNAMERecord" #define NID_cNAMERecord 483 #define OBJ_cNAMERecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,31L #define LN_associatedDomain "associatedDomain" #define NID_associatedDomain 484 #define OBJ_associatedDomain OBJ_pilotAttributeType,37L #define LN_associatedName "associatedName" #define NID_associatedName 485 #define OBJ_associatedName OBJ_pilotAttributeType,38L #define LN_homePostalAddress "homePostalAddress" #define NID_homePostalAddress 486 #define OBJ_homePostalAddress OBJ_pilotAttributeType,39L #define LN_personalTitle "personalTitle" #define NID_personalTitle 487 #define OBJ_personalTitle OBJ_pilotAttributeType,40L #define LN_mobileTelephoneNumber "mobileTelephoneNumber" #define NID_mobileTelephoneNumber 488 #define OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,41L #define LN_pagerTelephoneNumber "pagerTelephoneNumber" #define NID_pagerTelephoneNumber 489 #define OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,42L #define LN_friendlyCountryName "friendlyCountryName" #define NID_friendlyCountryName 490 #define OBJ_friendlyCountryName OBJ_pilotAttributeType,43L #define SN_uniqueIdentifier "uid" #define LN_uniqueIdentifier "uniqueIdentifier" #define NID_uniqueIdentifier 102 #define OBJ_uniqueIdentifier OBJ_pilotAttributeType,44L #define LN_organizationalStatus "organizationalStatus" #define NID_organizationalStatus 491 #define OBJ_organizationalStatus OBJ_pilotAttributeType,45L #define LN_janetMailbox "janetMailbox" #define NID_janetMailbox 492 #define OBJ_janetMailbox OBJ_pilotAttributeType,46L #define LN_mailPreferenceOption "mailPreferenceOption" #define NID_mailPreferenceOption 493 #define OBJ_mailPreferenceOption OBJ_pilotAttributeType,47L #define LN_buildingName "buildingName" #define NID_buildingName 494 #define OBJ_buildingName OBJ_pilotAttributeType,48L #define LN_dSAQuality "dSAQuality" #define NID_dSAQuality 495 #define OBJ_dSAQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,49L #define LN_singleLevelQuality "singleLevelQuality" #define NID_singleLevelQuality 496 #define OBJ_singleLevelQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,50L #define LN_subtreeMinimumQuality "subtreeMinimumQuality" #define NID_subtreeMinimumQuality 497 #define OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,51L #define LN_subtreeMaximumQuality "subtreeMaximumQuality" #define NID_subtreeMaximumQuality 498 #define OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,52L #define LN_personalSignature "personalSignature" #define NID_personalSignature 499 #define OBJ_personalSignature OBJ_pilotAttributeType,53L #define LN_dITRedirect "dITRedirect" #define NID_dITRedirect 500 #define OBJ_dITRedirect OBJ_pilotAttributeType,54L #define SN_audio "audio" #define NID_audio 501 #define OBJ_audio OBJ_pilotAttributeType,55L #define LN_documentPublisher "documentPublisher" #define NID_documentPublisher 502 #define OBJ_documentPublisher OBJ_pilotAttributeType,56L #define SN_id_set "id-set" #define LN_id_set "Secure Electronic Transactions" #define NID_id_set 512 #define OBJ_id_set OBJ_international_organizations,42L #define SN_set_ctype "set-ctype" #define LN_set_ctype "content types" #define NID_set_ctype 513 #define OBJ_set_ctype OBJ_id_set,0L #define SN_set_msgExt "set-msgExt" #define LN_set_msgExt "message extensions" #define NID_set_msgExt 514 #define OBJ_set_msgExt OBJ_id_set,1L #define SN_set_attr "set-attr" #define NID_set_attr 515 #define OBJ_set_attr OBJ_id_set,3L #define SN_set_policy "set-policy" #define NID_set_policy 516 #define OBJ_set_policy OBJ_id_set,5L #define SN_set_certExt "set-certExt" #define LN_set_certExt "certificate extensions" #define NID_set_certExt 517 #define OBJ_set_certExt OBJ_id_set,7L #define SN_set_brand "set-brand" #define NID_set_brand 518 #define OBJ_set_brand OBJ_id_set,8L #define SN_setct_PANData "setct-PANData" #define NID_setct_PANData 519 #define OBJ_setct_PANData OBJ_set_ctype,0L #define SN_setct_PANToken "setct-PANToken" #define NID_setct_PANToken 520 #define OBJ_setct_PANToken OBJ_set_ctype,1L #define SN_setct_PANOnly "setct-PANOnly" #define NID_setct_PANOnly 521 #define OBJ_setct_PANOnly OBJ_set_ctype,2L #define SN_setct_OIData "setct-OIData" #define NID_setct_OIData 522 #define OBJ_setct_OIData OBJ_set_ctype,3L #define SN_setct_PI "setct-PI" #define NID_setct_PI 523 #define OBJ_setct_PI OBJ_set_ctype,4L #define SN_setct_PIData "setct-PIData" #define NID_setct_PIData 524 #define OBJ_setct_PIData OBJ_set_ctype,5L #define SN_setct_PIDataUnsigned "setct-PIDataUnsigned" #define NID_setct_PIDataUnsigned 525 #define OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned OBJ_set_ctype,6L #define SN_setct_HODInput "setct-HODInput" #define NID_setct_HODInput 526 #define OBJ_setct_HODInput OBJ_set_ctype,7L #define SN_setct_AuthResBaggage "setct-AuthResBaggage" #define NID_setct_AuthResBaggage 527 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage OBJ_set_ctype,8L #define SN_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" #define NID_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage 528 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage OBJ_set_ctype,9L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResBaggage "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResBaggage 529 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage OBJ_set_ctype,10L #define SN_setct_CapTokenSeq "setct-CapTokenSeq" #define NID_setct_CapTokenSeq 530 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq OBJ_set_ctype,11L #define SN_setct_PInitResData "setct-PInitResData" #define NID_setct_PInitResData 531 #define OBJ_setct_PInitResData OBJ_set_ctype,12L #define SN_setct_PI_TBS "setct-PI-TBS" #define NID_setct_PI_TBS 532 #define OBJ_setct_PI_TBS OBJ_set_ctype,13L #define SN_setct_PResData "setct-PResData" #define NID_setct_PResData 533 #define OBJ_setct_PResData OBJ_set_ctype,14L #define SN_setct_AuthReqTBS "setct-AuthReqTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthReqTBS 534 #define OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,16L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBS "setct-AuthResTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBS 535 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,17L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBSX "setct-AuthResTBSX" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBSX 536 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,18L #define SN_setct_AuthTokenTBS "setct-AuthTokenTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthTokenTBS 537 #define OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS OBJ_set_ctype,19L #define SN_setct_CapTokenData "setct-CapTokenData" #define NID_setct_CapTokenData 538 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenData OBJ_set_ctype,20L #define SN_setct_CapTokenTBS "setct-CapTokenTBS" #define NID_setct_CapTokenTBS 539 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS OBJ_set_ctype,21L #define SN_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" #define NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg 540 #define OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg OBJ_set_ctype,22L #define SN_setct_AuthRevReqTBS "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBS 541 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,23L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResData "setct-AuthRevResData" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResData 542 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData OBJ_set_ctype,24L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBS "setct-AuthRevResTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBS 543 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,25L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBS "setct-CapReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBS 544 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,26L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBSX "setct-CapReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBSX 545 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,27L #define SN_setct_CapResData "setct-CapResData" #define NID_setct_CapResData 546 #define OBJ_setct_CapResData OBJ_set_ctype,28L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBS "setct-CapRevReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBS 547 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,29L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBSX "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBSX 548 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,30L #define SN_setct_CapRevResData "setct-CapRevResData" #define NID_setct_CapRevResData 549 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevResData OBJ_set_ctype,31L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBS "setct-CredReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBS 550 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,32L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBSX "setct-CredReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBSX 551 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,33L #define SN_setct_CredResData "setct-CredResData" #define NID_setct_CredResData 552 #define OBJ_setct_CredResData OBJ_set_ctype,34L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBS "setct-CredRevReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBS 553 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,35L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBSX "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBSX 554 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,36L #define SN_setct_CredRevResData "setct-CredRevResData" #define NID_setct_CredRevResData 555 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevResData OBJ_set_ctype,37L #define SN_setct_PCertReqData "setct-PCertReqData" #define NID_setct_PCertReqData 556 #define OBJ_setct_PCertReqData OBJ_set_ctype,38L #define SN_setct_PCertResTBS "setct-PCertResTBS" #define NID_setct_PCertResTBS 557 #define OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,39L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminReqData "setct-BatchAdminReqData" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminReqData 558 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData OBJ_set_ctype,40L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminResData "setct-BatchAdminResData" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminResData 559 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData OBJ_set_ctype,41L #define SN_setct_CardCInitResTBS "setct-CardCInitResTBS" #define NID_setct_CardCInitResTBS 560 #define OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,42L #define SN_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" #define NID_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS 561 #define OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,43L #define SN_setct_RegFormResTBS "setct-RegFormResTBS" #define NID_setct_RegFormResTBS 562 #define OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,44L #define SN_setct_CertReqData "setct-CertReqData" #define NID_setct_CertReqData 563 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqData OBJ_set_ctype,45L #define SN_setct_CertReqTBS "setct-CertReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CertReqTBS 564 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,46L #define SN_setct_CertResData "setct-CertResData" #define NID_setct_CertResData 565 #define OBJ_setct_CertResData OBJ_set_ctype,47L #define SN_setct_CertInqReqTBS "setct-CertInqReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CertInqReqTBS 566 #define OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,48L #define SN_setct_ErrorTBS "setct-ErrorTBS" #define NID_setct_ErrorTBS 567 #define OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS OBJ_set_ctype,49L #define SN_setct_PIDualSignedTBE "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" #define NID_setct_PIDualSignedTBE 568 #define OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE OBJ_set_ctype,50L #define SN_setct_PIUnsignedTBE "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" #define NID_setct_PIUnsignedTBE 569 #define OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE OBJ_set_ctype,51L #define SN_setct_AuthReqTBE "setct-AuthReqTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthReqTBE 570 #define OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,52L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBE "setct-AuthResTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBE 571 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,53L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBEX "setct-AuthResTBEX" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBEX 572 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,54L #define SN_setct_AuthTokenTBE "setct-AuthTokenTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthTokenTBE 573 #define OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE OBJ_set_ctype,55L #define SN_setct_CapTokenTBE "setct-CapTokenTBE" #define NID_setct_CapTokenTBE 574 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE OBJ_set_ctype,56L #define SN_setct_CapTokenTBEX "setct-CapTokenTBEX" #define NID_setct_CapTokenTBEX 575 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,57L #define SN_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" #define NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE 576 #define OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE OBJ_set_ctype,58L #define SN_setct_AuthRevReqTBE "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBE 577 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,59L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBE "setct-AuthRevResTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBE 578 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,60L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBEB "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBEB 579 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB OBJ_set_ctype,61L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBE "setct-CapReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBE 580 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,62L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBEX "setct-CapReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBEX 581 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,63L #define SN_setct_CapResTBE "setct-CapResTBE" #define NID_setct_CapResTBE 582 #define OBJ_setct_CapResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,64L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBE "setct-CapRevReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBE 583 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,65L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBEX "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBEX 584 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,66L #define SN_setct_CapRevResTBE "setct-CapRevResTBE" #define NID_setct_CapRevResTBE 585 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,67L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBE "setct-CredReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBE 586 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,68L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBEX "setct-CredReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBEX 587 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,69L #define SN_setct_CredResTBE "setct-CredResTBE" #define NID_setct_CredResTBE 588 #define OBJ_setct_CredResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,70L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBE "setct-CredRevReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBE 589 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,71L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBEX "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBEX 590 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,72L #define SN_setct_CredRevResTBE "setct-CredRevResTBE" #define NID_setct_CredRevResTBE 591 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,73L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE 592 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,74L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminResTBE "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminResTBE 593 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,75L #define SN_setct_RegFormReqTBE "setct-RegFormReqTBE" #define NID_setct_RegFormReqTBE 594 #define OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,76L #define SN_setct_CertReqTBE "setct-CertReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CertReqTBE 595 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,77L #define SN_setct_CertReqTBEX "setct-CertReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CertReqTBEX 596 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,78L #define SN_setct_CertResTBE "setct-CertResTBE" #define NID_setct_CertResTBE 597 #define OBJ_setct_CertResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,79L #define SN_setct_CRLNotificationTBS "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" #define NID_setct_CRLNotificationTBS 598 #define OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS OBJ_set_ctype,80L #define SN_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" #define NID_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS 599 #define OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,81L #define SN_setct_BCIDistributionTBS "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" #define NID_setct_BCIDistributionTBS 600 #define OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS OBJ_set_ctype,82L #define SN_setext_genCrypt "setext-genCrypt" #define LN_setext_genCrypt "generic cryptogram" #define NID_setext_genCrypt 601 #define OBJ_setext_genCrypt OBJ_set_msgExt,1L #define SN_setext_miAuth "setext-miAuth" #define LN_setext_miAuth "merchant initiated auth" #define NID_setext_miAuth 602 #define OBJ_setext_miAuth OBJ_set_msgExt,3L #define SN_setext_pinSecure "setext-pinSecure" #define NID_setext_pinSecure 603 #define OBJ_setext_pinSecure OBJ_set_msgExt,4L #define SN_setext_pinAny "setext-pinAny" #define NID_setext_pinAny 604 #define OBJ_setext_pinAny OBJ_set_msgExt,5L #define SN_setext_track2 "setext-track2" #define NID_setext_track2 605 #define OBJ_setext_track2 OBJ_set_msgExt,7L #define SN_setext_cv "setext-cv" #define LN_setext_cv "additional verification" #define NID_setext_cv 606 #define OBJ_setext_cv OBJ_set_msgExt,8L #define SN_set_policy_root "set-policy-root" #define NID_set_policy_root 607 #define OBJ_set_policy_root OBJ_set_policy,0L #define SN_setCext_hashedRoot "setCext-hashedRoot" #define NID_setCext_hashedRoot 608 #define OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot OBJ_set_certExt,0L #define SN_setCext_certType "setCext-certType" #define NID_setCext_certType 609 #define OBJ_setCext_certType OBJ_set_certExt,1L #define SN_setCext_merchData "setCext-merchData" #define NID_setCext_merchData 610 #define OBJ_setCext_merchData OBJ_set_certExt,2L #define SN_setCext_cCertRequired "setCext-cCertRequired" #define NID_setCext_cCertRequired 611 #define OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired OBJ_set_certExt,3L #define SN_setCext_tunneling "setCext-tunneling" #define NID_setCext_tunneling 612 #define OBJ_setCext_tunneling OBJ_set_certExt,4L #define SN_setCext_setExt "setCext-setExt" #define NID_setCext_setExt 613 #define OBJ_setCext_setExt OBJ_set_certExt,5L #define SN_setCext_setQualf "setCext-setQualf" #define NID_setCext_setQualf 614 #define OBJ_setCext_setQualf OBJ_set_certExt,6L #define SN_setCext_PGWYcapabilities "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" #define NID_setCext_PGWYcapabilities 615 #define OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities OBJ_set_certExt,7L #define SN_setCext_TokenIdentifier "setCext-TokenIdentifier" #define NID_setCext_TokenIdentifier 616 #define OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier OBJ_set_certExt,8L #define SN_setCext_Track2Data "setCext-Track2Data" #define NID_setCext_Track2Data 617 #define OBJ_setCext_Track2Data OBJ_set_certExt,9L #define SN_setCext_TokenType "setCext-TokenType" #define NID_setCext_TokenType 618 #define OBJ_setCext_TokenType OBJ_set_certExt,10L #define SN_setCext_IssuerCapabilities "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" #define NID_setCext_IssuerCapabilities 619 #define OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities OBJ_set_certExt,11L #define SN_setAttr_Cert "setAttr-Cert" #define NID_setAttr_Cert 620 #define OBJ_setAttr_Cert OBJ_set_attr,0L #define SN_setAttr_PGWYcap "setAttr-PGWYcap" #define LN_setAttr_PGWYcap "payment gateway capabilities" #define NID_setAttr_PGWYcap 621 #define OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap OBJ_set_attr,1L #define SN_setAttr_TokenType "setAttr-TokenType" #define NID_setAttr_TokenType 622 #define OBJ_setAttr_TokenType OBJ_set_attr,2L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap "setAttr-IssCap" #define LN_setAttr_IssCap "issuer capabilities" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap 623 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap OBJ_set_attr,3L #define SN_set_rootKeyThumb "set-rootKeyThumb" #define NID_set_rootKeyThumb 624 #define OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb OBJ_setAttr_Cert,0L #define SN_set_addPolicy "set-addPolicy" #define NID_set_addPolicy 625 #define OBJ_set_addPolicy OBJ_setAttr_Cert,1L #define SN_setAttr_Token_EMV "setAttr-Token-EMV" #define NID_setAttr_Token_EMV 626 #define OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV OBJ_setAttr_TokenType,1L #define SN_setAttr_Token_B0Prime "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" #define NID_setAttr_Token_B0Prime 627 #define OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime OBJ_setAttr_TokenType,2L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap_CVM "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap_CVM 628 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,3L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap_T2 "setAttr-IssCap-T2" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap_T2 629 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2 OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,4L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap_Sig "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap_Sig 630 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,5L #define SN_setAttr_GenCryptgrm "setAttr-GenCryptgrm" #define LN_setAttr_GenCryptgrm "generate cryptogram" #define NID_setAttr_GenCryptgrm 631 #define OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM,1L #define SN_setAttr_T2Enc "setAttr-T2Enc" #define LN_setAttr_T2Enc "encrypted track 2" #define NID_setAttr_T2Enc 632 #define OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2,1L #define SN_setAttr_T2cleartxt "setAttr-T2cleartxt" #define LN_setAttr_T2cleartxt "cleartext track 2" #define NID_setAttr_T2cleartxt 633 #define OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2,2L #define SN_setAttr_TokICCsig "setAttr-TokICCsig" #define LN_setAttr_TokICCsig "ICC or token signature" #define NID_setAttr_TokICCsig 634 #define OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig,1L #define SN_setAttr_SecDevSig "setAttr-SecDevSig" #define LN_setAttr_SecDevSig "secure device signature" #define NID_setAttr_SecDevSig 635 #define OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig,2L #define SN_set_brand_IATA_ATA "set-brand-IATA-ATA" #define NID_set_brand_IATA_ATA 636 #define OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA OBJ_set_brand,1L #define SN_set_brand_Diners "set-brand-Diners" #define NID_set_brand_Diners 637 #define OBJ_set_brand_Diners OBJ_set_brand,30L #define SN_set_brand_AmericanExpress "set-brand-AmericanExpress" #define NID_set_brand_AmericanExpress 638 #define OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress OBJ_set_brand,34L #define SN_set_brand_JCB "set-brand-JCB" #define NID_set_brand_JCB 639 #define OBJ_set_brand_JCB OBJ_set_brand,35L #define SN_set_brand_Visa "set-brand-Visa" #define NID_set_brand_Visa 640 #define OBJ_set_brand_Visa OBJ_set_brand,4L #define SN_set_brand_MasterCard "set-brand-MasterCard" #define NID_set_brand_MasterCard 641 #define OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard OBJ_set_brand,5L #define SN_set_brand_Novus "set-brand-Novus" #define NID_set_brand_Novus 642 #define OBJ_set_brand_Novus OBJ_set_brand,6011L #define SN_des_cdmf "DES-CDMF" #define LN_des_cdmf "des-cdmf" #define NID_des_cdmf 643 #define OBJ_des_cdmf OBJ_rsadsi,3L,10L #define SN_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" #define NID_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET 644 #define OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET OBJ_rsadsi,1L,1L,6L #define SN_ipsec3 "Oakley-EC2N-3" #define LN_ipsec3 "ipsec3" #define NID_ipsec3 749 #define SN_ipsec4 "Oakley-EC2N-4" #define LN_ipsec4 "ipsec4" #define NID_ipsec4 750 #define SN_whirlpool "whirlpool" #define NID_whirlpool 804 #define OBJ_whirlpool OBJ_iso,0L,10118L,3L,0L,55L #define SN_cryptopro "cryptopro" #define NID_cryptopro 805 #define OBJ_cryptopro OBJ_member_body,643L,2L,2L #define SN_cryptocom "cryptocom" #define NID_cryptocom 806 #define OBJ_cryptocom OBJ_member_body,643L,2L,9L #define SN_id_tc26 "id-tc26" #define NID_id_tc26 974 #define OBJ_id_tc26 OBJ_member_body,643L,7L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 807 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 OBJ_cryptopro,3L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 808 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 OBJ_cryptopro,4L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94 "md_gost94" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94 "GOST R 34.11-94" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94 809 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94 OBJ_cryptopro,9L #define SN_id_HMACGostR3411_94 "id-HMACGostR3411-94" #define LN_id_HMACGostR3411_94 "HMAC GOST 34.11-94" #define NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94 810 #define OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94 OBJ_cryptopro,10L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001 "gost2001" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001 "GOST R 34.10-2001" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001 811 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001 OBJ_cryptopro,19L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94 "gost94" #define LN_id_GostR3410_94 "GOST R 34.10-94" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94 812 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94 OBJ_cryptopro,20L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89 "gost89" #define LN_id_Gost28147_89 "GOST 28147-89" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89 813 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89 OBJ_cryptopro,21L #define SN_gost89_cnt "gost89-cnt" #define NID_gost89_cnt 814 #define SN_gost89_cnt_12 "gost89-cnt-12" #define NID_gost89_cnt_12 975 #define SN_gost89_cbc "gost89-cbc" #define NID_gost89_cbc 1009 #define SN_gost89_ecb "gost89-ecb" #define NID_gost89_ecb 1010 #define SN_gost89_ctr "gost89-ctr" #define NID_gost89_ctr 1011 #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC "gost-mac" #define LN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC "GOST 28147-89 MAC" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC 815 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC OBJ_cryptopro,22L #define SN_gost_mac_12 "gost-mac-12" #define NID_gost_mac_12 976 #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_prf "prf-gostr3411-94" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_prf "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_prf 816 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf OBJ_cryptopro,23L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001DH "id-GostR3410-2001DH" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001DH "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001DH 817 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH OBJ_cryptopro,98L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94DH "id-GostR3410-94DH" #define LN_id_GostR3410_94DH "GOST R 34.10-94 DH" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94DH 818 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH OBJ_cryptopro,99L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing 819 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing OBJ_cryptopro,14L,1L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing 820 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing OBJ_cryptopro,14L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet 821 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,30L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet 822 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,30L,1L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet 823 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,0L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 824 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,1L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 825 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,2L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 826 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,3L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 827 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,4L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet 828 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,5L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet 829 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,6L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet 830 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,7L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet 831 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 832 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 833 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 834 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,4L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 835 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,5L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 836 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,33L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 837 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,33L,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet 838 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,33L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet 839 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 840 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 841 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 842 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 843 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,36L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 844 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,36L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_a "id-GostR3410-94-a" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_a 845 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_aBis "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_aBis 846 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_b "id-GostR3410-94-b" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_b 847 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_bBis "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_bBis 848 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,4L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_cc "id-Gost28147-89-cc" #define LN_id_Gost28147_89_cc "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc 849 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,6L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_cc "gost94cc" #define LN_id_GostR3410_94_cc "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc 850 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,5L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_cc "gost2001cc" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001_cc "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc 851 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,5L,4L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc 852 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,3L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc 853 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,3L,4L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc "id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc 854 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,8L,1L #define SN_id_tc26_algorithms "id-tc26-algorithms" #define NID_id_tc26_algorithms 977 #define OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms OBJ_id_tc26,1L #define SN_id_tc26_sign "id-tc26-sign" #define NID_id_tc26_sign 978 #define OBJ_id_tc26_sign OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2012_256 "gost2012_256" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2012_256 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 979 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_sign,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2012_512 "gost2012_512" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2012_512 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512 980 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_sign,2L #define SN_id_tc26_digest "id-tc26-digest" #define NID_id_tc26_digest 981 #define OBJ_id_tc26_digest OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,2L #define SN_id_GostR3411_2012_256 "md_gost12_256" #define LN_id_GostR3411_2012_256 "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash" #define NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256 982 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_digest,2L #define SN_id_GostR3411_2012_512 "md_gost12_512" #define LN_id_GostR3411_2012_512 "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash" #define NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512 983 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_digest,3L #define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest "id-tc26-signwithdigest" #define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest 984 #define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,3L #define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256" #define LN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)" #define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 985 #define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest,2L #define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512" #define LN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)" #define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 986 #define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest,3L #define SN_id_tc26_mac "id-tc26-mac" #define NID_id_tc26_mac 987 #define OBJ_id_tc26_mac OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,4L #define SN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256" #define LN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit" #define NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 988 #define OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_mac,1L #define SN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512" #define LN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit" #define NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 989 #define OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_mac,2L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher "id-tc26-cipher" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher 990 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,5L #define SN_id_tc26_agreement "id-tc26-agreement" #define NID_id_tc26_agreement 991 #define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,6L #define SN_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" #define NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 992 #define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_agreement,1L #define SN_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" #define NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 993 #define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_agreement,2L #define SN_id_tc26_constants "id-tc26-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_constants 994 #define OBJ_id_tc26_constants OBJ_id_tc26,2L #define SN_id_tc26_sign_constants "id-tc26-sign-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_sign_constants 995 #define OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants OBJ_id_tc26_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants 996 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants,2L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest 997 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,0L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA 998 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB 999 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,2L #define SN_id_tc26_digest_constants "id-tc26-digest-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_digest_constants 1000 #define OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants OBJ_id_tc26_constants,2L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_constants "id-tc26-cipher-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_constants 1001 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants OBJ_id_tc26_constants,5L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants 1002 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z "id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z 1003 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants,1L #define SN_INN "INN" #define LN_INN "INN" #define NID_INN 1004 #define OBJ_INN OBJ_member_body,643L,3L,131L,1L,1L #define SN_OGRN "OGRN" #define LN_OGRN "OGRN" #define NID_OGRN 1005 #define OBJ_OGRN OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,1L #define SN_SNILS "SNILS" #define LN_SNILS "SNILS" #define NID_SNILS 1006 #define OBJ_SNILS OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,3L #define SN_subjectSignTool "subjectSignTool" #define LN_subjectSignTool "Signing Tool of Subject" #define NID_subjectSignTool 1007 #define OBJ_subjectSignTool OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,111L #define SN_issuerSignTool "issuerSignTool" #define LN_issuerSignTool "Signing Tool of Issuer" #define NID_issuerSignTool 1008 #define OBJ_issuerSignTool OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,112L #define SN_grasshopper_ecb "grasshopper-ecb" #define NID_grasshopper_ecb 1012 #define SN_grasshopper_ctr "grasshopper-ctr" #define NID_grasshopper_ctr 1013 #define SN_grasshopper_ofb "grasshopper-ofb" #define NID_grasshopper_ofb 1014 #define SN_grasshopper_cbc "grasshopper-cbc" #define NID_grasshopper_cbc 1015 #define SN_grasshopper_cfb "grasshopper-cfb" #define NID_grasshopper_cfb 1016 #define SN_grasshopper_mac "grasshopper-mac" #define NID_grasshopper_mac 1017 #define SN_camellia_128_cbc "CAMELLIA-128-CBC" #define LN_camellia_128_cbc "camellia-128-cbc" #define NID_camellia_128_cbc 751 #define OBJ_camellia_128_cbc 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,2L #define SN_camellia_192_cbc "CAMELLIA-192-CBC" #define LN_camellia_192_cbc "camellia-192-cbc" #define NID_camellia_192_cbc 752 #define OBJ_camellia_192_cbc 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,3L #define SN_camellia_256_cbc "CAMELLIA-256-CBC" #define LN_camellia_256_cbc "camellia-256-cbc" #define NID_camellia_256_cbc 753 #define OBJ_camellia_256_cbc 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,4L #define SN_id_camellia128_wrap "id-camellia128-wrap" #define NID_id_camellia128_wrap 907 #define OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,2L #define SN_id_camellia192_wrap "id-camellia192-wrap" #define NID_id_camellia192_wrap 908 #define OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,3L #define SN_id_camellia256_wrap "id-camellia256-wrap" #define NID_id_camellia256_wrap 909 #define OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,4L #define OBJ_ntt_ds 0L,3L,4401L,5L #define OBJ_camellia OBJ_ntt_ds,3L,1L,9L #define SN_camellia_128_ecb "CAMELLIA-128-ECB" #define LN_camellia_128_ecb "camellia-128-ecb" #define NID_camellia_128_ecb 754 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ecb OBJ_camellia,1L #define SN_camellia_128_ofb128 "CAMELLIA-128-OFB" #define LN_camellia_128_ofb128 "camellia-128-ofb" #define NID_camellia_128_ofb128 766 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128 OBJ_camellia,3L #define SN_camellia_128_cfb128 "CAMELLIA-128-CFB" #define LN_camellia_128_cfb128 "camellia-128-cfb" #define NID_camellia_128_cfb128 757 #define OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128 OBJ_camellia,4L #define SN_camellia_128_gcm "CAMELLIA-128-GCM" #define LN_camellia_128_gcm "camellia-128-gcm" #define NID_camellia_128_gcm 961 #define OBJ_camellia_128_gcm OBJ_camellia,6L #define SN_camellia_128_ccm "CAMELLIA-128-CCM" #define LN_camellia_128_ccm "camellia-128-ccm" #define NID_camellia_128_ccm 962 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ccm OBJ_camellia,7L #define SN_camellia_128_ctr "CAMELLIA-128-CTR" #define LN_camellia_128_ctr "camellia-128-ctr" #define NID_camellia_128_ctr 963 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ctr OBJ_camellia,9L #define SN_camellia_128_cmac "CAMELLIA-128-CMAC" #define LN_camellia_128_cmac "camellia-128-cmac" #define NID_camellia_128_cmac 964 #define OBJ_camellia_128_cmac OBJ_camellia,10L #define SN_camellia_192_ecb "CAMELLIA-192-ECB" #define LN_camellia_192_ecb "camellia-192-ecb" #define NID_camellia_192_ecb 755 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ecb OBJ_camellia,21L #define SN_camellia_192_ofb128 "CAMELLIA-192-OFB" #define LN_camellia_192_ofb128 "camellia-192-ofb" #define NID_camellia_192_ofb128 767 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128 OBJ_camellia,23L #define SN_camellia_192_cfb128 "CAMELLIA-192-CFB" #define LN_camellia_192_cfb128 "camellia-192-cfb" #define NID_camellia_192_cfb128 758 #define OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128 OBJ_camellia,24L #define SN_camellia_192_gcm "CAMELLIA-192-GCM" #define LN_camellia_192_gcm "camellia-192-gcm" #define NID_camellia_192_gcm 965 #define OBJ_camellia_192_gcm OBJ_camellia,26L #define SN_camellia_192_ccm "CAMELLIA-192-CCM" #define LN_camellia_192_ccm "camellia-192-ccm" #define NID_camellia_192_ccm 966 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ccm OBJ_camellia,27L #define SN_camellia_192_ctr "CAMELLIA-192-CTR" #define LN_camellia_192_ctr "camellia-192-ctr" #define NID_camellia_192_ctr 967 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ctr OBJ_camellia,29L #define SN_camellia_192_cmac "CAMELLIA-192-CMAC" #define LN_camellia_192_cmac "camellia-192-cmac" #define NID_camellia_192_cmac 968 #define OBJ_camellia_192_cmac OBJ_camellia,30L #define SN_camellia_256_ecb "CAMELLIA-256-ECB" #define LN_camellia_256_ecb "camellia-256-ecb" #define NID_camellia_256_ecb 756 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ecb OBJ_camellia,41L #define SN_camellia_256_ofb128 "CAMELLIA-256-OFB" #define LN_camellia_256_ofb128 "camellia-256-ofb" #define NID_camellia_256_ofb128 768 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128 OBJ_camellia,43L #define SN_camellia_256_cfb128 "CAMELLIA-256-CFB" #define LN_camellia_256_cfb128 "camellia-256-cfb" #define NID_camellia_256_cfb128 759 #define OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128 OBJ_camellia,44L #define SN_camellia_256_gcm "CAMELLIA-256-GCM" #define LN_camellia_256_gcm "camellia-256-gcm" #define NID_camellia_256_gcm 969 #define OBJ_camellia_256_gcm OBJ_camellia,46L #define SN_camellia_256_ccm "CAMELLIA-256-CCM" #define LN_camellia_256_ccm "camellia-256-ccm" #define NID_camellia_256_ccm 970 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ccm OBJ_camellia,47L #define SN_camellia_256_ctr "CAMELLIA-256-CTR" #define LN_camellia_256_ctr "camellia-256-ctr" #define NID_camellia_256_ctr 971 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ctr OBJ_camellia,49L #define SN_camellia_256_cmac "CAMELLIA-256-CMAC" #define LN_camellia_256_cmac "camellia-256-cmac" #define NID_camellia_256_cmac 972 #define OBJ_camellia_256_cmac OBJ_camellia,50L #define SN_camellia_128_cfb1 "CAMELLIA-128-CFB1" #define LN_camellia_128_cfb1 "camellia-128-cfb1" #define NID_camellia_128_cfb1 760 #define SN_camellia_192_cfb1 "CAMELLIA-192-CFB1" #define LN_camellia_192_cfb1 "camellia-192-cfb1" #define NID_camellia_192_cfb1 761 #define SN_camellia_256_cfb1 "CAMELLIA-256-CFB1" #define LN_camellia_256_cfb1 "camellia-256-cfb1" #define NID_camellia_256_cfb1 762 #define SN_camellia_128_cfb8 "CAMELLIA-128-CFB8" #define LN_camellia_128_cfb8 "camellia-128-cfb8" #define NID_camellia_128_cfb8 763 #define SN_camellia_192_cfb8 "CAMELLIA-192-CFB8" #define LN_camellia_192_cfb8 "camellia-192-cfb8" #define NID_camellia_192_cfb8 764 #define SN_camellia_256_cfb8 "CAMELLIA-256-CFB8" #define LN_camellia_256_cfb8 "camellia-256-cfb8" #define NID_camellia_256_cfb8 765 #define SN_kisa "KISA" #define LN_kisa "kisa" #define NID_kisa 773 #define OBJ_kisa OBJ_member_body,410L,200004L #define SN_seed_ecb "SEED-ECB" #define LN_seed_ecb "seed-ecb" #define NID_seed_ecb 776 #define OBJ_seed_ecb OBJ_kisa,1L,3L #define SN_seed_cbc "SEED-CBC" #define LN_seed_cbc "seed-cbc" #define NID_seed_cbc 777 #define OBJ_seed_cbc OBJ_kisa,1L,4L #define SN_seed_cfb128 "SEED-CFB" #define LN_seed_cfb128 "seed-cfb" #define NID_seed_cfb128 779 #define OBJ_seed_cfb128 OBJ_kisa,1L,5L #define SN_seed_ofb128 "SEED-OFB" #define LN_seed_ofb128 "seed-ofb" #define NID_seed_ofb128 778 #define OBJ_seed_ofb128 OBJ_kisa,1L,6L #define SN_hmac "HMAC" #define LN_hmac "hmac" #define NID_hmac 855 #define SN_cmac "CMAC" #define LN_cmac "cmac" #define NID_cmac 894 #define SN_rc4_hmac_md5 "RC4-HMAC-MD5" #define LN_rc4_hmac_md5 "rc4-hmac-md5" #define NID_rc4_hmac_md5 915 #define SN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1" #define NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 916 #define SN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1 "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1 "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1" #define NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1 917 #define SN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1" #define NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 918 #define SN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" #define LN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256" #define NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 948 #define SN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256 "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" #define LN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256 "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256" #define NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256 949 #define SN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" #define LN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256" #define NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 950 #define SN_chacha20_poly1305 "ChaCha20-Poly1305" #define LN_chacha20_poly1305 "chacha20-poly1305" #define NID_chacha20_poly1305 1018 #define SN_chacha20 "ChaCha20" #define LN_chacha20 "chacha20" #define NID_chacha20 1019 #define SN_dhpublicnumber "dhpublicnumber" #define LN_dhpublicnumber "X9.42 DH" #define NID_dhpublicnumber 920 #define OBJ_dhpublicnumber OBJ_ISO_US,10046L,2L,1L #define SN_brainpoolP160r1 "brainpoolP160r1" #define NID_brainpoolP160r1 921 #define OBJ_brainpoolP160r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,1L #define SN_brainpoolP160t1 "brainpoolP160t1" #define NID_brainpoolP160t1 922 #define OBJ_brainpoolP160t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,2L #define SN_brainpoolP192r1 "brainpoolP192r1" #define NID_brainpoolP192r1 923 #define OBJ_brainpoolP192r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,3L #define SN_brainpoolP192t1 "brainpoolP192t1" #define NID_brainpoolP192t1 924 #define OBJ_brainpoolP192t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,4L #define SN_brainpoolP224r1 "brainpoolP224r1" #define NID_brainpoolP224r1 925 #define OBJ_brainpoolP224r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,5L #define SN_brainpoolP224t1 "brainpoolP224t1" #define NID_brainpoolP224t1 926 #define OBJ_brainpoolP224t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,6L #define SN_brainpoolP256r1 "brainpoolP256r1" #define NID_brainpoolP256r1 927 #define OBJ_brainpoolP256r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,7L #define SN_brainpoolP256t1 "brainpoolP256t1" #define NID_brainpoolP256t1 928 #define OBJ_brainpoolP256t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,8L #define SN_brainpoolP320r1 "brainpoolP320r1" #define NID_brainpoolP320r1 929 #define OBJ_brainpoolP320r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,9L #define SN_brainpoolP320t1 "brainpoolP320t1" #define NID_brainpoolP320t1 930 #define OBJ_brainpoolP320t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,10L #define SN_brainpoolP384r1 "brainpoolP384r1" #define NID_brainpoolP384r1 931 #define OBJ_brainpoolP384r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,11L #define SN_brainpoolP384t1 "brainpoolP384t1" #define NID_brainpoolP384t1 932 #define OBJ_brainpoolP384t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,12L #define SN_brainpoolP512r1 "brainpoolP512r1" #define NID_brainpoolP512r1 933 #define OBJ_brainpoolP512r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,13L #define SN_brainpoolP512t1 "brainpoolP512t1" #define NID_brainpoolP512t1 934 #define OBJ_brainpoolP512t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,14L #define OBJ_x9_63_scheme 1L,3L,133L,16L,840L,63L,0L #define OBJ_secg_scheme OBJ_certicom_arc,1L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme 936 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme OBJ_x9_63_scheme,2L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme 937 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,0L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme 938 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,1L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme 939 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,2L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme 940 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,3L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme 941 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme OBJ_x9_63_scheme,3L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme 942 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,0L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme 943 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,1L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme 944 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,2L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme 945 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,3L #define SN_dh_std_kdf "dh-std-kdf" #define NID_dh_std_kdf 946 #define SN_dh_cofactor_kdf "dh-cofactor-kdf" #define NID_dh_cofactor_kdf 947 #define SN_ct_precert_scts "ct_precert_scts" #define LN_ct_precert_scts "CT Precertificate SCTs" #define NID_ct_precert_scts 951 #define OBJ_ct_precert_scts 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,2L #define SN_ct_precert_poison "ct_precert_poison" #define LN_ct_precert_poison "CT Precertificate Poison" #define NID_ct_precert_poison 952 #define OBJ_ct_precert_poison 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,3L #define SN_ct_precert_signer "ct_precert_signer" #define LN_ct_precert_signer "CT Precertificate Signer" #define NID_ct_precert_signer 953 #define OBJ_ct_precert_signer 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,4L #define SN_ct_cert_scts "ct_cert_scts" #define LN_ct_cert_scts "CT Certificate SCTs" #define NID_ct_cert_scts 954 #define OBJ_ct_cert_scts 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,5L #define SN_jurisdictionLocalityName "jurisdictionL" #define LN_jurisdictionLocalityName "jurisdictionLocalityName" #define NID_jurisdictionLocalityName 955 #define OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,1L #define SN_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName "jurisdictionST" #define LN_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName" #define NID_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 956 #define OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,2L #define SN_jurisdictionCountryName "jurisdictionC" #define LN_jurisdictionCountryName "jurisdictionCountryName" #define NID_jurisdictionCountryName 957 #define OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,3L #define SN_id_scrypt "id-scrypt" #define NID_id_scrypt 973 #define OBJ_id_scrypt 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11591L,4L,11L #define SN_tls1_prf "TLS1-PRF" #define LN_tls1_prf "tls1-prf" #define NID_tls1_prf 1021 #define SN_hkdf "HKDF" #define LN_hkdf "hkdf" #define NID_hkdf 1036 #define SN_id_pkinit "id-pkinit" #define NID_id_pkinit 1031 #define OBJ_id_pkinit 1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,2L,3L #define SN_pkInitClientAuth "pkInitClientAuth" #define LN_pkInitClientAuth "PKINIT Client Auth" #define NID_pkInitClientAuth 1032 #define OBJ_pkInitClientAuth OBJ_id_pkinit,4L #define SN_pkInitKDC "pkInitKDC" #define LN_pkInitKDC "Signing KDC Response" #define NID_pkInitKDC 1033 #define OBJ_pkInitKDC OBJ_id_pkinit,5L #define SN_X25519 "X25519" #define NID_X25519 1034 #define OBJ_X25519 1L,3L,101L,110L #define SN_X448 "X448" #define NID_X448 1035 #define OBJ_X448 1L,3L,101L,111L #define SN_kx_rsa "KxRSA" #define LN_kx_rsa "kx-rsa" #define NID_kx_rsa 1037 #define SN_kx_ecdhe "KxECDHE" #define LN_kx_ecdhe "kx-ecdhe" #define NID_kx_ecdhe 1038 #define SN_kx_dhe "KxDHE" #define LN_kx_dhe "kx-dhe" #define NID_kx_dhe 1039 #define SN_kx_ecdhe_psk "KxECDHE-PSK" #define LN_kx_ecdhe_psk "kx-ecdhe-psk" #define NID_kx_ecdhe_psk 1040 #define SN_kx_dhe_psk "KxDHE-PSK" #define LN_kx_dhe_psk "kx-dhe-psk" #define NID_kx_dhe_psk 1041 #define SN_kx_rsa_psk "KxRSA_PSK" #define LN_kx_rsa_psk "kx-rsa-psk" #define NID_kx_rsa_psk 1042 #define SN_kx_psk "KxPSK" #define LN_kx_psk "kx-psk" #define NID_kx_psk 1043 #define SN_kx_srp "KxSRP" #define LN_kx_srp "kx-srp" #define NID_kx_srp 1044 #define SN_kx_gost "KxGOST" #define LN_kx_gost "kx-gost" #define NID_kx_gost 1045 #define SN_auth_rsa "AuthRSA" #define LN_auth_rsa "auth-rsa" #define NID_auth_rsa 1046 #define SN_auth_ecdsa "AuthECDSA" #define LN_auth_ecdsa "auth-ecdsa" #define NID_auth_ecdsa 1047 #define SN_auth_psk "AuthPSK" #define LN_auth_psk "auth-psk" #define NID_auth_psk 1048 #define SN_auth_dss "AuthDSS" #define LN_auth_dss "auth-dss" #define NID_auth_dss 1049 #define SN_auth_gost01 "AuthGOST01" #define LN_auth_gost01 "auth-gost01" #define NID_auth_gost01 1050 #define SN_auth_gost12 "AuthGOST12" #define LN_auth_gost12 "auth-gost12" #define NID_auth_gost12 1051 #define SN_auth_srp "AuthSRP" #define LN_auth_srp "auth-srp" #define NID_auth_srp 1052 #define SN_auth_null "AuthNULL" #define LN_auth_null "auth-null" #define NID_auth_null 1053 openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/x509.h0000644000000000000000000013555613176625661016061 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_X509_H # define HEADER_X509_H # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # include # include # endif # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define X509_FILETYPE_PEM 1 # define X509_FILETYPE_ASN1 2 # define X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT 3 # define X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 0x0080 # define X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION 0x0040 # define X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0020 # define X509v3_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0010 # define X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT 0x0008 # define X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN 0x0004 # define X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN 0x0002 # define X509v3_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY 0x0001 # define X509v3_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY 0x8000 # define X509v3_KU_UNDEF 0xffff struct X509_algor_st { ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm; ASN1_TYPE *parameter; } /* X509_ALGOR */ ; typedef STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) X509_ALGORS; typedef struct X509_val_st { ASN1_TIME *notBefore; ASN1_TIME *notAfter; } X509_VAL; typedef struct X509_sig_st X509_SIG; typedef struct X509_name_entry_st X509_NAME_ENTRY; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) # define X509_EX_V_NETSCAPE_HACK 0x8000 # define X509_EX_V_INIT 0x0001 typedef struct X509_extension_st X509_EXTENSION; typedef STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) X509_EXTENSIONS; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) typedef struct x509_attributes_st X509_ATTRIBUTE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) typedef struct X509_req_info_st X509_REQ_INFO; typedef struct X509_req_st X509_REQ; typedef struct x509_cert_aux_st X509_CERT_AUX; typedef struct x509_cinf_st X509_CINF; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509) /* This is used for a table of trust checking functions */ typedef struct x509_trust_st { int trust; int flags; int (*check_trust) (struct x509_trust_st *, X509 *, int); char *name; int arg1; void *arg2; } X509_TRUST; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) /* standard trust ids */ # define X509_TRUST_DEFAULT 0 /* Only valid in purpose settings */ # define X509_TRUST_COMPAT 1 # define X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT 2 # define X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER 3 # define X509_TRUST_EMAIL 4 # define X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN 5 # define X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN 6 # define X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST 7 # define X509_TRUST_TSA 8 /* Keep these up to date! */ # define X509_TRUST_MIN 1 # define X509_TRUST_MAX 8 /* trust_flags values */ # define X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC (1U << 0) # define X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME (1U << 1) /* No compat trust if self-signed, preempts "DO_SS" */ # define X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT (1U << 2) /* Compat trust if no explicit accepted trust EKUs */ # define X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT (1U << 3) /* Accept "anyEKU" as a wildcard trust OID */ # define X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU (1U << 4) /* check_trust return codes */ # define X509_TRUST_TRUSTED 1 # define X509_TRUST_REJECTED 2 # define X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED 3 /* Flags for X509_print_ex() */ # define X509_FLAG_COMPAT 0 # define X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER 1L # define X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION (1L << 1) # define X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL (1L << 2) # define X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME (1L << 3) # define X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER (1L << 4) # define X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY (1L << 5) # define X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT (1L << 6) # define X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY (1L << 7) # define X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS (1L << 8) # define X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP (1L << 9) # define X509_FLAG_NO_AUX (1L << 10) # define X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES (1L << 11) # define X509_FLAG_NO_IDS (1L << 12) /* Flags specific to X509_NAME_print_ex() */ /* The field separator information */ # define XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK (0xf << 16) # define XN_FLAG_COMPAT 0/* Traditional; use old X509_NAME_print */ # define XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS (1 << 16)/* RFC2253 ,+ */ # define XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC (2 << 16)/* ,+ spaced: more readable */ # define XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC (3 << 16)/* ;+ spaced */ # define XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE (4 << 16)/* One line per field */ # define XN_FLAG_DN_REV (1 << 20)/* Reverse DN order */ /* How the field name is shown */ # define XN_FLAG_FN_MASK (0x3 << 21) # define XN_FLAG_FN_SN 0/* Object short name */ # define XN_FLAG_FN_LN (1 << 21)/* Object long name */ # define XN_FLAG_FN_OID (2 << 21)/* Always use OIDs */ # define XN_FLAG_FN_NONE (3 << 21)/* No field names */ # define XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ (1 << 23)/* Put spaces round '=' */ /* * This determines if we dump fields we don't recognise: RFC2253 requires * this. */ # define XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS (1 << 24) # define XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN (1 << 25)/* Align field names to 20 * characters */ /* Complete set of RFC2253 flags */ # define XN_FLAG_RFC2253 (ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | \ XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS | \ XN_FLAG_DN_REV | \ XN_FLAG_FN_SN | \ XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS) /* readable oneline form */ # define XN_FLAG_ONELINE (ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \ XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | \ XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | \ XN_FLAG_FN_SN) /* readable multiline form */ # define XN_FLAG_MULTILINE (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | \ XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE | \ XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | \ XN_FLAG_FN_LN | \ XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN) DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) typedef struct X509_crl_info_st X509_CRL_INFO; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_CRL) typedef struct private_key_st { int version; /* The PKCS#8 data types */ X509_ALGOR *enc_algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_pkey; /* encrypted pub key */ /* When decrypted, the following will not be NULL */ EVP_PKEY *dec_pkey; /* used to encrypt and decrypt */ int key_length; char *key_data; int key_free; /* true if we should auto free key_data */ /* expanded version of 'enc_algor' */ EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher; } X509_PKEY; typedef struct X509_info_st { X509 *x509; X509_CRL *crl; X509_PKEY *x_pkey; EVP_CIPHER_INFO enc_cipher; int enc_len; char *enc_data; } X509_INFO; DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_INFO) /* * The next 2 structures and their 8 routines were sent to me by Pat Richard * and are used to manipulate Netscapes spki structures - * useful if you are writing a CA web page */ typedef struct Netscape_spkac_st { X509_PUBKEY *pubkey; ASN1_IA5STRING *challenge; /* challenge sent in atlas >= PR2 */ } NETSCAPE_SPKAC; typedef struct Netscape_spki_st { NETSCAPE_SPKAC *spkac; /* signed public key and challenge */ X509_ALGOR sig_algor; ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; } NETSCAPE_SPKI; /* Netscape certificate sequence structure */ typedef struct Netscape_certificate_sequence { ASN1_OBJECT *type; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; } NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE; /*- Unused (and iv length is wrong) typedef struct CBCParameter_st { unsigned char iv[8]; } CBC_PARAM; */ /* Password based encryption structure */ typedef struct PBEPARAM_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt; ASN1_INTEGER *iter; } PBEPARAM; /* Password based encryption V2 structures */ typedef struct PBE2PARAM_st { X509_ALGOR *keyfunc; X509_ALGOR *encryption; } PBE2PARAM; typedef struct PBKDF2PARAM_st { /* Usually OCTET STRING but could be anything */ ASN1_TYPE *salt; ASN1_INTEGER *iter; ASN1_INTEGER *keylength; X509_ALGOR *prf; } PBKDF2PARAM; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define X509_EXT_PACK_UNKNOWN 1 # define X509_EXT_PACK_STRING 2 # define X509_extract_key(x) X509_get_pubkey(x)/*****/ # define X509_REQ_extract_key(a) X509_REQ_get_pubkey(a) # define X509_name_cmp(a,b) X509_NAME_cmp((a),(b)) void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth); X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl), int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl), int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer), int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk)); void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m); void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat); void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl); const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n); int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r); NETSCAPE_SPKI *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(const char *str, int len); char *NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x); EVP_PKEY *NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x); int NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki); int X509_signature_dump(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent); int X509_signature_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *alg, const ASN1_STRING *sig); int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int X509_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509 **pcert); # endif int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_REQ_sign_ctx(X509_REQ *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int X509_CRL_http_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, X509_CRL **pcrl); # endif int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x509); int i2d_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x509); X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **crl); int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *crl); X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **req); int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *req); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa); DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey); EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey); # endif X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG **p8); int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG *p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *key); int i2d_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a); int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a); # endif X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x509); int i2d_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 *x509); X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **crl); int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *crl); X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **req); int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa); DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey); EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey); # endif X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG **p8); int i2d_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG *p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *key); int i2d_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a); int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a); X509 *X509_dup(X509 *x509); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_dup(X509_EXTENSION *ex); X509_CRL *X509_CRL_dup(X509_CRL *crl); X509_REVOKED *X509_REVOKED_dup(X509_REVOKED *rev); X509_REQ *X509_REQ_dup(X509_REQ *req); X509_ALGOR *X509_ALGOR_dup(X509_ALGOR *xn); int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval); void X509_ALGOR_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *algor); void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b); X509_NAME *X509_NAME_dup(X509_NAME *xn); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *s, time_t *t); int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *s); ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *t); ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *t); ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj); const char *X509_get_default_cert_area(void); const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir(void); const char *X509_get_default_cert_file(void); const char *X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void); const char *X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void); const char *X509_get_default_private_dir(void); X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGOR) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_VAL) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY) int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key); EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key); int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x); int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp); RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp); EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # endif DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_SIG) void X509_SIG_get0(const X509_SIG *sig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest); void X509_SIG_getm(X509_SIG *sig, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ATTRIBUTE) X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME) int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CERT_AUX) #define X509_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg); void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx); int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp); X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp); void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x); int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x); int X509_trusted(const X509 *x); int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *name, int len); int X509_keyid_set1(X509 *x, const unsigned char *id, int len); unsigned char *X509_alias_get0(X509 *x, int *len); unsigned char *X509_keyid_get0(X509 *x, int *len); int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *, int); int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust); int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x); void X509_reject_clear(X509 *x); STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_trust_objects(X509 *x); STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *X509_get0_reject_objects(X509 *x); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL) int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev); int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x); X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void); void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *a); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKI) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKAC) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) X509_INFO *X509_INFO_new(void); void X509_INFO_free(X509_INFO *a); char *X509_NAME_oneline(const X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int size); int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int ASN1_digest(i2d_of_void *i2d, const EVP_MD *type, char *data, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type); int ASN1_item_digest(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const EVP_MD *type, void *data, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int ASN1_item_sign(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type); int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); long X509_get_version(const X509 *x); int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version); int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *x); const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x); int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a); int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a); const ASN1_TIME * X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x); ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x); int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x); ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x); int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int X509_up_ref(X509 *x); int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define X509_get_notBefore X509_getm_notBefore # define X509_get_notAfter X509_getm_notAfter # define X509_set_notBefore X509_set1_notBefore # define X509_set_notAfter X509_set1_notAfter #endif /* * This one is only used so that a binary form can output, as in * i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x), &buf) */ X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x); const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x); void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid); const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x); EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x); EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x); ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x); int X509_certificate_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pubkey); long X509_REQ_get_version(const X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x, long version); X509_NAME *X509_REQ_get_subject_name(const X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *req, X509_NAME *name); void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg); int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req); int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp); int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req); EVP_PKEY *X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(X509_REQ *req); X509_PUBKEY *X509_REQ_get_X509_PUBKEY(X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_extension_nid(int nid); int *X509_REQ_get_extension_nids(void); void X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts, int nid); int X509_REQ_add_extensions(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts); int X509_REQ_get_attr_count(const X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(const X509_REQ *req, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_get_attr(const X509_REQ *req, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_delete_attr(X509_REQ *req, int loc); int X509_REQ_add1_attr(X509_REQ *req, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ(X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(X509_REQ *req, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(X509_REQ *req, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version); int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name); int X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *crl); int X509_CRL_up_ref(X509_CRL *crl); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate # define X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate #endif long X509_CRL_get_version(const X509_CRL *crl); const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl); const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl); DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *crl)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *crl)) X509_NAME *X509_CRL_get_issuer(const X509_CRL *crl); const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_CRL_get0_extensions(const X509_CRL *crl); STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(X509_CRL *crl); void X509_CRL_get0_signature(const X509_CRL *crl, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg); int X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(const X509_CRL *crl); int i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(X509_CRL *req, unsigned char **pp); const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(const X509_REVOKED *x); int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); const ASN1_TIME *X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(const X509_REVOKED *x); int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_TIME *tm); const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) * X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(const X509_REVOKED *r); X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags); int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x509, const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags); int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain); int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a); int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *a); int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *a); unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x); # endif int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b); unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x); unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x); int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b); int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b); int X509_aux_print(BIO *out, X509 *x, int indent); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int X509_print_ex_fp(FILE *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag, unsigned long cflag); int X509_print_fp(FILE *bp, X509 *x); int X509_CRL_print_fp(FILE *bp, X509_CRL *x); int X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *bp, X509_REQ *req); int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); # endif int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase); int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag, unsigned long cflag); int X509_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x); int X509_ocspid_print(BIO *bp, X509 *x); int X509_CRL_print(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *x); int X509_REQ_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x, unsigned long nmflag, unsigned long cflag); int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req); int X509_NAME_entry_count(const X509_NAME *name); int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf, int len); int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf, int len); /* * NOTE: you should be passing -1, not 0 as lastpos. The functions that use * lastpos, search after that position on. */ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(const X509_NAME *name, int loc); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc); int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); ASN1_OBJECT *X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); ASN1_STRING * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder, size_t *pderlen); int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x); int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int X509_get_ext_count(const X509 *x); int X509_get_ext_by_NID(const X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509_get_ext_by_critical(const X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(const X509 *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc); int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void *X509_get_ext_d2i(const X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(const X509_CRL *x); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(const X509_CRL *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc); int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void *X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(const X509_REVOKED *x); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_REVOKED *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_REVOKED *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(const X509_REVOKED *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc); int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void *X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit); int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); ASN1_OBJECT *X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ne); int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(const X509_EXTENSION *ex); int X509at_get_attr_count(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x); int X509at_get_attr_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_get_attr(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_delete_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, int nid, int atrtype, const void *data, int len); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int atrtype, const void *data, int len); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, const char *atrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype, const void *data, int len); void *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx, int atrtype, void *data); int X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(const X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); ASN1_OBJECT *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); ASN1_TYPE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx); int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_count(const EVP_PKEY *key); int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID(const EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int lastpos); int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_OBJ(const EVP_PKEY *key, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_get_attr(const EVP_PKEY *key, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_delete_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, int loc); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_OBJ(EVP_PKEY *key, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_txt(EVP_PKEY *key, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* lookup a cert from a X509 STACK */ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBEPARAM) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBE2PARAM) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBKDF2PARAM) int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen); X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe_set(int alg, int iter, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen); X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen); X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, unsigned char *aiv, int prf_nid); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_scrypt(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, unsigned char *aiv, uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p); #endif X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int prf_nid, int keylen); /* PKCS#8 utilities */ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey); int PKCS8_pkey_set0(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *priv, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int version, int ptype, void *pval, unsigned char *penc, int penclen); int PKCS8_pkey_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg, const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen, const X509_ALGOR **pa, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8); const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * PKCS8_pkey_get0_attrs(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8); int PKCS8_pkey_add1_attr_by_NID(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval, unsigned char *penc, int penclen); int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg, const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen, X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub); int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags); int X509_TRUST_get_count(void); X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx); int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id); int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int), const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2); void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void); int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp); char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp); int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_X509_strings(void); /* Error codes for the X509 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR 100 # define X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN 106 # define X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL 101 # define X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS 149 # define X509_F_CHECK_POLICY 145 # define X509_F_DANE_I2D 107 # define X509_F_DIR_CTRL 102 # define X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT 103 # define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE 129 # define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE 130 # define X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR 135 # define X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT 104 # define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID 136 # define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ 137 # define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT 140 # define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA 139 # define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA 138 # define X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 128 # define X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF 105 # define X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP 147 # define X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID 108 # define X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ 109 # define X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS 110 # define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE 132 # define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE 111 # define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE 112 # define X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY 113 # define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID 114 # define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT 131 # define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT 115 # define X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE 116 # define X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT 117 # define X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW 150 # define X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP 118 # define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE 148 # define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0 119 # define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET 120 # define X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 144 # define X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX 121 # define X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP 122 # define X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509 123 # define X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT 124 # define X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL 125 # define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER 146 # define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT 143 # define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW 142 # define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT 134 # define X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ 126 # define X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD 133 # define X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET 141 # define X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT 127 /* Reason codes. */ # define X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH 110 # define X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR 133 # define X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE 100 # define X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR 118 # define X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY 114 # define X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE 101 # define X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA 127 # define X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE 131 # define X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH 128 # define X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY 113 # define X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME 119 # define X509_R_INVALID_TRUST 123 # define X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH 129 # define X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH 115 # define X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH 116 # define X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR 103 # define X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS 104 # define X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED 124 # define X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG 134 # define X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER 132 # define X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY 105 # define X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER 130 # define X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR 125 # define X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR 126 # define X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY 106 # define X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN 107 # define X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY 108 # define X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE 117 # define X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID 109 # define X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID 121 # define X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID 120 # define X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM 111 # define X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE 112 # define X509_R_WRONG_TYPE 122 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ui.h0000644000000000000000000004073013176625661015756 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_UI_H # define HEADER_UI_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * All the following functions return -1 or NULL on error and in some cases * (UI_process()) -2 if interrupted or in some other way cancelled. When * everything is fine, they return 0, a positive value or a non-NULL pointer, * all depending on their purpose. */ /* Creators and destructor. */ UI *UI_new(void); UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method); void UI_free(UI *ui); /*- The following functions are used to add strings to be printed and prompt strings to prompt for data. The names are UI_{add,dup}__string and UI_{add,dup}_input_boolean. UI_{add,dup}__string have the following meanings: add add a text or prompt string. The pointers given to these functions are used verbatim, no copying is done. dup make a copy of the text or prompt string, then add the copy to the collection of strings in the user interface. The function is a name for the functionality that the given string shall be used for. It can be one of: input use the string as data prompt. verify use the string as verification prompt. This is used to verify a previous input. info use the string for informational output. error use the string for error output. Honestly, there's currently no difference between info and error for the moment. UI_{add,dup}_input_boolean have the same semantics for "add" and "dup", and are typically used when one wants to prompt for a yes/no response. All of the functions in this group take a UI and a prompt string. The string input and verify addition functions also take a flag argument, a buffer for the result to end up with, a minimum input size and a maximum input size (the result buffer MUST be large enough to be able to contain the maximum number of characters). Additionally, the verify addition functions takes another buffer to compare the result against. The boolean input functions take an action description string (which should be safe to ignore if the expected user action is obvious, for example with a dialog box with an OK button and a Cancel button), a string of acceptable characters to mean OK and to mean Cancel. The two last strings are checked to make sure they don't have common characters. Additionally, the same flag argument as for the string input is taken, as well as a result buffer. The result buffer is required to be at least one byte long. Depending on the answer, the first character from the OK or the Cancel character strings will be stored in the first byte of the result buffer. No NUL will be added, so the result is *not* a string. On success, the all return an index of the added information. That index is useful when retrieving results with UI_get0_result(). */ int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize); int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize); int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf); int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf); int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, int flags, char *result_buf); int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, int flags, char *result_buf); int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text); int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text); int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text); int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text); /* These are the possible flags. They can be or'ed together. */ /* Use to have echoing of input */ # define UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO 0x01 /* * Use a default password. Where that password is found is completely up to * the application, it might for example be in the user data set with * UI_add_user_data(). It is not recommended to have more than one input in * each UI being marked with this flag, or the application might get * confused. */ # define UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD 0x02 /*- * The user of these routines may want to define flags of their own. The core * UI won't look at those, but will pass them on to the method routines. They * must use higher bits so they don't get confused with the UI bits above. * UI_INPUT_FLAG_USER_BASE tells which is the lowest bit to use. A good * example of use is this: * * #define MY_UI_FLAG1 (0x01 << UI_INPUT_FLAG_USER_BASE) * */ # define UI_INPUT_FLAG_USER_BASE 16 /*- * The following function helps construct a prompt. object_desc is a * textual short description of the object, for example "pass phrase", * and object_name is the name of the object (might be a card name or * a file name. * The returned string shall always be allocated on the heap with * OPENSSL_malloc(), and need to be free'd with OPENSSL_free(). * * If the ui_method doesn't contain a pointer to a user-defined prompt * constructor, a default string is built, looking like this: * * "Enter {object_desc} for {object_name}:" * * So, if object_desc has the value "pass phrase" and object_name has * the value "foo.key", the resulting string is: * * "Enter pass phrase for foo.key:" */ char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui_method, const char *object_desc, const char *object_name); /* * The following function is used to store a pointer to user-specific data. * Any previous such pointer will be returned and replaced. * * For callback purposes, this function makes a lot more sense than using * ex_data, since the latter requires that different parts of OpenSSL or * applications share the same ex_data index. * * Note that the UI_OpenSSL() method completely ignores the user data. Other * methods may not, however. */ void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data); /* We need a user data retrieving function as well. */ void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui); /* Return the result associated with a prompt given with the index i. */ const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i); /* When all strings have been added, process the whole thing. */ int UI_process(UI *ui); /* * Give a user interface parametrised control commands. This can be used to * send down an integer, a data pointer or a function pointer, as well as be * used to get information from a UI. */ int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); /* The commands */ /* * Use UI_CONTROL_PRINT_ERRORS with the value 1 to have UI_process print the * OpenSSL error stack before printing any info or added error messages and * before any prompting. */ # define UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS 1 /* * Check if a UI_process() is possible to do again with the same instance of * a user interface. This makes UI_ctrl() return 1 if it is redoable, and 0 * if not. */ # define UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE 2 /* Some methods may use extra data */ # define UI_set_app_data(s,arg) UI_set_ex_data(s,0,arg) # define UI_get_app_data(s) UI_get_ex_data(s,0) #define UI_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_UI, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int UI_set_ex_data(UI *r, int idx, void *arg); void *UI_get_ex_data(UI *r, int idx); /* Use specific methods instead of the built-in one */ void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth); const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void); const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui); const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth); /* The method with all the built-in thingies */ UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void); /* ---------- For method writers ---------- */ /*- A method contains a number of functions that implement the low level of the User Interface. The functions are: an opener This function starts a session, maybe by opening a channel to a tty, or by opening a window. a writer This function is called to write a given string, maybe to the tty, maybe as a field label in a window. a flusher This function is called to flush everything that has been output so far. It can be used to actually display a dialog box after it has been built. a reader This function is called to read a given prompt, maybe from the tty, maybe from a field in a window. Note that it's called with all string structures, not only the prompt ones, so it must check such things itself. a closer This function closes the session, maybe by closing the channel to the tty, or closing the window. All these functions are expected to return: 0 on error. 1 on success. -1 on out-of-band events, for example if some prompting has been canceled (by pressing Ctrl-C, for example). This is only checked when returned by the flusher or the reader. The way this is used, the opener is first called, then the writer for all strings, then the flusher, then the reader for all strings and finally the closer. Note that if you want to prompt from a terminal or other command line interface, the best is to have the reader also write the prompts instead of having the writer do it. If you want to prompt from a dialog box, the writer can be used to build up the contents of the box, and the flusher to actually display the box and run the event loop until all data has been given, after which the reader only grabs the given data and puts them back into the UI strings. All method functions take a UI as argument. Additionally, the writer and the reader take a UI_STRING. */ /* * The UI_STRING type is the data structure that contains all the needed info * about a string or a prompt, including test data for a verification prompt. */ typedef struct ui_string_st UI_STRING; DEFINE_STACK_OF(UI_STRING) /* * The different types of strings that are currently supported. This is only * needed by method authors. */ enum UI_string_types { UIT_NONE = 0, UIT_PROMPT, /* Prompt for a string */ UIT_VERIFY, /* Prompt for a string and verify */ UIT_BOOLEAN, /* Prompt for a yes/no response */ UIT_INFO, /* Send info to the user */ UIT_ERROR /* Send an error message to the user */ }; /* Create and manipulate methods */ UI_METHOD *UI_create_method(const char *name); void UI_destroy_method(UI_METHOD *ui_method); int UI_method_set_opener(UI_METHOD *method, int (*opener) (UI *ui)); int UI_method_set_writer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*writer) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)); int UI_method_set_flusher(UI_METHOD *method, int (*flusher) (UI *ui)); int UI_method_set_reader(UI_METHOD *method, int (*reader) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)); int UI_method_set_closer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*closer) (UI *ui)); int UI_method_set_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method, char *(*prompt_constructor) (UI *ui, const char *object_desc, const char *object_name)); int (*UI_method_get_opener(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *); int (*UI_method_get_writer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *); int (*UI_method_get_flusher(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *); int (*UI_method_get_reader(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *); int (*UI_method_get_closer(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *); char *(*UI_method_get_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, const char *, const char *); /* * The following functions are helpers for method writers to access relevant * data from a UI_STRING. */ /* Return type of the UI_STRING */ enum UI_string_types UI_get_string_type(UI_STRING *uis); /* Return input flags of the UI_STRING */ int UI_get_input_flags(UI_STRING *uis); /* Return the actual string to output (the prompt, info or error) */ const char *UI_get0_output_string(UI_STRING *uis); /* * Return the optional action string to output (the boolean prompt * instruction) */ const char *UI_get0_action_string(UI_STRING *uis); /* Return the result of a prompt */ const char *UI_get0_result_string(UI_STRING *uis); /* * Return the string to test the result against. Only useful with verifies. */ const char *UI_get0_test_string(UI_STRING *uis); /* Return the required minimum size of the result */ int UI_get_result_minsize(UI_STRING *uis); /* Return the required maximum size of the result */ int UI_get_result_maxsize(UI_STRING *uis); /* Set the result of a UI_STRING. */ int UI_set_result(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, const char *result); /* A couple of popular utility functions */ int UI_UTIL_read_pw_string(char *buf, int length, const char *prompt, int verify); int UI_UTIL_read_pw(char *buf, char *buff, int size, const char *prompt, int verify); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_UI_strings(void); /* Error codes for the UI functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define UI_F_CLOSE_CONSOLE 115 # define UI_F_ECHO_CONSOLE 116 # define UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_BOOLEAN 108 # define UI_F_GENERAL_ALLOCATE_PROMPT 109 # define UI_F_NOECHO_CONSOLE 117 # define UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE 114 # define UI_F_UI_CREATE_METHOD 112 # define UI_F_UI_CTRL 111 # define UI_F_UI_DUP_ERROR_STRING 101 # define UI_F_UI_DUP_INFO_STRING 102 # define UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_BOOLEAN 110 # define UI_F_UI_DUP_INPUT_STRING 103 # define UI_F_UI_DUP_VERIFY_STRING 106 # define UI_F_UI_GET0_RESULT 107 # define UI_F_UI_NEW_METHOD 104 # define UI_F_UI_PROCESS 113 # define UI_F_UI_SET_RESULT 105 /* Reason codes. */ # define UI_R_COMMON_OK_AND_CANCEL_CHARACTERS 104 # define UI_R_INDEX_TOO_LARGE 102 # define UI_R_INDEX_TOO_SMALL 103 # define UI_R_NO_RESULT_BUFFER 105 # define UI_R_PROCESSING_ERROR 107 # define UI_R_RESULT_TOO_LARGE 100 # define UI_R_RESULT_TOO_SMALL 101 # define UI_R_SYSASSIGN_ERROR 109 # define UI_R_SYSDASSGN_ERROR 110 # define UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR 111 # define UI_R_UNKNOWN_CONTROL_COMMAND 106 # define UI_R_UNKNOWN_TTYGET_ERRNO_VALUE 108 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/cast.h0000644000000000000000000000321213176625661016265 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CAST_H # define HEADER_CAST_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # define CAST_ENCRYPT 1 # define CAST_DECRYPT 0 # define CAST_LONG unsigned int # define CAST_BLOCK 8 # define CAST_KEY_LENGTH 16 typedef struct cast_key_st { CAST_LONG data[32]; int short_key; /* Use reduced rounds for short key */ } CAST_KEY; void CAST_set_key(CAST_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data); void CAST_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const CAST_KEY *key, int enc); void CAST_encrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key); void CAST_decrypt(CAST_LONG *data, const CAST_KEY *key); void CAST_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const CAST_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int enc); void CAST_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc); void CAST_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, const CAST_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/md4.h0000644000000000000000000000245213176625661016024 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_MD4_H # define HEADER_MD4_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif /*- * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * ! MD4_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide. ! * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! */ # define MD4_LONG unsigned int # define MD4_CBLOCK 64 # define MD4_LBLOCK (MD4_CBLOCK/4) # define MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 typedef struct MD4state_st { MD4_LONG A, B, C, D; MD4_LONG Nl, Nh; MD4_LONG data[MD4_LBLOCK]; unsigned int num; } MD4_CTX; int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *c); int MD4_Update(MD4_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int MD4_Final(unsigned char *md, MD4_CTX *c); unsigned char *MD4(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); void MD4_Transform(MD4_CTX *c, const unsigned char *b); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/asn1t.h0000644000000000000000000007736613176625661016406 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_ASN1T_H # define HEADER_ASN1T_H # include # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif /* ASN1 template defines, structures and functions */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ADB pointer from a type (only used internally) */ # define ASN1_ADB_ptr(iptr) ((const ASN1_ADB *)(iptr)) /* Macros for start and end of ASN1_ITEM definition */ # define ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const ASN1_ITEM itname##_it = { # define static_ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \ static const ASN1_ITEM itname##_it = { # define ASN1_ITEM_end(itname) \ }; # else /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ADB pointer from a type (only used internally) */ # define ASN1_ADB_ptr(iptr) ((const ASN1_ADB *)(iptr())) /* Macros for start and end of ASN1_ITEM definition */ # define ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \ const ASN1_ITEM * itname##_it(void) \ { \ static const ASN1_ITEM local_it = { # define static_ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \ static ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) # define ASN1_ITEM_end(itname) \ }; \ return &local_it; \ } # endif /* Macros to aid ASN1 template writing */ # define ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(tname) \ static const ASN1_TEMPLATE tname##_item_tt # define ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(tname) \ ;\ ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE,\ -1,\ &tname##_item_tt,\ 0,\ NULL,\ 0,\ #tname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(tname) \ ;\ static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE,\ -1,\ &tname##_item_tt,\ 0,\ NULL,\ 0,\ #tname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) /* This is a ASN1 type which just embeds a template */ /*- * This pair helps declare a SEQUENCE. We can do: * * ASN1_SEQUENCE(stname) = { * ... SEQUENCE components ... * } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(stname) * * This will produce an ASN1_ITEM called stname_it * for a structure called stname. * * If you want the same structure but a different * name then use: * * ASN1_SEQUENCE(itname) = { * ... SEQUENCE components ... * } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, itname) * * This will create an item called itname_it using * a structure called stname. */ # define ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname) \ static const ASN1_TEMPLATE tname##_seq_tt[] # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(stname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, stname) # define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(stname) static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, stname) # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, tname) \ ;\ ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\ tname##_seq_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ NULL,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(stname, tname) \ ;\ static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\ tname##_seq_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ NULL,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(tname) \ ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname) # define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_cb(tname, cb) \ ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(tname, cb) # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(tname, cb) \ static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, 0, 0, 0, cb, 0}; \ ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname) # define ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE(tname) \ static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN, 0, 0, 0, 0}; \ ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname) # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(tname, cb) \ static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, ASN1_AFLG_REFCOUNT, offsetof(tname, references), offsetof(tname, lock), cb, 0}; \ ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname) # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(tname, enc, cb) \ static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, ASN1_AFLG_ENCODING, 0, 0, cb, offsetof(tname, enc)}; \ ASN1_SEQUENCE(tname) # define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(tname) \ ;\ ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE,\ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\ tname##_seq_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ NULL,\ sizeof(tname),\ #tname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define static_ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(tname) \ ;\ static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE,\ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\ tname##_seq_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ NULL,\ sizeof(tname),\ #tname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE_END(stname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, stname) # define static_ASN1_BROKEN_SEQUENCE_END(stname) \ static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, stname) # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(stname, tname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname) # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(stname, tname) ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname) # define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(stname, tname) static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname) # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname) \ ;\ ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\ tname##_seq_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ &tname##_aux,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(stname, tname) \ ;\ static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE,\ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\ tname##_seq_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ &tname##_aux,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END_cb(stname, tname) \ ;\ ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE,\ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,\ tname##_seq_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_seq_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ &tname##_aux,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) /*- * This pair helps declare a CHOICE type. We can do: * * ASN1_CHOICE(chname) = { * ... CHOICE options ... * ASN1_CHOICE_END(chname) * * This will produce an ASN1_ITEM called chname_it * for a structure called chname. The structure * definition must look like this: * typedef struct { * int type; * union { * ASN1_SOMETHING *opt1; * ASN1_SOMEOTHER *opt2; * } value; * } chname; * * the name of the selector must be 'type'. * to use an alternative selector name use the * ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector() version. */ # define ASN1_CHOICE(tname) \ static const ASN1_TEMPLATE tname##_ch_tt[] # define ASN1_CHOICE_cb(tname, cb) \ static const ASN1_AUX tname##_aux = {NULL, 0, 0, 0, cb, 0}; \ ASN1_CHOICE(tname) # define ASN1_CHOICE_END(stname) ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, stname) # define static_ASN1_CHOICE_END(stname) static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, stname) # define ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, tname) ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, type) # define static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_name(stname, tname) static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, type) # define ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, selname) \ ;\ ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE,\ offsetof(stname,selname) ,\ tname##_ch_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_ch_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ NULL,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define static_ASN1_CHOICE_END_selector(stname, tname, selname) \ ;\ static_ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE,\ offsetof(stname,selname) ,\ tname##_ch_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_ch_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ NULL,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) # define ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(stname, tname, selname) \ ;\ ASN1_ITEM_start(tname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE,\ offsetof(stname,selname) ,\ tname##_ch_tt,\ sizeof(tname##_ch_tt) / sizeof(ASN1_TEMPLATE),\ &tname##_aux,\ sizeof(stname),\ #stname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) /* This helps with the template wrapper form of ASN1_ITEM */ # define ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(flags, tag, name, type) { \ (flags), (tag), 0,\ #name, ASN1_ITEM_ref(type) } /* These help with SEQUENCE or CHOICE components */ /* used to declare other types */ # define ASN1_EX_TYPE(flags, tag, stname, field, type) { \ (flags), (tag), offsetof(stname, field),\ #field, ASN1_ITEM_ref(type) } /* implicit and explicit helper macros */ # define ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ex) \ ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_IMPLICIT | ex, tag, stname, field, type) # define ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ex) \ ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EXPLICIT | ex, tag, stname, field, type) /* Any defined by macros: the field used is in the table itself */ # ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION # define ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID, -1, 0, #tblname, (const ASN1_ITEM *)&(tblname##_adb) } # define ASN1_ADB_INTEGER(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_INT, -1, 0, #tblname, (const ASN1_ITEM *)&(tblname##_adb) } # else # define ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID, -1, 0, #tblname, tblname##_adb } # define ASN1_ADB_INTEGER(tblname) { ASN1_TFLG_ADB_INT, -1, 0, #tblname, tblname##_adb } # endif /* Plain simple type */ # define ASN1_SIMPLE(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(0,0, stname, field, type) /* Embedded simple type */ # define ASN1_EMBED(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EMBED,0, stname, field, type) /* OPTIONAL simple type */ # define ASN1_OPT(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL, 0, stname, field, type) # define ASN1_OPT_EMBED(stname, field, type) ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_EMBED, 0, stname, field, type) /* IMPLICIT tagged simple type */ # define ASN1_IMP(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, 0) # define ASN1_IMP_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) /* IMPLICIT tagged OPTIONAL simple type */ # define ASN1_IMP_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) # define ASN1_IMP_OPT_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) /* Same as above but EXPLICIT */ # define ASN1_EXP(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, 0) # define ASN1_EXP_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) # define ASN1_EXP_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) # define ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(stname, field, type, tag) ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_EMBED) /* SEQUENCE OF type */ # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(stname, field, type) \ ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, stname, field, type) /* OPTIONAL SEQUENCE OF */ # define ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(stname, field, type) \ ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL, 0, stname, field, type) /* Same as above but for SET OF */ # define ASN1_SET_OF(stname, field, type) \ ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, stname, field, type) # define ASN1_SET_OF_OPT(stname, field, type) \ ASN1_EX_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL, 0, stname, field, type) /* Finally compound types of SEQUENCE, SET, IMPLICIT, EXPLICIT and OPTIONAL */ # define ASN1_IMP_SET_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) # define ASN1_EXP_SET_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) # define ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) # define ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) # define ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF) # define ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_IMP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) # define ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF) # define ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF|ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) /* EXPLICIT using indefinite length constructed form */ # define ASN1_NDEF_EXP(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) /* EXPLICIT OPTIONAL using indefinite length constructed form */ # define ASN1_NDEF_EXP_OPT(stname, field, type, tag) \ ASN1_EXP_EX(stname, field, type, tag, ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL|ASN1_TFLG_NDEF) /* Macros for the ASN1_ADB structure */ # define ASN1_ADB(name) \ static const ASN1_ADB_TABLE name##_adbtbl[] # ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION # define ASN1_ADB_END(name, flags, field, adb_cb, def, none) \ ;\ static const ASN1_ADB name##_adb = {\ flags,\ offsetof(name, field),\ adb_cb,\ name##_adbtbl,\ sizeof(name##_adbtbl) / sizeof(ASN1_ADB_TABLE),\ def,\ none\ } # else # define ASN1_ADB_END(name, flags, field, adb_cb, def, none) \ ;\ static const ASN1_ITEM *name##_adb(void) \ { \ static const ASN1_ADB internal_adb = \ {\ flags,\ offsetof(name, field),\ adb_cb,\ name##_adbtbl,\ sizeof(name##_adbtbl) / sizeof(ASN1_ADB_TABLE),\ def,\ none\ }; \ return (const ASN1_ITEM *) &internal_adb; \ } \ void dummy_function(void) # endif # define ADB_ENTRY(val, template) {val, template} # define ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(name) \ static const ASN1_TEMPLATE name##_tt /* * This is the ASN1 template structure that defines a wrapper round the * actual type. It determines the actual position of the field in the value * structure, various flags such as OPTIONAL and the field name. */ struct ASN1_TEMPLATE_st { unsigned long flags; /* Various flags */ long tag; /* tag, not used if no tagging */ unsigned long offset; /* Offset of this field in structure */ const char *field_name; /* Field name */ ASN1_ITEM_EXP *item; /* Relevant ASN1_ITEM or ASN1_ADB */ }; /* Macro to extract ASN1_ITEM and ASN1_ADB pointer from ASN1_TEMPLATE */ # define ASN1_TEMPLATE_item(t) (t->item_ptr) # define ASN1_TEMPLATE_adb(t) (t->item_ptr) typedef struct ASN1_ADB_TABLE_st ASN1_ADB_TABLE; typedef struct ASN1_ADB_st ASN1_ADB; struct ASN1_ADB_st { unsigned long flags; /* Various flags */ unsigned long offset; /* Offset of selector field */ int (*adb_cb)(long *psel); /* Application callback */ const ASN1_ADB_TABLE *tbl; /* Table of possible types */ long tblcount; /* Number of entries in tbl */ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *default_tt; /* Type to use if no match */ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *null_tt; /* Type to use if selector is NULL */ }; struct ASN1_ADB_TABLE_st { long value; /* NID for an object or value for an int */ const ASN1_TEMPLATE tt; /* item for this value */ }; /* template flags */ /* Field is optional */ # define ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL (0x1) /* Field is a SET OF */ # define ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF (0x1 << 1) /* Field is a SEQUENCE OF */ # define ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF (0x2 << 1) /* * Special case: this refers to a SET OF that will be sorted into DER order * when encoded *and* the corresponding STACK will be modified to match the * new order. */ # define ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER (0x3 << 1) /* Mask for SET OF or SEQUENCE OF */ # define ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK (0x3 << 1) /* * These flags mean the tag should be taken from the tag field. If EXPLICIT * then the underlying type is used for the inner tag. */ /* IMPLICIT tagging */ # define ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG (0x1 << 3) /* EXPLICIT tagging, inner tag from underlying type */ # define ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG (0x2 << 3) # define ASN1_TFLG_TAG_MASK (0x3 << 3) /* context specific IMPLICIT */ # define ASN1_TFLG_IMPLICIT ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_CONTEXT /* context specific EXPLICIT */ # define ASN1_TFLG_EXPLICIT ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_CONTEXT /* * If tagging is in force these determine the type of tag to use. Otherwise * the tag is determined by the underlying type. These values reflect the * actual octet format. */ /* Universal tag */ # define ASN1_TFLG_UNIVERSAL (0x0<<6) /* Application tag */ # define ASN1_TFLG_APPLICATION (0x1<<6) /* Context specific tag */ # define ASN1_TFLG_CONTEXT (0x2<<6) /* Private tag */ # define ASN1_TFLG_PRIVATE (0x3<<6) # define ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS (0x3<<6) /* * These are for ANY DEFINED BY type. In this case the 'item' field points to * an ASN1_ADB structure which contains a table of values to decode the * relevant type */ # define ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK (0x3<<8) # define ASN1_TFLG_ADB_OID (0x1<<8) # define ASN1_TFLG_ADB_INT (0x1<<9) /* * This flag when present in a SEQUENCE OF, SET OF or EXPLICIT causes * indefinite length constructed encoding to be used if required. */ # define ASN1_TFLG_NDEF (0x1<<11) /* Field is embedded and not a pointer */ # define ASN1_TFLG_EMBED (0x1 << 12) /* This is the actual ASN1 item itself */ struct ASN1_ITEM_st { char itype; /* The item type, primitive, SEQUENCE, CHOICE * or extern */ long utype; /* underlying type */ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *templates; /* If SEQUENCE or CHOICE this contains * the contents */ long tcount; /* Number of templates if SEQUENCE or CHOICE */ const void *funcs; /* functions that handle this type */ long size; /* Structure size (usually) */ const char *sname; /* Structure name */ }; /*- * These are values for the itype field and * determine how the type is interpreted. * * For PRIMITIVE types the underlying type * determines the behaviour if items is NULL. * * Otherwise templates must contain a single * template and the type is treated in the * same way as the type specified in the template. * * For SEQUENCE types the templates field points * to the members, the size field is the * structure size. * * For CHOICE types the templates field points * to each possible member (typically a union) * and the 'size' field is the offset of the * selector. * * The 'funcs' field is used for application * specific functions. * * The EXTERN type uses a new style d2i/i2d. * The new style should be used where possible * because it avoids things like the d2i IMPLICIT * hack. * * MSTRING is a multiple string type, it is used * for a CHOICE of character strings where the * actual strings all occupy an ASN1_STRING * structure. In this case the 'utype' field * has a special meaning, it is used as a mask * of acceptable types using the B_ASN1 constants. * * NDEF_SEQUENCE is the same as SEQUENCE except * that it will use indefinite length constructed * encoding if requested. * */ # define ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE 0x0 # define ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE 0x1 # define ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE 0x2 # define ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN 0x4 # define ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING 0x5 # define ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE 0x6 /* * Cache for ASN1 tag and length, so we don't keep re-reading it for things * like CHOICE */ struct ASN1_TLC_st { char valid; /* Values below are valid */ int ret; /* return value */ long plen; /* length */ int ptag; /* class value */ int pclass; /* class value */ int hdrlen; /* header length */ }; /* Typedefs for ASN1 function pointers */ typedef int ASN1_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); typedef int ASN1_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass); typedef int ASN1_ex_new_func(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); typedef void ASN1_ex_free_func(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); typedef int ASN1_ex_print_func(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, int indent, const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); typedef int ASN1_primitive_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it); typedef int ASN1_primitive_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); typedef int ASN1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); typedef struct ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS_st { void *app_data; ASN1_ex_new_func *asn1_ex_new; ASN1_ex_free_func *asn1_ex_free; ASN1_ex_free_func *asn1_ex_clear; ASN1_ex_d2i *asn1_ex_d2i; ASN1_ex_i2d *asn1_ex_i2d; ASN1_ex_print_func *asn1_ex_print; } ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS; typedef struct ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS_st { void *app_data; unsigned long flags; ASN1_ex_new_func *prim_new; ASN1_ex_free_func *prim_free; ASN1_ex_free_func *prim_clear; ASN1_primitive_c2i *prim_c2i; ASN1_primitive_i2c *prim_i2c; ASN1_primitive_print *prim_print; } ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS; /* * This is the ASN1_AUX structure: it handles various miscellaneous * requirements. For example the use of reference counts and an informational * callback. The "informational callback" is called at various points during * the ASN1 encoding and decoding. It can be used to provide minor * customisation of the structures used. This is most useful where the * supplied routines *almost* do the right thing but need some extra help at * a few points. If the callback returns zero then it is assumed a fatal * error has occurred and the main operation should be abandoned. If major * changes in the default behaviour are required then an external type is * more appropriate. */ typedef int ASN1_aux_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **in, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *exarg); typedef struct ASN1_AUX_st { void *app_data; int flags; int ref_offset; /* Offset of reference value */ int ref_lock; /* Lock type to use */ ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; int enc_offset; /* Offset of ASN1_ENCODING structure */ } ASN1_AUX; /* For print related callbacks exarg points to this structure */ typedef struct ASN1_PRINT_ARG_st { BIO *out; int indent; const ASN1_PCTX *pctx; } ASN1_PRINT_ARG; /* For streaming related callbacks exarg points to this structure */ typedef struct ASN1_STREAM_ARG_st { /* BIO to stream through */ BIO *out; /* BIO with filters appended */ BIO *ndef_bio; /* Streaming I/O boundary */ unsigned char **boundary; } ASN1_STREAM_ARG; /* Flags in ASN1_AUX */ /* Use a reference count */ # define ASN1_AFLG_REFCOUNT 1 /* Save the encoding of structure (useful for signatures) */ # define ASN1_AFLG_ENCODING 2 /* The Sequence length is invalid */ # define ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN 4 /* operation values for asn1_cb */ # define ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE 0 # define ASN1_OP_NEW_POST 1 # define ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE 2 # define ASN1_OP_FREE_POST 3 # define ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE 4 # define ASN1_OP_D2I_POST 5 # define ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE 6 # define ASN1_OP_I2D_POST 7 # define ASN1_OP_PRINT_PRE 8 # define ASN1_OP_PRINT_POST 9 # define ASN1_OP_STREAM_PRE 10 # define ASN1_OP_STREAM_POST 11 # define ASN1_OP_DETACHED_PRE 12 # define ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST 13 /* Macro to implement a primitive type */ # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(stname) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(stname, stname, 0) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE_ex(itname, vname, ex) \ ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_##vname, NULL, 0, NULL, ex, #itname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(itname) /* Macro to implement a multi string type */ # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(itname, mask) \ ASN1_ITEM_start(itname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING, mask, NULL, 0, NULL, sizeof(ASN1_STRING), #itname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(itname) # define IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(sname, tag, fptrs) \ ASN1_ITEM_start(sname) \ ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN, \ tag, \ NULL, \ 0, \ &fptrs, \ 0, \ #sname \ ASN1_ITEM_end(sname) /* Macro to implement standard functions in terms of ASN1_ITEM structures */ # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(stname) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, stname, stname) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(stname, itname) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, itname) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_ENCODE_name(stname, itname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_ENCODE_fname(stname, itname, itname) # define IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(stname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_pfname(static, stname, stname, stname) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(stname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, stname, stname) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_pfname(pre, stname, itname, fname) \ pre stname *fname##_new(void) \ { \ return (stname *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \ } \ pre void fname##_free(stname *a) \ { \ ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ stname *fname##_new(void) \ { \ return (stname *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \ } \ void fname##_free(stname *a) \ { \ ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)a, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname)); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ stname *d2i_##fname(stname **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) \ { \ return (stname *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\ } \ int i2d_##fname(stname *a, unsigned char **out) \ { \ return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\ } # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(stname) \ int i2d_##stname##_NDEF(stname *a, unsigned char **out) \ { \ return ASN1_item_ndef_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname));\ } # define IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(stname) \ static stname *d2i_##stname(stname **a, \ const unsigned char **in, long len) \ { \ return (stname *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len, \ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname)); \ } \ static int i2d_##stname(stname *a, unsigned char **out) \ { \ return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, \ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname)); \ } /* * This includes evil casts to remove const: they will go away when full ASN1 * constification is done. */ # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ stname *d2i_##fname(stname **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) \ { \ return (stname *)ASN1_item_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)a, in, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\ } \ int i2d_##fname(const stname *a, unsigned char **out) \ { \ return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)a, out, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname));\ } # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(stname) \ stname * stname##_dup(stname *x) \ { \ return ASN1_item_dup(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(stname), x); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(stname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, stname, stname) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ int fname##_print_ctx(BIO *out, stname *x, int indent, \ const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) \ { \ return ASN1_item_print(out, (ASN1_VALUE *)x, indent, \ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(itname), pctx); \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(name) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(name, name, name) # define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(stname, itname, fname) \ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_fname(stname, itname, fname) /* external definitions for primitive types */ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_BOOLEAN) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_TBOOLEAN) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_FBOOLEAN) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_SEQUENCE) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CBIGNUM) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(BIGNUM) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(LONG) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ZLONG) DEFINE_STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) /* Functions used internally by the ASN1 code */ int ASN1_item_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ts.h0000644000000000000000000006532413176625661015775 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_TS_H # define HEADER_TS_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TS # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # include # include typedef struct TS_msg_imprint_st TS_MSG_IMPRINT; typedef struct TS_req_st TS_REQ; typedef struct TS_accuracy_st TS_ACCURACY; typedef struct TS_tst_info_st TS_TST_INFO; /* Possible values for status. */ # define TS_STATUS_GRANTED 0 # define TS_STATUS_GRANTED_WITH_MODS 1 # define TS_STATUS_REJECTION 2 # define TS_STATUS_WAITING 3 # define TS_STATUS_REVOCATION_WARNING 4 # define TS_STATUS_REVOCATION_NOTIFICATION 5 /* Possible values for failure_info. */ # define TS_INFO_BAD_ALG 0 # define TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST 2 # define TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT 5 # define TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE 14 # define TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY 15 # define TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION 16 # define TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE 17 # define TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE 25 typedef struct TS_status_info_st TS_STATUS_INFO; typedef struct ESS_issuer_serial ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL; typedef struct ESS_cert_id ESS_CERT_ID; typedef struct ESS_signing_cert ESS_SIGNING_CERT; DEFINE_STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) typedef struct TS_resp_st TS_RESP; TS_REQ *TS_REQ_new(void); void TS_REQ_free(TS_REQ *a); int i2d_TS_REQ(const TS_REQ *a, unsigned char **pp); TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ(TS_REQ **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); TS_REQ *TS_REQ_dup(TS_REQ *a); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ **a); int i2d_TS_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, TS_REQ *a); #endif TS_REQ *d2i_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *fp, TS_REQ **a); int i2d_TS_REQ_bio(BIO *fp, TS_REQ *a); TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new(void); void TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a); int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT(const TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, unsigned char **pp); TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT(TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a); int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp(FILE *fp, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a); #endif TS_MSG_IMPRINT *d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT **a); int i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a); TS_RESP *TS_RESP_new(void); void TS_RESP_free(TS_RESP *a); int i2d_TS_RESP(const TS_RESP *a, unsigned char **pp); TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP(TS_RESP **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); TS_TST_INFO *PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(PKCS7 *token); TS_RESP *TS_RESP_dup(TS_RESP *a); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP **a); int i2d_TS_RESP_fp(FILE *fp, TS_RESP *a); #endif TS_RESP *d2i_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP **a); int i2d_TS_RESP_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP *a); TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_STATUS_INFO_new(void); void TS_STATUS_INFO_free(TS_STATUS_INFO *a); int i2d_TS_STATUS_INFO(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a, unsigned char **pp); TS_STATUS_INFO *d2i_TS_STATUS_INFO(TS_STATUS_INFO **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_STATUS_INFO_dup(TS_STATUS_INFO *a); TS_TST_INFO *TS_TST_INFO_new(void); void TS_TST_INFO_free(TS_TST_INFO *a); int i2d_TS_TST_INFO(const TS_TST_INFO *a, unsigned char **pp); TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO(TS_TST_INFO **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); TS_TST_INFO *TS_TST_INFO_dup(TS_TST_INFO *a); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO **a); int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, TS_TST_INFO *a); #endif TS_TST_INFO *d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO **a); int i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO *a); TS_ACCURACY *TS_ACCURACY_new(void); void TS_ACCURACY_free(TS_ACCURACY *a); int i2d_TS_ACCURACY(const TS_ACCURACY *a, unsigned char **pp); TS_ACCURACY *d2i_TS_ACCURACY(TS_ACCURACY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); TS_ACCURACY *TS_ACCURACY_dup(TS_ACCURACY *a); ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_new(void); void ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_free(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *a); int i2d_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL(const ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *a, unsigned char **pp); ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *d2i_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_dup(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *a); ESS_CERT_ID *ESS_CERT_ID_new(void); void ESS_CERT_ID_free(ESS_CERT_ID *a); int i2d_ESS_CERT_ID(const ESS_CERT_ID *a, unsigned char **pp); ESS_CERT_ID *d2i_ESS_CERT_ID(ESS_CERT_ID **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); ESS_CERT_ID *ESS_CERT_ID_dup(ESS_CERT_ID *a); ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new(void); void ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(ESS_SIGNING_CERT *a); int i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(const ESS_SIGNING_CERT *a, unsigned char **pp); ESS_SIGNING_CERT *d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(ESS_SIGNING_CERT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_SIGNING_CERT_dup(ESS_SIGNING_CERT *a); int TS_REQ_set_version(TS_REQ *a, long version); long TS_REQ_get_version(const TS_REQ *a); int TS_STATUS_INFO_set_status(TS_STATUS_INFO *a, int i); const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_status(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a); const STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) * TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_text(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a); const ASN1_BIT_STRING * TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_failure_info(const TS_STATUS_INFO *a); int TS_REQ_set_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint); TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_REQ_get_msg_imprint(TS_REQ *a); int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, X509_ALGOR *alg); X509_ALGOR *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a); int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_set_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a, unsigned char *d, int len); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_msg(TS_MSG_IMPRINT *a); int TS_REQ_set_policy_id(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy); ASN1_OBJECT *TS_REQ_get_policy_id(TS_REQ *a); int TS_REQ_set_nonce(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce); const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_REQ_get_nonce(const TS_REQ *a); int TS_REQ_set_cert_req(TS_REQ *a, int cert_req); int TS_REQ_get_cert_req(const TS_REQ *a); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_REQ_get_exts(TS_REQ *a); void TS_REQ_ext_free(TS_REQ *a); int TS_REQ_get_ext_count(TS_REQ *a); int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_NID(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int lastpos); int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_REQ *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int TS_REQ_get_ext_by_critical(TS_REQ *a, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_get_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *TS_REQ_delete_ext(TS_REQ *a, int loc); int TS_REQ_add_ext(TS_REQ *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void *TS_REQ_get_ext_d2i(TS_REQ *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); /* Function declarations for TS_REQ defined in ts/ts_req_print.c */ int TS_REQ_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_REQ *a); /* Function declarations for TS_RESP defined in ts/ts_resp_utils.c */ int TS_RESP_set_status_info(TS_RESP *a, TS_STATUS_INFO *info); TS_STATUS_INFO *TS_RESP_get_status_info(TS_RESP *a); /* Caller loses ownership of PKCS7 and TS_TST_INFO objects. */ void TS_RESP_set_tst_info(TS_RESP *a, PKCS7 *p7, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info); PKCS7 *TS_RESP_get_token(TS_RESP *a); TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_get_tst_info(TS_RESP *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_version(TS_TST_INFO *a, long version); long TS_TST_INFO_get_version(const TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a, ASN1_OBJECT *policy_id); ASN1_OBJECT *TS_TST_INFO_get_policy_id(TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint); TS_MSG_IMPRINT *TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_serial(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *serial); const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_serial(const TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_time(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime); const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *TS_TST_INFO_get_time(const TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a, TS_ACCURACY *accuracy); TS_ACCURACY *TS_TST_INFO_get_accuracy(TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_ACCURACY_set_seconds(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *seconds); const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_seconds(const TS_ACCURACY *a); int TS_ACCURACY_set_millis(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *millis); const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_millis(const TS_ACCURACY *a); int TS_ACCURACY_set_micros(TS_ACCURACY *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *micros); const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_ACCURACY_get_micros(const TS_ACCURACY *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_ordering(TS_TST_INFO *a, int ordering); int TS_TST_INFO_get_ordering(const TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_nonce(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce); const ASN1_INTEGER *TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce(const TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_set_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a, GENERAL_NAME *tsa); GENERAL_NAME *TS_TST_INFO_get_tsa(TS_TST_INFO *a); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *TS_TST_INFO_get_exts(TS_TST_INFO *a); void TS_TST_INFO_ext_free(TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_count(TS_TST_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_NID(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int lastpos); int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_OBJ(TS_TST_INFO *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_by_critical(TS_TST_INFO *a, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_delete_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc); int TS_TST_INFO_add_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void *TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_d2i(TS_TST_INFO *a, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); /* * Declarations related to response generation, defined in ts/ts_resp_sign.c. */ /* Optional flags for response generation. */ /* Don't include the TSA name in response. */ # define TS_TSA_NAME 0x01 /* Set ordering to true in response. */ # define TS_ORDERING 0x02 /* * Include the signer certificate and the other specified certificates in * the ESS signing certificate attribute beside the PKCS7 signed data. * Only the signer certificates is included by default. */ # define TS_ESS_CERT_ID_CHAIN 0x04 /* Forward declaration. */ struct TS_resp_ctx; /* This must return a unique number less than 160 bits long. */ typedef ASN1_INTEGER *(*TS_serial_cb) (struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *); /* * This must return the seconds and microseconds since Jan 1, 1970 in the sec * and usec variables allocated by the caller. Return non-zero for success * and zero for failure. */ typedef int (*TS_time_cb) (struct TS_resp_ctx *, void *, long *sec, long *usec); /* * This must process the given extension. It can modify the TS_TST_INFO * object of the context. Return values: !0 (processed), 0 (error, it must * set the status info/failure info of the response). */ typedef int (*TS_extension_cb) (struct TS_resp_ctx *, X509_EXTENSION *, void *); typedef struct TS_resp_ctx TS_RESP_CTX; DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(EVP_MD) /* Creates a response context that can be used for generating responses. */ TS_RESP_CTX *TS_RESP_CTX_new(void); void TS_RESP_CTX_free(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); /* This parameter must be set. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_cert(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, X509 *signer); /* This parameter must be set. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_key(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *key); int TS_RESP_CTX_set_signer_digest(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *signer_digest); /* This parameter must be set. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *def_policy); /* No additional certs are included in the response by default. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs); /* * Adds a new acceptable policy, only the default policy is accepted by * default. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_add_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy); /* * Adds a new acceptable message digest. Note that no message digests are * accepted by default. The md argument is shared with the caller. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_add_md(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md); /* Accuracy is not included by default. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_accuracy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int secs, int millis, int micros); /* * Clock precision digits, i.e. the number of decimal digits: '0' means sec, * '3' msec, '6' usec, and so on. Default is 0. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_clock_precision_digits(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, unsigned clock_precision_digits); /* At most we accept usec precision. */ # define TS_MAX_CLOCK_PRECISION_DIGITS 6 /* Maximum status message length */ # define TS_MAX_STATUS_LENGTH (1024 * 1024) /* No flags are set by default. */ void TS_RESP_CTX_add_flags(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int flags); /* Default callback always returns a constant. */ void TS_RESP_CTX_set_serial_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_serial_cb cb, void *data); /* Default callback uses the gettimeofday() and gmtime() system calls. */ void TS_RESP_CTX_set_time_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_time_cb cb, void *data); /* * Default callback rejects all extensions. The extension callback is called * when the TS_TST_INFO object is already set up and not signed yet. */ /* FIXME: extension handling is not tested yet. */ void TS_RESP_CTX_set_extension_cb(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, TS_extension_cb cb, void *data); /* The following methods can be used in the callbacks. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int status, const char *text); /* Sets the status info only if it is still TS_STATUS_GRANTED. */ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info_cond(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int status, const char *text); int TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, int failure); /* The get methods below can be used in the extension callback. */ TS_REQ *TS_RESP_CTX_get_request(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); TS_TST_INFO *TS_RESP_CTX_get_tst_info(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); /* * Creates the signed TS_TST_INFO and puts it in TS_RESP. * In case of errors it sets the status info properly. * Returns NULL only in case of memory allocation/fatal error. */ TS_RESP *TS_RESP_create_response(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, BIO *req_bio); /* * Declarations related to response verification, * they are defined in ts/ts_resp_verify.c. */ int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, X509 **signer_out); /* Context structure for the generic verify method. */ /* Verify the signer's certificate and the signature of the response. */ # define TS_VFY_SIGNATURE (1u << 0) /* Verify the version number of the response. */ # define TS_VFY_VERSION (1u << 1) /* Verify if the policy supplied by the user matches the policy of the TSA. */ # define TS_VFY_POLICY (1u << 2) /* * Verify the message imprint provided by the user. This flag should not be * specified with TS_VFY_DATA. */ # define TS_VFY_IMPRINT (1u << 3) /* * Verify the message imprint computed by the verify method from the user * provided data and the MD algorithm of the response. This flag should not * be specified with TS_VFY_IMPRINT. */ # define TS_VFY_DATA (1u << 4) /* Verify the nonce value. */ # define TS_VFY_NONCE (1u << 5) /* Verify if the TSA name field matches the signer certificate. */ # define TS_VFY_SIGNER (1u << 6) /* Verify if the TSA name field equals to the user provided name. */ # define TS_VFY_TSA_NAME (1u << 7) /* You can use the following convenience constants. */ # define TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT (TS_VFY_SIGNATURE \ | TS_VFY_VERSION \ | TS_VFY_POLICY \ | TS_VFY_IMPRINT \ | TS_VFY_NONCE \ | TS_VFY_SIGNER \ | TS_VFY_TSA_NAME) # define TS_VFY_ALL_DATA (TS_VFY_SIGNATURE \ | TS_VFY_VERSION \ | TS_VFY_POLICY \ | TS_VFY_DATA \ | TS_VFY_NONCE \ | TS_VFY_SIGNER \ | TS_VFY_TSA_NAME) typedef struct TS_verify_ctx TS_VERIFY_CTX; int TS_RESP_verify_response(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, TS_RESP *response); int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token); /* * Declarations related to response verification context, */ TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void); void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx); void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx); void TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx); int TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f); int TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f); BIO *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, BIO *b); unsigned char *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *hexstr, long len); X509_STORE *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *s); STACK_OF(X509) *TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs); /*- * If ctx is NULL, it allocates and returns a new object, otherwise * it returns ctx. It initialises all the members as follows: * flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE) * certs = NULL * store = NULL * policy = policy from the request or NULL if absent (in this case * TS_VFY_POLICY is cleared from flags as well) * md_alg = MD algorithm from request * imprint, imprint_len = imprint from request * data = NULL * nonce, nonce_len = nonce from the request or NULL if absent (in this case * TS_VFY_NONCE is cleared from flags as well) * tsa_name = NULL * Important: after calling this method TS_VFY_SIGNATURE should be added! */ TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(TS_REQ *req, TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx); /* Function declarations for TS_RESP defined in ts/ts_resp_print.c */ int TS_RESP_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_RESP *a); int TS_STATUS_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_STATUS_INFO *a); int TS_TST_INFO_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_TST_INFO *a); /* Common utility functions defined in ts/ts_lib.c */ int TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_INTEGER *num); int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int TS_ext_print_bio(BIO *bio, const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions); int TS_X509_ALGOR_print_bio(BIO *bio, const X509_ALGOR *alg); int TS_MSG_IMPRINT_print_bio(BIO *bio, TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg); /* * Function declarations for handling configuration options, defined in * ts/ts_conf.c */ X509 *TS_CONF_load_cert(const char *file); STACK_OF(X509) *TS_CONF_load_certs(const char *file); EVP_PKEY *TS_CONF_load_key(const char *file, const char *pass); const char *TS_CONF_get_tsa_section(CONF *conf, const char *section); int TS_CONF_set_serial(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_serial_cb cb, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int TS_CONF_set_crypto_device(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *device); int TS_CONF_set_default_engine(const char *name); #endif int TS_CONF_set_signer_cert(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *cert, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_certs(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *certs, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_signer_key(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *key, const char *pass, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_signer_digest(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *md, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_def_policy(CONF *conf, const char *section, const char *policy, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_policies(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_digests(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_accuracy(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_clock_precision_digits(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_ordering(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_tsa_name(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); int TS_CONF_set_ess_cert_id_chain(CONF *conf, const char *section, TS_RESP_CTX *ctx); /* -------------------------------------------------- */ /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_TS_strings(void); /* Error codes for the TS functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define TS_F_DEF_SERIAL_CB 110 # define TS_F_DEF_TIME_CB 111 # define TS_F_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT 112 # define TS_F_ESS_CERT_ID_NEW_INIT 113 # define TS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_NEW_INIT 114 # define TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN 149 # define TS_F_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO 148 # define TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MICROS 115 # define TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_MILLIS 116 # define TS_F_TS_ACCURACY_SET_SECONDS 117 # define TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS 100 # define TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES 101 # define TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY 102 # define TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS 103 # define TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO 104 # define TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT 145 # define TS_F_TS_CONF_INVALID 151 # define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERT 153 # define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_CERTS 154 # define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOAD_KEY 155 # define TS_F_TS_CONF_LOOKUP_FAIL 152 # define TS_F_TS_CONF_SET_DEFAULT_ENGINE 146 # define TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT 105 # define TS_F_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_SET_ALGO 118 # define TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_MSG_IMPRINT 119 # define TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_NONCE 120 # define TS_F_TS_REQ_SET_POLICY_ID 121 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_RESPONSE 122 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CREATE_TST_INFO 123 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_FAILURE_INFO 124 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_MD 125 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_ADD_POLICY 126 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW 127 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_ACCURACY 128 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_CERTS 129 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_DEF_POLICY 130 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_SIGNER_CERT 131 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_STATUS_INFO 132 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_GET_POLICY 133 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_GENTIME_WITH_PRECISION 134 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_STATUS_INFO 135 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_SET_TST_INFO 150 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_SIGN 136 # define TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE 106 # define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_ACCURACY 137 # define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_MSG_IMPRINT 138 # define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_NONCE 139 # define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_POLICY_ID 140 # define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_SERIAL 141 # define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TIME 142 # define TS_F_TS_TST_INFO_SET_TSA 143 # define TS_F_TS_VERIFY 108 # define TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT 109 # define TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW 144 /* Reason codes. */ # define TS_R_BAD_PKCS7_TYPE 132 # define TS_R_BAD_TYPE 133 # define TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_CERT 137 # define TS_R_CANNOT_LOAD_KEY 138 # define TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR 100 # define TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_ENGINE 127 # define TS_R_COULD_NOT_SET_TIME 115 # define TS_R_DETACHED_CONTENT 134 # define TS_R_ESS_ADD_SIGNING_CERT_ERROR 116 # define TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR 101 # define TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER 102 # define TS_R_INVALID_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_PURPOSE 117 # define TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH 103 # define TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH 104 # define TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED 105 # define TS_R_NO_CONTENT 106 # define TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN 107 # define TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNATURE_ERROR 118 # define TS_R_PKCS7_ADD_SIGNED_ATTR_ERROR 119 # define TS_R_PKCS7_TO_TS_TST_INFO_FAILED 129 # define TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH 108 # define TS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE 120 # define TS_R_RESPONSE_SETUP_ERROR 121 # define TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE 109 # define TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER 110 # define TS_R_TIME_SYSCALL_ERROR 122 # define TS_R_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 130 # define TS_R_TOKEN_PRESENT 131 # define TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH 111 # define TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED 112 # define TS_R_TST_INFO_SETUP_ERROR 123 # define TS_R_TS_DATASIGN 124 # define TS_R_UNACCEPTABLE_POLICY 125 # define TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM 126 # define TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 113 # define TS_R_VAR_BAD_VALUE 135 # define TS_R_VAR_LOOKUP_FAILURE 136 # define TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE 114 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ecdsa.h0000644000000000000000000000054613176625661016421 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/rc4.h0000644000000000000000000000147113176625661016030 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RC4_H # define HEADER_RC4_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef struct rc4_key_st { RC4_INT x, y; RC4_INT data[256]; } RC4_KEY; const char *RC4_options(void); void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data); void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata, unsigned char *outdata); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in0000644000000000000000000000731413176625661020300 0ustar rootroot/* * {- join("\n * ", @autowarntext) -} * * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES # error OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES no longer supported #endif /* * OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */ {- if (@{$config{openssl_sys_defines}}) { foreach (@{$config{openssl_sys_defines}}) { $OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n"; $OUT .= "# define $_ 1\n"; $OUT .= "#endif\n"; } } foreach (@{$config{openssl_api_defines}}) { (my $macro, my $value) = $_ =~ /^(.*?)=(.*?)$/; $OUT .= "#define OPENSSL_MIN_API $value\n"; } if (@{$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}}) { foreach (@{$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}}) { $OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n"; $OUT .= "# define $_\n"; $OUT .= "#endif\n"; } } if (@{$config{openssl_thread_defines}}) { foreach (@{$config{openssl_thread_defines}}) { $OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n"; $OUT .= "# define $_\n"; $OUT .= "#endif\n"; } } if (@{$config{openssl_other_defines}}) { foreach (@{$config{openssl_other_defines}}) { $OUT .= "#ifndef $_\n"; $OUT .= "# define $_\n"; $OUT .= "#endif\n"; } } ""; -} /* * Sometimes OPENSSSL_NO_xxx ends up with an empty file and some compilers * don't like that. This will hopefully silence them. */ #define NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT static void *dummy = &dummy; /* * Applications should use -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT= to suppress the * declarations of functions deprecated in or before . Otherwise, they * still won't see them if the library has been built to disable deprecated * functions. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED) # define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) #elif __GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ > 0) # define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) f __attribute__ ((deprecated)); #else # define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) f; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_FILE # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FILENAMES # define OPENSSL_FILE "" # define OPENSSL_LINE 0 # else # define OPENSSL_FILE __FILE__ # define OPENSSL_LINE __LINE__ # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_MIN_API # define OPENSSL_MIN_API 0 #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT) || OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < OPENSSL_MIN_API # undef OPENSSL_API_COMPAT # define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT OPENSSL_MIN_API #endif #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(f) DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) #else # define DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(f) #endif #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L # define DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0(f) DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) #else # define DEPRECATEDIN_1_0_0(f) #endif #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L # define DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(f) DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) #else # define DEPRECATEDIN_0_9_8(f) #endif {- $target{cpuid_obj} ne "mem_clr.o" ? "#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ" : "" -} /* Generate 80386 code? */ {- $config{processor} eq "386" ? "#define" : "#undef" -} I386_ONLY #undef OPENSSL_UNISTD #define OPENSSL_UNISTD {- $target{unistd} -} {- $config{export_var_as_fn} ? "#define" : "#undef" -} OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION /* * The following are cipher-specific, but are part of the public API. */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) {- $config{bn_ll} ? "# define" : "# undef" -} BN_LLONG /* Only one for the following should be defined */ {- $config{b64l} ? "# define" : "# undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG {- $config{b64} ? "# define" : "# undef" -} SIXTY_FOUR_BIT {- $config{b32} ? "# define" : "# undef" -} THIRTY_TWO_BIT #endif #define RC4_INT {- $config{rc4_int} -} #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ebcdic.h0000644000000000000000000000163413176625661016552 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_EBCDIC_H # define HEADER_EBCDIC_H # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Avoid name clashes with other applications */ # define os_toascii _openssl_os_toascii # define os_toebcdic _openssl_os_toebcdic # define ebcdic2ascii _openssl_ebcdic2ascii # define ascii2ebcdic _openssl_ascii2ebcdic extern const unsigned char os_toascii[256]; extern const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256]; void *ebcdic2ascii(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count); void *ascii2ebcdic(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h0000644000000000000000000006575113176625661016744 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_X509_VFY_H # define HEADER_X509_VFY_H /* * Protect against recursion, x509.h and x509_vfy.h each include the other. */ # ifndef HEADER_X509_H # include # endif # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- SSL_CTX -> X509_STORE -> X509_LOOKUP ->X509_LOOKUP_METHOD -> X509_LOOKUP ->X509_LOOKUP_METHOD SSL -> X509_STORE_CTX ->X509_STORE The X509_STORE holds the tables etc for verification stuff. A X509_STORE_CTX is used while validating a single certificate. The X509_STORE has X509_LOOKUPs for looking up certs. The X509_STORE then calls a function to actually verify the certificate chain. */ typedef enum { X509_LU_NONE = 0, X509_LU_X509, X509_LU_CRL } X509_LOOKUP_TYPE; #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L #define X509_LU_RETRY -1 #define X509_LU_FAIL 0 #endif DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_VERIFY_PARAM) int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *store, int depth); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn)(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); typedef STACK_OF(X509) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); typedef STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); # define X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,data) \ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,data) # define X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) \ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0) # define X509_L_FILE_LOAD 1 # define X509_L_ADD_DIR 2 # define X509_LOOKUP_load_file(x,name,type) \ X509_LOOKUP_ctrl((x),X509_L_FILE_LOAD,(name),(long)(type),NULL) # define X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(x,name,type) \ X509_LOOKUP_ctrl((x),X509_L_ADD_DIR,(name),(long)(type),NULL) # define X509_V_OK 0 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED 1 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT 2 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL 3 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE 4 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE 5 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 6 # define X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE 7 # define X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE 8 # define X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID 9 # define X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED 10 # define X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID 11 # define X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED 12 # define X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD 13 # define X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD 14 # define X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD 15 # define X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD 16 # define X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM 17 # define X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT 18 # define X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN 19 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY 20 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE 21 # define X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG 22 # define X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED 23 # define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA 24 # define X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED 25 # define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE 26 # define X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED 27 # define X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED 28 /* These are 'informational' when looking for issuer cert */ # define X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH 29 # define X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH 30 # define X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH 31 # define X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN 32 # define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER 33 # define X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION 34 # define X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN 35 # define X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION 36 # define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA 37 # define X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED 38 # define X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 39 # define X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED 40 # define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION 41 # define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION 42 # define X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY 43 # define X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE 44 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE 45 # define X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE 46 # define X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION 47 # define X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION 48 # define X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX 49 /* The application is not happy */ # define X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION 50 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE 51 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX 52 # define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX 53 # define X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR 54 /* Another issuer check debug option */ # define X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP 55 /* Suite B mode algorithm violation */ # define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION 56 # define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM 57 # define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE 58 # define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 59 # define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED 60 # define X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256 61 /* Host, email and IP check errors */ # define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH 62 # define X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH 63 # define X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH 64 /* DANE TLSA errors */ # define X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH 65 /* security level errors */ # define X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL 66 # define X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL 67 # define X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK 68 /* Caller error */ # define X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL 69 /* Issuer lookup error */ # define X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP 70 /* Certificate transparency */ # define X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS 71 # define X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION 72 /* Certificate verify flags */ # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK 0x0 /* Deprecated */ # endif /* Use check time instead of current time */ # define X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME 0x2 /* Lookup CRLs */ # define X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK 0x4 /* Lookup CRLs for whole chain */ # define X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL 0x8 /* Ignore unhandled critical extensions */ # define X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL 0x10 /* Disable workarounds for broken certificates */ # define X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT 0x20 /* Enable proxy certificate validation */ # define X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS 0x40 /* Enable policy checking */ # define X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK 0x80 /* Policy variable require-explicit-policy */ # define X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY 0x100 /* Policy variable inhibit-any-policy */ # define X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY 0x200 /* Policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping */ # define X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP 0x400 /* Notify callback that policy is OK */ # define X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY 0x800 /* Extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs, alternate CRL signing keys */ # define X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT 0x1000 /* Delta CRL support */ # define X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS 0x2000 /* Check self-signed CA signature */ # define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000 /* Use trusted store first */ # define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST 0x8000 /* Suite B 128 bit only mode: not normally used */ # define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY 0x10000 /* Suite B 192 bit only mode */ # define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS 0x20000 /* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */ # define X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS 0x30000 /* Allow partial chains if at least one certificate is in trusted store */ # define X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN 0x80000 /* * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.1.0. Setting this flag * will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions. */ # define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS 0x100000 /* Do not check certificate/CRL validity against current time */ # define X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME 0x200000 # define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1 # define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2 # define X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS 0x4 # define X509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED 0x8 # define X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE 0x10 /* Internal use: mask of policy related options */ # define X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_MASK (X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK \ | X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY \ | X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY \ | X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name); X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name); X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_OBJECT *x); int X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a); X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_new(void); void X509_OBJECT_free(X509_OBJECT *a); X509_LOOKUP_TYPE X509_OBJECT_get_type(const X509_OBJECT *a); X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(const X509_OBJECT *a); X509_CRL *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(X509_OBJECT *a); X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void); void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *v); int X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE *ctx); int X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE *ctx); int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE *v); STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *v); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *st, X509_NAME *nm); STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *st, X509_NAME *nm); int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags); int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose); int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust); int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *pm); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_verify(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify); #define X509_STORE_set_verify_func(ctx, func) \ X509_STORE_set_verify((ctx),(func)) void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify); X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_get_verify(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb); # define X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(ctx,func) \ X509_STORE_set_verify_cb((ctx),(func)) X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn get_issuer); X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued); X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn check_revocation); X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl); X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl); X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn cert_crl); X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn check_policy); X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_get_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn lookup_certs); X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls); #define X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(ctx, func) \ X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls((ctx), (func)) X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn cleanup); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_get_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx); #define X509_STORE_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int X509_STORE_set_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx, void *data); void *X509_STORE_get_ex_data(X509_STORE *ctx, int idx); X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void); int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); STACK_OF(X509)* X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify); X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain # define X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted # define X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack # define X509_STORE_get_by_subject X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject # define X509_STORE_get1_cert X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs # define X509_STORE_get1_crl X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls #endif X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m); X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void); X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void); int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x); int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret); X509_OBJECT *X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name); int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, char **ret); int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type); int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type); int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type); X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method); void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx); int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx); int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret); int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_OBJECT *ret); int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret); int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, const char *str, int len, X509_OBJECT *ret); int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx); int X509_STORE_load_locations(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file, const char *dir); int X509_STORE_set_default_paths(X509_STORE *ctx); #define X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data); void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int s); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *c, X509 *x); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *c, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk); int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose); int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust); int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, int purpose, int trust); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t); X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name); /* * Bridge opacity barrier between libcrypt and libssl, also needed to support * offline testing in test/danetest.c */ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane); #define DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS (1L << 0) /* X509_VERIFY_PARAM functions */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *to, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *from); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags); unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level); time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, ASN1_OBJECT *policy); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, uint32_t flags); uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name, size_t namelen); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name, size_t namelen); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned int flags); char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *email, size_t emaillen); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); const char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(void); const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(int id); const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(const char *name); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup(void); /* Non positive return values are errors */ #define X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE -2 /* Failure to satisfy explicit policy */ #define X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID -1 /* Inconsistent or invalid extensions */ #define X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL 0 /* Internal error, most likely malloc */ /* * Positive return values form a bit mask, all but the first are internal to * the library and don't appear in results from X509_policy_check(). */ #define X509_PCY_TREE_VALID 1 /* The policy tree is valid */ #define X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY 2 /* The policy tree is empty */ #define X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT 4 /* Explicit policy required */ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags); void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); int X509_policy_tree_level_count(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); X509_POLICY_LEVEL *X509_policy_tree_get0_level(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, int i); STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(const X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); int X509_policy_level_node_count(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level); X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_level_get0_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, int i); const ASN1_OBJECT *X509_policy_node_get0_policy(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node); STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *X509_policy_node_get0_qualifiers(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node); const X509_POLICY_NODE *X509_policy_node_get0_parent(const X509_POLICY_NODE *node); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/cmac.h0000644000000000000000000000205013176625661016235 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2010-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CMAC_H # define HEADER_CMAC_H # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # include /* Opaque */ typedef struct CMAC_CTX_st CMAC_CTX; CMAC_CTX *CMAC_CTX_new(void); void CMAC_CTX_cleanup(CMAC_CTX *ctx); void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx); int CMAC_CTX_copy(CMAC_CTX *out, const CMAC_CTX *in); int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl); int CMAC_Update(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dlen); int CMAC_Final(CMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen); int CMAC_resume(CMAC_CTX *ctx); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/cms.h0000644000000000000000000006362613176625661016134 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_CMS_H # define HEADER_CMS_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif typedef struct CMS_ContentInfo_st CMS_ContentInfo; typedef struct CMS_SignerInfo_st CMS_SignerInfo; typedef struct CMS_CertificateChoices CMS_CertificateChoices; typedef struct CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_st CMS_RevocationInfoChoice; typedef struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st CMS_RecipientInfo; typedef struct CMS_ReceiptRequest_st CMS_ReceiptRequest; typedef struct CMS_Receipt_st CMS_Receipt; typedef struct CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_st CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey; typedef struct CMS_OtherKeyAttribute_st CMS_OtherKeyAttribute; DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RevocationInfoChoice) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ContentInfo) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_ReceiptRequest) DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentInfo) # define CMS_SIGNERINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL 0 # define CMS_SIGNERINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER 1 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE -1 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS 0 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE 1 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK 2 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS 3 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER 4 /* S/MIME related flags */ # define CMS_TEXT 0x1 # define CMS_NOCERTS 0x2 # define CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY 0x4 # define CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY 0x8 # define CMS_NOSIGS \ (CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY|CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY) # define CMS_NOINTERN 0x10 # define CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY 0x20 # define CMS_NOVERIFY 0x20 # define CMS_DETACHED 0x40 # define CMS_BINARY 0x80 # define CMS_NOATTR 0x100 # define CMS_NOSMIMECAP 0x200 # define CMS_NOOLDMIMETYPE 0x400 # define CMS_CRLFEOL 0x800 # define CMS_STREAM 0x1000 # define CMS_NOCRL 0x2000 # define CMS_PARTIAL 0x4000 # define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST 0x8000 # define CMS_USE_KEYID 0x10000 # define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT 0x20000 # define CMS_KEY_PARAM 0x40000 # define CMS_ASCIICRLF 0x80000 const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms); BIO *CMS_dataInit(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *icont); int CMS_dataFinal(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *bio); ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_is_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_set_detached(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int detached); # ifdef HEADER_PEM_H DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(CMS, CMS_ContentInfo) # endif int CMS_stream(unsigned char ***boundary, CMS_ContentInfo *cms); CMS_ContentInfo *d2i_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo **cms); int i2d_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo *cms); BIO *BIO_new_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int i2d_CMS_bio_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in, int flags); int PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *in, int flags); CMS_ContentInfo *SMIME_read_CMS(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont); int SMIME_write_CMS(BIO *bio, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags); int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, unsigned int flags); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags); int CMS_data(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_data_create(BIO *in, unsigned int flags); int CMS_digest_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags); int CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int flags); int CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags); STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags); int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert); int CMS_decrypt_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen); int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen); STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_RecipientInfo_type(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EnvelopedData_create(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *recip, unsigned int flags); int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert); int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509 **recip, X509_ALGOR **palg); int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno); CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *id, size_t idlen, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date, ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId, ASN1_TYPE *otherType); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate, ASN1_OBJECT **potherid, ASN1_TYPE **pothertype); int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen); int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen); CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int iter, int wrap_nid, int pbe_nid, unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen, const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph); int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags); int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); CMS_CertificateChoices *CMS_add0_CertificateChoices(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert); int CMS_add1_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert); STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get1_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_add0_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl); int CMS_add1_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl); STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *CMS_get1_crls(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_SignedData_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); CMS_SignerInfo *CMS_add1_signer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags); EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si); EVP_MD_CTX *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_md_ctx(CMS_SignerInfo *si); STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *CMS_get0_SignerInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); void CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signer); int CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno); int CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *cert); int CMS_set1_signers_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags); void CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(CMS_SignerInfo *si, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509 **signer, X509_ALGOR **pdig, X509_ALGOR **psig); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature(CMS_SignerInfo *si); int CMS_SignerInfo_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si); int CMS_SignerInfo_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si); int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain); int CMS_add_smimecap(CMS_SignerInfo *si, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *algs); int CMS_add_simple_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **algs, int algnid, int keysize); int CMS_add_standard_smimecap(STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) **smcap); int CMS_signed_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si); int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int lastpos); int CMS_signed_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_signed_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc); int CMS_signed_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const void *bytes, int len); int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int type, const void *bytes, int len); int CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const char *attrname, int type, const void *bytes, int len); void *CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid, int lastpos, int type); int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count(const CMS_SignerInfo *si); int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_NID(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int lastpos); int CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_OBJ(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_get_attr(const CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *CMS_unsigned_delete_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int loc); int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const void *bytes, int len); int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_NID(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int nid, int type, const void *bytes, int len); int CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_txt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, const char *attrname, int type, const void *bytes, int len); void *CMS_unsigned_get0_data_by_OBJ(CMS_SignerInfo *si, ASN1_OBJECT *oid, int lastpos, int type); # ifdef HEADER_X509V3_H int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest **prr); CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen, int allorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptList, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptsTo); int CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr); void CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr, ASN1_STRING **pcid, int *pallorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto); # endif int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm); STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **pubalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert); int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm, CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno); int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, X509 *cert); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk); EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek); int CMS_SharedInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *kekalg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_CMS_strings(void); /* Error codes for the CMS functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT 99 # define CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_CERT 164 # define CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY 100 # define CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD 165 # define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECEIPTREQUEST 158 # define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT 101 # define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNER 102 # define CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_SIGNINGTIME 103 # define CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS 104 # define CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_CREATE 105 # define CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESSEDDATA_INIT_BIO 106 # define CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT 107 # define CMS_F_CMS_COPY_MESSAGEDIGEST 108 # define CMS_F_CMS_DATA 109 # define CMS_F_CMS_DATAFINAL 110 # define CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT 111 # define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT 112 # define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY 113 # define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD 166 # define CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY 114 # define CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_FIND_CTX 115 # define CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTALGORITHM_INIT_BIO 116 # define CMS_F_CMS_DIGESTEDDATA_DO_FINAL 117 # define CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY 118 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENCODE_RECEIPT 161 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT 119 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO 120 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT 121 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT 122 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY 123 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE 124 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO 125 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT 126 # define CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL 171 # define CMS_F_CMS_FINAL 127 # define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CERTIFICATE_CHOICES 128 # define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_CONTENT 129 # define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ECONTENT_TYPE 130 # define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED 131 # define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_REVOCATION_CHOICES 132 # define CMS_F_CMS_GET0_SIGNED 133 # define CMS_F_CMS_MSGSIGDIGEST_ADD1 162 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPTREQUEST_CREATE0 159 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECEIPT_VERIFY 160 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT 134 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT 169 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT 178 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG 175 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID 173 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS 172 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP 174 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT 135 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT 136 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID 137 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ID_CMP 138 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_CERT_CMP 139 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT 140 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT 141 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_ALGS 142 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID 143 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT 167 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY 144 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD 168 # define CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY 145 # define CMS_F_CMS_SD_ASN1_CTRL 170 # define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_IAS 176 # define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_KEYID 177 # define CMS_F_CMS_SET1_SIGNERIDENTIFIER 146 # define CMS_F_CMS_SET_DETACHED 147 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGN 148 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNED_DATA_INIT 149 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_CONTENT_SIGN 150 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_SIGN 151 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY 152 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT 153 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CONTENT 154 # define CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT 163 # define CMS_F_CMS_STREAM 155 # define CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS 156 # define CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY 157 /* Reason codes. */ # define CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR 99 # define CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_ALREADY_PRESENT 175 # define CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_HAS_NO_KEYID 160 # define CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR 100 # define CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR 101 # define CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR 102 # define CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR 103 # define CMS_R_CMS_LIB 104 # define CMS_R_CONTENTIDENTIFIER_MISMATCH 170 # define CMS_R_CONTENT_NOT_FOUND 105 # define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_MISMATCH 171 # define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA 106 # define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA 107 # define CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_SIGNED_DATA 108 # define CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR 109 # define CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR 110 # define CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE 111 # define CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR 112 # define CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY 113 # define CMS_R_ERROR_READING_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE 114 # define CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY 115 # define CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_RECIPIENTINFO 116 # define CMS_R_INVALID_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH 117 # define CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER 176 # define CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH 118 # define CMS_R_MD_BIO_INIT_ERROR 119 # define CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_ATTRIBUTE_WRONG_LENGTH 120 # define CMS_R_MESSAGEDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH 121 # define CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_ERROR 172 # define CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_VERIFICATION_FAILURE 162 # define CMS_R_MSGSIGDIGEST_WRONG_LENGTH 163 # define CMS_R_NEED_ONE_SIGNER 164 # define CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT 165 # define CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA 122 # define CMS_R_NOT_KEK 123 # define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT 181 # define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT 124 # define CMS_R_NOT_PWRI 177 # define CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE 125 # define CMS_R_NO_CIPHER 126 # define CMS_R_NO_CONTENT 127 # define CMS_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 173 # define CMS_R_NO_DEFAULT_DIGEST 128 # define CMS_R_NO_DIGEST_SET 129 # define CMS_R_NO_KEY 130 # define CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT 174 # define CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_DIGEST 131 # define CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT 132 # define CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_SIGNATURE 166 # define CMS_R_NO_MSGSIGDIGEST 167 # define CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD 178 # define CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY 133 # define CMS_R_NO_PUBLIC_KEY 134 # define CMS_R_NO_RECEIPT_REQUEST 168 # define CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS 135 # define CMS_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE 136 # define CMS_R_RECEIPT_DECODE_ERROR 169 # define CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR 137 # define CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND 138 # define CMS_R_SIGNFINAL_ERROR 139 # define CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR 140 # define CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR 141 # define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA 142 # define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA 143 # define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA 144 # define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA 145 # define CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA 146 # define CMS_R_UNABLE_TO_FINALIZE_CONTEXT 147 # define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER 148 # define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORIHM 149 # define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID 150 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 151 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE 152 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM 153 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM 179 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE 154 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE 155 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE 156 # define CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR 157 # define CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE 180 # define CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE 158 # define CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR 159 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ecdh.h0000644000000000000000000000054613176625661016245 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/md5.h0000644000000000000000000000245013176625661016023 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_MD5_H # define HEADER_MD5_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif /* * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * ! MD5_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide. ! * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! */ # define MD5_LONG unsigned int # define MD5_CBLOCK 64 # define MD5_LBLOCK (MD5_CBLOCK/4) # define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 typedef struct MD5state_st { MD5_LONG A, B, C, D; MD5_LONG Nl, Nh; MD5_LONG data[MD5_LBLOCK]; unsigned int num; } MD5_CTX; int MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *c); int MD5_Update(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int MD5_Final(unsigned char *md, MD5_CTX *c); unsigned char *MD5(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); void MD5_Transform(MD5_CTX *c, const unsigned char *b); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ocsp.h0000644000000000000000000004375313176625661016315 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_OCSP_H # define HEADER_OCSP_H #include /* * These definitions are outside the OPENSSL_NO_OCSP guard because although for * historical reasons they have OCSP_* names, they can actually be used * independently of OCSP. E.g. see RFC5280 */ /*- * CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { * unspecified (0), * keyCompromise (1), * cACompromise (2), * affiliationChanged (3), * superseded (4), * cessationOfOperation (5), * certificateHold (6), * removeFromCRL (8) } */ # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS -1 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED 0 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE 1 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE 2 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED 3 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED 4 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION 5 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD 6 # define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL 8 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Various flags and values */ # define OCSP_DEFAULT_NONCE_LENGTH 16 # define OCSP_NOCERTS 0x1 # define OCSP_NOINTERN 0x2 # define OCSP_NOSIGS 0x4 # define OCSP_NOCHAIN 0x8 # define OCSP_NOVERIFY 0x10 # define OCSP_NOEXPLICIT 0x20 # define OCSP_NOCASIGN 0x40 # define OCSP_NODELEGATED 0x80 # define OCSP_NOCHECKS 0x100 # define OCSP_TRUSTOTHER 0x200 # define OCSP_RESPID_KEY 0x400 # define OCSP_NOTIME 0x800 typedef struct ocsp_cert_id_st OCSP_CERTID; DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) typedef struct ocsp_one_request_st OCSP_ONEREQ; DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ) typedef struct ocsp_req_info_st OCSP_REQINFO; typedef struct ocsp_signature_st OCSP_SIGNATURE; typedef struct ocsp_request_st OCSP_REQUEST; # define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL 0 # define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST 1 # define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR 2 # define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER 3 # define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED 5 # define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED 6 typedef struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st OCSP_RESPBYTES; # define V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME 0 # define V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY 1 DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID) typedef struct ocsp_revoked_info_st OCSP_REVOKEDINFO; # define V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD 0 # define V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED 1 # define V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN 2 typedef struct ocsp_cert_status_st OCSP_CERTSTATUS; typedef struct ocsp_single_response_st OCSP_SINGLERESP; DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) typedef struct ocsp_response_data_st OCSP_RESPDATA; typedef struct ocsp_basic_response_st OCSP_BASICRESP; typedef struct ocsp_crl_id_st OCSP_CRLID; typedef struct ocsp_service_locator_st OCSP_SERVICELOC; # define PEM_STRING_OCSP_REQUEST "OCSP REQUEST" # define PEM_STRING_OCSP_RESPONSE "OCSP RESPONSE" # define d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(bp,p) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(OCSP_REQUEST,OCSP_REQUEST_new,d2i_OCSP_REQUEST,bp,p) # define d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bp,p) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(OCSP_RESPONSE,OCSP_RESPONSE_new,d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE,bp,p) # define PEM_read_bio_OCSP_REQUEST(bp,x,cb) (OCSP_REQUEST *)PEM_ASN1_read_bio( \ (char *(*)())d2i_OCSP_REQUEST,PEM_STRING_OCSP_REQUEST,bp,(char **)x,cb,NULL) # define PEM_read_bio_OCSP_RESPONSE(bp,x,cb)(OCSP_RESPONSE *)PEM_ASN1_read_bio(\ (char *(*)())d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE,PEM_STRING_OCSP_RESPONSE,bp,(char **)x,cb,NULL) # define PEM_write_bio_OCSP_REQUEST(bp,o) \ PEM_ASN1_write_bio((int (*)())i2d_OCSP_REQUEST,PEM_STRING_OCSP_REQUEST,\ bp,(char *)o, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL) # define PEM_write_bio_OCSP_RESPONSE(bp,o) \ PEM_ASN1_write_bio((int (*)())i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE,PEM_STRING_OCSP_RESPONSE,\ bp,(char *)o, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL) # define i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bp,o) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(OCSP_RESPONSE,i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE,bp,o) # define i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(bp,o) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(OCSP_REQUEST,i2d_OCSP_REQUEST,bp,o) # define OCSP_REQUEST_sign(o,pkey,md) \ ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\ &o->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,NULL,\ o->optionalSignature->signature,&o->tbsRequest,pkey,md) # define OCSP_BASICRESP_sign(o,pkey,md,d) \ ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),&o->signatureAlgorithm,NULL,\ o->signature,&o->tbsResponseData,pkey,md) # define OCSP_REQUEST_verify(a,r) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\ &a->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,\ a->optionalSignature->signature,&a->tbsRequest,r) # define OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(a,r,d) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),\ &a->signatureAlgorithm,a->signature,&a->tbsResponseData,r) # define ASN1_BIT_STRING_digest(data,type,md,len) \ ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ASN1_BIT_STRING),type,data,md,len) # define OCSP_CERTSTATUS_dup(cs)\ (OCSP_CERTSTATUS*)ASN1_dup((int(*)())i2d_OCSP_CERTSTATUS,\ (char *(*)())d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS,(char *)(cs)) OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_CERTID_dup(OCSP_CERTID *id); OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req); OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int maxline); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(BIO *io, int maxline); void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); void OCSP_set_max_response_length(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, unsigned long len); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_VALUE *val); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_nbio_d2i(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it); BIO *OCSP_REQ_CTX_get0_mem_bio(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_VALUE *val); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *op, const char *path); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, OCSP_REQUEST *req); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *name, const char *value); OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, const X509 *subject, const X509 *issuer); OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst, const X509_NAME *issuerName, const ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey, const ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber); OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid); int OCSP_request_add1_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, unsigned char *val, int len); int OCSP_basic_add1_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, unsigned char *val, int len); int OCSP_check_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); int OCSP_copy_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req); int OCSP_request_set1_name(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm); int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert); int OCSP_request_sign(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_response_status(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); OCSP_BASICRESP *OCSP_response_get1_basic(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OCSP_resp_get0_signature(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx); const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at(const OCSP_BASICRESP* bs); const STACK_OF(X509) *OCSP_resp_get0_certs(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); int OCSP_resp_get0_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, const X509_NAME **pname); int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last); int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd); int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status, int *reason, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd); int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd, long sec, long maxsec); int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, int *pssl); int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b); int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b); int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req); OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i); OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_onereq_get0_id(OCSP_ONEREQ *one); int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash, ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid); int OCSP_request_is_signed(OCSP_REQUEST *req); OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_basic_add1_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *rsp, OCSP_CERTID *cid, int status, int reason, ASN1_TIME *revtime, ASN1_TIME *thisupd, ASN1_TIME *nextupd); int OCSP_basic_add1_cert(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, X509 *cert); int OCSP_basic_sign(OCSP_BASICRESP *brsp, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert); int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert); int OCSP_RESPID_match(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_crlID_new(const char *url, long *n, char *tim); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_accept_responses_new(char **oids); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_archive_cutoff_new(char *tim); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_url_svcloc_new(X509_NAME *issuer, const char **urls); int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_count(OCSP_REQUEST *x); int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int lastpos); int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_REQUEST *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_REQUEST_delete_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int loc); void *OCSP_REQUEST_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int OCSP_REQUEST_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_REQUEST *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(OCSP_REQUEST *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_count(OCSP_ONEREQ *x); int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int lastpos); int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_ONEREQ_delete_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int loc); void *OCSP_ONEREQ_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int OCSP_ONEREQ_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_ONEREQ_add_ext(OCSP_ONEREQ *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *x); int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int lastpos); int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_BASICRESP_delete_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int loc); void *OCSP_BASICRESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int OCSP_BASICRESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext(OCSP_BASICRESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_count(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x); int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_NID(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int lastpos); int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_OBJ(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_critical(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *OCSP_SINGLERESP_delete_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int loc); void *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_SINGLERESP_add_ext(OCSP_SINGLERESP *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); const OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(const OCSP_SINGLERESP *x); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SINGLERESP) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTSTATUS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_BASICRESP) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPDATA) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPONSE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPBYTES) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_ONEREQ) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CERTID) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQUEST) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SIGNATURE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_REQINFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_CRLID) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_SERVICELOC) const char *OCSP_response_status_str(long s); const char *OCSP_cert_status_str(long s); const char *OCSP_crl_reason_str(long s); int OCSP_REQUEST_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_REQUEST *a, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_OCSP_strings(void); /* Error codes for the OCSP functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define OCSP_F_D2I_OCSP_NONCE 102 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_ADD1_STATUS 103 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_SIGN 104 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY 105 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW 101 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED 106 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS 107 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER 108 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_VALIDITY 115 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID 109 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL 114 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_SIGN 110 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY 116 # define OCSP_F_OCSP_RESPONSE_GET1_BASIC 111 # define OCSP_F_PARSE_HTTP_LINE1 118 /* Reason codes. */ # define OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR 101 # define OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR 102 # define OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_NEXTUPDATE_FIELD 122 # define OCSP_R_ERROR_IN_THISUPDATE_FIELD 123 # define OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL 121 # define OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE 103 # define OCSP_R_NEXTUPDATE_BEFORE_THISUPDATE 124 # define OCSP_R_NOT_BASIC_RESPONSE 104 # define OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN 105 # define OCSP_R_NO_RESPONSE_DATA 108 # define OCSP_R_NO_REVOKED_TIME 109 # define OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY 130 # define OCSP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DOES_NOT_MATCH_CERTIFICATE 110 # define OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED 128 # define OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA 111 # define OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED 112 # define OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_ERROR 114 # define OCSP_R_SERVER_RESPONSE_PARSE_ERROR 115 # define OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE 117 # define OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND 118 # define OCSP_R_STATUS_EXPIRED 125 # define OCSP_R_STATUS_NOT_YET_VALID 126 # define OCSP_R_STATUS_TOO_OLD 127 # define OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST 119 # define OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID 120 # define OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE 129 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/modes.h0000644000000000000000000002425713176625661016456 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif typedef void (*block128_f) (const unsigned char in[16], unsigned char out[16], const void *key); typedef void (*cbc128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int enc); typedef void (*ctr128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, const unsigned char ivec[16]); typedef void (*ccm128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, const unsigned char ivec[16], unsigned char cmac[16]); void CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block); void CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block); void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], unsigned char ecount_buf[16], unsigned int *num, block128_f block); void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], unsigned char ecount_buf[16], unsigned int *num, ctr128_f ctr); void CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, block128_f block); void CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, int enc, block128_f block); void CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, int enc, block128_f block); void CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t bits, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], int *num, int enc, block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_cts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc); size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_cts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc); size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc); size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt_block(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_nistcts128_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], cbc128_f cbc); typedef struct gcm128_context GCM128_CONTEXT; GCM128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_gcm128_new(void *key, block128_f block); void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block); void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len); int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t len); int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len); int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len); int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ctr128_f stream); int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ctr128_f stream); int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, size_t len); void CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len); void CRYPTO_gcm128_release(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx); typedef struct ccm128_context CCM128_CONTEXT; void CRYPTO_ccm128_init(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned int M, unsigned int L, void *key, block128_f block); int CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nlen, size_t mlen); void CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t alen); int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len); int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len); int CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ccm128_f stream); int CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, ccm128_f stream); size_t CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(CCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len); typedef struct xts128_context XTS128_CONTEXT; int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc); size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block); size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(void *key, const unsigned char *icv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, block128_f block); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB typedef struct ocb128_context OCB128_CONTEXT; typedef void (*ocb128_f) (const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t blocks, const void *key, size_t start_block_num, unsigned char offset_i[16], const unsigned char L_[][16], unsigned char checksum[16]); OCB128_CONTEXT *CRYPTO_ocb128_new(void *keyenc, void *keydec, block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt, ocb128_f stream); int CRYPTO_ocb128_init(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *keyenc, void *keydec, block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt, ocb128_f stream); int CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(OCB128_CONTEXT *dest, OCB128_CONTEXT *src, void *keyenc, void *keydec); int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len, size_t taglen); int CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t len); int CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len); int CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len); int CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag, size_t len); int CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len); void CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/seed.h0000644000000000000000000000662713176625661016270 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Copyright (c) 2007 KISA(Korea Information Security Agency). All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Neither the name of author nor the names of its contributors may * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef HEADER_SEED_H # define HEADER_SEED_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* look whether we need 'long' to get 32 bits */ # ifdef AES_LONG # ifndef SEED_LONG # define SEED_LONG 1 # endif # endif # include # define SEED_BLOCK_SIZE 16 # define SEED_KEY_LENGTH 16 typedef struct seed_key_st { # ifdef SEED_LONG unsigned long data[32]; # else unsigned int data[32]; # endif } SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE; void SEED_set_key(const unsigned char rawkey[SEED_KEY_LENGTH], SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); void SEED_encrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); void SEED_decrypt(const unsigned char s[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned char d[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); void SEED_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, int enc); void SEED_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int enc); void SEED_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num, int enc); void SEED_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char ivec[SEED_BLOCK_SIZE], int *num); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/rc5.h0000644000000000000000000000370413176625661016032 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RC5_H # define HEADER_RC5_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # define RC5_ENCRYPT 1 # define RC5_DECRYPT 0 # define RC5_32_INT unsigned int # define RC5_32_BLOCK 8 # define RC5_32_KEY_LENGTH 16/* This is a default, max is 255 */ /* * This are the only values supported. Tweak the code if you want more The * most supported modes will be RC5-32/12/16 RC5-32/16/8 */ # define RC5_8_ROUNDS 8 # define RC5_12_ROUNDS 12 # define RC5_16_ROUNDS 16 typedef struct rc5_key_st { /* Number of rounds */ int rounds; RC5_32_INT data[2 * (RC5_16_ROUNDS + 1)]; } RC5_32_KEY; void RC5_32_set_key(RC5_32_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data, int rounds); void RC5_32_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, RC5_32_KEY *key, int enc); void RC5_32_encrypt(unsigned long *data, RC5_32_KEY *key); void RC5_32_decrypt(unsigned long *data, RC5_32_KEY *key); void RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC5_32_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int enc); void RC5_32_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc); void RC5_32_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC5_32_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/__DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H0000644000000000000000000000105413176625661020725 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This file is only used by HP C on VMS, and is included automatically * after each header file from this directory */ /* restore state. Must correspond to the save in __decc_include_prologue.h */ #pragma names restore openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/aes.h0000644000000000000000000000642513176625661016114 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_AES_H # define HEADER_AES_H # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # define AES_ENCRYPT 1 # define AES_DECRYPT 0 /* * Because array size can't be a const in C, the following two are macros. * Both sizes are in bytes. */ # define AES_MAXNR 14 # define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /* This should be a hidden type, but EVP requires that the size be known */ struct aes_key_st { # ifdef AES_LONG unsigned long rd_key[4 * (AES_MAXNR + 1)]; # else unsigned int rd_key[4 * (AES_MAXNR + 1)]; # endif int rounds; }; typedef struct aes_key_st AES_KEY; const char *AES_options(void); int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key); int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, AES_KEY *key); void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key); void AES_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, const AES_KEY *key, const int enc); void AES_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, const int enc); void AES_cfb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc); void AES_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc); void AES_cfb8_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, const int enc); void AES_ofb128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); /* NB: the IV is _two_ blocks long */ void AES_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, const int enc); /* NB: the IV is _four_ blocks long */ void AES_bi_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char *ivec, const int enc); int AES_wrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen); int AES_unwrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ssl.h0000644000000000000000000036424113176625661016150 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_H # define HEADER_SSL_H # include # include # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # include # include # include # endif # include # include # include # include # include # include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* OpenSSL version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */ /*- * Version 0 - initial version * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate */ # define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001 # define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32 # define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8) # define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8 # define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48 /* The maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines we can support */ # define SSL_MAX_PIPELINES 32 /* text strings for the ciphers */ /* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */ # define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW" # define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM" # define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH" # define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS" # define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL" # define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL" # define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL" # define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA" # define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr" # define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd" # define SSL_TXT_kDH "kDH" # define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH"/* alias for kDHE */ # define SSL_TXT_kDHE "kDHE" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHr "kECDHr" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHe "kECDHe" # define SSL_TXT_kECDH "kECDH" # define SSL_TXT_kEECDH "kEECDH"/* alias for kECDHE */ # define SSL_TXT_kECDHE "kECDHE" # define SSL_TXT_kPSK "kPSK" # define SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK "kRSAPSK" # define SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK "kECDHEPSK" # define SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK "kDHEPSK" # define SSL_TXT_kGOST "kGOST" # define SSL_TXT_kSRP "kSRP" # define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA" # define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS" # define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH" # define SSL_TXT_aECDH "aECDH" # define SSL_TXT_aECDSA "aECDSA" # define SSL_TXT_aPSK "aPSK" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST12 "aGOST12" # define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST" # define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP" # define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS" # define SSL_TXT_DH "DH" # define SSL_TXT_DHE "DHE"/* same as "kDHE:-ADH" */ # define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH"/* alias for DHE */ # define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH" # define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA" # define SSL_TXT_ECDH "ECDH" # define SSL_TXT_EECDH "EECDH"/* alias for ECDHE" */ # define SSL_TXT_ECDHE "ECDHE"/* same as "kECDHE:-AECDH" */ # define SSL_TXT_AECDH "AECDH" # define SSL_TXT_ECDSA "ECDSA" # define SSL_TXT_PSK "PSK" # define SSL_TXT_SRP "SRP" # define SSL_TXT_DES "DES" # define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES" # define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4" # define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2" # define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA" # define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED" # define SSL_TXT_AES128 "AES128" # define SSL_TXT_AES256 "AES256" # define SSL_TXT_AES "AES" # define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM "AESGCM" # define SSL_TXT_AES_CCM "AESCCM" # define SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8 "AESCCM8" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128 "CAMELLIA128" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256 "CAMELLIA256" # define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA" # define SSL_TXT_CHACHA20 "CHACHA20" # define SSL_TXT_GOST "GOST89" # define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5" # define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1" # define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA"/* same as "SHA1" */ # define SSL_TXT_GOST94 "GOST94" # define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC "GOST89MAC" # define SSL_TXT_GOST12 "GOST12" # define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC12 "GOST89MAC12" # define SSL_TXT_SHA256 "SHA256" # define SSL_TXT_SHA384 "SHA384" # define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1 "TLSv1.1" # define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2 "TLSv1.2" # define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL" /*- * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select) * ciphers normally not being used. * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection. * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments * to the default cipher setup will also be included here. * * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed * for DEFAULT. */ # define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL" # define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" /* * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'. */ # define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL" /* * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.) */ /* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */ # define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1 # define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1 # define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM /* * This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the 'struct ssl_st *' * function parameters used to prototype callbacks in SSL_CTX. */ typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st; typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT; typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD; typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER; typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION; typedef struct tls_sigalgs_st TLS_SIGALGS; typedef struct ssl_conf_ctx_st SSL_CONF_CTX; typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP); /* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/ typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st { const char *name; unsigned long id; } SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE; DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn) (SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn) (SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, const SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg); /* Typedefs for handling custom extensions */ typedef int (*custom_ext_add_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, int *al, void *add_arg); typedef void (*custom_ext_free_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *out, void *add_arg); typedef int (*custom_ext_parse_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *parse_arg); /* Typedef for verification callback */ typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx); /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */ # define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004U # define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING 0x00000010U # define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040U /* * Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added in * OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) the * workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include it in * SSL_OP_ALL. Added in 0.9.6e */ # define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800U /* DTLS options */ # define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000U /* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */ # define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000U /* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */ # define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000U # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD /* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER * (only with deprecated DTLSv1_client_method()) */ # define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000U # endif /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000U /* Don't use compression even if supported */ # define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0x00020000U /* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */ # define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000U /* Disable encrypt-then-mac */ # define SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 0x00080000U /* * Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's preferences */ # define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000U /* * If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number as * latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0 * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks. */ # define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000U # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000U # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000U # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0x08000000U # define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0x10000000U # define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 0x04000000U # define SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2 0x08000000U # define SSL_OP_NO_SSL_MASK (SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|\ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) # define SSL_OP_NO_DTLS_MASK (SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) /* * Make server add server-hello extension from early version of cryptopro * draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. Required for interoperability * with CryptoPro CSP 3.x */ # define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG 0x80000000U /* * SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless. * This used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. * This used to be 0x80000BFFU before 1.1.1. */ # define SSL_OP_ALL (SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG|\ SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS|\ SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT|\ SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING|\ SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) /* OBSOLETE OPTIONS: retained for compatibility */ /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000001L */ /* Related to removed SSLv2. */ # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000002L */ /* Related to removed SSLv2. */ # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. Was 0x00000008L */ /* Dead forever, see CVE-2010-4180 */ # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1h and 1.0.2. Was 0x00000010L */ /* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2. */ # define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000020 */ # define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b. Was 0x00000040L */ # define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000080 */ /* Ancient SSLeay version. */ # define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000100L */ # define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00000200L */ # define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00080000L */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x00100000L */ # define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1k and 1.0.2. Was 0x00200000L */ # define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x01000000L */ # define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1. Was 0x08000000L */ # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.0.1. Was 0x10000000L */ # define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x20000000L */ # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x0 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0. Was 0x40000000L */ # define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x0 /* * Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success * when just a single record has been written): */ # define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001U /* * Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (buffer * contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid the * misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking * write(): */ # define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002U /* * Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking: */ # define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004U /* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */ # define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008U /* * Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context or * just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */ # define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010U /* * Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations * that require it. */ # define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020U # define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040U /* * Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. To be set only by applications * that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your * application attempts a normal handshake. Only use this in explicit * fallback retries, following the guidance in * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00. */ # define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080U /* * Support Asynchronous operation */ # define SSL_MODE_ASYNC 0x00000100U /* Cert related flags */ /* * Many implementations ignore some aspects of the TLS standards such as * enforcing certificate chain algorithms. When this is set we enforce them. */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT 0x00000001U /* Suite B modes, takes same values as certificate verify flags */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY 0x10000 /* Suite B 192 bit only mode */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS 0x20000 /* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS 0x30000 /* Perform all sorts of protocol violations for testing purposes */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 0x10000000 /* Flags for building certificate chains */ /* Treat any existing certificates as untrusted CAs */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED 0x1 /* Don't include root CA in chain */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT 0x2 /* Just check certificates already there */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK 0x4 /* Ignore verification errors */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR 0x8 /* Clear verification errors from queue */ # define SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR 0x10 /* Flags returned by SSL_check_chain */ /* Certificate can be used with this session */ # define CERT_PKEY_VALID 0x1 /* Certificate can also be used for signing */ # define CERT_PKEY_SIGN 0x2 /* EE certificate signing algorithm OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE 0x10 /* CA signature algorithms OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE 0x20 /* EE certificate parameters OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM 0x40 /* CA certificate parameters OK */ # define CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM 0x80 /* Signing explicitly allowed as opposed to SHA1 fallback */ # define CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN 0x100 /* Client CA issuer names match (always set for server cert) */ # define CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME 0x200 /* Cert type matches client types (always set for server cert) */ # define CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE 0x400 /* Cert chain suitable to Suite B */ # define CERT_PKEY_SUITEB 0x800 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE 0x1 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE 0x2 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT 0x4 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER 0x8 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS 0x10 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE 0x20 # define SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE 0x40 /* Configuration value types */ # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_UNKNOWN 0x0 # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_STRING 0x1 # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE 0x2 # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR 0x3 # define SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE 0x4 /* * Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, they * cannot be used to clear bits. */ unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx); unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL* s); unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op); unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op); unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op); unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op); # define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) # define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL) # define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL) # define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL) # define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL) # endif # define SSL_CTX_set_cert_flags(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_set_cert_flags(s,op) \ SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_CTX_clear_cert_flags(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) # define SSL_clear_cert_flags(s,op) \ SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS,(op),NULL) void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); # define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) # define SSL_get_extms_support(s) \ SSL_ctrl((s),SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT,0,NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* see tls_srp.c */ __owur int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx); int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad); __owur int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s); # endif /* 100k max cert list */ # define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 # define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20) /* * This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that * set them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in * a server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed. * Also, callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique * otherwise the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do * this using the 'ssl' value they're passed by; * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) The length value passed in * is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. In SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 * bytes. The callback can alter this length to be less if desired. It is * also an error for the callback to set the size to zero. */ typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB) (const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080 /* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */ # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200 # define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \ (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx); # define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL) void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)); int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)); void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)); SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE __owur int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e); # endif void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len); # endif __owur int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); # define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 # define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 # define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 __owur int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len); __owur int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len); void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* * the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the * resulting identity/psk */ # define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128 # define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256 void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); __owur int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint); __owur int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint); const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s); # endif /* Register callbacks to handle custom TLS Extensions for client or server. */ __owur int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type); __owur int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg); __owur int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg); __owur int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type); # define SSL_NOTHING 1 # define SSL_WRITING 2 # define SSL_READING 3 # define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4 # define SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED 5 # define SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS 6 /* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */ # define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING) # define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING) # define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING) # define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP) # define SSL_want_async(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED) # define SSL_want_async_job(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS) # define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1 # define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif # include # include # include /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */ # include /* Datagram TLS */ # include /* Support for the use_srtp extension */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * These need to be after the above set of includes due to a compiler bug * in VisualStudio 2015 */ DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER) DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) /* compatibility */ # define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg)) # define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a)) # define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0)) # define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0)) # define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg)) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)) /* * The valid handshake states (one for each type message sent and one for each * type of message received). There are also two "special" states: * TLS = TLS or DTLS state * DTLS = DTLS specific state * CR/SR = Client Read/Server Read * CW/SW = Client Write/Server Write * * The "special" states are: * TLS_ST_BEFORE = No handshake has been initiated yet * TLS_ST_OK = A handshake has been successfully completed */ typedef enum { TLS_ST_BEFORE, TLS_ST_OK, DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO, TLS_ST_CR_CERT, TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS, TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH, TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ, TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE, TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET, TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE, TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED, TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, TLS_ST_CW_CERT, TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH, TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY, TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE, TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO, TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED, TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ, TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO, DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO, TLS_ST_SW_CERT, TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH, TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ, TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE, TLS_ST_SR_CERT, TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH, TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY, TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO, TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE, TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED, TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET, TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS, TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE, TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED } OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE; /* * Most of the following state values are no longer used and are defined to be * the closest equivalent value in the current state machine code. Not all * defines have an equivalent and are set to a dummy value (-1). SSL_ST_CONNECT * and SSL_ST_ACCEPT are still in use in the definition of SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, * SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP and SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT. */ # define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000 # define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000 # define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF # define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01 # define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02 # define SSL_CB_READ 0x04 # define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08 # define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000/* used in callback */ # define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ) # define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP) # define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT) # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10 # define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 /* Is the SSL_connection established? */ # define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_in_init(a) && !SSL_is_server(a)) # define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_in_init(a) && SSL_is_server(a)) int SSL_in_init(SSL *s); int SSL_in_before(SSL *s); int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s); /* * The following 3 states are kept in ssl->rlayer.rstate when reads fail, you * should not need these */ # define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0 # define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1 # define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2 /*- * Obtain latest Finished message * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished) * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished). * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); /* * use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options are * 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired */ # define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00 # define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01 # define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02 # define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04 # define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() # endif /* More backward compatibility */ # define SSL_get_cipher(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np) # define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) # define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a) # define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b)) # define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a) # define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b)) # define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) # define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) # define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000/* offset to get SSL_R_... value * from SSL_AD_... */ /* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */ # define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC # define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED # define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE /* Not for TLS */ # define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR # define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR # define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED # define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION # define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION # define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE # define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE # define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ # define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK # define SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL # define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 # define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4 # define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5/* look at error stack/return * value/errno */ # define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC 9 # define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB 10 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13 # define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16 /* only applies to datagram connections */ # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17 /* Stats */ # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30 # define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31 # define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT 52 /* see tls1.h for macros based on these */ # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59 /*# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT 60 */ /*# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB 61 */ /*# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62 */ # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB 75 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB 76 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB 77 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG 78 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME 79 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH 80 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD 81 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS # define SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT 85 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 86 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS 87 # endif # define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73 # define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB 79 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83 # define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN 88 # define SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT 89 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES 90 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES 91 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST 92 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE 93 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS 97 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST 98 # define SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS 99 # define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS 100 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS 101 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST 102 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES 103 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES 104 # define SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN 105 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE 106 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE 107 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID 108 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY 109 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST 110 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS 111 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS 115 # define SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT 116 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT 117 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO 118 # define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU 120 # define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU 121 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT 122 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION 123 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION 124 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT 125 # define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES 126 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 127 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 128 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 129 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION 130 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION 131 # define SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST 1 # define SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT 2 # define SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER 3 # define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg) # define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL) # define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, onoff) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO,onoff,NULL) # define SSL_set_dh_auto(s, onoff) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO,onoff,NULL) # define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) # define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) # define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509) # define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only(ctx,px509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,1,px509) # define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,0,(char *)sk) # define SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,1,(char *)sk) # define SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,1,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509) # define SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, flags) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, flags, NULL) # define SSL_CTX_select_current_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT, op, NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx,st) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_set0_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,0,(char *)sk) # define SSL_set1_chain(ctx,sk) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN,1,(char *)sk) # define SSL_add0_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_add1_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT,1,(char *)x509) # define SSL_get0_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509) # define SSL_clear_chain_certs(ctx) \ SSL_set0_chain(ctx,NULL) # define SSL_build_cert_chain(s, flags) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, flags, NULL) # define SSL_select_current_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT,0,(char *)x509) # define SSL_set_current_cert(ctx,op) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT, op, NULL) # define SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,0,(char *)st) # define SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(s,st) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE,1,(char *)st) # define SSL_get1_curves(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CURVES,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_CTX_set1_curves(ctx, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_set1_curves(ctx, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_set1_curves_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_get_shared_curve(s, n) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE,n,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS,clistlen,(int *)slist) # define SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s) # define SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, clist) \ SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES, 0, (char *)clist) # define SSL_CTX_set1_client_certificate_types(ctx, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_set1_client_certificate_types(s, clist, clistlen) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES,clistlen,(char *)clist) # define SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, pn) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID,0,pn) # define SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, pk) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY,0,pk) # define SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, plst) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST,0,plst) # define SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, plst) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS,0,plst) #define SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, version) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL) #define SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, version) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, NULL, NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, NULL, NULL) #define SSL_set_min_proto_version(s, version) \ SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL) #define SSL_set_max_proto_version(s, version) \ SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, version, NULL) #define SSL_get_min_proto_version(s) \ SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION, NULL, NULL) #define SSL_get_max_proto_version(s) \ SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION, NULL, NULL) #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* Provide some compatibility macros for removed functionality. */ # define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) 0 # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) 1 # define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) 0 # define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) 1 # define SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(dummy, onoff) ((onoff) != 0) # define SSL_set_ecdh_auto(dummy, onoff) ((onoff) != 0) /* * We "pretend" to call the callback to avoid warnings about unused static * functions. */ # define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cb) while(0) (cb)(NULL, 0, 0) # define SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ssl, cb) while(0) (cb)(NULL, 0, 0) #endif __owur const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); __owur BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client); __owur BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from); void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *, const char *str); __owur SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth); int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *); __owur long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); __owur long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *, X509_STORE *); __owur int SSL_want(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_clear(SSL *s); void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits); __owur const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c); __owur const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); __owur uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c); __owur int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c); __owur int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c); __owur int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c); __owur int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s); __owur const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n); __owur char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len); __owur int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_pending(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK __owur int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd); __owur int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd); __owur int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd); # endif void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio); void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio); void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); __owur BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s); __owur BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str); void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); __owur int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s); __owur SSL_verify_cb SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s); void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, SSL_verify_cb callback); void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth); void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA __owur int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); __owur int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len); # endif __owur int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len); __owur int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); __owur int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len); /* Set serverinfo data for the current active cert. */ __owur int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo, size_t serverinfo_length); __owur int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA __owur int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); #endif __owur int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); __owur int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA __owur int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); #endif __owur int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); __owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); /* PEM type */ __owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); __owur int SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file); __owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); __owur int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *file); int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *dir); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define SSL_load_error_strings() \ OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS \ | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL) #endif __owur const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s); __owur const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s); __owur const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s); __owur const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s); __owur long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); __owur long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); __owur long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); __owur long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); __owur int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s); __owur const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s); __owur int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s); __owur unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s); void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick, size_t *len); __owur int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to, const SSL *from); __owur X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s); __owur int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); __owur int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid, unsigned int sid_len); __owur SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void); const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len); const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len); __owur unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); # endif int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); int SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x); int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ses); void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses); __owur int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp); __owur int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session); int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *, SSL_SESSION *c); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB); __owur int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB); __owur int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len); SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); # ifdef HEADER_X509_H __owur X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s); # endif __owur STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur SSL_verify_cb SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb callback); void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA __owur int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); __owur int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); # endif __owur int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); __owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); __owur int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u); pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx); void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u); pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s); void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s); int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose); __owur int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust); __owur int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust); __owur int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname); __owur int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname); __owur const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s); void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags); __owur int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord); __owur int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain); __owur int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen); __owur int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki); __owur int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector, uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen); /* * Bridge opacity barrier between libcrypt and libssl, also needed to support * offline testing in test/danetest.c */ SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *ssl); /* * DANE flags */ unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags); unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags); __owur int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); __owur int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm); __owur X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *)); int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g, BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info); int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp); __owur BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s); __owur BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s); __owur char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s); __owur char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s); # endif void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s); void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); # ifdef OSSL_ASYNC_FD /* * Windows application developer has to include windows.h to use these. */ __owur int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds); __owur int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds); # endif __owur int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); __owur int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); __owur int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); __owur int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); __owur int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void)); long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void)); __owur int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code); __owur const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s); /* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */ __owur int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void)) /* SSLv3 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)) /* SSLv3 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void)) /* SSLv3 */ # endif #define SSLv23_method TLS_method #define SSLv23_server_method TLS_server_method #define SSLv23_client_method TLS_client_method /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */ __owur const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void)) /* TLSv1.0 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void)) /* TLSv1.0 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void)) /* TLSv1.0 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void)) /* TLSv1.1 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void)) /* TLSv1.1 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void)) /* TLSv1.1 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void)) /* TLSv1.2 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void)) /* TLSv1.2 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void)) /* TLSv1.2 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.0 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.0 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.0 */ # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.2 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.2 */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(__owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void)) /* DTLSv1.2 */ #endif __owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */ __owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_server_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */ __owur const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_client_method(void); /* DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 */ __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *s); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s); int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s); __owur const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method); __owur const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); __owur const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); __owur const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); __owur const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); __owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s); __owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s); __owur int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); __owur int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s); void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s); __owur long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define SSL_library_init() OPENSSL_init_ssl(0, NULL) #endif __owur char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *, char *buf, int size); __owur STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk); __owur SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl); __owur X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl); /* * EVP_PKEY */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *ssl); __owur X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); __owur int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); __owur int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); __owur int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); __owur int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl); __owur int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath); # define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session/* just peek at pointer */ __owur SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); __owur SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */ __owur SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)); void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); __owur OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long v); __owur long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); __owur STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s); __owur size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); __owur size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); __owur size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); #define SSL_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) __owur int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx); #define SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) __owur int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx); #define SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) __owur int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx); __owur int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); # define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) # define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) # define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) # define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) # define SSL_set_split_send_fragment(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL) # define SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES,m,NULL) # define SSL_set_max_pipelines(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES,m,NULL) void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len); void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* NB: the |keylength| is only applicable when is_export is true */ void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); # endif __owur const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); __owur const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); __owur const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp); __owur const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp); __owur int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *meths); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() while(0) continue #endif __owur int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm); const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr); int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c); int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c); /* TLS extensions functions */ __owur int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len); __owur int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, void *arg); /* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */ __owur int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, void *arg); void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)); void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define SSL_cache_hit(s) SSL_session_reused(s) # endif __owur int SSL_session_reused(SSL *s); __owur int SSL_is_server(const SSL *s); __owur __owur SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void); int SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx); void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx); unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags); __owur unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags); __owur int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *pre); void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl); void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx); __owur int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value); __owur int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv); __owur int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd); void SSL_add_ssl_module(void); int SSL_config(SSL *s, const char *name); int SSL_CTX_config(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); __owur const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * A callback for verifying that the received SCTs are sufficient. * Expected to return 1 if they are sufficient, otherwise 0. * May return a negative integer if an error occurs. * A connection should be aborted if the SCTs are deemed insufficient. */ typedef int(*ssl_ct_validation_cb)(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *arg); /* * Sets a |callback| that is invoked upon receipt of ServerHelloDone to validate * the received SCTs. * If the callback returns a non-positive result, the connection is terminated. * Call this function before beginning a handshake. * If a NULL |callback| is provided, SCT validation is disabled. * |arg| is arbitrary userdata that will be passed to the callback whenever it * is invoked. Ownership of |arg| remains with the caller. * * NOTE: A side-effect of setting a CT callback is that an OCSP stapled response * will be requested. */ int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg); int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg); #define SSL_disable_ct(s) \ ((void) SSL_set_validation_callback((s), NULL, NULL)) #define SSL_CTX_disable_ct(ctx) \ ((void) SSL_CTX_set_validation_callback((ctx), NULL, NULL)) /* * The validation type enumerates the available behaviours of the built-in SSL * CT validation callback selected via SSL_enable_ct() and SSL_CTX_enable_ct(). * The underlying callback is a static function in libssl. */ enum { SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE = 0, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT }; /* * Enable CT by setting up a callback that implements one of the built-in * validation variants. The SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE variant always * continues the handshake, the application can make appropriate decisions at * handshake completion. The SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT variant requires at * least one valid SCT, or else handshake termination will be requested. The * handshake may continue anyway if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is in effect. */ int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode); int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode); /* * Report whether a non-NULL callback is enabled. */ int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx); /* Gets the SCTs received from a connection */ const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s); /* * Loads the CT log list from the default location. * If a CTLOG_STORE has previously been set using SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_store, * the log information loaded from this file will be appended to the * CTLOG_STORE. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx); /* * Loads the CT log list from the specified file path. * If a CTLOG_STORE has previously been set using SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_store, * the log information loaded from this file will be appended to the * CTLOG_STORE. * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path); /* * Sets the CT log list used by all SSL connections created from this SSL_CTX. * Ownership of the CTLOG_STORE is transferred to the SSL_CTX. */ void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *logs); /* * Gets the CT log list used by all SSL connections created from this SSL_CTX. * This will be NULL unless one of the following functions has been called: * - SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file * - SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file * - SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_store */ const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */ /* What the "other" parameter contains in security callback */ /* Mask for type */ # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_TYPE 0xffff0000 # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE 0 # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER (1 << 16) # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE (2 << 16) # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_DH (3 << 16) # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_PKEY (4 << 16) # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG (5 << 16) # define SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT (6 << 16) /* Indicated operation refers to peer key or certificate */ # define SSL_SECOP_PEER 0x1000 /* Values for "op" parameter in security callback */ /* Called to filter ciphers */ /* Ciphers client supports */ # define SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED (1 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER) /* Cipher shared by client/server */ # define SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED (2 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER) /* Sanity check of cipher server selects */ # define SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK (3 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER) /* Curves supported by client */ # define SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED (4 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE) /* Curves shared by client/server */ # define SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED (5 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE) /* Sanity check of curve server selects */ # define SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK (6 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE) /* Temporary DH key */ # define SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH (7 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_PKEY) /* SSL/TLS version */ # define SSL_SECOP_VERSION (9 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE) /* Session tickets */ # define SSL_SECOP_TICKET (10 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE) /* Supported signature algorithms sent to peer */ # define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED (11 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG) /* Shared signature algorithm */ # define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED (12 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG) /* Sanity check signature algorithm allowed */ # define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK (13 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG) /* Used to get mask of supported public key signature algorithms */ # define SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK (14 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG) /* Use to see if compression is allowed */ # define SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION (15 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_NONE) /* EE key in certificate */ # define SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY (16 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT) /* CA key in certificate */ # define SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY (17 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT) /* CA digest algorithm in certificate */ # define SSL_SECOP_CA_MD (18 | SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT) /* Peer EE key in certificate */ # define SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY (SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | SSL_SECOP_PEER) /* Peer CA key in certificate */ # define SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY (SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | SSL_SECOP_PEER) /* Peer CA digest algorithm in certificate */ # define SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD (SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | SSL_SECOP_PEER) void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level); __owur int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s); void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s, int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)); int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex); __owur void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s); void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level); __owur int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)); int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex); __owur void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx); /* OPENSSL_INIT flag 0x010000 reserved for internal use */ #define OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS 0x00100000L #define OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS 0x00200000L #define OPENSSL_INIT_SSL_DEFAULT \ (OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS) int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST __owur const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void); # endif extern const char SSL_version_str[]; /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); /* Error codes for the SSL functions. */ /* Function codes. */ # define SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST 331 # define SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS 345 # define SSL_F_CT_STRICT 349 # define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103 # define SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE 347 # define SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET 393 # define SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD 394 # define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245 # define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 318 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS 424 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 339 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE 390 # define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268 # define SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN 350 # define SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 371 # define SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 385 # define SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE 370 # define SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY 386 # define SSL_F_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL 342 # define SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION 417 # define SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION 418 # define SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE 352 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 # define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS 293 # define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292 # define SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC 285 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388 # define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 # define SSL_F_SSL3_INIT_FINISHED_MAC 397 # define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148 # define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN 316 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 319 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 298 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 277 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 307 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 299 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 278 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 308 # define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160 # define SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN 332 # define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT 346 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162 # define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN 340 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 280 # define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG 279 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230 # define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231 # define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164 # define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165 # define SSL_F_SSL_CONF_CMD 334 # define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT 398 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES 309 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS 343 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 290 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK 396 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 272 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO 336 # define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE 337 # define SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP 403 # define SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE 395 # define SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG 391 # define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180 # define SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST 408 # define SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT 402 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX 322 # define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183 # define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 # define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 # define SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT 392 # define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 300 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 302 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 310 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303 # define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 311 # define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 # define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 # define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 320 # define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 321 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID 423 # define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS 344 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK 399 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT 294 # define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196 # define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224 # define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT 313 # define SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB 389 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197 # define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 273 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205 # define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206 # define SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT 400 # define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207 # define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208 # define SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE 353 # define SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG 333 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209 # define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS 341 # define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 401 # define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 314 # define SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST 338 # define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF 284 # define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211 # define SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS 335 # define SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK 354 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 372 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE 404 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE 405 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST 406 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE 407 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA 409 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP 410 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 355 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO 356 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 357 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY 358 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED 359 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST 373 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 428 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 374 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE 375 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO 376 # define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 377 # define SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY 351 # define SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER 387 # define SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO 378 # define SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 384 # define SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 360 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 361 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS 362 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY 379 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 363 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE 411 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE 412 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST 413 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE 414 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA 415 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP 416 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 380 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO 381 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 382 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED 364 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE 365 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 366 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO 383 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 367 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE 368 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO 369 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE 419 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE 420 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE 421 # define SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP 422 # define SSL_F_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220 /* Reason codes. */ # define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100 # define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272 # define SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE 143 # define SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE 158 # define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103 # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA 390 # define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 # define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 # define SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE 102 # define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 # define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306 # define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH 332 # define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105 # define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271 # define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115 # define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116 # define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119 # define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH 347 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352 # define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353 # define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124 # define SSL_R_BAD_VALUE 384 # define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127 # define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128 # define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129 # define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130 # define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131 # define SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL 397 # define SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK 398 # define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133 # define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134 # define SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR 377 # define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137 # define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138 # define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 226 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED 343 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307 # define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142 # define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144 # define SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED 167 # define SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE 400 # define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308 # define SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED 206 # define SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED 172 # define SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL 173 # define SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED 175 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE 180 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE 184 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH 189 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 192 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE 200 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY 201 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR 202 # define SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA 203 # define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145 # define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147 # define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281 # define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 394 # define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148 # define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149 # define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334 # define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309 # define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING 318 # define SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE 374 # define SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL 399 # define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 354 # define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150 # define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151 # define SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN 204 # define SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE 194 # define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 # define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 # define SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC 405 # define SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO 401 # define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 # define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 # define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 # define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST 380 # define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373 # define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340 # define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS 104 # define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 # define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 341 # define SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIGURATION_NAME 113 # define SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE 212 # define SSL_R_INVALID_NULL_CMD_NAME 385 # define SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER 402 # define SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA 388 # define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME 357 # define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 328 # define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 325 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 404 # define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274 # define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161 # define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165 # define SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT 381 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169 # define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170 # define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM 358 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171 # define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177 # define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183 # define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185 # define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 331 # define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187 # define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER 330 # define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188 # define SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS 389 # define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190 # define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191 # define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 339 # define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 324 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS 376 # define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES 359 # define SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS 216 # define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK 403 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196 # define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197 # define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344 # define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198 # define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 227 # define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270 # define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199 # define SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX 391 # define SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT 392 # define SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE 406 # define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207 # define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 223 # define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB 224 # define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB 225 # define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211 # define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312 # define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213 # define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 335 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 336 # define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 337 # define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215 # define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING 342 # define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345 # define SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED 208 # define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275 # define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 # define SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT 407 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360 # define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 # define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361 # define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 362 # define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG 363 # define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 364 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 319 # define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 320 # define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010 # define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043 # define SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY 117 # define SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND 125 # define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228 # define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229 # define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230 # define SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH 372 # define SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_EMPTY 126 # define SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND 136 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 408 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303 # define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH 210 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 # define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 # define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT 365 # define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 366 # define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367 # define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157 # define SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS 409 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242 # define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244 # define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245 # define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CMD_NAME 386 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND 139 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 368 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254 # define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255 # define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 338 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259 # define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329 # define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 369 # define SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH 166 # define SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW 396 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 383 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261 # define SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE 378 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 370 # define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266 # define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267 # define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268 # define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/ssl2.h0000644000000000000000000000103613176625661016220 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL2_H # define HEADER_SSL2_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif # define SSL2_VERSION 0x0002 # define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/rc2.h0000644000000000000000000000277613176625661016037 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_RC2_H # define HEADER_RC2_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif typedef unsigned int RC2_INT; # define RC2_ENCRYPT 1 # define RC2_DECRYPT 0 # define RC2_BLOCK 8 # define RC2_KEY_LENGTH 16 typedef struct rc2_key_st { RC2_INT data[64]; } RC2_KEY; void RC2_set_key(RC2_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data, int bits); void RC2_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, RC2_KEY *key, int enc); void RC2_encrypt(unsigned long *data, RC2_KEY *key); void RC2_decrypt(unsigned long *data, RC2_KEY *key); void RC2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC2_KEY *ks, unsigned char *iv, int enc); void RC2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc); void RC2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, RC2_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/include/openssl/idea.h0000644000000000000000000000406313176625661016242 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_IDEA_H # define HEADER_IDEA_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif typedef unsigned int IDEA_INT; # define IDEA_ENCRYPT 1 # define IDEA_DECRYPT 0 # define IDEA_BLOCK 8 # define IDEA_KEY_LENGTH 16 typedef struct idea_key_st { IDEA_INT data[9][6]; } IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE; const char *IDEA_options(void); void IDEA_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); void IDEA_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *key, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); void IDEA_set_decrypt_key(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ek, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *dk); void IDEA_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv, int enc); void IDEA_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv, int *num, int enc); void IDEA_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, unsigned char *iv, int *num); void IDEA_encrypt(unsigned long *in, IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define idea_options IDEA_options # define idea_ecb_encrypt IDEA_ecb_encrypt # define idea_set_encrypt_key IDEA_set_encrypt_key # define idea_set_decrypt_key IDEA_set_decrypt_key # define idea_cbc_encrypt IDEA_cbc_encrypt # define idea_cfb64_encrypt IDEA_cfb64_encrypt # define idea_ofb64_encrypt IDEA_ofb64_encrypt # define idea_encrypt IDEA_encrypt # endif # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif openssl-1.1.0g/README0000644000000000000000000000621113176625656012742 0ustar rootroot OpenSSL 1.1.0g 2 Nov 2017 Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson All rights reserved. DESCRIPTION ----------- The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols (including SSLv3) as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptographic library. OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses. OVERVIEW -------- The OpenSSL toolkit includes: libssl (with platform specific naming): Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS. libcrypto (with platform specific naming): Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but not logically part of it. openssl: A command line tool that can be used for: Creation of key parameters Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs Calculation of message digests Encryption and decryption SSL/TLS client and server tests Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail And more... INSTALLATION ------------ See the appropriate file: INSTALL Linux, Unix, Windows, OpenVMS, ... NOTES.* INSTALL addendums for different platforms SUPPORT ------- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain commercial technical support. Free community support is available through the openssl-users email list (see https://www.openssl.org/community/mailinglists.html for further details). If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps first: - Download the latest version from the repository to see if the problem has already been addressed - Configure with no-asm - Remove compiler optimisation flags If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information and create an issue on GitHub: - OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a' - Any "Configure" options that you selected during compilation of the library if applicable (see INSTALL) - OS Name, Version, Hardware platform - Compiler Details (name, version) - Application Details (name, version) - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known) - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core) Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL. Use the openssl-users email list for this type of query. HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL ---------------------------- See CONTRIBUTING LEGALITIES ---------- A number of nations restrict the use or export of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to develop or distribute cryptographic code. openssl-1.1.0g/demos/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660013164 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/pkcs12/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014267 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/pkcs12/pkwrite.c0000644000000000000000000000273413176625660016126 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include /* Simple PKCS#12 file creator */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { FILE *fp; EVP_PKEY *pkey; X509 *cert; PKCS12 *p12; if (argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: pkwrite infile password name p12file\n"); exit(1); } OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]); exit(1); } cert = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); rewind(fp); pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); fclose(fp); p12 = PKCS12_create(argv[2], argv[3], pkey, cert, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); if (!p12) { fprintf(stderr, "Error creating PKCS#12 structure\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } if ((fp = fopen(argv[4], "wb")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } i2d_PKCS12_fp(fp, p12); PKCS12_free(p12); fclose(fp); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/pkcs12/README0000644000000000000000000000006413176625660015147 0ustar rootrootPKCS#12 demo applications Written by Steve Henson. openssl-1.1.0g/demos/pkcs12/pkread.c0000644000000000000000000000357413176625660015712 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include /* Simple PKCS#12 file reader */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { FILE *fp; EVP_PKEY *pkey; X509 *cert; STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL; PKCS12 *p12; int i; if (argc != 4) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: pkread p12file password opfile\n"); exit(1); } OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "rb")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]); exit(1); } p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL); fclose(fp); if (!p12) { fprintf(stderr, "Error reading PKCS#12 file\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, argv[2], &pkey, &cert, &ca)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error parsing PKCS#12 file\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } PKCS12_free(p12); if ((fp = fopen(argv[3], "w")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]); exit(1); } if (pkey) { fprintf(fp, "***Private Key***\n"); PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); } if (cert) { fprintf(fp, "***User Certificate***\n"); PEM_write_X509_AUX(fp, cert); } if (ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) { fprintf(fp, "***Other Certificates***\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) PEM_write_X509_AUX(fp, sk_X509_value(ca, i)); } fclose(fp); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660013746 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_sign2.c0000644000000000000000000000411213176625660015774 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* S/MIME signing example: 2 signers */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *scert = NULL, *scert2 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL, *skey2 = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(tbio); tbio = BIO_new_file("signer2.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; scert2 = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); skey2 = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!scert2 || !skey2) goto err; in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, in, CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL); if (!cms) goto err; /* Add each signer in turn */ if (!CMS_add1_signer(cms, scert, skey, NULL, 0)) goto err; if (!CMS_add1_signer(cms, scert2, skey2, NULL, 0)) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* NB: content included and finalized by SMIME_write_CMS */ if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, CMS_STREAM)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); X509_free(scert); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); X509_free(scert2); EVP_PKEY_free(skey2); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_uncomp.c0000644000000000000000000000232513176625660016257 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME uncompression example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Open compressed content */ in = BIO_new_file("smcomp.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* Sign content */ cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, NULL); if (!cms) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smuncomp.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* Uncompress S/MIME message */ if (!CMS_uncompress(cms, out, NULL, 0)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Uncompressing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_dec.c0000644000000000000000000000323013176625660015505 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME decryption example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *rcert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *rkey = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in recipient certificate and private key */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); rkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!rcert || !rkey) goto err; /* Open S/MIME message to decrypt */ in = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* Parse message */ cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, NULL); if (!cms) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("decout.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* Decrypt S/MIME message */ if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, NULL, out, 0)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Decrypting Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); X509_free(rcert); EVP_PKEY_free(rkey); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_sign.c0000644000000000000000000000366613176625660015727 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME signing example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *scert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; /* * For simple S/MIME signing use CMS_DETACHED. On OpenSSL 1.0.0 only: for * streaming detached set CMS_DETACHED|CMS_STREAM for streaming * non-detached set CMS_STREAM */ int flags = CMS_DETACHED | CMS_STREAM; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in signer certificate and private key */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!scert || !skey) goto err; /* Open content being signed */ in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* Sign content */ cms = CMS_sign(scert, skey, NULL, in, flags); if (!cms) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; if (!(flags & CMS_STREAM)) BIO_reset(in); /* Write out S/MIME message */ if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); X509_free(scert); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/encr.txt0000644000000000000000000000010113176625660015426 0ustar rootrootContent-type: text/plain Sample OpenSSL Data for CMS encryption openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cakey.pem0000644000000000000000000000157313176625660015553 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXgIBAAKBgQCqJMal1uC1/1wzi5+dE4EZF2im3BgROm5PVMbwPY9V1t+KYvtd c3rMcRgJaMbP+qaEcDXoIsZfYXGRielgfDNZmZcj1y/FOum+Jc2OZMs3ggPmjIQ3 dbBECq0hZKcbz7wfr+2OeNWm46iTjcSIXpGIRhUYEzOgv7zb8oOU70IbbwIDAQAB AoGBAKWOZ2UTc1BkjDjz0XoscmAR8Rj77MdGzfOPkIxPultSW+3yZpkGNyUbnsH5 HAtf4Avai/m3bMN+s91kDpx9/g/I9ZEHPQLcDICETvwt/EHT7+hwvaQgsM+TgpMs tjlGZOWent6wVIuvwwzqOMXZLgK9FvY7upwgtrys4G3Kab5hAkEA2QzFflWyEvKS rMSaVtn/IjFilwa7H0IdakkjM34z4peerFTPBr4J47YD4RCR/dAvxyNy3zUxtH18 9R6dUixI6QJBAMitJD0xOkbGWBX8KVJvRiKOIdf/95ZUAgN/h3bWKy57EB9NYj3u jbxXcvdjfSqiITykkjAg7SG7nrlzJsu6CpcCQG6gVsy0auXDY0TRlASuaZ6I40Is uRUOgqWYj2uAaHuWYdZeB4LdO3cnX0TISFDAWom6JKNlnmbrCtR4fSDT13kCQQCU +VQJyV3F5MDHsWbLt6eNR46AV5lpk/vatPXPlrZ/zwPs+PmRmGLICvNiDA2DdNDP wCx2Zjsj67CtY3rNitMJAkEAm09BQnjnbBXUb1rd2SjNDWTsu80Z+zLu8pAwXNhW 8nsvMYqlYMIxuMPwu/QuTnMRhMZ08uhqoD3ukZnBeoMEVg== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/sign.txt0000644000000000000000000000007213176625660015446 0ustar rootrootContent-type: text/plain Test OpenSSL CMS Signed Content openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_denc.c0000644000000000000000000000424613176625660015673 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * S/MIME detached data encrypt example: rarely done but should the need * arise this is an example.... */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *dout = NULL; X509 *rcert = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *recips = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; int flags = CMS_STREAM | CMS_DETACHED; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in recipient certificate */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!rcert) goto err; /* Create recipient STACK and add recipient cert to it */ recips = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!recips || !sk_X509_push(recips, rcert)) goto err; /* * sk_X509_pop_free will free up recipient STACK and its contents so set * rcert to NULL so it isn't freed up twice. */ rcert = NULL; /* Open content being encrypted */ in = BIO_new_file("encr.txt", "r"); dout = BIO_new_file("smencr.out", "wb"); if (!in) goto err; /* encrypt content */ cms = CMS_encrypt(recips, in, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), flags); if (!cms) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smencr.pem", "w"); if (!out) goto err; if (!CMS_final(cms, in, dout, flags)) goto err; /* Write out CMS structure without content */ if (!PEM_write_bio_CMS(out, cms)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Encrypting Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); X509_free(rcert); sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(dout); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_enc.c0000644000000000000000000000402313176625660015520 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME encrypt example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *rcert = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *recips = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; /* * On OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later only: * for streaming set CMS_STREAM */ int flags = CMS_STREAM; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in recipient certificate */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!rcert) goto err; /* Create recipient STACK and add recipient cert to it */ recips = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!recips || !sk_X509_push(recips, rcert)) goto err; /* * sk_X509_pop_free will free up recipient STACK and its contents so set * rcert to NULL so it isn't freed up twice. */ rcert = NULL; /* Open content being encrypted */ in = BIO_new_file("encr.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* encrypt content */ cms = CMS_encrypt(recips, in, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), flags); if (!cms) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* Write out S/MIME message */ if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Encrypting Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); X509_free(rcert); sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_comp.c0000644000000000000000000000253213176625660015714 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME compress example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; /* * On OpenSSL 1.0.0+ only: * for streaming set CMS_STREAM */ int flags = CMS_STREAM; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Open content being compressed */ in = BIO_new_file("comp.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* compress content */ cms = CMS_compress(in, NID_zlib_compression, flags); if (!cms) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smcomp.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* Write out S/MIME message */ if (!SMIME_write_CMS(out, cms, in, flags)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Compressing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cacert.pem0000644000000000000000000000205613176625660015715 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC6DCCAlGgAwIBAgIJAMfGO3rdo2uUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAMFcxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlUZXN0IENpdHkxFjAUBgNVBAoTDU9wZW5TU0wgR3Jv dXAxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1Rlc3QgUy9NSU1FIFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMDcwNDEzMTc0MzE3 WhcNMTcwNDEwMTc0MzE3WjBXMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzESMBAGA1UEBxMJVGVzdCBD aXR5MRYwFAYDVQQKEw1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMRwwGgYDVQQDExNUZXN0IFMvTUlN RSBSb290IENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCqJMal1uC1/1wz i5+dE4EZF2im3BgROm5PVMbwPY9V1t+KYvtdc3rMcRgJaMbP+qaEcDXoIsZfYXGR ielgfDNZmZcj1y/FOum+Jc2OZMs3ggPmjIQ3dbBECq0hZKcbz7wfr+2OeNWm46iT jcSIXpGIRhUYEzOgv7zb8oOU70IbbwIDAQABo4G7MIG4MB0GA1UdDgQWBBRHUypx CXFQYqewhGo72lWPQUsjoDCBiAYDVR0jBIGAMH6AFEdTKnEJcVBip7CEajvaVY9B SyOgoVukWTBXMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzESMBAGA1UEBxMJVGVzdCBDaXR5MRYwFAYD VQQKEw1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMRwwGgYDVQQDExNUZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBSb290IENB ggkAx8Y7et2ja5QwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQANI+Yc G/YDM1WMUGEzEkU9UhsIUqdyBebnK3+OyxZSouDcE/M10jFJzBf/F5b0uUGAKWwo u0dzmILfKjdfWe8EyCRafZcm00rVcO09i/63FBYzlHbmfUATIqZdhKzxxQMPs5mF 1je+pHUpzIY8TSXyh/uD9IkAy04IHwGZQf9akw== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/comp.txt0000644000000000000000000000106613176625660015450 0ustar rootrootContent-type: text/plain Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed Some Text To be Compressed openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_ddec.c0000644000000000000000000000363613176625660015663 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * S/MIME detached data decrypt example: rarely done but should the need * arise this is an example.... */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *dcont = NULL; X509 *rcert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *rkey = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in recipient certificate and private key */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); rkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!rcert || !rkey) goto err; /* Open PEM file containing enveloped data */ in = BIO_new_file("smencr.pem", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* Parse PEM content */ cms = PEM_read_bio_CMS(in, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!cms) goto err; /* Open file containing detached content */ dcont = BIO_new_file("smencr.out", "rb"); if (!in) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("encrout.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* Decrypt S/MIME message */ if (!CMS_decrypt(cms, rkey, rcert, dcont, out, 0)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Decrypting Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); X509_free(rcert); EVP_PKEY_free(rkey); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); BIO_free(dcont); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/cms_ver.c0000644000000000000000000000343513176625660015555 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME verification example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *cont = NULL; X509_STORE *st = NULL; X509 *cacert = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Set up trusted CA certificate store */ st = X509_STORE_new(); /* Read in CA certificate */ tbio = BIO_new_file("cacert.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; cacert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!cacert) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(st, cacert)) goto err; /* Open message being verified */ in = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* parse message */ cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, &cont); if (!cms) goto err; /* File to output verified content to */ out = BIO_new_file("smver.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; if (!CMS_verify(cms, NULL, st, cont, out, 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Verification Failure\n"); goto err; } fprintf(stderr, "Verification Successful\n"); ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Verifying Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); X509_free(cacert); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/signer2.pem0000644000000000000000000000351413176625660016025 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICpjCCAg+gAwIBAgIJAJ+rfmEoLQRiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAMFcxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlUZXN0IENpdHkxFjAUBgNVBAoTDU9wZW5TU0wgR3Jv dXAxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1Rlc3QgUy9NSU1FIFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMDcwNDEzMTgyOTQ0 WhcNMTcwNDA5MTgyOTQ0WjBWMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzElMCMGA1UEAxMcT3BlblNT TCB0ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBzaWduZXIgMjEgMB4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYRdGVzdDJAb3Bl bnNzbC5vcmcwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBANco7VPgX9vcGwmZ jYqjq1JiR7M38dsMNhuJyLRVjJ5/cpFluQydQuG1PhzOJ8zfYVFicOXKvbYuKuXW ozZIwzqEqWsNf36KHTLS6yOMG8I13cRInh+fAIKq9Z8Eh65I7FJzVsNsfEQrGfEW GMA8us24IaSvP3QkbfHJn/4RaKznAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwLAYJYIZI AYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlMB0GA1UdDgQW BBRlrLQJUB8uAa4q8B2OqvvTXonF5zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRHUypxCXFQYqewhGo7 2lWPQUsjoDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQBQbi2juGALg2k9m1hKpzR2lCGmGO3X h3Jh/l0vIxDr0RTgP2vBrtITlx655P/o1snoeTIpYG8uUnFnTE/6YakdayAIlxV4 aZl63AivZMpQB5SPaPH/jEsGJ8UQMfdiy4ORWIULupuPKlKwODNw7tVhQIACS/DR 2aX6rl2JEuJ5Yg== -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQDXKO1T4F/b3BsJmY2Ko6tSYkezN/HbDDYbici0VYyef3KRZbkM nULhtT4czifM32FRYnDlyr22Lirl1qM2SMM6hKlrDX9+ih0y0usjjBvCNd3ESJ4f nwCCqvWfBIeuSOxSc1bDbHxEKxnxFhjAPLrNuCGkrz90JG3xyZ/+EWis5wIDAQAB AoGAUTB2bcIrKfGimjrBOGGOUmYXnD8uGnQ/LqENhU8K4vxApTD3ZRUqmbUknQYF 6r8YH/e/llasw8QkF9qod+F5GTgsnyh/aMidFHKrXXbf1662scz9+S6crSXq9Eb2 CL57f6Kw61k6edrz8zHdA+rnTK00hzgzKCP4ZL5k8/55ueECQQD+BK+nsKi6CcKf m3Mh61Sf2Icm5JlMCKaihlbnh78lBN1imYUAfHJEnQ1ujxXB94R+6o9S+XrWTnTX 2m/JNIfpAkEA2NaidX7Sv5jnRPkwJ02Srl0urxINLmg4bU0zmM3VoMklYBHWnMyr upPZGPh5TzCa+g6FTBmU8XK61wvnEKNcTwJBAM24VdnlBIDGbsx8RJ3vzLU30xz4 ff5J80okqjUQhwkgC3tTAZgHMTPITZyAXQqdvrxakoCMc6MkHxTBX08AMCECQHHL SdyxXrYv7waSY0PtANJCkpJLveEhzqMFxdMmCjtj9BpTojYNbv3uQxtIopj9YAdk gW2ray++zvC2DV/86x8CQH4UJwgO6JqU4bSgi6HiRNjDg26tJ0Beu8jjl1vrkIVX pHFwSUeLZUsT2/iTUSgYH4uYiZPgYNcKTCT9W6se30A= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/cms/signer.pem0000644000000000000000000000351413176625660015743 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICpjCCAg+gAwIBAgIJAJ+rfmEoLQRhMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAMFcxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlUZXN0IENpdHkxFjAUBgNVBAoTDU9wZW5TU0wgR3Jv dXAxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1Rlc3QgUy9NSU1FIFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMDcwNDEzMTgyOTI3 WhcNMTcwNDA5MTgyOTI3WjBWMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzElMCMGA1UEAxMcT3BlblNT TCB0ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBzaWduZXIgMTEgMB4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYRdGVzdDFAb3Bl bnNzbC5vcmcwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL1ocAQ7ON2pIUXz jwKPzpPB9ozB6PFG6F6kARO+i0DiT6Qn8abUjwpHPU+lGys83QlpbkQVUD6Fv/4L ytihk6N9Pr/feECVcSZ20dI43WXjfYak14dSVrZkGNMMXqKmnnqtkAdD0oJN7A7y gcf8RuViV0kvk9/36eCMwMHrImfhAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwLAYJYIZI AYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlMB0GA1UdDgQW BBSyKqjvctIsFNBHULBTqr8SHtSxpDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRHUypxCXFQYqewhGo7 2lWPQUsjoDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQBvdYVoBfd4RV/xWSMXIcgw/i5OiwyX MsenQePll51MpglfArd7pUipUalCqlJt/Gs8kD16Ih1z1yuWYVTMlnDZ0PwbIOYn +Jr8XLF9b1SMJt6PwckZZ0LZdIi2KwGAxVsIW1kjJAqu9o4YH37XW37yYdQRxfvv lDiQlgX0JtmLgA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQC9aHAEOzjdqSFF848Cj86TwfaMwejxRuhepAETvotA4k+kJ/Gm 1I8KRz1PpRsrPN0JaW5EFVA+hb/+C8rYoZOjfT6/33hAlXEmdtHSON1l432GpNeH Ula2ZBjTDF6ipp56rZAHQ9KCTewO8oHH/EblYldJL5Pf9+ngjMDB6yJn4QIDAQAB AoGACCuYIWaYll80UzslYRvo8lC8nOfEb5v6bBKxBTQD98GLY+5hKywiG3RlPalG mb/fXQeSPReaRYgpdwD1OBEIOEMW9kLyqpzokC0xjpZ+MwsuJTlxCesk5GEsMa3o wC3QMmiRA7qrZ/SzTtwrs++9mZ/pxp8JZ6pKYUj8SE7/vV0CQQDz8Ix2t40E16hx 04+XhClnGqydZJyLLSxcTU3ZVhYxL+efo/5hZ8tKpkcDi8wq6T03BOKrKxrlIW55 qDRNM24rAkEAxsWzu/rJhIouQyNoYygEIEYzFRlTQyZSg59u6dNiewMn27dOAbyc YT7B6da7e74QttTXo0lIllsX2S38+XsIIwJBANSRuIU3G66tkr5l4gnhhAaxqtuY sgVhvvdL8dvC9aG1Ifzt9hzBSthpHxbK+oYmK07HdhI8hLpIMLHYzoK7n3MCQEy4 4rccBcxyyYiAkjozp+QNNIpgTBMPJ6pGT7lRLiHtBeV4y1NASdv/LTnk+Fi69Bid 7t3H24ytfHcHmS1yn6ECQF6Jmh4C7dlvp59zXp+t+VsXxa/8sq41vKNIj0Rx9vh5 xp9XL0C5ZpgmBnsTydP9pmkiL4ltLbMX0wJU6N2cmFw= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014276 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/smsign2.c0000644000000000000000000000413313176625660016025 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* S/MIME signing example: 2 signers. OpenSSL 0.9.9 only */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *scert = NULL, *scert2 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL, *skey2 = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(tbio); tbio = BIO_new_file("signer2.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; scert2 = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); skey2 = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!scert2 || !skey2) goto err; in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, in, PKCS7_STREAM | PKCS7_PARTIAL); if (!p7) goto err; /* Add each signer in turn */ if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, scert, skey, NULL, 0)) goto err; if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, scert2, skey2, NULL, 0)) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* NB: content included and finalized by SMIME_write_PKCS7 */ if (!SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, PKCS7_STREAM)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } PKCS7_free(p7); X509_free(scert); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); X509_free(scert2); EVP_PKEY_free(skey2); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/encr.txt0000644000000000000000000000010413176625660015761 0ustar rootrootContent-type: text/plain Sample OpenSSL Data for PKCS#7 encryption openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/cakey.pem0000644000000000000000000000157313176625660016103 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXgIBAAKBgQCqJMal1uC1/1wzi5+dE4EZF2im3BgROm5PVMbwPY9V1t+KYvtd c3rMcRgJaMbP+qaEcDXoIsZfYXGRielgfDNZmZcj1y/FOum+Jc2OZMs3ggPmjIQ3 dbBECq0hZKcbz7wfr+2OeNWm46iTjcSIXpGIRhUYEzOgv7zb8oOU70IbbwIDAQAB AoGBAKWOZ2UTc1BkjDjz0XoscmAR8Rj77MdGzfOPkIxPultSW+3yZpkGNyUbnsH5 HAtf4Avai/m3bMN+s91kDpx9/g/I9ZEHPQLcDICETvwt/EHT7+hwvaQgsM+TgpMs tjlGZOWent6wVIuvwwzqOMXZLgK9FvY7upwgtrys4G3Kab5hAkEA2QzFflWyEvKS rMSaVtn/IjFilwa7H0IdakkjM34z4peerFTPBr4J47YD4RCR/dAvxyNy3zUxtH18 9R6dUixI6QJBAMitJD0xOkbGWBX8KVJvRiKOIdf/95ZUAgN/h3bWKy57EB9NYj3u jbxXcvdjfSqiITykkjAg7SG7nrlzJsu6CpcCQG6gVsy0auXDY0TRlASuaZ6I40Is uRUOgqWYj2uAaHuWYdZeB4LdO3cnX0TISFDAWom6JKNlnmbrCtR4fSDT13kCQQCU +VQJyV3F5MDHsWbLt6eNR46AV5lpk/vatPXPlrZ/zwPs+PmRmGLICvNiDA2DdNDP wCx2Zjsj67CtY3rNitMJAkEAm09BQnjnbBXUb1rd2SjNDWTsu80Z+zLu8pAwXNhW 8nsvMYqlYMIxuMPwu/QuTnMRhMZ08uhqoD3ukZnBeoMEVg== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/sign.txt0000644000000000000000000000006613176625660016001 0ustar rootrootContent-type: text/plain Test OpenSSL Signed Content openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/smenc.c0000644000000000000000000000377113176625660015557 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME encrypt example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *rcert = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *recips = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; int ret = 1; /* * On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only: * for streaming set PKCS7_STREAM */ int flags = PKCS7_STREAM; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in recipient certificate */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!rcert) goto err; /* Create recipient STACK and add recipient cert to it */ recips = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!recips || !sk_X509_push(recips, rcert)) goto err; /* * sk_X509_pop_free will free up recipient STACK and its contents so set * rcert to NULL so it isn't freed up twice. */ rcert = NULL; /* Open content being encrypted */ in = BIO_new_file("encr.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* encrypt content */ p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(recips, in, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), flags); if (!p7) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* Write out S/MIME message */ if (!SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, flags)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Encrypting Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } PKCS7_free(p7); X509_free(rcert); sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/smsign.c0000644000000000000000000000366113176625660015750 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME signing example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *scert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; int ret = 1; /* * For simple S/MIME signing use PKCS7_DETACHED. On OpenSSL 0.9.9 only: * for streaming detached set PKCS7_DETACHED|PKCS7_STREAM for streaming * non-detached set PKCS7_STREAM */ int flags = PKCS7_DETACHED | PKCS7_STREAM; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in signer certificate and private key */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; scert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); skey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!scert || !skey) goto err; /* Open content being signed */ in = BIO_new_file("sign.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* Sign content */ p7 = PKCS7_sign(scert, skey, NULL, in, flags); if (!p7) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; if (!(flags & PKCS7_STREAM)) BIO_reset(in); /* Write out S/MIME message */ if (!SMIME_write_PKCS7(out, p7, in, flags)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } PKCS7_free(p7); X509_free(scert); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/cacert.pem0000644000000000000000000000205613176625660016245 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC6DCCAlGgAwIBAgIJAMfGO3rdo2uUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAMFcxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlUZXN0IENpdHkxFjAUBgNVBAoTDU9wZW5TU0wgR3Jv dXAxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1Rlc3QgUy9NSU1FIFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMDcwNDEzMTc0MzE3 WhcNMTcwNDEwMTc0MzE3WjBXMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzESMBAGA1UEBxMJVGVzdCBD aXR5MRYwFAYDVQQKEw1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMRwwGgYDVQQDExNUZXN0IFMvTUlN RSBSb290IENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCqJMal1uC1/1wz i5+dE4EZF2im3BgROm5PVMbwPY9V1t+KYvtdc3rMcRgJaMbP+qaEcDXoIsZfYXGR ielgfDNZmZcj1y/FOum+Jc2OZMs3ggPmjIQ3dbBECq0hZKcbz7wfr+2OeNWm46iT jcSIXpGIRhUYEzOgv7zb8oOU70IbbwIDAQABo4G7MIG4MB0GA1UdDgQWBBRHUypx CXFQYqewhGo72lWPQUsjoDCBiAYDVR0jBIGAMH6AFEdTKnEJcVBip7CEajvaVY9B SyOgoVukWTBXMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzESMBAGA1UEBxMJVGVzdCBDaXR5MRYwFAYD VQQKEw1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMRwwGgYDVQQDExNUZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBSb290IENB ggkAx8Y7et2ja5QwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQANI+Yc G/YDM1WMUGEzEkU9UhsIUqdyBebnK3+OyxZSouDcE/M10jFJzBf/F5b0uUGAKWwo u0dzmILfKjdfWe8EyCRafZcm00rVcO09i/63FBYzlHbmfUATIqZdhKzxxQMPs5mF 1je+pHUpzIY8TSXyh/uD9IkAy04IHwGZQf9akw== -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/smdec.c0000644000000000000000000000316413176625660015541 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME signing example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL; X509 *rcert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *rkey = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Read in recipient certificate and private key */ tbio = BIO_new_file("signer.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; rcert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_reset(tbio); rkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!rcert || !rkey) goto err; /* Open content being signed */ in = BIO_new_file("smencr.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* Sign content */ p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, NULL); if (!p7) goto err; out = BIO_new_file("encrout.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; /* Decrypt S/MIME message */ if (!PKCS7_decrypt(p7, rkey, rcert, out, 0)) goto err; ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Signing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } PKCS7_free(p7); X509_free(rcert); EVP_PKEY_free(rkey); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/signer2.pem0000644000000000000000000000351413176625660016355 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICpjCCAg+gAwIBAgIJAJ+rfmEoLQRiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAMFcxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlUZXN0IENpdHkxFjAUBgNVBAoTDU9wZW5TU0wgR3Jv dXAxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1Rlc3QgUy9NSU1FIFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMDcwNDEzMTgyOTQ0 WhcNMTcwNDA5MTgyOTQ0WjBWMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzElMCMGA1UEAxMcT3BlblNT TCB0ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBzaWduZXIgMjEgMB4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYRdGVzdDJAb3Bl bnNzbC5vcmcwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBANco7VPgX9vcGwmZ jYqjq1JiR7M38dsMNhuJyLRVjJ5/cpFluQydQuG1PhzOJ8zfYVFicOXKvbYuKuXW ozZIwzqEqWsNf36KHTLS6yOMG8I13cRInh+fAIKq9Z8Eh65I7FJzVsNsfEQrGfEW GMA8us24IaSvP3QkbfHJn/4RaKznAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwLAYJYIZI AYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlMB0GA1UdDgQW BBRlrLQJUB8uAa4q8B2OqvvTXonF5zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRHUypxCXFQYqewhGo7 2lWPQUsjoDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQBQbi2juGALg2k9m1hKpzR2lCGmGO3X h3Jh/l0vIxDr0RTgP2vBrtITlx655P/o1snoeTIpYG8uUnFnTE/6YakdayAIlxV4 aZl63AivZMpQB5SPaPH/jEsGJ8UQMfdiy4ORWIULupuPKlKwODNw7tVhQIACS/DR 2aX6rl2JEuJ5Yg== -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQDXKO1T4F/b3BsJmY2Ko6tSYkezN/HbDDYbici0VYyef3KRZbkM nULhtT4czifM32FRYnDlyr22Lirl1qM2SMM6hKlrDX9+ih0y0usjjBvCNd3ESJ4f nwCCqvWfBIeuSOxSc1bDbHxEKxnxFhjAPLrNuCGkrz90JG3xyZ/+EWis5wIDAQAB AoGAUTB2bcIrKfGimjrBOGGOUmYXnD8uGnQ/LqENhU8K4vxApTD3ZRUqmbUknQYF 6r8YH/e/llasw8QkF9qod+F5GTgsnyh/aMidFHKrXXbf1662scz9+S6crSXq9Eb2 CL57f6Kw61k6edrz8zHdA+rnTK00hzgzKCP4ZL5k8/55ueECQQD+BK+nsKi6CcKf m3Mh61Sf2Icm5JlMCKaihlbnh78lBN1imYUAfHJEnQ1ujxXB94R+6o9S+XrWTnTX 2m/JNIfpAkEA2NaidX7Sv5jnRPkwJ02Srl0urxINLmg4bU0zmM3VoMklYBHWnMyr upPZGPh5TzCa+g6FTBmU8XK61wvnEKNcTwJBAM24VdnlBIDGbsx8RJ3vzLU30xz4 ff5J80okqjUQhwkgC3tTAZgHMTPITZyAXQqdvrxakoCMc6MkHxTBX08AMCECQHHL SdyxXrYv7waSY0PtANJCkpJLveEhzqMFxdMmCjtj9BpTojYNbv3uQxtIopj9YAdk gW2ray++zvC2DV/86x8CQH4UJwgO6JqU4bSgi6HiRNjDg26tJ0Beu8jjl1vrkIVX pHFwSUeLZUsT2/iTUSgYH4uYiZPgYNcKTCT9W6se30A= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/signer.pem0000644000000000000000000000351413176625660016273 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICpjCCAg+gAwIBAgIJAJ+rfmEoLQRhMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAMFcxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlUZXN0IENpdHkxFjAUBgNVBAoTDU9wZW5TU0wgR3Jv dXAxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1Rlc3QgUy9NSU1FIFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMDcwNDEzMTgyOTI3 WhcNMTcwNDA5MTgyOTI3WjBWMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzElMCMGA1UEAxMcT3BlblNT TCB0ZXN0IFMvTUlNRSBzaWduZXIgMTEgMB4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYRdGVzdDFAb3Bl bnNzbC5vcmcwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL1ocAQ7ON2pIUXz jwKPzpPB9ozB6PFG6F6kARO+i0DiT6Qn8abUjwpHPU+lGys83QlpbkQVUD6Fv/4L ytihk6N9Pr/feECVcSZ20dI43WXjfYak14dSVrZkGNMMXqKmnnqtkAdD0oJN7A7y gcf8RuViV0kvk9/36eCMwMHrImfhAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwLAYJYIZI AYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlMB0GA1UdDgQW BBSyKqjvctIsFNBHULBTqr8SHtSxpDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRHUypxCXFQYqewhGo7 2lWPQUsjoDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQBvdYVoBfd4RV/xWSMXIcgw/i5OiwyX MsenQePll51MpglfArd7pUipUalCqlJt/Gs8kD16Ih1z1yuWYVTMlnDZ0PwbIOYn +Jr8XLF9b1SMJt6PwckZZ0LZdIi2KwGAxVsIW1kjJAqu9o4YH37XW37yYdQRxfvv lDiQlgX0JtmLgA== -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQC9aHAEOzjdqSFF848Cj86TwfaMwejxRuhepAETvotA4k+kJ/Gm 1I8KRz1PpRsrPN0JaW5EFVA+hb/+C8rYoZOjfT6/33hAlXEmdtHSON1l432GpNeH Ula2ZBjTDF6ipp56rZAHQ9KCTewO8oHH/EblYldJL5Pf9+ngjMDB6yJn4QIDAQAB AoGACCuYIWaYll80UzslYRvo8lC8nOfEb5v6bBKxBTQD98GLY+5hKywiG3RlPalG mb/fXQeSPReaRYgpdwD1OBEIOEMW9kLyqpzokC0xjpZ+MwsuJTlxCesk5GEsMa3o wC3QMmiRA7qrZ/SzTtwrs++9mZ/pxp8JZ6pKYUj8SE7/vV0CQQDz8Ix2t40E16hx 04+XhClnGqydZJyLLSxcTU3ZVhYxL+efo/5hZ8tKpkcDi8wq6T03BOKrKxrlIW55 qDRNM24rAkEAxsWzu/rJhIouQyNoYygEIEYzFRlTQyZSg59u6dNiewMn27dOAbyc YT7B6da7e74QttTXo0lIllsX2S38+XsIIwJBANSRuIU3G66tkr5l4gnhhAaxqtuY sgVhvvdL8dvC9aG1Ifzt9hzBSthpHxbK+oYmK07HdhI8hLpIMLHYzoK7n3MCQEy4 4rccBcxyyYiAkjozp+QNNIpgTBMPJ6pGT7lRLiHtBeV4y1NASdv/LTnk+Fi69Bid 7t3H24ytfHcHmS1yn6ECQF6Jmh4C7dlvp59zXp+t+VsXxa/8sq41vKNIj0Rx9vh5 xp9XL0C5ZpgmBnsTydP9pmkiL4ltLbMX0wJU6N2cmFw= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/smime/smver.c0000644000000000000000000000343113176625660015577 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Simple S/MIME verification example */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *tbio = NULL, *cont = NULL; X509_STORE *st = NULL; X509 *cacert = NULL; PKCS7 *p7 = NULL; int ret = 1; OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); /* Set up trusted CA certificate store */ st = X509_STORE_new(); /* Read in signer certificate and private key */ tbio = BIO_new_file("cacert.pem", "r"); if (!tbio) goto err; cacert = PEM_read_bio_X509(tbio, NULL, 0, NULL); if (!cacert) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(st, cacert)) goto err; /* Open content being signed */ in = BIO_new_file("smout.txt", "r"); if (!in) goto err; /* Sign content */ p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont); if (!p7) goto err; /* File to output verified content to */ out = BIO_new_file("smver.txt", "w"); if (!out) goto err; if (!PKCS7_verify(p7, NULL, st, cont, out, 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Verification Failure\n"); goto err; } fprintf(stderr, "Verification Successful\n"); ret = 0; err: if (ret) { fprintf(stderr, "Error Verifying Data\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } PKCS7_free(p7); X509_free(cacert); BIO_free(in); BIO_free(out); BIO_free(tbio); return ret; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/README0000644000000000000000000000041313176625660014042 0ustar rootrootNOTE: Don't expect any of these programs to work with current OpenSSL releases, or even with later SSLeay releases. Original README: ============================================================================= Some demo programs sent to me by various people eric openssl-1.1.0g/demos/evp/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660013756 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/evp/aesgcm.c0000644000000000000000000001011413176625660015356 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Simple AES GCM test program, uses the same NIST data used for the FIPS * self test but uses the application level EVP APIs. */ #include #include #include /* AES-GCM test data from NIST public test vectors */ static const unsigned char gcm_key[] = { 0xee, 0xbc, 0x1f, 0x57, 0x48, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x92, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x65, 0x66, 0x5f, 0x8a, 0xe6, 0xd1, 0x65, 0x8b, 0xb2, 0x6d, 0xe6, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x69, 0xa3, 0x52, 0x02, 0x93, 0xa5, 0x72, 0x07, 0x8f }; static const unsigned char gcm_iv[] = { 0x99, 0xaa, 0x3e, 0x68, 0xed, 0x81, 0x73, 0xa0, 0xee, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x84 }; static const unsigned char gcm_pt[] = { 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x87, 0x05, 0x5b, 0xc3, 0x2d, 0x0e, 0xeb, 0x31, 0xb2, 0xea, 0xcc, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0xa5 }; static const unsigned char gcm_aad[] = { 0x4d, 0x23, 0xc3, 0xce, 0xc3, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x7f, 0xec, 0x78, 0xde }; static const unsigned char gcm_ct[] = { 0xf7, 0x26, 0x44, 0x13, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x36, 0x86, 0x7e, 0xb9, 0xf2, 0x17, 0x36 }; static const unsigned char gcm_tag[] = { 0x67, 0xba, 0x05, 0x10, 0x26, 0x2a, 0xe4, 0x87, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xee, 0x62, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x7e, 0x0c }; void aes_gcm_encrypt(void) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int outlen, tmplen; unsigned char outbuf[1024]; printf("AES GCM Encrypt:\n"); printf("Plaintext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt)); ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); /* Set cipher type and mode */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); /* Set IV length if default 96 bits is not appropriate */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(gcm_iv), NULL); /* Initialise key and IV */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, gcm_key, gcm_iv); /* Zero or more calls to specify any AAD */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, gcm_aad, sizeof(gcm_aad)); /* Encrypt plaintext */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt)); /* Output encrypted block */ printf("Ciphertext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen); /* Finalise: note get no output for GCM */ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen); /* Get tag */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, 16, outbuf); /* Output tag */ printf("Tag:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, 16); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } void aes_gcm_decrypt(void) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int outlen, tmplen, rv; unsigned char outbuf[1024]; printf("AES GCM Derypt:\n"); printf("Ciphertext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct)); ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); /* Select cipher */ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); /* Set IV length, omit for 96 bits */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(gcm_iv), NULL); /* Specify key and IV */ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, gcm_key, gcm_iv); /* Zero or more calls to specify any AAD */ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, gcm_aad, sizeof(gcm_aad)); /* Decrypt plaintext */ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct)); /* Output decrypted block */ printf("Plaintext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen); /* Set expected tag value. */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(gcm_tag), (void *)gcm_tag); /* Finalise: note get no output for GCM */ rv = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen); /* * Print out return value. If this is not successful authentication * failed and plaintext is not trustworthy. */ printf("Tag Verify %s\n", rv > 0 ? "Successful!" : "Failed!"); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { aes_gcm_encrypt(); aes_gcm_decrypt(); } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/evp/aesccm.c0000644000000000000000000001100613176625660015353 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Simple AES CCM test program, uses the same NIST data used for the FIPS * self test but uses the application level EVP APIs. */ #include #include #include /* AES-CCM test data from NIST public test vectors */ static const unsigned char ccm_key[] = { 0xce, 0xb0, 0x09, 0xae, 0xa4, 0x45, 0x44, 0x51, 0xfe, 0xad, 0xf0, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x6f, 0x45, 0x55, 0x5d, 0xd0, 0x47, 0x23, 0xba, 0xa4, 0x48, 0xe8 }; static const unsigned char ccm_nonce[] = { 0x76, 0x40, 0x43, 0xc4, 0x94, 0x60, 0xb7 }; static const unsigned char ccm_adata[] = { 0x6e, 0x80, 0xdd, 0x7f, 0x1b, 0xad, 0xf3, 0xa1, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x25, 0xc7, 0x5f, 0x10, 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0x23, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0xb8, 0xf9, 0xaa, 0xa5, 0x3a, 0xde, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xcb, 0xf7, 0x8f, 0xe4 }; static const unsigned char ccm_pt[] = { 0xc8, 0xd2, 0x75, 0xf9, 0x19, 0xe1, 0x7d, 0x7f, 0xe6, 0x9c, 0x2a, 0x1f, 0x58, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0x4d, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0xb5, 0xdf, 0x13, 0x10 }; static const unsigned char ccm_ct[] = { 0x8a, 0x0f, 0x3d, 0x82, 0x29, 0xe4, 0x8e, 0x74, 0x87, 0xfd, 0x95, 0xa2, 0x8a, 0xd3, 0x92, 0xc8, 0x0b, 0x36, 0x81, 0xd4, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0xbb, 0xfd }; static const unsigned char ccm_tag[] = { 0x2d, 0xd6, 0xef, 0x1c, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xcc, 0xb7, 0x23, 0xdc, 0x07, 0x44, 0x14, 0xdb, 0x50, 0x6d }; void aes_ccm_encrypt(void) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int outlen, tmplen; unsigned char outbuf[1024]; printf("AES CCM Encrypt:\n"); printf("Plaintext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, ccm_pt, sizeof(ccm_pt)); ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); /* Set cipher type and mode */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_192_ccm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); /* Set nonce length if default 96 bits is not appropriate */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(ccm_nonce), NULL); /* Set tag length */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(ccm_tag), NULL); /* Initialise key and IV */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ccm_key, ccm_nonce); /* Set plaintext length: only needed if AAD is used */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, NULL, sizeof(ccm_pt)); /* Zero or one call to specify any AAD */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, ccm_adata, sizeof(ccm_adata)); /* Encrypt plaintext: can only be called once */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, ccm_pt, sizeof(ccm_pt)); /* Output encrypted block */ printf("Ciphertext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen); /* Finalise: note get no output for CCM */ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen); /* Get tag */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, 16, outbuf); /* Output tag */ printf("Tag:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, 16); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } void aes_ccm_decrypt(void) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int outlen, tmplen, rv; unsigned char outbuf[1024]; printf("AES CCM Derypt:\n"); printf("Ciphertext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, ccm_ct, sizeof(ccm_ct)); ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); /* Select cipher */ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_192_ccm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); /* Set nonce length, omit for 96 bits */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(ccm_nonce), NULL); /* Set expected tag value */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(ccm_tag), (void *)ccm_tag); /* Specify key and IV */ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ccm_key, ccm_nonce); /* Set ciphertext length: only needed if we have AAD */ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, NULL, sizeof(ccm_ct)); /* Zero or one call to specify any AAD */ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, ccm_adata, sizeof(ccm_adata)); /* Decrypt plaintext, verify tag: can only be called once */ rv = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, ccm_ct, sizeof(ccm_ct)); /* Output decrypted block: if tag verify failed we get nothing */ if (rv > 0) { printf("Plaintext:\n"); BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, outlen); } else printf("Plaintext not available: tag verify failed.\n"); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { aes_ccm_encrypt(); aes_ccm_decrypt(); } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/evp/Makefile0000644000000000000000000000076413176625660015425 0ustar rootroot# Quick instruction: # To build against an OpenSSL built in the source tree, do this: # # make OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION=-I../../include OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION=-L../.. # # To run the demos when linked with a shared library (default): # # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./aesccm # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./aesgcm CFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION) LDFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION) -lssl -lcrypto all: aesccm aesgcm aesccm: aesccm.o aesgcm: aesgcm.o aesccm aesgcm: $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660013735 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/server-conf.c0000644000000000000000000000736413176625660016344 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * A minimal program to serve an SSL connection. It uses blocking. It uses * the SSL_CONF API with a configuration file. cc -I../../include saccept.c * -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -ldl */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *port = "*:4433"; BIO *in = NULL; BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; CONF *conf = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf; long errline = -1; char buf[512]; int ret = 1, i; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); conf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (NCONF_load(conf, "accept.cnf", &errline) <= 0) { if (errline <= 0) fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld\n", errline); goto err; } sect = NCONF_get_section(conf, "default"); if (sect == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error retrieving default section\n"); goto err; } cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) { int rv; cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i); rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cnf->name, cnf->value); if (rv > 0) continue; if (rv != -2) { fprintf(stderr, "Error processing %s = %s\n", cnf->name, cnf->value); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto err; } if (strcmp(cnf->name, "Port") == 0) { port = cnf->value; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown configuration option %s\n", cnf->name); goto err; } } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto err; } /* Setup server side SSL bio */ ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0); if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL) goto err; /* * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it. * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup */ BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio); again: /* * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a * socket. In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the * BIO_read() function. */ if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0) goto err; for (;;) { i = BIO_read(in, buf, 512); if (i == 0) { /* * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt * to do an accept */ printf("Done\n"); tmp = BIO_pop(in); BIO_free_all(tmp); goto again; } if (i < 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(in)) continue; goto err; } fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout); fflush(stdout); } ret = 0; err: if (ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } BIO_free(in); exit(ret); return (!ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/descrip.mms0000644000000000000000000000244113176625660016105 0ustar rootroot# This build description trusts that the following logical names are defined: # # For compilation: OPENSSL # For linking with shared libraries: OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR and OSSL$LIBSSL_SHR # For linking with static libraries: OSSL$LIBCRYPTO and OSSL$LIBSSL # # These are normally defined with the OpenSSL startup procedure # By default, we link with the shared libraries SHARED = TRUE # Alternative, for linking with static libraries #SHARED = FALSE .FIRST : IF "$(SHARED)" .EQS. "TRUE" THEN DEFINE OPT []shared.opt IF "$(SHARED)" .NES. "TRUE" THEN DEFINE OPT []static.opt .LAST : DEASSIGN OPT .DEFAULT : @ ! # Because we use an option file, we need to redefine this .obj.exe : $(LINK) $(LINKFLAGS) $<,OPT:/OPT all : client-arg.exe client-conf.exe saccept.exe sconnect.exe - server-arg.exe server-cmod.exe server-conf.exe client-arg.exe : client-arg.obj client-conf.exe : client-conf.obj saccept.exe : saccept.obj sconnect.exe : sconnect.obj server-arg.exe : server-arg.obj server-cmod.exe : server-cmod.obj server-conf.exe : server-conf.obj # Stoopid MMS doesn't infer this automatically... client-arg.obj : client-arg.c client-conf.obj : client-conf.c saccept.obj : saccept.c sconnect.obj : sconnect.c server-arg.obj : server-arg.c server-cmod.obj : server-cmod.c server-conf.obj : server-conf.c openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/saccept.c0000644000000000000000000000556713176625660015540 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * A minimal program to serve an SSL connection. * It uses blocking. * saccept host:port * host is the interface IP to use. If any interface, use *:port * The default it *:4433 * * cc -I../../include saccept.c -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -ldl */ #include #include #include #include #define CERT_FILE "server.pem" static int done = 0; void interrupt(int sig) { done = 1; } void sigsetup(void) { struct sigaction sa; /* * Catch at most once, and don't restart the accept system call. */ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND; sa.sa_handler = interrupt; sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *port = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp; SSL_CTX *ctx; char buf[512]; int ret = 1, i; if (argc <= 1) port = "*:4433"; else port = argv[1]; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, CERT_FILE)) goto err; if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, CERT_FILE, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) goto err; if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) goto err; /* Setup server side SSL bio */ ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0); if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL) goto err; /* * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it. * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup */ BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio); /* Arrange to leave server loop on interrupt */ sigsetup(); again: /* * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a * socket. In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the * BIO_read() function. */ if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0) goto err; while (!done) { i = BIO_read(in, buf, 512); if (i == 0) { /* * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt * to do an accept */ printf("Done\n"); tmp = BIO_pop(in); BIO_free_all(tmp); goto again; } if (i < 0) goto err; fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout); fflush(stdout); } ret = 0; err: if (ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } BIO_free(in); exit(ret); return (!ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/server-arg.c0000644000000000000000000001000313176625660016150 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * A minimal program to serve an SSL connection. It uses blocking. It use the * SSL_CONF API with the command line. cc -I../../include server-arg.c * -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -ldl */ #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char *port = "*:4433"; BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx; char buf[512]; BIO *in = NULL; int ret = 1, i; char **args = argv + 1; int nargs = argc - 1; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); while (*args && **args == '-') { int rv; /* Parse standard arguments */ rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(cctx, &nargs, &args); if (rv == -3) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument for %s\n", *args); goto err; } if (rv < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error in command %s\n", *args); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto err; } /* If rv > 0 we processed something so proceed to next arg */ if (rv > 0) continue; /* Otherwise application specific argument processing */ if (strcmp(*args, "-port") == 0) { port = args[1]; if (port == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing -port argument\n"); goto err; } args += 2; nargs -= 2; continue; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown argument %s\n", *args); goto err; } } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto err; } #ifdef ITERATE_CERTS /* * Demo of how to iterate over all certificates in an SSL_CTX structure. */ { X509 *x; int rv; rv = SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST); while (rv) { X509 *x = SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(ctx); X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); printf("\n"); rv = SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT); } fflush(stdout); } #endif /* Setup server side SSL bio */ ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0); if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL) goto err; /* * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it. * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup */ BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio); again: /* * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a * socket. In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the * BIO_read() function. */ if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0) goto err; for (;;) { i = BIO_read(in, buf, 512); if (i == 0) { /* * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt * to do an accept */ printf("Done\n"); tmp = BIO_pop(in); BIO_free_all(tmp); goto again; } if (i < 0) goto err; fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout); fflush(stdout); } ret = 0; err: if (ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } BIO_free(in); exit(ret); return (!ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/server-ec.pem0000644000000000000000000000157113176625660016337 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQg/5kYU3PUlHwfdjEN lC1xTZEx3o55RgtSOuOCTryDfomhRANCAARW/qUFg+qZzjcFWrST4bmkRCFu8/rn KTHjW2vpBXYGXKDn4AbAfYXYhM9J7v1HkkrZBPPGx53eVzs61/Pgr6Rc -----END PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBsTCCAVegAwIBAgIJALChLe0vZzgoMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMDUxHzAdBgNVBAsM FlRlc3QgRUNEU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDAeFw0x NTEyMjIxNDUxMDRaFw00NDAxMDQxNDUxMDRaMDUxHzAdBgNVBAsMFlRlc3QgRUNE U0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABFb+pQWD6pnONwVatJPhuaREIW7z+ucpMeNba+kFdgZcoOfg BsB9hdiEz0nu/UeSStkE88bHnd5XOzrX8+CvpFyjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBROhkTJ lsm8Qd8pEgrrapccfFY5gjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBROhkTJlsm8Qd8pEgrrapccfFY5 gjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIFhyU/WZRcihilTpwFVm fly1JhwisouiZjLnPkRYZVzHAiEAgqxXfRQl1/phnEgO9gRcv2nFp9xvJiDgKPse VktDYjE= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/intca.pem0000644000000000000000000000251713176625660015543 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDvjCCAqagAwIBAgIJAPzCy4CUW9/qMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMGgxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT VElORyBQVVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgUm9vdCBD QTAeFw0xNTA3MTQxMzIyMDVaFw0yNTA2MjExMzIyMDVaMHAxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVL MRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVTVElORyBQ VVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMSUwIwYDVQQDDBxPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRl IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsErw75CmLYD6pkrG W/YhAl/K8L5wJYxDjqu2FghxjD8K308W3EHq4uBxEwR1OHXaM1+6ZZw7/r2I37VL IdurBEAIEUdbzx0so74FPawgz5EW2CTqoJnK8F71/vo5Kj1VPwW46CxwxUR3cfvJ GNXND2ip0TcyTSPLROXOyQakcVfIGJmdSa1wHKi+c2gMA4emADudZUOYLrg80gr2 ldePm07ynbVsKKzCcStw8MdmoW9Qt3fLnPJn2TFUUBNWj+4kvL+88edWCVQXKNds ysD/CDrH4W/hjyPDStVsM6XpiNU0+L2ZY6fcj3OP8d0goOx45xotMn9m8hNkCGsr VXx9IwIDAQABo2MwYTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUNsNsiOeV/rC97M4+PYarIYGH2towHwYD VR0jBBgwFoAUjBkP10IxdwUG4dOxn+s5+3hxOkUwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAO BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAANQT0pDWBQoT/RY76xz audadGz/dfYnwvSwT0RMFcXLcMVVRNqP0HeR8OP8qLaP7onRbNnEXNfos9pxXYlg j+/WjWTBLVcr3pX2Xtmcaqw3CGN9qbQI8B3JkYeijZmc5+3r5MzK/9R0w8Y/T9Xt CXEiQhtWHpPrFEfrExeVy2kjJNRctEfq3OTd1bjgX64zvTU7eR+MHFYKPoyMqwIR gjoVKinvovEwWoZe5kfMQwJNA3IgoJexX9BXbS8efAYF/ku3tS0laoZS/q6V/o5I RvG0OqnNgxhul+96PE5ujSaprsyvBswIUKt+e/BCxGaS6f2AJ8RmtoPOSfT4b9qN thI= -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/sconnect.c0000644000000000000000000000607313176625660015723 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /*- * A minimal program to do SSL to a passed host and port. * It is actually using non-blocking IO but in a very simple manner * sconnect host:port - it does a 'GET / HTTP/1.0' * * cc -I../../include sconnect.c -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #define HOSTPORT "localhost:4433" #define CAFILE "root.pem" extern int errno; int main(argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { const char *hostport = HOSTPORT; const char *CAfile = CAFILE; char *hostname; char *cp; BIO *out = NULL; char buf[1024 * 10], *p; SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; SSL *ssl; BIO *ssl_bio; int i, len, off, ret = 1; if (argc > 1) hostport = argv[1]; if (argc > 2) CAfile = argv[2]; hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(hostport); if ((cp = strchr(hostname, ':')) != NULL) *cp = 0; #ifdef WATT32 dbug_init(); sock_init(); #endif ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); /* Enable trust chain verification */ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL); SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ssl_ctx, CAfile, NULL); /* Lets make a SSL structure */ ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx); SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); /* Enable peername verification */ if (SSL_set1_host(ssl, hostname) <= 0) goto err; /* Use it inside an SSL BIO */ ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, ssl, BIO_CLOSE); /* Lets use a connect BIO under the SSL BIO */ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect()); BIO_set_conn_hostname(out, hostport); BIO_set_nbio(out, 1); out = BIO_push(ssl_bio, out); p = "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n"; len = strlen(p); off = 0; for (;;) { i = BIO_write(out, &(p[off]), len); if (i <= 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(out)) { fprintf(stderr, "write DELAY\n"); sleep(1); continue; } else { goto err; } } off += i; len -= i; if (len <= 0) break; } for (;;) { i = BIO_read(out, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (i == 0) break; if (i < 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(out)) { fprintf(stderr, "read DELAY\n"); sleep(1); continue; } goto err; } fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout); } ret = 1; goto done; err: if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) { /* system call error */ fprintf(stderr, "errno=%d ", errno); perror("error"); } else ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); done: BIO_free_all(out); SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); return (ret == 1); } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/cmod.cnf0000644000000000000000000000103113176625660015342 0ustar rootroot# Example config module configuration # Name supplied by application to CONF_modules_load_file # and section containing configuration testapp = test_sect [test_sect] # list of confuration modules # SSL configuration module ssl_conf = ssl_sect [ssl_sect] # list of SSL configurations server = server_sect [server_sect] # Only support 3 curves Curves = P-521:P-384:P-256 # Restricted signature algorithms SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA512 # Certificates and keys RSA.Certificate=server.pem ECDSA.Certificate=server-ec.pem openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/client-arg.c0000644000000000000000000000625113176625660016132 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *sbio = NULL, *out = NULL; int len; char tmpbuf[1024]; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx; SSL *ssl; char **args = argv + 1; const char *connect_str = "localhost:4433"; int nargs = argc - 1; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); while (*args && **args == '-') { int rv; /* Parse standard arguments */ rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(cctx, &nargs, &args); if (rv == -3) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing argument for %s\n", *args); goto end; } if (rv < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error in command %s\n", *args); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } /* If rv > 0 we processed something so proceed to next arg */ if (rv > 0) continue; /* Otherwise application specific argument processing */ if (strcmp(*args, "-connect") == 0) { connect_str = args[1]; if (connect_str == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing -connect argument\n"); goto end; } args += 2; nargs -= 2; continue; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown argument %s\n", *args); goto end; } } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } /* * We'd normally set some stuff like the verify paths and * mode here * because as things stand this will connect to * any server whose * certificate is signed by any CA. */ sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx); BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); if (!ssl) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); goto end; } /* Don't want any retries */ SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); /* We might want to do other things with ssl here */ BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, connect_str); out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } /* Could examine ssl here to get connection info */ BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n"); for (;;) { len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); if (len <= 0) break; BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); } end: SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); BIO_free_all(sbio); BIO_free(out); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/server.pem0000644000000000000000000001127713176625660015756 0ustar rootrootsubject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDyTCCArGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBwMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzEW MBQGA1UECgwNT3BlblNTTCBHcm91cDEiMCAGA1UECwwZRk9SIFRFU1RJTkcgUFVS UE9TRVMgT05MWTElMCMGA1UEAwwcT3BlblNTTCBUZXN0IEludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBD QTAgFw0xNjAxMDQwODU0NDZaGA8yMTE2MDEwNTA4NTQ0NlowZDELMAkGA1UEBhMC VUsxFjAUBgNVBAoMDU9wZW5TU0wgR3JvdXAxIjAgBgNVBAsMGUZPUiBURVNUSU5H IFBVUlBPU0VTIE9OTFkxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFRlc3QgU2VydmVyIENlcnQwggEiMA0G CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDzhPOSNtyyRspmeuUpxfNJKCLTuf7g 3uQ4zu4iHOmRO5TQci+HhVlLZrHF9XqFXcIP0y4pWDbMSGuiorUmzmfiR7bfSdI/ +qIQt8KXRH6HNG1t8ou0VSvWId5TS5Dq/er5ODUr9OaaDva7EquHIcMvvPQGuI+O EAcnleVCy9HVEIySrO4P3CNIicnGkwwiAud05yUAq/gPXBC1hTtmlPD7TVcGVSEi Jdvzqqlgv02qedGrkki6GY4S7GjZxrrf7Foc2EP+51LJzwLQx3/JfrCU41NEWAsu /Sl0tQabXESN+zJ1pDqoZ3uHMgpQjeGiE0olr+YcsSW/tJmiU9OiAr8RAgMBAAGj eDB2MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSCvM8AABPR9zklmifnr9LvIBturDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ2 w2yI55X+sL3szj49hqshgYfa2jAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUF BwMBMBQGA1UdEQQNMAuCCWxvY2FsaG9zdDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAC78R sAr4uvkYOu/pSwQ3MYOFqZ0BnPuP0/AZW2zF7TLNy8g36GyH9rKxz2ffQEHRmPQN Z11Ohg3z03jw/sVzkgt2U5Ipv923sSeCZcu0nuNex3v9/x72ldYikZNhQOsw+2kr hx3OvE9R7xl9eyjz7BknsbY7PC3kiUY8SDdc5Fr/XMkHm3ge65oWYOHBjC5tAr5K FGCEjM3syxS+Li5X6yfDGiVSjOU4gJuZDCYbl7cEQexU2deds8EmpJJrrI7s4JcQ rraHI8+Hu8X9VLpZE1jl/fKJw3D0i53PoN2WhukIOg1Zv+ajMKQ4ubVfISH2ebox +ybAZO8hxL6/I08/GQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Root CA -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDvjCCAqagAwIBAgIJAPzCy4CUW9/qMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMGgxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT VElORyBQVVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgUm9vdCBD QTAeFw0xNTA3MTQxMzIyMDVaFw0yNTA2MjExMzIyMDVaMHAxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVL MRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVTVElORyBQ VVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMSUwIwYDVQQDDBxPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRl IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsErw75CmLYD6pkrG W/YhAl/K8L5wJYxDjqu2FghxjD8K308W3EHq4uBxEwR1OHXaM1+6ZZw7/r2I37VL IdurBEAIEUdbzx0so74FPawgz5EW2CTqoJnK8F71/vo5Kj1VPwW46CxwxUR3cfvJ GNXND2ip0TcyTSPLROXOyQakcVfIGJmdSa1wHKi+c2gMA4emADudZUOYLrg80gr2 ldePm07ynbVsKKzCcStw8MdmoW9Qt3fLnPJn2TFUUBNWj+4kvL+88edWCVQXKNds ysD/CDrH4W/hjyPDStVsM6XpiNU0+L2ZY6fcj3OP8d0goOx45xotMn9m8hNkCGsr VXx9IwIDAQABo2MwYTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUNsNsiOeV/rC97M4+PYarIYGH2towHwYD VR0jBBgwFoAUjBkP10IxdwUG4dOxn+s5+3hxOkUwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAO BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAANQT0pDWBQoT/RY76xz audadGz/dfYnwvSwT0RMFcXLcMVVRNqP0HeR8OP8qLaP7onRbNnEXNfos9pxXYlg j+/WjWTBLVcr3pX2Xtmcaqw3CGN9qbQI8B3JkYeijZmc5+3r5MzK/9R0w8Y/T9Xt CXEiQhtWHpPrFEfrExeVy2kjJNRctEfq3OTd1bjgX64zvTU7eR+MHFYKPoyMqwIR gjoVKinvovEwWoZe5kfMQwJNA3IgoJexX9BXbS8efAYF/ku3tS0laoZS/q6V/o5I RvG0OqnNgxhul+96PE5ujSaprsyvBswIUKt+e/BCxGaS6f2AJ8RmtoPOSfT4b9qN thI= -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA84TzkjbcskbKZnrlKcXzSSgi07n+4N7kOM7uIhzpkTuU0HIv h4VZS2axxfV6hV3CD9MuKVg2zEhroqK1Js5n4ke230nSP/qiELfCl0R+hzRtbfKL tFUr1iHeU0uQ6v3q+Tg1K/Tmmg72uxKrhyHDL7z0BriPjhAHJ5XlQsvR1RCMkqzu D9wjSInJxpMMIgLndOclAKv4D1wQtYU7ZpTw+01XBlUhIiXb86qpYL9NqnnRq5JI uhmOEuxo2ca63+xaHNhD/udSyc8C0Md/yX6wlONTRFgLLv0pdLUGm1xEjfsydaQ6 qGd7hzIKUI3hohNKJa/mHLElv7SZolPTogK/EQIDAQABAoIBAADq9FwNtuE5IRQn zGtO4q7Y5uCzZ8GDNYr9RKp+P2cbuWDbvVAecYq2NV9QoIiWJOAYZKklOvekIju3 r0UZLA0PRiIrTg6NrESx3JrjWDK8QNlUO7CPTZ39/K+FrmMkV9lem9yxjJjyC34D AQB+YRTx+l14HppjdxNwHjAVQpIx/uO2F5xAMuk32+3K+pq9CZUtrofe1q4Agj9R 5s8mSy9pbRo9kW9wl5xdEotz1LivFOEiqPUJTUq5J5PeMKao3vdK726XI4Z455Nm W2/MA0YV0ug2FYinHcZdvKM6dimH8GLfa3X8xKRfzjGjTiMSwsdjgMa4awY3tEHH 674jhAECgYEA/zqMrc0zsbNk83sjgaYIug5kzEpN4ic020rSZsmQxSCerJTgNhmg utKSCt0Re09Jt3LqG48msahX8ycqDsHNvlEGPQSbMu9IYeO3Wr3fAm75GEtFWePY BhM73I7gkRt4s8bUiUepMG/wY45c5tRF23xi8foReHFFe9MDzh8fJFECgYEA9EFX 4qAik1pOJGNei9BMwmx0I0gfVEIgu0tzeVqT45vcxbxr7RkTEaDoAG6PlbWP6D9a WQNLp4gsgRM90ZXOJ4up5DsAWDluvaF4/omabMA+MJJ5kGZ0gCj5rbZbKqUws7x8 bp+6iBfUPJUbcqNqFmi/08Yt7vrDnMnyMw2A/sECgYEAiiuRMxnuzVm34hQcsbhH 6ymVqf7j0PW2qK0F4H1ocT9qhzWFd+RB3kHWrCjnqODQoI6GbGr/4JepHUpre1ex 4UEN5oSS3G0ru0rC3U4C59dZ5KwDHFm7ffZ1pr52ljfQDUsrjjIMRtuiwNK2OoRa WSsqiaL+SDzSB+nBmpnAizECgYBdt/y6rerWUx4MhDwwtTnel7JwHyo2MDFS6/5g n8qC2Lj6/fMDRE22w+CA2esp7EJNQJGv+b27iFpbJEDh+/Lf5YzIT4MwVskQ5bYB JFcmRxUVmf4e09D7o705U/DjCgMH09iCsbLmqQ38ONIRSHZaJtMDtNTHD1yi+jF+ OT43gQKBgQC/2OHZoko6iRlNOAQ/tMVFNq7fL81GivoQ9F1U0Qr+DH3ZfaH8eIkX xT0ToMPJUzWAn8pZv0snA0um6SIgvkCuxO84OkANCVbttzXImIsL7pFzfcwV/ERK UM6j0ZuSMFOCr/lGPAoOQU0fskidGEHi1/kW+suSr28TqsyYZpwBDQ== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/static.opt0000644000000000000000000000004313176625660015745 0ustar rootrootOSSL$LIBSSL/LIB OSSL$LIBCRYPTO/LIB openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/README0000644000000000000000000000037713176625660014624 0ustar rootrootThis directory contains some simple examples of the use of BIO's to simplify socket programming. The client-conf, server-conf, client-arg and client-conf include examples of how to use the SSL_CONF API for configuration file or command line processing. openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/server-cmod.c0000644000000000000000000000462013176625660016331 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * A minimal TLS server it ses SSL_CTX_config and a configuration file to * set most server parameters. */ #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { unsigned char buf[512]; char *port = "*:4433"; BIO *in = NULL; BIO *ssl_bio, *tmp; SSL_CTX *ctx; int ret = 1, i; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); if (CONF_modules_load_file("cmod.cnf", "testapp", 0) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n"); goto err; } if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, "server") == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error configuring server.\n"); goto err; } /* Setup server side SSL bio */ ssl_bio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0); if ((in = BIO_new_accept(port)) == NULL) goto err; /* * This means that when a new connection is accepted on 'in', The ssl_bio * will be 'duplicated' and have the new socket BIO push into it. * Basically it means the SSL BIO will be automatically setup */ BIO_set_accept_bios(in, ssl_bio); again: /* * The first call will setup the accept socket, and the second will get a * socket. In this loop, the first actual accept will occur in the * BIO_read() function. */ if (BIO_do_accept(in) <= 0) goto err; for (;;) { i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (i == 0) { /* * If we have finished, remove the underlying BIO stack so the * next time we call any function for this BIO, it will attempt * to do an accept */ printf("Done\n"); tmp = BIO_pop(in); BIO_free_all(tmp); goto again; } if (i < 0) { if (BIO_should_retry(in)) continue; goto err; } fwrite(buf, 1, i, stdout); fflush(stdout); } ret = 0; err: if (ret) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } BIO_free(in); exit(ret); return (!ret); } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/connect.cnf0000644000000000000000000000043513176625660016060 0ustar rootroot# Example configuration file # Connects to the default port of s_server Connect = localhost:4433 # Disable TLS v1.2 for test. # Protocol = ALL, -TLSv1.2 # Only support 3 curves Curves = P-521:P-384:P-256 # Restricted signature algorithms SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA512 openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/Makefile0000644000000000000000000000171713176625660015403 0ustar rootroot# Quick instruction: # To build against an OpenSSL built in the source tree, do this: # # make OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION=-I../../include OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION=-L../.. # # To run the demos when linked with a shared library (default): # # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./server-arg # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./server-cmod # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./server-conf # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./client-arg # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./client-conf # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./saccept # LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./sconnect CFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION) LDFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION) -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS) all: client-arg client-conf saccept sconnect server-arg server-cmod server-conf client-arg: client-arg.o client-conf: client-conf.o saccept: saccept.o sconnect: sconnect.o server-arg: server-arg.o server-cmod: server-cmod.o server-conf: server-conf.o client-arg client-conf saccept sconnect server-arg server-cmod server-conf: $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/shared.opt0000644000000000000000000000005713176625660015731 0ustar rootrootOSSL$LIBSSL_SHR/SHARE OSSL$LIBCRYPTO_SHR/SHARE openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/client-conf.c0000644000000000000000000000660613176625660016312 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *sbio = NULL, *out = NULL; int i, len, rv; char tmpbuf[1024]; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; SSL *ssl = NULL; CONF *conf = NULL; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect = NULL; CONF_VALUE *cnf; const char *connect_str = "localhost:4433"; long errline = -1; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (NCONF_load(conf, "connect.cnf", &errline) <= 0) { if (errline <= 0) fprintf(stderr, "Error processing config file\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld\n", errline); goto end; } sect = NCONF_get_section(conf, "default"); if (sect == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error retrieving default section\n"); goto end; } ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i); rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cnf->name, cnf->value); if (rv > 0) continue; if (rv != -2) { fprintf(stderr, "Error processing %s = %s\n", cnf->name, cnf->value); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } if (strcmp(cnf->name, "Connect") == 0) { connect_str = cnf->value; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown configuration option %s\n", cnf->name); goto end; } } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "Finish error\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } /* * We'd normally set some stuff like the verify paths and * mode here * because as things stand this will connect to * any server whose * certificate is signed by any CA. */ sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx); BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); if (!ssl) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); goto end; } /* Don't want any retries */ SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); /* We might want to do other things with ssl here */ BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, connect_str); out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); goto end; } /* Could examine ssl here to get connection info */ BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n"); for (;;) { len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); if (len <= 0) break; BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); } end: SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); BIO_free_all(sbio); BIO_free(out); NCONF_free(conf); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/root.pem0000644000000000000000000000250213176625660015422 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDtjCCAp6gAwIBAgIJAKkg71CjIAovMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGgxCzAJBgNV BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT VElORyBQVVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgUm9vdCBD QTAeFw0xNDAyMjMxMzA1MTNaFw0yNDAyMjExMzA1MTNaMGgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVL MRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVTVElORyBQ VVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgUm9vdCBDQTCCASIw DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANMaarigKGOra5Mc/LrhOkcmHzDs vkYL7dfaaht8fLBKRTYwzSBvO9x54koTWjq7HkbaxkYAg3HnDTkNCyzkGKNdM89H q/PtGIFFlceQIOat3Kjd05Iw3PtLEWTDjT6FMA9Mkjk/XbpmycqRIwNKtgICoFsG juIpc4P31kxK7i3ri+JnlyvVmRZjJxrheJB0qHGXilrOVDPOliDn//jXbcyzXemu R8KgAeQM4IIs9jYHJOgHrTItIpwa9wNTEp9KCGkO6xr20NkKyDp6XRyd+hmnUB7r 77WTptvKPFFTjTDFqEtcif9U2kVkCfn2mSRO8noCbVH++fuR8LMWlD99gt8CAwEA AaNjMGEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIwZD9dCMXcFBuHTsZ/rOft4cTpFMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA FIwZD9dCMXcFBuHTsZ/rOft4cTpFMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDgYDVR0PAQH/ BAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQCsoxVi49anYZ1aI/2rVJ5bvEd3ZvGn wx1Y+l75SQVYU2qX9CHNBVg1t8reIBN8yPEfBM1WcFPEg7Vy3zFaklMPm/oYXwVI /lX/LsfPUxdnQmONxLw4x/0booN1LV/dtRcebewUSqog6W9Z2fbTEe6srIBE4M5G Wa943lthlmQM6HzlU4D606PQ3zQbX08mue4eqQB813r4uSoI1MpGLqxkziBRFGGN T4VNYp8DeSVr3jHjNBmKCAPZxJIYElnLEK027OG00RH7sF7SGFDNsCjN1NmCvuRz 9AHnjVIBNzIvI3uiOn9tngRDXBRIcUBsdYG19tal8yWBgrr9SdlqFy/Y -----END CERTIFICATE----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/bio/accept.cnf0000644000000000000000000000062113176625660015663 0ustar rootroot# Example configuration file # Port to listen on Port = 4433 # Disable TLS v1.2 for test. # Protocol = ALL, -TLSv1.2 # Only support 3 curves Curves = P-521:P-384:P-256 # Restricted signature algorithms SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA512 Certificate=server.pem PrivateKey=server.pem ChainCAFile=root.pem VerifyCAFile=root.pem # Request certificate VerifyMode=Request ClientCAFile=root.pem openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014304 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/ocsprun.sh0000644000000000000000000000061013176625660016326 0ustar rootroot# Example of running an querying OpenSSL test OCSP responder. # This assumes "mkcerts.sh" or similar has been run to set up the # necessary file structure. OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl OPENSSL_CONF=../../apps/openssl.cnf export OPENSSL_CONF # Run OCSP responder. PORT=8888 $OPENSSL ocsp -port $PORT -index index.txt -CA intca.pem \ -rsigner resp.pem -rkey respkey.pem -rother intca.pem $* openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/ocspquery.sh0000644000000000000000000000143613176625660016676 0ustar rootroot# Example querying OpenSSL test responder. Assumes ocsprun.sh has been # called. OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl OPENSSL_CONF=../../apps/openssl.cnf export OPENSSL_CONF # Send responder queries for each certificate. echo "Requesting OCSP status for each certificate" $OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem -cert client.pem -CAfile root.pem \ -url http://127.0.0.1:8888/ $OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem -cert server.pem -CAfile root.pem \ -url http://127.0.0.1:8888/ $OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem -cert rev.pem -CAfile root.pem \ -url http://127.0.0.1:8888/ # One query for all three certificates. echo "Requesting OCSP status for three certificates in one request" $OPENSSL ocsp -issuer intca.pem \ -cert client.pem -cert server.pem -cert rev.pem \ -CAfile root.pem -url http://127.0.0.1:8888/ openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660015247 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/mkacerts.sh0000644000000000000000000000351113176625660017414 0ustar rootroot#!/bin/sh # Recreate the demo certificates in the apps directory. OPENSSL=openssl # Root CA: create certificate directly CN="OpenSSL Test Root CA" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -x509 -nodes \ -keyout root.pem -out root.pem -key rootkey.pem -new -days 3650 # Intermediate CA: request first CN="OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \ -key intkey.pem -out intreq.pem -new # Sign request: CA extensions $OPENSSL x509 -req -in intreq.pem -CA root.pem -CAkey rootkey.pem -days 3630 \ -extfile apps.cnf -extensions v3_ca -CAcreateserial -out intca.pem # Client certificate: request first CN="Test Client Cert" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \ -key ckey.pem -out creq.pem -new # Sign using intermediate CA $OPENSSL x509 -req -in creq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial | \ $OPENSSL x509 -nameopt oneline -subject -issuer >client.pem # Server certificate: request first CN="Test Server Cert" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \ -key skey.pem -out sreq.pem -new # Sign using intermediate CA $OPENSSL x509 -req -in sreq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial | \ $OPENSSL x509 -nameopt oneline -subject -issuer >server.pem # Server certificate #2: request first CN="Test Server Cert #2" $OPENSSL req -config apps.cnf -nodes \ -key skey2.pem -out sreq2.pem -new # Sign using intermediate CA $OPENSSL x509 -req -in sreq2.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial | \ $OPENSSL x509 -nameopt oneline -subject -issuer >server2.pem # Append keys to file. cat skey.pem >>server.pem cat skey2.pem >>server2.pem cat ckey.pem >>client.pem $OPENSSL verify -CAfile root.pem -untrusted intca.pem \ server2.pem server.pem client.pem openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/skey.pem0000644000000000000000000000321713176625660016730 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA84TzkjbcskbKZnrlKcXzSSgi07n+4N7kOM7uIhzpkTuU0HIv h4VZS2axxfV6hV3CD9MuKVg2zEhroqK1Js5n4ke230nSP/qiELfCl0R+hzRtbfKL tFUr1iHeU0uQ6v3q+Tg1K/Tmmg72uxKrhyHDL7z0BriPjhAHJ5XlQsvR1RCMkqzu D9wjSInJxpMMIgLndOclAKv4D1wQtYU7ZpTw+01XBlUhIiXb86qpYL9NqnnRq5JI uhmOEuxo2ca63+xaHNhD/udSyc8C0Md/yX6wlONTRFgLLv0pdLUGm1xEjfsydaQ6 qGd7hzIKUI3hohNKJa/mHLElv7SZolPTogK/EQIDAQABAoIBAADq9FwNtuE5IRQn zGtO4q7Y5uCzZ8GDNYr9RKp+P2cbuWDbvVAecYq2NV9QoIiWJOAYZKklOvekIju3 r0UZLA0PRiIrTg6NrESx3JrjWDK8QNlUO7CPTZ39/K+FrmMkV9lem9yxjJjyC34D AQB+YRTx+l14HppjdxNwHjAVQpIx/uO2F5xAMuk32+3K+pq9CZUtrofe1q4Agj9R 5s8mSy9pbRo9kW9wl5xdEotz1LivFOEiqPUJTUq5J5PeMKao3vdK726XI4Z455Nm W2/MA0YV0ug2FYinHcZdvKM6dimH8GLfa3X8xKRfzjGjTiMSwsdjgMa4awY3tEHH 674jhAECgYEA/zqMrc0zsbNk83sjgaYIug5kzEpN4ic020rSZsmQxSCerJTgNhmg utKSCt0Re09Jt3LqG48msahX8ycqDsHNvlEGPQSbMu9IYeO3Wr3fAm75GEtFWePY BhM73I7gkRt4s8bUiUepMG/wY45c5tRF23xi8foReHFFe9MDzh8fJFECgYEA9EFX 4qAik1pOJGNei9BMwmx0I0gfVEIgu0tzeVqT45vcxbxr7RkTEaDoAG6PlbWP6D9a WQNLp4gsgRM90ZXOJ4up5DsAWDluvaF4/omabMA+MJJ5kGZ0gCj5rbZbKqUws7x8 bp+6iBfUPJUbcqNqFmi/08Yt7vrDnMnyMw2A/sECgYEAiiuRMxnuzVm34hQcsbhH 6ymVqf7j0PW2qK0F4H1ocT9qhzWFd+RB3kHWrCjnqODQoI6GbGr/4JepHUpre1ex 4UEN5oSS3G0ru0rC3U4C59dZ5KwDHFm7ffZ1pr52ljfQDUsrjjIMRtuiwNK2OoRa WSsqiaL+SDzSB+nBmpnAizECgYBdt/y6rerWUx4MhDwwtTnel7JwHyo2MDFS6/5g n8qC2Lj6/fMDRE22w+CA2esp7EJNQJGv+b27iFpbJEDh+/Lf5YzIT4MwVskQ5bYB JFcmRxUVmf4e09D7o705U/DjCgMH09iCsbLmqQ38ONIRSHZaJtMDtNTHD1yi+jF+ OT43gQKBgQC/2OHZoko6iRlNOAQ/tMVFNq7fL81GivoQ9F1U0Qr+DH3ZfaH8eIkX xT0ToMPJUzWAn8pZv0snA0um6SIgvkCuxO84OkANCVbttzXImIsL7pFzfcwV/ERK UM6j0ZuSMFOCr/lGPAoOQU0fskidGEHi1/kW+suSr28TqsyYZpwBDQ== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/intkey.pem0000644000000000000000000000321313176625660017254 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsErw75CmLYD6pkrGW/YhAl/K8L5wJYxDjqu2FghxjD8K308W 3EHq4uBxEwR1OHXaM1+6ZZw7/r2I37VLIdurBEAIEUdbzx0so74FPawgz5EW2CTq oJnK8F71/vo5Kj1VPwW46CxwxUR3cfvJGNXND2ip0TcyTSPLROXOyQakcVfIGJmd Sa1wHKi+c2gMA4emADudZUOYLrg80gr2ldePm07ynbVsKKzCcStw8MdmoW9Qt3fL nPJn2TFUUBNWj+4kvL+88edWCVQXKNdsysD/CDrH4W/hjyPDStVsM6XpiNU0+L2Z Y6fcj3OP8d0goOx45xotMn9m8hNkCGsrVXx9IwIDAQABAoIBACg3wIV2o2KIJSZg sqXyHY+0GNEZMO5v9E2NAMo//N941lshaN6wrww5FbK39qH9yNylfxmFLe6sgJhA fLZprbcXgH+onto+Fpv4UqvCI+4WdHa03U3sJ+70SvxzSy1Gtrbc8FUPJl7qgrFf Nn5S8CgOwYb4J6KPguTh5G3Z9RPiCKObwOwEM34hrZUlgPS88wmzu9H6L2GM8A1v YBtEr0msBnlJBJOgStyUEfHW2KspNQ+VllQ6c0cedgFXUpl9EoKTLxP+WXwFI1sx jFCFzSrMqPcPz1PxU6bXoZE0WH6r+3c8WAW4xR/HVu04BrBDu0CGwn6zAXDy6wCU pWogDlkCgYEA4o+nIu2CTzqUlgc22pj+hjenfS5lnCtJfAdrXOJHmnuL+J9h8Nzz 9kkL+/Y0Xg9bOM6xXPm+81UNpDvOLbUahSSQsfB+LNVEkthJIL4XIk083LsHjFaJ 9SiCFRbf2OgWrEhe/c1drySwz9u/0f4Q7B6VGqxMnTDjzS5JacZ1pE8CgYEAxzMn /n/Dpdn+c4rf14BRNKCv1qBXngPNylKJCmiRpKRJAn+B+Msdwtggk/1Ihju21wSo IGy0Gw7WQd1Iq7V85cB2G5PAFY6ybpSV6G3QrzmzuvjHmKvXgUAuuaN+7Pp1YkMY rLVjUOcdP5JbXG6XnaCkHYJR8uapPwWPkDt+oO0CgYBI4yZGGlr92j7LNW70TJw1 2dnMcAzIfTSa7lgf/bxDetPBHKWJs8vYxA9S9BZM3Gvgjr6IxuAjsI0+9O6TzdvG UckrNc+h5Mq241ZDbmRK6MZXzOPUxlKDyJBw8Hb7dU82BeJpjJRDMG6hsHS5vh77 l6sodZ4ARCZFcEq1+N8ICQKBgDeBHJLAXO6YmFrvhkGQ4o+senJuSRuhabUHXGIH ExXyJNnKV5fQWOGSwTkbKRsmBmNRS9uFDoY/kxnVI8ucjUmjYAV9HNek5DkFs+OI vc4lYNwnN85li23bSWm2kcZMX2ra0URGYn8HdtHg4Q4XTq3ANhp21oi9FsmVrhP9 T+JdAoGBAK2ebwZ7CXFavDFo4mzLKkGitBjrSi/udFhZECXZWEbNzWlVc3Y3q0cU drDqUtbVm+/Xb5CMU044Gqq6SKdObAb3JElKmFylFL9fp2rfL/foUr2sdb87Vqdp 2j5jZyvt1DKnNaJ7JaFbUdRxlvHQRiqKlZpafN/SMQ0jCs1bSgCg -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/rootkey.pem0000644000000000000000000000321713176625660017451 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpgIBAAKCAQEA0xpquKAoY6trkxz8uuE6RyYfMOy+Rgvt19pqG3x8sEpFNjDN IG873HniShNaOrseRtrGRgCDcecNOQ0LLOQYo10zz0er8+0YgUWVx5Ag5q3cqN3T kjDc+0sRZMONPoUwD0ySOT9dumbJypEjA0q2AgKgWwaO4ilzg/fWTEruLeuL4meX K9WZFmMnGuF4kHSocZeKWs5UM86WIOf/+NdtzLNd6a5HwqAB5Azggiz2Ngck6Aet Mi0inBr3A1MSn0oIaQ7rGvbQ2QrIOnpdHJ36GadQHuvvtZOm28o8UVONMMWoS1yJ /1TaRWQJ+faZJE7yegJtUf75+5HwsxaUP32C3wIDAQABAoIBAQCEybEnwVamm0Vn nGw9AT+vUYN9Ou3VEdviUzk7YOrt2Un/9GKTbGSzItf80H+JQfqhhywBDIGiPDxN Dq9g5Xm6CP51/BdlsFYhuqukhDyt3d9XOXHEG4hlaarfP0KxeQXqGbhA2mMSxWVZ TkI/59blHNHRcCagjIJlGJhsFRYNO1/ApfA5zN7fWCFvH1XWZhuvsPDgUXKm4BS0 p3ol67MVJHRfYcLb/txBO5rBhSXinK0jEBiljRcE0rWzRycSedmDgG3SNV17wvA0 UWgMNpPcJ1b7Satr0nM7A8+siV8FRcfvPqCuGPKCYTrNn71hGJEhKXKwlURj9+95 O5yzRxjBAoGBAPtTRYN40/piRB0XLpi+zNh+4Ba4TGfXSymbaozgC/pI5wfgGXrz IpT9ujjV42r8TABHvXa6uiGm0cbxcUgq2n6Y8rf6iHxmn23ezCEBUs7rd6jtt11b m58T8o0XWyOgAovaH0UgzMtrlsZYR2fli5254oRkTWwaUTuO38z6CVddAoGBANcH nvdu3RniIYStsr5/deu7l81ZQ9rSiR1m3H6Wy8ryMIfkYfa0WqXhwNHrLrhvhLIQ 7mGnJ+jAkJyVQULE6UdbmVW8tC58Dfrgz/1s7RMeUYPnOmRpx79c/LqZ2IunfFWx IvBvFu7vidEHA+1tU2N+oXNsU+B9XpfsJ+/d2QtrAoGBAJTuP58tFtClMp/agO5b AqC4bqqIBB704cGCK53XlsF2OhHcprzJH5ES2iub8+wOHit8V7Xn6SzP4jf2E58k Zd3nXM3RVNgDKC6/fE+CrUOZHYupcqOMCag29eDOGl/+DgQ5+ZXJXhKdaveWkJns 2NNat/SkS4zn+4NDozOgZ7CxAoGBAIuXjfJRTUXNUDci0APtGO9U1AJiLbOzs4Gb 0g539IqmWS0O7S3L/YDsolFkXOsssjcq2KYabsUhpX+RQVGIJWzGoS9QlqQKssSo Bz4c5Xbg2shHZtfi9+JaClNVJofazdOPcAAoDfpFFPHWnQ0YSOcxQLx+maEFok/7 5h1IputLAoGBAKGBWDPwskgRRfCAIFpCJLOu/9D30M/akMtO0kJYQpBjOaKuigUy ic7pthFVse/pMUljXHAd1hs2CTjMW1ukEusU3x1Ei6wvnHHqn0Hs+6D5NQFQkcMn 7rejJ+bpJPRAn40AAV5hGBYI12XycB8ZgyPC4hTUK6unGVK06DC4qvdv -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/mkxcerts.sh0000644000000000000000000000213613176625660017445 0ustar rootroot # Create certificates using various algorithms to test multi-certificate # functionality. OPENSSL=../../../apps/openssl CN="OpenSSL Test RSA SHA-1 cert" $OPENSSL req \ -config apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -x509 -nodes \ -keyout tsha1.pem -out tsha1.pem -new -days 3650 -sha1 CN="OpenSSL Test RSA SHA-256 cert" $OPENSSL req \ -config apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -x509 -nodes \ -keyout tsha256.pem -out tsha256.pem -new -days 3650 -sha256 CN="OpenSSL Test RSA SHA-512 cert" $OPENSSL req \ -config apps.cnf -extensions usr_cert -x509 -nodes \ -keyout tsha512.pem -out tsha512.pem -new -days 3650 -sha512 # Create EC parameters $OPENSSL ecparam -name P-256 -out ecp256.pem $OPENSSL ecparam -name P-384 -out ecp384.pem CN="OpenSSL Test P-256 SHA-256 cert" $OPENSSL req \ -config apps.cnf -extensions ec_cert -x509 -nodes \ -nodes -keyout tecp256.pem -out tecp256.pem -newkey ec:ecp256.pem \ -days 3650 -sha256 CN="OpenSSL Test P-384 SHA-384 cert" $OPENSSL req \ -config apps.cnf -extensions ec_cert -x509 -nodes \ -nodes -keyout tecp384.pem -out tecp384.pem -newkey ec:ecp384.pem \ -days 3650 -sha384 openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/ckey.pem0000644000000000000000000000321713176625660016710 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAtK2p2x0S3C1ajftAc3GaWPsji6scw1k9Sw/XltbLQuDc11/f wwrUiFcje2CB3Ri6yD6+uCA3V12jEc4GdqzirJZhwgIhaTv42vfYBgiUcR9McEGr agFC3yVR3lIbOzhBjmXNp1on46irxnzU4pT+w58IuvYqUBavaEtfRZocFR5NsIOy mRhyNag8htOFK3wmTEYrb0vflFYT6SD47ogYtsd/xWSKS+YFyb7xSusR2Ot6Ktmr MswQE57QYJz+KiRVlnL0cduMBdT52Wm8blaC9mz50PyrzjQ68NyHapCoWDU7pe4x HLtzpXGSDMPuw4miiSwMym/2wReYJv6cFugLPQIDAQABAoIBAAZOyc9MhIwLSU4L p4RgQvM4UVVe8/Id+3XTZ8NsXExJbWxXfIhiqGjaIfL8u4vsgRjcl+v1s/jo2/iT KMab4o4D8gXD7UavQVDjtjb/ta79WL3SjRl2Uc9YjjMkyq6WmDNQeo2NKDdafCTB 1uzSJtLNipB8Z53ELPuHJhxX9QMHrMnuha49riQgXZ7buP9iQrHJFhImBjSzbxJx L+TI6rkyLSf9Wi0Pd3L27Ob3QWNfNRYNSeTE+08eSRChkur5W0RuXAcuAICdQlCl LBvWO/LmmvbzCqiDcgy/TliSb6CGGwgiNG7LJZmlkYNj8laGwalNlYZs3UrVv6NO Br2loAECgYEA2kvCvPGj0Dg/6g7WhXDvAkEbcaL1tSeCxBbNH+6HS2UWMWvyTtCn /bbD519QIdkvayy1QjEf32GV/UjUVmlULMLBcDy0DGjtL3+XpIhLKWDNxN1v1/ai 1oz23ZJCOgnk6K4qtFtlRS1XtynjA+rBetvYvLP9SKeFrnpzCgaA2r0CgYEA0+KX 1ACXDTNH5ySX3kMjSS9xdINf+OOw4CvPHFwbtc9aqk2HePlEsBTz5I/W3rKwXva3 NqZ/bRqVVeZB/hHKFywgdUQk2Uc5z/S7Lw70/w1HubNTXGU06Ngb6zOFAo/o/TwZ zTP1BMIKSOB6PAZPS3l+aLO4FRIRotfFhgRHOoECgYEAmiZbqt8cJaJDB/5YYDzC mp3tSk6gIb936Q6M5VqkMYp9pIKsxhk0N8aDCnTU+kIK6SzWBpr3/d9Ecmqmfyq7 5SvWO3KyVf0WWK9KH0abhOm2BKm2HBQvI0DB5u8sUx2/hsvOnjPYDISbZ11t0MtK u35Zy89yMYcSsIYJjG/ROCUCgYEAgI2P9G5PNxEP5OtMwOsW84Y3Xat/hPAQFlI+ HES+AzbFGWJkeT8zL2nm95tVkFP1sggZ7Kxjz3w7cpx7GX0NkbWSE9O+T51pNASV tN1sQ3p5M+/a+cnlqgfEGJVvc7iAcXQPa3LEi5h2yPR49QYXAgG6cifn3dDSpmwn SUI7PQECgYEApGCIIpSRPLAEHTGmP87RBL1smurhwmy2s/pghkvUkWehtxg0sGHh kuaqDWcskogv+QC0sVdytiLSz8G0DwcEcsHK1Fkyb8A+ayiw6jWJDo2m9+IF4Fww 1Te6jFPYDESnbhq7+TLGgHGhtwcu5cnb4vSuYXGXKupZGzoLOBbv1Zw= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/skey2.pem0000644000000000000000000000321313176625660017006 0ustar rootroot-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA63Yu4/cnLRvi+BIwcoIz5hKmcziREG2tujKEBs4JVO3uV3+f UW/4YFULigKImXu/0fKyuMyeFu4l3V8NC6gachvAeWhiniN9sPgPU3AQKaF1y9gq 2EBEI2cFCKS5WASItjZCY951ZKuXYJdYDgC4kPlvI4N5M4ORHPa4pqfa/dzfMLEi 92sLGn7q5mArzn+5Xh2jD9Vif8w0RlDRxv1rQ413PGVBtfuhF1PSXNhbPtjpn+33 DdJdNACv8D4PDmjUtKyshqvSXSE/RURldW13v68efBWhOQiLXcAkmISbxfzveS1k KMSV8nuWwhS5rw0xMlavRTEgqbX7Jm14xGRrFwIDAQABAoIBAHLsTPihIfLnYIE5 x4GsQQ5zXeBw5ITDM37ktwHnQDC+rIzyUl1aLD1AZRBoKinXd4lOTqLZ4/NHKx4A DYr58mZtWyUmqLOMmQVuHXTZBlp7XtYuXMMNovQwjQlp9LicBeoBU6gQ5PVMtubD F4xGF89Sn0cTHW3iMkqTtQ5KcR1j57OcJO0FEb1vPvk2MXI5ZyAatUYE7YacbEzd rg02uIwx3FqNSkuSI79uz4hMdV5TPtuhxx9nTwj9aLUhXFeZ0mn2PVgVzEnnMoJb +znlsZDgzDlJqdaD744YGWh8Z3OEssB35KfzFcdOeO6yH8lmv2Zfznk7pNPT7LTb Lae9VgkCgYEA92p1qnAB3NtJtNcaW53i0S5WJgS1hxWKvUDx3lTB9s8X9fHpqL1a E94fDfWzp/hax6FefUKIvBOukPLQ6bYjTMiFoOHzVirghAIuIUoMI5VtLhwD1hKs Lr7l/dptMgKb1nZHyXoKHRBthsy3K4+udsPi8TzMvYElgEqyQIe/Rk0CgYEA86GL 8HC6zLszzKERDPBxrboRmoFvVUCTQDhsfj1M8aR3nQ8V5LkdIJc7Wqm/Ggfk9QRf rJ8M2WUMlU5CNnCn/KCrKzCNZIReze3fV+HnKdbcXGLvgbHPrhnz8yYehUFG+RGq bVyDWRU94T38izy2s5qMYrMJWZEYyXncSPbfcPMCgYAtaXfxcZ+V5xYPQFARMtiX 5nZfggvDoJuXgx0h3tK/N2HBfcaSdzbaYLG4gTmZggc/jwnl2dl5E++9oSPhUdIG 3ONSFUbxsOsGr9PBvnKd8WZZyUCXAVRjPBzAzF+whzQNWCZy/5htnz9LN7YDI9s0 5113Q96cheDZPFydZY0hHQKBgQDVbEhNukM5xCiNcu+f2SaMnLp9EjQ4h5g3IvaP 5B16daw/Dw8LzcohWboqIxeAsze0GD/D1ZUJAEd0qBjC3g+a9BjefervCjKOzXng 38mEUm+6EwVjJSQcjSmycEs+Sr/kwr/8i5WYvU32+jk4tFgMoC+o6tQe/Uesf68k z/dPVwKBgGbF7Vv1/3SmhlOy+zYyvJ0CrWtKxH9QP6tLIEgEpd8x7YTSuCH94yok kToMXYA3sWNPt22GbRDZ+rcp4c7HkDx6I6vpdP9aQEwJTp0EPy0sgWr2XwYmreIQ NFmkk8Itn9EY2R9VBaP7GLv5kvwxDdLAnmwGmzVtbmaVdxCaBwUk -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/apps/apps.cnf0000644000000000000000000000340213176625660016701 0ustar rootroot# # OpenSSL configuration file to create apps directory certificates # # This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME or CN # is undefined. HOME = . RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd CN = "Not Defined" #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_keyfile = privkey.pem # Don't prompt for fields: use those in section directly prompt = no distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert string_mask = utf8only # req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = UK organizationName = OpenSSL Group organizationalUnitName = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY # Take CN from environment so it can come from a script. commonName = $ENV::CN [ usr_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity # certificate basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" [ ec_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity # certificate basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyAgreement # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA # PKIX recommendation. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always basicConstraints = critical,CA:true keyUsage = critical, cRLSign, keyCertSign openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/README0000644000000000000000000000153413176625660015167 0ustar rootrootThere is often a need to generate test certificates automatically using a script. This is often a cause for confusion which can result in incorrect CA certificates, obsolete V1 certificates or duplicate serial numbers. The range of command line options can be daunting for a beginner. The mkcerts.sh script is an example of how to generate certificates automatically using scripts. Example creates a root CA, an intermediate CA signed by the root and several certificates signed by the intermediate CA. The script then creates an empty index.txt file and adds entries for the certificates and generates a CRL. Then one certificate is revoked and a second CRL generated. The script ocsprun.sh runs the test responder on port 8888 covering the client certificates. The script ocspquery.sh queries the status of the certificates using the test responder. openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/ca.cnf0000644000000000000000000000430613176625660015362 0ustar rootroot# # OpenSSL example configuration file for automated certificate creation. # # This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME or CN # is undefined. HOME = . RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd CN = "Not Defined" default_ca = ca #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 1024 default_keyfile = privkey.pem # Don't prompt for fields: use those in section directly prompt = no distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extensions to add to the self signed cert string_mask = utf8only # req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = UK organizationName = OpenSSL Group # Take CN from environment so it can come from a script. commonName = $ENV::CN [ usr_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity # certificate basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid # OCSP responder certificate [ ocsp_cert ] basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE keyUsage=critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid extendedKeyUsage=OCSPSigning [ dh_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request for an end entity # DH certificate basicConstraints=critical, CA:FALSE keyUsage=critical, keyAgreement # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA # PKIX recommendation. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always basicConstraints = critical,CA:true keyUsage = critical, cRLSign, keyCertSign # Minimal CA entry to allow generation of CRLs. [ca] database=index.txt crlnumber=crlnum.txt openssl-1.1.0g/demos/certs/mkcerts.sh0000644000000000000000000000746113176625660016320 0ustar rootroot#!/bin/sh OPENSSL=../../apps/openssl OPENSSL_CONF=../../apps/openssl.cnf export OPENSSL_CONF # Root CA: create certificate directly CN="Test Root CA" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -x509 -nodes \ -keyout root.pem -out root.pem -newkey rsa:2048 -days 3650 # Intermediate CA: request first CN="Test Intermediate CA" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout intkey.pem -out intreq.pem -newkey rsa:2048 # Sign request: CA extensions $OPENSSL x509 -req -in intreq.pem -CA root.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions v3_ca -CAcreateserial -out intca.pem # Server certificate: create request first CN="Test Server Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout skey.pem -out req.pem -newkey rsa:1024 # Sign request: end entity extensions $OPENSSL x509 -req -in req.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial -out server.pem # Client certificate: request first CN="Test Client Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout ckey.pem -out creq.pem -newkey rsa:1024 # Sign using intermediate CA $OPENSSL x509 -req -in creq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial -out client.pem # Revoked certificate: request first CN="Test Revoked Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout revkey.pem -out rreq.pem -newkey rsa:1024 # Sign using intermediate CA $OPENSSL x509 -req -in rreq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions usr_cert -CAcreateserial -out rev.pem # OCSP responder certificate: request first CN="Test OCSP Responder Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -nodes \ -keyout respkey.pem -out respreq.pem -newkey rsa:1024 # Sign using intermediate CA and responder extensions $OPENSSL x509 -req -in respreq.pem -CA intca.pem -CAkey intkey.pem -days 3600 \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions ocsp_cert -CAcreateserial -out resp.pem # Example creating a PKCS#3 DH certificate. # First DH parameters [ -f dhp.pem ] || $OPENSSL genpkey -genparam -algorithm DH -pkeyopt dh_paramgen_prime_len:1024 -out dhp.pem # Now a DH private key $OPENSSL genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out dhskey.pem # Create DH public key file $OPENSSL pkey -in dhskey.pem -pubout -out dhspub.pem # Certificate request, key just reuses old one as it is ignored when the # request is signed. CN="Test Server DH Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -new \ -key skey.pem -out dhsreq.pem # Sign request: end entity DH extensions $OPENSSL x509 -req -in dhsreq.pem -CA root.pem -days 3600 \ -force_pubkey dhspub.pem \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions dh_cert -CAcreateserial -out dhserver.pem # DH client certificate $OPENSSL genpkey -paramfile dhp.pem -out dhckey.pem $OPENSSL pkey -in dhckey.pem -pubout -out dhcpub.pem CN="Test Client DH Cert" $OPENSSL req -config ca.cnf -new \ -key skey.pem -out dhcreq.pem $OPENSSL x509 -req -in dhcreq.pem -CA root.pem -days 3600 \ -force_pubkey dhcpub.pem \ -extfile ca.cnf -extensions dh_cert -CAcreateserial -out dhclient.pem # Examples of CRL generation without the need to use 'ca' to issue # certificates. # Create zero length index file >index.txt # Create initial crl number file echo 01 >crlnum.txt # Add entries for server and client certs $OPENSSL ca -valid server.pem -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem \ -config ca.cnf -md sha1 $OPENSSL ca -valid client.pem -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem \ -config ca.cnf -md sha1 $OPENSSL ca -valid rev.pem -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem \ -config ca.cnf -md sha1 # Generate a CRL. $OPENSSL ca -gencrl -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem -config ca.cnf \ -md sha1 -crldays 1 -out crl1.pem # Revoke a certificate openssl ca -revoke rev.pem -crl_reason superseded \ -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem -config ca.cnf -md sha1 # Generate another CRL $OPENSSL ca -gencrl -keyfile root.pem -cert root.pem -config ca.cnf \ -md sha1 -crldays 1 -out crl2.pem openssl-1.1.0g/CHANGES0000644000000000000000000204742013176625655013065 0ustar rootroot OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes. For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example, https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate release branch. Changes between 1.1.0f and 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017] *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3736) [Andy Polyakov] *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension, OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3735) [Rich Salz] *) Ignore the '-named_curve auto' value for compatibility of applications with OpenSSL 1.0.2. [Tomas Mraz ] *) Support for SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC in SSL_CONF_cmd. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.1.0e and 1.1.0f [25 May 2017] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target platform rather than 'mingw'. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c. VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1, which is the minimum version we support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.0d and 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017] *) Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependant on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat). (CVE-2017-3733) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0c and 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017] *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google. (CVE-2017-3731) [Andy Polyakov] *) Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2017-3730) [Matt Caswell] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3732) [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016] *) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team) (CVE-2016-7054) [Richard Levitte] *) CMS Null dereference Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings. Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure. (CVE-2016-7053) [Stephen Henson] *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected. This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for providing reproducible case. (CVE-2016-7055) [Andy Polyakov] *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0 or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed automatic addition of RPATH in shared libraries and executables, as this was a remainder from OpenSSL 1.0.x and isn't needed any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.0a and 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016] *) Fix Use After Free for large message sizes The patch applied to address CVE-2016-6307 resulted in an issue where if a message larger than approx 16k is received then the underlying buffer to store the incoming message is reallocated and moved. Unfortunately a dangling pointer to the old location is left which results in an attempt to write to the previously freed location. This is likely to result in a crash, however it could potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code. This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki. (CVE-2016-6309) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0 and 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016] *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6304) [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_peek() hang on empty record OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer sends an empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Alex Gaynor. (CVE-2016-6305) [Matt Caswell] *) Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() and dtls1_preprocess_fragment() A (D)TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message. This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed connection in a timely manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if: 1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event that the connection fails or 2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there is very little free memory or 3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is insufficient memory to service the multiple requests. Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6307 and CVE-2016-6308) [Matt Caswell] *) solaris-x86-cc, i.e. 32-bit configuration with vendor compiler, had to be removed. Primary reason is that vendor assembler can't assemble our modules with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged option, which we firmly point at... [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.1.0 [25 Aug 2016] *) Windows command-line tool supports UTF-8 opt-in option for arguments and console input. Setting OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment variable (to any value) allows Windows user to access PKCS#12 file generated with Windows CryptoAPI and protected with non-ASCII password, as well as files generated under UTF-8 locale on Linux also protected with non-ASCII password. [Andy Polyakov] *) To mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183), 3DES cipher suites have been disabled by default and removed from DEFAULT, just like RC4. See the RC4 item below to re-enable both. [Rich Salz] *) The method for finding the storage location for the Windows RAND seed file has changed. First we check %RANDFILE%. If that is not set then we check the directories %HOME%, %USERPROFILE% and %SYSTEMROOT% in that order. If all else fails we fall back to C:\. [Matt Caswell] *) The EVP_EncryptUpdate() function has had its return type changed from void to int. A return of 0 indicates and error while a return of 1 indicates success. [Matt Caswell] *) The flags RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME and DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME which previously provided the ability to switch off the constant time implementation for RSA, DSA and DH have been made no-ops and deprecated. [Matt Caswell] *) Windows RAND implementation was simplified to only get entropy by calling CryptGenRandom(). Various other RAND-related tickets were also closed. [Joseph Wylie Yandle, Rich Salz] *) The stack and lhash API's were renamed to start with OPENSSL_SK_ and OPENSSL_LH_, respectively. The old names are available with API compatibility. They new names are now completely documented. [Rich Salz] *) Unify TYPE_up_ref(obj) methods signature. SSL_CTX_up_ref(), SSL_up_ref(), X509_up_ref(), EVP_PKEY_up_ref(), X509_CRL_up_ref(), X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count() methods are now returning an int (instead of void) like all others TYPE_up_ref() methods. So now these methods also check the return value of CRYPTO_atomic_add(), and the validity of object reference counter. [fdasilvayy@gmail.com] *) With Windows Visual Studio builds, the .pdb files are installed alongside the installed libraries and executables. For a static library installation, ossl_static.pdb is the associate compiler generated .pdb file to be used when linking programs. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove openssl.spec. Packaging files belong with the packagers. [Richard Levitte] *) Automatic Darwin/OSX configuration has had a refresh, it will now recognise x86_64 architectures automatically. You can still decide to build for a different bitness with the environment variable KERNEL_BITS (can be 32 or 64), for example: KERNEL_BITS=32 ./config [Richard Levitte] *) Change default algorithms in pkcs8 utility to use PKCS#5 v2.0, 256 bit AES and HMAC with SHA256. [Steve Henson] *) Remove support for MIPS o32 ABI on IRIX (and IRIX only). [Andy Polyakov] *) Triple-DES ciphers have been moved from HIGH to MEDIUM. [Rich Salz] *) To enable users to have their own config files and build file templates, Configure looks in the directory indicated by the environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR as well as the in-source Configurations/ directory. On VMS, OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is expected to be a logical name and is used as is. [Richard Levitte] *) The following datatypes were made opaque: X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD. The unused type X509_CERT_FILE_CTX was removed. [Rich Salz] *) "shared" builds are now the default. To create only static libraries use the "no-shared" Configure option. [Matt Caswell] *) Remove the no-aes, no-hmac, no-rsa, no-sha and no-md5 Configure options. All of these option have not worked for some while and are fundamental algorithms. [Matt Caswell] *) Make various cleanup routines no-ops and mark them as deprecated. Most global cleanup functions are no longer required because they are handled via auto-deinit (see OPENSSL_init_crypto and OPENSSL_init_ssl man pages). Explicitly de-initing can cause problems (e.g. where a library that uses OpenSSL de-inits, but an application is still using it). The affected functions are CONF_modules_free(), ENGINE_cleanup(), OBJ_cleanup(), EVP_cleanup(), BIO_sock_cleanup(), CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), RAND_cleanup(), SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(), ERR_free_strings() and COMP_zlib_cleanup(). [Matt Caswell] *) --strict-warnings no longer enables runtime debugging options such as REF_DEBUG. Instead, debug options are automatically enabled with '--debug' builds. [Andy Polyakov, Emilia Käsper] *) Made DH and DH_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DH objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Made RSA and RSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing RSA objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Richard Levitte] *) Made DSA and DSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DSA objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Made BIO and BIO_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing BIOs have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed no-rijndael as a config option. Rijndael is an old name for AES. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed the mk1mf build scripts. [Richard Levitte] *) Headers are now wrapped, if necessary, with OPENSSL_NO_xxx, so it is always safe to #include a header now. [Rich Salz] *) Removed the aged BC-32 config and all its supporting scripts [Richard Levitte] *) Removed support for Ultrix, Netware, and OS/2. [Rich Salz] *) Add support for HKDF. [Alessandro Ghedini] *) Add support for blake2b and blake2s [Bill Cox] *) Added support for "pipelining". Ciphers that have the EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE flag set have a capability to process multiple encryptions/decryptions simultaneously. There are currently no built-in ciphers with this property but the expectation is that engines will be able to offer it to significantly improve throughput. Support has been extended into libssl so that multiple records for a single connection can be processed in one go (for >=TLS 1.1). [Matt Caswell] *) Added the AFALG engine. This is an async capable engine which is able to offload work to the Linux kernel. In this initial version it only supports AES128-CBC. The kernel must be version 4.1.0 or greater. [Catriona Lucey] *) OpenSSL now uses a new threading API. It is no longer necessary to set locking callbacks to use OpenSSL in a multi-threaded environment. There are two supported threading models: pthreads and windows threads. It is also possible to configure OpenSSL at compile time for "no-threads". The old threading API should no longer be used. The functions have been replaced with "no-op" compatibility macros. [Alessandro Ghedini, Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Add SSL_CIPHER queries for authentication and key-exchange. [Todd Short] *) Changes to the DEFAULT cipherlist: - Prefer (EC)DHE handshakes over plain RSA. - Prefer AEAD ciphers over legacy ciphers. - Prefer ECDSA over RSA when both certificates are available. - Prefer TLSv1.2 ciphers/PRF. - Remove DSS, SEED, IDEA, CAMELLIA, and AES-CCM from the default cipherlist. [Emilia Käsper] *) Change the ECC default curve list to be this, in order: x25519, secp256r1, secp521r1, secp384r1. [Rich Salz] *) RC4 based libssl ciphersuites are now classed as "weak" ciphers and are disabled by default. They can be re-enabled using the enable-weak-ssl-ciphers option to Configure. [Matt Caswell] *) If the server has ALPN configured, but supports no protocols that the client advertises, send a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. This behaviour is SHALL in RFC 7301, though it isn't universally implemented by other servers. [Emilia Käsper] *) Add X25519 support. Add ASN.1 and EVP_PKEY methods for X25519. This includes support for public and private key encoding using the format documented in draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-02. The corresponding EVP_PKEY method supports key generation and key derivation. TLS support complies with draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-08 and uses X25519(29). [Steve Henson] *) Deprecate SRP_VBASE_get_by_user. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak (CVE-2016-0798), SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. [Emilia Käsper] *) Configuration change; it's now possible to build dynamic engines without having to build shared libraries and vice versa. This only applies to the engines in engines/, those in crypto/engine/ will always be built into libcrypto (i.e. "static"). Building dynamic engines is enabled by default; to disable, use the configuration option "disable-dynamic-engine". The only requirements for building dynamic engines are the presence of the DSO module and building with position independent code, so they will also automatically be disabled if configuring with "disable-dso" or "disable-pic". The macros OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE and OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE are also taken away from openssl/opensslconf.h, as they are irrelevant. [Richard Levitte] *) Configuration change; if there is a known flag to compile position independent code, it will always be applied on the libcrypto and libssl object files, and never on the application object files. This means other libraries that use routines from libcrypto / libssl can be made into shared libraries regardless of how OpenSSL was configured. If this isn't desirable, the configuration options "disable-pic" or "no-pic" can be used to disable the use of PIC. This will also disable building shared libraries and dynamic engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Removed JPAKE code. It was experimental and has no wide use. [Rich Salz] *) The INSTALL_PREFIX Makefile variable has been renamed to DESTDIR. That makes for less confusion on what this variable is for. Also, the configuration option --install_prefix is removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Heartbeat for TLS has been removed and is disabled by default for DTLS; configure with enable-heartbeats. Code that uses the old #define's might need to be updated. [Emilia Käsper, Rich Salz] *) Rename REF_CHECK to REF_DEBUG. [Rich Salz] *) New "unified" build system The "unified" build system is aimed to be a common system for all platforms we support. With it comes new support for VMS. This system builds supports building in a different directory tree than the source tree. It produces one Makefile (for unix family or lookalikes), or one descrip.mms (for VMS). The source of information to make the Makefile / descrip.mms is small files called 'build.info', holding the necessary information for each directory with source to compile, and a template in Configurations, like unix-Makefile.tmpl or descrip.mms.tmpl. With this change, the library names were also renamed on Windows and on VMS. They now have names that are closer to the standard on Unix, and include the major version number, and in certain cases, the architecture they are built for. See "Notes on shared libraries" in INSTALL. We rely heavily on the perl module Text::Template. [Richard Levitte] *) Added support for auto-initialisation and de-initialisation of the library. OpenSSL no longer requires explicit init or deinit routines to be called, except in certain circumstances. See the OPENSSL_init_crypto() and OPENSSL_init_ssl() man pages for further information. [Matt Caswell] *) The arguments to the DTLSv1_listen function have changed. Specifically the "peer" argument is now expected to be a BIO_ADDR object. *) Rewrite of BIO networking library. The BIO library lacked consistent support of IPv6, and adding it required some more extensive modifications. This introduces the BIO_ADDR and BIO_ADDRINFO types, which hold all types of addresses and chains of address information. It also introduces a new API, with functions like BIO_socket, BIO_connect, BIO_listen, BIO_lookup and a rewrite of BIO_accept. The source/sink BIOs BIO_s_connect, BIO_s_accept and BIO_s_datagram have been adapted accordingly. [Richard Levitte] *) RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1 now accepts inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. [Emilia Käsper] *) CRIME protection: disable compression by default, even if OpenSSL is compiled with zlib enabled. Applications can still enable compression by calling SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION), or by using the SSL_CONF library to configure compression. [Emilia Käsper] *) The signature of the session callback configured with SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb was changed. The read-only input buffer was explicitly marked as 'const unsigned char*' instead of 'unsigned char*'. [Emilia Käsper] *) Always DPURIFY. Remove the use of uninitialized memory in the RNG, and other conditional uses of DPURIFY. This makes -DPURIFY a no-op. [Emilia Käsper] *) Removed many obsolete configuration items, including DES_PTR, DES_RISC1, DES_RISC2, DES_INT MD2_CHAR, MD2_INT, MD2_LONG BF_PTR, BF_PTR2 IDEA_SHORT, IDEA_LONG RC2_SHORT, RC2_LONG, RC4_LONG, RC4_CHUNK, RC4_INDEX [Rich Salz, with advice from Andy Polyakov] *) Many BN internals have been moved to an internal header file. [Rich Salz with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Configuration and writing out the results from it has changed. Files such as Makefile include/openssl/opensslconf.h and are now produced through general templates, such as Makefile.in and crypto/opensslconf.h.in and some help from the perl module Text::Template. Also, the center of configuration information is no longer Makefile. Instead, Configure produces a perl module in configdata.pm which holds most of the config data (in the hash table %config), the target data that comes from the target configuration in one of the Configurations/*.conf files (in %target). [Richard Levitte] *) To clarify their intended purposes, the Configure options --prefix and --openssldir change their semantics, and become more straightforward and less interdependent. --prefix shall be used exclusively to give the location INSTALLTOP where programs, scripts, libraries, include files and manuals are going to be installed. The default is now /usr/local. --openssldir shall be used exclusively to give the default location OPENSSLDIR where certificates, private keys, CRLs are managed. This is also where the default openssl.cnf gets installed. If the directory given with this option is a relative path, the values of both the --prefix value and the --openssldir value will be combined to become OPENSSLDIR. The default for --openssldir is INSTALLTOP/ssl. Anyone who uses --openssldir to specify where OpenSSL is to be installed MUST change to use --prefix instead. [Richard Levitte] *) The GOST engine was out of date and therefore it has been removed. An up to date GOST engine is now being maintained in an external repository. See: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Binaries. Libssl still retains support for GOST ciphersuites (these are only activated if a GOST engine is present). [Matt Caswell] *) EGD is no longer supported by default; use enable-egd when configuring. [Ben Kaduk and Rich Salz] *) The distribution now has Makefile.in files, which are used to create Makefile's when Configure is run. *Configure must be run before trying to build now.* [Rich Salz] *) The return value for SSL_CIPHER_description() for error conditions has changed. [Rich Salz] *) Support for RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA peer authentication. Obtaining and performing DNSSEC validation of TLSA records is the application's responsibility. The application provides the TLSA records of its choice to OpenSSL, and these are then used to authenticate the peer. The TLSA records need not even come from DNS. They can, for example, be used to implement local end-entity certificate or trust-anchor "pinning", where the "pin" data takes the form of TLSA records, which can augment or replace verification based on the usual WebPKI public certification authorities. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Revert default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED setting. Instead OpenSSL continues to support deprecated interfaces in default builds. However, applications are strongly advised to compile their source files with -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L, which hides the declarations of all interfaces deprecated in 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or the 1.1.0 releases. In environments in which all applications have been ported to not use any deprecated interfaces OpenSSL's Configure script should be used with the --api=1.1.0 option to entirely remove support for the deprecated features from the library and unconditionally disable them in the installed headers. Essentially the same effect can be achieved with the "no-deprecated" argument to Configure, except that this will always restrict the build to just the latest API, rather than a fixed API version. As applications are ported to future revisions of the API, they should update their compile-time OPENSSL_API_COMPAT define accordingly, but in most cases should be able to continue to compile with later releases. The OPENSSL_API_COMPAT versions for 1.0.0, and 0.9.8 are 0x10000000L and 0x00908000L, respectively. However those versions did not support the OPENSSL_API_COMPAT feature, and so applications are not typically tested for explicit support of just the undeprecated features of either release. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Add support for setting the minimum and maximum supported protocol. It can bet set via the SSL_set_min_proto_version() and SSL_set_max_proto_version(), or via the SSL_CONF's MinProtocol and MaxProtcol. It's recommended to use the new APIs to disable protocols instead of disabling individual protocols using SSL_set_options() or SSL_CONF's Protocol. This change also removes support for disabling TLS 1.2 in the OpenSSL TLS client at compile time by defining OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Support for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 added to libcrypto and libssl. [Andy Polyakov] *) New EC_KEY_METHOD, this replaces the older ECDSA_METHOD and ECDH_METHOD and integrates ECDSA and ECDH functionality into EC. Implementations can now redirect key generation and no longer need to convert to or from ECDSA_SIG format. Note: the ecdsa.h and ecdh.h headers are now no longer needed and just include the ec.h header file instead. [Steve Henson] *) Remove support for all 40 and 56 bit ciphers. This includes all the export ciphers who are no longer supported and drops support the ephemeral RSA key exchange. The LOW ciphers currently doesn't have any ciphers in it. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Made EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER and HMAC_CTX opaque. For HMAC_CTX, the following constructors and destructors were added: HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void); void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx); For EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER, complete APIs to create, fill and destroy such methods has been added. See EVP_MD_meth_new(3) and EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(3) for documentation. Additional changes: 1) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() and HMAC_CTX_cleanup() were removed. HMAC_CTX_reset() and EVP_MD_CTX_reset() should be called instead to reinitialise an already created structure. 2) For consistency with the majority of our object creators and destructors, EVP_MD_CTX_(create|destroy) were renamed to EVP_MD_CTX_(new|free). The old names are retained as macros for deprecated builds. [Richard Levitte] *) Added ASYNC support. Libcrypto now includes the async sub-library to enable cryptographic operations to be performed asynchronously as long as an asynchronous capable engine is used. See the ASYNC_start_job() man page for further details. Libssl has also had this capability integrated with the introduction of the new mode SSL_MODE_ASYNC and associated error SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC. See the SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_get_error() man pages. This work was developed in partnership with Intel Corp. [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() has been removed and ECDH is support is always enabled now. If you want to disable the support you should exclude it using the list of supported ciphers. This also means that the "-no_ecdhe" option has been removed from s_server. [Kurt Roeckx] *) SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() which can set 1 EC curve now internally calls SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() which can set a list. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Remove support for SSL_{CTX_}set_tmp_ecdh_callback(). You should set the curve you want to support using SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves(). [Kurt Roeckx] *) State machine rewrite. The state machine code has been significantly refactored in order to remove much duplication of code and solve issues with the old code (see ssl/statem/README for further details). This change does have some associated API changes. Notably the SSL_state() function has been removed and replaced by SSL_get_state which now returns an "OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE" instead of an int. SSL_set_state() has been removed altogether. The previous handshake states defined in ssl.h and ssl3.h have also been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) All instances of the string "ssleay" in the public API were replaced with OpenSSL (case-matching; e.g., OPENSSL_VERSION for #define's) Some error codes related to internal RSA_eay API's were renamed. [Rich Salz] *) The demo files in crypto/threads were moved to demo/threads. [Rich Salz] *) Removed obsolete engines: 4758cca, aep, atalla, cswift, nuron, gmp, sureware and ubsec. [Matt Caswell, Rich Salz] *) New ASN.1 embed macro. New ASN.1 macro ASN1_EMBED. This is the same as ASN1_SIMPLE except the structure is not allocated: it is part of the parent. That is instead of FOO *x; it must be: FOO x; This reduces memory fragmentation and make it impossible to accidentally set a mandatory field to NULL. This currently only works for some fields specifically a SEQUENCE, CHOICE, or ASN1_STRING type which is part of a parent SEQUENCE. Since it is equivalent to ASN1_SIMPLE it cannot be tagged, OPTIONAL, SET OF or SEQUENCE OF. [Steve Henson] *) Remove EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY, a compile-time option that never compiled. [Emilia Käsper] *) Removed DES and RC4 ciphersuites from DEFAULT. Also removed RC2 although in 1.0.2 EXPORT was already removed and the only RC2 ciphersuite is also an EXPORT one. COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT has been updated accordingly to add DES and RC4 ciphersuites. [Matt Caswell] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix no-stdio build. [ David Woodhouse and also Ivan Nestlerode ] *) New testing framework The testing framework has been largely rewritten and is now using perl and the perl modules Test::Harness and an extended variant of Test::More called OpenSSL::Test to do its work. All test scripts in test/ have been rewritten into test recipes, and all direct calls to executables in test/Makefile have become individual recipes using the simplified testing OpenSSL::Test::Simple. For documentation on our testing modules, do: perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm [Richard Levitte] *) Revamped memory debug; only -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG and -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT are used; the latter aborts on memory leaks (usually checked on exit). Some undocumented "set malloc, etc., hooks" functions were removed and others were changed. All are now documented. [Rich Salz] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] *) Rewrite PSK to support ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK. Add ciphersuites from RFC4279, RFC4785, RFC5487, RFC5489. Thanks to Christian J. Dietrich and Giuseppe D'Angelo for the original RSA_PSK patch. [Steve Henson] *) Dropped support for the SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED flag. This SSLeay era flag was never set throughout the codebase (only read). Also removed SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER which was only used if SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED was also set. [Matt Caswell] *) Changed the default name options in the "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509" to be "oneline" instead of "compat". [Richard Levitte] *) Remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is SSLeay legacy, we're not aware of clients that still exhibit this bug, and the workaround hasn't been working properly for a while. [Emilia Käsper] *) The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is transferred. [Matt Caswell] *) Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably not well tested). Therefore the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option has been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them. [Matt Caswell] *) Version negotiation has been rewritten. In particular SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method() and SSLv23_server_method() have been deprecated, and turned into macros which simply call the new preferred function names TLS_method(), TLS_client_method() and TLS_server_method(). All new code should use the new names instead. Also as part of this change the ssl23.h header file has been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) Support for Kerberos ciphersuites in TLS (RFC2712) has been removed. This code and the associated standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose. [Matt Caswell] *) RT2547 was closed. When generating a private key, try to make the output file readable only by the owner. This behavior change might be noticeable when interacting with other software. *) Documented all exdata functions. Added CRYPTO_free_ex_index. Added a test. [Rich Salz] *) Added HTTP GET support to the ocsp command. [Rich Salz] *) Changed default digest for the dgst and enc commands from MD5 to sha256 [Rich Salz] *) RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Users should use RAND_bytes instead. [Matt Caswell] *) Added support for TLS extended master secret from draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-03.txt. Thanks for Alfredo Pironti for an initial patch which was a great help during development. [Steve Henson] *) All libssl internal structures have been removed from the public header files, and the OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN option has been removed (since it is now redundant). Users should not attempt to access internal structures directly. Instead they should use the provided API functions. [Matt Caswell] *) config has been changed so that by default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is used. Access to deprecated functions can be re-enabled by running config with "enable-deprecated". In addition applications wishing to use deprecated functions must define OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED. Note that this new behaviour will, by default, disable some transitive includes that previously existed in the header files (e.g. ec.h will no longer, by default, include bn.h) [Matt Caswell] *) Added support for OCB mode. OpenSSL has been granted a patent license compatible with the OpenSSL license for use of OCB. Details are available at https://www.openssl.org/source/OCB-patent-grant-OpenSSL.pdf. Support for OCB can be removed by calling config with no-ocb. [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 support has been removed. It still supports receiving a SSLv2 compatible client hello. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz], done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case. [Annie Yousar ] *) CA.sh has been removed; use CA.pl instead. [Rich Salz] *) Removed old DES API. [Rich Salz] *) Remove various unsupported platforms: Sony NEWS4 BEOS and BEOS_R5 NeXT SUNOS MPE/iX Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400 DGUX NCR Tandem Cray 16-bit platforms such as WIN16 [Rich Salz] *) Clean up OPENSSL_NO_xxx #define's Use setbuf() and remove OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF Rename OPENSSL_SYSNAME_xxx to OPENSSL_SYS_xxx OPENSSL_NO_EC{DH,DSA} merged into OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO Remove OPENSSL_NO_BIO OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY OPENSSL_NO_EVP OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_ERR OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP OPENSSL_NO_LHASH OPENSSL_NO_OBJECT OPENSSL_NO_SPEED OPENSSL_NO_STACK OPENSSL_NO_X509 OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY Remove MS_STATIC; it's a relic from platforms <32 bits. [Rich Salz] *) Cleaned up dead code Remove all but one '#ifdef undef' which is to be looked at. [Rich Salz] *) Clean up calling of xxx_free routines. Just like free(), fix most of the xxx_free routines to accept NULL. Remove the non-null checks from callers. Save much code. [Rich Salz] *) Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible). Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc. Contributed by Akamai Technologies under our Corporate CLA. [Rich Salz] *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator, bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator. [Felix Laurie von Massenbach ] *) New output format NSS in the sess_id command line tool. This allows exporting the session id and the master key in NSS keylog format. [Martin Kaiser ] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support. Experimental support for encrypt then mac from draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42 For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no effect. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Extend CMS code to support RSA-PSS signatures and RSA-OAEP for enveloped data. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) New function ASN1_TIME_diff to calculate the difference between two ASN1_TIME structures or one structure and the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected failures. [Steve Henson] *) Add FIPS_{rsa,dsa,ecdsa}_{sign,verify} functions which digest and sign or verify all in one operation. [Steve Henson] *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporating all the algorithm test programs and fips_test_suite. Includes functionality to parse the minimal script output of fipsalgest.pl directly. [Steve Henson] *) Add authorisation parameter to FIPS_module_mode_set(). [Steve Henson] *) Add FIPS selftest for ECDH algorithm using P-224 and B-233 curves. [Steve Henson] *) Use separate DRBG fields for internal and external flags. New function FIPS_drbg_health_check() to perform on demand health checking. Add generation tests to fips_test_suite with reduced health check interval to demonstrate periodic health checking. Add "nodh" option to fips_test_suite to skip very slow DH test. [Steve Henson] *) New function FIPS_get_cipherbynid() to lookup FIPS supported ciphers based on NID. [Steve Henson] *) More extensive health check for DRBG checking many more failure modes. New function FIPS_selftest_drbg_all() to handle every possible DRBG combination: call this in fips_test_suite. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for canonical generation of DSA parameter 'g'. See FIPS 186-3 A.2.3. *) Add support for HMAC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test and POST to handle HMAC cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions FIPS_module_version() and FIPS_module_version_text() to return numerical and string versions of the FIPS module number. [Steve Henson] *) Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode to FIPS_module_mode_set and FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implemented outside the validated module in the FIPS capable OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Minor change to DRBG entropy callback semantics. In some cases there is no multiple of the block length between min_len and max_len. Allow the callback to return more than max_len bytes of entropy but discard any extra: it is the callback's responsibility to ensure that the extra data discarded does not impact the requested amount of entropy. [Steve Henson] *) Add PRNG security strength checks to RSA, DSA and ECDSA using information in FIPS186-3, SP800-57 and SP800-131A. [Steve Henson] *) CCM support via EVP. Interface is very similar to GCM case except we must supply all data in one chunk (i.e. no update, final) and the message length must be supplied if AAD is used. Add algorithm test support. [Steve Henson] *) Initial version of POST overhaul. Add POST callback to allow the status of POST to be monitored and/or failures induced. Modify fips_test_suite to use callback. Always run all selftests even if one fails. [Steve Henson] *) XTS support including algorithm test driver in the fips_gcmtest program. Note: this does increase the maximum key length from 32 to 64 bytes but there should be no binary compatibility issues as existing applications will never use XTS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive reorganisation of FIPS PRNG behaviour. Remove all dependencies to OpenSSL RAND code and replace with a tiny FIPS RAND API which also performs algorithm blocking for unapproved PRNG types. Also do not set PRNG type in FIPS_mode_set(): leave this to the application. Add default OpenSSL DRBG handling: sets up FIPS PRNG and seeds with the standard OpenSSL PRNG: set additional data to a date time vector. [Steve Henson] *) Rename old X9.31 PRNG functions of the form FIPS_rand* to FIPS_x931*. This shouldn't present any incompatibility problems because applications shouldn't be using these directly and any that are will need to rethink anyway as the X9.31 PRNG is now deprecated by FIPS 140-2 [Steve Henson] *) Extensive self tests and health checking required by SP800-90 DRBG. Remove strength parameter from FIPS_drbg_instantiate and always instantiate at maximum supported strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add ECDH code to fips module and fips_ecdhvs for primitives only testing. [Steve Henson] *) New algorithm test program fips_dhvs to handle DH primitives only testing. [Steve Henson] *) New function DH_compute_key_padded() to compute a DH key and pad with leading zeroes if needed: this complies with SP800-56A et al. [Steve Henson] *) Initial implementation of SP800-90 DRBGs for Hash and CTR. Not used by anything, incomplete, subject to change and largely untested at present. [Steve Henson] *) Modify fipscanisteronly build option to only build the necessary object files by filtering FIPS_EX_OBJ through a perl script in crypto/Makefile. [Steve Henson] *) Add experimental option FIPSSYMS to give all symbols in fipscanister.o and FIPS or fips prefix. This will avoid conflicts with future versions of OpenSSL. Add perl script util/fipsas.pl to preprocess assembly language source files and rename any affected symbols. [Steve Henson] *) Add selftest checks and algorithm block of non-fips algorithms in FIPS mode. Remove DES2 from selftests. [Steve Henson] *) Add ECDSA code to fips module. Add tiny fips_ecdsa_check to just return internal method without any ENGINE dependencies. Add new tiny fips sign and verify functions. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) New build option "fipscanisteronly". This only builds fipscanister.o and (currently) associated fips utilities. Uses the file Makefile.fips instead of Makefile.org as the prototype. [Steve Henson] *) Add some FIPS mode restrictions to GCM. Add internal IV generator. Update fips_gcmtest to use IV generator. [Steve Henson] *) Initial, experimental EVP support for AES-GCM. AAD can be input by setting output buffer to NULL. The *Final function must be called although it will not retrieve any additional data. The tag can be set or retrieved with a ctrl. The IV length is by default 12 bytes (96 bits) but can be set to an alternative value. If the IV length exceeds the maximum IV length (currently 16 bytes) it cannot be set before the key. [Steve Henson] *) New flag in ciphers: EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER. This means the underlying do_cipher function handles all cipher semantics itself including padding and finalisation. This is useful if (for example) an ENGINE cipher handles block padding itself. The behaviour of do_cipher is subtly changed if this flag is set: the return value is the number of characters written to the output buffer (zero is no longer an error code) or a negative error code. Also if the input buffer is NULL and length 0 finalisation should be performed. [Steve Henson] *) If a candidate issuer certificate is already part of the constructed path ignore it: new debug notification X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP for this case. [Steve Henson] *) Improve forward-security support: add functions void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) for use by SSL/TLS servers; the callback function will be called whenever a new session is created, and gets to decide whether the session may be cached to make it resumable (return 0) or not (return 1). (As by the SSL/TLS protocol specifications, the session_id sent by the server will be empty to indicate that the session is not resumable; also, the server will not generate RFC 4507 (RFC 5077) session tickets.) A simple reasonable callback implementation is to return is_forward_secure. This parameter will be set to 1 or 0 depending on the ciphersuite selected by the SSL/TLS server library, indicating whether it can provide forward security. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification parameters by name. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE. Add CMAC pkey methods. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental renegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is renegotiated requesting a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed multi-process servers. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(), BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the RAND_METHOD structure. [Steve Henson] *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h whose return value is often ignored. [Steve Henson] *) New -noct, -requestct, -requirect and -ctlogfile options for s_client. These allow SCTs (signed certificate timestamps) to be requested and validated when establishing a connection. [Rob Percival ] Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support AES-NI. This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding bytes. This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker. (CVE-2016-2107) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2105) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2106) [Matt Caswell] *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio() a short invalid encoding can cause allocation of large amounts of memory potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory. Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected. Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS applications are not affected. This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2016-2109) [Stephen Henson] *) EBCDIC overread ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2176) [Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL. [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers. [Viktor Dukhovni] * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of: SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available. (CVE-2016-0800) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Fix a double-free in DSA code A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2016-0705) [Stephen Henson] *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak. Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. (CVE-2016-0798) [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0797) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0799) [Matt Caswell] *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at http://cachebleed.info. (CVE-2016-0702) [Andy Polyakov] *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default, if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation apps to use 2048 bits by default. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] *) DH small subgroups Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). (CVE-2016-0701) [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. (CVE-2015-3197) [Viktor Dukhovni] Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-3193) [Andy Polyakov] *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG). (CVE-2015-3194) [Stephen Henson] *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected. SSL/TLS is not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2015-3195) [Stephen Henson] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] *) Alternate chains certificate forgery During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been restored. [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which processes public keys, certificate requests or certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with client authentication enabled. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton. (CVE-2015-1788) [Andy Polyakov] *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition, X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the time string. An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification callbacks. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and independently by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-1789) [Emilia Käsper] *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-1790) [Emilia Käsper] *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using the CMS code. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer. (CVE-2015-1792) [Stephen Henson] *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. (CVE-2015-1791) [Matt Caswell] *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported curves, prefer P-256 (both). [Emilia Kasper] Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford University. (CVE-2015-0291) [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell] *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller. (CVE-2015-0290) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only server. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson. (CVE-2015-0207) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. (CVE-2015-0286) [Stephen Henson] *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0208) [Stephen Henson] *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare. Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. (CVE-2015-0287) [Stephen Henson] *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-0289) [Emilia Käsper] *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message. This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper (OpenSSL development team). (CVE-2015-0293) [Emilia Käsper] *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack. (CVE-2015-1787) [Matt Caswell] *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded automatically, and the user has not seeded manually - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not SSL_client_methodv23) - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA). If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the output may be predictable. For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will succeed on an unpatched platform: openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA (CVE-2015-0285) [Matt Caswell] *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their commit 517073cd4b. (CVE-2015-0209) [Matt Caswell] *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice. This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0288) [Stephen Henson] *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one. So far those who have to target multiple platforms would compromise and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing near-optimal performance even on newer platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64 (other platforms pending). [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and OCSP response extensions from RFC6962. [Rob Stradling] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8. This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target. [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)] *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES, SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported. [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)] *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1, SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation. [Andy Polyakov, David Miller] *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a. RSAZ. [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)] *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2, BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched" implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support for TLS encrypt. This work was sponsored by Intel Corp. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method() supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only. [Steve Henson] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD structure. [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson] *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures. [Steve Henson] *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated summary of the connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary of connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions. [Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie] *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs from CRLDP extension in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download CRLs using the OCSP API. [Steve Henson] *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application configuration using configuration files or command lines. [Steve Henson] *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable tracing. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions. Print out extension in s_server and s_client. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature OID NID. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a client to OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring. [Steve Henson] *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert. [Steve Henson] *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name comparison. [Steve Henson] *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not use the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returning an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications to test if a chain is correctly configured. Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client hello and checking the requested ciphersuite. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate is required by client or server. An application can decide which certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server. This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing certificate and specify the whole chain. [Steve Henson] *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used to have similar checks in it. Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode". This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used with caution as it could cause interoperability issues. [Steve Henson] *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no shared signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server to support them. [Steve Henson] *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added it couldn't be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking functions. Add manual page. [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)] *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Fix OCSP checking. [Rob Stradling and Ben Laurie] *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509 utility) or reject. [Steve Henson] *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied. [Steve Henson] *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE, platform support for Linux and Android. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework. [Andy Polyakov] *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL. When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal, when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead. This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the (often lower performance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle the new parameter format automatically. [Steve Henson] *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest. [Steve Henson] *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use static structures instead of allocation if default values are used. New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves. Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client to set list of supported curves. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility to print out received values. [Steve Henson] *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both server and client use DH certificates with common parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of the certificate. Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info, X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review. Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3571) [Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0206) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3569) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3572) [Steve Henson] *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) [Steve Henson] *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification. An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0205) [Steve Henson] *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX, and can vary with the CTX. [Adam Langley] *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Re-encode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-8275) [Steve Henson] *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-3570) [Andy Polyakov] *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable sanity and breaks all known clients. [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) [Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was announced in the initial ServerHello. Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] *) SRTP Memory Leak. A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected. The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team. (CVE-2014-3513) [OpenSSL team] *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service attack. (CVE-2014-3567) [Steve Henson] *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be configured to send them. (CVE-2014-3568) [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. Client applications doing fallback retries should call SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). (CVE-2014-3566) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. Re-encode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures. Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code. Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC Group for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3512) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records. Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3511) [David Benjamin] *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3510) [Emilia Käsper] *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3507) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3506) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3505) [Adam Langley] *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write up to 255 bytes to freed memory. Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3509) [Gabor Tyukasz] *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-5139) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing output to the attacker. Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3508) [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-0221) [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512 bytes long. [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception. Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues. (CVE-2013-4353) *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) [Steve Henson] *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI supporting platforms or when small records were transferred. [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. (CVE-2013-0169) [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack. Thanks go to and to Adam Langley for discovering and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger for independently discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-2686) [Adam Langley] *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it returns the certificate actually sent. See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. [Rob Stradling ] *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello if renegotiating. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333) [Steve Henson] *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. [Steve Henson] *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not approved. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context, in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below]. [Steve Henson] *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to client side. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110) [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections. [Adam Langley] *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello record length exceeds 255 bytes. 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. Most broken servers should now work. 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable TLS 1.2 client support entirely. [Steve Henson] *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. [Steve Henson] *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work. [Steve Henson] *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum permitted client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add support for SCTP. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably: - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support; - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES); - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation; - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations; - s390x: z196 support; - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations; [Andy Polyakov] *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup (removal of unnecessary code) [Peter Sylvester ] *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated by Google. [Adam Langley and Ben Laurie] *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224, NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds). Code made available under Apache License version 2.0. Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs: EC_GFp_nistp224_method() EC_GFp_nistp256_method() EC_GFp_nistp521_method() EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible implementations). [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h [Steve Henson] *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional signature parameters can be passed using this option and in particular PSS. [Steve Henson] *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet. [Steve Henson] *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines. New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on the appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1 handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used. Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked against a number of sample certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs. [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser ] *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump. More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature parameters r, s. [Steve Henson] *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing RFC3211. [Steve Henson] *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as password based CMS). [Steve Henson] *) Session-handling fixes: - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID, but also support Session Tickets. - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client presented a ticket with an expired session. - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable. - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information. - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets. [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix PSK session representation. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations. This work was sponsored by Intel. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record) portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to include GCM and add a special AESGCM string for GCM only. [Steve Henson] *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt. [Steve Henson] *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support. As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for versions of TLS earlier than 1.2. [Steve Henson] *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method as unset and return the appropriate default but do *not* set the default. This means we can return the appropriate method in applications that switch between FIPS and non-FIPS modes. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed. [Steve Henson] *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen, encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods. [Steve Henson] *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers. [Steve Henson] *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want to use them can use the private_* version instead. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed. [Steve Henson] *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first. This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers and enable MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying FIPS modules versions. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use until after the certificate request message is received. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246. [Steve Henson] *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch to new signature format when needed using client digest preference. All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client support yet and no support for client certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods and version checking. [Steve Henson] *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined. [Steve Henson] *) Add SRP support. [Tom Wu and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id. [Steve Henson] *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(). [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used automatically instead of needing explicit application support. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705. [Robin Seggelmann , Steve Henson] *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only a few changes are required: Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag. Add TLSv1_1 methods. Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1. Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code). Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where an MMA defence is not necessary. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) [Steve Henson] *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing differences arising during decryption processing. A research paper describing this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann and Michael Tuexen for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. (CVE-2011-4576) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George Kadianakis for discovering this issue and Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) [Andrey Kulikov ] *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) [Rob Austein ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different interpretations of the '..._len' fields). [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, the last update always remained unused). [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf. [Bob Buckholz (Google)] Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011] *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207) [Kaspar Brand ] *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead. Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only. [Steve Henson] *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011] *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is ambiguous. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010] *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 [Steve Henson] *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 [Ben Laurie] Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010] *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 [Steve Henson] *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into a DLL. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010] *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover (CVE-2010-1633) [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager ] Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010] *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative. [Steve Henson] *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL. [Willy Weisz ] *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request: some responders need this. [Steve Henson] *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration. [Steve Henson] *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified or they could free up already freed BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash). [Guenter ] *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS. [Michael Tuexen ] *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't be used on C++. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually attempting to work them out. [Steve Henson] *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello: this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2 by default unless an application cipher string requests it. [Steve Henson] *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails. Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key then look for the first certificate that matches the key. [Steve Henson] *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now you can do: openssl sha256 foo as well as: openssl dgst -sha256 foo and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too. [Steve Henson] *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility. [Oliver Martin , Steve Henson] *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should be used to rebuild symbolic links. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't include an implicit MD5 dependency. [Steve Henson] *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum. [Steve Henson] *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST. [Jouni Malinen ] *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented in an ENGINE errors can occur. [Steve Henson] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex. [Ben Laurie] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated by type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues. [Steve Henson] *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate and search any appropriate delta CRLs available. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications won't see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by default. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for freshest CRL extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional CRL functionality in future. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for policy mappings extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling, policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS and URI types are currently supported. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long', mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno" as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads. Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(). Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric. ERR_remove_state(0) to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL). (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(), CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use of &errno.) [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build. [Ben Laurie] *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer RAM on SSL connections. This option can save about 34k per idle SSL. [Nick Mathewson] *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort. [Ben Laurie] *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility, support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many content types and variants. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO. [Steve Henson] *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32. The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source files from the associated perl scripts. [Steve Henson] *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites. Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) s390x assembler pack. [Andy Polyakov] *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU "family." [Andy Polyakov] *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt. Since this is not an official specification yet and no extension type assignment by IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number to use. For example, specify an option -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527 to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension, assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet Draft). Note that by doing so, you potentially lose interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might be using the same extension number for other purposes. SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create an interal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will return non-zero for success. To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function by using SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) where int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); void *arg; Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate. Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly be provided to the callback function). The callback function has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF input. In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated. Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client. A server will see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if available (NULL and 0 otherwise). Note that if the server provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the length of the client's opaque PRF input. Note that the callback function will only be called when creating a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0 handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake MAC. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL. OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2 [Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST ciphersuite support. [Victor B. Wagner , Steve Henson] *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream() to output in BER and PEM format. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and -macopt options to dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use alternative signing parameters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are enabled again. This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed). Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new funcionality) such that between otherwise identical cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in the default order. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT" (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH". This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning that you can't actually use DEFAULT). [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni] *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string processing) into multiple integers instead of setting "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK", "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer. (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128 and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all kinds of kludges. Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9. With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and "CAMELLIA256". [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256. Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q). [Nils Larsch] *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses it yet and it is largely untested. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. [Nils Larsch] *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is reimplemented. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions. [Steve Henson] *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing the CRL revoked certificates in a database. [Steve Henson] *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave. [Steve Henson] *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats. Kindly donated by Cryptocom. [Cryptocom] *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names. Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509. [Steve Henson] *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name) this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure. Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp(). [Steve Henson] *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG. [Steve Henson] *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing if necessary. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free() to free up any added signature OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(), EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility: list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1. Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes the array representation useful in a more general context. [Douglas Stebila] *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed. For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH" (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the protocol). The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL" and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492 ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case: kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA) kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH aECDH - ECDH cert aECDSA - ECDSA cert ECDSA - ECDSA cert AECDH - anonymous ECDH EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH") [Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported. Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message. [Steve Henson] *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code. [Steve Henson] *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and functional reference processing. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature process. [Steve Henson] *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an alternative message digest algorithm for signing. [Steve Henson] *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime application to support multiple signers. [Steve Henson] *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative digest MAC. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC. Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs, add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl: EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the new API. [Steve Henson] *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The return value indicates how strong the preference is 1 means optional and 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated. [Steve Henson] *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link between digests and public key types. [Steve Henson] *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1, rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery needed to use the correct OID to be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public key ASN1 method. [Steve Henson] *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and pkeyutl. [Steve Henson] *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in pkey, genpkey. [Steve Henson] *) BeOS support. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the manual pages. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New utility "genpkey" this is analogous to "genrsa" etc except it can generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation functionality for RSA. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old. [Steve Henson] *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public key API, doesn't do much yet. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility: "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key type. [Steve Henson] *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(), EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1. De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing of public and private key structures. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure. New ciphersuites: PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA New functions: SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity SSL_use_psk_identity_hint [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation] *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation and response verification functionality. [Zoltán Glózik , The OpenTSA Project] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou] *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added. [Andy Polyakov] *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle. [Andy Polyakov] *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont, dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced. BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets. [Andy Polyakov] *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size. Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of using the maximum available value. [Steve Henson] *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code in addition to the text details. [Bodo Moeller] *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't handle several customised structures at all. [Steve Henson] *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now handled using new ASN1 code equivalents. [Steve Henson] *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'. [Nils Larsch] *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of all fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. [Steve Henson] *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never update s->server with a new major version number. As of - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type, - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits, the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740) [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley ] *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). [Tomas Hoger ] Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245) [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta] *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!). [Bodo Moeller] *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too. [Steve Henson] *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally. This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while... [Steve Henson] *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later. This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and CVE-2009-4355. [Steve Henson] *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., ): a CAST_KEY doesn't change when encrypting or decrypting. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI. Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode. [Steve Henson] *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection. [Steve Henson] *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer renegotiation support in s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8. [Steve Henson] *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you know what you are doing. [Eric Rescorla , Ben Laurie, Steve Henson] *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in the handshake. [Steve Henson] *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(), CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam warnings in other configurations. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some systems need. [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley] *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs. [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky] *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in several standards that it is not used in new applications due to several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons the MD2 API is still compiled in by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved and restored. [Steve Henson] *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash. [Guenter ] *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(), it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything other than a simple chain. [David Woodhouse , Steve Henson] *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert() by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake. So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be buffered. (CVE-2009-1378) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to determine the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries. (CVE-2009-1377) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379) [Daniel Mentz] *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call. [Darryl Miles ] *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs [Ilya O. ] Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009] *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what you're doing. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009] *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789) [Paolo Ganci ] *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591) [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590) [Steve Henson] *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store level. [Steve Henson] *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice to handle some structures. [Steve Henson] *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time for a '\n' [Jeremy Shapiro ] *) New -hex option for openssl rand. [Matthieu Herrb] *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1. [Steve Henson] *) Support NumericString type for name components. [Steve Henson] *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the chosen compiler. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009] *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values (CVE-2008-5077). [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team] *) Enable TLS extensions by default. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.) [Sander Temme ] *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command. [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger] *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in s_client and s_server. [Ben Laurie] *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize(). [Rob Austein ] *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client. [Philip Paeps ] *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008] *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386). [PR #1679] *) Fix a state transition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...). [Nagendra Modadugu] *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding, addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been doubly unsafe triple-checked locking. So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder] *) Various precautionary measures: - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h). - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c). (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.) - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs outside the expected range. - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG builds. [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller] *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if the load fails. Useful for distros. [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team] *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code. [Huang Ying] *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too. Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: don't set attribute using ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain attribute creation routines such as certificate requests and PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008] *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) [Steve Henson, Mark Cox] *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) [Joe Orton] *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation. [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo] *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs: The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA. Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads. The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte invalid read after the end of 'db'). [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev: Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation. While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting. To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport). As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements, namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise, e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".) [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)] *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key sets may exist with different names. [Steve Henson] *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles. This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7 behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an implementation. [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)] *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9 implementation in the following ways: Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be hard coded. Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is ignored for embedded content. CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled with the enable-cms configuration option. [Steve Henson] *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used. [Paul Sheer ] *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and uncompresses any data passed through it. [Steve Henson] *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping. [Steve Henson] *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0(): sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier) data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied data. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set() to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior. [Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Netware support: - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT) - added some more tests to do_tests.pl - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc, netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32 platform - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD) - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply [Guenter Knauf ] *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546. A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples to s_client and s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007] *) Fix various bugs: + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session + Fix ia64 assembler code [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007] *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server. Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off" pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server. This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995. [Andy Polyakov] *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. [Kurt Roeckx , Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson] *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build. [Steve Henson] *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction. [Andy Polyakov] *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0 (which previously caused an internal error). [Bodo Moeller] *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out. [Ben Laurie] *) AES IGE mode speedup. [Dean Gaudet (Google)] *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162: TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA" To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-seed'. [KISA, Bodo Moeller] *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract information. For detailed background information, see http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a conditional branch. BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name remains as a deprecated alias. Similarly, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID context matching (which matters if an application uses a single external cache for different purposes). Previously, out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that, with applications using a single external cache for quite different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session in a different context. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007] *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't). [Victor Duchovni] *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters): When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RFC 3779 support. [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. Improve header file function name parsing. [Steve Henson] *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs. [Goetz Babin-Ebell] Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0. So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions. Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite. Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now. The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning; however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into multiple values to extend the available space. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias. However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation to avoid potential handshake problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key versions), which is now available for royalty-free use (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html). Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132. To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-camellia'. [NTT] *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by now or any which still have the bug do not support compression. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006] *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is. [Steve Henson] *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed. [Austin Ziegler ] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9 branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch). [Douglas Stebila] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32 to conform with the standards mentioned here: http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library can't be loaded. [Steve Henson] *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries under VC++ build system. [Steve Henson] *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO. Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags. [Steve Henson] *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Nils Larsch] *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman. [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions for well-known primes. [Nick Mathewson] *) Extended Windows CE support. [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov] *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to smime utility. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them. [Richard Levitte] *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private key into the same file any more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'. [Stefan and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code: - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently 32) - add new function for parameter creation - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the BN_BLINDING parameters - hide BN_BLINDING structure Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve performance when a single RSA object is shared among several threads. [Nils Larsch] *) Add support for DTLS. [Nagendra Modadugu and Ben Laurie] *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() [Walter Goulet] *) Remove buggy and incomplete DH cert support from ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c [Nils Larsch] *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for the apps/openssl applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set. [Ben Laurie] *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default. The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx". The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified. (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to avoid this algorithm.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe). [Richard Levitte] *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. [Andy Polyakov] *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the pod file: =for comment openssl_section:XXX The blank line is mandatory. [Steve Henson] *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase sources. [Steve Henson] *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters, update associated structures and add various utility functions. Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters to support policy checking and print out. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled). [Michal Ludvig , with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally). [Geoff Thorpe] *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented. [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people] *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler implementation contributed by IBM. [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov] *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure. [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe] *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial. (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7 patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8, we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.) [Steve Henson] *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always, developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes. [Steve Henson] *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality. This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys. Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not valid (weak or incorrect parity). [Steve Henson] *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the syntax: shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4 [Steve Henson] *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of BN_CTX's "bundling". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07. [Steve Henson] *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see below). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros. [Richard Levitte] *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results, and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated; if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro. [Geoff Thorpe] *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same initialised value as BN_new(). [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller] *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined, further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details. [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller] *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more). [Geoff Thorpe] *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***" aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used internally to the implementation so I've used that for now. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so these have been updated also. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addition into PKCS7_bio_add_digest(). New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7 digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization functions. [Steve Henson] *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7 structure of type "other". [Steve Henson] *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero") modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero" situation in the script. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly used as premaster secret. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2 curve secp160r1 to the tests. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO. [Götz Babin-Ebell via Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better control of the error stack. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or... NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way for a function to pass data back to the caller. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup() works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates a memory area. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently, the following flags are defined: OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero number. OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful if there are more than one element where the comparing function returns zero. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca' in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in. [Richard Levitte] *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate request can be signed by that key (self-signing). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for req and dirName. [Steve Henson] *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL, and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the default implementation more easily. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions in config files. [Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared. Make that possible even when linking against static libraries! [Richard Levitte] *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory. This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). [Steve Henson] *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how to do it. [Richard Levitte] *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult() will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul() faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication, scalar * generator). [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller] *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up. However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary linker additions, eg; ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp [Geoff Thorpe] *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt". [Geoff Thorpe] *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can also be overridden by providing the appropriate method callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex" postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc. Example for using the new callback interface: int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...; void *my_arg = ...; BN_GENCB my_cb; BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg); return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb); /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the * documentation of the function that calls the callback. * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg. * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex() * to continue, or 0 to stop. */ [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it available to TLS with the number defined in draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf): CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE { forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL, -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- } Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR". This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake. [Richard Levitte] *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg); and a macro that behave like int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a); to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c). EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this if applicable. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines dynamically from specific directories unless they could be found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new directory engines/. The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config. Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a. /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic engines, but that can be overridden at configure time through the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES. [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte] *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared libraries. Adapt Makefile.org. [Richard Levitte] *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs. [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" ] *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12 files while avoiding the low level API. New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac. Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm. New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create() instead of the low level API. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming PKCS#7 code. Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed down to the template encoder. [Steve Henson] *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not recognized instead of using RSA as a default. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt. As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL"; the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them. [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH engine support. [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations without success (which indicates a broken PRNG). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value is really the square of the return value. (Previously, BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/). New EC_METHOD: EC_GF2m_simple_method New API functions: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to enable it). As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields; the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m) are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts. (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from various internal method names.) An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult() through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult'). The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul' and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these methods are undefined. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit length of the modulus. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup. (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c. Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not used) in the following functions [macros]: BN_GF2m_add BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add] BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_inv BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr] BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp] (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m). BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.) For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set; i.e., p[] represents the polynomial f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] where p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. This applies to the following functions: BN_GF2m_mod_arr BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv] BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div] BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly Conversion can be performed by the following functions: BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic. Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available. The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some functionality is disabled at compile-time. [Douglas Stebila ] *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate: Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump' mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to avoid the appearance of a printable string. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form() EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form() These control ASN1 encoding details: - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_seed() EC_GROUP_get0_seed() EC_GROUP_get_seed_len() This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID of the appropriate field type OID. The new function EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add functions EC_POINT_point2bn() EC_POINT_bn2point() EC_POINT_point2hex() EC_POINT_hex2point() providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_POINT_oct2point(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions EC_GROUP_set_generator() EC_GROUP_get_generator() EC_GROUP_get_order() EC_GROUP_get_cofactor() are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when adding different types of curves. [Nils Larsch with input by Bodo Moeller] *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated (which avoid length expansion in many cases). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero. Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/. Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa' (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa'). ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the library. Most notably, - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option; - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA; - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be extracted before the specific public key; - ECDSA engine support has been added. [Nils Larsch ] *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(), and the list of available named curves can be obtained with EC_get_builtin_curves(). Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be accessed via EC_GROUP_set_curve_name() EC_GROUP_get_curve_name() [Nils Larsch ] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't. [Victor Duchovni] *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module. [Steve Henson] *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature. [Steve Henson] *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to run algorithm test programs. [Steve Henson] *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace. [Steve Henson] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006] *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows. [Steve Henson] *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005] *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS. The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not. BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of the difference induced by this change. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage. [Steve Henson] *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise, the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with biased k.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate cache-timing and potential related attacks. BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation, and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller] *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set. (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some clients need. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before). [Steve Henson] *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code structures constant. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up some needed definitions. [Steve Henson] *) Undo Cygwin change. [Ulf Möller] *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820. Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications, they must be explicitly allowed in run-time. See docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005] *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating server and client random values. Previously (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms). This change has negligible security impact because: 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random data. 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial handshake. 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random values. The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue to our attention. [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC] *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed prematurely by EGD/PRNGD. [Darren Tucker via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014] *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format. [Steve Henson] *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs. [Nauticus Networks SSL Team , Steve Henson] *) Add new -passin argument to dgst. [Steve Henson] *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp: this is needed for some certificates that re-encode DNs into UTF8Strings (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or won't issue name rollover certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just when there's an associated purpose to the check: - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has chosen to ignore this fault) - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all) - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been given) [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004] *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock. Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted(). [Steve Henson] *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly. [David Holmes ] *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities. This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl rather than being initialized to 1. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites (CVE-2004-0112) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes for these cases. [Steve Henson] *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue. A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues. [Steve Henson] *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL < 0.9.7. [Steve Henson] *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). [Peter Sylvester ] *) Use the correct content when signing type "other". [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server exiting on the first error in a request. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of blocks during encryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs. This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a certain size. [Steve Henson] *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes: output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures. Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME parser. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications should make sure they are passing it correctly. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler. [Ulf Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway. NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not used by default when no-err is given. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64. [dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454] *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change, the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped. [Kevin Greaney and Richard Levitte] *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building. Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result. Now the chain builder is disabled if either: 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set. The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are present and it might also want a means of sending no additional certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the root is omitted). [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails. [Steve Henson] *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode , Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as followup to PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on the config script, much like the NetBSD support. [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway ] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.7.] *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between client and server. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is removed entirely. [Richard Levitte] *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere. This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part of libcrypto. NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will have to be made anyway). [Richard Levitte] *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error. [Steve Henson] *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented. Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and edit numbers of the version. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()). [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte] *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer overflows. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could potentially lead to a spoofing attack). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal representations in a platform independent manner. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do indents. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half full. Fixed. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled unconditionally). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure CBCParameter. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be exploitable. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect the 0.9.6 release series: Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions. (CVE-2002-0657) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712. [Richard Levitte] *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch. [Michael Bell , Steve Henson] *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1. [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen ] *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions. [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman ] *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers, which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher. (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption. "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.) [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with some local tweaks: # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory. mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do mkdir -p `dirname $F` ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F done To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean" is a good thing. If it isn't successful, don't worry about it, it probably means the source directory is very clean. [Richard Levitte] *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values. [Götz Babin-Ebell ] *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests. [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer ] *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an error in AES-CFB decryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory. [Steve Henson] *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero. [Steve Henson] *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form. Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798; therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7". The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier. Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined argument is actually passed to the callback: In the SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback declaration has been changed from int (*cb)() into int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *); in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx) has been changed into i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg). To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions. [D. K. Smetters ] *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards. [Maurice Gittens , touchups by Geoff Thorpe] *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file. This allows older applications to transparently support certain OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading. Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will always load it have also been added. [Steve Henson] *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES. Adjust NIDs and EVP layer. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) Config modules support in openssl utility. Most commands now load modules from the config file, though in a few (such as version) this isn't done because it couldn't be used for anything. In the case of ca and req the config file used is the same as the utility itself: that is the -config command line option can be used to specify an alternative file. [Steve Henson] *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file and move code to CONF_modules_load_file(). [Steve Henson] *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected to work with the new engine framework. [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte] *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted to work with the new engine framework. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work. [Toomas Kiisk and Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX. [Robert Dahlem via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro. Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant FORMAT_IISSGC. [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine. [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk ] *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT. [Ben Laurie] *) Add new functions ERR_peek_last_error ERR_peek_last_error_line ERR_peek_last_error_line_data. These are similar to ERR_peek_error ERR_peek_error_line ERR_peek_error_line_data, but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one still in the error queue. [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller] *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things like: default_algorithms = ALL default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary ENGINE config module. [Steve Henson] *) New experimental application configuration code. [Steve Henson] *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c. [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt] *) Add option to output public keys in req command. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224). [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions/macros SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb) SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) to request calling a callback function void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) whenever a protocol message has been completely received (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)). 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg(). 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library. This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to the configuration scripts. NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed. ["Maciej W. Rozycki" and Richard Levitte] *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension. [Peter Sylvester ] *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just when reusing an existing buffer. [Bodo Moeller] *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command. This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings. [Steve Henson] *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter. [Ben Laurie] *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no' has the same effect. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes, but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one exception. Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility. There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines. In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that won't work. NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the default), and then completely removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions. If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a particular extension is supported. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests to retain compatibility with existing code. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which requires the destination to be valid. Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(). [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32. [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte] *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed - they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in the new code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds. [Steve Henson] *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number, and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_* become part of libeay.num as well. [Richard Levitte] *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call or HelloRequest/ClientHello received from the peer) and becomes false once a handshake has been completed. (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake() sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the client has followed the request.) [Bodo Moeller] *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION. By default, clients may request session resumption even during renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option, session resumption is possible only in the first handshake. SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes more bits available for options that should not be part of SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation. [Steve Henson] *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by "Douglas E. Engert" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7 (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE. Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE implementations into applications that are completely implemented in self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new "ERR_unload_strings" function. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD. [Ben Laurie] *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the md_data void pointer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the digest can only process a single chunk of data (typically because it is provided by a piece of hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers. [Ben Laurie] *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data" functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg. RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b) such data would previously have always leaked in application code and workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now rather than letting it slide. Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now has a return value to indicate success or failure. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default" implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set" the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get", pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts. Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add EVP test program. [Ben Laurie] *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change! [Ben Laurie] *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(), X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(). These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature. The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1). Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons for their choice and can explicitly enable this option. [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX). Usage example: EVP_MD_CTX md; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */ EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1()); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len); EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */ [Ben Laurie] *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer anyway): E.g., des_key_schedule ks; des_set_key_checked(..., &ks); des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...); (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.) [Ben Laurie] *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused) ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated functions prevents this. [Steve Henson] *) Cleanup of EVP macros. [Ben Laurie] *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the correct _ecb suffix. [Ben Laurie] *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The revocation information is handled using the text based index use by the ca application. The responder can either handle requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server. [Steve Henson] *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS. [Richard Levitte] *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance: 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ] 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper. Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req, and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/. Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries. [Vern Staats , Jeffrey Altman via Richard Levitte] *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key' values for each of the key sizes rather than having just parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Speed up EVP routines. Before: encrypt type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k decrypt des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k After: encrypt des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k decrypt des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k [Ben Laurie] *) Added the OS2-EMX target. ["Brian Havard" and Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf() to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts. [Richard Levitte] *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy(). [Verdon Walker , Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with arbitrary arguments instead of just a string. Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier versions of OpenSSL [engine]. Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else) and interrupts/cancellations. [Richard Levitte] *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()'). [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara ] *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this kind of callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes than this minimum value is recommended. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics that are easily reachable. [Richard Levitte] *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as: const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it; won't compile. This is used by the any applications that need to declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly needed for static libraries under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX internally such as S/MIME. Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default. Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server applications. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s) are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error. Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure. Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this. This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension handling. [Steve Henson] *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward compatibility functions using this new API are provided). The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in a window system and the like. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a per-structure level rather than having to store it globally. [Geoff] *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY. This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template, analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in this case have no functional references and the return value is the single structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing ENGINE structure. [Geoff] *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the tag cache. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include; - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information about an ENGINE's available control commands. - executing control commands from command line arguments using the '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for the individual commands are colon-separated, for example; openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so [Geoff] *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions, and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable" depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some discoverable commands may only be for direct use through ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow control over shared-library paths without source code alterations. [Geoff] *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction, this also allows the implementations to compile without using the internal engine_int.h header. [Geoff] *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only modify their own ones). [Geoff] *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code. - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values later on via ctrl() commands. - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code. - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release structural references. - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures. - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state). - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code. - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for flags from engine_int.h to engine.h. - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(), ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter. [Geoff] *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli, roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it for moduli up to 2048 bits. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code could not support the combine flag in choice fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies extensions from a certificate request to the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy and couldn't display additional details such as extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points \sum scalars[i]*points[i], optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP: scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i]. EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case that the point list has just one item (besides the optional generator). [Bodo Moeller] *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p): EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr operations and provides various method functions that can also operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic. EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic. [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling implementation directly derived from source code provided by Lenka Fibikova ] *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h, crypto/ec/ec_lib.c): Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator) based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library. Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects. Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires that the file contains a complete HTTP response. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX" to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the field while the former will cause them to run together if the field is 40 of more characters long. [Steve Henson] *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER pointers. [Steve Henson] *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them in . Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32. [Bodo Moeller] *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions might. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts: Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7 (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32. ASN1 error codes ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR ... ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS were 4 .. 9, conflicting with ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB) ... ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB). They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL). Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock suffices. [Bodo Moeller] *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT' and 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'. Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality, one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter is normally done by Configure or something similar). To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL in the source file (foo.c) like this: OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1; OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar); To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this: OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo); #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo) OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar); #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar) The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the header file everywhere where the defined globals are used. The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different. The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites). [Richard Levitte] *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod(). [Steve Henson] *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request trust settings. [Steve Henson] *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its OID rather that just UNKNOWN. [Steve Henson] *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(). [Steve Henson] *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting functions returning pointers to structures is not. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs. These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL. The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish, the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server". [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids the growing number of special cases it was previously handling. [Richard Levitte] *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with opensslconf.h. Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform- specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on what is available. [Richard Levitte] *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was auto incremented. [Steve Henson] *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions. Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple of the block size, otherwise an error occurs. [Steve Henson] *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support. [Steve Henson] *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host, port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce() this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if the request is nonce-less. [Steve Henson] *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file, e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) ] *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified. [Steve Henson] *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1 routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful. Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines. [Steve Henson] *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new(). Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER() to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER() where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER. [Steve Henson] *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which convert status values to strings have been renamed to: OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response printout format cleaned up. [Steve Henson] *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response. [Steve Henson] *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify() and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate. [Steve Henson] *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3 extensions from a separate configuration file. As when reading extensions from the main configuration file, the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the section to use. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet: still needs to check the OCSP response validity. [Steve Henson] *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca': 'openssl ca -status ' prints the status of the cert with the given serial number (according to the index file). 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates in the index file. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option so that the resulting key is not encrypted. [Damien Miller ] *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd. [Jonathan Bartlett via Richard Levitte] *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's certificate and verifies the signature on the response. [Steve Henson] *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given file name and line number information in additional arguments (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(), realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these additional arguments. To register and find out the current settings for extended allocation functions, the following functions are provided: CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends. CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an extended allocation function is enabled. Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where a conventional allocation function is enabled. [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller] *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts. There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant. If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically be queried. The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, querying stops when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom" (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur. Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c. For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c. [Richard Levitte] *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These provide utility functions which an application needing to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the response will typically need: as opposed to those which an OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later. OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created when the request structure is built). These are built from lower level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but won't normally be used unless the application wishes to examine extensions in the OCSP response for example. Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions. OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the validity of the nonce in an OCSP response. [Steve Henson] *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id(). This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the need to free up the newly created id. Change return type to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure. This can then be used to add extensions to the request. Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which will be added elsewhere. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which can be used to send requests and parse the response. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes: it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class) to produce the required SET OF. [Steve Henson] *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables. [Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs: asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i(). New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions. [Steve Henson] *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised. [Richard Levitte] *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old code will still work when these eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the same conventions as certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format. [Steve Henson] *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add appropriate entries for variables. [Steve Henson] *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have to do is register a locking callback using an array for storing which locks are currently held by the program. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential. Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL. [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe] *) Move common extension printing code to new function X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some print routines. [Steve Henson] *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7 structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK order did not reflect the encoded order. [Steve Henson] *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code. [Steve Henson] *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist for now but they will eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1 has also been converted to the new form. [Steve Henson] *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work for negative moduli. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead of not touching the result's sign bit. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be set. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the type-specific callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in RFC 2712. [Veers Staats , Jeffrey Altman , via Richard Levitte] *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided in sections depending on the subject. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under Windows. [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can be handled deterministically). [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_kronecker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is positive unless both parameters are zero. Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the sign of the number in question. Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0. The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w) because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'. Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably; it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word(). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_swap. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable results on negative inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative. Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative; I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour. [Bodo Moeller] *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c, and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c) and add new functions: BN_nnmod BN_mod_sqr BN_mod_add BN_mod_add_quick BN_mod_sub BN_mod_sub_quick BN_mod_lshift1 BN_mod_lshift1_quick BN_mod_lshift BN_mod_lshift_quick These functions always generate non-negative results. BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead). BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b] be reduced modulo m. [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] #if 0 The following entry accidentally appeared in the CHANGES file distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7. *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul() required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(), bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with differing sizes. [Richard Levitte] #endif *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that verification would just waste user's time since the resulting hash is going to be compared with some given password hash) or the new '-noverify' option is used. This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not cause any problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it. [Richard Levitte] *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load(). [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification. Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later time) [Richard Levitte] *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default. [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the following functions: ENGINE_load_cswift() ENGINE_load_chil() ENGINE_load_atalla() ENGINE_load_nuron() ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso libraries unless it's really needed. Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand. Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some declarations (they differed!). [Richard Levitte] *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities. [Richard Levitte] *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'. [Richard Levitte] *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and identity, and test if they are actually available. [Richard Levitte] *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root. [Damien Miller ] *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of keys (public as well as private) handled by engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo. [Richard Levitte] *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code. [Richard Levitte] *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch. [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte] *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the different shared library filenames on each system. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping of two sections. [Bernd Matthes , Steve Henson] *) NCONF changes. NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement, NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for binary backward compatibility. Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO, by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO. For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an LDAP server. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover this case. [Steve Henson] *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003] *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite: Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851) [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002] *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching, because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading from the external cache. This problem was masked, when SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set. (Found by Steve Haslam .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33. [Zeev Lieber ] *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling EVP_cleanup(). [Richard Levitte] *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not being properly terminated. [Richard Levitte] *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String. [stefank@valicert.com via Richard Levitte] *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural change. [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El] *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix initialization code race conditions in SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(), ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(). [Patrick McCormick , Bodo Moeller] *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik (see [openssl.org #212]). [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002] *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:] Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall'). [Lynn Gazis ] Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002] *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer , Alon Kantor (and others), Steve Henson] *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). [Arne Ansper , Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly by the selection routines (PR #130). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro. [Nils Larsch] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659) [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1. [Nils Larsch ; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller] *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c. [Nils Larsch ] *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines: an end-of-file condition would erroneously be flagged, when the CRLF was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov and Nedelcho Stanev. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello(). [Bodo Moeller] *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard' generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to BN_generate_prime().) In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless; a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not better. [Bodo Moeller] *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by Tom Wu . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from returning non-zero before the data has been completely received when using non-blocking I/O. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes] *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc). [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by Yoram Zahavi ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper configuration for the versions before that. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust: check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP flag is set). Proposed by Aslam . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested value is 0. [Richard Levitte] *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:] Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x. [Neale Ferguson via Richard Levitte] *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the session cache. To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of using a local variable. [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c) if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected. [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro. ["Dan S. Camper" ] *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0. [D P Chang ] Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001] *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl . (The previous implementation worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and 3*range is two bits longer than range.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce", OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce. Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were incorrect (cf. RFC 3039). [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller] *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid() returns early because it has nothing to do. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology. (Use engine 'keyclient') [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89' is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object modules). [Richard Shapiro ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported from 0.9.7. [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai , Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox] *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare. [Gary Benson ] *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname() instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have become invalid. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error, simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e., TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear() never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within one of the SSL handshake functions. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the client will at least see that alert. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation correctly. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake. [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider ] *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circumvents various cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a HelloRequest. Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer() before just sending a HelloRequest. [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla ] *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC verification error occurred. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information may leak via logfiles.) Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0, and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in the legal range. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf. James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_sqr() bug fix. [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis ] *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses, so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand() followed by modular reduction. [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young ] *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range() equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand(). [Bodo Moeller] *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB). This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message to handle SGC did not allow these large messages. (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long](). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl() for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix. The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected automatically. [Tim Mooney via Richard Levitte] *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message() with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request(). Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest messages might inadvertently be reject as too long. [Petr Lampa ] *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX). [Andy Polyakov] *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced to allow the necessary settings. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored dh->length and always used BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p). BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have dh->length. So switch back to BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...) where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1 otherwise. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RSA_eay_public_encrypt RSA_eay_private_decrypt RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing) RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification) (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt), always reject numbers >= n. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long' variable) is not atomic. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID. [Travis Vitek ] *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix. [Albert Chin-A-Young ] *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and little-endian MIPS. [Ralf Baechle ] *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen : PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s. [Andy Polyakov] *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out an error message in this case. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines. [Steve Henson] *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are positive and less than q. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle that itself. [Paul Rose ] *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix OAEP check. [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096 (previously it was 1024). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings unless some valid trust or reject settings are present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the DSA routines if parameters are absent. [Steve Henson] *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd" in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set. RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME. Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set. For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require environment variables. *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a combination of a flag and a thread ID variable. Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all versions of 'test'. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode() [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng ] *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp" if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in CygWin. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data. If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total amount of data available. [Steve Henson, reported by shige@FreeBSD.org] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug). For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced in the bctest version that searches along $PATH). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton: On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119, http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz). [Ulf Moeller] *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix. [Andy Polyakov] *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old (but broken) behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print it when found. [Tim Rice via Richard Levitte] *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary; don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously did not exist. [Bodo Moeller] *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5. [Jeremy Cooper ] *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions. [Richard Levitte] *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index. [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala ] *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c) due to incorrect handling of multi-threading: 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(). 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on(). 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x. [Kurt Hockenbury and "Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME was empty. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors" but the code is actually correct. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new and leaves the highest bit random. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve). Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly return NULL from CONF_get_section. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC. [Ulf Moeller] *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA. [Steve Henson] *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid headers. [Richard Levitte] *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF and break the signature. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. [Steve Henson] *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init() aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM. ["Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) ./config script fixes. [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte] *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni(). [Steve Henson, reported by ] *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn call failed, free the DSA structure. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings. These are present in some PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c). Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits when writing a 32767 byte record. [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day ] *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c), obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}. (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c], so they are meant to be shared between threads.) [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by "Reddie, Steven" ] *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Use better test patterns in bntest. [Ulf Möller] *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C. [Ulf Möller] *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken. [Bodo Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0. Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL_peek: Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately. A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal. [Bodo Moeller] *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was happening the other way round. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16. The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c [Jean-Marc Desperrier ] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument. Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz ] *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms. Previously, it would create entries for disabled algorithms no matter what. [Richard Levitte] *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function. [Lutz Jaenicke] Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000] *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version. (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated by the Finished messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows. [Jeffrey Altman ] *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes appropriately. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE: that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all together. [Steve Henson] *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will write a separate record, which will be read separately by the programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing. The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line, not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is the answer. Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has been tested well enough. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery, it can return incorrect results. (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a, but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].) [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly) include zero length content when signing messages. [Steve Henson] *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs). [Bodo Möller] *) Add DSO method for VMS. [Richard Levitte] *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the wrong sign. [Ulf Möller] *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three packages. The default package contains applications, application documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains include files, static libraries and function documentation. The doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller . [Richard Levitte] *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines. [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4. [NAKAJI Hiroyuki ] *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a random number < q in the DSA library. [Ulf Möller] *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place. (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read; but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it just makes things more complicated.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read from EGD. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509' work better on such systems. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create(). Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the keyid to the certificates aux info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop if there was more than one signature. [Sven Uszpelkat ] *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information about each symbol, as well as presenting variables as well as functions. This change means that there's n more need to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded. [Richard Levitte] *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application, rather than always using the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a number of criteria: subject name, authority key id and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates by the same criteria. The main comparison function is X509_check_issued() which performs these checks. Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this without completely rewriting the lookup code. Authority and subject key identifier are now cached. The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with the same hash value. As a result various functions (which were all internal use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE structure. This will break anything that messed round with X509_STORE internally. The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an exact match, rather than just subject name. The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however this can be worked round by performing a lookup first (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates) and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP entirely (maybe later...). The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably. All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer() callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques in future. A very simple version which uses a simple STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(). The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents in the X509_STORE_CTX structure. X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used to customise the verify behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which excludes S/MIME capabilities. [Steve Henson] *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputting again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the request is improperly encoded. [Steve Henson] *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling BIO_write(b, ...). In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write. [Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr] *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of words set to zero.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.). [Bodo Moeller] *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be used for low level RSA operations. DER public key BIO/fp routines also added. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4. [Andreas Schneider ] *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in demos/state_machine. [Ben Laurie] *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature generation and verification. [Steve Henson] *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can encode and decode it manually. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c compile under VC++. [Oscar Jacobsson ] *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg ] *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in memory there's not real point in using indefinite length constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used. [Steve Henson] *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf(). [Richard Levitte] *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the the strings written through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available through syslog. The prefixes are now: PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE INFO, INF => LOG_INFO DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen. On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this: LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE [Richard Levitte] *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS, and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring. [Richard Levitte] *) MD4 implemented. [Assar Westerlund , Richard Levitte] *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility. [Richard Levitte] *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some names from the lookup table if they were given a default value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate short or long names are found. [Steve Henson] *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK. [Scott Uroff ] *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol version rollback attacks was not effective. In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and BIO_dump_indent() are added. [Richard Levitte] *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex() these print out strings and name structures based on various flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility to allow the various flags to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME. Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure, this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity dates to be checked. [Steve Henson] *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid negative public key encodings) on by default, NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it. [Steve Henson] *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure. [Steve Henson] *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock), not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs are always statically linked for now, but there are preparations for dynamic linking in place. This has been tested on Linux and Tru64. [Richard Levitte] *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in: Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing DSA key. [Steve Henson] *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape form signing output easier to verify. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'. [Steve Henson] *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are already assumed to have been read in and checked. These are needed because all other string types have virtually identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag. [Steve Henson] *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows: - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following the syntax given in objects.README. - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new obj_mac.h. - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in obj_mac.h. This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as consistent name changes. [Richard Levitte] *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1'). [Bodo Moeller] *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'. The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or environment variable, or the default random state file. [Richard Levitte] *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order. Previously the output order depended on the order the files appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting of safestack.h . [Steve Henson] *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of a "stack macro" of the form SKM_(type, a, b). The DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts, this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF and PKCS12_STACK_OF. [Steve Henson] *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used instead. Added some new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to Adrian Peck for posting details of the modified algorithm to openssl-dev. [Steve Henson] *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example). Corrected to 'c.kname'. [Phillip Porch ] *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and omit any duplicate addresses. [Steve Henson] *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows. This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster. [Bodo Moeller] *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5 (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli). This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048"). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other software: Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc Free => OPENSSL_free [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15% faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange). [Bodo Moeller] *) CygWin32 support. [John Jarvie ] *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original approach. [Geoff Thorpe] *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts. This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway. [Geoff Thorpe] *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool' by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count). (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md', where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state' is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.) [Bodo Moeller] *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain(); otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later. [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Major EVP API cipher revision. Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters. Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length ciphers. Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every* cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num. New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack. Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms of macros. By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT flags. Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail any installed hardware versions can. [Steve Henson] *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version number. [Bodo Moeller] *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag; i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise. Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB). [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra] *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all. Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash features. [Steve Henson] *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present but no ssl client purpose. [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser ] *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled. Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the double NULL. However no password at all is different and is handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password: it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must be obtained from the error queue. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because thread_hash is no longer constant once set). [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one. [Ulf Möller] *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already. Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new() or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames that are sufficiently small and have no path information into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf' may not be NULL. [Damien Miller , Bodo Moeller] *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is provided to make it easier to write new configuration file reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*, or "the configuration storage API"... The new configuration file reading functions are: NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio, NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32 NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers, NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface. NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file, which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'. To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions, the function CONF_set_default_method is provided. [Richard Levitte] *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented. (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to them in a portable way. [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000] *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC. *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status (the default implementation of RAND_status). *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5, to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented. [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili ] *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length was larger than the MD block size. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William ] *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set() using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key components. [Steve Henson] *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix. [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear ] *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly discouraged. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver ] *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX' returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available. 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases, the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr. Additional arguments are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name, the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way. ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration. [Bodo Moeller] *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates its own key. ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meaning you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate). This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof does not suppress any output. [Richard Levitte] *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour, with all the associated security issues. X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead use the value in the default purpose. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again and fix a memory leak. [Steve Henson] *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters, DSA_generate_parameters is used.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated by 'openssl dhparam -C'. [Bodo Moeller] *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument which was free. [Steve Henson] *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random number generation fails. [Bodo Moeller] *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64 [Rolf Haberrecker ] *) Assembler module support for Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/). [Lutz Jaenicke and Anonymous] *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc. [Lutz Behnke ] Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000] *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy(). [Steve Henson] *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray ] *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n] case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally. [Ulf Möller] *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig ] *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) for example. [Steve Henson] *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some data structure without incrementing reference counters. (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference counter, some don't.) Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference counters or duplicate objects. [Steve Henson] *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure: the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf(). [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem pointed out by David Sacerdote ] *) Support EGD . New functions RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application, the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE or -rand. [Ulf Möller] *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures. Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the cipher list. [Steve Henson] *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs. [Steve Henson] *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument. Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code should work without changes. [Richard Levitte] *) (which is created by Configure) now contains sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES must be defined. E.g., #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES #include defines all pertinent NO_ symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller] *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS record layer. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID. [Steve Henson] *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate request header lines. Some software needs this. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase is prompted for as usual. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed, the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will autodetect the card and use it if present. [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.] *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info. [Steve Henson] *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write of seed file. [Steve Henson] *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications. [Steve Henson] *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of bits. [Ulf Möller] *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output. [Ulf Möller] *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now. [Andy Polyakov] *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0). [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line options to produce them. [Steve Henson] *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX. [Ulf Möller] *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont() for p == 0. [Ulf Möller] *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent was that statically linked binaries could for example just call SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not link with digests. This never worked because SSLeay_add_all_digests() and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'. [Steve Henson] *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster). [Bodo Moeller] *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts, use void * instead of char * in lhash. [Ulf Möller] *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client has already seen). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime, using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test. DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime. As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter generation becomes much faster. This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop. DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always has to allocate at least one BN_CTX). 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the trial division stage. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled as ASN1_TIME. [Steve Henson] *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_pseudo_rand(). [Ulf Möller] *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable) bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up the comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in SSL2 clients in multiple threads. [Bodo Moeller] *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required). [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place. [Steve Henson] *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL. [Ulf Möller] *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro: BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of Rabin-Miller iterations. [Ulf Möller] *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME. (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".) [Ulf Möller] *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys (instead of parameters) in future. [Steve Henson] *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values when a new cipher list is set. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was wrong. The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables). The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod). Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now an error is flagged. Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that the readability was also increased :-) [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1 for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number as the root CA. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses the new code. Add documentation for this stuff. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509 structures and behave in an analogous way to the X509v3 functions: they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used instead. So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality because they handle more complex structures.) [Steve Henson] *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. [Kris Kennaway , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy). [Ulf Möller] *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically, 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c to use this. Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return code. [Steve Henson] *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it. [Steve Henson] *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files. [Ulf Möller] *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no international characters are used. More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted in ASN1 order. [Steve Henson] *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template file containing all the field values and have req construct the request. Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7 structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow attributes to be looked up by NID and added. Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can be handled by the string table functions. Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this is useful when for example there is only one permissible type (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid types at all. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer, respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.) As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough. [Bodo Moeller] *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30% performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and SHA1. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two. To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello. [Steve Henson] *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional" format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key support to pkcs8 application. [Steve Henson] *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1 specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct' behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway). [Bodo Moeller] *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain them from an external cache). The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID, so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve consistency. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for example. [Steve Henson] *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension and any application specific purposes. The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted" if the certificate is self signed. [Steve Henson] *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line environment or config files in a few more utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities. Update documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and don't allocate anything because they don't need to. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS for details. [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods ] *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32 compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code. OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems. With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F] CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M] The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to request additional information: CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library. Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler options. To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other way than through macros have a new API and new semantic: CRYPTO_dbg_malloc() CRYPTO_dbg_realloc() CRYPTO_dbg_free() All macros of value have retained their old syntax. [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER, ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines. [Frans Heymans , modified by Steve Henson] *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be included in OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1, have a cleaner way to pick the version they need. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a PKCS12 structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add() functions so they accept a list of the field values and the application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't need initialising. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard" extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch() and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily be maintained manually. There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing. [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't work because people forget to call this function] Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added: so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call X509V3_EXT_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people should be discouraged from doing it. [Ben Laurie] *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant operations are affected by the digest parameter including the -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest. [Steve Henson] *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength. There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour: this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all. Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g. if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs. Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions which should be used for version portability: especially since the verify structure is likely to change more often now. SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers and vice versa. Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency. [Steve Henson] *) Support for the authority information access extension. [Steve Henson] *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle public keys in a format compatible with certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public keys so we should be OK. The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to stay in the name of compatibility. With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key. Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key. Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*() (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*()) that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the supplied key). [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs: added a new function to read in both types and return the number read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed. [Steve Henson] *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName. [Steve Henson] *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate: for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify has been modified to it will now verify a self signed certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a single self signed certificate. This means that: openssl verify ss.pem now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem is OK. [Steve Henson] *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure (and add it to external session representation). This is needed when client certificate verifications fails, but an application-provided verification callback (set by SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid security holes. [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure didn't contain any existing data because it was being created. [Po-Cheng Chen , slightly modified by Steve Henson] *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1 hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust code. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned. [Geoff Thorpe ] *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes. Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle certificate auxiliary information. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document the 'enc' command. [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info() is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty. Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe. [Richard Levitte] *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the encryption options which never did anything. Update docs. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase to be included on either the command line (not recommended on OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the manpages and fix a few bugs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice, leaking and not finding already revoked certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information. This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX() can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be retained: existing certificates can have this information added using the new 'x509' options. Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted for all purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD). The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95% performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs. [Mark Cox] *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2 handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key. A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes the key length and effective key length are equal. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0); and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in the structures. The more adventurous can try: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0); and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default openssl.cnf for more info. [Steve Henson] *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust: - Assure unique random numbers after fork(). - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them or use exactly the same state in multiple threads. Access to the large state is not always serializable because the additional locking could be a performance killer, and md should be large enough anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality for handling the random seed file. Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not: ca, dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option), s_client, s_server, x509 (when signing). Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges; for RSA signatures we could do without one. gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs that support '-rand'. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files; don't just chmod when it may be too late. [Bodo Moeller] *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed. [Bill Perry] *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type is suitable. [Steve Henson] *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility) should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly". [Steve Henson] *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client, server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to print out all the purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag. This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a single function call. [Steve Henson] *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. [Andy Polyakov] *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format). [Steve Henson] *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer when producing the local key id. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename "server.pem". [Steve Henson] *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow a public key to be input or output. For example: openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this. [Steve Henson] *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained in the message. This was handled by allowing X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it. [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki ] *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified. [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64 BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is trivial: move one line. [Steve Henson, reported by ian@uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ] *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this with an event loop for example. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available. For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead. This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1 for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt(). [Steve Henson] *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt). [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller] *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA key generation. [Steve Henson] *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs. (still largely untested) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before. [Steve Henson] *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate UTF8 strings a character at a time. [Steve Henson] *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala but extensively modified. [Steve Henson] *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'. [Andy Polyakov] *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala . The new option is called -extensions and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions in ca. [Steve Henson] *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example: 1.OU="Unit name 1" 2.OU="Unit name 2" this is the same syntax as used in the req config file. [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but are otherwise ignored at present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted. A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be copied until the next read. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only memory BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read, but a retry condition occurred while trying to read the rest. [Bodo Moeller] *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow extensions to be obtained and added. [Steve Henson] *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as CRLF (as required by many protocols). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999] *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency. [Andrija Antonijevic ] *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca' program. [Steve Henson] *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length). For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of utter importance to use SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); or SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup attacks may become possible! [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program: this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short or long name. [Steve Henson] *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present, otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example no private key components need be present and it might store extra data in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp. By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for private key operations. [Steve Henson] *) Added support for SPARC Linux. [Andy Polyakov] *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag); to ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); so that applications can pass data to their callbacks: The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever the password callback is called. [Damien Miller ; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller] New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata. Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will work. *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=... (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms. To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds). [Bodo Moeller] *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented. [Andy Polyakov] *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and delete an unused file. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32, since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain. This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key, and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case of an error. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check for verifying the consistency of RSA keys. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work: 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned comparison" warnings. 3. Add sk__sort to DEF file generator and do make update. [Steve Henson] *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and derived keys are printed to stderr. [Steve Henson] *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup(). [Roman E. Pavlov ] *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match. It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key: the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate. Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match. This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have this bug. [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson ] *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems. The interface is as follows: Applications can use CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop(); "off" is now the default. The library internally uses CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on() to disable memory-checking temporarily. Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were even the default) are now avoided. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful than just having a counter. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future extensions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX), which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour, whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour. Initial "mode" flags are: SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when a single record has been written. SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write retries use the same buffer location. (But all of the contents must be copied!) [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options worked. *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc. [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington ] *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime. Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some test programs. [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to point to the end. [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler ] *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database). [Steve Henson] *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the necessary function names. [Steve Henson] *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure was not even able to write more than one option correctly. Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info. [Steve Henson] *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS. Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions must use this, not the compile-time macro. (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by such programs?) Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't need locks. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e. SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE). [Bodo Moeller] *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value for the encoded length. [Jeon KyoungHo ] *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count. [Steve Henson] *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5 _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some unusual formatting. [Steve Henson] *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed to use the new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a constant. [Steve Henson] *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep, according to Mark Crispin . [Bodo Moeller] #if 0 *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird. [Ben Laurie] #else des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does. Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs -- where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used. #endif *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries on without noticing the failure. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) DES library cleanups. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use of v2.0. [Steve Henson] *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl". [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing. This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl. Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its value doesn't matter. [Steve Henson] *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't support mutable. [Ben Laurie] *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin). [Ray Miller ] "linux-sparc" configuration. [Christian Forster ] *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers. [Ulf Möller] *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress). File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *. [Ben Laurie] *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested). [Ben Laurie] *) Additional typesafe stacks. [Ben Laurie] *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999] *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc". *) Updated some demos. [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine] *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application. [Wu Zhigang] *) Fix memory leak in conf.c. [Steve Henson] *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it instead of using a fixed path. [Bodo Moeller] *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc. [Andy Polyakov] *) Improvements for VMS support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999] *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now! This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros. These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway. [Steve Henson] *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data. [Steve Henson] *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char) to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements), which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts. Introduce new type const_des_cblock. [Bodo Moeller] *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public key elements as negative integers. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganize and speed up MD5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) VMS support. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS. [Steve Henson] *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as intended anyway -- now it really works as intended). [Bodo Moeller] *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+ [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly. [Sebastian Akerman , modified by Steve] *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need). ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change. As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?), we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures. Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions: Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx) does not influence s as it used to. In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing key type. [Steve Henson] *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req' and 'x509'). [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509' extension option. [Steve Henson] *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic, without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds. [Ben Laurie] *) Support Borland C++ builder. [Janez Jere , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Support Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) Update HPUX configuration. [Anonymous] *) Add missing sk__unshift() function to safestack.h [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not DER-encoded.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API. x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error: Its depth (which was not part of the external interface) was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain; now it really counts the depth. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error messages since the error codes are not globally unique (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate didn't match the private key). *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each connection using the SSL_CTX). [Bodo Moeller] *) OAEP decoding bug fix. [Ulf Möller] *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by David Harris. [Bodo Moeller] *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris and Linux), "threads" is the default. [Bodo Moeller] *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh. [Bodo Moeller] *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories such as /usr/local/bin. [Bodo Moeller] *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries. [Niels Poppe ] *) New Configure option no- (rsa, idea, rc5, ...). [Ulf Möller] *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for extension adding in x509 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI prototypes. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR. [Ulf Möller] *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering, header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all on one line (which resulted in some large lines...). [Steve Henson] *) Change #include filenames from to . [Bodo Moeller] *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix some race conditions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate Policies and CRL distribution points documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0. [Merlin Hughes ] *) Fix lots of warnings. [Richard Levitte ] *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Change functions to ANSI C. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix typos in error codes. [Martin Kraemer , Ulf Möller] *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set. Various additions to support the r2i method this uses. [Steve Henson] *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE types DirectoryString and DisplayText. [Steve Henson] *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database, add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM. [Steve Henson] *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to support typesafe stack. [Steve Henson] *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options(). [Nils Frostberg ] *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete) old X509V3 handling code. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure option "rsaref". [Ulf Möller] *) Don't auto-generate pem.h. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs. [Ben Laurie] *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants. [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson] *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more. In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether. [Ben Laurie] *) Add `openssl ca -revoke ' facility which revokes a certificate specified in by updating the entry in the index.txt file. This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now. [Massimiliano Pala , Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl " for ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now. In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when it should have checked SSL_pending() first. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding. [Ulf Möller] *) Tweaks to Configure [Niels Poppe ] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support, yet... [Steve Henson] *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles. [Ulf Möller] *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386. The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486. [Ulf Möller] *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the same as SSL2_VERSION anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client. [Bodo Moeller] *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl application. Various cleanups and fixes. [Steve Henson] *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init to library startup routines. [Steve Henson] *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error codes along the way. [Steve Henson] *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12 objects to objects.h [Steve Henson] *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1 and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension. [Steve Henson] *) Add LinuxPPC support. [Jeff Dubrule ] *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to bn_div_words in alpha.s. [Hannes Reinecke and Ben Laurie] *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO. [Soren S. Jorvang ] Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999] *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon! [Ben Laurie] *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works. [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)] *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL document. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of Malloc, Free. [Lennart Bang , with minor changes by Steve] *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice if someone would make that last step automatic. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with the string "DEFAULT:eNULL". [Steve Henson] *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q. [Steve Henson] *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin', because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still installed as `perl'). [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparison to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener for the suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c. [Steve Henson] *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file is horrible: I feel ill.... [Steve Henson] *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data to ms/libeay{16,32}.def. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and openssl_bio.xs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl. [Kenji Miyake , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS. [John Tobey ] *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze. [Ben Laurie] *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf. Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure :
'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended to them (separated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key with value
and ``perl Configure '' is called. So, when you want to perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"'' now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed for linking it into DSOs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed! Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core@openssl.org. And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply to the OpenSSL toolkit. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...' display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'. Additionally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this. It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null encryption. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them), the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed. [Steve Henson] *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first field as blank. [Steve Henson] *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the relationship to the OpenSSL project. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h. [Lennart Bong ] *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/ [Lennart Bong ] *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Add new certificate file to stack functions, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()). This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list. [Ben Laurie] *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to ssl/ssl_lib.c. See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with openssl.doxy as the configuration file. [Ben Laurie] *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate. [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual] *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis (e.g. s_server). For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher" problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided no way to reconfigure them. The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be recognized by the users. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the already masked variable. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c [Richard Levitte ] *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal() from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'. [Richard Levitte ] *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose. Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA now, too. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info. [Arne Ansper ] *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT). [Arne Ansper , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt. [Ben Laurie] *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done. [Ben Laurie] *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support for some CRL extensions and new objects added. [Steve Henson] *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id. [Steve Henson] *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998). OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA. [Ulf Moeller , reformatted, corrected and integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Updates to the new SSL compression code [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3 (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00 [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c [Steve Henson] *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for an example. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script. [Lars Weber <3weber@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32 build instructions. [Steve Henson] *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work. [Steve Henson] *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness, too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil casts will probably fix them. Mostly. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros so it wasn't spotted. [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA ] *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test vectors if you have them. [Ben Laurie] *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested! [Ben Laurie] *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions. If you do a: perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update it will update them. [Steve Henson] *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*): - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain their history because I've copied them in the repository) - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced by better Test::Harness variants in the future) [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup: 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt where we collect the old documents and readme texts. 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for the crypto/md/ stuff). [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED. [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the INTEGER code. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe ] *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd like to hear about it if this slows down other processors. [Ben Laurie] *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script. [Alan Batie ] *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm' [Rainer W. Gerling ] *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences [Steve Henson] *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a few typos. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when doing certificate verification and some other functions. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments. [Steve Henson] *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req' and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate CA extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application. [Steve Henson] *) Takes a deep breath and start adding X509 V3 extension support code. Add files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet. [Steve Henson] *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print. Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions: this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version properly to be processed. [Steve Henson] *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which can still be regenerated with "make depend". [Ben Laurie] *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128. [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton ] *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour) either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl or delete all the .err files. [Steve Henson] *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing to regenerate it if needed. [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino ] *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c. [Ulf Möller ] *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems. [Steve Henson] *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config. [Ulf Möller ] *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca. [Anonymous ] *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an error, but didn't set one). [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous ] *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h. [Neil Costigan ] *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the OID is not part of the table. [Steve Henson] *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(). [Ben Laurie] *) Sort openssl functions by name. [Ben Laurie] *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password was "1234"). [Steve Henson] *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer. [Frans Heymans ] *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use NULL pointers. [Anonymous ] *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c. [Anonymous ] *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback(). [Ben Laurie] *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey(). [Steve Henson] *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error. [Arne Ansper ] *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH. [Arne Ansper ] *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still unused in the certificate verification process. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably. [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie] *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl ' are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command line interface `openssl ', similar to `cvs '. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie] *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits. [Steve Henson] *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID. [Steve Henson] *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand. [Paul Sutton] *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton] *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry(). [Ben Laurie] *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and other error libraries. [Steve Henson] *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly. [Steve Henson] *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length constructed EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now be read in. [Steve Henson] *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc) into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for the new set of documentation files. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or number of arguments. [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan ] *) Fix test data to work with the above. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems. [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller ] *) Autodetect FreeBSD3. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms: nextstep ncr-scde unixware-2.0 unixware-2.0-pentium sco5-cc. [Ben Laurie] *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files before they are needed. [Ben Laurie] *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy). [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998] *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Some fixups to the top-level documents. [Paul Sutton] *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time because the symlink to include/ was missing. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay. [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links' when "ssleay" is still not found. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11, [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann ] *) Updated the README file. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs to make a "cvs update" really silent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Cleaned up the top-level documents; o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE o removed obsolete TODO file o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32 [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree: crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various platform portability fixes. [Mark J. Cox] *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject: We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until summer 1998. [The OpenSSL Project] Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released] *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/ [Eric A. Young] *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff. [Eric A. Young] *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD, DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression: RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is available). [Eric A. Young] *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested binary structures [Dr Stephen Henson ] *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs. [Eric A. Young] *) DSA fix for "ca" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest. [Eric A. Young] *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command. [Eric A. Young] *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure. [Eric A. Young] *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library [Eric A. Young] *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases. [Eric A. Young] *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher. [Eric A. Young] *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS. [Eric A. Young] *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality. [Eric A. Young] *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). [Eric A. Young] *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all. [Eric A. Young] *) Additional PKCS1 checks. [Eric A. Young] *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers. [Eric A. Young] *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed a few memory leaks. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed various code and comment typos. [Eric A. Young] *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 bytes sent in the client random. [Edward Bishop ] openssl-1.1.0g/appveyor.yml0000644000000000000000000000167313176625656014461 0ustar rootrootplatform: - x86 - x64 environment: matrix: - VSVER: 14 configuration: - plain - shared before_build: - ps: >- If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") { $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86" $env:TARGET="VC-WIN32" } Else { $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64" $env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A" } - ps: >- If ($env:Configuration -Match "shared") { $env:SHARED="" } Else { $env:SHARED="no-shared" } - ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS")) - call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM% - mkdir _build - cd _build - perl ..\Configure %TARGET% no-asm %SHARED% - cd .. build_script: - cd _build - nmake - cd .. test_script: - cd _build - nmake test - mkdir ..\_install - nmake install install_docs DESTDIR=..\_install - cd .. openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661013054 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/driver.c0000644000000000000000000000217313176625661014516 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include #include #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FUZZ_LIBFUZZER int LLVMFuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { if (FuzzerInitialize) return FuzzerInitialize(argc, argv); return 0; } int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { return FuzzerTestOneInput(buf, len); } #elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_FUZZ_AFL) #define BUF_SIZE 65536 int main(int argc, char** argv) { if (FuzzerInitialize) FuzzerInitialize(&argc, &argv); while (__AFL_LOOP(10000)) { uint8_t *buf = malloc(BUF_SIZE); size_t size = read(0, buf, BUF_SIZE); FuzzerTestOneInput(buf, size); free(buf); } return 0; } #else #error "Unsupported fuzzer" #endif openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/cms.c0000644000000000000000000000150513176625661014003 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Test CMS DER parsing. */ #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { CMS_ContentInfo *i; BIO *in; if (!len) { return 0; } in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); OPENSSL_assert((size_t)BIO_write(in, buf, len) == len); i = d2i_CMS_bio(in, NULL); CMS_ContentInfo_free(i); BIO_free(in); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/README.md0000644000000000000000000000341413176625661014335 0ustar rootroot# I Can Haz Fuzz? LibFuzzer ========= Or, how to fuzz OpenSSL with [libfuzzer](http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html). Starting from a vanilla+OpenSSH server Ubuntu install. Use Chrome's handy recent build of clang. Older versions may also work. $ sudo apt-get install git $ mkdir git-work $ git clone https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/tools/clang $ clang/scripts/update.py You may want to git pull and re-run the update from time to time. Update your path: $ PATH=~/third_party/llvm-build/Release+Asserts/bin/:$PATH Get and build libFuzzer (there is a git mirror at https://github.com/llvm-mirror/llvm/tree/master/lib/Fuzzer if you prefer): $ cd $ sudo apt-get install subversion $ mkdir svn-work $ cd svn-work $ svn co http://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk/lib/Fuzzer $ cd Fuzzer $ clang++ -c -g -O2 -std=c++11 *.cpp $ ar r libFuzzer.a *.o $ ranlib libFuzzer.a Configure for fuzzing: $ CC=clang ./config enable-fuzz-libfuzzer \ --with-fuzzer-include=../../svn-work/Fuzzer \ --with-fuzzer-lib=../../svn-work/Fuzzer/libFuzzer \ -DPEDANTIC enable-asan enable-ubsan no-shared $ sudo apt-get install make $ LDCMD=clang++ make -j $ fuzz/helper.py $FUZZER Where $FUZZER is one of the executables in `fuzz/`. If you get a crash, you should find a corresponding input file in `fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER-crash/`. You can reproduce the crash with $ fuzz/$FUZZER AFL === Configure for fuzzing: $ sudo apt-get install afl-clang $ CC=afl-clang-fast ./config enable-fuzz-afl no-shared $ make Run one of the fuzzers: $ afl-fuzz -i fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER -o fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER/out fuzz/$FUZZER Where $FUZZER is one of the executables in `fuzz/`. openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/build.info0000644000000000000000000000623513176625661015036 0ustar rootroot{- use File::Spec::Functions; our $ex_inc = $withargs{fuzzer_include} && (file_name_is_absolute($withargs{fuzzer_include}) ? $withargs{fuzzer_include} : catdir(updir(), $withargs{fuzzer_include})); our $ex_lib = $withargs{fuzzer_lib} && (file_name_is_absolute($withargs{fuzzer_lib}) ? $withargs{fuzzer_lib} : catfile(updir(), $withargs{fuzzer_lib})); "" -} IF[{- !$disabled{"fuzz-afl"} || !$disabled{"fuzz-libfuzzer"} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=asn1 asn1parse bignum bndiv conf crl server x509 IF[{- !$disabled{"cms"} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=cms ENDIF IF[{- !$disabled{"ct"} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=ct ENDIF SOURCE[asn1]=asn1.c driver.c INCLUDE[asn1]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[asn1]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[asn1parse]=asn1parse.c driver.c INCLUDE[asn1parse]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[asn1parse]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[bignum]=bignum.c driver.c INCLUDE[bignum]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[bignum]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[bndiv]=bndiv.c driver.c INCLUDE[bndiv]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[bndiv]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[cms]=cms.c driver.c INCLUDE[cms]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[cms]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[conf]=conf.c driver.c INCLUDE[conf]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[conf]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[crl]=crl.c driver.c INCLUDE[crl]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[crl]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[ct]=ct.c driver.c INCLUDE[ct]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[ct]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[server]=server.c driver.c INCLUDE[server]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[server]=../libcrypto ../libssl {- $ex_lib -} SOURCE[x509]=x509.c driver.c INCLUDE[x509]=../include {- $ex_inc -} DEPEND[x509]=../libcrypto {- $ex_lib -} ENDIF IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=asn1-test asn1parse-test bignum-test bndiv-test conf-test crl-test server-test x509-test IF[{- !$disabled{"cms"} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=cms-test ENDIF IF[{- !$disabled{"ct"} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=ct-test ENDIF SOURCE[asn1-test]=asn1.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[asn1-test]=../include DEPEND[asn1-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[asn1parse-test]=asn1parse.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[asn1parse-test]=../include DEPEND[asn1parse-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[bignum-test]=bignum.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[bignum-test]=../include DEPEND[bignum-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[bndiv-test]=bndiv.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[bndiv-test]=../include DEPEND[bndiv-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[cms-test]=cms.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[cms-test]=../include DEPEND[cms-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[conf-test]=conf.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[conf-test]=../include DEPEND[conf-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[crl-test]=crl.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[crl-test]=../include DEPEND[crl-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[ct-test]=ct.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[ct-test]=../include DEPEND[ct-test]=../libcrypto SOURCE[server-test]=server.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[server-test]=../include DEPEND[server-test]=../libcrypto ../libssl SOURCE[x509-test]=x509.c test-corpus.c INCLUDE[x509-test]=../include DEPEND[x509-test]=../libcrypto ENDIF openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/helper.py0000755000000000000000000000251513176625661014713 0ustar rootroot#!/usr/bin/python # # Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html """Fuzzing helper, creates and uses corpus/crash directories. fuzzer.py """ import os import subprocess import sys FUZZER = sys.argv[1] THIS_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__)) CORPORA_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(THIS_DIR, "corpora")) FUZZER_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CORPORA_DIR, FUZZER)) if not os.path.isdir(FUZZER_DIR): os.mkdir(FUZZER_DIR) corpora = [] def _create(d): dd = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CORPORA_DIR, d)) if not os.path.isdir(dd): os.mkdir(dd) corpora.append(dd) def _add(d): dd = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CORPORA_DIR, d)) if os.path.isdir(dd): corpora.append(dd) def main(): _create(FUZZER) _create(FUZZER + "-crash") _add(FUZZER + "-seed") cmd = ([os.path.abspath(os.path.join(THIS_DIR, FUZZER))] + sys.argv[2:] + ["-artifact_prefix=" + corpora[1] + "/"] + corpora) print " ".join(cmd) subprocess.call(cmd) if __name__ == "__main__": main() openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/asn1.c0000644000000000000000000001525413176625661014071 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Fuzz ASN.1 parsing for various data structures. Specify which on the * command line: * * asn1 */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" static ASN1_ITEM_EXP *item_type[] = { ASN1_ITEM_ref(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdentifierChoice), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdentifiers), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASIdOrRange), #endif ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ANY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BIT_STRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BMPSTRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_BOOLEAN), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_ENUMERATED), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_FBOOLEAN), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_GENERALSTRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_IA5STRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_NULL), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_PRINTABLE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_SEQUENCE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_SET_ANY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_T61STRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_TBOOLEAN), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_TIME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_UTCTIME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_UTF8STRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 ASN1_ITEM_ref(ASRange), #endif ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(AUTHORITY_KEYID), ASN1_ITEM_ref(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(BIGNUM), ASN1_ITEM_ref(CBIGNUM), ASN1_ITEM_ref(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS ASN1_ITEM_ref(CMS_ContentInfo), ASN1_ITEM_ref(CMS_ReceiptRequest), ASN1_ITEM_ref(CRL_DIST_POINTS), #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ASN1_ITEM_ref(DHparams), #endif ASN1_ITEM_ref(DIRECTORYSTRING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(DISPLAYTEXT), ASN1_ITEM_ref(DIST_POINT), ASN1_ITEM_ref(DIST_POINT_NAME), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ASN1_ITEM_ref(ECPARAMETERS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ECPKPARAMETERS), #endif ASN1_ITEM_ref(EDIPARTYNAME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_NAMES), ASN1_ITEM_ref(GENERAL_SUBTREE), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressChoice), ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressFamily), ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressOrRange), ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressRange), #endif ASN1_ITEM_ref(ISSUING_DIST_POINT), ASN1_ITEM_ref(LONG), ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(NETSCAPE_SPKAC), ASN1_ITEM_ref(NETSCAPE_SPKI), ASN1_ITEM_ref(NOTICEREF), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_BASICRESP), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CERTID), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CERTSTATUS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_CRLID), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_ONEREQ), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_REQINFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_REQUEST), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPBYTES), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPDATA), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPID), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_RESPONSE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_REVOKEDINFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SERVICELOC), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SIGNATURE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(OCSP_SINGLERESP), #endif ASN1_ITEM_ref(OTHERNAME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PBE2PARAM), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PBEPARAM), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PBKDF2PARAM), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_BAGS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_MAC_DATA), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_SAFEBAG), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_DIGEST), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ENCRYPT), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ENVELOPE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_SIGNED), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD), ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICYINFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_MAPPING), ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICY_MAPPINGS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(POLICYQUALINFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION), ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_POLICY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSAPrivateKey), ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(RSAPublicKey), ASN1_ITEM_ref(SXNET), ASN1_ITEM_ref(SXNETID), /*ASN1_ITEM_ref(TS_RESP), want to do this, but type is hidden, however d2i exists... */ ASN1_ITEM_ref(USERNOTICE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_ALGOR), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_ALGORS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_ATTRIBUTE), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CERT_AUX), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CINF), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CRL), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_CRL_INFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_EXTENSION), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_EXTENSIONS), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_NAME), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_NAME_ENTRY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_PUBKEY), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_REQ), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_REQ_INFO), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_REVOKED), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_SIG), ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_VAL), ASN1_ITEM_ref(ZLONG), NULL }; int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { int n; ASN1_PCTX *pctx = ASN1_PCTX_new(); ASN1_PCTX_set_flags(pctx, ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT | ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SEQUENCE | ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_SSOF | ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_TYPE | ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_FIELD_STRUCT_NAME); ASN1_PCTX_set_str_flags(pctx, ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE | ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL); for (n = 0; item_type[n] != NULL; ++n) { const uint8_t *b = buf; unsigned char *der = NULL; const ASN1_ITEM *i = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(item_type[n]); ASN1_VALUE *o = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &b, len, i); if (o != NULL) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); ASN1_item_print(bio, o, 4, i, pctx); BIO_free(bio); ASN1_item_i2d(o, &der, i); OPENSSL_free(der); ASN1_item_free(o, i); } } ASN1_PCTX_free(pctx); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/asn1parse.c0000644000000000000000000000150513176625661015116 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Fuzz the parser used for dumping ASN.1 using "openssl asn1parse". */ #include #include #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { static BIO *bio_out; if (bio_out == NULL) bio_out = BIO_new_file("/dev/null", "w"); (void)ASN1_parse_dump(bio_out, buf, len, 0, 0); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/bndiv.c0000644000000000000000000000602113176625661014321 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Confirm that if (d, r) = a / b, then b * d + r == a, and that sign(d) == * sign(a), and 0 <= r <= b */ #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { static BN_CTX *ctx; static BIGNUM *b1; static BIGNUM *b2; static BIGNUM *b3; static BIGNUM *b4; static BIGNUM *b5; int success = 0; size_t l1 = 0, l2 = 0; /* s1 and s2 will be the signs for b1 and b2. */ int s1 = 0, s2 = 0; if (ctx == NULL) { b1 = BN_new(); b2 = BN_new(); b3 = BN_new(); b4 = BN_new(); b5 = BN_new(); ctx = BN_CTX_new(); } /* We are going to split the buffer in two, sizes l1 and l2, giving b1 and * b2. */ if (len > 0) { --len; /* Use first byte to divide the remaining buffer into 3Fths. I admit * this disallows some number sizes. If it matters, better ideas are * welcome (Ben). */ l1 = ((buf[0] & 0x3f) * len) / 0x3f; s1 = buf[0] & 0x40; s2 = buf[0] & 0x80; ++buf; l2 = len - l1; } OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf, l1, b1) == b1); BN_set_negative(b1, s1); OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf + l1, l2, b2) == b2); BN_set_negative(b2, s2); /* divide by 0 is an error */ if (BN_is_zero(b2)) { success = 1; goto done; } OPENSSL_assert(BN_div(b3, b4, b1, b2, ctx)); if (BN_is_zero(b1)) success = BN_is_zero(b3) && BN_is_zero(b4); else if (BN_is_negative(b1)) success = (BN_is_negative(b3) != BN_is_negative(b2) || BN_is_zero(b3)) && (BN_is_negative(b4) || BN_is_zero(b4)); else success = (BN_is_negative(b3) == BN_is_negative(b2) || BN_is_zero(b3)) && (!BN_is_negative(b4) || BN_is_zero(b4)); OPENSSL_assert(BN_mul(b5, b3, b2, ctx)); OPENSSL_assert(BN_add(b5, b5, b4)); success = success && BN_cmp(b5, b1) == 0; if (!success) { BN_print_fp(stdout, b1); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b2); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b3); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b4); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b5); putchar('\n'); printf("%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n", BN_is_negative(b1), BN_is_negative(b2), BN_is_negative(b3), BN_is_negative(b4), BN_is_zero(b4), BN_is_negative(b3) != BN_is_negative(b2) && (BN_is_negative(b4) || BN_is_zero(b4)), BN_cmp(b5, b1)); puts("----\n"); } done: OPENSSL_assert(success); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/fuzzer.h0000644000000000000000000000070313176625661014552 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len); int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv); openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/conf.c0000644000000000000000000000152513176625661014150 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Test configuration parsing. */ #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { CONF *conf; BIO *in; long eline; if (len == 0) return 0; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); OPENSSL_assert((size_t)BIO_write(in, buf, len) == len); NCONF_load_bio(conf, in, &eline); NCONF_free(conf); BIO_free(in); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/server.c0000644000000000000000000003466413176625661014543 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* Shamelessly copied from BoringSSL and converted to C. */ /* Test first part of SSL server handshake. */ #include #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" static const uint8_t kCertificateDER[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xff, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x11, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x84, 0xee, 0x34, 0x99, 0x98, 0x76, 0xfb, 0x6f, 0xb2, 0x15, 0xc8, 0x47, 0x79, 0x05, 0x9b, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x12, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x07, 0x41, 0x63, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x35, 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x37, 0x30, 0x30, 0x32, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x36, 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x36, 0x30, 0x30, 0x32, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x12, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x07, 0x41, 0x63, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xce, 0x47, 0xcb, 0x11, 0xbb, 0xd2, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x14, 0xaf, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xb6, 0xc9, 0x38, 0x2a, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0x7e, 0xfb, 0xbc, 0xfc, 0x59, 0x42, 0xb9, 0x56, 0xf0, 0x4c, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x31, 0x84, 0xbe, 0xac, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x71, 0x91, 0x85, 0xd8, 0x32, 0xbd, 0x00, 0xea, 0xac, 0x65, 0xf6, 0x03, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x8b, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0x58, 0x88, 0x04, 0x41, 0x92, 0x74, 0xa6, 0x57, 0x2e, 0x8e, 0x88, 0xd5, 0x3d, 0xda, 0x14, 0x3e, 0x63, 0x88, 0x22, 0xe3, 0x53, 0xe9, 0xba, 0x39, 0x09, 0xac, 0xfb, 0xd0, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x20, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe6, 0xed, 0xf1, 0x62, 0x1e, 0xe5, 0xc9, 0x48, 0xa0, 0xca, 0x2e, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x5a, 0x82, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x2a, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0xc8, 0x48, 0xa7, 0x39, 0x23, 0x74, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xb0, 0x6f, 0xc3, 0x64, 0x99, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x82, 0xc8, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0x86, 0x40, 0xce, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xce, 0x69, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x2a, 0x23, 0xca, 0xea, 0xb7, 0x7b, 0xdf, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x5f, 0xff, 0x7a, 0x49, 0x49, 0x0e, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x51, 0x45, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x64, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0xb5, 0x86, 0x89, 0x43, 0x22, 0x4c, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x09, 0xc4, 0xa4, 0x10, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x46, 0xe2, 0x46, 0x8f, 0x76, 0x50, 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x2b, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x78, 0xc7, 0xcf, 0xc1, 0x77, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xa9, 0xfb, 0xc9, 0x66, 0x5a, 0xc5, 0x9b, 0x31, 0x41, 0x67, 0x01, 0xbe, 0x33, 0x10, 0xba, 0x05, 0x58, 0xed, 0x76, 0x53, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0xbb, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0xcd, 0xfb, 0xdf, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x18, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x28, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0xa9, 0x50, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x47, 0x10, 0x41, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0xa0, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x25, 0x04, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x03, 0x01, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x19, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x11, 0x04, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x82, 0x0e, 0x66, 0x75, 0x7a, 0x7a, 0x2e, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x92, 0xde, 0xef, 0x96, 0x06, 0x7b, 0xff, 0x71, 0x7d, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0xae, 0xb8, 0x22, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0x96, 0x9c, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xe7, 0xd9, 0x47, 0xff, 0x3f, 0xe9, 0x35, 0x95, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xdc, 0x7f, 0xc8, 0x8a, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x1d, 0x38, 0x47, 0xfc, 0x76, 0xd2, 0x1f, 0x98, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xac, 0xc8, 0x70, 0x38, 0x0a, 0x3d, 0x51, 0x8d, 0x0f, 0x03, 0x1b, 0xef, 0x62, 0xa1, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0x4a, 0x8c, 0x12, 0x2b, 0x54, 0x50, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xd9, 0xf6, 0xbf, 0x58, 0x11, 0x58, 0x5e, 0xe5, 0x86, 0x1e, 0x3b, 0x6b, 0x30, 0x7e, 0x72, 0x89, 0xe8, 0x6b, 0x7b, 0xb7, 0xaf, 0xef, 0x8b, 0xa9, 0x3e, 0xb0, 0xcd, 0x0b, 0xef, 0xb0, 0x0c, 0x96, 0x2b, 0xc5, 0x3b, 0xd5, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0xae, 0x3a, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x0f, 0x75, 0x37, 0x55, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xd2, 0xed, 0x96, 0xac, 0x30, 0x6b, 0xda, 0xa1, 0x48, 0x17, 0x96, 0x23, 0x85, 0x9a, 0x57, 0x77, 0xe9, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x37, 0x03, 0xba, 0x49, 0x77, 0x40, 0x3b, 0x76, 0x4b, 0xda, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x57, 0x55, 0x34, 0x22, 0x83, 0x45, 0x29, 0xab, 0x2e, 0x11, 0xff, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x55, 0xb1, 0xa7, 0x58, 0x59, 0x05, 0x25, 0xf9, 0x1e, 0x3d, 0xb7, 0xac, 0x04, 0x39, 0x2c, 0xf9, 0xaf, 0xb8, 0x68, 0xfb, 0x8e, 0x35, 0x71, 0x32, 0xff, 0x70, 0xe9, 0x46, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x90, 0x88, 0x23, 0x48, 0x0c, 0x50, 0xeb, 0x0a, 0xa9, 0xae, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0xbe, 0xa5, 0x76, 0x94, 0xd7, 0x64, 0x22, 0x38, 0x98, 0x17, 0xa4, 0x3a, 0xa7, 0x59, 0x9f, 0x1d, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x90, 0x1a, 0x81, 0xef, 0x19, 0xfb, 0x2b, 0xb7, 0xa7, 0x64, 0x61, 0x22, 0xa4, 0x6f, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0x58, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4e, 0x77, 0x67, 0xd0, 0x5d, 0x58, 0x76, 0x8a, 0xbb, }; static const uint8_t kRSAPrivateKeyDER[] = { 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa5, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xce, 0x47, 0xcb, 0x11, 0xbb, 0xd2, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x14, 0xaf, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xb6, 0xc9, 0x38, 0x2a, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0x7e, 0xfb, 0xbc, 0xfc, 0x59, 0x42, 0xb9, 0x56, 0xf0, 0x4c, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x31, 0x84, 0xbe, 0xac, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x71, 0x91, 0x85, 0xd8, 0x32, 0xbd, 0x00, 0xea, 0xac, 0x65, 0xf6, 0x03, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x8b, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0x58, 0x88, 0x04, 0x41, 0x92, 0x74, 0xa6, 0x57, 0x2e, 0x8e, 0x88, 0xd5, 0x3d, 0xda, 0x14, 0x3e, 0x63, 0x88, 0x22, 0xe3, 0x53, 0xe9, 0xba, 0x39, 0x09, 0xac, 0xfb, 0xd0, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0x3c, 0x20, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe6, 0xed, 0xf1, 0x62, 0x1e, 0xe5, 0xc9, 0x48, 0xa0, 0xca, 0x2e, 0x3c, 0x14, 0x5a, 0x82, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x2a, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0xc8, 0x48, 0xa7, 0x39, 0x23, 0x74, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xb0, 0x6f, 0xc3, 0x64, 0x99, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x82, 0xc8, 0xf6, 0xdb, 0x86, 0x40, 0xce, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xce, 0x69, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x2a, 0x23, 0xca, 0xea, 0xb7, 0x7b, 0xdf, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x5f, 0xff, 0x7a, 0x49, 0x49, 0x0e, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x51, 0x45, 0x13, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x64, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0xb5, 0x86, 0x89, 0x43, 0x22, 0x4c, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x09, 0xc4, 0xa4, 0x10, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x46, 0xe2, 0x46, 0x8f, 0x76, 0x50, 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x2b, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x78, 0xc7, 0xcf, 0xc1, 0x77, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xa9, 0xfb, 0xc9, 0x66, 0x5a, 0xc5, 0x9b, 0x31, 0x41, 0x67, 0x01, 0xbe, 0x33, 0x10, 0xba, 0x05, 0x58, 0xed, 0x76, 0x53, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0xbb, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0xcd, 0xfb, 0xdf, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xd7, 0x18, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x28, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0xa9, 0x50, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x47, 0x10, 0x41, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xa8, 0x47, 0xb9, 0x4a, 0x06, 0x47, 0x93, 0x71, 0x3d, 0xef, 0x7b, 0xca, 0xb4, 0x7c, 0x0a, 0xe6, 0x82, 0xd0, 0xe7, 0x0d, 0xa9, 0x08, 0xf6, 0xa4, 0xfd, 0xd8, 0x73, 0xae, 0x6f, 0x56, 0x29, 0x5e, 0x25, 0x72, 0xa8, 0x30, 0x44, 0x73, 0xcf, 0x56, 0x26, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xde, 0x42, 0x81, 0xf4, 0xf0, 0x1f, 0x5d, 0xcb, 0x47, 0xf2, 0x26, 0xe9, 0xe0, 0x93, 0x28, 0xa3, 0x10, 0x3b, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x51, 0x11, 0x12, 0x06, 0x5e, 0xaf, 0xce, 0xb0, 0xa5, 0x14, 0xdd, 0x82, 0x58, 0xa1, 0xa4, 0x12, 0xdf, 0x65, 0x1d, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0xd5, 0x58, 0x68, 0x11, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0x23, 0xc2, 0xbf, 0xa1, 0x25, 0x24, 0x47, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x96, 0xb7, 0x1f, 0xf4, 0x44, 0xd4, 0xd1, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x33, 0x68, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x68, 0x99, 0x9c, 0x91, 0xe8, 0x72, 0xc9, 0xd7, 0x8c, 0x80, 0x20, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x83, 0x4d, 0xe4, 0xab, 0xf9, 0x74, 0xa1, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xc0, 0x0d, 0x5b, 0x05, 0x51, 0xc2, 0x6f, 0xb2, 0x91, 0x02, 0xec, 0xc0, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x5c, 0x91, 0x05, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0x65, 0xc2, 0xad, 0x24, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0xb6, 0x16, 0xf1, 0xa1, 0x67, 0x1a, 0x9d, 0x37, 0x56, 0xbf, 0x01, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x35, 0x30, 0x57, 0x73, 0xf4, 0xf0, 0x5e, 0xa7, 0xe8, 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x94, 0x17, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xbd, 0xf5, 0x31, 0xa7, 0x2d, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x01, 0xbd, 0xda, 0x16, 0x8e, 0xb9, 0x30, 0x40, 0xa6, 0x6e, 0xbd, 0xcd, 0x4d, 0x84, 0x67, 0x4e, 0x0b, 0xce, 0xd5, 0xef, 0xf8, 0x08, 0x63, 0x02, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0x67, 0x92, 0xe2, 0x23, 0x9d, 0x27, 0x22, 0x1d, 0xc6, 0x67, 0x5e, 0x66, 0xbf, 0x03, 0xb8, 0xa9, 0x67, 0xd4, 0x39, 0xd8, 0x75, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0xed, 0x56, 0xb8, 0x81, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xf7, 0x46, 0x68, 0xc6, 0x13, 0xf8, 0xba, 0x0f, 0x83, 0xdb, 0x05, 0xa8, 0x25, 0x00, 0x70, 0x9c, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x12, 0x34, 0x0d, 0x96, 0xcf, 0x0d, 0x98, 0x9b, 0x8d, 0x9c, 0x96, 0x78, 0xd1, 0x3c, 0x01, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0x35, 0x5c, 0x20, 0x42, 0xb4, 0x38, 0xe3, 0xd6, 0x54, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd6, 0x26, 0x8a, 0x0c, 0xf6, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x04, 0xc1, 0x22, 0x42, 0x19, 0x61, 0xc4, 0x94, 0x7c, 0x07, 0x2e, 0x80, 0x52, 0xfe, 0x8d, 0xe6, 0x92, 0x3a, 0x91, 0xfe, 0x72, 0x99, 0xe1, 0x2a, 0x73, 0x76, 0xb1, 0x24, 0x20, 0x67, 0xde, 0x28, 0xcb, 0x0e, 0xe6, 0x52, 0xb5, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0x8b, 0x1e, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x09, 0x26, 0xb9, 0xa7, 0x61, 0xba, 0xf8, 0x79, 0xd2, 0x66, 0x57, 0x28, 0xd7, 0x31, 0xb5, 0x0b, 0x27, 0x19, 0x1e, 0x6f, 0x46, 0xfc, 0x54, 0x95, 0xeb, 0x78, 0x01, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0x79, 0x5a, 0x4d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd5, 0x8f, 0x16, 0x53, 0x2f, 0x57, 0x93, 0xbf, 0x09, 0x75, 0xbf, 0x63, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x27, 0xfd, 0x23, 0x21, 0xde, 0x9b, 0xe9, 0x73, 0x3f, 0x49, 0x02, 0xd2, 0x38, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xc3, 0xba, 0x92, 0x07, 0x87, 0x52, 0xa9, 0x35, 0xe3, 0x0c, 0xe4, 0x2f, 0x05, 0x7b, 0x37, 0xa5, 0x40, 0x9c, 0x3b, 0x94, 0xf7, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xee, 0x3a, 0xa8, 0xfb, 0x1f, 0x11, 0x1f, 0xd8, 0x9a, 0x80, 0x42, 0x3d, 0x7f, 0xa4, 0xb8, 0x9a, 0xaa, 0xea, 0x72, 0xc1, 0xe3, 0xed, 0x06, 0x60, 0x92, 0x37, 0xf9, 0xba, 0xfb, 0x9e, 0xed, 0x05, 0xa6, 0xd4, 0x72, 0x68, 0x4f, 0x63, 0xfe, 0xd6, 0x10, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x0a, 0x93, 0xc6, 0xb9, 0xd7, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x57, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x93, 0x2b, 0xae, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x58, 0x44, 0x82, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x5d, 0x62, 0x11, 0x78, 0xea, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xc1, 0xe6, 0x0b, 0x72, 0xf1, 0x48, 0x5f, 0xac, 0xbd, 0x98, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0x09, 0xbd, 0x15, 0x95, 0x47, 0x09, 0xa1, 0x6c, 0x03, 0x91, 0xbf, 0x05, 0x70, 0xc1, 0x3e, 0x52, 0x64, 0x99, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0x98, 0x70, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x25, 0x9d, 0x8e, 0x88, 0x30, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x22, 0x6c, 0xd0, 0xcc, 0x51, 0x8f, 0x5c, 0x70, 0xc7, 0x37, 0xc4, 0x69, 0xab, 0x1d, 0xfc, 0xed, 0x3a, 0x03, 0xbb, 0xa2, 0xad, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x67, 0x4b, 0x96, 0xaa, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0x4b, 0xfa, 0x18, 0x21, 0x08, 0xb2, 0xa3, 0xb9, 0x3e, 0x61, 0x99, 0xdc, 0x5a, 0x97, 0x9c, 0x73, 0x6a, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0x68, 0x03, 0x24, 0x5f, 0x55, 0x77, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0xbe, 0x7a, 0x78, 0x53, 0x68, 0x48, 0x69, 0x53, 0xc8, 0xb1, 0xf5, 0xbf, 0x98, 0x2d, 0x11, 0x1e, 0x98, 0xa8, 0x36, 0x50, 0xa0, 0xb1, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x90, 0x88, 0x30, 0x71, 0xc7, 0xfe, 0x9b, 0x6d, 0x95, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x85, 0xe7, 0x44, 0x78, 0xbc, 0x79, 0x6e, 0x47, 0x86, 0xc9, 0xf3, 0xdd, 0xc6, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x94, 0x9f, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x87, 0xd0, 0xdb, 0xee, 0xcd, 0x1b, 0x87, 0x23, 0xff, 0x76, 0xd4, 0x37, 0x8a, 0xcd, 0xb9, 0x6e, 0xd1, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x97, 0x8d, 0xe3, 0x81, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x4e, 0xd1, 0xa0, 0xc4, 0x9f, 0xbd, 0x34, 0xe5, 0xe8, 0x53, 0x4f, 0xca, 0x10, 0xb5, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x09, 0x54, 0xde, 0x60, 0xa7, 0xd1, 0x16, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0x7a, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0x26, 0xef, 0xe4, 0x0e, 0x77, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0xdc, 0xb9, 0x88, 0x19, 0x23, 0x70, 0xc7, 0xe1, 0x60, 0xaf, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x04, 0xf7, 0x71, 0x17, 0x81, 0x36, 0x75, 0xbb, 0x97, 0xd7, 0x75, 0xb6, 0x8e, 0xbc, 0xac, 0x9c, 0x6a, 0x9b, 0x24, 0x89, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x6b, 0x8c, 0x65, 0xdb, 0x04, 0x73, 0xab, 0x25, 0xe1, 0x5b, 0xbc, 0x3c, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0x3c, 0x04, 0xae, 0x97, 0x2e, 0xfd, 0xa4, 0x97, 0x1f, 0x05, 0x17, 0x27, 0xac, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x85, 0xb4, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x5b, 0xb7, 0x94, 0x3b, 0x7f, 0x6c, 0x0c, 0xc7, 0x16, 0xc6, 0xa0, 0xbd, 0x80, 0xb0, 0x81, 0xde, 0xa0, 0x23, 0xa6, 0xf6, 0x75, 0x33, 0x51, 0x35, 0xa2, 0x75, 0x55, 0x70, 0x4d, 0x42, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x54, 0xe4, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x7a, 0xf2, 0x17, 0xa7, 0xdd, 0x13, 0x44, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0x6b, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x42, 0x8b, 0x13, 0x4d, 0xf9, 0x5b, 0xf8, 0x33, 0x42, 0xd9, 0x9e, 0x50, 0x1c, 0x7c, 0xbc, 0xfa, 0x62, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xcf, 0x99, 0xda, 0x9e, 0x04, 0x90, 0xb2, 0xc6, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0x2a, 0x7c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x40, 0xfc, 0xf5, 0x50, 0x98, 0x46, 0x89, 0x82, 0x40, }; static SSL_CTX *ctx; int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { const uint8_t *bufp = kRSAPrivateKeyDER; RSA *privkey; EVP_PKEY *pkey; int ret; X509 *cert; ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); privkey = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &bufp, sizeof(kRSAPrivateKeyDER)); OPENSSL_assert(privkey != NULL); pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, privkey); ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey); OPENSSL_assert(ret == 1); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); bufp = kCertificateDER; cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &bufp, sizeof(kCertificateDER)); OPENSSL_assert(cert != NULL); ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, cert); OPENSSL_assert(ret == 1); X509_free(cert); return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { SSL *server; BIO *in; BIO *out; if (!len) { return 0; } /* TODO: make this work for OpenSSL. There's a PREDICT define that may do * the job. * TODO: use the ossltest engine (optionally?) to disable crypto checks. * RAND_reset_for_fuzzing(); */ /* This only fuzzes the initial flow from the client so far. */ server = SSL_new(ctx); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); SSL_set_bio(server, in, out); SSL_set_accept_state(server); OPENSSL_assert((size_t)BIO_write(in, buf, len) == len); if (SSL_do_handshake(server) == 1) { /* Keep reading application data until error or EOF. */ uint8_t tmp[1024]; for (;;) { if (SSL_read(server, tmp, sizeof(tmp)) <= 0) { break; } } } SSL_free(server); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/crl.c0000644000000000000000000000157313176625661014006 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { const unsigned char *p = buf; unsigned char *der = NULL; X509_CRL *crl = d2i_X509_CRL(NULL, &p, len); if (crl != NULL) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); X509_CRL_print(bio, crl); BIO_free(bio); i2d_X509_CRL(crl, &der); OPENSSL_free(der); X509_CRL_free(crl); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/ct.c0000644000000000000000000000175013176625661013631 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Fuzz the SCT parser. */ #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { const uint8_t **pp = &buf; unsigned char *der = NULL; STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = d2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, pp, len); if (scts != NULL) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); SCT_LIST_print(scts, bio, 4, "\n", NULL); BIO_free(bio); if (i2d_SCT_LIST(scts, &der)) { /* Silence unused result warning */ } OPENSSL_free(der); SCT_LIST_free(scts); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/bignum.c0000644000000000000000000000453413176625661014507 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Confirm that a^b mod c agrees when calculated cleverly vs naively, for * random a, b and c. */ #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { static BN_CTX *ctx; static BIGNUM *b1; static BIGNUM *b2; static BIGNUM *b3; static BIGNUM *b4; static BIGNUM *b5; int success = 0; size_t l1 = 0, l2 = 0, l3 = 0; int s1 = 0, s2 = 0, s3 = 0; if (ctx == NULL) { b1 = BN_new(); b2 = BN_new(); b3 = BN_new(); b4 = BN_new(); b5 = BN_new(); ctx = BN_CTX_new(); } /* Divide the input into three parts, using the values of the first two * bytes to choose lengths, which generate b1, b2 and b3. Use three bits * of the third byte to choose signs for the three numbers. */ if (len > 2) { len -= 3; l1 = (buf[0] * len) / 255; ++buf; l2 = (buf[0] * (len - l1)) / 255; ++buf; l3 = len - l1 - l2; s1 = buf[0] & 1; s2 = buf[0] & 2; s3 = buf[0] & 4; ++buf; } OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf, l1, b1) == b1); BN_set_negative(b1, s1); OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf + l1, l2, b2) == b2); BN_set_negative(b2, s2); OPENSSL_assert(BN_bin2bn(buf + l1 + l2, l3, b3) == b3); BN_set_negative(b3, s3); /* mod 0 is undefined */ if (BN_is_zero(b3)) { success = 1; goto done; } OPENSSL_assert(BN_mod_exp(b4, b1, b2, b3, ctx)); OPENSSL_assert(BN_mod_exp_simple(b5, b1, b2, b3, ctx)); success = BN_cmp(b4, b5) == 0; if (!success) { BN_print_fp(stdout, b1); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b2); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b3); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b4); putchar('\n'); BN_print_fp(stdout, b5); putchar('\n'); } done: OPENSSL_assert(success); return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/test-corpus.c0000644000000000000000000000223013176625661015505 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ /* * Given a list of files, run each of them through the fuzzer. Note that * failure will be indicated by some kind of crash. Switching on things like * asan improves the test. */ #include #include #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int main(int argc, char **argv) { int n; FuzzerInitialize(&argc, &argv); for (n = 1; n < argc; ++n) { struct stat st; FILE *f; unsigned char *buf; size_t s; stat(argv[n], &st); f = fopen(argv[n], "rb"); if (f == NULL) continue; buf = malloc(st.st_size); s = fread(buf, 1, st.st_size, f); OPENSSL_assert(s == (size_t)st.st_size); FuzzerTestOneInput(buf, s); free(buf); fclose(f); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/fuzz/x509.c0000644000000000000000000000167013176625661013731 0ustar rootroot/* * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #include #include #include "fuzzer.h" int FuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { return 1; } int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { const unsigned char *p = buf; unsigned char *der = NULL; X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len); if (x509 != NULL) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); /* This will load and print the public key as well as extensions */ X509_print(bio, x509); BIO_free(bio); i2d_X509(x509, &der); OPENSSL_free(der); X509_free(x509); } return 0; } openssl-1.1.0g/configdata.pm0000644000000000000000000077072113176625662014532 0ustar rootrootpackage configdata; use strict; use warnings; use Exporter; #use vars qw(@ISA @EXPORT); our @ISA = qw(Exporter); our @EXPORT = qw(%config %target %disabled %withargs %unified_info @disablables); our %config = ( afalgeng => "", b32 => "1", b64 => "0", b64l => "0", baseaddr => "0xFB00000", bn_ll => "0", build_file => "Makefile", build_file_templates => [ "Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl", "Configurations/common.tmpl" ], build_infos => [ "./build.info", "crypto/build.info", "ssl/build.info", "engines/build.info", "apps/build.info", "test/build.info", "util/build.info", "tools/build.info", "fuzz/build.info", "crypto/objects/build.info", "crypto/md4/build.info", "crypto/md5/build.info", "crypto/sha/build.info", "crypto/mdc2/build.info", "crypto/hmac/build.info", "crypto/ripemd/build.info", "crypto/whrlpool/build.info", "crypto/poly1305/build.info", "crypto/blake2/build.info", "crypto/des/build.info", "crypto/aes/build.info", "crypto/rc2/build.info", "crypto/rc4/build.info", "crypto/idea/build.info", "crypto/bf/build.info", "crypto/cast/build.info", "crypto/camellia/build.info", "crypto/seed/build.info", "crypto/chacha/build.info", "crypto/modes/build.info", "crypto/bn/build.info", "crypto/ec/build.info", "crypto/rsa/build.info", "crypto/dsa/build.info", "crypto/dh/build.info", "crypto/dso/build.info", "crypto/engine/build.info", "crypto/buffer/build.info", "crypto/bio/build.info", "crypto/stack/build.info", "crypto/lhash/build.info", "crypto/rand/build.info", "crypto/err/build.info", "crypto/evp/build.info", "crypto/asn1/build.info", "crypto/pem/build.info", "crypto/x509/build.info", "crypto/x509v3/build.info", "crypto/conf/build.info", "crypto/txt_db/build.info", "crypto/pkcs7/build.info", "crypto/pkcs12/build.info", "crypto/comp/build.info", "crypto/ocsp/build.info", "crypto/ui/build.info", "crypto/cms/build.info", "crypto/ts/build.info", "crypto/srp/build.info", "crypto/cmac/build.info", "crypto/ct/build.info", "crypto/async/build.info", "crypto/kdf/build.info" ], build_type => "release", builddir => ".", cc => "cc", cflags => "", conf_files => [ "Configurations/90-team.conf" ], cross_compile_prefix => "", defines => [ "NDEBUG", "OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE" ], dirs => [ "crypto", "ssl", "engines", "apps", "test", "util", "tools", "fuzz" ], dynamic_engines => "0", engdirs => [ ], ex_libs => "", export_var_as_fn => "0", fips => "0", fipslibdir => "/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0/lib/", hashbangperl => "/usr/bin/env perl", libdir => "", major => "1", makedepprog => "cc", minor => "1.0", openssl_algorithm_defines => [ "OPENSSL_NO_MD2", "OPENSSL_NO_RC5" ], openssl_api_defines => [ ], openssl_other_defines => [ "OPENSSL_NO_ASAN", "OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG", "OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE", "OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128", "OPENSSL_NO_EGD", "OPENSSL_NO_FUZZ_AFL", "OPENSSL_NO_FUZZ_LIBFUZZER", "OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS", "OPENSSL_NO_MSAN", "OPENSSL_NO_SCTP", "OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE", "OPENSSL_NO_SSL3", "OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD", "OPENSSL_NO_UBSAN", "OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST", "OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS", "OPENSSL_NO_AFALGENG" ], openssl_sys_defines => [ ], openssl_thread_defines => [ ], openssldir => "", options => " no-asan no-crypto-mdebug no-crypto-mdebug-backtrace no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-egd no-fuzz-afl no-fuzz-libfuzzer no-heartbeats no-md2 no-msan no-rc5 no-sctp no-ssl-trace no-ssl3 no-ssl3-method no-ubsan no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic", perl => "/usr/bin/perl", perlargv => [ "dist" ], prefix => "", processor => "", rc4_int => "unsigned int", sdirs => [ "objects", "md4", "md5", "sha", "mdc2", "hmac", "ripemd", "whrlpool", "poly1305", "blake2", "des", "aes", "rc2", "rc4", "idea", "bf", "cast", "camellia", "seed", "chacha", "modes", "bn", "ec", "rsa", "dsa", "dh", "dso", "engine", "buffer", "bio", "stack", "lhash", "rand", "err", "evp", "asn1", "pem", "x509", "x509v3", "conf", "txt_db", "pkcs7", "pkcs12", "comp", "ocsp", "ui", "cms", "ts", "srp", "cmac", "ct", "async", "kdf" ], shared_ldflag => "", shlib_major => "1", shlib_minor => "1", shlib_version_history => "", shlib_version_number => "1.1", sourcedir => ".", target => "dist", version => "1.1.0g", version_num => "0x1010007fL", ); our %target = ( _conf_fname_int => [ "Configurations/90-team.conf" ], aes_asm_src => "aes_core.c aes_cbc.c", aes_obj => "aes_core.o aes_cbc.o", apps_aux_src => "", apps_obj => "", ar => "ar", bf_asm_src => "bf_enc.c", bf_obj => "bf_enc.o", bn_asm_src => "bn_asm.c", bn_obj => "bn_asm.o", build_file => "Makefile", build_scheme => [ "unified", "unix" ], cast_asm_src => "c_enc.c", cast_obj => "c_enc.o", cc => "cc", cflags => "-O", chacha_asm_src => "chacha_enc.c", chacha_obj => "chacha_enc.o", cmll_asm_src => "camellia.c cmll_misc.c cmll_cbc.c", cmll_obj => "camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o", cpuid_asm_src => "mem_clr.c", cpuid_obj => "mem_clr.o", defines => [ ], des_asm_src => "des_enc.c fcrypt_b.c", des_obj => "des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o", dso_extension => "", ec_asm_src => "", ec_obj => "", exe_extension => "", md5_asm_src => "", md5_obj => "", modes_asm_src => "", modes_obj => "", nm => "nm", padlock_asm_src => "", padlock_obj => "", poly1305_asm_src => "", poly1305_obj => "", ranlib => "\$(CROSS_COMPILE)ranlib", rc => "windres", rc4_asm_src => "rc4_enc.c rc4_skey.c", rc4_obj => "rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o", rc5_asm_src => "rc5_enc.c", rc5_obj => "rc5_enc.o", rmd160_asm_src => "", rmd160_obj => "", shared_cflag => "", shared_defines => [ ], shared_extension => "", shared_extension_simple => "", shared_ldflag => "", shared_rcflag => "", shared_target => "", template => "1", thread_defines => [ ], thread_scheme => "(unknown)", unistd => "", uplink_aux_src => "", uplink_obj => "", wp_asm_src => "wp_block.c", wp_obj => "wp_block.o", ); our %available_protocols = ( tls => [ "ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2" ], dtls => [ "dtls1", "dtls1_2" ], ); our @disablables = ( "afalgeng", "asan", "asm", "async", "autoalginit", "autoerrinit", "bf", "blake2", "camellia", "capieng", "cast", "chacha", "cmac", "cms", "comp", "crypto-mdebug", "crypto-mdebug-backtrace", "ct", "deprecated", "des", "dgram", "dh", "dsa", "dso", "dtls", "dynamic-engine", "ec", "ec2m", "ecdh", "ecdsa", "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128", "egd", "engine", "err", "filenames", "fuzz-libfuzzer", "fuzz-afl", "gost", "heartbeats", "hw(-.+)?", "idea", "makedepend", "md2", "md4", "mdc2", "msan", "multiblock", "nextprotoneg", "ocb", "ocsp", "pic", "poly1305", "posix-io", "psk", "rc2", "rc4", "rc5", "rdrand", "rfc3779", "rmd160", "scrypt", "sctp", "seed", "shared", "sock", "srp", "srtp", "sse2", "ssl", "ssl-trace", "static-engine", "stdio", "threads", "tls", "ts", "ubsan", "ui", "unit-test", "whirlpool", "weak-ssl-ciphers", "zlib", "zlib-dynamic", "ssl3", "ssl3-method", "tls1", "tls1-method", "tls1_1", "tls1_1-method", "tls1_2", "tls1_2-method", "dtls1", "dtls1-method", "dtls1_2", "dtls1_2-method", ); our %disabled = ( "afalgeng" => "not-linux", "asan" => "default", "crypto-mdebug" => "default", "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" => "default", "dynamic-engine" => "no-shared-target", "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default", "egd" => "default", "fuzz-afl" => "default", "fuzz-libfuzzer" => "default", "heartbeats" => "default", "md2" => "default", "msan" => "default", "pic" => "no-shared-target", "rc5" => "default", "sctp" => "default", "shared" => "no-shared-target", "ssl-trace" => "default", "ssl3" => "default", "ssl3-method" => "default", "threads" => "unavailable", "ubsan" => "default", "unit-test" => "default", "weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default", "zlib" => "default", "zlib-dynamic" => "default", ); our %withargs = ( ); our %unified_info = ( "depends" => { "" => [ "crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h", "crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h", "include/openssl/opensslconf.h", ], "apps/app_rand.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/apps.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/asn1pars.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/ca.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/ciphers.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/cms.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/crl.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/crl2p7.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/dgst.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/dhparam.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/dsa.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/dsaparam.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/ec.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/ecparam.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/enc.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/engine.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/errstr.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/gendsa.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/genpkey.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/genrsa.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/nseq.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/ocsp.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/openssl" => [ "libssl", ], "apps/openssl.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/opt.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/passwd.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/pkcs12.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/pkcs7.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/pkcs8.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/pkey.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/pkeyparam.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/pkeyutl.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/prime.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/progs.h" => [ "configdata.pm", ], "apps/rand.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/rehash.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/req.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/rsa.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/rsautl.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/s_cb.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/s_client.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/s_server.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/s_socket.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/s_time.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/sess_id.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/smime.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/speed.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/spkac.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/srp.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/ts.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/verify.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/version.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "apps/x509.o" => [ "apps/progs.h", ], "crypto/aes/aes-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/aes/aesni-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/aes/aest4-sparcv9.S" => [ "crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl", ], "crypto/aes/vpaes-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/bf/bf-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl", "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/bn/bn-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/bn/co-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/bn/x86-gf2m.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/bn/x86-mont.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/buildinf.h" => [ "configdata.pm", ], "crypto/camellia/cmll-x86.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/camellia/cmllt4-sparcv9.S" => [ "crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl", ], "crypto/cast/cast-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl", "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/cversion.o" => [ "crypto/buildinf.h", ], "crypto/des/crypt586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl", "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/des/des-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl", "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h" => [ "configdata.pm", ], "crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h" => [ "configdata.pm", ], "crypto/rc4/rc4-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/ripemd/rmd-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/sha/sha1-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/sha/sha256-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/sha/sha512-586.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/whrlpool/wp-mmx.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "crypto/x86cpuid.s" => [ "crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl", ], "fuzz/asn1-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/asn1parse-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/bignum-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/bndiv-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/cms-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/conf-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/crl-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/ct-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "fuzz/server-test" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "fuzz/x509-test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "include/openssl/opensslconf.h" => [ "configdata.pm", ], "libssl" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/aborttest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/afalgtest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/asynciotest" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/asynctest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/bad_dtls_test" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/bftest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/bio_enc_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/bioprinttest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/bntest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/buildtest_aes" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_asn1" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_asn1t" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_async" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_bio" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_blowfish" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_bn" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_buffer" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_camellia" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_cast" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_cmac" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_cms" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_comp" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_conf" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_conf_api" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_crypto" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ct" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_des" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_dh" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_dsa" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_dtls1" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_e_os2" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ebcdic" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ec" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ecdh" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ecdsa" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_engine" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_err" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_evp" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_hmac" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_idea" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_kdf" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_lhash" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_md4" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_md5" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_mdc2" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_modes" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_obj_mac" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_objects" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ocsp" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_opensslv" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ossl_typ" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_pem" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_pem2" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_pkcs12" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_pkcs7" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_rand" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_rc2" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_rc4" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ripemd" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_rsa" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_safestack" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_seed" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_sha" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_srp" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_srtp" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ssl" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ssl2" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_stack" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_symhacks" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_tls1" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ts" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_txt_db" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_ui" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_whrlpool" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_x509" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_x509_vfy" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/buildtest_x509v3" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/casttest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/cipherlist_test" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/clienthellotest" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/constant_time_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/crltest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/ct_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/d2i_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/danetest" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/destest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/dhtest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/dsatest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/dtlstest" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/dtlsv1listentest" => [ "libssl", ], "test/ecdsatest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/ectest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/enginetest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/evp_extra_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/evp_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/exdatatest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/exptest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/gmdifftest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/heartbeat_test" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/hmactest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/ideatest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/igetest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/md2test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/md4test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/md5test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/mdc2test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/memleaktest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/p5_crpt2_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/packettest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/pbelutest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/randtest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/rc2test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/rc4test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/rc5test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/rmdtest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/rsa_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/sanitytest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/secmemtest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/sha1test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/sha256t" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/sha512t" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/srptest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/ssl_test" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/ssl_test_ctx_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/sslapitest" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/sslcorrupttest" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/ssltest_old" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "test/threadstest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/v3ext" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/v3nametest" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/verify_extra_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/wp_test" => [ "libcrypto", ], "test/x509aux" => [ "libcrypto", ], }, "engines" => [ ], "extra" => [ "crypto/alphacpuid.pl", "crypto/arm64cpuid.pl", "crypto/armv4cpuid.pl", "crypto/ia64cpuid.S", "crypto/pariscid.pl", "crypto/ppccpuid.pl", "crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl", "crypto/x86cpuid.pl", "ms/applink.c", "ms/uplink-x86.pl", "ms/uplink.c", ], "generate" => { "apps/progs.h" => [ "apps/progs.pl", "\$(APPS_OPENSSL)", ], "crypto/aes/aes-586.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", "\$(CFLAGS)", "\$(LIB_CFLAGS)", "\$(PROCESSOR)", ], "crypto/aes/aes-armv4.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aes-ia64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-ia64.S", ], "crypto/aes/aes-mips.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aes-parisc.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aes-ppc.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-ppc.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aes-sparcv9.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-sparcv9.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aes-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aesfx-sparcv9.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aesni-mb-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aesni-sha1-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aesni-sha256-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aesni-x86.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", "\$(CFLAGS)", "\$(LIB_CFLAGS)", "\$(PROCESSOR)", ], "crypto/aes/aesni-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aesp8-ppc.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesp8-ppc.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aest4-sparcv9.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/aesv8-armx.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/bsaes-armv7.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/bsaes-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/vpaes-armv8.S" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/vpaes-ppc.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/aes/vpaes-x86.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", "\$(CFLAGS)", "\$(LIB_CFLAGS)", "\$(PROCESSOR)", ], "crypto/aes/vpaes-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/alphacpuid.s" => [ "crypto/alphacpuid.pl", ], "crypto/arm64cpuid.S" => [ "crypto/arm64cpuid.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/armv4cpuid.S" => [ "crypto/armv4cpuid.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bf/bf-586.s" => [ "crypto/bf/asm/bf-586.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", "\$(CFLAGS)", "\$(LIB_CFLAGS)", "\$(PROCESSOR)", ], "crypto/bn/alpha-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/alpha-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/armv4-gf2m.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/armv4-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/armv8-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/bn-586.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/bn-586.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", "\$(CFLAGS)", "\$(LIB_CFLAGS)", "\$(PROCESSOR)", ], "crypto/bn/bn-ia64.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S", ], "crypto/bn/bn-mips.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/bn-ppc.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/co-586.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/co-586.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", "\$(CFLAGS)", "\$(LIB_CFLAGS)", "\$(PROCESSOR)", ], "crypto/bn/ia64-mont.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/ia64-mont.pl", "\$(CFLAGS)", "\$(LIB_CFLAGS)", ], "crypto/bn/mips-mont.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/parisc-mont.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/ppc-mont.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/ppc64-mont.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/rsaz-avx2.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/s390x-gf2m.s" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/s390x-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/sparct4-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/sparcv9-gf2m.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/sparcv9-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/sparcv9a-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl", "\$(PERLASM_SCHEME)", ], "crypto/bn/vis3-mont.S" => [ "crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl", 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"tools/c_rehash", ], }, "ldadd" => { }, "libraries" => [ "libcrypto", "libssl", ], "ordinals" => { "libcrypto" => [ "crypto", "util/libcrypto.num", ], "libssl" => [ "ssl", "util/libssl.num", ], }, "overrides" => [ "crypto/bn/bn-mips3.o", "crypto/bn/pa-risc2.c", "crypto/bn/pa-risc2W.o", ], "programs" => [ "apps/openssl", "fuzz/asn1-test", "fuzz/asn1parse-test", "fuzz/bignum-test", "fuzz/bndiv-test", "fuzz/cms-test", "fuzz/conf-test", "fuzz/crl-test", "fuzz/ct-test", "fuzz/server-test", "fuzz/x509-test", "test/aborttest", "test/afalgtest", "test/asynciotest", "test/asynctest", "test/bad_dtls_test", "test/bftest", "test/bio_enc_test", "test/bioprinttest", "test/bntest", "test/buildtest_aes", "test/buildtest_asn1", "test/buildtest_asn1t", "test/buildtest_async", "test/buildtest_bio", "test/buildtest_blowfish", "test/buildtest_bn", "test/buildtest_buffer", "test/buildtest_camellia", "test/buildtest_cast", "test/buildtest_cmac", "test/buildtest_cms", "test/buildtest_comp", "test/buildtest_conf", "test/buildtest_conf_api", "test/buildtest_crypto", "test/buildtest_ct", "test/buildtest_des", "test/buildtest_dh", "test/buildtest_dsa", "test/buildtest_dtls1", "test/buildtest_e_os2", "test/buildtest_ebcdic", "test/buildtest_ec", "test/buildtest_ecdh", "test/buildtest_ecdsa", "test/buildtest_engine", "test/buildtest_err", "test/buildtest_evp", "test/buildtest_hmac", "test/buildtest_idea", "test/buildtest_kdf", "test/buildtest_lhash", "test/buildtest_md4", "test/buildtest_md5", "test/buildtest_mdc2", "test/buildtest_modes", "test/buildtest_obj_mac", "test/buildtest_objects", "test/buildtest_ocsp", "test/buildtest_opensslv", "test/buildtest_ossl_typ", "test/buildtest_pem", "test/buildtest_pem2", "test/buildtest_pkcs12", "test/buildtest_pkcs7", "test/buildtest_rand", "test/buildtest_rc2", "test/buildtest_rc4", "test/buildtest_ripemd", "test/buildtest_rsa", "test/buildtest_safestack", "test/buildtest_seed", "test/buildtest_sha", "test/buildtest_srp", "test/buildtest_srtp", "test/buildtest_ssl", "test/buildtest_ssl2", "test/buildtest_stack", "test/buildtest_symhacks", "test/buildtest_tls1", "test/buildtest_ts", "test/buildtest_txt_db", "test/buildtest_ui", "test/buildtest_whrlpool", "test/buildtest_x509", "test/buildtest_x509_vfy", "test/buildtest_x509v3", "test/casttest", "test/cipherlist_test", "test/clienthellotest", "test/constant_time_test", "test/crltest", "test/ct_test", "test/d2i_test", "test/danetest", "test/destest", "test/dhtest", "test/dsatest", "test/dtlstest", "test/dtlsv1listentest", "test/ecdsatest", "test/ectest", "test/enginetest", "test/evp_extra_test", "test/evp_test", "test/exdatatest", "test/exptest", "test/gmdifftest", "test/heartbeat_test", "test/hmactest", "test/ideatest", "test/igetest", "test/md2test", "test/md4test", "test/md5test", "test/mdc2test", "test/memleaktest", "test/p5_crpt2_test", "test/packettest", "test/pbelutest", "test/randtest", "test/rc2test", "test/rc4test", "test/rc5test", "test/rmdtest", "test/rsa_test", "test/sanitytest", "test/secmemtest", "test/sha1test", "test/sha256t", "test/sha512t", "test/srptest", "test/ssl_test", "test/ssl_test_ctx_test", "test/sslapitest", "test/sslcorrupttest", "test/ssltest_old", "test/threadstest", "test/v3ext", "test/v3nametest", "test/verify_extra_test", "test/wp_test", "test/x509aux", ], "rawlines" => [ "crypto/md5/md5-ia64.s: crypto/md5/asm/md5-ia64.S", " \$(CC) \$(CFLAGS) -E crypto/md5/asm/md5-ia64.S | \$(PERL) -ne 's/;\\s+/;\\n/g; print;' > \$\@", "", "##### SHA assembler implementations", "", "# GNU make \"catch all\"", "crypto/sha/sha1-%.S: crypto/sha/asm/sha1-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "crypto/sha/sha256-%.S: crypto/sha/asm/sha512-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "crypto/sha/sha512-%.S: crypto/sha/asm/sha512-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "crypto/poly1305/poly1305-%.S: crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "##### AES assembler implementations", "", "# GNU make \"catch all\"", "crypto/aes/aes-%.S: crypto/aes/asm/aes-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "crypto/aes/bsaes-%.S: crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "", "crypto/rc4/rc4-ia64.s: crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-ia64.pl", " \@(trap \"rm \$\@.*\" INT 0; \$(PERL) \$< \$(CFLAGS) \$(LIB_CFLAGS) \$\@.S; case `awk '/^#define RC4_INT/{print\$\$NF}' \$(BLDDIR)/include/openssl/opensslconf.h` in int) set -x; \$(CC) \$(CFLAGS) \$(LIB_CFLAGS) -DSZ=4 -E \$\@.S > \$\@.i && mv -f \$\@.i \$\@;; char) set -x; \$(CC) \$(CFLAGS) \$(LIB_CFLAGS) -DSZ=1 -E \$\@.S > \$\@.i && mv -f \$\@.i \$\@;; *) exit 1 ;; esac )", "", "# GNU make \"catch all\"", "crypto/rc4/rc4-%.s: crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "##### CHACHA assembler implementations", "", "crypto/chacha/chacha-%.S: crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "# GNU make \"catch all\"", "crypto/modes/ghash-%.S: crypto/modes/asm/ghash-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", "##### BN assembler implementations", "", "crypto/bn/bn-mips3.o: crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s", " \@if [ \"\$(CC)\" = \"gcc\" ]; then ABI=`expr \"\$(CFLAGS)\" : \".*-mabi=\\([n3264]*\\)\"` && as -\$\$ABI -O -o \$\@ crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s; else \$(CC) -c \$(CFLAGS) \$(LIB_CFLAGS) -o \$\@ crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s; fi", "", "# GNU assembler fails to compile PA-RISC2 modules, insist on calling", "# vendor assembler...", "crypto/bn/pa-risc2W.o: crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$(SRCDIR)/util/fipsas.pl \$(SRCDIR) \$< /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2W.o crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s", "crypto/bn/pa-risc2.o: crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$(SRCDIR)/util/fipsas.pl \$(SRCDIR) \$< /usr/ccs/bin/as -o pa-risc2.o crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s", "", "crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-%.S: crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-%.pl", " CC=\"\$(CC)\" \$(PERL) \$< \$(PERLASM_SCHEME) \$\@", ], "rename" => { }, "scripts" => [ "apps/CA.pl", "apps/tsget", "tools/c_rehash", "util/shlib_wrap.sh", ], "shared_sources" => { }, "sources" => { "apps/CA.pl" => [ "apps/CA.pl.in", ], "apps/app_rand.o" => [ "apps/app_rand.c", ], "apps/apps.o" => [ "apps/apps.c", ], "apps/asn1pars.o" => [ "apps/asn1pars.c", ], "apps/ca.o" => [ "apps/ca.c", ], "apps/ciphers.o" => [ "apps/ciphers.c", ], "apps/cms.o" => [ "apps/cms.c", ], "apps/crl.o" => [ "apps/crl.c", ], "apps/crl2p7.o" => [ "apps/crl2p7.c", ], "apps/dgst.o" => [ "apps/dgst.c", ], "apps/dhparam.o" => [ "apps/dhparam.c", ], "apps/dsa.o" => [ "apps/dsa.c", ], "apps/dsaparam.o" => [ "apps/dsaparam.c", ], "apps/ec.o" => [ "apps/ec.c", ], "apps/ecparam.o" => [ "apps/ecparam.c", ], "apps/enc.o" => [ "apps/enc.c", ], "apps/engine.o" => [ "apps/engine.c", ], "apps/errstr.o" => [ "apps/errstr.c", ], "apps/gendsa.o" => [ "apps/gendsa.c", ], "apps/genpkey.o" => [ "apps/genpkey.c", ], "apps/genrsa.o" => [ "apps/genrsa.c", ], "apps/nseq.o" => [ "apps/nseq.c", ], "apps/ocsp.o" => [ "apps/ocsp.c", ], "apps/openssl" => [ "apps/app_rand.o", "apps/apps.o", "apps/asn1pars.o", "apps/ca.o", "apps/ciphers.o", "apps/cms.o", "apps/crl.o", "apps/crl2p7.o", "apps/dgst.o", "apps/dhparam.o", "apps/dsa.o", "apps/dsaparam.o", "apps/ec.o", "apps/ecparam.o", "apps/enc.o", "apps/engine.o", "apps/errstr.o", "apps/gendsa.o", "apps/genpkey.o", "apps/genrsa.o", "apps/nseq.o", "apps/ocsp.o", "apps/openssl.o", "apps/opt.o", "apps/passwd.o", "apps/pkcs12.o", "apps/pkcs7.o", "apps/pkcs8.o", "apps/pkey.o", "apps/pkeyparam.o", "apps/pkeyutl.o", "apps/prime.o", "apps/rand.o", "apps/rehash.o", "apps/req.o", "apps/rsa.o", "apps/rsautl.o", "apps/s_cb.o", "apps/s_client.o", "apps/s_server.o", "apps/s_socket.o", "apps/s_time.o", "apps/sess_id.o", "apps/smime.o", "apps/speed.o", "apps/spkac.o", "apps/srp.o", "apps/ts.o", "apps/verify.o", "apps/version.o", "apps/x509.o", ], 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"test/v3nametest.c", ], "test/verify_extra_test" => [ "test/verify_extra_test.o", ], "test/verify_extra_test.o" => [ "test/verify_extra_test.c", ], "test/wp_test" => [ "test/wp_test.o", ], "test/wp_test.o" => [ "test/wp_test.c", ], "test/x509aux" => [ "test/x509aux.o", ], "test/x509aux.o" => [ "test/x509aux.c", ], "tools/c_rehash" => [ "tools/c_rehash.in", ], "util/shlib_wrap.sh" => [ "util/shlib_wrap.sh.in", ], }, ); 1; openssl-1.1.0g/doc/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660012622 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/doc/openssl-c-indent.el0000644000000000000000000000621113176625660016326 0ustar rootroot;;; This Emacs Lisp file defines a C indentation style for OpenSSL. ;;; ;;; This definition is for the "CC mode" package, which is the default ;;; mode for editing C source files in Emacs 20, not for the older ;;; c-mode.el (which was the default in less recent releaes of Emacs 19). ;;; ;;; Recommended use is to add this line in your .emacs: ;;; ;;; (load (expand-file-name "~/PATH/TO/openssl-c-indent.el")) ;;; ;;; To activate this indentation style, visit a C file, type ;;; M-x c-set-style (or C-c . for short), and enter "eay". ;;; To toggle the auto-newline feature of CC mode, type C-c C-a. ;;; ;;; If you're an OpenSSL developer, you might find it more comfortable ;;; to have this style be permanent in your OpenSSL development ;;; directory. To have that, please perform this: ;;; ;;; M-x add-dir-local-variable c-mode c-file-style ;;; "OpenSSL-II" ;;; ;;; A new buffer with .dir-locals.el will appear. Save it (C-x C-s). ;;; ;;; Alternatively, have a look at dir-locals.example.el ;;; For suggesting improvements, please send e-mail to levitte@openssl.org. ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ;; Note, it could be easy to inherit from the "gnu" style... however, ;; one never knows if that style will change somewhere in the future, ;; so I've chosen to copy the "gnu" style values explicitly instead ;; and mark them with a comment. // RLevitte 2015-08-31 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; (c-add-style "OpenSSL-II" '((c-basic-offset . 4) (indent-tabs-mode . nil) (fill-column . 78) (comment-column . 33) (c-comment-only-line-offset 0 . 0) ; From "gnu" style (c-hanging-braces-alist ; From "gnu" style (substatement-open before after) ; From "gnu" style (arglist-cont-nonempty)) ; From "gnu" style (c-offsets-alist (statement-block-intro . +) ; From "gnu" style (knr-argdecl-intro . 0) (knr-argdecl . 0) (substatement-open . +) ; From "gnu" style (substatement-label . 0) ; From "gnu" style (label . 1) (statement-case-open . +) ; From "gnu" style (statement-cont . +) ; From "gnu" style (arglist-intro . c-lineup-arglist-intro-after-paren) ; From "gnu" style (arglist-close . c-lineup-arglist) ; From "gnu" style (inline-open . 0) ; From "gnu" style (brace-list-open . +) ; From "gnu" style (topmost-intro-cont first c-lineup-topmost-intro-cont c-lineup-gnu-DEFUN-intro-cont) ; From "gnu" style ) (c-special-indent-hook . c-gnu-impose-minimum) ; From "gnu" style (c-block-comment-prefix . "* ") )) openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625660014142 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_SIG_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000325213176625660016632 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_SIG_get0, DSA_SIG_set0, DSA_SIG_new, DSA_SIG_free - allocate and free DSA signature objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void); void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a); void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_SIG_new() allocates an empty B structure. DSA_SIG_free() frees the B structure and its components. The values are erased before the memory is returned to the system. DSA_SIG_get0() returns internal pointers to the B and B values contained in B. The B and B values can be set by calling DSA_SIG_set0() and passing the new values for B and B as parameters to the function. Calling this function transfers the memory management of the values to the DSA_SIG object, and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly after this function has been called. =head1 RETURN VALUES If the allocation fails, DSA_SIG_new() returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. DSA_SIG_free() returns no value. DSA_SIG_set0() returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod0000644000000000000000000001046013176625660016440 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_s_secmem, BIO_s_mem, BIO_set_mem_eof_return, BIO_get_mem_data, BIO_set_mem_buf, BIO_get_mem_ptr, BIO_new_mem_buf - memory BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_mem(void); const BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_secmem(void); BIO_set_mem_eof_return(BIO *b, int v) long BIO_get_mem_data(BIO *b, char **pp) BIO_set_mem_buf(BIO *b, BUF_MEM *bm, int c) BIO_get_mem_ptr(BIO *b, BUF_MEM **pp) BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_mem() return the memory BIO method function. A memory BIO is a source/sink BIO which uses memory for its I/O. Data written to a memory BIO is stored in a BUF_MEM structure which is extended as appropriate to accommodate the stored data. BIO_s_secmem() is like BIO_s_mem() except that the secure heap is used for buffer storage. Any data written to a memory BIO can be recalled by reading from it. Unless the memory BIO is read only any data read from it is deleted from the BIO. Memory BIOs support BIO_gets() and BIO_puts(). If the BIO_CLOSE flag is set when a memory BIO is freed then the underlying BUF_MEM structure is also freed. Calling BIO_reset() on a read write memory BIO clears any data in it if the flag BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST is not set. On a read only BIO or if the flag BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST is set it restores the BIO to its original state and the data can be read again. BIO_eof() is true if no data is in the BIO. BIO_ctrl_pending() returns the number of bytes currently stored. BIO_set_mem_eof_return() sets the behaviour of memory BIO B when it is empty. If the B is zero then an empty memory BIO will return EOF (that is it will return zero and BIO_should_retry(b) will be false. If B is non zero then it will return B when it is empty and it will set the read retry flag (that is BIO_read_retry(b) is true). To avoid ambiguity with a normal positive return value B should be set to a negative value, typically -1. BIO_get_mem_data() sets B to a pointer to the start of the memory BIOs data and returns the total amount of data available. It is implemented as a macro. BIO_set_mem_buf() sets the internal BUF_MEM structure to B and sets the close flag to B, that is B should be either BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. It is a macro. BIO_get_mem_ptr() places the underlying BUF_MEM structure in B. It is a macro. BIO_new_mem_buf() creates a memory BIO using B bytes of data at B, if B is -1 then the B is assumed to be nul terminated and its length is determined by B. The BIO is set to a read only state and as a result cannot be written to. This is useful when some data needs to be made available from a static area of memory in the form of a BIO. The supplied data is read directly from the supplied buffer: it is B copied first, so the supplied area of memory must be unchanged until the BIO is freed. =head1 NOTES Writes to memory BIOs will always succeed if memory is available: that is their size can grow indefinitely. Every read from a read write memory BIO will remove the data just read with an internal copy operation, if a BIO contains a lot of data and it is read in small chunks the operation can be very slow. The use of a read only memory BIO avoids this problem. If the BIO must be read write then adding a buffering BIO to the chain will speed up the process. Calling BIO_set_mem_buf() on a BIO created with BIO_new_secmem() will give undefined results, including perhaps a program crash. =head1 BUGS There should be an option to set the maximum size of a memory BIO. =head1 EXAMPLE Create a memory BIO and write some data to it: BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); BIO_puts(mem, "Hello World\n"); Create a read only memory BIO: char data[] = "Hello World"; BIO *mem; mem = BIO_new_mem_buf(data, -1); Extract the BUF_MEM structure from a memory BIO and then free up the BIO: BUF_MEM *bptr; BIO_get_mem_ptr(mem, &bptr); BIO_set_close(mem, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* So BIO_free() leaves BUF_MEM alone */ BIO_free(mem); =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ct.pod0000644000000000000000000000263613176625660015263 0ustar rootroot=pod =for comment openssl_manual_section:7 =head1 NAME ct - Certificate Transparency =head1 SYNOPSIS #include =head1 DESCRIPTION This library implements Certificate Transparency (CT) verification for TLS clients, as defined in RFC 6962. This verification can provide some confidence that a certificate has been publicly logged in a set of CT logs. By default, these checks are disabled. They can be enabled using SSL_CTX_ct_enable() or SSL_ct_enable(). This library can also be used to parse and examine CT data structures, such as Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs), or to read a list of CT logs. There are functions for: - decoding and encoding SCTs in DER and TLS wire format. - printing SCTs. - verifying the authenticity of SCTs. - loading a CT log list from a CONF file. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY This library was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_num_bytes.pod0000644000000000000000000000332613176625660017236 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_num_bits, BN_num_bytes, BN_num_bits_word - get BIGNUM size =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_num_bytes(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG w); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_num_bytes() returns the size of a B in bytes. BN_num_bits_word() returns the number of significant bits in a word. If we take 0x00000432 as an example, it returns 11, not 16, not 32. Basically, except for a zero, it returns I. BN_num_bits() returns the number of significant bits in a B, following the same principle as BN_num_bits_word(). BN_num_bytes() is a macro. =head1 RETURN VALUES The size. =head1 NOTES Some have tried using BN_num_bits() on individual numbers in RSA keys, DH keys and DSA keys, and found that they don't always come up with the number of bits they expected (something like 512, 1024, 2048, ...). This is because generating a number with some specific number of bits doesn't always set the highest bits, thereby making the number of I bits a little lower. If you want to know the "key size" of such a key, either use functions like RSA_size(), DH_size() and DSA_size(), or use BN_num_bytes() and multiply with 8 (although there's no real guarantee that will match the "key size", just a lot more probability). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod0000644000000000000000000001457013176625660020222 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_generate_prime_ex, BN_is_prime_ex, BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex, BN_GENCB_call, BN_GENCB_new, BN_GENCB_free, BN_GENCB_set_old, BN_GENCB_set, BN_GENCB_get_arg, BN_generate_prime, BN_is_prime, BN_is_prime_fasttest - generate primes and test for primality =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, int do_trial_division, BN_GENCB *cb); int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b); BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void); void BN_GENCB_free(BN_GENCB *cb); void BN_GENCB_set_old(BN_GENCB *gencb, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); void BN_GENCB_set(BN_GENCB *gencb, int (*callback)(int, int, BN_GENCB *), void *cb_arg); void *BN_GENCB_get_arg(BN_GENCB *cb); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int num, int safe, BIGNUM *add, BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg); int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg, int do_trial_division); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_generate_prime_ex() generates a pseudo-random prime number of at least bit length B. If B is not B, it will be used to store the number. If B is not B, it is used as follows: =over 2 =item * B is called after generating the i-th potential prime number. =item * While the number is being tested for primality, B is called as described below. =item * When a prime has been found, B is called. =back The prime may have to fulfill additional requirements for use in Diffie-Hellman key exchange: If B is not B, the prime will fulfill the condition p % B == B (p % B == 1 if B == B) in order to suit a given generator. If B is true, it will be a safe prime (i.e. a prime p so that (p-1)/2 is also prime). The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_generate_prime_ex(). The prime number generation has a negligible error probability. BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() test if the number B

is prime. The following tests are performed until one of them shows that B

is composite; if B

passes all these tests, it is considered prime. BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(), when called with B, first attempts trial division by a number of small primes; if no divisors are found by this test and B is not B, B is called. If B, this test is skipped. Both BN_is_prime_ex() and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() perform a Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test with B iterations. If B, a number of iterations is used that yields a false positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. If B is not B, B is called after the j-th iteration (j = 0, 1, ...). B is a pre-allocated B (to save the overhead of allocating and freeing the structure in a loop), or B. BN_GENCB_call calls the callback function held in the B structure and passes the ints B and B as arguments. There are two types of B structure that are supported: "new" style and "old" style. New programs should prefer the "new" style, whilst the "old" style is provided for backwards compatibility purposes. A BN_GENCB structure should be created through a call to BN_GENCB_new(), and freed through a call to BN_GENCB_free(). For "new" style callbacks a BN_GENCB structure should be initialised with a call to BN_GENCB_set(), where B is a B, B is of type B and B is a B. "Old" style callbacks are the same except they are initialised with a call to BN_GENCB_set_old() and B is of type B. A callback is invoked through a call to B. This will check the type of the callback and will invoke B for new style callbacks or B for old style. It is possible to obtained the argument associated with a BN_GENCB structure (set via a call to BN_GENCB_set or BN_GENCB_set_old) using BN_GENCB_get_arg. BN_generate_prime (deprecated) works in the same way as BN_generate_prime_ex but expects an old style callback function directly in the B parameter, and an argument to pass to it in the B. Similarly BN_is_prime and BN_is_prime_fasttest are deprecated and can be compared to BN_is_prime_ex and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex respectively. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_generate_prime_ex() return 1 on success or 0 on error. BN_is_prime_ex(), BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(), BN_is_prime() and BN_is_prime_fasttest() return 0 if the number is composite, 1 if it is prime with an error probability of less than 0.25^B, and -1 on error. BN_generate_prime() returns the prime number on success, B otherwise. BN_GENCB_new returns a pointer to a BN_GENCB structure on success, or B otherwise. BN_GENCB_get_arg returns the argument previously associated with a BN_GENCB structure. Callback functions should return 1 on success or 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 REMOVED FUNCTIONALITY As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 it is no longer possible to create a BN_GENCB structure directly, as in: BN_GENCB callback; Instead applications should create a BN_GENCB structure using BN_GENCB_new: BN_GENCB *callback; callback = BN_GENCB_new(); if(!callback) /* handle error */ ... BN_GENCB_free(callback); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY BN_GENCB_new(), BN_GENCB_free(), and BN_GENCB_get_arg() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod0000644000000000000000000000445113176625660020101 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_error_string, ERR_error_string_n, ERR_lib_error_string, ERR_func_error_string, ERR_reason_error_string - obtain human-readable error message =head1 SYNOPSIS #include char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf); void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len); const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e); const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e); const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e); =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_error_string() generates a human-readable string representing the error code I, and places it at I. I must be at least 256 bytes long. If I is B, the error string is placed in a static buffer. Note that this function is not thread-safe and does no checks on the size of the buffer; use ERR_error_string_n() instead. ERR_error_string_n() is a variant of ERR_error_string() that writes at most I characters (including the terminating 0) and truncates the string if necessary. For ERR_error_string_n(), I may not be B. The string will have the following format: error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string] I is an 8 digit hexadecimal number, I, I and I are ASCII text. ERR_lib_error_string(), ERR_func_error_string() and ERR_reason_error_string() return the library name, function name and reason string respectively. If there is no text string registered for the given error code, the error string will contain the numeric code. L can be used to print all error codes currently in the queue. =head1 RETURN VALUES ERR_error_string() returns a pointer to a static buffer containing the string if I B<== NULL>, I otherwise. ERR_lib_error_string(), ERR_func_error_string() and ERR_reason_error_string() return the strings, and B if none is registered for the error code. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_SIG_get0.pod0000644000000000000000000000171213176625660016735 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_SIG_get0, X509_SIG_getm - DigestInfo functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void X509_SIG_get0(const X509_SIG *sig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest); void X509_SIG_getm(X509_SIG *sig, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pdigest, =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_SIG_get0() returns pointers to the algorithm identifier and digest value in B. X509_SIG_getm() is identical to X509_SIG_get0() except the pointers returned are not constant and can be modified: for example to initialise them. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000603113176625660017022 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_decrypt - decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData structure. B is the private key of the recipient, B is the recipient's certificate, B is a BIO to write the content to and B is an optional set of flags. The B parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content is detached. It will normally be set to NULL. =head1 NOTES Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS structure. If B is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B is set then the above behaviour is modified and an error B returned if no recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B generating a random content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with B especially in automated gateways as it can leave them open to attack. It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this case both B and B should be set to NULL. To process KEKRecipientInfo types CMS_set1_key() or CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() and CMS_ReceipientInfo_decrypt() should be called before CMS_decrypt() and B and B set to NULL. The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type B then an error is returned. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3) =head1 BUGS The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decrypt(). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/MD5.pod0000644000000000000000000000554413176625660015243 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME MD2, MD4, MD5, MD2_Init, MD2_Update, MD2_Final, MD4_Init, MD4_Update, MD4_Final, MD5_Init, MD5_Update, MD5_Final - MD2, MD4, and MD5 hash functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned char *MD2(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, unsigned char *md); int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c); int MD2_Update(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len); int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c); #include unsigned char *MD4(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, unsigned char *md); int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *c); int MD4_Update(MD4_CTX *c, const void *data, unsigned long len); int MD4_Final(unsigned char *md, MD4_CTX *c); #include unsigned char *MD5(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, unsigned char *md); int MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *c); int MD5_Update(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data, unsigned long len); int MD5_Final(unsigned char *md, MD5_CTX *c); =head1 DESCRIPTION MD2, MD4, and MD5 are cryptographic hash functions with a 128 bit output. MD2(), MD4(), and MD5() compute the MD2, MD4, and MD5 message digest of the B bytes at B and place it in B (which must have space for MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH == MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH == MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output). If B is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array. The following functions may be used if the message is not completely stored in memory: MD2_Init() initializes a B structure. MD2_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to be hashed (B bytes at B). MD2_Final() places the message digest in B, which must have space for MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output, and erases the B. MD4_Init(), MD4_Update(), MD4_Final(), MD5_Init(), MD5_Update(), and MD5_Final() are analogous using an B and B structure. Applications should use the higher level functions L etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly. =head1 NOTE MD2, MD4, and MD5 are recommended only for compatibility with existing applications. In new applications, SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160 should be preferred. =head1 RETURN VALUES MD2(), MD4(), and MD5() return pointers to the hash value. MD2_Init(), MD2_Update(), MD2_Final(), MD4_Init(), MD4_Update(), MD4_Final(), MD5_Init(), MD5_Update(), and MD5_Final() return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. =head1 CONFORMING TO RFC 1319, RFC 1320, RFC 1321 =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_should_retry.pod0000644000000000000000000001202413176625660020061 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_should_read, BIO_should_write, BIO_should_io_special, BIO_retry_type, BIO_should_retry, BIO_get_retry_BIO, BIO_get_retry_reason, BIO_set_retry_reason - BIO retry functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BIO_should_read(BIO *b); int BIO_should_write(BIO *b); int BIO_should_io_special(iBIO *b); int BIO_retry_type(BIO *b); int BIO_should_retry(BIO *b); BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason); int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio); void BIO_set_retry_reason(BIO *bio, int reason); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions determine why a BIO is not able to read or write data. They will typically be called after a failed BIO_read() or BIO_write() call. BIO_should_retry() is true if the call that produced this condition should then be retried at a later time. If BIO_should_retry() is false then the cause is an error condition. BIO_should_read() is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO needs to read data. BIO_should_write() is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO needs to read data. BIO_should_io_special() is true if some "special" condition, that is a reason other than reading or writing is the cause of the condition. BIO_retry_type() returns a mask of the cause of a retry condition consisting of the values B, B, B though current BIO types will only set one of these. BIO_get_retry_BIO() determines the precise reason for the special condition, it returns the BIO that caused this condition and if B is not NULL it contains the reason code. The meaning of the reason code and the action that should be taken depends on the type of BIO that resulted in this condition. BIO_get_retry_reason() returns the reason for a special condition if passed the relevant BIO, for example as returned by BIO_get_retry_BIO(). BIO_set_retry_reason() sets the retry reason for a special condition for a given BIO. This would usually only be called by BIO implementations. =head1 NOTES BIO_should_read(), BIO_should_write(), BIO_should_io_special(), BIO_retry_type(), and BIO_should_retry(), are implemented as macros. If BIO_should_retry() returns false then the precise "error condition" depends on the BIO type that caused it and the return code of the BIO operation. For example if a call to BIO_read() on a socket BIO returns 0 and BIO_should_retry() is false then the cause will be that the connection closed. A similar condition on a file BIO will mean that it has reached EOF. Some BIO types may place additional information on the error queue. For more details see the individual BIO type manual pages. If the underlying I/O structure is in a blocking mode almost all current BIO types will not request a retry, because the underlying I/O calls will not. If the application knows that the BIO type will never signal a retry then it need not call BIO_should_retry() after a failed BIO I/O call. This is typically done with file BIOs. SSL BIOs are the only current exception to this rule: they can request a retry even if the underlying I/O structure is blocking, if a handshake occurs during a call to BIO_read(). An application can retry the failed call immediately or avoid this situation by setting SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY on the underlying SSL structure. While an application may retry a failed non blocking call immediately this is likely to be very inefficient because the call will fail repeatedly until data can be processed or is available. An application will normally wait until the necessary condition is satisfied. How this is done depends on the underlying I/O structure. For example if the cause is ultimately a socket and BIO_should_read() is true then a call to select() may be made to wait until data is available and then retry the BIO operation. By combining the retry conditions of several non blocking BIOs in a single select() call it is possible to service several BIOs in a single thread, though the performance may be poor if SSL BIOs are present because long delays can occur during the initial handshake process. It is possible for a BIO to block indefinitely if the underlying I/O structure cannot process or return any data. This depends on the behaviour of the platforms I/O functions. This is often not desirable: one solution is to use non blocking I/O and use a timeout on the select() (or equivalent) call. =head1 BUGS The OpenSSL ASN1 functions cannot gracefully deal with non blocking I/O: that is they cannot retry after a partial read or write. This is usually worked around by only passing the relevant data to ASN1 functions when the entire structure can be read or written. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY The BIO_get_retry_reason() and BIO_set_retry_reason() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count.pod0000644000000000000000000000537413176625660021132 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_asn1_find, EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str, EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count, EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0, EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info - enumerate public key ASN.1 methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(void); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(int idx); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(ENGINE **pe, int type); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *pkey_base_id, int *ppkey_flags, const char **pinfo, const char **ppem_str, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth); =head1 DESCRIPTION EVP_PKEY_asn1_count() returns a count of the number of public key ASN.1 methods available: it includes standard methods and any methods added by the application. EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0() returns the public key ASN.1 method B. The value of B must be between zero and EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count() - 1. EVP_PKEY_asn1_find() looks up the B with NID B. If B isn't B, then it will look up an engine implementing a B for the NID B and return that instead, and also set B<*pe> to point at the engine that implements it. EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() looks up the B with PEM type string B. Just like EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(), if B isn't B, then it will look up an engine implementing a B for the NID B and return that instead, and also set B<*pe> to point at the engine that implements it. EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() returns the public key ID, base public key ID (both NIDs), any flags, the method description and PEM type string associated with the public key ASN.1 method B<*ameth>. EVP_PKEY_asn1_count(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_find() and EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str() are not thread safe, but as long as all B objects are added before the application gets threaded, using them is safe. See L. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_asn1_count() returns the number of available public key methods. EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0() return a public key method or B if B is out of range. EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() returns 0 on failure, 1 on success. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod0000644000000000000000000000744613176625660021766 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1, RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_add_SSLv23, RSA_padding_check_SSLv23, RSA_padding_add_none, RSA_padding_check_none - asymmetric encryption padding =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl, unsigned char *p, int pl); int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len, unsigned char *p, int pl); int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl); int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); =head1 DESCRIPTION The RSA_padding_xxx_xxx() functions are called from the RSA encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify functions. Normally they should not be called from application programs. However, they can also be called directly to implement padding for other asymmetric ciphers. RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP() and RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() may be used in an application combined with B in order to implement OAEP with an encoding parameter. RSA_padding_add_xxx() encodes B bytes from B so as to fit into B bytes and stores the result at B. An error occurs if B does not meet the size requirements of the encoding method. The following encoding methods are implemented: =over 4 =item PKCS1_type_1 PKCS #1 v2.0 EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 1); used for signatures =item PKCS1_type_2 PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 2) =item PKCS1_OAEP PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-OAEP =item SSLv23 PKCS #1 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 with SSL-specific modification =item none simply copy the data =back The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_padding_add_xxx(). RSA_padding_check_xxx() verifies that the B bytes at B contain a valid encoding for a B byte RSA key in the respective encoding method and stores the recovered data of at most B bytes (for B: of size B) at B. For RSA_padding_xxx_OAEP(), B

points to the encoding parameter of length B. B

may be B if B is 0. =head1 RETURN VALUES The RSA_padding_add_xxx() functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. The RSA_padding_check_xxx() functions return the length of the recovered data, -1 on error. Error codes can be obtained by calling L. =head1 WARNING The RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() padding check leaks timing information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod0000644000000000000000000003542613176625660021360 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc - X509 verification parameters =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags); unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, uint32_t flags); uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t); time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, ASN1_OBJECT *policy); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name, size_t namelen); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *name, size_t namelen); void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned int flags); char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *email, size_t emaillen); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen); int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions manipulate the B structure associated with a certificate verification operation. The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags() function sets the flags in B by oring it with B. See the B section for a complete description of values the B parameter can take. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the flags in B. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags() returns the inheritance flags in B which specifies how verification flags are copied from one structure to another. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags() sets the inheritance flags. See the B section for a description of these bits. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags() clears the flags B in B. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose() sets the verification purpose in B to B. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate chain, for example SSL client or SSL server. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust() sets the trust setting in B to B. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B to B. Normally the current time is used. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled by default) and adds B to the acceptable policy set. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B. Any existing policy set is cleared. The B parameter can be B to clear an existing policy set. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() sets the maximum verification depth to B. That is the maximum number of intermediate CA certificates that can appear in a chain. A maximal depth chain contains 2 more certificates than the limit, since neither the end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor count against this limit. Thus a B limit of 0 only allows the end-entity certificate to be signed directly by the trust-anchor, while with a B limit of 1 there can be one intermediate CA certificate between the trust-anchor and the end-entity certificate. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() sets the authentication security level to B. The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and public key strength when verifying certificate chains. For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates must meet the specified security level. The signature algorithm security level is not enforced for the chain's I certificate, which is either directly trusted or validated by means other than its signature. See L for the definitions of the available levels. The default security level is -1, or "not set". At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable. Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to B clearing any previously specified host name or names. If B is NULL, or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. If B is NUL-terminated, B may be zero, otherwise B must be set to the length of B. When a hostname is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes L with flags equal to the B argument given to X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags() (default zero). Applications are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly calling L, hostname checks are out of scope with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will be suppressed as appropriate when DANE support is added to OpenSSL. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host() adds B as an additional reference identifier that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names set via X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() or X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host() are retained, no change is made if B is NULL or empty. When multiple names are configured, the peer is considered verified when any name matches. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername() returns the DNS hostname or subject CommonName from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference identifiers. When wildcard matching is not disabled, or when a reference identifier specifies a parent domain (starts with ".") rather than a hostname, the peer name may be a wildcard name or a sub-domain of the reference identifier respectively. The return string is allocated by the library and is no longer valid once the associated B argument is freed. Applications must not free the return value. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email() sets the expected RFC822 email address to B. If B is NUL-terminated, B may be zero, otherwise B must be set to the length of B. When an email address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes L. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() sets the expected IP address to B. The B argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and B must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6. When an IP address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes L. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() sets the expected IP address to B. The B argument is a NUL-terminal ASCII string: dotted decimal quad for IPv4 and colon-separated hexadecimal for IPv6. The condensed "::" notation is supported for IPv6 addresses. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the current verification flags. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags() returns the current inheritance flags. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() do not return values. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth() returns the current verification depth. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level() returns the current authentication security level. =head1 VERIFICATION FLAGS The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags ored together. B enables CRL checking for the certificate chain leaf certificate. An error occurs if a suitable CRL cannot be found. B enables CRL checking for the entire certificate chain. B disabled critical extension checking. By default any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are ignored. B setting this option for anything other than debugging purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are supported can be performed in the verification callback. The B flag disables workarounds for some broken certificates and makes the verification strictly apply B rules. B enables proxy certificate verification. B enables certificate policy checking, by default no policy checking is performed. Additional information is sent to the verification callback relating to policy checking. B, B and B set the B, B and B flags respectively as defined in B. Policy checking is automatically enabled if any of these flags are set. If B is set and the policy checking is successful a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply log it for debugging purposes. By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by different keys are disabled. If B is set they are enabled. If B is set delta CRLs (if present) are used to determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored. B enables checking of the root CA self signed certificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root CA signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA are not treated as fatal errors. If B is set, when constructing the certificate chain, L will search the trust store for issuer certificates before searching the provided untrusted certificates. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled. The B flag suppresses checking for alternative chains. By default, unless B is set, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will attempt to replace untrusted certificates supplied by the peer with certificates from the trust store to see if an alternative chain can be found that is trusted. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B always set, this option has no effect. The B flag suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs against the current time. If X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() is used to specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed. =head1 INHERITANCE FLAGS These flags specify how parameters are "inherited" from one structure to another. If B is set then the current setting is zeroed after the next call. If B is set then no values are copied. This overrides all of the following flags. If B is set then anything set in the source is copied to the destination. Effectively the values in "to" become default values which will be used only if nothing new is set in "from". This is the default. If B is set then all value are copied across whether they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though. If B is set then the flags value is copied instead of ORed. =head1 NOTES The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters instead of legacy functions which work in specific structures such as X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(). =head1 BUGS Delta CRL checking is currently primitive. Only a single delta can be used and (partly due to limitations of B) constructed CRLs are not maintained. If CRLs checking is enable CRLs are expected to be available in the corresponding B structure. No attempt is made to download CRLs from the CRL distribution points extension. =head1 EXAMPLE Enable CRL checking when performing certificate verification during SSL connections associated with an B structure B: X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, param); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The B flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0 The legacy B flag is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0, and has no effect. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_OpenInit.pod0000644000000000000000000000432113176625660017105 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_OpenInit, EVP_OpenUpdate, EVP_OpenFinal - EVP envelope decryption =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char *ek, int ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY *priv); int EVP_OpenUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope decryption. They decrypt a public key encrypted symmetric key and then decrypt data using it. EVP_OpenInit() initializes a cipher context B for decryption with cipher B. It decrypts the encrypted symmetric key of length B bytes passed in the B parameter using the private key B. The IV is supplied in the B parameter. EVP_OpenUpdate() and EVP_OpenFinal() have exactly the same properties as the EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal() routines, as documented on the L manual page. =head1 NOTES It is possible to call EVP_OpenInit() twice in the same way as EVP_DecryptInit(). The first call should have B set to NULL and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again with B set to NULL. If the cipher passed in the B parameter is a variable length cipher then the key length will be set to the value of the recovered key length. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then the recovered key length must match the fixed cipher length. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_OpenInit() returns 0 on error or a non zero integer (actually the recovered secret key size) if successful. EVP_OpenUpdate() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. EVP_OpenFinal() returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000234613176625660017314 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASN1_STRING_new, ASN1_STRING_type_new, ASN1_STRING_free - ASN1_STRING allocation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_new(void); ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type); void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION ASN1_STRING_new() returns an allocated B structure. Its type is undefined. ASN1_STRING_type_new() returns an allocated B structure of type B. ASN1_STRING_free() frees up B. If B is NULL nothing is done. =head1 NOTES Other string types call the B functions. For example ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new() calls ASN1_STRING_type(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING). =head1 RETURN VALUES ASN1_STRING_new() and ASN1_STRING_type_new() return a valid ASN1_STRING structure or B if an error occurred. ASN1_STRING_free() does not return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/crypto.pod0000644000000000000000000000352313176625660016171 0ustar rootroot=pod =for comment openssl_manual_section:7 =head1 NAME crypto - OpenSSL cryptographic library =head1 SYNOPSIS See the individual manual pages for details. =head1 DESCRIPTION The OpenSSL B library implements a wide range of cryptographic algorithms used in various Internet standards. The services provided by this library are used by the OpenSSL implementations of SSL, TLS and S/MIME, and they have also been used to implement SSH, OpenPGP, and other cryptographic standards. B consists of a number of sub-libraries that implement the individual algorithms. The functionality includes symmetric encryption, public key cryptography and key agreement, certificate handling, cryptographic hash functions, cryptographic pseudo-random number generator, and various utilities. =head1 NOTES Some of the newer functions follow a naming convention using the numbers B<0> and B<1>. For example the functions: int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev); int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); The B<0> version uses the supplied structure pointer directly in the parent and it will be freed up when the parent is freed. In the above example B would be freed but B would not. The B<1> function uses a copy of the supplied structure pointer (or in some cases increases its link count) in the parent and so both (B and B above) should be freed up. =head1 RETURN VALUES See the individual manual pages for details. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000745113176625660020440 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time - Encapsulates the data required to evaluate whether SCTs meet a Certificate Transparency policy =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void); void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_cert(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); X509* CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_issuer(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); int CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer); const CTLOG_STORE *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get0_log_store(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *log_store); uint64_t CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_get_time(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); void CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time_in_ms); =head1 DESCRIPTION A B is used by functions that evaluate whether Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) fulfil a Certificate Transparency (CT) policy. This policy may be, for example, that at least one valid SCT is available. To determine this, an SCT's timestamp and signature must be verified. This requires: =over 4 =item * the public key of the log that issued the SCT =item * the certificate that the SCT was issued for =item * the issuer certificate (if the SCT was issued for a pre-certificate) =item * the current time =back The above requirements are met using the setters described below. CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new() creates an empty policy evaluation context. This should then be populated using: =over 4 =item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert() to provide the certificate the SCTs were issued for Increments the reference count of the certificate. =item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer() to provide the issuer certificate Increments the reference count of the certificate. =item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE() to provide a list of logs that are trusted as sources of SCTs Holds a pointer to the CTLOG_STORE, so the CTLOG_STORE must outlive the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX. =item * CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time() to set the time SCTs should be compared with to determine if they are valid The SCT timestamp will be compared to this time to check whether the SCT was issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST reject SCTs whose timestamp is in the future". By default, this will be set to 5 minutes in the future (e.g. (time() + 300) * 1000), to allow for clock drift. The time should be in milliseconds since the Unix epoch. =back Each setter has a matching getter for accessing the current value. When no longer required, the B should be passed to CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free() to delete it. =head1 NOTES The issuer certificate only needs to be provided if at least one of the SCTs was issued for a pre-certificate. This will be the case for SCTs embedded in a certificate (i.e. those in an X.509 extension), but may not be the case for SCTs found in the TLS SCT extension or OCSP response. =head1 RETURN VALUES CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new() will return NULL if malloc fails. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001346713176625660016775 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters, EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters, EC_GROUP_new, EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters, EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters, EC_GROUP_free, EC_GROUP_clear_free, EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m, EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name, EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m, EC_get_builtin_curves - Functions for creating and destroying EC_GROUP objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth); EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params) EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params) void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group); EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid); int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPARAMETERS *params) ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPKPARAMETERS *params) size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems); =head1 DESCRIPTION Within the library there are two forms of elliptic curve that are of interest. The first form is those defined over the prime field Fp. The elements of Fp are the integers 0 to p-1, where p is a prime number. This gives us a revised elliptic curve equation as follows: y^2 mod p = x^3 +ax + b mod p The second form is those defined over a binary field F2^m where the elements of the field are integers of length at most m bits. For this form the elliptic curve equation is modified to: y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b (where b != 0) Operations in a binary field are performed relative to an B. All such curves with OpenSSL use a trinomial or a pentanomial for this parameter. A new curve can be constructed by calling EC_GROUP_new, using the implementation provided by B (see L). It is then necessary to call either EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp or EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m as appropriate to create a curve defined over Fp or over F2^m respectively. EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters() will create a group from the specified B and EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters() will create a group from the specific PK B. EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp sets the curve parameters B

, B and B for a curve over Fp stored in B. EC_group_get_curve_GFp obtains the previously set curve parameters. EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m sets the equivalent curve parameters for a curve over F2^m. In this case B

represents the irreducible polynomial - each bit represents a term in the polynomial. Therefore there will either be three or five bits set dependent on whether the polynomial is a trinomial or a pentanomial. EC_group_get_curve_GF2m obtains the previously set curve parameters. The functions EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp and EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m are shortcuts for calling EC_GROUP_new and the appropriate EC_group_set_curve function. An appropriate default implementation method will be used. Whilst the library can be used to create any curve using the functions described above, there are also a number of predefined curves that are available. In order to obtain a list of all of the predefined curves, call the function EC_get_builtin_curves. The parameter B should be an array of EC_builtin_curve structures of size B. The function will populate the B array with information about the builtin curves. If B is less than the total number of curves available, then the first B curves will be returned. Otherwise the total number of curves will be provided. The return value is the total number of curves available (whether that number has been populated in B or not). Passing a NULL B, or setting B to 0 will do nothing other than return the total number of curves available. The EC_builtin_curve structure is defined as follows: typedef struct { int nid; const char *comment; } EC_builtin_curve; Each EC_builtin_curve item has a unique integer id (B), and a human readable comment string describing the curve. In order to construct a builtin curve use the function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name and provide the B of the curve to be constructed. EC_GROUP_free frees the memory associated with the EC_GROUP. If B is NULL nothing is done. EC_GROUP_clear_free destroys any sensitive data held within the EC_GROUP and then frees its memory. If B is NULL nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES All EC_GROUP_new* functions return a pointer to the newly constructed group, or NULL on error. EC_get_builtin_curves returns the number of builtin curves that are available. EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m return 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001765213176625660016531 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EC_KEY_get_method, EC_KEY_set_method, EC_KEY_new, EC_KEY_get_flags, EC_KEY_set_flags, EC_KEY_clear_flags, EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name, EC_KEY_free, EC_KEY_copy, EC_KEY_dup, EC_KEY_up_ref, EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_set_group, EC_KEY_get0_private_key, EC_KEY_set_private_key, EC_KEY_get0_public_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key, EC_KEY_get_conv_form, EC_KEY_set_conv_form, EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag, EC_KEY_precompute_mult, EC_KEY_generate_key, EC_KEY_check_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates, EC_KEY_oct2key, EC_KEY_key2buf, EC_KEY_oct2priv, EC_KEY_priv2oct, EC_KEY_priv2buf - Functions for creating, destroying and manipulating EC_KEY objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void); int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags); void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags); EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid); void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *key); EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src); EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src); int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *key); const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group); const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv); const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub); point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform); void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag); int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y); const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_method(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_method(EC_KEY *key, const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf); =head1 DESCRIPTION An EC_KEY represents a public key and, optionally, the associated private key. A new EC_KEY with no associated curve can be constructed by calling EC_KEY_new(). The reference count for the newly created EC_KEY is initially set to 1. A curve can be associated with the EC_KEY by calling EC_KEY_set_group(). Alternatively a new EC_KEY can be constructed by calling EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() and supplying the nid of the associated curve. See L for a description of curve names. This function simply wraps calls to EC_KEY_new() and EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(). Calling EC_KEY_free() decrements the reference count for the EC_KEY object, and if it has dropped to zero then frees the memory associated with it. If B is NULL nothing is done. EC_KEY_copy() copies the contents of the EC_KEY in B into B. EC_KEY_dup() creates a new EC_KEY object and copies B into it. EC_KEY_up_ref() increments the reference count associated with the EC_KEY object. EC_KEY_generate_key() generates a new public and private key for the supplied B object. B must have an EC_GROUP object associated with it before calling this function. The private key is a random integer (0 < priv_key < order, where I is the order of the EC_GROUP object). The public key is an EC_POINT on the curve calculated by multiplying the generator for the curve by the private key. EC_KEY_check_key() performs various sanity checks on the EC_KEY object to confirm that it is valid. EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates() sets the public key for B based on its affine co-ordinates; i.e., it constructs an EC_POINT object based on the supplied B and B values and sets the public key to be this EC_POINT. It also performs certain sanity checks on the key to confirm that it is valid. The functions EC_KEY_get0_group(), EC_KEY_set_group(), EC_KEY_get0_private_key(), EC_KEY_set_private_key(), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(), and EC_KEY_set_public_key() get and set the EC_GROUP object, the private key, and the EC_POINT public key for the B respectively. The functions EC_KEY_get_conv_form() and EC_KEY_set_conv_form() get and set the point_conversion_form for the B. For a description of point_conversion_forms please see L. EC_KEY_set_flags() sets the flags in the B parameter on the EC_KEY object. Any flags that are already set are left set. The flags currently defined are EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW and EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED. In addition there is the flag EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH which is specific to ECDH. EC_KEY_get_flags() returns the current flags that are set for this EC_KEY. EC_KEY_clear_flags() clears the flags indicated by the B parameter; all other flags are left in their existing state. EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag() sets the asn1_flag on the underlying EC_GROUP object (if set). Refer to L for further information on the asn1_flag. EC_KEY_precompute_mult() stores multiples of the underlying EC_GROUP generator for faster point multiplication. See also L. EC_KEY_oct2key() and EC_KEY_key2buf() are identical to the functions EC_POINT_oct2point() and EC_KEY_point2buf() except they use the public key EC_POINT in B. EC_KEY_oct2priv() and EC_KEY_priv2oct() convert between the private key component of B and octet form. The octet form consists of the content octets of the B OCTET STRING in an B ASN.1 structure. The function EC_KEY_priv2oct() must be supplied with a buffer long enough to store the octet form. The return value provides the number of octets stored. Calling the function with a NULL buffer will not perform the conversion but will just return the required buffer length. The function EC_KEY_priv2buf() allocates a buffer of suitable length and writes an EC_KEY to it in octet format. The allocated buffer is written to B<*pbuf> and its length is returned. The caller must free up the allocated buffer with a call to OPENSSL_free(). Since the allocated buffer value is written to B<*pbuf> the B parameter B be B. EC_KEY_priv2buf() converts an EC_KEY private key into an allocated buffer. =head1 RETURN VALUES EC_KEY_new(), EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() and EC_KEY_dup() return a pointer to the newly created EC_KEY object, or NULL on error. EC_KEY_get_flags() returns the flags associated with the EC_KEY object as an integer. EC_KEY_copy() returns a pointer to the destination key, or NULL on error. EC_KEY_up_ref(), EC_KEY_set_group(), EC_KEY_set_private_key(), EC_KEY_set_public_key(), EC_KEY_precompute_mult(), EC_KEY_generate_key(), EC_KEY_check_key(), EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(), EC_KEY_oct2key() and EC_KEY_oct2priv() return 1 on success or 0 on error. EC_KEY_get0_group() returns the EC_GROUP associated with the EC_KEY. EC_KEY_get0_private_key() returns the private key associated with the EC_KEY. EC_KEY_get_conv_form() return the point_conversion_form for the EC_KEY. EC_KEY_key2buf(), EC_KEY_priv2oct() and EC_KEY_priv2buf() return the length of the buffer or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod0000644000000000000000000000546213176625660016261 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len); int BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size); int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len); int BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *buf); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_read() attempts to read B bytes from BIO B and places the data in B. BIO_gets() performs the BIOs "gets" operation and places the data in B. Usually this operation will attempt to read a line of data from the BIO of maximum length B. There are exceptions to this, however; for example, BIO_gets() on a digest BIO will calculate and return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all. The returned string is always NUL-terminated. BIO_write() attempts to write B bytes from B to BIO B. BIO_puts() attempts to write a NUL-terminated string B to BIO B. =head1 RETURN VALUES All these functions return either the amount of data successfully read or written (if the return value is positive) or that no data was successfully read or written if the result is 0 or -1. If the return value is -2 then the operation is not implemented in the specific BIO type. The trailing NUL is not included in the length returned by BIO_gets(). =head1 NOTES A 0 or -1 return is not necessarily an indication of an error. In particular when the source/sink is non-blocking or of a certain type it may merely be an indication that no data is currently available and that the application should retry the operation later. One technique sometimes used with blocking sockets is to use a system call (such as select(), poll() or equivalent) to determine when data is available and then call read() to read the data. The equivalent with BIOs (that is call select() on the underlying I/O structure and then call BIO_read() to read the data) should B be used because a single call to BIO_read() can cause several reads (and writes in the case of SSL BIOs) on the underlying I/O structure and may block as a result. Instead select() (or equivalent) should be combined with non blocking I/O so successive reads will request a retry instead of blocking. See L for details of how to determine the cause of a retry and other I/O issues. If the BIO_gets() function is not supported by a BIO then it possible to work around this by adding a buffering BIO L to the chain. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.pod0000644000000000000000000000554113176625660022027 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers, OpenSSL_add_all_digests, EVP_cleanup - add algorithms to internal table =head1 SYNOPSIS #include Deprecated: # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void); void OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(void); void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void); void EVP_cleanup(void) # endif =head1 DESCRIPTION OpenSSL keeps an internal table of digest algorithms and ciphers. It uses this table to lookup ciphers via functions such as EVP_get_cipher_byname(). In OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0 these functions initialised and de-initialised this table. From OpenSSL 1.1.0 they are deprecated. No explicit initialisation or de-initialisation is required. See L for further information. OpenSSL_add_all_digests() adds all digest algorithms to the table. OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() adds all algorithms to the table (digests and ciphers). OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() adds all encryption algorithms to the table including password based encryption algorithms. In versions prior to 1.1.0 EVP_cleanup() removed all ciphers and digests from the table. It no longer has any effect in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 RETURN VALUES None of the functions return a value. =head1 NOTES A typical application will call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() initially and EVP_cleanup() before exiting. An application does not need to add algorithms to use them explicitly, for example by EVP_sha1(). It just needs to add them if it (or any of the functions it calls) needs to lookup algorithms. The cipher and digest lookup functions are used in many parts of the library. If the table is not initialized several functions will misbehave and complain they cannot find algorithms. This includes the PEM, PKCS#12, SSL and S/MIME libraries. This is a common query in the OpenSSL mailing lists. Calling OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() links in all algorithms: as a result a statically linked executable can be quite large. If this is important it is possible to just add the required ciphers and digests. =head1 BUGS Although the functions do not return error codes it is possible for them to fail. This will only happen as a result of a memory allocation failure so this is not too much of a problem in practice. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(), OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(), OpenSSL_add_all_digests(), and EVP_cleanup(), functions were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_crypto(). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_CMS.pod0000644000000000000000000000405613176625660017222 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SMIME_read_CMS - parse S/MIME message =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ContentInfo *SMIME_read_CMS(BIO *in, BIO **bcont); =head1 DESCRIPTION SMIME_read_CMS() parses a message in S/MIME format. B is a BIO to read the message from. If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in a memory bio which is written to B<*bcont>, otherwise B<*bcont> is set to NULL. The parsed CMS_ContentInfo structure is returned or NULL if an error occurred. =head1 NOTES If B<*bcont> is not NULL then the message is clear text signed. B<*bcont> can then be passed to CMS_verify() with the B flag set. Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined using CMS_get0_type(). To support future functionality if B is not NULL B<*bcont> should be initialized to NULL. For example: BIO *cont = NULL; CMS_ContentInfo *cms; cms = SMIME_read_CMS(in, &cont); =head1 BUGS The MIME parser used by SMIME_read_CMS() is somewhat primitive. While it will handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound formats may not work. The parser assumes that the CMS_ContentInfo structure is always base64 encoded and will not handle the case where it is in binary format or uses quoted printable format. The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size of message which can be processed due to memory restraints: a streaming single pass option should be available. =head1 RETURN VALUES SMIME_read_CMS() returns a valid B structure or B if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L L, L, L, L L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod0000644000000000000000000001305513176625660017476 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_keygen_init, EVP_PKEY_keygen, EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init, EVP_PKEY_paramgen, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb - key and parameter generation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); typedef int EVP_PKEY_gen_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb); EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data); void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_keygen_init() function initializes a public key algorithm context using key B for a key generation operation. The EVP_PKEY_keygen() function performs a key generation operation, the generated key is written to B. The functions EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init() and EVP_PKEY_paramgen() are similar except parameters are generated. The function EVP_PKEY_set_cb() sets the key or parameter generation callback to B. The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb() returns the key or parameter generation callback. The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info() returns parameters associated with the generation operation. If B is -1 the total number of parameters available is returned. Any non negative value returns the value of that parameter. EVP_PKEY_CTX_gen_keygen_info() with a non-negative value for B should only be called within the generation callback. If the callback returns 0 then the key generation operation is aborted and an error occurs. This might occur during a time consuming operation where a user clicks on a "cancel" button. The functions EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data() and EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data() set and retrieve an opaque pointer. This can be used to set some application defined value which can be retrieved in the callback: for example a handle which is used to update a "progress dialog". =head1 NOTES After the call to EVP_PKEY_keygen_init() or EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init() algorithm specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operation. The functions EVP_PKEY_keygen() and EVP_PKEY_paramgen() can be called more than once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. The meaning of the parameters passed to the callback will depend on the algorithm and the specific implementation of the algorithm. Some might not give any useful information at all during key or parameter generation. Others might not even call the callback. The operation performed by key or parameter generation depends on the algorithm used. In some cases (e.g. EC with a supplied named curve) the "generation" option merely sets the appropriate fields in an EVP_PKEY structure. In OpenSSL an EVP_PKEY structure containing a private key also contains the public key components and parameters (if any). An OpenSSL private key is equivalent to what some libraries call a "key pair". A private key can be used in functions which require the use of a public key or parameters. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(), EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(), EVP_PKEY_keygen() and EVP_PKEY_paramgen() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLES Generate a 2048 bit RSA key: #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_RSA, NULL); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, 2048) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Generate key */ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) /* Error */ Generate a key from a set of parameters: #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *param; /* Assumed param is set up already */ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(param); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Generate key */ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) /* Error */ Example of generation callback for OpenSSL public key implementations: /* Application data is a BIO to output status to */ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, status_bio); static int genpkey_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { char c = '*'; BIO *b = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(ctx); int p; p = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(ctx, 0); if (p == 0) c = '.'; if (p == 1) c = '+'; if (p == 2) c = '*'; if (p == 3) c = '\n'; BIO_write(b, &c, 1); (void)BIO_flush(b); return 1; } =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_f_cipher.pod0000644000000000000000000000536513176625660017127 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_f_cipher, BIO_set_cipher, BIO_get_cipher_status, BIO_get_cipher_ctx - cipher BIO filter =for comment multiple includes =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void); void BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc); int BIO_get_cipher_status(BIO *b) int BIO_get_cipher_ctx(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **pctx) =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_cipher() returns the cipher BIO method. This is a filter BIO that encrypts any data written through it, and decrypts any data read from it. It is a BIO wrapper for the cipher routines EVP_CipherInit(), EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal(). Cipher BIOs do not support BIO_gets() or BIO_puts(). BIO_flush() on an encryption BIO that is being written through is used to signal that no more data is to be encrypted: this is used to flush and possibly pad the final block through the BIO. BIO_set_cipher() sets the cipher of BIO B to B using key B and IV B. B should be set to 1 for encryption and zero for decryption. When reading from an encryption BIO the final block is automatically decrypted and checked when EOF is detected. BIO_get_cipher_status() is a BIO_ctrl() macro which can be called to determine whether the decryption operation was successful. BIO_get_cipher_ctx() is a BIO_ctrl() macro which retrieves the internal BIO cipher context. The retrieved context can be used in conjunction with the standard cipher routines to set it up. This is useful when BIO_set_cipher() is not flexible enough for the applications needs. =head1 NOTES When encrypting BIO_flush() B be called to flush the final block through the BIO. If it is not then the final block will fail a subsequent decrypt. When decrypting an error on the final block is signaled by a zero return value from the read operation. A successful decrypt followed by EOF will also return zero for the final read. BIO_get_cipher_status() should be called to determine if the decrypt was successful. As always, if BIO_gets() or BIO_puts() support is needed then it can be achieved by preceding the cipher BIO with a buffering BIO. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_f_cipher() returns the cipher BIO method. BIO_set_cipher() does not return a value. BIO_get_cipher_status() returns 1 for a successful decrypt and 0 for failure. BIO_get_cipher_ctx() currently always returns 1. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_secure_malloc.pod0000644000000000000000000001133313176625660020667 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init, CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized, CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done, OPENSSL_secure_malloc, CRYPTO_secure_malloc, OPENSSL_secure_zalloc, CRYPTO_secure_zalloc, OPENSSL_secure_free, OPENSSL_secure_clear_free, CRYPTO_secure_free, CRYPTO_secure_clear_free, OPENSSL_secure_actual_size, OPENSSL_secure_allocated, CRYPTO_secure_used - secure heap storage =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(size_t size, int minsize); int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized(); int CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done(); void *OPENSSL_secure_malloc(size_t num); void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line); void *OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(size_t num); void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line); void OPENSSL_secure_free(void* ptr); void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *, int); void OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(void* ptr, size_t num); void CRYPTO_secure_clear_free(void *ptr, size_t num, const char *, int); size_t OPENSSL_secure_actual_size(const void *ptr); int OPENSSL_secure_allocated(const void *ptr); size_t CRYPTO_secure_used(); =head1 DESCRIPTION In order to help protect applications (particularly long-running servers) from pointer overruns or underruns that could return arbitrary data from the program's dynamic memory area, where keys and other sensitive information might be stored, OpenSSL supports the concept of a "secure heap." The level and type of security guarantees depend on the operating system. It is a good idea to review the code and see if it addresses your threat model and concerns. If a secure heap is used, then private key B values are stored there. This protects long-term storage of private keys, but will not necessarily put all intermediate values and computations there. CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() creates the secure heap, with the specified C in bytes. The C parameter is the minimum size to allocate from the heap. Both C and C must be a power of two. CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized() indicates whether or not the secure heap as been initialized and is available. CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() releases the heap and makes the memory unavailable to the process if all secure memory has been freed. It can take noticeably long to complete. OPENSSL_secure_malloc() allocates C bytes from the heap. If CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() is not called, this is equivalent to calling OPENSSL_malloc(). It is a macro that expands to CRYPTO_secure_malloc() and adds the C<__FILE__> and C<__LINE__> parameters. OPENSSL_secure_zalloc() and CRYPTO_secure_zalloc() are like OPENSSL_secure_malloc() and CRYPTO_secure_malloc(), respectively, except that they call memset() to zero the memory before returning. OPENSSL_secure_free() releases the memory at C back to the heap. It must be called with a value previously obtained from OPENSSL_secure_malloc(). If CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() is not called, this is equivalent to calling OPENSSL_free(). It exists for consistency with OPENSSL_secure_malloc() , and is a macro that expands to CRYPTO_secure_free() and adds the C<__FILE__> and C<__LINE__> parameters.. OPENSSL_secure_allocated() tells whether or not a pointer is within the secure heap. OPENSSL_secure_actual_size() tells the actual size allocated to the pointer; implementations may allocate more space than initially requested, in order to "round up" and reduce secure heap fragmentation. CRYPTO_secure_used() returns the number of bytes allocated in the secure heap. =head1 RETURN VALUES CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() returns 0 on failure, 1 if successful, and 2 if successful but the heap could not be protected by memory mapping. CRYPTO_secure_malloc_initialized() returns 1 if the secure heap is available (that is, if CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init() has been called, but CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() has not been called or failed) or 0 if not. OPENSSL_secure_malloc() and OPENSSL_secure_zalloc() return a pointer into the secure heap of the requested size, or C if memory could not be allocated. CRYPTO_secure_allocated() returns 1 if the pointer is in the secure heap, or 0 if not. CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done() returns 1 if the secure memory area is released, or 0 if not. OPENSSL_secure_free() and OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() return no values. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0g. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod0000644000000000000000000000620013176625660017466 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_set_default_method, DSA_get_default_method, DSA_set_method, DSA_new_method, DSA_OpenSSL - select DSA method =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth); const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void); int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth); DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION A B specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for DSA operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for important information about how these DSA API functions are affected by the use of B API calls. Initially, the default DSA_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by DSA_OpenSSL(). DSA_set_default_method() makes B the default method for all DSA structures created later. B: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for DSA, so this function is no longer recommended. This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time as other OpenSSL functions. DSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default DSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. DSA_set_method() selects B to perform all operations using the key B. This will replace the DSA_METHOD used by the DSA key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have DSA keys that only work with certain DSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results. See L for information on constructing custom DSA_METHOD objects; DSA_new_method() allocates and initializes a DSA structure so that B will be used for the DSA operations. If B is NULL, the default engine for DSA operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DSA_METHOD controlled by DSA_set_default_method() is used. =head1 RETURN VALUES DSA_OpenSSL() and DSA_get_default_method() return pointers to the respective Bs. DSA_set_default_method() returns no value. DSA_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B was successfully set as the method for B (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE). DSA_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by L if the allocation fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_get0_uids.pod0000644000000000000000000000255113176625660017261 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get0_uids - get certificate unique identifiers =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_get0_uids() sets B<*piuid> and B<*psuid> to the issuer and subject unique identifiers of certificate B or NULL if the fields are not present. =head1 NOTES The issuer and subject unique identifier fields are very rarely encountered in practice outside test cases. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_get0_uids() does not return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/x509.pod0000644000000000000000000000434113176625660015355 0ustar rootroot=pod =for comment openssl_manual_section:7 =head1 NAME x509 - X.509 certificate handling =head1 SYNOPSIS #include =head1 DESCRIPTION An X.509 certificate is a structured grouping of information about an individual, a device, or anything one can imagine. A X.509 CRL (certificate revocation list) is a tool to help determine if a certificate is still valid. The exact definition of those can be found in the X.509 document from ITU-T, or in RFC3280 from PKIX. In OpenSSL, the type X509 is used to express such a certificate, and the type X509_CRL is used to express a CRL. A related structure is a certificate request, defined in PKCS#10 from RSA Security, Inc, also reflected in RFC2896. In OpenSSL, the type X509_REQ is used to express such a certificate request. To handle some complex parts of a certificate, there are the types X509_NAME (to express a certificate name), X509_ATTRIBUTE (to express a certificate attributes), X509_EXTENSION (to express a certificate extension) and a few more. Finally, there's the supertype X509_INFO, which can contain a CRL, a certificate and a corresponding private key. BI<...>, BI<...> and BI<...> handle X.509 certificates, with some exceptions, shown below. BI<...>, BI<...> and BI<...> handle X.509 CRLs. BI<...>, BI<...> and BI<...> handle PKCS#10 certificate requests. BI<...> handle certificate names. BI<...> handle certificate attributes. BI<...> handle certificate extensions. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2003-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000557513176625660017676 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init, EVP_PKEY_decrypt - decrypt using a public key algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() function initializes a public key algorithm context using key B for a decryption operation. The EVP_PKEY_decrypt() function performs a public key decryption operation using B. The data to be decrypted is specified using the B and B parameters. If B is B then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the B parameter. If B is not B then before the call the B parameter should contain the length of the B buffer, if the call is successful the decrypted data is written to B and the amount of data written to B. =head1 NOTES After the call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() algorithm specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operation. The function EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be called more than once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() and EVP_PKEY_decrypt() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLE Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys): #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; unsigned char *out, *in; size_t outlen, inlen; EVP_PKEY *key; /* NB: assumes key in, inlen are already set up * and that key is an RSA private key */ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Determine buffer length */ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0) /* Error */ out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (!out) /* malloc failure */ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Decrypted data is outlen bytes written to buffer out */ =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_swap.pod0000644000000000000000000000102713176625660016177 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_swap - exchange BIGNUMs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_swap() exchanges the values of I and I. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream.pod0000644000000000000000000000221113176625660021403 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream - output CMS_ContentInfo structure in PEM format =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() outputs a CMS_ContentInfo structure in PEM format. It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_CMS(). =head1 NOTES This function is effectively a version of the PEM_write_bio_CMS() supporting streaming. =head1 RETURN VALUES PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index.pod0000644000000000000000000001522213176625660021263 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CRYPTO_EX_new, CRYPTO_EX_free, CRYPTO_EX_dup, CRYPTO_free_ex_index, CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index, CRYPTO_set_ex_data, CRYPTO_get_ex_data, CRYPTO_free_ex_data, CRYPTO_new_ex_data - functions supporting application-specific data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); typedef void CRYPTO_EX_new(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp); typedef void CRYPTO_EX_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp); typedef int CRYPTO_EX_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp); int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad) int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx, void *arg); void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx); void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r); int CRYPTO_free_ex_index(int class_index, int idx); =head1 DESCRIPTION Several OpenSSL structures can have application-specific data attached to them, known as "exdata." The specific structures are: SSL SSL_CTX SSL_SESSION X509 X509_STORE X509_STORE_CTX DH DSA EC_KEY RSA ENGINE UI UI_METHOD BIO Each is identified by an B define in the B header file. In addition, B is reserved for applications to use this facility for their own structures. The API described here is used by OpenSSL to manipulate exdata for specific structures. Since the application data can be anything at all it is passed and retrieved as a B type. The B type is opaque. To initialize the exdata part of a structure, call CRYPTO_new_ex_data(). This is only necessary for B objects. Exdata types are identified by an B, an integer guaranteed to be unique within structures for the lifetime of the program. Applications using exdata typically call B at startup, and store the result in a global variable, or write a wrapper function to provide lazy evaluation. The B should be one of the B values. The B and B parameters are saved to be passed to the callbacks but are otherwise not used. In order to transparently manipulate exdata, three callbacks must be provided. The semantics of those callbacks are described below. When copying or releasing objects with exdata, the callback functions are called in increasing order of their B value. If a dynamic library can be unloaded, it should call CRYPTO_free_ex_index() when this is done. This will replace the callbacks with no-ops so that applications don't crash. Any existing exdata will be leaked. To set or get the exdata on an object, the appropriate type-specific routine must be used. This is because the containing structure is opaque and the B field is not accessible. In both API's, the B parameter should be an already-created index value. When setting exdata, the pointer specified with a particular index is saved, and returned on a subsequent "get" call. If the application is going to release the data, it must make sure to set a B value at the index, to avoid likely double-free crashes. The function B is used to free all exdata attached to a structure. The appropriate type-specific routine must be used. The B identifies the structure type, the B is be the pointer to the actual structure, and B is a pointer to the structure's exdata field. =head2 Callback Functions This section describes how the callback functions are used. Applications that are defining their own exdata using B must call them as described here. When a structure is initially allocated (such as RSA_new()) then the new_func() is called for every defined index. There is no requirement that the entire parent, or containing, structure has been set up. The new_func() is typically used only to allocate memory to store the exdata, and perhaps an "initialized" flag within that memory. The exdata value should be set by calling CRYPTO_set_ex_data(). When a structure is free'd (such as SSL_CTX_free()) then the free_func() is called for every defined index. Again, the state of the parent structure is not guaranteed. The free_func() may be called with a NULL pointer. Both new_func() and free_func() take the same parameters. The B is the pointer to the structure that contains the exdata. The B is the current exdata item; for new_func() this will typically be NULL. The B parameter is a pointer to the exdata field of the object. The B is the index and is the value returned when the callbacks were initially registered via CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() and can be used if the same callback handles different types of exdata. dup_func() is called when a structure is being copied. This is only done for B, B, B objects and B chains via BIO_dup_chain(). The B and B parameters are pointers to the destination and source B structures, respectively. The B parameter needs to be cast to a B as the API has currently the wrong signature; that will be changed in a future version. The B<*pptr> is a pointer to the source exdata. When the dup_func() returns, the value in B<*pptr> is copied to the destination ex_data. If the pointer contained in B<*pptr> is not modified by the dup_func(), then both B and B will point to the same data. The B, B and B parameters are as described for the other two callbacks. If the dup_func() returns B<0> the whole CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() will fail. =head1 RETURN VALUES CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() returns a new index or -1 on failure; the value B<0> is reserved for the legacy "app_data" API's. CRYPTO_free_ex_index() and CRYPTO_set_ex_data() return 1 on success or 0 on failure. CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns the application data or NULL on failure; note that NULL may be a valid value. dup_func() should return 0 for failure and 1 for success. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_verify_receipt.pod0000644000000000000000000000273713176625660020400 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_verify_receipt - verify a CMS signed receipt =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_verify_receipt() verifies a CMS signed receipt. B is the signed receipt to verify. B is the original SignedData structure containing the receipt request. B is a set of certificates in which to search for the signing certificate. B is a trusted certificate store (used for chain verification). B is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify operation. =head1 NOTES This functions behaves in a similar way to CMS_verify() except the flag values B, B, B and B are not supported since they do not make sense in the context of signed receipts. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_verify_receipt() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from L =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_get_extension_flags.pod0000644000000000000000000001334313176625660021426 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get0_subject_key_id, X509_get_pathlen, X509_get_extension_flags, X509_get_key_usage, X509_get_extended_key_usage, X509_set_proxy_flag, X509_set_proxy_pathlen, X509_get_proxy_pathlen - retrieve certificate extension data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x); uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x); uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x); uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x); const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x); void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x); void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(int l); long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions retrieve information related to commonly used certificate extensions. X509_get_pathlen() retrieves the path length extension from a certificate. This extension is used to limit the length of a cert chain that may be issued from that CA. X509_get_extension_flags() retrieves general information about a certificate, it will return one or more of the following flags ored together. =over 4 =item B The certificate is an obsolete version 1 certificate. =item B The certificate contains a basic constraints extension. =item B The certificate contains basic constraints and asserts the CA flag. =item B The certificate is a valid proxy certificate. =item B The certificate is self issued (that is subject and issuer names match). =item B The subject and issuer names match and extension values imply it is self signed. =item B The freshest CRL extension is present in the certificate. =item B The certificate contains an unhandled critical extension. =item B Some certificate extension values are invalid or inconsistent. The certificate should be rejected. =item B The certificate contains a key usage extension. The value can be retrieved using X509_get_key_usage(). =item B The certificate contains an extended key usage extension. The value can be retrieved using X509_get_extended_key_usage(). =back X509_get_key_usage() returns the value of the key usage extension. If key usage is present will return zero or more of the flags: B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B or B corresponding to individual key usage bits. If key usage is absent then B is returned. X509_get_extended_key_usage() returns the value of the extended key usage extension. If extended key usage is present it will return zero or more of the flags: B, B, B, B B, B, B or B. These correspond to the OIDs B, B, B, B, B, B, B and B respectively. Additionally B is set if either Netscape or Microsoft SGC OIDs are present. X509_get0_subject_key_id() returns an internal pointer to the subject key identifier of B as an B or B if the extension is not present or cannot be parsed. X509_set_proxy_flag() marks the certificate with the B flag. This is for the users who need to mark non-RFC3820 proxy certificates as such, as OpenSSL only detects RFC3820 compliant ones. X509_set_proxy_pathlen() sets the proxy certificate path length for the given certificate B. This is for the users who need to mark non-RFC3820 proxy certificates as such, as OpenSSL only detects RFC3820 compliant ones. X509_get_proxy_pathlen() returns the proxy certificate path length for the given certificate B if it is a proxy certificate. =head1 NOTES The value of the flags correspond to extension values which are cached in the B structure. If the flags returned do not provide sufficient information an application should examine extension values directly for example using X509_get_ext_d2i(). If the key usage or extended key usage extension is absent then typically usage is unrestricted. For this reason X509_get_key_usage() and X509_get_extended_key_usage() return B when the corresponding extension is absent. Applications can additionally check the return value of X509_get_extension_flags() and take appropriate action is an extension is absent. If X509_get0_subject_key_id() returns B then the extension may be absent or malformed. Applications can determine the precise reason using X509_get_ext_d2i(). =head1 RETURN VALUE X509_get_pathlen() returns the path length value, or -1 if the extension is not present. X509_get_extension_flags(), X509_get_key_usage() and X509_get_extended_key_usage() return sets of flags corresponding to the certificate extension values. X509_get0_subject_key_id() returns the subject key identifier as a pointer to an B structure or B if the extension is absent or an error occurred during parsing. X509_get_proxy_pathlen() returns the path length value if the given certificate is a proxy one and has a path length set, and -1 otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY X509_get_pathlen(), X509_set_proxy_flag(), X509_set_proxy_pathlen() and X509_get_proxy_pathlen() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod0000644000000000000000000002165613176625660017660 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DECLARE_LHASH_OF, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC, OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE, IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN, IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN, lh_TYPE_new, lh_TYPE_free, lh_TYPE_insert, lh_TYPE_delete, lh_TYPE_retrieve, lh_TYPE_doall, lh_TYPE_doall_arg, lh_TYPE_error - dynamic hash table =for comment generic =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DECLARE_LHASH_OF(TYPE); LHASH *lh_TYPE_new(); void lh_TYPE_free(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table); TYPE *lh_TYPE_insert(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table, TYPE *data); TYPE *lh_TYPE_delete(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table, TYPE *data); TYPE *lh_retrieve(LHASH_OFTYPE *table, TYPE *data); void lh_TYPE_doall(LHASH_OF(TYPE *table, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func); void lh_TYPE_doall_arg(LHASH_OF(TYPE) *table, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func, TYPE, TYPE *arg); int lh_TYPE_error(LHASH_OF(TYPE) *table); typedef int (*OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC)(const void *, const void *); typedef unsigned long (*OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC)(const void *); typedef void (*OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)(const void *); typedef void (*LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE)(const void *, const void *); =head1 DESCRIPTION This library implements type-checked dynamic hash tables. The hash table entries can be arbitrary structures. Usually they consist of key and value fields. In the description here, I is used a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I. lh_TYPE_new() creates a new B structure to store arbitrary data entries, and specifies the 'hash' and 'compare' callbacks to be used in organising the table's entries. The B callback takes a pointer to a table entry as its argument and returns an unsigned long hash value for its key field. The hash value is normally truncated to a power of 2, so make sure that your hash function returns well mixed low order bits. The B callback takes two arguments (pointers to two hash table entries), and returns 0 if their keys are equal, non-zero otherwise. If your hash table will contain items of some particular type and the B and B callbacks hash/compare these types, then the B and B macros can be used to create callback wrappers of the prototypes required by lh_TYPE_new() as shown in this example: /* * Implement the hash and compare functions; "stuff" can be any word. */ static unsigned long stuff_hash(const TYPE *a) { ... } static int stuff_cmp(const TYPE *a, const TYPE *b) { ... } /* * Implement the wrapper functions. */ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(stuff, TYPE) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(stuff, TYPE) If the type is going to be used in several places, the following macros can be used in a common header file to declare the function wrappers: DECLARE_LHASH_HASH_FN(stuff, TYPE) DECLARE_LHASH_COMP_FN(stuff, TYPE) Then a hash table of TYPE objects can be created using this: LHASH_OF(TYPE) *htable; htable = lh_TYPE_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(stuff), LHASH_COMP_FN(stuff)); lh_TYPE_free() frees the B structure B. Allocated hash table entries will not be freed; consider using lh_TYPE_doall() to deallocate any remaining entries in the hash table (see below). lh_TYPE_insert() inserts the structure pointed to by B into B
. If there already is an entry with the same key, the old value is replaced. Note that lh_TYPE_insert() stores pointers, the data are not copied. lh_TYPE_delete() deletes an entry from B
. lh_TYPE_retrieve() looks up an entry in B
. Normally, B is a structure with the key field(s) set; the function will return a pointer to a fully populated structure. lh_TYPE_doall() will, for every entry in the hash table, call B with the data item as its parameter. For example: /* Cleans up resources belonging to 'a' (this is implemented elsewhere) */ void TYPE_cleanup_doall(TYPE *a); /* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "TYPE_cleanup" */ IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(TYPE_cleanup, TYPE) /* Call "TYPE_cleanup" against all items in a hash table. */ lh_TYPE_doall(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_FN(TYPE_cleanup)); /* Then the hash table itself can be deallocated */ lh_TYPE_free(hashtable); When doing this, be careful if you delete entries from the hash table in your callbacks: the table may decrease in size, moving the item that you are currently on down lower in the hash table - this could cause some entries to be skipped during the iteration. The second best solution to this problem is to set hash-Edown_load=0 before you start (which will stop the hash table ever decreasing in size). The best solution is probably to avoid deleting items from the hash table inside a "doall" callback! lh_TYPE_doall_arg() is the same as lh_TYPE_doall() except that B will be called with B as the second argument and B should be of type B (a callback prototype that is passed both the table entry and an extra argument). As with lh_doall(), you can instead choose to declare your callback with a prototype matching the types you are dealing with and use the declare/implement macros to create compatible wrappers that cast variables before calling your type-specific callbacks. An example of this is demonstrated here (printing all hash table entries to a BIO that is provided by the caller): /* Prints item 'a' to 'output_bio' (this is implemented elsewhere) */ void TYPE_print_doall_arg(const TYPE *a, BIO *output_bio); /* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "TYPE_print" */ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(TYPE, const TYPE, BIO) /* Print out the entire hashtable to a particular BIO */ lh_TYPE_doall_arg(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(TYPE_print), BIO, logging_bio); lh_TYPE_error() can be used to determine if an error occurred in the last operation. =head1 RETURN VALUES lh_TYPE_new() returns B on error, otherwise a pointer to the new B structure. When a hash table entry is replaced, lh_TYPE_insert() returns the value being replaced. B is returned on normal operation and on error. lh_TYPE_delete() returns the entry being deleted. B is returned if there is no such value in the hash table. lh_TYPE_retrieve() returns the hash table entry if it has been found, B otherwise. lh_TYPE_error() returns 1 if an error occurred in the last operation, 0 otherwise. lh_TYPE_free(), lh_TYPE_doall() and lh_TYPE_doall_arg() return no values. =head1 NOTE The various LHASH macros and callback types exist to make it possible to write type-checked code without resorting to function-prototype casting - an evil that makes application code much harder to audit/verify and also opens the window of opportunity for stack corruption and other hard-to-find bugs. It also, apparently, violates ANSI-C. The LHASH code regards table entries as constant data. As such, it internally represents lh_insert()'d items with a "const void *" pointer type. This is why callbacks such as those used by lh_doall() and lh_doall_arg() declare their prototypes with "const", even for the parameters that pass back the table items' data pointers - for consistency, user-provided data is "const" at all times as far as the LHASH code is concerned. However, as callers are themselves providing these pointers, they can choose whether they too should be treating all such parameters as constant. As an example, a hash table may be maintained by code that, for reasons of encapsulation, has only "const" access to the data being indexed in the hash table (ie. it is returned as "const" from elsewhere in their code) - in this case the LHASH prototypes are appropriate as-is. Conversely, if the caller is responsible for the life-time of the data in question, then they may well wish to make modifications to table item passed back in the lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() callbacks (see the "TYPE_cleanup" example above). If so, the caller can either cast the "const" away (if they're providing the raw callbacks themselves) or use the macros to declare/implement the wrapper functions without "const" types. Callers that only have "const" access to data they're indexing in a table, yet declare callbacks without constant types (or cast the "const" away themselves), are therefore creating their own risks/bugs without being encouraged to do so by the API. On a related note, those auditing code should pay special attention to any instances of DECLARE/IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_[ARG_]_FN macros that provide types without any "const" qualifiers. =head1 BUGS lh_TYPE_insert() returns B both for success and error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY In OpenSSL 1.0.0, the lhash interface was revamped for better type checking. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod0000644000000000000000000002302613176625660016762 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, EC_POINT_point2buf, EC_POINT_new, EC_POINT_free, EC_POINT_clear_free, EC_POINT_copy, EC_POINT_dup, EC_POINT_method_of, EC_POINT_set_to_infinity, EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp, EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp, EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m, EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m, EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m, EC_POINT_point2oct, EC_POINT_oct2point, EC_POINT_point2bn, EC_POINT_bn2point, EC_POINT_point2hex, EC_POINT_hex2point - Functions for creating, destroying and manipulating EC_POINT objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point); void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point); int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dst, const EC_POINT *src); EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *src, const EC_GROUP *group); const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point); int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point); int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx); size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *bn, BN_CTX *ctx); EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *bn, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx); char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *ctx); EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *group, const char *hex, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION An B structure represents a point on a curve. A new point is constructed by calling the function EC_POINT_new() and providing the B object that the point relates to. EC_POINT_free() frees the memory associated with the B. if B is NULL nothing is done. EC_POINT_clear_free() destroys any sensitive data held within the EC_POINT and then frees its memory. If B is NULL nothing is done. EC_POINT_copy() copies the point B into B. Both B and B must use the same B. EC_POINT_dup() creates a new B object and copies the content from B to the newly created B object. EC_POINT_method_of() obtains the B associated with B. A valid point on a curve is the special point at infinity. A point is set to be at infinity by calling EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(). The affine co-ordinates for a point describe a point in terms of its x and y position. The functions EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp() and EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m() set the B and B co-ordinates for the point B

defined over the curve given in B. As well as the affine co-ordinates, a point can alternatively be described in terms of its Jacobian projective co-ordinates (for Fp curves only). Jacobian projective co-ordinates are expressed as three values x, y and z. Working in this co-ordinate system provides more efficient point multiplication operations. A mapping exists between Jacobian projective co-ordinates and affine co-ordinates. A Jacobian projective co-ordinate (x, y, z) can be written as an affine co-ordinate as (x/(z^2), y/(z^3)). Conversion to Jacobian projective from affine co-ordinates is simple. The co-ordinate (x, y) is mapped to (x, y, 1). To set or get the projective co-ordinates use EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp() and EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp() respectively. Points can also be described in terms of their compressed co-ordinates. For a point (x, y), for any given value for x such that the point is on the curve there will only ever be two possible values for y. Therefore a point can be set using the EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp() and EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m() functions where B is the x co-ordinate and B is a value 0 or 1 to identify which of the two possible values for y should be used. In addition B can be converted to and from various external representations. The octet form is the binary encoding of the B structure (as defined in RFC5480 and used in certificates and TLS records): only the content octets are present, the B tag and length are not included. B form is the octet form interpreted as a big endian integer converted to a B structure. Hexadecimal form is the octet form converted to a NULL terminated character string where each character is one of the printable values 0-9 or A-F (or a-f). The functions EC_POINT_point2oct(), EC_POINT_oct2point(), EC_POINT_point2bn(), EC_POINT_bn2point(), EC_POINT_point2hex() and EC_POINT_hex2point() convert from and to EC_POINTs for the formats: octet, BIGNUM and hexadecimal respectively. The function EC_POINT_point2oct() must be supplied with a buffer long enough to store the octet form. The return value provides the number of octets stored. Calling the function with a NULL buffer will not perform the conversion but will still return the required buffer length. The function EC_POINT_point2buf() allocates a buffer of suitable length and writes an EC_POINT to it in octet format. The allocated buffer is written to B<*pbuf> and its length is returned. The caller must free up the allocated buffer with a call to OPENSSL_free(). Since the allocated buffer value is written to B<*pbuf> the B parameter B be B. The function EC_POINT_point2hex() will allocate sufficient memory to store the hexadecimal string. It is the caller's responsibility to free this memory with a subsequent call to OPENSSL_free(). =head1 RETURN VALUES EC_POINT_new() and EC_POINT_dup() return the newly allocated EC_POINT or NULL on error. The following functions return 1 on success or 0 on error: EC_POINT_copy(), EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(), EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(), EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(), EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(), EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(), EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(), EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(), EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m() and EC_POINT_oct2point(). EC_POINT_method_of returns the EC_METHOD associated with the supplied EC_POINT. EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_point2buf() return the length of the required buffer or 0 on error. EC_POINT_point2bn() returns the pointer to the BIGNUM supplied, or NULL on error. EC_POINT_bn2point() returns the pointer to the EC_POINT supplied, or NULL on error. EC_POINT_point2hex() returns a pointer to the hex string, or NULL on error. EC_POINT_hex2point() returns the pointer to the EC_POINT supplied, or NULL on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_s_null.pod0000644000000000000000000000215413176625660016635 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_s_null - null data sink =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_null(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_null() returns the null sink BIO method. Data written to the null sink is discarded, reads return EOF. =head1 NOTES A null sink BIO behaves in a similar manner to the Unix /dev/null device. A null bio can be placed on the end of a chain to discard any data passed through it. A null sink is useful if, for example, an application wishes to digest some data by writing through a digest bio but not send the digested data anywhere. Since a BIO chain must normally include a source/sink BIO this can be achieved by adding a null sink BIO to the end of the chain =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_s_null() returns the null sink BIO method. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod0000644000000000000000000001712713176625660020415 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASN1_generate_nconf, ASN1_generate_v3 - ASN1 generation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(const char *str, CONF *nconf); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(const char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions generate the ASN1 encoding of a string in an B structure. B contains the string to encode B or B contains the optional configuration information where additional strings will be read from. B will typically come from a config file whereas B is obtained from an B structure which will typically be used by X509 v3 certificate extension functions. B or B can be set to B if no additional configuration will be used. =head1 GENERATION STRING FORMAT The actual data encoded is determined by the string B and the configuration information. The general format of the string is: =over 4 =item B<[modifier,]type[:value]> =back That is zero or more comma separated modifiers followed by a type followed by an optional colon and a value. The formats of B, B and B are explained below. =head2 Supported Types The supported types are listed below. Unless otherwise specified only the B format is permissible. =over 4 =item B, B This encodes a boolean type. The B string is mandatory and should be B or B. Additionally B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B and B are acceptable. =item B Encode the B type, the B string must not be present. =item B, B Encodes an ASN1 B type. The B string represents the value of the integer, it can be prefaced by a minus sign and is normally interpreted as a decimal value unless the prefix B<0x> is included. =item B, B Encodes the ASN1 B type, it is otherwise identical to B. =item B, B Encodes an ASN1 B, the B string can be a short name, a long name or numerical format. =item B, B Encodes an ASN1 B structure, the value should be in the format B. =item B, B Encodes an ASN1 B structure, the value should be in the format B. =item B, B Encodes an ASN1 B. B represents the contents of this structure, the format strings B and B can be used to specify the format of B. =item B, B Encodes an ASN1 B. B represents the contents of this structure, the format strings B, B and B can be used to specify the format of B. If the format is anything other than B the number of unused bits is set to zero. =item B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B These encode the corresponding string types. B represents the contents of this structure. The format can be B or B. =item B, B, B Formats the result as an ASN1 B or B type. B should be a section name which will contain the contents. The field names in the section are ignored and the values are in the generated string format. If B is absent then an empty SEQUENCE will be encoded. =back =head2 Modifiers Modifiers affect the following structure, they can be used to add EXPLICIT or IMPLICIT tagging, add wrappers or to change the string format of the final type and value. The supported formats are documented below. =over 4 =item B, B Add an explicit tag to the following structure. This string should be followed by a colon and the tag value to use as a decimal value. By following the number with B, B, B

or B UNIVERSAL, APPLICATION, PRIVATE or CONTEXT SPECIFIC tagging can be used, the default is CONTEXT SPECIFIC. =item B, B This is the same as B except IMPLICIT tagging is used instead. =item B, B, B, B The following structure is surrounded by an OCTET STRING, a SEQUENCE, a SET or a BIT STRING respectively. For a BIT STRING the number of unused bits is set to zero. =item B This specifies the format of the ultimate value. It should be followed by a colon and one of the strings B, B, B or B. If no format specifier is included then B is used. If B is specified then the value string must be a valid B string. For B the output must be a set of hex digits. B (which is only valid for a BIT STRING) is a comma separated list of the indices of the set bits, all other bits are zero. =back =head1 EXAMPLES A simple IA5String: IA5STRING:Hello World An IA5String explicitly tagged: EXPLICIT:0,IA5STRING:Hello World An IA5String explicitly tagged using APPLICATION tagging: EXPLICIT:0A,IA5STRING:Hello World A BITSTRING with bits 1 and 5 set and all others zero: FORMAT:BITLIST,BITSTRING:1,5 A more complex example using a config file to produce a SEQUENCE consisting of a BOOL an OID and a UTF8String: asn1 = SEQUENCE:seq_section [seq_section] field1 = BOOLEAN:TRUE field2 = OID:commonName field3 = UTF8:Third field This example produces an RSAPrivateKey structure, this is the key contained in the file client.pem in all OpenSSL distributions (note: the field names such as 'coeff' are ignored and are present just for clarity): asn1=SEQUENCE:private_key [private_key] version=INTEGER:0 n=INTEGER:0xBB6FE79432CC6EA2D8F970675A5A87BFBE1AFF0BE63E879F2AFFB93644\ D4D2C6D000430DEC66ABF47829E74B8C5108623A1C0EE8BE217B3AD8D36D5EB4FCA1D9 e=INTEGER:0x010001 d=INTEGER:0x6F05EAD2F27FFAEC84BEC360C4B928FD5F3A9865D0FCAAD291E2A52F4A\ F810DC6373278C006A0ABBA27DC8C63BF97F7E666E27C5284D7D3B1FFFE16B7A87B51D p=INTEGER:0xF3929B9435608F8A22C208D86795271D54EBDFB09DDEF539AB083DA912\ D4BD57 q=INTEGER:0xC50016F89DFF2561347ED1186A46E150E28BF2D0F539A1594BBD7FE467\ 46EC4F exp1=INTEGER:0x9E7D4326C924AFC1DEA40B45650134966D6F9DFA3A7F9D698CD4ABEA\ 9C0A39B9 exp2=INTEGER:0xBA84003BB95355AFB7C50DF140C60513D0BA51D637272E355E397779\ E7B2458F coeff=INTEGER:0x30B9E4F2AFA5AC679F920FC83F1F2DF1BAF1779CF989447FABC2F5\ 628657053A This example is the corresponding public key in a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure: # Start with a SEQUENCE asn1=SEQUENCE:pubkeyinfo # pubkeyinfo contains an algorithm identifier and the public key wrapped # in a BIT STRING [pubkeyinfo] algorithm=SEQUENCE:rsa_alg pubkey=BITWRAP,SEQUENCE:rsapubkey # algorithm ID for RSA is just an OID and a NULL [rsa_alg] algorithm=OID:rsaEncryption parameter=NULL # Actual public key: modulus and exponent [rsapubkey] n=INTEGER:0xBB6FE79432CC6EA2D8F970675A5A87BFBE1AFF0BE63E879F2AFFB93644\ D4D2C6D000430DEC66ABF47829E74B8C5108623A1C0EE8BE217B3AD8D36D5EB4FCA1D9 e=INTEGER:0x010001 =head1 RETURN VALUES ASN1_generate_nconf() and ASN1_generate_v3() return the encoded data as an B structure or B if an error occurred. The error codes that can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod0000644000000000000000000000516413176625660016260 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_s_fd, BIO_set_fd, BIO_get_fd, BIO_new_fd - file descriptor BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void); int BIO_set_fd(BIO *b, int fd, int c); int BIO_get_fd(BIO *b, int *c); BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platforms file descriptor routines such as read() and write(). BIO_read() and BIO_write() read or write the underlying descriptor. BIO_puts() is supported but BIO_gets() is not. If the close flag is set then close() is called on the underlying file descriptor when the BIO is freed. BIO_reset() attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file such as by using B. BIO_seek() sets the file pointer to position B from start of file such as by using B. BIO_tell() returns the current file position such as by calling B. BIO_set_fd() sets the file descriptor of BIO B to B and the close flag to B. BIO_get_fd() places the file descriptor in B if it is not NULL, it also returns the file descriptor. BIO_new_fd() returns a file descriptor BIO using B and B. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of BIO_read() and BIO_write() depends on the behavior of the platforms read() and write() calls on the descriptor. If the underlying file descriptor is in a non blocking mode then the BIO will behave in the manner described in the L and L manual pages. File descriptor BIOs should not be used for socket I/O. Use socket BIOs instead. BIO_set_fd() and BIO_get_fd() are implemented as macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method. BIO_set_fd() always returns 1. BIO_get_fd() returns the file descriptor or -1 if the BIO has not been initialized. BIO_new_fd() returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL is an error occurred. =head1 EXAMPLE This is a file descriptor BIO version of "Hello World": BIO *out; out = BIO_new_fd(fileno(stdout), BIO_NOCLOSE); BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n"); BIO_free(out); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDR.pod0000644000000000000000000001163413176625660016056 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_ADDR, BIO_ADDR_new, BIO_ADDR_clear, BIO_ADDR_free, BIO_ADDR_rawmake, BIO_ADDR_family, BIO_ADDR_rawaddress, BIO_ADDR_rawport, BIO_ADDR_hostname_string, BIO_ADDR_service_string, BIO_ADDR_path_string - BIO_ADDR routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #include typedef union bio_addr_st BIO_ADDR; BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDR_new(void); void BIO_ADDR_free(BIO_ADDR *); void BIO_ADDR_clear(BIO_ADDR *ap); int BIO_ADDR_rawmake(BIO_ADDR *ap, int family, const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port); int BIO_ADDR_family(const BIO_ADDR *ap); int BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(const BIO_ADDR *ap, void *p, size_t *l); unsigned short BIO_ADDR_rawport(const BIO_ADDR *ap); char *BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric); char *BIO_ADDR_service_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric); char *BIO_ADDR_path_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a wrapper around all types of socket addresses that OpenSSL deals with, currently transparently supporting AF_INET, AF_INET6 and AF_UNIX according to what's available on the platform at hand. BIO_ADDR_new() creates a new unfilled B, to be used with routines that will fill it with information, such as BIO_accept_ex(). BIO_ADDR_free() frees a B created with BIO_ADDR_new(). BIO_ADDR_clear() clears any data held within the provided B and sets it back to an uninitialised state. BIO_ADDR_rawmake() takes a protocol B, an byte array of size B with an address in network byte order pointed at by B and a port number in network byte order in B (except for the B protocol family, where B is meaningless and therefore ignored) and populates the given B with them. In case this creates a B B, B is expected to be the length of the path string (not including the terminating NUL, such as the result of a call to strlen()). I below>. BIO_ADDR_family() returns the protocol family of the given B. The possible non-error results are one of the constants AF_INET, AF_INET6 and AF_UNIX. It will also return AF_UNSPEC if the BIO_ADDR has not been initialised. BIO_ADDR_rawaddress() will write the raw address of the given B in the area pointed at by B

if B

is non-NULL, and will set B<*l> to be the amount of bytes the raw address takes up if B is non-NULL. A technique to only find out the size of the address is a call with B

set to B. The raw address will be in network byte order, most significant byte first. In case this is a B B, B gets the length of the path string (not including the terminating NUL, such as the result of a call to strlen()). I below>. BIO_ADDR_rawport() returns the raw port of the given B. The raw port will be in network byte order. BIO_ADDR_hostname_string() returns a character string with the hostname of the given B. If B is 1, the string will contain the numerical form of the address. This only works for B of the protocol families AF_INET and AF_INET6. The returned string has been allocated on the heap and must be freed with OPENSSL_free(). BIO_ADDR_service_string() returns a character string with the service name of the port of the given B. If B is 1, the string will contain the port number. This only works for B of the protocol families AF_INET and AF_INET6. The returned string has been allocated on the heap and must be freed with OPENSSL_free(). BIO_ADDR_path_string() returns a character string with the path of the given B. This only works for B of the protocol family AF_UNIX. The returned string has been allocated on the heap and must be freed with OPENSSL_free(). =head1 RAW ADDRESSES Both BIO_ADDR_rawmake() and BIO_ADDR_rawaddress() take a pointer to a network byte order address of a specific site. Internally, those are treated as a pointer to B (for B), B (for B) or B (for B), all depending on the protocol family the address is for. =head1 RETURN VALUES The string producing functions BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(), BIO_ADDR_service_string() and BIO_ADDR_path_string() will return B on error and leave an error indication on the OpenSSL error stack. All other functions described here return 0 or B when the information they should return isn't available. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod0000644000000000000000000000305213176625660017010 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_add_word, BN_sub_word, BN_mul_word, BN_div_word, BN_mod_word - arithmetic functions on BIGNUMs with integers =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions perform arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs with unsigned integers. They are much more efficient than the normal BIGNUM arithmetic operations. BN_add_word() adds B to B (C). BN_sub_word() subtracts B from B (C). BN_mul_word() multiplies B and B (C). BN_div_word() divides B by B (C) and returns the remainder. BN_mod_word() returns the remainder of B divided by B (C). For BN_div_word() and BN_mod_word(), B must not be 0. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_add_word(), BN_sub_word() and BN_mul_word() return 1 for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. BN_mod_word() and BN_div_word() return B%B on success and B<(BN_ULONG)-1> if an error occurred. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod0000644000000000000000000006735413176625660017647 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free, EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, EVP_DecryptInit_ex, EVP_DecryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptFinal_ex, EVP_CipherInit_ex, EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_CipherFinal_ex, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl, EVP_EncryptInit, EVP_EncryptFinal, EVP_DecryptInit, EVP_DecryptFinal, EVP_CipherInit, EVP_CipherFinal, EVP_get_cipherbyname, EVP_get_cipherbynid, EVP_get_cipherbyobj, EVP_CIPHER_nid, EVP_CIPHER_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_flags, EVP_CIPHER_mode, EVP_CIPHER_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode, EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding, EVP_enc_null, EVP_des_cbc, EVP_des_ecb, EVP_des_cfb, EVP_des_ofb, EVP_des_ede_cbc, EVP_des_ede, EVP_des_ede_ofb, EVP_des_ede_cfb, EVP_des_ede3_cbc, EVP_des_ede3, EVP_des_ede3_ofb, EVP_des_ede3_cfb, EVP_desx_cbc, EVP_rc4, EVP_rc4_40, EVP_rc4_hmac_md5, EVP_idea_cbc, EVP_idea_ecb, EVP_idea_cfb, EVP_idea_ofb, EVP_rc2_cbc, EVP_rc2_ecb, EVP_rc2_cfb, EVP_rc2_ofb, EVP_rc2_40_cbc, EVP_rc2_64_cbc, EVP_bf_cbc, EVP_bf_ecb, EVP_bf_cfb, EVP_bf_ofb, EVP_cast5_cbc, EVP_cast5_ecb, EVP_cast5_cfb, EVP_cast5_ofb, EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc, EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb, EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb, EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb, EVP_aes_128_cbc, EVP_aes_128_ecb, EVP_aes_128_cfb, EVP_aes_128_ofb, EVP_aes_192_cbc, EVP_aes_192_ecb, EVP_aes_192_cfb, EVP_aes_192_ofb, EVP_aes_256_cbc, EVP_aes_256_ecb, EVP_aes_256_cfb, EVP_aes_256_ofb, EVP_aes_128_gcm, EVP_aes_192_gcm, EVP_aes_256_gcm, EVP_aes_128_ccm, EVP_aes_192_ccm, EVP_aes_256_ccm, EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1, EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256, EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256, EVP_chacha20, EVP_chacha20_poly1305 - EVP cipher routines =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment generic #include EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc); int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc); int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int padding); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbynid(int nid); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyobj(const ASN1_OBJECT *a); int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e) int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e); unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *e); unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_mode(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP cipher routines are a high level interface to certain symmetric ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() creates a cipher context. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() clears all information from a cipher context and free up any allocated memory associate with it, including B itself. This function should be called after all operations using a cipher are complete so sensitive information does not remain in memory. EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B for encryption with cipher B from ENGINE B. B must be created before calling this function. B is normally supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). If B is NULL then the default implementation is used. B is the symmetric key to use and B is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set all parameters to NULL except B in an initial call and supply the remaining parameters in subsequent calls, all of which have B set to NULL. This is done when the default cipher parameters are not appropriate. EVP_EncryptUpdate() encrypts B bytes from the buffer B and writes the encrypted version to B. This function can be called multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data: as a result the amount of data written may be anything from zero bytes to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B should contain sufficient room. The actual number of bytes written is placed in B. It also checks if B and B are partially overlapping, and if they are 0 is returned to indicate failure. If padding is enabled (the default) then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() encrypts the "final" data, that is any data that remains in a partial block. It uses standard block padding (aka PKCS padding) as described in the NOTES section, below. The encrypted final data is written to B which should have sufficient space for one cipher block. The number of bytes written is placed in B. After this function is called the encryption operation is finished and no further calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate() should be made. If padding is disabled then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() will not encrypt any more data and it will return an error if any data remains in a partial block: that is if the total data length is not a multiple of the block size. EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() are the corresponding decryption operations. EVP_DecryptFinal() will return an error code if padding is enabled and the final block is not correctly formatted. The parameters and restrictions are identical to the encryption operations except that if padding is enabled the decrypted data buffer B passed to EVP_DecryptUpdate() should have sufficient room for (B + cipher_block_size) bytes unless the cipher block size is 1 in which case B bytes is sufficient. EVP_CipherInit_ex(), EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() are functions that can be used for decryption or encryption. The operation performed depends on the value of the B parameter. It should be set to 1 for encryption, 0 for decryption and -1 to leave the value unchanged (the actual value of 'enc' being supplied in a previous call). EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() clears all information from a cipher context and free up any allocated memory associate with it, except the B itself. This function should be called anytime B is to be reused for another EVP_CipherInit() / EVP_CipherUpdate() / EVP_CipherFinal() series of calls. EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit() and EVP_CipherInit() behave in a similar way to EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and EVP_CipherInit_ex() except the B parameter does not need to be initialized and they always use the default cipher implementation. EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and EVP_CipherFinal() are identical to EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex(). In previous releases they also cleaned up the B, but this is no longer done and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clean() must be called to free any context resources. EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() return an EVP_CIPHER structure when passed a cipher name, a NID or an ASN1_OBJECT structure. EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return the NID of a cipher when passed an B or B structure. The actual NID value is an internal value which may not have a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() enables or disables padding. This function should be called after the context is set up for encryption or decryption with EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex() or EVP_CipherInit_ex(). By default encryption operations are padded using standard block padding and the padding is checked and removed when decrypting. If the B parameter is zero then no padding is performed, the total amount of data encrypted or decrypted must then be a multiple of the block size or an error will occur. EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key length of a cipher when passed an B or B structure. The constant B is the maximum key length for all ciphers. Note: although EVP_CIPHER_key_length() is fixed for a given cipher, the value of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() may be different for variable key length ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() sets the key length of the cipher ctx. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then attempting to set the key length to any value other than the fixed value is an error. EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV length of a cipher when passed an B or B. It will return zero if the cipher does not use an IV. The constant B is the maximum IV length for all ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block size of a cipher when passed an B or B structure. The constant B is also the maximum block length for all ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the type of the passed cipher or context. This "type" is the actual NID of the cipher OBJECT IDENTIFIER as such it ignores the cipher parameters and 40 bit RC2 and 128 bit RC2 have the same NID. If the cipher does not have an object identifier or does not have ASN1 support this function will return B. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns the B structure when passed an B structure. EVP_CIPHER_mode() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode() return the block cipher mode: EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE or EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE. If the cipher is a stream cipher then EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER is returned. EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() sets the AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter" based on the passed cipher. This will typically include any parameters and an IV. The cipher IV (if any) must be set when this call is made. This call should be made before the cipher is actually "used" (before any EVP_EncryptUpdate(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() calls for example). This function may fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support. EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() sets the cipher parameters based on an ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter". The precise effect depends on the cipher In the case of RC2, for example, it will set the IV and effective key length. This function should be called after the base cipher type is set but before the key is set. For example EVP_CipherInit() will be called with the IV and key set to NULL, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() will be called and finally EVP_CipherInit() again with all parameters except the key set to NULL. It is possible for this function to fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support or the parameters cannot be set (for example the RC2 effective key length is not supported. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() allows various cipher specific parameters to be determined and set. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() returns a pointer to a newly created B for success and B for failure. EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and EVP_DecryptUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success. EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_CipherFinal_ex() returns 0 for a decryption failure or 1 for success. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() return an B structure or NULL on error. EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return a NID. EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block size. EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key length. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() always returns 1. EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV length or zero if the cipher does not use an IV. EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the NID of the cipher's OBJECT IDENTIFIER or NID_undef if it has no defined OBJECT IDENTIFIER. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns an B structure. EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() and EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() return greater than zero for success and zero or a negative number. =head1 CIPHER LISTING All algorithms have a fixed key length unless otherwise stated. =over 4 =item EVP_enc_null() Null cipher: does nothing. =item EVP_aes_128_cbc(), EVP_aes_128_ecb(), EVP_aes_128_cfb(), EVP_aes_128_ofb() AES with a 128-bit key in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. =item EVP_aes_192_cbc(), EVP_aes_192_ecb(), EVP_aes_192_cfb(), EVP_aes_192_ofb() AES with a 192-bit key in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. =item EVP_aes_256_cbc(), EVP_aes_256_ecb(), EVP_aes_256_cfb(), EVP_aes_256_ofb() AES with a 256-bit key in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. =item EVP_des_cbc(), EVP_des_ecb(), EVP_des_cfb(), EVP_des_ofb() DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. =item EVP_des_ede_cbc(), EVP_des_ede(), EVP_des_ede_ofb(), EVP_des_ede_cfb() Two key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. =item EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), EVP_des_ede3(), EVP_des_ede3_ofb(), EVP_des_ede3_cfb() Three key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. =item EVP_desx_cbc() DESX algorithm in CBC mode. =item EVP_rc4() RC4 stream cipher. This is a variable key length cipher with default key length 128 bits. =item EVP_rc4_40() RC4 stream cipher with 40 bit key length. This is obsolete and new code should use EVP_rc4() and the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function. =item EVP_idea_cbc() EVP_idea_ecb(), EVP_idea_cfb(), EVP_idea_ofb() IDEA encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. =item EVP_rc2_cbc(), EVP_rc2_ecb(), EVP_rc2_cfb(), EVP_rc2_ofb() RC2 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher with an additional parameter called "effective key bits" or "effective key length". By default both are set to 128 bits. =item EVP_rc2_40_cbc(), EVP_rc2_64_cbc() RC2 algorithm in CBC mode with a default key length and effective key length of 40 and 64 bits. These are obsolete and new code should use EVP_rc2_cbc(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() to set the key length and effective key length. =item EVP_bf_cbc(), EVP_bf_ecb(), EVP_bf_cfb(), EVP_bf_ofb() Blowfish encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher. =item EVP_cast5_cbc(), EVP_cast5_ecb(), EVP_cast5_cfb(), EVP_cast5_ofb() CAST encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher. =item EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc(), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb(), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb() RC5 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher with an additional "number of rounds" parameter. By default the key length is set to 128 bits and 12 rounds. =item EVP_aes_128_gcm(), EVP_aes_192_gcm(), EVP_aes_256_gcm() AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively. These ciphers require additional control operations to function correctly: see the L section below for details. =item EVP_aes_128_ocb(void), EVP_aes_192_ocb(void), EVP_aes_256_ocb(void) Offset Codebook Mode (OCB) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively. These ciphers require additional control operations to function correctly: see the L section below for details. =item EVP_aes_128_ccm(), EVP_aes_192_ccm(), EVP_aes_256_ccm() AES Counter with CBC-MAC Mode (CCM) for 128, 192 and 256 bit keys respectively. These ciphers require additional control operations to function correctly: see CCM mode section below for details. =item EVP_chacha20() The ChaCha20 stream cipher. The key length is 256 bits, the IV is 96 bits long. =item EVP_chacha20_poly1305() Authenticated encryption with ChaCha20-Poly1305. Like EVP_chacha20() the key is 256 bits and the IV is 96 bits. This supports additional authenticated data (AAD) and produces a 128 bit authentication tag. See the L section for more information. =back =head1 GCM and OCB Modes For GCM and OCB mode ciphers the behaviour of the EVP interface is subtly altered and several additional ctrl operations are supported. To specify any additional authenticated data (AAD) a call to EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() or EVP_DecryptUpdate() should be made with the output parameter B set to B. When decrypting the return value of EVP_DecryptFinal() or EVP_CipherFinal() indicates if the operation was successful. If it does not indicate success the authentication operation has failed and any output data B be used as it is corrupted. The following ctrls are supported in both GCM and OCB modes: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL); Sets the IV length: this call can only be made before specifying an IV. If not called a default IV length is used. For GCM AES and OCB AES the default is 12 (i.e. 96 bits). For OCB mode the maximum is 15. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, tag); Writes B bytes of the tag value to the buffer indicated by B. This call can only be made when encrypting data and B all data has been processed (e.g. after an EVP_EncryptFinal() call). For OCB mode the taglen must either be 16 or the value previously set via EVP_CTRL_OCB_SET_TAGLEN. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, tag); Sets the expected tag to B bytes from B. This call is only legal when decrypting data. For OCB mode the taglen must either be 16 or the value previously set via EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG. In OCB mode calling this with B set to NULL sets the tag length. The tag length can only be set before specifying an IV. If not called a default tag length is used. For OCB AES the default is 16 (i.e. 128 bits). This is also the maximum tag length for OCB. =head1 CCM Mode The behaviour of CCM mode ciphers is similar to GCM mode but with a few additional requirements and different ctrl values. Like GCM and OCB modes any additional authenticated data (AAD) is passed by calling EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() or EVP_DecryptUpdate() with the output parameter B set to B. Additionally the total plaintext or ciphertext length B be passed to EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() or EVP_DecryptUpdate() with the output and input parameters (B and B) set to B and the length passed in the B parameter. The following ctrls are supported in CCM mode: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, tag); This call is made to set the expected B tag value when decrypting or the length of the tag (with the B parameter set to NULL) when encrypting. The tag length is often referred to as B. If not set a default value is used (12 for AES). EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L, ivlen, NULL); Sets the CCM B value. If not set a default is used (8 for AES). EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL); Sets the CCM nonce (IV) length: this call can only be made before specifying an nonce value. The nonce length is given by B<15 - L> so it is 7 by default for AES. =head1 NOTES Where possible the B interface to symmetric ciphers should be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the cipher used and much more flexible. Additionally, the B interface will ensure the use of platform specific cryptographic acceleration such as AES-NI (the low level interfaces do not provide the guarantee). PKCS padding works by adding B padding bytes of value B to make the total length of the encrypted data a multiple of the block size. Padding is always added so if the data is already a multiple of the block size B will equal the block size. For example if the block size is 8 and 11 bytes are to be encrypted then 5 padding bytes of value 5 will be added. When decrypting the final block is checked to see if it has the correct form. Although the decryption operation can produce an error if padding is enabled, it is not a strong test that the input data or key is correct. A random block has better than 1 in 256 chance of being of the correct format and problems with the input data earlier on will not produce a final decrypt error. If padding is disabled then the decryption operation will always succeed if the total amount of data decrypted is a multiple of the block size. The functions EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptInit(), EVP_CipherInit() and EVP_CipherFinal() are obsolete but are retained for compatibility with existing code. New code should use EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() because they can reuse an existing context without allocating and freeing it up on each call. EVP_get_cipherbynid(), and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() are implemented as macros. =head1 BUGS For RC5 the number of rounds can currently only be set to 8, 12 or 16. This is a limitation of the current RC5 code rather than the EVP interface. EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH and EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH only refer to the internal ciphers with default key lengths. If custom ciphers exceed these values the results are unpredictable. This is because it has become standard practice to define a generic key as a fixed unsigned char array containing EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH bytes. The ASN1 code is incomplete (and sometimes inaccurate) it has only been tested for certain common S/MIME ciphers (RC2, DES, triple DES) in CBC mode. =head1 EXAMPLES Encrypt a string using IDEA: int do_crypt(char *outfile) { unsigned char outbuf[1024]; int outlen, tmplen; /* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from * another source. */ unsigned char key[] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}; unsigned char iv[] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}; char intext[] = "Some Crypto Text"; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; FILE *out; ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_idea_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, intext, strlen(intext))) { /* Error */ return 0; } /* Buffer passed to EVP_EncryptFinal() must be after data just * encrypted to avoid overwriting it. */ if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen, &tmplen)) { /* Error */ return 0; } outlen += tmplen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); /* Need binary mode for fopen because encrypted data is * binary data. Also cannot use strlen() on it because * it won't be null terminated and may contain embedded * nulls. */ out = fopen(outfile, "wb"); fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out); fclose(out); return 1; } The ciphertext from the above example can be decrypted using the B utility with the command line (shown on two lines for clarity): openssl idea -d =head1 HISTORY Support for OCB mode was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0 B was made opaque in OpenSSL 1.1.0. As a result, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() appeared and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() disappeared. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() remains as an alias for EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.pod0000644000000000000000000001365113176625660021216 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_get0_RecipientInfos, CMS_RecipientInfo_type, CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id, CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp, CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey, CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id, CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp, CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key, CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt, CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt - CMS envelopedData RecipientInfo routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_RecipientInfo_type(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno); int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert); int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate, ASN1_OBJECT **potherid, ASN1_TYPE **pothertype); int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen); int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function CMS_get0_RecipientInfos() returns all the CMS_RecipientInfo structures associated with a CMS EnvelopedData structure. CMS_RecipientInfo_type() returns the type of CMS_RecipientInfo structure B. It will currently return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS, CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE, CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK, CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS, or CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER. CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id() retrieves the certificate recipient identifier associated with a specific CMS_RecipientInfo structure B, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS. Either the keyidentifier will be set in B or B issuer name and serial number in B and B. CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp() compares the certificate B against the CMS_RecipientInfo structure B, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS. It returns zero if the comparison is successful and non zero if not. CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey() associates the private key B with the CMS_RecipientInfo structure B, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS. CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id() retrieves the key information from the CMS_RecipientInfo structure B which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK. Any of the remaining parameters can be NULL if the application is not interested in the value of a field. Where a field is optional and absent NULL will be written to the corresponding parameter. The keyEncryptionAlgorithm field is written to B, the B field is written to B, the B field if present is written to B, if the B field is present the components B and B are written to parameters B and B. CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp() compares the ID in the B and B parameters against the B CMS_RecipientInfo structure B, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK. It returns zero if the comparison is successful and non zero if not. CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() associates the symmetric key B of length B with the CMS_RecipientInfo structure B, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK. CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() attempts to decrypt CMS_RecipientInfo structure B in structure B. A key must have been associated with the structure first. CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() attempts to encrypt CMS_RecipientInfo structure B in structure B. A key must have been associated with the structure first and the content encryption key must be available: for example by a previous call to CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(). =head1 NOTES The main purpose of these functions is to enable an application to lookup recipient keys using any appropriate technique when the simpler method of CMS_decrypt() is not appropriate. In typical usage and application will retrieve all CMS_RecipientInfo structures using CMS_get0_RecipientInfos() and check the type of each using CMS_RecpientInfo_type(). Depending on the type the CMS_RecipientInfo structure can be ignored or its key identifier data retrieved using an appropriate function. Then if the corresponding secret or private key can be obtained by any appropriate means it can then associated with the structure and CMS_RecpientInfo_decrypt() called. If successful CMS_decrypt() can be called with a NULL key to decrypt the enveloped content. The CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() can be used to add a new recipient to an existing enveloped data structure. Typically an application will first decrypt an appropriate CMS_RecipientInfo structure to make the content encrypt key available, it will then add a new recipient using a function such as CMS_add1_recipient_cert() and finally encrypt the content encryption key using CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(). =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_get0_RecipientInfos() returns all CMS_RecipientInfo structures, or NULL if an error occurs. CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(), CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(), CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(), CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() and CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurs. CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurs. CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp() and CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_cmp() return 0 for a successful comparison and non zero otherwise. Any error can be obtained from L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000356413176625660017527 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_CTX_new, EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id, EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup, EVP_PKEY_CTX_free - public key algorithm context functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e); EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(int id, ENGINE *e); EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_CTX_new() function allocates public key algorithm context using the algorithm specified in B and ENGINE B. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id() function allocates public key algorithm context using the algorithm specified by B and ENGINE B. It is normally used when no B structure is associated with the operations, for example during parameter generation of key generation for some algorithms. EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup() duplicates the context B. EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() frees up the context B. If B is NULL, nothing is done. =head1 NOTES The B structure is an opaque public key algorithm context used by the OpenSSL high level public key API. Contexts B be shared between threads: that is it is not permissible to use the same context simultaneously in two threads. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(), EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup() returns either the newly allocated B structure of B if an error occurred. EVP_PKEY_CTX_free() does not return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod0000644000000000000000000000577313176625660017530 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_verify_init, EVP_PKEY_verify - signature verification using a public key algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_verify_init() function initializes a public key algorithm context using key B for a signature verification operation. The EVP_PKEY_verify() function performs a public key verification operation using B. The signature is specified using the B and B parameters. The verified data (i.e. the data believed originally signed) is specified using the B and B parameters. =head1 NOTES After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_init() algorithm specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operation. The function EVP_PKEY_verify() can be called more than once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_verify_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify() return 1 if the verification was successful and 0 if it failed. Unlike other functions the return value 0 from EVP_PKEY_verify() only indicates that the signature did not not verify successfully (that is tbs did not match the original data or the signature was of invalid form) it is not an indication of a more serious error. A negative value indicates an error other that signature verification failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLE Verify signature using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest: #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; unsigned char *md, *sig; size_t mdlen, siglen; EVP_PKEY *verify_key; /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig, siglen md and mdlen are already set up * and that verify_key is an RSA public key */ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Perform operation */ ret = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen); /* ret == 1 indicates success, 0 verify failure and < 0 for some * other error. */ =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.pod0000644000000000000000000002273313176625660016454 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_do_handshake, BIO_f_ssl, BIO_set_ssl, BIO_get_ssl, BIO_set_ssl_mode, BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes, BIO_get_num_renegotiates, BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout, BIO_new_ssl, BIO_new_ssl_connect, BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect, BIO_ssl_copy_session_id, BIO_ssl_shutdown - SSL BIO =for comment multiple includes =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); long BIO_set_ssl(BIO *b, SSL *ssl, long c); long BIO_get_ssl(BIO *b, SSL **sslp); long BIO_set_ssl_mode(BIO *b, long client); long BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(BIO *b, long num); long BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(BIO *b, long seconds); long BIO_get_num_renegotiates(BIO *b); BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client); BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from); void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *bio); long BIO_do_handshake(BIO *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_ssl() returns the SSL BIO method. This is a filter BIO which is a wrapper round the OpenSSL SSL routines adding a BIO "flavour" to SSL I/O. I/O performed on an SSL BIO communicates using the SSL protocol with the SSLs read and write BIOs. If an SSL connection is not established then an attempt is made to establish one on the first I/O call. If a BIO is appended to an SSL BIO using BIO_push() it is automatically used as the SSL BIOs read and write BIOs. Calling BIO_reset() on an SSL BIO closes down any current SSL connection by calling SSL_shutdown(). BIO_reset() is then sent to the next BIO in the chain: this will typically disconnect the underlying transport. The SSL BIO is then reset to the initial accept or connect state. If the close flag is set when an SSL BIO is freed then the internal SSL structure is also freed using SSL_free(). BIO_set_ssl() sets the internal SSL pointer of BIO B to B using the close flag B. BIO_get_ssl() retrieves the SSL pointer of BIO B, it can then be manipulated using the standard SSL library functions. BIO_set_ssl_mode() sets the SSL BIO mode to B. If B is 1 client mode is set. If B is 0 server mode is set. BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes() sets the renegotiate byte count to B. When set after every B bytes of I/O (read and write) the SSL session is automatically renegotiated. B must be at least 512 bytes. BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout() sets the renegotiate timeout to B. When the renegotiate timeout elapses the session is automatically renegotiated. BIO_get_num_renegotiates() returns the total number of session renegotiations due to I/O or timeout. BIO_new_ssl() allocates an SSL BIO using SSL_CTX B and using client mode if B is non zero. BIO_new_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting of an SSL BIO (using B) followed by a connect BIO. BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting of a buffering BIO, an SSL BIO (using B) and a connect BIO. BIO_ssl_copy_session_id() copies an SSL session id between BIO chains B and B. It does this by locating the SSL BIOs in each chain and calling SSL_copy_session_id() on the internal SSL pointer. BIO_ssl_shutdown() closes down an SSL connection on BIO chain B. It does this by locating the SSL BIO in the chain and calling SSL_shutdown() on its internal SSL pointer. BIO_do_handshake() attempts to complete an SSL handshake on the supplied BIO and establish the SSL connection. It returns 1 if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative value is returned if the connection could not be established, the call BIO_should_retry() should be used for non blocking connect BIOs to determine if the call should be retried. If an SSL connection has already been established this call has no effect. =head1 NOTES SSL BIOs are exceptional in that if the underlying transport is non blocking they can still request a retry in exceptional circumstances. Specifically this will happen if a session renegotiation takes place during a BIO_read() operation, one case where this happens is when step up occurs. The SSL flag SSL_AUTO_RETRY can be set to disable this behaviour. That is when this flag is set an SSL BIO using a blocking transport will never request a retry. Since unknown BIO_ctrl() operations are sent through filter BIOs the servers name and port can be set using BIO_set_host() on the BIO returned by BIO_new_ssl_connect() without having to locate the connect BIO first. Applications do not have to call BIO_do_handshake() but may wish to do so to separate the handshake process from other I/O processing. BIO_set_ssl(), BIO_get_ssl(), BIO_set_ssl_mode(), BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(), BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(), BIO_get_num_renegotiates(), and BIO_do_handshake() are implemented as macros. =head1 EXAMPLE This SSL/TLS client example, attempts to retrieve a page from an SSL/TLS web server. The I/O routines are identical to those of the unencrypted example in L. BIO *sbio, *out; int len; char tmpbuf[1024]; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; /* XXX Seed the PRNG if needed. */ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); /* XXX Set verify paths and mode here. */ sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx); BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); if (ssl == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* Don't want any retries */ SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); /* XXX We might want to do other things with ssl here */ /* An empty host part means the loopback address */ BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, ":https"); out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* XXX Could examine ssl here to get connection info */ BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n"); for ( ; ; ) { len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); if (len <= 0) break; BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); } BIO_free_all(sbio); BIO_free(out); Here is a simple server example. It makes use of a buffering BIO to allow lines to be read from the SSL BIO using BIO_gets. It creates a pseudo web page containing the actual request from a client and also echoes the request to standard output. BIO *sbio, *bbio, *acpt, *out; int len; char tmpbuf[1024]; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; /* XXX Seed the PRNG if needed. */ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) || !SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up SSL_CTX\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* XXX Other things like set verify locations, EDH temp callbacks. */ /* New SSL BIO setup as server */ sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0); BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); if (ssl == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); sbio = BIO_push(bbio, sbio); acpt = BIO_new_accept("4433"); /* * By doing this when a new connection is established * we automatically have sbio inserted into it. The * BIO chain is now 'swallowed' by the accept BIO and * will be freed when the accept BIO is freed. */ BIO_set_accept_bios(acpt, sbio); out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* Setup accept BIO */ if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept BIO\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error in connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* We only want one connection so remove and free accept BIO */ sbio = BIO_pop(acpt); BIO_free_all(acpt); if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error in SSL handshake\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } BIO_puts(sbio, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"); BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\nConnection Established\r\nRequest headers:\r\n"); BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n"); for ( ; ; ) { len = BIO_gets(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); if (len <= 0) break; BIO_write(sbio, tmpbuf, len); BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); /* Look for blank line signifying end of headers*/ if (tmpbuf[0] == '\r' || tmpbuf[0] == '\n') break; } BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n"); BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\n"); BIO_flush(sbio); BIO_free_all(sbio); =head1 BUGS In OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0 the BIO_pop() call was handled incorrectly, the I/O BIO reference count was incorrectly incremented (instead of decremented) and dissociated with the SSL BIO even if the SSL BIO was not explicitly being popped (e.g. a pop higher up the chain). Applications which included workarounds for this bug (e.g. freeing BIOs more than once) should be modified to handle this fix or they may free up an already freed BIO. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_load_crypto_strings.pod0000644000000000000000000000310713176625660021447 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_load_crypto_strings, SSL_load_error_strings, ERR_free_strings - load and free error strings =head1 SYNOPSIS Deprecated: #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void); void ERR_free_strings(void); #endif #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void SSL_load_error_strings(void); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION All of the following functions are deprecated from OpenSSL 1.1.0. No explicit initialisation or de-initialisation is necessary. See L and L. ERR_load_crypto_strings() registers the error strings for all B functions. SSL_load_error_strings() does the same, but also registers the B error strings. In versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 ERR_free_strings() freed all previously loaded error strings. However from OpenSSL 1.1.0 it does nothing. =head1 RETURN VALUES ERR_load_crypto_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings() and ERR_free_strings() return no values. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY The ERR_load_crypto_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings(), and ERR_free_strings() functions were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_crypto() and OPENSSL_init_ssl(). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod0000644000000000000000000000203013176625660017442 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_Applink - glue between OpenSSL BIO and Win32 compiler run-time =head1 SYNOPSIS __declspec(dllexport) void **OPENSSL_Applink(); =head1 DESCRIPTION OPENSSL_Applink is application-side interface which provides a glue between OpenSSL BIO layer and Win32 compiler run-time environment. Even though it appears at application side, it's essentially OpenSSL private interface. For this reason application developers are not expected to implement it, but to compile provided module with compiler of their choice and link it into the target application. The referred module is available as F, located alongside the public header files (only on the platforms where applicable). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RAND_load_file.pod0000644000000000000000000000372113176625660017373 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RAND_load_file, RAND_write_file, RAND_file_name - PRNG seed file =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t num); int RAND_load_file(const char *filename, long max_bytes); int RAND_write_file(const char *filename); =head1 DESCRIPTION RAND_file_name() generates a default path for the random seed file. B points to a buffer of size B in which to store the filename. On all systems, if the environment variable B is set, its value will be used as the seed file name. Otherwise, the file is called ".rnd", found in platform dependent locations: =over 4 =item On Windows (in order of preference) %HOME%, %USERPROFILE%, %SYSTEMROOT%, C:\ =item On VMS SYS$LOGIN: =item On all other systems $HOME =back If C<$HOME> (on non-Windows and non-VMS system) is not set either, or B is too small for the path name, an error occurs. RAND_load_file() reads a number of bytes from file B and adds them to the PRNG. If B is non-negative, up to B are read; if B is -1, the complete file is read. RAND_write_file() writes a number of random bytes (currently 1024) to file B which can be used to initialize the PRNG by calling RAND_load_file() in a later session. =head1 RETURN VALUES RAND_load_file() returns the number of bytes read or -1 on error. RAND_write_file() returns the number of bytes written, and -1 if the bytes written were generated without appropriate seed. RAND_file_name() returns a pointer to B on success, and NULL on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000274613176625660017151 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_STORE_new, X509_STORE_up_ref, X509_STORE_free, X509_STORE_lock, X509_STORE_unlock - X509_STORE allocation, freeing and locking functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void); void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *v); int X509_STORE_lock(X509_STORE *v); int X509_STORE_unlock(X509_STORE *v); int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE *v); =head1 DESCRIPTION The X509_STORE_new() function returns a new X509_STORE. X509_STORE_up_ref() increments the reference count associated with the X509_STORE object. X509_STORE_lock() locks the store from modification by other threads, X509_STORE_unlock() locks it. X509_STORE_free() frees up a single X509_STORE object. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_STORE_new() returns a newly created X509_STORE or NULL if the call fails. X509_STORE_up_ref(), X509_STORE_lock() and X509_STORE_unlock() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. X509_STORE_free() does not return values. =head1 SEE ALSO L L =head1 HISTORY The X509_STORE_up_ref(), X509_STORE_lock() and X509_STORE_unlock() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_VerifyInit.pod0000644000000000000000000000643313176625660017456 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_VerifyInit_ex, EVP_VerifyInit, EVP_VerifyUpdate, EVP_VerifyFinal - EVP signature verification functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_VerifyInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl); int EVP_VerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt); int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_VerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP signature verification routines are a high level interface to digital signatures. EVP_VerifyInit_ex() sets up verification context B to use digest B from ENGINE B. B must be created by calling EVP_MD_CTX_new() before calling this function. EVP_VerifyUpdate() hashes B bytes of data at B into the verification context B. This function can be called several times on the same B to include additional data. EVP_VerifyFinal() verifies the data in B using the public key B and against the B bytes at B. EVP_VerifyInit() initializes verification context B to use the default implementation of digest B. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_VerifyInit_ex() and EVP_VerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_VerifyFinal() returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for failure and -1 if some other error occurred. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 NOTES The B interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. Due to the link between message digests and public key algorithms the correct digest algorithm must be used with the correct public key type. A list of algorithms and associated public key algorithms appears in L. The call to EVP_VerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. This means that calls to EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can be called later to digest and verify additional data. Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak will occur. =head1 BUGS Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to EVP_VerifyUpdate() could not be made after calling EVP_VerifyFinal(). Since the public key is passed in the call to EVP_SignFinal() any error relating to the private key (for example an unsuitable key and digest combination) will not be indicated until after potentially large amounts of data have been passed through EVP_SignUpdate(). It is not possible to change the signing parameters using these function. The previous two bugs are fixed in the newer EVP_VerifyDigest*() function. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio.pod0000644000000000000000000000426513176625660021100 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp - PKCS#8 format private key functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); =head1 DESCRIPTION The PKCS#8 functions encode and decode private keys in PKCS#8 format using both PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption algorithms. Other than the use of DER as opposed to PEM these functions are identical to the corresponding B function as described in L. =head1 NOTES These functions are currently the only way to store encrypted private keys using DER format. Currently all the functions use BIOs or FILE pointers, there are no functions which work directly on memory: this can be readily worked around by converting the buffers to memory BIOs, see L for details. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_CRL_get0_by_serial.pod0000644000000000000000000000732513176625660020772 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_CRL_get0_by_serial, X509_CRL_get0_by_cert, X509_CRL_get_REVOKED, X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber, X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate, X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber, X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate, X509_CRL_add0_revoked, X509_CRL_sort - CRL revoked entry utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x); STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(X509_CRL *crl); const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(const X509_REVOKED *r); const ASN1_TIME *X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate(const X509_REVOKED *r); int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev); int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *crl); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_CRL_get0_by_serial() attempts to find a revoked entry in B for serial number B. If it is successful it sets B<*ret> to the internal pointer of the matching entry, as a result B<*ret> must not be freed up after the call. X509_CRL_get0_by_cert() is similar to X509_get0_by_serial() except it looks for a revoked entry using the serial number of certificate B. X509_CRL_get_REVOKED() returns an internal pointer to a stack of all revoked entries for B. X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber() returns an internal pointer to the serial number of B. X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate() returns an internal pointer to the revocation date of B. X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber() sets the serial number of B to B. The supplied B pointer is not used internally so it should be freed up after use. X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate() sets the revocation date of B to B. The supplied B pointer is not used internally so it should be freed up after use. X509_CRL_add0_revoked() appends revoked entry B to CRL B. The pointer B is used internally so it must not be freed up after the call: it is freed when the parent CRL is freed. X509_CRL_sort() sorts the revoked entries of B into ascending serial number order. =head1 NOTES Applications can determine the number of revoked entries returned by X509_CRL_get_revoked() using sk_X509_REVOKED_num() and examine each one in turn using sk_X509_REVOKED_value(). =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_CRL_get0_by_serial() and X509_CRL_get0_by_cert() return 0 for failure, 1 on success except if the revoked entry has the reason C (8), in which case 2 is returned. X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(), X509_CRL_add0_revoked() and X509_CRL_sort() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber() returns an B pointer. X509_REVOKED_get0_revocationDate() returns an B value. X509_CRL_get_REVOKED() returns a STACK of revoked entries. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_add1_recipient_cert.pod0000644000000000000000000000475713176625660021255 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_add1_recipient_cert, CMS_add0_recipient_key - add recipients to a CMS enveloped data structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *recip, unsigned int flags); CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *id, size_t idlen, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date, ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId, ASN1_TYPE *otherType); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_add1_recipient_cert() adds recipient B to CMS_ContentInfo enveloped data structure B as a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure. CMS_add0_recipient_key() adds symmetric key B of length B using wrapping algorithm B, identifier B of length B and optional values B, B and B to CMS_ContentInfo enveloped data structure B as a KEKRecipientInfo structure. The CMS_ContentInfo structure should be obtained from an initial call to CMS_encrypt() with the flag B set. =head1 NOTES The main purpose of this function is to provide finer control over a CMS enveloped data structure where the simpler CMS_encrypt() function defaults are not appropriate. For example if one or more KEKRecipientInfo structures need to be added. New attributes can also be added using the returned CMS_RecipientInfo structure and the CMS attribute utility functions. OpenSSL will by default identify recipient certificates using issuer name and serial number. If B is set it will use the subject key identifier value instead. An error occurs if all recipient certificates do not have a subject key identifier extension. Currently only AES based key wrapping algorithms are supported for B, specifically: NID_id_aes128_wrap, NID_id_aes192_wrap and NID_id_aes256_wrap. If B is set to B then an AES wrap algorithm will be used consistent with B. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_add1_recipient_cert() and CMS_add0_recipient_key() return an internal pointer to the CMS_RecipientInfo structure just added or NULL if an error occurs. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_get0_param.pod0000644000000000000000000000303513176625660020367 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_STORE_get0_param, X509_STORE_set1_param, X509_STORE_get0_objects - X509_STORE setter and getter functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *ctx); int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *pm); STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *X509_STORE_get0_objects(X509_STORE *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_STORE_set1_param() sets the verification parameters to B for B. X509_STORE_get0_param() retrieves an internal pointer to the verification parameters for B. The returned pointer must not be freed by the calling application X509_STORE_get0_objects() retrieve an internal pointer to the store's X509 object cache. The cache contains B and B objects. The returned pointer must not be freed by the calling application. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_STORE_get0_param() returns a pointer to an B structure. X509_STORE_set1_param() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. X509_STORE_get0_objects() returns a pointer to a stack of B. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY B and B were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EC_GFp_simple_method.pod0000644000000000000000000000576113176625660020613 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EC_GFp_simple_method, EC_GFp_mont_method, EC_GFp_nist_method, EC_GFp_nistp224_method, EC_GFp_nistp256_method, EC_GFp_nistp521_method, EC_GF2m_simple_method, EC_METHOD_get_field_type - Functions for obtaining EC_METHOD objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void); const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void); const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void); const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void); const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void); const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void); const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void); int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth); =head1 DESCRIPTION The Elliptic Curve library provides a number of different implementations through a single common interface. When constructing a curve using EC_GROUP_new (see L) an implementation method must be provided. The functions described here all return a const pointer to an B structure that can be passed to EC_GROUP_NEW. It is important that the correct implementation type for the form of curve selected is used. For F2^m curves there is only one implementation choice, i.e. EC_GF2_simple_method. For Fp curves the lowest common denominator implementation is the EC_GFp_simple_method implementation. All other implementations are based on this one. EC_GFp_mont_method builds on EC_GFp_simple_method but adds the use of montgomery multiplication (see L). EC_GFp_nist_method offers an implementation optimised for use with NIST recommended curves (NIST curves are available through EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name as described in L). The functions EC_GFp_nistp224_method, EC_GFp_nistp256_method and EC_GFp_nistp521_method offer 64 bit optimised implementations for the NIST P224, P256 and P521 curves respectively. Note, however, that these implementations are not available on all platforms. EC_METHOD_get_field_type identifies what type of field the EC_METHOD structure supports, which will be either F2^m or Fp. If the field type is Fp then the value B is returned. If the field type is F2^m then the value B is returned. These values are defined in the obj_mac.h header file. =head1 RETURN VALUES All EC_GFp* functions and EC_GF2m_simple_method always return a const pointer to an EC_METHOD structure. EC_METHOD_get_field_type returns an integer that identifies the type of field the EC_METHOD structure supports. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_get0_pqg.pod0000644000000000000000000001037113176625660017045 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_get0_pqg, DSA_set0_pqg, DSA_get0_key, DSA_set0_key, DSA_clear_flags, DSA_test_flags, DSA_set_flags, DSA_get0_engine - Routines for getting and setting data in a DSA object =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); void DSA_clear_flags(DSA *d, int flags); int DSA_test_flags(const DSA *d, int flags); void DSA_set_flags(DSA *d, int flags); ENGINE *DSA_get0_engine(DSA *d); =head1 DESCRIPTION A DSA object contains the parameters B

, B and B. It also contains a public key (B) and (optionally) a private key (B). The B

, B and B parameters can be obtained by calling DSA_get0_pqg(). If the parameters have not yet been set then B<*p>, B<*q> and B<*g> will be set to NULL. Otherwise they are set to pointers to their respective values. These point directly to the internal representations of the values and therefore should not be freed directly. The B

, B and B values can be set by calling DSA_set0_pqg() and passing the new values for B

, B and B as parameters to the function. Calling this function transfers the memory management of the values to the DSA object, and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly after this function has been called. To get the public and private key values use the DSA_get0_key() function. A pointer to the public key will be stored in B<*pub_key>, and a pointer to the private key will be stored in B<*priv_key>. Either may be NULL if they have not been set yet, although if the private key has been set then the public key must be. The values point to the internal representation of the public key and private key values. This memory should not be freed directly. The public and private key values can be set using DSA_set0_key(). The public key must be non-NULL the first time this function is called on a given DSA object. The private key may be NULL. On subsequent calls, either may be NULL, which means the corresponding DSA field is left untouched. As for DSA_set0_pqg() this function transfers the memory management of the key values to the DSA object, and therefore they should not be freed directly after this function has been called. DSA_set_flags() sets the flags in the B parameter on the DSA object. Multiple flags can be passed in one go (bitwise ORed together). Any flags that are already set are left set. DSA_test_flags() tests to see whether the flags passed in the B parameter are currently set in the DSA object. Multiple flags can be tested in one go. All flags that are currently set are returned, or zero if none of the flags are set. DSA_clear_flags() clears the specified flags within the DSA object. DSA_get0_engine() returns a handle to the ENGINE that has been set for this DSA object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set. =head1 NOTES Values retrieved with DSA_get0_key() are owned by the DSA object used in the call and may therefore I be passed to DSA_set0_key(). If needed, duplicate the received value using BN_dup() and pass the duplicate. The same applies to DSA_get0_pqg() and DSA_set0_pqg(). =head1 RETURN VALUES DSA_set0_pqg() and DSA_set0_key() return 1 on success or 0 on failure. DSA_test_flags() returns the current state of the flags in the DSA object. DSA_get0_engine() returns the ENGINE set for the DSA object or NULL if no ENGINE has been set. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001700313176625660017041 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ECDSA_SIG_get0, ECDSA_SIG_set0, ECDSA_SIG_new, ECDSA_SIG_free, i2d_ECDSA_SIG, d2i_ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_size, ECDSA_sign, ECDSA_do_sign, ECDSA_verify, ECDSA_do_verify, ECDSA_sign_setup, ECDSA_sign_ex, ECDSA_do_sign_ex - low level elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void); void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig); void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, unsigned char **pp); ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **sig, const unsigned char **pp, long len); int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY* eckey); ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp); int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); =head1 DESCRIPTION Note: these functions provide a low level interface to ECDSA. Most applications should use the higher level B interface such as L or L instead. B is an opaque structure consisting of two BIGNUMs for the B and B value of an ECDSA signature (see X9.62 or FIPS 186-2). ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates an empty B structure. Note: before OpenSSL 1.1.0 the: the B and B components were initialised. ECDSA_SIG_free() frees the B structure B. ECDSA_SIG_get0() returns internal pointers the B and B values contained in B. The B and B values can be set by calling ECDSA_SIG_set0() and passing the new values for B and B as parameters to the function. Calling this function transfers the memory management of the values to the ECDSA_SIG object, and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly after this function has been called. i2d_ECDSA_SIG() creates the DER encoding of the ECDSA signature B and writes the encoded signature to B<*pp> (note: if B is NULL i2d_ECDSA_SIG() returns the expected length in bytes of the DER encoded signature). i2d_ECDSA_SIG() returns the length of the DER encoded signature (or 0 on error). d2i_ECDSA_SIG() decodes a DER encoded ECDSA signature and returns the decoded signature in a newly allocated B structure. B<*sig> points to the buffer containing the DER encoded signature of size B. ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length of a DER encoded ECDSA signature created with the private EC key B. ECDSA_sign() computes a digital signature of the B bytes hash value B using the private EC key B. The DER encoded signatures is stored in B and its length is returned in B. Note: B must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory. The parameter B is currently ignored. ECDSA_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_sign_ex() with B and B set to NULL. ECDSA_do_sign() is similar to ECDSA_sign() except the signature is returned as a newly allocated B structure (or NULL on error). ECDSA_do_sign() is a wrapper function for ECDSA_do_sign_ex() with B and B set to NULL. ECDSA_verify() verifies that the signature in B of size B is a valid ECDSA signature of the hash value B of size B using the public key B. The parameter B is ignored. ECDSA_do_verify() is similar to ECDSA_verify() except the signature is presented in the form of a pointer to an B structure. The remaining functions utilise the internal B and B values used during signature computation. Most applications will never need to call these and some external ECDSA ENGINE implementations may not support them at all if either B or B is not B. ECDSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute parts of the signing operation. B is the private EC key and B is a pointer to B structure (or NULL). The precomputed values or returned in B and B and can be used in a later call to ECDSA_sign_ex() or ECDSA_do_sign_ex(). ECDSA_sign_ex() computes a digital signature of the B bytes hash value B using the private EC key B and the optional pre-computed values B and B. The DER encoded signature is stored in B and its length is returned in B. Note: B must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory. The parameter B is ignored. ECDSA_do_sign_ex() is similar to ECDSA_sign_ex() except the signature is returned as a newly allocated B structure (or NULL on error). =head1 RETURN VALUES ECDSA_SIG_set0() returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error. ECDSA_sign(), ECDSA_sign_ex() and ECDSA_sign_setup() return 1 if successful or 0 on error. ECDSA_do_sign() and ECDSA_do_sign_ex() return a pointer to an allocated B structure or NULL on error. ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an invalid signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 EXAMPLES Creating an ECDSA signature of a given SHA-256 hash value using the named curve prime256v1 (aka P-256). First step: create an EC_KEY object (note: this part is B ECDSA specific) int ret; ECDSA_SIG *sig; EC_KEY *eckey; eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); if (eckey == NULL) { /* error */ } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) == 0) { /* error */ } Second step: compute the ECDSA signature of a SHA-256 hash value using ECDSA_do_sign(): sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 32, eckey); if (sig == NULL) { /* error */ } or using ECDSA_sign(): unsigned char *buffer, *pp; int buf_len; buf_len = ECDSA_size(eckey); buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len); pp = buffer; if (ECDSA_sign(0, dgst, dgstlen, pp, &buf_len, eckey) == 0) { /* error */ } Third step: verify the created ECDSA signature using ECDSA_do_verify(): ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 32, sig, eckey); or using ECDSA_verify(): ret = ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 32, buffer, buf_len, eckey); and finally evaluate the return value: if (ret == 1) { /* signature ok */ } else if (ret == 0) { /* incorrect signature */ } else { /* error */ } =head1 CONFORMING TO ANSI X9.62, US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186-2 (Digital Signature Standard, DSS) =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream.pod0000644000000000000000000000226113176625660020440 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream - output PKCS7 structure in BER format =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() outputs a PKCS7 structure in BER format. It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_PKCS7(). =head1 NOTES This function is effectively a version of the d2i_PKCS7_bio() supporting streaming. =head1 BUGS The prefix "i2d" is arguably wrong because the function outputs BER format. =head1 RETURN VALUES i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L, L, L =head1 HISTORY i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod0000644000000000000000000000452013176625660016203 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RAND_add, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen - add entropy to the PRNG =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num); void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy); int RAND_status(void); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam); void RAND_screen(void); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION RAND_add() mixes the B bytes at B into the PRNG state. Thus, if the data at B are unpredictable to an adversary, this increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The B argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much randomness is contained in B, measured in bytes. Details about sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750. RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output. OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state is unique for each thread. On systems that provide C, the randomness device is used to seed the PRNG transparently. However, on all other systems, the application is responsible for seeding the PRNG by calling RAND_add(), L or L. RAND_seed() is equivalent to RAND_add() when B. RAND_event() and RAND_screen() are deprecated and should not be called. =head1 RETURN VALUES RAND_status() returns 1 if the PRNG has been seeded with enough data, 0 otherwise. RAND_event() calls RAND_poll() and returns RAND_status(). RAND_screen calls RAND_poll(). The other functions do not return values. =head1 HISTORY RAND_event() and RAND_screen() are deprecated since OpenSSL 1.1.0. Use the functions described above instead. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_start.pod0000644000000000000000000000321013176625660017074 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_CTX_start, BN_CTX_get, BN_CTX_end - use temporary BIGNUM variables =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx); void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions are used to obtain temporary B variables from a B (which can been created by using L) in order to save the overhead of repeatedly creating and freeing Bs in functions that are called from inside a loop. A function must call BN_CTX_start() first. Then, BN_CTX_get() may be called repeatedly to obtain temporary Bs. All BN_CTX_get() calls must be made before calling any other functions that use the B as an argument. Finally, BN_CTX_end() must be called before returning from the function. When BN_CTX_end() is called, the B pointers obtained from BN_CTX_get() become invalid. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_CTX_start() and BN_CTX_end() return no values. BN_CTX_get() returns a pointer to the B, or B on error. Once BN_CTX_get() has failed, the subsequent calls will return B as well, so it is sufficient to check the return value of the last BN_CTX_get() call. In case of an error, an error code is set, which can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign_add_signer.pod0000644000000000000000000000662113176625660020701 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS7_sign_add_signer - add a signer PKCS7 signed data structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_sign_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS7_sign_add_signer() adds a signer with certificate B and private key B using message digest B to a PKCS7 signed data structure B. The PKCS7 structure should be obtained from an initial call to PKCS7_sign() with the flag B set or in the case or re-signing a valid PKCS7 signed data structure. If the B parameter is B then the default digest for the public key algorithm will be used. Unless the B flag is set the returned PKCS7 structure is not complete and must be finalized either by streaming (if applicable) or a call to PKCS7_final(). =head1 NOTES The main purpose of this function is to provide finer control over a PKCS#7 signed data structure where the simpler PKCS7_sign() function defaults are not appropriate. For example if multiple signers or non default digest algorithms are needed. Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B parameter. If B is set then an attempt is made to copy the content digest value from the PKCS7 structure: to add a signer to an existing structure. An error occurs if a matching digest value cannot be found to copy. The returned PKCS7 structure will be valid and finalized when this flag is set. If B is set in addition to B then the B structure will not be finalized so additional attributes can be added. In this case an explicit call to PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign() is needed to finalize it. If B is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the PKCS7 structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the B parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a previously signed message. The signedData structure includes several PKCS#7 autenticatedAttributes including the signing time, the PKCS#7 content type and the supported list of ciphers in an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B is set then no authenticatedAttributes will be used. If B is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are omitted. If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following algorithms: triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any of these algorithms is disabled then it will not be included. PKCS7_sign_add_signers() returns an internal pointer to the PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO structure just added, this can be used to set additional attributes before it is finalized. =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS7_sign_add_signers() returns an internal pointer to the PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO structure just added or NULL if an error occurs. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, =head1 HISTORY PPKCS7_sign_add_signer() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/d2i_Netscape_RSA.pod0000644000000000000000000000175413176625660017662 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME i2d_Netscape_RSA, d2i_Netscape_RSA - insecure RSA public and private key encoding functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int i2d_Netscape_RSA(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp, int (*cb)()); RSA * d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int (*cb)()); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions decode and encode an RSA private key in NET format. These functions are present to provide compatibility with very old software. This format has some severe security weaknesses and should be avoided if possible. These functions are similar to the B functions. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod0000644000000000000000000002370213176625660020420 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_init_new, OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname, OPENSSL_INIT_free, OPENSSL_init_crypto, OPENSSL_cleanup, OPENSSL_atexit, OPENSSL_thread_stop - OpenSSL initialisation and deinitialisation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void OPENSSL_cleanup(void); int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings); int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void)); void OPENSSL_thread_stop(void); OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_init_new(void); int OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init, const char* name); void OPENSSL_INIT_free(OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *init); =head1 DESCRIPTION During normal operation OpenSSL (libcrypto) will allocate various resources at start up that must, subsequently, be freed on close down of the library. Additionally some resources are allocated on a per thread basis (if the application is multi-threaded), and these resources must be freed prior to the thread closing. As of version 1.1.0 OpenSSL will automatically allocate all resources that it needs so no explicit initialisation is required. Similarly it will also automatically deinitialise as required. However, there way be situations when explicit initialisation is desirable or needed, for example when some non-default initialisation is required. The function OPENSSL_init_crypto() can be used for this purpose for libcrypto (see also L for the libssl equivalent). Numerous internal OpenSSL functions call OPENSSL_init_crypto(). Therefore, in order to perform non-default initialisation, OPENSSL_init_crypto() MUST be called by application code prior to any other OpenSSL function calls. The B parameter specifies which aspects of libcrypto should be initialised. Valid options are: =over 4 =item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS Suppress automatic loading of the libcrypto error strings. This option is not a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option B will be ignored. =item OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS Automatic loading of the libcrypto error strings. With this option the library will automatically load the libcrypto error strings. This option is a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option B will be ignored. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS With this option the library will automatically load and make available all libcrypto ciphers. This option is a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option B will be ignored. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS With this option the library will automatically load and make available all libcrypto digests. This option is a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option B will be ignored. =item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS With this option the library will suppress automatic loading of libcrypto ciphers. This option is not a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option B will be ignored. =item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS With this option the library will suppress automatic loading of libcrypto digests. This option is not a default option. Once selected subsequent calls to OPENSSL_init_crypto() with the option B will be ignored. =item OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG With this option an OpenSSL configuration file will be automatically loaded and used by calling OPENSSL_config(). This is not a default option. See the description of OPENSSL_init_new(), below. =item OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG With this option the loading of OpenSSL configuration files will be suppressed. It is the equivalent of calling OPENSSL_no_config(). This is not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ASYNC With this option the library with automatically initialise the libcrypto async sub-library (see L). This is a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the RDRAND engine (if available). This not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the dynamic engine. This not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the openssl engine. This not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the cryptodev engine (if available). This not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the CAPI engine (if available). This not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the padlock engine (if available). This not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DASYNC With this option the library will automatically load and initialise the DASYNC engine. This not a default option. =item OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN With this option the library will automatically load and initialise all the built in engines listed above with the exception of the openssl and dasync engines. This not a default option. =back Multiple options may be combined together in a single call to OPENSSL_init_crypto(). For example: OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS | OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL); The OPENSSL_cleanup() function deinitialises OpenSSL (both libcrypto and libssl). All resources allocated by OpenSSL are freed. Typically there should be no need to call this function directly as it is initiated automatically on application exit. This is done via the standard C library atexit() function. In the event that the application will close in a manner that will not call the registered atexit() handlers then the application should call OPENSSL_cleanup() directly. Developers of libraries using OpenSSL are discouraged from calling this function and should instead, typically, rely on auto-deinitialisation. This is to avoid error conditions where both an application and a library it depends on both use OpenSSL, and the library deinitialises it before the application has finished using it. Once OPENSSL_cleanup() has been called the library cannot be reinitialised. Attempts to call OPENSSL_init_crypto() will fail and an ERR_R_INIT_FAIL error will be added to the error stack. Note that because initialisation has failed OpenSSL error strings will not be available, only an error code. This code can be put through the openssl errstr command line application to produce a human readable error (see L). The OPENSSL_atexit() function enables the registration of a function to be called during OPENSSL_cleanup(). Stop handlers are called after deinitialisation of resources local to a thread, but before other process wide resources are freed. In the event that multiple stop handlers are registered, no guarantees are made about the order of execution. The OPENSSL_thread_stop() function deallocates resources associated with the current thread. Typically this function will be called automatically by the library when the thread exits. This should only be called directly if resources should be freed at an earlier time, or under the circumstances described in the NOTES section below. The B flag will load a default configuration file. To specify a different file, an B must be created and used. The routines OPENSSL_init_new() and OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() can be used to allocate the object and set the application name, and then the object can be released with OPENSSL_INIT_free() when done. =head1 NOTES Resources local to a thread are deallocated automatically when the thread exits (e.g. in a pthreads environment, when pthread_exit() is called). On Windows platforms this is done in response to a DLL_THREAD_DETACH message being sent to the libcrypto32.dll entry point. Some windows functions may cause threads to exit without sending this message (for example ExitProcess()). If the application uses such functions, then the application must free up OpenSSL resources directly via a call to OPENSSL_thread_stop() on each thread. Similarly this message will also not be sent if OpenSSL is linked statically, and therefore applications using static linking should also call OPENSSL_thread_stop() on each thread. Additionally if OpenSSL is loaded dynamically via LoadLibrary() and the threads are not destroyed until after FreeLibrary() is called then each thread should call OPENSSL_thread_stop() prior to the FreeLibrary() call. On Linux/Unix where OpenSSL has been loaded via dlopen() and the application is multi-threaded and if dlclose() is subsequently called prior to the threads being destroyed then OpenSSL will not be able to deallocate resources associated with those threads. The application should either call OPENSSL_thread_stop() on each thread prior to the dlclose() call, or alternatively the original dlopen() call should use the RTLD_NODELETE flag (where available on the platform). =head1 RETURN VALUES The functions OPENSSL_init_crypto, OPENSSL_atexit() and OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() return 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY The OPENSSL_init_crypto(), OPENSSL_cleanup(), OPENSSL_atexit(), OPENSSL_thread_stop(), OPENSSL_init_new(), OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() and OPENSSL_INIT_free() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod0000644000000000000000000001174013176625660017064 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS7_verify, PKCS7_get0_signers - verify a PKCS#7 signedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags); STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS7_verify() verifies a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B is the PKCS7 structure to verify. B is a set of certificates in which to search for the signer's certificate. B is a trusted certificate store (used for chain verification). B is the signed data if the content is not present in B (that is it is detached). The content is written to B if it is not NULL. B is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify operation. PKCS7_get0_signers() retrieves the signer's certificates from B, it does B check their validity or whether any signatures are valid. The B and B parameters have the same meanings as in PKCS7_verify(). =head1 VERIFY PROCESS Normally the verify process proceeds as follows. Initially some sanity checks are performed on B. The type of B must be signedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if the content is detached B cannot be B. If the content is not detached and B is not B, then the structure has both embedded and external content. To treat this as an error, use the flag B. The default behavior allows this, for compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL. An attempt is made to locate all the signer's certificates, first looking in the B parameter (if it is not B) and then looking in any certificates contained in the B structure itself. If any signer's certificates cannot be located the operation fails. Each signer's certificate is chain verified using the B purpose and the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message are used as untrusted CAs. If any chain verify fails an error code is returned. Finally the signed content is read (and written to B is it is not NULL) and the signature's checked. If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful. Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B parameter to change the default verify behaviour. Only the flag B is meaningful to PKCS7_get0_signers(). If B is set the certificates in the message itself are not searched when locating the signer's certificate. This means that all the signers certificates must be in the B parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type B then an error is returned. If B is set the signer's certificates are not chain verified. If B is set then the certificates contained in the message are not used as untrusted CAs. This means that the whole verify chain (apart from the signer's certificate) must be contained in the trusted store. If B is set then the signatures on the data are not checked. =head1 NOTES One application of B is to only accept messages signed by a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed in the B parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the certificates supplied in B then the verify will fail because the signer cannot be found. Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example setting B will totally disable all verification and any signed message will be considered valid. This combination is however useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B and its validity is not considered important. Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted timestamp). =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS7_verify() returns one for a successful verification and zero if an error occurs. PKCS7_get0_signers() returns all signers or B if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from L =head1 BUGS The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signers certificate, this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B functionality. The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify(). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod0000644000000000000000000000603013176625660021234 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OCSP_request_add1_nonce, OCSP_basic_add1_nonce, OCSP_check_nonce, OCSP_copy_nonce - OCSP nonce functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int OCSP_request_add1_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, unsigned char *val, int len); int OCSP_basic_add1_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, unsigned char *val, int len); int OCSP_copy_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req); int OCSP_check_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *resp); =head1 DESCRIPTION OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce of value B and length B to OCSP request B. If B is B a random nonce is used. If B is zero or negative a default length will be used (currently 16 bytes). OCSP_basic_add1_nonce() is identical to OCSP_request_add1_nonce() except it adds a nonce to OCSP basic response B. OCSP_check_nonce() compares the nonce value in B and B. OCSP_copy_nonce() copys any nonce value present in B to B. =head1 RETURN VALUES OCSP_request_add1_nonce() and OCSP_basic_add1_nonce() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. OCSP_copy_nonce() returns 1 if a nonce was successfully copied, 2 if no nonce was present in B and 0 if an error occurred. OCSP_check_nonce() returns the result of the nonce comparison between B and B. The return value indicates the result of the comparison. If nonces are present and equal 1 is returned. If the nonces are absent 2 is returned. If a nonce is present in the response only 3 is returned. If nonces are present and unequal 0 is returned. If the nonce is present in the request only then -1 is returned. =head1 NOTES For most purposes the nonce value in a request is set to a random value so the B parameter in OCSP_request_add1_nonce() is usually NULL. An OCSP nonce is typically added to an OCSP request to thwart replay attacks by checking the same nonce value appears in the response. Some responders may include a nonce in all responses even if one is not supplied. Some responders cache OCSP responses and do not sign each response for performance reasons. As a result they do not support nonces. The return values of OCSP_check_nonce() can be checked to cover each case. A positive return value effectively indicates success: nonces are both present and match, both absent or present in the response only. A non-zero return additionally covers the case where the nonce is present in the request only: this will happen if the responder doesn't support nonces. A zero return value indicates present and mismatched nonces: this should be treated as an error condition. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SHA256_Init.pod0000644000000000000000000000732113176625660016504 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SHA1, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final, SHA224, SHA224_Init, SHA224_Update, SHA224_Final, SHA256, SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final, SHA384, SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final, SHA512, SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update, SHA512_Final - Secure Hash Algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c); int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c); int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c); int SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA256_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c); int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c); int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len); int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c); unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md); =head1 DESCRIPTION Applications should use the higher level functions L etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly. SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) is a cryptographic hash function with a 160 bit output. SHA1() computes the SHA-1 message digest of the B bytes at B and places it in B (which must have space for SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If B is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array. Note: setting B to NULL is B. The following functions may be used if the message is not completely stored in memory: SHA1_Init() initializes a B structure. SHA1_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to be hashed (B bytes at B). SHA1_Final() places the message digest in B, which must have space for SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases the B. The SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 families of functions operate in the same way as for the SHA1 functions. Note that SHA224 and SHA256 use a B object instead of B. SHA384 and SHA512 use B. The buffer B must have space for the output from the SHA variant being used (defined by SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH and SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH). Also note that, as for the SHA1() function above, the SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() functions are not thread safe if B is NULL. The predecessor of SHA-1, SHA, is also implemented, but it should be used only when backward compatibility is required. =head1 RETURN VALUES SHA1(), SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() return a pointer to the hash value. SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() and equivalent SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 functions return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. =head1 CONFORMING TO US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-4 (Secure Hash Standard), ANSI X9.30 =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod0000644000000000000000000000461713176625660017326 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_config, OPENSSL_no_config - simple OpenSSL configuration functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void OPENSSL_config(const char *appname); void OPENSSL_no_config(void); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION OPENSSL_config() configures OpenSSL using the standard B and reads from the application section B. If B is NULL then the default section, B, will be used. Errors are silently ignored. Multiple calls have no effect. OPENSSL_no_config() disables configuration. If called before OPENSSL_config() no configuration takes place. If the application is built with B defined, then a call to OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will implicitly call OPENSSL_config() first. =head1 NOTES The OPENSSL_config() function is designed to be a very simple "call it and forget it" function. It is however B better than nothing. Applications which need finer control over their configuration functionality should use the configuration functions such as CONF_modules_load() directly. This function is deprecated and its use should be avoided. Applications should instead call CONF_modules_load() during initialization (that is before starting any threads). There are several reasons why calling the OpenSSL configuration routines is advisable. For example, to load dynamic ENGINEs from shared libraries (DSOs). However very few applications currently support the control interface and so very few can load and use dynamic ENGINEs. Equally in future more sophisticated ENGINEs will require certain control operations to customize them. If an application calls OPENSSL_config() it doesn't need to know or care about ENGINE control operations because they can be performed by editing a configuration file. =head1 RETURN VALUES Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The OPENSSL_no_config() and OPENSSL_config() functions were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_crypto(). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_blinding_on.pod0000644000000000000000000000232413176625660017636 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_blinding_on, RSA_blinding_off - protect the RSA operation from timing attacks =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack. RSA_blinding_on() turns blinding on for key B and generates a random blinding factor. B is B or a pre-allocated and initialized B. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_blinding_on(). RSA_blinding_off() turns blinding off and frees the memory used for the blinding factor. =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_blinding_on() returns 1 on success, and 0 if an error occurred. RSA_blinding_off() returns no value. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_meth_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001617313176625660017037 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_meth_new, DH_meth_free, DH_meth_dup, DH_meth_get0_name, DH_meth_set1_name, DH_meth_get_flags, DH_meth_set_flags, DH_meth_get0_app_data, DH_meth_set0_app_data, DH_meth_get_generate_key, DH_meth_set_generate_key, DH_meth_get_compute_key, DH_meth_set_compute_key, DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp, DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, DH_meth_get_init, DH_meth_set_init, DH_meth_get_finish, DH_meth_set_finish, DH_meth_get_generate_params, DH_meth_set_generate_params - Routines to build up DH methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DH_METHOD *DH_meth_new(const char *name, int flags); void DH_meth_free(DH_METHOD *dhm); DH_METHOD *DH_meth_dup(const DH_METHOD *dhm); const char *DH_meth_get0_name(const DH_METHOD *dhm); int DH_meth_set1_name(DH_METHOD *dhm, const char *name); int DH_meth_get_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm); int DH_meth_set_flags(DH_METHOD *dhm, int flags); void *DH_meth_get0_app_data(const DH_METHOD *dhm); int DH_meth_set0_app_data(DH_METHOD *dhm, void *app_data); int (*DH_meth_get_generate_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *); int DH_meth_set_generate_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_key) (DH *)); int (*DH_meth_get_compute_key(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); int DH_meth_set_compute_key(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*compute_key) (unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)); int (*DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*bn_mod_exp) (const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)); int (*DH_meth_get_init(const DH_METHOD *dhm))(DH *); int DH_meth_set_init(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*init)(DH *)); int (*DH_meth_get_finish(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *); int DH_meth_set_finish(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*finish) (DH *)); int (*DH_meth_get_generate_params(const DH_METHOD *dhm)) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *); int DH_meth_set_generate_params(DH_METHOD *dhm, int (*generate_params) (DH *, int, int, BN_GENCB *)); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a structure used for the provision of custom DH implementations. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL for the implementation of the various DH capabilities. DH_meth_new() creates a new B structure. It should be given a unique B and a set of B. The B should be a NULL terminated string, which will be duplicated and stored in the B object. It is the callers responsibility to free the original string. The flags will be used during the construction of a new B object based on this B. Any new B object will have those flags set by default. DH_meth_dup() creates a duplicate copy of the B object passed as a parameter. This might be useful for creating a new B based on an existing one, but with some differences. DH_meth_free() destroys a B structure and frees up any memory associated with it. DH_meth_get0_name() will return a pointer to the name of this DH_METHOD. This is a pointer to the internal name string and so should not be freed by the caller. DH_meth_set1_name() sets the name of the DH_METHOD to B. The string is duplicated and the copy is stored in the DH_METHOD structure, so the caller remains responsible for freeing the memory associated with the name. DH_meth_get_flags() returns the current value of the flags associated with this DH_METHOD. DH_meth_set_flags() provides the ability to set these flags. The functions DH_meth_get0_app_data() and DH_meth_set0_app_data() provide the ability to associate implementation specific data with the DH_METHOD. It is the application's responsibility to free this data before the DH_METHOD is freed via a call to DH_meth_free(). DH_meth_get_generate_key() and DH_meth_set_generate_key() get and set the function used for generating a new DH key pair respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DH_generate_key(). The parameter for the function has the same meaning as for DH_generate_key(). DH_meth_get_compute_key() and DH_meth_set_compute_key() get and set the function used for computing a new DH shared secret respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DH_compute_key(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DH_compute_key(). DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp() and DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp() get and set the function used for computing the following value: r = a ^ p mod m This function will be called by the default OpenSSL function for DH_generate_key(). The result is stored in the B parameter. This function may be NULL unless using the default generate key function, in which case it must be present. DH_meth_get_init() and DH_meth_set_init() get and set the function used for creating a new DH instance respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DH_new() (if the current default DH_METHOD is this one) or DH_new_method(). The DH_new() and DH_new_method() functions will allocate the memory for the new DH object, and a pointer to this newly allocated structure will be passed as a parameter to the function. This function may be NULL. DH_meth_get_finish() and DH_meth_set_finish() get and set the function used for destroying an instance of a DH object respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DH_free(). A pointer to the DH to be destroyed is passed as a parameter. The destroy function should be used for DH implementation specific clean up. The memory for the DH itself should not be freed by this function. This function may be NULL. DH_meth_get_generate_params() and DH_meth_set_generate_params() get and set the function used for generating DH parameters respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DH_generate_parameters_ex() (or DH_generate_parameters()). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DH_generate_parameters_ex(). This function may be NULL. =head1 RETURN VALUES DH_meth_new() and DH_meth_dup() return the newly allocated DH_METHOD object or NULL on failure. DH_meth_get0_name() and DH_meth_get_flags() return the name and flags associated with the DH_METHOD respectively. All other DH_meth_get_*() functions return the appropriate function pointer that has been set in the DH_METHOD, or NULL if no such pointer has yet been set. DH_meth_set1_name() and all DH_meth_set_*() functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod0000644000000000000000000000373213176625660016663 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_set_bit, BN_clear_bit, BN_is_bit_set, BN_mask_bits, BN_lshift, BN_lshift1, BN_rshift, BN_rshift1 - bit operations on BIGNUMs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_set_bit() sets bit B in B to 1 (CEn)>). The number is expanded if necessary. BN_clear_bit() sets bit B in B to 0 (CEn)>). An error occurs if B is shorter than B bits. BN_is_bit_set() tests if bit B in B is set. BN_mask_bits() truncates B to an B bit number (CEn)>). An error occurs if B already is shorter than B bits. BN_lshift() shifts B left by B bits and places the result in B (C). Note that B must be non-negative. BN_lshift1() shifts B left by one and places the result in B (C). BN_rshift() shifts B right by B bits and places the result in B (C). Note that B must be non-negative. BN_rshift1() shifts B right by one and places the result in B (C). For the shift functions, B and B may be the same variable. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_is_bit_set() returns 1 if the bit is set, 0 otherwise. All other functions return 1 for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_meth_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001423413176625660017151 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_get_new_index, BIO_meth_new, BIO_meth_free, BIO_meth_get_write, BIO_meth_set_write, BIO_meth_get_read, BIO_meth_set_read, BIO_meth_get_puts, BIO_meth_set_puts, BIO_meth_get_gets, BIO_meth_set_gets, BIO_meth_get_ctrl, BIO_meth_set_ctrl, BIO_meth_get_create, BIO_meth_set_create, BIO_meth_get_destroy, BIO_meth_set_destroy, BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl, BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl - Routines to build up BIO methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BIO_get_new_index(void); BIO_METHOD *BIO_meth_new(int type, const char *name); void BIO_meth_free(BIO_METHOD *biom); int (*BIO_meth_get_write(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *, int); int BIO_meth_set_write(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*write) (BIO *, const char *, int)); int (*BIO_meth_get_read(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int); int BIO_meth_set_read(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*read) (BIO *, char *, int)); int (*BIO_meth_get_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, const char *); int BIO_meth_set_puts(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*puts) (BIO *, const char *)); int (*BIO_meth_get_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, char *, int); int BIO_meth_set_gets(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*gets) (BIO *, char *, int)); long (*BIO_meth_get_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, long, void *); int BIO_meth_set_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom, long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *)); int (*BIO_meth_get_create(BIO_METHOD *bion)) (BIO *); int BIO_meth_set_create(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*create) (BIO *)); int (*BIO_meth_get_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *); int BIO_meth_set_destroy(BIO_METHOD *biom, int (*destroy) (BIO *)); long (*BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom)) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *); int BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(BIO_METHOD *biom, long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *)); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a structure used for the implementation of new BIO types. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL for the implementation of the various BIO capabilities. See the L page for more information. BIO_meth_new() creates a new B structure. It should be given a unique integer B and a string that represents its B. Use BIO_get_new_index() to get the value for B. The set of standard OpenSSL provided BIO types is provided in B. Some examples include B and B. Filter BIOs should have a type which have the "filter" bit set (B). Source/sink BIOs should have the "source/sink" bit set (B). File descriptor based BIOs (e.g. socket, fd, connect, accept etc) should additionally have the "descriptor" bit set (B). See the L page for more information. BIO_meth_free() destroys a B structure and frees up any memory associated with it. BIO_meth_get_write() and BIO_meth_set_write() get and set the function used for writing arbitrary length data to the BIO respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_write(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for BIO_write(). BIO_meth_get_read() and BIO_meth_set_read() get and set the function used for reading arbitrary length data from the BIO respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_read(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for BIO_read(). BIO_meth_get_puts() and BIO_meth_set_puts() get and set the function used for writing a NULL terminated string to the BIO respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_puts(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for BIO_puts(). BIO_meth_get_gets() and BIO_meth_set_gets() get and set the function typically used for reading a line of data from the BIO respectively (see the L page for more information). This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_gets(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for BIO_gets(). BIO_meth_get_ctrl() and BIO_meth_set_ctrl() get and set the function used for processing ctrl messages in the BIO respectively. See the L page for more information. This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_ctrl(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for BIO_ctrl(). BIO_meth_get_create() and BIO_meth_set_create() get and set the function used for creating a new instance of the BIO respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_new() and passing in a pointer to the current BIO_METHOD. The BIO_new() function will allocate the memory for the new BIO, and a pointer to this newly allocated structure will be passed as a parameter to the function. BIO_meth_get_destroy() and BIO_meth_set_destroy() get and set the function used for destroying an instance of a BIO respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_free(). A pointer to the BIO to be destroyed is passed as a parameter. The destroy function should be used for BIO specific clean up. The memory for the BIO itself should not be freed by this function. BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl() and BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl() get and set the function used for processing callback ctrl messages in the BIO respectively. See the L page for more information. This function will be called in response to the application calling BIO_callback_ctrl(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for BIO_callback_ctrl(). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_clear_error.pod0000644000000000000000000000121413176625660017653 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_clear_error - clear the error queue =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void ERR_clear_error(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_clear_error() empties the current thread's error queue. =head1 RETURN VALUES ERR_clear_error() has no return value. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_meth_new.pod0000644000000000000000000002520513176625660017165 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_meth_get0_app_data, RSA_meth_set0_app_data, RSA_meth_new, RSA_meth_free, RSA_meth_dup, RSA_meth_get0_name, RSA_meth_set1_name, RSA_meth_get_flags, RSA_meth_set_flags, RSA_meth_get_pub_enc, RSA_meth_set_pub_enc, RSA_meth_get_pub_dec, RSA_meth_set_pub_dec, RSA_meth_get_priv_enc, RSA_meth_set_priv_enc, RSA_meth_get_priv_dec, RSA_meth_set_priv_dec, RSA_meth_get_mod_exp, RSA_meth_set_mod_exp, RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_get_init, RSA_meth_set_init, RSA_meth_get_finish, RSA_meth_set_finish, RSA_meth_get_sign, RSA_meth_set_sign, RSA_meth_get_verify, RSA_meth_set_verify, RSA_meth_get_keygen, RSA_meth_set_keygen - Routines to build up RSA methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags); void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth); RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth); const char *RSA_meth_get0_name(const RSA_METHOD *meth); int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name); int RSA_meth_get_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth); int RSA_meth_set_flags(RSA_METHOD *meth, int flags); void *RSA_meth_get0_app_data(const RSA_METHOD *meth); int RSA_meth_set0_app_data(RSA_METHOD *meth, void *app_data); int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*pub_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); int (*RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*pub_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); int (*RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); /* Can be null */ int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)); /* Can be null */ int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); int RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*bn_mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)); /* called at new */ int (*RSA_meth_get_init(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_init(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*init) (RSA *rsa)); /* called at free */ int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa)); int (*RSA_meth_get_sign(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_sign(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*sign) (int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)); int (*RSA_meth_get_verify(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa); int RSA_meth_set_verify(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*verify) (int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa)); int (*RSA_meth_get_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth)) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *rsa, int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a structure used for the provision of custom RSA implementations. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL for the implementation of the various RSA capabilities. See the L page for more information. RSA_meth_new() creates a new B structure. It should be given a unique B and a set of B. The B should be a NULL terminated string, which will be duplicated and stored in the B object. It is the callers responsibility to free the original string. The flags will be used during the construction of a new B object based on this B. Any new B object will have those flags set by default. RSA_meth_dup() creates a duplicate copy of the B object passed as a parameter. This might be useful for creating a new B based on an existing one, but with some differences. RSA_meth_free() destroys an B structure and frees up any memory associated with it. RSA_meth_get0_name() will return a pointer to the name of this RSA_METHOD. This is a pointer to the internal name string and so should not be freed by the caller. RSA_meth_set1_name() sets the name of the RSA_METHOD to B. The string is duplicated and the copy is stored in the RSA_METHOD structure, so the caller remains responsible for freeing the memory associated with the name. RSA_meth_get_flags() returns the current value of the flags associated with this RSA_METHOD. RSA_meth_set_flags() provides the ability to set these flags. The functions RSA_meth_get0_app_data() and RSA_meth_set0_app_data() provide the ability to associate implementation specific data with the RSA_METHOD. It is the application's responsibility to free this data before the RSA_METHOD is freed via a call to RSA_meth_free(). RSA_meth_get_sign() and RSA_meth_set_sign() get and set the function used for creating an RSA signature respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling RSA_sign(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for RSA_sign(). RSA_meth_get_verify() and RSA_meth_set_verify() get and set the function used for verifying an RSA signature respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling RSA_verify(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for RSA_verify(). RSA_meth_get_mod_exp() and RSA_meth_set_mod_exp() get and set the function used for CRT computations. RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp() and RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp() get and set the function used for CRT computations, specifically the following value: r = a ^ p mod m Both the mod_exp() and bn_mod_exp() functions are called by the default OpenSSL method during encryption, decryption, signing and verification. RSA_meth_get_init() and RSA_meth_set_init() get and set the function used for creating a new RSA instance respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling RSA_new() (if the current default RSA_METHOD is this one) or RSA_new_method(). The RSA_new() and RSA_new_method() functions will allocate the memory for the new RSA object, and a pointer to this newly allocated structure will be passed as a parameter to the function. This function may be NULL. RSA_meth_get_finish() and RSA_meth_set_finish() get and set the function used for destroying an instance of an RSA object respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling RSA_free(). A pointer to the RSA to be destroyed is passed as a parameter. The destroy function should be used for RSA implementation specific clean up. The memory for the RSA itself should not be freed by this function. This function may be NULL. RSA_meth_get_keygen() and RSA_meth_set_keygen() get and set the function used for generating a new RSA key pair respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling RSA_generate_key(). The parameter for the function has the same meaning as for RSA_generate_key(). RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(), RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(), RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(), RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(), RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(), RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(), RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(), RSA_meth_set_priv_dec() get and set the functions used for public and private key encryption and decryption. These functions will be called in response to the application calling RSA_public_encrypt(), RSA_private_decrypt(), RSA_private_encrypt() and RSA_public_decrypt() and take the same parameters as those. =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_meth_new() and RSA_meth_dup() return the newly allocated RSA_METHOD object or NULL on failure. RSA_meth_get0_name() and RSA_meth_get_flags() return the name and flags associated with the RSA_METHOD respectively. All other RSA_meth_get_*() functions return the appropriate function pointer that has been set in the RSA_METHOD, or NULL if no such pointer has yet been set. RSA_meth_set1_name and all RSA_meth_set_*() functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod0000644000000000000000000000655513176625660017163 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_sign_init, EVP_PKEY_sign - sign using a public key algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_sign_init() function initializes a public key algorithm context using key B for a signing operation. The EVP_PKEY_sign() function performs a public key signing operation using B. The data to be signed is specified using the B and B parameters. If B is B then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the B parameter. If B is not B then before the call the B parameter should contain the length of the B buffer, if the call is successful the signature is written to B and the amount of data written to B. =head1 NOTES EVP_PKEY_sign() does not hash the data to be signed, and therefore is normally used to sign digests. For signing arbitrary messages, see the L and L signing interfaces instead. After the call to EVP_PKEY_sign_init() algorithm specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operation (see L). The function EVP_PKEY_sign() can be called more than once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_sign_init() and EVP_PKEY_sign() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLE Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest: #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; /* md is a SHA-256 digest in this example. */ unsigned char *md, *sig; size_t mdlen = 32, siglen; EVP_PKEY *signing_key; /* * NB: assumes signing_key and md are set up before the next * step. signing_key must be an RSA private key and md must * point to the SHA-256 digest to be signed. */ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Determine buffer length */ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0) /* Error */ sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (!sig) /* malloc failure */ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, sig, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Signature is siglen bytes written to buffer sig */ =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod0000644000000000000000000000631213176625660017072 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_SealInit, EVP_SealUpdate, EVP_SealFinal - EVP envelope encryption =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk); int EVP_SealUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope encryption. They generate a random key and IV (if required) then "envelope" it by using public key encryption. Data can then be encrypted using this key. EVP_SealInit() initializes a cipher context B for encryption with cipher B using a random secret key and IV. B is normally supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. B is an array of buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer must contain enough room for the corresponding encrypted key: that is B must have room for B bytes. The actual size of each encrypted secret key is written to the array B. B is an array of B public keys. The B parameter is a buffer where the generated IV is written to. It must contain enough room for the corresponding cipher's IV, as determined by (for example) EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type). If the cipher does not require an IV then the B parameter is ignored and can be B. EVP_SealUpdate() and EVP_SealFinal() have exactly the same properties as the EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal() routines, as documented on the L manual page. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_SealInit() returns 0 on error or B if successful. EVP_SealUpdate() and EVP_SealFinal() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 NOTES Because a random secret key is generated the random number generator must be seeded before calling EVP_SealInit(). The public key must be RSA because it is the only OpenSSL public key algorithm that supports key transport. Envelope encryption is the usual method of using public key encryption on large amounts of data, this is because public key encryption is slow but symmetric encryption is fast. So symmetric encryption is used for bulk encryption and the small random symmetric key used is transferred using public key encryption. It is possible to call EVP_SealInit() twice in the same way as EVP_EncryptInit(). The first call should have B set to 0 and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again with B set to NULL. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod0000644000000000000000000000634513176625660020007 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASN1_STRING_dup, ASN1_STRING_cmp, ASN1_STRING_set, ASN1_STRING_length, ASN1_STRING_type, ASN1_STRING_get0_data, ASN1_STRING_data, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 - ASN1_STRING utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int ASN1_STRING_length(ASN1_STRING *x); const unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x); unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x); ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_dup(ASN1_STRING *a); int ASN1_STRING_cmp(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_STRING *b); int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len); int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x); int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, const ASN1_STRING *in); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions allow an B structure to be manipulated. ASN1_STRING_length() returns the length of the content of B. ASN1_STRING_get0_data() returns an internal pointer to the data of B. Since this is an internal pointer it should B be freed or modified in any way. ASN1_STRING_data() is similar to ASN1_STRING_get0_data() except the returned value is not constant. This function is deprecated: applications should use ASN1_STRING_get0_data() instead. ASN1_STRING_dup() returns a copy of the structure B. ASN1_STRING_cmp() compares B and B returning 0 if the two are identical. The string types and content are compared. ASN1_STRING_set() sets the data of string B to the buffer B or length B. The supplied data is copied. If B is -1 then the length is determined by strlen(data). ASN1_STRING_type() returns the type of B, using standard constants such as B. ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() converts the string B to UTF8 format, the converted data is allocated in a buffer in B<*out>. The length of B is returned or a negative error code. The buffer B<*out> should be freed using OPENSSL_free(). =head1 NOTES Almost all ASN1 types in OpenSSL are represented as an B structure. Other types such as B are simply typedef'ed to B and the functions call the B equivalents. B is also used for some B types which consist entirely of primitive string types such as B and B and I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. BN_sub() subtracts I from I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. BN_mul() multiplies I and I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. For multiplication by powers of 2, use L. BN_sqr() takes the square of I and places the result in I (C). I and I may be the same B. This function is faster than BN_mul(r,a,a). BN_div() divides I by I and places the result in I and the remainder in I (C). Either of I and I may be B, in which case the respective value is not returned. The result is rounded towards zero; thus if I is negative, the remainder will be zero or negative. For division by powers of 2, use BN_rshift(3). BN_mod() corresponds to BN_div() with I set to B. BN_nnmod() reduces I modulo I and places the non-negative remainder in I. BN_mod_add() adds I to I modulo I and places the non-negative result in I. BN_mod_sub() subtracts I from I modulo I and places the non-negative result in I. BN_mod_mul() multiplies I by I and finds the non-negative remainder respective to modulus I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. For more efficient algorithms for repeated computations using the same modulus, see L and L. BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I modulo B and places the result in I. BN_exp() raises I to the I

-th power and places the result in I (C). This function is faster than repeated applications of BN_mul(). BN_mod_exp() computes I to the I

-th power modulo I (C). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp(). BN_gcd() computes the greatest common divisor of I and I and places the result in I. I may be the same B as I or I. For all functions, I is a previously allocated B used for temporary variables; see L. Unless noted otherwise, the result B must be different from the arguments. =head1 RETURN VALUES For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return value should always be checked (e.g., C). The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod0000644000000000000000000001550113176625660017314 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_set_conn_address, BIO_get_conn_address, BIO_s_connect, BIO_new_connect, BIO_set_conn_hostname, BIO_set_conn_port, BIO_get_conn_hostname, BIO_get_conn_port, BIO_set_nbio, BIO_do_connect - connect BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_connect(void); BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *name); long BIO_set_conn_hostname(BIO *b, char *name); long BIO_set_conn_port(BIO *b, char *port); long BIO_set_conn_address(BIO *b, BIO_ADDR *addr); const char *BIO_get_conn_hostname(BIO *b); const char *BIO_get_conn_port(BIO *b); const BIO_ADDR *BIO_get_conn_address(BIO *b); long BIO_set_nbio(BIO *b, long n); int BIO_do_connect(BIO *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_connect() returns the connect BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platform's TCP/IP socket connection routines. Using connect BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be made and data transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction. Read and write operations on a connect BIO will perform I/O on the underlying connection. If no connection is established and the port and hostname (see below) is set up properly then a connection is established first. Connect BIOs support BIO_puts() but not BIO_gets(). If the close flag is set on a connect BIO then any active connection is shutdown and the socket closed when the BIO is freed. Calling BIO_reset() on a connect BIO will close any active connection and reset the BIO into a state where it can connect to the same host again. BIO_get_fd() places the underlying socket in B if it is not NULL, it also returns the socket . If B is not NULL it should be of type (int *). BIO_set_conn_hostname() uses the string B to set the hostname. The hostname can be an IP address; if the address is an IPv6 one, it must be enclosed with brackets. The hostname can also include the port in the form hostname:port. BIO_set_conn_port() sets the port to B. B can be the numerical form or a string such as "http". A string will be looked up first using getservbyname() on the host platform but if that fails a standard table of port names will be used. This internal list is http, telnet, socks, https, ssl, ftp, and gopher. BIO_set_conn_address() sets the address and port information using a BIO_ADDR(3ssl). BIO_get_conn_hostname() returns the hostname of the connect BIO or NULL if the BIO is initialized but no hostname is set. This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified. BIO_get_conn_port() returns the port as a string. This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified. BIO_get_conn_address() returns the address information as a BIO_ADDR. This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified. BIO_set_nbio() sets the non blocking I/O flag to B. If B is zero then blocking I/O is set. If B is 1 then non blocking I/O is set. Blocking I/O is the default. The call to BIO_set_nbio() should be made before the connection is established because non blocking I/O is set during the connect process. BIO_new_connect() combines BIO_new() and BIO_set_conn_hostname() into a single call: that is it creates a new connect BIO with B. BIO_do_connect() attempts to connect the supplied BIO. It returns 1 if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative value is returned if the connection could not be established, the call BIO_should_retry() should be used for non blocking connect BIOs to determine if the call should be retried. =head1 NOTES If blocking I/O is set then a non positive return value from any I/O call is caused by an error condition, although a zero return will normally mean that the connection was closed. If the port name is supplied as part of the host name then this will override any value set with BIO_set_conn_port(). This may be undesirable if the application does not wish to allow connection to arbitrary ports. This can be avoided by checking for the presence of the ':' character in the passed hostname and either indicating an error or truncating the string at that point. The values returned by BIO_get_conn_hostname(), BIO_get_conn_port(), BIO_get_conn_ip() and BIO_get_conn_int_port() are updated when a connection attempt is made. Before any connection attempt the values returned are those set by the application itself. Applications do not have to call BIO_do_connect() but may wish to do so to separate the connection process from other I/O processing. If non blocking I/O is set then retries will be requested as appropriate. It addition to BIO_should_read() and BIO_should_write() it is also possible for BIO_should_io_special() to be true during the initial connection process with the reason BIO_RR_CONNECT. If this is returned then this is an indication that a connection attempt would block, the application should then take appropriate action to wait until the underlying socket has connected and retry the call. BIO_set_conn_hostname(), BIO_set_conn_port(), BIO_set_conn_ip(), BIO_set_conn_int_port(), BIO_get_conn_hostname(), BIO_get_conn_port(), BIO_get_conn_ip(), BIO_get_conn_int_port(), BIO_set_nbio() and BIO_do_connect() are macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_s_connect() returns the connect BIO method. BIO_get_fd() returns the socket or -1 if the BIO has not been initialized. BIO_set_conn_hostname(), BIO_set_conn_port(), BIO_set_conn_ip() and BIO_set_conn_int_port() always return 1. BIO_get_conn_hostname() returns the connected hostname or NULL is none was set. BIO_get_conn_port() returns a string representing the connected port or NULL if not set. BIO_get_conn_ip() returns a pointer to the connected IP address in binary form or all zeros if not set. BIO_get_conn_int_port() returns the connected port or 0 if none was set. BIO_set_nbio() always returns 1. BIO_do_connect() returns 1 if the connection was successfully established and 0 or -1 if the connection failed. =head1 EXAMPLE This is example connects to a webserver on the local host and attempts to retrieve a page and copy the result to standard output. BIO *cbio, *out; int len; char tmpbuf[1024]; cbio = BIO_new_connect("localhost:http"); out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (BIO_do_connect(cbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } BIO_puts(cbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n"); for ( ; ; ) { len = BIO_read(cbio, tmpbuf, 1024); if (len <= 0) break; BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); } BIO_free(cbio); BIO_free(out); =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ENGINE_add.pod0000644000000000000000000007313413176625660016433 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ENGINE_get_DH, ENGINE_get_DSA, ENGINE_get_ECDH, ENGINE_get_ECDSA, ENGINE_by_id, ENGINE_get_cipher_engine, ENGINE_get_default_DH, ENGINE_get_default_DSA, ENGINE_get_default_ECDH, ENGINE_get_default_ECDSA, ENGINE_get_default_RAND, ENGINE_get_default_RSA, ENGINE_get_digest_engine, ENGINE_get_first, ENGINE_get_last, ENGINE_get_next, ENGINE_get_prev, ENGINE_new, ENGINE_get_ciphers, ENGINE_get_ctrl_function, ENGINE_get_digests, ENGINE_get_destroy_function, ENGINE_get_finish_function, ENGINE_get_init_function, ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function, ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function, ENGINE_load_private_key, ENGINE_load_public_key, ENGINE_get_RAND, ENGINE_get_RSA, ENGINE_get_id, ENGINE_get_name, ENGINE_get_cmd_defns, ENGINE_get_cipher, ENGINE_get_digest, ENGINE_add, ENGINE_cmd_is_executable, ENGINE_ctrl, ENGINE_ctrl_cmd, ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string, ENGINE_finish, ENGINE_free, ENGINE_get_flags, ENGINE_init, ENGINE_register_DH, ENGINE_register_DSA, ENGINE_register_ECDH, ENGINE_register_ECDSA, ENGINE_register_RAND, ENGINE_register_RSA, ENGINE_register_all_complete, ENGINE_register_ciphers, ENGINE_register_complete, ENGINE_register_digests, ENGINE_remove, ENGINE_set_DH, ENGINE_set_DSA, ENGINE_set_ECDH, ENGINE_set_ECDSA, ENGINE_set_RAND, ENGINE_set_RSA, ENGINE_set_ciphers, ENGINE_set_cmd_defns, ENGINE_set_ctrl_function, ENGINE_set_default, ENGINE_set_default_DH, ENGINE_set_default_DSA, ENGINE_set_default_ECDH, ENGINE_set_default_ECDSA, ENGINE_set_default_RAND, ENGINE_set_default_RSA, ENGINE_set_default_ciphers, ENGINE_set_default_digests, ENGINE_set_default_string, ENGINE_set_destroy_function, ENGINE_set_digests, ENGINE_set_finish_function, ENGINE_set_flags, ENGINE_set_id, ENGINE_set_init_function, ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function, ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function, ENGINE_set_name, ENGINE_up_ref, ENGINE_get_table_flags, ENGINE_cleanup, ENGINE_load_builtin_engines, ENGINE_register_all_DH, ENGINE_register_all_DSA, ENGINE_register_all_ECDH, ENGINE_register_all_ECDSA, ENGINE_register_all_RAND, ENGINE_register_all_RSA, ENGINE_register_all_ciphers, ENGINE_register_all_digests, ENGINE_set_table_flags, ENGINE_unregister_DH, ENGINE_unregister_DSA, ENGINE_unregister_ECDH, ENGINE_unregister_ECDSA, ENGINE_unregister_RAND, ENGINE_unregister_RSA, ENGINE_unregister_ciphers, ENGINE_unregister_digests - ENGINE cryptographic module support =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e); ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id); int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_ECDH(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_ECDSA(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid); int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_ECDH(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_ECDSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *list); int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags); unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void); void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags); int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void); int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void); int ENGINE_register_ECDH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_ECDH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_ECDH(void); int ENGINE_register_ECDSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_ECDSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_ECDSA(void); int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void); int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void); int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void); int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void); int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void); int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd); int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void), int cmd_optional); int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg, int cmd_optional); ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void); int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id); int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name); int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_ECDH(ENGINE *e, const ECDH_METHOD *dh_meth); int ENGINE_set_ECDSA(ENGINE *e, const ECDSA_METHOD *dh_meth); int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth); int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth); int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f); int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f); int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f); int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f); int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f); int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f); int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags); int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns); const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e); const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e); const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e); const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e); const ECDH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_ECDH(const ENGINE *e); const ECDSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_ECDSA(const ENGINE *e); const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e); const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e); const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid); int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e); const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e); EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void ENGINE_cleanup(void) #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions create, manipulate, and use cryptographic modules in the form of B objects. These objects act as containers for implementations of cryptographic algorithms, and support a reference-counted mechanism to allow them to be dynamically loaded in and out of the running application. The cryptographic functionality that can be provided by an B implementation includes the following abstractions; RSA_METHOD - for providing alternative RSA implementations DSA_METHOD, DH_METHOD, RAND_METHOD, ECDH_METHOD, ECDSA_METHOD, - similarly for other OpenSSL APIs EVP_CIPHER - potentially multiple cipher algorithms (indexed by 'nid') EVP_DIGEST - potentially multiple hash algorithms (indexed by 'nid') key-loading - loading public and/or private EVP_PKEY keys =head2 Reference counting and handles Due to the modular nature of the ENGINE API, pointers to ENGINEs need to be treated as handles - ie. not only as pointers, but also as references to the underlying ENGINE object. Ie. one should obtain a new reference when making copies of an ENGINE pointer if the copies will be used (and released) independently. ENGINE objects have two levels of reference-counting to match the way in which the objects are used. At the most basic level, each ENGINE pointer is inherently a B reference - a structural reference is required to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released. However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is initialised and able to use any of its cryptographic implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a B reference. This kind of reference can be considered a specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised and is ready to perform cryptographic operations, and will remain initialised until after you have released your reference. I This basic type of reference is used for instantiating new ENGINEs, iterating across OpenSSL's internal linked-list of loaded ENGINEs, reading information about an ENGINE, etc. Essentially a structural reference is sufficient if you only need to query or manipulate the data of an ENGINE implementation rather than use its functionality. The ENGINE_new() function returns a structural reference to a new (empty) ENGINE object. There are other ENGINE API functions that return structural references such as; ENGINE_by_id(), ENGINE_get_first(), ENGINE_get_last(), ENGINE_get_next(), ENGINE_get_prev(). All structural references should be released by a corresponding to call to the ENGINE_free() function - the ENGINE object itself will only actually be cleaned up and deallocated when the last structural reference is released. It should also be noted that many ENGINE API function calls that accept a structural reference will internally obtain another reference - typically this happens whenever the supplied ENGINE will be needed by OpenSSL after the function has returned. Eg. the function to add a new ENGINE to OpenSSL's internal list is ENGINE_add() - if this function returns success, then OpenSSL will have stored a new structural reference internally so the caller is still responsible for freeing their own reference with ENGINE_free() when they are finished with it. In a similar way, some functions will automatically release the structural reference passed to it if part of the function's job is to do so. Eg. the ENGINE_get_next() and ENGINE_get_prev() functions are used for iterating across the internal ENGINE list - they will return a new structural reference to the next (or previous) ENGINE in the list or NULL if at the end (or beginning) of the list, but in either case the structural reference passed to the function is released on behalf of the caller. To clarify a particular function's handling of references, one should always consult that function's documentation "man" page, or failing that the openssl/engine.h header file includes some hints. I As mentioned, functional references exist when the cryptographic functionality of an ENGINE is required to be available. A functional reference can be obtained in one of two ways; from an existing structural reference to the required ENGINE, or by asking OpenSSL for the default operational ENGINE for a given cryptographic purpose. To obtain a functional reference from an existing structural reference, call the ENGINE_init() function. This returns zero if the ENGINE was not already operational and couldn't be successfully initialised (eg. lack of system drivers, no special hardware attached, etc), otherwise it will return non-zero to indicate that the ENGINE is now operational and will have allocated a new B reference to the ENGINE. All functional references are released by calling ENGINE_finish() (which removes the implicit structural reference as well). The second way to get a functional reference is by asking OpenSSL for a default implementation for a given task, eg. by ENGINE_get_default_RSA(), ENGINE_get_default_cipher_engine(), etc. These are discussed in the next section, though they are not usually required by application programmers as they are used automatically when creating and using the relevant algorithm-specific types in OpenSSL, such as RSA, DSA, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, etc. =head2 Default implementations For each supported abstraction, the ENGINE code maintains an internal table of state to control which implementations are available for a given abstraction and which should be used by default. These implementations are registered in the tables and indexed by an 'nid' value, because abstractions like EVP_CIPHER and EVP_DIGEST support many distinct algorithms and modes, and ENGINEs can support arbitrarily many of them. In the case of other abstractions like RSA, DSA, etc, there is only one "algorithm" so all implementations implicitly register using the same 'nid' index. When a default ENGINE is requested for a given abstraction/algorithm/mode, (eg. when calling RSA_new_method(NULL)), a "get_default" call will be made to the ENGINE subsystem to process the corresponding state table and return a functional reference to an initialised ENGINE whose implementation should be used. If no ENGINE should (or can) be used, it will return NULL and the caller will operate with a NULL ENGINE handle - this usually equates to using the conventional software implementation. In the latter case, OpenSSL will from then on behave the way it used to before the ENGINE API existed. Each state table has a flag to note whether it has processed this "get_default" query since the table was last modified, because to process this question it must iterate across all the registered ENGINEs in the table trying to initialise each of them in turn, in case one of them is operational. If it returns a functional reference to an ENGINE, it will also cache another reference to speed up processing future queries (without needing to iterate across the table). Likewise, it will cache a NULL response if no ENGINE was available so that future queries won't repeat the same iteration unless the state table changes. This behaviour can also be changed; if the ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT flag is set (using ENGINE_set_table_flags()), no attempted initialisations will take place, instead the only way for the state table to return a non-NULL ENGINE to the "get_default" query will be if one is expressly set in the table. Eg. ENGINE_set_default_RSA() does the same job as ENGINE_register_RSA() except that it also sets the state table's cached response for the "get_default" query. In the case of abstractions like EVP_CIPHER, where implementations are indexed by 'nid', these flags and cached-responses are distinct for each 'nid' value. =head2 Application requirements This section will explain the basic things an application programmer should support to make the most useful elements of the ENGINE functionality available to the user. The first thing to consider is whether the programmer wishes to make alternative ENGINE modules available to the application and user. OpenSSL maintains an internal linked list of "visible" ENGINEs from which it has to operate - at start-up, this list is empty and in fact if an application does not call any ENGINE API calls and it uses static linking against openssl, then the resulting application binary will not contain any alternative ENGINE code at all. So the first consideration is whether any/all available ENGINE implementations should be made visible to OpenSSL - this is controlled by calling the various "load" functions. Having called any of these functions, ENGINE objects would have been dynamically allocated and populated with these implementations and linked into OpenSSL's internal linked list. At this point it is important to mention an important API function; void ENGINE_cleanup(void) If no ENGINE API functions are called at all in an application, then there are no inherent memory leaks to worry about from the ENGINE functionality. However, prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 if any ENGINEs are loaded, even if they are never registered or used, it was necessary to use the ENGINE_cleanup() function to correspondingly cleanup before program exit, if the caller wishes to avoid memory leaks. This mechanism used an internal callback registration table so that any ENGINE API functionality that knows it requires cleanup can register its cleanup details to be called during ENGINE_cleanup(). This approach allowed ENGINE_cleanup() to clean up after any ENGINE functionality at all that your program uses, yet doesn't automatically create linker dependencies to all possible ENGINE functionality - only the cleanup callbacks required by the functionality you do use will be required by the linker. From OpenSSL 1.1.0 it is no longer necessary to explicitly call ENGINE_cleanup and this function is deprecated. Cleanup automatically takes place at program exit. The fact that ENGINEs are made visible to OpenSSL (and thus are linked into the program and loaded into memory at run-time) does not mean they are "registered" or called into use by OpenSSL automatically - that behaviour is something for the application to control. Some applications will want to allow the user to specify exactly which ENGINE they want used if any is to be used at all. Others may prefer to load all support and have OpenSSL automatically use at run-time any ENGINE that is able to successfully initialise - ie. to assume that this corresponds to acceleration hardware attached to the machine or some such thing. There are probably numerous other ways in which applications may prefer to handle things, so we will simply illustrate the consequences as they apply to a couple of simple cases and leave developers to consider these and the source code to openssl's builtin utilities as guides. I Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operations, otherwise OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code illustrates how to approach this; ENGINE *e; const char *engine_id = "ACME"; ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); if(!e) /* the engine isn't available */ return; if(!ENGINE_init(e)) { /* the engine couldn't initialise, release 'e' */ ENGINE_free(e); return; } if(!ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e)) /* This should only happen when 'e' can't initialise, but the previous * statement suggests it did. */ abort(); ENGINE_set_default_DSA(e); ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(e); /* Release the functional reference from ENGINE_init() */ ENGINE_finish(e); /* Release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */ ENGINE_free(e); I Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised, it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work; /* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); /* Register all of them for every algorithm they collectively implement */ ENGINE_register_all_complete(); That's all that's required. Eg. the next time OpenSSL tries to set up an RSA key, any bundled ENGINEs that implement RSA_METHOD will be passed to ENGINE_init() and if any of those succeed, that ENGINE will be set as the default for RSA use from then on. =head2 Advanced configuration support There is a mechanism supported by the ENGINE framework that allows each ENGINE implementation to define an arbitrary set of configuration "commands" and expose them to OpenSSL and any applications based on OpenSSL. This mechanism is entirely based on the use of name-value pairs and assumes ASCII input (no unicode or UTF for now!), so it is ideal if applications want to provide a transparent way for users to provide arbitrary configuration "directives" directly to such ENGINEs. It is also possible for the application to dynamically interrogate the loaded ENGINE implementations for the names, descriptions, and input flags of their available "control commands", providing a more flexible configuration scheme. However, if the user is expected to know which ENGINE device he/she is using (in the case of specialised hardware, this goes without saying) then applications may not need to concern themselves with discovering the supported control commands and simply prefer to pass settings into ENGINEs exactly as they are provided by the user. Before illustrating how control commands work, it is worth mentioning what they are typically used for. Broadly speaking there are two uses for control commands; the first is to provide the necessary details to the implementation (which may know nothing at all specific to the host system) so that it can be initialised for use. This could include the path to any driver or config files it needs to load, required network addresses, smart-card identifiers, passwords to initialise protected devices, logging information, etc etc. This class of commands typically needs to be passed to an ENGINE B attempting to initialise it, ie. before calling ENGINE_init(). The other class of commands consist of settings or operations that tweak certain behaviour or cause certain operations to take place, and these commands may work either before or after ENGINE_init(), or in some cases both. ENGINE implementations should provide indications of this in the descriptions attached to builtin control commands and/or in external product documentation. I Let's illustrate by example; a function for which the caller supplies the name of the ENGINE it wishes to use, a table of string-pairs for use before initialisation, and another table for use after initialisation. Note that the string-pairs used for control commands consist of a command "name" followed by the command "parameter" - the parameter could be NULL in some cases but the name can not. This function should initialise the ENGINE (issuing the "pre" commands beforehand and the "post" commands afterwards) and set it as the default for everything except RAND and then return a boolean success or failure. int generic_load_engine_fn(const char *engine_id, const char **pre_cmds, int pre_num, const char **post_cmds, int post_num) { ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); if (!e) return 0; while (pre_num--) { if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1], 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id, pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1] ? pre_cmds[1] : "(NULL)"); ENGINE_free(e); return 0; } pre_cmds += 2; } if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed initialisation\n"); ENGINE_free(e); return 0; } /* ENGINE_init() returned a functional reference, so free the structural * reference from ENGINE_by_id(). */ ENGINE_free(e); while(post_num--) { if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1], 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id, post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1] ? post_cmds[1] : "(NULL)"); ENGINE_finish(e); return 0; } post_cmds += 2; } ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL & ~ENGINE_METHOD_RAND); /* Success */ return 1; } Note that ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() accepts a boolean argument that can relax the semantics of the function - if set non-zero it will only return failure if the ENGINE supported the given command name but failed while executing it, if the ENGINE doesn't support the command name it will simply return success without doing anything. In this case we assume the user is only supplying commands specific to the given ENGINE so we set this to FALSE. I It is possible to discover at run-time the names, numerical-ids, descriptions and input parameters of the control commands supported by an ENGINE using a structural reference. Note that some control commands are defined by OpenSSL itself and it will intercept and handle these control commands on behalf of the ENGINE, ie. the ENGINE's ctrl() handler is not used for the control command. openssl/engine.h defines an index, ENGINE_CMD_BASE, that all control commands implemented by ENGINEs should be numbered from. Any command value lower than this symbol is considered a "generic" command is handled directly by the OpenSSL core routines. It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the control commands implemented by a given ENGINE, specifically the commands: ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS Whilst these commands are automatically processed by the OpenSSL framework code, they use various properties exposed by each ENGINE to process these queries. An ENGINE has 3 properties it exposes that can affect how this behaves; it can supply a ctrl() handler, it can specify ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL in the ENGINE's flags, and it can expose an array of control command descriptions. If an ENGINE specifies the ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag, then it will simply pass all these "core" control commands directly to the ENGINE's ctrl() handler (and thus, it must have supplied one), so it is up to the ENGINE to reply to these "discovery" commands itself. If that flag is not set, then the OpenSSL framework code will work with the following rules; if no ctrl() handler supplied; ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns FALSE (zero), all other commands fail. if a ctrl() handler was supplied but no array of control commands; ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE, all other commands fail. if a ctrl() handler and array of control commands was supplied; ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE, all other commands proceed processing ... If the ENGINE's array of control commands is empty then all other commands will fail, otherwise; ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE returns the identifier of the first command supported by the ENGINE, ENGINE_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE takes the identifier of a command supported by the ENGINE and returns the next command identifier or fails if there are no more, ENGINE_CMD_FROM_NAME takes a string name for a command and returns the corresponding identifier or fails if no such command name exists, and the remaining commands take a command identifier and return properties of the corresponding commands. All except ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS return the string length of a command name or description, or populate a supplied character buffer with a copy of the command name or description. ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS returns a bitwise-OR'd mask of the following possible values: ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL If the ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL flag is set, then any other flags are purely informational to the caller - this flag will prevent the command being usable for any higher-level ENGINE functions such as ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). "INTERNAL" commands are not intended to be exposed to text-based configuration by applications, administrations, users, etc. These can support arbitrary operations via ENGINE_ctrl(), including passing to and/or from the control commands data of any arbitrary type. These commands are supported in the discovery mechanisms simply to allow applications to determine if an ENGINE supports certain specific commands it might want to use (eg. application "foo" might query various ENGINEs to see if they implement "FOO_GET_VENDOR_LOGO_GIF" - and ENGINE could therefore decide whether or not to support this "foo"-specific extension). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY ENGINE_cleanup(), ENGINE_load_openssl(), ENGINE_load_dynamic(), and ENGINE_load_cryptodev() were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_crypto(). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod0000644000000000000000000001037113176625660021327 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_get_entry, X509_NAME_entry_count, X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ - X509_NAME lookup and enumeration functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509_NAME_entry_count(const X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(const X509_NAME *name, int loc); int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf, int len); int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf, int len); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions allow an B structure to be examined. The B structure is the same as the B type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject and issuer names. X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve the next index matching B or B after B. B should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned. If B is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned. X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B. X509_NAME_get_entry() retrieves the B from B corresponding to index B. Acceptable values for B run from 0 to (X509_NAME_entry_count(name) - 1). The value returned is an internal pointer which must not be freed. X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(), X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() retrieve the "text" from the first entry in B which matches B or B, if no such entry exists -1 is returned. At most B bytes will be written and the text written to B will be null terminated. The length of the output string written is returned excluding the terminating null. If B is then the amount of space needed in B (excluding the final null) is returned. =head1 NOTES X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() are legacy functions which have various limitations which make them of minimal use in practice. They can only find the first matching entry and will copy the contents of the field verbatim: this can be highly confusing if the target is a multicharacter string type like a BMPString or a UTF8String. For a more general solution X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() or X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the various B utility functions on the result. The list of all relevant B and B can be found in the source code header files Eopenssl/obj_mac.hE and/or Eopenssl/objects.hE. Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL. =head1 EXAMPLES Process all entries: int i; X509_NAME_ENTRY *e; for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(nm); i++) { e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); /* Do something with e */ } Process all commonName entries: int lastpos = -1; X509_NAME_ENTRY *e; for (;;) { lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, lastpos); if (lastpos == -1) break; e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, lastpos); /* Do something with e */ } =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found. X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied NID is invalid. X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries. X509_NAME_get_entry() returns an B pointer to the requested entry or B if the index is invalid. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_printf.pod0000644000000000000000000000314313176625660016642 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_printf, BIO_vprintf, BIO_snprintf, BIO_vsnprintf - formatted output to a BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...) int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args) int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...) int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args) =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_printf() is similar to the standard C printf() function, except that the output is sent to the specified BIO, B, rather than standard output. All common format specifiers are supported. BIO_vprintf() is similar to the vprintf() function found on many platforms, the output is sent to the specified BIO, B, rather than standard output. All common format specifiers are supported. The argument list B is a stdarg argument list. BIO_snprintf() is for platforms that do not have the common snprintf() function. It is like sprintf() except that the size parameter, B, specifies the size of the output buffer. BIO_vsnprintf() is to BIO_snprintf() as BIO_vprintf() is to BIO_printf(). =head1 RETURN VALUES All functions return the number of bytes written, or -1 on error. For BIO_snprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf() this includes when the output buffer is too small. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod0000644000000000000000000001275713176625660021062 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OCSP_resp_get0_certs, OCSP_resp_get0_id, OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at, OCSP_resp_find_status, OCSP_resp_count, OCSP_resp_get0, OCSP_resp_find, OCSP_single_get0_status, OCSP_check_validity - OCSP response utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status, int *reason, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd); int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx); int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last); int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd); const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at( const OCSP_BASICRESP* single); const STACK_OF(X509) *OCSP_resp_get0_certs(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); int OCSP_resp_get0_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, const X509_NAME **pname); int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd, long sec, long maxsec); =head1 DESCRIPTION OCSP_resp_find_status() searches B for an OCSP response for B. If it is successful the fields of the response are returned in B<*status>, B<*reason>, B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd>. The B<*status> value will be one of B, B or B. The B<*reason> and B<*revtime> fields are only set if the status is B. If set the B<*reason> field will be set to the revocation reason which will be one of B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B or B. OCSP_resp_count() returns the number of B structures in B. OCSP_resp_get0() returns the B structure in B corresponding to index B. Where B runs from 0 to OCSP_resp_count(bs) - 1. OCSP_resp_find() searches B for B and returns the index of the first matching entry after B or starting from the beginning if B is -1. OCSP_single_get0_status() extracts the fields of B in B<*reason>, B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd>. OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at() extracts the B field from the single response B. OCSP_resp_get0_certs() returns any certificates included in B. OCSP_resp_get0_id() gets the responder id of . If the responder ID is a name then <*pname> is set to the name and B<*pid> is set to NULL. If the responder ID is by key ID then B<*pid> is set to the key ID and B<*pname> is set to NULL. OCSP_check_validity() checks the validity of B and B values which will be typically obtained from OCSP_resp_find_status() or OCSP_single_get0_status(). If B is non-zero it indicates how many seconds leeway should be allowed in the check. If B is positive it indicates the maximum age of B in seconds. =head1 RETURN VALUES OCSP_resp_find_status() returns 1 if B is found in B and 0 otherwise. OCSP_resp_count() returns the total number of B fields in B. OCSP_resp_get0() returns a pointer to an B structure or B if B is out of range. OCSP_resp_find() returns the index of B in B (which may be 0) or -1 if B was not found. OCSP_single_get0_status() returns the status of B or -1 if an error occurred. =head1 NOTES Applications will typically call OCSP_resp_find_status() using the certificate ID of interest and then check its validity using OCSP_check_validity(). They can then take appropriate action based on the status of the certificate. An OCSP response for a certificate contains B and B fields. Normally the current time should be between these two values. To account for clock skew the B field can be set to non-zero in OCSP_check_validity(). Some responders do not set the B field, this would otherwise mean an ancient response would be considered valid: the B parameter to OCSP_check_validity() can be used to limit the permitted age of responses. The values written to B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd> by OCSP_resp_find_status() and OCSP_single_get0_status() are internal pointers which B be freed up by the calling application. Any or all of these parameters can be set to NULL if their value is not required. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod0000644000000000000000000001523613176625660017701 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl, EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_rsa_keygen_bits, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc - algorithm specific control operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int keytype, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value); #include int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int mbits); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp); #include int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nbits); #include int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int len); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int gen); #include int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nid); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int param_enc); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() sends a control operation to the context B. The key type used must match B if it is not -1. The parameter B is a mask indicating which operations the control can be applied to. The control command is indicated in B and any additional arguments in B and B. Applications will not normally call EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() directly but will instead call one of the algorithm specific macros below. The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() allows an application to send an algorithm specific control operation to a context B in string form. This is intended to be used for options specified on the command line or in text files. The commands supported are documented in the openssl utility command line pages for the option B<-pkeyopt> which is supported by the B, B and B commands. All the remaining "functions" are implemented as macros. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md() macro sets the message digest type used in a signature. It can be used with any public key algorithm supporting signature operations. The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() sets the RSA padding mode for B. The B parameter can take the value RSA_PKCS1_PADDING for PKCS#1 padding, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING for SSLv23 padding, RSA_NO_PADDING for no padding, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING for OAEP padding (encrypt and decrypt only), RSA_X931_PADDING for X9.31 padding (signature operations only) and RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING (sign and verify only). Two RSA padding modes behave differently if EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md() is used. If this macro is called for PKCS#1 padding the plaintext buffer is an actual digest value and is encapsulated in a DigestInfo structure according to PKCS#1 when signing and this structure is expected (and stripped off) when verifying. If this control is not used with RSA and PKCS#1 padding then the supplied data is used directly and not encapsulated. In the case of X9.31 padding for RSA the algorithm identifier byte is added or checked and removed if this control is called. If it is not called then the first byte of the plaintext buffer is expected to be the algorithm identifier byte. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() macro sets the RSA PSS salt length to B as its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. Two special values are supported: -1 sets the salt length to the digest length. When signing -2 sets the salt length to the maximum permissible value. When verifying -2 causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the B block structure. If this macro is not called a salt length value of -2 is used by default. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_rsa_keygen_bits() macro sets the RSA key length for RSA key generation to B. If not specified 1024 bits is used. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp() macro sets the public exponent value for RSA key generation to B currently it should be an odd integer. The B pointer is used internally by this function so it should not be modified or free after the call. If this macro is not called then 65537 is used. The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used for DSA parameter generation to B. If not specified 1024 is used. The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len() sets the length of the DH prime parameter B

for DH parameter generation. If this macro is not called then 1024 is used. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_generator() macro sets DH generator to B for DH parameter generation. If not specified 2 is used. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid() sets the EC curve for EC parameter generation to B. For EC parameter generation this macro must be called or an error occurs because there is no default curve. This function can also be called to set the curve explicitly when generating an EC key. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc() sets the EC parameter encoding to B when generating EC parameters or an EC key. The encoding can be B for explicit parameters (the default in versions of OpenSSL before 1.1.0) or B to use named curve form. For maximum compatibility the named curve form should be used. Note: the B value was only added to OpenSSL 1.1.0; previous versions should use 0 instead. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() and its macros return a positive value for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001511413176625660017660 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_STORE_CTX_new, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_free, X509_STORE_CTX_init, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack, X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_set_default, X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn - X509_STORE_CTX initialisation =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void); void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X609_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name); STACK_OF(X509)* X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions initialise an B structure for subsequent use by X509_verify_cert(). X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly initialised B structure. X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() internally cleans up an B structure. The context can then be reused with an new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init(). X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B. After this call B is no longer valid. If B is NULL nothing is done. X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B for a subsequent verification operation. It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B is only good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second certificate with the same B then you must call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B, the end entity certificate to be verified is set to B and a set of additional certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B. Any or all of the B, B and B parameters can be B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B to B. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates instead of using an B. X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the certificate to be verified in B to B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain() sets the validated chain used by B to be B. Ownership of the chain is transferred to B and should not be free'd by the caller. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain() returns a the internal pointer used by the B that contains the validated chain. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() sets a set of CRLs to use to aid certificate verification to B. These CRLs will only be used if CRL verification is enabled in the associated B structure. This might be used where additional "useful" CRLs are supplied as part of a protocol, for example in a PKCS#7 structure. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() retrieves an internal pointer to the verification parameters associated with B. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted() retrieves an internal pointer to the stack of untrusted certificates associated with B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted() sets the internal point to the stack of untrusted certificates associated with B to B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() sets the internal verification parameter pointer to B. After this call B should not be used. X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() looks up and sets the default verification method to B. This uses the function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() to find an appropriate set of parameters from B. X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates that were used in building the chain following a call to X509_verify_cert(). X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify() provides the capability for overriding the default verify function. This function is responsible for verifying chain signatures and expiration times. A verify function is defined as an X509_STORE_CTX_verify type which has the following signature: int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *); This function should receive the current X509_STORE_CTX as a parameter and return 1 on success or 0 on failure. =head1 NOTES The certificates and CRLs in a store are used internally and should B be freed up until after the associated B is freed. =head1 BUGS The certificates and CRLs in a context are used internally and should B be freed up until after the associated B is freed. Copies should be made or reference counts increased instead. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns an newly allocates context or B is an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_init() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() returns a pointer to an B structure or B if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(), X509_STORE_CTX_free(), X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(), X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(), X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() do not return values. X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates used. =head1 SEE ALSO L L =head1 HISTORY X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_size.pod0000644000000000000000000000166513176625660016203 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_size, DH_bits - get Diffie-Hellman prime size =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DH_size(const DH *dh); int DH_bits(const DH *dh); =head1 DESCRIPTION DH_size() returns the Diffie-Hellman prime size in bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must be allocated for the shared secret computed by DH_compute_key(). DH_bits() returns the number of significant bits. B and Bp> must not be B. =head1 RETURN VALUE The size. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY DH_bits() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_s_accept.pod0000644000000000000000000002002513176625660017117 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_s_accept, BIO_set_accept_name, BIO_set_accept_port, BIO_get_accept_name, BIO_get_accept_port, BIO_new_accept, BIO_set_nbio_accept, BIO_set_accept_bios, BIO_set_bind_mode, BIO_get_bind_mode, BIO_do_accept - accept BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void); long BIO_set_accept_name(BIO *b, char *name); char *BIO_get_accept_name(BIO *b); long BIO_set_accept_port(BIO *b, char *port); char *BIO_get_accept_port(BIO *b); BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *host_port); long BIO_set_nbio_accept(BIO *b, int n); long BIO_set_accept_bios(BIO *b, char *bio); long BIO_set_bind_mode(BIO *b, long mode); long BIO_get_bind_mode(BIO *b); int BIO_do_accept(BIO *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_accept() returns the accept BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platform's TCP/IP socket accept routines. Using accept BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be accepted and data transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction. Read and write operations on an accept BIO will perform I/O on the underlying connection. If no connection is established and the port (see below) is set up properly then the BIO waits for an incoming connection. Accept BIOs support BIO_puts() but not BIO_gets(). If the close flag is set on an accept BIO then any active connection on that chain is shutdown and the socket closed when the BIO is freed. Calling BIO_reset() on an accept BIO will close any active connection and reset the BIO into a state where it awaits another incoming connection. BIO_get_fd() and BIO_set_fd() can be called to retrieve or set the accept socket. See L BIO_set_accept_name() uses the string B to set the accept name. The name is represented as a string of the form "host:port", where "host" is the interface to use and "port" is the port. The host can be "*" or empty which is interpreted as meaning any interface. If the host is an IPv6 address, it has to be enclosed in brackets, for example "[::1]:https". "port" has the same syntax as the port specified in BIO_set_conn_port() for connect BIOs, that is it can be a numerical port string or a string to lookup using getservbyname() and a string table. BIO_set_accept_port() uses the string B to set the accept port. "port" has the same syntax as the port specified in BIO_set_conn_port() for connect BIOs, that is it can be a numerical port string or a string to lookup using getservbyname() and a string table. BIO_new_accept() combines BIO_new() and BIO_set_accept_name() into a single call: that is it creates a new accept BIO with port B. BIO_set_nbio_accept() sets the accept socket to blocking mode (the default) if B is 0 or non blocking mode if B is 1. BIO_set_accept_bios() can be used to set a chain of BIOs which will be duplicated and prepended to the chain when an incoming connection is received. This is useful if, for example, a buffering or SSL BIO is required for each connection. The chain of BIOs must not be freed after this call, they will be automatically freed when the accept BIO is freed. BIO_set_bind_mode() and BIO_get_bind_mode() set and retrieve the current bind mode. If B (the default) is set then another socket cannot be bound to the same port. If B is set then other sockets can bind to the same port. If B is set then and attempt is first made to use BIO_BIN_NORMAL, if this fails and the port is not in use then a second attempt is made using B. BIO_do_accept() serves two functions. When it is first called, after the accept BIO has been setup, it will attempt to create the accept socket and bind an address to it. Second and subsequent calls to BIO_do_accept() will await an incoming connection, or request a retry in non blocking mode. =head1 NOTES When an accept BIO is at the end of a chain it will await an incoming connection before processing I/O calls. When an accept BIO is not at then end of a chain it passes I/O calls to the next BIO in the chain. When a connection is established a new socket BIO is created for the connection and appended to the chain. That is the chain is now accept->socket. This effectively means that attempting I/O on an initial accept socket will await an incoming connection then perform I/O on it. If any additional BIOs have been set using BIO_set_accept_bios() then they are placed between the socket and the accept BIO, that is the chain will be accept->otherbios->socket. If a server wishes to process multiple connections (as is normally the case) then the accept BIO must be made available for further incoming connections. This can be done by waiting for a connection and then calling: connection = BIO_pop(accept); After this call B will contain a BIO for the recently established connection and B will now be a single BIO again which can be used to await further incoming connections. If no further connections will be accepted the B can be freed using BIO_free(). If only a single connection will be processed it is possible to perform I/O using the accept BIO itself. This is often undesirable however because the accept BIO will still accept additional incoming connections. This can be resolved by using BIO_pop() (see above) and freeing up the accept BIO after the initial connection. If the underlying accept socket is non-blocking and BIO_do_accept() is called to await an incoming connection it is possible for BIO_should_io_special() with the reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT. If this happens then it is an indication that an accept attempt would block: the application should take appropriate action to wait until the underlying socket has accepted a connection and retry the call. BIO_set_accept_name(), BIO_get_accept_name(), BIO_set_accept_port(), BIO_get_accept_port(), BIO_set_nbio_accept(), BIO_set_accept_bios(), BIO_set_bind_mode(), BIO_get_bind_mode() and BIO_do_accept() are macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_do_accept(), BIO_set_accept_name(), BIO_set_accept_port(), BIO_set_nbio_accept(), BIO_set_accept_bios(), and BIO_set_bind_mode(), return 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. BIO_get_accept_name() returns the accept name or NULL on error. BIO_get_accept_port() returns the port as a string or NULL on error. BIO_get_bind_mode() returns the set of B flags, or -1 on failure. BIO_new_accept() returns a BIO or NULL on error. =head1 EXAMPLE This example accepts two connections on port 4444, sends messages down each and finally closes both down. BIO *abio, *cbio, *cbio2; /* First call to BIO_accept() sets up accept BIO */ abio = BIO_new_accept("4444"); if (BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* Wait for incoming connection */ if (BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } fprintf(stderr, "Connection 1 established\n"); /* Retrieve BIO for connection */ cbio = BIO_pop(abio); BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Sending out Data on initial connection\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 1\n"); /* Wait for another connection */ if (BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } fprintf(stderr, "Connection 2 established\n"); /* Close accept BIO to refuse further connections */ cbio2 = BIO_pop(abio); BIO_free(abio); BIO_puts(cbio2, "Connection 2: Sending out Data on second\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 2\n"); BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Second connection established\n"); /* Close the two established connections */ BIO_free(cbio); BIO_free(cbio2); =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_f_buffer.pod0000644000000000000000000000567513176625660017132 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_get_buffer_num_lines, BIO_set_read_buffer_size, BIO_set_write_buffer_size, BIO_set_buffer_size, BIO_set_buffer_read_data, BIO_f_buffer - buffering BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void); long BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(BIO *b); long BIO_set_read_buffer_size(BIO *b, long size); long BIO_set_write_buffer_size(BIO *b, long size); long BIO_set_buffer_size(BIO *b, long size); long BIO_set_buffer_read_data(BIO *b, void *buf, long num); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_buffer() returns the buffering BIO method. Data written to a buffering BIO is buffered and periodically written to the next BIO in the chain. Data read from a buffering BIO comes from an internal buffer which is filled from the next BIO in the chain. Both BIO_gets() and BIO_puts() are supported. Calling BIO_reset() on a buffering BIO clears any buffered data. BIO_get_buffer_num_lines() returns the number of lines currently buffered. BIO_set_read_buffer_size(), BIO_set_write_buffer_size() and BIO_set_buffer_size() set the read, write or both read and write buffer sizes to B. The initial buffer size is DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE, currently 4096. Any attempt to reduce the buffer size below DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE is ignored. Any buffered data is cleared when the buffer is resized. BIO_set_buffer_read_data() clears the read buffer and fills it with B bytes of B. If B is larger than the current buffer size the buffer is expanded. =head1 NOTES These functions, other than BIO_f_buffer(), are implemented as macros. Buffering BIOs implement BIO_gets() by using BIO_read() operations on the next BIO in the chain. By prepending a buffering BIO to a chain it is therefore possible to provide BIO_gets() functionality if the following BIOs do not support it (for example SSL BIOs). Data is only written to the next BIO in the chain when the write buffer fills or when BIO_flush() is called. It is therefore important to call BIO_flush() whenever any pending data should be written such as when removing a buffering BIO using BIO_pop(). BIO_flush() may need to be retried if the ultimate source/sink BIO is non blocking. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_f_buffer() returns the buffering BIO method. BIO_get_buffer_num_lines() returns the number of lines buffered (may be 0). BIO_set_read_buffer_size(), BIO_set_write_buffer_size() and BIO_set_buffer_size() return 1 if the buffer was successfully resized or 0 for failure. BIO_set_buffer_read_data() returns 1 if the data was set correctly or 0 if there was an error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_PUBKEY_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001055013176625660017244 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_PUBKEY_new, X509_PUBKEY_free, X509_PUBKEY_set, X509_PUBKEY_get0, X509_PUBKEY_get, d2i_PUBKEY, i2d_PUBKEY, d2i_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_PUBKEY_bio, X509_PUBKEY_set0_param, X509_PUBKEY_get0_param - SubjectPublicKeyInfo public key functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_PUBKEY *X509_PUBKEY_new(void); void X509_PUBKEY_free(X509_PUBKEY *a); int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get0(X509_PUBKEY *key); EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a); int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval, unsigned char *penc, int penclen); int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg, const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen, X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B structure represents the ASN.1 B structure defined in RFC5280 and used in certificates and certificate requests. X509_PUBKEY_new() allocates and initializes an B structure. X509_PUBKEY_free() frees up B structure B. If B is NULL nothing is done. X509_PUBKEY_set() sets the public key in B<*x> to the public key contained in the B structure B. If B<*x> is not NULL any existing public key structure will be freed. X509_PUBKEY_get0() returns the public key contained in B. The returned value is an internal pointer which B be freed after use. X509_PUBKEY_get() is similar to X509_PUBKEY_get0() except the reference count on the returned key is incremented so it B be freed using EVP_PKEY_free() after use. d2i_PUBKEY() and i2d_PUBKEY() decode and encode an B structure using B format. They otherwise follow the conventions of other ASN.1 functions such as d2i_X509(). d2i_PUBKEY_bio(), d2i_PUBKEY_fp(), i2d_PUBKEY_bio() and i2d_PUBKEY_fp() are similar to d2i_PUBKEY() and i2d_PUBKEY() except they decode or encode using a B or B pointer. X509_PUBKEY_set0_param() sets the public key parameters of B. The OID associated with the algorithm is set to B. The type of the algorithm parameters is set to B using the structure B. The encoding of the public key itself is set to the B bytes contained in buffer B. On success ownership of all the supplied parameters is passed to B so they must not be freed after the call. X509_PUBKEY_get0_param() retrieves the public key parameters from B, B<*ppkalg> is set to the associated OID and the encoding consists of B<*ppklen> bytes at B<*pk>, B<*pa> is set to the associated AlgorithmIdentifier for the public key. If the value of any of these parameters is not required it can be set to B. All of the retrieved pointers are internal and must not be freed after the call. =head1 NOTES The B functions can be used to encode and decode public keys in a standard format. In many cases applications will not call the B functions directly: they will instead call wrapper functions such as X509_get0_pubkey(). =head1 RETURN VALUES If the allocation fails, X509_PUBKEY_new() returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. X509_PUBKEY_free() does not return a value. X509_PUBKEY_get0() and X509_PUBKEY_get() return a pointer to an B structure or B if an error occurs. X509_PUBKEY_set(), X509_PUBKEY_set0_param() and X509_PUBKEY_get0_param() return 1 for success and 0 if an error occurred. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_find_type.pod0000644000000000000000000000361013176625660017320 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_find_type, BIO_next, BIO_method_type - BIO chain traversal =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *b, int bio_type); BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b); int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION The BIO_find_type() searches for a BIO of a given type in a chain, starting at BIO B. If B is a specific type (such as B) then a search is made for a BIO of that type. If B is a general type (such as B) then the next matching BIO of the given general type is searched for. BIO_find_type() returns the next matching BIO or NULL if none is found. The following general types are defined: B, B, and B. For a list of the specific types, see the B header file. BIO_next() returns the next BIO in a chain. It can be used to traverse all BIOs in a chain or used in conjunction with BIO_find_type() to find all BIOs of a certain type. BIO_method_type() returns the type of a BIO. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_find_type() returns a matching BIO or NULL for no match. BIO_next() returns the next BIO in a chain. BIO_method_type() returns the type of the BIO B. =head1 EXAMPLE Traverse a chain looking for digest BIOs: BIO *btmp; btmp = in_bio; /* in_bio is chain to search through */ do { btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD); if (btmp == NULL) break; /* Not found */ /* btmp is a digest BIO, do something with it ...*/ ... btmp = BIO_next(btmp); } while (btmp); =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod0000644000000000000000000000461013176625660016770 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters, EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters, EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters, EVP_PKEY_cmp - public key parameter and comparison functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from); int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters() returns 1 if the public key parameters of B are missing and 0 if they are present or the algorithm doesn't use parameters. The function EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() copies the parameters from key B to key B. An error is returned if the parameters are missing in B or present in both B and B and mismatch. If the parameters in B and B are both present and match this function has no effect. The function EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters() compares the parameters of keys B and B. The function EVP_PKEY_cmp() compares the public key components and parameters (if present) of keys B and B. =head1 NOTES The main purpose of the functions EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters() and EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() is to handle public keys in certificates where the parameters are sometimes omitted from a public key if they are inherited from the CA that signed it. Since OpenSSL private keys contain public key components too the function EVP_PKEY_cmp() can also be used to determine if a private key matches a public key. =head1 RETURN VALUES The function EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters() returns 1 if the public key parameters of B are missing and 0 if they are present or the algorithm doesn't use parameters. These functions EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. The function EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters() and EVP_PKEY_cmp() return 1 if the keys match, 0 if they don't match, -1 if the key types are different and -2 if the operation is not supported. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000253013176625660017247 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASN1_OBJECT_new, ASN1_OBJECT_free - object allocation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void); void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION The ASN1_OBJECT allocation routines, allocate and free an ASN1_OBJECT structure, which represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER. ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates and initializes an ASN1_OBJECT structure. ASN1_OBJECT_free() frees up the B structure B. If B is NULL, nothing is done. =head1 NOTES Although ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates a new ASN1_OBJECT structure it is almost never used in applications. The ASN1 object utility functions such as OBJ_nid2obj() are used instead. =head1 RETURN VALUES If the allocation fails, ASN1_OBJECT_new() returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. ASN1_OBJECT_free() returns no value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001074513176625660020013 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OCSP_sendreq_new, OCSP_sendreq_nbio, OCSP_REQ_CTX_free, OCSP_set_max_response_length, OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header, OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req, OCSP_sendreq_bio - OCSP responder query functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int maxline); int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx); void OCSP_set_max_response_length(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, unsigned long len); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *name, const char *value); int OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, OCSP_REQUEST *req); OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int maxline); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function OCSP_sendreq_new() returns an B structure using the responder B, the URL path B, the OCSP request B and with a response header maximum line length of B. If B is zero a default value of 4k is used. The OCSP request B may be set to B and provided later if required. OCSP_sendreq_nbio() performs non-blocking I/O on the OCSP request context B. When the operation is complete it returns the response in B<*presp>. OCSP_REQ_CTX_free() frees up the OCSP context B. OCSP_set_max_response_length() sets the maximum response length for B to B. If the response exceeds this length an error occurs. If not set a default value of 100k is used. OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() adds header B with value B to the context B. It can be called more than once to add multiple headers. It B be called before any calls to OCSP_sendreq_nbio(). The B parameter in the initial to OCSP_sendreq_new() call MUST be set to B if additional headers are set. OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() sets the OCSP request in B to B. This function should be called after any calls to OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(). OCSP_sendreq_bio() performs an OCSP request using the responder B, the URL path B, the OCSP request B and with a response header maximum line length of B. If B is zero a default value of 4k is used. =head1 RETURN VALUES OCSP_sendreq_new() returns a valid B structure or B if an error occurred. OCSP_sendreq_nbio() returns B<1> if the operation was completed successfully, B<-1> if the operation should be retried and B<0> if an error occurred. OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() and OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() return B<1> for success and B<0> for failure. OCSP_sendreq_bio() returns the B structure sent by the responder or B if an error occurred. OCSP_REQ_CTX_free() and OCSP_set_max_response_length() do not return values. =head1 NOTES These functions only perform a minimal HTTP query to a responder. If an application wishes to support more advanced features it should use an alternative more complete HTTP library. Currently only HTTP POST queries to responders are supported. The arguments to OCSP_sendreq_new() correspond to the components of the URL. For example if the responder URL is B the BIO B should be connected to host B on port 80 and B should be set to B<"/ocspreq"> The headers added with OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() are of the form "B: B" or just "B" if B is B. So to add a Host header for B you would call: OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, "Host", "ocsp.com"); If OCSP_sendreq_nbio() indicates an operation should be retried the corresponding BIO can be examined to determine which operation (read or write) should be retried and appropriate action taken (for example a select() call on the underlying socket). OCSP_sendreq_bio() does not support retries and so cannot handle non-blocking I/O efficiently. It is retained for compatibility and its use in new applications is not recommended. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_mod_inverse.pod0000644000000000000000000000201113176625660017531 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_mod_inverse - compute inverse modulo n =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_mod_inverse() computes the inverse of B modulo B places the result in B (C<(a*r)%n==1>). If B is NULL, a new B is created. B is a previously allocated B used for temporary variables. B may be the same B as B or B. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_mod_inverse() returns the B containing the inverse, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/d2i_PrivateKey.pod0000644000000000000000000000527013176625660017473 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME d2i_PrivateKey, d2i_PublicKey, d2i_AutoPrivateKey, i2d_PrivateKey, i2d_PublicKey, d2i_PrivateKey_bio, d2i_PrivateKey_fp - decode and encode functions for reading and saving EVP_PKEY structures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PublicKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp); int i2d_PublicKey(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a) =head1 DESCRIPTION d2i_PrivateKey() decodes a private key using algorithm B. It attempts to use any key specific format or PKCS#8 unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo format. The B parameter should be a public key algorithm constant such as B. An error occurs if the decoded key does not match B. d2i_PublicKey() does the same for public keys. d2i_AutoPrivateKey() is similar to d2i_PrivateKey() except it attempts to automatically detect the private key format. i2d_PrivateKey() encodes B. It uses a key specific format or, if none is defined for that key type, PKCS#8 unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo format. i2d_PublicKey() does the same for public keys. These functions are similar to the d2i_X509() functions; see L. =head1 NOTES All these functions use DER format and unencrypted keys. Applications wishing to encrypt or decrypt private keys should use other functions such as d2i_PKC8PrivateKey() instead. If the B<*a> is not NULL when calling d2i_PrivateKey() or d2i_AutoPrivateKey() (i.e. an existing structure is being reused) and the key format is PKCS#8 then B<*a> will be freed and replaced on a successful call. =head1 RETURN VALUES d2i_PrivateKey() and d2i_AutoPrivateKey() return a valid B structure or B if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by calling L. i2d_PrivateKey() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by calling L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod0000644000000000000000000000422013176625660020404 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_hostserv_priorities, BIO_parse_hostserv - utility routines to parse a standard host and service string =head1 SYNOPSIS #include enum BIO_hostserv_priorities { BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV }; int BIO_parse_hostserv(const char *hostserv, char **host, char **service, enum BIO_hostserv_priorities hostserv_prio); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_parse_hostserv() will parse the information given in B, create strings with the host name and service name and give those back via B and B. Those will need to be freed after they are used. B helps determine if B shall be interpreted primarily as a host name or a service name in ambiguous cases. The syntax the BIO_parse_hostserv() recognises is: host + ':' + service host + ':' + '*' host + ':' ':' + service '*' + ':' + service host service The host part can be a name or an IP address. If it's a IPv6 address, it MUST be enclosed in brackets, such as '[::1]'. The service part can be a service name or its port number. The returned values will depend on the given B string and B, as follows: host + ':' + service => *host = "host", *service = "service" host + ':' + '*' => *host = "host", *service = NULL host + ':' => *host = "host", *service = NULL ':' + service => *host = NULL, *service = "service" '*' + ':' + service => *host = NULL, *service = "service" in case no ':' is present in the string, the result depends on hostserv_prio, as follows: when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST host => *host = "host", *service untouched when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV service => *host untouched, *service = "service" =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_size.pod0000644000000000000000000000157013176625660016330 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_size, RSA_bits - get RSA modulus size =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa); int RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_size() returns the RSA modulus size in bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must be allocated for an RSA encrypted value. RSA_bits() returns the number of significant bits. B and Bn> must not be B. =head1 RETURN VALUE The size. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY RSA_bits() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_private_encrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000414013176625660020570 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt - low level signature operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions handle RSA signatures at a low level. RSA_private_encrypt() signs the B bytes at B (usually a message digest with an algorithm identifier) using the private key B and stores the signature in B. B must point to B bytes of memory. B denotes one of the following modes: =over 4 =item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This function does not handle the B specified in PKCS #1. When generating or verifying PKCS #1 signatures, L and L should be used. =item RSA_NO_PADDING Raw RSA signature. This mode should I be used to implement cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. Signing user data directly with RSA is insecure. =back RSA_public_decrypt() recovers the message digest from the B bytes long signature at B using the signer's public key B. B must point to a memory section large enough to hold the message digest (which is smaller than B). B is the padding mode that was used to sign the data. =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_private_encrypt() returns the size of the signature (i.e., RSA_size(rsa)). RSA_public_decrypt() returns the size of the recovered message digest. On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_check_ca.pod0000644000000000000000000000232013176625660017110 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_check_ca - check if given certificate is CA certificate =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_check_ca(X509 *cert); =head1 DESCRIPTION This function checks if given certificate is CA certificate (can be used to sign other certificates). =head1 RETURN VALUE Function return 0, if it is not CA certificate, 1 if it is proper X509v3 CA certificate with B extension CA:TRUE, 3, if it is self-signed X509 v1 certificate, 4, if it is certificate with B extension with bit B set, but without B, and 5 if it has outdated Netscape Certificate Type extension telling that it is CA certificate. Actually, any non-zero value means that this certificate could have been used to sign other certificates. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod0000644000000000000000000001416113176625660017510 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_check_host, X509_check_email, X509_check_ip, X509_check_ip_asc - X.509 certificate matching =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_check_host(X509 *, const char *name, size_t namelen, unsigned int flags, char **peername); int X509_check_email(X509 *, const char *address, size_t addresslen, unsigned int flags); int X509_check_ip(X509 *, const unsigned char *address, size_t addresslen, unsigned int flags); int X509_check_ip_asc(X509 *, const char *address, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION The certificate matching functions are used to check whether a certificate matches a given host name, email address, or IP address. The validity of the certificate and its trust level has to be checked by other means. X509_check_host() checks if the certificate Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or Subject CommonName (CN) matches the specified host name, which must be encoded in the preferred name syntax described in section 3.5 of RFC 1034. By default, wildcards are supported and they match only in the left-most label; but they may match part of that label with an explicit prefix or suffix. For example, by default, the host B "www.example.com" would match a certificate with a SAN or CN value of "*.example.com", "w*.example.com" or "*w.example.com". Per section 6.4.2 of RFC 6125, B values representing international domain names must be given in A-label form. The B argument must be the number of characters in the name string or zero in which case the length is calculated with strlen(B). When B starts with a dot (e.g ".example.com"), it will be matched by a certificate valid for any sub-domain of B, (see also B below). When the certificate is matched, and B is not NULL, a pointer to a copy of the matching SAN or CN from the peer certificate is stored at the address passed in B. The application is responsible for freeing the peername via OPENSSL_free() when it is no longer needed. X509_check_email() checks if the certificate matches the specified email B

. Only the mailbox syntax of RFC 822 is supported, comments are not allowed, and no attempt is made to normalize quoted characters. The B argument must be the number of characters in the address string or zero in which case the length is calculated with strlen(B
). X509_check_ip() checks if the certificate matches a specified IPv4 or IPv6 address. The B
array is in binary format, in network byte order. The length is either 4 (IPv4) or 16 (IPv6). Only explicitly marked addresses in the certificates are considered; IP addresses stored in DNS names and Common Names are ignored. X509_check_ip_asc() is similar, except that the NUL-terminated string B
is first converted to the internal representation. The B argument is usually 0. It can be the bitwise OR of the flags: =over 4 =item B, =item B, =item B, =item B, =item B. =item B. =back The B flag causes the function to consider the subject DN even if the certificate contains at least one subject alternative name of the right type (DNS name or email address as appropriate); the default is to ignore the subject DN when at least one corresponding subject alternative names is present. The B flag causes the function to never consider the subject DN even if the certificate contains no subject alternative names of the right type (DNS name or email address as appropriate); the default is to use the subject DN when no corresponding subject alternative names are present. If set, B disables wildcard expansion; this only applies to B. If set, B suppresses support for "*" as wildcard pattern in labels that have a prefix or suffix, such as: "www*" or "*www"; this only applies to B. If set, B allows a "*" that constitutes the complete label of a DNS name (e.g. "*.example.com") to match more than one label in B; this flag only applies to B. If set, B restricts B values which start with ".", that would otherwise match any sub-domain in the peer certificate, to only match direct child sub-domains. Thus, for instance, with this flag set a B of ".example.com" would match a peer certificate with a DNS name of "www.example.com", but would not match a peer certificate with a DNS name of "www.sub.example.com"; this flag only applies to B. =head1 RETURN VALUES The functions return 1 for a successful match, 0 for a failed match and -1 for an internal error: typically a memory allocation failure or an ASN.1 decoding error. All functions can also return -2 if the input is malformed. For example, X509_check_host() returns -2 if the provided B contains embedded NULs. =head1 NOTES Applications are encouraged to use X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() rather than explicitly calling L. Host name checks are out of scope with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal checks will be suppressed as appropriate when DANE support is added to OpenSSL. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod0000644000000000000000000000773213176625660017061 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASN1_TYPE_get, ASN1_TYPE_set, ASN1_TYPE_set1, ASN1_TYPE_cmp, ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence, ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence - ASN1_TYPE utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int ASN1_TYPE_get(const ASN1_TYPE *a); void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value); int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value); int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b); void *ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const ASN1_TYPE *t); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *s, ASN1_TYPE **t); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions allow an ASN1_TYPE structure to be manipulated. The ASN1_TYPE structure can contain any ASN.1 type or constructed type such as a SEQUENCE: it is effectively equivalent to the ASN.1 ANY type. ASN1_TYPE_get() returns the type of B. ASN1_TYPE_set() sets the value of B to B and B. This function uses the pointer B internally so it must B be freed up after the call. ASN1_TYPE_set1() sets the value of B to B a copy of B. ASN1_TYPE_cmp() compares ASN.1 types B and B and returns 0 if they are identical and non-zero otherwise. ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence() attempts to parse the SEQUENCE present in B using the ASN.1 structure B. If successful it returns a pointer to the ASN.1 structure corresponding to B which must be freed by the caller. If it fails it return NULL. ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence() attempts to encode the ASN.1 structure B corresponding to B into an ASN1_TYPE. If successful the encoded ASN1_TYPE is returned. If B and B<*t> are not NULL the encoded type is written to B overwriting any existing data. If B is not NULL but B<*t> is NULL the returned ASN1_TYPE is written to B<*t>. =head1 NOTES The type and meaning of the B parameter for ASN1_TYPE_set() and ASN1_TYPE_set1() is determined by the B parameter. If B is V_ASN1_NULL B is ignored. If B is V_ASN1_BOOLEAN then the boolean is set to TRUE if B is not NULL. If B is V_ASN1_OBJECT then value is an ASN1_OBJECT structure. Otherwise B is and ASN1_STRING structure. If B corresponds to a primitive type (or a string type) then the contents of the ASN1_STRING contain the content octets of the type. If B corresponds to a constructed type or a tagged type (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_SET or V_ASN1_OTHER) then the ASN1_STRING contains the entire ASN.1 encoding verbatim (including tag and length octets). ASN1_TYPE_cmp() may not return zero if two types are equivalent but have different encodings. For example the single content octet of the boolean TRUE value under BER can have any non-zero encoding but ASN1_TYPE_cmp() will only return zero if the values are the same. If either or both of the parameters passed to ASN1_TYPE_cmp() is NULL the return value is non-zero. Technically if both parameters are NULL the two types could be absent OPTIONAL fields and so should match, however passing NULL values could also indicate a programming error (for example an unparseable type which returns NULL) for types which do B match. So applications should handle the case of two absent values separately. =head1 RETURN VALUES ASN1_TYPE_get() returns the type of the ASN1_TYPE argument. ASN1_TYPE_set() does not return a value. ASN1_TYPE_set1() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. ASN1_TYPE_cmp() returns 0 if the types are identical and non-zero otherwise. ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence() returns a pointer to an ASN.1 structure or NULL on failure. ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence() return an ASN1_TYPE structure if it succeeds or NULL on failure. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.pod0000644000000000000000000000334713176625660021130 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING - RSA signatures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa); int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() signs the octet string B of size B using the private key B represented in DER using PKCS #1 padding. It stores the signature in B and the signature size in B. B must point to B bytes of memory. B is ignored. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(). RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() verifies that the signature B of size B is the DER representation of a given octet string B of size B. B is ignored. B is the signer's public key. =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() returns 1 on successful verification, 0 otherwise. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 BUGS These functions serve no recognizable purpose. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_print.pod0000644000000000000000000000237513176625660016516 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_print, RSA_print_fp, DSAparams_print, DSAparams_print_fp, DSA_print, DSA_print_fp, DHparams_print, DHparams_print_fp - print cryptographic parameters =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_print(BIO *bp, RSA *x, int offset); int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *x, int offset); #include int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x); int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x); int DSA_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x, int offset); int DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x, int offset); #include int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, DH *x); int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DH *x); =head1 DESCRIPTION A human-readable hexadecimal output of the components of the RSA key, DSA parameters or key or DH parameters is printed to B or B. The output lines are indented by B spaces. =head1 RETURN VALUES These functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod0000644000000000000000000000350413176625660017716 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_verify_cert - discover and verify X509 certificate chain =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION The X509_verify_cert() function attempts to discover and validate a certificate chain based on parameters in B. A complete description of the process is contained in the L manual page. =head1 RETURN VALUES If a complete chain can be built and validated this function returns 1, otherwise it return zero, in exceptional circumstances it can also return a negative code. If the function fails additional error information can be obtained by examining B using, for example X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(). =head1 NOTES Applications rarely call this function directly but it is used by OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and SSL/TLS code. A negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can occur if it is invoked incorrectly, such as with no certificate set in B, or when it is called twice in succession without reinitialising B for the second call. A negative return value can also happen due to internal resource problems or if a retry operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with standard lookup methods). Applications must check for <= 0 return value on error. =head1 BUGS This function uses the header B as opposed to most chain verification functions which use B. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_EncodeInit.pod0000644000000000000000000002001513176625660017377 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num, EVP_EncodeInit, EVP_EncodeUpdate, EVP_EncodeFinal, EVP_EncodeBlock, EVP_DecodeInit, EVP_DecodeUpdate, EVP_DecodeFinal, EVP_DecodeBlock - EVP base 64 encode/decode routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_ENCODE_CTX *EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(void); void EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *dctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX *sctx); int EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); int EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n); void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP encode routines provide a high level interface to base 64 encoding and decoding. Base 64 encoding converts binary data into a printable form that uses the characters A-Z, a-z, 0-9, "+" and "/" to represent the data. For every 3 bytes of binary data provided 4 bytes of base 64 encoded data will be produced plus some occasional newlines (see below). If the input data length is not a multiple of 3 then the output data will be padded at the end using the "=" character. EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new() allocates, initializes and returns a context to be used for the encode/decode functions. EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free() cleans up an encode/decode context B and frees up the space allocated to it. Encoding of binary data is performed in blocks of 48 input bytes (or less for the final block). For each 48 byte input block encoded 64 bytes of base 64 data is output plus an additional newline character (i.e. 65 bytes in total). The final block (which may be less than 48 bytes) will output 4 bytes for every 3 bytes of input. If the data length is not divisible by 3 then a full 4 bytes is still output for the final 1 or 2 bytes of input. Similarly a newline character will also be output. EVP_EncodeInit() initialises B for the start of a new encoding operation. EVP_EncodeUpdate() encode B bytes of data found in the buffer pointed to by B. The output is stored in the buffer B and the number of bytes output is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the buffer at B is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. Only full blocks of data (48 bytes) will be immediately processed and output by this function. Any remainder is held in the B object and will be processed by a subsequent call to EVP_EncodeUpdate() or EVP_EncodeFinal(). To calculate the required size of the output buffer add together the value of B with the amount of unprocessed data held in B and divide the result by 48 (ignore any remainder). This gives the number of blocks of data that will be processed. Ensure the output buffer contains 65 bytes of storage for each block, plus an additional byte for a NUL terminator. EVP_EncodeUpdate() may be called repeatedly to process large amounts of input data. In the event of an error EVP_EncodeUpdate() will set B<*outl> to 0 and return 0. On success 1 will be returned. EVP_EncodeFinal() must be called at the end of an encoding operation. It will process any partial block of data remaining in the B object. The output data will be stored in B and the length of the data written will be stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that B is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data which will never be more than 65 bytes plus an additional NUL terminator (i.e. 66 bytes in total). EVP_ENCODE_CTX_copy() can be used to copy a context B to a context B. B must be initialized before calling this function. EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num() will return the number of as yet unprocessed bytes still to be encoded or decoded that are pending in the B object. EVP_EncodeBlock() encodes a full block of input data in B and of length B and stores it in B. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of output data will be produced. If B is not divisible by 3 then the block is encoded as a final block of data and the output is padded such that it is always divisible by 4. Additionally a NUL terminator character will be added. For example if 16 bytes of input data is provided then 24 bytes of encoded data is created plus 1 byte for a NUL terminator (i.e. 25 bytes in total). The length of the data generated I the NUL terminator is returned from the function. EVP_DecodeInit() initialises B for the start of a new decoding operation. EVP_DecodeUpdate() decodes B characters of data found in the buffer pointed to by B. The output is stored in the buffer B and the number of bytes output is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the buffer at B is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. This function will attempt to decode as much data as possible in 4 byte chunks. Any whitespace, newline or carriage return characters are ignored. Any partial chunk of unprocessed data (1, 2 or 3 bytes) that remains at the end will be held in the B object and processed by a subsequent call to EVP_DecodeUpdate(). If any illegal base 64 characters are encountered or if the base 64 padding character "=" is encountered in the middle of the data then the function returns -1 to indicate an error. A return value of 0 or 1 indicates successful processing of the data. A return value of 0 additionally indicates that the last input data characters processed included the base 64 padding character "=" and therefore no more non-padding character data is expected to be processed. For every 4 valid base 64 bytes processed (ignoring whitespace, carriage returns and line feeds), 3 bytes of binary output data will be produced (or less at the end of the data where the padding character "=" has been used). EVP_DecodeFinal() must be called at the end of a decoding operation. If there is any unprocessed data still in B then the input data must not have been a multiple of 4 and therefore an error has occurred. The function will return -1 in this case. Otherwise the function returns 1 on success. EVP_DecodeBlock() will decode the block of B characters of base 64 data contained in B and store the result in B. Any leading whitespace will be trimmed as will any trailing whitespace, newlines, carriage returns or EOF characters. After such trimming the length of the data in B must be divisible by 4. For every 4 input bytes exactly 3 output bytes will be produced. The output will be padded with 0 bits if necessary to ensure that the output is always 3 bytes for every 4 input bytes. This function will return the length of the data decoded or -1 on error. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new() returns a pointer to the newly allocated EVP_ENCODE_CTX object or NULL on error. EVP_ENCODE_CTX_num() returns the number of bytes pending encoding or decoding in B. EVP_EncodeUpdate() returns 0 on error or 1 on success. EVP_EncodeBlock() returns the number of bytes encoded excluding the NUL terminator. EVP_DecodeUpdate() returns -1 on error and 0 or 1 on success. If 0 is returned then no more non-padding base 64 characters are expected. EVP_DecodeFinal() returns -1 on error or 1 on success. EVP_DecodeBlock() returns the length of the data decoded or -1 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC.pod0000644000000000000000000000473413176625660017263 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC, PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1 - password based derivation routines with salt and iteration count =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out); int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *out); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() derives a key from a password using a salt and iteration count as specified in RFC 2898. B is the password used in the derivation of length B. B is an optional parameter and can be NULL. If B is -1, then the function will calculate the length of B using strlen(). B is the salt used in the derivation of length B. If the B is NULL, then B must be 0. The function will not attempt to calculate the length of the B because it is not assumed to be NULL terminated. B is the iteration count and its value should be greater than or equal to 1. RFC 2898 suggests an iteration count of at least 1000. Any B less than 1 is treated as a single iteration. B is the message digest function used in the derivation. Values include any of the EVP_* message digests. PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1() calls PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() with EVP_sha1(). The derived key will be written to B. The size of the B buffer is specified via B. =head1 NOTES A typical application of this function is to derive keying material for an encryption algorithm from a password in the B, a salt in B, and an iteration count. Increasing the B parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it harder for an attacker to perform a brute force attack using a large number of candidate passwords. =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() and PBKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1() return 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod0000644000000000000000000000614713176625660017364 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_set_default_method, DH_get_default_method, DH_set_method, DH_new_method, DH_OpenSSL - select DH method =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth); const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void); int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth); DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine); const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION A B specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for Diffie-Hellman operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for important information about how these DH API functions are affected by the use of B API calls. Initially, the default DH_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by DH_OpenSSL(). DH_set_default_method() makes B the default method for all DH structures created later. B: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for DH, so this function is no longer recommended. This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time as other OpenSSL functions. DH_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default DH_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. DH_set_method() selects B to perform all operations using the key B. This will replace the DH_METHOD used by the DH key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have DH keys that only work with certain DH_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DH_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results. DH_new_method() allocates and initializes a DH structure so that B will be used for the DH operations. If B is NULL, the default ENGINE for DH operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DH_METHOD controlled by DH_set_default_method() is used. A new DH_METHOD object may be constructed using DH_meth_new() (see L). =head1 RETURN VALUES DH_OpenSSL() and DH_get_default_method() return pointers to the respective Bs. DH_set_default_method() returns no value. DH_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B was successfully set as the method for B (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE). DH_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by L if the allocation fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_generate_key.pod0000644000000000000000000000470413176625660020022 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_generate_key_ex, RSA_generate_key - generate RSA key pair =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L RSA *RSA_generate_key(int num, unsigned long e, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_generate_key_ex() generates a key pair and stores it in the B structure provided in B. The pseudo-random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_generate_key_ex(). The modulus size will be of length B, and the public exponent will be B. Key sizes with B E 1024 should be considered insecure. The exponent is an odd number, typically 3, 17 or 65537. A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress of the key generation. If B is not B, it will be called as follows using the BN_GENCB_call() function described on the L page. =over 2 =item * While a random prime number is generated, it is called as described in L. =item * When the n-th randomly generated prime is rejected as not suitable for the key, B is called. =item * When a random p has been found with p-1 relatively prime to B, it is called as B. =back The process is then repeated for prime q with B. RSA_generate_key() is deprecated (new applications should use RSA_generate_key_ex() instead). RSA_generate_key() works in the same way as RSA_generate_key_ex() except it uses "old style" call backs. See L for further details. =head1 RETURN VALUE RSA_generate_key_ex() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. RSA_generate_key() returns the key on success or B on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 BUGS B is used with two different meanings. RSA_generate_key() goes into an infinite loop for illegal input values. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod0000644000000000000000000001013213176625660020343 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASN1_tag2str, ASN1_STRING_print_ex, ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp, ASN1_STRING_print - ASN1_STRING output routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *out, const ASN1_STRING *str); const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions output an B structure. B is used to represent all the ASN1 string types. ASN1_STRING_print_ex() outputs B to B, the format is determined by the options B. ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp() is identical except it outputs to B instead. ASN1_STRING_print() prints B to B but using a different format to ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). It replaces unprintable characters (other than CR, LF) with '.'. ASN1_tag2str() returns a human-readable name of the specified ASN.1 B. =head1 NOTES ASN1_STRING_print() is a legacy function which should be avoided in new applications. Although there are a large number of options frequently B is suitable, or on UTF8 terminals B. The complete set of supported options for B is listed below. Various characters can be escaped. If B is set the characters determined by RFC2253 are escaped. If B is set control characters are escaped. If B is set characters with the MSB set are escaped: this option should B be used if the terminal correctly interprets UTF8 sequences. Escaping takes several forms. If the character being escaped is a 16 bit character then the form "\UXXXX" is used using exactly four characters for the hex representation. If it is 32 bits then "\WXXXXXXXX" is used using eight characters of its hex representation. These forms will only be used if UTF8 conversion is not set (see below). Printable characters are normally escaped using the backslash '\' character. If B is set then the whole string is instead surrounded by double quote characters: this is arguably more readable than the backslash notation. Other characters use the "\XX" using exactly two characters of the hex representation. If B is set then characters are converted to UTF8 format first. If the terminal supports the display of UTF8 sequences then this option will correctly display multi byte characters. If B is set then the string type is not interpreted at all: everything is assumed to be one byte per character. This is primarily for debugging purposes and can result in confusing output in multi character strings. If B is set then the string type itself is printed out before its value (for example "BMPSTRING"), this actually uses ASN1_tag2str(). The content of a string instead of being interpreted can be "dumped": this just outputs the value of the string using the form #XXXX using hex format for each octet. If B is set then any type is dumped. Normally non character string types (such as OCTET STRING) are assumed to be one byte per character, if B is set then they will be dumped instead. When a type is dumped normally just the content octets are printed, if B is set then the complete encoding is dumped instead (including tag and length octets). B includes all the flags required by RFC2253. It is equivalent to: ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_set_callback.pod0000644000000000000000000001354713176625660017760 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_set_callback_ex, BIO_get_callback_ex, BIO_set_callback, BIO_get_callback, BIO_set_callback_arg, BIO_get_callback_arg, BIO_debug_callback, BIO_callback_fn_ex, BIO_callback_fn - BIO callback functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef long (*BIO_callback_fn_ex)(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, size_t len, int argi, long argl, int ret, size_t *processed); typedef long (*BIO_callback_fn)(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); void BIO_set_callback_ex(BIO *b, BIO_callback_fn_ex callback); BIO_callback_fn_ex BIO_get_callback_ex(const BIO *b); void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b, BIO_callack_fn cb); BIO_callack_fn BIO_get_callback(BIO *b); void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg); char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b); long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_set_callback_ex() and BIO_get_callback_ex() set and retrieve the BIO callback. The callback is called during most high level BIO operations. It can be used for debugging purposes to trace operations on a BIO or to modify its operation. BIO_set_callback() and BIO_get_callback() set and retrieve the old format BIO callback. New code should not use these functions, but they are retained for backwards compatbility. Any callback set via BIO_set_callback_ex() will get called in preference to any set by BIO_set_callback(). BIO_set_callback_arg() and BIO_get_callback_arg() are macros which can be used to set and retrieve an argument for use in the callback. BIO_debug_callback() is a standard debugging callback which prints out information relating to each BIO operation. If the callback argument is set it is interpreted as a BIO to send the information to, otherwise stderr is used. BIO_callback_fn_ex() is the type of the callback function and BIO_callback_fn() is the type of the old format callback function. The meaning of each argument is described below: =over 4 =item B The BIO the callback is attached to is passed in B. =item B B is set to the operation being performed. For some operations the callback is called twice, once before and once after the actual operation, the latter case has B or'ed with BIO_CB_RETURN. =item B The length of the data requested to be read or written. This is only useful if B is BIO_CB_READ, BIO_CB_WRITE or BIO_CB_GETS. =item B B B The meaning of the arguments B, B and B depends on the value of B, that is the operation being performed. =item B B is a pointer to a location which will be updated with the amount of data that was actually read or written. Only used for BIO_CB_READ, BIO_CB_WRITE, BIO_CB_GETS and BIO_CB_PUTS. =item B B is the return value that would be returned to the application if no callback were present. The actual value returned is the return value of the callback itself. In the case of callbacks called before the actual BIO operation 1 is placed in B, if the return value is not positive it will be immediately returned to the application and the BIO operation will not be performed. =back The callback should normally simply return B when it has finished processing, unless it specifically wishes to modify the value returned to the application. =head1 CALLBACK OPERATIONS In the notes below, B defers to the actual callback function that is called. =over 4 =item B callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_FREE, NULL, 0, 0, 0L, 1L, NULL) or callback(b, BIO_CB_FREE, NULL, 0L, 0L, 1L) is called before the free operation. =item B callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_READ, data, dlen, 0, 0L, 1L, readbytes) or callback(b, BIO_CB_READ, data, dlen, 0L, 1L) is called before the read and callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0, 0L, retvalue, readbytes) or callback(b, BIO_CB_READ|BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0L, retvalue) after. =item B callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, data, dlen, 0, 0L, 1L, written) or callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, datat, dlen, 0L, 1L) is called before the write and callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0, 0L, retvalue, written) or callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN, data, dlen, 0L, retvalue) after. =item B callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_GETS, buf, size, 0, 0L, 1, NULL, NULL) or callback(b, BIO_CB_GETS, buf, size, 0L, 1L) is called before the operation and callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_GETS | BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, size, 0, 0L, retvalue, readbytes) or callback(b, BIO_CB_GETS|BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, size, 0L, retvalue) after. =item B callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_PUTS, buf, 0, 0, 0L, 1L, NULL); or callback(b, BIO_CB_PUTS, buf, 0, 0L, 1L) is called before the operation and callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_PUTS | BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, 0, 0, 0L, retvalue, written) or callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN, buf, 0, 0L, retvalue) after. =item B callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, parg, 0, cmd, larg, 1L, NULL) or callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL, parg, cmd, larg, 1L) is called before the call and callback_ex(b, BIO_CB_CTRL | BIO_CB_RETURN, parg, 0, cmd, larg, ret, NULL) or callback(b, BIO_CB_CTRL|BIO_CB_RETURN, parg, cmd, larg, ret) after. =back =head1 EXAMPLE The BIO_debug_callback() function is a good example, its source is in crypto/bio/bio_cb.c =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000457313176625660016175 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_chain_up_ref, X509_new, X509_free, X509_up_ref - X509 certificate ASN1 allocation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509 *X509_new(void); void X509_free(X509 *a); int X509_up_ref(X509 *a); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *x); =head1 DESCRIPTION The X509 ASN1 allocation routines, allocate and free an X509 structure, which represents an X509 certificate. X509_new() allocates and initializes a X509 structure with reference count B<1>. X509_free() decrements the reference count of B structure B and frees it up if the reference count is zero. If B is NULL nothing is done. X509_up_ref() increments the reference count of B. X509_chain_up_ref() increases the reference count of all certificates in chain B and returns a copy of the stack. =head1 NOTES The function X509_up_ref() if useful if a certificate structure is being used by several different operations each of which will free it up after use: this avoids the need to duplicate the entire certificate structure. The function X509_chain_up_ref() doesn't just up the reference count of each certificate it also returns a copy of the stack, using sk_X509_dup(), but it serves a similar purpose: the returned chain persists after the original has been freed. =head1 RETURN VALUES If the allocation fails, X509_new() returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. X509_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. X509_chain_up_ref() returns a copy of the stack or B if an error occurred. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod0000644000000000000000000000435113176625660016733 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_f_base64 - base64 BIO filter =for comment multiple includes =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method. This is a filter BIO that base64 encodes any data written through it and decodes any data read through it. Base64 BIOs do not support BIO_gets() or BIO_puts(). BIO_flush() on a base64 BIO that is being written through is used to signal that no more data is to be encoded: this is used to flush the final block through the BIO. The flag BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL can be set with BIO_set_flags() to encode the data all on one line or expect the data to be all on one line. =head1 NOTES Because of the format of base64 encoding the end of the encoded block cannot always be reliably determined. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method. =head1 EXAMPLES Base64 encode the string "Hello World\n" and write the result to standard output: BIO *bio, *b64; char message[] = "Hello World \n"; b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); bio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); BIO_push(b64, bio); BIO_write(b64, message, strlen(message)); BIO_flush(b64); BIO_free_all(b64); Read Base64 encoded data from standard input and write the decoded data to standard output: BIO *bio, *b64, *bio_out; char inbuf[512]; int inlen; b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); BIO_push(b64, bio); while((inlen = BIO_read(b64, inbuf, 512)) > 0) BIO_write(bio_out, inbuf, inlen); BIO_flush(bio_out); BIO_free_all(b64); =head1 BUGS The ambiguity of EOF in base64 encoded data can cause additional data following the base64 encoded block to be misinterpreted. There should be some way of specifying a test that the BIO can perform to reliably determine EOF (for example a MIME boundary). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_sign.pod0000644000000000000000000001220413176625660016307 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_sign - create a CMS SignedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_sign() creates and returns a CMS SignedData structure. B is the certificate to sign with, B is the corresponding private key. B is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the CMS structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain). Any or all of these parameters can be B, see B below. The data to be signed is read from BIO B. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B parameter. Many S/MIME clients expect the signed content to include valid MIME headers. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are prepended to the data. If B is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the B parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a previously signed message. The data being signed is included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, unless B is set in which case it is omitted. This is used for CMS_ContentInfo detached signatures which are used in S/MIME plaintext signed messages for example. Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if B is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it. The SignedData structure includes several CMS signedAttributes including the signing time, the CMS content type and the supported list of ciphers in an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B is set then no signedAttributes will be used. If B is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are omitted. If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following algorithms in preference order: 256 bit AES, Gost R3411-94, Gost 28147-89, 192 bit AES, 128 bit AES, triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any of these algorithms is not available then it will not be included: for example the GOST algorithms will not be included if the GOST ENGINE is not loaded. OpenSSL will by default identify signing certificates using issuer name and serial number. If B is set it will use the subject key identifier value instead. An error occurs if the signing certificate does not have a subject key identifier extension. If the flags B is set then the returned B structure is just initialized ready to perform the signing operation. The signing is however B performed and the data to be signed is not read from the B parameter. Signing is deferred until after the data has been written. In this way data can be signed in a single pass. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is output to which additional signers and capabilities can be added before finalization. If the flag B is set the returned B structure is B complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not properly finalize the B structure will give unpredictable results. Several functions including SMIME_write_CMS(), i2d_CMS_bio_stream(), PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B directly using BIO_new_CMS(). If a signer is specified it will use the default digest for the signing algorithm. This is B for both RSA and DSA keys. If B and B are NULL then a certificates only CMS structure is output. The function CMS_sign() is a basic CMS signing function whose output will be suitable for many purposes. For finer control of the output format the B, B and B parameters can all be B and the B flag set. Then one or more signers can be added using the function CMS_sign_add1_signer(), non default digests can be used and custom attributes added. CMS_final() must then be called to finalize the structure if streaming is not enabled. =head1 BUGS Some attributes such as counter signatures are not supported. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_sign() returns either a valid CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The B flag is only supported for detached data in OpenSSL 0.9.8, it is supported for embedded data in OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod0000644000000000000000000001031613176625660016400 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_bn2binpad, BN_bn2bin, BN_bin2bn, BN_bn2lebinpad, BN_lebin2bn, BN_bn2hex, BN_bn2dec, BN_hex2bn, BN_dec2bn, BN_print, BN_print_fp, BN_bn2mpi, BN_mpi2bn - format conversions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen); BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen); BIGNUM *BN_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a); char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a); int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a); int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a); int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_bn2bin() converts the absolute value of B into big-endian form and stores it at B. B must point to BN_num_bytes(B) bytes of memory. BN_bn2binpad() also converts the absolute value of B into big-endian form and stores it at B. B indicates the length of the output buffer B. The result is padded with zeroes if necessary. If B is less than BN_num_bytes(B) an error is returned. BN_bin2bn() converts the positive integer in big-endian form of length B at B into a B and places it in B. If B is NULL, a new B is created. BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_bin2lbn() are identical to BN_bn2binpad() and BN_bin2bn() except the buffer is in little-endian format. BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return printable strings containing the hexadecimal and decimal encoding of B respectively. For negative numbers, the string is prefaced with a leading '-'. The string must be freed later using OPENSSL_free(). BN_hex2bn() takes as many characters as possible from the string B, including the leading character '-' which means negative, to form a valid hexadecimal number representation and converts them to a B and stores it in **B. If *B is NULL, a new B is created. If B is NULL, it only computes the length of valid representation. A "negative zero" is converted to zero. BN_dec2bn() is the same using the decimal system. BN_print() and BN_print_fp() write the hexadecimal encoding of B, with a leading '-' for negative numbers, to the B or B B. BN_bn2mpi() and BN_mpi2bn() convert Bs from and to a format that consists of the number's length in bytes represented as a 4-byte big-endian number, and the number itself in big-endian format, where the most significant bit signals a negative number (the representation of numbers with the MSB set is prefixed with null byte). BN_bn2mpi() stores the representation of B at B, where B must be large enough to hold the result. The size can be determined by calling BN_bn2mpi(B, NULL). BN_mpi2bn() converts the B bytes long representation at B to a B and stores it at B, or in a newly allocated B if B is NULL. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_bn2bin() returns the length of the big-endian number placed at B. BN_bin2bn() returns the B, NULL on error. BN_bn2binpad() returns the number of bytes written or -1 if the supplied buffer is too small. BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return a null-terminated string, or NULL on error. BN_hex2bn() and BN_dec2bn() return the number of characters used in parsing, or 0 on error, in which case no new B will be created. BN_print_fp() and BN_print() return 1 on success, 0 on write errors. BN_bn2mpi() returns the length of the representation. BN_mpi2bn() returns the B, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_get0_pqg.pod0000644000000000000000000001111013176625660016721 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_get0_pqg, DH_set0_pqg, DH_get0_key, DH_set0_key, DH_clear_flags, DH_test_flags, DH_set_flags, DH_get0_engine, DH_get_length, DH_set_length - Routines for getting and setting data in a DH object =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); void DH_clear_flags(DH *dh, int flags); int DH_test_flags(const DH *dh, int flags); void DH_set_flags(DH *dh, int flags); ENGINE *DH_get0_engine(DH *d); long DH_get_length(const DH *dh); int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length); =head1 DESCRIPTION A DH object contains the parameters B

, B and B. Note that the B parameter is optional. It also contains a public key (B) and (optionally) a private key (B). The B

, B and B parameters can be obtained by calling DH_get0_pqg(). If the parameters have not yet been set then B<*p>, B<*q> and B<*g> will be set to NULL. Otherwise they are set to pointers to their respective values. These point directly to the internal representations of the values and therefore should not be freed directly. The B

, B and B values can be set by calling DH_set0_pqg() and passing the new values for B

and B are likely enough to be valid. This is a lightweight check, if a more thorough check is needed, use DH_check(). The value of B<*codes> is updated with any problems found. If B<*codes> is zero then no problems were found, otherwise the following bits may be set: =over 4 =item DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME The parameter B

has been determined to not being an odd prime. Note that the lack of this bit doesn't guarantee that B

is a prime. =item DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR The generator B is not suitable. Note that the lack of this bit doesn't guarantee that B is suitable, unless B

is known to be a strong prime. =back DH_check() confirms that the Diffie-Hellman parameters B are valid. The value of B<*codes> is updated with any problems found. If B<*codes> is zero then no problems were found, otherwise the following bits may be set: =over 4 =item DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME The parameter B

is not prime. =item DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME The parameter B

is not a safe prime and no B value is present. =item DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR The generator B cannot be checked for suitability. =item DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR The generator B is not suitable. =item DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME The parameter B is not prime. =item DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE The parameter B is invalid. =item DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE The parameter B is invalid. =back =head1 RETURN VALUES DH_generate_parameters_ex(), DH_check() and DH_check_params() return 1 if the check could be performed, 0 otherwise. DH_generate_parameters() (deprecated) returns a pointer to the DH structure, or NULL if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 NOTES DH_generate_parameters_ex() and DH_generate_parameters() may run for several hours before finding a suitable prime. The parameters generated by DH_generate_parameters_ex() and DH_generate_parameters() are not to be used in signature schemes. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod0000644000000000000000000000260513176625660016762 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_do_sign, DSA_do_verify - raw DSA signature operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_do_sign() computes a digital signature on the B byte message digest B using the private key B and returns it in a newly allocated B structure. L may be used to precompute part of the signing operation in case signature generation is time-critical. DSA_do_verify() verifies that the signature B matches a given message digest B of size B. B is the signer's public key. =head1 RETURN VALUES DSA_do_sign() returns the signature, NULL on error. DSA_do_verify() returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules.pod0000644000000000000000000000304613176625660022251 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules, ASN1_add_oid_module, ENGINE_add_conf_module - add standard configuration modules =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void); void ASN1_add_oid_module(void); ENGINE_add_conf_module(); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() adds all the standard OpenSSL configuration modules to the internal list. They can then be used by the OpenSSL configuration code. ASN1_add_oid_module() adds just the ASN1 OBJECT module. ENGINE_add_conf_module() adds just the ENGINE configuration module. =head1 NOTES If the simple configuration function OPENSSL_config() is called then OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() is called automatically. Applications which use the configuration functions directly will need to call OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() themselves I any other configuration code. Applications should call OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() to load all configuration modules instead of adding modules selectively: otherwise functionality may be missing from the application if an when new modules are added. =head1 RETURN VALUE None of the functions return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/evp.pod0000644000000000000000000001017513176625660015444 0ustar rootroot=pod =for comment openssl_manual_section:7 =head1 NAME evp - high-level cryptographic functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP library provides a high-level interface to cryptographic functions. LI<...>|EVP_SealInit(3)> and LI<...>|EVP_OpenInit(3)> provide public key encryption and decryption to implement digital "envelopes". The LI<...>|EVP_DigestSignInit(3)> and LI<...>|EVP_DigestVerifyInit(3)> functions implement digital signatures and Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Also see the older LI<...>|EVP_SignInit(3)> and LI<...>|EVP_VerifyInit(3)> functions. Symmetric encryption is available with the LI<...>|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> functions. The LI<...>|EVP_DigestInit(3)> functions provide message digests. The BI<...> functions provide a high level interface to asymmetric algorithms. To create a new EVP_PKEY see L. EVP_PKEYs can be associated with a private key of a particular algorithm by using the functions described on the L page, or new keys can be generated using L. EVP_PKEYs can be compared using L, or printed using L. The EVP_PKEY functions support the full range of asymmetric algorithm operations: =over 4 =item For key agreement see L =item For signing and verifying see L, L and L. However, note that these functions do not perform a digest of the data to be signed. Therefore normally you would use the L functions for this purpose. =item For encryption and decryption see L and L respectively. However, note that these functions perform encryption and decryption only. As public key encryption is an expensive operation, normally you would wrap an encrypted message in a "digital envelope" using the L and L functions. =back The L function provides some limited support for password based encryption. Careful selection of the parameters will provide a PKCS#5 PBKDF1 compatible implementation. However, new applications should not typically use this (preferring, for example, PBKDF2 from PCKS#5). The LI<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> and LI<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> functions implement base 64 encoding and decoding. All the symmetric algorithms (ciphers), digests and asymmetric algorithms (public key algorithms) can be replaced by L modules providing alternative implementations. If ENGINE implementations of ciphers or digests are registered as defaults, then the various EVP functions will automatically use those implementations automatically in preference to built in software implementations. For more information, consult the engine(3) man page. Although low level algorithm specific functions exist for many algorithms their use is discouraged. They cannot be used with an ENGINE and ENGINE versions of new algorithms cannot be accessed using the low level functions. Also makes code harder to adapt to new algorithms and some options are not cleanly supported at the low level and some operations are more efficient using the high level interface. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod0000644000000000000000000000237513176625660020062 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_remove_thread_state, ERR_remove_state - DEPRECATED =head1 SYNOPSIS Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid); #endif #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION The functions described here were used to free the error queue associated with the current or specified thread. They are now deprecated and do nothing, as the OpenSSL libraries now normally do all thread initialisation and deinitialisation automatically (see L). =head1 RETURN VALUE The functions described here return no value. =head1 SEE ALSO LL =head1 HISTORY ERR_remove_state() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.0.0 when ERR_remove_thread_state() was introduced. ERR_remove_thread_state() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 when the thread handling functionality was entirely rewritten. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod0000644000000000000000000001210213176625660016256 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PEM_write, PEM_write_bio, PEM_read, PEM_read_bio, PEM_do_header, PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO - PEM encoding routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len); int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len); int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cinfo); int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cinfo, unsigned char *data, long *len, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions read and write PEM-encoded objects, using the PEM type B, any additional B

information, and the raw B of length B. PEM is the term used for binary content encoding first defined in IETF RFC 1421. The content is a series of base64-encoded lines, surrounded by begin/end markers each on their own line. For example: -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIICdg.... ... bhTQ== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- Optional header line(s) may appear after the begin line, and their existence depends on the type of object being written or read. PEM_write() writes to the file B, while PEM_write_bio() writes to the BIO B. The B is the name to use in the marker, the B
is the header value or NULL, and B and B specify the data and its length. The final B buffer is typically an ASN.1 object which can be decoded with the B function appropriate to the type B; see L for examples. PEM_read() reads from the file B, while PEM_read_bio() reads from the BIO B. Both skip any non-PEM data that precedes the start of the next PEM object. When an object is successfully retrieved, the type name from the "----BEGIN -----" is returned via the B argument, any encapsulation headers are returned in B
and the base64-decoded content and its length are returned via B and B respectively. The B, B
and B pointers are allocated via OPENSSL_malloc() and should be freed by the caller via OPENSSL_free() when no longer needed. PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() can be used to determine the B returned by PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio() is encrypted and to retrieve the associated cipher and IV. The caller passes a pointer to structure of type B via the B argument and the B
returned via PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio(). If the call is successful 1 is returned and the cipher and IV are stored at the address pointed to by B. When the header is malformed, or not supported or when the cipher is unknown or some internal error happens 0 is returned. This function is deprecated, see B below. PEM_do_header() can then be used to decrypt the data if the header indicates encryption. The B argument is a pointer to the structure initialized by the previous call to PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(). The B and B arguments are those returned by the previous call to PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio(). The B and B arguments make it possible to override the default password prompt function as described in L. On successful completion the B is decrypted in place, and B is updated to indicate the plaintext length. This function is deprecated, see B below. If the data is a priori known to not be encrypted, then neither PEM_do_header() nor PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() need be called. =head1 RETURN VALUES PEM_read() and PEM_read_bio() return 1 on success and 0 on failure, the latter includes the case when no more PEM objects remain in the input file. To distinguish end of file from more serious errors the caller must peek at the error stack and check for B, which indicates that no more PEM objects were found. See L, L. PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() and PEM_do_header() return 1 on success, and 0 on failure. The B is likely meaningless if these functions fail. =head1 NOTES The PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() and PEM_do_header() functions are deprecated. This is because the underlying PEM encryption format is obsolete, and should be avoided. It uses an encryption format with an OpenSSL-specific key-derivation function, which employs MD5 with an iteration count of 1! Instead, private keys should be stored in PKCS#8 form, with a strong PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE. See L and L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001623713176625660017747 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd - functions to manage waiting for asynchronous jobs to complete =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(void); void ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD fd, void *custom_data, void (*cleanup)(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *, const void *, OSSL_ASYNC_FD, void *)); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, void **custom_data); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, size_t *numfds); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds); int ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key); =head1 DESCRIPTION For an overview of how asynchronous operations are implemented in OpenSSL see L. An ASYNC_WAIT_CTX object represents an asynchronous "session", i.e. a related set of crypto operations. For example in SSL terms this would have a one-to-one correspondence with an SSL connection. Application code must create an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX using the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new() function prior to calling ASYNC_start_job() (see L). When the job is started it is associated with the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX for the duration of that job. An ASYNC_WAIT_CTX should only be used for one ASYNC_JOB at any one time, but can be reused after an ASYNC_JOB has finished for a subsequent ASYNC_JOB. When the session is complete (e.g. the SSL connection is closed), application code cleans up with ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(). ASYNC_WAIT_CTXs can have "wait" file descriptors associated with them. Calling ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() and passing in a pointer to an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX in the B parameter will return the wait file descriptors associated with that job in B<*fd>. The number of file descriptors returned will be stored in B<*numfds>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that sufficient memory has been allocated in B<*fd> to receive all the file descriptors. Calling ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() with a NULL B value will return no file descriptors but will still populate B<*numfds>. Therefore application code is typically expected to call this function twice: once to get the number of fds, and then again when sufficient memory has been allocated. If only one asynchronous engine is being used then normally this call will only ever return one fd. If multiple asynchronous engines are being used then more could be returned. The function ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds() can be used to detect if any fds have changed since the last call time ASYNC_start_job() returned an ASYNC_PAUSE result (or since the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX was created if no ASYNC_PAUSE result has been received). The B and B parameters will be populated with the number of fds added or deleted respectively. B<*addfd> and B<*delfd> will be populated with the list of added and deleted fds respectively. Similarly to ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() either of these can be NULL, but if they are not NULL then the caller is responsible for ensuring sufficient memory is allocated. Implementors of async aware code (e.g. engines) are encouraged to return a stable fd for the lifetime of the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX in order to reduce the "churn" of regularly changing fds - although no guarantees of this are provided to applications. Applications can wait for the file descriptor to be ready for "read" using a system function call such as select or poll (being ready for "read" indicates that the job should be resumed). If no file descriptor is made available then an application will have to periodically "poll" the job by attempting to restart it to see if it is ready to continue. Async aware code (e.g. engines) can get the current ASYNC_WAIT_CTX from the job via L and provide a file descriptor to use for waiting on by calling ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(). Typically this would be done by an engine immediately prior to calling ASYNC_pause_job() and not by end user code. An existing association with a file descriptor can be obtained using ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd() and cleared using ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(). Both of these functions requires a B value which is unique to the async aware code. This could be any unique value but a good candidate might be the B for the engine. The B parameter can be any value, and will be returned in a subsequent call to ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(). The ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd() function also expects a pointer to a "cleanup" routine. This can be NULL but if provided will automatically get called when the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX is freed, and gives the engine the opportunity to close the fd or any other resources. Note: The "cleanup" routine does not get called if the fd is cleared directly via a call to ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd(). An example of typical usage might be an async capable engine. User code would initiate cryptographic operations. The engine would initiate those operations asynchronously and then call ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd() followed by ASYNC_pause_job() to return control to the user code. The user code can then perform other tasks or wait for the job to be ready by calling "select" or other similar function on the wait file descriptor. The engine can signal to the user code that the job should be resumed by making the wait file descriptor "readable". Once resumed the engine should clear the wake signal on the wait file descriptor. =head1 RETURN VALUES ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new() returns a pointer to the newly allocated ASYNC_WAIT_CTX or NULL on error. ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds and ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd all return 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 NOTES On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to async.h. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_uncompress.pod0000644000000000000000000000324513176625660017552 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_uncompress - uncompress a CMS CompressedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_uncompress() extracts and uncompresses the content from a CMS CompressedData structure B. B is a BIO to write the content to and B is an optional set of flags. The B parameter is used in the rare case where the compressed content is detached. It will normally be set to NULL. =head1 NOTES The only currently supported compression algorithm is zlib: if the structure indicates the use of any other algorithm an error is returned. If zlib support is not compiled into OpenSSL then CMS_uncompress() will always return an error. The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type B then an error is returned. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_uncompress() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3) =head1 BUGS The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decompress(). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod0000644000000000000000000000334713176625660017116 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_ALGOR_dup, X509_ALGOR_set0, X509_ALGOR_get0, X509_ALGOR_set_md, X509_ALGOR_cmp - AlgorithmIdentifier functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_ALGOR *X509_ALGOR_dup(X509_ALGOR *alg); int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval); void X509_ALGOR_get0(const ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *alg); void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_ALGOR_dup() returns a copy of B. X509_ALGOR_set0() sets the algorithm OID of B to B and the associated parameter type to B with value B. If B is B the parameter is omitted, otherwise B and B have the same meaning as the B and B parameters to ASN1_TYPE_set(). All the supplied parameters are used internally so must B be freed after this call. X509_ALGOR_get0() is the inverse of X509_ALGOR_set0(): it returns the algorithm OID in B<*paobj> and the associated parameter in B<*pptype> and B<*ppval> from the B B. X509_ALGOR_set_md() sets the B B to appropriate values for the message digest B. X509_ALGOR_cmp() compares B and B and returns 0 if they have identical encodings and non-zero otherwise. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000574013176625660017247 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS7_encrypt - create a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS7_encrypt() creates and returns a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure. B is a list of recipient certificates. B is the content to be encrypted. B is the symmetric cipher to use. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES Only RSA keys are supported in PKCS#7 and envelopedData so the recipient certificates supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not have to be signed using the RSA algorithm. EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use because most clients will support it. Some old "export grade" clients may only support weak encryption using 40 or 64 bit RC2. These can be used by passing EVP_rc2_40_cbc() and EVP_rc2_64_cbc() respectively. The algorithm passed in the B parameter must support ASN1 encoding of its parameters. Many browsers implement a "sign and encrypt" option which is simply an S/MIME envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to PKCS7_encrypt(). The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are prepended to the data. Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if B is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If B is set then B is ignored. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is output suitable for streaming I/O: no data is read from the BIO B. =head1 NOTES If the flag B is set the returned B structure is B complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not properly finalize the B structure will give unpredictable results. Several functions including SMIME_write_PKCS7(), i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(), PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B directly using BIO_new_PKCS7(). =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS7_encrypt() returns either a PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The B flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod0000644000000000000000000000724113176625660020250 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_DigestSignInit, EVP_DigestSignUpdate, EVP_DigestSignFinal - EVP signing functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_DigestSignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt); int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures. EVP_DigestSignInit() sets up signing context B to use digest B from ENGINE B and private key B. B must be created with EVP_MD_CTX_new() before calling this function. If B is not NULL the EVP_PKEY_CTX of the signing operation will be written to B<*pctx>: this can be used to set alternative signing options. EVP_DigestSignUpdate() hashes B bytes of data at B into the signature context B. This function can be called several times on the same B to include additional data. This function is currently implemented using a macro. EVP_DigestSignFinal() signs the data in B places the signature in B. If B is B then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the B parameter. If B is not B then before the call the B parameter should contain the length of the B buffer, if the call is successful the signature is written to B and the amount of data written to B. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_DigestSignInit() EVP_DigestSignUpdate() and EVP_DigestSignaFinal() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. The error codes can be obtained from L. =head1 NOTES The B interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. In previous versions of OpenSSL there was a link between message digest types and public key algorithms. This meant that "clone" digests such as EVP_dss1() needed to be used to sign using SHA1 and DSA. This is no longer necessary and the use of clone digest is now discouraged. For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded or the operation will fail. The call to EVP_DigestSignFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. This means that calls to EVP_DigestSignUpdate() and EVP_DigestSignFinal() can be called later to digest and sign additional data. Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak will occur. The use of EVP_PKEY_size() with these functions is discouraged because some signature operations may have a signature length which depends on the parameters set. As a result EVP_PKEY_size() would have to return a value which indicates the maximum possible signature for any set of parameters. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY EVP_DigestSignInit(), EVP_DigestSignUpdate() and EVP_DigestSignFinal() were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000666513176625660017510 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OCSP_REQUEST_new, OCSP_REQUEST_free, OCSP_request_add0_id, OCSP_request_sign, OCSP_request_add1_cert, OCSP_request_onereq_count, OCSP_request_onereq_get0 - OCSP request functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include OCSP_REQUEST *OCSP_REQUEST_new(void); void OCSP_REQUEST_free(OCSP_REQUEST *req); OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid); int OCSP_request_sign(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags); int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert); int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req); OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i); =head1 DESCRIPTION OCSP_REQUEST_new() allocates and returns an empty B structure. OCSP_REQUEST_free() frees up the request structure B. OCSP_request_add0_id() adds certificate ID B to B. It returns the B structure added so an application can add additional extensions to the request. The B parameter B be freed up after the operation. OCSP_request_sign() signs OCSP request B using certificate B, private key B, digest B and additional certificates B. If the B option B is set then no certificates will be included in the request. OCSP_request_add1_cert() adds certificate B to request B. The application is responsible for freeing up B after use. OCSP_request_onereq_count() returns the total number of B structures in B. OCSP_request_onereq_get0() returns an internal pointer to the B contained in B of index B. The index value B runs from 0 to OCSP_request_onereq_count(req) - 1. =head1 RETURN VALUES OCSP_REQUEST_new() returns an empty B structure or B if an error occurred. OCSP_request_add0_id() returns the B structure containing B or B if an error occurred. OCSP_request_sign() and OCSP_request_add1_cert() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. OCSP_request_onereq_count() returns the total number of B structures in B. OCSP_request_onereq_get0() returns a pointer to an B structure or B if the index value is out or range. =head1 NOTES An OCSP request structure contains one or more B structures corresponding to each certificate. OCSP_request_onereq_count() and OCSP_request_onereq_get0() are mainly used by OCSP responders. =head1 EXAMPLE Create an B structure for certificate B with issuer B: OCSP_REQUEST *req; OCSP_ID *cid; req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (req == NULL) /* error */ cid = OCSP_cert_to_id(EVP_sha1(), cert, issuer); if (cid == NULL) /* error */ if (OCSP_REQUEST_add0_id(req, cid) == NULL) /* error */ /* Do something with req, e.g. query responder */ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_GET_LIB.pod0000644000000000000000000000342313176625660016465 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_GET_LIB, ERR_GET_FUNC, ERR_GET_REASON, ERR_FATAL_ERROR - get information from error codes =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int ERR_GET_LIB(unsigned long e); int ERR_GET_FUNC(unsigned long e); int ERR_GET_REASON(unsigned long e); int ERR_FATAL_ERROR(unsigned long e); =head1 DESCRIPTION The error code returned by ERR_get_error() consists of a library number, function code and reason code. ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC() and ERR_GET_REASON() can be used to extract these. ERR_FATAL_ERROR() indicates whether a given error code is a fatal error. The library number and function code describe where the error occurred, the reason code is the information about what went wrong. Each sub-library of OpenSSL has a unique library number; function and reason codes are unique within each sub-library. Note that different libraries may use the same value to signal different functions and reasons. B reason codes such as B are globally unique. However, when checking for sub-library specific reason codes, be sure to also compare the library number. ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC(), ERR_GET_REASON(), and ERR_FATAL_ERROR() are macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES The library number, function code, reason code, and whether the error is fatal, respectively. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC() and ERR_GET_REASON() are available in all versions of OpenSSL. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_ctrl.pod0000644000000000000000000001214613176625660016307 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_ctrl, BIO_callback_ctrl, BIO_ptr_ctrl, BIO_int_ctrl, BIO_reset, BIO_seek, BIO_tell, BIO_flush, BIO_eof, BIO_set_close, BIO_get_close, BIO_pending, BIO_wpending, BIO_ctrl_pending, BIO_ctrl_wpending, BIO_get_info_callback, BIO_set_info_callback, bio_info_cb - BIO control operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef void bio_info_cb(BIO *b, int oper, const char *ptr, int arg1, long arg2, long arg3); long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *cb); char *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg); long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, int iarg); int BIO_reset(BIO *b); int BIO_seek(BIO *b, int ofs); int BIO_tell(BIO *b); int BIO_flush(BIO *b); int BIO_eof(BIO *b); int BIO_set_close(BIO *b, long flag); int BIO_get_close(BIO *b); int BIO_pending(BIO *b); int BIO_wpending(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b); int BIO_get_info_callback(BIO *b, bio_info_cb **cbp); int BIO_set_info_callback(BIO *b, bio_info_cb *cb); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_ctrl(), BIO_callback_ctrl(), BIO_ptr_ctrl() and BIO_int_ctrl() are BIO "control" operations taking arguments of various types. These functions are not normally called directly, various macros are used instead. The standard macros are described below, macros specific to a particular type of BIO are described in the specific BIOs manual page as well as any special features of the standard calls. BIO_reset() typically resets a BIO to some initial state, in the case of file related BIOs for example it rewinds the file pointer to the start of the file. BIO_seek() resets a file related BIO's (that is file descriptor and FILE BIOs) file position pointer to B bytes from start of file. BIO_tell() returns the current file position of a file related BIO. BIO_flush() normally writes out any internally buffered data, in some cases it is used to signal EOF and that no more data will be written. BIO_eof() returns 1 if the BIO has read EOF, the precise meaning of "EOF" varies according to the BIO type. BIO_set_close() sets the BIO B close flag to B. B can take the value BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. Typically BIO_CLOSE is used in a source/sink BIO to indicate that the underlying I/O stream should be closed when the BIO is freed. BIO_get_close() returns the BIOs close flag. BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() return the number of pending characters in the BIOs read and write buffers. Not all BIOs support these calls. BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() return a size_t type and are functions, BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() are macros which call BIO_ctrl(). =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_reset() normally returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. File BIOs are an exception, they return 0 for success and -1 for failure. BIO_seek() and BIO_tell() both return the current file position on success and -1 for failure, except file BIOs which for BIO_seek() always return 0 for success and -1 for failure. BIO_flush() returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. BIO_eof() returns 1 if EOF has been reached 0 otherwise. BIO_set_close() always returns 1. BIO_get_close() returns the close flag value: BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() return the amount of pending data. =head1 NOTES BIO_flush(), because it can write data may return 0 or -1 indicating that the call should be retried later in a similar manner to BIO_write_ex(). The BIO_should_retry() call should be used and appropriate action taken is the call fails. The return values of BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() may not reliably determine the amount of pending data in all cases. For example in the case of a file BIO some data may be available in the FILE structures internal buffers but it is not possible to determine this in a portably way. For other types of BIO they may not be supported. Filter BIOs if they do not internally handle a particular BIO_ctrl() operation usually pass the operation to the next BIO in the chain. This often means there is no need to locate the required BIO for a particular operation, it can be called on a chain and it will be automatically passed to the relevant BIO. However this can cause unexpected results: for example no current filter BIOs implement BIO_seek(), but this may still succeed if the chain ends in a FILE or file descriptor BIO. Source/sink BIOs return an 0 if they do not recognize the BIO_ctrl() operation. =head1 BUGS Some of the return values are ambiguous and care should be taken. In particular a return value of 0 can be returned if an operation is not supported, if an error occurred, if EOF has not been reached and in the case of BIO_seek() on a file BIO for a successful operation. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/UI_STRING.pod0000644000000000000000000001157613176625660016263 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME UI_STRING, UI_string_types, UI_get_string_type, UI_get_input_flags, UI_get0_output_string, UI_get0_action_string, UI_get0_result_string, UI_get0_test_string, UI_get_result_minsize, UI_get_result_maxsize, UI_set_result - User interface string parsing =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef struct ui_string_st UI_STRING; enum UI_string_types { UIT_NONE = 0, UIT_PROMPT, /* Prompt for a string */ UIT_VERIFY, /* Prompt for a string and verify */ UIT_BOOLEAN, /* Prompt for a yes/no response */ UIT_INFO, /* Send info to the user */ UIT_ERROR /* Send an error message to the user */ }; enum UI_string_types UI_get_string_type(UI_STRING *uis); int UI_get_input_flags(UI_STRING *uis); const char *UI_get0_output_string(UI_STRING *uis); const char *UI_get0_action_string(UI_STRING *uis); const char *UI_get0_result_string(UI_STRING *uis); const char *UI_get0_test_string(UI_STRING *uis); int UI_get_result_minsize(UI_STRING *uis); int UI_get_result_maxsize(UI_STRING *uis); int UI_set_result(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, const char *result); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B gets created internally and added to a B whenever one of the functions UI_add_input_string(), UI_dup_input_string(), UI_add_verify_string(), UI_dup_verify_string(), UI_add_input_boolean(), UI_dup_input_boolean(), UI_add_info_string(), UI_dup_info_string(), UI_add_error_string() or UI_dup_error_string() is called. For a B user, there's no need to know more. For a B creator, it is of interest to fetch text from these B objects as well as adding results to some of them. UI_get_string_type() is used to retrieve the type of the given B. UI_get_input_flags() is used to retrieve the flags associated with the given B. UI_get0_output_string() is used to retrieve the actual string to output (prompt, info, error, ...). UI_get0_action_string() is used to retrieve the action description associated with a B type B. For all other B types, NULL is returned. See L. UI_get0_result_string() is used to retrieve the result of a prompt. This is only useful for B and B type strings. For all other B types, NULL is returned. UI_get0_test_string() is used to retrieve the string to compare the prompt result with. This is only useful for B type strings. For all other B types, NULL is returned. UI_get_result_minsize() and UI_get_result_maxsize() are used to retrieve the minimum and maximum required size of the result. This is only useful for B and B type strings. For all other B types, -1 is returned. UI_set_result() is used to set the result value of a prompt. For B and B type UI strings, this sets the result retrievable with UI_get0_result_string() by copying the contents of B if its length fits the minimum and maximum size requirements. For B type UI strings, this sets the first character of the result retrievable with UI_get0_result_string() to the first B given with UI_add_input_boolean() or UI_dup_input_boolean() if the B matched any of them, or the first of the B if the B matched any of them, otherwise it's set to the NUL char C<\0>. See L for more information on B and B. =head1 RETURN VALUES UI_get_string_type() returns the UI string type. UI_get_input_flags() returns the UI string flags. UI_get0_output_string() returns the UI string output string. UI_get0_action_string() returns the UI string action description string for B type UI strings, NULL for any other type. UI_get0_result_string() returns the UI string result buffer for B and B type UI strings, NULL for any other type. UI_get0_test_string() returns the UI string action description string for B type UI strings, NULL for any other type. UI_get_result_minsize() returns the minimum allowed result size for the UI string for for B and B type strings, -1 for any other type. UI_get_result_maxsize() returns the minimum allowed result size for the UI string for for B and B type strings, -1 for any other type. UI_set_result() returns 0 on success or when the UI string is of any type other than B, B or B, -1 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_s_bio.pod0000644000000000000000000001777113176625660016447 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_s_bio, BIO_make_bio_pair, BIO_destroy_bio_pair, BIO_shutdown_wr, BIO_set_write_buf_size, BIO_get_write_buf_size, BIO_new_bio_pair, BIO_get_write_guarantee, BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee, BIO_get_read_request, BIO_ctrl_get_read_request, BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request - BIO pair BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void); int BIO_make_bio_pair(BIO *b1, BIO *b2); int BIO_destroy_bio_pair(BIO *b); int BIO_shutdown_wr(BIO *b); int BIO_set_write_buf_size(BIO *b, long size); size_t BIO_get_write_buf_size(BIO *b, long size); int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1, BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2); int BIO_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b); int BIO_get_read_request(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b); int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_bio() returns the method for a BIO pair. A BIO pair is a pair of source/sink BIOs where data written to either half of the pair is buffered and can be read from the other half. Both halves must usually by handled by the same application thread since no locking is done on the internal data structures. Since BIO chains typically end in a source/sink BIO it is possible to make this one half of a BIO pair and have all the data processed by the chain under application control. One typical use of BIO pairs is to place TLS/SSL I/O under application control, this can be used when the application wishes to use a non standard transport for TLS/SSL or the normal socket routines are inappropriate. Calls to BIO_read() will read data from the buffer or request a retry if no data is available. Calls to BIO_write() will place data in the buffer or request a retry if the buffer is full. The standard calls BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() can be used to determine the amount of pending data in the read or write buffer. BIO_reset() clears any data in the write buffer. BIO_make_bio_pair() joins two separate BIOs into a connected pair. BIO_destroy_pair() destroys the association between two connected BIOs. Freeing up any half of the pair will automatically destroy the association. BIO_shutdown_wr() is used to close down a BIO B. After this call no further writes on BIO B are allowed (they will return an error). Reads on the other half of the pair will return any pending data or EOF when all pending data has been read. BIO_set_write_buf_size() sets the write buffer size of BIO B to B. If the size is not initialized a default value is used. This is currently 17K, sufficient for a maximum size TLS record. BIO_get_write_buf_size() returns the size of the write buffer. BIO_new_bio_pair() combines the calls to BIO_new(), BIO_make_bio_pair() and BIO_set_write_buf_size() to create a connected pair of BIOs B, B with write buffer sizes B and B. If either size is zero then the default size is used. BIO_new_bio_pair() does not check whether B or B do point to some other BIO, the values are overwritten, BIO_free() is not called. BIO_get_write_guarantee() and BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() return the maximum length of data that can be currently written to the BIO. Writes larger than this value will return a value from BIO_write() less than the amount requested or if the buffer is full request a retry. BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() is a function whereas BIO_get_write_guarantee() is a macro. BIO_get_read_request() and BIO_ctrl_get_read_request() return the amount of data requested, or the buffer size if it is less, if the last read attempt at the other half of the BIO pair failed due to an empty buffer. This can be used to determine how much data should be written to the BIO so the next read will succeed: this is most useful in TLS/SSL applications where the amount of data read is usually meaningful rather than just a buffer size. After a successful read this call will return zero. It also will return zero once new data has been written satisfying the read request or part of it. Note that BIO_get_read_request() never returns an amount larger than that returned by BIO_get_write_guarantee(). BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request() can also be used to reset the value returned by BIO_get_read_request() to zero. =head1 NOTES Both halves of a BIO pair should be freed. That is even if one half is implicit freed due to a BIO_free_all() or SSL_free() call the other half needs to be freed. When used in bidirectional applications (such as TLS/SSL) care should be taken to flush any data in the write buffer. This can be done by calling BIO_pending() on the other half of the pair and, if any data is pending, reading it and sending it to the underlying transport. This must be done before any normal processing (such as calling select() ) due to a request and BIO_should_read() being true. To see why this is important consider a case where a request is sent using BIO_write() and a response read with BIO_read(), this can occur during an TLS/SSL handshake for example. BIO_write() will succeed and place data in the write buffer. BIO_read() will initially fail and BIO_should_read() will be true. If the application then waits for data to be available on the underlying transport before flushing the write buffer it will never succeed because the request was never sent! BIO_eof() is true if no data is in the peer BIO and the peer BIO has been shutdown. BIO_make_bio_pair(), BIO_destroy_bio_pair(), BIO_shutdown_wr(), BIO_set_write_buf_size(), BIO_get_write_buf_size(), BIO_get_write_guarantee(), and BIO_get_read_request() are implemented as macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_new_bio_pair() returns 1 on success, with the new BIOs available in B and B, or 0 on failure, with NULL pointers stored into the locations for B and B. Check the error stack for more information. [XXXXX: More return values need to be added here] =head1 EXAMPLE The BIO pair can be used to have full control over the network access of an application. The application can call select() on the socket as required without having to go through the SSL-interface. BIO *internal_bio, *network_bio; ... BIO_new_bio_pair(&internal_bio, 0, &network_bio, 0); SSL_set_bio(ssl, internal_bio, internal_bio); SSL_operations(); //e.g SSL_read and SSL_write ... application | TLS-engine | | +----------> SSL_operations() | /\ || | || \/ | BIO-pair (internal_bio) | BIO-pair (network_bio) | || /\ | \/ || +-----------< BIO_operations() | | | | socket ... SSL_free(ssl); /* implicitly frees internal_bio */ BIO_free(network_bio); ... As the BIO pair will only buffer the data and never directly access the connection, it behaves non-blocking and will return as soon as the write buffer is full or the read buffer is drained. Then the application has to flush the write buffer and/or fill the read buffer. Use the BIO_ctrl_pending(), to find out whether data is buffered in the BIO and must be transferred to the network. Use BIO_ctrl_get_read_request() to find out, how many bytes must be written into the buffer before the SSL_operation() can successfully be continued. =head1 WARNING As the data is buffered, SSL_operation() may return with an ERROR_SSL_WANT_READ condition, but there is still data in the write buffer. An application must not rely on the error value of SSL_operation() but must assure that the write buffer is always flushed first. Otherwise a deadlock may occur as the peer might be waiting for the data before being able to continue. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod0000644000000000000000000001410113176625660016605 0ustar rootroot=pod =for comment openssl_manual_section:7 =head1 NAME des_modes - the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL =head1 DESCRIPTION Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among other things. =head1 OVERVIEW =head2 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) Normally, this is found as the function I_ecb_encrypt(). =over 4 =item * 64 bits are enciphered at a time. =item * The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. =item * The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. =item * An error will only affect one ciphertext block. =back =head2 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) Normally, this is found as the function I_cbc_encrypt(). Be aware that des_cbc_encrypt() is not really DES CBC (it does not update the IV); use des_ncbc_encrypt() instead. =over 4 =item * a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. =item * The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. =item * The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not be rearranged. =item * The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext. =item * An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. =back =head2 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) Normally, this is found as the function I_cfb_encrypt(). =over 4 =item * a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. =item * The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. =item * The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are chained together and can not be rearranged. =item * The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext. =item * The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. =item * Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause greater processing overheads. =item * Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. =item * An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. =back =head2 Output Feedback Mode (OFB) Normally, this is found as the function I_ofb_encrypt(). =over 4 =item * a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. =item * The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. =item * The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. =item * The use of different start variables values prevents the same plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different key streams. =item * Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause greater processing overheads. =item * Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. =item * OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. =item * OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs to be re-initialized. =item * Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable different from the start variable values used before with the same key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be produced each time from the same parameters. This would be susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack. =back =head2 Triple ECB Mode Normally, this is found as the function I_ecb3_encrypt(). =over 4 =item * Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. =item * As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. =item * If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with just one key. =item * If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory. =item * If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal ecb mode. =back =head2 Triple CBC Mode Normally, this is found as the function I_ede3_cbc_encrypt(). =over 4 =item * Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. =item * As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. =back =head1 NOTES This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed it to: AS 2805.5.2 Australian Standard Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm Appendix A =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod0000644000000000000000000002203413176625660020221 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_CIPHER_meth_new, EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup, EVP_CIPHER_meth_free, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params, EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params, EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl - Routines to build up EVP_CIPHER methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(int cipher_type, int block_size, int key_len); EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher); void EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(EVP_CIPHER *cipher); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iv_len); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned long flags); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int ctx_size); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*init) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*do_cipher) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*cleanup) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_set_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*set_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_get_asn1_params(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*get_asn1_parameters) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *)); int EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int (*ctrl) (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr)); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_set_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_get_asn1_params(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, ASN1_TYPE *); int (*EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher))(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a structure for symmetric cipher method implementation. EVP_CIPHER_meth_new() creates a new B structure. EVP_CIPHER_meth_dup() creates a copy of B. EVP_CIPHER_meth_free() destroys a B structure. EVP_CIPHER_meth_iv_length() sets the length of the IV. This is only needed when the implemented cipher mode requires it. EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags() sets the flags to describe optional behaviours in the particular B. With the exception of cipher modes, of which only one may be present, several flags can be or'd together. The available flags are: =over 4 =item EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER, EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE, EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE, EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE, EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE The cipher mode. =item EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH This cipher is of variable length. =item EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV Storing and initialising the IV is left entirely to the implementation. =item EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT Set this if the implementation's init() function should be called even if B is B. =item EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT Set this to have the implementation's ctrl() function called with command code B early in its setup. =item EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH Checking and setting the key length after creating the B is left to the implementation. Whenever someone uses EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() on a B with this flag set, the implementation's ctrl() function will be called with the control code B and the key length in B. =item EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING Don't use standard block padding. =item EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY Making a key with random content is left to the implementation. This is done by calling the implementation's ctrl() function with the control code B and the pointer to the key memory storage in B. =item EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY Set this to have the implementation's ctrl() function called with command code B at the end of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). The intended use is for further things to deal with after the implementation specific data block has been copied. The destination B is passed to the control with the B parameter. The implementation specific data block is reached with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(). =item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 Use the default EVP routines to pass IV to and from ASN.1. =item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS Signals that the length of the input buffer for encryption / decryption is to be understood as the number of bits bits instead of bytes for this implementation. This is only useful for CFB1 ciphers. =begin comment The FIPS flags seem to be unused, so I'm hiding them until I get an explanation or they get removed. /RL =item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS =item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW =end comment =item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER This indicates that the implementation takes care of everything, including padding, buffering and finalization. The EVP routines will simply give them control and do nothing more. =item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER This indicates that this is an AEAD cipher implementation. =item EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK Allow interleaving of crypto blocks, a particular optimization only applicable to certain TLS ciphers. =back EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size() sets the size of the EVP_CIPHER's implementation context so that it can be automatically allocated. EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init() sets the cipher init function for B. The cipher init function is called by EVP_CipherInit(), EVP_CipherInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(). EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher() sets the cipher function for B. The cipher function is called by EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate(), EVP_DecryptUpdate(), EVP_CipherFinal(), EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(). EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup() sets the function for B to do extra cleanup before the method's private data structure is cleaned out and freed. Note that the cleanup function is passed a B, the private data structure is then available with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(). This cleanup function is called by EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(). EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl() sets the control function for B. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_input_blocksize(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_result_size(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_app_datasize(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_flags(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_update(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_final(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_copy(), EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl() are all used to retrieve the method data given with the EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_*() functions above. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY The B structure was openly available in OpenSSL before version 1.1.0. The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_digest.pod0000644000000000000000000000377613176625660016667 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_digest, X509_CRL_digest, X509_pubkey_digest, X509_NAME_digest, X509_REQ_digest, PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest - get digest of various objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_pubkey_digest() returns a digest of the DER representation of the public key in the specified X509 B object. All other functions described here return a digest of the DER representation of their entire B objects. The B parameter specifies the digest to be used, such as EVP_sha1(). The B is a pointer to the buffer where the digest will be copied and is assumed to be large enough; the constant B is suggested. The B parameter, if not NULL, points to a place where the digest size will be stored. =head1 RETURN VALUES All functions described here return 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod0000644000000000000000000001117313176625660020026 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_NAME_print_ex, X509_NAME_print_ex_fp, X509_NAME_print, X509_NAME_oneline - X509_NAME printing routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, const X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); char * X509_NAME_oneline(const X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int size); int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_NAME_print_ex() prints a human readable version of B to BIO B. Each line (for multiline formats) is indented by B spaces. The output format can be extensively customised by use of the B parameter. X509_NAME_print_ex_fp() is identical to X509_NAME_print_ex() except the output is written to FILE pointer B. X509_NAME_oneline() prints an ASCII version of B to B. If B is B then a buffer is dynamically allocated and returned, and B is ignored. Otherwise, at most B bytes will be written, including the ending '\0', and B is returned. X509_NAME_print() prints out B to B indenting each line by B characters. Multiple lines are used if the output (including indent) exceeds 80 characters. =head1 NOTES The functions X509_NAME_oneline() and X509_NAME_print() are legacy functions which produce a non standard output form, they don't handle multi character fields and have various quirks and inconsistencies. Their use is strongly discouraged in new applications. Although there are a large number of possible flags for most purposes B, B or B will suffice. As noted on the L manual page for UTF8 terminals the B should be unset: so for example B would be used. The complete set of the flags supported by X509_NAME_print_ex() is listed below. Several options can be ored together. The options B, B, B and B determine the field separators to use. Two distinct separators are used between distinct RelativeDistinguishedName components and separate values in the same RDN for a multi-valued RDN. Multi-valued RDNs are currently very rare so the second separator will hardly ever be used. B uses comma and plus as separators. B uses comma and plus with spaces: this is more readable that plain comma and plus. B uses spaced semicolon and plus. B uses spaced newline and plus respectively. If B is set the whole DN is printed in reversed order. The fields B, B, B, B determine how a field name is displayed. It will use the short name (e.g. CN) the long name (e.g. commonName) always use OID numerical form (normally OIDs are only used if the field name is not recognised) and no field name respectively. If B is set then spaces will be placed around the '=' character separating field names and values. If B is set then the encoding of unknown fields is printed instead of the values. If B is set then field names are padded to 20 characters: this is only of use for multiline format. Additionally all the options supported by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() can be used to control how each field value is displayed. In addition a number options can be set for commonly used formats. B sets options which produce an output compatible with RFC2253 it is equivalent to: B B is a more readable one line format which is the same as: B B is a multiline format which is the same as: B B uses a format identical to X509_NAME_print(): in fact it calls X509_NAME_print() internally. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001144413176625660017270 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_BLINDING_new, BN_BLINDING_free, BN_BLINDING_update, BN_BLINDING_convert, BN_BLINDING_invert, BN_BLINDING_convert_ex, BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread, BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread, BN_BLINDING_lock, BN_BLINDING_unlock, BN_BLINDING_get_flags, BN_BLINDING_set_flags, BN_BLINDING_create_param - blinding related BIGNUM functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod); void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b); int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b); void BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread(BN_BLINDING *b); int BN_BLINDING_lock(BN_BLINDING *b); int BN_BLINDING_unlock(BN_BLINDING *b); unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *); void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx), BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_BLINDING_new() allocates a new B structure and copies the B and B values into the newly created B object. BN_BLINDING_free() frees the B structure. If B is NULL, nothing is done. BN_BLINDING_update() updates the B parameters by squaring the B and B or, after specific number of uses and if the necessary parameters are set, by re-creating the blinding parameters. BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() multiplies B with the blinding factor B. If B is not NULL a copy the inverse blinding factor B will be returned in B (this is useful if a B object is shared among several threads). BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() multiplies B with the inverse blinding factor B. If B is not NULL it will be used as the inverse blinding. BN_BLINDING_convert() and BN_BLINDING_invert() are wrapper functions for BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() with B set to NULL. BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread() returns whether the B structure is owned by the current thread. This is to help users provide proper locking if needed for multi-threaded use. BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread() sets the current thread as the owner of the B structure. BN_BLINDING_lock() locks the B structure. BN_BLINDING_unlock() unlocks the B structure. BN_BLINDING_get_flags() returns the BN_BLINDING flags. Currently there are two supported flags: B and B. B inhibits the automatic update of the B parameters after each use and B inhibits the automatic re-creation of the B parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently 32). In newly allocated B objects no flags are set. BN_BLINDING_set_flags() sets the B parameters flags. BN_BLINDING_create_param() creates new B parameters using the exponent B and the modulus B. B and B can be used to pass special functions for exponentiation (normally BN_mod_exp_mont() and B). =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_BLINDING_new() returns the newly allocated B structure or NULL in case of an error. BN_BLINDING_update(), BN_BLINDING_convert(), BN_BLINDING_invert(), BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread() returns 1 if the current thread owns the B object, 0 otherwise. BN_BLINDING_set_current_thread() doesn't return anything. BN_BLINDING_lock(), BN_BLINDING_unlock() return 1 if the operation succeeded or 0 on error. BN_BLINDING_get_flags() returns the currently set B flags (a B value). BN_BLINDING_create_param() returns the newly created B parameters or NULL on error. =head1 HISTORY BN_BLINDING_thread_id() was first introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.0, and it deprecates BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id() and BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp.pod0000644000000000000000000001023113176625660022224 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp, SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp, SSL_get_srtp_profiles, SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile - Configure and query SRTP support =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles); int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles); STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl); SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SRTP is the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol. OpenSSL implements support for the "use_srtp" DTLS extension defined in RFC5764. This provides a mechanism for establishing SRTP keying material, algorithms and parameters using DTLS. This capability may be used as part of an implementation that conforms to RFC5763. OpenSSL does not implement SRTP itself or RFC5763. Note that OpenSSL does not support the use of SRTP Master Key Identifiers (MKIs). Also note that this extension is only supported in DTLS. Any SRTP configuration will be ignored if a TLS connection is attempted. An OpenSSL client wishing to send the "use_srtp" extension should call SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp() to set its use for all SSL objects subsequently created from an SSL_CTX. Alternatively a client may call SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp() to set its use for an individual SSL object. The B parameters should point to a NUL-terminated, colon delimited list of SRTP protection profile names. The currently supported protection profile names are: =over 4 =item SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 This corresponds to SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 defined in RFC5764. =item SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 This corresponds to SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 defined in RFC5764. =item SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM This corresponds to the profile of the same name defined in RFC7714. =item SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM This corresponds to the profile of the same name defined in RFC7714. =back Supplying an unrecognised protection profile name will result in an error. An OpenSSL server wishing to support the "use_srtp" extension should also call SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp() or SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp() to indicate the protection profiles that it is willing to negotiate. The currently configured list of protection profiles for either a client or a server can be obtained by calling SSL_get_srtp_profiles(). This returns a stack of SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE objects. The memory pointed to in the return value of this function should not be freed by the caller. After a handshake has been completed the negotiated SRTP protection profile (if any) can be obtained (on the client or the server) by calling SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(). This function will return NULL if no SRTP protection profile was negotiated. The memory returned from this function should not be freed by the caller. If an SRTP protection profile has been sucessfully negotiated then the SRTP keying material (on both the client and server) should be obtained via a call to L. This call should provide a label value of "EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp" and a NULL context value (use_context is 0). The total length of keying material obtained should be equal to two times the sum of the master key length and the salt length as defined for the protection profile in use. This provides the client write master key, the server write master key, the client write master salt and the server write master salt in that order. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp() and SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp() return 0 on success or 1 on error. SSL_get_srtp_profiles() returns a stack of SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE objects on success or NULL on error or if no protection profiles have been configured. SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile() returns a pointer to an SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE object if one has been negotiated or NULL otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_print_errors.pod0000644000000000000000000000327613176625660020116 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_print_errors, ERR_print_errors_fp, ERR_print_errors_cb - print error messages =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp); void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp); void ERR_print_errors_cb(int (*cb)(const char *str, size_t len, void *u), void *u) =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_print_errors() is a convenience function that prints the error strings for all errors that OpenSSL has recorded to B, thus emptying the error queue. ERR_print_errors_fp() is the same, except that the output goes to a B. ERR_print_errors_cb() is the same, except that the callback function, B, is called for each error line with the string, length, and userdata B as the callback parameters. The error strings will have the following format: [pid]:error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]:[file name]:[line]:[optional text message] I is an 8 digit hexadecimal number. I, I and I are ASCII text, as is I if one was set for the respective error code. If there is no text string registered for the given error code, the error string will contain the numeric code. =head1 RETURN VALUES ERR_print_errors() and ERR_print_errors_fp() return no values. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod0000644000000000000000000000417213176625660017645 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SMIME_write_PKCS7 - convert PKCS#7 structure to S/MIME format =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION SMIME_write_PKCS7() adds the appropriate MIME headers to a PKCS#7 structure to produce an S/MIME message. B is the BIO to write the data to. B is the appropriate B structure. If streaming is enabled then the content must be supplied in the B argument. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If B is set then cleartext signing will be used, this option only makes sense for signedData where B is also set when PKCS7_sign() is also called. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are added to the content, this only makes sense if B is also set. If the B flag is set streaming is performed. This flag should only be set if B was also set in the previous call to PKCS7_sign() or PKCS7_encrypt(). If cleartext signing is being used and B not set then the data must be read twice: once to compute the signature in PKCS7_sign() and once to output the S/MIME message. If streaming is performed the content is output in BER format using indefinite length constructed encoding except in the case of signed data with detached content where the content is absent and DER format is used. =head1 BUGS SMIME_write_PKCS7() always base64 encodes PKCS#7 structures, there should be an option to disable this. =head1 RETURN VALUES SMIME_write_PKCS7() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000460613176625660017351 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CTLOG_STORE_new, CTLOG_STORE_free, CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file, CTLOG_STORE_load_file - Create and populate a Certificate Transparency log list =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CTLOG_STORE *CTLOG_STORE_new(void); void CTLOG_STORE_free(CTLOG_STORE *store); int CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(CTLOG_STORE *store); int CTLOG_STORE_load_file(CTLOG_STORE *store, const char *file); =head1 DESCRIPTION A CTLOG_STORE is a container for a list of CTLOGs (Certificate Transparency logs). The list can be loaded from one or more files and then searched by LogID (see RFC 6962, Section 3.2, for the definition of a LogID). CTLOG_STORE_new() creates an empty list of CT logs. This is then populated by CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file() or CTLOG_STORE_load_file(). CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file() loads from the default file, which is named "ct_log_list.cnf" in OPENSSLDIR (see the output of L). This can be overridden using an environment variable named "CTLOG_FILE". CTLOG_STORE_load_file() loads from a caller-specified file path instead. Both of these functions append any loaded CT logs to the CTLOG_STORE. The expected format of the file is: enabled_logs=foo,bar [foo] description = Log 1 key = [bar] description = Log 2 key = Once a CTLOG_STORE is no longer required, it should be passed to CTLOG_STORE_free(). This will delete all of the CTLOGs stored within, along with the CTLOG_STORE itself. =head1 NOTES If there are any invalid CT logs in a file, they are skipped and the remaining valid logs will still be added to the CTLOG_STORE. A CT log will be considered invalid if it is missing a "key" or "description" field. =head1 RETURN VALUES Both B and B return 1 if all CT logs in the file are successfully parsed and loaded, 0 otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_zero.pod0000644000000000000000000000313213176625660016203 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_zero, BN_one, BN_value_one, BN_set_word, BN_get_word - BIGNUM assignment operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void BN_zero(BIGNUM *a); int BN_one(BIGNUM *a); const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void); int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w); unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_zero(), BN_one() and BN_set_word() set B to the values 0, 1 and B respectively. BN_zero() and BN_one() are macros. BN_value_one() returns a B constant of value 1. This constant is useful for use in comparisons and assignment. BN_get_word() returns B, if it can be represented as an unsigned long. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_get_word() returns the value B, and 0xffffffffL if B cannot be represented as an unsigned long. BN_one(), BN_set_word() and the deprecated version of BN_zero() return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. BN_value_one() returns the constant. The preferred version of BN_zero() never fails and returns no value. =head1 BUGS Someone might change the constant. If a B is equal to 0xffffffffL it can be represented as an unsigned long but this value is also returned on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_get_enc_flags.pod0000644000000000000000000000402313176625660020504 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EC_KEY_get_enc_flags, EC_KEY_set_enc_flags - Get and set flags for encoding EC_KEY structures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION The format of the external representation of the public key written by i2d_ECPrivateKey() (such as whether it is stored in a compressed form or not) is described by the point_conversion_form. See L for a description of point_conversion_form. When reading a private key encoded without an associated public key (e.g. if EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY has been used - see below), then d2i_ECPrivateKey() generates the missing public key automatically. Private keys encoded without parameters (e.g. if EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS has been used - see below) cannot be loaded using d2i_ECPrivateKey(). The functions EC_KEY_get_enc_flags() and EC_KEY_set_enc_flags() get and set the value of the encoding flags for the B. There are two encoding flags currently defined - EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS and EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY. These flags define the behaviour of how the B is converted into ASN1 in a call to i2d_ECPrivateKey(). If EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS is set then the public parameters for the curve are not encoded along with the private key. If EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY is set then the public key is not encoded along with the private key. =head1 RETURN VALUES EC_KEY_get_enc_flags() returns the value of the current encoding flags for the EC_KEY. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000312313176625660016015 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_new, BN_secure_new, BN_clear, BN_free, BN_clear_free - allocate and free BIGNUMs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIGNUM *BN_new(void); BIGNUM *BN_secure_new(void); void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a); void BN_free(BIGNUM *a); void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_new() allocates and initializes a B structure. BN_secure_new() does the same except that the secure heap OPENSSL_secure_malloc(3) is used to store the value. BN_clear() is used to destroy sensitive data such as keys when they are no longer needed. It erases the memory used by B and sets it to the value 0. BN_free() frees the components of the B, and if it was created by BN_new(), also the structure itself. BN_clear_free() additionally overwrites the data before the memory is returned to the system. If B is NULL, nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_new() and BN_secure_new() return a pointer to the B initialised to the value 0. If the allocation fails, they return B and set an error code that can be obtained by L. BN_clear(), BN_free() and BN_clear_free() have no return values. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY BN_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0; use BN_new() instead. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.pod0000644000000000000000000003371213176625660017760 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD, EVP_PKEY_asn1_new, EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy, EVP_PKEY_asn1_free, EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0, EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias, EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public, EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private, EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param, EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free, EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl, EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item, EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits, EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1 - manipulating and registering EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD; EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(int id, int flags, const char *pem_str, const char *info); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *src); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth); int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub), int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx), int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf), int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen), int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder), int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk), int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from), int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b), int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey), int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)); void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth, int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk)); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); =head1 DESCRIPTION B is a structure which holds a set of ASN.1 conversion, printing and information methods for a specific public key algorithm. There are two places where the B objects are stored: one is a built-in array representing the standard methods for different algorithms, and the other one is a stack of user-defined application-specific methods, which can be manipulated by using L. =head2 Methods The methods are the underlying implementations of a particular public key algorithm present by the B object. int (*pub_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, X509_PUBKEY *pub); int (*pub_encode) (X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*pub_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); int (*pub_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); The pub_decode() and pub_encode() methods are called to decode / encode B ASN.1 parameters to / from B. They MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. They're called by L and L. The pub_cmp() method is called when two public keys are to be compared. It MUST return 1 when the keys are equal, 0 otherwise. It's called by L. The pub_print() method is called to print a public key in humanly readable text to B, indented B spaces. It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. It's called by L. int (*priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pk, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf); int (*priv_encode) (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*priv_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); The priv_decode() and priv_encode() methods are called to decode / encode B form private key to / from B. They MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. They're called by L and L. The priv_print() method is called to print a private key in humanly readable text to B, indented B spaces. It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. It's called by L. int (*pkey_size) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*pkey_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*pkey_security_bits) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); The pkey_size() method returns the key size in bytes. It's called by L. The pkey_bits() method returns the key size in bits. It's called by L. int (*param_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen); int (*param_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder); int (*param_missing) (const EVP_PKEY *pk); int (*param_copy) (EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from); int (*param_cmp) (const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b); int (*param_print) (BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); The param_decode() and param_encode() methods are called to decode / encode DER formatted parameters to / from B. They MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. They're called by L and the B L. The param_missing() method returns 0 if a key parameter is missing, otherwise 1. It's called by L. The param_copy() method copies key parameters from B to B. It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. It's called by L. The param_cmp() method compares the parameters of keys B and B. It MUST return 1 when the keys are equal, 0 when not equal, or a negative number on error. It's called by L. The param_print() method prints the private key parameters in humanly readable text to B, indented B spaces. It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. It's called by L. int (*sig_print) (BIO *out, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx); The sig_print() method prints a signature in humanly readable text to B, indented B spaces. B contains the exact signature algorithm. If the signature in B doesn't correspond to what this method expects, X509_signature_dump() must be used as a last resort. It MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. It's called by L. void (*pkey_free) (EVP_PKEY *pkey); The pkey_free() method helps freeing the internals of B. It's called by L, L, L, and L. int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2); The pkey_ctrl() method adds extra algorithm specific control. It's called by L, L, L, L, L, ... int (*old_priv_decode) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen); int (*old_priv_encode) (const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder); The old_priv_decode() and old_priv_encode() methods decode / encode they private key B from / to a DER formatted array. These are exclusively used to help decoding / encoding older (pre PKCS#8) PEM formatted encrypted private keys. old_priv_decode() MUST return 0 on error, 1 on success. old_priv_encode() MUST the return same kind of values as i2d_PrivateKey(). They're called by L and L. int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig); The item_sign() and item_verify() methods make it possible to have algorithm specific signatures and verification of them. item_sign() MUST return one of: =over 4 =item <=0 error =item Z<>1 item_sign() did everything, OpenSSL internals just needs to pass the signature length back. =item Z<>2 item_sign() did nothing, OpenSSL internal standard routines are expected to continue with the default signature production. =item Z<>3 item_sign() set the algorithm identifier B and B, OpenSSL internals should just sign using those algorithms. =back item_verify() MUST return one of: =over 4 =item <=0 error =item Z<>1 item_sign() did everything, OpenSSL internals just needs to pass the signature length back. =item Z<>2 item_sign() did nothing, OpenSSL internal standard routines are expected to continue with the default signature production. =back item_verify() and item_sign() are called by L and L, and by extension, L, L, L, L, ... =head2 Functions EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() creates and returns a new B object, and associates the given B, B, B and B. B is a NID, B is the PEM type string, B is a descriptive string. The following B are supported: ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL If B is set, then the signature algorithm parameters are given the type B by default, otherwise they will be given the type B (i.e. the parameter is omitted). See L for more information. EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy() copies an B object from B to B. This function is not thread safe, it's recommended to only use this when initializing the application. EVP_PKEY_asn1_free() frees an existing B pointed by B. EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0() adds B to the user defined stack of methods unless another B with the same NID is already there. This function is not thread safe, it's recommended to only use this when initializing the application. EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias() creates an alias with the NID B for the B with NID B unless another B with the same NID is already added. This function is not thread safe, it's recommended to only use this when initializing the application. EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_private(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_param(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(), EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(), and EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_security_bits() set the diverse methods of the given B object. EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1() finds the B associated with the key B. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() returns NULL on error, or a pointer to an B object otherwise. EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0() and EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias() return 0 on error, or 1 on success. EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1() returns NULL on error, or a pointer to a constant B object otherwise. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/bio.pod0000644000000000000000000000535013176625660015422 0ustar rootroot=pod =for comment openssl_manual_section 7 =head1 NAME bio - Basic I/O abstraction =for comment generic =head1 SYNOPSIS #include =head1 DESCRIPTION A BIO is an I/O abstraction, it hides many of the underlying I/O details from an application. If an application uses a BIO for its I/O it can transparently handle SSL connections, unencrypted network connections and file I/O. There are two type of BIO, a source/sink BIO and a filter BIO. As its name implies a source/sink BIO is a source and/or sink of data, examples include a socket BIO and a file BIO. A filter BIO takes data from one BIO and passes it through to another, or the application. The data may be left unmodified (for example a message digest BIO) or translated (for example an encryption BIO). The effect of a filter BIO may change according to the I/O operation it is performing: for example an encryption BIO will encrypt data if it is being written to and decrypt data if it is being read from. BIOs can be joined together to form a chain (a single BIO is a chain with one component). A chain normally consist of one source/sink BIO and one or more filter BIOs. Data read from or written to the first BIO then traverses the chain to the end (normally a source/sink BIO). Some BIOs (such as memory BIOs) can be used immediately after calling BIO_new(). Others (such as file BIOs) need some additional initialization, and frequently a utility function exists to create and initialize such BIOs. If BIO_free() is called on a BIO chain it will only free one BIO resulting in a memory leak. Calling BIO_free_all() a single BIO has the same effect as calling BIO_free() on it other than the discarded return value. Normally the B argument is supplied by a function which returns a pointer to a BIO_METHOD. There is a naming convention for such functions: a source/sink BIO is normally called BIO_s_*() and a filter BIO BIO_f_*(); =head1 EXAMPLE Create a memory BIO: BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod0000644000000000000000000000354713176625660016324 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_sign, RSA_verify - RSA signatures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa); int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_sign() signs the message digest B of size B using the private key B using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in RFC 3447. It stores the signature in B and the signature size in B. B must point to RSA_size(B) bytes of memory. Note that PKCS #1 adds meta-data, placing limits on the size of the key that can be used. See L for lower-level operations. B denotes the message digest algorithm that was used to generate B. If B is B, an SSL signature (MD5 and SHA1 message digests with PKCS #1 padding and no algorithm identifier) is created. RSA_verify() verifies that the signature B of size B matches a given message digest B of size B. B denotes the message digest algorithm that was used to generate the signature. B is the signer's public key. =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_sign() returns 1 on success. RSA_verify() returns 1 on successful verification. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 CONFORMING TO SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data.pod0000644000000000000000000000335313176625660022236 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data - Routines to inspect and modify EVP_CIPHER_CTX objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *cipher_data); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data() function returns a pointer to the cipher data relevant to EVP_CIPHER_CTX. The contents of this data is specific to the particular implementation of the cipher. For example this data can be used by engines to store engine specific information. The data is automatically allocated and freed by OpenSSL, so applications and engines should not normally free this directly (but see below). The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data() function allows an application or engine to replace the cipher data with new data. A pointer to any existing cipher data is returned from this function. If the old data is no longer required then it should be freed through a call to OPENSSL_free(). =head1 RETURN VALUES The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data() function returns a pointer to the current cipher data for the EVP_CIPHER_CTX. The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data() function returns a pointer to the old cipher data for the EVP_CIPHER_CTX. =head1 HISTORY The EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod0000644000000000000000000002334213176625660017115 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DEFINE_STACK_OF, DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST, DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF, DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST, OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy, OPENSSL_sk_delete, OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr, OPENSSL_sk_dup, OPENSSL_sk_find, OPENSSL_sk_find_ex, OPENSSL_sk_free, OPENSSL_sk_insert, OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted, OPENSSL_sk_new, OPENSSL_sk_new_null, OPENSSL_sk_num, OPENSSL_sk_pop, OPENSSL_sk_pop_free, OPENSSL_sk_push, OPENSSL_sk_set, OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func, OPENSSL_sk_shift, OPENSSL_sk_sort, OPENSSL_sk_unshift, OPENSSL_sk_value, OPENSSL_sk_zero, sk_TYPE_num, sk_TYPE_value, sk_TYPE_new, sk_TYPE_new_null, sk_TYPE_free, sk_TYPE_zero, sk_TYPE_delete, sk_TYPE_delete_ptr, sk_TYPE_push, sk_TYPE_unshift, sk_TYPE_pop, sk_TYPE_shift, sk_TYPE_pop_free, sk_TYPE_insert, sk_TYPE_set, sk_TYPE_find, sk_TYPE_find_ex, sk_TYPE_sort, sk_TYPE_is_sorted, sk_TYPE_dup, sk_TYPE_deep_copy, sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func - stack container =for comment generic =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(TYPE) DEFINE_STACK_OF(TYPE) DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(TYPE) DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(FUNCTYPE, TYPE) DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(FUNCTYPE, TYPE) typedef int (*sk_TYPE_compfunc)(const TYPE *const *a, const TYPE *const *b); typedef TYPE * (*sk_TYPE_copyfunc)(const TYPE *a); typedef void (*sk_TYPE_freefunc)(TYPE *a); int sk_TYPE_num(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_new(sk_TYPE_compfunc compare); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_new_null(void); void sk_TYPE_free(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); void sk_TYPE_zero(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); TYPE *sk_TYPE_delete(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int i); TYPE *sk_TYPE_delete_ptr(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_push(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, const TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_unshift(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, const TYPE *ptr); TYPE *sk_TYPE_pop(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); TYPE *sk_TYPE_shift(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); void sk_TYPE_pop_free(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_freefunc freefunc); int sk_TYPE_insert(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr, int idx); TYPE *sk_TYPE_set(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx, const TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_find(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_find_ex(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr); void sk_TYPE_sort(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); int sk_TYPE_is_sorted(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_dup(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_deep_copy(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_copyfunc copyfunc, sk_TYPE_freefunc freefunc); sk_TYPE_compfunc (*sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_compfunc compare); =head1 DESCRIPTION Applications can create and use their own stacks by placing any of the macros described below in a header file. These macros define typesafe inline functions that wrap around the utility B API. In the description here, I is used as a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I. STACK_OF() returns the name for a stack of the specified B. DEFINE_STACK_OF() creates set of functions for a stack of B. This will mean that type B is stored in each stack, the type is referenced by STACK_OF(TYPE) and each function name begins with I. For example: TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST() is identical to DEFINE_STACK_OF() except each element is constant. For example: const TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF() defines a stack of B but each function uses B in the function name. For example: TYPE *sk_FUNCNAME_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST() is similar except that each element is constant: const TYPE *sk_FUNCNAME_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); sk_TYPE_num() returns the number of elements in B or -1 if B is B. sk_TYPE_value() returns element B in B, where B starts at zero. If B is out of range then B is returned. sk_TYPE_new() allocates a new empty stack using comparison function B. If B is B then no comparison function is used. sk_TYPE_new_null() allocates a new empty stack with no comparison function. sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func() sets the comparison function of B to B. The previous comparison function is returned or B if there was no previous comparison function. sk_TYPE_free() frees up the B structure. It does B free up any elements of B. After this call B is no longer valid. sk_TYPE_zero() sets the number of elements in B to zero. It does not free B so after this call B is still valid. sk_TYPE_pop_free() frees up all elements of B and B itself. The free function freefunc() is called on each element to free it. sk_TYPE_delete() deletes element B from B. It returns the deleted element or B if B is out of range. sk_TYPE_delete_ptr() deletes element matching B from B. It returns the deleted element or B if no element matching B was found. sk_TYPE_insert() inserts B into B at position B. Any existing elements at or after B are moved downwards. If B is out of range the new element is appended to B. sk_TYPE_insert() either returns the number of elements in B after the new element is inserted or zero if an error (such as memory allocation failure) occurred. sk_TYPE_push() appends B to B it is equivalent to: sk_TYPE_insert(sk, ptr, -1); sk_TYPE_unshift() inserts B at the start of B it is equivalent to: sk_TYPE_insert(sk, ptr, 0); sk_TYPE_pop() returns and removes the last element from B. sk_TYPE_shift() returns and removes the first element from B. sk_TYPE_set() sets element B of B to B replacing the current element. The new element value is returned or B if an error occurred: this will only happen if B is B or B is out of range. sk_TYPE_find() searches B for the element B. In the case where no comparison function has been specified, the function performs a linear search for a pointer equal to B. The index of the first matching element is returned or B<-1> if there is no match. In the case where a comparison function has been specified, B is sorted then sk_TYPE_find() returns the index of a matching element or B<-1> if there is no match. Note that, in this case, the matching element returned is not guaranteed to be the first; the comparison function will usually compare the values pointed to rather than the pointers themselves and the order of elements in B could change. sk_TYPE_find_ex() operates like sk_TYPE_find() except when a comparison function has been specified and no matching element is found. Instead of returning B<-1>, sk_TYPE_find_ex() returns the index of the element either before or after the location where B would be if it were present in B. sk_TYPE_sort() sorts B using the supplied comparison function. sk_TYPE_is_sorted() returns B<1> if B is sorted and B<0> otherwise. sk_TYPE_dup() returns a copy of B. Note the pointers in the copy are identical to the original. sk_TYPE_deep_copy() returns a new stack where each element has been copied. Copying is performed by the supplied copyfunc() and freeing by freefunc(). The function freefunc() is only called if an error occurs. =head1 NOTES Care should be taken when accessing stacks in multi-threaded environments. Any operation which increases the size of a stack such as sk_TYPE_insert() or sk_push() can "grow" the size of an internal array and cause race conditions if the same stack is accessed in a different thread. Operations such as sk_find() and sk_sort() can also reorder the stack. Any comparison function supplied should use a metric suitable for use in a binary search operation. That is it should return zero, a positive or negative value if B is equal to, greater than or less than B respectively. Care should be taken when checking the return values of the functions sk_TYPE_find() and sk_TYPE_find_ex(). They return an index to the matching element. In particular B<0> indicates a matching first element. A failed search is indicated by a B<-1> return value. STACK_OF(), DEFINE_STACK_OF(), DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(), and DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF() are implemented as macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES sk_TYPE_num() returns the number of elements in the stack or B<-1> if the passed stack is B. sk_TYPE_value() returns a pointer to a stack element or B if the index is out of range. sk_TYPE_new() and sk_TYPE_new_null() return an empty stack or B if an error occurs. sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func() returns the old comparison function or B if there was no old comparison function. sk_TYPE_free(), sk_TYPE_zero(), sk_TYPE_pop_free() and sk_TYPE_sort() do not return values. sk_TYPE_pop(), sk_TYPE_shift(), sk_TYPE_delete() and sk_TYPE_delete_ptr() return a pointer to the deleted element or B on error. sk_TYPE_insert(), sk_TYPE_push() and sk_TYPE_unshift() return the total number of elements in the stack and 0 if an error occurred. sk_TYPE_set() returns a pointer to the replacement element or B on error. sk_TYPE_find() and sk_TYPE_find_ex() return an index to the found element or B<-1> on error. sk_TYPE_is_sorted() returns B<1> if the stack is sorted and B<0> if it is not. sk_TYPE_dup() and sk_TYPE_deep_copy() return a pointer to the copy of the stack. =head1 HISTORY Before OpenSSL 1.1.0, this was implemented via macros and not inline functions and was not a public API. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_add0_cert.pod0000644000000000000000000000413613176625660017201 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_add0_cert, CMS_add1_cert, CMS_get1_certs, CMS_add0_crl, CMS_add1_crl, CMS_get1_crls - CMS certificate and CRL utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert); int CMS_add1_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert); STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get1_certs(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_add0_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl); int CMS_add1_crl(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509_CRL *crl); STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *CMS_get1_crls(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_add0_cert() and CMS_add1_cert() add certificate B to B. must be of type signed data or enveloped data. CMS_get1_certs() returns all certificates in B. CMS_add0_crl() and CMS_add1_crl() add CRL B to B. CMS_get1_crls() returns any CRLs in B. =head1 NOTES The CMS_ContentInfo structure B must be of type signed data or enveloped data or an error will be returned. For signed data certificates and CRLs are added to the B and B fields of SignedData structure. For enveloped data they are added to B. As the B<0> implies CMS_add0_cert() adds B internally to B and it must not be freed up after the call as opposed to CMS_add1_cert() where B must be freed up. The same certificate or CRL must not be added to the same cms structure more than once. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_add0_cert(), CMS_add1_cert() and CMS_add0_crl() and CMS_add1_crl() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. CMS_get1_certs() and CMS_get1_crls() return the STACK of certificates or CRLs or NULL if there are none or an error occurs. The only error which will occur in practice is if the B type is invalid. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_get0_signature.pod0000644000000000000000000000572513176625660020324 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get0_signature, X509_get_signature_nid, X509_get0_tbs_sigalg, X509_REQ_get0_signature, X509_REQ_get_signature_nid, X509_CRL_get0_signature, X509_CRL_get_signature_nid - signature information =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x); int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x); const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x); void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *crl, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg); int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *crl); void X509_CRL_get0_signature(const X509_CRL *crl, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg); int X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(const X509_CRL *crl); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_get0_signature() sets B<*psig> to the signature of B and B<*palg> to the signature algorithm of B. The values returned are internal pointers which B be freed up after the call. X509_get0_tbs_sigalg() returns the signature algorithm in the signed portion of B. X509_get_signature_nid() returns the NID corresponding to the signature algorithm of B. X509_REQ_get0_signature(), X509_REQ_get_signature_nid() X509_CRL_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() perform the same function for certificate requests and CRLs. =head1 NOTES These functions provide lower level access to signatures in certificates where an application wishes to analyse or generate a signature in a form where X509_sign() et al is not appropriate (for example a non standard or unsupported format). =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_get_signature_nid(), X509_REQ_get_signature_nid() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() return a NID. X509_get0_signature(), X509_REQ_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get0_signature() do not return values. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY X509_get0_signature() and X509_get_signature_nid() were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2. X509_REQ_get0_signature(), X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(), X509_CRL_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod0000644000000000000000000000733513176625660021362 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_generate_parameters_ex, DSA_generate_parameters - generate DSA parameters =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_generate_parameters_ex() generates primes p and q and a generator g for use in the DSA and stores the result in B. B is the length of the prime p to be generated. For lengths under 2048 bits, the length of q is 160 bits; for lengths greater than or equal to 2048 bits, the length of q is set to 256 bits. If B is NULL, the primes will be generated at random. If B is less than the length of q, an error is returned. DSA_generate_parameters_ex() places the iteration count in *B and a counter used for finding a generator in *B, unless these are B. A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress of the key generation. If B is not B, it will be called as shown below. For information on the BN_GENCB structure and the BN_GENCB_call function discussed below, refer to L. =over 2 =item * When a candidate for q is generated, B is called (m is 0 for the first candidate). =item * When a candidate for q has passed a test by trial division, B is called. While a candidate for q is tested by Miller-Rabin primality tests, B is called in the outer loop (once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime); i is the loop counter (starting at 0). =item * When a prime q has been found, B and B are called. =item * Before a candidate for p (other than the first) is generated and tested, B is called. =item * When a candidate for p has passed the test by trial division, B is called. While it is tested by the Miller-Rabin primality test, B is called in the outer loop (once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime). i is the loop counter (starting at 0). =item * When p has been found, B is called. =item * When the generator has been found, B is called. =back DSA_generate_parameters() (deprecated) works in much the same way as for DSA_generate_parameters_ex, except that no B parameter is passed and instead a newly allocated B structure is returned. Additionally "old style" callbacks are used instead of the newer BN_GENCB based approach. Refer to L for further information. =head1 RETURN VALUE DSA_generate_parameters_ex() returns a 1 on success, or 0 otherwise. DSA_generate_parameters() returns a pointer to the DSA structure, or B if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 BUGS Seed lengths E 20 are not supported. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod0000644000000000000000000001163013176625660017274 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_ia32cap - the x86[_64] processor capabilities vector =head1 SYNOPSIS env OPENSSL_ia32cap=... =head1 DESCRIPTION OpenSSL supports a range of x86[_64] instruction set extensions. These extensions are denoted by individual bits in capability vector returned by processor in EDX:ECX register pair after executing CPUID instruction with EAX=1 input value (see Intel Application Note #241618). This vector is copied to memory upon toolkit initialization and used to choose between different code paths to provide optimal performance across wide range of processors. For the moment of this writing following bits are significant: =over 4 =item bit #4 denoting presence of Time-Stamp Counter. =item bit #19 denoting availability of CLFLUSH instruction; =item bit #20, reserved by Intel, is used to choose among RC4 code paths; =item bit #23 denoting MMX support; =item bit #24, FXSR bit, denoting availability of XMM registers; =item bit #25 denoting SSE support; =item bit #26 denoting SSE2 support; =item bit #28 denoting Hyperthreading, which is used to distinguish cores with shared cache; =item bit #30, reserved by Intel, denotes specifically Intel CPUs; =item bit #33 denoting availability of PCLMULQDQ instruction; =item bit #41 denoting SSSE3, Supplemental SSE3, support; =item bit #43 denoting AMD XOP support (forced to zero on non-AMD CPUs); =item bit #54 denoting availability of MOVBE instruction; =item bit #57 denoting AES-NI instruction set extension; =item bit #58, XSAVE bit, lack of which in combination with MOVBE is used to identify Atom Silvermont core; =item bit #59, OSXSAVE bit, denoting availability of YMM registers; =item bit #60 denoting AVX extension; =item bit #62 denoting availability of RDRAND instruction; =back For example, in 32-bit application context clearing bit #26 at run-time disables high-performance SSE2 code present in the crypto library, while clearing bit #24 disables SSE2 code operating on 128-bit XMM register bank. You might have to do the latter if target OpenSSL application is executed on SSE2 capable CPU, but under control of OS that does not enable XMM registers. Historically address of the capability vector copy was exposed to application through OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(), but not anymore. Now the only way to affect the capability detection is to set OPENSSL_ia32cap environment variable prior target application start. To give a specific example, on Intel P4 processor 'env OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x16980010 apps/openssl', or better yet 'env OPENSSL_ia32cap=~0x1000000 apps/openssl' would achieve the desired effect. Alternatively you can reconfigure the toolkit with no-sse2 option and recompile. Less intuitive is clearing bit #28, or ~0x10000000 in the "environment variable" terms. The truth is that it's not copied from CPUID output verbatim, but is adjusted to reflect whether or not the data cache is actually shared between logical cores. This in turn affects the decision on whether or not expensive countermeasures against cache-timing attacks are applied, most notably in AES assembler module. The capability vector is further extended with EBX value returned by CPUID with EAX=7 and ECX=0 as input. Following bits are significant: =over 4 =item bit #64+3 denoting availability of BMI1 instructions, e.g. ANDN; =item bit #64+5 denoting availability of AVX2 instructions; =item bit #64+8 denoting availability of BMI2 instructions, e.g. MULX and RORX; =item bit #64+16 denoting availability of AVX512F extension; =item bit #64+18 denoting availability of RDSEED instruction; =item bit #64+19 denoting availability of ADCX and ADOX instructions; =item bit #64+29 denoting availability of SHA extension; =item bit #64+30 denoting availability of AVX512BW extension; =item bit #64+31 denoting availability of AVX512VL extension; =back To control this extended capability word use ':' as delimiter when setting up OPENSSL_ia32cap environment variable. For example assigning ':~0x20' would disable AVX2 code paths, and ':0' - all post-AVX extensions. It should be noted that whether or not some of the most "fancy" extension code paths are actually assembled depends on current assembler version. Base minimum of AES-NI/PCLMULQDQ, SSSE3 and SHA extension code paths are always assembled. Besides that, minimum assembler version requirements are summarized in below table: Extension | GNU as | nasm | llvm ------------+--------+--------+-------- AVX | 2.19 | 2.09 | 3.0 AVX2 | 2.22 | 2.10 | 3.1 AVX512 | 2.25 | 2.11.8 | 3.6 B is a macro returning the first word of the vector. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SCT_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001440713176625660016156 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SCT_new, SCT_new_from_base64, SCT_free, SCT_LIST_free, SCT_get_version, SCT_set_version, SCT_get_log_entry_type, SCT_set_log_entry_type, SCT_get0_log_id, SCT_set0_log_id, SCT_set1_log_id, SCT_get_timestamp, SCT_set_timestamp, SCT_get_signature_nid, SCT_set_signature_nid, SCT_get0_signature, SCT_set0_signature, SCT_set1_signature, SCT_get0_extensions, SCT_set0_extensions, SCT_set1_extensions, SCT_get_source, SCT_set_source - A Certificate Transparency Signed Certificate Timestamp =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef enum { CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET = -1, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509 = 0, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT = 1 } ct_log_entry_type_t; typedef enum { SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET = -1, SCT_VERSION_V1 = 0 } sct_version_t; typedef enum { SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE } sct_source_t; SCT *SCT_new(void); SCT *SCT_new_from_base64(unsigned char version, const char *logid_base64, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type, uint64_t timestamp, const char *extensions_base64, const char *signature_base64); void SCT_free(SCT *sct); void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a); sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct); int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version); ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct); int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type); size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id); int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len); int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len); uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct); void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp); int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct); int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid); size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig); void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext); void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len); int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len); sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct); int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source); =head1 DESCRIPTION Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) are defined by RFC 6962, Section 3.2. They constitute a promise by a Certificate Transparency (CT) log to publicly record a certificate. By cryptographically verifying that a log did indeed issue an SCT, some confidence can be gained that the certificate is publicly known. An internal representation of an SCT can be created in one of two ways. The first option is to create a blank SCT, using SCT_new(), and then populate it using: =over 4 =item * SCT_set_version() to set the SCT version. Only SCT_VERSION_V1 is currently supported. =item * SCT_set_log_entry_type() to set the type of certificate the SCT was issued for: B for a normal certificate. B for a pre-certificate. =item * SCT_set0_log_id() or SCT_set1_log_id() to set the LogID of the CT log that the SCT came from. The former takes ownership, whereas the latter makes a copy. See RFC 6962, Section 3.2 for the definition of LogID. =item * SCT_set_timestamp() to set the time the SCT was issued (epoch time in milliseconds). =item * SCT_set_signature_nid() to set the NID of the signature. =item * SCT_set0_signature() or SCT_set1_signature() to set the raw signature value. The former takes ownership, whereas the latter makes a copy. =item * SCT_set0_extensions() or B to provide SCT extensions. The former takes ownership, whereas the latter makes a copy. =back Alternatively, the SCT can be pre-populated from the following data using SCT_new_from_base64(): =over 4 =item * The SCT version (only SCT_VERSION_V1 is currently supported). =item * The LogID (see RFC 6962, Section 3.2), base64 encoded. =item * The type of certificate the SCT was issued for: B for a normal certificate. B for a pre-certificate. =item * The time that the SCT was issued (epoch time in milliseconds). =item * The SCT extensions, base64 encoded. =item * The SCT signature, base64 encoded. =back SCT_set_source() can be used to record where the SCT was found (TLS extension, X.509 certificate extension or OCSP response). This is not required for verifying the SCT. =head1 NOTES Some of the setters return int, instead of void. These will all return 1 on success, 0 on failure. They will not make changes on failure. All of the setters will reset the validation status of the SCT to SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET (see L). SCT_set_source() will call SCT_set_log_entry_type() if the type of certificate the SCT was issued for can be inferred from where the SCT was found. For example, an SCT found in an X.509 extension must have been issued for a pre- certificate. SCT_set_source() will not refuse unknown values. =head1 RETURN VALUES SCT_set_version() returns 1 if the specified version is supported, 0 otherwise. SCT_set_log_entry_type() returns 1 if the specified log entry type is supported, 0 otherwise. SCT_set0_log_id() and B return 1 if the specified LogID is a valid SHA-256 hash, 0 otherwise. Additionally, B returns 0 if malloc fails. B returns 1 if the specified NID is supported, 0 otherwise. B and B return 1 if the supplied buffer is copied successfully, 0 otherwise (i.e. if malloc fails). B returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000617713176625660017707 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init, EVP_PKEY_encrypt - encrypt using a public key algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init() function initializes a public key algorithm context using key B for an encryption operation. The EVP_PKEY_encrypt() function performs a public key encryption operation using B. The data to be encrypted is specified using the B and B parameters. If B is B then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the B parameter. If B is not B then before the call the B parameter should contain the length of the B buffer, if the call is successful the encrypted data is written to B and the amount of data written to B. =head1 NOTES After the call to EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init() algorithm specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operation. The function EVP_PKEY_encrypt() can be called more than once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init() and EVP_PKEY_encrypt() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLE Encrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys). See also L or L for means to load a public key. You may also simply set 'eng = NULL;' to start with the default OpenSSL RSA implementation: #include #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; ENGINE *eng; unsigned char *out, *in; size_t outlen, inlen; EVP_PKEY *key; /* NB: assumes eng, key, in, inlen are already set up, * and that key is an RSA public key */ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, eng); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Determine buffer length */ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0) /* Error */ out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen); if (!out) /* malloc failure */ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Encrypted data is outlen bytes written to buffer out */ =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod0000644000000000000000000000625513176625660020743 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OCSP_response_status, OCSP_response_get1_basic, OCSP_response_create, OCSP_RESPONSE_free, OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name, OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key, OCSP_RESPID_match - OCSP response functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int OCSP_response_status(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); OCSP_BASICRESP *OCSP_response_get1_basic(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs); void OCSP_RESPONSE_free(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp); int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert); int OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert); int OCSP_RESPID_match(OCSP_RESPID *respid, X509 *cert); =head1 DESCRIPTION OCSP_response_status() returns the OCSP response status of B. It returns one of the values: B, B, B, B B, or B. OCSP_response_get1_basic() decodes and returns the B structure contained in B. OCSP_response_create() creates and returns an B structure for B and optionally including basic response B. OCSP_RESPONSE_free() frees up OCSP response B. OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name() sets the name of the OCSP_RESPID to be the same as the subject name in the supplied X509 certificate B for the OCSP responder. OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() sets the key of the OCSP_RESPID to be the same as the key in the supplied X509 certificate B for the OCSP responder. The key is stored as a SHA1 hash. Note that an OCSP_RESPID can only have one of the name, or the key set. Calling OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name() or OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() will clear any existing setting. OCSP_RESPID_match() tests whether the OCSP_RESPID given in B matches with the X509 certificate B. =head1 RETURN VALUES OCSP_RESPONSE_status() returns a status value. OCSP_response_get1_basic() returns an B structure pointer or B if an error occurred. OCSP_response_create() returns an B structure pointer or B if an error occurred. OCSP_RESPONSE_free() does not return a value. OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name() and OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() return 1 on success or 0 on failure. OCSP_RESPID_match() returns 1 if the OCSP_RESPID and the X509 certificate match or 0 otherwise. =head1 NOTES OCSP_response_get1_basic() is only called if the status of a response is B. =head1 SEE ALSO L L L L L L L L =head1 HISTORY The OCSP_RESPID_set_by_name(), OCSP_RESPID_set_by_key() and OCSP_RESPID_match() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0a. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_check_issued.pod0000644000000000000000000000227113176625660020026 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_check_issued - checks if certificate is issued by another certificate =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject); =head1 DESCRIPTION This function checks if certificate I was issued using CA certificate I. This function takes into account not only matching of issuer field of I with subject field of I, but also compares B extension of I with B of I if B present in the I certificate and checks B field of I. =head1 RETURN VALUE Function return B if certificate I is issued by I or some B constant to indicate an error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_EXTENSION_set_object.pod0000644000000000000000000000721013176625660021150 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_EXTENSION_set_object, X509_EXTENSION_set_critical, X509_EXTENSION_set_data, X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID, X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ, X509_EXTENSION_get_object, X509_EXTENSION_get_critical, X509_EXTENSION_get_data - extension utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit); int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); ASN1_OBJECT *X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex); int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(const X509_EXTENSION *ex); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ne); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_EXTENSION_set_object() sets the extension type of B to B. The B pointer is duplicated internally so B should be freed up after use. X509_EXTENSION_set_critical() sets the criticality of B to B. If B is zero the extension in non-critical otherwise it is critical. X509_EXTENSION_set_data() sets the data in extension B to B. The B pointer is duplicated internally. X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID() creates an extension of type B, criticality B using data B. The created extension is returned and written to B<*ex> reusing or allocating a new extension if necessary so B<*ex> should either be B or a valid B structure it must B be an uninitialised pointer. X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ() is identical to X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID() except it creates and extension using B instead of a NID. X509_EXTENSION_get_object() returns the extension type of B as an B pointer. The returned pointer is an internal value which must not be freed up. X509_EXTENSION_get_critical() returns the criticality of extension B it returns B<1> for critical and B<0> for non-critical. X509_EXTENSION_get_data() returns the data of extension B. The returned pointer is an internal value which must not be freed up. =head1 NOTES These functions manipulate the contents of an extension directly. Most applications will want to parse or encode and add an extension: they should use the extension encode and decode functions instead such as X509_add1_ext_i2d() and X509_get_ext_d2i(). The B associated with an extension is the extension encoding in an B structure. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_EXTENSION_set_object() X509_EXTENSION_set_critical() and X509_EXTENSION_set_data() return B<1> for success and B<0> for failure. X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID() and X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ() return an B pointer or B if an error occurs. X509_EXTENSION_get_object() returns an B pointer. X509_EXTENSION_get_critical() returns B<0> for non-critical and B<1> for critical. X509_EXTENSION_get_data() returns an B pointer. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod0000644000000000000000000002554113176625660017152 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EC_GROUP_get0_order, EC_GROUP_order_bits, EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor, EC_GROUP_copy, EC_GROUP_dup, EC_GROUP_method_of, EC_GROUP_set_generator, EC_GROUP_get0_generator, EC_GROUP_get_order, EC_GROUP_get_cofactor, EC_GROUP_set_curve_name, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag, EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag, EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form, EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form, EC_GROUP_get0_seed, EC_GROUP_get_seed_len, EC_GROUP_set_seed, EC_GROUP_get_degree, EC_GROUP_check, EC_GROUP_check_discriminant, EC_GROUP_cmp, EC_GROUP_get_basis_type, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis, EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis - Functions for manipulating EC_GROUP objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dst, const EC_GROUP *src); EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *src); const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group); int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor); const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group); int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx); const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group); int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group); int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, BN_CTX *ctx); const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid); int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag); int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form); point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *); unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x); size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *); size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len); int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group); int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *); int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k); int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k1, unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3); =head1 DESCRIPTION EC_GROUP_copy copies the curve B into B. Both B and B must use the same EC_METHOD. EC_GROUP_dup creates a new EC_GROUP object and copies the content from B to the newly created EC_GROUP object. EC_GROUP_method_of obtains the EC_METHOD of B. EC_GROUP_set_generator sets curve parameters that must be agreed by all participants using the curve. These parameters include the B, the B and the B. The B is a well defined point on the curve chosen for cryptographic operations. Integers used for point multiplications will be between 0 and n-1 where n is the B. The B multiplied by the B gives the number of points on the curve. EC_GROUP_get0_generator returns the generator for the identified B. The functions EC_GROUP_get_order and EC_GROUP_get_cofactor populate the provided B and B parameters with the respective order and cofactors for the B. The functions EC_GROUP_set_curve_name and EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, set and get the NID for the curve respectively (see L). If a curve does not have a NID associated with it, then EC_GROUP_get_curve_name will return 0. The asn1_flag value is used to determine whether the curve encoding uses explicit parameters or a named curve using an ASN1 OID: many applications only support the latter form. If asn1_flag is B then the named curve form is used and the parameters must have a corresponding named curve NID set. If asn1_flags is B the parameters are explicitly encoded. The functions EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag and EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag get and set the status of the asn1_flag for the curve. Note: B was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0, for previous versions of OpenSSL the value 0 must be used instead. Before OpenSSL 1.1.0 the default form was to use explicit parameters (meaning that applications would have to explicitly set the named curve form) in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and later the named curve form is the default. The point_conversion_form for a curve controls how EC_POINT data is encoded as ASN1 as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA). point_conversion_form_t is an enum defined as follows: typedef enum { /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID = 6 } point_conversion_form_t; For POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED the point is encoded as an octet signifying the UNCOMPRESSED form has been used followed by the octets for x, followed by the octets for y. For any given x co-ordinate for a point on a curve it is possible to derive two possible y values. For POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED the point is encoded as an octet signifying that the COMPRESSED form has been used AND which of the two possible solutions for y has been used, followed by the octets for x. For POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID the point is encoded as an octet signifying the HYBRID form has been used AND which of the two possible solutions for y has been used, followed by the octets for x, followed by the octets for y. The functions EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form and EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form set and get the point_conversion_form for the curve respectively. ANSI X9.62 (ECDSA standard) defines a method of generating the curve parameter b from a random number. This provides advantages in that a parameter obtained in this way is highly unlikely to be susceptible to special purpose attacks, or have any trapdoors in it. If the seed is present for a curve then the b parameter was generated in a verifiable fashion using that seed. The OpenSSL EC library does not use this seed value but does enable you to inspect it using EC_GROUP_get0_seed. This returns a pointer to a memory block containing the seed that was used. The length of the memory block can be obtained using EC_GROUP_get_seed_len. A number of the builtin curves within the library provide seed values that can be obtained. It is also possible to set a custom seed using EC_GROUP_set_seed and passing a pointer to a memory block, along with the length of the seed. Again, the EC library will not use this seed value, although it will be preserved in any ASN1 based communications. EC_GROUP_get_degree gets the degree of the field. For Fp fields this will be the number of bits in p. For F2^m fields this will be the value m. The function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant calculates the discriminant for the curve and verifies that it is valid. For a curve defined over Fp the discriminant is given by the formula 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 whilst for F2^m curves the discriminant is simply b. In either case for the curve to be valid the discriminant must be non zero. The function EC_GROUP_check performs a number of checks on a curve to verify that it is valid. Checks performed include verifying that the discriminant is non zero; that a generator has been defined; that the generator is on the curve and has the correct order. EC_GROUP_cmp compares B and B to determine whether they represent the same curve or not. The functions EC_GROUP_get_basis_type, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis and EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis should only be called for curves defined over an F2^m field. Addition and multiplication operations within an F2^m field are performed using an irreducible polynomial function f(x). This function is either a trinomial of the form: f(x) = x^m + x^k + 1 with m > k >= 1 or a pentanomial of the form: f(x) = x^m + x^k3 + x^k2 + x^k1 + 1 with m > k3 > k2 > k1 >= 1 The function EC_GROUP_get_basis_type returns a NID identifying whether a trinomial or pentanomial is in use for the field. The function EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis must only be called where f(x) is of the trinomial form, and returns the value of B. Similarly the function EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis must only be called where f(x) is of the pentanomial form, and returns the values of B, B and B respectively. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following functions return 1 on success or 0 on error: EC_GROUP_copy, EC_GROUP_set_generator, EC_GROUP_check, EC_GROUP_check_discriminant, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis and EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis. EC_GROUP_dup returns a pointer to the duplicated curve, or NULL on error. EC_GROUP_method_of returns the EC_METHOD implementation in use for the given curve or NULL on error. EC_GROUP_get0_generator returns the generator for the given curve or NULL on error. EC_GROUP_get_order, EC_GROUP_get_cofactor, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag, EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form and EC_GROUP_get_degree return the order, cofactor, curve name (NID), ASN1 flag, point_conversion_form and degree for the specified curve respectively. If there is no curve name associated with a curve then EC_GROUP_get_curve_name will return 0. EC_GROUP_get0_order() returns an internal pointer to the group order. EC_GROUP_get_order_bits() returns the number of bits in the group order. EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor() returns an internal pointer to the group cofactor. EC_GROUP_get0_seed returns a pointer to the seed that was used to generate the parameter b, or NULL if the seed is not specified. EC_GROUP_get_seed_len returns the length of the seed or 0 if the seed is not specified. EC_GROUP_set_seed returns the length of the seed that has been set. If the supplied seed is NULL, or the supplied seed length is 0, the return value will be 1. On error 0 is returned. EC_GROUP_cmp returns 0 if the curves are equal, 1 if they are not equal, or -1 on error. EC_GROUP_get_basis_type returns the values NID_X9_62_tpBasis or NID_X9_62_ppBasis (as defined in ) for a trinomial or pentanomial respectively. Alternatively in the event of an error a 0 is returned. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_compress.pod0000644000000000000000000000512413176625660017205 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_compress - create a CMS CompressedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_compress() creates and returns a CMS CompressedData structure. B is the compression algorithm to use or B to use the default algorithm (zlib compression). B is the content to be compressed. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES The only currently supported compression algorithm is zlib using the NID NID_zlib_compression. If zlib support is not compiled into OpenSSL then CMS_compress() will return an error. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are prepended to the data. Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if B is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If B is set then B is ignored. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is returned suitable for streaming I/O: no data is read from the BIO B. The compressed data is included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, unless B is set in which case it is omitted. This is rarely used in practice and is not supported by SMIME_write_CMS(). =head1 NOTES If the flag B is set the returned B structure is B complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not properly finalize the B structure will give unpredictable results. Several functions including SMIME_write_CMS(), i2d_CMS_bio_stream(), PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B directly using BIO_new_CMS(). Additional compression parameters such as the zlib compression level cannot currently be set. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_compress() returns either a CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The B flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_copy.pod0000644000000000000000000000374213176625660016205 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_copy, BN_dup, BN_with_flags - copy BIGNUMs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *to, const BIGNUM *from); BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *from); void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_copy() copies B to B. BN_dup() creates a new B containing the value B. BN_with_flags creates a B shallow copy of B in B. It places significant restrictions on the copied data. Applications that do no adhere to these restrictions may encounter unexpected side effects or crashes. For that reason use of this function is discouraged. Any flags provided in B will be set in B in addition to any flags already set in B. For example this might commonly be used to create a temporary copy of a BIGNUM with the B flag set for constant time operations. The temporary copy in B will share some internal state with B. For this reason the following restrictions apply to the use of B: =over 2 =item * B should be a newly allocated BIGNUM obtained via a call to BN_new(). It should not have been used for other purposes or initialised in any way. =item * B must only be used in "read-only" operations, i.e. typically those functions where the relevant parameter is declared "const". =item * B must be used and freed before any further subsequent use of B =back =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_copy() returns B on success, NULL on error. BN_dup() returns the new B, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS12_newpass.pod0000644000000000000000000000623513176625660017317 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS12_newpass - change the password of a PKCS12 structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS12_newpass() changes the password of a PKCS12 structure. B is a pointer to a PKCS12 structure. B is the existing password and B is the new password. =head1 NOTES Each of B and B is independently interpreted as a string in the UTF-8 encoding. If it is not valid UTF-8, it is assumed to be ISO8859-1 instead. In particular, this means that passwords in the locale character set (or code page on Windows) must potentially be converted to UTF-8 before use. This may include passwords from local text files, or input from the terminal or command line. Refer to the documentation of L, for example. =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS12_newpass() returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. Applications can retrieve the most recent error from PKCS12_newpass() with ERR_get_error(). =head1 EXAMPLE This example loads a PKCS#12 file, changes its password and writes out the result to a new file. #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { FILE *fp; PKCS12 *p12; if (argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: pkread p12file password newpass opfile\n"); return 1; } if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "rb")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[1]); return 1; } p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL); fclose(fp); if (p12 == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error reading PKCS#12 file\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return 1; } if (PKCS12_newpass(p12, argv[2], argv[3]) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error changing password\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); PKCS12_free(p12); return 1; } if ((fp = fopen(argv[4], "wb")) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening file %s\n", argv[4]); PKCS12_free(p12); return 1; } i2d_PKCS12_fp(fp, p12); PKCS12_free(p12); fclose(fp); return 0; } =head1 NOTES If the PKCS#12 structure does not have a password, then you must use the empty string "" for B. Using NULL for B will result in a PKCS12_newpass() failure. If the wrong password is used for B then the function will fail, with a MAC verification error. In rare cases the PKCS12 structure does not contain a MAC: in this case it will usually fail with a decryption padding error. =head1 BUGS The password format is a NULL terminated ASCII string which is converted to Unicode form internally. As a result some passwords cannot be supplied to this function. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SCT_validate.pod0000644000000000000000000000610013176625660017145 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SCT_validate, SCT_LIST_validate, SCT_get_validation_status - checks Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) are valid =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef enum { SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED, SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION } sct_validation_status_t; int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx); sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct); =head1 DESCRIPTION SCT_validate() will check that an SCT is valid and verify its signature. SCT_LIST_validate() performs the same checks on an entire stack of SCTs. The result of the validation checks can be obtained by passing the SCT to SCT_get_validation_status(). A CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX must be provided that specifies: =over 4 =item * The certificate the SCT was issued for. Failure to provide the certificate will result in the validation status being SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED. =item * The issuer of that certificate. This is only required if the SCT was issued for a pre-certificate (see RFC 6962). If it is required but not provided, the validation status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED. =item * A CTLOG_STORE that contains the CT log that issued this SCT. If the SCT was issued by a log that is not in this CTLOG_STORE, the validation status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG. =back If the SCT is of an unsupported version (only v1 is currently supported), the validation status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION. If the SCT's signature is incorrect, its timestamp is in the future (relative to the time in CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX), or if it is otherwise invalid, the validation status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID. If all checks pass, the validation status will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID. =head1 NOTES A return value of 0 from SCT_LIST_validate() should not be interpreted as a failure. At a minimum, only one valid SCT may provide sufficient confidence that a certificate has been publicly logged. =head1 RETURN VALUES SCT_validate() returns a negative integer if an internal error occurs, 0 if the SCT fails validation, or 1 if the SCT passes validation. SCT_LIST_validate() returns a negative integer if an internal error occurs, 0 if any of SCTs fails validation, or 1 if they all pass validation. SCT_get_validation_status() returns the validation status of the SCT. If SCT_validate() or SCT_LIST_validate() have not been passed that SCT, the returned value will be SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod0000644000000000000000000002630013176625660022206 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb, X509_STORE_set_verify_func, X509_STORE_get_cleanup, X509_STORE_set_cleanup, X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls, X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls, X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs, X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs, X509_STORE_get_check_policy, X509_STORE_set_check_policy, X509_STORE_get_cert_crl, X509_STORE_set_cert_crl, X509_STORE_get_check_crl, X509_STORE_set_check_crl, X509_STORE_get_get_crl, X509_STORE_set_get_crl, X509_STORE_get_check_revocation, X509_STORE_set_check_revocation, X509_STORE_get_check_issued, X509_STORE_set_check_issued, X509_STORE_get_get_issuer, X509_STORE_set_get_issuer, X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify, X509_STORE_set_verify, X509_STORE_get_verify_cb, X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func, X509_STORE_set_verify_cb, X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn - set verification callback =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn)(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); typedef STACK_OF(X509) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); typedef STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb); X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_verify(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify); X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn get_issuer); X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued); X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn check_revocation); X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_get_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl); X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl); X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn cert_crl); X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_check_policy(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn check_policy); X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn lookup_certs); X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls); X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_set_cleanup(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn cleanup); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* Aliases */ void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(X509_STORE *st, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb); void X509_STORE_set_verify_func(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify); void X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn lookup_crls); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_STORE_set_verify_cb() sets the verification callback of B to B overwriting the previous callback. The callback assigned with this function becomes a default for the one that can be assigned directly to the corresponding B, please see L for further information. X509_STORE_set_verify() sets the final chain verification function for B to B. Its purpose is to go through the chain of certificates and check that all signatures are valid and that the current time is within the limits of each certificate's first and last validity time. The final chain verification functions must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_get_issuer() sets the function to get the issuer certificate that verifies the given certificate B. When found, the issuer certificate must be assigned to B<*issuer>. This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_check_issued() sets the function to check that a given certificate B is issued with the issuer certificate B. This function must return 0 on failure (among others if B hasn't been issued with B) and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_check_revocation() sets the revocation checking function. Its purpose is to look through the final chain and check the revocation status for each certificate. It must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_get_crl() sets the function to get the crl for a given certificate B. When found, the crl must be assigned to B<*crl>. This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_check_crl() sets the function to check the validity of the given B. This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_cert_crl() sets the function to check the revocation status of the given certificate B against the given B. This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_check_policy() sets the function to check the policies of all the certificates in the final chain.. This function must return 0 on failure and 1 on success. I X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs() and X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls() set the functions to look up all the certs or all the CRLs that match the given name B. These functions return NULL on failure and a pointer to a stack of certificates (B) or to a stack of CRLs (B) on success. I X509_STORE_set_cleanup() sets the final cleanup function, which is called when the context (B) is being torn down. This function doesn't return any value. I X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(), X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_get_check_issued(), X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_get_get_crl(), X509_STORE_get_check_crl(), X509_STORE_set_verify(), X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_get_check_policy(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls() and X509_STORE_get_cleanup() all return the function pointer assigned with X509_STORE_set_check_issued(), X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_set_get_crl(), X509_STORE_set_check_crl(), X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_set_check_policy(), X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls() and X509_STORE_set_cleanup(), or NULL if no assignment has been made. X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(), X509_STORE_set_verify_func() and X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb() are aliases for X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_set_verify() and X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls, available as macros for backward compatibility. =head1 NOTES All the callbacks from a B are inherited by the corresponding B structure when it is initialized. See L for further details. =head1 BUGS The macro version of this function was the only one available before OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 RETURN VALUES The X509_STORE_set_*() functions do not return a value. The X509_STORE_get_*() functions return a pointer of the appropriate function type. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY X509_STORE_set_verify_cb() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_get_verify_cb(), X509_STORE_set_verify(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(), X509_STORE_set_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_get_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_set_check_issued(), X509_STORE_get_check_issued(), X509_STORE_set_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_get_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_set_get_crl(), X509_STORE_get_get_crl(), X509_STORE_set_check_crl(), X509_STORE_get_check_crl(), X509_STORE_set_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_get_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_set_check_policy(), X509_STORE_get_check_policy(), X509_STORE_set_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls(), X509_STORE_get_lookup_crls(), X509_STORE_set_cleanup() and X509_STORE_get_cleanup() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod0000644000000000000000000000510713176625660021144 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_mod_mul_montgomery, BN_MONT_CTX_new, BN_MONT_CTX_free, BN_MONT_CTX_set, BN_MONT_CTX_copy, BN_from_montgomery, BN_to_montgomery - Montgomery multiplication =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void); void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from); int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions implement Montgomery multiplication. They are used automatically when L is called with suitable input, but they may be useful when several operations are to be performed using the same modulus. BN_MONT_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B structure. BN_MONT_CTX_set() sets up the I structure from the modulus I by precomputing its inverse and a value R. BN_MONT_CTX_copy() copies the B I to I. BN_MONT_CTX_free() frees the components of the B, and, if it was created by BN_MONT_CTX_new(), also the structure itself. If B is NULL, nothing is done. BN_mod_mul_montgomery() computes Mont(I,I):=I*I*R^-1 and places the result in I. BN_from_montgomery() performs the Montgomery reduction I = I*R^-1. BN_to_montgomery() computes Mont(I,R^2), i.e. I*R. Note that I must be non-negative and smaller than the modulus. For all functions, I is a previously allocated B used for temporary variables. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_MONT_CTX_new() returns the newly allocated B, and NULL on error. BN_MONT_CTX_free() has no return value. For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 WARNING The inputs must be reduced modulo B, otherwise the result will be outside the expected range. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY BN_MONT_CTX_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod0000644000000000000000000001164113176625660017044 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASN1_TIME_set, ASN1_TIME_adj, ASN1_TIME_check, ASN1_TIME_set_string, ASN1_TIME_print, ASN1_TIME_diff - ASN.1 Time functions =head1 SYNOPSIS ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t); ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec); int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str); int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t); int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *b, const ASN1_TIME *s); int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec, const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function ASN1_TIME_set() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B to the time represented by the time_t value B. If B is NULL a new ASN1_TIME structure is allocated and returned. ASN1_TIME_adj() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B to the time represented by the time B and B after the time_t value B. The values of B or B can be negative to set a time before B. The B value can also exceed the number of seconds in a day. If B is NULL a new ASN1_TIME structure is allocated and returned. ASN1_TIME_set_string() sets ASN1_TIME structure B to the time represented by string B which must be in appropriate ASN.1 time format (for example YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ). ASN1_TIME_check() checks the syntax of ASN1_TIME structure B. ASN1_TIME_print() prints out the time B to BIO B in human readable format. It will be of the format MMM DD HH:MM:SS YYYY [GMT], for example "Feb 3 00:55:52 2015 GMT" it does not include a newline. If the time structure has invalid format it prints out "Bad time value" and returns an error. ASN1_TIME_diff() sets B<*pday> and B<*psec> to the time difference between B and B. If B represents a time later than B then one or both (depending on the time difference) of B<*pday> and B<*psec> will be positive. If B represents a time earlier than B then one or both of B<*pday> and B<*psec> will be negative. If B and B represent the same time then B<*pday> and B<*psec> will both be zero. If both B<*pday> and B<*psec> are non-zero they will always have the same sign. The value of B<*psec> will always be less than the number of seconds in a day. If B or B is NULL the current time is used. =head1 NOTES The ASN1_TIME structure corresponds to the ASN.1 structure B. If it fails (due to invalid type or the value being too big to fit into an B type) it returns 0. ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64() is similar to ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64_t() except it converts to a B type and an error is returned if the passed integer is negative. ASN1_INTEGER_get() also returns the value of B but it returns 0 if B is NULL and -1 on error (which is ambiguous because -1 is a legitimate value for an B). New applications should use ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64() instead. ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64() sets the value of B B to the B value B. ASN1_INTEGER_set_uint64() sets the value of B B to the B value B. ASN1_INTEGER_set() sets the value of B B to the B value B. BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER() converts B B to an B. If B is NULL a new B structure is returned. If B is not NULL then the existing structure will be used instead. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN() converts ASN1_INTEGER B into a B. If B is NULL a new B structure is returned. If B is not NULL then the existing structure will be used instead. ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64(), ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64(), ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(), BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN() behave in an identical way to their ASN1_INTEGER counterparts except they operate on an B value. ASN1_ENUMERATED_get() returns the value of B in a similar way to ASN1_INTEGER_get() but it returns B<0xffffffffL> if the value of B will not fit in a long type. New applications should use ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64() instead. =head1 NOTES In general an B or B type can contain an integer of almost arbitrary size and so cannot always be represented by a C B type. However in many cases (for example version numbers) they represent small integers which can be more easily manipulated if converted to an appropriate C integer type. =head1 BUGS The ambiguous return values of ASN1_INTEGER_get() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get() mean these functions should be avoided if possible. They are retained for compatibility. Normally the ambiguous return values are not legitimate values for the fields they represent. =head1 RETURN VALUES ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(), ASN1_INTEGER_set(), ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_set() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. They will only fail if a memory allocation error occurs. ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. They will fail if the passed type is incorrect (this will only happen if there is a programming error) or if the value exceeds the range of an B type. BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER() and BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED() return an B or B structure respectively or NULL if an error occurs. They will only fail due to a memory allocation error. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN() return a B structure of NULL if an error occurs. They can fail if the passed type is incorrect (due to programming error) or due to a memory allocation failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(), ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(), ASN1_ENUMERATED_set_int64() and ASN1_ENUMERATED_get_int64() were added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_f_md.pod0000644000000000000000000001134413176625660016247 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_f_md, BIO_set_md, BIO_get_md, BIO_get_md_ctx - message digest BIO filter =for comment multiple includes =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void); int BIO_set_md(BIO *b, EVP_MD *md); int BIO_get_md(BIO *b, EVP_MD **mdp); int BIO_get_md_ctx(BIO *b, EVP_MD_CTX **mdcp); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_md() returns the message digest BIO method. This is a filter BIO that digests any data passed through it, it is a BIO wrapper for the digest routines EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestUpdate() and EVP_DigestFinal(). Any data written or read through a digest BIO using BIO_read() and BIO_write() is digested. BIO_gets(), if its B parameter is large enough finishes the digest calculation and returns the digest value. BIO_puts() is not supported. BIO_reset() reinitialises a digest BIO. BIO_set_md() sets the message digest of BIO B to B: this must be called to initialize a digest BIO before any data is passed through it. It is a BIO_ctrl() macro. BIO_get_md() places the a pointer to the digest BIOs digest method in B, it is a BIO_ctrl() macro. BIO_get_md_ctx() returns the digest BIOs context into B. =head1 NOTES The context returned by BIO_get_md_ctx() can be used in calls to EVP_DigestFinal() and also the signature routines EVP_SignFinal() and EVP_VerifyFinal(). The context returned by BIO_get_md_ctx() is an internal context structure. Changes made to this context will affect the digest BIO itself and the context pointer will become invalid when the digest BIO is freed. After the digest has been retrieved from a digest BIO it must be reinitialized by calling BIO_reset(), or BIO_set_md() before any more data is passed through it. If an application needs to call BIO_gets() or BIO_puts() through a chain containing digest BIOs then this can be done by prepending a buffering BIO. Calling BIO_get_md_ctx() will return the context and initialize the BIO state. This allows applications to initialize the context externally if the standard calls such as BIO_set_md() are not sufficiently flexible. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_f_md() returns the digest BIO method. BIO_set_md(), BIO_get_md() and BIO_md_ctx() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 EXAMPLES The following example creates a BIO chain containing an SHA1 and MD5 digest BIO and passes the string "Hello World" through it. Error checking has been omitted for clarity. BIO *bio, *mdtmp; char message[] = "Hello World"; bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1()); /* For BIO_push() we want to append the sink BIO and keep a note of * the start of the chain. */ bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5()); bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); /* Note: mdtmp can now be discarded */ BIO_write(bio, message, strlen(message)); The next example digests data by reading through a chain instead: BIO *bio, *mdtmp; char buf[1024]; int rdlen; bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb"); mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1()); bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5()); bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); do { rdlen = BIO_read(bio, buf, sizeof(buf)); /* Might want to do something with the data here */ } while (rdlen > 0); This next example retrieves the message digests from a BIO chain and outputs them. This could be used with the examples above. BIO *mdtmp; unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; int i; mdtmp = bio; /* Assume bio has previously been set up */ do { EVP_MD *md; mdtmp = BIO_find_type(mdtmp, BIO_TYPE_MD); if (!mdtmp) break; BIO_get_md(mdtmp, &md); printf("%s digest", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(md))); mdlen = BIO_gets(mdtmp, mdbuf, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) printf(":%02X", mdbuf[i]); printf("\n"); mdtmp = BIO_next(mdtmp); } while (mdtmp); BIO_free_all(bio); =head1 BUGS The lack of support for BIO_puts() and the non standard behaviour of BIO_gets() could be regarded as anomalous. It could be argued that BIO_gets() and BIO_puts() should be passed to the next BIO in the chain and digest the data passed through and that digests should be retrieved using a separate BIO_ctrl() call. =head1 HISTORY Before OpenSSL 1.0.0., the call to BIO_get_md_ctx() would only work if the BIO was initialized first. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SCT_print.pod0000644000000000000000000000324613176625660016520 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SCT_print, SCT_LIST_print, SCT_validation_status_string - Prints Signed Certificate Timestamps in a human-readable way =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SCT_print(const SCT *sct, BIO *out, int indent, const CTLOG_STORE *logs); void SCT_LIST_print(const STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, BIO *out, int indent, const char *separator, const CTLOG_STORE *logs); const char *SCT_validation_status_string(const SCT *sct); =head1 DESCRIPTION SCT_print() prints a single Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) to a L in a human-readable format. SCT_LIST_print() prints an entire list of SCTs in a similar way. A separator can be specified to delimit each SCT in the output. The output can be indented by a specified number of spaces. If a B is provided, it will be used to print the description of the CT log that issued each SCT (if that log is in the CTLOG_STORE). Alternatively, NULL can be passed as the CTLOG_STORE parameter to disable this feature. SCT_validation_status_string() will return the validation status of an SCT as a human-readable string. Call SCT_validate() or SCT_LIST_validate() beforehand in order to set the validation status of an SCT first. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000534213176625660020401 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_public_encrypt() encrypts the B bytes at B (usually a session key) using the public key B and stores the ciphertext in B. B must point to RSA_size(B) bytes of memory. B denotes one of the following modes: =over 4 =item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode. =item RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications. =item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes that the server is SSL3 capable. =item RSA_NO_PADDING Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I be used to implement cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure. =back B must be less than RSA_size(B) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, less than RSA_size(B) - 41 for RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B) for RSA_NO_PADDING. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_public_encrypt(). RSA_private_decrypt() decrypts the B bytes at B using the private key B and stores the plaintext in B. B must point to a memory section large enough to hold the decrypted data (which is smaller than RSA_size(B)). B is the padding mode that was used to encrypt the data. =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_public_encrypt() returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e., RSA_size(B)). RSA_private_decrypt() returns the size of the recovered plaintext. On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 WARNING Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING. =head1 CONFORMING TO SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod0000644000000000000000000000571413176625660021270 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data, X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt, X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID, X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ - X509_NAME_ENTRY utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_OBJECT * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); ASN1_STRING * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() retrieves the field name of B in and B structure. X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() retrieves the field value of B in and B structure. X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object() sets the field name of B to B. X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data() sets the field value of B to string type B and value determined by B and B. X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an B structure. =head1 NOTES X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() can be used to examine an B function as returned by X509_NAME_get_entry() for example. X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(), and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data() are seldom used in practice because B structures are almost always part of B structures and the corresponding B functions are typically used to create and add new entries in a single operation. The arguments of these functions support similar options to the similarly named ones of the corresponding B functions such as X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(). So for example B can be set to B but in the case of X509_set_data() the field name must be set first so the relevant field information can be looked up internally. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod0000644000000000000000000000672213176625660021250 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover - recover signature using a public key algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm context using key B for a verify recover operation. The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() function recovers signed data using B. The signature is specified using the B and B parameters. If B is B then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the B parameter. If B is not B then before the call the B parameter should contain the length of the B buffer, if the call is successful recovered data is written to B and the amount of data written to B. =head1 NOTES Normally an application is only interested in whether a signature verification operation is successful in those cases the EVP_verify() function should be used. Sometimes however it is useful to obtain the data originally signed using a signing operation. Only certain public key algorithms can recover a signature in this way (for example RSA in PKCS padding mode). After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() algorithm specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operation. The function EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() can be called more than once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLE Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest: #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; unsigned char *rout, *sig; size_t routlen, siglen; EVP_PKEY *verify_key; /* NB: assumes verify_key, sig and siglen are already set up * and that verify_key is an RSA public key */ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Determine buffer length */ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0) /* Error */ rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen); if (!rout) /* malloc failure */ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Recovered data is routlen bytes written to buffer rout */ =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CTLOG_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000461613176625660016376 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CTLOG_new, CTLOG_new_from_base64, CTLOG_free, CTLOG_get0_name, CTLOG_get0_log_id, CTLOG_get0_public_key - encapsulates information about a Certificate Transparency log =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CTLOG *CTLOG_new(EVP_PKEY *public_key, const char *name); int CTLOG_new_from_base64(CTLOG ** ct_log, const char *pkey_base64, const char *name); void CTLOG_free(CTLOG *log); const char *CTLOG_get0_name(const CTLOG *log); void CTLOG_get0_log_id(const CTLOG *log, const uint8_t **log_id, size_t *log_id_len); EVP_PKEY *CTLOG_get0_public_key(const CTLOG *log); =head1 DESCRIPTION CTLOG_new() returns a new CTLOG that represents the Certificate Transparency (CT) log with the given public key. A name must also be provided that can be used to help users identify this log. Ownership of the public key is transferred. CTLOG_new_from_base64() also creates a new CTLOG, but takes the public key in base64-encoded DER form and sets the ct_log pointer to point to the new CTLOG. The base64 will be decoded and the public key parsed. Regardless of whether CTLOG_new() or CTLOG_new_from_base64() is used, it is the caller's responsibility to pass the CTLOG to CTLOG_free() once it is no longer needed. This will delete it and, if created by CTLOG_new(), the EVP_PKEY that was passed to it. CTLOG_get0_name() returns the name of the log, as provided when the CTLOG was created. Ownership of the string remains with the CTLOG. CTLOG_get0_log_id() sets *log_id to point to a string containing that log's LogID (see RFC 6962). It sets *log_id_len to the length of that LogID. For a v1 CT log, the LogID will be a SHA-256 hash (i.e. 32 bytes long). Ownership of the string remains with the CTLOG. CTLOG_get0_public_key() returns the public key of the CT log. Ownership of the EVP_PKEY remains with the CTLOG. =head1 RETURN VALUES CTLOG_new() will return NULL if an error occurs. CTLOG_new_from_base64() will return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod0000644000000000000000000000544313176625660017613 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OCSP_cert_to_id, OCSP_cert_id_new, OCSP_CERTID_free, OCSP_id_issuer_cmp, OCSP_id_cmp, OCSP_id_get0_info - OCSP certificate ID utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, X509 *subject, X509 *issuer); OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst, X509_NAME *issuerName, ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey, ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber); void OCSP_CERTID_free(OCSP_CERTID *id); int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b); int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b); int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash, ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid); =head1 DESCRIPTION OCSP_cert_to_id() creates and returns a new B structure using message digest B for certificate B with issuer B. If B is B then SHA1 is used. OCSP_cert_id_new() creates and returns a new B using B and issuer name B, issuer key hash B and serial number B. OCSP_CERTID_free() frees up B. OCSP_id_cmp() compares B B and B. OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() compares only the issuer name of B B and B. OCSP_id_get0_info() returns the issuer name hash, hash OID, issuer key hash and serial number contained in B. If any of the values are not required the corresponding parameter can be set to B. =head1 RETURN VALUES OCSP_cert_to_id() and OCSP_cert_id_new() return either a pointer to a valid B structure or B if an error occurred. OCSP_id_cmp() and OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() returns zero for a match and non-zero otherwise. OCSP_CERTID_free() does not return a value. OCSP_id_get0_info() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 NOTES OCSP clients will typically only use OCSP_cert_to_id() or OCSP_cert_id_new(): the other functions are used by responder applications. The values returned by OCSP_id_get0_info() are internal pointers and B be freed up by an application: they will be freed when the corresponding B structure is freed. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ASYNC_start_job.pod0000644000000000000000000002774413176625660017610 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ASYNC_get_wait_ctx, ASYNC_init_thread, ASYNC_cleanup_thread, ASYNC_start_job, ASYNC_pause_job, ASYNC_get_current_job, ASYNC_block_pause, ASYNC_unblock_pause, ASYNC_is_capable - asynchronous job management functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int ASYNC_init_thread(size_t max_size, size_t init_size); void ASYNC_cleanup_thread(void); int ASYNC_start_job(ASYNC_JOB **job, ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, int *ret, int (*func)(void *), void *args, size_t size); int ASYNC_pause_job(void); ASYNC_JOB *ASYNC_get_current_job(void); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(ASYNC_JOB *job); void ASYNC_block_pause(void); void ASYNC_unblock_pause(void); int ASYNC_is_capable(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION OpenSSL implements asynchronous capabilities through an ASYNC_JOB. This represents code that can be started and executes until some event occurs. At that point the code can be paused and control returns to user code until some subsequent event indicates that the job can be resumed. The creation of an ASYNC_JOB is a relatively expensive operation. Therefore, for efficiency reasons, jobs can be created up front and reused many times. They are held in a pool until they are needed, at which point they are removed from the pool, used, and then returned to the pool when the job completes. If the user application is multi-threaded, then ASYNC_init_thread() may be called for each thread that will initiate asynchronous jobs. Before user code exits per-thread resources need to be cleaned up. This will normally occur automatically (see L) but may be explicitly initiated by using ASYNC_cleanup_thread(). No asynchronous jobs must be outstanding for the thread when ASYNC_cleanup_thread() is called. Failing to ensure this will result in memory leaks. The B argument limits the number of ASYNC_JOBs that will be held in the pool. If B is set to 0 then no upper limit is set. When an ASYNC_JOB is needed but there are none available in the pool already then one will be automatically created, as long as the total of ASYNC_JOBs managed by the pool does not exceed B. When the pool is first initialised B ASYNC_JOBs will be created immediately. If ASYNC_init_thread() is not called before the pool is first used then it will be called automatically with a B of 0 (no upper limit) and an B of 0 (no ASYNC_JOBs created up front). An asynchronous job is started by calling the ASYNC_start_job() function. Initially B<*job> should be NULL. B should point to an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX object created through the L function. B should point to a location where the return value of the asynchronous function should be stored on completion of the job. B represents the function that should be started asynchronously. The data pointed to by B and of size B will be copied and then passed as an argument to B when the job starts. ASYNC_start_job will return one of the following values: =over 4 =item B An error occurred trying to start the job. Check the OpenSSL error queue (e.g. see L) for more details. =item B There are no jobs currently available in the pool. This call can be retried again at a later time. =item B The job was successfully started but was "paused" before it completed (see ASYNC_pause_job() below). A handle to the job is placed in B<*job>. Other work can be performed (if desired) and the job restarted at a later time. To restart a job call ASYNC_start_job() again passing the job handle in B<*job>. The B, B and B parameters will be ignored when restarting a job. When restarting a job ASYNC_start_job() B be called from the same thread that the job was originally started from. =item B The job completed. B<*job> will be NULL and the return value from B will be placed in B<*ret>. =back At any one time there can be a maximum of one job actively running per thread (you can have many that are paused). ASYNC_get_current_job() can be used to get a pointer to the currently executing ASYNC_JOB. If no job is currently executing then this will return NULL. If executing within the context of a job (i.e. having been called directly or indirectly by the function "func" passed as an argument to ASYNC_start_job()) then ASYNC_pause_job() will immediately return control to the calling application with ASYNC_PAUSE returned from the ASYNC_start_job() call. A subsequent call to ASYNC_start_job passing in the relevant ASYNC_JOB in the B<*job> parameter will resume execution from the ASYNC_pause_job() call. If ASYNC_pause_job() is called whilst not within the context of a job then no action is taken and ASYNC_pause_job() returns immediately. ASYNC_get_wait_ctx() can be used to get a pointer to the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX for the B. ASYNC_WAIT_CTXs can have a "wait" file descriptor associated with them. Applications can wait for the file descriptor to be ready for "read" using a system function call such as select or poll (being ready for "read" indicates that the job should be resumed). If no file descriptor is made available then an application will have to periodically "poll" the job by attempting to restart it to see if it is ready to continue. An example of typical usage might be an async capable engine. User code would initiate cryptographic operations. The engine would initiate those operations asynchronously and then call L followed by ASYNC_pause_job() to return control to the user code. The user code can then perform other tasks or wait for the job to be ready by calling "select" or other similar function on the wait file descriptor. The engine can signal to the user code that the job should be resumed by making the wait file descriptor "readable". Once resumed the engine should clear the wake signal on the wait file descriptor. The ASYNC_block_pause() function will prevent the currently active job from pausing. The block will remain in place until a subsequent call to ASYNC_unblock_pause(). These functions can be nested, e.g. if you call ASYNC_block_pause() twice then you must call ASYNC_unblock_pause() twice in order to re-enable pausing. If these functions are called while there is no currently active job then they have no effect. This functionality can be useful to avoid deadlock scenarios. For example during the execution of an ASYNC_JOB an application acquires a lock. It then calls some cryptographic function which invokes ASYNC_pause_job(). This returns control back to the code that created the ASYNC_JOB. If that code then attempts to acquire the same lock before resuming the original job then a deadlock can occur. By calling ASYNC_block_pause() immediately after acquiring the lock and ASYNC_unblock_pause() immediately before releasing it then this situation cannot occur. Some platforms cannot support async operations. The ASYNC_is_capable() function can be used to detect whether the current platform is async capable or not. =head1 RETURN VALUES ASYNC_init_thread returns 1 on success or 0 otherwise. ASYNC_start_job returns one of ASYNC_ERR, ASYNC_NO_JOBS, ASYNC_PAUSE or ASYNC_FINISH as described above. ASYNC_pause_job returns 0 if an error occurred or 1 on success. If called when not within the context of an ASYNC_JOB then this is counted as success so 1 is returned. ASYNC_get_current_job returns a pointer to the currently executing ASYNC_JOB or NULL if not within the context of a job. ASYNC_get_wait_ctx() returns a pointer to the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX for the job. ASYNC_is_capable() returns 1 if the current platform is async capable or 0 otherwise. =head1 NOTES On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to async.h. =head1 EXAMPLE The following example demonstrates how to use most of the core async APIs: #ifdef _WIN32 # include #endif #include #include #include #include int unique = 0; void cleanup(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD r, void *vw) { OSSL_ASYNC_FD *w = (OSSL_ASYNC_FD *)vw; close(r); close(*w); OPENSSL_free(w); } int jobfunc(void *arg) { ASYNC_JOB *currjob; unsigned char *msg; int pipefds[2] = {0, 0}; OSSL_ASYNC_FD *wptr; char buf = 'X'; currjob = ASYNC_get_current_job(); if (currjob != NULL) { printf("Executing within a job\n"); } else { printf("Not executing within a job - should not happen\n"); return 0; } msg = (unsigned char *)arg; printf("Passed in message is: %s\n", msg); if (pipe(pipefds) != 0) { printf("Failed to create pipe\n"); return 0; } wptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(OSSL_ASYNC_FD)); if (wptr == NULL) { printf("Failed to malloc\n"); return 0; } *wptr = pipefds[1]; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(currjob), &unique, pipefds[0], wptr, cleanup); /* * Normally some external event would cause this to happen at some * later point - but we do it here for demo purposes, i.e. * immediately signalling that the job is ready to be woken up after * we return to main via ASYNC_pause_job(). */ write(pipefds[1], &buf, 1); /* Return control back to main */ ASYNC_pause_job(); /* Clear the wake signal */ read(pipefds[0], &buf, 1); printf ("Resumed the job after a pause\n"); return 1; } int main(void) { ASYNC_JOB *job = NULL; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = NULL; int ret; OSSL_ASYNC_FD waitfd; fd_set waitfdset; size_t numfds; unsigned char msg[13] = "Hello world!"; printf("Starting...\n"); ctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { printf("Failed to create ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n"); abort(); } for (;;) { switch(ASYNC_start_job(&job, ctx, &ret, jobfunc, msg, sizeof(msg))) { case ASYNC_ERR: case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: printf("An error occurred\n"); goto end; case ASYNC_PAUSE: printf("Job was paused\n"); break; case ASYNC_FINISH: printf("Job finished with return value %d\n", ret); goto end; } /* Wait for the job to be woken */ printf("Waiting for the job to be woken up\n"); if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, NULL, &numfds) || numfds > 1) { printf("Unexpected number of fds\n"); abort(); } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, &waitfd, &numfds); FD_ZERO(&waitfdset); FD_SET(waitfd, &waitfdset); select(waitfd + 1, &waitfdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); } end: ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(ctx); printf("Finishing\n"); return 0; } The expected output from executing the above example program is: Starting... Executing within a job Passed in message is: Hello world! Job was paused Waiting for the job to be woken up Resumed the job after a pause Job finished with return value 1 Finishing =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY ASYNC_init_thread, ASYNC_cleanup_thread, ASYNC_start_job, ASYNC_pause_job, ASYNC_get_current_job, ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(), ASYNC_block_pause(), ASYNC_unblock_pause() and ASYNC_is_capable() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_instrument_bus.pod0000644000000000000000000000374513176625660021143 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_instrument_bus, OPENSSL_instrument_bus2 - instrument references to memory bus =head1 SYNOPSIS #ifdef OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus(int *vector, size_t num); size_t OPENSSL_instrument_bus2(int *vector, size_t num, size_t max); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION It was empirically found that timings of references to primary memory are subject to irregular, apparently non-deterministic variations. The subroutines in question instrument these references for purposes of gathering entropy for random number generator. In order to make it bus-bound a 'flush cache line' instruction is used between probes. In addition probes are added to B elements in atomic or interlocked manner, which should contribute additional noise on multi-processor systems. This also means that B should be zeroed upon invocation (if you want to retrieve actual probe values). OPENSSL_instrument_bus() performs B probes and records the number of oscillator cycles every probe took. OPENSSL_instrument_bus2() on the other hand B consecutive probes with the same value, i.e. in a way it records duration of periods when probe values appeared deterministic. The subroutine performs at most B probes in attempt to fill the B, with B value of 0 meaning "as many as it takes." =head1 RETURN VALUE Return value of 0 indicates that CPU is not capable of performing the benchmark, either because oscillator counter or 'flush cache line' is not available on current platform. For reference, on x86 'flush cache line' was introduced with the SSE2 extensions. Otherwise number of recorded values is returned. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod0000644000000000000000000000651513176625660020617 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_DigestVerifyInit, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal - EVP signature verification functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt); int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures. EVP_DigestVerifyInit() sets up verification context B to use digest B from ENGINE B and public key B. B must be created with EVP_MD_CTX_new() before calling this function. If B is not NULL the EVP_PKEY_CTX of the verification operation will be written to B<*pctx>: this can be used to set alternative verification options. EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() hashes B bytes of data at B into the verification context B. This function can be called several times on the same B to include additional data. This function is currently implemented using a macro. EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() verifies the data in B against the signature in B of length B. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_DigestVerifyInit() and EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() returns 1 for success; any other value indicates failure. A return value of zero indicates that the signature did not verify successfully (that is, tbs did not match the original data or the signature had an invalid form), while other values indicate a more serious error (and sometimes also indicate an invalid signature form). The error codes can be obtained from L. =head1 NOTES The B interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. In previous versions of OpenSSL there was a link between message digest types and public key algorithms. This meant that "clone" digests such as EVP_dss1() needed to be used to sign using SHA1 and DSA. This is no longer necessary and the use of clone digest is now discouraged. For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded or the operation will fail. The call to EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. This means that EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can be called later to digest and verify additional data. Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak will occur. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY EVP_DigestVerifyInit(), EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() and EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod0000644000000000000000000000317113176625660020126 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CONF_modules_free, CONF_modules_finish, CONF_modules_unload - OpenSSL configuration cleanup functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void CONF_modules_finish(void); void CONF_modules_unload(int all); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void CONF_modules_free(void) #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION CONF_modules_free() closes down and frees up all memory allocated by all configuration modules. CONF_modules_finish() calls each configuration modules B handler to free up any configuration that module may have performed. CONF_modules_unload() finishes and unloads configuration modules. If B is set to B<0> only modules loaded from DSOs will be unloads. If B is B<1> all modules, including builtin modules will be unloaded. =head1 NOTES Normally in versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 applications will only call CONF_modules_free() at application exit to tidy up any configuration performed. From 1.1.0 CONF_modules_free() is deprecated and no explicit CONF cleanup is required at all. For more information see L. =head1 RETURN VALUE None of the functions return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY CONF_modules_free() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod0000644000000000000000000003404513176625660016057 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME d2i_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, d2i_ASIdOrRange, d2i_ASIdentifierChoice, d2i_ASIdentifiers, d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING, d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING, d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED, d2i_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, d2i_ASN1_GENERALSTRING, d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, d2i_ASN1_NULL, d2i_ASN1_OBJECT, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLE, d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, d2i_ASN1_SET_ANY, d2i_ASN1_T61STRING, d2i_ASN1_TIME, d2i_ASN1_TYPE, d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER, d2i_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, d2i_ASN1_UTCTIME, d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING, d2i_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING, d2i_ASRange, d2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, d2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID, d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, d2i_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, d2i_CMS_ContentInfo, d2i_CMS_ReceiptRequest, d2i_CMS_bio, d2i_CRL_DIST_POINTS, d2i_DHxparams, d2i_DIRECTORYSTRING, d2i_DISPLAYTEXT, d2i_DIST_POINT, d2i_DIST_POINT_NAME, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio, d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp, d2i_DSAPublicKey, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp, d2i_DSA_SIG, d2i_DSAparams, d2i_ECPKParameters, d2i_ECParameters, d2i_ECPrivateKey, d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio, d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp, d2i_EDIPARTYNAME, d2i_ESS_CERT_ID, d2i_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT, d2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, d2i_GENERAL_NAME, d2i_GENERAL_NAMES, d2i_IPAddressChoice, d2i_IPAddressFamily, d2i_IPAddressOrRange, d2i_IPAddressRange, d2i_ISSUING_DIST_POINT, d2i_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKAC, d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI, d2i_NOTICEREF, d2i_OCSP_BASICRESP, d2i_OCSP_CERTID, d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS, d2i_OCSP_CRLID, d2i_OCSP_ONEREQ, d2i_OCSP_REQINFO, d2i_OCSP_REQUEST, d2i_OCSP_RESPBYTES, d2i_OCSP_RESPDATA, d2i_OCSP_RESPID, d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE, d2i_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, d2i_OCSP_SERVICELOC, d2i_OCSP_SIGNATURE, d2i_OCSP_SINGLERESP, d2i_OTHERNAME, d2i_PBE2PARAM, d2i_PBEPARAM, d2i_PBKDF2PARAM, d2i_PKCS12, d2i_PKCS12_BAGS, d2i_PKCS12_MAC_DATA, d2i_PKCS12_SAFEBAG, d2i_PKCS12_bio, d2i_PKCS12_fp, d2i_PKCS7, d2i_PKCS7_DIGEST, d2i_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, d2i_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, d2i_PKCS7_ENVELOPE, d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, d2i_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, d2i_PKCS7_SIGNED, d2i_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, d2i_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, d2i_PKCS7_bio, d2i_PKCS7_fp, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp, d2i_PKCS8_bio, d2i_PKCS8_fp, d2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, d2i_POLICYINFO, d2i_POLICYQUALINFO, d2i_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION, d2i_PROXY_POLICY, d2i_RSAPrivateKey, d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio, d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp, d2i_RSAPublicKey, d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio, d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp, d2i_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp, d2i_SCT_LIST, d2i_SXNET, d2i_SXNETID, d2i_TS_ACCURACY, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp, d2i_TS_REQ, d2i_TS_REQ_bio, d2i_TS_REQ_fp, d2i_TS_RESP, d2i_TS_RESP_bio, d2i_TS_RESP_fp, d2i_TS_STATUS_INFO, d2i_TS_TST_INFO, d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio, d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp, d2i_USERNOTICE, d2i_X509, d2i_X509_ALGOR, d2i_X509_ALGORS, d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE, d2i_X509_CERT_AUX, d2i_X509_CINF, d2i_X509_CRL, d2i_X509_CRL_INFO, d2i_X509_CRL_bio, d2i_X509_CRL_fp, d2i_X509_EXTENSION, d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS, d2i_X509_NAME, d2i_X509_NAME_ENTRY, d2i_X509_PUBKEY, d2i_X509_REQ, d2i_X509_REQ_INFO, d2i_X509_REQ_bio, d2i_X509_REQ_fp, d2i_X509_REVOKED, d2i_X509_SIG, d2i_X509_VAL, i2d_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, i2d_ASIdOrRange, i2d_ASIdentifierChoice, i2d_ASIdentifiers, i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING, i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING, i2d_ASN1_ENUMERATED, i2d_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, i2d_ASN1_GENERALSTRING, i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, i2d_ASN1_NULL, i2d_ASN1_OBJECT, i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLE, i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, i2d_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, i2d_ASN1_SET_ANY, i2d_ASN1_T61STRING, i2d_ASN1_TIME, i2d_ASN1_TYPE, i2d_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, i2d_ASN1_UTCTIME, i2d_ASN1_UTF8STRING, i2d_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING, i2d_ASN1_bio_stream, i2d_ASRange, i2d_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, i2d_AUTHORITY_KEYID, i2d_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, i2d_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, i2d_CMS_ContentInfo, i2d_CMS_ReceiptRequest, i2d_CMS_bio, i2d_CRL_DIST_POINTS, i2d_DHxparams, i2d_DIRECTORYSTRING, i2d_DISPLAYTEXT, i2d_DIST_POINT, i2d_DIST_POINT_NAME, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio, i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp, i2d_DSAPublicKey, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_DSA_SIG, i2d_DSAparams, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters, i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio, i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio, i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_EDIPARTYNAME, i2d_ESS_CERT_ID, i2d_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT, i2d_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, i2d_GENERAL_NAME, i2d_GENERAL_NAMES, i2d_IPAddressChoice, i2d_IPAddressFamily, i2d_IPAddressOrRange, i2d_IPAddressRange, i2d_ISSUING_DIST_POINT, i2d_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKAC, i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI, i2d_NOTICEREF, i2d_OCSP_BASICRESP, i2d_OCSP_CERTID, i2d_OCSP_CERTSTATUS, i2d_OCSP_CRLID, i2d_OCSP_ONEREQ, i2d_OCSP_REQINFO, i2d_OCSP_REQUEST, i2d_OCSP_RESPBYTES, i2d_OCSP_RESPDATA, i2d_OCSP_RESPID, i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE, i2d_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, i2d_OCSP_SERVICELOC, i2d_OCSP_SIGNATURE, i2d_OCSP_SINGLERESP, i2d_OTHERNAME, i2d_PBE2PARAM, i2d_PBEPARAM, i2d_PBKDF2PARAM, i2d_PKCS12, i2d_PKCS12_BAGS, i2d_PKCS12_MAC_DATA, i2d_PKCS12_SAFEBAG, i2d_PKCS12_bio, i2d_PKCS12_fp, i2d_PKCS7, i2d_PKCS7_DIGEST, i2d_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, i2d_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, i2d_PKCS7_ENVELOPE, i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, i2d_PKCS7_NDEF, i2d_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, i2d_PKCS7_SIGNED, i2d_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, i2d_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, i2d_PKCS7_bio, i2d_PKCS7_fp, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp, i2d_PKCS8_bio, i2d_PKCS8_fp, i2d_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, i2d_POLICYINFO, i2d_POLICYQUALINFO, i2d_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION, i2d_PROXY_POLICY, i2d_PublicKey, i2d_RSAPrivateKey, i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio, i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp, i2d_RSAPublicKey, i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio, i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp, i2d_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, i2d_RSA_PSS_PARAMS, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_SCT_LIST, i2d_SXNET, i2d_SXNETID, i2d_TS_ACCURACY, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp, i2d_TS_REQ, i2d_TS_REQ_bio, i2d_TS_REQ_fp, i2d_TS_RESP, i2d_TS_RESP_bio, i2d_TS_RESP_fp, i2d_TS_STATUS_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio, i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp, i2d_USERNOTICE, i2d_X509, i2d_X509_ALGOR, i2d_X509_ALGORS, i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE, i2d_X509_CERT_AUX, i2d_X509_CINF, i2d_X509_CRL, i2d_X509_CRL_INFO, i2d_X509_CRL_bio, i2d_X509_CRL_fp, i2d_X509_EXTENSION, i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS, i2d_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME_ENTRY, i2d_X509_PUBKEY, i2d_X509_REQ, i2d_X509_REQ_INFO, i2d_X509_REQ_bio, i2d_X509_REQ_fp, i2d_X509_REVOKED, i2d_X509_SIG, i2d_X509_VAL, - convert objects from/to ASN.1/DER representation =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment generic TYPE *d2i_TYPE(TYPE **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); TYPE *d2i_TYPE_bio(BIO *bp, TYPE **a); TYPE *d2i_TYPE_fp(FILE *fp, TYPE **a); int i2d_TYPE(TYPE *a, unsigned char **pp); int i2d_TYPE_fp(FILE *fp, TYPE *a); int i2d_TYPE_bio(BIO *bp, TYPE *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION In the description here, I is used a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I. These functions convert OpenSSL objects to and from their ASN.1/DER encoding. Unlike the C structures which can have pointers to sub-objects within, the DER is a serialized encoding, suitable for sending over the network, writing to a file, and so on. d2i_TYPE() attempts to decode B bytes at B<*in>. If successful a pointer to the B structure is returned and B<*in> is incremented to the byte following the parsed data. If B is not B then a pointer to the returned structure is also written to B<*a>. If an error occurred then B is returned. On a successful return, if B<*a> is not B then it is assumed that B<*a> contains a valid B structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. This "reuse" capability is present for historical compatibility but its use is B (see BUGS below, and the discussion in the RETURN VALUES section). d2i_TYPE_bio() is similar to d2i_TYPE() except it attempts to parse data from BIO B. d2i_TYPE_fp() is similar to d2i_TYPE() except it attempts to parse data from FILE pointer B. i2d_TYPE() encodes the structure pointed to by B into DER format. If B is not B, it writes the DER encoded data to the buffer at B<*out>, and increments it to point after the data just written. If the return value is negative an error occurred, otherwise it returns the length of the encoded data. If B<*out> is B memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the data just written. i2d_TYPE_bio() is similar to i2d_TYPE() except it writes the encoding of the structure B to BIO B and it returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. i2d_TYPE_fp() is similar to i2d_TYPE() except it writes the encoding of the structure B to BIO B and it returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. These routines do not encrypt private keys and therefore offer no security; use L or similar for writing to files. =head1 NOTES The letters B and B in B stand for "internal" (that is, an internal C structure) and "DER" respectively. So B converts from internal to DER. The functions can also understand B forms. The actual TYPE structure passed to i2d_TYPE() must be a valid populated B structure -- it B simply be fed with an empty structure such as that returned by TYPE_new(). The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeroes. Therefore any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode. Functions such as strlen() will B return the correct length of the encoded structure. The ways that B<*in> and B<*out> are incremented after the operation can trap the unwary. See the B section for some common errors. The reason for this-auto increment behaviour is to reflect a typical usage of ASN1 functions: after one structure is encoded or decoded another will be processed after it. The following points about the data types might be useful: =over 4 =item B Represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER. =item B Represents a PKCS#3 DH parameters structure. =item B Represents a ANSI X9.42 DH parameters structure. =item B Represents a DSA public key using a B structure. =item B Use a non-standard OpenSSL format and should be avoided; use B, B, or similar instead. =item B Represents a PKCS#1 RSA public key structure. =item B Represents an B structure as used in IETF RFC 6960 and elsewhere. =item B Represents a B type as used for subject and issuer names in IETF RFC 6960 and elsewhere. =item B Represents a PKCS#10 certificate request. =item B Represents the B structure defined in PKCS#1 and PKCS#7. =back =head1 EXAMPLES Allocate and encode the DER encoding of an X509 structure: int len; unsigned char *buf; buf = NULL; len = i2d_X509(x, &buf); if (len < 0) /* error */ Attempt to decode a buffer: X509 *x; unsigned char *buf, *p; int len; /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */ p = buf; x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len); if (x == NULL) /* error */ Alternative technique: X509 *x; unsigned char *buf, *p; int len; /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */ p = buf; x = NULL; if (d2i_X509(&x, &p, len) == NULL) /* error */ =head1 WARNINGS Using a temporary variable is mandatory. A common mistake is to attempt to use a buffer directly as follows: int len; unsigned char *buf; len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); ... i2d_X509(x, &buf); ... OPENSSL_free(buf); This code will result in B apparently containing garbage because it was incremented after the call to point after the data just written. Also B will no longer contain the pointer allocated by OPENSSL_malloc() and the subsequent call to OPENSSL_free() is likely to crash. Another trap to avoid is misuse of the B argument to d2i_TYPE(): X509 *x; if (d2i_X509(&x, &p, len) == NULL) /* error */ This will probably crash somewhere in d2i_X509(). The reason for this is that the variable B is uninitialized and an attempt will be made to interpret its (invalid) value as an B structure, typically causing a segmentation violation. If B is set to NULL first then this will not happen. =head1 BUGS In some versions of OpenSSL the "reuse" behaviour of d2i_TYPE() when B<*px> is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged. i2d_TYPE() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL, if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the fields entirely and will not be parsed by d2i_TYPE(). This may be fixed in future so code should not assume that i2d_TYPE() will always succeed. Any function which encodes a structure (i2d_TYPE(), i2d_TYPE() or i2d_TYPE()) may return a stale encoding if the structure has been modified after deserialization or previous serialization. This is because some objects cache the encoding for efficiency reasons. =head1 RETURN VALUES d2i_TYPE(), d2i_TYPE_bio() and d2i_TYPE_fp() return a valid B structure or B if an error occurs. If the "reuse" capability has been used with a valid structure being passed in via B, then the object is not freed in the event of error but may be in a potentially invalid or inconsistent state. i2d_TYPE() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. i2d_TYPE_bio() and i2d_TYPE_fp() return 1 for success and 0 if an error occurs. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_get0_key.pod0000644000000000000000000001112513176625660017062 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_set0_key, RSA_set0_factors, RSA_set0_crt_params, RSA_get0_key, RSA_get0_factors, RSA_get0_crt_params, RSA_clear_flags, RSA_test_flags, RSA_set_flags, RSA_get0_engine - Routines for getting and setting data in an RSA object =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d); int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q); int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp); void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d); void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q); void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp); void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags); int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags); void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags); ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(RSA *r); =head1 DESCRIPTION An RSA object contains the components for the public and private key, B, B, B, B

, B, B, B and B. B is the modulus common to both public and private key, B is the public exponent and B is the private exponent. B

, B, B, B and B are the factors for the second representation of a private key (see PKCS#1 section 3 Key Types), where B

and B are the first and second factor of B and B, B and B are the exponents and coefficient for CRT calculations. The B, B and B parameters can be obtained by calling RSA_get0_key(). If they have not been set yet, then B<*n>, B<*e> and B<*d> will be set to NULL. Otherwise, they are set to pointers to their respective values. These point directly to the internal representations of the values and therefore should not be freed by the caller. The B, B and B parameter values can be set by calling RSA_set0_key() and passing the new values for B, B and B as parameters to the function. The values B and B must be non-NULL the first time this function is called on a given RSA object. The value B may be NULL. On subsequent calls any of these values may be NULL which means the corresponding RSA field is left untouched. Calling this function transfers the memory management of the values to the RSA object, and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed by the caller after this function has been called. In a similar fashion, the B

and B parameters can be obtained and set with RSA_get0_factors() and RSA_set0_factors(), and the B, B and B parameters can be obtained and set with RSA_get0_crt_params() and RSA_set0_crt_params(). For RSA_get0_key(), RSA_get0_factors(), and RSA_get0_crt_params(), NULL value BIGNUM ** output parameters are permitted. The functions ignore NULL parameters but return values for other, non-NULL, parameters. RSA_set_flags() sets the flags in the B parameter on the RSA object. Multiple flags can be passed in one go (bitwise ORed together). Any flags that are already set are left set. RSA_test_flags() tests to see whether the flags passed in the B parameter are currently set in the RSA object. Multiple flags can be tested in one go. All flags that are currently set are returned, or zero if none of the flags are set. RSA_clear_flags() clears the specified flags within the RSA object. RSA_get0_engine() returns a handle to the ENGINE that has been set for this RSA object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set. =head1 NOTES Values retrieved with RSA_get0_key() are owned by the RSA object used in the call and may therefore I be passed to RSA_set0_key(). If needed, duplicate the received value using BN_dup() and pass the duplicate. The same applies to RSA_get0_factors() and RSA_set0_factors() as well as RSA_get0_crt_params() and RSA_set0_crt_params(). =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_set0_key(), RSA_set0_factors and RSA_set0_crt_params() return 1 on success or 0 on failure. RSA_test_flags() returns the current state of the flags in the RSA object. RSA_get0_engine() returns the ENGINE set for the RSA object or NULL if no ENGINE has been set. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_load_strings.pod0000644000000000000000000000256613176625660020057 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_load_strings, ERR_PACK, ERR_get_next_error_library - load arbitrary error strings =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]); int ERR_get_next_error_library(void); unsigned long ERR_PACK(int lib, int func, int reason); =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_load_strings() registers error strings for library number B. B is an array of error string data: typedef struct ERR_string_data_st { unsigned long error; char *string; } ERR_STRING_DATA; The error code is generated from the library number and a function and reason code: B = ERR_PACK(B, B, B). ERR_PACK() is a macro. The last entry in the array is {0,0}. ERR_get_next_error_library() can be used to assign library numbers to user libraries at runtime. =head1 RETURN VALUE ERR_load_strings() returns no value. ERR_PACK() return the error code. ERR_get_next_error_library() returns zero on failure, otherwise a new library number. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000332513176625660017232 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS7_decrypt - decrypt content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS7_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure. B is the private key of the recipient, B is the recipients certificate, B is a BIO to write the content to and B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the PKCS#7 structure. The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type B then an error is returned. =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS7_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3) =head1 BUGS PKCS7_decrypt() must be passed the correct recipient key and certificate. It would be better if it could look up the correct key and certificate from a database. The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify(). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod0000644000000000000000000000174313176625660017170 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_set_mark, ERR_pop_to_mark - set marks and pop errors until mark =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int ERR_set_mark(void); int ERR_pop_to_mark(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_set_mark() sets a mark on the current topmost error record if there is one. ERR_pop_to_mark() will pop the top of the error stack until a mark is found. The mark is then removed. If there is no mark, the whole stack is removed. =head1 RETURN VALUES ERR_set_mark() returns 0 if the error stack is empty, otherwise 1. ERR_pop_to_mark() returns 0 if there was no mark in the error stack, which implies that the stack became empty, otherwise 1. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2003-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id.pod0000644000000000000000000000250013176625660021415 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id - Get a Certificate Transparency log from a CTLOG_STORE =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const CTLOG *CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(const CTLOG_STORE *store, const uint8_t *log_id, size_t log_id_len); =head1 DESCRIPTION A Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) identifies the Certificate Transparency (CT) log that issued it using the log's LogID (see RFC 6962, Section 3.2). Therefore, it is useful to be able to look up more information about a log (e.g. its public key) using this LogID. CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id() provides a way to do this. It will find a CTLOG in a CTLOG_STORE that has a given LogID. =head1 RETURN VALUES B returns a CTLOG with the given LogID, if it exists in the given CTLOG_STORE, otherwise it returns NULL. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY This function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod0000644000000000000000000000547113176625660017103 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS12_create - create a PKCS#12 structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS12_create() creates a PKCS#12 structure. B is the passphrase to use. B is the B to use for the supplied certificate and key. B is the private key to include in the structure and B its corresponding certificates. B, if not B is an optional set of certificates to also include in the structure. B and B are the encryption algorithms that should be used for the key and certificate respectively. B is the encryption algorithm iteration count to use and B is the MAC iteration count to use. B is the type of key. =head1 NOTES The parameters B, B, B, B and B can all be set to zero and sensible defaults will be used. These defaults are: 40 bit RC2 encryption for certificates, triple DES encryption for private keys, a key iteration count of PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER (currently 2048) and a MAC iteration count of 1. The default MAC iteration count is 1 in order to retain compatibility with old software which did not interpret MAC iteration counts. If such compatibility is not required then B should be set to PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER. B adds a flag to the store private key. This is a non standard extension that is only currently interpreted by MSIE. If set to zero the flag is omitted, if set to B the key can be used for signing only, if set to B it can be used for signing and encryption. This option was useful for old export grade software which could use signing only keys of arbitrary size but had restrictions on the permissible sizes of keys which could be used for encryption. If a certificate contains an B or B then this will be used for the corresponding B or B in the PKCS12 structure. Either B, B or both can be B to indicate that no key or certificate is required. In previous versions both had to be present or a fatal error is returned. B or B can be set to -1 indicating that no encryption should be used. B can be set to -1 and the MAC will then be omitted entirely. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_encrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000000742713176625660017046 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_encrypt - create a CMS envelopedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_encrypt() creates and returns a CMS EnvelopedData structure. B is a list of recipient certificates. B is the content to be encrypted. B is the symmetric cipher to use. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES Only certificates carrying RSA keys are supported so the recipient certificates supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not have to be signed using the RSA algorithm. EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use because most clients will support it. The algorithm passed in the B parameter must support ASN1 encoding of its parameters. Many browsers implement a "sign and encrypt" option which is simply an S/MIME envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to CMS_encrypt(). The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are prepended to the data. Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if B is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If B is set then B is ignored. OpenSSL will by default identify recipient certificates using issuer name and serial number. If B is set it will use the subject key identifier value instead. An error occurs if all recipient certificates do not have a subject key identifier extension. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is returned suitable for streaming I/O: no data is read from the BIO B. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is returned to which additional recipients and attributes can be added before finalization. The data being encrypted is included in the CMS_ContentInfo structure, unless B is set in which case it is omitted. This is rarely used in practice and is not supported by SMIME_write_CMS(). =head1 NOTES If the flag B is set the returned B structure is B complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not properly finalize the B structure will give unpredictable results. Several functions including SMIME_write_CMS(), i2d_CMS_bio_stream(), PEM_write_bio_CMS_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B directly using BIO_new_CMS(). The recipients specified in B use a CMS KeyTransRecipientInfo info structure. KEKRecipientInfo is also supported using the flag B and CMS_add0_recipient_key(). The parameter B may be NULL if B is set and recipients added later using CMS_add1_recipient_cert() or CMS_add0_recipient_key(). =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_encrypt() returns either a CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The B flag was first supported in OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod0000644000000000000000000000247713176625660022676 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid - get default signature digest =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() function sets B to the default message digest NID for the public key signature operations associated with key B. =head1 NOTES For all current standard OpenSSL public key algorithms SHA1 is returned. =head1 RETURN VALUES The EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() function returns 1 if the message digest is advisory (that is other digests can be used) and 2 if it is mandatory (other digests can not be used). It returns 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, =head1 HISTORY This function was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000374213176625660016542 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_CTX_new, BN_CTX_secure_new, BN_CTX_free - allocate and free BN_CTX structures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void); BN_CTX *BN_CTX_secure_new(void); void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c); =head1 DESCRIPTION A B is a structure that holds B temporary variables used by library functions. Since dynamic memory allocation to create Bs is rather expensive when used in conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the B structure is used. BN_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B structure. BN_CTX_secure_new() allocates and initializes a B structure but uses the secure heap (see L) to hold the Bs. BN_CTX_free() frees the components of the B, and if it was created by BN_CTX_new(), also the structure itself. If L has been used on the B, L must be called before the B may be freed by BN_CTX_free(). If B is NULL, nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_CTX_new() and BN_CTX_secure_new() return a pointer to the B. If the allocation fails, they return B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. BN_CTX_free() has no return values. =head1 REMOVED FUNCTIONALITY void BN_CTX_init(BN_CTX *c); BN_CTX_init() is no longer available as of OpenSSL 1.1.0. Applications should replace use of BN_CTX_init with BN_CTX_new instead: BN_CTX *ctx; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if(!ctx) /* Handle error */ ... BN_CTX_free(ctx); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY BN_CTX_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/UI_create_method.pod0000644000000000000000000001563713176625660020062 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME UI_METHOD, UI_create_method, UI_destroy_method, UI_method_set_opener, UI_method_set_writer, UI_method_set_flusher, UI_method_set_reader, UI_method_set_closer, UI_method_set_prompt_constructor, UI_method_set_ex_data, UI_method_get_opener, UI_method_get_writer, UI_method_get_flusher, UI_method_get_reader, UI_method_get_closer, UI_method_get_prompt_constructor, UI_method_get_ex_data - user interface method creation and destruction =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef struct ui_method_st UI_METHOD; UI_METHOD *UI_create_method(const char *name); void UI_destroy_method(UI_METHOD *ui_method); int UI_method_set_opener(UI_METHOD *method, int (*opener) (UI *ui)); int UI_method_set_writer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*writer) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)); int UI_method_set_flusher(UI_METHOD *method, int (*flusher) (UI *ui)); int UI_method_set_reader(UI_METHOD *method, int (*reader) (UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)); int UI_method_set_closer(UI_METHOD *method, int (*closer) (UI *ui)); int UI_method_set_prompt_constructor(UI_METHOD *method, char *(*prompt_constructor) (UI *ui, const char *object_desc, const char *object_name)); int UI_method_set_ex_data(UI_METHOD *method, int idx, void *data); int (*UI_method_get_opener(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *); int (*UI_method_get_writer(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *); int (*UI_method_get_flusher(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *); int (*UI_method_get_reader(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, UI_STRING *); int (*UI_method_get_closer(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *); char *(*UI_method_get_prompt_constructor(const UI_METHOD *method)) (UI *, const char *, const char *); const void *UI_method_get_ex_data(const UI_METHOD *method, int idx); =head1 DESCRIPTION A method contains a few functions that implement the low level of the User Interface. These functions are: =over 4 =item an opener This function takes a reference to a UI and starts a session, for example by opening a channel to a tty, or by creating a dialog box. =item a writer This function takes a reference to a UI and a UI String, and writes the string where appropriate, maybe to the tty, maybe added as a field label in a dialog box. Note that this gets fed all strings associated with a UI, one after the other, so care must be taken which ones it actually uses. =item a flusher This function takes a reference to a UI, and flushes everything that has been output so far. For example, if the method builds up a dialog box, this can be used to actually display it and accepting input ended with a pressed button. =item a reader This function takes a reference to a UI and a UI string and reads off the given prompt, maybe from the tty, maybe from a field in a dialog box. Note that this gets fed all strings associated with a UI, one after the other, so care must be taken which ones it actually uses. =item a closer This function takes a reference to a UI, and closes the session, maybe by closing the channel to the tty, maybe by destroying a dialog box. =back All of these functions are expected to return 0 on error, 1 on success, or -1 on out-off-band events, for example if some prompting has been cancelled (by pressing Ctrl-C, for example). Only the flusher or the reader are expected to return -1. If returned by another of the functions, it's treated as if 0 was returned. Regarding the writer and the reader, don't assume the former should only write and don't assume the latter should only read. This depends on the needs of the method. For example, a typical tty reader wouldn't write the prompts in the write, but would rather do so in the reader, because of the sequential nature of prompting on a tty. This is how the UI_OpenSSL() method does it. In contrast, a method that builds up a dialog box would add all prompt text in the writer, have all input read in the flusher and store the results in some temporary buffer, and finally have the reader just fetch those results. The central function that uses these method functions is UI_process(), and it does it in five steps: =over 4 =item 1. Open the session using the opener function if that one's defined. If an error occurs, jump to 5. =item 2. For every UI String associated with the UI, call the writer function if that one's defined. If an error occurs, jump to 5. =item 3. Flush everything using the flusher function if that one's defined. If an error occurs, jump to 5. =item 4. For every UI String associated with the UI, call the reader function if that one's defined. If an error occurs, jump to 5. =item 5. Close the session using the closer function if that one's defined. =back UI_create_method() creates a new UI method with a given B. UI_destroy_method() destroys the given UI method B. UI_method_set_opener(), UI_method_set_writer(), UI_method_set_flusher(), UI_method_set_reader() and UI_method_set_closer() set the five main method function to the given function pointer. UI_method_set_prompt_constructor() sets the prompt constructor. See L. UI_method_set_ex_data() sets application specific data with a given EX_DATA index. See L for general information on how to get that index. UI_method_get_opener(), UI_method_get_writer(), UI_method_get_flusher(), UI_method_get_reader(), UI_method_get_closer() and UI_method_get_prompt_constructor() return the different method functions. UI_method_get_ex_data() returns the application data previously stored with UI_method_set_ex_data(). =head1 RETURN VALUES UI_create_method() returns a UI_METHOD pointer on success, NULL on error. UI_method_set_opener(), UI_method_set_writer(), UI_method_set_flusher(), UI_method_set_reader(), UI_method_set_closer() and UI_method_set_prompt_constructor() return 0 on success, -1 if the given B is NULL. UI_method_set_ex_data() returns 1 on success and 0 on error (because CRYPTO_set_ex_data() does so). UI_method_get_opener(), UI_method_get_writer(), UI_method_get_flusher(), UI_method_get_reader(), UI_method_get_closer() and UI_method_get_prompt_constructor() return the requested function pointer if it's set in the method, otherwise NULL. UI_method_get_ex_data() returns a pointer to the application specific data associated with the method. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_get_data.pod0000644000000000000000000000423613176625660017114 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_set_data, BIO_get_data, BIO_set_init, BIO_get_init, BIO_set_shutdown, BIO_get_shutdown - functions for managing BIO state information =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void BIO_set_data(BIO *a, void *ptr); void *BIO_get_data(BIO *a); void BIO_set_init(BIO *a, int init); int BIO_get_init(BIO *a); void BIO_set_shutdown(BIO *a, int shut); int BIO_get_shutdown(BIO *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions are mainly useful when implementing a custom BIO. The BIO_set_data() function associates the custom data pointed to by B with the BIO. This data can subsequently be retrieved via a call to BIO_get_data(). This can be used by custom BIOs for storing implementation specific information. The BIO_set_init() function sets the value of the BIO's "init" flag to indicate whether initialisation has been completed for this BIO or not. A non-zero value indicates that initialisation is complete, whilst zero indicates that it is not. Often initialisation will complete during initial construction of the BIO. For some BIOs however, initialisation may not complete until after additional steps have occurred (for example through calling custom ctrls). The BIO_get_init() function returns the value of the "init" flag. The BIO_set_shutdown() and BIO_get_shutdown() functions set and get the state of this BIO's shutdown (i.e. BIO_CLOSE) flag. If set then the underlying resource is also closed when the BIO is freed. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_get_data() returns a pointer to the implementation specific custom data associated with this BIO, or NULL if none has been set. BIO_get_init() returns the state of the BIO's init flag. BIO_get_shutdown() returns the stat of the BIO's shutdown (i.e. BIO_CLOSE) flag. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BUF_MEM_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000404113176625660016630 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_new_ex, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow, BUF_MEM_grow_clean, BUF_reverse - simple character array structure standard C library equivalents =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void); BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new_ex(unsigned long flags); void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a); int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len); size_t BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len); void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size); =head1 DESCRIPTION The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs. BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size. BUF_MEM_new_ex() allocates a buffer with the specified flags. The flag B specifies that the B pointer should be allocated on the secure heap; see L. BUF_MEM_free() frees up an already existing buffer. The data is zeroed before freeing up in case the buffer contains sensitive data. BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to B. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in size. BUF_MEM_grow_clean() is similar to BUF_MEM_grow() but it sets any free'd or additionally-allocated memory to zero. BUF_reverse() reverses B bytes at B into B. If B is NULL, the array is reversed in-place. =head1 RETURN VALUES BUF_MEM_new() returns the buffer or NULL on error. BUF_MEM_free() has no return value. BUF_MEM_grow() and BUF_MEM_grow_clean() return zero on error or the new size (i.e., B). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L. =head1 HISTORY BUF_MEM_new_ex() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod0000644000000000000000000002077113176625660017327 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_malloc_init, OPENSSL_malloc, OPENSSL_zalloc, OPENSSL_realloc, OPENSSL_free, OPENSSL_clear_realloc, OPENSSL_clear_free, OPENSSL_cleanse, CRYPTO_malloc, CRYPTO_zalloc, CRYPTO_realloc, CRYPTO_free, OPENSSL_strdup, OPENSSL_strndup, OPENSSL_memdup, OPENSSL_strlcpy, OPENSSL_strlcat, OPENSSL_hexstr2buf, OPENSSL_buf2hexstr, OPENSSL_hexchar2int, CRYPTO_strdup, CRYPTO_strndup, OPENSSL_mem_debug_push, OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop, CRYPTO_mem_debug_push, CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop, CRYPTO_clear_realloc, CRYPTO_clear_free, CRYPTO_get_mem_functions, CRYPTO_set_mem_functions, CRYPTO_set_mem_debug, CRYPTO_mem_ctrl, CRYPTO_mem_leaks, CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp - Memory allocation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int OPENSSL_malloc_init(void) void *OPENSSL_malloc(size_t num) void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num) void *OPENSSL_realloc(void *addr, size_t num) void OPENSSL_free(void *addr) char *OPENSSL_strdup(const char *str) char *OPENSSL_strndup(const char *str, size_t s) size_t OPENSSL_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size); size_t OPENSSL_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size); void *OPENSSL_memdup(void *data, size_t s) void *OPENSSL_clear_realloc(void *p, size_t old_len, size_t num) void OPENSSL_clear_free(void *str, size_t num) void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len); unsigned char *OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(const char *str, long *len); char *OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(const unsigned char *buffer, long len); int OPENSSL_hexchar2int(unsigned char c); void *CRYPTO_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) void *CRYPTO_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line) void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *p, size_t num, const char *file, int line) void CRYPTO_free(void *str, const char *, int) char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *p, const char *file, int line) char *CRYPTO_strndup(const char *p, size_t num, const char *file, int line) void *CRYPTO_clear_realloc(void *p, size_t old_len, size_t num, const char *file, int line) void CRYPTO_clear_free(void *str, size_t num, const char *, int) void CRYPTO_get_mem_functions( void *(**m)(size_t, const char *, int), void *(**r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int), void (**f)(void *, const char *, int)) int CRYPTO_set_mem_functions( void *(*m)(size_t, const char *, int), void *(*r)(void *, size_t, const char *, int), void (*f)(void *, const char *, int)) int CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(int onoff) int CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(int mode); int OPENSSL_mem_debug_push(const char *info) int OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop(void); int CRYPTO_mem_debug_push(const char *info, const char *file, int line); int CRYPTO_mem_debug_pop(void); void CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *b); void CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *fp); =head1 DESCRIPTION OpenSSL memory allocation is handled by the B API. These are generally macro's that add the standard C B<__FILE__> and B<__LINE__> parameters and call a lower-level B API. Some functions do not add those parameters, but exist for consistency. OPENSSL_malloc_init() sets the lower-level memory allocation functions to their default implementation. It is generally not necessary to call this, except perhaps in certain shared-library situations. OPENSSL_malloc(), OPENSSL_realloc(), and OPENSSL_free() are like the C malloc(), realloc(), and free() functions. OPENSSL_zalloc() calls memset() to zero the memory before returning. OPENSSL_clear_realloc() and OPENSSL_clear_free() should be used when the buffer at B holds sensitive information. The old buffer is filled with zero's by calling OPENSSL_cleanse() before ultimately calling OPENSSL_free(). OPENSSL_cleanse() fills B of size B with a string of 0's. Use OPENSSL_cleanse() with care if the memory is a mapping of a file. If the storage controller uses write compression, then its possible that sensitive tail bytes will survive zeroization because the block of zeros will be compressed. If the storage controller uses wear leveling, then the old sensitive data will not be overwritten; rather, a block of 0's will be written at a new physical location. OPENSSL_strdup(), OPENSSL_strndup() and OPENSSL_memdup() are like the equivalent C functions, except that memory is allocated by calling the OPENSSL_malloc() and should be released by calling OPENSSL_free(). OPENSSL_strlcpy(), OPENSSL_strlcat() and OPENSSL_strnlen() are equivalents of the common C library functions and are provided for portability. OPENSSL_hexstr2buf() parses B as a hex string and returns a pointer to the parsed value. The memory is allocated by calling OPENSSL_malloc() and should be released by calling OPENSSL_free(). If B is not NULL, it is filled in with the output length. Colons between two-character hex "bytes" are ignored. An odd number of hex digits is an error. OPENSSL_buf2hexstr() takes the specified buffer and length, and returns a hex string for value, or NULL on error. B cannot be NULL; if B is 0 an empty string is returned. OPENSSL_hexchar2int() converts a character to the hexadecimal equivalent, or returns -1 on error. If no allocations have been done, it is possible to "swap out" the default implementations for OPENSSL_malloc(), OPENSSL_realloc and OPENSSL_free() and replace them with alternate versions (hooks). CRYPTO_get_mem_functions() function fills in the given arguments with the function pointers for the current implementations. With CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(), you can specify a different set of functions. If any of B, B, or B are NULL, then the function is not changed. The default implementation can include some debugging capability (if enabled at build-time). This adds some overhead by keeping a list of all memory allocations, and removes items from the list when they are free'd. This is most useful for identifying memory leaks. CRYPTO_set_mem_debug() turns this tracking on and off. In order to have any effect, is must be called before any of the allocation functions (e.g., CRYPTO_malloc()) are called, and is therefore normally one of the first lines of main() in an application. CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() provides fine-grained control of memory leak tracking. To enable tracking call CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() with a B argument of the B. To disable tracking call CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() with a B argument of the B. While checking memory, it can be useful to store additional context about what is being done. For example, identifying the field names when parsing a complicated data structure. OPENSSL_mem_debug_push() (which calls CRYPTO_mem_debug_push()) attachs an identifying string to the allocation stack. This must be a global or other static string; it is not copied. OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop() removes identifying state from the stack. At the end of the program, calling CRYPTO_mem_leaks() or CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp() will report all "leaked" memory, writing it to the specified BIO B or FILE B. These functions return 1 if there are no leaks, 0 if there are leaks and -1 if an error occurred. =head1 RETURN VALUES OPENSSL_malloc_init(), OPENSSL_free(), OPENSSL_clear_free() CRYPTO_free(), CRYPTO_clear_free() and CRYPTO_get_mem_functions() return no value. CRYPTO_mem_leaks() and CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp() return 1 if there are no leaks, 0 if there are leaks and -1 if an error occurred. OPENSSL_malloc(), OPENSSL_zalloc(), OPENSSL_realloc(), OPENSSL_clear_realloc(), CRYPTO_malloc(), CRYPTO_zalloc(), CRYPTO_realloc(), CRYPTO_clear_realloc(), OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(), OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(), OPENSSL_strdup(), and OPENSSL_strndup() return a pointer to allocated memory or NULL on error. CRYPTO_set_mem_functions() and CRYPTO_set_mem_debug() return 1 on success or 0 on failure (almost always because allocations have already happened). CRYPTO_mem_ctrl() returns -1 if an error occurred, otherwise the previous value of the mode. OPENSSL_mem_debug_push() and OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop() return 1 on success or 0 on failure. =head1 NOTES While it's permitted to swap out only a few and not all the functions with CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(), it's recommended to swap them all out at once. I C I =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod0000644000000000000000000000433413176625660021070 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, BN_div_recp, BN_RECP_CTX_new, BN_RECP_CTX_free, BN_RECP_CTX_set - modular multiplication using reciprocal =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void); void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *a, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_mod_mul_reciprocal() can be used to perform an efficient L operation when the operation will be performed repeatedly with the same modulus. It computes B=(B*B)%B using B=1/B, which is set as described below. B is a previously allocated B used for temporary variables. BN_RECP_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B structure. BN_RECP_CTX_free() frees the components of the B, and, if it was created by BN_RECP_CTX_new(), also the structure itself. If B is NULL, nothing is done. BN_RECP_CTX_set() stores B in B and sets it up for computing 1/B and shifting it left by BN_num_bits(B)+1 to make it an integer. The result and the number of bits it was shifted left will later be stored in B. BN_div_recp() divides B by B using B. It places the quotient in B and the remainder in B. The B structure cannot be shared between threads. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_RECP_CTX_new() returns the newly allocated B, and NULL on error. BN_RECP_CTX_free() has no return value. For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY BN_RECP_CTX_init() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod0000644000000000000000000000520013176625660017343 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_get_error, ERR_peek_error, ERR_peek_last_error, ERR_get_error_line, ERR_peek_error_line, ERR_peek_last_error_line, ERR_get_error_line_data, ERR_peek_error_line_data, ERR_peek_last_error_line_data - obtain error code and data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned long ERR_get_error(void); unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void); unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void); unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line); unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line); unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line); unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_get_error() returns the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and removes the entry. This function can be called repeatedly until there are no more error codes to return. ERR_peek_error() returns the earliest error code from the thread's error queue without modifying it. ERR_peek_last_error() returns the latest error code from the thread's error queue without modifying it. See L for obtaining information about location and reason of the error, and L for human-readable error messages. ERR_get_error_line(), ERR_peek_error_line() and ERR_peek_last_error_line() are the same as the above, but they additionally store the file name and line number where the error occurred in *B and *B, unless these are B. ERR_get_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and ERR_peek_last_error_line_data() store additional data and flags associated with the error code in *B and *B, unless these are B. *B contains a string if *B&B is true. An application B free the *B pointer (or any other pointers returned by these functions) with OPENSSL_free() as freeing is handled automatically by the error library. =head1 RETURN VALUES The error code, or 0 if there is no error in the queue. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/i2d_re_X509_tbs.pod0000644000000000000000000000541113176625660017410 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME d2i_X509_AUX, i2d_X509_AUX, i2d_re_X509_tbs, i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs, i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs - X509 encode and decode functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **px, const unsigned char **in, long len); int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *x, unsigned char **out); int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **out); int i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(X509_CRL *crl, unsigned char **pp); int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp); =head1 DESCRIPTION The X509 encode and decode routines encode and parse an B structure, which represents an X509 certificate. d2i_X509_AUX() is similar to L but the input is expected to consist of an X509 certificate followed by auxiliary trust information. This is used by the PEM routines to read "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" objects. This function should not be called on untrusted input. i2d_X509_AUX() is similar to L, but the encoded output contains both the certificate and any auxiliary trust information. This is used by the PEM routines to write "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" objects. Note that this is a non-standard OpenSSL-specific data format. i2d_re_X509_tbs() is similar to L except it encodes only the TBSCertificate portion of the certificate. i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs() and i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs() are analogous for CRL and certificate request, respectively. The "re" in B stands for "re-encode", and ensures that a fresh encoding is generated in case the object has been modified after creation (see the BUGS section). The encoding of the TBSCertificate portion of a certificate is cached in the B structure internally to improve encoding performance and to ensure certificate signatures are verified correctly in some certificates with broken (non-DER) encodings. If, after modification, the B object is re-signed with X509_sign(), the encoding is automatically renewed. Otherwise, the encoding of the TBSCertificate portion of the B can be manually renewed by calling i2d_re_X509_tbs(). =head1 SEE ALSO L L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get0_der.pod0000644000000000000000000000173613176625660017673 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_NAME_get0_der - get X509_NAME DER encoding =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder, size_t *pderlen) =head1 DESCRIPTION The function X509_NAME_get0_der() returns an internal pointer to the encoding of an B structure in B<*pder> and consisting of B<*pderlen> bytes. It is useful for applications that wish to examine the encoding of an B structure without copying it. =head1 RETURN VALUES The function X509_NAME_get0_der() returns 1 for success and 0 if an error occurred. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_CMS.pod0000644000000000000000000000414013176625660017433 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SMIME_write_CMS - convert CMS structure to S/MIME format =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SMIME_write_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION SMIME_write_CMS() adds the appropriate MIME headers to a CMS structure to produce an S/MIME message. B is the BIO to write the data to. B is the appropriate B structure. If streaming is enabled then the content must be supplied in the B argument. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES The following flags can be passed in the B parameter. If B is set then cleartext signing will be used, this option only makes sense for SignedData where B is also set when CMS_sign() is called. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are added to the content, this only makes sense if B is also set. If the B flag is set streaming is performed. This flag should only be set if B was also set in the previous call to a CMS_ContentInfo creation function. If cleartext signing is being used and B not set then the data must be read twice: once to compute the signature in CMS_sign() and once to output the S/MIME message. If streaming is performed the content is output in BER format using indefinite length constructed encoding except in the case of signed data with detached content where the content is absent and DER format is used. =head1 BUGS SMIME_write_CMS() always base64 encodes CMS structures, there should be an option to disable this. =head1 RETURN VALUES SMIME_write_CMS() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod0000644000000000000000000001126213176625660021123 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CONF_modules_load_file, CONF_modules_load - OpenSSL configuration functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname, unsigned long flags); int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname, unsigned long flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function CONF_modules_load_file() configures OpenSSL using file B and application name B. If B is NULL the standard OpenSSL configuration file is used. If B is NULL the standard OpenSSL application name B is used. The behaviour can be customized using B. CONF_modules_load() is identical to CONF_modules_load_file() except it reads configuration information from B. =head1 NOTES The following B are currently recognized: B if set errors returned by individual configuration modules are ignored. If not set the first module error is considered fatal and no further modules are loaded. Normally any modules errors will add error information to the error queue. If B is set no error information is added. If B is set configuration module loading from DSOs is disabled. B if set will make CONF_load_modules_file() ignore missing configuration files. Normally a missing configuration file return an error. B if set and B is not NULL will use the default section pointed to by B if B does not exist. By using CONF_modules_load_file() with appropriate flags an application can customise application configuration to best suit its needs. In some cases the use of a configuration file is optional and its absence is not an error: in this case B would be set. Errors during configuration may also be handled differently by different applications. For example in some cases an error may simply print out a warning message and the application continue. In other cases an application might consider a configuration file error as fatal and exit immediately. Applications can use the CONF_modules_load() function if they wish to load a configuration file themselves and have finer control over how errors are treated. =head1 EXAMPLES Load a configuration file and print out any errors and exit (missing file considered fatal): if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } Load default configuration file using the section indicated by "myapp", tolerate missing files, but exit on other errors: if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, "myapp", CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } Load custom configuration file and section, only print warnings on error, missing configuration file ignored: if (CONF_modules_load_file("/something/app.cnf", "myapp", CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: error loading configuration file\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } Load and parse configuration file manually, custom error handling: FILE *fp; CONF *cnf = NULL; long eline; fp = fopen("/somepath/app.cnf", "r"); if (fp == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Error opening configuration file\n"); /* Other missing configuration file behaviour */ } else { cnf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (NCONF_load_fp(cnf, fp, &eline) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld of configuration file\n", eline); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); /* Other malformed configuration file behaviour */ } else if (CONF_modules_load(cnf, "appname", 0) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error configuring application\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); /* Other configuration error behaviour */ } fclose(fp); NCONF_free(cnf); } =head1 RETURN VALUES These functions return 1 for success and a zero or negative value for failure. If module errors are not ignored the return code will reflect the return value of the failing module (this will always be zero or negative). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2004-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_size.pod0000644000000000000000000000176613176625660016321 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_size, DSA_bits - get DSA signature size or key bits =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa); int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_size() returns the maximum size of an ASN.1 encoded DSA signature for key B in bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must be allocated for a DSA signature. Bq> must not be B. DSA_bits() returns the number of bits in key B: this is the number of bits in the B

parameter. =head1 RETURN VALUE DSA_size() returns the size in bytes. DSA_bits() returns the number of bits in the key. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RC4_set_key.pod0000644000000000000000000000360113176625660016761 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RC4_set_key, RC4 - RC4 encryption =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data); void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, unsigned long len, const unsigned char *indata, unsigned char *outdata); =head1 DESCRIPTION This library implements the Alleged RC4 cipher, which is described for example in I. It is believed to be compatible with RC4[TM], a proprietary cipher of RSA Security Inc. RC4 is a stream cipher with variable key length. Typically, 128 bit (16 byte) keys are used for strong encryption, but shorter insecure key sizes have been widely used due to export restrictions. RC4 consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or decryption phase. RC4_set_key() sets up the B B using the B bytes long key at B. RC4() encrypts or decrypts the B bytes of data at B using B and places the result at B. Repeated RC4() calls with the same B yield a continuous key stream. Since RC4 is a stream cipher (the input is XORed with a pseudo-random key stream to produce the output), decryption uses the same function calls as encryption. =head1 RETURN VALUES RC4_set_key() and RC4() do not return values. =head1 NOTE Applications should use the higher level functions L etc. instead of calling these functions directly. It is difficult to securely use stream ciphers. For example, do not perform multiple encryptions using the same key stream. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/UI_new.pod0000644000000000000000000002136013176625660016036 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME UI, UI_new, UI_new_method, UI_free, UI_add_input_string, UI_dup_input_string, UI_add_verify_string, UI_dup_verify_string, UI_add_input_boolean, UI_dup_input_boolean, UI_add_info_string, UI_dup_info_string, UI_add_error_string, UI_dup_error_string, UI_construct_prompt, UI_add_user_data, UI_get0_user_data, UI_get0_result, UI_process, UI_ctrl, UI_set_default_method, UI_get_default_method, UI_get_method, UI_set_method, UI_OpenSSL, UI_null - user interface =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef struct ui_st UI; UI *UI_new(void); UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method); void UI_free(UI *ui); int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize); int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize); int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf); int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf); int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, int flags, char *result_buf); int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, int flags, char *result_buf); int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text); int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text); int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text); int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text); char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui_method, const char *object_desc, const char *object_name); void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data); void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui); const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i); int UI_process(UI *ui); int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth); const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void); const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui); const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth); UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void); const UI_METHOD *UI_null(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION UI stands for User Interface, and is general purpose set of routines to prompt the user for text-based information. Through user-written methods (see L), prompting can be done in any way imaginable, be it plain text prompting, through dialog boxes or from a cell phone. All the functions work through a context of the type UI. This context contains all the information needed to prompt correctly as well as a reference to a UI_METHOD, which is an ordered vector of functions that carry out the actual prompting. The first thing to do is to create a UI with UI_new() or UI_new_method(), then add information to it with the UI_add or UI_dup functions. Also, user-defined random data can be passed down to the underlying method through calls to UI_add_user_data. The default UI method doesn't care about these data, but other methods might. Finally, use UI_process() to actually perform the prompting and UI_get0_result() to find the result to the prompt. A UI can contain more than one prompt, which are performed in the given sequence. Each prompt gets an index number which is returned by the UI_add and UI_dup functions, and has to be used to get the corresponding result with UI_get0_result(). The functions are as follows: UI_new() creates a new UI using the default UI method. When done with this UI, it should be freed using UI_free(). UI_new_method() creates a new UI using the given UI method. When done with this UI, it should be freed using UI_free(). UI_OpenSSL() returns the built-in UI method (note: not necessarely the default one, since the default can be changed. See further on). This method is the most machine/OS dependent part of OpenSSL and normally generates the most problems when porting. UI_null() returns a UI method that does nothing. Its use is to avoid getting internal defaults for passed UI_METHOD pointers. UI_free() removes a UI from memory, along with all other pieces of memory that's connected to it, like duplicated input strings, results and others. If B is NULL nothing is done. UI_add_input_string() and UI_add_verify_string() add a prompt to the UI, as well as flags and a result buffer and the desired minimum and maximum sizes of the result, not counting the final NUL character. The given information is used to prompt for information, for example a password, and to verify a password (i.e. having the user enter it twice and check that the same string was entered twice). UI_add_verify_string() takes and extra argument that should be a pointer to the result buffer of the input string that it's supposed to verify, or verification will fail. UI_add_input_boolean() adds a prompt to the UI that's supposed to be answered in a boolean way, with a single character for yes and a different character for no. A set of characters that can be used to cancel the prompt is given as well. The prompt itself is divided in two, one part being the descriptive text (given through the I argument) and one describing the possible answers (given through the I argument). UI_add_info_string() and UI_add_error_string() add strings that are shown at the same time as the prompt for extra information or to show an error string. The difference between the two is only conceptual. With the builtin method, there's no technical difference between them. Other methods may make a difference between them, however. The flags currently supported are B, which is relevant for UI_add_input_string() and will have the users response be echoed (when prompting for a password, this flag should obviously not be used, and B, which means that a default password of some sort will be used (completely depending on the application and the UI method). UI_dup_input_string(), UI_dup_verify_string(), UI_dup_input_boolean(), UI_dup_info_string() and UI_dup_error_string() are basically the same as their UI_add counterparts, except that they make their own copies of all strings. UI_construct_prompt() is a helper function that can be used to create a prompt from two pieces of information: an description and a name. The default constructor (if there is none provided by the method used) creates a string "Enter I for I:". With the description "pass phrase" and the file name "foo.key", that becomes "Enter pass phrase for foo.key:". Other methods may create whatever string and may include encodings that will be processed by the other method functions. UI_add_user_data() adds a piece of memory for the method to use at any time. The builtin UI method doesn't care about this info. Note that several calls to this function doesn't add data, it replaces the previous blob with the one given as argument. UI_get0_user_data() retrieves the data that has last been given to the UI with UI_add_user_data(). UI_get0_result() returns a pointer to the result buffer associated with the information indexed by I. UI_process() goes through the information given so far, does all the printing and prompting and returns the final status, which is -2 on out-of-band events (Interrupt, Cancel, ...), -1 on error and 0 on success. UI_ctrl() adds extra control for the application author. For now, it understands two commands: B, which makes UI_process() print the OpenSSL error stack as part of processing the UI, and B, which returns a flag saying if the used UI can be used again or not. UI_set_default_method() changes the default UI method to the one given. This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time as other OpenSSL functions. UI_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default UI method. UI_get_method() returns the UI method associated with a given UI. UI_set_method() changes the UI method associated with a given UI. =head1 NOTES The resulting strings that the built in method UI_OpenSSL() generate are assumed to be encoded according to the current locale or (for Windows) code page. For applications having different demands, these strings need to be converted appropriately by the caller. For Windows, if the OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment variable is set, the built-in method UI_OpenSSL() will produce UTF-8 encoded strings instead. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/o2i_SCT_LIST.pod0000644000000000000000000000246513176625660016712 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME o2i_SCT_LIST, i2o_SCT_LIST, o2i_SCT, i2o_SCT - decode and encode Signed Certificate Timestamp lists in TLS wire format =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(SCT) *o2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, size_t len); int i2o_SCT_LIST(const STACK_OF(SCT) *a, unsigned char **pp); SCT *o2i_SCT(SCT **psct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len); int i2o_SCT(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out); =head1 DESCRIPTION The SCT_LIST and SCT functions are very similar to the i2d and d2i family of functions, except that they convert to and from TLS wire format, as described in RFC 6962. See L for more information about how the parameters are treated and the return values. =head1 RETURN VALUES All of the functions have return values consistent with those stated for L and L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_dup.pod0000644000000000000000000001473413176625660016174 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS, IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS, ASN1_ITEM, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new, ASIdOrRange_free, ASIdOrRange_new, ASIdentifierChoice_free, ASIdentifierChoice_new, ASIdentifiers_free, ASIdentifiers_new, ASRange_free, ASRange_new, AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free, AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_new, AUTHORITY_KEYID_free, AUTHORITY_KEYID_new, BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free, BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_new, CMS_ContentInfo_free, CMS_ContentInfo_new, CMS_ContentInfo_print_ctx, CMS_ReceiptRequest_free, CMS_ReceiptRequest_new, CRL_DIST_POINTS_free, CRL_DIST_POINTS_new, DIRECTORYSTRING_free, DIRECTORYSTRING_new, DISPLAYTEXT_free, DISPLAYTEXT_new, DIST_POINT_NAME_free, DIST_POINT_NAME_new, DIST_POINT_free, DIST_POINT_new, DSAparams_dup, ECPARAMETERS_free, ECPARAMETERS_new, ECPKPARAMETERS_free, ECPKPARAMETERS_new, EDIPARTYNAME_free, EDIPARTYNAME_new, ESS_CERT_ID_dup, ESS_CERT_ID_free, ESS_CERT_ID_new, ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_dup, ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_free, ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL_new, ESS_SIGNING_CERT_dup, ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free, ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new, EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free, EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_new, GENERAL_NAMES_free, GENERAL_NAMES_new, GENERAL_NAME_dup, GENERAL_NAME_free, GENERAL_NAME_new, GENERAL_SUBTREE_free, GENERAL_SUBTREE_new, IPAddressChoice_free, IPAddressChoice_new, IPAddressFamily_free, IPAddressFamily_new, IPAddressOrRange_free, IPAddressOrRange_new, IPAddressRange_free, IPAddressRange_new, ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free, ISSUING_DIST_POINT_new, NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free, NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_free, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_new, NETSCAPE_SPKAC_free, NETSCAPE_SPKAC_new, NETSCAPE_SPKI_free, NETSCAPE_SPKI_new, NOTICEREF_free, NOTICEREF_new, OCSP_BASICRESP_free, OCSP_BASICRESP_new, OCSP_CERTID_dup, OCSP_CERTID_new, OCSP_CERTSTATUS_free, OCSP_CERTSTATUS_new, OCSP_CRLID_free, OCSP_CRLID_new, OCSP_ONEREQ_free, OCSP_ONEREQ_new, OCSP_REQINFO_free, OCSP_REQINFO_new, OCSP_RESPBYTES_free, OCSP_RESPBYTES_new, OCSP_RESPDATA_free, OCSP_RESPDATA_new, OCSP_RESPID_free, OCSP_RESPID_new, OCSP_RESPONSE_new, OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_free, OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_new, OCSP_SERVICELOC_free, OCSP_SERVICELOC_new, OCSP_SIGNATURE_free, OCSP_SIGNATURE_new, OCSP_SINGLERESP_free, OCSP_SINGLERESP_new, OTHERNAME_free, OTHERNAME_new, PBE2PARAM_free, PBE2PARAM_new, PBEPARAM_free, PBEPARAM_new, PBKDF2PARAM_free, PBKDF2PARAM_new, PKCS12_BAGS_free, PKCS12_BAGS_new, PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free, PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new, PKCS12_free, PKCS12_new, PKCS7_DIGEST_free, PKCS7_DIGEST_new, PKCS7_ENCRYPT_free, PKCS7_ENCRYPT_new, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_free, PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new, PKCS7_ENVELOPE_free, PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new, PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free, PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_free, PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_new, PKCS7_SIGNED_free, PKCS7_SIGNED_new, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_free, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new, PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_free, PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new, PKCS7_dup, PKCS7_free, PKCS7_new, PKCS7_print_ctx, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new, PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_free, PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_new, POLICYINFO_free, POLICYINFO_new, POLICYQUALINFO_free, POLICYQUALINFO_new, POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free, POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_new, POLICY_MAPPING_free, POLICY_MAPPING_new, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new, PROXY_POLICY_free, PROXY_POLICY_new, RSAPrivateKey_dup, RSAPublicKey_dup, RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free, RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new, RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free, RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new, SCT_LIST_free, SXNETID_free, SXNETID_new, SXNET_free, SXNET_new, TLS_FEATURE_free, TLS_FEATURE_new, TS_ACCURACY_dup, TS_ACCURACY_free, TS_ACCURACY_new, TS_MSG_IMPRINT_dup, TS_MSG_IMPRINT_free, TS_MSG_IMPRINT_new, TS_REQ_dup, TS_REQ_free, TS_REQ_new, TS_RESP_dup, TS_RESP_free, TS_RESP_new, TS_STATUS_INFO_dup, TS_STATUS_INFO_free, TS_STATUS_INFO_new, TS_TST_INFO_dup, TS_TST_INFO_free, TS_TST_INFO_new, USERNOTICE_free, USERNOTICE_new, X509_ALGOR_free, X509_ALGOR_new, X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free, X509_ATTRIBUTE_new, X509_CERT_AUX_free, X509_CERT_AUX_new, X509_CINF_free, X509_CINF_new, X509_CRL_INFO_free, X509_CRL_INFO_new, X509_CRL_dup, X509_CRL_free, X509_CRL_new, X509_EXTENSION_dup, X509_EXTENSION_free, X509_EXTENSION_new, X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free, X509_NAME_ENTRY_new, X509_NAME_dup, X509_NAME_free, X509_NAME_new, X509_REQ_INFO_free, X509_REQ_INFO_new, X509_REQ_dup, X509_REQ_free, X509_REQ_new, X509_REVOKED_dup, X509_REVOKED_free, X509_REVOKED_new, X509_SIG_free, X509_SIG_new, X509_VAL_free, X509_VAL_new, X509_dup, - ASN1 object utilities =for comment generic =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(stname) typedef struct ASN1_ITEM_st ASN1_ITEM; extern const ASN1_ITEM TYPE_it; TYPE *TYPE_new(void); TYPE *TYPE_dup(TYPE *a); void TYPE_free(TYPE *a); int TYPE_print_ctx(BIO *out, TYPE *a, int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION In the description below, I is used as a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I. The OpenSSL ASN1 parsing library templates are like a data-driven bytecode interpreter. Every ASN1 object as a global variable, TYPE_it, that describes the item such as its fields. (On systems which cannot export variables from shared libraries, the global is instead a function which returns a pointer to a static variable. The macro DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS() is typically used in header files to generate the function declarations. The macro IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS() is used once in a source file to generate the function bodies. TYPE_new() allocates an empty object of the indicated type. The object returned must be released by calling TYPE_free(). TYPE_dup() copies an existing object. TYPE_free() releases the object and all pointers and sub-objects within it. TYPE_print_ctx() prints the object B on the specified BIO B. Each line will be prefixed with B spaces. The B specifies the printing context and is for internal use; use NULL to get the default behavior. If a print function is user-defined, then pass in any B down to any nested calls. =head1 RETURN VALUES TYPE_new() and TYPE_dup() return a pointer to the object or NULL on failure. TYPE_print_ctx() returns 1 on success or zero on failure. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest.pod0000644000000000000000000000545613176625660021246 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0, CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest, CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest, CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values - CMS signed receipt request functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen, int allorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptList, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) *receiptsTo); int CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr); int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest(CMS_SignerInfo *si, CMS_ReceiptRequest **prr); void CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values(CMS_ReceiptRequest *rr, ASN1_STRING **pcid, int *pallorfirst, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **plist, STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAMES) **prto); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0() creates a signed receipt request structure. The B field is set using B and B, or it is set to 32 bytes of pseudo random data if B is NULL. If B is NULL the allOrFirstTier option in B is used and set to the value of the B parameter. If B is not NULL the B option in B is used. The B parameter specifies the B field value. The CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() function adds a signed receipt request B to SignerInfo structure B. int CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() looks for a signed receipt request in B, if any is found it is decoded and written to B. CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values() retrieves the values of a receipt request. The signedContentIdentifier is copied to B. If the B option of B is used its value is copied to B otherwise the B field is copied to B. The B parameter is copied to B. =head1 NOTES For more details of the meaning of the fields see RFC2634. The contents of a signed receipt should only be considered meaningful if the corresponding CMS_ContentInfo structure can be successfully verified using CMS_verify(). =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0() returns a signed receipt request structure or NULL if an error occurred. CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 for success or 0 is an error occurred. CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest() returns 1 is a signed receipt request is found and decoded. It returns 0 if a signed receipt request is not present and -1 if it is present but malformed. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod0000644000000000000000000001430613176625660020473 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509v3_get_ext_count, X509v3_get_ext, X509v3_get_ext_by_NID, X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ, X509v3_get_ext_by_critical, X509v3_delete_ext, X509v3_add_ext, X509_get_ext_count, X509_get_ext, X509_get_ext_by_NID, X509_get_ext_by_OBJ, X509_get_ext_by_critical, X509_delete_ext, X509_add_ext, X509_CRL_get_ext_count, X509_CRL_get_ext, X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID, X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ, X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical, X509_CRL_delete_ext, X509_CRL_add_ext, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count, X509_REVOKED_get_ext, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical, X509_REVOKED_delete_ext, X509_REVOKED_add_ext - extension stack utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x); X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc); int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int X509_get_ext_count(const X509 *x); X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(const X509 *x, int loc); int X509_get_ext_by_NID(const X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509 *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509_get_ext_by_critical(const X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc); int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(const X509_CRL *x); X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(const X509_CRL *x, int loc); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc); int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(const X509_REVOKED *x); X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(const X509_REVOKED *x, int loc); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(const X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(const X509_REVOKED *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(const X509_REVOKED *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc); int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509v3_get_ext_count() retrieves the number of extensions in B. X509v3_get_ext() retrieves extension B from B. The index B can take any value from B<0> to X509_get_ext_count(x) - 1. The returned extension is an internal pointer which B be freed up by the application. X509v3_get_ext_by_NID() and X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ() look for an extension with B or B from extension stack B. The search starts from the extension after B or from the beginning if is B<-1>. If the extension is found its index is returned otherwise B<-1> is returned. X509v3_get_ext_by_critical() is similar to X509v3_get_ext_by_NID() except it looks for an extension of criticality B. A zero value for B looks for a non-critical extension a non-zero value looks for a critical extension. X509v3_delete_ext() deletes the extension with index B from B. The deleted extension is returned and must be freed by the caller. If B is in invalid index value B is returned. X509v3_add_ext() adds extension B to stack B<*x> at position B. If B is B<-1> the new extension is added to the end. If B<*x> is B a new stack will be allocated. The passed extension B is duplicated internally so it must be freed after use. X509_get_ext_count(), X509_get_ext(), X509_get_ext_by_NID(), X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(), X509_get_ext_by_critical(), X509_delete_ext() and X509_add_ext() operate on the extensions of certificate B they are otherwise identical to the X509v3 functions. X509_CRL_get_ext_count(), X509_CRL_get_ext(), X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(), X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(), X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(), X509_CRL_delete_ext() and X509_CRL_add_ext() operate on the extensions of CRL B they are otherwise identical to the X509v3 functions. X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(), X509_REVOKED_get_ext(), X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(), X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(), X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(), X509_REVOKED_delete_ext() and X509_REVOKED_add_ext() operate on the extensions of CRL entry B they are otherwise identical to the X509v3 functions. =head1 NOTES These functions are used to examine stacks of extensions directly. Many applications will want to parse or encode and add an extension: they should use the extension encode and decode functions instead such as X509_add1_ext_i2d() and X509_get_ext_d2i(). Extension indices start from zero, so a zero index return value is B an error. These search functions start from the extension B the B parameter so it should initially be set to B<-1>, if it is set to zero the initial extension will not be checked. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509v3_get_ext_count() returns the extension count. X509v3_get_ext() and X509v3_delete_ext() return an B pointer or B if an error occurs. X509v3_get_ext_by_NID() X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ() and X509v3_get_ext_by_critical() return the an extension index or B<-1> if an error occurs. X509v3_add_ext() returns a stack of extensions or B on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_get_serialNumber.pod0000644000000000000000000000371013176625660020663 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get_serialNumber, X509_get0_serialNumber, X509_set_serialNumber - get or set certificate serial number =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *x); const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x); int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_get_serialNumber() returns the serial number of certificate B as an B structure which can be examined or initialised. The value returned is an internal pointer which B be freed up after the call. X509_get0_serialNumber() is the same as X509_get_serialNumber() except it accepts a const parameter and returns a const result. X509_set_serialNumber() sets the serial number of certificate B to B. A copy of the serial number is used internally so B should be freed up after use. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_get_serialNumber() and X509_get0_serialNumber() return an B structure. X509_set_serialNumber() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY X509_get_serialNumber() and X509_set_serialNumber() are available in all versions of OpenSSL. X509_get0_serialNumber() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod0000644000000000000000000001542513176625660016676 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME i2t_ASN1_OBJECT, OBJ_length, OBJ_get0_data, OBJ_nid2obj, OBJ_nid2ln, OBJ_nid2sn, OBJ_obj2nid, OBJ_txt2nid, OBJ_ln2nid, OBJ_sn2nid, OBJ_cmp, OBJ_dup, OBJ_txt2obj, OBJ_obj2txt, OBJ_create, OBJ_cleanup - ASN1 object utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n); int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln); int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn); int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name); int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name); int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a); int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln); size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void OBJ_cleanup(void) #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1_OBJECT structures which are a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type. For convenience, OIDs are usually represented in source code as numeric identifiers, or Bs. OpenSSL has an internal table of OIDs that are generated when the library is built, and their corresponding NIDs are available as defined constants. For the functions below, application code should treat all returned values -- OIDs, NIDs, or names -- as constants. OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID B to an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively, or B is an error occurred. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID for the object B, the long name or the short name respectively or NID_undef if an error occurred. OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string . B can be a long name, a short name or the numerical representation of an object. OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string B into an ASN1_OBJECT structure. If B is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted as well as numerical forms. If B is 1 only the numerical form is acceptable. OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B B into a textual representation. The representation is written as a null terminated string to B at most B bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary. The total amount of space required is returned. If B is 0 then if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise the numerical form will be used. If B is 1 then the numerical form will always be used. i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() is the same as OBJ_obj2txt() with the B set to zero. OBJ_cmp() compares B to B. If the two are identical 0 is returned. OBJ_dup() returns a copy of B. OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. B is the numerical form of the object, B the short name and B the long name. A new NID is returned for the created object. OBJ_length() returns the size of the content octets of B. OBJ_get0_data() returns a pointer to the content octets of B. The returned pointer is an internal pointer which B be freed. In OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0 OBJ_cleanup() cleaned up OpenSSLs internal object table and was called before an application exits if any new objects were added using OBJ_create(). This function is deprecated in version 1.1.0 and now does nothing if called. No explicit de-initialisation is now required. See L for further information. =head1 NOTES Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined in the header file B. For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions: #define SN_commonName "CN" #define LN_commonName "commonName" #define NID_commonName 13 New objects can be added by calling OBJ_create(). Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are also static constant structures which are shared: that is there is only a single constant structure for each table object. Objects which are not in the table have the NID value NID_undef. Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed, the functions OBJ_txt2obj() and OBJ_obj2txt() can process the numerical form of an OID. Some objects are used to represent algorithms which do not have a corresponding ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER encoding (for example no OID currently exists for a particular algorithm). As a result they B be encoded or decoded as part of ASN.1 structures. Applications can determine if there is a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER by checking OBJ_length() is not zero. These functions cannot return B because an B can represent both an internal, constant, OID and a dynamically-created one. The latter cannot be constant because it needs to be freed after use. =head1 EXAMPLES Create an object for B: ASN1_OBJECT *o; o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName); Check if an object is B if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName) /* Do something */ Create a new NID and initialize an object from it: int new_nid; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier"); obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid); Create a new object directly: obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1); =head1 BUGS OBJ_obj2txt() is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set to B to determine the amount of data that should be written. Instead B must point to a valid buffer and B should be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice. =head1 RETURN VALUES OBJ_nid2obj() returns an B structure or B is an error occurred. OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() returns a valid string or B on error. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() and OBJ_txt2nid() return a NID or B on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY OBJ_cleanup() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod0000644000000000000000000001055213176625660021540 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID, X509_NAME_add_entry, X509_NAME_delete_entry - X509_NAME modification functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc, int set); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ() and X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() add a field whose name is defined by a string B, an object B or a NID B respectively. The field value to be added is in B of length B. If B is -1 then the field length is calculated internally using strlen(bytes). The type of field is determined by B which can either be a definition of the type of B (such as B) or a standard ASN1 type (such as B). The new entry is added to a position determined by B and B. X509_NAME_add_entry() adds a copy of B structure B to B. The new entry is added to a position determined by B and B. Since a copy of B is added B must be freed up after the call. X509_NAME_delete_entry() deletes an entry from B at position B. The deleted entry is returned and must be freed up. =head1 NOTES The use of string types such as B or B is strongly recommended for the B parameter. This allows the internal code to correctly determine the type of the field and to apply length checks according to the relevant standards. This is done using ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(). If instead an ASN1 type is used no checks are performed and the supplied data in B is used directly. In X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt() the B string represents the field name using OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0). The B and B parameters determine where a new entry should be added. For almost all applications B can be set to -1 and B to 0. This adds a new entry to the end of B as a single valued RelativeDistinguishedName (RDN). B actually determines the index where the new entry is inserted: if it is -1 it is appended. B determines how the new type is added. If it is zero a new RDN is created. If B is -1 or 1 it is added to the previous or next RDN structure respectively. This will then be a multivalued RDN: since multivalues RDNs are very seldom used B is almost always set to zero. =head1 EXAMPLES Create an B structure: "C=UK, O=Disorganized Organization, CN=Joe Bloggs" X509_NAME *nm; nm = X509_NAME_new(); if (nm == NULL) /* Some error */ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "C", MBSTRING_ASC, "UK", -1, -1, 0)) /* Error */ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "O", MBSTRING_ASC, "Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0)) /* Error */ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0)) /* Error */ =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() and X509_NAME_add_entry() return 1 for success of 0 if an error occurred. X509_NAME_delete_entry() returns either the deleted B structure of B if an error occurred. =head1 BUGS B can still be set to B to use a different algorithm to determine field types. Since this form does not understand multicharacter types, performs no length checks and can result in invalid field types its use is strongly discouraged. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod0000644000000000000000000000571413176625660016534 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_lookup_type, BIO_ADDRINFO, BIO_ADDRINFO_next, BIO_ADDRINFO_free, BIO_ADDRINFO_family, BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol, BIO_ADDRINFO_address, BIO_lookup - BIO_ADDRINFO type and routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #include typedef union bio_addrinfo_st BIO_ADDRINFO; enum BIO_lookup_type { BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER }; int BIO_lookup(const char *node, const char *service, enum BIO_lookup_type lookup_type, int family, int socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO **res); const BIO_ADDRINFO *BIO_ADDRINFO_next(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); int BIO_ADDRINFO_family(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); int BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); int BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); const BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDRINFO_address(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); void BIO_ADDRINFO_free(BIO_ADDRINFO *bai); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a wrapper for address information types provided on your platform. B normally forms a chain of several that can be picked at one by one. BIO_lookup() looks up a specified B and B, and uses B to determine what the default address should be if B is B. B, B are used to determine what protocol family and protocol should be used for the lookup. B can be any of AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX and AF_UNSPEC, and B can be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM. B points at a pointer to hold the start of a B chain. For the family B, BIO_lookup() will ignore the B parameter and expects the B parameter to hold the path to the socket file. BIO_ADDRINFO_family() returns the family of the given B. The result will be one of the constants AF_INET, AF_INET6 and AF_UNIX. BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype() returns the socket type of the given B. The result will be one of the constants SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_DGRAM. BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol() returns the protocol id of the given B. The result will be one of the constants IPPROTO_TCP and IPPROTO_UDP. BIO_ADDRINFO_address() returns the underlying B of the given B. BIO_ADDRINFO_next() returns the next B in the chain from the given one. BIO_ADDRINFO_free() frees the chain of B starting with the given one. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_lookup() returns 1 on success and 0 when an error occurred, and will leave an error indication on the OpenSSL error stack in that case. All other functions described here return 0 or B when the information they should return isn't available. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_check_key.pod0000644000000000000000000000533713176625660017310 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_check_key_ex, RSA_check_key - validate private RSA keys =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RSA_check_key_ex(RSA *rsa, BN_GENCB *cb); int RSA_check_key(RSA *rsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_check_key_ex() function validates RSA keys. It checks that B

and B are in fact prime, and that B. It does not work on RSA public keys that have only the modulus and public exponent elements populated. It also checks that B, and that B, B and B are set correctly or are B. It performs integrity checks on all the RSA key material, so the RSA key structure must contain all the private key data too. Therefore, it cannot be used with any arbitrary RSA key object, even if it is otherwise fit for regular RSA operation. The B parameter is a callback that will be invoked in the same manner as L. RSA_check_key() is equivalent to RSA_check_key_ex() with a NULL B. =head1 RETURN VALUE RSA_check_key_ex() and RSA_check_key() return 1 if B is a valid RSA key, and 0 otherwise. They return -1 if an error occurs while checking the key. If the key is invalid or an error occurred, the reason code can be obtained using L. =head1 NOTES Unlike most other RSA functions, this function does B work transparently with any underlying ENGINE implementation because it uses the key data in the RSA structure directly. An ENGINE implementation can override the way key data is stored and handled, and can even provide support for HSM keys - in which case the RSA structure may contain B key data at all! If the ENGINE in question is only being used for acceleration or analysis purposes, then in all likelihood the RSA key data is complete and untouched, but this can't be assumed in the general case. =head1 BUGS A method of verifying the RSA key using opaque RSA API functions might need to be considered. Right now RSA_check_key() simply uses the RSA structure elements directly, bypassing the RSA_METHOD table altogether (and completely violating encapsulation and object-orientation in the process). The best fix will probably be to introduce a "check_key()" handler to the RSA_METHOD function table so that alternative implementations can also provide their own verifiers. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY RSA_check_key_ex() appeared after OpenSSL 1.0.2. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ERR_put_error.pod0000644000000000000000000000470713176625660017407 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_data - record an error =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line); void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...); void ERR_add_error_data(int num, va_list arg); =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_put_error() adds an error code to the thread's error queue. It signals that the error of reason code B occurred in function B of library B, in line number B of B. This function is usually called by a macro. ERR_add_error_data() associates the concatenation of its B string arguments with the error code added last. ERR_add_error_vdata() is similar except the argument is a B. L can be used to register error strings so that the application can a generate human-readable error messages for the error code. =head2 Reporting errors Each sub-library has a specific macro XXXerr() that is used to report errors. Its first argument is a function code B, the second argument is a reason code B. Function codes are derived from the function names; reason codes consist of textual error descriptions. For example, the function ssl3_read_bytes() reports a "handshake failure" as follows: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); Function and reason codes should consist of upper case characters, numbers and underscores only. The error file generation script translates function codes into function names by looking in the header files for an appropriate function name, if none is found it just uses the capitalized form such as "SSL3_READ_BYTES" in the above example. The trailing section of a reason code (after the "_R_") is translated into lower case and underscores changed to spaces. Although a library will normally report errors using its own specific XXXerr macro, another library's macro can be used. This is normally only done when a library wants to include ASN1 code which must use the ASN1err() macro. =head1 RETURN VALUES ERR_put_error() and ERR_add_error_data() return no values. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000212313176625660016142 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_new, RSA_free - allocate and free RSA objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include RSA * RSA_new(void); void RSA_free(RSA *rsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION RSA_new() allocates and initializes an B structure. It is equivalent to calling RSA_new_method(NULL). RSA_free() frees the B structure and its components. The key is erased before the memory is returned to the system. If B is NULL nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES If the allocation fails, RSA_new() returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. RSA_free() returns no value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod0000644000000000000000000001121613176625660016516 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS7_sign - create a PKCS#7 signedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS7_sign() creates and returns a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B is the certificate to sign with, B is the corresponding private key. B is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the PKCS#7 structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain). The data to be signed is read from BIO B. B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B parameter. Many S/MIME clients expect the signed content to include valid MIME headers. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are prepended to the data. If B is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the PKCS7 structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the B parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a previously signed message. The data being signed is included in the PKCS7 structure, unless B is set in which case it is omitted. This is used for PKCS7 detached signatures which are used in S/MIME plaintext signed messages for example. Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if B is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it. The signedData structure includes several PKCS#7 autenticatedAttributes including the signing time, the PKCS#7 content type and the supported list of ciphers in an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B is set then no authenticatedAttributes will be used. If B is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are omitted. If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following algorithms: triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any of these algorithms is disabled then it will not be included. If the flags B is set then the returned B structure is just initialized ready to perform the signing operation. The signing is however B performed and the data to be signed is not read from the B parameter. Signing is deferred until after the data has been written. In this way data can be signed in a single pass. If the B flag is set a partial B structure is output to which additional signers and capabilities can be added before finalization. =head1 NOTES If the flag B is set the returned B structure is B complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not properly finalize the B structure will give unpredictable results. Several functions including SMIME_write_PKCS7(), i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(), PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() finalize the structure. Alternatively finalization can be performed by obtaining the streaming ASN1 B directly using BIO_new_PKCS7(). If a signer is specified it will use the default digest for the signing algorithm. This is B for both RSA and DSA keys. The B, B and B parameters can all be B if the B flag is set. One or more signers can be added using the function PKCS7_sign_add_signer(). PKCS7_final() must also be called to finalize the structure if streaming is not enabled. Alternative signing digests can also be specified using this method. If B and B are NULL then a certificates only PKCS#7 structure is output. In versions of OpenSSL before 1.0.0 the B and B parameters must B be NULL. =head1 BUGS Some advanced attributes such as counter signatures are not supported. =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS7_sign() returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The B flag, and the ability for B, B, and B parameters to be B to be was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 The B flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_final.pod0000644000000000000000000000243013176625660016440 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_final - finalise a CMS_ContentInfo structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_final() finalises the structure B. It's purpose is to perform any operations necessary on B (digest computation for example) and set the appropriate fields. The parameter B contains the content to be processed. The B parameter contains a BIO to write content to after processing: this is only used with detached data and will usually be set to NULL. =head1 NOTES This function will normally be called when the B flag is used. It should only be used when streaming is not performed because the streaming I/O functions perform finalisation operations internally. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_final() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_push.pod0000644000000000000000000000470713176625660016326 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_push, BIO_pop, BIO_set_next - add and remove BIOs from a chain =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append); BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b); void BIO_set_next(BIO *b, BIO *next); =head1 DESCRIPTION The BIO_push() function appends the BIO B to B, it returns B. BIO_pop() removes the BIO B from a chain and returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO. The removed BIO then becomes a single BIO with no association with the original chain, it can thus be freed or attached to a different chain. BIO_set_next() replaces the existing next BIO in a chain with the BIO pointed to by B. The new chain may include some of the same BIOs from the old chain or it may be completely different. =head1 NOTES The names of these functions are perhaps a little misleading. BIO_push() joins two BIO chains whereas BIO_pop() deletes a single BIO from a chain, the deleted BIO does not need to be at the end of a chain. The process of calling BIO_push() and BIO_pop() on a BIO may have additional consequences (a control call is made to the affected BIOs) any effects will be noted in the descriptions of individual BIOs. =head1 EXAMPLES For these examples suppose B and B are digest BIOs, B is a base64 BIO and B is a file BIO. If the call: BIO_push(b64, f); is made then the new chain will be B. After making the calls BIO_push(md2, b64); BIO_push(md1, md2); the new chain is B. Data written to B will be digested by B and B, B encoded and written to B. It should be noted that reading causes data to pass in the reverse direction, that is data is read from B, base64 B and digested by B and B. If the call: BIO_pop(md2); The call will return B and the new chain will be B data can be written to B as before. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_push() returns the end of the chain, B. BIO_pop() returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY The BIO_set_next() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod0000644000000000000000000001127413176625660020612 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once, CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new, CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock, CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock, CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock, CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free, CRYPTO_atomic_add - OpenSSL thread support =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CRYPTO_ONCE CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; int CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(CRYPTO_ONCE *once, void (*init)(void)); CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void); int CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); int CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock); =head1 DESCRIPTION OpenSSL can be safely used in multi-threaded applications provided that support for the underlying OS threading API is built-in. Currently, OpenSSL supports the pthread and Windows APIs. OpenSSL can also be built without any multi-threading support, for example on platforms that don't provide any threading support or that provide a threading API that is not yet supported by OpenSSL. The following multi-threading function are provided: =over 2 =item * CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() can be used to perform one-time initialization. The B argument must be a pointer to a static object of type B that was statically initialized to the value B. The B argument is a pointer to a function that performs the desired exactly once initialization. In particular, this can be used to allocate locks in a thread-safe manner, which can then be used with the locking functions below. =item * CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new() allocates, initializes and returns a new read/write lock. =item * CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock() locks the provided B for reading. =item * CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock() locks the provided B for writing. =item * CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock() unlocks the previously locked B. =item * CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_frees() frees the provided B. =item * CRYPTO_atomic_add() atomically adds B to B and returns the result of the operation in B. B will be locked, unless atomic operations are supported on the specific platform. Because of this, if a variable is modified by CRYPTO_atomic_add() then CRYPTO_atomic_add() must be the only way that the variable is modified. =back =head1 RETURN VALUES CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once() returns 1 on success, or 0 on error. CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new() returns the allocated lock, or NULL on error. CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_frees() returns no value. The other functions return 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 NOTES On Windows platforms the CRYPTO_THREAD_* types and functions in the openssl/crypto.h header are dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to crypto.h where use of CRYPTO_THREAD_* types and functions is required. =head1 EXAMPLE This example safely initializes and uses a lock. #ifdef _WIN32 # include #endif #include static CRYPTO_ONCE once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; static void myinit(void) { lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); } static int mylock(void) { if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&once, void init) || lock == NULL) return 0; return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock); } static int myunlock(void) { return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock); } int serialized(void) { int ret = 0; if (mylock()) { /* Your code here, do not return without releasing the lock! */ ret = ... ; } myunlock(); return ret; } Finalization of locks is an advanced topic, not covered in this example. This can only be done at process exit or when a dynamically loaded library is no longer in use and is unloaded. The simplest solution is to just "leak" the lock in applications and not repeatedly load/unload shared libraries that allocate locks. =head1 NOTES You can find out if OpenSSL was configured with thread support: #include #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) // thread support enabled #else // no thread support #endif =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_get_version.pod0000644000000000000000000000467613176625660017734 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get_version, X509_set_version, X509_REQ_get_version, X509_REQ_set_version, X509_CRL_get_version, X509_CRL_set_version - get or set certificate, certificate request or CRL version =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long X509_get_version(const X509 *x); int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version); long X509_REQ_get_version(const X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x, long version); long X509_CRL_get_version(const X509_CRL *crl); int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_get_version() returns the numerical value of the version field of certificate B. Note: this is defined by standards (X.509 et al) to be one less than the certificate version. So a version 3 certificate will return 2 and a version 1 certificate will return 0. X509_set_version() sets the numerical value of the version field of certificate B to B. Similarly X509_REQ_get_version(), X509_REQ_set_version(), X509_CRL_get_version() and X509_CRL_set_version() get and set the version number of certificate requests and CRLs. =head1 NOTES The version field of certificates, certificate requests and CRLs has a DEFAULT value of B meaning the field should be omitted for version 1. This is handled transparently by these functions. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_get_version(), X509_REQ_get_version() and X509_CRL_get_version() return the numerical value of the version field. X509_set_version(), X509_REQ_set_version() and X509_CRL_set_version() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY X509_get_version(), X509_REQ_get_version() and X509_CRL_get_version() are functions in OpenSSL 1.1.0, in previous versions they were macros. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_dup_DH.pod0000644000000000000000000000165413176625660016506 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_dup_DH - create a DH structure out of DSA structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DH * DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_dup_DH() duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys. q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length. =head1 RETURN VALUE DSA_dup_DH() returns the new B structure, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 NOTE Be careful to avoid small subgroup attacks when using this. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_LH_stats.pod0000644000000000000000000000425113176625660017574 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_LH_stats, OPENSSL_LH_node_stats, OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats, OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio, OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio, OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio - LHASH statistics =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void OPENSSL_LH_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out); void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out); void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out); void OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out); void OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out); void OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B structure records statistics about most aspects of accessing the hash table. This is mostly a legacy of Eric Young writing this library for the reasons of implementing what looked like a nice algorithm rather than for a particular software product. OPENSSL_LH_stats() prints out statistics on the size of the hash table, how many entries are in it, and the number and result of calls to the routines in this library. OPENSSL_LH_node_stats() prints the number of entries for each 'bucket' in the hash table. OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats() prints out a short summary of the state of the hash table. It prints the 'load' and the 'actual load'. The load is the average number of data items per 'bucket' in the hash table. The 'actual load' is the average number of items per 'bucket', but only for buckets which contain entries. So the 'actual load' is the average number of searches that will need to find an item in the hash table, while the 'load' is the average number that will be done to record a miss. OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio(), OPENSSL_LH_node_stats_bio() and OPENSSL_LH_node_usage_stats_bio() are the same as the above, except that the output goes to a B. =head1 RETURN VALUES These functions do not return values. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_sign.pod0000644000000000000000000000652613176625660016344 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_sign, X509_sign_ctx, X509_verify, X509_REQ_sign, X509_REQ_sign_ctx, X509_REQ_verify, X509_CRL_sign, X509_CRL_sign_ctx, X509_CRL_verify - sign or verify certificate, certificate request or CRL signature =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_REQ_sign_ctx(X509_REQ *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a, EVP_PKEY *r); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_sign() signs certificate B using private key B and message digest B and sets the signature in B. X509_sign_ctx() also signs certificate B but uses the parameters contained in digest context B. X509_verify() verifies the signature of certificate B using public key B. Only the signature is checked: no other checks (such as certificate chain validity) are performed. X509_REQ_sign(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_verify(), X509_CRL_sign(), X509_CRL_sign_ctx() and X509_CRL_verify() sign and verify certificate requests and CRLs respectively. =head1 NOTES X509_sign_ctx() is used where the default parameters for the corresponding public key and digest are not suitable. It can be used to sign keys using RSA-PSS for example. For efficiency reasons and to work around ASN.1 encoding issues the encoding of the signed portion of a certificate, certificate request and CRL is cached internally. If the signed portion of the structure is modified the encoding is not always updated meaning a stale version is sometimes used. This is not normally a problem because modifying the signed portion will invalidate the signature and signing will always update the encoding. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_sign(), X509_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_sign(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx(), X509_CRL_sign() and X509_CRL_sign_ctx() return the size of the signature in bytes for success and zero for failure. X509_verify(), X509_REQ_verify() and X509_CRL_verify() return 1 if the signature is valid and 0 if the signature check fails. If the signature could not be checked at all because it was invalid or some other error occurred then -1 is returned. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY X509_sign(), X509_REQ_sign() and X509_CRL_sign() are available in all versions of OpenSSL. X509_sign_ctx(), X509_REQ_sign_ctx() and X509_CRL_sign_ctx() were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.1. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod0000644000000000000000000001752313176625660021720 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls, X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs, X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy, X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation, X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued, X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer, X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb, X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb - get and set verification callback =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *); X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb); X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() sets the verification callback of B to B overwriting any existing callback. The verification callback can be used to customise the operation of certificate verification, either by overriding error conditions or logging errors for debugging purposes. However a verification callback is B essential and the default operation is often sufficient. The B parameter to the callback indicates the value the callback should return to retain the default behaviour. If it is zero then an error condition is indicated. If it is 1 then no error occurred. If the flag B is set then B is set to 2 to indicate the policy checking is complete. The B parameter to the callback is the B structure that is performing the verification operation. A callback can examine this structure and receive additional information about the error, for example by calling X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(). Additional application data can be passed to the callback via the B mechanism. X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb() returns the value of the current callback for the specific B. X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup() return the function pointers cached from the corresponding B, please see L for more information. =head1 WARNING In general a verification callback should B unconditionally return 1 in all circumstances because this will allow verification to succeed no matter what the error. This effectively removes all security from the application because B certificate (including untrusted generated ones) will be accepted. =head1 NOTES The verification callback can be set and inherited from the parent structure performing the operation. In some cases (such as S/MIME verification) the B structure is created and destroyed internally and the only way to set a custom verification callback is by inheriting it from the associated B. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() does not return a value. =head1 EXAMPLES Default callback operation: int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ok; } Simple example, suppose a certificate in the chain is expired and we wish to continue after this error: int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { /* Tolerate certificate expiration */ if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED) return 1; /* Otherwise don't override */ return ok; } More complex example, we don't wish to continue after B certificate has expired just one specific case: int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); X509 *err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); if (err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED) { if (check_is_acceptable_expired_cert(err_cert) return 1; } return ok; } Full featured logging callback. In this case the B is assumed to be a global logging B, an alternative would to store a BIO in B using B. int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *err_cert; int err, depth; err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d ", depth); if (err_cert) { X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } else BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); if (!ok) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); switch (err) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: BIO_puts(bio_err, "issuer= "); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: BIO_printf(bio_err, "notBefore="); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(err_cert)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: BIO_printf(bio_err, "notAfter="); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(err_cert)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: policies_print(bio_err, ctx); break; } if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2) /* print out policies */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify return:%d\n", ok); return(ok); } =head1 SEE ALSO L L L =head1 HISTORY X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(), X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RAND_egd.pod0000644000000000000000000000637413176625660016223 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RAND_egd, RAND_egd_bytes, RAND_query_egd_bytes - query entropy gathering daemon =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RAND_egd(const char *path); int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes); int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes); =head1 DESCRIPTION RAND_egd() queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket B. It queries 255 bytes and uses L to seed the OpenSSL built-in PRNG. RAND_egd(path) is a wrapper for RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255); RAND_egd_bytes() queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket B. It queries B bytes and uses L to seed the OpenSSL built-in PRNG. This function is more flexible than RAND_egd(). When only one secret key must be generated, it is not necessary to request the full amount 255 bytes from the EGD socket. This can be advantageous, since the amount of entropy that can be retrieved from EGD over time is limited. RAND_query_egd_bytes() performs the actual query of the EGD daemon on socket B. If B is given, B bytes are queried and written into B. If B is NULL, B bytes are queried and used to seed the OpenSSL built-in PRNG using L. =head1 NOTES On systems without /dev/*random devices providing entropy from the kernel, the EGD entropy gathering daemon can be used to collect entropy. It provides a socket interface through which entropy can be gathered in chunks up to 255 bytes. Several chunks can be queried during one connection. EGD is available from http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ (C to install). It is run as B I, where I is an absolute path designating a socket. When RAND_egd() is called with that path as an argument, it tries to read random bytes that EGD has collected. RAND_egd() retrieves entropy from the daemon using the daemon's "non-blocking read" command which shall be answered immediately by the daemon without waiting for additional entropy to be collected. The write and read socket operations in the communication are blocking. Alternatively, the EGD-interface compatible daemon PRNGD can be used. It is available from http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ . PRNGD does employ an internal PRNG itself and can therefore never run out of entropy. OpenSSL automatically queries EGD when entropy is requested via RAND_bytes() or the status is checked via RAND_status() for the first time, if the socket is located at /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool or /etc/egd-pool. =head1 RETURN VALUE RAND_egd() and RAND_egd_bytes() return the number of bytes read from the daemon on success, and -1 if the connection failed or the daemon did not return enough data to fully seed the PRNG. RAND_query_egd_bytes() returns the number of bytes read from the daemon on success, and -1 if the connection failed. The PRNG state is not considered. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod0000644000000000000000000000523613176625660017256 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_get0_type, CMS_set1_eContentType, CMS_get0_eContentType, CMS_get0_content - get and set CMS content types and content =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms); int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_get0_type() returns the content type of a CMS_ContentInfo structure as and ASN1_OBJECT pointer. An application can then decide how to process the CMS_ContentInfo structure based on this value. CMS_set1_eContentType() sets the embedded content type of a CMS_ContentInfo structure. It should be called with CMS functions with the B flag and B the structure is finalised, otherwise the results are undefined. ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType() returns a pointer to the embedded content type. CMS_get0_content() returns a pointer to the B pointer containing the embedded content. =head1 NOTES As the B<0> implies CMS_get0_type(), CMS_get0_eContentType() and CMS_get0_content() return internal pointers which should B be freed up. CMS_set1_eContentType() copies the supplied OID and it B be freed up after use. The B values returned can be converted to an integer B value using OBJ_obj2nid(). For the currently supported content types the following values are returned: NID_pkcs7_data NID_pkcs7_signed NID_pkcs7_digest NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData: NID_pkcs7_encrypted NID_pkcs7_enveloped The return value of CMS_get0_content() is a pointer to the B content pointer. That means that for example: ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pconf = CMS_get0_content(cms); B<*pconf> could be NULL if there is no embedded content. Applications can access, modify or create the embedded content in a B structure using this function. Applications usually will not need to modify the embedded content as it is normally set by higher level functions. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_get0_type() and CMS_get0_eContentType() return and ASN1_OBJECT structure. CMS_set1_eContentType() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001542413176625660017554 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_MD_meth_dup, EVP_MD_meth_new, EVP_MD_meth_free, EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize, EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size, EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize, EVP_MD_meth_set_flags, EVP_MD_meth_set_init, EVP_MD_meth_set_update, EVP_MD_meth_set_final, EVP_MD_meth_set_copy, EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup, EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl, EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize, EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size, EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize, EVP_MD_meth_get_flags, EVP_MD_meth_get_init, EVP_MD_meth_get_update, EVP_MD_meth_get_final, EVP_MD_meth_get_copy, EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup, EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data - Routines to build up EVP_MD methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_new(int md_type, int pkey_type); void EVP_MD_meth_free(EVP_MD *md); EVP_MD *EVP_MD_meth_dup(const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(EVP_MD *md, int blocksize); int EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(EVP_MD *md, int resultsize); int EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(EVP_MD *md, int datasize); int EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(EVP_MD *md, unsigned long flags); int EVP_MD_meth_set_init(EVP_MD *md, int (*init)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_update(EVP_MD *md, int (*update)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_final(EVP_MD *md, int (*final)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_copy(EVP_MD *md, int (*copy)(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)); void *EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_MD *md, int (*cleanup)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)); int EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_MD *md, int (*ctrl)(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)); int EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(const EVP_MD *md); unsigned long EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_init(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_update(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_final(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a structure for digest method implementation. It can also have associated public/private key signing and verifying routines. EVP_MD_meth_new() creates a new B structure. EVP_MD_meth_dup() creates a copy of B. EVP_MD_meth_free() destroys a B structure. EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize() sets the internal input block size for the method B to B bytes. EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size() sets the size of the result that the digest method in B is expected to produce to B bytes. The digest method may have its own private data, which OpenSSL will allocate for it. EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize() should be used to set the size for it to B. EVP_MD_meth_set_flags() sets the flags to describe optional behaviours in the particular B. Several flags can be or'd together. The available flags are: =over 4 =item EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT This digest method can only handles one block of input. =item EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_NULL When setting up a DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, this flag will have the parameter set to NULL by default. Use this for PKCS#1. I =item EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT When setting up a DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, this flag will have the parameter be left absent by default. I =item EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_CUSTOM Custom DigestAlgorithmIdentifier handling via ctrl, with B as default. I Currently unused. =back EVP_MD_meth_set_init() sets the digest init function for B. The digest init function is called by EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignInit_ex(), EVP_VerifyInit() and EVP_VerifyInit_ex(). EVP_MD_meth_set_update() sets the digest update function for B. The digest update function is called by EVP_DigestUpdate(), EVP_SignUpdate(). EVP_MD_meth_set_final() sets the digest final function for B. The digest final function is called by EVP_DigestFinal(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex(), EVP_SignFinal() and EVP_VerifyFinal(). EVP_MD_meth_set_copy() sets the function for B to do extra computations after the method's private data structure has been copied from one B to another. If all that's needed is to copy the data, there is no need for this copy function. Note that the copy function is passed two B, the private data structure is then available with EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(). This copy function is called by EVP_MD_CTX_copy() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(). EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup() sets the function for B to do extra cleanup before the method's private data structure is cleaned out and freed. Note that the cleanup function is passed a B, the private data structure is then available with EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(). This cleanup function is called by EVP_MD_CTX_reset() and EVP_MD_CTX_free(). EVP_MD_meth_set_ctrl() sets the control function for B. EVP_MD_meth_get_input_blocksize(), EVP_MD_meth_get_result_size(), EVP_MD_meth_get_app_datasize(), EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(), EVP_MD_meth_get_init(), EVP_MD_meth_get_update(), EVP_MD_meth_get_final(), EVP_MD_meth_get_copy(), EVP_MD_meth_get_cleanup() and EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl() are all used to retrieve the method data given with the EVP_MD_meth_set_*() functions above. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The B structure was openly available in OpenSSL before version 1.1.0. The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BF_encrypt.pod0000644000000000000000000001172313176625660016705 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BF_set_key, BF_encrypt, BF_decrypt, BF_ecb_encrypt, BF_cbc_encrypt, BF_cfb64_encrypt, BF_ofb64_encrypt, BF_options - Blowfish encryption =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data); void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, BF_KEY *key, int enc); void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int enc); void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, int enc); void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); const char *BF_options(void); void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key); void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key); =head1 DESCRIPTION This library implements the Blowfish cipher, which was invented and described by Counterpane (see http://www.counterpane.com/blowfish.html ). Blowfish is a block cipher that operates on 64 bit (8 byte) blocks of data. It uses a variable size key, but typically, 128 bit (16 byte) keys are considered good for strong encryption. Blowfish can be used in the same modes as DES (see L). Blowfish is currently one of the faster block ciphers. It is quite a bit faster than DES, and much faster than IDEA or RC2. Blowfish consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or decryption phase. BF_set_key() sets up the B B using the B bytes long key at B. BF_ecb_encrypt() is the basic Blowfish encryption and decryption function. It encrypts or decrypts the first 64 bits of B using the key B, putting the result in B. B decides if encryption (B) or decryption (B) shall be performed. The vector pointed at by B and B must be 64 bits in length, no less. If they are larger, everything after the first 64 bits is ignored. The mode functions BF_cbc_encrypt(), BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt() all operate on variable length data. They all take an initialization vector B which needs to be passed along into the next call of the same function for the same message. B may be initialized with anything, but the recipient needs to know what it was initialized with, or it won't be able to decrypt. Some programs and protocols simplify this, like SSH, where B is simply initialized to zero. BF_cbc_encrypt() operates on data that is a multiple of 8 bytes long, while BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt() are used to encrypt an variable number of bytes (the amount does not have to be an exact multiple of 8). The purpose of the latter two is to simulate stream ciphers, and therefore, they need the parameter B, which is a pointer to an integer where the current offset in B is stored between calls. This integer must be initialized to zero when B is initialized. BF_cbc_encrypt() is the Cipher Block Chaining function for Blowfish. It encrypts or decrypts the 64 bits chunks of B using the key B, putting the result in B. B decides if encryption (BF_ENCRYPT) or decryption (BF_DECRYPT) shall be performed. B must point at an 8 byte long initialization vector. BF_cfb64_encrypt() is the CFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback. It encrypts or decrypts the bytes in B using the key B, putting the result in B. B decides if encryption (B) or decryption (B) shall be performed. B must point at an 8 byte long initialization vector. B must point at an integer which must be initially zero. BF_ofb64_encrypt() is the OFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback. It uses the same parameters as BF_cfb64_encrypt(), which must be initialized the same way. BF_encrypt() and BF_decrypt() are the lowest level functions for Blowfish encryption. They encrypt/decrypt the first 64 bits of the vector pointed by B, using the key B. These functions should not be used unless you implement 'modes' of Blowfish. The alternative is to use BF_ecb_encrypt(). If you still want to use these functions, you should be aware that they take each 32-bit chunk in host-byte order, which is little-endian on little-endian platforms and big-endian on big-endian ones. =head1 RETURN VALUES None of the functions presented here return any value. =head1 NOTE Applications should use the higher level functions L etc. instead of calling these functions directly. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/0000755000000000000000000000000013176625661013424 5ustar rootrootopenssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod0000644000000000000000000000443613176625661017660 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get_time, SSL_SESSION_set_time, SSL_SESSION_get_timeout, SSL_SESSION_set_timeout, SSL_get_time, SSL_set_time, SSL_get_timeout, SSL_set_timeout - retrieve and manipulate session time and timeout settings =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); long SSL_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); long SSL_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_get_time() returns the time at which the session B was established. The time is given in seconds since the Epoch and therefore compatible to the time delivered by the time() call. SSL_SESSION_set_time() replaces the creation time of the session B with the chosen value B. SSL_SESSION_get_timeout() returns the timeout value set for session B in seconds. SSL_SESSION_set_timeout() sets the timeout value for session B in seconds to B. The SSL_get_time(), SSL_set_time(), SSL_get_timeout(), and SSL_set_timeout() functions are synonyms for the SSL_SESSION_*() counterparts. =head1 NOTES Sessions are expired by examining the creation time and the timeout value. Both are set at creation time of the session to the actual time and the default timeout value at creation, respectively, as set by L. Using these functions it is possible to extend or shorten the lifetime of the session. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_get_time() and SSL_SESSION_get_timeout() return the currently valid values. SSL_SESSION_set_time() and SSL_SESSION_set_timeout() return 1 on success. If any of the function is passed the NULL pointer for the session B, 0 is returned. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod0000644000000000000000000000235113176625661020703 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_default_timeout - get default session timeout value =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_default_timeout() returns the default timeout value assigned to SSL_SESSION objects negotiated for the protocol valid for B. =head1 NOTES Whenever a new session is negotiated, it is assigned a timeout value, after which it will not be accepted for session reuse. If the timeout value was not explicitly set using L, the hardcoded default timeout for the protocol will be used. SSL_get_default_timeout() return this hardcoded value, which is 300 seconds for all currently supported protocols. =head1 RETURN VALUES See description. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod0000644000000000000000000000501113176625661020617 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_peer_cert_chain, SSL_get0_verified_chain - get the X509 certificate chain of the peer =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl); STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns a pointer to STACK_OF(X509) certificates forming the certificate chain sent by the peer. If called on the client side, the stack also contains the peer's certificate; if called on the server side, the peer's certificate must be obtained separately using L. If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned. NB: SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns the peer chain as sent by the peer: it only consists of certificates the peer has sent (in the order the peer has sent them) it is B a verified chain. SSL_get0_verified_chain() returns the B certificate chain of the peer including the peer's end entity certificate. It must be called after a session has been successfully established. If peer verification was not successful (as indicated by SSL_get_verify_result() not returning X509_V_OK) the chain may be incomplete or invalid. =head1 NOTES If the session is resumed peers do not send certificates so a NULL pointer is returned by these functions. Applications can call SSL_session_reused() to determine whether a session is resumed. The reference count of each certificate in the returned STACK_OF(X509) object is not incremented and the returned stack may be invalidated by renegotiation. If applications wish to use any certificates in the returned chain indefinitely they must increase the reference counts using X509_up_ref() or obtain a copy of the whole chain with X509_chain_up_ref(). =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established or the certificate chain is no longer available when a session is reused. =item Pointer to a STACK_OF(X509) The return value points to the certificate chain presented by the peer. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod0000644000000000000000000000765613176625661016021 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_write - write bytes to a TLS/SSL connection =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_write() writes B bytes from the buffer B into the specified B connection. =head1 NOTES If necessary, SSL_write() will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if not already explicitly performed by L or L. If the peer requests a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during the SSL_write() operation. The behaviour of SSL_write() depends on the underlying BIO. For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the B must have been initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling L or SSL_set_accept_state() before the first call to an L or SSL_write() function. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_write() will only return, once the write operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a renegotiation take place, in which case a SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ may occur. This behaviour can be controlled with the SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY flag of the L call. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_write() will also return, when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_write() to continue the operation. In this case a call to L with the return value of SSL_write() will yield B or B. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a call to SSL_write() can also cause read operations! The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_write(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. SSL_write() will only return with success, when the complete contents of B of length B has been written. This default behaviour can be changed with the SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE option of L. When this flag is set, SSL_write() will also return with success, when a partial write has been successfully completed. In this case the SSL_write() operation is considered completed. The bytes are sent and a new SSL_write() operation with a new buffer (with the already sent bytes removed) must be started. A partial write is performed with the size of a message block, which is 16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1. =head1 WARNING When an SSL_write() operation has to be repeated because of B or B, it must be repeated with the same arguments. When calling SSL_write() with num=0 bytes to be sent the behaviour is undefined. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item E 0 The write operation was successful, the return value is the number of bytes actually written to the TLS/SSL connection. =item Z<><= 0 The write operation was not successful, because either the connection was closed, an error occurred or action must be taken by the calling process. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. Old documentation indicated a difference between 0 and -1, and that -1 was retryable. You should instead call SSL_get_error() to find out if it's retryable. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.pod0000644000000000000000000000231613176625661020430 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_set_verify_result - override result of peer certificate verification =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long verify_result); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_set_verify_result() sets B of the object B to be the result of the verification of the X509 certificate presented by the peer, if any. =head1 NOTES SSL_set_verify_result() overrides the verification result. It only changes the verification result of the B object. It does not become part of the established session, so if the session is to be reused later, the original value will reappear. The valid codes for B are documented in L. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_set_verify_result() does not provide a return value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod0000644000000000000000000000407513176625661022217 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback, SSL_set_psk_client_callback - set PSK client callback =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); =head1 DESCRIPTION A client application must provide a callback function which is called when the client is sending the ClientKeyExchange message to the server. The purpose of the callback function is to select the PSK identity and the pre-shared key to use during the connection setup phase. The callback is set using functions SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback() or SSL_set_psk_client_callback(). The callback function is given the connection in parameter B, a B-terminated PSK identity hint sent by the server in parameter B, a buffer B of length B bytes where the resulting B-terminated identity is to be stored, and a buffer B of length B bytes where the resulting pre-shared key is to be stored. =head1 NOTES Note that parameter B given to the callback may be B. =head1 RETURN VALUES Return values from the client callback are interpreted as follows: On success (callback found a PSK identity and a pre-shared key to use) the length (> 0) of B in bytes is returned. Otherwise or on errors callback should return 0. In this case the connection setup fails. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. Copyright 2005 Nokia. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod0000644000000000000000000000467413176625661017206 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_session, SSL_get0_session, SSL_get1_session - retrieve TLS/SSL session data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get0_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_session() returns a pointer to the B actually used in B. The reference count of the B is not incremented, so that the pointer can become invalid by other operations. SSL_get0_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(). SSL_get1_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(), but the reference count of the B is incremented by one. =head1 NOTES The ssl session contains all information required to re-establish the connection without a new handshake. SSL_get0_session() returns a pointer to the actual session. As the reference counter is not incremented, the pointer is only valid while the connection is in use. If L or L is called, the session may be removed completely (if considered bad), and the pointer obtained will become invalid. Even if the session is valid, it can be removed at any time due to timeout during L. If the data is to be kept, SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference count, so that the session will not be implicitly removed by other operations but stays in memory. In order to remove the session L must be explicitly called once to decrement the reference count again. SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created from this SSL_CTX object). =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL There is no session available in B. =item Pointer to an SSL_SESSION The return value points to the data of an SSL session. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_has_ticket.pod0000644000000000000000000000317413176625661020177 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket, SSL_SESSION_has_ticket, SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint - get details about the ticket associated with a session =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s); unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s); void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick, size_t *len); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_has_ticket() returns 1 if there is a Session Ticket associated with this session, and 0 otherwise. SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint returns the lifetime hint in seconds associated with the session ticket. SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket obtains a pointer to the ticket associated with a session. The length of the ticket is written to B<*len>. If B is non NULL then a pointer to the ticket is written to B<*tick>. The pointer is only valid while the connection is in use. The session (and hence the ticket pointer) may also become invalid as a result of a call to SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_SESSION_has_ticket, SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint and SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod0000644000000000000000000000424413176625661017403 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_set_shutdown, SSL_get_shutdown - manipulate shutdown state of an SSL connection =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_set_shutdown() sets the shutdown state of B to B. SSL_get_shutdown() returns the shutdown mode of B. =head1 NOTES The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bitmask of: =over 4 =item Z<>0 No shutdown setting, yet. =item SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN A "close notify" shutdown alert was sent to the peer, the connection is being considered closed and the session is closed and correct. =item SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN A shutdown alert was received form the peer, either a normal "close notify" or a fatal error. =back SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN and SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN can be set at the same time. The shutdown state of the connection is used to determine the state of the ssl session. If the session is still open, when L or L is called, it is considered bad and removed according to RFC2246. The actual condition for a correctly closed session is SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN (according to the TLS RFC, it is acceptable to only send the "close notify" alert but to not wait for the peer's answer, when the underlying connection is closed). SSL_set_shutdown() can be used to set this state without sending a close alert to the peer (see L). If a "close notify" was received, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN will be set, for setting SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN the application must however still call L or SSL_set_shutdown() itself. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_set_shutdown() does not return diagnostic information. SSL_get_shutdown() returns the current setting. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod0000644000000000000000000000410213176625661017204 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_set_session - set a TLS/SSL session to be used during TLS/SSL connect =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_set_session() sets B to be used when the TLS/SSL connection is to be established. SSL_set_session() is only useful for TLS/SSL clients. When the session is set, the reference count of B is incremented by 1. If the session is not reused, the reference count is decremented again during SSL_connect(). Whether the session was reused can be queried with the L call. If there is already a session set inside B (because it was set with SSL_set_session() before or because the same B was already used for a connection), SSL_SESSION_free() will be called for that session. If that old session is still B, it is considered bad and will be removed from the session cache (if used). A session is considered open, if L was not called for the connection (or at least L was used to set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN state). =head1 NOTES SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created from this SSL_CTX object). =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The operation failed; check the error stack to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.pod0000644000000000000000000000304413176625661020471 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_load_client_CA_file - load certificate names from file =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_load_client_CA_file() reads certificates from B and returns a STACK_OF(X509_NAME) with the subject names found. =head1 NOTES SSL_load_client_CA_file() reads a file of PEM formatted certificates and extracts the X509_NAMES of the certificates found. While the name suggests the specific usage as support function for L, it is not limited to CA certificates. =head1 EXAMPLES Load names of CAs from file and use it as a client CA list: SSL_CTX *ctx; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cert_names; ... cert_names = SSL_load_client_CA_file("/path/to/CAfile.pem"); if (cert_names != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, cert_names); else error_handling(); ... =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL The operation failed, check out the error stack for the reason. =item Pointer to STACK_OF(X509_NAME) Pointer to the subject names of the successfully read certificates. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod0000644000000000000000000000230313176625661016077 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_fd, SSL_get_rfd, SSL_get_wfd - get file descriptor linked to an SSL object =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_fd() returns the file descriptor which is linked to B. SSL_get_rfd() and SSL_get_wfd() return the file descriptors for the read or the write channel, which can be different. If the read and the write channel are different, SSL_get_fd() will return the file descriptor of the read channel. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item -1 The operation failed, because the underlying BIO is not of the correct type (suitable for file descriptors). =item E=0 The file descriptor linked to B. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L , L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod0000644000000000000000000000410613176625661017731 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_timeout, SSL_CTX_get_timeout - manipulate timeout values for session caching =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_timeout() sets the timeout for newly created sessions for B to B. The timeout value B must be given in seconds. SSL_CTX_get_timeout() returns the currently set timeout value for B. =head1 NOTES Whenever a new session is created, it is assigned a maximum lifetime. This lifetime is specified by storing the creation time of the session and the timeout value valid at this time. If the actual time is later than creation time plus timeout, the session is not reused. Due to this realization, all sessions behave according to the timeout value valid at the time of the session negotiation. Changes of the timeout value do not affect already established sessions. The expiration time of a single session can be modified using the L family of functions. Expired sessions are removed from the internal session cache, whenever L is called, either directly by the application or automatically (see L) The default value for session timeout is decided on a per protocol basis, see L. All currently supported protocols have the same default timeout value of 300 seconds. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_timeout() returns the previously set timeout value. SSL_CTX_get_timeout() returns the currently set timeout value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod0000644000000000000000000001314613176625661021752 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations, SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths, SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir, SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file - set default locations for trusted CA certificates =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath); int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() specifies the locations for B, at which CA certificates for verification purposes are located. The certificates available via B and B are trusted. SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() specifies that the default locations from which CA certificates are loaded should be used. There is one default directory and one default file. The default CA certificates directory is called "certs" in the default OpenSSL directory. Alternatively the SSL_CERT_DIR environment variable can be defined to override this location. The default CA certificates file is called "cert.pem" in the default OpenSSL directory. Alternatively the SSL_CERT_FILE environment variable can be defined to override this location. SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir() is similar to SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() except that just the default directory is used. SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file() is similar to SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() except that just the default file is used. =head1 NOTES If B is not NULL, it points to a file of CA certificates in PEM format. The file can contain several CA certificates identified by -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ... (CA certificate in base64 encoding) ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- sequences. Before, between, and after the certificates text is allowed which can be used e.g. for descriptions of the certificates. The B is processed on execution of the SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() function. If B is not NULL, it points to a directory containing CA certificates in PEM format. The files each contain one CA certificate. The files are looked up by the CA subject name hash value, which must hence be available. If more than one CA certificate with the same name hash value exist, the extension must be different (e.g. 9d66eef0.0, 9d66eef0.1 etc). The search is performed in the ordering of the extension number, regardless of other properties of the certificates. Use the B utility to create the necessary links. The certificates in B are only looked up when required, e.g. when building the certificate chain or when actually performing the verification of a peer certificate. When looking up CA certificates, the OpenSSL library will first search the certificates in B, then those in B. Certificate matching is done based on the subject name, the key identifier (if present), and the serial number as taken from the certificate to be verified. If these data do not match, the next certificate will be tried. If a first certificate matching the parameters is found, the verification process will be performed; no other certificates for the same parameters will be searched in case of failure. In server mode, when requesting a client certificate, the server must send the list of CAs of which it will accept client certificates. This list is not influenced by the contents of B or B and must explicitly be set using the L family of functions. When building its own certificate chain, an OpenSSL client/server will try to fill in missing certificates from B/B, if the certificate chain was not explicitly specified (see L, L. =head1 WARNINGS If several CA certificates matching the name, key identifier, and serial number condition are available, only the first one will be examined. This may lead to unexpected results if the same CA certificate is available with different expiration dates. If a "certificate expired" verification error occurs, no other certificate will be searched. Make sure to not have expired certificates mixed with valid ones. =head1 EXAMPLES Generate a CA certificate file with descriptive text from the CA certificates ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem: #!/bin/sh rm CAfile.pem for i in ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem ; do openssl x509 -in $i -text >> CAfile.pem done Prepare the directory /some/where/certs containing several CA certificates for use as B: cd /some/where/certs c_rehash . =head1 RETURN VALUES For SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations the following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The operation failed because B and B are NULL or the processing at one of the locations specified failed. Check the error stack to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(), SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir() and SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file() all return 1 on success or 0 on failure. A missing default location is still treated as a success. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod0000644000000000000000000000676713176625661020664 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback, SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg, SSL_set_msg_callback, SSL_set_msg_callback_arg - install callback for observing protocol messages =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback() or SSL_set_msg_callback() can be used to define a message callback function I for observing all SSL/TLS protocol messages (such as handshake messages) that are received or sent. SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() and SSL_set_msg_callback_arg() can be used to set argument I to the callback function, which is available for arbitrary application use. SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback() and SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() specify default settings that will be copied to new B objects by L. SSL_set_msg_callback() and SSL_set_msg_callback_arg() modify the actual settings of an B object. Using a B<0> pointer for I disables the message callback. When I is called by the SSL/TLS library for a protocol message, the function arguments have the following meaning: =over 4 =item I This flag is B<0> when a protocol message has been received and B<1> when a protocol message has been sent. =item I The protocol version according to which the protocol message is interpreted by the library. Currently, this is one of B, B and B (for SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, respectively). =item I In the case of SSL 2.0, this is always B<0>. In the case of SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0, this is one of the B values defined in the protocol specification (B, B, B; but never B because the callback will only be called for protocol messages). =item I, I I points to a buffer containing the protocol message, which consists of I bytes. The buffer is no longer valid after the callback function has returned. =item I The B object that received or sent the message. =item I The user-defined argument optionally defined by SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() or SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(). =back =head1 NOTES Protocol messages are passed to the callback function after decryption and fragment collection where applicable. (Thus record boundaries are not visible.) If processing a received protocol message results in an error, the callback function may not be called. For example, the callback function will never see messages that are considered too large to be processed. Due to automatic protocol version negotiation, I is not necessarily the protocol version used by the sender of the message: If a TLS 1.0 ClientHello message is received by an SSL 3.0-only server, I will be B. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod0000644000000000000000000000501613176625661016112 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_accept - wait for a TLS/SSL client to initiate a TLS/SSL handshake =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_accept() waits for a TLS/SSL client to initiate the TLS/SSL handshake. The communication channel must already have been set and assigned to the B by setting an underlying B. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of SSL_accept() depends on the underlying BIO. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_accept() will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_accept() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_accept() to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_accept() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_accept(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been established. =item E0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod0000644000000000000000000000640713176625661020476 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_shared_sigalgs, SSL_get_sigalgs - get supported signature algorithms =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash); int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() returns information about the shared signature algorithms supported by peer B. The parameter B indicates the index of the shared signature algorithm to return starting from zero. The signature algorithm NID is written to B<*psign>, the hash NID to B<*phash> and the sign and hash NID to B<*psignhash>. The raw signature and hash values are written to B<*rsig> and B<*rhash>. SSL_get_sigalgs() is similar to SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() except it returns information about all signature algorithms supported by B in the order they were sent by the peer. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() and SSL_get_sigalgs() return the number of signature algorithms or B<0> if the B parameter is out of range. =head1 NOTES These functions are typically called for debugging purposes (to report the peer's preferences) or where an application wants finer control over certificate selection. Most applications will rely on internal handling and will not need to call them. If an application is only interested in the highest preference shared signature algorithm it can just set B to zero. Any or all of the parameters B, B, B, B or B can be set to B if the value is not required. By setting them all to B and setting B to zero the total number of signature algorithms can be determined: which can be zero. These functions must be called after the peer has sent a list of supported signature algorithms: after a client hello (for servers) or a certificate request (for clients). They can (for example) be called in the certificate callback. Only TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 currently support signature algorithms. If these functions are called on an earlier version of TLS or DTLS zero is returned. The shared signature algorithms returned by SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() are ordered according to configuration and peer preferences. The raw values correspond to the on the wire form as defined by RFC5246 et al. The NIDs are OpenSSL equivalents. For example if the peer sent sha256(4) and rsa(1) then B<*rhash> would be 4, B<*rsign> 1, B<*phash> NID_sha256, B<*psig> NID_rsaEncryption and B<*psighash> NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption. If a signature algorithm is not recognised the corresponding NIDs will be set to B. This may be because the value is not supported or is not an appropriate combination (for example MD5 and DSA). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod0000644000000000000000000001005613176625661020524 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb - provide callback functions for server side external session caching =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb)(SSL *, SSL_SESSION *)); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *)); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION (*get_session_cb)(SSL *, const unsigned char *, int, int *)); int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb() sets the callback function, which is automatically called whenever a new session was negotiated. SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb() sets the callback function, which is automatically called whenever a session is removed by the SSL engine, because it is considered faulty or the session has become obsolete because of exceeding the timeout value. SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb() sets the callback function which is called, whenever a SSL/TLS client proposed to resume a session but the session could not be found in the internal session cache (see L). (SSL/TLS server only.) SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(), SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(), and SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb() allow to retrieve the function pointers of the provided callback functions. If a callback function has not been set, the NULL pointer is returned. =head1 NOTES In order to allow external session caching, synchronization with the internal session cache is realized via callback functions. Inside these callback functions, session can be saved to disk or put into a database using the L interface. The new_session_cb() is called, whenever a new session has been negotiated and session caching is enabled (see L). The new_session_cb() is passed the B connection and the ssl session B. If the callback returns B<0>, the session will be immediately removed again. The remove_session_cb() is called, whenever the SSL engine removes a session from the internal cache. This happens when the session is removed because it is expired or when a connection was not shutdown cleanly. It also happens for all sessions in the internal session cache when L is called. The remove_session_cb() is passed the B and the ssl session B. It does not provide any feedback. The get_session_cb() is only called on SSL/TLS servers with the session id proposed by the client. The get_session_cb() is always called, also when session caching was disabled. The get_session_cb() is passed the B connection, the session id of length B at the memory location B. With the parameter B the callback can require the SSL engine to increment the reference count of the SSL_SESSION object, Normally the reference count is not incremented and therefore the session must not be explicitly freed with L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod0000644000000000000000000000524613176625661017004 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_new, SSL_SESSION_up_ref, SSL_SESSION_free - create, free and manage SSL_SESSION structures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void); int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ses); void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_new() creates a new SSL_SESSION structure and returns a pointer to it. SSL_SESSION_up_ref() increments the reference count on the given SSL_SESSION structure. SSL_SESSION_free() decrements the reference count of B and removes the B structure pointed to by B and frees up the allocated memory, if the reference count has reached 0. If B is NULL nothing is done. =head1 NOTES SSL_SESSION objects are allocated, when a TLS/SSL handshake operation is successfully completed. Depending on the settings, see L, the SSL_SESSION objects are internally referenced by the SSL_CTX and linked into its session cache. SSL objects may be using the SSL_SESSION object; as a session may be reused, several SSL objects may be using one SSL_SESSION object at the same time. It is therefore crucial to keep the reference count (usage information) correct and not delete a SSL_SESSION object that is still used, as this may lead to program failures due to dangling pointers. These failures may also appear delayed, e.g. when an SSL_SESSION object was completely freed as the reference count incorrectly became 0, but it is still referenced in the internal session cache and the cache list is processed during a L operation. SSL_SESSION_free() must only be called for SSL_SESSION objects, for which the reference count was explicitly incremented (e.g. by calling SSL_get1_session(), see L) or when the SSL_SESSION object was generated outside a TLS handshake operation, e.g. by using L. It must not be called on other SSL_SESSION objects, as this would cause incorrect reference counts and therefore program failures. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_new returns a pointer to the newly allocated SSL_SESSION structure or NULL on error. SSL_SESSION_up_ref returns 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod0000644000000000000000000002625013176625661017553 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, SSL_verify_cb - set peer certificate verification parameters =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback); void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback); SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth); void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth); typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B to be B and specifies the B function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B. SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B to be B and specifies the B function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B. In this case last B set specifically for this B remains. If no special B was set before, the default callback for the underlying B is used, that was valid at the time B was created with L. Within the callback function, B can be called to get the data index of the current SSL object that is doing the verification. SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for B. SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for B. =head1 NOTES The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically or'ed B flags: =over 4 =item SSL_VERIFY_NONE B the server will not send a client certificate request to the client, so the client will not send a certificate. B if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the certificate verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake using the L function. The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result. =item SSL_VERIFY_PEER B the server sends a client certificate request to the client. The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. The behaviour can be controlled by the additional SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT and SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE flags. B the server certificate is verified. If the verification process fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an anonymous cipher is used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored. =item SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT B if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with a "handshake failure" alert. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. B ignored =item SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE B only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a renegotiation. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. B ignored =back If the B is SSL_VERIFY_NONE none of the other flags may be set. The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in verification procedure or using another application provided verification function set with L. The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information and the verify_callback() function, but the way this information is used may be different. SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set a limit on the number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates. Neither the end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against B. If the certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than B, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued. The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA certificate", "level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the trust-anchor). The default depth limit is 100, allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate CA certificates and a final trust anchor certificate. The B function is used to control the behaviour when the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and receives two arguments: B indicates, whether the verification of the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not (preverify_ok=0). B is a pointer to the complete context used for the certificate chain verification. The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level (the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate. At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever a verification error is found, the error number is stored in B and B is called with B=0. By applying X509_CTX_store_* functions B can locate the certificate in question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES). If no error is found for a certificate, B is called with B=1 before advancing to the next level. The return value of B controls the strategy of the further verification process. If B returns 0, the verification process is immediately stopped with "verification failed" state. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If B returns 1, the verification process is continued. If B always returns 1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using L or by maintaining its own error storage managed by B. If no B is specified, the default callback will be used. Its return value is identical to B, so that any verification failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set. =head1 BUGS In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set, but whether any flags are set. This can lead to unexpected behaviour if SSL_VERIFY_PEER and other flags are not used as required. =head1 RETURN VALUES The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information. =head1 EXAMPLES The following code sequence realizes an example B function that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with more informational output. All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain is printed on request. The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client certificates. The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data into/retrieve application data from the SSL structure (see L, L). ... typedef struct { int verbose_mode; int verify_depth; int always_continue; } mydata_t; int mydata_index; ... static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { char buf[256]; X509 *err_cert; int err, depth; SSL *ssl; mydata_t *mydata; err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); /* * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object. */ ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index); X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256); /* * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition. * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the * additional certificates would be logged. */ if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) { preverify_ok = 0; err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err); } if (!preverify_ok) { printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf); } else if (mydata->verbose_mode) { printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf); } /* * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use * it for something special */ if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) { X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256); printf("issuer= %s\n", buf); } if (mydata->always_continue) return 1; else return preverify_ok; } ... mydata_t mydata; ... mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL); ... SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, verify_callback); /* * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get * an appropriate error in the logfile. */ SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1); /* * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL * structure. */ mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ... SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata); ... SSL_accept(ssl); /* check of success left out for clarity */ if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) { if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) { /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */ } } =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod0000644000000000000000000000627513176625661021130 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list, SSL_set_client_CA_list, SSL_CTX_add_client_CA, SSL_add_client_CA - set list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list); void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list); int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cacert); int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *cacert); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() sets the B of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for B. SSL_set_client_CA_list() sets the B of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for the chosen B, overriding the setting valid for B's SSL_CTX object. SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() adds the CA name extracted from B to the list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for B. SSL_add_client_CA() adds the CA name extracted from B to the list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for the chosen B, overriding the setting valid for B's SSL_CTX object. =head1 NOTES When a TLS/SSL server requests a client certificate (see B), it sends a list of CAs, for which it will accept certificates, to the client. This list must explicitly be set using SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() for B and SSL_set_client_CA_list() for the specific B. The list specified overrides the previous setting. The CAs listed do not become trusted (B only contains the names, not the complete certificates); use L to additionally load them for verification. If the list of acceptable CAs is compiled in a file, the L function can be used to help importing the necessary data. SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() can be used to add additional items the list of client CAs. If no list was specified before using SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() or SSL_set_client_CA_list(), a new client CA list for B or B (as appropriate) is opened. These functions are only useful for TLS/SSL servers. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() and SSL_set_client_CA_list() do not return diagnostic information. SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() have the following return values: =over 4 =item Z<>0 A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B. Check the error stack to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back =head1 EXAMPLES Scan all certificates in B and list them as acceptable CAs: SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod0000644000000000000000000000306713176625661017365 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_state_string, SSL_state_string_long - get textual description of state of an SSL object =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl); const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_state_string() returns a 6 letter string indicating the current state of the SSL object B. SSL_state_string_long() returns a string indicating the current state of the SSL object B. =head1 NOTES During its use, an SSL objects passes several states. The state is internally maintained. Querying the state information is not very informative before or when a connection has been established. It however can be of significant interest during the handshake. When using non-blocking sockets, the function call performing the handshake may return with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE condition, so that SSL_state_string[_long]() may be called. For both blocking or non-blocking sockets, the details state information can be used within the info_callback function set with the SSL_set_info_callback() call. =head1 RETURN VALUES Detailed description of possible states to be included later. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod0000644000000000000000000001172513176625661016532 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_shutdown - shut down a TLS/SSL connection =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_shutdown() shuts down an active TLS/SSL connection. It sends the "close notify" shutdown alert to the peer. =head1 NOTES SSL_shutdown() tries to send the "close notify" shutdown alert to the peer. Whether the operation succeeds or not, the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag is set and a currently open session is considered closed and good and will be kept in the session cache for further reuse. The shutdown procedure consists of 2 steps: the sending of the "close notify" shutdown alert and the reception of the peer's "close notify" shutdown alert. According to the TLS standard, it is acceptable for an application to only send its shutdown alert and then close the underlying connection without waiting for the peer's response (this way resources can be saved, as the process can already terminate or serve another connection). When the underlying connection shall be used for more communications, the complete shutdown procedure (bidirectional "close notify" alerts) must be performed, so that the peers stay synchronized. SSL_shutdown() supports both uni- and bidirectional shutdown by its 2 step behaviour. =over 4 =item When the application is the first party to send the "close notify" alert, SSL_shutdown() will only send the alert and then set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag (so that the session is considered good and will be kept in cache). SSL_shutdown() will then return with 0. If a unidirectional shutdown is enough (the underlying connection shall be closed anyway), this first call to SSL_shutdown() is sufficient. In order to complete the bidirectional shutdown handshake, SSL_shutdown() must be called again. The second call will make SSL_shutdown() wait for the peer's "close notify" shutdown alert. On success, the second call to SSL_shutdown() will return with 1. =item If the peer already sent the "close notify" alert B it was already processed implicitly inside another function (L), the SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN flag is set. SSL_shutdown() will send the "close notify" alert, set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag and will immediately return with 1. Whether SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN is already set can be checked using the SSL_get_shutdown() (see also L call. =back It is therefore recommended, to check the return value of SSL_shutdown() and call SSL_shutdown() again, if the bidirectional shutdown is not yet complete (return value of the first call is 0). The behaviour of SSL_shutdown() additionally depends on the underlying BIO. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_shutdown() will only return once the handshake step has been finished or an error occurred. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_shutdown() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown() to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_shutdown() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. SSL_shutdown() can be modified to only set the connection to "shutdown" state but not actually send the "close notify" alert messages, see L. When "quiet shutdown" is enabled, SSL_shutdown() will always succeed and return 1. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time, if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed. The output of L may be misleading, as an erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred. =item Z<>1 The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent and the peer's "close notify" alert was received. =item E0 The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. It can also occur if action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. Call L with the return value B to find out the reason. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod0000644000000000000000000001156413176625661021340 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_set_tmp_dh - handle DH keys for ephemeral key exchange =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh); void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ctx, DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh) =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback function for B to be used when a DH parameters are required to B. The callback is inherited by all B objects created from B. SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() sets DH parameters to be used to be B. The key is inherited by all B objects created from B. SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback only for B. SSL_set_tmp_dh() sets the parameters only for B. These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only. =head1 NOTES When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral DH key exchange can take place. Ciphers with DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys as well. In these cases, the session data are negotiated using the ephemeral/temporary DH key and the key supplied and certified by the certificate chain is only used for signing. Anonymous ciphers (without a permanent server key) also use ephemeral DH keys. Using ephemeral DH key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection can only be decrypted, when the DH key is known. By generating a temporary DH key inside the server application that is lost when the application is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions, even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was only used for signing. In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group (DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation. As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters. DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the openssl L application. This application guarantees that "strong" primes are used. Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters, which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly. These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the L application. Generation of custom DH parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. File dh1024.pem contains old parameters that must not be used by applications. An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. Previous versions of the callback used B and B parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() or alternatively, use the callback but ignore B and B and simply supply at least 2048-bit parameters in the callback. =head1 EXAMPLES Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling partly left out.) Command-line parameter generation: $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048 Code for setting up parameters during server initialization: ... SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new(); ... /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */ DH *dh_2048 = NULL; FILE *paramfile; paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r"); if (paramfile) { dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); fclose(paramfile); } else { /* Error. */ } if (dh_2048 == NULL) { /* Error. */ } if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) { /* Error. */ } ... =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() do not return diagnostic output. SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_set_tmp_dh() do return 1 on success and 0 on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/ssl.pod0000644000000000000000000006254213176625661014742 0ustar rootroot=pod =for comment openssl_manual_section:7 =head1 NAME ssl - OpenSSL SSL/TLS library =head1 SYNOPSIS See the individual manual pages for details. =head1 DESCRIPTION The OpenSSL B library implements the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols. It provides a rich API which is documented here. Then an B object is created as a framework to establish TLS/SSL enabled connections (see L). Various options regarding certificates, algorithms etc. can be set in this object. When a network connection has been created, it can be assigned to an B object. After the B object has been created using L, L or L can be used to associate the network connection with the object. Then the TLS/SSL handshake is performed using L or L respectively. L and L are used to read and write data on the TLS/SSL connection. L can be used to shut down the TLS/SSL connection. =head1 DATA STRUCTURES Currently the OpenSSL B library functions deals with the following data structures: =over 4 =item B (SSL Method) That's a dispatch structure describing the internal B library methods/functions which implement the various protocol versions (SSLv3 TLSv1, ...). It's needed to create an B. =item B (SSL Cipher) This structure holds the algorithm information for a particular cipher which are a core part of the SSL/TLS protocol. The available ciphers are configured on a B basis and the actually used ones are then part of the B. =item B (SSL Context) That's the global context structure which is created by a server or client once per program life-time and which holds mainly default values for the B structures which are later created for the connections. =item B (SSL Session) This is a structure containing the current TLS/SSL session details for a connection: Bs, client and server certificates, keys, etc. =item B (SSL Connection) That's the main SSL/TLS structure which is created by a server or client per established connection. This actually is the core structure in the SSL API. Under run-time the application usually deals with this structure which has links to mostly all other structures. =back =head1 HEADER FILES Currently the OpenSSL B library provides the following C header files containing the prototypes for the data structures and functions: =over 4 =item B That's the common header file for the SSL/TLS API. Include it into your program to make the API of the B library available. It internally includes both more private SSL headers and headers from the B library. Whenever you need hard-core details on the internals of the SSL API, look inside this header file. =item B Unused. Present for backwards compatibility only. =item B That's the sub header file dealing with the SSLv3 protocol only. I. =item B That's the sub header file dealing with the TLSv1 protocol only. I. =back =head1 API FUNCTIONS Currently the OpenSSL B library exports 214 API functions. They are documented in the following: =head2 Dealing with Protocol Methods Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS protocol methods defined in B structures. =over 4 =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the I SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. See L for details. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the I SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the I SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers or both. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients. =item const SSL_METHOD *B(void); Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for servers. =back =head2 Dealing with Ciphers Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS ciphers defined in B structures. =over 4 =item char *B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len); Write a string to I (with a maximum size of I) containing a human readable description of I. Returns I. =item int B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *alg_bits); Determine the number of bits in I. Because of export crippled ciphers there are two bits: The bits the algorithm supports in general (stored to I) and the bits which are actually used (the return value). =item const char *B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher); Return the internal name of I as a string. These are the various strings defined by the I and I definitions in the header files. =item const char *B(SSL_CIPHER *cipher); Returns a string like "C" or "C" which indicates the SSL/TLS protocol version to which I belongs (i.e. where it was defined in the specification the first time). =back =head2 Dealing with Protocol Contexts Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS protocol context defined in the B structure. =over 4 =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); =item int B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, char *parg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *s, long t); =item void B(SSL_CTX *a); =item char *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item X509_STORE *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item STACK *B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item STACK *B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item char *B(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx); =item int B(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) =item void (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret); =item int B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item long B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int (*B(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath); =item SSL_CTX *B(const SSL_METHOD *meth); =item int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item SSL_SESSION *(*B(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); =item int (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); =item void (*B(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, t); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item LHASH *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *cs); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(), char *arg) =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *str); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK *list); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb);(void)) =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx); Use the default paths to locate trusted CA certificates. There is one default directory path and one default file path. Both are set via this call. =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx) Use the default directory path to locate trusted CA certificates. =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx) Use the file path to locate trusted CA certificates. =item int B(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, char *arg); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); =item unsigned long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op); =item unsigned long B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item unsigned long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); =item long B(SSL_CTX* ctx, DH *dh); =item long B(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*cb)(void)); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb);(void)) =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); =item int B(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); =item X509 *B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item EVP_PKEY *B(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); =item int B(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *hint); =item void B(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len)); =back =head2 Dealing with Sessions Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS sessions defined in the B structures. =over 4 =item int B(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b); =item void B(SSL_SESSION *ss); =item char *B(SSL_SESSION *s); =item char *B(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx); =item int B(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) =item long B(const SSL_SESSION *s); =item long B(const SSL_SESSION *s); =item unsigned long B(const SSL_SESSION *a); =item SSL_SESSION *B(void); =item int B(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x); =item int B(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x); =item int B(SSL_SESSION *s, char *a); =item int B(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, char *arg); =item long B(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); =item long B(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); =back =head2 Dealing with Connections Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS connection defined in the B structure. =over 4 =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(STACK *stack, const char *dir); =item int B(STACK *stack, const char *file); =item int B(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); =item char *B(int value); =item char *B(int value); =item char *B(int value); =item char *B(int value); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *t, const SSL *f); Sets the session details for B to be the same as in B. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. =item long B(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, char *parg); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item SSL *B(SSL *ssl); SSL_dup() allows applications to configure an SSL handle for use in multiple SSL connections, and then duplicate it prior to initiating each connection with the duplicated handle. Use of SSL_dup() avoids the need to repeat the configuration of the handles for each connection. For SSL_dup() to work, the connection MUST be in its initial state and MUST NOT have not yet have started the SSL handshake. For connections that are not in their initial state SSL_dup() just increments an internal reference count and returns the I handle. It may be possible to use L to recycle an SSL handle that is not in its initial state for re-use, but this is best avoided. Instead, save and restore the session, if desired, and construct a fresh handle for each connection. =item STACK *B(STACK *sk); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item SSL_CTX *B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(SSL *ssl); =item X509 *B(const SSL *ssl); =item const char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl, int *alg_bits); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl, int n); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item STACK *B(const SSL *ssl); =item STACK *B(const SSL *ssl); =item SSL_CIPHER *B(SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl, int i); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl, int idx); =item int B(void); =item int B(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item void (*B(const SSL *ssl);)() =item int B(SSL *s); =item STACK *B(const SSL *ssl); =item X509 *B(const SSL *ssl); =item const STACK_OF(SCT) *B(SSL *s); =item EVP_PKEY *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item BIO *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item SSL_SESSION *B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item const SSL_METHOD *B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item int (*B(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item BIO *B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *s, int updatetype); =item STACK *B(const char *file); =item SSL *B(SSL_CTX *ctx); =item int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item char *B(SSL *ssl); =item char *B(SSL *ssl); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item void B(SSL *ssl, char *arg); =item void B(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); =item int B(SSL *ssl, char *str); =item void B(SSL *ssl, STACK *list); =item void B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int idx, char *arg); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int fd); =item void B(SSL *ssl, void (*cb);(void)) =item void B(SSL *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); =item void B(SSL *ctx, void *arg); =item unsigned long B(SSL *ssl, unsigned long op); =item unsigned long B(SSL *ssl); =item unsigned long B(SSL *ssl, unsigned long op); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int mode); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int yes); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int fd); =item int B(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int mode); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *meth); =item void B(SSL *ssl, long t); =item void B(SSL *ssl, long t); =item void B(SSL *ssl, int mode, int (*callback);(void)) =item void B(SSL *ssl, long arg); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int fd); =item int B(SSL *ssl); =item OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE B(const SSL *ssl); Returns the current handshake state. =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item char *B(const SSL *ssl); =item long B(SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); =item int B(int type, SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); =item int B(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); =item int B(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); =item int B(SSL *ssl, int len, unsigned char *d); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(const SSL *ssl); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); =item void B(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)); =item int B(SSL *ssl, const char *hint); =item void B(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len)); =item const char *B(SSL *ssl); =item const char *B(SSL *ssl); =back =head1 RETURN VALUES See the individual manual pages for details. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY B, B and B where removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The return type of B was changed from void to int in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_set1_id.pod0000644000000000000000000000257713176625661017417 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get_id, SSL_SESSION_set1_id - get and set the SSL session ID =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid, unsigned int sid_len); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_get_id() returns a pointer to the internal session id value for the session B. The length of the id in bytes is stored in B<*len>. The length may be 0. The caller should not free the returned pointer directly. SSL_SESSION_set1_id() sets the the session ID for the B SSL/TLS session to B of length B. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_get_id() returns a pointer to the session id value. SSL_SESSION_set1_id() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure, for example if the supplied session ID length exceeds B. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY SSL_SESSION_set1_id() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data.pod0000644000000000000000000000250613176625661020323 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data, SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data - get and set application specific data on a session =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data); void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data() enables an application to store arbitrary application specific data B in an SSL_SESSION structure B. The index B should be a value previously returned from a call to L. SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data() retrieves application specific data previously stored in an SSL_SESSION structure B. The B value should be the same as that used when originally storing the data. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data() returns the previously stored value or NULL on failure. NULL may also be a valid value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file.pod0000644000000000000000000000305213176625661021404 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file, SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file - load a Certificate Transparency log list from a file =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file() loads a list of Certificate Transparency (CT) logs from the default file location, "ct_log_list.cnf", found in the directory where OpenSSL is installed. SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file() loads a list of CT logs from a specific path. See L for the file format. =head1 NOTES These functions will not clear the existing CT log list - it will be appended to. To replace the existing list, use L first. If an error occurs whilst parsing a particular log entry in the file, that log entry will be skipped. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file() and SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file() return 1 if the log list is successfully loaded, and 0 if an error occurs. In the case of an error, the log list may have been partially loaded. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx.pod0000644000000000000000000000300213176625660020520 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx, SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl - set context to configure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx() sets the context associated with B to the B structure B. Any previous B or B associated with B is cleared. Subsequent calls to SSL_CONF_cmd() will be sent to B. SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl() sets the context associated with B to the B structure B. Any previous B or B associated with B is cleared. Subsequent calls to SSL_CONF_cmd() will be sent to B. =head1 NOTES The context need not be set or it can be set to B in which case only syntax checking of commands is performed, where possible. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx() and SSL_CTX_set_ssl() do not return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_set1_host.pod0000644000000000000000000001072413176625661016566 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_set1_host, SSL_add1_host, SSL_set_hostflags, SSL_get0_peername - SSL server verification parameters =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname); int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname); void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags); const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions configure server hostname checks in the SSL client. SSL_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to B clearing any previously specified host name or names. If B is NULL, or the empty string the list of hostnames is cleared, and name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. When a non-empty B is specified, certificate verification automatically checks the peer hostname via L with B as specified via SSL_set_hostflags(). Clients that enable DANE TLSA authentication via L should leave it to that function to set the primary reference identifier of the peer, and should not call SSL_set1_host(). SSL_add1_host() adds B as an additional reference identifier that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names set via SSL_set1_host() or SSL_add1_host() are retained, no change is made if B is NULL or empty. When multiple names are configured, the peer is considered verified when any name matches. This function is required for DANE TLSA in the presence of service name indirection via CNAME, MX or SRV records as specified in RFC7671, RFC7672 or RFC7673. SSL_set_hostflags() sets the B that will be passed to L when name checks are applicable, by default the B value is 0. See L for the list of available flags and their meaning. SSL_get0_peername() returns the DNS hostname or subject CommonName from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference identifiers. When wildcard matching is not disabled, the name matched in the peer certificate may be a wildcard name. When one of the reference identifiers configured via SSL_set1_host() or SSL_add1_host() starts with ".", which indicates a parent domain prefix rather than a fixed name, the matched peer name may be a sub-domain of the reference identifier. The returned string is allocated by the library and is no longer valid once the associated B handle is cleared or freed, or a renegotiation takes place. Applications must not free the return value. SSL clients are advised to use these functions in preference to explicitly calling L. Hostname checks are out of scope with the RFC7671 DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will be suppressed as appropriate when DANE is enabled. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_set1_host() and SSL_add1_host() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. SSL_get0_peername() returns NULL if peername verification is not applicable (as with RFC7671 DANE-EE(3)), or no trusted peername was matched. Otherwise, it returns the matched peername. To determine whether verification succeeded call L. =head1 EXAMPLE Suppose "smtp.example.com" is the MX host of the domain "example.com". The calls below will arrange to match either the MX hostname or the destination domain name in the SMTP server certificate. Wildcards are supported, but must match the entire label. The actual name matched in the certificate (which might be a wildcard) is retrieved, and must be copied by the application if it is to be retained beyond the lifetime of the SSL connection. SSL_set_hostflags(ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS); if (!SSL_set1_host(ssl, "smtp.example.com")) { /* handle error */ } if (!SSL_add1_host(ssl, "example.com")) { /* handle error */ } /* XXX: Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */ if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) { const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl); if (peername != NULL) { /* Name checks were in scope and matched the peername */ } } =head1 SEE ALSO L, L. L. =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_print.pod0000644000000000000000000000221413176625661017207 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_print, SSL_SESSION_print_fp, SSL_SESSION_print_keylog - printf information about a session =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses); int SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_print() prints summary information about the session provided in B to the BIO B. SSL_SESSION_print_fp() does the same as SSL_SESSION_print() except it prints it to the FILE B. SSL_SESSION_print_keylog() prints session information to the provided BIO in NSS keylog format. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_print(), SSL_SESSION_print_fp() and SSL_SESSION_print_keylog return 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod0000644000000000000000000000503013176625661017257 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_do_handshake - perform a TLS/SSL handshake =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_do_handshake() will wait for a SSL/TLS handshake to take place. If the connection is in client mode, the handshake will be started. The handshake routines may have to be explicitly set in advance using either L or L. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of SSL_do_handshake() depends on the underlying BIO. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_do_handshake() will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_do_handshake() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake() to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_do_handshake() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been established. =item E0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.pod0000644000000000000000000001071313176625661021203 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb, SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb - handle client certificate callback function =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() sets the client_cert_cb() callback, that is called when a client certificate is requested by a server and no certificate was yet set for the SSL object. When client_cert_cb() is NULL, no callback function is used. SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb() returns a pointer to the currently set callback function. client_cert_cb() is the application defined callback. If it wants to set a certificate, a certificate/private key combination must be set using the B and B arguments and "1" must be returned. The certificate will be installed into B, see the NOTES and BUGS sections. If no certificate should be set, "0" has to be returned and no certificate will be sent. A negative return value will suspend the handshake and the handshake function will return immediately. L will return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP to indicate, that the handshake was suspended. The next call to the handshake function will again lead to the call of client_cert_cb(). It is the job of the client_cert_cb() to store information about the state of the last call, if required to continue. =head1 NOTES During a handshake (or renegotiation) a server may request a certificate from the client. A client certificate must only be sent, when the server did send the request. When a certificate was set using the L family of functions, it will be sent to the server. The TLS standard requires that only a certificate is sent, if it matches the list of acceptable CAs sent by the server. This constraint is violated by the default behavior of the OpenSSL library. Using the callback function it is possible to implement a proper selection routine or to allow a user interaction to choose the certificate to be sent. If a callback function is defined and no certificate was yet defined for the SSL object, the callback function will be called. If the callback function returns a certificate, the OpenSSL library will try to load the private key and certificate data into the SSL object using the SSL_use_certificate() and SSL_use_private_key() functions. Thus it will permanently install the certificate and key for this SSL object. It will not be reset by calling L. If the callback returns no certificate, the OpenSSL library will not send a certificate. =head1 BUGS The client_cert_cb() cannot return a complete certificate chain, it can only return one client certificate. If the chain only has a length of 2, the root CA certificate may be omitted according to the TLS standard and thus a standard conforming answer can be sent to the server. For a longer chain, the client must send the complete chain (with the option to leave out the root CA certificate). This can only be accomplished by either adding the intermediate CA certificates into the trusted certificate store for the SSL_CTX object (resulting in having to add CA certificates that otherwise maybe would not be trusted), or by adding the chain certificates using the L function, which is only available for the SSL_CTX object as a whole and that therefore probably can only apply for one client certificate, making the concept of the callback function (to allow the choice from several certificates) questionable. Once the SSL object has been used in conjunction with the callback function, the certificate will be set for the SSL object and will not be cleared even when L is being called. It is therefore mandatory to destroy the SSL object using L and create a new one to return to the previous state. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod0000644000000000000000000003754713176625661017624 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_dane_enable, SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set, SSL_dane_enable, SSL_dane_tlsa_add, SSL_get0_dane_authority, SSL_get0_dane_tlsa, SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags, SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags, SSL_dane_set_flags, SSL_dane_clear_flags - enable DANE TLS authentication of the remote TLS server in the local TLS client =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord); int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain); int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen); int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki); int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector, uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen); unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags); unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions implement support for DANE TLSA (RFC6698 and RFC7671) peer authentication. SSL_CTX_dane_enable() must be called first to initialize the shared state required for DANE support. Individual connections associated with the context can then enable per-connection DANE support as appropriate. DANE authentication is implemented in the L function, and applications that override L via L are responsible to authenticate the peer chain in whatever manner they see fit. SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set() may then be called zero or more times to adjust the supported digest algorithms. This must be done before any SSL handles are created for the context. The B argument specifies a DANE TLSA matching type and the B argument specifies the associated digest algorithm handle. The B argument specifies a strength ordinal. Algorithms with a larger strength ordinal are considered more secure. Strength ordinals are used to implement RFC7671 digest algorithm agility. Specifying a B digest algorithm for a matching type disables support for that matching type. Matching type Full(0) cannot be modified or disabled. By default, matching type C (see RFC7218 for definitions of the DANE TLSA parameter acronyms) is mapped to C with a strength ordinal of C<1> and matching type C is mapped to C with a strength ordinal of C<2>. SSL_dane_enable() must be called before the SSL handshake is initiated with L if (and only if) you want to enable DANE for that connection. (The connection must be associated with a DANE-enabled SSL context). The B argument specifies the RFC7671 TLSA base domain, which will be the primary peer reference identifier for certificate name checks. Additional server names can be specified via L. The B is used as the default SNI hint if none has yet been specified via L. SSL_dane_tlsa_add() may then be called one or more times, to load each of the TLSA records that apply to the remote TLS peer. (This too must be done prior to the beginning of the SSL handshake). The arguments specify the fields of the TLSA record. The B field is provided in binary (wire RDATA) form, not the hexadecimal ASCII presentation form, with an explicit length passed via B. A return value of 0 indicates that "unusable" TLSA records (with invalid or unsupported parameters) were provided. A negative return value indicates an internal error in processing the record. The caller is expected to check the return value of each SSL_dane_tlsa_add() call and take appropriate action if none are usable or an internal error is encountered in processing some records. If no TLSA records are added successfully, DANE authentication is not enabled, and authentication will be based on any configured traditional trust-anchors; authentication success in this case does not mean that the peer was DANE-authenticated. SSL_get0_dane_authority() can be used to get more detailed information about the matched DANE trust-anchor after successful connection completion. The return value is negative if DANE verification failed (or was not enabled), 0 if an EE TLSA record directly matched the leaf certificate, or a positive number indicating the depth at which a TA record matched an issuer certificate. The complete verified chain can be retrieved via L. The return value is an index into this verified chain, rather than the list of certificates sent by the peer as returned by L. If the B argument is not B and a TLSA record matched a chain certificate, a pointer to the matching certificate is returned via B. The returned address is a short-term internal reference to the certificate and must not be freed by the application. Applications that want to retain access to the certificate can call L to obtain a long-term reference which must then be freed via L once no longer needed. If no TLSA records directly matched any elements of the certificate chain, but a DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) record provided the public key that signed an element of the chain, then that key is returned via B argument (if not NULL). In this case the return value is the depth of the top-most element of the validated certificate chain. As with B this is a short-term internal reference, and L and L can be used to acquire and release long-term references respectively. SSL_get0_dane_tlsa() can be used to retrieve the fields of the TLSA record that matched the peer certificate chain. The return value indicates the match depth or failure to match just as with SSL_get0_dane_authority(). When the return value is non-negative, the storage pointed to by the B, B, B and B parameters is updated to the corresponding TLSA record fields. The B field is in binary wire form, and is therefore not NUL-terminated, its length is returned via the B parameter. If any of these parameters is NULL, the corresponding field is not returned. The B parameter is set to a short-term internal-copy of the associated data field and must not be freed by the application. Applications that need long-term access to this field need to copy the content. SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags() and SSL_dane_set_flags() can be used to enable optional DANE verification features. SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags() and SSL_dane_clear_flags() can be used to disable the same features. The B argument is a bitmask of the features to enable or disable. The B set for an B context are copied to each B handle associated with that context at the time the handle is created. Subsequent changes in the context's B have no effect on the B set for the handle. At present, the only available option is B which can be used to disable server name checks when authenticating via DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. For some applications, primarily web browsers, it is not safe to disable name checks due to "unknown key share" attacks, in which a malicious server can convince a client that a connection to a victim server is instead a secure connection to the malicious server. The malicious server may then be able to violate cross-origin scripting restrictions. Thus, despite the text of RFC7671, name checks are by default enabled for DANE-EE(3) TLSA records, and can be disabled in applications where it is safe to do so. In particular, SMTP and XMPP clients should set this option as SRV and MX records already make it possible for a remote domain to redirect client connections to any server of its choice, and in any case SMTP and XMPP clients do not execute scripts downloaded from remote servers. =head1 RETURN VALUES The functions SSL_CTX_dane_enable(), SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(), SSL_dane_enable() and SSL_dane_tlsa_add() return a positive value on success. Negative return values indicate resource problems (out of memory, etc.) in the SSL library, while a return value of B<0> indicates incorrect usage or invalid input, such as an unsupported TLSA record certificate usage, selector or matching type. Invalid input also includes malformed data, either a digest length that does not match the digest algorithm, or a C (binary ASN.1 DER form) certificate or a public key that fails to parse. The functions SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa() return a negative value when DANE authentication failed or was not enabled, a non-negative value indicates the chain depth at which the TLSA record matched a chain certificate, or the depth of the top-most certificate, when the TLSA record is a full public key that is its signer. The functions SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(), SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(), SSL_dane_set_flags() and SSL_dane_clear_flags() return the B in effect before they were called. =head1 EXAMPLE Suppose "smtp.example.com" is the MX host of the domain "example.com", and has DNSSEC-validated TLSA records. The calls below will perform DANE authentication and arrange to match either the MX hostname or the destination domain name in the SMTP server certificate. Wildcards are supported, but must match the entire label. The actual name matched in the certificate (which might be a wildcard) is retrieved, and must be copied by the application if it is to be retained beyond the lifetime of the SSL connection. SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; int (*verify_cb)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *sctx) = NULL; int num_usable = 0; const char *nexthop_domain = "example.com"; const char *dane_tlsa_domain = "smtp.example.com"; uint8_t usage, selector, mtype; if ((ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method())) == NULL) /* handle error */ if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) /* handle error */ if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) /* handle error */ if (SSL_dane_enable(ssl, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0) /* handle error */ /* * For many applications it is safe to skip DANE-EE(3) namechecks. Do not * disable the checks unless "unknown key share" attacks pose no risk for * your application. */ SSL_dane_set_flags(ssl, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS); if (!SSL_add1_host(ssl, nexthop_domain)) /* handle error */ SSL_set_hostflags(ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS); for (... each TLSA record ...) { unsigned char *data; size_t len; int ret; /* set usage, selector, mtype, data, len */ /* * Opportunistic DANE TLS clients support only DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). * They treat all other certificate usages, and in particular PKIX-TA(0) * and PKIX-EE(1), as unusable. */ switch (usage) { default: case 0: /* PKIX-TA(0) */ case 1: /* PKIX-EE(1) */ continue; case 2: /* DANE-TA(2) */ case 3: /* DANE-EE(3) */ break; } ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, usage, selector, mtype, data, len); /* free data as appropriate */ if (ret < 0) /* handle SSL library internal error */ else if (ret == 0) /* handle unusable TLSA record */ else ++num_usable; } /* * At this point, the verification mode is still the default SSL_VERIFY_NONE. * Opportunistic DANE clients use unauthenticated TLS when all TLSA records * are unusable, so continue the handshake even if authentication fails. */ if (num_usable == 0) { /* Log all records unusable? */ /* Optionally set verify_cb to a suitable non-NULL callback. */ SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_cb); } else { /* At least one usable record. We expect to verify the peer */ /* Optionally set verify_cb to a suitable non-NULL callback. */ /* * Below we elect to fail the handshake when peer verification fails. * Alternatively, use the permissive SSL_VERIFY_NONE verification mode, * complete the handshake, check the verification status, and if not * verified disconnect gracefully at the application layer, especially if * application protocol supports informing the server that authentication * failed. */ SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_cb); } /* * Load any saved session for resumption, making sure that the previous * session applied the same security and authentication requirements that * would be expected of a fresh connection. */ /* Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */ if (SSL_session_reused(ssl)) { if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) { /* * Resumed session was originally verified, this connection is * authenticated. */ } else { /* * Resumed session was not originally verified, this connection is not * authenticated. */ } } else if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) { const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl); EVP_PKEY *mspki = NULL; int depth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(ssl, NULL, &mspki); if (depth >= 0) { (void) SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(ssl, &usage, &selector, &mtype, NULL, NULL); printf("DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s at depth %d\n", usage, selector, mtype, (mspki != NULL) ? "TA public key verified certificate" : depth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate", depth); } if (peername != NULL) { /* Name checks were in scope and matched the peername */ printf("Verified peername: %s\n", peername); } } else { /* * Not authenticated, presumably all TLSA rrs unusable, but possibly a * callback suppressed connection termination despite the presence of * usable TLSA RRs none of which matched. Do whatever is appropriate for * fresh unauthenticated connections. */ } =head1 NOTES It is expected that the majority of clients employing DANE TLS will be doing "opportunistic DANE TLS" in the sense of RFC7672 and RFC7435. That is, they will use DANE authentication when DNSSEC-validated TLSA records are published for a given peer, and otherwise will use unauthenticated TLS or even cleartext. Such applications should generally treat any TLSA records published by the peer with usages PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1) as "unusable", and should not include them among the TLSA records used to authenticate peer connections. In addition, some TLSA records with supported usages may be "unusable" as a result of invalid or unsupported parameters. When a peer has TLSA records, but none are "usable", an opportunistic application must avoid cleartext, but cannot authenticate the peer, and so should generally proceed with an unauthenticated connection. Opportunistic applications need to note the return value of each call to SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and if all return 0 (due to invalid or unsupported parameters) disable peer authentication by calling L with B equal to B. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context.pod0000644000000000000000000000315113176625661021133 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context, SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context - get and set the SSL ID context associated with a session =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); =head1 DESCRIPTION See L for further details on session ID contexts. SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context() returns the ID context associated with the SSL/TLS session B. The length of the ID context is written to B<*len> if B is not NULL. The value returned is a pointer to an object maintained within B and should not be released. SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context() takes a copy of the provided ID context given in B and associates it with the session B. The length of the ID context is given by B which must not exceed SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH bytes. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod0000644000000000000000000000135713176625661016675 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_SSL_CTX - get the SSL_CTX from which an SSL is created =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_SSL_CTX() returns a pointer to the SSL_CTX object, from which B was created with L. =head1 RETURN VALUES The pointer to the SSL_CTX object is returned. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod0000644000000000000000000002036113176625661020527 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_use_certificate, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file, SSL_use_certificate, SSL_use_certificate_ASN1, SSL_use_certificate_file, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file, SSL_use_certificate_chain_file, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_use_PrivateKey, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_check_private_key - load certificate and key data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, int len); int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); int SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions load the certificates and private keys into the SSL_CTX or SSL object, respectively. The SSL_CTX_* class of functions loads the certificates and keys into the SSL_CTX object B. The information is passed to SSL objects B created from B with L by copying, so that changes applied to B do not propagate to already existing SSL objects. The SSL_* class of functions only loads certificates and keys into a specific SSL object. The specific information is kept, when L is called for this SSL object. SSL_CTX_use_certificate() loads the certificate B into B, SSL_use_certificate() loads B into B. The rest of the certificates needed to form the complete certificate chain can be specified using the L function. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate from the memory location B (with length B) into B, SSL_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate into B. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() loads the first certificate stored in B into B. The formatting B of the certificate must be specified from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1. SSL_use_certificate_file() loads the certificate from B into B. See the NOTES section on why SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() should be preferred. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() loads a certificate chain from B into B. The certificates must be in PEM format and must be sorted starting with the subject's certificate (actual client or server certificate), followed by intermediate CA certificates if applicable, and ending at the highest level (root) CA. SSL_use_certificate_chain_file() is similar except it loads the certificate chain into B. SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() adds B as private key to B. SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds the private key B of type RSA to B. SSL_use_PrivateKey() adds B as private key to B; SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds B as private key of type RSA to B. If a certificate has already been set and the private does not belong to the certificate an error is returned. To change a certificate, private key pair the new certificate needs to be set with SSL_use_certificate() or SSL_CTX_use_certificate() before setting the private key with SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() or SSL_use_PrivateKey(). SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type B stored at memory location B (length B) to B. SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type RSA stored at memory location B (length B) to B. SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() and SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() add the private key to B. SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found in B to B. The formatting B of the certificate must be specified from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1. SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private RSA key found in B to B. SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found in B to B; SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private RSA key found to B. SSL_CTX_check_private_key() checks the consistency of a private key with the corresponding certificate loaded into B. If more than one key/certificate pair (RSA/DSA) is installed, the last item installed will be checked. If e.g. the last item was a RSA certificate or key, the RSA key/certificate pair will be checked. SSL_check_private_key() performs the same check for B. If no key/certificate was explicitly added for this B, the last item added into B will be checked. =head1 NOTES The internal certificate store of OpenSSL can hold several private key/certificate pairs at a time. The certificate used depends on the cipher selected, see also L. When reading certificates and private keys from file, files of type SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 (also known as B, binary encoding) can only contain one certificate or private key, consequently SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() is only applicable to PEM formatting. Files of type SSL_FILETYPE_PEM can contain more than one item. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() adds the first certificate found in the file to the certificate store. The other certificates are added to the store of chain certificates using L. Note: versions of OpenSSL before 1.0.2 only had a single certificate chain store for all certificate types, OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later have a separate chain store for each type. SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() should be used instead of the SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() function in order to allow the use of complete certificate chains even when no trusted CA storage is used or when the CA issuing the certificate shall not be added to the trusted CA storage. If additional certificates are needed to complete the chain during the TLS negotiation, CA certificates are additionally looked up in the locations of trusted CA certificates, see L. The private keys loaded from file can be encrypted. In order to successfully load encrypted keys, a function returning the passphrase must have been supplied, see L. (Certificate files might be encrypted as well from the technical point of view, it however does not make sense as the data in the certificate is considered public anyway.) =head1 RETURN VALUES On success, the functions return 1. Otherwise check out the error stack to find out the reason. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod0000644000000000000000000001022213176625661017751 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs, SSL_set1_sigalgs, SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list, SSL_set1_sigalgs_list, SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs, SSL_set1_client_sigalgs, SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list, SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list - set supported signature algorithms =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *slist, long slistlen); long SSL_set1_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *slist, long slistlen); long SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str); long SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str); long SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *slist, long slistlen); long SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *slist, long slistlen); long SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str); long SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs() and SSL_set1_sigalgs() set the supported signature algorithms for B or B. The array B of length B must consist of pairs of NIDs corresponding to digest and public key algorithms. SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_sigalgs_list() set the supported signature algorithms for B or B. The B parameter must be a null terminated string consisting or a colon separated list of public key algorithms and digests separated by B<+>. SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(), SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list() set signature algorithms related to client authentication, otherwise they are identical to SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_sigalgs(), SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(). All these functions are implemented as macros. The signature algorithm parameter (integer array or string) is not freed: the application should free it, if necessary. =head1 NOTES If an application wishes to allow the setting of signature algorithms as one of many user configurable options it should consider using the more flexible SSL_CONF API instead. The signature algorithms set by a client are used directly in the supported signature algorithm in the client hello message. The supported signature algorithms set by a server are not sent to the client but are used to determine the set of shared signature algorithms and (if server preferences are set with SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) their order. The client authentication signature algorithms set by a server are sent in a certificate request message if client authentication is enabled, otherwise they are unused. Similarly client authentication signature algorithms set by a client are used to determined the set of client authentication shared signature algorithms. Signature algorithms will neither be advertised nor used if the security level prohibits them (for example SHA1 if the security level is 4 or more). Currently the NID_md5, NID_sha1, NID_sha224, NID_sha256, NID_sha384 and NID_sha512 digest NIDs are supported and the public key algorithm NIDs EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_DSA and EVP_PKEY_EC. The short or long name values for digests can be used in a string (for example "MD5", "SHA1", "SHA224", "SHA256", "SHA384", "SHA512") and the public key algorithm strings "RSA", "DSA" or "ECDSA". The use of MD5 as a digest is strongly discouraged due to security weaknesses. =head1 EXAMPLES Set supported signature algorithms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA using an array: const int slist[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA}; SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, 4); Set supported signature algorithms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA using a string: SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, "ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA256"); =head1 RETURN VALUES All these functions return 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.pod0000644000000000000000000000330113176625661020433 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_flush_sessions, SSL_flush_sessions - remove expired sessions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); void SSL_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_flush_sessions() causes a run through the session cache of B to remove sessions expired at time B. SSL_flush_sessions() is a synonym for SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(). =head1 NOTES If enabled, the internal session cache will collect all sessions established up to the specified maximum number (see SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size()). As sessions will not be reused ones they are expired, they should be removed from the cache to save resources. This can either be done automatically whenever 255 new sessions were established (see L) or manually by calling SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(). The parameter B specifies the time which should be used for the expiration test, in most cases the actual time given by time(0) will be used. SSL_CTX_flush_sessions() will only check sessions stored in the internal cache. When a session is found and removed, the remove_session_cb is however called to synchronize with the external cache (see L). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod0000644000000000000000000001703113176625661022446 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb - set a callback for session ticket processing =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL_CTX sslctx, int (*cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb() sets a callback function I for handling session tickets for the ssl context I. Session tickets, defined in RFC5077 provide an enhanced session resumption capability where the server implementation is not required to maintain per session state. It only applies to TLS and there is no SSLv3 implementation. The callback function I will be called for every client instigated TLS session when session ticket extension is presented in the TLS hello message. It is the responsibility of this function to create or retrieve the cryptographic parameters and to maintain their state. The OpenSSL library uses your callback function to help implement a common TLS ticket construction state according to RFC5077 Section 4 such that per session state is unnecessary and a small set of cryptographic variables needs to be maintained by the callback function implementation. In order to reuse a session, a TLS client must send the a session ticket extension to the server. The client can only send exactly one session ticket. The server, through the callback function, either agrees to reuse the session ticket information or it starts a full TLS handshake to create a new session ticket. Before the callback function is started I and I have been initialised with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init and HMAC_CTX_init respectively. For new sessions tickets, when the client doesn't present a session ticket, or an attempted retrieval of the ticket failed, or a renew option was indicated, the callback function will be called with I equal to 1. The OpenSSL library expects that the function will set an arbitrary I, initialize I, and set the cipher context I and the hash context I. The I is 16 characters long and is used as a key identifier. The I length is the length of the IV of the corresponding cipher. The maximum IV length is B bytes defined in B. The initialization vector I should be a random value. The cipher context I should use the initialisation vector I. The cipher context can be set using L. The hmac context can be set using L. When the client presents a session ticket, the callback function with be called with I set to 0 indicating that the I function should retrieve a set of parameters. In this case I and I have already been parsed out of the session ticket. The OpenSSL library expects that the I will be used to retrieve a cryptographic parameters and that the cryptographic context I will be set with the retrieved parameters and the initialization vector I. using a function like L. The I needs to be set using L. If the I is still valid but a renewal of the ticket is required the callback function should return 2. The library will call the callback again with an argument of enc equal to 1 to set the new ticket. The return value of the I function is used by OpenSSL to determine what further processing will occur. The following return values have meaning: =over 4 =item Z<>2 This indicates that the I and I have been set and the session can continue on those parameters. Additionally it indicates that the session ticket is in a renewal period and should be replaced. The OpenSSL library will call I again with an enc argument of 1 to set the new ticket (see RFC5077 3.3 paragraph 2). =item Z<>1 This indicates that the I and I have been set and the session can continue on those parameters. =item Z<>0 This indicates that it was not possible to set/retrieve a session ticket and the SSL/TLS session will continue by negotiating a set of cryptographic parameters or using the alternate SSL/TLS resumption mechanism, session ids. If called with enc equal to 0 the library will call the I again to get a new set of parameters. =item less than 0 This indicates an error. =back =head1 NOTES Session resumption shortcuts the TLS so that the client certificate negotiation don't occur. It makes up for this by storing client certificate an all other negotiated state information encrypted within the ticket. In a resumed session the applications will have all this state information available exactly as if a full negotiation had occurred. If an attacker can obtain the key used to encrypt a session ticket, they can obtain the master secret for any ticket using that key and decrypt any traffic using that session: even if the ciphersuite supports forward secrecy. As a result applications may wish to use multiple keys and avoid using long term keys stored in files. Applications can use longer keys to maintain a consistent level of security. For example if a ciphersuite uses 256 bit ciphers but only a 128 bit ticket key the overall security is only 128 bits because breaking the ticket key will enable an attacker to obtain the session keys. =head1 EXAMPLES Reference Implementation: SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb); .... static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) { if (enc) { /* create new session */ if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) ) { return -1; /* insufficient random */ } key = currentkey(); /* something that you need to implement */ if ( !key ) { /* current key doesn't exist or isn't valid */ key = createkey(); /* something that you need to implement. * createkey needs to initialise, a name, * an aes_key, a hmac_key and optionally * an expire time. */ if ( !key ) { /* key couldn't be created */ return 0; } } memcpy(key_name, key->name, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL); return 1; } else { /* retrieve session */ key = findkey(name); if (!key || key->expire < now() ) { return 0; } HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv ); if (key->expire < ( now() - RENEW_TIME ) ) { /* return 2 - this session will get a new ticket even though the current is still valid */ return 2; } return 1; } } =head1 RETURN VALUES returns 0 to indicate the callback function was set. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ex_data.pod0000644000000000000000000000273013176625661017651 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_get_ex_data, SSL_CTX_set_ex_data, SSL_get_ex_data, SSL_set_ex_data - Store and retrieve extra data from the SSL_CTX, SSL or SSL_SESSION =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx); int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg); void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx); int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL*_set_ex_data() functions can be used to store arbitrary user data into the B, or B object. The user must supply a unique index which they can subsequently use to retrieve the data using SSL*_get_ex_data(). For more detailed information see L and L which implement these functions and L for generating a unique index. =head1 RETURN VALUES The SSL*_set_ex_data() functions return 1 if the item is successfully stored and 0 if it is not. The SSL*_get_ex_data() functions return the ex_data pointer if successful, otherwise NULL. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod0000644000000000000000000000561013176625661021775 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback, SSL_set_psk_server_callback - set PSK identity hint to use =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *hint); int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *ssl, const char *hint); void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len)); void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, int max_psk_len)); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() sets the given B-terminated PSK identity hint B to SSL context object B. SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() sets the given B-terminated PSK identity hint B to SSL connection object B. If B is B the current hint from B or B is deleted. In the case where PSK identity hint is B, the server does not send the ServerKeyExchange message to the client. A server application must provide a callback function which is called when the server receives the ClientKeyExchange message from the client. The purpose of the callback function is to validate the received PSK identity and to fetch the pre-shared key used during the connection setup phase. The callback is set using functions SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback() or SSL_set_psk_server_callback(). The callback function is given the connection in parameter B, B-terminated PSK identity sent by the client in parameter B, and a buffer B of length B bytes where the pre-shared key is to be stored. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_use_psk_identity_hint() return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows: =over 4 =item Z<>0 PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message will be sent and the connection setup fails. =item E0 PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK successfully in parameter B. Return value is the length of B in bytes. It is an error to return a value greater than B. If the PSK identity was not found but the callback instructs the protocol to continue anyway, the callback must provide some random data to B and return the length of the random data, so the connection will fail with decryption_error before it will be finished completely. =back =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. Copyright 2005 Nokia. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod0000644000000000000000000000777713176625660022221 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_COMP_add_compression_method, SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods, SSL_COMP_get0_name, SSL_COMP_get_id, SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods - handle SSL/TLS integrated compression methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp); int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void) #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() adds the compression method B with the identifier B to the list of available compression methods. This list is globally maintained for all SSL operations within this application. It cannot be set for specific SSL_CTX or SSL objects. SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods() returns a stack of all of the available compression methods or NULL on error. SSL_COMP_get0_name() returns the name of the compression method B. SSL_COMP_get_id() returns the id of the compression method B. In versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() freed the internal table of compression methods that were built internally, and possibly augmented by adding SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(). However this is now unnecessary from version 1.1.0. No explicit initialisation or de-initialisation is necessary. See L and L. From OpenSSL 1.1.0 calling this function does nothing. =head1 NOTES The TLS standard (or SSLv3) allows the integration of compression methods into the communication. The TLS RFC does however not specify compression methods or their corresponding identifiers, so there is currently no compatible way to integrate compression with unknown peers. It is therefore currently not recommended to integrate compression into applications. Applications for non-public use may agree on certain compression methods. Using different compression methods with the same identifier will lead to connection failure. An OpenSSL client speaking a protocol that allows compression (SSLv3, TLSv1) will unconditionally send the list of all compression methods enabled with SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() to the server during the handshake. Unlike the mechanisms to set a cipher list, there is no method available to restrict the list of compression method on a per connection basis. An OpenSSL server will match the identifiers listed by a client against its own compression methods and will unconditionally activate compression when a matching identifier is found. There is no way to restrict the list of compression methods supported on a per connection basis. If enabled during compilation, the OpenSSL library will have the COMP_zlib() compression method available. =head1 WARNINGS Once the identities of the compression methods for the TLS protocol have been standardized, the compression API will most likely be changed. Using it in the current state is not recommended. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() may return the following values: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The operation succeeded. =item Z<>1 The operation failed. Check the error queue to find out the reason. =back SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods() returns the stack of compressions methods or NULL on error. SSL_COMP_get0_name() returns the name of the compression method or NULL on error. SSL_COMP_get_id() returns the name of the compression method or -1 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0. SSL_COMP_get0_name() and SSL_comp_get_id() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0d. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_alert_type_string.pod0000644000000000000000000001655713176625661020425 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_alert_type_string, SSL_alert_type_string_long, SSL_alert_desc_string, SSL_alert_desc_string_long - get textual description of alert information =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_alert_type_string() returns a one letter string indicating the type of the alert specified by B. SSL_alert_type_string_long() returns a string indicating the type of the alert specified by B. SSL_alert_desc_string() returns a two letter string as a short form describing the reason of the alert specified by B. SSL_alert_desc_string_long() returns a string describing the reason of the alert specified by B. =head1 NOTES When one side of an SSL/TLS communication wants to inform the peer about a special situation, it sends an alert. The alert is sent as a special message and does not influence the normal data stream (unless its contents results in the communication being canceled). A warning alert is sent, when a non-fatal error condition occurs. The "close notify" alert is sent as a warning alert. Other examples for non-fatal errors are certificate errors ("certificate expired", "unsupported certificate"), for which a warning alert may be sent. (The sending party may however decide to send a fatal error.) The receiving side may cancel the connection on reception of a warning alert on it discretion. Several alert messages must be sent as fatal alert messages as specified by the TLS RFC. A fatal alert always leads to a connection abort. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_type_string() or SSL_alert_type_string_long(): =over 4 =item "W"/"warning" =item "F"/"fatal" =item "U"/"unknown" This indicates that no support is available for this alert type. Probably B does not contain a correct alert message. =back The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_desc_string() or SSL_alert_desc_string_long(): =over 4 =item "CN"/"close notify" The connection shall be closed. This is a warning alert. =item "UM"/"unexpected message" An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations. =item "BM"/"bad record mac" This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This message is always fatal. =item "DF"/"decompression failure" The decompression function received improper input (e.g. data that would expand to excessive length). This message is always fatal. =item "HF"/"handshake failure" Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error. =item "NC"/"no certificate" A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not send a certificate (SSLv3 only). =item "BC"/"bad certificate" A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc =item "UC"/"unsupported certificate" A certificate was of an unsupported type. =item "CR"/"certificate revoked" A certificate was revoked by its signer. =item "CE"/"certificate expired" A certificate has expired or is not currently valid. =item "CU"/"certificate unknown" Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable. =item "IP"/"illegal parameter" A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This is always fatal. =item "DC"/"decryption failed" A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal. =item "RO"/"record overflow" A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal. =item "CA"/"unknown CA" A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message is always fatal. =item "AD"/"access denied" A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal. =item "DE"/"decode error" A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal. =item "CY"/"decrypt error" A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or validate a finished message. =item "ER"/"export restriction" A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit ephemeral RSA key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This message is always fatal. =item "PV"/"protocol version" The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons). This message is always fatal. =item "IS"/"insufficient security" Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is always fatal. =item "IE"/"internal error" An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory allocation failure). This message is always fatal. =item "US"/"user canceled" This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning. =item "NR"/"no renegotiation" Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert; at that point, the original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this would be appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This message is always a warning. =item "UP"/"unknown PSK identity" Sent by the server to indicate that it does not recognize a PSK identity or an SRP identity. =item "UK"/"unknown" This indicates that no description is available for this alert type. Probably B does not contain a correct alert message. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id.pod0000644000000000000000000000165113176625661021225 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id - get details about the compression associated with a session =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION If compression has been negotiated for an ssl session then SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id() will return the id for the compression method or 0 otherwise. The only built-in supported compression method is zlib which has an id of 1. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id() returns the id of the compression method or 0 if none. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod0000644000000000000000000000575613176625661022162 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, SSL_set_session_id_context - set context within which session can be reused (server side only) =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() sets the context B of length B within which a session can be reused for the B object. SSL_set_session_id_context() sets the context B of length B within which a session can be reused for the B object. =head1 NOTES Sessions are generated within a certain context. When exporting/importing sessions with B/B it would be possible, to re-import a session generated from another context (e.g. another application), which might lead to malfunctions. Therefore each application must set its own session id context B which is used to distinguish the contexts and is stored in exported sessions. The B can be any kind of binary data with a given length, it is therefore possible to use e.g. the name of the application and/or the hostname and/or service name ... The session id context becomes part of the session. The session id context is set by the SSL/TLS server. The SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() and SSL_set_session_id_context() functions are therefore only useful on the server side. OpenSSL clients will check the session id context returned by the server when reusing a session. The maximum length of the B is limited to B. =head1 WARNINGS If the session id context is not set on an SSL/TLS server and client certificates are used, stored sessions will not be reused but a fatal error will be flagged and the handshake will fail. If a server returns a different session id context to an OpenSSL client when reusing a session, an error will be flagged and the handshake will fail. OpenSSL servers will always return the correct session id context, as an OpenSSL server checks the session id context itself before reusing a session as described above. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() and SSL_set_session_id_context() return the following values: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The length B of the session id context B exceeded the maximum allowed length of B. The error is logged to the error stack. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000305013176625661015440 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_new, SSL_up_ref - create a new SSL structure for a connection =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_new() creates a new B structure which is needed to hold the data for a TLS/SSL connection. The new structure inherits the settings of the underlying context B: connection method, options, verification settings, timeout settings. An B structure is reference counted. Creating an B structure for the first time increments the reference count. Freeing it (using SSL_free) decrements it. When the reference count drops to zero, any memory or resources allocated to the B structure are freed. SSL_up_ref() increments the reference count for an existing B structure. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL The creation of a new SSL structure failed. Check the error stack to find out the reason. =item Pointer to an SSL structure The return value points to an allocated SSL structure. SSL_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod0000644000000000000000000000213513176625661017704 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_session_reused - query whether a reused session was negotiated during handshake =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_session_reused(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION Query, whether a reused session was negotiated during the handshake. =head1 NOTES During the negotiation, a client can propose to reuse a session. The server then looks up the session in its cache. If both client and server agree on the session, it will be reused and a flag is being set that can be queried by the application. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 A new session was negotiated. =item Z<>1 A session was reused. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback.pod0000644000000000000000000001357313176625661022707 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ssl_ct_validation_cb, SSL_enable_ct, SSL_CTX_enable_ct, SSL_disable_ct, SSL_CTX_disable_ct, SSL_set_ct_validation_callback, SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback, SSL_ct_is_enabled, SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled - control Certificate Transparency policy =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef int (*ssl_ct_validation_cb)(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *arg); int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode); int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode); int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg); int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg); void SSL_disable_ct(SSL *s); void SSL_CTX_disable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_enable_ct() and SSL_CTX_enable_ct() enable the processing of signed certificate timestamps (SCTs) either for a given SSL connection or for all connections that share the given SSL context, respectively. This is accomplished by setting a built-in CT validation callback. The behaviour of the callback is determined by the B argument, which can be either of B or B as described below. If B is equal to B, then in a full TLS handshake with the verification mode set to B, if the peer presents no valid SCTs the handshake will be aborted. If the verification mode is B, the handshake will continue despite lack of valid SCTs. However, in that case if the verification status before the built-in callback was B it will be set to B after the callback. Applications can call L to check the status at handshake completion, even after session resumption since the verification status is part of the saved session state. See L, , L. If B is equal to B, then the handshake continues, and the verification status is not modified, regardless of the validation status of any SCTs. The application can still inspect the validation status of the SCTs at handshake completion. Note that with session resumption there will not be any SCTs presented during the handshake. Therefore, in applications that delay SCT policy enforcement until after handshake completion, such delayed SCT checks should only be performed when the session is not resumed. SSL_set_ct_validation_callback() and SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback() register a custom callback that may implement a different policy than either of the above. This callback can examine the peer's SCTs and determine whether they are sufficient to allow the connection to continue. The TLS handshake is aborted if the verification mode is not B and the callback returns a non-positive result. An arbitrary callback context argument, B, can be passed in when setting the callback. This will be passed to the callback whenever it is invoked. Ownership of this context remains with the caller. If no callback is set, SCTs will not be requested and Certificate Transparency validation will not occur. No callback will be invoked when the peer presents no certificate, e.g. by employing an anonymous (aNULL) ciphersuite. In that case the handshake continues as it would had no callback been requested. Callbacks are also not invoked when the peer certificate chain is invalid or validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records which use a private X.509 PKI, or no X.509 PKI at all, respectively. Clients that require SCTs are expected to not have enabled any aNULL ciphers nor to have specified server verification via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. SSL_disable_ct() and SSL_CTX_disable_ct() turn off CT processing, whether enabled via the built-in or the custom callbacks, by setting a NULL callback. These may be implemented as macros. SSL_ct_is_enabled() and SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled() return 1 if CT processing is enabled via either SSL_enable_ct() or a non-null custom callback, and 0 otherwise. =head1 NOTES When SCT processing is enabled, OCSP stapling will be enabled. This is because one possible source of SCTs is the OCSP response from a server. The time returned by SSL_SESSION_get_time() will be used to evaluate whether any presented SCTs have timestamps that are in the future (and therefore invalid). =head1 RESTRICTIONS Certificate Transparency validation cannot be enabled and so a callback cannot be set if a custom client extension handler has been registered to handle SCT extensions (B). =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_enable_ct(), SSL_CTX_enable_ct(), SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback() and SSL_set_ct_validation_callback() return 1 if the B is successfully set. They return 0 if an error occurs, e.g. a custom client extension handler has been setup to handle SCTs. SSL_disable_ct() and SSL_CTX_disable_ct() do not return a result. SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled() and SSL_ct_is_enabled() return a 1 if a non-null CT validation callback is set, or 0 if no callback (or equivalently a NULL callback) is set. =head1 SEE ALSO L, , L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get0_peer_scts.pod0000644000000000000000000000235013176625661017557 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get0_peer_scts - get SCTs received =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get0_peer_scts() returns the signed certificate timestamps (SCTs) that have been received. If this is the first time that this function has been called for a given B instance, it will examine the TLS extensions, OCSP response and the peer's certificate for SCTs. Future calls will return the same SCTs. =head1 RESTRICTIONS If no Certificate Transparency validation callback has been set (using B or B), this function is not guaranteed to return all of the SCTs that the peer is capable of sending. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_get0_peer_scts() returns a list of SCTs found, or NULL if an error occurs. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.pod0000644000000000000000000000352013176625661021374 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size, SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size - manipulate session cache size =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() sets the size of the internal session cache of context B to B. This value is a hint and not an absolute; see the notes below. SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size() returns the currently valid session cache size. =head1 NOTES The internal session cache size is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT, currently 1024*20, so that up to 20000 sessions can be held. This size can be modified using the SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() call. A special case is the size 0, which is used for unlimited size. If adding the session makes the cache exceed its size, then unused sessions are dropped from the end of the cache. Cache space may also be reclaimed by calling L to remove expired sessions. If the size of the session cache is reduced and more sessions are already in the session cache, old session will be removed at the next time a session shall be added. This removal is not synchronized with the expiration of sessions. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() returns the previously valid size. SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size() returns the currently valid size. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sessions.pod0000644000000000000000000000215213176625661017235 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_sessions - access internal session cache =head1 SYNOPSIS #include struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_sessions() returns a pointer to the lhash databases containing the internal session cache for B. =head1 NOTES The sessions in the internal session cache are kept in an L type database. It is possible to directly access this database e.g. for searching. In parallel, the sessions form a linked list which is maintained separately from the L operations, so that the database must not be modified directly but by using the L family of functions. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb.pod0000644000000000000000000000557713176625661017661 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb, SSL_set_cert_cb - handle certificate callback function =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); int (*cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb() and SSL_set_cert_cb() sets the cert_cb() callback, B value is pointer which is passed to the application callback. When cert_cb() is NULL, no callback function is used. cert_cb() is the application defined callback. It is called before a certificate will be used by a client or server. The callback can then inspect the passed B structure and set or clear any appropriate certificates. If the callback is successful it B return 1 even if no certificates have been set. A zero is returned on error which will abort the handshake with a fatal internal error alert. A negative return value will suspend the handshake and the handshake function will return immediately. L will return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP to indicate, that the handshake was suspended. The next call to the handshake function will again lead to the call of cert_cb(). It is the job of the cert_cb() to store information about the state of the last call, if required to continue. =head1 NOTES An application will typically call SSL_use_certificate() and SSL_use_PrivateKey() to set the end entity certificate and private key. It can add intermediate and optionally the root CA certificates using SSL_add1_chain_cert(). It might also call SSL_certs_clear() to delete any certificates associated with the B object. The certificate callback functionality supersedes the (largely broken) functionality provided by the old client certificate callback interface. It is B called even is a certificate is already set so the callback can modify or delete the existing certificate. A more advanced callback might examine the handshake parameters and set whatever chain is appropriate. For example a legacy client supporting only TLS v1.0 might receive a certificate chain signed using SHA1 whereas a TLS v1.2 client which advertises support for SHA256 could receive a chain using SHA256. Normal server sanity checks are performed on any certificates set by the callback. So if an EC chain is set for a curve the client does not support it will B be used. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_set_bio.pod0000644000000000000000000000710513176625661016300 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_set_bio, SSL_set0_rbio, SSL_set0_wbio - connect the SSL object with a BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio); void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_set0_rbio() connects the BIO B for the read operations of the B object. The SSL engine inherits the behaviour of B. If the BIO is non-blocking then the B object will also have non-blocking behaviour. This function transfers ownership of B to B. It will be automatically freed using L when the B is freed. On calling this function, any existing B that was previously set will also be freed via a call to L (this includes the case where the B is set to the same value as previously). SSL_set0_wbio() works in the same as SSL_set0_rbio() except that it connects the BIO B for the write operations of the B object. Note that if the rbio and wbio are the same then SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() each take ownership of one reference. Therefore it may be necessary to increment the number of references available using L before calling the set0 functions. SSL_set_bio() does a similar job as SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() except that it connects both the B and the B at the same time. This function transfers the ownership of B and B to B except that the rules for this are much more complex. For this reason this function is considered a legacy function and SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() should be used in preference. The ownership rules are as follows: =over 2 =item * If neither the rbio or wbio have changed from their previous values then nothing is done. =item * If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and both are different to their previously set values then one reference is consumed for the rbio and one reference is consumed for the wbio. =item * If the rbio and wbio parameters are the same and the rbio is not the same as the previously set value then one reference is consumed. =item * If the rbio and wbio parameters are the same and the rbio is the same as the previously set value, then no additional references are consumed. =item * If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and the rbio is the same as the previously set value then one reference is consumed for the wbio and no references are consumed for the rbio. =item * If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and the wbio is the same as the previously set value and the old rbio and wbio values were the same as each other then one reference is consumed for the rbio and no references are consumed for the wbio. =item * If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and the wbio is the same as the previously set value and the old rbio and wbio values were different to each other then one reference is consumed for the rbio and one reference is consumed for the wbio. =back =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_set_bio(), SSL_set_rbio() and SSL_set_wbio() cannot fail. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod0000644000000000000000000001165113176625661022060 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode, SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode - enable/disable session caching =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx, long mode); long SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode() enables/disables session caching by setting the operational mode for B to . SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode() returns the currently used cache mode. =head1 NOTES The OpenSSL library can store/retrieve SSL/TLS sessions for later reuse. The sessions can be held in memory for each B, if more than one SSL_CTX object is being maintained, the sessions are unique for each SSL_CTX object. In order to reuse a session, a client must send the session's id to the server. It can only send exactly one id. The server then either agrees to reuse the session or it starts a full handshake (to create a new session). A server will look up the session in its internal session storage. If the session is not found in internal storage or lookups for the internal storage have been deactivated (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP), the server will try the external storage if available. Since a client may try to reuse a session intended for use in a different context, the session id context must be set by the server (see L). The following session cache modes and modifiers are available: =over 4 =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF No session caching for client or server takes place. =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT Client sessions are added to the session cache. As there is no reliable way for the OpenSSL library to know whether a session should be reused or which session to choose (due to the abstract BIO layer the SSL engine does not have details about the connection), the application must select the session to be reused by using the L function. This option is not activated by default. =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER Server sessions are added to the session cache. When a client proposes a session to be reused, the server looks for the corresponding session in (first) the internal session cache (unless SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP is set), then (second) in the external cache if available. If the session is found, the server will try to reuse the session. This is the default. =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH Enable both SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT and SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER at the same time. =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR Normally the session cache is checked for expired sessions every 255 connections using the L function. Since this may lead to a delay which cannot be controlled, the automatic flushing may be disabled and L can be called explicitly by the application. =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP By setting this flag, session-resume operations in an SSL/TLS server will not automatically look up sessions in the internal cache, even if sessions are automatically stored there. If external session caching callbacks are in use, this flag guarantees that all lookups are directed to the external cache. As automatic lookup only applies for SSL/TLS servers, the flag has no effect on clients. =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE Depending on the presence of SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT and/or SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, sessions negotiated in an SSL/TLS handshake may be cached for possible reuse. Normally a new session is added to the internal cache as well as any external session caching (callback) that is configured for the SSL_CTX. This flag will prevent sessions being stored in the internal cache (though the application can add them manually using L). Note: in any SSL/TLS servers where external caching is configured, any successful session lookups in the external cache (ie. for session-resume requests) would normally be copied into the local cache before processing continues - this flag prevents these additions to the internal cache as well. =item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL Enable both SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP and SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE at the same time. =back The default mode is SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode() returns the previously set cache mode. SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode() returns the currently set cache mode. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod0000644000000000000000000000312613176625661020414 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_verify_result - get result of peer certificate verification =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_verify_result() returns the result of the verification of the X509 certificate presented by the peer, if any. =head1 NOTES SSL_get_verify_result() can only return one error code while the verification of a certificate can fail because of many reasons at the same time. Only the last verification error that occurred during the processing is available from SSL_get_verify_result(). The verification result is part of the established session and is restored when a session is reused. =head1 BUGS If no peer certificate was presented, the returned result code is X509_V_OK. This is because no verification error occurred, it does however not indicate success. SSL_get_verify_result() is only useful in connection with L. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can currently occur: =over 4 =item X509_V_OK The verification succeeded or no peer certificate was presented. =item Any other value Documented in L. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.pod0000644000000000000000000000176713176625661020260 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher - retrieve the SSL cipher associated with a session =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSSION *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher() retrieves the cipher that was used by the connection when the session was created, or NULL if it cannot be determined. The value returned is a pointer to an object maintained within B and should not be released. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod0000644000000000000000000000503313176625661017663 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_add_session, SSL_add_session, SSL_CTX_remove_session, SSL_remove_session - manipulate session cache =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_add_session() adds the session B to the context B. The reference count for session B is incremented by 1. If a session with the same session id already exists, the old session is removed by calling L. SSL_CTX_remove_session() removes the session B from the context B. L is called once for B. SSL_add_session() and SSL_remove_session() are synonyms for their SSL_CTX_*() counterparts. =head1 NOTES When adding a new session to the internal session cache, it is examined whether a session with the same session id already exists. In this case it is assumed that both sessions are identical. If the same session is stored in a different SSL_SESSION object, The old session is removed and replaced by the new session. If the session is actually identical (the SSL_SESSION object is identical), SSL_CTX_add_session() is a no-op, and the return value is 0. If a server SSL_CTX is configured with the SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag then the internal cache will not be populated automatically by new sessions negotiated by the SSL/TLS implementation, even though the internal cache will be searched automatically for session-resume requests (the latter can be suppressed by SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP). So the application can use SSL_CTX_add_session() directly to have full control over the sessions that can be resumed if desired. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following values are returned by all functions: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The operation failed. In case of the add operation, it was tried to add the same (identical) session twice. In case of the remove operation, the session was not found in the cache. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod0000644000000000000000000000277113176625661016541 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME d2i_SSL_SESSION, i2d_SSL_SESSION - convert SSL_SESSION object from/to ASN1 representation =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions decode and encode an SSL_SESSION object. For encoding details see L. SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created from this SSL_CTX object). =head1 RETURN VALUES d2i_SSL_SESSION() returns a pointer to the newly allocated SSL_SESSION object. In case of failure the NULL-pointer is returned and the error message can be retrieved from the error stack. i2d_SSL_SESSION() returns the size of the ASN1 representation in bytes. When the session is not valid, B<0> is returned and no operation is performed. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod0000644000000000000000000000561513176625661021106 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list, SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list, SSL_set_max_cert_list, SSL_get_max_cert_list - manipulate allowed size for the peer's certificate chain =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, long size); long SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, long size); long SSL_get_max_cert_list(SSL *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list() sets the maximum size allowed for the peer's certificate chain for all SSL objects created from B to be bytes. The SSL objects inherit the setting valid for B at the time L is being called. SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list() returns the currently set maximum size for B. SSL_set_max_cert_list() sets the maximum size allowed for the peer's certificate chain for B to be bytes. This setting stays valid until a new value is set. SSL_get_max_cert_list() returns the currently set maximum size for B. =head1 NOTES During the handshake process, the peer may send a certificate chain. The TLS/SSL standard does not give any maximum size of the certificate chain. The OpenSSL library handles incoming data by a dynamically allocated buffer. In order to prevent this buffer from growing without bounds due to data received from a faulty or malicious peer, a maximum size for the certificate chain is set. The default value for the maximum certificate chain size is 100kB (30kB on the 16bit DOS platform). This should be sufficient for usual certificate chains (OpenSSL's default maximum chain length is 10, see L, and certificates without special extensions have a typical size of 1-2kB). For special applications it can be necessary to extend the maximum certificate chain size allowed to be sent by the peer, see e.g. the work on "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Proxy Certificate Profile" and "TLS Delegation Protocol" at http://www.ietf.org/ and http://www.globus.org/ . Under normal conditions it should never be necessary to set a value smaller than the default, as the buffer is handled dynamically and only uses the memory actually required by the data sent by the peer. If the maximum certificate chain size allowed is exceeded, the handshake will fail with a SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE error. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list() and SSL_set_max_cert_list() return the previously set value. SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list() and SSL_get_max_cert_list() return the currently set value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/DTLSv1_listen.pod0000644000000000000000000001062113176625660016522 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DTLSv1_listen - listen for incoming DTLS connections =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *ssl, BIO_ADDR *peer); =head1 DESCRIPTION DTLSv1_listen() listens for new incoming DTLS connections. If a ClientHello is received that does not contain a cookie, then DTLSv1_listen() responds with a HelloVerifyRequest. If a ClientHello is received with a cookie that is verified then control is returned to user code to enable the handshake to be completed (for example by using SSL_accept()). =head1 NOTES Datagram based protocols can be susceptible to Denial of Service attacks. A DTLS attacker could, for example, submit a series of handshake initiation requests that cause the server to allocate state (and possibly perform cryptographic operations) thus consuming server resources. The attacker could also (with UDP) quite simply forge the source IP address in such an attack. As a counter measure to that DTLS includes a stateless cookie mechanism. The idea is that when a client attempts to connect to a server it sends a ClientHello message. The server responds with a HelloVerifyRequest which contains a unique cookie. The client then resends the ClientHello, but this time includes the cookie in the message thus proving that the client is capable of receiving messages sent to that address. All of this can be done by the server without allocating any state, and thus without consuming expensive resources. OpenSSL implements this capability via the DTLSv1_listen() function. The B parameter should be a newly allocated SSL object with its read and write BIOs set, in the same way as might be done for a call to SSL_accept(). Typically the read BIO will be in an "unconnected" state and thus capable of receiving messages from any peer. When a ClientHello is received that contains a cookie that has been verified, then DTLSv1_listen() will return with the B parameter updated into a state where the handshake can be continued by a call to (for example) SSL_accept(). Additionally the B pointed to by B will be filled in with details of the peer that sent the ClientHello. If the underlying BIO is unable to obtain the B of the peer (for example because the BIO does not support this), then B<*peer> will be cleared and the family set to AF_UNSPEC. Typically user code is expected to "connect" the underlying socket to the peer and continue the handshake in a connected state. Prior to calling DTLSv1_listen() user code must ensure that cookie generation and verification callbacks have been set up using SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb() and SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb() respectively. Since DTLSv1_listen() operates entirely statelessly whilst processing incoming ClientHellos it is unable to process fragmented messages (since this would require the allocation of state). An implication of this is that DTLSv1_listen() B supports ClientHellos that fit inside a single datagram. =head1 RETURN VALUES From OpenSSL 1.1.0 a return value of >= 1 indicates success. In this instance the B value will be filled in and the B object set up ready to continue the handshake. A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for example) be because of non-blocking IO, or some invalid message having been received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error queue with further information if appropriate. Typically user code is expected to retry the call to DTLSv1_listen() in the event of a non-fatal error. Any old errors on the error queue will be cleared in the subsequent call. A return value of <0 indicates a fatal error. This could (for example) be because of a failure to allocate sufficient memory for the operation. Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 fatal and non-fatal errors both produce return codes <= 0 (in typical implementations user code treats all errors as non-fatal), whilst return codes >0 indicate success. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY DTLSv1_listen() return codes were clarified in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The type of "peer" also changed in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.pod0000644000000000000000000000603113176625661017714 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_sess_number, SSL_CTX_sess_connect, SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good, SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate, SSL_CTX_sess_accept, SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good, SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate, SSL_CTX_sess_hits, SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits, SSL_CTX_sess_misses, SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts, SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full - obtain session cache statistics =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_sess_number(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_accept(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_misses(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_sess_number() returns the current number of sessions in the internal session cache. SSL_CTX_sess_connect() returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in client mode. SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good() returns the number of successfully established SSL/TLS sessions in client mode. SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate() returns the number of start renegotiations in client mode. SSL_CTX_sess_accept() returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in server mode. SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good() returns the number of successfully established SSL/TLS sessions in server mode. SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate() returns the number of start renegotiations in server mode. SSL_CTX_sess_hits() returns the number of successfully reused sessions. In client mode a session set with L successfully reused is counted as a hit. In server mode a session successfully retrieved from internal or external cache is counted as a hit. SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits() returns the number of successfully retrieved sessions from the external session cache in server mode. SSL_CTX_sess_misses() returns the number of sessions proposed by clients that were not found in the internal session cache in server mode. SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts() returns the number of sessions proposed by clients and either found in the internal or external session cache in server mode, but that were invalid due to timeout. These sessions are not included in the SSL_CTX_sess_hits() count. SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full() returns the number of sessions that were removed because the maximum session cache size was exceeded. =head1 RETURN VALUES The functions return the values indicated in the DESCRIPTION section. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_random.pod0000644000000000000000000000644313176625661020335 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_client_random, SSL_get_server_random, SSL_SESSION_get_master_key - retrieve internal TLS/SSL random values and master key =head1 SYNOPSIS #include size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_client_random() extracts the random value sent from the client to the server during the initial SSL/TLS handshake. It copies as many bytes as it can of this value into the buffer provided in B, which must have at least B bytes available. It returns the total number of bytes that were actually copied. If B is zero, SSL_get_client_random() copies nothing, and returns the total size of the client_random value. SSL_get_server_random() behaves the same, but extracts the random value sent from the server to the client during the initial SSL/TLS handshake. SSL_SESSION_get_master_key() behaves the same, but extracts the master secret used to guarantee the security of the SSL/TLS session. This one can be dangerous if misused; see NOTES below. =head1 NOTES You probably shouldn't use these functions. These functions expose internal values from the TLS handshake, for use in low-level protocols. You probably should not use them, unless you are implementing something that needs access to the internal protocol details. Despite the names of SSL_get_client_random() and SSL_get_server_random(), they ARE NOT random number generators. Instead, they return the mostly-random values that were already generated and used in the TLS protocol. Using them in place of RAND_bytes() would be grossly foolish. The security of your TLS session depends on keeping the master key secret: do not expose it, or any information about it, to anybody. If you need to calculate another secret value that depends on the master secret, you should probably use SSL_export_keying_material() instead, and forget that you ever saw these functions. In current versions of the TLS protocols, the length of client_random (and also server_random) is always SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes. Support for other outlen arguments to the SSL_get_*_random() functions is provided in case of the unlikely event that a future version or variant of TLS uses some other length there. Finally, though the "client_random" and "server_random" values are called "random", many TLS implementations will generate four bytes of those values based on their view of the current time. =head1 RETURN VALUES If B is greater than 0, these functions return the number of bytes actually copied, which will be less than or equal to B. If B is 0, these functions return the maximum number of bytes they would copy--that is, the length of the underlying field. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_rbio.pod0000644000000000000000000000167513176625661016454 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_rbio, SSL_get_wbio - get BIO linked to an SSL object =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIO *SSL_get_rbio(SSL *ssl); BIO *SSL_get_wbio(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_rbio() and SSL_get_wbio() return pointers to the BIOs for the read or the write channel, which can be different. The reference count of the BIO is not incremented. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL No BIO was connected to the SSL object =item Any other pointer The BIO linked to B. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L , L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod0000644000000000000000000002036713176625661021207 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos, SSL_set_alpn_protos, SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb, SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb, SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb, SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated - handle application layer protocol negotiation (ALPN) =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len); int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len); void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len); void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg); void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg); int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B must be in protocol-list format, described below. The length of B is specified in B. SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B used by a server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B is NULL, ALPN is not used. The B value is a pointer which is passed to the application callback. B is the application defined callback. The B, B parameters are a vector in protocol-list format. The value of the B, B vector should be set to the value of a single protocol selected from the B, B vector. The B buffer may point directly into B, or to a buffer that outlives the handshake. The B parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(). SSL_select_next_proto() is a helper function used to select protocols. It implements the standard protocol selection. It is expected that this function is called from the application callback B. The protocol data in B, B and B, B must be in the protocol-list format described below. The first item in the B, B list that matches an item in the B, B list is selected, and returned in B, B. The B value will point into either B or B, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first item in B, B is returned in B, B. This function can also be used in the NPN callback. SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B that is called when a client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a user-defined pointer argument B which will be passed to this callback. For the callback itself, B must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B). The length of the protocol name must be written into B. The server's advertised protocols are provided in B and B. The callback can assume that B is syntactically valid. The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than B. The B parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(). SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B that is called when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol Negotiation. The returned list must be in protocol-list format, described below. The list is returned by setting B to point to it and B to its length. This memory will not be modified, but the B does keep a reference to it. The callback should return B if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the ServerHello. SSL_get0_alpn_selected() returns a pointer to the selected protocol in B with length B. It is not NUL-terminated. B is set to NULL and B is set to 0 if no protocol has been selected. B must not be freed. SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated() sets B and B to point to the client's requested protocol for this connection. If the client did not request any protocol or NPN is not enabled, then B is set to NULL and B to 0. Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols provided by the callback. =head1 NOTES The protocol-lists must be in wire-format, which is defined as a vector of non-empty, 8-bit length-prefixed, byte strings. The length-prefix byte is not included in the length. Each string is limited to 255 bytes. A byte-string length of 0 is invalid. A truncated byte-string is invalid. The length of the vector is not in the vector itself, but in a separate variable. Example: unsigned char vector[] = { 6, 's', 'p', 'd', 'y', '/', '1', 8, 'h', 't', 't', 'p', '/', '1', '.', '1' }; unsigned int length = sizeof(vector); The ALPN callback is executed after the servername callback; as that servername callback may update the SSL_CTX, and subsequently, the ALPN callback. If there is no ALPN proposed in the ClientHello, the ALPN callback is not invoked. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() return 0 on success, and non-0 on failure. WARNING: these functions reverse the return value convention. SSL_select_next_proto() returns one of the following: =over 4 =item OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED A match was found and is returned in B, B. =item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP No match was found. The first item in B, B is returned in B, B. =back The ALPN select callback B, must return one of the following: =over 4 =item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK ALPN protocol selected. =item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL There was no overlap between the client's supplied list and the server configuration. =item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK ALPN protocol not selected, e.g., because no ALPN protocols are configured for this connection. =back The callback set using SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() should return B if successful. Any other value is fatal to the connection. The callback set using SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() should return B if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the ServerHello. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd_argv.pod0000644000000000000000000000253113176625660017240 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CONF_cmd_argv - SSL configuration command line processing =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, int *pargc, char ***pargv); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function SSL_CONF_cmd_argv() processes at most two command line arguments from B and B. The values of B and B are updated to reflect the number of command options processed. The B argument can be set to B is it is not used. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CONF_cmd_argv() returns the number of command arguments processed: 0, 1, 2 or a negative error code. If -2 is returned then an argument for a command is missing. If -1 is returned the command is recognised but couldn't be processed due to an error: for example a syntax error in the argument. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod0000644000000000000000000000365613176625661020311 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead, SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead, SSL_set_read_ahead, SSL_get_read_ahead, SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead - manage whether to read as many input bytes as possible =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s); SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes); long SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() and SSL_set_read_ahead() set whether we should read as many input bytes as possible (for non-blocking reads) or not. For example if B bytes are currently required by OpenSSL, but B bytes are available from the underlying BIO (where B > B), then OpenSSL will read all B bytes into its buffer (providing that the buffer is large enough) if reading ahead is on, or B bytes otherwise. The parameter B or B should be 0 to ensure reading ahead is off, or non zero otherwise. SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead() is identical to SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(). SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead() and SSL_get_read_ahead() indicate whether reading ahead has been set or not. =head1 NOTES These functions have no impact when used with DTLS. The return values for SSL_CTX_get_read_head() and SSL_get_read_ahead() are undefined for DTLS. Setting B can impact the behaviour of the SSL_pending() function (see L). =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_get_read_ahead() and SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead() return 0 if reading ahead is off, and non zero otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version.pod0000644000000000000000000000451213176625661022017 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version, SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version, SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version, SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version, SSL_set_min_proto_version, SSL_set_max_proto_version, SSL_get_min_proto_version, SSL_get_max_proto_version - Get and set minimum and maximum supported protocol version =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, int version); int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, int version); int SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_set_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl, int version); int SSL_set_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl, int version); int SSL_get_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl); int SSL_get_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION The functions get or set the minimum and maximum supported protocol versions for the B or B. This works in combination with the options set via L that also make it possible to disable specific protocol versions. Use these functions instead of disabling specific protocol versions. Setting the minimum or maximum version to 0, will enable protocol versions down to the lowest version, or up to the highest version supported by the library, respectively. Getters return 0 in case B or B have been configured to automatically use the lowest or highest version supported by the library. Currently supported versions are B, B, B, B for TLS and B, B for DTLS. =head1 RETURN VALUES These setter functions return 1 on success and 0 on failure. The getter functions return the configured version or 0 for auto-configuration of lowest or highest protocol, respectively. =head1 NOTES All these functions are implemented using macros. =head1 HISTORY The setter functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The getter functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod0000644000000000000000000001265513176625661016652 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_error - obtain result code for TLS/SSL I/O operation =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_error() returns a result code (suitable for the C "switch" statement) for a preceding call to SSL_connect(), SSL_accept(), SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), or SSL_write() on B. The value returned by that TLS/SSL I/O function must be passed to SSL_get_error() in parameter B. In addition to B and B, SSL_get_error() inspects the current thread's OpenSSL error queue. Thus, SSL_get_error() must be used in the same thread that performed the TLS/SSL I/O operation, and no other OpenSSL function calls should appear in between. The current thread's error queue must be empty before the TLS/SSL I/O operation is attempted, or SSL_get_error() will not work reliably. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can currently occur: =over 4 =item SSL_ERROR_NONE The TLS/SSL I/O operation completed. This result code is returned if and only if B 0>. =item SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN The TLS/SSL connection has been closed. If the protocol version is SSL 3.0 or higher, this result code is returned only if a closure alert has occurred in the protocol, i.e. if the connection has been closed cleanly. Note that in this case B does not necessarily indicate that the underlying transport has been closed. =item SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ, SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. If, by then, the underlying B has data available for reading (if the result code is B) or allows writing data (B), then some TLS/SSL protocol progress will take place, i.e. at least part of an TLS/SSL record will be read or written. Note that the retry may again lead to a B or B condition. There is no fixed upper limit for the number of iterations that may be necessary until progress becomes visible at application protocol level. For socket Bs (e.g. when SSL_set_fd() was used), select() or poll() on the underlying socket can be used to find out when the TLS/SSL I/O function should be retried. Caveat: Any TLS/SSL I/O function can lead to either of B and B. In particular, SSL_read() or SSL_peek() may want to write data and SSL_write() may want to read data. This is mainly because TLS/SSL handshakes may occur at any time during the protocol (initiated by either the client or the server); SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), and SSL_write() will handle any pending handshakes. =item SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT, SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. The underlying BIO was not connected yet to the peer and the call would block in connect()/accept(). The SSL function should be called again when the connection is established. These messages can only appear with a BIO_s_connect() or BIO_s_accept() BIO, respectively. In order to find out, when the connection has been successfully established, on many platforms select() or poll() for writing on the socket file descriptor can be used. =item SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP The operation did not complete because an application callback set by SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() has asked to be called again. The TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. Details depend on the application. =item SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC The operation did not complete because an asynchronous engine is still processing data. This will only occur if the mode has been set to SSL_MODE_ASYNC using L or L and an asynchronous capable engine is being used. An application can determine whether the engine has completed its processing using select() or poll() on the asynchronous wait file descriptor. This file descriptor is available by calling L or L. The TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. The function B be called from the same thread that the original call was made from. =item SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB The asynchronous job could not be started because there were no async jobs available in the pool (see ASYNC_init_thread(3)). This will only occur if the mode has been set to SSL_MODE_ASYNC using L or L and a maximum limit has been set on the async job pool through a call to L. The application should retry the operation after a currently executing asynchronous operation for the current thread has completed. =item SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL Some non-recoverable I/O error occurred. The OpenSSL error queue may contain more information on the error. For socket I/O on Unix systems, consult B for details. =item SSL_ERROR_SSL A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error. The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod0000644000000000000000000000500713176625661015741 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_clear - reset SSL object to allow another connection =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION Reset B to allow another connection. All settings (method, ciphers, BIOs) are kept. =head1 NOTES SSL_clear is used to prepare an SSL object for a new connection. While all settings are kept, a side effect is the handling of the current SSL session. If a session is still B, it is considered bad and will be removed from the session cache, as required by RFC2246. A session is considered open, if L was not called for the connection or at least L was used to set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN state. If a session was closed cleanly, the session object will be kept and all settings corresponding. This explicitly means, that e.g. the special method used during the session will be kept for the next handshake. So if the session was a TLSv1 session, a SSL client object will use a TLSv1 client method for the next handshake and a SSL server object will use a TLSv1 server method, even if TLS_*_methods were chosen on startup. This will might lead to connection failures (see L) for a description of the method's properties. =head1 WARNINGS SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions (some of these settings were made automatically during the last handshake). It only makes sense for a new connection with the exact same peer that shares these settings, and may fail if that peer changes its settings between connections. Use the sequence L; L; L; L instead to avoid such failures (or simply L; L if session reuse is not desired). =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The SSL_clear() operation could not be performed. Check the error stack to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The SSL_clear() operation was successful. =back L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix.pod0000644000000000000000000000327413176625660020432 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix - Set configuration context command prefix =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *prefix); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix() sets the command prefix of B to B. If B is B it is restored to the default value. =head1 NOTES Command prefixes alter the commands recognised by subsequent SSL_CTX_cmd() calls. For example for files, if the prefix "SSL" is set then command names such as "SSLProtocol", "SSLOptions" etc. are recognised instead of "Protocol" and "Options". Similarly for command lines if the prefix is "--ssl-" then "--ssl-no_tls1_2" is recognised instead of "-no_tls1_2". If the B flag is set then prefix checks are case sensitive and "-" is the default. In the unlikely even an application explicitly wants to set no prefix it must be explicitly set to "". If the B flag is set then prefix checks are case insensitive and no prefix is the default. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod0000644000000000000000000004624013176625660016226 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type, SSL_CONF_finish, SSL_CONF_cmd - send configuration command =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value); int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd); int SSL_CONF_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function SSL_CONF_cmd() performs configuration operation B with optional parameter B on B. Its purpose is to simplify application configuration of B or B structures by providing a common framework for command line options or configuration files. SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() returns the type of value that B refers to. The function SSL_CONF_finish() must be called after all configuration operations have been completed. It is used to finalise any operations or to process defaults. =head1 SUPPORTED COMMAND LINE COMMANDS Currently supported B names for command lines (i.e. when the flag B is set) are listed below. Note: all B names are case sensitive. Unless otherwise stated commands can be used by both clients and servers and the B parameter is not used. The default prefix for command line commands is B<-> and that is reflected below. =over 4 =item B<-sigalgs> This sets the supported signature algorithms for TLS v1.2. For clients this value is used directly for the supported signature algorithms extension. For servers it is used to determine which signature algorithms to support. The B argument should be a colon separated list of signature algorithms in order of decreasing preference of the form B. B is one of B, B or B and B is a supported algorithm OID short name such as B, B, B, B of B. Note: algorithm and hash names are case sensitive. If this option is not set then all signature algorithms supported by the OpenSSL library are permissible. =item B<-client_sigalgs> This sets the supported signature algorithms associated with client authentication for TLS v1.2. For servers the value is used in the supported signature algorithms field of a certificate request. For clients it is used to determine which signature algorithm to with the client certificate. If a server does not request a certificate this option has no effect. The syntax of B is identical to B<-sigalgs>. If not set then the value set for B<-sigalgs> will be used instead. =item B<-curves> This sets the supported elliptic curves. For clients the curves are sent using the supported curves extension. For servers it is used to determine which curve to use. This setting affects curves used for both signatures and key exchange, if applicable. The B argument is a colon separated list of curves. The curve can be either the B name (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g B). Curve names are case sensitive. =item B<-named_curve> This sets the temporary curve used for ephemeral ECDH modes. Only used by servers The B argument is a curve name or the special value B which picks an appropriate curve based on client and server preferences. The curve can be either the B name (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g B). Curve names are case sensitive. =item B<-cipher> Sets the cipher suite list to B. Note: syntax checking of B is currently not performed unless a B or B structure is associated with B. =item B<-cert> Attempts to use the file B as the certificate for the appropriate context. It currently uses SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() if an B structure is set or SSL_use_certificate_file() with filetype PEM if an B structure is set. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B<-key> Attempts to use the file B as the private key for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. Note: if no B<-key> option is set then a private key is not loaded unless the flag B is set. =item B<-dhparam> Attempts to use the file B as the set of temporary DH parameters for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B<-min_protocol>, B<-max_protocol> Sets the minimum and maximum supported protocol. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B for TLS and B, B for DTLS, and B for no limit. If the either bound is not specified then only the other bound applies, if specified. To restrict the supported protocol versions use these commands rather than the deprecated alternative commands below. =item B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2> Disables protocol support for SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2 by setting the corresponding options B, B, B and B respectively. These options are deprecated, instead use B<-min_protocol> and B<-max_protocol>. =item B<-bugs> Various bug workarounds are set, same as setting B. =item B<-comp> Enables support for SSL/TLS compression, same as clearing B. This command was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, compression is off by default. =item B<-no_comp> Disables support for SSL/TLS compression, same as setting B. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, compression is off by default. =item B<-no_ticket> Disables support for session tickets, same as setting B. =item B<-serverpref> Use server and not client preference order when determining which cipher suite, signature algorithm or elliptic curve to use for an incoming connection. Equivalent to B. Only used by servers. =item B<-no_resumption_on_reneg> set SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION flag. Only used by servers. =item B<-legacyrenegotiation> permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation. Equivalent to setting B. =item B<-legacy_server_connect>, B<-no_legacy_server_connect> permits or prohibits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation for OpenSSL clients only. Equivalent to setting or clearing B. Set by default. =item B<-strict> enables strict mode protocol handling. Equivalent to setting B. =back =head1 SUPPORTED CONFIGURATION FILE COMMANDS Currently supported B names for configuration files (i.e. when the flag B is set) are listed below. All configuration file B names are case insensitive so B is recognised as well as B. Unless otherwise stated the B names are also case insensitive. Note: the command prefix (if set) alters the recognised B values. =over 4 =item B Sets the cipher suite list to B. Note: syntax checking of B is currently not performed unless an B or B structure is associated with B. =item B Attempts to use the file B as the certificate for the appropriate context. It currently uses SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() if an B structure is set or SSL_use_certificate_file() with filetype PEM if an B structure is set. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B Attempts to use the file B as the private key for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. Note: if no B option is set then a private key is not loaded unless the B is set. =item B, B, B, B These options indicate a file or directory used for building certificate chains or verifying certificate chains. These options are only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B Attempts to use the file B in the "serverinfo" extension using the function SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file. =item B Attempts to use the file B as the set of temporary DH parameters for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B This sets the supported signature algorithms for TLS v1.2. For clients this value is used directly for the supported signature algorithms extension. For servers it is used to determine which signature algorithms to support. The B argument should be a colon separated list of signature algorithms in order of decreasing preference of the form B. B is one of B, B or B and B is a supported algorithm OID short name such as B, B, B, B of B. Note: algorithm and hash names are case sensitive. If this option is not set then all signature algorithms supported by the OpenSSL library are permissible. =item B This sets the supported signature algorithms associated with client authentication for TLS v1.2. For servers the value is used in the supported signature algorithms field of a certificate request. For clients it is used to determine which signature algorithm to with the client certificate. The syntax of B is identical to B. If not set then the value set for B will be used instead. =item B This sets the supported elliptic curves. For clients the curves are sent using the supported curves extension. For servers it is used to determine which curve to use. This setting affects curves used for both signatures and key exchange, if applicable. The B argument is a colon separated list of curves. The curve can be either the B name (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g B). Curve names are case sensitive. =item B This sets the minimum supported SSL, TLS or DTLS version. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B and B. The value B will disable the limit. =item B This sets the maximum supported SSL, TLS or DTLS version. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B and B. The value B will disable the limit. =item B This can be used to enable or disable certain versions of the SSL, TLS or DTLS protocol. The B argument is a comma separated list of supported protocols to enable or disable. If a protocol is preceded by B<-> that version is disabled. All protocol versions are enabled by default. You need to disable at least one protocol version for this setting have any effect. Only enabling some protocol versions does not disable the other protocol versions. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B and B. The special value B refers to all supported versions. This can't enable protocols that are disabled using B or B, but can disable protocols that are still allowed by them. The B command is fragile and deprecated; do not use it. Use B and B instead. If you do use B, make sure that the resulting range of enabled protocols has no "holes", e.g. if TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 are both enabled, make sure to also leave TLS 1.1 enabled. =item B The B argument is a comma separated list of various flags to set. If a flag string is preceded B<-> it is disabled. See the L function for more details of individual options. Each option is listed below. Where an operation is enabled by default the B<-flag> syntax is needed to disable it. B: session ticket support, enabled by default. Inverse of B: that is B<-SessionTicket> is the same as setting B. B: SSL/TLS compression support, enabled by default. Inverse of B. B: use empty fragments as a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers. It is set by default. Inverse of B. B: enable various bug workarounds. Same as B. B: enable single use DH keys, set by default. Inverse of B. Only used by servers. B enable single use ECDH keys, set by default. Inverse of B. Only used by servers. B use server and not client preference order when determining which cipher suite, signature algorithm or elliptic curve to use for an incoming connection. Equivalent to B. Only used by servers. B set B flag. Only used by servers. B permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation. Equivalent to B. B permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation for OpenSSL clients only. Equivalent to B. Set by default. =item B The B argument is a comma separated list of flags to set. B enables peer verification: for clients only. B requests but does not require a certificate from the client. Servers only. B requests and requires a certificate from the client: an error occurs if the client does not present a certificate. Servers only. B requests a certificate from a client only on the initial connection: not when renegotiating. Servers only. =item B, B A file or directory of certificates in PEM format whose names are used as the set of acceptable names for client CAs. Servers only. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =back =head1 SUPPORTED COMMAND TYPES The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() currently returns one of the following types: =over 4 =item B The B string is unrecognised, this return value can be use to flag syntax errors. =item B The value is a string without any specific structure. =item B The value is a file name. =item B The value is a directory name. =item B The value string is not used e.g. a command line option which doesn't take an argument. =back =head1 NOTES The order of operations is significant. This can be used to set either defaults or values which cannot be overridden. For example if an application calls: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3"); SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue); it will disable SSLv3 support by default but the user can override it. If however the call sequence is: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue); SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3"); SSLv3 is B disabled and attempt to override this by the user are ignored. By checking the return code of SSL_CTX_cmd() it is possible to query if a given B is recognised, this is useful is SSL_CTX_cmd() values are mixed with additional application specific operations. For example an application might call SSL_CTX_cmd() and if it returns -2 (unrecognised command) continue with processing of application specific commands. Applications can also use SSL_CTX_cmd() to process command lines though the utility function SSL_CTX_cmd_argv() is normally used instead. One way to do this is to set the prefix to an appropriate value using SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(), pass the current argument to B and the following argument to B (which may be NULL). In this case if the return value is positive then it is used to skip that number of arguments as they have been processed by SSL_CTX_cmd(). If -2 is returned then B is not recognised and application specific arguments can be checked instead. If -3 is returned a required argument is missing and an error is indicated. If 0 is returned some other error occurred and this can be reported back to the user. The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() can be used by applications to check for the existence of a command or to perform additional syntax checking or translation of the command value. For example if the return value is B an application could translate a relative pathname to an absolute pathname. =head1 EXAMPLES Set supported signature algorithms: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "SignatureAlgorithms", "ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA256:DSA+SHA256"); There are various ways to select the supported protocols. This set the minimum protocol version to TLSv1, and so disables SSLv3. This is the recommended way to disable protocols. SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MinProtocol", "TLSv1"); The following also disables SSLv3: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3"); The following will first enable all protocols, and then disable SSLv3. If no protocol versions were disabled before this has the same effect as "-SSLv3", but if some versions were disables this will re-enable them before disabling SSLv3. SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "ALL,-SSLv3"); Only enable TLSv1.2: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MinProtocol", "TLSv1.2"); SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MaxProtocol", "TLSv1.2"); This also only enables TLSv1.2: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-ALL,TLSv1.2"); Disable TLS session tickets: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "-SessionTicket"); Enable compression: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "Compression"); Set supported curves to P-256, P-384: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Curves", "P-256:P-384"); Set automatic support for any elliptic curve for key exchange: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "ECDHParameters", "Automatic"); =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CONF_cmd() returns 1 if the value of B is recognised and B is B used and 2 if both B and B are used. In other words it returns the number of arguments processed. This is useful when processing command lines. A return value of -2 means B is not recognised. A return value of -3 means B is recognised and the command requires a value but B is NULL. A return code of 0 indicates that both B and B are valid but an error occurred attempting to perform the operation: for example due to an error in the syntax of B in this case the error queue may provide additional information. SSL_CONF_finish() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_CONF_cmd() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2 B doesn't have effect since 1.1.0, but the macro is retained for backwards compatibility. B was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. In earlier versions of OpenSSL passing a command which didn't take an argument would return B. B and B where added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod0000644000000000000000000001175013176625661021015 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_info_callback, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback, SSL_set_info_callback, SSL_get_info_callback - handle information callback for SSL connections =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*callback)()); void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(); void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*callback)()); void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_info_callback() sets the B function, that can be used to obtain state information for SSL objects created from B during connection setup and use. The setting for B is overridden from the setting for a specific SSL object, if specified. When B is NULL, no callback function is used. SSL_set_info_callback() sets the B function, that can be used to obtain state information for B during connection setup and use. When B is NULL, the callback setting currently valid for B is used. SSL_CTX_get_info_callback() returns a pointer to the currently set information callback function for B. SSL_get_info_callback() returns a pointer to the currently set information callback function for B. =head1 NOTES When setting up a connection and during use, it is possible to obtain state information from the SSL/TLS engine. When set, an information callback function is called whenever the state changes, an alert appears, or an error occurs. The callback function is called as B. The B argument specifies information about where (in which context) the callback function was called. If B is 0, an error condition occurred. If an alert is handled, SSL_CB_ALERT is set and B specifies the alert information. B is a bitmask made up of the following bits: =over 4 =item SSL_CB_LOOP Callback has been called to indicate state change inside a loop. =item SSL_CB_EXIT Callback has been called to indicate error exit of a handshake function. (May be soft error with retry option for non-blocking setups.) =item SSL_CB_READ Callback has been called during read operation. =item SSL_CB_WRITE Callback has been called during write operation. =item SSL_CB_ALERT Callback has been called due to an alert being sent or received. =item SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ) =item SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE) =item SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP) =item SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT) =item SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP) =item SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT) =item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START Callback has been called because a new handshake is started. =item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 Callback has been called because a handshake is finished. =back The current state information can be obtained using the L family of functions. The B information can be evaluated using the L family of functions. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_set_info_callback() does not provide diagnostic information. SSL_get_info_callback() returns the current setting. =head1 EXAMPLES The following example callback function prints state strings, information about alerts being handled and error messages to the B BIO. void apps_ssl_info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret) { const char *str; int w; w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK; if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT) str = "SSL_connect"; else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) str = "SSL_accept"; else str = "undefined"; if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:%s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n", str, SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) { if (ret == 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:failed in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); else if (ret < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:error in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } } } =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod0000644000000000000000000001711113176625661016161 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME TLSv1_2_method, TLSv1_2_server_method, TLSv1_2_client_method, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_CTX_up_ref, SSLv3_method, SSLv3_server_method, SSLv3_client_method, TLSv1_method, TLSv1_server_method, TLSv1_client_method, TLSv1_1_method, TLSv1_1_server_method, TLSv1_1_client_method, TLS_method, TLS_server_method, TLS_client_method, SSLv23_method, SSLv23_server_method, SSLv23_client_method, DTLS_method, DTLS_server_method, DTLS_client_method, DTLSv1_method, DTLSv1_server_method, DTLSv1_client_method, DTLSv1_2_method, DTLSv1_2_server_method, DTLSv1_2_client_method - create a new SSL_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL or DTLS enabled functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method); int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx); const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void); #endif const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_client_method(void); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void); const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_new() creates a new B object as framework to establish TLS/SSL or DTLS enabled connections. An B object is reference counted. Creating an B object for the first time increments the reference count. Freeing it (using SSL_CTX_free) decrements it. When the reference count drops to zero, any memory or resources allocated to the B object are freed. SSL_CTX_up_ref() increments the reference count for an existing B structure. =head1 NOTES The SSL_CTX object uses B as connection method. The methods exist in a generic type (for client and server use), a server only type, and a client only type. B can be of the following types: =over 4 =item TLS_method(), TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method() These are the general-purpose I SSL/TLS methods. The actual protocol version used will be negotiated to the highest version mutually supported by the client and the server. The supported protocols are SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2. Applications should use these methods, and avoid the version-specific methods described below. =item SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv23_client_method() Use of these functions is deprecated. They have been replaced with the above TLS_method(), TLS_server_method() and TLS_client_method() respectively. New code should use those functions instead. =item TLSv1_2_method(), TLSv1_2_server_method(), TLSv1_2_client_method() A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the TLSv1.2 protocol. =item TLSv1_1_method(), TLSv1_1_server_method(), TLSv1_1_client_method() A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the TLSv1.1 protocol. =item TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), TLSv1_client_method() A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the TLSv1 protocol. =item SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), SSLv3_client_method() A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the SSLv3 protocol. The SSLv3 protocol is deprecated and should not be used. =item DTLS_method(), DTLS_server_method(), DTLS_client_method() These are the version-flexible DTLS methods. Currently supported protocols are DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2. =item DTLSv1_2_method(), DTLSv1_2_server_method(), DTLSv1_2_client_method() These are the version-specific methods for DTLSv1.2. =item DTLSv1_method(), DTLSv1_server_method(), DTLSv1_client_method() These are the version-specific methods for DTLSv1. =back SSL_CTX_new() initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting, the callbacks, the keys and certificates and the options to their default values. TLS_method(), TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), DTLS_method(), DTLS_server_method() and DTLS_client_method() are the I methods. All other methods only support one specific protocol version. Use the I methods instead of the version specific methods. If you want to limit the supported protocols for the version flexible methods you can use L, L, L and L functions. Using these functions it is possible to choose e.g. TLS_server_method() and be able to negotiate with all possible clients, but to only allow newer protocols like TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2. The list of protocols available can also be limited using the B, B, B and B options of the L or L functions, but this approach is not recommended. Clients should avoid creating "holes" in the set of protocols they support. When disabling a protocol, make sure that you also disable either all previous or all subsequent protocol versions. In clients, when a protocol version is disabled without disabling I previous protocol versions, the effect is to also disable all subsequent protocol versions. The SSLv3 protocol is deprecated and should generally not be used. Applications should typically use L to set the minimum protocol to at least B. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL The creation of a new SSL_CTX object failed. Check the error stack to find out the reason. =item Pointer to an SSL_CTX object The return value points to an allocated SSL_CTX object. SSL_CTX_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =back =head1 HISTORY Support for SSLv2 and the corresponding SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_server_method() and SSLv2_client_method() functions where removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0. SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_server_method() and SSLv23_client_method() were deprecated and the preferred TLS_method(), TLS_server_method() and TLS_client_method() functions were introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0. All version-specific methods were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod0000644000000000000000000000500413176625661016301 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_connect - initiate the TLS/SSL handshake with an TLS/SSL server =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_connect() initiates the TLS/SSL handshake with a server. The communication channel must already have been set and assigned to the B by setting an underlying B. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of SSL_connect() depends on the underlying BIO. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_connect() will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred. If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_connect() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_connect() to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_connect() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_connect(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been established. =item E0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_library_init.pod0000644000000000000000000000236613176625661017347 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_library_init, OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms - initialize SSL library by registering algorithms =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_library_init(void); int OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_library_init() registers the available SSL/TLS ciphers and digests. OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() is a synonym for SSL_library_init() and is implemented as a macro. =head1 NOTES SSL_library_init() must be called before any other action takes place. SSL_library_init() is not reentrant. =head1 WARNING SSL_library_init() adds ciphers and digests used directly and indirectly by SSL/TLS. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_library_init() always returns "1", so it is safe to discard the return value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY The SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() functions were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by OPENSSL_init_ssl(). =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_rstate_string.pod0000644000000000000000000000303313176625661017540 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_rstate_string, SSL_rstate_string_long - get textual description of state of an SSL object during read operation =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const char *SSL_rstate_string(SSL *ssl); const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_rstate_string() returns a 2 letter string indicating the current read state of the SSL object B. SSL_rstate_string_long() returns a string indicating the current read state of the SSL object B. =head1 NOTES When performing a read operation, the SSL/TLS engine must parse the record, consisting of header and body. When working in a blocking environment, SSL_rstate_string[_long]() should always return "RD"/"read done". This function should only seldom be needed in applications. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_rstate_string() and SSL_rstate_string_long() can return the following values: =over 4 =item "RH"/"read header" The header of the record is being evaluated. =item "RB"/"read body" The body of the record is being evaluated. =item "RD"/"read done" The record has been completely processed. =item "unknown"/"unknown" The read state is unknown. This should never happen. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod0000644000000000000000000000457713176625661021516 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert, SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs - add or clear extra chain certificates =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); long SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B to the extra chain certificates associated with B. Several certificates can be added one after another. SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() clears all extra chain certificates associated with B. These functions are implemented as macros. =head1 NOTES When sending a certificate chain, extra chain certificates are sent in order following the end entity certificate. If no chain is specified, the library will try to complete the chain from the available CA certificates in the trusted CA storage, see L. The B certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be freed by the library when the B is destroyed. An application B free the B object. =head1 RESTRICTIONS Only one set of extra chain certificates can be specified per SSL_CTX structure. Different chains for different certificates (for example if both RSA and DSA certificates are specified by the same server) or different SSL structures with the same parent SSL_CTX cannot be specified using this function. For more flexibility functions such as SSL_add1_chain_cert() should be used instead. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() and SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() return 1 on success and 0 for failure. Check out the error stack to find out the reason for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L L L L L L L L L L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod0000644000000000000000000000533413176625661022404 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback - set peer certificate verification procedure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() sets the verification callback function for I. SSL objects that are created from I inherit the setting valid at the time when L is called. =head1 NOTES Whenever a certificate is verified during a SSL/TLS handshake, a verification function is called. If the application does not explicitly specify a verification callback function, the built-in verification function is used. If a verification callback I is specified via SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), the supplied callback function is called instead. By setting I to NULL, the default behaviour is restored. When the verification must be performed, I will be called with the arguments callback(X509_STORE_CTX *x509_store_ctx, void *arg). The argument I is specified by the application when setting I. I should return 1 to indicate verification success and 0 to indicate verification failure. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set and I returns 0, the handshake will fail. As the verification procedure may allow to continue the connection in case of failure (by always returning 1) the verification result must be set in any case using the B member of I so that the calling application will be informed about the detailed result of the verification procedure! Within I, I has access to the I function set using L. =head1 WARNINGS Do not mix the verification callback described in this function with the B function called during the verification process. The latter is set using the L family of functions. Providing a complete verification procedure including certificate purpose settings etc is a complex task. The built-in procedure is quite powerful and in most cases it should be sufficient to modify its behaviour using the B function. =head1 BUGS SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() does not provide diagnostic information. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext.pod0000644000000000000000000000157113176625661021756 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext - check whether a handler exists for a particular client extension type =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext() checks whether a handler has been set for a client extension of type B using SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(). =head1 RETURN VALUES Returns 1 if a handler has been set, 0 otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod0000644000000000000000000000437413176625660020152 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags, SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags - Set of clear SSL configuration context flags =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags); unsigned int SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags() sets B in the context B. The function SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags() clears B in the context B. =head1 NOTES The flags set affect how subsequent calls to SSL_CONF_cmd() or SSL_CONF_argv() behave. Currently the following B values are recognised: =over 4 =item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE recognise options intended for command line or configuration file use. At least one of these flags must be set. =item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER recognise options intended for use in SSL/TLS clients or servers. One or both of these flags must be set. =item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE recognise certificate and private key options. =item SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE If this option is set then if a private key is not specified for a certificate it will attempt to load a private key from the certificate file when SSL_CONF_CTX_finish() is called. If a key cannot be loaded from the certificate file an error occurs. =item SSL_CONF_FLAG_SHOW_ERRORS indicate errors relating to unrecognised options or missing arguments in the error queue. If this option isn't set such errors are only reflected in the return values of SSL_CONF_set_cmd() or SSL_CONF_set_argv() =back =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags() and SSL_CONF_CTX_clear_flags() returns the new flags value after setting or clearing flags. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2012-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod0000644000000000000000000000521213176625661016275 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_pending, SSL_has_pending - check for readable bytes buffered in an SSL object =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION Data is received in whole blocks known as records from the peer. A whole record is processed (e.g. decrypted) in one go and is buffered by OpenSSL until it is read by the application via a call to L. SSL_pending() returns the number of bytes which have been processed, buffered and are available inside B for immediate read. If the B object's I flag is set (see L), additional protocol bytes (beyond the current record) may have been read containing more TLS/SSL records. This also applies to DTLS and pipelining (see L). These additional bytes will be buffered by OpenSSL but will remain unprocessed until they are needed. As these bytes are still in an unprocessed state SSL_pending() will ignore them. Therefore it is possible for no more bytes to be readable from the underlying BIO (because OpenSSL has already read them) and for SSL_pending() to return 0, even though readable application data bytes are available (because the data is in unprocessed buffered records). SSL_has_pending() returns 1 if B has buffered data (whether processed or unprocessed) and 0 otherwise. Note that it is possible for SSL_has_pending() to return 1, and then a subsequent call to SSL_read() to return no data because the unprocessed buffered data when processed yielded no application data (for example this can happen during renegotiation). It is also possible in this scenario for SSL_has_pending() to continue to return 1 even after an SSL_read() call because the buffered and unprocessed data is not yet processable (e.g. because OpenSSL has only received a partial record so far). =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_pending() returns the number of buffered and processed application data bytes that are pending and are available for immediate read. SSL_has_pending() returns 1 if there is buffered record data in the SSL object and 0 otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The SSL_has_pending() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod0000644000000000000000000000462013176625661020415 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_cert_store, SSL_CTX_get_cert_store - manipulate X509 certificate verification storage =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store); X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() sets/replaces the certificate verification storage of B to/with B. If another X509_STORE object is currently set in B, it will be X509_STORE_free()ed. SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() returns a pointer to the current certificate verification storage. =head1 NOTES In order to verify the certificates presented by the peer, trusted CA certificates must be accessed. These CA certificates are made available via lookup methods, handled inside the X509_STORE. From the X509_STORE the X509_STORE_CTX used when verifying certificates is created. Typically the trusted certificate store is handled indirectly via using L. Using the SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() and SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() functions it is possible to manipulate the X509_STORE object beyond the L call. Currently no detailed documentation on how to use the X509_STORE object is available. Not all members of the X509_STORE are used when the verification takes place. So will e.g. the verify_callback() be overridden with the verify_callback() set via the L family of functions. This document must therefore be updated when documentation about the X509_STORE object and its handling becomes available. =head1 RESTRICTIONS The X509_STORE structure used by an SSL_CTX is used for verifying peer certificates and building certificate chains, it is also shared by every child SSL structure. Applications wanting finer control can use functions such as SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store() instead. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() does not return diagnostic output. SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() returns the current setting. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod0000644000000000000000000002363713176625661017750 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options, SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options, SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support - manipulate SSL options =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options); long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); long SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options); long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl); long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B to B. SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B to B. SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B. SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B. SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer supports secure renegotiation. Note, this is implemented via a macro. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options. The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a bitwise B operation (|). SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of the API can be changed by using the similar L and SSL_set_mode() functions. During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used. When a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(), the current option setting is copied. Changes to B do not affect already created SSL objects. SSL_clear() does not affect the settings. The following B options are available: =over 4 =item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER ... =item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers. =item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some broken SSL implementations. This option has no effect for connections using other ciphers. =item SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never between 256 and 511 bytes in length. This is needed as a workaround for some implementations. =item SSL_OP_ALL All of the above bug workarounds. =back It is usually safe to use B to enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is desired. The following B options are available: =over 4 =item SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG Disable version rollback attack detection. During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the first hello. Some clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example: the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.) =item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parameters (see L). This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when the DH parameters were not generated using "strong" primes (e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see L). If "strong" primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate a new DH key during each handshake but it is also recommended. B should therefore be enabled whenever temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used. =item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op. =item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients preferences. When set, the SSL/TLS server will choose following its own preferences. =item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 ... =item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 ... =item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2 These options turn off the SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2 protocol versions with TLS or the DTLSv1, DTLSv1.2 versions with DTLS, respectively. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, these options are deprecated, use L and L instead. =item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial handshake). This option is not needed for clients. =item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless session resumption. If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets will not be used by clients or servers. =item SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. See the B section for more details. =item SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched servers B: this option is currently set by default. See the B section for more details. =item SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC Normally clients and servers will transparently attempt to negotiate the RFC7366 Encrypt-then-MAC option on TLS and DTLS connection. If this option is set, Encrypt-then-MAC is disabled. Clients will not propose, and servers will not accept the extension. =back =head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION OpenSSL always attempts to use secure renegotiation as described in RFC5746. This counters the prefix attack described in CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere. This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure renegotiation is referred to as I. A server not supporting secure renegotiation is referred to as I. The following sections describe the operations permitted by OpenSSL's secure renegotiation implementation. =head2 Patched client and server Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementations. =head2 Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server The initial connection succeeds but client renegotiation is denied by the server with a B warning alert if TLS v1.0 is used or a fatal B alert in SSL v3.0. If the patched OpenSSL server attempts to renegotiate a fatal B alert is sent. This is because the server code may be unaware of the unpatched nature of the client. If the option B is set then renegotiation B succeeds. =head2 Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server. If the option B or B is set then initial connections and renegotiation between patched OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers succeeds. If neither option is set then initial connections to unpatched servers will fail. The option B is currently set by default even though it has security implications: otherwise it would be impossible to connect to unpatched servers (i.e. all of them initially) and this is clearly not acceptable. Renegotiation is permitted because this does not add any additional security issues: during an attack clients do not see any renegotiations anyway. As more servers become patched the option B will B be set by default in a future version of OpenSSL. OpenSSL client applications wishing to ensure they can connect to unpatched servers should always B B OpenSSL client applications that want to ensure they can B connect to unpatched servers (and thus avoid any security issues) should always B B using SSL_CTX_clear_options() or SSL_clear_options(). The difference between the B and B options is that B enables initial connections and secure renegotiation between OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers B, while B allows initial connections and renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask after adding B. SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bitmask after clearing B. SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask. SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The attempt to always try to use secure renegotiation was added in Openssl 0.9.8m. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod0000644000000000000000000001311113176625661022250 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id, SSL_set_generate_session_id, SSL_has_matching_session_id, GEN_SESSION_CB - manipulate generation of SSL session IDs (server only) =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb); int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB, cb); int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id() sets the callback function for generating new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for B to be B. SSL_set_generate_session_id() sets the callback function for generating new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for B to be B. SSL_has_matching_session_id() checks, whether a session with id B (of length B) is already contained in the internal session cache of the parent context of B. =head1 NOTES When a new session is established between client and server, the server generates a session id. The session id is an arbitrary sequence of bytes. The length of the session id is between 1 and 32 bytes. The session id is not security critical but must be unique for the server. Additionally, the session id is transmitted in the clear when reusing the session so it must not contain sensitive information. Without a callback being set, an OpenSSL server will generate a unique session id from pseudo random numbers of the maximum possible length. Using the callback function, the session id can be changed to contain additional information like e.g. a host id in order to improve load balancing or external caching techniques. The callback function receives a pointer to the memory location to put B into and a pointer to the maximum allowed length B. The buffer at location B is only guaranteed to have the size B. The callback is only allowed to generate a shorter id and reduce B; the callback B increase B or write to the location B exceeding the given limit. The location B is filled with 0x00 before the callback is called, so the callback may only fill part of the possible length and leave B untouched while maintaining reproducibility. Since the sessions must be distinguished, session ids must be unique. Without the callback a random number is used, so that the probability of generating the same session id is extremely small (2^256 for SSLv3/TLSv1). In order to assure the uniqueness of the generated session id, the callback must call SSL_has_matching_session_id() and generate another id if a conflict occurs. If an id conflict is not resolved, the handshake will fail. If the application codes e.g. a unique host id, a unique process number, and a unique sequence number into the session id, uniqueness could easily be achieved without randomness added (it should however be taken care that no confidential information is leaked this way). If the application can not guarantee uniqueness, it is recommended to use the maximum B and fill in the bytes not used to code special information with random data to avoid collisions. SSL_has_matching_session_id() will only query the internal session cache, not the external one. Since the session id is generated before the handshake is completed, it is not immediately added to the cache. If another thread is using the same internal session cache, a race condition can occur in that another thread generates the same session id. Collisions can also occur when using an external session cache, since the external cache is not tested with SSL_has_matching_session_id() and the same race condition applies. The callback must return 0 if it cannot generate a session id for whatever reason and return 1 on success. =head1 EXAMPLES The callback function listed will generate a session id with the server id given, and will fill the rest with pseudo random bytes: const char session_id_prefix = "www-18"; #define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len) { unsigned int count = 0; do { RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len); /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our * prefix is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects * anyway, eg. the server could only possibly create 1 session * ID (ie. the prefix!) so all future session negotiations will * fail due to conflicts. */ memcpy(id, session_id_prefix, (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ? strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len); } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)); if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS) return 0; return 1; } =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id() and SSL_set_generate_session_id() always return 1. SSL_has_matching_session_id() returns 1 if another session with the same id is already in the cache. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version.pod0000644000000000000000000000211213176625661022315 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version - retrieve session protocol version =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() returns the protocol version number used by session B. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() returns a number indicating the protocol version used for the session; this number matches the constants I B or B. Note that the SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() function does B perform a null check on the provided session B pointer. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod0000644000000000000000000000663613176625661020324 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_waiting_for_async, SSL_get_all_async_fds, SSL_get_changed_async_fds - manage asynchronous operations =for comment multiple includes =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #include int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s); int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fd, size_t *numfds); int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_waiting_for_async() determines whether an SSL connection is currently waiting for asynchronous operations to complete (see the SSL_MODE_ASYNC mode in L). SSL_get_all_async_fds() returns a list of file descriptor which can be used in a call to select() or poll() to determine whether the current asynchronous operation has completed or not. A completed operation will result in data appearing as "read ready" on the file descriptor (no actual data should be read from the file descriptor). This function should only be called if the SSL object is currently waiting for asynchronous work to complete (i.e. SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC has been received - see L). Typically the list will only contain one file descriptor. However if multiple asynchronous capable engines are in use then more than one is possible. The number of file descriptors returned is stored in B<*numfds> and the file descriptors themselves are in B<*fds>. The B parameter may be NULL in which case no file descriptors are returned but B<*numfds> is still populated. It is the callers responsibility to ensure sufficient memory is allocated at B<*fds> so typically this function is called twice (once with a NULL B parameter and once without). SSL_get_changed_async_fds() returns a list of the asynchronous file descriptors that have been added and a list that have been deleted since the last SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC was received (or since the SSL object was created if no SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC has been received). Similar to SSL_get_all_async_fds() it is the callers responsibility to ensure that B<*addfd> and B<*delfd> have sufficient memory allocated, although they may be NULL. The number of added fds and the number of deleted fds are stored in B<*numaddfds> and B<*numdelfds> respectively. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_waiting_for_async() will return 1 if the current SSL operation is waiting for an async operation to complete and 0 otherwise. SSL_get_all_async_fds() and SSL_get_changed_async_fds() return 1 on success or 0 on error. =head1 NOTES On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to async.h. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_waiting_for_async(), SSL_get_all_async_fds() and SSL_get_changed_async_fds() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod0000644000000000000000000001027513176625661021720 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb, SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata, SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb, SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata, SSL_set_default_passwd_cb, SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata, SSL_get_default_passwd_cb, SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata - set or get passwd callback for encrypted PEM file handling =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u); pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx); void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u); pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s); void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb() sets the default password callback called when loading/storing a PEM certificate with encryption. SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() sets a pointer to userdata, B, which will be provided to the password callback on invocation. SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb() returns a function pointer to the password callback currently set in B. If no callback was explicitly set, the NULL pointer is returned. SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata() returns a pointer to the userdata currently set in B. If no userdata was explicitly set, the NULL pointer is returned. SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(), SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(), SSL_get_default_passwd_cb() and SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata() perform the same function as their SSL_CTX counterparts, but using an SSL object. The password callback, which must be provided by the application, hands back the password to be used during decryption. On invocation a pointer to userdata is provided. The function must store the password into the provided buffer B which is of size B. The actual length of the password must be returned to the calling function. B indicates whether the callback is used for reading/decryption (rwflag=0) or writing/encryption (rwflag=1). For more details, see L. =head1 NOTES When loading or storing private keys, a password might be supplied to protect the private key. The way this password can be supplied may depend on the application. If only one private key is handled, it can be practical to have the callback handle the password dialog interactively. If several keys have to be handled, it can be practical to ask for the password once, then keep it in memory and use it several times. In the last case, the password could be stored into the userdata storage and the callback only returns the password already stored. When asking for the password interactively, the callback can use B to check, whether an item shall be encrypted (rwflag=1). In this case the password dialog may ask for the same password twice for comparison in order to catch typos, that would make decryption impossible. Other items in PEM formatting (certificates) can also be encrypted, it is however not usual, as certificate information is considered public. =head1 RETURN VALUES These functions do not provide diagnostic information. =head1 EXAMPLES The following example returns the password provided as userdata to the calling function. The password is considered to be a '\0' terminated string. If the password does not fit into the buffer, the password is truncated. int my_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) { strncpy(buf, (char *)u, size); buf[size - 1] = '\0'; return strlen(buf); } =head1 HISTORY SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(), SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(), SSL_set_default_passwd_cb() and SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod0000644000000000000000000000324113176625661021005 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_peer_certificate - get the X509 certificate of the peer =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns a pointer to the X509 certificate the peer presented. If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned. =head1 NOTES Due to the protocol definition, a TLS/SSL server will always send a certificate, if present. A client will only send a certificate when explicitly requested to do so by the server (see L). If an anonymous cipher is used, no certificates are sent. That a certificate is returned does not indicate information about the verification state, use L to check the verification state. The reference count of the X509 object is incremented by one, so that it will not be destroyed when the session containing the peer certificate is freed. The X509 object must be explicitly freed using X509_free(). =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established. =item Pointer to an X509 certificate The return value points to the certificate presented by the peer. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod0000644000000000000000000000320313176625661016113 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_set_fd, SSL_set_rfd, SSL_set_wfd - connect the SSL object with a file descriptor =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd); int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_set_fd() sets the file descriptor B as the input/output facility for the TLS/SSL (encrypted) side of B. B will typically be the socket file descriptor of a network connection. When performing the operation, a B is automatically created to interface between the B and B. The BIO and hence the SSL engine inherit the behaviour of B. If B is non-blocking, the B will also have non-blocking behaviour. If there was already a BIO connected to B, BIO_free() will be called (for both the reading and writing side, if different). SSL_set_rfd() and SSL_set_wfd() perform the respective action, but only for the read channel or the write channel, which can be set independently. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The operation failed. Check the error stack to find out why. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L , L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod0000644000000000000000000000605713176625661017155 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get1_supported_ciphers, SSL_get_client_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers, SSL_CTX_get_ciphers, SSL_get_cipher_list - get list of available SSL_CIPHERs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s); STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl); const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int priority); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs for B, sorted by preference. If B is NULL or no ciphers are available, NULL is returned. SSL_CTX_get_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs for B. SSL_get1_supported_ciphers() returns the stack of enabled SSL_CIPHERs for B, sorted by preference. The list depends on settings like the cipher list, the supported protocol versions, the security level, and the enabled signature algorithms. SRP and PSK ciphers are only enabled if the appropriate callbacks or settings have been applied. This is the list that will be sent by the client to the server. The list supported by the server might include more ciphers in case there is a hole in the list of supported protocols. The server will also not use ciphers from this list depending on the configured certificates and DH parameters. If B is NULL or no ciphers are available, NULL is returned. SSL_get_client_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs matching the list received from the client on B. If B is NULL, no ciphers are available, or B is not operating in server mode, NULL is returned. SSL_get_cipher_list() returns a pointer to the name of the SSL_CIPHER listed for B with B. If B is NULL, no ciphers are available, or there are less ciphers than B available, NULL is returned. =head1 NOTES The details of the ciphers obtained by SSL_get_ciphers(), SSL_CTX_get_ciphers() SSL_get1_supported_ciphers() and SSL_get_client_ciphers() can be obtained using the L family of functions. Call SSL_get_cipher_list() with B starting from 0 to obtain the sorted list of available ciphers, until NULL is returned. Note: SSL_get_ciphers(), SSL_CTX_get_ciphers() and SSL_get_client_ciphers() return a pointer to an internal cipher stack, which will be freed later on when the SSL or SSL_SESSION object is freed. Therefore, the calling code B free the return value itself. The stack returned by SSL_get1_supported_ciphers() should be freed using sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(). =head1 RETURN VALUES See DESCRIPTION =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod0000644000000000000000000000333313176625661020612 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_set_ssl_method, SSL_get_ssl_method - choose a new TLS/SSL method =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *method); int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method); const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version() sets a new default TLS/SSL B for SSL objects newly created from this B. SSL objects already created with L are not affected, except when L is being called. SSL_set_ssl_method() sets a new TLS/SSL B for a particular B object. It may be reset, when SSL_clear() is called. SSL_get_ssl_method() returns a function pointer to the TLS/SSL method set in B. =head1 NOTES The available B choices are described in L. When L is called and no session is connected to an SSL object, the method of the SSL object is reset to the method currently set in the corresponding SSL_CTX object. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur for SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version() and SSL_set_ssl_method(): =over 4 =item Z<>0 The new choice failed, check the error stack to find out the reason. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_ctrl.pod0000644000000000000000000000235213176625661016335 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_ctrl, SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl, SSL_ctrl, SSL_callback_ctrl - internal handling functions for SSL_CTX and SSL objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int cmd, void (*fp)()); long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int cmd, void (*fp)()); =head1 DESCRIPTION The SSL_*_ctrl() family of functions is used to manipulate settings of the SSL_CTX and SSL objects. Depending on the command B the arguments B, B, or B are evaluated. These functions should never be called directly. All functionalities needed are made available via other functions or macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES The return values of the SSL*_ctrl() functions depend on the command supplied via the B parameter. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get0_peer.pod0000644000000000000000000000163713176625661017735 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_SESSION_get0_peer - get details about peer's certificate for a session =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_SESSION_get0_peer() returns the peer certificate associated with the session B or NULL if no peer certificate is available. The caller should not free the returned value (unless L has also been called). =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_SESSION_get0_peer() returns a pointer to the peer certificate or NULL if no peer certificate is available. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod0000644000000000000000000000314413176625661020366 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_client_CA_list, SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list - get list of client CAs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list() returns the list of client CAs explicitly set for B using L. SSL_get_client_CA_list() returns the list of client CAs explicitly set for B using SSL_set_client_CA_list() or B's SSL_CTX object with L, when in server mode. In client mode, SSL_get_client_CA_list returns the list of client CAs sent from the server, if any. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() and SSL_set_client_CA_list() do not return diagnostic information. SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() have the following return values: =over 4 =item STACK_OF(X509_NAMES) List of CA names explicitly set (for B or in server mode) or send by the server (client mode). =item NULL No client CA list was explicitly set (for B or in server mode) or the server did not send a list of CAs (client mode). =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod0000644000000000000000000001337513176625661022302 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment, SSL_set_max_send_fragment, SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment, SSL_set_split_send_fragment, SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines, SSL_set_max_pipelines, SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len, SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len - Control fragment sizes and pipelining operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, long); long SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, long m); long SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(SSL_CTX *ctx, long m); long SSL_set_max_pipelines(SSL_CTX *ssl, long m); long SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(SSL_CTX *ctx, long m); long SSL_set_split_send_fragment(SSL *ssl, long m); void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len); void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len); =head1 DESCRIPTION Some engines are able to process multiple simultaneous crypto operations. This capability could be utilised to parallelise the processing of a single connection. For example a single write can be split into multiple records and each one encrypted independently and in parallel. Note: this will only work in TLS1.1+. There is no support in SSLv3, TLSv1.0 or DTLS (any version). This capability is known as "pipelining" within OpenSSL. In order to benefit from the pipelining capability. You need to have an engine that provides ciphers that support this. The OpenSSL "dasync" engine provides AES128-SHA based ciphers that have this capability. However these are for development and test purposes only. SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment() and SSL_set_max_send_fragment() set the B parameter for SSL_CTX and SSL objects respectively. This value restricts the amount of plaintext bytes that will be sent in any one SSL/TLS record. By default its value is SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH (16384). These functions will only accept a value in the range 512 - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH. SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines() and SSL_set_max_pipelines() set the maximum number of pipelines that will be used at any one time. This value applies to both "read" pipelining and "write" pipelining. By default only one pipeline will be used (i.e. normal non-parallel operation). The number of pipelines set must be in the range 1 - SSL_MAX_PIPELINES (32). Setting this to a value > 1 will also automatically turn on "read_ahead" (see L). This is explained further below. OpenSSL will only every use more than one pipeline if a ciphersuite is negotiated that uses a pipeline capable cipher provided by an engine. Pipelining operates slightly differently for reading encrypted data compared to writing encrypted data. SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment() and SSL_set_split_send_fragment() define how data is split up into pipelines when writing encrypted data. The number of pipelines used will be determined by the amount of data provided to the SSL_write() call divided by B. For example if B is set to 2000 and B is 4 then: SSL_write called with 0-2000 bytes == 1 pipeline used SSL_write called with 2001-4000 bytes == 2 pipelines used SSL_write called with 4001-6000 bytes == 3 pipelines used SSL_write called with 6001+ bytes == 4 pipelines used B must always be less than or equal to B. By default it is set to be equal to B. This will mean that the same number of records will always be created as would have been created in the non-parallel case, although the data will be apportioned differently. In the parallel case data will be spread equally between the pipelines. Read pipelining is controlled in a slightly different way than with write pipelining. While reading we are constrained by the number of records that the peer (and the network) can provide to us in one go. The more records we can get in one go the more opportunity we have to parallelise the processing. As noted above when setting B to a value greater than one, B is automatically set. The B parameter causes OpenSSL to attempt to read as much data into the read buffer as the network can provide and will fit into the buffer. Without this set data is read into the read buffer one record at a time. The more data that can be read, the more opportunity there is for parallelising the processing at the cost of increased memory overhead per connection. Setting B can impact the behaviour of the SSL_pending() function (see L). The SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len() and SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len() functions control the size of the read buffer that will be used. The B parameter sets the size of the buffer. The value will only be used if it is greater than the default that would have been used anyway. The normal default value depends on a number of factors but it will be at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD (16704) bytes. =head1 RETURN VALUES All non-void functions return 1 on success and 0 on failure. =head1 NOTES With the exception of SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len() and SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len() all these functions are implemented using macros. =head1 HISTORY The SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(), SSL_set_max_pipelines(), SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(), SSL_set_split_send_fragment(), SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len() and SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod0000644000000000000000000000276413176625661020535 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_current_cipher, SSL_get_cipher_name, SSL_get_cipher, SSL_get_cipher_bits, SSL_get_cipher_version - get SSL_CIPHER of a connection =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl); const char *SSL_get_cipher_name(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_get_cipher(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_cipher_bits(const SSL *s, int *np) \ const char *SSL_get_cipher_version(const SSL *s); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_current_cipher() returns a pointer to an SSL_CIPHER object containing the description of the actually used cipher of a connection established with the B object. See L for more details. SSL_get_cipher_name() obtains the name of the currently used cipher. SSL_get_cipher() is identical to SSL_get_cipher_name(). SSL_get_cipher_bits() is a macro to obtain the number of secret/algorithm bits used and SSL_get_cipher_version() returns the protocol name. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_get_current_cipher() returns the cipher actually used, or NULL if no session has been established. =head1 NOTES These are implemented as macros. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/ssl/SSL_export_keying_material.pod0000644000000000000000000000505213176625661021420 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SSL_export_keying_material - obtain keying material for application use =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context); =head1 DESCRIPTION During the creation of a TLS or DTLS connection shared keying material is established between the two endpoints. The function SSL_export_keying_material() enables an application to use some of this keying material for its own purposes in accordance with RFC5705. An application may need to securely establish the context within which this keying material will be used. For example this may include identifiers for the application session, application algorithms or parameters, or the lifetime of the context. The context value is left to the application but must be the same on both sides of the communication. For a given SSL connection B, B bytes of data will be written to B. The application specific context should be supplied in the location pointed to by B and should be B bytes long. Provision of a context is optional. If the context should be omitted entirely then B should be set to 0. Otherwise it should be any other value. If B is 0 then the values of B and B are ignored. Note that a zero length context is treated differently to no context at all, and will result in different keying material being returned. An application specific label should be provided in the location pointed to by B

, B and B as parameters to the function. Calling this function transfers the memory management of the values to the DH object, and therefore the values that have been passed in should not be freed directly after this function has been called. The B parameter may be NULL. To get the public and private key values use the DH_get0_key() function. A pointer to the public key will be stored in B<*pub_key>, and a pointer to the private key will be stored in B<*priv_key>. Either may be NULL if they have not been set yet, although if the private key has been set then the public key must be. The values point to the internal representation of the public key and private key values. This memory should not be freed directly. The public and private key values can be set using DH_set0_key(). Either parameter may be NULL, which means the corresponding DH field is left untouched. As with DH_set0_pqg() this function transfers the memory management of the key values to the DH object, and therefore they should not be freed directly after this function has been called. DH_set_flags() sets the flags in the B parameter on the DH object. Multiple flags can be passed in one go (bitwise ORed together). Any flags that are already set are left set. DH_test_flags() tests to see whether the flags passed in the B parameter are currently set in the DH object. Multiple flags can be tested in one go. All flags that are currently set are returned, or zero if none of the flags are set. DH_clear_flags() clears the specified flags within the DH object. DH_get0_engine() returns a handle to the ENGINE that has been set for this DH object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set. The DH_get_length() and DH_set_length() functions get and set the optional length parameter associated with this DH object. If the length is non-zero then it is used, otherwise it is ignored. The B parameter indicates the length of the secret exponent (private key) in bits. =head1 NOTES Values retrieved with DH_get0_key() are owned by the DH object used in the call and may therefore I be passed to DH_set0_key(). If needed, duplicate the received value using BN_dup() and pass the duplicate. The same applies to DH_get0_pqg() and DH_set0_pqg(). =head1 RETURN VALUES DH_set0_pqg() and DH_set0_key() return 1 on success or 0 on failure. DH_test_flags() returns the current state of the flags in the DH object. DH_get0_engine() returns the ENGINE set for the DH object or NULL if no ENGINE has been set. DH_get_length() returns the length of the secret exponent (private key) in bits, or zero if no such length has been explicitly set. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod0000644000000000000000000001123213176625660016577 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_s_file, BIO_new_file, BIO_new_fp, BIO_set_fp, BIO_get_fp, BIO_read_filename, BIO_write_filename, BIO_append_filename, BIO_rw_filename - FILE bio =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_file(void); BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode); BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int flags); BIO_set_fp(BIO *b, FILE *fp, int flags); BIO_get_fp(BIO *b, FILE **fpp); int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, char *name) int BIO_write_filename(BIO *b, char *name) int BIO_append_filename(BIO *b, char *name) int BIO_rw_filename(BIO *b, char *name) =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_s_file() returns the BIO file method. As its name implies it is a wrapper round the stdio FILE structure and it is a source/sink BIO. Calls to BIO_read() and BIO_write() read and write data to the underlying stream. BIO_gets() and BIO_puts() are supported on file BIOs. BIO_flush() on a file BIO calls the fflush() function on the wrapped stream. BIO_reset() attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file using fseek(stream, 0, 0). BIO_seek() sets the file pointer to position B from start of file using fseek(stream, ofs, 0). BIO_eof() calls feof(). Setting the BIO_CLOSE flag calls fclose() on the stream when the BIO is freed. BIO_new_file() creates a new file BIO with mode B the meaning of B is the same as the stdio function fopen(). The BIO_CLOSE flag is set on the returned BIO. BIO_new_fp() creates a file BIO wrapping B. Flags can be: BIO_CLOSE, BIO_NOCLOSE (the close flag) BIO_FP_TEXT (sets the underlying stream to text mode, default is binary: this only has any effect under Win32). BIO_set_fp() set the fp of a file BIO to B. B has the same meaning as in BIO_new_fp(), it is a macro. BIO_get_fp() retrieves the fp of a file BIO, it is a macro. BIO_seek() is a macro that sets the position pointer to B bytes from the start of file. BIO_tell() returns the value of the position pointer. BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and BIO_rw_filename() set the file BIO B to use file B for reading, writing, append or read write respectively. =head1 NOTES When wrapping stdout, stdin or stderr the underlying stream should not normally be closed so the BIO_NOCLOSE flag should be set. Because the file BIO calls the underlying stdio functions any quirks in stdio behaviour will be mirrored by the corresponding BIO. On Windows BIO_new_files reserves for the filename argument to be UTF-8 encoded. In other words if you have to make it work in multi- lingual environment, encode file names in UTF-8. =head1 EXAMPLES File BIO "hello world": BIO *bio_out; bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n"); Alternative technique: BIO *bio_out; bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (bio_out == NULL) /* Error ... */ if (!BIO_set_fp(bio_out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE)) /* Error ... */ BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n"); Write to a file: BIO *out; out = BIO_new_file("filename.txt", "w"); if (!out) /* Error occurred */ BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n"); BIO_free(out); Alternative technique: BIO *out; out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) /* Error ... */ if (!BIO_write_filename(out, "filename.txt")) /* Error ... */ BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n"); BIO_free(out); =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_s_file() returns the file BIO method. BIO_new_file() and BIO_new_fp() return a file BIO or NULL if an error occurred. BIO_set_fp() and BIO_get_fp() return 1 for success or 0 for failure (although the current implementation never return 0). BIO_seek() returns the same value as the underlying fseek() function: 0 for success or -1 for failure. BIO_tell() returns the current file position. BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and BIO_rw_filename() return 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 BUGS BIO_reset() and BIO_seek() are implemented using fseek() on the underlying stream. The return value for fseek() is 0 for success or -1 if an error occurred this differs from other types of BIO which will typically return 1 for success and a non positive value if an error occurred. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream.pod0000644000000000000000000000216513176625660021620 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream - output PKCS7 structure in PEM format =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() outputs a PKCS7 structure in PEM format. It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_PKCS7(). =head1 NOTES This function is effectively a version of the PEM_write_bio_PKCS7() supporting streaming. =head1 RETURN VALUES PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L, L, L =head1 HISTORY PEM_write_bio_PKCS7_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2007-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod0000644000000000000000000000437613176625660016755 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME PKCS12_parse - parse a PKCS#12 structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca); =head1 DESCRIPTION PKCS12_parse() parses a PKCS12 structure. B is the B structure to parse. B is the passphrase to use. If successful the private key will be written to B<*pkey>, the corresponding certificate to B<*cert> and any additional certificates to B<*ca>. =head1 NOTES The parameters B and B cannot be B. B can be in which case additional certificates will be discarded. B<*ca> can also be a valid STACK in which case additional certificates are appended to B<*ca>. If B<*ca> is B a new STACK will be allocated. The B and B attributes (if present) on each certificate will be stored in the B and B attributes of the B structure. The parameter B is interpreted as a string in the UTF-8 encoding. If it is not valid UTF-8, then it is assumed to be ISO8859-1 instead. In particular, this means that passwords in the locale character set (or code page on Windows) must potentially be converted to UTF-8 before use. This may include passwords from local text files, or input from the terminal or command line. Refer to the documentation of L, for example. =head1 RETURN VALUES PKCS12_parse() returns 1 for success and zero if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from L =head1 BUGS Only a single private key and corresponding certificate is returned by this function. More complex PKCS#12 files with multiple private keys will only return the first match. Only B and B attributes are currently stored in certificates. Other attributes are discarded. Attributes currently cannot be stored in the private key B structure. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_key.pod0000644000000000000000000000163713176625660020006 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_generate_key - generate DSA key pair =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DSA_generate_key(DSA *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_generate_key() expects B to contain DSA parameters. It generates a new key pair and stores it in Bpub_key> and Bpriv_key>. The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling DSA_generate_key(). =head1 RETURN VALUE DSA_generate_key() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md.pod0000644000000000000000000001011613176625660021174 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key, EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info - HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand key derivation algorithm =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, const EVP_MD *md); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, int keylen); int EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *info, int infolen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_HKDF algorithm implements the HKDF key derivation function. HKDF follows the "extract-then-expand" paradigm, where the KDF logically consists of two modules. The first stage takes the input keying material and "extracts" from it a fixed-length pseudorandom key K. The second stage "expands" the key K into several additional pseudorandom keys (the output of the KDF). EVP_PKEY_set_hkdf_md() sets the message digest associated with the HKDF. EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt() sets the salt to B bytes of the buffer B. Any existing value is replaced. EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_key() sets the key to B bytes of the buffer B. Any existing value is replaced. EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info() sets the info value to B bytes of the buffer B. If a value is already set, it is appended to the existing value. =head1 STRING CTRLS HKDF also supports string based control operations via L. The B parameter "md" uses the supplied B as the name of the digest algorithm to use. The B parameters "salt", "key" and "info" use the supplied B parameter as a B, B or B value. The names "hexsalt", "hexkey" and "hexinfo" are similar except they take a hex string which is converted to binary. =head1 NOTES All these functions are implemented as macros. A context for HKDF can be obtained by calling: EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL); The digest, key, salt and info values must be set before a key is derived or an error occurs. The total length of the info buffer cannot exceed 1024 bytes in length: this should be more than enough for any normal use of HKDF. The output length of the KDF is specified via the length parameter to the L function. Since the HKDF output length is variable, passing a B buffer as a means to obtain the requisite length is not meaningful with HKDF. Instead, the caller must allocate a buffer of the desired length, and pass that buffer to L along with (a pointer initialized to) the desired length. Optimised versions of HKDF can be implemented in an ENGINE. =head1 RETURN VALUES All these functions return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLE This example derives 10 bytes using SHA-256 with the secret key "secret", salt value "salt" and info value "label": EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; unsigned char out[10]; size_t outlen = sizeof(out); pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL); if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha256()) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_salt(pctx, "salt", 4) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_key(pctx, "secret", 6) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, "label", 6) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0) /* Error */ =head1 CONFORMING TO RFC 5869 =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod0000644000000000000000000003106713176625660021064 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_STORE_CTX_get_error, X509_STORE_CTX_set_error, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth, X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth, X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain, X509_verify_cert_error_string - get or set certificate verification status information =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int s); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions are typically called after X509_verify_cert() has indicated an error or in a verification callback to determine the nature of an error. X509_STORE_CTX_get_error() returns the error code of B, see the B section for a full description of all error codes. X509_STORE_CTX_set_error() sets the error code of B to B. For example it might be used in a verification callback to set an error based on additional checks. X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth() returns the B of the error. This is a non-negative integer representing where in the certificate chain the error occurred. If it is zero it occurred in the end entity certificate, one if it is the certificate which signed the end entity certificate and so on. X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth() sets the error B. This can be used in combination with X509_STORE_CTX_set_error() to set the depth at which an error condition was detected. X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert() returns the certificate in B which caused the error or B if no certificate is relevant. X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert() sets the certificate B in B which caused the error. This value is not intended to remain valid for very long, and remains owned by the caller. It may be examined by a verification callback invoked to handle each error encountered during chain verification and is no longer required after such a callback. If a callback wishes the save the certificate for use after it returns, it needs to increment its reference count via L. Once such a I certificate is no longer needed it can be freed with L. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert() retrieves an internal pointer to the certificate being verified by the B. X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain() returns a complete validate chain if a previous call to X509_verify_cert() is successful. If the call to X509_verify_cert() is B successful the returned chain may be incomplete or invalid. The returned chain persists after the B structure is freed, when it is no longer needed it should be free up using: sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); X509_verify_cert_error_string() returns a human readable error string for verification error B. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_STORE_CTX_get_error() returns B or an error code. X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth() returns a non-negative error depth. X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert() returns the certificate which caused the error or B if no certificate is relevant to the error. X509_verify_cert_error_string() returns a human readable error string for verification error B. =head1 ERROR CODES A list of error codes and messages is shown below. Some of the error codes are defined but currently never returned: these are described as "unused". =over 4 =item B the operation was successful. =item B the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found. =item B the CRL of a certificate could not be found. =item B the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only meaningful for RSA keys. =item B the CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused. =item B the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read. =item B the signature of the certificate is invalid. =item B the signature of the certificate is invalid. =item B the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time. =item B the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time. =item B the CRL is not yet valid. =item B the CRL has expired. =item B the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time. =item B the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time. =item B the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. =item B the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. =item B an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen. =item B the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of trusted certificates. =item B the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not be found locally. =item B the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found. This normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete. =item B no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not self signed. =item B the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused. =item B the certificate has been revoked. =item B a CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not consistent with the supplied purpose. =item B the basicConstraints path-length parameter has been exceeded. =item B the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose. =item B the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose. =item B the root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose. =item B the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and is B in itself an error. =item B the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current certificate. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and is B in itself an error. =item B the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier of the current certificate. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and is B in itself an error. =item B the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension does not permit certificate signing. This is only set if issuer check debugging is enabled it is used for status notification and is B in itself an error. =item B A certificate extension had an invalid value (for example an incorrect encoding) or some value inconsistent with other extensions. =item B A certificate policies extension had an invalid value (for example an incorrect encoding) or some value inconsistent with other extensions. This error only occurs if policy processing is enabled. =item B The verification flags were set to require and explicit policy but none was present. =item B The only CRLs that could be found did not match the scope of the certificate. =item B Some feature of a certificate extension is not supported. Unused. =item B A name constraint violation occurred in the permitted subtrees. =item B A name constraint violation occurred in the excluded subtrees. =item B A certificate name constraints extension included a minimum or maximum field: this is not supported. =item B An unsupported name constraint type was encountered. OpenSSL currently only supports directory name, DNS name, email and URI types. =item B The format of the name constraint is not recognised: for example an email address format of a form not mentioned in RFC3280. This could be caused by a garbage extension or some new feature not currently supported. =item B An error occurred when attempting to verify the CRL path. This error can only happen if extended CRL checking is enabled. =item B an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly set by an application. =back =head1 NOTES The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields in the B structure. In versions of OpenSSL before 1.0 the current certificate returned by X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert() was never B. Applications should check the return value before printing out any debugging information relating to the current certificate. If an unrecognised error code is passed to X509_verify_cert_error_string() the numerical value of the unknown code is returned in a static buffer. This is not thread safe but will never happen unless an invalid code is passed. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_cmp.pod0000644000000000000000000000237113176625660016007 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_cmp, BN_ucmp, BN_is_zero, BN_is_one, BN_is_word, BN_is_odd - BIGNUM comparison and test functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a); int BN_is_one(BIGNUM *a); int BN_is_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); int BN_is_odd(BIGNUM *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_cmp() compares the numbers B and B. BN_ucmp() compares their absolute values. BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() and BN_is_word() test if B equals 0, 1, or B respectively. BN_is_odd() tests if a is odd. BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), BN_is_word() and BN_is_odd() are macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES BN_cmp() returns -1 if B E B, 0 if B == B and 1 if B E B. BN_ucmp() is the same using the absolute values of B and B. BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() BN_is_word() and BN_is_odd() return 1 if the condition is true, 0 otherwise. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000215113176625660016125 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_new, DSA_free - allocate and free DSA objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DSA* DSA_new(void); void DSA_free(DSA *dsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_new() allocates and initializes a B structure. It is equivalent to calling DSA_new_method(NULL). DSA_free() frees the B structure and its components. The values are erased before the memory is returned to the system. If B is NULL nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES If the allocation fails, DSA_new() returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. DSA_free() returns no value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000371513176625660016136 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_new, BIO_up_ref, BIO_free, BIO_vfree, BIO_free_all, BIO_set - BIO allocation and freeing functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIO * BIO_new(const BIO_METHOD *type); int BIO_set(BIO *a, const BIO_METHOD *type); int BIO_up_ref(BIO *a); int BIO_free(BIO *a); void BIO_vfree(BIO *a); void BIO_free_all(BIO *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION The BIO_new() function returns a new BIO using method B. BIO_up_ref() increments the reference count associated with the BIO object. BIO_free() frees up a single BIO, BIO_vfree() also frees up a single BIO but it does not return a value. If B is NULL nothing is done. Calling BIO_free() may also have some effect on the underlying I/O structure, for example it may close the file being referred to under certain circumstances. For more details see the individual BIO_METHOD descriptions. BIO_free_all() frees up an entire BIO chain, it does not halt if an error occurs freeing up an individual BIO in the chain. If B is NULL nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_new() returns a newly created BIO or NULL if the call fails. BIO_set(), BIO_up_ref() and BIO_free() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. BIO_free_all() and BIO_vfree() do not return values. =head1 NOTES If BIO_free() is called on a BIO chain it will only free one BIO resulting in a memory leak. Calling BIO_free_all() on a single BIO has the same effect as calling BIO_free() on it other than the discarded return value. =head1 HISTORY BIO_set() was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0 as BIO type is now opaque. =head1 EXAMPLE Create a memory BIO: BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod0000644000000000000000000001171313176625660017574 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DH, EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY, EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DH, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA, EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA, EVP_PKEY_get0_DH, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY, EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DH, EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY, EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac, EVP_PKEY_type, EVP_PKEY_id, EVP_PKEY_base_id, EVP_PKEY_set1_engine - EVP_PKEY assignment functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key); int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key); int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key); int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key); RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey); EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey); const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len); RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey); EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key); int EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key); int EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key); int EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key); int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey); int EVP_PKEY_type(int type); int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *engine); =head1 DESCRIPTION EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() set the key referenced by B to B. EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key in B or B if the key is not of the correct type. EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(), EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get0_DH() and EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY() also return the referenced key in B or B if the key is not of the correct type but the reference count of the returned key is B incremented and so must not be freed up after use. EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH() and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() also set the referenced key to B however these use the supplied B internally and so B will be freed when the parent B is freed. EVP_PKEY_base_id() returns the type of B. For example an RSA key will return B. EVP_PKEY_id() returns the actual OID associated with B. Historically keys using the same algorithm could use different OIDs. For example an RSA key could use the OIDs corresponding to the NIDs B (equivalent to B) or B (equivalent to B). The use of alternative non-standard OIDs is now rare so B et al are not often seen in practice. EVP_PKEY_type() returns the underlying type of the NID B. For example EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_RSA2) will return B. EVP_PKEY_set1_engine() sets the ENGINE handling B to B. It must be called after the key algorithm and components are set up. If B does not include an B for B an error occurs. =head1 NOTES In accordance with the OpenSSL naming convention the key obtained from or assigned to the B using the B<1> functions must be freed as well as B. EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH() and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() are implemented as macros. Most applications wishing to know a key type will simply call EVP_PKEY_base_id() and will not care about the actual type: which will be identical in almost all cases. Previous versions of this document suggested using EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) to determine the type of a key. Since B is now opaque this is no longer possible: the equivalent is EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey). EVP_PKEY_set1_engine() is typically used by an ENGINE returning an HSM key as part of its routine to load a private key. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() return 1 for success or 0 for failure. EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key or B if an error occurred. EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH() and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_PKEY_base_id(), EVP_PKEY_id() and EVP_PKEY_type() return a key type or B (equivalently B) on error. EVP_PKEY_set1_engine() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000204413176625660016012 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_new, DH_free - allocate and free DH objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DH* DH_new(void); void DH_free(DH *dh); =head1 DESCRIPTION DH_new() allocates and initializes a B structure. DH_free() frees the B structure and its components. The values are erased before the memory is returned to the system. If B is NULL nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES If the allocation fails, DH_new() returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. DH_free() returns no value. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod0000644000000000000000000001117213176625660020247 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir, X509_LOOKUP_file, X509_load_cert_file, X509_load_crl_file, X509_load_cert_crl_file - Default OpenSSL certificate lookup methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(void); X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_file(void); int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type); int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type); int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type); =head1 DESCRIPTION B and B are two certificate lookup methods to use with B, provided by OpenSSL library. Users of the library typically do not need to create instances of these methods manually, they would be created automatically by L or L functions. Internally loading of certificates and CRLs is implemented via functions B, B and B. These functions support parameter I, which can be one of constants B, B and B. They load certificates and/or CRLs from specified file into memory cache of B objects which given B parameter is associated with. Functions B and B can load both PEM and DER formats depending of type value. Because DER format cannot contain more than one certificate or CRL object (while PEM can contain several concatenated PEM objects) B with B is equivalent to B. Constant B with NULL filename causes these functions to load default certificate store file (see L. Functions return number of objects loaded from file or 0 in case of error. Both methods support adding several certificate locations into one B. This page documents certificate store formats used by these methods and caching policy. =head2 File Method The B method loads all the certificates or CRLs present in a file into memory at the time the file is added as a lookup source. File format is ASCII text which contains concatenated PEM certificates and CRLs. This method should be used by applications which work with a small set of CAs. =head2 Hashed Directory Method B is a more advanced method, which loads certificates and CRLs on demand, and caches them in memory once they are loaded. As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, it also checks for newer CRLs upon each lookup, so that newer CRLs are as soon as they appear in the directory. The directory should contain one certificate or CRL per file in PEM format, with a file name of the form I.I for a certificate, or I.BI for a CRL. The I is the value returned by the L function applied to the subject name for certificates or issuer name for CRLs. The hash can also be obtained via the B<-hash> option of the L or L commands. The .I or .BI suffix is a sequence number that starts at zero, and is incremented consecutively for each certificate or CRL with the same I value. Gaps in the sequence numbers are not supported, it is assumed that there are no more objects with the same hash beyond the first missing number in the sequence. Sequence numbers make it possible for the directory to contain multiple certificates with same subject name hash value. For example, it is possible to have in the store several certificates with same subject or several CRLs with same issuer (and, for example, different validity period). When checking for new CRLs once one CRL for given hash value is loaded, hash_dir lookup method checks only for certificates with sequence number greater than that of the already cached CRL. Note that the hash algorithm used for subject name hashing changed in OpenSSL 1.0.0, and all certificate stores have to be rehashed when moving from OpenSSL 0.9.8 to 1.0.0. OpenSSL includes a L utility which creates symlinks with correct hashed names for all files with .pem suffix in a given directory. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod0000644000000000000000000001561613176625660017517 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RSA_set_default_method, RSA_get_default_method, RSA_set_method, RSA_get_method, RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL, RSA_flags, RSA_new_method - select RSA method =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth); RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void); int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth); RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa); RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void); int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa); RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); =head1 DESCRIPTION An B specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for RSA operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for important information about how these RSA API functions are affected by the use of B API calls. Initially, the default RSA_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(). RSA_set_default_method() makes B the default method for all RSA structures created later. B: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for RSA, so this function is no longer recommended. This function is not thread-safe and should not be called at the same time as other OpenSSL functions. RSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default RSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. RSA_set_method() selects B to perform all operations using the key B. This will replace the RSA_METHOD used by the RSA key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have RSA keys that only work with certain RSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the RSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results. RSA_get_method() returns a pointer to the RSA_METHOD being used by B. This method may or may not be supplied by an ENGINE implementation, but if it is, the return value can only be guaranteed to be valid as long as the RSA key itself is valid and does not have its implementation changed by RSA_set_method(). RSA_flags() returns the B that are set for B's current RSA_METHOD. See the BUGS section. RSA_new_method() allocates and initializes an RSA structure so that B will be used for the RSA operations. If B is NULL, the default ENGINE for RSA operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the RSA_METHOD controlled by RSA_set_default_method() is used. RSA_flags() returns the B that are set for B's current method. RSA_new_method() allocates and initializes an B structure so that B will be used for the RSA operations. If B is B, the default method is used. =head1 THE RSA_METHOD STRUCTURE typedef struct rsa_meth_st { /* name of the implementation */ const char *name; /* encrypt */ int (*rsa_pub_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); /* verify arbitrary data */ int (*rsa_pub_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); /* sign arbitrary data */ int (*rsa_priv_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); /* decrypt */ int (*rsa_priv_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); /* compute r0 = r0 ^ I mod rsa->n (May be NULL for some implementations) */ int (*rsa_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa); /* compute r = a ^ p mod m (May be NULL for some implementations) */ int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); /* called at RSA_new */ int (*init)(RSA *rsa); /* called at RSA_free */ int (*finish)(RSA *rsa); /* RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY - rsa_mod_exp is called for private key * operations, even if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp * are NULL * RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK - don't check pub/private match */ int flags; char *app_data; /* ?? */ int (*rsa_sign)(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); int (*rsa_verify)(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa); /* keygen. If NULL builtin RSA key generation will be used */ int (*rsa_keygen)(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb); } RSA_METHOD; =head1 RETURN VALUES RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(), RSA_PKCS1_null_method(), RSA_get_default_method() and RSA_get_method() return pointers to the respective RSA_METHODs. RSA_set_default_method() returns no value. RSA_set_method() returns a pointer to the old RSA_METHOD implementation that was replaced. However, this return value should probably be ignored because if it was supplied by an ENGINE, the pointer could be invalidated at any time if the ENGINE is unloaded (in fact it could be unloaded as a result of the RSA_set_method() function releasing its handle to the ENGINE). For this reason, the return type may be replaced with a B declaration in a future release. RSA_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by L if the allocation fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. =head1 BUGS The behaviour of RSA_flags() is a mis-feature that is left as-is for now to avoid creating compatibility problems. RSA functionality, such as the encryption functions, are controlled by the B value in the RSA key itself, not by the B value in the RSA_METHOD attached to the RSA key (which is what this function returns). If the flags element of an RSA key is changed, the changes will be honoured by RSA functionality but will not be reflected in the return value of the RSA_flags() function - in effect RSA_flags() behaves more like an RSA_default_flags() function (which does not currently exist). =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY The RSA_null_method(), which was a partial attempt to avoid patent issues, was replaced to always return NULL in OpenSSL 1.1.0f. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_add.pod0000644000000000000000000000764313176625660016730 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, EC_POINT_invert, EC_POINT_is_at_infinity, EC_POINT_is_on_curve, EC_POINT_cmp, EC_POINT_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine, EC_POINTs_mul, EC_POINT_mul, EC_GROUP_precompute_mult, EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult - Functions for performing mathematical operations and tests on EC_POINT objects =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p); int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, size_t num, const EC_POINT *p[], const BIGNUM *m[], BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, const EC_POINT *q, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); =head1 DESCRIPTION EC_POINT_add adds the two points B and B and places the result in B. Similarly EC_POINT_dbl doubles the point B and places the result in B. In both cases it is valid for B to be one of B or B. EC_POINT_invert calculates the inverse of the supplied point B. The result is placed back in B. The function EC_POINT_is_at_infinity tests whether the supplied point is at infinity or not. EC_POINT_is_on_curve tests whether the supplied point is on the curve or not. EC_POINT_cmp compares the two supplied points and tests whether or not they are equal. The functions EC_POINT_make_affine and EC_POINTs_make_affine force the internal representation of the EC_POINT(s) into the affine co-ordinate system. In the case of EC_POINTs_make_affine the value B provides the number of points in the array B to be forced. EC_POINT_mul calculates the value generator * B + B * B and stores the result in B. The value B may be NULL in which case the result is just B * B. EC_POINTs_mul calculates the value generator * B + B * B + ... + B * B. As for EC_POINT_mul the value B may be NULL. The function EC_GROUP_precompute_mult stores multiples of the generator for faster point multiplication, whilst EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult tests whether precomputation has already been done. See L for information about the generator. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following functions return 1 on success or 0 on error: EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, EC_POINT_invert, EC_POINT_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine, EC_POINT_mul, EC_POINTs_mul and EC_GROUP_precompute_mult. EC_POINT_is_at_infinity returns 1 if the point is at infinity, or 0 otherwise. EC_POINT_is_on_curve returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if not, or -1 on error. EC_POINT_cmp returns 1 if the points are not equal, 0 if they are, or -1 on error. EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult return 1 if a precomputation has been done, or 0 if not. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_sign_receipt.pod0000644000000000000000000000275513176625660020034 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_sign_receipt - create a CMS signed receipt =head1 SYNOPSIS #include CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si, X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_sign_receipt() creates and returns a CMS signed receipt structure. B is the B structure containing the signed receipt request. B is the certificate to sign with, B is the corresponding private key. B is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the CMS structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain). B is an optional set of flags. =head1 NOTES This functions behaves in a similar way to CMS_sign() except the flag values B, B, B, B and B are not supported since they do not make sense in the context of signed receipts. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_sign_receipt() returns either a valid CMS_ContentInfo structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/MDC2_Init.pod0000644000000000000000000000352013176625660016316 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME MDC2, MDC2_Init, MDC2_Update, MDC2_Final - MDC2 hash function =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned char *MDC2(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, unsigned char *md); int MDC2_Init(MDC2_CTX *c); int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len); int MDC2_Final(unsigned char *md, MDC2_CTX *c); =head1 DESCRIPTION MDC2 is a method to construct hash functions with 128 bit output from block ciphers. These functions are an implementation of MDC2 with DES. MDC2() computes the MDC2 message digest of the B bytes at B and places it in B (which must have space for MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output). If B is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array. The following functions may be used if the message is not completely stored in memory: MDC2_Init() initializes a B structure. MDC2_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to be hashed (B bytes at B). MDC2_Final() places the message digest in B, which must have space for MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output, and erases the B. Applications should use the higher level functions L etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly. =head1 RETURN VALUES MDC2() returns a pointer to the hash value. MDC2_Init(), MDC2_Update() and MDC2_Final() return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. =head1 CONFORMING TO ISO/IEC 10118-2, with DES =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_get_1024_160.pod0000644000000000000000000000433113176625660017035 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_get_1024_160, DH_get_2048_224, DH_get_2048_256, BN_get0_nist_prime_192, BN_get0_nist_prime_224, BN_get0_nist_prime_256, BN_get0_nist_prime_384, BN_get0_nist_prime_521, BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768, BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024, BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536, BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048, BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072, BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096, BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144, BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192 - Create standardized public primes or DH pairs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DH *DH_get_1024_160(void) DH *DH_get_2048_224(void) DH *DH_get_2048_256(void) const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_192(void) const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_224(void) const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_256(void) const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_384(void) const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(BIGNUM *bn) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(BIGNUM *bn) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(BIGNUM *bn) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(BIGNUM *bn) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(BIGNUM *bn) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(BIGNUM *bn) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(BIGNUM *bn) BIGNUM *BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(BIGNUM *bn) =head1 DESCRIPTION DH_get_1024_160(), DH_get_2048_224(), and DH_get_2048_256() each return a DH object for the IETF RFC 5114 value. BN_get0_nist_prime_192(), BN_get0_nist_prime_224(), BN_get0_nist_prime_256(), BN_get0_nist_prime_384(), and BN_get0_nist_prime_521() functions return a BIGNUM for the specific NIST prime curve (e.g., P-256). BN_get_rfc2409_prime_768(), BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(), BN_get_rfc3526_prime_1536(), BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(), BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(), BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(), BN_get_rfc3526_prime_6144(), and BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192() functions return a BIGNUM for the specified size from IETF RFC 2409. If B is not NULL, the BIGNUM will be set into that location as well. =head1 RETURN VALUES Defined above. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/CMS_verify.pod0000644000000000000000000001164013176625660016656 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME CMS_verify, CMS_get0_signers - verify a CMS SignedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_verify() verifies a CMS SignedData structure. B is the CMS_ContentInfo structure to verify. B is a set of certificates in which to search for the signing certificate(s). B is a trusted certificate store used for chain verification. B is the detached content if the content is not present in B. The content is written to B if it is not NULL. B is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify operation. CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from B, it must be called after a successful CMS_verify() operation. =head1 VERIFY PROCESS Normally the verify process proceeds as follows. Initially some sanity checks are performed on B. The type of B must be SignedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if the content is detached B cannot be B. An attempt is made to locate all the signing certificate(s), first looking in the B parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in any certificates contained in the B structure itself. If any signing certificate cannot be located the operation fails. Each signing certificate is chain verified using the B purpose and the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message are used as untrusted CAs. If CRL checking is enabled in B any internal CRLs are used in addition to attempting to look them up in B. If any chain verify fails an error code is returned. Finally the signed content is read (and written to B is it is not NULL) and the signature's checked. If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful. Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B parameter to change the default verify behaviour. If B is set the certificates in the message itself are not searched when locating the signing certificate(s). This means that all the signing certificates must be in the B parameter. If B is set and CRL checking is enabled in B then any CRLs in the message itself are ignored. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type B are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type B then an error is returned. If B is set the signing certificates are not verified. If B is set the signed attributes signature is not verified. If B is set then the content digest is not checked. =head1 NOTES One application of B is to only accept messages signed by a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed in the B parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the certificates supplied in B then the verify will fail because the signer cannot be found. In some cases the standard techniques for looking up and validating certificates are not appropriate: for example an application may wish to lookup certificates in a database or perform customised verification. This can be achieved by setting and verifying the signers certificates manually using the signed data utility functions. Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example setting B will totally disable all content verification and any modified content will be considered valid. This combination is however useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B and its validity is not considered important. Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted timestamp). =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero if an error occurred. CMS_get0_signers() returns all signers or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from L =head1 BUGS The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signing certificate, this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B functionality. The lack of single pass processing means that the signed content must all be held in memory if it is not detached. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_get_ex_new_index.pod0000644000000000000000000000401213176625660020647 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_set_ex_data, BIO_get_ex_data, ENGINE_get_ex_new_index, ENGINE_set_ex_data, ENGINE_get_ex_data, UI_get_ex_new_index, UI_set_ex_data, UI_get_ex_data, X509_get_ex_new_index, X509_set_ex_data, X509_get_ex_data, X509_STORE_get_ex_new_index, X509_STORE_set_ex_data, X509_STORE_get_ex_data, X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index, X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data, X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data, DH_get_ex_new_index, DH_set_ex_data, DH_get_ex_data, DSA_get_ex_new_index, DSA_set_ex_data, DSA_get_ex_data, ECDH_get_ex_new_index, ECDH_set_ex_data, ECDH_get_ex_data, EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index, EC_KEY_set_ex_data, EC_KEY_get_ex_data, RSA_get_ex_new_index, RSA_set_ex_data, RSA_get_ex_data - application-specific data =for comment generic =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int TYPE_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int TYPE_set_ex_data(TYPE *d, int idx, void *arg); void *TYPE_get_ex_data(TYPE *d, int idx); =head1 DESCRIPTION In the description here, I is used a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes listed in L. These functions handle application-specific data for OpenSSL data structures. TYPE_get_new_ex_index() is a macro that calls CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() with the correct B value. TYPE_set_ex_data() is a function that calls CRYPTO_set_ex_data() with an offset into the opaque exdata part of the TYPE object. TYPE_get_ex_data() is a function that calls CRYPTO_get_ex_data() with an an offset into the opaque exdata part of the TYPE object. =head1 SEE ALSO L. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod0000644000000000000000000000501613176625660020250 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OpenSSL_version, OpenSSL_version_num - get OpenSSL version number =head1 SYNOPSIS #include #define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0xnnnnnnnnnL #include unsigned long OpenSSL_version_num(); const char *OpenSSL_version(int t); =head1 DESCRIPTION OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER is a numeric release version identifier: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas 1 to 14, and f for release. for example 0x000906000 == 0.9.6 dev 0x000906023 == 0.9.6b beta 3 0x00090605f == 0.9.6e release Versions prior to 0.9.3 have identifiers E 0x0930. Versions between 0.9.3 and 0.9.5 had a version identifier with this interpretation: MMNNFFRBB major minor fix final beta/patch for example 0x000904100 == 0.9.4 release 0x000905000 == 0.9.5 dev Version 0.9.5a had an interim interpretation that is like the current one, except the patch level got the highest bit set, to keep continuity. The number was therefore 0x0090581f. OpenSSL_version_num() returns the version number. OpenSSL_version() returns different strings depending on B: =over 4 =item OPENSSL_VERSION The text variant of the version number and the release date. For example, "OpenSSL 1.0.1a 15 Oct 2015". =item OPENSSL_CFLAGS The compiler flags set for the compilation process in the form "compiler: ..." if available or "compiler: information not available" otherwise. =item OPENSSL_BUILT_ON The date of the build process in the form "built on: ..." if available or "built on: date not available" otherwise. =item OPENSSL_PLATFORM The "Configure" target of the library build in the form "platform: ..." if available or "platform: information not available" otherwise. =item OPENSSL_DIR The "OPENSSLDIR" setting of the library build in the form "OPENSSLDIR: "..."" if available or "OPENSSLDIR: N/A" otherwise. =item OPENSSL_ENGINES_DIR The "ENGINESDIR" setting of the library build in the form "ENGINESDIR: "..."" if available or "ENGINESDIR: N/A" otherwise. =back For an unknown B, the text "not available" is returned. =head1 RETURN VALUE The version number. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod0000644000000000000000000000506313176625660017426 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_BytesToKey - password based encryption routine =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *salt, const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); =head1 DESCRIPTION EVP_BytesToKey() derives a key and IV from various parameters. B is the cipher to derive the key and IV for. B is the message digest to use. The B parameter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to an 8 byte buffer or NULL if no salt is used. B is a buffer containing B bytes which is used to derive the keying data. B is the iteration count to use. The derived key and IV will be written to B and B respectively. =head1 NOTES A typical application of this function is to derive keying material for an encryption algorithm from a password in the B parameter. Increasing the B parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it harder for an attacker to perform a brute force attack using a large number of candidate passwords. If the total key and IV length is less than the digest length and B is used then the derivation algorithm is compatible with PKCS#5 v1.5 otherwise a non standard extension is used to derive the extra data. Newer applications should use a more modern algorithm such as PBKDF2 as defined in PKCS#5v2.1 and provided by PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC. =head1 KEY DERIVATION ALGORITHM The key and IV is derived by concatenating D_1, D_2, etc until enough data is available for the key and IV. D_i is defined as: D_i = HASH^count(D_(i-1) || data || salt) where || denotes concatenation, D_0 is empty, HASH is the digest algorithm in use, HASH^1(data) is simply HASH(data), HASH^2(data) is HASH(HASH(data)) and so on. The initial bytes are used for the key and the subsequent bytes for the IV. =head1 RETURN VALUES If B is NULL, then EVP_BytesToKey() returns the number of bytes needed to store the derived key. Otherwise, EVP_BytesToKey() returns the size of the derived key in bytes, or 0 on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/i2d_CMS_bio_stream.pod0000644000000000000000000000226413176625660020236 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME i2d_CMS_bio_stream - output CMS_ContentInfo structure in BER format =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int i2d_CMS_bio_stream(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, int flags); =head1 DESCRIPTION i2d_CMS_bio_stream() outputs a CMS_ContentInfo structure in BER format. It is otherwise identical to the function SMIME_write_CMS(). =head1 NOTES This function is effectively a version of the i2d_CMS_bio() supporting streaming. =head1 BUGS The prefix "i2d" is arguably wrong because the function outputs BER format. =head1 RETURN VALUES i2d_CMS_bio_stream() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L L, L, L =head1 HISTORY i2d_CMS_bio_stream() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod0000644000000000000000000002215113176625660017122 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get0_extensions, X509_CRL_get0_extensions, X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions, X509V3_get_d2i, X509V3_add1_i2d, X509V3_EXT_d2i, X509V3_EXT_i2d, X509_get_ext_d2i, X509_add1_ext_i2d, X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i, X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d, X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i, X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d - X509 extension decode and encode functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void *X509V3_get_d2i(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); void *X509V3_EXT_d2i(X509_EXTENSION *ext); X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_i2d(int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext); void *X509_get_ext_d2i(const X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); void *X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(const X509_CRL *crl, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *crl, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); void *X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(const X509_REVOKED *r, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *r, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x); const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_CRL_get0_extensions(const X509_CRL *crl); const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions(const X509_REVOKED *r); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509V3_get_ext_d2i() looks for an extension with OID B in the extensions B and, if found, decodes it. If B is B then only one occurrence of an extension is permissible otherwise the first extension after index B<*idx> is returned and B<*idx> updated to the location of the extension. If B is not B then B<*crit> is set to a status value: -2 if the extension occurs multiple times (this is only returned if B is B), -1 if the extension could not be found, 0 if the extension is found and is not critical and 1 if critical. A pointer to an extension specific structure or B is returned. X509V3_add1_i2d() adds extension B to STACK B<*x> (allocating a new STACK if necessary) using OID B and criticality B according to B. X509V3_EXT_d2i() attempts to decode the ASN.1 data contained in extension B and returns a pointer to an extension specific structure or B if the extension could not be decoded (invalid syntax or not supported). X509V3_EXT_i2d() encodes the extension specific structure B with OID B and criticality B. X509_get_ext_d2i() and X509_add1_ext_i2d() operate on the extensions of certificate B, they are otherwise identical to X509V3_get_d2i() and X509V3_add_i2d(). X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i() and X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d() operate on the extensions of CRL B, they are otherwise identical to X509V3_get_d2i() and X509V3_add_i2d(). X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i() and X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d() operate on the extensions of B structure B (i.e for CRL entry extensions), they are otherwise identical to X509V3_get_d2i() and X509V3_add_i2d(). X509_get0_extensions(), X509_CRL_get0_extensions() and X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions() return a stack of all the extensions of a certificate a CRL or a CRL entry respectively. =head1 NOTES In almost all cases an extension can occur at most once and multiple occurrences is an error. Therefore the B parameter is usually B. The B parameter may be one of the following values. B appends a new extension only if the extension does not already exist. An error is returned if the extension does already exist. B appends a new extension, ignoring whether the extension already exists. B replaces an extension if it exists otherwise appends a new extension. B replaces an existing extension if it exists otherwise returns an error. B appends a new extension only if the extension does not already exist. An error B returned if the extension does already exist. B extension B is deleted: no new extension is added. If B is ored with B: any error returned will not be added to the error queue. The function X509V3_get_d2i() will return B if the extension is not found, occurs multiple times or cannot be decoded. It is possible to determine the precise reason by checking the value of B<*crit>. =head1 SUPPORTED EXTENSIONS The following sections contain a list of all supported extensions including their name and NID. =head2 PKIX Certificate Extensions The following certificate extensions are defined in PKIX standards such as RFC5280. Basic Constraints NID_basic_constraints Key Usage NID_key_usage Extended Key Usage NID_ext_key_usage Subject Key Identifier NID_subject_key_identifier Authority Key Identifier NID_authority_key_identifier Private Key Usage Period NID_private_key_usage_period Subject Alternative Name NID_subject_alt_name Issuer Alternative Name NID_issuer_alt_name Authority Information Access NID_info_access Subject Information Access NID_sinfo_access Name Constraints NID_name_constraints Certificate Policies NID_certificate_policies Policy Mappings NID_policy_mappings Policy Constraints NID_policy_constraints Inhibit Any Policy NID_inhibit_any_policy TLS Feature NID_tlsfeature =head2 Netscape Certificate Extensions The following are (largely obsolete) Netscape certificate extensions. Netscape Cert Type NID_netscape_cert_type Netscape Base Url NID_netscape_base_url Netscape Revocation Url NID_netscape_revocation_url Netscape CA Revocation Url NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url Netscape Renewal Url NID_netscape_renewal_url Netscape CA Policy Url NID_netscape_ca_policy_url Netscape SSL Server Name NID_netscape_ssl_server_name Netscape Comment NID_netscape_comment =head2 Miscellaneous Certificate Extensions Strong Extranet ID NID_sxnet Proxy Certificate Information NID_proxyCertInfo =head2 PKIX CRL Extensions The following are CRL extensions from PKIX standards such as RFC5280. CRL Number NID_crl_number CRL Distribution Points NID_crl_distribution_points Delta CRL Indicator NID_delta_crl Freshest CRL NID_freshest_crl Invalidity Date NID_invalidity_date Issuing Distribution Point NID_issuing_distribution_point The following are CRL entry extensions from PKIX standards such as RFC5280. CRL Reason Code NID_crl_reason Certificate Issuer NID_certificate_issuer =head2 OCSP Extensions OCSP Nonce NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce OCSP CRL ID NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID Acceptable OCSP Responses NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses OCSP No Check NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck OCSP Archive Cutoff NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff OCSP Service Locator NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator Hold Instruction Code NID_hold_instruction_code =head2 Certificate Transparency Extensions The following extensions are used by certificate transparency, RFC6962 CT Precertificate SCTs NID_ct_precert_scts CT Certificate SCTs NID_ct_cert_scts =head1 RETURN VALUES X509V3_EXT_d2i() and *X509V3_get_d2i() return a pointer to an extension specific structure of B if an error occurs. X509V3_EXT_i2d() returns a pointer to an B structure or B if an error occurs. X509V3_add1_i2d() returns 1 if the operation is successful and 0 if it fails due to a non-fatal error (extension not found, already exists, cannot be encoded) or -1 due to a fatal error such as a memory allocation failure. X509_get0_extensions(), X509_CRL_get0_extensions() and X509_REVOKED_get0_extensions() return a stack of extensions. They return NULL if no extensions are present. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_get0_notBefore.pod0000644000000000000000000000653513176625660020246 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get0_notBefore, X509_getm_notBefore, X509_get0_notAfter, X509_getm_notAfter, X509_set1_notBefore, X509_set1_notAfter, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate, X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate, X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate - get or set certificate or CRL dates =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x); const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x); ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x); ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x); int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl); const ASN1_TIME *X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(const X509_CRL *crl); int X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_get0_notBefore() and X509_get0_notAfter() return the B and B fields of certificate B respectively. The value returned is an internal pointer which must not be freed up after the call. X509_getm_notBefore() and X509_getm_notAfter() are similar to X509_get0_notBefore() and X509_get0_notAfter() except they return non-constant mutable references to the associated date field of the certficate. X509_set1_notBefore() and X509_set1_notAfter() set the B and B fields of B to B. Ownership of the passed parameter B is not transferred by these functions so it must be freed up after the call. X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate() and X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate() return the B and B fields of B. The value returned is an internal pointer which must not be freed up after the call. If the B field is absent from B then B is returned. X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate() and X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate() set the B and B fields of B to B. Ownership of the passed parameter B is not transferred by these functions so it must be freed up after the call. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_get0_notBefore(), X509_get0_notAfter() and X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate() return a pointer to an B structure. X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate() return a pointer to an B structure or NULL if the B field is absent. X509_set1_notBefore(), X509_set1_notAfter(), X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate() and X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate() return 1 for success or 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY These functions are available in all versions of OpenSSL. X509_get_notBefore() and X509_get_notAfter() were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_f_null.pod0000644000000000000000000000162613176625660016623 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_f_null - null filter =head1 SYNOPSIS #include const BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_null(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_null() returns the null filter BIO method. This is a filter BIO that does nothing. All requests to a null filter BIO are passed through to the next BIO in the chain: this means that a BIO chain containing a null filter BIO behaves just as though the BIO was not there. =head1 NOTES As may be apparent a null filter BIO is not particularly useful. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_f_null() returns the null filter BIO method. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/d2i_DHparams.pod0000644000000000000000000000151313176625660017103 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME d2i_DHparams, i2d_DHparams - PKCS#3 DH parameter functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_DHparams(DH *a, unsigned char **pp); =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions decode and encode PKCS#3 DH parameters using the DHparameter structure described in PKCS#3. Otherwise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() described in the L manual page. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/HMAC.pod0000644000000000000000000001163613176625660015365 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME HMAC, HMAC_CTX_new, HMAC_CTX_reset, HMAC_CTX_free, HMAC_Init, HMAC_Init_ex, HMAC_Update, HMAC_Final, HMAC_CTX_copy, HMAC_CTX_set_flags, HMAC_CTX_get_md - HMAC message authentication code =head1 SYNOPSIS #include unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len, const unsigned char *d, int n, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *md_len); HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void); int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx); int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl); int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, int len); int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx); int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx); void HMAC_CTX_set_flags(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION HMAC is a MAC (message authentication code), i.e. a keyed hash function used for message authentication, which is based on a hash function. HMAC() computes the message authentication code of the B bytes at B using the hash function B and the key B which is B bytes long. It places the result in B (which must have space for the output of the hash function, which is no more than B bytes). If B is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array. The size of the output is placed in B, unless it is B. Note: passing a NULL value for B to use the static array is not thread safe. B can be EVP_sha1(), EVP_ripemd160() etc. HMAC_CTX_new() creates a new HMAC_CTX in heap memory. HMAC_CTX_reset() zeroes an existing B and associated resources, making it suitable for new computations as if it was newly created with HMAC_CTX_new(). HMAC_CTX_free() erases the key and other data from the B, releases any associated resources and finally frees the B itself. The following functions may be used if the message is not completely stored in memory: HMAC_Init() initializes a B structure to use the hash function B and the key B which is B bytes long. It is deprecated and only included for backward compatibility with OpenSSL 0.9.6b. HMAC_Init_ex() initializes or reuses a B structure to use the hash function B and key B. If both are NULL (or B is the same as the previous digest used by B and B is NULL) the existing key is reused. B must have been created with HMAC_CTX_new() before the first use of an B in this function. B. B If HMAC_Init_ex() is called with B NULL and B is not the same as the previous digest used by B then an error is returned because reuse of an existing key with a different digest is not supported. HMAC_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to be authenticated (B bytes at B). HMAC_Final() places the message authentication code in B, which must have space for the hash function output. HMAC_CTX_copy() copies all of the internal state from B into B. HMAC_CTX_set_flags() applies the specified flags to the internal EVP_MD_CTXs. These flags have the same meaning as for L. HMAC_CTX_get_md() returns the EVP_MD that has previously been set for the supplied HMAC_CTX. =head1 RETURN VALUES HMAC() returns a pointer to the message authentication code or NULL if an error occurred. HMAC_CTX_new() returns a pointer to a new B on success or B if an error occurred. HMAC_CTX_reset(), HMAC_Init_ex(), HMAC_Update(), HMAC_Final() and HMAC_CTX_copy() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. HMAC_CTX_get_md() return the EVP_MD previously set for the supplied HMAC_CTX or NULL if no EVP_MD has been set. =head1 CONFORMING TO RFC 2104 =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY HMAC_CTX_init() was replaced with HMAC_CTX_reset() in OpenSSL versions 1.1.0. HMAC_CTX_cleanup() existed in OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0. HMAC_CTX_new(), HMAC_CTX_free() and HMAC_CTX_get_md() are new in OpenSSL version 1.1.0. HMAC_Init_ex(), HMAC_Update() and HMAC_Final() did not return values in versions of OpenSSL before 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod0000644000000000000000000000317413176625660017006 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_new, EVP_PKEY_up_ref, EVP_PKEY_free - private key allocation functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void); int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *key); void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *key); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_new() function allocates an empty B structure which is used by OpenSSL to store private keys. The reference count is set to B<1>. EVP_PKEY_up_ref() increments the reference count of B. EVP_PKEY_free() decrements the reference count of B and, if the reference count is zero, frees it up. If B is NULL, nothing is done. =head1 NOTES The B structure is used by various OpenSSL functions which require a general private key without reference to any particular algorithm. The structure returned by EVP_PKEY_new() is empty. To add a private key to this empty structure the functions described in L should be used. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_new() returns either the newly allocated B structure or B if an error occurred. EVP_PKEY_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY EVP_PKEY_new() and EVP_PKEY_free() exist in all versions of OpenSSL. EVP_PKEY_up_ref() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod0000644000000000000000000000547513176625660017501 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME EVP_PKEY_derive_init, EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, EVP_PKEY_derive - derive public key algorithm shared secret =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer); int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP_PKEY_derive_init() function initializes a public key algorithm context using key B for shared secret derivation. The EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() function sets the peer key: this will normally be a public key. The EVP_PKEY_derive() derives a shared secret using B. If B is B then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the B parameter. If B is not B then before the call the B parameter should contain the length of the B buffer, if the call is successful the shared secret is written to B and the amount of data written to B. =head1 NOTES After the call to EVP_PKEY_derive_init() algorithm specific control operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operation. The function EVP_PKEY_derive() can be called more than once on the same context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_PKEY_derive_init() and EVP_PKEY_derive() return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. =head1 EXAMPLE Derive shared secret (for example DH or EC keys): #include #include EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; unsigned char *skey; size_t skeylen; EVP_PKEY *pkey, *peerkey; /* NB: assumes pkey, peerkey have been already set up */ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey); if (!ctx) /* Error occurred */ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) <= 0) /* Error */ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peerkey) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Determine buffer length */ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &skeylen) <= 0) /* Error */ skey = OPENSSL_malloc(skeylen); if (!skey) /* malloc failure */ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, skey, &skeylen) <= 0) /* Error */ /* Shared secret is skey bytes written to buffer skey */ =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, =head1 HISTORY These functions were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod0000644000000000000000000000336413176625660016606 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RAND_bytes, RAND_pseudo_bytes - generate random data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION RAND_bytes() puts B cryptographically strong pseudo-random bytes into B. An error occurs if the PRNG has not been seeded with enough randomness to ensure an unpredictable byte sequence. RAND_pseudo_bytes() has been deprecated. Users should use RAND_bytes() instead. RAND_pseudo_bytes() puts B pseudo-random bytes into B. Pseudo-random byte sequences generated by RAND_pseudo_bytes() will be unique if they are of sufficient length, but are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key generation etc. The contents of B is mixed into the entropy pool before retrieving the new pseudo-random bytes unless disabled at compile time (see FAQ). =head1 RETURN VALUES RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. The error code can be obtained by L. RAND_pseudo_bytes() returns 1 if the bytes generated are cryptographically strong, 0 otherwise. Both functions return -1 if they are not supported by the current RAND method. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/PEM_read_CMS.pod0000644000000000000000000000526613176625660016775 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DECLARE_PEM_rw, PEM_read_CMS, PEM_read_bio_CMS, PEM_write_CMS, PEM_write_bio_CMS, PEM_write_DHxparams, PEM_write_bio_DHxparams, PEM_read_ECPKParameters, PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters, PEM_write_ECPKParameters, PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters, PEM_read_ECPrivateKey, PEM_write_ECPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey, PEM_read_EC_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_EC_PUBKEY, PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_EC_PUBKEY, PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_read_PKCS8, PEM_read_bio_PKCS8, PEM_write_PKCS8, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8, PEM_write_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PEM_read_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PEM_read_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PEM_read_SSL_SESSION, PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION, PEM_write_SSL_SESSION, PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION - PEM object encoding routines =for comment generic =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DECLARE_PEM_rw(name, TYPE) TYPE *PEM_read_TYPE(FILE *fp, TYPE **a, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); TYPE *PEM_read_bio_TYPE(BIO *bp, TYPE **a, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); int PEM_write_TYPE(FILE *fp, const TYPE *a); int PEM_write_bio_TYPE(BIO *bp, const TYPE *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION In the description below, I is used as a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I. The macro B expands to the set of declarations shown in the next four lines of the synopsis. These routines convert between local instances of ASN1 datatypes and the PEM encoding. For more information on the templates, see L. For more information on the lower-level routines used by the functions here, see L. PEM_read_TYPE() reads a PEM-encoded object of I from the file B and returns it. The B and B parameters are as described in L. PEM_read_bio_TYPE() is similar to PEM_read_TYPE() but reads from the BIO B. PEM_write_TYPE() writes the PEM encoding of the object B to the file B. PEM_write_bio_TYPE() similarly writes to the BIO B. =head1 RETURN VALUES PEM_read_TYPE() and PEM_read_bio_TYPE() return a pointer to an allocated object, which should be released by calling TYPE_free(), or NULL on error. PEM_write_TYPE() and PEM_write_bio_TYPE() return the number of bytes written or zero on error. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_connect.pod0000644000000000000000000000667713176625660017010 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_socket, BIO_connect, BIO_listen, BIO_accept_ex, BIO_closesocket - BIO socket communication setup routines =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BIO_socket(int domain, int socktype, int protocol, int options); int BIO_connect(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options); int BIO_listen(int sock, const BIO_ADDR *addr, int options); int BIO_accept_ex(int accept_sock, BIO_ADDR *peer, int options); int BIO_closesocket(int sock); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_socket() creates a socket in the domain B, of type B and B. Socket B are currently unused, but is present for future use. BIO_connect() connects B to the address and service given by B. Connection B may be zero or any combination of B, B and B. The flags are described in L below. BIO_listen() has B start listening on the address and service given by B. Connection B may be zero or any combination of B, B, B, B and B. The flags are described in L below. BIO_accept_ex() waits for an incoming connections on the given socket B. When it gets a connection, the address and port of the peer gets stored in B if that one is non-NULL. Accept B may be zero or B, and is applied on the accepted socket. The flags are described in L below. BIO_closesocket() closes B. =head1 FLAGS =over 4 =item BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE Enables regular sending of keep-alive messages. =item BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK Sets the socket to non-blocking mode. =item BIO_SOCK_NODELAY Corresponds to B, and disables the Nagle algorithm. With this set, any data will be sent as soon as possible instead of being buffered until there's enough for the socket to send out in one go. =item BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR Try to reuse the address and port combination for a recently closed port. =item BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY When creating an IPv6 socket, make it only listen for IPv6 addresses and not IPv4 addresses mapped to IPv6. =back These flags are bit flags, so they are to be combined with the C<|> operator, for example: BIO_connect(sock, addr, BIO_SOCK_KEEPALIVE | BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK); =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_socket() returns the socket number on success or B (-1) on error. When an error has occurred, the OpenSSL error stack will hold the error data and errno has the system error. BIO_connect() and BIO_listen() return 1 on success or 0 on error. When an error has occurred, the OpenSSL error stack will hold the error data and errno has the system error. BIO_accept_ex() returns the accepted socket on success or B (-1) on error. When an error has occurred, the OpenSSL error stack will hold the error data and errno has the system error. =head1 HISTORY BIO_gethostname(), BIO_get_port(), BIO_get_host_ip(), BIO_get_accept_socket() and BIO_accept() are deprecated since OpenSSL 1.1. Use the functions described above instead. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_generate_key.pod0000644000000000000000000000306313176625660017665 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_generate_key, DH_compute_key - perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DH_generate_key(DH *dh); int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); =head1 DESCRIPTION DH_generate_key() performs the first step of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange by generating private and public DH values. By calling DH_compute_key(), these are combined with the other party's public value to compute the shared key. DH_generate_key() expects B to contain the shared parameters Bp> and Bg>. It generates a random private DH value unless Bpriv_key> is already set, and computes the corresponding public value Bpub_key>, which can then be published. DH_compute_key() computes the shared secret from the private DH value in B and the other party's public value in B and stores it in B. B must point to B bytes of memory. =head1 RETURN VALUES DH_generate_key() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. DH_compute_key() returns the size of the shared secret on success, -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_meth_new.pod0000644000000000000000000002213013176625660017141 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_meth_new, DSA_meth_free, DSA_meth_dup, DSA_meth_get0_name, DSA_meth_set1_name, DSA_meth_get_flags, DSA_meth_set_flags, DSA_meth_get0_app_data, DSA_meth_set0_app_data, DSA_meth_get_sign, DSA_meth_set_sign, DSA_meth_get_sign_setup, DSA_meth_set_sign_setup, DSA_meth_get_verify, DSA_meth_set_verify, DSA_meth_get_mod_exp, DSA_meth_set_mod_exp, DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp, DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, DSA_meth_get_init, DSA_meth_set_init, DSA_meth_get_finish, DSA_meth_set_finish, DSA_meth_get_paramgen, DSA_meth_set_paramgen, DSA_meth_get_keygen, DSA_meth_set_keygen - Routines to build up DSA methods =head1 SYNOPSIS #include DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_new(const char *name, int flags); void DSA_meth_free(DSA_METHOD *dsam); DSA_METHOD *DSA_meth_dup(const DSA_METHOD *meth); const char *DSA_meth_get0_name(const DSA_METHOD *dsam); int DSA_meth_set1_name(DSA_METHOD *dsam, const char *name); int DSA_meth_get_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam); int DSA_meth_set_flags(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int flags); void *DSA_meth_get0_app_data(const DSA_METHOD *dsam); int DSA_meth_set0_app_data(DSA_METHOD *dsam, void *app_data); DSA_SIG *(*DSA_meth_get_sign(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_sign(DSA_METHOD *dsam, DSA_SIG *(*sign) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_sign_setup(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **); int DSA_meth_set_sign_setup(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*sign_setup) (DSA *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **)); int (*DSA_meth_get_verify(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (const unsigned char *, int , DSA_SIG *, DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_verify(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*verify) (const unsigned char *, int, DSA_SIG *, DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); int DSA_meth_set_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)); int (*DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont); int DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*bn_mod_exp) (DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)); int (*DSA_meth_get_init(const DSA_METHOD *dsam))(DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_init(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*init)(DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_finish(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_finish(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*finish) (DSA *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_paramgen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *); int DSA_meth_set_paramgen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*paramgen) (DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, unsigned long *, BN_GENCB *)); int (*DSA_meth_get_keygen(const DSA_METHOD *dsam)) (DSA *); int DSA_meth_set_keygen(DSA_METHOD *dsam, int (*keygen) (DSA *)); =head1 DESCRIPTION The B type is a structure used for the provision of custom DSA implementations. It provides a set of of functions used by OpenSSL for the implementation of the various DSA capabilities. See the L page for more information. DSA_meth_new() creates a new B structure. It should be given a unique B and a set of B. The B should be a NULL terminated string, which will be duplicated and stored in the B object. It is the callers responsibility to free the original string. The flags will be used during the construction of a new B object based on this B. Any new B object will have those flags set by default. DSA_meth_dup() creates a duplicate copy of the B object passed as a parameter. This might be useful for creating a new B based on an existing one, but with some differences. DSA_meth_free() destroys a B structure and frees up any memory associated with it. DSA_meth_get0_name() will return a pointer to the name of this DSA_METHOD. This is a pointer to the internal name string and so should not be freed by the caller. DSA_meth_set1_name() sets the name of the DSA_METHOD to B. The string is duplicated and the copy is stored in the DSA_METHOD structure, so the caller remains responsible for freeing the memory associated with the name. DSA_meth_get_flags() returns the current value of the flags associated with this DSA_METHOD. DSA_meth_set_flags() provides the ability to set these flags. The functions DSA_meth_get0_app_data() and DSA_meth_set0_app_data() provide the ability to associate implementation specific data with the DSA_METHOD. It is the application's responsibility to free this data before the DSA_METHOD is freed via a call to DSA_meth_free(). DSA_meth_get_sign() and DSA_meth_set_sign() get and set the function used for creating a DSA signature respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DSA_do_sign() (or DSA_sign()). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DSA_do_sign(). DSA_meth_get_sign_setup() and DSA_meth_set_sign_setup() get and set the function used for precalculating the DSA signature values B and B. This function will be called in response to the application calling DSA_sign_setup(). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DSA_sign_setup(). DSA_meth_get_verify() and DSA_meth_set_verify() get and set the function used for verifying a DSA signature respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DSA_do_verify() (or DSA_verify()). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DSA_do_verify(). DSA_meth_get_mod_exp() and DSA_meth_set_mod_exp() get and set the function used for computing the following value: rr = a1^p1 * a2^p2 mod m This function will be called by the default OpenSSL method during verification of a DSA signature. The result is stored in the B parameter. This function may be NULL. DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp() and DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp() get and set the function used for computing the following value: r = a ^ p mod m This function will be called by the default OpenSSL function for DSA_sign_setup(). The result is stored in the B parameter. This function may be NULL. DSA_meth_get_init() and DSA_meth_set_init() get and set the function used for creating a new DSA instance respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DSA_new() (if the current default DSA_METHOD is this one) or DSA_new_method(). The DSA_new() and DSA_new_method() functions will allocate the memory for the new DSA object, and a pointer to this newly allocated structure will be passed as a parameter to the function. This function may be NULL. DSA_meth_get_finish() and DSA_meth_set_finish() get and set the function used for destroying an instance of a DSA object respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DSA_free(). A pointer to the DSA to be destroyed is passed as a parameter. The destroy function should be used for DSA implementation specific clean up. The memory for the DSA itself should not be freed by this function. This function may be NULL. DSA_meth_get_paramgen() and DSA_meth_set_paramgen() get and set the function used for generating DSA parameters respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DSA_generate_parameters_ex() (or DSA_generate_parameters()). The parameters for the function have the same meaning as for DSA_generate_parameters_ex(). DSA_meth_get_keygen() and DSA_meth_set_keygen() get and set the function used for generating a new DSA key pair respectively. This function will be called in response to the application calling DSA_generate_key(). The parameter for the function has the same meaning as for DSA_generate_key(). =head1 RETURN VALUES DSA_meth_new() and DSA_meth_dup() return the newly allocated DSA_METHOD object or NULL on failure. DSA_meth_get0_name() and DSA_meth_get_flags() return the name and flags associated with the DSA_METHOD respectively. All other DSA_meth_get_*() functions return the appropriate function pointer that has been set in the DSA_METHOD, or NULL if no such pointer has yet been set. DSA_meth_set1_name() and all DSA_meth_set_*() functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod0000644000000000000000000000404513176625660017425 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME SMIME_read_PKCS7 - parse S/MIME message =head1 SYNOPSIS #include PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *in, BIO **bcont); =head1 DESCRIPTION SMIME_read_PKCS7() parses a message in S/MIME format. B is a BIO to read the message from. If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in a memory bio which is written to B<*bcont>, otherwise B<*bcont> is set to B. The parsed PKCS#7 structure is returned or B if an error occurred. =head1 NOTES If B<*bcont> is not B then the message is clear text signed. B<*bcont> can then be passed to PKCS7_verify() with the B flag set. Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined using PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(), etc. To support future functionality if B is not B B<*bcont> should be initialized to B. For example: BIO *cont = NULL; PKCS7 *p7; p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont); =head1 BUGS The MIME parser used by SMIME_read_PKCS7() is somewhat primitive. While it will handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound formats may not work. The parser assumes that the PKCS7 structure is always base64 encoded and will not handle the case where it is in binary format or uses quoted printable format. The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size of message which can be processed due to memory restraints: a streaming single pass option should be available. =head1 RETURN VALUES SMIME_read_PKCS7() returns a valid B structure or B is an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2002-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod0000644000000000000000000000524613176625660020620 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME RAND_set_rand_method, RAND_get_rand_method, RAND_OpenSSL - select RAND method =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth); const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void); RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION A B specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for random number generation. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware RNGs may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for important information about how these RAND API functions are affected by the use of B API calls. Initially, the default RAND_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by RAND_OpenSSL(). RAND_set_default_method() makes B the method for PRNG use. B: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for RAND, so this function is no longer recommended. RAND_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current RAND_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependent on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. =head1 THE RAND_METHOD STRUCTURE typedef struct rand_meth_st { void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num); int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num); void (*cleanup)(void); void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, int entropy); int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num); int (*status)(void); } RAND_METHOD; The components point to method implementations used by (or called by), in order, RAND_seed(), RAND_bytes(), internal RAND cleanup, RAND_add(), RAND_pseudo_rand() and RAND_status(). Each component may be NULL if the function is not implemented. =head1 RETURN VALUES RAND_set_rand_method() returns no value. RAND_get_rand_method() and RAND_OpenSSL() return pointers to the respective methods. =head1 NOTES RAND_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other algorithmic APIs (eg. RSA_METHOD, EVP_CIPHER, etc) in B modules. If a default ENGINE is specified for RAND functionality using an ENGINE API function, that will override any RAND defaults set using the RAND API (ie. RAND_set_rand_method()). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way to control default implementations for use in RAND and other cryptographic algorithms. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod0000644000000000000000000000447613176625660016164 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand, BN_rand_range, BN_pseudo_rand_range - generate pseudo-random number =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of B in length and stores it in B. If B is less than zero, or too small to accommodate the requirements specified by the B and B parameters, an error is returned. The B parameters specifies requirements on the most significant bit of the generated number. If it is B, there is no constraint. If it is B, the top bit must be one. If it is B, the two most significant bits of the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random numbers will always have 2*B length. If B is B, the number will be odd; if it is B it can be odd or even. If B is 1 then B cannot also be B. BN_pseudo_rand() does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key generation etc. BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number B in the range 0 E= B E B. BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(), and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable. The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_rand() or BN_rand_range(). =head1 RETURN VALUES The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DES_random_key.pod0000644000000000000000000003330513176625660017475 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DES_random_key, DES_set_key, DES_key_sched, DES_set_key_checked, DES_set_key_unchecked, DES_set_odd_parity, DES_is_weak_key, DES_ecb_encrypt, DES_ecb2_encrypt, DES_ecb3_encrypt, DES_ncbc_encrypt, DES_cfb_encrypt, DES_ofb_encrypt, DES_pcbc_encrypt, DES_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ofb64_encrypt, DES_xcbc_encrypt, DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt, DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt, DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt, DES_cbc_cksum, DES_quad_cksum, DES_string_to_key, DES_string_to_2keys, DES_fcrypt, DES_crypt - DES encryption =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret); int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key); int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key); void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc); void DES_ecb2_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, int enc); void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc); void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec); void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); void DES_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num); void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, const_DES_cblock *inw, const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc); void DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); void DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num); void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num); DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, const_DES_cblock *ivec); DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[], long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed); void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key); void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1, DES_cblock *key2); char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret); char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt); =head1 DESCRIPTION This library contains a fast implementation of the DES encryption algorithm. There are two phases to the use of DES encryption. The first is the generation of a I from a key, the second is the actual encryption. A DES key is of type I. This type is consists of 8 bytes with odd parity. The least significant bit in each byte is the parity bit. The key schedule is an expanded form of the key; it is used to speed the encryption process. DES_random_key() generates a random key. The PRNG must be seeded prior to using this function (see L). If the PRNG could not generate a secure key, 0 is returned. Before a DES key can be used, it must be converted into the architecture dependent I via the DES_set_key_checked() or DES_set_key_unchecked() function. DES_set_key_checked() will check that the key passed is of odd parity and is not a weak or semi-weak key. If the parity is wrong, then -1 is returned. If the key is a weak key, then -2 is returned. If an error is returned, the key schedule is not generated. DES_set_key() works like DES_set_key_checked() if the I flag is non-zero, otherwise like DES_set_key_unchecked(). These functions are available for compatibility; it is recommended to use a function that does not depend on a global variable. DES_set_odd_parity() sets the parity of the passed I to odd. DES_is_weak_key() returns 1 if the passed key is a weak key, 0 if it is ok. The following routines mostly operate on an input and output stream of Is. DES_ecb_encrypt() is the basic DES encryption routine that encrypts or decrypts a single 8-byte I in I (ECB) mode. It always transforms the input data, pointed to by I, into the output data, pointed to by the I argument. If the I argument is non-zero (DES_ENCRYPT), the I (cleartext) is encrypted in to the I (ciphertext) using the key_schedule specified by the I argument, previously set via I. If I is zero (DES_DECRYPT), the I (now ciphertext) is decrypted into the I (now cleartext). Input and output may overlap. DES_ecb_encrypt() does not return a value. DES_ecb3_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts the I block by using three-key Triple-DES encryption in ECB mode. This involves encrypting the input with I, decrypting with the key schedule I, and then encrypting with I. This routine greatly reduces the chances of brute force breaking of DES and has the advantage of if I, I and I are the same, it is equivalent to just encryption using ECB mode and I as the key. The macro DES_ecb2_encrypt() is provided to perform two-key Triple-DES encryption by using I for the final encryption. DES_ncbc_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts using the I (CBC) mode of DES. If the I argument is non-zero, the routine cipher-block-chain encrypts the cleartext data pointed to by the I argument into the ciphertext pointed to by the I argument, using the key schedule provided by the I argument, and initialization vector provided by the I argument. If the I argument is not an integral multiple of eight bytes, the last block is copied to a temporary area and zero filled. The output is always an integral multiple of eight bytes. DES_xcbc_encrypt() is RSA's DESX mode of DES. It uses I and I to 'whiten' the encryption. I and I are secret (unlike the iv) and are as such, part of the key. So the key is sort of 24 bytes. This is much better than CBC DES. DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt() implements outer triple CBC DES encryption with three keys. This means that each DES operation inside the CBC mode is an C. This mode is used by SSL. The DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt() macro implements two-key Triple-DES by reusing I for the final encryption. C. This form of Triple-DES is used by the RSAREF library. DES_pcbc_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using the propagating cipher block chaining mode used by Kerberos v4. Its parameters are the same as DES_ncbc_encrypt(). DES_cfb_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using cipher feedback mode. This method takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the I variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs a complete DES ECB encryption per I, this function is only suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters. DES_cfb64_encrypt() implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback. Why is this useful you ask? Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding. Each call to this routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec and num. num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. If this does not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-). DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt() and DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() is the same as DES_cfb64_encrypt() except that Triple-DES is used. DES_ofb_encrypt() encrypts using output feedback mode. This method takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the I variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs a complete DES ECB encryption per numbits, this function is only suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters. DES_ofb64_encrypt() is the same as DES_cfb64_encrypt() using Output Feed Back mode. DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt() and DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt() is the same as DES_ofb64_encrypt(), using Triple-DES. The following functions are included in the DES library for compatibility with the MIT Kerberos library. DES_cbc_cksum() produces an 8 byte checksum based on the input stream (via CBC encryption). The last 4 bytes of the checksum are returned and the complete 8 bytes are placed in I. This function is used by Kerberos v4. Other applications should use L etc. instead. DES_quad_cksum() is a Kerberos v4 function. It returns a 4 byte checksum from the input bytes. The algorithm can be iterated over the input, depending on I, 1, 2, 3 or 4 times. If I is non-NULL, the 8 bytes generated by each pass are written into I. The following are DES-based transformations: DES_fcrypt() is a fast version of the Unix crypt(3) function. This version takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast crypt() implementations. This is different to the normal crypt in that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value is written into. It needs to be at least 14 bytes long. This function is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt. DES_crypt() is a faster replacement for the normal system crypt(). This function calls DES_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the third parameter. This mostly emulates the normal non-thread-safe semantics of crypt(3). The B must be two ASCII characters. DES_enc_write() writes I bytes to file descriptor I from buffer I. The data is encrypted via I (default) using I for the key and I as a starting vector. The actual data send down I consists of 4 bytes (in network byte order) containing the length of the following encrypted data. The encrypted data then follows, padded with random data out to a multiple of 8 bytes. =head1 BUGS DES_3cbc_encrypt() is flawed and must not be used in applications. DES_cbc_encrypt() does not modify B; use DES_ncbc_encrypt() instead. DES_cfb_encrypt() and DES_ofb_encrypt() operates on input of 8 bits. What this means is that if you set numbits to 12, and length to 2, the first 12 bits will come from the 1st input byte and the low half of the second input byte. The second 12 bits will have the low 8 bits taken from the 3rd input byte and the top 4 bits taken from the 4th input byte. The same holds for output. This function has been implemented this way because most people will be using a multiple of 8 and because once you get into pulling bytes input bytes apart things get ugly! DES_string_to_key() is available for backward compatibility with the MIT library. New applications should use a cryptographic hash function. The same applies for DES_string_to_2key(). =head1 NOTES The B library was written to be source code compatible with the MIT Kerberos library. Applications should use the higher level functions L etc. instead of calling these functions directly. Single-key DES is insecure due to its short key size. ECB mode is not suitable for most applications; see L. =head1 HISTORY The requirement that the B parameter to DES_crypt() and DES_fcrypt() be two ASCII characters was first enforced in OpenSSL 1.1.0. Previous versions tried to use the letter uppercase B if both character were not present, and could crash when given non-ASCII on some platforms. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/X509_get_subject_name.pod0000644000000000000000000000524113176625660020673 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME X509_get_subject_name, X509_set_subject_name, X509_get_issuer_name, X509_set_issuer_name, X509_REQ_get_subject_name, X509_REQ_set_subject_name, X509_CRL_get_issuer, X509_CRL_set_issuer_name - get and set issuer or subject names =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *x); int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *x); int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME *X509_REQ_get_subject_name(const X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *req, X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME *X509_CRL_get_issuer(const X509_CRL *crl); int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name); =head1 DESCRIPTION X509_get_subject_name() returns the subject name of certificate B. The returned value is an internal pointer which B be freed. X509_set_subject_name() sets the issuer name of certificate B to B. The B parameter is copied internally and should be freed up when it is no longer needed. X509_get_issuer_name() and X509_set_issuer_name() are identical to X509_get_subject_name() and X509_set_subject_name() except the get and set the issuer name of B. Similarly X509_REQ_get_subject_name(), X509_REQ_set_subject_name(), X509_CRL_get_issuer() and X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() get or set the subject or issuer names of certificate requests of CRLs respectively. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_get_subject_name(), X509_get_issuer_name(), X509_REQ_get_subject_name() and X509_CRL_get_issuer() return an B pointer. X509_set_subject_name(), X509_set_issuer_name(), X509_REQ_set_subject_name() and X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. =head1 HISTORY X509_REQ_get_subject_name() is a function in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and a macro in earlier versions. X509_CRL_get_issuer() is a function in OpenSSL 1.1.0. It was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 as a macro. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod0000644000000000000000000000431713176625660016302 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DSA_sign, DSA_sign_setup, DSA_verify - DSA signatures =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa); int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa); =head1 DESCRIPTION DSA_sign() computes a digital signature on the B byte message digest B using the private key B and places its ASN.1 DER encoding at B. The length of the signature is places in *B. B must point to DSA_size(B) bytes of memory. DSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute part of the signing operation in case signature generation is time-critical. It expects B to contain DSA parameters. It places the precomputed values in newly allocated Bs at *B and *B, after freeing the old ones unless *B and *B are NULL. These values may be passed to DSA_sign() in Bkinv> and Br>. B is a pre-allocated B or NULL. DSA_verify() verifies that the signature B of size B matches a given message digest B of size B. B is the signer's public key. The B parameter is ignored. The PRNG must be seeded before DSA_sign() (or DSA_sign_setup()) is called. =head1 RETURN VALUES DSA_sign() and DSA_sign_setup() return 1 on success, 0 on error. DSA_verify() returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 CONFORMING TO US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186 (Digital Signature Standard, DSS), ANSI X9.30 =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod0000644000000000000000000000240113176625660020625 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off); int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off); =head1 DESCRIPTION The ECPKParameters represent the public parameters for an B structure, which represents a curve. The ECPKParameters_print() and ECPKParameters_print_fp() functions print a human-readable output of the public parameters of the EC_GROUP to B or B. The output lines are indented by B spaces. =head1 RETURN VALUES ECPKParameters_print() and ECPKParameters_print_fp() return 1 for success and 0 if an error occurs. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/BIO_new_CMS.pod0000644000000000000000000000456213176625660016641 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME BIO_new_CMS - CMS streaming filter BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS #include BIO *BIO_new_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_new_CMS() returns a streaming filter BIO chain based on B. The output of the filter is written to B. Any data written to the chain is automatically translated to a BER format CMS structure of the appropriate type. =head1 NOTES The chain returned by this function behaves like a standard filter BIO. It supports non blocking I/O. Content is processed and streamed on the fly and not all held in memory at once: so it is possible to encode very large structures. After all content has been written through the chain BIO_flush() must be called to finalise the structure. The B flag must be included in the corresponding B parameter of the B creation function. If an application wishes to write additional data to B BIOs should be removed from the chain using BIO_pop() and freed with BIO_free() until B is reached. If no additional data needs to be written BIO_free_all() can be called to free up the whole chain. Any content written through the filter is used verbatim: no canonical translation is performed. It is possible to chain multiple BIOs to, for example, create a triple wrapped signed, enveloped, signed structure. In this case it is the applications responsibility to set the inner content type of any outer CMS_ContentInfo structures. Large numbers of small writes through the chain should be avoided as this will produce an output consisting of lots of OCTET STRING structures. Prepending a BIO_f_buffer() buffering BIO will prevent this. =head1 BUGS There is currently no corresponding inverse BIO: i.e. one which can decode a CMS structure on the fly. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_new_CMS() returns a BIO chain when successful or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY BIO_new_CMS() was added to OpenSSL 1.0.0 =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut openssl-1.1.0g/doc/crypto/DH_generate_parameters.pod0000644000000000000000000000721413176625660021242 0ustar rootroot=pod =head1 NAME DH_generate_parameters_ex, DH_generate_parameters, DH_check, DH_check_params - generate and check Diffie-Hellman parameters =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb); int DH_check(DH *dh, int *codes); int DH_check_params(DH *dh, int *codes); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION DH_generate_parameters_ex() generates Diffie-Hellman parameters that can be shared among a group of users, and stores them in the provided B structure. The pseudo-random number generator must be seeded prior to calling DH_generate_parameters(). B is the length in bits of the safe prime to be generated. B is a small number E 1, typically 2 or 5. A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress of the key generation. If B is not B, it will be called as described in L while a random prime number is generated, and when a prime has been found, B is called. See L for information on the BN_GENCB_call() function. DH_check_params() confirms that the B